

now stands. This book is a special bonus for those who research the Cold War in Asia, which is so often neglected in favour of the standoff in Europe. The same readers, regardless of any eschewing of anti-communist propaganda of the Cold War period, will find Luce a kind of hero as well, for here was a man who clearly loved Asia (at least China) and always kept it at the centre of his thinking. The present volume is also highly recommended reading for those who want an inside look at one 'theatre' (the journalistic front) of the early Cold War.

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GEOFFREY PARKER (ed.):

*The Cambridge History of Warfare.*

viii, 515 pp. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005. £13.99.

The present volume is divided into nineteen chapters with an introduction and epilogue, covering developments in warfare from Ancient Greece to the Gulf Wars. Geoffrey Parker, the editor, contributed the introduction and conclusion, as well as three chapters (6, 7, and 9) and a chapter (17) co-written by Parker and Williamson A. Murray. Other contributors include Victor Davis Hanson (chapters 1–3), Bernard S. Bachrach (4), Christopher Allmand (5), Patricia Seed (8), John A. Lynn (10 and 11), and Williamson A. Murray (12–16). The volume is rounded off with useful supplementary material including a lengthy chronology and a glossary.

The *Cambridge History of Warfare* amounts to a more than satisfactory survey of the origins and development of Western warfare. There is a healthy balance between specific details (provided with substantial economy) and general trends, and the reader is not dragged through meticulous descriptions of weaponry or repetitious biographical sketches of great conquerors (although with occasional emphasis on a few key actors such as Bismarck and Sheridan). Space does not allow a regurgitation of the myriad topics examined in the volume. Nevertheless, one topic that is particularly well handled across many of the chapters is the long, twisting evolution of fortifications which, after minimal change for a thousand years from the late Roman period, underwent substantial change in response to the impact of firearms. Interestingly, fortifications built by Europeans abroad were first arranged to defend against sea attacks by other Europeans, rather than hostile advances by indigenous forces from the hinterland. Attention to new Italian fortress designs after the introduction of firearms and later by French engineers is presented in the context of necessary manpower. As fortifications became better and more easily defended, it increased exponentially the number of troops required to bring a siege to fruition, leading to innovations in siege technology and tactics to reduce the commitment of troops and expense associated with such a campaign.

Nevertheless, the volume's coverage is limited mainly to the West. Developments outside of Europe and North America are limited mainly to those cases where and when Europeans brought their ships and guns to carve out

colonies. The native North Americans, the Aztecs, and Incas do appear in Seeds' chapter, 'The Conquest of the Americas', as well as Sudanese, the Zulus and the Vietnamese, among others (the Japanese expansion of World War II is provided, but their military was built on the Western model), in later chapters, but only as representatives of new challenges to European invaders and technology. The editor acknowledges this problem in the preface, but offers three reasons for the European focus: (1) a single volume on military history could not possibly cover the entire world satisfactorily; (2) a brief notice of non-Western developments in the context of an overwhelming focus on the West would present a great distortion; and (3) regardless of competing traditions, Western warfare did win the globe in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Hence, the 'rise and development of this dominant tradition, together with the secret of its success' deserves 'examination and analysis' (p. vii). One would expect that if this is the case the volume should have been entitled *The Cambridge History of European Warfare* or at least retained the earlier subtitle of *The Triumph of the West* for, in its present form, the title is very misleading.

No-one disagrees that Western warfare is worthy of examination, but one wonders if this story needs to be told yet again (European military success is, after all, a far from neglected theme in the literature and the coverage here, especially in the second half of the volume is very familiar ground indeed) at the expense of the rest of the world. The space devoted to the emergence of Western warfare in the present volume could have been substantially reduced to provide room for non-Western developments. Perhaps, a good beginning could have been made with at least one chapter on non-Western warfare, contrary to Parker's initial suggestion, to allow the non-Western world some space in their own history. Regarding Parker's third justification, the present reviewer has reservations as to whether the success of the West can really be understood without a more thorough investigation of how indigenous warfare emerged and why, in numerous encounters, Western warfare failed. The ability of the Burmese to delay the British advance in the First Anglo-Burmese War, the length of time it took to conclude the Java War, the much longer Aceh war, and a significant Dutch defeat in Bali in the mid-nineteenth century, all stress the need to understand the inadequacy of European armies in dealing with indigenous armies at the time and how Europeans were forced to develop new tactics and strategies, sometimes drawing upon indigenous technologies and tactics to do so. Further, as indigenous armies adapted themselves to Western warfare, many 'Westernized' indigenous armies fell very quickly and easily to European forces in the late nineteenth century. Afterwards, however, their rural (and hill) compatriots were able to hold off the Europeans for many years by falling back on indigenous tactics and technology.

Within the limited, Western, scope of the volume, the treatment of developments in warfare is scholarly and makes for a very rewarding read. Its arrangement and fine balance between details and narrative flow make it especially suitable for classroom instruction at the undergraduate and postgraduate levels. Indeed, the present reviewer expects to include this as supplementary reading in his own warfare course to cover warfare beyond the confines of Asia. The volume is thus recommended for researchers and students of warfare with the caveat that some supplementary reading on non-Western warfare should be undertaken if one desires a full and balanced understanding of the history of warfare on a global scale.

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