

PHILIP II AND THE CONSTRUCTION
OF THE MACEDONIAN STATE

by

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STATEMENT OF THESIS APPROVAL

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ABSTRACT

The accomplishments of Philip II of Macedonia have long been overshadowed by those of his son, Alexander the Great, due to the spectacular nature of Alexander's achievements and to the survival of ancient sources, though written later, that have documented Alexander's reign. Little remains of the histories or writings of Philip's contemporaries, and those that do remain are hostile to Philip and almost exclusively pro-Athenian. Ancient sources focus on Philip's diplomacy, imperialism, and character flaws—all from the view of outsiders watching Philip's actions against their Greek states. These ancient literary sources have necessarily focused the modern discussion of Greece in the 4th century BC on those same subjects and away from a survey of Philip's policies, systems, and successes within Macedonia. This thesis reviews the ancient literary, epigraphic, numismatic, and archaeological evidence in an effort to investigate Philip's initiatives and actions within Macedonia and to suggest the ideology related to these plans and strategies. Based on a review of this evidence, this thesis argues that Philip created a Macedonian state based on traditional Macedonian institutions, as well as new practices, that served Philip's purpose of uniting his disparate territories and peoples into one nation; and that Philip's reformed army provided the mechanism for Philip's achievement of his political, economic, and social goals, and importantly, for defining a national culture.

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INTRODUCTION

The remarkable reign of Philip II saw Macedonia burst into Greek affairs as the premier European military and political power of the 4th century BC. Most modern studies of Philip's life and rule concentrate on Philip's reform of the military, his foreign policy, his relationship with and attitude toward Athens and other Greek states, his establishment of a Panhellenic league, and his planned invasion of Asia.¹ These investigations reflect the nature of ancient, literary sources that focus on the strength of Philip's army, his diplomacy, his propensity toward political marriages, and his possible long-term goals in the larger Greek and Mediterranean world. Contemporary, literary Macedonian sources survive only in fragments that fail to provide an internal view of Macedonia or to act as a counterbalance to what are often hostile or biased Greek sources during this dynamic internal period in ancient Macedonian history. Marsyas of Pella wrote a history of Macedonia that focused on Philip II, *Makedonia*, of which only small fragments remain. Theopompos of Chios wrote a voluminous, contemporary history on

¹ The foundational work on Ancient Macedonian history that studies all topics in depth is the multivolume work of N.G.L. Hammond and G.T. Griffith, *A History of Macedonia*, (Oxford: 1972-1988); The second volume (Oxford: 1979) covers the period from 550-336 BC and will be referenced throughout this thesis. See also N.G.L. Hammond, *The Macedonian State: The Origins, Institutions, and History* (Oxford: 1989; reprint 2001) and R. Malcolm Errington, *A History of Macedonia* (Oxford: 1990). Eugene N. Borza, *In the Shadow of Olympus: The Emergence of Macedon* (Princeton: 1990; reprint 1992), in which Borza presents a narrative history of Macedonia that includes evidence from recent archaeological excavations. A summary of the literary, archaeological, and epigraphic sources for the study of Philip II can be found in Eugene N. Borza, *Before Alexander: Constructing Early Macedonia, Publications of the Association of Ancient Historians*, no. 6 (Claremont: 1999), 9-26.

Philip's reign, *Philippica*, whose numerous fragments criticize Philip's character and attribute his successes primarily to luck.² The main surviving Greek histories of the period, including Herodotus' *Histories*, Thucydides' *History of the Peloponnesian War*, and Xenophon's *Hellenica*, present only scant details on Macedonian history whenever Macedonian events affect the history of other Greek states. The only continuous historical narratives of Philip's reign are those of Diodorus Siculus' *Universal History*, written in the 1st century BC, dealing with events from earliest times to Diodorus' own time; and Justin's Epitome of Pompeius Trogus' *Historiae Philippicae*, a work from the 2nd or 3rd centuries AD based on a 1st century work, and derived from traditions hostile to Philip. Plutarch, a biographer living in the 2nd century AD and primarily interested in character, offers some information about Philip in his lives of *Demosthenes* and *Alexander*. Similarly, the historians Polybius, Arrian, and Quintus Curtius Rufus, all living in the 1st and 2nd centuries AD, provide some useful information related to Philip's reign—particularly Arrian and Curtius who wrote narrative histories on Alexander the Great based on earlier, contemporary sources now lost to us. The only abundant contemporary sources for Philip's reign come from the Athenian orators, Demosthenes, Aeschines, and Isocrates, all of whom have their specific political, philosophical, and moral reasons for maligning or supporting Philip, and whose speeches follow a rhetorical rather than historical tradition.

This thesis attempts to provide a re-examination of the ancient sources and a survey of other relevant evidence to discover Philip's initiatives and achievements within Macedonia itself during the dynamic period of his reign. When Philip succeeded to the

² Ian Worthington, *Philip II of Macedonia* (New Haven: 2008), 212. Worthington provides a succinct and informative summary of the ancient sources related to Philip's reign—both those extant and those now lost.

throne in 359 BCE after his brother's death in battle with the Illyrians, Macedonia had a weak central government, few urban centers, and underutilized manpower and natural resources.³ The external and internal crises that immediately beset Philip may call into question whether or not Macedonia could strictly be called a state at all: its territories were in dispute; its army, one of the few national institutions besides the monarchy, demoralized and diminished; and its kingship contested.⁴ And yet, in the space of only two decades, Philip transformed Macedonia into a state capable of defending and administering an expansive territory, commanding a large and skilled army, and unified in its laws, economy, and recognition of central authority.⁵ The archaeological, numismatic, epigraphic, and literary evidence supports the conclusion that Philip planned and implemented programs within his own country—initiatives that certainly predated any grand schemes outside Macedonia—to achieve this remarkable transformation. J.R. Ellis has specifically addressed the ways in which Philip employed traditional

³ N.G.L. Hammond points out that the forty years preceding Philip's accession demonstrated the "weaknesses" of the Macedonian state without any realization of its potentialities in *Philip of Macedon* (Baltimore: 1994), 7. Also, Errington, *History of Macedonia*, 18, states that the sources demonstrate the territorial and monarchical weakness of the Macedonian kingdom even earlier. Perdiccas' actions of shifting alliances during the Peloponnesian War suggest his fear for his weak state's survival. See also J. R. Ellis, *Philip II and Macedonian Imperialism* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976; rpt. 1986), 44.

⁴ Richard A. Billows, *Kings and Colonists: Aspects of Macedonian Imperialism* (New York: 1995), 1. Also, Ernst Badian lists in the context of disproving that Philip invaded Thrace at that time (or planned to) the various political and military problems that beset Philip in "Philip II and Thrace," *Pulpuveva: Semaines Philippopolitaines de L'Histoire et del La Culture Thrace* (Sofia: 1983), 53. Also, see Diod. 16.2.4-5. Any references in Greek or English to Diodorus come from the Loeb Classical Library text, Charles L. Sherman, *Diodorus of Sicily*, vol. VII (Cambridge: 1952; rpt. 1980), and vol. VIII (Cambridge: 1963; rpt. 1983).

⁵ Diod. 16.1.3: "For Philip was king over the Macedonians for twenty-four years, and having started from the most insignificant beginnings built up his kingdom to be the greatest of the dominions in Europe . . ."

Macedonian institutions, especially the army and the monarchy, to unify his state.⁶

Building on this and other studies, this thesis argues that Philip constructed his state on the foundation of traditional Macedonian institutions and on the practices of his two most successful predecessors, Alexander I and Archelaus. This thesis further argues that Philip undertook a number of related measures to change the social, political, economic, and cultural structure of his state. Such measures included the enlargement and reorganization of the army, the foundation of cities, the redistricting of territory by the movement and mixing of populations into established settlements and newly founded cities, the acquisition and exploitation of natural resources, the imposition of an administrative and monetary structure, and the conscious strengthening of the monarchy.⁷

This thesis asserts that the army provided the mechanism for Philip's achievement of his political, economic, and social goals, allowing Philip to combine force and diplomacy to achieve his internal goals, and a means for defining a national culture.⁸ Finally, this thesis contends that Philip systematically neutralized the disparate, and often hostile, peoples whom he conquered, incorporated them into both traditional and new systems,

⁶ Ellis, *Philip II*, focuses throughout on the Macedonian army and monarchy under Philip.

⁷ A number of articles provide unique support on these subjects and will be referenced throughout. These include the following from earliest to most recent: J.R. Ellis, "Population Transplants by Philip II," *Makedonia* 9 (1969): 9-17; J.R. Ellis, "The Dynamics of Fourth-Century Macedonian Imperialism," *Ancient Macedonia* 2 (Institute for Balkan Studies, Thessaloniki: 1977): 103-114; W.L. Adams, "Philip II and the Thracian Frontier," *Thrace Ancienne* 1 (Actes 2e Symposium International Des Etudes, Komotini: 1997): 81-88; W.L. Adams, "The Frontier Policy of Philip II," *Ancient Macedonia* 7 (Papers Read at the Seventh International Symposium, Institute for Balkan Studies, Thessaloniki: 2002): 283-291; W.L. Adams, "*Symmiktous Katoikisas* and the City Foundations of the Thracian Frontier, *Thrace in the Greco-Roman World* (Proceedings of the 10th International Congress of Thracology, Komotini-Alexandroupolis: 2005): 3-12.

⁸ See especially J. R. Ellis, *Philip II*, chapter 2 and passim, and "The Dynamics of Fourth-Century Macedonian Imperialism." See also Richard A. Gabriel, *Philip II of Macedonia: Greater than Alexander* (Washington, D.C.: 2010), 167.

and thereby established a national consciousness. Philip's successful efforts at unification enabled him to establish the first territorial, national state in Europe and, arguably, the first Hellenistic monarchy.⁹

⁹ Hammond, *The Macedonian State*, 49-53, in which Hammond explains that Macedonia had always been a "territorial" designation in that the lands over which the king had control defined the state; however, this "state" had been confined to "Macedonia proper" and not the Upper Cantons or wider territories on a consistent basis until Philip II. For the assessment of Philip as the founder of the first territorial state of Europe and as a visionary who founded the Hellenistic Age see Gabriel, *Philip II*, 2-3. Gabriel also points out that, even from the first battle against Greeks at Lavahdi Ridge in which the Macedonian phalanx won the day (without the cavalry as an attacking force as would become the norm) Philip changed Greek warfare permanently by his army's weapons and training. See also R. Lane Fox, "Philip of Macedon: Accession, Ambitions, and Self-Preservation, in *Brill's Companion to Ancient Macedon: Studies in the Archaeology and History of Macedon, 650 BC-300 AD* (Leiden: 2011), 335 and 337. And R. Lane Fox, "Philip's and Alexander's Macedon," in *Brill's Companion*, 377, in which Fox calls Philip's military innovations the "blueprint of Hellenistic warfare."²

CHAPTER I

FOUNDATIONS OF TRADITIONAL MACEDONIAN INSTITUTIONS OF STATE

Part I: The Monarchy

In their foundational work on ancient Macedonia, Hammond and Griffith recognized Macedonia as a polity in which “there was simply no government apart from the king.”¹⁰ The hereditary monarch of the Argeadae constituted the foundation of the *Macedones*, or those who “inhabited the homeland of Pieria and spread out from there” during the Archaic and Classical periods of ancient history.¹¹ From the foundation of their first city, Aegae, the Argeadae produced all Macedonia’s kings until the death of Alexander IV, the last Argead male—from the 7th century to 310/09 BCE.¹² After the death of Alexander, briefly the dynasty of Cassander, and then later the Antigonids in their turn, tried to legitimize their rule by a claim of kinship with the Argeadae.¹³ This

¹⁰ N.G. L. Hammond, and G.T. Griffith, *A History of Macedonia*, vol. 2 (Oxford: 1979), Hammond and Griffith, 384 (see also 152).

¹¹ Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia*, 151.

¹² Edward M. Anson, “Macedonia’s Alleged Constitutionalism,” *CJ* 80, no. 4 (Apr.-May 1985): 306, and note 6. Elizabeth Donnelly Carney, *Women and Monarchy in Macedonia* (Norman: 2000), 3 and 6. Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia*, 152.

¹³ Anson, “Alleged Constitutionalism,” 306. Anson points out that there were not always clear rules to succession, no rule of primogeniture, and often disputes over the control of the kingdom among legitimate Argead claimants. For the Antigonids “claimed kinship to the Argeads,” see p. 306, note 26. As further support for the strong tradition of the Argeadae, Anson points out that “it is the lack of a powerful Argead claimant to the

monopoly on power was, in part, the Argeads' assertion of divine descent from Heracles, the son of Zeus, by way of Temenus of Argos.¹⁴ The Argeadae also maintained their divine descent from Argeas, son of Macedon, who was a son of Zeus.¹⁵ Such a lineage gave a king and his *ethnos* better access to the "favor of the gods" and its attendant prosperity.¹⁶ Since it was the king's prerogative and duty to intercede with the gods on behalf of his people by the handling of sacrifices and festivals, his lineage and functions worked together to strengthen his position by imbuing it with a "sacral nature."¹⁷

throne and the division of the 'principes' which made possible the chaos at Babylon," after Alexander III's death (311). See also W.L. Adams, "Alexander's Successors to 221 BC," in *A Companion to Ancient Macedonia*, ed. Joseph Roisman and Ian Worthington (Oxford: 2010), 209-222 in which Adams details the efforts of Alexander's successors to establish connections with his line and his mystique in order to legitimize their rule.

¹⁴ Anson, "Constitutionalism," 306, note 26. Hammond, and Griffith, *History Macedonia*, 383. Herodotus gives the lineage in 8.138-140 while establishing the line of Alexandros, son of Amyntas: "The brothers then went to another region of Macedon, and settled down near the gardens which are called the gardens of Midas son of Gordias . . ." Any translations of Herodotus are from *The Histories: The Landmark Herodotus*, trans. Andrea L. Purvis, ed. Robert B. Strassler (New York: 2007).

¹⁵ N.G. L. Hammond, *The Macedonian State: Origins, Institutions, and History* (Oxford: 1989), 16. Hammond also points out that the veracity of the Argead's claim to divinity may be interesting research for modern scholars, but is irrelevant in understanding the influence of such a claim in ancient Macedonia since "no one in antiquity doubted the truth of the claim." (19)

¹⁶ Hammond, *Macedonian State*, 16-17. Hammond has always argued the basic accuracy of the Argead foundation legend that traces the founders of the dynasty back to Argos and places their arrival in traditional Macedonia in the middle of the 7th c. BC. In his most recent restatement of his arguments, Hammond emphasizes the general credibility of genealogical calculations of Hecataeus, Herodotus, and Thucydides as vindicated by archaeological discoveries; he also argues that, at the very least, the literary tradition and the "archaeological evidence at the Cemetery of Tumuli places the arrival of that dynasty firmly in 650," as he asserts in "The Early History of Macedonia," *AW* 27, no. 1 (1996): 70, and 69-71. W. Greenwalt has questioned the validity of the legend by attributing the efforts of Argead kings to participate in the Greek only games at Olympia as politically expedient, but notes the religious importance to the monarchy of this "special religious status" in "Herodotus and the Foundation of Argead Macedonia," *AW* 13, nos. 3-4 (1986): 121-122, and 118-120.

¹⁷ Anson, "Constitutionalism," 306-307. Anson explains that this "religious aura" even "carried over into the ceremonies performed for a dead king." Curtius also indicated that the Macedonian people had a deep reverence for their kings (3.6.17). References to

In fact, the strength of the Argeadae over their centuries of rule likely resulted from a practical “track record” of success in producing heirs and “carrying out military and religious functions.”¹⁸ The practice of polygamy among the Argead kings tended to produce more heirs than does monogamy, and was, therefore “desirable but not statutory.”¹⁹ Sometimes too many heirs led to competition among legitimate claimants to the throne.²⁰ Perhaps because of the availability of heirs or simply the need for militarily successful kings to fend off surrounding, hostile peoples, a pattern of succession emerges within Macedonia pointing to the importance of the Argead clan rather than to any particular Argead individual or his line.²¹ While the age, natural capacity, and experience of an heir played a definite role in describing him as fit for rule, any potential heir, it seems, could succeed to the throne depending on his influence from within the dynasty, his support from foreign states, and especially his “perceived personal competence”

Quintus Curtius Rufus may be found in Curtius’ *History of Alexander*, trans. John Yardley (New York: 1984; reprint 2004). R.M. Errington, *History of Macedonia*, 218, reports that the monarchic system “was so deeply rooted in the Macedonian way of life” that, even during Roman times, numerous pretenders to the throne gained popular support and “had to be suppressed by the legions.” Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia*, also point out (152) that the “royal family were unique in being Greek.” Whether or not this “Greekness” was, in fact, unique to the family is irrelevant if their subjects thought their position to be unique and desirable. M.B. Hatzopoulos, in “Macedonians and Other Greeks,” states that the belief in the “essential Greekness of the Macedonians . . . was not limited to a literary coterie, but was the *communis opinio*” during the 5th century BC, found in *Brill’s Companion to Ancient Macedon: Studies in the Archaeology and History of Macedon, 650 BC-300 AD* (Leiden: 2011), 57.

¹⁸ R. Lane Fox, “399-369 BC,” *Brill’s Companion to Ancient Macedon: Studies in the Archaeology and History of Macedon, 650 BC-300 AD* (Leiden: 2011), 219. Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia*, 153 emphasize the importance of the king’s producing heirs since, in Macedonia, “princes were foremost in the hunt and in battle, and casualties among them were frequent.”

¹⁹ Carney, *Women and Monarchy*, 24-25. Quote is from Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia*, 153. Although their kings were polygamous, the Macedonians, like the Greeks, were monogamous.

²⁰ Carney, *Women and Monarchy*, 24-25.

²¹ Carney, *Women and Monarchy*, 6-7.

among the Macedonian men in arms.²² Not surprisingly then, the death of an Argead king almost always created a contest among the many potential heirs of the dynasty.²³

The traditional Macedonian king was, in some respects, a “Homeric” king in that he was foremost a warrior and the Commander-in-Chief of his army.²⁴ Such a position required the king’s physical presence in the forefront of battle and assumes the development of close relationships between him and those who fought alongside him and protected him.²⁵ The royal family served the king as did his *hetairoi* or companions, including selected advisors, administrators, and appointed generals.²⁶ These *hetairoi* comprised a group of aristocratic cavalymen who served as the king’s bodyguard and

²² Carney, *Women and Monarchy*, 24. More will be said below about the importance of a king’s personal competence as perceived by the Macedonian Assembly, who often, it seems, chose among potential heirs by its support or withdrawal of support.

²³ Carney, *Women and Monarchy*, 6.

²⁴ Errington, *History of Macedonia*, 221. Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia*, 156, explain that the king’s “command was absolute,” that his “orders were obeyed to the letter,” and that the “king led the foremost troops” in battle. The nature of his “absolute rule” seems clearly to have been an outgrowth of his role of Commander-in-Chief whose military orders, which were most orders in a military state, could not be disobeyed. This does not prevent Griffith from arguing that the king’s rights were not absolute (158). Note the views of Charles Edson, in “Early Macedonia,” in *Philip of Macedon*, ed. Miltiades B. Hatzopoulos and Louisa D. Hatzopoulos (Athens: 2006), 11, who believes that “the fighting men chose the new king from the available males of the royal family, usually the oldest son of the former king, and could express the desires and attitudes of the folk.”

See also M. Mari, “Archaic and Early Classical Macedonia,” in *Brill’s Companion to Ancient Macedon: Studies in the Archaeology and History of Macedon, 650 BC-300 AD* (Leiden: 2011), 79, where Mari states: “In Macedonia, as opposed to most other parts of the Greek world, the government was still exercised by a king long after the Heroic Age, and the aristocracy surrounding and counseling him was a reminder of the Homeric world.”

²⁵ See Gabriel, *Philip II*, 37. Gabriel thinks that the traditional relationships among leaders and people grew out of a pastoralist society in which land was owned in common and a powerful chief led a companion of warriors “to protect the group.” He calls these relationships the “seeds of the constitutional monarchy that was the mark of the later Macedonian state.”

²⁶ Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia*, 153-154. More will be said below about a king’s companions.

closest associates, and whose number grew over time with the growth of Macedonian territory and prosperity, and especially as Philip included them through patronage in this institution.²⁷ What seems rather certain from literary and epigraphic sources is that the Macedonian king had absolute power over traditional, monarchical spheres of authority. He alone received foreign embassies and formed alliances and treaties.²⁸ He owned the mines, the timber stands, hunting parks, and landed estates, and consequently, the king used or distributed the profit from these enterprises as he saw fit.²⁹ All the land was termed the “king’s land.” Such actions would be confirmed or not by subsequent kings.³⁰ It is telling that the Macedonian king, “not the people or the state,” gained seats on the Amphictyonic Council at Delphi in 346 BC.³¹ The king ruled the cities of Macedonia, whether they were Greek *poleis* or native towns; and unlike cities in other parts of Greece that acted as independent states, Macedonian *poleis* did not control the state’s politics or determine foreign policy.³² In his own name, the king sent official letters into the cities and country districts addressed from himself to administrators (*epistatai*) who were called by their first names “as though personal servants of the king.”³³

The strength of the monarchy has been characterized by R.M. Errington as “the total supremacy of the king in all recorded aspects of public life,” especially in

consideration of Alexander’s actions among Macedonians in Asia, and of the actions of

²⁷ Errington, *History of Macedonia*, 243.

²⁸ Anson, “Constitutionalism,” 304. Errington, *History of Macedonia*, 220-221. Also, Borza, *Shadow of Olympus*, 56: “all surviving treaties regulating commerce in timber between foreign states and Macedon were made with the king personally.”

²⁹ Errington, *History of Macedonia*, 222-223.

³⁰ Hammond, *Macedonian State*, 54-55.

³¹ Errington, *History of Macedonia*, 221-222.

³² Mari, “Archaic and Early Classical Macedonia,” 79. Mari explains: “the cities and the *Makedones* were nearly invisible to a foreign observer” because other Greeks so closely identified the Macedonian king with the Macedonian state rather than any other entities.

³³ Errington, *History of Macedonia*, 222.

his successors.³⁴ Hammond has argued for a strong Macedonian monarch in relation to his *hetairoi*: a king who “associated with his Companions as *primus inter pares*,” but who was in fact “in complete control of them” since he had promoted them to their position and posts, and had bestowed upon them their wealth.³⁵ Errington attributes the nearly absolute power of a Macedonian king precisely to this close relationship between the king and his *hetairoi* who, in a less dependent relationship, may have effectively challenged the king’s authority.³⁶

Hammond has called the institution of Macedonian kingship a constitutional monarchy, in spite of its autocratic nature, because the king exercised his power as “commander and judge” in accordance with traditional law.³⁷ Drawing on Thucydides’ description of “hereditary monarchies with stated rights,” Griffith describes Macedonia as a state in which the king had “wide but not absolute rights,” that were, in fact, measured by the Macedonian Assembly.³⁸ He asserts that the Assembly chose the king, and that once chosen, he governed by consent, but could also be deposed “by the body

³⁴ Errington, “Macedonian ‘Royal Style’ and its Historical Significance,” *JHS* 94 (1974): 37.

³⁵ Hammond, *Macedonian State*, 57.

³⁶ Errington, *History of Macedonia*, 219. W.L. Adams presents a summary of the historiography on the debate surrounding the Macedonian *Staatsrecht* in “Macedonian Kingship and the Right of Petition,” in *Ancient Macedonia 4: Papers Read at the Fourth International Symposium Held in Thessaloniki*, September 21-25, by the Institute for Balkan Studies (Thessaloniki, 1986), 42-46 and throughout the article. F. Granier has argued that the Macedonian monarchy evolved from a Homeric war monarchy into a constitutional monarchy; A. Aymard has argued that the Macedonian right of *isēgoria* supports the idea of a monarch with defined authority and limited powers.

³⁷ Hammond, *Macedonian State*, 21. See also Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia*, 385 where Griffith argues that, although an autocrat after assuming power, the king was chosen by the Macedonian army assembled for the purpose and continued to be limited in his jurisdiction of capital crimes.

³⁸ Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia*, 158, where Griffith refers to Thuc. 1.13.1 and Arr. *An.* 4.11.6 to substantiate his arguments. See also 386. My references to Arrian’s *Campaigns of Alexander (Anabasis)* are from the translation of Aubrey de Selincourt, ed. J.R. Hamilton (New York: 1958; reprint 1971).

which had created him king.”³⁹ Unless deposed by this body, however, “the king was a free agent, conducting all affairs as he thought fit and not subject to approval by an organ of what we might call ‘government.’”⁴⁰ Perhaps the king’s traditional roles as a military commander and judge, and how a Macedonian king typically fulfilled those roles, gave the Macedonian monarchy a certain familiar quality that could be called constitutional in that it was deep-rooted, hereditary, and habitual.⁴¹ As Errington recognized, in spite of his autocratic power, a Macedonian king “behaved in a way that kept him in close contact with his people” and probably prevented the development of royal *accoutrements*.⁴²

Part II: The King and His People

While the king may theoretically have held absolute power should he have chosen to exercise it, several institutions among the Macedonians point toward a practical limitation of the king’s power by traditional customs that required his attention and compliance. The institution of the *hetairoi* possessed a privileged status based on their personal relationship with the king. C. Edson describes this relationship as one of “mutual benefit and obligation” that functioned as part of Macedonian government.⁴³ The king granted to his *hetairoi* land, gifts, position, and influence, and in turn, they

³⁹ Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia*, 158. Griffith also suggests that a restored version of Curtius, 6.8.25, may read “*de capitalibus rebus vetusto Macedonum modo inquirebat (rex, iudicabat) exercitus,*” and lend credence to a significant political role of the Macedonian Assembly. At 160, Griffith references the example of Amyntas III who was, in fact, “expelled by the Macedonians.”

⁴⁰ Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia*, 158. Griffith cites Arr. *An.* 4.11.6 in support.

⁴¹ Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia*, 152: “the kings drank, hunted, and fought alongside their contemporaries.”

⁴² Errington, *History of Macedonia*, 219.

⁴³ Edson, “Early Macedonia,” 11.

supported him politically, militarily, and personally.⁴⁴ In fact, Griffith asserts that the *hetairoi* had earned their positions based not just on the king's original patronage, but on their "personal merit" and the king's subsequent acknowledgement and reward of merit.⁴⁵ The festival of the *Hetairideia*, in honor of Zeus and with the king presiding, affirmed this reciprocal rather than unilateral relationship.⁴⁶ Certainly the *hetairoi* had a say in who would become king among the available heirs of the Argeadae.⁴⁷ These *hetairoi* seemed to have comprised a king's council whenever the king needed advice on a particular issue.⁴⁸ A king could have formed such a council *ad hoc* and invited whichever *hetairoi* he wanted at any given time—rather than a predetermined council of high army officers who would have, in any case, been *hetairoi* as well.⁴⁹

In a description that also calls into question the autocratic nature of the Macedonian monarchy, Justin records that Philip was "constrained by the people to take the throne," thereby offering some evidence, at least in the case of Philip, that the Macedonian "people" influenced the selection of their king from among contenders.⁵⁰ Justin's phrase, *compulsus a populo regnum suscepit*, suggests that, after Philip had been urged or obliged by the people's expressed wish, he accepted royal power and brought

⁴⁴ Edson, *Early Macedonia*, 11.

⁴⁵ Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia*, 162-163.

⁴⁶ Edson, *Early Macedonia*, 11. Edson references Athenaeus 13.572d.

⁴⁷ Errington, *History of Macedonia*, 220.

⁴⁸ Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia*, 398.

⁴⁹ Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia*, 398. Griffith argues that "to write of the king's council in constitutional terms seems impossible, and to separate its functions into the political, the diplomatic, the military, the judicial, and so on, seems academic."

⁵⁰ Justin records that Philip "was constrained by the people to take the throne." Justin 7.5.10. All translations of Justin, unless otherwise indicated, are those of J.C. Yardley, *Justin: Epitome of the Philippic History of Pompeius Trogus* (The American Philological Association: 1994).

the kingdom under his protection.⁵¹ One assumes that the *populus* is the Macedonian Assembly or the men in arms who might gather to shout “yay” or “nay” in response to decisions significantly affecting the kingdom and their lives and in response to direction from the *hetairoi* or aristocracy; but “populus,” may in fact mean “the people” as the word is used in this way by Justin in other contexts.⁵² Certainly the events following the death of Philip describe a system in which powerful nobles or *hetairoi* could immediately lend their support to a member of the Argead family, who was then confirmed by an Assembly of Macedonian soldiers; these soldiers were either ratifying the *hetairoi*’s selected candidate for king as a genuine demonstration of some actual political role, or acting *pro forma*, depending on whether and how the institution of the Assembly evolved from earliest Macedonian times into the Hellenistic period.⁵³

At the very least, the Macedonian monarchy had a “personal nature” that afforded Macedonians certain traditional privileges in their relationship with their king, limited only in power by the strength and popularity of the king in relation to his nobility.⁵⁴ A discussion of the nature of institutions in Macedonia must take into full account the ancient sources’ description of the right of Macedonians to speak to and to be heard by

⁵¹ Justin, 7.5.10. *Abrege des Histoire Philippiques de Trogue Pompee*, in *Corpus Scriptorum Latinorum: A Digital Library of Latin Literature*, edited by Marie-Pierre Arnaud-Lindet, ED maintained by David Camden, 2009.

⁵² Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia*, 390 and note 5, and 391. The suggestion is that soldiers and noncombatants may have been part of an assembly, but again, one assumes that these are former soldiers, or soldiers who may be called up for duty.

⁵³ Anson, “Constitutionalism,” 305-308. The soldiers clashed their spears as “part of a ritual surrounding the creation of a new king,” but the choice of king had already been made by the “powerful elements in Macedonian society.” Curt. 10.7.1-14. Ian Worthington argues that the Macedonian Assembly or men in arms could have had much say in the selection of a new king and particularly when the succession was disputed. *Philip II of Macedonia* (London: 2008), 12. At the very least, it would seem that the assembly had the role to affirm the selection of king.

⁵⁴ Anson, “Constitutionalism,” 315.

their king, whether or not the king had absolute power or was limited by the influence or role of other groups within the realm—and regardless of the class or status of an individual Macedonian.⁵⁵ W. L. Adams has argued persuasively that ancient literary sources preserve a custom of *isegoria*, or the right of the Macedonian people to speak freely to their king.⁵⁶ He cites three examples, each from a different period in Macedonian history and each unique from the others in circumstances. The first example concerns a peltast commander speaking freely to Philip V regarding the arrest of and imposition of a fine on a fellow peltast, and in turn, other peltasts speaking to the king on behalf of the commander when Philip charged the commander with crimes.⁵⁷ Two additional examples show an old woman, whose petition was repeatedly rebuffed by Philip II, responding to his excuse that he had no time to listen to her petition with the words, “then don’t be king,” and a defendant criticizing Philip for falling asleep during his trial where Philip was apparently presiding.⁵⁸ Philip’s reported response in the former instance was to right his wrongs by listening to petitions, and in the latter by paying the defendant’s fine himself. Another time, Philip’s soldiers demanded their back pay when

⁵⁵ The best summary of the scholarship and arguments for the traditional rights of Macedonians to speak to and be heard by their king are found in Adams, “Right of Petition,” 43-52. Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia*, 153, also suggest that instances of the Macedonian soldiers “speaking frankly to their king are typical of the independent spirit of a people, which, as Curtius remarked ‘was accustomed to the rule of a king but lived with a greater sense of freedom than any others subject to a monarchy.’” *Curt.* 4.7.31.

⁵⁶ Here, Adams is following the suggestion of A. Aymard as indicated in “Right of Petition.” Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia*, 392. Griffith defines *isēgoria* in the case of Macedonia as “the habit of answering back, and letting it be known to the king, if they disliked something, that they did dislike it.”

⁵⁷ Polybius records this instance in Polyb. 5 as referenced by Adams, “Right of Petition,” 46-47. Adams notes that A. Amyard discussed this example in his 1950 study, “Sur l’assemblée macedonienne,” in *REA* 52 (1950).

⁵⁸ W.L. Adams, “Right of Petition,” 47-48, in which he uses these examples recorded in Plut. *Moralia* 179 and Plut. *Moralia* 178, respectively. These references are made in another context above—related to laws and justice.

Philip was broke.⁵⁹ Philip good-naturedly received the criticism, even though he could not meet the demand.⁶⁰ Demetrius Poliorcetes' reign provides numerous examples of a king who would give no hearings, was inaccessible to his subjects, was therefore compared unfavorably to Philip, and was even approached and denounced by the *hetairoi* for his lavish lifestyle.⁶¹ These examples consistently represent that, regardless of the king's traditional authority, the limits to his powers in any given era, or the status or size of the groups involved, the Macedonian people expected to be able to approach their king and freely express their opinions to him.⁶² And they expected the king to listen—even when he could not or would not grant their requests.⁶³ An understanding of this relationship between the king and his people necessary defines the Macedonian king as constrained by custom to meet with and respond to his people, and to distribute justice. These examples also suggest that the people expected a king to provide for his people what they considered their due, although he may not have been formally required to do so. Perhaps Curtius had in mind this traditional relationship when he explained that, even

⁵⁹ Polyæn. *Strat.* 4.2.6, as cited in Adams, "Right of Petition," 48.

⁶⁰ Adams, "Right of Petition," 48. Adams emphasizes the fact that Philip took the abuse from the soldiers because the soldiers had the right to complain, and Philip had the obligation to listen.

⁶¹ Adams, "Right of Petition," 48-49, where he references Plut. *Demetr.* 41-44.

⁶² Anson, "Constitutionalism," 314-315, where he references Plut. *Demetr.* 42. 2-4; *Mor.* 179C; Polyb. 5. 27. 6-8 and Arr. *An.* 5.27. 2-9. Adams also demonstrates in "Right to Petition," 50-52 that a petition to the king could come from an individual, a small group, or from a large group as a "mass representation." Nor does Adams think that it matters whether these groups employing their right to free speech constituted a "council of war, an informal meeting, or an assembly which had the right to vote," as it is the institution of *isēgoria* itself that matters most in understanding the Macedonian state.

⁶³ Adams, "Right of Petition." Throughout this article, Adams suggests that the ancient literary examples provide evidence that the Macedonians could approach their king with concerns related to or unrelated to legal cases, whether or not the king wanted to hear what they had to say, but with no specific expectation that the king would grant their requests.

though “the Macedonians were accustomed to monarchy, they lived in the shadow of liberty more than other races . . .”⁶⁴

Part III: The King and the Law

While the judicial system of Macedonia is uncertain, the king held the power to summon, to judge, and to condemn or acquit someone accused of serious or even capital crimes. Nevertheless, the king seems constrained in his exercise of this power by a traditional or customary law requiring him to sound the opinions of his *hetairoi*, or some select council, that had adjudicated such cases, unless he wanted to be seen as a tyrant.⁶⁵ The king may only have acted as a prosecutor in capital cases while the Assembly judged such cases and carried out any necessary executions.⁶⁶ Griffith suggests that the king could even be tried for treason in the Assembly and sentenced by the Assembly, if found guilty.⁶⁷

That Macedonia had laws before Philip is quite certain, even if we do not have much evidence of a specific written code of laws before or during Philip’s reign.⁶⁸ The law, or *nomos*, of the Macedonians was not written or given by a traditional council or a democratic assembly, but the Macedonians had law, nevertheless, and the law bound the

⁶⁴ Curtius 4.7.31.

⁶⁵ Anson, “Constitutionalism,” 304-305, 309-310, referring to the conspiracy described in Curt. 8.6.28, 8.8.20; he also refers to R.M. Errington’s comments in “The Nature of the Macedonian State under the Monarchy,” 89-90, that, prior to the condemnation of Philotas and Permenion, Alexander needed to “test his ‘*auctoritas*’ before exercising his ‘*potestas*.’” Hammond and Griffith believe that the king had limited authority in the sphere of jurisdiction. See *History of Macedonia*, 385-386.

⁶⁶ Adams describes the argument for a constitutional nature of the Macedonian state as consisting of two important “pillars:” that the Assembly elected the king and that he only prosecuted in trials “*de capitalibus rebus*,” in “Right of Petition,” 43. See also Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia*, 158 and 385.

⁶⁷ Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia*,

⁶⁸ Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia*, 385-386.

various groups in the state to act their part in the state's governance.⁶⁹ Numerous instances recorded by Plutarch reveal Philip sitting as a judge, hearing cases, considering throwing a man out of his court, as though laws and judicial procedures had been well established by Philip's reign.⁷⁰ Polybius recorded incidents in which Philip's officers inspected allegations, heard witnesses, and made a report to the king; and in response to their information, Philip asked for securities for payment of fines, or arrested specific individuals based on his understanding of the evidence.⁷¹ Plutarch also records that Philip appointed as a judge one of Antipater's friends, whom he later dismissed because he did not trust his judgment.⁷² In a rare glimpse of the Macedonian legal system, references to a dispute between Philip and the Athenians over the island of Halonnesus suggest that, until the relationship between Athens and Philip had become highly adversarial, no formal treaties had been necessary between the two states to ensure that both Athenians and Macedonians received justice in Macedonian courts.⁷³

Arrian reported two speeches that suggest that Philip continued a tradition of the rule of law within Macedonia and then extended it to conquered territories and peoples who were unaccustomed to rule by law. In the first report, Callisthenes reminds

⁶⁹ Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia*, 386-387, and 393.

⁷⁰ Plut. *Moralia (Regum et Imperatorum Apophthegmata*, 177-178). See especially those sayings numbered 5, 24, 25, and 31. References are to Plutarch's *Moralia*, vol. 3, trans. Frank Cole Babbitt (London: 1931; reprint 1949), 41-53. See also Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia*, 386-387, and 393.

⁷¹ Polyb. 5.15 and 5.27. W.L. Adams references these incidents from Polybius when describing the Macedonians' right to address and be heard by their kings throughout his article, "Right of Petition." These recorded incidents may refer to Philip V, but demonstrate the nature and persistence of *isēgoria* among the Macedonians.

⁷² Plut. *Moralia (Regum et Imperatorum Apophthegmata* 178), saying number 23. Philip's appointment of one of Antipater's friends demonstrates the patronage that a king distributed to his loyal *hetairoi*.

⁷³ The Demosthenic corpus (7) includes this information according to Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia*, 393 and 511.

Alexander that he is “Philip’s son, a man with the blood of Heracles and Aeacus in his veins, a man whose forefathers came from Argos to Macedonia, where they long ruled not by force, but by law.”⁷⁴ In the second, Alexander reminds his soldiers that Philip brought them law, made them city-dwellers, and civilized them.⁷⁵ What emerges from these records is a tradition of a Macedonian king who is expected to rule justly and to govern according to customary laws—extending justice to his own people, to foreigners within his realm, to conquered peoples, and to conquered territories.

Part IV: The Concept of the Macedonia State

The concept of the Macedonian state, as compared to other Greek states, suggests a model of rule more akin to ancient Sparta in that the king and state’s *raison d’etre* was “conquest and war.”⁷⁶ In such a state, categories of constitutionalism or absolutism may be inapplicable.⁷⁷ A Macedonian king established his legitimacy by his success in battle and his winning of land, resources, and security for his people. His state was a “military state,” and his position would be better compared to other monarchies in the Balkans,

⁷⁴ Arr. *An.* 4.11.

⁷⁵ Arr. *An.* 7.9.

⁷⁶ Hammond, *Macedonian State*, at 63 suggests that Macedonia can be described in exactly the same way that Aristotle described Sparta as a state designed entirely for “conquest and war” (note 48).

⁷⁷ Alan E. Samuel, “Philip and Alexander as Kings: Macedonian Monarchy and Merovingian Parallels,” *AHR* 93, no. 5 (December 1988): 1270; Samuel acknowledges: “there are wide variances in views, from Macedonian kingship as almost a constitutional monarchy to the opposite extreme of representing it as an unrestrained autocracy.” I will refer later to Alan Samuel’s comparison of the monarchy to Merovingian chieftains in contrast to the formal analysis influenced by Hellenistic and Roman models often applied anachronistically to the Macedonian monarchy. Adams argues, in “Right of Petition,” 44-45, that scholars lack definitive evidence for absolutism or constitutionalism in Macedonia and that such evidence as exists is from limited periods; most importantly, that theories of the nature of the Macedonian state are “entirely too legalistic” and force the evidence into “preconceived and entirely modern notions of a constitution.”

including those of the Dardanians, Paeonians, and Thracians.⁷⁸ The Macedonian state also had affinities to early Thessalian models of rule.⁷⁹ Hammond has pointed out that, unlike other Greek states in the south as they expanded, the Macedonians applied the name, “Macedonia,” to newly conquered territories.⁸⁰ They defined their kingdom as “the territory over which the king as the executive agent of the state exercised a direct authority” rather than a state defined by strict ethnicity or locale.⁸¹ This definition implies that the king, his territory, and his people could be constantly redefined as “Macedonia.” Any “constitutional” systems in such an ancient state would have to be simple, malleable, and based more on personal relationships and general customs than on a strict adherence to law or formalities.⁸² W. L. Adams has aptly described the Macedonian constitution as “fluid” with a king’s success based largely on his *auctoritas* and his attention to his customary duties within his historical context.⁸³ Aristotle delineated several “expansionist tribal states (*ethne*) which rated military prowess and

⁷⁸ Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia*, 166. Griffith argues that “the same pattern of tribal life and of intertribal warfare, practiced often for plunder” characterizes these monarchies. Griffith also describes these Balkan monarchies as having “elite troops . . . formed around the king, as in the state of Macedonia.” Griffith also makes the connection among these *ethne* as to their king’s role (156): “As elsewhere in the Balkans the kings of Macedon were primarily warrior kings.”

⁷⁹ Mari, “Archaic and Early Classical Macedonia,” 79-80, where Mari points out the “regular trade relations” that existed between Macedonia and Thessaly throughout the Bronze Age and the Macedonian affinity with other people’s of the Balkan region.

⁸⁰ Hammond, *The Macedonian State*, 49 ff.

⁸¹ Hammond, *Macedonian State*, 49.

⁸² Adams, “Right of Petition,” 45, argues persuasively that the Macedonian state contained aspects of legal, customary, and personal relationships in the patterns of interaction between groups---a description consistent with a developing society that defies categorization by “current legal or social theory.”

⁸³ Adams, “Right of Petition,” 45-46.

power most highly” in his *Politics*.⁸⁴ Among these listed states, Aristotle gives examples from the Scythians, Thracians, and the Macedonians—all in the Balkans. Aristotle also supports this interpretation of the Macedonian state in his *Politics* in which he describes the benefit of Macedonian kingship to have been the “settling or gaining control of territory,” although he may just as easily have ascribed to it the benefits of other types of kingship from his list, such as elected kingship or absolute power.⁸⁵ Aristotle’s classification also suggests the primacy of the king’s military role in defining the state. While the army or nobles had to “ratify or accept” the new king as their leader, “once on the throne, a king was not necessarily secure” but had to continue to seek or earn support.⁸⁶ The six years following Archelaus’ murder and the accession of Amyntas III in which five or six kings came to power, as well as the “murderous campaign” against his opponents that secured the throne for Amyntas III, would suggest that a king’s security and authority depended on something besides his Argead lineage and absolute power.⁸⁷ Samuel sees the Macedonian king as analogous to the kings of the Germanic nations of the Western Roman Empire “whose power fluctuated with the abilities and

⁸⁴ Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia*, 166, where Griffith cites Aristotle (1324b), to make the argument that the Macedonia state was primarily a military state and recognized as such in ancient times.

⁸⁵ Aristotle, *Politics* 5.88.5 (1310b 38) as cited by Alan E. Samuel, “Philip and Alexander as Kings: Macedonian Monarchy and Merovingian Parallels,” *AHR* 93, no. 5 (December 1988): 1272 and note 7. Samuel points out that no one was in a better position to have “known the kingship of Macedon” than Aristotle (1272). Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia*, 517-519, in which Griffith delineates Aristotle’s “special connection” with Macedonia since Aristotle’s father had been a court physician to Philip’s father so Aristotle had been raised at the Macedonian court with Philip, and it is likely that Philip and Aristotle had kept in touch during the latter’s absence—hence the appointment of Aristotle as Alexander’s tutor in 342 B.C.

⁸⁶ Samuel, “Philip and Alexander,” 1274.

⁸⁷ Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia*, 168-172. For revised dates of the reigns of the kings of this period, see R. Lane Fox, “399-369,” in *Brill’s Companion to Ancient Macedon: Studies in the Archaeology and History of Macedonia, 650 BC-300 AD*, ed. R. Lane Fox (Leiden: 2011), 210-219. See also Worthington, *Philip II*, 223.

accomplishments of those who held it” and was “for the most part measured in military terms.”⁸⁸ In addition, he judges that the forty-year combined reigns of Philip II and Alexander allowed the office of king to “accumulate prestige and power in quantities sufficient to overawe or overwhelm the body of soldiers,” and to constitute a real shift in the power of the monarch against the will of his nobles and generals.⁸⁹

Part V: The Army

Thucydides describes the Macedonian army of Perdiccas, in 429/8 when Sitalces and his Odrysians invaded Macedonia, as unable to take the field against so numerous an invader,” and so “shut themselves up in such strong places and fortresses as the country possessed.”⁹⁰ According to Thucydides, the Macedonians “never even thought of meeting him with infantry,” but attacked the Odrysians “by handfuls of their horse, which had been reinforced from their allies in the interior.” These cavalrymen were “armed with breastplates, excellent horsemen,” and “wherever these charged they overthrew all before them.” They were simply too few, however, to put Sitalces’ forces of combined infantry and cavalry to flight. Only low provisions, bad weather, and the potential of

⁸⁸ Samuel, in “Philip and Alexander,” 1272 and 1276, sees the Germanic and Macedonian nations in the same stage of development and postulates his view based on the large amount of evidence available for the Germanic kingdoms as compared to evidence for the Macedonian kingdom at this stage of development. Ellis supports a similar view in *Philip II*, 24. Ellis suggests that the king was essentially an “elected military commander whose authority in peacetime was initially a function more of his personal standing and strength than of his office,” but that his office had “solidified into something more formal but with residual traces of its beginnings” by historical times.

⁸⁹ Samuel, “Philip and Alexander,” 1276 and 1279.

⁹⁰ Thuc. 2.100. 1-2. Translations of Thucydides are those of Richard Crawley, *The Landmark Thucydides: A Comprehensive Guide to the Peloponnesian War*, ed. Robert B. Strassler (New York: 1996).

numerous enemies allying against him forced Sitalces out of Macedonia.⁹¹ The implication from Thucydides' description is that the Macedonian army in the 5th century B.C. included an excellent cavalry and a negligible infantry. While skilled and well armed, the Macedonian cavalry was hardly a match against the numbers of combined infantry and cavalry that its enemies could muster.

Diodorus describes the *Macedones*, in a governmental sense, as “the men serving in the King’s Forces, *hai basilikai dynameis*, and those who had so served.”⁹² He also suggests that these men had been specifically “chosen by the king to serve in his forces.” To the extent that Macedonia had a state or civil administration, the army, in local militias, oversaw and executed such administration.⁹³ There is no evidence of any “administrative class or of state officials other than the military-officer element” in ancient Macedonia.⁹⁴ For that matter, the only national institution beyond the monarchy for which an argument can be made is the “army organization when not actually under arms,” however weak or strong it may have been at any given period.⁹⁵ Griffith makes the important point that a consideration of the Macedonian army in any period is also a discussion of Macedonia’s social history since the army or parts of the army constituted the Assembly and possibly an advisory council of *hetairoi*, while the king served as the highest officer in the army.⁹⁶

⁹¹ Thuc. 2.101.

⁹² Hammond, *Macedonian State*, 63. See Diod. 18.16.1 for the designation, *hai basilikai dynameis*.

⁹³ Hammond, *Macedonian State*, 63.

⁹⁴ Ellis, *Philip II*, 28.

⁹⁵ Ellis, *Philip II*, 26.

⁹⁶ Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia*, 407. Since the evidence is more abundant from Philip II’s reign on, and especially during the reign of Alexander III, I will elaborate on the army’s social significance in the sections below that discuss Philip’s reign.

The groups constituting the Macedonian army were several before the time of Philip II. The *hetairoi* appear to have existed *ab initio* in Macedonia and to have made up the core of the cavalry, the King's Companions, distinguished for their excellence and rewarded by their inclusion in a social and economic class of large landowners.⁹⁷ This same socio-economic class seems to have produced the heavy cavalry force, the top generals and administrators, and the king's close retainers—including an inner group of advisors.⁹⁸ The cavalry also constituted the main corps of the Macedonian army before Philip II.⁹⁹ The rest of the Macedonian men whose land holdings may have been smaller served as some type of infantry or light cavalry, but we have little information about the infantry as an effective fighting force prior to the reign of Philip II.¹⁰⁰

Diodorus records that Macedonia lost more than 4,000 men in battle at the hands of the Illyrians in the military disaster that killed Philip's brother and brought Philip into contention for the throne.¹⁰¹ The Macedonian king must have, therefore, levied some

⁹⁷ Ellis, *Philip II*, 26.

⁹⁸ The *hetairoi* were also mentioned above in the section on monarchy as holding a special position *vis a vis* the king. See also Ellis, *Philip II*, 26-27. Ellis compares the inner circle to the *hetairoi* of Homer or the *comitatus* described in Tacitus' *Germania*.

⁹⁹ So Thucydides would suggest above, as does G.T. Griffith, "Philip as a General and the Macedonian Army," in *Philip of Macedon*, ed. Miltiades B. Hatzopoulos and Louisa D. Loukopoulos (Athens: 2006), 58-59.

¹⁰⁰ Thucydides attributes a significant strengthening of a Macedonian infantry to Archelaus in Thuc. 2.100. 1-2. As mentioned above, Thucydides' descriptions have generally been substantiated by archaeological discoveries over time, so it is safe to say, I think, that the Macedonians had some infantry prior to Philip that Archelaus had improved. Perhaps the reason Thucydides did not mention the infantry when the Odrysians invaded Macedonia is because its size and effectiveness at that time was no match for the Odrysians, and the infantry was not sent into pitched battle. See also Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia*, especially 405ff. to understand the dearth of sources from before Philip and the helpful details related to the army during the reign of Alexander from ancient literary sources.

¹⁰¹ Diod. 16.2.5 : "For the Macedonians had lost more than four thousand men in battle, and the remainder, panic-stricken, had become exceedingly afraid of the Illyrian armies and had lost heart for continuing the war."

infantry troops from across the ever-changing boundaries of his kingdom to serve as soldiers before Philip's time. Griffith questions the nature of this group as a "phalanx" prior to Philip, as both the sources and "the logic of events themselves point to Philip" as the creator of the Macedonian phalanx.¹⁰² Nor does the term *pezhetairoi* appear before Philip's reforms of the army.¹⁰³ We know that Philip established a group of Foot Companions called *pezhetairoi* that functioned as an elite group of soldiers, or a Royal Guard not unlike his cavalry companions, and that he probably used this designation to extend privileged status and to generate loyalty among the group of leaders in a newly expanded infantry.¹⁰⁴ The act of establishing an elite group of Foot Companions suggests that a traditional group of foot soldiers existed before Philip from whom Philip could choose an elite group. Alexander III designated his elite group of foot soldiers as *hypaspistai* (or long-shield bearers), although Philip may have established this designation toward the end of his reign—but not before.¹⁰⁵ A group of servants and

¹⁰² Griffith, "Philip as General," 58. See also Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia*, 406.

¹⁰³ Griffith, "Philip as General," 58-59. Griffith asserts that Philip "gave Macedonia for the first time a real army and a great one."

¹⁰⁴ Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia*, 405-406. Griffith argues that a fragment from Anaximenes (*FGrH* no. 72 F 4) probably describes the *pezhetairoi* during the reign of Alexander III. If the "Alexander" of the fragment refers to Alexander I or Alexander II, it may be that one of these kings began to establish an infantry by a general levy. Such an interpretation, however, seems anachronistic in light of Thucydides' remarks and Diodorus' description of Philip's reforms that will be discussed below. See also Griffith, "Philip as General," 58 where Griffith asserts that the designation, *pezhetairoi*, appears firmly in the 340s to describe Philip's royal footguards—and not before Philip. Andrew Erskine makes the point that the fragment of Anaximenes that seems to contradict Theopompus lacks a context in which to understand it, and may be referring to a particular rather than a general description, "The *Pezhetairoi* of Philip II and Alexander III," *Historia* 38, no. 4 (1989): 385-394.

¹⁰⁵ Griffith, "Philip as General," 58-59.

laborers, who worked on the land of wealthier citizens, may have served as camp supporters of the army.¹⁰⁶

The king as general, a competent but small cavalry, and a somewhat inconsequential infantry constituted the Macedonian army before Philip II.¹⁰⁷ Not surprisingly, the same groups constituting the army units of Macedonia corresponded precisely to those groups functioning as organs of the Macedonian state in the period prior to Philip II.

¹⁰⁶ Ellis, *Philip II*, 27 and 41. Ellis cites Beloch on this point and states that Beloch believes that this lowest class outnumbered Macedonian citizens; he also references Arrian 4.4.1 and Curtius 6.8.23. The point does not seem conclusive to me from this evidence. Curtius mentions 6,000 soldiers appearing before Alexander III in a call for a “general assembly in arms,” accompanied by “camp-followers and servants.” Such folk typically accompanied an ancient army, and the context is Asia and not Macedonia. It is more likely that most Macedonian citizens were shepherds or farmers with small landholdings.

¹⁰⁷ Griffith, “Philip as General,” 59.

CHAPTER II

THE MACEDONIAN STATE BEFORE PHILIP

Part I: The Precedents of Alexander and Archelaus

Among the number of kings whom we know prior to Philip II, only two successfully implemented systems designed to centralize, unify, and strengthen Macedonia. These are Alexander I and Archelaus. Herodotus and Thucydides give the best literary information for the infrastructure of the Macedonian state during the 5th century BC, and much of Griffith's analysis of Macedonia from the reigns of Alexander I to Archelaus is based on their reports.¹⁰⁸ Both historians identify the ancient homeland of Macedonia in Pieria between the Thermaic gulf, the Haliacmon River, Mount Olympus, and the Pierian Mountains.¹⁰⁹ Thucydides explains that Macedonia did not control most of the areas outside this Macedonian heartland, even where the residents were culturally or ethnically Macedonian: "for the Lyncestae, Elimioti, and other tribes more inland, though Macedonians by blood and allies and dependents of their kindred, still have their own separate governments."¹¹⁰

¹⁰⁸ Mari, "Archaic and Early Classical Macedonia," 80-81. Mari supports the view that the digressions found in both Herod. 8.137-9 and Thuc. 2.99-2.100.2 constitute the best "surviving narratives of the origins and early expansion of the Macedonian kingdom" (81). See Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia*, 98-104 and 115-141.

¹⁰⁹ Mari, "Archaic and Early Classical Macedonia," 81.

¹¹⁰ Thuc. 2.99. 2.

With the exception of the foundation legends, neither Herodotus nor Thucydides says much about Macedonia before the Persian invasion, when Macedonia would have become more interesting to the general Greek reader; and the first kings mentioned are Amyntas I and his son Alexander I, who ruled for nearly the first half of the 5th century BC.¹¹¹ The Macedonian homeland expanded greatly as a result of Persia's early 5th century intrusions into Macedonian lands. Beginning in 512 BC, the Persians required the Macedonians to become their vassal state, and this situation continued until Xerxes' defeat at the hand of the Greeks and his withdrawal in 479 BC.¹¹² Darius had destroyed Paeonian power to the northwest of Macedonia in the 490s and had opened up trade between Persia and Macedonia.¹¹³ Amyntas took advantage of his alliance with Persia and Paeonia's weakness to expand the kingdom north beyond the Axios River.¹¹⁴

Though Thucydides acknowledges that eight Macedonian kings preceded the reign of Archelaus (413-399 BC), he mentions only Alexander I, son of Amyntas, whose "role in the enlargement of the 'Old Kingdom' had been decisive."¹¹⁵ When Persia invaded Greece a second time, Xerxes supported Alexander I in his efforts to bring the cantons of Upper Macedonia under his control.¹¹⁶ The bonanza for Alexander I came as the Persians withdrew from Greece leaving weakened polities behind them, and enabling Alexander to conquer Crestonia, Bisaltia, Mygdonia, the Strymon basin, the Nine Ways,

¹¹¹ Mari, "Archaic and Early Classical Macedonia," 85.

¹¹² Mari, "Archaic and Early Classical Macedonia," 85.

¹¹³ Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia*, 99-100.

¹¹⁴ Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia*, 99.

¹¹⁵ Mari, "Archaic and Early Classical Macedonia," 83. The information on the Macedonian kings is found in the digression on Sitalces in Thuc. 2.95-101.

¹¹⁶ Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia*, 99-100.

and significantly, the Bisaltic gold and silver mines.¹¹⁷ Thucydides lists those areas considered as “Macedonian territory” that had been hard won, and presumably, hard kept during the time of Alexander I, as requiring “the expulsion of peoples” from their lands in the process of conquest.¹¹⁸ Thucydides is the first to document the Macedonian practice of expelling the original inhabitants from conquered territories, as apparently happened in Pieria, Bottia, Eordaea, and Almopia over the course of the 5th century B.C., and repopulating the regions with Macedonians.¹¹⁹ The Macedonian practice of depopulating and repopulating conquered territories probably began with Alexander I. In the process of expansion, he may have established this system of resettlement in order to locate more Macedonians on land, thus qualifying them for his military levy.

Throughout Persia’s hegemony over Macedon, Alexander had been playing a “double game” with the Persians, courting their favor while continuing to trade with and to seek the approval of Greek cities in the south, and particularly Athens.¹²⁰ Among other things, Alexander had cultivated *xenia* with Greek elites, served Persia as a

¹¹⁷ Mari, “Archaic and Early Classical Macedonia,” 84. See also Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia*, 99-100. Hammond and Griffith also explain, 102, that the group that gained most from the Persian withdrawal was the Chalcidians who gained Olynthus at this time. There is also some question as to whether or not Macedonia occupied the Nine Ways at this early date. For a consideration of the arguments, see Mari, “Archaic and Early Classical Macedonia,” 86. Regardless, the Macedonians would soon lose control of the Nine Ways over which the Athenians and Thracians would fight for control of Strymon basin (as noted in Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia*, 102-103).

¹¹⁸ Thuc. 2.99. 3-6.

¹¹⁹ Mari, “Archaic and Early Classical Greece,” 83. Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia*, note that Alexander also offered refuge and settlement to the people of Mycenae in 468 BC (103).

¹²⁰ Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia*, 99 and note 3. Alexander was called the “Philhellene” in ancient times, although this epithet was probably a late attachment to distinguish Alexander I from Alexander III. Mari, “Archaic and Early Classical Greece,” 86-87, explains that Herodotus consistently refers to Alexander as a “friend of the Greeks,” in spite of Alexander’s loyalty to the Persians. His diplomacy between Athens and Persia is a direct result of his status as a *proxenos* of the Athenians. See Herod. 7.173, 8.131.1, 8.136-144, and Just. 7.4.2.

diplomat to Athens based on his historically good relations with the Athenians, participated in the Olympic games, and patronized Panhellenic sanctuaries.¹²¹ As a result of Alexander's successful relations with both the Persians and the Greeks, Macedonia's trade had increased, the Persians had begun to expand their royal road system, the "King's Road," into northern Greece as well as secondary routes, and had even built a bridge at the Nine Ways, thus opening up land routes for the movement of soldiers and trade.¹²²

After Persia's retreat and Alexander's subsequent conquests, Alexander had the resources to mint Macedonian coins in the name of the king for the first time in Macedonian history.¹²³ While Alexander temporarily controlled silver mines in the Dysoron Mountains that the Thracians had controlled, he created coins that borrowed greatly from neighboring peoples such as the Thracians and the nearby Greek *poleis* so that Macedonia could trade with these local peoples.¹²⁴ Significantly, Kremydi explains that the varieties of Macedonia coinage of Alexander I and his immediate successors,

¹²¹ Mari, "Archaic and Early Classical Macedonia," 87. Significantly, W.L. Adams sees these Greek games in which Alexander I, Archelaus, and later, Philip II participated as "rooted in religious practice," defining of "Greek culture," and "seen by the Greeks themselves and by those around them as an iconic representation of Greek civilization," and as such served as a "benchmark for Hellenic identity, both in Greece and outside it." Adams' arguments are found in "Sport and Ethnicity in Ancient Macedonia," in *Macedonian Legacies: Studies in Ancient Macedonian History and Culture in Honor of Eugene N. Borza* (Claremont: 2008): 57; Adams also points out that Alexander I, Archelaus, and Philip II employed their participation or alleged association with Greek games to strengthen their positions and enhance their prestige, 58-62.

¹²² Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia*, 100. The Persian troops built the roads using local trees, with a third of what was left of Xerxes' entire invasion army employed in the tree felling on one stretch of road over "the shoulder of the Pierian range." See also Herod. 7.131.

¹²³ Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia*, 100. Hammond and Griffith, 110, also explain that the emblems on Alexander's coins were mostly of "religious significance."

¹²⁴ S. Kremydi, "Coinage and Finance," in *Brill's Companion to Ancient Macedon: Studies in the Archaeology and History of Macedonia, 650 BC-300 AD*, ed. R. Lane Fox (Leiden: 2011), 161-162.

designed to match the varieties of standards used by Thracians, Athenians, and northern colonies, “reflects, on a monetary level, the complex environment in which this *ethnos* was destined to survive and develop.”¹²⁵ As a result of his resources in precious metals and his subsequent prosperity, Alexander was also able to dedicate two gold statues of himself to Apollo and Zeus; and according to Herodotus, Alexander’s Bisaltic mines were providing an “income of a talent of silver a day.”¹²⁶ Alexander’s borders extended west to within Lyncestis and east to the Strymon; and he had solidified his relationship with Elimeia by a royal marriage.¹²⁷ Even though Alexander had established his state as “the strongest state on the Thraco-Macedonian mainland,” his economy remained largely underdeveloped, most of his people continued to lead a pastoral life, and Macedonia lacked a “heavy-armed infantry.”¹²⁸ By the end of his reign, the Edones had captured the Bisaltic mines, and Athens had stirred up disunity among the Balkan tribes and disrupted Macedonian routes for accessing timber and mines.¹²⁹

Thucydides also describes the efforts of Archelaus (413-399 BC) to build a national infrastructure in Macedonia. These efforts were clearly military in nature and included the construction or improvement of fortresses and roads:

¹²⁵ Kremydi, *Coinage and Finance*, 162.

¹²⁶ Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia*, 104-105. Herod. 5.17.2. See also Borza, *In the Shadow of Olympus*, 164, where Borza explains how the production of these silver mines “provided the funds needed for Archelaus’ program of military and cultural reform.”

¹²⁷ Worthington, *Philip II*, 221. W.S. Greenwalt, “The Production of Coinage from Archelaus to Perdiccas III and the Evolution of Argead Macedonia,” in Ian Worthington (ed.), *Ventures into Greek History: Essays in Honor of N.G.L. Hammond* (Oxford: 1994): 105-106.

¹²⁸ Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia*, 114-115. At 114, Griffith makes this judgment of Alexander: “a strong and enterprising leader of his people, the creator of an enlarged kingdom, a man of Greek outlook and Panhellenic spirit . . . he was a worthy forerunner . . . of Philip and Alexander.”

¹²⁹ Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia*, 114.

Of these there was no great number . . . having been erected . . . by Archelaus son of Perdiccas on his accession, who also cut straight roads, and otherwise put the kingdom on a better footing as regards horses, heavy infantry, and other war material than had been done by all the eight kings that preceded him.¹³⁰

Thucydides' suggests that Archelaus paid particular attention to building up his military, and to the supporting logistical preparations and strategic sites that such an enterprise would entail. Thucydides words, "cut straight roads," suggest an opening up of new routes "through forested country," such as that toward and through the cantons of Upper Macedonia where life was still largely pastoral, as well as the strategically important route through the Demir Kapu en route to the Paeonians.¹³¹ Archaeological findings near Demir Kapu on a rocky hilltop across from the ancient settlement describe a fortified structure with a tower dated to the end of the 5th century, and suggest the likelihood that Archelaus established this and other such fortresses.¹³² His fortifying of strongholds and improving the means of moving men and information through his kingdom complemented Archelaus' efforts to increase and improve both the Macedonian cavalry and infantry along with their weapons and supplies.¹³³ Thucydides' reference to heavy infantry undoubtedly refers to Archelaus' hoplite levy, or the levying of a soldier who

¹³⁰ Thuc. 2.100. 1-2. W. Greenwalt, "Why Pella?" *Historia* 48, no. 2 (1999): 166-167. Greenwalt includes in these fortifications "the Zoodokos, Kara Burun, and Demir Kapu passes (providing access to the lower Macedonian plain from Elimaea, Eordaea, and Paeonia respectively)," although only the Demir Kapu Pass has yielded supportive archaeological evidence so far. See Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia*, 140 and 146. Griffith indicates his belief that Thucydides was writing from personal knowledge of Macedonia and of Archelaus (137).

¹³¹ Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia*, 140. Griffith, 140, goes as far as to suggest that Archelaus was the creator of the "*viae regiae*" or "*viae militares*" referred to by Livy 44.43.1, (*odoi basilikai*) that "ran through the Pierian forest from Aegeae direct to Pydna . . . from Beroea through the Zoodokos Pege into Elimea and from Edessa via Kara Burun into Eordaea."

¹³² Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia*, 146.

¹³³ Worthington, *Philip II*, Appendix 3, 221-222.

would have been a landowner connected with divisions of Macedonian *poleis* or *ethne*.¹³⁴ Greenwalt suggests that Archelaus had the ability to raise more troops than his predecessors because he had “tapped the manpower of nearby and once independent Greek poleis” and had “fostered the development of Macedonian *poleis* on the Greek model—without, of course, granting them political autonomy.”¹³⁵ Archelaus’ founding of the cities of Pella and Dion, while long considered strategic and cultural, should also be considered military and social. Archelaus extended a Hellenic institution, the *polis*, within Macedonia in order to “expand the social class from which he could draft hoplites.”¹³⁶ Hatzopoulos sees in Archelaus’ policies a king who fostered urbanization, built fortifications to protect urban centers, levied troops from the “middle class” of these cities, and then identified his people by these polities.¹³⁷ Archelaus had begun a practice that Philip would implement on a large scale: the defining of Macedonian citizenship through the king’s granting of land in return for military service, and the defining of the Macedonian state through that relationship.

When Thucydides speaks about Archelaus’ preparation of “war material,” he is likely referring to improvements in bronze body armor, iron weaponry, cavalry gear, and

¹³⁴ Greenwalt, “Why Pella,” 172.

¹³⁵ Greenwalt, “Why Pella,” 172. Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia*, 148. Griffith explains that Archelaus drew men from Pella and other developing urban centers.

¹³⁶ Greenwalt, “Why Pella,” 172. See also Ellis, *Philip II*, 41 where Ellis explains that Archelaus’ new centers served “as agencies for recruitment.”

¹³⁷ M.B. Hatzopoulos, “The Cities,” in *Brill’s Companion to Ancient Macedon: Studies in the Archaeology and History of Macedon, 650 BC-300 AD* (Leiden: 2011), 238.

Hatzopoulos perceives a trend during the fifth century BC in Macedonia towards “the entrenchment and diffusion of civic values and institutions” that Archelaus attempted “to control rather than to suppress.” Ellis, *Philip II*, 41 and note 87. Ellis thinks that Archelaus is the king who reorganized Lower Macedonia “into a series of cantons dominated by and perhaps administered from central towns . . .” Such a reorganization did occur at some point, and Ellis believes Arrian who attributes this reorganization to Archelaus (Arrian, *Ind.* 18).

missile weapons.¹³⁸ Archaeological evidence from the Balkans indicates that infantrymen from before the time of Archelaus wore the ‘Illyrian helmet’ and a light shield, and wielded two spears and a short sword. These infantrymen were “second rate” compared to the typical Greek hoplite fighting in a tight phalanx formation because they fought in a loose formation or individually. Macedonian infantry numbers were small compared to their own cavalry numbers, their enemies’ cavalry, and even the numbers of infantrymen that their neighbors could muster.¹³⁹ Archelaus’ intervention in Thessalian affairs and his subsequent control of strategic territory between Macedonia and Thessaly give proof of Archelaus’ success in implementing his military reforms.¹⁴⁰ And yet, Archelaus was still a weak king in some ways, especially against the kingdom’s cities in the Chalcidice that were pushing for autonomy.¹⁴¹ He was not always strong enough to settle his own domestic problems, as when he required the support of a small contingent of the Athenian fleet in order to retake the city of Pydna in 410 after it had revolted. After Archelaus had reconquered Pydna with Athens’ help, he tellingly moved the city to a site that he could better manage.

¹³⁸ Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia*, 140-147. What follows is largely Griffith’s analysis of the archaeological evidence.

¹³⁹ Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia*, 147. Griffith points out that the cavalry of the Upper cantons of Macedonia were the only fighting corps before Archelaus that could have given anybody a good fight. He also explains that the Odrysians could put 50,000 cavalry into the field and 100,000 infantrymen as under Sitalces. Such a superior number of enemy troops explains why “the population of Macedonia took to the hills and any defeated infantrymen did likewise” during an invasion. See Thuc. 4.124.3. See also Ellis, *Philip II*, 41. Ellis argues that Thucydides’ information supports a view that “the cavalry was excellent (though perhaps not numerous) but the infantry was totally inadequate.”

¹⁴⁰ Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia*, 141.

¹⁴¹ Mari, “Archaic and Early Classical Macedonia,” 91-92. See also Diod. 13.49.1. What follows is Mari’s analysis of the weakness of Archelaus relative to the strong cities of the Chalcidice.

During Archelaus' reign, the Athenian disaster at Syracuse relaxed Athenian naval activity and increased the demand for Macedonian timber from Athens and from Athens' enemies.¹⁴² Numismatic evidence indicates that Archelaus had regained control of the Bisaltic mines and was mining copper within Orestis and Tymphaea, suggesting his control over these areas.¹⁴³ Archelaus minted coins, including a "varied series of denominations" of silver staters of significant weight and of new weights that would facilitate trade with his neighbors and the larger Aegean community.¹⁴⁴ He even began to mint bronze coins for internal exchange that would replace, over time, the "expensive and impractical silver fractions."¹⁴⁵ W. Greenwalt notes the significant increase in Archelaus' output of coinage compared to his predecessors and attributes this increase to his "attempt to generate a more complex economy driven by cash exchange."¹⁴⁶ The debasing of his coinage, even his best silver, and his choice of coin weights indicate Archelaus' efforts to maintain a closed and profitable system within Macedonia, to increase his access to tax revenues, and to facilitate trade with Athens. Greenwalt sees such measures as evidence of a "major domestic reorganization and a significant commercial initiative aimed at Athenian trade."

¹⁴² Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia*, 137-139, 141.

¹⁴³ Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia*, 138-139. Griffith, 139, also points out that Archelaus' interference in Thessalian affairs demonstrates his control over "Elimeia, Tymphaea, and Orestis."

¹⁴⁴ Greenwalt, "Coinage," 106-107. Greenwalt, "Why Pella?," 173. See also Kremydi, "Coinage and Finance," 164.

¹⁴⁵ Kremydi, "Coinage and Finance," 164. Kremydi also points out that these bronze issues remained scarce during Archelaus' reign, but continued to increase in abundance "under the reigns of Amyntas III and Perdikkas III" just prior to Philip's reign; and they begin to "dominate everyday transactions within the Macedonian kingdom" (164). Clearly, Archelaus started something that proved, over time, its effectiveness as an economic measure.

¹⁴⁶ Greenwalt, "Why Pella," 173. Greenwalt's suggestions follow.

Kremydi argues that, sometime in the 5th century BC, the Macedonians invented the double standard of coinage: a system whereby the state produced coins of lesser value for internal circulation while coins of greater value were used for export—and that this economically effective invention spread from Macedonia “to the rest of the Greek world during the Hellenistic period.”¹⁴⁷ If Archelaus is not the inventor of the double standard, he certainly capitalized on it. Archelaus’ coins, like the coins of Alexander I, suggest that Archelaus aimed at “political and/or religious legitimacy” as much as profit.¹⁴⁸ Significantly, Archelaus minted staters much like Alexander’s but with the introduction of “a divine head . . . placed on the obverse” likely representing Heracles *Patroos*, the mythical progenitor of the kingdom.¹⁴⁹

Archelaus also established a new capital at Pella by at least 399.¹⁵⁰ While this site had originally been “associated with pastureland,” Archelaus must have drained the surrounding marshlands, put the newly created land under cultivation, and distributed this land to Macedonians.¹⁵¹ Located at the head of the Thermaic Gulf on water that was either an inland part of the gulf or an inland lake created by the River Loudias on its way

¹⁴⁷ Kremydi, “Coinage and Finance,” 163.

¹⁴⁸ Greenwalt, “Coinage,” 107. He apparently used expensive obverse dies and minted the coins in large numbers over the period of his entire reign.

¹⁴⁹ Kremydi, “Coinage and Finance,” 163-164.

¹⁵⁰ I.M. Akamatis, “Pella,” in *Brill’s Companion to Ancient Macedon: Studies in the Archaeology and History of Macedon, 650 BC-300 AD* (Leiden: 2011), 393-94 explains that archaeological evidence demonstrates that Pella became the capital toward the end of the 5th century BC, even though this relocation “is not mentioned in any written source” (394); and that, from its foundation on, Pella “rapidly developed into the largest city in the realm and one of the most important political, economic and artistic centres of the Hellenistic age” (393). See also Worthington, *Philip II*, 13 offers the date of 399, but Greenwalt suggests an earlier date of 406 based on the unique advantages that Archelaus would gain from the beginning of his reign and for the needs it could serve before and after the Athenians had requested special treatment, in “Why Pella?” 177.

¹⁵¹ Greenwalt, “Why Pella?” 172.

to the gulf, Pella offered easy access to the sea but protection from naval attacks.¹⁵² Pella offered a number of advantages to Archelaus: a strategic military site along the natural east-west passage that would later become the Egnatian corridor; enough arable land to support a substantial city; and enormous commercial potential as a center and as an end point along Archelaus' military roads for the transport of timber from Mt. Bermion through the Kara Burun to its north and the Zoodokos Pass to its south.¹⁵³ Timber could also travel to Pella by means of various streams and rivers, including the Haliacmon and Loudias rivers.¹⁵⁴ Pella may have also been the site where Archelaus allowed the Athenians to build 110 new triremes and supplied them with oars (although this probably happened at Methone).¹⁵⁵ Archelaus moved the "seat of court and government to Pella" and elevated the status of Dion by reorganizing its festival of *Olympia*.¹⁵⁶

The general picture of Archelaus' reign that emerges from Thucydides' observations, numismatic and archaeological evidence, and the establishment of the capital at Pella, suggests a "king with a keen sense of the importance of monopolizing and centralizing his control over his kingdom's most marketable assets."¹⁵⁷ We can view

¹⁵² Ellis, *Philip II*, 40. Ellis points out that "naval approaches from the gulf must have lain either up the river or through narrow and shifting channels in flat, marshy land . . ." See also A. B. Bosworth, "Philip II and Upper Macedonia," *CQ*, n.s. 21, no. 1 (May 1971): 99.

¹⁵³ Greenwalt, "Why Pella?" 174.

¹⁵⁴ Greenwalt, "Why Pella?" 174.

¹⁵⁵ Greenwalt, "Why Pella?" 175-176, where Greenwalt makes a good argument that Pella, if established by 406, would have been the best place to receive timber while simultaneously defending the ships before they were built. He suggests that such an enterprise would have provided Archelaus with much needed cash for implementing his reforms. Also, Eugene N. Borza, "Timber and Politics in the Ancient World," *PAPS* 131, no. 1 (March 1987): 45.

¹⁵⁶ Mari, "Archaic and Early Classical Macedonia," 92.

¹⁵⁷ Greenwalt, "Why Pella?" 172 and 175. Also, *In Shadow of Olympus*, Borza mentions the quality of the epigraphic material and artifacts recovered from Dion, though still unpublished, that commenced with the reign of Archelaus (174-175).

several of Archelaus' actions as designed to unify his state culturally and to strengthen his ties with Greece: Archelaus' philhellenism, as exemplified by his establishment of a dramatic competition to Zeus and the Muses at Dion; his support of Greek artists and poets such as Zeuxis, Agathon, and Euripides; and his artistic support of the Temenid and Argive legends linking the Macedonian Argeadae with Greece in his patronization of a play entitled *Archelaus* and performed at court for the king.¹⁵⁸ While his philhellenism had economic and cultural aims, Archelaus also used Hellenic culture and ideas to try to create a national identity that could neutralize or prevail over local identities.¹⁵⁹ He introduced Attic Greek as the "official court and legal language of Macedonia," an action aimed at facilitating trade in the Aegean and imposing a common language.¹⁶⁰

Archelaus' economic, social, and political reforms also combined to strengthen his state: the increase of the hoplites in the army and their supplies; the building and maintenance of roads and strongholds; the minting of coins and the manipulation of their value; and the strengthening and legitimizing of the monarchy through allusions to religion and lineage. These were expensive but potentially profitable initiatives for strengthening Archelaus' position and that of the Macedonians.¹⁶¹ Griffith judges Archelaus as a king who had a "plan for growth, which resembled in some ways the plan actualized by his great successor Philip II."¹⁶²

¹⁵⁸ Mari, "Archaic and Early Classical Macedonia," 92.

¹⁵⁹ Ellis, *Philip II*, 42. Ellis sees Archelaus' efforts to promote Hellenic culture as an effort to establish "the beginnings of a national identity . . ."

¹⁶⁰ Adams, "Sport and Ethnicity," 60. Adams argues that Archelaus utilizes athletics to "project himself into the Greek *Oikumene* as a Greek . . . and to establish a Greek identity at home."

¹⁶¹ Greenwalt, *Coinage*: 108. Also, Worthington, *Philip II*, 13.

¹⁶² Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia*, 141.

Part II: Obstacles to a Strong Macedonian State at Philip's Accession¹⁶³

Macedonia's southeastern border or its Aegean coastline contained many Greek colonies either controlled or influenced by Athens or the Chalcidian League that posed a constant threat to Macedonia and prevented it from fully utilizing its own resources.¹⁶⁴ To make matters worse, the Athenians and Chalcidians vied against each other for control of ports and of the interior, and alternately made alliances with or against Macedonia to suit their own purposes.¹⁶⁵ If this eastern region, full of mines and forest products, could be controlled and exploited by a strong monarch, it had the potential to produce enormous wealth for the Macedonian state.¹⁶⁶ To exploit this wealth in natural resources and trade, however, Macedonia would need seaports and the control of maritime trade in the region, the acquisition of which would mean war with autonomous or allied Greek states and their ultimate absorption into the Macedonian state.¹⁶⁷ To the extent that the Greek colonies controlled this rich area and maritime trade, they would continue to pose a serious threat to Macedonian stability.¹⁶⁸

Any strategy for Macedonia's long-term cohesion would require the extension of Macedonian power into the upper Axios basin and in the area between the Axios and the Strymon, and control of the key city of Amphipolis; territorial unity would also require

¹⁶³ Billows, *Kings and Colonists*, 2ff., provides the bulk of information for this section. Similar information can be found in Hammond, *Philip of Macedon*, 7-9, and in Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia*, 22-31, 115-136, and 189-200.

¹⁶⁴ Billows lists Pydna, Methone, Therme, Potidaia, Argilos, and Amphipolis as the most important in *Kings and Colonists*, 2. See also Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia*, 176 and 180.

¹⁶⁵ Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia*, 184-186 and 196—to cite a few instances.

¹⁶⁶ Borza, *Shadow of Olympus*, 56-57.

¹⁶⁷ Billows, *Kings and Colonists*, 2.

¹⁶⁸ Billows, *Kings and Colonists*, 2-3. Also Borza, *Shadow of Olympus*, 50ff. where Borza discusses the natural resources of this area. What follows is Borza's description and analysis.

the seizure of land beyond the Strymon as a buffer from the Thracians. In contrast, Macedonia's southern border with Thessaly was quiet and safe, but would remain so only by diplomacy and alliance that specifically aimed to hinder southern Greek armies from using Thessaly as a passage into Macedonia.¹⁶⁹

Macedonia's western border contained the cantons of Upper Macedonia, Eordaia, Elimea, Tymphaia, Orestis, Lynkos, and Pelagonia, areas that, by this time, generally operated almost independently of Lower Macedonia. These cantons contained significant "non-Macedonian elements" in their populations, including peoples of Molossian and Illyrian descent, and also royal Macedonian families that competed with the Argeads for dynastic control.¹⁷⁰ Historically, Upper Macedonia had struggled to maintain its independence and had often allied itself with peoples to the north and west in order to do so.¹⁷¹ At the time of Philip's accession, the Illyrians controlled much of Upper Macedonia, a region that the Argead kings' had not ever fully controlled.¹⁷² In order to unify Macedonia, a strong monarch would have to defeat or win over the royal families of Upper Macedonia, and consciously weaken local loyalties and replace them with a loyalty to the state.¹⁷³ As part of any full incorporation of Upper Macedonia, a monarch would have to deal with the continual problem posed by the unsettled borders with the

¹⁶⁹ Billows, *Kings and Colonists*, 3. Billows mentions a potential threat from the south such as Jason of Pherai was able to pose in the 370s B.C.

¹⁷⁰ Thucydides lists these families and their independent rule in a number of places, including 2.80, 99, 4.79, and 124-125. Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia*, 185. Griffith notes the tendency for some of these Upper Macedonian cantons to join the Molossian state as it suited them—especially as the Orestae, in particular, had ethnic ties to the Molossians. See also Billows, *Kings and Colonists*, 3, and note 10.

¹⁷¹ ABosworth, "Philip II and Upper Macedonia," 100.

¹⁷² J.R. Ellis, "The Unification of Macedonia," in *Philip of Macedon*, ed. Miltiades B. Hatzopoulos and Louisa D. Loukopoulos (Athens: 2006), 37-38.

¹⁷³ Billows, *Kings and Colonists*, 3-4. Archelaus had taken some successful steps toward the incorporation of Upper Macedonia as described above.

powerful Illyrians whose invasion and subsequent destruction of the Macedonian army and of Philip's brother brought Philip to power.

The Illyrians and Thracians resurged as a significant threat to Macedonia prior to Philip's accession and during the reign of his brother, Perdiccas III. The Illyrians drove Amyntas III out of Macedonia twice, as recorded by Diodorus, and only the help of the Thessalians restored Amyntas after two years of exile (he was able to restore himself to the throne the second time).¹⁷⁴ Bardylis, an Illyrian king who lived into the reign of Philip II, even required Amyntas to pay tribute to the Illyrians after a defeat in battle.¹⁷⁵ Bardylis' power extended, at this time, from the borders of Molossis all the way to the borders of Macedonia, and these resources allowed him to put a large force into the field.¹⁷⁶ Bardylis was the Illyrian king who in 359 B.C. killed 4,000 Macedonians out of a force of 6,000, including Philip's brother, Perdiccas, "exposing the kingdom to attack by all its neighbors—Illyrians, Paeonians, Thracians, Chalcidians, and the Athenians alike."¹⁷⁷

The Odrysian kingdom had been established as early as the 440s.¹⁷⁸ Their king, Cotys, controlled all of inland Thrace and had become powerful enough to interfere in Macedonian affairs. Cotys often allied with Macedonia and Athens against pretenders to the throne or against the Chalcidian League, but he just as often turned against the

¹⁷⁴ Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia*, 174. Griffith argues for the acceptance of two Illyrian invasions rather than viewing the report as a "doublet" from Diodorus. See Diod. 14.92.3-4 and 15.19.2.

¹⁷⁵ Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia*, 180.

¹⁷⁶ Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia*, 188. The evidence is from a fragment of Callisthenes.

¹⁷⁷ I have mentioned this battle above and its source: Diod. 16.2.4-5. The quote is from Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia*, 188.

¹⁷⁸ Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia*, 115.

Athenians or Macedonians when it suited him.¹⁷⁹ He strengthened his realm by uniting it with parts of Sitalces' old Odrysian Empire and then began to threaten Athens' holdings in the area of the Bosphorus and the Hellespont.¹⁸⁰ Although he was assassinated just prior to Philip's accession, Cotys had demonstrated how politically dangerous a strong Thracian polity could be to the Macedonian kingdom, and how economically dangerous, if it controlled the resources near the Strymon and along the inland trade routes.

The strength of the Argead family to provide legitimate heirs continued to prove its persistent weakness as well, since various claimants to the throne could muster the loyalty necessary to try to take power.¹⁸¹ With so many hostile peoples surrounding and competing with Macedonia, a claimant to the Macedonian throne had ample potential supporters. The external threats to the Macedonian state served to complicate and worsen its internal disunity.¹⁸² Philip II had to overcome a number of claimants, including his cousins, Pausanias and Argaeus, and his half-brother, Archelaus, in order to secure his position, a situation not at all unusual in Macedonia, and especially during the preceding decades.¹⁸³ Since the Macedonian monarchy constituted the source of Macedonian unity, any problems within this institution left Macedonia virtually without a state.¹⁸⁴ Philip

¹⁷⁹ Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia*, 177, 184, and 195. Cotys worked against Athens' recapture of Amphipolis, for instance.

¹⁸⁰ Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia*, 195-196.

¹⁸¹ Billows, *Kings and Colonists*, 4. See the arguments above related to the strengths and weaknesses of the Argead monarchy.

¹⁸² Ellis, "The Unification of Macedonia," 38.

¹⁸³ Billows, *Kings and Colonists*, 4. These challenges are also described in Diod. 16.2. 6 to 16. 3.6.

¹⁸⁴ Billows, *Kings and Colonists*, 4.

thus inherited an extremely “fragile kingdom,” small, divided, poorer than it had been for decades, surrounded by enemies, and without a real fighting force.¹⁸⁵

¹⁸⁵ Fox, “The 360’s” 268-269. Fox points out that the poor quality of Perdiccas’ coinage and its metal content is evidence that he lacked any access to the mines in the north or east. Fox emphasizes that Philip inherited a very poor and weak kingdom (269): “On point after point, closer study of the scattered evidence” has sharpened the impression that Philip was bequeathed “a Macedon even weaker than many historians . . . have outlined. His achievement, therefore, is even more remarkable.”

CHAPTER III

THE ARMY AS AN INSTITUTION OF STATE CONSTRUCTION

Part I: The Phalanx

Diodorus Siculus describes the Macedonia that Philip took over in 360/59 as a kingdom in a “sorry state” with its king dead along with 4,000 Macedonians, the Illyrians planning to invade Macedonia after their stunning victory, the Paeonians ravaging Macedonian lands out of contempt for its army, and two different claimants to the throne, one supported by the Thracians and another by the Athenians.¹⁸⁶ During this inaugural crisis, Diodorus records that Philip stayed calm and took an initial action that may not have been given the attention it deserves in relation to the strengthening of Philip’s immediate position as a legitimate king worthy of his subjects’ trust and loyalty.¹⁸⁷ Philip assembled the Macedonian men in arms, “in a series of assemblies, and exhorting them with eloquent speeches to be men, he built up their morale.”¹⁸⁸ As discussed above, Philip had inherited a monarchical position that required of its kings a certain intimacy with the troops. Philip’s training, under philosophers while a hostage in Thebes, had undoubtedly prepared him to give calm, eloquent, and artful speeches under virtually any

¹⁸⁶ Diod. 16. 2.1. 4.

¹⁸⁷ Diod. 16. 3.1.

¹⁸⁸ Diod. 16. 3. 1.

circumstance.¹⁸⁹ Diodorus reported that Philip was known for his diplomacy and was said to have been prouder of his “grasp of strategy and of his diplomatic successes than of his valor in actual battle.”¹⁹⁰ If Diodorus has accurately represented Philip’s judgment of his own his successes, then Philip must have realized the importance of strengthening his monarchical position immediately by an appeal to his soldiers, and over time, by frequent and intimate discussions with them.

After quickly positioning himself as a legitimate and invested Macedonian king, Philip set about strengthening traditional institutions of state. His first step involved the strengthening of the Macedonian army and the likely creation, training, and equipping of a heavily armed infantry. Philip’s experience as a hostage in Thebes, the greatest military city of Greece at the time, his assignment as the king’s brother to a garrison in a strategic area of Macedonia, and his upbringing as a Macedonian hunter and warrior combined to give him solid military training for a young man in his twenties.¹⁹¹ Griffith suggests that

¹⁸⁹ Diod. 16. 2.2-3. Justin 6.9.7. Justin explains that, while Philip was a hostage in Thebes, “he was trained in those qualities possessed by Epaminondas and Pelopidas,” and that it was his time in Thebes that, most of all, “served to develop Philip’s exceptional genius” (Justin 7.5.2-3). Philip would have received unparalleled military training under the tutelage of Pelopidas.

¹⁹⁰ Diod. 16. 95. Polyæn. 4.2.9 offers an explanation of Philip’s pride in his diplomatic successes: that he could take more credit for these but had to share the credit for military successes with his soldiers. He had to share his diplomatic successes with his troops as well, as I argue below. References to Polyænus are from his *Stratagems*, vols. 1-2 edited and translated by Peter Krentz and Everett L. Wheeler (Chicago: 1994). See T.T.B. Ryder, “The Diplomatic Skills of Philip II,” in Ian Worthington (ed.), *Ventures into Greek History: Essays in Honor of N.G.L. Hammond* (Oxford: 1994): 229 for an alternative view of the success of Philip’s diplomacy.

¹⁹¹ Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia*, 206-208. Griffith notes that Perdikkas, Philip’s brother, may have assigned him to Pelagonia, where there was some move toward independence. Griffith also notes that Perdikkas may simply have assigned Philip to an area and given him a few troops to lead in order to marginalize him so that he was not a threat to the throne. On the other hand, given Philip’s quick military response and methods upon his accession, he may very well have been the drill master of whatever troops Perdikkas possessed, since Philip’s return from Thebes.

Philip's experience in Thebes may have been quite influential in his subsequent actions with the Macedonian army since Philip would have observed first hand the training of the Theban infantry, "the final strength of Greek citizen armies."¹⁹² Certainly Philip had never seen such infantry in Macedonia or among the surrounding peoples.¹⁹³ Philip was probably present and fighting in the battle that killed his brother and 4,000 Macedonians, as Philip's brother, Perdiccas, had issued him a contingent of troops (presumably cavalry troops or lightly armed infantry), Philip had been brought up to be an Argead warrior, and Macedonia was in grave danger.¹⁹⁴

Philip's successful rebuilding and renovation of the Macedonian army would become the *sine qua non* for the building of the Macedonian state since it would provide the establishment of Philip as a successful king and provide the security that allowed for the establishment of internal unity; economic exploitation, the enfranchisement of old and new Macedonian citizens, and expansion would follow security and unity.¹⁹⁵ The strength of Philip's army would also provide his diplomatic initiatives with unusual force, since Philip's army would eventually have the ability to destroy completely "entire Greek peoples, societies, and states," unlike the traditional Greek armies of the Greek *poleis*.¹⁹⁶

¹⁹² Griffith, "Philip as a General," 59. See also Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia*, 425

¹⁹³ Gabriel, *Philip II*, 61: "Macedonia had no tradition of infantry combat." See also my descriptions above.

¹⁹⁴ Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia*, 208.

¹⁹⁵ Adams, "Frontier Policy," 284. Adams explains that the "nature of what he was trying to achieve with his kingdom would not have been possible without that security."

¹⁹⁶ Gabriel, *Philip II*, 59. Gabriel points out that Philip's war machine, in its developed form, had the capacity to effect wholesale destruction on a state. See also Adcock, *Art of War*, 5-7. Adcock indicates that ancient Greek hoplite warfare was fought on open, flat plains, with a relatively modest number of soldiers, with traditional and expected tactics, and at a certain season of the year; and its potential destruction to any one city-state was limited by the campaign season and other factors.

Ancient authors recognized Philip's military innovations as one of his first acts as king. Diodorus specifically states that Philip was "the first to organize the Macedonian phalanx."¹⁹⁷ His description of Philip's military reforms suggests that Philip implemented them quickly—maybe within his first year of rule—when, in fact, these reforms may more accurately represent Philip's changes over the course of many years.¹⁹⁸ Diodorus lists Philip's reforms of the army as several: provisioning the troops with appropriate weapons; changing the military formation; and constant training under arms through maneuvers and competitive exercises.¹⁹⁹ Polyaeus describes the type of vigorous training and conditioning, or the forced marches, that Philip imposed upon his troops before battles as "making them take their arms and march for 300 stades, carrying their helmets, shields, greaves, sarissas, plus—in addition to their arms—a stock of provisions and all the utensils necessary for daily life."²⁰⁰ Justin adds that Philip "amalgamated the cavalry and the infantry to create an invincible army."²⁰¹ Greeks had, of course, employed infantry and cavalry together since the beginning of hoplite warfare, so Justin's statement, "unumque corpus equitum pedestriumque copiarum inuicti exercitus fecit," must mean that Philip created a new unity in the way in which the cavalry and infantry fought together—and on a scale not seen before in Greek warfare.

¹⁹⁷ Diod. 16.3.2.

¹⁹⁸ Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia*, 211 and 407. Griffith argues that the process of developing Philip's army to the numbers and training bequeathed to Alexander III probably took Philip's whole lifetime.

¹⁹⁹ Diod. 16. 3.1.1-2.

²⁰⁰ Polyaeus. 4.2.10. These training marches would have been 35 miles long (if we assume approximately 8 stades to a mile).

²⁰¹ Justin 7.6.9. Philip's use of a combined infantry and cavalry is modeled on that of Pelopidas and Epaminondas of Thebes. More will be said of Philip's debt to these great generals below.

Philip first revolutionized Macedonian warfare by creating a distinctive Macedonian phalanx—which means that he decided its “structure, weapons, and tactics.”²⁰² Who were these Macedonians who might become heavily armed infantrymen amidst the crises besetting Philip from the outset of his reign? Certainly no cavalryman would have exchanged his elite position to start fighting on the ground. An aristocracy of landowners atop a group of small farmers, some landless workers, and craftsmen—along with slaves—had characterized Greek societies since the end of the Bronze Age.²⁰³ While such a societal structure had changed significantly in the city-states of southern and central Greece, Macedonia probably continued to have something resembling this archaic societal structure. Traditional hoplite warfare in Greece required a social class that could afford the armor of a hoplite soldier—and this class had emerged in Greece proper as early as the 8th century BCE because of the economic prosperity that had created a class of people distinct from the aristocracy who could afford to equip themselves.²⁰⁴ Macedonia did not yet have a large and prosperous middle class of

²⁰² Minor M. Markle has written two foundational articles on Philip’s organization of the Macedonian phalanx, both of which will be referenced throughout this section: “The Macedonian *Sarissa*, Spear, and Related Armor,” *American Journal of Archaeology*, 81, no. 3 (1977): 323-339 and “Use of the *Sarissa* by Philip and Alexander of Macedon,” *American Journal of Archaeology*, 82, no. 4 (1978): 483-497. See also Gabriel, *Philip II*, 61.

²⁰³ W.G. Forrest, *The Emergence of Greek Democracy: 800-400 BC* (New York: 1966; reprint 1979), 46. Note that there is no direct reference to slavery in ancient Macedonia although there would certainly have been slaves in the Greek city-states of the Chalcidice. See Gabriel, *Philip II*, 37-38.

²⁰⁴ Forrest, *Emergence of Greek Democracy*, 88-90. See also Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia*, 423-424. Griffith explains that Macedonia had few cities so that its political organization was still mostly based on the *ethnos* rather than the *polis*. The attendant soldiers were light-armed and not wealthy enough to arm themselves as hoplites.

citizens who had the means to provide themselves with the armor of a hoplite, and Philip would have had to establish such a group if he wanted to build a Greek phalanx.²⁰⁵

As Philip determined to develop a phalanx in Macedonia, he invested the Macedonian lightly armed infantrymen, who did not have heavy armor and, presumably could not have afforded it, fully into the Macedonian military structure.²⁰⁶ By investing men who had previously been peripheral to or nonexistent in the Macedonian military, Philip enfranchised large numbers of Macedonian men economically, socially, and politically into the Macedonian state.²⁰⁷ These were the troops who had wisely rushed away from any invaders attacking their countryside, had hidden themselves in the mountains and hills, and had preserved their lives in the only way that insufficiently armed, poorly trained, and small numbers of soldiers on foot could have.²⁰⁸ While Philip may not have had the time or the resources at the beginning of his reign to equip soldiers as hoplites or to train them in the Greek fashion, as much as he may have wished to do so, he initially used the soldiers and equipment that he had available, and he eventually had the means through conquest to give his soldiers the means to equip themselves in land, resources, and pay.²⁰⁹ Griffith has argued that Macedonia's vulnerable position

²⁰⁵ Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia*, 423-424.

²⁰⁶ While it is possible that Alexander I had attempted to create *pezhetairoi*, this is unlikely (see my discussion above). In addition, any specially trained foot soldiers would have been a small group of soldiers associated with the king and would likely have died in the attempt to repulse the Illyrians. See Gabriel, *Philip II*, 62.

²⁰⁷ I will discuss the economic and social significance of Philip's military reforms below.

²⁰⁸ Gabriel, *Philip II*, 61, suggests that such soldiers "were little more than untrained peasants hastily assembled for the occasion and armed mostly with farm implements and work tools."

²⁰⁹ Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia*, 421-426. While initially stating that Philip is not likely to have armed his phalanx himself, Griffith states (424) that "the making and issue of the right kind of pike (*sarissa*) and the right kind of shield to go with it, must have been organized by the government in some way, and it will have taken a little time." See also Gabriel, *Philip II*, 62-63.

forced Philip to levy as many soldiers as he possibly could at the beginning of his reign, “even if many of the citizens called up, probably most of them, could not equip themselves fully as hoplites.”²¹⁰ The levying of new soldiers and the formation of soldiers from the lightly armed infantry into a phalanx suggest that Philip may have organized the issuing of pikes and shields in those cases where a soldier could not afford it.

Since Philip needed troops quickly and cheaply who could effectively fight against traditional Macedonian enemies and even Greek hoplites, as the Athenians were supporting an alternative claimant to the throne, he conceived a new formation of soldiers who would be simply armed and equipped and would have the capacity to defend and hold enemy soldiers in position, while the traditionally strong and already trained and equipped Macedonian cavalry cut the enemy down.²¹¹ Hammond believes that Philip “revolutionized ancient warfare” by freeing the hands of the infantryman from carrying his shield, now reduced in size and attached to his left shoulder and neck more like a cuirass, so that his hands could wield a *sarissa*.²¹² This Macedonian type of shield, worn from the neck and protecting a soldier’s chest, proved to be lighter and cheaper than a

²¹⁰ Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia*, 424.

²¹¹ Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia*, 424-426. Griffith argues that Philip was able to use what he found “freely in Macedonia” (one assumes an abundance of men, timber, long hunting spears, and eventually, land) “to produce an infantry arm both bigger and better than anything that had been seen before.” See also Gabriel, *Philip II*, 64-65.

²¹² Hammond, *Macedonian State*, 100-102. See also Billows, *Kings and Colonists*, 12-14. Markle, “Use of the *Sarissa*,” 483 and throughout the article disputes that Philip armed his heavy infantry with a *sarissa* until the battle of Chaeronea in 338 B.C., and maintains instead that Philip created a traditional Greek phalanx armed with traditional Greek weapons. Markle argues that Philip would eventually employ a phalanx armed with *sarissai* but that he would continue to utilize traditionally armed hoplites even after the introduction of the *sarissa* to protect the flanks of the clunky Macedonian phalanx. Markle sees Philip’s significant innovations as related to the cavalry, of which more will be said below.

hoplon, the standard hoplite's shield.²¹³ Philip's *sarissa* was a long pike made of indigenous wood and traditionally used in the Macedonian boar hunt.²¹⁴ Macedonian cornelwood provided the material for the *sarissa* because of its strength and lightness.²¹⁵ And since the metals and wood of the realm belonged to Philip as king, he could have immediately had the means "to equip his men with pikes and light shields at his own expense."²¹⁶ One wonders if many of the Macedonians, even the smallest landholders and pastoralists, would not have already had their own pike for the traditional boar hunts. Polyaeus clearly described the list of equipment carried by Philip's troops in training as including the *sarissa*, although he may be writing anachronistically or preserving a description of the army that Philip had developed in time for Chaeronea.²¹⁷ Philip's initial poor and desperate circumstances, however, argue for his early introduction of the

²¹³ Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia*, 424. Griffith explains that the lightly armed hoplite of the Macedonian phalanx had armor like that of Thracian peltasts, and that Philip was understandably more concerned about winning battles against Illyrians, Thracians, and other ethnē than against Greeks. See also Gabriel, *Philip II*, 64-65. Gabriel points out that the initial armor worn across the chest of a Macedonian phalangite was probably just leather. He also indicates that the Macedonian type of shield seems to have been described in Homer's *Iliad* and may have its origins in the Bronze Age—like so much else in Philip's Macedonia (64).

²¹⁴ Gabriel, *Philip II*, 64-65. Gabriel demonstrates that this Macedonian pike probably originated in Homeric times and is related to the Homeric battle spear: "a miniature fresco from Akrotiri dating from 1450 BCE depicts Mycenaean warriors using long spears of the *sarissa*'s length in battle" . . . "while later tomb paintings show men hunting wild boars with long spears." Diodorus 16.3.2 also indicates that both the shields and the "close order fighting" that characterized Philip's phalangites were in imitation of the "warriors at Troy." While it is unlikely that the phalanx formation has origins in the Bronze Age, the shield might.

²¹⁵ Hammond, *Macedonian State*, 102. See also M. Markle, "The Macedonian *Sarissa*," 324.

²¹⁶ Hammond, *Macedonian State*, 104. Billows, *Kings and Colonists*, 14. Billows points out that Philip's provisions would have helped to ensure the loyalty of the phalanx to himself "as well as easing the financial burden of military service." Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia*, 421. Griffith disagrees that Philip provided the soldiers with equipment, but he accepts that Diodorus' description of Philip's arming of the soldiers is an indication of Philip's "innovation in the armament of the infantry."

²¹⁷ See Polyaeus. 4.2.10.

sarissa, and may explain his army's swift and substantial success by comparison with any predecessor.²¹⁸

The advantages of a *sarissa* to a Macedonian phalangite in battle were the same as those provided to the hunter in a boar hunt: it kept the enemy at a distance in a charge, and it could kill when driven with sufficient penetration and force.²¹⁹ Similarly, the *sarissa* allowed the Macedonian phalanx to assume a defensive position, probably without an inordinate amount of training, and with time and training, a threatening and lethal, offensive position. Philip may have initially conceived of the role of his *sarissa*-wielding phalanx as defensive so that his relatively untrained foot soldiers only had the role of holding an enemy force, infantry or cavalry, in an area that would allow his highly trained cavalry to make decisive attacks.²²⁰ Eventually, the Macedonian phalanx became a formidable offensive weapon. Plutarch described this *sarissa*-wielding phalanx at the battle of Pydna between Romans and Macedonians in 168 B.C.:

²¹⁸ Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia*, 421. Griffith argues that Philip introduced the *sarissa* into the Macedonian phalanx earlier rather than later because we do not hear about the existence of a phalanx before Philip; and “the arming of the infantry with it . . . represented the one material innovation which helped to make of the phalanx the formidable force which it became.” For an alternative but somewhat unconvincing view, see Minor M. Markle, III, “The Macedonian *Sarissa*, Spear,” 331; and Minor M. Markle, III, “The Use of the *Sarissa*,” 483 and *passim*. Markle argues that there is no evidence of the use of the *sarissa* as an infantry weapon until after Chaeronea—either explicitly in the ancient sources or by inference in the descriptions of fighting.

²¹⁹ Gabriel, *Philip II*, 65. Gabriel suggests that Philip got the idea to use the long spear from his experience of the Macedonian boar hunt. Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia*, 421. Griffith thinks that the *sarissa* is the most important change that Philip made to the army: “the introduction of the *sarissa* and the arming of the infantry with it . . . represented the one material innovation which helped to make of the phalanx the formidable force which it became.”

²²⁰ Gabriel, *Philip II*, 65-66 and 81.

Impregnable and unapproachable, with its close array of long spears everywhere meeting the assailant . . . and piercing those that came in their way quite through their armor, no shield or corslet being able to resist the force of that weapon.²²¹

Peter Manti argues convincingly from archaeological evidence, both pictorial evidence and artifacts from the mounds of Vergina, for specific length and types of *sarissai*.²²² The *sarissa* of the infantryman ranged from 15 $\frac{3}{4}$ to 18 feet long—the relative length of the mature trunk of the cornelwood tree.²²³ The *sarissa* of the infantryman differed from the *sarissa* used by a cavalryman or a peltast in that it was longer, had a “sharp bladed weapon head of iron affixed to the forehead, and a spike on the butt to implant the pike” in the event of an enemy’s charge, and to act as a “counterweight to its great length” when carried by the soldier.²²⁴ The *sarissa* also had cording that allowed a soldier to grip tightly around the shaft of the pike, but also marked

²²¹ Plutarch, “Aemilius Paulus,” in *Plutarch’s Lives*, vol. 1, ed. Arthur Hugh Clough, trans. John Dryden (New York: 2001), 369. See also Gabriel, *Philip II*, 65-66 and note 18. Gabriel asserts that “as long as the Macedonian infantry held their fear in check, the phalanx was impenetrable by hoplite infantry” (66).

²²² Peter A. Manti, “The Sarissa of the Macedonian Infantry,” *AW* 23, no. 2 (1992): 30-42 and “The Macedonian Sarissa, Again,” *AW* 25, no. 1 (1994): 77-91. Manti convincingly challenges the views of Minor Markle by establishing the length of a Macedonian cubit as 13.5 inches (making the Macedonian *sarissa* from 15 $\frac{3}{4}$ ft. to 18 ft. in length), and by establishing the differences based on archaeological evidence between the cavalry and infantry pike. Markle seems to have mistaken the various units by which particular polities designated lengths as being equal, and so suggested erroneous lengths and types of pikes for infantrymen and cavalrymen in Macedonia. Markle also interprets general terms such as *soteris* to suggest that the end of a cavalry pike would be in nature, size, and weight the same as the end of an infantry pike, although archaeological evidence suggests otherwise—as does common sense.

²²³ Manti, “Sarissa of the Macedonian Infantry,” 32 and 41. Manti points out that the trunk of a tree is “the only portion of a tree suitable for straight shafted weapons” (41).

²²⁴ Manti, “Sarissa of the Macedonian Infantry,” 32.

the spot that allowed a soldier to wield the weapon with balance and with an appropriate length jutting forward in relation to the position of other soldiers.²²⁵

Philip's phalanx arranged the soldiers in a simple box formation of ten men deep whose job was to move slowly forward or to hold a given position, whose leaders could control the formation from the corner, and which could readily turn in any direction needed in the course of battle.²²⁶ The phalanx could even form into a triangular wedge or hollow wedge as the battle demanded.²²⁷ As a result of their smaller shields and *sarissai*, the trained Macedonian soldier had an ability to fight in a closer and more flexible formation than Greek hoplites "both laterally and in depth," and, when contracted, produced five pike-points in front of its first line, giving it a huge advantage in a charge against a line of soldiers holding short, hoplite spears.²²⁸ Since the main defense against the Macedonian phalanx was to attempt to "chop off the *sarissa* head," a phalangite had to maintain the specific distance of two cubits (27 in.) between himself and the next soldier in a compact attack.²²⁹ Such a distance allowed the *sarissai* of following ranks to protect the *sarissai* just ahead, since each *sarissa* had a weapon head and foreshaftguard that ran for two cubits and could successively protect the vulnerable shaft of the forward *sarissai* for an "entire length of the six ranks of projecting pikes."²³⁰

²²⁵ Manti, "Sarissa of the Macedonian Infantry," 33. Manti explains that a cavalry *sarissa* had a strap and wrist loop, and where the infantry *sarissa* had a butt, the cavalry *sarissa* had a pointed spike on the butt that could be used as an alternative spike—although Manti doubts that the cavalry *sarissa* as pictured in the Boscoreale mural would have been able to be wielded by a cavalryman (32-34).

²²⁶ Gabriel, *Philip II*, 63.

²²⁷ Gabriel, *Philip II*, 67 and 69. See also Adcock, *Art of War*, 26-27. Adcock asserts that Philip's phalanx was more mobile than a hoplite phalanx—even though the phalanx became too big to maneuver well during the Hellenistic age under the Successors.

²²⁸ Hammond, *Macedonian State*, 102.

²²⁹ Manti, "Sarissa of the Macedonian Infantry," 39.

²³⁰ Manti, "Sarissa of the Macedonian Infantry," 39.

As Polyaeus explained: “In strength the phalanx resembles an invincible animal, as long as its body exists and it guards its continuous line of shields.”²³¹ For maximum success in battle, the soldiers of this new phalanx had to be trained to engage the enemy wearing less armor but working as a unit with their pikes in such a manner as would afford protection for the group.²³² Since the pike was heavy, the most effective troops over time would have been those conditioned and trained in order to “maintain the cohesion of the phalanx.”²³³

Part II: The Cavalry

Philip inherited from his predecessors an excellent Macedonian heavy cavalry, the Companions, a group that fought against other cavalry or in pursuit of retreating infantry.²³⁴ The Companions or *hetairoi* made up the king’s attendants, fought under the “personal leadership of the king,” were hand picked from among the aristocracy, and served as an “elite corps” of the cavalry.²³⁵ They consisted of 300 men before Philip and in Philip’s early years, but grew to 800 men during Philip’s reign. A Royal Squadron of 300 *hetairoi*, an *agema* or *ile basilike*, persisted even as Philip extended the number of his regular *hetairoi*. Philip’s additional cavalymen fought as squadrons that had been levied from particular cities or regions of Macedonian territory alongside this elite group.²³⁶

²³¹ Polyaeus, 18.4

²³² Hammond, *Macedonian State*, 103. Gabriel, *Philip II*, 63-64.

²³³ Hammond, *Macedonian State*, 103.

²³⁴ Hammond, *Macedonian State*, 106.

²³⁵ Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia*, 408-409. What follows is Griffith’s description except where indicated.

²³⁶ The source of this information dates from the beginning of Alexander III’s reign, but must have operated during Philip’s reign—and likely before. Hammond and Griffith,

Since the Macedonian cavalry constituted the traditional Macedonian army, and the main qualification for inclusion into the general cavalry seems to have been the wealth to afford the horse and the cavalry weapons, Philip could increase the number of loyal *hetairoi* simply by the extension of his patronage.²³⁷ That Philip expanded the number of cavalrymen is undisputed, although the figures vary from the 500 with whom he fought against the Illyrians in 358, to 3,000 in 352 against the Thessalians, and back down to 2,000 against the Greeks in 338—even with the addition of the Thessalian cavalry.²³⁸ This expansion, of which more will be said below, is a clear indication that Philip used the institution of the cavalry, and specifically the position of the *hetairoi*, to offer mobility and inclusion in his state to both Macedonians and conquered peoples, and to bind disparate groups to himself through the extension of his patronage.²³⁹

Besides increasing his number of cavalry significantly over the course of his reign, Philip made his cavalry remarkably successful by his implementation of innovative tactics. Such success, in turn, allowed Philip to reward his cavalrymen with estates on newly conquered lands.²⁴⁰ Philip trained his cavalry to manage a wedge-shaped assault supported by heavy infantry. Arrian claims that this cavalry tactic had been used first

History of Macedonia, 411. Arr. *An.* 1.2.5; 1.12.7; 2.9.3. Arrian's useful information will be discussed below.

²³⁷ J.R. Ellis, "The Unification of Macedonia," 40. See also Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia*, 408-410.

²³⁸ Diod. 16.4.4-6, 16.35.4, and 16.85.5. Griffith points out that Philip did not need to take all his cavalry with him for every battle, and he had logistical considerations that would have led him to lean heavily on the Thessalian cavalry for the battle of Chaeronea—thus accounting for some of the differences in reported numbers of cavalry used for specific engagements.

²³⁹ Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia*, 411-412.

²⁴⁰ Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia*, 412.

among the Scythians and later among the Thracians.²⁴¹ It called for the drawing up of the cavalry leaders into a circle so that “the front of the wedge tapers to a point.”²⁴²

Philip’s time as a hostage in Thebes may have shaped his implementation of this effective military tactic since, as Xenophon records, Epaminondas had used a similar cavalry formation at the Battle of Mantinea only two years after Philip had left Thebes.²⁴³ When Epaminondas saw that his enemies had drawn up their cavalry “in rows to a depth similar to a hoplite phalanx,” he decided to array his cavalry in a wedge formation, “believing that when his cavalry broke through, he would have achieved total victory.”²⁴⁴ Epaminondas’ concentrated attack achieved its desired ends, and Philip must have heard in Macedonia that this tactic had been successful in one of the most significant battles of the 4th century B.C. Arrian asserts that by using this wedge formation, Philip’s Macedonian cavalry “cut its way through an enemy formation” and had the ability “to wheel swiftly round and back.”²⁴⁵ The wedge formation allowed

²⁴¹ Arrian, *Tact.* 16.6-7. See also Brian Campbell, *Greek and Roman Military Writers: Selected Readings* (New York: 2004), 132. References to Arrian are here the translations of Brian Campbell.

²⁴² Arrian, *Tact.* 16.6-7.

²⁴³ Xenophon, *Hellenika* 7.5.24. All translations of Xenophon are those of John Marincola found in *The Landmark Xenophon’s Hellenika*, ed. Robert B Strassler, trans. John Marincola (New York: 2009). Philip had been a hostage in Thebes from approximately 368-365 BC. The Battle of Mantinea in which Epaminondas used a similar cavalry tactic occurred in 362. Epaminondas had likely conceived of such a tactic and had been training his cavalry for such an employment for a number of years—which would suggest that Philip had seen it or heard about it in Thebes. Minor Markle, “Use of the Sarissa,” 491, suggests that both the Thebans and Thracians used the wedge-shaped cavalry formation which Philip adopted, but that Philip was the first to use this formation in a *frontal* assault against infantry—as opposed to an attack on the rear or flanks.

²⁴⁴ Xenophon, *Hellenika* 7.5.24. See also G.T. Griffith, “Philip as General,” 62.

²⁴⁵ Arrian, *Tact.* 16.6-7.

experienced officers to lead at the point and, thereby, “alter the unit’s direction” as necessary for successfully engagement in the course of a battle.²⁴⁶

Philip’s success with a cavalry assault, regardless of its formation, would only have been successful if the cavalry had been armed and prepared to battle infantry as well as cavalry. The cavalryman of Philip’s reign and after seems to have worn armor in preparation for battles with infantrymen: an iron breastplate with a collar covering the neck and the lower half of the face, as well as thick leather flaps running under the armpit; an iron helmet; a gauntlet or leather sleeve covering the left hand; a metal greave over the right forearm; thick leather boots that came flush to the leather greaves for the legs; and metal and leather thigh piece for the upper leg.²⁴⁷ Philip improved the cavalryman’s arms by introducing a cavalry *sarissa* or *xyston*, a pike shorter than the infantry *sarissa* but effective for similar reasons.²⁴⁸ Arrian describes the Battle of the River Granicus as an engagement in which Alexander III’s cavalry had the advantage in the end over the Persian cavalry, as they fought in “a cavalry battle with infantry tactics,” and because the Macedonian spears were longer, made of sturdy cornel wood, and able to thrust and stab, as compared to the Persians’ “light lances.”²⁴⁹

²⁴⁶ Hammond, *Macedonian State*, 106. Hammond references both Arr. *Tact.* 16. 6 and Asclep. 7. 3 in note 17.

²⁴⁷ Gabriel, *Philip II*, 74-75. Gabriel is relying here on a list from Xenophon’s treatise on horsemanship and artifacts found in Macedonian tombs.

²⁴⁸ Markle, “The Macedonian *Sarissa*,” 337-338, argues that Philip’s truly effective military innovation was arming his cavalry with a relatively long lance that, in close combat, “enabled them to outreach their enemies who were armed with shorter spears or swords . . .” See also Gabriel, *Philip II*, 75.

²⁴⁹ Arrian. *An.* 15. Markle, “Macedonian *Sarissa*,” 339, points out that Arrian had practical, military experience as one of Hadrian’s legates, and had “successfully commanded cavalry before the invention of saddles and stirrups.” He, therefore, “speaks with experience and authority” about what horses can and cannot do.

Philip's cavalrymen may also have wielded the *machaira*, a cavalry sword with a curved blade that was something like a "meat cleaver."²⁵⁰ Philip's cavalry attacked infantry with the purpose of breaking into the formation and causing a breach; the cavalry accomplished this action by means of the speed and weight of their horses, the use of a lance longer than the weapons of a traditional hoplite, and the ability of the wedge formation to direct the impact of the charge on a specific part of the infantry line.²⁵¹ Philip eventually made use of lightly armed infantry wielding slingers, archers, and javelins to protect the somewhat vulnerable flanks of the Macedonian phalanx.²⁵²

Justin indicated that Philip created a new unity in his tactical use of infantry and cavalry in the Macedonian army, as mentioned above. Philip's introduction of new weapons and armor to his infantry, completely different from those of the Greek hoplite, only makes sense if Philip planned to fight differently with them.²⁵³ Shortly after his initial levy of men, Philip met and defeated mercenaries led by Argeus, a rival claimant to the throne, in a fairly easy battle, but one which gave his new troops confidence.²⁵⁴ By the end of his first year, Philip's army demonstrated the success of its initial training and reorganization under Philip by defeating the Illyrians under Bardylis. Diodorus reports

²⁵⁰ Gabriel, *Philip II*, 76 and note 61. Gabriel suggests that, while Philip may have introduced this weapon for his cavalry, he did not "invent" the weapon as it was likely an ancient Macedonian weapon used by hunters on horseback.

²⁵¹ Markle, "Macedonian *Sarissa*," 339, where Markle describes in detail how Philip's use of innovative weapons and tactics would have effected a successful cavalry attack against infantry. See also Gabriel, *Philip II of Macedonia*, 77.

²⁵² Hammond, *Macedonian State*, 106. Besides his auxiliary troops, Philip would eventually add a "siege train" to his army that would enable him to take fortified cities and about which more will be said below. See Billows, *Kings and Colonists*, 11. See also Gabriel, *Philip II*, 70, in which Gabriel describes these auxiliaries and their role on the battlefield. As I mentioned above, Philip may have used a contingent of the Macedonian phalanx to fight in the manner of a traditionally armed Greek phalanx in order to protect the rear and flanks of his *sarissa*-bearing Macedonian phalanx.

²⁵³ Gabriel, *Philip II*, 64.

²⁵⁴ Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia*, 418.

that Philip brought “ten thousand picked infantry soldiers and about five hundred cavalry” to this engagement against the Illyrians.²⁵⁵ Although Diodorus does not specifically mention new weapons or tactics here, his description of the battle suggests that Philip’s leadership in a cavalry charge made the difference in the end, even though the Illyrians were prepared for cavalry assaults on their front and flanks. Diodorus’ description of the battle would be consistent with a phalanx holding a defensive position while cavalry contingents acted as the offensive squadrons in the battle.

While this use of cavalry as the “combat arm of decision” is unusual before Philip, Plutarch records that the Theban commander, Pelopidas had employed cavalry as an assault force against Alexander of Pherae at the Battle of Cynoscephalae in 364.²⁵⁶ Pelopidas had initially ordered his cavalry to attack his enemy’s cavalry; but once the opposing cavalry had been routed, he “recalled the cavalry and ordered it to attack the enemy’s infantry”—a tactic that threw the opposing infantry into disorder. An assault cavalry aided by an infantry holding the enemy in position is the sort of tactic that Philip may have been able to manage successfully after only one year as king. Regardless, it is most impressive that Philip could put 10,000 infantry and 600 cavalry into the field within months of his accession, an achievement of which no other previous Macedonian king could boast.²⁵⁷ By the end of Philip’s reign, that number had risen to at least 24,000 men.²⁵⁸ Philip’s success against the Illyrians is attributable to his establishment of a

²⁵⁵ Diod. 16.4.4-6.

²⁵⁶ Plutarch, *Vit. Pel.* 32 in *The Age of Alexander*, trans. Ian Scott-Kilvert (New York: 1973). The phrase “combat arm of decision” is R. Gabriel’s, from *Philip II*, 72-73. Gabriel argues that the Greeks were just beginning to experiment with cavalry as an assault force when Philip came to power.

²⁵⁷ Diod. 16. 4. 3. Billows, *Kings and Colonists*, 14-15.

²⁵⁸ Diod. 17. 17. 4-5. Diodorus gives the number of heavy infantry at the beginning of Alexander’s reign as 24,000 foot and 3,300 horse going with Alexander to Asia—besides

substantial and trained infantry, his innovative use of experienced cavalry, and battle tactics that matched the types of infantry and cavalry that he possessed. Philip's military innovations enabled him to use his army to drive the Illyrians out of Macedonia, to unite Upper and Lower Macedonia, and to absorb the area between the Strymon and Nestos rivers.²⁵⁹

Part III: The Army as an Institution of Unification²⁶⁰

In the process of meeting Macedonia's own needs for security and defense, Philip used the army to achieve his specific goals for internally unifying Macedonia.²⁶¹ First, Philip created a "national citizen force," by taking his infantry from Lower and Upper Macedonia.²⁶² As Ellis explains, this army divided Macedonia "horizontally," or in such a way that loyalties were to those in one's own rank and circumstances. The effect of this division was to weaken the ties and distinctions between "region and region and *genos* and *genos*."²⁶³ Although troops were enlisted by region, they fought together as one army and had opportunities for advancement within the unified structure of the army; the structure of the cavalry under Philip even provided a mechanism for the inclusion of non-

whatever force had been left in Macedonia. See Billows, *Kings and Colonists*, 15 and note 47. See Ellis, "Unification of Macedonia," 40, and Griffith, "Philip as General," 59.
²⁵⁹ Billows, *Kings and Colonists*, 14-15.

²⁶⁰ The army's importance as an institution of unification is introduced here. The argument for army's central role in Philip's state will be developed further in Chapter IV.

²⁶¹ Ellis, "Fourth-Century Imperialism," 103. Ellis emphasizes that most accounts of Philip's success fail to consider his "own personal motivations," that likely put great emphasis on unifying and pacifying his own country. He also notes that Macedonia's "fundamental lack of unity" is, in his opinion, the "greatest single factor accounting for the traditional Macedonian inability to meet internal and external challenges" (104).

²⁶² Ellis, "Fourth-Century Imperialism," 105. See also Billows, *Kings and Colonists*, 16.

²⁶³ Ellis, "Fourth-Century Imperialism," 105.

Macedonians in the Companion Cavalry.²⁶⁴ Arrian's list of Alexander's troops suggests that Philip had not only increased the size of the *hetairoi* through the inclusion of noble cavalymen from Thessaly, but had also included cavalymen from conquered areas such as Bottiaea, Anthemous, Amphipolis, Apollonia, and Leugaia.²⁶⁵ The inclusion of these nobles of various origins into the highest rank of the military had the effect of "diluting the power of the traditional nobility" and enfranchising in the Macedonian state an ever-widening group who benefitted directly from the patronage of the king.²⁶⁶

Philip elevated the status of the "tallest and strongest," and one presumes, the best fighters from among his infantry, to a contingent of infantry "Companions" whom he called *pezhetairoi* or Foot Companions.²⁶⁷ By the creation of this elite infantry, Philip clearly intended to improve the standing of infantrymen in Macedonia and to establish a means by which men of this class and rank could hope to achieve a status not unlike that

²⁶⁴ Ellis, "Fourth-Century Imperialism," 105. See also Ellis, "Unification of Macedonia," 42. Ellis explains that Thessalians and other Greeks, not just Macedonians, were promoted to the rank of Companion Cavalry, and that these companions were said to "have owned more land than the ten thousand richest men among the Greeks." The wealth of these *hetairoi* describes the availability of land in Macedonia, the wealth of the class from which the *hetairoi* were drawn, and Philip's generosity over nearly two decades in awarding land to his best cavalymen. Ellis sites Athenaeus 13.557 for this property figure.

²⁶⁵ See Ellis, "Unification of Macedonia," 45. Also see Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia*, 411. The references are to Arrian, *An.* 1.2.5, 1.12.7, 2.9.3, and 3.11.8. All the territories, except Bottiaea, were annexed by Philip in the course of his conquests and then incorporated into the Macedonian kingdom along with their inhabitants (original or settled). Leugaia's location has not yet been identified.

²⁶⁶ Ellis, "Unification of Macedonia," 45.

²⁶⁷ The foundational discussion of the evidence is found in Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia*, 405ff. in which Griffith explains that the suggestion from a fragment of Theopompus, who was present in Macedonia during Philip's reign, describes the *pezhetairoi* as a Royal Guard of Foot Companions even though the term comes to refer to the whole of the Macedonian infantry under Alexander III. The Royal Guard becomes the *hypaspistai* under Alexander. See also Hammond, *The Macedonian State*, 148-150.

of the *hetairoi*, and by which Philip could ensure the loyalty of his very best troops.²⁶⁸ Diodorus suggests that Philip distributed land among his soldiers after the conquest of Methone, presumably as a reward for service.²⁶⁹ Philip would continue the distribution to his soldiers of land acquired through subsequent conquests with land adjacent to or within Macedonia. Such distribution of land would be a step toward the further enfranchisement of Macedonians in their relationship to their king and state. Soldiers could also earn incentive pay and rewards, regardless of their rank, for outstanding service.²⁷⁰

Philip utilized his state's only traditional structures, namely the monarchy and the army, as his tools for creating political and social unity because he recognized their capacity to embrace all Macedonian citizens.²⁷¹ Signs of the success of Philip's army in unifying the hearts and minds of the Macedonian subjects include the "widespread use of the Macedonian shield as the symbol *par excellence* of Macedonian identity," and tomb representations of Macedonians as warriors with military paraphernalia from the time of Philip.²⁷² His strengthening and reorganizing of the army for political and social purposes may have created an urgency for continuous, outward military action, once immediate threats had been resolved, in order to preserve the army's vitality as an

²⁶⁸ Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia*, 405-406 and 414-415, 417.

²⁶⁹ Diod. 16. 34. 5.

²⁷⁰ Ellis, "Unification of Macedonia," 40 and note 28. Ellis explains that soldiers could establish themselves as "ten-stater" or "double-rate" soldiers based on outstanding service.

²⁷¹ Ellis, "Fourth-Century Imperialism." Ellis' study focuses throughout on the relationship between the army and monarchy, on the one hand, and political and social unity, on the other hand.

²⁷² Billows, *Kings and Colonists*, 17. Billows admits the evidence is scanty from before Philip's time, but the military identity is certainly part of Philip's Macedonia.

institution for achieving domestic objectives.²⁷³ With its common training, opportunities for advancement, and the ability to enfranchise its members as landholders, the army became the single most important institution by which Philip bound his men to himself and to his national goals.²⁷⁴

Part IV: The School of Royal Pages

Philip established a school for Royal Pages that was related to the army in that it prepared adolescent boys for entry into the Companion Cavalry and reflects a deliberate policy on the part of Philip to foster an intense loyalty among the nobility of his realm and to undermine traditional disunities.²⁷⁵ Arrian attributes the establishment of this “custom” to Philip who required the adolescent sons of Macedonian nobles to attend personally upon the king.²⁷⁶ Arrian explains that these boys waited upon the king, guarded him while he slept, took care of his horses, and accompanied him when he

²⁷³ Ellis, “Fourth-Century Imperialism,” discusses the effect of Philip’s use of the army for political and social reasons. See also Billows, *Kings and Colonists*, 17-19. Billows compares Macedonia to Prussia in the 17th and 18th centuries as an “army which had a state.”

²⁷⁴ Ellis, “Unification of Macedonia,” 42. See also Lee L. Brice, “Philip II, Alexander the Great, and the Question of a Macedonian ‘Revolution in Military Affairs,’” *AW* 42, no. 2 (2011): 137-147. Brice argues that the impact of Philip II’s military reforms and changes, and the speed with which they occurred (in a thirty-six year period), qualify Philip’s reforms for the designation ‘Revolution in Military Affairs.’ In particular, Brice claims (146) that the Macedonian army, created by Philip and then used by Alexander in Asia, “not only dominated militarily, but completely changed the way wars were won” after 338 B.C.

²⁷⁵ Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia*, 400-401. See also Ellis, “Unification of Macedonia,” 45. It is interesting to note that Philip conducted a contest as to who would tutor Alexander and his companions. Aristotle not only won this contest, but tutored Alexander and his companions from 343-340 at Mieza. Philip chose Aristotle both for his brilliance and the fact he was the son of Amyntas III’s court physician, Nichomachus, and, therefore, had been raised at court with Philip. Aristotle thus had an intimate knowledge of Macedonia and court politics.

²⁷⁶ Arrian *An.* 4.13. Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia*, 401.

hunted. Curtius adds that the boys attended the king in battle, they sat and ate with the king, and only the king himself could punish them.²⁷⁷ Importantly, the boys “were highly educated in all the liberal arts,” and their experience served the Macedonians as a “seminary for their officers and generals.”²⁷⁸ Griffith argues that Philip’s establishment of this institution of Royal Pages, or his development of this ancient institution on a new level, had the element of taking hostages for the good behavior of aristocratic fathers, both Macedonian and non-Macedonian.²⁷⁹

Most importantly, after serving the king for four to five years exclusively, these boys, having become men, would return to their families possessed of a familiarity with the culture of the court and the king’s personality, and having experienced the king as their political, military, and social leader.²⁸⁰ The School for Royal Pages served as a mechanism by which the king could foster loyalty among the most important military and political group in his realm, the Companion Cavalry, and by which the king could ensure the cultivation of competent military leaders for each generation.²⁸¹ A successful, confident, and forceful king, such as Philip II, could impress upon the minds of these youth the sense that prosperity, fortune, and the gods attended his leadership, and he could bind them to a future of success that included them in a partnership with him.²⁸²

²⁷⁷ Curtius *Hist.* 8.6.2-6.

²⁷⁸ Curtius *Hist.* 8.6.4-6.

²⁷⁹ Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia*, 401. R. Gabriel, *Philip II*, 81 argues that Philip had a policy of pursuing in battle and killing as many as possible of the nobility of his enemies so that, once incorporated, he could educate and enfranchise their sons into his nobility. “The demise of the old leaders presented Philip with the opportunity to create a loyal cadre of new leaders.”

²⁸⁰ Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia*, 403-403.

²⁸¹ Ellis, “Unification of Macedonia,” 45.

²⁸² Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia*, 401. See also Ellis, “Unification of Macedonia,” 46.

Part V: Logistics, Siege Warfare, and the Navy

In an effort to build his state, Philip pursued a conscious policy of mastering the logistics of warfare, including the management of long-distance campaigns, the development, use, and transportation of siege machinery in a siege train, and the development of a navy. Macedonia's large base of manpower, especially after the firm acquisition of Upper Macedonia, was between 500,000 and a million men, giving Philip the opportunity, impossible in most Greek city-states, to levy only a percentage of the eligible men for a campaign while leaving a substantial number at home to run farms, provide security on the borderlands and in the cantons, and to add productively to Macedonia's economy.²⁸³ Over time, such a levy led to the establishment of a standing, professionally trained and paid military force, the first in Europe.²⁸⁴ Related to Philip's unusual efforts at training his troops, the reports of Diodorus and Polyaeus, as mentioned above, substantiate the development of a professional army. As part of his military policies, Philip generated rules and procedures that increased the capacity of his army to travel quickly and over a long distance. Typical Greek armies marched moderate distances accompanied by a long and burdensome trains—and they expected to return home quickly.²⁸⁵ Since most enemies lived nearby, and the city-states were often equally matched, Greek states failed to develop the logistics that could provision troops over long

²⁸³ Griffith, "Philip as General," 59. See also Gabriel, *Philip II*, 82-83. See also Ellis, "Unification of Macedonia," 40.

²⁸⁴ Edward M. Anson, "The Hypaspists: Macedonia's Professional Citizen-Soldiers," *Historia* 34, no. 2 (1985): 246-248. Anson argues that Philip kept some soldiers "continually in his service" while others were likely paid mercenaries. See also Gabriel, *The Great Armies of Antiquity*, 185.

²⁸⁵ Gabriel, *Philip II*, 85.

periods of time or great distances, and therefore, that could sustain long-term military objectives.²⁸⁶

Philip eliminated the typical and onerous army train by forbidding soldiers to bring wives or other women, by limiting attendants (one per four cavalrymen and one per ten infantrymen), and by disallowing carts, except those used for siege machines, and by allowing only horses and mules, instead of oxen, for drawing such carts as were necessary.²⁸⁷ Philip must have developed these logistical guidelines in response to his need to campaign in Thrace, Paeonia, and Illyria, territories with poor roads and mountainous terrain, where carts would prohibit quick movement.²⁸⁸ Philip also required his soldiers to carry much of their own gear and a fifteen-days' ration—much more than Greek armies transported per soldier.²⁸⁹

These logistical changes reduced the number of people and animals needing food and water on the march by over half, and allowed the troops to make thirteen miles per day on campaign—or triple what an army could make using oxen and followed by a huge

²⁸⁶ Gabriel, *The Great Armies of Antiquity*, 32, and *Philip II*, 85.

²⁸⁷ Donald W. Engels, *Alexander the Great and the Logistics of the Macedonian Army* (Berkeley: 1978), 12-15, and 22-23. See also Gabriel, *Great Armies of Antiquity*, 188.

²⁸⁸ Engels, *Logistics of the Macedonian Army*, 23.

²⁸⁹ Polyaeus 4.2.10, as mentioned above. See James R. Ashely, *The Macedonian Empire: The Era of Warfare under Phillip II and Alexander the Great, 359-323 B.C.* (Jefferson: 1998), 81-82. Ashley notes that Philip prohibited all but the most necessary carts, and these were used “to carry some of the siege equipment and to provide ambulances for the wounded.” He further notes that Alexander’s adoption of Philip’s logistical practices enabled the Macedonian army regularly to “outmarch Greek, Persian, and Indian armies.” Engels, *Logistics of the Macedonian Army*, 21-24, where Engels explains that regular Greek armies with huge baggage trains, animals, and attendants could only carry enough rations for four days. The Macedonian army under Philip and Alexander III demonstrated a capacity to travel further and feed itself longer as a result of soldiers’ carrying their gear and food—as Alexander’s campaigns through deserts and other remote places attest. See also Gabriel, *Philip II*, 86-87, and *The Great Armies of Antiquity*, 185 and 189.

train of people.²⁹⁰ Another calculation suggests that horses could move the same load over three times as far as oxen, on half the food, and at twice the speed.²⁹¹ Since the acquisition, supply, and transportation of water often dictated an army's route, Philip's speed on the march would have given him more flexibility in the direction and destination of each day's march.²⁹²

Philip may have begun the practice, later adopted by the Romans, of constructing a fortified field camp each night while on the march—a practice that would have given the Macedonians the same psychological and tactical advantage in enemy territory later realized by the Romans.²⁹³ The ancient sources also hint that Philip included a medical corps to treat his wounded soldiers on campaign.²⁹⁴ These logistical changes allowed

²⁹⁰ Engels, *Logistics of the Macedonian Army*, 22-23. See also Gabriel, *Great Armies of Antiquity*, 188, and *Philip II*, 86-87. Even though he emphasizes the improvements that Philip made to his army's logistics, Engels has likely underestimated the speed and distances of which the Macedonian army was capable.

²⁹¹ Gabriel, *Great Armies of Antiquity*, 188-189, and *Philip II*, 86-87.

²⁹² Ashley, *The Macedonian Empire*, 80-81. Ashley notes that water's weight and viscosity make it hard to transport, and a soldier marching in hot temperatures may require as much as nine quarts of water per day.

²⁹³ Gabriel, *Philip II*, 86. Gabriel refers to Frontinus' suggestion that the Roman practice of establishing a camp has its source in Philip's logistical reforms. Frontinus 4.1.14. Gabriel, in *Great Armies of Antiquity*, 240-241, suggests that the Roman fortified field camp "provided the commander the advantage of choosing between offensive or defensive action if attacked, and provided a secure rallying point around which a routed legion or army could regroup."

²⁹⁴ The Elder Pliny reports in his *Natural History* (HN 7.37.124) that Philip had the doctor, Kritoboulos, on staff with him at Methone when Philip was wounded in the eye by an arrow. According to Pliny, Kritoboulos' skill not only saved Philip, but prevented facial deformity: *extracta Philippi regis oculo sagitta, et citra deformitatem oris curata orbitate luminis*. The reference is from Pliny, *Natural History, Books 3-7*, trans. H. Rackham (Cambridge: 1942), 588-589. See also J.H. Prag, "Reconstructing King Philip: The Nice Version," *AJA* 94, no. 2 (1990): 239-240. Other suggestions of a medical component to the Macedonian army during and after Philip's reign are found in Arr. *An.* 1.16.52-53, where Alexander is said to have visited each of the wounded while they were convalescing after the Battle of Granicus River; and also in Arr. *An.* 2.12.28, where

Philip to seek long-term, strategic objectives, rather than the limited objectives usually sought by Greek states.²⁹⁵ Philip's calculated changes to the logistics of the Macedonian army increased its professionalism, speed, and sustainability—making the Macedonian army “the fastest, lightest, and most mobile force in existence, capable of making lightning strikes against opponents.”²⁹⁶

Philip initiated the development of siege machinery and operations on a large scale for the first time in Europe, a move that Griffith describes as Philip's most influential “war apparatus.”²⁹⁷ E. W. Marsden hypothesizes that Philip established a “military department of mechanical engineering” or provided the impetus and resources for an existing department to develop new, effective technology.²⁹⁸ While the Assyrians and Persians had used “siege towers, battering rams, fire arrows, and the *testudo*,” Philip was the first Greek to incorporate the use of siege machinery fully into his tactics and strategies.²⁹⁹

The Greek city-states had employed limited siege equipment and techniques in the fifth century B.C., primarily contravallation, to force a population to starve or to encourage betrayal by factions within a besieged city-state.³⁰⁰ Greek city-states were reluctant to besiege cities, since sieges usually took a long time to bring to a successful end, and the outcome of a siege of a port city depended on the relative strength of the

Alexander makes visits to the wounded, presumably in a mobile hospital after the Battle at Issus.

²⁹⁵ Gabriel, *Great Armies of Antiquity*, 188.

²⁹⁶ Engels, *Logistics of the Macedonian Army*, 3.

²⁹⁷ Griffith, “Philip as General,” 61-62.

²⁹⁸ E.W. Marsden, “Macedonian Military Machinery and Its Designers Under Philip and Alexander,” *Thessaloniki 2* (1977): 212.

²⁹⁹ Griffith, “Philip as General,” 62. See also Gabriel, *Great Armies of Antiquity*, 189-190.

³⁰⁰ Ashley, *The Macedonian Empire*, 73. Ashley's analysis follows.

naval forces involved. Greek city-states, with the exception of the Greeks of Sicily and the Thebans under the leadership of Onomarchos, had not desired to destroy their enemies' cities, but had been content to loot the countryside or lure soldiers out of cities to fight pitched battles—so their siege machinery had remained underdeveloped.³⁰¹ Dionysus of Syracuse had developed towers, rams, and moles as well as arrow-firing catapults, allowing him to storm cities successfully by the early 4th century B.C.³⁰² Greek city-states had available to them, by Philip's time, these same siege capabilities but without the professional army or the long-term strategic goals to make their regular inclusion in warfare an aim or a necessity.³⁰³ The fact that the successful deployment of siege machinery required continual training and skill also discouraged its use among most Greek city-states, but fits well with Philip's practical and analytic approach to warfare.³⁰⁴

While Philip made use of available siege equipment, such as an early catapult and a composite laminated bow, he also engaged the services of the Thessalian, Polyeidus, who may have invented the torsion catapult, and created a permanent corps of engineers.³⁰⁵ Diodorus describes Philip's siege against Perinthus as one in which Philip

³⁰¹ Paul T. Keyser, "The Use of Artillery by Philip II and Alexander the Great," *AW* 25, no.1 (1994): 33. Keyser explains that Onomarchos' use of mobile artillery against Philip in 354/3 BCE is the "first attested use of field artillery" or "mobile artillery used against troops in the field." Keyser further argues that Philip's defeat against Onomarchos' likely motivated Philip to procure artillery technology and engineers—for siege warfare, apparently, rather than for use in the field. See also Gabriel, *Phillip of Macedonia*, 90-91.

³⁰² Ashley, *The Macedonian Empire*, 73.

³⁰³ Ashley, *The Macedonian Empire*, 74.

³⁰⁴ Keyser, "The Use of Artillery," 30.

³⁰⁵ Marsden, "Macedonian Military Machinery," 212, and Griffith, "Philip as General," 62. Marsden points out that Polyeidus was succeeded by Diades by 334, and then by Posidonius (220-222). Philip had initiated an institution that Alexander would retain and expand. See also William M. Murray, "The Development of a Naval Siege Unit," *Macedonian Legacies: Studies in Ancient Macedonian History and Culture in Honor of Eugene N. Borza*, ed. Timothy Howe and Jeanne Reames (Claremont: 2008): 34. Murray argues that Polyeidus helped Philip to build powerful torsion catapults "that relied on

assailed the walls of the city “in relays day after day.”³⁰⁶ He also describes the siege machinery in this operation as rowers of eight cubits high—higher than the walls of Perinthus---along with battering rams, varied catapults, missiles, and “siege engines.” The barrage apparently went on “both day and night” and “kept up a steady pressure against the besieged people.” Diodorus points out that Philip’s management of this siege brought his army to the attention of the Persian king who “viewed this power with alarm,” and subsequently sent aid to the support of the Perinthians.³⁰⁷

The Persians should have been alarmed by Philip’s growing power and ability to achieve his strategic aims. Philip’s lightning-quick success with siege warfare allowed him to take Amphipolis, Pydna, and Potidaia in just over twelve months, followed by successful sieges of Methone and of the important Pagasai and Olynthos.³⁰⁸ It is worth noting that some of these cities were besieged without artillery, some capitulated, some were betrayed, and two later cities, Perinthus and Byzantium, were able to withstand the Philip’s sieges because of their defensible coastal sites and Philip’s lack of a strong navy.³⁰⁹ Yet by the time that Philip besieged Olynthos, he could build siege engines and towers within three months and conduct a successful siege within one month.³¹⁰

twisted skeins of sinew-rope to increase the force with which a stone or arrow was launched.” Gabriel, *Great Armies of Antiquity*, 190-191, also points out that Philip was the first Greek general to use these machines consistently as part of his siege train, but that Alexander used the machines in Asia in more innovative ways. See also Gabriel, *Philip II*, 88. See also Keyser, “The Use of Artillery,” 28. Keyser suggests that the main contribution of Philip and Alexander’s siege engineers was an increase in the range and power of missile weapons.

³⁰⁶ Diod. 16.74.2-5.

³⁰⁷ Diod. 16.75.1-2.

³⁰⁸ Griffith, “Philip as General,” 62.

³⁰⁹ Keyser, “Use of Artillery,” 37.

³¹⁰ Ashley, *Macedonian Empire*, 74. Ashley compares Philip’s relative speed at the siege of Olynthos to the Athenians’ siege of Samos in 366-365 BC, which took ten months, and their siege of Thasos, which took over two years—and the Athenians were some of the

Although Philip had to abandon the sieges of Perinthos and Byzantium, his reputation in Greece and Asia as a besieger of cities served to establish him as a king and a general who had the skill and dedication to organize a massive war machine, to achieve terrifying victories against his enemies, and to accomplish astonishing successes for his Macedonians.³¹¹

While Philip was building his siege capacity, he also began to build and sustain a navy—the first such force in Macedonian history.³¹² Several military concerns probably compelled Philip to invest in a naval force. First, Philip could improve his logistical capacity with a navy. While a horse or mule can carry 200 pounds, and two animals pulling a cart can carry 1,000 pounds, a large merchant ship could carry 400 tons.³¹³ Second, Philip had also discovered in his sieges of Perinthos and Byzantium that their allies could resupply cities through their harbors, and that any successful siege of port cities would require naval supremacy and naval siege engines.³¹⁴ Finally, Philip had conquered and acquired control of numerous port cities including Amphipolis, Pydna,

better besiegers of this period due to their experience with siege warfare and their naval supremacy.

³¹¹ Griffith, “Philip as General,” 62. Ashley, *Macedonian Empire*, 74, notes that Philip’s dedication to siege operations bequeathed to Alexander III “the tools, skilled experts, and doctrine he would need to conduct successfully some of the most difficult sieges of antiquity.” See also Murray, “The Development of a Naval Siege Unit,” 33. Murray attributes Alexander’s siege advances to Philip’s permanent workshop of engineers.

³¹² Gabriel, *Philip II*, 94.

³¹³ Ashley, *Macedonian Empire*, 81.

³¹⁴ Murray, “Development of a Naval Siege,” 38. Murray postulates that Alexander’s ability to wage naval siege warfare started with Philip’s engineers working on this problem after the failed sieges of Perinthos and Byzantium. See also William M. Murray, *The Age of Titans: The Rise and Fall of the Great Hellenistic Navies* (Oxford: 2012), 85. Murray argues that Philip had a navy before the sieges of Perinthos and Byzantium, “but it never posed a serious threat until the summer of 340,” during these sieges, and did not represent a naval supremacy. Murray also argues that Philip’s naval inferiority cost him the victories in these sieges (87).

Methone (which may have ceased to be a port), and Alorus.³¹⁵ These cities not only had the potential to provide Philip with experienced sailors, but in the case of Amphipolis, shipyards and a naval tradition, and in the case of Pydna, a fortified harbor.³¹⁶ Philip also gained control of the ports of the Chalcidean Peninsula whose population would have included many experienced sailors and oarsmen.³¹⁷

Polyaenus mentions a small Macedonian fleet operating during the siege of Byzantium along the Thracian coast.³¹⁸ Although Polyaenus describes the fleet as “many ships,” Philip avoided naval battle during the siege by a ruse, suggesting that he was not prepared to meet the Athenian Chares who had only twenty triremes.³¹⁹ Philip used the ships that he possessed to harass merchant ships near Euboea, to capture an Athenian trireme on a sacred mission, and to raid the northern coastal regions of the Aegean.³²⁰ In one audacious raid in the Bosphorus, Philip managed to use his modest navy to capture the 230 Athenian merchant grain ships waiting for their military export of Athenian triremes.³²¹ These minor naval successes may have had some impact on Philip’s continuing investment in building his navy, but more likely Philip’s failure to take Perinthos and Byzantium as a result of his naval inferiority would have solidified his commitment to building up his navy.³²²

³¹⁵ Hammond, *Macedonian State*, 127-128.

³¹⁶ Hammond, *Macedonia State*, 128. Gabriel, *Philip II*, 94. Gabriel points out that Amphipolis also had a “proximity to fir and pine forests that were the sources of wood for ships.”

³¹⁷ Gabriel, *Philip II*, 95.

³¹⁸ Polyaen. 4.2.22.

³¹⁹ Hammond, *Macedonian State*, 128.

³²⁰ Hammond, *Macedonian State*, 128.

³²¹ Hammond, *Macedonian State*, 128. Murray, *The Age of Titans*, 86. Murray explains that the booty acquired from this seizure amounted to 700 talents “including hides and timber.”

³²² Murray, *The Age of Titans*, 90.

Philip also needed his navy as a “defensive force” that could protect his newly won coastline and prevent seaborne attacks into Macedonia.³²³ Philip’s policies related to logistics, siege, and naval capacity worked together to increase his real and perceived power among his potential enemies. The perception that Philip could arrive quickly and conduct an onslaught by land and disruption by sea would likely end any conflict, especially a siege, more quickly.³²⁴

³²³ Gabriel, *Philip II*, 95.

³²⁴ Murray, *The Age of Titans*, 89-90.

CHAPTER IV

THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE MACEDONIAN STATE

Part I: The Army as the Catalyst of State Construction³²⁵

Philip reinvented the Macedonian army so that he could reconstruct the Macedonian state. The army and its relationship to the monarchy had been long established in Macedonia. Philip built his state on this traditional institution by enlarging it substantially, enfranchising its members with land and wealth, and by investing its members in its ideas and success. Philip constructed his vision of a Macedonian state by rebuilding and unifying his army because “the army was the only known structure capable of embracing all Macedonian citizens.”³²⁶ Philip’s vision also included a military and social unity that would allow his state to counter external threats and to impose state security. Philip’s restructuring of the army was a restructuring of his society, and any study of the army becomes “a social history” that “gives us a picture of the reign as a whole.”³²⁷ Philip’s successful reorganization of the army allowed him to secure his realm, to add vast land and resources to his state, and subsequently to

³²⁵ Ellis, “Dynamics of Fourth-Century Imperialism,” 105. Ellis calls Philip’s Macedonian army “the catalyst of national unity.”

³²⁶ Ellis, “Dynamics of Fourth-Century Imperialism,” 108, and 103-104. Ellis argues that Philip had social and political reasons to continue to find military objectives for his army. His suggestion is that internal considerations drove much of Philip’s external or foreign policy.

³²⁷ Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia*, 407.

distribute newly won king's land and resources to his *hetairoi* and *pezhetairoi*. Philip's military success and the ability that it gave him to establish the territorial integrity of Macedonia, to exploit his country's resources, and to create a shared cultural experience among his subjects allowed him to assert on an unprecedented scale the role of the Macedonian monarch to rule through patronage."³²⁸

Philip distributed his "spear-won" land and resources to strengthen the institution of the Macedonian monarch, to bind his subjects securely to this institution, and to unify his state.³²⁹ By his grants of land to cavalymen and infantrymen, Philip increased the holdings of his *hetairoi*, and he created the economic and social class from which he could levy his *pezhetairoi*.³³⁰ Diodorus preserves the only literary record of Philip's land distribution to Macedonian citizens. He claims that, after Philip razed the city of Methone, he "distributed its territory among the Macedonians."³³¹ Griffith argues that Diodorus' record indicates "a distribution *viritim*" to a significant number of Macedonians who may each have received a modest holding.³³² After Philip had captured Crenides, Diodorus records that Philip increased the size of the city "with a large number of inhabitants," a suggestion that Philip may have given land to Macedonians here as well.³³³ These two examples suggest that Philip established a regular practice for the distribution of land to regular Macedonian citizens when he had land to give and when it suited his political and military aims.

³²⁸ Edward M. Anson, "Philip II and the Transformation of Macedonia: A Reappraisal," in *Macedonian Legacies: Studies in Ancient Macedonian History and Culture in Honor of Eugene N. Borza*, ed. Timothy Howe and Jeanne Reames (Claremont: 2008), 17.

³²⁹ Anson, "Philip II and the Transformation of Macedonia," 17.

³³⁰ Anson, "Philip II and the Transformation of Macedonia," 17.

³³¹ Diod. 16.34.5. See also Anson, "Philip II and the Transformation of Macedonia," 21.

³³² Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia*, 361-362. N.G.L. Hammond concurs in "The King and the Land in Macedonia," *CQ* n.s. 38, no. 2 (1988): 386.

³³³ Diod. 16.8.6.

Other evidence points to Philip's gifts of land to Macedonians and the incorporation of non-Macedonians into the state by the patronage of the king. Arrian mentions Alexander III's remission of taxes to the parents and families of his soldiers who had died on his campaigns, an indication that the families of common soldiers held "royal land" as original gifts from Philip.³³⁴ Theopompus suggests that Philip gave many of his *hetairoi* vast land grants; these grants would account for the number of cavalrymen coming from formerly "Greek" cities conquered by Philip, such as Amphipolis, as mentioned by Arrian in his list of Alexander's eight cavalry squadrons.³³⁵ Much of the land that Philip gave to cavalrymen probably included big estates outside the city proper in its vast surrounding territory. Philip would have incorporated some of the original Greeks from Amphipolis into the town and the surrounding areas for economic and political reasons. An inscription found in the city of Kalindoia suggests that Alexander, following Philip's precedent, established a "Macedonian city" which had attached to it "the lands of three villages."³³⁶ Arrian also names "Macedonians from Pydna," another city conquered by Philip and whose land, it seems, was distributed to Macedonians along with non-Macedonians.³³⁷ Three specific cases in which Philip granted land survive in a

³³⁴ Arr. *An.* 7.10. See Anson, "Philip II and the Transformation of Macedonia," 22-23. See also M. B. Hatzopoulos, *Macedonian Institutions under the Kings: A Historical and Epigraphic Study* (Athens: 1996), 437.

³³⁵ Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia*, 352-353, and note 5. Arr. *An.* 1.2.5 and 3.11.8. Griffith's argument about the estates given to *hetairoi* hypothesizes that much of the land lay between Amphipolis and Crenides-Philippi since the latter was conquered shortly after Amphipolis was captured. Griffith's arguments follow.

³³⁶ Hammond, "The King and the Land in Macedonia," 387. The inscription specifically indicates that Kalindoia was a Macedonian city from its foundation, "a city of Macedonians," and included a vast attached territory to its district. Hammond also notes that Archelaus had set the precedent for establishing cities in strategic places, such as a city whose name is unknown by the Iron Gates of the Axios.

³³⁷ Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia*, 356-357, and note 3. Griffith cites Arr. *Ind.* 18.5. and Curt. 5.1.43 where Curtius names an Agathon "from Pydna."

single inscription—unusual because these sorts of transactions would not generally have been inscribed on stone—and confirm that Philip gave land to Macedonians in the Chalcidean region.³³⁸ The records of both Arrian and Curtius indicate that Alexander’s cavalry and infantry units were levied on the basis of territories or districts and included all of Macedonia and newly conquered lands.³³⁹ Such evidence confirms Philip’s political and military patronage and suggests the social and economic impact of his practices.

Alexander’s famous speech at Opis may reflect the social effect of Philip’s army reforms and land grants:

Philip found you a tribe of impoverished vagabonds, most of you dressed in skins, feeding a few sheep on the hills and fighting, feebly enough, to keep them from your neighbors—Thracians and Triballians and Illyrians. He gave you cloaks to wear instead of skins; he brought you down from the hills into the plains; he taught you to fight on equal terms with the enemy on your borders, till you knew that your safety lay not, as once, in your mountain strongholds, but in your own valor. He made you city-dwellers; he brought you law; he civilized you.³⁴⁰

Arrian’s rendition of Alexander’s speech hints at Philip’s settlement on land of a significant number of pastoral peoples and their relocation into towns or administrative districts. Estimates put the number of soldiers to whom Philip gave land at one-tenth to one-fourth of those eligible for military service (100,000-250,000), and the average amount of land given between 25 and 31.5 acres.³⁴¹ The number of soldiers on duty at any one time would have been only a part of the full levy that Philip could have

³³⁸ Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia*, 366-367, and note 5 (366).

³³⁹ Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia*, 412-413. See especially Arr. *An.* 1.16.51-52. And 3.16.11. See also Curt. 5.2.6.

³⁴⁰ Arr., *An.* 7.9. This speech is probably a construction of Arrian’s but may be based on contemporary historical sources no longer extant.

³⁴¹ Anson, “Philip II and the Transformation of Macedonia,” 25 and note 71. Anson’s estimates at 250,000 may be high as the normal formula for the estimation of eligible field troops would be 100,000 for a population of 1 million.

mobilized, so it is likely that his land grants affected the majority of Macedonian families during his reign—as well as non-Macedonians living within his territories.³⁴² Newly invested landowners would have had the desire to protect the king and the institution of the monarch as they now had ownership in the state.³⁴³ The cavalrymen or *hetairoi*, who were already large landowners, were given additional lands, but in areas removed from their original cantons or aristocratic strongholds.³⁴⁴ Philip's mobile field army of 24,000 infantry and 3,300 cavalry by the end of his reign provides evidence of the large scale social and economic changes created by the enfranchisement of dependent and rural peoples into Philip's Macedonian state.³⁴⁵ Such grants of land likely accompanied promotion in the army's ranks.³⁴⁶ Philip's grants of land to regular Macedonians, the result of both his need for an army and of his army's success at land acquisition, constituted a "social and psychological" act that bound Philip's Macedonians to the "monarch who had given them their land and who had defended their possession of it, but also to the institution of monarchy itself."³⁴⁷

Part II: The Practice of Decantation

Philip fostered territorial and social unity in Macedonia by a conscious method involving the arrangement, assignment, division, and placement of people within his state. He deliberately practiced decantation, or the planned movement of people for

³⁴² Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia*, 219.

³⁴³ Anson, "Philip II and the Transformation of Macedonia," 25.

³⁴⁴ I have mentioned above the cities of Amphipolis and Pydna where it is likely that *hetairoi* were given large land grants. See also Anson, "Philip II and the Transformation of Macedonia," 21.

³⁴⁵ Anson, "Philip II and the Transformation of Macedonia," 18-19.

³⁴⁶ Ellis, "Dynamics of Fourth-Century Imperialism," 106.

³⁴⁷ Anson, "Philip II and the Transformation of Macedonia," 18.

military, social, economic, and political purposes.³⁴⁸ The major objectives of such action in a divided Macedonia were the breaking up of “hostile concentrations” of people by relocating them or by “settling other groups in the midst of them; the creation of defensive cities at strategic locations and on the Macedonian plain; the guarding of the borders; and the development of deserted or underdeveloped areas.”³⁴⁹ Philip acted on precedents set by Greek states and by Archelaus when he set out to create cities and districts that had been established ostensibly for military purposes, but clearly had political, economic, and social aims as well.³⁵⁰

Philip’s movement and settlement of peoples was certainly military in that he created defensible cities on the Macedonian plains and in strategic mountain passes.³⁵¹ He established a number of garrisons along the Pindus Mountain Ridges and north to discourage the Illyrians, but he established towns as well including Lynkestis, Astraea, Dobera, and Kellion.³⁵² On the eastern frontier, after taking the Crenides, Philip refounded Oesyne, later known as Emathia after people from an Upper Macedonian canton; and another, Eordaia, in Mygdonia, also named after a canton.³⁵³ According to a fragment of Theopompos, Philip also founded at a point of strategic importance the Thracian town of Peneopolis, a settlement that may have included disenfranchised

³⁴⁸ Ellis, “Population Transplants,” 9-17.

³⁴⁹ Adams, “Philip II and the Thracian Frontier,” 83. Ellis, “The Unification of Macedonia,” 42. See also J.R. Ellis, “Population Transplants,” 15-16.

³⁵⁰ Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia*, 660. See also Ellis, “Population Transplants,” 17 and note 4. Ellis points out Archelaus’ decantation of the Pydnaians to a new location, his movement of the capital from Aegae to Pella, both suggestive of creating a people dependent on his patronage.

³⁵¹ Adams, “Frontier Policy,” 284.

³⁵² Adams, “Frontier Policy,” 284. While the dates of the foundations are disputed, Adams significantly points out that the process was on-going

³⁵³ Adams, “Frontier Policy,” 287.

mercenaries or criminals.³⁵⁴ Philip established Gonnoi near the Pass of Tempe in Thessaly, clearly a strategic site where Philip had brought together disparate peoples into defensible settlements.³⁵⁵ Following Philip's precedent of establishing new, strategic cities, and as part of a complex campaign involving Philip's generals Antipater and Parmenio, Alexander III established Alexandropolis along Philip's northern frontier while Alexander was regent around 340 B.C.³⁵⁶

In moving people within his realm, Philip had the specific objective of weakening local ties that had created disunity in the Macedonian state and mixing his various peoples to create new loyalties. Archaeological evidence demonstrates that, after Philip had destroyed Olynthus and Stageira, he resettled the latter with a combination of peoples including Macedonians, while the valley of Anthemous received Macedonian settlers after Philip's conquest of the Chalcidice.³⁵⁷ Based on the evidence of the place names of settlements and cities, Philip seems to have taken people from certain cantons or districts and settled them elsewhere—sometimes because their expertise made them especially suited for settlement in the new area, but also because he wanted them to live at a distance from their traditional, aristocratic strongholds.³⁵⁸ Philip addressed the disunity of the Macedonian state by putting loyal Macedonians, who would have a real stake in

³⁵⁴ Ellis, "Population Transplants," 12-13 and note 4. F 110 (Jacoby). See also Ellis, "Unification of Macedonia," 45.

³⁵⁵ Ellis, "Unification of Macedonia," 44-45.

³⁵⁶ Ellis, "Unification of Macedonia," 45.

³⁵⁷ B. Tsigarida, "Chalcidice," in *Brill's Companion to Ancient Macedon: Studies in the Archaeology and History of Macedon, 650 BC-300 AD*, ed. Robin J. Lane Fox (Leiden: 2011), 153-154.

³⁵⁸ Adams, "Frontier Policy," 286, mentions the people from Eordaia being settled around Lake Begoritis for their expertise in agriculture and irrigation.

defending their lands against barbarians, on the frontier borders, and by settling some of the least reliable groups closer to the Macedonian homeland.³⁵⁹

As Philip expanded into Thrace, he implemented a policy of conquest and incorporation of conquered lands by establishing settlements in these areas as a part of a true frontier policy.³⁶⁰ Adams has argued that Philip organized his conquered territories on firm military, agricultural, and demographic bases before beginning to exploit the natural resources of the area, including the mines.³⁶¹ These settlements included Philippi, Beroia, Emathia, and Eordaia—significantly, these last cities are all names of cantons from Upper Macedonia, an area traditionally hostile to the Argead monarchy.³⁶² Philip set a precedent with Philippi by naming the city after himself, the first city in the Greek world named after its founder, an indication that he intended the city and its settlement to draw attention.³⁶³ An inscription associated with Philippi suggests that the city, formerly Crenides, owned its original land and whatever surrounding territories Philip had granted it, and that the Thracians living in the vicinity “were allowed only to cultivate the land and gather its produce.”³⁶⁴ The result of Philip’s settlements was the establishment of a deep frontier zone between Macedonia and its one-time enemies from east to west, and south toward the coastal plain.³⁶⁵ With these careful policies, Philip managed to avoid deracinating the Macedonian plain of people by relocating frontier

³⁵⁹ Ellis, “Population Transplants,” 16.

³⁶⁰ Adams, “Philip II and the Thracian Frontier,” 81. Also see Adams, “Frontier Policy,” 287.

³⁶¹ Adams, “Frontier Policy,” 287-288.

³⁶² Ellis, “Population Transplants, 12. Ellis explains that the Upper Cantons of Macedonia, such as Orestis and Lynkos, resented central authority, “when they themselves were not exercising it.”

³⁶³ Borza, *In the Shadow of Olympus*, 214-215.

³⁶⁴ Hammond, “The King and the Land in Macedonia,” 285.

³⁶⁵ Adams, “Frontier Policy,” 288.

peoples into that region, as when he relocated 10,000 Illyrians to the lowlands or when he relocated 20,000 Scythian women and boys into Macedonia, and to relocate loyal Macedonians to important economic and political frontier areas.³⁶⁶

On both the west and northwest borders as well as on the eastern borders, long-time settlements already contained a mixture of peoples.³⁶⁷ This situation was particularly true on the Thracian frontier and had been a reality experienced by the Greek frontier cities for centuries.³⁶⁸ The Greek experience had shown that the only successful settlements on these frontiers were those that contained ethnically diverse settlers who had established economic interaction with the interior and worked together for economic prosperity.³⁶⁹ Philip recognized the need to use the movement of people to break old ties that had led to disunity and to build new ties of unity—and he accomplished these dual goals with his frontier policy.³⁷⁰ He utilized a method of “horizontal” division within his re-foundations, much as he had within the army by mixing diverse groups of people to build new administrative and military divisions.

As a Macedonian monarch, Philip could employ a policy of incorporating a variety of ethnicities in cities and settlements because a Macedonian citizen was defined by his relationship to the king as one holding land in exchange for military service, rather than strictly as a member of an ethnic or kinship group, as was common among the Greeks. “The Macedonian definition of citizenship was political rather than solely

³⁶⁶ Adams, “Frontier Policy,” 285. Polyaeus mentions these 10,000 Illyrians of the Sarnusii who were “taken bound into Macedonia.” Polyaeus. 4.2.12. See also Just. 9.2.15-16.

³⁶⁷ Ellis, “Population Transplants,” 15. This situation arose as a result of the lack of natural borders and the history of changing territorial lines among the Macedonians, Illyrians, Paionians, Thracians, and others. Adams, “Frontier Policy,” 285.

³⁶⁸ Adams, “City Foundations,” 3.

³⁶⁹ Adams, “City Foundations,” 7.

³⁷⁰ Adams, “Frontier Policy,” 285-291. Adams arguments and suggestions follow.

ethnic, and allowed for acculturation and absorption of non-Macedonic groups.”³⁷¹ Thus, the *symmiktous katoikisas*, or mixed population of Alexandropolis, is a reflection of Philip’s frontier policy as its foundation occurred while Philip was still king.³⁷²

How well Philip’s policies worked in establishing social and political unity along the frontier may be judged from an inscription that records a property dispute between some Thracians and the city of Philippi over reclaimed marshlands.³⁷³ The inscription records Alexander’s confirmation of Philip’s original decision concerning the rights of use by certain Thracians over specific lands near Philippi. As Adams explains, the significance of this fragment is that the process of settling this dispute appears to be in accordance with a normal legal structure; two important Macedonians are sent to handle this frontier dispute; Philip is the originator of the ruling that is confirmed by Alexander; A non-Macedonian people, Thracians have been given the protection of Macedonian law in their appeal and in the decision; and most significantly, the whole affair is settled by “royal ruling, not force of arms.” The Thracians seek a confirmation of Philip’s original decision because they expect to be heard by the Macedonian officials, to be treated fairly by the Macedonian legal structure, and to gain redress of their grievances. The point is that Philip’s frontier policy has successfully acculturated and incorporated into the administration, law, and concept of state both the diverse peoples settled at Philippi and the Thracians living nearby and cultivating the land.

³⁷¹ Adams, “Thracian Frontier,” 82. Adams cites C.F. Edson, “Early Macedonia,” *Archaia Makedonia I* (Thessaloniki 1970) 30-31 where this definition of citizenship is elaborated.

³⁷² Adams, “Frontier Policy,” 285.

³⁷³ Hammond, “The King and the Land in Macedonia,” 382-386. This inscription has been mentioned above. See also Adams, *Thracian Frontier*,” 86-87. What follows is Adams’ analysis.

Justin described Philip's measures in the movement of peoples and recognized the specific objectives that he sought to achieve. Justin compared Philip to a shepherd who moves his flocks from winter to summer pastures and back again: "he now capriciously transplanted whole peoples and cities as he felt regions needed to be populated and depopulated."³⁷⁴ Justin explained the reasons for Philip's policies of decantation as several: first, to create a bulwark against his enemies; second, to establish settlements on the remote frontiers; and finally, to supplement the population of his cities.³⁷⁵ Philip's policies have clear objectives to Justin, who explained them as Philip's efforts to make "one kingdom and one people from large numbers of different clans and tribes."³⁷⁶ Justin's record supports specific details in Arrian's rendition of Alexander's speech at Opis, mentioned above, in which Philip is given credit for bringing people "down from the hills," and making them "city-dwellers" and "civilized."³⁷⁷ Philip's policies of settlement and decantation enabled him to do what Alexander I and Archelaus had been unable to do: to secure, defend, and incorporate into Macedonia's political, social, and economic structure his northern, eastern, and western frontiers.³⁷⁸

Part III: Development of Economy and Natural Resources

Philip's conquests and settlements repositioned Macedonia for the exploitation of its natural resources. Griffith describes Philip's internal initiatives related to the

³⁷⁴ Justin 8.5.7. Also Ellis, "Population Transplants," 13 where Ellis suggests that we do not know the exact decantation to which Justin refers in this passage. I would like to suggest that Justin is describing a general practice of Philip's and its positive and negative effects on populations.

³⁷⁵ Justin 8.6.1.

³⁷⁶ Justin 8.6.2.

³⁷⁷ Arrian 7.9.

³⁷⁸ Borza, *In the Shadow of Olympus*, 212-213.

development of his economic resources as a “social and economic” revolution.³⁷⁹

Philip’s need to move his troops quickly to any threatened area necessitated the extension of the system of roads begun by Archelaus and the improvement of existing roads. The compelling evidence for a system of roads under Philip is the security that Macedonia enjoyed during Philip’s reign and for some time after. If we are to believe Arrian regarding the change from pastoralism to agriculture, then Philip drained swamps along the coastal plains that had been formerly used for pasture, cut down trees in the fenlands, and drained these fenlands for agricultural purposes.³⁸⁰ Theophrastus preserves evidence that the area of Philippi had been a swampy forest when the Thracians controlled it, but when Theophrastus later visited the area after Philip had implemented practices that encouraged economic growth, the land been drained and brought under cultivation.³⁸¹

Philip undoubtedly drained and developed other areas of his realm that were subject to flooding, such as the coastal plain of the Thermaic Gulf, in order to bring such lands under cultivation in order to feed his expanding state. Griffith suggests that Philip’s observations while he was a hostage in Thebes had shown him huge tracts of maintained agricultural lands in the Boeotian plains. Similarly, Philip would have instigated the draining of lands in Upper Macedonian in the basin of the upper Erigon in an effort to improve the output of agricultural production for newly settled

³⁷⁹ Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia*, 658-59. What immediately follows is Griffith’s analysis of Philip’s improvements to Macedonia’s infrastructure.

³⁸⁰ Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia*, 659. Here Griffith draws a comparison between the relatively swift changes that occurred in this same direction in Albania from 1945 to 1970 and the swift changes that occurred under Philip in Macedonia.

³⁸¹ Theophrastus, *CP* 5.14.5 as referenced in Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia*, 659. Griffith notes that Theophrastus would have visited Philippi around 336 B.C., twenty years after Philip had taken over the plain. His discussion of the draining of the Thermaic Gulf follows.

Macedonians.³⁸² These economic initiatives complemented Philip's gifts of land for the economic and subsequent social and political enfranchisement of Philip's subjects.

Philip combined the provision of newly created cultivable lands with stockbreeding, viticulture, and arboriculture.³⁸³ Justin records that Philip brought 20,000 thoroughbred mares into Macedonia from Scythia and as a result of his success against the Scythians, which he undoubtedly determined to breed with stallions from Macedonia.³⁸⁴ The areas of Crestonia, Bisaltia, and Amphipolis produced abundant harvests of figs, grapes, and olives during Philip's reign because of the mildness of the spring season in these areas.³⁸⁵ Arrian suggests that Philip took over the towns with the best locations on the coast and encouraged work in his mines—a suggestion of his intent to export and import goods and to increase his currency and wealth in precious metals.³⁸⁶

As Philip cut down timber to make lands available for agriculture, he exported this timber, brought the newly cleared land under cultivation, and enabled Macedonia to become self-sufficient in foods and to generate a surplus for export.³⁸⁷ While scholars have questioned whether or not Philip's efforts to increase agriculture within his realm would have had any substantial effect on the prosperity of the people within his state during his lifetime, such efforts, at the very least, gave Philip new, arable lands on which

³⁸² Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia*, 661. Griffith explains that Philip would have settled Macedonians with local people at towns near the frontier or at strategic military points.

³⁸³ Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia*, 660.

³⁸⁴ Just. 9.2.15-16.

³⁸⁵ This information is preserved on a Greek fragment (*FGrH* 115 F 230) referenced by Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia*, 660.

³⁸⁶ Arr. *An.* 7.9.3. See also Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia*, 662.

³⁸⁷ Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia*, 662. See also E. Borza, *In the Shadow of Olympus*, 216-217.

to settle his veterans and on which to raise horses.³⁸⁸ Philip's conquests brought Macedonia an enormous increase in land and people, and along with Philip's policies of draining swamps and flooded areas, clearing land of timber, and encouraging the agricultural use of land, Philip's Macedonia must have produced, even in a handful of years, an increase in the output of food, livestock, and products for export.

Although Philip had likely been minting silver coins in Pella since his accession, the ancient sources report that Philip began exploiting the gold and silver mines in the Pangaion region shortly after his establishment of Philippoi in 357/6 B.C., and in the region of the Pindus range, and that these mines provided Philip with an income of more than a thousand talents.³⁸⁹ Philip established a new, Greek practice for minting coins, and one that would influence the practice of kings in the Hellenistic period: he "conceived the innovative idea of multiple mints within a single state," at Pella and Amphipolis.³⁹⁰ He adopted the Attic standard for his gold coins and a "Thraco-Macedonian" standard for his silver coins, suggesting that he was carrying on the established practice in Macedonia of the production of a specific type of coin to encourage foreign exchange, and another type to encourage domestic exchange.³⁹¹ Philip

³⁸⁸ Borza, *In the Shadow of Olympus*, 216. See Hugo Montgomery, "The Economic Revolution of Philip II—Myth or Reality," *Symbolae Osloenses* 60 (1985): 37-47, for a contrasting view of Macedonia's economic prosperity under Philip.

³⁸⁹ Diod. 16.8.6-7. Diodorus explains that Philip had gained so much money from his mines that he held an unusually superior position in his realm. See Georges le Rider, "The Coinage of Philip and the Pangaion Mines," in *Philip of Macedon*, ed. Miltiades B. Hatzopoulos and Louisa D. Loukopolos (Athens: 2006), 48 and 52. Le Rider argues, however, that Philip did not mint gold coins until 345-342 B.C. See also, Adams, "Thracian Frontier," 83.

³⁹⁰ Kremydi, "Coinage and Finance," 165.

³⁹¹ Kremydi, "Coinage and Finance," 165 and 170. Kremydi points out that Alexander will apply the Attic standard to silver coins as well in order to provide a uniform currency for his empire (167).

produced silver coins in much greater quantities than his gold coins, and may have begun producing gold coins late in his reign.³⁹² Even so, Philip's gold coins were "the first important gold coinage of the Greek world," and under Alexander, they would "replace the Persian daric on the international market."³⁹³ In fact, these *Philippeioi* became an extremely popular form of exchange both in Greece and in the Near East as they were minted on a standard to match the Daric and so to compete directly with it.³⁹⁴

Montgomery has argued that Philip's most important economic innovation was the introduction of these gold coins primarily because of the prestige associated with their use and with the king who struck them.³⁹⁵ Perhaps the most substantive numismatic evidence from Philip's reign is simply how many coins he produced compared to his predecessors.³⁹⁶ The wealth of coins reflects the success of Philip's exploitation of his resources and his deliberate policies to control and encourage internal and external exchange.

Part IV: Administration of the Cities

The evidence from Arrian's lists of Alexander's trierarchs has indicated that Macedonia was organized by districts or cities; and each "citizen," regardless of his ethnicity, was referred to as a "Macedonian" from a certain city or district of residence.³⁹⁷ All Macedonian citizens were dually registered by their designation as *Macedones* and by their tribal district or town. The towns described the administrative units in the

³⁹² Le Rider, "The Coinage of Philip and the Pangaion Mines," 49-50.

³⁹³ Kremydi, "Coinage and Finance," 166.

³⁹⁴ Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia*, 662-663.

³⁹⁵ Hugo Montgomery, "The Economic Revolution of Philip II---Myth or Reality," *Symbolae Osloenses* 60 (1985) 44-45.

³⁹⁶ Kremydi, "Coinage and Finance," 165.

³⁹⁷ Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia*, 648-50. Griffith's analysis follows.

Macedonian coastal plain and the districts described the administrative units inland and upland. Recent epigraphic evidence has shed light on Philip's general organization of Macedonia, his internal administrative structure, and his relationship with both the Macedonian cities of his realm and those cities with Greek origins.³⁹⁸ Hatzopoulos has argued that Philip II fostered "the aspiration to civic autonomy" that already characterized many Macedonian cities by the time of his reign and was typical of traditional Greek cities; but he sought to "integrate" and "domesticate" the cities within Macedonia for his own purposes.³⁹⁹ The traditional practice within cities of electing city officials would have become a formality, and Philip alone would have decided foreign policy, state finances, and other central decisions. The cities had the right to grant *proxenia* and other such honors to foreigners, and Philip seemed content to allow the continuance and fostering of most local traditions and structures, as long as they did not challenge his central authority.⁴⁰⁰ And it is clear from Philip's own efforts at establishing settlements that he "favored urbanization," because of the unity, organization, and productivity that urbanization engendered.⁴⁰¹

Philip is the likely author of the practice by which all the districts or territorial units within Macedonia received a designation equivalent to that of a *polis*, and their

³⁹⁸ M.B. Hatzopoulos presents the evidence throughout *Macedonian Institutions under the Kings*, and in "The Cities," in *Brill's Companion to Ancient Macedon: Studies in the Archaeology and History of Macedon, 650 BC-300 AD*, ed. Robin J. Lane Fox (Leiden: 2011), 235-241.

³⁹⁹ Hatzopoulos, *Macedonian Institutions under the Kings*, 481. See also Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia*, 648-650

⁴⁰⁰ Hatzopoulos, *Macedonian Institutions under the Kings*, 481-483. What follows is Hatzopoulos' analysis from a small but important body of epigraphic material dating from Alexander III's reign and on, but indicative of administrative structures established during Philip's reign since they are found existing and fully established at the beginning of Alexander's reign.

⁴⁰¹ See the above sections on Philip's settlements and decantations. Hatzopoulos, *Macedonian Institutions under the Kings*, 482.

councils were equated with the *boulai* of city-states. Philip even granted some of the Greek city-states within his realm, primarily those in the southern Chalcidian peninsula, an allied status—stripped, of course, of any central state authority. A similar situation likely existed in the less-urbanized “districts” of Macedonia where tribal states were part of Philip’s larger *koinon* but continued to administer their local affairs and to cultivate an identity—one that was becoming a national identity alongside a local identity.⁴⁰²

Philip imposed a uniform calendar on his realm, but allowed city-states to continue to refer to their local authorities in their own traditional way, with titles such as *tagoi* (commander or ruler), *archontes* (magistrate, ruler), and *dikastai* (judges). The chief magistrates of the cities came to be called *epistates* (prefects) in all the cities of Macedonia during Philip’s reign, and this originally Chalcidian term became common in cities founded in Asia by Alexander. Evidence also suggests that, while a common Macedonian law prevailed throughout Philip’s kingdom, this fact “did not prevent the several cities from continuing to vote their own particular laws” that governed local traditions and customs.⁴⁰³ Perhaps because of the wealth of his royal land and harbor duties, Philip respected the “financial autonomy of the cities of Macedonia,” in much the same way as he had operated relative to the cities in Thessaly.⁴⁰⁴ In spite of the fact that Philip’s unification of his state had stripped the city-states of any real autonomy, Philip had apparently allowed them to retain enough cultural and local independence to be recognized internationally and, therefore, to be allowed to receive sacred envoys from

⁴⁰² Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia*, 650-651.

⁴⁰³ Hatzopoulos, *Macedonian Institutions under the Kings*, 483.

⁴⁰⁴ Hatzopoulos, *Macedonian Institutions under the Kings*, 483-484. Hatzopoulos compares the administrative districts of Thessaly, the *tetrads* that coexisted with *poleis* as artificial *ethne* but useful administrative districts, to the districts and cities of Macedonia that were used concurrently as recruitment units.

Panhellenic sanctuaries.⁴⁰⁵ From 360-323 B.C.—spanning Philip’s entire reign and beyond—Macedonian cities had the right, and perhaps, even the obligation to send delegates to religious festivals “as autonomous political units within the kingdom.”⁴⁰⁶

The evidence from inscriptions suggests that Philip II imposed an administrative unity on Macedonia in which he designated various areas of the kingdom in civic units, even when this designation was artificial in relation to districts and less urbanized areas, allowed local civic institutions to thrive, and gave civic units relative financial autonomy.⁴⁰⁷

Philip’s practice seems to have been to control closely what needed to be controlled to preserve the integrity of his state, but to have established a loose hegemony over those areas that could foster local unity among the disparate peoples that he had settled in the various regions of his realm.

Part V: The Ideology of State

Philip’s construction of the Macedonian state may not have occurred without a cultivation of the Macedonian ideology that upheld the legitimacy of Macedonian

⁴⁰⁵ Hatzopoulos, “The Cities,” 239. Hatzopoulos refers to the lists of the *theorodokoi*, documents that record the names of the persons entrusted to receive the *theoroi* as they visited specific cities. See also Ch. Koukouli-Chrysanthaki, “Amphipolis,” in *Brill’s Companion to Ancient Macedon: Studies in the Archaeology and History of Macedon, 650 BC-300 AD*, ed. Robin J. Lane Fox (Leiden: 2011), 417, where the argument is made that Amphipolis continued to issue bronze coins after its surrender to Philip, but Philip seemed to control the choice of *epistates* for subsequent years, as well as the eponymous archon—and the city adopted the Macedonian calendar.

⁴⁰⁶ Hatzopoulos, “The Cities,” 239.

⁴⁰⁷ Hatzopoulos, “The Cities,” 239-240. Hatzopoulos explains that his findings are based on the archaeological findings of the last three decades that have produced around thirty civic laws and decrees along with twenty additional official or semi-official documents coming from cities all across Macedonia and dating from the 4th to the 2nd centuries B.C.

monarchy—that of the heroic nature and the divine lineage of the king.⁴⁰⁸ From the moment of Philip’s accession, he sought to legitimize his position ideologically. Philip sought to identify himself with the Panhellenic games. His chariots claimed victory at the Olympics of 356 B.C., and he presided twice over the Pythian games because of his military victories and his political position in Greece subsequent to the battle of Chaeronea.⁴⁰⁹ While in this position of strength, Philip constructed a Philippeion in the sacred area of Olympia into which he placed statues of himself, his parents, his wife, Olympias, and his son, Alexander, demonstrating his family’s association with heroic honors and the divine festival of Zeus.⁴¹⁰ This building stood near the heart of the sanctuary so that visitors to Olympia would have seen his family in this central, religious position.⁴¹¹ Philip’s involvement in the Sacred Wars enabled him to become Apollo’s savior and to acquire delegates in the sacred priesthood of the sanctuary, other religious titles and honors, and the placement of a gold statue of himself within the Pythian sanctuary.⁴¹²

Hammond has argued that heroic honors have a long history in Macedonia with their origins in the Homeric poems, wherein kings and war heroes are buried with riches

⁴⁰⁸ N.G.L. Hammond, “Heroic and Divine Honors in Macedonia before the Successors,” *AW* 30, no. 2 (1999): 104ff.

⁴⁰⁹ Adams, “Sport and Ethnicity in Macedonia,” 60-61. Adams points out that Philip had his victory at Olympic engraved on his coins—an obvious promotion of his prowess.

⁴¹⁰ Adams, “Sport and Ethnicity in Macedonia,” 61. Pierre Leveque, “Philip’s Personality,” in *Philip of Macedon*, ed. Miltiades B. Hatzopoulos and Louisa D. Loukopoulos (Athens:2006), 182. Leveque calls this construction and the states “a monument of a hero cult.”

⁴¹¹ S.A. Paspalas, “Classical Art,” in *Brill’s Companion to Ancient Macedon: Studies in the Archaeology and History of Macedon, 650 BC-300 AD*, ed. Robin J. Lane Fox (Leiden: 2011), 189.

⁴¹² Leveque, “Philip’s Personality,” 182.

and their place of burial covered with a large, circular mound.”⁴¹³ Such rituals characterized the burials of Macedonian kings and their families from 370 B.C. on, at least, and continued among the Macedonians under Alexander III in Asia, even to the point of “magnificent tombs and a huge memorial, a festival of athletics and art, shrines and sacrifices . . . a continuing use of his name . . . and likenesses in ivory and gold.”⁴¹⁴ The Macedonians had a long-standing belief that past kings could influence the present and a long-standing tradition of worshipping deceased kings by offering libations, sacrifices, and hymns atop the tumulus of the king.⁴¹⁵ No doubt, Philip expected as much for himself, and maybe more as a result of his remarkable accomplishments. Perhaps such thoughts were what motivated Philip when he had a statue of himself paraded with the Olympians in the theater at Aegae. Divine honors had a long history in Macedonia in association with a “ruler cult,” and indicated the worthiness of the ruler to claim his divine lineage and his merited honor.⁴¹⁶

Perhaps Philip’s sense of his own heroism, and the importance of passing on that message, motivated his construction of the remarkable Palace of Aegae, which has been

⁴¹³ Hammond, “Heroic and Divine Honors in Macedonia,” 104. Hammond points out that these Homeric heroes lived for “honor and for the glory which is the recognition of honor.” What follows is Hammond’s analysis. It is also worth noting that Philip established a hero cult for his father, Amyntas III, in accordance with Macedonian tradition.

⁴¹⁴ Hammond, “Heroic and Divine Honors in Macedonia,” 104. Hammond describes the heroic honors afforded Hephaestion after his death at Babylon.

⁴¹⁵ Hammond, “Heroic and Divine Honors in Macedonia,” 108. See also Arrian, *An.* 4.11.2.

⁴¹⁶ Hammond, “Heroic and Divine Honors in Macedonia,” 113-114. See also Robert Fleischer, Hellenistic Iconography on Coins,” in *Aspects of Hellenistic Kingship*, ed. Peter Bilde, Troels Engberg-Pedersen, and Jan Zahle (Aarhus: 1996), 38. Fleischer explains that the Hellenistic era ushered in by Philip and Alexander “is a time when gods were shown more human, and human beings more god-like than previously.”

recently dated to Philip's reign.⁴¹⁷ This very large edifice was "not only the biggest, but together with the Parthenon, one of the most important buildings of classical antiquity."⁴¹⁸ The building is oriented to the east, half way up the acropolis of the city, and near the theater and the sanctuary of Eukleia; each of these buildings that are likewise oriented suggest a unity of organization and planning unusual for this ancient city.⁴¹⁹ The building repeats a complicated meander pattern in its mosaics that is reminiscent of the pattern on the shield of Philip II; and the female figures growing out of the flowers have parallels in the antechamber of Philip's tomb. The palace includes a unique type of architectural column, the use of the golden ratio throughout the structure, huge banqueting rooms, and an unusual floor mosaic that has now been discovered and recognized as Zeus seizing Europe.⁴²⁰

Most importantly, the building is not a residence or a home for the king, as it lacks any private spaces that would normally be found in a residence, but should be considered a center of "public life and political action, accessible from every direction, and with wide-open stoas."⁴²¹ The stoa's façade suggests a room where the "Macedonian king exercised his ancestral judicial power," and the interior of the palace is a reversed

⁴¹⁷ A. Kottaridi, "The Palace of Aegae," *Brill's Companion to Ancient Macedon: Studies in the Archaeology and History of Macedon, 650 BC-300 AD*, ed. Robin J. Lane Fox (Leiden: 2011), 301-303. The pottery sherds that give a *terminus post quem* of the second half of the 4th century are consistent with a completion date of 336 B.C., if the architectural evidence has been interpreted accurately.

⁴¹⁸ Kottardi, "Palace of Aegae," 298.

⁴¹⁹ Kottardi, "Palace of Aegae," 293-303. What follows is Kottardi's description and analysis.

⁴²⁰ Kottardi, "Palace of Aegae," 321-324. Kottardi argues that the subject of the mosaic cannot be coincidental as Philip's officers were called "Generals of Europe," Philip called his last child, "Europe," and the reality that Philip had become, by this time, "Lord of Europe."

⁴²¹ Kottardi, "Palace of Aegae," 328-331. What follows is Kottardi's hypothesis on the use of the building.

temple: where the cult statue should be, the palace presents a wide-open meeting place for the king and, presumably, his *hetairoi*. The palace is the artistic yet practical structure that reflects the sacred and pragmatic relationship between the institutions of the monarchy and the elite army corps. The building seeks to express in style and structure the ideology of a Macedonian king who has established his divine lineage, fulfilled his traditional obligations toward his people, bestowed his traditional patronage on those worthy of it, and established himself not only as a Macedonian hero, but also as an enlightened Greek king.⁴²²

The ideological basis of Philip's state construction was not simply the development of a cult of personality based on hero worship—although this aspect of Philip's rule, or the rule of any Macedonian king, played a part in establishing his authority. While the Argead kings had always sought to promote the divinity of their lineage, Philip institutionalized the Macedonian king as a hero by emphasizing the nature of Macedonian citizenship as bound up in the king and his bestowing of land, law, and justice, and by strengthening the traditional belief that the relationship between the king and his men was sacred. Philip was aided in the establishment of such an ideology by the fact that a huge percentage of the Macedonian nobility had been killed in the battle that brought him to power. Philip had an opportunity to persuade the remaining *hetairoi* to support his vision of a Macedonian state and created the opportunity, through the School of Royal Pages, to persuade their sons. While the successes of Philip II and Alexander III

⁴²² Kottardi, "Palace of Aegae," 329 and 333. Kottardi suggests (329) that Philip's exposure to Pythagorean philosophy and, possibly, Plato's ideas had their effect on Philip after all. Robin J. Land Fox suggests that "it would be excessive to credit Philip with being the first Hellenistic king" even though Philip had exemplified everything that Alexander took to Asia—only because Philip did not take it to Asia, in "The First Hellenistic Man," in *Creating a Hellenistic World*, ed. Andrew Erskine and Lloyd Llewellyn-Jones (Oxford and Wales: 2011), 13.

changed the nature of the relationship between the king and his Macedonians profoundly and in favor of the king, Philip's concept of a unified, secure, and productive Macedonia led by a warrior-king survived into Roman times—as did the institutions he created.

CONCLUSION

The Emperor Augustus famously claimed that he had found Rome a city of clay and had left it a city of marble. Philip II could have claimed that he had found Macedonia in a shambles, and had created a firm and secure nation of territorial and political integrity. Though vilified by the Athenians for destroying the freedom of the Greeks and presented in some ancient traditions as a self-indulgent man of low character, Philip proved to be a visionary who, building on the efforts of his predecessors and on traditional Macedonian institutions, ultimately constructed a nation without precedent in Greece or Europe relative to its size, its exploitation of resources, its administrative structure, its military and economic capacity, and its influence on the subsequent history of the Mediterranean and Near Eastern world.

Philip's efforts to build the Macedonia state brought unprecedented success. He reformed his army by its enlargement, its reconfiguration, its tactical training, and its ability through improved logistics and engineering to achieve long-term strategic goals beyond the capacity of other Greek states. Philip owed much of the inspiration for his military innovations to his experience as a hostage in Thebes where he had viewed firsthand the best infantry in Greece and training in the innovative use of combined infantry and cavalry tactics. His second source of military inspiration came from his experience as a member of the Macedonian royal family where he had seen and used his

country's traditional weapon, the *sarissa*, in the boar hunt, and had participated throughout his life in cavalry warfare.

Philip used his reinvented army to level and enfranchise the common people, regardless of their origins, and to offer them citizenship through the mechanisms of military service and land ownership. He extended a system of meritocracy within the army to a steadily increasing number of noble cavalymen that qualified such individuals for large land grants, administrative positions, and close association with the king. Such a system of service and patronage among the *hetairoi* had the paradoxical effect of increasing their prestige by their inclusion in a national system and limiting their ability to exercise any sort of real power outside Philip's orders. His meritocracy within the army extended as well to the common foot soldier who could now hope to attain the position of Royal Foot Companion by a display of excellent valor and the commitment of years of service, and could also seek to earn an ever-increasing wage for service based on merit.⁴²³

Philip strengthened the institution of the Macedonian monarch and elevated its position in relation to the army—an institution to which Philip had brought unprecedented success. Eligibility for Philip's patronage extended to all the people within his territory—ethnically Macedonian and non-Macedonian alike—and this patronage became a mechanism for enhancing and extending royal power and authority. Philip's establishment of the School of Royal Pages allowed him to indoctrinate a new generation of military, social, and political leaders, and to bind them specifically to a shared experience with him and with their peers. They were instructed in an ideology of state that recognized the institution of the monarchy as heroic, related to divinity, and

⁴²³ Ellis, "Dynamics of Fourth-Century Imperialism," 305.

bound to the elite corps of the army by a relationship that was sacred—even while familiar. Philip joined the traditional, Macedonian warrior hero to the image of a Panhellenic hero through his patronage of religious festivals and games within Macedonia and in the larger Greek world. Philip's building program began to reflect a combination of the importance of the Macedonian monarchy, its relationship to the Macedonian *hetairoi*, and its emphasis on patronage, leadership, and justice.

Philip built on the efforts of Archelaus in creating an infrastructure for Macedonia that would allow him to maintain territorial integrity and internal security. He drained swamps, reclaimed lands, improved harbors, cut timber, and built roads throughout his realm. He encouraged the cultivation of specific agricultural products in suitable areas and influenced the breeding of horses. His domestic policies for the use of traditional lands and the development of new lands enabled him to feed and exploit a growing populace, and to utilize fully his mining resources and pasturelands. Philip minted coins on a level never experienced in Macedonia and encouraged production, trade, and export in path-breaking ways.

Philip determined to establish a nation that could aim for and achieve long-term, strategic goals. To that end, Philip changed the logistics of Greek warfare, consciously promoted the development of siege warfare and its supporting military corps, and began to develop a Macedonian navy for the first time in history. Philip also implemented the establishment of a professional, national army that utilized only a portion of Macedonia's available manpower, could remain on campaign year round, and received pay for service from the Macedonian monarch.

Philip discharged a policy of urbanization within Macedonia by which he established new cities and encouraged the cultivation of local traditions and civic pride as a complement to the larger Macedonian polity. He redefined nonurbanized districts as *poleis* and connected his realm by each district's designation as a "city." He allowed his administrative areas some autonomy, especially in finance and in the designated titles of officials, while maintaining control of the appointment of officials who had any real power in a given district. As in other aspects of Philip's Macedonia, real power was an extension of the authority of the monarch and a reflection of his patronage.

Perhaps most of all, Philip created a shared experience for his subjects that included exceptionally advanced and successful military service to the state, "freedom from fear and want, and a promise of security and prosperity for the future"—powerful incentives enough for men to stay invested in a state.⁴²⁴ Philip's soldiers served for extended periods of time in an army supported by the best military, engineering, and medical technology of its day.⁴²⁵ Under Philip, Macedonian soldiers would have experienced an army divided "horizontally"; that is, soldiers would have developed a loyalty to each other based on rank and fighting unit rather than simply on territorial origin (*taxis* or *ethnos*), as in a "vertically" divided society. Its leaders would have grown up at Philip's court, gaining military and political experience, and learning to defer to the monarchy. Its members would have benefitted from the patronage of the king in small and large ways, and would view their continuing success and advancement in relation to his continuing success. The most valued and experienced members of the *hetairoi*

⁴²⁴ Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia*, 662. Griffith argues that "national unity sprang in part from the womb of prosperity."

⁴²⁵ Ellis, "The Dynamics of Fourth-Century Imperialism," 105-106. What follows is largely Ellis' analysis.

would have partaken of the most sacred of ceremonies in the most beautiful of settings with the king and the royal court, as a reflection of their close ties to the king and of their acquiescence to the unity of the Macedonian state in his person and in the institution of the monarchy. Philip's successful implementation of his vision for Macedonia allowed Justin to state unequivocally that, out of many peoples and nations, Philip had "made one kingdom and one people."⁴²⁶

⁴²⁶ Just. 8.6.2. *Atque ita ex multis gentibus nationibusque unum regnum populumque constituit.* It should be noted that Justin claimed this achievement for Philip even though he is writing from a source hostile to Philip in Pompeius Trogus.

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