

AMERICAN COLONIAL POLICY IN THE PHILIPPINES
(1916-1932)

by

TOMAS ZAMORA LIMBOS

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PRINCIPLE
OF
AMERICAN COLONIAL ADMINISTRATION

It should in every particular aim at the well-being of the Filipinos. We must accept this new responsibility as a trust for civilization. We want no tribute-bearing colonies. The colonial history of Spain, Holland, and England contains valuable lessons by which we must profit. Their experience demonstrates the folly of selfishness--the more selfish the policy, the more complete its failure. If, with the warning of their experience, we repeat their blunders, we shall be much more culpable than they.

Joshua Strong



RIZAL MONUMENT, MANILA

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PREFACE

The United States' colonial policy in the Philippines as first enunciated by President McKinley contemplated the preparation of the islanders for a speedy participation in the government with the ultimate object of granting them independence under a democracy in the form of a republic. This policy has been accompanied, nobody can deny, by the thought of introducing big business for commercial gains, but it nevertheless remained America's firm conviction. If such has been so, the Philippine people owe much to the Democratic Party because of its constant denunciations against imperialistic notions.

Thus the Filipinos were from time to time given gradual participation in the mechanism and direction of their own affairs. It was not until 1913, however, when they were given full control of the legislative branch of the government. Full Filipino autonomy has been accelerated by the passage of the Jones Act, usually called the Philippine Act of 1916 which is the basis of American colonial policy. Through it, Filipinization became wholly complete. America's pledge to redeem its promise seemed at an end. But in the face of the Republican rule certain alterations have been made——policy of further trusteeship was evoked, independence was made remote. It is then the object of this thesis to follow the trend of America's govern-

mental mind, from the passage of the Jones Act in 1916 to the last days of the Republican administration in 1932.

In the preparation of this work, the writer has been under special obligation to members of the department of History and Political Science in the University of Utah, chief among whom are Professor George Emery Fellows, head of the department, who kindly consented to act as my counselor; Professor Elbert D. Thomas, now Junior Senator of the State of Utah, who has really offered the writer valuable suggestions as to the construction of the work; and, Professor Andrew Neff, who suggested to the writer the title of this thesis.

Further indebtedness is acknowledged to Senator William H. King, who has given the writer the desired Congressional records, Senate resolutions, and other public documents; the Bureau of Insular Affairs and War Dept. who had furnished the writer with the messages and inaugural addresses of the Governors-General of the Philippines.

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THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Chapter I

A. PRE-AMERICAN OCCUPATION

Before the advent of American occupation, the Filipinos were engaged in a revolution for emancipation against Spain. It was a losing struggle, but determined as they were, they fought courageously and met every odd and handicap with a willingness to sacrifice all that which they possessed for the sake of freedom.

In the course of the struggle, the Filipinos wrested from the arrogant and autocratic imperial government the Treaty of Biak-na-Bato which was signed with the understanding that the Spanish government was to introduce reforms while the native leaders were to exile themselves on payment of a million dollars. The Philippine leaders fulfilled their share of the agreement, but the political myopia of Spain compelled her not only to ignore her written promise but continued her usual attitude and even went further to make conditions unbearable. In a spirit of unison, the Filipinos under the Aguinaldo leadership once more raised the battle cry against the Bourbon suzerainty.

In the meantime the Teller resolution ushered the declaration of war between the United States and Spain. By instructions from Washington, under the direction of Assistant Secretary of Navy Theodore Roosevelt, Admiral Dewey

proceeded to Manila Bay wherein the decaying Spanish fleet remained intact. The battle of Manila, famous for its historical significance, took place on May 1, 1898.

Simultaneously, through the efforts of American Consul-General Edwin Wildman, acting through the wishes of Admiral Dewey, General Aguinaldo was brought back to the Philippines on board the U. S. Gunboat McCulloch. Thus arriving in Cavite, May 19th, he was encouraged to organize his countrymen. Guns and munitions were given him from the Spanish Arsenal.⁽¹⁾

B. ABORTIVE PHILIPPINE REPUBLIC AND THE WAR

Not wanting in respect and not slow in recognizing what the Americans have done, Aguinaldo, in his proclamation of May 24th, claims them liberators of his country.⁽²⁾ The Filipino spirit ran high and with the cooperation of the United States Army and Navy a vigorous campaign was fought. The opportune time had come. Plans were devised to organize and establish a republic. Accordingly, a temporary "Dictatorial Government" with General Aguinaldo as the head, was proclaimed on June 18th only to be followed later by the promulgation on January 23, 1899, of the Constitution of the Philippine Republic.

For almost a year since the capitulation of Manila,

⁽¹⁾ U. S. Philippine Commission, "Report", Vol. I, p. 171 1900

⁽²⁾ U. S. Congress, 57:1; "Sen. Doc." 331, p. 2955

August 18, 1898, an amicable understanding existed between the two joint military forces. However after the adoption of the Treaty of Paris on December 10th,⁽³⁾ the peaceful relationship between the two peoples assumed ominous forebodings. General Wesley Merritt went to the Philippines with a definite instruction not to recognize the then existing Philippine Republic, instead to establish a provisional government. He was succeeded by General Otis who refused to continue the joint occupation of Manila with General Aguinaldo. Hence, on September 5, 1898, he wrote in a somewhat mandatory manner to the Filipino chieftain to withdraw.⁽⁴⁾ A convulsion of hatred was at once aroused in every native heart. The force of hatred rapidly gained momentum and like a cyclone of fury it burst against the wall of American determination. The Filipino-American conflict commenced on the 4th of February of the following year, later developed into a guerilla warfare, and ended in the capture of General Aguinaldo by General Funston in March, 1901. Psychologically and politi-

(3) The Treaty was adopted by the United States Congress with a vote of 57 to 27, one vote more than the required two-thirds vote. (Feb. 6, 1898.)

(4) U. S. War Dept., "Annual Report," 1899, Vol. I Part IV, p. 9



SPANISH ARCH BRIDGE, PHILIPPINES

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cally speaking, the acknowledgment by the native leader of American sovereignty put an end to the abortive Philippine Republic. Its fate was finally sealed by the presidential decree on the twenty first of December.

C. INCEPTION OF AMERICAN RULE

Almost three months after the ratification of the treaty of Paris,⁽⁵⁾ the Republican administration sent the Schurman Commission which arrived there on March 4, 1899. Up to 1900, the government of the Philippines was military. An immediate effort was therefore made to re-establish law and order. The first measure which the President undertook was the appointment of a Board of Commissioners⁽⁶⁾ to assume the duties of the first Commission and to act as a legislative body. Mr. Taft who was to "inaugurate governments essentially popular in their form as fast as territory is held by our troops" was inaugurated the first Civil Governor in 1901. Thus civil government was established all over the archipelago, although a few provinces still remained under the military government for the obvious reason that

(5) President McKinley affixed his signature on February 10, 1889; the Queen Regent affixed hers the following day.

(6) Philippine Islands, "Acts and Treaties Pertaining to the Philippines" Appendix V, p. 125, Washington Government Printing Office, 1925

they were not completely pacified.

The President's instructions⁽⁷⁾ to the Commission were executed accordingly; popular control was extended slowly yet steadily. Hence, in 1901 and 1902, municipal governments were placed in the hands of the Filipinos. The native voters were allowed to elect their municipal officials and, later on, in 1903, the provinces were allowed to elect their governors.⁽⁸⁾ There was a Provincial Board in each province composed of a governor and two members. These third members at first were appointive, but like the governor, they, too, later became elective. In 1907, popular control virtually became complete. And so, consistent with the provisions of the Cooper Act of 1902, the first elective assembly was inaugurated. The Philippine Legislature at that time was composed of an Assembly as a lower branch and a Commission presided over by the Governor-General as the Upper House.

Evidently, the Democratic administration at Washington, mindful of the tremendous progress shown by the Filipinos in the careful manipulation of their own affairs, unhesitatingly granted them full control of the Legislative

(7)Ibid Appendix V pp. 125-130.

(8)Kalaw, M. M., "The Proceedings of the First Independence Congress", pp. 95-133, 1930.

department by giving them in 1913 a majority in the Commission. The usual deadlock between the two houses, the upper controlled by an American majority, the lower by the natives, at last came to an end.

A more decisive step taken toward the fulfillment of the Democracy's policy of Filipino autonomy and self-rule came in 1916 when the Congress passed the Jones Act, or Philippine Autonomy Act, pledging the people of this country to recognize the independence of the Philippines "as soon as a stable government can be established therein." The Act considers the necessity of giving them, as a preparation for that policy, what Dean Kalaw says, "the greatest amount of autonomy compatible with the exercise of the rights of American sovereignty."

Three years after the passage of the famous act, the islanders became convinced that the only condition prescribed in the law has been fulfilled. The Philippine Legislature sent a Special Mission to the United States to present the fact and to urge the fulfillment and redemption of America's pledge. It was at this juncture that President Wilson in his last message to Congress recommended the voting of independence to the Philippines, but Congress did not act on the chief executive's recognition. The problem was laid squarely upon the shoulders of the next administration.

President Harding, viewing with seriousness the urgency for solution of the Philippine question, authorized the Wood-Forbes Mission to dig facts and to bring home pictures of the real conditions existing therein. It is interesting to note that the high calibre of the special envoys clearly manifest the superlative regard attached by the administration to its colonial policy.

The knowledge of Major-General Wood of the general conditions of the archipelago which he acquired first as a governor of the Moroland, then as a member of the Mission, amply qualified him for the post of Governor-General. On October 15, 1921, he was inaugurated the successor of Hon. Francis Burton Harrison. His administration was one characterized by various incidents hurtful to the Filipino-American relationship. His Mussolinian policy led to the resignation of all the Filipino members of the cabinet and to the campaign of passive revolution. The total absence of cooperation greatly paralyzed the affairs of the islands and involved the sending of numerous missions to the United States. His practically self-imposed duty to run the whole machinery of government without the proper coordination of parts obviously became unbearable. He was an able leader, but human as he was, he slowly succumbed to the ordeals of his exalted position.



IFUGAO RICE TERRACES, MOUNTAIN PROVINCE, PHILIPPINES

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After his death, Mr. Stimson was appointed by President Coolidge to assume the post. On March 1, 1928, he delivered at Luneta his inaugural address wherein he outlined his economic policy and his desire to regain cooperation. As a corporate lawyer and as a diplomat, he was unmistakably qualified to meet the situation. Instead of following the course pursued by the late general or taking sides with the native leaders, he assumed a middle road. The establishment of the Cabinet and the re-creation of the Council of State really gained for him the respect and confidence of the Philippine people. But his administration did not last long, for shortly after he established himself there, he was tendered the honor of being the Secretary of State under the Hoover administration. However, his policy based on "enlightened trusteeship and hostile to all forms of exploitation" continued to persist.

Mr. Dwight Davis followed his predecessor's safe path. In his first Philippine speech, he stressed the necessity of economic development of the islands and of honesty in government. Under his regime, there was a perfect peace and order save the temporary fracas created by Mr. Hoover's appointment of Mr. Nicholas Roosevelt for Vice-Governor-General and head of the Department of Public Instruction. The whole Filipino nation coupled by a great number of the United States Senate objected to the appointment on the

grounds of Mr. Roosevelt's imperialistic notions as expressed in his book entitled: PHILIPPINES: A TREASURE AND A PROBLEM.

President Hoover showed his political sportsmanship in the meticulous manipulation of the affair. A brief discussion of this political affray will be shown in the latter part of chapter V. The President was given an opportunity to show his friendliness toward the Philippines when Governor-General Davis resigned from his post. Immediately, Mr. Hoover sent the name of Col. Theodore Roosevelt Jr., the present Governor of Porto Rico to the Senate. His appointment won wide acclamation because of the appointee's sympathy with the common man. He arrived in Manila on January, 1932.

THE PHILIPPINE ORGANIC ACT OF 1916

Chapter II

A. JUSTIFICATION OF ITS PASSAGE

From time to time since the inception of American sovereignty, the Philippine problem confronted every administration at Washington, the leaders of which expressed hope for the early separation of those island groups. In a message to Congress, December, 1899, President McKinley declared:

"We shall continue as we have begun....to make these people.....feel that it is their liberty and not our power.....we are seeking to enhance."

President Roosevelt has the following to say:

"Apparently its (the present administration's) course in the Philippines has proceeded upon the theory that Filipinos are now fit to govern themselves. Whatever may be our personal and individual beliefs in this matter, we ought not as a nation, to break faith or even to seem to break faith."⁽¹⁾

In like manner, President Taft declared that American policy "must logically reduce and finally end the sovereignty of the United States" in the archipelago. Although the Republican platforms were silent on this matter of Filipino separation which the Democrats considered as manifestation of imperialistic designs, the Republican Presidential utter-

(1) Ex-President Roosevelt's pronouncement in an article as quoted by Senator King, Senate hearings, 1930, p. 94.

ances affirm the policies advocated by the Democratic platforms. (2)

For many years, Bryan, as the titular head of his party, strenuously and unflinchingly lambasted the opposite party for its imperialistic tendencies—tendencies diametrically opposed to the spirit of the Constitution. For three presidential years, Democratic platforms announced their policies toward the Philippines. The platform in 1900, uncompromisingly denounced the Republican administration as placing this great American Commonwealth "previously known and applauded throughout the world as the champion of freedom, in the false and un-American position of crushing with military force the efforts of our former allies to achieve liberty and self-government....." The 1912 Democratic platform upon which Wilson was elected President, states:

"We reaffirm the position thrice announced by the Democracy in national convention assembled against a policy of imperialistic and colonial exploitation in the Philippines....We favour an immediate declaration of the nation's purpose to recognize the independence of the Philippine Islands as soon as a stable government can be established." (3)

(2) This has been pointed out by Mr. Taft in a public address, March, 1918.

(3) "Democratic Text Book", p. 30, 1912

By virtue of the mandate of the American electorate, the Democratic Party withheld the idea that the policies enumerated in its platform justified the administration's future actions. Accordingly, President Wilson, acting under authority vested in him, announced to Congress his action of according the "people of the islands a majority in the Philippine Commission by appointing five instead of four native citizens."

"I believe that in this way", says the President, "we shall make proof of their capacity in counsel and their sense of responsibility in the exercise of political power, and the success of this step will be sure to clear our view for the steps which are to follow. Step by step we should extend and perfect the system of self-government in the islands, making the test of them and modifying them as experience discloses their successes and failures: that we should more and more put under the control of the native citizens of the archipelago the essential instruments of their life, their local instrumentalities of government, their schools, all the common interests of their communities, and so by counsel and experience set up a government which all the world will see to be suitable to a people whose affairs are under their control." (4)

To fulfill the letter and spirit of this insular policy, Filipinization commenced earnestly and steadily. The islanders availed themselves of the chance; proved their abilities

(4) Wilson, W., "Messages and Papers of the Presidents," Bureau of National Literatures, Inc., 1913-17, pp. 1910-11.

"in counsel" and "sense of responsibility" without the least misgivings and apprehensions on the part of the administration. The successes of the colonial experiment, prompted the Democratic Congress to act accordingly. But it seemed as if from the psychological standpoint Congress was timid to go to the extreme. Senator Lodge tells us that though "frankly desirous of getting rid of the islands, but lacking the courage to do so, Congress passed the Jones Act, thus completely changing the situation". (5)

B. THE CORNERSTONE OF AMERICAN COLONIAL POLICY

By almost unanimous vote of Congress, the United States has committed herself to a policy of withdrawal from the Philippines. From the adoption of the Jones Law:

An act to declare the purpose of the people of the United States as to the future status of the people of the Philippine Islands, and to provide a more autonomous government for those islands...

the administration in Washington conceded the fullest liberty of action and freedom from interference with the government of the Philippines. "The United States," says Mr. Fenwick, "had already pledged itself to recognize the independence of the Philippine Islands when they had given promise of their ability to maintain a stable government." (6)

(5) Lodge, C., "Our Failure in the Philippines" Harper's Magazine, Vol. 160, p. 211

(6) Fenwick, C., "International Law," p. 238

Perhaps it would be worthwhile to note the sentiment expressed by the late President Roosevelt in a pronouncement attributed to him with regard to a definite pledge put forth in the Act. I quote:

"Personally, I think it is a fine and high thing for a nation to have done such a deed with such a purpose. But we can not taint it with bad faith. If we act so that the natives understand us to have made a definite promise, then we should live up to that promise."⁽⁷⁾


In a similar tone, Governor-General Harrison said that the spirit of the Jones Law was without question that of self-government for the Filipino people and that it was incumbent upon the Governor-General to carry out the terms of the act with as much consideration as possible for that principle.⁽⁸⁾ The passage of the Jones Act marked the beginning of the new era in Filipino-American relationship. It has embarked this country on a new colonial policy never before attempted by any colonial power.

C. HIGHLIGHTS OF.....

The Philippine Organic Act stipulates the vast reconstruction of the Insular Government. For the sake of brevity I intend to point out that which I consider the high-

(7) The late President Roosevelt's article written in Everybody's Magazine, January, 1915.

(8) Harrison, R. B., "Cornerstone of Philippine Independence", p. 203



PAGSANJAN GORGE, PHILIPPINES

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lights of the act conducive to the grant of greater autonomy and to the points of contention.

1. Suffrage

The act created an elective legislature, but all citizens could not vote for its members. Hence, it stipulates the following conditions: All male individuals (not to include convicts and insane) twenty-one years old and over, not subjects or citizens of a foreign country, if residents in the Philippine Islands one year and in the municipality six months, provided they come within the following classifications:

Firstly, Those who under the previous laws were legal voters and had exercised the right. This referred to men who held public office during the Spanish regime or during the early American occupation.

Secondly, Those that owned at least \$250 worth of real property or paid at least \$15 a year of taxes.

Thirdly, Those able to read and write either Spanish, English, or a native dialect. (9)

Within the limitations of these provisions, sixty-one per cent of the whole 1918 population were qualified voters.

(9) S. 381, Philippine Organic Act, Sec. 15

Almost eighty-six per cent of the total qualified registered voters went to the polls in the 1919 general election as compared to the forty-nine per cent when Mr. Coolidge was elected President of the United States.

2. Legislature

The Organic Law divided and subdivided the archipelago into twelve senatorial ⁽¹⁰⁾ and ninety representative districts, each district was drawn according to population. Each senatorial district was to have two senators holding office for six years, half of the senate body to be elected every three years, and each representative, ^{district} was to have one representative holding a term of three years. Senators of the twelfth senatorial district and nine representatives of the same division, representing the so-called non-Christian Filipinos, were to be appointed by the Governor-General with the advice and consent of the Insular Senate. Elections were to take place on the first Tuesday in June, and the Legislature to convene on October 16th next thereafter (now amended to July 16th by the Insular Legislature.)

Laws passed by this body must be submitted to the Governor-General for his signature. He had the right of

(10) Ibid, Sec. 16

veto which could be over-ruled by a two-thirds vote of both houses. If he disapproved of the measure for the second time, he could send it to the President of the United States for his final action. A duration of six months had been set for the President for his final action, after which when approved becomes a law, if not, dead. This presidential power had never been used so far. All laws passed by the Legislature must be reported to the Congress of the United States, which thereby reserved "power and authority to annul the same." This power of Congress may be discussed later under the heading, ANOMALIES OF THE ACT.⁽¹¹⁾ Two resident Commissioners to Washington were to be elected by the Legislature for a term of three years, and were to receive equal official recognition and equal privileges and immunities as any member of Congress.⁽¹²⁾

3. Governor-General

The Organic Act vested in the Governor-General what is called the supreme executive power. He was to be appointed by the President with the approval of the United States Senate, and to hold office at the pleasure of the nation's chief. The said Governor-General was to have

⁽¹¹⁾ Ibid Sec. 19

⁽¹²⁾ Ibid Sec. 20

the general supervision and control of all the departments and bureaux of the Insular Government "as far as not inconsistent with the provisions of this act" which as we shall see later became the spring of controversy between the executive and legislative departments. An annual report was required of him to be submitted to the Executive Department assigned by the President. This report, in turn, was to be submitted by the authorized executive department (War Department) to the United States Congress. Why this peculiar governmental procedure is done, I can not very well understand, but one writer ascribed it "to the quaint operations of the Congressional mind."

Furthermore, he was empowered to appoint all important officials including the two Senators and nine Representatives of the non-Christian people, by and with the consent of the Insular Senate. It is specified, however, that this does not include the Vice-Governor-General, the Insular auditor, and the Justices of the Supreme Court.

He could order investigation into official conduct; determine when it was necessary to practice eminent domain; order the examination of the books and accounts of the Auditor and Treasurer; reserve from settlement of public lands; deport, after an investigation, from the Philippines any citizen of a foreign power; order the concen-

tration of the people, with the approval of the Senate, for protection and order. Also, he had charge of all extradition cases; had supervision over the correspondence touching the foreign relations of the Philippine Islands. And he was made head of the Bureau of Audits and the Bureau of Civil Service. ⁽¹³⁾

The direct supervision by Governor-General of the Civil Service Bureau made it possible for him, (Mr. Harrison), to accomplish his policy of Filipinization.

4. Vice-Governor-General

He, too, like the Governor-General was to be appointed by the President by and with the consent of the Senate. He was to act as the head of the Department of Public Instruction and was to assume the vacancy left by the resignation or leave of absence of the Governor-General. ⁽¹⁴⁾

5. Insular Auditor and Deputy Auditor

These two Insular officials, "who shall examine, audit, and settle all accounts" pertaining to the revenues and receipts of the governments, likewise that of the provincial and municipal governments, were to be appointed by the President with the approval of the United States

⁽¹³⁾ Ibid Sec. 21

⁽¹⁴⁾ Ibid Sec. 23

Senate. Strangely enough, they were to send an annual report to the Secretary of War, which procedure remains as the relic of the Military Government. ⁽¹⁵⁾

6. Courts

The Supreme Court, the Courts of First Instance, the Municipal Courts, were to be continued on the existing system. The Chief Justice and the associate justices were to be appointed by the President of the United States by and with the advice and consent of the United States Senate. The judges of the Court of First Instance and the justices of the Peace or Police Courts were to be appointed by the Governor-General with the approval of the Philippine Senate. The Jones Act stipulates that the Supreme Court and the Courts of First Instance should remain under the jurisdiction of the admiralty until further changes are effected by the Congress. ⁽¹⁶⁾

D. ANOMALIES OF THE ACT

1. ABSOLUTE POWER OF CONGRESS OVER ISLAND LEGISLATURE

"There is something patently un-American", says Mr. Morley, "in our failure to give any constitutional guar-


⁽¹⁵⁾ Ibid, Sec. 24

⁽¹⁶⁾ Ibid, Sec. 26

antees or safeguards to the people of the Philippines." (17)

This statement seems far from being true, but when one remembers the absolute power of Congress over the insular Legislature, one adheres to the above opinion. It is not unlike a suspended electric light bulb which when cut from the point of suspension at the instant drops and breaks itself to unrecognizable pieces. Such is the status of the Philippine law-making body. Section 19 of the Act, referred to in this chapter, stipulates that "all laws enacted by the Philippine Legislature shall be reported to the Congress of the United States, which hereby reserves the power and authority to annul the same." Is it not obvious from the letter, not to say the spirit, of this item of the law that a mere majority of votes in both houses of Congress with the consent of the President can wipe out of existence the insular Legislature? To put it in another way, is it not possible for the sake of argument, that with such a composition of Congress, as a reactionary measure, can alter the basic law and political status of the Philippines? A leading Filipino student of the Constitution, in a frank statement, declared: "Congress can keep the Philippines in perpetual dependency, convert it into the state of the Union, or declare it free

(17) Morley, "Our Far Eastern Assignment," p. 151.



MONT MAYON, PHILIPPINES

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and independent."⁽¹⁸⁾

Nominally autonomous, the Philippine islands have surely much less-guaranteed self-government than any state of the Union. They are allowed to send two Resident Commissioners to the United States Congress, who can talk, but can not vote or participate in the division on the floor of the House of Representatives.

However, the Congress of the United States has thus far been scrupulously careful to exercise this enormous and arbitrary power over the Filipinos cautiously. Nevertheless, Filipino leaders are not without fear for what Congress may do---"a fear which is quite comprehensive in view of the general ignorance of our Senators and Representatives on Philippine sentiments and conditions."⁽¹⁹⁾

2. GOVERNOR-GENERAL'S POWER OF APPOINTMENT

Senator Lodge, one of the staunchest opponents of the Wilsonian administration, gives his own biting criticisms of the act--an act which he contends inaugurated the "system of American responsibility without authority." The American chief executive of the Philippines "is one of the most hopeless creations in the whole of Governmental history." He goes on to say, "He is supposed to represent the sovereignty of the United States, and in that capacity

⁽¹⁸⁾ Kalaw, M. M., "The Present Government of the Philippines," p. 113

⁽¹⁹⁾ Morley, op. cit. p. 151

he can appoint no one to public office without the consent of the Filipino Legislature. He is thus a complete contradiction in terms." (20)

Senator Lodge's criticism have been indirectly, if not directly acknowledged by Governor-General Harrison in his book, "Cornerstone of Philippine Independence." But how can the Democracy's policy of Filipinization be executed without finding some contradictions, inconsistencies, and flaws in the machinery of government?

E. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE ACT

Rational thinkers, sometimes, argue that an act should be judged not by the means, but by the ends. If we were to ignore the anomalies applied in the former as in the case of the Jones Act and turn our eyes to the latter as in the policy of Filipinization, we find as it has been done, the flowers of American humanitarianism and American thought.

The conditions set forth in the Act represent a notable progressive change in colonial policies. They not alone affect the relationship between colonial power and dependency, but also touch the sphere of international

(20) Lodge, C., "Our Failure in the Philippines", Harper's Magazine, Vol. 160, p. 212.

politics. The act, as a whole, signifies "not only an act of reparation, an abandonment of the Imperialistic doctrine, which constitutes the profession of faith of the great powers, but also the adoption of a new dogma that implies the renunciation of acquired rights, where these rights are not founded upon morality and justice. It signifies, moreover, the noble and loyal fulfillment of all engagements implied in the voluntary acceptance of a trusteeship for the well-being of the Filipinos, and the inauguration of a new method for the peaceful and legal solution of the question of one people's dependence upon another. It further signifies the reaffirmation of the principle enounced in the Declaration of Independence, that peoples should always be governed by their own consent, never without their consent." (2)

(2) Quoted by the R. of Rs., Vol. 54, pp. 221-2, 1916, from an article published by the Hon. Rafael Palma in the Philippines Review (Manila).

POLICY: POWER OF CONTROL AND SUPERVISION

Chapter III

A. THE CHANGE OF ADMINISTRATION

There is a legal maxim in a Latin version which says: "Perpetua lex est nullam legem humanam ac positivam perpetuam esse, et clausula quae abrogationem exclusit ab initio non valet."⁽¹⁾ This maxim runs true when we infer it in the change of administration at Washington. If we take the Republican Party as an example, which assumed power on March 4, 1921, we find that its principles and policies toward the Philippine archipelago were in complete reversion with those enunciated and executed by its opponent and predecessor. It is the intention of this chapter to show the turn of colonial policy, from the Democracy's theory of fast Filipinization and early grant of independence to the Republican's theory of retardation and close control and supervision.

1. The Wood-Forbes Mission

Upon the assumption of Mr. Harding to the presidency, legal steps were undertaken to learn the existing conditions in the Philippines and to ascertain what procedure

(1) Translated by Dean M. Kalaw—"It is a perpetual law that no human and positive law can be perpetual and a clause (in law) which precludes the power of abrogation is void from the beginning."

his administration would take. Indirectly assumed as a challenge to the claims made by the Filipino Independence Mission in 1919,⁽²⁾ and to the pronouncements made by President Wilson before Congress, the administration, before attempting to make recommendations to Congress regarding the problem, appointed a commission of two with seven other members of the staff to study the local conditions. The mission sailed April 9, 1921, from Seattle.

The Chief Executive's selection of General Wood as Chairman caused few to deny that he had picked the best man able to fulfill the mission brilliantly and successfully. Ex-Governor Forbes, as an associate member, had made use in this inquiry of his knowledge of finance and of his acquaintance with the islands. Equipped in every way, these two brilliant men with their attaches arrived in Manila, May 4th. The high calibre of the investigators indicate the great import which President Harding attached to his colonial policy.

2. Findings

They traveled widely and during their four months stay, they made an exhaustive investigation of administrative, educational, political, social, and economic

(2) The Independence Mission in 1919 (40 members) laid claim before Congress the establishment of the "stable government", the only prerequisite laid down by the Jones law to the early grant of independence.

institutions. "They found," said Morse and McNair, "much to praise and a good deal to censure."⁽³⁾ Perhaps it would be fitting to state in brief the favorable and unfavorable aspects of their report.

They commended (1) the loyalty of the Philippines to American sovereignty especially during the recent World War when the entire American forces were withdrawn for services in France, (2) the generally good public order, (3) the great strides in popular education and self-government, and (4) the exceedingly prosperous economic conditions. On the other hand, they pointed out (a) that the administration of justice had left something to be desired; (b) that Filipinization of the public services have progressed too rapidly for effective administration; (c) that taxation and governmental expenditures had greatly advanced; and, (d) that the financial policy was disastrous to the economic welfare of the islands.

3. Conclusions and Recommendations

In the light of the Wood-Forbes Mission's findings, the report concluded that the time had not yet come for complete independence. It was recommended that "the present general status of the Philippine Islands continue

(3) Morse and McNair, "Far Eastern International Relations" p. 616; See also "House Doc.", No. 325, 67th Congress, Second Session, pp. 45-46

until the people have had time to absorb and thoroughly master the powers already in their hands.* It further recommended that "under no circumstances should the American government permit to be established in the Philippine Islands a situation which would leave the United States in a position of responsibility without authority.*"

4. A Filipino Response

The Report of the special mission on investigations to the Philippine Islands, has occasioned much comment and protest on the part of the Philippine public bodies and in the Philippine press. Public opinion was aroused against the charges. A book was published by Senate President Manuel Quezon and Junior Commissioner Camilo Osias, which contains in full detail the minute refutation of all the charges stated in the report. And just after the publication of the Report, a committee was at once appointed by the Philippine Legislature to come to the mainland to answer the charges and to oppose the recommendations contained therein.

B. GOVERNOR GENERAL PLAYS MUSSOLINI

To give due respect to General Wood's knowledge of the local conditions, and in consideration of the administration's policies, he was appointed in October, 1921, as the Governor-General, a position which he held until his death in August, 1927. He at once set himself to the

* *Morse & McNaair, op. cit., p. 618*

task of overcoming the weaknesses which he found in the Insular government. His first budget was twelve million pesos less than the preceding year. "By a Currency Act, by Congressional permission to increase the limit of debt for the Islands, and by exempting Philippine government bonds from taxation in the United States, the credit of the islands was restored, and the peso again reached par." These bold, benevolent strokes so characteristic of a soldier saved the government from financial and economic disruption. His records show in him the presence of a prominent statesman which had been overshadowed only by his Mussolinian methods of doing and accomplishing things.

1. His Attitude Against Government in Business

As Governor-General, he has fought the Insular Board of Control for six years; now suddenly, "aided by the Attorney General's office in Washington," he has invented the power to abolish it.* Consequently, he put an end of it through an executive decree. When Harrison was governor, the Filipinos, eager to develop the islands with native capital, invested government's funds in the Philippine National Bank, in Sugar Centrals, in the development of coal mines, and in a cement plant. When Governor-General Wood toured the islands from end to end in 1921, he immediately deplored these sad examples of "State Socialism." He overlooked the fact that Japan had built up

* Morse & McNair, "Far Eastern International Relations," p.618, 1931



EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL, MANILA

2A-1453



LEGISLATIVE BUILDING, MANILA

2A-1423

her industries with government support, and government patronage of industrial development in various British colonies. Thus he met a snag in the Board of Control, which had power over government industries. Being the Governor-General, he, as an ex-officio, automatically was one of the three members of the board. But in his desire to "get the government out of business," he was in a minority of one. Incumbent upon his mind to do so, the state of affairs began rapidly to take definite shape.

2. Usurpation of Power

"To the Filipino mind the alternative was subjection to American capital, always more interested in overseas profits than in development of the islands for the islanders." Backed up by American interests, General Wood, sought to take these enterprises away from the Philippine government. But his attempt had met the opposition of a Filipino phalanx. After "every decent method failed," he firmly resorted to the good old technique of the Mussolini type.

Opponents of Filipino separation talked much of the "separation of powers." President Coolidge seemed to have made the "stable government" referred to in the Organic Act synonymous with separation of the functions of the legislative and executive. It is beyond doubt that in the Harrison regime the natives, acting through their

legislature, assumed a greater control on their government than Congress had contemplated. But the Nation Magazine reasons it out: "We honor them for so doing; we would despise any people which did not attempt to encroach upon the powers of a dominant alien race."*

Surely if separation of powers means anything, it worked two ways. By no possible interpretation of the law had Governor-General Wood, executive, the right to substitute himself for the courts, by executive decree declared legislative enactments unconstitutional, or suddenly to assume control of organizations created by the legislature which have been functioning under its supervision for years. "Governor Wood's usurpation of power smashes the boundaries," said an editorial of The Nation, "between legislative, executive, and judiciary as no act of the Filipinos had ever done. It was not administration."**

3. The Cabinet Crisis

It is true there were mistakes committed during the Democratic administration, but that there was also more democracy there during that same period of time than any other subsequent period,---no impartial observer can deny. Democracy everywhere, Lord Bryce once expressed, is not noted for its wisdom but for its strength. And Governor Harrison firmly believed that the evils of a Democracy

* *The Nation*, 123: 55, Dec. 1, 1926 ** *Ibid*, p. 55

should be self-corrected. "The process," wrote Dean Kalaw of the University of the Philippines, "might be a longer one, but the result would be more lasting."⁽⁴⁾

Unlike his predecessor who believed in the theory of Filipino self-help, and he, as a mere coach, General Wood went over as an administrator first and foremost determined to correct in person what evils and errors had been committed under the preceding rule. He practiced to the utmost that which was granted him by the Organic Act. He believed not in party government. He claimed that the members of the Cabinet were fully responsible to him and not even partly to the Insular Legislature. What he told Senate President Quezon as quoted by Dean Kalaw illustrates his official attitude. "To try to dictate to my secretaries of department (directed at the Council of State) is just like my trying to dictate to your own private secretary." He created a popularly dubbed "military Cabinet" which assumed semi-administrative functions; exercised the power of control and supervision to a very great extent. "As a matter of fact, it was his interpretation of this phrase which was the immediate cause of the resignation of the Filipino members of the Council of State,

(4) Kalaw, M. M., "Foreign Affairs," Vol. 7, p. 372

leading to a condition of virtual non-cooperation."⁽⁵⁾

There is one thing to my mind that contributed to the famous crisis. It lies in the pronouncement made by President Harding,---"no backward step is contemplated." Governor-General Wood had interpreted it in an entirely different light from that of the Insular Legislature. To the former it meant that the system of government formulated in the Philippine Organic Act was to be enforced. Whereas to the latter, it meant that the legislative control of the government organized under the Council of State was to be continued. The Governor unbendingly tried to enforce the presidential system of government; the Legislature, the European Parliamentary system. It is obviously understood what this all meant to the native leaders when they saw General Wood gradually assuming all the powers abdicated by his predecessor. Not unlike a guitar's string steadily pulled from one side, the tightened situation came to the point of breakage when the Ray Conley case ensued.⁽⁶⁾

(5) Ibid, p. 273

(6) Ray Conley, an American detective in Manila, was dismissed by the City Mayor on counts of irregularity. General Wood intervened, reinstated the policeman against the protest of those directly in control. *See Robb, W. "The Filipinos' Demand for Independence," Civ. Hist. 19, p. 286, 1924*

4. The Struggle for Supremacy

"It is not a pretty situation," wrote Senator Lodge, "when for nearly five years after 1923, our imperialism worked so badly around Manila that there exists substantially a passive revolution against cooperation between Manila and Washington."⁽⁷⁾ The state of affairs was not at all pleasing to both sides. Filipino-American relation was stranded. Like two opposing military camps, one shot charges of causing the dislocation of relationship and encroachment of powers upon the other.

Speaker Roxas of the Insular House of Representatives, claimed that the usurpation of authority on the part of General Wood exceeded the autocratic rule of Spain. The latter retorted that there has been "a firm insistence by the executive upon the observance of the provisions of the Organic Act, and a sharp distinction has been maintained between the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of the government...."⁽⁸⁾ Both maintained their right of way. The protagonists of Filipinization accused the Governor-General of "disloyalty to American ideals and principles, with reversing the policy of Filipinization, with disregarding the authority of the Filipino heads of departments,

(7) Lodge, H. C., "Our Failure in the Philippines", Harper's Monthly Magazine, Vol. 160, p. 209-18.

(8) The Salt Lake Tribune, p. 18, Jan. 2, 1927.

with using public funds in violation of law, and with favoring various selfish interests which wanted to exploit the country.* In a special election based upon this burning issue, the Filipino people showed its verdict by electing Mayor Ramon Fernandez, a coalition candidate for the Philippine Senate on a pro-independence and anti-Wood platform. The controversy became so intense that the administration at Washington took grave concern. President Coolidge, ever cognizant of the ability and sincerity of his appointee, upheld the stand taken by the Governor. But the executive's judicious declaration did not altogether stem the tide of restlessness. It was through the Filipino respect for American sense of justice and American political sportsmanship that put an end to it.

5. Attempts To Oust Governor-General Wood

During the controversy, certain steps were undertaken to voice the Filipino remonstrance of and reluctance to abide by with the Wood Leadership. The Insular Legislature having approved the action of the Filipino Councilors in resigning, proceeded by joint resolution to petition the American Government and people for the recall of General Wood against what was claimed to be the usurpation of power and tyranny. It was upon this juncture, that President Coolidge, through Secretary of War Weeks, sent a cable stating his complete support of the island executive (based

* *Kelaw, M. M. "Governor Stimson in the Philippines," For. Aff. 7, p. 373*

on the interpretation of the letter of the power and duties of that office). Six days later, a renewed petition was made for General Wood's removal and for the appointment of a Filipino to succeed him. The following day, Secretary of War Weeks, too, upheld in a public statement the governor. A second independence mission was formed, but attempts to discredit the Insular executive failed.

C. PRESIDENTIAL MISSIONERS

The Secretary of War and the President of the United States both supported the Governor's stand, it is true. But that was not enough; the problem was not solved; the administration's action was not sufficient and satisfying. Something was to be done. Ever abiding with the American government's political farsightedness, President Coolidge sent a one-man-mission to gather facts conducive to the current problem of "control and supervision" and of independence.

1. The Thompson Report

After a brief yet sufficient visit, Colonel Carmi Thompson, a personal envoy of the President, came back with specific recommendations—twelve in all. Firstly, is a proper solution of the Islands' political problem, one phase of which is the pernicious deadlock between Governor Wood and the Insular Legislature, and the other, the independence movement. Secondly, the postponement of a

grant of independence until the "islands are sufficiently developed to maintain an independent government," but with progressive grants of internal autonomy to the islands as conditions warrant. Thirdly, to restore cooperation, the transfer of the Philippines and other territories from the War Department to an independent civil agency and removal of the "military atmosphere." Fourthly, that the military atmosphere has been unfortunate in its reactions upon the Filipino leaders. The envoy admitted that the officers had excellent military records, but evidently lack training and experience in the duties of civil government, and that instead of facilitating cooperation between the Governor and the executive heads of the departments and legislative leaders, this group has been one of the factors which has made such cooperation difficult. Fifthly, that there is no evidence of anti-Americanism in the islands to necessitate continued military control and that no sedition or insurrection if this country avoided "exploitation."

Sixthly, he made a flat recommendation against the separation of Mindanao from the rest of the islands "unless the United states were to break faith with the Moros." Seventhly, the necessity of strengthening American control over the Moros or to permit them union with the united Filipino people. Other recommendations included the extension of the Federal Reserve and land bank system in the

islands, the establishment of agricultural experimental stations by this country to develop insular resources; amendment by the legislature of laws to attract capital for the development of rubber, coffee, and other tropical products; withdrawal of the island government from private business ventures; and that there should be no change in the Jones Act and no amendment at the time by Congress of the Philippine Land Laws.

2. Evaluations of Designs Behind These Recommendations

Special attention is made in the first seven recommendations which clearly indicates further control and retention of the islands, and the rest anticipate sinister designs to plant more American capital which when fully rooted prevents the realization of an easy and an early Filipino separation. Farsighted leaders of the archipelago point out the dangers lurking around the inplantation of American big business and American capital. It does not alone mean the possible economic dependency of the natives to these interests, but the inevitable paralyzation of the autonomous government and the probable abandonment of Philippine independence which their leaders were zealously guarding.

3. Secretary Hurley in Manila

For a time, the Thompson report effected an idea of further retention. The Filipino people, through their

duly constituted representatives, expressed their dissatisfaction with the current tendency of the Washington Government. Nevertheless, imbued with the sense of American fair play and American idealism, they sent mission after mission to Washington to present their case of "self-determination" which is based on facts.

The Hoover administration, too, determined ^{not} to evade the Philippine problem, sent its special representative to Manila in the person of Secretary of War Hurley. Let it be known on the first place that President Hoover himself declared:

"Independence of the Philippines at some time has been directly or indirectly promised by every President and by the Congress."

Three distinct factors were attached to the presence of Mr. Hurley in Manila. To enumerate: (1) It crossed swords with the American labor and agricultural interests who declared themselves in favor of Philippine freedom because Philippine labor and products compete with theirs; (2) it tended to balance the effect of Senator Hawes' visit earlier in the summer; and (3) Independence was made remote. ⁽⁹⁾

D. POSTPONEMENT OF SELF-RULE

The crisis in Philippine affairs came with the appointment of General Wood. Unquestionable the intent of

* *President Hoover released this statement. See Hearing on H.R. 7233, p. 21*

(9) Cur. Hist., Vol. 35, pp. 267-8, 1931-32

the Jones Law was to organize the government of the Philippines upon the model of the Federal and state governments of the United States based upon the doctrine of separation of powers with its accompanying checks and balances. The Governor with all the authority vested in him (coupled by his influence) tried to execute in every way possible the letter of the Jones Law and to uphold the presidential system. The Filipino leaders, on the other hand, have deliberately aimed at supplanting the presidential system with the European parliamentary system wherein the executive is subordinate to the legislature in which all power is lodged. They based their right of way through the Council of State which was established under the authority granted them by Governor-General Harrison, whose object was to facilitate Filipinization. In the midst of the struggle for constitutional right, the actions of the Governor-General were upheld by the administration at Washington. Further autonomy was checked and independence was made remote.

Governor Wood's stand of further extension of the granting of independence was collaborated by the reports of the two subsequent special envoys. The problem had its culmination when President Coolidge sent a response to an

answer to the letter of Speaker Roxas, head of the Filipino delegation, in which he declared definitely that the Philippine people were not yet ready for self-rule. The letter blasted the hopes of the islanders and it ushered the idea of uncertainty. It meant the postponement of Filipino self-rule. The following passage, quoted from the President's letter illustrates the spirit of postponement and protraction though it recognizes the tremendous advance made by the Filipino people. "In education, in cultural advancement, in political conceptions, institutional development, the Filipino people have demonstrated a capacity which can not but justify high hopes for their future." ^{¶(10)} Perhaps it is with this spirit in the President that prompted him to send Colonel Stimson whose psychology of mind favored a policy of moderation.

¶(10) Coolidge, C. "President's Letter to Sr. Roxas", *Cur. Hist.* 20: 156-60, April, 1924

THE TIDE OF MODERATION

Chapter IV.

In the preceding chapter, I have attempted to discuss, though not fully, the various developments that sprang out of General Wood's unsympathetic and rigid administration as against the succeeding one. In this chapter, I will endeavor to trace the change of administrative policy both in Washington and in Manila. A special notice will be seen in the occasion of the sound working of the Jones Law in the face of an indifferent Republican regime. To begin with, let me contrast first the two Republican Governors-General, Wood and Stimson as to their training and administrative policies.

A. WOOD AND STIMSON

1. Training

Governor-General Wood was trained primarily a soldier, an administrator, and a social worker. Hence, he loved to display his executive ability and experience. On the other hand, Governor Stimson was trained a prosecuting attorney. His capacity as a corporation counsel, enabled him to learn the good and bad sides of corporations. His views, therefore, are those of a man who believes in economic development along corporate lines. While the former did not believe in a party government in the Philippines, and from the beginning would have liked to do away with the semblance

party cabinet, the latter believed in party rule and strove to achieve Filipino cooperation.

2. Administrative Policies

Governor Stimson based his island policy upon the development of the natural resources by Filipinos themselves, the unification and mutual understanding of the Christians and Mohammedans, and the restriction of enormous foreign investments. It was diametrically "opposed to Wood's policies who, whether or not expressedly allowed it, his American assistants encouraged the Moros to make complaints against their Christian brothers, thus instituting dissensions."⁽¹⁾ Indeed, Colonel Stimson took a definite stand for public avowal by the United States administration of a continued control of the archipelago and of guardianship against encroachment by neighboring peoples⁽²⁾ until the "experiment of training for independent self-rule is carried through."⁽³⁾ He believed that such avowal would aid, rather than hinder, the cause of self-rule by discouraging politi-

(1) Kalaw, M. M., "Governor Stimson in the Philippines", Foreign Affairs, p. 380.

(2) Chinese were excluded from the Philippines in 1905 to protect Filipinos from Chinese cheap labor.

(3) Outlook, Vol. 147, p. 523, Dec. 28, 1927.

cal experiments and agitation for "immediate, absolute, and complete independence", and by centering American and Filipino thought on the really necessary steps along the avenue to self-government.

B. RESTORATION OF PARTY SYSTEM

Mr. Stimson stressed the need of the development of responsible native political parties and the desirability of appointing qualified Filipinos to executive positions. The following quotation attributed to him reveals the transitional point and the mental aptitude of the man destined to restore cooperation. I quote:

"I believe that on this way the Jones Act can be made a bridge by which we can pass gradually from a rigidly supervised system of government to one depending more and more upon responsibility to political parties and public opinion."*

1. The Council of State⁽⁴⁾

Consistent with the above declared policy, he appointed in August a Cabinet⁽⁵⁾ which drew the confidence of the parties. The establishment of the party cabinet was followed

* *Stimson, H. L., "Future Philippine Policy Under the Jones Act," For. Affairs 5: 459-71*

(4) The Council of State was created under the Harrison administration by Executive Order No. 37, dated Oct. 16, 1918.

(5) This particular cabinet is said to be one of the strongest ever formed. See Kalery, M. M., "Governor Stimson in the Philippines," *Foreign Affairs* 7: 372-383, 1928-1929



ZIG ZAG, BENGUET, PHILIPPINES

2A-M479



MANILA'S NEW POST OFFICE FROM PASIG RIVER

2A-N449

on August 30, 1928, by the re-creation of the Council of State—the monument of a parliamentary government—by an executive order which reads:

"A council of State is hereby created to advise the Governor General on such matters of public policy as he may from time to time lay before it. He shall be the presiding officer of such Council of State, and it shall consist of such persons as may from time to time be appointed and summoned by him. Until otherwise ordered by him, it shall consist of the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Majority Floor Leader of the Senate, the Majority Floor Leader of the House of Representatives, and the heads of the six executive departments."⁽⁶⁾

2. Restoration of Native Confidence

The policy of reconstruction and moderation has been struck and proper restitution of native confidence has been on the up trend. This has been accelerated by Mr. Stimson's democratic view:

"In view of misunderstanding in past years I think it is worth while to record certain features in detail for the benefit of American administrators who, like myself, may be without previous experience in the orient. When I assumed office I was warned that the nature of the oriental was such that it would be dangerous for me to confer with them without the presence of American witnesses. I rejected this advice feeling that it was better to trust and be betrayed than to make mutual confidence impossible. So far as I am aware,

(6) For. Affairs, Vol. 7, pp. 372-83, 1928-29

I was not betrayed in a single instance; and the character of our conferences became such that I was frequently made the recipient of conferences by the Filipino leaders which proved of priceless value to my administration. Again, bearing in mind the responsibilities of leadership in political organizations in the United States, I was very careful never to surprise the Filipino leaders of the party organizations with which I was dealing by an executive decision of any importance. Instead, I always conferred with them about it beforehand, giving them an opportunity to discuss it and, if finally decided on, to prepare their followers for the announcement."*

The native leaders were fully satisfied with the procedure the Governor handled things, especially his economic program, and commenting on it, Quezon, speaking on the floor of the Senate says: "The views of Governor Stimson as to proper relations between the executive and the legislature in the Philippines and the responsibilities and powers that should be granted to the department heads are substantially in accord with our own."**

3. Revival of the Parliamentary Form

Governor Stimson's aim of seeking cooperation between the two branches of the government has been achieved. The first sign of cooperative spirit shown by the Filipinos was the passage of the Belo Act which furnished money for carrying out the administrative function (over-sight of how things are going nationally and locally). Undoubtedly, he captured the admiration and respect of the Philippine people.

***Quezon expressed the above opinion on behalf of the majority party. See Kalaw, M. M. op. cit. For. Aff. 7, p. 377*

When retiring as Governor-General to assume his exalted office in the Hoover Cabinet, he pointed out with pride to the fact that his administration had completely restored the "Harrison" or semi-parliamentary type of government for the islands which his predecessor, General Wood, "had discarded in favour of an autocratic system."

4. Honesty in Government

Upon the assumption of Colonel Davis to the office, he indicated his desire to continue his predecessor's policy and suggested that the problem of the archipelago was economic rather than political. In his inaugural address, he stressed the necessity of getting additional capital invested in the islands and the need for honesty in government service.⁽⁷⁾

C. PRESIDENT HOOVER'S APPOINTEE

Since the advent of the Stimson administration, there existed a time of perfect harmony and understanding between Manila and Washington. Cooperation went on undisturbed for almost two years, followed by the Davis administration, only to be interrupted by an incident created by the President's vice-governatorial appointment.

(7) Davis, D. F. "Inaugural Address", July 8, 1929
Manila, Bureau of Printing, 1929

1. The Roosevelt Incident

The vacancy in the vice-governorship in the Philippines necessitated the President to appoint a successor, and to that office he appointed Mr. Nicholas Roosevelt. The appointment was objectionable to a considerable section of the American Senate, to that section which believed in America's Far Eastern policy of giving independence to the islands, whether that belief was predicated by the stand taken by the Democratic party, on the sugar beet industry, or on unreasoning idealism. The cry for exclusion of, at least protection from Philippine sugar has been answered by Mr. Hoover appropriately and soothingly in the person of Dwight D. Davis, the then Secretary of War. The President emphasized his first appointment by choosing an editorial writer in the person of "Nick" Roosevelt. Mr. Hoover's appointment can be interpreted only as meaning that he endorses Roosevelt's views--unequivocally opposed to independence.⁽⁸⁾

2. The Spirit of Restlessness

As soon as the appointment was made known to the press, the islanders who, zealously guarding their cherished desire for liberty, at once petitioned, through their duly

(8) Mr. Nicholas Roosevelt proposed the idea of selling the Philippines to Germany or to any other European power.

constituted representatives, the United States Senate to disapprove the appointment. Widespread restlessness prevailed and the natives once more thought of their political weapon of non-cooperation. In a public meeting in Manila, the book written by Mr. Roosevelt was thrown into the bay. On September 1, 1930, another copy was publicly burnt at the foot of the statue of Balintawak where the first cry of the revolution against Spain was sounded.

3. A Signal Victory for Filipinos

For a time, in spite of all the pressures, the Presidential appointee intended to cling on, but refused to leave for the islands until late in August or early in September. Secretary Hurley hoped for Filipino open-mindedness. The editorial staff of the New York Times gave a luncheon to the nominee. On the other hand, the Resident Commissioners at Washington explained their opposition to the appointment;⁽⁹⁾ and a fiscal boycott of him was proposed in the Philippine Legislature.⁽¹⁰⁾ Not blind to the open opposition, which only means another inception on non-cooperation, he immediately tendered his resignation. In the meantime, the President re-appointed him as minister to Hungary. The whole Filipino press hailed the resignation

(9) New York Times, 3:5, August 5, 1930

(10) Ibid, August 22, 1930, 11:2.

as showing American sportsmanship.

4. Another Roosevelt

President Hoover once more went to the list of possibilities for appointment in the Philippines. Finally, he put his thumb on the name of Mr. Butte of Texas, whose name when sent to the Senate for approbation received an unanimous consent. Hardly had things settled when another vacancy was left open by the resignation of Governor-General Davis, who it was said went to Paris to pay his invalid wife a visit. In the meantime, wild speculations once more permeated the political atmosphere. President Hoover took the mainland and insular leaders by surprise by appointing Theodore Roosevelt Jr. who was then serving as the Governor-General of Porto Rico. His appointment received acclamation, for it left everybody content. The Insular Senate head emphatically declared that he favored the appointment precisely on the ground that he would protect the average man. A high tribute was paid to him because of his liberal policies. During his administration, he cooperated with the Legislature; had confidence in the members of his cabinet; the choice of the legislature.

INCENTIVES TO THE EARLY SOLUTION OF THE PHILIPPINE
PROBLEM

Chapter V

The United States Congress, by its act of 1918, is definitely committed to grant the Filipinos their freedom "after" they had demonstrated their capacity for self-government. That capacity to run their own destiny has long since been demonstrated, but indefinite and uncertain meaning has been given to the term "after." There are imperialists in America who claim that the word "after" means twenty-five years after, some who would make it fifty years after, and others who declare it should be more than two hundred years after.⁽¹⁾ How easy it is to seek an excuse to justify a political immorality! The moral obligation of the American people towards the Philippines, however, seems enough to counterbalance all forms of imperialistic reasoning. *Sympathetic* thinking Americans, like Senator William H. King of Utah, insist on saying, "Let us be honest and just with the Philippine people and let us keep faith in our promise to grant them their national independence." It is my purpose in this chapter to discuss not the independence problem, but bring to light the facts that have brought about a nucleus for its urgent and inevitable solution. Let it be known that amidst the discussions of this

(1) Hearing on H. R. 7233, p. 123; also on p. 130

delicate problem involving the status of thirteen million inhabitants of those fair isles, certain unsuspected and unexpected factors have entered and greatly hastened its final solution.

A. THE CRY FOR PROTECTION

1. The American Federation of Labor

The statistics of the 1930 census tells us that there are 45,208 Filipinos in Continental United States, 34,996 of which are in the Pacific coast. When the figures were made available, the alarmists at once jumped on their feet, pounded the pulpit and platform tables, and pointed out with contempt another growing Oriental menace which would beyond cavil pollute American standards. The Labor Federation ever alert to such warnings, met in Vancouver, on December 6 and 7, 1930. At the close of its convention, a resolution was passed to favor Filipino exclusion based on racial, social, and economic grounds. The Federation went on record as far as to advocate the liberation of these people in order to bring about the realization of this program.

2. The Sugar Beet Interests

In like manner, the tariff-duty-free granted the Philippines against its wishes, made the United States a favorable and gainful market for Filipino sugar. From year to year, the volume of sugar shipped to this country has increased by leaps and bounds that the beet sugar industry was

not without grave apprehensions, uneasiness, and misgivings. In 1899, the first year of American occupation, Philippine exportation was 85,000; in 1928, as declared by Resident Commissioner Camilo Osias, was 569,000 metric tons; in 1930, according to Mr. Fred Cummings, President of the Beet Growers Association, in his testimony before the House Insular Affairs Committee, was 617,000 tons with a benefit of \$44,000,000. "You can not convince me," said Mr. Cummings, "a grower of beets, or any other intelligent grower of beets, that it does not depress the price of sugar." With this gigantic threat against his association's interests, he declared himself and his constituents unequivocally favorable to giving independence to the islanders. In a ringing tone, he offered a challenge by declaring that it is now time "for the United States to stop acting as a good cousin or a good brother to the whole world and that the United States ought to stay home and attend to ⁽²⁾ its own business."

3. Other Agricultural Organizations

The sentiment of all other agricultural organizations against the free entrance of Philippine products and its people in this country is typified in a resolution by the National Grange presented to the Committee on Insular Affairs of the House. It reads:

(2) Ibid, p. 158

"Whereas the rapidly increasing immigration of people from the Philippine Islands who can never be assimilated and who are participating a serious social problem; and
"Whereas the economic advantages and competition encountered by our farmers as a result of their inability to secure protection against importation and competition of Philippine products, produced under decidedly inferior and un-American standards of living; and...."

It goes on to remind the government of the United States of its intention to withdraw its sovereignty over the Philippine Islands. In its conclusion, it declared:

"Resolved, that the National Grange urge Congress to speed the accomplishment of this purpose, to the end that the social and economic standards of our people may be maintained."⁽³⁾

B. TRADE RELATIONS

1. The Free Trade: Its Establishment

From the first days of American occupation to March 8, 1902, no tariff preferences existed. The Philippine Islands continued to pay in full the tariff duty of goods entering the United States and the latter's goods going to the Philippines paid full tariff duty. From 1902 to August 5, 1909, a new arrangement was enforced. Philippine products not on the free list of the American tariff Act of 1897 were granted preferential reduction of 25 per cent. American products, on the other hand, entering the archi-

(3) Ibid, p. 164

pelago were subject to full import duty. This reduction shows American generosity which the islands would never forget. Whether or not this country did it on purpose, I cannot say, but one fact remains true that if the United States were given the same preferential reduction, Spain would ask for the same treatment because of the ten years specified in the Paris treaty in which the Spanish shipping and products were to receive equal footing with the United States. At the expiration of the commercial clause of the Treaty of Paris another trade arrangement was enacted in Congress (Aug. 5, 1909 to Oct. 3, 1913) in which both sides received exclusive tariff preference with certain limitations. Under the Democratic leadership, a new tariff act was approved in October, 1913. Under this act, which now governs American-Philippine trade relations, "all limitations on duty-free shipments of Philippine products were removed except (Philippine goods containing foreign material in excess of 20 per cent of their value) the limitation of the maximum permissible foreign material content of Philippine manufactures." *

2. Peculiar Phase of the Free Trade

As has been pointed above, Philippine commodities arriving in this country must pay a duty unless eighty per cent or more of the material of which they are made or composed is of native or American origin or both. On the other

* *Roxas, M. "Hearing... on H.R. 7233," p. 53, 1932*

hand all products entering the Philippine Islands from the United States are exempt from custom levies without any limitations or specifications as to their composition. Resultant of these various changes and arrangements, the United States has increased its percentage of imports into the islands from seven in 1899 to fifty-five in 1925. That is a vital element in colonial policy. The seriousness of such a policy has been undoubtedly demonstrated in "the struggle over the revenue bill of 1929-30 when American products demanded protection against Philippine sugar and other commodities, going so far as to advocate independence as a means of justifying a higher barrier between the United States and the Islands."

3. Imposition of Tariff

When the Smoot-Hawley Tariff bill came for debate before Congress in 1929, it was found that tariff levies were imposed on numerous Philippine goods. Filipino sympathizers in the Senate took occasion to voice their objections to the proposed measure. Senator Swanson, now the Secretary of the Navy, on October 9, said:

"I want to say this, before I take my seat, that I am opposed to the imposition of tariff duties on any imports from the Philippine Islands as long as they are a part of the United States. I hope the day will never come when colonial exploitation, started by Great Britain and since abandoned, shall be approved by an American Congress."⁽⁴⁾

(4) Ibid, p. 322

Senator Glass, speaking on the same subject, the following day, declared:

"I simply want to say that I am for independence for the Philippines, and until independence is granted, I never expect to vote for one stiver of tariff taxation upon the products of the islands. I prefer to sit here and give the products of the Philippines free entrance, just as free entrance into this country as we give to the products of the various States which pass in interstate commerce, and I shall maintain that position as long as we hold the Philippine Islands."⁽⁵⁾

Cohorts of the imposition of tariff on Philippine sugar failed in their attempt and so they resorted to the increase of shipping costs which will mean the exclusion of foreign vessels, retardation of commerce, and a possible misinterpretation and repudiation of the United States open door policy. Mr. Stimson attacked the extension of the shipping laws to the islands and defended the present tariff regime. There seemed present in the American mind the tendency to have an open trade with the rest of the world and at the same time to install a close door policy in the Philippines. And if colonial powers should equally adopt such a policy we can see what colonies mean as a cause of wars.

So harmful and pernicious is the effect of this present trade relationship between the Philippine Islands and

(5) Ibid, p. 322

the United States. This tariff policy in diverting trade from its natural channels has tended to obstruct economic development in the Philippines; more than that, it has tended to make those islands an economic dependency of the United States. If that was a new colonial policy, the protagonists of early Filipino separation have surely worked hard to block it and should have the commendation of the Filipino people.

C. SOCIAL BUGABOO

Side by side with the economic aspect of the Philippine problem is the social factor which greatly enhanced the final fulfillment of America's pledge as embodied in the Jones Act.

1. Immigration and Race-Riots

The Filipinos shared the opportunity with other colonial subjects of the free entrance into the mainland. Quotas ~~are~~ imposed in European countries, in the interest, it is said of preserving American nationality. But her grave mistake is apparent and the peculiarity of this arrangement was shown in the race riots involving Philippine laborers in the Western coast. Race problem has at once come to the attention of our statesmen. Immigration and race problems are no less important than national defence and commerce, hence, they become strong incentives to the struggle for independence.

2. Proposed Exclusion

Following the unprecedented increase of Filipino immigrants in the Pacific coast, a demand for restriction or exclusion "based upon the fear, if it continues at the present rate, will surely produce social and economic problems",^{*} necessitated legislation. Recent riots along the western shore precipitated a Congressional action, though contrary to American-Filipino relation was to be done to satisfy the desires of an affected group. Thus in Congress, Representative Welch of Californis's Fifth District presented a bill,⁽⁶⁾ which provided for "Filipino independence with a provision excluding Philippine immigrants" from this country. Again during the hearing of the Hawes-Cutting Bill, a statement signed by Californis's ten representatives was presented to the Committee on Insular Affairs advocating the same thing.⁽⁷⁾

3. Citizenship

Filipino citizenship needs a strict definition. Nobody can figure out what a Filipino status is in this country. He is between two poles. He occupies an unique position in American body politic. The problem is a living puzzle to American statesmanship. "He is," says Professor Mal-

* Panunzio, C. "The U.S. Immigration Policy" *The Annals of American Academy*, p. 24

(6) Welch Bill, H. R. 6

(7) Hearing....on H. R. 7233, pp. 378-9.

coln, "neither alien nor citizen."⁽⁸⁾ He is held to be a citizen of the Philippine Islands, a subject of the United States, but not a citizen." Commissioner Osias, upon answering a question relative to the subject, said: "We are not citizens of the United States and we can not be citizens of the United States and therefore we can not train the boys and girls of the Philippine Islands for American citizenship. We are not free and, therefore, we do not know exactly how to train them for citizenship in a self-governing and free Philippines."⁽⁹⁾ One can sense the gravity of the problem viewing it from the Philippine side. If this state of uncertainty, "wherein we are neither citizens of America nor foreigners," points Speaker Roxas, "wherein we are not a part of the United States, and, on the other hand, are not outside of the United States, wherein for some purposes we are within and under the American Constitution, and in other respects we are outside the American Constitution----is unjust, and no self-respecting people can live happy and contented under that status or relationship."⁽¹⁰⁾

(8) Malcolm, Roy, "A Survey of Filipino Immigration", Philippine Republic, p. 8, April, 1931.

(9) Hearing....on H. R. 7233, p. 363; See Bunuan, V.G. "The Preliminary Drive for Freedom", *The Phil. Rep.*, p. 2, Mar.-Apr., 1930

(10) Ibid, p. 9

D. PHILIPPINES: A BASE

From the very beginning, the protagonists of imperialism advocated the retention of the Philippines on two counts, viz, a commercial and a naval base. On the contrary, the antagonists found faults and weaknesses from this policy which might involve the question of American integrity.

1. Commercial and Military Assers

The carrying out of the provisions of the Monroe Doctrine, the United States has subjected herself to the verge of an economic war, and for many other reasons, with "an infinitesimal portion of the continent of South America." All the more, the proximity of every Latin American port to European shores as it is to the United States, subjects the latter to the fiercest competition. This country turned its eyes to Asia and seemingly pursued the eighteenth century *IGNIS FATUUS* of establishing colonies for an "exclusive and sole market."** The Philippines offered the possibilities of commercial expansion and the essentials of protection laid down by Captain Mahan for a strategic position, strength, resources.

Position: The Philippines could command the channels of the China Sea and would flank the communications between any European power and her colonies of the nearby shores of China. And with them as a coaling station, the United States cruisers could infest the narrower passages of the

* *Beale, T. "Strategical Value of the Philippines," North American Review, 166: 759, 1898*

** *Ibid, p. 759*

of the Malayan territories.

Strength: The 7083 islands that composed the archipelago constitute the very strength of the Philippines when they are attacked. Blockade is quite impossible because of the numerous straits and passages.

Resources: With its 13,000,000 inhabitants and its vast natural resources, the United States force stationed in the islands can withstand a few days blockade or attack.*

This holds true to the present time although the Washington Conference in 1922 forbids the fortification of the Philippines. With its teeming millions for a wide American market and with its geographic key position, does one wonder that the United States became overnight a Pacific power?

2. A Liability in Time of War

It is true as has been shown that the islands are an important factor in the maintenance of American naval strength in the Orient and afford a base for the protection of American enterprise, in Asia. How far are the arguments sound? Is there less risk for the United States so to upset the supposed gains? No proof is forthcoming to show that the Philippines 'pay' in an economic sense. Individual capitalists gain, but no figures show that supervision and protection do not exceed by far the gains.

* *Ibid*, p. 60

This is a phase in which politicians are silent.

As to national defense, the archipelago is a source of weakness rather than strength. Mr. Carman Travers makes this clear when he asserted that the islands are "economic asset and commercial gateway in peace time, but liability in time of war..."* Reliable authorities on the subject have expressed the idea that in case of a war with any first class power in the Pacific, the American navy would not even attempt to defend the Philippines. Would the United States still insist on holding the islands in spite of these grave dangers which may cost her youthful blood and treasure in endless stream?

3. Possible American Retrenchment

If we brush aside the "promised independence" and the concurrent beliefs of American handicaps in cases of struggle in the Far East, there is a factor which rules that the United States is not an exception. If History repeats itself, then this country is certain to leave the Philippine shores. I am now referring to the theory of retrenchment.

During the American struggle for independence, the Carribean was a naval zone of importance. Great Britain acquired a vast territory in that region with the Isthmus as her final goal. But her growing power was made impractical by the Clayton-Bulwer and the Hay-Pauncefote

* *The Outlook* 127: 589-90, Apr. 13, 1921



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treaties. The British naval power lessened in strength and her dignity slowly retreated---it fell into practical obsolescence. Her defences at Bermuda and Jamaica which were once strong are now considered ineffective.

For the same line of reasoning, the United States would do well to retrench gradually in the Philippine waters without shock to American pride. Such retrenchment would be to her lasting credit and would be an evidence of a "high grade of intelligence than governments have ordinarily been able to show in the handling of imperial affairs.*" This may be an incidental element in American colonial policy, but the fact remains that it coincides with the American thought put forth in the Organic Act.

E. EVIDENCES OF A CAPABLE SELF-GOVERNMENT

So far I have shown factors that exerted a tremendous influence in the final solution of the problem of independence. Now I have to show evidences by which Filipinos have qualified themselves to the claim of self-government.

1. Popular Education, Health, and Sanitation

a. Schools: In 1903, there were but 2,962 schools mostly around Manila. The Philippine Census for 1918 tells us that there were 6,510, classified as 5,720 primaries, 508 intermediates, 87 secondaries, 198 vocationals, 15 superior schools, and 2 universities (now three)** The figures suggest an increase of 119 per cent since 1903 or an annual

* *Williams, B. H. "The U.S. and Disarmament," ch. V, p. 73*

** *Philippine Census of 1918, Vol. IV, Pt. II, p. 5*

increase of 7.9 per cent. At present, according to Speaker Roxas, there are 8,442 schools, an increase of almost 7,000 since the inception of American regime.

b. Enrollment: As to the comparative number of enrolled students in these institutions, we had from 356,385 in 1903 to 789,046 in 1918. A later record shows that there were "enrolled in the public schools, as of September, 1929, 1,213,711 students, and in private schools, 102,413." These are instructed by an army of 18,134 teachers, of which 17,172 are Filipinos, 501 Americans, 249 Spanish, the rest are Chinese, British, and British subjects. The tremendous progress thus far achieved in this field of human endeavor is unparalleled by any other people. This flower of American thought and American unselfishness is the beacon light in their struggle for political emancipation.

c. Literacy: Education has not alone helped improve their standard of living, but helped raise the percentage of literacy. After a comparative study of the problem, the Philippines is found to have a higher percentage than thirty-seven of the independent countries of the world not excluding Brazil, Chile, China, Cuba, Greece, Mexico, Nicaragua, Persia, Peru, Portugal, Russia, Siam, Spain, Turkey, Venezuela and many others.**

d. Hospitals: The establishment of hospitals dates back during the Spanish rule. It was continued under the

* Roxas, M. "Hearing... on H.R. 7233", p. 33

** Osias, C. "Hearing... on H.R. 7233", p. 363

erstwhile Philippine Republic, but received its setback during the Filipino-American war. After the war, however, the establishment and development of this type of institution received a great impetus. This was made possible by friendly legislation. In 1931, there were 105 hospitals, public and private, 1081 dispensaries, and 51 laboratories. Governor Davis in his annual report to the Secretary of War for 1931 bears witness of this fact. He wrote: "The development of hospitals, and the training of public health officers promoted our health efficiency. Our quarantine service is the best in the Far East."*

e. Sanitation: Another blessing conferred upon the Filipino people, is the system of sanitation which greatly improved living conditions and reduced the prevalence of diseases. Perhaps it would be best to quote Junior Resident Commissioner Osias who gives us a vivid description of the various health activities of the Bureau of Health Service which are conducive to health and sanitation.

"Immunization work, school and medical inspection, industrial hygiene, rat campaign, public health nursing, physical inspection of government employees and food handlers, cooperation with Rockefeller Foundation and School of Sanitation and Public Health, public health education, hospital laboratories and special service, special clinics, care of the insane, relief work. These are undertaken to improve general sanitation, housing conditions, sewage disposal, water supply, milk supply, public markets, and slaughter houses, food and food products establishments and cemeteries."**

* Davis, D. F. "Annual Report of the Gov. Gen. of the Phil. Islands," p. 5, 1931

** Osias, C. "Hearing.... on H.R. 7233," pp. 359-360

2. Political and Governmental

a. Civil Service: In order to show the extent of Filipino participation in their own government, it would be appropriate and timely to draw some figures from the civil service as of December 31, 1930. There were 21,348 Filipinos and 456 Americans of which 282 are in the Bureau of Education, 22 in the Constabulary, 50 in the Police Department, 17 in the Bureau of Public Works. The personnel of the bureaux of Civil service, Treasury, and Commerce and Industry, is entirely Filipino and the Bureau of Posts is more than 99 $\frac{1}{2}$ % Filipino. To state it in another way, the American officials are but 1 $\frac{1}{2}$ % of the total in the government service.

b. Administration of Justice: The Judges of First Instance, with but two exceptions, and the justices of the Supreme Court, four of nine, are native inhabitants. The Chief Justice is a native. The Philippines is divided into 28 judicial districts, in each of which there is one or two judges of First Instance. Assisting these judges are 38 auxiliary judges. There is only one system of courts, and these courts are both courts of law and courts of equity. As to the character of the Philippine courts, one writer describes it in this manner:

"A pure, impartial, and upright judiciary has been created and an antiquated method of judiciary procedure, which prolonged litigation and ruined litigants with the law's delay, has been

replaced by one which assures to all who diligently seek its aid a fair hearing without favor and justice without price."*

3. Balanced Trade

The balance of trade for the first eleven months of 1932 was favorable to the islands by 19,834,871 pesos official figures from the Bureau of Customs show. Foreign trade amounted to 315,579,407 pesos; imports totaled 147,-872,268 pesos; exports mounted to 167,827,193 pesos. If the December figures were to be added, it approximated to, foreign trade 340,000,000 pesos, imports 158,000,000 pesos, and exports 182,000,000, with a favorable balance of at least 24,000,000 pesos.**

There is no more need to go into further details as to the presentation of facts to justify the Filipino claim for self-rule or to justify the prompt solution of the problem. A quotation from the Honorable William Cameron Forbes, former Governor-General and an earnest opponent of the "School of Independistas", will suffice to elucidate the cultural, material, and social conditions existing in the islands, nay, their fitness for self-government. He declared:

"There was then almost universal illiteracy and ignorance. Standards of living were low. Now with higher wages and working conditions, with trade and commerce enormously increased, with transportation vastly improved by railroads, roads, bridges and harbor improvements and with communication established with all parts of the world---

** *The Sunday Tribune (Manila), Jan. 8, 1933, p. 13*

steamers of all important lines plying in the Orient now call at Manila--with many new manufactures and industries, cement, rubber, sugar established, the people of the islands are much more prosperous than they were. Irrigation has made them practically self-supporting in the matter of food production. Their outlook on world affairs, with better educational facilities, has widened enormously."

CONCLUSION

"There never has been a time," says the Honorable William H. King, "since the American forces landed upon Philippine soil that the Filipinos were willing to be an American colony or even an American State. They have desired to be free; they have had confidence in their ability to govern themselves and to maintain an Independent and sovereign state, possessing a liberal form of government and adequate to protect its people and discharge its international obligations." ⁽¹⁾ The senior Senator from Utah has exposed himself of his real knowledge of the Philippine people. His farsighted declaration, if an honest opinion persist over a biased mind, is true in every way. In fact, in my historical discussions, I made it clear that even amidst America's sympathetic, responsible, and progressive administration, the Filipino people continued and still continue to agitate for an independence with no string attached to it. Typical of this strong plea and desire for self-rule, if we consider it typical, is a statement made by Senate President Quezon: "I would rather see the Philippines sunk to the bottom of the sea than have them remain in permanent dependence upon any nation."

This thought has been the guiding spirit which prompted the natives to oppose the autocratic policy of General Wood. Again we note this spirit moving when President

(1) Refer to Field, C. "National Greed and The Philippines," Forum 83:

42-6, 1930

(2) Quezon uttered this sentence in a political speech at Manila. See Duggan, S. P. "The Future of the Philippines," For. Aff. 5: 114-131, 1927

Coolidge furnished a temporary check to their earnest agitation. The campaign will continue, expressed Speaker Roxas to whom the President's letter was addressed, in spite of the administration's formal declaration.

I have shown that his campaign was answered not in vain. The administration appointed a man sympathetic with the Filipino cause and cognizant of the colonial policy announced in the Jones Act. Cooperation between Manila and Washington which was obstructed during the Wood administration was restored at this juncture. It was this cooperation that made possible the tremendous advance in the various fields of human endeavor.

The American colonial policy in the Philippines, in spite of minor mistakes and misunderstanding on both sides of the Pacific, has been an untold blessing in those lovely isles. The splendid highways and efficient forms of communications uniting the linguistically divided groups; the artesian wells, whose gushing silvery waters brought new life to the people; schools and colleges, whose ever increasing and ever spreading light illumine the dark corners of every home; and the unmuzzled newspaper service marks another day in the Filipino national life, are few of the material benefits derived from this humanitarian policy.

Has the United States remained content with this unparalleled achievement? Uncle Sam has been willing to go

a step further. I say willing because in January, 1933, in conformity with its announced policy, the United States Congress has passed over President Hoover's veto what is known as the Hawes-Cutting Bill granting independence to the Philippines after a "supposed limited time." I intended to discuss it here, but because time and space do not allow me to do so, I leave it to some other student as a subject for another thesis.

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