

ISLAMISTS IN THE HEADLINES: CRITICAL DISCOURSE ANALYSIS
OF THE REPRESENTATION OF THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD
IN EGYPTIAN NEWSPAPERS

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ABSTRACT

This study examines how Islamists are socially, discursively and linguistically represented in the Egyptian newspaper *al-Ahram*. The main question of this study is what would the Egyptian government do to halt the Brothers' political growth and potential threat? To answer this question, the study uses Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) to examine how Islamists are represented in frontpage news reports in the Egyptian newspaper *al-Ahram*, in 2000 and 2005. The analysis first examines both discursive and social practices related to the Muslim Brotherhood. This analysis examines the process of news making, role of ideology, history of Islamism, and type[s] of relationships between Islamists and the regimes. Second, the news reports are analyzed linguistically in terms of Idealized Reader (IR) framework, transitivity, sourcing, lexical choices and presupposition.

The analysis leads to the conclusion that the Egyptian regimes have been practicing a constant and systematic strategy of exclusionary nature towards the Muslim Brotherhood. This exclusion has been implemented through the use of sheer power (detention, prison, and military tribunals) and through soft power (media negative representation) as well. Van Dijk's *ideological square* (1998) is found well-suited to describe the relationship between the Egyptian regime and Islamists:

we are good and *they* are bad. The analysis of *al-Ahram* data, supplemented by analyzing other news sources, shows that:

- A. Almost all the accusations of the Egyptian government against the Muslim Brothers are unfounded,
- B. *al-Ahram* uses the technique of silence to conceal the *good* aspect of the Muslim Brotherhood,
- C. Islamists, in contrast with what is said about them, are willing to participate in democratic and civil society, and
- D. There is a relation between the discourse on Islamism and Orientalism.

The negative representation, the study also concludes, is explained by the government's fear of Islamists as a political threat, its desire to maintain the West's support, and the continuation of Orientalist discourse.

To those who dedicate their lives so that our world would live
in justice, freedom and peace

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PREFACE

Although the copyright date of this dissertation is December, 2011, it was successfully defended on May 2010. For unforeseen reasons, the researcher was not able to submit it until the fall of 2011. This explains why there is no reference to the momentous changes that took place in Egypt and the Middle East, in general, after May 2010. Following are some reflections on the Arab spring that started in December 2010.

Inspired by the successful revolution in Tunisia, Egyptian people, on the 25th of January 2011, went into the streets to express their resentful wrath. They protested the autocratic rule of President Mubarak, who ruled Egypt for thirty years, with rampant corruption and widespread poverty. The government, blinded by its faith in the use of suppressing force, responded by shutting down all Internet and cellular phone services, blocking Twitter and Facebook, and using tear gas, water cannons, batons and live bullets. Surprisingly, the people did not draw back. The numbers of protesters started to increase in the streets and main squares in Cairo and in most other Egyptian cities. The use of force and the fall of tens of martyrs, instead, enraged Egyptian citizens and increased the national attention to the uprising.

Main figures and organizations joined the uprising from its first day, including Nobel Laureate and former head of the International Atomic Energy

Agency Mohamed el-Baradei and the Muslim Brotherhood, the long and fierce opponent of the Mubarak regime. This gave a tremendous impetus to a revolution the likes of which Egypt had not seen since the large-scale protests of the 1970s. The escalating protests made the situation uncontrollable by the police, which led Mubarak to call on the military to take over security. This move was welcomed by most of the Egyptian people who hold the army in high regard. The protesters in Tahrir square, which witnessed the gathering of over three million people, were lucky enough as the military saved them from a real massacre when Mubarak and his cronies hired thugs and gangs to attack the protestors. The Minister of the Interior had given orders to set all criminal prisoners free to spread terror and panic among civilians.

Egypt was on fire when Mubarak, after a long silence, appeared on the state television to announce a change of the government. At that point, the protesters raised the ceiling of their demands and finally, on the 11th of February 2011, Mubarak was forced to step down. That day is considered a day of the second liberation of Egypt after it was first liberated from the British occupation in 1952.

The present research concluded that Mubarak's regime is a typical example of durable authoritarianism and the U.S. would support any regime that secures its interests even if it is undemocratic. Mubarak enjoyed the support of the U.S. for thirty years and, furthermore, attempts were being made to groom his son, Gamal, to inherit the rule of Egypt. One of the factors that explains how Mubarak managed to stay in power for thirty years is that he skillfully used soft power to create a state of

democratic appearance with an autocratic content. Egypt, under Mubarak, had political parties, elections, civic associations, and a relatively free press etc. All these processes were, however, scrupulously run and carefully controlled to provide a well-calculated space for democracy, a space that would consume people's frustrations without being a real threat to the regime.

The United States, which considered Mubarak as the safety valve of the Middle East, doubted that Mubarak would go. "Our assessment is that the Egyptian government is stable and is looking for ways to respond to the legitimate needs and interests of the Egyptian people," said Secretary of State Hillary Clinton on January 25, 2011. This is how Obama's administration saw Mubarak: a resilient regime. Therefore, it can be said that the U.S. did not want the revolution to succeed because Mubarak had instilled a fear of Islamists who would be in power in case he was thrown out.

Islamists in the Arab world, the present study concluded, have been marginalized and excluded on all levels from being part of the political scene. However, repressive strategies have failed to eradicate Islamists' existence in the Arab political street or to weaken people's sympathy with them. A quintessential case is the results of the first transparent elections that occurred in Tunisia and Egypt after the beginning of the Arab spring. In Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood won a majority of board seats in the Teachers', Journalists', Pharmacists' syndicates. In Tunisia and as of the 29th of October 2011, the provisional final results have indicated that the Islamist al-Nahda party 'renaissance' won 90 of the 217 seats in

the assembly that will rewrite the constitution, appoint a president and form a caretaker government.

This is a significant indicator of the fallacious political assessment of the U.S., the West, and the Arab leaders regarding the situation in the Middle East. The U.S. administration has been uncertain as to which way to go: to go with the people and support their intrinsic rights for freedom or support the sham Arab leaders. This hesitant and ambiguous situation led the raging masses in the Arab streets to lose faith in Western democracy. In short, the U.S. has missed a golden chance by putting all its eggs in the basket of the Arab autocratic regimes and not opening serious channels of communications with Islamists who, seemingly, are going to take over in a postmodernized Islamic era.

1. INTRODUCTION

The present study utilizes the Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) framework to explicate the form and function of mainstream Islamists' ideological representation in the Egyptian newspaper *al-Ahram*. The present study is based on van Dijk's concept of *ideological square* (1998a), where the us/them dichotomy underlies the representation of people in a given ideology. This dissertation focuses on the following points:

1. Does *al-Ahram*, through its representation of Islamists, contribute to the formation of in-group and out-group identities; and if so, how?
2. Are there consistent themes of exclusion in the news material covering Islamists in *al-Ahram*?
3. Would the whole discourse of exclusion be related to a wider local and/or global sociopolitical context?
4. Would discourse on Islamism be considered an extension, or another form of colonialist and/or Orientalist discourse?

CDA is a framework of analysis that is not confined by or associated with any one theory or certain science – it is a multidisciplinary approach. The feature that distinguishes CDA from other discourse analysis frameworks is that it integrates ethical principles into issues it deals with. In other words, it is not just an analysis for

the sake of analysis, where the goal could be to demonstrate how textual features are used in certain patterns or to show stylistic or genre features. CDA, although it includes textual analysis, includes also the social, historical, and cognitive contexts that surround the creation of a text. Combining all of these elements in an analysis offers a more comprehensive understanding of the discourse, situates it in both its social and cultural context, and finally explains the subtle ideologies that are latent in and between the lines.

The ethical aspect in the CDA approach is that it tries to uncover subtle manipulation of language, provide the reader with the necessary tools to become aware of the hidden and subtle meanings in the discourse, expose issues of inequality and racism, and strive to promote a democratic society. The following tenets are common in CDA (Fairclough and Wodak, 1997; Huckin, 1995):

1. CDA addresses social problems;
2. Power relations are discursive;
3. Discourse constitutes and is constituted by society and culture;
4. Discourse is ideological;
5. Discourse is historical;
6. The link between society and text is mediated;
7. Discourse analysis is interpretative and explanatory;
8. Discourse is a form of social action;
9. CDA has an ethical stance.

Drawing on the concepts of intertextuality (i.e., the relationship between various texts, past and present, pertaining to the same topic), interdiscursivity (i.e., the combination of discourses in a text) and hegemony (i.e., the dominance of certain ideologies: political, social, etc.), Fairclough (1992a ; 1992 b; 1995b) develops an analytical framework to conduct CDA. He includes these three elements in every event analysis. Therefore, every event is a text, discursive practice (including the production and interpretation of texts) and social practice.

CDA thus is conducted through three main stages: *description*, where a detailed linguistic analysis is carried out; *interpretation*, where an attempt is made to find a relation between the linguistic findings and the social context; and *explanation*, where the analyst connects both the linguistic and the social to the cultural level (Fairclough, 1995a). It is worth noting that these are not separate levels of analysis, for sometimes they overlap and interrelate during actual analysis.

Ideology is an essential concern in CDA. It is defined as the interface between social structure and social cognition (Van Dijk, 1998b) and as “the mental frameworks – the languages, the concepts, categories, imagery of thought, and the systems of representation” (Morley, 1996: 25) that different groups use to understand and explain various social practices. More significantly, ideologies function as symbolic systems of thought to organize, maintain, and stabilize particular forms of power relations (Hall, 1996; van Dijk, 1998b). In CDA, the researcher attempts to pin both the explicit and implicit forms of ideologies underlying any text and alerts the reader to them.

Popular Islamists, also called political Islamists, are those who” believe that struggle [against undemocratic regimes] is futile and self-defeating, and reject the assumptions of urgency advocated by militants” (Karawan, 1997: 20). Popular Islamists have chosen to pursue legitimate means, such as social work and national and union elections to peacefully and civilly change existing military regimes that have been running Arab countries since the beginning of the postcolonization era in the second half of the twentieth century. The interminable dominance of military institutions in the political life of the Arab world resulted in the growth of a branch of Islamists in the political populace, and in Egypt this growth has been reflected by their substantial existence and influence on social institutions. In the 1990s, Islamists won positions on executive staff club boards of most Egyptian universities and on the boards of the professional syndicates of doctors, lawyers, engineers, etc. Most importantly, their active participation in parliamentary elections has noticeably increased. The influential and growing presence of Islamists has been a strong catalyst of the government’s apprehension about this emerging phenomenon, usually called *Islamism*. Therefore, it was not unexpected that the government would create many strategies to suppress or even eradicate the influential existence of Islamists. These strategies ranged from the use of sheer power (imprisonment, detention, confiscation of financial resources, etc.) to misrepresentation in the media.

Finally, in the modern world, media have become the primary focus of attention as it has superseded other institutions in the cultural production of knowledge. Bell and Garrett cite the following as good reasons to stimulate interest

in studying and analyzing media discourse: first, media discourse is ready and accessible data that provides rich sources for research, studying and teaching. Second, media discourse not only represents speech communities' use of attitudes towards language but also influences them. Third, the formation and expression of culture, politics, ideological beliefs and social life are not only reflected in the media but are also influenced and created by it. Fourth, because of what it represents, media discourse can reveal a great deal about social meaning and stereotypes embedded in, produced and reproduced throughout discourse and communication (Bell, 1998).

Using CDA, the present research attempts to explain, through the three levels of analysis, how Islamists are represented in the mainstream Egyptian official media and the factors that influence this representation. Therefore, in addition to the linguistic analysis of news items related to Islamism, the researcher has conducted an analysis of both discursive as well as social practices. The first analysis concerns how media work while the latter concerns the socio-political system in Egypt. It is hoped that this multilayered analysis will help create a better understanding of how and why Islamists are represented the way they are.

1.1. Purpose of the Study

The main purpose of the study is to analyze how Islamists are linguistically represented in the government-oriented and controlled newspapers. Therefore, the goal of the study can be summed up as follows:

1. To explain how Islamists are represented in the Egyptian media;

2. To investigate the role of language both as constituted by society and by culture, i.e., social semiotic (Halliday, 1978), and as constituting other social practices such as media discourse. That is to say, this research investigates how language is employed in the media to represent social events and, simultaneously, how it constructs other social practices;
3. To prove the validity of CDA as a powerful approach that utilizes various linguistic tools to dissect a text on both the micro and macro levels;
4. To demonstrate how CDA can be useful in enlightening media consumers by helping them read between the lines, discern manipulated discourse, and differentiate between informative and manipulative/persuasive media reports;
5. To show how Egyptian media are used as a powerful instrument of hegemony and as tool of social exclusion by the elites over the less powerful social groups; namely, Islamists;
6. Consequently, to help achieve a democratic society by depriving the elites of one of their “loaded weapons” and spreading language manipulation awareness. It is expected that this research will promote awareness of how newspapers’ language can be manipulated and how readers can critically read news stories;
7. To decipher the reasons for the conflicts in the Middle East between governments and a major part of the society. This could lead to lessening tensions in the Arab World.

1.2. Study Questions

The relation between the Egyptian government and Islamists has been dynamic since the mid-twentieth century. Historically, these relations have been primarily tense. This tension reached its climax when the Muslim Brotherhood (MB), the main active political Islamist group in Egypt and in the Arab world, emerged as a serious and powerful rival of the government in the 2000 and 2005 legislative elections, and afterward. *Al-Ahram*, being the largest paper in terms of its educated and elite readership within and outside Egypt, is expected to reflect the government stance and perspective regarding Islamists.

It is noteworthy here to mention that Edward Said discusses how Western media represent Muslims. According to Said, media are the “cultural apparatus” through which the West derives its perception of Islam and Muslims (1981: 43). Therefore, the success of the images created by the media lies not in whether they are true or not, but in the power of those who market them and their ability to make them appear as truthful and invulnerable to questions. “Labels have survived many experiences and have been capable of adapting to new events, information and realities” (ibid.: 9).

This research claims that the same ideological basis of the Western newspapers’ representation of Islam and Muslims holds true to the representation of the Egyptian elite’s *al-Ahram* of the mainstream Islamists – a representation based on the ideology of exclusion and *othering*.

When it comes to the Egyptian media's representation of Islamists, the government media are expected to reflect the ruling regime's policy and ideology. It is also expected that the government media would reflect the tense relations between the government and the MB. Working within the framework of CDA, the present study will investigate and analyze the representation of popular Islamists by the government newspaper in Egypt and attempt to answer the following questions:

1. To what extent is *al-Ahram* the mouthpiece of the regime?
2. How are Islamists linguistically represented in *al-Ahram*?
3. What are the socio-political factors that are conducive to this type of representation?
4. Is there a preferred reading-between-the-lines of reports about Islamists? In other words, what is present in the text that reflects the writer's preferred reading?
5. Are there any linguistic traces in the text that highlight the policy of exclusion?
6. How is language discursively used to portray both the good *self* and the negative *other*, following van Dijk's ideological square (1998c)?

1.3. Significance of the Study

Since 11 September 2001, the world has witnessed a new era in which the United States is set to become the one and only superpower that manages world affairs. One side of this arrangement was reflected in the announcement made by the

United States administration addressing the necessity of having a “new Middle East,” of spreading democracy in the Arab world, and encouraging Arab governments to implement radical reform in various systems (educational, economic, political, etc.) in their countries so as to pave the way for liberal Western democracy.

In a wide-ranging keynote address on Middle East policy in September 2003 at the US-Arab Economic Forum, US Secretary of State Colin Powell (CNN, 2007) urged the Arab community to “build a new Middle East” based on religious tolerance, the rights of the individual and the rule of law. On 25 July 2006, the US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice again made it clear that the United States was seeking major changes in the Middle East, rather than a quick cease-fire (Rice, 2006). Moreover, President Bush’s rhetoric used the same language on many occasions and expressed the same message: to get rid of Saddam Hussein, to have a new Iraq, and to spread democracy in a new Middle East. In February 2003, Bush (2003), discussing the future of Iraq, said, “A new regime in Iraq would serve as a dramatic and inspiring example of freedom for other nations in the region.”

Since the advent of the third millennium, the Middle East has received significantly more attention from the United States and the West. The area has been encouraged to adopt a new morphology. The West’s interest was followed by a wide range of political gestures by various Arab countries. The Arab countries varied in terms of their response to the United States demands. In February 2005, for example, President Mubarak of Egypt suggested a bill for basic constitutional amendments that allow, for the first time in Egyptian history, multicandidate presidential

elections. Moreover, the 2005 Egyptian parliamentary elections witnessed an organized domestic mobilization on the issue of election management and monitoring, judicial oversight and discreet international backing.

The most significant electoral outcome was that the active and organized Muslim Brotherhood managed to secure 20 percent of the Egyptian Parliament seats. It is outside the scope of this study to investigate the validity or the reliability of the elections or to validate whether or not the Egyptian government truly did illegally interfere in the elections.¹

Every now and then, especially since the 2005 elections, news stories of negative representation of the MB appear in the State-run media. However, there has not been any analysis of the nature and quality of such coverage of the MB in the Egyptian (or even Arab media) within the theoretical and analytical framework of CDA. To the best of the researcher's knowledge, the present study will be the first analysis of the representation of mainstream Islamists in the Arab Media within the CDA approach.

The significance of this study lies in:

¹ Mona el-Ghobashy, commenting on the elections in Egypt in the second half of the last century, called the elections an "extremely valuable tool" in the hands of "undemocratic regimes in a democratic age". "[The elections] create opportunities for limited popular participation, disarm domestic and international critics, and enhance political monitoring and control by revealing the relative political strength of government and opposition candidates. Such elections are successful to the extent that they maximize tolerated competition and minimize the residual uncertainty that accompanies even the most managed poll. It is no mystery, then, why authoritarian elites convene elections. The paradox is why they constrain themselves in fixing them." From <http://www.merip.org/mer/mer238/elghobashy.html>, retrieved in January 2005.

1. Its attempt to analyze how the ruling regime in Egypt handled the dilemma of being squeezed between the external Western demands of opening the doors for freedom and democracy, and the internal emergence of organized political Islamists.
2. Its attempt to dissect the complexities involved in the nature of the clash between Islamists and subsequent regimes in Egypt; that is to say, to investigate this question: is the clash between Islamists and the regime ideological, authoritative or coercive? Does the regime, in its dealing with Islamists, depart from an ideological base, or it is just a matter of material interests?
3. Its questioning of the relation, if there is any, between *Islamophobia* (the growing fear of Islam in the West) and *Islamism-phobia* (the growing fear of Islamists in the Arab world and in the West); and furthermore, the influence of external factors on the way local regimes deal with Islamists.
4. Its relevant topic: In the early years of the twenty-first century, the nations of the world were facing many challenges to living in peace, one of which was called the “danger of Islamism” and the “clash of civilizations.” This study traces the historical roots of Islamism to understand if it is really a threat to democracy and civil society or only to dictatorship and imperialism.
5. Finally, it is the first research that deals with Islamism from a CDA perspective.

1.4. Literature Review

There are relatively few studies that deal with either the theme of Islamism or Arabic political discourse in general. There is no single study, to the best of the researcher's knowledge, that deals with Islamism from a CDA perspective. The available studies either examine political discourse from a nonlinguistic approach (Ismail, 1998), or analyze the discourse from a perspective other than CDA (Bengio, 1998; Mazraani, 1995, 1999; Shabana, 2005). The one study that uses CDA as a framework (al-Ali, 2006) does not analyze political discourse. Mazid's thesis (1999) deals with issues of ideology and social control in terms of analyzing various genres (Sadat's speech, US Declaration of Independence, advice columns and headlines). However, no studies have ever dealt with the Islamists' representation in the Arab newspapers from a CDA perspective.

Ismail's (1998) study was conducted from a political economy perspective and it analyzes the conservative and radical Islamist discourse, its role in shaping the political field in Egypt, and its impact on the dominant relations of power in society. Based on Greimas's *On Meaning: Selected Writings in Semiotic Theory* (1987), Ismail tries to extract the prominent defining features of the discourse of conservative Islamists (Jihadists and militant Islamists) and how this discourse challenges the postindependence secularist and nationalist discourse in defining identity, history, and the place of Islam in the world. Ismail's study focuses on the discourse of conservative Islamists, not the moderates, and how this discourse is trying to compete with the postindependence secular nationalist discourse over

certain topics like identity, Islam, and the West. Moreover, the study uses some linguistic tools of analysis, lexical semantics and narrative structure, to highlight the prominent features of the radicalists' discourse. However, the study does not address the representation of the radical Islamists by the ruling regime.

Bengio, in *Saddam's Word: Political Discourse in Iraq* (1998), analyzes how the *Ba'hist* Party of Saddam, as a way to establish and legitimize its power, uses and manipulates language, symbolism, history, art, myths, etc. Using a thorough content analysis, the study shows how the lexical items had been frequently used by the Iraqi *Ba'hist* Party to establish its identity and to paralyze its enemies. The study uses as data Hussein's speeches and writings, Iraqi newspapers, *Ba'hist* publications, and Iraqi government documents. Through an etymological analysis, Bengio shows how the usage of a large number of terms has been twisted and how this twisting is an indicator of political change. The *Ba'hist*s, for example, stripped terms like "freedom," "Arab unity," "revolution" and "socialism" of their original meaning by the continuous association of these words with the party's slogans and infusing them in its rhetoric. Emphasizing pan-Arabism, the word *qutr*, "country," is used negatively to mean "separatism" (95); to face the Kurdish attempts to be separated from Iraq, their attempts are called *fitnah*, "sedition" or "conspiracy." The association of Saddam with metaphorical images of the lion, fortress, eagle and sun is part of a populist strategy of the use of symbols. The gradual decline, for example, of the secular terminology and the growing use of Islamic rhetoric shows the need of the party to recruit mass support after the disasters it brought to the country. The

study also shows how the *Ba'thist* regime depended on four legs to establish its identity: Arabism, Islamism, tribalism and ancient Mesopotamian history. Although Bengio's study deals with the good *self*, the first part of van Dijk's ideological square, it does not analyze how the *other* is represented in the *Ba'thist* discourse.

In *Functions of Arabic Political Discourse: The Case of Saddam Hussein's Speeches*, Mazraani (1995) analyzes one of Saddam's press conferences in terms of code switching between Modern Standard Arabic (MSA), *Baghdadi* Arabic (BA), and Saddam's native *Tikriti* dialect. Purposes of persuasion and unification were crucial in determining which dialect is used. MSA is used in formal situations as it adds a tone of authority to the text while the BA or mixed MSA-BA codes seek audience involvement and commitment. Saddam Hussein avoids use of his own dialect with its potential to be a barrier to friendly, cooperative interaction with the audience.

In her book *Aspects of Language Variation in Arabic Political Speechmaking*, Mazraani (1999) studies the linguistic variation between Modern Standard Arabic and colloquial Arabic, and how this code-switching is seen as a discourse function strategy. On a microlevel analysis of the levels of syntax and phonology, the author cites where the speakers, Presidents Nasser, Gaddafi and Hussein, in their political speeches switch between MSA and dialect and how this switch is discourse-derived. Both of Mazraani's studies are done from a sociolinguistic perspective and therefore, are descriptive rather than critical in nature.

Shabana's *A Pragmatic Study of Aspects of Political Discourse in Press Headlines* (2005) analyzes the headlines of *al-Ahram* newspaper in two war periods, pre-1967 and pre-1973, to explore the different aspects of political discourse of the two periods and to show whether the political discourse of each leadership was appropriate and in the interests of the country. The headlines are analyzed within discourse pragmatics, Speech Act Theory and Gricean Pragmatics. Tools such as deixis, intertextuality and framing are used. This study, even though it uses newspaper data from *al-Ahram*, does not utilize CDA as a framework of analysis. The researcher believes that using CDA in this particular study would have rendered more critical reading of the two historical periods under analysis. Moreover, that researcher does not state how many headlines he used and the rationale behind his data choice.

In *Democracy in Contemporary Egyptian Political Discourse*, Dunne (2005) investigates the theme of democracy in the public area in Egypt. Dunne, in an attempt to analyze not what the texts say on democracy but what they *do*, examines texts taken from speeches of President Mubarak, newspaper commentaries and a petition written by opposition leaders to Mubarak. The analysis is conducted on two levels: first, the social ethnographic level, where the interactional context that produced the discourse is explored; and second, the linguistic level, where specific linguistic devices, such as deixis, interdiscursivity and framing are employed; that is to say, what social/interactional function does talking about democracy achieve and what linguistic traces are found. Dunne found that a deep analysis of the texts reveals

the real paradox in Egyptian political discourse about democracy: the discrepancy between theory and practice.

In the introduction, Dunne refers to some of her unpublished research on discourse construction of identity in policy speeches by a United States cabinet member. The researcher believes that it would have been beneficial if she had briefly exposed the results of the unpublished research and compared it with the Egyptian political discourse data. Moreover, the study's data are relatively small and this may pose questions on how representative the data are of the respective genres. One could also argue that a section or more on how democracy is represented in the discourse of Islamists and/or other Egyptian presidents would have added a more comprehensive picture on the discourse of democracy in contemporary Egypt.

Al-Ali's 'Religious Affiliations and Masculine Power in Jordanian Wedding Invitation Genre' (2006), uses CDA to analyze the genre of written wedding invitations in terms of their component patterns, and the role played by the broader socio-cultural norms and values in shaping this genre. The analysis has revealed that two components, culture/religion and masculine authority, are playing a crucial role in constructing and shaping the text, coloring the lexical choices, and naming practices. This is a relevant application of CDA on social concerns, like gender and equality. However, it would have been very enlightening if the researcher had shown how and where masculine authority is derived from culture and/or religion, since Arab culture is sometimes, if not most times, taken as Islamic.

In his unpublished PhD thesis *Ideology and Control in Some Speech and Newspaper Genres: a Politico-linguistic Approach to Discourse Analysis*, Mazid (1999) uses an eclectic approach. He analyzes one speech of former Egyptian president Sadat, an advice column in *al-Ahram*, and headlines from three Egyptian newspapers. He compares the Arabic data with excerpts from the *US Declaration of Independence*, advice columns in *Cosmopolitan* and three headlines from the *Herald Tribune* and *The Times*. While Sadat's speech aims at a compromise with Israel, the *Declaration* writers aim at freedom and independence. Both texts employ different tools to express ideology and control based on the variation of the text settings and this difference is reflected in the use of pronoun systems. The study is interesting in terms of revealing how Sadat negotiates the *I*, *we1* and *we2* to refer to himself, himself and the rest of the Arabs, and the Arabs and Israelis, respectively. On the other hand, there is only *we1* and *we2* and *they* in the *Declaration of Independence* referring to the representatives, the representatives and the rest of the American people, and the British, respectively. The analysis shows how Sadat was aware of the ideology he was departing from and of Israel's status in the area, causing the use of *we1* and *we2*. In Sadat's speech, *inclusion*, *involvement* and *convergence* are the ideological function of the pronouns while in the *Declaration of Independence* it is *exclusion*, *separation* and *divergence*.

Analysis of the advice columns shows, according to Mazid, that columnists have more access and more reach than their average clients and hence have communicative authority. Therefore, the columnists are in power positions and they

control their clients and the relation between the columnist and the reader is similar to patient-doctor or teacher-student relationship in terms of dominance and power. It is not clear what role power and control play in the advice columns as the relationship between the columnist and the client is of virtual power and is not a real power, as it is the case with other forms of institutional discourse that are mentioned (e.g., doctor-patient). One important feature in the institutional discourse is directness and face-to-face relation in, for example, the classroom, clinic, lawyer's office, etc. There is no actual or presumed power to actualize the illocutionary force of the advice column. Therefore, although the linguistic analysis in terms of transitivity, modality and metadiscourse shows the reader as a *beneficiary* and a *sensor* and not as an *actor* or an *agent*, still this could be regarded as genre schematic structure and features. The cross-culture and linguistic differences between the advice columns in both *al-Ahram* and *Cosmopolitan*, such as allusions to religious references, ratio of modality and engendered assertions are really interesting and significant.

In his analysis of the political speeches, Mazid focuses on how the ideology of the speaker/writer plays a role in the production of the concerned discourse. However, if the researcher had added the social and historical background as well as the repercussion of the discourse, in Sadat's speech, for example, this would have increased our appreciation of why the speech was the way it was. This addition would have been interesting in the case of Sadat, as he went to Jerusalem despite the strong objections to the visit both in Egypt and the Arab world. On another level, and

in terms of genre analysis, I think that comparing Sadat's speech with the *Declaration of Independence* does not reveal too much in terms of genre analysis. The two texts differ socio-linguistically along the medium: oral versus written; historicity (1977 vs. 1776); and discourse type (declaration vs. initiative). In his analysis of the newspaper headlines, along with its not being at all representative, the author does not justify the choice of headlines or why he is comparing the three Arabic headlines with the English ones. In addition, there is no analytic basis for the comparison: he analyzes different topics, different newspapers and different dates, an issue that renders the results of the analysis unrepresentative.

Lastly, El-Moshtohry (2006) analyzes data collected from both Arabic and French Egyptian newspapers while trying to pin down linguistic markers of ideology. She uses a contrastive analysis of the news on political events in both Arabic- and French-language newspapers. Her conclusions are: 1) the two dailies, Arabic and French, and the weekly Arabic-language paper are subject to a very elevated degree of discursive and textual constraint and to authoritarian and Arab ideologies; 2) the French weekly displays the most elevated degree of freedom of expression and adopts a liberal ideological stance; and 3) in all the newspapers, we have been able to pinpoint regularities in terms of angles of sight, textual schematization, and thematic approaches.

In this study, El-Moshtohry does not justify the choice of the period 2000–2002 to collect data. Moreover, the analysis is done by looking for certain grammatical tools to verify the dominance of subjectivity vs. objectivity, personal vs.

impersonal view, etc. The *topic* dimension is neglected while it could have an effect on both the form and content of the text.

It is evident that none of the above works dealt with Islamists from a CDA perspective and this makes it significant for the present research to investigate to this area.

1.5. Thesis Layout

The dissertation is divided into six chapters and a conclusion. The second chapter introduces CDA as a framework of analysis; the basic terms of definition and the various trends within CDA are elaborated. A response to the critiques directed towards CDA is also presented.

Chapter 3, departing from Fairclough's tripartite framework, deals with the social and discursive practices as the first two levels of analysis. It examines the process of news production and the role of media in sustaining or excluding certain social practices. The chapter also deals with all the social, political and historical accumulations that are involved in the production, reception, and interpretation of any social events. Various approaches of ideology and its relation to media and representation are also elaborated. The chapter ends by laying out the origin and history of Islamism, how Islamists have been politically treated under the consecutive Egyptian regimes, and the position of Islamism in third millennium.

The fourth chapter explains the process of data collection and justifies the use of *al-Ahram* during the 2000 and 2005 periods. It also shows how data were

collected, sampled, and analyzed. The second part of the chapter elaborates on the linguistic tools of analysis that are used to analyze the data textually.

Chapters 5 and 6 present the textual analysis of the 2000 and 2005 data respectively. Both chapters approach the data in terms of Idealized Reader framework, transitivity, presupposition, sourcing and lexical choices, and the 2005 data are then introduced in terms of the same tools.

Chapter 7 approaches the data using silence framework to examine what was not said in the news reports on MB. The chapter also compares the results of the discursive and social practices, and textual analysis with the silence analysis.

The Conclusion paints a complex mosaic and presents the results and outcomes of the analysis. It also summarizes the analysis done in Chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7. Moreover, in this chapter an attempt is made to identify why Islamists are misrepresented in the government's media and excluded from the social arena. Another question that is dealt with in the Conclusion is: can Islamists be included as a legal social power and political players?

2. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND: CRITICAL DISCOURSE ANALYSIS

2.1. Introduction

This chapter lays down the theoretical framework on which the present study is based, namely, CDA: its definition, CDA and media discourse, its origins and goals, the common features among the CDA trends, and the three main CDA trends. Fairclough's social approach is discussed in some detail because the present study draws heavily on it. The section closes by listing some of the criticisms directed at CDA, followed by a response to them.

2.2. CDA: Origins and Goals

CDA is concerned with providing methods and tools to help conduct empirical studies of the relations between discourse and society and culture. Its main target is to uncover minute details of that discourse-society relation. It can be traced to the 1970s in the work on power, ideology and control by Fowler, Hodge and Kress (1979). Their work focused on how language works in the social context and how it is related to power and ideology. The work of M.A.K. Halliday on language as a social semiotic (Halliday, 1978) and how language shapes and is shaped by social and cultural context was an influential drive to examine in-depth the language-ideology relation. Blommaert (2005) refers to the work of the Birmingham Centre

for Contemporary Culture Studies as a significant source of influence on CDA.

According to Blommaert, the areas of a political, social, and cultural nature in British capitalist society which the Centre dealt with became topics in CDA.²

CDA is not a school of one trend but rather an approach under the scope of which we can find many trends. This is the reason why one cannot simply accept a single definition of CDA. We can define the trends under CDA by their goals rather than by their techniques and tools of analysis. Simply put, CDA aims mainly to uncover the socio-political inequalities, whether based on political, economic, cultural, religious, or gendered grounds, that exist in a certain society. According to Fairclough (1995a: 132), CDA is the study of:

often opaque relationships of causality and determination between (a) discursive practices, events and texts, and (b) wider social and cultural structures, relations and processes; to investigate how such practices, events and texts arise out of and are ideologically shaped by relations of power and struggles over power; and to explore how the opacity of these relationships between discourse and society is itself a factor securing power and hegemony.

Here, Fairclough aims at a CDA that is aware of the social and cultural events, the discursive practices which produced them, the dialectical relationship between them and furthermore, the role of discourse, which is itself a product of the social and discursive practices in producing and sustaining social relations of power and ideology. Elucidating the function of CDA in modern society, Huckin defines it as “a highly context-sensitive, democratic approach which takes an ethical stance on social issues with the aim of improving society” (1995: 95). It strives to explore how

² For a detailed historical background on the origins of CDA, see Blommaert and Bulcaen (2000).

these nontransparent relationships are crucial in securing power and hegemony, and it draws attention to domination forms, social inequities, nondemocratic practices, and other injustices so as to encourage people to perform corrective actions (Fairclough, 1993). From both Fairclough and Huckin, we can conclude that CDA is a means to show readers how to be aware of the guising and indoctrinating ideologies meant to manipulate them.

Almost all CDA practitioners share a concern with issues of power and change caused by recurrent social practices. The inherent core of CDA is to demonstrate how selectively the world is construed in discourses. Such selection renders a translated, condensing and reductionist reading of some aspects of the world (Harvey, 1996). The job of CDA research is not only to demonstrate what is occurring within the text, but also to note what is absent from the text; why this particular selection or reduction, why here, why now (Huckin, 2002)? The overarching goal of CDA is to make visible the way in which institutions and their discourse shape us. CDA aims to show how “linguistic-discursive practices” are linked to “socio-political structures of power and domination” (Kress, 1990: 85) by emphasizing “the role of discourse in the (re)production and challenge of dominance” (van Dijk, 1993: 249). According to Wodak, the purpose of CDA is to analyze “opaque as well as transparent structural relationships of dominance, discrimination, power and control as manifested in language” (Wodak and Meyer, 2001: 2). More specifically, “[CDA] studies real, and often extended, instances of social interaction which take (partially) linguistic form. The critical approach is distinctive in its view of (a) the relationship between language and society, and (b)

the relationship between analysis and the practices analyzed” (Fairclough and Wodak, 1997: 258).

It is worth mentioning here that CDA is different from other approaches to discourse in that it is critical. CDA does not limit itself to analyzing the immediate formal properties of the text but rather it situates the text in its wider social, economic, historical, cognitive and political context and critically examines how this text relates to other texts, how it is constituted by the existing social practices and is constitutive of other new social practices. According to Wodak, “critical” could be understood as having “distance from the data, embedding the data in the social, making a political stance explicit, and having a focus on self-reflection as scholars doing research” (2007: 209). Being critical also means showing how “our use of language in particular [is] bound up with causes and effects which we may not be at all aware of under normal conditions” (Fairclough, 1995b: 54). Put differently, CDA demystifies “discourses by deciphering ideologies” (Weiss and Wodak, 2003: 14). It is worth noting that “critical” does not mean detecting only the negative sides of social interaction and processes and painting a black and white picture of societies. “Quite to the contrary, *critical* means distinguishing complexity and denying easy, dichotomous explanations, and making contradictions transparent” (Wodak, 1999: 168).

It is proper to end this section on the goals of CDA with how Wodak and Meyer (2001) responded to those who see CDA as a tool to judge what is right and what is wrong. Instead, she stresses that the role of CDA should be, above all, “to make choices at each point in the research itself, and should make these choices

transparent. It should also justify theoretically why certain interpretations of discursive events seem more valid than others” (65). So CDA just opens the doors and provides the tools to those who are willing to practice and lead critical thinking and social change and it is not imposing certain ideologies on certain situations or problems.

2.3. Common Features

We can identify five common features among the various CDA approaches. The following account draws on Fairclough and Wodak’s overview (1997):

1. Social and cultural structures are partly linguistic-discursive. Discursive practices, through which texts are produced and consumed, are important factors in shaping social practices. This indicates that not all social practices are formed by language.
2. Discourse is both constitutive and constituted. Discourse both constitutes social relations between individuals and groups in society and, at the same time, is constituted by these social relations. The representation of, for example, Islamists in the Egyptian government broadsheet newspaper *al-Ahram* is simultaneously socially constitutive (produced by a certain group of people – elites) and constituting of more social practices towards Islamism.
3. Language use should be analyzed within its social context. Here, CDA is different from other approaches in terms of degrees of focus rather than difference in qualitative analysis. CDA constitutes an empirical linguistic textual analysis of language use in social interactions.

4. Discourse functions ideologically. CDA is based on the fact that discursive practices create unbalanced social powers and unequal relations between groups based on religious, political, racial, or gender issues. All these issues deal with ideology.
5. CDA is ethically critical. CDA commits itself to an agenda, social change and uncovering of the manipulative power in society. CDA sides with the oppressed and unfairly treated.

2.4. Approaches in CDA

CDA presents a diverse picture in terms of the approaches under its umbrella. Since its beginnings, some CDA practitioners have used systemic-functional linguistics as a framework of analysis. However, categories and concepts have also been borrowed from other disciplines: discourse analysis, text linguistics, stylistics, social semiotics, social cognition, rhetoric, social psychology and conversation analysis. Some practitioners of CDA welcome the diversity of methodology (Chouliaraki and Fairclough, 1999:17); others strive for a systematic and focused framework based, for instance, on concepts of genre and field and on the socio-semantic representation of social actors (van Leeuwen, 1995). In spite of the importance which Kress (1997) and Kress and van Leeuwen (1996) have given to incorporating visual images into concepts of discourse and to the multimodal conceptions of semiotics, CDA is still mainly inclined toward examining the textual and structural levels of discourse and how these structures contribute to the social

production of inequality, power, ideology, authority, or manipulation (van Dijk, 1995).

One can define three main approaches working within CDA: the historical-discoursal, the social-discoursal, and the cognitive-discoursal. In the following subsections, while briefly pinning down the main features on the first two approaches, the researcher will discuss in detail Fairclough's approach, as the present study draws heavily on the social-discoursal approach.

2.4.1. *Historical - Discoursal*

Ruth Wodak is the main figure associated with this approach. Wodak's sociolinguistic ethnographical CDA approach is frequently referred to as the discourse-historical approach. Wodak's research emphasizes not only the contextualized nature of discourse within its present state of occurrence, but also explains the development of this discourse through a historical continuum. Her focus has centred on issues of anti-Semitism and is particularly relevant to the research at hand. Wodak has developed a discourse-historical method devoted to tracing the (intertextual) history of phrases and arguments (see, for example, Wodak, 1995; van Leeuwen and Wodak, 1999). The method starts with studying original documents (e.g., in their analysis of the Waldheim Affair, Wehrmacht documents on war activities in the Balkan) augmented by ethnographic research of the past (e.g., interviews with war veterans), and proceeds to wide-ranging data collection and analysis of contemporary news reporting, political discourse, lay beliefs, and discourse. According to Wodak (1996), it is not viable to decipher the discursive

strategies adopted in any discourse without understanding the historical/social background against which they were created. We can summarize the main features of the discourse-historical approach (Wodak and Meyer, 2001; Reisigl and Wodak, 2001):

- A. It adheres to socio-philosophical orientation of critical theory.
- B. It embraces at least three elements:
 - 1) “text or discourse immanent critique” which aims to discover the inconsistencies, self contradictions, paradoxes in the text –internal.
 - 2) “socio-diagnostic critique” which aims to demystify exposures of the manipulative feature of discursive discourse using the historical and social background to do so,
 - 3) “prospective critique” which aims to transform and improve communication.
- C. It tries to integrate a large quantity of available knowledge about historical sources and background of social and political background in which discursive events are embedded (ibid.: 32-34).

2.4.2. *Cognitive - Discoursal*

Reconciling cognitive sciences and CDA with its emphasis on social and linguistic aspects is an uneasy task and is still in its infancy. The call to include cognitive psychology in any serious CDA research is attributed to Teun van Dijk, whose plea to have a multidisciplinary approach to CDA (van Dijk, 1993, 2001) has not been widely received.

According to van Dijk (2006 a and b), there is an agreement among discourse analysts that communicative events should be approached in terms of their immediate constituents: grammatical, stylistic, rhetorical, pragmatic, argumentative, interactional or other related structures. There is less agreement on adding context to the list above and even lesser agreement on studying the cognition of the speakers:

beliefs, intentions, and processes involved in the production and comprehension of the discourse. Van Dijk is a strong advocate of including cognition in studying discourse. For example, he laments that metaphors are too often analyzed only as lexical or even rhetorical devices rather than as conceptual metaphors or as cognitive phenomena (e.g., van Dijk, 1998a: 45).

Van Dijk views “ideologies” as “interpretation frameworks” which “organize sets of attitudes” about other elements of modern society. Ideologies, therefore, provide the “cognitive foundation” for the attitudes of various groups in societies, as well as the impetus to pursue their own goals and interests (1991: 36). Showing the centrality of ideology in discourse, van Dijk defines it as “the overall, abstract mental systems that organize such socially shared attitudes” (van Dijk, 1995: 18). Van Dijk et al. (2004: xviii) argue that “Ideologies may be exhibited in many social practices.” Among these practices, “discourse, that is, socially situated text and talk” may be considered as “one of the most crucial social practices” (van Dijk, 2005: 3).

Van Dijk is also interested in how cognitive theories deal with discourse processing. Language is comprehended by constructing mental representations; i.e., prior knowledge is used to construct a mental model of the incoming discourse (van Dijk and Kintsch, 1983; Johnson-Laird, 1983). Furthermore, discourse comprehension is an ongoing process which operates both at a local or microstructural level and at a global or macrostructural level. At a microstructural level, each utterance is analyzed and encoded into memory. Macrostructural processes operate over a series of utterances to form a coherent representation by providing the summary of an extended discourse. Schematic processes, which also

operate at a macrostructural level, provide expectations regarding the flow of information (van Dijk, 1998a).

Van Dijk offers a “schema” of relations between ideology, society, cognition and discourse: within social structures, social interaction takes place. This social interaction is presented in the form of text/discourse, which is then cognitively processed according to a cognitive system/memory. This “system/memory” consists of short-term memory, in which “strategic processing,” or decoding and interpretation takes place. Long-term memory, however, serves as a holder of “socio-cultural knowledge,” which consists of knowledge of language, discourse, communication, persons, groups and events existing in the form of “scripts.” “Social (group) attitudes” also reside within long-term memory and provide further decoding guides. Each of these “group attitudes” can represent an array of ideologies which combine to create one’s own personal ideology which conforms to one’s identity, goals, social position, values and resources.

According to van Dijk, hegemonic power takes the form of controlling people’s minds (van Dijk, 1993; 1997), a phenomenon, in social cognition, referred to as *mental models structuring ideologies*. These models are acquired and (re)produced through social, including discursive, practices and interact with the personal cognition of group members. Cognitively structured ideologies provide group cohesion by defining membership in a group as well as its tasks/activities, goals, norms/values, position and resources (van Dijk, 1995). Ideology therefore has both social and cognitive functions and according to van Dijk, ideology can be the interface between the cognitive models (representations and processes underlying

discourse and action) and the societal position and interests of social groups (van Dijk, 1995a: 18). Therefore, power relations can be reproduced and legitimated at the ideological level; which means that to control other people, it is most effective to try to control their group attitudes and attitude-producing, ideologies (van Dijk, 1991). The result of this process is that audiences will behave out of their own “free will” in accordance with the interests of the powerful. Van Dijk’s thesis implies that the exercise of power in modern, democratic societies is no longer primarily coercive, but persuasive, that is, ideological.

Another important aspect in van Dijk’s approach is the analysis of implicitness in discourse. Implicitness is to say without saying, to pass on the idea/ideology without stating it in the text or discourse. This concept is crucially relevant to the study of media discourse in relation to ideology. Van Dijk stresses on the “the systematic analysis of implicitness” as journalists and media users are in possession of “mental models...about the world.” Consequently, the text is really like “an iceberg of information” and it is only the “tip” which is “actually expressed in words and sentences. The rest is assumed to be supplied by the knowledge scripts and models of the media users, and therefore usually left unsaid.” Van Dijk concludes, therefore, that “the analysis of the implicit...is very useful in the study of underlying ideologies.” (1991: 181–83).

Van Dijk (2000) acknowledges that CDA does not have a unitary theoretical framework or methodology because it is best viewed as a shared perspective encompassing a range of approaches instead of one school. What van Dijk is calling for is a discourse framework in terms of the social aspect and “*also, but not*

exclusively, in terms of mental representations” (van Dijk, 1998a: 22; original emphasis). Van Dijk (2006c: 161) advocates:

... a broad multidisciplinary approach to discourse, which integrates a detailed and explicit study of structures of text and talk with an analysis of their social and cognitive contexts as a basis for problem-oriented critical discourse analysis. In such an approach, the study of relevant knowledge, ideologies and other socially shared beliefs is crucial in describing many of the properties and social functions of discourse.

Van Dijk has researched many fields and discourses in which aspects such as racism and ideology can be located. Such fields include the press, everyday conversation, parliamentary discourse and debates, press conferences and textbooks. His book, *Racism, Discourse and Textbooks: The Coverage of Immigration in Spanish Textbooks* (2004b), analyzes the role of academic textbooks in the maintenance of societal myths and hegemonic structures. Van Dijk situates his research findings within a cognitive framework, with reference to both episodic and long-term memories.

2.4.3. *Social-Discoursal*

Although no one single framework has been used to analyze the data, Norman Fairclough’s approach has formed the point of departure in the layout of the present work. The dissertation is organized around his triaspectual framework: social practices, discursive practices and textual aspects.

Fairclough’s approach is different from both the historical-discoursal (Reisigl and Wodak, 1999; 2002) and the cognitive discoursal (van Dijk, 1993, 1998a, 2001) in its emphasis on the social aspect. There is a dialectical relationship between language and other social practices; it is socially shaped by while shaping other

social practices (Fairclough, 1995a: 131). Fairclough's research agenda focuses on language and globalization, contemporary social change, as well as language, education and power.

Fairclough's CDA has been defined as a methodology which is fundamentally interested in analyzing "opaque as well as transparent structural relationships of dominance, discrimination, power and control as manifested in language" (Wodak, 1995: 204; Weiss and Wodak, 2003: 15). This framework, through deconstructing society, aims at critically investigating possible social inequalities as expressed, constituted, legitimized by discursive practices. CDA aims to make more transparent and more visible the opaque aspects of discourse. This approach emerged from Critical Theory (Chouliaraki and Fairclough, 1999), which was developed by the Frankfurt school. According to Kincheloe and McLaren (2000: 281), Critical Theory

... analyzes competing power interests between groups and individuals within a society – identifying who gains and who loses in specific situations. Privileged groups, criticalists argue, often have an interest in supporting the status quo to protect their advantages; the dynamics of such efforts often become a central focus of critical research...critical research attempts to expose the forces that prevent individuals and groups from shaping the decisions that crucially affect their lives.

Therefore, the agenda of Critical Theory is:

1. Identifying and challenging assumptions behind ordinary ways of perceiving, conceiving and acting;
2. Recognizing the influence of history, culture, and social positioning on beliefs and actions;
3. Imagining and exploring extraordinary alternatives, ones that may disrupt routines and established orders;
4. Being appropriately sceptical about any knowledge or solution that claims to be the only truth or alternative (Alvesson and Deetz, 2000: 8).

Fairclough extended Critical Theory when he connected it to discourse analysis. So a critical analysis explains the ways in which people are unequally socially positioned, the ways discourse constitutes objects and is constituted by them in society, and the ways meanings are created by both language production and consumption. Henceforth comes the dialectical and mutual relationship between the social and the linguistic: Language both constitutes the social practice and is constituted by the social practices as well (Fairclough, 2003). It is an important characteristic of the economic, social and cultural changes of late modernity that they exist as discourses as well as processes that are taking place outside discourse, and that the processes that are taking place outside discourse are substantively shaped by these discourses (Chouliaraki and Fairclough, 1999). This dialectical relationship marks CDA as an interdisciplinary/transdisciplinary framework drawing on works from different fields: Gramsci, Althusser, Habermas, Halliday, Kress and Bakhtin, (Fairclough, 1992; Chouliaraki and Fairclough, 1999). The multidisciplinary nature of CDA makes it the task of CDA practitioners to:

... systematically explore often opaque relationships of causality and determination between (a) discursive practices, events and texts, and (b) wider social and cultural structures, relations and processes; to investigate. How such practices, events and texts arise out of and are ideologically shaped by relations of power and struggles over power; and to explore how the opacity of these relationships between discourse and society is itself a factor securing power and hegemony. (Fairclough, 2003: 135)

Moreover, CDA attempts, via textual analysis, to describe the nuances of unequal relations of power, hegemony, marginalization and exclusion. It is an emancipative and a “democratic approach which takes an ethical stance on social issues with the aim of improving society” (Huckin, 1997: 1). To achieve this, CDA

tries to explain how social injustices are produced, reproduced, and legitimized as well as understand the agencies that institutionalize and mystify them, and, above all, relate these interpretations to wider socio-cultural, political and historical contexts.

Fairclough's (1992b) *Discourse and Social Change* introduced the social-discoursal framework in CDA. In that book, Fairclough prescribed a social theory of discourse with a methodological blueprint for critical discourse analysis. Figure (2.1) summarizes his plan of action to conduct a comprehensive analysis (Fairclough, 1995a: 98).




Figure 2.1 Fairclough's CDA Model

This diagram shows three distinct but intrinsically interwoven levels of analysis: the text level, the discursive practice level, and the socio-cultural level. In Fairclough's model, "the connection between text and social practice is seen as being mediated by discourse practice" (Fairclough, 1995a: 133). So "each discursive event has three dimensions or facets" (ibid.):

1. it is a spoken or written language text;
2. it is an instance of *discourse practice* involving the production and interpretation of text;
3. it is a piece of *social practice*.

There is, therefore, a tripartite method of discourse analysis, where:

... the method of discourse analysis includes linguistic description of the language text, interpretation of the relationship between the (productive and interpretative) discursive processes and the text, and explanation of the relationship between the discursive processes and the social processes. (ibid.:97)

In the remainder of this section, these three dimensions of the model will be elaborated.

2.4.3.1 Discourse as text. The first dimension is discourse-as-text. The focus is on the contents of the text, the linguistic features of discourse. Choices and patterns in vocabulary (e.g., wording, metaphor), grammar (e.g., transitivity, modality), semantics, cohesion (e.g., conjunction, schemata), and text structure (e.g., episodizing, turn-taking system) should be systematically analyzed. The use of passive verb forms in news reporting, for instance, can have the effect of obscuring the agent of political processes. Included in the text dimension is *intertextuality*: how a certain text is linked to or interpreted in terms of other texts or other discourses.

The analyst, basically, looks for what is represented in the text in terms of actors, recipients, benefactors, etc.; what is represented in the *theme* and *rheme* of the sentences composing the text and collocations; and patterns of co-occurrences of words in text, which simply means looking at which other words most frequently precede and follow any word which is in focus. At this level, it is significant to analyze:

1. Genre, and check if the data conform or deviate from the specific genre norms, i.e., the semantic relationships;
2. How elements of social events (processes, people, objects, means, times, places) are represented;
3. To what degree some elements are present or absent (foregrounding and backgrounding);
4. How events are ordered and the angle which is being taken; the main assumptions and presuppositions of the discursive compositions of text.

(Fairclough, 2003; Huckin, 1995)

2.4.3.2 Discourse as discursive practices. The second dimension is discourse-as-discursive-practice. Discursive practices of discourse include all the factors that contribute to the production of the text. It, as Fairclough puts it, "... involves various aspects of the processes of text production and text consumption. Some of these have a more institutional character where as others are discourse processes in a narrower sense" (1995a: 58). Discourse practice refers to the production and reception of messages. Participation in certain recurrent patterns of discursive practice is what constitutes social identities, relations and cultural models and provides as well the

condition for their reproduction or transformation. An example of this is the parent-child interaction at a home that helps to constitute family relationships, or male-female interaction in the workplace setting and outside, which helps to constitute gender relations in society. Knowing how to act in this way means that the participants draw upon what Fairclough calls *members' resources* (MR). The MR includes internalized knowledge of all three levels in the discourse model:

1. Social structure and social practices – the mental maps or cultural models (Gee, 1996) that people carry in their heads;
2. Knowledge about the production and interpretation of discourse types – which are often hybrids involving creative combination of genres and discourses;
3. Detailed knowledge of particular linguistic and textual structuring devices.

The analysis of this aspect includes but is not limited to the sociology of journalism, the newsroom production, the process of text production, circulation and consumption in a certain society. This dimension indicates affiliating the text to a wider context that contributed to this production and consumption. In dealing with discursive practices, questions like the following are considered:

1. Why are certain events rather than others chosen to be reported?
2. Why are the events reported the way they are?
3. What are the factors that influence and /or control journalists in their reporting?
4. What are the other related texts and genres circulated in a society that might affect the production and consumption of this certain text?
5. Are there any other competing texts/discourses?
6. Who is sourced and quoted in news? How?

Although the analysis of the linguistic features of any text will inevitably involve the analysis of discursive practices and vice versa, Fairclough maintains that both levels of analysis should be separated analytically.

2.4.3.3 Discourse as social practices. The third dimension is discourse-as-social-practice. This is concerned with the social, ideological and hegemonic practices prevailing in the society and how these practices shape (and are shaped by) discursive practices. Social practice, which includes discourse, does not merely reflect reality; it also has effects on social structures and can play an active role in social change. Fairclough (1999) gives the example of schools. Schools have a certain way of ordering social space in which there are distinct settings where discourse occurs (classroom, assembly, principal's office, staffroom, playground) and in each of these there are discourse practices belonging to certain types. For example, the classroom sets up discourse types in which there are distinct subject positions for teachers and students. Occupying these subject positions means following certain conventions that determine the discursial rights and obligations of teachers and students – what each is allowed and expected to do or say within the discourse type. This is an example of how the level of culture and society and the level of text are connected through what Fairclough calls “discourse practice.”

Understanding the wider socio-cultural, political, ideological, institutional and historical context and structures surrounding the text, in other words, the wider context, helps to explain the dynamics of a text, in terms of its production, distribution and consumption. At this explanatory level, we consider more than language and discourse. We analyze and understand the implicit power relations and

their roles in generating and establishing power asymmetries among social actors, their roles in facilitating the marginalization and exclusion of groups as well as possibilities of change and resistance. Showing that this level is somehow different from the other two levels, Fairclough says that the social/cultural practices “may be at different levels of abstraction from the particular event: It may involve its more immediate situational context, the wider context of institutional practices the event is embedded within, or the yet wider frame of the society and culture” (1995a: 62). The analyst, at this level, should be ready to deal with semiotic as well as nonsemiotic elements. Social practices “... can be seen as articulations of different types of social elements. They articulate semiosis (hence language) together with other non-semiotic social elements” (Fairclough, 2004: 227). He suggests that the following elements may be key elements in the composition of any social practice:

1. Action and interaction;
2. Social relations;
3. Persons (with beliefs, attitudes, histories, etc);
4. The material world semiosis (ibid.).

This comprehensive analytic agenda assists in understanding and interpreting:

1. The wider picture in which certain discourses and ideologies work and interact in society;
2. The complexities involved in the hegemonic process and its role in social and political exclusion and marginalization of the less-powerful groups;
3. How the hegemonic process

shape beliefs, fantasies and desires so as to regulate practices of institution building that set the stage for material production and reproduction of activities that in turn construct social relations that finally return to ensure the perpetuation of power (Harvey, 1996: 82);

4. The “radical changes that are taking place in social life” and locate the negative impacts of any prospective changes on the social life (Fairclough, 2003: 205).

Point number (4) is relevant to social studies as it enables researchers, through comprehensive analyses of both dominant and competing discourses, to trace the processes of hegemony and prospective change in the “orders of new discourses.” Hegemony, Fairclough states, concerns power that is achieved through constructing alliances and integrating classes and groups through consent, so that “the articulation and rearticulating of orders of discourse is correspondingly one stake in hegemonic struggle.” (Fairclough, 1992a: 93)

This tripartite framework is followed in the present study. Both social and discursive practices are discussed in Chapter 3 and the textual analysis is introduced in Chapter 4. Any analysis of Islamism in the Arab world, for example, should analyze the historical roots of Islamism, the socio-economic and socio-political factors that are at stake.

2.5. Critiques of CDA

A number of criticisms have been directed to CDA. In the following paragraphs, the criticisms against CDA are grouped and a response follows.

1. CDA is, by nature, interpretive and subjective in its analysis (Schegloff, 1997; Wetherell, 2001; Widdowson, 1995, 1996, 1998). The question, therefore, is

how to disengage the researcher's preconceptions and personal beliefs from the various researchers' procedures.

2. Widdowson also attacks CDA, stating that it ignores context and separates it from text.
3. CDA does not discuss the effects of discourse in the globalized context of language use. Blommaert accordingly argues that "a critical analysis of discourse ... necessarily needs to provide insights in the dynamics of societies-in-the-world" (Blommaert, 2005: 2).
4. In terms of methodology, CDA has been attacked as missing the essential flavour of being a theory and as having "a strange mixture of theoretical eclecticism and unreflexive modernism" (Pennycook, 2001:87), Widdowson (1998) criticized CDA practitioners as "a kind of ad hoc bricolage which takes from theory whatever concept comes usefully to hand."
5. Pennycook (2001) cites the need to combine textual analysis with production and consumption practices, noting that what is produced without this last step is reduced to nothing more than a particular reading of a particular text.

A recurrent criticism is that CDA practitioners tend to focus "excessively on different segments of textual material, considering news discourse in terms of mainly grammatical features, topics, or themes to sort out textual materials and organize discussions" (Barkho, 2008c). Despite the warnings from prominent thinkers on discourse analysis (Bourdieu, 1991; Thompson, 1990), Barkho believes that CDA analysts still rely on the text as "a final product to reveal how ideological power is discursively enacted in media organizations producing it." (2008c:112)

Responding to the above critiques in the listed order may lead to a sort of repetition and redundancy, so they will be answered in terms of topics. The issue of subjectivity and multiplicity of truths is unavoidable in qualitative analysis in social sciences. Fairclough (2001b, 2002) has emphasized that his approach is a set of guidelines that can be used with lucidity, and that CDA can never be objective: it always has particular interests, always comes from a particular perspective, and renders analyses that are partial and incomplete. Stressing the same concern, Fairclough (2001b: 4), clarifying his position, says that he is “a socialist with a generally low opinion of the social relationships in society and a commitment to the emancipation of the people who are oppressed by them.” His approach has been entwined to a commitment to emancipation and to acknowledge the way that his “reading” or analysis of data is made from a particular position. Miles and Huberman (1994: 208) elaborate that:

We all have preconceptions, our pet theories about what is happening. The risk is taking them for granted, imposing these willy-nilly, missing the inductive grounding that is needed. We do not hold as strongly as Glaser (1992) that all predefined concepts should be abjured in favor of solely “grounded theory” emergence.

In the view of the researcher, what is actually relevant is how cogent and rigorous the research is. Fairclough has not claimed that his framework is not open or cannot be juxtaposed by or infused with any other methodology; meaning the substance that CDA deals with is by nature a dynamic process prone to multiple interpretations. So, the following procedures can be added to ensure rigour and cogency in any CDA analysis:

- A. The inclusion of ethnographic methodologies, such as interviews and questionnaires;
- B. Verification of the analysis results by asking for peer-reviews;
- C. The use of quantitative analysis;
- D. Relating the results of the textual analysis in logically-based procedures to the readings from any nontextual contexts.

CDA practitioners have always stressed the significance of context and intertextuality to their analysis. Fairclough and Wodak (1997:276) insist that “discourse is historical”:

Utterances are only meaningful if we consider their use in a specific situation, if we understand the underlying conventions and rules, if we recognize the embedding in a certain culture and ideology, and most importantly, if we know what the discourse relates to in the past. Discourse is not produced without context and cannot be understood without taking the context into consideration ... discourses are always connected to other discourses which were produced earlier ...

As for Blommaert’s criticism of the lack of “historicity,” where the analyst ignores the historical background and context of the texts analyzed, this can be remedied by including Wodak’s historical approach as well as including the synchronic dimension onto the analysis.

As for the methodological criticisms, according to Weiss and Wodak (2003:7), it is useful to think of CDA as “a theoretical synthesis of conceptual tools.” Weiss and Wodak argue that a plurality of theory and method should not be considered unsystematic or eclectic, suggesting instead that it can be understood as a specific strength of CDA that provides opportunities for “innovative and productive theory formation.”

This point leads to a related critique pointed at CDA: the researcher as an individual and his/her subjective influence on the analysis. Wodak (1999: 185) also states that the term “critical” implies a self-reflective researcher who considers his/her own position while doing research about social problems. Researchers must constantly be aware of how they are analyzing and interpreting, thus CDA requires a particular kind of balance between theory and empirical phenomena. Wodak (1999: 186) rightly observes that researchers “cannot separate their own values and beliefs from the research they are doing ... [therefore]... researchers must be constantly aware of what they are doing” (ibid.). Self-reflection points to two aspects: a constant awareness of one’s own biases, and “a constant balancing between theory and empirical phenomena,” in an attempt to understand the social life rather than announcing truths (ibid.). I could add here that the researchers should try to find recurring patterns in the discourse they are analyzing. These recurring patterns, be it on the micro or macro levels, are consolidating support against subjectivity.

Discourses do not exist in a vacuum, but they are products of histories of interactions between peoples, groups, ideas, ideologies and interests. Therefore, to have a full account of any discourse, we need to study these histories along both diachronic and synchronic dimensions. Analyzing the diachronic aspect explains the historical accumulations presented in the discourse while dealing with discourse synchronically educates us on how the present discourse more or less competes or conforms with other discourses, and how the interplay of both local or global forces affect the discourse present form and content.

Most of the studies done in CDA tend to focus on a single aspect of analysis. However, this does not mean that these studies totally neglect other aspects of analysis. Rather, it means that if the analyst is coming from a historical-discoursal angle, he or she would center on the historical background and this focus would outweigh both the textual and social aspects. To fill in this gap, the present analysis attempts to lay out, in a balanced manner, the various aspects pertaining to the phenomena of Islamism: historical, social and linguistic.

2.6. Concluding Note

CDA, as exemplified within this dissertation, will be defined following van Dijk (1988a) as the linguistically-based study and analysis of written texts and spoken words in order to reveal the underlying discursive sources of power, dominance, inequality, and bias evidenced in both. This study will connect this definition to Fairclough's framework, represented in Figure 2.1. It is important to stress that although the framework analytically provides three layers or levels of analysis, these three levels, in fact, overlap in real analysis. Chapter 3 talks about both the discursive practices involved in the process of news making in Egypt and the social practices that have contributed to the production and perception of Islamists. Combining these two levels of analysis would significantly shed light on how and why Islamists are represented in the way they are in the Egyptian media.

3. DISCURSIVE AND SOCIAL PRACTICES: IDEOLOGY, MEDIA, REPRESENTATION AND ISLAMISM

3.1. Introduction

This chapter, departing from Fairclough's tripartite framework, discusses the first two levels of analysis in this approach: discursive and social practices.

Discursive practices concern how the news is made and presented in the way it is, the role of media in sustaining or quashing social practices and the process of news-making. Since an event is not an event until it is reported and mediated in words via discourse to the reader, we need to analyze the crucial factors that shape the news-making process. Analyzing social practices includes dealing with all the social, political, and historical accumulations that are involved in the production, reception, and interpretation of any social phenomenon. The present chapter sheds light on:

- A. Ideology: the various definitions and different approaches to analyze ideology;
- B. Media: elaboration on media as an ideology carrier in modern society and the role of media as a discursive practice that (mis)represents social events;
- C. Representation: what events are presented and how;
- D. Islamism: its origin and history, and the different approaches to Islamism.

3.2. Ideology

3.2.1. *Ideology: Neutral Connotations*

Ideology, like almost every term in social sciences, does not lend itself to one unified and self-contained definition. Rather, literature on ideology provides us with a variety of definitions that range from one that has neutral connotations to other pejorative examples. In his Internet course, van Dijk provides a general working definition of ideology: “Ideologies are the fundamental beliefs of a group and its members” (1998b: 7). This is an example of a definition that does not have a negative evaluation of ideology; it also does not limit itself to ideologies that legitimize dominance and control. This definition is more than enough if the purpose of the research is mainly to segment points of view in a certain discourse or of certain people toward the outer world, without judging these ideologies. Furthermore, the definition focuses on the group and not on individuals. This means that individual and personal beliefs are not considered ideology, nor are social or culture beliefs or traditions. The ideology or beliefs of a whole culture are commonsense knowledge that is unquestionably perceived and taken for granted, at least as far as this particular culture is concerned. Any group with a certain ideology tries, over the course of time, to establish its beliefs as commonsense knowledge by utilizing many tools, the most significant of which is discourse.

The word “group” in van Dijk’s definition also needs some explanation, as it does not apply to all people who are gathered in a certain place at one time. Rather, we are interested in social groups that are formed by individuals who have common goals. These groups are often structured: they may have ordinary members, who may

be more or less officially part of the group (e.g., simply having a membership card), but also include individuals or subgroups who fulfill specific positions or have special roles. They have leaders and followers, teachers and ideologues, as well as offices that have similar functions. This kind of organization in groups is vital for the acquisition, spreading, defense or inculcation of ideologies. Thus, new members need to learn the ideology of a group (van Dijk, 1998b).

Van Dijk emphasizes the role discourse plays in the development and promulgation of ideologies. Ideologies both influence the content of discourse and are also acquired and transformed through discourse. This perspective is very close to Fairclough's interpretation of the role of discourse in society: discourse both constitutes and is constitutive of social practices (1995a; 1995b; 1999).

On the other end of the scale, there are definitions of ideology with pejorative and negative connotation. A good example of this type is the West's perception of communism. According to van Dijk (1998b: 6):

Communism as well as anticommunism, socialism and liberalism, feminism and sexism, racism and antiracism, pacifism and militarism, are examples of widespread ideologies. Group members who share such ideologies stand for a number of very general ideas that are at the basis of their more specific beliefs about the world, guide their interpretation of events, and monitor their social practices.

It is this type of ideology that generates polarization of people into *us* and *them*, and the audience begins to produce and consume discourse in terms of the *we* and *they* dichotomy. This process of polarization leads to the discussion of van Dijk's *ideological square* (van Dijk, 1998c), which explains the dichotomous

character of the prevailing discourses in societies. The ideological square gets its label from the four dimensions that make it up and which explain and justify the presence of inequality in the society. The square polarizes the in-groups and out-groups through both emphasis and mitigation: ideological discourses emphatically present the good *self* and the bad *other* and simultaneously mitigate the bad *self* and the good *other*. Van Dijk (1995) maintains that ideologies are often articulated and based on the ideological square. The ideological square:

- A. Emphasizes positive things about us;
- B. Emphasizes negative things about them;
- C. De-emphasizes negative things about us;
- D. De-emphasizes positive things about them.

It is actually this ideological square that forms the departure point of the present dissertation; how far this square applies to the Egyptian government in its representation of mainstream Islamists.

3.2.2. *Ideology: Pejorative Connotations*

As stated above, there is the approach to ideology that bears a pejorative meaning (Blommaert, 2005; Thompson, 1990). This approach is associated with the way in which Marxists view ideology, a view where the ideational aspect is “materially mediated” (Blommaert, 2004: 164). Blommaert draws on Gramsci’s view of *hegemony*, which is defined as the “cultural domination of the bourgeoisie” and as power by which the bourgeoisie is related to other social classes. In Gramsci’s thinking, ideology plays a vital role in stabilizing and sustaining the domination of

the ruling class. In that sense, Giddens' definition of ideology as "shared ideas or beliefs which serve to justify the interests of dominant groups" (583) makes it easy for us to understand Gramsci's concept of ideology. Here, ideology is used as soft power in the hands of the ruling class to dominate. According to Gramsci, no regime could sustain itself primarily through the absolute use of state power and armed forces. Therefore, he suggests the use of ideology as a soft alternative to absolute power; this means hegemony and consent as the political power that originates from "intellectual and moral leadership." Consensus based on soft ideology will be more effective than that which is based solely on armed forces. He borrowed this concept from the way in which the Catholic Church exercised a substantial intellectual power over its followers to obviate widening the gap between the educated and uneducated followers. Therefore, according to Gramsci, the ruling class could maintain its power and hegemony in society via establishing cultural and political consensus through utilizing its institutions: schools (textbooks, language policy, administration system, etc.), political parties, media, and others (Gramsci, 1971). Blommaert defines hegemony and power as dominant and determining factors in the ideological processes. He observes that the "coercive and disciplining system of education" lie beneath the reproduction of dominant culture. This is what Foucault views as the "locus of capillary power, all-pervasive surveillance, and perpetual punishability" (Blommaert 2005: 167).

Thompson, while distinguishing between the pejorative/critical and the neutral definitions of ideology, adopts the critical. For Thompson, ideology is "the ways in which meaning serves to establish and sustain relations of domination"

(1990: 56). He provides a definition of ideology that is not restricted only to conflicts between social classes but to any form of domination:

When established relations of power are systematically asymmetrical, then the situation may be described as one of domination. Relations of power are “systematically asymmetrical” when individuals or groups of individuals are endowed with power in a durable way which excludes, and to some significant degree, remains inaccessible to, other individuals or groups of individuals, irrespective of the basis upon which such exclusion is carried out. (ibid: 151)

Ideology, because of its dynamic and dialectical relationship with meaning takes various semantic modes or forms. According to Thompson (1990), these forms are:

1. Legitimation: the process of representing an event or incident as “legitimate,” “just,” and “worthy of support.” Max Weber (quoted in Thompson) identifies the following three grounds on which legitimacy can be claimed:
 - A. Rational grounds. This means “appealing to the legality of enacted rules and using a chain of reasoning to persuade the audience of the validity of existing social relations;”
 - B. Traditional grounds. This means “appealing to the sanctity of immemorial traditions.” What Thompson refers to as *narrativization* is very close to this notion; the claims to legitimacy are seen to be consolidated by how the present has emanated from a glorious past and is attached to time-honored traditions. In many cases, ideology propagators may create traditions to color the present with legitimacy;
 - C. Charismatic grounds. This concerns “appealing to the exceptional character of an individual who exercises authority.” This does not mean that

Charismatic attributes are inherent in the person as “attractive” and “popular,” but the person may be propagated as associated with words qualities that represent the charismatic flavour: the *Iron Lady* with Thatcher, *al-ra’ees al-mulham* “the inspired (revealed-to) president” with Gamal abdel-Nasser, and *al-ra’ees al-mu’men* “the believer president” with Sadat.

These three grounds, Weber explains, do not occur in “pure forms” (329, 333) but they may occur in combination. He also observes that developing from one ground to the other is done gradually.

2. Dissimulation: the process of concealing, denying, or mitigating relations of dominance in a given context. The techniques used to achieve dissimulation are:
3. Displacement: a process where a term that is used to refer to one object or individual is used to refer to another and, thus, either positive or negative attributes connoted by the term is transferred. This process is meant to associate a person, a system, or a regime with a glory past or popularity in present;
4. Euphemization: a process of beautifying a (negative or unacceptable) action or process: the US existence in Iraq is not called “invasion” but “liberation;” the Americans did not “destroy” the Vietnamese villages, they “disassembled” them, and the Egyptian government did not “liquidate” the public corporations in favor of private sectors but they are “modernizing” Egypt and “improving” the economic situation;

5. Trope. This includes figures of speech such as synecdoche, metonymy and metaphor. A popular example is the Egyptian government's use of the word *al-sha'b* "the people," which means the whole people while an analysis of the discourse where the word "people" is mentioned will reveal that actually it means the government and dominating elites;
6. Unification: a process of establishing "a form of unity which embraces individuals in a collective identity" regardless of racial, religious, social, gender, or political barriers which may separate them.
7. Fragmentation concerns the process of fragmenting the opposing or the other individuals and groups whose unity stand as a challenge or a threat to the dominant individuals and groups.
8. Reification means "representing a transitory, historical state of affairs as if it were permanent, natural, outside of time. Processes are portrayed as things or as events of a quasi-natural kind, in such a way that their social and historical character is eclipsed" (67). Processes presented this way are represented in a manner that renders them invulnerable and unquestionable.

The modes through which ideology operates can be more or less tailored to van Dijk's ideological square: legitimation, dissimulation and unification establish the good self while fragmentation the bad other. The ideological modes of operation are usually transmitted through subtle linguistic and discursive strategies.

3.2.3. *Fairclough: Meaning in the Service of Power*

The last approach to ideology that we will tackle here is that of a prominent figure in CDA, Norman Fairclough. According to Fairclough, ideologies “[only] arise in class societies characterized by relations of domination” and therefore discourse is ideological only in so far as it contributes “to sustaining or undermining power relations” (1995a: 82). Departing from Giddens’s definition of ideology, Fairclough defines it as “meaning in the service of power” (1995b:14). Therefore, his understanding is that ideologies are constructions of meaning which generate production, reproduction and transformation of relation dominance (Fairclough, 1992b: 87; Chouliaraki and Fairclough, 1999:26). This means that ideologies exist in societies that have conflicts and tension in the social structure, like class struggle, gender, etc., and every ideology attempts to create its own discourse that will compete for domination with other discourses prevalent in society.

Fairclough perceives discourse as a pertinent carrier of ideology; hence discourse can be more or less ideological. “Orders of discourse can be seen as one domain of potential cultural hegemony, with dominant groups struggling to assert and maintain particular structuring within and between them” (Fairclough, 1995b: 56). This indicates that in a certain society, not all ideologically competing discourses have equal status. Some discourses have more powerful impact than others based on their producers’ access to resources (van Dijk, 1996). This also shows that Fairclough does not conceive ideology in a literally Marxist sense, i.e., as an abstract system of values that work as a unified social body, binding people together and thus securing the social order. In contrast, Fairclough assigns the

process of meaning production and reproduction in daily life an important role in maintaining social order.

It is crucial here to stress that Fairclough does not adopt the deterministic view of the effects of ideology on people, i.e., the passivity and incapability of the people to counter manipulation. Rather, people “are ideologically positioned, but they are capable of acting creatively to make their own connections between the diverse practices and ideologies to which they are exposed and to restructure positioning practices and structures” (1992b: 91).

The discussion of ideology so far leads us to the conclusion that the different approaches are not as antithetical as they may seem to be; instead they are looking at ideology from different angles or emphasizing a certain dimension over the other in analysis. Van Dijk, for example, stresses the role cognitive networks play in processing ideology – this may be because this aspect has been neglected by discourse analysts. Blommaert, within the Marxist trend, deals with ideology as a system next to power to maintain social order. Thompson’s position, reflected also in Fairclough, is clear on the penetration of ideology in meaning production and reproduction in our daily life. Fairclough stresses the social dimension in studying ideology. The relation between language and ideology is given more and better explication in the ensuing section.

3.2.4. *Ideology and Language in CDA*

Power associated with any discourse is not initiated by language itself as “language is not powerful on its own – it gains power by the use powerful people

make of it” (Weiss and Wodak, 2003: 14). The power of any discourse is acquired from the various social practices (different social institutions) that generate that discourse. These institutions (government, parliament, school, asylum agencies, etc.) “operate as incarnations of power” (Harvey, 1996: 95). Different discourses are, therefore, a result of “relation of difference” on social structures. Language is entwined with social power in a number of ways: Language indexes power, expresses power, is involved where there is contention over power and where power is challenged. Power does not derive from language, but language can be used to challenge power, to subvert it, and to alter distributions of power. (Wodak and Meyer, 2001: 2).

Language, however, is not the only condition to exercise or challenge power but one also must have access to various social outlets (media, institutions, textbooks, education, etc.). The elites and the dominating people use their power to generate, maintain, institutionalize, and legitimize their discourse. Fairclough calls the process of using discourse to institutionalize ideology and achieve hegemony *normalization* and in many cases “normalization brings about social change in our knowledge, our attitudes, values and so forth” (Fairclough, 2003: 8). Language therefore sustains or reproduces dominant ideologies and it is thereby “establishing, maintaining and changing social relations of power, domination and exploitation” (ibid. : 9).

The centrality of language in CDA as an ideology carrier makes it ideological, too, and this echoes Habermas’ claim about language as a medium of domination and social force and as a power legitimizer and organizer (Habermas,

1967: 259). Those who have power and access can legitimize or delegitimize objects (persons, actions, institutions, etc.) in the world by their own way of language use. Hall (Morley and Chen: 26) describes this process as having “especially to do with the concepts and the languages of practical thought which stabilize particular forms of power and domination” and is meant to “reconcile and accommodate the masses of the people to their subordinate place in the social formation.” (ibid.)

To sum up the section on ideology, the main question is: can CDA dissect this subtle relation between ideology and discourse and other semiological forms, and, if so, how? Both Wodak and Fairclough suggest a positive answer to this question (Wodak and Meyer, 2001: 3; Fairclough, 1992b: 91). As for the present study, the tense relation between the Egyptian government and Islamists is not based on class struggle but on a socio-political basis. Therefore, the present study attempts to analyze the ideological stance that the Egyptian government has towards Islamists and the role that language plays in carrying that ideology.

3.3. Media

In this section, the role of media in mediating discourses in the modern world is discussed, and then the role of media in the Arab world in general, and in Egypt in particular, is given more attention.

3.3.1. Media and Ideology Dissemination

Herman and Chomsky (2002) explain that people’s opinions and beliefs are always formed and shaped by commercial media institutions, which usually further

the social, political and economic interests of the dominating elites. It is accepted that what the media will reflect will support the social interests of the elite.

Consequently, the dominant ideology of the elites will be presented as a commonsense and rational understanding, and will also attempt to extenuate what is presumed to be contesting beliefs and strategies (Knight and Dean, 1982).

Media are used here to mean the institutional system through which social meanings are produced, stored, distributed and consumed on a mass scale. The goals beyond that process vary based on the produced content (TV ads, editorials, talk shows movies, news reports, etc.). The present study analyzes one form of media: government newspapers that are used to produce, sustain, maintain and protect social meanings that are favourable to the ruling regime. It is hard to limit journalism to just one function. It is true that journalism in a capitalist age is a business and aims for profit. This, however, is not the essential and sole reason for its existence.

Journalism is meant to achieve many goals, the most important of which is reporting and informing audiences about the outside world and representing events that the audiences did not see. Richardson sees that the function of journalism is to “enable citizens better understand their lives and their position(s) in the world” (2006: 6). This perspective is an ideal stance, because it stresses what journalism is supposed to do but not what it is actually doing. What the media are actually doing is offering its audience selective presentations of selective events. The main function of newspapers is to provide the readers with news about the events that happened “out there.” Newspapers, then, are transmitting/transferring events in the form of language, i.e., semiotically, to the readers. Two issues are of importance here: the

selection of the events to be reported as news and the manner of presentation.

Journalists have to decide what events will be selected and reported, and in what form these events will be presented.

In fact, events become news only when selected for inclusion in news reports. This process of inclusion is treated differently by different newspapers and the difference will be reflected in both form and content of the coverage. The world of news is not a copy of the real world. Fowler (1991: 12) calls it “a world skewed and judged.” Moreover, the selection process indicates subjectivity in terms of both form and content. Regarding content, Fowler (1991: 11–12) notes that all news is inevitably mediated and news medium cannot be completely “neutral” or “unbiased.” Fairclough (2001: 41, 128) goes further claiming that mass media discourse involves hidden relations of power: text producers in mass communication address an “ideal subject,” construing their own notion of their “ideal reader,” and by these means may succeed in manipulating audiences to accept their view of particular events. On the level of form, questions like the following are considered:

1. The phrasing of the headline: Is it nominal or verbal?
2. What information should be included in the headline?
3. Does this action have an agent or is it agentless?
4. With much vocabulary at hand, which words will be chosen and why?
5. In formatting the report, what type of information distribution in terms of headline, lead, body and conclusion will be used?
6. What sources are (not) cited?

How discursively the event is reported departs from an ideological base of the reporter. Hartley (1982: 47) explains how the news takes the discourse form it does as something determined by “the way the news-makers themselves act within the constraints, pressures, structures and norms that bring the larger world of social relations to bear on their work.” The same idea is iterated by Fowler:

Anything that is said or written about the world is articulated from a particular ideological position: Language is not a clear window, but a refracting, structuring medium. If we can acknowledge this as a positive, productive principle, we can show by analysis how it operates in texts. (1991: 10)

This is what the present research is trying to achieve: to show how the text is woven around a certain ideological stance in terms of representing both the self and the other.

3.3.2. *Media Filters*

Edward Herman and Noam Chomsky (2002) describe the media as businesses which sell a product (readers) to other businesses (advertisers). In their propaganda model of the media they point to five *filters* which determine what we read in the newspapers and see on the television. These filters produce a very narrow view of the world that is in line with government policy and business interests. This model explains the constraints on what is/is not reported and what makes its way to the audience. These filters are *ownership, funding, sourcing, flak and antiideologies*.

Most of the world’s big media corporations are privately owned. *News International, CBS* (now merged with *Westinghouse*), *Turner Broadcasting* (now merged with *Time-Warner*) – which may belong to even larger parent corporations

such as *General Electric* (owners of *NBC*) – are just examples. All these have close ties to the local and international stock markets, which in turn would affect the nature of the media production. Sourcing is related to who gets to be sourced for the news and commentaries. “The mass media are drawn into a symbiotic relationship with powerful sources of information by economic necessity and reciprocity of interest.” (Herman and Chomsky, 2002: 14). In today’s world, professional journalism depends mostly on what the official sources say and that what these sources say is the news (McChensey, 2000). As for sourcing, according to McChensey, “if you talk to prisoners, strikers, the homeless, or protesters, you have to paint their perspectives as unreliable, or else you’ve become an advocate and are no longer a ‘neutral’ professional journalist.” Such reliance on official sources gives the news an inherently conservative cast and gives those in power tremendous influence over defining what is or is not ‘news.’ Advertising concerns the source of funding and as ads are a major source of fund, the news that would negatively affect any of advertised products are filtered.

Herman and Chomsky describe flak as the negative responses to a media statement or TV or radio program. It may take the form of letters, telegrams, phone calls, petitions, lawsuits, speeches and bills before Congress, and other modes of complaint, threat and punitive action.

The fifth filter is ideology. This filter deals with the question: does the story justify political manoeuvring and defend corporate interests around the world? In the 1988 edition, Herman and Chomsky cited “anticommunism” as the ideological

enemy of the West. With the collapse of the USSR, any ideological framework that is perceived as opposing Western interests can assume the filter position.

These filters show how media carry concealed ideologies and interests. This model has been criticized (see, for example, Klaehn, 2005a, 2005b) for its deterministic view and as a conspiracy theory. However, this author believes that if the model is read from CDA perspective, it would be seen as a reader-kit to inform, educate and enlighten the readers of the process of news-making.

With this in mind, it can be said that media mobilize the public to support the social interests of the elite or whoever stands behind media industry. To work securely, this dominant ideology tends to exclude any contesting beliefs, values that undermine the elites' worldview (Knight and Dean, 1982). This is what Gramsci (1971) refers to as the *soft power* (persuasion). By using soft power, the ruling groups in democratic societies gain dominance through a double process of coercion and persuasion.

Many studies have talked about the complexities involved in the production of news of representations (Cottle, 2000; Fowler, 1991; Hartley, 1982; Herman and Chomsky 2002; Richardson 2004; Poole 2002). The guidelines that these studies elaborated on as regulating the work of journalism in the West can hardly be stretched to be applied to Arab media. Just one example will be used to explain this point: Richardson (2004: 34) talks about finance, profit and advertising as professional constituting parts of news production in the West. However, this does not apply to the Egyptian *al-Ahram*. *Al-Ahram* is a state-owned, government-funded institution, and this, largely, excludes the influence of the capital and business-

making industry in the production of the newspaper or the institution. The board of the *al-Ahram*, as well as of many other papers in Egypt, is appointed by the editors-in-chief who, in turn, are directly appointed by the Egyptian President. It is not, therefore, unexpected that the mainstream line of *al-Ahram* would be government-oriented. The media filter in the case of *al-Ahram* is government interference. Since the editor-in-chief is appointed by the President and the paper is government-funded, it is expected that *al-Ahram* would be a mouthpiece of the government and any antigovernment news or reports will be filtered.

3.3.3. *Egyptian Media: Discursive Practices and News-making*

In almost all Arab countries, both official and private press exist in the political venue. However, no one can issue a newspaper or own any media outlet before getting the official approval and license from the government. In Egypt, for example, the majority of Egyptian newspapers are government-owned, and the consent of Supreme Council on Journalism is a prerequisite to publish any private newspaper. Given that this Council is government-appointed, it is expected that only regime-favoured orientations or individuals would be licensed. This Council also has the right to discontinue and confiscate a newspaper at any time.

In some Arab countries, although in sharp contrast with the basics of freedom of speech, access to and working in the journalism profession requires the approval of certain official bodies. Al-Jammal explains that the Arabs' authorities justify this interference by the need to maintain political and social stability (in Mellor, 2005: 33). Theoretically, the Egyptian constitution stipulates on the freedom of speech

(article 47/1980). The constitution states that the freedom of speech is granted to every citizen and everyone is free to express their opinions via any medium, that censoring or confiscating media outlets is prohibited and that the right is granted to any individual as well as groups to own, issue and publish newspapers or other media forms. However, practically, this freedom is not applied at any level.

During the second half of the twentieth century, categorizing the press was based on the well-known *Four Theories of the Press* (McQuail, 2002), which divides local press into four types: *authoritarian*, *libertarian*, *communist*, and *social responsibility*. In spite of the criticism directed to this categorization (Akhavan-Majid and Wolf, 1991; Ostini and Fung 2002) as lacking the requisite flexibility to analyze modern press systems, its idealism and lack of empiricism, I see that it well applies to the official media in Egypt. Egyptian media, including *al-Ahram*, falls under the authoritarian type, where the ruling regime and the elites monopolize media outlets. The authoritarian type indicates that journalism is subservient to the interests of the state in maintaining social order and achieving political goals. Saying that *al-Ahram* is under the authoritarian type implies it avoids criticism to the President, the government policies or officials, and it censors publishing any material that challenges the established order. Although Mubarak's time has been propagated as the age of free press, multiple cases prove that the state retains the right to punish journalists or close media outlets that transgress "permissible" limits on reporting and commentary. In the next sections, media under the consecutive Egyptian presidents is given in details.

3.3.3.1 Nasser and media. In 1960, Nasser nationalized all privately-owned press organizations and since then the press has been under the control of the regime. Whatever was published must gain the approval of the censor (Nasser, 1990: 3–4). Nasser invented the task of appointing new editors-in-chief for the state-owned papers, a policy that is still applied at the time of writing. According to Nasser (1979), this policy led journalists to choose “self censorship” to ensure that their work would be published. Abd el-Nasser himself once said that there were no restrictive laws on the press and that journalists themselves chose to ignore certain issues out of self-censorship. Moreover, Nasser also controlled the Egyptian Press Syndicate to mobilize his political and economic views (Nasser, 1990: 5). Summarizing the role of press during Nasser’s era, Abd el-Rahman (1989, quoted in Mellor: 31) states that Nasser’s period was the beginning of detaching the Egyptian press from its main function of informing readers (22).

3.3.3.2.Sadat and media. In 1970, when Sadat came to power, he lifted some of the Nasserite controls on press, like opening news sources for information, yet the censorship remained untouched. A major incident during Sadat’s time was the dismissal of Mohammed H. Heikal, the most influential journalist in Egypt in the second half of the twentieth century, after criticizing Sadat’s way of handling the 1973 war. In the mid-1970s, Sadat started to loosen the controls on press freedom in what he called “doses of freedom” but he seemed to be discontented with the many criticisms that began to spread against his open door policy. He called for journalists to adopt a “code of ethics to control the misuse of freedom” (Nasser, 1991:13). After his surprise visit to Israel in 1977, the press began to criticize Sadat harshly for going

against both national and Arab consensus by visiting Israel. So in 1979, Sadat, in a press conference, attacked the press and accused it of committing crimes against the people, and consequently two Islamic-oriented papers were closed. *Al-Sha'b* (People) newspaper was the major opposition paper during Sadat's time and the government frequently harassed its journalists (Nasser, 1990: 16). In 1980, Sadat proposed the Bill of the *Law of Shame* قانون العيب. He proposed to "punish Egyptians who disparage their government." He urged the People's Assembly (Egyptian Congress) to adopt legislation on ethics to curb critics who criticized his policies through publications and broadcast (Nasser, 1991: 18ff).

3.3.3.3 Mubarak and media. The general line of press in the Arab world is to punish any journalist who transgresses the freedom limits set by the government. The punishment varies from administrative to judicial. This statement does not hold true any longer concerning the press under Mubarak. Mubarak has ruled the country since 1981 by Emergency Law. The TV channels are state-owned, which means they are government-owned, which also means they are owned by the National Democratic Party. The following is a short list of serious freedom and human rights violations recorded during Mubarak's time:

1. One of the most active political parties during the 1980s and 1990s was the Labor Party حزب العمل , and its weekly newspaper *al-Shaa'ab* was the fiercest and boldest in confronting the malefaction and corruption of the government. Both the party and the paper were closed and, in spite of the frequent judicial verdicts of the illegality of closing the party and the paper, the regime insists on its position of not allowing the party to resume its political activities;

2. According to a recent report of Reporters Without Borders, Egypt occupied the 145th rank among countries with regard to press freedom;
3. The 2007 Reporters Without Borders report documented severe transgressions on the part of the Egyptian governments towards journalists and political activists as follows:
 1. Twelve journalists were sued by the government under accusations such as infringing “public interest,” or “national security;”
 2. In September 2007, four editors-in-chief were sentenced to a year in prison with Force Work. Those are Ibrahim Isa of *al-Dustuur*, Adel Hammuda of *al-Fajr*, Wael ibrashi of *Sawt al-Ummah* and Abdel-Halim Kandil of *al-Karrama*. In fact, according to the report, an NDP (the ruling party) member had raised a case against these four editors-in-chief because they had dealt with issues related to Mubarak, his sons and the corruption in Egypt;
 3. Huwaida Taha, an *al-Jazeera* correspondent in Cairo, was sentenced to six months in prison plus 20,000 LE on the basis of her report about the current situation of the Egyptian prisons;
 4. Two web bloggers, Kareem Amer and Moneim Mahmoud, were sentenced to four years and two months, respectively, in prison. The charges were criticism of the president and the government and working with an outlaw group (the Muslim Brotherhood).

This short list reflects the repressive nature and reality of the ruling regime. Arab journalists who want to escape the government’s iron grip on the freedom of

press have managed to launch Arab satellites and publish Arabic press from abroad.

According to Lynch (2003: 83):

Whereas the broadcasting of the 1950s had been in the service of powerful states, the new media (both television and press) have self-consciously portrayed themselves as a mouthpiece for an Arab public deeply frustrated with all Arab regimes and beholden to none of them. Based primarily in London, the elite Arab press has been able to escape direct government control while drawing on writers and journalists from all over the world.

Mellor applies this framework to media in the Arab world. He summarizes the state of press and its role in the Arab world:

In general, the press was regulated so that it promoted the government's developmental aims by writing about government projects and encouraging people to buy locally manufactured goods. As a consequence, the press turned into a mere mouthpiece for national governments. (2005: 31)

Therefore, the main function of the local Arab news agencies is to assist the government in disseminating its information and controlling the incoming news from foreign sources (Rugh, 1987).

Lastly, the interference and control of the Egyptian government of the news-making process is verified by Al-Moshtohry in her dissertation *L'idéologie à travers des indices linguistiques: Analyse des discours de la presse écrite arabophone et francophone en Egypte* (2000–2002). She found that there are variations in the quantity and types of the linguistic indices of ideologies between the French and Arabic newspapers published in Egypt and neither the type of newspaper nor language is behind the variations. The variation exists because of constraints imposed on journalists, on the newspaper, or even on the press agencies. The constraints are determined by the ideologies and journalistic values which orient production in each newspaper and which supply each with its own character.

3.4. Representation

Representation means transmitting X via Y, where X is an event, people, place etc., and Y is the medium through which the X is transmitted. This means that representation is a process. It is recalled from the media section that media represent reality and this indicates that what is represented in media are not a copy of reality, but is more or less discursively presented reality.

In this study, representation is used to refer to the process of meaning production through combination of semiotic signs. Reality is not always experienced directly but always through the symbolic categories made available by a society, and these categories are the sifters or filters of the original reality they are transmitting. The result is more or less similar to the original reality. It is as Hall (1982) puts it, “Representation is a very different notion from that of reflection. It implies the active work of selecting and presenting, of structuring and shaping; not merely the transmitting of an already existing meaning, but the more active labor of making things mean” (64). The elites, as a dominating power and to achieve hegemony by using media, are involved in what Hall calls “the politics of signification” (1982: 67, 72). In this process, images about the world are produced and reproduced, generating particular meanings and interpretations of events, people, ideas, etc. According to Poole (2002: 23), at the same time media reproduce the prevailing ideologies of the society, media also construct their own “meanings” (norms and values) through signifying practice. Therefore, it is hard to say media representation of a certain event is a transparent copy of the reality; it is rather a modified copy. This modified copy is intended to provide “interpretative framework” (ibid.) for the audience

through which they see the world. Media, thus, has “the power to signify events in a particular way” (Hall, 1982) and it is our role as researchers to look for the patterns that are used and reused to frame the events in a particular way.

There is a strong correlation between representation and culture. The more forms of representation that recur in a society; the most likely these representations would turn into cognitive concepts and cultural modes. Representation, according to Hall (1997), bifurcates into objects representation and language representation. The first type relates objects in the outside world to sets of mental representation in our heads and it is this type that people use when they think. Hall states that these are accumulations of systems related to each other through the various cognitive processing methods such as similarity and difference, temporal sequence, and cause and effect. Language presentation relates to language as used to delineate the world, i.e., discourse. The relation between representation and cultural models, between language and object representation is what Gee (1996) calls *Discourse* and *discourse*, respectively. The lower case discourse is the linguistic words, signs and sounds and Discourse is what we have in our minds regarding these signs.

This definition of representation is very significant to studying how Islamists are represented in *al-Ahram*. The linguistic representations of this group of people build, and at the same time, are explained by mental models that the language users have. Furthermore, the recurrence of a certain representation transforms over time to become a cultural model that is rarely disputed.

3.5. Islamism

In this section, the term Islamism is defined in terms of its origins and development. This section discusses the social practices related to Islamism and therefore deals with the socio-political background of Egypt under three presidents since 1952: Nasser, Sadat and Mubarak. In each subsection, and after the socioeconomic background is given, a discussion of Islamism under each president is presented. Islamism in the current millennium is presented in a separate section.

3.5.1. *Origins of Islamism*

Islamism refers to the movements and ideologies that adopt and believe in Islam as the basis for “restructuring contemporary states and societies according to an idealized image of Islam’s founding period 1400 years ago” (Karawan, 1997: 7). Islamic movements’ basic formations can be traced back to the third decade of the twentieth century. This period marked the official collapse of Islamic caliphate in 1924. Attempts have never stopped since then to reformulate groups and organizations to regain “the glory of the past” (ibid.). The situation in the Islamic world in the 1920s was that the Muslim *ummah* (nation) was without a leader after the collapse of the Ottoman Caliphate in 1924 and most of the Arab/Muslim countries were placed under Western colonialism that drained the cultural and natural resources of the colonized. Colonialism lasted until around the 1950s and 1960s when most of struggles and revolutions ended in the freedom of the colonized countries. In 1952, in Egypt, for example, a military cadre succeeded in deposing King Farouk, and forced the British to evacuate Egypt on 18 June 1956.

Most postcolonialism Arab regimes, in a search for identity, were keen to emphasize the Islamic identity of the state. In Egypt, for example, the second article in the Constitution states that “the official religion of the State is Islam” and in Saudi Arabia, the flag has “no god but Allah and Muhammad is his Messenger” inscribed on it. Other states prohibited the inclusion of Islamic practices in the state’s affairs. In 1961, the Tunisian President Bourguiba argued that Ramadan (the month of fasting in Islamic tradition and one of the constituting five pillars of Islam) should not be observed under the pretext that it reduces productivity. Neither of these two types of postcolonialism states won the interest of Islamic activists or the public. Both were perceived with apprehension of being allies of the West, and were accused of “deviating from the true Islam and of serving the interests of [the] enemies” (Karawan, 1997: 14).

During this bleak and difficult phase, many reformation movements led by intellectual figures called for the need of the Muslim nation to revive its way of life in order to restore the glory of the past. Among those reformists were Gamal al-Afghani, Muhammad Rashid Reda and Muhammad Abdu.

Influenced by his father, who was an Azharite scholar, Hasan al-Banna was an avid reader of Islamic sciences with a strong connection to modern life styles and politics. al-Banna, who graduated from a secular university – Cairo University – had a substantial and influential connection with the reformationist ideas of el-Afghani, Abdu and Rida. He was particularly influenced by Reda as he contacted him during his stay in Cairo. He voraciously read Reda’s *al-Manar* magazine and absorbed all the ideas of the Islamic reformers at that time, such as the need to have an Islamic

state, ruled by Islamic law, the dangers of Westernization, and the necessity of Egypt and all other Islamic countries independence. Esposito (1998) refers to two main factors that affected el-Banna's thought and laid down the connection between religion and politics: First, there was the 1919 revolt against the British; and second, his membership in his adulthood in many Islamic and civil societies.

In 1928, Hasan al-Banna, a school teacher, founded *al-Ikhwān al-Muslimūn* (Muslim Brotherhood Society) with six Egyptian labourers in the Suez Canal city of Isma'iliya in North Egypt. The group was first established under the necessity of establishing organized work to achieve the goal of Islamic revival. The group began to grow as its members started to roam the neighbouring cities and countryside, café shops, social clubs, public and personal places, spreading their revival ideas. In its first three years, al-Banna, known for his charismatic character, focused on building the inner self and personality of his followers and membership-building activities. The original goal of the MB was to “reform [...] hearts and minds, to guide Muslims back to the true religion, and away from the corrupt aspirations conduct created by the European dominance.” (Zubaida, 1989: 48).

With both focused vision and well-organized teamwork, the MB grew so rapidly that its leader had to fully devote himself to the organization and move to the capital, Cairo, in 1933 to establish and direct the main headquarters of the society. The early years of the MB – between 1930 through 1938 – witnessed a rapid increase in the number of members, which, although there is no precise documentation, is estimated by Mitchell as 150,000 representing three hundred branches over Egypt. In 1934, the MB published its first weekly newsletter and held its first *General*

Society's members conference. Both the comprehensive agenda of the MB and its distinctiveness from other active political or religious groups helped to boost its popularity. Whereas in 1932 The MB had 15 branches, by 1938 the number had reached 300 (Mitchell, 1969).

The MB Society was defined as “a Salafiyya message, a Sunni way, a Sufi truth, a political organization, an athletic group, a cultural-educational union, an economic company, and a social idea” (Mitchell, 1989: 9, 14). The MB was, thus, attractive, as it did not focus on one aspect, like the Sufis who focus only on the mystical aspect and neglect the political, and the secular political parties that focus on politics and disregard religion. The agenda was all-inclusive and appealing to various social classes.

The MB reform agenda was and still is comprehensive, as it includes initiating reform on all societal levels beginning with the individual, to the family, the neighbourhood, and up to the whole nation and then the world. Because of the comprehensiveness of its agenda, the MB devoted its power in its early years to recruiting members and building a social service organization. Its popularity was enhanced by its support of national and pan-Arab causes: the British evacuation, Palestine, and the eradication of poverty and illiteracy. The MB began to hold large public rallies and demonstrations, calling for social reform and an immediate withdrawal of British troops from Egypt. British authorities stopped the group's activities and el-Banna was imprisoned in late 1941. In 1942, the group performed its first formal political activity when it competed with secular parties in the parliamentary elections. However, the group's social and political activities were

resumed during and after the World War II. The group members and branches during the second half of 1940 were increasing significantly. The Society produced several publications and increased the frequency of its public rallies. It created what came to be known as the *secret apparatus*, a covert paramilitary arm of the organization whose principal aims were to protect the leaders of the organization and to further the Society's goals through political violence.

In 1948, the MB military apparatus members joined the Palestine side in their war against the Israelis and blamed the Egyptian government for its passivity in dealing with the Israeli occupation of Palestine. Commenting on their military achievements in that war, Mitchell says:

[The] Brothers' most notable achievement was the assistance they rendered to the besieged Egyptians caught in the 'Faluja pocket', created by the Israeli advance after the second truce had broken down in October 1948. In the field the Brothers helped to run supplies through the encircled forces; in Cairo the Society joined with others to press the Egyptian government for more volunteers to relieve the trapped garrison. Nuqrashi refused and it was only in the following February, after the armistice agreements, that the pocket was relieved. The Faluja excitement reached its highest pitch in November 1948. Early in the next month the Society of Muslim Brothers no longer legally existed. (1969: 58)

The MB's performance in the 1948 war was so puissant that it bred anxiety in the minds of the Egyptian monarchy, who felt, together with the colonizing British, the potential threat embedded in leaving the MB free to practice its political role in the Egyptian society, disseminate its ideas, and recruit more mass support. Consequently, King Farouk's government dissolved the MB and imprisoned a number of its prominent leaders on accusations from wishing to use a growing secret military apparatus to threatening the State's power. Planning "immanent revolution"

was the official reason given to justify the arrest (ibid.). The MB founder was not among the imprisoned because the regime had another plan for him. In the same year of 1948, the Egyptian Prime Minister Mahmud Fahmi al-Nuqrashi was assassinated and an attempt to kill the Minister of the Interior, Ibrahim Abdel-Hadi, who took over as the new PM, took place. Although al-Banna denied the accusations that members from his organization were behind all this, the official decision blamed the Society for the chaos, and the charismatic leader and founder of the MB was assassinated in February of 1949.

It is noteworthy here to mention that the regimes let the MB grow as long as it did not constitute a tangible threat to the monarchy. At some points, the MB was used to consolidate the government position in contesting competing Communist trends. According to Mitchell (1969: 59), when the weak government during the 40s failed to recruit any popular support, it used the MB popularity to contest the Wafd party. We will find out that this has been a recurrent strategy used by almost every authoritarian system that has permitted Islamists to unobstructedly practice their political rights. Kassem (2004: 137) also captures the same pattern and notes that both the “cooperative” and “coercive” tactics were more or less maintained by the three regimes that ruled Egypt after 1952.

3.5.2. Post-independent Egypt: Socio-Political Background

One main feature of any democratic system is the balanced separation between executive, legislative and judiciary powers. In Egypt, the power balance tended to tilt sharply towards the executive authority, represented by the President

(Kassem, 2004). This is evidenced by the fact that the Egyptian regime's policies and strategies have meant to empower the President with sultanic prerogatives that gather both legislative and executive powers in his hand. Since independence, the Egyptian regimes have been "one of the most resilient personal authoritarian systems in the world" (Kassem, 2004:11) and one common feature among them is their invulnerability to both outside and inside pressures to achieve any minimum tangible democratic progress and their relentless exclusionary wars against their political opposition.

For five decades, "personal authoritarian rule in Egypt survives and has been maintained" (Kassem, 2004). Kassem's justification of this view is supported by the fact that "the implementation of a multiparty arena has not affected the outcome of the government. The formal branches for government remain subservient to the overwhelming domination of the executive and development of autonomous groupings and constituencies remain hindered and weak" (ibid.: 1). The multiparty system devised by Sadat has not been able to move Egypt into the real democratic zone as the political parties are, as can be induced from both Sadat's and Mubarak's practices, "as much as tools for maintaining social order and managing elite conflict than as mechanisms for mass mobilization" (Brownlee, 2004: 81).

The concept "neosultanistic regimes" from Chehabi and Linz (1998) fits well in our attempt to delineate an account of the political system in modern Egypt.

Chehabi and Linz (1998: 7) define the contemporary sultanistic regimes as:

... based on rulership and people's loyalty to the ruler is ... motivated not by [the ruler's] embodying or articulating an ideology, nor a unique personal mission, nor by any charismatic qualities, but by a mixture of fear and

rewards to his collaborators. The ruler exercises his power without restraint at his own discretion and above all unencumbered by rule nor any commitment to an ideology or a value system ... The binding norms of ... administration are constantly subverted arbitrary personal decisions by the ruler. As a result corruption reigns supreme at all levels of society.

This image applies perfectly to Egypt, at least in the last fifty years. The state is run according to the personal interests of the President and his cronies who, being beneficiaries, blindly support whatever policies he dictates.

The ensuing sections will elaborate on the political and social system in Egypt under Nasser, Sadat and Mubarak, and on how the phenomenon of Islamism was dealt with during the reign of each of them.

3.5.3. *Nasser: Socio-Political Background*

The coup d'état on 23 July 1952 changed the monarchy system into the Arab Republic of Egypt. At first, Mohammad Nagib presided over the Command Council of the Revolution, the leading authority following the coup, and was the first Egyptian President. Although Nasser was the most ambitious among the officers, he let Nagib be President to utilize Nagib's popularity and win the masses' support to the revolutionary young officers. But Nagib's growing popularity in the Nile valley seemed to instigate Nasser's and the other officers' unrest. By early 1954, the competition over political supremacy had escalated into an "all or nothing" confrontation between Nasser and Nagib (Gordon, 1992: 124, Vatikiotis: 384). The contest ended in Nasser's victory and Nagib was forced to leave the president's chair under the accusation of collaborating with the MB.

When Nasser became president, he conducted essential political, economic and agricultural reforms such as evacuation of the British forces from Egypt, distribution of lands to subordinate peasants, nationalization of the Suez Canal and the establishment of basic industries. These achievements strengthened his relation with the masses. Adding Nasser's charismatic character to these achievements, the aggressive popular support he enjoyed at both the local and the pan-Arab levels is understandable.

As is the case with every ruler who wants to establish power through legalizing their dictatorship, Nasser's 1956 constitution replaced a parliamentary system of government with presidential republican system. Under the new constitution, the President (Vatikiotis, 1991, Kassem, 2004; Baaklini et al., 1999)

1. Is to be elected by a general popular plebiscite;
2. Is vested with the executive power;
3. Presides over the council of ministers;
4. Appoints and dismisses ministers;
5. Lays down the general policy of the state;
6. Is the supreme commander of the armed forces and chairman of the defense council;
7. Appoints the commander-in-chief of the armed forces.

In short, the state is embodied with the President's persona. The new single party, National Union, was born as a result of the 1965 constitution's putting all powers in the hands of the President (Kassem, 2004:18). The constitution granted workers and peasants 50 percent of the seats of all legislature Houses. These two

sectors empowered the ruling regime as they “were enmeshed in the government rural patronage network and hence beholden to it” (Baaklini et al., quoted in Kassem, 2004: 18ff). Furthermore, to give the regime a strong hold on the internal affairs, State Security Courts were created to “handle cases of treason and internal subversion, as well as ‘political crimes’ of lesser magnitude which are defined as coming under their jurisdiction” (Hill, quoted in Kassem, 2004: 19). The political life in Nasser’s time was that of a single party where only the National Union (1956–1962) and the Arab Socialist Union (1962–1976) led and formed the country’s policies. During that period, the practice of some professions (e.g., journalists) depended upon party membership (Waterbury, 1983: 314).

3.5.4. *Nasser and Islamism*

Nasser’s period was, in fact, the most incommensurable in the history of the MB as Nasser “crushed the Muslim Brotherhood movement in a manner unprecedented to date” (Kassem, 2004: 137). It has already been noted that in the period before 1952 revolution, the MB grew rapidly, establishing an educational, economic, military and political infrastructure. After the assassination of al-Banna, Hasan al-HuDaybi, an Egyptian High Court judge and well-respected member of the Egyptian elite, was elected to succeed al-Banna in 1951. When the military cadre overthrew the king, the relationship between the Free Officers and the MB was strong from both sides. The imprisoned MB members were thus released and the organization resumed its normal activities in the Egyptian society. One interpretation of this attitude of the Free Officers is that they wanted reconciliation with the state’s best-

organized and most influential group to gain the support of its more than one million members. Compared to other parties in the political opposition field, the MB enjoyed a longer grace period under Nasser's regime. This may be attributed to two facts: first, the relationship that tied the military cadre members with the MB particularly, as Nasser used to attend the MB religious and intellectual meetings; and second, the group's influential existence in the Egyptian society, massive ability to recruit members, tight organization, infrastructure network and the para-organization military apparatus. However, the latter was the very reason that ignited Nasser's wrath toward the MB. It caused, as it did before with King Farouk, the regime's apprehensions. Therefore, the grace period was not expected to last for long. In 1954, Nasser was shot at, but not injured, while giving a public speech in Alexandria. The MB was accused of plotting against Nasser and since then the relationship between the regime and the organization went into a dark tunnel. The MB Society was redissolved, thousands were imprisoned, military trials ended in the execution of six leaders while tens of thousands were jailed and tortured for almost a decade; and moreover, the group was labeled "an extremist organization" (Gordon, 1992: 184).

In 1966, the regime held military tribunals and some of the MB prominent think tanks, like Sayyid Qutb and Abdel-Qader Ouda, were sentenced to death. Despite the hard times it faced during the Nasserite regime, al-HuDaybi, the Guide General, managed to keep the uniformity and unity of the organization and bravely confronted the calls that originated among MB members inside the Nasser's prisons to *takfir al-mujtam'* "to call the society infidel" by publishing his seminal work *Do'ah La QuDah (Preachers not Judges)*. The main line of argument in this book is

that the MB mission is to call, preach, and attract people to the true religion and true path of God and it is not their business to judge them whether they are Muslims or Infidels or categorize them or hold trials to classify people; it is God's business to do so and this was the MB belief regardless of severe torture and jails (al-HuDaybi).

Although the thesis of book worked effectively among the broad range of the organization members, it did not hinder the creation of the takfir and Hijara group, a radicalist movement that advocates using force and power to overthrow existing regimes and to effect changes in society.

3.5.5. Sadat: Socio-Political Background

Sadat succeeded Nasser after the latter's sudden death in 1970. He was keen to get rid of all the old guards (Nasserites) and to tailor laws and the constitution to strengthen his grip on the internal affairs. According to Kassem (2004), the most salient feature of Sadat's period was the "personal authoritarian." The expulsion of the Soviets in 1972, the war with Israel in 1973, the introduction of a multiparty system in 1976 and the historic visit to Jerusalem in 1977 were all personal policy initiatives and decisions of the president (23). Although Sadat redirected the state's economy towards the open-door policy and he leaned toward the West (United States) instead of the Soviets, he, like Nasser, developed his own network to keep control of the country's affairs.

In 1971, the constitution was tailored to fit into how Sadat wanted to rule the country. The constitution was packed with presidential prerogatives that would serve prospective presidents. Although the constitution clearly divides power between the

three branches of government, supports many democratic freedoms, and guarantees people's right to vote and contest their leaders, el-Ghobashy (2005: 31), summarizes the nature of the 1971 document as a "composite creature" that was:

... overwhelmingly weighted towards the chief executive, granting him the power to appoint and dismiss the prime minister and cabinet ministers, start impeachment proceeding against them, issue decrees with the force of law, hold referenda by which parliament can be bypassed, declare states of emergency, convene emergency sessions of parliament and appoint ten members of that body. The constitution grants the president staggering powers over the two other branches, giving him the right to dissolve parliament after putting the issue to a referendum and empowering him to chair the Supreme Judicial Council, which oversees affairs of the nation's judges.

El-Ghobashy, moreover, explains that the good features that the constitution stipulates can be reduced or even abolished by the application of self-made laws. So the constitution makers did not forget to put the phrase "these rights are to be determined by law," a phrase which left the door open to envisage new laws to curtail the people's rights.

The following is a quote from the 1971 constitution to show how authoritarian Sadat was. The article number is referenced between parentheses:

1. The President of the Republic shall have the right to promulgate laws or object to them. (112)
2. The President of the Republic shall not dissolve the People's Assembly unless it is necessary and after a referendum of the People. (136) (It is noticed that the word necessary is so vague that it renders itself to many interpretations.)
3. The President of the Republic shall appoint the Prime Minister, his deputies, the Ministers and their deputies and relieve them of their posts. (141)

4. In case it becomes necessary during the absence of the People's Assembly, to take measures which cannot suffer delay, the President of the Republic shall issue decisions in this respect which have the force of law. (147)
5. The President of the Republic shall proclaim a state of emergency in the manner prescribed by the law. (148)
6. The President of the Republic may call a referendum of the People on important matters related to the supreme interests of the country. (152)

It may be asked, what else is left to both the legislative and judicial powers?

The president's control over the legislative power is rendered very significant by Kassem (2004) as it eliminates the possibility of having rivals to the presidency, and placing all powers in Sadat's hands, or the prospective president under his control. In reality, Sadat, to ensure his supreme power, harassed all his political opponents, even those who served in his cabinet. Springborg (1989) exemplifies this policy by referring to the fact that Sadat either jailed, home-arrested or replaced his army generals once they showed serious opposition to his policies.

Sadat tried to promote the slogan that Egypt is the "state of law and institutions." However, this "state of law and institutions" is rendered meaningless, as it was crippled and hindered by the intertwined relationship between the judiciary system and the president's prerogatives which entitles him to appoint judges, public prosecutor, attorney generals, the judges of the Cassation court, and judges of the Supreme Constitutional Court (Law 46/1972, articles 173).

Although it is not known for sure why Sadat decided to move to the multiparty system in 1976, it can be argued, based on a reading of Sadat's actual

political practices, that this was not intended to promote a healthy political life based on real participation and democracy. In 1980, he changed article # 77 of the Constitution to define the president's term of six years without any maximum terms, but he did not live to enjoy a typical life-long presidency.

3.5.6. *Sadat and Islamism*

The relationship between the government and the MB at the end of Nasser's era was at its worst. The turbulent times the MB suffered during Nasser's period was partially eased during the reign of Sadat who, to restrain the growing leftist trend, allowed the MB to work publicly. Upon ascension to power in Egypt in 1971, Sadat released the imprisoned members of the MB and opened the door for them to publicly resume their Society activities. This tolerance was informally recognized, as Sadat did not approve the existence of the MB as an officially legal group.

At that time, Sadat believed that he needed the MB to curb and obliterate the main threat to his position in its early years, namely, the remnants of the Nasser era, always referred to as "power centres." However, he remained quite suspicious of the MB and he did not allow them to restore their legal status (religious or political) but left them to work in limbo: they were allowed to work and practice their religious and political activities without being recognized as a political party or as an official religious organization. This may indicate that Sadat did not believe in the legality of the MB but he used it temporarily to confront the Nasser and communists remnants.

Moreover, to solidify his position against the Nasserites, Sadat amended the Constitution of Egypt twice. In 1970, he added a clause declaring Islam as "the State

religion.” Given Nasser’s secularism, this change was very significant. The Constitution further stipulated that the *shari’a (Islamic Law)* is a main source of legislation. The radicals and the Muslim Brotherhood were not satisfied and in 1980 Sadat rechanged the same clause to emphasize that shari’a is “*the main* [my italics] source of legislation.” It is worth mentioning that the annihilation policy of Nasser pushed active Islamists underground and to exile. The moderate mainstream line within the Society of MB could not abort the growing militant attitude born as a logical consequence of Nasser’s policy, the 1967 defeat, and the failure of the state’s developmental projects. So, and as Binder puts it (1988: 341):

Many new local and often small and secret organization were founded after 1965, some of which challenged the vestige of the Ikhwan [MB], and others of which did their own religious thing. Some were highly politicized and militant while others sought the comfort of fraternal association and the consultation of mutual cooperation.

Given this, one more reason can be added to explain Sadat’s tolerance toward the MB activities: to restrain the diffusion of the radicalist Islamists.

The MB enjoyed the freer atmosphere up to 1979 when Sadat signed the peace treaty with Israel. This step was considered a betrayal by almost all the political activists, especially the MB. Sadat, accordingly, began to display the “canines of democracy,” as he himself coercively put it in the September 1981 speech. He put in prison representatives of almost all the colors of political life in Egypt, ranging from leftists, Islamists, nationalists, Christian leaders and even independent activists who opposed his peace initiative.

In October 1981, military radicals that emerged from inside the army assassinated Sadat during the annual October military parade, and his deputy, Hosni Mubarak, took office via a referendum in 1981.

3.5.7. Mubarak: Socio-political Background

Although Mubarak does not enjoy the charismatic character of Nasser nor the dominating network over elites of Sadat, the authoritarian presidency remained the centrepiece of his reign. Mubarak ruled Egypt since his ascension to power in 1981 after the assassination of Sadat. He came to authority empowered by the 1971 Constitution that put almost all power in his hand. Although Mubarak did not feel threatened by the remnant power centers of Nasser's period, he was threatened by powerful and charismatic figures. His tendency to abolish any threat was similar to that of his predecessor, removing men from critical power positions and away from mass support. Two cases are worth mentioning here: the Minister of Defense, Abugazala and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Amr Musa. Both were removed from their positions (1989 and 2001, respectively) when they were at the apex of their power and popularity, and had the armed forces' support.

When Mubarak came to power in 1981, he declared that he would not nominate himself for more than two terms. In 2005, he ran for the fifth term in the first multi-candidate presidential elections in Egypt. The candidates who ran against Mubarak were either inactive politicians or unheard-of names and they only gave the election a democratic gloss from the international vantage point. The only serious candidate in that election was Ayman Nour, a long-time advocate of human rights

and a senior parliamentarian. In 2004, he managed, after long and fierce trials, to legalize a new political party, *al-Ghad 'Tomorrow'*, which was expected to disturb the politically stagnant life in Egypt. The ruling elites felt threatened by Nour and thought his new party might mobilize the masses against Mubarak, so when Nour came second to Mubarak's in the number of votes, he was convicted and jailed based on allegedly forged accusations.

The government has been trying to suborn the judiciary and render it subservient. Nevertheless, the judges, via their active professional club, have been working to preserve their independence in the face of government constraints. The judges have been a thorn in the government's side for so many years, insisting on the respecting of the judges' rights, keeping a vigil over elections and demanding the right of the civilians to be tried before the natural judge and not before the Supreme State Security courts or the military courts.

In 1992, the parliament, dominated by ruling regime members, passed amendments to the penal code (Law No. 97). A number of provisions dealing with terrorism were added and made it harsher and more severe; prison terms, for example, were replaced with forced labor, temporary sentences with life sentences and life sentences with the death penalty. The term *terrorist acts* has been vaguely defined to include almost any violent behaviour against the state:

... terrorism means any use of force or violence or any threat or intimidation to which the perpetrator resorts in order to disturb the peace or jeopardize the safety and security of society and which is of such nature as to harm or create fear in persons or imperil the lives, freedoms or security; harm the environment; damage or take possession of communications; prevent or impede the public authorities in the performance of their work; or thwart the

application of the Constitution or of laws or regulations. (Egyptian Criminal Law No. 97, 1992)

It is under this penal code that Sa'd-eddin Ibrahim, a renowned Egyptian human rights activist and professor, was tried and convicted. Ibrahim established *Ibn-Khaldoun Center for Development Studies*, a research and advocacy institute in Cairo that is concerned with human rights, issues of democratization and political and social development and civil rights awareness. Ibrahim has monitored and recorded the government's performance regarding violations of human rights elections infringement, and that was enough reason to be charged under the penal code.

Mubarak has ruled Egypt under Emergency Law 162/1958 since 1981. This deeply unpopular law has to be renewed every three years and with its dominating majority in the parliament, the government faces no problem in this regard. In its internecine battle against its political opposition, the regime appears legally vested by Emergency law. The law authorizes the regime to:

1. Arrest suspects at will and detain them without trial for prolonged periods;
2. Refer civilians to military or exceptional state security courts, whose procedures fall far short of international standards for fair trial;
3. Prohibit strikes, demonstrations and public meetings;
4. Censor or close down newspapers in the name of national security.

Under this infamous law, civilians have been tried before either the Supreme State Security court or a military court. Table 3.1 shows the number of cases handled before military courts:

Table 3.1 Number of trials before military courts (based on Kienle, 1998: 222)

Year	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996
No. of cases	8	12	5	43	70

It should be noted here that judges in the military courts are judicially inexperienced and fall under the influence of the regime and their superiors regarding their job and tenure. Therefore, it is not surprising that most trials end in conviction. Based on a 2003 report by the Egyptian Organization of Human Rights the number of detainees under the emergency law exceeds 20,000. Kassem sees that application of Emergency Law has been politically advantageous to Mubarak as it dwindled the judiciary interventions (Kassem, 2004): the regime can detain, convict and prosecute political activists without any judicial pursuits.

The calls, both from inside and outside, for democratizing the Middle East surprised and even scared the autocratic regimes. King Fahd of Saudi Arabia said, “The democratic system prevailing in the world does not suit us in the region, for our people’s composition and traits are different from the traits of that world. We cannot import the way in which other peoples deal [with their own affairs] in order to apply it to our people” (Herbert, 2003: 142). Hafez al-Assad, (Shavit) a Syrian President iterating the same tone, declared at his inauguration ceremony that:

Each nation has its own heritage and history, and consequently, its own culture, soul, concepts, and manners. If this were not so, our world would have been one nation, and this is not the case ... even in Arab countries, you will find someone who talks about democracy and has in mind only one picture which he likes because he did not search, within himself, for any other picture.

The response of Mubarak to the call for democratization was no different from that of Fahd and al-Asad. He believes in a democracy that is self-made: authoritarian democracy. In a speech at the conference “Arab Reform: Vision and Implementation” (2004), he reports the Arabs consensus that having a better life is based on “... push[ing] forward efforts for modernization and development based on the self-made vision of our Arab societies as well as on the harmony and cohesion between Arab governments and their peoples”

After the tragic events of 9/11, the US launched a war on terrorism. George W. Bush, the US President stated (Bush, 2001):

Today, millions of Americans mourned and prayed, and tomorrow we go back to work. Today, people from all walks of life gave thanks for the heroes; they mourn the dead; they ask for God’s good graces on the families who mourn, and tomorrow the good people of America go back to their shops, their fields, American factories, and go back to work. [...] This is a new kind of – a new kind of evil. And we understand. And the American people are beginning to understand. This crusade, this war on terrorism is going to take a while.

He also declared “We’re a nation that can’t be cowed by evil-doers. We will rid the world of the evil-doers. We will call together freedom-loving people to fight terrorism.”

Although there has been no precise definition of terrorism, the term has been loosely and widely used to label any act to justify launching a war against the bad other, be it a verbal, psychological, economic or military war. In November 2001, President Bush said that there was no room for neutrality in the war against terrorism and every country has to participate in the war on terrorism. Bush said he would not point out any specific country in his speech: “Over time it’s going to be important for

nations to know they will be held accountable for inactivity,” he said. “*You’re either with us or against us in the fight against terror*” [emphasis mine].

Moreover, in September 2003, President Bush, in a speech to the UN inaugurating session, said, “Leaders in the region [Middle East] will face the clearest evidence that free institutions and open societies are the only path to long-term national success and dignity. And a transformed Middle East would benefit the entire world, by undermining the ideologies that export violence to other lands” (Bush, 2003).

The United States, pushing for democratic changes in the Middle East, put the despotic Arab leaders in a quandary. The puzzle for the Arab leaders was how to reconcile the United States call to implement democracy and to keep their authoritarian power; in other words how to apply a self-made democracy. In Egypt, for example, Mubarak came up with a constitutional amendment that was put into effect in February 2005, to allow a multicandidate presidential election. September of the same year witnessed for the first time nine candidates running for the office. However, the constitutional amendments made it difficult if not impossible for anyone other than Mubarak to win the election. Now Mubarak’s regime has the democratic gloss and he still enjoys ruling the country in his own authoritarian “neosultanic” style.

Other provisions in the amendment and the new election law include the following:

- A. Candidates from legal opposition parties must come from their party’s leadership to be eligible to run in 2005; however, in future elections, a party

would need to have been licensed for at least five years and to hold at least 5 per cent of the seats in the lower and upper houses of parliament to get on the ballot. This last requirement would make it difficult for many small opposition parties to field candidates. It also heightens the importance of the upcoming parliamentary elections in November 2005, and in 2010, since President Mubarak, at age 77, may choose not to seek another term.

- B. Oversight of the presidential election process is given to a Presidential Electoral Commission (PEC) composed of current and former judges and other “public figures.” Five of the Commission’s ten members are chosen by Parliament.
- C. The PEC has the sole authority to approve candidate nominations, supervise election procedures, and tally the final results. Most importantly, since some of its members are judges, the PEC has final “judicial competence” to rule on any contestation or challenge submitted in relation to the presidential elections, and its decision will be final and subject to no appeal. Critics charge that this final provision places the PEC above the rule of the court.

3.5.8. Mubarak and Islamism

Mubarak began his reign with a period of partial or temporary appeasement towards the MB (Campagna, 1996: 281): He released the third Guide General of the MB, Omar al-Telmisani, and all the MB members imprisoned by Sadat. The group revived again and began to restore some of its power in the Egyptian community. Mubarak, irritated by the radical Islamists who assassinated Sadat and in a way to

secure their side, wanted to have the MB on his side to counterbalance radicalism. This grace period actually lasted until 1984 when the government was astounded by the election performance of the MB in coalition with the Wafd party. In the 1984 elections the Wafd-Brotherhood alliance won 58 seats, most of which were won by the Brotherhood. Since then the organization has been perceived as a threat. This threat was realized when the group publicly announced its intentions to escalate its political opposition to the government policy. In an interview the Guide General, al-Telmisani, said:

We were completely serious when we joined the elections. Our aim was to reach Parliament through a legal channel, the Wafd Party, because People's Assembly members enjoy parliamentary immunity. The brothers who will reach the Assembly will speak on behalf of the Brotherhood, will urge enforcement of the Islamic sharia laws, and will embarrass the government on this issue without fear of detention or torture ... Now some of them [MB] are People's Assembly members, watching the government and entitled to make it account for its actions. (Policy, June 1984: 9–10; cited in Campagna 1996: 283)

The 1984 and 1987 elections were important, as they were the most open and competitive elections since 1952. They included more parties: the New Wafd Party and the National Progressive Unionist Party, excluded by Sadat, and the MB, which was allowed to run individual candidates under the auspices of an allied secular party. The government, as usual, had the upper hand via the various means: media monopoly, restriction of opposition parties to hold conferences and reach the voters, the Minister of Interior running the elections where there is no ballot secrecy and the

intimidation of the police to poll watchers and voters, through which it can secure the electoral outcome for to the government's interest. In 1987, the MB – Socialist Labor alliance won 78 seats out of which 36 went to the Brotherhood.

During the period from 1984 to 1989, the regime practised a consistent policy of non-confrontation with the MB except, as Campagna notes, for occasional arrests of some members by security forces. The escalation started in 1989 when the then-Interior Minister Zaki Badr issued a public statement in which he placed all Islamists, violence and non-violence advocates, in one basket and accused the MB of being a façade for the militant Islamists: “[T]he extremists are in fact a secret organization of the Muslim Brotherhood for assassinations. There is no conflict between the two tendencies, as some want to believe, and they are in fact a single association” (quoted in Campagna, 1996: 285).

Throughout the year, arrests of MB members continued and escalated. In 1990, the MB joined other opposition parties in boycotting the parliamentary elections because there was no minimum guarantee for fair elections. This event marked the MB as an influential threat to the regime. In the MB spokesman's words,

We wanted a free and fair election. We did not accept the circumstances of this election. Our demands were refused. We asked for judicial supervision; this was refused. We asked that voters prove their identity; this was refused. The Minister of the Interior is controlling everything. Everyone is under his orders. There are no guarantees. (Campagna, 1996:9)

Moreover, the mid-1980s and the 1990s witnessed a substantial MB involvement and successes in political and social life; this was embodied in the MB members dominating presence in professional syndicates: the doctors', engineers', pharmacists', and lawyers' syndicates elected boards. Such presence kept moving up

until the mid-1990s. It is again out of a well-organized and focused vision that the MB was able to dominate almost the boards of all the professional syndicates and run it efficiently. Kassem, explaining the significance of the MB winning of 14 out of 24 seats of the 1992 Lawyers Syndicate elections, clarifies that this particular Society has traditionally been a highly vocal defender of liberalism and secular thought. Consequently, the success of the Brotherhood in winning more seats in this traditional liberal entity than did the NDP and the secular opposition parties combined appeared overtly challenging to the regime. Moreover, the government enacted legislation to minimize, if not obliterate, the control of the MB over civil and professional organizations and to bring most of the syndicates under the management of government- appointed judicial committees (2004: 113). On the symbolic level, the MB “was able to introduce the son of the Brotherhood’s founder, Saif-Eddin Hassan al-Banna, into a leadership position” (Stacer, quoted in Kassem, *ibid.*).

This large-scale success along with civil work was conducive to recruiting more members, or at least sympathizers. However, it was also fuelled by the stagnation prevalent in the political life in Egypt.

Alongside with these achievements, the MB started to raise its protesting tone against the government. Protesting the absence of complete judicial supervision and distancing itself from being a facade of false democracy, the MB joined the major opposition parties. The Wafd Party and the Labor Party affiliated with the Muslim Brothers (but not the leftist Tagammu’), and signed a pact in October 1990 to boycott the parliamentary poll. They also, jointly with other opposition parties, severely criticized the government’s continuation of the emergency law that had

been running since 1981 and condemned the Egyptian government participation and marketing for the 1991 Madrid peace talks.

The regime perceived these successes and growing criticism as “a formidable threat to its own declining legitimacy” (Campagna, 1996: 280) and, as expected, it could not stand silent as the MB crossed the preset demarcations. The regime replied by detaining members of the MB with other people under the charge of organizing antigovernment rallies and distributing leaflets opposing the Madrid talks.

In 1995, Mubarak won the presidential elections with 94 percent of the votes, against no opposition candidate. The same year witnessed the parliamentary elections where the NDP (Mubarak’s party) won 90.4 percent of the seats with only 14 out of 444 seats going to opposition parties. Reading merely the results of both elections would refute any claim of democratic or pluralistic life. Moreover, the reports of human rights and civil society watchers of the elections have shown that “series of fraud and irregularities had taken place in more than half of the 222 voting districts” (Ibrahim, 1996: 4), the “judges eventually nullified the results in 80 out of 88 electoral districts” (Ibrahim and Sherbiny, 2000: 62) and also, the elections were “heavily marked by fraud, coercion, and bans on many potentially competitive parties” (Stepan and Robertson, 2003: 39). The 1995 legislative elections have seen the NDP’s share of the parliament’s seats steadily increase, from 68 percent in 1987 to 86 percent in 1990 to an incredible 94 percent in 1995.

On the coercive level, in November 1995 the regime’s Supreme Military Court sentenced 54 leading members of the MB to prison terms ranging from three to five years with forced labor, and detained thousands without trials (Kienle, 2001).

Sixteen of those convicted had wanted to run for parliament and fourteen had served in the 1987 Parliament (Makram-Ebeid, 1996: 128). The charges were “affiliation to and reviving an outlawed movement and the attempt to establish control over the syndicates and arrange to out-throw the regime.” The verdict represents the first prosecution of members of the organization by a military court since 1965, when Nasser sought to demolish the group by imprisoning its leaders. The regime interfered fiercely in the elections process to assure the results, “the police ejected the opposition, shut the police stations and filled the ballot boxes to the brim” (Makram-Ebeid, 1996: 131).

Since 2000, state security forces have continued arresting the MB members, raiding private residences, and detaining them for long periods without trial and on charges of belonging to an illegal organization or plotting to overthrow the government. The regime has been escalating conflict with the MB since 2005. The Human Rights Watch (HRW) Website has collected the names of 226 of members of the banned, nonviolent organization, Egypt’s largest opposition group who are currently held by Egyptian authorities. Among the detainees is Khairat al-Shatir, Deputy General Guide of the MB and sixteen other prominent members of the organization.

The 1990s were the bloodiest in Egypt’s internal history, where clashes between militant Islamists and the state forces escalated, and the number of both casualties and detainees hit unprecedented numbers. The EHRW Website provides the number 15,000– 20,000 as the detainees and 1,164 as casualties. Indeed, Mubarak’s period witnessed an “unprecedented expansion of politically motivated

violence,” “an upsurge in the number of Islamist prisoners,” “mass military trials ... of civilians” and above all the advent of “political terrorism” (Kassem, 2004: 145).

Despite the regime’s attempts to stem the MB tide, all ballot-manipulation and opposition voters’ harassment, the 2000 and 2005 elections resulted in 17 and 88 seats, respectively, reserved for the MB in the parliament. Although this is too modest a number of seats to have any influential effect inside the parliament, it indicates the significantly threatening potential of the MB to the regime if given the free and democratic space to practice its activities in civil society without any harassment.

3.5.9. *Islamism in the Third Millennium*

One approach to studying how political opposition works, in general, is what can be called the *reactionist* approach. This is where the opposition course of action is interpreted only in the light of the prevailing political system. It is true that the regime decides on the nature of the opposition’s course of actions, and this is due to the imbalance in the power scale of both the ruling elites and the opposition. The regime with its dominating and, mostly, coercive strategies aims to control and/or demolish the opposing parties. Defining that type of relation, Anderson says that the nature of relation between the ruling systems and oppositions is reactive and the way the system perceives the opposition is influenced by the type and function of the prevailing political system. She also defines opposition as “having the unusual characteristic of being defined partly by what it opposes; it develops within and in opposition to an ideological and institutional framework and, as such, reveals a great

deal not only about its own adherents, but also about the individual, polices, regimes, and states in authority” (Anderson, 1987: 18–19).

Moreover, she explains that the opposition is usually perceived by authoritarian regimes as *disloyal* and *rejectionist* because of the lack of a *reliable* and *transparent* political atmosphere that contains all parties. Islamists fall within this category of opposition as they are never allowed to “play the election game” in a fair political atmosphere (ibid.).

Islamists, both moderates and radicalists, constitute the afflictive opposition to the ruling regimes in the Arab world and the regime perceives them as such. Although the ruling regimes analyze Islamists as one composite (opposition), scholars who study the phenomenon agree that Islamism is not a monolithic phenomenon (Ayoob, 2007; Karawan, 1997; Anderson, 1987; Kassem, 2004). Ayoob agrees that Islamism consists of more than one color and they “are not cut from the same cloth. They were and continue to be very different sorts of organization in terms of their strategies, with their respective characters determined largely by the milieus in which they have had to operate over several decades” (2007: 75). All Islamists share the goal of establishing an Islamic state (Karawan, 1997: 16). However, they differ on the means to achieve that. One trend sees that the use of force and attrition war against the state is the only way to remove these “un-Islamic regimes;” these are called militant Islamists (ibid.) and those who adopt the peaceful techniques in change are called “political Islamists” (ibid.: 20f) or “centrist Islamists” (ibid.: 23). The MB is the mainstream in the latter trend. In its dealings with the regimes, the MB depends on the long-term deep-breath policy; they depend

on the solid bringing up of the members, meticulous network organization and the gradual/staged change policy (see Zubaida, 1989: 47–55).

In nondemocratic states, regimes maintain political pluralism as long as it: a) does not threaten, sooner or later, their own existence; and b) remains within their self-drawn game rules. Therefore, authoritarian rulers will tolerate a multiparty system if the opposition agrees to act as puppeteers in the political arena and is satisfied with whatever as-a-reward-prerogatives from the ruler. The only function of the opposition in that case is to stamp the regime with a democratic gloss. However, if the opposition plans to genuinely perform its national and patriotic role in serving the country and the people, the clash is the inevitable end.

My study of the history of Islamism in Egypt led to the hypothesis that any official discourse in government newspapers will be a discourse of exclusion, disaffection, marginalization and stereotyping.

The reasons and motives backing the regime's war of exclusion on Islamists are so interrelated and complicated that we cannot explain them in terms of just one reason or the other, domestic or international. It is a multifaceted phenomenon. The present work will just refer to two main reasons that are believed to be mainly driving that campaign. First, there are the domestic reasons of sustaining the internal social stability and securing its domination against any imminent or potential threat. The Egyptian regime, like any other authoritarian monarchy, is keen to maintain its internal social stability so as not to lose power and control over the people and/or country's resources. To achieve hegemony, the regime depicts a negative picture of any other and a positive one for the self.

The second reason is to establish a strong relationship with the world superpower, i.e., the United States. The regime depicts Islamists as a potential threat to the West and Western interests. The regime, therefore, would gain the support of the West and the US in particular on the pretext of being the guardian of the Western interests and values in the Middle East.

After the fall of the former USSR in 1989, the world became unipolar and the US became the world's only policeman that strives to maintain the world stability so as not to lose power and control over the world's countries and resources. To achieve control through hegemony and/or coercion, the United States presents a negative picture the *other* and a positive one of the *self*. This is, of course, one option among many others, such as the use of military power. After the fall of the USSR, the US and the West tried to depict a new foreign policy matching the *new World Order*, a policy based on disseminating the *liberal democracy* throughout the developing world. The support of democratizing the Middle East, thereof, became a central issue in the United States foreign policy.

To prove that they were part of the war on terrorism which was declared by Bush after the 9/11 events, the regimes in the Middle East re/packaged Islamists, both radicals and moderates, as the imminent danger to the Western interests in the area. The war on terrorism has been an invaluable chance for the Egyptian regime to get rid of its main opponents under the claim of their being terrorists. Henceforth, the ferociousness of the war against Islamists, which took the form of exclusion, marginalization or demolition, can be explained. The MB, being the most prominent opponent to the government, was the main target of the regime's war of exclusion.

Analyzing the social and political state of the Arab countries leads to one conclusion: the United States did not call for democracy to prosper nor did the Arab leaders initiate a democracy that suits their own traits and culture, as they claimed. Instead, they maintained their own dictatorial grip on their countries and people.

Before this section comes to an end, it is worthwhile raising a significant issue related to the legitimacy of Islamists. If Islamists have lost the regime's and official legitimacy, they continued to, as Esposito describes:

... root itself more deeply and pervasively in Egyptian society, growing among the lower and middle classes, educated and uneducated, professionals, students and laborers, young and old, women and men. Islamists gained cultural legitimacy, becoming a more visible and effective part of mainstream Muslim life and society. ...the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamists became dominant voices in professional organizations and syndicates of lawyers, doctors, engineers, and journalists (1999: 259).

This quotation poses a relevant question: what are the genuine sources of legitimacy in a certain society? Is it the ruler, the constitution, or the people? As a case in point, are Islamists legitimate because they genuinely gained the "cultural legitimacy" or are they illegitimate and outlawed because they lack the regime's blessing and official stamp?

The history of the relationship between the successive regimes in Egypt and the MB has always been in ebb and flow and the regime has always been unscrupulous in its transactions with political Islamists. The ebb and flow repercussions depended mainly on the regime's self-drawn off-limits; that is to say, the ruling regime has always set the criteria for a self-made democracy, a superficial democracy that is packaged for the outside and that befits its own authoritarian interests in the inside. It can confidently be called authoritarian democracy.

In conclusion, the analysis of the social practices of the Egyptian in the post-independence régimes towards the Islamists proved that the policy has not been of containment and participation but of exclusion and exoticism. The textual analysis (Chapter 5) will show how Islamists were linguistically represented in both 2000 and 2005.

4. METHODOLOGY

This chapter describes the data used for analysis in terms of its source, period, and selection. The second and third sections lay out the method of textual analysis and present the linguistic tools that are used in the analysis.

4.1. Data

4.1.1. *Data Collection*

The data used for the research are taken from one of the Egyptian media outlets; namely, *al-Ahram* newspaper. *Al-Ahram* was chosen as a research field because of the importance of the media in contemporary society and the integral role it plays in framing the world around us. According to Hall, journalism and journalists draw interpretative frameworks from their society's cultural repertoire, serving simultaneously as the producers, distributors and re/producers of public discourse (1997b). The mass media have been found to be a good site for ideology and a very powerful tool for its dissemination through discourse (Billig, 1995; Bishop and Jaworski, 2003; Chouliaraki, 1999; Madianou, 2005). The discourse of the media in general, and that of the press in particular, is considered the interface for the elites to practice their social domination and as the self-appointed voice of the people: Their voice is the whole society's voice. The role of the press is more than that of a medium; it is a powerful institution that empowers those who own it or work in it to

have access to all the resources in society. This type of access allows the elites to impose a policy of exclusion on minorities or any social group that does not belong to *us*. Henry and Tator's study of racism (2002) reveals that most of what the Whites in the US and Europe know about minorities and immigrants is from the press.

The corpus of the present study has been collected from front page news reports published in *al-Ahram* during the years 2000 and 2005. I have used *al-Ahram Online Index* to retrieve any front page item pertaining to the MB.³

The results included any occurrence of the following variables in both headlines and texts: 'the Brothers', 'the banned', 'The Muslim Brotherhood' (in both nominative and accusative case). The inclusive search periods were 1 January 2000 to 31 December 2000 and 1 January 2005 to 31 December 2005. After retrieval of the research results, the items were manually checked individually to make sure the retrieved outcomes talked about the MB. It was discovered that the keyword search retrieved items that were irrelevant to the search variables. One of the results, for example, was an article that talked about the Wright Brothers and plane invention. The search also retrieved all the morphologically related inflectional forms like 'the two brothers' and 'the brothers'.

Al-Ahram Index allows limiting search options to include or exclude any news section/s from the scope of research. The following sections were chosen to

³ This is a simple online search engine and it allows the researchers to look for words or phrases in the different sections of the news papers in a selected time span.

search for the MB occurrences: front page and headline. The choice of these sections renders a comprehensive repertoire rather than a sketchy or cursory picture when only one news section is selected for analysis. These sections represent news reports that mediate the event to the reader without, supposedly, interference on the part of the reporter. They would also reflect the ideological base of the newspaper towards a certain issue, here the MB. Finally, the number of readers who skim headlines and front page drastically outnumbers those who read full news stories, articles, columns, editorials, etc. By focusing the analysis on front page items, we would have a closer understanding of how the MB is represented to and construed by the *al-Ahram* readership.

4.1.2. *Why al-Ahram*

Founded in 1875 by the Lebanese Takla family, *al-Ahram* is Egypt's largest newspaper in circulation. According to the *al-Ahram* Website, it now has a circulation of over one million. The newspaper is published in Arabic, and is the best known and leading newspaper in the Arab world today. The newspaper also has subscribers in most of the world's countries, and is often the first Arabic newspaper that libraries in non-Arab countries make available in their newspaper selections. *Al-Ahram* has a wide coverage of world affairs, but as for Egyptian affairs, it is considered the medium that expresses views that are close to the government. The choice of *al-Ahram* is triggered by the fact that it:

1. Is the end-market paper in Egypt and the Arab world.
2. Is locally and internationally respected.

3. Is one of the broadsheets, not tabloid, papers.
4. Has the highest circulation and is the 'intellectuals' newspaper.

The periods for collecting the research data have been selected for the following reasons:

1. In 2000, there were parliamentary elections in which the MB significantly participated. The MB won 17/444 seats which, although too little to be influential inside the parliament, is considered a historical achievement. This is the first time the group could secure that percentage in spite of the government's aggressive political intolerance towards the group members and ballot manipulation. This relative success was enough to fuel the government's apprehensions from the growing threat. This apprehension is expected to be reflected in the government's media outlets in 2000.
2. In 2002, Mubarak appointed his son, Gamal, as the Chairman of the ruling NDP's powerful policy-making committee. This step was seen as grooming Gamal to succeed his father. Since then, Gamal quickly made known his agenda: economic and political reforms. In 2004, the cabinet shuffle reflected the influence of Gamal Mubarak, as the majority of the new cabinet members were among his and his father's cronies. This gives the 2005 election a challenging taste to the MB, who will definitely fight to circumvent the inheritance project by trying to win an influential number of parliamentary seats.
3. In 2005, Egypt witnessed passing the Egyptian President's bill to amend the Constitution to have multicandidate presidency elections. In spite of the fact

that the amendments were constrained a set of crippling conditions, it invigorated the stagnant political life in Egypt.

4. In 2005, the Presidential election ended with Mubarak being the President for another 6 years, to complete 25 years in power.
5. In 2005, the parliamentary election outcomes (87 seats for the MB out of 444) reflected the continuous growing mobility and organization of the MB as a challenging rival of the government.
6. In 2005, the widely controversial issue of Mubarak's intention to secure the presidency seat for his son to succeed him took a tangible form.

4.1.3. *Data Sampling*

Data collection consisted of retrieving news reports that mainly talk about the MB. Other retrieved items, like interviews or press conferences, in part refer to the MB. In the latter case and for the purpose of analysis, I have separated the part on the MB from the rest of the report while keeping the context in which the MB reference is made. This means if the MB is mentioned in the middle of an interview, the relevant questions and answers on the MB are sorted out while keeping the context of the selected part mentioned, i.e. what is before and after. This method proved to be useful later on in the analysis because sometimes the surrounding questions and answers in the interview are used as a preamble to the questions on Islamists and to make some relevant insinuations. The headlines have been separated, translated and analyzed individually. This is meant to have an idea of data orientation in terms of how the MB are represented in the headlines. The 2000 data are analyzed first. This

has proved to be useful in verifying the validity of the study hypothesis and to make clear the rising curve of the negative MB representation from 2002 to 2005. Table (4.1) presents the number of retrieved items pertaining to the MB in 2000 and 2005.

To prepare the data for analysis, the texts have been divided into numbered sentences to make it easy to refer to in the analysis. If the analysis deals with a long text and uses only selected sentences that are not in order (e.g., 1, 3, 5, 7, 9, 14), these are inserted with original text number followed by the Arabic translation in a matching numbered line. At the end of the English translation, citing information of the source of the data analyzed is provided. Source information is given in the following order: first there is the text type (HL = headline; FP = front-page), followed by the year (00 = 2000; 05 = 2005) and then by the text #according to the chronological order of the data. HL00, # 3, for example, stands for the headline from 2000 and it is # 3; FP05, # 19 means front page report number 3 in the 2005 data. *AConcorde* software was used to search for the frequencies and lexical items related to the MB. The software, though simple, was enough for the goals of the present research. It was useful in locating the lexical choices that are close to any reference to the MB.

Table 4.1 Total number of news items on the MB in 2000 and 2005.

Year	Headline	Front page
2000	4	11
2005	14	60

4.1.4. *Method of Analysis*

CDA is sometimes criticized on the grounds that the data it analyses is complicated and requires too much cognitive processing to be practiced by average readership or those who read for a gist. Goatly rightly defines the majority of newspaper consumers: “For many people, newspapers are probably the only regular leisure reading, and are the most widely circulated print medium” (2000: 286). Such readers exert the minimal effort to process information and connect propositions and, in most cases, reading for gist is a goal in itself. Therefore, there is a need to include a type of analysis from the vantage point of the average reader. Huckin has been developing a CDA framework that incorporates the average reader in the analysis equation (1995, 2002, forthcoming). His approach is a user-friendly CDA manual, as he calls it: a manual that can be used by everyone if the method is included within literacy education curricula.

In his user-friendly manual, Huckin suggests a three-step approach to conduct such an analysis. It focuses not only on the explanation level (see Figure 1.1) but also on the interpretation level from the average reader’s perspective. His framework starts with, first, setting the general mode of the text. The analysis should start from scratch (Huckin, 1997) by initially looking at the a text in an uncritical manner, like an ordinary, undiscerning reader who is looking for the general picture of the text without trying to position or angle it. Second, the analyst rereads the text in a critical manner, focusing on the pictorial elements and headlines, raising questions on why headlines are phrased the way they are and what the function of any attached images are. At this stage, the reader tries to mentally compare the text to other related texts

and situate it into its genre. Here, he suggests a toolbox that a CDA practitioner would resort to in order to dissect the text, such as framing, foregrounding, textual silence, voice, labels and naming, topicalization, agency, modality and register. In the last step, the analyst tries to connect the conclusions of the analysis to a wider social and cultural context.

Similarly, O'Halloran (2003), from a language cognition perspective, suggests an Idealized Reader (IR) framework, where the IR is the average reader who reads for a gist and does not have either the time to spend or the effort to exert on analyzing the text beyond skimming the headlines or, at best, reading the first two or three sentences in the lead. O'Halloran outlines a set of eighteen principles that would characterize the IR's approach to reading newspapers (189–91). These principles, derived from various approaches to language cognition (such as Connectionism, Cognitive linguistics, Relevance theory), explain what reading for a gist can or cannot afford to the reader. This is crucial in the context of refuting a frequent criticism to CDA as being subjective: it reads and analyzes for the reader; it assumes a job that average readers do not usually do when skimming the news. Applying some or all of O'Halloran's IR principles would guard the analyst against a subjective reading of the text. Some of these principles are:

1. The IR reads in line with minimalist hypothesis and thus their reading involves only *automatic inferences* that are only generated when available information is available.
2. Strategic inferences are a talk likely to be generated at the IR's reading as they require exerting more effort and work.

3. Causal-antecedent inferences are automatic for IR. The IR can connect the main point of the current to a previous one, or he/she can retrieve information from prior text to be activated during the reading of the current text, or he/ he can make use of background knowledge a likely but not mentioned causal antecedent. (O'Halloran, 189ff)

In reading and analyzing the text from the average reader's perspective, Huckin's and O'Halloran's approaches are combined in the analysis of headlines and front page news reports. Data of 2000 are analyzed first and then the 2005 data, using the same tools of analysis. The textual analysis is conducted in the following order:

1. The IR analysis of headlines and front pages;
2. Transitivity;
3. Sourcing;
4. Lexical choice;
5. Presupposition.

Starting with the IR analysis is useful as it gives an idea about the average reader approach to the news report and it validates the detailed analysis which unveils the covert ideological strategies through which the MB is meant to be excluded from Egyptian political life. The next section explores the analytic tools that will be drawn on in the analysis.

4.2. Tools of Analysis

4.2.1. *Idealized Reader Framework*

For the analysis of headlines (HL) and front page (FP) reports, the news reports from the regular reader's view are approached without any predetermined perspective. O'Halloran's IR framework is used to ensure approaching the text from the perspective of the average reader. According to the IR framework (O'Halloran, 2003: 225), the type of inferences that the IR is unlikely to draw automatically are the elaborative inferences such as:

1. Super ordinate goal: why did someone do something?
2. Instrument: what did they use?
3. Subordinate goal-action: how was the action achieved?
4. Instantiation: 'filling in' a general category with more specific category;
5. Casual consequence: what were the results of the action?

For the IR to get information on these items (1–5), he/she has to be provided with them in the news report, otherwise the report will be analyzed as mystifying and as an example of manipulative "textual silence" (Huckin, 2002: 348).

4.2.2. *Transitivity: What Is Going on in Our World?*

The use of the term 'transitivity' indicates more than suggested by the distinction between transitive and intransitive verbs. Transitivity, here, deals with not only verbs, but with the verb's associated participants and circumstances as well (Halliday, 1967–8: 81ff; 1973: 39; 1985: 103). Hence the area of transitivity encompasses the relationships between the processes (i.e., verbs) and the participants

involved with it, i.e., subjects and/or objects where ‘participant’ is to be understood as the linguistic representation of non-human, inanimate and even abstract entities, as well as human beings. Transitivity “refers to the content or factual-notional structure of the clause in its entirety” (Halliday in Kress, 1997: 159). According to Halliday (1994: 106-107)

Transitivity is an area of meaning in which a writer or speaker chooses and constructs a certain type of process for his clauses. This selection of process type from a finite set of possibilities which are made available in the network reflects a reality outside language, a reality in the human community of which the writer is a member and in which there are events like relations, actions, mental processes, locutions and behaviors. Analyzing transitivity implies concern with the clause in its ideational function, its role as a means of representing patterns of experience and its various aspects of reality, i.e., goings-on: doing, happening, feeling, being, etc. It also specifies the different types of processes that are recognized in the language (in its semantic system) and the structures by which they are expressed (the lexico-grammatical system).

Transitivity analysis includes identifying who is set as *agent* (doer or sayer, etc.), as *goal* (who is acted upon), and the processes (doing or saying). This type of analysis would reveal a good deal of the intricate system of hegemony and domination in society as expressed in media headlines and reports. The basic semantic framework for the representation of processes shows that a process consists potentially of three components:

- The process itself;
- Participants in the process;
- Circumstances associated with the process (Halliday, 1994).

Halliday (1994) identifies six process categories in his system of transitivity which are summarized in Table 4.2.

Table 4.2 Process types, their meaning and key participants, (Halliday, 1994: 143)

Process type	Category meaning	Participants
<i>Material:</i> Action Event	Doing Happening	Actor, Goal
<i>Behavioural</i>	Behaving	Behaver
<i>Mental:</i> Perception Affection Cognition	Sensing Seeing Feeling Thinking	Sensor, Phenomenon
<i>Verbal</i>	Saying	Sayer, Target
<i>Relational:</i> Attribution Identification	Being Attributing Identifying	Carrier, Attribute Identified, Identifier, Token, Value
<i>Existential</i>	Existing	Existent

- A. Material processes or ‘processes of doing’;
- B. Mental processes or ‘processes of sensing, perceiving or understanding’;
- C. Relational processes or processes of being such as is or have;
- D. Behavioural processes, which involve human physiological or psychological
- E. Behaviour such as ‘watching’, ‘dreaming’, ‘tasting’;
- F. Existential processes such as in ‘there is a tree at the end of the street’; it
represents the fact that something exists or happens;

The significance of analyzing the data propositions in terms of Participant, Process and Goal types puts our hands on the doers, the actions done and the recipients of the action; in other words, *who is doing what to whom?* This analysis

relates to the ideational metafunction (Halliday, 1978, 1994; Eggins, 2004) in Halliday's Systemic Functional Linguistics and which delineates the goings-on in the external world around us. Applying transitivity analysis to the presentation of the MB answers the following questions:

1. Are the members of MB presented as Doers?
2. If yes, what are the Process types they are associated with as Doers?
3. Are they presented as Goal/Recipients of any Processes?
4. If yes, what are the Process types they are associated with as Recipients?

Analyzing the sentences that have the MB in the subject or object position is significant as it highlights the following aspects: with

1. Material processes: what they do or what is done to them.
2. Mental processes: how they perceive the world and how the world perceives them.
3. Verbal processes: what they say and what is said about them;
4. Relational processes: how the world identifies them as *they are/are not, have or have not*.

The analysis of transitivity will, moreover, include a subset categorization where the verbal group is further subdivided into three subgroups: *negative, neutral* and *positive* (Chen, 2005). Negative verbal processes are those that cast some doubt, scepticism and a feeling of negativity on the reporter's part on what is reported or quoted. A good example of this type is *insist*. Neutral subgroups are those that do not add any flavour to the content, like *said*. Positive verbal processes, like *announced, declared, pointed out*, are meant to add a positive appraisal of what is reported and

whoever is reported. It will make what is quoted appear as *wise, valid, authentic, clear and true*.

A second approach to the study of transitivity is what Halliday calls *ergativity* (1994: 161). Ergativity deals with the clause on an abstract level that relates and examines causation. Halliday (1994) makes a distinction between two types of ergativity:

- A. Middle: the processes which are brought about internally (self-engendered), e.g., *the cup broke*;
- B. Effective: the processes which are brought about externally (by some other entity), e.g., *he broke the cup*.

The participant in the Middle type is *medium* and in the second, Effective, *agent* and *medium*. So in *six people were injured*, the *six people* is the medium. The Agent is the “participant functioning as external cause” (164). The ergativity system is also relevant to the analysis of the data as the Middle type mystifies agency and hence removes responsibility from the cause and leaves it vague. Therefore, examining ergative analysis in the news reports would lay down the actual role(s) of the MB in the Egyptian society as construed and presented by *al-Ahram*.

4.2.3. *Sourcing: Whose Voice?*

News reports are presentations of events by reporters who either have witnessed the event or sought other witnesses and sources who will be considered by the reader – or at least are presented to them as – trustworthy, and their utterances as authentic and value-laden. Sourcing is one of the effective tools that are widely used

in news reports to align the reporter at a certain distance close or far from what he/she reports. By choosing whose voice is sourced, the reporter positions the reader attitudinally with regard to the content of the report. Newsmakers tend to present their sources as informed knowers and legitimate sources so what is reported will go unquestioned and will be accepted as facts. Sourcing, according to Tuchman (1972), is considered one of four “strategic rituals” for achieving “objectivity.” This is if the report is represented in a balanced way by reporting the opposite sides of the reported event. But since this is not always the case, sourcing can be considered as a tool of achieving power and authority. Van Dijk refers to sourcing as a way to achieve hegemony, because access to news media is not available to everyone but to “members of more powerful social groups and institutions, and especially their leaders (the elites) have more or less exclusive access” (van Dijk, 1998b: 5).

Sourcing in news takes two forms: direct and indirect quoting. Directly quoting the sources highlights the news trustworthiness. Direct quotes in this context help to present the news as a fact that is invulnerable to questioning because it is coming from an official, an informed source or a witness. It also helps to distance the reporter’s voice from the event presentation.

Readers tend to accept the quoted person as an authority; therefore, the quoted voices are attributed with some authoritative quality to legitimize the journalist’s claims in the news story (e.g., Van Dijk, 1988b). Elite people whose voices are used in the news stories are assigned credentials (or titles) that embody their claims to news value. Examples of such accreditation are PM, MP, informed source, a witness, doctor, professor, an expert, etc. However, reporters can still insert

their own voices even in the direct quoting and align their positions with or against what the source is saying. News reports “evoke fragments of discourse outside the text either to show agreement with them, because they are considered transcendental, or to criticize them or discredit them” (Rojo, 1995: 54). On the other hand, indirect reporting is a place where the reporter’s voice can be sought. This will appear in the way he/she rephrases the source’s words.

In addition to the information that voicing analysis reveals on who is always quoted, who has access to media, which actors are found more important than others to be quoted, it also shows “how the journalist evaluates quoted opinions” (van Dijk, 1993: 252). Van Dijk suggests that when there is a reported speech, it is always accompanied by the reporter’s voice in words like *claim*, *alleged* and *insisted*, which signify the reporter’s orientation towards the message he/she is quoting.

Therefore, the significance of voicing in news reports lies in the legitimization wrapping which is added to the message (Wodak and Van Leeuwen, 2002) and the worldview, held by those in positions of power and influence, which reinforces the effectiveness of social control (Habermas, 1987).

In the present study, the analysis will focus on who is reported and sourced, how this sourcing contributes to the legitimization/delegitimization of social actors and whether voicing reinforces the process of the MB exclusion by the ruling regime in Egypt.

4.2.4. *Lexical Choices*

Analyzing lexicalization means studying individual lexical items and their connotations and denotations. Such analysis is significant because naming and lexical choices are value-laden and ideologically charged. The most classic example of lexicalization is noun-pairing: *freedom fighters vs terrorist* (e.g., Kress, 1983; van Dijk 1995; Clark 1998). The naming choice is based on the ideology of those who name (Thetela, 2001: 354). Allan (1999: 178–9) cites a list of such pairings that work on the level of nouns, verbs and adjectives. Fairclough argues that “a text’s choice of wording depends on, and helps create, social relationships between participants” (1999: 116). According to Huckin (1995: 101), special attention should be given to studying words and phrases because “labels often carry unavoidable connotations.” He gives *abortion* as an example; those who oppose it are named *pro-life* by sympathizers and *antichoice* by opponents. For Fowler, lexical choices have always been seen as very crucial in the construction of meaning. They “mark off socially and ideologically distinct areas of experience” (1991: 84). The idea of “marking off” indicates a categorization process where labellers divide the world into *us* and *them*; *we* are good, *they* are bad. The analysis of lexical choices sets out how reference to participants in an event can cognitively and socially categorize in-group and out-group identities as “the different possibilities [of naming] signify different assessments by the speaker/writer of his or her relationship with the person referred to or spoken to, and of the formality or intimacy of the situation” (Fowler et al., 1979: 200).

Studying labelling is, in fact, a study of representation because objects are given names to identify them and the process of identification is done on ideological basis. So when we identify/label social objects, we represent them from our own perspective. Describing a social actor as *legal* or *illegal* partly helps in the representation of the social actors as such. But the recurrence of the label *legal* or *illegal*, for example, will discursively lead to setting up mental concepts about the labelled actor which over time becomes an inalienable attribute which ultimately becomes part of the culture and common sense knowledge.

In this section, labels which refer to the MB will be examined to see whether they contribute to excluding the group and if so, how. According to Fairclough, there are two aspects of representation: “The first has to do with the structuring of propositions, [and] the second with the combination and sequencing of propositions” (1995b: 104). Thus, the choice of words used in nomination and characterization of social actors are of particular significance in analyzing the positive self-presentation and negative other-presentation integral to the ‘ideological square’.

The Appraisal theory is also useful in the context of analyzing labels because of the evaluative role of lexicalization in the context of news reporting. Approaching the data from the perspective of appraisal framework would highlight how the language is used to “evaluate, to adopt stances, to construct textual personae and to manage interpersonal positioning and relationships” (White, 2002). The Appraisal theory focuses on three particular systems: Attitude, Engagement and Graduation. The present analysis will draw only on the Attitude system. White defines *Attitude* as “those meanings by which texts/speakers attach an intersubjective value or

assessment to participants and processes by reference either to emotional responses or to systems of culturally-determined value systems” (1999:5). Attitudinal positioning is concerned with lexical items that carry or can be interpreted to carry positive or negative assessment of people, places, happenings, things, states of affairs, etc. It also includes items that trigger positive or negative assessment of people, places, things, happenings and states of affairs in the reader’s cognition (or the listener’s, in case of verbal utterances). Attitude is divided into three subsystems:

1. Affect: The writer’s or speaker’s expression of emotion towards people, places, things, happenings.
2. Judgment: It is concerned with the ethics and allows the writer or speaker to evaluate human behavior by making reference to norms of social propriety and expectation.
3. Appreciation: The writer’s evaluation of the appearance, significance, impact, etc., of natural objects, human artifacts and human individuals, but not human behavior. (Jovanovic-Krstic, 2004).

There are two types under Judgment: *social esteem* and *social sanction*.

Social esteem involves questioning, positively or negatively, explicitly or implicitly, one social aspect or more of the participant (i.e., person, group, institution, etc.). This type of judgment does not have legal consequences but is only confined to the social esteem of the variable that is under judgment. This type would include expressions like *normal/ abnormal, capable/ incapable*, etc. (Martin, 2000). Social Sanction involves judging (praising/condemning) from the legal point of view: *legal/illegal, legitimate/illegitimate*. So, from the writer’s (or speaker’s) point of view, the set of

social codes, laws, or even the country's constitution or religious principles are at question when we talk about social sanction. Consequently, violation of the social sanction would result in and legitimize a sort of punishment. The full system of Judgment as adapted from White (2002) is set out in Table (4.3).

The analysis of lexicalization will draw only on the Judgment subsystem as it is concerned with the textual realizations that will most likely occur in news reporting. Martin defines Judgment as “the institutionalization of feeling, in the context of proposals (norms about how people should and shouldn't behave)” (2000: 155). Thus, we have two types of Judgment: positive Judgment and negative Judgment. The social actors and their behavior thus may be judged as acceptable or unacceptable, moral or immoral, legal or illegal, etc. (Martin, 2000; White, 1999). However, Jovanovic-Krstic stresses that “Judgment is highly determined by cultural and ideological values, and as such what is viewed as appropriate in one culture may not be viewed in the same light in another” (2000: 75). The analysis, hence, will draw on what is acceptable or acceptable in the Arab and Egyptian culture when it analyzes examples of judgments in the data. In the analysis of lexical references, the following points are taken into consideration:

1. The way participants are referred to;
2. Any associated adjectives, appositions, prepositional phrases, relative clauses, conjunctive clauses, infinitive clauses and participial clauses or groups, pronouns, similes, metaphors, allusions, evocations, and presuppositions/implications (Reisigl and Wodak, 2001; van Dijk, 1993);

Table 4.3 System of Appraisal judgment; Source: adapted from White 2002; cited in Jovanovic-Krstic 2004: 75)

Social Esteem	Positive (admire)	Negative (criticize)
Normality (custom): 'Is the person's behavior unusual, special, customary?'	Standard, everyday, average. ...; Lucky, charmed ...; Fashionable, avant garde ...	Eccentric, odd, maverick ...; Unlucky, unfortunate ...; Dated, unfashionable ...
Capacity: 'Is the person competent, capable?'	Skilled, clever, insightful ..., Athletic, strong, powerful ...; Sane, together...	Stupid, slow, simple-minded clumsy, weak, uncoordinated ...; Insane, neurotic ...
Tenacity (resolve): 'Is the person dependable, well disposed?'	Plucky, brave, heroic ...; Reliable, dependable ...; Indefatigable, resolute, persevering	Cowardly, rash, despondent ...; Unreliable, undependable ...; Distracted, lazy, unfocussed ...
Social Sanction	Positive [praise]	Negative [condemn]
Veracity (truth): 'Is the person honest?'	Honest, truthful, credible Authentic, genuine ...; Frank, direct ...;	Deceitful, dishonest ...; Bogus, fake ...; Deceptive, obfusatory ...
Propriety (ethics): 'Is the person ethical, beyond reproach?'	Good, moral, virtuous ...; Law-abiding, fair, just ...; Caring, sensitive, considerate ...;	Bad, immoral, lascivious ...; Corrupt, unjust, unfair ...; Cruel, mean, brutal, oppressive ...

3. The Judgment type that is dominant in the data and its significance;
4. The significance of the labelling system and its contribution to grouping, categorizing, discriminating, and hence, excluding the MB.

4.2.5. *Presupposition*

Presupposition is a term that is widely used in both linguistics and pragmatics. One feature of presupposition is that a presupposition of a sentence is also a presupposition of its negation (Kadmon, 2001, quoting Ferge, 1892; Yule 1996: 29). So in that *they are challenging our transparent democracy/they are not challenging our transparent democracy*, the presupposition in both sentences is unaffected by negation as what is negated is *challenging*, but that *we have democracy* and *it is transparent* is presupposed and remains intact. The analysis concerns presupposition within the context of discourse and discourse cognitive processing; that is to say, the discursal meanings which are explicitly or implicitly presented to be shared and taken-for-granted knowledge between the language producer and receiver. Studying presupposition to uncover discursive ideology is interesting and significant because:

4. Presupposition is “notoriously manipulative” when it is unchallenged — or unnoticed altogether (Huckin, 1997);
5. Presupposition can be created intentionally or unintentional by the writer/speaker.

Presupposition is mostly of unintentionally-created nature and this is because the language user perceives the content of his/her propositions as real and true and should be perceived as such;

6. Presupposition and implicature are two closely related concepts as what is presupposed is also implied. We can say that implicature is a general type of presupposition;
7. The manipulative power of presupposition lies in the fact that in a text with presupposition, the focus of the language reader/ hearer would be on another proposition in the text or on a part of the sentence other than the part that has the presupposed information. In the above *democracy* example, the focus of the reader is on *do they really challenge or not?* So what is presupposed or implied is removed from the reader's direct contestation.

Van Dijk (2005: 80) summarizes some strategies that are at work when processing and managing presupposition:

1. If the recipients are believed to be members of my own epistemic community (culture, country, group, etc.), presuppose all socially shared knowledge of this epistemic community to be known by these recipient(s);
2. If the recipients are believed to be members of another epistemic community, then activate knowledge about that other community. If such knowledge fails, assume that knowledge may be the same or similar to that of your own community. When in doubt ask, or show ignorance;
3. If I have just acquired new knowledge, e.g., about specific events, it is probably not socially shared throughout the community, and hence not to be presupposed to be known to the recipients unless these recipients are known to have used the same source of information (e.g., the media);
4. Interpersonal knowledge by definition may be presupposed to be known by the recipients with whom it was shared. In doubt, it should be referred to;
5. Personal knowledge is not assumed to be shared by recipients, and should hence not be presupposed.

Studies on presupposition have divided it into two types: pragmatic and conventional (Levinson, 1983; Grundy, 1995; Stalnaker, 2000; Norrick, 2001) or linguistic and pragmatic (Maingueneau, 1996: 68–69, cited in Develotte and

Rechniewski, 2001). The pragmatic presupposition is nonlinguistically realized and depends in its interpretation on the context of the utterance or the proposition.

Understanding this type of presupposition derives “from the relation of the énoncé [proposition] to its context, including the context of the discursive ‘rules’ which ascribe to certain forms of language, certain pragmatic functions (ibid.). The linguistic/conventional presupposition works at the level of the current text and its propositions. Understanding this type of presupposition would derive from:

1. Syntactic structure as in *they hate our democracy* (that *we have democracy* is presupposed); or
2. Anaphoric/cataphoric use as in *they are repeating the same mistake* (presupposing that they have done it before).

Presupposition can also occur at the sentence level in the form of persuasive rhetoric that can be used to convey the impression that what an agent of power says carries more weight (Huckin, 1995; 2002).

In the present analysis, the linguistic analysis of presupposition will reveal what type of information is presupposed in the news reports, how it affects the image of the MB, and whether it nurtures excluding and *othering* them.

5. TEXTUAL ANALYSIS

5.1. Introduction

The discussion in Chapter 3 on social and discursive practices has shown that the consecutive ruling regimes in Egypt have marginalized and excluded the MB. The government's common tendency has been to encumber the growth of the organization under a legal umbrella. Although the group has been given, at times of leniency, a limited space to work, this space has always been temporary and without any guarantees for the future. The discussion concluded that: 1) the Egyptian authoritarian regimes have been controlling media outlets and using them to their own interests; and 2) Islamists, civil rights advocates and antigovernment groups have been discursively and socially excluded and discriminated against by using sheer power, negative media representation, or both. This chapter presents a textual analysis of the front-page news reports that deal with the MB to see whether this analysis would yield similar conclusion to that of the social and discursive practices. The main point from which the textual analysis departs is: Does the textual representation of the MB in *al-Ahram* create and reinforce the exclusionary attitude that the Egyptian government has been imposing on the Brotherhood? To answer this question, the 2000 and 2005 data are analyzed in the following sections, 'The MB in 2000' and in Chapter 6. This order enables the study to determine whether there is any quantitative and/or qualitative shift or change over the years in the government's

orientation in the media coverage of the MB. The various textual techniques (Idealized Reader framework, transitivity, lexical choices, presupposition and sourcing) that are used in the analysis would enable us to understand the nature of the exclusionary discourse practiced against the MB.

Newspaper consumers can be divided into three categories: those who a) read only the headlines; b) read the headlines and (part of) the lead; and c) comprehensively and critically read all or most of the newspaper sections. The present analysis, therefore, will approach the data first from the average reader perspective. This gives a clear idea on the effect of reading-for-a-gist on the average reader who skims the headlines and front-page stories. This is meant to respond to the criticism that CDA analysts approach the text from critically aware readers' perspective and not from the point of view of average readers. On the second level of analysis, a number of analytical tools are used to approach the data from an in-depth analysis perspective. This way, some of the criticisms directed at CDA are responded to and, more importantly, the study questions are empirically validated.

5.2. The MB in 2000

5.2.1. The MB in Headlines: IR Perspective

The search for الاخوان, 'the Brothers', in *al-Ahram* during 2000 retrieved four headlines (HL). Analyzing the headlines from the IR perspective found that mystification is a common feature among the four headlines. Mystification in the news results when an essential piece of information is missing and which is unlikely to be generated by the general reader. The analysis has also shown that the missing

information is so crucial that it leads, to say the least, to misinforming the reader.

The HL in (1) is an example.

(1)

2. تولي قيادات من الإخوان والجماعات المتطرفة مناصب قيادية في الحزب.

2. Leaders from the Brothers' and extremist groups assume leadership positions in the Labor Party.

FP00, #8

Reading the HL in (1) from the IR perspective would leave the reader perplexed about the answer to the question: what is the focal point of the HL? Given that this statement is issued by the Public Prosecutor as an accusation against some MB members and not given the relevant information on why joining a political party is an accusation, the IR will either cognitively fill in the missing information by recalling some background knowledge or will be left with unanswered questions. In both cases, mystification is the result. If the reader recalls the background knowledge related to the MB, provided by the social and discursive practices, the negative MB image would be the only result. The same technique of omitting crucial information is repeated in (2).

(2)

1. مصادر مطلعة: أوامر القبض علي عناصر من الإخوان قانونية

1. Informed sources: The warrants to arrest elements of the Brothers [are] legal

FP00, #5

The focal point of the HL is that *the warrants are legal*. The crucial information about the grounds of the accusation, is, again, left unalluded to. The absence of this relevant information from (1) and (2) helps the IR create a cognitive, even though rudimentary, image of the MB as a threat and an excluded group. The theme of exclusion is stressed in (3) and (4).

(3)

3. المحكمة: المتهمون حاولوا اختراق القنوات الشرعية واستغلال فترة الانتخابات للترويج لأفكارهم.

3. The court: the accused [MB group] attempted penetrating through legitimate channels and exploiting the elections period to disseminate/promote their ideas.

FP00, #1

(4)

4. وزير الداخلية في مؤتمر صحفي: جماعة الإخوان حاولت استثمار الدين لأهداف سياسية وتنظيمية سرية.

4. Minister of Interior Affairs in a press conference: The Brothers group has been attempting to exploit religion to [achieve] secret, political and organizational goals.

FP00, #2

Here, the average reader would be mystified by the fact that neither of the two HLs refer to how the MB is penetrating legal channels or exploiting religion,

respectively. Later in the analysis, it is also found that the reports give no more information than the headlines.

The IR analysis of the 2000 HLs revealed that the HLs that covered the MB mystify the readers by not providing them with relevant information which is unlikely to be automatically generated, as in (1) and (2), and present the MB as a threat, as in (3) and (4).

The next section examines the full text of the front-page news stories (henceforth FP) to see whether mystification is also a feature of the news reports.

5.2.2. *The MB in Front Pages (FP): IR Perspective*

Reading the FP reports that deal mainly or partly with the MB from the average reader view stresses the conclusion of the HLs analysis that mystification is an inherent feature of the news stories related to the MB. Mystification is used as a tool to politically and socially exclude the MB. In the HL in (5), the Minister of Interior is clearly negating the existence of any entity by the name of MB. The IR would perceive this as ‘if there is no political party or group by the name of MB, so these people’s activities are illegal and unlawful’.

(5)

1. العادلي: لا نعرف شيئا اسمه الاخوان ماداموا ليسوا حزبا شرعيا

1. The Minister of Interior: we do not know of any entity called the Brothers as long as they are not an official party.

FP00, #10

The same orientation towards the MB can be concluded from the answer of President Mubarak to a question on freezing the Labor Party , as in (6, L.4)

(6)

2. سؤال: أليس إغلاق حزب العمل في الأسبوع الماضي تدخلا قبل الانتخابات القادمه؟

3. مبارك: لا مطلقا, لان انصار حزب العمل مثلهم في ذلك مثل انصار اي حزب اخر يمكنهم

دخول الانتخابات كمستقلين دون حاجه الي تغطيه من حزب,

4. بل ان الاخوان المسلمين وهم ليسوا منظمه شرعيه يستطيعون التقدم للانتخابات كمستقلين.

2. Q: Is not the closure of the Labor Party last week considered interference [in the Party's affairs] before the coming elections?
3. Mubarak: No, absolutely. This is because the supporters of the Labor Party can, like others, run in the elections as independents without the need to be Party-affiliated.
4. Moreover, the MB, though being an illegal organization, can run as independents too.

FP00, #9

According to O'Halloran (2003: 225), the following conditions make it unlikely for elaborative inferences to be generated by the IR:

- A. The background knowledge is not readily accessible.;
- B. There is no one obvious inference to be generated.

This means that for the report not to be mystifying, it has to provide the reader with crucial information on the event, such as *who*, *how* and *why*. Analyzing Mubarak's

answer in (6) in terms of the elaborative inference notion, it is found that the answer is mystifying as the elaborative inference regarding *why the Party was frozen* is not provided by him and is unlikely to be inferred by the IR. The fact that the supporters of the Labor Party can run as independents does not justify or interpret the action of freezing the Party. Consequently the President's answer does not directly address the question and hence it mystifies the reader. The unneeded-for reference to the MB in L.3 may spark the connection between the Labor Party and the MB, and freezing the Party. This connection may require some work on the part of the reader to reach. Three months later, this connection was made clear when the General Prosecutor officially accused the Labor Party of having a relationship with 'the banned Brothers group' (FP00, # 8). The minimum effort that is usually exerted by the IR in skimming the news stories would lead them to conclude, as in (7), that connection with the MB is the legal reason for freezing the Party. However, the cognitive processing of the readers-for-a-gist does not go any further towards asking if this is a valid and worthy justification.

(7)

4. اولاً: ارتباط حزب العمل الاشتراكي بجماعه الاخوان المسلمين المحظور نشاطها

5. , وتعاونه مع عناصر من الجماعات الاسلاميه المتطرفه والمناهضه للوحده الوطنيه

والسلام الاجتماعي.

6. وتقلد بعض افراد هذه الجماعات لمناصب قياديه بالحزب.

4. [The] first [violation of the law by the Labor Party], the linkage of

the Labor Party to the banned MB.

5. And its cooperation with elements from the extreme Islamists groups that are antinational unity and antisocial peace.
6. And the assumption of some members of these groups of the Party leadership positions.

FP00, #8

The same analysis is concluded from another front-page report (FP00, #6). In this report, Ibrahim Shukri, the Labor Party president, is interrogated by the Supreme State Security Prosecutor. One of the accusations is that the Labor Party had connections with the banned MB and extremist groups. In November 2000, the results of the military tribunal investigations were reported and a list of accusations charged to some MB members, as in:

(8)

14. الانضمام لجماعه نظمت بالمخالفه لأحكام القانون
15. الغرض منها تعطيل أحكام الدستور
16. والاضرار بالسلام الاجتماعي
17. والتخطيط لحياء نشاط جماعه الاخوان المحظوره
18. وتحريض الغير علي معاداه الحكومه عن طريق الانضمام للانتخابات المهنيه والجمعيات الخيريّه
19. واختراق القنوات الشرعيه والقانونيه من خلال الترشيح في انتخابات مجلس الشعب الماضيه والمجالس النيابيه
20. واستغلال فتره الدعايه الانتخابيه في الترويج لنشر افكار ومبادئ التنظيم في مختلف الاوساط الجماهيريّه
21. واستثارتها ضد الحكومه الشرعيه القائمه لاكتساب تعاطفها مع مرشحي التنظيم.

14. joining a group organized in violation of the provisions of the law
15. the purpose of which is to disrupt the provisions of the constitution,
16. and damage the social peace,
17. to Plan to revive the banned Muslim Brotherhood
18. and to incite others to be antigovernment by joining the professional unions and charities
19. and to infiltrate the legitimate and legal channels through running for nomination in the recent elections of both People's Council [Parliament] and other representative bodies.
20. and to exploit the electoral campaigns to disseminate the ideas and principles of the group to the masses.
21. to provoke them be against the current legitimate government to gain its support to the group's candidates

FP00#1

In terms of mystification, the information in L.15 is not elaborated to explain how the goal of the MB is to cause *constitutional disruption* or *damage the society's security*. In other words, the two conditions for making elaborative inference likely to be generated do not apply to the information given in FP #1, in (8) and therefore, mystification is the expected outcome. In (8), L.18 is indeed perplexing and difficult to decipher for the IR: it is neither clear how joining professional unions and civil societies would breed antigovernment attitude nor why it is considered an accusation. If this statement is true, the regime that criminalizes being active in civil society is consequently illegitimate and if it is not, the accusations against the MB

are not justified.

To sum up, the analysis of both the headlines and news reports on front pages in 2000 revealed that mystification is a prevailing feature in the news reports on the MB. It also revealed that the MB and any entity that is connected to it are excluded from the socio-political arena either by soft power, i.e., negatively represented in the media and/or sheer power, i.e., detention and imprisonment.

The coming sections present a detailed linguistic analysis of the front page reports in terms of a set of linguistics tools. This is meant to examine the nature of the government discourse towards the MB and how more or less exclusionary it is.

5.2.3. *Transitivity*

Analyzing the front page reports in terms of transitivity patterns highlights the ways the MB is represented in *al-Ahram*: what they are represented to be doing and what is done to them. The analysis retrieved a total number of 70 process types associated with the MB and they are distributed as shown in Table 5.1. The reports

Table 5.1 Distribution of process types associated with the MB in 2000

Process type	# of occurrences
Material	49
Verbal	12
Relational	7
Mental	2




Figure 5.1 Percentage of MB-related process types in 2000 front-page news

predominance of the material processes as shown in Figure 5.1 signifies that the world, in this case Egypt, is experiencing change, movement and action.

A detailed analysis of the sentences that have material processes would reveal who is doing what to whom.

Analyzing the clauses where the MB is the Actor (subject) revealed that the material processes found in the data belong to the semantic field of *violence* and *disturbance*. In front page (#1) in (9), it is found that the MB members are the actors of *disruption* (L.15), *damaging* (L.16), *inciting sedition* (L.18), *infiltration* (L.19), *exploitation* (L.20), *provoking* (L.21)

(9)

13. والتي وجهت للمتهمين جميعا
14. الانضمام لجماعه نظمت بالمخالفه لاحكام القانون.
15. الغرض منها تعطيل احكام الدستور, والاضرار بالسلام الاجتماعي.
16. والاضرار بالسلام الاجتماعي
17. والتخطيط لاحياء نشاط جماعه الاخوان المحظوره.
18. وتحريض الغير علي معاداه الحكومه عن طريق الانضمام للنقابات المهنيه والجمعيات الخيريّه.

19. واختراق القنوات الشرعيه والقانونيه من خلال الترشيح في انتخابات مجلس الشعب الماضيه,
والمجالس النيابيه
20. واستغلال فتره الدعايه الانتخابيه في الترويج لنشر افكار ومباديء التنظيم في مختلف الاوساط
الجماهيريه
21. واستنارتها ضد الحكومه الشرعيه القائمه لاكتساب تعاطفها مع مرشحي التنظيم.

13. [the prosecutor] accused the MB members of
14. Joining a group organized in violation of the provisions of the law,
15. the purpose of which is to disrupt the provisions of the constitution,
16. and damage the social peace
17. to plan to revive the banned Muslim Brotherhood
18. and to incite others to be antigovernment by joining professional unions
and charities
19. and to infiltrate the legitimate and legal channels through running for
nomination in the recent elections of both People's Councils [Parliament]
and other representative bodies,
20. and to exploit the electoral campaigns to disseminate the ideas and
principles of the group to the masses
21. to provoke them to be against the current legitimate government so as to
gain their support for the group's candidates.

The image that is created by this representation is that this group is illegal, anticivil life and should be uprooted and excluded. The report withholds essential information, which leads to mystification of the reader. In the report there is no explanation of what the group members are actually doing to *disable law enforcement* (L.15) or *damage the social peace* (L.16). A more mystifying example is given in L.18, where it is not made clear to the reader why *joining civil societies and professional syndicates* is considered *antigovernment*. The same analysis can be extended to L.19, where no justification is give as to why *working through political and legitimate channels to incur change in society* is illegal. The MB is trying to implement political change through legal channels and in the light of the constitution but the process is represented to the reader as a crime.

Studying the process types in another text where the MB is the Actor renders the same conclusion. In (10), the Interior Minister stresses what the MB has been trying to do:

(10)

8. كشف فيه النقاب عن.
 9. محاولات بعض المرشحين التخطيط لعمليات عدائيه تستهدف مقار اللجان الانتخابيه
 10. بقصد الاخلال بالامن.
 11. وأكد أن عناصر جماعه الاخوان المحظوره حاولت استثمار تأثير الدين علي المواطنين
 12. لكنهم فشلوا وخططوا لكسب شعبيه لخدمة أهداف سياسيه وتنظيميه سرية وغير شرعية
8. Where he uncovered
 9. Attempts by some candidates to plan terroristic actions against the headquarters of the electoral commissions

10. in order to breach security
11. He stressed that elements of the banned Muslim Brotherhood tried to exploit the influence of religion on citizens
12. but they failed and they planned to win popularity for secretive, illegal, political and organizational purposes

FP00, #2

Here, the group is represented as trying to *exploit the influence of religion on citizens* (L11) and as having *secret* (impliedly illegitimate) *plans* (L12). Although the actors of the two processes in L10 and L10 – *plan terrorist acts* and *breach security*, respectively – are mystifyingly referred to as *some candidates*, the reader would cognitively anchor the actor with the MB candidates.

Two principles can be suggested to explain the process of cognitively anchoring the Actors in these clauses to the MB: the *proximity principle* and the *historical principle*. The proximity principle means that the average reader, when reading sentences whose subjects are not explicitly stated, tends to connect these sentences with the Actors of surrounding sentences. The historical principle concerns the role of social practices in shaping the historical collective memory of the average reader. The analysis of social practices in Chapter 4 leads to the predication that the average reader would connect violent acts to the MB in any text or context in which the group is alluded to.

The negative image of the MB recurs throughout almost all the sentences of which the group members are the Actors. In (11), the government investigations

have proved the MB guilty of the same charges as above. Yet there is no explanation of the nature of these violent acts or how the group carried these crimes out.

(11)

3. التحقيقات التي اجرتها النيابة, مع عدد من اعضاء جماعه الاخوان المحظوره قانونا,

4. قد اثبتت تورط عناصر من الجماعه في اعمال الاثاره, والتحريض, والتشكيك في مصداقيه

النظام في التمسك بالديمقراطيه,

3. Investigations conducted by the Prosecutor, with a number of members of the outlawed Muslim Brotherhood,
4. Have proved the involvement of elements of the group in acts of provocation, incitement, and questioning the credibility of the government's adherence to democracy.

FP00, #5

On the other hand, analyzing the clauses where the MB occupies the Goal position – that is the object of material processes – reveals that the group is always the object of *court ruling, charging, arresting, detaining and imprisonment or being acquitted*. A good example of this is FP00, #1.

It is also significant to analyze the mental processes because such analysis would show how the MB perceives the world, in cases where they are represented as the Sensor (subject of the mental process) or how they are perceived, in cases where they are the Phenomenon (object of the mental process). In the 2000 data, mental processes have the fewest occurrences, as shown by Figure 5.1. The mental

processes analysis retrieved two sentences, in the first of which the MB is the Sensor, as in (12), and in the second it is the Phenomenon, as in (13). In (12), the MB is associated with the process *disbelieve/cast doubts* and is presented as *antigovernment group* that does not believe in the government's commitment to a civil and democratic society.

(12)

4. قد اثبتت تورط عناصر من الجماعه في اعمال الاثاره, والتحريض, والتشكيك في مصداقيه النظام في التمسك بالديمقراطيه,

4. [investigations] Have proved the involvement of elements of the group in acts of provocation, incitement, and casting doubts on the credibility of the government's adherence to democracy,

FP00, #5

(13)

3. العادلي: لا نعرف شيئاً اسمه الاخوان ماداموا ليسوا حزبا شرعيا.

3. Minister of Interior: we do not know any entity called the Brothers as long as they are not an official party.

FP00, #10

In (13), the MB is the object of the process *know* and is negated any legal existence in the government's cognition, represented here by the Interior Minister.

The verbal process occurrences are also significant in stressing the negative representation of the MB. In the analyzed verbal sentences, it is the government's voice that is always present *saying, confirming, stressing* and *reporting* something

negative on the MB. The search did not retrieve any instance from the data where the MB is a Sayer. The group is always talked about but its voice is never represented.

The following are examples of verbal clauses with the government as a Sayer:

- A. The Minister of Interior [*says*]: we do not know any entity called the Brothers as long as they are not an official party. (FP00, #10, L.3)
- B. Mubarak [*answers*]: what is more is that the MB, though being an illegal organization, can run as independents. (FP00, #9, L.4)
- C. Informed sources *said* to al-Ahram that ... (FP00, #5, L.2)
- D. The sources, also, *said* that the procedures to arrest the elements of the Muslim Brotherhood are lawful. (FP00, #5, L.6)
- E. and *confirmed* that none of the members of this group have been arrested under the authority of the emergency law. (FP00, #5, L.7)

The analysis of verbal processes subcategorization reveals that all the verbal processes associated with the government belong to either the neutral or the positive sub-categories. The verb *emphasized* أكد is frequently used with the government as in the following examples in (14):

(14)

The court <i>emphasized</i>	FP00, # 1, L.5
The Minister <i>emphasized</i>	FP00, #2, L.7
[Informed sources] <i>emphasized</i>	FP00, #5, L.6

The neutral subcategory *say* is used with informed sources as in (FP00, #5, L2 and L6). It is noticed that the participants in both positive and neutral types of verbal

processes are always an official, an authority or an expert who *says* or *confirms* something negative about the MB. The analysis of verbal processes is also significant in terms of drawing the demarcating lines of the ideological square between the MB members and the government members in terms of *they vs we*.

The last category to be analyzed is the relational processes. Relational processes in news reports would tell what the MB is/is not from the government's view. The present data retrieved the following relational sentences, as in (15).

(15)

- A. The sources also said that the procedures to arrest the elements of the Muslim Brotherhood *are* lawful. FP00, #5, L.6
- B. [The Labor Party] *having* links with the banned MB. FP00, #8, L.4
- C. The extreme Islamists groups that *are* antinational unity and antisocial peace ... FP00, #8, L.5
- D. But some of them may run through agreements with other parties or as Independents. FP00. #10, L.4

The two concepts that are established by these relational processes are that the MB is an illegal entity and that the government's procedures against the MB are legal.

To conclude this section, the analysis of transitivity underlined the negative image and the exclusionary attitude towards the Islamist group. The MB members are represented as *doers* of violent acts, disturbing the society, being an illegal entity, and are perceived and identified as such. This image goes in line with both the social

and discursive practices analysis in Chapter 3. In the next section, sourcing in news reports is analyzed.

5.2.4. *Sourcing*

The analysis of the 2000 data in terms of sourcing is relevant as far as the theme of exclusion is concerned. The data reveals four voices, or sources, that are frequently reported. The four voices are significantly either government officials: the Interior Minister, as in (16) and (17), the President, as in (18), the military court, as in (19) or informed sources, as in (20).

(16)

7. واكد ان عناصر جماعه الاخوان المحظوره حاولت استثمار تاثير الدين علي

المواطنين

7. He [the Interior Minister] stressed that elements of the banned Muslim Brotherhood tried to exploit the influence of religion on citizens

FP00, #2

(17)

7. العادلي: لا نعرف شيئا اسمه الاخوان ماداموا ليسوا حزبا شرعيا.

7. The Minister of Interior [*says*]: we do not know any entity called the Brothers as long as they are not an official party.

FP00, #10

(18)

1. سؤال: أليس اغلاق حزب العمل في الاسبوع الماضي تدخلا قبل الانتخابات القادمه؟
2. جواب: لا مطلقا, لان انصار حزب العمل مثلهم في ذلك مثل انصار اي حزب اخر يمكنهم دخول الانتخابات كمستقلين دون حاجه الي تعطيه من حزب,
3. بل إن الاخوان المسلمين وهم ليسوا منظمه شرعيه يستطيعون التقدم للانتخابات كمستقلين.

1. *Politics*: Is not the closure of the Labor party last week considered interference (in the party's affairs) before the coming elections?
2. President Mubarak: No, absolutely. Because the supporters of the Labor party can, like others, run in the elections as independents without the need to be party affiliated.
3. Moreover, MB, though being an illegal organization, can run as independents

FP00, #9

(19)

5. وقبل النطق بالحكم اكدت هيئته المحكمه في كلمتها ان

5. Before pronouncing the sentences, the court *emphasized* that
FP00,#1

From the above-cited examples, it can be seen that all the participants who are privileged with access to media are official people. Both Mubarak and al-Adali are speaking from the perspective of their official positions, as president and Minister respectively – a fact that colours what they say with authority and authenticity.

Moreover, the reporter's stance can be said to be in favour of what is reported by the government officials, and this is based on two reasons. First, the reporter's choice of verbal processes are subcategorized as either neutral or positive, like *stress*, *emphasize*, *confirm*, *say* and *answer*. In example (19), the verbal process that is used with the court is *confirmed* and it is not known what made the reporter delineate the verbal action of the judges as such. Unless he credits what the court says, the reporter could have used *said* as a neutral process. The same analysis applies to (16). There is an absolute absence of voices from the MB side. The MB or any related individuals have never been reported in any of the news stories that covered them in *al-Ahram*.

Objectivity requires that the report fairly represents the two sides of an issue and leaves it to the readers to judge for themselves. What is done here is a presentation of only one side of the argument from the perspective of the government. This renders the news coverage subjective and biased. Again, since this chapter is devoted to textual analysis, discussion of bias will not be elaborated here but will be kept for discussion in Chapter 6.

To conclude, voicing analysis has shown that the ideology of excluding the MB is systematic and consistent. The 2000 data did not yield a single reference or voice of the MB. It is hard to explain or interpret the utter absence of the MB voice in reports that deal directly with them and in which they are accused of committing such significant crimes. The next section will further approach the data from the lexicalization perspective to see if the reporter's choices on the level of vocabulary, e.g., nouns, adjectives, adverbs etc, support the exclusionary nature of the front-page reports.

5.2.5. Lexical Choices

In this section, the analysis examines the social denotation, positive or negative, of the lexical items that are used to describe the MB. Using the Judgment framework of the Appraisal theory, it is found that all references to the MB in news reports are of a negative type.

The lexical references that referred to the MB in the 2000 data can be grouped into four main categories. The first group establishes a strong connection between the MB and acts of both terror and violence. Depicting them as people who *work against the security and safety of the society* is a tangible example. They are represented as groups that are *antinational unity* and *antisocial peace*, (FP00, #8, L.5), and who *plan to ruin the election process and want to fail the elections to serve their own agenda and their own candidates* (FP00, #2, L.13). The Interior Minister accuses them as those who *cast doubt on the election outcomes* and describes them as those who *want to distort the national achievement* and who *do not want stability in Egypt* (FP00, #2). Moreover, they are a group whose goal is to *disrupt the provisions of the constitution* and they are *damagers, inciters, provokers and seditionists* (FP00, #1). However, the MB were also implicitly referred to as *bullies* and *terrorists*. In a press conference with the Interior Minister (FP00, #10), there was a question on how the police would deal with bullying and crimes of violence in the elections. Right after this question, the Minister was asked another question on the MB where the Minister answered by negating the existence of any entity by the name of the MB in the political life. The occurrence of the question on the MB right

after the question on violence and bullying insinuates a juxtaposed connection of the MB and violence.

The same process of implication occurred in another interview with President Mubarak. First, Mubarak is asked: what was the Egyptian strategy in fighting Islamic terrorism? Then another question followed on the Emergency Law that had been in effect since Mubarak came to power in 1981. Third, there was a question on the forthcoming elections and the preparations to have transparent and democratic elections and how to prevent illegal interferences. The fourth question was on freezing the Labor Party. It has already been mentioned that the Labor Party was frozen because of connections with the MB and other Islamists. In his answer to this question, the President brought the MB to the discussion, although the question had nothing to do with the Brothers. This feeds the reader with the idea that there is a connection between Islamism, terrorism, Emergency Law, the Labor Party and the MB.

The second group of lexical references denies Islamists legitimacy. The Minister of Interior describes them as *not a legal party* (FP00, #10). The labels *illegal*, *illegitimate*, *unrecognized* and *banned* are reiterated throughout the data to negatively modify the MB and its members. The label *banned* has the most frequency of occurrences. Searching for *al-Ikhwan* الإخوان the *Brothers* and *al-MaHthura* المحظورة/المحظور *banned* resulted in the frequency of 19, 11, respectively. Examples referring to the MB as *banned* and *illegal* are: *the activity of which* (the MB) *is banned* (FP00, #8), *legally banned* (FP00, #5), the *outlaws*, *secret* and *illegitimate* (FP00, #2).

Extremists is the third label that is used to delineate the Brothers. This label is attributed by implication to the MB, when the Labor Party was frozen based on hosting MB members (FP00, #6 and #8). *Elements* is a fourth label. The Longman Language Activator dictionary defines *element* as ‘a group who have the same ideas, aims, beliefs etc. that are different from those of a larger group, especially when you do not like or agree with them’. The significance of this definition in the present analysis lies in that it reinforces the conclusion of the analysis reached so far – that the official discourse on the MB is exclusionary in nature. The use of *elements* socially excludes the MB from Egyptian mainstream. It singles them out in a negative way as different and few. *Elements* supports *othering* the organization.

The idea of *othering* is very relevant to the discussion of exclusion. In the 2000 data, the label *elements* occurred eight times and all of them emphasized that the MB or Islamists in general were categorized as the *other*. *Elements of the MB* عناصر الإخوان المسلمين occurred seven times (FP00, # 2 and #3 [twice], #5 [twice], #8 , #10), and the label is used associated with extremist Islamist groups in FP00, # 7 and # 8. The context of the use of *elements* suggests the negative implication it has on the denoted people and hence excluding them.

The fifth label that is used to foster *othering* the MB is *the few* القلة. When *the few* is used to describe the *other*, it implies a division through which people are categorized along the *we* vs. *they* continuum-- *we* are the majority vs. *they* are the few. The label *few* is used three times by the Minister of Interior to refer to those who are challenging the government in the elections. This is interpreted as though those who oppose the government fall in the *other* category and by implication are

excluded. In the following example, the label is given a further negative implication: ‘The Minister assured that the police adhered to being neutral but being neutral does not mean being passive as the few wants it to be’ (FP00, #2 L15-16). Referring to the *other* as *few* and impliedly as *passive* highlights the ideological square along which the government is portrayed as *good, majority* and *positive* and the MB as *bad, few* and *passive*.

The ideological square can be highlighted by the way pronouns are manipulated in a text. According to Silverstein (1995), deictics or shifters, such as pronouns, often have a central role in establishing the larger discursive structures that create and transform relationships. Thus, the analysis of pronouns and other types of deictics provides essential cues about the interactional significance of an utterance. By using and manipulating the pronouns, speakers/writers mean more than the referring function of the pronouns; they index some social and cultural codes in such use. The speaker, for example, by using the first-person pronoun, positions himself/herself in a particular social hierarchy which indexes social distance/intimacy, formality/informality, respect/contempt, gender, power, etc., and against which other positions in the hierarchy struggles. Some examples in which the Egyptian officials use pronouns indexically to refer to the MB are:

1. *They* use the elections period to promote their ideas (FP00, #1);
2. *They* want to fail the election to serve their goals and their candidates (FP00, #2);
3. *They* do not want Egypt a stable country and we will not be bothered by them (FP00, #2).

The boundary is now clear: *they* are bad and, by implication, *we* are good; *their* goals and candidates are different from *our* goals and candidates. It is clear here that *they* and *them* and *we* and *us* indicate more than the literal reference to the MB or the Minister of Interior, respectively. These pronouns are indexically used to refer to two ideologically opposing groups: *we/us* as the government, the elite, the dominating and *they/them* as the other, the few, the passive and the dominated. In the ideological square, *we* is so inclusive that it does not only include the speaker or the government but also includes the hearer/reader, too, who is triggered to be aligned with the speaker/writer.

A further interesting example of labelling is referring to Hassan el-Banna, the founder of the MB, as ‘an anti-Western idea’ (FP00, # 11). The report talks about six Egyptian figures chosen among the most influential people in the twentieth century. El-Banna was chosen as one of these figures. This particular reference extends the *we* camp of the ideological square to include the West next to the government in *our* camp against the *other* camp of Islamists.

To conclude, the analysis in this section has shown that the negative image of the MB is actively at work on the lexical level. The analysis of lexical choices also supported the hypothesis that exclusion is a constant policy of the Egyptian government towards the MB. The next section discusses presupposition as another tool through which excluding the MB is carried out.

5.2.6. *Presupposition*

The analysis revealed examples of presupposition that stress the theme of exclusion. It is found that the main function of presupposition in the data is to present the government in positive terms while negatively delineating the MB. In (21), the military court lists a number of accusations against the MB members. They want to:

(21)

1. Damage the social peace
2. Revive the banned Muslim Brotherhood
3. Provoke them be against the current legitimate government

FP00. #1

These accusations presuppose the following: there is social peace, the MB is dead/inactive and the current government is legitimate, respectively. In terms of the ideological square, these presuppositions categorize the government in the positive side: it is the cause of the social peace and it is legitimate, while positioning the MB on the other side: they destroy the social peace, reactivate a banned (implied) dangerous organization and are confronting the legitimate government. The adjective *legitimate* is significantly used to mean that the MB is illegitimate as long as it opposes the legitimate government. The same analysis can be extended to FP00, #8 where the Islamist groups are represented as ‘antinational unity and antisocial peace’ (L.5).

Presupposition and implication work hand in hand when ideology is involved. The analysis of lexical choices has shown that the MB is represented as

bullies, terrorists and outlaws. In the report where the Interior Minister talks about election and bullying, he states that ‘our role is confronting only the outlaws who want to fail the elections’ (FP00, #2). The ‘outlaws’ – الخارجين علي الشرعية – which means those who oppose legitimacy – presuppose that the current regime in Egypt is legitimate and any activity that is not in its interest is unpatriotic and unlawful.

Presuppositions are also used to favourably colour the government and its official bodies. In the same press conference, the Minister condemns and threatens those who ‘cast doubts on the efforts and neutrality of the police; [and] aim to distort the national achievement’ (FP00, #2). The issue here is not if the police are neutral or not, because this information, given by an authority figure, is taken for granted and the election is considered an achievement. The focus of the reader/hearer is on those who are challenging these good achievements and thus whether what the official is talking about is an achievement or not is not contested. The two presuppositions, in turn, beautify both the government police and election.

One way to turn an idea or concept from just being a personal or group ideology to a commonsense and taken-for-granted knowledge is by repeatedly using it as a presupposition. By virtue of presupposition, what was one day contested and argued is now an institutionalized rule or maybe a law that would cause any opposition to be tried, sentenced and imprisoned. Whether a certain system is democratic does not trigger an absolute consensus. Yet, the Egyptian regime finds it a reason to accuse the MB. The group is accused of التشكيك في مصداقيه النظام في التمسك – ‘questioning [casting doubts on] the credibility of the government’s adherence to democracy’ (FP00, #5). Presupposition works at its best here as the

regime's honesty and commitment to democracy is so immune to questioning that talking about it is considered a felony.

The analysis of presupposition has validated the results of previous analyses in that *othering* and excluding the MB is a main theme of front-page reports. In addition, presupposition is used to sustain and legitimize the current regime and, hence claim any opposition as illegitimate.

The next chapter deals with the 2005 data in terms of the above-used tools to see if it yields a similar or different conclusion.

6. THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD IN 2005

6.1. MB in 2005

In this chapter, the data of 2005 are analyzed in the same terms as those analysis of the 2000 data in the previous chapter. The significance of this chapter is to examine if the conclusion of the 2005 data would confirm or deviate from that of 2000. If the two analyses ended with the same conclusion, this means excluding the MB is a systematic and consistent strategy.

6.1.1. *MB in Headlines: IR perspective*

Searching for headlines which talk about the MB in *al-Ahram* of 2005 retrieved sixteen items. Quantitatively, this is a 400 percent increase from 2000. This considerable upswing is reflected qualitatively as well in the nature of the MB negative representation. Again, the approach to the headlines will be first in terms of the IR framework to examine what effect reading for a gist would have on average readers regarding their perception of the MB. The analysis echoed the recurring theme of exclusion in all the sixteen HLs. Exclusion is found to be achieved through presenting the group in the context of being banned, demonstration, connection with foreign countries, dictators, trouble makers, prisoners, antigovernment and liars.

Reading the HL in (22) for a gist would make connection between these three lexical items: terrorism (L.2), chaos (L.2), religion-based party (L.3) and the MB (L.4) in the reader's short-term memory.

(22)

1. مبارك في حديث لصحيفة لوفيجارو الفرنسية: قانون الطوارئ لمكافحة الإرهاب والمخدرات

فقط

2. ولن أسمح بانتشار الفوضى أبدا

3. القانون لا يسمح بتشكيل حزب علي أساس ديني

4. ولا أمنع الإخوان من الانضمام لأحزاب أخرى

1. Mubarak to Le Figaro: Emergency law is only for dealing with terrorism and drugs
2. I will not allow chaos to happen
3. The law does not permit establishing parties on a religious basis
4. I do not prevent the Brothers from joining other parties

FP05, # 58

According to van Dijk, headlines are sites of “expression of semantic macrostructures, or topics, which organize local semantic structures” (2006b: 366). Accordingly, the topics, persons, events, participants, etc. that are mentioned in the headlines will likely be stored in the short-term memory of any reader and with frequent recurrence of the same topic and connotations, the very topic becomes part of the knowledge system of the reader. Skimming the HL in (23), readers-for-a-gist would be left with the information that the MB members are *thugs and troublemakers*.

(23)

1. عقب تظاهرهم بأربع محافظات القبض علي 200 من أعضاء جماعة الإخوان المحظورة
 2. إصابة 30 من قوات الأمن
 3. ومصرع أحد المتظاهرين نتيجة التدافع
1. After their demonstration in four governorates, the arrest of 200 members of the banned Brothers group
 2. 30 state-security forces injured
 3. death of one demonstrator because of stampede

HL05, #55

The cognitive processing of this HL leads the readers to perceive the arrest of the MB members as justified. The readers, thus, are cognitively prepared to accept whatever the government tribunals consequently do with them. This perception of the event is intensified by L.2 and L.3 where the demonstrators are alleged to have caused injury or death.

Some HLs are meant to create apprehension and fear of the MB in the Egyptian society. In (24), the HL is meant to create such fear.

(24)

6. مبارك: الإخوان يريدون السلطة
7. وإذا حكموا فسيحكمون إلي الأبد
8. وسيسيبون القلق في البلاد
9. ما قامت به كفاية مدفوع الثمن..
13. وكان بإمكانني تنظيم مظاهرات بحفنة فلوس تهتف مش كفاية

6. Mubarak: The Brothers want authority
7. If they rule, they will rule for ever
8. And they cause chaos in Egypt
9. What *Kifaaya* did is paid for [by the West or a foreign party]
13. I could have formed similar demonstrations with a handful of money to shout “not *kifaya*”, “not enough.”

FP05, #50

Here, the Egyptian President warns his people of the latent threat. Uncritical readers would perceive the warning as real, especially when it comes from a source of authority who should know more than anyone else about the security of the state. Analyzing the full text of this HL would reveal whether the warning is elaborated and justified or if it is just an ungrounded and unjustified warning. Readers without a goal, who skim the headlines, would most likely perceive the warning as real and they would interpret subsequent HLs in the light of this understanding. In this headline, the immediate information for the IR is the *chaotic* MB (L. 8) and the *disloyal Kifaaya* (L.9).

Prison, detention and trial are recurrent themes that occurred in about 60 per cent of the HLs about the MB. Consequently, the resulted cognitive image on the group that cursory and uncritical readers would have is inevitably negative or at least apprehensive and unsupportive.

It is noteworthy that about 82 percent of the headlines that mentioned the MB in 2005 occurred in the period from March–June, 2005, and all of them, as shown in the analysis, imprint an unfavourable, negative and exclusionary image in the

readers' cognition. This can be interpreted as preparing for the then-forthcoming legislative elections by imprinting a negative image on the MB and excluding from the readers' cognition the most challenging force to the ruling National Democratic Party (NDP). Although the MB was the main and the only challenging competitor of the ruling NDP in the (November–December) 2005 election, there were only two references (12.5 percent) to the organization in the headlines from September–December 2005. The two HLs, in line with the analysis, negatively represent the Brothers: HL #24 talks about the 'release of 3 members of the banned Brothers group' and HL #27 stresses that Ayman Nour, who was second to Mubarak in the presidential election, got all his votes from the MB. This was meant to instill the connection between the MB and antigovernment, and prison. The next section handles, in the same way as the previous analysis of the 2000 data did, the FP reports in terms of the IR perspective.

6.1.2. *MB in Front-Page: Idealized Reader Perspective*

Searching for *al-Ikhwan* 'the Brothers' in front-page reports resulted in sixty news items. Where the MB is not the main topic of the report, it is referred to, in most cases, in answers to questions in interviews or press conferences. Approaching the FP reports from the IR point of view reveals and supports the results of the analysis reached in the previous chapter: mystification, negative image and exclusion. It needs to be mentioned here that no attempt is made to analyze the 60 reports in full. However, the results of the analysis, although it applies to all data, will be presented in terms of selected examples.

In L.6 in (25), there is no reference as to how ‘stirring the masses’ was done or to the nature of the ‘demonstration’. The absence of explanation in such a case leaves the reader with no choice but to believe the negative picture that the MB members were ‘pushing the masses to commit illegal actions and disturb security’. Given the cultural background, in the Arab world demonstrations are the nightmare of the Arab rulers; no demonstrations are tolerated and the police can use any weapon to disperse the protestors. The ‘caught-in-the-act’ process presented in L.9 is explained in L.10, again, mystifyingly. The reader is not given what type of action the MB leaders in were planning to do ‘to disturb the public peace and cause chaos’. The uncritical reader would process this arrest as justified.

(25)

4. كشف مصدر امني عن انه
5. تم لقاء القبض علي 200 من أعضاء جماعه الاخوان المحظوره بأربع محافظات هي:
القاهره والدقهليه والاسماعيليه والسويس
6. لقيامهم باتاره الجماهير
7. وتحريضهم علي التظاهر عقب صلاه الجمعه أمس..
8. وأضاف المصدر أن
9. أجهزه الأمن تمكنت من ضبط الدكتور عصام العريان القيادي الاخواني وثلاثه اخرين من
قيادات الجماعه المحظوره في منزل الأول
10. كانوا يعدون لتحرك يستهدف زعزعه الاستقرار والاخلال بأمن المواطنين.

11. وكان نحو الفي شخص من اعضاء الجماعه قد تظاهروا امام مسجد الغنام بمدينة طلخا بالدقهليه

12. وبرغم تحذيرات الأمن بضروره فض المظاهرات ، قاموا بقذف رجال الشرطه بالطوب والحجاره،

13. مما أدي الي اصابه اربعة ضباط و26 من الافراد والجنود،

14. ولقي أحد المتظاهرين مصرعه واسمه طارق طه مهدي غنام40 سنه، وهو من قيادات الاخوان بالمحافظه نتيجته تدافع المتظاهرين.

4. A security source has revealed that
5. 200 members of the banned MB have been arrested in four governorates
6. As they stirred up the masses
7. and incited them to demonstrate after Friday prayers yesterday.
8. The source added
9. the security forces were able to arrest Dr. Essam el-Eryaan, the leading Brother's figure and three other leaders in the house of the first
10. While they were planning for actions causing instability and chaos (peoples security)
11. Furthermore, about 2000 Brothers members demonstrated in front of

el-Ghannam mosque in Talkha

12. In spite of police warning to end the demonstration, they pelted police with bricks and stones
13. Which resulted in the injury of 4 officers and 26 soldiers
14. Moreover Tarek Ghannam, 40, one of the demonstrators and a leading figure in the MB, died because of demonstrators' stampede

FP05, #55

The report does not make available to the IR, who does not have time or effort to look for alternative news sources, the information why this huge number of people is demonstrating? The readers are left to understand that these people are unpatriotic, disloyal and troublemakers as they *pelt police with bricks and stones* (L.6), *injure officers and soldiers* (L.12) and irresponsibly *kill one of their leaders* (L.14). A detailed critical reading of the same report, as will be shown in the next sections, will at least throw some doubt on the trustworthiness of the content of the report. However, for the IR, the representation of the event (demonstration) is mystified and thus the result (police reaction) is justified.

Mystification techniques are widely used in all the FP reports pertaining to how the elections process was going. In every line in (26), the reader would not be able to infer who is doing the action mentioned or why.

(26)

3. ففي مصر القديمه, أسفرت المصادمات بين أنصار مرشح الوطني ومرشح جماعه الاخوان المحظوره عن اصابه 7 اشخاص, من بينهم سيدتان
4. وذلك بسبب اتهامات بشراء الاصوات.
5. وفي منطقه بولاق ابو العلا بالقاهره, تمكنت مباحث القاهره من القبض علي 6 من البلطجيه والمسجلين خطر استاجرهم جزار بمبالغ تتراوح بين 300 و 400 جنيه
6. لمسانده مرشح مستقل, .
7. وضبطت الشرطه معهم اسلحه بيضاء وصناديق مياه غازيه فارغه لاستخدامها في اي معارك محتمله.
8. وفي دائره الخليفه بالقاهره ايضا, استخدم انصار بعض المرشحين السنج والمطاوي لارهاب خصومهم,
9. كما شهدت بعض لجان الدائره عمليات شراء الاصوات بشكل علني.
13. كما عادت ظاهره توزيع الاجهزه الكهربائيه من جانب المرشحين مقابل منح الناخبين اصواتهم لهم في الظهور من جديد امس,
15. وفي بني سويف, جري اغلاق عده لجان بسبب اعمال البلطجه ومحاولة ارهاب الناخبين,
16. وحاول انصار احد المرشحين افتعال مشاجره ضخمه, استخدموا فيها السيوف والسنج والشوم,

3. Clashes between the supporters of the NDP and the banned MB candidate resulted in the injury of 7 persons, two of them were women in Old Cairo,
4. This was because of mutual accusations of vote purchasing,

5. in Boulak, Cairo police was able to arrest 6 thugs and recorded-as dangerous hired for L.E. 400 to 500 by a butcher,
6. to support an independent candidate
7. The police seized with them white arms to be used in any may-be battles
8. in addition, in the Khalifa area, the supporters of some candidates used pocket knives to terrify their opponents,
9. some voting sites witnessed vote purchasing done publically,
13. Also, the phenomena of distributing electric household sets to the voters to support a certain candidate has reappeared
15. in Bani Suwif, some of the voting sites were closed due to bullying and terroristic acts,
16. as the supporters of a certain candidate tried to fabricate a large brawl in which they used pocket knives and fighting sticks ...

FP05, #16

Elaborative inferences, such as *who* and *why*, are unlikely to be inferred by the IR and they have to be provided by the report. If the report does not clearly state who did the action and why, the reader would cognitively look for other cues to generate these information. In (26), the reader reads about a fighting scene but cannot generate who is responsible for it. In L.1, all what we know from the report is that there was a clash between X and Y that ended in the injury of seven people. Did X start the clash or did Y? Do the injured belong to X or Y? These pieces of

information, though crucial, are absent from the report. The responsibility of mutual clashes and vote purchasing (L.3, L.4, L.9), hiring of thugs (L.5), use of pocket knives (L.8), fabricating a brawl (L.16) is attributed to no one in the report. Although it cannot be said that this report has negatively represented the MB, the IR is left with a negative image of the group because of the accumulated knowledge processed from previous reports. This accumulated knowledge would assign actors to and reasons for the actions in the report by cognitively binding the violent acts with Islamists. The reader, in the interpretation process, will resort to other discursive and social practices as well as other reports that explicitly or by implication associate violence with Islamism.

In (27), violence is clearly affiliated to the MB as in L.5 and, to highlight the credibility of the news for the average reader, the report sources a senior official in the Interior: the Ministry of Interior spokesperson.

(27)

1. المتحدث باسم الداخليه: الأجهزة الأمنية عملت علي نجاح العمليه الانتخابيه رغم التجاوزات المحدوده
2. أكد اللواء ابراهيم حماد مساعد وزير الداخليه والمتحدث الرسمي لوزاره الداخليه
7. واكد اللواء ابراهيم حماد ان شخصا واحدا في الاسكندريه لقي حتفه بعد نقله الي المستشفى مصابا بطعنه نافذه,
8. كما اصيب عدد من ضباط وجنود الشرطه اثناء محاولاتهم لحمايه وتامين المقار الانتخابيه والتصدي للبلطجيه فيها.
9. واكد ان انصار جماعه الاخوان المسلمون المحظوره هم المسئولون عن اغلب اعمال

العنف

1. The Ministry of Interior spokesperson: the security authorities worked on the success of the election process, regardless of the limited transgressions.
2. Major General Ibrahim Hammad, assistant of Minister of Interior and the Interior spokesman, stressed that:
7. He also stressed that in Alexandria , one person was stabbed and died after he was transferred to the hospital
8. A number of police officers and soldiers have been injured while in duty trying to protect and secure the voting sites and to confront the thugs.
9. He also stressed that the banned MB supporters are responsible of most of the violent acts.

FP05, #12

Mystification is at work in L.7 and L.8 where it is not put at the disposal of the reader *who was killed, who killed him, why* or *who injured the police officers in duty*. However, the social practices, the accumulated knowledge and the comment of the spokesperson in L.9 all lead the IR to associate the violent actions with the MB candidates and their supporters.

In the interview with the Egyptian President in one of the widely circulated Arabic newspapers, the Kuwaiti *Politics*, the President negatively represents the MB as in (28):

(28)

4. سياده الرئيس ما سر تحالف الاخوان المسلمين, مع التكفيريين, مع الناصريين ومع جماعه حزب الغد واجتماعهم ضد الرئاسه وضد الرئيس؟
5. الرئيس : تستطيع ان تري وتقدر من يقف وراءهم.
6. هناك اسباب لاجتماعهم
7. وانا اعرفها,
8. لكن ما يهمني هو مصلحه الغالبية العظمي
27. ما قصه فتح الامريكيين لقناه حوار مع جماعه الاخوان المسلمين؟, مع اني اعرف ان ولي العهد السعودي الامير عبدالله قد عاتبهم عليها.. انا اريد ان تكون شفافا في الاجابه؟
28. غير مسموح في قانوننا بتاسيس الاحزاب الدينيه,
29. ولا مانع للحزب الديني من العمل عبر احزاب اخري مرخصه,
30. لكن هل اطروحات الاخوان مقبوله من الناس?.
31. وان تستروا بحزب اخر
32. الناس هنا اجتازوا مرحله التضليل
33. ويفهمون مجريات الامور, ولديهم تفسير لكل شيء

4. *Politics*: Mr. President, what is the secret behind the alliance of the Muslim Brotherhood with the Takfiri groups, the Nasserites and the Ghad party, and their coming together against the president?
5. *President*: you can see it and know who stands behind them.
6. There are reasons for them to come together
7. and I know these reasons
8. but I only care for the interest of the majority

27. *Politics*: what is the story behind the Americans opening a dialogue channel with the MB? I know that the Saudi prince Abdalla has admonished them on it. I want a transparent answer
28. *President*: Our law does not allow establishing religious parties
29. yet they can work through other licensed parties
30. However, are the theses of the MB acceptable by people
31. Even if they cower under another party's umbrella?
32. People here have passed the phase of mystification
33. They understand the current situation and they have an interpretation for everything.

FP05, #52

The questions in lines 4 and 27 evoke the idea of MB disloyalty in the cognition of the IR: the MB members are opening contacts with a foreign country and ally with either publicly unacceptable or antigovernment groups. Moreover, the answers of Mubarak stress the same idea of the MB being disloyal and publicly unacceptable. The answers, L.5 and L.8 are so general that they leave the IR undecided about many issues in the report: the identity of who the MB is dealing with and the (secret) information that the President knows about the MB that supposedly makes them against the interest of the majority. L.30, mystifyingly, establishes the following as a fact: *the MB is publicly unacceptable*. Since the information came from the Head of State, uncritical readers would accept it without contestation. The statement is mystifying because it is offered without any supporting evidence. Moreover, on 21

June (FP05, #38) and 8 June (FP05, #42), both the US ambassador in Cairo and Secretary of State, respectively, denied that any dialogue channels had been opened with the MB. Nevertheless, would the readers-for-a-gist be able to connect these news reports together to understand that the President's claims were false and ungrounded?

The FP report in (29) restates the same image: the MB is working against the mainstream.

(29)

1. عشره الاف عضو بالحزب الوطني ينظمون مسيره مويده لمبارك
 2. شارك أكثر من عشره الاف عضو بالحزب الوطني في مسيره سلميه
 3. مؤيده للرئيس حسني مبارك ومبادرته التاريخيه بتعديل ماده(76) من الدستور,
 4. ومطالبه الرئيس باعلان ترشيحه.
 5. ومن جانب اخر تجمع عدد من انصار حركه كفايه وقيادات من جماعه الاخوان المحظوره في نقابتي الصحفيين والمحامين,
 6. وطالبوا بالاصلاح السياسي الشامل.
1. 10,000 NDP members organize a march in support of Mubarak
 2. More than 10,000 NDP members have participated in a peaceful march
 3. To supporting president Mubarak and his historic intuitive to amend constitutional article 76
 4. And ask him to declare his candidacy
 5. On the other side, a number of people from Kifaya and the Banned

MB gathered in both lawyers and journalists' syndicates

6. and called for reform.

FP05, # 51

A cursory reading of (29) would imprint the following image: on one side, there are 10,000 people supporting Mubarak, and on the other there are a 'number of people' representing the MB. Referring to the number when the reference is to *us* and mystifying it, in a belittling way, when it comes to *them* is another way to endorse the exclusionary ideological square. Modifying the 'march' of the NDP supporters as 'peaceful' is also significant in adding a positive imprint to *us* and colouring the *them* by implication as opposite.

During the analysis of how the MB is represented to the average reader in *al-Ahram*, it was not difficult to trace and pin down the theme of exclusion and the strategies used to implement it. In (30), the Egyptian PM confesses that it is not easy to include the MB in the political body of Egyptian society under the frequently-quoted justification that the MB is a religious party and the Constitution does not allow religion-based parties.

(30)

7. نظيف: لن نقوم بذلك الامر بهذه البساطه,
8. دستورنا لا يسمح بذلك.
9. لن نسمح باحزاب سياسيه علي اساس ديني
10. ولا توجد الكثير من الدول التي ستسمح بذلك.
11. هل تودين ان ترين في مصر حزبا للاسلام وحزبا للمسيحيه وحزبا لليهوديه؟

12. هذا هو ما يريدونه. كيف يمكن لنا السماح بذلك؟

7. Nazif: We would not simply do it,
8. our Constitution does not allow it.
9. we will not allow political parties based on religion
10. and many countries do not allow it
11. Would you like to see in Egypt, the party of Islam and Christian parties and parties of Judaism?
12. This what they want to see happen, how would we allow it to?!

FP05, #48

The average uncritical reader would not question the religion-based party statement nor examine its truth-value and, henceforth, would accept it. CDA and critically-aware analysis, which will be explicated in the next sections, would have a different reading of the statement.

To conclude this section, a number of techniques have been manipulated in news reporting in relation to the representation of the MB: mystification; explicit, yet ungrounded, accusations; *othering* (connection with foreign countries, antigovernment groups), and binding them with violence and chaos. Mystification keeps absent from the report the necessary background information that the reader-for-a-gist needs to fully process the event and without which he/she is left open to accepting the between-the-lines reading of the reporter. In the following sections, a detailed linguistic analysis of the front-page news reports is presented.

6.1.3. *Transitivity*

In the analysis of transitivity, only the processes that are related to the MB are counted. Therefore, the reports on elections have been fully analyzed and the processes have been counted in terms of their types and subtypes. However, sometimes, the front-page items cover the elections or the MB in part of it, the analysis then focuses only on that part.

The analysis of transitivity patterns in the data of 2000 revealed the predominance of material processes, seconded by the verbal processes. The analysis has also shown that all the material processes are related to violence, chaos, prison, detention and demonstration which negatively marked the MB and helped to develop an atmosphere of apprehension and exclusion. In this section, the data of 2005 are analyzed to see if the analysis would render the same results. The total number of the processes in the analyzed data is 523. Analyzing the front-page news items resulted in, again, the significant predominance of material processes as shown in Table 6.1. The occurrence percentages are shown by Figure 6.1. A simple comparison between Figures 5.1 and 6.1 which is explained by Table 6.2, reveals that the percentage of

Table 6.1 Distribution of process types in MB-related 2005 front-page reports

Process type	# of occurrences
Material	405
Verbal	66
Relational	42
Mental	10
Total	523




Figure 6.1 Percentage of MB-related process types in 2005 front-page news reports

Table 6.2 Number of transitivity types occurrences in 2000 and 2005

Process type	Occurrences in 2000	Occurrences in 2005
Material	49 / 70%	405 / 77%
Verbal	12 / 17	66 / 13 %
Relational	7 / 10%	42 / 8%
Mental	2 / 3%	10 / 2%
Total	70	523

processes occurrences is, interestingly, almost the same in the two years.

Analyzing transitivity types in the 2005 data revealed that the MB are consistently associated through the use of material processes with violent and chaotic acts. A typical example of this image is the headline of FP05, #55, given in (23). This headline says it directly and briefly: arresting members of the MB is justified by their demonstrating; the injury to the police is construed to have been caused by the demonstrators and when a demonstrator dies, it is because of his fellows rushing.

The collective image resulting out of skimming the headline is the MB members are violent and the police are the victim. This image is highlighted by the use of topicalization, where the predicate of the sentence , عقب تظاهرهم “after their demonstration” is placed in the subject position, 200 من أعضاء جماعه الاخوان القبض علي المحظوره “the arrest of 200 members of the banned Brothers.” The significance of topicalization is to prepare the reader cognitively to accept the effect (arrest) after mentioning the cause (demonstration) at the beginning of the sentence. Reading the full report in (30) confirms this analysis.

In the text of FP05, #55 in (25), all the material processes associated with the MB belong to the semantic field of violence and chaos: *stir, incite, demonstrate, demonstrate, plan* and *pelt*. In this report, there are three causes which lead to three effects:

Causes (members of the MB as Actors of the clauses):

1. 200 people demonstrating, inciting and provoking the masses;
2. four people are secretly planning to disturb stability;
3. 2000 are rioting, have injured the some policemen.

Effects (members of the MB as Goal of the clauses):

1. 200 arrested;
2. gour people arrested;
3. one MB member died,

The cause/effect analysis is what imprints the negative image on the reader’s mind.

The group is presented as challenging the legitimate regime and, therefore, the

government's clampdown would look justified as to protect legitimacy. The strategy of accusing the group and its members of incitement and breaching social security recurs frequently in the 2005 data. It can be seen in (31), which talks about the arrest of the General Secretary of the MB organization, Dr. Mahmoud Ezzat.

(31)

5. كانوا يستهدفون تحريض المواطنين, خاصة الطلاب والعمال,

6. لاشعال الفوضي والدعوه الي العصيان المدني.

5. [the Brothers] were planning to provoke the public, specially students and workers

6. To spark chaos and to call for civil disobedience

FP05, #44

The cause/effect strategy is repeatedly used to establish the negative representation, as in (32).

(32)

2. المظاهرات غير المبررة....تستهدف إيجاد حالة شغب طارئة للاستثمار

2. [Unjustified demonstrations]...aim to create a state of chaos that is centrifugal of [foreign] investments.

FP05, #53

The “demonstrations,” implied as being led by the Brothers, *create* a state of chaos.

The MB, again, as an Actor is presented as the cause of weakening the country's economical resources by holding protests that will detract investments, which means they are working against the people's interest and security.

The technique of associating the MB with violence and chaos took a sharp curve up with the beginning of the first round of elections in November 2005. The MB protest developed from ‘demonstration’ to ‘clashes’ and ‘fights’. One of the reports, in (33), devotes the full report to cover the elections and it reports nothing but violence.

(33)

3. أسفرت المصادمات بين أنصار مرشح الوطني ومرشح جماعه الاخوان المحظوره عن

اصابه 7 أشخاص, من بينهم سيدتان

4. وذلك بسبب اتهامات بشراء الاصوات.

3. Clashing between the supporters of the NDP and the banned MB candidate resulted in the injury of 7 persons; Two of them were women in Old Cairo.
4. This was because of mutual accusations of vote purchasing,

FP05, # 16

Nominalization is a further linguistic strategy that is used to conceal the actor and mystify the agent. It is the use of a noun instead of a verb to express the action. Therefore, a nominalized version of *X killed Y* is *the killing of Y*. The result of nominalization is that the focus on agency is mystified and the action is perceived as a fact. According to Fairclough (2000: 26), the function of nominalization lies in that

no specification of who or what is changing, a backgrounding of the processes of change themselves, and a foregrounding of their effect. In backgrounding the processes themselves, nominalization also backgrounds questions of agency and causality, of who or what causes change.

Nominalization, therefore, “freezes the processes and makes them static so that they can be talked about and evaluated” (Francis 1988: 203). The text is no longer about what is happening, but what is being “internalised and factualised by society as to the status of what has already happened: the relationship between events rather than events themselves” (ibid.: 216). The impact of using such a form is that ‘nominalization of transitive verbs ... holds enormous ideological potential, since it obfuscates responsibility by backgrounding (or often deleting) agency and causality’ (Richardson, 2004: 54). In (33), two nominalized forms are used: *clashing* and *purchasing* (L.3 and L.4). Readers are put in a position to focus on the result of the clashes rather than who caused them. One other function of nominalization is to normalize and nullify the agency. The event where *A started the clash with B* will be reported as *the clashes between A and B*. In the second version, the responsibility is distributed between the two parties rather than falling on A. Moreover, the anchoring principle would trigger the reader to align the two processes with the MB. The same process is repeatedly used in the data. One more example is given in (34) where it is not known *who did the vote purchasing*.

(34)

9. كما شهدت بعض لجان الدائره عمليات شراء الاصوات بشكل علني

9. Some voting sites witnessed vote purchasing done publically,

FP05, #16

Some other examples have shown that the effect of obscuring and mystifying the agent is achieved even with the linguistic realization of the Actor of the sentence

as in (26) above. In L.5–7, it is known that the *hired* Actors *plan* to use the white weapons and *support* the independent candidate. Yet it is not known for whom these thugs are working. In L8, the agent is referred to, again, mystifyingly, as *the supporters of some candidates*. It is the goal of news reports to lay down the event in front of the reader and leave it to him/her to judge who is responsible. But here, the event is affiliated with unidentified subjects. This leaves undecided about the real agents of the processes or they are triggered by the context to affiliate the agent role to the MB.

A further technique that is used to mystify agency is *ergativity*. An example of ergativity is given in (35):

(35)

15. وفي بني سويف, جري اغلاق عدّه لجان بسبب اعمال البلطجه ومحاوله ارهاب الناخبين,

16. وحاول أنصار احد المرشحين افتعال مشاجره ضخمه, استخدموا فيها السيوف والسنج

والشوم,

17. الي أن أسرعت الشرطه لفض المشاجره.

18. وفي أسيوط, جري اطلاق عدّه اعيره ناريه قرب لجنه موشي التابعه للدائره الثانيه مركز

اسيوط

19. وحدثت مشادات عديده,

15. In Bani Suwif, some of the voting sites were closed due to bullying and terroristic acts,
16. As the supporters of a certain candidate tried to fabricate a large brawl in which they used pocketknives and fighting sticks...

17. Until the police were able to break the melee up
18. And in Assuit, a number of shots were fired near Moshee voting site
19. There have been numerous altercations.

FP05, # 16

The three ergative processes (L.15, L.18 and L.19) are all of the Middle type that has only one participant: the Medium. The translation of the Arabic processes جري اغلاق , جري اطلاق and حدثت مشادات are rendered passive forms: *were closed*, *shots were fired* and *there have been*, respectively. It worth noting here that the literal translations of the Arabic processes are *a closing of the sites happened*, *firing of the shots took place* and *altercations happened* respectively. Out of this analysis, the processes of *closing*, *firing* and *altercations* are represented as a reflexive type of actions, i.e., as if they made themselves or they just happened and no one is responsible.

Another frequently used structure through which ergativity is realized is the passive voice, the effect of which is to hide the actual agent of the process. The structure *be + injured* is the one that is used predominantly and its frequency is distributed over the longest three reports that covered the elections in full. These three reports are FP05, #1 (3 times), FP05, #11 (4 times) and FP05, #12. The examples are given in (36 A–C). The ergative processes are underlined in the Arabic sections.

(36A)

21 وقد أصيب ستة مجندين، وعدد من الضباط نتيجة القذف بالحجاره وزجاجات المواد الحارقة.

- 24 وفي كفر الشيخ، أُصيب نحو 35 شخصا في عده دوائر في اشتباكات بين أنصار المرشحين
- 32 حيث أُصيب أحد المحامين بعاهة مستديمة
21. And 6 soldiers and a number of officers have been injured due to throwing of rocks and incendiary bottles
24. In Kafr el-Shiekh, about 35 people were injured in clashed between the candidates supporters
32. Where a lawyer has been injured with a permanent disability

FP05, # 1

(36B)

11. كما أُصيب احد المرشحين المستقلين (وطني
12. وأُصيب احد انصار جماعه الاخوان المسلمون المحظوره,
13. وقد أُصيب العشرات من المواطنين الذين ذهبوا للادلاء باصواتهم خلال الاشتباكات التي وقعت امام الدوائر الانتخابيه,
61. في الوقت نفسه, أُصيب شقيق مرشح الحزب الوطني حسن ز غاري بدائره كفر شكر بمحافظة القليوبيه بكسر في قدمه في مشاجره بالعصي الغليظه بين انصار شقيقه, وانصار الاخوان,
11. One of the independent candidates (NDP) was injured as well
12. And one supporter of the banned MB was injured
13. And tens of people who went to vote were injured during clashes that occurred in front of the voting sites
61. At the same time, in Kafr Shokr the NDP candidate's brother was injured with a fraction in his foot in a big fight with sticks between

his brother's supporters and the MB supporters.

FP05, # 11

(36C)

8. كما أُصيب عدد من ضباط وجنود الشرطه أثناء محاولاتهم لحمايه وتأمين المقار الانتخابيه والتصدي للبلطجيه فيها.

8. A number of police officers and soldiers were injured while attempting to protect and secure the voting sites and to confront the bullies

FP05, # 12

In the sentences where the passive form أُصيب *injured* is used, all that is known is that people are injured but the reader is not provided any information as to who injured them.

In the 2005 elections, the main two players were the NDP and the MB. So in studying the above ergative clauses, the Medium is found to be either government-related, MB-related, or is left vague (i.e., there is no clue who the Medium is). For the purpose of the present analysis, it will be assumed that if the Medium is government related, then the external cause (the assumed agent of the ergative process (Halliday, 1994: 165)) is the MB and if the medium is the MB, then the external cause is government-related. Moreover, if the medium cannot be assigned because it is left unmentioned in the text, it will be called 'vague' and more information will be sought in both the text and the context to generate the external cause for these 'vague' Mediums. The Medium distribution is presented in Table 6.3. The percentage of frequency of the Medium is presented in Figure 6.3.

Table 6.3 Medium distribution in 2005 reports

	Medium	Attribution
36A	6 soldiers and a number of officers	Government
	35 people	Vague
	A lawyer	Vague
36B	Independent candidates (NDP)	Government
	One supporter of the banned MB	MB
	Tens of people	Vague
	NDP candidate's brother	Government
36C	Police officers and soldiers	Government




Figure 6.2 Medium distribution in ergativity clauses in 2005 front-page reports

This chart highlights the following points:

1. The MB is the external cause of violent acts in 50 percent;
2. The government is the external cause of violent acts in 12 percent.

However, the percentage under ‘vague’ can be added to the government’s share based on the previous analysis which has shown that whenever the external cause is mystified, the context triggers the reader to hold the MB responsible for the violent acts. Therefore, the government would be responsible for only 12 percent as a cause of violence while the MB, in turn, would be responsible for 88 percent. In terms of the ideological square, the chart shows that the *we vs they* dichotomy works on the level of transitivity as well: *our* evils are mitigated while *theirs* are accentuated.

The frequent reference to the MB in front-page stories in a negative way as in (37) supports the anchoring process by which the reader cognitively connects any violent act that has no explicit cause to the MB.

(37)

16. وقد ألفت أجهزه الأمن القبض علي أكثر من 200 شخص من مثيري الشغب والبلطجه من أنصار مختلف المرشحين بالمحافظات التسع .
17. وذكر مصدر أمني مسئول أن هولاء سوف تتم احالتهم الي النيابة المختصة.
18. وأكدت وزاره الداخليه في بيان أمس أن قوات الشرطه تعاملت علي الفور مع أحداث الشغب,
19. واتخذت الاجراءات القانونيه بشأن أعمال الشغب التي أثارها مؤيدو المرشحين في ظل حاله توتر بالغه
20. أشاعها المرشحون تحت شعارات اسلاميه,

21. وأنه جري القبض علي أكثر من ثمانيه من عناصر جماعه الاخوان المسلمون المحظوره
بتهمه الشغب.

16. The security authorities arrested more than 200 riot-agitators and bullies among the supporters of different candidates
17. A security source said that those people will be referred to the prosecution authorities.
18. In a statement issued yesterday, the ministry of Interior confirmed that the police has immediately dealt with the riots
19. And has taken legal action regarding the riots sparked by the candidates' supporters amid an extremely tense situation
20. Created by candidates with Islamic slogans,
21. And more than 8 elements belonging to the banned MB have been arrested as riot-agitators.

FP05, #11

In the first part of the report (L16–L.19), the actors of ‘riots’ and ‘violence’ are left unidentified. In L.20, the MB is claimed to be guilty and this justifies arresting them (L.21). In transitivity terms, the members of the MB are represented as Actor of violence and chaos and the object of *arrest*, where they are the Goal of the process. This is the most recurring image of the MB in *al-Ahram* so far. A further example of the MB as the Actor in material processes is given in (38) where the MB members are depicted as, again, terrorists, vandals, street fighters and bullies.

(38)

29. قام نحو مائه شخص من انصار المرشح تحت شعار اسلامي صبري خلف الله.. برشق المقر الانتخابي للمرشح احمد محمد ابوزيد بدائره قسم ثان الاسماعيليه بالزجاجات الفارغه والاشتباك مع بعض انصاره..
30. اسفر ذلك عن اصابه اثنين وتم نقلهما الي المستشفى.
31. تم ابلاغ قسم دمنهور من مدرس بكلية الزراعه بدمنهور وكيله عن المرشح مصطفى الفقي انه
32. في اثناء استقلاله سياره ملاكي اسكندريه
33. فوجيء بانصار المرشح تحت شعار اسلامي محمد جمال حشمت خارجين من مكتبه بشارع الطحان حاملين العصي وزجاجات مملوءه بسائل البنزين ومثبت بها فتيل
34. وقاموا باتلاف زجاج السياره الخلفي.
35. كما ابلاغ سائق انه حال قيادته اوتوبيسا وبرفته وكيل الدكتور مصطفى الفقي امام مدرسه احمد محرم ابوالريش
36. قام بعض الاشخاص بايقاف الاوتوبيس والتعدي عليهما بالضرب, واحداث تلفيات بالسياره
37. وفروا هاربين

29. About 100 MB candidates supporters threw the election headquarters of the NDP candidates Ahmad Abu Zeid with empty bottles and they *clashed* with his supporters.
30. [the clash] resulted in the injury of two persons who were transported to the hospital.
31. A professor at Damanhur College of Agriculture who is also representative of el-Fiki [an NDP candidate] has informed the police station that

32. While he was driving
33. He was surprised by the supporters of the Gamal Heshamt, running under Islamic slogans, carrying sticks, bottles filled with liquid gasoline and installed by the fuse
34. And they broke the car's windshield
35. A driver also reported to the police that while driving in the company of Dr. el-Feqi's representative ,
36. Some people blocked and stopped the bus , beated them and caused some damages to the bus
37. And then [they] escaped.

FP05, #11

A salient feature of the clauses that have the MB as the Actor is war metaphor. The semantic field of the chosen processes belongs to fighting and war: *throw, clash, injure, fight with sticks and burning bottles, break, block, damage, and escape*. The war metaphor is significantly used to legitimize the process of exclusion (Wodak and Matouschek, 1993) that is practiced by the Egyptian government, and to naturalize all the harsh techniques and discursive representations that have been implemented against the group. All the unlawful acts are attributed to the MB and this attribution is made by someone who is said to have witnessed them. This 'someone' is sometimes a driver (L35), professor (L31), or a witness. The story, then, is confirmed discursively by, directly or indirectly, quoting some sources that do not belong to *al-Ahram* nor to the MB.

One last example of material processes in which the MB is the Actor is given in (39). This example relevantly underlines the ideological square. Here, a senior US source is commenting on the Egyptian elections. He was quoted as denying the involvement of the Egyptian police or the government in the clashes and as accusing all the candidates of being involved in violence. He uses two material processes: *run* and *implicated* (i.e., involved).

(39)

5. وأن بعضها جري علي يد مرشحين للحزب الوطني.

6. بينما تورطت جماعه الاخوان المسلمين المحظوره في اعمال عنف مماثله.

5. Some of [the violent acts] which have run at the hands of candidates of the NDP
6. While the MB was implicated [indulged / involved] in similar violent acts

FP05, #10

Comparing the two clauses in L.5 and L.6 shows that the process in the first clause mitigates the action associated with government while accentuates it with the MB. In L.5, *the violent act* itself is the medium, according the ergativity analysis, and the real external cause is placed in the background while in L.6, the clause is phrased in an SVO order, which highlights the MB as a direct Actor of the material process *involve*. This means while *some actions happened at the hands of the some NDP candidates* (L.5), the *MB* (as a whole) *was involved in violence*.

In the clause in (40), the MB is the Goal: *the President knows the connections running on between the US and the MB*. Highlighting the connection with the US is

significant at that time because of two reasons. The first is the then-recent US invasion of Iraq with the help of some Iraqi opposition groups and the second is the negative US image in the Arab world because of its unfair foreign policy and its bias towards Israel against the Palestinians.

(40)

3. علي الأمريكيين ألا يظنوا أنني نائم والمعلومات تأتيني أولاً بأول حول اتصالاتهم مع الإخوان المسلمين

3. The Americans [US administration] do not have to think that I am sleeping; information comes to me first-hand on their contacts with the Muslim Brotherhood.

FP05, #53

For these two reasons, the US or any connections with it would have negative repercussions in the consciousness of the ordinary Egyptian citizen. So reporting that the MB are running contacts with the US (like the Iraqi opposition) would trigger fear and apprehension towards the group's intentions.

The same theme of association is used when the MB is connected with entities that have a negative image in the memory of the Egyptian people, as in (41). This example is taken from an interview with the President by the Kuwaiti *Politics*.

(41)

4. ما سر تحالف الإخوان المسلمين مع التكفيريين مع الناصريين ومع جماعه حزب الغد واجتماعهم ضد الرئاسة وضد الرئيس؟
5. تستطيع ان تري وتقدر من يقف وراءهم.

4. What is the secret behind the alliance of the Muslim Brotherhood with the Takfiri groups, Nasserites and the Ghad party, and their coming together against the president?
5. You can see it and know who stands behind them

FP05, #52

The MB is represented as initiating alliances with other groups that are or presented to be as extremists and of anti national interests: Takfiri, Nasserites and the Ghad ‘tomorrow’ Party. Mubarak’s answer does not explicitly state that the US is the country that stands behind them but it is implied. Moreover, describing the ally as ‘secret’ in the question implies that this action is perceived as treacherous by the regime – a perception that fosters the idea that the Egyptian regime tends to exclude any type of serious opposition.

It is interesting to find, in later dates in *al-Ahram*, two statements denying the MB connections with the US. On 6 August 2005, David Walsh, a Secretary of State assistant, said, ‘there is no current connection between the US and the MB and there is no plans for any connection in the near future’ (FP05, #42). A message to the same effect was confirmed by the US Secretary of State on 12 June 2005 (FP05, #38). These two denials question the validity of what President Mubarak said on the existence of such connections and the authenticity of the information submitted to him.

The idea of juxtaposing people along two camps, *we vs. they*, and associating them with material processes that belong to different semantic fields and that reflect the ideological square is repeatedly used in front pages. The following example in (42) portrays such division in a clear way.

(42)

2. شارك أكثر من عشرة الاف عضو بالحزب الوطني في مسيره سلميه

3. مؤيده للرئيس حسني مبارك ومبادرته التاريخيه بتعديل الماده(76) من الدستور,

4. ومطالبه الرئيس باعلان ترشيحه.

5. ومن جانب اخر تجمع عدد من أنصار حركة كفايه وقيادات من جماعه الاخوان المحظوره في

نقابتي الصحفيين والمحامين.

6. وطالبوا بالاصلاح السياسي الشامل.

2. More than 10,000 NDP members have participated in a peaceful march
3. To support President Mubarak and his historic initiative to amend constitutional article 76
4. And ask him to declare his candidacy
5. On the other side, a number of people from Kifaya and the Banned MB gathered in both lawyers and journalists' syndicates
6. and called for reform.

FP05, #51

This report pictures the two groups as belonging to two opposing teams. The use of the verbs is significant in this regard: while the first group *participated*, the second *gathered*. Participation has a socially positive connotation as people always participate willingly for good causes while the verb *gather* can have either positive or negative connotation based on the activity done. The actors of the process in L.5 are the MB members and the *Kifaaya* movement, and this implies the negativity of the connotation of the verb *gather*, which can be said to mean *demonstrate*.

Moreover, while the *we* camp called on the President to continue in power, the *they* group called for comprehensive political reforms.

The MB is, moreover, presented as a latent enemy that is waiting for the opportunity to take over power in Egypt, as in (43).

(43)

6. الإخوان يريدون السلطة

7. وإذا حكموا فسيحكمون إلي الأبد

8. وسيسببون القلق في البلاد

9. واطاف ان الاخوان سيبدأون بمهادنه الحاكم كخطوه أولي

10. ثم يبدأون باثاره الفوضي السياسيه,

11. ثم القفز علي الحكم.

6. The Brothers want authority
7. If they rule, they will rule for ever
8. And they will cause chaos in Egypt
9. He added that the MB will start by appeasing the ruler
10. And then start causing political chaos
11. And then jump to the Office

FP05, #50

To summarize the analysis of material processes, it can be said that all the material processes are meant to portray the MB as a threat. The political parties in the modern world are working for serving and ruling their countries. So it is

legitimate for the MB to work towards that goal and it is not a pejorative act to be accused of. Whether they want to take over power or not is ungrounded information that is based on mere apprehension. Moreover, Mubarak himself has been ruling the country since 1981 without any near hope that he will willingly leave. Therefore, the accusation he is making in L.7 applies in the first place to him.

Accusing the MB of causing anxiety (L.11) can be interpreted in relation to either Egyptian Christians or economic disasters. Both of these issues have been recurrent topics when talking about the MB and the likelihood of their coming to power in Egypt. Mubarak here is casting the MB as the villain to the Egyptians and, maybe to the West too, to legitimize his position towards the MB. He is using the fear strategy to divide people into two camps where *our* camp is safer while *theirs* is dangerous.

The analysis of both the verbal and relational processes indicates that they work in the same direction as the material processes in excluding the MB and associating them with negative images. In the data of 2000, all the verbal processes were associated with government authorities and press sources without any reference to the MB. In 2005, there are two reports where the verbal processes have an MB member as a Sayer. Interestingly, these verbal processes are either neutral or are in the interest of the government. In FP05 # 28 and #31, the MB spokesman and the MB Guidance Imam are quoted respectively on the same topic: the presidential election. In the first example, Dr. Habib, the MB spokesman, denied that the MB has any plans to vote for a certain presidential candidate (FP05, #28). In the other example, the General Guidance of the MB is quoted as having called the people to

actively participate in the election (FP 05, # 31). The two verbal processes used with the MB figures worked in the interests of Mubarak as *calling* all the people to participate in the election with no guarantee that the elections are transparent and would only increase election turn out in Mubarak's side. The verbal process used by the reporter to comment on what Habib said belongs to the negative type. The report quotes Habib as saying, 'the result [of the elections] is, as he claims, known in advance'. Here the use of the negative verbal process *claim* indicates the reporter's stance towards the content of what his source is saying; that the results are predetermined is just a claim of Habib.

All the other verbal processes in the data are associated with the government: the President, PM, MPs, Ministers, or informed sources. The function of these processes is to either positively add to the government or negatively to the MB. All the verbal subtypes work in this direction. The President is always reported with the neutral subtype as in 'he [the President] *says*: I am entrusted on the lives of 70 million Egyptians' (FP05, #50), or with a positive ones 'he *emphasized* that the demonstrations [of the MB and Kifaya] are aimless'. When he is reported with a negative subtype, it is in the interests of the country, as in 'he *warned* that demonstrations lead to the flight of investors, which, in turn, will lead to more unemployment in Egypt' (ibid.). When *emphasize* is used, the ideological square is an issue. Following is a list of examples that shows how the verbal processes contribute to building the ideological square:

Good self:

- A. He [a security source] *emphasized* the adherence of the police to

neutrality and preserving stability and security. (#1)

- B. The ministry of Interior *confirmed* that the police has immediately dealt with the riots (#11)
- C. Major General Ibrahim Hammad emphasized that stability and security is number 1 priority during the election (#12)
- D. el-Fiki [a prominent NDP member] denied the happening of any fraud or manipulation in his constituency. (#9)

Bad other:

- A. Information *emphasized* that they [MB] aim to plan to provoke the public, specially students and workers to spark chaos and to call for civil disobedience
- B. He also *stressed* that the banned MB supporters are responsible of most of the violence acts. (#12)
- C. Nazif [PM] *downplayed* the importance of the achievement of the MB in the late elections.
- D. He [el-Fiki] *accused* the MB of terrorizing the judges. (#9)

Moreover, the negative verbal subtype is used significantly to highlight the MB members as obnoxious and arrogant, as in (44). The context of this report is that a group of people from different political trends gathered to form a coalition to help Egypt get out from its political, economic and social stagnancy. Representatives of these trends met to discuss the agenda of the project. According to the report, there had been some arguments among the participants and:

(44)

11. حيث اضطر حسين عبدالرازق الي الانسحاب من الجبهة,

12. وتدخل الدكتوران نعمان جمعه وعزيز صدقي لحسم الخلاف الدائر

13. بعد تمسك ممثل الاخوان بأن يكون شعار إداره الحمله الانتخابيه الاسلام هو الحل.

11. As Huessin Abdrazeq was forced to withdraw from the front

12. And Dr Gumaa and Dr Sidqi have to intervene to resolve the ongoing dispute

13. After the MB representative insisted that the slogan campaign should be 'Islam is the Solution'.

FP05, #26

The MB member is represented in L.13 as the one who ruined the meeting. The use of the negative verbal process *insist* negatively highlights the behaviour of the MB representative as someone who was so relentless that he caused one representative to quit the meeting. The same use reiterates in another report where the reported person said that the MB 'wants to impose their opinion by force' (FP05,#34 L.9).

The last process category to be discussed is the relational: how the MB identifies and is identified by others. Most of the examples of relational processes occur in the predicate of verbal process. Therefore, to avoid repetition, the role of the relational processes in portraying the MB will be summarized. The main identifications of the MB through relational processes are (all the statements are made by Egyptian officials and elites):

- A. Banned organization: *Nazif said the MB is a banned organization (#49)*. The theme that MB is banned is not actually new but is a continuation of the excluding policy by subsequent regimes in Egypt as has been shown in the discussion of social practices. Many officials have reiterated the same statement in many occasions;
- B. Antigovernment: *90 percent of the votes Nour received are from the MB (#27)*. The focus on the MB as an antilegitimacy entity took various forms: accusing them of allying with other antigovernment groups, and supporting any project that would weaken the government;
- C. Connection to acts of violence: *MB supporters are responsible for most of the violence acts (#12)*. This is a recurrent theme in 2000 and 2005. No single piece of news talks about the MB without a reference to them as committing violence, sentenced for violence, or released from prison;
- D. Ungrounded claimers: *the hollow slogans, empty statements, loud voice policy and disturbing interference are the weapons of those who do have the truth (#9)*. This is actually a traditional technique of the NDP towards its opponents. The government attributes its real opponents with lack of vision, lack of planning and lack of socio-economic programmes;
- E. Connection to terrorism and al-Qaeda: *Al-zawahry [the second man in al-Qaeda] is from the MB (#36)*. A prominent Egyptian novelist and writer has reiterated the same meaning in (#34). In only one instance in the data under analysis did the Egyptian PM announce in a press conference in the US that,

'the MBs are neither terrorists nor extremists' (#49). Other than that, al-Qaeda is represented as historically connected to the MB;

F. Aimless: *the demonstrators have no programs.* (#53). This point is related to D above.

The only relational clause that positively represented the MB was when the president of the Egyptian parliament was asked about why the MB excelled all other opposing parties in the 2005 elections. He said, *'The MB is more organized and more energetic'* (FP05, #17 L.1) .

To conclude this section, the analysis of how the MB is represented according to the transitivity system in front-page reports underlines the group with a negative image of an exclusionary nature. The MB members are:

- Associated with acts of violence;
- Disturbing the society;
- Members of an illegal entity;
- Mentally perceived and identified as illegitimate.

This image goes in line with both the social practices and the IR analyses in which the Brothers have been negatively represented. In the next section, voicing is analyzed to see who gets to be reported in the front page reports and the influence of voicing on the represented image of the MB

6.1.4. *Sourcing*

All the news reports on the MB in 2005 reflect a stunning absence of the voice of Islamists even in the reports that handle critical election-related issues. The prevailing voice is that of the elites: government officials and close-to-the-government thinkers. The macrostructures of the reports that deal with the MB in 2005 are as follows:

- A. Use of violence in election;
- B. Police negative interference in the election process;
- C. Accusation of fraud;
- D. Connection to terrorism;
- E. Why MB success.

In none of the reports that handled these topics has any MB member been sourced or reported. The organization is always talked about but never talks. In all the reports about the use of violence in election, the following bodies were sourced:

1. The securities authorities (#1, #12);
2. General marshal gamal hammad, the interior spokesman (#1, #15);
3. The minister of justice (#1);
4. Security sources (#2, #10);
5. An american high-level source (#10);
6. Safwat el-sherif, (#4,, #12). He is the chairman of the *shura* council (senators)

And a minister of information and media for 22 years;

7. The saudi minister of interior (#36);

8. Khairi shalabi (#34), an egyptian writer and thinker;
9. David walsh, an assistant to the us secretary of state (#38);
10. Condoleezza Rice the US Secretary of State (#42).

It is noted that, during the presidential election, some news emerged that the MB recommended voting for Nour against Mubarak. Only then did *al-Ahram* source the MB spokesman to deny the news. After the MB surprised many fronts by winning 20 percent of the parliament's seats in 2005, the question that has been ongoing since then is: what does stand behind the MB success? In an attempt to answer this question, *Al-Ahram* sourced only one of the NDP veterans , Dr. Ahmad Fathi Sorour (#12). When the Judges' Club accused the police officers of interfering in the elections process, the following sources were reported:

1. A US.senior official (#10);
2. The Interior spokesman (#7);
3. The Chairman of judges' Club (#7).

Finally, In Damanhur constituency, one of the most prominent NDP figures, Dr. Mostafa el-Fiki, ran against the MB candidate, Dr. Gamal Heshamt. The official results announced the NDP candidate the winner. This was shocking to many fronts including the majority of the judges who supervised the process of voting and counting in that particular constituency. Dr. Heshamt held a press conference and announced that there was evidence of ballot rigging for the NDP candidate. Although this situation requires hearing from both sides, the report that covered the rigging issue did not source any other voice except the government candidate, Dr. el-Fiki (#9).

In conclusion, the analysis of voicing in the news reports works on the same line of exclusion. The MB is not quoted directly or indirectly in any of the 2005 reports – something that substantially affects the objectivity and trustworthiness of the reports. Since analyzing sourcing in the 2000 data revealed the same conclusion, it can safely be said that the absence of the MB voice in *al-Ahram* is not accidental and is a result of a systematic exclusionary strategy practised by the government. The next section examines the data in terms of lexical choices and references to the MB.

6.1.5. *Lexical Choices*

Labelling is a powerful tool that can be used to foreground the two poles of the ideological square. The analysis of labelling examines what lexical choices are used to refer to the MB and the effect of these choices in terms of the theme of exclusion. The process of naming or referring to people can be significant in terms of in- and out-grouping. So, calling someone loyal and another a betrayer would necessarily indicate that the first is included, i.e., with *us*, and the second is excluded. Lexical choices in the present data highlight the theme of *othering* the MB; that is to say, the MB is portrayed as standing in another square from the government, the people and the society. *Othering* the MB is done qualitatively and quantitatively as well. Qualitatively, the MB is excluded on the legal, cultural and social levels, and quantitatively, it is excluded in terms of being *few* and minority compared to the majority of the government side.

The MB is presented in the data as a legally *banned* group that is not allowed to take part in the political process. Ironically, in the parliament, the MB members act as one group under the Muslim Brothers slogan. Searching for al-Ikhwan, الاخوان, ‘the Brothers’ and al-MaHuuTHra banned, المحظورة/ المحظور, resulted in the occurrence of 101 and 51 occurrences, respectively. This means that the label *banned* is associated with 50 percent of the MB occurrences. Studying the relational clauses in the 2005 news reports revealed that most of the labels and references to the MB are made implicitly and indirectly. This is done by leaving the responsibility of violence unattributed to any party, and because of the anchoring principle, whereby the readers attribute the responsibility of any violence actions to the members of MB. Consequently, all the references made to violence committers will be labels and references to the MB. One of the legal labels used to describe the MB is المخالفين, *violators* (F05, #1). A violator is someone who transgresses the rules and consequently deserves punishment. Another label under the legal category is *thugs* and *bullies*, البلطجية, which were mentioned eleven times in the data associated with either no specified actor or with members of the MB. When they are associated with the MB, they are the external cause of the ergative clauses as in ‘the supporters of the religious candidate randomly fire shots’ (#1). *Hooligans* and *thugs* are mentioned three times (#7, L.8 and L.56; # 11, L.8) in the context of the religious candidate’s supporters committing violence against the NDP supporters. Another label from the same field is *riot-provoking experts*, محترف في اثارة الشغب (FP05, #7, L.13). This label is explicitly attributed to the MB in FP05, #11, L.11–13 and L.21–29. These clauses have been studied under the analysis of the material processes in the analysis of

transitivity. The label *troublemakers*, مشاغبين, is mentioned in the headline of FP05, #11 without any connection or attribution to any entity. However, the reader will definitely deduce that the *troublemakers* are the MB supporters and members.

(45)

21. About 100 MB candidates supporters threw empty bottles at the election headquarters of the NDP candidates Ahmad Abu Zeid, and they *clashed* with his supporters
22. This resulted in the injury of two people, who were hospitalized
23. A professor at Damanhur College of Agriculture, who is also representative of el-Fiki [an NDP candidate], has informed the police station that
24. While he was driving
25. He was surprised by the supporters of Gamal Heshamt, running under Islamic slogans, carrying sticks, bottles filled with liquid gasoline and installed with fuses
26. They broke the car's windshield
27. A driver also reported to the police that while driving in the company of Dr al-Feqi's representative,
28. Some people blocked the road and stopped the bus, beat the passengers and caused some damage to the bus

29. And then escaped

FP05, #11

Violence initiator in FP05, #12 is another reference that is given to the MB to further highlight the negative image. Major General Ibrahim Hammad, the Minister of Interior's assistant and the Interior Ministry spokesman, uses the label which gives it an official stamp. The label is not always used as a noun or attribute but sometimes as an action as in '[the MB members] incited them [the people] to demonstrate after Friday prayers yesterday' (FP05, #55, L.7). *Terrorists* is also a label given to the MB by Mustafa el-Fiki in FP05, #9. He is reported to say 'the Brothers terrorize the judges, especially the youth of them'. There is no further explanation given in the report on how the MB harass or terrorize the judges or in what capacity. Other than in this place, the MB is not linked to terrorism except by implication.

Culturally, a group can be excluded by referring to them as *not belonging to the mainstream culture*. In addition, they can be referred to as those who have their own way of understanding religion, which is in contrast with the mainstream understanding and rituals. The main labels in this field are *extremists* and *religious currents*. Connecting the MB with extremism appears in two places in the data (FP05, #34 and # 36). In FP #34, the report surveys people's opinions of and reactions to the terrorist explosions that took place in the Egyptian tourist city Sharm al-Sheikh in July 2005. One of the reported sources, Khairi Shalabi, a prominent writer and thinker, makes the statement that 'these actions are done by al-Qaeda and the leading figures of al-Qaeda, like Ayman Azzawahry, belong to the Brothers'. He, furthermore, says, 'the government propitiates the religious currents'. The

implication of the labels *current* and *extremists* is that this group is culturally considered as representing itself and not the mainstream. The label *religious current* occurred nine times (#1 twice, #2, #11 twice, #15 and #34 three times). In all the occurrences, it referred to the MB, except in #34 where it referred to religious movements in general.

Another label that feeds into the same direction is *elements*. It is repeated three times (#11 twice, #41) and in both cases it is used to refer to the MB. The significance of the use of this label in terms of exclusion has already been discussed in the analysis of *lexical choices* in Chapter five. Mubarak used the same concept of being culturally different in FP05, #59 when he said ‘We are all Muslims! Are the Brothers a different type! Each one [of Islamists] has his own concept. And we all perform prayers. So you can not differentiate between a Muslim and another’ (L. 21–27). The argument that Mubarak was trying to make here was that since we all perform the same prayers and perform the basic religious duties, we are all Muslims and there is no need for a group of people to claim that they are different or have a different understanding of Islam. So according to Mubarak, the MB is considered a splinter from the fabric of society.

Excluding a group or a person socially means representing them as not conforming to the socially accepted norms and rules. Labels and references of this type would fall under the social sanction type in the Appraisal Judgment analysis terms (see Table 4.2). In the data, there are three attributes from the social sanction category two of which are made by Safwat al-Shereef, Chairperson of the *Shura* Council. In one report the MB has been described as *thugs* and *bullies*. Commenting

on the violent acts committed during elections he said, ‘Resorting to these types of behavior is unacceptable and is a negative phenomenon, and constitutes a pressure on the election process’. He added that the NDP candidates were targets of great violence in front of the voting sites (FP05, #11). Since the main opponent of the NDP in the election was the MB, the NDP candidates, by implication, were harassed by the MB supporters and then they were practicing the type of behavior that he described as unacceptable and negative. In another report as in (54), the reporter describes the behaviour of the MB candidate as unacceptable.

The last axis to be discussed and through which the *other* can be excluded is the quantitative. This simply means the representation of the *other* as minority, or referring to them as a small in number and power, helpless and contained, compared to the majority which is big in number and power, and has access to resources. This strategy has been revealed in data for 2000 and here as well. This technique is observed in FP05, #51 (given in (29)). The ideological square is typically exemplified in this example and can be represented in terms of the *we* vs *they* dichotomy as follows:

WE

- *Are 10,000*
- *Participate* [positive connotation]
- *Peaceful march*
- *Support the President*
- *Ask the President to continue*
- *Are legal*
- *Have access* [implicated]

THEY

- *Are a number of ...*
- *Gather* [neutral negative connotation]
- *NA* (but impliedly the opposite)
- *Oppose the President*
- *Ask the President to stop*
- *Banned*
- *Do not have access* [implicated]

The analysis of lexical choices supports the search results reached so far: the news reports on the MB are meant to exclude the group legally, socially and culturally. The next section presents the last tool of analysis in this chapter: presupposition.

6.1.6. *Presupposition*

Although there are fewer examples of presupposition in the 2005 data compared to 2000, the examples found are significant and relevant to the theme of exclusion. The presupposition examples work in two directions, matching the two slots in the ideological square: good *us* vs bad *them*. The first group beautifies the image of the regime. When the PM was asked about the justification for imprisoning a large number of such an important category as the MB, he answered ‘the democratic reforms are much bigger than any arrests that happen due to riots ...’ (FP05, #48). The PM here was presupposing that there are democratic reforms and he was using this as a justification for the arrests. The significance of his placing democratic reforms in the background is to hide it from questioning and, therefore, the focus of the reader will be diverted from focusing on the question of whether or not there democratic reforms to focus on whether the reforms are bigger than, hence justifying, the arrests or not. The significance of presupposition is given more weight when it is known that the interview was done in the US with *US Today*. Here the PM was portraying the good image of the Egyptian regime to respond to the US call to start serious democratic reforms and at the same time justifying the regime’s harsh procedures against its opponents, especially the MB.

In one of the reports, a security source said that three leaders of the MB were arrested because they were planning for actions to *shake stability and breach people's security* (FP05, #55). This clause presupposes the existence of *security and stability* which, in turn, promotes the good image of the regime while negatively stamping the MB. Instead of being intrigued by the presupposition focal point, i.e., were they planning or not, the real question should be: is there stability and security in the Egyptian society or not? But the use of presupposition underlies this information and directs the readers' attention to the verbal phrase: they were plotting and they deserve the punishment.

A further example of presupposition that supports building the good self is when Mubarak said in one of the interviews 'demonstrations will lead to the flight of both local and foreign investments' (FP05, #50 and #53). It is presupposed that there are investments already going on in Egypt and this indicates that the government is properly running the country in terms of economy. This view that is given the lie by various professional reports about the unprecedented poverty level and unemployment in Egypt. This is a headline from Reuters reporting a UN source on poverty in Egypt: 'Poverty grows in Egypt despite rapid growth'. However, how many readers would go and check on the information and statistics given in the government's documents? This means that presupposition works on a large scale on the newspaper readership. One example of presupposition that embodies the essential stance of the government towards the MB is when Egyptian officials repeatedly ground the banning of the MB on the statement 'the law/Constitution does not allow establishing political parties on a religious basis, so we will not allow parties on a

religious basis' (FP05, #45, #48, #52). The included implication here is that there would be no problem in authorizing parties based on civil principles. Examining real life practices of the Egyptian regime would falsify this implication. Research is needed to validate these presuppositions and implications. This type of research would prove whether the government is really implementing and adhering to the law or if it is just a pretext to ban and suppress any potential politically threatening power from growing under a legal umbrella. In the next chapter, such an aspect is discussed in detail.

Another relative presupposition is when the PM said, 'they [the MB] say that they have given up violence. We are waiting to see this in reality' (FP05, #45). The presupposition made here is that the Brothers have been violent and the question now is: did they abandon it or not? The significance of the presupposition is highlighted when it becomes known that this information was given in the US to the leaders of American society in the Washington Institute of Near Eastern Studies. The negative image of the MB was given to the West to justify Mubarak's iron fist on Islamists and to promote the idea that he was the one who could preserve the interests of the US in the area.

In sum, the analysis of presupposition supports the findings reached in previous analyses: *othering* and excluding the MB is a main theme of any report related to the group. In addition, presupposition is used to legitimize the current regime and hence claim any opposition as illegitimate.

6.2. Concluding Note

In this chapter, the front-page news reports have been analyzed by using a number of linguistic tools to examine how the news reports more or less include/exclude the MB. The analysis started by approaching the data from the perspective of an average reader to see what the readers-for-a-gist would get from quickly skimming the headlines and parts of the lead. Then the data were approached for detailed analysis using these tools: transitivity, sourcing lexical choices and presupposition. Significantly, all the analyses led to the same conclusion: whenever the MB is the topic of the proposition, it is always pejoratively portrayed and negatively talked about. The next chapter brings it all together. It takes the analysis results as a point of departure and compares them to other texts to see whether that gives a similar or different perspective. Moreover, it attempts to connect the divergent, local and global lines pertaining to Islamism to get a better understanding of the phenomenon and explain the grounds of why Islamism is perceived and presented the way it is.

7. THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD AND THE DISCOURSE OF SILENCE

7.1. Introduction

The present chapter attempts to pinpoint the common ground underlying the negative MB representation as explained in the analysis. The analysis of transitivity has shown that the MB is portrayed solely in a negative way, associated with actors of violence, irresponsible acts and bullying. It is also identified as a *banned* group. The people sourced in the reports represented the *good self* side of the ideological square and the voice of the MB has never been raised or heard. The choice of lexical items singled it out as a different group from mainstream society and finally, the use of presupposition supported the negative image of the MB and the positive image of the regime. Parallel with the negative media representation, the MB organization and members have been exposed to various harassment techniques to curtail their influence and eradicate the potential political threat of the group. The regime has used several methods of persecution which ranged from the use of sheer power – such as detention – prohibition of travelling, prison, referral to military tribunals and liquidation of assets, to soft power, such as negatively representing them in the media and in public, local and international, forums. This chapter is organized around the main points raised by the regime against the MB. An attempt is made to discuss the same points in the light of sources and news reports from different media outlets to

see whether these other sources will render a similar or different perspective from that which is presented in *al-Ahram*. The main issues that are raised against the MB and used as a pretext to persecute its activities are:

1. The MB is a theocratic organization and is anticivil society; it wants to establish a theocratic state;
2. The MB legitimates and uses violence to achieve its goals. The news reports frequently reported the group as being associated with violent acts against NDP candidates and society;
3. The MB is against democracy regardless of their claim that they commit themselves to democracy and civil society and if they came to power, they would forsake democracy.

Examining these points requires reference to other pertinent texts to see if that perspective is similar to or different from the image that is presented in the reports of *al-Ahram*. Studying other texts is called intertextuality. According to Fairclough, intertextuality is “the property texts have of being full of snatches of other texts, which may be explicitly demarcated or merged in, and which the text may assimilate, contradict, ironically echo, and so forth” (1992: 84). Furthermore, Fairclough typifies intertextuality into *manifest intertextuality*, how quoted utterances are selected, changed, and contextualized; and *constitutive intertextuality*, how texts are made up of heterogeneous elements, generic conventions, discourse types, register and style (ibid.). The importance of such analysis is that it shows how texts are produced and reproduced in the light of other social and discursive practices.

Intertextuality leads us to think of another crucial point, that is, the absence of intertextuality or *intertextuality silence*. Intertextuality silence is the omission of other crucial pertaining texts or sources that partially or drastically change the outcome of the present text and the absence of which mystifies the text. Huckin (2002) has developed a framework for studying *textual silence*. He defines silence as “the omission of some piece of information that is pertinent to the topic at hand” (348). According to Huckin, the five broad categories of textual silence are:

1. *Speech-act silences* are those that have illocutionary force by virtue of being so interpretable by a reader/listener;
2. *Presuppositional silences* are those that serve communicative efficiency by not stating what the speaker/writer apparently assumes to be common knowledge;
3. *Discreet silences* are those that avoid stating sensitive information;
4. *Genre-based silences* are those that are governed by genre conventions;
5. *Manipulative silences* are those that deliberately conceal relevant information from the reader (ibid.).

The intertextuality silence can be subcategorized under Huckin’s manipulative silence.

This chapter considers what is absent from the MB representation in *al-Ahram*. The first point that will be analyzed in the next section concerns Islamists and theocracy: it discusses whether Islamists are theocratic or not. Next, whether Islamists are democratic or not is handled in where a definition of democracy and its applications are explained. In the penultimate section, the discussion deals with the

essential point of the present dissertation and answers a basic question: why are Islamists excluded? This section talks about an enlightening side of the MB that is dimmed in *al-Ahram* and that is made invisible to its readers. The last section deals with one type of silence that has substantially contributed to establish the negative image created for Islamists in *al-Ahram*; that is sourcing. An attempt is made to listen to voices that were supposed to be present in *al-Ahram* when it reported on the MB, but were not, in order to see whether they support, modify or alter the present readings of *al-Ahram* reports.

7.2. Islamists: Theocrats or Democrats

One of the recurrent issues raised against the MB is that the Egyptian regimes have banned the organization due to its religion-based orientation and its nonacceptance of the concept of civil society. This argument has been marketed to justify the regime's continuous refusal to include the MB in Egyptian political life and authorize them to establish a political party. This view is held not only by the old guardians of the NDP, but also by the new generation and many prominent writers and journalists. In an interview with *Council on Foreign Relations*, Mohamed Kamal,⁴ a prominent member of a new generation of reformers within Egypt's ruling NDP, said:

Our view towards the Muslim Brotherhood hasn't changed. We still consider them a banned organization, an illegal organization. *We still adhere to the*

⁴ http://www.cfr.org/publication/9321/egypts_mohamed_kamal.html> Retrieved April 2009.

law that prevents the creation of a party based on religion, and that's what they want to do. (Author's emphasis)

The question that poses itself here is: is the MB really a theocratic group that is in opposition to civil and democratic society? According to the *Britannica Concise Encyclopedia*, theocracy is defined as "Government by divine guidance or by officials who are regarded as divinely guided." Examining the MB literature did not lead to any support of this theocratic orientation. In contrast, what is found is a complete negation of this idea. Abdel Moneim Abul-Fotouh, a leading MB member, wrote in *The Guardian*:

We have been accused of being theocratic or promoting terrorism. In fact, we reject the theocratic model of the state and believe in a peaceful transfer of power and we respect the people's choice through the ballot box. Many of our female members and activists were candidates in the elections and all are encouraged to participate in the public sphere. We have repeatedly condemned all forms of terrorism in Egypt and around the world, and have endorsed *fatwas* forbidding the terrorizing of innocent people. (16 March 2007)

Khairat el-Shatir, the MB vice-president, who at the time of writing (August 2009) is under arrest because of what is known to be the international MB Organization, also wrote in *The Guardian*, "We are committed to democracy and to respect fair election results, whatever the outcome" (23 November 2005).

Although the MB literature reflects the same conclusion regarding theocracy of the state and confirms their appreciation of democracy, it needs to be clarified here, however, that political Islamists accept democracy as a general framework and not necessarily in detail. The basic features in democracy that are accepted by Islamists are:

1. people have the right to express themselves;
2. people have the right to choose their rulers and reject them;

3. it is the consensus of the community that is the final arbiter in public affairs, and the concept of a veto power exercised by the clergy has no theological and legal basis (Ahmad, 2002);
4. all citizens are equal before the law regardless of their religion, gender or ethnicity.

However, democracy, in the literal sense of the term, is not agreed upon because:

It is not the structure of an Islamic state that should constitute the focal point in constructing an Islamic polity; what really matters is the question of its functions, goals and objectives. The specific structural arrangements and institutional features of one Islamic state may differ from another due to differences in material conditions, but their guiding principles and values must reflect those enunciated in the Qur'an and the traditions of the Prophet. (ibid.)

Under an Islamic state people therefore have the basic types of freedom but they are not the ultimate source of legislation. That is to say, for example, Islamic jurisprudence disallows drinking, handling and dealing with alcohol. Therefore, it is ultimately illegal to approve a law with a contrary effect even if it is a majority demand, which is unlikely to happen because the majority of people in an Islamic state would hold the view that alcoholism is prohibited by God before it is criminalized by the government or the law. This explains why the majority in the Muslim world does not handle alcohol even if it is available and allowed. Along the same lines, Walter Lippman considers it a weakness of democracy that it lays more emphasis on the origin of government rather than on what it should do:

The democratic fallacy has been its preoccupation with the origin of government rather than the processes and results. The democrat has always assumed that if political power could be derived in the right way, it would be beneficent. His whole attention has been on the source of power, since he is hypnotized by the belief that the great thing is to express the will of the people, first because expression is the highest interest of man, and second because the will is instinctively good. But no amount of regulation at the source of a river will completely control its behavior, and while democrats have been absorbed in trying to find a good mechanism of originating social

power, that is to say, a good mechanism of voting and representation, they neglected almost every other interest of men. (Cited in Diggins, 1994: 334)

Theoretically speaking, if the majority in a democratic society decided, for example, to deprive women of some of their basic rights, would it be in the interest of the society to pass this law? The answer would be *yes* if we apply the form of democracy, but *no* if we examine the result and the goal of democracy. Furthermore, in their portraying of the reform project of Islamists, Arab regimes compare it to the present *democratic state* as applied in Europe and America. Such contextualization is, according to Holden, a “definitional fallacy”:

In essence, it is the fallacy of believing that the meaning of ‘democracy’ is to be found simply by examining the systems usually called democracies. A common example of this is the idea that if you want to know what democracy is, you simply have a look at the political systems of Britain and America. There are some deep-rooted misconceptions involved here. Apart from anything else, though, such an idea involves the absurdity of being unable to ask whether Britain and America *are* democracies: if ‘democracy’ *means*, say, ‘like the British political system’ we cannot ask if Britain is a democracy. (1988: 4)

Democracy, therefore, is not the issue so much as what type of democracy. Simply, there is no concept in Islam that makes it inherently incompatible with democracy (Erdoğan, 1999). It is not the purpose or the scope of the present study to get into detailed discussion on democracy and its applications. The concern here is to show that Islamists are not theocratic in the literal sense of the word that is promoted in media to instill fear of their project. Esposito calls the characterization of Islamists as theocratic “a gross distortion” (1999: 145) and he quotes Sayyid Qutb,

The Islamic system is not restricted to solely to a replica of the first Islamic state ... the Islamic system has room for scores of models and new needs of the contemporary age as long as the Islamic idea dominates these models in its expansive external perimeter. (Ibid.)

Furthermore, looking at the practices of the Brothers since the establishment of the organization makes it clear that they are far from theocratic. Since its establishment, the MB has focused on social reform: “they ran small hospitals, built neighborhood mosques and schools, established cottage industries, and opened local social clubs” (ibid.: 138). The MB is fundamentalist in the sense that it calls for a return to the genuine Islamic principles that are timeless but it does not stick to any particular form of government.

Pinning down the reasons for the fear and apprehension of Islamists coming to power, Habib, a prominent Egyptian Christian thinker and writer (2009), says that in Islam there is no such concept of absolute religious authority as it was practiced by the church in the Medieval Age when the clergies ruled as the representatives of God on earth. He says

In fact, Islamic historical experience did not know this model as defined by the historical experience of Western Christianity. In spite of this, the opponents of the Islamist project try to present it as a type of Divine Right rule, i.e., religious dictatorship. This concept is completely in contrast with the Islamic framework and has no basis in the Islamic jurisprudence and, furthermore, did not happen at all along the Islamic history.

It can also be added that this misconception is fed by the fact that the Arab regimes do not want to lose their authority under the growing support for Islamists in their societies and, therefore, they portray Islamists to the West as the bogeyman. This fear is represented by Walsh, for example, who indicates that Islamists embody concerns for lives and freedoms, and their coming to power would cause instability in the Muslim world, terrorism and intolerance (Walsh, 2003 : 18). McGuinn wrote, “United States stands to lose a great deal if it signals a willingness to abandon albeit

rickety allies in favor of ‘popular’ Islamic forces” (Quoted in Abed-Kotob, 1995: 321).

If Islamists have been denied legality under the pretext of being theocrats, would the regime allow Islamists to form a civil political party? The answer is *no*. In January 1996, a group of young Egyptian Islamists announced the formation of a new Islamist party in Egypt and they named it *al-Wasat*, ‘The Middle/The Center’.⁵ The founders of the new party included Muslims, Christians and women. Abu ‘Ila Madi, the representative of the founders, said that *al-Wasat* was a civil party with an Islamic identity. In May 1996, the State Party Affairs Committee refused the application submitted in January to authorize the party. The founders filed an appeal that was also refused in May 1998. In the same month, the founders recruited more people and submitted another application to establish *al-Wasat al-Misri*, ‘the *Egyptian Wasat*’ party, but it did not have any better luck. In 2004, the number of the founders reached 200 people among whom were prominent figures, such as the think-tank professor Abdel-Wahab el-Misiri, the veteran politician Fikri al-Gazzar (also called the laureate of parliament independents), a number of university professors, judges, lawyers, professionals, peasants, workers and artisans. Among the founders were also seven Christians and forty-four women. As usual, the government-appointed Parties Committee refused to authorize the proposed party under the pretext that “it does not offer anything new or different from the existent

⁵ The information is based on my follow-up of the case and on these two websites:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4316258.stm>
<http://www.alwasatparty.com/modules.php?name=Content&pa=showpage&pid=6>>

parties.” The founders appealed to the Parties’ Court at the State Council Commission. A legal expert committee, presided over by a Christian judge, Chancellor Farid Nazeeh Tanago, who was the vice-president of the State Council Commission, prepared a report on the legal opinion and it was to the effect that the decision of the Parties’ Committee regarding *al-Wasat* should be cancelled. The report also noted that the programme of the party was indeed distinctive. A court was due to rule on the matter on 1 October 2005, but the decision was postponed at the request of the government’s lawyers. The government lawyers claimed they needed more time to read the ten-page report written by the legal experts. In April 2006, the case was returned to be reconsidered because the seven Christians had withdrawn their membership under, according to the *al-Wasat* website,³ government pressure. The party has not yet been approved.

Defining what it means to have a both Islamic and a civil party at the same time, Habib, one of the founders, says, “Our Islamic identity is both religious and cultural. When we speak about *al-Wasat*, we refer to a cultural identity which all people, whether in Egypt or any other Arab country, have in common, be they Muslims or Christians” (el-Gawhary, 1996: 30). Madi, comparing it to a similar case in Germany, says “Western countries, such as Germany, for example, have Christian Democratic parties. I have a Muslim friend in Germany who is a member of the ruling Christian Democratic Union (CDU). *Al-Wasat* is a civil party like the CDU – our culture is Islamic, while theirs is Christian” (ibid.).

The Egyptian regime officials have repeatedly announced that there is an option for Islamists to work under any existing working party. The experience of the

MB with the Labor Party has proven the official statement to be words for consumption. The Party has been frozen since 2000 and its newspaper has been confiscated and prevented from being published since then, and the reasons were the penetration of the MB members and leading figures in the Labor Party.

What does the refusal to approve the al-Wasat Party and the harsh restriction on any outlet for Islamists to work legally mean? It suggests that the Egyptian government theocracy-justification is not the real reason behind taking that hard and harsh stance against the MB; and, second, it wants the NDP to maintain the monopoly of power in Egypt and it is not its intention to devolve power. This means there will be no space for the *other* to be represented in an orderly and democratic manner. Mubarak once said, ‘The Brothers want authority ... if they once rule, they will rule forever’ (FP05, #50). Mubarak has been in power since 1981, which makes it look like this statement applies to himself before it applies to others. What type of election or democracy does the Egyptian regime want? They would advocate the democracy that would keep them in power and would exclude the alternative Islamists. The next section examines this accusation in light of other texts.

7.3. Election Process: Democratic or Authoritarian

The analysis of transitivity and lexical choices has shown that the MB members are presented in *al-Ahram* as actors of violence: its members are represented as gangs of thugs who disturb people’s security and terrorize their opponents. To examine the validity of this image, I will study reports pertaining to the Egyptian elections that were done by, local and international, human rights

activists and other civil organizations. I will also compare the regime's actions in similar electoral situations to see its adherence and consistency to democracy and transparency.

The constitutional amendments that were approved by the parliament to have multicandidate presidential elections were devoid of any positive effect in terms of this democratic application. The Egyptian regime should be recognized for this step. However, the arbitrary terms associated with the amendments made it difficult if not impossible for any party other than the NDP to run a candidate. The amendments, as the report of the International Republican Institute (IRI) describes it, were “symbolic” (2005: 3). The Middle East Report (MER) (12/12/2005) called the amendments and the referendum “pseudo reforms.” According to the MER report, “On July 2, the Judges’ Club – the professional syndicate of the Egyptian bench that has been vocally campaigning for greater judicial independence – issued a report confirming that the turnout figures had been manipulated to exaggerate public backing for the amendment. The judges noted that, in several constituencies, the turnout had been officially registered at 100 percent.” This clearly indicates the falsification of the referendum results. The following points have been cited on the presidential election by the IRI report (2005):

1. The limitation on a candidate to be a member in a party that has been established for at least five years with at least 5 percent of seats in both houses of parliament was meant to ban the MB from participating (7);

2. The short period of time from the announcement of the referendum results to the setting of the election date and the beginning of the campaign period denied the candidates from conducting effective campaigns;
3. The continued state of emergency, weakness of opposition political parties, absence of independent candidates and limited time to prepare for elections all contributed to a situation that did not foster a genuinely competitive environment (*ibid.*);
4. The membership of the Presidential Election Commission (PEC) was composed of figures who were former high-ranking members of the NDP. This impugns the commission's integrity and calls into question its objectivity in overseeing the presidential election (*ibid.*);
5. The fact that the decisions of the PEC are "final and subject to no appeal" put the committee above the law;
6. The PEC held the authority to select which judges would supervise election, and excluded nearly 1,500 judges who advocated for greater judicial independence in regard to elections and other issues. This move was seen as particularly politically motivated, given the shortage of judges to cover all 9,739 polling stations.

As for the 2005 parliamentary elections, several reports and witnesses have documented the elections as flawed, with interference from the part of the police and NDP. The IRI monitoring groups working with other civil organizations have reported the following main points (IRI, 2005):

1. Although in the first phase of election, there was almost no interference from the police as reported by all the monitoring organizations, local and international, in both the second and the third phases “the position taken toward the monitors was far more aggressive and many [monitors] were prevented from entering the polling stations. Several were arrested or beaten by police and candidates” supporters primarily affiliated with the ruling party (9);
2. During the counting process, there was too much interference by the police, the judges and candidates’ supporters in the three phases. “Less than 10 percent of the monitors were allowed to observe this critical step in the election process thus impugning the credibility of the election results. Despite assurances from the Election Commission, domestic observers were systematically denied the right to observe the ballots being counted” (9);
3. While the representatives of the opposition parties and independents were deprived from witnessing the vote counting under the pretext that the space is limited inside the counting stations, NDP representatives were allowed to witness the counting (16).

According to the *Washington Post* (10 December 2005), the elections were

“shameful” and:

Government security forces and gangs of thugs from the ruling National Democratic Party blockaded access to dozens of polling sites where opposition candidates were strong. In several cases they opened fire on citizens who tried to vote; 10 people were reported killed. Inside the election stations, government appointees blatantly stuffed ballot boxes in full view of judicial monitors. In some districts, they ignored court orders seeking to prevent them from buying votes or busing in nonresidents to defeat opposition candidates.

A close reading of the results of the 2000 and 2005 elections leads to the belief that the NDP is not the majority’s party. In 2000, official NDP candidates obtained only 172/444 of the seats. However, it was thanks to the ‘returning/rejoining’ independents that the NDP reached a 90 percent majority. In 2005, the NDP candidates only obtained 149/444 of the seats and the same scenario of the rejoined independents secured majority to the NDP. The fact that the regime

was so lenient in the first phase of the first round in 2005, is explained by Brownlee (2006) as

The result of 88 MPs is less than they would have garnered in a fair election but a historical high for the Brotherhood. I would say the results were probably a signal from Mubarak to Bush to back off on democracy promotion. Subsequent developments show that the government feels free to disregard the Brotherhood delegation and begin a new the process of excluding them.

Examining the regime's behavior in the municipal elections would shed some more light on the nature of the ruling regime in Egypt in terms of its adherence and commitment to democracy or elections. Such an analysis would tell whether the regime faithfully believes in democracy and it is a mere "democratic disguise."

It is known that municipal bodies are crucial for any country in running the daily business of people. In Egypt, local councils have long been dominated by the ruling NDP. The importance of these councils increased after the 2005 amendment of the constitutions that made it a condition for any presidential candidate to obtain endorsements from 250 parliament and local councils members in order to run. The government thus was apprehensive of the MB reaching those councils, securing the required endorsement and running a candidate for presidency. Therefore, in February 2006, Mubarak postponed the local elections that were scheduled for April 2006 for two years. The reasons for postponing the elections were to:

- A. Preserve the governing NDP monopoly of power at a time when its grip has begun to loosen after the results of the 2005 elections;
- B. Block the MB from promoting an independent presidential candidate in 2011.

In 2008, in a step to curb the MB from achieving any significant success in the postponed local elections, the government allowed only 60 out of the MB 10,000 potential candidates to register. Coordinating this with step, there was a crackdown against the group. Media reports and a press conference by the MB parliamentary bloc referred to the detention of around 700–800 of the group’s potential candidates (Human Rights Watch (HRW), 29 March 2008. Tarik al-Beshri (2008), a retired senior member of the Egyptian judiciary and a prominent thinker, describes the MB decision to participate in the local election, although they did not gain any seats, as ‘appropriate’. This is not because they would win but because it uncovered the “intention of the regime to exclude the group,” and it “shows that the election is not a real one. They also revealed the long-standing tradition of the regime in all elections; that is to say, the elections are run to guarantee that the government is the ultimate winner.” However, what the MB and other movements have achieved is that now “local and external reactions to the falsification of elections became more serious and publicly recognized than before.”

When the MB stood up and supported the judges campaigning for judicial independence and clean elections, the government cracked down on them. In January 2007, hundreds of members of the “nonviolent” Muslim Brotherhood were detained solely for:

exercising their rights to freedom of expression and association ... Security forces originally arrested Khairat al-Shatir, deputy General Guide of the Muslim Brotherhood, and 16 other prominent members of the organization in simultaneous predawn raids in December 14, along with more than 140 students from Al-Azhar University, and later charged with supplying the students with combat training, knives, and chains. (*Al-jazeera*, 25 January 2007).

Although the Cairo Criminal Court ruled that all charges against the MB be dismissed and all the detainees be immediately released, the government flouted the court rule and moments after their acquittal, all the MB senior members were rearrested by the police.

In February of the same year, Mubarak, acting in his capacity as Commander-of-Chief, transferred the MB cases and those of twenty-four other members to a military tribunal. Commenting on the rearrest, Sarah Whitson said that it “shows a complete contempt for the rule of law and shocking disrespect for the court” (HRW, 2007a). It is known that Egypt is a state party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). According to the ICCPR, “the trial of civilians by military courts should be very exceptional and occur only under conditions that genuinely afford full due process” (HRW, 2007). Since the court has ruled to release all detainees, the unjustified referral to military tribunal is understood to be a method to “deliver the desired verdict” (HRW, 2007). On 28 January, the public prosecutor, Abd al-Magid Mahmud, ordered the assets of the members of the Muslim Brotherhood frozen on the grounds that they financed a banned organization (*al-Jazeera*, 9 January 2007). All this coincides with Mubarak labelling the MB “a threat on national security” (*al-Jazeera*, 12 January 2007).

In a step that shows the Egyptian regime’s intransigence, Mr. Ramsey Clark, a former US Attorney General, and Yvonne Ridley, a British award-winning journalist, were prevented from attending the third session of the military trial of thirty-three MB leaders. Moreover, it is reported that during the first two sessions, the government denied access to representatives from Amnesty

International, Human Rights Watch, and Arab Human Rights organization (HRW, 4 June 2007). In a press conference, Clark, who was detained in the Cairo airport for three hours, said, “What happened to me is embarrassing to the Egyptian government. I have travelled to countries across the five continents to monitor political trials there but I was neither prevented from attending trials nor denied access to the country.” Clark accused the Egyptian government of violating the laws of human rights by not allowing fair and neutral trial to the MB and condemned the government’s “brazen injustice against the Muslim Brotherhood.”

Highlighting the reasons for the government’s relentless behaviour, Clark said that the trial was politically motivated to prevent the group from maintaining its services to the society. “How come up to fourteen university professors,” he exclaimed, “are among those referred to the military tribunal? University professors should be at the university, not in prison.” In the same conference, the Amnesty International delegate’s report was not different in both its message and tone from Clark’s (*Al-Jazeera*, 17 July 2007; Ikhwanweb, 5 November 2007; Yvonne Ridley, 20 July 2007; HRW, 15 April 2008).

Moreover, looking at other aspects of life in Egypt would echo the same type of authoritarianism on the part of the government. The government does not tolerate any attempt that makes people aware of their rights or how to defend them. It controls academic life from schools to universities and it strictly bans and censors the use of Internet as a means of expression and blogging. In April 2007, state security officers closed the headquarters of the Center for Trade Union and Workers’ Services (CTUWS), which offers legal assistance to Egyptian factory workers,

educates them as to their rights, and reports on labor-rights issues. The police had closed two other branch offices. The Ministry of Social Solidarity has blamed the CTUWS of inciting labor unrest around the country (HRW, 26 April 2007).

In a lengthy in-depth report, Human Rights Watch examines how the regime's dictatorship affected the academic life in Egypt. Under *Instruments of Repression*, the report says that the Egyptian government uses three main tools, in various combinations, to stifle academic freedom: a pervasive police presence on campus, the political appointment of key administrators and a series of laws that regulate internal affairs produce a university system under strict control of the state. "University education in Egypt cannot produce proper intellectuals," said Ahmad Taha, a poet and former professor. "It is nothing more than a government office." Using these instruments of repression, the state dictates what material can be taught and studied, restricts what opinions can be expressed and how and interferes in staff and student activities. In so doing, it undermines the autonomy universities need to protect academic freedom and violates basic human rights (HRW, 8 June 2005).

Lastly, the Egyptian government has been very harsh on internet bloggers who write or promote antiregime material, so much so that *Time* wondered in one of its issues *Why Egypt Is Cracking Down on Bloggers* (*Time*, 1 June 2006). There have been dozens of cases of police harassment of bloggers. Commenting on the reaction of the government campaign against the bloggers, Fadi Al Qadi, Cairo-based Human Rights activist, told *Time*, "Intimidation has reached a really serious level. The record of the Egyptian security response towards peaceful demonstrators recently has

been really awful. It is not legal, it is brutal, and it is a fundamental contradiction of the Egyptian government's promises of reform" (ibid.).

The puzzle of the coexistence of democracy and persecution of opposition in Egypt is solved by Zakria (2001) when he states "America's allies in the Middle East are autocratic, corrupt and heavy-handed. But they are still more liberal, tolerant and pluralistic than what would likely replace them." What would likely replace them are Islamists. Therefore, elections are democratic as long as they do not bring up Islamists or the "sham democrats," as Zakaria (ibid.) names them, to power.

Answering the following questions is significant before ending this section: if the type of regime in Egypt is closer to being authoritarian, why does it continue to call itself "democratic" and why does it run elections? According to Mady, elections in the Arab world have functions that are different from their counterparts in the Western countries. Such elections are "means to demonstrate a false facade of democracy that disguise regimes that are not democratic and/or it is there to respond to external demands of observing human and civil rights and this what is called *constitutional hypocrisy*" (2007). The difference between totally authoritarian regimes and exclusionary ones is that with the latter, opposition groups are allowed to participate in elections for government posts, but the institutions of competition consistently favour the incumbent regime's candidates (Schedler, 2002). So "institutional opportunities for opposition participation" Brownlee states, "is the only conceptual border between these authoritarian regimes and exclusionary ones" and both regimes end up with the same results regarding the opposition "either through soft or sheer power" (2004: 42). Consequently, this refutes what Mubarak said about

the Brothers, that *if they rule, they would rule forever*, because it is Mubarak and his party who are ruling forever and forcibly dispersing any effort and exterminating any group that work seriously for the interest of Egypt and Egyptians.

To wrap up the discussion, it can be said that it is a mere allegation and unfounded argument that the MB is theocratic or undemocratic. “Commitment to democracy is a serious issue but cannot be gauged by hurling groundless accusations.” (el-Ghobashy, 2005)

Studying other texts pertaining to elections, Islamists and democracy has added more insight to the understanding of why the MB is both presented negatively in *al-Ahram* and continuously persecuted by the government. The MB’s negative image as presented in news reports is only a means used by the regime to uproot the most active group in the Egyptian political scene. Therefore, the question now is: what is the reason for this policy of exclusion? It can be said that it is the successful performance of the MB that shaped the group as a potential threat to the regime. The MB is an exemplary organization and when given a space of leniency, even if limited, its members show great success and quickly gain people’s trust. They are also strictly organized and have the ability to mobilize people. The NDP, therefore, finds it necessary not to include the MB into the political system and keep persecuting them. In the next section, the MB as political force in Egyptian life and its role in civil associations are discussed.

7.4. Islamism: Threat of Success

In the previous section, we have concluded that the Egyptian regime persecutes the MB because of its fear of the organization's successful expansion in society. Here, we will shed some light on why the Brothers are gaining popular support. The discussion will present some facets of the group's success that gained people's trust and brought the government's fear as well. Summarizing the essential role played by the MB in the Egyptian society, al-Beshri (2008) says:

What is going on is that the government has become incapable of managing the state and the various state bodies became in a state of standstill and so disintegrated that they cannot carry out its assumed responsibilities...MB is the only organized body that is able to mobilize people, however, the regime in Egypt is interested in not seeing any challenging and mobilizing organization.

Explaining the rise of Islamism in the 1970s and the popular support that it has been receiving, Karawan adds that beside Islam being the faith of the majority, there are other factors that helped Islamism to appear: "policy failure and the declining legitimacy of many Arab regimes" and the "highly uneven development, the increased social tensions and dislocation" (1997: 15). Such reasons still stand today. Other studies attributed the support to the feeling of "anomie" and "dislocation" (Kepel, 1993). This interpretation is based on Durkheim's analysis of social change and anomie where people feel they are alienated and their identity is compromised. The rapid urbanizing changes that Egypt witnessed during *al-Infitaah* 'open door policy' in the 1970s can be given as a cause for people's adopting and supporting Islamists. From a Marxist view, the process of modernization drives the lower and middle classes to Islamists (Sivan, 1990). Ayubi (1980) sees the support as

a result of the Western influence, the growing Western power and the interference in the Muslim countries affairs. Relative deprivation among the majority of impoverished Egyptian population is also regarded as a main cause of the popularity of Islamism (Vandenbroucke, 1983). Disregarding the external influence that may have helped the public acceptance of an Islamist agenda, be it economic or political, Munson (2001) looks at the issue from the Islamists' perspective and argues that the main reasons constituting the support are the Muslim Brotherhood's ideas, organizational structure, group activities and the beliefs and practices of ordinary Egyptians. Although Munson's study covered the period 1932–54, his conclusions still stand today.

The public support of Islamists cannot simply be attributed to one reason. People who choose to be members of the MB or to vote for them in the elections are motivated by various reasons depending on their age, education and social class, to mention just some factors. The World Bank has reported that the economy of the Middle East is drawing back every year and that in Egypt, as an example, more than 25 percent of the population is under the poverty line. This reason is good enough to push lower- and middle-class people to support Islamists. The same people would also be driven by the official corruption, routine, bribery, favoritism and the nonexistence of an equal-opportunity principle, which spilled over the Egyptian society. Middle-class and educated people may be pushed by the fact that the postcolonial leadership's credibility in almost all Islamic countries is low. John Esposito notes that modernization has not led to the triumph of secular political and economic ideologies. Liberal nationalism, Arab nationalism and socialism,

capitalism and Marxism have, in fact, come to be viewed by Muslims as the sources of Muslim political and economic failures (1999). The support of Christian thinkers and writers of the MB adds to the complexity and multiplicity of perspectives on Islamism. In the Middle East Report (el-Gawhary, 1996), Rafiq Habib, a prominent Christian thinker, said “as an Arab Christian, I identify myself with the values system of the Arab and Islamic civilization which expresses my feelings and preferences” (el-Gawhary, 1996: 30). In conclusion, because of the MB’s comprehensive agenda, it has been able to attract the interest of a broad spectrum of Egyptian people and no single reason would be enough to explain the organization popularity.

When Islamists have had the chance to run any professional organization, such as syndicates, educational institutions, etc., they have proved to be successful to the extent that they have been viewed as an optimal replacement of the regime whose presence has led to stagnancy in all aspects of life in Egypt.

Indicators of development in Egypt show that the gap between the rich and the poor is reaching an unbridgeable state. This can be easily read in the UN development reports, the frequent demonstrations by workers in almost all Egyptian official institutions (university professors, teachers, factory workers, IRS workers, judges, etc.) demanding salary raise to meet sky-rocketing prices. Egypt today witnesses the emergence of an affluent class that controls almost every aspect of the Egyptian society side-by-side with another devastated class who can barely feed themselves. The affluent class enjoys living in skyscrapers, luxurious palaces and residences, driving the latest model of car, shopping from Europe and from gigantic

malls in Zammalek, Nasr City, Masr al-Jdidiah, etc. and sending their children to local foreign-language schools or abroad, while the other class lives in overcrowded rooms or tin-made huts or modest apartments, with barely enough food, and rare access to clean water or humane health treatment.

The MB has a comprehensive agenda of reform that was introduced in Chapter 3 and is repeated here: MB is “a Salafiyya message, a Sunni way, a Sufi truth, a political organization, an athletic group, a cultural-educational union, an economic company, and a social idea” (Mitchell, 1969: 9, 14). Giving his opinion on the comprehensiveness of the MB agenda, Walsh (2003) describes the three stages through which political Islamists in Egypt worked out their idea or ideology. First, they sought to gain properly elected representation in the parliament, largely through coalitions with other small opposition parties; second, it has taken control of professional and student associations (the most prominent organizations in the country), again through proper electoral process; and finally, they have established a network of social services in neighbourhoods and villages. “These initiatives fill gaps in government services, creating an enormous degree of popular support for the Brotherhood without directly challenging the government” (ibid.).

Whenever the Brothers are given a chance, they embark in all walks of life to improve and create a society where people live like free people, not like slaves. Out of this belief, the Egyptian political and social civil societies have been invigorated at times when Islamists were leading the work. During the researcher’s undergraduate years, the MB were running the Student Unions and they offered students various services that made the students’ lives easier in terms of affordable

textbooks, school supplies, clothes, tutoring services and conferences. When they were elected to the Boards of the bar, engineering and medical syndicates, they eclipsed any other organization, official or non-official, in terms of the services offered. One of the distinctive projects that several thousands of young people in the 1990s benefited from was the *marriage project*, where the engineers' syndicate brokered between its members and wholesalers to provide various marriage-related services and goods at affordable prices with easy methods of payments.

During the devastating 1992 earthquake, the syndicates, run by the MB, stood up to their responsibility to help the victims. Tons of contributions (blanket, tents, clothes, food, etc.) were collected in few days and were ready to be distributed until the *wise* government issued Military Decree 4/1992, requiring all Egyptian charities to obtain government approval before collecting any donations. The government was caught off guard by the substantial amount of donations the MB was able to collect in a short period while the government stood paralyzed.

On the economic level, the MB is credited with the establishment of Islamic banks and financial institutions, which

offer depositors a return nearly double the 13 percent interest of the commercial banks by operating under profit-sharing arrangements instead of simply issuing certificates of deposit. The great advantage of the Islamic banks is their predominance in the informal sector of the economy (mostly unofficially remitted wages from the Gulf), which accounts for about 35 percent of the official Egyptian GDP. The banks admittedly have suffered in the past from clear instances of fraud and mismanagement, but their general success has broadened the Brotherhood's constituency to include parts of the business sector and has solidified its support among workers' families who depend on remitted wages. (Walsh 2003: n.p.)

However, in its clamping down on Islamists the government does not differentiate between extremists and moderates.

In conclusion, the success of the MB on various levels was the main reason behind its popular support, and that is why the government's performance is outshone by the MB's performance. This performance has been recognized by scholarly research and reports. Dr Amani Qandil⁶ (2005) attributes the MB success not as a 'takeover' but because of professionalism and dedication and fair election. The following are the main points of Qandil's book on the political role of professional syndicates under Islamists:

1. The MB's 2005 success is a logical evolution of what the group has been doing for more than 20 years;
2. The evolution of consciousness and awareness of the MB second-generation members due to the changes that have happened in the Egyptian society after adopting liberal economic policies, which led millions of Egyptians to be politically and economically marginalized, directed the attention and gained the attraction of broad middle-class categories. The bar and other associations when run by Islamists responded to the needs of the middle class, especially the newly graduates;
3. In parallel, the syndicates directed their attention to the devastated poor class and impoverished areas by establishing mosque-attached free or low-cost clinics and hospitals;
4. Highly organized skills, dedicated energy, industrious effort are common features among the MB members;

5. Recognizing and appreciating the value of work and teamwork that appeared in the coalition between different associations and other civil societies in Egypt and the Arab World;
6. Once the president of the medical syndicate (who is not affiliated with MB) wrote “I wish we learned from Islamists their meticulousness, high-profile performance, dedicated work, commitment and adherence to what we believe in” (Wafd, 14 January 1993);
7. Understanding and assimilating of the rules of the political game and the acceptance to work through it. It has been notable that the MB never ran for any of the syndicates’ presidency chairs. This position remained an open channel between them and the government. They, moreover, never sought confronting the government.

In addition to the success of the MB as a political player, another factor can be added to decipher the reasons of the exclusion campaign led against them: this is the general fear of Islamism in the West. The Egyptian and maybe the Arab regimes play on this fear and portray Islamism to the West as a hobgoblin that would cause chaos and disasters not only in the Middle East, but also in the world. Islamism is also presented as a threat to Western interests in the East. Exporting this idea on Islamists can be recognized when Amr Moussa [it should be Muhammad Mussa], Egypt’s Interior Minister, said in *The Economist*, “The Brotherhood is a greater threat to the safety of the state than the terrorists and the militant groups. We are determined not to go Algeria’s way.” Mubarak has also repeatedly made similar statements. Mubarak was cited in *The New Yorker* in 1994: “Middle Eastern

terrorism is a by-product of our own illegal Muslim Brotherhood” (Walsh, 2003). To the *Washington Post* he said, “When the funeral [of MB General Guide] took place, there were over 80,000 Muslim Brothers there. When you Americans talk about democracy in the Middle East, who do they think is going to take over? Democrats? It will be the Muslim Brotherhood’s pawns in Cairo, Amman, Riyadh and Palestine” (Mady, 2007: 112). Mubarak (2007) announced that “the Brothers are dangerous because they follow a religion-based policy and if they come to power, Egypt will be banned internationally.”

This section has presented the main reasons that brought support and success to the MB and these are the same reasons that can be considered to have driven the government to persecute them. In the next section, *sourcing* is revisited in the light of intertextuality to see if the readers of *al-Ahram* have been kept away from essential and critical information pertaining to the events presented to them, and which, if presented, would have changed their readings.

7.5. Sourcing

Genre-based silence is one of Huckin’s five types of textual silence (Huckin, 2002). It “concerns those omissions that are conventional to a particular genre” (351). Since the data of the present study are based on news reporting, this section is devoted to studying any genre-based silences in the front-page reports.

Sourcing in news reports is closely related to the notion of objectivity. Richardson points out that an objective report is not necessarily neutral, as it cannot be argued that any piece of news is valueless (2004). This means that the report can

be neutral but still has some orientation or value added to it by the reporter. Sourcing is one of the areas where the reporter can add value to the report, hence affecting the objectivity of the report. This value can be examined by looking at who is given space to comment on the events and who is not. The reporter can choose to source one side and/or silence the other and hence supporting in the exclusion of the *other*. In reporting, for example, a protest demonstration, the reporter may choose to side with the protesters, the protested-against, or both. In the first two cases, the ideological value is seen in silencing the side that is not voiced. In the third, the analyst needs to look at both sides: who is reported, what verbal processes are used with each one of them, how many times they have the chance to comment, etc. The occurrence of the first two types is a tangible example of Huckin's genre-based silence because sourcing both sides is a prerequisites of an objective report.

The textual analysis of *sourcing* in previous sections has shown the absence of the MB's voice. The absence of the MB's voice is stunning because in reporting events that relate to the credibility of the candidates and mutual accusations, the reader needs to hear from both sides. In such a case, however, the report did not quote or report the voice of the MB candidate(s). Genre-based silence is a prevailing feature in *al-Ahram* reporting as in (47). The reporting of this particular event is a significant example of the bias against the MB candidate. The case deals with two candidates. The first is Dr. el-Fiki, who is a prominent NDP member, a university professor, a former ambassador and a former special secretary of President Mubarak.

(47)

3. في أول رد علي ادعاءات جماعه الاخوان المسلمين المحظوره,
4. نفي الدكتور مصطفى الفقي حدوث اي تزوير او تلاعب في دائرته الانتخابيه ببندر دمنهور وزاويه غزال.
5. وقال: ان شن مثل هذه الحمله ضده كانت امرا متوقعا منذ عده شهور,
6. مؤكدا أنه يحتكم الي الدستور والقانون في كشف الحقيقه, و سلامه موقفه, وصحه عضويته,
7. معربا عن استعداده للقبول بأي قرار لاعاده فرز الأصوات ولو في مكان عام.
8. وتعهد الفقي في حوار ه مع أحمد موسي المحرر القضائي للأهرام بترك مقعده في مجلس الشعب لو ثبت حدوث تزوير لمصلحته,

3. In his first response to the allegations made by MB against him,
4. Dr. el-Fiki denied the occurrence of any fraud or manipulation in his constituency
5. He said that launching such a campaign against him was expected several months ago
6. He also asserted that he invokes the constitution and the law to reveal the truth
7. He expressed his approval of votes re-count even in public place
8. He will leave, he pledged, his parliament seat if fraud is proven

He is now the chairperson of the Foreign Relations Committee in the parliament. The second is Dr. Heshmat, an MB member who won the parliamentary election in the Damanhur consistency in 2000. In 2005, el-Fiki was announced a winner of the Damnhour seat, an announcement that was stunning to Heshmat and his supporters who refuted the result as a fraud. They said that vote counting of 80 percent of the ballots showed that Heshmat had won easily (28,000/7,000). Heshmat insisted that there was ballot rigging by the judge who presided the constituency. On 24 November 2005, the daily *el-Misery el-Youm* published an article by Judge Noha el-Zeini, a deputy chair at the Administrative Prosecution Authority, in which she presented the rigging she witnessed during the Egyptian 2005 election in the same constituency. The rigging was in the interest of the NDP candidate, Dr. el-Fiki. In her account, although the ballot count showed Gamal Hashemite gaining 35,000 votes while 7,000 went to el-Fiki, the president of the Electoral General Commission, who asked all monitoring judges to leave, and, after making many low-voiced telephone calls, announced el-Fiki the winner. In spite of the trouble she would be in because of publishing this report, she wrote that she decided to ease her conscience and speak the truth. She wrote that she handed in her counting results very late because she double-checked her results by recounting the ballots. Almost at the end of counting, "it was apparent that el-Feqi's rival, the Muslim Brotherhood candidate, Gamal Heshmat would end up with a sweeping victory." This was because Heshmat got about 25,000 and el-Fiki almost 7,000. She also denied any connection of any kind with the MB.

Interestingly, the testimony of Judge el-Zeiny catalyzed reactions from other judges about electoral fraud and 137/160 in the same constituency backed up her claims. The judges testified that they were subject to insults and attacks. In an independent procedure, the Judges' Club formed a committee to investigate the fraud and the final report of the committee has confirmed the fraud, harassment and police passivity towards thugs bullying in front of the voting centres.

Dr. Heshmat appealed to the Court of Cassation which ruled of the invalidity of the elections and that the election should be held again. The Cassation ruling was sent to the parliament to be executed but the government ignored the ruling.

Furthermore, el-Fiki has appeared on Egyptian TV channels and newspapers and claimed that the Cassation ruling proved that there was no rigging. Here, el-Fiki intentionally misinformed the public about what exactly the court ruled. el-Zeiny explained that what the court ruled was that the election procedures were invalid (because of the intrusion of police by harassing the judges and voters, etc.) and therefore the election results were void. The court did not refer to or investigate the issue of rigging, a process that involves time-consuming procedures like recounting, summoning judges and other witnesses to question them, etc., which the court did not do. It is, therefore, evident that when el-Fiki said that the Cassation Court exonerated him, he was not telling the truth. On the other hand, his parliament seat was void in any case, either because of the rigging or the rule of the Cassation Court. However, he never stepped down nor was the election held again.

The exclusion of MB figures such as Gamal Heshmat is considered by Brownlee, who is a specialist in democracy and authoritarianism in the Arab world,

as “the government opted for targeted exclusion of a few key MB representatives like Gamal Heshmat and Mohammad Morsi, to prevent their parliamentary delegation from developing experience” (2006: n.p.). The report on el-Fiki’s case, in conclusion, was misleading to the reader when it did not source Heshmat or any other figure from the MB side.

Another example on how news reporting on the MB is professionally deficient in terms of sourcing is FP05, #55 (given in (23)). Although the whole report is on the arrest of MB senior members, no voice from the MB side is mentioned or referred to. According to the Egyptian Organization of Human Rights, that arrest was illegal as it was done without warrants from the prosecution authorities. Moreover, information on the identity of the arrested figures is concealed from the report. This information would at least pose a question mark on the credibility of the accusation. The arrested figures were:

- Dr. el-Eryaan, the Secretary-General of the Federation of Arab doctors, has an MS in clinical pathology and a degree in law;
- Professor Amr Darrag, professor at Cairo university and deputy president of Cairo University Staff Club;
- Professor Hamdi Shaheen, assistant professor in the school of Science, Cairo university;
- Mr. Yassir Abdo, the Secretary-General of the Egyptian Trade Union.

If one of these figures was asked or voiced in the report, the reading of the report would have been given a different angle. Interestingly, *al-Ahram Weekly*, the English twin of *al-Ahram*, interviewed one of the arrested: Dr Esaam al-Eryaan who

described the event in a different way from that of *al-Ahram*. According to the *Weekly*, the arrest was part of a government campaign against the group because of its recent increasing cooperation with other human rights movements like Kifaya and in response to a rumour that al-Eryaan might run for presidency.

The discussion of the two cases of both el-Fiki and al-Eryaan highlights the degree of manipulation and misinformation caused by silencing the *other*. The genre-based silence in the report exemplified by not having any voice from the MB side or neutral witnesses like Judge al-Zeini is a serious defect in the news story. It has been shown that the interpretation of the event has drastically changed when the same story is heard from different sources.

7.6. Concluding Note

In this chapter, the silence framework has been used to look at the results of the textual analysis. Analyzing silence was not as easy as the textual analysis because, as Huckin (2002: 348) rightly put it, “manipulative silence is the least linguistically constrained and therefore most difficult type of silence to identify and analyze.”

The analysis of silence has revealed aspects that the textual analysis was not able to uncover. The textual analysis in Chapters 5 and 6 has presented the MB as the “devil’s advocate” that wants to take over power from the NDP, and as the people’s nightmare causing and spilling over into violence, insecurity, bullying and treachery. Stunningly and in contrast, the present chapter has laid down an opposite picture: the MB is an organization that carries on its shoulders service to the country and its

people regardless of gender or religion, carrying out developmental and humanitarian projects, peacefully fighting to be admitted to work legally. Moreover, the MB members professionally and successfully ran the bar, medical, engineers' syndicates until the government, with its exclusionary bylaws, took over these associations.

The silence analysis has shown that Islamists are not against democracy or civil society. It is actually the military regime that has been ruling Egypt by state of emergency since 1981, harassing NGOs and interfering in university affairs. The MB's frequent success and rivalry-potential are the reasons that triggered the severe exclusionary policies practiced against them. In spite of all this success and of being the largest opposition group bloc, Islamists unjustifiably have never been quoted except negatively during news stories in 2000 and 2005.

Prominent writers in *al-Ahram* occasionally touch upon this group's negative image and exclusion. In his daily column *Mawaqef*, 'Stances', Anis Mansur, a distinguished columnist and writer echoing the same conclusions, writes

Recently, I had a conversation with some friends from the Muslim Brothers who are MPs. They expressed that they will not object for objection sake and they will have to benefit from the new [parliamentary] experience. They also said they will not be friends [with the government] overnight and will express their opinions in all issues and this is their right. They will be neither a 'bogyman' nor the 'ugly duckling' but they will stick to Islamic mannerism ... they want people to see MB as a role model although newspapers represent them as the scarecrow and 'devils of terrorism'. This means they are willing to present their good image and not the ugly picture represented by security authorities and official papers.

I knew also that they are deeply concerned with the country's problem s... they do not want to increase the burdens on the already burdened Egyptian people or make their life blacker [harder]. They have solutions to many problems but neither officials nor newspapers want to listen to or publish them. They hope to find the parliament a healthy outlet for their ideas. They do not have any newspaper that could speak on their behalf or correct the ugly picture presented by other papers. (*al-Ahram*, 29 December 2005: n.p.)

8. CONCLUSION

8.1. CDA, Islamism and Media

The present study has examined how Islamists are represented in the government newspaper, *al-Ahram*, by using the framework of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA). Most CDA studies have been done within a Western context so the contribution of the present work lies in its use of CDA to examine the issue of representing social actors in the Eastern and Arab context. The data have been chosen from one of the most widely-distributed newspapers in the Arab world, *al-Ahram*. *Al-Ahram* is state-owned and is considered to be very close to the ruling regime in Egypt. The data have been chosen from two periods, 2000 and 2005. These two years have been chosen because two significant parliamentary elections took place in which the MB performance outshone that of other political parties and the group appeared as a potential threat to the continuation of the NDP in power. The study hypothesis was: will this growing MB performance be paralleled with negative representation in government-endorsed papers?

In Chapter 2, CDA is explicated as a framework of analysis and the main trends working under its shield are introduced, pointing out the similarities and differences in the main three CDA trends: the historical approach of Wodak, the cognitive approach of van Dijk and the social approach of Fairclough. A deeper look into these three approaches tells that these trends, although distinct from each other,

have common ground and they complement each other. All three trends have been used in the present study. The history of the MB since its establishment in 1928, the social practices in Egyptian society and the cognitive processing of news reports by the average reader are examined. At the end of Chapter 2, more details on Fairclough's approach are given, as this approach constitutes the point of departure of this dissertation.

Chapter 3 deals with the social and discursive practices. Issues such as how news is made in the Arab world, the relation between media and ideology, media and representation and Islamism have been elaborated. The early origins of Islamism since 1920s are discussed and the nature of the relation between Islamists and different Egyptian regimes since the 1940s is has been examined. The chapter concludes that the MB has been facing a policy of exclusion and exoticism under all regimes. It was found that methods of persecution against the MB differed from one regime to another but the hardest was during Nasser's time which was exterminatory in nature. During Sadat's time, the MB had a period of leniency, but it was still banned from working publicly. Yet, there were periods of crackdown on the group. Mubarak's time can be considered the worst in terms of exclusion. This is not only because of the physical persecution exercised against the MB but the degree of representing the group negatively took a sharp curve up.

Chapter 4 has presented both how the data were collected and how they were analyzed. *Al-Ahram Online Index* has been used to retrieve all the front-page news reports that deal, wholly or in part, with the MB. The search variables were ,الاخوان, 'the Brothers', 'المحظورة/ المحظور', 'Muslim Brotherhood', 'الاخوان المسلمون/المسلمين',

banned'. The retrieved items were manually sifted to make sure that every report included in the analysis talks about the MB or Islamists in Egypt. The search resulted in eleven and sixty news reports in 2000 and 2005, respectively. *Concorde* software was used to search the data for occurrences and percentages of the search variables related to the MB. The software, though simple, was useful in locating the immediate context of any references to Islamists, MB or any related variable.

In Chapter 5 and 6, the data of 2000 and 2005 are analyzed. The data were approached textually to examine how some linguistic tools contribute to the negative representation of the MB. For every linguistic feature, how, more or less, it relates to the exclusion of the MB has been examined. The data were first approached from the perspective of the Idealized Readers (IR). O'Halloran's IR framework was used to read and analyze the data from the perspective of the readers-for-a-gist. The IR analysis of both 2000 and 2005 data revealed the same results: Mystification is a prevailing feature of the headlines and news reports. Mystification keeps necessary background information, such as *who* did *what* and *why*, absent from the report. This information is so essential to understanding the news that its absence would cause mystification of and misinformation to the reader who then would be open to accepting the in-between-the-lines meaning. This incomplete information causes confusion to the reader's cognition and because such readers do not have the time or want to make the effort to seek the missing information in other sources, they cognitively anchor the actions that are always violent in nature to the MB. The association of the MB with violence is cognitively done because of the high frequency of reports that connect, explicitly or implicitly, Islamists with violence.

Transitivity is the second tool used for the textual analysis. Transitivity analysis helps to lay out the event (presented by the *processes*) and its main participants (*Actor, Goal*). Transitivity, therefore, laid down the action, who did it and to whom. The significance of this analysis is that it enables us to categorize the clauses according to whether the MB is Actor or Goal. Second, it helps to locate the different types of processes that are associated with the MB. The Transitivity analysis, therefore, highlights the negative image associated with the MB. In the clauses where the MB are Actors, it has been found that they are always doers of violent and bullying acts and are causing insecurity and challenging state authority (material processes); they are identified as *illegal* and *banned* (relational processes) and they are perceived as *banned* and *dangerous* (mental processes).

The data have also shown predominance of the material process (70 percent) which signifies the negative representation of the MB. Interestingly, the verbal processes have always shown the government and its officials as Sayers while the group has not been used as the subject of verbal clauses. The verbal clauses were used to comment on, say or stress a negative aspect about the MB. The analysis of verbal processes subtypes, moreover, has shown that neutral and positive verbal subtypes were always associated with the government while the MB was always associated with the negative subtype.

Ergativity concerns the clauses with no subject, like passive and subjectless clauses. The ergativity analysis has shown that 88 percent of the clauses have the government officials as *medium* (the one to whom the action is done; *injured, killed, shot, beaten*, etc.), which in turn indicates the responsibility of MB for 88 percent of

violence in elections. Transitivity analysis again underlines the exclusionary nature of MB representation in front-page reports.

Analyzing sourcing was significant to show who is/is not reported in certain events. It has been noticed that there was a complete absence of the MB voice from the news reports. In the reports that deal directly with the organization or its members, their voice has never been quoted or sourced. In 2005 elections, an MB candidate accused the NDP prominent member, Mustafa el-Fiki, of ballot rigging and it was the MB candidate who should have won the parliament seat. The report that dealt with this particular case only presented the voice of el-Fiki while the voice of other involved parties was inexplicably absent. The complete absence of the MB voice in news reporting substantially affected the news trustworthiness and objectivity. It is evident that this absence is not accidental because the analysis of the sourcing in 2000 and 2005 data has yielded the same conclusion, which is a strong indication of the systematic policy of exclusion persecuted towards the MB members.

The analysis of lexical choices has given the same conclusion. Members of the MB have been lexically represented as *thugs, bullies, agitators, riots-provokers, elements and banned*. All these references negatively portray the group on both the legal and social levels. Although all references intensify the tone of *othering* the MB, the use of the noun , *القلة* 'the few', has been shown to be of particular significance. The term has been expressed through various devices like pronouns as in *we will not care for them*, or *those will not affect us*, or, *I am only concerned with the majority* (vs. minority). These references draw our attention to the ideological square where

we are good while *they* are bad. The lexical items used to represent and attribute the MB can be categorized into four groups:

1. Social negative judgment: *unacceptable, extremists*;
2. Legally-loaded judgments: *professional riots-provokers, legally banned, riots-provokers*;
3. Culturally-alienated: *extremists*;
4. Quantitatively few: *few, a number of, those*.

The analysis of presupposition did not yield a different conclusion. The presupposition instances that occurred in the data clearly demarcated the MB and the government as two opposing entities. In the following examples, presuppositions are italicized:

1. The *democratic reforms* are much larger than any arrests that happen due to riots, etc.;
2. They want to cast doubts on the efforts and neutrality of the police [who] aim to distort *the national achievement*;
3. The MB members were arrested because they were planning for actions to disturb *stability* and breach *people's security*;
4. The MB members say that they have *given up violence*. We are waiting to see this in reality;
5. In his first response to the *allegations* made by MB against him, Dr el-Fiki ...;
6. Our role is confronting only those who oppose *legitimacy*, who wanted to make the elections fail.

In these examples, the ideological square (*we vs. they*) is clearly foregrounded: *we* are legal, legitimate and source of security while the *other* (MB) is illegal, illegitimate and a source of disturbance and chaos. The textual analysis has verified and supported the hypothesis that the theme of exclusion regarding the representation of the MB in *al-Ahram* is systematic and consistent.

The main issues that have been raised against the MB in the reports were:

- A. The group is theocratic;
- B. The group does not have a democratic orientation;
- C. The group is a threat not only to Egypt but to the Western interests

The main concern of CDA is to uncover the latent forms of ideology and manipulation in the discourse. One way to achieve this is to access the event/s from other sources of different perspectives to see whether they would yield different conclusions. Therefore, in Chapter 7, when these issues have been examined in sources other than *al-Ahram*, a completely different image of the MB was realized. Looking for what was missing or *silenced* in *al-Ahram* the report has been the ideal approach to read the data from a different angle.

The silence analysis started by looking for evidence that the MB is theocratic and that they are aspiring to establish and run a state by the divine right rule. The researched sources did not yield any indication that the group believed or adopted the theocratic ideology and, to the contrary, the group was found to accept democracy, advocate human rights and encourage women's participation, respect the citizenship principle, not to discriminate against people based on race or religion and to promote civil society.

The analysis found that the Egyptian regime, in contrast with what *al-Ahram* promotes, is not implementing or practicing democracy. The Egyptian version of democracy is tailored to suit the government's interest where the concept of democracy can be stretched and tightened according to the regime orientation. It is stretched when the opposition parties are not strong enough to politically challenge the government. However, when the opposition is organized, has the support of people and forms a politically potential threat to the government, democracy is tightened to maintain the government's monopoly of power. Although the Egyptian Constitution allows a multi-party political system, the government does not allow any serious parties to appear, let alone grow to challenge the current regime. The MB has been fighting for a legitimate presence in the political system for decades without any success. *Al-Wasat Party*, as another example, has been trying to get official permission to be a legal political party since 1996 with no hope of being authorized in the near future.

8.2. The Exclusion Framework

The conclusions of both the textual and silence analyses can be developed into a framework that is suitable for analyzing social exclusion. The framework is represented in Figure 8.1. The framework can be used to analyze other types of social exclusion. In this framework, exclusion can be realized either linguistically, where exclusionary features can be tracked on the level of clauses, or nonlinguistically, where the text must be gone beyond to examine the absence of the essential components of the news story.




Figure 8.1 Procedural framework of exclusion in news reports

The linguistic realization takes two main forms: *qualitative*, where exclusion takes place through a process of dismemberment of the excluded individual or group from an array of epistemological norms. Qualitatively, the *other* is excluded from *our* shared *legal, cultural or social* system of knowledge. Quantitatively, the *other* is represented as *little, few, diminutive, minority* etc. compared to the *big majority* or the *mainstream*. On the other hand, exclusion can also be realized by the relative or complete absence of the *other* from a certain text. Here, Huckin's silence framework can be included. This framework presents one side of the ideological square, namely,

the *they* side. All it analyzes is how the *other* is represented in *our* text. Moreover, another framework that would analyze the *we* side is possible: how *we* represent *ourselves* in *our* discourse.

8.3. Why Exclusion

The success of the MB in professional syndicates and other associations stands as the main reason for the regime's obduracy and inexorability towards legalizing the organization to allow it to enjoy a considerable weight in the Egyptian politics and substantial support of the populace. The regime pessimistically trembles at the emergence of any active and organized group that addresses both the state and people's needs. Such groups would make vulnerable the regime's inadequacy, inefficiency and illegitimacy. Another reason for the government's stance towards Islamists is to obtain and sustain the West's support. The Egyptian government, by portraying Islamists as dangerous, increases the already-existing Western fear of Islamists and the assumed threat to democracy and Western interests. Arab regimes are considered the gatekeepers of Western policies and interests in the region and, in return, they enjoy the political, financial and military support of the US and the West to remain in power. The West knows that Arab leaders are autocratic, corrupt, and heavy-handed dictators, yet "they [Arab leaders] are better than the alternative."⁶ The

⁶ As noted by Fareed Zakaria's Newsweek article *How To Save the Arab World*. This is an embodiment of this view:

'Arafat is reported to have responded [to Bill Clinton] with words to the effect, 'If I do what you want, Hamas will be in power tomorrow.' The Saudi monarchy's most articulate spokesman, Prince Bandar bin Sultan, often reminds American officials that if they press his government too hard, the likely alternative to the regime is not Jeffersonian democracy but Islamic theocracy...when 'the

fear of Islamists is exemplified by Zakaria (2001) when he says that Islamists “would happily come to power through an election but then set up their own dictatorship.”

The question now is: what is the difference then between Mubarak’s dictatorship and that of Islamists? Why does the West support one and fear the other?

A third reason is that the exclusion of Islamists can be considered as a link in the Orientalism chain. Many studies that deal with issues of anti-Muslim rhetoric in Western societies (Richardson, 2004; Poole, 2002; Esposito, 1992; Halliday, 1992) present Orientalism as a discourse of division of the world into *We* (the West) and *They* (the East). This division is clear in news reports related to Muslims, Muslim countries, and Islam. It can be said that *othering* Islamists is an extension of the Orientalist discourse. This means that while the old Orientalist discourse is between two identities, East and West, and focuses on Islam and Muslim in general terms, the new discourse has replaced Muslims with Islamists. So the new oriental discourse is on Islamism and Islamists.

If Orientalism in the last two centuries had led to colonialism in which most of the Muslim countries were colonized by Western countries, the new Orientalism views Islamism as its enemy. Islamism constitutes the major obstacle in front of the attempts to culturally Westernize and socially and economically dominate Muslim and Arab countries. The West, to confront Islamism and minimize its prospective

American gently raises the issue of human rights and suggests that Egypt’s government might ease up on political dissent, allow more press freedoms and stop jailing intellectuals. Mubarak tenses up and snaps, ‘If I were to do what you ask, the fundamentalists will take over Egypt. Is that what you want?’ from http://www.fareedzakaria.com/articles/newsweek/122401_how.html>

influence, has chosen to support the ruling Arab regimes, which are claimed to represent *moderate Islam*, against their main political opposition groups, Islamists who are claimed to represent the *fundamental Islam*. Islamists, with their potential comprehensive renaissance and cultural project that aims to raise awareness in Arab and Muslim countries to catch up with building a model of a civilized culture and nation, constitute the formidable obstacle facing the new form of colonization. The confrontation is, thus, now between the former colonizers, represented by the Arab regimes and Islamists. The Arab regimes would suffocate any potential threat and stifle people's overwhelming indignation regarding the Muslims and Arabs overwhelmingly deteriorating life in all aspects.

Reading some events that happened in the second half of the twentieth century would support the above analysis:

1. In Algeria, Islamists (FIS) sweepingly won the December 1991 legislative elections. Faced with the real possibility of the FIS victory, the government cancelled the second stage of elections in January 1992. Then, a French-supported five-member Higher State Council, chaired by Mohamed Boudiaf, took over power in a military coup;
2. After 9/11, the US called on the Arab regimes to undertake real political reforms towards democracy in their countries. A sincere response to these calls would inevitably bring Islamists to power. Therefore, the US stepped back in its endeavor to promote democracy in the Arab world after strong signs that Islamists might 'take over' in some Arab countries. The US has remained

silent, regardless of the several reports from local and international human rights watch organizations on the deteriorating level of human rights in Egypt;

3. In a transparent election, monitored by both local and international organizations, Islamists won the majority in the parliamentary election in January 2006. Since then the Palestinian Islamist's government has not been welcomed in most of the Arab regimes. The winning Hamas has been put on the US terrorism list. The *Washington Post* reported the arrival of Hamas as a disaster: "The election results stunned US and Israeli officials, who have repeatedly stated that they would not work with a Palestinian Authority that included Hamas, which both countries and the European Union have designated as a terrorist organization." Although Hamas came to power democratically, Javier Solana, the European Union's foreign policy chief, said in a statement that the Palestinian people had "voted democratically and peacefully." But, he added, "These results may confront us with an entirely new situation which will need to be analyzed." The US has supported the Palestinian President, Mahmoud Abbas, in his endeavours to control and dwarf the new government. In October 2006, there was a US supported coup d'etat through which Abbas has formed a new government. This coup d'etat has created a sectarian paradigm between Hamas and FattH. Since then, the Gaza Strip has suffered blockades by both Israel and Egypt alike;
4. The suffocating blockade imposed by the Egyptian government on the people of Gaza. Egypt has shut down the crossing gate 'outlet' between Egypt and Gaza thus preventing thousands of tons of supplies provided by the campaign called

Artery of Life. The Gazans are caught in the crossfire because they choose to stand by their democratically elected government;

5. Egypt trains Fatah-affiliated (PLO) Special Operations Forces through US aid. A question was submitted to the Arab Affairs Committee in the Egyptian parliament regarding this issue. Why does the government support Abbas against Hamas?;
6. Magdy Huseein, the General Secretary of the frozen Egyptian Labor Party was referred to a military tribunal and ruled for two-year prison because he visited Gaza to express his support;
7. In an interview with *al-Ahram*, Fukuyama said⁷

In the long run, if the US keeps insisting on the Egyptian regime to open the political forum to all parties, the result will be that the MB will take the chance and take over, exactly like what Hamas did in Palestine. The question now is: Will the US be happy with extremists in power?

Although these events occurred at different times and places, they are all along the same line and can be interpreted within the same framework that connects Orientalism to the discourse on Islamism. A study devoted to this issue would shed more light on the relation between campaigns against Islamists, postcolonialism politics and the West.

⁷ <<http://www.ahram.org.eg/archive/Index.asp?ADSLUser=1&id1=47399&id2=956898677&id3=1756&id4=956898677>> Accessed June 2007.

8.4. Can Islamists Be Included?

The question now is: can Islamists be included in mainstream politics? The answer is *yes* as long as the involved parties, including Islamists, sincerely abide by the rules of democracy. The best example that can be cited here is the experience of Islamists in Turkey. Habib, one of the founders of *al-Wasat* Party, sees that the experience of the Turkish Welfare Party shows “how to be politically active Islamists within a civil party.” Habib significantly points out that although *al-Wasat* is similar to the Welfare, there are contextual differences. In Egypt, the Islamic law is, by Constitution, the main source of legislation while in Turkey it is not (el-Gawhary, 1996). This means that, if Turkey, with its secularism-based Constitution, happened to include Islamists in a unique experience, would Egypt not also do so?

There is mutual responsibility between Islamists and governments. Governments have to open up and implement serious reforms towards including all streams in society. How long can the Egyptian dictatorship, or others, stand not taking the urgent step to reconcile with the opposition? More significantly, how long would it take people to give up on believing in the legitimate and peaceful methods of change? Otherwise, as the International Crisis Group puts it “the government risks realizing too late that it has squandered a vital opportunity and wasted the fruits of its own earlier successes on the security front” (2004: n.p.). On the other hand, Islamists need to be clearer on issues like democracy, the role of women and minorities’ rights, among all other *sensitive* issues that cause apprehension of Islamism. Moreover, opening communication channels with civil societies in the West would be too positive a step in that direction.

8.5. Study Limitations and Implication for Future Research

The analysis and conclusions of this study are limited by two factors. First, this study only investigates the representation of one socio-political group, the MB, and thus it cannot be claimed that the conclusions apply to all other political groups that oppose the regime. Second, the analyzed data cover two periods, 2001 and 2005, in *al-Ahram*'s circulation. Therefore, the conclusion cannot be extended to other government media outlets but it rather suggests further research in these areas.

The present research opens the door for further research in various directions. The following is a list of some suggested topics: the present study analyzed front-page news reports. A future study would cover other news sections like op-ed pieces, articles and columns. That study would be revealing in terms of comparing and validating the results of the present dissertation. During the analysis, it was found that what was silenced in *al-Ahram* was spoken out about in the English-language *al-Ahram Weekly* which is issued by the same institution. Another study would examine the representation of Islamists in the *al-Ahram Weekly*. The data in this study covered only two years, 2000 and 2005. Further research covering other years would add to the findings of this dissertation.

There is a particular need to study exclusion in other media outlets like the Internet, TV programs, movies, etc.

APPENDIX A

THE HEADLINES AND NEWS REPORTS OF 2000

The appendices include the data that were used for analysis. The headlines are presented in bold font and separated from the text by an empty line. The Arabic data are presented followed by translation.

FP00, #1	11-20-00	
		1. المحكمة العسكريه تصدر احكامها في قضيه تنظيم الاخوان
		2. السجن 5 سنوات ل3 متهمين و3 سنوات ل12 متهما وبراءه خمسه
		3. المحكمة: المتهمون حاولوا اختراق القنوات الشرعيه
		4. واستغلال فتره الانتخابات للترويج لافكارهم
		5. اصدرت المحكمة العسكريه العليا امس احكامها في قضيه جماعه الاخوان المسلمين المحظوره وذلك بداخل النقابات المهنيه المختلفه
		6. والمتهم فيها 20 متهما حيث قضت بالسجن 5 سنوات علي 3 متهمين والسجن 3 سنوات علي 12 متهما وبراءه 5 متهمين
		7. وكانت المحكمة العسكريه قد عقدت جلساتها امس
		8. وحضرها ممثلون عن الصحف القوميه والحزبيه ووكالات الانباء العالميه وعدد كبير من المحامين واهالي المتهمين.
		9. وقبل النطق بالحكم اكدت هيئه المحكمة في كلمتها ان
		10. من لم يثبت بالدليل القاطع من الاوراق ادانته تتم تبرئته
		11. هيئه المحكمة اخذت الوقت الكافي في الاطلاع والبحث في اوراق الدعوي ومناقشه جميع شهود الاثبات والنفي.
		12. كما استمعت لمرافعه النيابة العسكريه
		13. والتي وجهت للمتهمين جميعا
		14. الانضمام لجماعه نظمت بالمخالفه لاحكام القانون
		15. الغرض منها تعطيل احكام الدستور
		16. والاضرار بالسلام الاجتماعي
		17. والتخطيط لاحياء نشاط جماعه الاخوان المحظوره
		18. وتحرير غير علي معاده الحكومه عن طريق الانضمام للنقابات المهنيه والجمعيات الخيرييه
		19. واختراق القنوات الشرعيه والقانونيه من خلال الترشيح في انتخابات مجلس الشعب الماضيه والمجالس

	النيابيه
20.	واستغلال فتره الدعايه الانتخابيه في الترويج لنشر افكار ومباديء التنظيم في مختلف الاوساط الجماهيريه
21.	واستثارتها ضد الحكومه الشرعيه القائمه لاكتساب تعاطفها مع مرشحي التنظيم.
22.	ثم اصدرت المحكمه العسكريه احكامها وهي كالتالي السجن 5 سنوات علي 3 متهمين وهم محمد بديع عبدالمجيد(57) سنه, وكيل كليه الطب البيطري جامعه بني سويف, وسعد ز غول عشاوي(44) سنه طبيب وامين عام نقابه اطباء القاهره, احمد ابراهيم الحلواني(36) سنه مدرس وعضو نقابه المعلمين.
23.	كما قضت بالسجن 3 سنوات علي 12 متهما وهم مدحت احمد الحداد مهندس, ومختار محمد نوح امين صندوق نقابه المحاميين, ومحمد علي اسماعيل بشر امين عام نقابه المهندسين, وعبدالله زين العابدين سليمان صيدلي, وخالد محمد بدوي امين مساعد نقابه المحامين سابقا, ومحمد هشام مصطفى سعد عضو نقابه الاطباء, وسيد عبدالعظيم هيكل عضو نقابه الاطباء, احمد شوقي عبدالستار عضو نقابه اطباء دمياط, واحمد عبدالرحيم عبدالحفيظ استاذ بكليه هندسه اسيوط, وعاطف عبدالجليل السمري محاسب, وعضو مجلس نقابه التجاريين, وابراهيم علي عبد السيد صيدلي, وعبد مصطفي عبدالرحمن طبيب وعضو نقابه الاطباء.
24.	وقضت ببراءه 5 متهمين هم ابراهيم الرشيدى ابراهيم, وكيل نقابه المحامين الفرعيه بالسويس وعلي عبدالرحيم محمد عبدالحفيظ استاذ بهندسه اسيوط, ومحمد سعد عليوه طبيب وامين عام نقابه اطباء بالحيزه, احمد محمد ابو الانوار مهندس وعضو نقابه المهندسين بالمنصوره, واحمد محمود حسين موظف.

1	The military tribunal issues decisions pertaining the Brothers' group (tanzeem):
2	5-year prison for 3, 3-year prison for 12, and not-guilty for 5.
3	The court: the accused (group) attempted to penetrate through legitimate channels and
4	To exploit the election period to disseminate/ promote their ideas
5.	The court issued its decisions pertaining the banned MB case
9.	Before pronouncing the sentences, the court stressed that
13.	[the prosecutor] accused the MB members of
14.	joining a group organized in violation of the provisions of the law
15.	the purpose of which is to disrupt the provisions of the constitution,
16.	and damage the social peace,
17.	to Plan to revive the banned Muslim Brotherhood
18.	and to incite others to be antigovernment by joining the professional unions and charities
19.	and to infiltrate the legitimate and legal channels through running for nomination in the recent elections of both People's Council [Parliament] and other representative bodies.
20.	and to exploit the electoral campaigns to disseminate the ideas and principles of the group to the masses.
21.	to provoke them be against the current legitimate government to gain its support to the group's candidates
22.	Then, the military court issued its decisions as follows: prison xxxx
23.	And sentenced 12 others for 3-year prison

24.	And acquitted 5
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FP00, #2, 11-19-00	
1.	وزير الداخليه في مؤتمر صحفي:
2.	نتيجه انتخابات مجلس الشعب تميزت بالدقه دون تحريف او تاويل
3.	بعض احزاب المعارضة تسعى لضم مستقلين لهيئتها البرلمانيه
4.	جماعه الاخوان حاولت استثمار الدين لاهداف سياسيه وتنظيميه سريه
5.	اراد وزير الداخليه السيد حبيب العادلي ان يضع النقاط فوق الحروف
6.	والرد علي ما اثير من ادعاء عن دور اجهزه الامن خلال العمليه الانتخابيه
7.	وعقد وزير الداخليه مؤتمرا صحفيا امس باكاديميه مبارك للامن
8.	كشفت فيه النقاب عن
9.	محاولات بعض المرشحين التخطيط لعمليات عدائيه تستهدف مكار اللجان الانتخابيه
10.	بقصد الاخلال بالامن
11.	واكد ان عناصر جماعه الاخوان المحظوره حاولت استثمار تأثير الدين علي المواطنين
12.	لكنهم فشلوا وخططوا لكسب شعبيه لخدمه اهداف سياسيه وتنظيميه سريه وغير شرعيه
13.	, ودورنا استهدف مواجهه للخارجين علي الشرعيه فقط والذين ارادوا افشال الانتخابات لخدمه اهدافهم ومرشحيهم
14.	هناك من لا يريدون لمصر الاستقرار, ولن نلتفت لهؤلاء
15.	واشار وزير الداخليه الي ان حملات التشكيك التي تبنتها القله في جهد الشرطه وحيادها تهدف الي تشويه انجاز قومي
16.	وان حملات التشكيك جاءت نتيجة لارتباك وتناقض وفقدان اتزان لهذه القله بسبب الفشل القاسي للبعض
17.	واكد أن الشرطه التزمت الحياد طوال العمليه الانتخابيه
18.	ولا يعني ذلك ان يكون الحياد هو السلبيه, كما كانت تريدها القله

1	Minister of Interior in a press conference:
2	The results of People's Assembly (parliament) elections were so accurate and without any distortion or Interpretation.
3	Some opposition parties seek recruiting independents to their board
4	The Brothers' group has been attempting to exploit/ take advantage of religion to [achieve] secret political and organizational goals.
5	Minister of Interior, Habib el-Adli, wanted to put dots on the letters,
6	and respond to questions about the claims regarding the role of the [official] security services during the electoral process,
7	The Minister of the Interior held a press conference at the Mubarak Academy of Security
8	Where he uncovered
9	Attempts by some candidates to plan terroristic actions against the headquarters of the electoral commissions
10	in order to breach security

11	He emphasized that elements of the banned Muslim Brotherhood tried to exploit the influence of religion on citizens
12.	but they failed and they planned to win popularity for secretive, illegal, political and organizational purposes
13.	In addition, our role is confronting only the outlaws who want to fails the elections to serve their own agenda and their own candidates.
14.	There are those who do not want stability to Egypt, but we are not affected by them
15.	The Minister also referred that the campaigns adopted by the few to cast doubts on the efforts and neutrality of the police aim to distort the national achievement.
16.	Campaigns to cast doubts [on the results] came as a result of confusion and contradiction of the few people because they terribly failed [in the elections].
17.	And the police hve been neutral during the elections
18.	But being neutral does not mean being passive,
19.	As the few want it to be

FP00, #5, 09-23-00	
1	مصادر مطلعته: اوامر القبض (is) علي عناصر من الاخوان قانونيه
2.	قالت مصادر مطلعته للاهرام ان
3.	التحقيقات التي اجرتها النيابة مع عدد من اعضاء جماعه الاخوان المحظوره قانونا,
4.	قد اثبتت تورط عناصر من الجماعه في اعمال الاثاره, والتحريض, والتشكيك في مصداقيه النظام في التمسك بالديمقراطيه,
5.	في محاوله منهم للتاثير في المناخ العام والناخبين.
6.	وقالت المصادر ان اجراءات القبض علي عناصر الاخوان تتم حسب ضوابط واجراءات القانون,
7.	واكدت انه لم يعتقل اي من اعضاء هذه الجماعه بقانون الطوارئ, الذي يطبق علي البلطجيه ومثيري الشغب.
1.	Informed Sources: The warrants to arrest elements of the Brothers [are] legal
2.	Informed sources said to al-Ahram that
3.	Investigations conducted by the Prosecutor, with a number of members of the outlawed Muslim Brotherhood,
4.	Have proved the involvement of elements of the group in acts of provocation, incitement, and questioning the credibility of the government's adherence to democracy,
5.	in an attempt to influence the general climate and the electorate.
6.	The sources, also, said that the procedures to arrest the elements of the Muslim Brotherhood are lawful,
7.	and emphasized that none of the members of this group have been arrested under the authority of the emergency law, that is applied only to the thugs and

hooligans.

FP00, #6, 09-21-00	
1	بدء التحقيق مع ابراهيم شكري حول مخالفات حزب العمل
2.	بدأت نيابه امن الدوله العليا صباح امس تحقيقات موسعه مع المهندس ابراهيم شكري رئيس حزب العمل المجدد نشاطه
3.	في الاتهامات والمخالفات المنسوبه للحزب التي انتهت اليها تحقيقات المدعي الاشتراكي,
4.	وشملت 7 اتهامات جنائيه,
5.	منها ارتباط الحزب بجماعه الاخوان المحظوره, والجماعات المتطرفه.
6.	وقد اخلت النيابة سبيل المهندس ابراهيم شكري بعد التحقيقات التي استمرت 4 ساعات علي ان تواصل اليوم سماع اقواله.
1.	Starting interrogating Ibrahim Shukri on the violations of the Labor party
2.	The Supreme State Security Prosecution started wide interrogation with Engineer Ibrahim Shukri, the president of the frozen Labor party
3.	Regarding the violations and accusations attributed to the party by the General Prosecutor
4.	Which included
5.	having connections with the banned MB group and the extremist groups
6.	Shukri was released after the investigation that lasted for 4 hours and he will be on a hearing later today.

FP00, #8, 07-20-00	
1.	التقرير النهائي لجهاز المدعي الاشتراكي في قضيه حزب العمل:
2.	تولي قيادات من الاخوان والجماعات المتطرفه مناصب قياديه في الحزب
2.	وقد انتهت التحقيقات الي توجيهه 9 اتهامات الي حزب العمل الاشتراكي
3.	والذي ثبت ارتكابه المخالفات التاليه:
4.	اولا: ارتباط حزب العمل الاشتراكي بجماعه الاخوان المسلمين المحظور نشاطها
5.	وتعاونه مع عناصر من الجماعات الاسلاميه المتطرفه والمناهضه للوحده الوطنيه والسلام الاجتماعي
6.	وتقلد بعض افراد هذه الجماعات لمناصب قياديه بالحزب
1.	Socialist Prosecutor (= Attorney General) final report on the Labor Party case:
2.	Leaders from the Brothers' and extremist groups assume leadership positions in the Labor Party.
2.	The investigation [of the Attorney General] resulted in charging the Labor Party with 9 accusations
3.	The party has been proven to commit the following violations:

4.	first, the having links with the banned MB
5.	and its cooperation with elements from the extreme Islamists groups that are antinational unity and anti social peace
6.	and the undertaking of some members of these groups to the party leadership positions

FP00, #9, 05-29-00	
1	(حوار مع الرئيس في حديث لصحيفة الباييس الاسبانية) انصار حزب العمل والانتخابات
2	سؤال: اليس اغلاق حزب العمل في الاسبوع الماضي تدخلا قبل الانتخابات القادمه؟
3	جواب: لا مطلقا, لان انصار حزب العمل مثلهم في ذلك مثل انصار اي حزب اخر يمكنهم دخول الانتخابات كمستقلين دون حاجه الي تغطيه من حزب,
4.	بل ان الاخوان المسلمين وهم ليسوا منظمه شرعيه يستطيعون التقدم للانتخابات كمستقلين.

1.	(an interview with the president): Labor Party supporters and elections
2.	Q: Is not the closure of the Labor party last week considered interference (in the party's affairs) before the coming elections?
3.	A: No, absolutely. Because the supporters of the Labor party can, like others, run in the elections as independents without the need to be party affiliated
4.	Moreover, MB, though being an illegal organization, can run as independents

FP00, #10, 04-30-00	
1.	(وزير الداخليه في مؤتمر صحفي): لا وجود للاخوان!..
2.	سؤال: جماعه الاخوان المحظوره تسعي لترشيح عناصر لها في انتخابات مجلس الشعب. فما موقفكم امام مثل هذه الترشيحات؟!
3.	العادلي: لا نعرف شيئا اسمه الاخوان ماداموا ليسوا حزبا شرعيا.
4.	ولكن بعضهم قد يستطيع الترشيح بانضمامه لحزب دخلوا معه في اتفاق او كمستقلين

1.	The Minister of Interior in a press conference : Nothing is called MB
2.	The banned Muslim Brotherhood seeks to nominate some of its elements in the parliament elections, what is your position on this?
3.	The Minister of Interior: we do not know any entity called the Brothers as long as they are not an official party.
4.	But some of them may run through agreements with other parties or as Independents

APPENDIX B

THE HEADLINES AND NEWS REPORTS OF 2005

FP05, #1 12/08/05	
1	أعنف يوم في انتخابات مجلس الشعب
2	مصرع 2 بدمياط واصابه العشرات في مصادمات وشغب بالشرقيه والدقهلية وكفر الشيخ
3	أجهزه الأمن تؤكد التزامها بالحياد دون التخلي عن مواجهة المخالفين
4	وزير العدل: الانتخابات جرت حسب ضمانات الحيده والشفافيه والنزاهه
5	وسط أجواء مشحونه بالعنف والمصادمات والشغب
6	وصلت الي حد سقوط قتيلين في دمياط, وثالث في حاله خطيره, بالإضافة الي عشرات المصابين في المحافظات الاخرى,
7	جرت أمس في تسع محافظات جولة الاعادة للمرحله الثالثه والاخيره من الانتخابات البرلمانيه.
8	بعد ان اصدرت محكمه القضاء الاداري حكما بتاجيل الانتخابات في ثلاث دوائر منها دائرتان في كفر الشيخ, والثالثه هي دائره اجا بالدقهليه.
9	وتنافس في هذه الجوله 254 مرشحا مثلوا مختلف الاحزاب والقوي السياسيه, منهم 126 مرشحا للوطني, و35 لجماعه الاخوان المحظوره, واثنان للوفد, ومرشح واحد لكل من الحزب الناصري, وحزب الكرامه تحت التأسيس, و89 مستقلا.
10	وذكر مصدر امني ان الدائره الاولى في دمياط شهدت
11	قيام انصار أحد مرشحي التيار الديني بالتجمع أعلى الكوبري العلوي بمدخل المدينه,
12	وايقاف حركه المرور,
13	وقذف قوات الشرطه بالحجاره,
14	وإطلاق اعيره ناريه من أعلى أسطح المنازل
15	وصرح اللواء ابراهيم حماد المتحدث الرسمي لوزاره الداخليه بأن
16	أحداث الشغب والبلطجه التي شهدتها دمياط
17	أسفرت عن مقتل شخصين في قريه الخياطه متأثرين باصابتهم بطلقات ناريه
18	أطلقها بعض أنصار مرشح التيار الديني بالدائره,
19	فضلا عن إصابه ثالث باصابه خطيره نجم عنها ارتجاج في المخ,
20	وقد تم نقله للمستشفى في حاله سيئه, لإجراء عمليه جراحيه له,
21	وقد أصيب سته مجندين, وعدد من الضباط نتيجة القذف بالحجاره وزجاجات المواد الحارقه.
22	ونفي المصدر ما عمدت بعض الفضائيات الي ترديده حول تدخل الاجهزه الأمنيه في المسار الانتخابي,
23	واكد التزام الأمن بالحياد دون التخلي عن دوره في الحفاظ علي مقومات الأمن والاستقرار والتصدي للانشطه الاجراميه وعمليات الشغب.
24	وفي كفر الشيخ, أصيب نحو 35 شخصا في عده دوائر في اشتباكات بين أنصار المرشحين,
25	مما دفع الشرطه الي اطلاق القنابل المسيله للدموع لتفريق المتظاهرين.
26	وشهدت بعض اللجان في دوائر محافظه الشرقيه مصادمات داميه بين انصار المرشحين,

27	مما اضطرت قوات الامن الي اطلاق القنابل المسيله للدموع لتفريق المتجمعين.
28	ووقعت اشتباكات في منيا القمح, والقنايات, ودير بنجم, والعريزيه, ونل حوين, ومشتول السوق.
29	وقال بعض الناخبين:
30	انهم تم منعهم من الوصول الي المقار الانتخابيه للتصويت,
31	وتقدم بعض المرشحين بشكوي رسميه لرئيس اللجنه العامه في الزقازيق, واتميده, ومنيه النصر,
32	حيث اصيب احد المحامين بعاهه مستديمه.
33	وقال اللواء ابراهيم حماد, ان الانتخابات جرت تحت سيطره امنيه كامله,
34	وان قوات الامن قامت بواجبها في حمايه اللجان ورجال القضاء من اي تهديد, او اخلال بالامن.
35	واوضح ان اجهزه الامن رصدت انصار بعض المرشحين الذين حاولوا استهداف عشر لجان للقيام باعمال بلطجه وشغب,
36	واكد انه كان هناك تعاون كامل وتنسيق كبير بين وزارتي العدل والداخليه,
37.	وانهما علي اتصال دائم,
38.	واشار الي ان اجهزه الامن تمكنت من ضبط احد المقار
39.	تولي القائمون عليها تخزين العديد من السيوف والجنائز والشوم, تمهيدا لاستخدامها في افساد العمليه الانتخابيه في عده لجان بمحافظة الشرقيه,
40.	وقد تم ضبط القائمين عليها وتقديمهم للنيابه للتحقيق.
21.	And 6 soldiers and a number of officers have been injured due to throwing of rocks and incendiary bottles
24.	In Kafr el-Shiekh, about 35 people were injured in clashed between the candidates supporters
32.	Where a lawyer has been injured with a permanent disability

FP05, #2 12-08-05	
1.	أسلحه ناريه في فاقوس!
2.	ذكرت مصادر امنيه في دائره فاقوس ان
3.	احد القيايين الاخوانيين, ويدعي حسن محمد الحيوان, قام بتدبير كميات من الاسلحه الناريه
4.	لدعم مرشح التيار الديني فريد اسماعيل خليل.
5.	وقد تم ضبط كميات من الاسلحه والذخيره, ومبالغ ماليه, ومحركات تنظيميه اخوانيه علي قاعده بيانات جهاز كمبيوتر.
1.	Fire arms in Faqous
2.	
3.	
4.	
5.	

FP05, #3 12-04-05	
1.	
2.	4 ايام وتنتهي اشرس انتخابات برلمانيه في مصر
3.	القضاء الاداري يقر باحقية المجتمع المدني في مراقبه الفرز بدوائر تليفزيونيه
	الوطني يضمن 84 مقعدا في 67 دائره دون منافسه

4.	تنتهي بعد اربعة ايام من الان, اشرس حملته انتخابات برلمانيه شهدتها مصر,
5.	تنتهي بعد اربعة ايام من الان, اشرس حملته انتخابات برلمانيه شهدتها مصر,
6.	ومن المقرر ان تجري جوله الحسم الاخير للانتخابات البرلمانيه يوم الاربعاء المقبل,
7.	ويتنافس فيها 254 مرشحا علي 127 مقعدا, منهم 2 للوفد, وواحد للناصري, ومثله للكرامه تحت التأسيس, و50 مستقلا, منهم 35 من جماعه الاخوان المحظوره.

FP05, #4 12-03-05	
1.	
2.	9 ناجحين فقط من الجوله الاولى بينهم 8 للوطني وواحد من الوفد
3.	254 مرشحا يخوضون معركه حاسمه الاربعاء المقبل لتحديد مصير 127 مقعد
4.	الشريف: الحزب الوطني زاد عدد نوابه الي 224 ويقترب من تحقيق اغلبيه الثلثين
5.	عائلات ابوستيت وعبدالآخر وابوكريشه السوهاجيه تغادر البرلمان
6.	الاعاده في دمياط وشمال وجنوب سيناء واسوان والبحر الاحمر علي جميع المقاعد
	10 نواب حاليين في الشرقيه و11 في سوهاج خسروا مقاعدهم
7.	مفاجات عديده اسفرت عنها النتائج الرسميه للجوله الاولى من المرحله الثالثه للانتخابات البرلمانيه,
8.	فلم ينجح سوي 9 مرشحين فقط, من بين 1770 مرشحا
9.	دخلوا الجوله الاولى للانتخابات في هذه المرحله
10.	بينما ستجري الاعاده يوم الاربعاء المقبل في غالبية الدوائر بين 254 مرشحا, لتحديد مصير 127 مقعدا.
11.	واشارت النتائج الي ان ثمانية من المرشحين الفائزين
12.	ينتمون الي الحزب الوطني والمستقلين علي مبادئ الوطني.
13.	بينما ينتمي الفائز التاسع الي حزب الوفد الجديد.
14.	وسوف يدخل انتخابات الاعاده 126 مرشحا من الوطني و35 من جماعه الاخوان المحظوره و2 من الوفد, وواحد للحزب الناصري, وواحد من حزب الكرامه تحت التأسيس والباقي من المستقلين.
15.	وقد فشلت جماعه الاخوان المحظوره في الفوز باي مقعد في هذه الجوله,
16.	برغم دخولها ب49 مرشحا,
17.	وتخوض الجماعه جوله الاعاده ب35 مرشحا في محافظات: الدقهليه والشرقيه وكفر الشيخ وسوهاج وشمال سيناء ودمياط,
18.	وبذلك يكون 14 من مرشحيها قد خرجوا من السباق تماما.

FP05, #6 12-01-05	
1.	رئيس مجلس الوزراء في المنتدى الدولي الثالث للاستثمار والتجاره
2.	انخفاض معدل التضخم لاقل من 4 % وزياده دخل المواطن المصري لاكثر من 15 %
1.	. ومن المنتظر عقد اتفقيه للتجاره الحره مع تركيا وان نجاح الاخوان المسلمين في البرلمان لا يتعارض مع مصالح الناس.

FP05, #7 11-27-05	
1.	انتخابات صعبه.. واجواء مشحونه بالتوتر
2.	التصويت جري في 65 دائره.. ووقفه في القناطر الخيرييه واطسا والمنشيه
3.	بدء عمليات الفرز.. وعلان نتائج المرحله الثانيه خلال ساعات
4.	القبض علي العشرات واغلاق مراكز الاقتراع في عدد من الدوائر
5.	تعلم اللجنة العليا للانتخابات خلال ساعات نتائج جولته الاعاده للمرحله الثانيه من انتخابات مجلس الشعب
6.	التي جرت امس في تسع محافظات في ظل مناخ اكثر انضباطا وحزما
7.	بعد تصدي الاجهزه الامنيه لمثيري الشغب والبلطجه في عدد من الدوائر.
8.	وقد اغلقت صناديق الاقتراع في السابعه من مساء امس في 65 دائره انتخابيه.
9.	وتنافس علي مقاعد الفئات والعمال في هذه الدوائر 230 مرشحا من مختلف الاحزاب والتيارات السياسيه لاختيار 116 نائبا
10.	بعد قرار القضاء الاداري بوقف الانتخابات في ثلاث دوائر هي: بالقناطر الخيرييه في القليوبيه, واطسا في الفيوم, والمنشيه والجمرك في الاسكندريه.
11.	وقد بادرت قوات الشرطه المعنيه بتامين اللجان الانتخابيه
12.	بضبط عدد من محترفي اثاره الشغب في محافظات: الاسكندريه, الفيوم, وبورسعيد.
13.	واشارت التقارير الصحفيه الي تراجع ظاهره البلطجه في محافظه الاسكندريه بعد الجوله الاولي الساخنه التي جرت يوم الاحد الماضي.
14.	في الوقت نفسه, تشير تقديرات وسائل الاعلام والمراقبين الي تراجع نسبه التصويت في اللجان
15.	التي شهدت اعمال عنف نتيجة خشيه الناخبين من تعرضهم للايذاء بسبب هذه الافعال.
16.	وقد اشتكى انصار بعض المرشحين من صعوبه وصولهم الي لجان التصويت في ظل الحزم الامني
17.	الذي ساد العمليه الانتخابيه امس.
18.	واظهرت عمليه التصويت طوال نهار امس سير عمليه التصويت علي وتيره مشابهه لما حدث في المرحله الاولي
19.	وفي تطور لاحق, قرر عدد من القضاء المشرفين علي جولته الاعاده وقف الانتخابات,
20.	واغلاق بعض مكاتب الاقتراع في دائرتي رشيد وكفر الدوار احتجاجا علي منع الناخبين من الدخول وتبديل كشوف الناخبين.
21.	واتهم نادي القضاء الشرطه بفرض حصار علي عدد من مراكز الاقتراع,
22.	مما دفع القضاء المشرفين الي غلقها,
23.	والغاء الانتخابات بعد تحرير محاضر بهذا الشأن
24.	وقال هشام بسطويسي نائب رئيس محكمه النقض, وعضو لجنه مراقبه الانتخابات بنادي القضاء:
25.	ان الشرطه حاصرت اللجان الانتخابيه,
26.	
27.	ومنعت الناخبين من الدخول في بورسعيد, وكفر الدوار, ورشيد, والمحموديه, وكفر شكر, وفي دائرتي غربال والدخيله في الاسكندريه.
28.	ومن جانبه, اعلن المتحدث باسم وزاره الداخليه:
29.	انه لا صحه لما اذاعته قناه فضائيه عن توقف العمليه الانتخابيه ببعض اللجان بدائره مركزي ادكو ورشيد في محافظه البحيره,
30.	عدا الدوائر الثلاث التي لا تجري فيها انتخابات الاعاده في الاسكندريه, والقليوبيه, والفيوم.
31.	وفي الوقت نفسه, اعلن المستشار محمود ابوالليل وزير العدل, ورئيس اللجنة العليا للانتخابات,
32.	ان اللجنة قامت بمتابعه ما يتصل بمدي انتظام سير العمليه الانتخابيه في دوائر الاعاده, وما شاب بعض الدوائر من تجاوزات.
33.	وفي اول تقاريرها عن سير عمليه الانتخاب امس,

34.	رصدت المنظمه المصريه لحقوق الانسان استمرارا لاعمال العنف والبلطجه,
35.	بما يوثق في نزاهه وشفافيه الانتخابات في عدد من الدوائر.
36.	وقال بيان المنظمه:
37.	انها سترفع خلال ساعات بلاغات للنائب العام, ووزير العدل, ولجنه الانتخابات
38.	ضد حالات الاعتداء علي اللجان والناخبين,
39.	واستخدام الاسلحه البيضاء بالاسماء والصور لتقديم مرتكبيها للعداله.
40.	كما رصدت الجمعيه المصريه لدعم التطور الديمقراطي تدخلات في سير العمليه الانتخابيه في بورسعيد والفيوم,
41.	وتصاعدا للعنف في الغربيه والقليوبيه,
42.	وتاخير فتح اللجان في دوائر قنا,
43.	مما اضعف من المناخ الايجابي للتصويت.
44.	واشتكت اللجنه المستقله لمراقبه الانتخابات من
45.	استخدام انصار المرشحين الاسلحه الناريه في محافظات: الغربيه, والقليوبيه, والاسكندريه
46.	بصوره تهدد امن وسلامه العمليه الانتخابيه, والتاثير السلبي في النتائج.
47.	وشهدت محافظه القليوبيه توترا ومشاجرات بين انصار المرشحين
48.	في الوقت الذي لم تعقد الانتخابات في دائره القناطر الخيرييه
49.	بعد حكم القضاء الاداري ببطلان الانتخابات بها,
50.	وزاد الحضور في قري المرشحين, وتراجع في القري الاخرى.
51.	كما شهدت بعض لجان محافظه الغربيه مشاجرات بين انصار مرشحي الحزب الوطني, والمرشحين المستقلين,
52.	مما ادي الي اعاقه عمل لجان قري الهياتم, ومحله حسن, وبلقينا, وصفط تراب في المحله الكبرى لعدده ساعات.
53.	كما قام انصار مرشح جماعه الاخوان المحظوره خالد سعد عطيه بدائره شبراخيت بحيره
54.	بالقاء حجاره علي مقار اللجان في احد المعاهد الدينيه الازهريه,
55.	والقت الشرطه القبض علي 13 من مثيري الشغب وبحوزتهم جنازير وسنج
56.	وستتم احالتهم للنيايه العامه.
57.	وقد اعترض البلطجيه والمسجلون خطر
58.	ممن يحملون سيوفا سياره مرشح الحزب الوطني السيد راشد في دائره سيدي جابر بالاسكندريه,
59.	في اثناء مروره علي لجنه باحدي المدارس,
60.	وتبين ان البلطجيه يعملون لمصلحه مرشح مستقل,
61.	ونجحت قوات الامن في احتواء الموقف.
62.	والقت اجهزه الامن القبض علي 21 من مويدي المرشح المستقل توكل مسعود بدائره الدخيله بالاسكندريه,
63.	لتعديدهم بالضرب علي افراد الشرطه
64.	وإحداث إصابه لخمسه منهم,
65.	وتهشيم زجاج ثلاث سيارات للشرطه,
66.	كما نجحت الشرطه في ضبط 27 شخصا في بعض لجان بورسعيد
67.	لمحاولتهم ترويع الناخبين.
68.	وخمسه اخرين في مركز سنورس بالفيوم لحيازتهم اسلحه بيضاء.

FP05, #8 11-26-05	
1.	جوله اعاده حاسمه لتحديد مصير 242 مرشحا اليوم

2.	تنسيق كامل بين لجنة الانتخابات والداخليه لتامين سلامه القضاء والناخبين
3.	3500 عضو بمنظمات المجتمع المدني وحقوق الانسان يراقبون الانتخابات
4.	وقال الدكتور نظيف في تصريحات لصحيفه فايننشال تايمز البريطانيه من اهميه المكاسب التي حققتها جماعه الاخوان المسلمين المحظوره قانونا, في انتخابات مجلس الشعب الحاليه
5.	وانتقد اعضاء الجماعه الذين خاضوا الانتخابات علي انهم مستقلون
6.	, وقال: يجب ان تاتي المعارضه من مستقلين حقيقيين, لا ينتمون الي اي حزب سياسي.
7.	وقال السيد صفوت الشريف الامين العام للحزب الوطني
8.	ان الحزب يخوض الانتخابات بكل شرف ونزاهه
9.	حاملا لواء العمل من اجل مصر, من خلال برنامج الانتخابي
10.	, الذي سيحقق به مع برنامج الرئيس حسني مبارك كل امال المصريين
11.	ويستجيب لمطالبهم
12.	ويقدم حولا فعاله وحاسمه لمشكلاتهم, وعلي راسها مشكله تشغيل الشباب ببرنامج طموح
13.	واستنكر الشريف اعمال البلطجه وتزييف الاصوات
14.	موكدا ان الحزب الوطني وحكومته لن يتراجعا عن خوض معركه الانتخابات بكل نزاهه حتي اخر ساعه فيها
15.	مشيرا الي ان الحزب الوطني سيحسم نتيجته المرقله الثانيه باغلبيه ساحقه, بعد فوزه بما يزيد علي 75% من المقاعد في المرقله الاولي من الانتخابات.

FP05, #9 11-26-05	
1.	مصطفى الفكي ل الاهرام:موقفي سليم ومستعد لاعاده فرز الاصوات في مكان عام
2.	الدستور والقانون هما الحكم وساترك مقعدي لو ثبت تزوير لمصلحتي
3.	في اول رد علي ادعاء ت جماعه الاخوان المسلمين المحظوره.
4.	نفي الدكتور مصطفى الفكي حدوث اي تزوير او تلاعب في دائرته الانتخابيه ببندر دمنهور وزاويه غزال.
5.	وقال: ان شن مثل هذه الحمله ضده كانت امرا متوقعا منذ عده شهور,
6.	موكدا انه يحتكم الي الدستور والقانون في كشف الحقيقه, و سلامه موقفه, وصحه عضوبته,
7.	معربا عن استعدادة للقبول باي قرار لاعاده فرز الاصوات ولو في مكان عام.
8.	وتعهد الفكي في حوار ه مع احمد موسي المحرر القضائي للاهرام بترك مقعده في مجلس الشعب لو ثبت حدوث تزوير لمصلحته,
9.	اما محاوله التشويش وسياسه الصوت العالي والبيانات الناريه والشعارات الجوفاء فهي سلاح من لا يملكون الحقيقه.
10.	واتهم الدكتور الفكي جماعه الاخوان المحظوره بالسعي لارهاب القضاء خصوصا الشباب مع نهايه المرقله الثانيه وبدايه الثالثه, ومحاوله الزج بالدين الحنيف في العمليه الانتخابيه.
3.	In his first response to the allegations made by MB against him,
4.	Dr. el-Fiki denied the occurrence of any fraud or manipulation in his constituency
5.	He said that launching such a campaign against him was expected several months ago

6.	He also asserted that he invokes the constitution and the law to reveal the truth
7.	He expressed his approval of votes re-count even in public place
8.	He will leave, he pledged, his parliament seat if fraud is proven

FP05, #10 11-21-05	
1.	مصدر امريكي رفيع المستوى: العنف في الانتخابات المصريه بدا بين المرشحين بعيدا عن الأمن
2.	أكد مصدر امريكي رفيع المستوى في وزاره الخارجيه الامريكيه ان
3.	المعلومات المتاحه لديهم تفيد بان
4.	احداث العنف في الانتخابات البرلمانيه المصريه نجمت عن اشتباكات بين المرشحين انفسهم,
5.	وان بعضها جري علي يد مرشحين للحزب الوطني,
6.	بينما تورطت جماعه الاخوان المسلمين المحظوره في اعمال عنف مماثله.
7.	واضاف المصدر انه في الوقت الذي يجب فيه علي الحكومه توفير الحمايه للناخبين, لدي الادلاء باصواتهم,
8.	فاننا لا نملك معلومات تفيد بان اجهزه الامن كانت مسئوله عن بدء عمليات العنف.
9.	وكان شون ماكورميك, المتحدث باسم الخارجيه الامريكيه, قد ادلي بتصريحات اوحت بتحميل اجهزه الامن
10.	المصريه مسئوليها ما حدث من اعمال عنف.
11.	وقد اعرب ديفيد ولش مساعد وزير الخارجيه الامريكيه في لقاء اقتصر علي مراسلي صحف الاهرام و الحياه و النهار عن اسفه لهذه الاحداث
12.	وقال: انه يامل في ان تتم الجولات الانتخابيه المقبله في جو من الهدوء.
1.	A senior U.S. source: violence in Egyptian elections was done away from the police
5.	Some of which has run at the hands of candidates of the NDP candidates
6.	While the MB was implicated / indulged / involved in a similar violent acts

FP05, #11 11-21-05	
1.	سخونه بالغه في المرحله الثانيه للانتخابات البرلمانيه
2.	تفجر اعمال العنف في بعض الدوائر
3.	الاسكندريه وبورسعيد تتقدمان قائمه العنف
4.	وشغب في البحيره.. وهدوء نسبي في الصعيد
5.	اجهزه الامن تتدخل للسيطره وتامين الناخبين وتضبط اكثر من 200 مشاغب
6.	الشريف ياسف لاحداث العنف وتأثيرها السلبي علي العمليه الانتخابيه
7.	بدء عمليات الفرز والنتائج الاولى خلال ساعات
8.	وتوقع الاعاده في 90% من الدوائر
9.	خيتم اجواء العنف والبلطجه علي الجوله الاولى من المرحله الثانيه للانتخابات البرلمانيه في تسع محافظات مصريه,
10.	وسقط اول قتيل في هذه الانتخابات بالاسكندريه, التي شهدت اعنف المصادمات,
11.	كما اصيب احد المرشحين المستقلين(وطني

12.	واصيب احد انصار جماعه الاخوان المسلمون المحظوره.
13.	وقد اصيب العشرات من المواطنين الذين ذهبوا للدلاء باصواتهم خلال الاشتباكات التي وقعت امام الدوائر الانتخابيه.
14.	ويبلغ عدد المرشحين في هذه المرحله ما يزيد علي 1700 مرشح, من بينهم 144 مرشحا للحزب الوطني, و 81 لقائمه المعارضه.
15.	بالاضافه الي مرشحي جماعه الاخوان المسلمون المحظوره, وعددهم 52 مرشحا, والمستقلين والقوي السياسيه الاخرى, ويبلغ عددهم 1429 مرشحا.
16.	وقد الفت اجهزه الامن القبض علي اكثر من 200 شخص من مثيري الشغب والبلطجه من انصار مختلف المرشحين بالمحافظات التسع.
17.	وذكر مصدر امني مسئول ان هولاة سوف تتم احوالهم الي النيابات المختصه.
18.	وأكدت وزاره الداخليه في بيان أمس أن قوات الشرطه تعاملت علي الفور مع احوادث الشغب.
19.	واتخذت الاجراءات القانونيه بشأن اعمال الشغب التي اثارها مويديو المرشحين في ظل حاله توتر بالغه اشاعها المرشحون تحت شعارات اسلاميه.
20.	وانه جري القبض علي اكثر من ثمانيه من عناصر جماعه الاخوان المسلمون المحظوره بتهمة الشغب.
21.	واضاف مصدر امني: انه اتضح الاتي:
22.	بالنسبه لما بثته بعض القنوات الفضائيه عن اصابه المرشح المستقل سيف القباري بدائره قسم كرموز باصابات خطيره
23.	.. تاكد من الفحص ان اصابته مجرد جرح سطحي باليد
24.	وادعاؤه ضبط سيف مع احد ممارسي البلطجه.
25.	حدوث مشاجره بين انصار مرشحي الحزب الوطني عيد سالم ومحمد عوده بدائره قسم ثان شبرا الخيمه بمحافظه القليوبيه, والمرشح تحت شعار اسلامي جمال شحاته ابراهيم.. داخل مقر فناء مدرسه اسكو الابتدائيه.
26.	اعقبها اطلاق اعيره ناريه من خارج مقر اللجنه..
27.	وقد تم احتواء الموقف.
28.	قام نحو مائه شخص من انصار المرشح تحت شعار اسلامي صبري خلف الله.. برشق المقر الانتخابي للمرشح احمد محمد ابوزيد بدائره قسم ثان الاسماعيليه بالزجاجات الفارغه والاشتبك مع بعض انصاره..
29.	اسفر ذلك عن اصابه اثنين وتم نقلهما الي المستشفى.
30.	تم ابلاغ قسم دمنهور من مدرس بكلية الزراعه بدمنهور وكيلا عن المرشح مصطفى الفقي انه
31.	في اثناء استقلاله سياره ملاكي اسكندريه
32.	فوجيء بانصار المرشح تحت شعار اسلامي محمد جمال حشمت خارجين من مكتبه بشارع الطحان حاملين العصي وزجاجات مملوءه بسائل البنزين ومثبت بها فتيل
33.	وقاموا باتلاف زجاج السياره الخلفي.
34.	كما ابلى سائق انه حال قيادته اوتوبيسا وبرفتهه وكيل الدكتور مصطفى الفقي امام مدرسه احمد محرم ابوالريش
35.	قام بعض الاشخاص بايقاف الاوتوبيس والتعدي عليهما بالضرب, و احوادث تلفيات بالسياره
36.	وفروا هاربين
37.	واكد البيان وفاه المواطن محمد خليل من مويديو المرشح مستقل حسن حسين نتيجه اصابته بجرح نافذ,
38.	وذلك عقب منافسه حاده بين المرشحين في دائره 22 بالمنشيه في الاسكندريه.
39.	وسجلت الداخليه مشاجرات في بورسعيد,
40.	كما ضبطت عشره من العناصر المشاغبه من انصار احد المرشحين المستقلين في مدينه قوص بقنا.
41.	وقد اعرب السيد صفوت الشريف, الامين العام للحزب الوطني, عن اسفه لحالات العنف التي شهدتها بعض الدوائر خلال الانتخابات.
42.	وقال في تصريحات خاصه ل الاهرام ان حده المنافسه في الانتخابات لا تستوجب العنف,
43.	

44.	وان اللجوء الي مثل هذه الاساليب امر مرفوض, وظاهره سلبيه, وتمثل ضغوطا علي العمليه الانتخابيه.
45.	واضاف ان مرشحي الوطني تعرضوا لعنف كبير امام اللجان, خاصه في الاسكندريه, وبورسعيد, وبعض لجان الغربيه. وأشار الي وجود حمايه كامله امنيه للجان الانتخابيه, وقد شهد بذلك جميع المرشحين والمراقبين.
46.	وتوقع الشريف حدوث اعاده في 90% من دوائر المرحة الثانيه نظرا لكثرة عدد المرشحين,
47.	وان يحقق الحزب الوطني تقدما,
48.	وان يظل محتفظا بالاغلبيه التي حققها في المرحة الاولى من الانتخابات.
49.	وقد تركزت اعمال العنف في غالبية المحافظات التسع التي جرت بها الانتخابات.
50.	واحتلت الاسكندريه قائمه السباق الانتخابي في الجوله الاولى من المرحة الثانيه باحداث العنف والاشتباكات الملتهمه ما بين انصار المرشحين في معظم الدوائر,
51.	وتصاعدت اعمال العنف والبلطجه بعد الظهيره,
52.	وتلقت غرفه عمليات مديره الصحه في الاسكندريه اكثر من 25 حالة اصابه في مختلف مستشفيات الاسكندريه.
53.	ومن ناحيه اخري, ذكرت المنظمه المصريه لحقوق الانسان التي تراقب الانتخابات
54.	ان وكيل مرشح الاخوان المحظوره احمد معتوق في دائره ادكو ورشيد بمحافظة البحيره قد طعن في رقبته, ونقل الي احد المستشفيات.
55.	وفي بورسعيد, لم تخل دوائر المحافظه الثلاث من اعمال عنف, ا
56.	دت الي وقوع عدد من المصابين من انصار الوطني والتيار الديني والمعارضه,
57.	وشملت المصادمات جميع اقسام الشرطه,
58.	وقد تدخلت الشرطه بشكل ايجابي وفعال لانهاء تلك الاشتباكات التي شملت دائره الغرب, ودائره الشرق, ودائره المناخ.
59.	ومن ناحيه اخري, ودعت الاسماعيليه هدوءها المعروف
60.	وسادتها اجواء من العنف بين انصار مرشح التيار الديني المهندس صبري خلف الله, وانصار مرشح الوطني احمد ابوزيد, وذلك بالدائره الاولى.
61.	في الوقت نفسه, اصيب شقيق مرشح الحزب الوطني حسن زغاري بدائره كفر شكر بمحافظة القليوبيه بكسر في قدمه في مشاجره بالعصي الغليظه بين انصار شقيقه, وانصار الاخوان.
62.	كما وقعت مشاجره اخري بين انصار مرشح الاخوان تيمور عبدالغني, وانصار خالد محيي الدين مرشح حزب التجمع.

5.	The security authorities interfere to control the situation and secure the voters and arrest more than 200 riot-agitators and bullies among the supporters of different candidates
11.	One of the independent candidates (NDP) was injured as well
12.	And one supporter of the banned MB was injured
13.	And tens of people who went to vote were injured during clashes that occurred in front of the voting sites
17.	A security source said that those people will be referred to the prosecution authorities.

18.	In a statement issued yesterday, the ministry of Interior confirmed that the police has immediately dealt with the riots
19.	And has taken legal action regarding the riots sparked by the candidates' supporters amid an extremely tense situation
20.	created by candidates under Islamic slogans,
	created by candidates under Islamic slogans,
21.	And more than 8 elements belonging to the banned MB have been arrested as riot-agitators.
29.	About 100 MB candidates supporters threw the election headquarters of the NDP candidates Ahmad Abu Zeid with empty bottles and they <i>clashed</i> with his supporters
30.	This resulted in the injury of two who were hospitalized
31.	A professor at Damanhur College of Agriculture who is also representative of el-Fiki [an NDP candidate] has informed the police station that
32.	While he was driving
33.	He was surprised by the supporters of the Gamal Heshamt, running under Islamic slogans, carrying sticks, bottles filled with liquid gasoline and installed by the fuse
34.	And they broke the car's windshield
35.	A driver also reported to the police that while driving in the company of Dr. el-Feqi's representative ,
36.	Some people blocked and stopped the bus , beated them and caused some damages to the bus
37.	And then escaped
61.	At the same time, in in Kafr Shokr the NDP candidate's brother was injured with a fraction in his foot in a big fight with sticks between his brother's supporters and the MB supporters.

FP05, # 12 11-21-05	
1.	المتحدث باسم الداخليه: الأجهزه الأمنيه عملت علي نجاح العمليه الانتخابيه رغم التجاوزات المحدوده
2.	أكد اللواء ابراهيم حماد مساعد وزير الداخليه والمتحدث الرسمي لوزاره الداخليه
3.	أن الاستقرار والأمان في مصر هو الهدف الأول في هذه العمليه الانتخابيه,
4.	وقال المتحدث أن الوضع الامني حتي تلك الساعه تحت السيطره الامنيه.
5.	والسمه الاساسيه هي الاستقرار الامني الحقيقي
6.	بصرف النظر عن بعض التجاوزات التي انحصرت في سنه محافظات في بعض الدوائر والمقرات الانتخابيه.
7.	واكد اللواء ابراهيم حماد ان شخصا واحدا في الاسكندريه لقي حتفه بعد نقله الي المستشفى مصابا بطعنه نافذه,
8.	كما اصيب عدد من ضباط وجنود الشرطه اثناء محاولاتهم لحمايه وتامين المقار الانتخابيه والتصدي للبلطجيه فيها.
9.	واكد ان انصار جماعه الاخوان المسلمون المحظوره هم المسئولون عن اغلب اعمال العنف
1.	The ministry of Interior spokesperson: the security authorities worked on the

	success of the election process, regardless of the limited transgressions.
2.	Major General Ibrahim Hammad, assistant of Minister of Interior and the Interior spokesman, stressed that:
7.	He also stressed that in Alexandria , one person was stabbed and died after he was transferred to the hospital
8.	A number of police officers and soldiers have been injured while in duty trying to protect and secure the voting sites and to confront the thugs.
9.	He also stressed that the banned MB supporters are responsible of most of the violent acts.

FP05, # 16, 11-16-05	
1.	احتكاكات بالسنج والمطاوي.. وكوبونات لشراء الاصوات
2.	وكاميرات المحمول تصور بطاقات الاقتراع داخل اللجان
3.	ففي مصر القديمه, أسفرت المصادمات بين أنصار مرشح الوطني ومرشح جماعه الاخوان المحظوره عن اصابه 7 اشخاص, من بينهم سيدتان
4.	وذلك بسبب اتهامات بشراء الاصوات.
5.	وفي منطقه بولاق ابوالعلا بالقاهره, تمكنت مباحث القاهره من القبض علي 6 من البلطجيه والمسجلين خطر استاجرهم جزار بمبالغ تتراوح بين 300 و 400 جنيه
6.	لمسانده مرشح مستقل, .
7.	وضبطت الشرطه معهم اسلحه بيضاء وصناديق مياه غازيه فارغه لاستخدامها في اي معارك محتمله.
8.	وفي دائره الخليفه بالقاهره ايضا, استخدم انصار بعض المرشحين السنج والمطاوي لارهاب خصومهم.
9.	كما شهدت بعض لجان الدائره عمليات شراء الاصوات بشكل علني.
10.	وترددت شائعات عن ارتفاع صاروخي في سعر الصوت الانتخابي في بولاق ابوالعلا,
11.	فقد بدا صباحا ب 100 جنيه, ثم صعد الي 500 جنيه في الظهره,
12.	وقال البعض انه قفز محلقا الي الف جنيه في نهايه اليوم.
13.	كما عادت ظاهره توزيع الاجهزه الكهربائيه من جانب المرشحين مقابل منح الناخبين اصواتهم لهم في الظهور من جديد امس,
14.	فقد حصل الكثيرون من ابناء احدي دوائر القاهره علي كوبونات صرف اجهزه كهربائيه خاصه المكواه والمروحه من احد المنافذ القريبه من مقر الاقتراع.
15.	وفي بني سويف, جري اغلاق عده لجان بسبب اعمال البلطجه ومحاولة ارهاب الناخبين,
16.	وحاول انصار احد المرشحين افتعال مشاجره ضخمه, استخدموا فيها السيوف والسنج والشوم,
17.	الي ان اسرعت الشرطه لفض المشاجره.
18.	وفي اسيوط, جري اطلاق عده اعيره ناريه قرب لجنه موشي التابعه للدائره الثانيه مركز اسيوط
19.	وحدثت مشادات عديده,
20.	ابرزها في لجنه باخوم بدائره البداري.
21.	وانتشرت شائعات بثها المرشحون وانصارهم ضد الخصوم,
22.	وصلت الي درجه ترديد شائعه عن وفاه احمد القاياتي مرشح الوطني فلاح في دائره العدوه بالمنيا
23.	الامر الذي كلف المرشح جوله علي جميع اللجان بالدائره لينفيها
24.	ولجا بعض المرشحين الي استغلال تكنولوجيا المحمول المتطوره,
25.	وقاموا باعطاء اجهزه المحمول المزوده بالكاميرات للناخبين
26.	حتي يقوموا بتصوير بطاقه الانتخاب

27.	لكي يؤكدوا قيامهم بالتصويت لهذا المرشح او ذاك.
28.	ايضا كان الغناء موجودا امس
29.	فقد علا صوت المطربين في دائره بولاق ابوالعلا من خلال شرائط كاسيت يشيدون فيها بانجازات مرشح الوطني فئات, والمرشح الاخر المستقل.
1.	Clashes with pocket knivescoupons for purchasing votes7
2.	Cell phones image of the bullets
3.	Clashes between the supporters of the NDP and the banned MB candidate resulted in the injury of 7 persons, two of them were women in Old Cairo,
4.	This was because of mutual accusations of vote purchasing,
5.	in Boulak, Cairo police was able to arrest 6 thugs and recorded-as dangerous hired for L.E. 400 to 500 by a butcher,
6.	to support an independent candidate
7.	The police seized with thwm white arms to be used in any may-be battles
8.	in addition, in the Khalifa area, the supporters of some candidates used pocket knives to terrify their opponents,
9.	some voting sites witnessed vote purchasing done publically,
13.	Also, the phenomena of distributing electric household sets to the voters to support a certain candidate has reappeared
15.	in Bani Suwif, some of the voting sites were closed due to bullying and terroristic acts,
16.	as the supporters of a certain candidate tried to fabricate a large brawl in which they used pocket knives and fighting sticks...
17.	until the police was able to break the melee up
18.	And in Assuit, a number pf shots were fired near Moshee voting sitei n Assuit.
19.	There have been numerous altercations

FP05, #17 13-11-05	
1.	وقدم سرور تفسيراً لنجاح خمسة من جماعه الاخوان المسلمين المحظوره في الجوله الاولى
2.	بتاكيد ان هذا يكشف عن ضعف احزاب المعارضه في الشارع السياسي.
3.	وان الجماعه اكثر حركه ونشاطا وتنظيما.

FP05, #20 11-10-05	
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1.	كإطلاق المرحلة الأولى من الانتخابات البرلمانية في ثماني محافظات
2.	تحت الإشراف القضائي الكامل
3.	الانتخابات جرت في هدوء
4.	وانخفاض في الشكاوي المعتاده من اخطاء جداول الناخبين
5.	وجود امني مكثف ومنظم خارج اللجان
6.	والشرطه التزمت بالحياد التام بين جميع المرشحين
7.	فان المراقبين لاحظوا قلته حالات العنف والاحتكاكات بين انصار المرشحين
8.	فيما وصف بانه نجاح للوجود الامني المكثف والمنظم,
9.	خاصه في الدوائر الساخنه التي شهدت تنافسا حادا بين مرشحي الحزب الوطني وجماعه الاخوان المسلمين المحظوره,

FP05, #21, 11-07-05	
1.	في المعركه الانتخابيه: شريط فيديو علي القنوات الفضائيه وقطع مياه الري.. و معلمه تروج لزوجها بالمدرسه!
2.	وفي دائره بمحافظه المنيا حدث صدام بين عائلتين حول مسانده مرشح بعينه
3.	قامت علي اثره احدهما بقطع مياه الري عن ارض العائله الاخرى لمدته يومين,
4.	علي الرغم من ان المرشح لا ينتمي من الاساس لاي منهما,
5.	وتدخل عمده القريه للصلح بينهما,
6.	واتفق الطرفان علي مسانده مرشح اخر لوقف الاحتقان.
7.	وفي مواجهه محاوله الدعايه للزوج
8.	وجهت ادارة احدي المدارس بالصعيد انذارا
9.	لمعلمه قامت بتوزيع ملصقات دعائيه لزوجها داخل احد الفصول الدراسي,

	ودعت تلاميذها الي التعريف بزوجها في منازلهم,	.10
	وحدث اسرهم علي انتخابه.	.11
	وفي سلوك اخر مرفوض.	.12
	فقد مرشح عن جماعه الاخوان المحظوره اعصابه في احدي دوائر المنوفيه	.13
	وقام بتوزيع مبالغ ماليه من فئه ال50 جنيتها علي ابناء الدائره في العلن بعد موتمر انتخابي لمرشح منافس من الحزب الوطني!	.14
12.	In unacceptable behavior,	
13.	one of the MB candidates in Menoufiyya lost his temper	
14.	and started distributing bills of L.E.50 to the people of the constituency after a NDP candidate held his election conference	

FP05, #24, 10-17-05		
	اخلاء سبيل ثلاثه من اعضاء جماعه الاخوان المحظوره	.1
	امر المستشار هشام بدوي, المحامي العام الاول لنيابه امن الدوله العليا, باخلاء سبيل ثلاثه من اعضاء جماعه الاخوان المحظوره بكفاله تتراوح بين 50 و2000 جنيهه	.2
	وكانت اجهزه الامن قد القت القبض علي الاعضاء الثلاثه وهم: ياسر محمود, ومحمد نعيم احمد مدرس, ومحمد محمدي ناظر مدرسه, وذلك في اثناء المظاهرات التي شهدتها الفتره الاخير	.3
1.	Release of 3 members of the banned Brothers group	

FP05, #26, 09-10-05		
	قائمه موحده للمعارضه ضد الوطني في الانتخابات البرلمانيه 9 احزاب وقوي سياسيه تعلن تاسيس جبهه وطنيه للتغيير	.1
	في تطور مفاجئ, اعلن عدد من احزاب المعارضه والقوي السياسيه تاسيس جبهه وطنيه للتغيير السياسي والدستوري,	.2
	واتفقت علي خوض الانتخابات البرلمانيه المقبله بقائمه موحده في مواجهه الحزب الوطني الديمقراطي.	.3
	والتزمت جماعه الاخوان المسلمين المحظوره قانونا بالتنسيق الكامل مع تلك القائمه الموحد.	.4
	وكانت احزاب الوفد, والناصري, والتجمع, وجماعه الاخوان المسلمين المحظوره, والحركه المصريه من اجل التغيير كفايه, وحزب العمل, وحركه الكرامه, وحزب الوسط, والتحالف الوطني للإصلاح والتغيير قد عقدت اجتماعا بمقر حزب الوفد الجديد امس,	.5
	حيث قرر ممثلوها اعلان تاسيس جبهه وطنيه للتغيير السياسي والدستوري تضم الاحزاب والقوي السياسيه للسعي من اجل تحقيق الاصلاح والتغيير, بما يحقق اقامه ديمقراطيه حقيقيه بالبلاد.	.6

7.	وأكد الدكتور محمد مرسي, ممثل جماعه الاخوان في الجبهه, التزام الجماعه بالتنسيق الكامل مع قائمه الموحد.
8.	تمهيدا لخوض الانتخابات البرلمانيه المقبله.
9.	, واختارت الجبهه الدكتور عزيز صدقي منسقا عاما لها, والدكتور نعمان جمعه متحدثا رسميا.
10.	وشهد الاجتماع جدلا واسعا بين حسين عبدالرازق الامين العام لحزب التجمع, وممثل جماعه الاخوان,
11.	حيث اضطر حسين عبدالرازق الي الانسحاب من الجبهه,
12.	وتدخل الدكتوران نعمان جمعه وعزيز صدقي لحسم الخلاف الدائر
13.	بعد تمسك ممثل الاخوان بان يكون شعار اداره الحمله الانتخابيه الاسلام هو الحل.

	FP05, #27, 09-10-05
1.	مبارك أول رئيس منتخب لمصر مرشح الوطني يحصل علي 6 ملايين و316 ألف صوت بنسبة 88.5%
2.	عدد المشاركين 7 ملايين و310 آلاف بنسبة 23%.
3.	والأصوات الصحيحة 98%
4.	نور في المركز الثاني بـ540 ألف صوت
5.	وجمعة الثالث وحصل علي 208 آلاف صوت نائب رئيس الوفد
6.	90% من أصوات مرشح الغد حصل عليها من الإخوان
7.	مدوح مرعي: الانتخابات جرت في إطار من الشفافية والنزاهة تحت إشراف قضائي كامل
8.	اختيار الرئيس من بين أكثر من مرشح.. حجر الزاوية للبناء الديمقراطي الجديد
9.	الرئيس المنتخب يؤدي اليمين القانونية أمام مجلس الشعب الأربعاء المقبل
10.	احتفالات جماهيرية في مختلف المدن والقري ابتهاجا بفوز مبارك
11.	وكانت تقارير الرصد لعملية التصويت, والتي حصل عليها مندوب الازهرام احمد موسى,
12.	قد كشفت عن ان جماعه الاخوان المحظوره عقدت اتفاقا مع مرشح حزب الغد
13.	تم بموجبه خروج المنتمين للجماعه من الاسكندريه الي قنا في توقيت واحد, وهو الخامسه
14.	وادلوا باصواتهم لمصلحه نور
15.	الذي استعان بعدد منهم كمندوبين في اللجان المختلفه.
16.	وصرح منير فخري عبدالنور نائب رئيس حزب الوفد ل الازهرام بان 90% من الاصوات التي ذهبت لمرشح الغد

17. باستثناء شمال سيناء واسوان, هي اصوات جماعه الاخوان المسلمين المحظوره.

1.	Mubarak, the first elected president of Egypt, wins 6 millions and 316,00 votes with a percentage of 88.5%
2.	Total number of votes is 7 millions and 310,00
4.	Nour comes second with 540,00 votes
5.	Goumaa comes third with 208,00 votes
6.	90% of Nour's votes are from the Brothers
7.	Mamdouh Mare'e: the elections was run under transparency and integrity and under a complete judicial supervision
8.	The election of the president from among more than one candidate is the cornerstone of the new democratic building
9.	Mubarak takes the oath of office next Wednesday
10.	Mass celebrations all over the country observing Mubarak's election

FP05, #28, 09-08-05	
1.	مصر تدخل عصر الرئيس المنتخب
2.	الملايين شاركوا في اول انتخابات رئاسيه
3.	والاقبال علي التصويت في القرى فاق المدن
4.	الشرطه التزمت الحياد والاقتراع تم وسط اجواء هادئه دون مخالقات جسيمه
5.	السماح للمنظمات الحقوقيه بمتابعه الانتخابات من داخل اللجان
1.	ومن جهته, نفي الدكتور محمد حبيب, النائب الاول لمرشد جماعه الاخوان المسلمين المحظوره,
2.	ان تكون هناك تعليمات قد صدرت بالتصويت لمصلحه مرشح بعينه في الانتخابات الرئاسيه,
3.	وقال: ان طريقه التصويت تركت لكل عضو من اعضاء الجماعه للمفاضله بين المرشحين علي اساس برامجهم وتاريخهم السياسي, وقدرتهم علي الوفاء بما طرحوه من برامج.
4.	وقال: انه ادلي بصوته من خلف الستاره,
5.	وغمس اصبعه في الحبر الفوسفوري,
6.	مشيرا الي ان الانتخابات تسير كما لو كانت انتخابات جديده, علي الرغم من ان نتيجتها علي حد زعمه مقرر سلفا.

FP05, #29, 09-03-05	
1.	نور في بورسعيد: أنا أفضل المرشحين العشره!
2.	وصف الدكتور أيمن نور مرشح حزب الغد في انتخابات الرئاسة نفسه بأنه الأفضل من بين المرشحين العشره وهاجم ..
3.	وان كان لا يدعي انه افضل مصري!!
4.	ايمن نور الولايات المتحده الامريكيه وطالب بوقف التطبيع مع العدو الصهيوني
4.	ورحب بمشاركه الاخوان المسلمين في منظومه التعدديه الحزبيه ووعده بحكومته ائتلافيه والغاء حبس

الصحفيين واعداد دستور جديد لمصر.	

FP05, #31, 08-22-05	
1. مهدي عاكف يدعو للمشاركة في الانتخابات	
2. دعا محمد مهدي عاكف المرشد العام لجماعه الاخوان المسلمين المحظوره	
3. الي المشاركه في الانتخابات الرئاسيه المقبله بايجابيه	
4. ووصف المشاركه في الانتخابات بانها امانه ومسئوليه امام الله والتاريخ	
5. مطالبيا بالتدقيق في الاختيار جاء ذلك في بيان اصدره امس.	
6. واكد المرشد العام للجماعه محمد مهدي عاكف في بيان اصدره امس ان	
7. علي الاخوان جميعا الا يويدوا ظالما او يتعاونوا مع فاسد او مستبد وعليهم التدقيق في الاختيار.	
8. وان يعلموا ان الشهاده مسئوليه امام الله ويجب ان تذهب لمن يستحق.	
9. واثار عاكف الي ان من يريد حكم مصر ويسعي اليه عليه ادراك عظم المسئوليه	
10. وان الله سيحاسبه علي ما يفعل, وانه لن يفلت من الحساب.	
11. واوضح ان مصر تمر الان بمرحله دقيقه واحداث جسيمه	
12. تجري علي ساحتها	
13. تلفت الانتباه	
14. وتثير الاهتمام	
15. وتدعو كل مصري امين حريص علي مصلحه الامه ان يتفاعل معها.	
16. وان يقوم بواجبه تجاهها.	
17. وتاتي الانتخابات الرئاسيه في هذا الاطار بعد التعديل الدستوري الذي شمل الماده(76).	

FP05, #34, 07-25-0	
1. يدا بيد في مواجهه الارهاب ولا تزال ردود الافعال الغاضبه تتوالي	
2. ويرى المفكر والاديب خيرى شلبي الحاصل علي جائزه الدوله التقديرية هذا العام ان	
3. مقاومه الارهاب ممكنه في مصر بشرط ا	
4. لن يكون هناك موقف محدد من الارهاب	
5. وفي تقديره ان الحكومه تجامل التيار الديني	
6. وتغالي في هذه المجامله	
7. مع ان هذه المجامله ليست من الدين في شئ	
8. والمعروف ان التيارات الدينيه المتطرفه تربت في مدرسه الاخوان	
9. التي تريد ان تفرض رايها بالقوه وتجعل نفسها القائد والجلاد.	

FP05, #36, 06-30-05	
1.	وزير الداخلية السعودي في مؤتمر صحفي:
2.	قائمة المطلوبين الجديده من التنظيم نفسه السابق ولديهم التوجهات نفسها
3.	وحول ما ان كان هناك ارتباط او علاقات بين المطلوبين في المملكه وجماعه الاخوان المسلمين
4.	قال الوزير نحن نتكلم عن القاعده
5.	لكن من المعروف ان الاب الروحي لهذا العمل هو عبد الله عزام الذي كان في مصر وباكستان
6.	, والطواهري من جماعه الاخوان المسلمين.
3.	And whether there is any connection between the 'wanted' in Saudia and the MB, the minister said
4.	We talk about al-Qaeda
5.	But what is known is that the spiritual father to this work [jihadist groups] is Abdalla Azzam who was in [studied] Egypt and Pakistan
6.	And Azzawahry is from the MB.

FP05, # 38, 06-12-05	
1.	لا اتصالات مع الاخوان
2.	نفت كوندوليزا رايس وزيره الخارجيه الامريكيه وجود اي اتصالات امريكيه مع جماعه الاخوان المسلمين المحظوره في مصر,
3.	وقالت في محاضرتها بالجامعه الامريكيه:
4.	ان وجودها في المنطقه هدفه تشجيع الاصلاحات والمساعده في اقامه انتخابات حره ونزيهه.
5.	ونفت ان تكون كوندوليزا رايس وزيره الخارجيه الامريكيه
6.	قد اجتمعت مع ممثلين لجماعه الاخوان المسلمين
7.	لانهم لا يشكلون حزبا سياسيا مشروعا
No connections with the Muslim Brotherhood.	

FP05, #39, 06-19-05	
1.	الافراج عن 463 من الاخوان
2.	واستمرار حبس 37 متهما فقط
3.	أعلن المستشار ماهر عبدالواحد النائب العام ان
4.	463 متهما من المنتمين الي جماعه الاخوان المحظوره اخلي سبيلهم لانتهاء مبررات حبسهم الاحتياطي,
5.	ومازال 37 متهما فقط محبوسين,
6.	ويقتضي سير التحقيقات استمرار حبسهم احتياطي لحين انتهائها
1.	Release of 463 from the Brothers
2.	Only 37 accused are still detained.

FP05, #40, 06-15-05	
1.	إخلاء سبيل 137 شخصا من جماعة الإخوان المحظورة

1.	أمر المستشار ماهر عبدالواحد النائب العام بإخلاء سبيل 137 شخصا من جماعه الاخوان المحظوره
2.	كانت أجهزه الامن قد ألقت القبض عليهم في احداث التجمهر الاخير,
3.	والمفرج عنهم ينتمون الي محافظات: القاهره, والبحيره, والاسماعيليه, والفيوم, والمنيا, والشرقيه, والدقهليه, ودمياط.
1.	Release of 137 persons from the banned Brothers group

	FP05, #41, 06-13-05
1.	النائب العام يامر بإخلاء سبيل 163 من عناصر الاخوان
2.	امر المستشار ماهر عبدالواحد النائب العام بإخلاء سبيل 163 متهما من العناصر المنسوب اليها الانتماء لجماعه الاخوان المسلمين المحظوره,
3.	وهم من اطباء, والمحامين, والطلاب, والتقنيين, والمدرسين.
4.	وكان قد القي القبض عليهم في الاحداث الاخيره بمحافظات: القاهره, والغزبيه, والشرقيه, والاسماعيليه, ودمياط,
1.	Attorney General orders the release of 163 Brothers elements

	FP05, # 42, 08-06-05
1.	واشنطن تنفي الاتصال بالاخوان المسلمين
2.	نفي ديفيد وولش, مساعد وزيره الخارجيه الامريكيه لشئون الشرق الادني, وجود اي اتصالات بين الولايات المتحده, وجماعه الاخوان المسلمين المحظوره,
3.	او ان يكون لديها خطط للقيام بذلك في المستقبل.
4.	وقال في اول لقاء له مع مراسلي الصحف العربيه في واشنطن, منذ توليه منصبه في مارس الماضي
5.	ان التقارير الصحفيه عن هذه اللقاءات منسوبه الي ممثلي الاخوان, وليس الي الاداره الامريكيه.

	FP05, #43, 13-05-05
1.	الافراج عن 52 طالبا من جماعه الاخوان المحظوره
2.	امر المستشار ماهر عبدالواحد النائب العام امس بالافراج عن 52 طالبا من جماعه الاخوان المحظوره في المنصوره والزقازيق.
3.	كانت اجهزه الامن قد ألقت القبض عليهم في اثناء احداث التظاهر الماضيه لجماعه الاخوان.
4.	وجاء قرار الافراج عن الطلاب ليتمكنوا من اداء امتحاناتهم.

5.	يذكر ان النائب العام كان قد افرج قبل عدة ايام عن 77 طالبا اخرين من المنتمين للجماعه نفس
1.	Release of 52 students from the banned Brothers group

FP05, # 44, 23-05-05	
1.	القبض علي امين التنظيم في جماعه الاخوان المحظوره
2.	ألقت أجهزه الأمن القبض علي الدكتور محمود عزت, الرجل الثاني في جماعه الاخوان المحظوره,
3.	الذي يتولي منصب سكرتير عام الجماعه وامين التنظيم, و22 اخرين من اعضاء الجماعه,
4.	حيث اكدت المعلومات انهم
5.	كانوا يستهدفون تحريض المواطنين, خاصه الطلاب والعمال,
6.	لاشعال الفوضى والدعوه الي العصيان المدني.
1.	Arrest of the Organization Secretary of the banned Brothers group
2.	Security bodies have arrested Dr. Ezzat, the second authority in the banned Brotherhood group
3.	who also is the general secretary of the MB, and other 22 members
4.	The information confirmed that they
5.	Plan to provoke the public, specially students and workers
6.	To spark chaos and to call for civil disobedience

FP05, #45, 22-05-05	
1.	في حوار شامل مع قيادات المجتمع الامريكي بمعهد واشنطن لدراسات الشرق الادني
2.	نظيف: الحكومه تقبل رويه بوش عن ضروره قياده مصر للاصلاح الديمقراطي في المنطقه
3.	العلاقات مع امريكا لم تتجاوز الخيط الرفيع
4.	الذي يفصل بين تقديم النصيحه والتدخل في شئوننا
5.	كما تمسك بموقف الحكومه المصريه الرافض لانشاء احزاب في مصر علي اسس دينيه,
6.	وذلك ردا علي سوال لمراسل التلفزيون الاسرائيلي ايهود ياعاري
7.	حول دعوه مصر لمشاركه جميع الفصائل الفلسطينيه والعراقيه في محادثات سياسيه حول المستقبل السياسي لبلديهما
8.	في الوقت الذي ترفض فيه قيام جماعه الاخوان المسلمين بانشاء حزب سياسي,
9.	ونفى بشده ان تكون الحكومه المصريه تمنع الاخوان من المشاركه السياسيه,
10.	مشيرا الي حقيقه ان لهم سبعة عشر نائبا في البرلمان
11.	كما ان الاخوان المسلمين يقولون انهم تخلوا عن العنف,
12.	ونحن في انتظار ان يثبتوا ذلك مع الوقت
13.	واضاف في الوقت الذي قد لا يكون مستغربا في اسرائيل قيام احزاب دينيه
14.	فان الوضع في مصر مختلف
15.	حيث ان لديها اقلية مسيحيه كبيره
16.	وتساءل ماذا سيكون الوضع لو وصل حزب ديني الي الحكم

17.	وسعي لفرض ارائه بالقوه علي بقيه الاقليات
18.	وأضاف ان مصر تسمح للجميع بالمشاركة
19.	ولكن من دون انشاء حزب ديني.

FP05, #48, 19-05-05	
1.	نظيف في حديث لصحيفه يو.اس.توداي:
2.	مبارك طرح مبادرته الشجاعه
3.	والتحدي الان علي عاتق احزاب المعارضه
4.	سؤال: الاخوان المسلمون تبقي منظمه محظوره,
5.	وتم اخيرا اعتقال مئات منهم في الاسابيع الاخيره
6.	كيف ستجدون طريقه تسمح لمثل هذا الجزء المهم للغايه من الجسد السياسي المصري بان يكون له دور ما في حكم البلد؟
7.	نظيف: لن نقوم بذلك الامر بهذه البساطه,
8.	دستورنا لا يسمح بذلك.
9.	لن نسمح باحزاب سياسيه علي اساس ديني
10.	ولا توجد الكثير من الدول التي ستسمح بذلك.
11.	هل تودين ان ترين في مصر حزبا للاسلام وحزبا للمسيحيه وحزبا لليهوديه؟
12.	هذا هو ما يريدونه. كيف يمكن لنا السماح بذلك؟
13.	* سؤال: اذن لا يبقي امام هؤلاء الناس سوي الترشيح علي قوائم اطراف اخري؟
14.	* نظيف اعضاء الاخوان المسلمين لهم ممثلون في البرلمان كمستقلين, ونحن نرحب بقيامهم بذلك.
15.	وردا علي سوال حول قيام السلطات المصريه امس باعتقال عدد من ناشطي جماعه الاخوان, وتعارض ذلك مع التوجه نحو الاصلاح السياسي.
16.	قال نظيف: ان الاصلاحات الديمقراطيه اوسع كثيرا من اي اعتقالات قد تحدث نتيجته لشغب في الشوارع, او غير ذلك من الامور.
17.	وأضاف أن الاصلاح الديمقراطي هو تعديل أساسي للدستور, يتم لأول مره في تاريخ مصر من خلال انتخاب رئيس الجمهوريه من بين أكثر من مرشح.
1.	The PM, Nazif, in an interview with <i>US Today</i> :
2.	Mubarak has submitted his historical initiative [to amend the Constitution]
4.	Q: the MB is still considered banned
5.	and lately hundreds of them have been arrested.
6.	Is there a way that would allow for such a very important part of the Egyptian political body to have a role in the governance of the country?
7.	Nazif: We would not simply do it,
8.	our Constitution does not allow it.
9.	we will not allow political parties based on religion
10.	and many countries do not allow it
11.	Would you like to see in Egypt, the party of Islam and Christian parties and parties of Judaism?
12.	This what they want to see happen , how would we allow it to?!

FP05, # 49, 05-18-05	
1.	رئيس الوزراء في لقائه بمجلس العلاقات الخارجية الأمريكية:
2.	الإخوان المسلمون منظمة محظورة
3.	لكنهم ليسوا إرهابيين
4.	وأكد نظيف وجود خلط بين المتشددين والاعوان المسلمين والارهابيين.
5.	فالمتشددون ليسوا ارهابيين.
6.	والاعوان ليسوا متشددين ولا ارهابيين.
7.	وأن الارهابيين لا يشترط أن يكونوا مسلمين.
8.	مشيرا الي أنه بالرغم من اختلافنا مع الاعوان فيما يتعلق بتكوين حزب سياسي.
9.	فان مصر لم تقف حائلا دون دخول أي منهم الي المجالس النيابيه
1.	PM in his meeting with the American Council on Foreign Affairs:
2.	The Brothers is a banned organization
3.	But they are not terrorists

FP05, # 50, 05-14-05	
1.	مبارك: أنا مؤتمن علي حياة 72 مليون مصري
2.	ومسئوليتي توفير العيش الكريم لهم
3.	الرئيس في حديث شامل إلي أحمد الجار الله رئيس تحرير السياسة الكويتية:
4.	تعديل المادة 76 جاء قرارا ذاتيا
5.	ولم يصدر استجابة لضغوط داخلية أو أمريكية
6.	الإخوان يريدون السلطة
7.	وإذا حكموا فسيحكمون إلي الأبد
8.	وسيسببون القلق في البلاد
9.	ما قامت به كفاية مدفوع الثمن..
10.	وأضاف أن الاعوان سيبدأون بمهادنه الحاكم كخطوه أولى
11.	ثم يبدأون باثاره الفوضي السياسيه.
12.	ثم القفز علي الحكم.
13.	وكان بإمكانني تنظيم مظاهرات بحفنة فلوس تهتف مش كفاية
14.	وحذر الرئيس من المظاهرات غير المبرره.
15.	مشيرا الي انه ستودي الي هروب المستثمرين مما يزيد من البطاله في البلاد.
16.	واكد ان مثل هذه المظاهرات لا برامج لها.
17.	وتستهدف ايجاد حاله شغب طارده للاستثمار المحلي والاجنبي.
18.	وقال: انه مؤتمن علي حياه ومستقبل 72 مليون مواطن. ومسئوليتي توفير العيش بكرامه لهم.
19.	وفي قضيه فتح قناه حوار بين الولايات المتحده وجماعه الاعوان.
20.	قال الرئيس: أن هناك قصه طويله يعرف كل تفاصيلها.
21.	وعلي الأمريكيين ألا يظنوا أنني نائم.
22.	والمعلومات تاتيني أولا باول حول اتصالاتهم مع الاعوان.

1.	Mubarak: I am trusted on the lives of 70 millions Egyptians
2.	My responsibility is to provide them with a decent life
3.	President in a comprehensive talk with al-Jaralla, the Editor-in-Chief of the

	Kuwaiti <i>Politics</i> :
4.	The amendment of article 76 was a self-initiative
5.	It did not happen because of internal or US pressure
6.	The Brothers want authority
7.	If they rule, they will rule for ever
8.	And they cause chaos in Egypt
9.	What Kifaaya did is paid for [by the west or foreign party]
10.	He added that the MB will start with appeasing the ruler
11.	And then they start causing political chaos
12.	And then jump to the Office
13.	I could have formed similar demonstrations with a handful of money to shout ' not <i>kifaya</i> ' 'not enough'
14.	The president warned against the unjustified demonstrations
15.	as it will lead to the flight of investors , which, in turn, will lead to more unemployment in Egypt
16.	The president stressed that these demonstrations have no strategy (i.e. random)
17.	and aim to create a state of chaos that would chase away local and foreign investment

	FP05, # 51, 14-05-05
	1. عشرة الاف عضو بالحزب الوطني ينظمون مسيره مؤيدة لمبارك
	2. شارك أكثر من عشره الاف عضو بالحزب الوطني في مسيرة سلمية
	3. مؤيده للرئيس حسني مبارك ومبادرته التاريخيه بتعديل الماده(76) من الدستور,
	4. ومطالبه الرئيس باعلان ترشيحه.
	5. ومن جانب اخر تجمع عدد من انصار حركه كفايه وقيادات من جماعه الاخوان المحظوره في نقابتي الصحفيين والمحامين.
	6. وطالبوا بالاصلاح السياسي الشامل.
1.	10,000 NDP members organize a march in support of Mubarak
2.	More than 10,000 NDP members have participated in a peaceful march
3.	To supporting president Mubarak and his historic intuitive to amend constitutional article 76
4.	And ask him to declare his candidacy
5.	On the other side, a number of people from Kifaya and the Banned MB gathered in both lawyers and journalists' syndicates
6.	and called for reform

FP05, #52, 05-14- 05	
1. الرئيس مبارك في حديث لرئيس تحرير صحيفه السياسه الكويتيه: لست محتاجا لتسويق نفسي.. واعمالى يعرفها الشعب..	
2. ولست بحاجه الي حلقه تليفزيونيه	
3. البلد ليس عزبه ملكي وانا قيم عليه بتفويض من الشعب	
وإذا اردت ان افعل شيئاً فيجب ان ارجع اليه	
4. سياده الرئيس ما سر تحالف الاخوان المسلمين, مع التكفيريين, مع الناصريين ومع جماعه حزب الغد واجتماعهم ضد الرئاسه وضد الرئيس؟	
5. الرئيس : تستطيع ان تري وتقدر من يقف وراءهم.	
6. هناك اسباب لاجتماعهم	
7. وانا اعرفها,	
8. لكن ما يهمني هو مصلحه الغالبية العظمى	
9. الناس لا تريد ان يكون الرئيس حسني مبارك متأثراً من هؤلاء, او يعتبر تحالفهم مبادره قلّه وفاء من شعب مصر؟	
10. عندك 72 مليون.	
11. أركز جهدي كله من اجل ان اكفيهم,	
12. وان يعيشوا بكرامه, بقدر ما استطيع,	
13. البلد يزيد مليون وثلاثمئه الف تسمه كل سنه,	
14. تخيل طلبات هؤلاء لوحدهم كم تبلغ.	
15. والسنه المقبله سيزيد هؤلاء بنفس العدد.	
16. في بدايه ولايتي كان عدد السكان 42 مليوناً,	
17. اليوم بلغ 72 مليوناً نعم.. تقول لي هناك بطاله, نعم أقول لك هناك بطاله. مكافحه البطاله بحاجه الي استثمار.	
18. بالمظاهرات التي نراها سيهرب المستثمر,	
19. يعني ان البطاله ستزيد وتتفشي بين الناس,	
20. ومن هنا, ولهذا السبب يبدأ تأثري,	
21. وليس لاي شيء اخر يزعج هذا الوضع	
22. ولو انه لن يؤثر علي مسار الدوله	
23. الا انه يخلق حاله تباطو في التوسع الاستثماري	
24. اذ نظمت مظاهرات, وتوجهت نحو المصانع, والمرافق وخلق حاله شغب ستقع المصيبه	
25. الالف العمال والاطباء والموظفين والمهندسين الذين يعملون في هذه المصانع والمرافق سيتوقفون عن العمل	
26. يعني مافيش مرتبات اي البطاله زادت, المفروض ان نراعي مصلحه الشعب	
27. ما قصه فتح الامريكيين لقناه حوار مع جماعه الاخوان المسلمين؟, مع اني اعرف ان ولي العهد السعودى الامير عبدالله قد عاتبهم عليها.. انا اريد ان تكون شفافاً في الاجابه؟	
28. غير مسموح في قانوننا بتاسيس الاحزاب الدينيه,	
29. ولا مانع للحزب الدينى من العمل عبر احزاب اخرى مرخصه,	
30. لكن هل اطروحات الاخوان مقبوله من الناس?,	
31. وان تستروا بحزب اخر	

	الناس هنا اجتازوا مرحله التضليل	32.
	ويفهمون مجريات الامور, ولديهم تفسير لكل شيء	33.
4.	<i>Politics</i> : Mr. President, what is the secret behind the alliance of the Muslim Brotherhood with the Takfiri groups, the Nasserites and the Ghad party, and their coming together against the president?	
5.	<i>President</i> : you can see it and know who stands behind them.	
6.	There are reasons for them to come together	
7.	and I know these reasons	
8.	but I only care for the interest of the majority	
27.	<i>Politics</i> : what is the story behind the Americans opening a dialogue channel with the MB? I know that the Saudi prince Abdalla has admonished them on it. I want a transparent answer	
28.	<i>President</i> : Our law does not allow establishing religious parties	
29.	yet they can work through other licensed parties	
30.	However, are the theses of the MB acceptable by people	
31.	even if they cower under another party's umbrella?	
32.	People here have passed the phase of mystification	
33.	they understand the current situation and they have interpretation to everything.	

FP05, #53, 05-14-05		
1.	مبارك: حملت أمانة مرهقة ومضنية لكن شعب مصر يهون لأجله كل شيء فهو أبو التضحيات	
2.	المظاهرات غير المبررة لا برامج لها وتستهدف إيجاد حالة شغب طارئة للاستثمار	
3.	علي الأمريكيين ألا يظنوا أنني نائم والمعلومات تأتيني أولاً بأول حول اتصالاتهم مع الإخوان المسلمين	
1.	Mubarak: I have carried a heavy and tiring burden but everything can be sacrificed for the Egyptian people sake.	
2.	Unjustified demonstrations have no programs and aim to create a state of riots that is centrifugal of [foreign] investments	
3.	Americans [US administration] do not need to think that I am sleeping; information comes to me first-hand on their contacts with the Muslim Brotherhood.	

FP05, #55, 05-07-05		
1.	عقب تظاهروهم باربع محافظات القبض علي 200 من اعضاء جماعه الاخوان المحظوره	
2.	اصابه 30 من قوات الامن	
3.	ومصرع أحد المتظاهرين نتيجة التدافع	
4.	كشفت مصدر امني عن انه	
5.	تم القاء القبض علي 200 من أعضاء جماعه الاخوان المحظوره بأربع محافظات هي: القاهره والدقهليه والاسماعيليه والسويس	
6.	لقيامهم باثارة الجماهير	

7.	وتحريضهم علي التظاهر عقب صلاة الجمعة أمس..
8.	وأضاف المصدر أن
9.	أجهزه الأمن تمكنت من ضبط الدكتور عصام العريان القيادي الاخواني وثلاثة اخرين من قيادات الجماعة المحظوره في منزل الأول
10.	كانوا يعدون لتحرك يستهدف زعزعه الاستقرار والاخلال بأمن المواطنين.
11.	وكان نحو الفي شخص من اعضاء الجماعة قد تظاهروا امام مسجد الغنام بمدينة طلخا بالدقهليه
12.	وبرغم تحذيرات الأمن بضروره فض المظاهرات ، قاموا بقذف رجال الشرطه بالطوب والحجاره،
13.	مما أدى الي اصابه اربعة ضباط و26 من الافراد والجنود،
14.	ولقي احد المتظاهرين مصرعه واسمه طارق طه مهدي غنام40 سنه، وهو من قيادات الاخوان بالمحافظه نتيجته تدافع المتظاهرين.

1.	After their demonstration in four governorates, the arrest of 200 members of the banned Brothers group
2.	The injury of 30 State Security forces
3.	The death of one demonstrator because of stampede
4.	A security source has revealed that
5.	200 members of the banned MB have been arrested in four governorates
6.	As they stirred up the masses
7.	and incited them to demonstrate after Friday prayers yesterday.
8.	The source added
9.	the security forces were able to arrest Dr. Essam el-Eryaan, the leading Brother's figure and three other leaders in the house of the first
10.	While they were planning for actions causing instability and chaos (peoples security)
11.	Furthermore, about 2000 Brothers members demonstrated in front of el-Ghannam mosque in Talkha
12.	In spite of police warning to end the demonstration, they pelted police with bricks and stones
13.	Which resulted in the injury of 4 officers and 26 soldiers
14.	Moreover Tarek Ghannam, 40, one of the demonstrators and a leading figure in the MB, died because of demonstrators' stampede

FP05, #58, 03-25-05	
1.	مبارك في حديث لصحيفة لوفيجارو الفرنسية: قانون الطوارئ لمكافحة الإرهاب والمخدرات فقط
2.	ولن أسمح بانتشار الفوضى أبدا
3.	القانون لا يسمح بتشكيل حزب علي أساس ديني
4.	ولا أمتع الإخوان من الانضمام لأحزاب أخرى

5.	هل ستشرع قيام احزاب سياسيه مثل جماعه الاخوان المسلمين؟
6.	الرئيس: ليس لدينا اي اعتراض علي الاحزاب السياسيه
7.	هناك 19 حزبا في مصر
8.	ولكن القانون لايسمح بتشكيل حزب علي أساس ديني
9.	انني لا امانع الاخوان المسلمين من الانضمام الي احزاب سياسيه مختلفه, فهم أحرار
10.	واكد انه ليس لديه اي اعتراض علي الاحزاب السياسيه
11.	فهناك 19 حزبا في مصر
12.	لكن القانون لا يسمح بتشكيل حزب علي اساس ديني.
13.	ولا امانع الاخوان المسلمين من الانضمام الي احزاب سياسيه مختلفه, فهم احرار.
1.	Mubarak to Le Figaro: Emergency law is only for dealing with terrorism and drugs
2.	I will not allow chaos to happen
3.	The law does not permit establishing parties on a religious basis
4.	I do not prevent the Brothers from joining other parties

FP05, #59, 01-17-05	
1.	الرئيس في حديث صريح لقناه العربيه: حكم مصر عمليه صعبه جدا
2.	واذا كان الشعب يريدني فلن استطيع الرحيل
3.	انا رجل جاد اعمل منذ الصباح حتي ميعاد النوم
4.	..وابني يساعدي كما تساعد شيراك ابنته
5.	{المذيع: سوال عن علمانيه امريكا والروساء الامريكيين ان تعرف معظمهم هل من الممكن ان تتحول لدوله دينيه؟
6.	الرئيس: امريكا عمرها ماتكون دوله دينيه
7.	كان عندي الراجل الامريكاني ده
8.	له بعض اتصالات ببعض ناس في العالم العربي
9.	قلت له انا هسالك سوال
10.	انتم بتلعبوا لعبه خطر
11.	وهيضروكم
12.	يعني احنا مثلا في عالما العربي مش هنفرح بها
13.	انتم عندكم حزب سياسي علي اساس ديني؟
14.	قال لي لا.
15.	قلت له واوروبا فيها حزب سياسي علي اساس ديني؟
16.	قال لي لا.
17.	قلت له ماتطلبوش من العالم
18.	سببوا العالم.
19.	قلت له احنا ما عندناش
20.	القانون يمنع
21.	لكن ما احنا كلنا مسلمين
22.	يعني اخوان ده صنف واخوان مسلمين
23.	يطلع لي 3 او 4 انواع من الاخوان المسلمين
24.	كل واحد بتصور معين

25.	ما احنا كلنا مسلمين
26.	وكلنا بنادي الفريضة
27.	فما تقدرش ان انت تفرق بين هذا وذاك.
28.	ويقدروا يخشوا الانتخابات التشريعيه
29.	او ينضموا لاحزاب
30.	لكن حزب علي اساس ديني القانون عندنا بيحرموا
31.	ما هياش بدعه إنما بيحرموا.

FP05, #60, 01-15-05	
1.	مبارك في حديث مع شبكه بي. بي. اس الأمريكية
2.	تشارلي: هل تعتقد يا سياده الرئيس أن الاخوان المسلمين بمقدورهم تحقيق نتائج جيده اذا ما أجريت انتخابات حرة وشفافه في مصر.
3.	الرئيس مبارك: لماذا تخوض في مسائل حساسه يا تشارلي, اتركها للنهايه.
4.	تشارلي: ماذا تعني باتركها للنهايه؟
5.	الرئيس مبارك: الي النهايه.

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