

MUSLIM MARSEILLE: THE METROPOLIZATION
OF IMPERIAL PRACTICES (1900-1939)

by

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ABSTRACT

During the first four decades of the twentieth century, Muslim North Africans were French colonial subjects and started to become a sizable minority in France. A few thousand in the first decade, France brought over 300,000 of them to Europe as soldiers and workers during World War I. Though many returned to their homes in Algeria, Tunisia, or Morocco after the war, French officials of the interwar period found the status quo ante bellum of a negligible Muslim presence in France unattainable. Their numbers in metropolitan France never dropped below 50,000 again and continued to rise from the 1920s through the 1930s.

This dissertation argues that although historians have generally interpreted this history as one of foreign immigration to France, categorizing it primarily as such imposes a postcolonial and anachronistic understanding of France and North Africa on the time period. Further, it does not fully reflect how French society and North Africans both saw this migration: as a movement of colonial subjects within a single imperial nation-state.

As such, it is better to think of this as a colonial and transnational history as much as one of migration, and the metropolitan “capital of the colonies,” Marseille, illustrates this. The port city served as the gateway in and out of France for Muslim North Africans and had a Muslim colonial population second only to Paris. The city’s officials looked to colonial administrators and experts in governing them, thus bringing imperial practices to metropolitan France that included views on hygiene, policing, and preventing North

Africans from integrating as citizens. Meanwhile, North Africans brought their knowledge of the French state and what rights they had as limited participants in that society with them as well.

Thus, Muslim North Africans did not arrive in France as complete foreigners, but as members of the French imperial-state, and unlike many European immigrants, the French government prevented them from integrating as citizens. Colonialism made them partial members of French society, neither in nor out. In doing so, France placed them in a transnational existence that straddled two continents, languages, major religions, and political statuses.

For Sue, Lyla, Nicolas, and Alexander.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION: MUSLIM COLONIES IN THE METROPOLE

Muslim North Africans have been a noticeable presence in metropolitan France since the start of the twentieth century.¹ They mainly arrived via the southern French port city of Marseille, where many of them stayed to work. In 1912, somewhere between 4,000 and 5,000 Muslim North Africans lived in the whole of metropolitan France.² During World War I, well over 400 thousand of them crossed the Mediterranean in order to work or fight for France.³ Their numbers fluctuated throughout the 1920s and 1930s but never fell out of the tens of thousands before settling into the hundreds of thousands. This migration has proven itself to be a deeply impactful migration on French society. Still mostly Muslim, North Africans are now the largest minority in twenty-first-century France and have been at the center of many discussions in the public sphere, ranging from concerns about immigration, such as assimilation and job availability, to greater xenophobia of Muslims in general due to the rise of Islamic extremists. This dissertation is a history of the earliest arrivals of this highly debated minority group on a large scale

¹ Though very few in numbers, the Muslim and/or Arab presence in France predates nineteenth-century colonialism. For more on this, see Ian Coller, *Arab France: Islam and the Making of Modern Europe, 1798-1831* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2011).

² *Les Kabyles en France. RAPPORT de la Commission chargée d'étudier les conditions du travail des indigènes algériens dans la métropole* (Beaugency: Imprimerie René Barrillier, 1914), 9, 28.

³ At least 325,000 Algerians, 80,000 Tunisians, and 45,000 Moroccans went to France during World War I. John Ruedy, *Modern Algeria: The Origins and Development of a Nation*, 2nd ed. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2005), 111; Kenneth J. Perkins, *A History of Modern Tunisia* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 74; Susan Miller, *A History of Modern Morocco* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 102-103.

in metropolitan France, between the start of the twentieth century and World War II. However, this is not solely a history of immigration, although that is how it has largely been conceived of in the past. This is equally a transnational history of colonialism that explores identities and how early-twentieth-century France dealt with difference.

There are good categorical reasons for why early-twentieth-century Muslim North Africans in metropolitan France have been written about and discussed primarily as a history of immigration. The most obvious one is that these Muslim North Africans did leave North Africa—for the purposes of this dissertation, defined as Algeria, Tunisia, and Morocco—to live in France. Movement from one continent to another certainly evokes the word “immigration.” Another reason is race. Generally speaking, North Africans are either Arabs, or, less frequently, Berbers. They are not “white” Europeans, which is the majority in France. Being “French” or holding citizenship in France is not defined by race today, but it certainly has been used as an important determinant in the past. Indeed, for France’s Nazi-Collaborating Vichy Regime, this was the most important factor.⁴ Currently a factor or not though, race, like movement, is often a part of discussions about immigration. A third reason is religion. Like race, this too has ceased to be an official consideration for French citizenship, but it was a factor until as recently as 1958.⁵ It was only then that a desperate Charles de Gaulle offered full-integration to Muslim Algerians in one of the last attempts ever made to preserve French rule in Algeria before it came to an end four years later.⁶ Thus, this was a factor in the first decades of the twentieth

⁴ For a detailed explanation of how France has defined citizenship since the French Revolution, see Patrick Weil, *How to Be French: Nationality in the Making since 1789*, trans. Catherine Porter (Durham: Duke University Press, 2008).

⁵ That year, all Algerians, Muslims or not, became French citizens until Algerian independence. For more, see Todd Shepard, *The Invention of Decolonization: the Algerian War and the Remaking of France* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2008), 19.

⁶ Ruedy, *Modern Algeria*, 173.

century that are under examination in this dissertation. Movement, race, and religion are all factors in how many societies conceive of difference, identity, and immigrants, and this was perhaps even more so the case in the first-half of the twentieth century.

Beyond categorical, there are the less tangible, more emotional reasons as well. In the past half a century, both Algerians and French have had their reasons to want to distance their identities from each other. By 1962, Algerians had just suffered through 132 years of colonial rule and a painful war for their independence. Although accurate, writing histories that highlighted the previous union between Algeria and France would have cut away at the new Algerian identity that the revolutionaries wished to create. It seemed better then to write histories that anachronistically consider Algerians and French completely separate during the first half of the twentieth century.

As for France's emotional interest in forgetting or obscuring this history, its pride and sense of self as a nation had been deeply wounded. The French had just lost their most prized colonial acquisition of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Algeria. This came on the heels of defeat in another prized colony, Indochina, as well as the loss of several other colonies as decolonization toppled colonial empires around the world. These losses were further piled upon with the embarrassment of Nazi occupation during World War II. All of this was a great deal of loss for a historical world power to process almost all at once, and it took its emotional toll, especially on the French military.⁷ Struggling with these losses and the need to completely redefine French civilization is why Todd Shepard has argued "'the invention of decolonization' ... allowed the French to forget that Algeria had been an integral part of France since the 1830s and to escape

⁷ Ruedy, *Modern Algeria*, 171.

many of the larger implications of that shared past.”⁸ Indeed, while perhaps not a perfect reflection of French sentiment, that emotional toll might point to why the French Parliament took until 1999 to recognize that the “conflict” in Algeria that toppled the Fourth Republic was, in fact, a war.⁹ Ignoring the history of North Africans in metropolitan France, or at least downplaying Franco-Muslim North Africans of the colonial period while highlighting the differences between North Africans and the French, was thus something of a historical distortion used by French society to sooth its wounds and reconstruct itself in the wake of decolonization.

Despite these reasons for conceiving of the history of North Africans in early-twentieth-century metropolitan France as a wave of immigration, if immigration is the movement of a foreign population to another country, then using this as the sole or primary vantage point to study this history renders a narrative that is quite incomplete. By 1900, France had long considered Algeria fully integrated into France. The city of Algiers was considered as much a part of France as Paris. Hundreds of thousands of white Europeans, first known as *colons* and later as *pieds-noirs*, lived in Algeria, a number that reached one million by the time of independence. Those originally from France retained their citizenship, their rights, voted, and sent representatives to the parliament in Paris. This was also the case for those *colons* who had never been to Metropolitan France, even if their family had not been to metropolitan France since the French invasion of Algiers in 1830. By the end of French rule, some French families had lived in Algeria for well over a century. White Europeans from other countries had full-French citizenship offered to them in due course as well. They were absorbed into the

⁸ Shepard, *The Invention of Decolonization*, 2.

⁹ William B. Cohen, “The Harkis: History and Memory,” in *Algeria and France, 1800-2000: Identity, Memory, Nostalgia*, ed. Patricia M. E. Lorcin. (New York: Syracuse University Press), 176.

colon population, just as though they had immigrated to Metropolitan France. Even some of the North African population had gained full-citizenship. The 1870 Crémieux Decree gave French citizenship to the Jewish population of Algeria. Jews who had never been to Metropolitan France and whose families had lived in North Africa for centuries were suddenly citizens of France. Only Muslim Algerians did not have full-citizenship. They were considered French nationals, which was a distinction from Muslim North Africans who came from the French protectorates of Tunisia and Morocco. Their distinction as French nationals was because Muslim Algerians, according to the French, were not born in a French colony like Tunisians or Moroccans. They were born in France because again, as it bears repeating once more, colonial Algeria was completely and integrally France.

The mixture of French and Algerian identities caused by colonization was so thorough that it has also manifested itself through literature. For instance, the *pied-noir* Algerian born author Albert Camus' novel, *L'Etranger (The Stranger)*, has become one of the best-known books of the twentieth century. Its plot revolves around a Frenchman named Meursault who kills a nameless "Arab."¹⁰ The very fact that Camus, writing in the 1940s, took no effort to explain how and why his protagonist inhabits a European world where Arabs or Berbers cross his path shows that Camus assumed his readers would find this natural. Indeed, Camus does not make it clear even whether some scenes are happening in Algeria or in metropolitan France. Similarly, Malika Mokeddem, born in Algeria and educated in France, has explored French and Algerian identities in her novels, as seen in *L'Interdite (the Forbidden)*.¹¹ Alternating between the voice of an

¹⁰ Albert Camus, *L'Etranger* (Paris: Gallimard, 2013), 92.

¹¹ Malika Mokeddem, *L'Interdite*, 6th ed. (Paris: Grasset), 2009.

Algerian woman named Sultana and a Frenchman named Vincent, Mokeddem takes us into a world where North African and French identities are still entangled in the postcolonial era. Vincent is a math professor at the University of Paris who has come to Algeria on an emotional impetus after receiving a kidney transplant from an unknown Algerian woman. In creating this story line, Mokeddem crosses nationality and gender lines to emphasize their common ground and overlapping identity. Meanwhile, Sultana is an Algerian who had moved to France to gain an education and become a doctor but now finds herself back in her hometown, practicing medicine. Mokeddem shows an internal struggle in Sultana who feels rejected by both worlds. She is too culturally French for Algerians, but will be forever seen as an Algerian by the French. The truth is that Mokeddem is exploring an identity crisis that has existed for at least a segment of North Africans for well over century.

Literary works such as these that explore the colonial or now postcolonial ties between France and Algeria illustrate the ambiguity of transnationalism. The characters in Mokeddem's novel overtly struggle with the ambiguity of their own transnational identities. Vincent struggles in a physical sense with how having an Algerian female's kidney in his body impacts his identity. Sultana struggles in a cultural sense with how her education in France and Algerian heritage come together, be that in coexistence, a fusion of the two, or in spite of each other. Meanwhile, Camus presents a colonial world where Algeria and France have a political union that brings Europeans and Arabs into a single world, but where their differences remain. These linguistic, religious, and ethnic differences were, after all, great enough to permit historians to have traditionally overlooked the political union between Algeria and France prior to 1962 so much that

they only thought of the movement of people between the two as a foreign migration. Yet with those differences, Camus' story reminds us that the Europeans and Arabs in Algeria or metropolitan France actually inhabited a less clearly divided world, for neither could escape the presence of the other in their shared physical spaces. In this sense, literature from both before and after Algerian independence demonstrates the ambiguity of the idea or term "transnational" through the ambiguity of places or identities in the minds of these colonial and postcolonial era authors.

Indeed, defining transnationalism is a task in and of itself. A popular working concept of transnationalism comes from Steven Vertovec, who says that "to the extent that any single '-ism' might arguably exist, most social scientists working in the field may agree that 'transnationalism broadly refers to multiple ties and interactions linking people or institutions across the borders of nation-states.'"¹² His speculation proved correct. Many scholars across disciplines doing work on transnationalism have cited this same quotation even, at least in part, while trying to define transnationalism in the past few years.¹³ This includes historians Kevin Grant, Philippa Levine, and Frank Trentmann, who also see transnationalism as a vital part of understanding modern European colonialism and cite Vertovec's view in the introduction of their edited volume

¹² Steven Vertovec, "Conceiving and Researching Transnationalism," *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 22, no. 2 (1999): 447.

¹³ Kevin Grieves, *Journalism Across Boundaries: The Promises and Challenges of Transnational and Transborder Journalism* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 8; Valentina Mazzucato, "Simultaneity and Networks in Transnational Migration: Lessons Learned from a Simultaneous Matched-Sample Methodology," in *Migration and Development Within and Across Borders: Research and Policy Perspectives on Internal and International Migration*, ed. Josh DeWind and Jennifer Holiday. (New York: Social Science Research Council, 2008), 71; Lesley Bartlett and Ameena Chaffar-Kucher, "Introduction: Refugees, Immigrants, and Education in the Global South—Lives in Motion," in *Refugees, Immigrants, and Education in the Global South—Lives in Motion*, ed. Lesley Bartlett and Ameena Ghaffar-Kucher. (New York: Routledge, 2013), 10.

on the British Empire.¹⁴ Crucial to understanding Vertovec's definition in the context of France and North Africa though is the recognition that the borders of nation-states are quite different from the borders of imperial-nation states. The former typically consists of a dominant culture, language, and people with a shared sense of identity. The latter consists of a conquering people who have subjugated other cultures and peoples that are forced into some level of rapprochement or hybridization, but often remain distinct in many ways as well—as was the case with the conquering French and largely Arab peoples of North Africa. This is why the definition offered by Eliezer Ben-Fafael and Yitzhak Sternberg is also useful: “while by ‘transnational’ one also understands relations that run across states and societies, this term focuses on people and groups and do not necessarily refer to official bodies.”¹⁵ Their clarification of what transnationalism means illustrates how the term is not just applicable, but fitting, to describing the colonial relationship between metropolitan France and French North Africa, which was a single official body as an imperial nation-state, but still included distinct groups of people. In what follows, the notion of transnationality illuminates for us the interaction of incompletely constructed identities in the French colonial empire. Administrators and officials in France at times viewed Muslim North Africans as members of the French nation, while at other times they saw them as foreign intruders into that nation. North Africans, on the other hand, found themselves seeking the rights they had been promised

¹⁴ Kevin Grant, Philippa Levine, and Frank Trentmann, “Introduction,” in *Beyond Sovereignty, Britain, Empire and Transnationalism, c. 1880-1950*, ed. Kevin Grant, Philippa Levine, and Frank Trentmann. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 1.

¹⁵ Eliezer Ben-Rafael and Yitzhak Sternberg, “Introduction: Debating Transnationalism,” in *Transnationalism: Diasporas and the Advent of a New (dis)order*, ed. Eliezer Ben-Rafael and Yitzhak Sternberg. (Boston: Brill, 2009), 1.

as French subjects, while at the same time maintaining aspects of their identities, such as Islam.

Thus, designating the movement of North Africans to metropolitan France a transnational history of colonization as much as it is a history of immigration is not a simple technicality based on how the French labeled Algeria, the place of origin for the majority of Muslim North Africans in France both then and now. This is about understanding the arrival of Muslim North Africans in early-twentieth-century metropolitan France without the hindrance and baggage of the later constructions of decolonization that reimagined people and events of the French colonial empire's recent past in a manner that was more palatable to a changing French society. To that end, this dissertation examines the history of Muslim North Africans in metropolitan France between 1900 and 1939 in a way that balances its migratory aspects with its transnational and colonial aspects as well. The city of Marseille serves as the case study because it was the main metropolitan point of entry and exit for North Africans and one of the largest centers of North African life in metropolitan France. In Marseille, therefore, we will be able to observe local experiences as well as larger nationwide events.

Ultimately, this dissertation accomplishes two goals. First, it adds to our working knowledge of the local history of Muslim life in Marseille. This is important because so little scholarship currently exists on the subject. What is shown here is that Muslim life in early-twentieth-century Marseille had multiple facets to it, and it reflected the multiple identities of Muslim North Africans, sometimes multiple times within the same day. They were immigrants in a sense, but they were also nationalists, communists, loyal French nationals with assimilationist visions, French war veterans, thieves, agents of the police,

fugitives, dockworkers, sugar factory workers, vendors, fathers, brothers and sons from North Africa, and even husbands (or at least lovers) of French women. At times, some of these identities gave them power. At other times, some of these identities were imposed by France and took power. Either way, these various identities showcase the agency of Muslim North Africans as they acted within an imperial nation-state's colonial system.

Second and far more reaching, this dissertation also challenges the current spatial thinking of colonial history's distinctively geographical discourse of "colonies," defined as places where a colonial empire has conquered; and of a "metropole," which is the homeland of the colonizing people. Rather, this dissertation shows that this dichotomy fails to acknowledge the full reality of twentieth-century French colonialism, which is that the colonies had followed the colonizers "back home" to the metropole. It had not only impacted French thought, but as colonial migrants from North Africa arrived in metropolitan France and identities began to mix, imperial practices from the colonies were used to monitor them, to control them, to try to dictate separate identities as the colonial and metropolitan worlds were merging and becoming less distinguishable. In this way, the French literally created colonial enclaves within the borders of metropolitan France—Muslim colonies in the metropole, essentially—that reflect French fears of difference and the transnational nature of colonial identities as the lines blurred between old identifiers, such as colony and metropole, or immigrant and national.

Historiography

This dissertation pulls from and contributes to several fields of history, but most especially, to the history of immigration to France and the history of colonialism. In order to illustrate the significance of the dissertation's overall argument then, this section

situates it within the scholarship currently available on these two subjects. Doing so makes it evident that the history of immigration to France is in many ways still an emerging field that will greatly benefit from further additions. Indeed, this is especially the case within the subfield of Muslim North African migration to France prior to Algerian independence in 1962, which will be explained separately after discussing the more general history of immigration to France. Lastly, this section also explains the current historiography of colonialism in order to show that the specific argument for a nonspatial and transnational view of colonialism challenges and pushes colonial scholarship since the “imperial turn” in a meaningful and new direction.

The history of (im)migration and nationality—in other words, the history of different groups coming to France and becoming or being “French” in anyway—was almost completely ignored until the 1970s and 1980s.¹⁶ It only became of interest then because immigration and minorities had become contentious topics in France’s political discourse. Scholars from the era often say as much in their works. Introducing his *mémoire de maîtrise* on Muslim North African migration, Bernard Panza wrote that three years earlier, Marseille “saw racial tension suddenly reach the breaking point,” and that “historians have until now neglected the first North African migration, content to star over eternally with one or two reference texts.”¹⁷ Gérard Noiriel claimed that this was also the case for the whole history of immigration to France. “The state of historical research in France in the 1980s,” writes Noiriel in his preface to the English-language edition “is also relevant to understanding the conditions in which this book [*The French*

¹⁶ The lone scholar who predates this era in a significant way is Norbert Gomar. His work focuses on the poor living conditions of North Africans and offers some demographic information, but is quite basic; see Norbert Gomar, *L’émigration algérienne en France* (Paris: Les Presses modernes, 1931).

¹⁷ Bernard Panza and Bernard Viala, “L’immigration Nord-Africaine à Marseille et dans Les Bouches-du-Rhône, 1906-1939” (*Mémoire de maîtrise*, Aix-en-Provence, France, 1976-77), 1.

Melting Pot] was written. The issue of immigration, a topic of heated political controversy, was at the time completely marginal in French historical writing.”¹⁸ Thus it was the political interests of the day that first produced any significant historical studies of immigration to France within the past forty years, as well as histories of migration to France by specific groups, such as North Africans.

The standard-bearer for the general history of immigration to France is Gérard Noiriel. His book, *Le creuset français*, was the first extensive general history ever written on immigration to France in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Spurred by the political climate of the day, Noiriel sought to separate the real origins of the various minority groups in 1980s France from the various claims made at the time. To that end, he examined census records and French laws surrounding immigration over the past two centuries. In doing so, he discovered that France has been Europe’s melting pot, or *creuset* in French, for the past two centuries. In fact, Noiriel found it appropriate to compare France to the United States in this regard. His findings contradicted the idea that France has a static Gallicized population descending from Celt and Romans, proving rather that France had welcomed several waves of immigrants from all over Europe and subjects of the previous colonial empire in order to meet economic or wartime needs for at least the past two hundred years. Noiriel’s book has been an important reference point for historians of immigration to France who have since sought to build on his important but nonetheless general history of a broad topic and time period.¹⁹

¹⁸ Gérard Noiriel, *The French Melting Pot: Immigration, Citizenship and National Identity*, trans. Geoffroy de Laforcade (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996), xiii.

¹⁹ Rogers Brubaker, *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992); Peter Sahlin, *Unnaturally French: Foreign Citizens in the Old Regime and After* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004); Miriam Feldblum, *Reconstructing Citizenship: The Politics of Nationality Reform and Immigration in Contemporary France* (Albany, N.Y.: SUNY Press, 1999); Riva Kastoryano, *Negotiating Identities: States and Immigrations in France and Germany* (Princeton: Princeton University

Following Noiriel's publication, Rogers Brubaker joined him as one of the most influential historians of immigration to France.²⁰ Brubaker examined immigration in a comparative context, using a historical view to understand how France and Germany have responded to immigration in recent decades. His conclusion was that these two neighboring nations have drastically different paradigms on the topic. He argues that since the French Revolution, France has determined citizenship and the acceptance of foreigners on the principle of *jus soli*, or citizenship by place of birth. He also claims that Germany, on the other hand, has operated on the idea of *jus sanguinis*, which is citizenship determined by ancestry, or bloodlines. Brubaker discusses North Africans in France after Algerian independence, but he largely glosses over their arrival in the colonial period. What he does have to say on the matter takes less than a paragraph, which is a skeleton outline of the numbers Muslim Algerians who migrated to France from just before World War I to the era that Brubaker is interested in discussing—the 1960s and on.²¹ Pointing this out is not meant to take away from his work. It remains an important contribution to the discussion of French immigration and nationality, but Brubaker's work shows how North Africans of the colonial period continued to receive little to no attention in the 1990s as scholars brush over them in an *all too eager desire to discuss their modern-day descendants*.

Following Brubaker, Patrick Weil has thus far become the face of scholarship for the history of immigration and nationality in the twenty-first century. Like Brubaker, Weil uses immigration to discuss the acquisition of French nationality. Specifically, his

Press, 2002); Alec G. Hargreaves, *Multi-Ethnic France: Immigration, Politics, Culture and Society*, 2nd ed. (New York: Routledge, 2007); Weil, *How to Be French*, 2008.

²⁰ Rogers Brubaker, *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany*.

²¹ Rogers Brubaker, *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany*, 139.

work seeks to explain what has made a person “French” since the French Revolution. His research relies on years of archival research in France, Germany, and the United States, ranging from public to private collections. Tracing the history of French nationality, or perhaps better put, the history of French citizenship, he examined civil laws, military recruitment, and interviewed French lawmakers. Weil ultimately refutes Brubaker, claiming that French nationality in the past two centuries cannot be simplified to the concept of *jus soli*. Rather, modern French nationality has a complex history that has included *jus sanguinis*. The French were, in fact, responsible for unleashing *jus sanguinis* on Europe through the French civil code of 1803. Prussians later brought it back to France after the Franco-Prussian War. France also developed what Weil has dubbed *double jus soli*, a principle that permits the children of immigrants to France to choose French citizenship but automatically considers their grandchildren citizens. In short, Weil shows that French identity or nationality is a continually evolving concept. It “is less a subject about which we have a substantial body of knowledge and analysis than an object fraught with contradictory representations, beliefs, and stereotypes.”²² It also bears mention that Weil succeeds far more so than Brubaker in unraveling the complications of colonialism in modern citizenship, though of course he does through the prism of immigration: the arrival of a foreign group and their eventual absorption into a new society.

The larger discussion on the history of immigration and nationality in France has made serious progress since political necessity made it a topic of study in the last quarter of the twentieth century, but it is still lacking. Weil put it well in his introduction: “the history of French nationality has never been the object of a complete and systematic

²² Weil, *How To Be French*, xiv.

study. Whole facets of this important story have been left in the dark.”²³ This is a telling comment, especially when considering that Weil wrote it less than a decade ago. To be sure, Muslim North Africans, especially those with colonial identities in the first-half of the twentieth century, remain—to paraphrase Weil—one of those facets “of this important story” that has largely been “left in the dark.”

To shift from the general historiography of immigration to France to its subfield of Muslim North Africans im/migration to France requires revisiting the 1970s in order to introduce Charles-Robert Ageron. Although he was more a historian of nineteenth- and twentieth-century North Africa than a historian of North African migration in France, the transnational nature of the prior meant that he made great contributions to the latter. Having very little scholarship to fall back on in the 1970s and 1980s, it is not surprising that many of his multiple works are essentially textbooks that lay out the basic political and economic histories of French North Africa.²⁴ He also produced some of the first biographical sketches of important early-twentieth-century figures like the relatively sympathetic Governor-General of Algeria, Charles Jonnart, and the Francophone Muslim Algerian reformer, the Emir Khaled.²⁵ Ageron also lays out the stark realities of life for Muslim Algerians that pushed them to the metropole in the early-twentieth century, but he left plenty of room for other historians to explain in greater detail what life was like on the other side of the Mediterranean.

²³ Weil, *How To Be French*, xv.

²⁴ Charles-Robert Ageron, *Les Algériens musulmans et la France: 1871-1919* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1968); Charles-Robert Ageron, *Modern Algeria: a History from 1830 to Present* (Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 1991). Charles-Robert Ageron, *Politiques coloniales au Maghreb* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1973); Charles-Robert Ageron, *L'Algérie des Français* (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1993).

²⁵ Charles-Robert Ageron, “Enquête sur les origines du nationalisme algérien. L’émir Khaled premier nationaliste algérien ?,” *Revue de l’Occident musulman et de la Méditerranée* 2, no. 2 (1966): 9-49.

Malek Ath-Messaoud and Alain Gillette collaborated to write one of the first books that truly addressed North African migration to France before decolonization. For them, this history could be boiled down to one word: economics. They emphasize how France benefited economically from Muslim Algerian labor in the metropole during the late-nineteenth and twentieth centuries. In fact, the largest section of their work is entitled “*Fonctions économiques*,” and explains that Muslim Algerian migrants were always available to do the work that the French did not want to do, but were then easily disposable if the economy hit a down turn. While their main argument is that Muslim Algerian migration is always entangled with French capitalism, their more lasting impact has been framing this history as immigration in nature, which they claim first started as early as 1871. No other scholars have agreed with their start date since, but they have nonetheless generally continued to use Ath-Messaoud and Gillette’s essentially immigration point of view.²⁶ This is not to say that colonialism or the status of Algerians as French Nationals has been completely ignored, but both of these aspects have only been recognized in the past fifteen years and remain extremely underdeveloped.

The influential historian Emile Temime is one such example of how this is the case. Temime’s work encompassed the whole of the Mediterranean, but he had a few

²⁶ Raouf Ressaïssi, *Settlement Colonization and Transnational Labor Emigrations in the Maghreb: A Comparative Study of Algeria and Tunisia* (Lund: Studentlitteratur, 1984); Belkacem Hifi, *L’immigration algérienne en France: Origines et perspectives de non-retour* (Paris: Harmattan, 1985); Jacqueline Costa-Lascoux and Émile Temime, eds., *Les Algériens en France : genèse et devenir d’une migration* (Paris: Publisud, 1985); Benjamin Stora, *Algeria, 1830-2000: A Short History*, trans. Jane Marie Todd (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2001); Benjamin Stora, *Ils venaient d’Algérie: L’immigration algérienne en France (1912-1992)* (Paris: Fayard, 1992); Jacques Simon, *L’immigration Algérienne en France: des origines à l’indépendance* (Paris: Paris-Méditerranée, 2000); Rabah Aïssaoui, *Immigration and National Identity: North African Political Movements in Colonial and Postcolonial France* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009).

publications that significantly included the migration of Muslim North Africans.²⁷ These included collaborative works over the past few decades, the most thorough of which was a history of migration in Marseille.²⁸ It carefully notes in the preface, written by Temime himself, the problem with counting Muslim North Africans in the first half of the century is that “the Algerian migration is, until 1962, a *French migration* and, as such, difficult to discern in numbers.”²⁹ This is an improvement. Even though his multivolume work still discusses Algerians as “*immigrés*” (immigrants) with little further acknowledgment of their colonial reality, Temime had begun to shift toward seeing Muslim North Africans as having a French (colonial) identity, even if his analysis still treated them essentially as immigrants.³⁰ This small change is a reflection of the “imperial turn” bringing colonialism into the discourse on immigration.

From the mid-twentieth century to the late-1990s and early-2000s, colonial or imperial history appeared to be on its way out. In the decades following World War II, a process now called “decolonization” by historians took place. This term is used to describe the process by which the colonies of various European powers around the world either seized their independence or had it granted to them. As the imperial world disappeared, so too did its place as a field of history. Increasingly, those who wished to study the former colonies of Europe did so through area studies, or as histories of the

²⁷ Jacqueline and Temime, *Les Algériens en France*; Émile Temime and Pierre Échinard, *La préhistoire de la migration (1482-1830)*, vol. 1 of *Migrance: Histoire des migrations à Marseille*, ed. Émile Temime (Marseille: Jeanne Laffitte, 2007).

²⁸ Émile Temime, ed., *Migrance: Histoire des migrations à Marseille*, 4 vols. (Marseille: Jeanne Laffitte, 2007).

²⁹ Temime and Échinard, *La préhistoire de la migration*, 5. Italics added by me for emphasis.

³⁰ Émile Temime and Renée Lopez, *L'expansion Marseillaise et « l'invasion italienne » (1830-1918)*, vol. 2 of *Migrance: Histoire des migrations à Marseille*, ed. Émile Temime (Marseille: Jeanne Laffitte, 2007), 154.

independent and sovereign nations that were replacing the colonies.³¹ It was a shift that reflected the now autonomous peoples of previous colonies claiming their own identity and Europe coming to terms with that fact. However, just when imperial or colonial history truly appeared to have become a thing of the past, “imperial turn,” which is the study of the influence and impact of the colonial empires on the colonial powers themselves, changed and brought new life to the field.

Among the first historians to embrace this idea and to push other historians to pursue it were Ann Laura Stoler and Frederick Cooper. In the late-1990s they co-authored a crucial essay that served as the introduction to an edited volume that helped to usher in the “imperial turn.” In their essay, Stoler and Cooper framed a discourse in which colonizer was no longer seen as the only influencer in the colonial experience. Rather it could be seen as exchange between the colonies and the metropole. As they put it, “our interest is more in how both colonies and metropolises shared dialectics of inclusion and exclusion, and in what ways the colonial domain was distinct from the metropolitan one. We hope to explore within the shared but differentiated space of empire the hierarchies of production, power, and knowledge that emerged in tension with the extension of the domain of universal reason, of market economics, and of citizenship.”³² Stoler and Cooper were seeing how various dynamics of imperial empires, such as economics, politics, and intellectual discourse were reverberating back in their metropolises, and they hoped to see more historians of European powers seek to understand the implications and extent of that influence.

³¹ Douglas M. Peers, “Is Humpty-Dumpty back together again? The revival of imperial history and the Oxford History of the British Empire,” *Journal of World History* 13, no. 2 (2002): 452.

³² Frederick Cooper and Ann Stoler, “Between Metropole and Colony: Rethinking a Research Agenda,” in *Tensions of Empire: Colonial Cultures in a Bourgeois World*, ed. Frederick Cooper and Ann Stoler. (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1997) 3.

While Stoler and Cooper's edited volume helped create the "imperial turn," Antoinette Burton's edited volume assisted historians in continuing to engage with it and find solutions to its challenges. Focused significantly but not exclusively on the British Empire, Burton's volume "seeks dialogue and critical companionship with a number of recent discussions about the directions of postmodern and postcolonial scholarship."³³ She points to the challenges of maintaining the national histories of both metropolises and colonies within the context of the "imperial turn" while also considering ways in which these once empires connect now in an increasingly globalized, postcolonial world. Despite the impression given by the volume's title, *After the Imperial Turn*, Burton very much encourages new avenues of thinking within it, rather than depicting it as something that is or will soon be past. Likely due to the influence of the "imperial turn" then, some worthwhile histories of colonial migrant populations in the metropolises started to appear in the late-1990s and have continued through the past decade.³⁴

Among the first historians influenced by the "imperial turn" to write on Muslim North Africans in early-twentieth-century metropolitan France was Neil MacMaster. His

³³ Antoinette Burton, "Introduction: On the Inadequacy and the Indispensability of the Nation," in *After the Imperial Turn: Thinking with and through the Nation*, ed. Antoinette Burton. (Durham [N.C.]: Duke University Press, 2003), 16.

³⁴ Frederick Cooper and Ann Stoler, *Tensions of Empire: Colonial Cultures in a Bourgeois World* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1997); Jonathan Schnerer, *London 1900: The Imperial Metropolis* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1999); Felix Driver and David Gilbert, eds., *Imperial Cities: Landscape, Display and Identity* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999); Sue Peabody and Tyler Edward Stovall, eds., *The Color of Liberty: Histories of Race in France* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2003); Clifford Rosenberg, *Policing Paris: The Origins of Modern Immigration Control between the Wars* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006); Eric T. Jennings, *Curing the Colonizers: Hydrotherapy, Climatology, and French Colonial Spas* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2006); Kevin Grant, Philippa Levine, and Frank Trentmann, eds., *Beyond Sovereignty: Britain, Empire and Transnationalism, c. 1880-1950* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007); Mary Dewhurst Lewis, *The Boundaries of the Republic: Migrant Rights and the Limits of Universalism in France, 1918-1940* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007); Richard S. Fogarty, *Race and War in France: Colonial Subjects in the French Army, 1914-1918* (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 2008); Amelia Lyons, *The Civilizing Mission in the Metropole: Algerian Families and the French Welfare State during Decolonization* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2013).

work encompasses Muslim North Africans between 1900 and 1962.³⁵ The title of his book alone shows a marked increase in the attention to the colonial facet of this history, *Colonial Migrants and Racism: Algerians in France, 1900-62*. Though publishing in the late-1990s, MacMaster's work, like Noiriel's over a decade earlier, is also a response to the fact that "integration of ethnic minorities, and racism have become central issues in French politics."³⁶ MacMaster's unique contribution was explaining the colonial influence in the development of racism towards Algerians in metropolitan France. He found a number of causes for racism against Algerians in the metropole, but the colonial relationship was a major contribution. He argues that many of the *colons* in French-Algeria felt threatened by Muslim Algerians going to the metropole and experiencing greater Freedom. In response, the *colons* influenced metropolitan French society to see Algerians as criminals and to slow their access to metropolitan France. For MacMaster then, the colonies were shaping the experience of North Africans before and as they arrived as immigrants in the metropole.

Clifford Rosenberg's contribution to our understanding of Muslim North African life in metropolitan France is an examination of how France policed immigrants, and especially Muslim North Africans in Paris, between the wars. Rosenberg is very clear that his interest is in unraveling the French perspective on immigration, or as he puts it, he focuses "on the French response to immigration rather than the immigrant communities themselves."³⁷ His recent monograph is divided into two major parts. The first provides a summation of France's surveillance of foreigners and how policing

³⁵ Neil MacMaster, *Colonial Migrants and Racism: Algerians in France, 1900-1962* (New York: St. Martin's Press Inc., 1997).

³⁶ MacMaster, *Colonial Migrants and Racism*, 1.

³⁷ Rosenberg, *Policing Paris*, xii.

worked and changed between the wars. The second part discusses how North Africans specifically were policed in interwar Paris. In dedicating half of his book to the subject, Rosenberg makes it one of the most in-depth histories of North Africans in the interwar period published to date. For example, he explains thoroughly how Paris' North African Brigade functioned and the origins of the Franco-Muslim hospital in Paris. In the end, he argues persuasively that the French state treated Muslim North Africans migrants far more harshly than other white immigrants from European countries.

Meanwhile, Mary Dewhurst Lewis has approached early-twentieth-century immigration to France from a comparative point of view that greatly includes Muslim North Africans. She contrasts the experiences of three groups in the metropole: "labor migrants," who are by and large Europeans, refugees of various nationalities, and lastly, Muslim Algerians. Relying on departmental archives and numerous others in Paris, Lewis uses the cities of Lyon and Marseille as case studies to better understand the experiences of these three migrant groups in interwar period France, which leads her to give ample attention to Muslim Algerians. Lewis' conclusion is that despite the ideals of republican principles and equality, the extent to which the Third Republic assimilated each respective group had more to do with "factors ranging from local social relations to national politics to international affairs, and dependent on the choices made by both state agents and migrants under the constraint of these shifting relationships."³⁸ In a similar vein as Rosenberg, Lewis' work has further helped to demonstrate that North African migrants were indeed treated in a manner that did not fit with the other (white) immigrants' experiences.

³⁸ Lewis, *The Boundaries of the Republic*, 16.

Histories produced in the past fifteen or twenty years since the “imperial turn” have considered some of the ways in which colonialism impacted early-twentieth-century Muslim North African im/migration to France, but they remained constrained by terms used within the colonial discourse. Specifically, terms such as “colony” and “metropole” conjure a more rigid and cleanly bifurcated image of colonial empires, the people within them, and their identities, than actually existed. Challenging the current static and purely geographical definition of these terms, this dissertation demonstrates that the experience of Muslim North Africans in metropolitan France can be better understood by recognizing that French colonial subjects took their colonial status and identities with them wherever they went. This was even the case when migrating to the metropole, because metropolitan leaders looked to their colonial counterparts in order to replicate colonial life. In a very real way, they endeavored to create colonial enclaves inside the metropole that prevented Muslim North Africans from truly being immigrants in the sense of being a people moving to foreign land with different laws, customs, and national identities. Indeed, the metropolitan French of the early-twentieth century viewed them far more as colonial subjects, or *indigènes* (native, usually of a colony) than as immigrants. To put that in another way that leans partially upon Todd Shepard’s framing, just as France “invented” decolonization in order to accept that Algeria was no longer French after 1962, historians since the 1950s have “invented” the image of metropolitan-dwelling colonial subjects as immigrants to better fit our postcolonial geopolitics at the expense of reflecting colonial realities. By looking past constructions of “immigrants” moving from a “colony” to the “metropole,” Muslim North Africans of the era can better be seen for what they were: a diverse group with multiple identities that existed in a

colonial world and did not see the end of this existence as possible, let alone inevitable. This new colonial perspective will improve our understanding of North African history, French history, the transnational identities of those caught in the middle of this trans-Mediterranean colonial French world, and even better inform discussions about twenty-first-century minority groups in France today.

Colonialism, North Africa, France, and Marseille

As a colonial and transnational history with its focal point in Marseille, this dissertation brings together a number of historical narratives, all of which are important to understanding the experience of Muslim North Africans in France between 1900 and 1939. This section provides a brief overview of how colonialism, North Africa, and the city of Marseille came together in early-twentieth-century France. To that end, first is a history of French imperialism and colonialism, which will be followed by overviews of colonialism in Algeria, Tunisia, and Morocco, in that order. This will illustrate how Muslims from these three colonies were often seen as one cohesive group of colonial subjects, yet were also different, as the Algerian majority of them had a second semi-French and transnational designation, that of French national. Their commonalities and differences all factored into how they and the French state interacted with each other. This is followed by a brief history of the French Third Republic, which focuses on its struggle and desire to be a place of *égalité* (equality) even as it expands a colonial empire that contradicts this ideal and challenges assumptions about French identity. Last of all

comes a history of Marseille as a transnational place of migration, or as Temime describes it, the “crossroads-city that is Marseille.”³⁹

French Imperialism and Colonialism

Europe began the process of what is now called “European colonization” as early as the late-fifteenth century. European powers did so in an effort “to expand their trade, protect their political authority, and export their religious beliefs and ways of life to the other parts of the world.”⁴⁰ Their attempts at empire were frequently challenged, both by those peoples being subjugated and by other European powers vying for control of the same regions. Despite these difficulties, large empires had been established by the early 1800s. Best known to English-speaking audiences was the British Empire. Already including large territories ranging from the Indian subcontinent to North America by 1800, it only continued to grow over the course of the nineteenth century. Portugal controlled parts of Africa’s coasts, significant islands in the Atlantic Ocean, and modern-day Brazil. Spain had taken a large swath of land in North and South America, as well as the Philippines. Among the Netherlands’ conquests was the Dutch East Indies, which makes up much of Indonesia today. All of the above had colonies in the Caribbean. Russia, meanwhile, had expanded its conquest from Eastern Europe and Western Asia to

³⁹ Emile Temime and Renée Lopez, *L’expansion Marseillaise et « l’invasion italienne » (1830-1918)*, vol. 2 of *Migrance: Histoire des migrations à Marseille*, ed. Emile Temime (Aix-en-Provence: Jeanne Laffitte, 2007), 154.

⁴⁰ James R. Lehning, *European Colonialism since 1700* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 16. For a more in-depth overview of all of these colonial empires, see William Roger Louis, ed., *The Oxford History of the British Empire* (Oxford [England]: Oxford University Press, 1998); Philippa Levine, *The British Empire: Sunrise to Sunset* (Harlow, England: Pearson Longman, 2007); Martin Thomas, *The French Empire between the Wars: Imperialism, Politics and Society* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2005); Martin Thomas, *Violence and Colonial Order: Police, Workers and Protest in the European Colonial Empires, 1918-1940* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2012).

include the Americas via the Pacific Ocean, taking in Alaska and even exerted influence as far south as California.

Alongside these five imperial powers was France.⁴¹ Certainly not the least among them, France had also established colonies throughout the world during the early modern era (roughly 1500 to 1750, sometimes considered to go as late as 1800) with various degrees of success. With the exception of occasional interruptions by other European powers, early-nineteenth-century France had maintained control of several Caribbean islands for some two hundred years, where lucrative plantations had first produced “tobacco, cotton, cocoa and coffee that found ready markets in Europe,” before shifting “to a more lucrative product, sugar,” in the late 1600s.⁴² Other colonial undertakings included a failed venture in Florida, and a successful one in *Pondichéry*, India.⁴³ The largest French colonial holding before the nineteenth century, however, was *Nouvelle-France*, or New France. A stronghold of French missionary work and the fur trade at its height, New France covered an enormous span of North America. From north to south, it included what is now the Canadian province of Quebec down to the American state of Louisiana. From west to east, it claimed much of the modern-day Midwestern United States. All of New France was lost to the British and Spanish in the 1763 treaty of Paris that brought an end to the Seven Years War. France still had some very lucrative colonies, but the influence, economy, and surface area that its colonial holdings encompassed had been significantly dwarfed.

⁴¹ Jean Meyer and Jacques Thobie, *Histoire de la France coloniale* (Paris: Armand Colin, 1990); James Pritchard, *In Search of Empire: The French in the Americas 1670-1730* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2004); Thomas, *The French Empire between the Wars*; Thomas, *Violence and Colonial Order*.

⁴² Lehning, *European Colonialism*, 17.

⁴³ Lehning, *European Colonialism*, 16.

Through the end of the eighteenth century, France's focus was more on European affairs than on overseas colonization. First, there were the economic, political, and philosophical issues that led to the French Revolution of 1789. Notably, France's providing aid to the colonials in the American Revolution sounded the economic death knell for the government's finances. Combined with inept taxation practices and the costs of the Seven Years War, both in terms of fighting it and the colonial territory lost, the resources spent on ensuring American independence had rendered France insolvent. In need of economic reform, Louis XVI called for a meeting of the Estates General. This was an Old Regime legislative body that consisted of representatives from the clergy, the nobility, and "the third estate," which constituted "the overwhelming mass of the French population."⁴⁴ With the ideas of the Enlightenment in the atmosphere, the meeting gave way to calls for a constitution and gave rise to a revolution.

Then there was the Revolution itself. Things went as smoothly as could be expected of any revolution the first few years, but by 1792, the Revolution's proponents found themselves not only struggling internally, but externally as well. This was the beginning of the Revolution's radical phase. At the behest of displaced French aristocrats, European monarchs unleashed their armies on France with the goal of ensuring Louis XVI's continued reign. These conflicts, known as the French Revolutionary Wars, not only kept France focused on Europe, but they enabled it to gain territory at the expense of its neighbors. Much of this was done under the leadership of a young Napoleon Bonaparte.

⁴⁴ Raymond Anthony Jonas, *France and the Cult of the Sacred Heart: An Epic Tale for Modern Times* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000), 58.

Bonaparte's military prowess facilitated much of France's success, and ultimately permitted him to transmute the essence of the Revolution into a regime under his control, known as the Napoleonic Empire (1804-1815). Under the Corsican general, his troops upended the whole of Europe, controlling territory from the Iberian Peninsula to Moscow at the Empire's peak. Yet, Napoleon did not focus solely on Europe. He simply had more success there. His 1798-1801 campaign in Egypt failed to establish French rule along the Nile, although he did destabilize the region enough for the Ottoman general Muhammad Ali to eventually break it away from the Empire to form the modern state of Egypt. Napoleon also had ambitions to expand in the Americas, but gave up this dream once it had become clear that the revolting slaves in the once lucrative French colony of Saint-Domingue were on the path towards a successful revolution. Having planned to use the colony as his staging ground for empire building in the Americas, he opted instead to sell the vast North American territory that he had acquired from Spain in 1800 to the United States as the Louisiana Purchase in 1803. Europe, then, was where he enjoyed success, but this unraveled in 1814. After a short revival following his escape from the Island of Elba that same year, Napoleon's power and empire came to an end when he was exiled for a second time in 1815. At the same time, leaders from the most powerful states of Europe met at the Congress of Vienna, where they dismantled most of what Bonaparte had built and redrew the political map of Europe. Though France still remained in control of some colonial holdings, Bonaparte's fall meant the largest loss of territory and empire since the loss of New France in 1763.

Despite the political turmoil that prevented a single regime from surviving in France for more than twenty years from 1789 to 1870, the French began to build another

colonial empire in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. By the twentieth century, Britain alone surpassed France's empire in size and influence. Aided by the technological advancements of industrialization, it rose with other European empires in the nineteenth century that culminated in the creation of Europe's "imperial nation-states," in which "colonial subjects were pulled into the economic, political, and cultural systems of empire by force of conquest, colonial government, and the daily presence of colonizers in their midst."⁴⁵

The French built a new, second colonial empire with the belief that they were bringing civilization to the non-European world, and as such, they officially charged themselves with *la mission civilisatrice* (the civilizing mission).⁴⁶ A mixture of pseudoscientific racial thinking and paternalism, French supporters of colonialism claimed that the empire would enable "inferior races" to become greater by becoming more French.⁴⁷ Colonized peoples were encouraged to "associate," which still meant adopting French language, culture, and leaving behind their "barbaric customary law" in favor of French law.⁴⁸ One unique exception to this was in Algeria, where some French hoped for a period that the Berber subgroup known as Kabyles would assimilate and become fully French.⁴⁹ While other European powers had similar ideas about race and empire, most notably Britain and its supposed "white man's burden," no other empire

⁴⁵ Lehnig, *European Colonialism*, 210.

⁴⁶ Alice L. Conklin, *A Mission to Civilize: The Republican Idea of Empire in France and Western Africa, 1895-1930* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997); Patricia Lorcin, *Imperial Identities: Stereotyping, Prejudice and Race in Colonial Algeria* (London: I.B. Tauris, 1995); Denise Bouche, *Histoire de la colonisation française: Flux et reflux (1815-1962)* (Saint-Amand-Montrond, Cher: Fayard, 1991); Osama Abi-Mershed, *Apostles of Modernity: Saint-Simoniens and the Civilizing Mission in Algeria* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2010).

⁴⁷ Bouche, *Histoire de la colonisation française*, 207.

⁴⁸ Conklin, *A Mission to Civilize*, 6.

⁴⁹ Lorcin, *Imperial Identities*, 184.

made these views an “official imperial doctrine.”⁵⁰ Further, as a republic by the late-nineteenth century, France alone believed it had a charge to export its republican ideals of *liberté, égalité, fraternité* to the world through its colonial empire.⁵¹ As a people who valued equality before the law, the French also believed that their views on empire and race were not as racist as the British.⁵² Whether this was true or not, the French believed it.

Thus, the civilizing mission “implied that France’s colonial subjects were too primitive to rule themselves, but were capable of being uplifted,” through assimilation or association.⁵³ The French colonized extensively in Africa and Asia through means of conquest, coming to control immense areas of land that make up several countries today, such as Vietnam, Madagascar, and Senegal. The second French colonial empire got its start in 1830 with the invasion of Algiers. This North African city would later serve as the capital of colonial and then independent Algeria.

Algeria

The territory that became the French colony of Algeria sits directly south and across the Mediterranean from France. They would share borders were it not for this body of water. While Berbers are its indigenous people, the area has been conquered and inhabited by several other groups, including the Phoenicians, Romans, and Germanic tribes. It was when seventh-century Muslim Arabs swept through that it acquired the religious and ethnic concentration that it mostly retains to this day. Many Arabs settled

⁵⁰ Conklin, *A Mission to Civilize*, 1.

⁵¹ Bouche, *Histoire de la colonisation Française*, 207.

⁵² William A. Hoisington, Jr., *Lyautey and the French Conquest of Morocco* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1995), 108.

⁵³ Conklin, *A Mission to Civilize*, 1.

and soon outnumbered the Berbers who adopted the religion of the new dominate group. In the sixteenth century, Muslim Ottoman Turks established a vassal-state of their then expanding Ottoman Empire that roughly aligns with the boundaries of modern-day Algeria. The Ottomans had a few governors there called “beys,” who answered to a single “dey” in Algiers. The Dey in turn answered to the Ottoman Empire’s governing powers, also known as “the Porte,” in Istanbul. Although an ailing Ottoman Empire had largely lost its ability to control Algeria by the start of the nineteenth century, the Dey of Algiers still respected the appearance of Ottoman oversight.

The 1830 invasion of Algiers and subsequent creation of French-Algeria started with a French Revolution debt. While the French Revolution and its wars raged on, Algerian-Jewish houses of Bushnaq and Bakri provided much needed grain to Bonaparte’s armies and southern French provinces between 1793 and 1798.⁵⁴ When Bonaparte invaded Egypt, then a possession of the Ottoman Empire, like Algeria, Franco-Algerian relations broke down with an outstanding French debt of 7,000,000 to 8,000,000 francs. After Bonaparte’s demise, relations were reestablished with France and Louis XVIII and continued under his brother and successor, Charles X (r. 1824-1830), but the issue of this French Revolution debt hung over both countries. Meanwhile, Bakri, “who owed money to the state,” convinced the Dey of Algiers, Hussein Dey, that he was financially incapable of paying the state until the French payed him.⁵⁵ To make matters worse, Bakri claimed exaggerated interest rates, while the Bourbons remained loath to pay a debt taken by revolutions to overthrow their dynasty.

⁵⁴ Ruedy, *Modern Algeria*, 45-46.

⁵⁵ Ruedy, *Modern Algeria*, 46.

On April 29, 1827, the debt issue came to a head. The French consul at Algiers, Pierre Deval, visited the Hussein with the intention of paying his respects as Ramadan was coming to a close. During their exchange, Hussein asked why he had not heard back from Charles X regarding this now thirty-year-old debt. “Deval allegedly responded in words to the effect that His Most Christian Majesty could not lower himself to correspond with the Dey.”⁵⁶ Insulted and out of patience, the usually calm and collected Hussein had simply come to his breaking point. He lost his composure and hit Deval “three times on the arm with the handle of a peacock-feather fly whisk and ordered him to get out.”⁵⁷ This event has since been known as the “Fly Whisk Incident.”

As tension increased over the matters of honor, insult, and who owed an apology to whom, Hussein cut off French trading posts in Algeria while France undertook an expensive, ultimately failing, blockade of the port of Algiers. Three years passed like this, during which time Charles X’s creep towards greater autocratic rule was making him increasingly unpopular with many of his subjects. Uneasy about the certainty of retaining his crown, he ordered the full invasion of Algiers with the hope that a military victory would rebuild his popularity at home. It did not work. Only three weeks after the French flag went up over the defeated Kasbah of Algiers on July 5, 1830, the people of Paris defied him and barricaded the small alleyways of their architecturally medieval capital, causing Charles X to abdicate within a mere three days now known as the July Revolution.

France subdued the rest of Algeria over the course of the next four decades (1830-1871). The process started under the leadership of Count Bertrand Clauzel, who was

⁵⁶ Ruedy, *Modern Algeria*, 46.

⁵⁷ Ruedy, *Modern Algeria*, 46.

given charge in Algeria on September 2, 1830 by the newly crowned Orleanist king, Louis-Philippe (1830-1848).⁵⁸ Clauzel crushed the resistance efforts of Hussein's Bey of Constantine, Ahmad Bey, but was replaced shortly thereafter in 1836 when he suffered a thorough and embarrassing defeat at the hands of another resister to French occupation who has gone down in Algerian history as a symbol of colonial defiance, Abd al-Qadir. Clauzel's defeat caused his replacement by Thomas Robert Bugeaud that same year. Bugeaud was merciless. He became infamous for chasing those who dared to defy French expansion into caves, then lighting fires at the entrance to trap them inside, which cause them to either suffocate or burn to death. His tactics worked. Elevated to Governor-General in 1840, he greatly weakened Abd al-Qadir in the early 1840s, which contributed to the latter's surrendered to General Louis de Lamoricière in 1847. Others rose to fight back after his surrender, but they all saw defeat. The millenarian Bou Ma za fought in the lowlands. Bu Ziyane repelled the French at his fortified oasis for over fifty days before all 800 of the people with him were "methodically slaughtered" and his decapitated head was placed on the wall.⁵⁹ The female *marabout* Lalla Fatima rallied Kabyle fighters in the mountains.⁶⁰ They all failed. The Kabylia insurrection in 1871 was the last gasping breath of Algerian resistance. It took the lives of 2,686 Europeans, while the Algerian loss of life will always remain unknown, though "it was clearly many times greater."⁶¹ From 1830 to 1871, 1861 was the only year that passed with a significant military

⁵⁸ Ruedy, *Modern Algeria*, 52.

⁵⁹ Ruedy, *Modern Algeria*, 67.

⁶⁰ Kabyles are a specific group of Berbers, many of whom live in the mountains of Northern Algeria. A *marabout* is a figure within North African Islam comparable to a saint, "who was enlightened or famous for his virtues who becomes, after death, a cult figure or object of veneration." F. Benzakour, Driss Gaadi, and Ambroise Queffélec, *Le Français au Maroc* (Brussels: AUPELF-UREF, 2000), 255.

⁶¹ Ruedy, *Modern Algeria*, 78.

resistance.⁶² After forty years of valiant effort and total failure, it was not until the 1940s that a significant number of Algerians could even conceive of a future without French rule.

During forty years of conquest, settlers were arriving. In the 1830s, Clauzel was a figure who bridged the two worlds of conquest and settlement. For him, Algeria was the answer to France's colonial void since the loss of New France in the Americas. "In many ways a man of the eighteenth century, Clauzel saw Algeria replacing France's lost new-world empire as a source of exotic commodities, and he became a vigorous proponent of active settlement in Algeria."⁶³ Indeed, Clauzel's vision set the tone for Algeria to become a white settler colony. He helped "to trigger a land rush that saw Europeans buying and selling agricultural lands at a feverish pace."⁶⁴ Europeans seeking greater opportunity jumped on the chance for a fresh start. Some were so poor, colonial legend has it, that they could not afford footwear.⁶⁵ This is one of the origin-stories given for the nickname of *colons* in Algeria used by the twentieth century: *pieds-noirs* (literal translation, "black feet"). Big companies also bought tracts of land for farming. They then hired the native Algerian population to work as laborers for pittance, sometimes employing Algerians on what was their very own personal farm before the French took it. When Buguead became Governor-General, the European population of *colons* was approaching 40,000.⁶⁶ In the next few decades, Algeria attracted white settlers from various European countries and also became a dumping ground for French criminals, radicals, and republicans. By 1872, settlers—arriving by their own free will or not—

⁶² Ruedy, *Modern Algeria*, 55.

⁶³ Ruedy, *Modern Algeria*, 52.

⁶⁴ Ruedy, *Modern Algeria*, 52-53.

⁶⁵ Ruedy, *Modern Algeria*, 69.

⁶⁶ Ruedy, *Modern Algeria*, 69.

coupled with births, had raised the *colon* European population to 279,691.⁶⁷ This was still not enough settlement in the eyes of those in support of colonialism, but it had made Algeria the primary destination for *colons* of the French Empire.

Structural and administrative changes during this same time period completed the annexation of Algeria. Under the July Monarchy, the *bureaux arabes* (usually translated in the singular as “Arab Bureau”) was established. Its efforts to slow *colons* abuse of native Algerians combined with a few opportunist officers who joined the *colons* ensured that both sides hated it until its end in 1871.⁶⁸ In 1845, a royal ordinance divided Algeria into the three provinces of Alger, Oran, and Constantine and further created local administration that depended on the ratio of Europeans to native Algerians. A *commune de plein exercice* used civil law and was for areas with a high *colon* population. The other two types of administrations, *territoires mixtes* and *territoires arabes*, were under military rule, though limited self-government was permitted for *colons* in the former.⁶⁹

As Louis-Napoleon Bonaparte rose to power in France, first as president of the short-lived Second Republic (1848-1852) and then as Emperor Napoleon III of the Second Empire (1852-1870), he came to see himself as “Emperor of the Arabs” and “instituted enlightened policies of pacification and development in Algeria.”⁷⁰ His first attempt at such a policy was the *Senatus Consultum* of April 22, 1863. The point of the law was to protect native Algerians from further land confiscation at the hands of the *colons* by stipulating that any lands traditionally used by an Algerian tribe belonged to that tribe and was not available for the government or *colons* to claim. Instead, the civil

⁶⁷ Ruedy, *Modern Algeria*, 69.

⁶⁸ Abi-Mershed, *Apostles of Modernity*, 88.

⁶⁹ Ruedy, *Modern Algeria*, 73.

⁷⁰ David Baguley, *Napoleon III and His Regime: An Extravaganza* (Baton Rouge: LSU Press, 2000), 172.

authorities reinterpreted the 1863 law in a way that turned tribal lands into *mulk* (private land, able to be sold), or transferred tribal lands to the public domain. Thus, the law had completely failed within a few years.

Another attempt to give Muslim Algerians more political rights came through the *Senatus Consultum* of July 14, 1865, but it backfired as well. The law “declared that Algerians were French” and therefore, French nationals who “could serve in the military, become civil servants, and perform other functions in the French establishment.”⁷¹ These opportunities afforded to Muslim Algerians as French nationals were later expanded to include other privileges that their fellow colonial subjects from other colonies did not enjoy, such as the ability to travel to metropolitan France freely, or having a limited vote on some local measures. But the *Senatus Consultum* of July 14, 1865 also stipulated that those who were ruled under Muslim law “were not citizens of France.”⁷² If a Muslim Algerian wished to become a citizen then, it required apostatizing, a choice that only two thousand or so made between 1865 and Algerian independence in 1962.

Thus, the *Senatus Consultum* of July 14, 1865 also unintentional established a three-class system among Muslim North Africans and white French within the imperial nation-state of France. At the top were French citizens. They were primarily white European Christians with a Jewish minority, and were either born with citizenship or had naturalized. By the start of the Third Republic, male citizens enjoyed full voting rights while women at least benefited from legal protections. Beneath them came Muslim Algerian French nationals. Despite being of the same ethnicities (Arab and Berber) and religion (Muslim) as other colonial subjects from the other North African colonies, they

⁷¹ Ruedy, *Modern Algeria*, 75.

⁷² Ruedy, *Modern Algeria*, 75-76.

enjoyed the few additional privileges given by the *Senatus Consultum* of July 14, 1865. Even so, this was not equal to the rights of full citizens. Muslim Algerian men were not uniformly given the right to vote. Even as this right was expanded to more Muslim Algerian men after World War I, it still only included 43 percent of them, and their votes were counted in a separate college from that of the *colons* to ensure the former never trumped the latter.⁷³ Muslim Algerian French nationals also continued to be subject to additional laws that did not apply to French citizens. The most famous example of this was the *code de l'Indigénat*. Passed in 1881, it permitted administrators to inflict penalties on Muslim Algerians without going through the court.⁷⁴ Despite these injustices, the second-class designation of French national was still better than the third and lowest designation of being only a colonial subject. This described Muslims in the neighboring colonies of Morocco and Tunisia. While subject to all the additional regulations placed on Muslim Algerian French nationals but not French citizens, they were also denied the few rights and privileges granted by the *Senatus Consultum* of July 14, 1865. They could not leave their respective colonies without express permission and purpose and had even less if any say in their governance.

The last crucial administrative changes occurred when the Franco-Prussian War (1870-1871) ended Napoleon III's reign in 1870. Republicans in the metropole happily teamed up with *colons* to help each other achieve their political ambitions. The *colons* supported a republic while the republicans supported the end of military rule and full-annexation of Algeria into France. Because of this, from 1870 until the Algerian independence in 1962, Algeria was French-Algeria, and counted as an integral part of

⁷³ Ruedy, *Modern Algeria*, 112.

⁷⁴ Lehning, *European Colonialism*, 201.

France just as much as Provence, Brittany, or Paris itself. At the same time, Adolphe Crémieux proposed the Crémieux decree, which would give full-French citizenship to all native Algerian Jews. The *colons*, republicans, and Crémieux all got what they wanted.

By 1871, Algeria had become French-Algeria and its tone changed very little until World War I. The minority of Europeans and native Jews and token apostate Muslims were citizens capable of full participation in the wholly civil government. On the other hand, the majority population of Muslim Arabs and Berbers recognized that the French were there to stay for the foreseeable future, meaning large-scale overt revolts ceased and a large spectrum of views on how to live under French rule emerged. Their status as French nationals, or second-class citizens had been well established. The *colons* continued to profit at their expense, using the backing of the French government to take the land best suited to agricultural productivity from Muslims for themselves. Between 1871 and 1919, the French government took 18.5 million acres of land from Muslims in Algeria in order to give it to the *colons*.⁷⁵ Stora asserts that doing this in nonindustrial Algeria, where “the economic future was based almost entirely on agriculture,” financially devastated much of Algeria’s Muslim population.

Some significant reforms happened in the years surrounding World War I, but they only occurred because French leadership felt they were necessary to encourage Muslims to help France in the war or to keep them from rebelling. The first of these was the 1914 law on free circulation between French-Algeria and metropolitan France that was ostensibly extended to all Muslim Algerians to encourage them to help in the war effort. The next significant reform was the Jonnart Law in 1919, which was the reform

⁷⁵ Benjamin Stora, *Algeria*, 7.

that expanded the male Algerian vote to 43 percent, but this reform was a dramatic let down from what Muslim Algerians had been led to believe they would receive at the end of the war. From the early-1920s on, the number of Muslim Algerians who believed that France would ever offer them full civil rights continued to steadily drop through the 1930s and on, eventually opening the way for Algerian nationalism to rise.

The next meaningful proposal for reform came in the form of the Blum-Viollette Bill in 1936. It was named after French Prime Minister Leon Blum and Minister of State Maurice Viollette, both of whom were sympathetic to Muslim Algerians. Blum did not have a strong understanding of the complicated situation in French-Algeria, but he “surrounded himself with trustworthy people who had a thorough knowledge of Algerians matters,” which included the appointment of Maurice Viollette as his Minister of State.⁷⁶ Viollette was a socialist and had served as the Governor-General of Algeria (1925-27). His sympathies for the Muslim population had earned him the nickname “Viollette l’Arabi” (Viollette the Arab).⁷⁷ Together, they put forward the Blum-Viollette proposal, which would have made some assimilated Muslim Algerians, called *évolués*, full French citizens without requiring them to give up Islam. It would have applied to Muslim Algerians who worked in the civil service, social administration, or as teachers.⁷⁸ This would only have included 21,000 to 25,000 of French-Algeria’s 5 million Muslims, but this was such a large step forward for Muslim equality that Muslim leaders took

⁷⁶ France Tostain, “The Popular Front and the Blum-Viollette Plan, 1936-37,” in *French Colonial Empire and the Popular Front: Hope and Disillusion*, eds., Tony Chafer and Amanda Sackur. (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999), 219.

⁷⁷ France Tostain, “The Popular Front and the Blum-Viollette Plan, 1936-37,” 219.

⁷⁸ France Tostain, “The Popular Front and the Blum-Viollette Plan, 1936-37,” 222.

notice.⁷⁹ However, the bill did not pass. *Colons* and Algerian nationalists who opposed the further integration of Muslim Algerians into French society managed to kill it by 1938.

By the start of World War II in 1939, or the independence of Algeria in 1962 for that matter, all enacted reforms had fallen drastically short of full citizenship for Muslims as the most meaningful reforms never made it past the level of discussion. It was not until the start of the Fifth Republic in 1958 that de Gaulle spoke of giving all Muslim Algerians citizenship in one of the last attempts to keep French rule in Algeria. But the details of events beyond 1939 reach beyond the scope of this dissertation. At this point, it is sufficient to state that French-Algeria had become more integrated into France than any other colony of France did; possibly more so than any other colony of any European power for that matter; and that only complicated things for the protectorates on either side of it.

The Protectorate of Tunisia

Tunisia is modern Algeria's smaller and eastern neighbor. Like Algeria before the 1830 French invasion, this area had become mostly Arab and Muslim since the seventh century and was technically a vassal-state of the crumbling Ottoman Empire that actually enjoyed great autonomy. Being smaller both in terms of geography and population, it was ruled by a single bey, called the Bey of Tunis, who worked directly under the Porte. From 1705 on, all of the Beys of Tunis came from the Husainid dynasty.

⁷⁹ Tostain says the Blum-Viollette Bill would have impacted 21,000 Muslims while Ruedy says it would have impacted "about 25,000." France Tostain, "The Popular Front and the Blum-Viollette Plan, 1936-37," 222; Ruedy, *Modern Algeria*, 141.

Tunisia did not become a French protectorate until 1881, but it was pursued and pressured by the French from the 1830s on. When France began conquering Algeria, the Porte responded by tightening its grip on Tunisia's eastern neighbor, Tripolitania, by sending occupying troops in 1835.⁸⁰ The new Bey of Tunis, Ahmad Bey—not to be confused with his contemporary, the Bey of Constantine in Algeria who resisted French rule, also called Ahmad Bey—faced a difficult situation. He wanted to maintain the autonomous nature of his family's position, but felt the pressure of the French to the west and the Ottomans to the east. Ahmad proved a brilliant diplomat as he successfully played the Porte's interest in reasserting its control of the region against France's interest in less Ottoman control in the region, all while updating his military with state-of-the-art weaponry and ships of European design. As he sent his modernized armed forces to assist the Ottoman Empire in the Crimean War (1853-1856), Ahmad felt great pride in having essentially reversed the vassal relationship. When he died in 1855, he did so completely unaware that his modernized military, on a campaign financed by the sale of expensive royal jewels, had been virtually wiped out by disease before ever seeing battle.⁸¹ Ahmad's successors failed to prevent foreign influence the way he had. Muhammad II (1855-1859), who was down one army, had debts, and was a less effective leader than his predecessor, found himself manipulated by the French and British, both of which had interest in Tunisia by this point. Muhammad al-Sadiq (1859-1882) inherited an even worse situation. Externally, he had the French and British increasingly meddling in Tunisian affairs and a further weakened Ottoman Empire that could no longer fend them off. Internally, Tunisia's debts and expenditures had increased beyond what taxes could

⁸⁰ Perkins, *A History of Modern Tunisia*, 12.

⁸¹ Perkins, *A History of Modern Tunisia*, 16.

cover. This pushed Muhammad al-Sadiq to strengthen France's position even more by accepting a 35 million franc loan from French bankers that committed Tunisia to annual payments of "roughly half the state's average annual income" in 1863.⁸² Meanwhile, almost every attempt at meaningful reform was stifled, from the Constitution of 1861, to various increases and decreases in taxation. Sporadic armed rebellions ensued. Conflict between longtime Prime Minister Mustafa Khaznadar and the reform-minded Khair al-Din al-Tunsi, who briefly replaced him from 1873 to 1877, further exacerbated problems.

By this point, the path to making Tunisia a colony was rapidly clearing for France. Neither Tunisia nor the Ottoman Empire had the strength to resist a European power taking over. Meanwhile, the other European powers willingly gave France their blessing. Britain's interests in Tunisia had waned. Its attention was now focused on the recently opened Suez Canal and its access to India. France then found its ambitions in Tunisia supported at the 1878 Congress of Berlin while its only other competitor, Italy, were not. This came at the behest of the newly formed German Empire, which hoped that its support for French rule in Tunisia might assuage France's *revanchisme* towards the Second Reich for its annexation of Alsace-Lorraine as it formed itself after the Franco-Prussian War. As every historian of World War I could attest, Tunisia did not prove to be a sufficient healing balm, but France took the support. Italy's complaints were smoothed over with a similar promise of support for their rule in Tripolitania. Now France only had to wait for a scuffle that would justify its descent upon Tunisia, which came in early 1881 along the Algerian-Tunisian border. French troops moved in and Muhammad al-Sadiq was forced to sign the Bardo Treaty by May of that year. which left him in his position as Bey, but "placed Tunisia's external relations under the command of a French general"

⁸² Perkins, *A History of Modern Tunisia*, 28.

and “allowed France to station troops throughout the country as it deemed necessary to maintain order.”⁸³ The French crushed protest and rebellion against the new treaty. Paul Cambon, a senior French diplomat, arrived the following year to serve as France’s first resident general of the French Protectorate of Tunisia.

A number of similarities and differences existed between Algeria and Tunisia under the French. Though not fully-annexed like Algeria and permitted to retain the semblance of local authority, Tunisia was also soundly under the thumb of French government. The successor to Muhammad al-Sadiq, Ali Bey, “continued to reign, but he no longer ruled,” and by World War I, “protectorate officials had come to take beylical subservience for granted.”⁸⁴ Tunisia never came to have the same kind of *colon* population as Algeria, but those that were there enjoyed privileges that the *indigènes* did not, just like their *colon* counterparts in Algeria. Indeed, Muslim Tunisians were not even French nationals as were Muslim Algerians. Even as Muslims from Algeria and Tunisia were sometimes lumped together in metropolitan France, this would make a difference in how they were treated at times, and in how they navigated their interactions with the French.

The Protectorate of Morocco

While Morocco has a similar ethnic and religious composition to that of Algeria and Tunisia, its political history differed, as it remained the only part of North Africa that never succumbed to Ottoman rule. It is known as “The Western Kingdom” in Arabic because it sits at the western edge of the Arab world—to the west of Algeria at the end of the African continent. This places Morocco directly south of Spain, with the two barely

⁸³ Perkins, *A History of Modern Tunisia*, 12

⁸⁴ Perkins, *A History of Modern Tunisia*, 40.

being separated geographically by the Strait of Gibraltar. This close geographical proximity helped facilitate the Arab invasion of Spain and its nearly eight-centuries long Muslim presence that only ended with the completion of the *Reconquista* (reconquering of Spain from Muslim rule) by European Christians in 1492. The Alaouite Dynasty began ruling as sultans of this largely Muslim and Arab populated state in the early-seventeenth century and, despite the interruption of French colonization, continues to do so to this day, albeit now under the title of king.

Like Tunisia, Morocco also got entangled with France shortly after its 1830 conquest of Algiers. While noting that there were still many other factors in Moroccan life at this point, Susan Gilson Miller asserts that “the year 1830 marks the beginning of a transition to a new phase in which Europe is no longer an intermittent factor in Moroccan affairs, but an omnipresent reality looming over political events, the economy, and even social life.”⁸⁵ The Moroccan sultan at the time was Abd al-Rahman (r. 1822-1859). He was already busy trying to rebuild the prestige and trade of Morocco that his predecessor, Sultan Sulayman, had destroyed nearly singlehandedly. Cautious of upsetting either the Ottomans or the French, Abd al-Rahman nonetheless decided to try and take advantage of the French invasion in Algeria. He welcomed Algerian refugees and purposely allowed western Algeria to see him as “an alternative to the Turks.”⁸⁶ He offered refuge to Abd al-Qadir in the early 1840s, but the Sultan ultimately proved no match for the French. Their warships demolished Moroccan ports. In 1844, Bugeaud achieved a decisive victory over Moroccan troops led by Abd al-Qadir’s son and heir at the battle of Isly. By September of that year, Abd al-Rahman had little choice but to sign the Treaty of

⁸⁵ Miller, *A History of Modern Morocco*, 7.

⁸⁶ Miller, *A History of Modern Morocco*, 13.

Tangier. This ended hostilities between Morocco and France, but it also meant the loss of some Moroccan territory and the recognition of French rule in Algeria.

Fiercely independent Morocco was now on the same path to eventual European conquest as the rest of North Africa. The primary contenders at this point were France and Spain, though Britain remained interested mostly out of a desire to obstruct the expansion of French or Spanish power. Partly to that end, Britain secured increased trade access and the lowering of custom duties for British goods going to Morocco through two Anglo-Moroccan conventions in 1856.⁸⁷ Abd al-Rahman had hoped this would give a boost to Morocco's economy. Instead, it destroyed local production as cheap British products easily undersold Moroccan goods. From here, "other European states lined up to take advantage of Morocco's all-too-apparent vulnerability." When Anjera tribesmen began raiding the Spanish garrison at Ceuta in 1859, Spain seized upon the moment to go on the offensive, leading to the short Tetuan War (1859-60). The new Sultan, Muhammad IV (r. 1859-1873) suffered a tragic defeat. Spanish holdings at Ceuta and Melilla were expanded and missionaries were permitted to build a church at Tetuan.⁸⁸ Spain also required an indemnity of twenty million *duros*, a sum "far greater than the balance of the Moroccan treasury."⁸⁹ British loans partially facilitated payment of the indemnity while Spanish agents remained in Moroccan ports to ensure tariffs were collected to pay the rest. Like his troubled counterpart pushing the *Tanzimat* reforms in Istanbul, Mohammad IV and his successors also hoped reform could save Morocco. Efforts were mostly continuous into the twentieth century and included the economy, military, and administration.

⁸⁷ Miller, *A History of Modern Morocco*, 23.

⁸⁸ C. R. Pennell, *Morocco since 1830: A History* (New York: New York University Press, 2000), 68.

⁸⁹ Miller, *A History of Modern Morocco*, 25.

What really kept Morocco independent, however, was not Moroccan reform, but the relationships between the interested European powers. For the next few decades after the Tetuan War, none of them wanted to spoil their chance to profit from Morocco by forcing things militarily and causing another European power to react. So they all sought indirect influence instead. The 1880 Conference of Madrid is a perfect example of this. Ostensibly meant to limit European infringement in Morocco, the conference increased it, ensuring that Europeans could own Moroccan land.⁹⁰ Even so, the stalemate did not last more than a few decades. Morocco's continued independence relied greatly on Britain's continued interest in preventing other Europeans from colonizing it, which had turned Britain into an "informal protector of the makhzan" [Moroccan government].⁹¹ This dynamic broke down in 1904 with the signing of the Anglo-French accord. The Anglo-French rapprochement "gave France the lead in negotiating a major bailout of the failing makhzan"—much as it had with the Bey of Tunis years before—that ensured "the removal of all obstacles to a French takeover was complete."⁹² In connection with the mounting tensions building to World War I, Germany was concerned about this development. This spurred the 1906 Algeiras Conference held in Algeiras, Spain, at which it was acknowledged that France had won out as the dominant power in Morocco. Moroccans, who had been able see their independence slipping away for quite a while by this point, had taken to rebelling. Without France needing to worry about reprisals from other European powers, a 1911 uprising served as the pretext for French occupation. Claiming to want to protect European property and the Sultan, French troops occupied Morocco. Sultan Abd al-Hafiz (r. 1908-1912) was forced to agree to the treaty of Fez the

⁹⁰ Pennell, *Morocco since 1830*, 86.

⁹¹ Miller, *A History of Modern Morocco*, 62.

⁹² Miller, *A History of Modern Morocco*, 62-63.

following year. Spain acquired Ifni in the south and established a small protectorate on the northern coast with Tetuan as its capital; Tangier became an international city; while France controlled the rest of Morocco. Germany agreed to the arrangement in exchange for a piece of French Equatorial Africa—*Neukamerun*.

Moroccans were more like Tunisians than Algerians, but they had their own unique path as well. Barely acquired by the French before World War I, Hubert Lyautey, who served as Resident-General of Morocco from 1912 to 1925, had to focus on suppressing rebellions more than French leaders in Tunisia or Algeria. Indeed, his leadership came to an end because of a military failure in April 1925, when troops he sent to fight against insurgent Moroccan Berbers in the Rif War (1920-1926) were overrun.⁹³ Like Tunisians, however, Moroccans in the metropole would at times seem indistinguishable from their Muslim Algerian counterparts even though distinctions existed. All of them were colonial subjects, but only Algerians were also French Nationals. Thus, the experience of Moroccans under the French tricolor more closely resembled that of Tunisians than of Algerians. Their struggle for independence would even culminate in a near simultaneous liberation in 1956. Their smaller role in French society and history is why both Moroccans and Tunisians were, and still sometimes to this day, assumed to be Algerian in metropolitan France.

The French Third Republic

From monarchs, to emperors, to republics, French government oscillated between nineteenth-century conservative and liberal ideas from 1789 to 1870. There were various constitutional and authoritarian governments in the first decade (1789-1799), which were

⁹³ Miller, *A History of Modern Morocco*, 108.

then followed by Napoleon Bonaparte's Consulate (1799-1804) and full-fledged French Empire (1804-1814). Even so, a decade of rule under an emperor had not snuffed out the evolutionary ideals of equality before the law and constitutional government. The restored Bourbon Dynasty had to rule as a constitutional monarchy rather than as an absolutist monarchy. Louis XVIII (r. 1814/15-1824) understood this well enough, which permitted him to be the last monarchical ruler of France whose reign did not end with abdication. His brother and successor, Charles X (r. 1824-1830) failed to take this lesson to heart. His restrictive July Ordinances of 1830 attempted to take France in a more conservative direction that precipitated the July Revolution of 1830. Louis-Philippe of the house of Orleans (r. 1830-1848) replaced him. Initially loved by the common people for his more liberal views, as reflected in his nickname "Citizen King," his approval diminished as the working class came under distress. After an economic crisis in 1847, he was forced to abdicate as the Revolution of 1848 ushered in the Second Republic (1848-1852) that briefly extended the vote to all Frenchmen and elevated the nephew of Napoleon Bonaparte from exile to President. Ironically, President Louis-Napoleon is responsible for the short existence of the republic. As the constitution did not permit a president to run for a second term, he arranged a coup d'état that made him emperor. Taking the title of Napoleon III, he was the lone ruler of the Second Empire (1852-1870). He was repressive in the 1850s, but permitted increased liberalization in the 1860s, extending the vote to more Frenchmen. He also grew the colonial empire, oversaw the expansion of railroads, and famously remade Paris in the Haussmann architectural style for which it is still known today. It was only when France saw defeat at the hands of

Prussia and its allies in the Franco-Prussian war that Napoleon III's empire ended and left France open to yet another regime change and established its Third Republic.

A republican government was not the obvious choice for France in 1870. Although republicanism had existed in France since the Revolution in 1789, it had also remained a minority view. Most of France remained monarchist. The problem for this majority was that they could not agree on which dynasty ought to rule. Those known as Legitimists favored restoring the House of Bourbon that had ruled before the French Revolution and during the Bourbon Restoration (1814/15-1830). Those known as Orleanists wanted the House of Orleans to rule. Yet still others, called Bonapartists, remained loyal to the House of Bonaparte. Given the discord among the majority, republican government proved to be a stopgap measure that none of the various monarchists thought would last long anyway.

Indeed, beyond the monarchical sentiment in France, no one would have predicted the Third Republic's seventy-year longevity given the challenges of Prussian invaders and internal rebellion. Proclaimed on September 4, 1870, the Third Republic still had to contend with advancing Prussian troops who began laying siege to Paris itself later that same month. After a few more months of resistance, peace was made in May 1871 on Prussian terms, which required France to pay an indemnity of five billion francs and give up the territory of Alsace-Lorraine to Germany.⁹⁴ Meanwhile, the election of monarchists to the Republic's National Assembly and government's choice of using Versailles as its capital rather than Paris led to rebellion in major French cities that established self-governing communes. Paris established its commune on March 18 and

⁹⁴ Reiner Marcowitz, "Attraction and Repulsion," in *A History of Franco-German Relations in Europe: from "Hereditary Enemies" to Partners*, eds., Carine Germond and Henning Türk. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 20.

found itself in a full on war as the Third Republic sent troops to take the capital by force from Paris' National Guard.⁹⁵ After a bloody nine weeks that cost 20,000 lives, the Paris Commune fell.

Adolphe Thiers ordered the savage military occupation of Paris. Originally an Orleanist politician and statesman, Thiers had nonetheless emerged as the head of the new republic. During the Second Republic, he had first endorsed republicanism, famously calling for it on practical grounds as 'the government which divides us the least.'⁹⁶ Twenty years later, France was proving Thiers right. At the peak of his career, well known and trusted throughout France, the republic's National Assembly chose him as the provisional president, a position that he held from 1871 until 1873. By his last year, France had paid its indemnities to the newly created German Empire under Prussian leadership and the monarchist majority in the Assembly finally decided they could challenge Thiers and reestablish a French king.

Instead, the monarchists divisions let the republic creep along until the people of France came to prefer it. The Legitimists wanted the comte de Chambord placed on the throne, but the more liberal Orleanists would not accept a king who refused the tricolor flag.⁹⁷ Thus, they installed the conservative Marshal MacMahon to buy them yet more time, but that time proved instead to legitimize republican governance. The Wallon amendment of 1875 ensured the survival of the republic with "universal manhood suffrage."⁹⁸ With the Third Republic soundly established then, France of the *Belle*

⁹⁵ Donny Gluckstein, *Paris Commune: A Revolution in Democracy* (Chicago: Haymarket Books, 2011), 223.

⁹⁶ Munro Price, *The Perilous Crown: France between Revolutions, 1814-1848* (London: Macmillan, 2010), 4.

⁹⁷ James R. Lehning, *To Be a Citizen* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001), 187.

⁹⁸ Lehning, *To Be a Citizen*, 10.

Epoque (Beautiful Period) began to transform into the *laïque*, republican and egalitarian-aspiring country that it is known as today. Ironically, this was also when France vastly expanding its colonial empire, as it acquired French-Indochina, Madagascar, Tunisia, Morocco, and further expanded French West Africa, as well as French Polynesia. While celebrating universal human rights and equality before the law, French society was simultaneously navigating what it meant to have colonial subjects and what rights they deserved. Essentially, France was trying to make sense of how to incorporate colonialism and the differences of ethnicity and religion it brought while still aspiring to live up to its rhetoric of a *laïque* and equal society. These tensions manifested themselves in the metropole as well.

The Dreyfus Affair became a deeply divided issue in French society in the 1890s. In 1894, a cleaning lady at the German Embassy in Paris found a note that clearly indicated a French officer had committed treason by divulging information about the War Ministry.⁹⁹ Army captain Alfred Dreyfus was accused of being the spy because his handwriting had some similarity to that on the note. There was nothing to really convict Dreyfus. The only difference between him and his colleagues was that he was Jewish. France was split in two. Conservatives, often Catholic and filled with anti-Semitism, were certain that Dreyfus was guilty. On the other hand, the more liberal, proupublican and anticlerical French stood by him. It took until 1906 for the case to be completely resolved, when it was proven that Dreyfus was indeed innocent. Crucially though, the Dreyfus Affair shows the tension in Third Republican France between the ideal of equality before the law, and France sorting out what it means to be truly accepted as French; to have a French identity.

⁹⁹ Leslie Derfler, *The Dreyfus Affair* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2002), 117.

France was also preparing for possible war shortly after the start of the new century. By 1907, France had entered into an agreement known as the Triple Entente with Russia and Britain to shore up its chances in the event of a war against the more populated German Empire and its allies, Austria-Hungary and Italy. After nearly a century of relative peace, Europe had become enamored with a romanticized version of militarism that further failed to comprehend the impact of industrialization on warfare. Although not wanting a war it could not win, France was also eager to regain Alsace-Lorraine from Germany. The assassination of the heir to the Austrian-Hungarian throne, Franz Ferdinand, carried out by Serbian nationalists in Sarajevo on June 28, 1914, ignited these and other larger issues that ushered in World War I. Over the course of the war, hundreds of thousands of colonial subjects from around the world came to France to fight under the tricolor.¹⁰⁰

World War I saw the height of Georges Clemenceau's career. As a radical republican, he was highly invested in the war and wanted to see France regain Alsace-Lorraine from Germany.¹⁰¹ He served as Prime Minister of France twice, once before the war, from 1906 to 1909, and at the end of the war, from 1917 to 1920. He was also a committed supporter of Dreyfus, and anticolonial. Yet, anticolonial did not mean accepting of all races as equal, or equally French. Clemenceau backed efforts to "repatriate" all colonial French war veterans to their homes in the colonies, as will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter III. To the horror of French leaders, however, they found that even if they could return the colonial subjects, the links between the colonies

¹⁰⁰ For more on colonial subjects in the war, see Fogarty, *Race and War in France*.

¹⁰¹ Lehning, *To Be a Citizen*, 138.

and the metropole forged during the war proved too strong to break as colonial subjects came back to the metropole.

In the 1920s, France found the punitive measures it took against Germany in the Versailles treaty that ended World War I to be difficult to enact. The *Bloc National* coalition of moderates and conservatives that led the government from 1919 to 1924 sent troops to occupy the industrial and economic centers of Germany's Rhineland, but payments still lagged. This failure gave the socialists the chance to take the lead in the form of the *Cartel des gauches* (cartel of the lefts), but they fared no better. The saving grace at the end of the 1920s came from Raymond Poincaré. He was a member of the Democratic Republican Alliance, which by this point had become a probusiness and republican government party. He had built a strong reputation in government through the years, most notably serving as President of the Republic from 1913 to 1920. He became Prime Minister in 1926. His financial reforms, which recognized that France would have to absorb some of the costs of the war, put France on a much better financial footing at the end of the decade. Unfortunately, that footing was lost in the 1930s. The Great Depression that first started in the United States in 1929 spread around the world and caught up with the French economy early in 1931.

While in Germany and Italy, financial crisis permitted the rise of a new extreme right-wing ideology called fascism, it facilitated the emergence of the left-wing alliance called the *Front Populaire* (Popular Front) by 1934. A union of previously bitterly divided communists and socialists, it also included the North African metropolitan political group, *Étoile nord-africaine* (North African Star, or ENA). Although more of an Algerian nationalist party, it owed much of its success to French communists.

The ENA's role in a metropolitan French political alliance serves as yet another example of the complications of the North African identity in a French context during the interwar period. Its members were colonial subjects and French nationals, many of whom were also French military veterans, living and working in metropolitan France with a small degree of influence in the government. Yet at the same time, they constituted a movement calling for greater autonomy from France, if not complete separation. Even their platform sent mixed messages, calling for changes that would increase autonomy while also asking for more social programs to be provided by France. The ENA's role in the Popular Front came to end, however, when its nationalist endeavors came to full force when it opposed the Blum-Viollette Bill and contributed to its ultimate failure to pass by 1938.

The identity and place of Muslim Algerians in French society remained an unsettled question as World War II broke out and Nazi Germany overtook France. As the French always seemed willing to offer too little too late in terms of reforms, Algeria ultimately became independent through the Algerian war (1954-1962). Yet, as Mokkedem's twentieth and twenty-first century writings show, the narrative of two separate identities today oversimplifies their separation. North Africans and *pieds-noirs* in France still struggle to some degree to find a place for themselves. While this is the case today, it was exponentially more of an issue during the French Third Republic.

Marseille

Marseille was an international hub of the Ancient World, where the descendants of Greek colonists mingled with Roman Rulers and local Celts, all while trading with peoples throughout the Mediterranean. The city was born of colonialism and has been

fueled by its interactions with foreigners ever since. Located on what is now France's southern and Mediterranean coast, Marseille was founded by Ionian Greek colonists who called it *Massilia* in 600 BC. Barely a trace remains of the original Greek settlement today, but Marseille had "remained a centre of Greek culture and learning until the 6th century AD."¹⁰² During this 1,200-year period, Marseille held the attention of Aristotle, was an ally of the Roman Republic during the Punic Wars, was part of the Roman Empire's first Gallic province, influenced the Celtic Hallstatt and La Tène cultures, and dominated trade with the Iberian Peninsula.¹⁰³

In many ways, Marseille has maintained its reputation as a place of independence and transnational populations through the millennia. It retained its autonomy from Rome until 49 BC, when Julius Caesar took his revenge on the port city for siding with Pompey, not him, in the Rome's Great Civil War (49-45 BCE). Further cultural exchange eventually Gallicized the city as Frankish influence mixed with its Greco-Roman ways. Even so, it continued to guard its independence after the fall of Rome. Marseille did not completely succumb to the French Crown until the rule of Louis XIV.¹⁰⁴

But even as an integral part of France, the independent and transnational nature of the city's population continued to thrive. It was revolutionaries from Marseille who had travelled to Paris that gave France the national anthem now in use today, *La Marseillaise*. They stood apart so much from other revolutionaries that as they sang this newly written marching song it became uniquely associated with them. Only then was it named after the

¹⁰² Kathleen Donahue Sherwood, "Massilia," in *Encyclopedia of Ancient Greece*, ed. Nigel Guy Wilson. (New York: Routledge, 2006), 452.

¹⁰³ Aristotle described of Marseille's government in his work, *The Constitution of Massilia*. Unfortunately, it has been lost. Scholars of the ancient world are still aware, however, that the Greek government was an oligarchy, "with its council of 600 (*timouchi*), an additional minor council of 15 members, and three top magistrates." Sherwood, "Massilia," 452.

¹⁰⁴ Emile Temime, *Histoire de Marseille, de la Révolution à nos jours* (Paris: Perrin, 1999), 8.

southern port city. Meanwhile, many in Marseille resented the centralizing efforts coming from Paris. In 1793, the city became the location of one of the most forceful and extreme federalist revolts against France's National Convention.¹⁰⁵ After the fall of Napoleon III, Marseille followed in the steps of Paris and established an independent commune that effectively lasted until April 1871.¹⁰⁶ Had it the means to resist at the end, the commune of Marseille would likely have ended in great violence, as General Espivent was there "to ensure the enforcement of Thiers' decrees."¹⁰⁷ Meanwhile, foreigners continued to arrive in Marseille, keeping it a city of cultural and ethnic fluctuation. "The end of the fifteenth century to the start of the nineteenth shows the constant renewal of the population, proletariats from Gap [in the Hautes-Alpes] or Piedmont, Genoese sailors and fishermen, assistants and merchants coming from Northern Europe or the Eastern Mediterranean."¹⁰⁸

From the most part, the nineteenth century was the Italian century for Marseille and, to some degree, France. Italian immigration to Marseille was nothing new. Indeed, in terms of immigrant groups, "Marseille has always been an Italian city," as might be expected of a major port city whose country shares its national border with Italy.¹⁰⁹ This was actually a reflection of increased immigration to France as a whole because of the nation's need for more workers in its increasingly industrialized economy. In fact, industrialization had turned France into Europe's largest immigrant nation by the 1870s, enticing workers especially from Spain, Germany, Switzerland, Italy, and Belgium.¹¹⁰

From 1850 to 1901, the number for foreigners residing in France rose from 379,289 (1.1

¹⁰⁵ William Scott, *Terror and Repression in Revolutionary Marseilles* (New York: Barnes & Noble Books, 1973), 143.

¹⁰⁶ Louis M. Greenberg, *Sisters of Liberty: Marseille, Lyon, Paris and the Reaction to a Centralized State, 1868-1871* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971), 212.

¹⁰⁷ Greenberg, *Sisters of Liberty*, 212.

¹⁰⁸ Temime and Échinard, *La préhistoire de la migration (1482-1830)*, xiv.

¹⁰⁹ Temime and Lopez, *L'expansion Marseillaise et « l'invasion italienne » (1830-1918)*, 70.

¹¹⁰ Simon, *L'immigration Algérienne en France*, 10, 22.

percent of the population) to 1,037,778 (2.6 percent of the population).¹¹¹ The two largest in sheer numbers and best established among immigrant communities were Belgians and Italians, the latter being slightly bigger. Together, they represented over 600,000 of the just over a million foreigners residing in France in 1901, numbering at 323,000 Belgians and 330,000 Italians.¹¹² From 1851 to 1901, censuses show that between 24 percent and 27 percent of Italians in France lived in Marseille.¹¹³ More impressive is that in 1901, the just over 90,000 Italians in Marseille “represented more than 91 percent of the foreign population established in the city, a proportion that had never been reached and which will never be passed up to our day.”¹¹⁴ Marseille continued to have connections with and receive immigrations from other parts of the world, but Italy had become the dominant immigrant group in the city’s work force by 1900.

As such a dominant part of the work force, Italian workers in Marseille were assimilating and starting to expect more of their employers. They began to form *organisations syndicales* (trade unions) in the late 1890s. Italian workers were expressing the same frustration as the French working class. Having formed slowly as industrialization steadily crept through France over the course of the preceding century, the working-class across many different industries had become more collectively self-aware and ready to fight for better pay and working conditions. Indeed, Michelle Perrot characterized the late nineteenth and twentieth century as a time when “like an irresistible

¹¹¹ Gary S. Cross, *Immigrant Workers in Industrial France* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1983) 21.

¹¹² Yves Lequin, “L’invasion pacifique” in *Histoire des étrangers et de l’immigration en France*, ed. Yves Lequin. (Paris: Larousse, 1992), 327.

¹¹³ Temime and Lopez, *L’expansion Marseillaise et « l’invasion italienne » (1830-1918)*, 71.

¹¹⁴ Temime and Lopez, *L’expansion Marseillaise et « l’invasion italienne » (1830-1918)*, 72.

tide, strikes swept through the land and all occupations.”¹¹⁵ Caught up in the same working-class fervor gripping French citizens, Italian immigrants joined them. Italian and French workers first went on strike together in Marseille in May 1899, calling for an increase in wages for masons/bricklayers.¹¹⁶ Italians employed in Marseille’s “*raffineries et huileries*” (refineries and oil mills) went on strike in 1906.¹¹⁷ Unfortunately for them, French business owners responded by simply turning to a new group—Muslim Algerians.

A very few thousand Muslim Algerians had succeeded in Gallicizing enough to thrive under French rule, but many more of them had been dispossessed of their land and were far worse off than their predecessors, making the most difficult and menial jobs available in metropolitan France actually enticing. Kabyles became the first Muslim Algerians to gain access to employment there. This was partly because the French saw the Kabyle as more “European,” and perhaps partly due to their own campaigning. As early as 1889, brochures had been made touting the Kabyles as “*montagnards laborieux et intelligents*” (hard-working and intelligent mountain-dwellers) that could benefit French industry.¹¹⁸ By 1899, the president of the Kabyle Financial Delegation, Aït Mehdi, kaid in the Algerian commune of Beni Menguellet began lobbying for jobs for Kabyles in the metropole.¹¹⁹ With nearly the same wording, he called Kabyles, “*montagnards travailleurs et intelligents*” from which the French economy could benefit.¹²⁰

¹¹⁵ Michelle Perrot cited in Gérard Noiriel, *Workers in French Society in the 19th and 20th Centuries* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1990), 88.

¹¹⁶ Temime and Lopez, *L’expansion Marseillaise et « l’invasion italienne » (1830-1918)*, 149.

¹¹⁷ Simon, *L’immigration Algérienne en France*, 39.

¹¹⁸ Temime and Lopez, *L’expansion Marseillaise et « l’invasion italienne » (1830-1918)*, 154.

¹¹⁹ Simon, *L’immigration Algérienne en France*, 39.

¹²⁰ Simon, *L’immigration Algérienne en France*, 39.

From the end of the nineteenth century to the start of World War I, the Muslim Algerian presence in Marseille and metropolitan France steadily increased. A very small number of Muslim Algerians received permission to enter and work in the metropole as soon as the 1890s.¹²¹ It was the 1906 strike, however, that provided the impetus for Marseille's leadership to allow them to come and stay in a more permanent capacity to work. These workers, nearly all Kabyles, began arriving in 1907.¹²² During the new few years leading up to World War I, the Kabyle in Marseille gained a reputation as "*des brise-grèves*" (strikebreakers).¹²³ By 1912, the French government's official estimates put the number of Muslim Algerians employed in metropolitan France as high as 4,000 to 5,000, generally living and working in coastal and/or industrial cities, with a full 2,000 of them being Kabyles who worked on the docks in or around the same port city through which all of these Algerians arrived—Marseille.¹²⁴

The welcoming of Muslim colonial workers by the city's business and political leaders in turn-of-the-century Marseille likely reflects the enthusiasm found in the city for French colonialism. This enthusiasm is fairly easy to explain, given that colonialism meant economic gains for Marseille as goods came in and French soldiers, administrators and others involved with the colonial empire went out through its port. As will be seen in Chapter II, the city even hosted a colonial exposition in 1906. In fact, by this point, Marseille had become the "Capital of the Colonies."¹²⁵

¹²¹ Simon, *L'immigration Algérienne en France*, 10.

¹²² Temime and Lopez, *L'expansion Marseillaise et « l'invasion italienne » (1830-1918)*, 154.

¹²³ Temime and Lopez, *L'expansion Marseillaise et « l'invasion italienne » (1830-1918)*, 155.

¹²⁴ Simon, *L'immigration Algérienne en France*, 40; Stora, *Ils venaient d'Algérie*, 13; Gomar, *L'émigration algérienne en France*, 151.

¹²⁵ Stefan Goodwin, *Africa in Europe: Interdependencies, Relocations and Globalization* (Plymouth, UK: Lexington Books, 2009), 176.

As might be expected though, other nationalities in Marseille's working class, especially the dominant French and Italians, began to harbor resentment towards their Kabyle replacements. Of course, Italians or other immigrant communities were experiencing their own hardships and discrimination, but as the newest group, the Kabyles took the blame for other groups' unemployment. Brawls erupted between the Kabyles and Italians at times, while Kabyles also found themselves being followed on their way to work by groups of hostile young men.¹²⁶ However despite these social dynamics, Kabyle workers continued to show up in Marseille to replace workers of other nationalities, "notably in the sugar refineries where Italian workers [were] numerous."¹²⁷

During World War I, Marseille served as the point of entry for the hundreds of thousands of Muslim North Africans who came to the metropole as conscripts or volunteers to help France win the war. This is very significant given how many the Great War brought to the metropole. "About 300,000 Algerians crossed to France during 1914-1918."¹²⁸ Ruedy breaks that number down as over 206,000 who served as soldiers while another 119,000 worked in factories, in mines, and on farms.¹²⁹ Both soldiers and workers were largely conscripts, but the greater point is that "more than a third of the male population [of Algeria] between the ages of twenty and forty was in France during the war."¹³⁰ Meanwhile, 110,000 Tunisians were sent to the metropole during World War I, 80,000 of whom fought under the tricolor while the other 30,000 worked, mined, and farmed, just like the Muslim Algerians workers.¹³¹ In recently taken and rebellious

¹²⁶ Temime and Lopez, *L'expansion Marseillaise et « l'invasion italienne » (1830-1918)*, 155.

¹²⁷ Temime and Lopez, *L'expansion Marseillaise et « l'invasion italienne » (1830-1918)*, 154.

¹²⁸ MacMaster, *Colonial Racism*, 58.

¹²⁹ Ruedy, *Modern Algeria*, 111.

¹³⁰ Ruedy, *Modern Algeria*, 111.

¹³¹ Perkins, *A History of Modern Tunisia*, 74-75.

Morocco, “the situation was ironic. While tens of thousands of Moroccan soldiers were fighting and dying alongside Frenchmen in the trenches of the Western Front, their brothers and cousins were battling other Frenchmen in the valleys of the Middle Atlas, in the Rif Mountains, and in the High Atlas.”¹³² Despite the fight continued by some of his subjects, Sultan Yusuf supported France and sent five infantry battalions to Europe, making for a total of 45,000 Moroccans soldiers in addition to 38,000 Moroccan workers.¹³³ All of these North African soldiers and workers first went to the Colonial Depot in Marseille to be processed before going to their assignment, be that to work in sugar factory, farm, mine, or heading to the front lines.

During the interwar period, transnational Marseille continued to be a city of colonial peoples as well, with an especially large Muslim North African population. Immediately following World War I, nearly all North Africans in the metropole were sent back to the colonies, but this did not last. It soon became all too clear that they were still needed by the French. North Africans had become too important of a fixture in the metropolitan economy, especially after the heavy loss of manpower brought by the war. Furthermore, so many North Africans wanted to be in the metropole where they could earn higher wages that were available in the colonies that the French state could not keep them from coming. As these Muslim North Africans who were often French military veterans came (or rather, returned) to the metropole, they again passed through Marseille. The port city again celebrated colonialism with a second Colonial Exposition in 1922. Within a few years after that, Marseille also had one of the few offices in all of France established for surveillance of Muslim North Africans.

¹³² Miller, *A History of Modern Morocco*, 102-103.

¹³³ Miller, *A History of Modern Morocco*, 102-103.

This history shows why Marseille is an especially crucial city to study in order to better understand the Muslim North African experience in and migration to metropolitan France before World War II. Paris alone rivaled the size of its metropolitan Muslim North African community, but in addition to that, nearly all Muslim North Africans in metropolitan France had to pass through Marseille's port. Indeed, the leaders of Algerian nationalism and independence movements that will be discussed in Chapter V were likely processed at Marseille's colonial depot. Further, Marseille was the transnational city par excellence for the French between the world wars, as the full implications of having a colonial empire began to become apparent in metropolitan France. It is for these reasons that Marseille serves as the case study of French colonial practices being employed to control Muslim North Africans in the metropole itself. For both French officials, at every level from the national government to the municipal police, and for present-day historians, no other city can offer a localized and a nationwide perspective on how Muslim North Africans were treated during the early-twentieth century in such an effective way.

Structure of the Dissertation

Muslim Marseille is a transnational history of colonial Muslim North Africans and their communities in pre-World War II twentieth-century France (1900-1939) that uses Marseille as its case study. This southern port city is effective in this role for two reasons: first, it had one of the largest such communities in France, which allowed Marseille to produce a significant quantity and quality of sources to examine; and second, regardless of where a Muslim North African ultimately ended up within France, he (and on a very small scale at this point in history, she) most likely first arrived in Marseille and

moved on from there. For these reasons, Marseille is both an example of Muslim North African life in a specific geographic region and the ideal place to explore the impact that this specific colonial group had on metropolitan France. Ultimately, *Muslim Marseille* adds to several fields of history, but its most important contributions are in French and European immigration and colonialism/imperialism.

This study is expanding a scant body of knowledge on the history's earliest decades of the modern-day's Muslim North African community coming to and living in France. Despite the fact that this is the era in which a mere 5,000-Algerian workers, mostly based in the areas surrounding Marseille and Paris, expanded to hundreds of thousands found throughout the country, relatively little has been written on the topic. This is not due to a lack of interest in immigration or North Africans, both of which have been the topic of numerous articles and books in the past 20 or 30 years. When writing about Muslim-North Africans, however, scholars have tended to focus more on the Algerian War (1954-62) and the following decades. Given that North Africans have become the largest minority group in twenty-first-century France; and that immigration—especially of Muslims—into twenty-first-century Europe is currently a major point of political dialogue throughout the continent; expanding our understanding of the genesis of this migration seems well over due.

Yet, this dissertation does more than fill a specific gap in French immigration history or informing current-European affairs. Equally important is its inquiry on the reach, impact, and consequences of imperialism and colonialism in the twentieth century. While much has already been written about imperialism and colonialism, the colonies and metropole have generally continued to be treated as separate entities. *Muslim*

Marseille challenges the separation of the two by arguing that, as Muslim colonial workers were brought to France, the French reappropriated imperial practices from the colonies into the metropole. I further argue that while this was done to keep the line between colonial subjects and republican citizens clear, an unintended side effect was the blurring of the line between colony and metropole.

This is demonstrated through four examples, which make up Chapters II through V. Starting with the very beginnings of Muslim-North African immigration to the metropole, Chapter II relies on previously unexamined blueprints for a Muslim village meant to be built in Marseille during World War I. As the war raged on, the French government welcomed Muslim colonial subjects by conscripting Muslim-North Africans to work in its factories and fight on the frontlines in France. This village reflects an acknowledgement by France of the long-term nature of their conscription. It included housing for families, single workers, restaurants, and even a mosque that, had it been built in a timely manner, could have predated the Grand Mosque of Paris. As the chapter demonstrates, the rationale for building this village echoed the language used in managing colonial subjects in the colonies. It further would have removed Muslim-North Africans from the working class neighborhoods of Marseille, thus decreasing their interaction with white, Christian Europeans, both native French and other Europeans who had emigrated from other countries. This project amounts to creating a Muslim colonial enclave within Marseille that would allow the state to replicate its colonial practices in North Africa. The chapter also assesses other architectural undertakings that underscore colonialism and how it manifested itself in early-twentieth-century Marseille, from the

1906 and 1922 colonial expositions, to the 1920s' staircase at Marseille's train station, which still remains there today.

The third chapter examines the French government's forced repatriation of the Muslim North Africans that it had welcomed and even coerced into coming to France during the war. The chapter draws from the records of hundreds of Muslim North Africans working all over France, but who were returned to their colonial homelands in 1920 through Marseille. While providing an overview of the circumstances of these repatriations, the chapter also shows the extent to which France had in effect colonized itself with Muslim North Africans, now found in nearly every corner of the country. It also demonstrates their continued colonial status in the metropole, despite these North Africans often being veterans of the French military or residence in the metropole for several years.

The fourth chapter follows France's shift from repatriation to observation through methods developed—once again—in the colonies. The use of these methods in the metropole began in the capital, where the Parisians city council modeled their attempts to monitor and control Muslim North Africans on Pierre Godin's experience as a bureaucrat in an Algerian *territoire mixte*. Godin's colonial vision for monitoring Muslim colonial subjects in the metropole quickly spread to other major French cities, including Marseille. The bureau born from Godin's colonial thinking, the *Service des affaires indigènes nord-africaines*, is yet another example of metropolitan France implementing imperial practices from the colonies in its quest to maintain the colonial status of Muslim North African population.

The fifth chapter differs from the other chapters by offering a glimpse into the Muslim North African perspective on French colonization throughout this time period. This is done through an examination of Muslim North African newspapers printed in both French and Arabic. These newspapers offer a close look at some of the perspectives within the Muslim North African community on what its relationship should or should not be with France. It will be shown that this question largely revolved around whether or not French society would extend full civil rights and equality before the law to Muslim Algerians. Additionally, these newspapers, regularly sold and read on both sides of the Mediterranean, show how the physical location of Muslims in the metropole made little difference to the concerns they had. Thus, as a coherent transnational group despite being spread across North African and France, it is seen again how the physical separation of metropole and colony slowly eroded for the French Empire between the start of the twentieth century and the outbreak of World War II.

CHAPTER II

COLONIAL SPACES IN THE METROPOLITAN
CITY OF MARSEILLE

If there was any question that Marseille was the French colonial empire's most important metropolitan city, the year of 1906 settled it. Marseille was "intimately connected with the French empire ... as a double gateway" to and from the metropole.¹ Indeed, this could describe the city throughout the existence of the colonial empire during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. It was that year though that both Marseille and Paris hosted colonial expositions, and the southern port city's extravagance made the capital's entire undertaking appear "modest by comparison."² Marseille had transformed an entire city block into the French colonies. French architects built structures that mimicked and exaggerated the architectural styles of North Africans, West Africans, Cambodians, and others. The exposition brought the colonies of the world into a small space within the metropolitan city, where visitors could easily pass from one colony to another, much like visitors to Las Vegas or amusement parks today pass from one world to another in different themed casinos or areas. The 1906 exposition made the city's zeal for French colonialism evident, and it would be hard to question the assertion that

¹ Yaël Simpson Fletcher, "Capital of the Colonies," in *Imperial Cities: Landscape, Display and Identity* ed., Felix Driver, David Gilbert (New York: Manchester University Press, 1999), 137.

² Stefan Goodwin, *Africa in Europe: Interdependencies, Relocations and Globalization* (Plymouth, UK: Lexington Books, 2009), 176.

Marseille had “in a sense [become] ‘the capital of the French Empire.’”³ One time not being enough, Marseille repeated the experience in 1922 with another exposition that was just as elaborate if not more so than the first, which occupied the same space.

The city also erected monuments to colonialism at its iconic train station in the 1920s. Descending the long staircase upon arrival in Marseille, statues on either side lauding French colonization are still there today. Built in an era when most metropolitan French passing through Marseille would arrive or depart via the train, these statues would have been seen by almost any French visitors or recently arrived migrants heading deeper into France, including colonial subjects. The choice to dedicate this space as an homage to colonialism speaks volumes to the city’s perspective and priorities in the interwar period.

In addition to expositions and statues dedicated to colonialism, Paris alone rivaled Marseille and the surrounding area’s Muslim colonial population in the earliest years of the twentieth century and the interwar period. First, the French government’s 1912 *enquête*—essentially a census of Muslim Algerians living in France at that time—found a total of 4,000 to 5,000 *indigènes algériens* living throughout the country, with 2,000 of them residing in the Bouches-du-Rhône department alone.⁴ Considering that Marseille was and still is both the capital and the largest city of the Bouches-du-Rhône department, it is probable that many of them they would have stayed in or near Marseille.

Furthermore, the *enquête* also mentioned that 400 Muslim Algerians worked in “*huileries*” (oil factories), while another 300 of them worked in “*raffineries*”

³ Goodwin, *Africa in Europe*, 176.

⁴ The *enquête* was reported as Algerians because they were the only major group of North Africans in France at this point. Tunisians and Moroccans began arriving in larger numbers with the outbreak of World War I. *Les Kabyles en France. RAPPORT de la Commission chargée d’étudier les conditions du travail des indigènes algériens dans la métropole* (Beaugency, Imprimerie René Barrillier, 1914), 9, 28.

(refineries).⁵ This means that at least 700 or more of the Bouches-du-Rhône's 2,000 Algerians stayed close to or in Marseille at this point. Within the next few years, World War I caused the North African population to increase dramatically as hundreds of thousands of colonial workers and soldiers were conscripted and brought to France to help with the war effort.⁶ Not surprisingly, this nationwide increase also caused the North African population of Marseille to swell in kind. Before going elsewhere, North Africans were processed on the same grounds as the 1906 and then future 1922 colonial exposition, which had been turned into a colonial depot.⁷ Those who stayed in the city were also altering the demographics of the working-class neighborhood near the St. Louis sugar refinery in the fifteenth arrondissement, where many of them worked.

In fact, the extent and speed at which Marseille's North African population grew there was great enough that by 1916, local government officials and leaders in the city began discussing the possibility of building new housing and community buildings specifically for North African workers, who were now seen as a long-term installment within the city that would certainly outlast the war. Various names were used at different points to describe the project, such as "*village Kabyle*," (Kabyle village) "*village Arab*" (Arab village), and "*village Mussulmen*" (Muslim village). Regardless of what it was called, the department's prefect, Marseille's Chamber of Commerce, local business leaders, French colonial experts, and others took the idea of a North African village being built in Marseille quite seriously and discussed it in earnest between September 1916 and February 1917. They even took two separate bids on the total cost of the project, but

⁵ *Les Kabyles en France*, 28.

⁶ For more details on the numbers of North African colonial subjects in metropolitan France during World War I, see Chapter I.

⁷ Norbert Gomar, *L'émigration algérienne en France* (Paris: Les Presses modernes, 1931), 19-20.

ultimately it was not constructed. Though never realized, the proposal and the extent to which Marseille's leaders researched, planned, and considered the Muslim village demonstrates that they saw a need to define yet another significant space beyond the colonial exposition grounds and the staircase at the train station to the colonial project. This time, Marseille wanted to create a space that would serve as a home for a permanent Muslim colonial population, essentially a Muslim colony, inside a metropolitan city.

This chapter examines the physical dimensions of colonial spaces in Marseille. It also used the colonial expositions as real housing for colonial subjects, which sought to recreate the colonial world within the space of a large metropolitan city block. Marseille celebrated the idea of colonialism through its expositions and statues. The crux though is the planned Muslim village, which shows that Marseille's leaders wanted to use city planning to recreate the colonies not just as an attraction but also as a permanent situation in their metropolitan city. They were influenced by and put to use the perspectives, ideas, and policies of the colonies in Marseille. Between the colonial expositions, the staircase, and the Muslim village project, Marseille demonstrates that colonial spaces had been created inside the metropole that utterly defy the conventionally held notion that these are two separate and distinct physical entities.

Historiography

This chapter draws upon scholarship from architecture, urban planning, and public health policies. The reason for this is that French colonization brought all three closely together. While architecture deals with the actual structures being built and urban planning has more to do with where city planners decide a building can go up (and what codes apply to it), both impact the appearance of the city and more importantly, what the

city communicates about itself. For instance, the architecture of a building has the power to communicate with the passerby, as it can either give away the purpose of the building or intentionally obscure it through the design of its façade. In this way, the architect wields a degree of power over city. Similarly, the layout of a city can also communicate the values of those in charge of it, overtly or subtly. Whether a building is located in a prominent area or out of view articulates at least to a degree what the city's leaders want people to see or value. The layout of neighborhoods can also purposely connect or separate groups. Thus, architecture and urban planning can be used to communicate or even to inculcate certain values and ideas in a city's population. Meanwhile, public health policies are an essential aspect of urban planning and the architecture of a building. Regulations on the number of people permitted in a specific area at a time, the layout, and need of sanitary water and waste removal all impact how a single building or entire cities are designed. As all three of these things manifested themselves in Marseille's early-twentieth century colonial spaces, it is important to explain the current scholarship on each.

One of the most famous contributors to this historiography is the anticolonialist Frantz Fanon. Born in the then French colony now *département* of Martinique, Fanon was an *indigène* who managed to obtain an education and became a psychologist. He wrote several works denouncing colonialism in the mid-twentieth century.⁸ Through his work, Fanon provided a psychological analysis of colonialism that was heavily influenced by Marxism. He believed that colonialism negatively impacted both the colonized and the colonizer. Those who have in turn analyzed Fanon have tended to

⁸ Frantz Fanon, *Peau noire, masques blancs* (Paris: Seuil, 1971); Frantz Fanon, *L'An V de la révolution algérienne* (Paris: F. Maspero, 1966); Frantz Fanon, *Pour la révolution africaine: écrits politiques* (Paris: F. Maspero, 1964); Frantz Fanon, *Les Damnés de la Terre* (Paris: F. Maspero, 1968).

focus on his role as an anticolonial crusader, especially in his adopted-homeland of Algeria; on how he is remembered (or not) in Algeria, France, and Martinique; or on his role as a psychologist and how his ideas can be applied to contemporary issues.⁹

Within the niche of French colonialism, Fanon's work has influenced scholars of both public health and urban planning. Specifically in his *L'An V de la révolution algérienne* (titled as *A Dying Colonialism* in English), which claims that during the Algerian Revolution, Algerians shed French culture that had been pressed upon them, he dedicates a chapter to "Medicine and Colonialism."¹⁰ In this chapter, he argues that Western medicine became a tool of oppression as Algerian views on disease were dismissed and the dynamics between Western doctors and colonial patients served as a reflection of the colonial power structure. Fanon remains more theoretical than historical in his argument, but his overall argument of Western ideas of medicine and health serving as a colonial tool has contributed at least in abstract terms to the origination of some of the ideas presented in this chapter. Further, he briefly, even if tangentially, discusses the physical location of colonial cities vis-à-vis the colonizers and the colonized.¹¹ Brief as it is, he is among the first to articulate this notion, and he is cited for this in the later work of Janet L. Abu-Lughod.¹²

Abu-Lughod's work examines French colonialism in Algeria's western neighbor, Morocco, during the early-twentieth century. She argues that the urban divisions in

⁹ David Macey, *Frantz Fanon: A Life* (London: Granta Books, 2000); David Macey, "'I Am My Own Foundation': Frantz Fanon As a Source of Continued Political Embarrassment," *Theory, Culture & Society* 27, no. 7-8 (2010): 33-51; Lewis R. Gordon, *Fanon and the Crisis of European Man: An Essay on Philosophy and the Human Sciences* (New York: Routledge, 1995); Anthony C. Alessandrini, ed., *Frantz Fanon: Critical Perspectives* (New York: Routledge, 2005); Hussein Abdilahi Bulhan, *Frantz Fanon and the Psychology of Oppression* (New York: Plenum Press, 2004).

¹⁰ Frantz Fanon, *A Dying Colonialism* (New York: Grove Press, 1967), 121-146.

¹¹ Fanon, *A Dying Colonialism*, 51-52.

¹² Janet L. Abu-Lughod, *Rabat: Urban Apartheid in Morocco* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980), 131.

Morocco's newly designed colonial cities under the administration of French General Hubert Lyautey were comparable to South African apartheid, which was still in practice at the time of her writing. She maintains that her comparison of French colonial cities in Morocco to South African racial divisions is not inappropriate by looking at developments under Lyautey. During his time in Morocco, the French designed Rabat in such a way that the new European sections ran right up against the old *madina* (Arab city). As such, Abu-Lughod argues, the division between Europeans and colonial subjects was not just one of class. It became spatial as well.

Of course, few French of the early-twentieth century would not have agreed with that, something that William A. Hoisington Jr's research makes abundantly clear. In fact, he calls Abu-Lughod's claim to apartheid "controversial."¹³ His work assess Lyautey's use of indirect rule, which is a term for describing a sort of soft imperialism in which colonial peoples maintain some semblance of self-governance. Hoisington chiefly argues that although Lyautey is often credited with the development of indirect rule within the French colonial empire, his regime in Morocco never really succeeded at putting this into practice. While discussing this though, he explains that the French believed the cities they were building showed their sensitivity towards Moroccans. The French were bringing modernity with their new buildings, but maintaining the integrity of the original *medinas*. Abu-Lughod and Hoisington's interpretations of French urban planning in Morocco certainly differ when it comes to intentions and attitudes, but one thing stands in common—both are illustrating the extreme divide between the Muslim city and the European city.

¹³ William A. Hoisington, Jr., *Lyautey and the French Conquest of Morocco* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995), 109.

While Abu-Lughod and Hoisington analyze Lyautey in Morocco, Paul Rabinow explains how Lyautey developed into the man he was by that time in terms of urban planning in the colonial world. His research on nineteenth-century French urban planning includes following Lyautey's colonial career from Asia to Africa. Significantly, it became abundantly clear that Lyautey was bothered by the lack of sanitation and public health infrastructure that he saw throughout the empire. This did not mean that he managed to provide proper health facilities to Moroccans as he oversaw the construction of new cities.¹⁴ It is helpful though to see Lyautey contemplating urban planning, public health, and how they were connected, as he traversed the French colonies around the world and gained the experiences and views that he took to French North Africa.

While Rabinow illuminates our understanding of Lyautey in a larger colonial and global context, Gwendolyn Wright builds on his work to flesh out the big picture of urban planning throughout the French colonial empire even further. Wright argues that architects in the colonies took metropolitan ideas to the colonies. Far away from the stifling regulations of metropolitan cities, Morocco, Indochina, Madagascar, and other colonial holdings provided architects and city planners the opportunity to build nearly whatever they wanted. This often meant fixing, as they perceived it, problems in the layout of metropolitan cities and structures, even if those problems did not exist in the colonies. The colonies then became a place of fantasy to some degree, a place where French planners and architects thought they could build whatever they could dream up. These fantasies did not just include metropolitan dreams, but also the ways in which architects imagined the cultures and styles of the colonies. As this chapter shows, the

¹⁴ Paul Rabinow, *French Modern: Norms and Forms of the Social Environment* (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1989), 287.

same can be said of the colonial architecture that appeared in early-twentieth century Marseille.

Although not directly responding to Wright or addressing colonialism, Sheila Crane's work on urban projects and architecture in twentieth-century Marseille illustrates Wright's point on the colonies serving as an outlet for crushed architectural metropolitan aspirations. Crane shows that many projects proposed in Marseille during the interwar period were not ultimately constructed during this "tumultuous period in the city's history."¹⁵ Crane illustrates Wright's point that developments planned in the metropole often went unfulfilled. This also helps to clarify that Marseille's ultimate failure to realize the Muslim Village discussed in this chapter does not reflect a prejudice against the project because of its colonial nature, but rather the era itself. Considering then that Marseille rarely completed proposed projects, that makes those that did come to fruition, such as the expositions of 1906 and 1922, even more meaningful in terms of what they communicate about the city's or the nation's values and perceptions of the colonies.

Indeed, interpreting how exhibitions and fairs perceived the Islamic world is precisely what Zeynep Çelik's *work does*. With special attention to the Paris world fair of 1867, she examined the architecture of pavilions at nineteenth-century world's fairs and explains what they communicate about Western attitudes towards Islam. Çelik concludes that exhibitions of Middle Eastern cultures failed to accurately depict them. Rather, "European stereotypes of the East and the notion of a clear-cut world order, as sketched by European power, remained dominant."¹⁶ For instance, at the 1867 Paris world fair, the

¹⁵ Sheila Crane, *Mediterranean Crossroads: Marseille and Modern Architecture* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2011), 5.

¹⁶ Zeynep Çelik, *Displaying the Orient: Architecture of Islam at Nineteenth-Century World's Fairs* (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1992), 49.

Ottoman section had three buildings: “a mosque, a residential structure called Pavillon du Bosphore, and a bath.”¹⁷ They were purposely arranged in an irregular and non-symmetrical fashion to lend it greater authenticity, but Çelik informs us that this reflected the French idea of Ottoman architecture far more than it did reality.¹⁸ Decades of such representations at one fair after another reinforced to the West its interpretation of an Islamic world that few had bothered to actually investigate.

Much has been written about the colonial expositions and world fairs of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, often exploring the importance of spectacle and display in projecting a specific discourse, such as national pride, progress, or both. This includes both world fairs that often had colonial exhibits, and full colonial expositions, the latter of which relied on exercising control over colonial subjects and harnessing them as a part of spectacles that reinforced the state’s interests in continuing colonialism.¹⁹ This is the aspect of colonial expositions traditionally discussed by scholars. It is a valid point, but it is also apparent that, in many instances, the colonialist discourses of expositions were challenged by other Europeans and by the colonial subjects brought to Europe to participate. In 1931, opponents of European colonialism launched a counter-

¹⁷ Çelik, *Displaying the Orient*, 60.

¹⁸ Çelik, *Displaying the Orient*, 61.

¹⁹ Çelik, *Displaying the Orient*; Peter H. Hoffenberg, *An Empire on Display: English, Indian, and Australian Exhibitions from the Crystal Palace to the Great War* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001); Goodwin, *Africa in Europe*; Felix Driver, David Gilbert, eds., *Imperial Cities: Landscape, Display and Identity* (Manchester University Press, 2003); Dana S. Hale, *Race on Display: French Representations of Colonized Peoples, 1886-1940* (Indiana University Press, 2008); Robert W. Rydell, *World of Fairs: The Century-of-Progress Expositions* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993); Patricia A. Morton, *Hybrid Modernities: Architecture and Representation at the 1931 Colonial Expositions*, Paris (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000); Catherine Hodeir and Michel Pierre, *L’exposition coloniale, 1931* (Brussels: Editions Complexe, 1991); Shanny Peer, *France on Display: Peasants, Provincials, and Folklore in the 1937 Paris World’s Fair* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1998); James R. Lehning, *The Melodramatic Thread: Spectacle and Political Culture in Modern France* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2007); Herman Lebovics, *True France: The Wars over Cultural Identity, 1900-1945* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992).

exposition that pointed out its evils.²⁰ Further, there is evidence of some performers doing this, such as the African at the London exhibition in 1899 who became engaged to an Englishwoman, or the ambiguous ways in which the African-American Josephine Baker played on the exotic in Paris music halls in the 1930s.²¹ Once in the metropole, French officials could not completely control the actions of colonial subjects, or the impact of their appropriated architecture on French society.

Yaël Simpson Fletcher's contribution on Marseille's 1922 exposition is somewhat outside of this paradigm, and as such proves especially useful to this chapter that is focusing on how the colonies impacted the colonizer through colonial expositions, rather than the other way around. Fletcher argues that the exposition was "designed to celebrate the dominance of this metropolitan port city [Marseille] in the empire," but instead it "highlighted the liminality of Marseilles, exposing the fragility of the imperial divide between metropole and colonies."²² Fletcher points to the weaknesses of the exposition, specifically its treatment of the colonial workers brought to Marseille, to illustrate how it showed the city's weakness as much as its strength. True to the "imperial turn," Fletcher shows the colonies impacting metropolitan life as the exposition is visited by French citizens and discussed in publications. She also shows a city populated with colonial subjects to the point that it "cast doubt on the metropolitan French identity of the city."²³ This chapter will use the 1922 exposition along with other architectural examples to build upon Fletcher's argument and argue that the boundary between the metropole and colonies was not just fragile. It had been burst, and not just by the presence of a colonial

²⁰ Hodeir and Pierre, *L'exposition coloniale*, 126.

²¹ James R. Lehning, *European Colonialism Since 1700* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 238-239.

²² Fletcher, "Capital of the Colonies," 137.

²³ Fletcher, "Capital of the Colonies," 150.

population, but by the policies that the metropolitan French took from the colonies and put to use in the city.

The architecture of the 1906 and 1922 expositions will play a significant part in this argument, but the proposed Muslim Village of 1916 also brings public health matters into this discussion of colonial architecture and planning. Numerous works have been written on the history of public health and medicine, even within the limitations of a colonial context.²⁴ This fact alone shows how closely connected imperialism and medical practices and regulations were, but space remains largely excluded from the dialogue.

Throughout Europe, there was a belief that colonial populations harbored more diseases than white populations and were therefore a threat to the health of the colonizers. Philippa Levine demonstrates this in her work on Britain's efforts to control venereal disease in the colonies. From India to Hong Kong, Queensland, and the Straits Settlements, new laws were created in the nineteenth century with the intention of preventing the spread of venereal disease among British troops. Yet, as these laws were far more focused on controlling indigenous women than on controlling the conduct of British sailors and soldiers, it becomes apparent that these efforts also reflected racially based fears and beliefs about health. Thus, the British wanted the empire abroad, but their policy makers and leaders also wanted to keep the British separated from the colonial subjects.

²⁴ David Arnold, *Colonizing the Body: Tate Medicine and Epidemic Disease in Nineteenth-Century India* (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1993); Alison Bashford, *Imperial Hygiene: A Critical History of Colonialism, Nationalism and Public Health* (Houndsmills, England: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004); Eric T. Jennings, *Curing the Colonizers: Hydrotherapy, Climatology, and French Colonial Spas* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2006); Eric T. Jennings, *Imperial Heights: Dalat and the Making and Undoing of French Indochina* (University of California Press, 2011); William Gallois, *The Administration of Sickness: Medicine and Ethics in Nineteenth-Century Algeria* (Basingstoke, England: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008); Philippa Levine, *Prostitution, Race and Politics: Policing Venereal Disease in the British Empire* (New York: Routledge, 2003).

Eric T. Jennings has proven that the French were just as afraid of life in the colonies adversely impacting their health as the British. Jennings work on hydrotherapy at colonial spas demonstrates that the French went to these spas in Guadeloupe, Madagascar, Tunisia, and so forth to preserve their health. The French believed this would help them to survive in tropical climates, where white bodies were a foreign presence. Upon returning to the metropole, they could go to the mother spa, in Vichy. Like Levine, Jennings shows the European desire to have colonial control but to stay separate from the colonized peoples. In this instance, the French had even come up with a pseudoscientific ritual by which they cleansed themselves of the colonial effect when contact could not be avoided, and to take Jennings' work in a slightly new direction, they did so in specifically designated spaces.

Architecture, urban planning, public health—all of these have been studied in the context of the French colonial empire. What remains to be seen though is how their use in the colonies returned to metropolitan France. As Wright has demonstrated that metropolitan ideas went to the colonies, so the 1906 and 1922 colonial expositions, the St. Charles train station's staircase, and the proposed Muslim village all show that views and ideas of colonialism developed abroad manifested themselves in early-twentieth-century Marseille. From the divisions of cities imagined in Rabat in paternalistic and colonial terms, to the belief that whites and colonial subjects should be separated for health reasons, Marseille assumed the practices and beliefs of the colonies. Thus it was not just colonial populations coming to the metropole, as Fletcher has shown. It was the policies that govern them as well, creating, in effect, colonies of colonial subjects in the

metropole. As this happened, it ruptured whatever distinctions remained between the metropole and the colonies.

The Expositions of 1906 and 1922

The last section of the introduction to Crane's *Mediterranean Crossroads: Marseille and Modern Architecture* explains that Marseille is "a city without monuments."²⁵ She forcefully demonstrates this by citing visitors that span the centuries who all seem to share the idea. They range from Victor Hugo and Prosper Mérimée in the early-nineteenth century, both of whom remarked on how extraordinary it is that a city with a Greco-Roman past conspicuously lack evidence of it; to Blaise Cendrars' post-World War II commentary that Marseille "is the only ancient capital that does not overwhelm us with monuments to the past ... it is not a town for architecture, religion, belles-lettres, academies or fine arts. It is in no way the product of history."²⁶ In short, Marseille has traditionally been viewed as a city conspicuously lacking in architectural representations of its past.

Be this as it may, Cendrars wisely avoided overgeneralizing by saying that Marseille's monuments do "not overwhelm us," not that they do not exist or that they never have. Ample records of Marseille's 1906 and 1922 colonial expositions remain for discussing both their impact on the city as they filled the landscape, and how they reflect the ideas and attitudes of Marseille's residents. Further, some monuments are still there today, even if few in number. The staircase running from Marseilles' Saint Charles train station to the T-junction where *Place des Marseillaises* and *Boulevard d'Athènes* intersect is nothing short of a public homage to colonialism. This section uses the 1906

²⁵ Crane, *Mediterranean Crossroads*, 11.

²⁶ Crane, *Mediterranean Crossroads*, 11-12.

and 1922 colonial expositions and the St. Charles staircase to demonstrate briefly that, despite Marseille's constantly changing physical appearance, its early-twentieth-century architecture illustrates that the colonial empire had physically entered the metropole; and furthermore, it celebrated this in very grandiose ways.

Starting in the mid-nineteenth century and continuing into the twentieth, Europe was enamored with world exhibitions. The first of these was Britain's 1851 Great Exhibition held at the Crystal Palace in London, England. It displayed the marvels of Britain's industrial accomplishments, new technology and, to a limited extent, its colonial empire. The success of this exhibition led to others throughout Western civilization for years to come that mimicked the 1851 model: located within a host city, lasting for the duration of a few months and requiring new buildings, either permanent or temporary, to house events or displays. These exhibitions, ranging from Paris in 1867 and 1889, to Vienna in 1873, to Chicago in 1893 and other locations for the next century to come, drew "tens of millions of visitors" from all over the world.²⁷ In addition to displaying the host nation's accomplishments and abilities to the international community, they also served to placate the subjects/citizens of the host country by downplaying fears and selling progress. Just as the 1851 Great Exhibition "took form against a backdrop of democratic upheavals on the continent and challenges to prevailing British authorities by the Chartist Movement," these other exhibitions would play a role in convincing the common people that their country status quo was not only acceptable, but even preferable, and that the future would only bring them yet a better world.²⁸

²⁷ Rydell, *World of Fairs*, 3.

²⁸ Rydell, *World of Fairs*, 5.

As European powers extended their colonial empires in the late-nineteenth century, colonialism became a theme around which host countries built entire exhibitions. This is not to say that other exhibitions ceased. In the era of the late-nineteenth century's New Imperialism, however, colonialism had become such a large piece of European political life that host countries created entire exhibitions that would solely celebrate and flaunt this aspect of their power. Architecture became a key aspect of this process. This is because it could lend a sense of authenticity to an exposition while simultaneously enforcing fallacious European fantasies about the colonies. As Zeynep Çelik explains: "the architectural representation of cultures at the world's fairs was double-sided, making a claim to scientific authority and accuracy while nourishing fantasy and illusion."²⁹ Though her study focuses specifically on the nineteenth century, architecture continued to serve this double-sided purpose into the twentieth as well.

For these reasons, France hosted a major colonial exposition in 1906. There were two locations, or two separate colonial expositions, one in Paris and the other in Marseille. The latter of the two enjoyed much greater success. Under the direction of the very procolonialist Jules Charles-Roux, the exposition intended to bring "an authentic portion" of the empire to the metropole.³⁰ He did this by bringing colonial subjects to his metropolitan city to live and perform in the exposition and by overseeing the construction of buildings that would make visitors feel as though they had actually gone to the colonies. In doing so, the 1906 colonial expositions and those to follow later were examples of colonial oppression and control of colonized peoples in a zoo-like atmosphere in which organizers intended that the attendees observe supposedly inferior

²⁹ Çelik, *Displaying the Orient*, 2.

³⁰ Hale, *Races on Display*, 87.

colonial life in a controlled environment. Yet, even as Charles-Roux's 1906 exposition is an example of colonial dominance, it simultaneously inserted the colonies directly into a confined space within Marseille.

Roughly two to three miles south of Marseille's western-facing *Vieux Port* (Old Port) and St. Charles train station, Charles-Roux's colonial exposition was confined within the triangular space of three streets: *chemin de Sainte-Marguerite*, *Boulevard Rabatau*, and *Boulevard Michelet* (see Figure 1). Visitors likely arrived by boat or train, then took advantage of the city's tramway or otherwise travelled down the *avenue Prado*. They would soon find themselves at a roundabout, *rond-point du Prado*, which is where the *Boulevard Rabatau*, and *Boulevard Michelet* intersect. At that moment, they would see the massive structures of the colonial exposition towering above them on the block to their left.

Walking through the entrance at *rond-point du Prado*, the exposition's visitors felt as though they could explore the entire French colonial world, conveniently packaged within "thirty-six hectares (eighty-nine acres) of level terrain."³¹ As the exposition's map shows, the visitors first found themselves looking down the *Avenue Centrale* (see Figure 1). Proceeding down the *avenue*, they would see replicas of "native" homes and buildings to their left and their right. Inside of them, visitors could see "natives"—that is, actual colonial subjects brought to the metropole for the purposes of the exposition—who were living there and remained "present to do craftwork or perform before the public."³² With authentic peoples and authentic buildings, the exposition was nothing short of a miniature colonial empire.

³¹ Hale, *Races on Display*, 87.

³² Hale, *Races on Display*, 87




Figure 1. Map of the 1906 Colonial Exposition. *Plan Générale*, Collection of Georges Aillaud, in *Désirs d'ailleurs: Les expositions coloniales de Marseille 1906 et 1922* ed., Archives de la ville de Marseille. (Marseille: Alors hors du temps, 2006), 64.

In order to lend greater authenticity to the structures, the exposition relied on colonial expertise in designing them. For instance, Monsieur Resplandy, a French architect working in Tunisia, designed the Tunisian Pavilion that was located on the left side of the *Avenue Centrale* and accessed by a smaller path just past the main entrance.³³ Resplandy's Tunisian Palace had a simple, white exterior, but contained the basics expected in Islamic architecture (see Figure 2). The top consists of a series of domes. This aesthetic has been an architectural mainstay within Islamic architecture at least since the Ottoman Emperor Mehmet II's 1453 conquest of Constantinople, after which the Byzantine's use of domes in their impressive church-turned-mosque, Hagia Sophia, was absorbed throughout the empire.³⁴ Jutting out from one side was a minaret, from which Muslims would have been called to prayer.³⁵ Horseshoe arches, which are arches that form just over a semi-circle, decorated the entrance. Given that horseshoe arches "developed their characteristic form in Spain and North Africa," they made a fitting addition to the Tunisian Palace and Resplandy's effort to recreate North Africa in Marseille.³⁶

Having passed some time in a fantasy version of Tunisia, visitors could then continue down a small path to see Indochina, where once again architecture created a feeling of authenticity. Various buildings lined this pavilion's main thoroughfare, the *rue de l'Annam* (see Figure 3). The structures of this *rue* were evidently based on the Khmer architecture of Cambodia, then a part of French ruled Indochina. One structure at the

³³ Adrien Artaud to Monsieur Resplandy, 10 October 1916, *Projet de Construction d'un Village Kabyle à Marseille 1916-1917*, ML 4274/02, Chambre de Commerce et d'Industrie Marseille-Provence (hereafter cited as *Muslim Village*, ML 4274/02, CCI).

³⁴ Moya Carey, *An Illustrated History of Islamic Architecture* (London: Southwater, 2012), 19.

³⁵ Carey, *An Illustrated History of Islamic Architecture*, 125.

³⁶ Andrew Petersen, *Dictionary of Islamic Architecture* (London: Routledge, 1996), 24.



Figure 2. The Tunisian Palace, 1906 Colonial Exposition. Photograph by Léon Gazel, 46 Fi 184, Archives de la ville de Marseille (hereafter cited as AM), in *Désirs d'ailleurs*, 86.



Figure 3. Visitors walking on the *rue de l'Annam*, 1906 Colonial Exposition. Photograph by Léon Gazel, 46 Fi 179, AM, in *Désirs d'ailleurs*, 8.

colonial exposition even appears to mimic the style's twelfth-century icon, Angkor Wat, which was brought to Europe's attention by the French naturalists Henri Mouhot in 1860s.³⁷ In the center-right background of Figure 3, an ogival shaped tower covered in symmetric reliefs protrudes into the sky. This is a clear replication of the five ogival towers at Angkor Wat that represent the peaks of Mount Meru, the home of the Hindu gods.³⁸ Directly to the left of the replicated tower found in this photo sits a majestic and symmetrical building with an acutely slanted roof adorned with upward reaching naga gables and an enormous spire (see Figure 3). This imitates architecture found in Cambodia after the influence of French colonization. Indeed, the building bears some resemblance to the National Museum in Phnom Penh. Though built a decade after the 1906 colonial exposition, it is nonetheless "one of the finest examples of the adaptation of old Cambodian forms and motifs to modern use."³⁹

On the opposite end of the grounds, visitors could visit France's version of *Afrique Occidentale* and see West African architecture. There, an enormous, rectangular palace with a large square-shaped tower resembles the mud-brick mosques built in Mali since the thirteenth century (see figure 4). Considering that the modern mosque in Déjnné, Mali, which uses this same Sudano-Sahelian architectural style "is one of the most distinctive Islamic buildings in Africa," the palace's likeness to it shows the lengths to which its creators were willing to go to bring the colonies to life in Marseille in as realistic a way as possible.⁴⁰ The West African palace even included the "bundles of palm

³⁷ Haydon Cherry, "Digging Up the Past: Prehistory and the Weight of the Present in Vietnam," *Journal of Vietnamese Studies* 4, no. 1 (2009): 86-87.

³⁸ Trudy Ring, Robert M. Salkin and Sharon La Boda, *International Dictionary of Historical Places: Asia and Oceania* (Taylor & Francis, 2008), 31.

³⁹ Helen Ibbitson Jessup, *Art & Architecture of Cambodia* (New York: Thames & Hudson, 2004), 207.

⁴⁰ The current version of this mosque was built in 1907, but a mosque built of mud-brick has been there since 1240. Carey, *An Illustrated History of Islamic Architecture*, 88.



Figure 4. The West African Palace, 1906 Colonial Exposition. Photograph by Léon Gazel, 46 Fi 173, AM, in *Désirs d'ailleurs*, 10.

sticks that bristle and jut” from the walls of these West African mosques (see Figure 4).

Heading back towards the *Avenue Centrale* and just beyond Madagascar, the visitors to the exposition could also simulate spending time in Algeria. There they would find a palace with many of the same North African and Islamic architectural features seen at Resplandy’s Tunisian Pavilion. It also showed its Ottoman influence through multiple domes, each of which was topped with the Ottoman crescent moon (see Figure 5). Crucially, a minaret towered above the rest of the palace. Horseshoe arches were also featured throughout the palace, which highlighted Algeria’s place in North Africa (see Figure 5).

As Patricia Morton has pointed out in her analysis of the colonial exposition of 1931 in Paris, the construction of these French interpretations of North African structures at colonial expositions can be seen as a form of *arabisation*, a term that describes the absorption of Arab architecture into French architecture that occurred in North Africa. She describes it as “the colonizer mimicking the colonized.”⁴¹ What might be added to her observation of this phenomenon in a colonial exposition setting is that this exhibits the practices of colonial architects entering the metropole.

Despite prewar plans to host, Marseille had to overcome a bid from Paris for the 1922 National Colonial exposition. After the war, some French legislators thought it would be preferable to hold an exhibition that represented the colonies of all the Allied Powers.⁴² This in turn led to discussion of relocating the exposition to Paris, but Marseille’s leaders were determined to keep the exposition. Within two days of the

⁴¹ Morton, *Hybrid Modernities*, 320.

⁴² Yael Simpson Fletcher, “Capital of the Colonies,” 139.



Figure 5. The Algerian Palace, 1906 Colonial Exposition. Photograph by Léon Gazel, 46 Fi 194, AM, in *Désirs d'ailleurs*, 88.

signing of the 1918 armistice that brought a cease-fire to World War I, they had already started trying to get the exposition resurrected.⁴³ Ultimately, Marseille and its proponents won by convincing the legislature that France did not need an allied colonial exposition, but a French colonial exposition that would celebrate the rebirth of France in a postwar world.⁴⁴ Once it was decided that the exposition should focus on France solely, Marseille, the capital of the French colonies, naturally won.⁴⁵

Charles-Roux's death in September 1918 made it necessary to find a new commissioner general who would maintain the same high standard of colonial importation established by the 1906 colonial exposition. Adrien Artaud proved to be the man for the job.⁴⁶ Much of his career had already revolved around colonialism. During World War I, he had served as the president of Marseille's Chamber of Commerce, which was the same organization that had sponsored an expedition in French West Africa around the time of the 1906 exposition.⁴⁷ As president of the chamber of commerce, he also oversaw the 1916-17 Muslim village project. With such a background in colonial matters and leadership experience, Artaud was well equipped to prepare the 1922 colonial exposition.

Indeed, the 1922 convention proved to be as remarkable an example of colonial architecture as its 1906 predecessor. The 1906 location at the *rond-point du Prado* remained the same for the 1922 exposition, but it included new buildings and changed the specific locations of various pavilions within its grounds. Unlike other colonial expositions held by other European powers, everything was meant to be authentic, just as

⁴³ Rydell, *World of Fairs*, 63

⁴⁴ Fletcher, "Capital of the Colonies," 139.

⁴⁵ Fletcher, "Capital of the Colonies," 139.

⁴⁶ Hale, *Races on Display*, 88.

⁴⁷ Goodwin, *Africa in Europe*, 176.

Marseille's leaders believed their 1906 exposition had been. The large, looming colonial structures were again filled with colonial subjects who lived there and performed for the pleasure of the exposition's visitors.

Upon entering the exposition's main entrance, visitors could proceed down the main thoroughfare, renamed the *Grande Allée*, and at its end, they would find the North African pavilions. Facing the ornate *Grand Palais* and its large fountain, the Moroccan Pavilion sat to the left and across the vast, open esplanade (see Figure 6). Like the 1906 exposition, the North African pavilions contained all the combined trimmings of North African and Islamic architecture. Entering the Moroccan Pavilion, a visitor would see its minaret while approaching the horseshoe-arched entrance (see Figure 7). Meanwhile, Fletcher describes the Tunisian Pavilion as being "represented as totally 'genuine', with streets 'full of character, of mystery and of shadow', a market so authentic that 'one could positively believe it to be in Tunis'."⁴⁸ Moving around the esplanade counterclockwise, it sat just between the Moroccan Pavilion and the Algerian Pavilion, which was as "authentic" as its North African counterparts (see Figure 8).

The conviction among French officials and attendees that the colonial expositions truly recreated the colonies in the authentic manner described by Fletcher could be considered a hallmark of French colonial expositions. Morton found the same conceptualization of authenticity expressed at the 1931 exposition in Paris. "For some of them [the attendees], it was exactly being in the colonies."⁴⁹ Indeed, at least one visitor

⁴⁸ Fletcher, "Capital of the Colonies," 141.

⁴⁹ Morton, *Hybrid Modernities*, 79.



Figure 6. Panoramic view of the *Grand Palais*, 1922 Colonial Exposition. Photograph by Léon Gazel, 46 Fi 256, AM, in *Désirs d'ailleurs*, 112.



Figure 7. The Moroccan Palace, 1922 Colonial Exposition. Post Card, 96 Fi 110, AM, in *Désirs d'ailleurs*, 118.



Figure 8. The Algerian Palace, 1922 Colonial Exposition. Photograph by Georges Rouard, 37 Fi 173, AM, in *Désirs d'ailleurs*, 119.

suspended disbelief to such an extent that it seemed hard to recall that this was actually Paris.⁵⁰

Completing the counterclockwise circle around the esplanade, extensive pavilions depicted *Indochine* and *Afrique Occidentale*. Indochine had incredible replicas of colonial structures, such as “an enormous Indochinese temple based on the temple of Angkor Wat.”⁵¹ Far more extravagant than even the 1906 Colonial Exposition, three massive ogival towers brought Angkor Wat to Marseille (see Figure 9). It would later influence the reproduction of Angkor Wat at Paris’ 1931 colonial exposition that “surpassed the volume of the basilique du Sacré-Cœur at Montmartre”⁵² The streets and paths surrounding it and other pavilions were put together with attention to detail and quality in mind. “Hanoi Street, for example, was planned to be ‘not one bit like those papier-mâché streets of previous expositions, but rather a genuine street, with real houses in which the artisans would truly live’⁵³ Meanwhile, a “West African tower three times the height of the original in Timbuctu” arose in the heart of Marseille.⁵⁴

The 1922 colonial exposition reaffirmed the 1906 exposition’s crowning of Marseille as the de facto capital of the French colonial empire, and architecture proved a key factor in this. The location and dimensions of the expositions remained the same. What changed were the actual structures themselves. The fanciful caricatures of the colonies increased with ever-bigger buildings that grossly exaggerated the dimensions of what they were supposed to represent, as seen with the West African tower. Meanwhile,

⁵⁰ Morton, *Hybrid Modernities*, 145.

⁵¹ Fletcher, “Capital of the Colonies,” 136.

⁵² Hodeir and Pierre, *L’exposition coloniale*, 40.

⁵³ Fletcher, “Capital of the Colonies,” 141.

⁵⁴ Fletcher, “Capital of the Colonies,” 136.




Figure 9. Angkor Wat Palace, 1922 Colonial Exposition. Photograph by Georges Rouard, 37 Fi 151, AM, in *Désirs d'ailleurs*, 112.

attention to creating a feeling of authenticity required sound structures, such as Hanoi street.

Both the 1906 and the 1922 colonial expositions were truly cities within a city—colonial cities inside a metropolitan city. This permitted Europeans to feel as though they had gone to colonies while never leaving Europe, and at the same, believe that their isolation kept the otherwise European city purely European. The planning to create this effect was so exact and purposeful that “officials deliberately sited the 1922 exposition so that ‘one would not see the domes of Angkor or the Moroccan minarets silhouetted against a block of flats or competing with the chimney of a factory’.”⁵⁵ It likely influenced Paris’ 1931 colonial exposition, which in a marked break from its exposition in 1900 had “very few places within the grounds where a visitor could see the surrounding Parisian buildings.”⁵⁶ Like so much of Marseille’s past architectural creations, these pavilions are no longer standing. Yet Marseille does have at least one looming example of early-twentieth century architecture that celebrated colonialism still surviving today: the staircase at the Saint Charles train station.

The Staircase at Gare de Saint-Charles

The railroad was one of the single-largest changes that the Industrial Revolution wrought upon nineteenth-century Europe, and France began to feel this impact in the 1840s. In 1842, the Chamber of Deputies handed civil engineer Victor Legrand the task of creating a centralized railroad system that would connect major French cities to Paris. In a combination of Legrand’s name and the fact that the hexagon shaped country’s railroads were to be directed through the capital in a centralizing layout, thus creating the

⁵⁵ Fletcher, “Capital of the Colonies,” 141.

⁵⁶ Morton, *Hybrid Modernities*, 144-45.

rough image of a star's shape from a birds-eye view, the project was known as "Étoile Legrand," (the Legrand Star).⁵⁷ It took until the 1850s to complete the whole project, with Marseille's *gare de Saint-Charles*, or Saint Charles train station, being built in 1848.⁵⁸ The train station is perched on a plateau just over a mile to the northeast of the Old Port and close to three miles north of where the colonial expositions were held. Looking down toward the heart of the city, the view is spectacular. Today, the large staircase opens onto the *Boulevard d'Athènes*, which is covered with Haussmann-style buildings that descend as though they will drop into the nearby Mediterranean. Standing at the top, it is easy to imagine the water being visible in the train station's earliest decades (see Figure 10).

Picturesque though it may be, Saint Charles' location on top of such a large plateau made it something of an inconvenience to access throughout the nineteenth-century. It took over seventy-five years for a large staircase to be added to the train station that connects with the major streets below. The decision to do so was made in 1911, but it did not materialize, however, until the next decade.⁵⁹ The staircase became functional and was opened to the public in 1925.⁶⁰ Two years later, on April 24, 1927, the President of the French Third Republic, President Doumergue, ceremoniously inaugurated the staircase that most travellers arriving in Marseille by train would use. Much like the port or the train station itself, these stairs served as yet another of the few gateways by which travellers coming to metropolitan France or leaving it for the colonies

⁵⁷ Allan Mitchell, *Rêves parisiens: L'échec de projets de transport public en France au XIXe siècle* (Paris: Presses de l'École nationale des ponts et chaussées, 2005), 65.

⁵⁸ Chloé Maurel, "Introduction," in *Essais d'histoire globale*, ed. Chloé Maurel (Paris: L'Harmattan, 2013), 26.

⁵⁹ Catherine Marand-Fouquet, "Sur les escaliers de la gare Saint-Charles à Marseille," *Le genre de la nation* 12 (2000): 189.

⁶⁰ Maurel, "Introduction," 26.



Figure 10. View from the top of the staircase at St. Charles train station. Photograph by the author, 10 August 2013.

needed, and they were decorated with four large colonial-themed statues. Facing the *Boulevard d'Athènes* and the Mediterranean below, these statues still adorn the staircase to this day.

Standing at the bottom of the stairs and facing the train station, two statues celebrating the colonies are immediately visible (see Figure 11). The statue entitled, “*Colonies d’Asie*” (colonies of Asia), is on the left, and represents French power in what was then French Indochina (see Figure 12). It is the work of the Marseillais sculptor Louis Botinelly.⁶¹ The top of the statue depicts a reclining woman who Maurel describes as “resembling a Khmer princess.”⁶² Marand-Fouquet has interpreted the woman as Khmer as well.⁶³ Maurel supports this interpretation further by pointing out the lion on the princess’ left-hand side, which is another aspect of the statue that “equally recalls Khmer art.”⁶⁴ In mimicking Khmer art, like the mimicking of Arab architecture *arabisation* discussed by Morton, Botinelly places himself in the same category as the creators of the exposition’s buildings who not only wanted to create architecture that recalled the colonies, but that did so authentically.⁶⁵ In addition to the statue invoking Khmer artistic styles, it is also a plausible explanation in light of the colonial expositions that brought Khmer people to Marseille as a part of French Indochinese Pavilions. In fact, Maurel further speculates that female Cambodian dancers at the 1922 colonial exposition may have served as Botinelly’s inspiration.⁶⁶ The 1906 exposition influenced Botinelly, a fact demonstrated by his previous 1916 bust, “*Déesse cambodgienne*” (Cambodian

⁶¹ Maurel, “Introduction,” 26.

⁶² Maurel, “Introduction,” 26.

⁶³ Maurel, “Introduction,” 26; Marand-Fouquet, “Sur les escaliers de la gare Saint-Charles à Marseille,” 190.

⁶⁴ Maurel, “Introduction,” 26.

⁶⁵ Morton, *Hybrid Modernities*, 320.

⁶⁶ Maurel, “Introduction,” 27.



Figure 11. View from the bottom of the staircase at St. Charles train station. Photograph by the author, 10 August 2013.



Figure 12. “Colonies of Asia” statue, staircase at St. Charles train station. Photograph by the author, 10 August 2013.

Goddess).⁶⁷ Specifically Khmer or not, the representation reinforces the fantasy world created by the Marseille's 1906 and 1922 expositions. The woman is mostly nude, but wears an extravagant headdress and a few pieces of ornate jewelry. There are two young boys at her feet as well as fruits and other symbols of "exotic products and perhaps of fertility."⁶⁸

On the right-hand side of the staircase just opposite the statue commemorating the Asian colonies is another statue by Botinelly that commemorates France's African colonies.⁶⁹ Inscribed with the words "*Colonies d'Afrique*" (colonies of Africa) in the same style as the *Colonies d'Asie* statue, it also features a woman in a reclined position surrounded by items and styles associated with her respective continent. There are again two young boys as well, though this time they have a basket overflowing with exotic products associated with the African continent, such as bananas and watermelons (see Figure 13). Meanwhile, the woman wears "braided hair, leaning on a bench with an African buffalo head with spiraling horns."⁷⁰ With the exception of an ornate necklace, earrings, and bracelets, she is completely nude, lacking even the small skirt that her counterpart on the "*Colonies d'Asie*" wears. Nonetheless, Marand-Fouquet argues that their visible breasts "conserve the appearance of chastity."⁷¹ Both statues then communicate that the colonies in Asia and Africa are not only exotic, but young, fertile, and still virgin lands.

The other two major colonial-themed statues are located half way up the stairs, and they celebrate the colonizers rather than focusing on the colonized. Appropriately

⁶⁷ Marand-Fouquet, "Sur les escaliers de la gare Saint-Charles à Marseille," 190.

⁶⁸ Marand-Fouquet, "Sur les escaliers de la gare Saint-Charles à Marseille," 189.

⁶⁹ Maurel, "Introduction," 26.

⁷⁰ Maurel, "Introduction," 27.

⁷¹ Marand-Fouquet, "Sur les escaliers de la gare Saint-Charles à Marseille," 190.



Figure 13. "Colonies of Africa" statue, staircase at St. Charles train station. Photograph by the author, 10 August 2013.

and perhaps not coincidentally, they are the work of Auguste Carli, who along with Danys Puech also sculpted an impressive bust of Charles-Roux during the first colonial exposition in Marseille in 1906.⁷² Each statue extols the French civilizing mission by linking it to the Greeks and their role as the originators of Marseille and Western civilization.

The statue on the right-hand side of the staircase is entitled, “*Marseille porte de l’Orient*,” meaning “Marseille, Gateway to the East” (see Figure 14). It boasts of the city’s role as the capital of the French colonies, facilitating France’s access to the world across the waters. Featured here is a woman holding a trident, like the Greek god Poseidon. In addition to the trident, the fact that she is wearing the distinctive classical Greek *pallium*, which was a “rectangular mantle” and “the quintessence of Greek dress,” further verifies that she is Greek.⁷³ She appears to personify the city of Marseille while the trident invokes the port city’s maritime tradition. Completing that image, the woman sits on a ship that appears to be moving quickly and forcefully through the water, as the sculpture includes a turbulent wake (see Figure 14). The statue depicts Marseille as the place of departure, or gateway, for France into the larger colonial world.

If anyone should doubt the merit of France going forth as a colonial power, the statue on the left-hand side of the staircase provides a vivid interpretation of the civilizing mission as a continuation of Marseille’s, if not all of France’s, Greek heritage. It too features a woman wearing the distinctive *pallium*. She is seated on a ship and is entitled, “*Marseille colonie grecque*,” meaning “Marseille, Greek Colony” (see Figure 15). This

⁷² Bernard Barbier, “Jules Charles-Roux et la Société de géographie,” in *Désirs d’ailleurs: Les expositions coloniales de Marseille 1906 et 1922*, ed. Archives de la ville de Marseille. (Marseille: Alors hors du temps, 2006), 39.

⁷³ Liza Cleland, Glenys Davies, and Lloyd Llewellyn-Jones, *Greek and Roman Dress from A to Z* (London: Routledge, 2007), 137.



Figure 14. “Marseille, Gateway to the East” statue, staircase at St. Charles train station. Photograph by the author, 10 August 2013.



Figure 15. "Marseille, Greek Colony," statue, staircase at St. Charles train station. Photograph by the author, 10 August 2013.

woman personifies both the original Greek town of Massalia and the modern French city of Marseille. This symbolism reminds the viewer that Marseille itself is the product of colonization, built by the Greeks around 600BC. This makes colonialism not appear to be a modern concept, but rather as one of the very building blocks of Western civilization. It would seem then that the viewer of this statue, standing in one of the largest cities in all of France, is meant to feel that everything around him or her is thanks to colonialism. Combined then, “*Marseille porte de l’Orient*” and “*Marseille colonie grecque*” create a powerful procolonial vision. The prior informs its viewer that Marseille is the gateway for France to the colonies, which is also a reminder of Marseille’s importance and relevance in contrast to Paris. It even suggests that, while Paris might be the capital now, French civilization started with Marseille. The latter reminds its viewer that Marseille was founded upon what Europe considers civilized, classical virtues. This also implies that the city’s role in assisting the French civilizing mission, as the capital of the colonies and the point contact between the metropole and the colonies, is important, selfless, and magnanimous.

The 1906 and 1922 colonial expositions and staircase at Saint Charles train station have provided three examples of large architectural undertakings that brought colonialism to early-twentieth-century Marseille. These examples not only demonstrate Marseille’s exceptional interest in using architecture to manifest its role in the French colonial empire during this time period, but they different ways in which they did so. The expositions were meant to take the colonies from abroad and place them in Marseille, albeit in a very controlled, specific, and isolated area. Meanwhile, the staircase was more a celebration of what the French perceived themselves as accomplishing in the colonies, erected in a very

open, public place, where they would be seen by nearly all who came to or left the city by train. These positive reinforcements envelope the person descending the massive staircase, all while their view is towards the Mediterranean's blue waters only a mile or away, almost bidding the presumably French citizen descending towards it to continue on to the colonies abroad. Yet, there was no need to leave the shores of Marseille to govern colonial subjects. In fact, their numbers in the port city had grown enough during the war that Marseille's leaders wanted to build an entire village for them, providing yet another architecturally based example of how the distinction between colony and metropole had blurred or even disappeared as early as World War I.

The Muslim Village

Although many of the hundreds of thousands of North Africans entering France through Marseille during World War I moved on to other cities or the frontlines, the city nonetheless absorbed a significant number of them. Official government *enquêtes* (inquires) from the period estimate that Marseille's "Muslim North African population" reached 4,000 around 1916 and peaked at 5,000 the following year.⁷⁴ This indicates that by 1916, Marseille had seen its Muslim North African population increase by slightly more than 570 percent from its verifiable numbers in 1912. In 1917, its further growth put the Muslim North African population at an over 700 percent increase from those same 1912 figures. The percentages show that the growth was nothing short of meteoric.

As they came to Marseille, Muslim North African workers took up residence in the city's working-class neighborhoods. This is not surprising. As their own socio-economic condition was generally worse than the French working class by a significant

⁷⁴ Bernard Panza and Bernard Viala, "L'immigration Nord-Africaine à Marseille et dans Les Bouches-du-Rhône, 1906-1939" (Mémoire de maîtrise, Aix-en-Provence, France, 1976-77), 69-70.

degree, it would be difficult to imagine them moving into any better available housing. By 1916, the *Comité d'Action Economique* (Economic Development Agency, or EDA) of the fifteenth arrondissement had become concerned about this demographic shift, and so it became a point of discussion in several of their meetings.⁷⁵ Their concern ultimately led to the very real consideration of building an entire Muslim village for these North African workers in Marseille. Like the expositions, the proposed village would seek to recreate colonial life in metropolitan Marseille. Furthermore, what the EDA considered doing was nothing short of an implementation of practices in the colonies. Not only would this mimic the colonies, where colonial subjects and French citizens lived in distinctly separate places, but the motivation to do this came from the same racial understanding of sanitation and fear of colonial hygiene seen among the French in the colonies.

Explaining the combination of colonial architecture, beliefs about colonial subject's hygiene, and colonial practices that are all manifested in the proposed Muslim village will proceed mostly chronologically. The minutes from two meetings of Marseillais leadership on September 27 and October 3, 1916 show their absorption of colonial views on hygiene and the paternalistic aspects of the French civilizing mission as they justified the project and decided that Adrien Artaud, the same man who later served as the 1922 colonial exposition's commissioner general, should take the lead on it. The blueprints and other plans prepared after these meetings reinforced the use of North African style architecture by the French, just as in the expositions, even relying on the same architect who designed the 1906 exposition's Tunisian Pavilion. Finally, all major

⁷⁵ "Over the course of its last sessions, the Economic Development Agency has been occupied with the question of the Kabyle worker." Monsieur Berton to Adrien Artaud, 22 Septembre 1916, Muslim Village, ML 4274/02, CCI.

outside advisors were French who had first-hand colonial experience, which further illustrates how the perspective and practices from the colonies were grafted into metropolitan Marseille.

The EDA's first course of action was to express its concern to the Prefect of the Bouches-du-Rhône department while advising that separate housing for the Muslim North African workers was the appropriate response. He evidently saw merit in the committee's idea. The Prefect responded by having his assistant, Monsieur Berton, immediately call a meeting of leaders from three major groups: 1) "authorized representatives of Commerce" (which appears to have meant the Chamber of Commerce); 2) the City of Marseille; and 3) the Bouches-du-Rhône department.⁷⁶ At this meeting, they were to discuss the possibility of building a Muslim village, at this point called "*un village kabyle*," in Marseille's fifteenth arrondissement. The meeting happened quickly. Monsieur Berton's letter inviting the President of Marseille's Chamber of Commerce to attend is dated September 22, 1916. The meeting was held only five days later on September 27 at the Bouches-du-Rhône's prefecture in Marseille at 2:30 in the afternoon.

Arguably the most important attendee was Adrien Artaud, who attended as the president of Marseille's colonial-inclined chamber of commerce. "Founded in 1599 to combat pirates," it was the oldest chamber of commerce in France.⁷⁷ In 1753, it had created a department dedicated solely to handling "trade to the Levant and North Africa."⁷⁸ In 1828, one of its chamber members, Pierre-Honoré de Roux, "championed

⁷⁶ Monsieur Berton to Adrien Artaud, 22 Septembre 1916, Muslim Village, ML 4274/02, CCI.

⁷⁷ Michael A. Osborne, *The Emergence of Tropical Medicine in France* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2014), 155.

⁷⁸ Osborne, *The Emergence of Tropical Medicine in France*, 155.

French intervention in Algeria.⁷⁹ This history combined with its then recently sponsored expedition in French West Africa, Marseille's chamber of commerce had made its position quite clear, and Artaud was currently at its helm.⁸⁰ His experience planning this Muslim village undoubtedly contributed to the decision to put him in charge of the 1922 colonial exposition a few years later.

In addition to Artaud and the Prefect, this meeting drew the attendance of several other important officials and influential people.⁸¹ Artaud was accompanied by his Vice President, M. Lombard, and by the *Présidents honoraires* of the Chamber of Commerce, *messieurs* Estrine and Desbief. The President of the main assembly for the whole department, the *Conseil Général*, also attended. Marseille's Mayor was detained, and so sent a proxy, his *adjoint*, M. Delibes. As the affair at hand concerned colonial workers, the Commander of the Colonial Depot, Lieutenant Colonel Roy-Roux was there. The Colonial Depot was where North Africans arriving on Marseille's docks to work in France would be processed before going to their assigned job. It did not matter if their ultimate destination was local, such as Marseille, or on the other side of the country, such as Le Havre. All North Africans passed through the Colonial Depot. As a major employer of North-African workers in the fifteenth arrondissement, *les Raffineries de Sucre de St-Louis* (the Sugar Refineries of St. Louis, generally referred to as St. Louis Sucre) also had representation at the meeting. They sent an *Administrateur-Délégué*, M. Bourgougnon, and further had the representation of M. Desbief mentioned above, who in addition to his work with the Chamber of Commerce was the President of the sugar refinery's

⁷⁹ Osborne, *The Emergence of Tropical Medicine in France*, 156.

⁸⁰ Goodwin, *Africa in Europe*, 176.

⁸¹ Monsieur Berton to Adrien Artaud, 22 Septembre 1916, Muslim Village, ML 4274/02, CCI; Minutes, 3 October 1916, Muslim Village, ML 4274/02, CCI.

Administrative Council.⁸² With the exception of outside experts that would be consulted later, the heavily business-minded group that assembled at this first meeting comprised all those who were involved with the Muslim Village.

There was one overarching rationale for the project expressed at the meeting—to provide North African workers with the “hygiene, comfort and morality.”⁸³ The importance of this train of thought can hardly be overstated. Indeed, hygiene and morality were the main reasons for building a Muslim village mentioned in M. Berton’s letter of invitation to the September 27th meeting. He stated that: “among the recommended means [of stabilizing North African workers in Marseille], one of the most effective could be, it seems, the construction of a neighborhood where the North African working population can live in conditions of hygiene and morality which currently they greatly lack.”⁸⁴

It might be thought that Marseille’s leaders believed Muslim North Africans had poor hygiene because they lived in working-class neighborhoods, but the minutes from the September 27 meeting make it clear that this was not the case. Rather, they were concerned about insertion of colonial subjects into metropolitan life, where North Africans “do not find the lodgings natural and conforming to their tastes.”⁸⁵ The men at this meeting believed that “their [North African] presence” posed “certain dangers and certain inconveniences for the white population of these neighborhoods.”⁸⁶ In its context, the “dangers” and “inconveniences” were likely the dangers of communicable diseases. This is significant because it shows that the usual fear held by metropolitan elites of catching a communicable disease from the white working class had been displaced by the

⁸² Minutes, 3 October 1916, Muslim Village, ML 4274/02, CCI.

⁸³ Minutes, 3 October 1916, Muslim Village, ML 4274/02, CCI.

⁸⁴ Monsieur Berton to Adrien Artaud, 22 Septembre 1916, Muslim Village, ML 4274/02, CCI.

⁸⁵ Minutes, 3 October 1916, Muslim Village, ML 4274/02, CCI.

⁸⁶ Minutes, 3 October 1916, Muslim Village, ML 4274/02, CCI.

even greater and more urgent fear of catching a communicable disease from the Muslim colonial subjects spread out through “diverse” parts of Marseille.⁸⁷ The answer to this was the same as in the colonies: paternalistic intervention to elevate the colonial subject to the standards of French civilization while simultaneously separating them from the French population.

The approaches taken to bring the hygiene of colonial subjects to French notions of civilization in the early-twentieth century can be traced back to the metropole. During the nineteenth century, France came to view personal hygiene as an issue of morality that could be addressed by society through public policy. The cholera outbreak of 1832 took 18,000 Parisians to the grave and “raised the question of what conditions favored the disease. Some predisposing factors were extrinsic: the entire environment of the working class, its way of life, its diet, its clothing, its housing.”⁸⁸ To control such environments then, hygiene became something that could be corrected through public policy and thus “fell under the purview of municipal engineers, the police, and public administrators, who attempted to reduce foul odors and to counteract the effects of deadly vaporous miasmas in the air, water and waste of crowded urban centers.”⁸⁹ A vivid example of this is the Parisian sewer system. In the decades after 1832, the sewers of Paris were improved to such an extent that they became a source of pride for the city. In fact, taking a boat tour of the capital’s sewers became commonplace in the nineteenth century, even drawing dignitaries such as the King of Portugal into its subterranean world.⁹⁰

⁸⁷ Minutes, 3 October 1916, Muslim Village, ML 4274/02, CCI.

⁸⁸ François Delaporte, *Disease and Civilization: The Cholera in Paris, 1832* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1986), 4, 198.

⁸⁹ Janet R. Horne, *A Social Laboratory for Modern France: The Musée Social and the Rise of the Welfare State* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2006), 224.

⁹⁰ Donald Reid, *Paris Sewers and Sewermen: Realities and Representations* (Cambridge: MA, Harvard University Press, 1993), 39.

Redesigning and engineering a city then, was becoming an acceptable way for the elites to correct what they saw as an unhygienic working-class environment, and it would later be done in colonial settings as well.

But city planning was not the only factor, for by the end of the nineteenth century, advancements in biological science had led French society to better understand how disease spread. In 1854, John Snow's study of a cholera epidemic in London challenged the then long-held miasma theory, which claimed that disease spreads through pollutions in the air. Already doubting the miasma theory, Snow hypothesized that the water supply had something to do with cholera's spread. "With help from the city bureaucracy," Snow was able to carry out a study that found nearly everyone dead from the disease had drunk a water pump on Broad Street.⁹¹ Snow not only saved lives and cast doubt on miasma theory, but his methods also gave rise to the modern discipline of epidemiology. In the following decades, the French scientist Louis Pasteur further challenged miasma theory with germ theory. Much of Pasteur work revolved around ways to improve French industries of wine, silk production and agriculture. "Undrinkable beer, spoiled wine, and diseases of silkworms were the subjects of Pasteur's initial studies. He turned to anthrax, a disease of cattle, in 1878."⁹² His study of yeast and fermentation led him to conclude that microorganisms, small germs of life, spread disease, culminating in his germ theory in 1880.⁹³ Such important discoveries by Snow, Pasteur, and others in the biological sciences thus "redirected the attention of hygienists to the disinfection of factories, sweatshops, schools, tenements, and other buildings where contagious microbes were

⁹¹ John G. Simmons, *Doctors and Discoveries: Lives that Created Today's Medicine* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2002), 164.

⁹² Simmons, *Doctors and Discoveries*, 18.

⁹³ Simmons, *Doctors and Discoveries*, 18.

thought to be lurking.”⁹⁴ Meanwhile, these new scientific developments, coupled with the notion that a city can be engineered to bring behavior in line with French sanitation and hygiene standards found their way to the colonies.

Indeed, public health had become an important part of France’s civilizing mission. As Paul Rabinow put it in *French Modern*, “if the sign of civilization was a busy road, the sign of modernity was hygiene. The Chinese, after all, had also animated commerce and secured the roads. The French had higher standards to meet.”⁹⁵ At the turn of the century, the French were determined to elevate their colonial subjects from what the brutal French colonial leader Joseph-Simon Gallieni saw in French-Indochina as their “general lack of hygiene,” and “tribal traits” that were not “worthy of respect but simple indications of a lack of civilization” to a respectable level of association.⁹⁶ From 1890 on, public health in the French colonial empire fell on doctors and pharmacists who conducted research, founded and taught at schools of medicine, as well as created the *Assistance Médicale Indigène* (Indigene Medical Assistance) and 14 *Instituts Pasteurs* throughout the French empire.⁹⁷ They also established a school in Marseille that was dedicated to tropical medicine, called *l’école du Pharo*.⁹⁸ Opened in 1907, “some 267 postgraduate students in medicine and pharmacy passed through the Pharo” before its suspension due to World War I in 1914.⁹⁹ Its impact was even greater when it reopened.

⁹⁴ Horne, *A Social Laboratory for Modern France*, 224.

⁹⁵ Rabinow, *French Modern*, 149.

⁹⁶ Rabinow, *French Modern*, 149-150.

⁹⁷ Denise Bouche, *Histoire de la colonisation française: Flux et reflux (1815-1962)* (Saint-Amand-Montrond, Cher: Fayard, 1991), 236.

⁹⁸ Sylvie Clair, “L’expansion coloniale française,” in *Désirs d’ailleurs: Les expositions coloniales de Marseille 1906 et 1922*, ed. Archives de la ville de Marseille. (Marseille: Alors hors du temps, 2006), 17.

⁹⁹ Osborne, *The Emergence of Tropical Medicine in France*, 184.

Between 1925 and 1956 “one of every four colonial physicians serving the empire” had graduated from the Pharo.¹⁰⁰

Ironically, the need to improve public sanitation in the colonies was often due to the side effects of colonialism itself, but Europeans did not seem to notice this. On the contrary, Europeans often congratulated themselves on addressing the problems they created. For instance, white British soldiers had their share of responsibility for the contraction and spreading of sexually transmitted diseases at various posts throughout the colonial empire. Indeed, compared to their non-white soldiering counterparts, they were infected and in need of treatment more frequently at Dinapore and Dum-Dum in 1868 and 1869. Still, this did not prevent Britain from placing the blame for these outbreaks on colonial soldiers and/or colonial women.¹⁰¹ Britain then responded by passing legislation in “almost all of Britain’s overseas possessions” aimed at controlling colonial contagious diseases.¹⁰² Meanwhile, in Morocco, as the architect Henri Prost altered Moroccan cities and Arab slums began to appear on their periphery, he complained of how they were “dangerous sources of contamination, despite the ceaseless intervention of Health Services.”¹⁰³ It never occurred to him that the slums were a result of displacement created by his new cities. Europeans had thus become convinced that colonial populations were less hygienic, and therefore more likely to transmit communicable diseases.

Afraid of the illnesses allegedly carried by colonial subjects, nineteenth and twentieth-century colonizers responded by physically removing themselves. They went to spa towns, found in both the British and French colonies, where climatic or

¹⁰⁰ Osborne, *The Emergence of Tropical Medicine in France*, 222.

¹⁰¹ Levine, *Prostitution, Race and Politics*, 283.

¹⁰² Levine, *Prostitution, Race and Politics*, 16.

¹⁰³ Quoted in Abu-Lughod, *Rabat*, 161.

hydrotherapeutic cures were available to help Europeans overcome the *colonialites*, (the “colonial ills,” to which they were allegedly exposed).¹⁰⁴ Here, Europeans who “craved the familiar” could go to “sites of leisure and medicine created in the image of the metropole.”¹⁰⁵

Thus, French colonial public health measures boiled down to two aspects by the start of the twentieth century. First, French colonizers redesigned the colonial subject’s environment to make it hygienic, as was ostensibly being done with the working class in the metropole. At times, this also meant creating institutions and bringing in professionals intended to elevate colonial subjects’ hygiene to European standards, as seen by the Pharo school in Marseille. The second aspect though was keeping colonial subjects and themselves, the Europeans, separated whenever possible, especially as the understanding of germ theory grew. Combined, these two aspects created a situation in which the French were trying to avoid physical contact with the very people they were supposedly in the midst of “civilizing.”

The rationale for building the Muslim village, given by Marseille’s leadership in 1916, displays both aspects of French colonial views on public and hygiene. To start, they wanted to alter the environment of Marseille’s Muslim North Africans on the premise of improving their hygiene. Crucially though, the Muslim village was intended to separate them from the white population. As Muslim North Africans came to be “dispersed in numerous neighborhoods” of Marseille, it increased the probability that

¹⁰⁴ Jennings, *Curing the Colonizers*, 1, 4.

¹⁰⁵ Jennings, *Curing the Colonizers*, 1, 5.

Marseille's European population would be exposed to them and to the diseases that, according to these views, they carried.¹⁰⁶

This is not to say that overcrowding and poor conditions did not exist in the neighborhoods where Muslims lived, for they certainly did. In some instances, North Africans even rented the same bed that someone else slept in while the other was at work.¹⁰⁷ Significantly though, they rented their beds, lived, and worked in metropolitan Marseille, meaning that they functioned in a physical sense within the same metropolitan and French structure that their white neighbors did. So the fact that Marseille's leadership believe that Muslim North Africans needed to be separated from them to prevent the spread of dangerous communicable diseases confirms that they were thinking in colonial terms. Like their counterparts in the colonies seeking hydrotherapy while "civilizing" colonial subjects, Marseille's leaders wanted the Muslim North African population separated from them, but in doing so, they also wanted to carry out the civilizing mission by improving their hygiene.

Those present at the September 27 meeting decided that the Muslim village should move forward, and several points of order were immediately decided to enable further progress. The location where it was to be built also had to be decided. This proved exceptionally easy and was decided that same afternoon. As a large employer of Muslim North Africans, M. Desbief had become particularly enthusiastic about the project and offered 41,000 square meters of the St. Louis Sucre's land to lease or sell for the village.¹⁰⁸ The land consisted of a large lot in the 15th arrondissement that sat between

¹⁰⁶ Minutes, 3 October 1916, Muslim Village, ML 4274/02, CCI.

¹⁰⁷ "Rapport: Conditions dans lesquelles sont logés les Arabes et les Kabyles travaillant à Marseille," Muslim Village, ML 4274/02, CCI.

¹⁰⁸ Minutes, 3 October 1916, Muslim Village, ML 4274/02, CCI.

Route Nationale N8 de Paris à Marseille et Toulon (now known as *Rue de Lyon*) and *Chemin de la Commanderie*.¹⁰⁹ This was immediately adopted as the planned site. Had it ever been built, the village would have been just a few minutes' walk from the St. Louis Sucre factory, which is still there and operating today.

Leadership for the project was finalized as well. With the exception of the representatives from the Chamber of Commerce, it was unanimous that the responsibility for overseeing the planning and logistics of the village should fall on them. It was noted on several occasions that the Chamber had an “a particular interest” in the “exotic” colonial workers, especially Kabyles.¹¹⁰ Considering its long history of active support for colonialism, it is not difficult to imagine that the Chamber had a “particular interest,” which in this instance was likely the lower wages that North Africans would accept. From this point forward, President Artaud became the central figure in the developments of the Muslim village.

President Artaud made a few important decisions that afternoon. He suggested creating a “*société*,” which was essentially a legal body, comparable to a corporation that would serve as the legal body for handling the financial aspects of building the Muslim village. This motion was carried. He also called for a study to be completed over the course of the next month that would include the specifics of how this society should function, as well as “the type, cost and number of buildings to build” within the Muslim village.¹¹¹ The study was entrusted to Armand Chapusot, the *Directeur Général du Service de l'Outillage et des Hangars de la Chambre de Commerce*, who was responsible

¹⁰⁹ “Plan General, Canalisations, Assainissements, Machinerie,” Muslim Village, ML 4274/02, CCI.

¹¹⁰ “Note Administrative sur la construction d'un village arabe à Marseille,” Muslim Village, ML 4274/02, CCI.

¹¹¹ Minutes, 3 October 1916, Muslim Village, ML 4274/02, CCI.

for any physical maintenance and construction associated with property belonging to the chamber of commerce.¹¹² It was also noted that President Artaud would write letters to two experts seeking more advice: one to M. Lutaud, the Governor-General of Algeria, who would have more familiarity with Algerians; the other to M. Resplandy, the architect in Tunis, who was behind the “remarkable Tunisian Pavilion at the National Colonial Exposition of 1906” held in Marseille.¹¹³

On October 3 of the following week, President Artaud informed the Chamber of Commerce of their new role in undertaking the proposed Muslim village. The entire Chamber supported it, with the exception of one member, Monsieur Rieu, who labeled all African workers as “undesirables” who were given to brawls, and as harbingers of diseases that “threatened to cause epidemics in working-class neighborhoods.”¹¹⁴ He further suggested that North African workers be housed in the very factories in which they work “without contact with the surrounding population.”¹¹⁵ No one present at the meeting agreed with Rieu’s suggestion to house North Africans in the factories, but his attitude and demeanor do reflect, albeit in a forceful and overt manner, the fears and attitudes embedded in early-twentieth-century French colonial thought. Rieu’s description of North Africans as less civilized, carrying disease, and needing to be kept separate from Europeans only lacks the paternalistic desire to make them more culturally French to be completely in line with general colonial views.

¹¹² Minutes, 6 July 1917, Muslim Village, ML 4274/02, CCI; Monsieur *L’Administrateur Directeur* to Armand Chapusot, 11 November 1917, Muslim Village, ML 4274/02, CCI.

¹¹³ Minutes, 3 October 1916, Muslim Village, ML 4274/02, CCI.

¹¹⁴ Minutes, 3 October 1916, Muslim Village, ML 4274/02, CCI.

¹¹⁵ Minutes, 3 October 1916, Muslim Village, ML 4274/02, CCI.

Chapusot's study took much longer than the one month asked of him. President Artaud did not receive the final product on February 10, 1917.¹¹⁶ The two men were certainly in touch through that time though, and this is evident from the report's inclusion of suggestions made by the various experts on North Africa with whom President Artaud exchanged letters in late 1916 and early 1917, just as he had discussed doing at the September 27th meeting. Most essential among them was Monsieur Resplandy, the architect in Tunis. The Governor-General of Algeria was contacted as well. President Artaud also wrote to academic associations in Paris for advice on studying the Arab world and Islam. In response, he received a list of books to read on the subjects. He further had contact with two French "*peintres orientalistes*" (orientalist artists), José Silbert and Nasreddine Dinet, the latter of whom had converted to Islam before the war. Their input, evident within the blueprints for the actual Muslim village, demonstrate that urban planning occurring in the French empire abroad—or what Gwendolyn Write has called colonial urbanism—was just what President Artaud had planned to do within Marseille, within the very metropole itself. Intending to or not, President Artaud's choices further demonstrate that the Muslim village project was as much about colonialism as it was about housing.

President Artaud wrote Resplandy a short letter one week after his meeting with the Chamber of Commerce, on October 10. After describing the project in a few sentences, he complimented Resplandy's work at Marseille's Colonial Exposition of 1906 and made it evident that the Chamber of Commerce's members were familiar with and had enjoyed his work. "We remember your remarkable Tunisian pavilion at our

¹¹⁶ Monsieur Armand Chapusot to Adrien Artaud, 10 February 1917, Muslim Village, ML 4274/02, CCI.

¹¹⁷ Adrien Artaud to Monsieur Resplandy, 10 October 1916, Muslim Village, ML 4274/02, CCI.

Exposition of 1906,” he wrote.¹¹⁷ President Artaud then asked for some schematics, nothing detailed or complex, though he does specify that he and the Chamber would like to see schematics for housing for both single and married workers. He also acknowledges his and the Chamber’s “ignorance” on the matter, and calls Resplandy’s potential participation “precious” to them.¹¹⁸ Indeed, his participation was.

Artaud sent more letters to Resplandy than any other outside adviser. The next letter that appears in the records is dated October 28, but he references another letter that he sent to Resplandy on October 19. In this letter, President Artaud sent accompanying documents, such as a map of the city with the location of the land that St. Louis Sucre was willing to sell. He also described the terrain, noting that there was no vegetation worth taking into account other than a few trees, specifically a few olive trees, found around the perimeter.¹¹⁹ On November 13, Artaud sent another letter that provided details Resplandy had requested from the Chamber of Commerce the week prior. Here, President Artaud makes clear the three items they would like from Resplandy: 1) “a draft of a schematic of the Arab and Kabyle village” that they could adapt to Marseille; 2) the elevation and layout of North African *gourbis* (an Arab word for groups of tents); 3) and general information on Islam, specifically as it would apply to “this study.”¹²⁰ Resplandy’s seven-page response, dated December 11, became the basis for Chapusot’s blueprints.¹²¹ What he sent called for a city within a city. In terms of housing, there would be 50 houses for families and 400 rooms for unmarried workers, or at least, for

¹¹⁷ Adrien Artaud to Monsieur Resplandy, 10 October 1916, Muslim Village, ML 4274/02, CCI.

¹¹⁸ Adrien Artaud to Monsieur Resplandy, 10 October 1916, Muslim Village, ML 4274/02, CCI.

¹¹⁹ Adrien Artaud to Monsieur Resplandy, 28 October 1916, Muslim Village, ML 4274/02, CCI.

¹²⁰ Adrien Artaud to Monsieur Resplandy, 13 November 1916, Muslim Village, ML 4274/02, CCI.

¹²¹ “Notes pour la construction d’un village kabyle par l’architecte J. Resplandy,” 11 December 1916, Muslim Village, ML 4274/02, CCI.

workers who did not have their families with them (see Figure 16). For those in the latter group, six men would have occupied each room (see Figure 17). In total, the Muslim Village would have housed approximately 3,000 residents, or 75 percent of Marseille's total Muslim population in 1916.¹²² Beyond that, he proposed everything a Muslim city would need, which was basically the rebuilding of his Tunisian Pavilion at Marseille's 1906 colonial exposition: a mosque; "Moor" cafes; restaurants designated to serve North African cuisine; a hammam (a Middle-Eastern bath house); fountains with an "Arab impression" for washing and drinking; and stores that can "provide the *Indigènes* with the products of the metropole and those of their country to which they are accustomed."¹²³ Of course, in keeping with the public health rationale for the Muslim village, Resplandy noted the need for a sewer system to allow "the inhabitants the observation of the most rudimentary prescriptions of hygiene."¹²⁴ Using figures from his role in building the 1906 Tunisian pavilion, he figured the total cost would be 1,500,000 francs.¹²⁵ The blueprints that came together in February 1917 followed these recommendations nearly to the letter.

To create not just a Muslim area or neighborhood, but a whole separate Muslim city within an otherwise white city, is a distinctly colonial approach to urban planning. This was precisely the kind of planning undertaken in Morocco at nearly the same time that Marseille's leadership was discussing their Muslim village. Hubert Lyautey had

¹²² The proposed plan called for 400 rooms for single men that would be shared by six occupants each, rendering a total of 2,400 single Muslim men. Another 50 domiciles were proposed for married workers. These plans do not make mention of how many children would be here. It is safe to assume that French officials would have expected some number of children to exist among 50 families. Excluding children, 2,500 adults would have occupied the village. "Notes pour la construction d'un village kabyle par l'architecte J. Resplandy," 11 December 1916, Muslim Village, ML 4274/02, CCI.

¹²³ "Notes pour la construction d'un village kabyle par l'architecte J. Resplandy," 11 December 1916, Muslim Village, ML 4274/02, CCI.

¹²⁴ "Notes pour la construction d'un village kabyle par l'architecte J. Resplandy," 11 December 1916, Muslim Village, ML 4274/02, CCI.

¹²⁵ "Notes pour la construction d'un village kabyle par l'architecte J. Resplandy," 11 December 1916, Muslim Village, ML 4274/02, CCI.




Figure 16. Blueprint of housing for North African families. "Types de Maisons pour Familles," Muslim Village, CCI, ML 4274/02.



Figure 17. Blueprint of housing for single North African workers. “Types de Salles pour Célibataires,” Muslim Village, CCI, ML 4274/02.

become France's first resident-general of the newly acquired protectorate in 1912, a position he held until 1925.¹²⁶ During this time, Lyautey turned the city of Rabat into Morocco's new capital with the help of the architect Henri Prost. In doing so, "Prost worked carefully since he did not want 'to spoil' old Rabat."¹²⁷ What they created was in effect two cities, one the old Kasbah and a few other neighborhoods and buildings, the other a new European-style area for white settlers and colonial leaders, called "*villes nouvelles*," which "in every case encircled the medinas with European development."¹²⁸

In the minds of French leaders, they were displaying true cultural sensitivity. They thought that this approach to urban planning in the colonies fit well within the civilizing mission's concept of association, because they were seeking to avoid damaging the architecture and culture of those they colonized. In fact, this line of thinking is precisely one of the points on which the French came to view themselves as less racist than the British in how they built their empire. As Guillaume de Tarde, an urbanist, later said in defense of Lyautey's cities in Morocco: "separation, yes, but not radical separation. This is not a kind of contemptuous attitude towards the native city (an attitude which I think is the English approach)."¹²⁹ William Hoisington Jr. has summed up French planners in general as viewing their "'dual city' approach, which in a serendipitous fashion saved the *medinas* from derestriction," as not being "a 'radical separation' *à l'anglaise* based on racial distance, but a 'discreet separation' of two cities that remained tightly bound together."¹³⁰

¹²⁶ W. Brian Newsome, *French Urban Planning, 1940-1968: The Construction and Deconstruction of an Authoritarian System* (New York: Peter Lang Publishing, Inc., 2009), 33.

¹²⁷ Hoisington, Jr., *Lyautey and the French Conquest of Morocco*, 110.

¹²⁸ Gwendolyn Wright, *The Politics of Design in French Colonial Urbanism* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), 153.

¹²⁹ Quoted in Rabinow, *French Modern*, 294.

¹³⁰ Hoisington, Jr., *Lyautey and the French Conquest of Morocco*, 108.

Scholars have pointed out a disconnect between the benevolence that the French saw in their colonial urban planning and reality. The fiercely anticolonialist Frantz Fanon described such planning in the most hostile of terms. “The Europeans city is not the prolongation of the native city. The colonizers have not settled in the midst of the natives. They have surrounded the native city; they have laid siege to it. Every exit from the Kasbah of Algiers opens on enemy territory. And so it is in Constantine, in Oran, in Blida, in Bone.”¹³¹ Janet L. Abu-Lughod, who equates Lyautey’s urban planning in Rabat to apartheid, has written that “The split in the urban hierarchy was paralleled by a fission within each of the major cities, as Lyautey’s planners designed extensive appendages intended to house, at luxurious standards and at outrageously wasteful densities, an upper caste, consisting of French civil servants and a foreign bourgeoisie, which was superimposed upon the class structure of the country.”¹³² While French of the early-twentieth-century might not have been capable of seeing the inequality and racism within it, the dual city layout is the epitome of France’s uniquely colonial urban planning; and this exactly what Artaud was considering in Marseille.

Along with the bifurcated design of colonial cities, “orientalism” makes up another crucial aspect of colonial urban planning that manifested itself in Marseille’s proposed Muslim Village. The term has been used to describe Western depictions of Middle Eastern and Asian cultures in art, literature, architecture, and so on. It has taken a rather negative connotation since Edward Said’s *Orientalism* argued that orientalists, particularly in Britain, France, and the United States, use an imagined fantasy version of Asian cultures as their Other, which sets up a skewed juxtaposition to praise and

¹³¹ Fanon, *A Dying Colonialism*, 51-52.

¹³² Abu-Lughod, *Rabat*, 151.

empower the West while denigrating and taking power from the East.¹³³ Orientalism has manifested itself in architecture, literature, and art since the start of European imperialism in the nineteenth century, and colonial urban planning is no exception to this. Colonial architects designing new cities wielded the power, deciding where colonial subjects would live, how big or small their homes would be and what amenities they would have. This perfectly describes the power balance displayed in the planning of Marseille's Muslim village.

Somewhat related to orientalism, colonial urban planning often reduced the diversity of North Africans into one cohesive group. Like at the colonial expositions, French architects designed structures that seemed authentic in their simplified understanding of a colony's cultures and styles, which the French often saw as a single culture and style. Gwendolyn Wright provides an example of this through the work of French architect Albert Laprade, in Morocco in 1918. "Laprade's oversimplified generalization about Islamic aesthetics suggest a darker side to the apparent cultural sensitivity, quite similar to the academic prejudices and policies Edward Said has labeled 'Orientalism.' As a design, this district [of Casablanca] was a Western stage-setting for Moroccan life, a Disneyland world."¹³⁴

This tendency for simplification and reduction manifested itself in Marseille as well. Resplandy and his fellow architects who designed the pavilions for the 1906 colonial exposition went to great lengths to create authentic colonial representations, but despite the great lengths to which they went, they fell into generalizations and caricatures. Relying so heavily on the 1906 colonial exposition for his inspiration, Artaud

¹³³ Edward Said, *Orientalism* (New York: Vintage Books, 1979).

¹³⁴ Wright, *French Colonial Urbanism*, 157-158.

fell into simplifications as well. His letter to Resplandy on October 28, 1916 stated that the Muslim village would house Kabyles families and Arabs “from several tribes,” and he clearly saw no issue with that.¹³⁵ Nor did Resplandy. Demonstrating his capacity for simplification from Tunisia, he wrote in his proposal on December 11: “We believe we should add that in executing this construction as economically as possible, it will be however possible to give them [the buildings] a certain artistic charm with some purely Arab characteristics.”¹³⁶ Clearly “Arab characteristics” is a sweeping generalization, yet he comes across as proud of offering North Africans what he considers authentic housing despite costs. From the dual-city nature of the plan for the proposed Muslim village, to its orientalist power dynamic and simplified aesthetics, Resplandy had become the Henri Prost to Artaud’s inner Lyautey.

Artaud also wrote to the Governor-General of Algeria. In response, the Governor-General sent a two-page letter on November 25th. He drew attention to the important logistical point that most workers would be single, or at least not bringing their families with them. He also implied that building a mosque or places of worship would not be particularly important to the workers in Marseille, because “prayer is neglected enough by the *Indigènes* from the countryside and above all by the workers” who can always pray in nearly “*tout endroit*” (any place).¹³⁷ Dismissive of Islam, his comments also reflected the attitudes exhibited by his contemporaries on public health in the colonies. Describing North African housing, he stated that “often the domesticated animals, goats,

¹³⁵ Adrien Artaud to Monsieur Resplandy, 28 October 1916, Muslim Village, ML 4274/02, CCI.

¹³⁶ “Notes pour la construction d’un village kabyle par l’architecte J. Resplandy,” 11 December 1916, Muslim Village, ML 4274/02, CCI.

¹³⁷ The Governor-General of Algeria to Adrien Artaud, 26 November 1916, Muslim Village, ML 4274/02, CCI.

sheep cows, are sheltered under the same room.”¹³⁸ This sounds very similar to the observations Gallieni made in Indochina: “as for the houses, they seem to be as dirty as on the other side of the border. Animals and people live together pell-mell in a promiscuity which is common in these regions.”¹³⁹ Overall, the Governor-General colonial perspective served to reinforce Marseille’s absorption of colonial public health views.

In addition to seeking the colonial advice of Monsieur Resplandy and the Governor General of Algeria, Monsieur Lutaud, President Artaud wrote to the *Association de Documentation Bibliographique, Scientifique, Industrielle et Commerciale*, located in the ninth arrondissement of Paris, to enrich his own understanding of North Africans. On November 18, he received a letter from this association that, after briefly encouraging him to become a member at the cost of 100 francs, proceeded with a two-page annotated list of 15 books to help President Artaud and his engineer better understand North-African culture and life.¹⁴⁰ There is no indication that President Artaud read all of the books listed, but they give us some insight into the kind of expert advice he was likely to get.

At the very least, President Artaud saw an excerpt from Etienne Villot’s *Mœurs coutumes et institutions des indigènes de l’Algérie*. Villot was one of three authors that the *Association de Documentation Bibliographique, Scientifique, Industrielle et Commerciale* specifically encouraged Artaud to examine. The reason for this was that Villot’s book contained a drawing of the layout of a Kabyle home, as the Parisian

¹³⁸ The Governor-General of Algeria to Adrien Artaud, 26 November 1916, Muslim Village, ML 4274/02, CCI.

¹³⁹ Rabinow, *French Modern*, 149

¹⁴⁰ *Association de Documentation Bibliographique, Scientifique, Industrielle et Commerciale* to Adrien Artaud, 18 November 1916, Muslim Village, ML 4274/02, CCI.

association's director pointed out: "I call in particular your attention to the work of Villot, where on page 16 there is a blueprint a Kabyle home that we can copy for you."¹⁴¹ This interested Artaud enough to make sure he obtained a copy of the drawing (see Figure 18). On November 28, he received a letter from the *Association de Documentation Bibliographique* in Paris that accompanied "the blueprint of the Kabyle house, extracted from the work cited by Colonel Villot."¹⁴²

This basic sketch influenced the blueprints for the Muslim village (see Figure 19). It could not be expected to be the same, given that Chapusot was designing housing for largely unwed, industrial workers, not mountain dwelling agricultural workers in polygamous families.¹⁴³ Still, the very basic idea of a room for sleep attached to a courtyard is present in both the single housing and the married housing presented by Chapusot (see Figure 19). More importantly, this offers another example of the civilizing mission and orientalism in practice as the French understanding of a Muslim lifestyle is used to make plans for actual Muslims. It also speaks to the French desire to not only control public spaces, such as location of Muslims in Marseille, but to control private spaces, such as the layout and function of Muslim homes.

Artaud's expert consultations were largely done through letters that overlapped in their chronology between October 1916 and January 1917. The letters exchanged with the two orientalist painters came towards the end of this time frame. José Silbert was a

¹⁴¹ *Association de Documentation Bibliographique, Scientifique, Industrielle et Commerciale* to Adrien Artaud, 18 November 1916, Muslim Village, ML 4274/02, CCI.

¹⁴² *Association de Documentation Bibliographique, Scientifique, Industrielle et Commerciale* to Adrien Artaud, 28 November 1916, Muslim Village, ML 4274/02, CCI.


¹⁴³ Etienne Cécile Edouard Villot, *Mœurs coutumes et institutions des indigènes de l'Algérie*, 3rd ed. (Paris: Jourdan, 1888), 15-17.

— 16 —

Les massifs montagneux habités par les Berbères, tels que la Kabylie, ont de véritables maisons, toutes construites sur un modèle identique, et qu'on retrouve dans les villes et les oasis.

LA MAISON

Nous empruntons à l'excellent ouvrage du capitaine Devaux, de regrettable mémoire, le plan et la description de la maison kabyle.



1. Porte de la première partie. — 2. Cour destinée aux troupeaux de moutons et de chèvres. — 3. Porte de la maison, proprement dite. — 4. Logement de chef de famille et des femmes. — 5. Lit en pierre, qui sert au chef de famille. — 6. Trou où l'on allume le feu. — 7. Fenêtre. — 8. Élévation en terre qui supporte les jarres affectant la forme de l'amphore romaine. — 9. Piquets fichés dans les murs pour soutenir le métier à laine. — 10. Porte. — 11. Écurie (mulets, vaches, bœufs, paille, foin, tabac, etc.) — 12. Fenêtres.

Quelques maisons ont un étage.

Figure 18. Villot's Kabyle house. Villot, *Mœurs coutumes et institutions des indigènes de l'Algérie*, 16.




Figure 19. Kabyle house proposal based on Villot's sketch. "Plan de Maison Kabyle," Muslim Village, CCI, ML 4274/02.

local artist from Aix-en-Provence who had done several pieces where North Africans served as his subjects. He later became the commissioner of arts for the 1922 colonial exposition over which Artaud took the lead role.¹⁴⁴ He wrote a very short, three-paragraph note on February 5. It offers a few pieces of technical advice, such as how to use bricks in building stairs in an oriental style, but his main point was to introduce a letter from his fellow orientalist painter and personal friend, Dinet.

Nasreddine Dinet was as close as a Frenchman might come to North African perspective. Originally named Alphonse Etienne Dinet, he was born in Paris and educated at the *École des Beaux-Arts*. In 1905, he moved to Bou-Sâada, Algeria, where he converted to Islam in December 1913.¹⁴⁵ A committed French-Muslim, he changed his first name to Nasreddine and eventually made the one-time pilgrimage to Mecca expected of all devout Muslims with the means to do so (the *Hajj*) in 1929.¹⁴⁶

Dinet's letter focused on the construction of the mosque. He starts with general directions for the whole of it. For example, he instructs them to ensure that its "orientation [is] towards Mecca, that is to say, for Marseille, between east and south-east," and that there are rugs on the ground.¹⁴⁷ Dinet then proceeds with specific aspects of the mosque, describing the mihrab, mimber, minaret, dome, and the windows, specifically the mashrabyas. Dinet's advice did not factor into the blueprints for the mosque. His letter could not have arrived until February 5 at the soonest, as Silbert's letter accompanied it, and the blueprints were completed on February 1.¹⁴⁸ That does not

¹⁴⁴ Fletcher, "Capital of the Colonies," 145, 153.

¹⁴⁵ Mansour Abrous, *Algérie, arts plastiques: Dictionnaire biographique (1900-2010)* (Paris : Editions L'Harmattan, 2011), 249.

¹⁴⁶ Abrous, *Algérie, arts plastiques*, 249.

¹⁴⁷ Nasreddine Dinet to Adrien Artaud, 25 January 1917, Muslim Village, ML 4274/02, CCI.

¹⁴⁸ José Gilbert to Adrien Artaud, 25 Janvier 1917, 25 January 1917, Muslim Village, ML 4274/02, CCI.

mean, of course, that Dinet's letter might not have still influenced the building of the Muslim village had the project moved forward. However, the fact that Marseille's leaders would move forward with the blueprints for a mosque without the input of any Muslims as far as can be seen, even from a white French Muslim, displays the extent to which the paternalism of European and Christian superiority embedded within the civilizing mission factored into Marseille's decisions regarding colonial workers.

Chapout's blueprints and final report were both finished on February 1.¹⁴⁹ Ultimately, he proposed a village that could support 1,160 long-term residences and a hotel that could hold another 40 for a total of 1,200 residents.¹⁵⁰ Though smaller in its total capacity than Resplandy's letters called for, it relied on his vision of unwed workers housed together and a self-sustainable city within a city. It would have consisted of six blocks, separated by five-meter wide streets, shops, public gardens, and many other amenities.¹⁵¹ It even would have included a hammam and a mosque (see Figure 20). Infrastructure included an impressive sewer system, water supply to permit the existence of a public washhouse capable of accommodating 20 people at a time, and a power grid with 25 public lights, which did not even include the lighting inside the buildings.¹⁵² Clearly, the health and sanitation impetus of designing the Muslim village had not been forgotten. As for the price, Chapot took two separate estimates that led him to conclude

¹⁴⁹ "Rapport sur le projet de création d'un société anonyme pour l'édification et l'exploitation d'un village musulman à Marseille," 1 February 1917, Muslim Village, ML 4274/02, CCI.

¹⁵⁰ "Rapport sur le projet de création d'un société anonyme pour l'édification et l'exploitation d'un village musulman à Marseille," 1 February 1917, Muslim Village, ML 4274/02, CCI.

¹⁵¹ "Rapport sur le projet de création d'un société anonyme pour l'édification et l'exploitation d'un village musulman à Marseille," 1 February 1917, Muslim Village, ML 4274/02, CCI.

¹⁵² "Rapport sur le projet de création d'un société anonyme pour l'édification et l'exploitation d'un village musulman à Marseille," 1 February 1917, Muslim Village, ML 4274/02, CCI.




Figure 20. Sketch of the proposed mosque. "Avant projet de village arabe et kabyle," 1 February 1917, Muslim Village, CCI, ML 4274/02.

that: “the total cost for the execution of the project [would be] at 1,689,483.61 francs.”¹⁵³

Despite having come so far in its development, the Muslim village was never realized and no explanation was given. It may have simply been a casualty of its time. Sheila Crane quotes urban historian Marcel Roncalvolo as saying that “the first half of the twentieth century was ‘a most indecisive moment,’ and herself adds that “none of the ambitious plans for the city [of Marseille] that were developed between World War I and the end of World War II were realized exactly as planned.”¹⁵⁴ If this was the case throughout the whole of the interwar period, it is by no means a stretch to postulate that development in Marseille could have started seeing these difficulties by the latter half of World War I. Furthermore, implementing ambitious urban planning projects in the colonies was generally easier than doing so in the metropole due the difference in bureaucracy. For instance, in wartime Morocco, if Lyautey hit any legal barriers in his plans, he could issue a decree and that would suffice. In France, however, that new legislation related to urban planning had to go before parliament.¹⁵⁵

Conclusion

Only a truly observant eye would recognize the extent of Marseille’s role in the French colonial empire during the early-twentieth century while walking around the city today. The colonial expositions have hardly left a trace. Where the Algerian pavilion, West African tower, and Angkor Wat-inspired palace once pierced the sky, now the *Stade Vélodrome* (Velodrome stadium) stands. The location still entertains large groups of people, but rather than marveling at the domineering power of the French empire,

¹⁵³ “Rapport sur le projet de création d’une société anonyme pour l’édification et l’exploitation d’un village musulman à Marseille,” 1 February 1917, Muslim Village, ML 4274/02, CCI.

¹⁵⁴ Crane, *Mediterranean Crossroads*, 5.

¹⁵⁵ Rabinow, *French Modern*, 290.

spectators cheer for their favorite soccer or rugby teams. On the other side of the city, just up the street from the St. Louis Sucre factory that continues operating to this day, the location for the proposed Muslim village now has a few homes, tennis courts, a post office, and a small strip mall. Only the staircase at St. Charles remains as a vivid reminder to the thoughtful passerby of Marseille's role in the France's colonial past.

But the fact that the spaces allotted to the colonial expositions at the *rond-point du Prado* and intended for the Muslim village in the 15th arrondissement have been redefined does not change what they meant to the Marseillais in the first quarter of the twentieth century. These were locations that the metropole ceded to colonial subjects, even going so far as to try to replicate their very structures and lifestyles. In this way, the French further ruptured the division between the metropole and the colonies.

The implementation of imperial practices completed the *indigène* colonization of Marseille. The power dynamics, practices, and attitudes of France's colonial leaders were brought to Marseille through the architecture of both the 1906 and the 1922 colonial expositions. The dynamics of Europeans controlling colonized peoples certainly accompanied the expositions, as it did in other cities and years, but they also meant the construction of colonial buildings in metropolitan space. It meant the *arabisation* and the mimicking of other colonial peoples was not just happening at the hands of French architects abroad, but also at "home," in metropolitan France. Meanwhile, the process of planning the Muslim village, the letters, reports, and plans demonstrate that colonial views on hygiene and public health had motivated Marseille's metropolitan leaders to consider it in the first place. Indeed, their continual turning to colonial administrators who were seasoned with colonial experience ensured that they absorbed more of the

colonial mind frame. Their attitude towards Marseille's thousands of Muslim North Africans was impacted by these colonial leaders, regardless of the Muslim village being built or not. Taken together then, all of the examples of colonial themed architecture and the planned Muslim village discussed in this chapter show that Marseille did not only celebrate its role as the capital of the colonies, it even gave up metropolitan space to France's colonial subjects.

CHAPTER III

REPATRIATION WITHIN A NATION? REMOVING
MUSLIM NATIONALS AND SUBJECTS FROM
THE METROPOLE IN 1920

During World War I, France came as close to welcoming its colonial subjects to the Metropole as it ever would. Between conscription and a minority of volunteers, “the French Army deployed some 500,000 colonial subjects on European battle fields” while over a hundred thousand more came as workers.¹ “Rhetoric of unity and brotherhood, combined with concrete signs of acceptance, seemed to confirm France’s openness.”² Muslim Algerians especially saw greater integration into French society. On July 15, 1914, just two weeks after the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand and two weeks prior to the outbreak of war, France passed a law that ended the practice of requiring Muslim Algerians to have a *permit de voyage* to travel outside of their home *douar* (commune).³ As French nationals, they were free to move about French territory. This victory for *indigénophiles* politicians had been years in the making and even meant that Muslim Algerians could travel between French-Algeria and Metropolitan France. Other colonial subjects looked forward to new reforms after the war as well, holding to the

¹ Richard S. Fogarty, *Race and War in France: Colonial Subjects in the French Army, 1914-1918* (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 2008), 2.

² Fogarty, *Race and War in France*, 3.

³ Neil MacMaster, *Colonial Migrants and Racism: Algerians in France, 1900-1962* (New York: St. Martin’s Press Inc., 1997), 50.

promises of grateful Metropolitan leaders. “Tunisians welcomed the 1917 promise of Prime Minister Georges Clemenceau that France would remember and reward the sacrifices made by the people of its dependencies when the war had been won.”⁴ Indeed, colonial subjects across North Africa and beyond looked forward to its fulfillment once peace had been obtained.

The tenor of postwar France, however, was quite the opposite. On May 15, 1919, Clemenceau told the commander of Marseille’s colonial depot to stop renewing North African labor contracts. “Labor contract renewals for North Africans will no longer be accepted. The North African workers sent to the depot in Marseille will all be repatriated **without exception** and will not be authorized to renew their contracts.”⁵ Some North Africans with contracts that had not yet expired could be extended by six months, but nothing further.⁶ The goal was to ensure that all North Africans and other colonial subjects would be out of contracts and then “repatriated” to their place of origin as quickly as possible. Even though this repatriation effort would require the tracking and movement of hundreds of thousands of colonial subjects, “their wartime experiences gave bureaucrats and elected politicians the confidence that they could achieve a much greater degree of control over society than they had previously imagined.”⁷ With a total disregard for the promises made under the threat of German invasion, French leaders wanted to return the Third Republic and its colonial empire to the ante bellum status quo—a time when white French citizens moved freely in the metropole and colonies, but colonial

⁴ Kenneth J. Perkins, *A History of Modern Tunisia* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 75.

⁵ Clemenceau, quoted in Lewis, *The Boundaries of the Republic*, 191.

⁶ Mary Dewhurst Lewis, *The Boundaries of the Republic: Migrant Rights and the Limits of Universalism in France, 1918-1940* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007), 301.

⁷ Clifford Rosenberg, *Policing Paris: The Origins of Modern Immigration Control between the Wars* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006), 39.

subjects very rarely entered the metropole, and never in a permanent way. In other words, they wanted to recreate the demolished boundaries that once separated the colonies and the metropole in a significant manner.

As the *de facto* capital of, and door to, the colonies, Marseille found itself at the heart of the repatriation effort. Its port had served as the point of entry for colonial workers and soldiers throughout the war. Now, this was to be reversed. Marseille became the place from which North Africans and other colonial subjects returned “home,” whether they wanted to do so or not. While many colonial subjects went home either willingly or at least obediently, this chapter provides an examination of those in 1920 who tried to get around the system and stay in the metropole but got caught and were repatriated forcibly. Specifically, it will be argued that this repatriation shows that North Africans in early-1920s metropolitan France should be studied as much through the lens of colonial and transnational history as they are through the lens of immigration history. Traditionally, this has not been the case, despite the fact that they were colonial subjects and often French nationals, and their experiences in the metropole were more in line with the colonial world than they were with immigrant life in France.

This will be argued as follows. First, this chapter will situate North African repatriation within the historiography of immigration while showing how it should additionally be thought of through a colonial framing. Next is a history and explanation of the various French police agencies as they existed in the early-twentieth century because they had an enormous role in forced repatriations as they arrested, detained, and transported North Africans to Marseille. Thirdly, the dossier of 1920 repatriations will be described, including an explanation of its strengths and weaknesses. Fourth, the

remainder of the chapter will demonstrate that the North Africans forcibly repatriated in 1920 show that this was less about controlling immigrants and more about managing difference—removing non-white colonial subjects from the metropole in favor of replacing them with white immigrants or French citizens—and trying to reestablish boundaries between the colonies and the metropole.

Historiography

Metropolitan France's repatriation of North Africans fits more directly into the established historiography that considers these colonial subjects' presence there an act of immigration more so than any other chapter in this dissertation. Most of the other chapters examine an aspect of French policies or North African behaviors that are a direct result of North Africans being in the metropole. This chapter alone engages with the actual movement of North Africans across the Mediterranean in a migratory sense, though that movement is actually out of metropolitan France rather than into it. Because of this, the historiographical discussion in this current chapter will build largely on scholarship mentioned in that chapter's broader historiography, but it will also go into more of the specifics of how North Africans in the metropole came to be seen as a history of immigration.

A contemporary of Charles-Robert Ageron, Malek Ath-Messaoud, and Alain Gillette, Abdelmalek Sayad comes from the generation of historians who turned their attention to immigration in response to increased racial tension building in France during the 1970s and 1980s.⁸ One of his more marked contributions was developing a theory

⁸ For more on Charles-Robert Ageron, Malek Ath-Messaoud, and Alain Gillette, see Chapter I.

that he called “the three ages of Algerian emigration.”⁹ According to this model, the first age of Algerian emigration consisted of Muslim Algerian communities sending someone to work as a contracted worker in Metropolitan France. The worker’s role is to earn the much higher wages available there and send that money back to his village and/or family in Algeria. The worker has no intention of staying long-term. In fact, the goal is to work for only a few years before returning to his home village, allowing another (and younger) man to replace him as the village’s provider across the Mediterranean. In the second age, young workers went to the metropole for their own financial benefit, rather than that of the community, but still with the intention of returning to Algeria. Finally, the third age was the point at which these workers stopped returning to Algeria. Sayad said that this came about organically. The worker did not mean to do so, but realized after some number of years he had put down roots.¹⁰

A problem with this interpretation though is it fails to recognize the impact of the French colonial framework that forced many to leave the metropole while immigrants were permitted to stay. If Muslim Algerian migration to the metropole is discussed in terms such as ‘ages,’ then the first age, or at least an age, ought to be their military conscription as French nationals. With the exception of a meager few thousand before World War I, conscription preceded most migration to help the economy of local villages. Especially since prewar migration was limited mostly to Berbers, conscription actually precipitated and opened the way for the majority Arab Muslims of Algeria, as well as the colonial subjects of Tunisia and Morocco, to even have the chance to go to the metropole. This “age” ended with repatriation. Sayad’s theory may describe a portion of

⁹ Abdelmalek Sayad, “Les trois âges de l’émigration algérienne,” *Actes de la recherche en Sciences Sociales*, no. 15 (1977): 59-79.

¹⁰ Sayad, “Les trois âges de l’émigration algérienne,” 59-79.

workers in the interwar period to some degree, but it is nonetheless a theory that reflects a historian writing at a time while the pains of colonization were still very fresh, leading France and newly independent Algeria to want to distance their identities from each other. As such, the complete political division between the two that exists today and that had just been established when Sayad was writing in the 1970s were anachronistically ascribed to the 1920s.

Noiriel subscribed to Sayad's theory and further engrained its place in the historiography. He believed it so ardently that he explained it in his own work and then expanded it. Noiriel described the first age as the community choosing an individual "and entrust[ing] him with a 'temporary mission' on the other side of the Mediterranean, in order to provide the peasant group with the resources it needs."¹¹ He interpreted the second age as the point when "the emigrant is no longer delegated to insure the survival of the community. He leaves to attempt to improve his own personal lot," while the third was "that of definitive emigration."¹² For Noiriel though, this was not just about Algerians. It was "the basic trends of the process of rural emigration toward industrial centers."¹³ He especially thought that "the Italian case is a perfect illustration of the 'three ages' process" and furthermore that "the process can also be found in other rural regions," such as Belgium, Spain and Turkey.¹⁴ Noiriel's reliance on Sayad's theory and integration of it into his larger work on general immigration to France served to strengthen the assumption that the history of North Africans in France fit best, or fit only, with an immigration discourse.

¹¹ Gérard Noiriel, *The French Melting Pot: Immigration, Citizenship, and National Identity* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996), 110.

¹² Noiriel, *The French Melting Pot*, 111.

¹³ Noiriel, *The French Melting Pot*, 110.

¹⁴ Noiriel, *The French Melting Pot*, 113.

In buying so deeply into Sayad's theory, Noiriel lumps North Africans in with European immigrants as a group that seems to come and go between a given home country and France with great ease. Doing so solidified the earlier failure to recognize the role of repatriation in the history of North Africans in the metropole. It also draws attention away from the fact that they were repatriated not as immigrants, nor even as migrant workers. They were repatriated as colonial subjects.

The work of Rosenberg and Lewis and others have started to turn this narrative towards the reality that North Africans were not in the same category as European migrant workers, and they have done this in part by contrasting the expulsions of the two groups.¹⁵ As for Rosenberg, his work on immigration control in interwar period France explains the North African experience in great depth, and it includes repatriation. He describes how policing functioned in Paris at the time and relates the history of the development of a branch focused on immigrants, and later a branch focused solely on North Africans. Rosenberg makes clear that repatriation focused on colonial workers, especially Chinese and North Africans, while the French had a different set of standards for Europeans. Assessing migration policy as a whole, he states: "the greatest distinction to emerge between the wars, ironically, was not between foreigners and French citizens, or between immigrant workers and political refugees, but rather between all of those groups and colonial subjects."¹⁶ He is also clear on the fact that most North Africans were

¹⁵ "Others" here refers to scholars whose work does not focus on repatriation, but on the general difference between North Africans and European immigrants. See the section on historiography in Chapter I for this information.

¹⁶ Rosenberg, *Policing Paris*, 10.

“technically French nationals but not citizens—colonial subjects and protégés without the right to vote.”¹⁷

But as his phrase “technically French nationals” suggests, even as Rosenberg sees and draws attention to the colonial imprints on the treatment of North Africans in interwar period metropolitan France, he still discusses them dominantly as immigrants. Indeed, his entire work is framed around immigration. “I will explore how the meaning of crossing borders has changed, both for immigrants and host societies, by looking in detail at the crucial case of Paris. I have tried to show in particular how citizenship came to matter in people’s everyday lives, as the barriers to exit that traditionally bound the poor to the land gave way to the barriers to entry familiar to us today.”¹⁸ Thus, while Rosenberg’s work has contributed to our understanding of North Africans as immigrants and the legal boundaries they encountered, it does miss the point that the racial attitudes and French desire to repatriate them, as well as the very mechanisms and policies of repatriation used by the state, made repatriation a colonial issue as much as it was an immigrant issue, if not more so.

Lewis’ specific contributions to this chapter revolve around the primary sources. She is the only historian who has previously examined the forced 1920 repatriations that form the basis of this chapter, which she did in her work comparing the experiences of migrant workers in Lyon and Marseille. In expanding our knowledge of migrant history in these two large French cities during the interwar period, she finds that North Africans had a harder time assimilating than white migrants. Much like Rosenberg, she acknowledges the colonial status of North Africans far more than her predecessors.

¹⁷ Rosenberg, *Policing Paris*, 10.

¹⁸ Rosenberg, *Policing Paris*, 6.

Indeed, her chapter on North Africans that includes the forced repatriations of 1920, titled, “Subjects, Not Citizens,” is a clear nod to their semi-French status that she further acknowledges by quoting Patrick Weil’s assessment of their nationality: “perverted, gutted.”¹⁹ But the framing of Lewis’ work, like Rosenberg’s, revolves around several migrant “boundaries”—as her title indicates—“diplomatic, political, administrative, or social—that helped to draw the borderline between inclusion and exclusion at any one time and for any particular migrant.”²⁰ Clearly, Lewis can see the play of colonialism in the lives of North African migrants, but a close examination of that is mostly outside the scope of her study of migration, which considers North Africans as a part of a larger group of new arrivals mostly from European countries.

This chapter builds on the work of past scholars, especially Rosenberg and Lewis, and does so by bringing a more specific focus on the colonial influence on the forced repatriations of North Africans. This is not to say that the migration framing of this issue is wrong, but rather that a specifically colonial focused framing will bring out otherwise overlooked aspects of these repatriations that complement and better inform the migratory aspects of this history as well. It will show the depth of colonial views and policies at play in this complex metropolitan repatriation in ways previous scholarship has not, thus further illustrating the breakdown of the distinctions between the colonies and the metropole even as France’s leaders fought to regain them.

The French Police(s)

When it comes to policing, France has had numerous and overlapping agencies. This has been the case for centuries, and it continues to be the case today. As Jean-Marc

¹⁹ Lewis, *The Boundaries of the Republic*, 188.

²⁰ Lewis, *The Boundaries of the Republic*, 2.

Berlière wrote: “there has never been in France, no more in the nineteenth than in the twentieth century, *a police force*, but always *the police forces*.”²¹ As such, those policing and arresting North Africans in Paris are an entirely different agency than those policing North Africans else where in the country. This section explains the three major agencies (the *gendarmerie nationale*, the *sûreté générale*, and the *Prefecture de police de Paris*) that functioned in interwar metropolitan France so as to make the process of repatriation more understandable.

The *gendarmerie nationale* (National Gendarmerie) has a long history. Its origins go back to the *maréchaussée* of the Middle Ages, “who first began its patrols in the sixteenth century, [and] were responsible for rural policing, although they worked with urban authorities as well.”²² The French Revolution swept away the Old Regime *maréchaussée* with the law of February 16, 1791, and established the National Gendarmerie as the new “principally rural police force” in its stead.²³ A major distinction from its predecessor though is that the National Gendarmerie was also made “an integral part of the army.”²⁴ Under the direction of the Ministry of War, it answered to the Cavalry until 1920, when the National Gendarmerie became its own separate branch within the French military.²⁵

The National Gendarmerie’s military status is reflected in its organization across France’s 101 *départements*. Through the twentieth century, one colonel commanded each of the 27 legions, which were the “equivalent of regiments,” that covered the

²¹ Jean-Marc Berlière, *Le Monde des polices en France* (Brussels: Éditions Complexe, 1996), 15.

²² John Merriman, *Police Stories: Building the French State, 1815-1851* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 14.

²³ Merriman, *Police Stories*, 3.

²⁴ Berlière, *Le Monde des polices en France*, 16.

²⁵ Berlière, *Le Monde des polices en France*, 16.

geographical area of several departments.²⁶ Legions then divided into companies “one per department, led by a *chef d’escadron* [commander]” who worked with the department’s Prefect.²⁷ Beneath that, a captain or lieutenant led all gendarmes within a specific *arrondissement*, which is the next subdivision beneath a department. “The base unit,” Berlière explains, “is the brigade” and there must always be at least one brigade per *canton*, which is the subdivision of *arrondissements*. The organization excludes the structure of cities because the National Gendarmerie’s jurisdiction mostly extends only to the roads and countryside. Any police action on its part in Paris is infrequent and only with the permission of the Prefect of police.²⁸

Following the French Revolution, the National Gendarmerie was charged with four major metropolitan functions. First, the National Gendarmerie was charged with “the maintenance of order” in general terms.²⁹ This vague statement can mean a number of things, such as carrying out arrests or conducting investigations. Second, as a police force under the Ministry of War, it served as the military police for France’s armed forces. Third, its officers also had responsibility for policing the nation’s *voie de communication*, which includes all roads, street highways, and footpaths. Though not exactly the same because the term *voie de communication* is quite broad, this aspect is similar to highway patrol officers in the United States today. Fourth, the National Gendarmerie policed rural areas, which included small towns. Once the next subdivision below a *canton*, called a

²⁶ Berlière, *Le Monde des polices en France*, 16.

²⁷ Berlière, *Le Monde des polices en France*, 16.

²⁸ Berlière further specifies that it is the *Garde républicaine* (Republican Guard), a specific branch of the National Guard charged with guarding important buildings and people, that would do any policing in Paris. Berlière, *Le Monde des polices en France*, 17.

²⁹ Berlière, *Le Monde des polices en France*, 17.

commune, reached a population of 5,000 though, the *sûreté générale* took over police activities.

Although the policing actions discussed in this chapter took place in the metropole, the colonial population examined here makes it worth mentioning that the National Gendarmerie was also responsible for the colonies.³⁰ By September 1830, only months after taking Algiers, the July Monarchy created units of “*Gendarmeries des Colonies*.”³¹ It was not alone in this because in true French fashion, the colonies had overlapping policing organizations just like the metropole. In mid-nineteenth-century Algeria for example, a newly created Arab Bureau was charged with overseeing colonial subjects, and this sometimes included policing duties.³² The divisions in the colonies could become far more convoluted than in the metropole, but the main responsibility of the gendarmes in the colonies was gathering intelligence.³³

Like the National Gendarmerie, the *sûreté générale* has changed and evolved into its modern existence since its founding, which was in January 1796.³⁴ The association of the word “*sûreté*” with policing really happened through François Vidocq in the early-nineteenth century. A reformed criminal turned detective, “no figure contributed more to the unfortunate reputation of the police” than Vidocq, who was seen as a *mouchard* (a snitch) and served as the head of the *sûreté de police* in Paris from 1812 to 1827.³⁵ At this point, the *sûreté générale* policed in Paris, but in 1853 and 1854, that permanently

³⁰ Berlière, *Le Monde des polices en France*, 17.

³¹ Jean-Noël Luc, ed., *Gendarmerie, état et société au XIXe siècle* (Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne, 2002), 498.

³² For more on the Arab Bureau, see Chapter IV.

³³ Luc, *Gendarmerie*, 480.

³⁴ Berlière, *Le Monde des polices en France*, 19.

³⁵ Merriman, *Police Stories*, 10.

changed as it was given charge over all cities in France except the capital instead.³⁶ The official name changed to *sûreté générale* in 1871, while full autonomy from the Prefect of Police in Paris came in 1903.³⁷ Since then, the *sûreté générale* has answered directly to the Ministry of the Interior.

The responsibilities of the *sûreté générale* generally mirrored those of the National Gendarmerie, but its jurisdiction was different. Under the Ministry of the Interior, the *sûreté générale* also had responsibilities for policing France's ports and borders and other issues related to immigration and foreigners.³⁸ While the National Gendarmerie policed the nation's roads, the *sûreté générale* policed the trains (although this did not mean that a gendarme could not make an arrest at a train station within his jurisdiction). When the National Gendarmerie lost jurisdiction over a *commune* because the population had reached 5,000 people or more, the *sûreté générale* became the policing agency.

The *sûreté générale* had a subdivision, called the *police municipale*, or, Municipal Police, that patrolled all such communes. The Municipal Police were paid by municipal taxes, not the *sûreté générale*, but these officers who handled the daily patrols within their commune answered to the mayor and a *commissaire de police* who was chosen by the *sûreté générale*.³⁹ With the help of the loosely attached Municipal Police, the *sûreté générale* policed all cities and urban areas, such as Marseille, Lyon or Toulouse, with one exception—the capital, Paris.

³⁶ Berlière, *Le Monde des polices en France*, 19.

³⁷ Berlière, *Le Monde des polices en France*, 19-20.

³⁸ Berlière, *Le Monde des polices en France*, 21, 36.

³⁹ Berlière, *Le Monde des polices en France*, 36.

“Successor of the lieutenant generals of police created by Louis XIV in March 1667,” the Prefecture of Police of Paris was founded in 1800.⁴⁰ From its creation to today, it polices the city of Paris. During the interwar period, its exact area was defined as the capital and the now defunct Department of the Seine, which included some rural areas around Paris that have since been absorbed into new departments.⁴¹ Unlike many other organizations in Paris, it managed to survive the turbulent regime changes between then and the 1870 founding of the Third Republic without interruption. At its head is the Prefect of police. Appointed by the Minister of the Interior, this was an unusual and powerful position that mixed some aspects of the powers of a mayor and a prefect into one position (Paris did not have a mayor until the 1970s).⁴² The Prefect commanded between 12,000 and 20,000 officers in the interwar period, which far outnumbered the 7,000 officers that made up the *sûreté générale* in 1934.⁴³ They were divided between three branches: the *police judiciaire*, which consisted of detectives working to solve criminal cases; the *police municipale*, which were the officers patrolling the streets of Paris, just like the Municipal Police under the *sûreté générale*; and *renseignements généraux*, which watched over political threats, including foreigners and colonial subjects.⁴⁴

Each of these agencies has changed to a small degree since the interwar period. The *sûreté générale* became the National Police in the 1960s. The National Gendarmerie’s budget is now under the Ministry of the Interior.⁴⁵ Meanwhile, the

⁴⁰ Berlière, *Le Monde des polices en France*, 31.

⁴¹ Rosenberg, *Policing Paris*, 87.

⁴² Berlière, *Le Monde des polices en France*, 32, 36.

⁴³ Rosenberg, *Policing Paris*, 9.

⁴⁴ Rosenberg, *Policing Paris*, 9.

⁴⁵“Control de l’application de la loi relative à la gendarmerie nationale,” *Sénat: Un site au service des citoyens*, accessed 21 May 2014, <http://www.senat.fr/application-des-lois/pj107-499.html>.

Prefecture of Police of Paris has technically lost some autonomy and is now a part of the National Police along with its southern counterpart created in 2012, the Prefecture of Police des Bouches-du-Rhône.⁴⁶ Generally speaking though, these are small changes in functionality. Since the French Revolution, metropolitan France has had three major and evolving police agencies, one for rural France, another urban France, and a prefecture to police its largest cities. A testament to how thoroughly North Africans had entered metropolitan French life, each of these agencies were involved in their repatriation in 1920.

A Dossier of Forced Repatriation

In order to appreciate who the North Africans discussed in this chapter were, it is useful to divide repatriations into two groups. The first were those who left the metropole when the French state asked them to do so through repatriation. Indeed, Rosenberg explains that “many North African workers took advantage of the authorities’ willingness to send them home.”⁴⁷ Considering that most were forced to come in the first place as conscripts, this is hardly surprising. Undoubtedly, there were other colonial workers and soldiers who might have preferred to stay, but did not want to break the law or make trouble. They too would have left the metropole with their more eager counterparts, and are thus included in this first group. It is clear that the repatriated North African colonial workers and soldiers examined in this chapter do not belong to this first group.

⁴⁶ “Décret n° 2012-1151 du 15 octobre 2012 relatif à l’organisation et à l’action des services de l’Etat dans le département des Bouches-du-Rhône,” *Legifrance*, accessed 22 May 2014, http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do;jsessionid=389B89097EA90110536742AD2521D1D0.tpdljo09v_2?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000026498577&dateTexte=&oldAction=rechJO&categorieLien=id.

⁴⁷ Rosenberg, *Policing Paris*, 163.

Although not explicitly stated, the dossier examined here is filled with the records of those from the second group—those who pushed back and tried to stay but were unlucky. Every single one of the 393 repatriated Muslim North Africans mentioned in this dossier was arrested, and usually the reasons for those arrests amounted to being in the metropole after their welcome had worn out. Further, the dossier makes it clear that the willingly repatriated North Africans were not recorded in this dossier by mentioning such repatriations in passing only. For example, it is noted in the arrest records of Ahmed Ben Rahal Ben Bouabid and Said ben Abdallah ben Layachi that before they were arrested in Rouen and sent to Marseille for repatriation in October 1920, they had run away from their repatriation group six months earlier. Layachi's records state that: "he slipped away on March 15, 1920 from a convoy of seventy-five colonial workers headed to Marseille in order for their repatriation to Morocco." Nowhere in this dossier is a group of seventy-five repatriating Moroccans mentioned, which makes it evident that they were filled elsewhere, lost or discarded. Hence, the distinction is that the North Africans examined here were among the forced repatriations, obstinate enough to stay, unlucky enough to get caught.

Unfortunately, it is likely impossible to establish what percentage of North African repatriations in 1920 this dossier represents because any significant figures on repatriation between 1920 and 1923, forced or otherwise, seem to "have not survived," as Rosenberg has claimed.⁴⁸ Still, some other applicable figures from the era still exist and as the only possible gauge on repatriations, they are worth mentioning. Lewis reports that French officials in 1919 claimed there were "121,700 *indigènes*" in the metropole.⁴⁹ This

⁴⁸ Rosenberg, *Policing Paris*, 163.

⁴⁹ Lewis, *The Boundaries of the Republic*, 191.

French word, which means an “indigenous person,” was often used to describe colonial subjects from all over the French colonial Empire, which means this would have included Indochinese, Africans, and people from the Caribbean in addition to North Africans at the very least. According to Panza and Viala, the *service de sécurité générale* and the *Gouvernement General* reported that the number of Algerians in metropolitan France stayed very stable from the end of the war until 1922, when it jumped dramatically: approximately 60,000 in 1918; 50,000 in 1919; 54,000 in 1920; 53,000 in 1921; then a steady increase of roughly 20,000 per year until it stabilized around 100,000 in 1924 before jumping again in 1936.⁵⁰

Who those North Africans were, however, is difficult to say because although Abdelmalek neglects to mention conscriptions and repatriations in his “three ages” theory, he was right about the turnover of the population. Panza and Viala also have rates of Algerian *entrées* (arrivals) and *sorties* (departures from) France for these same years. They show that just fewer than 20,000 Algerians left every year from 1918 through 1921, before the numbers rose in kind with the total number in the metropole in 1922. Arrivals dropped dramatically from 1918 to 1919, going from 25,000 to 5,000, but they quickly rose to 20,000 in 1920, and then jumped to 45,000 in 1922.⁵¹ Crucially, the missing pieces from all of this are what the numbers on Tunisians and Moroccans were, as well as how many of the *sorties* were repatriations carried out by the state, both willingly and unwillingly.

There is one figure that exists on North Africans awaiting repatriation in Marseille in 1919. It bears mentioning for the sake of thoroughness, but offers little because of its

⁵⁰ Bernard Panza and Bernard Viala, “L’immigration Nord-Africaine à Marseille et dans Les Bouches-du-Rhône, 1906-1939” (Mémoire de maîtrise, Aix-en-Provence, France, 1976-77), 38-39.

⁵¹ Panza and Viala, *L’immigration Nord-Africaine à Marseille et dans Les Bouches-du-Rhône*, 38-39.

lack of context. It too comes from Panza and Viala, who say that there were 7,000 North Africans awaiting repatriation at Marseille's colonial depot all at the same time in 1919.⁵² But since Panza and Viala also state ambiguously that, "certain ones stayed" depending on French economic needs, that number does not say much on repatriation numbers.⁵³ Another issue with this figure is that it is impossible for it to be representative of the flow of repatriations. Lewis notes that "confinement in Marseille alone sometimes exceeded four weeks."⁵⁴ Her point was to highlight the cruelty of detaining North Africans in poor conditions and with little food for as much as a month. Not to take away from that important point, but with that as the longest figure for detainment, if the colonial depot had been constantly teeming with 7,000 North Africans, it would have had to repatriate at least 91,000 North Africans per year.⁵⁵ That would mean the claim that fewer than 20,000 North Africans left each year from 1918 to 1921 was very wrong, and that seems highly unlikely since Panza and Viala are the ones that reported both the annual figures and those at the depot. It seems more likely that this was a momentary spike in total numbers at the depot. Altogether, these correlating numbers show that there were probably tens of thousands repatriated North Africans, making this dossier a worthwhile sample of those who tried to stay in the metropole at any cost, but ultimately failed to do so.

The documents provide a paper trail of the soon-to-be forcibly repatriated individual from the initial arrest to the day of departure, ultimately staying there in the port city. Each set of documents tells the story of an individual Muslim North African's

⁵² Panza and Viala, *L'immigration Nord-Africaine à Marseille et dans Les Bouches-du-Rhône*, 78; Lewis, *The Boundaries of the Republic*, 192.

⁵³ Panza and Viala, *L'immigration Nord-Africaine à Marseille et dans Les Bouches-du-Rhône*, 78.

⁵⁴ Lewis, *The Boundaries of the Republic*, 193.

⁵⁵ Four-week periods multiplied by thirteen equals 52, the number of weeks in a year. Thus, this figure is arrived at by multiplying 7,000 North Africans by thirteen four-week periods to show what that number would mean if it were constant over a year.

repatriation. Put together, the thousands of pages provide an overview of which Muslim North Africans tried to stay in the metropole but got caught and ended up repatriated. This overview includes their place of origin, age, where French officials tended to arrest them, and the rationale used by French officials for the arrest. This section explains what these documents are and how this information can be extrapolated from them.

The story for every one of the hundreds of repatriated Muslim North Africans mentioned in the dossier began with their arrest. This was the case regardless of where they came from, be that Le Havre, Paris, Rouen or one of the other twenty-two metropolitan locations noted in these documents, but the details given in the arrest records that made their way to Marseille depended on the police agency. The *procès-verbal* of the arrest accompanied North Africans arrested outside of Paris. A *procès-verbal* is a description of a legal action written by a French official, which in this case means the original arrest record. Those from the National Gendarmerie tended to include the following: location of the arrest; the reason for initially approaching the North African worker; the charges and personal details of the individual under arrest, such as his colonial place of origin and age; as well as the state of his papers, or lack thereof. These reports generally ran several paragraphs in length, usually consisting of one to two hand-written pages. Though the gendarmes' tendency to use the same phrases when recording arrests made their *procès-verbaux* somewhat rote, they also recorded details of the arrested North African's backstory. This contrasts against the *procès-verbaux* from the *sûreté*, which were actual forms. They contained the same demographic and factual information, but often lacked the humanizing explanations of the arrested North African's situation found, even if unintentionally, in those of the gendarmes. The records coming

from the Prefecture in Paris were more similar to those from the *sûreté*. Written by hand on small sheets of paper, some ironically with “*service des refugies*” printed but crossed out in the top-left corner as part of the prefecture’s header, these records conveyed the demographic and legal information, such as the deportee’s name, age, family relations, place of origin, and offense without further explanation. Sometimes they would include a Parisian address and, in a minority of applicable cases, the repatriated’s criminal record in France.

Another document was the *ordre de conduite*. It appears to have been carried by the French official or officials, such as a gendarme, escorting the detained Muslim North Africans from prisons all over metropolitan France to Marseille. The *ordre de conduite* explained that the detainee needed to go to Marseille’s colonial “*dépôt*.”⁵⁶ It rarely had any information to add to that of the arrest record, although an *ordre de conduite* did often duplicate details such as the Muslim North African’s name, and the reason for arrest. The more unique aspects were the directions it gave to the official escorting a detainee, which noted among other things that the “greatest surveillance is recommended;” that the detainees could not drink any alcohol; and that “in the case of evasion,” the officers needed to write up a *procès-verbal* immediately.

There were a few documents that show up infrequently in the dossier, but offer more insights about the journey to Marseille. These include a few deportee’s passports and identity cards, both of which contain the individual’s work history in France and the specific *communes* in which they were permitted to stay. They also replicated some personal details, such as the deportee’s place of birth, place of departure from the

⁵⁶ *Ordre de Conduite*, 14 May 1920, 4 M 2214, Archives Départementales des Bouches-du-Rhône (hereafter cited as 4 M 2214, ADBR)

Maghreb, and occasionally, a photo of the individual as well.⁵⁷ Those North Africans who were trusted to conduct themselves to Marseille were given a *sauf-conduit* (safe-conduct). Usually that meant that they had not violated any laws or policies previous to their arrest in 1920, and that arrest would be for a nonviolent crime. For example the “Moroccan colonial worker” and military veteran Ahmed ben Lahcen received a *sauf-conduit* after he was arrested for lacking a contract and being out of his permitted area.⁵⁸ This allowed him to travel freely to Marseille for repatriation and even ensured he received the reduced rates to which French military veterans were entitled at hotels.⁵⁹ Of course, Ahmed ben Lahcen’s situation highlights the curiousness and absurdity of this repatriation—a veteran of the French military, given special prices for lodgings not available to most citizens was forced out of the land he risked his life to defend. The occasional *feuille de déplacement* was essentially an *ordre de conduite* sometimes used for colonial military veterans, which makes it clear that military service did not necessarily mean a colonial worker could travel to Marseille on his own.⁶⁰

Lastly, there were two other important documents written up or finalized after the repatriating North African arrived in Marseille. First, the names of those transported for repatriation in the same group appeared on a list of “undesirable North Africans to repatriate.”⁶¹ These lists, bearing the stamp of Marseille’s *Commissaire Central de Police*, contain a few pieces of information. Consistently, they include the deportee’s full name, place of origin, age, and a date. What that date signifies is not expressly stated, but matching the dates against those in the documents from the *services maritimes postaux*

⁵⁷ *Carte d'identité* of Ahmed Ben Lahcen, 4 M 2214, ADBR.

⁵⁸ *Sauf-conduit*, 3 November 1920, 4 M 2214, ADBR.

⁵⁹ *Sauf-conduit*, 3 November 1920, 4 M 2214, ADBR.

⁶⁰ *Feuille de déplacement*, 10 October 1920, 4M 2214, ADBR.

⁶¹ *État des indésirables Nord africains à rapatrier*, 6 December 1920, 4 M 2214, ADBR.

(maritime postal service) show that this is the date of the given Muslim North African's arrival in Marseille. This last type of document in the 1920 records can best be described as a receipt of the repatriation. They show that Muslim North Africans travelled in fourth class and that the office of the Bouches-du-Rhône's prefecture had to stamp and sign off on each repatriation. Though the forms only had space for one name, prefaced by an "*M*" for *monsieur*, sometimes the document simply had the number of individuals written there instead, such as "twenty-four Algerians," with a list added to the back.⁶²

Having explained the sources on the 1920 forced repatriations, the following section provides analysis of the information found within it. This will be done using categories where roughly 90 percent of the individuals examined could provide information, which are: place of origin, age, location of arrest, and charges. Doing so will fully flesh out the process of repatriations for North Africans, from arrest to transportation to Marseille, to repatriation via a steamship from Marseille's port. More importantly, this will also show how colonial thinking and imperial practices drove these repatriations in a way that differed from the deportations of foreigners, making this repatriation, this exercise of control, an act of colonialism.

Removing Colonial Subjects, Not Immigrants

Thirteen non-North Africans accompanied the 393 repatriated Maghrebian colonial subjects. At barely more than three percent of total repatriations, their significance should not be overstated, but their existence in the dossier highlights the fact that repatriation in 1920 was about controlling colonial "undesirable" races, not the expulsion of immigrants as a whole. At least twelve of the thirteen were either colonial

⁶² *Services maritimes postaux*, 8 June 1920, 4 M 2214, ADBR.

subjects or connected to the colonial system. None of these twelve were European. One worker came from French Guiana, which was a colony in South America, while three more came from Senegal, then a part of French West Africa. Eight of these workers were described as “Chinese,” and there are two possibilities for these workers. They may have been among the 36,941 migrants workers in France during World War I from the Republic of China, where the French did not have colonies per se, but did enjoyed spheres of influence and political enclaves.⁶³ Alternatively, French officials in the metropole might not have distinguished between Chinese and colonial subjects from the colony of French-Indochina in their hand written notes. This colony, located in southeast-Asia, consisted of the modern-day countries of Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam, and sent 48,955 colonial subjects to work and fight for the colonial power during World War I.⁶⁴ Chinese or Indo-Chinese made little difference in the metropole though. Either way, they were processed at the same colonial depot in Marseille.⁶⁵ The only individual out of the 406 that did not have a colonial connection and was European was a Bulgarian, named Kostan Diantof (see Table 1).

Table 1. Place of Origin of Repatriated Workers.

Place of Origin	Number Arrested and Repatriated
French North Africa	393 (96.79 percent)
Other French Colonies/Colonial Influence	12 (2.96 percent)
Noncolonial	1 (0.25 percent)
Total Repatriations	406

⁶³ John Horne, “Immigrant Workers in France during World War I,” *French Historical Studies* 14, no. 1 (1985): 57-88, 59.

⁶⁴ John Horne, “Immigrant Workers in France during World War I,” 59.

⁶⁵ John Horne, “Immigrant Workers in France during World War I,” 67.

The lack of Europeans is not surprising because France in 1920 was not generally interested in deporting immigrants. Far from it, the French economy had a shortage of labor and desperately needed immigrants to fill it. “This situation arose because the French practiced birth control on a wide scale, and an unusually low fertility rate was compounded by the enormous losses of the First World War. Without an injection of foreign labor French economic growth would have been severely impeded.”⁶⁶ Indeed, France needed as many workers as it could get, hence the reversal of repatriation decisions sometimes made at the colonial depot. France was trying to push North Africans out of the metropole not because of a lack of jobs, but because of the pseudo-scientific racism embedded in the civilizing mission that justified colonialism.

Beginning in the nineteenth century, scholars with the ambition to explain the rise of humanity and its divisions had “insisted that members of ‘backward’ societies lacked the cognitive capacity of ‘advanced’ Westerners” because they lacked “the ability for abstract thought.”⁶⁷ A few scientists, such as Paul Rivet, had begun to push against these ideas by the 1930s, but they were still the minority. Indeed, through the 1930s, “the biological study and ranking of the human race was still considered a full legitimate branch of the human sciences” in France.⁶⁸ In fact, colonialism of the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries had thrived on the argument that European imperialism would help these “backward” peoples to evolve.⁶⁹

But how races were “ranked” or viewed in the metropole was influenced by the opinions of France’s citizens in the colonies, and in Algeria, they had downgraded the

⁶⁶ MacMaster, *Colonial Migrants and Racism*, 3.

⁶⁷ Conklin, *In the Museum of Man: Race, Anthropology, and Empire in France, 1850-1950* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2013), 2.

⁶⁸ Conklin, *In the Museum of Man*, 1.

⁶⁹ Conklin, *In the Museum of Man*, 2.

“rank” of North Africans. When the French first began colonizing Algeria, they invented a “Kabyle Myth,” which maintained that the Kabyle, a Berber group from the northern mounts of Algeria, “were superior to the Arabs . . . it was also a racial myth, for the intellectual concepts of this ideology were essentially ones of race.”⁷⁰ The idea was that the Kabyle were in fact of European descent, possibly from the Romans and Germans.⁷¹ The Kabyle continued to be seen as superior to Arabs in the twentieth century, but the idea that they were equal to Europeans ultimately lost out in the face of further *colon* settlement.⁷² In order to become the dominant group, the *colons* established their superiority racially, and they exported their views to the metropole.

Though not all, a significant numbers of French considered North Africans as a lesser, degenerate race, and their arrival in France along with other such races was, as Georges Dequidt and Georges Forestier wrote in 1926, “nothing less than ‘the advanced indices of the twilight of our Western Civilization and the decline of the white race.’”⁷³ To “save” the white race, or rather, the French race, eugenics societies talked of the need to separate the “inferior” races while grafting acceptable ones into the French race. The immigration expert René Martial ranked various races on their ability to be “grafted” into France.⁷⁴ Meanwhile, the law professor and economist Bertrand Nogaro and his collaborators came up with a scale of “assimilable” races, a status that colonial subjects had lost decades ago as the civilizing mission shifted to the idea of association instead. “In order, they recommended: Italians, Poles, Czechs, Portuguese, Spaniards, Greeks,

⁷⁰ Patricia Lorcin, *Imperial Identities: Stereotyping, Prejudice and Race in Colonial Algeria* (London: I.B. Tauris, 1995), 2-3.

⁷¹ Lorcin, *Imperial Identities*, 22.

⁷² Lorcin, *Imperial Identities*, 213.

⁷³ Quoted in William H. Schneider, *Quality and Quantity: The Quest for Biological Regeneration in Twentieth-Century France* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 236.

⁷⁴ Schneider, *Quality and Quantity*, 240-241.

Russians, Germans, Austro-Hungarians, and Bulgarians.”⁷⁵ Their recommendations placed Bulgarians, along with other World War I enemies, at the bottom, which may explain Diantof’s role as the sole white and noncolonial outlier in a racially charged repatriation.

Motivated by a desire to keep races associated with the colonies out, these repatriations also demonstrate the dissolution of the boundaries between colonial Algeria and metropolitan France. On July 15, 1914, a law was passed that granted Muslim Algerians full mobility in all French territory. Creating the law on the eve of World War I, Leaders of the Third Republic hoped to curry favor with the Muslim Algerians that they wanted to conscript into the army in the event of war. This law permitted the free movement of Muslim Algerians between French-Algeria and Metropolitan France due to their status as French nationals.⁷⁶ Ostensibly then, they could live on either side of the metropole as readily as any white European French citizen.

But after the war, French officials wanted Algerians out of the metropole as much as they wanted Tunisians and Moroccans to leave for all the same racial reasons. Accordingly, French officers circumvented, abused, or flat out ignored the 1914 law. When it came to navigating the French national status of Algerians, “they could not be subjected to formal expulsion procedures; nonetheless, arrest and incarceration were often used to encourage them to repatriate.”⁷⁷ This made for a clever way to overcome the legal hurdle of the 1914 law, and not surprisingly, a full half of all repatriations in this dossier were Muslim Algerians.

⁷⁵ Rosenberg, *Policing Paris*, 124.

⁷⁶ Lewis, *The Boundaries of the Republic*, 190, 301.

⁷⁷ Lewis, *The Boundaries of the Republic*, 193.

But Muslim Algerians could see through this. In 1921, Muslim Algerians in Marseille composed a petition that shows they understood their rights as French nationals. They stated that “it was unacceptable that ‘simply because they are Arabs,’ these ‘citizens’ who served their country during the war are forced to leave. ‘Nothing can allow them to be chased out against their will, like vulgar foreign trouble-makers against whom such summary procedures are not even employed.’”⁷⁸

This petition is significant for at least two reasons. First, it shows that Algerians were standing up for their rights amid unlawful repatriations. This may have amounted to very little in individual cases, but as the French relied on North African labor, especially Algerian, it could also explain why their repatriation percentage is slightly lower. More importantly, the wording of their petition throws the colonial and transnational relationship Algeria had with France at this point into sharp relief. The Algerians who sent this petition called themselves “citizens.” They juxtaposed themselves against foreigners. Even if their doing so reflected diplomatic expediency more than personal attachments to a French identity, this still reflects their political reality. They were not immigrants. They were French nationals that the French viewed through a colonial gaze, be that in North Africa or in the Metropole. Indeed, they could be treated worse than immigrants not because they were lesser immigrants, but because they were a lower class of being altogether, that of colonial subjects.

What is more surprising about these repatriations is its low percentage of Tunisians and high percentage of Moroccans. Despite more Tunisians coming to metropolitan France during the war than Moroccans, only 27 repatriations were Tunisian while 162 were Moroccan, which is 6.7 percent and 39.9 percent, respectively (see Table

⁷⁸ Lewis, *The Boundaries of the Republic*, 194. Underlining appears in Lewis’ book.

2). It may suggest that Tunisians disproportionately repatriated on a voluntary basis in 1919. Still, this does not explain the high number of Moroccan repatriations relative to Algerian repatriations. Moroccans may have become more of a target for repatriation because Morocco was the least stable of the North African colonies in 1920. Under colonial rule for less than a decade, some Moroccans were still fighting against their European rulers. Indeed, 1920, was also the year that a war broke out between the Spanish and Berbers in the Rif Mountains of Northern Morocco. Known as the Rif War, Berbers living in this small area of Morocco under Spanish control had proclaimed an independent republic that Spain would not recognize. Slowly but surely, the French got involved in the five-year struggle as well, a move that ultimately cost Lyautey his position as Resident-General of Morocco. Whatever the cause, Moroccans were evidently more susceptible to repatriations than Algerians and Tunisians.

Young men have historically been those who migrate or relocate. They are more likely to be the least attached to significant financial or family situations and are healthy enough to go elsewhere. Rosenberg described “foreign migrants” in his work on interwar period Paris as “single, young, working-class men.”⁷⁹ Sayad and Noiriel support this idea as well. Yet, conscripts are often young, too. Whether a repatriated North African came

Table 2. Repatriated North Africans by Place of Origin

Place of Origin in North Africa	Number arrested and repatriated
Algeria	203 (50.2 percent)
Morocco	162 (39.9 percent)
Tunisia	27 (6.7 percent)
Total	393

⁷⁹ Rosenberg, *Policing Paris*, 31.

to France as a military conscript during the war or came in 1919 as a worker independently, the majority of them were in their twenties or later (see Table 3).

The 1920 repatriations contain several workers who were clearly military conscripts, made evident from their years in France coinciding with the war, to their description as “military” colonial workers. Overall, the arrest records show that the vast majority of these North Africans, 65.6 percent, were in their 20s while 25.2 percent were in their 30s, again reflecting conscription ages. The furthest extremes were two Algerians: a sixteen-year old and a fifty-six-year old. Sixteen-year old Djaroud Belkacem and the others in his age group may have also come to France as conscripts, since “many of the conscripts brought that year [1917] were boys of no more than of [sic] twelve or thirteen.”⁸⁰ The relative general youthfulness of North Africans crossing between the metropole and the colonies has often been considered an indicator of their status as migrant workers, but in the haste to cast them as “migrants,” this line of thinking also overlooks the possible influence of colonial-based military conscription. This is not to negate economic reasons in 1920 for North Africans to return to the metropole or come for the first time, as other documents in the dossier show repatriations

Table 3. Ages of Repatriated North Africans

Years old	North Africans counted in the sample
16-19	22 (6 percent)
20-29	242 (65.6 percent)
30-39	93 (25.2 percent)
40-49	11 (2.7 percent)
50-59	1 (0.2 percent)
Total:	369 (24 North Africans, unknown)

⁸⁰ Rosenberg, *Policing Paris*, 115.

of North Africans who arrived after World War I. “Hardships caused by surpluses of unsold grain in 1919 were followed by failed harvests in 1920 that evoked for many the legendary famines of 1866 to 1870.”⁸¹ In addition to economic failures in agriculture, the sector of the economy in which most Muslim Algerians worked, “mortality rates soared” as the highly lethal Spanish flu, known as “*la grippe espagnole*” to the French, made its way through the population.⁸² Meanwhile, Morocco saw the arrival of tens of thousands of new *colons* and Tunisians who had begun to move back into sectors of the economy that *colons* fighting in World War I had left vacant and found themselves pushed out once again.⁸³ Putting aside sentimental reasons, the economic enticement for the average North Africa in the 1920s to stay in the colonies would have been minimal. All the opportunities were in the metropole, where unskilled and skilled labor was in great demand, even if French officials wanted that work done by “white” races. For a North African to stay in the Metropole in 1920 though, it required avoiding arrest.

Arrests: Rationale and Location

Though it is evident from Clemenceau’s refusal to renew work contracts that French officials were to arrest North Africans in 1920 in order to repatriate them, that was never stated as the reason for the arrest *per se*. A law had to be broken, after which repatriation would be the default punishment with exceptions made as it served the state’s interests. Of the 393 North Africans repatriated in 1920, 352 of them (89.57 percent) have noted in their paperwork the reason why they were arrested and a city or commune

⁸¹ John Ruedy, *Modern Algeria: The Origins and Development of a Nation*, 2nd ed. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2005), 115.

⁸² Ruedy, *Modern Algeria*, 115.

⁸³ Susan Miller, *A History of Modern Morocco* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 111; Perkins, *A History of Modern Tunisia*, 74.

from which they were sent to Marseille. An additional eight North Africans have the reason noted, though not the location. This information offers a view into the actual charges brought against them, and how they differed from rural to urban settings. Most of these crimes were harmless and quite in line with Rosenberg's findings on North African arrests in Paris during the period. "From 1920 to 1923, roughly two percent of all arrests were for violent crimes" and "most of these cases involved the settling of scores between North Africans, not violence against French citizens."⁸⁴ Usually the offenses were against laws not applicable to French citizens and designed to help the state consolidate its power in tracking and controlling colonial subjects, both during World War I and after. Among those laws that did apply to the whole of society, North Africans were far more likely to get arrested for not having a valid ticket on a train than for violence.

This section analyzes the reasons given for arrests in the 1920 dossier. Although policing efforts and power increased throughout France and over all segments of society in the interwar period, these arrests also show that Muslim North Africans continued to be seen as colonial subjects first and as migrants or even French nationals second in the eyes of the state. First is an analysis of the nonviolent and innocuous offenses. These terms have been coined in order to categorize arrests that would not have been lawful if the North African had been a full-French citizen instead of a colonial subject. This will be followed by an explanation of how North Africans got caught for these crimes in rural settings, because nearly all rural arrests fell in this category. Next is a description of arrests for breaking laws that did apply to the whole society, which runs the gamut from

⁸⁴ Rosenberg, *Policing Paris*, 161.

unpaid train fare to violence, including one count of attempted murder. These occurred almost exclusively in urban settings, especially in Paris.

Over the course of World War I, North African workers came to France under increasingly rigid restrictions regarding who employed them and where they could travel. Most came voluntarily for the first year of the war. By 1915, this gave way to recruited workers, then conscripts, all of whom had work contracts.⁸⁵ These stipulated what company had hired the given North African and for how long that position would last. Before reporting to that job though, be it a factory in Northern France's Pas-de-Calais, the mines of the Saône-et-Loire department, or any other part of metropolitan France, each North African worker first had to pass through Marseille, where they were processed by the Colonial Depot. Officials would make note of how long colonial workers would labor and where, and then restrict their stay to the physical and time extensions of that contract. Norbert Gomar offers an overview of that process:

At Marseille, where all the North African laborers arrive, a depot was installed in the colonial exposition park. The organization of lodgings was remarkable: they constructed wooden barracks, 'Adrian' barracks, then barracks in brick, always with great concern for hygiene. The North Africans had to arrive there with a *carnet d'identité* (identity papers, roughly equivalent to a passport). The depot verified, registered and photographed [them], then attached the photograph to their *carnet d'identité* and delivered [to them] their *carte verte* (green card). This administrative process was completed with a detailed physical examination.⁸⁶

The exact names of documents could differ from those listed by Gomar as long as they offered state officials the information needed to maintain control. Ali Ben Eubarek, a Moroccan colonial subject, had a passport that shows he travelled from Tangier, Morocco, to Marseille in 1916 (see Figure 21). Another Moroccan named Brahim Ben

⁸⁵ Rosenberg, *Policing Paris*, 115.

⁸⁶ Norbert Gomar, *L'émigration algérienne en France* (Paris: Les Presses Modernes, 1931), 19-20.




Figure 21. Ali Ben Eubarek's passport. *Passeport*, Ali Ben Eubarek, 4 M 2214, ADBR.

Ahmed Ben Lahcene had a *carte d'identité* (identity card), which had his photo, date of arrival in Marseille, and the commune in which he was “authorized to circulate” (see Figure 22).

Far more important than which document colonial subjects carried was the fact that they had to carry these specific documents, which is one of the aspects of life that North Africans had in common with immigrants. Everyone in France had to have their papers if an officer requested them, but identity cards distinguished North Africans as different from French citizens in 1920. “Only after World War II did French governments extend the identify card requirement to all citizens on a permanent basis.”⁸⁷ In fact, identity cards only became available to Parisians in 1921, and even then it was not required but for “French nationals who wanted them for convenience in dealing with authorities.”⁸⁸ To be sure, this level of control over citizens and noncitizens alike was developing in interwar period France. For the time being though, many aspects of the state’s mounting power and control focused more on managing those who were different, and colonial subjects, including Muslim Algerians—despite their being French nationals, born in France (French-Algeria), war veterans, and lawfully permitted to be in the metropole—were seen as more different than actual foreigners. Thus, North Africans were arrested for crimes that did not apply to the French and were punished with repatriation even when immigrants were not.

North African workers were frequently arrested for having “*rupture de contrat*.”⁸⁹ The literal translation of this infraction to English would be “breach of contract” or

⁸⁷ Rosenberg, *Policing Paris*, 55.

⁸⁸ Rosenberg, *Policing Paris*, 55.

⁸⁹ For one of many examples of this, see the *procès-verbal* for Ahmed ben Bouchta, 10 October 1920, 4 M 2214, ADBR.



Figure 22. Brahim Ben Ahmed Ben Lahcene's *carte d'identité*. *Carte d'identité*, Brahim Ben Ahmed Ben Lahcene, 4 M 2214, ADBR.

“broken contract,” but based on the context of these arrests, these renderings would be *faux amis*, or false cognates. Despite the use of the word, “rupture,” many North Africans were arrested under this charge because their last contract had simply expired.

Depending on the context then, “out of contract” would often make for an equal or better translation. Clemenceau essentially ensured that all North Africans would be guilty of “*rupture de contrat*” by the end of 1920 when he told the Colonial Depot in May of that year that it could no longer renew contracts for North Africans. Even Algerians who had the right by the 1914 law to be in metropolitan France were arrested for *rupture de contrat*. Repatriation would often happen once the Algerian realized his incarceration would only end when he “agreed” to it.

“*Circulation irrégulière*,” translated as “irregular circulation,” had to do with the geographical bounds within which the North African worker was expected to stay. Usually this meant staying in the same commune in which they worked. So if a worker had a valid contract but decided to visit a neighboring commune, he could be arrested. A colonial worker’s designated commune would also be noted on the identity card that North Africans needed to carry with them, making it another easily identifiable offense.

North Africans were especially vulnerable to these offenses because French law enforcement had gained a great deal of power to police foreigners in the past few decades, and these powers were now used on them as colonial subjects. French laws designed to increase surveillance of foreign populations, or in much of this case, of non-white French Nationals, had been in place for decades by the time North Africans arrived in the metropole, at least since the 1880s. At that time, these laws were aimed at

Germans, Belgians, and Italians in France.⁹⁰ Concerns ranged from the competition for jobs that they gave to French citizens, to the possibility that they were spies.⁹¹ Urged by these worries, laws passed on October 2, 1888 and August 8, 1893 that made it necessary for all foreigners to make their presence known at city hall.⁹² From there, Berlière says that France passed further laws that were increasingly controlling of new arrivals and fueled xenophobia among law enforcement.⁹³ Many of these laws were not enforced or otherwise overlooked during World War I, but in the 1920s “stepped up enforcement of old laws gave the police enormous leverage over immigrants that they did not have over French citizens. The police now had the right to question anyone who looked out of place or kept the wrong company,” as they still do today.⁹⁴

In 1920, the legal right to profile, developed for policing immigrants, was now exercised on colonial subjects. In fact, the legality of pursuing them was not even a concern in Paris. In May 1919, the minister of the interior knowingly disregarded the 1914 law on free circulation that protected Muslim Algerians and “instructed the prefect of police to ‘round up every individual you consider undesirable,’ without worrying about further authorization.”⁹⁵ Thus, as agents of France’s various police organizations were actively seeking “undesirables,” fittingly the very word used to describe them on repatriation lists in Marseille, colonial subjects fell into their purview, despite being veterans or French nationals.

⁹⁰ James R. Lehning, *To Be a Citizen* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001), 110.

⁹¹ Lehning, *To Be A Citizen*, 110.

⁹² Belière, *Le monde des polices en France*, 248; Rosenberg, *Policing Paris*, 48.

⁹³ Berlière, *Le monde des polices en France*, 197.

⁹⁴ Rosenberg, *Policing Paris*, 10.

⁹⁵ Rosenberg, *Policing Paris*, 124.

Ahmed ben Lahcen is a prime example of how arrests for being in breach of contract and irregular circulation would come about by profiling. Lahcen had worked in France since 1916. His identity card stated that he was only permitted to circulate within the Loire department's commune of La Ricamarie, where he worked for Jean LaFond at a "*usine d'électro-zincage*."⁹⁶ Among the papers associated with his arrest is a note from his previous employer, confirming that as of October 20, 1920, Lahcen was "free from all engagements," or in other words, that his work contract had come to an end.⁹⁷ Per Clemenceau's instruction to the colonial depot in May of that same year, Lahcen, like all colonial workers, was not eligible for a renewal. Clearly, he wanted to stay in the metropole because he did not report to Marseille. Instead, he fled outside of his designated commune, most likely looking for work without a legal contract. He was identified one department further to the north, in the department of Saône-et-Loire's Étang-sur-Arroux commune by some gendarmes who stated that they asked to see his papers because he "appeared to have been of a foreign nationality."⁹⁸ Ten days earlier, he had been a legal resident and worker in France. Now, legal profiling had led to his arrest for "*rupture de contrat*" and "*circulation irrégulière*," penalized by repatriation.

With so many of the colonial workers in metropolitan France living there as conscripts, "*déserteur*" (deserter, one who is guilty of desertion) also appeared in arrest records with some frequency. There were a few different ways this same idea was noted in arrest records: "*Disparu du groupement*" (disappeared from the [colonial worker]

⁹⁶ "Certificat no. 39," *Usine d'électro-zincage à La Ricamarie (Loire)*, 20 October 1920, 4 M 2214, ADBR.

⁹⁷ "Certificat no. 39," *Usine d'électro-zincage à La Ricamarie (Loire)*, 20 October 1920, 4 M 2214, ADBR.

⁹⁸ *Procès-verbal* for Ahmed ben Lahcen, 30 October 1920, 4 M 2214, ADBR.

association) and “*quitté le groupement*” appear very frequently.⁹⁹ The line between desertion and *rupture de contrat* was thin, if it existed. These categories appear to have been unstable, used interchangeably to some degree by gendarmes on the beat. After all, the most important thing was to justify the arrest to get the North African repatriated. That said, if the colonial worker’s disappearance lasted long enough, his name went on a list of deserters. It appears these were the individuals charged with disappearing instead of *rupture de contrat*.

Circulation number 9170 5/8 makes very clear how police were to handle deserting colonial workers in 1920. Issued on April 15 of that year, it reminded French officials of an already current policy, stating: “it remains understood moreover that Chinese and North Africans would be apprehended after having been signaled as having abandoned their post do not have to be returned by the gendarme nor any military authority, but directed under escort to the Colonial Worker Depot in Marseille in order to be repatriated.”¹⁰⁰ The lumping of North Africans together with Chinese, who although not colonial subjects of France were processed at the colonial depot and thought of categorically as such, draws to the forefront once more the colonial nature of repatriation. Notice that there is no mention of escorting foreign white workers for repatriation because the goal was not to impede or otherwise slow immigration. The goal was to ensure new arrivals were white. To that end, due legal process appears to have been skirted, at least in part. The only opportunity these colonial workers had to plead their case was with colonial authorities, which is yet another example of the distinction

⁹⁹ For examples of this, see the arrest records of Embareck ben Mohamed and Moktar ben Ahmed, 17 August 1920, 4 M 2214, ADBR.

¹⁰⁰ Circulation number 9170 5/8, 15 April 1920, 4 M 2214, ADBR. The original document has this section underlined.

between North Africans and white immigrants who were not handled by colonial authorities.

Mohamed ben Abdallah's deserter status and subsequent repatriation for "*disparu du groupement*" vividly illustrates the colonial and transnational complications of North African repatriation. Abdallah appears to have arrived in Metropolitan France in December 1919. Despite arriving well after the war, as a colonial subject from Morocco, he was considered a colonial worker of the French military. He next went to Villefrance in the southern department of Aveyron to work in a European branch of the Pennsylvania-based Middletown Car Company. He worked undisturbed for months since the papers he had with him appeared to be in order, but he must have intentionally or unintentionally missed a bureaucratic step in Marseille because by March 1920 he was considered to have "disappeared from the group in Marseille on December 9, 1919."¹⁰¹ Because of this, his name went on "the list of military colonial workers to search out and arrest."¹⁰² Unable to have his contract renewed after May 1920, he was dismissed from the company when it expired in June with a letter specifying that he was "free of all engagement."¹⁰³ Armed with his letter of safe conduct, he was to report to the colonial depot in Marseille. Instead, gendarmes arrested Abdallah and he was then "interrogated by the intermediary of the interpreter Lahoussine ben Amar."¹⁰⁴ Amar's name does not appear in the dossier of repatriations. It is possible that he was another repatriation whose records are not in this specific dossier, but it seems unlikely that he would have been processed along with Abdallah, happened to volunteer to translate, and that his

¹⁰¹ *Procès-verbal* for Mohamed ben Abdallah, 26 July 1920, 4 M 2214, ADBR.

¹⁰² *Procès-verbal* for Mohamed ben Abdallah, 26 July 1920, 4 M 2214, ADBR.

¹⁰³ Memorandum from the Middletown Car Company, 11 June 1920, 4 M 2214, ADBR.

¹⁰⁴ *Procès-verbal* for Mohamed ben Abdallah, 26 July 1920, 4 M 2214, ADBR.

documents would end up elsewhere. The circumstances suggest that the colonial depot in Marseille may have kept Maghrebi colonial soldiers employed in the service of repatriation. If so, this creates the scenario in which Algerians as French nationals might have served their imperial nation-state by expelling other colonial subjects with whom they shared a common culture and language. This is yet another example of how the line between national identities had become quite blurred.

Another common cause for arrest was “*vagabondage*” (vagrancy), which meant that a North African had “no legitimate source of income and no proof of domicile.”¹⁰⁵ The root cause of vagrancy could of course be traced back to the denial of renewed contracts. Without a legitimate job, paying rent becomes more difficult. As Lewis has previously discussed, vagrancy could result in jail time in the Metropole and was not limited to colonial workers.¹⁰⁶ European immigrants were also arrested for vagrancy, but the primary difference was that Europeans could realistically hope for acquittal, while North Africans would be repatriated almost without question. Between 1919 and 1932, “Almost all (88 percent) of the Moroccans and Tunisians considered for expulsion in Marseille were expelled, and a considerable number of those expulsions (36 percent) were ordered summarily by the prefect without review by the Interior Ministry.”¹⁰⁷ Rosenberg points out this difference as well. “Instead of a lengthy administrative or judicial process, the police could simply arrest colonial migrants for *vagabondage* and put them on a train to Marseille, where they would be forced onto a ferry crossing the Mediterranean.”¹⁰⁸

¹⁰⁵ Lewis, *The Boundaries of the Republic*, 192.

¹⁰⁶ Lewis, *The Boundaries of the Republic*, 192-193.

¹⁰⁷ Lewis, *The Boundaries of the Republic*, 193.

¹⁰⁸ Rosenberg, *Policing Paris*, 164.

While many North Africans saw volunteering for repatriation as a free ticket home, some came to this conclusion only after failing to find good pay without a legal working contract. In one instance, a group of seven North Africans (two Algerians and five Moroccans) in the Joigny commune located in the Yonne department, actually requested arrest.¹⁰⁹ They had been working outside of a contract but now wanted to be repatriated. Like others whose contracts had expired, they had found work outside of the proper channels of French bureaucracy. Unfortunately for them, their French employer fully recognized that he could take advantage of their illegal status and paid them a terribly low wage. Several of them were quoted in their *procès-verbaux* as having said they were paid “insufficient to live.”¹¹⁰ Clearly then, their wages were so low that they felt they could fare better on the other side of the Mediterranean. Having run initially, however, they were classified as being guilty of *rupture de contrat*. Even still, this does not mean that repatriations classified as voluntary were always valid. Rosenberg mentions an instance in which “a certain Inspector Guenancia wrote that Ali H. requested repatriation. When the colonial authorities in Paris interviewed him, Ali claimed never to have made any such request. He was six thousand francs in debt, having sold all his worldly possessions to make the trip to Paris. His wife and five children back home depended upon his support, and returning to them would condemn them all.”¹¹¹ The colonial authority went on to say that Ali “begged us to let him stay in Paris.”¹¹²

There were other instances of dishonesty among French officials leading to North African repatriation that happened for personal reasons. Larby (also spelled “Larbi”) Ben

¹⁰⁹ *Liste des indésirables Nord africains à rapatrier*, 15 October 1920, 4 M 2214, ADBR; *Procès-verbal* for Mohamed ben Ali, 8 October 1920, 4 M 2214, ADBR.

¹¹⁰ *Procès-verbal* for Mohamed ben Ali, 8 October 1920, 4 M 2214, ADBR.

¹¹¹ Rosenberg, *Policing Paris*, 164.

¹¹² Rosenberg, *Policing Paris*, 164.

Djilali was officially arrested on July 20, 1920 and repatriated to Morocco nine days later on the charge of *disparu du groupement*.¹¹³ With his records, however, is a letter dated July 16, 1920, written by a Monsieur H. Vasseur, an assistant manager at a factory in Le Harve. Vasseur's letter was addressed to *le Commissaire*, undoubtedly the *commissaire* in Marseille over colonial repatriations. In it, he explains that Djilali has been spending time with a young woman from an "honorable" family with which he is acquainted, and asks Monsieur *le Commissaire* to repatriate Djilali before his work brings him back to Le Harvre in order keep the two of them apart. Vasseur writes: "I beg of you *Monsieur le Commissaire*, to truly want, if it is possible, to do what is necessary to prevent this man from coming to Le Havre to carry out his threats."¹¹⁴ Even as Vasseur tries to depict Djilali as an aggressor, it is clear that the young woman is interested in seeing him, and this seems to only add to Vasseur's fear. A repatriation such as this in a time when parts of French society were actively discussing the need to repopulate alongside "interracial grafting," that is, cataloging different races as acceptable or not acceptable to "graft in," as Martial put it, only reiterates again the how pseudo-scientific racial ideas and colonial views on race had merged in interwar period metropolitan France.¹¹⁵

All of these infractions provided justification for the repatriation of colonial subjects, many of whom were war veterans and, if Algerians, French nationals. Of the 360 repatriations with an explanation of the initial arrest, 261 (72.5 percent) of them fall into one or more of the nonviolent and innocuous offenses described above, meaning that nearly three out of four North Africans forced to repatriate were arrested for breaking laws that did not apply to French citizens, or to put that another way, white French

¹¹³ Arrest record of Larbi Ben Djilali, 20 July 1920, 4 M 2214, ADBR.

¹¹⁴ Monsieur H. Vasseur to *Monsieur le Commissaire*, 16 July 1920, 4 M 2214, ADBR.

¹¹⁵ Schneider, *Quality and Quantity*, 241.

nationals. In rural metropolitan France, these nonviolent and innocuous crimes account for almost all arrests—62 out of 65 (95.38 percent). The specifics behind some of these arrests on highways and in small towns help to flesh out further the colonial influence in the metropole, and show that many were arrested while trying to reach larger cities.

In the small provincial cities of France outside of Paris and Lyon, many repatriated North Africans were stopped and subsequently arrested in open outdoor spaces. As they were a mostly Arab group in a European nation that permitted profiling in its efforts to preserve a “white” French race, this is hardly surprising. These North Africans were simply out in public—walking down the street or by the *place de l’hôtel de ville*. For instance, in the case of Ahmed Ben Driss, the gendarme in the small, central France commune of Lezoux wrote in his *procès-verbal* that they were at home when “we saw passing by on the road a foreigner to the *pays*, who appeared to us to be a colonial worker.”¹¹⁶ Many of the *procès-verbaux* that mention why the gendarme approached the soon-to-be-arrested North African in the first place say the same thing; that they simply looked foreign. This made North Africans especially vulnerable while travelling between towns on major roads. Their *procès-verbaux* described them as being arrested while “*sur le chemin*” or “*sur la route*” (on the road).¹¹⁷

Being indoors did not necessarily mean North Africans were safe either. Any public space was searched. Xavier Barthelemy, a “legal scholar” pointed out this tactic in 1936: “most of the time, an officer ... will invite an individual who *looks suspicious* to ‘display’ his identity papers on a routine check of hotels and various public places.”¹¹⁸ Though his work was sixteen years after the 1920 repatriations, these patterns were

¹¹⁶ *Procès-verbal* for Ahmed Ben Driss, 29 August 1920, 4 M 2214, ADBR.

¹¹⁷ *Procès-verbal* for Ahmed Ben Driss, 29 August 1920, 4 M 2214, ADBR.

¹¹⁸ Quoted in Rosenberg, *Policing Paris*, 94.

already starting to develop. An example of this is Larbi ben Ali, who was arrested in the lobby of a hotel in the small commune of Autun found in the Saône-et-Loire department.¹¹⁹ Like so many others, he, too, was first questioned because he “appeared to be of a foreign nationality.”¹²⁰ This was also the case for Ahmed ben Lahcen when he was arrested in Étang-sur-Arroux.¹²¹ The gendarme found him hiding in the third-class compartment of a train waiting to depart.¹²² Outside or indoors, public spaces proved dangerous locations for North Africans trying to avoid repatriation in 1920.

Of course, finding work and staying out of public spaces did not guarantee safety either, even for those who tried to out-think the system. When Mohamed ben Mohamed ben Ahmed’s contract expired and he could not get it renewed, he took the name Lhasen ben Mohamed as an alias and managed to get work in a factory in Le Havre, which allowed him to make a decent wage and appear to have proper papers. His incognito employment would have worked out quite well if a few of his fellow Moroccan laborers had not ratted him out. He claimed the name confusion was a clerical error, but this seems quite unlikely given that he had worked and lived under the name for a while by the time he was caught.¹²³ Unfortunately for him, his claim of clerical error did not save him from repatriation.

Putting aside Ahmed’s clever but failed attempt to stay in the same locality, public spaces, especially those associated with travel, such as train stations, hotels, and roads, were dangers worth risking in hopes of obtaining the greater safety and opportunities available in larger cities, such as the capital. “Paris also attracted a

¹¹⁹ *Procès-verbal* for Larbi ben Ali, 7 November 1920, 4 M 2214, ADBR.

¹²⁰ *Procès-verbal* for Larbi ben Ali, 7 November 1920, 4 M 2214, ADBR.

¹²¹ *Procès-verbal* for Ahmed ben Lahcen, 30 October 1920, 4 M 2214, ADBR.

¹²² *Procès-verbal* for Ahmed ben Lahcen, 30 October 1920, 4 M 2214, ADBR.

¹²³ *Procès-verbal* for Mohamed ben Mohamed ben Ahmed, 14 September 1920, 4 M 2214, ADBR.

significant number of foreign workers from the provinces whose contracts had expired, or who broke valid contracts, and who did not want to return ‘home.’”¹²⁴ There they could hope to stand out less and blend in more by becoming one face of many in a crowd. Work opportunities were greater in the cities as well. “Home to many industries and commercial interests, cities such as Lyon and Marseille attracted migrants ‘like moths to light.’ Compared to their counterparts living in France’s agricultural regions, company towns, or mono-industrial areas, migrants in Lyon and Marseille encountered a wide range of employment opportunities.”¹²⁵

The remaining 99 repatriated North Africans with arrest records still run a wide range in terms of how damaging to society or violent their actions were. The arrests that are generally associated with urban settings will be discussed by progressing from the least damaging to the most violent. It should also be noted that some North Africans had multiple charges brought against them. In these cases, they have been categorized by their most violent charge for the purposes of this chapter. For example, a North African charged with irregular circulation and with illegally carrying a gun has been counted in the “illegally carrying a gun” category, not as an irregular circulation. With that, the following crimes applied to French citizens as much as North Africans, and while still not the cause of the majority of arrests in the cities, they happened almost exclusively in urban settings.

There is no question that at least some of the *infraction à la police de chemin de fer* did not commit a major crime. Within the twenty-three instances that this is the charge, there are sporadic mentions of the arrested North African traveling *sans billet*

¹²⁴ Clifford Rosenberg, *Policing Paris*, 29.

¹²⁵ Lewis, *The Boundaries of the Republic*, 10.

(without a ticket). This is very likely the case for many or all of these infractions, but as many of the arrests do not specify what the “infraction” actually was, it is possible that it was something more, such as a minor theft. These arrests often happened at Paris train stations, such as the *Gare de Lyon*. All twenty-three of these North Africans were taken into custody by the Prefecture of Police of Paris.

Arrests for *port d'arme prohibé* (illegally carrying a gun) and *vol* (theft) were roughly as frequent as *infraction à la police de chemin de fer*. Some of the arrests in both of these categories had other reasons for arrest listed as well. These ranged from vagabondage, to being *sans travail* (without work), to theft, and in one instance, (*ivresse*) for being drunk.¹²⁶ It is significant that nearly all of the arrests for both of these crimes happened in Paris. This was the case for twenty-two of the twenty-three arrests for illegally carrying a gun. The one exception was Boubeker ben Ahmed’s arrest in Rouen, which is still a larger French city. The theft outside of Paris was in Le Havre, which is another well-populated area on the northern coast of France. That none of the North Africans arrested in a rural setting were charged with carrying illegal weapons or stealing suggests that those engaging in either of these behaviors were in a more dangerous and perhaps desperate setting, acting more out of the inability to go to the authorities for protection or find legitimate work than a desire to commit violence or steal.

Fraud was another cause of arrest. Fourteen North Africans were arrested for *escroquerie* (fraud or swindling), which was often because of playing *jeu de bonneteau*, a game that Lewis describes as “a confidence game akin to three-card monte.”¹²⁷ Given that this kind of confidence game does not require any sort of financial backing to pull

¹²⁶ Arrest record of Brahim Ben Mohamed, 4 May 1920, 4 M 2214, ADBR.

¹²⁷ Lewis, *The Boundaries of the Republic*, 193.

off, since most people can afford three playing cards, it is not surprising that impoverished working-class North Africans with an inclination for conning would turn to this game. By 1920, many North Africans in Paris were out of work and could not legally get work. A confidence game with essentially no overhead or start up cost would become quite enticing to many who are hungry and/or homeless and have no other legal recourse. Two other North Africans were charged with *abus de confiance*, which were most likely forgery. Like the charge for illegally carrying a gun and theft, charges of fraud reflect city life. All fourteen arrests for *escroquerie* and both counts of *abus de confiance* happened in Paris, which again gives reason to consider if France's hard drive for repatriation is not more the cause of these crimes being committed in the first place, as North Africans were pushed into harder, more desperate financial positions. Furthermore, considering how alienated North Africans had become by policies meant to force them to leave the metropole by 1920, these are still incredibly low numbers for actual crimes.

The remaining ten charges of the total known 360 were the most serious. Five North Africans were charged with "*coups et blessures volontaires*," which best translates into English as assault and battery.¹²⁸ Another three were charged with acts of violence. There was one case of *outrage*, which without context could be the more minor offense of threatening a French official, or rape.¹²⁹ Lastly, one North African allegedly attempted murder.¹³⁰ With the exception of one of the charges for an act of violence, all of these happened in Paris.

It cannot be over emphasized that the majority of total arrests were for non-violent and innocuous charges that did not apply to French citizens: *rupture de contrat*,

¹²⁸ Arrest record of Zekni Said Mohamed, 12 July 1920, 4 M 2214, ADBR.

¹²⁹ Arrest record of Hassin ben Salem Achille, 14 July 1920, 4 M 2214, ADBR.

¹³⁰ Arrest record of Mohamed ben Ahmed, 4 May 1920, 4 M 2214, ADBR.

circulation irrégulière, déserteur/disparu du groupement, vagabondage. The only others who could be arrested for some of these charges were immigrants, yet they often received less severe sentences than the French subjects and nationals discussed here. Even among the minority of charges that were for breaking laws that applied to the whole of society, these charges tended to be for minor offences, with *infraction à la police de chemin de fer* being among the most frequent. Crime is an unfortunate part of all societies, but the stark contrast of nearly all North Africans who were arrested in rural settings having clean criminal records versus their counterparts who escaped to the city suggests that the crimes committed by North Africans had more to do with their place in French society than anything else. Indeed, desperation may have fueled the instances of *port d'arme prohibé, vol, ivresse, jeu de bonneteau, abus de confiance*. The rare instances of actual violence, one being attempted murder, were certainly graver issues, but their rarity show that metropolitan French society was hardly any worse off with North Africans within it. Repatriation was an effort to completely exclude North Africans from the metropole. They were viewed as colonial subjects who belonged in the colonies, and the arrests reflect that.

Conclusion

France relied on the efforts of hundreds of thousands of North Africans during World War I. Reforms were given to Muslim Algerians before its end, including the right to travel and be in the metropole. Promises of more reforms were also given to them, as well as other North African colonial subjects. Rhetoric at the time claimed that France was the “adopted fatherland” of its colonial subjects.¹³¹ The state played up the

¹³¹ Fogarty, *Race & War in France*, 2.

transnational identity of colonial subjects as part of a global imperial-state France while North Africans were conscripted and sent to the frontlines. For years in some instances, they fought, bled, and died for their “adopted fatherland.” Nearly 26,000 Muslim Algerians alone laid down their lives for France.¹³²

It was a different story after the war, and when the promises proved empty, it is easy to imagine a North African’s potential frustration or anger at the situation, perhaps even a sense of betrayal. Imagine for instance, Muslim Algerians who were conscripted early on during World War I. They likely left hearing the reassurance that the 1914 law on free circulation in the metropole meant that their status as French nationals meant more. They were also told that after the war, further reforms would make it even more meaningful. They then spent years in the trenches with these promises, all the while seeing friends die, possibly being wounded, and maybe even forming bonds with some of the metropolitan white French soldiers. After the war, being relieved of duty, their stories might have gone a few different directions. Some may have not wanted to cause trouble and reported to Marseille for repatriation. Others may have tried to stay, working in a factory in rural France or finding work in Paris. Some of them would have been profiled as “undesirable” or “foreign looking” and stopped on the street, in a train station, or maybe in a hotel by a gendarme. Getting desperate, some in Paris may have tried their luck at *jeu de bonneteau*, or stolen food, ultimately getting taken by the Prefect of Police.

After arrest, be that by the *sûreté* or the Prefecture of Police of Paris, North Africans may have spent some period of time in jail, but they eventually went to Marseille. If it was believed that a North African could be trusted to report to the depot, he was given a Safe Conduct and sent by himself. Otherwise, the *ordre de conduite*

¹³² Ruedy, *Modern Algeria*, 111.

clarified that the prisoner was to be: 1) sent by rail; and 2) escorted by a *gendarme*, just as circulation 9170 5/8 had stated. The French government must have been quite dedicated to ensuring repatriation when it could, because the ratio of *gendarme* to North Africans was sometimes as high as 1:1. For instance, a *bulletin de transport* dated July 29, 1920 states that two *gendarmes* named Nicolas and Gotheron escorted two North Africans to Marseille. The cost for the four seats, all third class, was 79 francs.¹³³ Back in Marseille, where they had probably first arrived in France months or years earlier, these North African workers were detained, processed, and prepared to leave.

At some point between leaving prison and their arrival at the depot in Marseille, most North Africans were placed into specific groups of deportees, though occasionally a single deportee could make the trip to Marseille with no one for company besides the *gendarme*. These groups were noted on the “list of undesirable North Africans to repatriate.” At the bottom of the list was the date and the signature of Marseille’s *Commissaire Central*, including his official stamp: “*Commissariat Central de Police, Marseille.*”¹³⁴

At last, the repatriated North African was placed on a ship in fourth class to go back to their place of origin: Algeria, Tunisia, or Morocco. These ships were the same ones handling the *services maritimes postaux*, most likely owned by the shipping company *Messagerie Maritimes*. It was “created specifically for carrying out this postal service, while also carrying out a commercial service (transporting passengers and

¹³³ *Bulletin de transport*, 29 July 1920, 4 M 2214, ADBR.

¹³⁴ For an example, see *Liste des indésirables Nord africains à rapatrier*, 15 October 1920, 4 M 2214, ADBR.

merchandise).”¹³⁵ Shipping from Marseille, the company had 60 “modern ships” by 1870 that comprised 60 percent of France’s steamships.¹³⁶

Though the word “repatriation” evokes the idea of sending a foreigner back to his or her home country, it has been aptly demonstrated that early-1920s France did not see it as such. Deporting European immigrants was virtually nonexistent due to labor needs. Meanwhile, colonial subjects, people who were veterans of the French military and considered politically a part of the French empire were deported despite France’s need for willing workers. “Repatriation” was not about sending away foreigners but about sending away colonial subjects because of racial ideas prevalent in the Western world in the early-twentieth century but informed in part by prejudices brought back to the metropole from the colonies.

Furthermore, colonialism was the cause of North Africans being in the metropole in the first place. Unlike migrant workers from European countries, they came as military conscripts, both to work and to fight. Many North Africans, especially Algerians, also had an understanding that they would enjoy greater rights because of their contributions to the war. In fact, French law should have protected Algerians in the metropole. Instead, the French state went after these colonial subjects with an aim to repatriate, while they continued to be handled by colonial offices, such as the colonial depot in Marseille. This is a considerably different experience from white European immigrants, who did not answer to colonial officials and were encouraged to stay and “join” the French race.

This is not to say that this repatriation or other aspects of the history of North Africans in metropolitan France should be excluded from a discussion of migration. As

¹³⁵ Marie-Françoise Berneron-Couvenhes, “La concession des services maritimes postaux au XIXe siècle : Le cas exemplaire des Messageries Maritimes,” *Revue économique* 58, no. 1 (2007): 260.

¹³⁶ Berneron-Couvenhes, “La concession des services maritimes postaux au XIXe siècle,” 268.

has been shown by previous scholars and indeed this chapter, there were some aspects of the two experiences that overlapped. To think of this history primarily through migratory terms, however, is to lose another important perspective—the colonial one.

CHAPTER IV

SERVICE DES AFFAIRES INDIGENES NORD-AFRICAINES: THE SURVEILLANCE OF MUSLIMS IN INTERWAR MARSEILLE

Despite all efforts at repatriation, the French government could never manage to return the relationship with its Meghrebi colonial subjects to the ante bellum status quo. While the state might have had the ability to pressure Muslim Algerians to repatriate, there was little to stop them from returning to metropolitan France. The 1914 law on circulation made it so they did not require papers to go to the metropole, and they could often find work as long as they would take worse pay and conditions than Europeans. Metropolitan politicians were struggling to reverse this. As Rosenberg has pointed out, they felt grateful for the wartime service of Muslim Algerians, feared “continued unrest” if they did try to restrict movement, and were kept in check to a degree by their republican ideals: “despite a general wariness regarding colonial migration, no self-respecting republican could publicly advocate closing the border [between French-Algeria and metropolitan France].”¹ So their numbers only continued to increase. The metropolitan population of just over 50,000 Muslim Algerians in both 1920 and 1921 had

¹ Clifford Rosenberg, *Policing Paris: The Origins of Modern Immigration Control between the Wars* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006), 129, 139.

jumped to over 100,000 by 1924.²

Unable to eradicate their presence, French officials had to settle for exerting influence and control over the North African communities in Metropolitan France. The interest in watching over North Africans with greater scrutiny than the majority of the metropolitan population only grew in the early 1920s as they soon found allies among the French communists who had developed a “militant anti-imperialism” view.³ French officials also became concerned that North Africans in the metropole might learn about nationalism and be inspired by that ideology to challenge French rule in North Africa. In fact, the fear of communism or nationalism influencing North Africans became one of the few issues on which nearly all politicians from all view points could agree as they “persuaded even the most left-leaning Socialists to join their erstwhile enemies on the right in creating police networks with virtually unlimited powers” to watch over North Africans.⁴ But politicians still needed an immediate reason for increasing surveillance.

They found their justification in the murder of two people in Paris by a North African in 1923. As the story created and amplified fears of North Africans throughout France, Paris’ municipal council allowed one of its members who was also an experienced colonial administrator, Pierre Godin, to implement imperial practices from French-Algeria in the capital through a new organization of his own creation the following year: *Service des affaires indigènes nord-africaines* (SAINA). Charged with two duties—aiding and monitoring North Africans—Godin had fashioned a metropolitan organization that fulfilled the civilizing mission in the capital itself. SAINA further

² Bernard Panza and Bernard Viala, “L’immigration Nord-Africaine à Marseille et dans Les Bouches-du-Rhône, 1906-1939” (Mémoire de maîtrise, Aix-en-Provence, France, 1976-77), 38-39.

³ Rosenberg, *Policing Paris*, 129.

⁴ Rosenberg, *Policing Paris*, 129.

extended imperial practices throughout the metropole, as new branches opened in several large cities in the late-1920s and 1930s, including Marseille.

This chapter examines the colonial roots of SAINA and traces its extension from Paris to Marseille, where it existed from 1928 until presumably the late 1930s, as its records abruptly end just before the start of World War II in 1939. Previous historians have viewed SAINA primarily as an immigrant agency, meaning that it watched over and assisted North African immigrants in the metropole. However, it had deep colonial roots, both in its creation and in its day-to-day operations. In Marseille, SAINA clearly was an extension of imperial practices that had already been put to use in SAINA's Paris office. This is not to say that the colonial aspect of SAINA has been completely ignored, but discussing it as an immigrant agency first and foremost has failed to underscore the extent to which SAINA represented the strong connections between colonial practices and the metropole, the centrality of the empire to the interwar Republic, and inability of the Republic to maintain the division between the metropole and the colonies. Ultimately, this chapter shows how the metropolitan surveillance of North Africans was a colonial idea that deeply impacted the metropole by bringing, or rather by this point reinforcing, colonial methods of managing people, colonial views on Muslim North Africans and health, as well as colonial administrators to it.

Historiography

Within the small number of books and articles that have been written about North Africans in France prior to decolonization, SAINA has received some passing attention.⁵

⁵ Panza and Viala, *L'immigration Nord-Africaine à Marseille et dans Les Bouches-du-Rhône*, 60-61; Emmanuel Blanchard, "La dissolution des Brigades nord-africaines de la Préfecture de police : la fin d'une police d'exception pour les Algériens de Paris (1944-1953) ?" in *Institut d'histoire du temps présent* no. 83

This office is one of the greatest evidences that colonialism had truly followed the French back to the metropole itself. Historians writing within the past two decades have always noted the connection, but then stopped short of going so far as to call SAINA an imperial practice. Instead, it has been interpreted primarily as an agency monitoring a specific group of migrants: North Africans. The historiography considered here demonstrates that while SAINA's colonial origins have been acknowledge to a greater degree than in other specifics of North African life in the interwar period metropole, more remains to be said. This is especially the case for SAINA's branches outside of Paris, and for its impact on public health issues.

MacMaster provides the most thorough and systematic history of SAINA's office in Paris. He recognizes SAINA's colonial roots, although he casts some doubt on its success at enacting colonial policy in the metropole, calling it "an attempt to insert colonial methods of policing and 'native management' into metropolitan France on a scale that was unprecedented in Europe."⁶ Indeed, at the heart of it all, this is still a history of migration for MacMaster. This is evident in his general description of the men behind SAINA, including not only Pierre Godin, but also Adolph Gérolami, Octave Depont, and Julien Azario: "they brought to the 'problem' of immigration all the attitudes both paternalist and authoritarian of the colonial system."⁷ Notice, the issue here as MacMaster frames it is primarily immigration, which leaves room for a greater exploration of the colonial contribution to SAINA. Lastly, he provides a very clear

(2004): 70-82; Rosemary Wakeman, *The Heroic City: Paris 1945-58* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009); Amerlia Lyon, *The Civilizing Mission in the Metropole: Algerian Families and the French Welfare State during Decolonization* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009). Neil MacMaster, *Colonial Migrants and Racism: Algerians in France, 1900-1962* (New York: St. Martin's Press Inc., 1997); Rosenberg, *Policing Paris*; Mary Dewhurst Lewis, *The Boundaries of the Republic: Migrant Rights and the Limits of Universalism in France, 1918-1940* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007).

⁶ MacMaster, *Colonial Migrants and Racism*, 154.

⁷ MacMaster, *Colonial Migrants and Racism*, 154.

breakdown of the many functions of SAINA in Paris, including: welfare, advisement, repatriation, strike busting, and “immigrant hostels,” all of which are a major contribution to our understanding of SAINA in Paris.⁸

Rosenberg’s view on SAINA is similar to that of MacMaster’s. In all, he sees the creators of SAINA as having adapted colonial methods to metropolitan conditions, where “they took advantage of the vastly greater resources available in Paris to invest in social services, combining traditional police measures with expensive assistance programs.”⁹ He too does not analyze first and foremost the colonial aspects of SAINA. Of course, given that the subject of his book is “the French response to immigration,” it should not be surprising that his focus is the organization’s role in the immigrant world, not its colonial ties.¹⁰ His unique contributions include providing one of the most detailed versions of the murders in 1923 that gave credence to the suggestion that SAINA needed to exist, as well as an excellent background on its primary founder, Pierre Godin.¹¹ Because Rosenberg’s study is focused specifically on policing, he also offers more insights on SAINA’s role as a policing force in Paris.

Naomi Davidson examines SAINA within her recently published monograph on Islam in twentieth-century France.¹² Her central argument is that French leadership in both the metropole and the colonies encouraged the development of a unique “French Islam” over the course of the twentieth century. “French Islam” becomes further distinctive as colonial subjects from North Africa and Western Africa—which she refers

⁸ MacMaster, *Colonial Migrants and Racism*, 160-165.

⁹ Rosenberg, *Policing Paris*, 167.

¹⁰ Rosenberg, *Policing Paris*, xii.

¹¹ Rosenberg, *Policing Paris*, 141-143.

¹² Naomi Davidson, *Only Muslim: Embodying Islam in Twentieth-Century France* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2012).

to as immigrants—come to the metropole and their own traditions mix together within the bounds of French society. Davidson views SAINA as a response to French fears of Islam. “For Godin and the other authorities involved in the management of North African immigrant populations, ‘Africa’ arriving on France’s doorstep was really the approach of Islam. Thus national identities were replaced with a religious one.”¹³ Although this is a fascinating and insightful perspective, it is also evident from this quote that Davidson sees North Africans in France prior to decolonization as primarily immigrants, as well.

The sole recent historian to have studied SAINA’s office in Marseille prior to this dissertation is Lewis.¹⁴ Her comparison of it against SAINA’s office in Lyon shows that Marseille’s was the less functional of the two, grossly underfunded and continued to make Marseille a place of repatriation.¹⁵ Though focused on different cities than Rosenberg, Lewis has also written a history of migration workers, and so it is not surprising that she, too, places North Africans primarily within a migrant discourse. Indeed, she draws attention to the colonial expertise of SAINA’s founders, even comparing it to the mid-nineteenth century Arab Bureau that policed and governed Algeria’s Muslim population, but she seeks to draw out the distinctions between the metropole and the colonies. “Those spearheading the SAINA initiative may have hoped that it could serve as a metropolitan ‘Arab Bureau,’” but, asserts Lewis, “the trouble was that for all the settlers insisted that Algeria was part of France, the metropole was not

¹³ Davidson, *Only Muslim*, 71.

¹⁴ Very minimally, Panza and Viala touch on SAINA and mention that it existed in Marseille. Panza and Viala, *L’immigration Nord-Africaine à Marseille et dans Les Bouches-du-Rhône*, 59-61.

¹⁵ Lewis, *The Boundaries of the Republic*, 199-211.

Algeria. SAINA officers were not military establishments in colonial hinterlands serving as the sole source of colonial authority for miles around.”¹⁶

The historiography of SAINA, and indeed the larger historiography of North Africans in metropolitan France, exhibits the lingering effects of what scholars call “colonial amnesia.”¹⁷ The term describes the collective forgetting about colonial empires in the modern European states that once ran them, and as Todd Shepard has pointed out, “such amnesia encourages us to view divisions fabricated by recent historical events (France and the French different from Algeria and the Algerians) as obvious.”¹⁸ Colonial amnesia has made it appear, as Shepard put it, “obvious,” that North Africans going to early-twentieth-century metropolitan France were immigrants. Yet at the time, no one, French or Algerian as we think of them today, knew that the colonial empire was only three decades from a near complete collapse. This must be kept in mind when writing and reading the history of North Africans in the early-twentieth century, regardless of which side of the Mediterranean is discussed. Those who have written on SAINA, such as MacMaster, Rosenberg, Lewis, and Davidson, share their common framing of immigration because of colonial amnesia’s impact on modern French history, and to some degree, on the whole of modern European history. While immigration has been and remains a useful perspective, colonialism is as important if not more so, and this chapter will further explore SAINA from the vantage point of the latter.

¹⁶ Lewis, *The Boundaries of the Republic*, 199.

¹⁷ Pamela Pattynama, “Cultural Memory and Indo-Dutch Identity Formations,” in *Post-Colonial Immigrants and Identity Formations in the Netherlands*, ed. Ulbe Bosma. (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2012), 176; Susan Lawrence, “Introduction,” in *Archaeologies of the British: Explorations of Identity in the United Kingdom and its Colonies 1600-1945*, ed. Susan Lawrence. (London: Routledge, 2013), 7; Pascal Blanchard et al., “Introduction” in *Colonial Culture in France since the Revolution*, ed. Pascal Blanchard et al. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2013), 41. Todd Shepard, *The Invention of Decolonization: The Algerian War and the Remaking of France* (Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 2008), 12.

¹⁸ Todd Shepard, *The Invention of Decolonization*, 12.

The Development of Colonialism Surveillance

France began to maintain surveillance over North Africans and assist them in a paternalistic way within a year of the invasion of Algiers.¹⁹ “The military intelligence unit that came to be known as the ‘Arab Bureaux’” was established in 1831 and reached its “definitive form” by 1844.²⁰ In its first decade, its officers sought to assimilate Arabs by “turning them into French style peasants.”²¹ As these early years passed, officers came to see that the real goal behind colonization in the eyes of the *colons* was not to bring European style civilization to the Arabs, but rather to take their land. This put many Arab Bureau officers in the role of serving as “spokesmen for Arab rights,” which naturally led opportunistic *colons* to dislike them greatly. Meanwhile, those officers who shared the *colons’* view, or otherwise preferred to abuse their power over the Arab population of Algeria, greatly damaged the office’s image in the eyes of the Arabs. The impact of both types of officers made them unpopular with both groups, but even so, “the *Bureaux arabes*, down to the time of their elimination in the 1870s, were the de facto formulators of most native policy as well as its executors.”²²

While the Arab Bureau had come to its end, surveillance had not. The *colons* saw to the passage of new laws in French-Algeria that only applied to Muslim colonial subjects, such as the restrictive *code de l’indigénat*.²³ Holding Muslims to an entirely separate and far more restricting legal code assisted the greatly outnumbered European population to feel secure in their position of power. In those far off and remote regions

¹⁹ For details on the 1830 invasion of Algiers and the subsequent conquest of Algeria from 1830 to 1871, see Chapter I.

²⁰ Osama Abi-Mershed, *Apostles of Modernity: Saint-Simonians and the Civilizing Mission in Algeria* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2010), 75.

²¹ John Ruedy, *Modern Algeria: The Origins and Development of a Nation*, 2nd ed. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2005), 73.

²² Ruedy, *Modern Algeria*, 73.

²³ For further details on the *code de l’indigénat*, see chapter one.

where the European population was sparse or nonexistent, the Civil Commissioner and the General Staff's Subdivisions for Indigenous Affairs took on the surveillance and governing role previously performed by the Arab Bureau, though they did so on a much smaller scale.²⁴

When World War I led the French to bring large numbers of North Africans to the metropole, the practice of surveillance came with them. New offices were created to carry out this work. As of 1916, the minister of war had the newly created office of *Service de surveillance des coloniaux* reporting to him. Further demonstrating the blurred existence of Muslim colonial subjects in the transnational French state, oversight of this office moved to the minister of the colonies the following year.²⁵ By 1918, another surveillance organization came into existence called the *Commissariat général des militaires et travailleurs africains*.²⁶ These offices had very short life spans. They were closed at the end of the war.²⁷ Their closure is not surprising though. French officials had thought and hoped that they could repatriate all North Africans out of the metropole. Undoubtedly, they decommissioned these offices because they believed that colonial subjects would no longer be in metropolitan France, and that meant that colonial practices could leave with them. This was a short hiatus, however. As it became increasingly clear that metropolitan France could not completely rid itself of colonial populations, the imperial practice of surveillance and observation of colonial subjects in the metropole returned by the mid-1920s.

²⁴ On governance in remote regions, Abi-Mershed says that: "by 1881, only twenty-eight officers remained in operation, with first-class units located exclusively in remote pre-Saharan and Saharan districts." Abi-Mershed, *Apostles of Modernity*, 89.

²⁵ Davidson, *Only Muslim*, 69.

²⁶ Davidson, *Only Muslim*, 69.

²⁷ Davidson, *Only Muslim*, 69.

Although lacking any significant evidence for their anxieties, French officials had specific concerns about North Africans in the metropole that they wanted to monitor in the interwar period. One was miscegenation between white Europeans and Arab/Berber North Africans. Octave Depont, who was a “a leading policymaker in the Ministry of the Interior,” recognized North African contributions during World War I and saw the potential for good in having North African workers in the metropole, but he was very concerned about this issue.²⁸ In 1922, he mentioned needing to “warn fathers a few years earlier that their daughters had succumbed to the ‘aggressive flirting’ of certain North African workers.”²⁹ His thought process is hardly isolated, as it reflects the attitudes and concerns of many other influential French thinkers and politicians throughout the interwar period, such as René Martial or Georges Mauco.³⁰ Even though relationships between North Africans and metropolitan Europeans were infrequent, French officials instituted massive surveillance efforts to prevent the potential threat, as they saw it, of the French race “degenerating” by mixing with Arabs and Berbers.

The influence of French communists on North Africans also scared the French. By this time, communists had emerged as the most radical group that claimed to adhere to the economic and political theory credited to the nineteenth-century philosopher, Karl Marx. He predicted that the capitalist economic system of the nineteenth century would soon topple and succumb to a working-class revolution that would redistribute the means of production. European elites were especially concerned about communists in the aftermath of World War I. Before the war, it had been an influential ideology across the continent, but it had never overtaken a European government. This changed when one of

²⁸ Rosenberg, *Policing Paris*, 136.

²⁹ Rosenberg, *Policing Paris*, 136.

³⁰ For previous examples of French miscegenation concerns, see Chapters II and III.

France's most important wartime allies, Russia, exited the war in 1917 due to a revolution that led to the establishment of a new regime under the control of communists. Communists in Germany tried to replicate their Russian counterparts' success right after the war. Though they failed in Germany, two revolutions made communists in the interwar period a significant threat.

Hence, the growing rapprochement between a segment of North Africans in the metropole and communists in the 1920s also concerned the French government. In fact, communists were the only segment of French society that really befriended North Africans in an otherwise hostile metropole. "Culturally isolated and confronted with numerous material problems, the [North African] workers discovered that only the French far left, the anarchists and especially the Communists, demonstrated much interest in their issues or their welfare," which in turn led "a small group of Algerians" to join the French Communist party and the *Confédération générale du travail unitaire* (CGTU).³¹ Many French communists in the metropole saw North Africans as fellow members of the working class, likewise oppressed by the bourgeoisie. North Africans represented an opportunity for communists to increase their influence and strength in France, be that in the metropole or in French-Algeria. In 1924, the Communists aided in the organization of a Maghrebi worker congress and in 1926 provided the support needed for the founding of the *Étoile nord-africaine*, which was the "first permanent Maghribi [sic] political organization in France."³² Though quite small in numbers, this burgeoning relationship between communists and some of the North Africans in metropolitan France threatened

³¹ Ruedy, *Modern Algeria*, 136.

³² Ruedy, *Modern Algeria*, 136-137.

to increase communist influence in both the metropole and in the colonies, so surveillance over the whole community made sense to French officials.

Lastly, French officials of the interwar period worried about North Africans embracing nationalism. With “roots in the French Revolution,” nationalism’s popularity grew throughout the nineteenth and twentieth-century Europe.³³ This ideology called for ethnicity to serve as the primary factor in determining a political state’s boundaries. By its nature then, this means that nationalism can easily create opposition against the existence of political entities that include multiple ethnicities, especially if created by force and conquest. Since this perfectly described the French colonial empire, French officials had a vested interest in keeping their ethnically diverse colonial subjects, such as Arabs from North Africa, or Cambodians from Indochina, and so forth, away from nationalist ideology that could inspire them to rebel against French rule in their homelands with the goal of establishing an independent state along ethnic lines. Indeed, the fear of colonial subjects working in the Metropole embracing nationalism led in part to the creation of the *Service de contrôle et d’assistance en France aux indigènes des colonies* (CAI) in 1923 in order to keep track of colonial subjects from West Africa and Southeast Asia with “a particular goal of stamping out any nascent nationalist movements taking root in French soil.”³⁴

Partly a self-fulfilling prophecy due to metropolitan surveillance and alimentionation of North Africans, the French fears of nationalism and communism influencing North Africans in the metropole proved to be correct. While groups such as the *Fédération des élus indigènes* took form in Algeria in order to fight for increased civil liberties for

³³ John Merriman, *A History of Modern Europe: From the Renaissance to the Present*, 3rd ed. (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2010), 436.

³⁴ Davidson, *Only Muslim*, 69-70.

Muslims within a more unified French society, the *Étoile nord-africaine* (ENA) was forming in the metropole. Originally receiving its support from French communists, its leader, a young World War I veteran now working in the metropole named Messali Hadj, turned it into an influential and fierce Algerian nationalist party.³⁵ The party's success led the French government to ban it by 1929, which only caused the ENA to go underground until it could reemerge publicly in 1933 as *la Glorieuse Étoile nord-africaine*.³⁶ It seems ironic that a group of Muslims in French-Algeria were fighting for greater assimilation while some of the Muslim Algerians in the metropole had begun the fight for independence, but as Ruedy explains, "the fact that the Algerian national movement was born on foreign soil ... is not difficult to explain. It was in France, especially in Paris, that a modern Algerian community, largely leveled socially and economically because of its proletarian status and pressed into tightly knit groupings by its cultural isolation from the French majority, began to develop group solidarity and to perceive itself as a separate identity."³⁷ Entirely separate from the CAI, French leaders established SAINA to observe these developments after the prospect of its existence became politically palatable when a North African murdered two Europeans in the capital.

Murder, Fear, and Colonial Practices in Paris

On November 7, 1923, four Parisians fell victim to a stabbing rampage.³⁸ It started late in the afternoon that day, when a homeless North African named Khémili Mohamed Sulimane dragged thirty-year-old Jeanee Billard out of the grocery store she and her husband operated and slit her throat in the middle of the street. Sulimane then

³⁵ For more a more detailed account of the history of the ENA, see Chapter V.

³⁶ Ruedy, *Modern Algeria*, 138.

³⁷ Ruedy, *Modern Algeria*, 138.

³⁸ Blanchard, "La dissolution des Brigades nord-africaines de la Préfecture de police," 70-82.

attacked others erratically. He plunged his large, stolen kitchen knife into Louise Fougère right in front of her eight-year-old grandson's eyes. He then attacked a young mother holding her child. His last victim was a Romanian immigrant.³⁹ Sulimane was stopped at this point from doing any further damage by a courageous constructor worker and two policemen. Sulimane was then arrested and taken to the hospital for his gunshot wounds, where he stated that he attacked because Madame Billard had repeatedly rejected his romantic advances.⁴⁰ Rosenberg casts some skepticism on the accuracy of the reporting that brought about this narrative by pointing out that “the theme of the invading, libidinous colonial subject laying waste to ‘la douce France’ could not be more stereotypical.”⁴¹ Yet the motive may not ultimately matter. The fact remained that *Mesdames* Billard and Fougère had died at the hand of a North African, and France was outraged.

Named for the street in Paris where the double murder took place, the *double meurtre de la rue Fondary* allowed many French to believe that Sulimane's knife-wielding rampage represented the mental stability and desires of all North Africans, and they wanted to see something done about this newly perceived North African threat. Indeed, French citizens from the political right, center, and even center-left called for action. Whatever that action would be, it had to work with the constricting reality that North Africans were in the metropole to stay. Mass repatriation would not work. The French economy still needed North African workers, and they had already proven far too capable at working around the system for that to prove productive anyway. Besides that, not all French who were calling for some kind of action wanted to go so far as to deport

³⁹ Rosenberg, *Policing Paris*, 141.

⁴⁰ Rosenberg, *Policing Paris*, 142.

⁴¹ Rosenberg, *Policing Paris*, 142.

North Africans *en masse*. Furthermore, as strikes and protests against the French state were increasing in Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia, it was feared that stricter migration regulations against North Africans would only increase this unrest.⁴² Something had to be done, but exactly what remained the question.

In this atmosphere, seasoned colonial bureaucrats, such as Pierre Godin and Adolphe Gérolami, who now lived in the capital, began pursuing the creation of a new office that could watch over North Africans and provide them with aid. These men:

had all passed their formative years as native administrators. Moulded [sic] by their shared experience of training in the schools for colonial officers and by years in the *bled*, they brought to the ‘problem’ of immigration all the attitudes, both paternalist and authoritarian, of the colonial system. These ex-administrators, fluent in Arabic and Berber, had an unparalleled knowledge of Algerian rural society. It was precisely this expertise, a claim to understand the peculiarities of native psychology and culture, that gave the lobbyists a special authority with ministers, politicians and newspaper editors in Paris. They claimed to know what made the *indigène* migrant tick, the nuance of language and approach required to win his confidence, and the kinds of measure that would safely contain him.⁴³

Little is available on Adolphe Gérolami’s background beyond what MacMaster mentions, but Gérolami had a significant hand in SAINA, serving as the head of its police force, and later at the head of Paris’ Franco-Muslim hospital in the 1930s. In this way, his carrier with SAINA embodied its dual mission: “to monitor and aid.”⁴⁴

Of SAINA’s founders though, Godin was the most important. Originally from the Gironde department, he worked in French-Algeria’s colonial bureaucracy, first as a clerk, then as part of the colonial police, and finally as the subprefect of Médéa from 1896 to 1909.⁴⁵ After returning to the metropole, he ended up in Paris and was a member of the city’s municipal council when the *double meurtre de la rue Fondary* took place. He later

⁴² Mary Lewis, *The Boundaries of the Republic*, 191.

⁴³ MacMaster, *Colonial Migrants and Racism*, 154-155.

⁴⁴ Davidson, *Only Muslim*, 70.

⁴⁵ Rosenberg, *Policing Paris*, 154-155.

became its president from 1926 to 1927.⁴⁶ On June 29, 1935, Godin also sustained a gunshot wound in a pistol duel that arose because of his critical remarks about his successor to the council's presidency, the former Prefect of Police, Jean Chiappe.⁴⁷ Given Godin's role in creating SAINA on the back of violence in the capital, this is not without its irony.

Godin had acquired an essentially *colon* perspective on North Africans by the time he returned to the metropole, which fueled his vision for SAINA. He believed that Muslim North Africans could and should be subject to additional laws that do not apply to white people of European descent because they were a less developed people.⁴⁸ Indeed, while pursuing the creation of SAINA, Godin described North Africans as a less civilized presence in Paris. "These 'primitives' are among us. These 'mountain dwellers,' these 'barbarians' heard civilization's call and are tasting the charms of the City. With them, old Africa opens itself up and comes to us. It is Islam, approaching."⁴⁹ Further, Godin brought the civilizing mission to Paris. The aiding aspect of SAINA was meant to improve the "corrupted" North Africans, who would then return to the colonies as a "better trained labour force and improved human beings ... they will become, not uprooted or classless people, but friends on their way to becoming equals."⁵⁰ As MacMaster observes, Godin was relying on the "classic colonial theory of assimilation"

⁴⁶ Davidson, *Only Muslim*, 70.

⁴⁷ "Paris 'Mayor' Wounds Foe in Duel," *Reading Eagle*, 29 June 1935, accessed 14 July 2014: <http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=1955&dat=19350629&id=avBWAAAAIIBAJ&sjid=g0INAAAAIIBAJ&pg=2962,6022743>.

⁴⁸ Rosenberg, *Policing Paris*, 155.

⁴⁹ Quoted in Davidson, *Only Muslim*, 70.

⁵⁰ MacMaster, *Colonial Migrants and Racism*, 161

to justify SAINA.⁵¹ To call for the French government to “monitor and aid” North Africans then, was not a new or unique idea—it was a colonial idea.

It took Godin and his allies two years of maneuvering, but they managed to secure approval for their colonial office in the capital. The City Council voted to support the project on July 31, 1924.⁵² Paris provided 15 percent of the funding through its council and 35 percent through the Prefecture of Police.⁵³ The rest of SAINA’s funding came by adding a “thirty *centièmes de centime* to the property taxes (*patente*) of Parisian businesses.”⁵⁴ The office opened under the name of *le Service de surveillance et de protection des indigènes nord-africains* in 1925 and later changed its name to *Service des affaires indigènes nord-africaines* (SAINA) in 1928.⁵⁵

Though undertaken in the paternalistic mentality and supposed superiority expected of colonial endeavors, SAINA did, in fact, offer some useful services to the North African community.⁵⁶ It was located at number 6 on rue Lecomte in the seventeenth arrondissement of Paris.⁵⁷ At first, it did nothing more than function as a “placement and information office for North African workers’ use,” where they were “required to register their presence ... and occasionally to renew their identity papers.”⁵⁸

It grew quickly to offer more services, many of which sought to separate North Africans from the European population on a medical basis. Within the first year, it began providing medical assistance for North Africans, including “special services for those

⁵¹ MacMaster, *Colonial Migrants and Racism*, 161

⁵² MacMaster, *Colonial Migrants and Racism*, 158.

⁵³ MacMaster, *Colonial Migrants and Racism*, 158.

⁵⁴ Rosenberg, *Policing Paris*, 148-149.

⁵⁵ Blanchard, “La dissolution des Brigades nord-africaines de la Préfecture de police,” 70-82.

⁵⁶ Though the name SAINA did not come into use until 1928, it will be referred to as SAINA for the sake of simplicity.

⁵⁷ Rosenberg, *Policing Paris*, 160.

⁵⁸ Davidson, *Only Muslim*, 71.

afflicted with tuberculosis and venereal disease, which were thought to be endemic to North Africans.”⁵⁹ Other dispensaries opened in the years to come, including one at the Paris mosque, another in the fifteenth arrondissement.⁶⁰ In 1935, SAINA, Godin and G erolami both played a role in the opening of a Franco-Muslim hospital in Bobigny, which included 270 beds and was “constructed in a Moorish style by the architect who designed the Paris mosque” and was “modern and well-equipped.”⁶¹ 1927 saw the addition of an eight-bed hostel at rue Lecomte, which was followed by five others in cooperation with private construction companies, all placed in locations with heavy North African populations: Boulogne-Billancourt, Asni eres, Saint-ouen, Charenton, and Colombes.⁶² Only one remained in service by 1936 though, due to “poor financial management and a boycott campaign led by the ENA [* toile Nord-Africaine*].”⁶³

While possibly done with the best of (paternal) intentions, SAINA’s large role in providing health services to colonial subjects in a way that separated them from the European population exhibited the same colonial practices vis- -vis public health that Marseille’s proposed Muslim village did in 1916.⁶⁴ It also reflects the eagerness to keep Europeans and colonial subjects separated that was seen in the repatriation drives following World War I.⁶⁵ To go to a larger European imperial perspective, it is hard to see the specific interest Godin and his supporters had in using SAINA to attempt to control venereal disease within a colonial population without thinking of Philippa Levine’s work on Britain’s efforts to control venereal disease in its colonies through

⁵⁹ Davidson, *Only Muslim*, 71.

⁶⁰ MacMaster, *Colonial Migrants and Racism*, 166.

⁶¹ MacMaster, 166. For details on the hospital, see Rosenberg, *Policing Paris*, 168-198.

⁶² MacMaster, *Colonial Migrants and Racism*, 165; Davidson, *Only Muslim*, 71.

⁶³ MacMaster, *Colonial Migrants and Racism*, 165.

⁶⁴ See Chapter II.

⁶⁵ See Chapter III.

closer monitoring of its colonial subjects rather than its white sailors and soldiers.⁶⁶ From a public health or medical perspective, SAINA offers yet another example of how colonial policies deeply impacted how metropolitan France viewed and treated those colonial subjects in it.

Other attempted services included job placement, repatriation, advisement on the social security system, education, unemployment benefits translation, and even help with “the shipment of one’s earnings to family in North Africa.”⁶⁷ These services were abused at times as well and did not always function as they were meant to. For example, Gérolami coerced hundreds of North Africans into repatriation when work slowed in the winter of 1926-1927.⁶⁸ Many North Africans preferred to avoid SAINA rather than seek its help because of these abusive scenarios. Despite these abuses, or perhaps because of them, the paternal “aiding” aspect of the civilizing mission manifests itself vividly through SAINA.

Far more important than the aid SAINA offered, at least in the eyes of its creators and supporters, was its surveillance efforts. This was primarily done by a new police force dedicated to watching over North Africans in Paris known as the *Brigade nord-africaine* (North African Brigade). Not only did the brigade worked out of the same office on rue Lecomte that offered services to North Africans, in truth, “it was primarily a site designed to monitor the movements and activities of the Maghrébin population in the city and suburbs.”⁶⁹ While Gérolami ran it as the director, Godin played a crucial role in its creation. “He went out of his way to recruit men who understood the ‘native

⁶⁶ Philippa Levine, *Prostitution, Race and Politics: Policing Venereal Disease in the British Empire* (New York: Routledge, 2003).

⁶⁷ MacMaster, *Colonial Migrants and Racism*, 160-171; Davidson, *Only Muslim*, 71.

⁶⁸ MacMaster, *Colonial Migrants and Racism*, 163.

⁶⁹ Davidson, *Only Muslim*, 70.

mentality,” which meant employing French officers with experience in the colonies that “inevitably brought their prejudices and means of dealing with the ‘natives’ to the metropole, and did not blanch at using force.”⁷⁰ Joining the brigade even came to require taking a language examination in Arabic or Kabyle, but as Rosenberg points out, this amounted to little help on the job because few passed, and many of those who did still spoke and understood so little that it came to nearly no effect.⁷¹ Rosenberg also argues that the language exam was less about the candidate’s linguistic ability and more about ensuring that the hiring pool remained filled with “colonial settlers and soldiers.”⁷² These colonial-minded officers focused much of their attention on monitoring the degree of Algerian participation in strikes, their involvement with the Communist Party, and with the burgeoning Algerian nationalist movement known as the *Étoile nord-africaine* (North African Star, ENA). Indeed, “SAINA agents attended almost every public meeting of the ENA, of which there were hundreds, and placed spies in the ENA executive.”⁷³

SAINA’s surveillance efforts highlighted its colonial roots even more than its assistance efforts, and this fact has manifested itself in works of previous historians. MacMaster describes the surveillance model set up by Godin as “unambiguously that of the colonial administrator, the father of his people, to whom the natives came to resolve their problems and disputes.”⁷⁴ Rosenberg observes that in making this the North African Brigade, “Godin and his allies drew from their colonial experience. Nowhere else did a colonial vision dominate so clearly in the metropole as in the police brigade they created

⁷⁰ Rosenberg, *Policing Paris*, 157.

⁷¹ Rosenberg, *Policing Paris*, 158.

⁷² Rosenberg, *Policing Paris*, 158.

⁷³ MacMaster, *Colonial Migrants and Racism*, 159.

⁷⁴ MacMaster, *Colonial Migrants and Racism*, 160.

to protect the capital.”⁷⁵ Meanwhile, Davidson characterized its creation as being “to a large extent, the result of one man’s obsessive campaign to bring the lessons he had learned as a colonial official in Algeria to bear on the administration of North African immigrants in Paris.”⁷⁶ Even for scholars who have characterized the North African presence in the metropole during the interwar period as immigration, the colonial presence is overwhelming.

Godin’s colonial influence on the metropole only continued to spread as major French cities with large Muslim North African populations, aside from Paris, established their own SAINA offices during the 1920s and 1930s. By 1927, SAINA had been proposed to at least four French cities: Lille, St. Etienne, Bordeaux, and Marseille.⁷⁷ After years of financial disputes, Lyon also created a SAINA bureau in 1934.⁷⁸ In fact, finances proved a difficulty for many SAINA offices, as state officials encouraged cities to open SAINA offices but did not want to fund them. Some small assistance was given mainly through colonial funds, but they generally hoped that the local city governments would see value in SAINA and fund it themselves, as Paris had.⁷⁹ The lack of centrality in SAINA’s funding meant that each office’s functionality differed according to the interests of local leaders, meaning that while each location had the same goal of surveillance and assistance, execution varied from city to city. However, regardless of these issues, the influence of Godin—the colonial bureaucrat turned Paris Municipal

⁷⁵ Rosenberg, *Policing Paris*, 154.

⁷⁶ Davidson, *Only Muslim*, 70.

⁷⁷ *Ministre de l’Intérieur to Monsieur le Prefet des Bouches-du-Rhône*, 9 August 1927, Archives Départementales des Bouches-du-Rhône (hereafter cited as 1 M 759, ADBR).

⁷⁸ Mary Lewis, *The Boundaries of the Republic*, 199.

⁷⁹ For more on the financial aspect of SAINA, both in Marseille and Lyon, see Mary Lewis, *Boundaries of the Republic*, 198-214; 230-33.

Council member—was spreading through France; and one of the first new locations was Marseille.

SAINA Marseille

The first documented discussions regarding SAINA's Marseille regional office appear to have begun in June 1927. On June 2, 1927, the Minister of the Interior wrote from Paris to the Mayor of Marseille with the interest of bringing SAINA to Marseille.⁸⁰ He began with an emotional appeal by mentioning his recent trip to Algeria and how this had reminded him of the North Africans living in France and “the situation in which they find themselves and the aide that we must bring them.”⁸¹ The letter continued to give the same colonial and paternalistic perspective that Godin had used in Paris when discussing the creation of SAINA three years earlier. The Minister of the Interior ultimately recounted the history of SAINA in Paris and its two purposes—to watch and assist—then said that because of the “success of the experience” in Paris, it makes sense to open similar offices in other cities, “notably in Marseille.”⁸² The letter closed with some vague references to funding that was yet to be determined. The Mayor did not show any great enthusiasm for the project (the Prefect of the Bouches-du-Rhône turned out to be the most excited official in the south about SAINA), but nonetheless, the dialogue surrounding it had begun.⁸³

There were a few factors that would have encouraged the Prefect and ultimately others leaders in Marseille to open its regional office. Collectively speaking, the city

⁸⁰ *Ministre de l'Intérieur to Monsieur le Maire de Marseille*, 2 June 1927, 1 M 759, ADBR.

⁸¹ *Ministre de l'Intérieur to Monsieur le Maire de Marseille*, 2 June 1927, 1 M 759, ADBR.

⁸² *Ministre de l'Intérieur to Monsieur le Maire de Marseille*, 2 June 1927, 1 M 759, ADBR.

⁸³ *Monsieur le Préfet des Bouches-du-Rhône to Ministre de l'Intérieur*, 21 September 1927, 1 M 759, ADBR.

feared the potential effect of communist and North African nationalist ideology spreading among its North-African inhabitants more than other major French cities did, Paris being the only possible exception. Their fear was justified. Communists in the southern port city had shown significant interest in assisting North Africans. In 1927, Marseille's communists had begun "demanding equal salaries, unemployment benefits, the right to organize, the eight-hour day, and freedom of circulation between colonies and metropole for North Africans."⁸⁴ Meanwhile, Arab newspapers such as the pro-Algerian assimilationist *L'Ikdam*, and later, the Algerian nationalist *El Ouma* were moving between Metropolitan France and French-Algeria via Marseille.⁸⁵ Having these newspapers pass directly through the city only meant greater North-African access to the idea of increased civil rights or the idea of Algerian independence, both of which challenged the status quo, even if in opposite ways. So when French authorities realized that "Arab nationalist newspapers, published in Paris, were distributed to Algeria via ships leaving Marseille," opening a local SAINA office became a greater point of interest.⁸⁶ Lastly, there were the paternalistic and colonial concerns that had also been a part of the rationale for proposing Marseille's Muslim village during World War I—hygiene.

Significantly, the Prefect of the Bouches-du-Rhône put the concern of hygiene on equal footing with concerns about social disorder. Writing in September 1927, he stated that "the worry of hygiene and public security are at the base of this social work."⁸⁷ Once again, Marseille had a leader expressing a concern about the health of colonial subjects

⁸⁴ Mary Lewis, *The Boundaries of the Republic*, 200.

⁸⁵ For a detailed discussion of these two newspapers, see Chapter V.

⁸⁶ Mary Lewis, *The Boundaries of the Republic*, 200.

⁸⁷ *Monsieur le Prefet des Bouches-du-Rhône to Ministre de l'Intérieur*, 21 September 1927, 1 M 759, ADBR.

on a level and in a way that could have just as easily come from a French official in North Africa, Indochina, or any other colony. Continuing with a hygienic tone, the Prefect's choice to combine "hygiene and public security" make communism and nationalism appear as though they were intellectual viruses that had to be kept from the easily infected colonial North African population in order to avoid a "pandemic" of either or both that could run through the metropole and into French North Africa. So yet again, the colonial interpretation of hygiene manifested itself in Marseille, but this time accompanied by the fears of two ideologies that threatened the political status quo across the (failed) boundaries of the colonial empire, like highly communicable and deadly diseases, ready to infect the transnational French political order.

Questions over logistics, however, prevented the project from materializing until the following year. By September 1927, the Prefect, who appeared very excited about the project, had managed to raise a grant [*subvention*] of 50,000 francs.⁸⁸ By his estimates, this was only 33 percent of what would be needed to launch the project.⁸⁹ The biggest issue the Prefect had, as he noted in a letter to the *Ministre de l'Intérieur* on September 21, 1927, was how far the bounds of SAINA's future Marseille office would reach. Officials within the Marseille area had an interest in the project and were willing to put funds forward, but not if the office would be bound strictly to the city limits. Another problem was deciding where SAINA would fit in Marseille's bureaucratic structure. It is clear from the Prefect's letter that the Ministry of the Interior had written previously to suggest that SAINA be organized in all other French cities as it had been in Paris—by the

⁸⁸ *Monsieur le Préfet des Bouches-du-Rhône to Ministre de l'Intérieur*, 21 September 1927, 1 M 759, ADBR.

⁸⁹ *Monsieur le Préfet des Bouches-du-Rhône to Ministre de l'Intérieur*, 21 September 1927, 1 M 759, ADBR.

city council. While this structure worked in Paris and would work in the other three cities of Lille, Bordeaux, and St-Etienne, this would be difficult for the Prefect to replicate because, as he wrote, “among all of these cities, Marseille alone possesses a state police force.”⁹⁰

That Marseille had a nationalized police force did make it more difficult to place SAINA within its ranks. The move to nationalize it happened in 1908 because of the city’s reputation as a place “where armed thugs ruled the Old Port neighborhood while ineffectual police failed to pursue cases.”⁹¹ The intent of nationalizing was to improve and increase policing in Marseille, as reflected in words of Clemenceau during his first term as Prime Minister before World War I: “I am going to ask for a credit for this single-handed city, for this has become absolutely indispensable ... Marseille has a territory three or four times greater than Paris but there are only three hundred agents. Also on *la Canebière* theft and robbery happened to people in plain day. It is evident that this cannot endure any longer.”⁹² Nationalization meant that the state would now provide 50 percent of the funding for the city’s police force, local funds would continue to provide the other 50 percent, and its prefect would answer straight to the *direction de la sûreté générale* within the Ministry of the Interior.⁹³ The downside to this arrangement was that Marseille did not determine what the budget would be, meaning that if it added SAINA to the city’s police force, the city council did not have the power to raise funds for it, as had been the case for SAINA in Paris. This is why the Prefect argued it would be best if SAINA fell

⁹⁰ *Monsieur le Préfet des Bouches-du-Rhône to Ministre de l’Intérieur*, 21 September 1927, 1 M 759, ADBR.

⁹¹ Lewis, *The Boundaries of the Republic*, 28.

⁹² Jean-Marc Berlière, *Le Monde des polices en France* (Brussels: Éditions Complexe, 1996), 88.

⁹³ Lewis, *The Boundaries of the Republic*, 28, 265.

under the state bureaucracy, not a local one. Marseille's regional office opened on May 11, 1928 with funds allotted by the Bouches-du-Rhône departmental council.⁹⁴

The office in Marseille was never staffed or funded as well as Paris or Lyon and has few surviving records, especially from its earliest years.⁹⁵ As Lewis has written, “throughout its existence, Marseille’s SAINA operated on a shoestring budget, never with more than three paid employees, in a small space that lacked heat and adequate office supplies.”⁹⁶ That does appear to have been the case from what records do exist. It is also likely the case that it employed *colons* from French-Algeria, or at least experienced colonial administrators. A decree on October 27, 1928 mandated that a SAINA director had to be a previous administrator of a *commune mixte*, so this was probably the case in Marseille.⁹⁷ This decree is yet another evidence of SAINA bringing colonial views and policies to the metropole.

Even though scant records remain of the office’s day-to-day affairs, a June 1938 report by its interim director, Monsieur Poussardin, offers us some idea of what the office had done in years past and was doing at that time. By 1938, there were two paid employees. First was Poussardin, who had joined the office in 1928 as the *secrétaire* (administrator). For the past “two and half years,” he wrote, he had continued to maintain his original purpose while also serving as the intermediary director.⁹⁸ The only other employee was Mohammed Ben Hadj, who was a living example of the complicated transnationalism of this history. Beyond them, one *brigadier* and three *gardiens de la*

⁹⁴ “Rapport sur le Service des affaires indigènes nord-africaines de Marseille,” 17 June 1938, 1 M 759, ADBR.

⁹⁵ Mary Lewis, *The Boundaries of the Republic*, 209.

⁹⁶ Mary Lewis, *The Boundaries of the Republic*, 207.

⁹⁷ MacMaster, *Colonial Migrants and Racism*, 170.

⁹⁸ “Rapport sur le Service des affaires indigènes nord-africaines de Marseille,” 17 June 1938, 1 M 759, ADBR.

paix were also attached to Marseille's SAINA office, though they "constituting a part of the police of Marseille do not draw a salary from the budget of the Service [SAINA]." ⁹⁹ This arrangement of a six-man office with only two directly on the payroll and the other four in a jerry-rigged situation going through the city's police helps to illustrate the struggle for funding Marseille's SAINA office faced.

Among these few employees, Hadj, and those like him, as well as what they illustrate about the colonial and transnational nature of North African communities in France, deserve further consideration. Hadj was a North African, yet he was also one of the small number of people ever employed by Marseille's SAINA office in order to help the French government maintain surveillance over North Africans. He had worked as the "*Chaouch*" (guard) since March 1931. ¹⁰⁰ His employment in this office might seem paradoxical or even treasonous in our modern-day, post-Algerian independence/decolonized world. But in his world, one where the French empire existed and Algeria was as much France as Marseille or Paris, Hadj likely saw a government job, and in the metropole no less.

Indeed, he is not the only example of North Africans in the interwar period metropole who had an interest in working for the French government in a policing role. A letter dated July 19, 1928, written by another North African who signed his letter simply as Afayad, shows that he applied for a position as a police inspector. In it, he mentions that he was born in Tunis "of Arab parents but naturalized French." ¹⁰¹ It would appear

⁹⁹ "Rapport sur le Service des affaires indigènes nord-africaines de Marseille," 17 June 1938, 1 M 759, ADBR.

¹⁰⁰ "Rapport sur le Service des affaires indigènes nord-africaines de Marseille," 17 June 1938, 1 M 759, ADBR.

¹⁰¹ Afayad to *Monsieur le Préfet des Bouches-du-Rhône*, 16 July 1928, 1 M 759, ADBR.

then that Afayard's parents had made the rare decision among North Africans to take French citizenship over being Muslim.

Regardless of whether or not he was hired, Afayad's application and Hadj's job at SAINA demonstrate just how obsolete distinguishing between the colonies and metropole was becoming by the 1930s. Here are at least two documented instances from the same era and in the same city that show at least some segment of North Africans were interested in a career enforcing French law, and in the metropole, no less. Their applications also demonstrate that they genuinely believed French metropolitan police agencies would take their applications seriously enough that it was worth applying. While there is no documentation showing what happened with Afayad's application, it is clear that in Hadj's case, the French government was interested. While European colonial empires often relied on capable colonial subjects, or *indigènes*, to fill lower bureaucratic positions in the colonies, seeing this done in the metropole as well serves as yet another example of how differences between the two were become increasing minor and difficult to observe as time passed during the interwar period.

Unlike Paris' SAINA office that performed a number of services that justified to some degree the claim of "to aid" as its other goal besides "to monitor," Marseille's SAINA office only really managed to perform the latter, especially in the 1930s. From 1935 to 1938, the office in Marseille managed identity cards, handled complaints and miscellaneous tasks (*affaires diverses*), and above all else, carried out repatriations. The data in Table 4 shows the number of times that each of these four functions were performed according to Poussardin's 1938 report. As the table makes vividly evident, repatriations were the main component over the three years (see Table 4). 1935 is the

Table 4. The Four Main Functions of SAINA Marseille by Year.

Year	1935	1936	1937	1938 (to 1 June)	Total
Carte d'identité	54	77	147	100	378
Plaintes	393	795	875	529	2,592
Affaires diverses	498	766	977	2,363	4,604
Rapatriment	466	662	6000	5901	13,029
All four functions	1,411	2,300	7,999	8,893	20,603

only year in which repatriations was not the largest function, and even that is a technicality, since the category *affaires diverse* in and of itself means that it represents several other, much smaller and unidentified functions, rather than a true category of its own. Over the course of the two and half year period, repatriations made up 63.24 percent of everything Marseille's SAINA office accomplished. That number is only more dramatic if 1935 is omitted. As Lewis has already pointed out, "repatriations from Marseille increased by more than 2,600 percent between 1936 and 1937, the year they peaked."¹⁰² In truth, however, it is safe to assume that 1938 was the real year that repatriations peaked. It should be remembered that Poussardin's report was written in June 1938, and as such he only had figures for the first five months of the year, stopping with June 1.¹⁰³ This means that with seven months still left in the year, Marseille's SAINA office had already repatriated 98 percent of the same number as the previous year. Theoretically, if the same rate in the first five months was maintained through the last seven months of the year, there was another 8,261.4 North Africans repatriated between June 1 and December 31, which would render the 1938 annual total at 14,162.4.

¹⁰² Mary Lewis, *The Boundaries of the Republic*, 209.

¹⁰³ "Rapport sur le Service des affaires indigènes nord-africaines de Marseille," 17 June 1938, 1 M 759, ADBR.

It is clear then that repatriations not only constituted the largest function of Marseille's SAINA office from 1936 to 1938, but that it probably did not peak in 1937. Rather, it probably continued to increase year after year.

Having established the continual rise of repatriations, especially in 1937 and 1938, it still remains somewhat ambiguous as to why this was the case. Lewis asserts that the high number of repatriations in Marseille, which were far higher than Lyon's, was due at least partly to the fact that Marseille simply had more North Africans living within its borders than Lyon.¹⁰⁴ She also mentions the possibility that Marseille's failure to gain as much "local and national support for assistance to North Africans" as the SAINA office in Lyon did not cause Marseille to falter in providing these other services.¹⁰⁵ These are both worthwhile points. Two additional points that could further explain this rise, however, should be noted. First, it is not clarified if SAINA's Marseille office was or was not counting North Africans that other SAINA offices had already counted as "repatriated" when they arrived in the port city. Even if the less centralized nature of SAINA discussed above is excluded from consideration, this is not entirely impossible in a complicated bureaucracy like the French Third Republic. Second, by this point, Marseille had already served as the main gateway for heavy North African movement between metropolitan France and North Africa for three roughly three decades. Many of these repatriations then might have been North Africans from elsewhere in France, sent to Marseille, and then processed by SAINA locally, just as was the case with the forced repatriations in 1920.¹⁰⁶ There is even a precedent for this within SAINA. Rosenberg explains that North Africans from the surrounding areas of Paris, even as far off as Le

¹⁰⁴ Mary Lewis, *The Boundaries of the Republic*, 209.

¹⁰⁵ Mary Lewis, *The Boundaries of the Republic*, 209.

¹⁰⁶ See Chapter III.

Havre, had to report to the capital in order to deal with SAINA.¹⁰⁷ It is very likely then that this was the case with SAINA in Marseille as well. If these repatriations were entirely from Marseille's own North African population remains uncertain.

Whether Marseille's SAINA office succeeded in meeting its two-fold mission of watching and assisting may not be the real indicator of success. SAINA was, after all, founded in response to an irrational fear of North Africans as a whole that received reinforcement when a single North African committed murder. What Godin had offered the metropole was a greater amount of control over colonial subjects, more in the way that the *colons* in French-Algeria wanted French society to function. The Marseille office certainly did fail to offer the kind of assistance that Paris and Lyon did, but given that the real point to SAINA was to control a feared colonial population, repatriations would be certainly one way to accomplish this. In fact, Lewis points out that these repatriations in the late 1930s differ from those of the early 1920s because this time, local leaders made these decisions, not the government in Paris, which shows that these officials "viewed North Africans as singularly different from other migrants."¹⁰⁸ Indeed they did, and the express reason for that was the status of North Africans as colonial subjects. The prejudices developed on the other side of the Mediterranean over the past century had come to the metropole right along with colonial practices and views that were even creating whole new colonial and metropolitan bureaucracies, like SAINA. So while Poussardin may have been terribly frustrated with the lack of support he received, perhaps his superiors saw the office as functioning as they had hoped it would. It was, after all, controlling a population of colonial subjects and helping to dampen anticolonial

¹⁰⁷ Rosenberg, *Policing Paris*, 161.

¹⁰⁸ Lewis, *Boundaries of the Republic*, 211.

concerns like Algerian nationalism and the local communists who would assist North Africans in this while also maintaining the colonial relationship.

Conclusion

French surveillance of North Africans in the metropole clearly demonstrates that the practice of colonialism had followed the French back home. Not only was this a practice with a long-established historical precedent in the colonies going back at least to the Arab Bureau in 1830s French-Algeria, but the creation and use of government offices to carry out surveillance over colonial populations rose and fell with colonial populations. Furthermore, these offices, which existed for other colonial subjects as well, again show that North Africans were treated more like their fellow colonial subjects from Sub-Saharan Africa or Indochina—which also had a specific agency created to monitor them—than like immigrants in metropolitan France. In the case of SAINA, its very creation by a colonial bureaucrat turned Parisian-dweller further illustrate those ties, and while SAINA may have struggled financially or otherwise in many cities, the very fact that it appealed to metropolitan political leaders and stood for years proves that the once separate worlds of the metropole and the colonies had in many ways merged by the 1930s.

In addition to its colonial roots, perspectives, and practices, SAINA also shows the inability of the French government to treat colonial subjects, or, in the case of Muslim Algerians, French nationals, as French. France already had a robust police force that monitored the whole of France that would have had no problem including North Africans as well.¹⁰⁹ France already had social services in place that also could have included North

¹⁰⁹ See Chapter II.

Africans. The state instead created SAINA to perform both of these tasks, or “to monitor and to aid” North Africans, and to keep them separated from the white European population as they were in French-Algeria. So the French Third Republic found itself in the paradox of claiming to base itself on the principles of universal human rights, of calling Muslim Algerians French nationals and making overtures to them on that basis when it suited the state’s needs, but then making distinctions when it came to actual practices. This was the non sequitur built into French republic colonialism in the first place, and as the bounds between the colonies and the metropole eroded, it had come to manifest itself in the metropole as well, even accompanied with some of the same rhetorical trappings, such as the emphasis on hygiene.

SAINA offices appear to have closed by the end of World War II. Rosenberg reports that life under Nazi occupation and its collaborationist Vichy regime that governed the south of metropolitan France minus its Atlantic coast had caused “authorities to renounce the type of surveillance methods used by the rue Lecomte ... even the most hawkish, pro-Algérie française members of the municipal council admitted that the North African Brigade had been aberrant, corrupt, and violent.”¹¹⁰ As such, SAINA was unceremoniously and discreetly ended by July 1945.¹¹¹ A tool of surveillance and welfare for the French state primarily throughout the interwar period, SAINA was also a symbol of colonial issues and people having a sizable and influential presence in the metropole and French society’s struggle with that new reality.

¹¹⁰ Rosenberg, *Policing Paris*, 207.

¹¹¹ Rosenberg says it ended in June, though he may be referring only to SAINA’s policing role. Blanchard says SAINA ended in July. See Rosenberg, *Policing Paris*, 207; Blanchard, “La dissolution des Brigades nord-africaines de la Préfecture de police,” 70-82.

CHAPTER V

BECOMING A CITIZEN: A DESIRE THAT TRANSCENDED FRENCH OR ALGERIAN IDENTITY

French officials left a paper trail of their interactions with Muslim North Africans everywhere they went, including blueprints, arrest records, and new government offices. This was the case wherever these interactions took place, be that in Algiers, Paris, or Marseille. Conversely, the Muslim North African perspective of this history remains more elusive. This is not surprising. In the colonies of nineteenth- and twentieth-century European empires, the imperial powers produced bureaucratic paperwork and generally controlled what version of events was recorded on these and other official reports. The survival of these documents then further had the advantage of often having duplicates made for the sake of record keeping and the possibility of being archived. On the other hand, most writings produced by the colonized population did not enjoy such benefits.

For a colonial population in the metropole, like Muslim North Africans in the city of Marseille, this imbalance in the likelihood of producing and preserving historical records was only further exacerbated by an imbalance in the quantity of records produced. Outside the metropole, Europeans may have been powerful interlopers, but they remained the minority among millions of colonial subjects. This meant that even with lower literacy rates and a greater difficulty in procuring the time and means to

record and preserve their views than that of Europeans, colonized natives still had a good chance of leaving behind some records, especially their elites. Inside the metropole though, where colonial subjects were a small minority living among a much larger European population, they did not retain the advantage of sheer numbers. Accordingly, no sizable collection of historical sources produced by Muslim North Africans in Marseille during the first half of the twentieth century is known to exist at present. This is part of the reason why historians who have taken on the topic of North Africans in the metropole have chosen to present only the French perspective that is available through French sources. However, it is not altogether impossible to gain some insights on what Muslim North Africans in France were thinking and feeling. This is made possible by examining the publications of those transnational North Africans whose writings appeared in the colonies and the metropole, including in Marseille.

Two such transnational groups were especially influential on North Africans and the future of French colonialism. The first of these to develop were the *évolués*. They often and actively called for full North African assimilation or association with French society. Dunwoodie describes the term “*évolué*” and its use in the interwar period as a

descriptor of the minority francophone group, connoted both ‘progress’ *and* deferral ... the *évolué* is the colonised [sic] individual who, thanks to the contact and education that constitute the heart of France’s civilising [sic] efforts, has abandoned a benighted past (Arab — oriental — Islamic) and absorbed not merely the French language but the values, attitudes and culture of the coloniser [sic]. The perfect *évolué(e)* is thus demonstrably ‘French’ yet, since s/he *is* an *évolué*, s/he is, equally obviously, not French.¹

In short, they were educated Gallicized Arabs and Berbers, and their voice was heard through their several newspapers, read by Muslim colonial subjects in North Africa and the metropole.

¹ Peter Dunwoodie, *Francophone Writing in Transition: Algeria 1900-1945* (Oxford: P. Lang, 2005), 11.

Algerian nationalists made up the other important transnational North African group. Ironically but understandably, Algerian nationalism finds its roots in the metropole. Its leaders came from the ranks of North African World War I veterans who were influenced in their political thinking by French society. Indeed, the movement incubated in metropolitan cities such as Paris and Marseille for a decade before it finally gained serious attention in Algeria in 1936.² It was in the heart of the Third Republic that North African workers formed the ideas that ultimately led to Algerian independence. Like the *évolués* who preceded and co-existed with them, Algerian Nationalists published newspapers that were read in North Africa and in metropolitan France.

Both groups' newspapers made up a crucial part of the *presse indigène* (Muslim colonial press), which was incredibly effective despite the fact that "Arab/Berber illiteracy had reached 90 percent" in French North Africa by the 1890s.³ In fact, by 1900, Algeria alone had approximately 100 *indigène* newspapers.⁴ Further, the most successful newspapers enjoyed an "echo" in the French press from the newspapers of the sympathetic metropolitan liberals and irate *colons* who reprinted their articles either to laud or argue against them.⁵ This gave the more successful *presse indigène* newspapers, such as *El Ouma*, which had a circulation of 43,500 by 1934, enormous influence.⁶ These newspapers then used their influence to project narratives that supported their separate visions of the Franco-Muslim relationship and what its future ought to be. As these narratives competed for the minds of Muslim North Africans in the metropole as well as

² John Ruedy, *Modern Algeria: The Origins and Development of a Nation*, 2nd ed. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2005), 142.

³ Dunwoodie, *Francophone Writing in Transition*, 55.

⁴ Dunwoodie, *Francophone Writing in Transition*, 50.

⁵ Dunwoodie, *Francophone Writing in Transition*, 50-51.

⁶ Ruedy, *Modern Algeria*, 138.

in Algeria, they offer a significant understanding of the ideas to which North Africans in Marseille and elsewhere were exposed.

In order to better know what those ideas were, and thus what North Africans in Marseille and throughout the metropole may have been thinking, this chapter analyzes three of the most prominent *presse indigène* newspapers that existed between 1909 and 1939: *L'Islam* (1909-14), *L'Ikdam* (1919-1923; 1931-1935), and *El Ouma* (1930-1939). In spite of their circulation, it must be recognized that these newspapers directly reflect the views of their editors and contributors, and only indirectly the larger Muslim North African community that previous chapters have more directly addressed. Nonetheless, throughout these publications under assimilationist Young Algerians, associationist Young Algerians, and Algerian nationalists, a common theme of civil rights and full equality before the law with all French citizens emerges. Indeed, it will be argued that the publications of Young Algerian assimilationist and associations reveal that their distinctions were less political than others have maintained in the past, as each faction wanted full civil rights within French society and clung to their Muslim and North African identities, as well as French identity. In examining the publications of *L'Ikdam* and *El Ouma* in the 1930s, it will also be shown that although the Young Algerians and Algerian nationalists had opposite visions for Algeria—the prior wanting to maintain French rule, the latter rejecting it for independence—in actuality, both were motivated by the same goal of civil rights for Muslims. Inhabiting a transnational, trans-Mediterranean world, they represented two different visions for a transnational people that increasingly yearned for real citizenship, ultimately with or without the French.

Historiography

Within the transnational histories that link France and its former North African colonies, the voices of Arab and Berber *indigènes* who occupied any meaningful space between the colonies and the metropole—such as the *évolués* and Algerian nationalists—have been grossly overlooked or simplified until quite recently. This is partly because colonial and migration topics only became of significant interest to historians in the last quarter of the twentieth century and are still developing as fields of history. It is also due to the historical profession's tendency to conceive of history in national terms. Because of this general framework, acknowledging such transnational groups like the *évolués* or the greater dimensions of Algerian nationalists often complicates the narrative and even frustrates those seeking to write a nationalistic history, be that French, Algerian, Tunisian, or Moroccan. Only a few historians, most publishing in the twenty-first century, have begun to flesh out the significance of those early-twentieth-century transnational North Africans whose work was “*both* French and Maghrebin.”⁷ The following historiography traces the movement of transnational North Africans, specifically the *évolués* and Algerian nationalists, within secondary sources and reveals at least two major issues: First, that scholars have only recently stopped ignoring or diminishing their French influence and place within the transnational and colonial histories of France and North Africa; Second, that the common ground between the *évolués* and Algerian nationalists of fighting for civil rights and true equality before the law that helps explain how the Young Algerian movement ironically contributed to Algerian nationalism remained understated by scholars.

⁷ Dunwoodie, *Francophone Writing in Transition*, 15.

In the years just after the decolonization of North Africa, transnational North Africans were omitted or discussed in nationalistic terms that often depended on the nationality of the historian. The French and other Europeans had a tendency to overlook the role of transnational North Africans, or downplayed them and the disruptions they caused in the colonial project. Meanwhile, the Algerian approach more often wanted to reimagine such colonial voices in a more nationalistic narrative. One of the starkest examples of this is how the nineteenth-century resistance leader, Abd al Qadir, was viewed by both groups. Ruedy explains that nationalist-bent Algerian historians of the twentieth century interpreted him as “proof either that an Algerian nation existed even before the French invasion or that his state was in fact a nation-state,” while “certain European historians argued that since his authority and appeal were clearly religious and the entity he constructed was based on an Islamic model, he could not possibly be considered a nationalist.”⁸ Still other European scholars considered Abd al Qadir ‘s “single-minded fierceness ... as proof that the Amir was motivated mainly by a taste for personal power or that he was not much more than a traditional tribal shaykh fighting much as his ancestors had for generations for the advantage of his group.”⁹ Historians from both sides had their national pride and identities mixed in with their research. Generally speaking, French and other European historians were seeking to justify colonialism, as the orientalist attitudes that Ruedy described make evident. Meanwhile, Algerian historians hoped to create a common identity for the Arabs, Berbers, Jews, and the extremely small European minority that had suddenly become Algerian citizens with

⁸ Ruedy, *Modern Algeria*, 66.

⁹ Ruedy, *Modern Algeria*, 66.

the arrival of independence from France. This gave Algerian historians reason to depict their new national identity as being as deeply rooted in history as possible.

Charles-Robert Ageron was among the first to take a more nuanced position on transnational North Africans and show their ties to both North Africa and France. For instance, he questioned whether or not Abd al Qadir's grandson, the Emir Khaled, was "the first Algerian nationalist," as had been asserted by other European historians.¹⁰ Ageron concluded instead that the Emir was a complex person and that it was "very difficult for the historian to present a definitive image" of him.¹¹ Perhaps more importantly, Ageron argued that Emir Khaled "was not the inventor, nor the precursor of Algerian nationalism," instead calling the catalyst of Algerian nationalism the failure of the French to work with assimilationists.¹² This continues to be an accepted interpretation today.¹³ Ageron also described the *évolués*' Young Algerians movement as being "of French inspiration," thus seeing it for the French-Maghrebi hybrid that it was.¹⁴ His work still tended to divide historical narratives by nation-state lines, but he was among the first to see and even highlight the transnational nature of the *évolués* and North African nationalists instead of focusing solely on their nationalistic aspects.

David Prochaska is among the next wave of historians who have built upon what Ageron started. Prochaska's work has focused on the Algerian city of Annaba (called "Bône" while under French colonial rule), primarily from the start of the French Third Republic to the end of World War I. He explains how the city changed as a result of

¹⁰ Charles-Robert Ageron, "Enquête sur les origines du nationalisme algérien. L'émir Khaled, petit-fils d'Abd El-Kader, fut-il le premier nationaliste algérien ?," *Revue de l'Occident musulman et de la Méditerranée* 2 no. 2 (1966): 1.

¹¹ Ageron, "Enquête sur les origines du nationalisme algérien," 46.

¹² Ageron, "Enquête sur les origines du nationalisme algérien," 49.

¹³ Ruedy, *Modern Algeria*, 144.

¹⁴ Quoted in Dunwoodie, *Francophone Writing in Transition*, 46.

French colonialism in a variety of ways: politically, linguistically, economically, culturally, and so forth. Prochaska's strength is that he does not depict the city as an Algerian/Ottoman space turned French under colonization, but rather as a complex mixture of North African cultures washed over but not overtaken by French influence. An example of this that is particularly important to this dissertation is his examination of the *évolués* Arabs and Berbers in Annaba that helped propel the Young Algerian movement. Using archival sources and newspapers, Prochaska's analysis is informed by both the French view of this movement as well as the participants themselves who printed newspapers, such as *L'Islam*, with the goal of furthering their cause. That said, his work on the Young Algerians and their newspapers is somewhat generalized when discussing its actions in the whole of Algeria or in metropolitan France. This is of course understandable, given that Prochaska's main goal was to explore the colonial history of Annaba, not to write the definitive history of the Young Algerians. Confined geographically, he nonetheless made a significant contribution to a very open field in need of much more research.

Among the most comprehensive contribution to this historiography is the work of Peter Dunwoodie. His work focuses solely on examining the written works left behind by the *évolués* between the start of the twentieth century and the end of World War II (1900-1945). Dunwoodie explores how they were empowered as the elites of a colonial population, while also restricted because they were nonetheless Arab or Berber. He describes them as "colonial Algeria's Francophone Arab and Berber élite," and assesses them through their newspapers, essays, and fictional writings.¹⁵ Dunwoodie's analysis is more literary than historical. He spends more time focusing on motifs in their writing,

¹⁵ Dunwoodie, *Francophone Writing in Transition*, 9.

which include the Francophone Arab perspectives on French colonialism and the role of Islam in their colonial world. That said, the *évolués* literature was so heavily informed by their political situation that Dunwoodie's work remains an important piece in expanding our understanding of the influence they wielded over the French and their fellow North Africans on both sides of the Mediterranean. His work further provides much of the literary analysis that is highly useful in preparing a more historically oriented study of the *évolués*. Yet, even though his work covers the whole period from 1900 to 1945, his focus is so singularly on the *évolués* that Algerian nationalists do not factor into his analysis.

As for the Algerian nationalists, Rabah Aissaoui's work is among the most recent and thorough treatments on their place and role in the metropole. For Aissaoui, metropolitan racism is an important cause of the rise of Algerian nationalism. In his own words, Aissaoui's work "is an historical, ethnographic and political analysis of aspects of immigration in France. It focuses principally on ethnicity, nation-ness and political mobilization in North African political organizations in France within their specific historical contexts."¹⁶ Accordingly, his research draws from "newspapers and bulletins published in France and Algeria by Algerian political activists. They also include tracts and other publications produced by (or for) the North African population in France and by the French Communist Party and the *Confédération générale du travail unitaire* (CGTU), the trade union close to the PCF (*Parti communiste français*)," as well as other archival sources and "pertinent" French newspapers.¹⁷ Like Dunwoodie, Aissaoui has entered such an underdeveloped area of French history that there is far too much ground for him to cover by himself. His book goes from the interwar period well into the 1970s,

¹⁶ Rabah Aissaoui, *Immigration and National Identity: North African Political Movements in Colonial and Postcolonial France* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2009), 7.

¹⁷ Aissaoui, *Immigration and National Identity*, 7.

and more in-depth research on any of these time periods would be a welcomed addition to the secondary sources available on Algerian nationalism in metropolitan France. More importantly, however, Aissaoui does not discuss *évolués* influence on Algerian nationalism much at all. His closest approach to doing so is a handful of citations from *L'Ikdam* but are providing historical background more than showing a connection in the thought processes of the two groups.

The approach taken by historians on transnational North Africans such as the *évolués* and Algerian nationalists has evolved significantly since the days of Ageron. Yet much of that evolution has only occurred in the past few years. With Dunwoodie and Aissaoui having just produced their separate works so recently, much work remains to be done on both groups, especially in analyzing the intellectual evolution that linked them despite their opposite goals in terms of French rule. This chapter contributes to our understanding of both groups, and more importantly, to our understanding of the shared intellectual space of these transnational groups. Indeed, their interest in pursuing civil rights for Muslim Algerians shows that they have a great deal in common despite wanting very different political outcomes for Algeria. This chapter demonstrates this through each group's newspapers.

Muslim Politics and the Young Algerians (1900-1926)

A variety of political views existed among Muslim Algerians in the first quarter of the twentieth century. It is true that France's violent subjugation of Algeria between 1830 and 1870 effectively crushed any hopes of resistance among the Arab and Berber populations, but it did not kill their resentment of colonialism or desire for a better way of life. Muslim opinions about what to do within the unavoidable limitations of French rule

ran the entire gamut. On one extreme, there were those who tried to maintain as much of a non-European influenced life as possible, even rejecting European clothes. On the other side were those who willingly assisted the French for personal gain. With the exception of those who were most adamantly opposed to interacting with the French, these various views would have existed among the majority Algerian Muslims North Africans, in the metropole as well. This section will give an overview of the major groups and factions by which Muslim Algerians had come to define themselves by the beginning of the twentieth century with special attention to the most vocal group, the Young Algerians. This overview will provide crucial context about the authors of the Young Algerians' newspapers and their readership in both the Maghreb and the metropole in the early-twentieth century that will be discussed below.

Those that were most virulently opposed to the French were called *vieux turbans* (Old Turbans), a name that both the French and some segments of the Muslim population used throughout the Maghreb.¹⁸ Very little literature exists on them specifically, but different aspects are mentioned by a few scholars in passing before discussing related topics. All sources call them the conservative Muslim voice, be that in French-Algeria or elsewhere in North Africa.¹⁹ Indeed, Rivlin describes Tunisian Old Turbans as “a group of old religious traditionalists” who “looked with disdain at the modernists tendencies of the Young Tunisians [pro-assimilationist Muslim Tunisians].”²⁰ According to Ruedy, the Old Turbans mostly descended from the “great ‘Moorish’ families” that wielded much of

¹⁸ Spencer D. Segalla, *Moroccan Soul: French Education, Colonial Ethnology, and Muslim Resistance, 1912-1956* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2009), 45; Benjamin Rivlin, “The Tunisian Nationalist Movement: Four Decades of Evolution,” *Middle East Journal* 6 no. 2 (1952): 168; Ruedy, *Modern Algeria*, 99, 106-107.

¹⁹ Ruedy, *Modern Algeria*, 99, 106-107; Jamil M. Abun-Nasr, *A History of the Maghrib in the Islamic Period* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 328-329; Rivlin, “The Tunisian Nationalist Movement,” 168.

²⁰ Rivlin, “The Tunisian Nationalist Movement,” 168.

the economic power in the cities of Ottoman Algeria and were profoundly devout Muslims who opposed any variance from Islamic law.²¹ As such, it is no surprise that a number of Old Turbans had a very traditional Muslim education, studying the Arabic language, the Qur'an and other holy texts. Some of them stayed more relevant to the changing world around them by gaining a French education as well, but those were in the minority, while still others were "ignorant by any standard."²²

The Old Turbans were opposed to French culture rubbing off on Muslim North Africans and any evidence of assimilation. According to Ruedy, these abhorrent changes, in their view, ranged from Muslims dressing in European clothing; to Muslims serving in the French military; to French attempts at implementing their *laïque* style of government on Muslims in French-Algeria.²³ On the other side of the same proverbial coin, Abun-Nasr points out that the Old Turbans also feared the French trying to regulate Islamic law.²⁴ The great concern here was not so much French administration, since colonization had already ensured that was the case anyway. Instead, the Old Turbans were scared that the French would Gallicize or otherwise influence Islam.²⁵ In short, while every other faction would accept some level of middle ground with the French, the Old Turbans would not budge, even when this caused them financial or political setbacks.

If the Old Turbans were the staunchest anti-French Muslims in North Africa, the *Beni-Oui-Oui* were the most willing to concede. A *Beni-Oui-Oui* was a Muslim who would actively assist the French in maintaining their hold on Algeria for personal gain and without regard for his countrymen. Their appellation was a derogatory nickname

²¹ Ruedy, *Modern Algeria*, 99.

²² Ruedy, *Modern Algeria*, 106.

²³ Ruedy, *Modern Algeria*, 106.

²⁴ Abun-Nasr, *A History of the Maghrib in the Islamic Period*, 328-329.

²⁵ Abun-Nasr, *A History of the Maghrib in the Islamic Period*, 328-329.

used by other Muslims and came from a mixture of Arabic and French. It best translates into English as “Yes Men,” but the nuance of how the term linguistically cuts them out of Muslim society is lost in that rendering. “*Beni*” comes from the Arabic word for son, “*ibn*” (ابن), while “*Oui-Oui*” originates from the French word for yes, “*oui*.” As in many other languages, Arabic uses the word “son” to designate a family name, or tribe. This is significant because the word *ibn* is designating those Muslims who say “*oui, oui*” (yes, yes) to French interests as a tribe of their own: “sons of yes, yes.” This conveys a much stronger sense than the English term “Yes Man.” They were seen as collaborators, especially by the Young Algerians who were frustrated at their willingness to assist the French without making any demands to improve the lot of Muslims.

Little scholarship exists on the *Beni-Oui-Oui* either, but general consensus is that the name was justified. Their description in Benzakour, Gaadi, and Queffélec’s lexicon of French in Morocco states that they “always approve the initiatives of an established authority,” and that “many workers lost their jobs due to their [the *Beni-Oui-Oui*’s] reports.”²⁶ Ruedy calls them those who the French saw as “dependable” and who “would be satisfied with the material profits to be won from their positions without interfering with the ‘civilizing’ programs of the Europeans.”²⁷ Queffélec’s was also part of an editorial team that put together lexicon of French in Algeria, which describes them as “mediocre” people who seized power “through opportunism.”²⁸ The *Beni-Oui-Oui*’s image as a collaborator, an opportunist and even a traitor, appears well set in the current historiography. No evidence suggests that there is any reason to challenge this currently.

²⁶ Fouzia Benzakour, Driss Gaadi, and Ambroise Queffélec, *Le Français au Maroc: Lexique et contacts de langues* (Brussels: Duculot, 2000), 156.

²⁷ Ruedy, *Modern Algeria*, 88.

²⁸ Ambroise Queffélec, Yacine Derradji, Valéry Debov, Dalila Smaali-Dekdouk, and Yasmina Cherrad-Benchefra, *Le Français en Algérie: Lexique et dynamique des langues* (Brussels: Duculot, 2002), 204-205.

While the Old Turbans resented French rule and the Beni-Oui-Oui took advantage of it for personal gain, the *Jeunes Algériens* (Young Algerians) answer to French colonization was to acquire full participation with the French political system. Young Algerians numbered among the *évolués*. Ruedy describes participants in the Young Algerian movement as “a new class of young Muslims who had found their way to and through the French educational system and were beginning to constitute a small professional and intellectual elite. They also included a few Muslim businessmen who had integrated successfully in to the European world of commerce and finance.”²⁹ Young Algerians may also be thought of as Muslims who believed in the French civilizing mission. As was the case among the French, they too were divided on whether or not Muslims should assimilate into French society or associate with the French in what they felt would be an equal but still distinctly Muslim way.³⁰ This was a small distinction in the group before World War I, but it later caused a minimal rupture in the 1920s.

The overall image of the Young Algerian movement is not contested, but there is some variety in the details of how different scholars have described them and their goal to fully participate in the French Republic. Although Dunwoodie maintains that the newspaper *L'Islam* was assimilationist and *L'Ikdam* was associationist, he nonetheless calls the whole of the Young Algerians “a pro-assimilation group” and “the most vociferous and gallicised [sic], but not the most numerous.”³¹ Ruedy sees more nuance among them. He says that they had a greater diversity of opinions among them than the Old Turbans did, and that “the question of whether it was more appropriate either to accept citizenship individually, as a few had, or to work for collective naturalization was

²⁹ Ruedy, *Modern Algeria*, 106.

³⁰ For more on the civilizing mission, see Chapter II.

³¹ Dunwoodie, *Francophone Writing in Transition*, 45.

the largest single issue separating wings of the Young Algeria movement.”³² Meanwhile, MacMaster’s description matches closely to that of Dunwoodie’s, as he points out that they were “led by an educated and Francophile élite” and “campaign[ed] for an assimilationist policy which would extend full political rights and equality to all Algerian subjects.”³³ His addition is in describing the Young Algerians as a “proto-nationalist movement.”³⁴ This is not an outlandish claim but it is a matter of ongoing historical debate. MacMaster represents those who consider Algerian Nationalism’s growth out of the Young Algerian movement as evidence of it being proto-nationalist, with some historians even calling late Young Algerian leaders nationalists.³⁵ Other historians, such as Ruedy, believe that labeling Young Algerian leaders like Emir Khaled as a nationalist contradicts “explicit evidence of Khaled’s assimilation vision.”³⁶ Furthermore, it bears pointing out that labeling Young Algerian leaders as nationalists is teleological and presumes that Algerian nationalism had to win out over any alternatives, as though it were predestined to do so.

Emir Khaled numbered among three especially influential Young Algerian leaders between its origin around 1900 and the rise of Algerian nationalism in the mid-1920s. The most important pre-World War I Young Algerian leader was Dr. Benthamiould Hamida. “Generally considered the leader of the Young Algeria movement,” as Ruedy declares, he studied in Montpellier, France, became an ophthalmologist and professor and with some difficulty obtained French citizenship in 1906.³⁷ Dr. Benthami

³² Ruedy, *Modern Algeria*, 107.

³³ Neil MacMaster, *Colonial Migrants and Racism: Algerians in France, 1900-1962* (New York: St. Martin’s Press Inc., 1997), 7.

³⁴ MacMaster, *Colonial Migrants and Racism*, 7.

³⁵ Ageron, “Enquête sur les origines du nationalisme algérien,” 9-10; Ruedy, *Modern Algeria*, 130.

³⁶ Ruedy, *Modern Algeria*, 130.

³⁷ Ruedy, *Modern Algeria*, 108.

also numbers among the few *indigènes* elected to office, serving on the Algiers Municipal Council in 1908.³⁸ He actively led clubs intended to improve or mold Muslim men that offered “lectures, fencing, maths, physics and Arabic classes.”³⁹ In 1912, he led the Young Algerian delegation that met with leaders of the Republic in Paris.⁴⁰ Alongside Benthami was Omar Bouderra. He came from an old and prosperous Algerian family that had effectively learned to operate within the French colonial system. Ruedy describes him as a “successful businessman,” while Bouveresse calls him a lawyer.⁴¹ Lastly, there was Emir Khaled, who later emerged as the most important Young Algerian leader after World War I. In addition to being the grandson of one of the greatest nineteenth-century colonial resisters, Abd al Qadir, he had an impressive resume on his own merits.⁴² Khaled studied at the Lycée Louis-le-Grand in Paris and the military academy at St-Cyr and eventually served as a captain in the French army under none other than the famous General Hubert Lyautey in Morocco.⁴³ Khaled’s uncompromising vision of Muslim association (full civil rights without having to give up Muslim status) caused him to be viewed as a radical and to have to go into exile in 1923.⁴⁴ That said, his influence had a greater impact on the future of Algeria and France than any other Young Algerian. His voice was heard largely through one of the newspapers analyzed in this chapter, *L’Ikdam*.

Though the Young Algerians were not the largest group, their sway over Muslim Algerians in the first quarter of the twentieth century was exceptional. Among Muslims that were politically involved, the Young Algerians were very appealing, and not only in

³⁸ Ruedy, *Modern Algeria*, 108.

³⁹ Dunwoodie, *Francophone Writing in Transition*, 25.

⁴⁰ Ruedy, *Modern Algeria*, 108.

⁴¹ Ruedy, *Modern Algeria*, 108. Jacques Bouveresse, *Un parlement colonial? Les délégations financières algériennes (1898-1945)* (Mont-Saint-Aignan: Université de Rouen et du Havre, 2008), 1: 841.

⁴² Ageron, “Enquête sur les origines du nationalisme algérien,” 9.

⁴³ Ruedy, *Modern Algeria*, 109.

⁴⁴ Ruedy, *Modern Algeria*, 131.

French-Algeria. Colonial workers in the metropole were highly influenced as well. Aissaoui found that “up until the early 1920s, politically active North African migrants in France were still ideologically close to the *Jeunes Algériens*, and viewed metropolitan France as the true home of revolutionary principles.”⁴⁵ They believed that the ideals of liberty and equality so cherished by the French had not taken root in French-Algeria only because leadership in the metropole remained unaware of the extent to which the *colons* oppressed Muslims. “They considered that there was a dichotomy between France and the values it stood for, and the colonial system that oppressed North Africans: Muslims were fortunate to depend on a central government and parliament with enough concern for justice to guarantee a fairer system in North Africa if only the terrible conditions in which Muslims lived were better known in Paris.”⁴⁶ It would later become clear in the mid-1920s that Parliamentary leaders in Paris actually did not want to help Muslim Algerians, but until that point, the Young Algerians were among the most influential political groups in Algeria and in Algerian communities in Metropolitan France.

Thus, Young Algerian newspapers before World War I and during the early 1920s, *L’Islam* and *L’Ikdam*, respectively, provide a look inside one of the most accepted political perspectives among Muslims in the time period. Previous scholars have used these newspapers to illustrate the tension of the *évolués* who felt caught between their French and North African identities. Here these newspapers are used instead to argue that the main shared objective of their authors was obtaining the French concept of equality before the law for all Muslim Algerians. In the context of their transnational world and

⁴⁵ Aissaoui, *Immigration and National Identity*, 100.

⁴⁶ Aissaoui, *Immigration and National Identity*, 100.

Francophile view, further integration into French society appeared the most likely way to accomplish this.

L'Islam (1909-1914) and Conscriptation for Civil Rights

Starting in 1909 and continuing through most of 1914, *L'Islam* served as the chief newspaper for the Young Algerian movement.⁴⁷ It published in the Algerian city of Bône until 1912, when headquarters moved to Algiers and continued publishing until December 1914. During its more than five years running, *L'Islam* was a weekly newspaper that came off the press every Sunday and sold for 10 centimes.⁴⁸

The actual structure of *L'Islam* bore a striking resemblance to that of French Third Republican newspapers, which consisted of four pages: “a first page with a single article giving a relatively simplistic political commentary, a moralizing story, or a popularization of a scientific discovery; a second page with news reportage, and a third page of *faits divers* and other news briefs. The bottom of these three pages was given over to a fictional serial, and the last page to advertisements.”⁴⁹ As Dunwoodie indicates that newspapers of the *presse indigène* usually used “four pages, including a full page of advertisements,” it is clear that they looked to the French press for a model.⁵⁰ As for *L'Islam* in particular, the front page boldly avowed their religion and heritage by centering the title *L'Islam* at the top in large capital letters, and by placing the Ottoman moon and crescent on both its right and left sides. Beneath that, one long political article appeared, pushing the Young Algerian agenda with perhaps two to four smaller articles

⁴⁷ David Prochaska, *Making Algeria French: Colonialism in Bône, 1870-1920* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 309.

⁴⁸ *L'Islam*, 7 January 1912.

⁴⁹ James R. Lehning, *To Be a Citizen* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001), 163.

⁵⁰ Dunwoodie, *Francophone Writing in Transition*, 51.

on the edges, on political topics as well. Frequently, one of these smaller articles would be a poem about patriotism or loyalty, thus still maintaining a political bend. The second page had several brief articles or *faits divers* while the last two ran advertisements for all sorts of products, such as soap and tobacco. *L'Islam* also published in French. Calling for French society to accept Muslims as equals, written in French yet adorned with the moon and crescent, the newspaper itself was symbolic of the transnational Franco-Muslim world inhabited by the Young Algerians.

Sadek Denden served as the editor of *L'Islam* through most of its time in publication.⁵¹ He was born in the late 1860s to a large family and raised in the coastal Algerian city of Bône, which was later renamed as Annaba in the twentieth century after the Algerian War.⁵² Prochaska reports that a local historian in Annaba told him that Sadek Denden descended from Sidi Denden.⁵³ The latter was a pre-French invasion *marabout*, a term that describes a “saintly personage who was enlightened or famous for his virtues who becomes, after death, a cult figure or object of veneration.”⁵⁴ Dale F. Eickelman calls *marabouts* “saints” who could develop large followings during their lives and were believed to be capable of dispensing “God’s grace (*Baraka*)” on their followers.⁵⁵ Prochaska remains skeptical of the alleged relation between the two, however, due to a lack of any substantiating documents.⁵⁶ Sidi Denden’s descendent or not, Sadek Denden could hardly have been more different than this traditionalist Muslim Algerian with a similar name. As a part of the Young Algerian movement, he looked to a

⁵¹ Although he does not offer much more beyond a name, Prochaska mentions that the first director of *L'Islam* was ‘Abd al Aziz Tebibel. Prochaska, *Making Algeria French*, 301.

⁵² Prochaska, *Making Algeria French*, 230.

⁵³ Prochaska, *Making Algeria French*, 230, 301.

⁵⁴ Benzakour, *Le Français au Maroc*, 255.

⁵⁵ Dale F. Eickelman, *Moroccan Islam: Tradition and Society in a Pilgrimage Center* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1976), 25-26.

⁵⁶ Prochaska, *Making Algeria French*, 230, 301.

future where Muslim Algerians enjoyed more benefits under French rule through the extension of their rights, possibly even as citizens of the French Republic. His desire to see Muslim Algerians fully assimilated into French society as equals with white French citizens permeates every issue of the newspaper, especially on the topic of Algerian conscription.

Conscripting Muslim Algerians into the French military had become a real point of discussion within the French government by 1908. War with the German and Austrian-Hungarian Empires was becoming increasingly plausible. To some in France, using colonial subjects as soldiers appeared to be the one way that France could shore up its odds against the significantly more populated German Empire. With this logic, the decree of July 17, 1908, called for a census of all Algerians [*indigènes*] age 18 and older in the event that France did decide to conscript them.⁵⁷

The idea was immediately unpopular among nearly everyone in French-Algeria. As Ruedy explains, “ironically, the majority of colons and the majority of Muslims came together in opposition to this proposal [conscription]. The *colons* feared that arming the natives could lead to insurrection or, alternatively, to inordinate native arrogance and political demands; Algerians saw little reason to fight or die for a Republic that had subjugated and humiliated them.”⁵⁸ Yet, despite this unusual alignment of nearly the whole population of French-Algeria, the Young Algerians saw opportunity in conscription. They decided that this proposal presented potential leverage for working towards Muslim assimilation. With that logic, they could agree to conscription, but only

⁵⁷ Bouveresse, *Un parlement colonial*, 1: 841.

⁵⁸ Ruedy, *Modern Algeria*, 110-111.

“on the condition of obtaining complete civil rights for the Arab population.”⁵⁹ After all, the Young Algerians could not envision France asking Muslim Algerians to risk their lives for the Republic while still not “according them basic civil rights.”⁶⁰

It was with these high hopes that Boudierba led a delegation of Young Algerians to meet with then Prime Minister Georges Clemenceau in order to voice their demands. Like other radical republicans at the turn of the century, Clemenceau was opposed to colonialism. He numbered among those politicians who saw colonialism as a distraction from France’s need to focus on regaining the territories of Alsace and Lorraine, which had been taken by the Germans in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870. He furthermore “saw colonialism as a violation of the ideals of the Revolution and the Republic.”⁶¹ Clemenceau made one concession to the Young Algerian delegation. From then on, Muslim Algerians would elect their representatives in the department general councils instead of having them appointed by the state, as had been the case since the 1870s.⁶² The Young Algerians had wanted this change for years, but they saw this singular concession as far from a sufficient offering in exchange for conscription. It barely expanded the voting abilities of the 5,000 Muslim Algerians who already had the right to vote in such small and local elections, while further failing to expand Muslim Algerian suffrage. That said, it should be noted in Clemenceau’s defense that this represented the probable extent of what he could do without raising the ire of the *colons*.

With such a small reform obtained in 1908, Algerian conscription in exchange for civil rights received immediate attention when the Young Algerians launched *L’Islam* in

⁵⁹ Bouveresse, *Un parlement colonial*, 1: 842.

⁶⁰ Ruedy, *Modern Algeria*, 111.

⁶¹ Lehning, *To Be a Citizen*, 138.

⁶² Ruedy, *Modern Algeria*, 111.

1909. Prochaska reports that Young Algerians in Bône “staged a mass meeting, 1,200 strong according to European estimates, three thousand according to the Algerians, which amounted to between 10 and 25 percent of all of Bône’s Algerians. They gathered ostensibly to support a recent French law which required French military service of all Algerians, but in actuality they used the occasion to call for reforms.”⁶³ Writing two and half years later, Denden claims that “the whole Muslim population” attended.⁶⁴ Denden was both present and the only one of three speakers that Prochaska mentions. He reports that Denden: “urged that Algerians who served in the French military be given the option of becoming French citizens.”⁶⁵ The rally had no demonstrable effect, but as might be expected when a newspaper editor gives a politically charged speech at a public gathering, *L’Islam* gave the rally and Denden’s words full attention in its next edition the following day.⁶⁶ Denden’s print activism over the issue of conscription continued and only became more fervent in 1912 because politicians were discussing the possibility of requiring three years of military service from male Muslim Algerians.⁶⁷ The following analysis focuses on *L’Islam* and its quest to obtain civil rights in exchange for conscription from this turning point in 1912 until it ceased publishing in 1914.

Three years after the rally, in early 1912, the French government was coming to a final decision on what Muslim Algerian conscription ought to entail. The decree of February 3, 1912 created a “mitigated conscription” of Algerian men 18 years of age and older on a lottery basis to serve for three years.⁶⁸ This is especially noteworthy, as it

⁶³ Prochaska, *Making Algeria French*, 232.

⁶⁴ “La Conscription des Indigènes,” *L’Islam*, 28 April, 1912.

⁶⁵ Prochaska, *Making Algeria French*, 232.

⁶⁶ Prochaska, *Making Algeria French*, 232.

⁶⁷ Bouveresse, *Un parlement colonial*, 1: 842.

⁶⁸ Bouveresse, *Un parlement colonial*, 1: 842.

shows the place of Algerians in the social and political hierarchy of the French imperial nation-state. The French government was asking less of Algerians than it did of its colonial subjects in French West Africa, who became subject to conscription for four years of military service only days later with the decree of February 7, 1912.⁶⁹ However, it was still asking more than it did of white European Frenchmen, who were only to be conscripted to serve for two years at this point in time.⁷⁰ Only after Germany increased its peacetime army from 653,00 to 863,000 men did the French government increase the time period of conscription for male French citizens to three years on August 7, 1913.⁷¹ The French government did this in order to keep its military roughly as large as that of Germany's. The situation on conscription in 1912 further confirms the Algerian's place as a French national with more of a place in French society than other colonial subjects, yet still in a second-class tier. Meanwhile, no further meaningful reforms had been offered to Muslim Algerians and under the direction of Denden, *L'Islam* continued to state that their support of Muslim colonial conscription would only be given in exchange for full civil rights. Denden's work provides an insightful look at the Young Algerian's hopes and its political reality of not having any real leverage.

In the month prior to the decree of February 3, the 100th edition of *L'Islam* was published from its new headquarters in Algiers. Denden ran a piece that weighed in on the issue entitled, "The Conscription of Algerians (*Indigènes*) and M. Morinaud."⁷² The article starts by trying to show that Muslim Algerian conscription should mean granting

⁶⁹ G. Wesley Johnson, *The Emergences of Black Politics in Senegal: The Struggle for Power in the Four Communes, 1900-1920* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1971), 182.

⁷⁰ Bouveresse *Un parlement colonial*, 1: 842.

⁷¹ Dorit Geva, *Conscription, Family and the Modern State: A Comparative Study of France and the United States* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 68-70.

⁷² "La Conscription des Indigènes et M. MORINAUD," *L'Islam*, 7 January 1912.

them civil rights by pointing to French newspapers that have previously supported or seen the logic in the idea. For example, it says *le Republican* had claimed that “the conscript of *indigènes* ... pushes for our Muslim subjects the bestowal of the rights of French citizenship.”⁷³ Giving very little actual attention to the anti-Semite *colon* politician Emile Morinaud, the real point of the article in *L’Islam* was to call for the rights of citizenship while denying the need for Muslims to actually be citizens.⁷⁴ This illustrates that Denden valued the acquisition of civil rights more than formal assimilation and recognition of it from French society. It further shows that he understood the need to create a narrative that fit with the plausible political realities of the day. As such, instead of calling for citizenship, the article drew great attention to the fact that most Muslim Algerians did not want French citizenship. “If it is exact,” reads the article, “the statistics indicate that there are less than ten Arab naturalizations per year in Algeria, demonstrating the exactitude of our affirmations: ‘Muslim Algerians do not seek the title of French citizen.’”⁷⁵

What is significant about this article is the way it attempts to massage the idea of citizenship for Muslims in a way that Denden hopes French society will find more comfortable. The article explicitly states that Muslims ought to have “in particular, the right to participate in equality with the French of the colony in the election of deputies and senators,” but it also disavows that most Muslims have an interest in citizenship, or

⁷³ “La Conscription des Indigènes et M. MORINAUD,” *L’Islam*, 7 January 1912.

⁷⁴ Emile Morinaud was the deputy of Constantine from 1898 to 1902. He was out of the political limelight when this article was printed, but managed to make a return to public office after World War I. As he considered himself a friend of Algerians, his position on the Algerian vote appeared quite contradictory. “Emile Morinaud,” *Assemblée Nationale*, accessed 24 July 2014, http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/sycomore/fiche.asp?num_dept=5425; Bouveresse, *Un parlement colonial*, 1: 799.

⁷⁵ “La Conscription des Indigènes et M. MORINAUD,” *L’Islam*, 7 January 1912.

rather, the title of “citizen.”⁷⁶ Notice that for Denden, the title was far less important than the actual political power it brings, such as voting. Denden was hoping that this would somehow be lost on the French. Furthermore, the article brilliantly manipulates a statistic to try and ease the concerns of the French about Muslim participation. To say that the low number of naturalizations per year accurately gages the interest of the Muslim community in citizenship is disingenuous. As a Young Algerian, Denden would know that many in that same organization refused to take citizenship on the basis that they would have to give up Islam for it, while even those that had made that large step still had to fight through bureaucratic nightmares to do so. This article displays the Young Algerian platform tailored in a way that Denden hoped would make it palatable to French ears.

Denden had to be aware that government officials read his newspaper regularly in order to keep an eye on developments within the Young Algerian movement. Not only was this something of a regular governmental practice, but the fact that Denden was challenging the French state’s call for Algerian conscription as Europe prepared for war only contributed to that likelihood. Thus, even before conscription caused a deluge of North Africans to enter the metropole, government monitoring of *L’Islam* and other such newspapers in Algeria was making Marseille an entrepôt of North African-related intelligence as officials in French-Algeria and Paris passed Muslim publications and reports on them between each other. This article was really intended for a French audience, not Muslim Algerians.

Denden published other articles that were meant more directly for his Muslim readership. Reporting in April 1912, *L’Islam* described the terms of the decree as “the

⁷⁶ “La Conscription des Indigènes et M. MORINAUD,” *L’Islam*, 7 January 1912.

nightmare of Algerian repression.”⁷⁷ Denden’s hyperbolic description of conscription appears to reflect a hope that he can energize the whole of Muslim society to fight against it, and this is further supported by an appeal to a sense of duty towards the French state that reflects a Young Algerian assimilationist perspective: “our duty of sincere loyalty made us obliged to help in the realization of a project that must contribute to reinforce, to consolidate the military power of the nation, and consequently, to bring about a moral rise in our coreligionists [fellow Muslims].”⁷⁸ That Denden had to plead and urge his readership of Young Algerians to fight against conscription without civil rights reforms may also reflect the diversity of views within the Young Algerian movement, or at least that a significant number of Young Algerians were less committed than leadership liked.

Other efforts at galvanizing the Young Algerian base followed. In May, Denden published another protestation of the decree of February 3, 1912, this time citing specific changes that he believed must be made. He wrote: “the creators [*inspireurs*] of the decree of 3 February have certainly proven their absolute misunderstanding of Muslim-Algerian psychology, if they have thought that in exchange for a few coins [*quelques douros*] the *Indigènes* would make a sacrifice of their children.”⁷⁹ He gave very specific items that needed to be changed in order for Muslims to agree to conscription in any way. The government needed to alter the decree of February 3 by: 1) reducing obligatory service to two years; 2) raising the age of conscription to twenty-one; 3) not making Muslims the first conscripts; and 4) not permitting replacements for conscripts.⁸⁰ Further, Muslims would need to be compensated in three specific ways: “abolishment of the laws

⁷⁷ “La Conscription des Indigènes,” *L’Islam*, 28 April 1912.

⁷⁸ “La Conscription des Indigènes,” *L’Islam*, 28 April 1912.

⁷⁹ “La Conscription des Indigènes M. MORINAUD,” *L’Islam*, 26 May 1912.

⁸⁰ “La Conscription des Indigènes M. MORINAUD,” *L’Islam*, 26 May 1912.

of exception; abolition of the Arab taxes and their replacement with a tax only on non-developed property,” and lastly, Muslim military veterans must have the right of opting “for the quality of French citizenship.”⁸¹

These seven points that would change Muslim conscription and compensation again call for French citizenship in all but name. The first three points on the decree of February 3 only ask for the French state to ask no more from Muslim Algerians than it asked of its own citizens. It speaks to an interest in preventing the wealthy and well connected from avoiding war at the expense of those who cannot buy their way out, such as the poor and colonial subjects. When it comes to compensation, here the Young Algerians covertly pressed for citizenship. The laws of exception were laws that only applied to Muslim Algerians in French-Algeria, more commonly known as the *code d'indigénat*, that imposed restrictions and regulations on colonial subjects that did not apply to French citizens.⁸² Getting rid of this would be a major step towards equality, as would be the elimination of taxes that only applied to Muslims and not to French citizens. These two points then would elevate and empower the whole of Muslim society in French-Algeria. Of course, to then give veterans the “quality” of citizenship is to virtually give them citizenship. The Young Algerians were still trying to avoid a word that they knew was very sensitive for the French.

The points in this article served as the groundwork for the list of demands that made up the “Young Algerian Manifesto” (*manifeste jeune-algérien*), delivered by a group of their leaders to the French government on June 18, 1912.⁸³ “Using again their

⁸¹ “La Conscription des Indigènes M. MORINAUD,” *L'Islam*, 26 May 1912.

⁸² Amrouche El-Mouhoub, *Un Algérien s'adresse aux Français ou l'histoire d'Algérie par les textes (1943-1961)* (Paris: Harmattan 1994), 282. See Chapter I for more details on the code itself.

⁸³ Bouveresse *Un parlement colonial*, 1: 842.

same tactic of 1908,” when they first met with Clemenceau and saw at least a small degree of progress, the Young Algerians sent a delegation of nine Young Algerians to Paris.⁸⁴ Led by Dr. Bentami, they met with Prime Minister Poincaré and delivered the manifesto.⁸⁵ Unfortunately for the Young Algerians and the advancement of civil rights in French-Algeria, little came of this. *L’Islam* complained about Prime Minister Poincaré’s inability to keep his promises and the *Beni-Oui-Oui arabes* continued influence in French-Algeria.⁸⁶ Ruedy says the only improvements made were “some lessening of penalties under the *indigénat*, the exemption from its provisions of certain categories of évolués, and the increase of Muslim representation in the municipal councils from one fourth to one third.”⁸⁷ *Colon* influence in the capital ensured that nothing further happened before the start of World War I.⁸⁸

After the war broke out on July 28, 1914, the tone of *L’Islam* changed considerably. The Young Algerian leadership must have been aware of their lack of power and with the war under way, they appear to have concluded that the best course of action for the improvement of Muslim Algerians was to support the Republic with loyal Muslim colonial troops. Thus, having previously denounced the French government for wanting Muslim Algerians to risk their lives for an oppressive colonial master unwilling to make any major concessions in return, the newspaper took a remarkably pro-conscription position. Within two weeks of the outbreak of war, Denden authored an article entitled, “To Muslim Algerians!” in which he exhorted Muslim Algerians to come

⁸⁴ Bouveresse *Un parlement colonial*, 1: 842.

⁸⁵ Bouveresse *Un parlement colonial*, 1: 842.

⁸⁶ “Une Politique d’Ait-Mehdi: des Beni-Oui-Oui,” *L’Islam*, 5 November 1912; “L’Election Présidentielle et la Politique Indigène,” *L’Islam*, 28 January 1913.

⁸⁷ Ruedy, *Modern Algeria*, 111.

⁸⁸ Ruedy, *Modern Algeria*, 111.

to the aid of France. Denden's choice to feature it as his main article on the front page highlights its importance. "In facing the terrible dangers which threaten France, our dear adoptive motherland, cradle of all liberties, our loyalist Muslim duty, profoundly attached to the republican institutions is clearly outlined: all of us, every single man, we must face the Teuton enemy and help with all the force of our soul the tricolor to triumph over the brutal German soldier."⁸⁹ He goes on to encourage his fellow Muslims to "forget our petty quarrels of yesterday ... with our French brothers" and to answer the call of "generous France, the valiant France" in need of "her Algerian children for the defense of our common patrimony."⁹⁰ Denden even resorts to trying to scare his readers with the notion of Algeria becoming a German colony, which appears to go without saying, would be worse than French rule.

Indeed, the war had turned *L'Islam* into a French propaganda newspaper. In its last few months, *L'Islam* continued to print pro-French war sentiment. In December 1914, it ran a poem by P. Rigal on the front page called, "In the Saddle for France!" with the title printed in all capital letters.⁹¹ The entire point of the poem was to place France in a heroic role while demonizing Germany. He accomplishes this in part by referring to Germany as the "Germanic Empire" while France remains simply "France."⁹² Though German Empire was technically a correct term for the Second Reich, the purposeful use and avoidance of "empire" proves a very effective way of making Germany take on a more aggressive and violent character than France. Rigal has conveniently and ironically played up France's republican ideals while publishing his poem in a newspaper printed

⁸⁹ "Aux Musulmans Algériens!," *L'Islam*, 8 August 1914.

⁹⁰ "Aux Musulmans Algériens!," *L'Islam*, 8 August 1914.

⁹¹ "En selle pour la France!," *L'Islam*, 14 December 1914.

⁹² "En selle pour la France!," *L'Islam*, 14 December 1914.

by political activists then being denied the rights of the Republic while living in one of the most prized territories of the French colonial Empire. He further asserts that France helps the weak, whereas the German Empire was “born of violence.”⁹³ This too is a rather ironic comparison to make in a newspaper publishing in French-Algeria, which was violently conquered and subjugated over the course of four decades. All this is whitewashed, however, in an effort to show loyalty to the French government in hopes of actually gaining the rights French citizens already enjoyed, which clearly still appeared to be a real possibility in the eyes of Denden and other Young Algerians. This poem then is less a reflection of France and more a reflection of what Young Algerians wanted, imagined, and hoped it to be, especially after their loyalty had been proven in the war.

By the end of the year, *L'Islam* ceased printing. When Denden became involved with the publication of another Young Algerian newspaper after World War I called *L'Ikdam*, he explained in its pages that the war had made it so difficult to acquire the materials needed to produce a newspaper that those in charge of *L'Islam* decided to take a “voluntary interruption”⁹⁴ That interruption proved to be permanent. Though with that said, in the world of the *presse indigène*, where newspapers were “usually, short-lived – sometimes a matter of weeks or the duration of a specific campaign,” the life span of *L'Islam* was, in fact, quite impressive.⁹⁵

Throughout its relatively long run, the goal of civil rights and equality before the law for Muslims remained at the forefront, and continued to be seen as a real and achievable goal under French rule. Such were the notions presented to Young Algerians as they went to Marseille and other parts of the metropole during the war. An actual

⁹³ “En selle pour la France!,” *L'Islam*, 14 December 1914.

⁹⁴ “A nos lectures & amis,” *L'Ikdam*, 7 March 1919.

⁹⁵ Dunwoodie, *Francophone Writing in Transition*, 51.

possibility or not, *L'Islam* had offered a Young Algerian vision of a transnational Franco-Muslim society, and it was a world in which Muslims and French could co-exist as equals, especially if the over 200,000 Muslim Algerians heading to metropolitan France to defend the republic could prove themselves worthy of it.

L'Ikdam (1919-1923) and Civil Rights

After World War I, many Muslims across French North Africa had high expectations of reform. Anticolonial Clemenceau had returned to the office of Prime Minister during the war and had made it known that he was “determined to reward Algerians for their contribution to the war effort.”⁹⁶ Faithful colonial subjects in Tunisia and other French colonies looked to Clemenceau’s promise made in 1917 that “France would remember and reward the sacrifices made by the people of its dependencies when the war had been won.”⁹⁷ Unfortunately, loyal colonial subjects who had contributed to the French war effort with this understanding found themselves gravely disappointed. In French-Algeria, Muslims gained some ground in the fight for civil rights through the Jonnart Law, but these gains were nowhere near what many of them had hoped to acquire.

Charles Jonnart was a French politician with a sympathetic and reform-minded view of the Muslim population in French-Algeria. Born to a family of the provincial bourgeoisie in Fléchin-en-Artois, France, he was “seduced by Algeria” while visiting in his youth and spent much of his career there as an adult.⁹⁸ Shortly after finishing his

⁹⁶ Ruedy, *Modern Algeria*, 111-112.

⁹⁷ Kenneth J. Perkins, *A History of Modern Tunisia* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 75.

⁹⁸ “Charles Jonnart,” *Académie française*, accessed 24 July 2014, <http://www.academie-francaise.fr/les-immortels/charles-jonnart>.

studies, Leon Gambetta placed Jonnart in the Governor-General of Algeria's cabinet in 1881.⁹⁹ He returned to the metropole and in 1886 began serving in a few elected offices, including deputy and later senator of Pas-de-Calais. Jonnart then returned to Algeria as the Governor-General in 1901, took a brief break for a year, then served as Governor-General again from 1903 until 1911.¹⁰⁰ During this decade Jonnart proved himself "sympathetic but paternalistic" towards the *indigènes*.¹⁰¹ These very qualities were the reason why Clemenceau called upon Jonnart to return to French-Algeria for a third time as governor-general after World War I to enact reforms.

Jonnart had a difficult task in trying to enact meaningful reform for French-Algeria. The *colons* were loath to lose their disproportionate power over the majority Muslim population to any degree. Meanwhile, the colonial population, especially the Young Algerians, expected the French state to deliver on its promises. Jonnart tried to make both happy by coming to a middle ground. He greatly watered down the reforms discussed in 1917. Most of these weaker reforms are included in the Jonnart Law of February 4, 1919, which "expanded the Muslim electorate to about 425,000 or about 43 percent of the adult male population; and by instituting a separate college of non-French voters, it created, in effect, a kind of intermediate native citizenship. Empowered to vote in communal elections were all honorably discharged veterans, owners of land or businesses, active or retired civil servants, recipients of French decorations, graduates of elementary school, and members of chambers of commerce or agriculture."¹⁰² This law

⁹⁹ "Charles Jonnart," *Académie française*, accessed 24 July 2014, <http://www.academie-francaise.fr/les-immortels/charles-jonnart>.

¹⁰⁰ "Charles Jonnart," *Académie française*, accessed 24 July 2014, <http://www.academie-francaise.fr/les-immortels/charles-jonnart>.

¹⁰¹ Ruedy, *Modern Algeria*, 112.

¹⁰² Ruedy, *Modern Algeria*, 112.

also permitted Muslim councilmen to participate in the selection of mayors, but as Muslims continued to make up no more than one-third of any given municipal council, this added power was quite representative of the frustration Muslims felt with the whole process.¹⁰³

Technically, the political reach of Muslims had been extended, but in reality, the *colons* had succeeded in ensuring that these extensions came to no real value. Ultimately, no one was happy. The *colons* were still outraged that Muslim Algerians had been given as much power as they had, while Muslim Algerians were disappointed that they were given so little for their wartime contributions. This half-way reform also caused a rupture in the Young Algerians. Two factions emerged: “one, whose nominal leader continued to be Dr. Benthami, largely resigned itself to the equivocal nature of the new legislation and began to devote itself to the pursuit of specific goals of interest to their various district constituencies. The other, headed by the Emir Khaled, determined to keep campaigning for full realization of the Young Algeria program.”¹⁰⁴

In this atmosphere, *L'Ikdam* came to the press. Published in Algiers, it cost 20 centimes per issue. The title, translated best as “to advance boldly,” or “to proceed boldly,” conveyed its goal to move forward the cause of Muslim Algerians. Like the other *presse indigène* newspapers that came before it, the structure of *L'Ikdam* followed that of French newspapers: a major story on the front page, followed by smaller pieces on the next page or two and advertisements at the end, making for a total of four pages. At times, *L'Ikdam* appeared in French, at other times in Arabic, and still others, in both

¹⁰³ Ruedy, *Modern Algeria*, 112.

¹⁰⁴ Ruedy, *Modern Algeria*, 129.

simultaneously. The choice of language was less consistent than the message, which was the same as its predecessor, *L'Islam*—full civil rights for Muslim Algerians.

It started under the direction of Denden and H. Hadjammar. Both had experience with newspapers. Denden had edited *L'Islam* while Hadjammar was involved with another previous Young-Algerian newspaper, *le Rachidi*, which ran from 1911 to 1914 out of Djidjelli, Algeria.¹⁰⁵ Unfortunately, this is the sum of knowledge available on Hadjammar's background. This new undertaking, as they explained in their first edition, would be “equally, the fusion of these two newspapers into one.”¹⁰⁶ If by an equal fusion they meant the editors would stay the same, this did not continue to be the case. Hadjammar ended up maintaining the newspaper on his own for a few months in 1920 before being joined by a different partner, M. Kaid-Hammoud.¹⁰⁷ Little is known about Kaid-Hammoud either, although Ageron mentions that he was an engineer, which shows that Kaid-Hammoud was another well-educated *évolué*.¹⁰⁸

L'Ikdam also served as “the colony's [Algeria's] most influential platform for the most prominent member of the francophone Young Algerians, Emir Khaled.”¹⁰⁹ In addition to publishing articles in *L'Ikdam*, he also served as the newspaper's political director by 1922.¹¹⁰ As the best-known Young Algerian in the early-1920s, the Emir's connection to *L'Ikdam* undoubtedly helped it become the successful *presse indigène* newspaper that it was. His influence, rather than Dr. Benthami's, is probably why

¹⁰⁵ Gilbert Meynier, *L'Algérie révélée: la guerre de 1914-1918 et le premier quart du XXe siècle* (Geneva: Librairie Droz, 1981), 219-220.

¹⁰⁶ “A nos lectures & amis,” *L'Ikdam*, 7 March 1919.

¹⁰⁷ 31 December 1920, *L'Ikdam*.

¹⁰⁸ Ageron, “Enquête sur les origines du nationalisme algérien,” 21.

¹⁰⁹ Dunwoodie, *Francophone Writing in Transition*, 69.

¹¹⁰ 6 January 1922, *L'Ikdam*.

scholars have considered *L'Ikdam* a Young Algerian pro-association newspaper, rather than a pro-assimilation newspaper.¹¹¹

However, it seems that the division between pro-association and pro-assimilation was vague. Assimilation meant colonial subjects became “fully French,” while association meant they spoke in French and acted French but kept any “worthy” aspects of their *indigène* culture; however, since France only paid lip-service to both ideas, its hard to say what either would have looked like in full maturation. Furthermore, even though the Young Algerians had their separate camps divided along assimilation and association lines, their speech and actions make them hard to distinguish. Denden, categorically an assimilationist, published articles in *L'Islam* that called for civil rights without the acknowledgement of Muslims as citizens. This does not seem to represent full integration into French society. Further, publishing in a time when Muslims were excluded from citizenship by virtue of being Muslim, it seems significant that he, as an assimilationist, published a newspaper called *L'Islam*. This all makes it difficult to see a real distinction between the assimilations and the associationists like Emir Khaled who also wanted full civil rights and the ability to keep Islam.

Indeed, the agenda of *L'Ikdam* still demanded full-civil rights and male suffrage for Muslim Algerians as *L'Islam* had done. A series of articles in 1920 called for further changes, especially the need to bridge the communication gap between French-Algeria's colonial population and leadership in Paris. It called for “representatives knowing their [Algerians'] needs and their desire to capably present them before the *Chambres Françaises*, where they know that they will be examined with welcome.”¹¹² The last

¹¹¹ Dunwoodie, *Francophone Writing in Transition*, Appendix 2c.

¹¹² “Les Indigènes et le conseil algérien: II,” 7-14 mai 1920, *L'Ikdam*.

clause of this quote is crucial to seeing the crux of the Young Algerian perspective—a real belief in the ability of Muslims to gain full civil rights under French rule. That Young Algerian leaders believed they would be received “with welcome” in Paris shows that they also continued to think that the French in the metropole differed from the *colons*. It was still the case that, in the Young-Algerian mind, metropolitan French cared about Muslims and the universal application of the French ideals in the Rights of Man and Citizen and would assist Muslim Algerians if they only understood how dire the situation truly was. This was the narrative of *L'Ikdam* in the early 1920s.

How this message was conveyed had changed to some degree though because the war had changed society and circumstances. To start, conscription would no longer serve as the Young Algerian's greatest bargaining chip. Instead, *L'Ikdam* used Muslim wartime contributions as a means to demonstrate the loyalty of the Muslim community and the debt that France owed; a debt that should be paid with full civil rights, not with the meager offering of the Jonnart Law. Further, believing that the metropolitan French would right their wrongs did not stop Young Algerians from taking a sharper tone, which is evident in *L'Ikdam*. At times, articles compared France with the way other European powers treated their colonial subjects in what appears to have been an effort to shame it into action. “Italy, newly come in the Mediterranean colonial domain, has not hesitated to grant to their Tripolitan subjects a constitution that does not lack in nobility. France, country of justice and liberty, does she wish to leave her loyal subjects in a situation that is less than that of those reserved for their coreligionists, by these Balkanic peoples who have yet so much to learn?”¹¹³ Whether frustration with the lack of reform after World

¹¹³ “Quelques réflexions d'Abou-el-Hack: La Représentation des Indigènes au Parlement,” 20 September 1920, *L'Ikdam*.

War I had hit a boiling point for Young Algerian leaders, or a harsher tone appeared to be the only way to get their words past the *colons*' version of life in French-Algeria, *L'Ikdam* pushed harder than *L'Islam* did.

However, as a Young Algerian newspaper, this harshness was still offset on occasion by articles that deeply praised France. This tendency might have been unique to Denden, whose work clearly depicts him as a complete and thorough Francophile. These articles appear mostly frequently in its first year, before Denden left the newspaper. An exceptional example of this is the article, "Those who well deserve the *Indigènes*," which describes the 1830 invasion of Algiers and the impact of colonialism. There is no way to know for certain how familiar Denden and other Young Algerian leaders were with the history France's colonization of Algeria, but it is highly unlikely that those involved in the publication of *L'Ikdam* were completely unaware of the violence and force behind it. However, none of the financial and political happenings in 1830 France that led to the invasion of Algiers are mentioned, nor is any of the violence that followed.¹¹⁴ Instead, the article presents a French-imperial whitewashed version of this history. For instance, the sole reason given for the invasion is that King Charles X had to defend the honor of France after the Ottoman ruler, Hussein Bey, slapped the French consul in 1827.¹¹⁵ Further, the article holds this as not only justified, but necessary.¹¹⁶ What is more, the consul is described as "*notre agent consulaire*," meaning "*our consular agent*."¹¹⁷ Despite Muslims producing the newspaper and largely consuming it, *L'Ikdam* presented the white representative of France, then an indisputably foreign presence in Algeria, as belonging

¹¹⁴ For details of the 1830 invasion and the brutal colonization of Algeria between 1830 and 1870, see Chapter I.

¹¹⁵ "Ceux qui ont bien mérité des Indignes," 7 March 1919, *L'Ikdam*.

¹¹⁶ "Ceux qui ont bien mérité des Indignes," 7 March 1919, *L'Ikdam*.

¹¹⁷ "Ceux qui ont bien mérité des Indignes," 7 March 1919, *L'Ikdam*. Italics added for emphasis.

to twentieth-century Muslim Algerians. Seeing the associationist *L'Ikdam* appropriate not just a twentieth-century French identity but even the nineteenth-century colonizers shows again that association and assimilation appear to lack distinction. It also shows the extent to which Young Algerians were willing to go if it meant the French would extend full civil rights to Muslims.

Subscription options for *L'Ikdam* also show that their calls for civil rights reached a trans-Mediterranean readership. From its start, annual subscriptions were available not just in North Africa, but in the metropole as well.¹¹⁸ This demonstrates one of two possible situations. First, this could point to Muslims in the metropole having an interest in staying aware of what was happening politically in North Africa, and specifically from a Young Algerian news sources. Considering that Algerian nationalist newspapers published in Paris during the late 1920s “were distributed to Algeria via Marseille,” seeing *L'Ikdam* with a significant cross-Mediterranean readership only a few years earlier is quite plausible. Furthermore, having even a few subscribers in Metropolitan France could have translated to a large readership that would make it well worthwhile. In Algeria, *L'Ikdam* numbered among the few *indigènes* newspapers that “went round the entire town, from hand to hand,” giving it much higher readership than one person per copy.¹¹⁹ Without actual figures on subscriptions to *L'Ikdam* in French-Algeria or Metropolitan France, both of which are not currently had, it is hard to say much beyond that.

¹¹⁸ Initially, the cost depended on location. In 1919, Algerian subscribers paid 12 francs 50 per year, whereas reads in Tunisia, Morocco, and France paid 13 francs per year. By 1922, the rate was a flat 20 francs per year for anywhere within those four geographical entities. Extra charges did still apply, however, for anyone à l'Etranger. Even the manner in which *L'Ikdam* charged demonstrates the uniquely strong ties, economically and culturally, between metropolitan France and North Africa. 20 September 1919, *L'Ikdam*; 6 January 1922, *L'Ikdam*.

¹¹⁹ Dunwoodie, *Francophone Writing in Transition*, 50.

That *L'Ikdam* ran in both French and Arabic, sometimes exclusively in one, at other times publishing bilingual editions, conveys shifts in the Young Algerian's interest in reaching a larger and transnational audience. Nineteenth and early twentieth-century *presse indigène* newspapers were mostly concerned about reaching Muslims only, and had tried printing solely in Arabic; first using classical, then dialectal.¹²⁰ Some *évolués* then became convinced that Muslim Algerian youth preferred reading in French to Arabic.¹²¹ Eventually, the *presse indigène* became interested in reaching the French as well, and this became the real catalyst for French language publications. These same rationales are reflected in language choices made at *L'Ikdam*.

In fact, Dunwoodie has already pointed out that Emir Khaled clarified in *L'Ikdam* that it would use a bilingual approach from 1921 on so that the newspaper could reach both the French and Muslim populations on both sides of the Mediterranean, a task made feasible by the constant shipping between the two passing through Marseille. Doing so would enable *L'Ikdam* to “pursue a Franco-Muslim policy and to own a powerful native platform, so that we may freely put our grievances before the French and, in particular the French of (metropolitan) France, who love us but are, in general, unaware of our situation in Algeria.”¹²² Still clinging to the hope that metropolitan French “loved” the Muslims more than the *colons*, Emir Khaled supported *L'Ikdam* actually trying to speak to the French as much if not more than its supposed target audience, Muslim Algerians. In addition to this, Dunwoodie also found that other newspapers in the 1930s offered similar justifications, which generally indicates that French language *presse indigène* newspapers were very aware that they were speaking not just to Muslims when they went

¹²⁰ Dunwoodie, *Francophone Writing in Transition*, 52-53.

¹²¹ Dunwoodie, *Francophone Writing in Transition*, 53.

¹²² *L'Ikdam*, quoted and translated in Dunwoodie, *Francophone Writing in Transition*, 56.

to press in French; and that this awareness informed their narrative of civil rights for Muslim Algerians.¹²³

To take Dunwoodie's analysis a step further though, choices about publishing in French, Arabic, or both appear to have not only been used according to whom a newspaper's authors wanted to reach, but also by the degree of defiance they wanted to signal towards the French. For instance, before the war, when Young-Algerian hopes of assimilation were the highest, French was used almost exclusively. *L'Ikdam* started out relying on French as well, but that changed when Denden left in 1920. For several months, the newspapers ran exclusively in Arabic. These editions even used the *Hijri* calendar (Arabic calendar) as opposed to the Gregorian calendar, which was a decision that had nothing to do with reaching a larger Muslim readership, but rather displayed an increased assertion of Muslim culture. For another few months in 1921, while Hadjammam and Haid-Hammoud were co-editors of *L'Ikdam*, editions appeared in both French and in Arabic. It was only at this point that Emir Khaled's assertion that *L'Ikdam* was a bilingual newspaper intended to reach both French and Muslims appeared. His article, published August 19, 1921, likely reflected the end of a power struggle among the newspaper's leaders over the choice of language and the goals of *L'Ikdam*, especially considering that within this same article, he took the time to explain what he believed the goal of newspapers ought to be in general. "A newspaper, if it is sincere and impartial, is a faithful friend who completes your instruction, your education, who brings you the news and the information, which keeps you up-to-date on all sorts of questions: economics, commercial, agriculture, etc ... In Algeria, the *Indigènes* do not have, to speak truly, real informative newspapers. It is thus entirely necessary to create a grand

¹²³ Dunwoodie, *Francophone Writing in Transition*, 56-57.

newspaper [*grand organe*], in *Arabic and in French*, well heard, daily, or, at least bi-weekly.”¹²⁴

The publication of *L'Ikdam* went on hiatus in 1924. By this point, French leaders had effectively begun the slow death of the Young Algerian movement by showing that they did not want Muslims to join French society. They did this by definitively obstructing Emir Khaled's political rise. Though the Jonnart Law's expansion of colonial suffrage and offices available to Muslims were minimal, the Emir nonetheless beat out the *Beni Oui-Oui* candidates in the November 1919 municipal election (annulled by the Algiers government) and was later elected to the Algiers general council and the Muslim financial delegation.¹²⁵ Despite the fact that Emir Khaled was an assimilationist Young Algerian, the combination of him being the grandson of the nineteenth-century resistance leader Abd al-Qadir with his political prowess had made him “a powerful symbol of national resistance in the eyes of Algiers Muslims.”¹²⁶ While the Emir would not have led a rebellion, the growth of his following had caused *colons* and other colonial leaders to fear that the very real reforms he sought, such as Muslim representation in the metropole, might happen if he was not removed. Thus, the colonial government spent the next few years “isolating him from his colleagues, who came to fear personal and career consequences of close association with his brand of ‘radicalism.’”¹²⁷ Overtime, this “led Emir Khaled to declare that Algerians had been duped by France's assimilationist rhetoric, which was nothing more than a smokescreen.”¹²⁸ Accordingly, in April 1924,

¹²⁴ “*L'utilité des journaux*,” 19 August 1921, *L'Ikdam*. Italics for emphasis.

¹²⁵ Martin Thomas, *The French Empire between the Wars: Imperialism, Politics and Society* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2005), 247-248.

¹²⁶ Thomas, *The French Empire Between the Wars*, 247.

¹²⁷ Ruedy, *Modern Algeria*, 131.

¹²⁸ Aissaoui, *Immigration and National Identity*, 38.

“Khaled abruptly withdrew from the race for the Conseil Général of the Algérois and halted publication of *Ikdam*.”¹²⁹ The newspaper was furthermore banned.¹³⁰ Khaled then left French-Algeria to go into exile. Whether that was forced, pressured, or of his own accord is an issue debated to this day.¹³¹

The Young Algerians arguably stayed alive through the next decade, and even began to publish *L'Ikdam* again in 1931, but the movement had also been mortally wounded and had to reinvent itself as a new group for *évolués* called the *Fédération des élus* (Federation of Elected Representatives). France had made it evident that it did not truly want its *évolués* joining French society, and all but a few had received the message, loud and clear. No longer would the Young Algerians or other Muslims think that most metropolitan French citizens were in their corner politically, and while some still preferred to assimilate, this pushed others in new directions, most especially towards nationalism. The situation was perhaps best described in February 1926 by the then Governor-General of Algeria, Maurice Viollette: “six out of ten of these [*évolués*] ... are ready to adopt the French fatherland without second thoughts, but if the French fatherland rejects them, raises itself so high that they cannot reach it, they will make their own fatherland, and we will have willed it.”¹³² Viollette could not have been more correct. That same year saw the founding of the first Algerian nationalist organization, which would continue the struggle for civil rights, but by calling for Algeria to break off from France instead of completing its integration. The organization was called *L'Étoile nord-africaine* (ENA).

¹²⁹ Ruedy, *Modern Algeria*, 131.

¹³⁰ Aissaoui, *Immigration and National Identity*, 18.

¹³¹ Ruedy, *Modern Algeria*, 131.

¹³² Quoted in Ruedy, *Modern Algeria*, 144.

Muslim Politics and Algerian Nationalism (1926-1939)

As we saw in Chapter IV, early twentieth-century European nationalism promoted the idea that nation-states ought to be determined along ethnic lines, and that made the ideology a serious threat to the colonial empire if it caught on with France's colonial subjects.¹³³ One of the main reasons for the French state's surveillance and monitoring efforts over its colonial workers in the metropole during the 1920s and 1930s was to prevent the influence of the two subversive ideologies of nationalism and communism.¹³⁴ To the disappointment of those French in favor of colonialism, this aspect of surveillance proved profoundly unachievable. "Anti-colonial nationalism" took root among the various colonial peoples in the metropole during the interwar period, including North Africans.¹³⁵ What procolonialism French generally failed to see, however, was that the success of these nationalist movements was not because France had failed to execute its surveillance well, but because by this point, colonial subjects were starting to think nationalism might be the most plausible way for them to receive equality and civil rights. At least in French-Algeria, this is why the Young Algerian movement had begun to lose steam. Between the impact of the disappointing Jonnart Law reforms and the colonial administration's role in ending Emir Khaled's political career, it looked more and more as though the French would never deliver on assimilation and/or association. Algerian nationalism was able to take advantage of this disappointment. It grew in the metropole during the 1920s, then slowly spread to French-Algeria in the 1930s. Ultimately, Algerian nationalism emerged as the victor over its three rival political factions, all of

¹³³ For a more detailed explanation of nationalism and its origins, see Chapter IV.

¹³⁴ For more details on the surveillance of colonial workers in the interwar period and the role of nationalism, see Chapter IV.

¹³⁵ Thomas, *The French Empire Between the Wars*, 256-257.

which presented a different vision for Algeria: the *Fédération des élus*, the *Association des Oulémas* (Islamic Reform Movement) and the Algerian Communist Movement.

With the fall of Emir Khaled, the *Fédération des élus* became the political lifeboat for Young Algerians who were not willing to disappear from the political discourse. It met for the first time in Algiers in September 1927 with Dr. Benthami—the same *évolué* who had led those Young Algerians after World War I and who had been more accepting of the Jonnart Law reforms than Emir Khaled's group—as its first president.¹³⁶ The second was Dr. Mohamed Salah Bendjelloul of Constantine, who took the position in 1930, although Robert Montagne credits Dr. Bendjelloul as the *Fédération des élus* founder.¹³⁷ He came from a middle-class background, held an M.D. from the University of Algiers, and worked in public health before becoming a politician in his thirties. Ruedy assesses him as having “tirelessly promoted the advantages of assimilation to France,” but ultimately, “Bendjelloul's personal ambition in time seemed to take precedence over ideological commitment, and eventually Algerian political discourse left him behind.”¹³⁸ During his time as president, the *Fédération des élus* also focused itself locally, no longer meeting as a group on a colony level.¹³⁹

The *Fédération des élus* is often described much as the Young Algerians had been. Feriel Lalami calls them “assimilationists.”¹⁴⁰ Aissaoui refers to them as reformers who “largely failed” to gain “equal rights within the French Nation.”¹⁴¹ Montagne mentions the *Fédération des élus* briefly as representing those elites who were

¹³⁶ Ruedy, *Modern Algeria*, 132.

¹³⁷ Robert Montagne, “Evolution in Algeria,” *International Affairs* 23, no. 1 (1947): 45.

¹³⁸ Ruedy, *Modern Algeria*, 133.

¹³⁹ Ruedy, *Modern Algeria*, 133.

¹⁴⁰ Feriel Lalami “Grand an : L'enjeu du statut des femmes durant la période coloniale en Algérie,” *Nouvelles Questions Féministes* 27, no. 3 (2008): 21.

¹⁴¹ Aissaoui, *Immigration and National Identity*, 14.

“extremely emancipated, with many of its [the elite’s] members married to Frenchwomen—aspired to play a role in the French Parliament.”¹⁴² Ruedy’s more detailed description of their platform places them squarely within the Young Algerian train of thought. He points out that very few were calling for “unqualified assimilation.”¹⁴³ Though again, to raise the issue of differentiation between assimilation and association, it would bear asking how qualified assimilation would differ from association. More to the point, Ruedy says that the *Fédération des élus* sought equality through “a program that called for native representation in Parliament, equal payment for equal work in the bureaucracy, equality in length of military service, free travel between Algeria and France, abolition of the indigénat, development of academic and vocational education, extension of metropolitan social legislation to Algeria, and reorganization of electoral procedures in the communes mixtes.”¹⁴⁴ The *Fédération des élus* may best be thought of then as a tamer, more fractured, or at least more decentralized continuation of the Young Algerians.

The Islamic Reform Movement sought to give new life to Islam in Algeria. Shaykh Abd al-Hamid Ben Badis served as the movement’s leader. Although coming from a family that had long worked in the colonial administration, he chose instead to make the *hajj*, study at the Zituna mosque university located in Tunis, and dedicate himself to the “renaissance and purification of Algerian Islam.”¹⁴⁵ The movement’s beginning is a bit unclear. Ruedy considers the movement to have begun in the first

¹⁴² Robert Montagne, “Evolution in Algeria,” 45.

¹⁴³ Ruedy, *Modern Algeria*, 132.

¹⁴⁴ Ruedy, *Modern Algeria*, 132.

¹⁴⁵ Ruedy, *Modern Algeria*, 134.

decade of the twentieth century.¹⁴⁶ That said, the *Association des Oulémas* was not founded until 1931.¹⁴⁷ Since Shepard considers the Islamic Reform Movement and the *Association des Oulémas* as one and the same, this creates a small degree of ambiguity over when it actually started. Regardless of from when it is dated, the movement stayed under his leadership until he died in 1940.

The Islamic Reform Movement first articulated the idea of an independent and sovereign Algeria specifically under Islamic rule. They can best be summarized in their motto: “Islam is our religion, Arabic is our language, Algeria is our country.”¹⁴⁸ Lalami describes them as “demanding the defense of Arab-Islamic values, the development of instruction in the Arab language and the total liberty of Muslim worship.”¹⁴⁹ Shepard paints them in a more generalized light, saying they, “like most interwar ‘Muslim’ political movements, worked to develop autonomy under French rule while also fighting for Muslim access to the political rights that were their due as (male) French nationals, including citizenship.”¹⁵⁰ The consistent image between these scholars, of course, is defining the Islamic Reform Movement as pushing for an Islamic Algeria, which is also found in Ruedy’s assessment. For Ruedy though, its leaders contributed to the future of Algeria less through their religious teachings and more by being “the first to articulate with clarity and eloquence the proposition that Algerians belonged to a distinct nation with its own specific culture and glorious past, which could never be confounded in another.”¹⁵¹ It was not the first to articulate that Algeria ought to be independent, as the

¹⁴⁶ Ruedy, *Modern Algeria*, 134.

¹⁴⁷ Lalami, “Grand an,” 21.

¹⁴⁸ Todd Shepard, *The Invention of Decolonization: The Algerian War and the Remaking of France* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2008), 38.

¹⁴⁹ Lalami, “Grand an,” 21.

¹⁵⁰ Shepard, *The Invention of Decolonization*, 38.

¹⁵¹ Ruedy, *Modern Algeria*, 136.

ENA had already done so, but the Islamic Reform Movement gave a history and culture to the idea.

Communism first influenced Algerian politics in the interwar period through Muslim workers in the metropole. In the years immediately following World War I, the hundreds of thousands of Muslim Algerian workers that went to metropolitan France found that “only the French far left, the anarchists and especially the Communists, demonstrated much interest in their issues or their welfare.”¹⁵² This led some North African workers to join the *Parti communiste français* (PCF). Established in 1920, the PCF consisted of “members of the French-Socialist Party who supported the Bolsheviks in the 1917 Russian Revolution and opposed World War I.”¹⁵³ A number of North Africans in the metropole also joined the heavily communist trade union confederation, the *Confédération générale du travail unitaire* (CGTU). Like the PCF, the CGTU reflected a general schism among Marxists in the wake of the Russian Revolution that created a distinction between its more moderate adherents, now called socialists, and its more radical adherents, now called communists. The CGTU owed its creation to communists who wished to part ways with the socialists that they left behind in the less-radical *Confédération générale du travail* (CGT) in 1922.¹⁵⁴

The small success among North Africans in the metropole inspired an attempt to transport communism back to Algeria itself in the early-1920s, but this was generally a failure.¹⁵⁵ Communists drew much of their Muslim following in the metropole more

¹⁵² Ruedy, *Modern Algeria*, 136.

¹⁵³ David Walker and Daniel Gray, *Historical Dictionary of Marxism* (Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press, 2007), 107.

¹⁵⁴ Branko M. Lazic and Milorad M. Drachkovitch, *Biographical Dictionary of the Comintern* (Stanford: Hoover Press, 1986), xxxi.

¹⁵⁵ Aissaoui, *Immigration and National Identity*, 14-15.

because no other groups would have the colonial workers than because they were profoundly interested in the ideology. Because of this, Algeria's "early party membership was predominantly European," and even then, communism in French-Algeria had a colonial slant, as "most [communist *colons*] never fundamentally questioned the appropriateness of their own superior position in a colonial society."¹⁵⁶ Muslim membership picked up in the early and mid-1930s, but only to lose out at the end of the decade to rising Algerian nationalism. It is because of its general failure in Algeria but influential role within Algerian nationalism that Ruedy calls communism "less as a direct participant" in interwar Algerian politics and more "a fermenting or leavening agent."¹⁵⁷

Algerian nationalism owes much of its start to French communists in the metropole. Because some Muslim Algerians in the metropole had joined the PCF and/or the CGTU, both groups "provided crucial financial and material support" for the creation of the ENA, which was the first Muslim political organization in metropolitan France."¹⁵⁸ The ENA continued to align itself with the left, particularly with the communists and later with the socialists, but many of its members were more concerned with colonial issues than with the "universal proletarian cause and Marxist-Leninist revolutionary theory" of the PCF, which ultimately made the party into a nationalist organization.¹⁵⁹ The person largely responsible for that ideological pivot was Messali Hadj.

Messali Hadj was the undisputed leader of Algerian nationalism in the 1920s and early 1930s. He was born to a "modest family" of mixed Berber and Turkish descent in the city of Tlemcen, Algeria, where he grew up "stricken by different aspects of

¹⁵⁶ Ruedy, *Modern Algeria*, 139.

¹⁵⁷ Ruedy, *Modern Algeria*, 138.

¹⁵⁸ Aissaoui, *Immigration and National Identity*, 16.

¹⁵⁹ Ruedy, *Modern Algeria*, 137.

colonization, with the conquest of Morocco, the increased pauperization of the Muslim population, heavy taxation [*les impôts arabes*], the *code de l'indigénat* and conscription leading to the exodus of 1911.”¹⁶⁰ As a young man, he was called upon to fight for France in 1917 and stayed in the military until 1923, during which time he followed the events unfolding in newly Bolshevik-controlled Russia and the formation of the Turkish Republic in the face of a collapsed Ottoman Empire.¹⁶¹ Uninterested in the Emir Khaled and his Young Algerians, Messali moved to Paris after he left the French military.¹⁶² There, he met and married his wife, who was a French communist; joined both the CGTU and the PCF; and found work as a day laborer and delivery boy before managing to acquire his own stall at a market by 1926.¹⁶³ That same year, he also became the secretary general of the newly formed ENA, which lasted from 1926 to 1937.

The ENA put itself on the political map within its first three years (1926-1929). Although influenced by Marxism and nationalism, the ENA hoped “to rally North African migrant workers from all social backgrounds to the ENA,” including “the North African *petite bourgeoisie* in Paris” and “called for Emir Khaled to be allowed to return from exile.”¹⁶⁴ The organization’s political agenda became more solidified when Messali attended the International Congress against Colonial Oppression and Imperialism in February 1927 and “established a clear connection between the fight for the democratic program and the independence of the three North African countries [Algeria, Tunisia, and

¹⁶⁰ Jacques Simon, *Biographies de Messali Hadj* (Paris: Harmattan, 2009), 9.

¹⁶¹ Simon, *Biographies de Messali Hadj*, 9.

¹⁶² Simon, *Biographies de Messali Hadj*, 9.

¹⁶³ Ruedy, *Modern Algeria*, 137.

¹⁶⁴ Aissaoui, *Immigration and National Identity*, 16.

Morocco].”¹⁶⁵ He delivered a list of demands that simultaneously called for independence while obviously realizing that independence would not be immediate:

withdrawal of the army of occupation, building of a national army, abolition of the code de l’indigénat, freedom of press and association, an Algerian parliament chosen via universal suffrage, and municipal councils chosen via universal suffrage. Economically and culturally, the agenda called for confiscation of large estates, the extension of French social legislation to Algeria, the expansion of credit facilities for fellahs, access to education at every level, and creation of Arabic language schools.¹⁶⁶

By 1928, the ENA had 4,000 members in the metropole, leading the French government to ban the group in 1929.¹⁶⁷

The ENA operated somewhat clandestinely until 1933, when it reemerged as *la Glorieuse Étoile nord-africaine* before coming to its permanent end in 1937.¹⁶⁸ It also moved completely out of the PCF’s control in 1933, as Messali made it clear that when pushed to choose between communism and nationalist aspirations, he would chose the latter.¹⁶⁹ By 1935, the ENA had gained enough traction in the metropole to play a role in the left-wing alliance that controlled the government known as the Popular Front. Yet Messali soon found his nationalistic vision of Algeria threatened by the proposed Blum-Viollette Bill, “which would have granted citizenship to about 25,000 Algerian évolués” and had gained the attention and interest of *Fédération des élus*, and the *Association des Oulémas*.¹⁷⁰ Messali went to Algeria and pushed his agenda of nationalism. In doing so, he brought the only real Algerian nationalist organization in existence at the time to Algeria. This also proved the undoing of his party and the final death knell for the

¹⁶⁵ Simon, *Biographes de Messali Hadj*, 16.

¹⁶⁶ Ruedy, *Modern Algeria*, 137.

¹⁶⁷ Ruedy, *Modern Algeria*, 138.

¹⁶⁸ Ruedy, *Modern Algeria*, 138.

¹⁶⁹ Simon, *Biographes de Messali Hadj*, 16.

¹⁷⁰ Ruedy, *Modern Algeria*, 141.

assimilation platform. Opponents of the Blum-Viollette Bill used Messali to argue that any rapprochements with the Muslim population—such as this bill—would only lead to the undoing of the colonial empire. As a result, the bill failed, and assimilationist politicians moved into the nationalism movement as World War II broke out. Meanwhile, Messali's actions against the bill caused the Popular Front's Blum government to ban the ENA indefinitely on January 26, 1937.¹⁷¹ He soon founded another nationalist party that would last through World War II, called the *Parti du peuple algérien* (PPA), but his involvement was limited by his arrest and subsequent imprisonment.

Between the failure of the French government to follow through on its promises from World War I, the rejection of the Emir Khaled's last overtures towards French in the early 1920s, and continued Muslim contact in the metropole with French communists, the Muslim-Algerian political spectrum in the second quarter of the twentieth century differed significantly from that of the first. Over the course of the 1920s and 1930s, the Young Algerians/*Fédération des élus* steadily lost power to other ideologies, especially Algerian nationalism. Considering that the first called for unification with the French while the latter wanted to break off completely, the two viewpoints come across as radically different. Yet in truth, they had at least one major aspect in common, which was the drive to create a world in which Muslim Algerians enjoyed full civil liberties. This is demonstrated by both of their newspapers from the 1930s.

El Ouma (1930-1939) and *L'Ikdam* (1931-1935)

Despite the French government not permitting the ENA to operate completely in the open in 1930, this was the year that Messali launched his Algerian nationalist

¹⁷¹ Martin Evans, *Algeria: France's Undeclared War* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 70.

newspaper, *El Ouma*. Appropriate for an Algerian nationalist organization, the Arabic title of the newspaper translates as “the community” or “the nation.” After a brief period of preparation, *El Ouma* started publishing in October 1930.¹⁷² Like *L’Islam* and *L’Ikdam* before it, *El Ouma* also used the four-page French model for its format. From its headquarters in Paris, it reached across the metropole to French-Algeria via the ships coming and going through Marseille. By the time it ceased printing in 1939, *El Ouma* had “become the most important Algerian nationalist newspaper in the 1930s.”¹⁷³

Only a few months after *El Ouma* began publication, *L’Ikdam* returned to the press in March 1931. This was the first edition since the days of the Emir Khaled, and it triumphantly announced on the front page that “*L’Ikdam* is reborn from its ashes.”¹⁷⁴ Sadek Denden had returned to run the newspaper along with the newly elected president of the *Fédération des élus*, Dr. Bendjelloul. Run by two longtime-assimilationist Young Algerians nearly a decade after the Emir’s platform had been demolished, it is not surprising that the manifesto of the new *L’Ikdam* announced “that this program [of *L’Ikdam*] will be exactly the same as that of its older brother, *L’Islam*.”¹⁷⁵ In other words, unlike the associationist *L’Ikdam* under the Emir Khaled, this would be an assimilationist newspaper like Denden’s Young Algerian newspaper before World War I, even if this said more about factional infighting than significant differences in policy. This fact was further emphasized by calling this the third edition of the newspaper, which must have counted *L’Islam* as the first edition and *L’Ikdam* of the early 1920s as the second. It ran until 1935.

¹⁷² Evans, *Algeria*, 59.

¹⁷³ Aissaoui, *Immigration and National Identity*, 19.

¹⁷⁴ “Aux lecteurs de L’IKDAM,” 14 March 1931, *L’Ikdam*.

¹⁷⁵ “Notre Programme, Notre Action!,” 14 March 1931, *L’Ikdam*.

L'Ikdam and its contemporary and competitor, *El Ouma*, could not have had more different visions for the political future of Algeria, but what they presented were in fact two very different paths to the common goal of civil rights and the end of colonial oppression. *L'Ikdam* represented those Muslim Algerians who still believed that the best path to full political participation and rights was through a closer relationship with France, not through challenging it. They continued to believe “in the love that France has for all its children, regardless of their race, their religion and their color,” despite many if not most Muslims feeling that history had showed them this was an inaccurate description of the French state.¹⁷⁶ Of course, as colonial elites who in some instances had married into white French families, their experience had been quite different from that of the majority of Muslim Algerians. Meanwhile, *El Ouma* represented those Muslim Algerians who believed France was nothing but an oppressor, denying Muslims their culture, heritage, and identity; and furthermore, a state that had demonstrated its incapacity to reform and make space for Muslims as equals.

Thus, *L'Ikdam* sought to provide a narrative in which France appeared capable of adapting to the full inclusion of Franco-Muslims with civil rights. This was done in part by relying on white French politicians who shared, or could be presented as sharing, the newspaper's assimilationist view in its articles. Among the earlier examples of this is none other than the first Resident-General of Morocco, Hubert Lyautey.¹⁷⁷ At the top of the second page of the March 14, 1931 edition of *L'Ikdam*, he and his words found great praise in the article “Colonial Problems, Words of a Soldier.”¹⁷⁸ The article begins by claiming his “long stay in Morocco especially during the war [World War I] left in the

¹⁷⁶ “Aux lecteurs de L'IKDAM,” 14 March 1931, *L'Ikdam*.

¹⁷⁷ For more on the background of Lyautey, see Chapter II.

¹⁷⁸ “Les Problèmes Coloniaux – Paroles d'un soldat,” 14 March 1931, *L'Ikdam*.

minds of our neighbors to the west, the best memories.” In becoming the omnipotent narrator of Lyautey’s legacy in Morocco, *L’Ikdam* has assumed the authority needed to craft him into a character whose political views have always been inline with assimilationists and/or associationists. Building on the power of this description, *L’Ikdam* quotes Lyautey as he spoke “while recently visiting the worksites of the colonial exposition.”¹⁷⁹ Given the article’s date, this was presumably the colonial exposition held in Paris later that same year. Said Lyautey: “Exterior France has become the victim of a moral crisis, a political sickness which is particularly serious in Indochina, and which has its origin in the tendency that we have to consider as inferior the races placed under our authority. It is not just to treat the Berbers, Annamites [Vietnamese], Arabs, Malagasies with a condescending distain, which gives birth to hatred and prepares the revolts of tomorrow.”¹⁸⁰ Knowing Lyautey’s fuller background described in Chapter II, it is easy to see that while he may think the French need to change how they treat their colonial subjects in general, the larger concern was maintaining control of the empire. But *L’Ikdam* has successfully painted Lyautey as more of a crusader for equality before the law for colonial subjects.

Later that same year, the radical-socialist senator, Henry Berenger, contributed an article to *L’Ikdam* that called for equality for colonial subjects. Passionate about colonial issues, he had been chosen to represent the colony of Guadelupe as its representative in the French Senate despite being from Rugles, France.¹⁸¹ “The day must come,” he wrote on the front page of *L’Ikdam*, “and we believe it not too far off, where all our colonial

¹⁷⁹ “Les Problèmes Coloniaux – Paroles d’un soldat,” 14 March 1931, *L’Ikdam*.

¹⁸⁰ “Les Problèmes Coloniaux – Paroles d’un soldat,” 14 March 1931, *L’Ikdam*.

¹⁸¹ “BERENGER, Henry,” *Sénat: Un site au service des citoyens*, accessed 26 July 26 2014, http://www.senat.fr/senateur-3eme-republique/berenger_henry0845r3.html#1889-1940.

populations, from five continents will be legally represented in the French *Parlement* and will be able to participate in all the justice of our free [*libre*] institutions. That day, our colonial France will be definitively created.”¹⁸² Berenger was not representative of the majority of French society, but his position of authority gave more credence to his claim. Seeing a political figure of his stature call of a truly international-French state, rather than an imperial-French state, would have been a hopeful prospect to the *évolués*.

L'Ikdam even managed to quote the president of the Third Republic, Albert Lebrun. In truth, this is a particularly noteworthy achievement on the part of its directors, given his underwhelming presence as France's president during the Great Depression, the last eight years before Nazi occupation, and the fall of the Third Republic. Jean-Baptiste Duroselle explains Lebrun's tenure as President from May 1932 to April 1939 by summing him up as a man of inaction: “Never before in the history of the French Republic had there been such an abysmal void. We cannot find a single initiative taken by Albert Lebrun at anytime, even during the most dramatic events.”¹⁸³

Despite such a profound silence, *L'Ikdam* found President Lebrun of use in their June 15, 1932 edition. Prominently placed on the front page was an article recounting how *la gauche* (the left) had helped facilitate the advancement of Muslim Algerians in French society nearly since the beginning of the twentieth century. The article blamed World War I for interrupting this advancement while listing several French politicians that it claimed as allies to the Algerian cause, most notably including Georges Clemenceau.¹⁸⁴ Reaching the year 1932, *L'Ikdam* identifies hopeful changes in the

¹⁸² Henry Berenger, “L'Algérie vivra-t-elle ?,” 1 November 1931, *L'Ikdam*.

¹⁸³ Jean-Baptiste Duroselle, Catherine Dop Miller, and Robert L. Miller, *France and the Nazi Threat: The Collapse of French Diplomacy 1932-1940* (New York: Enigma Books, 2004), xxxvi.

¹⁸⁴ “L'avènement des gauches et la question Indigène,” 15 June 1932, *L'Ikdam*.

political climate by quoting President Lebrun in all capital letters as he called on Parliament to have greater focus on colonial issues: “TO PURUSE EFFECTIVELY, THE WELL-BEING OF THE INDIGENE POPULATIONS, A COLONIAL POLICY WHICH VALUES THE GLORIOUS DOMAINE *D’OUTRE-MER* [overseas].”¹⁸⁵ The words are vague, as they do not give any specific actions that ought to be taken, but nonetheless, *L’Ikdam*, presented the president of the Republic as a supporter and kept the hope of assimilation alive.

On November 10, 1933, a French citizen named Georges Grandjean contributed a stirring argument for full civil rights to be extended to Algerians. Though not an editor in the earlier years of *L’Ikdam*, in this edition and subsequent ones, he was listed as the “*rédacteur en chef*” (editor-in-chief) next to Denden, who continued on as the *directeur*. The reason was likely legal. Dunwoodie explains that in an effort to control the *presse indigène*, colonial authorities interpreted a metropolitan law from 1881 that had “significantly relaxed censorship and state control” over the French Press in such a way as to maintain “that only French and naturalised [sic] French citizens could occupy the post of editor, since only these citizens had, as the letter of the law demanded, access to full civil rights. Any Muslims still subject to the ‘personal Muslim status’ could thus be conveniently excluded.”¹⁸⁶ Many newspapers of the *presse indigène* thus found French citizens who were willing to give their name to the newspaper for the sake of meeting the requirements of the law.

In this edition, however, Grandjean contributed the main article found on the front page of *L’Ikdam*. His work appeared only one day shy of the fifteenth anniversary of the

¹⁸⁵ “L’avènement des gauches et la question Indigène,” 15 June 1932, *L’Ikdam*.

¹⁸⁶ Dunwoodie, *Francophone Writing in Transition*, 55.

armistice that ended World War I. The publication's timing allowed it to be appreciated and absorbed by its readers before the actual anniversary the following day. Appropriate to the anniversary, Gradjean reminded readers of the wartime contributions of Muslim Algerians for the defense of the Third Republic and used this to call for the extension of civil rights to all Muslim Algerians. "Fifteen years of peace! Fifteen years of defeat. Fifteen years of deceit [*duperie*]," read the refrain that punctuated the opening and closing of his article.¹⁸⁷ He calls French authorities promise breakers and liars as he recalls the blood and life sacrificed by Muslim Algerians for France on the frontlines. These reminders culminate in a single point. "For ... at the end of the day, one cannot fight for France, but on the condition of being a free people."¹⁸⁸ To the readers of *L'Ikdam*, that freedom would not mean independence from France, but full integration into a truly transnational French society.

This method of building the case that France would assimilate Muslims by using the voices of white French citizens continued through the end of *L'Ikdam*. A front-page article in January 1935 calling for more assistance to Francophone Muslim students opened not with the words of its Franco-Muslim author, Abd-El-Djabbar, but rather by quoting Maurice Viollette, then a rising politician who had an important part in the Popular Front political alliance that governed France the following year.¹⁸⁹ The article decried the struggles of *évolué* students to find financial and social support. To make the point that *évolué* students were essential to the advancement of Muslim Algerian civil rights, Djabbar quoted Viollette as saying: "Muslim students who will have fully assimilated French culture can do much to clear up the respective misunderstandings and

¹⁸⁷ "11 Novembre 1918 11 Novembre 1933," 10 November 1933, *L'Ikdam*.

¹⁸⁸ "11 Novembre 1918 11 Novembre 1933," 10 November 1933, *L'Ikdam*.

¹⁸⁹ For more on Maurice Viollette and the Popular Front, see Chapter I.

disarm latent hostilities.”¹⁹⁰ In other words, assimilation will only work if these students are supported. Thus, the editors of *L’Ikdam* used white French citizen contributors and the words of French political figures to depict a French society in which assimilation with full civil rights and equality before the law was truly possible. The *évolué* Muslims behind *L’Ikdam* believed that the majority of French citizens and Muslim Algerians who did not see such a future simply misunderstood, and it was the job of their newspaper to correct that narrative.

On the other hand, *El Ouma* created an entirely different narrative, which was that the French never intended to give Muslim’s civil rights, and the only way for Muslim Algerians to correct this wrong was through independence. *El Ouma* focused on French organizations that exemplified France’s capacity to oppress in order to highlight the state’s failure to assimilate those who were not European or Christian. Articles decried injustices committed against North Africans that the Algerian nationalists believed to illustrate that, when it came to Muslims, France had no intention of living up to its ideals of equality before the law.

The complaint against the lack of civil rights for Algerians could be reached from somewhat indirect means. After what *El Ouma* judged to be the “false report of a snitching, undercover cop [*mouchard-policier*]” resulted in the arrest of Messali and other Algerian nationalist leaders, the newspaper proclaimed on its front page: “this demonstrates the hypocrisy of the government of the Third Republic, whose crafty promises quickly evaporate.”¹⁹¹ Significantly, *El Ouma* never mentions the actual charges brought against Messali, although it does provide a photo of him looking very respectable

¹⁹⁰ “La grande détresse de nos étudiants,” 26 January 1935, *L’Ikdam*.

¹⁹¹ “La répression s’aggrave!,” 28 December 1934, *El Ouma*.

and in European clothing, which leaves the impression of a man minding his position within society.¹⁹² Instead, his arrest proved an opportunity to raise general grievances against France tangentially.

The article goes on to scoff at the values of France's concept of universal human rights and equality, saying that "democracy bends over and fades away before the *code de l'Indigénat* which has established itself as sovereign master in the capital of 'liberal' France!"¹⁹³ For Messali's Algerian nationalists, life in the metropole and life in Algeria brought the same oppression—a transnational, imperial oppression. The article further claims that France's concept of liberty is worse than fascism, "far behind *le Duce* [Benito Mussolini of Italy], behind Hitler!"¹⁹⁴ With vivid wording such as "snitch" and "crafty" that creates a strong image of underhanded dealings and manipulation, as well as a comparison to Hitler, *El Ouma* turned an incomplete report on Messali's arrest into a hyperbolic general complaint of France's failures that completely opposes that offered by *L'Ikdam*.

In the very same edition on the second page, *El Ouma* displayed utter contempt and distrust in describing SAINA:

Given the scope of our movement and the enthusiasm that it causes among the masses of North Africans, the dispensary of corruption and snitching installed at rue Lecomte [SAINA] deploys an activity even more raucous than constitutes its sole *raison d'être*. Godin and his *valets* are looking to justify the sinecures created by them ... any path seems good to them that discourages our compatriots and obliges them to abandon the work [*action entreprise*].¹⁹⁵

The article's author creates a powerful literary pun in calling SAINA Paris' medical dispensary, where the state provided medical services to North African workers in Paris,

¹⁹² "La répression s'aggrave!," 28 December 1934, *El Ouma*.

¹⁹³ "La répression s'aggrave!," 28 December 1934, *El Ouma*.

¹⁹⁴ "La répression s'aggrave!," 28 December 1934, *El Ouma*.

¹⁹⁵ "Une Belle Manifestation de Solidarité," 28 December 1934, *El Ouma*.

a “dispensary of corruption and snitching.” The dispensary in fact provided medical care as well as an excellent way for the police to monitor North Africans, but the strong wording focuses the attention solely on the less savory aspect of SAINA. Given that SAINA was a government office created ostensibly for the purpose of helping Muslim workers in the metropole, this provides another reminder to Muslim readers that the French state cannot be trusted as well as a message to the French state that its colonial subjects can see through its lies.¹⁹⁶

At least on one occasion, *El Ouma* used the heading of its front page to call on Muslims to take their civil rights. In large letters right next to the newspaper’s title in a December 1937 edition, it stated in bolded print: “let us unite ourselves to snatch up our rights, as we are united in religion.”¹⁹⁷ The translation does not quite do the sentence justice, and no singular translation ever could. The verb “to snatch” in the original French is “*arracher*.”¹⁹⁸ In this sentence, “snatch up” is the closest English equivalent, but *arracher* can also translate as tearing away, or wresting something. It conveys a sense of ripping away, even violently if needed. This image sums up the sentiment of Messali’s Algerian nationalists—that Muslim Algerians must seize their civil rights, even tear them from the hands of the French, if they are have them.

That said, a mark of Messali’s version of Algerian nationalism, which was tamer than the that of the later Algerian nationalist movement *Front de Libération Nationale* (FLN) that fought against France during the Algerian War, was that it sought reforms from the French while demanding the end of imperialism. In that same December 1937 edition is an article on the second page dedicated to discussing working North Africans in

¹⁹⁶ For More on SAINA, see Chapter IV.

¹⁹⁷ December 1937, *El Ouma*.

¹⁹⁸ December 1937, *El Ouma*.

France. It complains of their distinction from European workers. A major frustration is again with SAINA. Assuming the ability to speak for all North Africans, *El Ouma* claims “North Africans, unanimously, demand the immediate closure of the police services of la rue Lecomte ... it is necessary that North Africans have the possibility to take care of themselves in all hospitals in the Parisian region, not exclusively in this one [the Franco-Muslim hospital].”¹⁹⁹ Again, the issue for those behind *El Ouma* appears to have been equality, and they simply could not envision that coming from the French.

These examples of *El Ouma* seeing no way to reconcile with France abound, and nearly always occupied the front page. As the ENA and *El Ouma* approached their final year, a special “*spécimen gratuit*” (free edition) dedicated to decrying French imperialism and injustice, and again, the abuse of Muslim Algerian civil rights, appeared. Three of the four stories on the front page took on these topics. The main article, “Does France want to Dig itself a Grave in North Africa?” argued that as fascist Italy had taken Ethiopia and was now, according to *El Ouma*, draining Britain’s resources by taking Egypt, it would next turn its attention to Tunisia and cost France dearly if it tried to maintain the colony.²⁰⁰ The answer, of course, was for France to leave it. On the right-hand side of the newspaper’s page, an article on North African workers in metropolitan France complained of Leon Blum’s Popular Front breaking more promises.²⁰¹ The article complains of a recent law that had enacted a quota system on the number of North Africans permitted to work in the metropole.²⁰² “Leon Blum let us believe that he was going, according to the promises made by the Popular Front, to realize a regime of

¹⁹⁹ “Les Travailleurs Nord-Africains en France,” December 1937, *El Ouma*,

²⁰⁰ “La France, veut-elle se creuser une tombe en Afrique du Nord?,” 27 May 1938, *El Ouma*.

²⁰¹ For more on Leon Blum and the Popular Front, see Chapter I.

²⁰² “LE REGIME des Travailleurs Nord-Africains,” 27 May 1938, *El Ouma*.

equality that we were in the right to expect. But after the vote for the social laws, the pause came just in time to deprive our workers of all the advantages that they were to procure through metropolitan work.”²⁰³ Again, *El Ouma* reports disappointment on civil rights issues. In the bottom left corner of the page, another article denounces police abusing the rights of an *El Ouma* manger, who “handcuffed, under the escort of a genuine detachment, was led to the seat of the *police judiciaire*. It was over the simple payment of a fine for which he had never received notice. Nonetheless, he was detained for a whole day, during which he was insulted and hit several times by ‘courageous’ inspectors who were taking pleasure going at it on an elderly man of fifty-five years.” The title of the article, “the cowards!” further highlighted the base actions of the police abusing the civil rights of an elderly Muslim Algerian.²⁰⁴

In terms of conveying their messages, both *L’Ikdam* and *El Ouma* struggled with deciding whether publishing in French, Arabic, or both languages would serve them best. Of course, this linguistic question was a common trait of the *presse indigène* that understood the importance of reaching both Muslim North Africans and the French.²⁰⁵ Significantly though, the two newspapers decisions reflect their political leanings. Unlike its bilingual existence under the Emir in the 1920s, *L’Ikdam* of the 1930s now favored publishing almost exclusively in French. Having the assimilationist Denden back in the role director must have contributed to this, as *L’Islam* and *L’Ikdam* of the 1920s always relied more heavily on French when he was in charge. When Arabic did appear in *L’Ikdam*, it was usually in its advertisements, and even still, these were bilingual. More

²⁰³ “LE REGIME des Travailleurs Nord-Africains,” 27 May 1938, *El Ouma*.

²⁰⁴ “Les lâches !”, 27 May 1938, *El Ouma*.

²⁰⁵ Dunwoodie, *Francophone Writing in Transition*, 56.

importantly, this linguistic choice asserted French culture, which set *L'Ikdam* on very different footing than its nationalist competitor, *El Ouma*.

As for the newspaper that wanted to assert an independent Muslim North African identity, *El Ouma* favored Arabic far more. Like many other Muslim newspapers, it went back and forth between using French and Arabic. According to Dunwoodie, the use of French demonstrates that those behind the newspaper likely wanted the French to read their work.²⁰⁶ Following his logic then, *El Ouma*'s use of Arabic exclusively in many of its issues would signal a lack of interest in engaging with French society. Considering that the French police in Paris struggled to recruit French citizens who could handle basic conversations in Arabic, it is not hard to imagine that finding French who could monitor the Muslim community by reading publications in Arabic would have proven equally difficult, if not more so.²⁰⁷ The choice of language then is not just about reaching a larger readership, but also about asserting a specific identity, either by excluding or including the French linguistically.

Each newspaper was also a transnational publication or at least aspired to be one. Both offered subscriptions that spanned metropolitan France and French-Algeria. *El Ouma* offered subscriptions in Algeria, France and, towards its end in 1938, in “*étranger*” [foreign locations].²⁰⁸ The rebooted *L'Ikdam* of the 1930s offered subscriptions on the basis of Algeria, France, and “*étranger*” as well.²⁰⁹ The vague “foreign” category appearing as a subscription option is more indicative of a desire to have a voice on the

²⁰⁶ Dunwoodie, *Francophone Writing in Transition*, 56-57.

²⁰⁷ Rosenberg, *Policing Paris*, 157-158.

²⁰⁸ December 1937, *El Ouma*; 27 May 1938, *El Ouma*.

²⁰⁹ 14 October 1931, *L'Ikdam*; 10 November 1933, *L'Ikdam*.

international stage than it is evidence of having much of one, but without circulation figures, that cannot be said definitively.

Conclusion

L'Islam, *L'Ikdam* and *El Ouma* are all North African newspapers published between the beginning of the early-twentieth century and the outbreak of World War II. Each newspaper represents the most popular and influential publication of their ideologies: *L'Islam*, that of the assimilation World War I era Young Algerians; the first/second edition of *L'Ikdam*, that of the associationist early 1920s Young Algerians; the third edition of *L'Ikdam*, that of the last assimilationist Young Algerians/*Fédération des élus*; and finally, *El Ouma*, which was the mouthpiece of Messali's Algerian-nationalism throughout the whole of the 1930s.

While the Young Algerian movement separated itself into assimilationists and associationists, their newspapers do not articulate any significant distinctions in their policies. This is especially evident through the assimilationist Denden's war time willingness to give up the actual title of citizen if it meant gaining civil rights, and his use of the name "Islam" for his newspaper, which distinctly demonstrates an interest in maintaining something of a North African identity. On the other end of the Young Algerian spectrum, the associationist Emir Khaled's push for full voting power and representation makes him appear just as ardent about joining French society. Both camps called for full civil rights and equality before the law with French citizens, and both appeared to value their distinctiveness as Muslims and North Africans as well. The differentiation between the two factions then, appear to reflect conflict and infighting within the movement more than actual differences on policies.

Meanwhile, by the 1930s, the Young Algerians/*Fédération des élus*, which favored further integration into French society, found themselves contending against the rising Algerian nationalist movement, which favored complete separation. However, the two arguments come back to a common theme—that of civil rights and full Muslim participation in government. The real difference between the sides was their belief in how that could be obtained, with one continuing to place its faith in the French, the other not. Each group's argument for how to accomplish this is vastly different from the other, but the goals are quite similar. Indeed, this common ground likely accounts the disagreements among historians over the Emir Khaled's place in Algerian history as a Young Algerian and/or Algerian nationalist.²¹⁰ Even though he clearly placed himself in the former, the fact that the latter would have any claim on him, or indeed want to claim him, illustrates again that the same common interest in civil rights was the largest interest for both the Young Algerians and Algerian nationalists, which has also been demonstrated through their newspapers.

Given the popularity of the Young Algerians among North Africans in the metropole during and shortly after World War I and the ENA's existing almost exclusively as a metropolitan organization until 1936 and *El Ouma*'s high circulation figures, it is evident that a significant albeit unknown number Muslim Algerians in the metropole, such as those in Marseille, were deeply concerned about their status as French nationals lacking full civil rights as citizens. Surrounded by white Frenchmen with full citizenship and white immigrants who in some ways enjoyed greater rights than them, Muslim Algerians in metropolitan France were likely even more aware of their social standing than their friends and family back in Algeria, which speaks to the fact that

²¹⁰ Ageron, "Enquête sur les origines du nationalisme algérien," 9-49; Ruedy, *Modern Algeria*, 130.

Algerian nationalism originated in the metropole. The desire for civil rights, however, appears to have been the paramount concern, and one that transcended Young Algerian or Algerian Nationalist politics.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

Muslim North Africans in Marseille between 1900 and 1939 demonstrate that imperial practices were brought back to Metropolitan France. This is made evident by the enormous degree to which Marseille's leaders looked to experienced bureaucrats, administrators, or planners in the colonies to help them respond to the influx of hundreds of thousands of colonial subjects arriving at its port because of France's wartime and interwar period economic needs. Furthermore, this advice was put to use, which is especially evident in Marseille's concerns about public health. Muslim North Africans were migrants in that they left their homes to go to the metropole, but they also remained a colonial population once there. For Algerians, this meant bringing their status as colonial subjects and French nationals but lacking full rights with them. For Tunisians and Moroccans, this meant continuing to be only colonial subjects of the Third Republic. In the eyes of the state, they were neither French nor immigrants, not in the same sense as white French citizens or European immigrants. They remained North African colonial subjects merely sojourning in the metropole, no matter how permanent of a fixture their communities or the individuals in them became within metropolitan cities like Marseille.

However, while acknowledging that they were "colonial" migrants, and emphasizing the unjust and separate treatment Muslim North Africans received in the metropole from the French state in comparison to European immigrants, historians have

so firmly and definitely placed Muslim North Africans in an immigration discourse that the colonial aspects of this migration are all too often marginalized, if not pushed to the side completely. Colonialism then is treated like a façade within the history of Muslim North Africans in the metropole. The word is sprinkled in as an adjective in secondary texts as “colonial migrants,” “colonial workers,” or “colonial subjects,” but these works then proceed to examine the metropolitan North African experience through a dominantly migration narrative. This is an important facet to be sure, but not the only important one. Thus, this chapter has two main tasks in bringing this dissertation to a close. First is to highlight how the previous chapters taken together forcefully illustrate a pattern among Marseille’s leadership of turning to the colonies for policies to manage Muslim colonial subjects, both generally and more specifically in terms of public health practices. Building on that proof of imported imperial practice, the second task is to discuss how metropolitan North African history and, by extension, our understanding of twenty-first-century France and race would greatly benefit from a fuller recognition of how the colonial relationship between North Africa and France set these migrants apart from immigrants in a dramatic way. It was so significant, in fact, that it will be argued that colonialism should be thought of in less spatially divided terms than it is now, which is that the colonies are distinct and separate from the metropole. Rather, they are overlapping entities, and this framework will enable historians to better understand and articulate the experiences of Muslim North Africans in metropolitan France.

From the Colonies to the Metropole

It is made evident that imperial practices had made their way to the metropole at the start of the early-twentieth century by the way in which Marseille’s leaders repeatedly

sought advice from colonial leaders on how to govern, or rather, to control, the city's expanding Muslim North African population as early as World War I. Charged with overseeing Marseille's Muslim village project in 1916, Adrien Artaud relied heavily on Frenchmen who had built their lives in French North Africa managing the affairs of the empire in one way or another. He asked for the advice of the Governor-General of Algeria. He based the blueprints for the whole village on the ideas of one of the few colonial architects who had built housing for colonial subjects, M Resplandy in Tunisia. He incorporated the views of orientalist painters, especially Nasreddine Dinét, who was one of the few white Frenchmen who had converted to Islam. From what his letters and papers show, Artaud's only significant input from the metropole came from the *Association de Documentation Bibliographique* in Paris, but even here, he received a booklist written largely by people with extensive colonial experience.

The interwar period showed an even greater incorporation of colonialism in the metropole. After a full-scale repatriation effort with the co-operation of colonial administrators failed to prove a viable option for the French economy, Marseille followed in the footsteps of Paris and opened a SAINA office, which was the brainchild of the colonial administrator turned Parisian city council member, Pierre Godin. Tasked with what could be called its two-point mission statement, "to aid and to monitor [Muslim North Africans]," SAINA embodied the paternalistic assumptions of the French civilizing mission. Firstly "to monitor," which reflects the civilizing mission's claim that France should and could watch over its colonial subjects because, it was believed, they were all from more degenerate races than Europeans. Secondly, "to aid," which speaks to the civilizing mission's claim that France should and could assist its colonial subjects to

become better, or in other words, to become more French in a cultural sense. Indeed, SAINA is the embodiment of the civilizing mission in the metropole, and while this dissertation has focused mostly on its functions in Marseille, the fact that these offices existed in several metropolitan cities further illustrates the extent to which imperial practices, or colonialism, had ceased to be something that could be thought of in physical terms by the interwar period. The spatial aspect of colonialism, in which colonial subjects lived in colonies “overseas,” away from a white and separate metropole, no longer existed as the French themselves grafted colonial enclaves into metropolitan France.

A close examination of the public health policies governing Muslim North Africans in the metropole further illustrates how France created colonial spaces in the metropole. Spanning the breadth of European colonial empires, scholars have shown that European settlers and bureaucrats of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries greatly feared the contagious diseases that they believed to be prolific among the non-white populations over whom they ruled, which led to various racially focused public health initiatives meant to control colonial populations around the world. The British unjustifiably blamed colonial women for venereal disease afflicting their troops, so laws were created that regulated the women rather than the soldiers.¹ Believing Western medicine to be uniformly superior to all other forms, the British also tried to replace Indian medical practices with Western medical practices.² In Australia, hygiene became a barometer of whiteness for British settlers to maintain.³ Meanwhile, the French held similar views and

¹ Philippa Levine, *Prostitution, Race and Politics: Policing Venereal Disease in the British Empire* (New York: Routledge, 2003).

² David Arnold, *Colonizing the Body: Tate Medicine and Epidemic Disease in Nineteenth-Century India* (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1993).

³ Alison Bashford, *Imperial Hygiene: A Critical History of Colonialism, Nationalism and Public Health*. Houndsmills (England: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004).

took the same types of actions in their colonies. Colonial urban planner Henri Prost failed to see how his projects and disregard for the homes of the Moroccan people had caused the very tent-city that he called “a hazard” to be beyond the capacity of the French to immediately rectify.⁴ The French also feared life in the colonies would cause them to contract “colonial” illnesses, such as yellow fever. They responded to this with hydrotherapy at spas found in the colonies, from South America to Africa, and in the metropole.⁵ Throughout their colonies, Europeans were trying to live apart from and impose Western public health ideals upon colonial populations because of their fears of contagious diseases.

While well-to-do French citizens had similar fears of catching contagious disease from the white metropolitan working class, the specifics of how Marseille displayed its fears toward Muslim North Africans during World War I more accurately reflect the way that French fears of disease had developed in the colonies. Requiring all North African workers arriving at Marseille’s port to proceed to the city’s colonial depot in order to provide paperwork that literally demonstrated a clean bill of health mirrors almost perfectly the procedures used in Algeria in the 1920s to protect the health of cities. For example, in order to protect the “*hygiène publique*,” colonial officials responded to an arrival of country-dwelling colonial subjects in the French-Algerian city of Cherchell by requiring that they produce a ticket that was only issued to colonials subjects who were free from typhus.⁶

⁴ Janet L. Abu-Lughod, *Rabat: Urban Apartheid in Morocco* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980), 161.

⁵ Jennings, *Curing the Colonizers: Hydrotherapy, Climatology, and French Colonial Spas* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2006).

⁶ William Gallois, *The Administration of Sickness: Medicine and Ethics in Nineteenth-Century Algeria*. Basingstoke (England: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 1.

Moreover, the fact that Marseille wanted to build a Muslim village to separate these colonial workers from the white working class for hygienic reasons also shows that Marseille's elites did not consider the perceived threat of disease among both groups as equal. Colonial subjects were in a category of their own. Marseille's leadership considered Muslims such a greater threat to public health than poor whites that they wanted the two groups separated out of a fear that Muslims would spread more disease in the city's population.

Further actions taken by Marseille's leadership and the French state through the interwar period make it evident that they continued to fear diseases among the colonial Muslim population more than among the white working class. Indeed, one of the very few reasons specifically given in government documents for opening SAINA Marseille was "the worry of hygiene."⁷ SAINA Marseille never benefited from the same funding that the original SAINA office in Paris had and therefore never realized a medical branch, but the inspiration behind SAINA Marseille came from Paris' dispensary. Possible further inspiration may have been the plans for the Franco-Muslim Hospital that did open in Paris in 1935. Further, the large public health/hygienic inspiration for SAINA Marseille from Paris not only demonstrates that the distinction between colonial and working class disease continued through the interwar period in the southern port city, but that this distinction was alive and well throughout the metropole.

The public health measures are a powerful manifestation of Marseille working to physically recreate the colonies of North Africa within itself. Colonial communities in the metropole then can be described as something of a distorted reflection of the European

⁷ *Monsieur le Préfet des Bouches-du-Rhône to Ministre de l'Intérieur*, 21 September 1927, 1 M 759, ADBR.

enclaves among non-white populations in the colonies. In a very real and physical way, metropolitan France worked so hard to maintain the colonial status of North Africans that they colonized metropolitan French soil with colonial subjects.

Lastly, the transnational identities that North Africans experienced, as both quasi-French and as Algerians, Tunisians or Moroccans, followed them regardless of which side of the Mediterranean they were located. The newspapers of the *presse indigène* especially highlight the tension within the whole of Algerian society between its colonial and imperial identities. The common struggle of both the Young Algerians and the Algerian nationalists for civil rights—for citizenship—illustrate that breaking free of imperial oppression, within French society or not, was the greater concern motivating the majority of Algerians. In other words, distinguishing between Algerian and French was still a rather unnatural thing at this point before the invention of decolonization.

“Muslim Marseille” within the Historical Discourse

The historical profession largely failed to give colonized peoples the attention they deserve throughout the twentieth century. To start, when these histories were written, the focus tended to stay on the European elites colonizing in a colonial land, which left the history of the colonized and their impact on the metropole largely in the dark. To make matters worse, historians paid less attention to the history of European empires as they fell apart in the second half of the twentieth century. “If it [imperial history] was not dead,” wrote Douglas M. Peers in 2002, “it most certainly was thought

to be on life support.”⁸ Then around the start of the twentieth century, the momentum dramatically shifted.

New ideas such as the “imperial turn” revitalized interest in imperialism and colonialism. Antoinette Burton describes the “imperial turn” as “the accelerated attention to the impact of histories of imperialism on metropolitan societies in the wake of decolonization.”⁹ It is in this train of thought that Stoler and Cooper assert that “Europe was made by its imperial projects, as much as colonial encounters were shaped by conflicts within Europe itself.”¹⁰ They effectively illustrate this in part by arguing that imperial states conceive of their individual “imagined community” within an imperial context. “For example, “England was imagined in relation to Ireland and Scotland, to Jamaica and the North American colonies, as well as in relation to Spain and France.”¹¹ The “imperial turn” has resulted in a dramatic increase in scholarship over the past decade exploring the role of imperialism in shaping the metropole.¹² Indeed, scholars

⁸ Douglas M. Peers, “Is Humpty-Dumpty Back Together Again? The Revival of Imperial History and the Oxford History of the British Empire,” *Journal of World History* 13, no. 2 (2002): 452.

⁹ Antoinette Burton, “Introduction: On the Inadequacy and the Indispensability of the Nation,” in *After the Imperial Turn: Thinking with and Through the Nation*, ed. Antoinette Burton. (Durham [N.C.]: Duke University Press, 2003), 2; Benedict R. Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, 1991).

¹⁰ Frederick Cooper and Ann Stoler, “Between Metropole and Colony: Rethinking a Research Agenda,” in *Tensions of Empire: Colonial Cultures in a Bourgeois World*, eds. Frederick Cooper and Ann Stoler. (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1997), 1.

¹¹ Cooper and Stoler, “Between Metropole and Colony,” 22.

¹² Frederick Cooper and Ann Stoler, eds., *Tensions of Empire: Colonial Cultures in a Bourgeois World* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1997); Jonathan Schner, *London 1900: The Imperial Metropolis* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1999); Felix Driver and David Gilbert, eds., *Imperial Cities: Landscape, Display and Identity* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999); Sue Peabody and Tyler Edward Stovall, eds., *The Color of Liberty: Histories of Race in France* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2003); Clifford Rosenberg, *Policing Paris: The Origins of Modern Immigration Control between the Wars* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006); Jennings, *Curing the Colonizers*; Kevin Grant, Philippa Levine and Frank Trentmann, eds., *Beyond Sovereignty: Britain, Empire and Transnationalism, c. 1880-1950* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007); Mary Dewhurst Lewis, *The Boundaries of the Republic: Migrant Rights and the Limits of Universalism in France, 1918-1940* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007); Richard S. Fogarty, *Race and War in France: Colonial Subjects in the French Army, 1914-1918* (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 2008); Amelia Lyons, *The Civilizing Mission in the Metropole: Algerian Families and the French Welfare State during Decolonization* (Stanford: Stanford University

have become increasingly aware that “the pervasiveness of colonialism makes a modern European history without it incomplete at best, deceptive at worst.”¹³

But for all the talk of imperialism impacting the metropole, the discussion has still fallen short due to spatial concepts of what a colony is or was. What Marseille of 1900 to 1939 demonstrates is that the colonies and the metropole did not just affect one another by proverbially rubbing shoulders, as historians since the “imperial turn” have observed and proven. For all intents and purposes, they physically overlapped with each other. Just as white European colonial settlers left the metropole and took their identity with them to foreign lands, by the early-twentieth century, France had created de facto enclaves of what can best be described as Muslim Arab/Berber colonial settlers in Marseille. However, historians have not yet fully recognized this other side of the colonial coin, which were what could be called “non-white metropolitan colonies,” and the degree to which they are distinct from peoples who immigrated to France from outside of the colonial empire. Discussing them as colonial im/migrants gets at some of this, but dilutes the overall reality of how attuned and assimilated some of these colonial subjects were and how distinctly the metropole viewed them in contrast to European immigrants.

Any colonial historian would readily acknowledge that Europeans created “white colonies,” where Europeans imagined themselves as the/a new native population. This occurred in places like British North America or Australia. It also led to the creation of enclaves of white settler colonists within “non-white” colonies, where they became a significant population but not the majority, as in Algeria. When Europeans moved from

Press, 2013). Nancy L. Green, “French History and the Transnational Turn,” *French Historical Studies* 37, no. 4 (2014): 551-564.

¹³ James R. Lehning, *European Colonialism since 1700* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 10.

the metropole to one of these colonies, they certainly migrated, but unless they crossed imperial bounds, their citizenship did not change (e.g., a Parisian relocating to Algiers stayed French). Moreover, their descendants did not maintain a perpetual “immigrant” status, but rather took on a new “native” identity along with their nationality, be that the general appellation of “creoles,” or location specific, such as French who were also “Pieds-Noirs,” or Britons who were also “Canadians,” and so forth. The dual-identity served then as it does now as a profoundly powerful way to communicate how linked the colonies and the metropole were, filled with transnational and overlapping identities that could be imperial (their citizenship) and local simultaneously. Historians have succeeded in grasping this with European populations and showing it in their scholarship.

Yet when writing about non-white colonial populations moving to the metropole, historians struggle to capture their dual-identities, reducing them to their place of origin only. Before the “imperial turn,” any identity beyond that was often ignored. This likely reflects the then decolonizing world. Some in the metropolises of these once large empires—especially in France—have tried to distance their nations from the evils of colonialism by minimizing the impact and relation between the metropole and the colonies. By omitting a colonial subject’s imperial identity, it also made it easier to think of them as a migrant or immigrant when coming to the metropole. On the other end of the spectrum, liberated colonies, now sovereign states, have the understandable desire to assert their identities as independent peoples beyond the pale of Imperial Europe. Albeit for different reasons, this gives historians from both sides incentive to marginalize identities created by colonialism.

This has begun to shift in the past decade, as the work of MacMaster, Lewis, Rosenberg, and others has shown, but migration retains favor as the dominant theme over the imperial identity in their works. MacMaster discusses Muslim Algerians by themselves as “colonial migrants.” The phrase well represents the analysis in his work. “Colonial” is the adjective, a descriptor that modifies and gives nuance to the larger and more important picture: migration. Like MacMaster, both Lewis and Rosenberg give ample acknowledgement of North Africans being colonial subjects, and that background factors into their analysis to a degree, but they still frame North Africans within a discussion of migrants. Lewis compares their general treatment and experiences in Marseille and Lyon to immigrants who are mostly white Europeans, and Rosenberg discusses how the French state policed them in Paris, also bringing in white immigrants as counterpoints. This is not to tear down what they have done, for each of these historians have produced well-researched and excellent works, but using migration as the primary lens for examining the metropolitan North African experience every time, never substituting it for colonialism, has left us with a history that fails to capture the imperial dimension of their identity. It highlights the foreignness of the Arab-speaking, transient worker with nationalist ambitions in the metropole at the expense of the Franco-Muslim Young Algerian/Young Tunisian North African, and all those variant degrees between these extremes. Further, it causes the French acculturation pressed upon Muslim North Africans, in some cases for a century or more, to become lost in the background. Though it has a significant place, a migrant focus over and over again erodes the nuance and complexity of this transnational history.

Acknowledging the complexities of European colonial identities and marginalizing the imperial aspects of the identities of the colonized is a double standard at best, and encourages the racist ideology of the decolonizing mid-twentieth century to remain in the present at worst. This point is best illustrated by comparing Muslim North African migration to the “repatriation” of the *Pieds-Noirs* from Algeria after it won independence from France in 1962.¹⁴ As Arnon Golan points out, “repatriation” is a less than accurate description of the situation. He explains that French society considered calling the *Pieds-Noirs* “refugees” and “immigrants,” but “the term that did stick was ‘repatriates,’” even though

the connections between most *pieds noirs* and the French metropole were not strong. Of the 900,000 European ‘repatriates’ from Algeria arriving in France in the spring and early summer of 1962 only 9 percent had visited the metropole often before their evacuation from Algeria. Eighteen percent had only visited ‘mainland France’ once in their life. Forty-five percent had visited France ‘only a few times.’ Indeed a full 28 percent had never before been to the metropole.¹⁵

Although pointing out that “repatriation” hardly describes the migration of a group of people to metropolitan France when over 90 percent of them had rarely or never set foot in it, let alone lived there, historians have not argued that the *Pieds-Noirs* should be denied their French identity. They are duly evaluated within the full complexities of their colonial Algerian identity as well as their French identity despite the fact that hypothetically, no one in their family may have been in metropolitan France for more than a century.

Contrast this with the way in which historians describe Muslim Algerians who

¹⁴ Naomi Davidson, *Only Muslim: Embodying Islam in Twentieth-Century France* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2012), 140; Todd Shepard, *The Invention of Decolonization: the Algerian War and the Remaking of France* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2008), 222.

¹⁵ Ian Lustick, “The Unraveling of *Algérie Française* and the Fate of the *Pieds Noirs*,” in *Population Resettlement in International Conflicts: A Comparative Study*, eds. Arie Marcelo Kacowicz and Pawel Lutomski. (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2007), 49.

migrated to the metropole only a few decades earlier in the interwar period as im/migrants. These are people who have lived in French ruled Algeria as long or longer than any European population. Some speak fluent French and many have even served in the military. Yet rather than dig deeply into their identity as Muslim Arabs and colonial subjects, or in the case of Algerians, as French nationals, historians have reduced them primarily to the first of those identities, much as the French of that time did. It is no wonder then that in France today “the term immigrant is often diverted from its original meaning to refer mainly to non-Europeans, particularly North Africans, irrespective of whether or not they were born in France and are French nationals.”¹⁶ Of course, studying and writing the history of Muslim North Africans in metropolitan France before decolonization, even if as essentially immigration history, has helped to combat the tendency of “the media and politicians [of France to] construct maghrebi and other postcolonial immigrations as a relatively recent phenomenon and radically different from those of pervious migrant groups.”¹⁷ This narrative has helped to show that Muslim North Africans have indeed been in France far longer than since decolonization. But a greater inclusion of their colonial, quasi-French identity during the early-twentieth century would further illuminate the severity of the unique and unjust experience of the North Africans in coming to the metropole. As Patrick Weil asserts in his history of French citizenship since the 1789 Revolution:

The French of metropolitan France need to understand the extent to which, in colonial Algeria more than anywhere else, France pushed to the extreme the confusion between the words of the law and the realities of lived experience, emptying the very terms ‘nationality’ and ‘equality’ of their content. Given that background, it is important to understand that shifting from the status of subject

¹⁶ Rabah Aissaoui, *Immigration and National Identity: North African Political Movements in Colonial and Postcolonial France* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 1.

¹⁷ Aissaoui, *Immigration and National Identity*, 2.

without right to the status of a full French national is much more complex than the transition from being a foreigner to becoming French.¹⁸

Historians could better equip twenty-first-century France to grasp that point by showing that Muslim North Africans in early-twentieth-century France brought the “confusion” that Weil describes with them when they came to the metropole. It is because of the severity of this confusion in the colonial period that the French worked so hard to recreate the colonial world when Muslim North Africans entered the metropole. It is the case then that Muslim North Africans were migrant colonials as much as they were colonial migrants.

From “Capital of the Colonies” to *Euroméditerranée*

Marseille remains the crossroads of cultures, ethnicities, and identities that it has been since its founding by the Greeks, but how the port city interprets that role has changed dramatically in the postcolonial world. No longer the “capital of the colonies,” Marseille has been carrying out an ambitious urban renewal project since 1995 that speaks to its desired image in the twenty-first century—“*Euroméditerranée*.”¹⁹ As “the largest urban renewal project in southern Europe,” *Euroméditerranée* is “renovating a 480-hectare area in the heart of the City of Marseilles, between the commercial harbor, the Old Port and the TGV station” with the goal “of making Marseille an attractive and influential city between Europe and the Mediterranean.”²⁰

Rather than serving as the center of diffusion for French culture and values,

¹⁸ Weil, *How to Be French: Nationality in the Making since 1789*, trans. Catherine Porter (Durham: Duke University Press, 2008), 253-254.

¹⁹ “Introduction,” *Euroméditerranée*, accessed 11 August 2014, <http://www.euromediterranee.fr/quartiers/presentation.html?L=1>.

²⁰ “Introduction,” *Euroméditerranée*, accessed 11 August 11, 2014, <http://www.euromediterranee.fr/quartiers/presentation.html?L=1>

Marseille has now positioned itself as a globalized and transnational city that connects to the broader interconnected Europe of the European Union and to the largely Muslim and Arab countries that sit on the opposite coastline of the Mediterranean. The city's aspiration for such a perception is perhaps best captured in the 2013 opening of the *Euroméditerranée* project's new Museum of European and Mediterranean Civilisations [sic] (MuCEM), which displays the connections of these worlds. The shift is natural and extraordinary at once. It is a natural shift in that this is a multicultural city simply embracing its diversity by welcoming and celebrating other cultures. However, it is also extraordinary in that the demographic composition of twenty-first-century Marseille owes much of its existence to its crucial role in twentieth-century colonialism and dedication to the ideas of the French civilizing mission.

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AM	Archives de la ville de Marseille
CCI	Chambre de Commerce et d'Industrie Marseille-Provence

Primary

Archival Series

Archives de la Chambre de Commerce et d'Industrie Marseille-Provence.

ML 4274/02

Archives Départementales des Bouches-du-Rhône (Marseille)

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