

THE NEGATION OF HISTORY

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History is inevitably involved in our philosophical reflections about human nature and destiny. Yet in the past, philosophy has had an uneasy and questionable relationship to history. In this paper I would like to examine seven paradigmatic cases which hopefully will illustrate some crucial aspects of the past relationships between history and philosophy. Ideally, we can then prepare the way for a clearer insight into one of the themes in the philosophy of history, i.e., philosophy's ability to illuminate the nature of historical inquiry and man's existence in historical time.

Let us first attend to the definition of the terms in the title of this paper: history and negation. The attempt to derive a definition of history from its Greek etymology (*ιστορία*) has lost force because the sense of the word as inquiry or narration has evaporated before the more complicated demands of more recent methodology. For example, in Hegel's *Philosophie der Weltgeschichte* (1830) the term history would indicate (1) the scholarly activity of inquiry into the past; (2) the narration of past events; (3) the past events themselves. Any definition of history, then, would seem to be required to distinguish the study, method, and narration of the past (*Historie*) and the actual past events themselves (*Geschichte*). In this paper I shall refer to all of these senses of the term. Hopefully, the context of my uses will indicate the sense that I mean. In addition, however, I will suppose another use developed by recent historicism and phenomenology, i.e., *Geschichtlichkeit* or historicity, which refers to the way man is in time and to the way man is understood in time by an interpreter. By the phrase 'negation of history' I want to refer to the material or pre-selected philosophical paradigm cases when there is a tendency for these cases to distort, cancel, repress, or ignore the actuality of the historical past, or to attempt to understand the past by exclusively philosophical means, or to claim methodological or ideological priority over the field of historical explanation.

For our first paradigm, I would like to examine the philosophy of Plato in the context of the previous pre-Socratic philosophy, and then to contrast his ideas to the historiography of Thucydides. Fundamentally, the pre-Socratic philosophers had asked the question, "What is, really?" This question was always posed in the context of *arche* or the originary and fundamental explanatory principle of the world, e.g.,

matter, number, etc. This early search for the first explanatory principle of things was a “rational” endeavor because it always demanded of the early physical philosophers that their explanations of the world be presented in discursive, logical, and objective form. When the question of *arche* was posed, the search was always for a universal and reasoned explanation of the multiplicity of sense phenomena. Explanation from the materials of myth, opinion, authority, or popular cultural conditioning was ruled out from the beginning.

The pre-Socratic philosophers’ inquiry into the *arche* had an important consequence for the historical sense of things, for their researches would tend to replace the traditional Greek cosmogonic explanation of the origin of the universe with a cosmological explanation. By cosmogony, we refer to the mythopoetic account of the origin of the universe and the gods. Cosmology refers here, on the other hand, to the study of the first metaphysical principles of the universe. Cosmogony was the first form of Greek historical-genetic explanation. While the cosmogic-mythopoetic tendency will persist even through the writing of Herodotus, the orientation of early philosophy was usually cosmological in the sense that it searched for the eternal, transphenomenal *arche* of the world. The mythopoetic concern to account for the original and development of the gods and nature (such as Hesiod’s *Theogony*) tended to lose force. Even at the beginning of Greek philosophy, then, the search for the first principles of cosmology tended to be disjoined from a genetic or temporal account of things.

It was from Parmenides especially that Plato received the notion that the real is known only by reason, that it is changeless and self-sufficient, and that the unreal is changing and sensate. Science (*episteme*) for Plato was the understanding of the objective, fundamental meaning structures (*eide*) which were Plato’s equivalent of the Parmenidean reality. The *eide* were known by reason, were changeless, and were the principles by which the temporal-physical world were explained. Reality, for Plato, then was inherently trans-temporal.

We must note, too, that Plato had also generated a new and revolutionary meaning for the traditional Greek idea of *physis*, or that which ‘is’ by the order of nature. For Plato, the traditional *physis* of the older physical philosophers was an example of materialism without normative or purposeful structure. In the socio-historical realm, Plato’s philosophy revolutionized the term to designate the ideal nature of man—the natural potential of both polis and individual. Plato’s *Physis* was contrasted to the radical sophist’s use of the term. But like the sophists, he would contrast the term against the notion of *nomos* (custom or opinion). Plato’s *physis* referred to the fact that man, culture, and virtues contained an ideal potential for full growth or development.

Such ideal possibilities stood in contrast to the normal mass opinions (*nomoi*) about the nature and value of things. In the *Republic*, for example, Plato defined justice as the rendering to man of what is his due by nature, not social convention or authority. Justice is 'by nature' when a society exists in which each member can fulfill his or her innate potential in the polis by means of proper education (*paideia*).

This conception has fateful implications for both society and history. Philosophy for Plato became, in part at least, joined to a *praxis* of social control and reconstruction after the patterns of the forms. Plato subverted common sense experience, values and traditions—the world of *nomos*—by means of philosophy in the hands of guardians. Exemplification of this trend is found in Plato's critique of the traditional Greek virtues (*arete*) in the early and middle dialogues. Plato there searched for the *eidos* of *arete*, the fundamental meaning structure of the virtues. The traditional Greek opinions about these matters were seen by Plato as only "passing fair." The task of philosophy was to reveal the true nature or form of such virtues as justice and to institute the form into the social order. This implies that the world of socio-historical becoming and opinion must be brought into conformity with the rational and moral standards revealed by philosophy. The philosophic conception of sociohistorical life is modeled after the real order laid up in heaven. In this manner, the ideal nature (*physis*) is actualized in historical time. The empirical or actual orders of society remaining in the world belong only to the order of *nomos*. They are but the empirical residue of the true polis and as such as subject to the perpetual cycles of generation and decay. The endurance of the ideal society would represent for Plato the arrest of history.

The point to follow here is that Plato accounts for the order of society in time with a methodology of metaphysical principles (*arche*). These principles, however, have normative content, and they act as paradigms for social and moral transformation. They are principles which are meant to apply to the social-historical flux and control it under the aegis of the philosopher king. I would now like to contrast this philosophical-historical method, if we may call it that, to a contemporary development in historiography and social science—that of Thucydides.

Thucydides' conception of history and social science is best understood for our purposes, I believe, by relating him to an empirical tendency in Greek thought which began with Hippocratic Greek medicine (460-377). For Hippocrates, human disease was not seen as the result of divine retribution, but as a product of natural causes. The end of reason or natural philosophy was not the search for the first principles of existence (*arche*). Instead, medicine was the search for the order

of secondary material cause and effect relations in human physiology. The first stage of his method he called diagnosis, or the attempt to infer empirically the nature of causes from the symptoms of a disease. The second stage, prognosis, was the predictive element in his method, i.e., it was the attempt to foretell the probable course of the disease's development. Therapy was the attempt to restore health and deflect a disease's prognosis by natural medication. Here, as in other areas of Greek thought, some early principles of induction and predictive analysis were established.

Hippocrates' influence on Thucydides is apparent in his *History of the Peloponnesian War*. For example, in Book II of the *History*, Thucydides provided an analysis of the Athenian plague. Here, his attempt was to diagnose not only the physical but the social symptoms of a plague situation. He then attempted to provide a historical analysis or prognosis of the development of psychological, moral, and social consequences of a plague situation in a civil society at war. His principles of explanation were not derived from the first principles of being, but from the probable and secondary facts of empirical nature. Also, as in other places, Thucydides attempted to provide a diagnosis and prognosis as a model of human behavior to be used by statesmen and scholars for understanding the probable behavior of the masses given certain historical conditions. History was not only placed outside of metaphysics, but also it was placed *in* a purely indicative mode of understanding, i.e., it indicates what is the case in the mundane world, and it is seen under the aegis of factual interpretation, hypothesis formation, and empirical prediction.

The Thucydidean model of historical explanation was also in the indicative mode in still another sense: the claim to value neutrality. By this Thucydides meant that no trans-temporal or preferred values can be assumed in or imposed on history. For example, in the famous "Melian Dialogues" between the citizens of a weak polis and imperial Athenian generals, who were about to invade Melos, the only relevant standards of justice assumed by Thucydides belonged to an order of facts, an indicative order that postulates only what is, not what ought to be. It is the nature (*physis*) of man, he assumed, for the stronger to seek power over the weaker. The Melians were destroyed because they were weaker. They were not saved by their argumentative appeals to any normative standards of justice. For Thucydides, then, the nature (*physis*) of justice is exhausted by factual description of a situation and a delineation of probable development. Not only is Plato's imposition of a prescriptive order of values negated from the realm of proper history, but his attempt to grasp socio-historical existence by reference to the first principles of being is also rejected. History belongs exclusively to

the secondary order of natural causation. At this point we see that, at least in these paradigmatic cases, the methods and assumptions of history and philosophy were significantly disjoined in the Greek world. Thucydides' model exemplified the negation of either a platonic or normative-imperative methodology from empirical historiography for over 2000 years. Plato, on the other hand, provided no adequate method for dealing with empirical history.

In our second example, St. Augustine's philosophy of history, the relation between philosophy and history took a different form. In this case, history was examined under the aegis of philosophical theology. St. Augustine attempted the construction of a historical monogenism, i.e., the attempt to identify a single, essential cause of historical development. For Augustine, this cause was God guiding the world according to providence. Augustine understood history as a progressive and linear revelation of God's will as it had been revealed to the Hebrew prophets and on up to the Christian era. Here, for the first time in the philosophy of history, linear progress is expressed and understood in the context of progressive revelation.

Augustine added an element of apologetics to his historical material. Foremost in his mind when he wrote *The City of God* was Alaric's sack of Rome in 410 A.D. Augustine attempted to account for this tragedy to contemporary Christians, first, by an appeal to God's providence and, second, by his creation of a bifurcated model of historical explanation. Augustine argued that the fall of Rome should not lead to a loss of Christian faith, because history is divided into "divine" and "secular" parts. Divine history, which he often expressed as the "City of God," is the story of God's elect from the ancient prophets to the present Christian citizens of Rome. These elect participants in history are characterized by the love of God. Secular or profane history is composed of actors whose chief characteristic is the love of self. The will of this latter class is unredeemed by God's Grace. For Augustine, the inevitable historical fate of such a people is the fall of Rome, a city vitiated by ungodliness. On the other hand, the end of the divine city is salvation.

For Augustine, the history of the secular world was non-essential history, i.e. it was not the main vehicle which advanced his monogenistic theme. Also, a secular analysis of the causes of Rome's fall was not central to him. Indeed, the tools of secular historiography were little developed in Augustine's writings at all. The center of his monogenism was the development of the divine city. This tendency is illustrated in his uniquely Christian and linear notion of historical development. In a famous phrase in his *City of God*, he tells us that the Christian world "will no longer walk in circles."

By this phrase, he meant that the Greek historical cycles of generation and decay will not obtain in divine history. God's providence and salvation are not "mere caprice," but the unfolding of salvation. The story of history is the progressive unfolding of his will as given in revelation, and the end of divine history is salvation of the elect. Also, human will in the divine city is aided by God's grace and is directed to the end of salvation.

Even given this brief and inadequate sketch of Augustine's historical thought, we can draw from it some rather pronounced implications. First, we can note that Thucydides' naturalistic model of explanation and second-order causation analysis were negated as non-essential to Augustine's Christian *Weltanschauung*. Indeed, as we have noted above, little fundamental development of secular historiography emerged from him. Also implicit in Augustine's philosophy of history was his rejection of the importance of *praxis* from secular history. Praxis as a means of the secular and linear improvement of man's historical condition is non-efficacious and irrelevant to the center of divine history, whose end is advanced by Grace. For Augustine, the human will is free, but it is vitiated since the fall. It cannot, as he argued against Pelagius, lead to the essential and proper end of historical man, i.e., the City of God. Finally, Augustine's philosophy of history reflects a disjunction between nature and divinity, a disjunction that is already implicit in his doctrine of creation *ex nihilo*. Two levels of historical understanding are generated—the divine and the secular. But the secular dimension is actually non-essential and inferior. The implication here is that secular history, the history in which most of us live, is negated into a secondary and even illusory status. It is unredeemed and hopeless in its possibilities of development.

A third case, and perhaps the most important example so far, must be seen in the context of the rise of mathematical science in the seventeenth century. While it is difficult or impossible to characterize a whole movement such as this, I believe that we can make the following claims about it. The world was considered in this movement to be composed of material bodies whose motion and relations could be expressed mathematically as "the laws of nature." Given any physical cause, such as the gravitational influence of one body on another, there could be determined an effect such as the mathematically predictable orbit of a planet around the sun. Physical phenomena, when so understood, were usually believed to exhibit in their motion the same necessity that axioms bear to theorems. In addition, nature was considered to have a true status which could be expressed in terms of the so-called "primary qualities," namely weight, velocity, figure, position, magnitude, and number. These properties were believed to be the essence of matter in

that they express the external world as it is in itself apart from its perceptual and subjective appearance to man. Conversely, ordinary sense experiences, that is, the perceptible qualities of physical things such as colors and smells, were termed "secondary qualities" of experience and nature. They are secondary in the sense that they are merely the subjectively mediated appearance of nature as it is in its primary state. For example, Galileo believed that our ordinary perception of heat is a secondary state of illusion. The primary or real status of heat is nothing but the friction of elementary atomic bodies. For him the designation "reality" could only be applied to the primary state.

It is in Descartes that we first feel the impact of these premises for the historical and social studies. In his *Discourse On Method* and *Meditations of First Philosophy*, he claimed that the status of these subjects was sub-rational because of their subjectivity, their lack of a universally valid method, and lack of certainty. Descartes saw correctly that these studies provided no universally valid method for the discovery of self-evident and deductively ordered truths. He would advocate what can be called a monomethodological approach to knowledge, i.e., there is but one method of reasoned inquiry into the natural world. This method is the mathematical comprehension of nature in its primary status. The secondary or qualitative states of experience would be equated with the illusions of subjectivity.

It is not an accident that Descartes' *mathesis universalis* makes no provisions for the sociohistorical studies. Indeed, the implications of his assumptions and methods are fatal to them. Their very material involves human subjectivity and secondary qualitative states. Such subjects as history cannot be explicated in clear and distinct, self-evident, or purely quantitative conceptions *per se*, nor can they be reduced to the primary qualities of the *res extensa* without eliminating everything the sociohistorical world is about—deliberate actions, emotions, first person states, ordinary sense data, cultural symbolizations, records and artifacts, and the significance of ordinary language. In short, because Descartes' monomethodology and presuppositions about reality are incompatible with sociohistorical attributes, he was forced to confine the sociohistorical world to a merely subjective or subrational status. And this he did. History—its methods and materials—was negated by its relegation to the sub-rational and sub-real world.

Our fourth case is an instance of revolution in ideas, a revolution perpetrated by an obscure Italian genius whose importance, until recently, has gone largely unrecognized. Giambattista Vico (1668-1744) seized upon the problem of the status and method of the sociohistorical studies and created a tradition which is still in the process of unfolding in such diverse areas as ordinary language philosophy, James Joyce,

Jean Piaget, Marx, Levi-Strauss, and phenomenology.

Vico held that a novel approach, a "new science," must be created to penetrate the "thick darkness" which obscures human life in its individual, social, and historical dimensions. In his *On the Study Methods of Our Time* and *The New Science*, he would respond to what he considered to be the Cartesian rejection of the so-called *Verisimilar* notion of truth. By this term, he indicated that a valid method for the interpretation of ordinary life and its creations is possible. Vico was aware that the humanistic tradition of philosophy had recognized the need for such a doctrine. In Aristotle, for example, there was *phronesis* or practical wisdom. By this conception, Aristotle would provide to the mind a means for explaining the practical, common sense disciplines of politics and rhetoric. Vico believed that the rise of science and Cartesianism had subverted this epistemological category. Cartesianism had granted epistemic priority and exclusiveness to what Aristotle had reserved for *theoria*, that is, the purely abstract faculty which cognizes metaphysics, mathematics and physics.

For Vico, Cartesianism had never achieved a true unity of method, but only a species of it, i.e., the mathematical-deductive attempt to formulate the laws of external nature. In order to provide an understanding of the sociohistorical world, Vico would advance a formula for the nature of truth which he styled *verum et factum convertuntur*. This formula claims that truth converts into the creations and actions of human beings.

Hopefully, this conception can be elucidated as follows. For Vico, God is immanent in nature and understands its *logos* as a creation of His own being. But man can only understand nature externally through sense experience and hypothesis formation. The innermost parts of nature remain unknowable to Man because he did not make nature. In the sociohistorical world, however, knowledge is attainable because the sociohistorical world is a human creation. Man is the cause of his own cultural effects, and the principles of these effects "are found in the modification of his own mind." But how can we clarify and exemplify this seemingly obscure notion in Vico?

I would propose that for Vico the created human world has two aspects. We can note examples from Vico himself: the overt physical motions that attend an action (the physical sound waves of a speech act, the ink and paper of a classical document) are the sensate, physical or 'outer' side of these creations; but the 'outer' physical features are not sufficient conditions for a complete understanding of the actions and creations in question. It is true, of course, that human creations and actions must take some material embodiment, but we must note that the concept of culture has what today we would call an intentional aspect: it

is constituted as meaning and value laden, and as expressing human purpose. Culture is always significant beyond its outer physical aspects. For Vico, the establishment of the fundamental and universal principles of culture must be derived from the humanly constituted meaning of human creations. This is the purpose of his *New Science*.

The human mind had previously tried to understand itself by reference to external bodies. But for Vico, the mind can only understand true nature by self-reflection. In the case of language, Vico argued that the mind first understands its verbal creations only by reference to physical bodies. Subsequently, it comes to reflect on its own activity by attention to the symbols which express the significance we assign to objects. Natural languages are for Vico expressions of a common mental structure which provides the basis of intersubjectivity in the human world. The *verum est factum* formula is the assertion that the knowing and the being of the cultural world are unified because in human making (*factum*) the agent self-consciously performs the subjective symbolic operations that constitute the meaning of his making. We can be said to understand the creations of the human world when we can self-consciously refer to the states of awareness that constitute the meaning of any creation. The innermost being of the human world is understandable because the consciousness which recognizes itself in the object is the cause of the intelligibility in the objects made.

For Vico, history is human creation and action in time. It is a product (*factum*) of man. Its method of interpretation is autonomous in the sense that its maker is its interpreter. Its status is not subrational or external to our knowing faculty. Nor are its explanatory devices derived from a subject matter foreign to its nature. The philosophy of historical immanence is here established for the first time. Vico attempted to negate the negation of the historical world by Descartes. History was seen to have its own methods and subject matter. The force of Vico's position were largely ignored by philosophy until the latter half of the nineteenth century. Its position was negated in the sense that it was forgotten.

In Hegel's philosophy of history, our fifth paradigm, the doctrine of historical immanence was confined to the indwelling possibility of consciousness in historical time. But the promise of Vico's *verum et factum* method was not retained. Instead, historical process and its meaning were to be understood by reference to first principles, by a return to the doctrine of *nous* as the cause of world order. In the *Lectures on the Philosophy of History*, Hegel cited the text of Plato's *Phaedo* from 99 d to 101 d (pp. 11 ff., Sibree trans.) Here, Socrates was described as disappointed to find that Anaxagoras's *nous* provided reason to nature only insofar as it was a description of external material

causes. Plato's Socrates wanted to overcome Anaxagoras's purportedly inadequate explanation of nature in terms of mechanical causes. To effect this end, Socrates posited the existence of the forms as the strongest *logoi* of explanation, and he had Socrates understand *nous* as that principle which arranges nature "for the best."

Hegel asserted that his positing of "reason in history" would advance historical understanding to the extent that the Phaedo's notion of *nous* was a turning point in the philosophy of nature. Hegel claimed that history, too, must be comprehended by reason, for *nous* is manifest in history as well as nature. Hegel wanted to show that reason is consciousness determining itself in absolute freedom in historical time. For Hegel, the mere cause and effect or descriptive narration of the past fails to show necessity, goal, or reason in history. The sole thought which philosophy brings to history is the concept that reason is the law of the world. Reason transforms history in its ability to actualize the ideal, to effect the 'ought' or the imperative mode by the achievement of freedom and self-consciousness in progressive stages of historical time. Hegel's philosophy of history tried to illustrate progressive stages of reason's development in time.

The issue which Hegel brought to history was not a new competence in historiography, but a new reality principle. While he denied that his method was simply an *à priori* means of explanation, Hegel, like Plato before him, appealed to the highest order of cause which can "arrange things for the best" in historical time. This was the recrudescence of *nous* or reason. I believe that one may apply the term "negation of history" to Hegel's thought in the following senses: (1) historians such as Ranke, Burckhardt, Mommsen, Bury, Meinecke, Trevelyan, Huizinga, Henry Adams, G. P. Gooch and others have claimed that Hegel's "reason in history" is methodologically unhelpful and misleading with respect to the historical materials with which it deals; (2) historical time does not reveal a clear progress of either reason or freedom, so his method leads to a distortion of progressive chronology, when for example the Crusades is seen as a higher expression of development than Greece; (3) Hegel's treatment virtually excludes the historicity of the non-Western world; and (4) the notion of the "cunning of reason" has not adequately elucidated the irrational, selfish, or unintended consequences of human action.

While Hegel's philosophy of history has largely evaporated from the theory and practice of professional historians, the historical claims of Karl Marx arouse passions everywhere, and his influence is manifestly apparent in a variety of schools and individuals. Eager partisanship on the one hand and strong antipathy on the other help make a fair and full treatment of his views difficult in a limited time. Here, as in the

paradigm case of Hegel, I will attempt nothing like a full statement or analysis of Marx's theory of history. However, some elements of his position must be mentioned.

1. Hegel's idealist metaphysics—the view that substance is subject, that the universe is the self-expression of spirit and reason—was entirely implausible to Marx. For him, matter had ontological, causal, and temporal precedence over mind. However, Marx did accept from Hegel the dialectical method for the interpretation of reality. But he accepted dialectical method not because it answers to the nature of thought, but because it answers, he believed, to the nature of things.
2. Marx borrowed from Hegel the notion that the different aspects of society are organically related in time. But for Marx, the principle of organic connection was not objective spirit, but the economic constituents that render social and political affairs connected and explainable.
3. For Marx, the historical task became directed toward explaining how economic or class structures have evolved with respect to the various historical solutions to the problem of production.
4. History must record how the forces of production negate existing economic and social arrangements in order to provide a rationale for radical social change. Indeed, the end of history is to record the progress of man to an end, i.e., a classless, stateless, and free communistic society.

But our account of Marx thus far is incomplete, for it neglects Marx's relation to the empirical tradition of the Enlightenment, i.e., to the utilitarians, and the classical liberal schools. From these sources, he inherited the belief that history not only must exhibit an empirical and predictive character, but that history must be controlled and changed. Passive understanding of history is not enough. The point is to change it. Also, a speculative philosophy of history which records the stages of intelligibility of human consciousness in time is inadequate. Rather, for Marx, the explanatory horizon for all historical explanation is the empirical economic background through which concepts become meaningful and related. For Marx, this theory of explanation is evidence of his negation of Hegel's *á priori* method in the dialectic. But, like Hegel, Marx wanted to join a notion of methodological empiricism to the imperative or normative mode. This is to say that the development of history, when joined to revolutionary action, is essentially towards a desirable goal, i.e., the communist social order.

At this point, I would like to address myself to the question of how Marxism, or at least its exemplification in contemporary regimes, re-

lates to the problem of the negation of history. Marxist regimes or practitioners negate history *if* the following conditions obtain:

1. when Marxist economic determination becomes simply a purportedly empirical surrogate for Hegel's *nous*; i.e., a single factor analysis of all historical reality in terms of a method which is exclusive and reductionistic;
2. when alternative hypotheses about the causal relations that might obtain between consciousness, economic action, and the historical milieu (such as that of Max Weber's) are dismissed *à priori* as false consciousness, i.e., as non-complementary to materialistic presupposition, and Marxist ideology;
3. when Marxist ideologists reject an alternative approach only because it is hostile or neutral towards Marxist assumptions of the proper end of history as classless, collectivistic, and free; this is to say that there may be valid approaches to history which do not assume the methodological unity of fact and value, and reject the norms of self-fulfilling prophecy;
4. when a regime demands an exclusive intellectual and moral allegiance to the Marxist state in scholarship or social behavior, and demands legitimation of its previously imposed institutions and hierarchies; for example, the Polish Communist Party Chief Stanislaw Kania argued from the standpoint of his state Marxism that the Solidarity movement is essentially anti-historical; Soviet authorities called it counterrevolutionary and, therefore, anti-historical; recently the underground Solidarity movement, Young Poland, has advocated a published text, *Truth-in-History*, on the relations between Poland and Russia; this can only mean that action or thought which is considered discomplementary to establish power is negated as valid historical matter;
5. finally, when there is a tendency in at least some Marxist trends to create and sanctify a historical bifurcation between ideal and real Marxism, and in so doing to attempt to disassociate a merely ideational Marxism from given historical realities.

The negation of history exists here in a refusal even to consider a possible relation between Marxist theory and the negative positivity of historical results. For example, the tendency towards centralization of power, in one case at least, has resulted in a Stalin. The idealist interpretation of this development is the instant assumption that there is no association to be found between Marxist presuppositions and historical results. Or, apologists will explain such facts as purely aberrational, or merely instances of the "evil man" theory of historical possibility. Any

hypothesis as to whether there is an essential tendency in statist theory to generate absolute and self-serving power is negated from the beginning.

In our final paradigm case, I would like to consider some of the thinking of Martin Heidegger. In Heidegger's thought the notion of historical immanence from Vico and historicity of life in Dilthey have been combined into the notion of the radical historicity of human being (*Dasein*). This means that man is not a substance, for a substance is a thing, "an objectified presence" in Heideggerian analysis of existence indicates that the self is not a ready-made condition but a state of existence to be gained or lost in historical time. Heidegger's model of man involves radical historicity of human existence, because the three dimensions of temporality—past, present, and what will be—are correlated to the essential structure of life as care (*die Sorge*), i.e., possibility or the projection of what is to come, facticity (the taking over of what has been) and falling (the concern with the present).

Heidegger's concept of human being as radical historicity allowed him to distinguish between man and thing. The thing endures through time, but its relation to time is that of a kind of moving from one now to another, an external relation. But human being (*Dasein*) is not confined to the now. It projects its possibilities to the future and it is responsible for the past. Man is not merely in time, but he has time and takes time as one of his essential attributes. Indeed, his very being is only possible in the horizon of time. Man appropriates that which is ahead and that which has been; and the unity of a future which becomes the present from the process of having been is temporality. It is because of man's essential historicity that he can understand the past. Heidegger's notion of historicity follows Dilthey, who distinguished between the *Naturwissenschaften* and the *Geisteswissenschaften* in order to illustrate that in the latter we create and participate in their subject matter. Their content is the historical creation of human being in time.

Heidegger developed the being of man as a regional ontology. As such, his considerations were intended to introduce us to the so-called problem of being itself. This is to say that the inquiry into the being of man was not conducted for its own sake, but as a means for entering into the question of being *per se*. This second phase—sometimes called "the turning"—was concerned with Being itself, and man is to be understood secondarily in the light of Being. The later Heidegger advocated a passive or receptive attitude to the unconcealment of Being. Philosophy became the hermeneutics of being. This mode of doing philosophy is distinguished from what Heidegger believed was a misconception in the West, i.e., the tendency to think of being as a thing, as essence, as a presence at hand. In this respect, Nietzsche's thought

represented an essentialistic concept of being as the will to power and domination in the form of technology. The problem of nihilism is inseparable from the problem of being here, because nihilism is the attempt to master beings and to forget Being. From this present impasse we can only wait to be delivered, wait for a new revelation of the meaning of being. This attitude seems to me to stand in contrast to the earlier Heidegger's emphasis on human responsibility for the appropriation of the future, for the creation of history. Heidegger's now famous last interview with *Der Spiegel* illustrates the issue. When asked about the future of humanity with respect to war or peace, or the possibility of a holocaust, Heidegger replied, "Only a god can save us."

This understanding of things, I would suggest, is a negation of history in the sense that a responsible existence towards the future—which is after all part of man's historicity for Heidegger—is forgotten or avoided. Historical time has become a kind of waiting, an enduring. It is from this situation that the present "terror of history" emerges. By this phrase, I refer to any posture of helplessness or waiting for a destiny that is beyond human control. If it is the fate of contemporary man to retreat into passivity, terror, or waiting for the dispensation of being, has he not approached the status of an object among object, an object who does not appropriate the future of his own-ness? Here, in Heidegger, the most immanent of historical philosophies seems to negate the very responsibility, praxis, or authenticity implied in the doctrine of radical historical immanence.

In closing, I would like to note, as I am sure you have noted, that many relations between philosophy and history have gone unaddressed. My purpose, however, has not been to present an exhaustive summary, but to suggest some problems, i.e., that philosophy either as a method or doctrine maintains a problematic relation to history, that one task of contemporary philosophy might be an analysis, elucidation and resolution of the issues that have emerged from our analysis: (1) the order of causation in history has been disjoined, in significant part, from both philosophical and scientific methods since Plato; (2) an a-historical philosophical theology such as that of St. Augustine can swallow the efficacy of human praxis into eternity; (3) a nomothetic reductionism in the form of monomethodology will tend to subserve history into nature and negate even the possibility of an idiographic method for the understanding of sociohistorical being; (4) philosophical theories of historical immanence can become messianic and pretend to knowledge of the final meaning of history without recourse to the demands of empirical methods or independent criticism; at the same time such historical theses can provide the rationale for political domination and intellectual subservience; (5) finally, if philosophical inquiry, criticism, ontology, or

normative prescription are divorced from the historical *Lebenswelt*, then philosophy, along with other disciplines, becomes a mere spectator of history.

Indeed, individuals are captives of history when they float along with its currents and trust to historical drift in the face of holocaust. The apparent lack of the recognition of man's radical historicity and his implied responsibility for his future are the ghosts that haunt contemporary philosophy. To be *in* the flux, *to be* the flux, are the very marks of humanity. While these marks are a sign of human finitude, are they not also signs of man's grandeur, of his possibility for the future and the promotion of intelligence in the modern world?