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EVALUATING THE AIR FORCE INSPECTION SYSTEM

THESIS  
MARCH 2018

Luis D. Rosado-Medina, Captain, USAF  
AFIT-ENS-MS-18-M-157

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE  
AIR UNIVERSITY  
AIR FORCE INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY

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EVALUATING THE AIR FORCE INSPECTION SYSTEM

THESIS

Presented to the Faculty

Department of Operational Sciences

Graduate School of Engineering and Management

Air Force Institute of Technology

Air University

Air Education and Training Command

In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the  
Degree of Master of Science in Logistics & Supply Chain Management

LUIS D. ROSADO-MEDINA, MA

Captain, USAF

March 2018

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AFIT-ENS-MS-18-M-157

EVALUATING THE AIR FORCE INSPECTION SYSTEM

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Abstract

SAF/IG implemented the Air Force Inspection System (AFIS) in 2013 following a USAFE pilot study into its potential for implementation across the Air Force. Using responsive constructive evaluation and content analysis of interviews as a methodology, AFIS was evaluated against the objectives laid out in AFPAD13-01. 18 interviews were conducted on 4 stakeholder groups across the inspection enterprise, which resulted in 4 overarching themes: Culture Shifts, Self-Assessment, Higher Headquarters Relationships, and PAD Objectives. This research allows SAF/IG to implement changes to future versions of AFIS that incorporates views from the field.

## Dedication

To my amazingly supportive and loving wife and children, my parents, and finally my close  
friends.

## Acknowledgments

I would like to give thanks to my advisor, Maj Breitbach, for the guidance and constant support he gave me as I worked my way through AFIT, and researched a topic I truly believed in. I also want to thank those folks I interviewed; I'm grateful for your candor, and insight. I only hope that I did you justice. Finally, to my classmates, I had so much fun and learned a lot from all of you. I would be proud to work with any of you any day.

Luis D. Rosado-Medina



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# EVALUATING THE AIR FORCE INSPECTION SYSTEM

## I. Introduction

### Overview

Secretary of the Air Force, Inspector General (SAF/IG) implemented the Air Force Inspection System (AFIS) in 2013 following a USAFE pilot study into its potential for implementation across the Air Force. According to Air Force Program Action Directive 13-01 (AFPAD13-01):

“The Inspector General (TIG) completed a comprehensive assessment of the effectiveness and efficiency of the AF Inspection System. TIG found the system to be wasteful, inadequate and unsustainable in the current and future resource environment. Over time, AF organizations had created over 100 inspections requiring 350+ inspection days over a 5-year span for most wings. These inspections—80% by AF Functionals, 20% by IG—were often done with inadequate cross-tell, resulting in an unsustainable burden on inspectors and inspected units. In addition, TIG found the system was not providing the kind of AF-wide unit performance data desired by AF senior leaders. The current system also does not fully meet Title 10 requirements for commanders and IGs to inspect and report on the efficiency, economy, state of discipline, and readiness of AF units.”

As a result of this, SAF/IG implemented AFIS as a means to correct these deficiencies. This program was designed to be a cultural change about getting Airmen to identify our problem areas so that we can work on them collectively (Mueller, 2013).

The intent of this research effort is to evaluate the program based on the objectives laid out in AFPAD13-01. In the 4 years since implementation, the prevailing culture in the Air Force to “embrace the red” (meaning to accept that there are deficiencies within our programs that will not be instantly corrected) has had effects on operations, it benefits the Air Force to determine what those effects have been.

## Background

In 2012, Lt Gen Rogers, SAF/IG, declared that the current Air Force Inspection System was unsustainable. “Given budget constraints, reduced manning, and increased taskings, headquarters and wings will not have the money, personnel, or time to execute the current system. And, we cannot solve our wings’ white-space problems simply by creatively scheduling/organizing external inspections to reduce their duration and frequency; we must fundamentally change the system.” (Rogers, 2012)

The 2010 governing guidance for inspector general activities spelled out broad categories of inspections including: Limited Inspections, Federal Recognition Inspections, Biological Select Agents and Toxins Inspections, Nuclear Weapons Related Materiel (NWRM) Inspections, Wounded Ill, and Injured (WII) Facility Inspections, FAM Evaluations and Assessments, Self-Inspections, Compliance Inspections (CI), Operational Readiness Inspections (ORI), Nuclear Surety Inspections (NSI), Nuclear Operational Readiness Inspections (NORI), Health Services Inspections (HSI), Field Inspections, Inspector General Directed Investigations (IGDI), and several other forms of audits (SAF/IGI, 2009). Within these broader categories of inspections and activities, smaller inspections, audits, and staff assistance visits would occur as well.



The burden of finding manning to conduct all these inspections, the cost of conducting all of these inspections, and the workload on the wings due to all of these inspections led the Chief of Staff of the Air Force in June of 2010 to direct all inspection agencies to map the current AF inspection system with emphasis on identifying primary consumers of wing “whitespace”. Whitespace was defined as time available to the wing not being consumed by other parties by means of inspections, visits, or HHQ exercises. There was also an attempt to reemphasize and reinvigorate the role of Gatekeepers, and develop and implement actions to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of the entire AF inspection system (Paris, 2011).

A Tiger Team was established and determined that the typical wing experiences 500+ days of inspection related activities over a 5 year period of time and left no “whitespace” to try to improve operations or train personnel in problem areas. Based on this finding, the Tiger Team determined that all inspections would need to be routed through the IG at the wing (or equivalent) level in order to deconflict the immense workload placed on units and inspectors, with the exception of inspections that have by-law requirements to be conducted by non-IG personnel.

Further, this team identified that coordination of the self-inspection data would be better served by consolidating the multitude of self-generated spreadsheets floating around into a system of record that could be analyzed at the MAJCOM/HAF level. MICT was realigned to provide units in AF Reserve Command (AFRC) with a means to quickly determine what checklists applied to each unit, what roles and responsibilities were needed, and the overall process to follow (Craig, 2013). This system allows multiple personnel in each unit access to populate the same checklist, provide input and feedback until the information is approved and locked by a supervisor (Mejia, 2011).

The most important piece of AFIS, however is the Commander’s Inspection Program (CCIP) and Unit Effectiveness Inspection (UEI) construct. The CCIP is composed of 2 pieces—a wing-level inspection program and a self-assessment program (Figure 1). The self-inspection program exists to provide the unit commander the capability to improve their unit where the rubber meets the road. Any deficiencies should be detected and reported into MICT at the local level. Waivers to requirements can be requested and approved at the appropriate level within MICT. Further, as life in the squadron is fluid, so should their current state of compliance as reporting is a continuous process. The wing level inspection program exists to assist commanders in validating their self-assessment programs (HQ USAF, 2013).




Figure 1 – Commanders Inspection Program (HQ USAF, 2013)

The UEI was a significant change in focus for MAJCOM IGs and MAJCOM staffs. The UEI validates and verifies a Wing’s CCIP and offers the MAJCOM Commander an independent

assessment of the unit in 4 major graded areas: Executing the Mission, Improving the Unit, Managing Resources, and Leading People (Figure 2).




Figure 2 – AFIS Major Graded Areas (MGA) and Sub-MGAs (HQ USAF, 2013)

These UEIs would also be conducted in a rotating manner, in order to reduce the overall footprint needed for inspection AF-wide with a 24-30 month inspection cycle for Active-Duty and AFRC Wings and a 48-60 month inspection cycle for ANG Wings. AFRC Wings will be inspected by HQ AFRC and gaining MAJCOM IGs on a 48-60 month cycle. This results in a UEI every 24-30 months based on a rotational schedule between AFRC and the gaining MAJCOM (HQ USAF, 2013).

Thanks to the use of virtual tools such as MICT and IGEMS, inspections could be continuous and further reduce the size of the inspection foot print. A continual evaluation period is used to build a “photo-album” of a Wing’s performance throughout the inspection cycle.

Virtual inspections, MAJCOM FAM inputs, Wing\* CC's Inspection Reports (CCIR), MICT data, Inspector General Evaluation Management System (IGEMS) data, and small-team on-site visits are just some of the inspection methods which are used (Figure 3). A MAJCOM IG-administered survey of each inspected Wing is conducted and included in the Leading People MGA. Finally, an on-site, capstone visit during which the MAJCOM IG conducts focus groups, interviews, task evaluations, audits and observations to complete the UEI (HQ USAF, 2013).




Figure 3 – MAJCOM IG's UEI Flow (HQ USAF, 2013)

### Purpose

The purpose of this research is to identify to what extent the changes that the Air Force has made targeted the problems it initially identified. Further, it seeks to determine what shortfalls remain and potentially identify fixes to fill those shortfalls. This has been a

dramatic change in mindset that we've asked Airmen to make, with emotions involved in some cases. This change has its benefits and its costs. Four years after implementation, it is time to decide how well the program has achieved its objectives.

### Research Question and Investigative Questions

The research question to be answered is "How has the Air Force Inspection System succeeded in achieving desired Program Action Directive objectives?" By taking a good look at the field, this research seeks to determine where AFIS has succeeded and where changes could be implemented to achieve the desired objectives. Specific investigative questions include:

1. How rigorous is the current implementation of AFIS in terms of providing analysis of the state of the inspected unit?
2. To what extent does the current implementation of AFIS provide AF senior leaders with AF-wide reporting IAW Title 10 requirements to report to the Congress on: readiness problems, readiness assessments, combatant command assigned mission assessments (not within the purview of AFIS), risk assessment of dependence on contractor support, combat support and related agencies assessment, major exercise assessments, and cannibalization rates?
3. Has there been a reduction in time spent preparing for inspection has AFIS achieved from the previous model where units spent 350+ days over 5 years on inspection prep.
4. How much of the responsibility of inspection has been moved back to unit commanders as a result of the implementation of AFIS?
5. In what ways can HHQ utilize system data to provide the field with actionable guidance to meet HHQ priorities?

## Research Focus

The research will focus on maintenance and mission support group squadrons from ACC and AMC. Data will also be pulled from MICT in order to bolster the validity of qualitative data pulled from subject matter experts. SAF/IG is sponsoring this research in order to see what potential policy changes are available to better report the effectiveness of the Air Force.

## Theoretical Lens

Lincoln and Guba's responsive constructivist evaluation is used as a theoretical lens to conduct this research. This theory proposes that program evaluation needs to take place in an atmosphere where the key stakeholders are able to provide their input into the evaluation, versus relying solely on the expertise of the evaluator in a vacuum (Guba & Lincoln, 1989). This lens provides a basis to conduct the interview portion of this research.

## Methodology

Chapter III discusses the qualitative and quantitative research methods used in researching success in meeting objectives of AFIS. To ascertain the opinions and values of a population, a qualitative research method was utilized to gain new insights from subject matter experts (SMEs). 19 SMEs were interviewed at the program management, squadron, wing, and MAJCOM IG level. The participants were asked questions in a semi-structured interview which enabled immediate feedback. This method allowed for the asking of questions that evolved from the interview, and provided clarification of answers. Data was collected via a digital recorder and

the researcher took notes during the interviews. All recordings were transcribed and the researcher coded and analyzed the data. Results were analyzed using descriptive statistics.

Quantitative data showing the number of observations that units reported and compared to the overall rating of their most recent UEI was pulled from MICT. ANOVA analysis was conducted to determine if there was a difference between groups that reported high number of observations and groups that reported low numbers of observations. This was done in an attempt to see if high levels of self-reporting actually resulted in a more robust UEI inspection.

### Research Goal

The main implication is that this research better enables SAF/IG to implement AFIS in a way that better meets the objectives assigned in AFPAD13-01. An improved reporting system ensures the integrity of the inspection system by not only identifying and documenting deficiencies and best practices, but also ensures Airmen expediently and efficiently correct broken processes and other identified deficiencies (Johnson, 2013). Further, this research serves as a reminder to the field that it is incumbent on us to evaluate the programs that we push down to ensure that we are getting everything we were supposed to get.

In summary, personnel concerned with the efficiency and efficacy of our inspection system could use this study and its results. The following chapters will provide a background of pertinent literature, the methodology, and the results from the interviews. The concluding chapter discusses the potential usage of the results from this research and new avenues of future research.

## II. Literature Review

### Overview

Program evaluation is often cited as an important element in determining the value of a program's socio-economic effects, often to the point of declaring whether or not the program is "successful" (Laihonen & Linzalone, 2015). Chapter 2 will establish the framework used to conduct research on the Air Force Inspection System and also review literature and theoretical frameworks used in program evaluation research. It is broken into two sections: discussion of theory, and an Air Force document review to identify decision maker objectives.

The USAF, as a public institution, is often the subject of internal and external program reviews and audits. These are often conducted unevenly, based on the expertise of the evaluators (Cowin, 1996). The results of evaluations on various defense projects have lasting impact on the readiness and effectiveness of the USAF. By evaluating the current practices utilized by SAF/IG, we are making an attempt to meet the intent of the IG to "continuously improve the AFIS so there is an ever-shrinking difference--both real and perceived--between mission readiness and inspection readiness" (SAF/IGI, 2009)

### Section I - Discussion of Theory

Ensuring that research is grounded in a solid framework provides researchers a roadmap for the way ahead. In the case of program evaluation, several different approaches are available each with its own benefits and shortcomings. The critical piece for the researcher is to have a solid understanding of what those are when deciding what method to follow (Cowin, 1996). The following paragraphs provide an overview of how academic research uses theory within the area of program evaluation.



## Fourth Generation Evaluation and the Responsive Model.

The most widely cited model on program evaluation is spelled out in Lincoln and Guba's 1989 book *Fourth Generation Evaluation*. Their book is a critique on what they see as three previous periods in the development of program evaluation: 1) Measurement, as exemplified in the ideas of Scientific Management from the 1900s to 1930s. 2) Description, which described patterns of strengths and weaknesses in regards to stated objectives and really set the stage for program evaluation from the 1930s to 1950s. 3) Judgement, where objectives or goals were also opened up to be evaluated from the 1960s to 1970s (Cowin, 1996).

Throughout all 3 periods there was an emphasis on maintaining a positivist world-view when it came to evaluating programs. This emphasis on finding the "truth" often came at the expense of ignoring problems of bias within research. This is not to say that other world-views "solve" the issue of researcher or subject bias. However, it is acknowledged and steps are taken to try to minimize any negative impact that bias will introduce (Kvale, 2007).

Lincoln and Guba had a number of critiques of the three previous periods. First, not evaluating the values adopted by the evaluators led to issues where consensus could not be reached, especially among disparate stakeholders. Lincoln and Guba described this as failing to accommodate value-pluralism. Second, the managerial focus of evaluations had a tendency to lead evaluations down a certain path, often pre-determined based on what management desired the evaluation to conclude. There are many anecdotal accounts of leadership pushing evaluators to certain conclusions about pet projects which show that this phenomenon is still very prevalent today. Finally, Lincoln and Guba felt that the over commitment to a quantitative approach removed context from the life of the program and resulted in weaker explanatory capabilities of evaluation (Guba & Lincoln, 1989).

Lincoln and Guba recommend a fourth generation of evaluation to flow from this history: responsive constructivist evaluation. Responsive evaluation was defined by Lincoln and Guba this way:

"Responsive evaluation was so named by its originator, Robert Stake, to signal the idea that all stakeholders put at risk by an evaluation have the right to place their claims, concerns and issues on the table for consideration (response), irrespective of the value system to which they adhere. It was created as the antithesis of preordinate evaluation, which assumes the evaluator and the client together possess sufficient information and legitimacy to design and implement an evaluation, without the need to consult other parties...."

Constructivism was added to this framework to develop a methodology that accepted that there is no objective, scientifically verifiable reality for humans to discover, and constructs would be necessary to develop any new knowledge from evidence gathered in the field (Cowin, 1996). To constructivists, how people view an object or event and the meaning that they attribute to it is what matters (Rubin & Rubin, 2012).

The steps of responsive constructivist evaluation can be summarized as:

1. Identify stakeholders
2. Introduce claims across all stakeholder groups
3. Claims that cannot be resolved by stakeholders become the responsibility of the evaluator to locate data for.
4. Negotiate among stakeholders for consensus (Cowin, 1996).

## Other Evaluation Models

The other mix of theories fall into one of three models: goal-based models, decision-making models, and connoisseurship models. Each has its benefit, but also have their limitations that made them less suitable for this study.

Goal-based models are designed to measure programs against stated goals. Their major limitation lies in the specificity of the goals at the time of formulation. There is a major insensitivity to second and third order effects, and there is an assumption made that you can find some form of quantitative measure that affords the researcher the capability to make an assessment.

Decision-making models have the benefit of being utilized while the major decisions of the program are being made. They tend to be quantitative and can have sophisticated methodologies. They can be single or multiple criterion decision support tools that provide decision makers with the data they need to make a quality decision. There are problems with decision-making models, however. They assume that the researcher has developed all possible alternatives and that decision makers have provided the researcher with all the pertinent values and criteria needed to come to the “right” answer. Further, in large organizations, determining who has the proper authority to make the decision is not always a straightforward process (Cowin, 1996).

Connoisseurship models rely on the technical expertise of the evaluator. This has been the preferred method of individual inspectors of the previous version of the Air Force Inspection System. Emphasis is placed on the person chosen to conduct the evaluation as no two experts will have the same value structures or weigh criterion equally. The major limitation of this model

is that it becomes difficult to determine whether or not the evaluator's perception is accurate (Cowin, 1996).

## Section II – Air Force Document Research

### Implementation Guidance

Understanding the regulatory guidance that implemented AFIS is a key requirement in conducting any sort of evaluation on that program. The configuration of AFIS is the responsibility of SAF/IG, in coordination with SECAF and CSAF and is implemented from guidance provided in AFPAD 13-01 using authorities listed in: SECAF and CSAF approved Inspection System Guiding Principles, 10 USC § 8020 Inspector General, 10 USC § 8583 Requirement of Exemplary Conduct, AFMD 1-20, The Inspector General, 23 April 2008, AFPD 90-2, Inspector General-The Inspection System, 26 April 2006, AFI 90-201, The Air Force Inspection System, 23 March 2012, and SAF/IG signed charter of the AFIS Implementation Tiger Team, 12 March 2013.

The Commander's Inspection Program (CCIP) is the foundation of the AFIS and is set up with two key components: 1) An inspection program executed by the wing level IG with support from subject-matter experts from the wing. 2) A self-assessment program utilizing the Management Internal Control Toolset (MICT) that reports compliance with requirements. AFIS is structured to inspect and report in accordance with four key areas: Managing Resources, Leading People, Improving the Unit, and Executing the Mission (HQ USAF, 2013). When the system was implemented there were two primary lines of effort, establishing inspection capability at the wing and headquarters actions to enable and support AFIS.

Inspections conducted above the wing level are called Management Inspections and are geared at inspecting selected Air Force and MAJCOM level programs. Unit Effectiveness Inspections (UEIs) are levied against wings and wing equivalent organizations by the MAJCOM IGs and the Air Force Inspection Agency, in the case of DRUs and FOAs. The intent of the UEI is not to identify specific cases of non-compliance, but rather to determine the quality of the CCIP for the wing commander. They are focused on helping the wing commander identify blind spots, poorly focused or misaimed sensors within their CCIP (USAF, 2015).

### TIG Briefs

The Inspector General regularly communicates with the field using TIG briefs, a quarterly newsletter detailing developments in the area of inspection. During the formulation of the current AFIS, Lt Gen Rogers wrote an article, dated March 2012, detailing the need for a change to the system as the previous version did not meet the requirements of the Air Force. He stated that the new system needed to strengthen the command function and effectiveness, and needed to motivate and promote military discipline and unit performance (Rogers, 2012).

This message to the field set up his successor, Lt Gen Mueller, to begin the hard work of pushing through AFIS and the UEI construct. He set the guiding principles that would be embodied in AFIS in his first TIG article, dated May 2012, where he stated that the common standards and goals would be:

- Correcting a lack of self “policing” is critical to AF future
- Inspection IS a command function
- The IG is a special duty

- Makes us Better
- Airman's time is the key issue
- Functional/Command balance is "out of balance"
- IG Inspection System is the vector
- Cost of Compliance is the key variable
- Squadron is the AF's organizational building block
- We need to be pit bulls

Several points from this article are now part of the core ethic of AFIS and the UEI construct: self-assessment, inspection being a commander's core responsibility, and compliance being a risk assessment to the overall mission.

#### Contribution

This research aims to apply the responsive model to the status of the Air Force Inspection System. The goal is to conduct semi-structured interviews in a way that allows for the application of the input from previous interviews as well as allow the conversations to progress organically. Based on the results, it should be readily apparent if the responsive model provides a good framework to evaluate other Air Force programs.

#### Conclusion

This chapter laid out the supporting literature and framework for program evaluation and the supporting documentation for the implementation of the AFIS. As seen in the reviewed research, it is imperative to understand methodology involved in conducting a worthwhile program evaluation. At the same time, it is necessary to have a firm understanding of the

program to be evaluated in order to maintain credibility. Chapter 3 will delve into the methodology to be utilized in this study.

### III. Methodology

#### Overview

Chapter 3 describes the qualitative approach taken to evaluate the Air Force Inspection System. Section 1 provides a review of qualitative research, the responsive constructivist evaluation methodology, and explains why this is the best method to evaluate the Air Force Inspection System. Section 2 discusses the steps used to acquire data, the interview subjects and guides, and the analysis process.

#### Section I – Qualitative Research – Responsive Constructivist Evaluation

Responsive constructivist evaluation was the primary tool that was used to conduct this research. Responsive constructivist evaluation is orientated on program activities versus program goals, and responds to the audience's needs versus predetermined information categories. Responsive constructivist evaluation was focused on by Guba and Lincoln in the 1980s, but was more fully developed by Robert Stake, who was an early advocate of qualitative methods for evaluating social programs (Shadish, Cook, & Leviton, 1991). Stake advocated for responsive evaluation:

“An evaluation probably will not be useful if the evaluator does not know the interests and language of his audiences. During the evaluation study, a substantial amount of time may be spent learning about the information needs of the persons for whom the evaluation is being done... To be of service and to empathize evaluation issues that are important for each program, I recommend the responsive evaluation approach” (Stake, 1980).



This was the best approach for this research because the subject matter is of high interest to many of the participants in the study, and it allowed a degree of flexibility needed to construct the interview guides and develop the thematic codes necessary in conducting qualitative research (Creswell, 2014).

### Applied Framework

The steps required to complete a responsive evaluation in a culturally sensitive framework have been summarized by Askew et al below (Askew, Beverly, & Jay, 2012):

1. Assemble the evaluation team. Attend to the sociocultural context of the evaluation by assembling a team of evaluators who are knowledgeable of and sensitive to the context.
2. Engage stakeholders. From beginning to end, seek out and involve members from all stakeholder groups, attending to distributions of power.
3. Identify evaluation purpose and intent. Examine the social and political climate of the program and the community in which it operates paying particular attention to equitable distribution of resources and benefits.
4. Frame the right questions. Using a democratic process, assess whether the evaluation questions reflect the concerns and values of all significant stakeholders including the end users.
5. Design the evaluation. Design comprehensive and appropriate evaluations that take advantage of qualitative and quantitative methods to examine and measure important cultural and demographic variables.
6. Select and adapt instruments. Instruments should be identified, developed, adapted and validated for the target population, using culturally sensitive language.

7. Collect the data. Select data collection methods that are appropriate and respectful of the cultural context of the program and the target population.
8. Analyze the data. Involve representatives from various stakeholder groups, as cultural interpreters, to review data and validate evaluators' inferences and interpretations.
9. Disseminate and utilize results. Distribute findings broadly using multiple modalities and in ways that are consistent with the original purpose of the evaluation and can be understood by a wide variety of audiences.

## Section II – Steps Taken

The approach taken had three significant steps (Figure 4). The preparatory actions included receiving sponsorship from SAF/IG on the research topic, coordinating IRB exemption status (see Appendix A for exemption determination letter), preparing the literature, selection of interview subjects, and the first iteration of the interview guides. The most important phase of the preparatory actions was in interviewee selection.




Figure 4 – Process Flow

The Data Collection and Analysis phases included conducting the interviews, coding, and the analysis required to get useable results from interview data. The results of this effort are

detailed in chapters 4 and 5. The following section details the process followed to identify the interview subjects.

### Selection Criteria

This research focused on SMEs from Active Duty and Air National Guard units within Air Combat Command (ACC) and Air Mobility Command (AMC). The first step was to determine the right mix of SMEs in terms of level of involvement in AFIS. Four levels of input for the CCIP were identified: MAJCOM IG, Wing commander, Squadron Commander, and Program Manager (USAF, 2015). The scope was limited to squadrons within maintenance and mission support groups. Those organization types are responsible for 35% of deficiencies on checklist items (see Figure 5).




Figure 5 – Deficiencies by Functional Area (MICT) (Maj Jesse Wales, AFIA/ETA, 2016)

After narrowing the scope of potential unit types, a list of potential units was generated utilizing PASCodesNet (which provides a list of all units in the AF) to generate a list of 2,031

ACC active duty and guard units. With this list, the maintenance and mission support units were filtered out, leaving 606 units. A random number generator (RNG) was applied and 9 ACC units and 10 AMC units were selected while also applying a proportional quota for the level of individual (MAJCOM IG, Squadron Commander, Wing Commander, or Program Manager). A RNG was applied to unit type assignments (i.e. Logistics Readiness SQ, Component Maintenance SQ, etc.) from the bases identified. If a base did not have a particular function (in the case of contracted functions), the RNG was reapplied to correct. This resulted in the following selections being made (Table 1):

Table 1 – Interview Subjects

Interview	Position	Command	Base	Unit
1	PM	ACC Guard	TINKER	FSS
2	WING/CC	ACC	NELLIS	WG
3	IG	AMC	SCOTT	IG
4	IG	AMC GUARD	SCOTT	IG
5	PM	AMC	DOVER	CS
6	PM	ACC	MOODY	SFS
7	CC	ACC	MOODY	EMS
8	CC	ACC GUARD	TINKER	CES
9	PM	AMC	TRAVIS	MXS
10	CC	AMC GUARD	Roland R. Wright ANGB, Utah	AMXS
11	PM	AMC GUARD	Roland R. Wright ANGB, Utah	LRS
12	IG	ACC	LANGLEY	IG
13	CC	AMC	DOVER	LRS
14	PM	ACC	LANGLEY	CONS
15	IG	ACC	LANGLEY	IG
16	IG	AMC	SCOTT	IG
17	CC	ACC	LANGLEY	MXS
18	CC	AMC	ROBINS	FSS

### Interview Guide and Process

After subjects were determined, they were contacted to determine availability and whether they would consent. Interviews were semi-structured and conducted over the phone. Audio was recorded as the subjects were all geographically separated from the interviewer. The interview guide was divided into four different types based on the varying expertise expected from respondents. The nature of assignments in the Air Force makes it likely that the individuals

assigned to each position do not have equal levels of experience. Therefore it becomes necessary to use the initial portion of the interview to gauge what level of experience that the individual has in their job. The interview then progressed into topics that sought to answer the investigative questions laid out. Those questions used the objectives laid out in AFPD13-01 as a starting point (e.g. What is your opinion about the amount of rigor provided by units in their self-assessments?)

Based on the answers provided by interviewee's, further inquiry followed along lines that capitalized on the interviewee's specific expertise (Kvale, 2007). After completing an initial set of 4 pilot interviews, the interview guide based on the input of from the respondents. See the initial set of interview guides in Appendix B.

### Initial Coding

Prior to conducting the interviews, the researcher speculated what sort of responses would be coming from the respondents based on the writing of Air Force officers in publications like the TIG Briefs, and commentaries seen in the development of the literature review and prior experience. Based on all of this, an initial listing of 38 generic sentiments was developed (Table 2):

Table 2 – Expected Sentiments

<u>Expected Sentiments</u>	
Change in Culture	Functionals do help
No Change in culture	System does report Title 10 Requirements well
Mindset still hasn't changed	System does not report Title 10 Requirements well
Mindset has changed	AFIS increases workload over previous model
Not Ok with having write ups	AFIS decreases workload over previous model
Ok with having write ups	Inspection does not belong to commanders
Not getting help with write ups	Inspection does belong to commanders
Help is provided with write ups	Rigor is lacking in this inspection system
HHQ is not helpful with guidance	Rigor is present in this inspection system
HHQ is helpful with guidance	We need more rigor
Field fights every single write up	We need less rigor
Field is understanding of write ups	CCIP is easily accomplished now
Field does not understand process	CCIP is very difficult to accomplish
Field does understand process	Units are resigned to accomplish
Culture has changed	Units are excited to accomplish
Culture is in process of changing	Self-Assessment is challenging to accomplish
Guidance is inadequate	Self-assessment is easy to accomplish
Guidance is adequate	Training program managers is difficult to accomplish
Functionals do not help	Training program managers is easy to accomplish

Additionally a list of research question related sentiments were also developed in order to aid in the content analysis of this research effort (Table 3):

Table 3 – Research Question Sentiments

<u>RQ Sentiments</u>	
Meeting PAD objectives	Self-assessment is not meeting rigor requirement
Not Meeting PAD objectives	There are many ways to improve guidance through system
AFIS reduces workload	There are not many ways to improve guidance through system
AFIS does not reduce workload	There are ways it improve guidance, just not through the system
Inspection is a commanders responsibility	
Inspection is not a commanders responsibility	
Self-assessment is meeting rigor requirement	
Self-assessment is exceeding rigor requirement	

Pilot Interviews

Four interviews (one from each group) were selected as the pilot interviews and additional inductive codes were developed. Inductive codes are developed after initial pilot interviews are conducted, generalizing from those individual interviews expressed sentiments onto the whole data set. Those inductive codes are below in Table 4.

Table 4 – Inductive Codes

<u>Inductive Codes</u>
AFIS increases redundancy
AFIS decreases redundancy
Risk based decision making is happening
Risk based decision making is not happening
AFIS stresses going through the chain
AFIS does not stress going through the chain
Expertise on staff is adequate



Expertise on staff is lacking
AFIS does not increase or decrease workload
Self-assessment is not easy or challenging to accomplish
Training program managers is not hard or easy to do
SAPM role is challenging
SAPM role is not challenging
SAPM role requires more than half of duty day
SAPM role requires less than half of duty day
Wartime requirements not captured by communicators
Wartime requirements are captured by communicators
AFIS is vulnerable to comm out
AFIS is not vulnerable to comm out
Manning is adequate
Manning is not adequate

### Coding Methodology

In order to accomplish coding, audio data was uploaded to Dedoose, a web-based platform for performing qualitative analysis. At this point, excerpts of interviewee responses could be created and coded. This allowed for coding to be accomplished in smaller batches and increased reliability. Figure 6 is an example of a demo audio file where excerpts were created and coded.




Figure 6 – Demo Audio Coded

This methodology allowed for multiple codes to be applied to the same excerpts, as multiple sentiments would be expressed in one question response.

#### Validity and Reliability

Shenton identified 14 techniques to ensure that validity remains high in qualitative research studies. Validity is trying to answer the question “How congruent are the findings with reality?” Table 5 details the tactics and means of implementation to ensure a high degree of validity (Shenton, 2004).

Table 5 – Validity Tactics

Tactic	Method to implement tactic
Using well established research methods	Content and Thematic Analysis has been the preferred means to conduct responsive evaluation (Cowin, 1996)
Developing a familiarity of the organizations culture	The researcher is a military professional with over 9 years experience in the field and has an appreciation for the culture of the Air Force.
Random sampling	Selection of units to interview was done using a random number generator to maximize random sampling

Triangulation	By examining data from MICT, IGEMS, conducting 18 interviews, and reviewing TIG documents, triangulation can be achieved
Tactics to help ensure honest in informants	In the selection process, the interviewees were given ample opportunity to refuse to participate to ensure that only those who were willing to participate did so.
Frequent debriefing sessions	Weekly sessions were conducted to ensure that interviewer was staying on track and provided perspective as to findings

Qualitative reliability is defined as having a consistent approach across different researchers and different projects (Creswell, 2014). Reliability was achieved by using the same methodology to code the interviews. Excerpts were created from each response provided by the interviewee. The coder then coded the particular excerpt in an effort to prevent being overloaded by too much information. This methodology was applied to every interview. 368 total excerpts were created from the 18 interviews. Other tactics to ensure reliability are in Table 6, from Creswell, include:

Table 6 – Reliability Tactics

Tactic	Method to implement tactic
Check transcripts to ensure there are no mistakes in transcription	Coding was accomplished directly from the audio files, and quality of the recording was tested prior to each interview
Ensure no drift in definition of codes	146 memos were written during coding process to keep codes consistent

Analysis

The procedures utilized to accomplish the analysis follow Creswell’s process depicted in Figure 7 (Creswell, 2014):




Figure 7 – Analysis Process Flow (Creswell, 2014)

Throughout this process, quality checks need to occur to ensure that code integrity is maintained throughout the research process. Normalized code counts and raw code counts were used for reporting due to disparate size groups. The normalization function, an option in a variety of Dedoose frequency charts, operates by assigning a weight of '1' to the class with the largest number of members (basis class) and then assigns weights to the other classes as a function of the numeric relation between the number of members in the class to that of the number of members in the 'basis' class. These weights are then used to adjust the number of raw counts to accomplish ratio equivalence across class for visualization. The weighted percentage is calculated based on these adjusted counts (Dedoose, 2018).

For example, if we are interested in the relative percentage of codes applied for “manning is not adequate” across groups, we calculate as follows in Table 7:

Table 7 – Normalization Calculation

Groups	# of Class Members	Assigned Weight (basis class/class count)	Raw Code Count	Adjusted Count (count x weight)	Weighted %
Program Managers	6 (tied for basis)	1 (6/6)	3	3 (3 x 1)	3.4%
Squadron Commanders	6 (tied for basis)	1 (6/6)	4	4 (4 x 1)	4.5%
Wing Commanders	1	6 (6/1)	11	66 (11 x 6)	74.5%
IG Personnel	5	1.2 (6/5)	13	15.6 (13 x 1.2)	17.6%
				88.6 (sum of adjusted count)	

Applying normalization to the wing commander group benefits the research by not allowing the contribution of the group to be lost. This can be seen by comparing Figure 8 and Figure 9.




Figure 8 – Raw Theme Totals by Group




Figure 9 – Normalized Totals by Group

### Report Comparisons

Additional statistical analysis was attempted to determine if there is a statistical relationship between the results of a units last UEI and the current number of deficiencies noted by that units self-assessment program. ANOVA techniques were attempted to see if there were different groups within the 5 potential grade groups (Outstanding, Highly Effective, Effective, Marginally Effective, and Unsatisfactory).

Data queried from the Inspector General Evaluation Management System (IGEMS) to get AMCs and ACCs UEI results from 1 October 2013 to 1 October 2017. This resulted in a list of

scores and wing designations. Data was requested from AMC and ACC IGI for report of deficiencies self-reported through the self-assessment program.

### Assumptions and Limitations

This research assumes that the personnel interviewed are representative of personnel in the field that are an integral part of AFIS. It is also assumed that the data pulled from MICT is accurate. Stating these assumptions allowed the researcher to generalize the results of the study to ACC and AMC at large.

As to the data analysis, the following limitations applied: data analysis conducted by the researcher meant that he or she must interpret the data, but the limitation of interpretation is unavoidable (Charmaz, 2006). The researcher's non-presence in the in-person interviews may provide a source of bias, and the use of semi structured interviews allows a variety of information to come from the interviews which may not be comparable to other participants. Other interview limitations included the indirect information filtered through the viewpoints of the participants, and that not all people were equally perceptive and articulate (Creswell, 2014).

## IV. Analysis and Results

### Overview

Interview and document data revealed that there are many areas where the inspection system is meeting the intent of the PAD, however there are several aspects where improvement could be made. Making a concerted effort towards changing the culture regarding inspection between Active Duty and Guard Units would go a long in meeting the PAD objectives. Targeting manning decisions to allow the staff to reap the benefits of the system data provided. Additionally, educating commanders on the risk based methodology that AFIS depends on would improve the overall quality of the system data available to the staff. The following paragraphs discuss the results of the interview data analysis, answer the research and investigative questions laid out in Chapter 1, provided additional insights garnered from the research.

### Report Comparison

ANOVA did not result in a useful product as there is simply not enough variation in the outcome variable (Inspection Score). The AMC score report resulted in 21 inspections, all scored as “Effective” (Table 8)

Table 8 – AMC Inspection Results

Unit	Inspection Window	Final Score
**Masked**	07Dec2015 - 11Dec2015	Effective
**Masked**	09Jul2016 - 18Jul2016	Effective
**Masked**	20Feb2015 - 27Feb2015	Effective
**Masked**	02Mar2015 - 22May2017	Effective
**Masked**	01Feb2015 - 10Apr2017	Effective
**Masked**	13Jul2015 - 17Jul2015	Effective



**Masked**	01Nov2016 - 30Jan2017	Effective
**Masked**	07Apr2016 - 18Apr2016	Effective
**Masked**	14Feb2015 - 01May2017	Effective
**Masked**	14Oct2015 - 24Oct2015	Effective
**Masked**	02Feb2015 - 10Feb2015	Effective
**Masked**	25Apr2016 - 31Jul2017	Effective
**Masked**	09May2016 - 23May2016	Effective
**Masked**	03Dec2016 - 12Dec2016	Effective
**Masked**	07Apr2016 - 18Apr2016	Effective
**Masked**	15Sep2014 - 12Dec2016	Effective
**Masked**	09Jan2015 - 11Jan2015	Effective
**Masked**	22Jun2015 - 26Jun2015	Effective
**Masked**	03Mar2015 - 22May2017	Effective
**Masked**	04Aug2015 - 07Aug2015	Effective
**Masked**	25Jan2016 - 29Jan2016	Effective

ACCs score report resulted in 43 inspections with four scores that were not “Effective”, one “Outstanding” and three “Marginally Effective” (Table 9).

Table 9 – ACC Inspection Results

Unit	Inspection Window	Rating
**Masked**	09Dec2013 - 13Dec2013	Effective
**Masked**	28Feb2016 - 05Mar2016	Effective
**Masked**	11Aug2014 - 18Aug2014	Effective
**Masked**	31Jul2016 - 06Aug2016	Effective
**Masked**	31Mar2014 - 05Apr2014	Effective
**Masked**	10Apr2016 - 16Apr2016	Effective
**Masked**	21Apr2015 - 25Apr2015	Effective
**Masked**	14Jun2015 - 19Jun2015	Effective
**Masked**	11Jun2017 - 17Jun2017	Effective

**Masked**	24Apr2016 - 30Apr2016	Outstanding
**Masked**	03Nov2016 - 10Nov2016	Effective
**Masked**	22Feb2015 - 28Feb2015	Effective
**Masked**	10Sep2017 - 16Sep2017	Effective
**Masked**	24Feb2017 - 26Feb2017	Effective
**Masked**	03Mar2017 - 05Mar2017	Effective
**Masked**	28Feb2017 - 02Mar2017	Effective
**Masked**	15Sep2014 - 23Sep2014	Effective
**Masked**	23Oct2016 - 29Oct2016	Effective
**Masked**	08Nov2015 - 13Nov2015	Effective
**Masked**	09Feb2017 - 15Feb2017	Effective
**Masked**	28Feb2016 - 05Mar2016	Effective
**Masked**	23Aug2015 - 29Aug2015	Effective
**Masked**	24Sep2017 - 30Sep2017	Effective
**Masked**	22Mar2015 - 28Mar2015	Effective
**Masked**	12Mar2017 - 18Mar2017	Effective
**Masked**	31Jan2016 - 06Feb2016	Effective
**Masked**	13Mar2016 - 19Mar2016	Effective
**Masked**	16Nov2015 - 20Nov2015	Effective
**Masked**	17Sep2017 - 23Sep2017	Effective
**Masked**	13Sep2015 - 19Sep2015	Effective
**Masked**	17Sep2017 - 23Sep2017	Marginally Effective

**Masked**	01Nov2015 - 07Nov2015	Effective
**Masked**	28Feb2016 - 05Mar2016	Effective
**Masked**	01Jun2015 - 17Jun2015	Effective
**Masked**	05Jun2017 - 16Jun2017	Effective
**Masked**	14Nov2016 - 18Nov2016	Marginally Effective
**Masked**	31Mar2014 - 05Apr2014	Effective
**Masked**	10Apr2016 - 16Apr2016	Effective
**Masked**	01Nov2015 - 07Nov2015	Effective
**Masked**	10Jan2016 - 16Jan2016	Effective
**Masked**	14Nov2016 - 18Nov2016	Effective
**Masked**	14Nov2016 - 18Nov2016	Effective
**Masked**	14Nov2016 - 18Nov2016	Marginally Effective

As a result of only having 6% of inspections earning scores outside of “Effective”, it would not be feasible to interpret an ANOVA result on these groups. This does highlight a weakness in the Air Force’s compliance reporting: with 94% of units receiving a middle score, defending this scoring system to outside agencies would be difficult, especially if that outside agency attempts a similar

### Themes Analysis

Interviews were coded according to the codes listing. This provided a way to tally the amount of times a code was used or referenced and provided a means to determine which theme was most important. Codes were then arranged into themes and initial statistics were looked at to determine relative importance of each theme. Table 10 shows the theme list totals.

Table 10 – Thematic Statistics and Total Coding Totals

Theme	Theme Total	Theme %	Code	Total	Code	Total
Culture	206	24.55%	Change in Culture	22	Culture has changed	18
			No Change in Culture	8	Culture is in process of changing	31
			Mindset still hasn't changed	19	AFIS increases redundancy	17
			Mindset has changed	35	AFIS reduces redundancy	12
			Not Ok with having writeups	8	Risk based decisionmaking is happening	20
			Ok with having writeups	6	Risk based decision making is not happening	10
					Culture Totals	206
HHQ Relationship	209	24.91%	Not Getting help with writeups	3	Functionals do not help	12
			Help is provided with writeups	16	Functionals do help	13
			HHQ is not helpful with guidance	19	AFIS stresses going through chain	25
			HHQ is helpful with guidance	29	AFIS does not stress going through chain	1
			Field fights every single write up	4	There are many ways to improve guidance through system	5
			Field is understanding of write ups	11	There are not many ways to improve guidance through system	5
			Field does not understand process	11	There are ways to improve guidance, just not through system	11
			Field does understand process	19	Expertise on staff is adequate	3
			Guidance is inadequate	10	Expertise on the staff is lacking	5
			7			
					HHQ Totals	209
PAD Objectives	172	20.50%	System does report Title 10 Requirements well	4	Not meeting PAD objectives	29
			System does not report Title 10 Requirements well	14	AFIS reduces workload	4
			AFIS increases workload over previous model	23	AFIS does not reduce workload	24
			AFIS decreases workload over previous model	8	AFIS does not increase or decrease workload	2
			Inspection does not belong to commanders	2	Inspection is a commanders responsibility	18
			Inspection does belong to commanders	17	Inspection is not a commanders responsibility	3
			24			
					PAD Objectives Totals	172
Self Assessment	252	30.04%	Rigor is lacking in this inspection system	21	Training program managers is easy to accomplish	3
			Rigor is present in this inspection system	15	Self assessment is meeting rigor requirement	19
			We need more rigor	16	Self assessment is not meeting rigor requirement	5
			We need less rigor	2	Self assessment is exceeding rigor requirement	1
			CCIP is easily accomplished now	8	SAPM role is challenging	15
			CCIP is very difficult to accomplish	15	SAPM role is not challenging	2
			Units are resigned to accomplish	6	SAPM role requires more than half of duty day	3
			Units are excited to accomplish	6	SAPM role requires less than half of duty day	5
			Self Assessment is challenging to accomplish	22	War time requirement not captured by communicators	7
			Self Assessment is not easy or challenging to accomplish	16	War time requirement is captured by communicators	5
			Self assessment is easy to accomplish	5	AFIS is vulnerable to comm out	2
			Training program managers is difficult to accomplish	7	AFIS is not vulnerable to comm out	0
			Training program managers is not hard or easy to do	5	Manning is adequate	10
				Manning is not adequate	31	
Theme Totals	839				Self-Assessment Totals	252

Figure 10 provides a comparison of the total code count by theme by groups. Based on the strict totals, the majority (30%) of the codes come from the Self-Assessment codes and the smallest contribution (20%) come from the PAD Objectives codes.




Figure 10 – Code Totals by Theme

Within the Self-Assessment theme, there were three sub themes that emerged as strong findings: Rigor, Organizational Implementation, and Individual Implementation. Of the 252 Self-Assessment Theme code applications, 91 (36%) came from the Rigor sub theme, 119 (47%) came from the Organizational Implementation sub theme, and 42 (16%) came from the Individual Implementation sub theme. Figure 11 provides normalized counts of the code occurrences within each of the sub themes.




Figure 11 – Normalized Sub Theme Counts

## Results

Once all of the interviews were coded, tables organized around whether or not the theme was treated positively or negatively by the interviewee were generated. The purpose was to see the overall impression that groups have towards the efficacy of AFIS. For example, comparing tables of Self-Assessment codes produces Figure 12:




Figure 12 – Self-Assessment Sentiments

Figure 12 indicates that the Air Force does not man the inspection system in an adequate fashion, being identified 31 times. It also says that the Air Force, over all groups, is meeting the rigor requirements. There were 3 neutral categories of response within this particular theme.

They were used once it was determined that it was a repeated sentiment response.

Code co-occurrence was also examined. This looks at the excerpts where multiple codes are attached and counts the co-occurrence of 2 codes. Table 11 is a portion of the entire code co-

occurrence chart. This metric pinpointed which codes were good candidates for combining or were more important to the overall theme. It also assisted in ensuring reliability as shifts in code meaning can be identified when unlike codes become more prevalent together. This acts as a trigger for the researcher to go back and ensure that coding those excerpts that way was appropriate.

Table 11 – Portion of Code Co-Occurrence Table

	C01 - Change in Culture	P06 - Inspection does belong to commanders	S08 - Units are excited to accomplish	S26 - Manning is not adequate	S25 - Manning is adequate	S24 - AFIS is not vulnerable to comm out	S23 - AFIS is vulnerable to comm out	S22 - War time requirement is captured by communicators	S21 - War time requirement not captured by communicators	S20 - SAPM role requires less than half of duty day	S19 - SAPM role requires more than half of duty day	S18 - SAPM role is not challenging	S17 - SAPM role is challenging	S16 - Self-assessment is exceeding rigor requirement	S15 - Self-assessment is not meeting rigor requirement	S14 - Self-assessment is meeting rigor requirement	S13 - Training program managers is easy to accomplish	S12a - Training program managers is not hard or easy to do	S12 - Training program managers is difficult to accomplish	
P09 - AFIS reduces workload	3	1								1									1	
P10 - AFIS does not reduce workload	3	1		9	1				1		3		7		2	1	1			
P10a - AFIS does not increase or decrease workload																1				
P11 - Inspection is a commanders responsibility	4	11	2	3	1				1				1		1	2				
C02 - No Change in Culture		1											1							
C03 - Mindset still hasn't changed	2	3		1					2				1							
C04 - Mindset has changed	23	3		2					1	2	3		3						3	1
C05 - Not Ok with having writeups	1	1							3											
C06 - Ok with having writeups	4			1												2				
C07 - Culture has changed	5		1													2				

Table 11 shows that there were 7 instances where SAPM role is challenging intersected with AFIS does not reduce workload. Those 2 codes were identified during the initial coding session as most likely being identified together.

### Investigative Question #1

How rigorous is the current implementation of AFIS in terms of providing analysis of the state of the inspected unit?

This was a critical investigative question. As a result, a larger series of codes was developed along with three sub themes to help in answering the question from the position of experts that use this system. The overall result of asking whether or not self-assessment as



currently implemented throughout the units is that we are meeting a perceived self-assessment requirement. There is some indication that we could benefit from integrating more rigor into the self-assessment process, but there is also an indication that units are not eager to take on the additional workload to accomplish this.

Examining the rigor component of this question requires a look at the rigor components of the self-assessment codes. Figure 13 gives the rigor themed normalized code counts across groups. The program managers and IG personnel give high levels of agreement that we are meeting the rigor requirement as stated in the AFI.




Figure 13 – Normalized Rigor Code Counts

Figure 14 gives an indication as to why units are not eager to attempt to improve the system at their level. The primary reason is Wing Commanders and IG personnel believe that the manning associated in AFIS (SAPMs, Wing IG offices, MAJCOM IG offices, etc.) is insufficient to complete the job now.




Figure 14 – Normalized Organization Implementation Code Counts

Figure 15 is a representation of the view from the individuals that do the leg work of the inspection system. There is a wide disparity of how much daily input goes into a self-assessment program, but there is wide agreement between Program Managers, Squadron Commanders, and Wing commanders that the SAPM role is challenging.




Figure 15 – Normalized Individual Implementation Counts

### Program Managers

Program managers believe that the self-assessment is meeting the rigor requirement needed to provide adequate information about the status of their unit’s compliance. There were no negative codes associated with program managers on this particular topic. When asked whether or not there was rigor in the responses, there were slightly more negative responses expressed. Figure 16 gives the Self-Assessment theme codes arranged by agreement/disagreement.

As to the difficulties associated with running a self-assessment program, the codes captured a sense that it was moderately difficult to accomplish. This can be seen in Figure 16, in

the codes CCIP is easily accomplished now, Units are excited to accomplish, Self-Assessment is not easy or challenging to accomplish, and Self-Assessment is easy to accomplish.




Figure 16 – Program Manager Self-Assessment Codes

There were some differences in opinion depending on how much experience program managers had in program evaluation. A newer SAPM had this to say about the difficulty in running a newer program:

"I would say my biggest challenge is the system. I feel like I can navigate it well enough, but telling where my people are at, and figuring out what questions they've

answered and what checklists they've completed, and all the associated management related is my biggest challenge right now."

This SAPM felt that determining where their program managers are in terms of meeting their reporting obligations can be a real challenge. They have the support of their local IG team to help them navigate MICT, but there is still a pretty steep learning curve for someone who has not spent a lot of time in program management/evaluation.

A more experienced SAPM looked at the inspections from the MAJCOM and Wing differently:

"I don't call them inspections, we get an opportunity to educate the unit, help identify their blind spots, do some risk based sampling in areas and programs that their commander should be aware of, educate them on things that, hey this is where you could do better, and also point out any weaknesses or problems in their programs so they can improve."

This more experienced program manager views the MAJCOMs role to assess the wings inspection program, not to inspect it. The key difference is that assessment provides the unit an opportunity to improve, where inspection happens in a moment in time.

#### Squadron Commanders

Squadron commanders view the current state of the self-assessment component of AFIS as meeting the stated objectives, however they all believe that there is ample room for rigor to be increased in the system. A squadron commander expressed that by only going in 2 times a year, they were much more motivated to ensure that the entries that were put into the self-assessments were of high quality. Doing them monthly invites a level of complacency that is difficult to ferret out, especially in the absence of a strong outside look:

"Overall we had better rigor when we only had to do this in September and March, and the reason for that is because it's so run of the mill now, that we don't feel we have to try that hard."




Figure 17 – Squadron Commander Self-Assessment Codes

An examination of Figure 17 shows that there was no agreement with the sentiment that we apply too much rigor to the system. There was also a neutral response that the AF is exceeding the rigor requirement.

## Wing Commanders

Wing commanders are extremely skeptical regarding the amount of rigor being applied in self-assessment (Figure 18). They view these commander programs as needing to have some sort of strong guidance from HHQ to ensure that the right sorts of activities are regarded as being “above the line” activities. When asked to rate how he viewed self-assessment being conducted in the squadrons, this wing commander had this to say:

“Very hit or miss. Its very Commander dependent, like everything is. But the commander only has so much time and energy to focus on things. So, to the extent that a commander focuses on it you're going to get good stuff out of it. But to the extent that a commander is doing other things that might be just as important or more so at the time and you're depending on that frontline guy to fill out the checklist right, that's when you see a lot of unidentified non-compliance start creeping in”




Figure 18 – Wing Commander Self-Assessment Codes

Inspector General Personnel

IG personnel are much more evenly split as to whether or not there is sufficient rigor in the inspection system (Figure 19). They do agree that the amount of rigor that is present in the system is sufficient to meet the requirement as it is currently laid out, however. There is also a huge concern that the amount of manning that is present within the inspection enterprise is



insufficient to meet the need of eliminating the blind spots that are present in every unit. One IGI member had this to say on the topic:

“Due to manning cuts at the various 2 letter levels, Continual Eval is not occurring in a robust enough fashion and we’re concerned that the issues that are being identified by the field that could have policy solutions are not being addressed by the staff.”




Figure 19 – IG Personnel Self-Assessment Codes

## Overall

The Air Force is meeting a perceived self-assessment rigor requirement. There is some indication that there could benefit from integrating more rigor into the self-assessment process, but there is also an indication that units are not eager to take on the additional workload to accomplish this.

### Investigative Question #2

To what extent does the current implementation of AFIS provide AF senior leaders with AF-wide reporting IAW Title 10 requirements to report to the Congress on: readiness problems, readiness assessments, combatant command assigned mission assessments (not within the purview of AFIS), risk assessment of dependence on contractor support, combat support and related agencies assessment, major exercise assessments, and cannibalization rates?

There is disagreement between IG personnel and Wing Commanders on whether or not Title 10 requirements are being met. Figure 20 shows the overall count of expressed agreement/disagreement from the stakeholder groups on the code “Does the AF meet its Title 10 requirements for reporting?”




Figure 20 – System does report Title 10 requirements

### Program Managers

AFI 90-201 require commanders to appoint Program Managers to record self-assessments and appoint other assessors to conduct assessments based on the communicators assigned. They act as a primary quality control for the assessments conducted throughout the unit before they reach the commander for approval. Thus, these individuals are in a unique position within the unit’s inspection regime and possess key insights at the unit level.

Looking at the rates of positive and negative response from program managers to questions geared at this IQ gives the overall impression that there is a slightly positive

impression that the Air Force is meeting its Title 10 responsibilities. Figure 21 below explains in greater detail the particular code counts.




Figure 21 – Program Manager PAD Objective Sentiments

Program managers largely acknowledge that AFIS now provides the commander of the unit much more of an up to date understanding of the status of the compliance programs s/he is responsible for. This fits very much in line with meeting PAD objectives and allows for accurate reporting to the Congress IAW Title 10. One program manager described the benefits of the current system over the previous system this way:

"I think this system makes the commander maintain a higher knowledge level of his squadron throughout the year, versus the old system where they didn't really find out until right before the inspection"

## Squadron Commanders

Squadron commanders were in a better position to answer specifically whether or not Title 10 requirements were being accomplished. The overall sentiment regarding Title 10 requirements was negative, by more than 2 to 1. Looking at the overall PAD objectives, however, show that squadron commanders are more positive in thinking that AFIS is meeting its PAD objectives. There is a strong sentiment that the current inspection model increases workload over the previous model, as seen in Figure 22.




Figure 22 – Squadron Commander PAD Objective Sentiments

The main problem squadron commanders have with believing that AFIS is an improvement on reporting title 10 requirements was summed up by a commander below:

"If we're trying to report on readiness, that's why we have the ART, SORTS, DRRS, AF-IT, all that kinda of stuff. And that's not inspectable as far as compliance goes. So I don't know if... I think they're cousins, but I don't think they're brothers."

They view all of the actions conducted by the wing IG and MAJCOM IG and don't see where these compliance-focused inspections equate to providing readiness data that is required. The preponderance of operational communicators are geared at answering whether or not units stay within the limits of what's provided by AFI, and do not address the detailed activities that are requested through ART, SORTS, DRRS, AF-IT, etc. The by-law communicators are even more focused on the compliance activities that the individuals that are appointed to positions of responsibility have taken. As a result, AFIS has not made a difference in reporting readiness and, as it is required to report to the Wing on a monthly basis, takes more of a commander's time than the previous model did.

#### Wing Commanders

Wing Commanders tend to be ambivalent as to whether or not we are meeting Title 10 requirements or PAD objectives (Figure 23). They are much more of the opinion that AFIS increases the workload on their staffs to accomplish inspection, however.




Figure 23 – Wing Commander PAD Objective Sentiments

A wing commander had this to say when asked as to whether or not Title 10 objectives were being met:

“I would say no from those kinds of areas. We're more in line when it comes to by law programs and inspections that need to be done. In those areas that actually does a good job. My IGI breaks out all the inspections that we're going to do throughout the year and it clearly delineates which ones are by law inspections that we got to get done. With that we prioritize appropriately and get those inspections done. To the extent that there are other title 10 things, like you mentioned reporting on readiness and some of those other things, it has not been my experience at those things lend themselves, particularly readiness, to the IG process.”

## Inspector General Personnel

IG personnel were strongly of the opinion that AFIS does not meet Title 10 requirements for readiness reporting (Figure 24). Further they were even more strongly of the opinion that AFIS is not meeting its PAD objectives as defined. Many of the individuals interviewed from the different IG staffs were very excited to describe the newer readiness exercises that are being rolled out over the next few years.




Figure 24 – IG Personnel PAD Objective Sentiments

These individuals recognized that there is a significant gap in the system that they hope to fill by reintroducing readiness inspections. The understanding is that the current version of AFI 90-201 does have readiness inspection requirements, however they are at the discretion of the wing commander. Therefore, many commanders are taking the risk of only accomplishing



smaller taskings to reduce the overall cost in time and money that a full-up inspection would incur.

#### Overall

There is an agreement between IG personnel, squadron commanders, and wing commanders that Title 10 readiness reporting requirements are not being met with the current implementation of AFIS. This sentiment is best summed up by an IG member

“I think there has been some concern on whether or not this system is able to give a good read to senior leaders on whether or not the wings are able to do what they need to do. Now having said that I think the senior leadership is a little bit culpable in not answering the question, ready for what?”

#### Investigative Question #3

Has there been a reduction in time spent preparing for inspection that AFIS achieved from the previous model where units spent 350+ days over 5 years on inspection prep.

This particular question can be answered by focusing on the culture-themed codes. By looking to see if there is an acknowledgement of a cultural shift, then we would see a reduction in time spent on “inspection prep”. As culture takes years to move in any direction, we are more likely to see the climate change first, which is what we see when examining the agreement and disagreement codes between all stake holder groups. Figure 25 shows that the IG and Wing Commander groups view the culture as largely the same as before the implementation of AFIS, where Squadron Commanders and Program Managers see that there has been a change in culture and the way they approach inspection.




Figure 25 – Normalized Percentage of Culture Codes by Group

### Program Managers

Program Managers tend to respond positively that the culture has changed in the Air Force when it comes to inspection prep and the nature inspection in general by about a 2 to 1 ratio, as can be seen in Figure 26. They also agree that there is a reduction in redundancy in inspection, now that gatekeepers are in place to try to de-conflict inspections from within the AF and also from outside agencies. One program manager gave this insight:

“My impression is that outside agencies are using the gatekeeper process which helps limit and de-conflict the number of inspections that we are faced with. Where possible, the agencies are furnished with preexisting data from self-assessment that also helps in limiting the redundancy of inspections from outside agencies.”




Figure 26 – Program Manager Culture Sentiments

### Squadron Commanders

Squadron Commanders are very much of the opinion that the overall culture and mindset around inspection has changed in accordance with the PAD objectives (Figure 27). They acknowledge that day to day actions are simply documenting the mission and do not consider the effort made in that documentation to be “inspection prep”. One squadron commander summed up the effort this way:

“Its leadership walking around and making sure that were in accordance with and doing things the right way. It’s a little bit old school. We’re holding folks accountable for using their tech data, and doing the right steps and using the right tools, and that’s where it starts. Its start with that discipline and accountability. No inspection system is going to work if you don’t have that”.




Figure 27 – Squadron Commander Culture Sentiments

### Wing Commanders

Wing Commanders view this issue of inspection prep differently than the squadron commanders. As they are required to staff the inspector general position “out of hide”, they are finding that finding qualified personnel to step into the role of inspector is eating up the time savings that they were supposed to receive from not “preparing”. Further the monthly CIMB requirement is non-trivial for the wing as a whole. A wing commander delved into the topic of second order effects from pulling manpower from organizations to fill what they view as a tax:

“... but the second and third order effects of taking this high man hour intensive inspection on at the wing level, and doing it out of hide is that other things where you pulled these bodies from, their workload goes up. So, my IGI is populated by two people from The Defenders, 2 TSgts that made master sergeant from the defenders, so that's work that ain't being done down in security forces. My chief

of IGI comes from one of the medical squadrons, a major completely out of hide and that's work that ain't being done down there. That's the other workload that's affected that isn't captured well.”

There was consensus that, at the unit level, the culture of preparing for inspection has diminished, however there are concerns at each unit as well about what this does:

“I think that part of it worked pretty much as required or as advertised. But just because less prep means you're going to end up with more time to be ready. I think there's still in my mind an open question of Commander's inspecting themselves and finding blind spots. Part of prepping for the IG to come was that you didn't know what you didn't know, and the unknown unknowns as the former Secretary of Defense said, so you try to find all the unknown unknowns as best you can. Now when you're inspecting yourself, and you are the only review of what you did, I don't have a lot of confidence at my blind spots are being covered.”

Figure 28 shows raw counts for culture sentiments expressed by Wing Commanders. There is a good indication here that the Wing Commander view is that there has not been much culture change as of yet.




Figure 28 – Wing Commander Culture Sentiments

### Inspector General Personnel

Inspector General Personnel are not under the impression that AFIS is complete in its culture change mission to reduce inspection prep. Figure 29 indicates that IGIs view a non-trivial amount of difference between reserve units and active duty units, where reserve units are still trying to stick to their previous model of preparing for inspection immediately prior to the inspection. MAJCOM IGI personnel had this to say when asked if they were seeing reductions in inspection prep type actions:

“I’d say we still have a way to go, especially in our Air National Guard units.

There are some pretty strong indications that a lot of them still put a ton of effort into getting ready for the inspections. We are making incremental progress, what challenges us most in turning concept into reality is the lack of capacity to actually do continual evaluation over the 5-year cycle for guard units and 2-year cycle for active wings in terms of the steady-state you’re always getting feedback

from your functional stove pipe and a bunch of feedback at the capstone, so we still have that problem of most of the Wings feedback is coming in two doses, midpoint and a capstone. And what they're getting from the over the horizon continual evaluation it's still pretty thin so that's the biggest thing that probably still allows Wings to still live in the model of we can let things degrade to a degree and then just bump up the level of performance to please inspectors when they get there.”




Figure 29 – IG Personnel Culture Sentiments

### Overall

The IG and Wing Commander groups view the culture as largely the same as before the implementation of AFIS. Squadron Commanders and Program Managers state that there has been a change in culture and the way they approach inspection. Wing commanders and IG personnel view units that will ramp up prior to inspections, which they believe go against the goals and aims of operationalizing inspection. Squadron level personnel believe that the ramp up

is minimal and should be done to prevent losing face to outside organizations, and is simply human nature, however there has been a massive reduction in time spent on preparing for inspection as compared to the previous system.

#### Investigative Question #4

How much of the responsibility of inspection has been moved back to unit commanders as a result of the implementation of AFIS?

This question can be answered by recording two standalone codes. The first asked if inspection belonged to commanders, meaning do the activities required to conduct inspection reside at the commander's level. The second code asked if the responsibility belonged to commanders to conduct inspection. This was aimed at determining if the authorities existed at the commander level to execute these inspections.

Based on these codes, Figure 30 is a normalized count look at how often interviewees agreed/disagreed that the responsibility for inspection belonged to commanders code and with the inspection is a commanders responsibility code. There is consensus among all groups that the responsibility and the de facto reality is that commanders are able and have the responsibility to conduct meaningful inspections on their units.

One IG member stated that "between 90-201, 1-1, and direction from CSAF on down, it's clear that inspection is a commander's responsibility. The key difference of why this AFIS is better than the previous IS comes from the breakdown in the taboo about admitting deficiencies. Hiding your deficiencies from the inspector did not help anyone, but now there's no point in hiding because they should have been documented a long time ago. The old model didn't allow



that. It brought more fear than actual compliance. The here to help wasn't really a true statement under the old way, now it is a true statement."




Figure 30 – Normalized Occurrence of Inspection Codes

Risk-based decision making was also examined. AFIS is mandated to promote risk-based decision making at the command level as a means of deciding which inspectable activities will fall “below the line”. These are activities that will not be completed in accordance with regulations after consideration by leadership, and the application of some form of risk analysis. Codes were developed to see whether or not risk based decision making was occurring in the field.




Figure 31 – Normalized Occurrence of Risk Based Decision Making is Happening

Figure 31 shows that risk-based decision making is much more on the minds of IG and squadron commanders than it is on program managers, however it is not mentioned by wing commanders at all. There is another concern here, however. When all of the squadron level personnel (squadron commanders and program managers) were queried as to the number of waivers they had submitted, all 12 responded that there were no waivers in the system. This option to not submit waivers and just deal with write-ups circumvents the risk based system that AFIS tries to promote. This is summed up by one squadron commander:

“Because the system does not increase workload over the previous model, I haven't felt the need to go in and try to improve the system by working with the functional.”

#### Program Managers

When program managers are broken out and asked if inspection responsibility lies with the commander, they overwhelmingly respond affirmatively. But when asked if a risk-based

approach is taken to decision making, Figure 32 shows there is almost a 2 to 1 negative response. This possibly represents the portion of culture change that senior leaders need to target an AF wide education campaign as to what “embracing the red” really means.




Figure 32 – Program Manager Responsibility Codes

### Squadron Commanders

Squadron commanders are much more positive in their assessment that risk based decision making is occurring than the program managers (Figure 33). However, when they were asked directly as to the reason why they hadn't submitted waivers to the IG for programs, they all responded that they were under the impression that the process was fairly simple, however they just hadn't felt the need to go through the process. It seemed easier for them to have certain write-ups that they could address in their own time.




Figure 33 – Squadron Commander Responsibility Codes

When asked the question about whether or not AFIS moved the responsibility to them as opposed to the previous model of inspection, many commanders felt that the responsibility was always on them to accomplish inspection. One commander that had experience being inspected under both regimes summed it up this way:

"I'm unfamiliar with what they were trying to fix with the new inspection system, I hate to say. I'm not sure what they were trying to fix, cause I never saw a problem with the old system."

#### Wing Commanders

Wing commanders feel that fairly strongly that inspection belongs to commanders at all levels at a 2 to 1 level as shown in Figure 34. When asked if we could have received the benefits of the current AFIS from the old system, one wing commander responded:

"I would say it does accomplish that goal, and the old system probably would not have gotten those benefits. The commander's definitely feel more of a burden and

empowerment perhaps to inspect themselves. I think we won't know if it was worth it until we get a sense of those blind spots and the other work that ain't being done because he shifted that workload from the MAJCOM down to the commanders.”




Figure 34 – Wing Commander Responsibility Codes

### Inspector General Personnel

IG personnel had high levels of agreement with the code Risk-based decision making is happening (Figure 35). They applied a risk based model in their preparations to conduct UEIs. They view Continual Evaluation conducted by the 2-letter staff as an integral piece to risk-based analysis and in moving the responsibility of inspection to the commander by providing information to them during the inspectable periods and outside of it as well.



Figure 35 – Inspector General Responsibility Codes

When asked about whether or not the responsibility for inspection had been moved to the commander, this IGI member stated:

“We’ve made inspection a commander responsibility. Where we still need to help commanders is in getting them resources to accomplish that, whether that’s through funded IG positions or SAPMs”

Overall

There is consensus among all groups that the responsibility and the de facto reality is that commanders are able and have the responsibility to conduct meaningful inspections on their units. This is a result of regulatory changes within AFI 1-1 and AFI 90-201, as well as cultural changes such as having CIMB meetings at the wing monthly putting the responsibility for inspection on squadron commanders.

## Investigative Question #5

In what ways can HHQ utilize system data to provide the field with actionable guidance to meet HHQ priorities?

Continual Evaluation and constant feedback to the unit is a hallmark to AFIS. Based on the overall response received from interviewee's, we can see that the field is happy communicating up the chain as needed. The two trouble areas highlighted in Figure 36 show issues with the perceived level of expertise on the staff and the quality of the guidance that is received from staffs.




Figure 36 – Normalized HHQ Relationship Codes Across All Groups

**Program Managers**

Program managers tend to believe that communicating with their wing IGs and other HHQ agencies is the real way to ensure that progress can be made in ensuring that the guidance



being provided is actionable by the field. They do see that the cuts to the MAJCOM staffs has depleted the expertise that was there before, but also see that functionals are still trying to provide relevant help where they can (Figure 37).




Figure 37 - Program Manager HHQ Relationship Codes

One program manager described the possibility of using system data to improve guidance this way:

“I think the checklists do provide a good sight picture that could tell HAF or someone else what the operational situation is in the field, but again, it depends on what’s being put into the system. If they come out and do a SAV and come to find

out that we haven't been doing our stuff right and it drives a undetected non-compliance, then they're more likely to discount what's provided in the systems"

### Squadron Commanders

Figure 38 shows that squadron commanders are evenly split as to whether or not the guidance coming from headquarters is helpful. They are also slightly negative in their perception that it is possible to improve the system through the feedback provided in self-assessments.




Figure 38 - Squadron Commander HHQ Relationship Codes

One commander strongly feels that MAJCOMs could improve guidance based on input from the field, but doesn't believe they are taking that input into account when developing policy:

"I think they could, but my question is are they?"

This sentiment is echoed by another commander describing their experience when they went through an inspection where the MAJCOM IG came down, but did not have much of an interaction with them:

"We just had an inspection, and it was so insignificant I'm not really sure whether or not it was the IG...They do have some knowledgeable people, but they're just not out and about enough for me to tell you whether or not it's worth it.

#### Wing Commanders

The wing commanders interviewed were of the opinion that the manning situation at the staff has a lot to do with the quality of response provided by staff to actionable information generated in the system. If the staffs are overwhelmed by tasks and undermanned, then the first activity not to be done is continual evaluation. Therefore, it becomes absolutely imperative for the field to be talking directly to the staff to get guidance concerns addressed, outside of the system. This can be seen in their responses (Figure 39).




Figure 39 - Wing Commander HHQ Relationship Codes

When asked what they believe drives the inadequate guidance provided by the staff, a wing commander responded:

“I think it's more the stove piping we've done of authority into the functionals. There's so much that is out of the Commander's hands, but to be honest with you ACC doesn't have much of a say in it. So much of this stuff is written into AFI by functionals out of the Commander's hands, leave in the commander with a whole lot of accountability but not a lot of responsibility. So, stuff goes wrong he's getting fired, but she doesn't have a lot of capability to affect those things. And I don't think the system is getting that. But conceivably it could, because there is a process to get a waiver follow it through that would do it, but it's not track very well. It took four-star involvement to figure out where all the waivers are and who's tracking them. Because enough of the ACC Wing Commanders put in the

COMACC quarterly report to the commander of ACC that we had a whole bunch of waivers just sitting out here and no one could tell us where they're at. That led to him energizing the staff.”

#### Inspector General Personnel

IG personnel do not tend to use the information provided in the self-assessment systems as a tool to improve 90-201. There are staffs that acknowledge there would be value in analyzing those systems to try to find improvements, but with the inspection schedule they find that they are undermanned to accomplish those sorts of projects. They do see a difference in AD and reserve components in the quality of responses, and they does create a bit of bias at the staff to want to try to get more information from the units during their inspection than would be normally the case with the information that they have access to virtually. One IGI member summed this up this way:

"It's not just strictly MICT or IGEMS, because some folks just...the stuff they put into MICT is just not very reliable"

Figure 40 highlights the perception that IG personnel have that their role is to assist wings in their operation of AFIS. They believe their role is to provide guidance wherever possible to get the commanders intent accomplished through the system. A member of SAF/IG stated that their role was to:

"...provide guidance to the MAJCOMs to ensure that the policy that we're putting out meets the intent of SECAF, CSAF, as well as help the MAJCOMS commanders to perform their duties."




Figure 40 - IG Personnel HHQ Relationship Codes

Overall

Continual Evaluation and constant feedback to the unit is a hallmark to AFIS. Based on the overall response received from interviewee’s, we can see that the field is communicating up the chain as needed. There is strong indication that the IG and staff functionals are not using this information to improve policy however. This is based on lack of personnel conducting analysis at the staff level, and a general distrust of the information input into the system to begin with.

## V. Conclusion and Recommendations

### Overview

Lt Gen Rogers, SAF/IG, stated in the March 12 TIG Brief that: “Adequate assessment and reporting without being overly burdensome or disruptive to the organization’s or unit’s ability to complete its mission is an important component of a disciplined military force.” (Rogers, 2012). With that in mind, understanding whether or not the implementation of AFIS met the requirement it was set to accomplish will go a long way in ensuring that our system does all that Lt Gen Rogers demanded of the Air Force. The next paragraphs will go into further detail the resolution of the investigative questions, recommended actions, further research opportunities, and implications.

### Conclusions of Research

#### Investigative Questions 1 – How rigorous is AFIS?

The rigor provided by AFIS meets the statutory requirement set by AF leaders. Most individuals in all stakeholder groups readily admit that there could easily be more rigor provided. However, as the primary mission of our squadrons is not to satisfy the IG, most units act in a satisficing manner in most cases. There are wide rigor differences detected between active duty and guard/reserve units with active duty outperforming the guard/reserves. These differences are mostly attributed to lack of experience and different rates of adoption of the culture of “operationalizing” the inspection mindset.

## Investigative Questions 2 – AFIS Meeting Statutory Requirements

Title 10's readiness reporting requirement is not fully met with the input provided by AFIS. Most of the readiness data required is still provided by all of the other reporting tools (ART, SORTS, DRRS, AF-IT, etc.) levied against commanders at all levels. Further, based on the delegation of authorities down to Wing commanders, some of our nuclear, biological, and chemical warfighting skills have atrophied since the implementation of AFIS. Specifically, as the AF has authorized wing commanders to select what mission assurance activities satisfy the AFI 90-201, Table 5.2 requirement, they have tended to act in that satisficing fashion.

Fundamentally, the principle tool used by the MAJCOMs to evaluate Wings is focused on non-readiness activities, namely evaluating the wings ability to evaluate itself on compliance items. The wing is focused on non-readiness activities, namely the Groups and Squadrons abilities to evaluate themselves on compliance items. The net result is there is no product generated from the AFIS implementation that addresses our readiness to respond.

## Investigative Questions 3 – Inspection preparation reduction

Changing the culture around inspection preparation was an excellent goal put forward by SAF/IG in 2012. To date, there is agreement at the squadron and program manager level that AFIS has accomplished just that. They readily express that their unit has "embraced the red", do not engage in overt inspection preparation, and have operationalized the AFIS mindset.

At the Wing and MAJCOM IG level however, individuals respond that the culture change has been very uneven, especially between guard and active duty wings. They view the differences in experience being a principle culprit to not embracing the philosophy, but they also



believe that the different timelines that each component uses adds to hesitation to adopt the mindset.

#### Investigative Questions 4 - Commander inspection responsibility and authority

AFI 1-2, Commander's Responsibilities provides that commanders have the legal authority and responsibility to inspect their subordinates and subordinate units. A robust commander's inspection program finds deficiencies and improves mission readiness. Part of this effort must be a self-assessment program where individual Airmen report their compliance with guidance (USAF, 2014). Across all stakeholder groups, there is agreement that AFIS has met this goal. Commanders have the tools and expertise available to accomplish a robust inspection program. Where the evidence deviates from the views expressed, however, is in the implementation. Commanders have the capability to waive off requirements that they view do not pay off in terms of mission accomplishment after a risk analysis has been conducted. Of all the units interviewed, none had accomplished an analysis of this type, or had plans to. This indicates that there is still some education as to what commander's responsibilities and authorities mean.

#### Investigative Questions 5 – Improving guidance through AFIS systems

The various IT systems utilized by AFIS do provide a capability to provide input into the staff as it accomplishes its policy writing mission. Individuals at the squadron and program management level don't see that information being utilized in that fashion, however. Individuals at the Wing and IG level believe that the staff cuts at the MAJCOM level prevents Continual Evaluation from being accomplished. This results in all that actionable data not being used in formulating good policy for the field.

## Future Research Opportunities

This study looked primarily at MXG and MSG type squadrons in ACC and AMC. A much wider analysis would be able to detect if these issues are isolated in those 2 commands. Additionally, Wing IG personnel were not polled in this study, they could be targeted in future research. Further, text mining techniques could be applied to the comments provided in MICT and IGEMS to see if there are any trends that would indicate any sorts of undetected noncompliance issues.

## Recommended Actions

Meeting the intent of the PAD should be the priority for any program that receives taxpayer funds. In order to meet the readiness reporting deficiencies indicated by this research, the AF should begin including a Wing level readiness inspection, either through parts or as a wing as a whole, as part of future versions of AFIS. Further, educating commanders at all levels what risk-based analysis means when conducting CCIP would pay dividends by providing staffs with data on what activities are being waived by the field, and what activities are simply difficult to stay in compliance with.

Part of this study asked interviewees what aspects of AFIS they would change if they were in charge of the program. These responses are below in Table 12 in Appendix C, however among the more feasible improvements include generating a list of waivers available to wings, groups, and squadrons based on mission types. For example, a list of common waivers could be provided to Air Base Wing commanders as a potential “menu” of options that the commander would apply their judgement and experience against.

A separate suggestion was to make the activities to be inspected in table 5.2 of AFI 90-201 much more tailorable. This would allow MAJCOM IGs to apply their own risk-based analysis in determining the composition of the team that gets sent out on inspection and allow for better data to be provided to the unit to improve.

## Appendix A – IRB Exemption Letter



**DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE  
AIR FORCE INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY  
WRIGHT-PATTERSON AIR FORCE BASE OHIO**

23 Jun 2017

MEMORANDUM FOR Dr. Timothy W. Breitbach (AFIT/ENS)

FROM: Brett J. Borghetti, Ph.D.  
AFIT IRB Exempt Determination Official  
2950 Hobson Way  
Wright-Patterson AFB, OH 45433-7765

SUBJECT: Not Human Subjects Research determination on exemption request from human experimentation requirements (32 CFR 219, DoDD 3216.2 and AFI 40-402) for “AFIT Research Study”, dated 30 May 2017.

1. Your request was for exemption based on the Code of Federal Regulations, title 32, part 219, section 101, paragraph (b) (2) Research activities that involve the use of educational tests (cognitive, diagnostic, aptitude, achievement), survey procedures, interview procedures, or observation of public behavior unless: (i) Information obtained is recorded in such a manner that human subjects can be identified, directly or through identifiers linked to the subjects; and (ii) Any disclosure of the human subjects’ responses outside the research could reasonably place the subjects at risk of criminal or civil liability or be damaging to the subjects’ financial standing, employability, or reputation.
2. Your study **qualifies for this exemption** because your survey was recorded in such a way that human subjects cannot be identified, directly or through identifiers linked to the subjects.
3. This determination pertains only to the Federal, Department of Defense, and Air Force regulations that govern the use of human subjects in research. This determination is only for the research outlined in the exemption request letter. If the research changes from what was described in the request letter, or the data received is determined to be different than described in the request letter (e.g. unexpected identifying information is discovered in the data), please cease research efforts immediately and contact me as soon as possible for determining course of action.

6/23/2017

X 

Signed by: BORGHETTI.BRETT.J.1009082820  
BRETT J. BORGHETTI, Ph.D.  
AFIT Exempt Determination Official

## Appendix B – Initial Interview Guides

### INTERVIEW GUIDE: WING COMMANDER

Introduction (~3 mins)

Hi, \_\_\_\_\_, my name is Capt Luis Rosado-Medina, and I am a Master's Student in Logistics and Supply Chain Management at the Air Force Institute of Technology. How are you doing today?

☺ Thanks for agreeing to talk with me, and thanks for your time. The purpose of this interview is to ask you some questions about the work your organization does assessing the readiness, discipline, and efficiency of the units assigned to your command. This interview is part of my research on the impact that the AFIS has had since the implementation of AFD13-01. I would like you to think of it as an open conversation, rather free flowing, about the various requirements that AFIS fulfills, the previous model of inspection, and the nature of inspection in general. It won't take more than 1 hour but less time is of course ok.

Now, since it is an academic interview, you have some special rights as a respondent:

- All the information you give me today will be treated confidentially.
  - Your name and your organization's name will not be linked to any answer.
  - I am having similar discussions with multiple stakeholders in this area, including individuals from other commands, and at the Wing and Squadron level. Any insights or take-aways from our conversation will be reported as originating from the stakeholder group and not a specific person unit, unless you give me permission to do so.
- The interview is voluntary, which means:
  - You have the right to decline to answer any particular question,
  - And you can stop the interview at any time.
- I now request your permission to record the interview, if that's OK with you. ☺
  - You have the right to stop the recording at any time.
  - The recording will be kept in an encrypted digital file, guarded by me personally.
  - All copies will be destroyed once our research project is complete.

Do you have any questions? ☺ (Answer the questions, if any). Let's proceed.

Positioning questions (~5-10 minutes):

- 1) Can you tell me a bit about your organization's background and primary focus?
  - 1a) What is the scope in terms of different types of activities supported?
  - 1b) Where they operate – regional or country specific
  - 1c) The overall budget and size of their operations
- 2) How would you describe MAJCOM IGs role in the area of inspection?
  - 4a) As a authority for assessment?
  - 4b) As an source of expertise in mission areas?
- 3) How would you describe your wing's IG role in this area?
  - 4a) As a authority for assessment?
  - 4b) As an source of expertise in mission areas?

Focused Questions (~30-45 minutes):

1. Title 10 spells out various requirements that the AF is responsible to report to the congress on, in your opinion, how well does the current AFIS meet these requirements?

\*\*\* If need be, prompt with the following questions:

- Specifically, are readiness problems, readiness assessments, risk assessment of dependence on contractor support, combat support and related agencies assessment, major exercise assessments, and cannibalization rates reported on adequately by our current system?
  - How has the implementation of the current system improved or degraded our reporting capability?
2. One of the key justifications for transitioning to the new AFIS was to reduce the amount of inspection prep that was occurring in the field, how do you think AFIS has done in this regard?
    - Have functionals given you any input into this area?
    - Has your prep workload diminished as a result of AFIS?
    - Have there been any increases in certain areas (nuclear, NWRM, etc.)?
    - Any other impacts from AFIS on time spent on inspection?
  3. Trying to bring the responsibility of inspection to unit commanders is a cornerstone to AFI 90-201. What about the implementation of AFIS accomplishes this goal?

- Do you think we could have gotten those benefits in the previous model of inspection?
4. What is your opinion about the amount of rigor provided by units in their self-assessments?
- Is it:
    - a. Providing in-depth information about the various programs?
    - b. Determining whether or not the unit is truly prepared to accomplish its wartime mission?
    - c. In what ways could the current system be improved to increase rigor, and do you think it's necessary to do this?
5. Does the current system provide good feedback to HHQ on the conditions in the field that would lead to improvements in policy and guidance?
6. In terms of inspection frequency, are you satisfied with the frequency of unit inspections?
- What's your rationale for this opinion?
7. In terms of working with our Total Force partners, is there good integration into those components for reporting effectiveness?

During the course of this conversation, try to move the conversation from the individuals to the organization's overall strategy and how it has positioned itself in the SC / Financing realm. Try to keep it anchored on how financing decisions are made and how the outcomes are measured.

- For interesting things, ask: "Tell me more about X".
- When the respondent is getting vague, ask: "Can you give me an example of X?" (Especially important for successful or unsuccessful programs or operations. Make sure their definition of success is outlined).
- If the conversation is getting lost in operational details, ask: "What is the purpose of this?", or "What is the philosophy/idea behind this?"

- If the conversation is getting too strategic, ask: "How do you implement this?", or "How do you ensure this happens", or "How do you enable this?" depending on the subject.

Strategic / Open section (~5-15 minutes)

(Note: All these questions are optional. Ask only those that seem relevant to the position and that have not been answered before during the course of the conversation.)

1. Opportunities and challenges (ask together if deemed appropriate):
  - What would you say is the biggest opportunities facing the Air Force in terms of reporting effectiveness today?
  - What would you say is the biggest challenge facing your organization in this realm?
2. What do you see as an area or need that is not currently being addressed by AFIS? Or, maybe not being addressed on a large enough scale?
3. What do you see as an unsung success of the current system?

Thank you very much for your time and that's pretty much what I had to ask you. The formal portion of our discussion is over, and I'm turning off the recorder.

- Are there any points you would like to add or do you have any feedback for me? I really appreciate your answers and your time. Would you happen to have any contacts that you think would be interesting in having a similar conversation?

I hope I can contact you with follow up questions after I have analyzed our conversation. I'll send a copy of the interview transcript if you would like to review our conversation. Thanks again!



## INTERVIEW GUIDE: SQUADRON COMMANDER

### Introduction (~3 mins)

Hi, \_\_\_\_\_, my name is Capt Luis Rosado-Medina, and I am a Master's Student in Logistics and Supply Chain Management at the Air Force Institute of Technology. How are you doing today?

☺ Thanks for agreeing to talk with me, and thanks for your time. The purpose of this interview is to ask you some questions about the work your organization does assessing the readiness, discipline, and efficiency of the units assigned to your command. This interview is part of my research on the impact that the AFIS has had since the implementation of AFD13-01. I would like you to think of it as an open conversation, rather free flowing, about the various requirements that AFIS fulfills, the previous model of inspection, and the nature of inspection in general. It won't take more than 1 hour but less time is of course ok.

Now, since it is an academic interview, you have some special rights as a respondent:

- All the information you give me today will be treated confidentially.
  - Your name and your organization's name will not be linked to any answer.
  - I am having similar discussions with multiple stakeholders in this area, including individuals from other commands, and at the Wing and Squadron level. Any insights or take-aways from our conversation will be reported as originating from the stakeholder group and not a specific person unit, unless you give me permission to do so.
- The interview is voluntary, which means:
  - You have the right to decline to answer any particular question,
  - And you can stop the interview at any time.
- I now request your permission to record the interview, if that's OK with you. ☺
  - You have the right to stop the recording at any time.
  - The recording will be kept in an encrypted digital file, guarded by me personally.
  - All copies will be destroyed once our research project is complete.

Do you have any questions? ☺ (Answer the questions, if any). Let's proceed.

Positioning questions (~5-10 minutes):

1) Can you tell me a bit about your organization's background and primary focus?

1a) What is the scope in terms of different types of activities supported?

1b) Where they operate – regional or country specific

1c) The overall budget and size of their operations

2) How would you describe MAJCOM IGs role in the area of inspection?

4a) As a authority for assessment?

4b) As an source of expertise in mission areas?

3) How would you describe your wing's IG role in this area?

4a) As a authority for assessment?

4b) As an source of expertise in mission areas?

Focused Questions (~30-45 minutes):

1. Title 10 spells out various requirements that the AF is responsible to report to the congress on, in your opinion, how well does the current AFIS meet these requirements?

\*\*\* If need be, prompt with the following questions:

- Specifically, are readiness problems, readiness assessments, risk assessment of dependence on contractor support, combat support and related agencies assessment, major exercise assessments, and cannibalization rates reported on adequately by our current system?
- How has the implementation of the current system improved or degraded our reporting capability?

2. One of the key justifications for transitioning to the new AFIS was to reduce the amount of inspection prep that was occurring in the field, how do you think AFIS has done in this regard?

- Have functionals given you any input into this area?
- Has your prep workload diminished as a result of AFIS?
- Have there been any increases in certain areas (nuclear, NWRM, etc.)?
- Any other impacts from AFIS on time spent on inspection?

3. Trying to bring the responsibility of inspection to unit commanders is a cornerstone to AFI 90-201. What about the implementation of AFIS accomplishes this goal?

- Do you think we could have gotten those benefits in the previous model of inspection?
4. What is your opinion about the amount of rigor provided by units in their self-assessments?
- Is it:
    - d. Providing in-depth information about the various programs?
    - e. Determining whether or not the unit is truly prepared to accomplish its wartime mission?
    - f. In what ways could the current system be improved to increase rigor, and do you think it's necessary to do this?
5. Does the current system provide good feedback to HHQ on the conditions in the field that would lead to improvements in policy and guidance?
6. In terms of inspection frequency, are you satisfied with the frequency of unit inspections?
- What's your rationale for this opinion?
7. In terms of working with our Total Force partners, is there good integration into those components for reporting effectiveness?
- How much time do you need to devote to accomplish this?

During the course of this conversation, try to move the conversation from the individuals to the organization's overall strategy and how it has positioned itself in the SC / Financing realm. Try to keep it anchored on how financing decisions are made and how the outcomes are measured.

- For interesting things, ask: "Tell me more about X".
- When the respondent is getting vague, ask: "Can you give me an example of X?" (Especially important for successful or unsuccessful programs or operations. Make sure their definition of success is outlined).
- If the conversation is getting lost in operational details, ask: "What is the purpose of this?", or "What is the philosophy/idea behind this?"

- If the conversation is getting too strategic, ask: "How do you implement this?", or "How do you ensure this happens", or "How do you enable this?" depending on the subject.

Strategic / Open section (~5-15 minutes)

(Note: All these questions are optional. Ask only those that seem relevant to the position and that have not been answered before during the course of the conversation.)

1. Opportunities and challenges (ask together if deemed appropriate):
  - What would you say is the biggest opportunities facing the Air Force in terms of reporting effectiveness today?
  - What would you say is the biggest challenge facing your organization in this realm?
2. What do you see as an area or need that is not currently being addressed by AFIS? Or, maybe not being addressed on a large enough scale?
3. What do you see as an unsung success of the current system?
4. How would you change the system?

Thank you very much for your time and that's pretty much what I had to ask you. The formal portion of our discussion is over, and I'm turning off the recorder.

- Are there any points you would like to add or do you have any feedback for me? I really appreciate your answers and your time. Would you happen to have any contacts that you think would be interesting in having a similar conversation?

I hope I can contact you with follow up questions after I have analyzed our conversation. I'll send a copy of the interview transcript if you would like to review our conversation. Thanks again!

## INTERVIEW GUIDE: PROGRAM MANAGER

Introduction (~3 mins)

Hi, \_\_\_\_\_, my name is Capt Luis Rosado-Medina, and I am a Master's Student in Logistics and Supply Chain Management at the Air Force Institute of Technology. How are you doing today?

🕒 Thanks for agreeing to talk with me, and thanks for your time. The purpose of this interview is to ask you some questions about the work your organization does assessing the readiness, discipline, and efficiency of the units assigned to your command. This interview is part of my research on the impact that the AFIS has had since the implementation of AFPD13-01. I would like you to think of it as an open conversation, rather free flowing, about the various requirements that AFIS fulfills, the previous model of inspection, and the nature of inspection in general. It won't take more than 1 hour but less time is of course ok.

Now, since it is an academic interview, you have some special rights as a respondent:

- All the information you give me today will be treated confidentially.
  - Your name and your organization's name will not be linked to any answer.
  - I am having similar discussions with multiple stakeholders in this area, including individuals from other commands, and at the Wing and Squadron level. Any insights or take-aways from our conversation will be reported as originating from the stakeholder group and not a specific person unit, unless you give me permission to do so.
- The interview is voluntary, which means:
  - You have the right to decline to answer any particular question,
  - And you can stop the interview at any time.
- I now request your permission to record the interview, if that's OK with you. 🕒
  - You have the right to stop the recording at any time.
  - The recording will be kept in an encrypted digital file, guarded by me personally.
  - All copies will be destroyed once our research project is complete.

Do you have any questions? 🕒 (Answer the questions, if any). Let's proceed.

Positioning questions (~5-10 minutes):

1) Can you tell me a bit about your organization's background and primary focus?

1a) What is the scope in terms of different types of activities supported?

1b) Where they operate – regional or country specific

2) How would you describe MAJCOM IGs role in the area of inspection?

4a) As a authority for assessment?

4b) As an source of expertise in mission areas?

3) How would you describe your wing's IG role in this area?

4a) As a authority for assessment?

4b) As an source of expertise in mission areas?

Focused Questions (~30-45 minutes):

1. Transitioning from the previous inspection model, what were the unexpected impediments you faced? Unexpected benefits?

\*\*\* If need be, prompt with the following questions:

- Do you feel that training for the self-assessment aspect of CCIP is adequate throughout the field?
- In your self-assessment responses, do you feel they adequately represent the status of your program?

2. One of the key justifications for transitioning to the new AFIS was to reduce the amount of inspection prep that was occurring in the field, how do you think AFIS has done in this regard?

- Have functionals given you any input into this area?
- Has your prep workload diminished as a result of AFIS?
- Have there been any increases in certain areas (nuclear, NWRM, etc.)?
- Any other impacts from AFIS on time spent on inspection?

3. Trying to bring the responsibility of inspection to unit commanders is a cornerstone to AFI 90-201. What about the implementation of AFIS accomplishes this goal?

- Do you think we could have gotten those benefits in the previous model of inspection?

4. What is your opinion about the amount of rigor provided by units in their self-assessments?
  - o Is it:
    - g. Providing in-depth information about the various programs?
    - h. Determining whether or not the unit is truly prepared to accomplish its wartime mission?
    - i. In what ways could the current system be improved to increase rigor, and do you think it's necessary to do this?
  
5. Does the current system provide good feedback to HHQ on the conditions in the field that would lead to improvements in policy and guidance?
  
6. In terms of inspection frequency, are you satisfied with the frequency of unit inspections?
  - o What's your rationale for this opinion?
  
7. In terms of working with our Total Force partners, is there good integration into those components for reporting effectiveness?

During the course of this conversation, try to move the conversation from the individuals to the organization's overall strategy and how it has positioned itself in the SC / Financing realm. Try to keep it anchored on how financing decisions are made and how the outcomes are measured.

- For interesting things, ask: "Tell me more about X".
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- If the conversation is getting too strategic, ask: "How do you implement this?", or "How do you ensure this happens", or "How do you enable this?" depending on the subject.

Strategic / Open section (~5-15 minutes)

(Note: All these questions are optional. Ask only those that seem relevant to the position and that have not been answered before during the course of the conversation.)

1. Opportunities and challenges (ask together if deemed appropriate):
  - What would you say is the biggest opportunities facing the Air Force in terms of reporting effectiveness today?
  - What would you say is the biggest challenge facing your organization in this realm?
2. What do you see as an area or need that is not currently being addressed by AFIS? Or, maybe not being addressed on a large enough scale?
3. What do you see as an unsung success of the current system?

Thank you very much for your time and that's pretty much what I had to ask you. The formal portion of our discussion is over, and I'm turning off the recorder.

- Are there any points you would like to add or do you have any feedback for me? I really appreciate your answers and your time. Would you happen to have any contacts that you think would be interesting in having a similar conversation?

I hope I can contact you with follow up questions after I have analyzed our conversation. I'll send a copy of the interview transcript if you would like to review our conversation. Thanks again!



## INTERVIEW GUIDE: INSPECTOR GENERAL

Introduction (~3 mins)

Hi, \_\_\_\_\_, my name is Capt Luis Rosado-Medina, and I am a Master's Student in Logistics and Supply Chain Management at the Air Force Institute of Technology. How are you doing today?

☺ Thanks for agreeing to talk with me, and thanks for your time. The purpose of this interview is to ask you some questions about the work your organization does assessing the readiness, discipline, and efficiency of the units assigned to your command. This interview is part of my research on the impact that the AFIS has had since the implementation of AFPD13-01. I would like you to think of it as an open conversation, rather free flowing, about the various requirements that AFIS fulfills, the previous model of inspection, and the nature of inspection in general. It won't take more than 1 hour but less time is of course ok.

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  - I am having similar discussions with multiple stakeholders in this area, including individuals from other commands, and at the Wing and Squadron level. Any insights or take-aways from our conversation will be reported as originating from the stakeholder group and not a specific person unit, unless you give me permission to do so.
- The interview is voluntary, which means:
  - You have the right to decline to answer any particular question,
  - And you can stop the interview at any time.
- I now request your permission to record the interview, if that's OK with you. ☺
  - You have the right to stop the recording at any time.
  - The recording will be kept in an encrypted digital file, guarded by me personally.
  - All copies will be destroyed once our research project is complete.

Do you have any questions? ☺ (Answer the questions, if any). Let's proceed.

Positioning questions (~5-10 minutes):

1) Can you tell me a bit about your organization's background and primary focus?

2a) What is the scope in terms of different types of activities supported?

2b) Where they operate – regional or country specific

2c) The overall budget and size of their operations

2) How would you describe MAJCOM IGs role in this area?

4a) As a authority for assessment?

4b) As an source of expertise in mission areas?

Focused Questions (~30-45 minutes):

1. Title 10 spells out various requirements that the AF is responsible to report to the congress on, in your opinion, how well does the current AFIS meet these requirements?

\*\*\* If need be, prompt with the following questions:

- Specifically, are readiness problems, readiness assessments, risk assessment of dependence on contractor support, combat support and related agencies assessment, major exercise assessments, and cannibalization rates reported on adequately by our current system?
- How has the implementation of the current system improved or degraded our reporting capability?

2. One of the key justifications for transitioning to the new AFIS was to reduce the amount of inspection prep that was occurring in the field, how do you think AFIS has done in this regard?

- Have functional given you any input into this area?
- Has your travel workload diminished as a result of AFIS?
- Have there been any increases in certain areas (nuclear, NWRM, etc.)?
- Any other impacts from AFIS on time spent on inspection?

3. Trying to bring the responsibility of inspection to unit commanders is a cornerstone to AFI 90-201. What about the implementation of AFIS accomplishes this goal?

- Do you think we could have gotten those benefits in the previous model of inspection?

4. What is your opinion about the amount of rigor provided by units in their self-assessments?
  - o Is it:
    - j. Providing in-depth information about the various programs?
    - k. Determining whether or not the unit is truly prepared to accomplish its wartime mission?
    - l. In what ways could the current system be improved to increase rigor, and do you think it's necessary to do this?
  
5. In developing policy solutions for the field, how frequently do you turn to system data in MICT or IGEMS to assist?
  - o What are reasons that you do or do not rely on self-assessment comments or IGEMS data?
  
6. In terms of inspection frequency, are you satisfied with the frequency of unit inspections?
  - o What's your rationale for this opinion?
  
7. In terms of working with our Total Force partners, is there good integration into those components for reporting effectiveness?

During the course of this conversation, try to move the conversation from the individuals to the organization's overall strategy and how it has positioned itself in the SC / Financing realm. Try to keep it anchored on how financing decisions are made and how the outcomes are measured.

- For interesting things, ask: "Tell me more about X".
- When the respondent is getting vague, ask: "Can you give me an example of X?" (Especially important for successful or unsuccessful programs or operations. Make sure their definition of success is outlined).
- If the conversation is getting lost in operational details, ask: "What is the purpose of this?", or "What is the philosophy/idea behind this?"
- If the conversation is getting too strategic, ask: "How do you implement this?", or "How do you ensure this happens", or "How do you enable this?" depending on the subject.

Strategic / Open section (~5-15 minutes)

(Note: All these questions are optional. Ask only those that seem relevant to the position and that have not been answered before during the course of the conversation.)

1. Opportunities and challenges (ask together if deemed appropriate):
  - What would you say is the biggest opportunities facing the Air Force in terms of reporting effectiveness today?
  - What would you say is the biggest challenge facing your organization in this realm?
2. What do you see as an area or need that is not currently being addressed by AFIS? Or, maybe not being addressed on a large enough scale?
3. What do you see as an unsung success of the current system?

Thank you very much for your time and that's pretty much what I had to ask you. The formal portion of our discussion is over, and I'm turning off the recorder.

- Are there any points you would like to add or do you have any feedback for me? I really appreciate your answers and your time. Would you happen to have any contacts that you think would be interesting in having a similar conversation?

I hope I can contact you with follow up questions after I have analyzed our conversation. I'll send a copy of the interview transcript if you would like to review our conversation. Thanks again!

Appendix C – Tables

Table 12 – Recommendations for AFIS improvement from field

Program Manager	The only way to get a 100% assessment of how our units are operating would be to do some sort of no-notice, like preinspection or something.
Program Manager	I feel that the Air Force Task List needs to be integrated into the communicators in a way that gets at the capability of the unit, and not the compliance situation.
Squadron Commander	The communicators should be much more detailed beyond the requirements in the AFI. They also feel that reverting to a semiannual requirement to report on self-assessments would increase the rigor of the system.
Squadron Commander	If I Were King for the day I would take a look at the inspection checklist themselves to make sure that they are viable, their value added, and making sure that we need to have that many questions. I understand that certain programs and may dictate that like PRP or something like that, but there are certain programs that I know if you have a 50-question MICT checklist that you can answer and Ensure that you're in compliance with 10, that's what I would look I would try to get that scrub down.
Wing Commander	Here's an example, we were trying to determine what waivers to put forward and we asked the question: why do we need to even invent this? Why don't we try what all the air base wings in the Air Force are putting in for waivers? We should be able to hit a button and get a list Instead of waiting for a good idea person to we should wave this we should wave that. Also, the program ought to be able to hit a button and get what all the issue areas are that wings like you have. Instead you have to try to get you UEI reports, dig through those reports and see if any of them apply to you. It would seem to me that this program ought to be able to do cross organizational analysis better than what it does.
IG Personnel	I would make Attachment 3 much more tailorable to the MAJCOM, instead of the you must do this and you must do it all in the inspectable UEI period. In fact we're trying to get GO support on this.
IG Personnel	I would make the wing it position a post Squadron command vectored position as a matter of development. The way we manage our IG's so that you have a person that's walked a mile in my shoes, has run a unit self-assessment program, and understands the challenges associated with that, and can be a mentor in addition to providing validation to Squadron self-assessor programs. He'd be a peer mentor to those Squadron Commanders as opposed to how it typically is done as someone who's on the path to retirement, which was the old system, or now it's seems to be gaining some traction where it's done pre-command for someone who is of command caliber, who's likely to go to command as a sort of spin up. I think you get more out of it if you do it after the command experience.

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