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Real Time Fault Detection and Diagnostics Using FPGA-Based Architecture

Nathan P. Naber

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REAL TIME FAULT DETECTION AND DIAGNOSTICS

USING FPGA-BASED ARCHITECTURES

THESIS

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AFIT/GCE/ENG/10-04

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THESIS

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In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the
Degree of Master of Science in Computer Engineering

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
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
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Abstract

Errors within circuits caused by radiation continue to be an important concern to developers. A new methodology of real time fault detection and diagnostics utilizing FPGA based architectures while under radiation were investigated in this research. The contributions of this research are focused on three areas; a full test platform to evaluate a circuit while under irradiation, an algorithm to detect and diagnose fault locations within a circuit, and finally to characterize Triple Design Triple Modular Redundancy (TDTMR), a new form of TMR. Five different test setups, injected fault test, gamma radiation test, thermal radiation test, optical laser test, and optical flash test, were used to assess the effectiveness of these three research goals.

The testing platform was constructed with two FPGA boards, the Device Under Test (DUT) and the controller board, to generate and evaluate specific vector sets sent to the DUT. The testing platform combines a myriad of testing and measuring equipment and work hours onto one small reprogrammable and reusable FPGA. This device was able to be used in multiple test setups. The controlling logic can be interchanged to test multiple circuit designs under various forms of radiation.

The detection and diagnostic algorithm was designed to determine fault locations in real time. The algorithm used for diagnosing the fault location uses inverse deductive elimination. By using test generation tools, fault lists were developed. The fault lists were used to narrow \ the possible fault locations within the circuit. The algorithm is able to detect single stuck at faults based on these lists. The algorithm can also detect multiple output errors but not able to diagnose multiple stuck at faults in real time.

TDTMR utilized three unique forms of logic rather than having three copies of identical circuitry. The three different adder designs used for this research are a behavioral adder, carry look ahead adder, and ripple carry adder.

Based on the five tests, the testing platform operated successfully. The detection and diagnosis algorithm was able to detect errors. The injected fault test was the only test that was able to properly diagnosis the location of the fault. The results also unexpectedly showed that the voting unit failed before any of the adders while under radiation. Dose rate versus total dose has a differing effect on the DUT. The goals of this research was met by completing a fully interchangeable and operational testing platform, an algorithm that detects and diagnosis errors in real time, and an initial evaluation of TDTMR.

To My Uncle
For always pushing me toward
higher learning

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List of Symbols and Acronyms

ASIC	Application Specific Integrated Circuit
ATPG	Automatic Test Pattern Generation
C	Celsius
CLB	Configurable Logic Blocks
CMOS	Complementary Metal Oxide Semiconductor
Co	Cobalt
COTS	Commercial Off The Shelf
DUT	Device-Under-Test
EMI	Electro Magnetic Interface
FPGA	Field Programmable Gate Array
FTMR	Functional Triple Modular Redundancy
MBU	Multiple Bit Upset
MOS	Metal Oxide Semiconductor
NRL	Nuclear Research Lab
OSU	Ohio State University
OSUNRL	Ohio State University Nuclear Research Lab
PTMR	Partial Triple Modular Redundancy
SEB	Single Event Burnout
SEE	Single Event Effect
SEL	Single Event Latch-up
SEU	Single Event Upset
Si	Silicon
STMR	Selective Triple Modular Redundancy
TID	Total Ionizing Dose
TDTMR	Triple Design TMR
TMR	Triple Modular Redundancy
V	Volts
VHDL	VHSIC Hardware Description Language
W	Watt

REAL TIME FAULT DETECTION AND DIAGNOSTICS USING FPGA-BASED ARCHITECTURES

I. Introduction

Electronics and technology continue to dominate the market and play an indispensable role in space exploration. Space, while seemingly benign, is both volatile and chaotic. To study such a vast, unknown area, man has launched satellites, space shuttles, and telescopes out into space to gather more information about this unfamiliar place. These machines and devices contain a vast array of electronics. Terrestrial electronics are largely protected from the effects of radiation, not so in space.

Circuits and transistors endure a lot of stress in the harsh space environment. The study of electronics in this environment is crucial for their reliable operation. The effects of radiation on electronics are a principle concern. The current technique for protecting electronics in space is to make them “Radiation Hardened”. While this brute force method is effective, a cheaper, more effective means of combating radiation effects is always desirable.

A Field-Programmable Gate Array (FPGAs) is an integrated circuit with the versatility to be reprogrammed for multiple applications. A design utilizing FPGAs offers both cost cutting and time-saving advantages over a design utilizing a conventional Application-Specific Integrated Circuit (ASIC) [23]. Thus, FPGAs are increasingly being considered for various new device applications throughout the commercial business world.

1.1 Motivation

Newer technologies are increasingly being developed on FPGAs due to their low costs and increased performance results over traditional ASIC devices. Space radiation has the potential of producing errors at the transistor level of electrical devices [1]. The current methods to combat these conditions and minimize the overall damage due to errors are to use radiation

hardened ASIC or programmable logic devices found within FPGAs. Radiation hardened devices are not 100% effective and they are expensive [3]. Commercial FPGAs have been investigated as a cheaper means of electrical devices in space; however, they are not radiation hardened [2, 3].

In an effort to combat this problem, computer models and real simulations have been used to demonstrate the impacts of errors through various forms of radiation on specific components of commercial FPGAs in addition to the FPGA itself. It is still difficult to characterize the effects of radiation on electronics. An FPGA offers the versatility in creating a platform to characterize and evaluate the damaging effects of radiation. A test platform cuts the cost of having all the necessary measuring tools to evaluate a circuit.

An issue that has not been carefully investigated is attempting to locate and diagnose specific faults within a circuit in real time. Testing circuits is a challenging undertaking and attempting to diagnose the location of error presents an even greater challenge. Obtaining the ability to locate errors in real time can aid in the understanding and classification of radiation effects. A better understanding of these effects can lead to better counter measures and error prevention techniques for protecting circuits from these errors.

Design logic and hardened by design both have been used in an effort to correct errors while in a space environment. Various methods have been proven more effective than others and Triple Modular Redundancy (TMR) has shown to be an effective fault redundancy method in error correction [3-6]. Further investigation in improving TMR can demonstrate the importance of fault redundancy in integrated circuits.

1.2 Scope

Research in this thesis will focus on the continuation of the topic of radiation effects on

electronics. Several forms of radiation are used in this research: a ^{60}Co gamma cell (providing ionizing radiation only), thermal radiation, and optical radiation. The two FPGA boards chosen in this research are the Virtex-II-Pro and the FX12 mini module series both manufactured by Xilinx. The testing platform will enable researchers to utilize it in other forms of radiation not employed in this thesis.

1.3 Contributions

The overarching goal of this research was to characterize the effects of different radiation forms on integrated circuits. The research facilitates the potential replacement of physically hardened ASIC and FPGA devices, as well as allow for improvements in designs of non-radiation hardened electronics.

A test platform was developed in an effort to establish a base system that has the potential to be used in various forms of radiation with multiple circuit designs. The test platform utilizes a bridge board with ribbon cables to perform proper communication between the two FPGAs. This design offered significant improvement from the previous Ethernet cable design [17]. The testing platform provides the ability to generate a number of input vectors, monitor the values that would be sent to the DUT, and analyze the resulting data.

Along with this testing platform, an algorithm was developed to diagnose and locate the faults within the circuit. Upon uncovering an error within the circuit, the device locates which circuit design's output was faulty and switches to a real-time diagnostic mode. The circuit undergoes a series of test and diagnostic vectors designed to pin point the exact stuck at fault location within the integrated circuit with the best resolution possible without physically destroying the chip. The testing platform helps validate the diagnosis algorithm on the FPGA while under various radiation environments.

Finally, the research performed in this thesis attempts to demonstrate whether design-hardening techniques can reduce system vulnerability to external errors. A new architecture design and programming model was implemented to increase detection, correction and tolerance of failures furthering the potential uses for FPGAs in the callous space radiation environments. Triple Design TMR (TDTMR) was implemented into the logic in an effort to correct errors without causing downtime in the circuit. Instead of the traditional three copies of the same circuit design in TMR, a unique approach of having different design implementations of the same circuit was used. This new method demonstrates that different design logic could be more robust under the effects of radiation instead of having the same copy of the design three times. This implementation hopes to improve the ability to correct these errors without needing to reprogram the entire microelectronic device.

The contributions of this work include an analysis of commercial off the shelf (COTS) reconfigurable electronics in radiation environments over the current use of radiation hardened devices. Overall, the main contributions of this work are as follows:

1. Design a test platform utilizing a FPGA module that could send, receive, and process data while under radiation.
2. Real-time diagnostics to uncover an error and pinpoint its location with the best resolution in the quickest manner.
3. Utilizing design hardening techniques in a commercial FPGA with TDTMR.

1.4 Thesis Organization

The work performed on this thesis can be broken up to five main sections. Following this introduction is background information on the topic and its related sources. The background

covers radiation effects on electronics, current TMR methods used with circuit design, and testing platforms.

Chapter 3 discusses the methodology used to formulate an optimal solution for the research work performed on this topic. It also further discusses the design choices chosen for the particular implementation used to complete the project. Chapter 4 covers the results obtained through the methodology and a critical analysis of them. Finally, chapter 5 serves to summarize and conclude the relevant work achieved through this thesis. It further discusses possible future research within this area.

II. Background

2.1 Chapter Overview

This section describes key areas of background information related to the topic of this thesis. Information on FPGAs, TMR, Fault detection and correction, radiation effects on electronics, and radiation sources are covered in this chapter. A set of improvements made on TMR are also described. There are many forms of radiation effects on electronics but Total Dose Effect, Single Event Effects, and Single Event Upsets are only explained. The gamma and thermal radiation sources are also described in this chapter.

2.2 Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGA)

Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs) are increasingly demanded by circuit designers from all fields due to their high flexibility to meet multiple requirements such as high performance, low costs, and the capability of on the fly reprogramming. FPGAs have been known to be slower, less energy efficient, and generally achieve less functionality than their fixed ASIC counterparts. However, the decreasing costs and development time needed to implement FPGAs compared to designs using discrete logic devices have made programmable logic devices favorable in space and avionic applications as well [7]. These forms of integrated circuits contain an array of Configurable Logic Blocks (CLBs) and programmable interconnects in the circuit that allows the connection of different gates and structures. CLBs are made of basic elements which include look-up tables, multiplexers, and flip flops along with routing logic, pass transistors, and I/O pads. Each CLB can implement any Boolean function of its inputs and can be linked together via routing blocks to implement more complex logic. The CLBs are interconnected through a general routing matrix that comprises an array of routing switches located at the intersections of horizontal and vertical routing channels [8].

FPGA devices have been used in space for more than a decade with a mixed level of success; however, recently few reprogrammable devices have been used on spacecraft due to their sensitivity to involuntary reconfiguration due to Single Event Upsets (SEU) [4]. Space electronic designers are now more willing to utilize FPGAs in high radiation environments in place of radiation hardened devices. They perform well in high throughput signal processing applications often used in space. With the rising costs of radiation hardened devices, research into utilizing FPGAs for hardened by design testing has grown significantly.

As previously mentioned, despite the growth of FPGA development, they still remain susceptible to radiation errors. Since FPGAs store their programming data, or configuration in an SRAM-like configuration memory, radiation can actually alter the intended circuit [6]. The static memory elements and combinatorial logic paths are susceptible to upset from heavy ion particles within the space environment. Protection of the combinatorial logic is therefore required to avoid involuntary changes of functionality. It has been important to develop some form of mitigation techniques to account for these errors to ensure reliable operation.

It is important to note that even though the growing use of FPGAs in space and radiation environments are rapidly expanding, radiation induced errors provide a significant hindrance on performance. New strategies have been implemented to help foster the growing field of FPGAs in the space environment through hardened by design rather than radiation hardened. These mitigation strategies of correcting the effects of radiation errors lead the way for this particular research along with other research in this field.

2.3 Triple Modular Redundancy (TMR)

Recently, several TMR methods have been introduced in an effort to reliably combat the persistent problem of errors in integrated circuits. Some of the methods have been more

promising than others. The method chosen for this study of TMR was the technique of design hardening also categorized as fault redundancy and correction.

TMR has been widely used as a form of design hardening to greatly improve the reliability of FPGA designs to mitigate an upset as it occurs in the device configuration. TMR has been shown to greatly improve the reliability of FPGA designs subject to SEUs [2]. This mitigation technique traditionally uses three identical copies of a circuit which would run in parallel. The outputs would then go through a majority voter circuit. If there would be an error on one of the bits in one circuit, the TMR votes out the error. To improve the basic concept of TMR, a few design enhancement steps were made on the simple three circuit and voter layout (Figure 1).




Figure 1 – Basic TMR

The first addition was to expand the one bit voter layout shown in Figure 2 and triplicate the voter unit so there would no longer be a single point of failure (Figure 3). This application significantly reduces the configuration sensitivity of the design [2].




Figure 2 – TMR Circuit Diagram




Figure 3 – TMR with Triplicated Voter

It was shown that these two designs suffer from resynchronization problems [3] meaning if a faulty bit is ‘repaired’ in one of the voting logic, that bit would not be synchronized with the other two copies of logic. By needing to correct the bit, a slight delay is introduced which compounded over time may cause a synchronization issue. This problem can be prevented by placing the voting circuitry within the feedback path of the circuit [3]. The simple addition helped prevent synchronization problems and increased the reliability of the circuit (Figure 4). Each of these designs was tested on their reliability with preventing SEUs. Table 1 depicts the results from a series of tests on four different TMR designs.

Table 1 – Evaluation Results of TMR Designs

Design	Simple Incrementer			Up/Down Loadable Counter		
(single clock)	LUTs	Failures	Speed(MHz)	LUTs	Failures	Speed (MHz)
No Redundancy	8	446	220	10	463	220
1 Voter	35(~4x)	410	217(99%)	41(~4x)	484	217(99%)
3 Voters	51(~6x)	14	199(91%)	57(~6x)	14	213(97%)
Feedback	51(~6x)	14	160(73%)	57(~6x)	15	157(72%)
Map Feedback	27(~3x)	15	194(88%)	N/A		




Figure 4 – TMR Design with Feedback

Some recent design enchantments with TMR have been developed. There were three new TMR techniques that were explored, Functional Triple Modular Redundancy (FTMR), Selective Triple Modular Redundancy (STMR), and Partial Triple Modular Redundancy. FTMR shows that both sequential and combinational blocks can be protected by means of TMR [4]. SMTR extends the basic TMR technique by identifying “sensitive” gates in the circuit and then introduces TMR selectively at those gates [5]. Finally, Partial TMR extends STMR a bit but gives priority to the circuit components which are more susceptible to persistent errors and applies TMR to them [6].

Each of these methods offers a more enhanced version of TMR. The current use of TDTMR in this research utilized a few of the enhancements, but the main difference was using three different logic designs instead of the three copies.

2.4 Fault Detection and Correction

Fault Detection and correction has always been a crucial aspect when it comes to digital circuits. With a countless number of logical gates that continue to increase, it has become virtually impossible to fully test every possible input combination for circuit designs for testing purposes. A defect is an error introduced into a device during the manufacturing process. A fault is said to be detected if a specific test pattern used with the primary inputs could detect the specific fault and contain differing primary output results from the original design.

High level fault modeling provides the ability to use simulation based design verification. Bridging faults, delay faults, stuck-at faults are the most popular fault models in digital testing at this level [9]. The single ‘stuck-at’ fault model has been the most versatile fault model for testing circuit logic. A stuck-at fault is assumed to affect only the interconnection between gates. It shows if a circuit has ‘n’ signal lines, then there are potentially ‘2n’ ‘stuck-at’ faults within the circuit. The goal would be to find a test pattern that could detect all possible faults for each circuit design. Automatic Test Pattern Generation (ATPG) was developed in an effort to find manufacturing defects along with finding a small number of test patterns that identify a high number of possible faults.

ATPG is a testing method developed to locate a test sequence that allows the user to differentiate between the correct circuit behavior and a faulty circuit. The goal of ATPG is to find a set of test patterns which achieve the highest fault coverage. A pattern set with 100% fault coverage consists of tests to detect every possible ‘stuck-at’ fault in a circuit. 100% fault

Table 2 – History of Algorithm Speedups [9]

Algorithm	Estimated speedup over D-Algorithm (normalized to D-ALG CPU time)	Year
D-ALG [551]	1	1966
PODEM [258]	7	1981
FAN [229, 232, 233]	23	1983
TOPS [360]	292	1987
SOCRATES [576]	1574 ATPG System	1988
Waicukauski <i>et al.</i> [708]	2189 ATPG System	1990
EST [110, 253]	8765 ATPG System	1991
TRAN [122]	3005 ATPG System	1993
Recursive learning [376]	485	1995
Tafertshofer <i>et al.</i> [648]	25057	1997

coverage does not necessarily guarantee high quality, since other faults such as bridging or open faults could still occur. There are cases when circuits containing faults can't show up for any of the input sequences generated. One case might have the fault be intrinsically undetectable meaning that no test patterns exist that can detect that particular fault. These faults are redundant in the sense that their presence does not influence the observable circuit functionality. Since the ATPG problem is NP-complete, a problem that cannot be determined in a 'practical' amount of time, there will also be cases where patterns exist but the ATPG algorithm gives up since it will take a significant amount of time to find them [9].

Historically, there have been many algorithms developed in an effort to utilize test patterns for circuit designs to test for faults. Testing these integrated circuits with significant fault coverage has proven to be a daunting task due to its complexity. One of the earliest and cornerstone algorithms used for ATPG today is the D-Algorithm. This algorithm provided the building blocks necessary to cultivate faster and more efficient ATPG algorithms. Table 2 depicts a brief history of the algorithms used for ATPG with estimated speedup based on the D-Algorithm.

These algorithms employ heuristics that find all necessary signal assignments for a test as early as possible. It has been shown that sequential circuits are far more complex than combinational circuits to achieve considerable fault coverage. For combinational fault simulation, the complexity is $O(n^2)$. Big Oh notation describes a growth rate as a simpler function. For sequential fault simulation, the complexity is estimated to be between $O(n^2)$ and $O(n^3)$ based on empirical measurements [9]. These algorithms have been employed to test for defects on manufactured circuits and continue to be developed to find faster and more efficient ways of detecting faults.

2.5 Fault Diagnosis

Faults are understood to be an abnormal change of system function or defect at the component, equipment, or subsystem that may or may not lead to physical failure or breakdown [10]. If faults occur, the outcome has the potential of being catastrophic by possibly endangering lives. It is imperative that uncovering the location of faults is critical. Some traditional approaches to fault diagnosis have been installing multiple sensors and hardware, analytical or functional redundancy, and a combination of hardware and analytical redundancy [11].

The purpose of this research was to be able to implement a method of detecting and diagnosing faults within the circuit while under radiation. Attempting to diagnose the location of faults and errors on a circuit continues to be investigated thoroughly. Much of the recent progress in fault diagnosis can be credited to the extensive use of fault equivalence to reduce the number of fault conditions for analysis, since only one fault from each fault equivalence class needs to be retained as a representative [12]. However, the difficulty still consists of finding diagnostic methods which are suitable for real time execution.

The goal of this research was to be able to use similar diagnosing methods and algorithms to detect errors found within the circuit design and diagnose the location of the faults with the best possible resolution. This means the fault was reduced to the minimum number of locations that could be distinguished using stuck-at fault modeling. The information provided by this diagnostic would provide the user the ability to better address the next action needed to be taken to correct the problem. The following research attempts to uncover whether real time diagnosing under radiation has the potential of being successful.

2.6 Radiation Effects on Electronics

Operational reliability is one of the key principal concerns in microelectronic systems. This is particularly true of space bound systems since they are exposed to ionizing radiation and their operating conditions do not allow for quick and easy restoration of failed or malfunctioning components. The harsh space environment can cause severe damage and malfunction on unprotected electronics. Trapped protons and electrons in the Earth's radiation belts and cosmic rays prove to be crucial challenges for space electronics to operate normally in this environment. Long periods of time and exposure to space's callous energy particles can degrade even the best device's performance, leading to component failure. Everything from major components to the wiring and cabling of electronic devices can be seriously affected by radiation.

This section will explore key components of radiation effects on electronics related to the research goals of this thesis. Three key issues are discussed further, total dose effect, single event effects (SEE), and single event upsets.

2.6.1 Total Dose Effect

Electronic devices in space suffer long-term radiation effects, mostly due to electrons and protons. Total dose effects refers to the integrated radiation dose that is accumulated by space

electronics over a certain period of time and can reduce mission lifetimes due to long-term damage to devices, ICs, or solar cells. Long-term exposure can cause device threshold shifts, increased device leakage and power consumption, timing changes, and decreased functionality [13]. After the exposure to sufficient total-dose radiation, most insulating materials such as capacitor dielectrics, circuit-board materials, and cabling insulators, become less insulating or become more electrically leaky along with certain conductive materials, such as metal-film resistors, can change their characteristics under exposure to total-dose radiation [14]. These changes may not be constant with time after irradiation and may depend on the dose rate at which the radiation is received.

The radiation damage in the silicon dioxide layers consists of three components: the buildup of trapped charge in the oxide, an increase in the number of interface traps, and an increase in the number of bulk oxide traps [15]. The ionizing radiation primarily affects the gate and field oxide layers. In CMOS devices, the gate oxide becomes ionized by the dose it absorbs and ionization produces electron-hole pairs in insulation layers. The electrons have high mobility, but the holes have lower mobility. The free electrons and holes drift under the influence of the electric field that is induced in the oxide by the gate voltage. The holes that escape “initial” recombination transport through the oxide toward the silicon and silicon dioxide interface by hopping through localized states in the oxide [16]. A small number of holes become trapped in the gate oxide. Trapped charge in the oxide and at interface regions changes the threshold voltage and mobility of the gate and field-oxide transistors, therefore modifying their characteristics [23]. The accumulated charge can be high enough to keep the transistors permanently open or closed, having the source drain current no longer be controlled by the gate leading to device failure. Trapped holes are not stable, they gradually anneal with time. The

overall effect depends on bias conditions and device technology. With devices becoming smaller, the gate oxides in these shrinking transistors are growing thinner. Being thinner, the gate oxide traps less positive charge overall [14]. Therefore, transistors with smaller technologies are becoming inherently more radiation resistant. Figure 5 shows how the total dose effects the threshold voltage and causes a shift in both 'n' and 'p' transistors. The threshold voltage does change during the annealing process after it has been irradiated shown in Figure 6.




Figure 5 – Threshold Voltage of 'n' and 'p' Transistors during Irradiation [15]




Figure 6 – Irradiation and Annealing Effects [15]

Since the number of electron-hole pairs generated is directly proportional to the amount of energy absorbed by the device material, the total damage is also roughly proportional to the total dose of radiation received by the device [15].

2.6.2 Single Event Effects

Another important category of radiation effects that an integrated circuit is vulnerable to are Single Event Effects (SEE). A SEE occurs when a single high-energy particle strikes a device, leaving behind an ionized track and can lead to sudden device or system failure (Figure 7). These failures result from the charge deposited by a single particle crossing a sensitive region in the device and are a function of the amount of charge collected at the sensitive node and the node state [13]. The ionization along the path of the impinging particle collects at a circuit node. The ionized track contains equal numbers of electrons and holes and is therefore electrically neutral.




Figure 7 – Cosmic Ray Through the Strain of a NMOS Transistor

The total number of charges is proportional to the linear energy transfer of the incoming particle. Every memory device has a certain critical charge which could result in a SEE or other undesirable phenomenon [14]. The three largest categories of SEEs are Single Event Upsets

(SEU), Single Event Latch-up (SEL), and Single Event Burnout (SEB). The soft error or upset (SEU) is a change in the information stored on the circuit. A hard error is characterized by permanent or semi-permanent damage such as the latch-up (SEL) or the burnout (SEB).

Another source of SEEs is impurities in the device material. There might be traces of uranium or thorium, which both are naturally radioactive elements, decaying by alpha emissions. The alpha particle can then release its charge and cause a SEE.

In the space environment, circuit designers have been concerned with both the protons and cosmic rays that lead to a greatly increased SEE rate. For cosmic rays, SEEs are typically caused by its heavy ion component. These cosmic rays can easily penetrate the structure of an integrated circuit. Cosmic rays may be galactic or solar in origin. Protons, usually trapped in the earth's radiation belts or from solar flares, may cause direct ionization SEEs in very sensitive devices. However, a proton may typically cause a nuclear reaction near a sensitive device area creating an indirect ionization effect potentially causing a SEE.

2.6.3 Single Event Upsets

A cosmic ray, or a secondary ion released via a high-energy proton-induced nuclear reaction, can deposit enough energy within a sensitive node that an integrated circuit can be upset. These single event upsets (SEUs) are analogous to soft errors in electronics or avionics due to energetic alpha particles or atmospheric neutrons. SEU is defined by NASA as "radiation-induced errors in microelectronic circuits caused when charged particles (usually from the radiation belts or from cosmic rays) lose energy by ionizing the medium through which they pass, leaving behind a wake of electron-hole pairs." A SEU usually manifests itself as a state change or "bit-flip" of a single data bit or memory cell that causes a momentary glitch in the device output (Figure 8).




Figure 8 – Example of SEU

If enough of these upsets occur, or if a single critical node is affected, a reset or rewriting of the device results in normal device behavior would be required. Single-event upsets occur in computer memories, microprocessors, controllers, and almost any digital circuit containing memory elements. They do not cause lasting damage to the device, but may cause lasting problems to a system which cannot recover from such an error. Also, in very sensitive devices, a single ion hits two or more bits causing simultaneous errors, known as multiple-bit upsets (MBUs), in adjacent memory cells. As the minimum device feature size is down scaled to smaller and smaller dimensions, the susceptibility to such SEU's has been found to increase remarkably [15].

Research and mitigation techniques within this field have been growing significantly. New methods and studies have been investigated in order to try to lower the number of possible SEU on a circuit at a given time. An alternative approach to reducing SEU and transient upset levels, as well as eliminating the possibilities of latch-up, is to use silicon on sapphire or silicon on insulator technologies to build CMOS circuits [15]. Other methods have been using the hardened by design methodology i.e. Tripler Modular Redundancy. It is with these mitigation techniques and research where these phenomena could be carefully investigated to better understand and predict when these upsets could occur with space electronics.

2.7 Gamma Radiation Source

The cobalt-60 isotope (^{60}Co) was used as the source of ionizing radiation for this experiment. ^{60}Co undergoes beta decay with a half-life of 5.24 years releasing two gamma particles and one electron, demonstrated in Figure 9.




Figure 9 – Decay scheme of ^{60}Co [20]

Ohio State University (OSU) Nuclear Reactor Lab (NRL) in Columbus, Ohio provided a ^{60}Co source. A simplified diagram showing the gamma irradiator can be found in Figure 10. It contains a six inch wide aluminum tube containing a movable platform that can be raised and lowered out of the irradiator. The gamma irradiator cell itself sits on the bottom of a pool of water and consists of 14 ^{60}Co sources evenly spread around the aluminum tube.




Figure 10 – ^{60}Co Gamma Irradiator Layout [17]

When the device under test (DUT) is lowered into the tube, the radiation dose rate is based on the location of the device relative to the center of the Co-60 source rods. However, the dose rate curve is based on the distance of the DUT above the bottom of the moveable platform when the platform is resting on the bottom of the aluminum tube [17]. The radiation dose curve provided by OSUNRL is depicted in Figure 11.




Figure 11 – Dose Rate of Co-60 Irradiator [21]

2.8 Thermal Radiation Source

A 1600W Xe lamp thermal simulator was used for the irradiation of the DUT in this thesis. The schematic shown below (Figure 12) is accurate with the exception that the thermal simulator used in these experiments had an output direction rotated 90 degrees so that the output was perpendicular to the major axis of the thermal simulator producing a horizontal beam [18].




Figure 12 – Schematic of 1600 W Solar Simulator

The thermal simulator was assembled by Koehl [19] and the manufacturer recorded a spectral output seen in Figure 13 below.




Figure 13 – Spectral Output from 1600W Thermal Simulator

The spectrum is largely a smooth Plankian distribution, reflecting the source plasma temperature with superimposed lines from the xenon emission spectrum. The smooth Plankian portion of the distribution is similar to the measured intensities for a 1 kT nuclear explosion [19].

2.9 Previous Work

Research with this topic has been performed in the last few years. The work presented with the last two AFIT theses has been inconclusive. There were many problems that were fixed from the previous work along with a significant contribution by real time detection and diagnosing.

The original code developed for evaluating circuits under radiation was not operational. The next version's code was primitive and could not offer any real, solid conclusion. The pervious hardware constructed for communication between the two boards was suboptimal and unusable. The efforts in building TMR on the base level was not implemented properly because the code was written and optimized by Xilinx and not built structurally. The monitoring system for collecting errors was not actually accounting items in real time. It polled the system in intervals that the max speed for RS232 could perform at.

Not everything in the work done previously was completely inconclusive. Results from previous work suggested that the baseboard was the cause of most of the errors in the result. The results also demonstrated that dose rate versus total dose could be significant. Both works performed previously made an attempt to characterize the effects of radiation on electronics but failed to fully implement a capable measuring system.

The current research corrected these problems. The testing platform utilized ribbon cables, buffers, and capacitors to correctly implement a bridge between the two FPGA boards. TDTMR was implemented structurally and laid out onto the mini module FX12 series board (Figure 14). The monitoring system was only used to see the results. The actual data that was measured was written to a flash device in real time. Further detail of the implementation of this research is described in the following chapter.




Figure 14 – Layout of the 3 Adders on the FX12 Board

2.10 Summary

This chapter provides a quick background in key areas that are being investigated in this research. There are many fault redundancy techniques that are used in a variety of forms in research. This particular research focuses on TMR. Radiation effects on electronics also have a very large and comprehensive background. A full understanding and explanation of these effects still remains a bit of a mystery. The previous two AFIT researchers in this area did not completely cover the most basic concepts. Their attempts did produce a few benefits, in the long run there were too many errors to take any work that was accomplished and build upon it. All the work done for this thesis was rebuilt from the ground up. The goal was to correct these

mistakes and expand on the concepts of radiation effects on electronics. Further research into these areas can be found through the references in the bibliography.

III. Methodology

3.1 Chapter Overview

This section describes the entire methodology used to accomplish the evaluation of the testing platform, the detection and diagnosis algorithm and TDTMR. The first section breaks down each portion of the testing platform. A description of the methodology used to create the detection and diagnosis algorithm is described in this chapter. Each test set up for the experiment was also included. Further descriptions and diagrams can also be found in the Appendix.

3.2 Test Platform

The overall testing platform was broken into three parts: the controller unit which houses all the command logic along with the processing of data for the diagnosis algorithm, the TMR unit or Device Under Test (DUT) which describes the circuitry being evaluated under radiation, and the external devices which monitors and records all the information being processed.



Figure 15 – Block Diagram of Testing Platform

3.2.1 TMR Design

The FPGA device under test (DUT) for these radiation experiments was the Xilinx Virtex 4 FX12 Series Mini-module mounted on an Avnet Mini-Module Baseboard, pictured in Figure 16. The FPGA contained 90nm transistor technology with 10 layers of metal interconnects and triple oxide technology running internally at 1.2 Volts (V) [22]. A more complete description of the Virtex 4 Mini Module can be found in Appendix A.




Figure 16 – DUT Virtex 4 Mini-Module

The DUT component consisted of the new Triple Design TMR. The design also utilized the triplicated voter enhancement [2]. The DUT contains three copies of different forms of adder logic. The Carry Look Ahead Adder and Ripple Carry Adder designs were implemented structurally using base level gates. The two adder diagrams can be found in Appendix B and C. The third adder was implemented in a behavior method, meaning it was left to the Xilinx software to layout how the adder would be designed. The three adder's results entered the triplicated voter logic in an effort to perform fault redundancy. The outputs of each adder were also sent to the controller board along with the results of the triplicated voter logic. Figure 17 shows the design of the entire TDTMR Unit.




Figure 17 – Diagram of TDTMR

Other components were also added to the DUT as well, for testing purposes. A clock generator and an error generator were also added in the DUT (Figure 18). These units were used to simulate fault injections into the design. A fault injection is an error purposefully implanted into the integrated circuit that can be controlled by a user or automated through a computer program with specific guidelines.




Figure 18 – Diagram of DUT

The error unit generated errors at different timing intervals to simulate single errors into the TDTMR. These generated errors would lie dormant unless activated by a switch from the base board. Upon activation it would generate four errors at four different timing intervals, one microsecond, one millisecond, two seconds, and eight seconds.

The overall goal of this research was to radiate just the Virtex 4 chip without the baseboard. To help eliminate other possible errors and isolate the chip itself, specialized connector cables (Figure 19) were constructed to allow just the chip to be placed under radiation and keep the base board protected from any possible radiation damage. No buffers were needed to have the chip be fully functional. With the current cables, the chip itself can be two feet away from the base board without any problems with timing and synchronization.




Figure 19 – Connector Cables between Chip and Baseboard

3.2.2 Controller Board

The Virtex-II Pro development system was the FPGA chosen to implement the controller board logic. It contains a PowerPC Processor which was used in the compilation of the diagnostic algorithm. 130 nm technology was also used with this board along with nine layers of metal. Output pins were soldered onto the board to provide the ability to utilize ribbon cables. Figure 20 shows the Virtex-II Pro board. Further description of the Virtex-II Pro can be found in Appendix D.




Figure 20 – Virtex-II Pro Controller Board

VHSIC Hardware Description Language (VHDL) controlled the basic flow of how the hardware operated. A state machine was developed in VHDL on the controller board to run the basic operations. Figure 21 shows the state diagram used for the controller board.




Figure 21 – State Diagram of Controller Board

The remaining parts of the controller logic was written in C and utilized by the PowerPC. The controller board cycles through vectors of nine bits for the input that come from a counter or random module. These two modules can be interchanged during runtime by the user. A copy of the DUT circuit is also placed in the controller board and acts as the ‘golden circuit’ for comparison purposes. All the values from the DUT were compared to the ‘golden circuit’

results. Figure 22 illustrates the block diagram of the controller logic. Upon detecting an error, the controller board automatically switches to ‘Diagnostic Mode’ which has all the test and diagnostic vectors chosen as inputs. The PowerPC also runs the algorithm that calculates the location of the error. This will be discussed further in this chapter.




Figure 22 – Controller Board Block Diagram

3.2.3 External Devices

The two external devices used for the test platform is a laptop attached to the Virtex-II Pro board via RS232 (serial) cable and a compact flash card which is on the board.

Hyper-terminal was used to communicate with the controller board. The hyper-terminal acted as a monitor of all the operations. A user can check the number of errors detected, how long it's been running, how many vectors have been checked, and some of the input vectors with its results from all the outputs. Since the controller board operates significantly faster than what the hyper-terminal can output, the input vectors and output results are randomly chosen for display. The user can also change to four different modes through the hyper-terminal, namely counter, random, test, and debug. Figure 23 shows what the monitoring screen would look like.

```

COM1 - PuTTY
*****
* Control Board Module Control Program *
*****

Press 'q' to quit...
Beginning run: 003

Elapsed CPU time: 15:59:50
Number of Errors: 0
Vectors Checked: 161780 x 1000
Input: A=0x0c B=0x04 c=1
Result: beh=0x01 cla=0x01 rc=0x01 v=0x01 gc=0x01
Vector Source: Count
Loop (ns)      avg: 2147483647 min: 2147483647 max: 2147483647

```

Figure 23 – Hyper-Terminal Monitoring Screen

The compact flash card was utilized to record all the data in real time for possible post processing analysis. Due to the volume of vectors being analyzed, only when presented with an error would information be logged onto the flash card. The flash card recorded which input vector caused a failure along with that vector's results. It also documented all the results from each of the test and diagnostic vectors. Figure 24 shows an example of what the output on the flash card would look like.

Vector ID	Source	Behav	Gold Circuit	Input Values	Results
10389833	Test	e,e,e,e,e	8,5,1	f5dafedf	3699.186364
10389836	Test	4,4,4,4,4	a,9,1	f49af6c6	3699.186625
10389837	Test	f,f,f,f,f	1,e,0	f4009646	3699.186886
10389838	Test	1,1,1,1,1	5,c,0	f4009640	3699.187147
10389839	Test	b,b,b,b,b	e,d,0	f4008640	3699.187409
10389840	Test	3,3,3,3,3	b,7,1	f0008000	3699.187671
10389841	Test	f,f,f,f,f	6,8,1	00008000	3699.187939
10389888	Count	1,1,3,1,1	0,0,1	ffffff	3699.23819
10389989	Test	e,e,e,e,e	8,5,1	f5dafedf	3699.238542
10389990	Test	4,4,4,4,4	a,9,1	f49af6c6	3699.239392
10389991	Test	f,f,f,f,f	1,e,0	f4009646	3699.239654
10389992	Test	1,1,1,1,1	5,c,0	f4009640	3699.239915
10389993	Test	b,b,b,b,b	e,d,0	f4008640	3699.240177
10389994	Test	3,3,3,3,3	b,7,1	f0008000	3699.240440
10389995	Test	f,f,f,f,f	6,8,1	00008000	3699.240708

Fault Location List in Hex

Adder Results, Vector Result

Figure 24 – Output of the Flash Card

The card would record the vector ID, the vector source, all the outputs of the adder and voter, the gold circuit, the input vectors, and the time of when the vector was executed. The FPGA would write to a buffer, a temporary file, for two hundred kilobytes worth before writing

it out to flash. This process was done in case of an error or problem that potentially causes the FPGA to crash. If there was a failure while writing to flash, everything written into the buffer would all be lost or corrupted. The smaller files allow less data to be lost in case of a crash.

3.2.4 Buffer Bridge

The Virtex 4 Mini-Module was originally chosen for its size to fit down a pipe under radiation. To communicate between the two boards, ribbon cable was used. Due to the incompatibility of the two boards to match the same pin layout, a bridge board needed to be constructed (Figure 25).




Figure 25 – Bridge Board

The bridge board also serves as a buffer to clean up the signal degradation between the two boards. Since there would be fifteen feet of cable between the controller board and the DUT, high speed CMOS buffers were used to aid in cleaning up the signal. Full details and specifications of the high speed CMOS buffers can be found in Appendix E. Figure 26 displays the comparisons of the signals with and without the CMOS buffers after fifteen feet. Another

addition to the bridge board was to use IC sockets with capacitors. These sockets also aided in cleaning up the signal. Appendix F contains the specs of these sockets.




Figure 26 – Signal Comparisons

3.3 Operation Speed

The Virtex-II Pro Power PC has the ability to operate at clock speeds of 300 MHz and the Virtex 4 Mini-Module can operate at 100 MHz. The Virtex-II Pro board itself can operate at 100 MHz. In order to get the two boards to properly communicate with each other, the speed of each board had to be reduced. The biggest hurdle was due to the distance of the two boards. Using a clock pulse and the oscilloscope, measurements were made with fifteen feet of cable. With the two boards needing to be fifteen feet apart, the boards with the aid of the buffer board were able to sustain a clean square pulse at 1 MHz.

Due to the nature of the diagnostic algorithm and the predetermined vector sets (explained later in this thesis), a bottle neck developed between the Power PC and the Virtex-II Pro. The instantiated hardware required more processing time to handle the code from the Power PC. Thus, delay was added to the Power PC processing to allow the Virtex II-Pro to execute all

its commands and still be in synch. An attempt was made to investigate this problem further; however, no concrete solution was discovered in time. This bottle neck caused the code to not reach the potential of 1 MHz or one million vectors per second. With the current code in place, the system can operate on average only 2,817 vectors per second. Possible enhancements are noted in the future works section of this thesis.

3.4 Fault Detection and Diagnosis

This section describes the process and methodology used to come up with the fault detection and diagnosis algorithm. The method used to detect faults was similar to previous work done in this field [17] with a few differences. The diagnosis algorithm was developed by utilizing the TESTCAD test generation and fault simulation tool sets. The full algorithm flow chart is displayed in Figure 27.




Figure 27 – Fault Detection and Diagnosis Algorithm

3.4.1 Fault Detection

The algorithm runs a simple loop of generating inputs and checking the outputs. The controller board generates one of the 2^N possible input combinations, 'N' representing the number of inputs, to be put through the DUT. With nine inputs, there are possible 2^9 or 512 unique input combinations. Once the controller board receives the results of the input vector after it has travelled to the DUT, it performs a bitwise comparison on the results of the three adders and the voter logic to the 'gold circuit'. The bitwise comparison determines which adder

caused an error and which bit of that particular adder was wrong. The error sends an interrupt to the processor to begin the diagnosis of the error.

3.4.2 Fault Diagnosis

The process of diagnosing the exact location of faults within a circuit was a two step process. The first step was to utilize the TESTCAD test generation and fault simulation tool set in order to develop the test vector and the individual fault list. The second step after creating these lists, an algorithm was developed to detect the fault location with the best possible resolution for stuck-at fault modeling.

3.4.2.1 Test Vector Generation

Due to creating the adders structurally, it made the creation of the fault list easier. The TESTCAD tools allowed for the creation of all the possible faults that could be found in a structural design along with fully optimizing and reducing the fault list by equivalence and then by dominance. The fault reduction was able to reduce the number of possible faults by 16-18%. The TESTCAD tools evaluated the circuit combined with the fault list and were able to provide 100% fault efficiency. This meant that all the faults within a circuit were detected. The next goal was to find out how many faults a vector was able to uncover. Each of the 2^N possible input combinations were simulated individually to list all the possible fault locations it detected that associated with that particular input vector. Appendix G has a brief description of all the TESTCAD tool commands.

The data collected from the TESTCAD tools were tabulated and placed in a giant table. Figure 28 depicts a small portion of the table that indicates all the fault locations found with each test vector along the 'x' axis and their respective vector outputs along the 'y' axis. A full detailed list containing all the vectors, faults, and detectable faults can be found in Appendix H.

Fault	Output	v215	v339	v335	v423	v109	v296	v505	v125	v306	v277	v472	v142
10 0 0	59D	Det	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
14 3 0	59D	X	Det	Det	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
14 2 0	59D	X	X	X	Det	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
4 0 0	59D	X	X	X	Det	Det	Det	Det	Det	Det	X	X	X
30 5 1	59D	X	X	X	Det	Det	Det	X	X	X	X	X	X
30 4 1	59D	Det	Det	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	Det	Det	X
31 0 1	59D	X	X	X	Det	Det	Det	X	X	X	X	X	X
5 0 0	59D	Det	Det	X	X	X	X	Det	Det	Det	Det	Det	X
32 0 1	59D	Det	Det	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	Det	Det	X
46 33 1	59D	X	X	Det	X	X	X	Det	X	X	X	X	X
46 19 1	59D	X	X	X	X	Det	Det	X	X	X	Det	X	X
47 0 1	59D	X	X	Det	X	X	X	Det	X	X	X	X	X
48 0 1	59D	X	X	X	X	Det	Det	X	X	X	Det	X	X
10 1 1	59D	X	X	X	X	Det	X	X	X	X	X	X	X

Figure 28 – Layout of Detected Faults

Each individual test vector was able to detect on average thirty faults. The final goal was to reduce the number of vectors to the least amount that would still cover every possible error. The table was sorted by each of the output bits. This showed that there were a lot of redundant test vectors. After eliminating all the redundant vectors, around twenty-four vectors remained. The average number of faults detected by each vector for each output bit reduced to eight. From here, the list of test vectors, diagnostic vectors, and their particular fault lists were made. These lists of vectors and their respective fault list were stored on the controller board.

3.4.2.2 Diagnosis Algorithm

With the test vectors and fault lists stored on the controller board, an algorithm was developed in an effort to detect the location of a single fault with the best possible resolution. By following a similar methodology of Deductive Fault Simulation [9], an inverse deductive fault detection algorithm was developed.

The goal of this algorithm was to diagnose a single fault in the entire system. Upon determining which adder and which bit caused the error, the algorithm would choose the appropriate test vector list and fault list to start inverse deductive fault detection. A possible fault list array was created and populated with values of ‘1’ which represent the possible location of faults. Each of the test and diagnostic vectors would process through the system and the

results would be evaluated. Pending on passing or failing, would determine how the elimination process of the fault list array would be conducted. The algorithm would continue in a loop until only one error remained or the end of the list has been reached. If more than one fault remained at the end of the list, it was determined that there was no possible way to distinguish the single fault amongst them all. The remaining faults would be the best possible resolution for fault diagnosis.

The possibility of having multiple bit failures did present an issue. The current algorithm's scope to diagnose the location of faults expects to have only one bit failure. However, when multiple bit failures were present, the algorithm runs through a set of test vectors without attempting to perform the diagnosis algorithm. The results are stored on the flash card to perform post processing analysis.

3.5 Test Setup

The ultimate goal for this research was to test the algorithm under a form of radiation. To verify the validity of the algorithm, different test set ups were created. Hardware fault injection, gamma radiation, and thermal radiation were the testing environments. Each setup utilized the test platform in its entirety.

3.5.1 Injected Fault Setup

The setup for this test was conducted in an open lab. It utilized the same full test platform described above. Four faults were injected in random locations in the structural design of the adders. The error generator rotates through the four different faults one at a time for specific durations. The test platform executed for seventy two hours straight with no errors to exercise its durability and duration. Fault injections were manually simulated randomly throughout the testing process.

3.5.2 Gamma Radiation Test Setup

The test platform was originally constructed to be tested under gamma radiation at the OSUNRL. The DUT was separated from the base board and placed eight inches from the bottom based on Figure 10 to achieve the highest dose rate per hour (see Chapter 2). The base board was strapped above the DUT separated by a thick piece of lead to be protected from the radiation. The bridge board, controller board, and the remaining devices stayed fifteen feet above the reactor. Figure 29 depicts the entire set up used for the gamma radiation test.




Figure 29 – Gamma Radiation Test Setup

3.5.3 Thermal Radiation Test Setup

Thermal Radiation was chosen as another form to generate errors on the DUT. In a previous thesis [19], a Newport Xe Solar Simulator was assembled with the ability to provide 3.3 cal/cm²s irradiance. Figure 30 depicts the set up used for this irradiation test.




Figure 30 – Thermal Radiation Test Setup

A two inch diameter fused silica Plano convex lens was inserted 95 mm after the focusing optic of the setup. The focal length of the second external optic is 150 mm. However, to increase the homogeneity of the beam, the target was placed closer to the second external optic than the focal length [18]. A pinhole was constructed that was placed in between the two inch Silica Lens and the FPGA to ensure the focus of the thermal radiation onto the FPGA alone. Figure 31 provides a diagram with detailed specification of the entire set up.




Figure 31 – Thermal Radiation Specification Setup

3.5.4 Optical Laser Test Setup

Using a COTS laser pen to cause errors was another test. The test setup consisted of a laser pointer, a pinhole plate, and the DUT. All the lasers were green in color with a wavelength of 532 nm. Three different wattage laser pens were used in an attempt to create errors. The three lasers had wattages of 10 mW, 20 mW, and 50 mW. The cover of the FPGA on the DUT was removed for this test. The pinhole plate was 600 micrometers in diameter.

The laser pointer was setup with the pinhole over the laser to get a more focused target onto the uncovered FPGA. The distance to the FPGA was 73 mm. Each laser was focused on one corner of the FPGA. Figure 32 depicts the entire set up used for the optical laser test.




Figure 32 – Optical Laser Test Setup

3.5.5 Optical Flash Test Setup

The last test setup used for this research that was available was the optical flash test. The goal of this test was to see if the Electrical Magnetic Interference (EMI) of a professional, camera flash device would cause errors on the DUT. Figure 33 depicts how the test setup was arranged.




Figure 33 – Optical Flash Test Setup

The flash device was controlled digitally through the concept in photography known as F-stop. F-stops are powers of $\sqrt{2}$. The first f stop is $\sqrt{2}^0$, or $f/1$. Next is $\sqrt{2}^1$, or $f/1.4$, then $\sqrt{2}^2$ for $f/2$, etc [24]. For each increment of f -stop number the output wattage doubles. $f/1$ starts with output wattage of 18.75, $f/2$'s output wattage is 37.5, $f/3$'s output wattage is 75, and so forth.

Three different DUT tests were conducted. One was with a brand new mini module with no modifications. The other two tests used another brand new module with the outer most protective plate removed. One of those setups had the DUT completely exposed to the flash. The other setup used a 600 micrometer pinhole to focus the flash onto one part of the exposed DUT.

3.6 Summary

The previous chapter describes the entire process to develop the test platform and all the components associated with it. A description of the development of the test and diagnostic vectors was discussed and how they were derived, set up, and implemented. The entire detection

and diagnosing algorithm was also described in this chapter. Each of the five test setups that were used are described in detail on how they were constructed for testing the goals of this research. Further code, diagrams, specifications sheets, and other pertinent information can be found in the Appendix.

IV. Results & Analysis

4.1 Chapter Overview

This chapter covers all the results and analysis performed for this research as described in the previous methodology chapter. Each section covers all the results from all the test setups used to obtain errors.

4.2 Test Setup Results

The five subsections describe the results gathered from each of the five tests. Some tests were more successful than others. A detailed account of each experiment was recorded and written out in this chapter.

4.2.1 Injected Fault Results

The results for this hardware simulation test setup were completed. The objective of locating the fault within the circuit and be able to diagnose the location of that particular fault in real time were achieved. The four hardware injected faults were located with the best resolution through the algorithm described in Chapter 3. The algorithm was able to pinpoint the exact location of the fault that was randomly placed in the structural design of either the Ripple Carry Adder (Figure 34) or the Carry Look Ahead Adder (Figure 35). Three of the four faults were




Figure 34 – Injected Fault Locations for Ripple Carry Adder




Figure 35 – Injected Fault Locations for Carry Look Ahead Adder

detected and the diagnostic algorithm pinpointed them exactly on the circuit diagram. One of the faults was not able to be located exactly; however, the algorithm reduced the number of possible locations to three. This result cannot uniquely distinguish amongst the three faults without fully

destroying the circuit. Using this method, it is the best possible solution that can be found.

Figure 36 shows the results printed in the flash device depicting how the algorithm reduces the number of faults in an effort to pinpoint the exact fault.

```

10402451,Count,0,0,8,0,0,5,b,0,ffffffff,3704.420431
10402452,Test,f,f,f,f,f,6,8,1,f5fabd3f,3704.420779
10402453,Test,f,f,f,f,f,1,e,0,f1fabd3f,3704.421125
10402454,Test,e,e,e,e,e,8,5,1,f1dab03f,3704.421470
10402455,Test,8,8,8,8,8,2,5,1,f192101f,3704.421816
10402456,Test,4,4,c,4,4,6,e,0,00001019,3704.422162
10402457,Test,4,4,4,4,4,a,9,1,00001019,3704.422507
10402458,Test,b,b,b,b,b,e,d,0,00000019,3704.422853
10402459,Test,8,8,8,8,8,a,d,1,00000019,3704.423198
10402460,Test,3,3,b,3,3,b,7,1,00000019,3704.423544
10402461,Test,4,4,4,4,4,4,0,0,00000019,3704.423890

10405304,Count,f,7,f,f,f,a,4,1,ffffffff,3705.898454
10405305,Test,3,3,3,3,3,6,d,0,ed6ffee5,3705.899313
10405306,Test,1,1,1,1,1,d,4,0,ec0feee5,3705.899569
10405307,Test,a,a,a,a,a,c,d,1,ec05e265,3705.899825
10405308,Test,1,1,1,1,1,1,f,1,e405e265,3705.900083
10405309,Test,8,8,8,8,8,9,f,0,e405e265,3705.900339
10405310,Test,3,3,3,3,3,7,b,1,e005e265,3705.900596
10405311,Test,9,9,9,9,9,5,3,1,e005e025,3705.900872
10405312,Test,c,4,c,c,c,0,c,0,00054020,3705.901217
10405313,Test,5,5,5,5,5,6,f,0,00054020,3705.901563
10405314,Test,7,f,7,7,7,6,0,1,00000020,3705.901909

```

Figure 36 – Injected Fault Results

The circled result is represented in HEX. Each HEX number represents four fault locations. The first result of 00000019 depicts that there are three possible fault locations the algorithm located.

The second result of 00000020 represents the exact location of the fault uncovered.

4.2.1.1 Analysis

These results prove that the inverse deductive algorithm for fault detection and diagnosis worked. The algorithm correctly detected each of the injected fault locations individually and properly reduced the number of possible fault locations to the best possible solution. These faults were each injected one at a time. The algorithm's goal was to detect single errors within a circuit but also takes into account multiple errors. However, it is not able to fully diagnose the exact location of multiple errors. The algorithm performs a set of test vectors and post processing analysis was done.

4.2.2 Gamma Radiation Results

Four separate tests were conducted at the OSUNRL. The first test used a Spartan series chip that was separated from the baseboard. The maximum dose rate of 69 krad(Si)/hr was set based on the dose rate curve found in Chapter 2. No errors were detected for the first fifteen hours, but soon after, the chip experienced a catastrophic failure and no values were obtained. The chip itself was damaged beyond repair and not able to be reprogrammed.

In an effort to cause errors, the next three tests kept the baseboard and the DUT attached. The first test lasted for forty-eight minutes before it was removed from radiation. The result log showed a sporadic array of random results with no consistent outcome. All the adders and voter logic produced multiple random results. There were no clear, traceable set of results obtained in the result logs. After pulling the DUT from radiation, the baseboard was damaged and inoperable. However, despite the damaged baseboard, the DUT remained operational. Figure 37 shows a portion of the log of the errors from this test. The full results are similar to the portion displayed in this figure.

```
5427461,Test,f,f,f,f,3,6,d,0,ffffffff,4763.531108
5427462,Test,f,c,e,f,7,6,0,1,ffffffff,4763.531453
5427463,Test,f,c,0,1,3,7,b,1,ffffffff,4763.531799
5427464,Test,f,d,b,1,d,a,2,1,ffffffff,4763.532145
5427465,Test,3,8,0,1,f,0,e,1,ffffffff,4763.532490
5427466,Test,2,8,0,1,1,1,f,1,ffffffff,4763.532836
5427467,Test,2,0,0,0,9,5,3,1,ffffffff,4763.533181
**REPEATS**
5427487,Test,0,0,0,0,8,9,f,0,ffffffff,4763.540395
5427488,Test,0,7,f,8,4,8,b,1,ffffffff,4763.540651
5427489,Test,0,7,f,8,a,c,d,1,ffffffff,4763.540908
5427490,Test,0,0,0,0,8,b,c,1,ffffffff,4763.541168
5427491,Test,0,7,f,b,3,6,d,0,ffffffff,4763.541476
5427492,Test,9,7,f,f,7,6,0,1,ffffffff,4763.541821
5427493,Test,9,f,f,f,3,7,b,1,ffffffff,4763.542167
5427494,Test,d,f,f,f,d,a,2,1,ffffffff,4763.542512
5427495,Test,d,f,f,f,f,0,e,1,ffffffff,4763.544415
5427496,Test,f,f,f,f,f,1,1,f,1,ffffffff,4763.544675
```

Figure 37 – Gamma Radiation Test 2,3 Results

The third test was set up in a similar fashion as the second test. This test lasted for an hour and nineteen minutes before numerous errors showed up. The third test lasted longer but

the results within the log were the same as Figure 36. Aside from the duration of this test, the only other difference between the two tests was Test 3's baseboard and DUT were no longer operational. Test 2's DUT was still operational.

The final test for gamma radiation was met with differing results. The device was raised to seventeen inches from the bottom of the radiation chamber. By raising the distance, the dose rate is effectively reduced to 35 krad(Si)/hr based on Figure 11 found in Chapter 2. After two and three quarter hours, the baseboard and the DUT were still operational after being pulled from the radiation event. There were a total of thirty-four errors that were traceable coming in three groups of time. Figure 38 shows the timeline for all four tests for gamma radiation along with the group of errors detected in Test 4.




Figure 38 – Gamma Radiation Timeline

The three groups of errors, based on the logs, were consistent and traceable. It appeared that the voting logic produced errors at bit zero. The results showed that bit zero of the voting logic was a stuck-at-zero fault meaning a value in the output remained zero for a period of time. Table 3 presents an example of how the results represent a bit stuck at zero. Finally, Table 4 shows a summary of all four test results taken during the gamma radiation test.

Table 3 – Stuck at Zero Faults

Behave Adder	CLA Adder	RC Adder	Voter	Gold Circuit
D – 1101	D – 1101	D – 1101	C – 110 <u>0</u>	D – 1101
3 – 0011	3 – 0011	3 – 0011	2 – 001 <u>0</u>	3 – 0011
9 – 1001	9 – 1001	9 – 1001	8 – 100 <u>0</u>	9 – 1001

Table 4 – Gamma Radiation Results Summary

Test #	Chip Type	Baseboard Attached	Dose Rate (krad(Si)/hr)	Duration (hrs)	Baseboard Operational	DUT Operational	Vectors Checked * 1000
1	Spartan 3	No	69	15	Yes	No	150861
2	FX (1)	Yes	69	0.8667	No	Yes	7269
3	FX (2)	Yes	69	1.333	No	No	15482
4	FX (3)	Yes	35	2.75	Yes	Yes	26470

4.2.2.1 Analysis

The overall results from the gamma radiation test showed that the test platform created for this test was successful. The detection portion of the algorithm of determining if errors existed proved successful. In Test 1 the catastrophic failure of the chip rendered the results inconclusive. However, the test did show that the separated DUT with its smaller technology (90 nm) was more resilient to gamma radiation. By having smaller technology, the gate oxide traps less positive charge overall. With less trapped charges due to radiation, the transistors have a better chance of operating normally. Test 2 and 3 confirmed that the baseboard is more susceptible to gamma radiation than the DUT itself as shown in previous work [17]. One could speculate that the cause for this would be the baseboard was not designed for volatile environments. The designers were not interested in creating a board to withstand gamma radiation rather than to just provide a connection port for the DUT.

The final test showed that the algorithm was able to track the single bit error in the voting logic. However, it was not able to diagnose the error because it would disappear on average 0.00069 seconds. The logs were able to track thirty four errors before pulling the device out of

Table 5 – Thermal Radiation Results Summary

Test #	Chip Type	Duration (mins:secs)	Start Temp (C°)	Peak Temp (C°)	Final Output Wattage
1	FX(1)	11:07	34.8	440.9	1800
2	FX(2)	13:06	36.1	392.7	1350
3	FX(3)	18:39	42.8	298.1	1300
4	FX(4)	21:35	35.5	301.8	1290

the radiation. The results show that the number of errors for each ‘grouping’ increased over time. This would be expected since the DUT has been constantly exposed to gamma radiation. If the device would have remained in radiation, the results had the potential to show that more errors would occur due to the voltage threshold dropping as in Figure 9 (Chapter 2) while in radiation.

The tests performed with gamma radiation do suggest that there might be a difference between total ionizing dose and dose rate. The two tests with the highest dose rate failed faster than the board with half the dose rate and under radiation with more than doubled the amount of time than the other two tests. This would be similar to skin exposure to the sun’s harmful UV rays. On a bright sunny day with no form of protection, skin has a higher chance of being damaged in a period of one hour than a cloudy day in a period of two hours. Skin would be exposed to similar total amounts of UV rays but the one in direct sunlight can potentially cause more immediate damage. In the end, the total dose rate does have an effect on the threshold voltage. As shown in Figure 4 (Chapter 2), the threshold voltage could have shifted causing the set of errors from Test 4 to appear and then disappear in groups. More tests would be needed to verify this, but there are promising results from the outcome of this test setup.

4.2.3 Thermal Radiation Results

An attempt to expose the DUT to thermal (heat) radiation was another test in an effort to detect errors. Four tests were conducted on four separate DUTs. Table 5 shows a summary of

the results of all four tests for thermal radiation. The duration column indicates how long it took before complete chip failure. The first two tests were conducted by increasing the wattage quickly over a shorter period of time. The results for the first two tests had catastrophic failure at higher temperatures. The log did show that there were errors in the voting logic at bit one before completely failing all together with all outputs being zero. Between the first two tests there were more than a dozen single voter errors spanning five hundred milliseconds before everything failed.

The last two tests had the output wattage slowly increase over a longer span of time. With this test, the chip failed around 300°C. Though the chip took longer to fail and had lower temperatures, no traceable errors were able to be detected. The FX series chip was only rated for temperatures in the range of zero to eighty-five degrees Celsius. In the end due to this fact, the chip catastrophically failed having results of all zeros for the output.

4.2.3.1 Analysis

The results for this test again showed that the voter logic was the first to fail before any of the adders. Due to the law of thermal equilibrium, a direct pinpoint form of thermal radiation could not be achieved. The entire body of the DUT would heat up to roughly the same temperature of the directed pinpoint of the beam. In semiconductors, electrical conductivity increases with increasing temperature. Silicon's thermal conductivity is only three hundred Kelvin which is equivalent to twenty-seven degrees Celsius. One could speculate that with the quick ramp up of wattage thermal equilibrium was not fully reached allowing the chip to achieve higher temperatures before failing. The high temperatures did not fully diffuse across the DUT possibly causing partial damage. Once the rest of the chip caught up with the focal point of the beam, the entire chip completely failed.

Table 6 – Optical Laser Results Summary

Test #	Chip Type	Duration (min)	Laser (mW)	Errors
1	FX(1)	45	10	None
2	FX(1)	45	20	None
3	FX(1)	45	50	None

The other tests had the increase of temperature ramped up more slowly. These tests did not have any constructive results. The chip failed completely by having a short created due to the heat. The slow method of increasing the temperature allowed for thermal equilibrium across the entire chip before stepping to the next level. By waiting longer, the entire chip would have the same temperature and allow it to fail completely without damaging a portion of the chip first. In the end, the results for this test did show that the system was able to detect some single errors before completely crashing.

4.2.4 Optical Laser Results

An attempt to cause errors on the DUT was to use a laser pointer. Three tests were conducted with each of the three lasers. Table 6 depicts the results gathered from the experiment. The lasers were focused onto the same corner of the DUT where a few of the outputs would have been located. After forty-five minutes, it was determined that the test would not cause any errors.

4.2.4.1 Analysis

After careful examination of the DUT, it was determined another metal plate was there to protect the innermost logic of the FPGA. Without permanently damaging the chip itself, attempts through chemicals and small blades to remove the second metal plate turned up fruitless. The possibility that the laser could create enough heat to cause thermal conductivity producing errors was considered. However, since the lasers were COTS, the laser was not able

Table 7 – Optical Flash Results Summary

Test #	Chip Type	Flash Output (W)	Covering	Results
1	FX(1)	600 (Max)	Yes	None
2	FX(2)	18.75(Min)	No Lid	Crashed
3	FX(2)	428.4	No Lid / 600um pinhole	Crashed

to last long enough due to batteries. It was concluded that the laser test would not be able to induce any errors on the DUT with the second metal plate in place.

4.2.5 Optical Flash Results

This was the last test that was performed and available. The goal of this test was to use a flash to cause Electrical Magnetic Interference (EMI) to the DUT. Table 7 is a summary of the results collected from each test.

The first test used a brand new DUT completely intact. The DUT was completely resistant to the output of the flash all the way up to its max, 600W. No errors or damage to the DUT came about with this test. The second test used a DUT that had the top plate removed. By removing this plate, the DUT was completely susceptible to EMI. With the lowest setting, 18.75W, the DUT reset its values. Even a camera flash was able to reset the DUT. However, in this test the DUT was able to be reprogrammed and used again. The final test used the 600 micrometer pinhole in an effort to direct the flash onto on portion of the DUT. With the f-stop setting of 4.2 (428.4W), the flash device was able to reset the DUT. Further tests were conducted to make sure this value was the case. The DUT would consistently fail at the f-stop setting of 4.2 but not at 4.1.

4.2.5.1 Analysis

It is easily concluded that the outer plate of the DUT helped protect the device from EMI and other potential harmful effects. By removing this plate, it exposed the device and made it

more susceptible to EMI. The simple flash of a camera was able to cause enough EMI in the circuit to cause a voltage drop throughout the entire FPGA. By dropping the voltage, all the thresholds were lowered and the resulting outputs from the FPGA turned into 1's. By adding a pinhole plate over the DUT, it was able to shield out some of the EMI on the low outputs. However, once it reached 4.2, the DUT became subject to EMI causing it to fail. Even with a pinhole, the EMI was not directed toward one portion of the DUT. The entire FPGA failed.

4.3 Summary

This chapter discussed all the results obtained from the five tests to detect and diagnose errors within the DUT. Some tests were slightly successful. In short, some of the tests were able to validate the detection portion of the algorithm. The injected fault test was the only test to exercise the diagnosis part of the algorithm. This was expected since the entire experiment was run through hardware and was completely controlled by a user. It was disappointing the remaining tests were unable to fully allow for diagnosing single errors on a circuit. The gamma and thermal radiation test was able to detect single errors in the voter logic, but were not able to pinpoint the exact location of the fault. The gamma radiation test had its errors disappear most likely due to the SEEs only creating temporary damage. The thermal radiation test went beyond the thermal conductivity of silicon causing the DUT to fail completely. The optical laser test was not able to produce any real results because of the extra metal plating. Finally, the optical flash test caused enough EMI to create soft errors when the DUT was completely exposed. Attempting to pinpoint the flash did not help with any of the results. The pinhole in the end helped protect the chip from the EMI of the flash device. All in all, these tests do prove that circuits are still susceptible to multiple forms of radiation which provides an ample amount of

time and research to be performed to help mitigate errors within a circuit. All result logs can be found in Appendix I.

V. Conclusion

5.1 Chapter Overview

A final wrap up is discussed in this section along with notes and ideas for future work that could be completed to enhance this particular area of research. The conclusion covers the success of the implementation of the testing platform and diagnostic algorithm. The TDTMR conclusion is also discussed in this chapter.

5.2 Conclusion

The first step done for this thesis was correcting the multiple mistakes previously performed in this area described in Chapter 2. Along with correcting mistakes, three main goals were the focus of this research; construct a test platform to evaluate circuit designs under various forms of radiation, develop an algorithm to detect and diagnose errors within a circuit, and finally study a new design, TDTMR.

The first goal of constructing a test platform to evaluate a circuit while under radiation was accomplished. The test platform was fully developed to allow a DUT to be placed under hazardous conditions while the control board performs a full test vector evaluation. The test platform was also corrected and enhanced from previous designs and work that was done in this area of research. This platform was used in all five test setups and could be modified to adapt to other possible test setups. The entire test setup replaces numerous machines and countless man hours to setup a testing environment.

The goal of developing a method to detect errors and diagnose the location in real time was accomplished. The algorithm showed its full functionality during the manual injected test. The algorithm accurately detects single errors and was capable of locating them in the DUT. If multiple errors occurred at the same time, the algorithm can detect the incorrect outputs, but not

fully diagnose its location due to the scope of the algorithm. The final results within the logs showed that multiple errors were accounted for by this algorithm.

Finally, the goal of fully exercising the concept TDTMR was not fully tested with the current time constraints. However, corrections were made to the original design that was performed in previous research. The design correctly implements the TMR concept along with having the design fully laid out on the FPGA instead of being optimized. The results of a few test setups do, however, indicate that the voting logic is more susceptible to radiation damage than the three forms of adding logic. Overall, the TDTMR design is prepared and capable of being fully evaluated given the opportunity.

5.3 Future Work

There is a lot of opportunity for further research and studies within this area. Radiation effects on electronics continue to be a mystery. There are a lot of areas to investigate further from this research.

First, the TDTMR design should be more thoroughly investigated. The current research in this thesis does not fully cover all the possibilities that are out there. TDTMR has the opportunity to possibly be extremely effective. Having three differing forms of equal logic could demonstrate that one form of logic is more resilient to errors than another. TDTMR can then potentially be added to the hardening by design techniques if fully developed. TDTMR could be taken a step further by utilizing Xilinx's floor planner tool to place the different logic blocks in different areas of the FPGA.

Additionally, work could be done to perfect the algorithm to take into account of multiple bit errors. The algorithm currently is only able to detect for single errors but research and development of diagnosing multiple error locations could be expanded. Further research for

fault detection and diagnosis in sequential logic also could be looked into more significantly. Sequential logic is in more demand and developing an algorithm for detecting and locating faults would be significant.

Finally, the test platform developed in this research can be modified and utilized for other forms of radiation. The basic form of the platform is stable and has the potential to be used to examine other forms of radiation. Gamma radiation was the only form that was immediately available during this research. With more time, this platform could be used to characterize other forms of radiation.

The overall framework of this research has been ongoing. However, the research performed for this thesis provides a more solid foundation to take the concepts of testing and evaluating radiation effects on electronics to the next level. The goals of this research provides a better direction and heading for further studies in this field.

Appendices

Appendix A : Virtex 4 FX Series Mini-Module Datasheet

Found on CD > Appendix/FX12_man.pdf

Appendix B : Carry Look Ahead Adder Schematic

Found on CD > Appendix/full_cla.jpg

Appendix C : Ripple Carry Adder Schematic

Found on CD > Appendix/full_rc.jpg

Appendix D : Virtex II Pro Datasheet

Found on CD > Appendix/V2P_man

Appendix E : High Speed CMOS Hex Buffer Datasheet

Found on CD > Appendix/buffer_data.pdf

Appendix F : IC Socket with Capacitor Datasheet

Found on CD > Appendix/IC_socket.pdf

Appendix G : TESTCAD Tool Guide

Found on CD > Appendix/TESTCAD Tool Guide.pdf

Appendix H : Full Fault List

Found on CD > Appendix/cla_final_FL.xls

Found on CD > Appendix/rc_final_FL.xls

Appendix I : Result Logs

Found on CD > Appendix/RESULTS/

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