



Secure Disk Scrubbing in a Large-Scale Automated Testbed THE Cody Cutler, Eric Eide, Mike Hibler, Robert Ricci Flux Group, School of Computing OF UTAH

Node Booting

The Emulab testbed gives users full access to physical nodes

Standard Boot Path

BIOS POSTs and boots

Node in

Must be secure:

 Physical nodes are time-shared • Users have root access • Even BIOS is untrusted Nodes must be scrubbed completely between uses

Must be scalable:

- 500+ physical nodes in constant use
- Automated node allocation/deallocation Admin interaction is not feasible

Must be flexible

 Node boot paths change frequently Boot code is upgraded periodically Locking down to one particular boot path per node is not acceptable

Our approach:

Redesign the boot path to protect the disk-loading process while adhering to the above requirements



Secure, Flexible Boot Path

BIOS and boot loader are passed to the boot loader

stage and measures it in software

and asks whether or not to



Critical Design Points

- Hybrid HW/SW technique for "measuring" (verifying) boot stages
- Immutable hardware trust root (TPM)
- Server verifies dynamic boot stages
- If any stage fails to verify, boot process is aborted
- TPM contains TLS key allowing secure communication channel

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Novel Properties

- Add or modify boot paths
- Transparent to node user
- VM-like isolation for physical nodes
- Fully automated
- No local state dependency