

HOODED EMPIRE

THE
KU KLUX KLAN
IN
COLORADO

ROBERT ALAN GOLDBERG

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PREFACE

The decade of the 1920s conjures up a unique cluster of images. A few broad, organizing conceptions dominate as people and events are filtered through a screen of memories, books, and films. This was the era of "normalcy," prohibition, "flaming youth," and the "golden glow." George Babbitt, Al Capone, and Charles Lindbergh reign unchallenged in America's mind. Looking backward, Middletown seemed to have revolved around the acquisition of automobiles, radios, and washing machines. Beneath this perceptual facade, poorly focused, were ordinary Americans who lived and worked much the same as their ancestors and descendents. The needs, fears, and resulting activities of some of these men and women are the subjects of this study. Alongside the flapper and the bootlegger stands the hooded figure of the Ku Klux Klansman as one of the enduring symbols of the decade.

The images of these Klanspeople are faint, for the Invisible Empire of the twenties has been lost in the wakes of America's two more publicized Klan movements. The first Ku Klux Klan arose in the South during Reconstruction in response to black emancipation and Republican rule. The third movement appeared after World War II and grew steadily in reaction to black assaults upon the racial status quo. Only recently has it moved north and west to capitalize upon racial tensions. Violence was characteristic of both movements.

Unlike these Klans, the movement in the 1920s was not primarily southern, terrorist, or white supremacist. Preaching a multifaceted program based upon "100 Per Cent Americanism" and militant Protestantism, it enlisted recruits in every section of the nation. Perhaps as many as six million Americans heeded its call to resist Catholics, Jews, lawbreakers, blacks, and immigrants. Despite the size and importance of this social movement, its character remains shrouded in mystery. Sixty years after its rise to power students of the Ku Klux Klan are still uncertain of its causes, rural or urban nature, and the socioeconomic disposition of the membership.

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Building upon the work of sociologist John Mecklin, scholars such as David Chalmers, John Higham, Richard Hofstadter, William Leuchtenburg, and Seymour Lipset maintain that the Klan was in message and membership a movement of the villages and small towns of America. Kleagles recruited those Protestants who had had the least contact with minority groups and who were left relatively unscathed by the emergent mass-production and mass-consumption urban culture. The Klansman living in a large city was merely a recent migrant who "brought his heartland values and his defensiveness with him to the metropolis."¹ Urban knights were thus a small minority and for all practical purposes indistinguishable from their country cousins.²

Local community tensions did not generate the Klan movement. The Klan was, instead, the last major gasp of small-town Protestant America in its struggle with the city for cultural hegemony. The Klan impulse, wrote Hofstadter,

was not usually a response to direct personal relationship or face to face competition, but rather the result of a growing sense that the code by which rural and small-town Anglo-Saxon America had lived was being ignored and even flouted in the wicked cities, and especially by the "aliens," and that the old religion and morality were being snickered at by the intellectuals. The city had at last eclipsed the country in population and above all as the imaginative center of American life. . . . It was the city that enjoyed the best of the new prosperity, the countryside that lagged behind. But above all, the city was the home of liquor and bootleggers, jazz and Sunday golf, wild parties and divorce. The magazines and newspapers, the movies and radio, brought tidings of all this to the countryside and even lured children of the old American stock away from the old ways.³

Spurred on by the "unspent hatreds" of World War I, the economic depression of the early 1920s, and the appearance of a new wave of foreign immigration, the alienated residents of provincial America rallied around the Klan. Klan-inspired racial and religious bigotry was, therefore, a manifestation of a deeper malaise. The real threats were "status deprivation," cultural change, and the "acids of modernity." The struggle against these unassailable specters was, from its inception, hopeless and irrational, a futile attempt to resurrect a past golden age.⁴

Historian Charles Alexander, while accepting the Klan as a

small-town phenomenon, has looked beyond such abstractions for an explanation of the order's rise. His survey of Klan activity in Texas, Oklahoma, Louisiana, and Arkansas revealed that people joined because of widespread, flagrant violations of the law and moral codes. Against a backdrop of war-related tensions and economic hard times, southwestern Klansmen organized "to preserve premarital chastity, marital fidelity, and respect for parental authority; to compel obedience of the state and national prohibition laws; to fight the postwar crime wave; to rid state and local governments of dishonest politicians."⁵

In 1967 Kenneth Jackson issued a provocative challenge to the traditional interpretation. On the basis of detailed research in nine cities, Jackson contended not only that kleagles were extremely successful in recruiting members in large cities but that the Klan was predominantly an urban movement. The Klan's urban complexion was reflected in the lifestyle of the leadership, the source and character of the order's newspapers, the places of residence of the majority of members, and the influence of city klaverns on state and national decision-making.

Jackson's analysis of urban Klans indicated that the hooded order's attention was focused upon the immediate concern of neighborhood transition. Klan growth was a result of the clash between the diverse racial, ethnic, and religious groups which formed the urban environment. Conflict was particularly acute in the "zone of emergence," the strip of land that separated the crowded ghettos from the more affluent, outer residential districts. To this zone, peopled primarily with poorer, white, working-class families, turned those who sought to escape their ghetto existence. It was among the white, Protestant residents of this area that the Klan found its greatest success. "Not a reaction against the rise of the city to dominance in American life, the Invisible Empire was rather a reaction against the aspirations of certain elements within the city."⁶

The socioeconomic identities of the members of the Invisible Empire have also long been subjects for speculation and debate. Almost every scholar agrees with John Mecklin's observation that the vast majority of Klansmen were "conventional Americans, thoroughly human, kind fathers and husbands, hospitable to the stranger. . . ."⁷ Consensus, however, ends at this point. Mecklin, an early and perceptive student of the organization, considered the Klan a movement of the "well-meaning but more or less ignorant and unthinking middle class. . . ." It included "in many instances the best citizens of the community."⁸ Journalist Stanley Frost, also writing in

the 1920s, agreed: "They are usually the good, solid, middle-class citizens, the 'backbone of the nation.'"⁹ In Oklahoma town merchants and professionals, rather than poor farmers and tenants, joined the secret society. Seventy-three Pennsylvania Exalted Cyclopes swore under oath in 1927 that the rank and file was "gleaned from the average walk of life and such as composes our Protestant churches, our lodges, commercial clubs, and other civic organizations."¹⁰

The Klan's economic and social respectability has been challenged with qualitative and quantitative data that portray the organization's membership as overwhelmingly lower middle and working class. While it is conceded that prominent men did appear in the klavern hall initially, they were among the first to defect when the Klan swelled with members of lesser rank. Allegedly, Klan violence and blatant appeals to prejudice repelled the better educated professionals and businessmen. Seymour Lipset argued, "As a simplistic moralistic bigoted movement, the Klan increasingly became a movement of the less educated and less privileged strata. . . ." ¹¹ Frederick Lewis Allen dismissed the Klan as a product of "the less educated and less disciplined elements of the white Protestant community."¹² Norman Weaver's investigation of the Detroit Klan revealed that southern whites, threatened by black competition for jobs and homes, were especially receptive to the secret society's appeals. The Middletown Klan, remarked Helen and Robert Lynd, was "largely a working class movement."¹³ Jackson's study of urban Klans strongly bolsters the marginal man—low status argument. His analysis of Klan membership lists and chapter records from six cities and towns demonstrated that "white collar workers in general provided a substantial minority of Klan membership and included primarily struggling independent businessmen, advertising dentists, lawyers, and chiropractors, ambitious and unprincipled politicians and salesmen, and poorly paid clerks. The greatest source of Klan support came from rank and file nonunion, blue-collar employees of large businesses and factories. Miserably paid, they rarely boasted of as much as a high school education and more commonly possessed only a grammar or 'free school' background."¹⁴ Proponents of the low-status view augment their position by quoting the Klan's second Imperial Wizard, Hiram Wesley Evans: "We are a movement of the plain people, very weak in the matter of culture, intellectual support and trained leadership. . . . This is undoubtedly a weakness. It lays us open to the charge of being 'hicks' and 'rubes' and 'drivers of second-hand Fords.' We admit it."¹⁵ Contemporary opponents of the Klan agreed, although their motives may be more suspect. Also of-

ferred in evidence is the frequently quoted observer of an Indiana Klan demonstration: "You think the influential men belong here? Then look at their shoes when they march in parade. The sheet doesn't cover the shoes."¹⁶

A third hypothesis, rarely made explicit, has also been suggested. A few students of the Klan have interpreted the organization's heterogeneous program as a mirror of the membership. Charles Alexander, while accepting the middle-class explanation, concluded from his study of the Klans in the Southwest that "excluding non-whites and non-Protestants, the membership of the order was remarkably cross-sectional. Bankers, businessmen, salesmen, physicians, lawyers, ministers, and even university professors donned their white robes and hoods alongside mechanics, farmers, and day laborers. The Klan had something for them all."¹⁷

Colorado provides an unparalleled opportunity to probe these conflicting conceptions of the hooded society. The Klan arrived in Colorado in 1921 and in less than three years converted the state into one of the Invisible Empire's strongest realms. Centered in Denver, it enlisted more than 35,000 men and played a powerful role in the election of Colorado's local and state leaders. No other state in the Rocky Mountain West compared in membership or political clout. Only in Indiana did Klan political influence rival that attained in the Centennial state.

Because the Klan keyed its message to the local environment, five cities and towns differing in population, economic base, sizes and types of minority groups, and regional location were selected for analysis. The communities are: Denver, the state's largest city and political, financial, and cultural capital; Pueblo, Colorado's second largest city and chief industrial center; Colorado Springs, ranking third in population and a tourist and health resort; Canon City, a remote, small town of 4,500 people; and Grand Junction, with a population of 8,700 persons, the largest town on the Western Slope. Case studies of this disparate group of communities allow an examination of the effects of variations in geographic, social, economic, and demographic features upon the Klan experience. Such in-depth investigations are also necessary to isolate the variables which influenced Klan mobilization success or failure. The patterns which emerge from the local Colorado environments may provide added insights not only into the Ku Klux Klan but into other American social movements as well.

Also important in the selection process was the availability in

each community of complete files of newspapers, the chief source of qualitative data about the Klan. Reliance upon newspapers does not preclude critical evaluation of their contents. News reports were used carefully and always measured against other materials to assess their accuracy. Moreover, the style, extent of event coverage, and interpretation of newspaper reports and editorials molded readers' perceptions and attitudes. The newspaper, as a daily opinion-shaper and chronicle, is thus an indispensable historical tool for discerning a past actor's reality.

Interviews gave life to the material gleaned from the newspapers. The Klan's meaning was largely distilled from the experiences of the actors. Their perceptions of events, reasons for joining the Klan or opposing it, and characterizations of the leading personalities of the period crucially shaped every part of this study. Of the twenty-seven interviews or telephone conversations conducted, ten were held with Klansmen, thirteen with anti-Klansmen, and four with neutral observers. Names were collected from Klan and anti-Klan membership lists, newspaper accounts, and personal referrals. It was necessary to use an alias when contacting Klansmen because the initial effort under my real name produced no interviews. An additional nine interviews conducted by James Davis were also employed extensively.

Qualitative materials have been the basis but also the limitation of almost every investigation of the Ku Klux Klan. In Colorado, however, statistical analysis is possible because membership lists are among the artifacts which have survived the Klan days. The names of Denver, Pueblo, and Colorado Springs Klan leaders are known. Rosters of the Klan's rank and file in Denver and Canon City are available. Information about each Klansman was extracted from city directories, vital statistics records, obituaries, military records, and membership lists of various fraternal, civic, and social groups. These sources furnished data about age, place of birth, military service, membership in other organizations, place and length of residence, occupation, pattern of mobility, and marital status. Determining which men joined not only will produce a sharper social and economic picture of the Klan but will enhance our understanding of why they joined.

A conscious effort was made to avoid the methodological weaknesses which have hindered studies of the Klan. Unlike other research concerning membership, data were collected upon a variety of socioeconomic variables. Occupational status, while critical, was only one fragment of information that composed a variegated por-

trait. Moreover, gross classification of occupational information into monolithic white- and blue-collar categories was rejected for more precise and intellectually defensible divisions. Random sampling furnished groups of Klansmen representative of the larger klavern membership. Comparisons to the general population were also undertaken to more fully explore the nature of the Klan movement. Since the rosters were dated, the character of Klan membership could be determined over time.

This book also addresses two largely unexplored areas in Klan research. The Klan was in Colorado, as in many other states, a political machine. Colorado Klan organization, tactics, and strategy are extensively probed on the local and state levels to explain the secret society's success in outmaneuvering the established political parties. Also, as elsewhere in the United States, Colorado Klansmen could not translate their electoral victories into legislative accomplishments and governmental policy. The reasons for their failure are pertinent not only to the Klan but to other liberal and conservative movements which throughout American history have wrestled with the power structure for their version of reform.

Finally, this study attempts to treat the Ku Klux Klan as a social movement rather than a pathological assembly of deviant men and women. The Klan, like all social movements, was a formally organized group which consciously sought to promote or resist change through collective action. Social movements are rooted not in individual psychosis or breakdowns in society's integrating mechanisms but instead in confrontations with real community problems. Like members of conventional groups, social movement participants are rational individuals who seek to mobilize resources (people, money, and votes) to influence the decisions which affect their lives. The Ku Klux Klan thus differs in appeals but not in tasks from the American Association of University Professors, the Sierra Club, and more "acceptable" movements such as the National Organization for Women. An assumption of continuity and similarity furnishes more explanatory power than a division between normal and abnormal. Obviously an assumption of rationality and normality does not imply approval of aims. Only when the conceptual blinders are shed can such an organization as the Ku Klux Klan be understood.¹⁸

The combination of the techniques of oral history and collective biography in a case-study framework will furnish some answers to the questions that have perplexed students of the Klan: Why did men join the Ku Klux Klan? Did the Klan's voice seem especially reasonable to "marginal men" or those threatened by neighborhood

change? What community variables affected joining motivation? Did urban klaverns recruit more men and exercise greater influence than the small-town organizations? Were Klansmen drawn from a particular socioeconomic segment or did they represent a cross-section of their society? Has the unifying symbol of the burning cross disguised an organization composed of heterogeneous factions?

Many have extended their time and energy, both academic and personal. Eleanor M. Gehres, Opal Harber, Frederick J. Yonce, Hazel Lundberg, Young Chin Mueller, Lynn Taylor, Bonnie Hardwick, Carolyn Koplín, Augie Mastrogiuseppe, and especially Kay Kane, Douglas Tabor, Sandra Turner, and Kay Wilcox of the Western History Department, Denver Public Library, gave to the limit professionally and emotionally. The Denver Klan's official membership lists were opened only because of the ceaseless efforts of Dr. Maxine Benson of the State Historical Society of Colorado. The company of Ellen Wagner and Christopher Compton, also of the Historical Society, made the wading through piles of microfilm almost pleasurable. Stan Suski's patience with my demands was greatly appreciated. Donald Davids, director of the Colorado Bureau of Vital Statistics, cut endless red tape to allow access to crucial records. David Hardy and Eleanor Drake generously permitted me to search their family collections for Klan material. In the field counseling from Professor Steven Leonard of Metropolitan State College suggested new areas of research and kept me from numerous historical embarrassments.

Academically I am most heavily indebted to Professor Charles P. Cell of the University of Wisconsin's Department of Sociology. With give and take on the farm and in the classroom, he sharpened my perception of the Klan as a social movement. Professor John M. Cooper, Jr., of Wisconsin's Department of History supervised this study, giving me what I most needed: independence, reassurance, and perceptive criticism. Professors Daniel Rogers and Diane Lindstrom, also of the Department of History, cogently convinced me of weaknesses in the early drafts, many of which I hope have been remedied. I have also benefited from the incisive yet gently tendered suggestions of Professors Crandall Shifflett of Virginia Polytechnic Institute and David R. Johnson of the University of Texas at San Antonio. Lois Corcoran and Rose Pantoja expeditiously, accurately, and patiently typed the manuscript over and over again.

My deepest appreciation goes to the Goldberg clan. My mother, father, brothers, and sister could not have been more supportive.

Preface

Helen and Robert Roberts's encouragement and enthusiasm made the task so much easier. Katharine Goldberg made life exciting in the pre-dissertation years. I thank my son Davy for allowing me to occasionally work on the chapters. My wife, Susan, bore the burden of typing, editing, listening, and soul searching. The author's vanity alone kept her name from appearing with his on the title page.

GLOSSARY OF KLAN TITLES AND TERMS

<i>Exalted Cyclops</i>	chief officer of the local Klan chapter, elected by the membership for a one-year term.
<i>Grand Dragon</i>	the Klan leader of the state, appointed by the Imperial Wizard.
<i>Great Titan</i>	chief administrator of a province.
<i>Imperial Commander</i>	highest officer of the Colorado Women's Klan.
<i>Imperial Wizard</i>	national leader of the Ku Klux Klan.
<i>Invisible Empire</i>	lofty name for the Knights of the Ku Klux Klan Inc., its bureaucracy and territory.
<i>Klabee</i>	treasurer of the local Klan chapter, elected by the membership for a one-year term.
<i>Klaliff</i>	vice-president of the local Klan chapter, elected by the membership for a one-year term.
<i>Klarogo</i>	inner guard of the local Klan chapter, elected by the membership for a one-year term.
<i>Klavern</i>	Klan's indoor meeting hall; also used to signify local Klan chapter.
<i>Kleagle</i>	recruiter or organizer.
<i>Klectoken</i>	ten-dollar initiation fee.
<i>Klexter</i>	outer guard of the local Klan chapter, elected by the membership for a one-year term.
<i>Klokan</i>	investigator of the local Klan chapter, elected by the membership for a one-year term.
<i>Kloran</i>	Klan ritual book used to conduct meetings and initiations.

<i>Klorero</i>	annual state convention of delegates from chartered Klans.
<i>Kludd</i>	chaplain of the local Klan chapter, elected by the membership for a one-year term.
<i>Kluxing</i>	kleagle recruiting or organizing activities.
<i>Nighthawk</i>	keeper of the fiery cross of the local Klan chapter, elected by the membership for a one-year term.
<i>Province</i>	administrative unit encompassing a group of counties. The Colorado realm was divided into two provinces until 1925 and three thereafter.
<i>Realm</i>	a subdivision of the Invisible Empire equivalent to a state.

CHAPTER ONE

THE KLUXING OF COLORADO

Our organization is more than a secret order; it is a movement; in a sense, it is a Crusade.

Paul S. Etheridge
Imperial Klonsel, Knights of the Ku Klux Klan

I

In the spring of 1921 William Joseph Simmons stepped from a train at Denver's Union Station. Dressed in a well-fitted suit emblazoned with lodge buttons, this tall, heavy-set man attracted little notice from the crowd. Simmons, the son of a country physician, had been born on a farm near Harpersville, Alabama, in 1880. Groping for success, he had been in turn a medical student, Methodist circuit rider, history instructor, and fraternal organizer. Simmons had only recently found his true calling; on the train platform stood the self-proclaimed Imperial Wizard of the Knights of the Ku Klux Klan.¹

Peering through his pince-nez glasses, Simmons immediately spotted his old friend Leo Kennedy. Kennedy, a Mason and former member of the anti-Catholic American Protective Association, hurriedly greeted Simmons and quickly led him from the station. Within minutes they were driving up Seventeenth Street to the Brown Palace Hotel. Speed was essential, for the Imperial Wizard was traveling incognito and word of his mission was not to appear in the Denver newspapers.²

Once in traffic the two men relaxed. Perhaps, after a few pleasantries, Simmons recounted the events that had propelled him to national power. Six years earlier on Thanksgiving night, 1915, Sim-

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mons had persuaded fifteen men to follow him to the summit of Stone Mountain in Georgia. There they had knelt before an American flag and burning cross and dedicated themselves to the resurrection of the Invisible Empire. Simmons traced his inspiration to a vision he had experienced upon his return from the Spanish-American War. One summer evening he had stood transfixed as the clouds in the sky were molded into charging white-robed horsemen. When the images had faded, Simmons had fallen to his knees and promised to convert this divine sign into reality.³

The resurrected Ku Klux Klan had not been an immediate success; by 1920 the Invisible Empire consisted of only 4,000 or 5,000 knights in scattered Klans throughout Georgia and Alabama. To revitalize his dream, Simmons had enlisted the aid of two shrewd promoters, Edward Young Clarke and Mrs. Elizabeth Tyler of the Atlanta-based Southern Publicity Association. On June 7, 1920, they had signed a contract which stipulated that the association, henceforth the Propagation Department of the Invisible Empire, would promote and enlarge the Klan in exchange for eight of the ten-dollar membership fee or klectoken. Clarke and Tyler had hired an initial sales force of more than 200 kleagles or recruiters and directed them to exploit any issue or prejudice that would lure men to the movement. The kleagles worked on a commission basis and thus sought to secure as many new members as they possibly could. The sharp rise in the secret order's membership reflected their success, for between June, 1920, and October, 1921, 85,000 men joined the Klan. Simmons later said of Clarke: "He put an army of 1,100 paid organizers in the field; hundreds of smart men working for him. They made things hum all over America."⁴

The Imperial Wizard was correct; America hummed. In Texas, the Invisible Empire's first self-governing realm, 200,000 men joined, and a Klansman was elected to the U.S. Senate. Oregon furnished the cause with 50,000 of its citizens, and Klan-endorsed candidates won the governor's chair and a Senate seat. The Klan enrolled 50,000 Protestants in California and helped capture the statehouse for its approved candidate. The Midwest proved quite fertile to Klanism. Twenty local chapters were organized for Chicago's 50,000 Klansmen, while 35,000 wore the hood and robe in Detroit. The Klan citadel of Indiana sheltered 240,000 knights who succeeded in electing two governors and two U.S. senators. In neighboring Ohio 400,000 men paid their klectokens for the privilege of entering the Invisible Empire. New York added 200,000 more Klansmen, and Pennsylvania 225,000. The Klan found recep-

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tive Protestants even in New England: Connecticut provided 20,000 men, and Maine 15,000. At its height in 1924 the national movement drew an estimated three to six million men from throughout the United States.⁵

Simmons's visit to Denver was part of the initial kluxing surge. At the request of Leo Kennedy, the Imperial Wizard had scheduled a private meeting at the Brown Palace Hotel to explain the Klan message. The select group of prominent Denverites had already formed when Simmons and Kennedy arrived. With the fervor of a revivalist Simmons extolled the virtues and principles of his new secret society. The men were convinced and he promptly initiated them. The Ku Klux Klan had arrived in Colorado and would soon spread to every county in the state.⁶

II

By train and automobile the kleagles scoured Colorado for prospective Klansmen. Topographical variations in the new sales territory influenced their efforts. Extending east from the foothills of the Rocky Mountains to the Nebraska and Kansas borders lies a dry, treeless prairie dotted by farms and small, isolated towns. Devoted to agriculture, its people grew wheat, hay, and corn and raised beef and dairy cattle. The Klan fastened itself to the region, meeting only scattered resistance. In 1920 four of every ten Coloradans lived within a thirty-mile-wide strip running along the base of the foothills and extending the length of the state. Crowded into this band were the state's steel mills, stockyards, meat and canning plants, wholesale and retail houses, and major financial institutions. The foothill belt contained all of Colorado's cities with a population of 8,000 or more except Grand Junction. The urban centers were also physically close: Denver, the state capital, was only thirty miles from Boulder, fifty-four miles from Greeley, seventy miles from Colorado Springs, and 112 miles from Pueblo. Because they were so easily accessible, the people of this section experienced the most intensive Klan recruiting campaigns. The Rocky Mountains to the west slowed Klan expansion; klaverns or local chapters were not organized in western Colorado until 1924, several years after similar efforts on the Eastern Slope. Although the Klan eventually gained a foothold among its high mesas and narrow, fertile valleys, the sparsely populated Western Slope proved most resistant to the Klan onslaught.⁷

The kleagles lectured Coloradans about all aspects of the Klan




Figure 1. Colorado's Counties, Principal Cities, and Rivers.

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creed. They portrayed the Klan as a patriotic organization dedicated to the preservation of America's institutions and ideals. The white-robed "guardians of liberty" stood for fair elections, honest leaders, efficient government, and against unresponsive and corrupt politicians. Disclaiming partisanship, the Klan infiltrated both major parties and elected scores of candidates pledged to its version of "100 Per Cent Americanism." For those demanding political reform, the Klan provided a convenient vehicle for mobilization.

Clothed in the symbols of Protestantism, the Klan posed as the savior of the "old time religion." The Klan promised to unite Protestants in a crusade that would combat the teaching of evolution and restore faith in God, the Bible, and the Christian fundamentals. Vigorous recruitment of ministers and generous donations to Protestant churches enhanced the organization's aura of religiosity. According to Denver Klan leader the Reverend William Oeschger, "The Klan includes more Protestants who are without the church than it does those that are within it. It is gathering together the great arm of Protestantism into a single unit and counteracting the great tragedy of Protestantism, namely its division."⁸

Law and order was another Klan rallying cry. In the postwar years a sharp upsurge in crime jolted Coloradans. Although crimes of all types increased, most attention was focused upon the breakdown of the prohibition laws. Moonshiners and bootleggers infested the state, pursuing their trade with impunity as local authorities seemed unwilling or unable to stamp them out. Citizens of such towns as Aguilar, DeBeque, Meeker, and Oak Creek were frustrated by inadequate law enforcement and beseeched Governor William Sweet for state assistance. In 1924 the *Denver Post* echoed the sentiments of many of its readers: "When the law is not enforced, when it is disregarded spurned and trampled upon . . . when its lack of enforcement and its delay fail to protect the citizen and taxpayer, he has but one immediate recourse, and that is to enforce the laws himself. . . . The zero point is just about reached in this community."⁹

The traditional code of morality was also under attack. Challenges to the moral status quo had appeared before World War I and rapidly multiplied in the twenties. Evidence of moral laxity was everywhere; new styles of clothing, "suggestive" dances, and "titillating" motion pictures were symbols of the decay sapping America's strength. Klansmen vowed not only to banish loose women, roadhouses, and "joyriding neckers and petters" but also to restore decency and decorum to their communities. The Klan's main thrust was directed at the bootlegger, for it was his product that fueled the

revolution in manners and morals. The Boulder klavern's *Rocky Mountain American* proclaimed: "The Klan is the answer, not the question. The question is the immorality that permeated the government, the churches, the social and domestic life in the post-war saturnalia."¹⁰

The Klan's message of Americanism and law enforcement was not aimed at all of Colorado's 939,629 people; only white, native-born, Protestant males, eighteen years or older, were accepted for mobilization. Later the eligible population was expanded, and kleagles organized women and foreign-born Protestants. Completely excluded from "100 Per Cent Americanism" and depicted as threats to the nation's ideals and values were the Catholics, Jews, immigrants, and blacks.

The Catholics bore the brunt of Klan hatred. Unlike Jews and blacks, who were concentrated in Denver, Colorado's 125,757 Roman Catholics resided in all sections of the state. Preying upon long-time suspicions and prejudices, the Klan excoriated Catholics for their devotion to a false church that preached a "paganistic creed with its worship of the Virgin Mary, dead saints, images, bones, and other relics."¹¹ More important, kleagles accused Catholics of placing their allegiance to the pope above their loyalty to the United States. Catholics, said Klan sympathizer Bishop Alma White of the Pillar of Fire Church, were completely subservient and unable to resist the Vatican's commands. "Moral obligations," she argued, "have little to do with holding a Romanist in subjection to his superiors; it is the fear that the secrets of the confessional might be used against him so as to effect his undoing in this world and that which is to come."¹² Ever ready to expand his power, the pope had long coveted Protestant America. With Catholic votes he would elect men to do his bidding. Once the Catholic hierarchy had gained control of the government, it would end the separation of church and state, ban the Bible, and destroy the freedoms of press, speech, and religion. In the 1920s, the Klan contended, the papists were within reach of their goals. A Klansman speaking at a naturalization ceremony near Trinidad, Colorado, warned that 85 percent of federal government employees, 60 percent of elected and appointed office holders, and the entire Secret Service were Catholic.¹³

Rumors of papal intrigue spread all over the state. In the Fort Collins area Klansmen circulated faked copies of the oath of the Knights of Columbus, "the oily knights of the Pope's militia." In Las Animas County suspicious citizens tore the corners off dollar bills to destroy the fabled papal mark. Klan newspapers were filled with ar-

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ticles detailing priestly corruption and convent horrors. Colorado kl eagles demanded that the high walls surrounding monasteries, convents, and parish schools be demolished and probes launched into the activities of these institutions. In the Denver klavern leaders reported that Colorado Catholics had kidnapped and mutilated several Protestant men. Boulder's Klan newspaper admonished Protestants to awaken to the danger. Fifteen million American Catholics are "organizing and working as a unit through many societies that are military and are drilled and equipped with arms and ammunition. . . ." Their aim was obvious: "to make America Catholic."¹⁴

Klansmen also believed that Rome was anxious to subvert the public school system. Regarded as essential to the creation of a loyal and intelligent citizenry, the schools were conspicuous targets. The papists sought to ruin the quality of education and romanize the students by placing Catholics on the school boards and employing them as teachers. "In the event of their success, there would be a string of beads around every Protestant child's neck and a Roman Catholic catechism in its hand. 'Hail Mary, Mother of God,' would be on every child's lips, and the idolatrous worship of dead saints a part of the daily program."¹⁵ The menace, cautioned the Klan, was neither imaginary nor distant. A Klan recruiter claimed that Roman Catholic catechisms had been seized in a public school in southern Colorado. In 1924 eight public schools were burned; authorities placed the blame on an insane arsonist. For those taught to mistrust Catholics, the Klan's explanation was more convincing.¹⁶

Klan-inspired anti-Semitism was largely unknown outside of Denver, the center of Colorado's Jewish population. In the Klan litany the Jews were "Jonah[s] on the Ship of State," incapable of assimilation because of their conceited religious and social exclusiveness. Scornful of American traditions, the Jews planned to undermine Protestant hegemony. Well-organized "Hebrew syndicates" forced Protestants from positions of economic power. The motion picture industry, an early victim of the Jews, produced debauching films, commercialized the Sabbath, and lured Protestants from their churches. The Klan also accused Jews of leading the movement branding the Bible a sectarian book and excluding it from the public schools. Protestant women were warned of the lascivious Jews, "men in whose characters animal passions and greed are the predominant forces."¹⁷ Some even believed that Jewish financiers were aiding the pope in his scheme to disinherit Protestant Americans.¹⁸

Immigrants presented another challenge to pure Americanism, a Trojan horse filled with inferior and disloyal men and women.

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The Klan maintained that the newcomers from southern and eastern Europe cared little for justice and liberty, wanting only to siphon America's wealth and return to lives of ease in their homelands. Clustered in urban foreign quarters, immune to the forces of Americanization, the immigrants perpetuated their alien lifestyles and retained their allegiance to the Old World. Underlying much of the Klan's animosity were the religious affiliations of the immigrants. Because they were predominantly Catholics and Jews, immigrants were merely pawns in the anti-Protestant conspiracy.¹⁹

White supremacy had always been a major tenet in the Klan's creed, and Denver kleagles in particular called men to its defense. The Klan, despite Colorado's small black population, exploited white fears of a "new Negro" emerging from World War I demanding political, economic, and social equality. Kleagles even spread rumors that black leaders advocated intermarriage with whites. Citing the Bible and "scientific evidence" of black mental inferiority inherited from "savage ancestors, of jungle environment," Klansmen stood ready to battle for the purity of the white race. "WE MUST KEEP THIS A WHITE MAN'S COUNTRY," decreed a Klan recruiting ad. "Every effort to wrest from the White Man the control of this country must be resisted. No person of the White Race can submit . . . without shame."²⁰

Klansmen, lamented Dr. John Galen Locke, the Grand Dragon of the Colorado Ku Klux Klan, were "now outlaws in the land of their forefathers, forced to conceal their activities and identity with a mask of secrecy." Their birthright was imperiled by the Jew, "his eye . . . on the prosperity, wealth and resources of America"; the Roman Catholic, who would "have us bow down our heads in worship to his foreign pope"; and the Negro, "the untaught would fain be teacher." "Should they gain sway," he continued, "no more would America be a land of liberty, justice and equality, a land of resources and opportunity, the land of virgin hope, the land of the ideals and aspirations of our forefathers. All this would these people sacrifice on the altar of self."²¹

III

In each Colorado town and city Klan mobilization success was a function of the interplay of four variables: local tensions, governmental responsiveness, the quality of the klavern's leadership, and community perceptions. The Klan offered a program of Americanism, militant Protestantism, fraternity, order, religious intol-

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erance, and racial purity—a plethora of causes from which to choose. But such abstract causes could not generate membership unless they drew meaning from the immediate environment. Real community tensions and neighborhood conflicts rather than distant dangers produced Klan growth. “You cannot put into effect any set program,” insisted Hiram Wesley Evans, the Klan’s second Imperial Wizard, “for there are different needs in the various localities. Your program must embrace the needs of the people it must serve.”²² The Klan’s rationale was dependent upon the actions of the local authorities. Their level of responsiveness to Protestant demands to curb law violators, resist minorities, or initiate civic reforms critically affected the Klan’s ability to justify its existence. The men responsible for molding the Klan’s message to the needs of the targeted communities were the klavern leaders. Attuned to local conditions, these ambitious, dynamic men made Klan explanations and solutions convincing for the discontented. Often well-known community figures, they exploited their reputations and positions of trust to attract recruits. The community’s perception of the Ku Klux Klan also influenced a potential Klansman’s membership decision. The reaction of the local opinion-making public—clergymen, newspaper editors, and other respected individuals—helped shape the Klan’s definition. A negative, positive, or neutral response colored residents’ attitudes and hence a Klan leader’s organizing effectiveness. The actions of government officials or the arguments of an anti-Klan movement could likewise sway the public mind. Joining the Pueblo Klan could thus mean something far different from membership in either the Canon City or Denver organizations. Loose coordination and a lack of strong central direction from the state hierarchy militated against outside interference in variable interplay. Community isolation makes a case-study approach necessary to discern the differing experiences of Colorado Klansmen.

The Colorado realm, moreover, was for several years immune from national Klan meddling. Distance, the personality of the Grand Dragon, and the distraction of the Imperial Wizard enabled Colorado Klansmen to develop their organizations with a minimum of interference. As a Grand Junction Klansman recalls: “We knew that the Klan came out of Georgia, but we never thought of them being at the head of it. We knew that they probably got a dollar out of our ten dollars to join . . . and we knew our bed sheets came from there. As far as we were concerned Denver was the head of it.”²³

CHAPTER TWO

QUEEN CITY OF THE COLORADO REALM

Well, this might not be as funny as it looks. There is something big starting in this country, and we've just joined it.

Anonymous Denver Klansman

The Denver klavern was the largest and most influential member of the Colorado Klan federation. Its energetic and skillful Klan leaders were able to build the state's strongest organization because they responded to the grievances of Denver Protestants confronted with an actual breakdown in law and order and challenges from minority groups. With city officials seemingly unresponsive, the Klan solution became, for many, the only solution. Using lodge, social, and professional connections, Klansmen first contacted Denver's public officials, Protestant ministers, and leading businessmen. Later, in preparation for political action, the Klan broadened its base and welcomed all who sought to enlist. Klan recruiting and resource gathering, after an initial confrontation with government authorities, encountered only scattered resistance. Following a few skirmishes, the path was cleared toward the goal of controlling community decision-making. The organization, wrote national Klan leader Edgar I. Fuller, "was not taken seriously at first; many who saw the danger thought that by ignoring it the chances of its spreading would be lessened. But, this proved to be a mistaken idea, for, like a spark in a sawdust pile, the smoldering fire burst and grew into flame. . . ."¹

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I

During the 1920s Denver was the financial and commercial center of the Rocky Mountain West, unchallenged in a wide trade area extending for 500 miles in all directions. Denver had been founded in 1858 and first served as an outfitting station for miners seeking their fortunes in the mountains. With the building of the railroads and the settlement of the plains, the city had expanded to supply the needs of farmers and cattle ranchers. Denver was primarily a distribution and collection point and never developed substantial heavy industry. Manufacturing was diversified, small scale, and oriented toward local and regional markets. Only 28 percent of the labor force was employed in manufacturing, slightly less than the number engaged in trade and transportation. Denver was also Colorado's capital and largest city, containing slightly more than one-fourth of the state's total population. Between 1910 and 1920, the population of Denver had increased by 20 percent, to over 256,000 persons. The growth rate slowed in the 1920s, reaching 287,000 persons by 1930. Denver citizens were predominantly white and Protestant. In 1920 there were only 6,075 blacks in the city, an increase of 649 since 1910. There was no heavy migration from the South during the twenties and Denver's blacks barely maintained their percentage of the population. The number of Roman Catholics had risen from 28,772 in 1916 to 37,748 in 1926, thus constituting nearly 15 percent of the city's inhabitants. Aside from a few immigrant neighborhoods, the city was ethnically and culturally homogeneous.²

Soon after their initiation at the Brown Palace Hotel, the Ku Klux Klan's new recruits founded a klavern under the title "Denver Doers Club." The inspired initiates wasted no time in spreading the Klan message to friends and relatives. To coordinate recruiting efforts and direct the enlistment campaign, the Klan's Propagation Department in Atlanta quickly dispatched several kleagles to the city. Headquarters for the membership drive were established in rented offices in the Continental Trust Building at Seventeenth and Larimer streets. On June 17, 1921, after a few months of secret organizing, the Denver Klan was ready to announce its existence. The Klan boasted, in a letter to the *Denver Times*, of its ability and eagerness to suppress crime: "We are a law and order organization assisting at all times the authorities in every community in upholding law and order. Therefore we proclaim to the lawless element of

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the city and county of Denver and the state of Colorado that we are not only active now, but we were here yesterday, we are here today and we shall be here forever."³

Two weeks later, at midnight on June 29, a column of cars loaded with Klansmen sped through downtown Denver and stopped in front of the Rivoli Theater on Curtis Street. Klansmen holding red torchlights affixed notices to the theater demanding the re-engagement of the film *The Face at Your Window*. According to a Klan recruiting newsletter, the motion picture "shows the hooded figures of the knights of the Ku Klux Klan riding to the rescue and portrays the final triumph of decent and orderly government . . . over the alien influences now at work in our midst."⁴ The film was reshown and the Klan given credit and free publicity in a *Denver Post* advertisement. In July A. J. Padon, Jr., the Grand Goblin of Domain No. 7, which included Colorado, claimed that 175 Denver men had been recruited and promised 2,000 more members in ninety days. The Klan, he said, was ready to place these men at the disposal of the chief of police within three minutes whether day or night. Only with these additional forces could crime be driven from Denver. Americanism, relief of the poor, protection of the home, and brotherhood were also declared goals. The image-making process had only just begun.⁵

Anti-Klan sentiment quickly surfaced. Mayor Dewey C. Bailey condemned the Klan as a threat to lawful government and ordered an investigation. "We are going to find out the purpose of this new organization in Denver," vowed Bailey, "and if it plans to take the law into its own hands . . . we are going to . . . break it up."⁶ F. C. Howbert, Denver's collector of internal revenue, launched a probe into the local Klan's alleged failure to pay federal taxes on initiation fees and dues. Simultaneously the Department of Justice sent agents to Denver to gather evidence for its investigation of the national Klan. In September the *Denver Express*, a liberal, labor-oriented newspaper, began the first of several exposés of Klan secrets.⁷

The Klan, partly in reaction to these moves, closed its recruiting office, and its kleagles left the city. Mention of the activities of the Denver Klan disappeared from the newspapers for the rest of the year. The apparent defeat of the Ku Klux Klan was a relief to many Denverites, for their city had been spared the strife and discord that usually accompanied the hooded order. The Klan, however, had not surrendered. Rather, a shift in tactics was needed. Responsibility fell into the hands of a nucleus of local men who chose to carry on their crusade underground. Klan leaders, now shielded from hostile

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opinion makers and authorities, guided their movement through its formative stage. Quietly they organized and the ranks swelled.⁸

The leader of this determined band was an enigmatic Denver physician, John Galen Locke. Dr. Locke had been among the first in Denver to join and quickly rose to command the organization. Under his astute leadership as Exalted Cyclops and later Grand Dragon, the Klan came to dominate the city and state. Locke had been born in New York City on September 6, 1873. Like his father, he had decided upon a career in medicine and enrolled in Bellevue Hospital Medical College. Locke had left New York for Denver in 1893 where he completed his education at the College of Physicians and Surgeons. After several years of further training in Europe he had returned to Denver to practice. Locke was never admitted to either the Denver or Colorado Medical Societies despite his seemingly extensive training. Speculation concerning his rejection ranged from the accusation that he performed abortions to his supposed failure to keep abreast of developments in his profession. More likely, it was Locke's belief in homeopathy as opposed to allopathic medicine that kept him from membership. The Spanish-American War in 1898 had briefly interrupted his practice. He had enlisted and was commissioned a first lieutenant in Chafee's Light Artillery, but his unit never left the United States and he did not see action.⁹

In appearance, Locke was hardly awesome or inspiring. He was a short fat man, weighing 250 pounds, who wore a Van Dyke beard and carefully trimmed moustache. A former patient likened him to a "buddha with a goatee."¹⁰ His voice was high and squeaky, the result of a knife wound he received while attempting to quell a riot in London, England. Locke practiced an ascetic lifestyle which barred drink and sex and permitted only an occasional cigar. Yet underneath this deceptive exterior was a charismatic personality possessing the necessary traits of leadership. Locke's genius for organization, eloquence, and ability to inspire fanatical loyalty made him one of the most important factors in the growth of the Colorado Klan. The Grand Dragon's office and private hospital, located at 1345 Glenarm Place, further enhanced his aura of leadership. In the basement behind sliding steel doors was Locke's inner sanctum and the headquarters of the Colorado Ku Klux Klan. In the center of the soundproof hall was a thronelike chair at the feet of which lounged a Dalmatian and two fawn-colored Great Danes. A solid gold seal of the United States hung above an enormous fireplace, and ancestral portraits, hunting trophies, swords, and pistols covered the walls. Half a dozen bodyguards were always present to en-

sure the safety of their leader. An astonished *Denver Post* reporter remarked when ushered into the room, "His tastes are of another age."¹¹

Locke, despite his position as Grand Dragon, was rarely accused of bigotry. He had been married to a Catholic; he paid the pew rents of his two Catholic secretaries. At Klan meetings Locke preached moderation and nonviolence; a Catholic priest credited him with preventing the bombing of Denver's Immaculate Conception Cathedral. For legal advice Locke turned to Catholics and Jews. It was neither prejudice nor money that lured Locke to the Klan, it was his lust for power. A close friend of the Grand Dragon recalled: "He felt a sense of history and mission all of a sudden. Here, he, Dr. Locke who had never done anything but work on this poor human carcass was shaping the course of life of thousands of people. And he loved the power, he just loved it. No doubt about it."¹²

Locke's eccentricities and mystical regalia should not disguise his affinity to leaders of other more mundane movements and organizations. The Klan's leader planned strategy and issued orders while he simultaneously faced the pressures of a tight budget, juggled the interests of differing factions, allocated scarce resources, and parried challenges to his authority. His efforts, while sometimes based upon incomplete or erroneous information, were clearly directed toward achieving Klan aims. The order's success in Denver and Colorado testify to this man's effectiveness.

II

The Denver Klan reappeared in January, 1922, with a donation to the Young Men's Christian Association. A month later Klansmen fastened a note to the door of Dr. William H. Sharpley, Denver's manager of health and charity, warning the city to take precautions against a threatened smallpox epidemic. Nine recent deaths attributed to the disease gave credence to Klan fears. In March a destitute widow received \$200 from the Denver klavern. Klansmen trumpeted these acts of benevolence and public service as evidence of their sincere desire to aid their fellow man. Such activities were also effective public relations devices which lessened community resistance and attracted new members. Visitations and contributions to Protestant churches reinforced the Klan's image of piety. More spectacular was the staged kidnapping of Aimee Semple McPherson on June 17, 1922. Klansmen presented McPherson with a bouquet of white roses and assured her "that the spirit of the Ku Klux Klan

will surround you wherever you go." "There is work for you men to do," replied the evangelist, "to defend the weak and to stand as champion for those who have none to stand by them."¹³ A newspaper reporter was conveniently present to record the scene. Thus did Klan power grow. It was reflected not only in a larger membership base but in informal alliances with other, more established community organizations.¹⁴

The Klan even exploited the dead to ease its reception. In February, 1922, "handsomely robed" Klansmen interrupted the funeral services of Charles E. Locke, placed a white floral cross at the head of the grave, and withdrew. Locke was a veteran of the Civil War, Spanish-American War, and Philippine insurrection as well as a prominent member of the Masons. The Klan praised him as "a real American" whose "record stands unsurpassed in the service of our country."¹⁵ He was also the father of John Galen Locke and, although it was denied, a member of the Denver Klan.

The Klan's benevolent activities only briefly masked its darker side. On January 27, 1922, black janitor Ward Gash received a letter from the Denver Klan charging him with "intimate relations with white women" and "the use of abusive language to, and in the presence of white women." He was warned to leave town by February 1. "Nigger," the note concluded, "do not look lightly upon this. Your hide is worth less to us than it is to you."¹⁶ Gash turned the letter over to District Attorney Philip Van Cise and promptly left Denver. Van Cise carefully investigated the Klan's charges and found them groundless, characterizing Gash as a "good boy." He then turned his anger against the Klan. A grand jury was called and began its probe of the Klan on March 10. A second Klan threat, sent this time to George Gross, the president of Denver's National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, made the grand jury's work more imperative. After a month the grand jury issued a report returning no indictments but recommending further investigation. Van Cise decided against launching another formal inquiry and instead ordered five of his men to infiltrate the organization and spy on its activities. Van Cise's tactical decision helped guarantee Klan success. With Denver's publicity-minded mayor amenable merely to verbal anti-Klanism, the district attorney was the only city official in a position to exert the government's power against the secret order. When Van Cise opted for weekly spy reports and minimal infiltration, he removed the government as an effective obstacle to Klan ambitions. Klansmen attempted to retaliate by initiating a recall effort against the district attorney in the summer of 1922. The move-

ment collapsed, however, when Van Cise smashed Denver's notorious bunco ring.¹⁷

The Klan sought to regain a measure of respectability during the grand jury investigation and filed its articles of incorporation with the state government. State officers, however, refused official recognition and rejected the charter as too vague. Such prominent Denverites as Benjamin B. Lindsey, father of the juvenile court; Father Matthew Smith, editor of the *Denver Catholic Register*; Sidney Whipple of the *Denver Express*; and Jewish leaders Philip Hornbein and Charles Ginsberg hammered the Klan in eloquent editorials and speeches as a threat to constitutional government and the liberties of all Americans. Yet their voices were barely heard, for after an early demonstration of opposition Denverites acquiesced in the Klan's presence. The *Rocky Mountain News* and the *Denver Times* kept silent about the Klan issue. The *Denver Post* at first hesitated and remained neutral; later it swiped at Klansmen not so much for their membership in the secret order but because they were political opponents. Anti-Klan forays by the *Denver Jewish News* and the *Colorado Statesman*, a black newspaper, were feeble. In at least one instance silence nearly gave way to appeasement. In 1924 members of Denver's B'nai B'rith planned an open meeting to curry favor with Klan leaders, but the scheme was blocked only after heated debate. Those who looked for anti-Klan champions among Denver's white Protestant organizations despaired because only a few groups such as the men's Bible class of the Central Presbyterian Church publicly condemned the order.¹⁸

Denver's inability to generate an effective counterforce during the Klan's formative years, whether in the form of attitudes or an opposition organization, facilitated the movement's expansion. City officials underestimated their adversary and failed to pursue a policy of continual harassment and confrontation. In fact, their own actions voided the use of government power as an effective instrument of social control. Opinion makers—Protestant ministers, editors, and other leading community figures—emitted ambiguous signals; most were unable or perhaps unwilling to define the Klan as deviant. Rather than intimidating and exhausting the Klan, their silence created the atmosphere which allowed the secret society to gather resources—men, money, and good will—with only minor interference. The Klan easily defended itself against a confused and sporadic opposition composed mainly of minority group members. Protestant Denver accepted or at least tolerated the Klan and only

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occasionally questioned it as a legitimate response to community needs.

The grand jury investigation and charter rejection only temporarily slowed the Klan's momentum. Two thousand hooded Klansmen gathered in June, 1922, at Estes Park, fifty miles from Denver, for the state's first publicized outdoor initiation. Three hundred Colorado men formed a circle around an altar and burning cross, knelt, and swore an oath of allegiance to the Invisible Empire. "Mortal men," proclaimed a Klan officer, "cannot assume a more binding oath. . . . Always remember that to keep this oath means to you honor, happiness, and life, but to violate it means disgrace, dishonor, and death. . . ." ¹⁹ Men flocked to the Klan standard and the Denver klavern quickly outgrew its meeting places, Yeager Mortuary, Woodmen Hall, the Mining Exchange Building, and the Knights of Pythias Hall. The Klan eventually acquired the Cotton Mills Stadium in South Denver and South Table Mountain, nine miles west of the city, to accommodate its knights. ²⁰

III

The Klan's most effective draw was its pledge to clean up Denver and rid the city of its criminal element. In 1920 the newly elected District Attorney Van Cise had described Denver as "practically a wide open town" and had formulated plans to eradicate the problem. ²¹ A sharp rise in criminal activity had frustrated his efforts. The *Denver Express* reported that "the wave of lawlessness sweeping Denver in 1921 exceeded all previous criminal reigns." ²² Police arrested an average of fifty-three persons per day for a total of 19,649, an increase of 28 percent over the 1920 figure and almost double the number apprehended in 1919. The crime rate continued upward in 1922, and although more cases were filed than in 1921, convictions decreased. Police statistics revealed a slight decline in lawlessness during 1923, but a series of jarring crime waves evoked doubt about the city's ability to cope with the situation. ²³

Prohibition law violators accounted for much of the increase in crime. Colorado and federal statutes outlawing intoxicating beverages had in no way curbed Denver's thirst. Liquor was cheap and easily obtainable, and police raids failed to dam the city's supply. Anxious Denverites attended mass meetings to prod city officials to more aggressive action against the bootleggers. The police responded with flurries of raids and arrests which lasted only until the

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outcry had dissipated. Denver police officials complained that lenient judges thwarted their efforts by restricting search and seizure practices. Judges were also lambasted because congested court calendars had forced them to accept guilty pleas in exchange for fines rather than impose prison terms. Van Cise realistically asserted, "I admit we are getting nowhere with bootlegging. The people are not back of us and it is hard to find a jury that will convict."²⁴

Prostitution also flourished in the city. Denver had officially closed its red-light district in 1912, but lax regulation after World War I had enabled some sixty brothels to reopen and scores of prostitutes to work the streets. On June 22, 1921, a federal investigator charged, "Street conditions are worse here than in any place I was ever in. I was solicited by no less than two dozen prostitutes. . . . They seem to be on the streets as much in the day as in the night."²⁵ A year later a grand jury investigation found no change in the situation. Prostitution was rampant in the downtown district and survived only because of official connivance. Van Cise had attempted, after taking office, to banish prostitution from Denver. In response to the grand jury's probe his office accelerated the campaign and launched a series of raids which padlocked most of the brothels and temporarily swept the streets of prostitutes. The raids, however, had an unforeseen result, since the prostitutes who had been primarily concentrated in a twelve-block downtown area slipped the confines of the district and spread to all parts of the city.²⁶

Denver's drug problem was less publicized but equally alarming. A *Denver Post* headline in August, 1921, declared, "CITY DOPE TRAFFIC GALLOPS ON, POLICE EXPERTS UNABLE TO COPE WITH THE EVER-PRESENT SCOURGE."²⁷ The police disclosed that drug addiction had claimed more than 1,000 victims and was not confined to any particular socioeconomic group. To stimulate business, the organizers of the traffic visited high schools and distributed free samples to students. Confiscations and prison sentences failed to check the traffic or lessen parental concern.²⁸

Police inefficiency and malfeasance aggravated crime conditions. The Denver police department's main weapon against lawlessness was a periodic sweep which collared "all suspicious characters and all persons . . . unable to give a good account of themselves. . . ."²⁹ More important, the city's police force was riddled with corruption. Charges such as accepting bribes, selling bootleg whiskey, associating with prostitutes, and drinking on duty were regularly lodged against Denver police officers. The infection was not confined to the poorly paid patrolman but spread to the upper echelons of the de-

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partment. A 1923 grand jury censured eight law enforcement officials, including the manager of safety and the city constable as "totally unfit to hold any office in this city and should be discharged forthwith."³⁰ The district attorney was more sweeping: "The present city administration is a disgrace to American government."³¹

In addition to bootlegging, prostitution, and narcotics, the city reeled under frequent and intense epidemics of burglaries, hold-ups, and sometimes murders. Unsolved crimes proliferated and further compromised the police. A few months before the Klan's arrival Denverites initiated plans to form a vigilance committee to assist the police department. The leader of this effort, a non-Klansman, declared, "Things have come to such a pass that such action now seems imperative."³² The *Denver Post* also sounded the alarm: "*The reign of outlawry that has existed during the past two or three years cannot continue and our country and government remain stable and safe. The government cannot continue to function when its laws are . . . belittled and insulted by law violators everywhere.*"³³

The Klan early seized upon the city's crime problem and promised to make Denver again a fit place to live and raise children. Publicity-wise Klan leaders lost no opportunity to bolster the organization's law and order image. They thus issued warnings to lawbreakers, offered rewards, and pledged thousands of men to aid the police department in fighting crime. Unscrupulously, yet tactically quite sound, Klansmen appeared at the funeral of non-Klansman Richie Rose, a police officer gunned down by Italian bootleggers, and demanded that his murderers be apprehended and brought to trial without delay. They also vowed that "the family of Patrolman Rose will not suffer for want of food and clothing. Their needs will be known to the members of this organization for many years to come."³⁴

Distrustful of their police force and impatient with the court system, many Denverites turned to the Ku Klux Klan as the only agency capable of driving crime and vice from the city. One such individual was Warren R. Given, president of a brokerage and investment company and a highly respected member of the community. Given had been born on November 10, 1874, in Centralia, Illinois, of native-born American parents. He was reared in Denver and was active in several fraternal orders, the First Church of Christ (Scientist), and Republican politics, having served as the vice-president of Colorado's Harding for President Club. Given, one of the founders of the Denver Ku Klux Klan, cited the reason for its formation: "A wave of crime during the past two years has swept over Denver and

other cities, the magnitude of which is the greatest in its history. . . . Because of this condition . . . [the Klan] is being maintained to the end that its members can give greater aid and support to the officials in stamping out crime, lawlessness and immorality, and to assist the authorities in ridding . . . Denver of criminals and undesirables. . . ."³⁵ For Given, the actual breakdown in law and order was not an abstract issue nor the Klan a symbolic crusade. The danger to family and city was immediate. The solution to the problem seemed to lie with the Klan. A large bloc of fellow Klansmen shared Given's fears and hopes.³⁶

The Denver Klan raised the papal specter to garner members, thus perpetrating the city's anti-Catholic tradition. In the 1890s the American Protective Association had attracted 10,000 men to its anti-Catholic campaign and captured the city government. The APA's demise had led Protestant crusaders to form, in turn, the Knights of Abraham Lincoln, the Guardians of Liberty, the Knights of Luther, and the Night Riders. These groups had boycotted Catholic merchants, blacklisted Catholic political candidates, and demanded passage of a convent inspection law.³⁷ Catholic job seekers, especially teachers, found it almost impossible to secure positions. Anti-Catholic sermons were frequent, and the *Menace*, a weekly published in the Ozark hills of Missouri, and "escaped nun" Maria Monk's *Confessions* were sold openly on Denver streets.³⁸

Anti-Catholic agitation eased during World War I only to resurface in the twenties when evidence of an apparent conspiracy appeared and helped rekindle dormant Protestant fears. In April, 1921, the *Denver Catholic Register* announced the formation of the Colorado chapter of the National Council of Catholic Men. An enthusiastic spokesman claimed, "By Christmas it is expected every layman in the state will be a member of this great organization."³⁹ Its objectives were vague: to unite Catholic men all over the United States "for general welfare work." In its first year the new society reported that it had established contact with similar organizations in other counties throughout the world. Also in 1921, Catholics established the Colorado Apostolate to wage a campaign for converts. The apostolate, backed by the Knights of Columbus, planned to "make one of the greatest drives ever engineered in any American diocese to bring Catholic truth to the attention of as many non-Catholics as possible. . . ."⁴⁰ It pledged, in addition, to aid Protestant ministers financially or otherwise, after their "leap toward the light."⁴¹ Klansmen even found support for their charges of priestly corruption. In 1923 Father Walter Grace of Arvada, a Denver sub-

urb, was indicted for forging a nun's signature on a liquor permit and served two years in prison. For those alert to Catholic machinations, the news was ominous.⁴²

Dedicated anti-Catholics as well as those Protestants susceptible to their message used the Klan to defeat the papal intrigue. The Klan fanned their fears even though the National Council of Catholic Men was merely a paper organization, the Colorado Apostolate consisted of only two men, and the Grace affair was an isolated occurrence. Kleagles searched the roster of the anti-Catholic Loyal Orange Society for recruits and also persuaded former members of Denver's Night Riders to join. Ex-APA members were contacted and several became prominent in the new movement, including Charles Locke, the Grand Dragon's father; Leo Kennedy, who brought the Imperial Wizard to Denver; and Rice Means, the Klan's candidate for the U.S. Senate. The Klan's most conspicuous anti-Catholic was Gano Senter, the Great Titan of Colorado's northern provinces. In 1914 Senter and a group of like-minded Denverites sent an open letter to the *Rocky Mountain News* echoing the charges of an anti-Catholic lecturer: "The Catholic priesthood is a great octopus and an unscrupulous political machine . . . extending its tentacles into every country it can for plunder, fighting . . . free schools and progress, and keeping the people in ignorance and superstition that it can ply its trade of corruption and extortion. . . ."⁴³ Senter joined the Klan in his early thirties and his "Kool Kozy Kafe" on Fifteenth and Curtis streets became an important hooded haunt. A large sign hung in the window: "We Serve Fish Every Day—Except Friday."⁴⁴ Jews received a similar welcome. Denver needed the Klan, said Senter, because "the Catholics and the Jews were taking over and we had to do something. So we went down to the Masonic Lodge and organized."⁴⁵

The Klan attracted many men from Bishop Alma White's Pillar of Fire Church. Their Klan fervor, like that of their leader, was partially rooted in the belief that the Catholic church was a major obstacle in the struggle for women's suffrage and equality. The Klan's anti-Catholicism plus its support of prohibition made it the foe of the twin evils enslaving women. "To whom," asked Bishop White, "shall we look to champion the cause and to protect the rights of women? Is there not evidence that the Knights of the Ku Klux Klan are the prophets of a new and better age?"⁴⁶

Irrationality or status anxiety are not sufficient explanations for Klan anti-Catholicism. Protestant fears proved groundless yet were based on actual events of the early 1920s. Reports of alleged papal

plotting and organizing interacted with and seemed to confirm the anti-Catholic stories and lessons learned as children. The long-dreaded Catholic revolution, given credence by local, tangible evidence and Klan speakers, had begun. Protestant rule was being challenged. Colorado and Denver had to be defended.

The kleagles did not create Denver's anti-Semitism; they merely exploited it. Denver's Jewish population had increased almost nine-fold between 1916 and 1926, to 17,000 persons. The Jews were primarily concentrated around West Colfax Avenue, an area derisively referred to as "Little Jerusalem" or "Jew Town." Tracts of vacant land and the South Platte River separated the district from Protestant Denver. The compact settlement housed many immigrants and Orthodox Jews who maintained their traditional values and customs. Numerous religious schools, multiple dialects, and more than a dozen synagogues reflected the diversity of nationalities and beliefs. Culturally, ethnically, and religiously distinct, the West Colfax Jewish community generated distrust and disgust among many Protestants. The inhabitants of the section, contended a former Klansman, were "cagey and aggressive, with Jew-stuff oozing out of every pore."⁴⁷

Denverites were suspicious for reasons other than the community's alien nature. Many, including the district attorney, linked the Jews to bootlegging and illicit gambling operations. The *Denver Jewish News* acknowledged the problem: "Unfortunately many Jewish sounding names are mentioned among those guilty of conducting gambling houses or disorderly places, as well as those who frequent them."⁴⁸ It also excoriated Jewish bootleggers who posed as rabbis to obtain large consignments of wine for religious purposes. The son of Denver Klan leader Harry Saunders concluded, "We had a lot of pretty scabby Jews."⁴⁹ Jewish migration from West Colfax to the rest of Denver accelerated in the 1920s and did little to ease tensions. Again, stress-provoking incidents in the immediate environment intermingled with latent prejudices to produce Klan recruits.⁵⁰

The Italians of North Denver also incited Klan hostility. Little Italy was an enclave of Old World culture where Italian was spoken as often as English. The Klan's indictment went beyond ethnicity and religion, for the colony was tagged with an undeserved reputation for lawlessness. "These are the criminals," charged Van Cise, "these are the disturbers, these are the unfit."⁵¹ The Italians controlled Denver's supply of bootleg whiskey and wine throughout the prohibition era despite numerous raids and arrests. Little Italy, in addition, was considered the center of the city's drug traffic. Denver

narcotics agent Henry Williamson blamed the drug plague on "olive complexioned youths of the loud clothes and the impressive motors [who] are scouring the highways . . . every evening in search of susceptible girls. They are finding all too many."⁵² The Italians, like the Jews, concentrated in a small but highly visible ethnic pocket, were an obvious fulcrum upon which to build the Klan.⁵³

Black Denver was numerically small and barely expanding in the 1920s. Blacks were confined mainly to the Five Points area, an old and deteriorating section east of downtown and north of Capitol Hill. Denver's racial tensions, unlike other cities after World War I, resulted not from a southern influx but from the actions of black Denverites aggressively assaulting the racial status quo. Despite the existence of a state public accommodations law and the absence of legal residential segregation, to blacks, "Dallas, Dixie and Denver were very much alike."⁵⁴

Even before World War I blacks rebelled against their second-class status. In 1915 they organized the Colored Protective League and a chapter of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People to advance civil and political rights. They attempted with the assistance of the city's two black newspapers, the *Colorado Statesman* and the activist *Denver Star*, to prohibit the showing of the film *Birth of a Nation*, but failed. Blacks were more successful a year later when they helped block a plan to legalize residential segregation in Denver. Those protests in 1916 sparked an anonymous threat to reactivate the Ku Klux Klan.⁵⁵

The struggle to achieve equality was vigorously renewed after the war. In 1920 a black man filed suit against the city because he was prevented from playing on tennis courts restricted to whites. A black woman sued the city the following year when she was ejected from the municipal auditorium after refusing to sit in the seats reserved for blacks. Dr. Clarence Holmes, president of the Denver NAACP, launched a drive to integrate the downtown movie theaters. The now-organized Klan sent a threatening note to Holmes and burned a cross in front of his office in retaliation. Black students at East Denver High School interrupted a whites-only dance to force integration of the school's social events.⁵⁶ The students acted with the approval of several black organizations and promised that their action signaled the beginning of a campaign to attain full equality in the city's schools. The Parent-Teacher Association and the Parkhill Improvement Association responded with resolutions advocating separate schools for blacks and whites. Denver Klan No. 1 proposed a more moderate solution: integrated schools, segregated social

events. The suggestion also contained a warning: "Any intrusion by members of either race into the social affairs of the other will not be tolerated."⁵⁷

Meanwhile, blacks were escaping their ghetto and buying homes in white neighborhoods. They received a hostile reception. In 1920 a white mob and the threat of violence forced Mrs. Emma Davis to leave her home at 2540 Gaylord Street.⁵⁸ On July 7, 1921, a bomb ripped the newly acquired home of a black family at 2112 Gilpin Street, and four months later the house was bombed again. In December, 1926, bombs were hurled at E. E. Carrington's home at Twenty-second Avenue and Vine Street; a second attempt a month later drove the family from the neighborhood. None of the bombers was ever apprehended.⁵⁹

Bombing was only one of several white reactions. The Capitol Hill Improvement Association appointed a committee to organize Denver in support of Jim Crow laws that would guarantee school and residential segregation. The Allied Council of Improvement Associations sanctioned such action. When these efforts failed, many of Denver's improvement associations successfully called upon property owners to sign covenants restricting the sale of their homes to whites. The black community refused to cower. "Let no one suppose for a moment," fired back the *Colorado Statesman*, "that the Negro citizens of Colorado will sit supinely by and witness their rights . . . ruthlessly taken from them."⁶⁰ Thus black efforts to achieve equality posed an immediate threat to white control. White Denverites believed racial mixing at school social functions imperiled the chastity of their daughters. Property values, they feared, would surely plummet once blacks moved into all-white neighborhoods. Even more disconcerting, the black revolt did not appear to be the work of a few radicals but, instead, had the support of the leading members of the black community. It is not difficult to understand why some Denverites looked to the Ku Klux Klan as the means to preserve neighborhood purity and restrain contentious blacks.⁶¹

IV

The Klan appeal involved more than its issue-oriented campaign. The Invisible Empire offered an exotic fraternal life complete with ghostly costumes and eerie burning crosses. Denver Klansmen escaped their routine lives twice a week to mingle in the klavern with the exalted cyclops and his nighthawks. Regular lodge

nights were supplemented with wrestling tournaments, parades, concerts by the 200-member Klan band, and an auto race (unhappily for the sponsors, won by a Catholic). Picnics were especially popular, the most memorable drawing over 100,000 persons. The fraternal side of the order attracted veteran lodge joiners such as Klansman No. 15,357,⁶² a native of Ohio who paid his ten-dollar klectoken at the age of sixty-eight. He had come to Denver in 1879 after graduating from the University of Michigan School of Law and became active in four fraternal lodges to which he devoted considerable time. He had served his lodges as secretary, recorder, grand captain general, grand warden, and grand sword bearer, among others. Two years after joining the Klan, he died. For others the Klan was their first foray into the mystic life of the lodge. Somewhat akin to the lodge men were those seeking fun, adventure, and a share of the secret. Membership became for a time faddish; "everybody wanted in the Ku Klux Klan because it was the thing to do."⁶³ But such ties were usually fragile and dissolved after only a few meetings.⁶⁴

The kleagles wielded the Klan's economic club to convince the reluctant. Employees filled out application blanks to get or keep jobs.⁶⁵ Scores enlisted to increase business or prevent a boycott. Store owners quickly exploited their membership and proudly displayed Klan window stickers. Salesmen waited at the entrance to meetings and showered Klansmen with business cards and sales pitches. Business firms flashed their names across screens erected at the gatherings as the men were ordered to "Trade only with Klansmen."⁶⁶

The Klan, despite its 100 percent American image, did not prey upon the tensions arising from Denver's Red Scare. Denver was battered in 1919 and 1920 with frightening newspaper headlines, anti-radical legislation, and Palmer raids. The Red Scare climaxed in August, 1920, with the tramway strike, which left seven dead and the city under martial law. The Klan never raised the Bolshevik threat because the issue was no longer relevant. "Nobody," said a former Klansman, "took them seriously."⁶⁷ Phantom issues were decidedly less potent than those grounded in existing local tensions.

Once a white Protestant decided to become a Klansman, joining was a simple matter. It was also a quick process, usually lasting a week to ten days from application to naturalization. Most often contact was made through lodge, union, church, or familial channels, for each Klansman was a part-time kleagle instructed to reach needed men. The Denver Klan's 138 paid organizers would then

follow up these leads and process the applicants. Willing recruits who escaped these efforts could clip Klan application coupons from the daily newspapers. Later Klansmen encouraged their wives, mothers, and sisters to form an auxiliary. Foreign-born Protestants enrolled in the Klan-sponsored Royal Riders of the Red Robe and the American Crusaders. Denver Klansmen even organized their children.⁶⁸

The multifaceted image and platform of the Ku Klux Klan offered something for everyone. The result was a loose coalition of diffuse, unorganized camps distinguished by their particular needs and fears. Distinct groups are discernible although the mosaic is blurred, for few took out membership on the basis of a single feature of the Klan program. Involvement in Klan affairs, as in all organizations, varied in intensity depending upon the individual, with allegiance contingent upon performance. As soon as the movement proved unable to fulfill its promises, the defections began. Aside from the opportunists, the coerced, and the faddists whose influence was minimal, several salient groupings can be identified. The Klan contained a small hard core of true believers eager to save the world from marauding Catholics, Jews, and blacks. An allied bloc, less steeped in the rhetoric of prejudice, reacted to immediate threats to their homes and neighborhoods. The lodge men found the mysteries of Kloranic ritual more satisfying than minority baiting. None of these groups alone or combined, however, was sufficient to propel the movement to power. Success came only when the Klan merged their grievances with demands to restore law and order to Denver. Many of those concerned about the spreading lawlessness were not particularly bigoted. They tolerated the rabid passions of fellow Klansmen primarily because of the white Protestant heritage of distrust and the minority connection to crime. The Denver Klan's law and order emphasis reflected its drawing strength and the needs of its membership. Klan leaders representing the different interests guaranteed, however, that no issue was neglected. A rough balance, through careful juggling, was thus effected under Dr. Locke's steadying hand which precluded any major radical thrusts. Unfortunately, small bands of Klansmen could not be easily restrained from independent action.⁶⁹

The Denver environment proved congenial to Klan mobilization success. City government could not solve a stressful crime problem or suppress what appeared to be a coordinated minority uprising against Protestantism. Denverites who believed that they had been abandoned by local authorities could only look to themselves

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and the Ku Klux Klan for their salvation. Unfulfilled fellowship and spiritual needs, too, sought an outlet. In John Galen Locke the Klan found a charismatic leader who generated zealous enthusiasm among his followers. Locke, assisted by capable and energetic lieutenants, molded the Klan into a solution for almost every concern. Their skillful planning and execution made the organization a potent force in local affairs. In addition, the Klan encountered no substantial counterattack. A man did not fear his minister's censure or neighbor's scorn when he enlisted in the secret society. The movement operated in a community devoid of widespread public hostility and a meaningful opposition. The risks were few, the rewards unlimited. With all variables tilted in the Klan's favor, it is not surprising that nearly 17,000 Denver men passed through the portals of the Invisible Empire. Still, the Klan had one other hurdle to clear on the road to power. It had to attract the support of men and women whose needs or frustrations lacked the intensity to cause membership yet were sufficient to evoke sympathy for Klan aims. For this population, too, the interplay of Klan leadership, local tensions, governmental responsiveness, and community perceptions was crucial in confirming allegiance. Victory with these men and women would guarantee Klan aims, for it would yield controlling influence over Denver's formal decision-making process.⁷⁰

V

The Denver Klan's program and growing strength dictated political action, and the first opportunity came in the Denver mayoral election of 1923. The hooded order secretly supported Benjamin F. Stapleton against the Republican incumbent Dewey Bailey. Stapleton, a Democrat, had been born in 1869 on a farm near Paintsville, Kentucky. A veteran of the Spanish-American War, he had served Denver as judge, police magistrate, and postmaster. His political stance, however, was unclear. A Democratic party leader described Stapleton as "just a name. There was nothing against him, there was nothing for him. He was an unknown entity."⁷¹

Stapleton announced his candidacy on March 30, pledging a war on crime and vice, lower taxes, and an efficient and frugal city government. He counted among his allies the *Denver Post*, the *Denver Express*, the Italian-American Social Club, and liberal Democrats Governor William Sweet and Morrison Shafroth. Organized labor, through the Denver Labor County Central Committee and the *Colorado Labor Advocate*, also aided his effort. Stapleton was the Klan's

obvious choice; he was a close friend of Dr. Locke and Klan member No. 1,128. Rumors of Stapleton's Klan affiliations surfaced throughout the campaign, and he condemned the Klan to appease his Jewish and Catholic supporters. "True Americanism," he declared, "needs no mask or disguise. Any attempt to stir up racial prejudices or religious intolerance is contrary to our constitution and is therefore un-American."⁷² His word was accepted, and a coalition of Klan and anti-Klan forces swept him into office over an incumbent tainted with corruption and linked to organized crime.⁷³

Mayor Stapleton quickly implemented many of his campaign promises. The new administration stressed economy in all municipal agencies and cut excess jobs. Shake-ups in the police department weeded out the inefficient and corrupt. Police units intensified their anticrime efforts, probing Little Italy for bootlegging sites and planning operations to drive prostitutes from the city's residential districts. In less than a month District Attorney Van Cise detected a dramatic drop in criminal activity, tracing it to the city's offensive against bootleggers, prostitutes, and gamblers. Although Stapleton appointed a few Catholics and Jews to office, the Klan's mark was very much in evidence. The mayor named fellow Klansman Rice Means as manager of safety and later city attorney. Klansman Reuben Hershey succeeded Means as manager of safety after first serving as manager of revenue. Klansmen filled the offices of clerk and recorder, manager of improvements and parks, and city accountant, among others. The police department was heavily infiltrated, with seven sergeants and dozens of patrolmen all card-carrying Klansmen. Yet, despite pressure, Mayor Stapleton refused for almost a year to appoint a Klansman as chief of police.⁷⁴

In 1923 and 1924 the Klan's influence upon the court system became apparent. Stapleton designated Klansmen Henry Bray and Albert Orahoad as justices of the peace. They joined another Klansman already on the bench, District Judge Clarence Morley, the Klokan of the Denver klavern. The threat of Klan justice emanated not only from the judge's bench but also from juries drawn from Klan membership lists. Klan jury tampering intensified after the 1924 elections.⁷⁵

Stapleton's electoral coalition began to crumble six weeks after his victory. On June 26, 1923, Klansmen distributed notices inviting Denverites to a free lecture about Klan principles to be given the following night at the city auditorium. Some of the placards were nailed to the doors of Temple Emmanuel and the Immaculate Conception Cathedral. The mayor authorized the Klan's use of the

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building, citing the right of free speech and assurances "that there will be no attack made upon color, race or creed."⁷⁶ The *Denver Express* rejected Stapleton's position: "The cultivation and support, even unofficial, of such an organization places a premium upon lawlessness. When that support becomes official—it will inspire every fanatic, every hoodlum, every bigot, every mischief-maker to believe that he is a law unto himself. That way lies anarchy."⁷⁷ The NAACP, labor leaders, liberal Democrats, Denver's Elks, prominent Jews, and the Ancient Order of Hibernians protested the mayor's action in vain.⁷⁸

Four thousand persons attended the lecture, but they never heard a word about the Ku Klux Klan. G. K. Minor, Klan lecturer from Texas, began his talk with the proviso that if anyone objected, he would cancel the meeting. Fathers Francis Walsh and Thomas Kelley of the cathedral, both wearing their World War I army uniforms, immediately stood up in protest. Shouts drowned out their words. Within minutes Rice Means ordered the hall emptied to prevent violence. A week after the incident the city council passed a bill prohibiting the Klan from again using the municipal auditorium.⁷⁹

Later in 1923 Klansmen erected eleven wooden crosses in different parts of Denver and simultaneously set them ablaze. None of the Klansmen were caught. When questioned about the matter, Stapleton replied that the police department was unable to find any evidence of the cross burnings. The city council demanded that the administration conduct a full investigation, but no further action was taken.⁸⁰

There were other examples of Klan militancy. Klansmen threatened to boycott businessmen advertising in the *Denver Express* and *Denver Catholic Register*. Mimeographed lists of proscribed Catholic merchants were circulated at Klan gatherings. Members routed their kavalkades past West Colfax synagogues and mocked worshipers. Crosses burned before Catholic churches. Anti-Catholic Klansmen brought ex-"nun" Mary Angel to Denver where she delivered sixty lectures which, according to the *Denver Catholic Register*, "for utter foulness . . . simply could not be surpassed. It was the vomit not of the red light district, but of hell's depths. . . ."⁸¹ Jewish activists and Catholic priests were also subjected to physical harassment and death threats; "feeling ran so high that just the sight of a white collar set them off."⁸²

Denver Klansmen were implicated in at least two acts of violence. On October 27, 1923, five Klansmen kidnapped Patrick Walker, a member of the Knights of Columbus, drove him to a spot near

Riverside Cemetery, and clubbed him with the butts of their revolvers. Three months later, in January, 1924, Jewish attorney Ben Laska was forced into a car at gunpoint, taken to the outskirts of the city, and beaten with blackjacks. The Klansmen admonished Laska, "Don't get these bootleggers off. Don't defend them. This is your first warning. The next will not be so light."⁸³ Apparently Laska heeded the warning, because he subsequently became the Grand Dragon's attorney. Monsignor Gregory Smith, reflecting on the Klan days, was surprised there was not more violence: "We had our hot heads, they had their hot heads. . . . We were screaming for justice but you always have some that don't wait for the wheels of justice to turn. They were terrible times."⁸⁴

While such acts are reprehensible and to be condemned, it is also necessary to consider them as tactics in a struggle for power. Klansmen, now protected from government retaliation, attempted to strengthen their position in the community. These incidents demonstrated to members and nonmembers that the Klan intended to carry out its pledge to shackle minorities. They also served to heighten movement unity and to hamper the mobilization of resources by anti-Klansmen. Bigotry is thus only a partial answer. The quest for power also plays an explanatory role.

Despite Mayor Stapleton's pro-Klan stance and invisible credentials, he was not pliable enough to suit the Grand Dragon. Stapleton had used the Klan to win office and had sought Locke's advice, but he never succumbed completely to the organization's dictates. The mayor's repeated refusal to appoint a Locke lieutenant as chief of police precipitated the break. To punish Stapleton, the Grand Dragon decided to circulate a recall petition. Just as the Klan was readying its campaign, other Denverites began a drive to gather signatures in favor of the mayor's recall. This second group charged the administration with raising taxes, allowing crime to flourish, and engaging in antilabor activities. These accusations masked the movement's real motivation, to rid city hall of Klan domination. The mayor judged his position untenable and capitulated to Klan demands. "Stapleton," cautioned Locke, "you went back on us once. We have decided to support you again. We will elect you. But if you ever go back on us again, God help you!"⁸⁵

Stapleton named William Candlish as Denver's new chief of police in return for Klan support. Candlish was a former newspaper editor, state senator, and radium experimenter with no previous police experience. His only qualifications were his Klan membership and his subservience to Locke. Chief Candlish made the police de-

partment an instrument of the Klan's will. Candlish asked all Protestant policemen to fill out Klan membership applications; those who accepted were rewarded with choice assignments, shorter hours, and promotions. The rest joined Jewish and Catholic police officers working night shifts on undesirable beats. Candlish's men began enforcing forgotten city ordinances to harass Jewish and Catholic shopkeepers. More frightening was a Candlish edict, based upon an old Denver law, prohibiting Greek, Japanese, Chinese, Mexican, and black businessmen from employing white women. The Klan was so sure of its control that it even requisitioned men and vehicles from the department.⁸⁶

Candlish's appointment accelerated the momentum of the anti-Klan recall forces. It was final proof, observed the *Denver Express*, of a "gigantic conspiracy" bent upon "the seizure and control of every department of city, county, and state government."⁸⁷ On March 29, 1924, two weeks after Candlish assumed his post, Philip Hornbein and John B. O'Malley filed a petition containing 26,000 names, enough to force a special election on August 12. The recall movement selected former mayor Dewey Bailey as its candidate. The choice was unfortunate in light of the candidate's reputed underworld connections and earlier defeat by Stapleton. Bailey's antilabor record also dogged his efforts. The Denver Labor County Central Committee condemned him "for allowing armed thugs to parade the streets of Denver and to shoot into gatherings of unarmed citizens, for refusing to enforce the minimum wage law for men employed on city work, and for his alliance with powerful interests violently antagonistic to labor."⁸⁸

Bailey based his campaign on one issue, Denver's invisible government. "If I am elected mayor of Denver," he promised, "there will be no nightgown tyranny in this town."⁸⁹ Throughout the summer of 1924 pro-recall speakers Charles Mahoney, Ben Lindsey, Sidney Whipple, and Hornbein assailed the Klan and Stapleton's secret ties. In a surprise move the Denver Democratic County Assembly endorsed recall, denouncing "any administration that permits itself to become the working tool of the Ku Klux Klan."⁹⁰ The *Denver Post* in its first major confrontation with the Klan reiterated the recall's theme, "SHALL THE KU KLUX KLAN, AN ANONYMOUS SECRET MASKED SOCIETY RULE DENVER, OR SHALL THE PEOPLE RULE DENVER? . . . ALL OTHER ISSUES, HOWEVER IMPORTANT THEY MAY SEEM, SINK INTO ABSOLUTE INSIGNIFICANCE."⁹¹

Arrayed against recall were organizations as formidable as they were diverse, the Anti-Saloon League, the Denver Labor County

Central Committee, the Colored Citizens League, and the Denver Ministerial Alliance. The Stapleton campaign also drew strong support from the *Rocky Mountain News*, *Denver Times*, *Denver Democrat*, and the *Colorado Labor Advocate*. The anti-recall forces contended that Stapleton was innocent of any gross abuses or malfeasance and should be allowed to remain in office. Disgruntled political job seekers and bootleggers in league with yellow journalists had engineered the recall to seize power for their selfish ends. The Klan issue was merely a ruse to distract the voters.⁹²

Despite other sources of support, however, Stapleton's most powerful ally was the Ku Klux Klan. The Klan dominated the Stapleton campaign, contributing more than \$15,000 and scores of election workers. The Klan supplemented these efforts with two incidents manufactured to draw hesitant Protestants to the polls. In June a bullet shattered a window in the Highlands Christian Church just after its Klan minister had received a donation from a delegation of Klansmen. Two days before the election the Reverend James Thomas, a Klansman, told his congregation that the district attorney had just uncovered a Knights of Columbus plot to arm the city's Catholics. Van Cise dismissed the minister's story as absurd. On July 14, 1924, Mayor Stapleton addressed a Klan gathering on South Table Mountain and reaffirmed his commitment: "I have little to say, except that I will work with the Klan and for the Klan in the coming election, heart and soul. And if I am re-elected, I shall give the Klan the kind of administration it wants."⁹³ Police Chief Candlish later clarified Stapleton's words: "Another term with the mayor, and the red necks and slimy Jews would crawl into their holes and pull the holes in after them."⁹⁴

Election day was peaceful as the city cast the heaviest vote in its history. Stapleton swamped Bailey at the polls, piling up 55,130 votes to 23,808 and winning all sixteen election districts. The mayor's strongest support came from districts R, S, and T in South Denver, which were carried by a six-to-one margin. Stapleton was routed only in the West Colfax Jewish precincts. Noting the size of the Stapleton vote, the *Denver Post* remarked, "*The victory yesterday proves beyond any doubt that the Ku Klux Klan is the largest, most cohesive and most efficiently organized political force in the State of Colorado today.*"⁹⁵ The Klan and its leaders had managed Stapleton to victory by refusing to do battle on the invisible government issue. By avoiding the subject, the winning coalition of strange bedfellows was forged. Organized labor was especially proud of its contribution, claiming

"a large share of the credit for the tremendous majority. . . ." ⁹⁶ Moreover, Klan campaigners shrewdly capitalized upon anti-Klan blunders, especially the naming of Bailey as the recall candidate. Many who opposed recall as a matter of principle or who detested Bailey chose Stapleton without regard to his position concerning the Klan. Thus enough indifferent or sympathetic non-Klansmen had voted with the minority to defeat the recall. ⁹⁷

Denver Klansmen awaited the election returns on South Table Mountain. When the Stapleton tide became overwhelming, they signaled their victory with fiery crosses visible in Denver. The automobile caravan that descended the mountain after the ceremony indicated a redirection of Klan energy. Bumper stickers proclaiming "I'll vote again for Ben" were now covered with those heralding "Morley for Governor." ⁹⁸

VI

The Klan owed much of its success to the men who had shaped its local identity and charted the course to power. Who were the leaders of Denver Klan No. 1? What were the backgrounds of those who represented the rank and file, eased factional wrangling, and set priorities upon resource distribution? The names of Dr. Locke's chief lieutenants and Klan leaders elected in 1924, 1925, and 1926 were obtained and biographical data compiled for each man. The resulting socioeconomic grouping was as diverse as it was homogeneous. Age and place of birth information was gathered for twenty-five of the thirty-six leaders. Klan officers ranged in age from twenty-one to sixty-seven years with a mean age of 42.4 years. Although men in all age groups appeared in the hierarchy, those thirty to thirty-nine years old (ten) and fifty years and older (eight) were overrepresented and those in their twenties (two) were underrepresented when compared to Denver's native white male population. While every section of the United States except the Pacific Coast region contributed to the leadership, the largest blocs of Klansmen were born in the Middle Atlantic states (five) and Colorado (six). The sizes of the birthplaces of twenty-one men are known and are primarily towns with a population of 2,500 or less (nine) or cities of 100,000 or more people (seven). Military service data, available for three-quarters of the men, indicate that twenty never served in the armed forces, one was a Spanish-American War veteran, and four had participated in World War I. It is surprising, considering the

youth of many of the leaders, that so few had served in 1917-18. The Klan's leaders were mostly married men, with only four remaining single and one divorced.⁹⁹

Information concerning length of residence and fraternal affiliations also reflects sharp contrasts. Klan officers resided an average of 14.5 years in Denver before joining. The figure, however, is misleading and hides considerable variation. Eight of the leaders were recent arrivals, having lived in the community three years or less. At the other extreme, long-time residents in Denver, eighteen years or more, constituted one-third of the group. Over two-thirds of the leaders resided in the city for seven years or more. Eighteen, or half, of the leaders had no fraternal membership in a lodge other than the Ku Klux Klan. All but one of the rest belonged to two or more fraternal orders. Of those with multiple memberships, fifteen were Masons, eleven Knight Templars, and eight Odd Fellows. Klansmen were, in addition, active in the Elks, Lions, and Woodmen of the World. The city's elite clubs, such as the Denver Club, Denver Country Club, Cherry Hills Country Club, Lakewood Country Club, and University Club, had no Klan leaders among their members. Four Klan officers belonged to the Denver Athletic Club, which was one level below these organizations. Only one Klan leader was listed in the Social Register. Three of the five men eligible were members of either the American Legion or the Veterans of Foreign Wars.¹⁰⁰

Although the Klan leaders differed considerably as to age, length of residence, and number of fraternal ties, they showed striking similarity in occupational status (see Table 1). Twenty-six of the men held occupations in the two highest status groups. Only three men were engaged in manual labor. The most frequently occurring occupations were small businessman (eight), clergyman (four), lawyer (four), manager of a firm (four), and physician (three). When compared to the occupational distribution for all male Denverites, Klansmen in the high and middle nonmanual categories are vastly overrepresented and all other groupings decidedly underrepresented. The men's occupational histories before joining the Klan indicate that twelve were upwardly mobile, eleven were in the same status group as when they first entered the Denver work force, and only one was downwardly mobile. There is little change in these totals when occupations held while Klansmen are considered. For some of the men, high occupational status may well have counteracted the detrimental effects of short-term residence and youth upon their chances of joining the Klan hierarchy.¹⁰¹

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Table 1. Occupational Distribution of the Leaders of the Denver Klan, 1924-26, Compared with the Occupational Distribution of Denver's Male Population in 1920.

Occupational Status	Klan leaders		Male Population
	N	Percent	Percent
High nonmanual	12	33	4.7
Middle nonmanual	14	39	14.5
Low nonmanual	4	11	22.3
Skilled	2	6	18.0
Semiskilled and service	1	3	21.0
Unskilled	0	0	13.5
Unknown	3	8	6.0
Total	36		

SOURCE: *Denver City Directory*; U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Fourteenth Census of the United States, 1920: Occupations*, IV, 1095-98.

Just a rung below the city's elite, the leaders of the Denver Klan were sufficiently attractive, socially and economically, to draw recruits. They were primarily business and professional men whose sobriety and respectability shielded the Klan from charges of irresponsibility and radicalism. Skillfully they exploited lodge and business contacts to lure like-minded men of similar status. As they did, the Klan's reputation was further enhanced. Middle aged, often with families, they were the models of decorum, quite convincing when they voiced parental fears for the future of Denver's youth. The Denver Klan's advantage was obvious—their leaders not only looked the part, they acted it.

VII

"They came from City hall and from the suburbs," observed a *Denver Express* reporter stationed outside a Klan meeting. "Tall, short, young and old—some well dressed by tailors and some from Curtis Street second hand stores."¹⁰² The hood and robe concealed the identities of the Klan's rank and file. Membership lists were closely guarded, and rarely did the names of ordinary Klansmen appear in the newspapers. Sometimes friends, neighbors, and even

wives were unaware of the binding invisible tie. Fortunately, the social and economic characteristics of these Denver Klansmen can be ascertained because the official Roster of Members as well as the 1924 Membership Applications Book have been preserved. To test the long-held observation that early-joining Klansmen differed in socioeconomic status from late joiners and to examine membership patterns over time, the 16,727 knights listed on the roster were divided into three groups: those recruited before January, 1923; between January, 1923, and May, 1924; and after May, 1924. January, 1923, was chosen as an end date for the early joiner group because it approximated the Klan's shift from its formative stage to a more aggressive and open involvement in the community. Membership in the early joiner group was determined by examining newspapers, addresses, death certificates, and the resignation, suspension, and banishment dates entered in the roster. The total early joiner population was 1,000 men from which two names were excluded, one a duplicate and the other a newspaper spy. Those men entering the Klan after May, 1924, were designated late joiners. This division was based upon the Denver Klan's decision to open its rolls and launch a major membership drive at the end of May, 1924, in preparation for the mayoral recall election. The Membership Applications Book records the names of 13,353 prospective Klansmen and their dates of application from May 27, 1924, to the end of the year. Applicants' names were matched to those appearing in the roster to set the beginning number for the late joiners. More than 1,200 men filled out application blanks but never joined. Also included in the late joiner population were 1,550 men who enlisted in 1925. The late joiners thus numbered 13,735 from which seven duplicate or spies' names were excluded. Three hundred seventy-five men were randomly selected from the early joiner population of 998 and 583 men from the 13,728 late joiners. No sample was taken from the group joining between January, 1923, and May, 1924, because the data accumulated would not have compensated for the resources and time expended. With a confidence level of 95 percent and confidence interval of ± 4 percent, a sample of 375 is acceptable for a population of 1,000 and 583 for 20,000. Thus, if an indefinitely large number of samples of size 375 or 583 were drawn, the results from 95 percent of these samples would be within 4 percent of the "true" values of the two populations. With the data compiled upon these 958 sample members, assertions concerning the roots of the Klan response may be examined. Was the Invisible Empire primarily a movement of socially and economically marginal men? Was the Klan a symptom of

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working-class authoritarianism? Or did the Klan's diverse appeal attract a cross-section of the white, Protestant, male population?¹⁰³

The Denver Klan was an organization of mature men and not the young. The mean age of early joiners upon entering the Klan was 39.9 years and did not differ significantly from the late joiners at 37.8 years (Table 2). The late joiners were evenly distributed along the age continuum, while early joiners thirty to thirty-nine years of age constituted over 40 percent of their group. Similar proportions of men in their forties and those over fifty belonged to each Klan group with the sharpest difference occurring in the group of thirty to thirty-nine year olds. The late joiners in almost every category more closely resembled the city's native white population. With 85 percent of the early joiners and 75 percent of the late joiners thirty years or older, the movement was hardly an uprising of callow, thrill-seeking young people. Stability is also reflected in marital status statistics. More than 75 percent of both groups were married, 22 percent single, and only 1 percent divorced. These figures compared to 58 percent married, 30 percent single, and 2 percent divorced of the adult male population.¹⁰⁴

Table 2. Age Distribution of Denver Klansmen, 1921-25, Compared with the Age Distribution of Denver's Native White Male Population in 1920 (Twenty Years and Older), by Percent.

Age	Early Joiners	Late Joiners	Native White Male Population
Under 20	—	1.4	—
20-29	15.5	23.4	30.0
30-39	41.4	29.4	26.5
40-49	24.1	24.8	20.1
50 and older	19.0	20.9	23.4
Total	244	286	

SOURCE: Sample data; U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Fourteenth Census of the United States, 1920: Population*, II, 308.

The Midwest, not the South, was the Klan's chief spawning ground. Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Missouri, and the rest of the states of the east and west north-central regions furnished the bulk of Denver's Klan population (Table 3). Although one-third of Denver was native to the state, Colorado-born Klansmen comprised less than a

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fourth of the two sample groups. This discrepancy, however, might only reflect the inclusion of children eighteen years and younger in the census figures for Denver. Curiously, one man born in England, one in Ireland, and two in Germany appeared in the sample. All four were long-time residents and were probably granted admission because of friendship or deceit. Information regarding the size of birthplaces for one-third of the late joiners (201) and one-half of the early joiners (183) reveals a rural and small-town background. Over 50 percent of the late joiners and 45 percent of the early joiners were born in or near towns with a population of 2,500 or less, 66 percent and 62 percent respectively in towns of 10,000 or less. Fewer than one-fourth of the late joiners and one-fifth of the early joiners were born in cities of 100,000 or more.

Table 3. Distribution of Birthplaces of Denver Klansmen, 1921-25, Compared with the Distribution of Birthplaces of Denver's Native Population in 1920, by Percent.

Area of Birth	Early Joiners	Late Joiners	Native Population
New England	3.3	1.0	2.2
Middle Atlantic	8.3	6.4	9.0
East north-central	23.0	25.3	19.3
West north-central	24.0	34.2	21.3
South Atlantic	5.0	4.0	2.5
East south-central	5.8	5.0	3.6
West south-central	4.6	0.4	3.4
Mountain (excluding Colorado)	2.1	0.4	2.4
Colorado	23.0	22.6	35.2
Pacific	—	0.3	1.1
Foreign-born	0.8	0.4	—
Total	241	283	

SOURCE: Sample data; U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Fourteenth Census of the United States, 1920; Population*, II, 666.

An overwhelming majority of both early and late joiners never served in America's wars. When the unknown category is disregarded, two-thirds of the early joiners (154) and three-quarters of the later arrivals (203) stayed home during wartime. Seventy-three (32 percent) of the early joiners entered the service in 1917 and one

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man in 1898. The figures for late joiners are even lower; sixty-five men (24 percent) served in World War I and one man during the Spanish-American War. In the 1920s few Klansmen shared their military experiences in either the American Legion or the Veterans of Foreign Wars, comprising just 2 percent and 4 percent of the memberships respectively. In the ranks, as in the leadership, recently discharged military veterans were noticeable by their absence. Missing past crusades to save American freedom and democracy, perhaps many saw the Klan as a means to compensate for lost opportunities to serve.

A striking contrast between early and late joiners appears in regard to membership in fraternities other than the Klan. Seventy-six percent (447) of the late-joining Klansmen had no known fraternal ties. Of the remaining 136 men, forty-three (7 percent) belonged to two or more lodges. Forty-eight percent of the early joiners had no known fraternal ties, but 34 percent were members of two or more orders. The Masons provided a second fraternal home for 85 percent of the early-joining Klansmen and 79 percent of the late joiners with at least one lodge tie. Klansmen also appeared in the ranks of the Knight Templars, Rotarians, Lions, Elks, and Odd Fellows but in much smaller numbers. Denver's elite clubs listed only a handful of Klansmen among their members. The Denver Athletic Club contained the most, forty Klansmen or 3 percent of its total membership. The notion that early joiners tended to have more fraternal affiliations than late joiners is supported by gamma (+.56), a measure of association. These differences reflect changes in the methods of recruiting between the Klan's arrival and the stage of intensive organizing. Early in the Klan period the lodge was a prime site for contacting non-Klansmen. Later, as the saturation point was reached in the lodge room, other recruiting techniques were brought into play. A changing membership also indicated a transition in the Klan's meaning and appeal.

Klansmen were both long-time residents and recent migrants to the city. Early joiners resided in Denver an average 13.5 years as compared to 9.5 years for the late joiners (Table 4). Thirty-one percent of the early joiners and 20 percent of the later members resided in Denver eighteen years or more. Fifty-three percent of the later joiners as opposed to 37 percent of the early joiners lived in Denver six years or less; 41 percent to 27 percent, three years or less. The visible impression that early joiners tended to reside in Denver for longer periods is supported by Pearson's coefficient of contingency (.53).

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Table 4. Length of Residence of Denver Klansmen, 1921-25
(Prior to Joining).

Years	Early Joiners		Late Joiners	
	N	Percent	N	Percent
1-3	99	27	242	41
4-6	39	10	73	12
7-9	17	5	40	7
10-13	46	12	28	5
14-17	35	9	53	9
18 and over	117	31	114	20
Unknown	22	6	33	6
Total	375		583	

SOURCE: *Denver City Directory*.

These fraternal and residential data bear directly upon the hypothesis of mass society theorists which ties social movement activism to a weakened network of community groups. According to Seymour Lipset, the ranks of extremist movements are filled with "marginal men"—"the personal failures, the socially isolated, the economically insecure, the uneducated, unsophisticated and authoritarian persons at every level of society."¹⁰⁵ Sociologist William Kornhauser contends, "Within all strata, people divorced from community, occupation, and association are first and foremost among the supporters of extremism. The decisive social process in mass society is the *atomization* of social relations; even though this process is accentuated in the lower strata, it operates throughout society."¹⁰⁶ Early joiner information demonstrates, however, that rather than being divorced from social groups, nearly 20 percent were involved in outside organizational affairs and over one-third were thoroughly enmeshed. It is important to bear in mind for both early and late joiners that these figures are conservative because of the unavailability of complete fraternal membership rosters. Probably many affiliations remain uncovered. The existing evidence indicates that the majority of early Klan recruits were approached through Denver's network of civic, social, and fraternal organizations. These fraternal and social connections appear to have accelerated the movement's early momentum. On the other hand, a large percentage of early and late joiners seem to fit the mass society stereotype of uprooted and marginal men. Short-term residence and isolation

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from community affairs did cause many to see the secret order as a beacon of security and stability in an unpredictable environment. But too much emphasis should not be placed upon what was actually an uninfluential minority. Men usually joined the Klan at the urgings of lodge brothers, relatives, or close business associates. Applicants were required to complete a detailed, personal information questionnaire which included the names of five references, preferably Klansmen. Employer and peer pressure, not a lack of self-esteem, carried others into the order. The Klan could also serve as a conduit into the larger community. In the klavern a Denver newcomer could connect with established figures of outside clubs and fraternities. Finally, a brief residence in Denver and a lack of fraternal ties did not necessarily imply a different motivational or value orientation. Joining the Klan reflected an attachment to the community, a desire to protect it. Protestants of diverse socioeconomic status and background reacted similarly to the Jewish bootlegger, the Italian drug peddler, and the Jesuit priest.

Historian Kenneth Jackson's suggestion in *The Ku Klux Klan in the City* that residents in the "zone of emergence" were particularly susceptible to hooded appeals is not applicable to the Denver case. There was no distinct belt of contested neighborhoods in the city because minority expansion was irregular and sporadic. Eastern European Globeville and Little Jerusalem were spatially isolated and not perceived as disruptive of existing residential patterns. Further, Denver, except for the location of its black ghetto, does not fit the ethnic core-middle class rings model of many eastern cities. Thus, while the situational factor of neighborhood transition explains the motivation of some Klansmen, no visible pattern of Klan settlement emerges. Residentially there were four major pockets of Klansmen: North Denver-Berkeley, the area between the Platte River and Cherry Creek, South Denver, and Capitol Hill. Twenty percent of the late joiners and 14 percent of the early joiners lived in North Denver-Berkeley, a middle-class neighborhood with small, single-family homes and well-kept lawns. The residents of the area, on the western boundary of Little Italy, were especially sensitive to the threat of immigrant encroachment. Another 20 percent of the late joiners resided in the strip of land between the Platte River and Cherry Creek, a densely populated, run-down section of the city. Below Alameda Avenue, in South Denver, were the homes of 13 percent of the early joiners and 17 percent of the later recruits. South Denver was a relatively new area and, like North Denver, populated by the middle class. Capitol Hill, between Seventh and




Figure 2. Distribution of Denver Klan Sample in 1924.

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Twentieth avenues, housed 33 percent of the early joiners and 14 percent of the late joiners. More affluent than South Denver, Capitol Hill was a heterogeneous area of large mansions, small homes, and exclusive apartments. Other concentrations of Klansmen appeared in Park Hill, downtown Denver, and around the Five Points black ghetto. As expected, the sparsely settled areas east of Colorado Boulevard and west of the South Platte River produced few recruits. The residential distribution is further evidence of the Klan's varied appeal. No neighborhood, whether wealthy, middle class, decaying, old, or new, was off limits to the klavern's kleagles.¹⁰⁷

Occupational differences between the two groups were considerable (Table 5). Early joiners engaged in high and middle nonmanual occupations comprised 51.5 percent of their group, while just 21 percent of the late joiners shared an equal status. At the same time, 43 percent of the late joiners labored in occupations below low nonmanual as compared to 16.5 percent of the early joiners. Only in the low nonmanual category do the groups contain similar proportions of men. Within the early joiner sample the most numerous occupations were manager of a firm (fifty-four), small businessman (forty-two), salesman (twenty-three), lawyer (seventeen), office clerk (seventeen), and physician (sixteen). Salesman (forty-eight), small businessman (forty-six), and office clerk (thirty-eight) also predominated in late joiner ranks along with laborer (thirty-seven), driver (twenty-five), and mechanic (twenty). These occupational differences were significant, with late joiners tending to hold fewer high-status jobs than early joiners (gamma, $-.56$).

The late joiner's occupational distribution was a cross-section of the wider Denver structure in all but the unskilled category. Conversely, high and middle nonmanual job holders among the early joiners are heavily overrepresented relative to the Denver population. When the two samples are united, the early joiners, skewed as a result of recruiting bias, disrupt the representative nature of the later joiners. In the combined Klan membership, the high and middle nonmanual categories are overrepresented, the low nonmanual bloc equivalent, and all blue-collar divisions underrepresented. Thus a larger proportion of men in the upper occupational groups appeared in the Klan than did in the outer environment. Semi-skilled and unskilled workers were the least likely to share the secrets of the Invisible Empire. The numerical domination of clerical and blue-collar workers in the Ku Klux Klan is, therefore, misleading. The Klan attracted a greater number of men holding low nonmanual and manual jobs not because of the alleged intolerance or

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Table 5. Occupational Distribution of Denver Klansmen, 1921-25, Compared with the Occupational Distribution of Denver's Male Population in 1920.

Occupational Status Group	Early Joiners		Late Joiners		Male Population
	N	Percent	N	Percent	Percent
High nonmanual	58	15.5	15	3.0	4.7
Middle nonmanual	135	36.0	107	18.0	14.5
Low nonmanual	76	20.3	140	24.0	22.3
Skilled	32	8.5	110	19.0	18.0
Semiskilled and service	28	7.5	102	17.0	21.0
Unskilled	2	0.5	40	7.0	13.5
Unknown	44	11.7	69	12.0	6.0
Total	375		583		

SOURCE: *Denver City Directory*; U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Fourteenth Census of the United States, 1920: Occupations*, IV, 1095-98.

status anxiety of these groups but, rather, because of the character of Denver's economy. There were simply more Denverites in occupations below the middle nonmanual line than above it, and the Klan reflected this distribution. Hence, what at first glance seems to have been a movement of the lower middle and working classes was actually a wider based organization, a somewhat distorted mirror image of the population encompassing all but the elite and unskilled.

The pre-Klan occupational mobility histories of 54 percent of the early members and 41 percent of the later arrivals were surveyed. They reveal that before entering the Klan over half of the early joiners were nonmobile, one-third were upwardly mobile, and one-tenth were downwardly mobile. Occupationally static late joiners formed 48 percent of their group, upwardly mobile 29 percent, and downwardly mobile 18 percent. There is little change in these percentages when occupations held as Klansmen are considered.

In light of the Klan's initial recruiting techniques, it is not surprising that the early joiners resembled the Denver leadership socially and economically. Klavern officers had first turned to their close friends, relatives, lodge brothers, and business associates when seeking men. There were no significant differences between the early joiners and the leaders as to age, number of fraternal ties,

length and place of residence, or occupational status. While similar to the late joiners in age and place of residence, leaders tended to have resided in Denver for longer periods and to hold more fraternal memberships. The leaders were far more likely to have high-status occupations than the late joiners (gamma, .79).

Selective recruiting explains much of the socioeconomic variation between early and late joiners. Early joiners were contacted through restricted lodge, business, and professional channels while the later joiners were conscripted in a mass membership drive. The leaders and early joiners were economically and fraternally one step below Denver's elite while the late joiners closely approximated the outer society. Significant differences were observed in length of residence, number of fraternal ties, and occupational status. That is, early joiners tended to live in Denver for longer periods, belong to more lodges, and hold higher-status jobs than late joiners. Diversity within the two blocs helped lessen intergroup differences. A sizable bloc of early joiners had lived in the city only a short time before entering the Invisible Empire. Also, men in high and middle non-manual occupations comprised 21 percent of the late joiner sample. Similarly, common life and generational experiences united the heterogeneous membership. The knights were mature men with families. The majority had roots in the farms and small towns of Colorado and the Midwest. Almost all had remained on the home front during World War I. The men shared issue interests as well. Regardless of circumstances, they formed informal factions based upon their specific needs and concerns.

Unfortunately, the religious affiliations of only 11 percent of the 958 sample members could be ascertained. To determine more clearly the denominational support of the Denver Klan, the stance of individual Protestant congregations was examined. A Denver church was designated as Klan-supporting if (1) its minister was a Klansman, (2) it advertised in the Klan newspaper, or (3) its trustees allowed fake ex-"nun" Mary Angel to speak to the congregation. If these criteria are employed, thirty Denver churches, almost 20 percent of the Protestant total, are tarnished. One-third of the Methodist, one-fourth of the Baptist, and five of seven Disciples of Christ churches had Klan links. The Congregationalists and Presbyterians emerge only slightly less tainted. None of the city's Episcopalian or Lutheran churches succumbed to Klan blandishments.¹⁰⁸

The Denver case supports the conception of a highly diversified membership. The Klan's complex appeal, rooted in a shared Protestant identity and cache of symbols, was designed to attract men from

every station on the socioeconomic spectrum. Excluding the elite and the unskilled, the Klan rank and file was a near occupational cross-section of the local community. Modifications in recruiting methods and issue salience enabled any white Protestant, regardless of background, to find a home in the Invisible Empire. Denver's early joiners were, as a group, prominent men holding high-status occupations and multiple fraternal memberships. The later arrival of men more closely resembling the general population did not precipitate a mass exodus of the first recruits. Resignation notations did not fill the membership records because late joiners were welcomed as Klan voters and allies in internal factional battles. Common generational experiences and backgrounds also seemed to lessen disharmony. The young, the elite, and the proletariat were the only groups that could not be accommodated under the invisible panoply.

Sheltering half of the state's hooded population, the Denver organization was the center of Colorado Klandom. The Klan's initial objective had also been the first Colorado community to fall under the sway of invisible government. The Denver Klan's cafeteria of appeals, molded to time and local events, drew strength from governmental inaction and unresponsiveness. White Protestant men from almost all socioeconomic strata and backgrounds responded to the call to save their homes and community from disruptive groups. The credit for the Klan's success rested with its able leaders, for they attracted and then held this heterogeneous membership together. They made it possible for the movement to be simultaneously an agency for law and order, a fraternal home, and, for the newly arrived, a way station bedecked with the symbols of the small town. Operating in an atmosphere of tolerance and unhindered by opposition sniping, the Denver Klan's rise to power was swift. But was Denver unique? How would other communities differing in size, economic base, and minority populations react toward the Klan? Could the Klan operate effectively if a resistance organization adopted a strategy of head-on confrontation? Were local cadres available to lead new Klans or would they have to be exported from Denver? The answers to these questions were unclear when the Klan directed its offensive toward Pueblo and Colorado Springs, the state's second and third largest cities. Their fate as invisible colonies or free cities hinged, as had Denver's, upon the interplay of the four key variables in the mobilization process.

CHAPTER THREE

THRUST TOWARD THE SOUTH

There is no room in the Pikes Peak region for the Ku Klux Klan, or for any other organization of like purpose. Organized religious and racial hatreds are foreign to American thought and dangerous in their threat to individual freedom. . . . It is fanaticism raised to high power, the more dangerous because it moves secretly and under cover of darkness.

Colorado Springs Gazette and Telegraph, December 2, 1923

If the Klan is a means by which public sentiment may be made effective for the maintenance of public morality, for the enforcement of law, for the support of the public courts and officers, and for the preservation of good government . . . it should be commended and approved.

Pueblo Chieftain, June 29, 1923

Klan organizers left Denver in 1921 and 1922 for the cities and towns of southern Colorado. Their receptions ranged from eager acceptance to bitter hostility. In Colorado Springs the Klan recruited only 2,000 men and could not capture political control. Inept Klan leadership, responsive authorities, and an absence of volatile issues isolated the secret order from potential knights and nonmember supporters. Most important was the presence of a strong anti-Klan resistance which employed its own as well as government resources to blunt Klan influence. Denied access to an adequate resource base, the Klan challenged but could not sway decision makers. Because Colorado Springs was one of the few cities in the state to defeat the Klan, it offers more than just another instance of hooded activity. It also provides an opportunity to study the variables making for Klan failure. Conditions in Pueblo, on the other hand, created the neces-

sary milieu in which the Klan thrived. As in Denver, Klansmen successfully vied for power and eventually became the arbiters of community policy.

I

Colorado Springs in 1920 was the state's third largest city with 30,605 inhabitants, an increase of only 3.5 percent since 1910. The city was not a commercial center nor did it attract much industry. Tourists, health seekers, and the wealthy flocked to the resort at the base of Pikes Peak, generating the community's prosperity. Still, manufacturing accounted for nearly a fourth of the total employment. The "City of Churches" was overwhelmingly Protestant, counting only 500 Jews and 2,965 Catholics among its citizens. Slightly more than 1,000 blacks and 2,600 foreign-born immigrants resided in Colorado Springs in 1920, both groups numbering fewer than in the previous decade. Unlike Denver, Colorado Springs contained no conspicuous ethnic neighborhoods, and Catholics, Jews, blacks, and immigrants lived throughout the city.¹

Kleagles were ordered to Colorado Springs in July, 1921, shortly after the Klan's first public demonstration in Denver. Following standard Klan procedure, they prepared a recruiting package and secretly approached the city's law enforcement officials and prominent men. But in less than a month the kleagles' activities were exposed. The Colorado Springs police department placed the organizers under surveillance and Chief Hugh Harper vowed to take action if the Klan violated the law. Only a handful of Colorado lawmen took a similar stance. The Klan's "mysterious nature" and "romantic history," said Harper, were a "temptation to the hot-heads and the firebrand. I believe that there is good prospect that the new Ku Klux Klan may take men into its roster who act first and think afterward. That can only mean a calamity in any community, sooner or later."² Exposure made the Klan's task more difficult; resistance and indifference made it impossible. The city's two major newspapers, the *Colorado Springs Gazette* and the *Colorado Springs Evening Telegraph* responded to the Klan intrusion with a steady barrage of hostile articles and cartoons which lifted only after the danger had passed. A Colorado Springs man who welcomed the Klan declared, "The public was antagonistic, it looked with suspicion on the Klan and the efficiency of local officials made it unnecessary."³ The kleagles left the city without organizing a local Klan.⁴

Nine months later, in April, 1922, the Reverend Edward Hislop, pastor of the First Methodist Episcopal Church, and three members of his congregation received threatening letters signed "Ku Klux Klan." The following month a note was mailed to Fredrick H. Bair, superintendent of the Colorado Springs Board of Education, ordering him to discharge all woman teachers whose husbands were employed. The warning concluded, "You will be held personally, directly and rigidly responsible if any such teacher is so elected. K.K.K."⁵ Chief of Police Harper, however, discounted Klan involvement, citing the petty nature of the threats and the letter writer's failure to use the official seal and stationery of the Invisible Empire.⁶

Seeming to belie Harper, the editor of the *Colorado Springs Evening Telegraph* received a letter on June 14, 1922, with the official Klan seal. The "K.K.K. Publicity Committee," in a rambling proclamation, disclosed the existence of a local chapter of the secret fraternity. "This organization is founded upon the principles of justice, liberty and patriotism. The preservation of these ideals is its object; the suppression of un-American and anti-American activities is its work." The Klan further promised to assist police in maintaining law and order, praised the civic work of the Chamber of Commerce, and guaranteed the success of the Community Chest fund drive. Curiously, it attacked ex-servicemen's organizations and specifically the American Legion for advocating a cash bonus for veterans. "Our patriotism," boasted the Klansmen, "springs from love of home and country, and no true American can demand pay for responding to that call." The veterans' groups were advised to check their rosters, for their members were deserting in large numbers "to join their comrades and business and professional associates in promoting Americanism under the cross." The letter closed with a veiled threat: "Needless to say, the sentiment of every lodge, of every secret and fraternal order, regarding those matters of vital interest to the K.K.K. is known to us. In this we permit no violation of any oath nor care to learn matters of private concern. We desire only to know when and where aid or correction is needed in order that we may act promptly as upright American citizens."⁷ Klan literature was distributed in the streets of Colorado Springs the following day, confirming fears of a renewed offensive.⁸

The reaction was immediate. The leadership of the American Legion dismissed the Klan's assertions, protesting that "there is no place for it in Colorado Springs."⁹ James F. Jewell, department commander of the Grand Army of the Republic, supported the Legion-

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naires in a Colorado Springs speech: "The Ku Klux Klan is an organized band of lawbreakers. Its practice should be curbed, for no organization outside of the government should be allowed to take the law into its own hands. . . ." ¹⁰ Colorado Springs businessmen made tentative plans to organize an anti-Klan body. In addition, the Reverend Charles A. Fulton of the First Baptist Church condemned the Klan before his congregation. The Klan's probe was quickly withdrawn, but not before it had caused severe damage. The Klan's letter, appearing so soon after the forged threat notes, was a major tactical blunder, for it saddled the local organization with an image of lawlessness and irresponsibility. The ill-conceived letter also alienated several segments of the population and made them more susceptible to future anti-Klan mobilization. With the retreat of the Klan, vigilant anti-Klansmen dispersed. ¹¹

The Invisible Empire became visible again in Colorado Springs on July 4, 1923. Klansmen climbed to the summit of Pikes Peak to initiate a class of recruits and to mark Colorado's anointment as a realm of the Ku Klux Klan. ¹² At the completion of the ceremony the Klansmen ignited a thirty-foot cross, disrupting Independence Day celebrations in Colorado Springs. The cross burning furnished the Klan a dramatic opportunity to announce that thirty men had joined Pikes Peak Klan No. 11, the recently organized klavern for Colorado Springs and El Paso County. The engagement of the film *Birth of a Nation* at a local theater the day before the Klan's appearance assumed greater significance. The Colorado Klan frequently used the motion picture to launch intensive recruiting drives. ¹³

Anti-Klansmen organized to meet the renewed challenge. The "Buck-Shot Brigade" decreed: "There will be no parading of the flaming cross in Colorado Springs, and the lights of our streets will burn each night without interruption. The police of our city will be trusted to carry out their duty and only as a last resort will we come forward and break up any activity of masked men in our city, where all denominations live in peace and harmony from the day of founding of our fair city." ¹⁴ C. C. Hamlin, editor and publisher of the *Colorado Springs Gazette* and *Colorado Springs Evening Telegraph*, flayed the Klan in scathing editorials. ¹⁵ "Its code," charged the *Gazette*, "is such that few save the most viciously biased would openly subscribe to it. The protection of anonymity, the refuge of moral cowardice, alone brings members to it." ¹⁶ Pledging to "tear the masks from the hooded mobs," Hamlin and his staff prominently

displayed news articles highlighting Klan violence and corruption while maintaining a steady flow of anti-Klan commentary. The newspapers even refused to report information concerning Klan lectures or public meetings.

This time, however, the Klan did not flee Colorado Springs. Denver kleagles arrived in the city and began the lengthy process of contacting men and convincing them to join. Colorado Springs' thirty Klansmen furthered their advance by furnishing names and even enlisting new members themselves. As in Denver, Klansmen initially relied upon organizational ties to mobilize potential members. The Masonic lodge was an especially fertile source of recruits. Horace Ragle, a Klan founder and Mason, openly proselytized at lodge meetings. Another Mason, Darius Allen, contended that the Colorado Springs Klan "was made up mostly of people of the Masonic order. But they were the most belligerent members, they weren't the rank and file."¹⁷ The Pikes Peak Baptist Church was another center of Klan strength, offering men and its minister to the cause. The family tie was also important in Klan enlistment. Klan relatives lessened the onus of membership and provided effortless access for their kin. For example, one Klansman and his wife joined because their relatives had been members of the Reconstruction Klan as well as the current Invisible Empire. To hasten recruitment, Klansmen distributed literature and klavern admission cards to all eligible Protestants. "Real men," read the cards, "whose oaths are inviolate are needed. Upon . . . the recommendation of your friends you are given an opportunity to become a member of the most powerful secret non-political organization in existence, one that has the most sublime lineage in history. . . ."¹⁸ Similar appeals, along with application blanks, were mailed from Denver to 700 Colorado Springs business and professional men. The Denver stamp was thus firmly affixed, and the Pikes Peak klavern could not shake the local stigma of being a pawn of outsiders. Rumors also spread that the Klan was attempting to infiltrate the Colorado College student body.¹⁹

The Colorado Springs Klan manipulated the Catholic menace, repeating the usual refrains concerning priestly corruption and scheming Knights of Columbus. The kleagles further claimed that large numbers of Catholics were seeking political office in an attempt to seize the city government. When these allegations collapsed in the face of Catholic passivity, the Klan was forced to sell itself as insurance against a potential papal plot. The danger was not

immediate and, according to the former Klexter, the Klan's focus "seemed to be more anti-Pope than anti-Catholic."²⁰ Colorado Springs Klansmen did not organize boycotts or burn crosses to intimidate Catholics; friendships with Catholics were maintained. "Put only Americans on Guard" became the Klan's main solution to Colorado Springs' Catholic "problem."

Law and order, the Klan's other major thrust, also failed to arouse much enthusiasm. Bootleggers were present in Colorado Springs and El Paso County, but vigorous law enforcement kept their activities at a minimum. During the early 1920s the city was spared any serious outbreaks of crime. Parental concern about "flaming youth" and changing moral values did, however, create Klansmen and women. In the winter and spring of 1923 "social investigator" Elizabeth S. Morse lashed the community for its immoral ways in a series of reports to women's groups and parent-teacher associations. Morse warned parents about adolescent petting parties and formulated rules to prohibit "the suggestive form of dancing." She reserved her sharpest words for the parked car, "which we see as we drive along the highway at any hour of the night, drawn to one side of the road, and which in every single instance conceals someone's son or daughter . . . brother or sister. That darkened, curtained auto is the greatest evil of the age, and it is time we protest—that we demand that this shameful practice shall be abolished."²¹

While anti-Catholicism and anxiety about moral laxity drew men, these grievances lacked the urgency to energize the movement. Government officials, except upon the moral reform problem, were responsive to citizens' demands, and community conflict was kept at a minimum. With conditions relatively tranquil, the Klan had the greatest recruiting success with its non-issue features of fraternalism and fellowship. No attempt was made to enroll men on the basis of issues outside the immediate environment. Thus Colorado Springs kleagles never preached against the evils of the new urban orientation of American life. Nor was Denver crucified as a sister city of either Sodom or Gomorrah. Except for difficulties with "flaming youth," Klansmen seemed quite comfortable in the twentieth century. If the leadership had been content to administer a lodge, the Klan might have settled into a more placid and conventional existence. But, at the insistence of the Grand Dragon, Klan officers arrayed the order as a contender for power. Pikes Peak Klan No. 11 stood, at its height, upon a membership base of 2,000 men, but fraternalism would prove a poor foundation upon which to build nonmember support.²²

II

The Klan attracted men throughout El Paso County, but the majority resided in Colorado Springs and its suburbs. Klan strength concentrated in the city's southern and western precincts which were predominantly lower middle and working class. The city's central and affluent northern districts were heavily anti-Klan. Colorado Springs' twenty-five Klan leaders were drawn from all socioeconomic strata of the Protestant population except the elite. Just over one-third of the men held occupations in the two highest status groups, far below Denver, where nearly three-quarters of the leaders belonged in these categories. Unlike other klaverns, Klan No. 11 drew heavily from the working class, choosing eight or almost one-third of its officers from blue-collar ranks. Such a high percentage may be a reflection of the influence and numbers of a large working-class Klan population or of the opposition's ability to deter significant numbers of men of higher occupational status from joining. Those holding nonmanual occupations were also unfamiliar with power and did not play prominent roles in the city's political or economic affairs. A long-time resident observed that, except for John Little, a former district judge and Exalted Cyclops, "I can't think of anyone with any promise . . . who was ever active or affiliated in the Klan."²³ The leaders differed sharply as to their length of residence in the city. Fourteen of the men had lived in Colorado Springs for seven years or less, eleven Klansmen three years or less. At the same time, six men had resided in the community for seventeen years or more. The mean length of residence for the Klansmen was 8.6 years, significantly lower than the 14.5 years averaged by Denver's leaders. Thus Klan leaders suffered not only external constraints but personal inadequacies as well. Occupationally, the men commanded little influence or respect. Their short residence in the community probably restricted knowledge of local people and conditions. So necessary to Klan success in Denver, the leadership variable in Colorado Springs must be assigned a negative value.²⁴

III

In 1923 Klansmen quietly recruited and initiated new members at weekly meetings in the Woodmen of the World Hall on Colorado Avenue and Twenty-fifth Street. Regular outdoor konklaves took place in a field fifteen miles east of Colorado Springs, and special ceremonies were held in Manitou and the Garden of the Gods, a

spacious mountain park west of the city. Lodge meetings were devoted to discussions of activities, ritual work, and an occasional social evening with Klanswomen. A few Klan troubles did surface. The *Jayhawker American*, a Kansas Klan newspaper, reported that the Colorado Springs organization was "progressing steadily, taking advantage of the experience of too rapid choice of alleged Americans."²⁵ Internal dissension thus appears to have been another in a growing list of deficiencies that required remedy. Confidence men were also in the city posing as kleagles and collecting klectokens. Aside from a few cross burnings the Klan avoided overt provocation.²⁶

The strength of the anti-Klan forces dissipated without direct confrontation and a visible foe. Agitation was suspended except in the Colorado Springs newspapers, which continued their campaign to drive the Klan from the city. Newspaper editorials evoked an occasional condemnation of the Klan from the pulpits. The Reverend Celian Ufford of All Souls Unitarian Church denounced the Klan as "hypocritical, un-American and ridiculous. This nation . . . cannot long tolerate even partial dictatorship from any sort of empire, especially when that empire's members are a mob of sore-heads parading about under the cloak of sheets and pillow cases."²⁷ The Reverend Raymond Burke in a speech to an assembly of Colorado Congregationalists and evangelist A. E. Lickey similarly censured the Klan. Only the Colorado Springs Pillar of Fire Church publicly defended the organization.²⁸

The Colorado Springs Ku Klux Klan chose nearby Fountain, Colorado, as the site of its first and only public appearance. On January 6, 1924, sixteen hooded and robed Klansmen filed into the First Baptist Church and presented the Reverend C. F. Thomas with a fifty-dollar donation. Reports that Thomas was working as a day laborer to support his family spurred the Klan's gift. Thomas gratefully accepted the money and remarked to his congregation, "If America is to be saved, as saved she must be from untimely thralldom, take it from me, the K.K.K. is the salvation of America today."²⁹ The donation caused an uproar in the church. The board of trustees defended the congregation against a Klan smear, contending that the majority opposed the "un-American" order. A week after the incident the board accepted Thomas's resignation. The Klan followed the church visitation with an attempt to polish its law and order image. On January 22 Klansmen burned a huge cross to note the closing of the Colorado Sheriffs' Association convention. As the cross burned, the sheriffs received a bouquet of roses and a

letter praising their efforts against crime and "un-American tendencies." The sheriffs ignored the Klan's offering.³⁰

The Klan shrank from these two rebuffs and, except for an occasional recruiting ploy and fiery cross, was silent for over a year. Colorado Springs Klansmen exerted little influence in the 1924 primary and general elections. Their only candidate denied Klan membership and still lost. Not until April and May, 1925, did the Klan surreptitiously grab for municipal government control, but again anti-Klansmen rallied to block the attempt.

Without effective leadership and explosive issues, Pikes Peak Klan No. 11 was never able to establish itself as a necessary presence or even to develop a clear identity. The Klan enlisted 2,000 men, but for a town the size of Colorado Springs, this figure is surprisingly low; that is, a greater proportion of the population of small towns and cities tended to join the Klan than in Denver. Inexperienced leaders suggested issues and then discarded them, finally having to rely primarily upon a fraternal message. Seemingly oblivious to the lodge joiner membership, they later unwisely pushed their reluctant charges toward political action and subsequent defeat. Unstable leadership also lessened the Klan's impact. Four men served as Exalted Cyclops during the short life of the Colorado Springs Klan, two of whom were deposed before the expiration of their terms. Internal dissension similarly struck the women's auxiliary. In addition, the Klan could not find an issue to arouse the community. The city's Catholics, Jews, and blacks were quiet and posed no threat to white Protestant rule. Law enforcement officials were coping well with the crime situation while Colorado clergymen deflated Klan claims to Protestant purity. The order did not even possess sufficient political and economic leverage to force hesitant men to conform. An uninspired leadership combined with an insipid program failed, moreover, to erase the Colorado Springs Klan's early reputation for recklessness. Impotence and isolation stemmed not only from a disinterested and insufficient membership but from the failure to attract the support of tolerant or sympathetic non-Klansmen. As in all Colorado towns and cities, Colorado Springs Klansmen were a minority unable to gain power without the backing of this crucial bloc. Their votes, instead, went to the candidates of a vigorous anti-Klan movement which exercised considerable influence upon public opinion.³¹

The anti-Klan resistance effort was the most important cause of the Klan's failure to win power. Although unable to prevent the formation of klavern No. 11, the opinion-making public had early

forced the Klan on the defensive. Colorado Springs newspapers and churches refused to remain neutral and assailed the Klan as a threat to the harmony and prosperity of the community. The city and county governments and especially the police department resisted all Klan entreaties. The Colorado Springs city council refused even to grant a parade permit to the secret society. The El Paso County Republican and Democratic parties similarly remained free of Klan influence. Colorado Springs' multipronged attack had created a mood of anti-Klan intolerance, thus sharply inhibiting a kleagle's ability to enlist recruits.³²

Much of the anti-Klan's advantage was rooted in the caliber of its membership. Anti-Klansmen organized the bipartisan Citizens' Committee to counter the Klan's challenge in the spring, 1925, municipal and school board elections. The committee's membership list was a roll call of the social, economic, political, and intellectual elite of Colorado Springs. The president of Colorado College, the city manager, several city councilmen, and a Republican national committeeman joined Colorado Springs labor leaders, ministers, and prominent business and professional men in opposition to the Klan. The twenty-six men who constituted the executive committee of the organization included a former Colorado governor, the county attorney, the managing editor of the *Colorado Springs Gazette and Telegraph*, and several millionaires.³³ Three-quarters of the committeemen engaged in high nonmanual occupations while the remainder followed middle nonmanual pursuits. More than one-half of the Klan's leaders were employed in occupations below middle nonmanual. Almost one-third of the committee's leaders were listed in *Who's Who in Colorado*, and several were members of the exclusive El Paso Club. None of the Klan's officers shared these distinctions. According to a former Colorado Springs anti-Klansman, "These are the fellows that ran the town."³⁴ Occupationally and socially more prestigious than their Klan counterparts, the anti-Klansmen had also lived in Colorado Springs for longer periods. Twenty-three of the men resided in the city for thirteen years or more. Only one member of the executive committee, a Colorado College professor, had lived in the community for less than three years.³⁵

The opposition repeatedly condemned the Klan for breeding hatred and attempting to usurp the functions of government. But altruism and libertarian sentiments, while crucial, were not the only motives of the anti-Klan. Many Colorado Springs businessmen turned to the Citizens' Committee fearing that Klan-engendered strife would disrupt the tourist trade and hinder the economic de-

velopment of the region. The Klan as a movement of the powerless, led by relative unknowns, also threatened to dislodge the community's ruling elite from its positions of political influence. Unwilling to share power or even allow the Klan access to decision-making, the elite responded in two ways. Elite group members launched, directed, and financed the Citizens' Committee to mobilize private resources necessary to secure their control over the community. In addition, government officials, at the prompting of the elite, condemned the Klan, denied it privileges, and threatened to dismiss any employees who joined the secret society. The utilization of these public and private resources was sufficient to deny the Klan influence in the city. The combination of antipathy to hooded rule and self-interest proved overwhelming.³⁶

The frustrations and failures of Pikes Peak Klan No. 11 were duplicated in only a few scattered Colorado communities. Colorado Springs Klansmen had early become targets of derision, unable to justify their existence. The reverse of the Denver Klan experience had occurred. In Colorado Springs it was the anti-Klan organization which had a galvanizing issue, strong leadership, and the support of a united opinion-making public. Easy access to abundant government and private resources combined with high marks on the mobilization variables sealed the Klan's fate. The Klan's internal and external weaknesses were glaringly apparent in the early months of 1924, a year before its final defeat. The life of the Colorado Springs klavern was prolonged only because an overt incident sufficient to mobilize the anti-Klan forces had not previously materialized.

IV

In Pueblo on Sunday night, April 29, 1923, the congregation of the Broadway Christian Church gathered as usual for evening services. In the middle of the second verse of the hymn "Oh Sometimes the Shadows Are Deep," the doors of the church swung open and three hooded and robed members of Pueblo Klan No. 5 marched down the aisle toward the Reverend Gus Ramage. The Klansmen handed Ramage an envelope containing twenty-five dollars, a gift from the 1,600-member klavern for a favorable sermon delivered a few days before. The Klan enclosed a letter with the donation which Ramage read to his startled congregation:

We are a Christian militant organization and are ever ready to stand behind the Protestant Church as long as it remains

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Protestant. We are not Anti-Catholic, Anti-Jew, Anti-Negro, or Anti-anything, but are PRO-AMERICAN. We stand by the Government of the United States, its Constitution, and Laws and protect same unto DEATH . . .

We are strictly American and stand for FREE PUBLIC SCHOOLS, FREE PRESS, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE, WHITE SUPREMACY, PROTECTION OF OUR PURE WOMAN-HOOD and THE ELIMINATION OF GRAFT IN PUBLIC OFFICES and will assist THE OFFICERS OF THE LAW IN EVERY WAY POSSIBLE.³⁷

The Klansmen departed after joining the congregation in prayer.

The Ku Klux Klan's first public appearance shocked Pueblo. Only five months before the *Pueblo Chieftain* had assured residents that the city was free of Klansmen. No news of local Klan meetings or recruiting had been reported and kleagles were thought to be far off. Especially frightening was the Klan's claim of 1,600 recruits. Fears were justified a week later when more than 1,000 uniformed Klansmen burned a forty-foot cross illuminating Pueblo's north side. The Klan had secretly arrived early in 1922 and found Pueblo's Protestants ready for organizing.³⁸

The Klan's target was a major manufacturing center with 181 factories employing almost 10,500 men and women. The Colorado Fuel and Iron Company, the largest steel plant west of Chicago, dominated Pueblo's industrial life and engaged nearly 6,000 workers. Pueblo's population in 1920 was 43,050, an increase of only 1,300 people since 1910. The city's 1,395 blacks comprised just 3.2 percent of the population, an absolute and relative decline from the previous decade. In 1916 there were only 100 Jews in Pueblo, but by 1926 the number had increased twelvefold. One-third of the city was Roman Catholic.³⁹

Surprisingly, the Pueblo Klan did not stress the Jewish influx or the large Catholic minority when recruiting men. Kleagles repeated local complaints concerning Jewish economic power and Catholic political maneuvering, but this was not the main impulse. A Klan advertisement declared, "We sing no hymns of hate against the Jew. He is interested in his own things and we are exercising the same privilege of banding our own kind together. . . ." ⁴⁰ Similarly, businessman Henry Robinson observed that religious bigotry "was in the background . . . they weren't pushing it." ⁴¹ More important in raising Klansmen and klectokens was the coupling of certain elements in the foreign-born community to the breakdown of law and order.⁴²

The Colorado Fuel and Iron Company's steel mills and coal

mines attracted Austrians, Slovenes, Greeks, Japanese, and thirty other nationalities to Pueblo. By 1920 immigrants accounted for 17 percent of the population, with an additional 17 percent second-generation Americans. Most settled in heavily Eastern European Bessemer, just west of the C.F. and I. plant, and the Grove district near the Arkansas River. The city's two largest ethnic groups, the Mexicans and the Italians, established separate colonies. The majority of Pueblo's 1,882 Mexicans lived two miles east of the city in Salt Creek. Poorly paid and without adequate housing, they occupied the society's lowest rungs. Long before the Klan's appearance, religious and cultural differences had generated prejudice, discrimination, and sometimes violence. As late as 1919 a Pueblo mob stormed the city jail and lynched two Mexicans accused of murder. The Italians occupied Goat Hill on Pueblo's east side. The earliest immigrants arrived in the late nineteenth century and converted the redlight district into "an old world Italian village."⁴³ The self-contained settlement observed traditional holidays, spoke Italian, and supported three weekly newspapers. Less traditional ties to Italy were also maintained; in 1923 plans were made to organize a local chapter of Mussolini's Blackshirts.⁴⁴

The heterogeneous foreign-born population was a constant source of irritation. Native-born Puebloans considered the immigrants' isolation and interdependence to be self-imposed barriers to assimilation. The Klan early accepted these judgments, maintaining "that a divided allegiance means no allegiance. There can be no half Americans, and any sort of hyphen absolutely makes impossible any kind of loyalty to the American government, its ideals and institutions."⁴⁵ The image of the immigrant as lawbreaker, however, outweighed these apprehensions. A Pueblo grand jury revealed that "ninety percent of the bootleggers and gamblers are foreign born and that a great many of these are not even naturalized citizens."⁴⁶ Commissioner of Public Safety George J. Stumpf concurred: "Our greatest handicap . . . [in fighting crime] is our great foreign population, as most of the lawbreakers are aliens, principally Italians. . . ."⁴⁷ The newspapers printed the nationalities of law violators, thus strengthening the immigrant identification with crime.

Much of Pueblo's heightened criminal activity stemmed from prohibition law violations. Unswayed by traditional Protestant morality, immigrants failed to equate winemaking and bootlegging with sin. Little Italy, in particular, refused to go dry and continued to supply the city's needs. The police responded with door-to-door li-

quor searches in Little Italy and the Grove district with Italian names dominating arrest reports. Even more alarming was a series of murders linked to the liquor trade. Between 1922 and 1926 ten men were killed in the Italian neighborhood, casualties of a war for control between two "blackhand" factions. In 1923 the blackhand feud spread to Bessemer when two Italian homes were bombed. All of the murderers and bombers evaded capture. Members of the police prohibition squad also received death threats with the blackhand symbol.⁴⁸

Pueblo County roadhouses offered another challenge to law and morality. "Road houses," charged Federal Judge J. Foster Symes, "are the worst type of places where liquor is kept and sold . . . because in these houses young girls are ruined and boys are led astray."⁴⁹ The parked automobile, another symbol of changing standards, was seen more frequently along rural Pueblo roads. Despite protests, officials failed to close the resorts or clear the highways.

Rampant bootlegging, unsolved murders, and notorious roadhouses eroded the community's confidence in its police force. The 1923 Pueblo grand jury lamented, "If it is true that all officers are doing their duty, then the feeling of the jury can be expressed: 'Good Lord have mercy on us!'"⁵⁰ Frustration produced angry accusations of police corruption which official denials failed to assuage. To be concerned about the crime situation, then, was not evidence of fanaticism or abnormality. Nor were such grievances confined to Klansmen. All law-abiding citizens feared for their own safety and that of their families in the face of the authorities' ineffectiveness. The key difference between Klansmen and other Puebloans was the formers' belief that they could do something about the problem. Many agreed with the editor of the *Pueblo Chieftain* when he wrote, "Much of the present spirit of lawlessness, and much of the inclination to seek an instrument of justice outside of the courts and the public officers, is due to the general belief that crime is not punished as it ought to be. . . ."⁵¹

The Klan presented itself as just such an "instrument of justice," able to succeed where law enforcement officials had failed. Klan organizers judged the crime problem so acute that other appeals were either neglected or treated perfunctorily. Methodist minister and Klan sympathizer T. C. Collister dramatically exhorted Pueblo to service: "If our officials cannot enforce the law we should teach them how. I have no respect for the official who winks at the law. There have been many battles in past times, but none greater than this. We are in a fight to keep men's homes bright—to protect

our wives and our children.”⁵² Klansmen awaited only the opportunity to do their duty.

During 1923 the Pueblo Klan gathered strength and proudly displayed it. In June the Pueblo klavern hosted a meeting of Denver, Aguilar, La Junta, and other southern Colorado Klansmen. An estimated 3,200 Klansmen assembled in a field north of the city to initiate 200 men. Following the naturalization ceremony, the crowd of Klansmen and their families were entertained with speeches, songs, and a barbecue dinner. Klansmen ignited crosses again in September when several hundred more recruits took the oath. These activities were major social events attended by entire families, serving also as lures to attract new members. During the winter Klansmen were compelled to meet in the more mundane International Order of Odd Fellows Building at Seventh Street and Grand Avenue. The Pueblo Klan closed the year with its exclusive greeting: six crosses were burned in and around the city on Christmas day. The incident was never investigated.⁵³

Pueblo's opinion-making public did not resist Klan encroachments. The *Pueblo Chieftain* had repeatedly rebuked the organization in 1921 and 1922. Just a few months before the Klan's appearance the editor contended that “the people's government can tolerate no rival. The processes of justice can never be administered successfully in secret by irresponsible agents acting independently of the law or in defiance of the public officials. . . .”⁵⁴ The Klan's presence in Pueblo triggered a sharp shift in position. The new stance was broached in an editorial in the June 29, 1923, edition. “Under present conditions,” remarked the *Chieftain*, “almost all that can be said about this organization must begin with an ‘if.’” The newspaper opposed the Klan if it fostered religious intolerance or assumed the role of a vigilance committee. Yet the editor found the Klan's “mystery” and “mummery” healthy outlets for civilized men. Moreover, the Klan could harness support for law enforcement, good government, and public decency and as such “should be commended and approved.”⁵⁵ The *Chieftain* avoided further comment about the local organization. The *Pueblo Star-Journal*, the city's other major newspaper, similarly ignored the issue. Puebloans never organized an opposition movement to challenge Klan assertions and battle for the public's mind. The failure to mobilize probably reflected the success of the Klan's leaders and program. By keying itself to very real community concerns about law and order, avoiding confrontation with established groups, and refraining from racial and religious offenses, it escaped even the minimal resistance en-

countered in Denver. Former U.S. Congressman John A. Martin delivered Pueblo's only recorded anti-Klan speech. On Flag Day in 1924 he denounced the Klan but advised his listeners not to "take this organization too seriously, it cannot live and will not live."⁵⁶

V

The Klan built strong bases of support in the Reverend T. C. Collister's Northern Avenue Methodist Church near Bessemer, the Reverend George Lowe's East Side Baptist Church, and the Broadway Christian Church. Lowe was especially influential, serving as the local klavern's Exalted Cyclops. Again the Klan followed the pattern of employing pre-existing groups as the foundation for mobilization. Data concerning age, place of birth, and military service were available for sixteen of the Pueblo Klan's twenty-six leaders. Twelve of the men joined the Klan when they were forty years of age or older; the leaders' mean age was 44.5 years. Only two men in their twenties were able to penetrate the ranks of the middle-aged leadership. In light of their ages it is not surprising that eleven never served in the nation's armed forces, while four had volunteered for duty in 1898 and one was a veteran of World War I. Pueblo Klan leaders, like their Denver counterparts, were not recent migrants, having lived in their city an average of 14.8 years. Only eight of Pueblo's twenty-six Klan officers, as compared to nearly two-thirds in Colorado Springs, had lived in the city seven years or less; one-fifth, as opposed to nearly one-half, had lived there three years or less. Long residence in the community facilitated the formation of fraternal ties. Fraternal membership information was obtained for fifteen of the leaders and reveals that all but four wore two or more lodge pins. The most popular fraternity was the Masons, to which thirteen of the Klansmen belonged. Obviously, few held memberships in the American Legion or the Veterans of Foreign Wars. In Pueblo, as in Denver, the marginal were absent and the fraternally integrated present in Klan leadership positions.⁵⁷

Klan leaders were also well established in their careers. Almost three-quarters of the men held high or middle nonmanual occupations while only three wore blue collars. Doctors and lawyers appeared in the hierarchy, yet more than one-fourth of the leaders were small businessmen, with the rest scattered among fifteen different occupations. Their occupational histories reveal that twelve were in the same occupational status group during the 1920s as when they first entered the Pueblo work force. Three others were

moving upward occupationally and three were downwardly mobile. When occupations held as Klansmen are considered, the upwardly mobile group increased to six men with no change in the other categories. Secure fraternally and economically, the Klansmen had, in addition, settled down to family life. Only one member of the Pueblo leadership remained unmarried. Apparently the outcasts and failures of society were unable to penetrate the hierarchy. The respectability and prestige of the Pueblo officers matched the Denver leaders and likewise stimulated Klan growth.⁵⁸

VI

On January 28 the 1924 Pueblo grand jury assailed the police department in a scathing report about crime conditions. The jury's investigation exposed dozens of "vice dens" where prostitutes, gamblers, and bootleggers conducted business unhampered. The report sparked renewed demands for law and order as well as action independent of the police. The next day police officers padlocked thirty-one of the offending businesses but failed to calm the furor. The grand jurors called a law and order meeting for February 8 to organize the Law Enforcement League. Invitations were sent to civic, fraternal, and social organizations warning: "Almost from coast to coast Pueblo is being proclaimed the haven for the unemployed and encouragement given, probably inducements also, for the weary Willies and other ne'er-do-wells to flock hither. . . . It behooves us to spread the word that we're cleaning house, and that henceforth OUR HOUSE WILL BE KEPT CLEAN."⁵⁹

Klan representatives George Lowe and A. P. DeVore, the Great Titan of the Southern Provinces, were among the 800 men and women who attended the meeting. The gathering enabled residents to express their grievances concerning inadequate police protection and particularly the absence of liquor law enforcement. Klansman DeVore also focused attention upon local immorality: "Last night in a trip about the city and suburbs I counted 27 automobiles parked at secluded spots along the highway."⁶⁰ The meeting concluded with the creation of a committee assigned to formulate plans for increased public participation in law enforcement. Ten men, including Lowe and DeVore, were appointed to the committee a week later.⁶¹

The Klan, perhaps as a result of its minority position or to tactically reassert its leadership upon the issue, decided to act independently of the league. On February 23 and 24 DeVore and fellow

Klansman Sheriff Samuel Thomas led fifty men on liquor raids into south Pueblo. The raiders targeted forty-two suspected bootlegging sites but made only seven arrests because they lacked search warrants. A disappointed member of the raiding party claimed that "the places we went to were tipped off and that is why we couldn't get anything."⁶² Thereafter, Klansmen and their sympathizers continued the fight in their own weekly law and order meetings. "We need men," said Reverend Lowe, "who will carry the load and not throw it off. . . . Just as long as I can lift my voice and my feet will carry me I am going to stay on the job until the town is cleaned up."⁶³

The Klan's stand for law and order was well received in Trinidad, Walsenburg, and other southern Colorado towns. As in Pueblo, immigrants and corrupt police officials were blamed for the crime epidemic. Judge David M. Ralston of the Las Animas County court charged the bootlegging traffic to "foreigners, who by education and training believe in the use of intoxicating liquors." The bootleggers, he continued, "are well organized and, in a community such as ours, wield considerable political power."⁶⁴ A Trinidad Klansman declared, "The authorities of this country have absolutely turned their back and refused to even attempt to rid this community of violators of the Eighteenth Amendment. . . . We have absolute proof that the deputy sheriffs . . . are, or have recently been in the bootlegging business."⁶⁵ Three hundred fifty Klansmen paraded the streets of Walsenburg on January 19, 1924, to protest the murders of the chief of police and his deputy by an Italian bootlegger. The Klansmen marched in silence before cheering crowds, their banners linking the planks of the Klan platform: "The Bootlegger Must Go," "America for Americans," and "We're for Restricted Immigration." The Klan was needed, wrote a Walsenburg member, because "the environment with these law violators running loose is not fit to raise children. . . . Our law enforcers are rotten and will not arrest or prosecute any man, no matter what his crime. . . ."⁶⁶ The crime situation was not a fabrication. Some immigrants were disobeying the law, and government officials either connived in its violation or were unable to deal with the widespread problem. Unprotected by the authorities, many citizens assumed responsibility for their own safety by joining the Ku Klux Klan. Their solution, whether right or wrong, was an act of confrontation, not avoidance, of an immediate crisis.⁶⁷

Southern Colorado Klansmen, although preoccupied with the law and order issue, devoted much attention to charity. The Klansmen of Trinidad raised \$1,000 for the local Christian Church and

\$100 for the Italian Presbyterian Church. Klansmen also visited the African Methodist Church and donated \$254. In Olney Springs Klansmen contributed to the Methodist Episcopal Church in appreciation for a pro-Klan sermon. Pueblo Klansmen demonstrated their support of the public schools with a flag presentation in August. Image building and publicity were as responsible for these acts as humanitarianism. But the Klan's focus began to shift from charity and law enforcement in the spring and summer of 1924. In Colorado Springs, Pueblo, Trinidad, Walsenburg, and the rest of Colorado, Klansmen drafted plans to capture political control of their cities, counties, and state.⁶⁸

Although only forty-two miles apart, the Klan experiences of Colorado Springs and Pueblo were decidedly antithetical. In Colorado Springs the Klan met early and effective resistance. City officials, religious leaders, veterans' and lodge groups, members of the elite, and the newspapers formed a united front to curtail Klan recruiting and influence. Responsive government authorities and passive minorities denied the Klan issues with which to excite the Protestant community. The leaders of Pikes Peak Klan No. 11, moreover, were too conservative, too willing to follow John Locke's orders instead of their own instincts. The Klan thus found both avenues to power, informal infiltration of government agencies and formal electoral efforts, blocked. Conversely, Pueblo kleagles encountered Protestants quite receptive to the Klan program, having already forged the immigrant link to crime. Preached by leading Puebloans, the Klan solution snared men and women fearful of uncontrolled foreign-born lawbreakers. Pueblo citizens did not oppose the Ku Klux Klan; on the contrary, they welcomed it. The evidence gathered from Pueblo's and Colorado Springs' encounters with the Klan bolsters the conclusions reached in the Denver case. Considering the circumstances, the Klan was a realistic response to legitimate grievances and needs. Normal men created and participated in the organization because local problems threatened to disrupt accustomed lifestyles. Acceptance or rejection, influence or impotence, again proved to be a function of the four variables of leadership, issues, governmental responsiveness, and community perceptions.

CHAPTER FOUR

TRIUMPH AT THE POLLS

The Klan is in politics and in deep. If you don't believe it, ask Al Smith.

G. K. Minor

National lecturer, Knights of the Ku Klux Klan

On May 13, 1924, Klan leaders from all over the state secretly gathered in Denver to mark the first anniversary of the Colorado realm of the Invisible Empire. Grand Dragon Locke called the klorero to order at 10:00 A.M. and then yielded the rostrum to speakers who expounded upon such customary Klan themes as "Law Enforcement," "Klannishness," and "Americanism." With the speeches completed, Locke focused the meeting's attention upon "Future Activities," the upcoming primary and general elections. He outlined a plan of political organization designed to win Colorado's two U.S. Senate seats, the governorship, control of the state legislature, and scores of county offices. Every county was assigned a Klan major who appointed a captain to each bloc of six precincts. The major also selected a committee of three "emergency men" capable of managing any component of the county organization. Captains designated a sergeant for each precinct, who in turn chose corporals if more than six Klansmen resided in his area of responsibility. To the sergeants and corporals was handed the primary mission of corraling voters, registering them, and inducing them to vote. The organization demanded strict discipline and a regular flow of information up the chain of command. "Our success," concluded the report, "is found in the abnegation of self. This is the realization of the dream of a movement as silent as the tomb—as impending as death."¹ Locke later boasted that Klan regulations

were modeled "on those of the United States army, where the command of a superior officer is never questioned . . . and where the honor of one is the honor and responsibility of all. Formed on military lines it has the added advantage of secrecy maintained by the uniform worn by the members. In secrecy resides the element of mystery; mystery shrouds strength and members and fear as well."²

With the political structure perfected, the Klan's next task was to enlarge its voting bloc and financial base. In the spring of 1924 membership drives were launched throughout the state. Locke toured northern Colorado and the Western Slope founding new Klans and chartering provisional organizations. The Denver Klan, preparing also for the mayoral recall election in August, increased its kleagle sales force, promising a salary of \$100 per week in exchange for fifty new recruits and \$500 in klectokens. Other Eastern Slope cities and towns followed Klan No. 1's lead in a more modest fashion. By election day Klan leaders could muster the votes of 35,000 to 40,000 knights of the Invisible Empire in Colorado.³

The Klan's electoral campaign eschewed violence and terrorism. To overcome its minority position, the Klan chose a route well traveled in American history by similarly situated conservatives and liberals. The Klan accepted the rules for acquiring power, only following them more diligently than their opponents. The secret organization's preparations, discipline, and purpose at the political grass-roots level surprised its blundering adversaries and delivered control of one of the state's major parties. Absorbing new resources, continuing their intensive efforts, and taking advantage of challengers' miscalculations, Klansmen were able to triumph where many more conventional actors had failed. The minority had begun by outmaneuvering the majority and finished by commanding it.

I

In January, 1924, Democratic Governor William E. Sweet announced his bid for re-election, kicking off the state campaign. Elected in 1922 despite allegations of "socialistic tendencies," Sweet worked for a more equitable distribution of the tax burden, state aid to farmers through the construction of crop storage warehouses, and recognition of labor's right to bargain collectively. Sweet was also Protestant, dry, and bitterly anti-Klan. Two months later thirty-six-year-old Morrison Shafroth, a Denver attorney and son of a former U.S. senator, entered the race for the short-term Senate seat vacated when Samuel D. Nicholson died in 1923. His replacement,

Senator Alva Adams, declared his candidacy for the full-term Senate seat held by Lawrence Phipps. Shafroth and Adams, like Sweet, strongly opposed the Ku Klux Klan. Their candidacies aroused only meager resistance, thus affirming the decidedly anti-Klan complexion of the Democratic party. Also indicative, the Democratic state convention met in May to choose delegates to the national convention and condemned the Klan by name, a feat which the national body could not duplicate. The Klan, although repulsed on the state level, did successfully infiltrate several county Democratic organizations.⁴

The Republican party proved more susceptible to Klan influence. Former Governor Oliver Shoup's decision not to seek office threw the race wide open for gubernatorial candidates. The leading contender and favorite of the party hierarchy was Lieutenant Governor Robert F. Rockwell, a rancher from the Western Slope. Rockwell sensed the power of the Colorado Klan and chose a neutral stance to avoid alienating anyone. "I do not regard," he wrote, "the Ku Klux Klan or any other secret organization an issue in this campaign, and I will not be drawn into any controversy over the merits or demerits of any such organization." He was also careful to add, "I am a Protestant and my family have been Protestant residents of this country for almost three hundred years."⁵ The Klan's candidate was District Judge Clarence Morley, a member of the Denver Klan and a loyal follower of John Galen Locke. Morley made no attempt to disguise his Klan ties, hiring the leader of the Klan's foreign-born auxiliary as campaign manager and speaking at numerous Klan gatherings. At one meeting he told his fellow Klansmen: "Not for myself, mind you, do I wish to run, but for the benefit of the Klan. We must clean up the statehouse and place only Americans on guard."⁶ To provide Republicans with an anti-Klan alternative, former Lieutenant Governor Earl Cooley announced his candidacy. If elected, he pledged to purge Colorado of this "sinister organization conceived in graft, bigotry and plunder [which] has entered our state for the sole purpose of creating turmoil, setting neighbor against neighbor, exciting class and racial hatreds, [and] injecting religious intolerance into our political affairs. . . ."⁷

The Grand Dragon endorsed Klansman Rice Means, Denver's city attorney, for the short-term Senate vacancy. A decorated veteran of the Spanish-American War and World War I, Means had joined the Klan after failing to parlay his military achievements into political success. Means's toughest opponent was Charles Waterman,

a corporate lawyer from Denver. Waterman had the backing of the party's old guard but was so poor a campaigner that, it was claimed, "whenever he shakes a hand, he loses a vote."⁸ Western Slope attorney Charles Moynihan also contested the seat, basing his campaign on the fact that he alone of the three candidates resided outside of Denver. Senator Lawrence Phipps was unchallenged in his bid for renomination, yet was given little chance of defeating Alva Adams in November. Phipps's troubles stemmed from an undistinguished voting record compounded by his votes against tightening the prohibition laws. Secretary of the Interior Hubert Work acknowledged the problem in a letter to former Postmaster General Will H. Hays: "It is going to be a big job to get the tide turned in favor of Phipps. Everyone admits, 'He is a good Senator, then adds, 'But we can not elect him.'"⁹ Phipps, a non-Klansman, believed the Klan held the key to his re-election. In return for its endorsement, Phipps allegedly contributed a major share of the Klan's campaign funds. Democratic leader Charles Ginsberg described Phipps's predicament: "He couldn't appeal; he couldn't go out on the street and go in front of a labor group and get a vote out of them. But he could organize them under Locke. And they'd vote for him religiously because that was the direction from headquarters. They didn't know why, but they were told to vote for him and they did. . . . He bought an organization that he couldn't have built in any other way."¹⁰ Klansmen, their candidates designated, made ready to capture the machinery of the Colorado Republican party.¹¹

II

Republican and Democratic county assemblies met in late July to nominate candidates for local office and delegates to the state convention. The vote for Morley and Means delegates provides a rough measure of the centers of Colorado Klan strength. Robert Rockwell and Charles Moynihan swept the Western Slope counties, with the Klan managing to pick up less than 6 percent of the delegates. On the local level the Klan was slightly more successful. In Grand Junction, the largest city on the Western Slope, a few Klansmen concealed their secret ties and gathered enough votes in the Democratic and Republican conventions to be designated on the September primary ballot. The Klan captured one-third of the Republican delegates from eastern Colorado, showing significant strength in the agricultural counties of Kit Carson, Phillips, and

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Washington. The El Paso County Republican convention cast a strong anti-Klan vote, assigning one-third of its delegates to Earl Cooley and none to Morley. Colorado Springs Klansman John Little denied his membership and was thus able to campaign for the Republican nomination for district attorney in the Fourth Judicial District. All other El Paso County races were free of Klan intrigue.¹²

Means and Morley delegates fared little better in southern Colorado. Anti-Klansman Cooley won almost half of his delegates in this region, including a majority of the Otero County contingent. Pueblo Klansmen could deliver only one-fourth of the delegation to Morley and one-fifth to Means. The Klan's poor showing was, to a large extent, the result of the bipartisan nature of the Pueblo klavern; penetrating both county parties, it could not concentrate its strength. This tactic, however, enabled the order to assume a non-partisan stance in the primary and endorse a slate of Klansmen and Klanswomen from the two parties.¹³

Fremont County was the Klan's bastion in southern Colorado. Based in Canon City and Florence, the Klan was so powerful that it could split its forces and still dominate the county's two political parties. Klansmen saturated Republican precinct meetings on July 29 and captured the party organization. They elected their own committeemen and women as well as two-thirds of the delegates to the county convention. The next day Klan delegates caucused at the Canon City klavern and agreed upon convention motions, committee assignments, and candidate nominations. They did their work well—Morley and Means won all twenty state delegates and the entire Klan county slate was designated. The Klan staged an equally impressive coup in the county Democratic convention where the chairman and three-fourths of the delegates were members of the Invisible Empire. Fremont County Klansmen did not agonize about possible conflicts between their opposing slates. "Some of the candidates nominated," observed the *Florence Paradox*, "are to receive the support of the Klan, while others are placed there as dummies and will be sacrificed for members of the Klan on the Democratic ticket."¹⁴

Klan candidates received their greatest support in the Denver area. Delegates pledged to Morley and Means swept a majority of the precinct selection contests and took control of the Republican county assembly. To increase its leverage, the Klan stationed Denver police officers at the entrance to the meeting with orders to deny admittance to "anyone who was not a member of the klan and, except

delegates, no one but klansmen had tickets.”¹⁵ Under the guiding hand of Dr. Locke, who sat in the mayor’s box in the rear of the auditorium, Klansmen committed 75 percent of their 223-member delegation to Morley and 55 percent to Means. The entire Klan ticket for county legislative and judicial offices was placed on the primary ballot. A resolution proposing legislation to open Klan membership rosters and to prohibit the wearing of masks in public was tabled in committee; those objecting were shouted down. The Democratic county convention which met at the same time was free of Klan influence and passed a resolution denouncing the secret society.¹⁶

The Republican state convention met in Denver on August 6, with the Klan holding less than one-third of the 1,053 delegates. Charles Moynihan and Charles Waterman both outpolled Rice Means in the Senate race, and Robert Rockwell’s margin over Clarence Morley was two to one. Although the Klan’s candidates were beaten for the top designations on the ticket, they did receive enough votes to win a place on the primary ballot. “As a result of the action of the assembly,” remarked the *Denver Post*, “a klansman will oppose a nonklansman for each office in the primary election. The issue is clearly drawn.”¹⁷ The Klan also shrewdly shifted a sufficient number of delegate votes to Earl Cooley to ensure his primary designation. Rockwell, Moynihan, and Waterman supporters, encouraged by the Klan’s impotence, basked in their strong convention showings confident of success in the September voting.¹⁸

The Democrats also gathered in Denver for their state convention. Governor William Sweet set the tone of the meeting with a well-received anti-Klan address. Sweet and Alva Adams won their party’s designation uncontested while Morrison Shafroth looked forward to only token opposition in the primary. But the Democrats, like the Republicans, had their Klan wing; a disguised Klansman won the nomination for lieutenant governor without opposition. In addition, all of the Democratic candidates for state office in 1924 were Protestant and native-born.¹⁹

The Republican primary campaign began in earnest two weeks after the state convention. Both Moynihan and Waterman tried to assume the role of party unifier and conducted conservative campaigns designed to cultivate support among all party factions. Robert Rockwell was also unwilling to jeopardize his front-runner position and pursued his preconvention strategy of avoiding the Klan issue. “No one,” he wrote, “seems to know what strength the Klan

will develop and whether it will vote as a unit or not." He further confided to his friend, "You are right in feeling that I should not antagonize the K.K.K.s. It certainly is the farthest from my desires to do so."²⁰ Rockwell stubbornly maintained this course despite Earl Cooley's repeated attempts to badger him to take a stand. Disquieting reports of rising Klan momentum denied the wisdom of Rockwell's strategy. The Klan invaded Rockwell territory on August 24 with a political rally and picnic at Brookston on the Western Slope. A worried Rockwell supporter from Hayden, Colorado, warned, "Several thousand attended and they are wild for Morley—the Klan is working a 24 hr. shift and it is going to be hard to beat them."²¹ In Grand Junction several hundred members of newly organized Mesa County Klan No. 35 staged a dramatic, silent parade through the downtown business district. Within two weeks of the Klan's first appearance in Grand Junction, Merle Vincent cautioned Rockwell, "Local conditions here are difficult to describe. You have a great many supporters, but the Morley Klan organization is evidently strong." He later added, "It has reached the point here where some men talk of little else and others are afraid to discuss it at all."²² The news from the Eastern Slope was equally discouraging. Special trains from Greeley, Brush, Fort Morgan, and Denver brought Klansmen and their families to Loveland for a parade and political meeting. An estimated 20,000 Coloradans, "the largest crowd ever seen in Loveland," gathered at the fairgrounds and "loudly applauded" speakers favoring the candidacies of Clarence Morley and Rice Means.²³

Morley, sure of his Klan support, played down his secret debts to expand his base among Republican voters. He promised to cut government spending, tighten the prohibition laws, and help farmers raise agricultural prices. Morley also attempted to prove his regular Republicanism with staunch declarations of loyalty to the national platform and the Calvin Coolidge–Charles Dawes ticket. Morley's identification with the Klan was so strong, however, that such posturing probably convinced few non-Klansmen. Means's Klan backing was less secure and he found it necessary to harp upon the need for strong immigration laws and the dangers of foreign-language newspapers. Means had only praise for the Ku Klux Klan, describing it as "the greatest institution for good in America today."²⁴ If elected, he vowed to launch God's program for the mental, moral, and physical purification of the United States. This program entailed federal regulation of all public and private schools, strength-

ening of the prohibition and immigration laws, and military training for every American. "Unless this be done," Means said, "we can not carry out the plan which God intended shall be carried out by this people."²⁵

The Klan issue was muted in Colorado Springs, Greeley, Grand Junction, and Pueblo local elections. Lines were drawn tight, however, in Fremont and Denver counties, as anti-Klansmen rallied from their convention defeats and mobilized for political action. A week before the primary election Fremont County Republicans and Democrats organized the anti-Klan Independent party and endorsed candidates for county offices. The party platform declared in favor of prohibition, law and order, and government economy, making the Klan the sole topic of the campaign. The anti-Klan front became even more formidable when it harnessed the enthusiastic support of the *Canon City Daily Record*, the county's largest newspaper. Although the complete Independent party ticket would not appear until the November election, the anti-Klan group hoped that its candidates already on the primary ballot would be bolstered by a strong vote of support.²⁶

In Denver 100 prominent Republicans led by District Attorney Philip Van Cise formed the Visible Government League to fight the Ku Klux Klan. The League organized a successful petition drive which gathered enough signatures to field an anti-Klan county ticket in the Republican primary. The Klan stepped up its campaign activities to meet the challenge. Klan leaders decreed that failure to register to vote was sufficient grounds for suspension from the Invisible Empire. Regular Klan business was postponed and biweekly klavern meetings were devoted to political speeches, campaign pep talks, and the initiation of new voters. Candidates awaited the summons of the Grand Dragon to appear on South Table Mountain and pledge fealty to the Ku Klux Klan. The secret order's endorsement proved quite expensive. Grand Dragon Locke vowed that the Klan "would not support any man . . . [who] did not sign his name to the dotted line, to all the promises and pledges that the Klan would demand."²⁷ Candidates also signed undated resignation forms in return for the Klan nod.²⁸

The climax of the Denver campaign occurred on September 4, when Philip Van Cise rented the city auditorium and invited Denverites to an exposé of Klan secrets. His talk, entitled "Morley and the Courts—The Klan Boycott," was an incisive condemnation of Klan attempts to ruin Catholic businessmen, influence judges and

juries, and disrupt the Republican party. But Van Cise was never heard. On Locke's orders, Klansmen and women flooded the hall, comprising 70 percent of the audience. Although instructed to remain silent, they could not contain their anger. The result was, in the words of a *Denver Express* reporter, "a scene never duplicated in Denver in all its history, a scene which in its violence and threatened violence carried the mind back to the French Revolution. A meeting hall packed with enraged, shouting, shrieking men and women gone mad with fanatic klan-frenzy."²⁹ For over four hours they howled, jeered, and shook their fists as Van Cise fruitlessly tried to speak. Klan leaders and forty police officers were called but failed to quiet the crowd. Finally, at a little after one in the morning, Van Cise gave up and walked out of the auditorium while the knights sang "Onward Christian Soldiers."³⁰

The incident gave added impetus to a wave of anti-Klan editorials appearing just before the primary. The *Colorado Springs Gazette and Telegraph* abandoned its long-standing policy of neutrality during primary contests and denounced the Klan-tainted candidacies of Morley and Means. The *Pueblo Chieftain* similarly rejected Morley and endorsed Rockwell in the interests of Colorado and the Republican party. The *Denver Post* also joined anti-Klan ranks and declared its support for Rockwell, Moynihan, and the entire Visible Government League slate. The editor of the *Boulder News Herald* dramatically warned voters of the dangers confronting Colorado: "The right of free speech would be destroyed. The blacklist and the boycott would be used against all citizens who would not be slaves to the Klan kaisers. Sheriffs would select Klan juries. Klan judges and juries would dispense injustice under the Klan oath. . . . Fear, hatred and strife would succeed community co-operation and goodwill. Heaven would become hell!"³¹

On primary election day, September 9, the Colorado Klan played its final card. Klansmen throughout the state placed "pink tickets" under the doors and in the mailboxes of their neighbors. The tickets listed every candidate for public office and classified each as "Protestant," "Catholic," or "Jew." Protestant candidates objectionable to the Klan were denoted with a star, meaning "unsatisfactory because of Roman Catholic Affiliations and Friendships." Robert Rockwell, Charles Moynihan, and Charles Waterman were among those characterized as "KNOWN ENEMIES OF AMERICAN INSTITUTIONS" because of their alleged papist ties.³²

The Klan minority took advantage of Colorado's primary law

which permitted voters to choose ballots regardless of their party affiliation. Locke concentrated the order's strength in the Republican primary, reminding his men, "We are not Democrats or Republicans but Klansmen."³³ Klan bloc voting, combined with a split in non-Klan ranks, produced a sweep for the Invisible Empire. Klan candidates won nomination for every state office except the superintendent of public instruction, which was lost by only thirty-one votes of more than 100,000 cast. Clarence Morley and Rice Means were nominated even though they received only 48 percent and 43 percent respectively of the total vote. Morley beat Rockwell and Cooley in Denver by a smaller than projected margin but ran surprisingly well outside of the city. The Klansmen carried Pueblo, nineteen eastern and southern counties, and Routt and Moffatt counties on the Western Slope. Rockwell captured the rest of his Western Slope base and showed strength in all sections of the state. His most serious setback occurred in northern Colorado, which he expected to win easily. Instead, a heavy Klan turnout sharply reduced Rockwell's winning margins in Boulder and Larimer counties and handed Weld and Logan counties to Morley. The decisive factor, however, was Earl Cooley's anti-Klan candidacy, which siphoned away 7,700 votes that would have tipped the election to Rockwell. In the Senate race non-Klansmen Moynihan and Waterman together gathered a majority in all but eight of Colorado's sixty-three counties. Again, a large Klan vote in Denver, Pueblo, and Weld County provided the margin of victory. An apathetic Republican majority had thus fallen victim to the concerted efforts of a determined minority.³⁴

A disillusioned Robert Rockwell probably echoed the thoughts of Moynihan and Waterman in an election postmortem: "I did not think that in this day and age forty or fifty thousand 100% Americans would allow themselves to be voted as a unit for any man or bunch of men. It was a question of religious prejudice without regard to personal qualifications, economic condition, lower taxes or the other issues which ordinarily make up a campaign."³⁵ Rockwell specifically laid his defeat to Cooley's candidacy, the pink ticket smear, and particularly the Klan's political organization. "The Klan leaders," he decided, "voted their membership almost as the Kaiser handled the Prussian army."³⁶

Election results at the county level were mixed. Colorado Springs and El Paso County voted overwhelmingly against the Klan's state ticket and its sole candidate for local office. In Mesa County on the Western Slope Klansmen were involved in three con-

tested races, two of which they lost. Other Mesa County Klansmen were nominated without opposition. Pueblo Klansmen not only carried their county for Morley and Means but placed many of their candidates on both sides of the November ballot. Every Fremont County Klan and Independent party designee was selected. Huge Klan majorities in North Denver, South Denver, and the Cherry Creek-Platte River area snowed under Van Cise's Visible Government ticket. Except for two district judgeships, Klansmen won every legislative and judicial contest in the Denver Republican primary.³⁷

III

The Klan takeover of the Republican party fixed the course of the fall campaign. Although Colorado Democrats campaigned vigorously for farm relief, the rights of labor, and against Teapot Dome, they leveled their heaviest guns at the Ku Klux Klan. The Democratic state party platform sternly rebuked the Klan for attempting "to inject questions of religious belief or church affiliation into American politics. . . . Such a course is destructive of peaceable and friendly relations among the citizens of our country and is in disregard and violation of the fundamental principles of our constitution."³⁸ William Sweet, Alva Adams, and Morrison Shafroth crisscrossed the state denouncing the Klan before innumerable party gatherings. They rallied disaffected Republicans such as Philip Van Cise and Earl Cooley to the Democratic side. Colorado's Republican national committeeman C. C. Hamlin bolted and advised party members that support of Morley and Means "is in no sense a test of party allegiance or of loyalty to the party's presidential nominee, Mr. Coolidge."³⁹ Many rank-and-file Republicans heeded their leaders and deluged the Democrats with letters offering aid and encouragement. The *Denver Post*, *Boulder News Herald*, *Colorado Springs Gazette and Telegraph*, and other Republican newspapers also turned from the nominees of their party. Colorado's La Follette-Progressive party provided additional support, unofficially backing Democratic anti-Klansmen on the state level.⁴⁰

More important than these defections were the new resources available for Klan use. Klan candidates, as the party's official representatives, laid legitimate claim to the organization's vote-getting machinery and to its respectability. The Klansmen had also obtained the Republican birthright, the allegiance of dedicated party-line voters. This tie was so firm that many men and women voted for

Klan Republicans against their personal principles. Thus the *Colorado Statesman*, the state's black newspaper, could not abandon the party of Abraham Lincoln and Theodore Roosevelt. It advised its readers to vote on election day "for the continuance of the Republican party which had weathered the gale for all times."⁴¹

The Klan leased the entire second floor of the Brown Palace Hotel for its campaign headquarters. Non-Klan party regulars were allotted only two rooms and were bypassed in political decision-making. The Klan's strategy was to ignore the Invisible Government issue and wrap its candidates in the mantle of Coolidge Republicanism. The state party platform thus contained planks promoting law and order, the Constitution, and the national Republican ticket. Non-Klansmen received a faithless pittance: "We condemn all attempts to breed race and religious dissension and to make political capital therefrom."⁴² Throughout the campaign Morley and Means assured voters of their moderation and denied any radical plans to disrupt the peace or prosperity of the state. Tested Klan tactics, however, were not discarded. Pink tickets reappeared denouncing Shafroth and Adams for marrying Catholics (they had not) and Sweet as tainted by Roman influence. Kleagles meanwhile were out in force pursuing every lead to increase the Klan vote. Their success was visible at the weekly naturalization ceremonies where sometimes as many as 1,800 initiates were processed into the Invisible Empire.⁴³

Klan candidates benefited not only from the Coolidge campaign and a well-financed grass-roots organization but also from Democratic ineptitude. Incompetence was particularly characteristic of the Morrison Shafroth campaign against Means. Shafroth ran a one-man campaign and refused to accept financial contributions. "We spent no money," he said, "we had no paid workers. We had no paid advertisements. It was really a very foolish kind of a campaign."⁴⁴

Senator Lawrence Phipps relied upon the support of the Ku Klux Klan but shunned its public embrace. He evaded the Klan issue and campaigned for lower taxes, a protective tariff, and a good roads program under the slogan "A Vote for Phipps Is a Vote for Coolidge."⁴⁵ Phipps, however, could not so easily shake his burden, for the Democrats never tired of linking his name with Morley and Means or accusing him of financing the Klan effort. Yet it was the Anti-Saloon League, and not the Democrats, which dealt the Phipps candidacy its most serious blow. The league blacklisted the senator for voting against a prohibition measure, a move which led several

county Klans to endorse Alva Adams. The Klan organization tried to limit the damage by assuring voters that "in the main he has stood firmly by the president and his party. We have not approved his every act, or his every vote, but we have respected, and do now, his independence and determination to do what he believed to be right."⁴⁶ Despite some defections, most Klan tickets, pink and otherwise, listed Phipps's name at the head of the column of approved candidates.⁴⁷

The Klan versus anti-Klan nature of the campaign placed organized labor in an ambiguous position. Union men had seemingly formed a united front in June, 1924, when the Colorado State Federation of Labor condemned the Klan and urged its members not to join. The convention also endorsed Robert M. La Follette for president and Sweet, Adams, and Shafroth for state office. But behind this outward display of solidarity was an organization afflicted with dissension and drained of its influence. Union men were entering the Invisible Empire in such numbers that "a circle within a circle" was formed for those members with both Klan and union cards. When questioning candidates for public office, the Grand Dragon deferred to this body, asking each politician his views of labor unions and, if elected, his plans to advance the rights of the workman. The *Colorado Labor Advocate* and the *Denver Labor Bulletin* supported the Democratic state ticket yet never assailed Phipps, Morley, or Means for their relationships with the Klan. In fact, neither newspaper even acknowledged the Klan's presence in the primary or general elections.⁴⁸

The resurgence of anti-Klan groups in Fremont and Denver counties diverted voters' attention from the state races. The Independent party of Fremont County reappeared in October and named a complete legislative and judicial slate to oppose Klansmen on the Republican and Democratic ballots. Both sides refitted their organizations and waged a bitter campaign in the newspapers, meeting halls, and streets. A cycle of denunciation, first of papal intrigue and Tammanyism and then of hooded despotism, had by election day divided voters into two antagonistic camps.⁴⁹ Denver's Visible Government League, partially recovered from its primary mauling, worked for the election of "Independent Judiciary" candidates to the county, juvenile, and district court judgeships. The Klan harassed the league's candidates as it had in the primary election. Klansmen and Klanswomen saturated league meetings, heckled speakers, turned off lights, and exited en masse to disrupt proceedings. Ben Lindsey, candidate for re-election as juvenile judge and a

target of these tactics, likened these Klanswomen to the "women before the Tribunal at the French Revolution demanding the blood of their victims."⁵⁰

Lindsey and Lewis R. Mowry, the Republican candidate for district attorney, were singled out and made the prime quarry of the Denver Klan's campaign. Lindsey, the father of the juvenile court system, had become vulnerable after twenty-three years on the bench. He had alienated Catholics as well as Klansmen with his vigorous espousal of birth control and companionate marriage. Lindsey's active role in the movement to recall Mayor Stapleton and his continued opposition to invisible government had further hardened the Klan's determination to remove him. Lewis Mowry received Klan support in the primary but sinned when he refused to take out membership in the order. The Klan threatened to blackmail him by exposing his relationship with a "pretty self-declared 'golddigger'" unless he conformed to its demands. Mowry refused to cower and on the day before election was forced to confess his indiscretion. His Democratic opponent was more attentive to the Klan's wishes and won its endorsement.⁵¹

On November 4 voters went to the polls under clear skies and gave the Republicans and the Ku Klux Klan control of Colorado. Calvin Coolidge ran ahead of the state ticket, taking 57 percent of the vote and sixty of sixty-three counties. Despite evidence of widespread ticket splitting (Klan candidate vote totals were 7 percent below Coolidge's), Morley, Means, and Phipps profited from the "Keep Cool with Coolidge" wave which engulfed the Democrats in 1924. In the Denver area, the Greeley-Fort Collins region, and Fremont County, Morley and Means amassed sizable leads which the Democrats could not overtake in the rest of the state. The Klansmen carried all but four counties east of the Rocky Mountains and made strong inroads into the traditionally Democratic mountain and western plateau counties. The Democrats even had trouble in Pueblo County, where Morley barely lost and Means won. Phipps's support was not as evenly distributed, and he relied heavily upon an 18,000-vote margin in Denver to defeat Alva Adams. The power of the Klan's endorsement was also reflected in other returns. Klan-supported candidates were elected to the offices of lieutenant governor, secretary of state, attorney general, superintendent of public instruction, and state supreme court justice. Only two Democratic candidates for state office survived the Republican landslide; both had the endorsement of the Ku Klux Klan.⁵²

Klan-backed Republicans and Democrats won legislative and

judicial offices in Boulder, Pueblo, Weld, and many other Colorado counties. Fremont County Klansmen defeated the Independent party decisively in every race but two. Returns were equally gratifying in Denver, where only three district judgeships and the juvenile court escaped Klan nets. Ben Lindsey was narrowly re-elected by a margin of thirty-five votes out of more than 88,000 cast. His opponent, Klansman Royal Graham—whom the *Denver Post* accused of “judicial corruption, personal dishonesty and criminal conduct”—filed for a recount alleging voter fraud in a West Colfax precinct.⁵³ Simultaneously, a grand jury drawn from Klan membership lists indicted six precinct workers for violating election statutes. Charges against five of the accused were later dismissed, but one pleaded guilty and served six months in prison. Denver District Judge Julian Moore, however, refused to throw out the votes of the disputed precinct and after a recount awarded the election to Lindsey. In 1927 the case was appealed to the Colorado Supreme Court, which reversed Moore’s decision and named Graham the winner even though he had committed suicide two years earlier.⁵⁴ In a final gesture of anti-Klan defiance, Lindsey burned his court records and left the state for California.⁵⁵

A week after the election Imperial Wizard Hiram Wesley Evans and the Grand Dragons of Georgia, Indiana, and Kansas arrived in Denver to bask in the Colorado Klan’s victory. Dr. Locke, Governor-elect Morley, and Judge Albert Orahood, as well as a phalanx of newspaper reporters and photographers, greeted the Evans entourage at Union Station. After welcoming ceremonies were completed, a motorcade flanked by Denver police officers brought the Imperial Wizard to the Brown Palace Hotel for conferences with state Klan leaders. The climate had certainly changed since 1921 when the Klan’s first Imperial Wizard, William Simmons, had found it necessary to enter the city surreptitiously. The high point of Evans’s visit came that night when he addressed a Klan meeting at the Cotton Mills stadium in South Denver. An estimated 35,000 persons, including 5,000 new recruits, heard the Imperial Wizard laud Locke, his knights, and the future leaders of the state of Colorado.⁵⁶

Like most social movements, the Klan controlled only a minority share of the electorate. To gain power and thus effect its ends, the Klan could either infiltrate an existing party or form a new political vehicle. Colorado Klansmen chose the more realistic route and the more amenable Republican party. Organizing on the precinct level, they were able to control enough delegate selection contests to

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win primary designations for their candidates. The massing of hooded strength in the Republican primary and the splits in non-Klan ranks produced victory for Morley and Means. The Klan's fall campaign, bolstered by the addition of new resources, was a finely calibrated effort designed to forge a legitimizing link to Coolidge Republicanism and to ensure that all sympathetic voters went to the polls. The triumph in November testified to the skill and dedication of Klan strategists. Mastering the means to power, however, would prove far simpler than exercising it.

CHAPTER FIVE

UNDER INVISIBLE RULE

I want a conservative administration. I do not want any legislation that will bring on rancor or class hatred. . . . I have no intention of turning the world upside down.

Governor-elect Clarence Morley

In a radio address on January 13, 1925, Governor Clarence Morley predicted: "Never has there been such a bright future before us as the year 1925 presents."¹ The governor spoke to all Coloradans, but in particular to the men and women of the Ku Klux Klan. The Colorado realm of the Invisible Empire reached the height of its power in the winter of 1924-25. It had won control of the statehouse and scores of county courthouses throughout Colorado. The Klan commanded the political summit of the Rocky Mountain state but did not press for discriminatory legislation against Catholics, Jews, or blacks. Nuremberg laws were not the Colorado Klan's style. Nor did the Klan executive initiate a policy of planned persecution against minority groups. The organization's purpose was to make government again responsive to the Protestant majority. To effect this end, the Klan attempted to fill state agencies with loyal and dependable men. Physical control of government, rather than new legislation, would restore the balance in favor of the white Anglo-Saxon Protestant. The Klan's grip, however, was more tenuous than it knew, and the trappings of office proved insufficient to assure success. Hostile legislators and bureaucrats blocked Klansmen, leaving them impotent even as they held the symbols of authority. The movement lost the battle for influence after it appeared to have won it. Instead of visions of a new dawn, Klansmen and Klanswomen witnessed the beginning of their empire's decay.

I

The new governor of Colorado was a small, bespectacled man who had been born on a farm near Dyersville, Iowa, in 1869. A second-generation American, Clarence Morley had come to Colorado in 1890 and was a member of the 1899 graduating class of the Denver University Law School. Morley had found escape from a mediocre law practice in Republican politics and had been elected district judge in 1918. Despite his position, he was considered "one of the minor pee wees of the community. . . . A kind fellow who hoped everything would go well."² While a district judge he was introduced to John Galen Locke and the newly arrived Ku Klux Klan. The judge received membership card No. 953 and was elected a Klokan or investigator for the Denver Klan in 1924. Locke exerted an almost hypnotic influence over Morley, becoming larger than life and even an instrument of divine will. According to Morley, "In times of trouble the Almighty always sends some men to lead us. God sent us George Washington when we needed a leader in our struggle with England. God sent us Abraham Lincoln to preserve the union. And God has sent us John Galen Locke to lead our city out of its terrible condition of chaos and trouble."³ There was little question where power resided in the new administration. Weak and blindly loyal, Morley was in constant telephone communication with Glenarm Place seeking the Grand Dragon's advice and instructions. The Republican *Colorado Springs Gazette* characterized the governor as "a mere figurehead, an automaton responding as the strings are pulled."⁴ A friend of both men agreed: "Morley was only a charwoman. He took the orders. He scrubbed the buckets, he mopped the floors. He turned on the lights, he turned off the lights. He did as he was told. And it never occurred to him that he ought to have an independent thought."⁵

Clarence Morley took the oath of office on January 13 at the Denver auditorium before galleries packed with cheering members of the Invisible Empire. His inaugural address, interrupted frequently by applause, outlined the Klan's cure for Colorado's ills. To fetter the Catholic hierarchy, Morley proposed legislation prohibiting the use of sacramental wine, thereby outlawing the Mass, and a measure creating a woman's reformatory as an alternative to the "sinister" Houses of the Good Shepherd. These two proposals, however, were primarily gestures to the Klan's anti-Catholic wing, and the administration did little to ensure their passage. The governor called for an end to the coddling of lawbreakers and asked for the

repeal of the public defender act, a symptom of "spineless enforcement of our criminal laws. . . ." ⁶ To protect the interests of organized labor, Morley recommended passage of alien exclusion laws which would forbid immigration and the ownership of property. ⁷ The most important section of the governor's message concerned the abolition of more than a dozen government boards and agencies, including the State Tax Commission, the Board of Corrections, the State Board of Health, and the Board of Nursing Examiners. Morley justified their extinction on the basis of efficiency and economy, but his reasoning failed to mask a broader purpose. The state constitution severely restricted the governor's policy-making and appointment powers. "There is no one," remarked the *Boulder Daily Camera*, "he can fire except the private secretary he brought with him unless he has a trial before a civil service commission. Two-thirds of the members of all boards and bureaus were there before he was elected and he can only name one-third of the membership of each." ⁸ When a Morley bill abolishing a government bureau was introduced into the legislature, a companion bill recreating the agency under a new name was placed into the hopper. Passage of the administration's bills would enable the governor to weed out Catholics (14 percent of all state employees) and realize his slogan "Every Man under the Capitol Dome a Klansman." A Klan machine, firmly entrenched in the administrative bodies of the state government, would thus be created to continue hooded rule after the Morley years. ⁹

Just four hours after taking office, Morley tested the limits of his power. The governor dismissed National Guard Adjutant General Paul P. Newlon and his two aides in what was labeled an economy move. Newlon, however, refused to vacate his post, and a district court later invalidated Morley's order. Although repulsed at the upper echelon, the Klan had more success among the guard's junior officers and men with standard recruiting techniques. Those offices which Morley could distribute were quickly given to Klansmen. The defeated Republican candidate for secretary of state, E. J. Wallinger, a member of the Royal Riders of the Red Robe, was appointed as budget and efficiency commissioner. John Galen Locke was made an honorary colonel in the National Guard and assigned as the governor's *aide de camp*. A delegation of men sent to the Good Roads Convention in Texas read like a who's who of Colorado Klandom. Other Klan appointees had to await the approval of the Senate before taking office. ¹⁰

Clarence Morley did not allow his duties as governor to inter-

fere with his Klan obligations. The governor appeared regularly at Denver klavern meetings and always found time for the organization's special events. He invited Locke to accompany the Colorado delegation to the Coolidge inaugural and while in Washington attended a formal dinner hosted by the Imperial Wizard. In 1926 Morley led a column of 500 Denver men down Sixteenth Street, stopped in front of a clothing store, and demanded the dismissal of all employees lacking the proper secret credentials.¹¹

II

Governor Morley confidently presented his legislative proposals to the overwhelmingly Republican Twenty-fifth General Assembly. Republicans held a lopsided majority of fifty-two to thirteen in the House of Representatives, an increase of nineteen seats in the November election. Klan influence in the lower chamber was considerable because many of the Republicans and some of the Democrats were Klansmen or were elected with the order's support. "The house is klan," wrote a statehouse reporter, "to the extent they sometimes carry their night shirts in a package with them so they will not have to go back home . . . when a meeting is scheduled for that evening."¹² The Klan bloc was large, but it did not control enough votes to pass legislation. It was thus forced to ally with non-Klansmen who were loyal to the Republican party and therefore to the current administration.¹³

The Klan's hold on the Senate was far more precarious. Morley forces could count on the votes of only twelve Republicans, despite the party's twenty-one-to-fourteen advantage. Minority leader Billy Adams's persuasive abilities and disciplinary tactics solidified the Democrats against administration promises and kept all but three votes from the Klan. The balance of power was held by nine Republicans, six of whom were holdovers elected in 1922 and thus free of Klan debt. Administration senators attempted to court these unaligned Republicans—except for Trinidad's Jewish Senator Simon Fruedenthal—but were immediately rebuffed. On the first day of the legislative session Senators David Elliott (Colorado Springs), Frank Kelly (Salida), L. A. Puffer (Colorado Springs), and Henry Toll (Denver) walked out of the party caucus and refused to abide by the majority's decisions concerning committee assignments. Senators W. E. Renshaw of Idaho Springs and John Dickinson of Hugo backed the insurgents and threatened to bolt if the committee question was not reviewed. Two days later Klan leaders conceded and

named Puffer and Elliott chairmen of the powerful Finance and State Affairs committees respectively; other dissenters received choice committee assignments. These concessions temporarily mollified the rebels but proved disastrous for the Morley administration. Anti-Klan senators now occupied key positions from which they could influence the legislative process and disrupt the Klan's agenda.¹⁴

The period for the introduction of new legislation ended on January 21, with 1,080 bills submitted for consideration. The administration's legislative package, which constituted only a fraction of this number, had grown since Morley's inaugural address. More agencies were slated for extinction, such as the Bureau of Labor Statistics, the State Civil Service Commission, the Pure Food and Drug Commission, and the State Industrial Commission. To ensure that no offending bureaus had escaped detection, a Klan senator from Denver introduced a bill abolishing all departments and institutions not specifically created by the state constitution. The responsibilities of the marked boards, like those discussed earlier, were transferred either to new agencies or to existing departments already in Klan hands. The duties of the State Industrial Commission, for example, would mainly devolve to the office of Deputy State Labor Commissioner Carl DeLochte, the Grand Ragon of the Klan's foreign-born auxiliary. Similarly, a Klan proposal to reorganize the Colorado Fish and Game Department was no more than a move enabling the governor to replace the incumbent commissioner and his deputies with men performing the same functions under different titles. Morley, stung by the outcome of the Newlon affair, also lobbied for a bill which empowered the governor to appoint and dismiss the adjutant general of the National Guard.¹⁵

Individual Klan members in the Denver House delegation framed their own regressive legislation independent of the governor's office. Representative Charles Bigelow proposed a bill which prohibited epileptics, drug addicts, drunkards, or persons charged with a felony from marrying. Marriages between Orientals and whites would also be barred in Colorado. Klanswoman Minnie C. T. Love introduced legislation which authorized the sterilization of epileptics, the retarded, and the insane if procreation might result in "defective or feeble-minded children with criminal tendencies. . . ." ¹⁶ Love authored another piece of legislation which attempted to abolish sectarian and institutional schools maintained wholly or in part by "public moneys." While private self-sustaining schools were exempted from the bill's provisions, "public moneys" were broadly de-

fended as funds raised by "taxation, community chests, charity organizations or public drives."¹⁷ Fellow Klansperson E. S. Hawkins called for the repeal of Colorado's civil rights laws which guaranteed persons of all races and religions equal access to public accommodations. Other Klan bills appearing on the legislative calendar would, if passed, abolish the Denver juvenile court, enforce Sunday closing laws, and strengthen prohibition enforcement.¹⁸

Not all of Morley's or individual Klanspersons' recommendations were punitive or prejudicial. The governor ordered Klan members to support legislation establishing a minimum wage for women and outlawing working conditions detrimental to their health and morals. Klansmen and Klanswomen spearheaded the effort to obtain the legislature's approval of a constitutional amendment giving Congress the power to prohibit child labor. Representative Minnie Love sponsored a bill advocating the distribution of birth control information and the manufacture and distribution of contraceptives. Klanswomen Louise Patterson of Pueblo and Martha Long of Denver jointly introduced an act to allow women to serve as jurors in Colorado's courts. These examples of progressive legislation present an interesting and unnoticed side of the Ku Klux Klan. But the list is too small and overshadowed to significantly cleanse the organization's traditional reputation.¹⁹

Republican floor leaders in the House, confident of easy and early passage of the administration's program, neglected their legislative homework. They were shaken from their complacency when a sharp reaction greeted the first major administration measure. Democrats picked apart the provisions of the bill abolishing the Board of Nursing Examiners and convinced more than a dozen Republicans and some Klanswomen to defect. To regroup their forces, administration supporters quickly pushed through a motion for a weekend adjournment. Republicans were herded into conferences and drilled in the catechisms of party discipline. Recalcitrant members who resisted the call of party loyalty were threatened with the defeat of their favorite bills and, when applicable, expulsion from the Invisible Empire. Party leaders proved effective teachers; not only did the nursing bill pass, but in the following two weeks more than half of the governor's program was approved. Among the measures passed along to the Senate were the adjutant general act, the women's minimum wage bill, and bills abolishing the State Tax Commission and the Board of Corrections. Later in the session the Colorado Fish and Game Department reorganization act and bills eliminating the State Industrial Commission and State Civil Service

Commission were approved. The sacramental wine bill never left committee. Anti-Catholics portrayed the bill simply as another attempt to plug a loophole in the prohibition laws, denying that it was aimed at any particular religious group. Catholics, Jews, and even the Women's Christian Temperance Union denounced the bill and called for its defeat. The Right Reverend Irving Peale Johnson, Episcopal bishop of Colorado, predicted that the measure "would automatically make criminals similar to those who were outlawed by Caligula and Nero, for, if it came to an issue, some of us would be compelled by conscience to obey God rather than men at any cost to life or liberty."²⁰ These protests, combined with the governor's lack of support, encouraged legislators already wary of the bill's intent to disregard the arguments of anti-Catholic Klansmen. Other Klan measures, both progressive and regressive, never reached the floor for consideration.²¹

Morley's supporters were on the defensive in the Senate. Anti-Klan Republicans renewed their rebellion, refusing to attend their party caucus because the vote of its majority was binding upon all. Instead, they joined with the Democrats to form a bipartisan majority against the administration. The anti-Klan bloc pursued a strategy of delay rather than confrontation, hoping to smother Morley's bills quietly in committee under the weight of procedural motions and debate. The strength of the anti-Klan forces on key committees made this plan possible. They controlled the State Affairs Committee, which received almost half of the House bills, and wielded enough votes in the Finance Committee to postpone consideration of another third of the governor's program. Morley and his Senate supporters, aware of their minority position, intensified their efforts to effect a realignment of forces. The governor met several times with Republican rebels and attempted to coax them back into the fold with appeals to party loyalty and promises of support for their bills. When persuasion failed to have the desired effect, threats were employed. Democratic Senator Joseph Grigsby was warned that the House would not appropriate funds for the Pueblo state fair and state hospital unless he voted with the Klan. Morley also used the appropriations for the University of Colorado as a bargaining counter. Earlier in the session the governor ordered university president Dr. George Norlin to dismiss all Catholic and Jewish professors or suffer a drastic cut in funds. Although the financial bludgeon failed to impress Norlin, it was later resurrected to coerce the university's friends in the Senate. Meanwhile, the House of Representatives applied pressure by refusing to act upon any Senate measures until

House bills were reported out of committee. Administration Republicans supported their threat with a vote returning a Senate bill under consideration to committee. The Senate called the House's bluff and adjourned for a three-day holiday. The stalemate between the two chambers continued until the end of the session. Equally subtle intimidation appeared on each legislator's desk every Wednesday in the form of the Denver Klan's *Protestant Herald*. On page one, bordered in black, were the names of the Republican insurgents. "Cut this list of TRAITORS out for future use," advised the *Herald*. "It will come in handy."²²

The first formal test of strength between Klan and anti-Klan occurred on February 27 when the Judiciary Committee reported out H.B. 435, abolishing the State Department of Charities and Corrections. The bill was defeated by a margin of twenty to fifteen, with nine Republicans joining eleven Democrats to save the agency. Within two weeks of this victory anti-Klan senators accomplished a major feat by taking complete control of the Calendar Committee. This committee determined which bills the Senate considered and could kill any bill simply by refusing to place it on the agenda. All five members of the committee were anti-Klansmen, thus forestalling the possibility of an unorthodox bill escaping through a minority report. The committee allowed only three administration measures, the nursing examiner's bill, the Fish and Game Department reorganization act, and a proposed constitutional amendment eliminating the party primary, to reach the Senate floor. Each was defeated overwhelmingly.²³

"There is an old saying," mused a Denver newspaperman, "that the legislature which does nothing is a good one. Measured by that standard, the twenty-fifth is one of the best assemblies the state has had in many years."²⁴ The legislature adjourned in deadlock on April 16, with 85 percent of the 1,080 bills introduced in January lying stillborn in committee. Among the more noteworthy pieces of legislation awaiting the governor's signature were bills which forbade picking the blue columbine, allowed counties to exterminate prairie dogs, and authorized convicts to manufacture license plates. Morley's package of thirty-seven bills abolishing or reorganizing state agencies was decisively defeated. The House passed nineteen administration measures, but only one, a bill eliminating the defunct Board of Horseshoe Examiners, survived Senate scrutiny. Just two Klan-endorsed bills became state law: one requiring schools to fly the American flag and the other making ownership or operation of a still a felony. Their program in ruins, Klansmen in the House

took a measure of revenge on their Senate opponents by refusing to appropriate funds for the University of Colorado, the Pueblo state fair, and the Adams Normal School in Alamosa. Frustrated and confused Klansmen even killed their own proposal to allow children to leave school daily for religious instruction because it drew the support of Catholics and Jews. Governor Morley also took vengeance on those who had humiliated him. He crippled the State Tax Commission, the State Board of Health, the Public Examiner's office, and several other agencies with vetoes of their staff salary appropriations. Soon after adjournment the staunchly Republican *Pueblo Chieftain* reached a popular verdict on Clarence Morley and Klan rule: "It is unfortunate for Colorado that the Morley administration must be prolonged after it has been conclusively demonstrated as the worst failure ever inflicted upon the people. . . ." ²⁵

Governor Morley was slightly more successful filling government jobs than passing legislation. Unable to legislate the state's boards and bureaus out of existence, he chose as his best alternative to appoint trusted men to existing vacancies. Morley placed before the Senate a list of twenty-five appointees that included the Exalted Cyclopes of Canon City, Colorado Springs, and Fort Collins, as well as many prominent Denver Klansmen. The Senate promptly confirmed ten of his choices, rejected two, and tabled thirteen. When the legislative session ended, the governor gave two-year recess appointments to the disappointed nominees. Over half of the men, however, never assumed their posts. Eight recess appointees of the previous administration refused to relinquish their offices and convinced the courts that Morley's appointments were illegal because the Senate had not confirmed them. The only important appointment left unchallenged was to the Public Utilities Commission; the remainder were unsalaried positions on minor boards. Begun with such great hopes, the Morley administration had utterly failed to achieve its goals. The dream of a self-perpetuating Klan machine entrenched in government to safeguard Protestant rights was dead. With it went a large measure of confidence in the Klan and its leadership. ²⁶

III

Colorado's confrontation with invisible power was confined to the executive branch of the state government after the Klan's legislative chastisement. On June 10, 1925, Governor Morley evoked a forgotten antiliquor law and commissioned fifty-two prohibition

agents with all of the authority vested "in the district attorneys, sheriffs, constables and police officers of the state. . . ." ²⁷ By the end of the year Morley's prohibition force numbered almost 200 men, three-quarters of whom kept their identities secret. Morley reactivated the law not so much to strengthen prohibition enforcement but to repay campaign debts, provide employment for jobless Klansmen, and to honor the realm's leading men. Thus, along with Grand Dragon Locke and Great Titans A. P. DeVore and Gano Senter, a wide assortment of klabees, kligrapps, nighthawks and kludds from every den in Colorado received appointments. ²⁸

Although Morley's intentions were benign, the dangers inherent in his plans became apparent when several agents took their commissions seriously. Just nine days after his appointment agent R. N. Mason, the Exalted Cyclops of the Trinidad Klan, led a raiding party on a random search for liquor. Mason's men battered in the doors of fifty homes without identifying themselves, drew revolvers, and lined up the frightened men and women for search. The raid was a success; thirteen people were arrested and 500 gallons of wine were seized. Judge A. T. Hollenbeck, however, released the prisoners because "a man's home being his castle is not subject to search and seizure, even with search warrant unless there is absolute proof that the laws of the United States are being violated." ²⁹ His decision ruled out further wholesale raids in the Trinidad area based upon speculation and insufficient evidence. On the day following the Trinidad incident, Morley agents staged a night raid in Weld County. Armed raiders, lacking criminal or search warrants, ransacked several suspected residences and hauled twelve men to jail. The presiding justice of the peace levied fines for possession which he subsequently divided with the dry agents. The *Greeley News* censured the actions of these officials and angrily asked: "Has Colorado come to a stage in her development where that sort of thing is to be permitted? Is there no law that must be observed any more except the liquor law?" ³⁰ In Denver Morley's men used their search for liquor to cover harassment of anti-Klan leaders. Similar violations of constitutional rights occurred throughout Colorado in 1925. In light of their tactics it is surprising that the dry law enforcers shot only two people, one a suspected bootlegger and the other a fellow agent. ³¹

Such examples of prohibition law enforcement unleashed a firestorm of protest. Denver's District Attorney Foster Cline denounced Morley's "un-American, secret spy system" and threatened to jail any agent who violated the law. ³² Thomas Clennan, warden of

the Denver County jail, refused to accept any prisoners taken by "the governor's Russian helpers."³³ Joel E. Stone, the district attorney for Adams, Arapahoe, Clear Creek, Jefferson, and Gilpin counties, also lodged a complaint accusing the agents of graft and brutality. Governor Morley answered his critics by praising the force's "excellent and effective work."³⁴ But charges of wrongdoing and corruption undercut Morley's defense. Agent J. E. Johnson, a former convict, was arrested for accepting a bribe. Fred Kuensel of Denver was exposed as a U.S. Army deserter and Carl C. Burns of Pueblo as a convicted burglar. Another agent was imprisoned for his central role in a bootlegging ring. Public indignation finally forced Governor Morley, on December 31, 1925, to revoke the commissions of his dry officers. In 1926 Morley returned to his original purpose and appointed fifty-eight former agents to nonsalaried, honorary positions in a remodeled prohibition corps. After an uneventful year their services were terminated by newly elected Governor Billy Adams.³⁵

Clarence Morley ended his term with a final act of homage to his friend John Galen Locke. The governor named Locke to a six-year term on the State Board of Medical Examiners, an appointment not requiring Senate confirmation. Ironically, some anti-Morley members of the new General Assembly attempted to block the appointment by first abolishing the board and then recreating it under a new title. Resistance was minimal, however, because the Klan issue was no longer relevant under the capitol dome. Morley was a beaten man who had long since given up hope of creating a Klan machine in the state government. Klan holdovers in the Senate had resumed their party identities, and legislative battles were again contested along Republican and Democratic lines. The governor's chair was now in the hands of Billy Adams, the Klan's former arch-foe in the Senate. Morley's only contribution to Colorado government was a fleeting one, a small surplus in the state treasury.³⁶

Many newly emergent movements seeking political and social change are frustrated once they are in a position to translate their program into government policy. The Colorado Klan was no exception. The Klan sought to make government more responsive by enacting a few laws and, most important, by placing its men in positions of authority. But the Klan and Clarence Morley were no match for the seasoned political operatives who knew the rules and tricks of the legislative arena. Naive, unaware of legislative procedures and nuances, Klansmen placed their opponents in strategic vantage

points which enabled them to block Governor Morley's proposals. Checkmated in the legislature, the Klan then unsuccessfully confronted stubborn bureaucrats jealous of their prerogatives. Their refusal to relinquish office or carry out the governor's wishes was sanctioned by the courts and caused a complete breakdown in the Klan's ability to govern. Trapped by their adversaries and their own blunders, Klansmen clung to power that existed in name only. Klan abuses were also kept to a minimum because of the absence of a planned strategy of intimidation and of large numbers of hooded zealots ready to use extreme measures to gain their ends. Rather than the creation of a Klan eden in Colorado with only "Americans" on guard, the Twenty-fifth General Assembly presented the order with its most serious setback. The Klan's defeat in state government drained it of credibility and contributed to a chain reaction which was to leave the eastern half of the Empire in ruins, the most populous klaverns factionalized and dispersed.

CHAPTER SIX

TWILIGHT ON THE EASTERN SLOPE

. . . there is a common ground on which you must meet and that is Americanism—when our soldiers went over seas they did not stop because there was someone in their regiment they did not like—they went and went together, then fought out their personal differences when they got home. The situation that is facing the Klan is practically the same so cut out the foolishness until we get the enemy cleared out and things at home under a Protestant government.

Rocky Mountain American, May 1, 1925

The Ku Klux Klan's descent from the pinnacle of power was even more abrupt than its rapid climb. Coinciding with the frustrations encountered in the state legislature was a series of events which shook the foundation of Eastern Slope Klan might. The decline of the Denver klavern resulted from the interaction between internal dissension and the reversal of the variables critical to Klan growth. The Klan, like all social movements built upon a heterogeneous platform and membership base, was prone to disagreements concerning strategy, priorities, and control. Dissidents expanded their influence and mounted challenges when the movement's fortunes waned. Klan setbacks appeared in many forms: a loss in program salience, governmental failure, and debasement of the leaders' images. When energy and hostility were directed inward, the Klan lost its drive and opened itself further to enervating dissension. As the key props of leadership, Klan governmental responsiveness, and issues were withdrawn, members' attitudes changed. Negative community perceptions further confirmed a Klansman's belief that the order no longer fulfilled his needs. The Denver Klan could not stanch the flow because few sanctions or traditions were available to

dissuade the disaffected. Thus a downward spiral, gradually increasing in speed, had begun. Internecine combat and outside adversity generated defections which, in turn, eliminated the store of resources needed to exercise influence. As more and more men and money followed the path outward from the Invisible Empire, the fight over the spoils became meaningless.

Internal dissension, program failures, and discredited leaders were not the only causes of decline. The Pueblo Klan found success and a subsequent inability to react to a new status equally devastating. In Colorado Springs public opinion makers, taking advantage of Klan leadership and issue weakness, rallied their city to a crusade that overwhelmed the men of the Pikes Peak klavern. These Eastern Slope defeats led national Klan officials to reassert their authority over the state organization. Their efforts, however, could not stop the decay that left Colorado's major klaverns sapped of their influence, vitality, and members.

I

John Galen Locke and Denver Klan No. 1 confidently awaited the beginning of 1925. The Klan's phenomenal growth and electoral successes in 1924 had shattered the opposition and left the Invisible Empire virtually unchallenged. Press releases emanating from the basement headquarters of the Grand Dragon on Glenarm Place were reckoned as important as those distributed by the mayor or even the governor. But the Klan's eagerness did not spring from a desire for renewed combat. Nineteen twenty-five was to be a year of consolidation, a time to bask in the organization's triumphs. In the new year, too, came evidence that the Klan was attempting to discard its image of notoriety and become a respected pillar of the community.

The Denver Klan began 1925 with a nine-day boxing and wrestling tournament given for the amusement of its members and all Denverites. A few months later the city was invited to the Cotton Mills Stadium for an evening of musical entertainment by the 200-piece Imperial Klan Band. On June 25 a large crowd of men and women jammed Lakeside Park for the first annual picnic and outing of the Denver Klan. Klan leaders became less reticent about their memberships, and their names and pictures appeared in the newspapers. Banquets honoring Klan notables were even broadcast over radio station KLZ for Denver's listening pleasure. The frenetic recruiting pace of 1924 gave way in the more relaxed atmosphere.

Only 1,550 men were admitted into the Invisible Empire in the first six months of 1925, a sharp decline from the bumper harvests of the previous year.¹

Despite its sense of self-assurance and control, the Klan remained wary of any sign of opposition. Klansmen lobbied Senators Rice Means and Lawrence Phipps for the removal of their long-time adversary Frank C. Howbert as Denver's collector of internal revenue. In April 400 hooded Klansmen, some armed with revolvers, disrupted a meeting of the United Sons of America, a newly formed anti-Klan organization. Police officers called to the scene refused to halt the Klan demonstration. Following Governor Morley's failure in the legislature, Klansmen were busy circulating petitions to place on the ballot a constitutional amendment abolishing the state civil service. If the amendment passed, Morley could expel all Catholics in state government service and appoint acceptable Protestants to their positions.²

The Klan was not as invincible as it appeared, for from beneath the surface came rumblings of dissension. Dr. Locke's dictation of the Klan's course had alienated a group of its leading members, the most prominent of whom was Mayor Ben Stapleton. The mayor's appeasement of the Klan and the subsequent defeat of recall in August, 1924, had only sharpened his discontent. Chafing under Locke's commands, Stapleton had met secretly in September with old friend and fellow Klansman Harry Saunders to devise a plan to oust the Grand Dragon. The two men agreed to launch a paper Ku Klux Klan and to ask the courts to enjoin Locke and the Georgia-based organization from operating in Colorado. After five months of legal wrangling, however, the case had been dismissed and the new order's articles of incorporation set aside. Saunders was banished from the Invisible Empire for his disloyalty. The mayor had been spared a similar fate because of his office and the Klan's needs. Stapleton and his city hall coterie had retreated, hoping for another opportunity to revolt. In November, 1924, they had recruited a powerful ally, U.S. Senator-elect Rice Means. Means, angered by Locke's lukewarm support during the campaign, hoped to convert the Klan into his personal vote-getting machine. While Locke rode the crest, the opposition commanded little influence with the rank and file. Still, Stapleton's and Means's positions gave them power bases from which to mobilize resources. The dissidents now waited for events that would heighten dissatisfaction and fire their cause.³

On January 6, 1925, six Klansmen kidnapped fellow member Keith Boehm, a nineteen-year-old East High School student. Boehm

was taken to Dr. Locke's office and under threat of castration married a woman who was several months pregnant. Locke considered the matter entirely a Klan affair: "When I learned of what had happened . . . I meant to see to it that young Boehm, as a Klansman, should do the manly thing."⁴ Philip Van Cise saw the incident differently and reversed his policy of inactive hostility. The district attorney, in one of his last official acts, filed kidnapping and conspiracy charges against Locke and his men. Locke was arrested and his case assigned to Klan foe Judge Ben B. Lindsey of the juvenile court. After Lindsey disqualified himself, Ben Laska, the Grand Dragon's attorney, engineered a series of venue changes until the case was remanded to a Klan judge who dismissed the charges on technical grounds. The kidnapping made Locke the object of public ridicule and raised questions in Klansmen's minds about their leader's judgment and respect for law and order. Two years after the kidnapping the courts annulled Boehm's forced marriage.⁵

To reassert his authority over the Denver police force and to embarrass the Klan, Mayor Stapleton launched the Good Friday vice raids on April 10, 1925. Bypassing Klan Chief of Police William Candlish, the mayor secretly deputized 125 American Legionnaires to execute the operation. The raiders were highly successful, arresting over 200 bootleggers, gamblers, and prostitutes. A series of follow-up raids in May gathered almost 100 more offenders, confirming Stapleton's commitment to his clean-up campaign. The arrests exposed a complex network of tipoffs, graft, and protection, at the center of which were the hand-picked men of the Klan vice squad. Fourteen police officers were suspended, all but two of whom were well-known Klansmen. Police hearings conducted after the raids substantiated the charges and forced the dismissal of two sergeants and ten patrolmen.⁶

The Klan, caught off guard by the mayor's action, attempted initially to belittle its importance. Later it tried to turn the anticrime operation to Klan advantage. "Have you noticed," asked the Klan's *Rocky Mountain American*, "the list of names of those arrested in the booze and vice clean-up of Denver? Looks like a page torn out of a city directory of the Holy City of Rome, with a sprinkling of Cork."⁷ But the damage to the Klan's image and prestige as a law and order organization was not so easily repaired. This was hardly the responsive government the Klan had promised discontented Protestants. Many of those who had joined the Klan in reaction against crime and vice conditions had to agree with the editor of the *Denver Express*, who wrote, "It means the complete breaking down of the pre-

tensions to purity of those who have openly boasted their control of city politics."⁸

The stain of scandal touched other members of the Denver Klan. The county's undersheriff was found guilty of falsifying his expense account and confined in the penitentiary in Canon City. Governor Morley's personal secretary was indicted for mail fraud. In the following year two of Locke's closest advisors were imprisoned for embezzlement and two Klan police officers were suspended for violating the prohibition laws. Such instances of corruption, prominently displayed in the newspapers, heightened the anger and disgust of the faithful who wore the now sullied sheets of the Invisible Empire. The Klan foundation had begun to crack. When membership ties loosened, resources needed to exert influence were withdrawn. Imperceptible at first, the downward spiral had started and picked up speed with the rising number of Klan mistakes and failures.⁹

II

The 1925 Colorado Springs municipal elections presented realm leaders with an opportunity to replenish their spent influence. Successful confrontation at the center of Colorado anti-Klan power would not only silence critics within the Klan but humble those hostile to the hooded order. Their miscalculation merely hastened the decline. In March incumbent city councilmen Ira Harris, Martin Drake, and George Birdsall opened their campaigns for re-election and were promptly challenged by three political newcomers, G. W. Bartlett, T. F. Rudy, and Frank Seeley. For four weeks the city was dragged through a listless campaign that aroused little fanfare and even fewer issues. Lethargy, however, was transformed into alarm just two days before the election. On April 5 newspapers revealed that the Colorado Springs Klan, silent for more than a year, was engaged in an all-out effort to defeat the incumbents. To swing the election to the Klan's candidates, Grand Dragon Locke ordered 100 kleagles to the Springs to assist members in getting out the vote for the "American Ticket." On several occasions Locke, Chief Candlish, and Governor Morley motored from Denver in police department automobiles to direct the effort and bolster their troops' morale. Opposition to the Klan, spearheaded by the *Colorado Springs Gazette and Telegraph*, began mobilizing to counter the now overt threat. One hundred fifty of the city's most prominent busi-

ness and professional men hastily organized the Citizens' Committee and initiated a last-minute drive in support of the anti-Klan candidates. The faculty of the Colorado Springs Labor College closed ranks with the city's elite and denounced the Klan's "spirit of bigoted intolerance."¹⁰ On election eve the *Colorado Springs Gazette* in a front-page editorial warned citizens to "Vote Your Security": "The election tomorrow has as its stake the future of Colorado Springs—whether it is to be ordered and directed and regulated by the people of this city, or . . . an alien influence. The issue is of local self government in the interest of the whole people, or the conduct of municipal business by a clique for clique purposes and gain."¹¹

Colorado Springs Klansmen arose early on election day and began the final stage of their campaign. Newspaper reporters counted at least 100 automobiles, plastered with Klan placards, ferrying voters to the polls. Klansmen were dispatched to every precinct to watch for polling irregularities and to assist sympathetic voters with their choices. Overzealousness produced several disturbances, causing the eviction of Klan workers from two polling places. A police officer and a newspaperman were assaulted in other scuffles with Klansmen. Despite these efforts, the inhabitants of Colorado Springs heeded the *Gazette's* advice, although by only a small margin. All three anti-Klan councilmen were barely re-elected, winning 52 percent of the 10,200 ballots cast. The large Klan turnout, after so long a period of hooded inactivity, stunned the city's newspapers and the Citizens' Committee. "The threat of masked government has been met," observed the *Colorado Springs Gazette*, "but not in sufficient manner. The election is a warning even as it is a victory for honest citizenship."¹² Relief and congratulations were short-lived, however, for the danger to visible government had not subsided. In May residents would elect a new school board, a prize which the Ku Klux Klan desperately wanted to win.¹³

One week after the municipal elections the members of the Citizens' Committee met to perfect and expand their organization in anticipation of the school board fight. Several hundred of the city's economic, political, and social leaders attended the meeting, elected an executive committee, and unanimously approved a declaration of principles.¹⁴ The members proclaimed:

Without cause, but only thru hysteria, friendships of long standing are being torn, business relations are being disrupted, the tolerance which is the basis of all good feeling is disappearing,

and in its place is coming a bigotry that will be fatal to the community. Citizens are threatened. A campaign of persecution has been started.

We, therefore, . . . deprecate the organization and activities of the Ku Klux Klan, and its deadening and destructive influence, and do pledge ourselves, not merely to resist it, but to exert our utmost influence to counteract the evil which inevitably it exercises upon the community.¹⁵

Although the meeting was described as a rising of common citizens, invitations were mailed to selected individuals and no public announcements appeared until after the gathering adjourned. Colorado Springs residents were later invited to subscribe to the declaration of principles, which was placed on display in all of the city's banks. An optimistic member of the anti-Klan group predicted, "When we are organized there will be no more Ku Klux Klan in the Pikes Peak region. The affairs of the city are going to be kept in the hands of our own people."¹⁶

The Citizens' Committee endorsed three respected and well-known Colorado Springs residents for the school board and waged a vigorous campaign to overcome the apathy endemic to such elections. The declaration of principles was reprinted daily in the newspapers with instructions to sign, clip, and mail to committee headquarters. Prominent committee members went door to door in search of sympathetic voters and new recruits. Eloquent speakers recharged the spirit and energy of campaign workers at weekly meetings. Organized labor again pledged its support to the anti-Klan movement. Labor leaders A. P. R. Drucker (a committee member), John Dingle, and W. J. Graham issued statements declaring Klan membership antithetical to unionism. Colorado Springs Chief of Police Hugh Harper, also a member of the committee, tore at the Klan's promise to preserve law and order. Throughout the nation, charged Harper, the Klan has caused "an almost complete failure of law enforcement and a total loss of [police] morale. . . . It is said that thieves and crooks join the Klan to secure the protection of Klan police officers."¹⁷

During the campaign C. C. Hamlin's *Colorado Springs Gazette and Telegraph* became the organ of the Citizens' Committee. Readers opened their newspapers almost daily to blistering front-page anti-Klan editorials. Hamlin's spies infiltrated the Klan and secured a list of leaders, application blanks, and klavern admission cards, all of

which were promptly published. Even more damaging was the newspaper's threat to print the names of every member of Pikes Peak Klan No. 11.¹⁸

The committee's campaign overwhelmed the hooded fraternity. On May 4 a record number of Colorado Springs residents went to the polls and gave anti-Klan candidates 56 percent of their votes in the school board election. Two defeats in less than a month crushed the spirit of the Pikes Peak Klan. Its Klexter remembers the men's frustration: "They just couldn't win the battle, so they gave up."¹⁹ Victory, on the other hand, strengthened the resolve of the anti-Klan movement. "The effort cannot cease," said the *Gazette*, "and will not, until the broad menace . . . of the Ku Klux Klan is definitely eliminated."²⁰ Ralph O. Giddings, chairman of the executive committee, was more bellicose: "Those who are not with us must be counted against us."²¹

The returns from other Eastern Slope school board elections were mixed. Klan candidates for board of education positions were defeated in Fort Collins, Fort Lupton, Rocky Ford, and four other eastern towns. At the same time eleven communities located primarily in the Greeley and Denver areas chose their board members from Klan ranks. Puebloans, casting a record school election vote, split the board between Klan and anti-Klan candidates. These victories, however, could not compensate for the damage inflicted in Colorado Springs. Grand Dragon Locke had risked his and the Klan's prestige in a headlong encounter on a hostile battlefield. As a result, the Klan's image of invincibility earned in the hard-fought contests of 1924 was shattered. The spring elections of 1925 only strengthened the arguments of the Grand Dragon's detractors.²²

III

The Denver Klan, despite the kidnapping incident and police department scandals, achieved two final victories. On May 5 Klan candidates emerged from a field of six to win places on the Denver school board. Their success was as much the product of apathy and surprise as the Klan's campaign organization. "We were sound asleep," recalls Monsignor Gregory Smith. "We just never thought of it."²³ Two weeks later Denverites went to the polls to elect a new nine-member city council. Remarkably, no organization was formed to mobilize anti-Klan voters even though the secret order's intentions were well known. Election returns gave six of the council seats to Klan-endorsed candidates. Once elected, the new councilmen

made no attempt to conceal their obligations. The Reverend Carl J. Wells took his oath of office before thousands of cheering Klansmen at the Cotton Mills Stadium. Gus Reddish of North Denver ended a council speech with a verse from the Klan poem, "God Give Us Men." Council President H. W. Risley, who was assigned Klan membership No. 12,894, was a frequent visitor at Dr. Locke's headquarters. Unfortunately for the Denver Klan, its control of the city council lasted only five months. The Colorado Supreme Court ruled that Wells had to relinquish his office to his non-Klan opponent because he had failed to satisfy the residency requirement. Another member of the Klan majority assumed an independent stance and voted consistently against his former associates.²⁴

The final act in the downfall of John Galen Locke began the day after the municipal elections. On May 20 Denver newspapers reported that federal officials were investigating the Grand Dragon's alleged failure to file income tax returns from 1913 to 1924. The government charged that Locke had reported no taxable income despite his earnings as a physician and his purported commission as Klan leader from initiation and robe fees. Locke denounced the investigation as an attempt by his enemies to discredit him. He denied receiving any income for his services to the Klan and declared that his medical practice was small, confined primarily to "the poor, working and industrial class who were and are not able to pay. . . ."²⁵ When Locke refused to cooperate voluntarily, Judge J. Foster Symes ordered him to appear before the tax examiners on June 1 with all pertinent books and records. Locke failed to comply with the court's order and was taken into custody by U.S. marshals. Judge Symes, however, vacated the contempt of court charge and released the Grand Dragon after he apologized and agreed to cooperate with the investigation. Yet, on the day of examination, Locke announced that his financial records had mysteriously vanished from his automobile while en route to the hearing. Unknown to investigators, Locke's aide Joseph Bushnell had taken the books and returned them to the Grand Dragon's secretary. Symes lost all patience and again cited Locke for contempt of court. On June 15 Locke was sentenced to ten days in the county jail and fined \$1,500. Governor Morley and other prominent Denver Klansmen pleaded in vain with Symes to reduce the fine and release their leader.²⁶

Locke's stay in jail was not unpleasant. Flowers and telegrams from all over Colorado flooded his cell. "Oodles and oodles of foodstuff were sent to him," reported the *Denver Post*, "not to mention thirty boxes of cigars and ten cans of his favorite tobacco."²⁷

Prison officials received 280 telephone inquiries about the Grand Dragon's health. More than 600 friends called personally to express their support. Dr. Locke's most solicitous attendant was Clarence Morley, whose eyes were sometimes "reddened and moist when he took his leave."²⁸ To ease his leader's burden, the governor ordered the state auditor's office to pay \$1,600 in salary owed John Locke for his National Guard service since January 20. Attorney General William Boatright, however, frustrated the governor's will, ruling that Locke was not entitled to the salary because he had been appointed to nonexistent posts. Friends' donations eventually paid the fine. Similarly, Governor Morley organized a fund to pay Locke's income taxes arbitrarily assessed for the years 1918 to 1924 at \$14,700. A six-year statute of limitations prevented the Internal Revenue Service from collecting taxes owed before 1918.²⁹

Jail buffered Locke from the dissension that was tearing his organization apart. Upon his release he moved quickly to rally his shaken followers. Locke held private conferences with leading Klansmen to convince them of his innocence. Klan newspapers were filled with articles justifying the Grand Dragon's resistance. A special meeting was called to expose the government's campaign of persecution, which supposedly included breaking into the Locke family mausoleum and "desecrating the dead" in search of tax records. Throughout the meeting Locke sat sullenly, his head in his hands, perhaps aware of the futility of his efforts. Many Klansmen, numbed by the spectacle of their leader behind bars, remained unconvinced. According to one member, Locke betrayed their trust and "took out a good part of the money."³⁰

John Galen Locke had been the Klan's architect. His charismatic and dynamic personality gave the Klan much of its unity; he was the cement which bound together the organization's heterogeneous factions. In command from the beginning, he was the visible symbol not only of Denver but of Colorado Klandom. Thus his disgrace proved to be far more than a personal injury. Public opinion generalized the scandal to the movement and forced it upon the shoulders of every knight. Members reeled even more from the shock of their leader's alleged perfidy. The leadership variable, which had been so crucial to Klan growth, now stimulated community disapproval and turned members from the cause.

The income tax investigation, perhaps instigated at the suggestion of Senator Rice Means, was the decisive incident the insurgents had long awaited. Means met with Imperial Wizard Hiram Wesley Evans in Washington, D.C., and argued the case for the removal of

John Galen Locke. The kidnapping, the police department scandals, the debacle in the state legislature, the election defeats, and now the imprisonment of their Grand Dragon had demoralized the knights and caused mass defections. The Colorado realm could be restored to health only if Locke resigned and leadership was entrusted to men untainted by corruption. Evans was receptive to these pleadings because he had for some time been suspicious of Locke's ambitions. The Colorado Grand Dragon had become too independent of national Klan headquarters. Emissaries sent by the Imperial Wizard to investigate conditions in the realm had frequently been turned back at the state border. Atlanta also questioned whether it was receiving its share of Colorado Klan funds. Locke had further angered Evans when he organized his own Women's Klan in Colorado and Wyoming in defiance of the prerogatives of the Klan's official women's auxiliary. The insurgents had approached the Imperial Wizard at a most opportune time. Having just repulsed the strong challenge of Indiana Klan king D. C. Stephenson, Evans was sensitive to any threats to his authority.³¹

On June 30, 1925, Imperial Wizard Evans asked Locke to step down as Colorado's Grand Dragon. That same night Locke read his resignation statement to several thousand Klansmen assembled at the Cotton Mills Stadium. The knights refused to accept it. Their protests lasted more than an hour and, said a *Denver Post* reporter, "assumed the proportions of thunder." When the demonstration ended, the Klansmen voted to banish Senator Rice Means, Mayor Ben Stapleton, Secretary of State Carl Milliken, and six members of the mayor's city hall faction from the Invisible Empire. This unexpected emotional uproar caught the Imperial Wizard's delegation, sent to supervise the transition, by surprise. Uncertain of the situation, they gave ground and asked Locke to continue as Grand Dragon. Evans agreed with his delegation's decision and revoked the resignation order, temporarily, to allow Klan tempers to cool. In interviews with reporters Locke denied any bitterness and professed his steadfast loyalty to Atlanta. "Like a soldier," he said, "I obey the orders of my commander and do the work assigned me. . . ."³²

Despite such public declarations of fealty, Grand Dragon Locke knew that his Klan career had come to an end. Power was now only briefly his, tenuously held at the whim of the Imperial Wizard. But Locke had grown accustomed to command and was not eager to return to a quiet medical practice. He therefore used the lull to set in motion the Minute Men of America, a new secret society that would challenge the Invisible Empire for the allegiance of its members. On

July 3 Klansmen supporting Locke filed the new organization's articles of incorporation with the Colorado secretary of state. Twelve days later Locke's secretary and two prominent Klanswomen submitted incorporation papers for the Minute Women of America.³³

Mayor Ben Stapleton ended the lull on July 15 when he declared his independence by firing Chief of Police William J. Candlish. On July 17, as a prelude to dismissal, the Imperial Wizard telegraphed Locke to freeze the assets of the Colorado Klan. The Minute Men were well prepared. They took control of the regular klavern meeting at the Cotton Mills Stadium and read Evans's wire to an estimated 6,000 Klansmen. After a brief demonstration a secession motion was put to a vote and passed unanimously. Former Klan leader and now Minute Man M. Allen Barth ordered the knights to remove their hoods and robes. Minute Men tore down a huge electric fiery cross and carried it from the auditorium. Bricks were thrown through windows painted with the letters K.K.K. Next, Denver Klan leaders pledged their allegiance to the new society and donned the uniform of the Minute Men. The doors of the stadium were then locked and the men instructed to exchange their Klan memberships for Minute Men cards. Fifty booths at the rear of the hall handled the paperwork. Locke resigned as Grand Dragon three days later and was promptly banished from the Ku Klux Klan.³⁴

The Imperial Palace in Atlanta moved quickly to contain and suppress the revolt. The charter of Denver Klan No. 1 was suspended indefinitely. Imperial Representative Harry C. Hoffman of Wichita, Kansas, was ordered to Denver to take charge of the Colorado Klan until Locke's replacement could be chosen. A special delegation was dispatched from Klan headquarters to assist Hoffman in restoring order. In addition, Evans reinstated Means, Stapleton, and the other insurgents to help rally Klan loyalists. To secure the orderly exchange of Klan records and property, the chairman of the delegation met privately with Dr. Locke in Governor Morley's office at the state capitol. Locke amicably returned the Klan's books and over \$23,000 but balked at the transfer of the klavern meeting hall. Probably aware of the impending crisis, Locke had asked Klansmen in the spring of 1925 to subscribe \$60,000 as individuals, not members, to purchase the Cotton Mills Stadium. The issue was decided in the court a year later; the building would be sold, the bondholders reimbursed, and the Klan given the right of redemption. Final settlement of the Cotton Mills claims, however, did not occur until December, 1932. In a last desperate attempt to save their organization, loyal Klansmen informed Locke that his banishment

would be revoked if he agreed to return to the invisible fold. Locke summarily rejected their offer.³⁵

Nearly 5,000 of Denver's 17,000 Klansmen followed Locke into the Minute Men of America. Less than 1,000 men reaffirmed their loyalty to the Invisible Empire. For the majority, the revolt provided an opportunity to sever all ties to 100 Percent Americanism. Many who joined the cause to save Denver from lawlessness and to restore governmental responsiveness felt betrayed. The police scandals and the illegal actions of the Grand Dragon had corrupted the organization's law and order reputation and discredited every member. Further, as the crime issue gradually waned, men questioned their obligations to a now superfluous body. Similarly, the Catholic and Jewish conspiracies to seize Protestant rights never materialized. Blacks, after their initial challenges to the racial status quo, settled back into their prescribed positions. Thus the question of Klan governmental responsiveness could act in both a positive and negative manner upon the movement's fortunes. Those who perceived Klan authorities as responsible for the decline in minority challenges could leave the order assured that the crisis had passed. On the other hand, Klan governmental failures convinced many to withdraw their allegiance. Political needs had created other difficulties. In 1924 the Klan had expanded its voting base with a recruiting campaign that netted every willing, white, Protestant, native-born male possessing ten dollars. The drive had helped win an election, but it had also transformed the social and economic character of the Denver Klan. Men entering the Invisible Empire in search of fellowship and fraternity instead found meetings to be random affairs attended by hundreds and sometimes thousands of anonymous men. Some early joiners, such as the 1923 Exalted Cyclops, who had opposed lowering the barriers left the order rather than share it with men of lesser rank. Even the economic lure was dulled as Minute Men and Klansmen launched counterboycotts and Catholics shunned the merchants of both groups. Finally, men had personal reasons for abandoning the movement. One man quit because he was tired of being herded like a steer by mounted Klansmen at the gatherings on South Table Mountain. A wife's threat of divorce prompted another to resign. The Minute Men revolt merely hastened the decline of the Ku Klux Klan. The Klan's fragile coalition could not survive the defeat of its program in city and state government, the humiliation of its leader, or the absence of a multitude of enemies. Lacking success and a reason for existence, the order could offer its members only worn platitudes about Americanism, Protestantism, and white su-

premac. Interest and commitment vanished, and with them money, votes, skills, and the various other resource tokens necessary to influence community decision-making. The arsenal depleted quickly and the declension spiral spun out of control.³⁶

IV

The Minute Men of Denver Regiment No. 1 formalized their organization in August and September, 1925. Former Exalted Cyclops Rex Yeager and former Great Titan Gano Senter rejected Klan treaties to return and were installed as Minute Men colonel and lieutenant colonel respectively. Instead of white sheets, the uniform of the revolutionary soldier was adopted complete with tricorner hat and knee breeches. Minute Men wore no masks, boasted a group leader, because, unlike Klansmen, "We are not afraid to show our faces."³⁷ Recruiters began the now familiar process of contacting prospective members, primarily concentrating their efforts upon old hooded comrades. Dr. Locke also hoped to attract Catholics and Jews to the new organization. He sent Father Matthew Smith, editor of the *Denver Catholic Register*, the Minute Men constitution before it was promulgated, in an effort to allay suspicion that his order was anti-Catholic. Ben Laska, the Grand Dragon's attorney, and a few other Denver Jews were inducted into the regiment on Locke's orders. Locke's attempt to expand his base, however, proved too radical and he was later overruled. Nor were the children forgotten. A Minute Boys organization was incorporated to care for their needs.³⁸

On September 18, 1925, at the Cotton Mills Stadium, Locke was installed as commander in chief of the Minute Men. He appeared at the ceremony dressed in a blue flowing coat with bright red facings and lining, doeskin breeches, tan boots, and a blue colonial cap with cockade. After a thirty-minute ovation heightened by the band's repeated rendition of "Hail to the Chief," he outlined the principles of the new society. "We are," proclaimed Locke, "members of a great organization that soon is to sweep the country. Our organization is founded upon patriotism and our course is dedicated to the teaching of Americanism. . . ." Like the Klan, the Minute Men promised to uphold law and order, protect white womanhood, promote charity, maintain the separation of church and state, and curtail foreign immigration. But, Locke also declared, "The right of every man to worship according to the dictates of his own conscience is guaranteed by the Constitution of the United States. The Minute Men of America of today, like their great-great-grandfathers, who laid

down their lives in 1776 . . . , will stand in the front ranks of Americans fighting for these principles. Tolerance shall be our watchword and with this as our slogan we shall march forth to a grand and splendid victory in the United States."³⁹

The dissension that shattered the men's organization also infected the Denver women's Klan. Mrs. Laurena Senter, the Imperial Commander of the Colorado women's order, attempted to steer a neutral course between the warring male factions. In August 10,000 Klanswomen from thirty Colorado klaverns paraded in the Denver suburb of Arvada to demonstrate female Protestant solidarity and to rally the divided forces of Americanism. Thousands lined the streets as the women marched, unmasked, with the "precision of a military machine." Interspaced between the marching delegations in the two-mile-long procession were colorful banners and floats reminding spectators of the dangers confronting the little red school house, the Bible, and the Constitution. Within two months of this display of unity Excellent Commander Minnie Love, who was also a lieutenant in the Minute Women, convinced a majority of Denver's 1,000 Klanswomen to shed their hoods for Betsy Ross outfits. Imperial Commander Senter suspended Love, revoked the Denver Klan's charter, and seized its assets to prevent their disappearance into Minute Women coffers. Senter reorganized the loyal remnant and later survived a Minute Women lawsuit to recover the disputed assets. But the rebellion had been costly; the strongest fortress in the women's organization had been reduced to rubble.⁴⁰

The Minute Men revolt spread westward to Salt Lake City and as far east as Madison, Wisconsin. Membership inquiries from Alabama, California, Indiana, and Kentucky were received at the Minute Men headquarters in Denver. Although such nationwide advances received extensive press coverage, recruiting success was primarily confined to northeastern Colorado. Fourteen of the state's sixty-six klaverns voted to join the Denver-led secession and surrender their charters to the Imperial Wizard. Defections were concentrated in those areas where Dr. Locke's influence had been strongest: Denver and its suburbs, the Greeley-Fort Collins region, and Colorado Springs. Southern and western klaverns, with the exception of Durango Klan No. 66, renewed their covenants. Yet victory was not always clear-cut. Littleton Klansmen, for example, voted 195 to 147 against secession. But instead of yielding to the majority decision, the minority organized Arapahoe Lodge No. 1 of the Minute Men of America. In Colorado Springs 350 Klansmen met to consider the secession question. After shouting down Klan loyalists they

unanimously approved their leader's recommendation to enlist in the new movement. Despite their apparent enthusiasm, however, only half took out membership in the Minute Men and after a brief interval quietly disbanded. Meanwhile, a faithful band of Colorado Springs Klansmen successfully petitioned for their charter's return.⁴¹

Colorado Minute Men held their first and last statewide encampment in Denver on November 30, 1925. Commander-in-Chief Locke called the 250 delegates from fifty-eight Colorado regiments to order in a hall emblazoned in red, white, and blue. After the required number of speeches predicting a glorious future, the Minute Men elected their state officers, only one of whom resided in a city outside of the state's northeastern quadrant. The delegates adjourned their convention on an optimistic note. J. F. Mayes, the newly elected Minute Men major general, announced the commencement of an extensive membership drive which would raise Colorado regiment strength from fifty-eight to 150 by January 1. The opportunity to change from their colonial uniforms to civilian clothes after the day-long meeting probably also cheered the delegates.⁴²

Even while the convention was in session, desertions were bleeding Colorado regiments of their members. The new movement could not inspire, excite, or hold its recruits with a tired, Klan-like program. Membership was, in effect, a highly emotional commitment to John Locke, a transitory state that quickly faded. Without issues or benefits, it could attract few new men. After the initial wave of enthusiasm the Denver Minute Men found themselves in sole possession of the fort.

The Denver regiment similarly failed to capture the issues or generate the excitement necessary for sustained growth. Rather than seeking a fresh approach, the Minute Men became in Locke's hands a negative force, a personal instrument of revenge. From October, 1925, to June, 1926, the Denver Minute Men concentrated all of their time and energy upon a campaign to oust Mayor Ben Stapleton from city hall. They sponsored an amendment to the Denver city charter which, if approved, would abolish the mayor's office and substitute a city manager form of government. The amendment also authorized the creation of a public utilities commission to protect residents from unfair rates and excessive taxation. Minute Men organizers circulated petitions calling for a special election and obtained twice the required number of signatures. City Attorney and loyal Klansman Henry May, however, blocked the effort dismissing the amendment as merely "recall in a different dress."⁴³ May's ruling cited five other violations of the Denver charter and convinced the

city council to reject the Minute Men's plea for an election. The Colorado Supreme Court later upheld the council's decision.⁴⁴

The amendment's defeat was not the only setback the Minute Men suffered in 1926. In January Chairman John B. Stephen of the Republican County Central Committee moved to release the party machinery from Minute Men control. He appointed a loyal Klansman and three other Minute Men opponents to the managing board of the central committee, thus giving the anti-Locke forces a majority of the votes. A month later the committee selected twenty-one new district captains, none of whom wore a tricornered hat. Stephen's men continued the rout in April, ousting one of the committee's Minute Men members and replacing him with Charles M. Anderson, the son-in-law of long-time Locke foe Frank Howbert. The final purge occurred in August, when the Colorado Supreme Court, ruling in Stephen's favor, decided that the names of only twenty-three of 120 Minute Men-supported candidates for precinct committee posts could appear on the primary ballot. Denver District Attorney Foster Cline also quickened the Minute Men's fall. An investigation of improper jury selection procedures led Cline to Commander Locke's office, where he found evidence that old Klan membership lists had been stuffed into the jury wheel.⁴⁵

The Denver regiment lost its viability by the end of 1926. Political failures and the jury-tampering investigation discredited the movement and further drained it of resources. Unable to spark Denver's imagination with either a dramatic flair or a positive plan of action, the Minute Men had failed to attract new recruits sufficient to offset staggering desertions. Even the uniform proved debilitating; three-cornered hats and knee breeches could not replace the magic of the hood and robe. Dr. Locke lacked the patience and will to revive what had become moribund. Soon after the honorary election of his friend Clarence Morley as Minute Men colonel, Locke quietly abandoned his six-year crusade.⁴⁶

John Galen Locke's return to private life was interrupted in 1928 when the Internal Revenue Service reopened its income tax investigation. Agents, assisted in their probe by the Ku Klux Klan, slapped Locke with an additional tax of \$30,500 on his alleged income as Grand Dragon. Locke appealed the assessment and in 1935 was absolved of any wrongdoing. The U.S. Board of Tax Appeals ruled that Locke earned no income from Klan sources and was even entitled to a \$3,000 refund on his 1925 assessment of \$14,000. Despite his consuming tax struggle, Locke found time in 1934 to promote another secret society. Evidently hoping to repeat his Klan suc-

cess, he convinced between 2,000 and 3,000 men to wear the black silk hood of the Order of Equals. Membership in the Equals was open to white Denverites of all religions who were concerned about the city's subversive elements. Locke's dream ended abruptly on April 1, 1935. While talking to a friend at the Brown Palace Hotel, he collapsed and died of a heart attack at the age of sixty-one. He was buried at Fairmont Cemetery on April 5, with a Catholic and a Jew among his pallbearers. The night after his interment, a band of ex-Klansmen secretly entered the cemetery and lit a cross before his crypt.⁴⁷

V

Although the Minute Men rebellion seriously scarred the Denver, Greeley, and Colorado Springs Klans, it hardly touched the remainder of the Colorado realm. Every Klan in southern Colorado and the Western Slope except one rejected Minute Men allegiance. Fifty-one klaverns including Pueblo No. 5, Canon City No. 21, and Grand Junction No. 35 reaffirmed their ties to Atlanta. In November, 1925, four months after the split, Imperial Wizard Evans judged the realm sufficiently revived to elect a Grand Dragon to replace Locke. Eight hundred Klansmen attended the klorero held in Colorado Springs and chose Baptist minister Fred G. Arnold of Canon City as their new leader. With Arnold's election, the headquarters of the Colorado Klan moved from Denver's Glenarm Place to a garage located in an alley behind the Canon Hotel in Canon City. The rise of the Exalted Cyclops of Canon City reflected the recent shift in the Klan balance of power. The Eastern Slope Klans, which had for so long dominated the state organization, were now in decline. The Klan flame flickered for a while longer in Denver, Colorado Springs, and Pueblo, but the heat was gone.⁴⁸

Slipping from one failure to another, Denver Klan No. 1 never regained its balance after the July, 1925, secession. Meetings resumed on August 15 in the Woodmen of the World Hall, following a month-long reorganization. Slightly more than a hundred Klansmen attended the gathering, their beliefs made consistent by charges that the pope had bribed Locke to revolt. In October Klansmen resurrected an earlier petition drive calling for a state referendum upon the Colorado civil service law. The campaign, however, fell short of signatures and collapsed. A simultaneous drive to recall Judges Henry Calvert, Charles Sackmann, and George Luxford for their alleged Minute Men memberships also gained little support.

The new year brought no relief. The second annual Ku Klux Klan boxing and wrestling tournament received scant notice and drew few paying spectators. In May Denver Klansmen hosted a Memorial Day klorero, with 30,000 to 40,000 people expected to attend. Unfortunately for the Denver Klan, far fewer appeared at the celebration, and a much touted parade of strength through the streets of the city attracted only 468 masked Klansmen and Klanswomen.⁴⁹

The Denver municipal elections in the spring of 1927 furnished further evidence of the Klan's decline. Mayor Ben Stapleton announced his bid for re-election and joined six other candidates seeking the office. Three of the candidates were, like Stapleton, former Klansmen, while two received the backing of the anti-Klan Constitutionalists. Klansmen divided over the men, and as a result the organization made no endorsement. But disunity was not the only reason for the Klan's failure to take an active role in the campaign. In a letter to a Denver member Grand Dragon Arnold wrote: "The Klan has not sufficient strength to put a man across—such a man as might be after their own hearts." Arnold also used the letter to berate the members for their contentiousness: "I do wish that Denver No. 1 would settle down. . . . Ever since the reorganization took shape, there have been these complaints. No doubt many of them have a real foundation and others are imaginary. . . . It is a poor comment upon the membership of Denver No. 1 for it to be unable to govern itself. They have vastly more difficulty than any other Klan in the State."⁵⁰ Despite a Stapleton victory, the election was a repudiation of men with Klan ties in their past or present lives. Voters cleared the city council of its secret society members and defeated all but one of the ex-Klansmen seeking a seat on the body.⁵¹

Infrequent press releases marked the final years of the Denver Klan. On the night of July 24, 1928, 200 Klansmen demonstrated and ignited a cross on the lawn of a woman convicted of child abuse. In March, 1932, the Klan blamed the Depression for hindering its growth but predicted future expansion. A year later Klansmen announced that they had infiltrated the Denver Communist party and were aware of the red menace's every move. In December, 1933, protests from Jewish and Catholic organizations barred the entry of two Klan floats in an NRA-Blue Eagle parade. Having influenced neither opinion nor events for years, the Denver Klan's demise shortly thereafter went unnoticed.⁵²

The Minute Men splintering came just two months after the 1925 municipal election defeats and meant the end of the Colorado Springs Klan to all but a faithful few hundred. After July, 1925,

Klansmen rarely appeared publicly in the Pikes Peak region, outside of the courtroom. In 1925 and 1926 three local Klansmen were charged with child molesting or statutory rape. A Klan leader's libel suit against the *Colorado Springs Gazette and Telegraph* was dismissed after six months of litigation. Klan No. 11's voice, the *Colorado Springs Independent*, was forced to retract libelous statements against the secret organization's foe Sheriff Samuel Berkley. Despite dire forecasts, a Klan election offensive before the 1926 fall primaries failed to materialize. In municipal elections the following spring the Klan endorsed a slate of candidates for the city council. Yet even the bitterly anti-Klan *Colorado Springs Gazette and Telegraph* was unconcerned, judging the move "more as an attempt to regain a shred of prestige than as an aggressive effort to elect a ticket. . . ." ⁵³ The only Klan-endorsed candidate elected also had the backing of the anti-Klan side. On September 21, 1928, the Pikes Peak Klan burned its last cross, at a home recently purchased by a black family in a white neighborhood. The fiery warning was ignored. ⁵⁴

Pueblo Klan No. 5, unlike its counterparts in Denver and Colorado Springs, lost only a fraction of its members to the Minute Men. In the municipal election of November, 1925, the Klan won control of the government, electing two of its men to the city commission. The Minute Men's candidate placed last in a field of four contenders. Two weeks after the election Klansmen, women, and juniors packed the city auditorium to celebrate their victory. On Christmas day Klansmen and Klanswomen distributed food baskets to hundreds of needy Pueblo families. ⁵⁵

Despite its seemingly robust appearance, the Pueblo Klan entered a period of decline in late 1925. The Klan's decay resulted not from internal dissension but from an even more devastating cause, the loss of its reason for being. The law and order issue that had drawn men and power to Klan No. 5 in 1923 and 1924 no longer had an explosive impact. The city's crime situation had been brought under control, much of the credit due to Klansmen elected to office on law and order platforms. In 1925 and 1926 frequent police raids and arrests had made liquor more difficult to secure and sparked a renewed faith in the ability of visible government to handle the city's problems. Just five murders were committed in the county during 1925 and only one remained unsolved. District Attorney J. Arthur Phelps proudly announced that his office had obtained convictions in 92 percent of the cases tried in 1925. The 1926 grand jury commended the city's campaign against lawlessness and returned no criminal indictments. Even the roadhouse question was solved. All

Pueblo county roadhouses were ordered to close in 1926 when they failed to submit to government regulation. Although a few of the resorts resumed business just across the line in Custer County, most people believed that the struggle with sin had been won. In October, 1926, Chief of Police J. Arthur Grady proclaimed the end of the city's reign of lawlessness. "Crime waves and criminal activities in Pueblo," the chief explained, "seem to come in very definite cycles. A band of criminals will set up business and will make things hot for a time until it is effectually broken up and dispersed by the police."⁵⁶ The grand jury report of 1927 confirmed Grady's statement, making few law and order recommendations and no criminal indictments.⁵⁷

The Pueblo Klan could not adapt to the changing environment. Klansmen left their organization either fulfilled by its success or bored by its inactivity. Newspaper references to Klan activities became scarce in 1926 and almost nonexistent in 1927. The last important Klan event occurred on September 6, 1927, when Imperial Wizard Hiram Wesley Evans visited Pueblo and spoke to an open meeting held in the city auditorium. Klansmen had planned to honor Evans with a parade through the streets of the city but were refused a permit. Charles B. Clark, the discourteous city commissioner who turned down the Klan's request, was immediately ejected from the Invisible Empire. Also marring Evans's appearance was the filing of two \$50,000 damage suits which named him and twenty-three Pueblo Klan leaders as defendants. The Klan, unable to make the transition from crime fighter to an ordinary fraternal lodge, disappeared from the city.⁵⁸

In just seven months the Ku Klux Klan had lost its standing in the community and ability to influence decision-making. Once initiated, the demobilization cycle had gathered momentum as it proceeded. The initial wound was opened in the state legislature where anti-Klansmen routed their inexperienced foes. Then, in rapid succession, political blunders, leadership errors, and revelations of corruption appeared to weaken a movement suffering from a loss in relevance. The bonds that unified the unstable and heterogeneous Denver Klan coalition had begun to unravel. Members withdrew their time, money, and allegiance, thus lowering the Klan's resistance to internal infection and external attack. Klan leaders who had seemed so perceptive during the order's organizing stage now were unable to prevent the exit from influence. Simultaneously, hostile community perceptions militated against an attempt to reverse

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the spiral through recruitment of former or new members. Conversely, in Pueblo the Klan registered positive values upon all variables and succumbed to its own success. Having accomplished its mission and unable to assume a new one, the klavern withered in victory. Decline in Colorado Springs was rooted in the local opinion-making public's effort to rouse the city and smother Klansmen under successive defeats. Shut out from influence and plagued by leadership and issue impotence, Klansmen left the movement in frustration.

Klansmen on the Western Slope, their isolation fortified by mountain barriers, remained immune from the dissension which decimated their eastern comrades. With the fall from grace of Locke and Denver No. 1, the Klan capital shifted to Canon City, the most powerful eastern outpost of the now truncated empire. In Canon City the Ku Klux Klan controlled events to a degree unmatched by any other Colorado klavern.

CHAPTER SEVEN

HOODED PROGRESSIVISM: Canon City's Imprint upon Colorado Klanism

The Ku Klux Klan is behind the new blood of the county. Klansmen are supporting men with new and progressive ideas of government. They are on a crusade for better government, one in which the old political ring shall be done away with and the people shall rule as a real democracy.

Klan political advertisement

Canon City Daily Record, October 31, 1924

The search for the descendents of the pre-World War I progressives has rarely, if ever, led historians into the Invisible Empire. The Klan's watchwords, anti-Catholicism, law and order, and nativism, were the arch symbols of a decade of reaction, the very antithesis of the progressive temper. If the Klan's mark is found, it is only on those reforms, such as prohibition, that turned sour during the 1920s. Despite these judgments, the dividing line between the conventional reformers and the members of the Canon City Ku Klux Klan is blurred. Like the progressives, these Klansmen armed themselves with the rhetoric of moral righteousness and stood at Armageddon to battle for the return of power to the people. They campaigned against a conservative political and economic elite under whose control government had become unresponsive and encrusted with privilege. Once in power, they moved to correct abuses, leaving intact the basic political and social structure of the town. The use of the Klan as a vehicle for change enabled the reformers to gain the support of men and women unmoved by their civic responsibilities. This heterogeneous coalition, while necessary, saturated the reform impulse with the more odious features of Klanism.

I

Canon City, located on the Arkansas River forty-five miles southwest of Colorado Springs, was one of many small towns that fell under the domination of the Ku Klux Klan. The retail and distribution center of Fremont County, Canon City funneled supplies to the region's coal miners, farmers, and ranchers. Also important to the economic welfare of the community was income gained from tourism, the state prison, and small-scale manufacturing. With 4,551 inhabitants in 1920, Canon City was the largest town in Fremont County. Adding the residents of the bordering villages of East Canon and South Canon raises the total population of the area to 6,277. Canon City lost population between 1910 and 1920, but that trend reversed in the postwar decade; by 1930, 8,004 people lived in and around the town. Canon City contained few foreign-born immigrants and even fewer blacks. In 1920 immigrants comprised 8 percent (373) and blacks 2.6 percent (117) of the town's inhabitants, and both groups had declined since 1910. The statistics for 1930 reflected continued slippage for the two minorities. There was only one Jewish family in Canon City. Florence, the site of the county's other klavern, contained 2,629 people in 1920. Just nine miles to the east of Canon City, Florence sat in the middle of Colorado's oldest and largest oil field. The majority of Fremont County's 2,771 foreign born, over a third of whom were Italians, lived in coal camps outside of Canon City and Florence. The county's Catholic population tripled between 1916 and 1926, rising from 826 to 2,580 or 14 percent of all residents.¹

In 1923 a kleagle secretly arrived in Canon City after first organizing a provisional klavern in nearby Florence. Following a brief reconnaissance, he contacted the minister of the First Baptist Church, the county sheriff, and several guards at the Colorado State Penitentiary and convinced them to enter the Invisible Empire. The kleagle delegated recruiting chores to the new Klansmen and soon left town for Walsenburg and other prospective sales territories. Isolated from outside influence and interference, they mobilized their fellow Protestant townsmen with a program tailored to the needs and conditions of the community. By the end of 1923, 500 Canon City men had responded to their call.²

The Catholic influx alone probably prepared many Canon City Protestants for the Klan's message. Its conjunction with other supposed evidence of papal intrigue made the Klan's anti-Catholic appeal irresistible. To Klansmen the rising Catholic tide was merely a

prelude to the creation of a papal state in Fremont County. In 1923 the Benedictine Society of Colorado acquired ninety acres of orchard land in East Canon to build an abbey and boy's school. Asked about the society's plans, Father Cyprian Bradley replied, "It is the aim of the order to make Canon City the center of the activities of the Benedictines in the West. We have had our eye on Canon City since 1896 and the purchase . . . is the first step in the consummation of our ambitions."³ The abbey school opened in 1925, joining Canon City's other two Catholic educational institutions, St. Michael's parochial school and Mount Saint Scholastica Academy for girls. The following year, reported the *Canon City Daily Record*, amidst "all of the rich pageantry, fine pomp and inspiring ceremony of the Roman Catholic Church," the Holy Cross Abbey held its first public service.⁴ The construction of the monastery, warned the Klan, was an ominous sign. The pope had ordered the construction of the Holy Cross Abbey of Canon City as his summer residence, a base from which to infiltrate Protestant America. Fiery Klan speakers who denounced this nefarious plot generated bomb threats, causing guards to be posted around the abbey. In the same year that the abbey's cornerstone was placed, the Knights of Columbus organized in Canon City. The pope's "shock troops" numbered fifty townsmen, half the membership of the Florence K. C. council. Throughout the Klan years recruiters never tired of exposing the Catholic menace, continually repeating stories of arms being stockpiled in the churches and gossip concerning a local priest's indiscretions. And many Canon City Protestants never tired of listening. Protestant fears were groundless and now appear ridiculous. Yet, to understand the Klan and its members, the events must be placed in their proper context. Catholic actions and population growth were real elements of the local environment. Because the "provocations" occurred in a rapid sequence, they appeared directed and thus more threatening. Klan organizers, whether sincere or not, bolstered this impression by tying the "conspiratorial" threads into a knot. When these factors interacted with a Protestant frame of reference, which had been conditioned from childhood with stories of Catholic intrigue, the events' meaning became unmistakable.⁵

Juxtaposed and at times entwined with anti-Catholicism was the other major theme of the Canon City Klan, civic reform. According to Klansman Claude Singer:

The Klan came here for a definite, positive purpose. There was an old political group that had been here for years and

years. Coming here from back East in the early days. They had a . . . death grip on politics. They owned all the real estate and the business houses and controlled the two banks. And a young man couldn't run for dog catcher unless he had permission from this group. From the county sheriff and commissioners all the way down, that gang controlled everything.

Well, our schools were no good, they didn't amount to anything. Our streets were dirt, our sidewalks wooden. When I went to school . . . they didn't even have electric lights. There were no lights in any of the public schools.

We members of the Klan decided that we wanted to make a change in that, which we did. We definitely did.⁶

The overthrow of the local establishment was not a simple task. The elite controlled political offices, jobs, loans, and information. The effort would require independent and capable leaders, secrecy to protect members from retaliation, and resources, especially in the form of votes. Reformers realized that the Klan could provide them with the necessary keys to influence. The movement enlisted those excluded from the town's political and economic decision-making process with promises to "Clean Out the Court House Gang."⁷ Elite group members singled out for sharpest attack were businessman George Rockafellow; Dr. William T. Little; Congressman Guy U. Hardy, editor and publisher of the *Canon City Daily Record*; attorneys John P. Thomas, Jr., and Edwin Stinemeyer; and bankers A. J. Turner and D. N. Cooper. The elite's crime was not corruption but conservatism. Rather than supporting new bond issues and taxes to lay sewers or pave the streets, the influential favored economic retrenchment. Instead of improving the public schools, the elite allegedly sent their children to private institutions. The ruling group, charged Klansmen, had become arrogant and unresponsive; access to power had been all but shut off. It was now time to move Canon City into the twentieth century and return it to the control of the common people. This popular issue struck a responsive chord among small businessmen, middle-class professionals, workers, and disappointed office seekers. Even a few junior members of the elite group, chafing under their elders' dictates, rallied to the Klan. Klan speakers warmed anti-Catholics to the reform cause with accusations that the elite was merely a pawn of the pope, kept in power by a solid Catholic vote. Again and again Klan leaders reminded members that "millionaires and those who don't eat meat on Friday" had joined forces to frustrate the Protestant will.⁸

The law and order appeal, so effective in Denver and Pueblo,

received little attention in Fremont County. Klansmen and non-Klansmen alike praised Sheriff Clifford Glasson, a member of the hooded order, for his vigorous law enforcement efforts especially in regard to bootlegging. "The number of major crimes," reported the *Canon City Daily Record*, "are few and far between. One seldom hears of any scandal or of big gambling parties."⁹ Occasionally during the 1920s a wave of burglaries engulfed the community. At those infrequent times the Klan beat the law and order drum in search of men. White supremacy also needed few defenders. "We went to school with them," said the Nighthawk of the Canon City Klan, "and color didn't mean a thing to us, any of us."¹⁰ The small black colony evidently accepted the traditional patterns of race relations and did nothing to arouse white suspicions. Similarly, the Klan had no argument with the town's four Jews. Klansmen even returned, as a gesture of peace, \$100 in protection money donated by the wary Jews. Despite coal strikes in 1921, 1922, and 1927, which primarily involved foreign-born miners, the Klan never resorted to the language of the Red Scare. Nor was the local organization a product of rural antipathy and jealousy of the urban lifestyle. The Klan's attention was rarely occupied with happenings in New York and Chicago. Protestants had no reason to look beyond the town limits for a reason to enlist. The Catholics appeared to be mobilizing for power. The elite frustrated reform. The Klan was grounded in governmental unresponsiveness and not status anxiety or a sense of personal rootlessness.¹¹

Three men guided the Canon City Klan through its formative stage and most of its history. The Reverend Fred G. Arnold, one of the original converts, served as provisional Klan leader until his election as Exalted Cyclops in January, 1924. Born in Stella, Nebraska, on March 25, 1886, Arnold had entered the ministry in 1912 after a brief and unsatisfying career as a pharmacist. He had come to Canon City in 1920 to assume the pastorate of the First Baptist Church. Young and handsome, Arnold impressed townsmen with his "radical Baptist" beliefs and "ardent prohibitionism." He apparently impressed his fellow clergymen as well, for in 1924 he was selected president of the Colorado Baptist Ministerial Conference. In addition to his regular church work, Arnold attended to the spiritual needs of the inmates of the penitentiary. While prison chaplain, he secretly worked in conjunction with Governor William Sweet to effect penal reform. Arnold's position, eloquence, organizing ability, and awareness of community needs overshadowed his brief residence in Canon City and made him the popular and logical choice as klavern leader.

Less is known about Clifford Glasson, the second member of the Klan triumvirate. Glasson had been born in Central City, Colorado, in 1876 and had moved to Fremont County as a child. A former Florence saloon keeper, he had been elected county sheriff in 1922 as "a rabid Prohibitionist." Glasson was fraternally well connected and found the Klan many recruits through his Masonic and Knight Templar connections. The Klan also benefited from his spotless law and order reputation.

Attorney T. Lee Witcher, the scion of a prominent Fremont County family, completed the Klan troika. The son of a Confederate soldier, Witcher had been born near Cotopaxi, Colorado, in 1883. He had been elected county attorney in 1917 and exercised considerable power in the local Democratic organization. As a junior member of the elite, Witcher's embrace of the Ku Klux Klan lent it a measure of prestige and respectability. It cannot be overemphasized that much of the Klan's mobilization success was based upon ties to existing and established groups. Arnold worked the religious organizations, Glasson the lodges, and Witcher the political circles for members. Despite their considerable influence, the three men did not attempt to dictate Klan policy. The Klan's course, although guided, was subject to internal debate, with all members participating in decision-making.¹²

The Canon City Klan, like the Denver organization, captured the issues and with them the members necessary for success. During the vulnerable period of secret recruiting, local leaders effectively manipulated the Klan's appeal to make its solutions to community problems and tensions convincing. Neither the opinion-making public nor an opposition group arose to challenge its answers or pressure the Klan into enervating defensive counterpunching. The elite made no effort to co-opt Klan officers or issues, and many respected citizens joined. Moreover, Klan recruiting proceeded without hindrance from government authorities. The failure to organize an anti-Klan movement is surprising in that Congressman Guy Hardy, the owner of the *Canon City Daily Record*, was aware of the Klan's presence. On his orders a newspaper spy had joined the Klan and relayed information about its activities. But, rather than exposés, the *Daily Record* was content to print a few scattered anti-Klan editorials and merely to report Klan happenings in Colorado and around the nation. Perhaps the elite was too contemptuous, too sure of its control.¹³

II

The Ku Klux Klan emerged from the shadows on January 26, 1924. Klansmen erected seven wooden crosses, each twenty feet tall, and simultaneously set them ablaze. As the crosses burned, 500 Klansmen gathered at the natatorium to receive the charter of Canon City Klan No. 21 from Grand Dragon John Locke. Following the ceremony, a large class of new recruits was initiated into the local branch of the Invisible Empire. Five days after the Klan rite members distributed the klavern's official organ, the *Rocky Mountain Klansman*, on the streets of the town. The newspaper explained the meaning of the Klan's initial appearance and also outlined the order's intentions. Canon City Klansmen would not tolerate defamation of the Bible, the public schools, pure womanhood, or the Constitution. Lawbreakers were warned of a Klan offensive to make Canon City and Fremont County crime-free. The *Klansman* did not overlook the most formidable enemy: "Rooted on American soil are religious zealots who by virtue of their might in realms of industry and finance are reputed power of yea and nay between nations. . . . Together with and as a tool of this dangerous power goes the public press—owned outright or under dictation—to justify their processes before a bewildered people. . . . The shadow of the same deathhand is seen on the pages of books in public schools [and] curriculums of colleges. . . ." The newspaper concluded, "These are the briefest possible hints of the size of the job ahead. The movement is birthed none too soon."¹⁴ The editor set no regular publication date, tying the appearance of the newspaper to significant events.¹⁵

In January and February the Klan began to redeem its pledges of civic improvement. To relieve overcrowding in the schools, Klansmen joined fellow townspeople in circulating petitions calling for a school bond election. Their efforts were rewarded in March when the town, by a five to one margin, approved a bond issue allocating funds to build a modern high school and grade school. Immediately after the election the Klan appeared publicly to claim sole credit for the victory. On March 14 over 250 hooded and robed Klansmen "resembling a company of ghosts" silently marched through the streets of Canon City to the high school. There they formed a large circle around the athletic field and stood at attention, the night illuminated by a large burning cross. Regardless of the Klan's contribution to the bond's passage, the demonstration successfully imprinted a favorable image of the order upon the minds of mothers and fa-

thers concerned about their children's future. "Perhaps," remarked a newspaper reporter, "a more weird, fascinating and uncanny scene has never been staged in Canon City."¹⁶

Florence Klan No. 7 experienced comparable recruiting success for similar reasons. On July 8 Fremont County's other klavern demonstrated its strength. After dark, several hundred Klansmen, marching four abreast, emerged from their meeting hall and silently paraded through the town. The column extended for more than seven blocks and included a drum corps, American flags, and electric crosses. When the parade concluded, two crosses were fired in the town square while friendly spectators cheered. Town officials did not interfere and the crosses burned themselves out. Such visible manifestations of invisible power produced no anti-Klan broadsides or public meetings. Similarly, county newspapers seemed unconcerned, reporting Klan activities without comment. In private, however, some non-Klansmen considered the possibility of hooded meddling in the upcoming primary and general elections. State Senator George Colgate, for example, cautioned gubernatorial candidate Robert Rockwell, "We have a very uncertain element in the K.K.K.s. They are estimated to be 1200 strong—They are militant-organized[,] ready and anxious for a fight. . . . Many of our best people belong to them[;] both Democrats and Republicans are found in their ranks."¹⁷ Colgate's fears were well founded; Klansmen were busy formulating plans to seize control of both county parties.¹⁸

Fremont County Republicans attended caucus meetings on July 29, 1924, to select precinct committeemen and women and delegates to the county assembly. Klansmen packed the poorly attended gatherings and elected their candidates to every precinct post in the Canon City–Florence area. The town precincts also gave the Klan sixty-nine assembly delegates, two-thirds of the county total. The organization's success was so complete that the *Daily Record* remarked, "If a single delegate from the Canon City district to the Republican county assembly was not a Klansman, he or she got in by mistake."¹⁹ The turnover of personnel in the party hierarchy similarly awed observers. Unknown men, never before active in county politics, controlled the Republican party; the formerly prominent were defeated for every precinct and delegation slot. Klan delegates regrouped the following evening at Smith Hall, headquarters of the Canon City klavern, to prepare the agenda of the county assembly. With committee assignments and nominations for county office decided beforehand, the August 1 convention proceeded according to the

Klan schedule. Klansmen designated all of their candidates for county office while allowing a few nonmembers to appear on the primary ballot. Again, reporters noted the changed complexion of the party: "Gentlemen of Canon City, who have been Republican supporters and leaders for many years were noticeable by their absence."²⁰ As the Republicans succumbed to hooded envelopment, Klansmen maneuvered to capture the Democratic party. Large numbers of Democratic Klansmen overwhelmed party regulars in the Florence and Canon City precinct elections and named three-quarters of the delegates to the county convention. Led by T. Lee Witcher, the chairman of the convention, Klan delegates placed every one of their candidates on the primary ballot. Klan Democrats, like their Republican allies, attempted to appease non-Klan party members and prevent them from bolting by selecting several of their candidates for the ticket.²¹

The Klans of Fremont County had scored an impressive victory in their first political foray. The name of at least one Klansman appeared on the primary ballot for every county office. For some positions all nominees were members of the Invisible Empire. To ease the Klan further into power, one party or the other refused in a few cases even to designate a candidate to oppose a hooded favorite. In those instances where Republican or Democratic Klansmen contested the same office, the primary election served as the order's selection process. Klansmen would back the candidate who emerged with the greatest number of votes and discard the weaker contender.

An anti-Klan opposition finally surfaced thirteen days before the primary election. On August 30 displaced Fremont County Republicans and Democrats organized the Independent party to combat "the bipartisan dictatorship of a few Klan leaders."²² A convention five days later endorsed a full slate of candidates for county office and declared in its party platform for law and order, government economy, and against the Ku Klux Klan. Too late to contest the primary election effectively, the anti-Klan group announced that its major effort would come in November. Yet the party hoped that its candidates already on the ballot would build a strong voter base from which to launch their fall campaigns. A write-in vote drive for those not on the ballot was also planned for the same reason. The fortunes of the new party were greatly enhanced when the *Daily Record* declared its support. "Seldom in the history of Fremont County," commented the newspaper, "has a political gathering taken place that comprehended more completely the rank and file of its citizenship, in fact, . . . it was the most representative con-

vention that ever met here. . . .”²³ On the same day that the Independent party was formed, Congressman Guy Hardy, opposed by the Klan for re-election, condemned the Invisible Empire in a front-page editorial as an organization of men “who are comparatively new in the community—who haven’t much interest in the community except a desire to direct its affairs.”²⁴

Both camps claimed victory in the September 12 primary. Klansmen placed all of their candidates on the November ballot and also carried the county for their gubernatorial and senatorial candidates, Clarence Morley and Rice Means. Although the Independent party’s write-in vote failed to materialize, its designees listed on the ballot had compiled sizable vote totals. The only losers were those candidates who had attempted to take a middle ground between the two sides.²⁵

The election campaign resumed in earnest in mid-October. Klansmen staged parades, canvassed door to door, and opened their meetings to the public in a vigorous effort to solicit votes. To bolster the drive, the Canon City klavern imported national Klan lecturer “Colonel” McKeever, who combined politics with his standard recruiting pitch. At a meeting in the city armory McKeever told an overflow crowd, “The Klan stands for law enforcement; money and politics must cease to play a part in our courts. The Klan stands for the American home; there is no sanctuary like a mother’s heart, no altar like a mother’s knee. The Klan stands for good men in office. . . .” God, he later said, “has set aside this giant oak for a purpose. He will use it as a maul some November morning and crush rotten politics to earth.”²⁶ The Independent party relied primarily upon the newspapers to convey its message to the people. Its political advertisements rapped the Klan as an alien presence and warned voters that hooded control meant “despotism equal to the darkest days of Soviet Russia.”²⁷ The Klan counter charged that the Independents were part of the papal conspiracy to destroy Protestantism. More important was the Klan’s attack on Fremont County’s courthouse gang, “a more perfect ring [than] in old Chicago’s State street [sic] or in Tammany.”²⁸ Typical was the Klan advertisement which asked: “Do you know that you have been at the mercy of a political ring for nearly a quarter of a century? Do you know that the leaders of the Independent party and the candidates of that party have been that ring? They have had their hands on the public money all that period, have had court procedures in their hands and have managed the affairs of county and city alike. Politically, they have owned Fremont County, body and soul.”²⁹ In the last week of

the campaign the Klan invited the still undecided to a Morley-Means rally at the armory and to the Baptist Church for Sunday sermons entitled, "Why the Klan Came to America and Fremont County" and "The Principles, Practices and Programs of the Ku Klux Klan."³⁰

Superior organization and energetic campaigning combined with Independent party complacency to produce a stunning election victory for the Klan. Klan candidates won every race but two, losing the county treasurer's office by four votes and the county judgeship by twenty-one votes. Klansmen also delivered their county by wide margins to the order's state candidates, Clarence Morley and Rice Means. Alva Adams, the Democratic contender for the long-term U.S. Senate seat, won Fremont County only because Lawrence Phipps had alienated Klansmen on the prohibition issue. The Klan's opposition to Guy Hardy's alleged pro-Catholic tendencies stripped the congressman of his home base, but strong support in the surrounding counties ensured his re-election.³¹

Less than two years after its arrival the Ku Klux Klan had found the issues and leadership necessary to arouse the community against an unresponsive clique. Opponents, although in a commanding resource position, misjudged the Klan's appeal and waited until too late to mobilize. With the elite unwilling to even confront citizens' complaints, the Klan was able to pose as the champion of civic reform. The secret society promised to work for the welfare of the common people and campaigned for improved schools, paved streets, and new parks. Industry would be encouraged to locate in the county. Such causes were undramatic, but they reflected the needs of the local environment. The Klan spoke simultaneously to its other major constituency, vowing to protect residents from an insidious effort "to make our political life subservient to the Catholic hierarchy."³² Now, as the dominant force in Fremont County politics and government, the men of the Invisible Empire made ready to carry out their popular mandate.³³

III

The triumph in November did not diminish the intensity of the Klan offensive. Fremont Klans announced the formation of a Minute Men unit (no relation to Locke's Minute Men of America) that would safeguard citizens during floods, fires, crime waves, and other emergencies. According to the *Canon City Directory*, three

short blasts of the fire whistle repeated three times summoned the unit to duty. Members motored to nearby Penrose and donated seventy-five dollars to Klan minister C. H. Leonard of the Presbyterian Church. On Christmas eve Klansmen lit up Canon City's Main Street with fiery crosses erected at every intersection. A hooded delegation also visited the black congregation of the Mount Olive Baptist Church and gave its pastor twenty-five dollars. In January, 1925, Klansmen took another swipe at the town elite. They elected the board of directors of the Young Men's Christian Association, deposing long-time members Dr. William T. Little, Congressman Hardy, and prominent businessman J. R. Quinn. The Klan later raised \$1,100 for the organization, more than a tenfold increase over its 1924 contribution. January was an important month for Klansmen's mothers, wives, and sisters. Over 400 women attended chartering ceremonies making Royal Gorge Klan No. 6 an official part of the Invisible Empire. Crosses were ignited, of course, to mark the occasion.³⁴

With county offices in proper hands, the Klan's next political targets were the municipal governments of Canon City and Florence. In March Canon City Klansmen designated a "Progressive" slate headed by T. Lee Witcher to contest the city's mayoral and eight aldermanic races. The Progressives adopted a platform advocating law and order, government efficiency, improved parks and streets, and boosterism to draw tourists and new residents. The Klan's opponents ran banker T. B. Coulter, Dr. Little, J. R. Quinn, and several leading businessmen on a Reform ticket that emphasized economy and prohibition enforcement. The Reform party also denounced the Klan, warning that the election of men "under the control of any secret organization makes for an irresponsible and dangerous form of government."³⁵ Despite the explosive potential of the confrontation, the Klan issue remained in the background. Except for one Progressive rally, both sides waged their campaigns in the newspapers. This strategy backfired for the anti-Klan reformers; on April 7 the Progressives captured every municipal office. The Canon City council later completed the Klan takeover when it appointed only members in good standing to government jobs. In Florence and South Canon Klansmen were elected without opposition. The victory celebration two weeks later attracted Klansmen from Denver, Pueblo, and Colorado Springs; among the honored guests were Grand Dragon Locke, Governor Morley, and Senator Means. Sixteen hundred Klanspersons paraded through the streets

of Canon City to the high school in a procession which included bands, floats, and a mounted troop of cavalry. At the high school crosses were fired and the crowd entertained with songs, speeches, and military drills. When the program concluded, Klansmen adjourned to the armory and Klanswomen to Smith Hall to hear political speeches and a talk about convent horrors by "Sister" Mary Angel. In May Klansmen won two uncontested seats on the Canon City school board.³⁶

The Ku Klux Klan's power was felt in areas other than politics. To break the elite's economic grip on the town, Klansmen incorporated the Colorado State Bank with a capital stock of \$25,000. Klansmen also made plans to open a canning factory to produce additional income for their order. T. Lee Witcher and the Reverend Fred Arnold were among the organizers of the American Publishing Company, which printed the *Daily American* to compete with the *Daily Record*. The *American* not only gave its readers regular news copy but kept them current on Klan topics. Thus, merely by flipping the pages of his newspaper, a Klansman could find Babe Ruth's current batting average and afterward discover that John Wilkes Booth, Charles Guiteau, and Leon Czolgosz were Catholics. The *Daily American*, with 700 to 800 subscribers, cut deeply into the *Daily Record's* circulating and advertising revenues. Monetary gain, however, was a secondary consideration. The *American* enabled the Klan to lay claim to an opinion-making public role. Through the newspaper Klansmen could present their version of events and shape local perceptions. Successful competition, moreover, would eliminate a powerful Klan rival and leave the secret society nearly the sole arbiter of its image.³⁷

As the Klan grew in numbers and influence, its regressive side became even more prominent. Klansmen launched highly disciplined boycotts against Catholic businessmen in an attempt to drive them from town. Protestant nonmembers were ordered to dismiss Catholic employees and join the Klan or suffer similar treatment. Paper fiery crosses were repeatedly pasted on the windows of proscribed stores to remind Klansmen of their duty. Frightened Catholic parents warned their children not to enter the stores plastered with the letters KIGY, meaning "Klansmen I Greet You." Klan school teachers, protected by a sympathetic board of education, praised their order's coming while denouncing Catholics for their alleged dual loyalties. James Sterling, a small boy during the Klan days, recalls, "Being a Catholic, you were in a group all by your-

self.”³⁸ Klan anti-Catholicism “was a disgrace,” added the klavern’s Nighthawk, “and it took us years and years to get over it.”³⁹ Fallout from Catholic baiting descended upon the town’s Episcopalians. They evoked Klan suspicion because, like the Catholics, their ministers wore clerical collars and their services required sacramental wine. The Episcopal complexion of the elite also generated bitterness. It was probably fortunate that Klan leaders ordered members to leave their hoods and robes in the klavern meeting hall. They thus eliminated the possibility of free-lance violence.⁴⁰

The opposition to the Klan finally awakened to the seriousness of the situation after the spring municipal elections. Anti-Klansmen and women had belittled their opponent’s appeal, confidently relying upon the people’s “common sense” and “better judgment” to gain victory. Now, with the Klan ensconced in power, they shed their naivete and began to build a grass-roots organization to oust the Invisible Empire from the county. The effort began on May 20, 1925, when all but three of the 150 members of the Canon City Elks Lodge approved a resolution condemning Klan bigotry. This condemnation firmed anti-Klan sentiment and provided a membership base for the creation of the Constitutional Liberty League of Fremont County. The league censured the hooded fraternity in its declaration of principles as “un-Christian, un-social and un-American, and destructive of our constitutional form of government.” It pledged to use “all fair, honorable, legitimate and legal means . . . to counteract, resist and destroy the evil activities and consequences of the Ku Klux Klan in this community and elsewhere. . . .”⁴¹ In June the league’s president, attorney J. W. Foster, reported that 1,250 men held memberships in the new organization. The women’s auxiliary counted another 350 recruits for the cause. Membership claims were validated on July 1 when 1,000 Constitutionals gathered at the armory to hear Denver’s Congressman William Vaile deliver an anti-Klan speech.⁴²

The league met weekly and invited leading Coloradans, such as Charles Moynihan and Philip Hornbein, to discuss the Klan question. In the winter the Constitutionals published a weekly column in the *Daily Record* that exposed Klan secrets and contradictions. The *Daily Record* enthusiastically endorsed the new movement: “It stands for the rights and privileges guaranteed to all citizens of the Republic . . . whether white or black, Protestant or Catholic, Jew or Gentile. Its patriotism is the patriotism of Washington and Jefferson, of Lincoln and Grant, of Roosevelt and Wilson. . . .”⁴³ In ad-

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dition to fighting the Klan, the league was a social organization. Anti-Klansmen, like their hooded adversaries, enjoyed the weekly get-togethers which featured vaudeville acts, dances, dramatic readings, and songs. Elite group members also joined and, in the early stages, played supporting roles.⁴⁴

With their attention distracted by the Minute Men revolt in Denver, Canon City Klansmen at first ignored the opposition. The virus of dissension, however, never infected Fremont County, and its 1,800 Klansmen voted unanimously to remain loyal to the Invisible Empire. During the summer months of 1925 the secret organization inaugurated a fresh recruiting drive, the highlight of which was a public initiation of twenty-six enlistees. The warm weather also proved conducive to a series of outings, picnics, and barbecues attended by the entire Klan family. In December Klanspeople packed the Canon City armory to honor Colorado's new Grand Dragon, Fred Arnold. Following musical numbers by a male quartet, a "humorous" one-act play, and a speech by Exalted Cyclops Witcher, loyal subjects presented Arnold with a gold watch and chain as befitting his high office. The Grand Dragon named Canon City the capital of the Colorado realm and established his headquarters in a garage behind the Canon Hotel.⁴⁵

IV

The Fremont County Invisible Empire drew its members from Canon City, Florence, and the immediate surrounding towns. The Klan was unwelcome in the outlying coal camps where the majority of immigrants from southern and eastern Europe had settled. The official membership records of the Fremont County Klans have disappeared since the 1920s, and the identities of most of the 1,800 joiners have been lost. Although the bulk of the rank and file remains anonymous, newspaper reports and Klan election petitions circulated in 1924, 1926, and 1928 contain the names of 329 (18 percent of the klaverns' total) of the more "visible" members. These Klansmen were either candid about their secret affiliations or just happened to be present at a klavern meeting when election petitions were distributed. "Visible" participation in the hooded order does not imply that the group was skewed socially or economically. Because of the nature of the sources, the recovered Klansmen are probably fairly representative of Fremont County's wider invisible population. From the list of 329 names, 200 were drawn at random

and biographical information collected for each man. The men were not analyzed according to the different time intervals because their memberships were stable, with most appearing on more than one list.⁴⁶

Age, birth, and military service data, compiled for just over 50 percent of the sample, yield a profile that both resembles and differs from the comparable Denver rank and file. Fremont County Klansmen were older than their Denver counterparts, having entered their order at a mean age of 47.5 years as opposed to 39.8 years for the early joiners and 37.8 years for the late joiners. Forty-two percent of the sample members were fifty years of age or older, while 24.5 percent were between the ages of thirty and thirty-nine years and 24.5 percent between forty and forty-nine years. The young were again absent, with only 9 percent of the men between twenty and twenty-nine. Like the Denverites, the majority (57 percent) of the Canon City and Florence organizations' members were born in the east north-central and west north-central states. Colorado-born members constituted 16 percent of the known group, slightly below the Denver percentages. Klansmen in the Fremont County sample, as might be expected, were predominantly rural in background, with 83 percent born in communities of 2,500 or fewer people and just 1 percent in cities of 100,000 or more. Military service attracted few Colorado Klansmen, and Fremont knights were no exception. There were no known Spanish-American War veterans in the Klan, and just sixteen men had served during World War I. The "visible" Klansmen had lived in their communities an average of twelve years before joining. Congruent with the Denver Klan pattern, large blocks of men appeared at both extremes of the years of residence continuum (Table 6). Eighty-six percent of the men were married.⁴⁷

"Leaders of the Klan," charged Congressman Guy Hardy, "undertook to set up a standard . . . to be eligible for membership in and offices of all local lodges, organizations and even the University Club."⁴⁸ Hardy's allegation is difficult to confirm or deny because fraternal information is fragmentary. Fraternal data could be obtained for only 37 percent of the sample, of which 55 percent were members of at least one lodge other than the Klan; 31 percent, two; and 9 percent, three. The most popular order was, as elsewhere, the Masons, attracting 25 percent of the fraternally inclined. Klansmen or Klanswomen held at least one leadership position in each of the following: the Odd Fellows, Knights of Pythias, Order of the Eastern Star, Modern Woodmen of America, and Lions' Club. The Elks,

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Table 6. Length of Residence of Fremont County Klansmen, 1924-28 (Prior to Joining).

Years	N	Percent
1-3	50	25.0
4-6	20	10.0
7-9	31	15.5
10-13	3	1.5
14-17	25	12.5
18 and over	39	19.5
Unknown	32	16.0
Total	200	

SOURCE: *Canon City Directory*.

as was noted earlier, were decidedly anti-Klan. The Barbers' Union, the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers and Firemen, the Canon City Typographical Union, and the Carpenters' Union also listed Klansmen among their leaders. In the religious sphere Klan ministers guided the Baptist Church and Church of Christ in Canon City and the Penrose Methodist Church. In addition, a sizable delegation of Presbyterians appeared in Klan ranks. The Fremont County data complement the Denver results. Klansmen had stakes, often ones of leadership, in the network of community groups. Outside allegiances enabled Klansmen to quickly penetrate lodge, union, and church pools for potential applicants. The Klan appeared in a more favorable light when recommended by a lodge brother or a fellow member of a Bible study class. Such mobilizing possibilities were greatly enhanced when an officer of an organization engaged in recruiting, for he commanded influence and easy access to members. Depending upon his authority, the suggestion may have been quite difficult to ignore.⁴⁹

Small businessmen and farmers, comprising 75 percent of the middle nonmanual group, dominated the occupational structure of the Fremont County Klans (Table 7). When combined with members holding other nonmanual occupations, they dwarf the 18 percent laboring in blue-collar jobs. The results for this sample of "visible" Klansmen closely approximates, in all but the low nonmanual category, the occupational breakdown of Denver's early joiners. Occupational census data were unavailable for Fremont County, thus

making a comparison to the general population impossible. Pre-Klan occupational mobility histories are known for 39 percent of the men and indicate that 56 percent were nonmobile, 26 percent upwardly mobile, and 16 percent downwardly mobile. Occupational patterns after joining were determined for 68 percent of the Klansmen, with the nonmobile group increasing to 67 percent, the downwardly mobile declining to 7 percent, and the upwardly mobile remaining constant.⁵⁰

The "visible" Klansmen of Fremont County, like their counterparts in Denver, were conventional men whose interests and activities focused upon proximate concerns. The sample members were middle aged or older, married, and to some degree well connected fraternally. A large number were self-employed members of the middle class. Many had resided in their communities a decade or longer, enough time to cultivate a bitter resentment of the ruling elite. Long-time residents objected as well to the abrupt appearance of the papal menace in their formerly peaceful and secure towns. Another sizable group entered Fremont County just prior to the Klan's arrival. Perhaps, while attempting to start a business, some had been frustrated in a confrontation with the economically entrenched. Or, to survive in their new environment, they took out a secret membership. Other recent migrants may have used the Klan to penetrate the outer wall of small-town society.

Table 7. Occupational Distribution of Fremont County Klansmen, 1924-28.

Occupational Status Group	N	Percent
High nonmanual	22	11.0
Middle nonmanual	79	39.5
Low nonmanual	14	7.0
Skilled	17	8.5
Semiskilled and service	16	8.0
Unskilled	3	1.5
Retired	3	1.5
Unknown	46	23.0
Total	200	

SOURCE: *Canon City Directory*.

V

Fraternal affairs consumed much Klan and Liberty League energy in the first few months of 1926. In addition to the standard inspirational speeches, the two organizations entertained their members with song fests, dances, and fellowship smokers. Such activities not only enhanced movement unity and identification but also were a means of resource gathering. Nonmembers were often invited to these social events in hopes of eliciting a commitment to join. Klan naturalization ceremonies, always popular with the hooded throng, were staged frequently throughout the year, although the classes of initiates grew smaller. While the league's initiation rites were less spectacular, membership climbed to 2,100 Canon City men and women. In June a league branch was organized in Florence. As its strength increased, the Constitutionals became bolder. An unofficial boycott was begun to counteract Klan economic discrimination. The league's newspaper column escalated the confrontation weekly, aggressively assailing the hooded order with satire and logic. Flaming circles, the symbol of the anti-Klan movement, competed with fiery crosses in the night air around Canon City. The lull gradually came to an end as the summer county conventions and fall primaries approached. League members devoted less time to fraternity and became increasingly absorbed in political planning and organization. President J. W. Foster instructed his troops: "Only by concentration of voting power can the Constitutionals cast off the prejudicial oppressions foisted upon the state generally and on Fremont County particularly by the secret religious and political organization. Anti-Klansmen must count noses and vote together if they are to prevent another strategic victory of a minority."⁵¹ Sensing a close contest, Klansmen intensified their efforts to get out the vote.⁵²

The political year began in April when Oliver H. Shoup entered the race for the Republican gubernatorial nomination. Shoup, a popular ex-governor and one of the founders of the statewide anti-Klan Constitutionals, based his campaign solely upon the secret society issue. In a press statement he declared, ". . . I will oppose to my fullest ability any effort of the Ku Klux Klan or the Minute Men of America in the election of any member . . . to any office, state or national."⁵³ With Morley discredited and not seeking a second term, Grand Dragon Arnold endorsed federal prohibition administrator John F. Vivian for governor. Vivian realized that the Klan's nod was not as much an asset as a liability and publicly downplayed its significance. Secretary of State Carl Milliken, a former

Denver Klansman, also contested the nomination, seeking as the compromise candidate to draw votes from secret society members and nonmembers. Senator Rice Means announced his bid for reelection and received enthusiastic Klan backing. His opponent, as in 1924, was attorney Charles Waterman. Waterman, like Shoup, garnered the support of the Constitutionlists for his stand against the Klan. The Colorado Democratic party was securely in the hands of secret society opponents. Both William Sweet and attorney Paul Prosser vied for their party's senatorial nomination on strong anti-Klan platforms. The Klan's legislative nemesis, State Senator Billy Adams, declared his candidacy for the governorship and faced only minimal opposition.⁵⁴

The fight for delegates to the Republican state convention was waged in late July and early August in Colorado's sixty-three county assemblies. The selection process registered the effects of Klan demobilization and the subsequent changes in the dispositions of hooded power since 1924. The Klan's candidates, Vivian and Means, won 24 percent of the Western Slope delegates, up sharply from less than 6 percent in the previous election year. The eastern agricultural counties were less receptive to the Klan in 1926, giving 24 percent of their delegates to Means and Vivian, down from 33 percent. Means's Pueblo and southern Colorado showing was much stronger than in 1924 and he collected 39 percent of the region's delegate votes. The Klan was weakest in the Denver and Greeley areas, where two years before Morley had found four of his every ten delegates and Means one of every two. In 1926 the Minute Men and the Constitutionlists cut into the Klan vote, allowing Vivian 11 percent and Means 16 percent shares of the delegate total. With Milliken picking up only 10 percent of the votes, Shoup's and Waterman's front-running positions were impregnable.⁵⁵

The county conventions also dealt the Klan several setbacks in their nominations for local legislative, executive, and judicial offices. In Denver Klan and Minute Men delegates were outnumbered ten to one as a result of John Stephen's and Frank Howbert's tinkering with the party machinery. Klansmen not only failed to prevent Shoup from winning the entire delegation but were unable to place their favorite candidates on the primary ballot. Men who had ridden the Klan wave in 1924 and received enough votes to be designated in 1926 had renounced their secret affiliations and returned to the party as penitents. The Denver Democrats convened a few days after the Republicans adjourned and renewed their anti-Klan stand with a sharp condemnation of secret societies. The El Paso County

Republican convention was anti-Klan in tone, membership, and action. Guided by State Senator L. A. Puffer, the assembly pledged all of its delegates to Shoup and Waterman and adopted a resolution denouncing Klan political intrigue. Just one Pikes Peak Klansman obtained a sufficient number of votes to be nominated for office. The secret society issue was not openly discussed in either the Pueblo Republican or Democratic conventions. Klansmen as well as non-Klansmen won places on both party tickets. In Grand Junction Republicans and Democrats unanimously passed anti-Klan resolutions. Despite this unanimity, the two county parties selected several active Klansmen to appear in the primary election.⁵⁶

After being surprised in 1924, Fremont County Republicans and Democrats were now eager for political confrontation with the Ku Klux Klan. Liberty League members in both parties met weekly to coordinate their strategy. Democratic and Republican Constitutionalists spoke in Canon City and throughout the county rallying their respective party members in preparation for the precinct caucus meetings on July 27 and 30. Republican efforts proved unnecessary because the Klan surrendered party caucuses without a fight. On July 24 anti-Klan members of the Republican County Central Committee pushed through a resolution giving country precincts greater representation on the party's governing board. Outnumbered in their Canon City enclave, Klansmen walked out of the meeting, organized their own Republican party, and elected fellow member Claude Singer as their chairman. The rebels then called upon all Republicans to boycott the July 27 precinct meetings and to attend, instead, Klan caucuses on July 30. Regular Republicans gathered as planned, although Canon City meetings were poorly attended, and elected Constitutionalist delegates to the county assembly. They nominated a complete anti-Klan slate for local office and a Shoup-Waterman delegation to the state convention. Klansmen elected at their precinct meetings held a convention on August 2 and named a rival county ticket and a delegation pledged to Means and Vivian.⁵⁷

Democratic precinct meetings convened as scheduled on July 30. Instead of a quick and easy victory, Klansmen struggled for every delegate vote against a large and well-disciplined Constitutionalist force. Klansmen were upset in two Canon City precincts and lost decisively in most of the outlying towns. The Klan's other "safe" Canon City precincts were won only after strong Constitutionalist challenges were turned aside. Florence Constitutionalists attended separate caucuses rather than meet in the klavern hall. In

many precincts one or the other side withdrew, alleging dishonest tactics, and organized its own caucus and delegate vote. The delegate totals at the end of the selection process reflected the bitter fight; the Klan controlled fifty-three convention seats and the Constitutionalists fifty-two seats, with the remaining 112 seats still in question. With the county central committee in Klan hands, however, the delegates' allegiances were not long in doubt. On August 5 the committee, under T. Lee Witcher's control, gave every contested seat to a Klansman. The Constitutionalists bolted, formed their own convention, and sent an anti-Klan delegation to the Democratic state meeting. The anti-Klan Democrats reconvened on August 13 and nominated a county slate identical to the regular Republican ticket. The Klan Democrats, meanwhile, designated their candidates for local office and chose a delegation to represent the party at the state convention.⁵⁸

Fremont County's rival Republican delegations arrived in Denver on August 6 and presented their credentials to the state convention. The Klansmen could not have chosen a less receptive body to hear their case. Shoup and Waterman supporters ran the assembly and were determined to commit their party to the anti-Klan cause. They succeeded in passing a stinging resolution that declared, in part, "Politics is the affair of the whole people and must be conducted in the open. We are opposed to the Ku Klux Klan, the Minute Men or any other organization seeking to control the political affairs of the state. The Republican party must and will be master of its own house."⁵⁹ The resolution foreshadowed the fate of the Fremont Klansmen. After a brief hearing the county banner was awarded to the Constitutionalists. The balloting for the gubernatorial and senatorial nominations was anticlimactic. Oliver Shoup overwhelmed John Vivian and Carl Milliken with 71 percent of the votes, while Charles Waterman's margin over Rice Means was three to one. Despite these lopsided victories, all of the candidates received sufficient votes to be designated on the primary ballot. Klan and anti-Klan candidates also faced one another in all but two of the primary races for state office. In a surprise move two days after the convention, Denver Judge George Luxford entered the race for the senatorial nomination as the unofficial Minute Men candidate. On August 13 the Democratic convention, in short order, refused to seat the Fremont County Klan delegation, adopted a resolution flaying the hooded order, and sent all of its anti-Klan candidates into the primary wars.⁶⁰

"The issue," wrote the editor of the *Colorado Springs Gazette*,

“was long ago made for this primary, and it is squarely drawn. It is an out and out Klan and anti-Klan fight with no complicating circumstances of any nature.”⁶¹ Despite the editor’s words, the primary campaign lacked the drama, clarity, and intensity which might be considered inherent in a Klan versus anti-Klan confrontation. Neither Shoup nor Waterman had reputations as exciting stump speakers. Both men ran cautious campaigns stolidly plodding the state in search of votes. Notwithstanding their colorless performances, they were confident of victory. The Klan had benefited in 1924 from a split in opposition ranks; now the situation was reversed. John Vivian’s and Rice Means’s campaign strategies also blurred the Klan versus anti-Klan focus. Vivian, a two-time Colorado national committeeman, was not a citizen of the Invisible Empire although he did welcome hooded support. During the primary he publicly avoided mentioning the Klan and emphasized his prohibition enforcement record when cultivating Republicans. Senator Rice Means spoke at Klan rallies in Colorado Springs and Denver and made no attempt to discard his hood and robe. At the same time Means found non-Klan Republicans receptive to speeches that stressed his experience and proven loyalty to Calvin Coolidge. John Galen Locke and his Minute Men further clouded the situation. Both before and after the convention reports circulated that Locke would throw the Minute Men vote to Vivian, but the organization never committed itself. Political commentators did note, however, that “Vivian for Governor” bumper stickers decorated Locke’s automobile and signified at least an unofficial endorsement. One thing was certain—Locke would never let his men vote for Means, whom he considered “a personal and political traitor.”⁶² The commander of the Minute Men favored Luxford yet was convinced he could not win. He therefore ordered his regiments to support Waterman and thus deny Means his Senate seat.⁶³

The state races overshadowed local contests everywhere but Fremont County. “The local Constitutional Liberty League,” Guy Hardy told Shoup, “is so deeply interested in cleaning out the Court House of the Klan that State issues are entirely forgotten.”⁶⁴ Klavern strategists planned a two-pronged primary attack that entailed preventing the Constitutionalist tickets from appearing on the ballot and mobilizing sympathetic voters in support of the Klan’s candidates. On August 19 county clerk and Klansman R. M. Booth refused to certify the Constitutionalist’s Democratic slate because its duplication of the Republican ticket was an attempt to defraud the people. Booth, without stating his reasons, also denied certification

to the regular Republicans. Fortunately for the Liberty League, Judge James L. Cooper overruled Booth and added both sets of candidates to the Klansmen already on the ballot. With sure victory denied, Klansmen stepped up their campaigns, promising further civic reform and tough law enforcement. The Liberty League countered with a succession of meetings, rallies, and speakers. Especially effective were Constitutionalist taunts reviving the Walter Brasher incident. A well-known Canon City Klansman, Brasher had been arrested in July for sexually molesting more than a dozen children. Breaking just before the primary campaign, the affair was a serious blow to Klan election chances.⁶⁵

7 Grand Dragon Fred Arnold's order to vote in the Republican primary did not save the Klan's candidates on September 14. Oliver Shoup and Charles Waterman just edged the divided opposition with 49.7 percent and 50.6 percent, respectively, of the vote. Shoup built a 9,000-vote lead in Denver and, with a good showing in every section of the state, could not be overtaken. Supporters of John Vivian gave him his greatest victories in Pueblo and home base Jefferson County while adding six Western Slope and four eastern farming counties to his column. Rice Means registered significant increases over his 1924 vote in Pueblo, southern Colorado, and the Western Slope. His gains were particularly noticeable on the Western Slope, where he carried twelve counties, seven more than in the previous election. Senator Means was defeated because of his disastrous third-place finish in Denver. In 1924 he had led a three-man field, winning 20,971 votes or 43 percent of his total; in 1926 he gained only 7,843 votes or a 19 percent share. Former Klan districts, such as R, S, and T in South Denver, that had voted overwhelmingly for Means now turned to Waterman by margins as high as two to one. Klan votes that Means had once owned now belonged to demobilized members and Minute Men supporters who despised him. Judge Luxford's Minute Men effort, which gathered 14,330 votes (70 percent from Denver), proved more of a drain on Waterman than Means. Klan-backed candidates were also beaten in the races for secretary of state, superintendent of public instruction, and Supreme Court justices. The Klan endorsed no candidate for either lieutenant governor or attorney general. Two weeks after the election the Klan suffered another state-level defeat. The Colorado Supreme Court ruled a Klan-sponsored initiative amendment to abolish the civil service off the November ballot.⁶⁶

Local returns were equally devastating. Denver voters weeded such prominent ex-Klanspersons as Minnie Love and Charles Bige-

low from the pack seeking nomination to the Colorado House of Representatives. The only candidate nominated for a House seat who had had Klan ties was Martha Long, and she had split with the Invisible Empire early in the 1925 legislative session. In El Paso County the only Klansman seeking office finished fifth in a field of six candidates. Fremont County, headquarters of the realm, witnessed a Constitutionalist rout in the Democratic primary. A heavy vote from the country precincts coupled with reduced Klan majorities in Canon City and Florence enabled the Liberty League's candidates to sweep every nomination. Among those defeated was Sheriff Clifford Glasson, "the backbone," said the *Daily Record*, "of the Klan's machine in the Court House."⁶⁷ In the Republican primary anti-Klan candidates won nomination for county sheriff, treasurer, and superintendent of schools. Scattered victories in Grand Junction and Pueblo were of some comfort to Klan leaders.⁶⁸

With their candidates and amendment defeated, the Ku Klux Klan lost interest in the outcome of the statewide races. Yet neither Republicans nor Democrats would allow the secret order to depart quietly. The two parties adopted platform planks denouncing invisible government and fiercely contested for the anti-Klan mantle. This was especially evident in the race for governor, where basic agreement upon substantive issues led the candidates into character assassination. Although the Constitutionlists endorsed both Oliver Shoup and Billy Adams, each candidate tried to hang the hood and robe on his opponent. Shoup, through the *Denver Post*, accused Adams's nephew and campaign manager of sponsoring the *Fellowship Forum*, a Klan newspaper published in Washington, D.C. In addition to having alleged Klan ties, the *Post* repeatedly charged that Adams was antilabor, antiwomen, and delinquent on income tax payments. Adams ignored the allegations, while such newspapers as the *Denver Express* came to his defense. The *Express* refuted the *Post*'s erroneous assertions and then wondered in print why Shoup's voice was not heard when the Klan captured the Republican party in 1924. The newspaper also noted the discrepancy between Shoup's campaign promise to oppose all Klan candidates and the existence of men with questionable affiliations on the current Republican ticket. Shoup's viciousness evidently ricocheted on November 2, when he was the only Republican frustrated in a bid for statewide office.⁶⁹

The Klan resumed the fight in Fremont County. In September the organization successfully petitioned to place the Progressive ticket, a bipartisan combination of Klan primary winners and Dem-

ocratic losers, on the November ballot. On October 5 Fred Arnold fired his followers for the coming campaign:

Our business is to put over the doctrine of our order. If it costs dollars, and it will, we are going to spend them. If it costs lives, and it probably will, we are willing to sacrifice them. If we have to wade in hot blood to attain the aims of our organization, we are willing to do that.

Henceforth the war cry which must supersede all others is "down with the Catholic church." All other issues are secondary to this and it is time we came out in the open to proclaim ourselves on this issue.⁷⁰

The elimination of Klan candidates in the primary election, he continued, meant the ruin of white Protestant America. ". . . The people of Colorado voted to have their daughters marry negroes, their sons wenches. They voted to make of Americans a race of mulattoes. They voted to align this state with the Catholic-cursed, the liquor-cursed, priest-cursed, Rome-cursed, Al Smith-cursed state of New York."⁷¹ Fremont County was the last Colorado outpost dedicated to 100 Percent Americanism, and the Ku Klux Klan had to hold it. The battle would be hard fought but, Arnold later assured his Baptist congregation, right would triumph. God would surely help them preserve their community from the Constitutionalists, the "beer-guzzling, wine imbibing, flask sucking, cellar loving seekers after the old-time brass rail and saloon."⁷²

The Liberty League responded, as it had in the primary, with "get out the vote" rallies and intensive grass-roots organizing. The Constitutionalist ticket received the endorsement of Fremont County's United Mine Workers and the support of the *Canon City Daily Record* and *Florence Paradox*. In the last two weeks of the campaign the weekly *Paradox* was issued daily with almost every page devoted to the anti-Klan cause. Well-known Colorado Constitutionalists, such as Philip Van Cise, spoke at league meetings and ordered the members to remove the Klan from government "as you cut out a cancer from the physical body of the individual. . . ." ⁷³ On November 2 the heaviest vote in county history eliminated every Klan candidate for courthouse office. The only survivors were Klansmen running for a seat in the state House of Representatives and the justice of the peace and constable positions in precinct one. The Klan, hoping to carry Canon City by a 300- to 500-vote majority, found its totals cut in half. Its candidates lost two Florence precincts and

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were overwhelmed in Portland, Penrose, Chandler, and the other country towns. “. . . They caught us napping two years ago,” said Constitutionalist D. N. Cooper. “We were not organized to oppose them nor to get out the vote of those opposed to the Klan. It is a different story today. . . .”⁷⁴ For Grand Dragon Arnold the election results meant a return “to those pre-Klan days of drinking from stys and eating from slop barrels.”⁷⁵

VI

The spring 1927 municipal elections provided an opportunity for the Constitutionlists to extend their November gains. But, rather than a repetition of the bitterly contested fall campaign, the election was a lackluster affair which failed to generate much enthusiasm or even interest. The Liberty League filed a complete mayoral and aldermanic ticket in support of which they optimistically held only two rallies. Aside from the rallies, which resembled fraternal gatherings more than political meetings, the league's major thrust was a series of newspaper advertisements depicting ebbing Klan electoral strength in Canon City since 1924. The November defeat had tempered Klan spirits. Its Progressive slate played down the hooded connection, a spokesman even conceding that “religion should not in any instance forfeit a citizen's privilege to hold office.”⁷⁶ Instead, the Progressives reminded voters of the high school, the city hall and municipal building under construction, the expanded park system, the reorganized fire department, and the number of newly paved streets. If returned to office, they promised to continue their street paving program and to erect a city stadium for athletic events. On April 6 the Klan vote again declined from the 1924 level, yet it was still sufficient to elect the entire Progressive ticket. In East Canon the Klan-organized People's party downed the league-endorsed slate. South Canon voters chose a Constitutionalist-supported ticket of rebel Klansmen over the official secret candidates. The Florence city hall emerged partially from the Invisible Empire when the anti-Klan Citizen's party elected the mayor and the second ward's alderman. The Canon City area proved to be the only bright spot for the Klan on election day. Klan candidates were defeated in Brighton, Longmont, Grand Junction, and twelve other Colorado cities and towns.⁷⁷

The Ku Klux Klan remained entrenched in Canon City, but the organization had entered a period of transition and decline. Con-

fronted with decreasing attendance and revenues, the members of the Florence Klan had terminated their klavern lease in 1926 and moved to the smaller lodge rooms of the Knights of Pythias Hall. When Canon City meetings drew fewer and fewer men in late 1927 and early 1928, Klan leaders ordered the members to sign attendance pledges. The move had little effect on the trend. The state organization was in even worse shape. Realm leaders suspended publication of the official *Kolorado Klan Kourier*, ostensibly to conform with the Imperial Wizard's plan to standardize the order's newspapers. On November 29, 1927, the financial state of the realm became obvious when Grand Dragon Arnold filed a chattel mortgage on the furniture in Klan headquarters as security for a loan of \$1,200.⁷⁸

Restricted to their Canon City bastion, Klansmen began to adjust to the changed environment. Some remained loyal to their organization, discarded its noxious features, and, except for an occasional political campaign, placed heavy emphasis upon fraternalism. Thus in 1927 economic warfare between Klan and anti-Klan forces ended when members painted over the KIGY signs of their recalcitrant comrades. Communal boosterism replaced boycotts as the means to prosperity. The majority of the Klan's 1,800 members, however, had already departed or would soon do so. Klan demobilization was, in part, a reaction to the rise of a potent opposition. The Liberty League had rallied Fremont County citizens economically, politically, and socially cowered by the Klan and provided them the means to resist. It also had convinced Klan members and sympathizers to desert their movement. Constitutionalist speakers and columns had robbed the Klan of its mystery and, by harping upon such incidents as the Brasher affair, of its respectability. As the anti-Klan organization gathered more recruits and votes, the resource balance between it and the hooded order gradually shifted. The league's victory in 1926 destroyed the Invisible Empire's appearance of invulnerability and its claims of indispensability. Fremont County did not, as Arnold predicted, return to pre-Klan conditions of "hell-hole saloons" and "flesh pots." Constitutionalist county officials quickly convinced residents of their determination to ferret out bootleggers and lawbreakers. Further, four summers had passed since 1923, and the pope had not moved into his residence at the Holy Cross Abbey. As time passed, the Catholics appeared less frightening and their presence was tolerated, if not yet accepted. Just as defeat generated defections, so did success. The Klan had fulfilled many of its prom-

ises of reform and civic improvement while also slashing at the concentration of economic power. "We all done what we had started out to do with it," recalled Klanswoman Leona Singer. "We had no other interest to go on ahead with it. . . . We didn't need it anymore, we just forgot it. We were on our way."⁷⁹ Perhaps the hardest blow fell on June 1, 1928. After a brief illness forty-two-year-old Grand Dragon Arnold died of blood poisoning and erysipelas. Six hundred Klansmen, women, and children followed the muffled drums of the Pueblo contingent to Lakeside Cemetery and buried their leader in accordance with the order's secret ritual. A fiery cross was engraved on his headstone, a permanent reminder of the Klan era. Arnold had been the driving force behind the Canon City Klan since its inception in 1923; without him, members lost their direction and purpose. Arnold's death also meant the end of Colorado as an independent realm of the Invisible Empire. In 1929 Hiram Wesley Evans assigned an imperial representative to manage the state's Klan affairs.⁸⁰

Fraternal activities and social events dominated the Klan calendar for a year after the 1927 municipal elections. Perhaps stirred by the rising momentum of Al Smith's candidacy, Klansmen in the summer of 1928 set aside their klorans for a last major county campaign. Anti-Klan Republicans and Democrats again named a coalition ticket which allocated county offices equally between the two parties. The Klan, rather than dividing its forces in two primaries, concentrated its strength upon an independent Republican slate. Fremont County Klan Democrats and Republicans sent delegates to their respective state conventions, but in both instances the anti-Klan contingents were seated. To win election, Klan county candidates had to attract votes from outside Canon City. The Catholic and foreign-born majorities in the surrounding coal camps, however, had never been amenable to hooded ambitions. The Klan's solution to this dilemma was an attempted alliance with the organization that dominated the mining towns, the Industrial Workers of the World. The Wobblies entered Fremont County in October, 1927, and shut down every local mine to force a hike in wages. The strike failed, yet the IWW's influence continued to permeate the camps. Some Klansmen had joined the IWW and had been active in promoting the strike. A few Klan businessmen had provided strikers with needed food, clothing, and shelter. The Klan's *Daily American* bolstered these offerings with editorial support. Klan leaders hoped that these gestures against their common enemy, the ruling elite, could be par-

laid into votes on election day. Their answer came on September 11, when just four Klan candidates emerged from a fusion ticket wave that engulfed the coal camps and three of Canon City's six precincts. These four men were victorious only because their popularity transcended their Klan ties. A month later the Klan filed the Independent ticket to compete in the general election. Again the results were the same—the Klan's four primary winners were elected to office. The November returns did offer some solace to the Ku Klux Klan; Herbert Hoover carried their county by more than a two-to-one margin. In 1930 county Republicans and Democrats renewed their alliance and posted another anti-Klan coalition slate. Their opponents, tarred by past secret affiliations, vainly declared, "WE ARE NOT sponsored by nor pledged to any SECRET OR OPEN organization."⁸¹ Only two nonfusion candidates won office. The 1932 elections marked the end of Klan versus anti-Klan politics. Former Klansmen attended the Republican and Democratic county conventions, and several were designated for places on the ballot.⁸²

Klan and anti-Klan labels lost their significance in Canon City as well. In 1928 dissident Klansmen, with the support of former Constitutionalists, were elected to South Canon's town hall without opposition. The East Canon municipal elections were similarly free of the Klan issue. The following year Mayor Witcher and his Progressive ticket won an uncontested victory in an election which only sporadically aroused interest. In Florence the formerly antagonistic City Welfare and Progressive parties merged and offered a united slate. During 1924, observed the *Paradox*, ". . . Florence was a hotbed for the propagation of the seeds of hatred, but since the last city election rays of light began shining through and increasing in brightness until today a peace prevails . . . not unlike that existing in a happy family."⁸³ Conditions had changed so dramatically by 1929 that the Knights of Columbus chose Canon City for their annual state convention. The 600 knights received a warm welcome from most of the townspeople, and no incidents marred the two-day gathering. At the same time, the return of realm headquarters to Denver sparked scant notice. Depression-generated adversity further unified the town as the last vestiges of the Klan days disappeared. Hard times forced the Klan's Colorado State Bank and the Young Men's Christian Association to close their doors. The *Daily American*, already weakened by a Constitutionalist libel suit, failed in 1932 after a seven-year run. Klan dues became a luxury, and membership lapsed. Politicians who had begun their careers in the Klan

organization, however, survived. These men shed their hoods and robes and emerged as an important faction in a rejuvenated political elite. The reform impulse thus survived but without its Klan markings.⁸⁴

The positive and negative impact of the Ku Klux Klan was most clearly visible in Canon City. Klan leaders, aided by their religious, political, and fraternal connections, mobilized a diverse coalition in support of a conventional program of needed civic reform and improvements. Local opinion makers facilitated their task by either joining the movement or arrogantly ignoring it. The Klan's reform drive rallied citizens against the establishment's backward-looking mentality and paved the streets, built modern schools, and extended park acreage. Not only was the physical environment made more amenable, but the political structure and government became more responsive as the conservative elite was ousted. The Klan bank and newspaper were attempts to decentralize economic and opinion-making power. The triumph of reform, however, was as dependent upon anti-Catholicism as good citizenship. Canon City paid a high price for Klan-inspired reform, almost a decade of fear and intolerance. The rise of a strong opposition movement interacted with a decline in local tensions, the re-emergence of a responsive "visible" government, a Klan leadership vacuum, and success to destroy the Fremont klaverns' resources. The bigotry upon which the Klan fed did not vanish with the last fiery cross. Its shadow lingered in the 1930s and 1940s when Catholic voters suffered occasional harassment from ex-Klan poll watchers. As late as the 1950s, the stores of some merchants remained off limits to Catholics. The tensions of the Klan period left scars in the minds of older residents that have not healed to this day.⁸⁵

CHAPTER EIGHT

GRAND JUNCTION AND THE WESTERN SLOPE

To live in a modern world and be an ancient; to live in a hum-drum world and be a knight; to live in a gabby world and have a secret—all this is possible. It is the essence of fraternalism that it does its best to make it possible.

Charles Merz
Harper's Magazine, February, 1927

The kluxing of Grand Junction and other Western Slope towns was begun after most eastern Klans had already received their charters. Not until the summer of 1924 did Grand Dragon John Locke journey across the mountains and officially welcome western Klansmen to the Invisible Empire. Rarely did he or other state leaders repeat the trip. As they had delayed the Klan's appearance, the Rocky Mountains also shielded these klaverns from the dictates and friction emanating from Denver and, later, Canon City. On the Western Slope inadequate transportation facilities combined with geographical obstacles to further heighten this seclusion. Thoroughly insulated, internal community currents molded the Klan life cycle to the exclusion of all other factors. Western Klansmen, to a greater degree than their Eastern Slope brothers, were thus able to cast their organizations into almost any shape they desired.

Klavern individuality and isolation were most clearly visible in Grand Junction, the center of the Klan's Western Slope empire. In this community the traditional stereotypes of the Ku Klux Klan are inapplicable. The Grand Junction organization announced no platform of change or plan of action. The standard Klan appeals of

anti-Catholicism, law and order, and nativism were ignored. Although a moral reform movement was mobilizing to redress local problems, it had no connection with the Klan and the knights refused to participate in its work. Unlike the Pueblo and Denver organizations, this Klan could hardly be characterized as a contender for influence and power. Local leaders spoke to another need, stressing a feature inherent but overshadowed in the programs of most klaverns. The Ku Klux Klan offered Grand Junction Protestants an opportunity to enter an exciting fraternal lodge, to share in the secret, the fun, and the fellowship. "Don't ask me why I joined," remarked a former Klansman. "The whole thing looks like a lot of nonsense now. But at the time if you weren't a member you weren't anybody, you were on the outside of everything. It's a hard thing to understand now."¹ Managed by community leaders and opinion makers, the order's purpose was rendered benign and posed no threat to the local balance of power. When the prominent retired from their order with the bulk of the rank and file, the Klan diverged from its original intention. Only then did Grand Junction reject the secret society.

I

With a population of 8,665 in 1920, Grand Junction was the largest city on the Western Slope. Secluded in the Grand Valley at the confluence of the Colorado and Gunnison rivers, the city served as the retail outlet for the vast territory between the Rocky Mountains and the Wasatch range in eastern Utah. Trade far outweighed industrial development, with local manufacturing keyed to the surrounding cattle-raising, general farming, and fruit-growing economy. Grand Junction's growth rate rose 12 percent in the decade after 1910, and during the 1920s climbed to 18 percent for a 1930 population of 10,247. Townspeople were white, native born, and Protestant. Few blacks or Jews made their homes in Grand Junction and none were active in town affairs. One-third of Mesa County's 1,598 foreign-born residents had immigrated from Canada or the British Isles and encountered only minor obstacles in the assimilation process. Two minority groups, however, disrupted the homogeneous pattern. The number of Catholics had jumped from 982 to 1,770 (an 80 percent increase) between 1916 and 1926, thus comprising 8 percent of the county's inhabitants. Much of the Catholic influx originated in Mexico. The Mexican population of Mesa Coun-

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ty had expanded over 600 percent, from 136 persons in 1920 to 973 in 1930.²

The Catholic and Mexican presence was not the only problem an enterprising Klan organizer could offer to solve. Although Grand Junction did not suffer recurring crime waves, all of Mesa County soaked in moonshine and bootleg whiskey. From DeBeque, Governor Sweet received a plea for state aid in enforcing the prohibition laws. "Conditions," wrote Methodist minister Paul Shields, "are getting deplorable in this town and vicinity. Men, boys and girls are drinking in semi public and often public places."³ In February, 1924, tragedy struck a young Grand Junction man when he drowned while intoxicated. The anti-liquor furor that arose after his death flared again in September when federal prohibition officers raided three Grand Junction bootlegger dens openly operating in violation of the law. The agents characterized their action as merely "a drop in the bucket." The *Daily Sentinel* paraphrased their assessment of the situation: "Bootleggers are plying their illegal trade in this city day in and day out with little attempt at concealing their work. If this city gets a black eye anywhere it gets it from the bootleggers. It is a part of the work of people appointed by the city and county to stop bootlegging, but things go along as usual with little break in the monotonous routine. Vagrants are picked up by the score—but not bootleggers."⁴ The town's moral reform element, led by the Reverend W. C. Wasser of the Methodist church and the Women's Christian Temperance Union, found other black marks on the city's reputation. Grand Junction officials permitted houses of prostitution to operate in a regulated red-light district. Despite protests, this affront to decent citizens was not shut down. Sporadic waves of arrests and fines neither appeased the reformers nor affected life in the "Little Barbary Coast." Also provocative were the titillating motion pictures shown in the town's two theaters. Earlier in the decade when films were more traditional, eight congregations, including the Catholic church, had attempted to bolster religious devotion by proposing that the theaters at least close their doors on Sunday. Sponsors of the move had pursued their campaign in the press, the pulpit, and eventually the courts but had failed to attain their goal. By 1924 and 1925, the Sunday closing issue had become irrelevant, for the "film evil" had so corrupted young people's morals that vigilance was necessary seven days a week. Residents were concerned about the effect upon their fellow citizens of such motion pictures as "The Truth about Husbands," "Sinners in Silk," and "Pleasure

Mad." "Sporting Youth," which played in 1924, invited the public to see "Young blood, young love, young ideas—bound recklessly pleasure-ward, jazz stepping and thrill chasing its way towards newer more vital sensations."⁵ The opening of a municipal dance hall in May, 1924, sparked another outcry and lament for the moral well-being of Grand Junction.⁶

Yet few moral reformers made the transition to the Invisible Empire because it did not address their needs. The men who organized and initially led the Ku Klux Klan in Grand Junction were content with the status quo. As members of the elite and opinion-making public they did not envision an activist role for their association. Although the evidence is only suggestive, it appears that the local elite may have coopted the order to distract citizens and prevent any change in the distribution of power. The town's first Klan leader was Walter Walker, the editor and publisher of the *Daily Sentinel*, the owner of the Avalon Theater, and a ranking member of the establishment. He obtained the Klan franchise from Grand Dragon Locke in 1924 and marked a course from which the order deviated only in the later stages of its life cycle. To Walker, Grand Junction was "one of the cleanest towns in the west and the conduct and deportment and ideals of its citizenship . . . compare[d] most favorably with any city of its size in the entire nation." He and many of his friends had lost patience with those "trying to make it appear that 'conditions are awful in Grand Junction,' that everyone needs reforming, that everything needs to be controlled and regulated by this particular crowd and clique, that every organization and every individual needs its censorship."⁷ Liquor law violations stirred Walker and his followers as much as the alleged deterioration of morality. *Daily Sentinel* editorials disputed those who charged that bootlegging was rampant in Mesa County and continually praised local law enforcement efforts to end the traffic. Beer was served at klavern meetings, a reflection of the members' attitude toward prohibition, at least as it pertained to their own drinking habits. The hooded affiliation of the Mesa County sheriff also made Klan demands for law and order inappropriate. Prejudice attracted few recruits because it was not an overt appeal, and Catholics, immigrants, Jews, and blacks presented few challenges to existing economic and political power relationships. In addition, the foreign-born link to crime was not clearly drawn in the county, for many lawbreakers had Anglo-Saxon names. A Klansman, married to a Catholic, recalled that while members knew of their organization's reputation for intolerance, it "was not a loud issue in Grand Junction. What I mean by loud, it wasn't

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talked about and there was no fights about it. . . . I wasn't mad at anybody. I never heard of any Klansman being mad at anybody."⁸

Walker recruited his friends, employees, lodge brothers, and fellow citizens not for a holy crusade but for an exotic fraternal organization. "It was just like another lodge starting, although it had this secret business. Of course, lodges are secret too; the Elks are secret, the Masons are secret [and], the Odd Fellows are secret."⁹ The Klan, however, was newer and more exciting than these fraternal groups. No other lodge burned crosses in darkened fields or provided its members with so foreboding a costume. Each week men could dress in their hoods and robes and briefly leave drab small-town life for a sojourn into a world of fantasy. With a password and a secret handshake an ordinary man was transformed into a knight of the mystical Invisible Empire. Together with the mystique, the Klan offered its members the more common pleasures associated with fraternalism: fellowship, social activities, and business contacts. Walker's presence drew men well known in the town's business, political, and fraternal circles. Their membership, said a Klansman, in turn became a factor in the organization's growth; many white- and blue-collar employees joined "because of the hell of a lot of prominent men that belonged to it. . . . We didn't get too serious about this thing. We belonged to a bunch that was the popular thing to be in."¹⁰ Here was an opportunity to meet important people. No one in the middle echelons of the community or on his way up the ladder would fail to grab the ring.

Still, leadership, camaraderie, and a desire for influence do not completely explain the Klan's mild disposition. With Catholics and immigrants quiescent, it was difficult to divert members from fraternalism. A minority did believe that the Klan's thrust had been misplaced. Some anti-Catholics and zealous prohibitionists had entered the Klan hoping to shake members from their fraternal lethargy. Small yet cohesive, this faction found itself powerless to influence Klan leaders or members. Ritual and personal ambition proved too consuming and Klansmen paid little attention to agitation either inside or outside the lodge room. Only in the later years of the Klan period would the balance shift in the minority's favor.¹¹

Grand Junction Klan organizers launched their membership drive on February 6, 1924, with a three-day engagement of *Birth of a Nation* at the Avalon Theater. Most residents did not understand the significance of the film's appearance or the double meaning of a newspaper advertisement which claimed, "It will make a better American of you."¹² The motion picture's portrayal of the coura-

geous knights of the Ku Klux Klan made men receptive, and recruiters successfully tapped the usual membership sources, the churches, the fraternal lodges, and the police force. Members met secretly each week in the Margery Building on Main Street without fear of newspaper exposure or government harassment. By summer, the provisional Klan organization was sufficiently strong to apply for a charter and to make its presence known. On July 25 three crosses were burned simultaneously around the city; "an impressive sight," remarked the *Sentinel*.¹³ A few days later a typewritten note was nailed to the door of a local black family: "Warning to the colored race you are requested to leave this neighborhood under orders of the Klu [sic] Klux Klan."¹⁴ Police officers, however, discounted Klan involvement because the organization's official seal was not stamped upon the letter and its name was misspelled. Besides, the family was "law abiding" and had lived in the house for more than a decade. The blacks refused to be intimidated and were not bothered again. Grand Junction residents got their first glimpse of the Ku Klux Klan on August 17. Shortly after nine o'clock at night a cross was fired and carried at the head of a column of 500 hooded and robed Klansmen in a parade through the streets of the town. Several thousand people watched the forty-five-minute demonstration, remaining as silent as the marchers. The parade was staged to celebrate the end of the local organization's dependent and provisional status. That afternoon Grand Dragon Locke had handed over the charter of Mesa County Klan No. 35 to its 800 knights. An effusive newspaper report the next day recaptured "the spectacular silent, orderly and impressive" activities of the "famous and mysterious organization" for those who were absent.¹⁵

The Mesa County Klan was too disinterested and preoccupied with recruiting to become deeply involved in the 1924 political campaign. The order did little more than ask its members to vote for Clarence Morley and Rice Means; neither candidate carried the county in the primary or general elections. Locally, Klansmen were named to the primary ballots of both parties, not because of secret influence but because of their own popularity and prestige. The Klan made no public endorsements for county office and did not emerge as an election issue. Instead of political rallies, the Klan invited Grand Junction Protestants to recruiting lectures. On October 6 an Ohio knight told a standing-room-only crowd at the city auditorium that the Klan stood for law enforcement, Christianity, Americanism, and equal justice for all. "They say we are breeding re-

ligious hatred but we are breeding religious love. They say we are breeding racial hatred but we are breeding racial sympathy . . . and friendliness. We have no hatred for anybody." "His talk," observed a reporter, "went over the top, and he was nearly mobbed by prospective Klansmen. . . ." ¹⁶ Twelve hundred men and women attended a similar meeting three weeks later. Also in October, the Klan donated \$100 to sponsor the YMCA memberships of underprivileged children. The hooded delegation was received enthusiastically: "Not only did the cheers resound while the klansmen were in the building, but as they departed and until they were well away. . . ." To the chairman of the membership committee, "They looked like they were eight feet tall." ¹⁷ The absence of resistance is hardly surprising. The Klan had neither proposed nor executed an objectionable act. It offered no challenge to the local establishment or to any minority. Leading townspeople had given the order respectability. Citizens accepted the Ku Klux Klan as just another harmless fraternal lodge attempting to relieve the boredom of small-town life. Unlike klaverns in many other Colorado cities, this organization tempered and deflected grievances rather than aroused them. ¹⁸

II

In other Western Slope towns Klansmen responded to many of the same fears as the knights across the mountains. The order, with its flexible program, gained considerable power in the towns of Routt County. Klansmen in Hayden were concerned about Catholic influence in the public schools. In Milner, Oak Creek, and Yampa members had their hands full with bootleggers, prostitutes, gamblers, and a large immigrant population. The situation was similar in Meeker, where Klansmen attempted to save Protestants from a conspiracy hatched by Catholics, bootleggers, and corrupt government officials. The men of Montrose Klan No. 37 fought the papal menace with committees working "to deprive every Catholic of employment, no matter how small or inconsiderate. . . ." ¹⁹ At the same time the organization's donations to a high school band uniform drive and a historical monument fund won it the praise of unprejudiced Protestant townspeople. To the south, in Dolores County, Klansmen promised to root out bootleggers and again make their communities safe for women and children. They received a boost from the *Dolores Star*, which declared in 1925, "Today the best of Americans are Klansmen." ²⁰ As in Grand Junction, each Klan as-

sumed an identity subject only to the needs of its members and the immediate community. But though the local environment gave the Klan its meaning, it also generated the causes for change and decline.²¹

III

The Ku Klux Klan had been received in Grand Junction with only scattered dissent. As one of a number of approved fraternal lodges men could enter the Klan without fear of being branded with the odious stigma of hooded membership. Minority group leaders ignored the organization while Protestant clergymen enlisted or remained silent. The *Daily Sentinel*, the principal agency of local opinion making, was sympathetic if not enamored. Acceptance, though, was only temporary. The Klan and its environment began to change slowly at the end of 1924.

A highly successful ten-month recruiting drive had inundated the order with membership applications. Screening was not official policy, and "anybody who had a ten dollar bill could join."²² Although the rush of new members made the Klan less cohesive and exclusive, it did not distort the basic fraternal focus. The enlarged rank and file did, however, opt for fresh leadership. Just before the November elections Klansmen chose Grand Junction realtor D. B. Wright as their first Exalted Cyclops over a chagrined Walter Walker. Walker's defeat was not a rejection of the local establishment, for Wright was a wealthy and respected businessman. Rather, it was a personal rebuke to the Klan's creator. Walker, whom a friend described as suffering from a "Napoleon Complex," would not accept his rejection and turned against his former devotion.²³ His first anti-Klan editorial appeared on November 2 and warned residents of the "bold, bald, daring effort to incite, excite and play upon the prejudices of men. . . ."²⁴ The *Daily Sentinel* would continue to hound the organization for the remainder of its local existence. Walker's resignation and the exodus of his friends did not modify elite domination or the fraternal orientation of the order. Still, 1925 would be a year of transition for the Mesa County Klan. With Walker's assistance and Klan mistakes, the community's perception of its newest lodge shifted away from the fraternal definition.²⁵

Concern for the future of their community diverted individual Klansmen briefly from fraternalism into local politics. At stake in the municipal elections of April, 1925, was the entire seven-man city council. The council acted as a legislative body and also appointed

the city manager who, in turn, selected the chief of police, the city attorney, and every member of the municipal government. The campaign opened in March when Methodist minister W. C. Wasser urged all Christians to join a political crusade dedicated to the elimination of bootlegging, prostitution, and gambling from Grand Junction. Wasser, a leader in the moral reform cause, blamed city officials for allowing the community to slip into depravity. High school boys, he charged, were frequently found in the brothels of the red-light district, their characters forever flawed. Police officers had allegedly allowed prostitutes to brazenly solicit on Main Street and in the municipal dance hall. The minister later added pool halls and movie theaters to the forces making Grand Junction a "cesspool of vice and iniquity."²⁶ To avoid God's wrath, Wasser endorsed six candidates for the city council and pleaded their case before Christian voters. The Women's Christian Temperance Union accepted Wasser's accusations and called upon municipal officials to enforce the law. "Do you need," it queried, "the religious and moral element which does not patronize such business, to minutely investigate and bring you the proof?"²⁷ The union's election slate included all but one of Wasser's candidates. The Mesa County Klan made no public endorsements though its members were well represented in the field of candidates. Of the nineteen men running for office, at least ten belonged to the Ku Klux Klan, yet none of them revealed his membership. The Klan addressed citizens only once about the campaign. Even that public utterance, tacked to the bottom of a recruiting invitation, was a bland appeal for "the election of competent and conscientious officials, and the economical and business-like administration of the affairs of the city."²⁸ On election day Klansmen took every seat on the city council. Although the *Sentinel* labeled the returns a defeat for Wasser, three of the Klansmen had received the minister's support. The men's success, however, was more a product of their own standing in the community than either Klan or Wasser sentiment. All of the winning candidates were well-known civic leaders who had profited from their long-time connections.²⁹

The secret affiliations of the councilmen were not long hidden. They named Klansman Edward Thompson city manager, and he filled every municipal office from his order's membership roster. The Grand Junction police department, under Chief Frank Clifton, became the main source of Klan patronage, with experience no longer the chief prerequisite for employment. Klannishness or fraternal nepotism rather than malevolence probably accounted for the appointments. The *Daily Sentinel* censured the new administra-

tion and warned citizens of the frightening implications: "Men are serving on the Grand Junction police force today for no other reason than that they are members of this organization and from the chief down they are taking their orders from the exalted cyclops of the Ku Klux Klan. It is a deplorable condition. It is more than that—it is an outrageous condition. Never were there so many men on the police force. Never were there so many special and private officials. Never were there so many stool pigeons and amateur gun men."³⁰

In June Grand Junction Klansmen invited members from all over the Western Slope to a celebration konklave. The councilmen granted the Klan a parade permit and, in preparation for the event, draped the county courthouse and city hall with large American flags. Sixty-seven stores along the parade route were similarly adorned. Seven hundred Klansmen marched two abreast in the night procession. Also featured were the Grand Junction municipal band and drum corps and an automobile carrying City Manager Ed Thompson and Chief of Police Frank Clifton. After the parade Klansmen and members of the newly organized women's auxiliary gathered in Lincoln Park for a festive evening of speeches, fireworks, initiations, and dancing. The Denver secession crisis in the summer of 1925 did not diminish Klan spirit. Klansmen from Grand Junction, Montrose, and Delta assembled in Gunnison in July for another parade and family outing. The following month Mesa County Klan No. 35 joined every Western Slope klavern but one in a declaration of loyalty to Atlanta.³¹

Grand Junction's Klan city officials were, for the most part, responsible and diligent public servants. They passed no obnoxious laws nor enforced ordinances unfairly. The existing power structure was left undisturbed. Business efficiency and government economy, instead, were their passion. Municipal authorities did not harass business in the Little Barbary Coast. The red-light district remained open during the Klan's city hall tenure and obeyed the traditional restrictions of no liquor, no youthful customers, and no expansion. In the city and county the Klan sheriff averaged one bootlegging raid every five days and began to curb the area's liquor traffic. Police inexperience and aggressiveness, however, made more of an impression upon community perceptions than moderation and governmental effectiveness. On the night of August 3 a Klan policeman shot and killed Manuel Cordova and wounded his companion after a cursory search of their automobile for liquor. The next day a coroner's jury acquitted the Klansman, ruling that he had acted in self-defense when Cordova reached for a pistol. The *Daily Sentinel* ac-

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cepted the verdict but argued that the officer's unfamiliarity with correct police methods had prevented a thorough search which would have uncovered the weapon and averted the shooting. Cordova's death, contended Walter Walker, was the direct result of Klan domination of the police department. Klan membership, not prior police experience or knowledge, had become "the magic talisman, the open sesame" into the force: "The killing the other night was the first score on a toll of incompetency and inefficiency, and the blame should be placed where it belongs. And it is time to say that the city hall, in every department, is under the complete control of the Ku Klux Klan, and the exalted cyclops and NOT the city manager or the council is ruling Grand Junction today. . . . The time has come to have a showdown."³² Other incidents of police bullying, unreasonable searches, and lengthy detention of both residents and tourists bolstered Walker's argument that "things have gone far enough." Also damaging was the arrest of a Klansman and city employee for child molesting.³³

Walker paid a price for his unrelenting criticism of the Klan. On September 3, 1925, Deputy Sheriff Charles F. Thomas, labeled by the *Daily Sentinel* as "the most radical and violent talking klansman in Mesa County," hailed Walker on Main Street and cursed him for his newspaper attacks.³⁴ When words failed to produce a retraction, Thomas struck Walker and knocked him to the sidewalk and kept knocking him down each time the editor managed to rise. Chief Clifton arrived on the scene a few minutes later, but refused to arrest the deputy sheriff because he had not witnessed the beating. Thomas was eventually arrested and confined to the county jail for thirty days. An eyewitness disagreed with the *Daily Sentinel's* account of the incident: "Thomas just shook him, that's all. He didn't rough him up, he didn't cuff him, he didn't hit him, he didn't trip him, he didn't throw him to the ground. . . ." ³⁵ Only a handful, however, read or heard anything other than the newspaper's report. Public reaction went strongly against Thomas and the Ku Klux Klan with few people able to draw a distinction. The Walker assault was seen as one more in a long series of examples of Klan irresponsibility. The next day respected attorney M. D. Vincent called for the creation of an anti-Klan organization to end the "reign of terror." Republican leader Lee Burgess, in support of Vincent's appeal, asked in an open letter: "Have we reached a point where a free-born American is not free to discuss his public officers without fear of violence? Are we no longer free to think and express our thoughts publicly without fear of a boycott? . . . Are we servile subjects who must

conform to the wishes of Imperial Rulers, set up in our midst?"³⁶ Two weeks after Walker was beaten, his thirteen-year-old son arrived home dazed, suffering from a concussion. Although the boy had merely been in a bicycle accident, the *Sentinel's* story placed a Klan leader at the site of the mishap and left readers to draw a causal connection.³⁷

Grand Junction began its reassessment of the Ku Klux Klan in the summer of 1925. The aggressive behavior of individual Klan policemen evoked hostility which generalized to all members of the organization. Every Klansman shared the responsibility and blame for the actions of the intemperate and inexperienced. The *Daily Sentinel* facilitated this identification by repeatedly depicting the deeds of the few as a direct result of official Klan policy and decision. Thomas's assault upon Walter Walker hastened this process, hardening an amorphous discontent into steadfast Klan opposition. The incident also awakened city officials to the seriousness of the situation, and the police department was brought under tighter control. The fun was now over and Klan ties had become counterproductive. The popularity of the secret society plummeted further as the influential departed. Klansmen, in reaction to the flight of the prominent and changing community attitudes, reviewed the benefits of their memberships. When members found that the fiery cross, the kloran, and the hood and robe were not worth their neighbors' rejection, many withdrew. The decision to withhold dues or not to attend meetings, however, was not always consciously made. "We didn't leave it," recalled a member, "we just forgot it. There were no resignations turned in. It just faded away."³⁸ Regardless of how men terminated their commitments, the Klan had entered a downward spiral from which it could not break free.

The Mesa County Klan retreated slowly in 1926, its rearguard actions incapable of modifying public opinion or damming the membership drain. The organization broke seven months of silence in May, 1926, to announce the election of the Reverend George Rossman of Grand Junction's First Christian Church as the new Exalted Cyclops. Despite the importance of the voting, less than 100 Klansmen appeared to cast their ballots. As a leading moral reformer and anti-Catholic, Rossman had benefited from the internal power realignment which followed the lodge men's withdrawal. Rossman's faction, so long muted, had remained intact and easily captured the organization. Once in control, they directed Klan energy away from benign fraternalism and against those who threatened Protestant America. Rossman invited wayward members to re-

turn to the Klan: "For the sake of America and her institutions that are now in deadly peril—let us forget our differences and come together in a great meeting."³⁹ In August he wrote: "Do not be misled by the false reports circulated by the enemies of America. Petty politicians are in hand with the WETS and ROMANISTS. . . . The real issue is WET versus DRY,—and America versus her enemies. Unless the Klan is able to unite its forces and enlist the cooperation of the peoples who have this nation's institutions and welfare at heart, dark days loom before us."⁴⁰ Rossman's anti-Catholic rhetoric and prohibitionist extremism, however, failed to have the desired effect. Few were impressed with the Klan's new message and even fewer responded. Nor did the fresh approach enhance Klan political influence. Mesa County Republicans and Democrats passed resolutions denouncing the hooded order. All Klan-endorsed candidates were defeated in either the primary or general elections, while community service and standing erased the former memberships of several winners.⁴¹

In March, 1927, the Klan issued "fiery summonses" ordering active and ex-members to attend a political rally honoring the Grand Dragon. "If you fail to answer this summons by your presence (Providence alone preventing), you may never be permitted to cross the threshold of a klavern again."⁴² Only 150 Klansmen, a third from rural Mesa County, took the threat seriously. Rossman also failed to rally Klansmen in time for the April municipal elections. Klan opponents, supported by the *Sentinel*, organized the citizens' ticket and won all three city council races. Klan representation on the council had declined sharply since 1925. The body's new makeup was three anti-Klansmen, three former members, and only one active Klansman. Among the council's first actions was the removal of Chief Frank Clifton and all but three policemen from the department. "Let it be a new day in Grand Junction," proclaimed the *Daily Sentinel*.⁴³ The dawn actually arrived two weeks later when Rossman was removed from his church and advised to leave town. The minister had become romantically entwined with a sixteen-year-old member of his Sunday school class. Rather than administer the final blow, Grand Junction ignored the Ku Klux Klan and allowed it to drown in its impotence.⁴⁴

The Grand Junction experience offers another dimension to the Klan's image. Although crime waves and minority pressure were absent from the community, problems existed amenable to a Klan solution. The Klan might have campaigned against unresponsive

government and with an established, church-based moral reform movement. But Grand Junction Klan leaders, unlike their counterparts elsewhere in Colorado, did not address or exploit Protestant concerns. These prominent community figures turned their attention and their followers from local tensions to fraternalism. The local Klan ceased to be the arm of a social movement and became a conventional association. Whether the leaders' purpose was philanthropy or social control is unclear; the effect was to render the Klan useless as a protest vehicle. Direction from above thus assured favorable community perceptions and respectable leadership while neutralizing the energizing variables of governmental responsiveness and issues. The Mesa County Klan, purposely built upon this narrow foundation, did not actively pursue politics or engage in law enforcement. The majority of its members were not driven to effect or prevent change. The contrast between elite control in Grand Junction and elite resistance in Colorado Springs and Canon City is dramatic. In 1924 the order had taken its place beside the community's established fraternal lodges, unhindered by adverse publicity. There it might have remained except for the unauthorized behavior of individual Klansmen which poisoned the atmosphere for fellow members. Prodded by an avenging editor, residents shunned those who bore the guilt of association. The Klan was no longer benevolent, no longer acceptable. The threat to reputation and position would end only through renunciation. The desertion of the influential, followed by the lodge men, further isolated the Ku Klux Klan. The espousal of bigotry sealed its fate.

CHAPTER NINE

THE KU KLUX KLAN AS A SOCIAL MOVEMENT

. . . with the exception of Indiana, there was no bigger or brighter star in the Klan flag than Colorado.

L. C. Speers

New York Times, September 26, 1926

The anatomy of a social movement like the Ku Klux Klan can be dissected from numerous entry points. The Klan's roots in the American traditions of nativism, vigilantism, and religious bigotry may be traced to the colonial period. Comparative analysis with simultaneous and kindred European movements after World War I might indicate basic similarities or differences. Advertising and sales promotion models would furnish valuable insights into the Klan's rapid growth during the 1920s. Except in the Democratic convention of 1924, the Klan's role as a national political pressure group remains largely unexplored. The socioeconomic character of the Klan leadership can be probed with the techniques of collective biography. Inquiries at the state level could measure the lower echelon's obedience to national directives as well as regional uniformity and diversity. Macroinvestigation, however, conceals as much as it reveals. To understand the meaning of the Ku Klux Klan for the participants of the drama, for those who joined or were affected by its actions, it is necessary to descend to the local community. Local leaders and needs shaped an already pliable program to fit a particular time and place. Each klavern program distinctively fused issue and non-issue appeals, drawing a heterogeneous membership. Rather than a tight belief system or monolithic organization, a mo-

saic emerges which denies commonly held generalizations and stereotypes. This case study approach conceptualizes the Klan as a social movement. Seeking to influence community policies, Klans had to mobilize and expend resources. People, money, and votes were the keys to power. Klaverns were not inhabited by uprooted men and women suffering from psychic and societal disorders. Instead, Klan membership represented a normal individual's decision to confront real and immediate problems. Tactics and goals may be questioned and censured but not rejected simply as the work of the irrational. Just as the generators of growth and success were confined almost completely to the local environment, so too were the forces making for decline and failure.

I

Traditional explanations for the growth of the Ku Klux Klan do not fit the Colorado case. Economic depression has often been considered a causative factor in the development of social movements. Students of the southwestern and Colorado Klans have linked the order's emergence to the deep but brief depression that struck the United States in 1920. Economic hard times did not spawn the Rocky Mountain organization. The Klan came to Denver in 1921, a year of financial collapse. All economic indicators pointed downward: farm prices and livestock receipts had declined, iron and coal production was curtailed, and the number of new business incorporations had fallen off. The Klan, however, was quiescent during the trough, its growth and political victories awaiting the return of prosperity in 1923, 1924, and 1925. Scapegoating to ease the fears of the unemployed or downwardly mobile was not a prominent Klan feature. The Colorado organization's literature, recruiting appeals, and speakers rarely listed job competition or economic crimes among the charges leveled at Jews, Catholics, blacks, or immigrants. Moreover, the Klan's first recruits tended to be the more economically and socially prominent members of the community.¹

World War I has repeatedly been called into service to account for the rise of not only the Klan but all right-wing social movements of the "Bigoted Twenties."² John Mecklin eloquently set forth the standard interpretation in 1924:

The war, with its hymns of hate, its stories of poison gas and human carnage, its secret spyings upon fellow Americans, its accounts of Belgian atrocities, its imprisonments of radicals . . .

had opened up the fountains of the great deep of national feeling. After the armistice these hates kindled by the war and to which the nation had become habituated during the years of bloodshed were suddenly set adrift. . . . As a nation we had cultivated a taste for the cruel, the brutal, the intolerant, and the un-Christian that demanded gratification. Here was an unparalleled opportunity for the Klan "salesmen of hate."³

Charles C. Alexander, writing in 1964, also stressed the war's crucial impact: "In the fall of 1918, just as the indoctrination process was reaching a peak, as patriotic feeling was mounting to a frenzy, the war came abruptly to an end. Americans who had stored up an enormous volume of superpatriotic zeal now no longer had an official enemy on whom to concentrate this fervor."⁴ The Creel Committee's causal relationship to Klan building, despite fifty years of scholarly assertion, remains nebulous. There is no evidence that such tensions needed an outlet or even existed. Nor is it explained why such feelings, if they did endure, were displaced from the Hun to American Catholics and Jews. Moreover, if unquenched wartime passion was at its height immediately after the armistice, why was the Klan's rise delayed until 1923 and 1924? Finally, what data could even be mustered to substantiate a link between war frustrations and the Klan? How could it be measured?

Six years after the armistice the war had ceased to arouse excitement or resentment. Newspapers and politicians shied away from mentioning what had become an unpleasant experience. Moreover, by the mid-1920s more salient problems pressed Coloradans. The emergence of the Ku Klux Klan did not signal a return to "normalcy" or a tiring of crusades. For many Klansmen and Klanswomen membership was an idealistic commitment to a goal beyond the self. The Klan offered Protestants an opportunity to enlist in a cause to save a nation, a faith, and a way of life from their detractors. Commitment was not difficult; with ten dollars or a vote for a Klan candidate, any man or woman in any community could battle the forces of evil. This time God's side would not be tainted with a European stain. The Red Scare had also receded. The Bolshevik was no longer a frightening figure and kleagles did not conjure him up. The red threat had so diminished by 1927 that Fremont County Klansmen greeted an IWW strike not with a call to arms or a jeremiad but with limited support.

The southern black exodus, while accelerated after World War I, had no meaning for white Coloradans. Between 1910 and 1920

the state's black population increased by only 510 persons. The black "threat" in Colorado was confined to Denver and was generated from within, not from without. Similarly, the surge in foreign immigration after the war posed little danger to Anglo-Saxon supremacy in the Centennial state. Colorado's foreign born comprised just 14 percent of the population, and the Ellis Island battlefront was far away. To Coloradans, alleged criminality, rather than ethnicity or numbers, was at the core of the immigrant problem. Neighborhood transition, while useful in explaining the motivation of some Klansmen, was also of secondary importance in the growth of the state's urban klaverns. In Colorado cities the "zone of emergence" concept was inapplicable.⁵

Abstract appeals for law and order, Americanism, or the salvation of white womanhood were not sufficient in themselves to mobilize men. Nor was the Klan a regressive consequence of the triumph of urban society and culture over small-town values. Colorado Klansmen did not cast Denver or New York in the role of devil or decry the urban lifestyle. The Klan had to adapt to each local environment, finding the conditions which would make its vague solutions relevant and concrete. Kleagles systematically exploited real community tensions and problems, not ethereal evils outside a man's immediate frame of reference. The pope was an obvious villain, but without evidence of local Catholic "aggression" anti-Catholic rhetoric would have drawn few members. An international Jewish conspiracy could not have generated as much anti-Semitic agitation as the exotic inhabitants of Little Jerusalem. Blacks became dangerous only when they moved next door or attended the high school prom. The local moonshiner or drug dealer produced far more fear than Al Capone and his Chicago mob. Each Klan, attuned to its community's concerns, became a differentiated cell in a larger organism.

II

Recalling a kleagle's instructions to key the Klan to the target's needs, what problems did Colorado communities present to the Invisible Empire for solution? In which areas did the authorities appear unresponsive to citizens' needs and fears? The Denver Klan was able to offer its complete cure. The order did not manufacture but manipulated Protestant anxiety concerning crime waves, Catholic organizing, Jewish distinctiveness, immigrant criminality, and black violation of inferior status. Frightened, sincere men respond-

ed with money and votes. They placed "100 Percent Americans" on guard in the city hall and the police department, sure that they had struck an effective blow against their enemies. Boycotts and cross burnings were employed to handle situations beyond the government's reach. Conversely, anti-Semitism, anti-Catholicism, and white supremacy were not important planks in the Pueblo Klan's platform. Klansmen attacked crime conditions and promised to expel bootleggers, roadhouses, murderers, and foreign-born lawbreakers from the county. Blacks, Jews, and law violators were not threatening to Canon City Klansmen. Townspeople demanded civic reform and the Klan was determined to provide it. Klansmen pledged to save their town not only from an indifferent elite but from a Catholic offensive. The danger became quite real to suspicious Protestants when the Fremont County Catholic population increased sharply in preparation for the pope's alleged arrival. Grand Junction welcomed a fraternal lodge rather than an organization dedicated to Protestant morality or religious bigotry. The Klansmen of Colorado Springs were unable to develop a particular style or image. Harassed and intimidated, plagued by vapid issues and poor leadership, the Pikes Peak Klan never established a firm klavern identity. In its selection of issues, primed to actual community tensions and governmental unresponsiveness, the Klan became less a free agent and more a servant of the local environment.

Non-issue appeals, as well, attracted men to the secret society. The Klan was a political machine, and struggling office seekers joined to secure its vote. Membership could mean the difference between economic success or failure to a businessman. Mystery and excitement were powerful draws. For others, fraternalism was the only goal. "Marginal men" also appeared in Klan ranks. To those low in socioeconomic status, socially uprooted, or cut off from the network of community relations, the Klan offered a new sense of self-respect, dignity, and meaning. For ten dollars the Invisible Empire allowed a knight to rededicate his life in a holy crusade for the defense of Americanism, Protestantism, and the white race. Many Klansmen held no other fraternal memberships. In Denver sizable proportions of both early and late joiners had experienced the status frustrations and uncertainties of vertical mobility. A substantial number had only recently migrated to their communities. The Klan, with its emphasis upon familiar ideas, served those lacking roots as a comforting decompression chamber between rural and urban life. The organization probably facilitated their adaption to a new lifestyle.

HOODED EMPIRE

The importance of the marginal Klansman, however, should not be overdrawn. The most heavily traveled paths into the Invisible Empire ran through the lodge, the church, and the family. Friends and relatives served as part-time kleagles and were most able to overcome doubts about entering an unknown secret society. Informal work and leisure groups, with their own forms of communal bonds, were often the places where men first were introduced and later recruited into the Klan. Economic pressure and even social ostracism, rather than an unwanted self, prodded others to join. Further, short-term residence and factory employment do not necessarily indicate psychological insecurity or less anxiety about crime in the streets and Catholic "aggression." The Klan mobilized Protestants of differing socioeconomic status and background with an appeal to shared values and ideals. A common Protestant frame of reference toward minorities and lawbreakers cut across personal circumstances and allowed all to unite in defense of their community. Like more conventional organizations, the Klan was goal-directed, a problem-solving response keyed to local conditions. Those who joined to ease psychic tensions had little influence on the movement and were unrepresentative of their fellow members.

Despite Klan heterogeneity, a common theme emerges from the Colorado pattern. Viciousness and cruelty marked the personalities of few Klansmen and women. Instead, they were concerned citizens reacting to local problems left festering and untended by government authorities. Local government officials had failed to respond to grievances concerning an actual breakdown in law and order, minority challenges, and the necessity of civic reform. Retaining their basic faith in the system, they used the Klan to mobilize the discontented and reassert the influence of the Protestant majority. Their solution was usually political, the election of trusted men who would assail criminals, regulate minority groups, and initiate community improvements. Cooptation, as was the case in Grand Junction, could, however, effectively short-circuit and negate this Klan pattern. On the state level, too, the Klan's primary goal was to take control of the agencies and bureaus which had allegedly fallen into unreliable hands and thus make government more amenable to the Protestant will. At the same time, minorities often had to be reminded of their place with boycotts and fiery crosses. Klan membership was an optimistic commitment. Change could be effected, the problems remedied, once the law-abiding and God-fearing were aroused. Klansmen attempted not to resurrect a past golden age but

to make the Protestant hold on the present more secure. Their victory could only have been temporary.

The problem of government authorities being unresponsive in the face of local tensions was not confined to Colorado. Klansmen throughout the United States seemed to share the belief that public officials had left them defenseless or had actually betrayed them to a conspiracy of criminals, Catholics, Jews, and immigrants. Men entered the Klan in Madison, Wisconsin, because the police force appeared to have capitulated in the war against crime. The department, pockmarked by inefficiency and corruption, could offer the community no respite from bootleggers, murderers, and prostitutes. In El Dorado, Arkansas, residents accused the city government of collaborating with lawbreakers and ignoring rampant vice: "Gambling has been run wide open in several places. . . . Booze has been sold right over the bar and every known kind of vice has been going full sway. . . . All night long . . . women can be seen on the downtown streets with men in a drunken condition."⁶ Disgusted with the situation, Protestants accepted the Ku Klux Klan as the only means of cleansing their town. In the face of government lethargy Klansmen in Chattanooga, Tennessee, compiled a list of 100 suspected bootleggers and demanded their apprehension. All Klansmen knew the reason for the government's failure to act: two Catholics, a Jew, and a renegade Presbyterian, who hired "papists" to teach in the public schools, sat on the Chattanooga city commission. In Anaheim, California, Klansmen were instrumental in forcing an incompetent city official from office and later helped replace an administration branded as ineffective and fiscally irresponsible.⁷

The common Klan remedy for unresponsive government was the election of reliable men who could be depended upon to enforce the law and to protect rights. The presence of Klan public officers was usually sufficient to redress the balance in the Protestants' favor and keep Jews, Catholics, and blacks in their places. Rarely were discriminatory ordinances passed once the Klan attained power. Law and order required a more active defense, and communities frequently witnessed sustained anticrime campaigns. Some Klansmen, particularly in the Southwest, believed conditions were deteriorating too rapidly to await election day. They responded to government failure with direct action—the lash, the tar bucket, and the gun. Terrorism, however, was not official Klan policy and violence was usually perpetrated by independent bands of radicals. After 1923 the Klansmen of Texas, Oklahoma, and Arkansas discarded their

night-riding tactics and joined the rest of the Invisible Empire in pursuing their goals through the ballot box.⁸

The Colorado klaverns' differing positions on the appeal spectrum masked another factor making for homogeneity. No membership was monolithic, despite emphasis upon a particular Klan feature. Each organization was composed of a coalition of informal, competing groups separated by their diverse concerns. The law and order men coexisted uneasily with the "true believers," who in turn probably doubted the sincerity of the fraternalists and economically motivated. Grand Junction fraternalists overshadowed but did not silence the anti-Catholic and moral reforming members. Law and order advocates prevailed in the Pueblo Klan while nativists and anti-Catholics were also recruited. Jew and black baiters joined the Canon City Klan yet exercised little influence. The coalitional hierarchy was not static, and the Klan's thrust could shift with the fortunes of a rising or declining faction. Coalition heterogeneity furthered interklavern understanding and produced a measure of unity. No Colorado Klansman could ever be an outsider when visiting distant hooded brothers.

The Ku Klux Klan did not suddenly appear in a community, become inundated with klectokens, and automatically rise to power. Klan building, especially in the formative stage, was a slow process of contacting eligible men, persuading them to join, and following up their initial commitments. The keys to Klan mobilization success were the men who made their order's solutions to local problems appear reasonable and inexorable. These early leaders first introduced the organization to the community, shaped its early identity, controlled its growth, and were thus largely responsible for its future. The leaders of Denver, Pueblo, Canon City, and Grand Junction were imaginative, eloquent, enthusiastic, even charismatic. Walter Walker, John Galen Locke, George Lowe, and Frederick Arnold were well-known local figures who capitalized upon their connections and positions of trust and respect to attract followers. Each guided a competitive and volatile coalition of factions toward cooperative action. They restrained hotheads and radicals from independent adventures which would discredit the Klan, weaken its unity, and frustrate its aims. While exercising a tight internal rein, every leader had to hold his organization together against external attack. In tasks, responsibilities, and status, these men were no different from their counterparts in more conventional groups. Only the hood and robe set them apart. At the same time state-level leadership was entrusted to men who rarely pried or meddled in the af-

fairs of the local Klans. Both Colorado Grand Dragons granted klavern leaders maximum autonomy, thus avoiding the internal disension which tore apart other state organizations. The importance of the leadership variable to Klan health is obvious when the men in command were defamed, died, or too frequently replaced.

Community perceptions and the reactions of authorities touched every stage of Klan mobilization. The opinion-making public—newspaper editors, clergymen, respected local figures, and other shapers of attitudes—significantly influenced the meaning of the social movement. Their approval, neutrality, or hostility affected a man's propensity to join or vote with the organization. Similarly, government action could stimulate or retard Klan growth. Official silence was often interpreted as unofficial support. Klansmen in city and town halls actively recruited fellow citizens while frustrating investigations. Conversely, government disapproval in the form of harassment of leaders, disruption of meetings, and intimidation of individual members might have caused men to hesitate before joining. Repressive overkill, however, could arouse sympathy and make memberships firmer. Klan opponents responded to their hooded adversaries indirectly by exerting leverage upon the unaffiliated majority. The potency of the anti-Klan argument was a function of the intensity of the resistance, its tactics, the type of men who engineered the counteroffensive, and local Klan behavior. The Klan was most vulnerable when well-known Protestants built a permanent organization and repeatedly appealed to the populace with newspaper exposés, rallies, and intensive enlistment campaigns. Although it was easier to oust the secret society in its formative years before membership hardened, so intense a response, even if belated, could be effective. The Klan's advantage was greatest against a vacillating, minority-dominated thrust which appeared only before elections.

No Colorado community produced an opposition movement which swayed the public mind sufficiently to completely shut off the Klan impulse. The Colorado Springs counterforce most closely approximated the ideal type. An informal resistance movement, primarily composed of public opinion makers, responded to visible Klan intrusions with newspaper condemnations, government surveillance, and appeals to establish opposition groups. These efforts, combined with other factors, created a negative local perception but did not prevent the creation of Pikes Peak No. 11. Overt thrusts were met, yet anti-Klan sentiment could not be sustained against a hidden enemy. Not until the hard-fought municipal elections in 1925 did the Protestant social, economic, and political leadership

commit itself to a methodical anti-Klan campaign and aggressively rally the population against the secret society. In Denver the Klan survived opposition from several government sources in its first year and was never again seriously confronted. The anti-Klan forces were disorganized, appeared sporadically, and were unable to attract widespread Protestant popular or opinion maker support. The responses of Canon City and Grand Junction were more nearly typical. At first the Klan was accepted or at least tolerated. In Canon City Klan opponents misjudged the strength of the hooded appeal, awakening only after city and county government had been lost. Their Liberty League aroused the county, recaptured the courthouse, but could not sustain its drive against the Canon City stronghold. The Grand Junction Klan was a project of the elite and initially functioned solely as a fraternal lodge. There were few local objections to such an organization. Klan abuses, amplified by the town's newspaper, eventually forced the establishment to withdraw its support and the community to reverse its verdict. In this hostile environment the Klan died without the aid of an organized opposition. In Pueblo no group ever appeared to challenge Klan domination.

The major lines of interplay in the mobilization process between local tensions, unresponsive government, Klan leadership and program, the opinion-making public, opposition, residents' perceptions, and actions of authorities are diagrammed in Figure 3. The failure of local authorities to respond to real grievances and fears dissipated faith in the honesty and efficacy of elected officials. The government's inability to prevent crime or harass minorities made men and women susceptible to an extralegal agency's promises to ease such dissatisfaction. Community beliefs, buttressed by official pronouncements, tied religious and ethnic minorities to local problems (i.e. ethnic link to crime), further heightening receptivity. The absence of environmental supports plus the monotony of daily existence readied others for the Klan's appearance. Klan leaders responded with a diversified program modeled upon the needs of alienated Protestants. The package identified the sources of strain and offered convincing remedies. Klan proponents magnified the organization's allure by lending it their sincerity, respectability, and credibility. Public opinion makers and government officials were simultaneously shaping the Klan's local definition. Their acceptance, tolerance, or rejection affected a man's accessibility to Klan recruiters. The opposition force exerted influence upon community attitudes commensurate with the nature of its membership and campaign style. Klan actions as well as words fed back into the public

PRECONDITIONS

Local Tensions and Conflicts

- 1 Social
- 2 Political
- 3 Religious

Unresponsive Government

KLAN FORMATION

Klan Leaders Present Program

- 1 Explanations
- 2 Solutions
- 3 Other Appeals

COMMUNITY REACTION

Opinion-making Public

Opposition

Residents' Perceptions

Action of Authorities

MEMBERSHIP DECISION

Potential Member's Response

KLAN POWER

Size of Klavern

- Influence
- 1 Social
 - 2 Economic
 - 3 Political

Membership

Sympathizers

Figure 3. The Ku Klux Klan Mobilization Process.

mind. Church donations, acts of charity, and fiery cross threats generated negative and positive adjustments in the evolving judgment. Previous and newly arising tensions interacted with the Klan's proposals, the character of its leadership, and the community's perceptions upon each Protestant's frame of reference. Could the Klan make the streets safe for women and children? Were the tales of Catholic atrocities, learned as a youth, true? Were Klan leaders as corrupt as the newspapers claimed? What effect would a black neighbor have on property values? Were blacks lusting for his daughter? Was his low salary the product of Jewish scheming? Did the hood and robe mask an organization of cowards? Past experiences and current needs were analyzed in the family, work, church, and lodge settings. From such discussions came commitments to join the Invisible Empire, pledges of political support, opposition, and neutrality. As the Klan mobilized more and more resources and thus exercised increasing influence, its presence became another element affecting membership decisions.

The Klan did not exist in isolation and without reference to time. Changes in any of the variables, during any of the stages, could hasten or short-circuit the mobilization process. Adjusting community definitions and authorities' perceptions, the emergence of a strong opposition, evolving Klan strategy, leadership transition, heightened governmental effectiveness, and the rise and decline of local tensions constantly interacted upon joining motivation. The roles of the variables merged in this continuous interplay, making measurement of their relative importance difficult. Relationships may therefore be suggested but, in the absence of sufficient qualitative and quantitative evidence, not conclusively demonstrated.

III

Who joined the Ku Klux Klan in Colorado? Were Klansmen the stereotypic "marginal men" of American society? Was the Klan a movement of a particular social and economic class? Colorado examples indicate that the Klan's membership was highly diversified. Except for the elite, Klansmen were drawn from all sections of the socioeconomic class spectrum. Modifications in recruiting methods and issue salience enabled any white Protestant, regardless of background, to find a home in the Invisible Empire. Denver's early joiners were, as a group, prominent men holding high-status occupations and multiple fraternal memberships. The later appear-

ance in the klavern of men more representative of the outer society did not cause mass defections of early members. The later joiners were considered neither intruders nor subordinates. The two joining blocs were not uniform; diversity existed between and also within them. Both groups had sizable shares of urban newcomers and life-long residents. Early joiners, as a whole, lived in their community for longer periods, yet more than one-fourth resided in Denver three years or less; over one-third, six years or less. At the same time, 41 percent of the late joiners were recent migrants and 20 percent long-time residents. Similarly, two-thirds of the late joiners labored in lower middle and working-class occupations while one-fifth held high or middle nonmanual jobs. Early joiner occupational figures were: 51.5 percent employed in the high-status occupations and 37 percent in the lower occupational divisions. Late joiners were not shunned but welcomed as Klan voters and allies in internal factional battles. What disharmony did exist was more a product of conflicting issue interests than differing economic status. In addition, discord had little time to develop in the short period between the opening of the membership rolls and the Minute Men split. Common generational and life experiences also seemed to lessen socioeconomic disparities. Denver Klansmen were married and middle-aged. A large majority were born on farms or in the small towns of Colorado and the east and west north-central states. All but a fraction had escaped service in World War I and were perhaps seeking a patriotic substitute in the 1920s.

Fremont County's "visible" Klansmen also demonstrated a tendency to cluster at both extremes of the length of residence continuum. Twenty-five percent of the knights had lived in the community three years or less, as opposed to 19.5 percent, eighteen years or more. Like Denver's early joiners, members with high and middle nonmanual occupations dominated their Klan's occupational structure. Still, one-fourth of the men were occupationally lower middle or working class. Although older and more rural in background, the Klansmen of Fremont County did resemble their Denver comrades as to regions of birth, military service, and marital status.

Table 8 is a compilation of available occupational information for Klansmen in five American klaverns. Data for Aurora, Illinois (1920 population 36,397), Knox County (113,000), and Winchester, Illinois (1,540), were obtained from Kenneth Jackson's *The Ku Klux Klan in the City* and resorted into the occupational categories used in this study. A list of Chicago Klansmen was excluded because of its

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Table 8. Occupational Distribution of Selected Klaverns by Percent

Occupational Status Group	Denver				Knox County		
	Fremont County	Early	Late	Total	Aurora	(Knoxville)	Winchester
High nonmanual	11.0	15.5	3	7.6	19	8.5	12
Middle nonmanual	39.5	36.0	18	25.0	30	12.0	46
Low nonmanual	7.0	20.3	24	22.6	25	15.1	9
Skilled	8.5	8.5	19	15.0	5	26.6	8
Semiskilled and service	8.0	7.5	17	13.6	14	30.0	7
Unskilled	1.5	.5	7	4.4	7	7.8	18
Retired	1.5	-	-	-	-	-	-
Unknown	23.0	11.7	12	11.8	-	-	-
Total	200	375	583	958	73	399	180

SOURCE: Tables 5 and 7; Jackson, *Klan in the City*, 62, 119, 120.

unreliability. Unfortunately, it is uncertain whether the occupations cited for these Aurora, Knox County, and Winchester Klansmen are representative of their entire klavern's membership.

Farmers and small businessmen combined with the professional class to numerically dominate the smaller Fremont County, Aurora, and Winchester Klans. Klansmen in the high and middle nonmanual status groups also ruled the occupational structure of the Denver early joiner sample. Most of these knights were not of the "struggling businessman" or "advertising chiropractor" variety. Conversely, lower middle and working-class membership in the Denver late joiner group and in the Knox County Klan stood at 67 percent and 79.5 percent respectively. The Denver Klan's recruitment of the occupationally less prestigious late joiners had lowered the organization's level of economic status. When the Denver samples are joined, one-third of the Klansmen held occupations in the high and middle nonmanual range while 55.6 percent were employed in jobs below that line. In no Klan other than Winchester No. 72 did the unskilled comprise more than 8 percent of the membership. On another level, every Klan but Knox County No. 14 contained a white-collar population of 45 percent or more.

While small-town Klansmen may have been socially and economically respectable, simple counting substantiates the notion of a lower middle-working class movement. Of the 1,810 men listed

above, two-thirds labored in occupations below middle nonmanual. Despite appearances, the statistics do not support a clean urban-rural dichotomy. Closer examination of the Denver case suggests significant qualifications. When Denver late and early joiners are combined and the unknowns are excluded, the men in the higher-status occupations are outnumbered almost two to one. The lower-status groups' advantage existed, however, because Denver's economy generated more clerical and blue-collar jobs and not as a result of special appeals to the occupationally marginal types or a worker's alleged greater propensity to join a social movement. Perhaps the situation was similar in Knox County.

Denver Klan membership reflected the outside environment. The economic makeup of the late joiners, except in the unskilled category, closely approximated the city's wider occupational structure. The cross-sectional pattern is warped when early and late joiner blocs are considered as a unit, since the original members were a select body recruited through exclusive professional, business, and fraternal links. If the occupational characteristics of the total membership are compared to the Denver distribution, the high and middle nonmanual categories are overrepresented, the low nonmanual division equivalent, and all blue-collar groups underrepresented in Klan ranks. In other words, the Denver Klan drew a greater share of the upper economic groups than appeared in the outer society. Most slighted were the unskilled workers.

Denver and Pueblo Klan leaders were remarkably alike in occupational and social status. Three-fourths of the men were employed in high or middle nonmanual occupations with only a handful wearing blue collars. Residing an average of more than fourteen years in their communities, many were fraternally well connected and almost all were married. Their mean age was over forty years with Pueblo men slightly older than the Denverites. Marital status was the only characteristic they shared with their Colorado Springs counterparts. Only one-third of the leaders of Pikes Peak Klan No. 11 were employed in high or middle nonmanual positions while one-third labored in manual jobs. These men had also lived in their city for shorter periods, a mean of 8.6 years. There were no significant differences between the Denver leadership and the socially and economically comparable early joiners in terms of place or length of residence, age, occupational status, and fraternal memberships. Like the early joiners, the leaders tended to hold higher-status jobs and affiliate with more lodges than did the late joiners. Fremont

County's "visible" Klansmen were older and had resided in their community shorter periods, but scored similarly on the other variables.

Diversity is as much the key to understanding Klan membership as it was to interpreting the Klan appeal. Prominent men led and held together a heterogeneous membership attracted from almost every stratum of the society. The Colorado Klan was not an economic movement or a spokesman for the socially deprived. The Denver case demonstrated that, excluding the elite and unskilled laborers, the Klan rank and file was an occupational cross-section of the local community. Distortions of this pattern were often the product of defections, recruiting bias, a socioeconomically skewed Klan leadership or opposition, and unrepresentative samples.

IV

The Klan's attempt to tighten the Protestant grip on state government was the beginning of the Colorado realm's end. Klan leaders quickly discovered that the skills required to conduct a successful election campaign were not the same as those needed to steer a program through the legislature. Outmaneuvered at every turn by experienced politicians, the Klan amateurs were unable to prevent the emasculation of their plans. The Klan's proposals to eliminate state boards and agencies antagonized government bureaucrats who then refused to execute the governor's orders. As a result, Klansmen were left commanding the symbols but not the essence of power.

Legislative impotence was a Klan experience nationally. Klansmen in California, Kansas, Maine, Ohio, and Tennessee scored impressive electoral gains yet suffered governmental frustration. Election day had cleared the barricades but had not opened the road to power. Often the Klan commitments of office seekers were rooted in votes rather than ideology. Once elected, these politicians ignored their hooded supporters and refused to follow the Klan line. Bureaucrats viewed Klansmen not as Republicans or Democrats but as usurpers who only temporarily held the reins of government. Owing no loyalty to the political upstarts, they quietly smothered offensive Klan demands under a blanket of red tape. The inexperience of Klan political newcomers further dulled the hooded impact. Internal dissension was another cause of Klan failure. In Indiana, the only realm to match the Colorado organization's political influence, factional disputes between hooded legislative blocs enabled opponents to mutilate the Klan package. Unprepared for crushing

legislative defeat so soon after sweeping electoral success, Klansmen began the questioning which would gradually erode their ties to the Invisible Empire.

V

The variables that affected Klan growth also operated in its decline. In each community shifts in issue salience, governmental responsiveness, Klan leadership, and local perceptions interacted to diminish resources and force the secret society into retreat. The Klan grew in an emotionally charged atmosphere filled with unrestrained, larger than life villains. Government officials seemed unable or unwilling to cope with the lawbreakers, Catholics, Jews, and blacks bent upon undermining white Anglo-Saxon Protestant hegemony. By the mid-1920s the dangers had passed or never appeared. Crime waves had declined in severity and became less threatening. Jews and Catholics had not organized to take over the government. The black thrust was more symbolic than real and was easily blunted. The hooded vehicle had outlived its usefulness and was no longer necessary or relevant. Success proved as debilitating as the absence of enemies. Klan officials had curbed crime in Pueblo and initiated reforms in Canon City, thus completely or at least partially stripping their organization of purpose.

Others lost interest because they considered their Klan experience a betrayal. Despite promises to clean up Denver, the Klan police force was riddled with corruption. Although in control of the governor's office and the lower house of the state legislature, the Klan could not rid the capital of Catholics and Jews. Domination of Grand Junction's city hall produced only abuses of power and public antagonism. The governmental responsiveness variable could thus reverse in several directions. It could work to the organization's detriment whether Klansmen in the government succeeded or failed in restoring responsiveness. Nonmembers or anti-Klansmen could also cause the variable to function negatively by making government more amenable to local needs. Some "true believers" would not have been satisfied until the Klan had torn down convent walls and herded the Jews into ghettos. A few felt that the Klan had lured them by cynically manipulating imaginary fears. Those tuned to non-issue appeals were similarly disillusioned. Instead of fraternity and spiritual regeneration, the Klan furnished its members a number and a place in a crowd of anonymous milling men. What had been mysterious and exciting in 1924 became banal and inane in

1926. Their needs met or thwarted, men withdrew their loyalty, time, money, and votes, and the coalition crumbled.

Klan leaders could not stop their organization's slide. While often the same men who had nursed the Klan through its formative years, they could not find the means to later survival. Officers were unable to refocus the Klan program, and it lagged behind events. Political defeat, judgment errors, and disaffected rivals discredited and drained them of their influence. Election blunders weakened the Colorado Springs leadership and immorality destroyed the Exalted Cyclops of Grand Junction. Fred Arnold fell victim to disease and John Locke to hubris and an alliance of powerful foes. Leadership failure further tarnished the organization's reputation as it left the rank and file without direction.

Methodical campaigning helped turn Colorado Springs and Canon City against the hooded order. Anti-Klan sentiment could also, as in Grand Junction, crystalize without a formal effort. Regardless of the means, public hostility initially mutilated the Klan's image for potential recruits, thus cutting off growth. Friends' and neighbors' antagonism then robbed the Klan of its political and economic sympathizers, the men and women needed to secure power for a minority movement. Later, ostracized and impotent, Klansmen gradually found membership supports insufficient to sustain enthusiasm.

Except for a brief interval in 1928, interest faded and the Klan disappeared into the back pages of Colorado's newspapers. The Klan attempted to funnel anti-Al Smith sentiment into a renewed membership drive, but its disgrace was too fresh in the public mind. Besides, there were far more interesting topics in the "ballyhoo years": Would Lindbergh arrive safely in Paris? What would the new Ford automobile look like? What was the price of a common share of American Can?

VI

Did the Klan attract more men in the nation's small towns than in its metropolitan areas? Did urban klaverns dominate realm decision-making? Were Klan leaders and newspapers products of the small town or the city? Both sides in the debate concerning the Klan's small-town or urban nature can find support in the Colorado realm. Denver, while containing only one-fourth of the state's population, recruited at least half of the organization's knights. Grand

Dragon John Galen Locke had spent his entire adult life in large cities. Many state leaders as well as the Klan's 1924 candidates for governor and U.S. senator resided in Denver. Conversely, the Minute Men split ended the Queen City's primacy, and Fred Arnold and his staff operated from a small town. Of Colorado's four Klan newspapers, only one, the *Protestant Herald* of Denver, was published in a city of more than 11,000 people. Although only a handful of issues are extant, all of the newspapers seemed to share a fascination with homilies and local social gossip, hardly characteristic of an urban environment. Even the news stories were written in a folksy style.⁹

The Klan adapted to Colorado's cities and towns regardless of population, minority presence, rate of growth, or economic base. The mobilization variables, rather than physical or demographic features, determined the degree of Klan success. While there were more Klansmen in the cities, small-town knights recruited a higher percentage of their communities and exercised greater influence in local affairs. Small-town and big-city Klan behavior was indistinguishable. Denver Klansmen were as likely as their Canon City counterparts to stage parades, conduct charity drives, or burn crosses to threaten enemies. Outdoor initiations and barbecues were as well attended in the city as in the small town. Politics infected almost all klaverns equally. At least in Colorado, the urban-rural dichotomy proved useless as a guide to understanding the secret society.¹⁰

VII

Kleagles attempted to revive the Colorado Ku Klux Klan during the 1930s. Their recruiting efforts, however, failed to net many new men or excite former members. Coloradans watched the last cross burn in 1940. Thirty-six years later, at a time of racial unrest precipitated by court-ordered school busing, the Klan was resurrected in Denver. "Grand Wizard" Jerry Dutton of Louisiana was looking for men who would work for the expatriation of blacks and fight the international Jewish conspiracy. As in 1922, Denver's district attorney reacted to the intrusion by assigning an investigator to scrutinize the organization's moves. "I'm concerned," said Dale Tooley, "about the lack of official response to the Klan in this community. . . ." Also reminiscent of the 1920s was the Anti-Defamation League's decision to repulse the Klan by ignoring it. Dutton's task would be vastly more difficult than was John Galen Locke's, yet

dependent upon the same variables: community perception, leadership capabilities, governmental responsiveness, and the existence of local problems. Perhaps, rather than neglecting the danger, opponents should review Colorado's past for the tools of resistance. They thus might learn the answer to a Denver Klansman's jeer, "What in hell do we care for history?"¹²

APPENDIX A
CLASSIFICATION OF OCCUPATIONS
BY STATUS GROUP

I. HIGH NONMANUAL

Architect
Banker
Businessman (sufficient property)
Chemist
Chiropractor
Clergyman
Dentist
Editor
Engineer (except locomotive or stationary)
Farm Owner, large
Government Official, upper echelon
Lawyer/Judge
Manufacturer, large
Optometrist
Osteopath
Pharmacist
Physician
Teacher
Veterinarian

II. MIDDLE NONMANUAL

Accountant/Auditor
Actor
Aviator
Businessman, small
Buyer/Department Head
College Student
Contractor
Creditman
Dietician

HOODED EMPIRE

Draftsman
Embalmer
Farm Owner, small
Floor Manager
Government Official, middle echelon
Inspector
Manager of a Business
Manufacturer's Agent

III. LOW NONMANUAL

Agent
Auctioneer
Bank Teller
Bookkeeper
Cashier
Collector
Dispatcher
Express Messenger
Foreman
Government Official, lower echelon
Head Waiter
Huckster/Peddler
Insurance Salesman
Mail Carrier
Office Clerk
Police Sergeant
Railway Clerk
Real Estate Salesman
Sales Clerk
Salesman
Shipping and Receiving Clerk
Stenographer/Secretary
Telegraph Messenger

IV. SKILLED (Apprentices in v, Self-employed in II)

Baker
Blacksmith
Boilermaker
Bookbinder
Brick and Stone Mason
Butcher
Cabinetmaker
Carpenter
Cement and Concrete Finisher

Compositor/Printer
Electrician
Engraver
Engineer, locomotive or stationary
Fireman, locomotive
Furrier
Glassblower
Jeweler/Watchmaker
Lithographer
Machinist
Mechanic
Millwright
Painter
Piano Tuner
Plasterer
Plumber
Roofer
Shoemaker (except factory)
Steamfitter
Tailor
Tinsmith
Tool and Die Maker
Upholsterer
Vulcanizer

V. SEMISKILLED AND SERVICE

Apprentice
Attendant
Barber
Brakeman
Chainman
Chauffeur
Conductor, bus or street railroad
Cook
Cooper
Deliveryman
Driver, car, bus, truck, or tram
Dyer
Elevator Operator
Factory Operative
Fireman
Guard, Watchman
Heavy Machine Operator
Janitor

HOODED EMPIRE

Launderer
Meterman
Mine Operative
Policeman
Repairman
Sawyer
Soldier
Switchman, railroad
Waiter
Welder

VI. UNSKILLED

Gardener
Laborer
Porter

APPENDIX B

ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE COLORADO KLAN AND THE PROTESTANT CHURCHES

The religious aspects of the Ku Klux Klan have led historians to investigate the relationship between organized Protestantism and the hooded order. Ministers and church members may have joined the Klan as individuals, but what were the views of the Protestant establishment? Studies on the national level have produced no evidence of outright Klan-church collusion. For example, Robert Moats Miller's survey of the church press, minutes of national denominational conventions, and the opinions of prominent clergymen failed to detect support for the Klan. Unfortunately, few state-level studies consider the question in detail. One exception, an examination of the Mississippi Klan, uncovered a general pattern of "passive resistance" and an absence of formal ties between church and Klan.'

In Colorado most state Protestant organizations remained neutral and observed Klan-engendered prejudice and tensions in silence. The Northern Baptist church, with 24,000 members, did not shy from controversial issues during the 1920s. Its state conventions adopted resolutions demanding strict prohibition enforcement, favoring America's entrance into the World Court, and censuring Charles Darwin's theory of evolution. The Baptists never raised the Klan question in convention, and they did not oust leading Klansmen from posts in the church hierarchy. The church's executive committee did, however, refuse in 1924 to financially support a supply minister who neglected his religious duties because of Klan commitments. The *Colorado Baptist Bulletin* also kept silent about the Klan, but a flurry of anti-Catholic articles in late 1926 gave some indication of its sentiments. The leaders of Colorado's 27,000 Presbyterians were too busy fighting polygamy and defending the sabbath to heed the Klan danger. The Methodists, the state's largest Protestant denomination with nearly 47,000 members, were the first to consider the Klan problem. In 1923 the state conference passed a vaguely worded resolution which condemned "private law enforcement" without specifically naming the Ku Klux Klan. During the same conference the Lay Association of the Colorado Methodist Church approved a similar resolution but rebuked the Klan directly. Apparently satisfied with their mild rep-

rimand, the Methodists avoided the subject at later meetings. Both the Congregationalists and Episcopalians delayed their denunciations of the Klan until 1925. Only the fundamentalist Pillar of Fire Church, with congregations in Denver and Colorado Springs, gave its official support to the harbingers of the "new reformation."

The Invisible Empire rose to power with the aid of ministers from all denominations who turned their churches into Klan sanctuaries and recruiting camps. These ministers served the realm at all leadership levels and willingly bestowed their benedictions upon the fiery cross. They welcomed delegations of Klansmen and eagerly accepted their donations. They gave the Klan its aura of religious respectability. The activities of clergymen in urban and rural parishes thus assumed far greater weight than the belated and ineffective resolutions of the state conventions. On the local level in Colorado, the silent observer became the silent partner.



NOTES

PREFACE

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2. John Moffatt Mecklin, *The Ku Klux Klan: A Study of the American Mind* (New York, 1924); John Higham, *Strangers in the Land* (New York, 1970); Richard Hofstadter, *The Age of Reform: From Bryan to F.D.R.* (New York, 1955); William Leuchtenburg, *The Perils of Prosperity, 1914-1932* (Chicago, 1958); Seymour Martin Lipset and Earl Raab, *The Politics of Unreason: Right-Wing Extremism in America, 1790-1970* (New York, 1970).
3. Hofstadter, *Age of Reform*, 294.
4. Lipset and Raab, *Politics of Unreason*, Chapter 4; John A. Davis, "The Ku Klux Klan in Indiana, 1920-1930: An Historical Study" (Ph.D. dissertation, Northwestern University, 1966), 244.
5. Charles C. Alexander, *The Ku Klux Klan in the Southwest* (Lexington, Ky., 1966), 21.
6. Kenneth T. Jackson, *The Ku Klux Klan in the City, 1915-1930* (New York, 1967), 245.
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8. *Ibid.*, 103, 96.
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10. Garin Burbank, "Agrarian Radicals and Their Opponents: Political Conflict in Southern Oklahoma, 1910-1924," *Journal of American History*, LVIII (June, 1971), 18-19; Emerson H. Loucks, *The Ku Klux Klan in Pennsylvania: A Study in Nativism* (Harrisburg, Pa., 1936), 60.
11. Lipset and Raab, *Politics of Unreason*, 125.
12. Frederick Lewis Allen, *Only Yesterday* (New York, 1931), 56.
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14. Jackson, *Klan in the City*, 240-41.
15. Hiram Wesley Evans, "The Klan's Fight for Americanism," *North American Review*, CCXXIII (Mar., 1926), 49.
16. Allen, *Only Yesterday*, 56.
17. Alexander, *Klan in the Southwest*, 18-19.

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18. For more detailed discussions of the continuity between conventional groups and social movements, see William A. Gamson, *The Strategy of Social Protest* (Homewood, Ill., 1975); Anthony Oberschall, *Social Conflict and Social Movements* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1973); Charles Tilly, "From Mobilization to Political Conflict" (unpublished manuscript, University of Michigan, 1970).

CHAPTER ONE

1. Edgar I. Fuller, *The Maelstrom: The Visible of the Invisible Empire* (Denver, 1925), 76; William G. Shepherd, "How I Put Over the Klan," *Collier's*, LXXXII (July 14, 1928), 7; Robert L. Duffus, "Salesmen of Hate," *World's Work*, XLVI (May, 1923), 31; Winfield Jones, *Story of the Ku Klux Klan* (Washington, D.C., 1921), 58-62.
2. Monsignor Matthew Smith, "Facts of How K.K.K. Got Colorado Start Are Given," *Denver Catholic Register*, Feb. 26, 1948; *Rocky Mountain News*, Jan. 5, 1894.
3. Jones, *Story of the Ku Klux Klan*, 59.
4. U.S. Congress, House Committee on Rules, *Hearings on the Ku Klux Klan*, 67th Cong., 1st sess. (1921), 32-34, 148; William G. Shepherd, "Ku Klux Koin," *Collier's*, LXXXII (July 21, 1928), 39.
5. Chalmers, *Hooded Americanism*, 39, 40, 88, 175, 236, 237, 260; Jackson, *Klan in the City*, 96, 237, 239.
6. Smith, "Facts of How K.K.K. Got Colorado Start," *Denver Catholic Register*.
7. Colorado, Board of Immigration, *Year Book of the State of Colorado, 1919* (Denver, 1919), 5; Colorado, Board of Immigration, *Colorado: Eastern Colorado* (Denver, 1925), 8-38; Writers' Program of the Works Progress Administration, *Colorado: A Guide to the Highest State* (New York, 1941), 5-6; U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, *Fourteenth Census of the United States, 1920: Population*, I, 82, 321, 323, 326.
8. *Boulder News-Herald*, May 28, 1924.
9. Dick Griffith to William Sweet, Sept. 23, 1924, Box 1; the Reverend Paul A. Shields to Sweet, Dec. 20, 1924, Box 6; Ernest W. Norlin to Sweet, Apr. 17, 1923, Box 6, Records of the Office of the Governor, William Sweet, 1923-25, Correspondence, 1923-24, Colorado State Archives and Record Service; *Denver Post*, Mar. 19, 1924.
10. *Rocky Mountain American*, Jan. 31, 1925.
11. Alma White, *Klansmen: Guardians of Liberty* (Zarephath, N.J., 1926), 45.
12. Alma White, *Heroes of the Fiery Cross* (Zarephath, N.J., 1928), 119-20.
13. U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, *Census of Religious Bodies: 1926*, I, 585; Hiram Wesley Evans, "The Ballots behind the Ku Klux Klan," *World's Work*, LV (Jan., 1928), 250; Hiram Wesley Evans, "The Attitude of the Knights of the Ku Klux Klan toward the Roman Catholic Hierarchy," in *Papers Read at the Meeting of Grand Dragons, Knights of the Ku Klux Klan at Their First Annual Meeting* (Asheville, N.C., 1923), 113-17; *Rocky Mountain American*, Mar. 6, 1925; *Crowley County Leader*, Feb. 13, 1925.

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15. Alma White, *The Ku Klux Klan in Prophecy* (Zarephath, N.J., 1925), 26.
16. White, *Klan in Prophecy*, 26; *Good Citizen*, May, June, 1924; *Rocky Mountain American*, Mar. 13, 1925; *Crowley County Leader*, Feb. 13, 1925; *Denver Catholic Register*, Apr. 10, July 10, 1924; *Imperial Nighthawk*, May 7, 1924.
17. White, *Heroes of the Fiery Cross*, 34.
18. *Good Citizen*, Feb., Mar., 1924, Dec., 1927; *Rocky Mountain American*, Jan. 31, 1925; Hiram Wesley Evans, *The Attitude of the Ku Klux Klan toward the Jew* (Atlanta, 1923), 4; White, *Heroes of the Fiery Cross*, 10-11; White, *Klan in Prophecy*, 50-53.
19. Hiram Wesley Evans, *The Attitude of the Knights of the Ku Klux Klan toward Immigration* (Atlanta, 1923), 5-7; *Good Citizen*, Jan., 1924, July, 1927; *Rocky Mountain American*, Apr. 24, 1925.
20. White, *Klan in Prophecy*, 135; *Good Citizen*, Oct., 1927; Hiram Wesley Evans, "The Klan's Challenge and the Reply," *Literary Digest*, LXXIX (Nov. 17, 1923), 32; *Pueblo Chieftain*, Sept. 30, 1923.
21. [John Galen Locke], "A Klansman's Obligation as a Patriot to His God, His Country, His Home and His Fellowmen," in *Papers Read*, 60.
22. Hiram Wesley Evans, "Where Do We Go from Here?" in *Papers Read*, 7.
23. Personal interview, Grand Junction, May 3, 1975.

CHAPTER TWO

1. Fuller, *The Maelstrom*, 76.
2. William F. Christians, "Land Utilization in Denver" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago, 1938), 2-4, 148, 167; Homer B. Vanderblue, *Denver the Industrial City* (Denver, 1922?), 3-4; U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Fourteenth Census of the United States, 1920: Occupations*, IV, 1095-98; *1919: Manufactures*, IX, 162-65; *1920: Population*, II, 47, 49, 52; U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Fifteenth Census of the United States, 1930: Population*, I, 22, III, 307; U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Census of Religious Bodies: 1916*, I, 245-46; *1926*, I, 406-7.
3. *People of the State of Colorado v. W. R. Given*, 1922; *Denver Express*, Sept. 17, 1921; *Denver Times*, June 17, 1921.
4. U.S. Congress, House Committee on Rules, *Hearings on the Ku Klux Klan*, 36.
5. Interview with Harvey T. Sethman by James Davis, Denver, Mar. 27, 1963; *Rocky Mountain News*, June 30, 1921; *Denver Post*, July 2, 8, 1921; *New York World*, Sept. 9, 1921.
6. *Denver Post*, July 25, 1921.
7. *Denver Express*, Sept. 19, 20, 21, 1921.
8. *Ibid.*, Sept. 17, 28, 1921.
9. Wilbur Fiske Stone, ed., *History of Colorado* (Chicago, 1918), I, 727, II,

- 448-49; *Denver Catholic Register*, Feb. 26, 1948; Sethman interview; *Daily Sentinel* (Grand Junction), July 20, 1925; Lee Casey, "When the Ku Klux Klan Controlled Colorado" (series of articles), *Rocky Mountain News*, June 17, 1946. Imperial Wizard Simmons held Locke in such high esteem that he appointed him in 1921 to the board of directors of Klan-controlled Lanier University in Atlanta. U.S. Congress, House Committee on Rules, *Hearings on the Ku Klux Klan*, 107.
10. Interview with Byron Akers, Colorado Springs, Oct. 31, 1975.
 11. *Pueblo Chieftain*, July 20, 1925; interview with Glenn Saunders by James Davis, Denver, Sept. 1, 1963; interview with Glenn Saunders by author, Denver, July 8, 1975; Casey, *Rocky Mountain News*, June 17, 1946; *Denver Post*, Aug. 14, 1924.
 12. *Denver Catholic Register*, Feb. 26, 1948; interview with Monsignor Gregory Smith, Denver, Feb. 21, 1975; personal interview, Denver, Sept. 12, 1975; interview with Ray Humphreys by James Davis, Denver, Feb. 27, 1963; Marjorie Hornbein, personal letter, Jan. 23, 1975; Saunders interview by Davis.
 13. *Denver Post*, June 18, 1922.
 14. *Denver Catholic Register*, Jan. 26, 1922; *Denver Express*, Mar. 1, 1922; *Denver Post*, Feb. 25, Mar. 13, June 18, 1922.
 15. *Denver Post*, Feb. 20, 1922; Denver Klan No. 1, Roster of Members, Ku Klux Klan Collection, State Historical Society of Colorado.
 16. Letter to Ward Gash, 1922, Ku Klux Klan Collection, Western History Department, Denver Public Library.
 17. *Denver Post*, Feb. 25, Mar. 11, 13, July 28, Aug. 29, 1922; *Denver Express*, Feb. 25, 1922; *Rocky Mountain News*, Mar. 10, 1922; *Colorado Statesman*, Mar. 18, 1922; *Report of the Grand Jury*, 1922; interview with Robert R. Maiden by James Davis, Denver, Jan. 20, 1963; Don Zylstra, "When the Ku Klux Klan Ran Denver," *Denver Post Roundup*, Jan. 5, 1958, 6.
 18. *Denver Express*, Mar. 7, 1922; *Rocky Mountain News*, Mar. 17, 1922; Monsignor Smith interview; Robert L. Perkin, *The First Hundred Years: An Informal History of Denver and the Rocky Mountain News* (New York, 1959), 462; B'nai B'rith Lodge No. 171, Minutes, Apr. 23, Mar. 27, 1924; Allen Breck, *The Centennial History of the Jews of Colorado, 1859-1959* (Denver, 1961), 196; Ida L. Uchill, *Pioneers, Peddlers, and Tsadikim* (Denver, 1957), 160-61; *Denver Post*, Mar. 6, 1922.
 19. Henry P. Fry, *The Modern Ku Klux Klan* (Boston, 1922), 89. One ex-Klansman considered the oath still binding fifty years after joining and refused to discuss the inner workings of the organization; personal interview, Denver, Feb. 10, 1975.
 20. *Denver Times*, June 6, 1922; *Denver Post*, Apr. 2, 1935.
 21. Philip Van Cise, *Fighting the Underworld* (Cambridge, Mass., 1936), 22.
 22. *Denver Express*, Jan. 3, 1922.
 23. Interview with Robert R. Maiden by author, Denver, Jan. 25, 1975; *Denver Post*, Jan. 22, Dec. 31, 1922, Dec. 28, 1924.

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24. *Denver Post*, June 2, Oct. 4, 8, 13, 1921; *Rocky Mountain News*, Sept. 9, 1921.
25. *Denver Post*, June 22, 1921.
26. Van Cise, *Fighting the Underworld*, 21, 143, 148, 149; *Report of the Grand Jury*, 1922; *Denver Post*, Apr. 2, June 3, 1921, Mar. 24, Apr. 23, July 14, 16, 1922.
27. *Denver Post*, Aug. 21, 1921.
28. *Denver Express*, Apr. 27, June 3, 1922, Jan. 27, 1923; Maiden interview with author.
29. *Denver Post*, May 12, 1922.
30. *Ibid.*, Apr. 7, 1923.
31. *Ibid.*, Feb. 7, Sept. 21, 1921, Dec. 5, 1922, Mar. 31, 1923.
32. *Ibid.*, Feb. 11, 1921.
33. *Ibid.*, Jan. 1, 1923.
34. *Ibid.*, Apr. 16, Oct. 31, Nov. 5, 1922, Mar. 19, 1924.
35. *State of Colorado v. Given*, 1922.
36. James H. Baker and LeRoy R. Hafen, *History of Colorado* (Denver, 1927), IV, 71; Saunders interview by author; personal interview, Denver, Feb. 10, 1975.
37. The Colorado House of Representatives passed a bill in 1915 with several future Klansmen voting in favor of the measure, but it was defeated in the Senate. Colorado General Assembly, *House Journal*, 20th sess. (1915), 199, 696; *Senate Journal*, 1406.
38. Samuel Wallace Johnson, *Autobiography* (Denver, 1960), 85, 90–92, 95; Carla Joan Atchison, "Nativism in Colorado Politics: The American Protective Association and the Ku Klux Klan" (Master's thesis, University of Colorado, 1972), 52–53; *Denver Catholic Register*, June 12, July 24, 1913, Apr. 23, Sept. 3, Oct. 8, Nov. 12, 1914, Feb. 4, June 3, 1915, Feb. 3, Mar. 16, Sept. 21, 1916, Mar. 15, 1917, Dec. 9, 1918, June 12, 1919, May 27, 1920, Nov. 6, 1947; Monsignor Smith interview.
39. *Denver Catholic Register*, Apr. 7, 1921.
40. *Ibid.*, Sept. 1, 1921.
41. *Ibid.*, Sept. 15, 1921.
42. *Ibid.*, July 21, 1921; *Denver Post*, Mar. 21, July 26, 1923; Maiden interview by author.
43. *Rocky Mountain News*, May 1, 1914.
44. Casey, *Rocky Mountain News*, June 19, 1946.
45. Monsignor Smith interview; *Denver Catholic Register*, "Historical Index: 1913–1939"; *Denver Catholic Register*, Sept. 7, 1916, May 12, 1921; Johnson, *Autobiography*, 94, 201, 205; *Colorado Catholic*, Jan. 18, Oct. 20, 1894; *Denver Post*, June 18, 1924; Fred A. Rosenstock, "The Denver I Remember," *Denver Westerners 1974 Brand Book*, xxix (Boulder, 1974), 417; telephone conversation, Denver, Sept. 28, 1975.
46. White, *Klansmen*, 131; *Good Citizen*, Feb., 1923. Bishop White published and edited *Woman's Chains* concurrently with the bitterly anti-Catholic

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Good Citizen. *Woman's Chains* vigorously advocated women's liberation from social, religious, and civil restrictions.

47. U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Census of Religious Bodies: 1916*, I, 245; 1926, I, 406; *Denver City Directory*, 1924; Breck, *Centennial History of the Jews*, 190; Uchill, *Pioneers, Peddlers, and Tsadikim*, 208–30; Saunders interview by author; personal interview, Denver, May 17, 1975.
48. *Denver Jewish News*, Aug. 24, 1921.
49. Saunders interview by author.
50. Van Cise, *Fighting the Underworld*, 39; *Denver Jewish News*, June 18, 1919, May 25, 1921; Maiden interview by author; *Denver Post*, Oct. 15, 1921; Breck, *Centennial History of the Jews*, 118.
51. *Denver Express*, Feb. 7, 1924.
52. *Denver Post*, Oct. 1, 1922.
53. Globeville, the city's other major immigrant neighborhood, failed to attract the Klan's attention because of its isolation and the absence of the crucial link to crime. Colorado WPA Writers' Program, "Racial Groups in Denver," typescript in Box 5, U.S. Works Progress Administration Papers, Western History Department, Denver Public Library; Carleton H. Reed, "A Culture-Area Study of Crime and Delinquency in the Italian Colony of Denver, Colorado" (Master's thesis, University of Colorado, 1940), 15–18; *Denver Post*, Aug. 21, Oct. 15, 1921, Jan. 10, 1924; Maiden interview with author; Saunders interview with author.
54. Interview with Dr. Clarence Holmes, Denver, Mar. 21, 1975.
55. *Denver Star*, Apr. 3, Sept. 25, Nov. 13, 1915, Sept. 9, 1916; *Denver Post*, Dec. 17, 1915, Sept. 8, 1916; *Rocky Mountain News*, Sept. 8, 1916.
56. A similar incident occurred in 1924 at Manual High School. *Denver Express*, Mar. 19, 1924.
57. Holmes interview; *Denver Post*, Nov. 11, 1920, Dec. 2, 1921, Feb. 5, 6, 9, 1923. On Mar. 27, 1924, the Denver school board ordered black and white students to attend separate social functions. Blacks brought suit seeking an injunction to restrain the school board from enforcing the edict. The case was appealed to the Colorado Supreme Court, which on Jan. 24, 1927, reversed a lower court ruling and declared the board's action unconstitutional. See Colorado Supreme Court, *Cases Argued and Determined in the Supreme Court of the State of Colorado*, LXXXI (Chicago, 1927), 25–32.
58. The spokesman for the resisting whites was later elected district attorney with strong Klan support.
59. Holmes interview; *Denver Post*, May 19, 28, June 18, Sept. 21, 1920, Jan. 16, Feb. 10, 1927; *Rocky Mountain News*, July 8, Nov. 16, 1921, Dec. 11, 1926.
60. *Colorado Statesman*, Feb. 17, 1923.
61. *Denver Express*, Feb. 13, 1923; *Denver Post*, Feb. 8, 1923, Sept. 30, 1925; James A. Atkins, *The Age of Jim Crow* (New York, 1964), 167.
62. Membership number from Denver Klan No. 1, Roster of Members.
63. Saunders interview by author.

64. *Denver Post*, Jan. 15, Apr. 26, June 25, 1925; *Denver Express*, June 17, 29, 1925; *Colorado Springs Gazette*, July 20, 1925; *Rocky Mountain American*, July 3, 1925; Baker and Hafen, *History of Colorado*, V, 667.
65. Such pressure is reflected, to some extent, in the Roster of Members, which reveals that men in certain factories and businesses joined in a bloc.
66. Holmes interview; interview with Forbes Parkhill by James Davis, Denver, Mar. 4, 1963; Zylstra, "When the Klan Ran Denver," 6; Philip Van Cise Spy Reports, Apr. 28, May 5, 1924, Klan Collection, Denver Public Library. Cigar salesman Dale Deane attempted to corner the Klan market with his Cyana Cigars, an acronym meaning "Catholics You Are Not Americans." Van Cise Spy Reports, May 26, 1924.
67. Maiden interview by author; Philip L. Cook, "Red Scare in Denver," *Colorado Magazine*, XLIII (Fall, 1966), 309-26; personal interview, Denver, Mar. 1, 1975.
68. Denver Klan No. 1, Membership Applications Book, 1924, Klan Collection, State Historical Society of Colorado; *Denver Times*, Mar. 28, 1924; *Pueblo Chieftain*, July 20, 1925; Maiden interview by Davis; personal interview, Denver, May 17, 1975. For examples of Colorado Klan recruiting literature see the Philip Van Cise Scrapbook, private collection of Eleanor Drake, Denver.
69. Saunders interview by author; personal interview, Denver, Mar. 1, 1975; personal interview, Denver, Feb. 10, 1975.
70. Denver Klan No. 1, Roster of Members.
71. *Denver Post*, May 3, 1923; interview with Charles Ginsberg by James Davis, Denver, May 5, 1963.
72. *Denver Post*, May 3, 1923.
73. *Denver Express*, Mar. 30, May 1, 3, 8, 12, 14, 1923; *Rocky Mountain News*, Apr. 23, 29, June 27, 1923; *Denver Post*, Apr. 30, 1923; *Colorado Labor Advocate*, May 3, 1923; Denver Klan No. 1, Roster of Members. Ginsberg interview. Dr. Locke's name appeared as sponsor on the baptismal certificate of Stapleton's son. Box 4, folder 96, Benjamin F. Stapleton Collection, State Historical Society of Colorado. Denverites cast preferential ballots which gave Stapleton 37,551 first-, second-, and third-choice votes to Bailey's 31,037. See also Lyle W. Dorsett, *The Queen City: A History of Denver* (Boulder, 1977).
74. *Denver Post*, June 1, 2, 4, 6, 7, 16, 26, July 16, 26, Aug. 2, 1923; *Denver Express*, May 31, June 2, 6, 14, 16, 1923; *Rocky Mountain News*, June 16, 20, 1923; *Imperial Nighthawk*, June 6, 1923; Maiden interviews by author and Davis; Denver Klan No. 1, Roster of Members.
75. *Denver Express*, Mar. 31, Apr. 4, 1924; *Rocky Mountain News*, Feb. 2, Mar. 29, Apr. 1, 1924; *Denver Post*, Mar. 12, 31, 1924.
76. *Denver Post*, June 27, 1923. In 1925 Mayor Stapleton prohibited Clarence Darrow from speaking at the auditorium because "some folks might object." *Denver Post*, Aug. 14, 1925.
77. *Denver Express*, June 27, 1923.

78. *Denver Post*, June 24, 27, 1923; *Daily Sentinel* (Grand Junction), June 27, 1923.
79. *Denver Post*, June 28, July 3, 1923; *Denver Express*, July 13, 1923; *Rocky Mountain News*, June 28, 1923; Council of the City and County of Denver, Proceedings, July 2, 1923, IV, 329-30.
80. *Rocky Mountain News*, Nov. 11, 13, 1923; *Denver Post*, Nov. 13, 1923; *Denver Express*, Nov. 12, 1923.
81. *Denver Catholic Register*, May 28, 1925.
82. Van Cise Spy Reports, Apr. 28, May 26, 1924; Maiden interview by Davis; *Denver Express*, Mar. 28, 1924; *Denver Catholic Register*, Apr. 3, June 19, 1924, July 2, 1925; Zylstra, "When the Klan Ran Denver," 6-7; "The Rise and Fall of Dr. John Galen Locke," KOA radio broadcast, Feb. 23, 1962; Monsignor Smith interview. Contrary to Colorado folklore, Dr. Locke did not order the "sister" from the state because her talks were too inflammatory. She appeared in Colorado Springs in June, 1925, after the completion of her Denver lectures.
83. *Denver Post*, Jan. 12, 1924.
84. *Ibid.*, Oct. 29, 1923, Jan. 12, 1924; *Denver Express*, Oct. 29, Nov. 3, 1923, Jan. 12, 1924; Monsignor Smith interview.
85. Ginsberg, Maiden, Parkhill, and Saunders interviews by Davis; *Denver Post*, Feb. 15, June 26, Aug. 11, 1924; *Denver Express*, Aug. 6, 1924.
86. Personal interview, Denver, Sept. 12, 1975; Humphreys interview; *Denver Post*, Mar. 12, 13, May 23, 26, Aug. 11, Oct. 2, 1924, Apr. 16, 1935; *Denver Express*, Mar. 18, Apr. 30, 1924.
87. *Denver Express*, Mar. 27, 1924.
88. *Denver Post*, Mar. 29, July 9, 1924; Box 4, Colorado State Federation of Labor Papers, Western Historical Collection, University of Colorado Library.
89. *Denver Post*, Aug. 9, 1924.
90. *Ibid.*, Aug. 2, 1924.
91. *Ibid.*, June 28, July 13, 27, Aug. 2, 6, 3, 1924.
92. *Denver Express*, Feb. 25, 28, 1924; *Colorado Labor Advocate*, Feb. 28, Mar. 6, Aug. 7, 1924; *Denver Times*, Aug. 5, 11, 1924; *Denver Democrat*, Aug. 16, 1924; *Rocky Mountain News*, June 27, July 15, Aug. 7, 11, 1924.
93. *Denver Post*, Aug. 8, 1924.
94. *Rocky Mountain News*, May 10, 1932; *Denver Express*, Aug. 9, 1924; *Denver Post*, June 16, Aug. 8, 11, 1924; Van Cise Spy Reports, July 14, 1924.
95. *Denver Post*, Aug. 13, 1924.
96. *Colorado Labor Advocate*, Aug. 14, 1924.
97. Denver Election Commission Official Returns; *Denver Post*, Aug. 12, 13, 1924; *Denver Express*, Aug. 13, 1924; *Denver Catholic Register*, Aug. 14, 1924.
98. *Denver Post*, Aug. 13, 1924.
99. The list of leaders is complete for 1924 and only the Klexter and Kligrapp are unknown for 1926. Most of the names appeared in the

Denver Express, Apr. 1, 1924, and May 11, 1926. The other men were either elected leaders in 1925 or were members of Dr. Locke's unofficial inner circle. Their names were gathered from a variety of Klan documents and newspapers. Some Klan leaders held more than one office while members. For example, the Reverend William Oeschger was Klaliff in 1924 and Exalted Cyclops in 1925; Walter DuBree served consecutive terms as Klokan. Data about each man were gathered from death certificates, biographical dictionaries, obituaries, city directories, *The Roster of the Men and Women Who Served in the World War from Colorado, 1917-1918* (Denver, 1941), and "Armed Service Cards," Colorado State Archives and Record Service. The breakdown of regions by state was taken from the U.S. Census and is as follows: NEW ENGLAND: Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Vermont; MIDDLE ATLANTIC: New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania; EAST NORTH CENTRAL: Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Ohio, Wisconsin; WEST NORTH-CENTRAL: Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, South Dakota; SOUTH ATLANTIC: Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina, Virginia, West Virginia; EAST SOUTH-CENTRAL: Alabama, Kentucky, Mississippi, Tennessee; WEST SOUTH-CENTRAL: Arkansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, Texas; MOUNTAIN: Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah, Wyoming; PACIFIC: California, Oregon, Washington.

100. Klan leaders were located in the *Denver City Directory* and traced backward at three-year intervals from 1925 to 1901. Years of residence is the minimum possible residential period because of time gaps between directories and exclusion resulting from error or youth. In every case possible information from other sources was used to confirm residential period. The complete membership rosters of the American Legion, Cherry Hills Country Club, Denver Athletic Club, Denver Chamber of Commerce, Denver Club, Denver Country Club, Knight Templars, Lakewood Country Club, Lions' Club, Rotary Club, United Spanish-American War Veterans, University Club, and the Veterans of Foreign Wars were checked for Klan leaders. Biographical dictionaries, obituaries, and other miscellaneous sources were used to supplement an incomplete list of Denver Masons and to provide data about Eagle, Eastern Star, Knights of Pythias, Elk, Moose, Odd Fellow, Shrine, and Woodmen of the World memberships. Because lists for these groups were not complete, affiliation statistics are minimum numbers. See also *Social Record and Club Annual*, xvii (Denver, 1924), 121-54.
101. The occupations given are those listed in the *Denver City Directory* for 1922 (early joiners) and 1925 (late joiners). The socioeconomic classification of occupations employed in this study is a modification of the rankings made by Alba M. Edwards in *A Social-Economic Grouping of the Gainful Workers of the United States: 1930* (Washington, D.C., 1938).

Other sources helpful in formulating the occupational classification scheme were Peter Blau and Otis Dudley Duncan, *The American Occupational Structure* (New York, 1967); George S. Counts, "The Social Status of Occupations: A Problem in Vocational Guidance," *School Review*, xxxiii (Jan., 1925), 16-27; Albert J. Reiss, Jr., *Occupations and Social Status* (New York, 1961); Stephan Thernstrom, *The Other Bostonians: Poverty and Progress in the American Metropolis, 1880-1970* (Cambridge, Mass., 1973). See Appendix A for a breakdown of status groups by occupation. Occupational mobility is considered to be any movement from one status group to another.

Interestingly, although the educational backgrounds of only one-third (thirteen) of the men are known, six (17 percent) had received degrees from professional or graduate schools.

102. *Denver Express*, Apr. 1, 1924.

103. In 1946 an anonymous Denver Klansman gave *Rocky Mountain News* reporter Lee Casey the Klan's Roster of Members and Membership Applications Book. Casey subsequently donated the material to the State Historical Society of Colorado where it remained closed to researchers until 1975. The men listed in the membership roster bear numbers from 501 to 47,802. Actually, there are only 16,727 Klansmen recorded. Large gaps between numbers inflated the total, perhaps to impress members with the strength of the organization. Along with the names, residential and business addresses are listed. Members with Denver business addresses and suburban residences were assigned to Klan No. 1. The decision to open the membership rolls is revealed in the Van Cise Spy Reports, May 12, 19, 1924. The Membership Applications Book contains notes which indicate some of the reasons for the failure of the more than 1,200 prospective members to follow through: "Says he can't go on account of family"; "Bootlegger"; and "Short Residence." Herbert Arkin and Raymond R. Colton, comps., *Tables for Statisticians* (New York, 1963), 145 (Table 20).

104. U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Fourteenth Census of the United States, 1920: Population*, II, 479. Because the Klan only admitted those over eighteen years of age, married males fifteen to nineteen years old were excluded from consideration. Census statistics do not total 100 percent.

105. Seymour Martin Lipset, *Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics* (New York, 1959), 178.

106. William Kornhauser, *The Politics of Mass Society* (Glencoe, Ill., 1959), 73.

107. Christians, "Land Utilization in Denver," 32-43, 48, 53-62, 73-80; F. L. Carmichael, "Housing in Denver," *University of Denver Business Review*, xvii (June, 1941), 10, 17, 19, 22, 42; Jackson, *Klan in the City*, 244.

108. Denver Klan No. 1, Roster of Members; *Denver Catholic Register*, May 7, 14, 28, June 4, 1925; *Protestant Herald*, Sept. 25, May 28, 1926. See also Appendix B.

CHAPTER THREE

1. U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Fourteenth Census of the United States, 1920: Population*, II, 61; *Occupations*, IV, 253; U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Census of Religious Bodies: 1926*, I, 396; Akers interview; interview with Darius Allen, Colorado Springs, Nov. 13, 1975; Manly D. and Eleanor R. Ormes, *The Book of Colorado Springs* (Colorado Springs, 1933), 115, 196; Colorado WPA Writers' Program, "Racial Groups," Denver Public Library.
2. *Colorado Springs Evening Telegraph*, July 27, 1921.
3. *Ibid.*, Sept. 24, 1921.
4. *Colorado Springs Gazette*, July 28, Sept. 18, 1921; *Colorado Springs Evening Telegraph*, July 27, Sept. 18, 24, Oct. 3, 7, 1921.
5. *Colorado Springs Evening Telegraph*, May 13, 1922.
6. *Colorado Springs Gazette*, May 8, 1922; *Colorado Springs Evening Telegraph*, May 13, 14, 1922.
7. *Colorado Springs Evening Telegraph*, June 15, 1922.
8. *Colorado Springs Gazette*, June 16, 1922.
9. *Colorado Springs Evening Telegraph*, June 16, 1922.
10. *Colorado Springs Gazette*, June 18, 1922.
11. *Ibid.*, June 27, 1922; *Colorado Springs Evening Telegraph*, July 3, 1922.
12. When the Ku Klux Klan first entered a state, it erected a provisional organization over which the Propagation Department in Atlanta exercised strict control. To organize a state completely, the Propagation Department appointed a King Kleagle who in turn hired his own kleagles to establish klaverns throughout the sales territory. When a specified number of men joined, the state organization was chartered. Chartering transferred power from the national to the state and local Klans; the Grand Dragon replaced the King Kleagle as the state's highest Klan officer. In May, 1923, Colorado became the fourteenth realm of the Invisible Empire. Imperial Wizard Hiram Wesley Evans commissioned Dr. John Galen Locke as Grand Dragon to "rule and govern in strict accordance with all laws, usages and customs of the Invisible Empire." Locke interpreted his powers differently: "to do anything and everything I see fit to do in Colorado pertaining to the Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, whether to hire, fire or do anything else." *Imperial Night-hawk*, May 30, 1923; *E. M. Sabin v. John Galen Locke*, 1925, contains a copy of Locke's appointment and informative depositions by the Imperial Wizard and the Colorado Grand Dragon.
13. *Colorado Springs Gazette*, July 3, 5, 6, 1923.
14. *Ibid.*, July 6, 1923.
15. On April 28, 1923, C. C. Hamlin, the owner of the *Colorado Springs Evening Telegraph*, purchased the *Colorado Springs Gazette*. The newspapers retained their separate identities, although the editorial columns of the *Telegraph* were discontinued. *The Colorado Springs Gazette and Telegraph* was published on Sundays.
16. *Colorado Springs Gazette*, July 7, 1923.

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17. Allen interview.
18. *Colorado Springs Gazette*, Nov. 26, 1923.
19. *Ibid.*, Nov. 26, Dec. 1, 1923; *Colorado Springs Gazette and Telegraph*, Nov. 11, Dec. 16, 1923; Allen interview; Akers interview; personal interview, Colorado Springs, Nov. 17, 1975.
20. Personal interview, Colorado Springs, Nov. 17, 1975.
21. *Colorado Springs Evening Telegraph*, Jan. 28, Apr. 22, 23, 1923.
22. Allen interview; personal interview, Colorado Springs, Nov. 17, 1975; *Colorado Springs Gazette*, July 21, 1925.
23. Akers interview.
24. The lists of Klan leaders appeared in the *Colorado Springs Gazette*, May 1, Dec. 30, 1925. All but one of the Klan leaders were located in the *Colorado Springs City Directory* and traced backward at three-year intervals from 1925 to 1901. The occupations given are those listed for 1925. See above, Chapter Two, footnote 100, for an explanation of methodology and also Appendix A. The unknown Klansman was a resident of Yoder, Colo., and therefore not listed in the *Colorado Springs City Directory*. In addition, one of the leaders was a Locke lieutenant from Fort Morgan who appeared in the *Directory* but gave no occupational information. The list of elected officers is complete except for the 1925 Klaliff and the 1926 Klexter. Only a few of the 1924 leaders could be identified and were therefore excluded. Unfortunately, data concerning fraternal and veterans' group memberships could not be obtained.
25. *Colorado Springs Gazette and Telegraph*, Jan. 6, 1924.
26. Personal interview, Colorado Springs, Nov. 17, 1975; *Colorado Springs Gazette*, Nov. 26, 30, Dec. 19, 1923; *Colorado Springs Gazette and Telegraph*, Dec. 16, 1923.
27. *Colorado Springs Gazette*, Oct. 29, 1923.
28. *Ibid.*, June 2, 23, July 26, 1923.
29. *Ibid.*, Jan. 7, 1924.
30. *Fountain Herald*, Jan. 9, 1924; *Colorado Springs Gazette*, Jan. 7, 11, 14, 23, 1924.
31. Personal interview, Colorado Springs, Nov. 17, 1975; *Colorado Springs Gazette*, Dec. 17, 18, 27, 1924, May 1, Dec. 30, 1925.
32. *Colorado Springs Gazette*, Jan. 14, 1925.
33. The executive committee consisted of twenty-one members in 1925 and nineteen in 1926. Fourteen of the officers served during both years, seven resigned, and five were elected in 1926.
34. Allen interview.
35. The lists of anti-Klansmen appeared in the *Colorado Springs Gazette*, Apr. 29, 1925, Sept. 14, 1926; Allen interview; Akers interview; personal interview, Colorado Springs, Nov. 17, 1975; *Who's Who in Colorado and Cheyenne, Wyo.*, IV, 1923-25 (Denver, n.d.), 76-80; *Colorado Springs Gazette*, Apr. 29, 1925, Sept. 14, 1926. See above, Chapter Two, footnote 100, for an explanation of methodology and also Appendix A.

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36. *Colorado Springs Gazette*, Apr. 16, 1925; Akers interview; Allen interview; personal interview, Colorado Springs, Nov. 17, 1975.
37. *Pueblo Chieftain*, Apr. 30, 1923.
38. *Ibid.*, Dec. 9, 1922, May 7, 1923.
39. *Facts about Pueblo, Colorado* (Pueblo, 1929), 1, 3; *Pueblo City Directory*, 1921, 181, 1925, 59; U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Fourteenth Census of the United States, 1920: Population*, III, 147; U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Census of Religious Bodies: 1916*, I, 245-46; 1926, I, 519-20; *Pueblo Chieftain*, Sept. 20, 1926.
40. *Pueblo Chieftain*, Sept. 30, 1923.
41. Interview with Henry Robinson, Pueblo, Oct. 26, 1975.
42. *Ibid.*
43. Colorado WPA Writers' Program, "Racial Groups," Denver Public Library.
44. U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Fourteenth Census of the United States, 1920: Population*, III, 147, 149; Robinson interview; *Pueblo Chieftain*, Sept. 13, 14, 1919, Jan. 2, 1921, July 15, 1923; Colorado WPA Writers' Program, "Racial Groups," Denver Public Library.
45. *Pueblo Chieftain*, Sept. 30, 1923.
46. *Ibid.*, Jan. 25, 1925.
47. *Ibid.*, Feb. 7, 1924.
48. *Ibid.*, Dec. 5, 1921, Feb. 4, May 7, June 26, 1922, Feb. 19, 1923, July 4, 5, 1924, May 15, 16, 1926; *Pueblo Indicator*, Mar. 3, 1923.
49. *Pueblo Chieftain*, Dec. 18, 1922.
50. *Ibid.*, Jan. 20, 1923.
51. *Ibid.*, Dec. 29, 1922.
52. *Ibid.*, Feb. 27, 1924.
53. *Imperial Nighthawk*, July 11, 1923; *Pueblo Chieftain*, June 19, Sept. 26, Dec. 26, 1923, Sept. 13, 1924.
54. *Pueblo Chieftain*, Dec. 9, 1922.
55. *Ibid.*, June 29, 1923.
56. Stephen T. Walrod, "The Ku Klux Klan in Colorado, 1921-1926" (B.A. thesis, Princeton University, 1970), 116; *Pueblo Chieftain*, July 10, 1921, Feb. 27, Apr. 25, 1922, Jan. 11, 1923.
57. In 1927 twenty-three Pueblo leaders were named defendants in a lawsuit seeking damages for the accidental death of a Klansman in a 1925 rally. The list is almost a complete roster of the klavern leadership for 1925 and 1927. Unfortunately legal documents relating to the court case could not be located in either Pueblo or the Colorado State Archives. The names of three additional leaders active during these years were found in other sources and added to the list. Data about each man were gathered from military records, obituaries, fraternal membership lists, and the *Pueblo City Directory*. See above, Chapter Two, footnote 100, for an explanation of methodology. *Pueblo Chieftain*, Sept. 12, Dec. 7, 1925, Sept. 7, 1927; *Denver Post*, Sept. 7, 8, 1927.

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58. *Pueblo City Directory*; see above, Chapter Two, footnote 101, for an explanation of methodology and also Appendix A.
59. *Pueblo Chieftain*, Jan. 29, Feb. 1, 7, 8, 1924.
60. *Ibid.*, Feb. 9, 1924.
61. *Ibid.*, Feb. 9, 15, 1924; Robinson interview.
62. *Pueblo Chieftain*, Feb. 25, 1924.
63. *Ibid.*, Feb. 24–27, 29, Mar. 6, 1924.
64. David M. Ralston to William Sweet, Sept. 29, 1923, Box 6, Records of the Office of the Governor, William Sweet, 1923–25, Correspondence, 1923–24, Colorado State Archives and Record Service.
65. *Crowley County Leader*, Feb. 27, 1925.
66. *Walsenburg World*, Feb. 1, 1924.
67. *Pueblo Chieftain*, Jan. 20, 1924; *Denver Post*, Jan. 20, 1924; *Walsenburg World*, Jan. 15, 18, 20, 1924; see also Records of the Office of the Governor, Clarence Morley, 1925–27, Correspondence, 1925–27, Colorado State Archives and Record Service.
68. *Canon City Daily Record*, Oct. 17, 1923; *Walsenburg World*, Feb. 1, 1924; Philip Van Cise Scrapbook, private collection of Eleanor Drake, Denver; *Pueblo Chieftain*, Jan. 21, Aug. 17, 1924.

CHAPTER FOUR

1. Philip Van Cise Scrapbook, private collection of Eleanor Drake, Denver.
2. Van Cise Scrapbook; "Program of the First Anniversary of the Realm of Colorado," May 13, 1924, Ku Klux Klan Collection, Western History Department, Denver Public Library; *Denver Post*, Aug. 14, 1924.
3. Philip Van Cise Spy Reports, May 12, 19, June 23, Aug. 18, 1924, Klan Collection, Denver Public Library; Robert L. Duffus, "The Ku Klux Klan in the Middle West," *World's Work*, XLVI (Aug., 1923), 364.
4. *Pueblo Chieftain*, Aug. 6, Nov. 6, 1922; *Colorado Springs Evening Telegraph*, Sept. 24, 1922; *New York Times*, Mar. 25, 1923; *Daily Sentinel* (Grand Junction), Jan. 9, Mar. 7, 1924; *Colorado Springs Gazette and Telegraph*, May 25, 1924. See John Livingston, "Governor William Sweet: Persistent Progressivism vs. Pragmatic Politics," *Colorado Magazine*, LIV (Winter, 1977), 1–25, for a discussion of the appointment of Alva Adams to the U.S. Senate and its effect upon Governor Sweet's re-election effort.
5. Rockwell twice refused to join the Klan in return for its support. He also turned down Klan aid in exchange for a promise that no Catholics be appointed in his administration. Robert Rockwell to Dr. Charles Lory, Sept. 27, 1924, Rockwell to Earl Cooley, Aug. 25, 1924, Box 3, Robert Rockwell Papers, Western Historical Collection, University of Colorado Library.
6. *Denver Express*, Aug. 8, 1924.
7. Johnson, *Autobiography*, 204; Rockwell to E. H. Robinson, July 31, 1924, Box 3, Rockwell Papers; *Rocky Mountain News*, Aug. 2, 1924.
8. Casey, *Rocky Mountain News*, June 19, 1946.

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9. Hubert Work to Will R. Hays, Nov. 16, 1923, Box 13, Hubert Work Papers, Colorado State Archives and Record Service.
10. Ginsberg interview.
11. Baker and Hafen, *History of Colorado*, V, 243; interview with Morrison Shafroth, Denver, Apr. 11, 1975; Holmes interview; Ginsberg interview; *Daily Sentinel*, Dec. 21, 1921, Sept. 5, 1924; *Steamboat Pilot*, Oct. 29, 1924; *Boulder Daily Camera*, Sept. 9, 1924; *Denver Post*, Aug. 5, 1924.
12. *Rocky Mountain News*, Aug. 7, 1924; *Daily Sentinel*, Aug. 3, 10, 1924; *Colorado Springs Gazette and Telegraph*, July 6, Aug. 3, 1924; *Colorado Springs Gazette*, Aug. 6, 1924.
13. *Rocky Mountain News*, Aug. 7, 1924; Robinson interview; *Pueblo Chieftain*, Aug. 2, 3, 1924.
14. *Canon City Daily Record*, July 29–31, Aug. 1, 1924; *Florence Paradox*, Aug. 7, 1924.
15. *Denver Post*, Aug. 5, 1924.
16. "The Rise and Fall of Dr. John Galen Locke," KOA radio broadcast, Denver, Feb. 23, 1962; *Denver Post*, Aug. 2, 3, 5, 1924; *Rocky Mountain News*, Aug. 5, 1924; *Denver Express*, Aug. 4, 1924.
17. *Denver Post*, Aug. 7, 1924.
18. *Ibid.*, Aug. 6, 7, 1924; *Rocky Mountain News*, Aug. 7, 1924; *Pueblo Chieftain*, Aug. 7, 1924.
19. Wayne C. Williams, *Sweet of Colorado* (New York, 1943), 100–104; *Denver Post*, Aug. 8, 9, 1924.
20. Rockwell to Willard B. Gordon, July 25, 1924, Rockwell to Earl Cooley, Aug. 25, 1924, Rockwell to Benjamin Griffith, Aug. 22, 1924, Box 3, Rockwell Papers.
21. F. R. Carpenter to Rockwell, Aug. 26, 1924, Box 3, Rockwell Papers.
22. Merle Vincent to Rockwell, Aug. 28, 1924, Box 3, Rockwell Papers.
23. *Denver Post*, Aug. 24, 1924; *Steamboat Pilot*, Aug. 27, 1924; *Daily Sentinel*, Aug. 18, 1924; *Loveland Reporter Herald*, Aug. 27, 29, 30, 1924.
24. *Daily Sentinel*, Sept. 5, 1924.
25. *Colorado Springs Gazette and Telegraph*, Sept. 7, 1924; *Colorado Springs Gazette*, Sept. 1, 1924; *Daily Sentinel*, Sept. 5, 1924.
26. *Canon City Daily Record*, Aug. 30, Sept. 4, 5, 1924.
27. Van Cise Spy Reports, May 26, 1924.
28. Van Cise Spy Reports, May 26, July 21, Aug. 22, Sept. 1, 8, 1924; *Denver Express*, Aug. 19, 1924; interview with O. Otto Moore by James Davis, Denver, Oct. 7, 1962; Parkhill interview.
29. *Denver Express*, Sept. 5, 1924.
30. Van Cise Spy Reports, Sept. 1, 8, 1924; *Denver Express*, Sept. 4, 5, 1924; *Denver Post*, Sept. 5, 1924; *Rocky Mountain News*, Sept. 5, 1924; Parkhill interview. For a copy of Van Cise's speech see Van Cise Scrapbook.
31. *Colorado Springs Gazette*, Sept. 5, 1924; *Pueblo Chieftain*, Sept. 9, 1924; *Denver Post*, Sept. 7, 1924; *Boulder News Herald*, Sept. 6, 1924.
32. *Steamboat Pilot*, Oct. 1, 1924; Rockwell to C. S. Birkins, Sept. 23, 1924, Box 3, Rockwell Papers; 1924 "pink ticket" in the author's possession.

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33. Van Cise Spy Reports, May 26, 1924. Klansmen were not only rank-and-file Democrats and Republicans but also party leaders. For example, the president and vice-president of Colorado's Harding for President Club were members of the Ku Klux Klan.
34. *New York Times*, Sept. 9, 1924; *Denver Post*, Sept. 11, 1924; *Pueblo Chieftain*, Sept. 11, 1924; Rockwell to William Murphy, Sept. 29, 1924, Box 3, Rockwell Papers; State of Colorado, *Abstract of Votes Cast at the Primary Election and at the General Election, 1924* (Denver, 1924). Vote totals for the major races were:

<i>Governor</i>		<i>Senator</i>	
Earl Cooley	7,712	Rice Means	48,778
Clarence Morley	57,152	Charles Moynihan	25,655
Robert Rockwell	51,976	Charles Waterman	38,903

35. Rockwell to Colonel Patrick J. Hamrock, Sept. 29, 1924, Box 3, Rockwell Papers.
36. Rockwell to George Colgate, Sept. 23, 1924, Rockwell to William P. Robinson, Sept. 29, 1924, Box 3, Rockwell Papers.
37. *Colorado Springs Gazette*, Sept. 11, 1924; *Daily Sentinel*, Sept. 10, 1924; personal interview, Grand Junction, May 3, 1975; *Canon City Daily Record*, Sept. 10, 12, 1924; *Denver Post*, Sept. 10-12, 1924; State of Colorado, *Abstract of Votes Cast at the Primary Elections in 1924 and 1926 in the City and County of Denver by District*, Colorado State Archives and Record Service.
38. *Denver Post*, Sept. 28, 1924.
39. *Colorado Springs Gazette*, Sept. 12, 1924.
40. *New York Times*, Sept. 13, 30, 1924; *New York World*, Sept. 13, 1924; *Denver Post*, Sept. 23, Nov. 2, 1924; *Daily Sentinel*, Oct. 27, 1924; *Steamboat Pilot*, Sept. 24, 1924; *Brush Tribune*, Sept. 19, 1924; *Colorado Springs Gazette and Telegraph*, Sept. 19, 1924; *Pueblo Chieftain*, Oct. 26, 1924; *Boulder News Herald*, Oct. 28, 1924; Shafroth interview; F. L. Toliver to William Sweet, Sept. 15, 1924, A. J. Flynn to Sweet, Oct. 14, 1924, Dan H. Hughes to Sweet, Sept. 12, 1924, John J. Vandemoer to Sweet, Nov. 4, 1924, Part II, Box 1, William E. Sweet Collection, State Historical Society of Colorado. Klansmen appeared in the ranks of Colorado's La Follette-Progressive party. The Progressives' candidate for governor, J. Frank Coss, a leading advocate of the rights of organized labor, was a member of the Klan and later the assistant editor of the Denver klavern's *Protestant Herald*. See *Colorado Springs Gazette and Telegraph*, Aug. 8, 1925.
41. *Colorado Statesman*, Nov. 1, 1924.
42. *Denver Post*, Sept. 28, 1924.
43. Casey, *Rocky Mountain News*, June 19, 1946; *Rocky Mountain News*, Oct. 31, 1924, Aug. 6, 1926; *Denver Post*, Sept. 28, Oct. 2, 1924; *Daily Sentinel*, Oct. 30, 1924; *New York World*, Sept. 9, 1924; Shafroth interview; Van Cise Spy Reports, Sept. 9, 1924.

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44. Shafroth interview.
45. Lawrence C. Phipps, Jr., personal letter, Apr. 10, 1975.
46. *A Summary of the Principles of the Knights of the Ku Klux Klan* (Boulder, 1924), 3.
47. Monsignor Smith interview; "Senator Lawrence C. Phipps of Colorado: 'Fighting Phipps'" (n.p., n.d.); *Canon City Daily Record*, Mar. 11, Oct. 29, 1924, Sept. 13, 1926; *Daily Sentinel*, Oct. 24, 1924.
48. *Denver Express*, June 6, 1924; *Colorado Labor Advocate*, June 12, 1924, May 27, 1926; Colorado State Federation of Labor, *Official Proceedings of the Twenty-ninth Annual Convention* (Denver, 1924), 70-71; Colorado State Federation of Labor, *Official Proceedings of the Thirtieth Annual Convention* (Denver, 1925), 93; *Denver Post*, Aug. 18, 1926; Van Cise Spy Reports, Sept. 1, 1924.
49. See Chapter Seven for a more detailed discussion of the Fremont County election.
50. *Denver Express*, Oct. 1, 30, 31, Nov. 3, 1924; *Denver Post*, Oct. 2, 5, 1924; Benjamin B. Lindsey, "The Beast in a New Form" (letter to the editor), *New Republic*, xvi (Dec. 24, 1924), 121.
51. Marjorie Hornbein, "The Story of Judge Ben Lindsey," *Southern California Quarterly*, lv (Winter, 1973), 472-73; Frances Ann Huber, "The Progressive Career of Ben B. Lindsey, 1900-1920" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan, 1963), 423-25; *Denver Post*, Oct. 29, 1924, Sept. 18, 1927; *Denver Express*, Oct. 28, 1924; *Denver Times*, Nov. 3, 1924; Van Cise Spy Reports, Oct. 20, 1924; Moore interview; Johnson, *Autobiography*, 202.
52. James M. Zoetewey, "A Statistical Study of the Voting Behavior of the Counties of Colorado in Presidential and Gubernatorial Elections, 1904-1964" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Colorado, 1971), 522-23, 534-35; *Daily Sentinel*, Nov. 5, 1924; *Denver Express*, Nov. 5, 1924; State of Colorado, *Abstract of Votes Cast, 1924*. Vote totals for the major state races were:

<i>Governor</i>	<i>Senator (long term)</i>	<i>Senator (short term)</i>
Clarence Morley	Alva Adams	Rice Means
178,078	139,660	159,383
William Sweet	Lawrence Phipps	Morrison Shafroth
151,041	159,698	138,714

53. *Denver Post*, Oct. 27, 1924.
54. The Colorado Supreme Court later ordered Lindsey to reimburse Mrs. Graham for the salary owed her husband as the duly elected juvenile court judge. Lindsey paid the money but the widow never received it. Her lawyer absconded with Graham's "earnings" and was not found until his death in 1953. *Denver Post*, Sept. 16, Oct. 3, 1929, Feb. 1, 1953.
55. Herbert M. Baker to William Sweet, Nov. 6, 1924, Box 1, Sweet Collection; *Boulder Daily Camera*, Nov. 3, 5, 1924; Robinson interview; *Pueblo Chieftain*, Nov. 9, 1924; *People of the State of Colorado v. Sarah Singer, Dor-*

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- othy Rollnick, Tillie Reckler, Sarah Fineberg, and Fannie Webber, 1925; *People of the State of Colorado against William Unter*, 1925; Colorado Supreme Court, *Cases Argued and Determined*, LXXX, 465-99; Ben B. Lindsey and Rube Borough, *The Dangerous Life* (New York, 1931), 397-98; *Rocky Mountain News*, Jan. 25, Feb. 18, 1925; *Denver Express*, Apr. 2, 1925; *Denver Post*, Nov. 6, 1924; Jan. 17, Feb. 1, 2, 7, 11, 14, 17, Apr. 2, 15, 16, Sept. 9, 1925, Jan. 24, Sept. 16, 18, 1927.
56. *Denver Post*, Nov. 11, 12, 1924.

CHAPTER FIVE

1. *Rocky Mountain News*, Jan. 13, 1925.
2. Saunders interview by author.
3. *Denver Express*, Feb. 20, 1926.
4. *Colorado Springs Gazette*, Apr. 18, 1925.
5. Baker and Hafen, *History of Colorado*, IV, 609-10; Denver Klan No. 1, Roster of Members, Ku Klux Klan Collection, State Historical Society of Colorado; Maiden interview by Davis; Sethman interview; Saunders interview by Davis.
6. Colorado General Assembly, *House Journal*, 25th sess. (1925), 108.
7. In 1922 the people of Colorado voted against an amendment to the state constitution granting the legislature authority to enact an alien exclusion law prohibiting those ineligible for citizenship from owning real or personal property. The amendment was defeated 47,985 to 19,364. *Rocky Mountain News*, Apr. 29, 1921; *Denver Post*, Nov. 9, 1922.
8. *Boulder Daily Camera*, Nov. 24, 1924.
9. *House Journal*, 105-12; *Denver Post*, Jan. 13, 1925; *Colorado Springs Gazette and Telegraph*, Feb. 8, 1925; *Pueblo Chieftain*, Jan. 24, 1925; *Denver Catholic Register*, Feb. 26, June 18, 1925; interview with Francis J. Knauss by James Davis, Denver, Feb. 18, 1963; interview with Henry Toll by James Davis, Denver, Jan. 27, 1963.
10. Toll interview; Knauss interview; *Colorado Springs Gazette*, Jan. 14, 15, 29, 1925; *Pueblo Chieftain*, Jan. 14, 1925; *Daily Sentinel* (Grand Junction), Jan. 14, 1925; *Denver Post*, Jan. 24, Apr. 8, 1925.
11. *Denver Post*, Jan. 18, Aug. 18, 1925, Apr. 14, 1926; *Denver Express*, Apr. 10, 1926; Zylstra, "When the Klan Ran Denver," 6; Fuller, *The Maelstrom*, 80; *Rocky Mountain News*, Mar. 7, 1925; *Denver Catholic Register*, Mar. 5, 19, 1925.
12. *Steamboat Pilot*, Jan. 28, 1925.
13. Sethman interview; *Denver Post*, Feb. 22, 1925.
14. Toll interview; Sethman interview; John P. Dickinson, "Life in Eastern Colorado," *Colorado Magazine*, xix (Sept., 1942), 195-97; *Denver Post*, Jan. 7, 9, 1925; *Denver Times*, Jan. 9, 1925; *Pueblo Chieftain*, Jan. 10, 1925; Colorado General Assembly, *Senate Journal*, 25th sess. (1925), 48.
15. *Denver Times*, Jan. 12, 1925; *Denver Post*, Jan. 22, 1925; *House Journal*, 99-230; *Senate Journal*, 117-208. The original Senate and House bills

- introduced into the twenty-fifth General Assembly are available in the Colorado State Archives and Record Service.
16. H.B. 60, Twenty-fifth General Assembly (1925).
 17. H.B. 80, Twenty-fifth General Assembly (1925).
 18. *Denver Post*, Jan. 12, 14, 15, 1925; *Rocky Mountain News*, Jan. 13, 22, 1925; H.B. 6, 398, Twenty-fifth General Assembly (1925); *House Journal*, 178, 182, 205; *The Compiled Laws of Colorado, 1921* (Denver, 1922), 1169-70.
 19. H.B. 278, 457, Twenty-fifth General Assembly (1925); *House Journal*, 87, 108, 140, 197.
 20. Episcopal Diocese of Colorado, *Journal of the Thirty-ninth Annual Convention* (Denver, 1925), 54.
 21. *Denver Post*, Jan. 31, Feb. 25, Mar. 23, 1925; *Pueblo Chieftain*, Jan. 31, Feb. 22, 1925; *House Journal*, 344, 360-64, 381-86, 404, 493-94, 525, 550, 584, 880, 921; Episcopal Diocese of Colorado, *Journal*, 43-44; Colorado Women's Christian Temperance Union, *Report of the Forty-sixth Annual Convention* (Denver, 1925), 53, Colorado Women's Christian Temperance Union Papers, Western Historical Collection, University of Colorado Library.
 22. Toll interview; *Denver Post*, Feb. 8, 15, 18, 20-22, Apr. 13, 1925; *Rocky Mountain News*, Feb. 21, 25, 1925; *Denver Catholic Register*, Apr. 9, 1925; Dr. George Norlin to J. S. Boggs, Feb. 2, 1939, Records of the Office of the Governor, Ralph L. Carr, 1939-43, Correspondence, 1939, Colorado State Archives and Record Service; *Protestant Herald*, Mar. 17, 1925.
 23. *Denver Post*, Feb. 10, 28, 1925; *Senate Journal*, 575, 650-54, 794, 1118-19, 1190-91.
 24. *Denver Post*, Apr. 18, 1925.
 25. Colorado General Assembly, *Laws Passed at the Twenty-fifth Session of the General Assembly of the State of Colorado* (Denver, 1925); *Senate Journal*, 345, 357-58; Norlin to Boggs, Carr Papers; *Denver Post*, Apr. 16, 17, May 1, 1925; *Denver Express*, Apr. 17, 1925; *Rocky Mountain News*, Feb. 15, 1925; *Daily Sentinel*, Apr. 1, 1925; *Pueblo Chieftain*, Apr. 2, May 2, June 14, 1925.
 26. *Denver Post*, Apr. 18, Aug. 13, Nov. 9, Dec. 15, 1925, Jan. 10, 1926; *Denver Express*, Apr. 18, 1925, Feb. 3, 1926; *Rocky Mountain News*, Sept. 18, 1925; *Colorado Springs Gazette*, Dec. 16, 1925.
 27. Colorado General Assembly, *Laws Passed at the Twentieth Session of the General Assembly of the State of Colorado* (Denver, 1915), 286.
 28. D. V. Thompson to Clarence Morley, June 22, 1925, Box 1; Joy Parrott to Morley, July 7, 1925, Box 1; Charles J. Hobby to Morley, June 12, 1925, Box 4, Records of the Office of the Governor, Clarence Morley, 1925-27, Correspondence, 1925-27, Appointments, 1925-27, Colorado State Archives and Record Service; *Denver Post*, June 10, 30, Nov. 27, 1925.

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29. *Pueblo Chieftain*, Aug. 9, 1925.
30. *Greeley News* quoted in *Denver Democrat*, July 11, 1925.
31. *Denver Post*, June 21, Nov. 15, 21, Dec. 2, 1925; Robert E. Winbourn to Morley, July 17, 1925, Box 4, Morley Papers; *Pueblo Chieftain*, Aug. 4-6, 1925; *Colorado Springs Gazette*, Aug. 6, 1925; *Weld Country News*, Nov. 27, 1925; *Denver Express*, Nov. 21, 28, Dec. 1, 1925.
32. *Denver Post*, Nov. 23, 1925.
33. *Ibid.*, Nov. 24, 1925.
34. *Ibid.*
35. *Ibid.*, Aug. 5, Sept. 4, Nov. 23, 25, Dec. 12, 1925, Jan. 27, 1927; *Denver Express*, Jan. 22, 1926; *Pueblo Chieftain*, Dec. 31, 1925, Feb. 26, 1926; list of new agents, Box 4, Morley Papers.
36. *Denver Post*, Nov. 15, Dec. 23, 27, 1926, Jan. 4, 1927; Colorado General Assembly, *House Journal*, 26th sess. (1927), 49.

CHAPTER SIX

1. *Denver Post*, Jan. 15-17, Apr. 15, 26, June 25, 1925; *Rocky Mountain News*, Jan. 14, June 27, 1925; Denver Klan No. 1, Roster of Members, Ku Klux Klan Collection, State Historical Society of Colorado.
2. *Denver Post*, Feb. 18, 1925; *Denver Express*, Apr. 24, June 29, 1925; *Pueblo Chieftain*, June 11, 1925.
3. Saunders interview by author; *Denver Post*, Sept. 26, Nov. 26, 1924, Feb. 26, 1925; *The Knights of the Ku Klux Klan of Colorado vs. the Knights of the Ku Klux Klan of Georgia*, 1924.
4. *Denver Post*, Jan. 8, 1925.
5. *Denver Post*, Jan. 7-10, 17, Feb. 3, 20, 24, Mar. 10, Apr. 10, June 2, 16, Aug. 8, 1925, Dec. 10, 1927; *Denver Express*, Jan. 7, 1925; *Rocky Mountain News*, Jan. 8, 1925; *People of the State of Colorado v. John Galen Locke, C.A. Kirkling, William Pritts et al.*, 1925.
6. Bribery and grand larceny charges were filed against six of the police officers. Two were tried separately; one was convicted and the other acquitted. The remaining four men, accused of selling confiscated whiskey to a bootlegger, were freed when District Judge Henry Bray granted a defense motion for a directed verdict of acquittal. Bray, a Klansman, ruled that since the Prohibition law made liquor illegal, it could not be the subject of property rights. Therefore, liquor could not be an object of larceny. This torturous interpretation was conceived in a conference attended by Locke, Bray, and defense attorneys at the Grand Dragon's office on Glenarm Place. Although the defendants were discharged and could not be tried again, the prosecutor appealed the case to the Colorado Supreme Court. The justices found Bray's construction "frought with such momentous and disastrous results that we would need go no further than invoke against it the fundamental rule that absurd interpretations will not be given statutes when reasonable ones may be resorted to." Governor Morley later pardoned the only police officer convicted. *Denver Post*, Apr. 11, 16, 30, May 1, 3, 22, 24, June

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- 2, 4, Sept. 22, Nov. 22, 1925; *Rocky Mountain News*, Apr. 14, 1925; Moore interview; Colorado Supreme Court, *Cases Argued and Determined*, LXXIX, 303-6.
7. *Rocky Mountain American*, Apr. 24, 1925.
8. *Denver Express*, Apr. 11, 1925.
9. *Denver Post*, May 9, 30, 1925, Jan. 27, 1926; *Denver Express*, Apr. 18, 1925, Apr. 14, 1926.
10. *Colorado Springs Gazette*, Apr. 7, 1925.
11. *Colorado Springs Gazette and Telegraph*, Apr. 5, 1925; *Denver Post*, Apr. 5, 12, 1925; *Colorado Springs Gazette*, Mar. 12, 18, 19, Apr. 6, 7, 1925.
12. *Colorado Springs Gazette*, Apr. 8, 1925.
13. *Ibid.*; Akers interview.
14. See above, Chapter Three, for a discussion of the socioeconomic characteristics of the executive committee.
15. *Colorado Springs Gazette*, Apr. 15, 1925.
16. *Ibid.*, Apr. 16, 17, 1925.
17. *Ibid.*, Apr. 16-18, 27, 1925.
18. *Ibid.*, Apr. 20, 22, 27, May 1, 2, 1925; *Colorado Springs Gazette and Telegraph*, Apr. 26, May 3, 1925.
19. Personal interview, Colorado Springs, Nov. 17, 1925.
20. *Colorado Springs Gazette*, May 5, 1925.
21. *Ibid.*
22. *Denver Post*, May 5, 27, 1925; *Denver Express*, May 5, 1925; *Pueblo Chieftain*, May 3, 5, 1925.
23. Monsignor Smith interview.
24. *Denver Express*, Apr. 30, May 5, 13, 18, 20, 27, June 2, 3, July 3, 1925; *Denver Catholic Register*, May 7, 1925; *Denver Post*, May 3, 5, 20, July 11, 1925; Denver Klan No. 1, Roster of Members; Council of the City and County of Denver, Proceedings, June 1, 1925-July 18, 1927, V, *passim*.
25. *Denver Post*, May 26, 1925.
26. *Ibid.*, May 20, 26-28, 30, June 2, 3, 8, 9, 12, 13, 15, Feb. 20, 1927; *Denver Express*, June 13, 1925; *The United States of America v. John Galen Locke*, 1925.
27. *Denver Post*, June 21, 1925.
28. *Ibid.*, June 14, 1925.
29. *Ibid.*, June 14, 17-21, 24, Sept. 3, 1925; *Rocky Mountain News*, June 25, 1925; *Denver Express*, June 24, Sept. 3, 1925.
30. Maiden interview by Davis; *Rocky Mountain American*, June 19, 1925; personal interview, Denver, Mar. 1, 1975.
31. *Denver Post*, July 1, 23, 1925; Zylstra, "When the Klan Ran Denver," 7; *Denver Express*, May 28, July 2, 25, 1925; *Colorado Springs Gazette and Telegraph*, June 14, 1925; *Steamboat Pilot*, June 17, 25, July 8, 1925; *Rocky Mountain American*, July 17, 31, 1925; Sethman interview.
32. *Denver Express*, July 1, 2, 1925; *Denver Post*, Dec. 8, 1924, May 17, July 1-3, 1925.
33. *Denver Post*, July 15, 18, 1925.

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34. *Ibid.*; *Denver Express*, July 18, 20, 1925; *Pueblo Chieftain*, July 19, 1925.
35. *Denver Post*, July 19–25, 28, 29, Aug. 5, 1925, July 23, 1927, Nov. 18, 1932; *Rocky Mountain News*, Sept. 25, 1926; *E. M. Sabin v. John Galen Locke*, 1925; *Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, Inc. v. John H. Martin, William J. Candlish, Cleveland W. Cole, Clarence A. Kirkling, and William F. Pritts*, 1925.
36. Although coinciding in time, the formation of the statewide anti-Klan Constitutionalists in May, 1925, had little influence upon the order's waning fortunes. *Robert Sterling v. the Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, a Corporation, et al.*, 1926; personal interview, Denver, May 17, 1975; Ginsberg interview; *Denver Post*, May 10, 12, June 27, 1925.
37. *Denver Post*, Aug. 15, 1925.
38. *Denver Express*, July 21, 1925; *Denver Post*, Aug. 14, 15, 22, Sept. 5, 18, 1925, Feb. 20, 1927; *Denver Catholic Register*, "Historical Index: 1913–1939."
39. *Denver Post*, Sept. 19, 1925, Apr. 2, 1935; *Protestant Herald*, Sept. 25, 1925.
40. *Denver Post*, Aug. 9, 19, Sept. 23, Oct. 26, Nov. 24, Dec. 3, 1925, Jan. 8, Dec. 9, 30, 1926; *Denver Express*, Aug. 10, Oct. 24, 1925; *Minnie C. T. Love v. Women of the Ku Klux Klan, et al.*, 1925; *Ku Klux Klan v. Martin et al.*, 1925; *Canon City Daily Record*, Nov. 11, 1925. In 1929 the national organization of Klanswomen, incorporated in Little Rock, Ark., won a four-year court battle permanently restraining Mrs. Senter's group from operating under the name "Women of the Ku Klux Klan." For the details of the litigation see *The Women of the Ku Klux Klan, a Corporation v. The Women of the Ku Klux Klan, a Corporation, Mrs. Gano Senter and Esther M. Parker*, 1925.
41. *Denver Post*, July 18, 19, 25, 31, 1925, Jan. 27, 1926; *Canon City Daily Record*, July 20, 1925; *Rocky Mountain American*, July 24, 1925; *Rocky Mountain News*, Oct. 2, 1925; *Colorado Springs Gazette*, July 21, 1925.
42. *Denver Post*, Nov. 30, Dec. 1, 1925.
43. *Ibid.*, May 24, 1926.
44. *Ibid.*, Oct. 17, 1925, Jan. 2, Feb. 19, 20, May 10, 11, 18, 24, 27, June 8, 11, 28, 1926; Council of the City and County of Denver, Proceedings, May 24, 1926, VI, 322; Colorado Supreme Court, *Cases Argued and Determined*, 629–36.
45. *Denver Post*, Jan. 2, 22, Feb. 6, 9, 10, 13, 15, 17, 23, Apr. 2, 1926; *Denver Express*, Dec. 31, 1925, Feb. 25, Mar. 6, Aug. 23, 27, Sept. 1, 1926; O. Otto Moore, "Justice, If Any, in the Twenties and Thirties," *Denver Westerners 1969 Brand Book*, xxv (Boulder, 1969), 166; *Ex Rel Foster Cline District Attorney In-Re Petition for an Open Venire*, 1926.
46. *Denver Post*, Feb. 27, 1927.
47. In the same year as his leader's death Clarence Morley was indicted in Indianapolis for mail fraud. He was convicted in 1937 and at the age of seventy was sentenced to five years in Leavenworth Penitentiary. *Rocky*

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- Mountain News*, Mar. 19, 1926, Dec. 13, 1933, May 15, 1934; *Denver Morning Post*, Feb. 16, 1927; *Denver Post*, Apr. 17, May 10, 1932, July 6, 1933, Feb. 2, Apr. 2, 3, 5, 1935; Saunders interview by author; Zylstra, "When the Klan Ran Denver," 6; *Denver Catholic Register*, Mar. 2, 1939.
48. *Denver Post*, July 21, Nov. 23, Dec. 6, 1925.
 49. *Denver Post*, Aug. 15, Oct. 6, 17, Dec. 9, 1925, Jan. 6, May 23, 28, 30, 1926; *Pueblo Chieftain*, Mar. 14, 1926; *Protestant Herald*, May 28, 1926; *Denver Express*, May 31, 1926.
 50. Grand Dragon Fred G. Arnold to anonymous Denver Klansman, Apr. 27, 1927, Klan Collection, State Historical Society of Colorado.
 51. *Denver Post*, Apr. 17, 21, 28, May 18, 1927; Horace N. Hawkins to Charles Thomas, June 10, 1927, Box 1, Charles S. Thomas Papers, State Historical Society of Colorado.
 52. *Denver Post*, July 25, 1928; *Kourier Magazine*, Mar., 1932, Feb., Dec., 1933.
 53. *Colorado Springs Gazette*, Apr. 3, 1927.
 54. *Ibid.*, Apr. 10, May 29, Sept. 16, Nov. 1, 1925, Jan. 28, Mar. 15, 21, Apr. 3, 4, 5, 1927, Sept. 22, 1928; *James A. Merritt v. Gazette and Telegraph Company, a Corporation, C. C. Hamlin, and T. E. Nowels*, 1925; *Samuel R. Berkley v. J. C. McCreary*, 1925.
 55. *Pueblo Chieftain*, Sept. 20, Nov. 1, 4, 14, Dec. 25, 1925; *Denver Express*, Nov. 4, 1925.
 56. *Pueblo Chieftain*, Oct. 17, 1926.
 57. *Ibid.*, Jan. 3, 10, 11, 24, Feb. 2, 15, Mar. 2, 4, Dec. 3, 1926, Jan. 22, 1927.
 58. *Ibid.*, Aug. 1, 1926, Sept. 6, 7, 1927; *Denver Post*, Sept. 7, 8, 1927.

CHAPTER SEVEN

1. Colorado WPA Writers' Program, "Canon City Guide" (typescript, Denver, [1940]); Colorado Board of Immigration, *Year Book of the State of Colorado* (Denver, 1920), 85-86; U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Fourteenth Census of the United States, 1920: Population*, I, 326, III, 143, 148, 149; U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Thirteenth Census of the United States, 1910: Population*, II, 230; U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Fifteenth Census of the United States, 1930: Population*, I, 168, 170, III, 307, 328; personal interview, Canon City, May 24, 1975; U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Census of Religious Bodies: 1916*, I, 246; 1926, I, 585.
2. Personal interview, Canon City, May 24, 1975; *Canon City Daily Record*, June 1, 1928; *Imperial Nighthawk*, Feb. 21, 1924.
3. *Canon City Daily Record*, May 10, 1923.
4. *Ibid.*, Apr. 7, 1926.
5. *Ibid.*, May 10, 1923, Nov. 17, 1924; *Denver Catholic Register*, May 17, 1923; interview with William T. Little, Canon City, May 8, 1975; interview with Brother Michael Murray, Canon City, Apr. 28, 1975; personal interview, Canon City, May 24, 1975; interview with Ruth Stinemeyer, Canon City, May 8, 1975.

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6. Interview with Claude and Leona Singer, Canon City, May 24, 1975.
7. *Canon City Daily Record*, Oct. 30, 1924.
8. Singer interview; personal interview, Canon City, May 24, 1975; *Canon City Daily Record*, Aug. 10, 1926.
9. *Canon City Daily Record*, Jan. 30, 1923.
10. Personal interview, Canon City, May 24, 1975.
11. Singer interview; Little interview; personal interview, Canon City, May 24, 1975; *Canon City Daily Record*, Mar. 28, 1923, Oct. 30, 1926.
12. Baker and Hafen, *History of Colorado*, IV, 542; *Denver Post*, June 1, 1928; personal interview, Canon City, May 24, 1975; Singer interview; the Reverend Fred Arnold to William Sweet, Feb. 21, 1924, Part I, Box 1, William E. Sweet Collection, State Historical Society of Colorado; *Canon City Daily Record*, Sept. 7, 1970.
13. Personal interview, Canon City, May 24, 1975.
14. *Rocky Mountain Klansman*, Jan. 30, 1924.
15. *Canon City Daily Record*, Jan. 28, 31, 1924; *Imperial Nighthawk*, Feb. 21, 1924; *Rocky Mountain Klansman*, Jan. 30, 1924.
16. *Canon City Daily Record*, Feb. 7, Mar. 8, 12, 15, 1924.
17. George Colgate to Robert Rockwell, Apr. 6, 1924, Box 3, Robert Rockwell Papers, Western Historical Collection, University of Colorado Library.
18. *Canon City Daily Record*, July 8, 1924.
19. *Ibid.*, July 31, 1924.
20. *Ibid.*, Aug. 1, 1924.
21. *Ibid.*, July 29–31, Aug. 1, 1924; *Florence Paradox*, Aug. 7, 1924.
22. *Ibid.*, Aug. 30, 1924.
23. *Ibid.*, Sept. 5, 1924.
24. *Ibid.*, Aug. 30, Sept. 4, 1924.
25. *Ibid.*, Aug. 28, Sept. 9, 12, 1924.
26. *Ibid.*, Oct. 24, 1924.
27. *Ibid.*, Oct. 30, 1924.
28. *Ibid.*
29. *Ibid.*
30. *Ibid.*, Oct. 7, 11, 24, 25, 28–31, Nov. 1, 3, 1924; *Fremont County Daily News*, Oct. 31, 1924.
31. *Canon City Daily News*, Sept. 4, Oct. 29, Nov. 5, 14, 15, 1924.
32. *Fremont County Daily News*, Oct. 31, 1924.
33. *Ibid.*; *Canon City Daily Record*, Oct. 25, 1924.
34. *Fremont County Daily News*, Oct. 31, 1924; *Canon City Daily Record*, Feb. 12, Dec. 23, 1924, Jan. 1, 13, 29, Mar. 3, 1925; *Canon City Directory*, 1925.
35. *Canon City Daily Record*, Mar. 20, 1925.
36. *Ibid.*, Mar. 12, 13, 16, 20, 23, 26, Apr. 1, 4, 6, 8, 21, 22, May 5, 1925; *Pueblo Chieftain*, May 5, 1925.
37. The Canon City klavern's Nighthawk also served for a year as editor of

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- the *Daily American*. *Canon City Daily Record*, Apr. 29, June 4, 5, Aug. 25, Nov. 28, 1925; *Florence Paradox*, June 25, 1925; Little interview; personal interview, Canon City, May 24, 1975.
38. Interview with James Sterling, Canon City, Aug. 5, 1975.
39. Personal interview, Canon City, May 24, 1975.
40. Little interview; Sterling interview; personal interview, Canon City, May 24, 1975; *Canon City Daily Record*, Sept. 29, 1925; Stinemeyer interview; Singer interview.
41. *Canon City Daily Record*, June 16, 1925.
42. *Ibid.*, May 21, June 16, 24, 27, July 1, 1925.
43. *Ibid.*, Jan. 19, 1926.
44. *Ibid.*, July 29, Oct. 17, 24, Nov. 21, 1925, Feb. 9, 19, May 24, 1926.
45. *Ibid.*, June 5, 10, July 13, Sept. 21, Oct. 26, Dec. 9, 15; *Florence Paradox*, July 30, Oct. 29, 1925; *Rocky Mountain News*, July 21, 1925.
46. The total list of active Klanspersons numbers 490, of whom 158 were women. Because of the difficulty of tracking women through city directories, they were excluded from this study. Also, all known leaders were removed from the lists. The sample of 200 men contains 149 members from Canon City, twenty-one from Florence, and thirty from assorted Fremont County towns. Data about each man were gathered from military records, obituaries, and fraternal membership lists. The *Canon City Directory* included all Fremont County towns but Florence, thus prohibiting the collection of complete marital and length-of-residence information for its Klansmen. Miscellaneous sources, however, provided the needed information for one-third of the Florence men. The *Directory* did contain a complete listing of Florence businesses, and from it the occupations of two-thirds of the town's Klansmen could be ascertained. See *Canon City Daily Record*, 1924-28, especially Aug. 13, 1924, Oct. 19, 1926, and Aug. 8, 1928.
47. See above, Chapter Two, footnotes 99 and 100, for an explanation of methodology.
48. Rough draft of an undated editorial, Guy U. Hardy Papers, private collection of David Hardy, Canon City.
49. Interestingly, a member of the original Reconstruction Ku Klux Klan appeared in the sample. Little interview; Singer interview; personal interview, Canon City, May 24, 1975. *Canon City Directory*, 1925; *Canon City Daily Record*, Dec. 10, 1925.
50. The occupations given are those listed in the *Canon City Directory* for 1925. See above, Chapter Two, footnote 101, for an explanation of the methodology and also Appendix A.
51. *Canon City Daily Record*, June 15, 1926.
52. *Ibid.*, Jan. 16, 21, 26, Feb. 2, 9, 13, 19, 23, Apr. 6, 13, 24, May 1, 11, 15, 24, 25, June 22, 23, 26, 29, 1926; *Florence Paradox*, Jan. 28, Mar. 18, Apr. 15, 22, June 24, 1926; personal interview, Canon City, May 24, 1975.

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53. *Denver Post*, Apr. 1, 1926.
 54. *Ibid.*, July 3, 21, 1926.
 55. *Rocky Mountain News*, Aug. 7, 1926.
 56. *Denver Post*, Aug. 3, 5, 10, 1926; *Rocky Mountain News*, Aug. 6, 1926; *Denver Express*, Aug. 4, 1926; *Colorado Springs Gazette*, Aug. 3, 1926; *Pueblo Chieftain*, Aug. 1, 6, 1926; *Daily Sentinel* (Grand Junction), Aug. 5, 6, 13, 1926; personal interview, Grand Junction, May 3, 1975.
 57. *Florence Paradox*, July 1, 29, 1926; *Canon City Daily Record*, July 26–28, 30, 31, Aug. 2, 10, 1926.
 58. *Canon City Daily Record*, July 30, 31, Aug. 5, 7, 13, 1926.
 59. *Denver Post*, Aug. 7, 1926.
 60. *Ibid.*, Aug. 6–10, 13, 1926; *Rocky Mountain News*, Aug. 6, 7, 1926; *Colorado Springs Gazette*, Aug. 7, 1926; *Canon City Daily Record*, Aug. 6, 12, 1926.
 61. Quoted in the *Denver Post*, Aug. 22, 1926.
 62. *Denver Express*, Aug. 4, 1926.
 63. *Denver Post*, July 21, Aug. 29, Sept. 4, 12, 14, 1926; *Denver Express*, Sept. 14, 1926; *Colorado Springs Gazette*, Aug. 19, Sept. 10, 1926; *Daily Sentinel*, Sept. 12, 1926.
 64. Guy Hardy to Oliver Shoup, Aug. 28, 1926, Hardy Papers.
 65. *Canon City Daily Record*, July 2, 14, Aug. 10, 17–21, 26, 1926.
 66. *Colorado Springs Gazette*, Aug. 25, 1926; *Denver Post*, June 19, July 3, Sept. 13, 15, 1926; *Pueblo Chieftain*, Sept. 19, Oct. 1, 1926; State of Colorado, *Abstract of Votes Cast at the Primary Election and at the General Election, 1926* (Denver, 1926). Vote totals for the major races were:

Governor		Senator	
Carl S. Milliken	15,568	George A. Luxford	14,330
Oliver H. Shoup	58,689	Rice W. Means	41,721
John F. Vivian	43,685	Charles W. Waterman	57,537

67. *Canon City Daily Record*, Sept. 17, 1926.
 68. *Rocky Mountain News*, Sept. 15, 1926; *Colorado Springs Gazette*, Sept. 16, 1926; *Canon City Daily Record*, Sept. 15, 25, 1926; *Pueblo Chieftain*, Sept. 16, 1926; *Daily Sentinel*, Sept. 15, 1926.
 69. *New York Times*, Oct. 18, 1926; *Denver Post*, Oct. 3, 17–19, Nov. 3, 1926; *Rocky Mountain News*, Oct. 17, 30, 1926; *Denver Express*, Oct. 18, 21, Nov. 3, 1926; *Pueblo Chieftain*, Oct. 31, 1926.
 70. *Canon City Daily Record*, Oct. 6, 1926.
 71. *Ibid.* A week after Arnold's speech the Colorado Constitutionalists demanded that the Grand Dragon be arrested for inciting to riot, encouraging resistance to law and order, and treason. Arnold dismissed the organization as a papal tool. Its attack, he said, "comes from the Roman Catholic church and was inspired by my statement that with the help of God we will open up the doors of monasteries and nunneries and let the light of day shine in." State government officials refused to pros-

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- ecute the Grand Dragon. *Denver Post*, Oct. 14, Nov. 6, 1926; *Canon City Daily Record*, Oct. 30, 1926.
72. *Canon City Daily Record*, Sept. 27, Oct. 6, 11, 1926.
73. *Ibid.*, Oct. 26, 1926.
74. *Ibid.*, Nov. 2, 1926.
75. *Florence Paradox*, Oct. 14, 18–23, 25–30, Nov. 1, 1926; *Canon City Daily Record*, Oct. 21, 23, 25, 30, Nov. 2, 3, 15, 1926.
76. *Canon City Daily Record*, Mar. 30, 1927.
77. *Ibid.*, Mar. 3, 5, 11, 12, 19, 22, 29–31, Apr. 1, 2, 4, 6, 1927; *Florence Paradox*, Mar. 3, 17, Apr. 7, 1926; *Denver Post*, Apr. 6, 1927.
78. *Florence Paradox*, Sept. 2, 1926; *Canon City Daily Record*, Nov. 29, 1927, Apr. 27, 1928; *Daily Sentinel*, Sept. 30, 1926.
79. Singer interview.
80. *Canon City Daily Record*, July 11, 1927, June 1, 5, 1928; personal interview, Canon City, May 24, 1975; Little interview; Singer interview.
81. *Canon City Daily Record*, Sept. 8, 1930.
82. *Ibid.*, Oct. 24–31, Nov. 5, 7, 8, 1927, Feb. 17, 20, Mar. 9, 26, Apr. 13, 14, May 11, 15, 17–19, June 27, July 25, 26, 28, 30, Aug. 3, 6–8, 25, 30, 31, Sept. 5, 6, 11–13, Oct. 10, Nov. 7, 8, 1928, July 24, 31, Aug. 6, Sept. 8, 10, 11, Nov. 4, 5, 13, 1930, Aug. 4, Sept. 14, 1932; Singer interview; Little interview; Stinemeyer interview; *Klan Campaign Kook Book* (Canon City, 1928).
83. *Florence Paradox*, Mar. 14, 1929.
84. *Canon City Daily Record*, Mar. 10, 12, 17, 19, Apr. 3, 4, 26, May 17, Nov. 17, 1928, Feb. 25, Mar. 15, Apr. 2, 3, Aug. 26, Nov. 6, 1929, Mar. 20, Apr. 8, 1931, Nov. 22, 1932; *Florence Paradox*, Mar. 21, Apr. 4, 1929; Little interview; Singer interview; *Dedrich N. Cooper v. The Fremont County American Publishing Company, a Corporation, et al.*, 1928.
85. Sterling interview; Stinemeyer interview; Murray interview; Little interview; personal interview, Canon City, May 24, 1975.

CHAPTER EIGHT

1. Quoted in Alan Pritchard, "The Walkers of Grand Junction," *Denver Westerners 1961 Brand Book*, xvii (Boulder, 1961), 218.
2. Mary Rait, "The Development of Grand Junction and the Colorado River Valley to Palisade from 1881 to 1931" (Master's thesis, University of Colorado, 1931), 1, 2, 4, 5, 92, 103, 148; *Daily Sentinel* (Grand Junction), Jan. 23, 1924; U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Fourteenth Census of the United States, 1920: Population*, I, 323, III, 144, 148–49; U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Fifteenth Census of the United States, 1930: Population*, I, 169, III, 308, 316–17; U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Census of Religious Bodies: 1916*, I, 245–46; 1926, I, 585.
3. The Reverend Paul A. Shields to William Sweet, Dec. 20, 1924, Box 6, Records of the Office of the Governor, William Sweet, 1923–25, Correspondence, 1923–24, Colorado State Archives and Record Service.

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4. Personal interview, Grand Junction, May 3, 1975; *Daily Sentinel*, Feb. 13, 14, 16, Sept. 23, 1924.
5. *Daily Sentinel*, Mar. 21, 1924.
6. Personal interview, Grand Junction, May 3, 1975; *Daily Sentinel*, Aug. 6, Sept. 19, Nov. 25, 28, 1921, Jan. 31, Apr. 6, 1922, Oct. 13, 31, Dec. 3, 12, 19, 23, Mar. 28, Oct. 28, May 29, 1924.
7. *Daily Sentinel*, Apr. 6, 1922.
8. *Ibid.*, Feb. 11, 24, June 24, 1922, Sept. 17, 18, 1923, Mar. 3, Sept. 24, 27, 1924; personal interview, Grand Junction, May 3, 1975.
9. Personal interview, Grand Junction, May 3, 1975.
10. *Ibid.*
11. Pritchard, "Walkers of Grand Junction," 218; personal interview, Grand Junction, May 3, 1975.
12. *Daily Sentinel*, Feb. 6, 1924.
13. *Ibid.*, July 26, 1924.
14. *Ibid.*, July 30, 1924.
15. In June, 1924, Walter Walker was in New York City serving as a delegate to the Democratic National Convention. He was one of six Colorado delegates to vote against a motion denouncing the Ku Klux Klan by name. Personal interview, Grand Junction, May 3, 1975; *Daily Sentinel*, June 30, July 30, Aug. 18, 1924.
16. *Daily Sentinel*, Oct. 7, 1924.
17. *Ibid.*, Oct. 11, 12, 1924.
18. Personal interview, Grand Junction, May 3, 1975; *Daily Sentinel*, Aug. 24, Sept. 7, 10, Oct. 7, 11, 31, Nov. 5, 1924.
19. Charles J. Moynihan to William Sweet, Dec. 8, 1924, Box 5, Sweet Papers.
20. Quoted in Gordon S. Chappell, *Logging along the Denver and Rio Grande* (Golden, Colo., 1971), 157.
21. F. R. Carpenter to Robert Rockwell, Aug. 14, 1924, Box 3, Robert Rockwell Papers, Western Historical Collection, University of Colorado Library; M. B. Pidcock to Clarence Morley, May 21, 1925, Emmett E. White to Morley, June 22, 1925, Box 4, Records of the Office of the Governor, Clarence Morley, 1925-27, Correspondence, 1925-27, Colorado State Archives and Record Service; Ernest W. Norlin to William Sweet, Apr. 17, 1923, the Reverend D. A. Gregg to Sweet, Dec. 13, 1923, Lillian Purdy to Sweet, Apr. 30, 1924, Box 6, Sweet Papers; Peter Yurich, "The Ku Klux Klan in Oak Creek, Colorado" (term paper, Adams State College, 1970), 6-9; *Daily Sentinel*, Feb. 18, Aug. 24, Sept. 20, 1924, Mar. 7, 1925.
22. Personal interview, Grand Junction, May 3, 1975.
23. *Ibid.*
24. *Daily Sentinel*, Nov. 2, 1924.
25. Personal interview, Grand Junction, May 3, 1975.
26. *Daily Sentinel*, Mar. 23, 1925.

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27. *Ibid.*, Mar. 25, 1925.
28. *Ibid.*, Mar. 29, 1925.
29. *Ibid.*, Mar. 1, 15, 16, 19, 23, 30, Apr. 4, 6, 8, 1925; personal interview, Grand Junction, May 3, 1975.
30. *Daily Sentinel*, May 4, Aug. 4, 1925.
31. *Ibid.*, June 2, 25, July 14, 28, Aug. 1, 3, 1925; personal interview, Grand Junction, May 3, 1975; *Rocky Mountain American*, July 17, 1925; *Gunnison News Champion*, July 16, 1925; *Gunnison Republican*, July 23, 1925.
32. *Daily Sentinel*, Aug. 4, 1925.
33. Personal interview, Grand Junction, May 3, 1975; *Daily Sentinel*, Oct. 31, 1923, June 11, 24, Aug. 3, 4, 29, Sept. 2, 1925, June 23, 1926.
34. *Daily Sentinel*, Sept. 2, 1925.
35. Personal interview, Grand Junction, May 3, 1975.
36. *Daily Sentinel*, Sept. 5, 1925.
37. *Ibid.*, Sept. 3-5, 14, 1925; *Protestant Herald*, Sept. 25, 1925; personal interview, Grand Junction, May 3, 1975.
38. Personal interview, Grand Junction, May 3, 1975.
39. *Daily Sentinel*, July 27, 1926.
40. *Ibid.*, Aug. 24, 1926.
41. *Ibid.*, May 27, July 27, Aug. 5, 6, 12, 13, 24, Sept. 14, 15, Oct. 31, Nov. 3, 1926; personal interview, Grand Junction, May 3, 1975.
42. *Daily Sentinel*, Mar. 21, 1927.
43. *Ibid.*, May 5, 1927.
44. *Ibid.*, Mar. 14, 16, 21, 29, 30, Apr. 3, 4, 6, May 2, 5, 23, 1927.

CHAPTER NINE

1. Albert and Raymond Breton, "An Economic Theory of Social Movements," *American Economic Review*, LIX (May, 1969), 198-204; Alexander, *Klan in the Southwest*, 13; James H. Davis, "The Rise of the Ku Klux Klan in Colorado, 1921-1925" (Master's thesis, University of Denver, 1963), 29; "Changes in Economic Welfare, Denver and Colorado," *University of Denver Business Review*, III (Jan., 1927), 21-22.
2. Lipset and Raab, *Politics of Unreason*, 103-4, 110.
3. Mecklin, *The Klan*, 121-22.
4. Alexander, *Klan in the Southwest*, 12.
5. U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Fifteenth Census of the United States, 1930: Population*, III, 291, 317.
6. Alexander, *Klan in the Southwest*, 31.
7. Chalmers, *Hooded Americanism*, 152; Alexander, *Klan in the Southwest*, 31; Richard Melching, "The Activities of the Ku Klux Klan in Anaheim, California, 1923-1925," *Southern California Quarterly*, LVI (Summer, 1974), 175-79.
8. Alexander, *Klan in the Southwest*, 59-60, 79.
9. The issues of the debate are most clearly set forth in Jackson, *Klan in the City*, 236, 233.

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10. *Ibid.*, 241, 246-48.
11. *Rocky Mountain Journal*, Oct. 6, 1976.
12. *Ibid.*, Sept. 29, Oct. 6, 1976; *Rocky Mountain News*, Oct. 8, 1976; *Denver Express*, Oct. 29, 1924.

NOTES TO APPENDIX B

1. Robert Moats Miller, "A Note on the Relationship between the Protestant Churches and the Revived Ku Klux Klan," *Journal of Southern History*, xxii (Aug., 1956), 355-68; David M. Reimers, *White Protestantism and the Negro* (New York, 1965), 96-99; Laura Lipsey Bradley, "Protestant Churches and the Ku Klux Klan in Mississippi during the 1920's: Study of an Unsuccessful Courtship" (Master's thesis, University of Mississippi, 1962), 4-5, 42-45, 54-55, 69-71, 77-78.
2. U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Census of Religious Bodies: 1926*, I, 585; Colorado Baptist State Convention, *Proceedings of the Thirty-second-Thirty-eighth Anniversaries of the Colorado Baptist State Conventions* (n.p., 1920-26); Colorado Baptist State Convention, Minutes of the Board of Directors, July 10, 1924, 4; Bruce K. Blunt, "Ninety Years of Baptist Missionary Administration in Colorado" (Th.D. dissertation, Central Baptist Theological Seminary, 1951), 87; *Colorado Baptist Bulletin*, Sept., Oct., 1926; (Presbyterian) Synod of Colorado, *Minutes of the Fiftieth-Fifty-fifth Annual Meetings* (n.p., 1921-26); Andrew E. Murray, "A History of Presbyterianism in Colorado" (Th.D. dissertation, Princeton Theological Seminary, 1947), 126; Colorado Conference of the Methodist Episcopal Church, *Year Books and Official Minutes of the Fifty-eighth-Sixty-fourth Sessions* (Denver, 1920-26); Colorado Conference of the Methodist Episcopal Church, "Abridged Minutes of the Lay Electoral Conference," *Minutes of the Sixty-first Session*, 1923; Colorado Congregational Conference, *Minutes of the Fifty-second-Fifty-ninth Annual Meetings* (n.p., 1920-27); Episcopal Diocese of Colorado, *Journals of the Thirty-fourth-Fortieth Annual Conventions* (Denver, 1920-26). Unfortunately the state records of the Disciples of Christ, a denomination which demonstrated a strong affinity to the Klan on the local level, were inaccessible.

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