

TOWARD A CRITICAL NURSING PROCESS:  
NURSING PRAXIS

by  
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A dissertation submitted to the faculty of  
The University of Utah  
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

College of Nursing  
The University of Utah

August 1983

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


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## ABSTRACT

The purpose of this study is to develop a critical perspective which can be used to address the social reality of nursing. The study uses the tradition of the Frankfurt School and critical theory as the primary intellectual frameworks for developing this perspective. The investigation is primarily an exploratory, reflective study which seeks to develop a critical consciousness about nursing.

The methodology used in this study differs significantly from empirical-analytic modes of inquiry. The investigation proceeds via the process of reflection. Radical reflection, the method used in this study, contains five stages or steps. They include: bracketing, historical recovery, critique, dialectical imagination and negotiation. The study proceeds in an exploratory way through each of these steps.

As in other forms of reflection, findings produced in this study take the form of hypotheses. The study generates insights or interpretive hypotheses about the social construction of reality in nursing. As in other examples of reflection, these are hypotheses whose confirmation depends upon continued negotiation among nurses.

Specific findings generated in this study include 1) a critique of scientific consciousness in nursing, 2) a critique of bourgeois professional ideology in nursing and 3) a critique of sexism in nursing.

## CONTENTS

ABSTRACT. . . . . iv

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS . . . . . viii

### Chapter

1. INTRODUCTION . . . . .	1
1.1 Purpose and Rationale. . . . .	1
1.2 Background: Critical Theory, Habermas and the Theory of Knowledge and Human Interests. . . . .	4
1.3 Concept Definition: The Phenomenon of Ideology . . . . .	44
1.4 Methodology. . . . .	53
1.5 The Archeology of Tradition in Nursing . . . . .	84
Endnotes . . . . .	87
2. THE RECOVERY OF PRECAPITALIST MODES OF HUMAN ACTION . . . . .	96
2.1 Introduction . . . . .	96
2.2 The Greek Distinction between Modes of Human Conduct: The <u>Vita Activa</u> and The <u>Vita Contemplativa</u> . . . . .	97
2.3 <u>Theoria</u> and <u>Episteme</u> . . . . .	100
2.4 <u>Praxis</u> and <u>Phronesis</u> . . . . .	103
2.5 Production: <u>Techne</u> and <u>Poeisis</u> . . . . .	119
2.6 The Scientization of Politics and Production: Transition in the Renaissance . . . . .	125
2.7 Nurses as Contemporary Social Actors: Recognizing the Genesis of Our Historical Selves . . . . .	139
2.8 When Insights Intervene in Life: Pragmatic Consequences . . . . .	147
Endnotes . . . . .	150
3. CRITIQUE: RECOGNIZING THE DIALECTIC OF ENLIGHTENMENT. . . . .	154

3.1	Introduction . . . . .	.154
3.2	Empiricism and Enlightenment Ideology. . .	.156
3.3	Kantian Critical Philosophy. . . . .	.161
3.4	Hegelian Critique . . . . .	.176
3.5	Marx and The Theory of Knowledge as Social Theory . . . . .	.198
3.6	Positivism and the Critique of Positivism.	.205
3.7	Phenomenology. . . . .	.228
3.8	Conclusion: Nursing's Inheritance of the Dialectic of Enlightenment . . . . .	.233
	Endnotes . . . . .	.238
4.	TOWARD A CRITICAL NURSING PROCESS: NURSING PRAXIS . . . . .	.244
4.1	Introduction . . . . .	.244
4.2	The Existential Determination of Thought and the Social Construction of Reality . .	.246
4.3	Imagination and Negotiation. . . . .	.266
4.4	Negotiation in Nursing . . . . .	.269
4.5	Conclusion . . . . .	.288
	Endnotes . . . . .	.290
	REFERENCES. . . . .	.293



## ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This work reflects the influence of several people, mostly critical thinkers themselves who have provoked important moments of question, conversation and, happily, friendship. Teresa Christy has created one of those moments. Her presence and the opportunity for future conversations are sorely missed. Peter Morley and John Sullivan have created other moments of critical interaction. The experience of their friendship is like witnessing critical method in action, it is recognizing that the cognitive style of critical theory is objectified in a lifestyle; it becomes a way of life.

Another important source of influence has come from earlier work with Southeast Asian refugees. I would like to acknowledge the impact of that work in my life, in my own ideological crisis. This whole project has been provoked by the recognition of social contradictions, like the creation of refugee populations, emerging under modern industrial capitalism. The refugees, especially Hmong women, helped me to see these contradictions.

Finally, I would like to acknowledge the experiences I have shared with my family, my husband and my children in the course of this work. Our life together has now become the test ground for this content. We have learned its language together and we

have been shaken and disoriented by its insights. We are different people because of it. In this case, we are stronger, more self-conscious, and happily, more in love.

## CHAPTER 1

### INTRODUCTION

#### 1.1 Purpose and Rationale

The purpose of this study is to develop a critical perspective which focuses on the practice and the ideology of nursing. The study uses the tradition of the Frankfurt School and critical theory as the primary intellectual frameworks for developing this perspective. Along with critical theory, however, the investigation also explores other intellectual strands in a contemporary European tradition. It explores recent developments in the critical theory of Jurgen Habermas and in the political philosophy of Hannah Arendt. It touches briefly on the hermeneutic arguments of H.G. Gadamer. It explores content from the sociology of knowledge tradition in the work of Berger and Luckman. It touches briefly on the existentialist-phenomenology of M. Merleau-Ponty. And finally, it explores feminist arguments in the analysis of Sheila Rowbotham.

These explorations in a European intellectual tradition provide a background for the development of a critical perspective which focuses on the social institution of nursing. This is a study then, which explores strands in a contemporary

neo-Marxist tradition, borrowing insights, reconstructing some of these insights and applying these insights to contemporary issues in nursing practice.

Because of the exploratory nature of the study and because of its subject matter, it seems important to make some preliminary comments about this eclectic neo-Marxist tradition and its reception among American audiences. U.S. interpretations of critical theory, for example, frequently are biased because of the tradition's link to Marxian thought and because of the cultural distance which separates American and German traditions. The reception of Jurgen Habermas' work in America, for instance, testifies to the difficulty which American audiences have in interpreting this European tradition.

With the translation in recent years of a growing number of his books and articles, Habermas's influence has gradually spread to the English speaking world. But his reception by Anglo-American thinkers has by no means been painless. It has been hindered by the usual problems of cultural distance attending the penetration of any work that is deeply rooted in German tradition. . . Moreover, the tradition of Western Marxism Habermas seeks to renew has remained comparatively underdeveloped here: a number of important works by Lukacs, Korsch, Horkeimer, Adorno and Marx himself were only recently translated. Then there are problems deriving from Habermas's own approach. In our empirically and analytically inclined culture, we are bound to be dismayed by someone who seems to thrive in the rarefied atmosphere of general ideas and who views social theory so broadly as to include virtually the entire range of systematic knowledge about man. Clearly, these are formidable obstacles to an intelligent reception of Habermas's work. If one adds to this the fact that his writings assume the readers' familiarity with a wide range of disciplines, authors and approaches, that he often makes his point by reviewing broad areas of research and steering ongoing discussions in new directions, the obstacles seem

insuperable [1].

These are obstacles which occur in the process of translation and interpretation; barriers which make it very difficult for an American (nursing) audience to appropriate a neo-Marxist tradition. Still, translation is possible and one can begin to adopt the orientation of a Western Marxian perspective, so long as the commitment is retained to lay aside a priori prejudices about this tradition. This is a kind of exploration in which participants must suspend preconceived prejudices about Marxian discourse.

A very common misconception about Marxist thought is that it invariably collapses into dogma or absolutist doctrine. With this kind of a priori assumption, the intent or purpose of this investigation will be misinterpreted. The reader may misjudge the study as attempting to produce a critique of nursing practice, which then collapses into Marxist dogma. The study may be mistaken as attempting to develop its own manifesto, doctrine or "blueprint" concerning the social practice of nursing. A critical nursing perspective may be misinterpreted as an example of a revolutionary elitism which criticizes the consciousness of the "masses" as "false."

These are all intentions which the study will not fulfill, purposes which the investigation does not have. Critical theory has been chosen as a primary theoretical framework and as a methodology precisely because it avoids dogmatic arguments.

The pages which follow contain no manifesto and no doctrine. They resist the production of dogma in any form. The investigation does not criticize the consciousness of nursing as "false" and it does not speculate about a utopian form of nursing practice. It will be difficult therefore to characterize the study as "Marxist" in its analysis, although it most certainly is based upon Marxian premises.

The intent of the study instead is to explore a broad range of social theory which addresses the human condition. This is exploring content in the humanities in a way which teaches us something new and unrecognized about ourselves. This exploration occurs through the use of critical method, a kind of critical, radical reflection. Through the use of this method, the study seeks to develop a new reflexivity [2] about nursing. This is exploring traditions and using methods which help to develop a new consciousness about nursing. It is acquiring new language and shaping new conversations or a new discourse about the social reality of nursing.

A person learns a new language and, as we say, gets a new soul. He puts himself into the attitude of those that make use of that language. He cannot read its literature, cannot converse with those that belong to that community, without taking on its peculiar attitudes. He becomes, in that sense, a different individual [3].

### 1.2 Background: Critical Theory, Habermas and the Theory of Knowledge and Human Interests

Critical theory originated as a German intellectual

movement in the 1920s. The movement was identified with the Frankfurt School, an intellectual circle which housed itself at the Institute of Social Research, established in affiliation with the University of Frankfurt in 1923. Work generated by the Frankfurt School came to be labeled "critical theory," an appellation which captures the critical spirit of the movement. The school was part of a more general European intellectual trend to rethink the social philosophy of Marx, a form of critique which surfaced as fundamentally Marxian, although it questioned orthodox Marxist doctrine.

In the last ten years, the work of the best-known representatives of the Frankfurt School has come to be associated with two basic concerns: social philosophy and social psychology. The theoretical innovations for which they are most often recognized are their analyses of the structure of reason and technique and of the entanglement of enlightenment, myth, domination and nature; while their best known empirical studies relate to authoritarianism and the authoritarian personality. . . Sympathetic interpreters of the Institute's work have come to see these writings as amounting to a "radical and sustained critique of bourgeois society," although developed and presented in a fragmentary way. Critics have charged that these works represent a pessimistic cultural critique which does less to integrate Marxist political economy with sociocultural and psychological dimensions than to replace the former with the later[4].

Some of the objections leveled against critical theory have perhaps been well taken. The movement lost much of its momentum in Europe following World War II, while a third generation of critical theory has gained ascendance in the United States [5]. But this may have been due, in part, to the emigration of many members of the Frankfurt School to the United States during the

Second World War.

However fragmentary the work may seem, it has provided some provocative and important insights via the critique of bourgeois society. Its more or less systematic accounts of the development of capitalism have been attempts to rethink Marxian philosophy. Collectively, they constitute an historically real ideology or world view which has surfaced in modern industrial capitalism. If for no other reason than because of its real historical presence, critical theory should be viewed as a significant phenomenon. It was and is an actual, historically real occurrence of critical spirit which has surfaced in the twentieth century.

The perspective developed by Jurgen Habermas has focused primarily on the themes mentioned above: the structure of reason and technique, the entanglement of enlightenment, authoritarianism, domination and nature, and historical transformations in social philosophy [6]. While much of his more recent work has demonstrated a progression to theories of communicative competence (universal pragmatics) and to a theory of social evolution, the present discussion will focus on those topics addressed in his earlier works, especially the structure of reason and technique (It will be noted at the outset that Habermas' interest in this problematique perhaps makes him more vulnerable to those criticisms mentioned earlier: particularly the criticism that he deflects the focus away from the role of



class conflict in history by centering his analysis on reason. Still, Habermas does incorporate the phenomena of class and class conflict in a very meaningful way into his philosophical frame of reference).

### The Theory of Knowledge and Human Interests

In his Knowledge and Human Interests[7], Habermas advanced a theory of knowledge which has become perhaps his most familiar work in the United States. The work contained his famous thesis concerning species-rooted cognitive interests or "quasi-transcendental" interests which guide the constitution of reality.

It is his central thesis that "the specific viewpoints from which we apprehend reality," the general cognitive strategies that guide systematic inquiry, have their basis in the natural history of the human species. They are tied to imperatives of the sociocultural form of life [8].

The imperatives which Habermas identified were the interests pursued by the human species in the course of its self-formative process. These are "quasi-transcendental" commitments to which reason adheres in the preservation of life at the cultural level.

The concept of "interest" is not meant to imply a naturalistic reduction of transcendental-logical properties to empirical ones. Indeed, it is meant to prevent just such a reduction. Knowledge constitutive interests mediate the natural history of the human species with the logic of its self-formative process. . .I term interests the basic orientations rooted in specific fundamental conditions of the possible reproduction and self-constitution of the human species, namely work and interaction. Hence these

basic orientations do not aim at the gratification of immediately empirical needs but at the solution of systems problems in general. . . Knowledge-constitutive interests can be defined exclusively as a function of the objectively constituted problems of the preservation of life that have been solved by the cultural form of existence as such [9].

The commitments which drive reason are thus not to be understood within a biological/sociobiological, sociologicistic or psychologistic framework. The interests which reason pursues are to be found within the cultural frame of reference; this is a frame of reference which illuminates the fundamental conditions of man's self-formative process.

Habermas explicitly identifies these existential conditions as work (labor) and interaction. By interaction, Habermas refers specifically to the use of symbols, so that he is actually designating symbolic interaction as an existential requirement for humans. In the categories of labor and communicative interaction, then, Habermas established an existential grounding for his theory of knowledge.

### Species Rooted Interests

Habermas begins from a premise that labor is an existential condition peculiar to the human species. Labor is the invariant relation which binds humans to the natural environment; it is "the perpetual necessity of human life."

The nature that surrounds us constitutes itself as objective nature for us only in being mediated by the subjective nature of man through processes of social labor. That is why labor, or work is not only a fundamental category of human existence, but also an epistemological category. The system of objective

activities creates the tactical conditions of the possible reproduction of social life and at the same time the transcendental conditions of the possible objectivity of experience. The category of man as a tool making animal signifies a schema both of action and of apprehending the world. Although a natural process, labor is at the same time more than a mere natural process; for it regulates material exchange with nature and constitutes a world [10].

This argument contains the Marxist percept that labor is an irreducible category of human existence. Labor is the category of activity in which man "takes over" nature and because of this taking over, is able to reproduce his own life. Labor, as externalized embodied activity, regulates material exchange with the natural environment. It pulls resources from the environment and creates human products. In this material exchange, labor creates factual conditions -- conditions which then make possible the ongoing reproduction of social life.

But the argument also contains another point. Labor is not only an existential category, a way for humans to reproduce their own life. It is also an epistemological category. As it regulates material exchange, labor also constitutes the world. In its objectivation, labor constitutes the natural environment as an objectivity, as something object-like. In labor, we come to apprehend the natural environment as a fixed "something" characterized by various predicates; i.e., we constitute the natural environment as "nature."

Labor then becomes a kind of activity which discloses reality. It is at once a mode of action and a way of apprehending the world, a kind of activity which literally gives

humans access to reality. The significance of this point is that the constitution of reality, or what humans apprehend as objectivity, cannot be separated from the category of labor. The "natural attitude" or the "general thesis," however it is inherited from generation to generation, moves within the parameters of labor in its historically changing forms.

While epistemologically, we must presuppose nature as existing in itself, we ourselves have access to nature only within the historical dimension disclosed by labor processes. . . "Nature in itself" is therefore an abstraction, which is a requisite of our thought; but we always encounter nature within the horizon of the world -- historical self-formative process of mankind [11].

If labor is then accepted as both an existential and epistemological category, it becomes important to identify the characteristics of labor, to see what kind of action and thinking this is [12]. Habermas characterizes labor as instrumental action; action that is, which gives man control over the natural environment. While this is not exactly the nihilating action of Hegel, nor the objectivation and alienation of Marx, instrumental action seems to lend itself to either of these interpretations.

On the one hand, labor as instrumental action denotes technical control over natural processes; an interpretation which can be taken as annihilating nature. On the other hand, instrumental action also denotes reproduction of the material base of life and reproduction of human existence, an interpretation which can be taken as the externalization and

objectivation of man -- or the humanization of nature. Habermas preserves both of these interpretations in a treatment of labor which emphasizes the cultural, historical analyses of Marx.

(Marx discloses) the invariant relation of the species to its natural environment, which is established by the behavioral system of "instrumental action" -- for labor processes are the "perpetual, natural necessity of human life." The conditions of instrumental action arose contingently in the natural evolution of the human species. At the same time, however, with transcendental necessity, they bind our knowledge of nature to the interest of possible technical control over natural processes. The objectivity of the possible objects of experience is constituted within a conceptual-perceptual scheme rooted in deep-seated structures of human action; this scheme is equally binding on all subjects that keep alive through labor. The objectivity of the possible objects of experience is thus grounded in the identity of a natural substratum, namely that of the bodily organization of man, which is oriented toward action. . .[13]

The behavioral mode of instrumental action is an existential category which arose contingently in the evolution of the human species. It is a mode of action which arose primarily because of man's bodily organization; i.e., because of certain structural properties (e.g., the ability to make tools) and because of an underdeveloped instinctual organization (the completion of organismic developments in the human infant after birth). Instrumental action arose as humans secured their own survival and produced environmental conditions which could support life.

But while it arose contingently, instrumental action binds our knowledge of nature to an instrumental orientation. This involves the argument that instrumental action is both an

existential and an epistemological category. As a way of apprehending nature, instrumental action contains a conceptual-perceptual scheme which discloses reality from the standpoint of possible prediction and control. This cognitive interest in possible technical control over natural processes is a conceptual-perceptual scheme which is rooted in the existential requirement of instrumental action. It may not be eliminated, so long as human subjects stay alive through instrumental action.

The cognitive-perceptual scheme associated with labor was labeled by Habermas as technical interest. This was one of three cognitive interests which Habermas characterized as knowledge-constitutive. It was presented as a fundamental epistemological orientation, rooted in the existential requirements of man. Knowledge-constitutive interests, like technical interest, were then presented as fundamental cognitive-perceptual orientations which mediate access to reality.

These cognitive interests are of significance neither for the psychology nor for the sociology of knowledge, nor for the critique of ideology in any narrower sense; for they are invariant. [They are not] influences on cognition that have to be eliminated for the sake of objectivity of knowledge; rather they themselves determine the aspect under which reality can be objectified, and thus made accessible to experience in the first place [14].

Habermas argued that the history of the human species demonstrates one quasitranscendental cognitive orientation which

he labeled technical interest. This was an "anthropologically deep seated" interest in predicting and controlling natural processes; a cognitive interest which is grounded in the existential requirement of labor or instrumental action.

The reproduction of human life is irrevocably bound to the reproduction of the material base of life. From the most elementary forms of wrestling an existence from nature, through the organized crafts and technical professions, to the development of a technologically based industry, the "material exchange process" with nature has transpired in structures of social labor that depend on knowledge that makes a claim to truth. The history of this confrontation with nature has, from the epistemological point of view, "the form of a 'learning process.'" Habermas's thesis is that the general orientation guiding the sciences of nature is rooted in an "anthropologically deep-seated interest" in predicting and controlling events in the natural environment, which he calls the technical interest [15].

The human interest in technical control is then a cognitive orientation which provides technically exploitable knowledge. It discloses reality from the standpoint of possible prediction and control, generating knowledge which makes these truth claims. This is a knowledge constitutive orientation of humans writ large which finds its extension in the general orientation guiding the sciences of nature. These sciences generate technically exploitable knowledge; knowledge with truth claims concerning prediction and control of natural processes.

It seems important to emphasize that the human interest in technical control was characterized by Habermas as "quasi-transcendental." This is a somewhat problematic characterization which has been the target of some legitimate criticism [15]. Here it will only be noted that by using the

label "quasi-transcendental," Habermas reveals the synthesis in his work of perspectives taken from Kant, Hegel and Marx. He retains enough of Kant to argue that such a technical interest is transcendental; i.e., this cognitive orientation is the basis (or one condition) of possible experience. But against Kant and somewhere between Hegel and Marx, Habermas does not use the technical interest to fix an ahistorical knowing subject or an ahistorical knowing process.

The technical interest in predicting and controlling events in the natural environment is an historically changing orientation, one which is mediated by human learning and the accumulation of technical control. Increasing competence in the human level of production is acquired in feedback (learning) controlled, trial and error instrumental action. This means that the technical interest discloses reality from a standpoint which is "cumulative" or inherited; it rests on the level of prediction and control achieved in previous generations.

Technically exploitable knowledge. . .is acquired through trial and error in the realm of feedback controlled action. . .the level [of production] designates that of a cumulative learning process and thus determines the conditions under which new technical knowledge arises [17].

Beyond the existential requirement for instrumental action and its associated technical interest, Habermas also identified a second existential requirement for humans. The condition he labeled "interaction," a term which refers to the processes of symbolic or communicative action. Habermas presents his



argument concerning communicative interaction as a corrective for a fundamental error in the work of Marx. According to Habermas, Marx reduced the self-formative process of the species to the single condition of labor. For Marx, the category of material activity (labor) designated the only dimension in which the history of the species moves. The sphere of communicative interaction, which includes institutionalized social relations was not ignored by Marx. But it was not (according to Habermas) incorporated in the philosophical frame of reference as a primary condition of existence at the cultural level. In his opposition to Marx, Habermas argues that the category of symbolic interaction designates equally the limits within which natural history moves.

[It is necessary] to make visible an indecision that has its foundation in Marx's theoretical approach itself. For the analysis of the development of economic formations of society, he adopts a concept of the system of social labor that contains more elements than are admitted in the idea of a species that produces itself through social labor. Self-constitution through social labor is conceived at the categorical level as a process of production; instrumental action, labor in the sense of material activity, or work designates the dimension in which natural history moves. At the level of his material investigations, on the other hand, Marx always takes account of social practice that encompasses both work and interaction. The processes of natural history are mediated by the productive activity of individuals and the organization of their interrelations. These relations are subject to norms that decide, with the force of institutions, how responsibilities and rewards, obligations and charges to the social budget are distributed among members. The medium in which these relations of subjects and of groups are normatively regulated is cultural tradition. It forms the linguistic communication structure on the basis of which subjects interpret both nature and themselves in their environment. While instru-

mental action corresponds to the constraint of external nature and the level of the forces of production determines the extent of technical control over natural forces, communicative action stands in correspondence to the suppression of man's own nature. The institutional framework determines the extent of repression by the unreflected, "natural" force of social dependence and political power, which is rooted in prior history and tradition. . . Taken together both categories of social practice [instrumental and communicative activity] make possible. . . the self-generative act of the species [18].

In his identification of a second existential requirement for humans, Habermas has attempted to preserve the category of symbolic interaction as an irreducible part of life. The category of interaction or communicative action however, has a slightly different connotation than that commonly associated with symbolic interaction. It is a less conservative interpretation, one which denotes conflict more than consensus.

By communicative action, Habermas means action which coincides with an inherited structure of power relations. This is a behavioral mode which produces and reproduces a structure of social relations (e.g., class society). It is action which produces social norms, social responsibilities, rewards and obligations. It is action which reproduces these conditions in social institutions and institutionalized role behavior passed on to succeeding generations. Habermas is here arguing that the production of this institutionalized power structure requires a mode of human action which is different than the instrumental, material activity of labor.

For Marx, the category of material activity (labor)

designated the only dimension in which the history of the species moves. The mode of communicative action, which produces institutionalized social relations was not ignored by Marx. But it was not incorporated in his philosophical frame of reference; i.e., his historical materialism placed primary emphasis upon the instrumental activity of labor.

Against Marx, Habermas argues that the category of symbolic interaction designates equally the limits within which natural history moves. The dimension of symbolic interaction or communicative action contains the configurations of action and consciousness which Marx labeled ideology. In communicative action, men and women produce the ideological dimension of culture; they produce institutionalized social relations and commonly held interpretations of these.

The ideological conditions are held by Habermas to be irreducible and essential to human existence. Institutionalized social relations and mutually accepted interpretations of these are necessary conditions for existence at the cultural level. Disturbances in this dimension of communicative interaction threaten the survival of the species just as surely as do disturbances in the category of technical control.

This interpretation again reflects Habermas' tendency to synthesize European intellectual history. This particular interpretation of communicative action and ideology presented by Habermas reflects his synthesis of Marx and Freud [19]. By

communicative action, Habermas is referring to a behavioral mode which produces and reproduces power relations. But communicative action has the additional connotation of being a behavioral mode in which humans suppress their own instincts. When an institutionalized structure of power relations is internalized, humans learn, concomitantly, to suppress their own nature. While in labor, men and women learn to dominate and control their own natural environment, in communicative action, humans learn to control their own nature (instinct).

Habermas refers to the production of institutionalized power relations as communicative action because this network of relations is linguistically transmitted. It is internalized, externalized and objectified via language. Beginning in primary socialization, children learn to suppress instinct (their own nature) via the communicative action of parents. In language (and within an authoritarian mode) parents deposit a whole range of expectations and rules (i.e., norms) which regulate the behavior of children. This "linguistically deposited" experience is a transmission of institutionalized power relations. Through it, children learn to suppress their own instincts and to accept the authority and domination of others.

Once the structure of power relations has become internalized, there is a compulsion (a repression) of "internal nature" which humans carry with them through life. That compulsion is normatively regulated, legitimated or reinforced

by social institutions which preserve an existing structure of power relations. Power relations are preserved and reproduced, again through communicative processes of ordinary language. As was the case in childhood, communicative action, especially unreflected and uncritical interaction, continues to suppress man's own nature throughout life. This suppression occurs in the communicative processes of ordinary language use.

Habermas is here presenting a critically important point. He is arguing that the behavioral mode of communicative action, the production, internalization and reproduction of institutionalized power relations, is a mode of human action which determines equally (vis a vis labor) the dimension in which the history of the species moves. He is arguing with Freud, that at given levels of technology or productive efficiency, species survival requires certain levels of compulsion to work and renunciation of instinct [20]. The collective repression of instinct, like that reproduced in institutionalized power relations, is an existential requirement, a condition which must be present, if the human species is to survive. Humans have accumulated increasing levels of technical competence and productive efficiency precisely because of the complementary capacity to suppress instincts and engage in instrumental action.

Habermas is arguing again with Freud, that communicative action is the behavioral mode which symbolically redirects human

instinct. Communicative action uses symbols to legitimate certain levels of compulsion, so that the suppression of instinct is accepted. In other words, the compulsion to work and to accept authority becomes a social norm which is not challenged or questioned. This human use of symbols to "redirect instinct" means that the compulsion to work is reproduced among successive generations; that the internalized compulsion to accept authority is reproduced in successive generations and that an institutionalized network of power relations is reproduced in successive generations. Communicative action is then a category of social practice which fixes the dimension of man's suppression of himself.

This point, again, is critically important, for in it Habermas is struggling to fill in important gaps; to create a revised historical materialism. He is arguing that in unreflective, uncritical patterns of primary and secondary socialization, in unreflective modes of communicative activity, humans reproduce an inherited institutional framework. Such unreflective modes of communicative activity determine the continued extent of social and personal repression. Patterns of social dependence and domination then take on the quality of a "second nature." Having been received from history and cultural tradition without challenge or question they are accepted as nonhuman entities. In other words, they are reified and rigidly reproduced in the institutional framework of successive genera-

tions. Communicative activity then fixes this institutional dimension of human existence. Taken together with instrumental activity, it fixes the parameters of man's self-formative process.

The existential requirement for institutionalized power relations makes it a condition which has been present throughout history. As a cultural requirement, Habermas argues that communicative action has been accompanied by a quasitranscendental cognitive orientation which he labels practical interest. Like technical interest, this human interest is again knowledge constitutive, orienting human access to reality.

We call the cognitive interest of [communicative action] "practical." It is distinguished from the technical cognitive interest in that it aims not at the comprehension of an objectified reality but at the maintenance of the intersubjectivity of mutual understanding, within whose horizon reality can first appear as something. . .Whereas [technical interest] aims at disclosing and comprehending reality under the transcendental viewpoint of possible technical control [the practical interest] aims at maintaining the intersubjectivity of mutual understanding in ordinary language communication and in action according to common norms [22].

In his discussion of the practical cognitive interest, Habermas reveals a linguistic bias, maintaining that communicative processes, rooted in ordinary language, are a fundamental existential condition, peculiar to the human species. He argues that communicative interaction is an existential requirement which is of equal importance (*vis a vis* labor) to the self-formative process of man.

The reproduction of human life is just as irrevocably based

on reliable intersubjectivity in ordinary language communication. The transformation of the helpless newborn into a social individual capable of participating in the life of the community marks his entrance into a network of communicative relations from which he is not released until his death. Disturbances in communication in the form of the nonagreement of reciprocal expectations is no less a threat to the reproduction of social life than the failure of purposive-rational action on nature. . . . Habermas' thesis is that the general orientation guiding the "historical hermeneutic sciences is rooted in an anthropologically deep-seated interest in securing and expanding possibilities of mutual and self-understanding in the conduct of life. He calls this the practical interest [22].

A practical cognitive interest is then an orientation which discloses reality from the standpoint of intersubjectivity, or mutual understanding. This is an orientation which is achieved partly because of the structural and functional properties of language. The communicative processes of ordinary language use "coerce" experience into categories which provide at least minimal levels of mutual understanding among members of a linguistic community.

Habermas here argued that since humans have always been faced with the need to reproduce institutionalized power relations, natural history has carried with it a general cognitive orientation which aims at maintaining the intersubjectivity of mutual understanding. This is an orientation which does not concern itself with the comprehension of an objectified reality, i.e., that it is not aimed at prediction and control. This orientation aims rather at orienting human action by disclosing reality from the standpoint of mutually accepted norms and meanings. The human interests which Habermas labeled practical



and technical were then general cognitive orientations or epistemological categories associated with existential conditions of the human species. Habermas also identified one final human interest which he presented in roughly the same way. This was again a quasitranscendental orientation which discloses reality from its own unique standpoint. The third human interest Habermas labeled the emancipatory interest.

In his discussion of this emancipatory interest, Habermas again began from a view of the human species which synthesizes both Marx and Freud. He argued that an emancipatory interest is tied very closely to the dimensions of technical control and practical understanding which have been achieved within successive generations.

With the development of technology, the institutional framework which regulates the distribution of obligations and rewards and stabilizes a power structure that maintains a cultural renunciation can be loosened. Increasingly parts of cultural tradition that at first have only projective content can be changed into reality. That is, virtual gratification can be transposed into institutionally recognized gratification. "Illusions" are not merely false consciousness. Like what Marx called ideology, they too harbor utopia. If technical progress opens up the objective possibility of reducing socially necessary repression below the level of institutionally demanded repression, this utopian content can be freed from its fusion with the delusory, ideological components of culture that have been fashioned into legitimations of authority and be converted into a critique of power structures that have become historically obsolete [23].

While the argument here seems rather complex, Habermas appears to be moving through the following points. At given levels of technical competence, the human species is confronted

with different degrees of economic scarcity. Given these technoeconomic conditions, humans must defend themselves against libidinal and aggressive impulses which, if unchecked, would threaten the effectiveness of instrumental action. To provide such a defense, humans produce a structure of institutionally demanded repression, i.e., a structure of power relations through the communicative activity of ordinary language use. This institutional framework is legitimated or reinforced by ideological components of culture -- interpretations of the institutional framework which provide mutual understanding or intersubjectivity.

As levels of technical competence improve, the institutional framework can gradually be loosened. Levels of social and personal repression which once were necessary, gradually become obsolete; a new institutional framework, providing a new distribution of rewards and obligations is possible. But in order for this to occur, a mode of human action which aims at emancipation must emerge.

When technical progress opens up the real possibility of reducing the level of socially necessary repression, then utopian or "illusory" aspects of cultural tradition can be converted into reality. To achieve this, utopian content must be recovered, remembered and nourished. It must be separated from the reifying pattern of consciousness which legitimates historically obsolete power structures. Such critique gives expression to the human

emancipatory interest.

The emancipatory interest then might best be understood as a cognitive orientation aimed at freedom; it is a form of consciousness which directs itself toward freedom from pseudonatural constraint -- constraints such as historically obsolete social institutions and ideology. Habermas argues (in the style of German idealism) that the power of these constraints resides in their nontransparency. In prereflective, uncritical communicative action, the constraint of social institutions is accepted dogmatically as a natural objectivity, i.e., as a second nature. The institutional framework, therefore, receives its legitimacy from its nontransparency, from the inability of humans to "see through" these institutions and recognize them as self-imposed constraints. Emancipatory interest is then the cognitive orientation which overturns this natural attitude (general thesis), exposing self-imposed objectivity and making pseudonatural constraints transparent.

This interest aims at reflection on oneself. . .Self-reflection brings to consciousness those determinants of a self-formative process. . .which ideologically determine a contemporary practice and conception of the world. . .[It] leads to insight due to the fact that what has previously been unconscious is made conscious in a manner rich in consequences; analytic insights intervene in life [24].

The emancipatory interest is then a cognitive orientation which unmaskes previously concealed determinants in man's self-formative process. It exposes power relations which shape social practice and conceptions of the world. It exposes layers of

compulsion which have been internalized over the course of personal history and natural history. This is a form of reflection then which is appropriately directed both at personal and species-wide acts of self-genesis. It is a cognitive orientation which aims at personal and social emancipation by directing consciousness into a critical mode of reflection (critique) [25].

To summarize briefly then, Habermas has presented three quasitranscendental, species rooted interests which he believes mediate the course of natural history. The technical interest is a general cognitive orientation which discloses reality from the standpoint of a possible prediction and control. The practical interest is similarly an orientation which discloses reality from the standpoint of possible intersubjectivity and mutual understanding. The emancipatory interest is the general orientation which discloses reality from the standpoint of possible freedom from pseudonatural, historically obsolete constraints.

These cognitive orientations have been presented as "anthropologically deep seated" interests which are present at the pretheoretical, prescientific level of everyday life. Habermas argues additionally, that because these human interests are knowledge constitutive, they find their extensions in more abstract levels of human activity -- specifically in the theoretical activity of empirical-analytic sciences, the historical hermeneutic sciences and in philosophy and the critically oriented

sciences (e.g., critical sociology).

### Epistemology

Habermas offers an account of natural-scientific inquiry which links empirical-analytic science with the human interest in technical control. (The empirical-analytic sciences are not exactly coextensive with the natural sciences. Social science may also have empirical-analytic components to the extent that it produces statements about the covariance of observable events, with a view toward prediction.)[26].

As the systematic continuation of the cumulative learning process that proceeds on the prescientific level within the behavioral system of instrumental action, empirical-analytic inquiry aims at the production of technically exploitable knowledge and discloses reality from the viewpoint of possible technical control over objectified processes. The law-like hypotheses characteristic of this type of science can be interpreted as statements about the covariance of events. Given a set of initial conditions, they make predictions possible. Empirical-analytic knowledge is thus possible predictive knowledge. The connection of hypotheses to experience is established through controlled observation, typically an experiment. We generate initial conditions and measure the result of operations carried out under these conditions. In reality then, basic statements do not provide immediate evidence with no admixture of subjectivity. They are not "simple representations of facts in themselves, but express the success or failure of our operations [27].

This interpretation of empirical-analytic science is a critically important argument for an emerging generation of nurse scientists to consider. His interpretation of normal science is making an extremely controversial point about the meaning of scientific statements. This is the controversy between a quasi-instrumental interpretation of science and a realist interpre-

tation of science.

To illustrate this point for nursing, it might help to look at a hypothetical example of empirical-analytic inquiry in nursing research [28]. In experimental research carried out with victims of port-wine stain, researchers engage in controlled observation to measure the effects of laser treatment. After generating initial conditions (e.g., standardized sampling, standardized treatment protocol), experimental research measures the results of operations (experimental intervention) carried out under these conditions. The knowledge which is generated in this process has technical utility because it discloses reality from the viewpoint of possible prediction and control over objectified processes (most would argue that this is prediction and control of hemodynamic processes).

Up to this point, most hard scientists would have little argument with Habermas. The controversy begins, however, with his interpretation of the meaning of scientific statements. According to Habermas, empirical-analytic inquiry in nursing science is not presenting or approximating a true picture of the regular order of a nature-in-itself (e.g., hemodynamic processes). This interpretation of the meaning of scientific statements would coincide with scientific realism and a correspondence theory of truth. Habermas is arguing instead that this kind of knowledge is the expression of the success or failure of instrumental action. It is measuring the pragmatic consequence

of belief about reality; it is not measuring reality in itself.

Habermas developed this somewhat controversial interpretation of empirical-analytic science in his examination of pragmatism as it was expressed by Charles Saunders Peirce [29]. From Peirce, Habermas appropriates a pragmatic interpretation of the meaning of scientific beliefs/statements.

. . .for Peirce, the concept of truth is not derivable merely from the logical rules of the process of inquiry, but rather only from the objective life context in which the process of inquiry fulfills specificable functions: the settlement of opinions, the elimination of uncertainties, fixation of belief. . .the definition of a belief is that we orient our behavior according to it. ". . .Belief consists mainly in being deliberately prepared to adopt the formula believed in as a guide to action." The "essence of belief" is the establishment of a habit; and different beliefs are distinguished by the different modes of action to which they give rise [30].

On this account, empirical inquiry fixes belief about the covariance of events. Empirical-analytic inquiry in nursing fixes belief about the covariance of laser treatment and treatment outcome. But the definition of this belief is that we orient our behavior according to it. The belief is not a mirror image of reality, but rather a formula which is adopted to guide action. The meaning of scientific statements about laser treatment is not that they provide "knowledge of . . ." This is the interpretation of scientific realism. A pragmatic interpretation argues that the meaning of scientific statements about laser treatments is that they provide "knowledge that. . ." scientific statements are a kind of "recipe knowledge." As they

fix belief, they generate behavioral certainty; this is knowing that "if I engage in this specific form of instrumental action, under these specific conditions, I will achieve this level of success." The meaning of scientific statements is then that they establish habits -- they generate habitual forms of (successful) instrumental action.

The significance of this kind of pragmatism for nursing is not just that it is a controversial or an "interesting" interpretation of what "hard" nurse scientists do. Habermas is not engaging in bourgeois abstraction about epistemology. He is making a critically important point about the nature of scientific activity as real human activity and he is presenting critically important insights about an appropriate way for nurse scientists to justify/legitimate their activity.

He is making the point that empirical-analytic inquiry is nothing more than the isolation of a learning process contained in labor. The feedback controlled process of labor is a mechanism which stores or accumulates layers of recipe knowledge. Over history, humans have accumulated an immense stock of formulas which guide instrumental action. Empirical-analytic inquiry, like that found in modern "hard" science, has appropriated this learning process, in many instances, isolating it from everyday life.

Empirical-analytic inquiry then is human activity modeled on a feedback-control or learning process. This is a learning



process which provides humans with the behavioral certainty required for successful instrumental action. Empirical-analytic inquiry produces this behavioral certainty by adhering to a fixed procedure for learning, which is the pattern of inference contained in normal science.

Peirce identified three forms of inference which, taken together, constitute the logic of empirical-analytic inquiry.

Peirce distinguishes three forms of inference: deduction, induction, and abduction. Deduction proves that something must behave in a certain manner; induction that something does in fact behave in a certain manner; and abduction that something probably will behave in a certain manner. . . It is abduction and induction that are important for the topic of inquiry. It is through them that the information input from experience enters our interpretations. The content of our theories about reality is extended abductively through the discovery of new hypotheses, whereas we inductively check the agreement of our hypothesis with the facts [31].

Peirce and Habermas both have taken the additional transcendental logical step of asking about the validity of this pattern of inference. How is it to be justified? Why is the pattern of deduction, induction and abduction a valid form of inference for human inquiry? This is the same question which concerned Kant: It is asking after the conditions of possible knowledge.

Peirce eventually answered this question through the strategy of ontologizing. According to Habermas, he projected the schema of human instrumental action onto nature, proposing Laws of Nature, and Cases arising under these laws. The three modes of inference then correspond to the discovery of laws, the dis-

covery of causes, and the prediction of effects [32].

Habermas maintains however that a genuinely "quasi-transcendental" pragmatism would have answered this question about the logic of inquiry in a different way.

If we assume that reality is not constituted independently of the rules to which the process of inquiry is subject, then we cannot refer to this reality to justify the validity of the rules of the process of inquiry, that is the modes of inference. . .The logical rules of the process of inquiry owe their validity to the circumstance. . .that they establish a procedure that increases intersubjectively recognized beliefs, if it is carried out continuously under empirical conditions. If this method is the sole guarantee of obtaining true statements, then these rules, as specifications of a method, have the function of transcendental conditions of possible objects of experience. But unlike other transcendental conditions, they cannot be derived from the constitution of consciousness per se. They remain contingent as a whole [33].

The validity of the logic of empirical-analytic inquiry then resides in its ability to generate intersubjectively recognized beliefs. It is a method for settling differences of opinion, eliminating behavioral uncertainty, i.e., it is a humanly created procedure for fixing belief. The logic of empirical-analytic inquiry, therefore, has the property of a transcendental condition (a condition of possible knowledge). Objectified reality cannot be constituted independently of the rules of inquiry. But these rules are only a "quasi-transcendental" condition of possible knowledge. They do not represent an ahistorical, fixed structure of consciousness which limits (absolutely) human access to reality.

Rather, the logic of empirical-analytic inquiry is a system

of rules which has been produced contingently in the history of the human species. Deduction, induction and abduction are rules which have been created by real, live people. They are rules which have been accepted because they provide behavioral certainty, because they generate successful instrumental action.

Pragmatism. . .[legitimizes] the validity of synthetic modes of inference on the basis of the transcendental structure of instrumental action. . .The correction and amplification of concepts occurs in processes of syllogistic reasoning, in which abduction, deduction and induction supplement each other. But this "movement of the concept" is neither absolute or self-sufficient. It acquires its meaning only from the system of reference of possible feedback-controlled action. Its goal is the elimination of behavioral uncertainty. The primary form of relation is expressed in the conditional prediction of what events will occur under specifiable conditions, which means in principle conditions that can be manipulated. Thus the meaning of the validity of statements is determined with reference to possible technical control of the connection of empirical variables [34].

These are arguments which struggle for a compromise between an absolute historicism and an absolute transcendentalism in epistemology. On the one hand, Habermas is arguing for a form of historical relativity in conditions of possible knowledge. But that relativity is not completely anarchistic, since it is grounded in a species rooted requirement for behavioral certainty.

For nursing, the significance of these arguments seems to coincide with the following points. Empirical-analytic inquiry (normal science) in nursing is the extension of a learning process which is built into instrumental action. The pattern of inference found in this mode of inquiry (deduction, induction and abduction) derives its validity from the transcendental structure of instru-

mental action. The logic of inquiry found in normal science has validity because it coincides with a learning process which eliminates behavioral uncertainty. It provides nurses with a stock of recipe knowledge to guide instrumental action. Hard science in nursing, therefore, does not produce "privileged representations" or "pictures" of reality which are more accurate than lay representations. Hard science only produces formulas which make us better technicians than the general public.

While nursing science might have a hard enough time accepting this pragmatic view of empirical-analytic inquiry, Habermas' interpretation presents one additional bite. In his criticism of Peirce, he goes on to argue that the sphere of instrumental action, in and of itself, does not provide sufficient justification for the logic of empirical-analytic inquiry. It does not explain how humans achieved consensus about normal science, how they came to agree upon this mode of inquiry.

Reflection on the community of investigators, through whose communication, scientific progress is realized from the transcendental point of view of possible technical control, would necessarily burst the pragmatist framework. Precisely this self-reflection would show that the subject of the process of inquiry forms itself on the foundation of an intersubjectivity that as such extends beyond the transcendental framework of instrumental action. In the dialogic clarification of metatheoretical problems, the communication of investigators avails itself of a mode of knowledge linked to the framework of symbolic interaction. This cognitive mode is presupposed in the acquisition of technically exploitable knowledge (Wissen) but cannot itself be justified in terms of the latter's categories [35].

Habermas is here arguing that the existential framework of

instrumental action is not only the transcendental condition making knowledge possible. Taken alone, the framework of instrumental action does not explain how or why humans have been able to agree in the learning process of normal science. The logic of inquiry found there can be used by solitary persons, individual investigators can think in its pattern of inference. But they do not argue with each other in the confines of deduction, induction and abduction.

Rather, a community of investigators achieves consensus about metatheoretical problems in a mode of thinking and acting which is outside instrumental action. If investigators were only able to constitute reality from the standpoint of instrumental action, they could not recognize and reciprocally know each other as unmistakable individuals. They could not achieve consensus. The framework of instrumental action, in and of itself, cannot provide the ground of intersubjectivity which is presumed in normal science. This foundation of intersubjectivity is provided by another existential framework, another cognitive orientation which is presupposed (but rarely explicated) in the process of empirical-analytic inquiry. That cognitive orientation is the mode of symbolic interaction or communicative action. In it, investigators engage in the dialogic clarification of metatheoretical problems; they achieve mutual understanding.

What does this mean in nursing? It means that as we develop

our expertise in empirical-analytic inquiry, we need to stay focused on two kinds of understanding. We need to pay attention to the logic of scientific inquiry we have adopted and learn how it can provide us with good formulas. But we also need to pay attention to the communicative processes which are presupposed in our use of normal science. We need to learn how we achieve mutual understanding concerning the use of normal science; how we dialogically clarify metatheoretical problems; how we achieve intersubjectivity; how we justify our use of empirical-analytic inquiry. If we stay focused exclusively on our skills in empirical-analytic inquiry, we end up being unable to justify our use of normal science, literally not knowing what we are doing or why.

This is a critically important point which justifies some reiteration. If empirical-analytic inquiry (conforming to the pattern of deduction-induction-abduction) is accepted as a valid mode of understanding in nursing, then we have chosen to accept the logic and method of the natural sciences to help us become better technicians; to increase our success at instrumental action. But if this is the only mode of understanding which we accept as valid, then we have chosen a form of human understanding which cannot account for itself.

The existential framework of instrumental action can only frame reality from the perspective of technical control. It will only admit problems and questions related to instrumental

activity. It will not admit questions concerning understanding, if by understanding we mean mutually accepted meaning. It will not admit questions or debate on the topic of itself; it will not admit questions such as "why is this a valid form of knowing." It literally is a kind of understanding which cannot account for itself or justify itself.

To feel comfortable and confident in our use of normal science, nurses need to recognize another form of understanding which is presupposed in empirical-analytic inquiry. This is the kind of understanding which Habermas identified in the dialogic activity of investigators. It is a kind of knowing which is outside the pragmatist program of Peirce. This is hermeneutic understanding, the ground of intersubjectivity which is achieved not in instrumental action, but in communicative (symbolic) interaction.

In its very structure, hermeneutic understanding is designed to guarantee, within cultural traditions, the possible action-orienting self-understanding of individuals and groups as well as reciprocal understanding between different individuals and groups. It makes possible the form of unconstrained consensus and type of open intersubjectivity on which communicative action depends. It bans the danger of communication breakdown in both dimensions: the vertical one of one's own individual life history and the collective tradition to which one belongs, and the horizontal one of mediating between the traditions of different individuals, groups and cultures. When these communication flows break off and the intersubjectivity of mutual understanding is either rigidified or falls apart, a condition of survival is disturbed, one that is as elementary as the complementary condition of the success of instrumental action: namely the possibility of unconstrained agreement and non-violent recognition. Because this is the presupposition of practice, we call the knowledge constructive interest of

the cultural sciences (Geisteswissenschaften) "practical" [36].

Habermas is here arguing that the dialogic activity of humans, those forms of communicative interaction which occur via ordinary language use, produce a dimension of understanding which is presupposed in scientific inquiry. This is a dimension of understanding which he called hermeneutic, meaning that it produces reciprocal understanding, or shared, common interpretations among different individuals and groups. In its structure or in its logic, hermeneutic understanding differs fundamentally from the logic of scientific inquiry. This is a structure which does not follow the lines of deduction, induction and abduction. The structure of hermeneutic understanding is dialogic, it takes its form from the logic of ordinary language.

The historical-hermeneutic sciences gain knowledge in a different methodological framework. Here the meaning of the validity of propositions is not constituted in the frame of reference of technical control. . . theories are not constructed deductively and experience is not organized with regard to the success of operations. Access to the facts is provided by the understanding of meaning, not observation. The verification of lawlike hypotheses in the empirical-analytic sciences has its counterpart here in the interpretation of texts. Thus the rules of hermeneutics determine the possible meaning of the validity of statements of the cultural sciences. . . The subject of hermeneutic understanding establishes communication between (two) worlds. . . hermeneutic inquiry discloses reality subject to a constitute interest in the preservation and expansion of the intersubjectivity of possible action-orienting mutual understanding. The understanding of meaning is directed in its very structure toward the attainment of possible consensus among actors in the framework of a self-understanding derived from tradition [37]

Understanding in the (nonpositivistic) historical-



hermeneutic sciences then proceeds according to the rules of interpretation. This is a process of interpreting texts, clarifying meaning or of understanding another tradition, where subjects can, in principle, reach consensus or mutual agreement. This is the kind of action-orienting intersubjectivity which makes possible the taken for granted, unconstrained agreement and nonviolent recognition which is presupposed in ordinary language use and in everyday life [38]. The historical-hermeneutic sciences then differ fundamentally from the empirical-analytic sciences, in both their goals or purposes, in their access to data, in their processes of verification, and in the meaning of their statements. The clarification of these differences and an appropriate use of both forms of science remains as an important task for nurse-intellectuals [39].

A final form of understanding identified by Habermas was again linked to the existential requirement for emancipation. Habermas described the critical sciences and philosophy as forms of knowledge which objectify emancipatory reason. He characterized this form of knowing as follows:

When reason constitutes itself in terms of a critique of reified consciousness, then its viewpoint, namely idealism, cannot be compelled by means of arguments according to the rules of logic alone. In order to divest oneself rationally of the limitations of dogmatism, one must first have made the interest of reason one's own: The ultimate basis of the difference between the idealist and the dogmatist is thus the difference of interest. The desire for emancipation and an original act of freedom are presupposed. . .[40].

A form of reason which is driven by an interest in freedom

is something which is different, in kind, than that natural attitude which Habermas calls reified consciousness. The commonly held, natural attitude takes itself to be reflecting reality or nature as if it (the natural attitude) were a mirror [41]. Emancipatory reason, on the other hand, begins from a desire for freedom. This original act takes emancipatory reason (idealism) beyond the reified images of reality held in any particular epoch. Emancipatory reason is thus a strange bird, something which refuses to be confined to the cages of existent reality/experience.

Habermas finds reason, in all its forms to be committed or guided by a human interest. Reason in the form of the natural attitude is consciousness committed to the human interests of technical control and practical communicative competence. Reason, so committed, takes on the form of the natural attitude with a view toward disclosing reality. But at both the prescientific and scientific levels of practice, this disclosure of reality is always committed. It is a view of reality oriented toward technical control or practical symbolic interaction.

Empirical-analytic sciences disclose reality in so far as it appears within the behavior system of instrumental action. . . . nomological statements about this object domain. . . .grasp reality with regard to technical control that, under specified conditions, is possible everywhere and at all times. The hermeneutic sciences do not disclose reality under a different transcendental framework. Rather, they are directed toward the transcendental structures of various actual forms of life, within each of which reality is interpreted according to a specific grammar of world-apprehension, and of action. They grasp interpretations of reality with regard to intersubjectivity of action-orienting

understanding possible from a given hermeneutic starting point [42].

While the natural and behavioral sciences are reason committed either to hermeneutic understanding or instrumental action, critical consciousness is reason no less committed. Critical thought commits itself to the emancipatory interest of liberation from dogmatic dependence. This is the interest in exposing "ideologically frozen" relations of dependence, institutionalized social relations that in principle can be transformed.

[Emancipatory] reason takes up a partisan position in the controversy between critique and dogmatism and with each new stage of emancipation it wins a further victory. In this kind of [critical] reason, insight and explicit interest in liberation by means of reflection converge. The higher level of reflection coincides with a step forward in the progress toward the autonomy of the individual, with the elimination of suffering and the furthering of concrete happiness. Reason involved in this argument against dogmatism has definitely taken up this interest as its own. . . . [It] presupposes the experience of emancipation by means of critical insight into relationships of power, the objectivity of which has as its source solely in that the relationships have not been seen through. . . . Reason has not yet renounced the will to the rational [43].

Emancipatory reason is here a form of consciousness which is committed on two counts. In the first instance, it is reason committed to a number of existential ends. These include the elimination of suffering and the furthering of concrete happiness. But importantly, critical thought is also committed to human liberation from dogma. In the twin moments of insight and emancipation from dogmatic assumptions, critical thought aims at a particular form of liberation which is freedom from child-

like dependent consciousness.

Emancipatory reason is thus committed to the autonomy of the individual; to autonomous, adult existence, liberated from child-like dogmatic dependence. The metaphor of human cognitive development is used frequently to describe this transformation, emphasizing common moments of critical reflection and insight, where child-like dependent cognition gives way to adult, autonomous thought [44].

An adult state of liberation from dogmatically held maxims and doctrine is then an important existential end to which critical thought commits itself. But beyond its commitment to certain humanistic ends, emancipatory reason also contains a commitment to means. It commits itself to reason as the appropriate means for achieving emancipatory ends.

Emancipatory consciousness, under Habermas, presupposes an original act of liberation by means of critical insight into the relationships of power. Here, emancipation happens in the simultaneous moments of insight and rejection of dogma. The objectivity or legitimacy of dogma comes from its nontransparency. It has not been "seen through." Under emancipatory reason, liberation occurs in an act of recognition which clarifies, exposes or demystifies relationships of power.

In the concept of reason active as critique of (dogma), knowledge and commitment are related dialectically: on the one hand, it is only possible to see through the dogmatism of a congealed society to the degree to which knowledge has committed itself to being guided by the anticipation of an

emancipated society and actualized adult autonomy for all human beings; at the same time, on the other hand, this interest demands that insights into the processes of social development be already attained, because only in these processes can such insight be constituted as objective [45].

Having achieved liberation in such an original, critical act of reason, emancipatory consciousness then commits itself to this form of reason as both a legitimate-liberating means and a legitimate-liberating end. In this kind of critical thought, "insight and explicit interest in liberation by means of reflection converge." This is reason committed to the will to reason [46].

Under Habermas, critical thought commits itself to rational discourse. This is reason committed to itself as an emancipatory end and an emancipatory means. In these commitments, emancipatory reason is much different than technical and practical reason. It is a kind of thinking and acting which takes up "the seriousness, pain, patience and work of the negative" [47]. It is a form of reason which never stops searching, which never accepts the status quo, which continually negates reified assumptions.

We never cease living in the world of perception, but we go beyond it in critical thought -- almost to the point of forgetting the contribution of perception to our idea of truth. For critical thought encounters only bare propositions which it discusses, accepts or rejects. Critical thought has broken with the naive evidence of things and when it affirms, it is because it no longer finds any means of denial [48].

Habermas maintains that this form of critical thought or emancipatory reason finds its extension in the critical sciences

and philosophy.

The systematic sciences of social action, that is economics, sociology, and political science, have the goal, as do the empirical analytic sciences, of producing nomological knowledge. A critical social science, however, will not remain satisfied with this. It is concerned with going beyond this goal to determine when theoretical statements grasp invariant regularities of social action as such and when they express ideologically frozen relations of dependence that can in principle be transformed [49].

To reiterate, this last epistemological category of emancipatory reason or critical thought is a category which differs from instrumental reason in the empirical-analytic sciences and from practical reason in the historical-hermeneutic sciences in its goals and purposes, access to data, processes of verification and in the meaning of its statements. It is a category which has been the target of some important criticism and a segment of Habermas' work which has been revised and changed over the years. The clarification of this kind of understanding and an exploration of its use in nursing research remains as an important task for organic intellectuals in nursing (those who preserve an organic link to the working class)[51].

### 1.3 Concept Definition: The Phenomenon of Ideology

The preceding sections have attempted to clarify the tradition of critical theory and the epistemological framework contained therein. This study will borrow insights and assumptions from this tradition, in an effort to develop a critical perspective which focuses on the social institution of

nursing. An important part of this study will include a look at contemporary ideology in nursing. This is a critical exploration, in other words, which struggles to examine both the ideology and the practice of nurses in bourgeois society.

Because the study seeks, in part, to explore ideology and to develop a critical perspective about ideology in nursing, it seems important to make some preliminary comments to clarify the definition of ideology, as this concept is used in the following pages.

In a descriptive sense, ideology usually refers to the ideational sphere of culture. In this sense, ideology usually includes aspects of culture such as values, norms, religious beliefs, philosophy, sentiments, ethical principles, world views, etc. [51]. In a very loose descriptive sense, ideology may be equated with Weltanschauung, a term which translates roughly into the English counterpart, "world view." Here, ideology or "world view" captures a subset of characteristic beliefs, values, principles, etc. which are widely shared among members of a society.

The intuition which motivates the introduction of a concept of ideology as "world-view" is that individuals and groups don't just "have" randomly collected bundles of beliefs, attitudes, life-goals, etc. The bundles generally have some coherency. . .the elements in (ideological bundles) are widely shared among agents in the group, the beliefs are systematically interconnected, they are "central" to the agents' conceptual scheme, i.e., the agents won't easily give them up, the beliefs have a wide and deep influence on the agents' behavior, and the beliefs in the world are "central" in that they deal with central issues of human

life (i.e., they give interpretations of such things as death, the need to work, sexuality, etc.) or central metaphysical issues [52].

Ideology, in this descriptive sense, refers to a form of consciousness which is deeply embedded -- a perspective or a way of apprehending reality which exerts a wide influence on human action. In this investigation, ideology (so defined) will be examined using several neo-Marxian premises or assumptions. These assumptions about ideology also coincide with the perspective found in critical theory.

With the early Marx (and Habermas), this study will view ideology as existentially determined:

The production of ideas, of conceptions, of consciousness is at first directly interwoven with the material activity and the material intercourse of men, the language of real life. Men are the producers of their conceptions, ideas etc. -- real, active men, as they are conditioned by a definite development of their productive forces and of the intercourse corresponding to these, up to its furthest forms. Consciousness can never be anything else than conscious existence, and the existence of men is their actual life-process. In direct contrast to German philosophy which descends from heaven to earth, here we ascend from earth to heaven. We set out from real active men, and on the basis of their real life process we demonstrate the development of the ideological reflexes and echoes of this life process. Morality, religion, metaphysics, all the rest of ideology and their corresponding forms of consciousness thus no longer retain the semblance of independence. They have no history, no development, but men, developing their material production and their material intercourse, alter, along with this their real existence, their thinking and the products of their thinking. Life is not determined by consciousness, but consciousness by life [53].

Here, the significant assumption is that ideology, Weltanschauung or consciousness may only be understood in its re-



lation to real existential conditions, or in its connection to the real bodily activity of humans. While Marx may have emphasized the category of labor as the primary mode of human activity grounding ideology, this study will also emphasize the category of communicative action or language as an existential determinant of ideology.

The study will then contain the following three primary assumptions about ideology:

1. That ideology is existentially determined. (That existence or existential conditions shape consciousness.)
2. That one fundamental category of existential activity is labor. That economic activity and class or social position are primary influences shaping ideology.
3. That another fundamental category of existential activity is communicative activity. That the use of symbols, especially language, is an existential activity which also shapes the formation of ideology.

These three assumptions -- an existential grounding, the importance of labor and language -- have been present in other descriptions of ideology. The sociology of knowledge tradition (particularly the work of Mannheim) and the tradition of symbolic interactionism were both perspectives which shared these assumptions about ideology, perspective or consciousness.

Along with Marx and Habermas, Karl Mannheim [54] preserved the existential grounding of ideology in real human activity.

He maintained that ideology is rooted in the existential category of labor, as did Marx and Habermas. But along with Habermas, Mannheim argued that Marx had collapsed too much existential activity into the category of labor. He objected to Marx's "undifferentiated" notion of class, which reduced so much existential activity to economic position [55]. Mannheim then extended the existential basis of ideology, including other categories beyond economic position as examples of social context which ground ideology.

Mannheim, objecting to the assumption of what he termed a "dogmatic Marxism" which asserts that all social thought is traceable to a class basis, postulates a series of other social groups which are bearers of social ideologies or perspectives. . .Mannheim does not merely impute thought to be a class basis, but rather, he holds the opinion, held by many social psychologists, that "reference groups" are also basis of perspectives. . .Mannheim's primary objection to what he terms an "undifferentiated class concept" is that it is too narrow. Again, he broadens the Marxian base to include such groups as "generations, status groups, sects, occupational groups, etc." [56].

While preserving the existential determination of ideology, this tradition broadened that existential base. Mannheim still argued that class stratification was the primary or most significant form of social grouping to influence ideology. He thereby preserved the Marxian emphasis on labor as a fundamental category of existential activity.

But he also extended this existential grounding to include other related aspects of social context, e.g., generations. This is a way of grounding ideology in social context and existential activity, as did Habermas. These are existential assumptions, in

other words, which relate consciousness, cognitive orientations, world views or ideology to real human activity and to the social context in which human actors find themselves.

With these kinds of assumptions, a critical analysis of nursing ideology would relate that ideology to the social context of nurses, to their economic activity and to their social positions. It would view economic position and economic activity as primary influences on nursing ideology. But it would also capture other aspects of social context; e.g., generation, gender, etc. It would view nursing ideology as a "collective perspective" which is produced in the socioeconomic activity of nurses.

Beyond this prejudice or assumption concerning labor and social context as an existential basis for ideology, the study will also share a linguistic assumption which was found in the tradition of symbolic interactionism and in the work of Habermas. The addition of a "linguistic turn" in the analysis of ideology is a corrective which would have strengthened the Marxian/Mannheim perspective.

Mannheim does not deal adequately with the mechanisms that connect thought to its social matrix. G.H. Mead, however, does develop a theoretical bridge between thought and existential reality: he identifies language and role taking as the principle connecting mechanism [57].

In its emphasis upon language, the tradition of symbolic interactionism appropriated insights from the "linguistic turn" in twentieth century thought. As with Habermas and most other forms

of social theory, the work of Mead reflected a twentieth century acknowledgment of the role of language in shaping ideological and material conditions of existence. These are interpretations which preserve the notion of humans as a cultural, that is, a symbol producing, species.

Mead does not argue that language expresses ideas which exist antecedently in all minds, nor does it reflect "data" from the objective environment. More correctly, language is a socially constituted product that focuses attention on specific aspects of the environment in specialized ways; the prevailing universe of discourse establishes a framework for our perspectives of social reality [58].

Linguistic assumptions, such as those found in symbolic interactionism and critical theory, are an important bias in this investigation. They emphasize the role of language as an existential basis or determinant of ideology. These are assumptions which relate social perspectives to a matrix of discourse or to language and symbols, as these shape our perspectives of social reality [59].

Linguistic assumptions, such as those found in critical theory, and symbolic interactionism, would relate nursing ideology not only to the economic activity of nurses and to their social positions, but also to the universe of discourse shared by humans in the twentieth century industrial capitalism. Nursing ideology would then be linked to the communicative interaction of nurses, to the use of symbols and language by nurses as participants in modern industrial society.

These assumptions, then, produce a perspective about

ideology which links it to real human activity. This is focusing on ideology as a collective perspective or a frame of reference which is produced in the bodily activity of humans. In its existential assumptions, this critical perspective would emphasize the kind of class activity experienced by nurses (their bodily labor) as having a primary influence on the production of nursing ideology. Additionally, this kind of critical perspective would emphasize the language used by nurses and the universe of discourse they share with others as a second existential activity shaping the ideology of nurses. Ideology is then seen as a collective perspective or frame of reference, produced in the existential activities of labor and language, which orients human access to reality.

These kinds of assumptions about ideology have been found in the work of many twentieth century intellectuals. In addition to Habermas, Mannheim and Mead, the work of M. Merleau-Ponty also reflected assumptions about labor and language. Merleau-Ponty attempted to blend a Marxist-existentialist analysis with his version of phenomenology. From the phenomenological tradition, Merleau-Ponty appropriated insights concerning consciousness as a frame of reference or medium which orients human access to reality. But against Husserl, and with Heidegger (and Habermas), Merleau-Ponty argued for the existential grounding of consciousness.

For Merleau-Ponty, consciousness, ideology, or perspective

was viewed as a pretheoretical foundation of existence. In analyses which resemble some of Habermas' work, Merleau-Ponty argued that ideological formations or perspectives are practical categories or frames of reference which are produced in the real material activity of humans. Ideology was then presented as a practical category which orients human being-in-the-world.

Marx's materialism is the idea that all the ideological formations of a given society are synonymous with or complementary to, a certain type of praxis, i.e., the way this society has set up its basic relationship with nature. It is the idea that economy and ideology have interior ties within the totality of history. . . The spirit of society is realized, transmitted and perceived through the cultural objects which it bestows upon itself and in the midst of which it lives. It is there that the deposit of its practical categories is built up, and these categories, in turn, suggest a way of being and thinking [60].

This is a way of viewing ideology which recognizes its "centrality" or its fundamental function as a frame of reference which orients. The investigation will share these Marxian-existentialist biases about ideology. With Merleau-Ponty and with Habermas, the study will view ideology as a pretheoretical foundation of existence or as a "quasi-transcendental" frame of reference which orients human access to reality. Ideology will then be seen as both an epistemological category and as an existential category, as a frame of reference which orients human access to reality and as a frame of reference which orients human being-in-the-world.

These sorts of assumptions about ideology suggest the use

of a Marxian/existentialist slant in the analysis of nursing ideology. That analysis would situate nursing ideology within the broader, sociohistorical structure of twentieth century Western ideology writ large. Nursing ideology would then be viewed as an example of those "pretheoretical foundations" which orient human existence in twentieth century industrial/capitalist society.

Nursing ideology would be seen as a collective perspective. It would be viewed as a "practical category," or as a frame of reference which "prejudices" nurses, suggesting both a way of being and a way of knowing. These are existential and epistemological consequences of nursing ideology which can be traced to the real embodied labor of nurses and to the use of symbols or language within the social institution of nursing.

### 1.3 Methodology

Since the investigation seeks to explore segments of ideology and practice within the social institution of nursing, this section will discuss the method which will be used to make this exploration. The method of analysis used in this investigation will be labeled radical reflection. This is a method of analysis which takes its intellectual origins again from existentialist phenomenology and critical theory. Here the discussion will attempt to briefly explicate the steps or structure of this method, as it will be applied in this investigation.

As method, radical reflection appropriates an attitude or a viewpoint which owes some of its origin to Husserlian phenomenology. For Husserl, reflection was a method of analysis used to investigate the a priori (not psychological) structure of consciousness. Husserl argued for a radical use of the method to investigate phenomena or "objects-as-they-are experienced." He undertook the development of a new discipline, phenomenology, which he believed could be a radical "root" or foundation for science and logic itself. In phenomenology then, reflection would have been a method of analysis which preceded ontological and epistemological investigations.

The current investigation does not share the Husserlian interest in transcendental subjectivity. It resists the tendency in Husserlian phenomenology (and Kantian epistemology) to search for an ahistorical knowing subject and an ahistorical knowing process. It resists the attempt to focus on a logically necessary structure of consciousness and logically necessary conditions of possible knowledge.

However, from Husserl, this method does appropriate a key phenomenological insight concerning the "natural attitude." Husserl labeled a naive, nonreflexive interpretation of reality, "the general thesis of the natural standpoint." He described this natural attitude as follows:

I find continually present and standing over against me the one spatio-temporal fact-word to which I myself belong, as do all other men found in it and related in the same way to



it. This "fact-word," as the world already tells us, I find to be out there, and also take it just as it gives itself to me as something that exists out there. All doubting and rejecting of the data of the natural world leaves standing the general thesis of the natural standpoint. "The" world is as fact-world always there. . "it" remains ever, in the sense of the general thesis, a world that has its being out there [61].

For Husserl, the general thesis of a world or reality with its own independent existence, is the characteristic attitude of a natural (naive) standpoint. Husserl proposed a method, or a series of steps, which he believed could radically alter the natural thesis.

Instead now of remaining at this standpoint, we propose to alter it radically. . . We put out of action the general thesis which belongs to the essence of the natural standpoint, we place in brackets whatever it includes respecting the nature of Being: this entire natural world therefore which is continually "there for us," "present to our hand" and will ever remain there is a "fact-world" of which we continue to be conscious. . . If I do this, I do not then deny this "world," as though I were a sophist, I do not doubt that it is there as though I were a skeptic; but I use the phenomenological epoche, which completely bars me from using any judgment that concerns spatio-temporal existence (Dasein) [62].

### Bracketing

From Husserl, this investigation will retain a modified version of this methodological step. An important first step in radical reflection is a "bracketing" of the natural thesis. As Husserl (and later Merleau-Ponty) argued, this "bracketing" is a step which includes neither doubt nor denial of the world. Bracketing is rather a kind of suspension, where all judgment concerning a spatiotemporal world is placed in abeyance.

Reflection does not withdraw from the world towards the unity of consciousness as the world's basis; it steps back to watch the forms of transcendence fly up like sparks from a fire; it slakens the intentional threads which attach us to the world and thus brings them to our notice. . .in order to see the world and grasp it as paradoxical, we must break with our familiar acceptance of it. . .[63].

In this investigation, radical reflection begins with this kind of suspension, bracketing or epoche. This a temporary "slackening" of intentional ties to an external world. It is temporarily suspending all judgment about a given, external reality. The first step of radical reflection is then a bracketing of the natural thesis.

In successive steps, the method takes its inspiration primarily from the existentialist version of phenomenology. With Merleau-Poincy, this method does not find pure consciousness as a residuum which is left over after the reduction. Instead, as the method suspends the natural attitude, it discovers the existential layer of the Lebenswelt or "life world;" it discovers the prereflective foundation of being-in-the-world.

[From this epoche] we can learn nothing but the unmotivated upsurge of the world. The most important lesson which the reduction teaches us is the impossibility of a complete reduction. . .since we are in the world, since indeed our reflections are carried out in the temporal flux on to which we are trying to seize, there is no thought which embraces all our thought. The philosopher is a perpetual beginner. . .radical reflection amounts to a consciousness of its own dependence on an unreflective life. . .[64].

In this investigation, the initial step of bracketing helps to suspend judgment about a given, external spatio-temporal

reality. But this bracketing is only a "temporary slackening" of intentional ties to the world. What it discovers behind those ties is an "unmotivated upsurge of the world," or more precisely, of human-being-in-the-world. After the epoche, the method does not find pure consciousness, but rather a prereflective layer of being-in-the-world. The reduction helps us to discover the impossibility of a complete reduction. It draws our attention not to an external reality-in-itself and not to a pure eidetic consciousness -- but rather to a prereflective foundation of being-in-the-world. This is discovering, again, the existential foundation of consciousness.

#### Historia: Historical Recovery

The next step in radical reflection goes on to explore this prereflective "life-world." In its second step, the method includes a process of historical recovery. In this step, the method attempts to reconstruct or recover other historical traditions which have led to our current existential modes, our unreflective ways of being-in-the-world and our interpretations of reality. This kind of historical reflection resembles introspection, since it attempts to remember or reconstruct the genesis of our historical selves.

In this step of historical reflection, the method recovers concrete historical examples of human being-in-the-world as this has changed over time. This is remembering other times in history, other modes of human conduct (real, existential

activity) and other ideological formations, as human traditions which have preceded this one.

Remembering in this way, or passing through stages of reflection and recovery, helps to establish a self-understanding or a reflexivity about our historical selves. It helps to keep the natural attitude partially suspended, so that an external reality does not become reified, as fixed, given or fully determinate. It helps us to recognize that other interpretations of reality are possible, since other interpretations have occurred in history.

In its first two steps then, the method suspends the general thesis of a reified world, and reconstructs the genesis of our historical selves, our unreflective mode of being-in-the-world and our interpretations of reality. This is a kind of reflection which helps us to recognize ourselves as historical knowing subjects who use an historical knowing process to constitute reality.

The observing consciousness of phenomenology knows that it itself is incorporated in the experience of reflection as one of its elements. Beginning with natural consciousness, its genesis must be reconstructed up to the point of view provisionally taken by the phenomenological observer. Then the position of the critique of knowledge can coincide with the constituted self-consciousness of a consciousness that has become aware of its own self-formative process; . . . For the consciousness that is about to begin the task of examination, the subject of epistemological investigation is not yet at hand. It is first given to itself only with the result of its self-ascertainment [65].

In its initial steps, radical reflection brackets the

natural attitude and becomes aware of consciousness as an active ingredient in the constitution of reality. But bracketing, in and of itself, is only the first step in a process of achieving self-consciousness. Consciousness which has just become aware of itself, must then go on to reconstruct its genesis, ascertaining its own self-formative process. This is recognizing how we came to be the historical knowing subjects we are. With this historical recovery, the historical knowing subject is given to itself. This is another way of saying that consciousness achieves self-consciousness or self-understanding.

Having established this kind of reflexivity, the method then goes on to include a third step of critique. In this step, the method identifies epistemic, functional or genetic problems which may be present in human interpretations of reality or in various ideological formations. The critique of ideology is therefore an important third step in the methodology of radical reflection.

### Critique

The step of critique is an episode of self-consciousness; it is consciousness examining itself and becoming critical of itself. Kant engaged in this kind of critique when he examined pure and practical reason. Hegel extended that analysis, arguing that consciousness cannot become radically critical of itself, until it has reconstructed its own genesis.

Here, the step of critique follows historical recovery.

Radical reflection can include a moment of critique, when consciousness has become aware of its own self-formative process. This is reiterating the Hegelian emphasis in critical theory: the critique of knowledge coincides with self-consciousness. Radical reflection cannot engage in the task of self-examination until the subject of epistemological investigation is "at hand," -- until consciousness has reconstructed its own historical genesis.

When historical recovery produces this kind of self-consciousness, then reflection can also include the moment of critique. This is the hallmark of epistemological investigations; it is consciousness becoming critical of itself. For Kant, critique was consciousness struggling to identify its own limits. For Habermas, critique was consciousness struggling to radicalize the experience of critique.

Here, the discussion will explicate some guidelines for the step of critique. In the tradition of Marxian discourse, the critique of ideology is a kind of critical examination which illustrates this moment of critical self-consciousness. It is consciousness becoming critical of itself, examining problems or limits contained in itself. Ideologiekritik then can be examined as an example of the third step in radical reflection, critique.

As mentioned previously, a critique of ideology will be focusing on the "collective perspective" or the

"pretheoretical" frame of reference used by social actors. This is becoming reflective and critical about those prereflective and uncritical frames of reference which orient human action in the world. Ideologiekritik is then a temporary "slackening" of intentional ties; it is a temporary suspension of those frames of reference which orient our action-in-the-world, and it is a critical examination which begins to identify problems or limits in those frames of reference.

In its critical examination, ideologiekritik begins to identify problems or limitations in our commonly held world views. It becomes critical of ideology, uncovering aspects of consciousness which, though once accepted as true or accurate, now seem delusional. This critical examination then identifies some aspects of consciousness or ideology as "false." Geuss discussed three ways in which ideology may be judged false.

1. Ideology may be judged false in virtue of some epistemic properties of the beliefs which are its constituents.
2. Ideology may be judged false in virtue of its functional properties.
3. Ideology may be judged false in virtue of some of its genetic properties [66].

In the first instance, above, ideology may be judged false because of some problem with its epistemic properties. This might occur because ideology misinterprets or confuses the epistemic status of some of its beliefs. For example, ideology

might contain both normative beliefs (or value statements) and descriptive beliefs (statements concerning empirically verifiable phenomena). These are different kinds of knowledge; i.e., they require different conditions of verification. When ideology confuses these two kinds of beliefs or overlooks the difference in their epistemic standing, it makes a "category mistake" (metabasis) and might be judged false. This problem occurs (rather frequently) when normative beliefs are presented as statements of fact, or when normative-analytic theories present themselves as empirical-analytic constructions.

In the social reality of nursing, contemporary nursing ideology might then be judged false if it confuses the epistemic standing of some of its beliefs. This criticism might be made, for example, when nursing theory presents normative beliefs as statements of fact. Some examples of nursing theory which surfaced in the 1960s (e.g., Weidenbach, Orlando, Travelbee) contained many normative beliefs about nursing practice. They were largely normative-analytic statements which presented value judgments concerning the "good" or "right" conduct in nursing. "Therapeutic use of self" and the presence of "compassion" were normative features in these theories which defined good nursing practice.

So long as nursing ideology recognizes statements such as these as normative-analytic constructions, it does not make a category mistake. But when nursing ideology confuses normative-



analytic statements like these for empirical-analytic statements, then it might be judged "false" in view of a metabasis. When these examples of normative judgments are accepted as statements of fact, then nursing theory might be criticized as "false" in view of an epistemic problem.

Other problems concerning the epistemic properties of ideology occur when descriptive beliefs are not supported by available empirical evidence. For example, ideology might be judged false when it contains beliefs to the effect that the particular interest of some subgroup is the general interest of the group as a whole. Frequently, this descriptive belief is not supported by available empirical evidence. This sort of epistemic problem might occur, for example, when empirical evidence demonstrates that the particular interest which nurses have in professionalism may not always coincide with the general interest of society (e.g., competent practitioners). Professional ideology also expresses an elitist perspective in which a subset of social actors (professionals) are granted prestige/privilege which may eventually come in conflict with the interest of society as a whole. (The obvious example here is the escalating cost of health care in industrial societies and the cost of educating health care professionals.)

Additionally, ideology may be judged false when it contains descriptive beliefs to the effect that empirical phenomena are static or unchanging, although available empirical evidence

fails to support this view. This last problem occurs when ideology contains an "objectification mistake." This is the mistake of constituting social phenomena in the same manner as natural phenomena. For example, when social agents "falsely objectify" their own activity, they take the activity to be a natural process, something beyond their control. This is a belief which is ideologically delusive or false, in the sense that it rests on an objectification mistake and that it is not supported by available empirical evidence.

These are examples of ideologies which may be judged false in view of some problem with their epistemic properties. But an ideology may also be judged false because of some of its functional properties. Here ideology carries a pejorative connotation when it functions to stabilize or legitimize certain kinds of social institutions and practices or when it functions to obscure or to conceal the repressive nature of certain social formations. Ideology may then be judged false when it supports or justifies reprehensible social relations, unjust social practices, exploitative institutions, hegemony or domination.

This is the sense in which Habermas described the legitimating function of ideology in social formations under capitalism:

With private ownership of the means of production, a power relationship is institutionalized in class societies, which in the long run threatens social integration; for the opposition of interests established in the class relationship represents a conflict potential. Of course,

within the framework of a legitimate order of authority, the opposition of interests can be kept latent and integrated for a certain time. This is the achievement of legitimating world-views or ideologies. They remove the counterfactual validity claims of normative structures from the sphere of public thematization and testing. The order of authority is justified by falling back on traditional world views and a conventional civic ethic [67].

Here, ideology legitimizes authority structures by removing them from the sphere of public testing. Under capitalism, power relationships continue because of "ideologically false," counterfactual validity claims. That is, the normative components of ideology commonly make a validity claim concerning the existing authority structure; e.g., that the current corporate employer/employee authority structure is a valid form of social organization.

But this is a validity claim which does not derive from empirical testing. The authority structure is prevented from ever reaching the stage of public testing because traditional world views and "conventional civic ethics" close off the possibility of verification/falsification. "Class society is valid; there is no reason to test it."

The function of justifying or stabilizing certain hegemonic aspects of social reality by removing them from the sphere of empirical verification is a property which makes ideology "false" or delusive. It is delusive because it obscures exploitative conditions or domination or repression, never allowing these to be tested empirically. But this criticism of

"false" consciousness does not imply that all forms of domination, authority or repression may just be eliminated; or that the legitimacy of any and all power relations is to be questioned. Rather, ideology may be judged false if it legitimizes a level of domination or repression which is more extensive than that required for human existence.

Marxists are committed to the view that at certain levels of development of material forces of production, an unequal distribution of repressive normative power is historically necessary, i.e., necessary for the society to maintain and reproduce itself. If a certain distribution of power is "necessary," there seems no point in questioning its legitimacy. . . Showing that a form of consciousness supports unequal distribution of power does not, in itself, give us reason to reject the form of consciousness -- unless we also know that this distribution of power is not at present necessary. To say that a society imposes "surplus repression" on its members is to say that it frustrates their preferences to a greater extent than is necessary for it to maintain and reproduce itself. . . We could then define ideology as a (false) form of consciousness when it supports or legitimizes surplus [repression] [68].

This analysis raises points which have been made by both Marx and Freud. At the human level, both have argued that species survival requires the collective effort of individuals to secure technical control over the external environment. Economic scarcity, in turn, requires that aggressive and libidinal impulses be suppressed; that society restrict the number of its members and divert their energies from sexual activity to work. But as the forces of production expand, institutionalized repressions are not just eliminated. They become linked to the organization of society, specifically to

the organization of labor processes and to the distribution of wealth. At any given level of technological development, then, there will be a certain socially necessary level of repression (necessary in the sense that it is demanded by economic scarcity). But there will also be institutionalized sources of repression (including class specific privations and prohibitions) which are superfluous; they function mainly to secure a particular system of social labor and maintain the distribution of wealth. The difference between the existing level of institutionalized repression and the degree of repression that is necessary at a given level of technological development is a measure of surplus (superfluous) domination.

In his work on the theory of civilization, Freud recognized the use of institutionalized repression as a mechanism which functions to maintain a hegemonic social order.

With the recognition that every civilization rests on a compulsion to work and a renunciation of instinct and therefore inevitably provokes opposition from those affected by these demands, it has become clear that civilization cannot consist principally or solely in wealth itself and the means of acquiring it and the agreements of its distribution; for these things are threatened by the rebelliousness and destructive mania of participants in civilization. Alongside of wealth we now come upon the means by which civilization can be defended -- measures of coercion and other measures that are intended to reconcile men to it and recompense them for their sacrifices. The latter may be described as the mental assets of civilization [69].

Here, Freud captured the influence of coercion and power relations in ideology as they function to reproduce an existing hegemonic social order. Institutionalized sources of repression

are power relations; they impose sanctions on specific forms of social action to the end that an existing social order is reproduced. Ideology becomes coercive when it is translated into an inner compulsion to conform; to accept superfluous forms of domination. An institutionalized authority structure does not require compulsion through open force when it has been legitimized by inner compulsion through the affective force of unconscious mechanisms. Under these conditions of inner compulsion, ideology becomes "power" and "coercion" just because it has removed institutionalized power relations from the sphere of public testing.

The coercive force of ideology may then be thought of as a distorted form of communication [70]. The "mental assets" of a civilization, its "world views," ideals, values, etc. are shared in the sphere of symbolic interaction. When symbols transform a superfluous level of domination into socially acceptable norms, ideology then contains symbolically redirected sources of repression, "world views" which legitimate existing power relations. Institutionalized sources of surplus repression are then not eliminated; they are retained and transformed in symbol laden compulsions.

Humans who internalize these ideological sources of repression shrink to a dimension of existence which is one-dimensional [71]. They are locked into a pattern of relatively rigid behavior, reproducing an existing social order without

ever criticizing the conventional rationalizations for this order. By conforming to a sphere of symbolically transformed power relations, humans learn to accept substitute gratification and compensation for their sacrifices. In this process, existing power relations are mystified, hidden, obscured. Systematic distortions in communication remove the sources of repression from criticism and the institutional structure of power relations is legitimized, in absentia, so to speak.

From this perspective, ideology may be judged false when it prevents humans from seeing that the boundaries of existence are movable and that there could (conceivably) be other dimensions of social relations which are excluded by the present structure of domination.

With the development of technology, the institutional framework, which regulates the distribution of obligations and rewards and stabilizes a power structure that maintains cultural renunciation, can be loosened. Increasingly, parts of cultural tradition that at first have only projective content can be changed into reality. . . If technical progress opens up the objective possibility of reducing socially necessary repression below the level of institutionally demanded repression. . . ideological components of culture that have been fashioned into legitimations of authority [can] be converted into a critique of power structures that have become historically obsolete [72].

The critique of ideology is then the critique of "frozen" authority structures. When technology advances to a sufficient level, obsolete forms of substitute gratification can in principle be loosened. This "loosening," in Habermas' account,

is "helped along" by the conversion of "false consciousness" into a critical consciousness, this is the conversion of frozen world views or legitimation of authority into a critique of those authority structures as historically obsolete.

Beyond these problems with its functional and epistemic properties, ideology may also take on a pejorative connotation because of some problem with its genetic properties. This is the argument that consciousness is false in virtue of some facts about its origin, genesis, or history or in virtue of some facts about how it arises and comes to be acquired or held by agents.

Mannheim, it may be recalled, argued that the origin of ideology is to be found in the characteristic life experience and perspectives of various social groups. Here, the genesis of ideology was not limited narrowly to class position, but also included other reference groups such as generations, status groups, occupational groups, etc. From this analysis, ideology may be judged false (in the sense of being a partial or incomplete Weltanschauung) because of its particularity; because it only expresses the experience, perceptions and interests of particular social groups. This is another way of saying that ideology is false because it is a partial perspective and that it is partial because it is existentially determined.

The ideas expressed by the subject are thus regarded as functions of his existence. This means that opinions, statements, propositions, and systems of ideas are not taken at their face value, but are interpreted in light of the life-situation of the one who expresses them. It



signifies further that the specific character and life situation of the subject influence his opinions, perceptions and interpretations [73].

To label ideology false because it is existentially determined, because it originates in the life experience of social groups, or because it expresses only partial perspectives, raises a number of questions:

If a form of consciousness is an "expression" of the class position of a group in society, not merely in the sense that it arose out of their experience, but also in the sense that it is appropriate only to those who share that class position, e.g., if it speaks only to their particular needs, problems, and values, then it may be irrelevant to those of us who do not share that class-position. But to say that it is irrelevant is not to say that it is a delusion -- it certainly wouldn't seem to be any kind of delusion for them, if we do reject it, it is because it is "not appropriate" for us and that is something we may determine without any knowledge of its causal history [74].

This is an argument which raises the problem of the "genetic fallacy" or the criticism that nothing is demonstrated about the truth or falsity of a belief by showing how it arose. The discovery that ideology originates in the particular existential conditions of social groups gives no information about the truth claims of ideology; this is another way of acknowledging (as criticisms of the genetic fallacy do) that the context of discovery and the context of justification are separate spheres of inquiry. By discovering how ideology arises or how it is maintained among humans, we still have not demonstrated its truth. Showing that a particular form of consciousness arises from the social conditions of groups does not tell us whether or not the form of consciousness is

justified. The context of discovery does not answer the question, "Is this form of consciousness a legitimate one for humans to hold?"

Against criticisms of the genetic fallacy, Habermas and earlier members of the Frankfurt School held that ideology could be judged false in virtue of its genetic properties, or because of problems with the social conditions in which ideology arises. Here, a form of consciousness may be judged false in virtue of its genetic properties if it originates in conditions of distorted communication about which humans are basically ignorant. This is the argument that humans accept ideologically frozen world views under conditions of coercion which are not acknowledged or recognized.

In the case of ideologies, it isn't just that they are said to have been adopted for unacknowledged. . . reasons [coercion] but for [reasons] which could not be acknowledged by the agents. This presumably means that if the agents had to acknowledge that these were their [reasons], they would thereby not only no longer be motivated as they were to continue to accept the ideology, but they would see that there is no reason for them to accept it. . . The form of consciousness is false in that it requires ignorance or false belief on the part of the agents of their true (reasons) to accept it [75].

When humans accept and adhere to hypostatized world views under genetic conditions involving unrecognized coercion, they have accepted ideology for unacknowledged reasons. If the coercion is recognized, that is, if humans gradually learn that they have accepted world views because of coercion, they may still adhere to the world view, admitting that they accept it

because of coercion. This is accepting the validity of coercive social conditions and accepting coercion as a legitimate condition of genesis. It is also accepting the world views which arise from these conditions or denying the claim that ideology is false because it originates in coercion. In this situation, ideology may not be judged false, because humans basically accept its coercive genetic properties [76].

On the other hand, humans may also learn that they have accepted ideology because of coercion and with this recognition, they may reject the world view. This process may occur rapidly or it may require an extended period of tension and struggle, with hesitance, reluctance and reversals. For some, learning that a form of ideology originates under coercive conditions is learning that one's world views have a reprehensible causal history. This insight can make us suspicious of our ideology and we may begin to examine our beliefs and assumptions with more care. At any point along the way, we may decide that just because our beliefs have this unpleasant genetic history, still this is not a sufficient reason to reject our inherited ideology.

But for others, learning that we have accepted a prevailing ideology because of distorted communication is an insight which does more than create uneasiness or suspicion. Here the recognition that one's world views have been generated under conditions of surplus coercion is reason enough and more than

reason to reject the world view.

Among some then, ideology may be judged false and may be rejected when its distorted genetic properties are recognized. In this situation, ideology is judged false because it cannot be retained once we recognize the false conditions in which it arises. This is rejecting the validity of coercive social conditions. It is denying the claim that coercion is a legitimate condition of genesis. It is also rejecting the world views which arise from these conditions. It is rejecting the truth claims of any statement which originates in superfluous coercion. In this situation, ideology is judged false because humans basically reject its coercive genetic properties.

In summary then, the third step of radical reflection involves the process of critique. Ideologiekritik has provided one possible set of guidelines for the critical examination of consciousness. Within three frames of reference, the critique of ideology may judge consciousness or interpretations of reality to be false. Ideology may be judged false or delusive in virtue of its epistemic, functional or genetic properties. It may be criticized because, as ideology, it makes unacceptable category mistakes, or because it has become historically obsolete or because it originates in reprehensible conditions. These are all properties of ideology which might make it reflectively unacceptable.

Reaching this point of critical self-consciousness can

leave one in a fairly disoriented state of cynicism or skepticism. If there are so many problems or limitations in our commonly held world views, how is it possible to go back to the intentional world and have the same taken-for-granted confidence in a Weltanschauung? Can there be forms of ideology which are reflectively acceptable? Or shall we give up confidence in the ideational sphere of culture remaining permanently cynical or skeptical of it?

Fortunately, ideology cannot be dismissed this easily. Though they may be problematic, our inherited world views cannot simply be dismissed as a superfluous part of existence. Having a Weltanschauung, using a collection of discursive and nondiscursive processes for achieving signification, is an irrevocable part of existence at the cultural level.

Culture is a closed segment abstracted from the infinity of events which is endowed with meaning and signification only for man. The transcendental condition of all cultural science is not that we find this or that culture valuable but the fact that we are cultural men endowed with the capacity consciously to take a position with regard to the world and to give meaning to it. Whatever this meaning might be its consequence is that in living we abstract certain phenomena of human coexistence and in order to judge them, we take a position (positive or negative) with regard to their significance [77].

So if, as Merleau-Ponty would argue, we are "condemned to meaning," [78] if humans are "stuck", so to speak, with the requirement for ideology, the question then arises as to the proper form of ideology. What kind of world view would escape all the preceding pejorative connotations? What would ideology

which is "reflectively acceptable" look like?

Questions like this raise the discussion of ideology in the positive sense. This is wondering what kind of ideology or what form of Weltanschauung could be appropriate or suitable for human existence. Ideology in this positive or laudatory sense presumably would satisfy the human requirement for meaning while at the same time, it would escape all the distortions and problems which were uncovered in "false" consciousness.

Geuss introduces the notion of ideology in the positive sense as follows:

Traditional religious world-views owe their persistence to their ability to meet some [basic existential] needs. They do this by providing agents with approved models of action, goals, ideals, and values and by furnishing interpretations of such important existential features of human life as birth and death, suffering, evil, etc. In addition to such basic existential needs, human agents and groups have more mundane needs, wants and interests which a given set of habits, beliefs, and attitudes, a given "culture" can satisfy more or less adequately. Starting then from the wants needs, interests, and the objective situation of a given human group, we can set ourselves the task of determining what kind of sociocultural system or what world view would be most appropriate for that group, i.e., what "ideology" (in some descriptive sense of the term) is most likely to enable the members of the group to satisfy their wants and needs and further their interests. I will call this task of producing for the group an "ideology in the positive or laudatory sense" [79].

Discovering a new ideology, a fully human Weltanschauung in the laudatory sense is something like the appeal made by and to the new left of the 1970s. "Ideology in the positive sense" resembles the following exhortation.

Over the next few years, left praxis must create new ideology and movement. . .In the United States, sexism, racism and authoritarianism are crucial factors in all people's lives and in all revolutionary calculations. A new ideology must perceive that reality, understand it and create strategies to change it, in ways relevant to our specific contexts. . .We can expect that our [ideology] will be very concerned with the role of ideas, race, sex, and authority, and that it will be aware of the multiplicity of dynamics that actually constitute most historical situations. We can reasonably expect that it will have a powerful perspective that sees in human nature a relatively constant good, or at worst a neutral basis upon which personality develops, due to upbringing, education, culture, work and all other kinds of socialization. But a new ideology won't stop with theory. . .a new strategy needs to provide guidelines for building a movement, contesting the authorities for power and developing the institutions and values of a new society. . .we can expect that such a new strategy will include a process through which revolutionaries not only contest power, but through which they also learn how to create and "administer" a new society. We can expect that within factories, schools, hospitals\*, and all other institutions, the new strategy will call for the creation of more and more revolutionaries, each of whom is self-confident and able to function strategically and thereby able to contribute to the development of a wholly new society [80].

So a new ideology, in this instance, a revolutionary one, is positive to the extent that it furnishes interpretation for important existential features of human life (e.g., birth, death and suffering in its contemporary forms of racism, sexism and authoriatarianism). It is also positive if it enables humans to satisfy mundane needs, wants and interests; if it helps humans to satisfy all of the existential requirements which arise from the real objective conditions of human life. Finally, ideology is positive if it shows humans how to transcend unacceptable conditions of existence; if it shows them how to develop new forms of being.

Ideology in this positive sense is something addressed by the fourth step in radical reflection. Until this point, the method has suspended a natural standpoint, bracketing an hypostatized interpretation of reality. It then establishes a level of reflexivity by uncovering the genesis of our historical selves and by recognizing the hidden problems in our world views. In the next step, the method uses this foundation of reflexivity to imagine or project other interpretations of reality, other ideological alternatives, other existential modes.

#### Dialectical Imagination

As a fourth step in the method of radical reflection, imagination again takes some of its inspiration from phenomenological method. "Free variation in imagination" was a step in Husserl's method which followed "reduction of the natural attitude." Edward Casey described the process of imagination as follows:

The full procedure of full-variation proper consists in one or more of three complementary methodological moves: 1) the attempted removal of all significant traits from the phenomenon in the example -- the effort to imagine such traits as absent from the phenomenon. Those traits that cannot be removed in this way. . .are shown to be essential to the phenomenon. . .2) the substitution of new traits for the original ones. Here one imagines different traits in place of those that are initially given as characterizing the phenomenon. . .3) The productive imagination of additional traits which are not given in the grasping of example and which do not merely replace those that are. These extra traits act to fill out an example that is incomplete or ambiguous as first presented [81].



The use of dialectical imagination is then another cognitive step which helps the user to recognize characteristics of phenomena which are "core" or "essential" and other characteristics which might make the phenomenon "other than thus." When applied to the phenomenon of ideology, this step helps the user to imagine new forms of ideology and new existential modes which might make this ideology possible. For example, Habermas imagines an egalitarian society with social relations which are free from coercion and domination in a situation which he labels the "ideal speech situation." Here, social actors participate freely and equally in an open society -- where the opportunity to participate in speech situations is equal among all participants [82].

In this use of imagination, the emphasis is placed upon the process of imagining new possibilities, with a reflexive awareness that humans participate in the social construction of reality. "Essences" or essential structures may be identified in this process (e.g., the existential layer of being-in-the-world is taken as an essential structure). But the emphasis is placed upon imagining other, new possibilities.

Imagination is also called for because of its ability to process manifold possibilities -- possibilities which are "pure" by virtue of their independence of the realm of fact. . . (this is) the ability to entertain such possibilities, whether by treating already existing objects or events as sheerly possible, or by projecting altogether new possibilities [83].

The fourth step in reflection, dialectical imagination then

helps to stabilize and extend the user's reflexivity. It helps humans to recognize properties or features of reality which have remained relatively invariant. But more importantly, it helps the user to recognize alternatives or potentialities which remain unfulfilled or frozen within hypostatized world views. It helps to restore a recognition that the real is evolving into something else.

Dialectical method seeks to free all being from the appearance of rigidity and from ahistorical interpretations. It treats all objects as many faced, coming-into-being, acting and passing away in time. As a result, reality is comprehended as a process of becoming, in which reality as a whole, as well as each particular, individual part, is understood as developing out of an earlier stage of its existence and as evolving into something else. This entails grasping not only an object's positive features but also its negative qualities -- what it is becoming and what it is not -- for all these things contribute to its character [84].

### Negotiation

A fifth and final step in radical reflection involves a process which might be called negotiation. Until this point, the method enables users to suspend hypostatized interpretations of reality contained in the natural attitude. It helps users to recognize the genesis of their historical selves and the genesis of common sense interpretations. It helps users uncover epistemic problems and unrecognized conditions of coercion which have contributed to acceptance of an hypostatized world view. Finally, the method helps users to project other alternatives or potentialities which might replace these "unacceptable"

interpretations of reality.

The final step in reflection, negotiation, is a process which occurs when these insights start to interact with the user, transforming unreflective interpretations of reality into reflexive ones, transforming unreflexive life routines into reflexive, conscious ones. This step very much resembles the kind of confirmation and transformation described in psychoanalytic theory. This step has been described as follows:

In [psychoanalytic dialogue], the "patient" must recognize himself in the interpretations offered by the therapist. If he does, then such interpretations are recognized by the therapist as true. The important distinction between this method of truth testing and the method applied in the analytic stage is that the hypothesis itself is active and operative in creating conditions in which it can become true. . .It is the protracted negotiation of the alternative interpretation which may eventually generate a new situation in which this interpretation "becomes" true by having been assimilated into the consciousness of the patient, and thereby "authenticated" [85].

In the step of negotiation, critical reflection offers an interpretation of the historical experience of persons or groups. This is an interpretation which has not been recognized before; it is the suggestion of a new or different meaning in the historical experience of individuals or groups. In this step, meanings are negotiated. This occurs where unreflexive interpretations of reality collide with critical reflexive ones.

Significantly, the meaning offered by the "therapist" is itself active. The new interpretation is active, for example, when it gains ascendancy, "capturing" the experience of the

individual or group with power and cogency. If, in the process of negotiation, the interpretation is adopted/accepted by a reflective individual or group, then the interpretation is recognized as "true" by both "patient" and "therapist." It is confirmed only in the process of active negotiation, where it is accepted by the individual, assimilated into his or her conscious experience, and therefore authenticated.

Negotiation is, therefore, a step when a critical perspective or new interpretation is offered, an individual reflectively recognizes himself or herself in this interpretation and reflectively adopts or accepts this new interpretation.

In the case of re-interpreting the historical experience of a group, the authentication of an alternative interpretation requires the previous active presence of a relevant hypothesis and a properly organized process of its negotiation. . .the enlightenment process consists, therefore, in a dialogue in which critical theorists attempt to negotiate the alternative meanings they offer and apply persuasion to convince their partners of their adequacy. Whether they will succeed or not depends, on the whole on the degree of correspondence between the interpretive formula contained in the critical theory and the volume of experience collectively accumulated and common sensically assimilated by the group. Such correspondence must be given the opportunity of being carefully considered -- and scrupulously assessed by all participants. . .The sign of authentication is precisely the former patient's emerging from his subordinate position on the receiving end of the dialogue, and assuming the role of a fully developed creative agent of meaning negotiation [86].

Negotiation is then a step where participants emerge as partners in the dialogue. This is a kind of discourse (ideal speech situation) where participants' involvement is

egalitarian, a dialogue free of distorted communication, coercion or dominance. When negotiation produces this kind of dialogue, that is, when two partners emerge as creative agents of "meaning negotiation," then radical reflection has reproduced itself. It has regenerated reflexive humans and re-initiated a cycle in which humans recover the capacity for self-understanding, suspending an hypostatized, reified world.

The ideal which rests within radical reflection is then something like a utopian dream for the ideal speech situation. This is the hope for a mode of human existence where various interpretations of reality may coexist, a mode of existence free of distorted communication. If, in the process of negotiation, a newly accepted set of meanings are established there follows a need for practical action which can adjust social reality to coincide with those new interpretations. To be consistent, this practical action must continue to operate within the methodological tenets of radical reflection. That is, it struggles to find interpretations which are reflectively acceptable to partners -- never closing off dialogue. This is the quality of critical method (praxis) which distinguishes it from an orthodox Marxist revolutionary method.

Particularly important in this context is the choice between the continuation of the dialogue or its termination, on the assumption that the communication has been broken definitely and beyond all chance of repair. The crucial decision, in other words, concerns the classification of the opposite number as a partner in the dialogue or implacable enemy. That is the choice between

the pragmatics of persuasion and the pragmatics of struggle. . .one has to emphasize as strongly as possible that, whatever the course of ideologue, it will never supply conclusive evidence for a hypothesis that one of its partners is inherently unable to embrace the truth and that therefore struggle is the only rational and visible attitude [87].

The final step in reflection is then a commitment to remain in negotiation. This is a commitment to political attitudes and action which continue to search for interpretations that are reflectively acceptable to partners. If the interpretations offered by critical theorists are not accepted, then the commitment remains to continue reflection and negotiation. This is a commitment which opts for the "pragmatics of persuasion" against the "pragmatics of struggle."

#### 1.4 The Archeology of Tradition in Nursing [88]

These introductory remarks have attempted to sketch some epistemological and methodological prejudices of the study. Remaining chapters will apply the method, in an attempt to recover some segments of tradition and ideology inherited in the contemporary social institution of nursing. This is using radical reflection in an effort to develop new levels of reflexivity about nursing.

Chapter Two engages in the step of historical recovery. It presupposes an act of bracketing or a suspension of the natural attitude. This epoche is possible if one accepts Habermas' arguments concerning the human species and its quasitranscenden-

tal orientations. It is possible, in other words, to temporarily bracket these orientations, if one views them as quasitranscendental traditions which have been inherited in the natural history of the species.

With a "slackening" or a temporary suspension of the natural attitude, the study attempts to recover or to reconstruct segments of tradition which have preceded ours in history. This is remembering or reconstructing the genesis of our historical selves. It is recovering traditions which have contributed to an historical knowing process; recovering perspectives which have been inherited by historical knowing subjects. Chapter Two attempts, in a very brief way, to recover traditions which preceded those found in modern industrial capitalism. It remembers modes of human conduct and examples of ideology found in early Greek society and in Renaissance society. It discovers a fusion in the genesis of a new tradition during the transition to capitalism and bourgeois society.

With these steps of historical recovery, the investigation then goes on, in Chapter Three to engage in the step of critique. It briefly reviews Western Intellectual traditions, including British Empiricism, Kantian philosophy, Hegelian metaphysics, positivism and phenomenology. In an act of critique, this chapter identifies a dialectic in these traditions. This step of reflection argues that Western

intellectual traditions have been characterized as a fundamental tension between constrained, hypostatized modes of reality construction (those characterized by the natural attitude) and critical, emancipatory modes of reality construction, or interpretations which struggle against reified world views. This step of critique argues that nursing has inherited Western intellectual traditions which continue to demonstrate this dialectic of constraint versus struggle.

Chapter Four uses these critical, historical insights as a foundation for the steps of imagination and negotiation. This Chapter struggles to imagine other structural alternatives for nursing practice and ideology. It imagines other modes of human conduct and other forms of ideology which could (in principle) be inherited and produced by nurses as social actors. In an act of negotiation, the study identifies three important dimensions of nursing practice in bourgeois society which need continued reflective investigation and negotiation. This Chapter develops critical hypotheses concerning scientism in nursing, bourgeois professionalism in nursing and feminism in nursing.



Endnotes

1. T. McCarthy, The Critical Theory of Jurgen Habermas. (Cambridge, MIT Press, 1978), pp. ix-x. Hereafter, T. McCarthy, CTJH.
2. The term reflexivity is used in this study in the sense of being reflective or being capable of reflection.
3. G.H. Mead, in A. Strauss, The Social Psychology of George Herbert Mead. (Chicago, Phoenix, 1965), p. 152.
4. D. Held, Introduction to Critical Theory (Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1980) p. 40. While this text is an excellent introduction to critical theory, the most frequently cited historical account of the Frankfurt School is the work by Martin Jay, The Dialectical Imagination: A History of the Frankfurt School and the Institute of Social Research (Boston, Little-Brown, 1973).
5. This point is made by John O'Neill in "Critique and Remembrance" in On Critical Theory (New York, Seabury Press, 1976), pp. 1-11.
6. The principal works cited in connection with these topics are Knowledge and Human Interest (Boston, Beacon Press, 1971), Theory and Practice (Boston, Beacon Press, 1973) and Legitimation Crisis (Boston, Beacon Press, 1973). For an excellent account of his career and the progression to a theory of communicative competence in his later works, see the analysis by T. McCarthy, The Critical Theory of Jurgen Habermas (Cambridge, MIT Press, 1981).
7. J. Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interest (Boston, Beacon Press, 1971). Hereafter, J. Habermas, KHI.
8. T. McCarthy, The Critical Theory of Jurgen Habermas, Cambridge, MIT Press, 1978), p. 55.
9. J. Habermas, KHI, p. 196.
10. J. Habermas, KHI, p. 28.
11. Ibid., p. 34.
12. An adequate treatment of the notion of labor would require much more analysis than is possible here. Still, this is an important topic for nursing to explore. Good reading includes Hannah Arendt's criticism of Marx and her

distinction between work, labor and action. See the discussion in B. Parekh, Hannah Arendt and the Search for New Political Philosophy (London, MacMillan, 1981), pp. 108-123. Also, see a very helpful examination of Hegel's and Marx's views of labor in N. Lobkowitz, Theory and Practice (Notre Dame, 1967), pp. 321-348.

13. J. Habermas, KHI, p. 35.
14. J. Habermas, Theory and Practice (Boston, Beacon Press, 1973), pp. 8-9. Hereafter, Habermas, TP.
15. T. McCarthy, CTJH, p. 55.
16. A very fine criticism of Habermas is contained in the work of L. Kolakowski, Main Currents of Marxism: The Breakdown (Vol. 3) (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1978), pp. 341-395.
17. J. Habermas, KHI, pp. 36-37.
18. Ibid., pp. 52-53.
19. A discussion of the reconciliation between Marx and Freud as it occurred in the work of the Frankfurt School may be found in T. McCarthy, CTJH, pp. 84-88; 193-213 and also in D. Held, Introduction to Critical Theory, pp. 110-147. For an original example of this synthesis, see the discussion in KHI, pp. 214-300, where Habermas reviews Freud's instinct theory and makes a case for its incorporation into a revised historical materialism.
20. See the discussion of Freud's work on the theory of civilization in T. McCarthy, CTJH, pp. 84-87.
21. J. Habermas, KHI, p. 176.
22. T. McCarthy, CTJH, p. 56.
23. J. Habermas, KHI, p. 280.
24. J. Habermas, TP, pp. 22-23.
25. In his Main Currents of Marxism: The Breakdown, L. Kolakowski argues that Habermas does not present convincing evidence to support the notion of emancipatory reason, and characterizes this aspect of Habermas' work as a remnant of German idealism. This criticism has some legitimacy.
26. See the discussion of this point in "Habermas' Consensus Theory of Truth," in M. Hesse, Revolutions and

Reconstructions in the Philosophy of Science  
(Brighton/Sussex, Harvester Press, 1980), pp. 206-231.

27. T. McCarthy, CTJH, pp. 63-64.
28. The following "thought experiment" has been provoked by the clinical research of a fellow doctoral student (Sue Huether) who studied the effects of laser treatment on victims of port-wine stain.
29. See the section of KHI, titled "The Self Reflection of the Natural Sciences: The Pragmatist Critique of Meaning," pp. 113-139.
30. J. Habermas, KHI, pp. 119-120. This passage contains quotations from Peirce's "Lectures on Pragmatism" and "How to Make Our Ideas Clear."
31. J. Habermas, Ibid, pp. 113-114.
32. See this discussion in KHI, p. 126.
33. Ibid., pp. 118-119.
34. Ibid., p. 121.
35. Ibid., p. 139.
36. Ibid., p. 176.
37. Ibid., pp. 309-310.
38. Habermas discusses a democratic situation which he labels the "ideal speech situation." Here all participants have equal access to discourse and positions are accepted based solely upon the strength of the argument. While this social situation is obviously counterfactual, Habermas maintains that it is possible, in principle, because of the structure of language itself. See the discussion in T. McCarthy, CTJH, pp. 306-310.
39. The difference between empirical-analytic inquiry and hermeneutic inquiry in nursing research will be discussed again in Chapters Three and Four.
40. J. Habermas, TP, p. 259.
41. See Richard Rorty's critique of the idea of reason as a mirror of nature in Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1979).

42. J. Habermas, KHI, p. 195.
43. J. Habermas, TP, p. 254.
44. The metaphor of adult autonomy was used by Fichte to describe the capacity for critical thought among those who choose idealism as a philosophical posture. See the discussion of this point in Theory and Practice, pp. 259-261. Adult autonomous consciousness is also found in transformations under Freudian psychoanalysis, where childlike repressive constraint is eroded through critical insight. In fact, Habermas takes psychoanalysis as an "ideal-type" example of critical thought. See pp. 214-300 of Knowledge and Human Interests.

Finally an interesting parallel argument concerning an adult, autonomous view of science was presented by P. Feyerabend in "Rationalism, Relativism and Scientific Method" in Philosophy in Context 6 (1977), pp. 7-19. Here, Feyerabend exposes the dogma which is contained in various forms of rationalism. In the rejection of dogmatic rationalism, the alternative which presents itself is relativism, the view that "there is not one rationality, there are many, and it is up to us to choose the one we like best." The ordinary response to this relativism was characterized by Feyerabend as child-like.

For many thinkers, such a result is intolerable. Relativism, they believe opens the door to chaos and arbitrariness. The fear of chaos, the longing for a world in which one need not make fundamental decisions, but can always count on advice, has made rationalists act like frightened children. "What shall we do?" "How shall we choose?" they cry when presented with a set of alternatives, assuming that the choice is not their own. . . These questions however are answered by saying, "You are grown up now children, and so, you have to find your own way."

45. J. Habermas, TP, p. 262.
46. It will be noted in passing that the commitment to insight as the appropriate means for liberation raises many controversies. Habermas acknowledges that reified consciousness and social relations are not rendered inoperative by reflection alone. However, he does emphasize rational discourse (in an ideal speech situation) as the preferred mode for rejecting reified/falsified world views. Liberation then presumably occurs through the

mechanism of nonviolent (rational) discourse. Humans who achieve consensus through insightful discourse are able to achieve mutual understanding. They are able to pursue the practical and emancipatory cognitive interests in a nonviolent pattern which does not threaten the survival of the species.

Against this basic presupposition of nonviolence and insight as a means of liberation, c.f. the discussion by F. Fanon in The Wretched of the Earth, pp. 61 and 94.

At the decisive moment, the colonialist bourgeoisie, which up till then has remained inactive, comes into the field. It introduces the new idea which in proper parlance a creation of the colonial situation: non-violence. In its simplest form, this non-violence signifies to the intellectual and economic elite of the colonized country that the bourgeoisie has the same interests as they and that it is therefore urgent and indispensable to come to terms for the public good. Non-violence is an attempt to settle the colonial problem around a green baize table [ideal speech situation, J.T.] before any regrettable act has been performed or irreparable gesture made, before any blood has been shed. . . But it so happens that for the colonized people, violence, because it constitutes their only work, invests their characters with positive and creative qualities. The practice of violence binds them together as a whole, since each individual forms a violent link in the great chain, a part of the great organism of violence which has surged upward in reaction to the settler's violence in the beginning. . . At the level of individuals, violence is a cleansing force. It frees the native of his inferiority complex and from his despair and inaction: it makes him fearless and restores his self-respect. Even if the armed struggle has been symbolic and action is demobilized through a rapid movement of decolonization, the people have the time to see that the liberation has been the business of each and all and that the leader has no special merit. Where the people have taken violent part in the national liberation, they will allow no one to set themselves up as "liberators." They show themselves to be jealous of the results of their action and take good care not to place their future, their destiny or the fate of their country in the hands of a living god. Yesterday, they were completely irresponsible; today they mean to understand everything and make all decisions.

47. G. Hegel, from Phenomenology of Spirit quoted in I. Soll, An Introduction to Hegel's Metaphysics, p. 38.
48. M. Merleau-Ponty, The Primacy of Perception (Northwestern University Press, 1964) p. 3.
49. J. Habermas, KHI, p. 310.
50. Subsequent sections of this investigation will continue the discussion of critical method and explore its application in nursing.
51. Kaplan D. and Manners, R. Culture Theory (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, Prentice Hall, 1972), p. 112.
52. R. Geuss, The Idea of Critical Theory (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1981), p. 10.
53. K. Marx, "The German Ideology" in D. McClellan, Karl Marx: Selected Writings (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1977), p. 164.
54. K. Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia (New York, Harcourt, Brace and World, 1936).
55. A very common criticism of Marx's work rejects a deterministic relationship between material base and ideology. While Mannheim argued that the category of class was too narrowly defined, others objected to a deterministic interpretation which presented ideology as a "boxcar" tagging along after the economic infrastructure. In his Problems in Materialism and Culture (London, Verso Editions/NLB, 1980), Raymond Williams argues that Marx never presented ideology in this deterministic way. According to Williams, this mechanistic interpretation was a later development in the Marxist tradition.
56. P. Morley, "Dialectical Historicism: Karl Mannheim's Sociology of Knowledge," Unpublished manuscript, 1981, pp. 9-10.
57. Ibid., pp. 84-85.
58. Ibid., p. 85.
59. These very brief comments can only begin to suggest the importance of "the linguistic turn" as it affected twentieth century thought across a broad front. It must be acknowledged, if only in passing, that this turn was

influenced most significantly by the work of Wittgenstein, who followed a trajectory from an analytic philosophy of language, with emphasis upon the formal (logical) structure of language, to a later emphasis upon pragmatics, language games or ordinary language use. For a good analysis of Wittgenstein's work, see A. Kenny Wittgenstein (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1973).

60. M. Merleau-Ponty, "Marxism and Philosophy" in Sense and Non-Sense (Northwestern University Press, 1964), pp. 130-131.
61. E. Husserl, Ideas (Collier MacMillan Publications, New York, 1975), p. 96.
62. Ibid, p. 100.
63. M. Merleau-Ponty, "Preface" The Phenomenology of Perception (London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1962), p. xiii.
64. Ibid., p. xiv.
65. J. Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests (Boston, Beacon Press, 1971), p. 16.
66. R. Geuss, The Idea of Critical Theory, p. 19.
67. J. Habermas, Legitimation Crisis (Boston, Beacon Press, 1973), p. 19.
68. R. Geuss, The Idea of Critical Theory, p. 19.
69. S. Freud, "The Future of an Illusion," quoted in J. Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interest, p. 271.
70. Habermas coins the label of distorted communication for ideology with a pejorative connotation. In KHI, see especially pp. 311-317.
- \* 71. The reference here is to Herbert Marcuse, One Dimensional Man, (Boston, Beacon Press, 1964).
72. J. Habermas, KHI, p. 280.
73. K. Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia, p. 49.
74. R. Geuss, The Idea of Critical Theory, p. 20.
75. Ibid., p. 21

76. This point is worth emphasizing. In this version of ideologiekritik, ideology may not be judged false if, upon reflection, agents recognize its coercive genesis and accept this coercion.
77. M. Weber, Gesammelte Aufsätze Zur Wissenschaftslehre, quote in M. Merleau-Ponty, "The Crisis of Understanding" in The Primacy of Perception, (Northwestern University Press, 1964), p. 204.
78. M. Merleau-Ponty, The Phenomenology of Perception (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1962), p. xix.
79. R. Geuss, The Idea of Critical Theory, pp. 22-23.
80. M. Albert, What is to be Undone (Boston, Porter Sargent Publications, 1974), pp. 313-315 (\* emphasis of current author).
81. E. Casey, "Imagination and Phenomenological Method" In Husserl: Expositions and Appraisals, F. Elliston and P. McCormick (eds.). (Notre Dame, University of Notre Dame Press, 1977), pp. 75-76.
82. For a good (critical discussion of Habermas' "Ideal speech situation" see Mary Hesse, Revolutions and Reconstructions in the Philosophy of Science (Brighton/Sussex, Harvester Press, 1980), pp. 206-231.
83. E. Casey, "Imagination and Phenomenological Method," p. 76.
84. D. Held, An Introduction to Critical Theory, (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1980), p. 229. Other sections of Held's work include an analysis of negative dialectics and non-identity thinking as formulated by the early Frankfurt School, Marcuse and Habermas. See especially pp. 212-222.
85. Z. Bauman, Towards a Critical Sociology: An Essay on Commonsense and Emancipation (Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1976), pp. 106-107.
86. Ibid., p. 108.
87. Ibid., p. 110.
88. Although I have only a passing awareness of his work, it seems possible that many of the ideas expressed here may bear some rough resemblance to the perspective expressed by



- ↑ Michel Foucault in Archeology of Knowledge (See the
- × discussion of his work in C.O. Schrag, Radical Reflection  
(West Lafayette, Purdue University Press, 1980), pp. 12-24.

## CHAPTER 2

### THE RECOVERY OF PRECAPITALIST MODES OF HUMAN ACTION

#### 2.1 Introduction

Historia is a totally different source of truth from theoretical reason. It exists in its own right because human passions cannot be governed by the universal prescriptions of reason. In this sphere one needs, rather, convincing examples as only history can offer them [1].

This chapter begins the hermeneutic step which Gadamer called historia. This is recovering the memory of precapitalist modes of human action. It is remembering how humans have conducted themselves under existential conditions which place different constraints on them. This recovery has the practical intent of providing convincing examples, as only history can offer them; examples which provoke the awareness that humans can and have enjoyed different modes of being.

The step of recovery is itself an important piece of reflection, for in it, human memory recalls other traditions which have preceded this current one. This is an episode of remembering then which recalls past experience or past traditions. It is a step which produces insights about the genesis of our historical selves, generating a "self" consciousness or an awareness of how we have come to be the

subjects we are, with these interpretations or views of reality. This is learning more about our own tradition through the reflective recovery of other traditions.

This recovery seems important. Under modern capitalism, modes of thinking and acting have become so reified that it has become difficult to imagine any other form of being. This chapter enters the hermeneutic circle of remembering because historia can and does provoke a "dialectical imagination." It helps human passion to believe and hope that things might be "other than thus." Historia provokes the realization that modes of human conduct undergo historical alteration; that modes of being go on changing and that human conduct could have a different structure, with different properties in the future. In its concrete, convincing examples, historia shows us that current modes of being, so massive and unmoving under capitalism, are not the only alternative available to man [2].

The chapter enters this step of historical recovery by directing its attention to early Greek society.

## 2.2 The Greek Distinction between Modes of Human Conduct: The Vita Activa and the Vita Contemplativa

Examinations of ancient Greek civilization [3] note a distinction which was commonly made by Greek citizens between two "walks of life" or two modes of human action. This distinction has been labeled the Vita Activa and the Vita

Contemplativa [4]. The Vita Activa was a label used to describe the active life of practice. For the Greeks, the word "practice" (  $\pi\rho\alpha\acute{\xi}\iota\varsigma$  ) had a unique meaning; it referred exclusively to the sphere of political activity. The Vita Activa then was a lifestyle of practice devoted to matters of the polis; it was the life of a politician.

The Vita Contemplativa, on the other hand, was a label used to describe the life of contemplation and theoretical activity. For the Greeks, the term "theory" (  $\theta\epsilon\omega\rho\acute{\iota}\alpha$  ) referred to the act of watching, the life of a spectator removed from either political or productive activity. The Vita Contemplativa, the life of contemplation, was the lifestyle of philosophers.

Aristotle seems to have been the first Greek thinker to reduce the many different walks of life to . . . two, thus becoming the first explicitly to contrast . . . "practical" and "theoretical" life. As Aristotle indicates, men of refinement take only two kinds of life seriously into consideration, namely, the "practical" life of politics, whose representatives identify the good with honor, and the theoretical life of the philosopher, who strives for the contemplation of eternal truths. . . . When the Greeks opposed to each other [theory] and [practice], they did not have in mind abstract doctrines in contrast to their concrete application. Rather, what they had in mind was a distinction between various kinds or walks of life. . . . That which we call theory today corresponds to what Aristotle called "contemplative life;" and what we call "practice" has its origins in Aristotle's analysis of "political life". . . . In the Politics, Aristotle characterizes the difference between these two more refined ways of life as follows: practical life is the life of active citizenship, of active participation in the life of the polis; "theoretical life" on the contrary is a life of detachment from political partnership, the life of someone who is alien to the polis; [theoretical life] is the life of those who contemplate things beautiful, first divine, pure and eternal [5].

The distinction between practice and theory, then referred to social positions or to lifestyles within the Greek city state. The life of practice was a class privilege as was the life of theory. The Vita Activa and the Vita Contemplativa were only enjoyed by citizens, by free men, who were generally landed proprietors. Politicians and philosophers enjoyed the privilege of practice and theory since they were free from the more mundane necessities of everyday life. They were unencumbered by the struggle for survival which characterized commercial life (the life of retailers/merchants), wage earning occupations (the life of artisans) and manual labor (the life of slaves). In this sense, the Vita Activa and the Vita Contemplativa already constitute elitist modes of human action; they were "walks of life" which excluded the "productive" strata of Greek society.

While Greeks were aware of the necessity of productive activity, these mundane forms of labor were not included in the ways of life of "men of refinement" (i.e., citizens). By Greek standards, productive labor was a form of activity which was not meaningful enough to be considered a "walk of life," i.e., it was not a truly human mode of action.

To understand this elitist hierarchy of productive, practical (political) and theoretical activity, it is helpful to look more closely at the specific interpretations which Greek society gave to each mode of action.

### 2.3 Theoria and Episteme

As mentioned above, the Greek equivalent of our term "theory" originally referred to the act of watching, to the life of a spectator who observed sacral/divine events. The objects of contemplation for Greek philosophers were the eternal, universal or unperishable features of the universe: "the totality of the universe, the order of the stars, the mathematical realm." The Greek philosopher, in other words, was a spectator of things "which cannot be other than in fact they are; objects which exist of necessity and therefore are eternal." [6].

The "theoretical life" included what today would be called "scientific inquiry;" after all, the philosopher was the only Greek counterpart to the modern scientist. But the scientific inquiry in question was rooted neither in mere curiosity nor in "practical necessity." As Aristotle put it, it was owing to their wonder that men begin to philosophize; one philosophizes in order to escape from ignorance, not because one expects some use from philosophy. . .[in his contemplation] the philosopher is removed from the agitation and transitory character which life has for ordinary man: he contemplates the divine order and takes part in its eternity, thus somehow transcending man's most distinctive character, his mortality [7].

"Theoria," the life of contemplation, was then the most sublime act of watching. In it, philosophers participated in a peculiar kind of thinking, a form of consciousness with an intentionality all its own. The kind of thinking enjoyed by philosophers, contemplation, had very little in common with the intellectual activity found among modern scientists. Theoria differed from science in that it involved very little of the

abstract theorizing which today is taken as the sine qua non of scientific activity. The predicative and discursive activity so characteristic of modern science simply were not part of early Greek theoretical activity. Rather, contemplation was more on the level of intuitionism. This was a relatively passive "gaze," an immediate intellectual experience which had the subjective character of "contemplative union" with the object of inquiry [8].

In such contemplation, where consciousness is directed toward eternal, absolutely determinate objects, a characteristic intentionality emerges. Greek philosophers displayed this kind of thinking with its characteristic intentionality. Understanding for the philosopher was an apodictic recognition; i.e., it was a theoretical certainty of the order and nature of the universe. This was a form of intellectual experience which "does not need to articulate itself into demonstrations and propositions, since it amounts to an immediate contact and union with its object" [9]. The philosopher's thinking, in other words, was a theoretical knowing which produced for him, an experience of absolute certainty. This form of apodictic thinking and the theoretical knowledge it produced were termed episteme [10].

While it may seem improbable from a contemporary standpoint, theoretical knowledge for the Greeks was never interpreted as something capable of application. Applied

science was an invention of more contemporary times. In Greek society, the philosopher's contemplation and his episteme were not means to any pragmatic end on earth. Rather, as a spectator, one inquired after the eternal for the sake of that experience alone.

To have theoretical knowledge in the Greek sense meant that one had the experience of intellectual union with the eternal. In his contemplation, the philosopher experienced a form of "expanded consciousness" which, literally, was transcendent. His thinking transported him beyond the transitory, agitated sphere of human existence into another realm: i.e., the eternal/immortal. To experience an intellectual union with this realm was to participate in it. Doing philosophy or having the intellectual experience of episteme, then was not a means to some other end, but an end in itself. It was the end of participating in the immortal.

It seems important to emphasize that the philosopher was one who could afford the luxury, or more accurately, someone who had inherited the privilege of watching eternal features of the cosmos. Those who took up the lifestyle of theoria were those who concerned themselves with understanding the unchangeable features of the world. This kind of understanding, episteme, was therefore not an active engagement or struggle with the world, since it was not concerned with "things doable." Instead, episteme and theoria constituted a form of



understanding and a mode of human action, by which the most elite strata of Greek society fled the contingency of human existence, fixing their gaze steadfastly away from the transitory and human, on the eternal/divine.

#### 2.4 Praxis and Phronesis

In contrast to the life of contemplation, the life of practice, the Vita Activa was characterized by "doing" -- by an active, hectic engagement with other humans. As mentioned above, "practice" for the Greeks had a very unique connotation which has been lost in modern times. Practice referred specifically to the life of politics and not to the whole range of productive activity (most forms of labor) which today would be labeled "practical activity."

Today we have a hard time understanding how anyone could possibly identify the realm of the practical with that of the political. Certainly even the Greeks were aware of the fact that political activity is not the only kind of activity characteristic to man. . . Nevertheless, the Greeks viewed their political life. . . as the most truly human activity. [This is] because in order to take part in political life, a man had to be freed from the struggle for survival, that is, released from all, or almost all activities concerned with the procurement of the necessities of life. It is against this background that the Greek distinction has to be understood between "mere life," in the sense of a mere maintaining and pursuing of one's ultimate physical existence, and a "good life" which achieved man's ultimate destination. There were activities which simply did not belong to a "good life," even though they were indispensable pre-conditions of any life and thus also a "good life;" labor of all kinds, handicraft, commerce, in fact, all activities except those of which "political life" consisted and to which philosophers added a further activity -- that of contemplation. One almost would be tempted to say that the Greeks considered all

"pre-political" activities pre-human and that only in the political life were they able to see a way of life which transcended the animal realm [11].

Here it seems important to emphasize the positive connotation which was attached to political activity in the Greek city-state. For the Greeks, the politician was engaged in the "essence" of human activity. There was no higher level of genuinely human action than the practice of politics. As indicated, it seemed to be the case that all levels of prepolitical activity, that is, all forms of productive activity were judged as prehuman; and that the theoretical activity found among philosophers was judged as superhuman, i.e., divine.

This positive connotation given by the Greeks to political activity stands in direct contrast to the interpretation of politics deposited in later periods. As Hannah Arendt observed, traditional political philosophy has viewed political activity with a pejorative or negative connotation, i.e., with contempt, as an activity which is superficial, morally corrupting and degrading [12]. Instead, the Greeks viewed the politician as someone who proved himself as truly human precisely because of his political competence.

To understand this positive value placed on politics, it helps to look more closely at the kind of thinking and action which constituted politics for the Greeks. Generally, politics seems to have been a mode of human action which contemporary thought struggles to capture in the term "jurisprudence,"

although politics contained none of the legalistic connotation now associated with this term. Politics was prudent judgment, "prudentia -- the capacity of judging the given situation and of being able to do the right thing accordingly" [13].

Politics was prudent judgment in the face of uncertainty and difference of opinion. In this judgment, politicians directed their thinking to issues of governance [14]. Their activity involved argumentation, persuasion and the constitution of decisions about how best to cultivate and preserve virtuous conduct among citizens. Public-political life addressed the need to preserve "the good and the just life." Importantly, then, politics was the extension of ethics: struggling with decisions concerning virtuous life meant that one was also struggling with judgments concerning virtue, i.e., judgments concerning the good and the just.

For Aristotle, politics was continuous with ethics, the doctrine of the good and the just life. As such, it referred to the sphere of human action, praxis, and was directed to achieving and maintaining an order of virtuous conduct among its citizens. The practical intention of politics [was] the cultivation of virtuous character in a moral-political order that rendered its citizens capable of leading a good and just life [15].

And again,

[Practice] covers those human actions and activities which Aristotle discusses in his ethical and political writings: moral conduct and political activity. Aristotle explicitly states that ethics is only a part of political "science" . . . [16].

To state that politics was the extension of ethics is to emphasize an historical point which may at first seem relatively

trivial. After all, it is a commonplace of western political ideology that politicians generally are expected to concern themselves with the preservation of "the good and just life" -- and that the execution of this responsibility entails ethical judgment. But the interpretations of political/ethical judgment found in contemporary Western ideology are not the same as those found in the Greek notion of practice. Prudent judgment meant something different than it does today.

In the first instance, it seems important to recognize that when the Greeks spoke of ethical or political judgment, i.e., of prudent judgment, they were not referring to a cognitive faculty. At least since the time of Descartes and his notorious separation of thinking and everything else, judgment generally has been equated with cognition (e.g., aesthetic, moral, etc.). But the Greeks were fortunate enough to have escaped this blunder. When they spoke of prudent judgment, they were not referring to some solipsistic act of cognition which descends a ladder of ethical reasoning from axioms to conclusions. Judgment for the Greeks referred less to the act of cognition than it did to the use of language, to articulate speech.

The Greeks of the fourth and third centuries B.C. still had a long way to go to reach what today is called "the idea of the unity of mankind." The reason why they were so far removed from this idea seems to have been their insight that man alone of the animals possesses [rationality], that man is an animal rationale. But rationality to the Greeks certainly did not primarily refer to some cognitive faculty, it meant rationality as it expresses itself in articulate speech. And this rationality a Greek did not precisely see

either in the slave or in the barbarian; rational and articulate speech for the Greek was embodied in politics -- arguing and persuading one another and reaching rational decisions based on common agreement [17].

There was a fundamental intersubjectivity in this notion of rationality which seems to have escaped a great deal of modern thought. What distinguished men from animals for the Greeks was the human use of language, specifically the art of argumentation and persuasion. The politician proved himself as genuinely human because of his competence in this intersubjective mode of action. He was not truly human because of some innate cognitive capacity to elaborate ethical doctrines. Politicians were truly human just because they used speech, because they argued with and persuaded each other, reaching agreement where there had been difference of opinion.

In the experience of the polis, which not without justification has been called the most talkative of all bodies politic, the emphasis shifted from action to speech, and to speech as a means of persuasion rather than the specifically human way of answering, talking back and measuring up to whatever happened or was done. To be political, to live in a polis meant that everything was decided through words and persuasion, and not through force and violence. In Greek self-understanding, to force people through violence, to command rather than to persuade, were pre-political ways to deal with people, characteristic of life outside the polis, of home and family life, where the household head ruled with uncontested despotic powers, or of life in the barbarian empires of Asia. . .[18].

From a contemporary perspective, it is difficult to imagine a mode of action which so easily dismissed the options of coercion and violence in political activity. Now, to assert that man is a political animal is nothing more than the self-

awareness of violence as a fundamental part of human existence [19].

But the Greeks had not inherited the social relations of feudalism and capitalism, nor their ethical/political ideologies; e.g., utilitarian, decisionistic ethics. Greek society was still a communal society with a relatively fixed roster of values, the most important of which was the notion of measure or, as Aristotle labeled it, the mean.

It was the principle of the mean which dominated ethical judgment for Greek politicians, a principle which explains the absence of coercive/ruling ideology in Greek political practice.

Thus it is possible to go too far, or not to go far enough, in respect of fear, courage, desire, anger, pity and pleasure and pain generally, and the excess and deficiency are alike wrong. But to experience these emotions at the right times and on the right occasions and towards the right persons and for the right causes and in the right manner is the mean or the supreme good, which is characteristic of virtue [20].

For the Greeks, politics was mastery of this principle of the mean. Politicians were truly human because of their competence in the lifestyle of measure; because of their capacity to experience the appropriate emotion at the right time, toward the right person and for the right reason. Politicians exercised the principle of the mean in their judgment, cultivating virtuous character for themselves. But they also struggled to maintain a political order where measure was the norm for all citizens--where virtuous conduct, the principle of the mean, was not simply an abstract ethical

doctrine, but a social norm.

To preserve moral excellence in the polis, politicians used the principle of the mean as an axiom or criterion. In each new situation, measure was the criterion for determining which conditions constitute the good and the just life. Measure defined the existential condition of happiness, it loosely prescribed happiness as a condition of moderation, appropriate sentiments directed toward appropriate people. The practical intent of politics was to cultivate this existential condition for Greek citizenry. This was an ethical principle which helped (loosely) to define the "happy" man -- "the good life" or "well being."

For Aristotle, the rational part of man's soul is more than just an intellect and intellectual excellence by itself does not make a good and happy man. Reason governs action as well as theorizing. Action is the response made to desire, and here, Aristotle insists, one can respond too much or too little. The correct response lies somewhere between the two extremes. This is the doctrine of the mean. It does not pretend to provide a moral decision procedure. It is a meta-ethical statement about the form of certain moral concepts: to every virtue there are two distinct vices (excess and deficiency). So what is needed in addition to intellectual excellence is moral excellence. The man who has the latter has habits that lead him always to find the virtuous mean between two vicious extremes. These habits are not unthinking responses or natural instincts for doing the right thing. They involve a rational assessment of each new situation and a choice made in the light of a conception of what it is that men should aim at, what they should regard as constituting happiness [21].

For the Greeks, then, measure defined happiness. Well-being was the experience of a full range of human sentiments

(e.g., fear, courage, desire, anger, pity, pleasure, pain) -- while in happiness, none of these were experienced excessively or deficiently. To be happy was to experience these emotions appropriately -- at the right times, toward the right persons and for the right reason. The cultivation and preservation of this virtuous life, both for himself and for the polis, was the responsibility of politicians.

To accomplish this, politicians used a different kind of understanding -- a different combination of knowing and acting. Praxis was a kind of understanding which assessed each new, varying situation, making choices which were guided by the principle of the mean. Decisions of governance were right if they struck a balance between extreme sentiments; if they were generated in an atmosphere of measure and if they cultivated an environment of measure for citizens.

Importantly, the kind of thinking or understanding used by politicians in this activity was a very different form of consciousness. It differed significantly from the kind of knowing which was present among philosophers. The prudent judgment of politicians was a kind of understanding which was much more contingent, with none of apodictic intentionality found in episteme. The form of understanding enjoyed by politicians phronesis had a cognitive status which reflected the changing situations at the center of political activity.

The practical intention of politics (the cultivation of virtuous character in a moral political order that rendered



its citizens capable of leading a good and just life) as well as the nature of its subject matter (the changing and contingent conditions of such a life) determined its cognitive status. Politics and practical philosophy generally, could not achieve the status of rigorous science, of episteme. Because it had to take account of the contingent and variable, it had to rest content with establishing rules of a "more or less" and "in most cases" character. The capacity thereby cultivated, and the keystone of virtuous character, was phronesis, a prudent understanding of variable situations with a view to what was to be done [22].

The difference between the kind of understanding found in politics and phronesis, and the kind of understanding found in contemplation episteme, is a critically important one to recover. The scientization of politics (and of civilization generally) has eroded this distinction. The prudent understanding of variable situations was a form of knowing and acting which scientific consciousness has forgotten. In his Truth and Method, H.G. Gadamer has also noted the importance of recovering this aspect of Greek tradition. He described the distinction between theoretical understanding (episteme) and practical/political understanding (phronesis) as follows:

The old Aristotelian distinction between practical and theoretical knowledge is . . . a distinction which cannot be reduced to that between the true and the probable. Practical knowledge, phronesis, is another kind of knowledge. Primarily, it means that it is directed towards the concrete situation. Thus, it must grasp the "circumstances" in their infinite variety. . . This kind of knowledge is outside the rational concept of knowledge, but this is not in fact, mere resignation. . . Rather there is a positive ethical element involved. . . The grasp and moral control of the concrete situation require the subsumption of what is given under the universal; i.e., the goal that one is pursuing so that the right thing may result. Hence, it assumes a direction of the will, i.e., moral being. That is why Aristotle considers phronesis as an intellectual virtue

. . .Although the practice of this virtue means that one distinguishes what should be done from what should not, it is not simply practical shrewdness and general cleverness. The distinction between what should and should not be done includes the distinction between the proper and the improper and thus presumes a moral attitude, which it continues to develop. . .(phronesis), the sense of the right and the general good. . .is acquired through living in the community and is determined by its structures and its aims [23].

Mastery of phronesis was a competence acquired from living, from internalizing and externalizing the structures and aims of the community. Politicians were masters of phronesis and therefore wise men, not because they had perfected the technique of contemplation, but because they had mastered the art of public life.

Theirs was a kind of mastery which objectified the principle of the mean. To live in the polis (as a citizen) meant first of all that one internalized the notion of measure. The principle of the mean was the ethical core of Greek ideology -- the nucleus of belief/assumption/conviction which anchored public experience. In their phronesis, politicians also externalized and objectified the principle of the mean. They were masters of the art of argumentation/persuasion -- a process which externalized the convictions of measure, a process which made the principle of the mean objectively real.

Phronesis was therefore a kind of knowing which was acquired from public-political life. Competence only came from doing, from mastering the art of prudent judgment. To have this kind of understanding meant more than simply acquiring a subjective sense

of right/wrong. "To know," in the sense of phronesis, was something much different than a solipsistic experience. It meant that one objectified a moral attitude, that one argued with others in the posture of measure. This was a kind of understanding which both presumed and cultivated a moral attitude. It was a kind of knowing which sprang from living in the community, since that living involved the process of internalizing measure. But more importantly, phronesis was acquired from living because one only gained the knowledge by doing, by recreating or reproducing the principle of measure in objectively real political activity, by cultivating/developing a moral attitude.

For [Aristotle], as for all ancient writers, moral goodness lay in the realization of virtues, but in each individual case, it was for phronesis to decide which concrete actions were virtuous. True moral merit lay not simply in acknowledging the right values or in incorporating these value-claims and virtues into character, but rather in the "astuteness" with which each virtue and virtues were applied. It was of no use, for example, for someone who was unable to decide when, where, with whom, how and why he should be magnanimous to have a "magnanimous" character; he possessed this "virtue" to no purpose, since he did not know how to act magnanimously, and if he did not practice magnanimity, he would finish by losing value and "virtue" alike [24].

Mastery of this kind of understanding required an astuteness which was absolutely unique to political life. This was an astuteness which only came from doing -- from practicing virtuous conduct. But to master this practice -- to be politically astute required a keen sense of contingency, a "sixth sense" that could recognize variable conditions, continually adjusting or tailoring

judgment in each new concrete situation. Phronesis was the capacity to decide, in each new, changing situation, which actions were virtuous.

Although phronesis was characterized by an astute "sixth sense" of contingency, it was not the "practical shrewdness" or "general cleverness" of being "street smart." What made the politician's judgment virtuous was its positive moral element. Judging the contingent always included a "value-judgment" -- a judgment which identified proper versus the improper or right versus wrong conduct in each new situation.

The "positive moral element" contained in phronesis was a property which made this kind of judgment much different than the practical shrewdness which is known today as being "street smart." Politicians knew how to act in changing or contingent situations. But this acting always subsumed the concrete, contingent situation under a "positive-moral" category. It could identify virtuous conduct in each new situation because it had a more universal criterion of virtuous conduct: the principle of measure. Because Greek politicians had internalized this "positive moral element," they used it, in each new situation, to act and to govern in such a way that measure and virtuous conduct would be cultivated among citizens.

It seems important to emphasize that this "positive moral element" (specifically the principle of measure) made Greek politics much different than political judgment in bourgeois

society [25]. Phronesis or classical politics was unlike modern politics, with its rotating roster of values and its decisionistic utilitarian ethic. Unlike bourgeois ethics, where consequence is the criterion or yardstick for judging virtue, in phronesis, communal society loosely established a much different communal ethic, one which reflected the principle of measure.

The contingency of phronesis, its characteristic moral element, and its mode of acquisition in public life made it a form of knowing which simply could not be compared in any meaningful way with other forms of understanding. In particular, the kind of knowing which politicians mastered could not be compared meaningfully to the episteme of philosophers.

For moral being, as Aristotle described it, is clearly not objective knowledge, i.e., the knower is not standing over against a situation that he merely observes, but he is directly affected by what he sees. It is something that he has to do. It is obvious that this is not the knowledge of science. Thus the distinction that Aristotle makes between the knowledge of phronesis and the theoretical knowledge of episteme is a simple one, especially when we remember that science, for the Greeks, is represented by the model of mathematics, a knowledge of what is unchangeable, a knowledge that depends on proof and that can, therefore, be learned by anybody. Compared to this kind of "theoretical" knowledge [phronesis] is a kind of moral knowledge. Its object is man and what he knows of himself. But he knows himself as an acting being, and this kind of knowledge that he has of himself does not seek to establish what exists. An active being rather, is concerned with what is not always the same as it is, he can discover the point at which he has to act. The purpose of his knowledge is to govern his action. . .[26].

Knowledge which could direct public action was something different in kind than the apodictic certainty of episteme.

Phronesis was directed toward the sphere of human action, seeking to recognize aspects of human civilization which are changing. This sphere of understanding touches the moral being of man, teaching humans how and when to act.

The question is whether there can be any such thing as philosophical knowledge of the moral being of man, and what role knowledge plays in the moral being of man. Aristotle emphasizes that it is impossible to have in ethics the kind of extreme exactitude that the mathematician can achieve. Indeed, it would be an error to demand this kind of exactitude. . . Human civilization differs essentially from nature in that it is not simply a place in which capacities and powers work themselves out, but man becomes what he is through what he does and how he behaves. Thus Aristotle sees ethos as differing from physis in that it is a sphere in which laws of human nature do not operate, yet not a sphere of lawlessness, but of human institutions and human attitudes that can be changed and have the quality of rules only to a limited degree [27].

To recognize that phronesis is not the same kind of lawlike understanding found in mathematics, is to acknowledge that this form of understanding is both a knowing and an acting -- a way of being or a mode of existence which does not stand over against the world, but which makes it. A kind of knowing which studies the moral and historical existence of man does not remain sterile and untouched by what it learns. For it learns that the conditions of existence change and it wants to know how to act in this change.

Phronesis is not content to know what exists. It is a kind of understanding which knows man, as he does exist and has existed. But it knows man because it wants to learn how to live; it judges men and changing circumstances because it wants to know

how to conduct life, how to make one's own life -- which is the construction of something new; something which does not yet exist. Phronesis is only half content with a knowledge of existing conditions, because it knows that these are only the foundations of something different.

The moral reasoning of phronesis then learns that human institutions (social formations) are not "lawless," they have the quality of rules. But they are rule governed only to a limited extent: this is because humans create and recreate those rules and institutions. Phronesis knows that the conditions of human existence change because humans judge conditions and act to change them. The judgment of phronesis is the reasoning which governs this action.

The state of affairs, which represents the nature of moral reflection, not only makes philosophical ethics a methodologically difficult problem, but also gives the problem of method a moral relevance. Aristotle emphasizes that it is impossible to have in ethics the kind of extreme exactitude that the mathematician can achieve. Indeed, it would be an error to demand this kind of exactitude. What needs to be done is simply to make an outline, and by means of this sketch, give some help to moral consciousness. But how such help can be possible is already a moral problem. For obviously, it is among the characteristics of the moral phenomenon that the person acting must himself know and decide and cannot let anything take this responsibility from him. Thus it is essential that philosophical ethics have the right approach so that it does not usurp the place of moral consciousness and yet does not seek either a purely theoretical or "historical" knowledge, but by outlining phenomena, helps moral consciousness to attain clarity concerning itself [28].

To know, in the sense of phronesis, then meant that one had a general outline or schemata defining virtuous conduct.

Generally, virtue was moderation, it was experiencing sentiments appropriately. But this was only the most general of all possible outlines. For in each actual situation of life, the task of phronesis was to decide which sentiments were appropriate, and what behavior right. This really meant that in each concrete situation, the task of moral judgment was to attain clarity concerning itself. The task was to fill out the outline, a task which required reflexivity. It required that moral consciousness become transparent -- that it become aware of itself working and scanning the situation.

This is a level of reflexivity and a kind of knowing which was/is, indeed, "methodologically problematic." Phronesis could not be taught in the same didactic way that mathematical proof was taught. It was a kind of understanding which prudent humans could "help" others to acquire. But humans could only be helped to acquire phronesis if they already possessed a moral awareness.

This asks a lot of the person who is to receive this help. . . He must be mature enough not to ask of his instructor anything other than it can and may give. To put it positively, he must himself already have developed through education and practice an attitude in himself that he constantly concerned to preserve in the actual situations of his life and to prove it through right behavior [29].

All that could be done was to give moral consciousness some sort of outline and then help it attain clarity or reflexivity concerning itself. But how this kind of help could be provided was/is problematic, for this is a kind of knowing which can only come from questions. It presumes that men and women have



cultivated the attitude of continually asking "what is the virtuous thing to do?" and it presumes that they will not let anything take away the responsibility of asking this question.

Praxis and phronesis then, the life of politics, was a mode of human conduct which differed radically from the lifestyle of philosophers. It was a kind of thinking and acting which scanned variable situations, judging proper versus improper conduct in light of the principle of measure. It was a life of argumentation and persuasion, which nurtured virtuous conduct for citizens. And finally, it was a mode of conduct which was not content to gaze at what existed, but which wanted to know and to act. Phronesis then was a kind of knowing which was important as a means to an end. It showed politicians how to govern -- it directed their praxis.

## 2.5 Production: Techne and Poiesis

Aristotle several times distinguishes between three kinds of thinking or knowledge: "theoretical," "practical" and "productive." While theoretical knowledge is concerned with things which cannot be otherwise than in fact what they are, both practical and productive knowledge are concerned with things dependent on man's "doing" and "making" respectively. Practical knowledge is concerned with human actions which, both for their coming to be and with respect to their distinct character, depend upon deliberate choice; productive knowledge is concerned with artifacts which depend upon human "art" [30].

The recognition of this third kind of understanding, techne, is an elusive task in contemporary analysis. Because of some historical fusions which occurred during the Renaissance and during the industrial revolution, it has become more difficult to

identify clear and distinct differences between the kinds of knowing used by scientists, politicians and craftsmen. But in Greek society, those differences are patently real.

For the Greeks, the sphere of productive activity (poesis) was a mode of human conduct totally distinct from the lifestyles of politics and theory. Production was exactly this; a lifestyle. It was the mode of conduct found among artisans and slaves. It was the common way of life found among the lower socioeconomic strata of Greek society, not considered significant enough to be called a "walk of life" by landed proprietors, politicians and philosophers.

For the Greeks, this sphere of productive activity was a mode of human conduct requiring a different kind of thinking and acting. It was a form of activity which comes closest to contemporary ideas about labor. It referred to activity which produced enduring objects or artifacts and it required the acquisition of skills and the application of these skills to achieve certain tasks and to produce desired artifacts.

This mode of human conduct, production or poesis, required a different kind of understanding. This was a way of knowing which again contained none of the apodictic certainty of episteme, since it was concerned with things "doable" and not with unchangeable features of the cosmos. Additionally, it was a kind of knowing which did not coincide with phronesis, since it was not concerned with the sphere of ethical and political

conduct. The distinction between political understanding and productive understanding is especially important to note.

. . .practical knowledge was not to be confused with productive knowledge. The spheres of praxis and poesis, of moral-political action and the production of useful or beautiful artifacts, were no less distinct [than the spheres of praxis and theoria]. Whereas the one domain [praxis] was reserved for practical prudence, the other belonged properly to workmanlike skill, or techne. . .[theory] could contribute nothing directly to the techne of the craftsman or artist, which was based on acquired skills and experiences. . .like phronesis, techne could neither be derived from nor justified by theory [31].

The clear separation of theoria/phronesis/techne seems much less obvious today. But for the Greeks, there was no connection between the episteme of philosophers and the production (techne) of artisans. Similarly, there was very little connection between the phronesis of politicians and the understanding found among either artisans or philosophers. These were three distinct modes of knowing.

While the contrasts between these kinds of knowing were very real, there were, however, some very important parallels, especially between the kinds of understanding enjoyed by politicians and that found among artisans. Socrates and Aristotle both recognized important parallels between phronesis and techne; noting that both were characterized by some common properties.

Both forms of understanding, for instance, were characterized by application; both were used to guide action. In the case of the politicians; phronesis guided his deliberate

choice; in the case of the artisan, techne guided his craftsmanship or "making."

. . . There is no doubt a real analogy between the perfection of moral consciousness and that of the capacity to make something, i.e., of a techne. . . A person who knows how to make something knows something good and he knows it for himself, so that where there is the possibility of doing so, he is really able to make it. He takes the right material and chooses the right means for the execution. Thus, he must know how to apply in the concrete situation what has been learned in a general way. Is the same not true of moral consciousness? A person who has to make moral decisions has always already learned something. He has been so formed by education and custom that he knows in general what is right. The task of making a moral decision is that of doing the right thing in a particular situation, i.e., seeing what is right within the situation and laying hold of it. He too has to act, choosing the right means and his action must be governed just as carefully as that of a craftsman. . . Both are knowledge of a dynamic kind, i.e., their purpose is to determine and guide action. Consequently, they must include the application of knowledge to the particular task [32].

Techne then shared with phronesis this property of application. It was a kind of knowing which directed action, a "blueprint" or a master plan which guided human activity. Like the politician who acquired his "blueprint" from living in the community and internalizing its aims, the artisan also acquired a "blueprint" or a form of knowing which oriented his activity and directed decisions and action. This "blueprint" or techne of the artisan was acquired from accumulated experience.

In the end this kind of knowledge is little more than accumulated experience based on past "making," either one's own or that of others, which is sufficiently articulate to be useful to further "making" [33].

The similarities between phronesis and techne then included

the application of these forms of knowledge to guide human action. They stood against theory as ways of knowing which were concerned with things "doable" and "makeable," and unlike theory, their acquisition depended directly upon the accumulation of either technical or political experience.

But Aristotle, and other Greek thinkers were also very concerned to articulate fundamental differences between phronesis and techne. This was a concern to preserve the distinction between the activity of politicians and the activity of artisans; preserving the distinction between practice and techne.

We learn a techne and can also forget it. But we do not learn moral knowledge nor can we forget it. We do not stand over against it as if it were something that we can acquire or not, in the way that we can choose to acquire or not an objective skill, a techne. Rather, we are always already in the situation of having to act and hence must already possess and be able to apply moral knowledge. That is why the concept of application is highly problematical. For we can only apply something that we already possess; but we do not possess moral knowledge in such a way that we already have it and then apply it to specific situations. The image that man has of what he ought to be, i.e., his ideas of right and wrong, of decency, courage, dignity, loyalty, etc. . . . are certainly to some degree guiding ideas towards which he looks: but there is still a basic difference from the guiding idea represented by the plan the craftsman has of an object he is going to make. What is right, for example, cannot be determined independently of the situation that requires a right action from me, whereas the eidos of what a craftsman desires to make is fully determined by the use for which it is intended [34].

Here Gadamer is identifying a very subtle difference between the application of phronesis and the application of techne. For the craftsman, the application of techne is more rigidly determined. The object he intends to create or the result he

intends to achieve is known in advance, and while particular details of techne may vary, still the intended object generates a relatively fixed blueprint for action or a design, which the craftsman carries out.

Phronesis, on the other hand, is more contingent. In it, there is not a fixed image of the outcome. There is not "anterior certainty" concerning the good life and virtuous conduct. For the politician, what is right cannot be determined in advance of the concrete situation which requires right conduct. The application of phronesis was then much more contingent, depending more upon the specific details of each new situation.

For many thinkers, the subtle, yet important differences between phronesis and techne have been overlooked. Centuries of western thought have eroded the important distinction between productive activity and ethicopolitical activity. Increasingly, production and its attendant form of understanding (techne) have been "minimized" or devalued as distinct categories of knowing and acting.

Aristotle has divided knowledge into theoretical, practical, and productive. Yet the third member of this division seems to have fallen into oblivion soon after Aristotle's death, the main reason probably being that Aristotle had tended to identify productive knowledge with arts and thus and suggested that it was not a genuine type of knowledge in the strong sense of the term. In any case, most of the Greek Peripatetics already distinguished only between theoretical and practical knowledge, either treating productive knowledge as an insignificant subdivision of the latter or else simply forgetting about it. Accordingly, where the Arabs and early medieval thinkers wished to

classify quasi-sciences such as medicine, alchemy or navigation, they were in a somewhat embarrassing situation of either having to treat them as theoretical sciences somewhat comparable to mathematics and metaphysics, or else being forced to place them in practical philosophy beside politics and ethics. If the first alternative was chosen, such "sciences" could only be treated as parts or subparts of the knowledge of nature. . . If, on the other hand, one preferred to consider such quasi-sciences as practical, one had to treat them as subparts of. . . practical philosophy beside ethics and politics. It is easy to see that both classifications are quite unsatisfactory. . . [35].

To understand this historical memory lapse and the erosion of production/techne as a distinct category of human conduct, it is helpful to explore a fusion in Western traditions which occurred roughly between the twelfth and the fifteenth centuries A.D. This was a fusion of ways of knowing, episteme/phronesis/techne during the Renaissance and the transition to bourgeois society.

### 2.6 The Scientization of Politics and Production: Transition in the Renaissance

With the rise of modern science the classical constellation of theoretical, practical and productive knowledge was drastically altered. Theory came to mean the logically integrated systems of quantitatively expressed, lawlike statements characteristic of the most advanced sciences. . . a potential for predictive and technological application is intrinsic to theoretical knowledge of this sort. . . The close connection between pure and applied research which is familiar to us today arose gradually only in the 19th century. Since that time, the systematic, institutionalized connection between science and technology has undergone constant development, until today technological considerations play a dominant role in determining the direction of progress in many areas of pure science. At the same time, craftsmanship, techne, has become less and less important for the reproduction of the material conditions of existence. Thus, the classical conceptions of contemplative theory and theory-free techne have given way to the modern

conceptions of scientific theory and theoretically grounded technology [36].

The fusion of theory and production, a development which may be called the scientization of production, occurred roughly between the twelfth and fifteenth centuries A.D. in western civilization. While today it may be difficult to imagine a time when science and technology were isolated forms of human activity, their fusion has in fact been a relatively recent historical event. It may be recalled that, for the Greeks, episteme and theoria characterized the lifestyle of the philosopher. His was a "walk of life", or a way of knowing with no practical intent or no pragmatic applications on earth.

But beginning at least in the twelfth century A.D., Western discourse began to acknowledge a fusion of theory and practice, or the emergence of "applied science." One part of this development involved a merger of strictly theoretical understanding (the knowledge of episteme) with the pragmatic "handling and making of things." The episteme of philosophers began to melt into or merge with the understanding of artisans.

This fusion of theory and techne happened at a time when significant technological innovations were occurring in the Western world. Those technological developments were to have far reaching effects, changing social attitudes about theory and its relevance to practice.

Only during the last decades have we begun to realize that the more than one thousand years between the end of antiquity and the beginning of the so called "modern times"



was also a period of significant technological innovation which produced far reaching social changes and led to the emergence of a radically new attitude of Western man both toward nature and toward his "world" . . . Around the year 1000 A.D. Western man began systematically to use natural powers. It was around this time that there emerged the first fulling mills, trip hammers and water driven mills cutting marble, treating hemp and forging iron. One century later the first horizontal axle windmill was built. Once invented, these machines quickly spread all over Europe. . . This mechanization made possible production on a comparatively large scale and soon led to a significant refinement of techniques in general. Beginning with the thirteenth century, this technological development tended to result in a new interest in methods for solving practical problems better than the age old method of trial and error [37].

Mechanization or technological innovation began to solve complex practical problems, increasing the degree of technical control which humans held over nature. In Habermas' language, the feedback controlled learning process contained in instrumental action, gained ascendancy as a method for solving survival problems. This was a quickening or a heightened application of techne to the natural environment.

With its success, social attitudes began to change. Humans expressed new interests in solving practical (technical) problems through the application of theory. Francis Bacon articulated this interest in applied theory when he identified scientific method.

It is this attitude toward knowledge which Francis Bacon articulated into a program for revolutionizing the whole of science. His greatness consists in having made explicit the self-understanding of an emerging industrial and capitalist society, of having translated into an articulate, philosophical program the social aspirations and ideals which underneath the abstract thinking of philosophers and forerunners of science, had gradually developed in the minds

of common people since the end of the thirteenth century., Knowledge, instead of aiming at patterns which are as lofty as they are useless, ought to bear fruits in works; science ought to be "practical," that is, applicable to technological progress [38].

When Bacon isolated the steps of scientific method, he isolated the feedback controlled learning process which had always been contained in the artisan's instrumental reason, or in his techne. Bacon raised this method to a formal abstract level, calling it science. He was actually giving expression to the fusion of episteme and techne. This fusion converted episteme into a technocratic, instrumentally oriented cognitive product. It converted the intuitive contemplative "union" of episteme into logically integrated systems of lawlike statements. This development might reasonably be called the technocratization of theory, or the scientization of production.

While this fusion has had far reaching effects, including the institutional merger of science and technology, the transition to bourgeois society also witnessed another important fusion. This was a blending which occurred between the notion of practice, in the sense of ethicopolitical activity and the notion of practice, in the sense of productive activity. Increasingly, there was very little distinction drawn between the practical understanding of politicians and the practical understanding of craftsmen.

. . .In the twelfth century. . .the expression "practical" ceased to refer exclusively to the ethical/political realm . . .the expression "practical" came to refer both to the deontological realm of ethics and politics and to the

twilight zone in which strictly theoretical science met with the purposeful handling and making of things. . . This ambiguity did not disappear when in the thirteenth century the newly translated writings of Aristotle drew the philosopher's attention to the Greek distinction between a knowledge guiding ethico-political action and a quite different kind of knowledge guiding making. Thomas Aquinas in many instances uses the term "practicus" as referring both to the virtuous man and politician and to the artisan. . . There certainly is more to this development than only an innocuous shift in terminology. . . one no longer was aware of the basic difference between the knowledge involved in ethico-political activities and the knowledge characteristic of the artisan [39].

This fusion of phronesis and techne can be clearly identified in the shift from a classical doctrine of politics to a traditional (bourgeois) political doctrine. This was a development which may be termed the "scientization of politics." In this fusion, prudent judgment or phronesis changed from the cultivation of virtuous conduct in a communal society to the technocratic problem of regulating social relations. This was a fusion of ethicopolitical judgment and a technocratic orientation.

This fusion of the deontological and technological permitted, and later increasingly invited, a treatment of the deontological in terms of categories applicable to an artisan -- to a man who has a well-weighed masterplan and then carries it out. . . As technology progressed and abstract theoretical considerations became increasingly relevant to all kinds of "making," the link which the middle ages had established between ethics and politics, on the one hand, and technology, on the other hand proved fateful. . . it did not take long until politics and ethics turned from a practical knowledge as Aristotle had conceived it, into the knowledge of a man who translates into practice abstract insights which have to work, since the politician knows the laws of society like an architect knows the laws of mechanics and statics [40].

This was a fusion of phronesis and techne which proved fatal for the classical doctrine of politics. The idea of praxis, as

the Greeks had used it, referred to a mode of ethicopolitical activity with none of the certainty or control which is desired in bourgeois politics. There was, in short, no technocratic orientation in the classical notion of phronesis.

But in the transition to bourgeois society, this technocratic orientation became the sine qua non of politics. In the scientization of politics, political doctrine and praxis forgot the Greek tradition of cultivating and nurturing virtuous character. This had been the tradition of governance. In bourgeois society, politics instead turned its attention toward the instrumental (technocratic) task of regulating social relations. This was the beginning of the contemporary tradition of ruling (coercion).

The old doctrine of politics referred exclusively to praxis in the narrow sense of the Greeks. This had nothing to do with techne, the skillful production of artifacts and expert mastery of objectified tasks. In the final instance, politics was always directed toward the formation and cultivation of character; it proceeded pedagogically and not technically. For Hobbes, on the other hand, the maxim promulgated by Bacon, of scientia propter potentiam, is self-evident: mankind owes its greatest advances to technology, and above all to political technique, for the current establishment of the state [41].

This was a crucial shift in Western civilization, a shift which has erased the memory of praxis and phronesis, in the classical sense, as existential modes. Contemporary thought must now struggle even to recognize that ethicopolitical activity could have a much different gestalt; that politics and ethicopolitical judgment has been characterized, in the past, by

an absence of this technocratic orientation, and that it could, in principle again be characterized by an absence of an instrumental gestalt.

But the tradition of scientifically oriented politics was solidified during the transition to bourgeois society. Now, the concept of politics is very real evidence of the fusion of episteme/phronesis/techne which occurred during the transition to capitalist society. Politics now includes an instrumental (technocratic) orientation, reflected in its concern to predict, manipulate and control social intercourse. And it displays a scientific consciousness, (episteme), presuming that there could, in principle, be some foundation of ontologic constancy or lawlike regularity in ethicopolitical conduct. These are aspects of the contemporary tradition of politics which have very little in common with the classical tradition of phronesis and praxis.

Aristotle emphasizes that politics, and practical philosophy in general cannot be compared in its claim to knowledge with a rigorous science, with apodictic episteme. For its subject matter, the Just and the Excellent in its context of a variable and contingent praxis lacks ontological constancy, as well as logical necessity. The capacity of practical philosophy is phronesis, a prudent understanding of the situation. . .[42].

Whereas now,

. . .the claim of scientifically grounded social philosophy aims at establishing once and for all the conditions for the correct order of the state and society as such. Its assertions are to be valid independently of place, time and circumstances and are to permit an enduring foundation for communal life, regardless of historical situation. [Additionally] the translation of knowledge into practice, the application, is a technical problem. With a knowledge

of the general conditions for a correct order of the state and of society, practical prudent action of human beings toward each other is no longer required, but what is required instead is the correctly calculated generation of rules, relationships and institutions. [Finally], human behavior is therefore to be now considered only as the material for science. The engineers of the correct order can disregard the categories of ethical social intercourse and confine themselves to the construction of conditions under which human beings, just like objects within nature, will necessarily behave in a calculable manner. This separation of politics from morality replaces instruction in leading a good and just life with making possible a life of well-being within a correctly instituted order. . .The order of virtuous conduct is changed into the regulation of social intercourse [43].

The scientization of politics was a development which was tied directly to an historical or cultural transition in Western civilization. This was the transition from communal society to bourgeois society. In this transition, humans passed from one tradition to another -- letting go of the classical tradition of ethics and moral/political conduct and taking up a new tradition, with a new institutional order and new definitions of virtuous conduct. The scientization of politics was evidence of this shift. It was evidence of an institutional transition, where social relations lost the characteristics of communal ethics (the principal of measure) and took up the tradition of bourgeois, utilitarian ethics (decisionism).

In the transition from feudalism to capitalism, public life underwent drastic changes -- changes which were reflected in political philosophy -- in practical philosophy generally. In feudal society, public activity was still more or less consistent with one's social position, i.e., there was a

relatively fixed roster of values which made up a relatively stable communal ethic. But with the capitalist division of labor and the loosening of the social hierarchy, what had been a relatively stable communal ethic began to undergo a kind of fragmenting. New positions within the social structure, new occupations, brought with them new rights and obligations: and a new roster of values.

So long as there existed an immediate communal ethic, where only a difference, but no contradiction obtained between concrete and abstract norms, men could find a secure guide by holding fast to the existing system of norms. If however, there is no firm communal ethic, then neither Socratic ethical rationalism nor its Aristotelian modification is satisfactory. The problem is not only whether we will know the "good" (i.e., the system of virtues, which is also a generalization and idealization of the customary ethic) or even whether character, training, and long-standing habits permit us to follow that known good; the problem is that the good itself becomes ambiguous. What does it mean to be just? What does it mean to be steadfast. In themselves -- abstractly -- these categories meant less and less. . .[44].

If the classical doctrine of politics was gradually being eclipsed by a technocratic, scientific notion of politics, this was because classical notions of virtuous conduct were becoming less and less meaningful in bourgeois society. The whole possibility of praxis and phronesis (or of political activity) had been anchored in a communal ethic, which defined virtue in terms of measure. There was little ambiguity in knowing and practicing the good or the just, since communal society had a relatively clear definition of virtue. For the Greeks, the good and the just, or virtuous conduct was synonymous with measure.

But modern morality witnessed the birth of a new ethico-political tradition. This was a tradition with new and different kinds of ambiguities.

Modern morality, reacting to man's situation in bourgeois society -- and hence beginning with the Renaissance -- opposes to the existing system of ethical custom not some concrete system of ethical norms -- but rather a set of abstract norms; or more correctly, it tries with the help of those abstract norms to orient itself within the existing system of ethical custom. Here is the origin of that contradiction between "morality" and "legality" which Kant so rightly recognized. . .When people come to act, they rarely can act on a basis of pure legality and never on a basis of pure morality. The former implies an absolute conformism and the extinction of the "private" conscience. On the other hand, it is impossible to act from a purely moral standpoint, because at every step one strikes contingencies, relations and situations in which absolute systems of value have foundered or provide us with no bearings whatsoever. . .[45].

The transition to bourgeois society saw the creation of a new set of abstract norms or standards to orient ethicopolitical conduct. These standards included both legalistic and moralistic postulates. Legalistic standards coerced human conduct from the standpoint of conformism, extinguishing private conscience. Moralistic standards coerced human conduct from the standpoint of subjectively internalized, absolute, value orientations, which in their concrete, practical application, frequently "foundered" [46].

The ambiguities of bourgeois ethics then required new definitions of phronesis or a new formula for prudent judgment and virtuous conduct. Those new definitions occurred with the creation of bourgeois, utilitarian ethics (decisionism).



. . .if neither pure morality nor pure legality offer any opportunity for genuinely ethical action, can ethics itself be possible? Assuredly it can. But it will be much more boundup than before with individual choice, with an ability to take account of the situation, with the mutual interaction of character and situation and will judgment. The concept of phronesis took on a new meaning. Not only must general values be applied in a manner appropriate to the individual situation: in each concrete situation, the hierarchy of values must constantly be re-created, with some values being rejected and others reinterpreted, in the search for the "mean" value between the general and the subjective individual, between what is demanded and what is possible. That is the new ethic whose birth we can witness, an ethic of groping for a "mean" between morality and legality. . .[47].

Phronesis and praxis then underwent a fundamental transformation in the transition to capitalism. While there had been a significant degree of contingency in Aristotelian ethics, there had at least been a relatively stable communal ethic anchoring ethicopolitical activity. In the transition to bourgeois society, that "anchoring" form of practical reason gave way to a new tradition, where the judgment of virtue and the execution of virtuous conduct became an individual decision. In each new situation, the individual groped for the mean between legalistic and moralistic imperatives.

In doing this, individuals could no longer rely upon a fixed, given set of values. There were always situations where moralistic postulates became contradictory or where moralistic and legalistic imperatives were in conflict. This required a "shuffling" of the value roster, recreating the "hierarchy" of values in each new situation, rejecting some values,

reinterpreting others.

A new sort of ethics then became possible; one which was much more "bound up" with individual choice. This fundamental shift in the social definition of praxis was accompanied by a new criterion for determining the good and choosing virtue in each new situation. Bourgeois ethics was/is characterized by the criterion of consequence. Practical philosophy began to emphasize the consequence of action as the criterion for judging goodness or virtue.

Machiavelli declares, as a matter of general validity, that it is impossible to act in keeping with abstract virtues at all times and places. What was new in this was the establishment of the fact that the infringement of virtues, could, in certain concrete connections and from certain points of view, be adequate, necessary, and what is more, good. There exists, moreover, a criterion by which its "goodness" can be measured, a standard by which that goodness can be read. That is none other than the consequence of an action [48].

The new ethics was one which groped for the mean between legality and morality, using the consequence of an action to make judgments concerning its virtue. The new ethics also made this "shuffling" of the value roster, the practical responsibility of each individual.

An overall action may be proper even though it contains many partial actions which contradict accepted rosters of values, and an overall action may be wrong even though there is no single part of it which contradicts them. Machiavelli thus uncovered the internal contradiction between abstract morality and real social ethics (an ethics based not on any Ought, but on the unity of Ought and possibilities). And he pointed out as well that bearing this contradiction, and eventually resolving it, is not a general abstract theoretical task, but an eminently practical one, and a practical task of a sort which every single human

being must solve again and again in each concrete situation, and for which, he must bear personal responsibility [49].

Machiavelli's ethics was the first great step which mankind has made since Aristotle's theory of the mean towards a theoretical solution of the contradictory character and thrust of ethics. Just as, with the emergence of a non-communal society, moral responsibility came to weigh more and more heavily on the individual's shoulders, so too Machiavelli proclaimed the need for the individual's acceptance of responsibility for good and evil, humanity's arrival at moral adulthood, and the ethics of willingness to take a risk. In a paradoxical way, Machiavelli's . . . propositions served to awaken men to the risky character of their actions and, among other things, to the fact that often they can only choose between the greater and lesser evil and that in these cases, neither God nor the law will decide for them what to choose [50].

The transition from communal society to bourgeois society brought with it a new form of practice and a new form of phronesis. Political action was no longer judged in terms of its competence in measure. Where Greek political action had been skillful if it embodied the principle of the mean -- now political action was judged solely in terms of its consequence. While the action in itself might be accepted as virtuous conduct, it could turn into poor judgment or bad action if its consequence was bad.

Machiavelli captured the transition from communal ethics to bourgeois ethics when he presented Renaissance political ideology. From that time until now, the understanding of phronesis had been a kind of knowing which straddles the contradictions of bourgeois ethics. This is a kind of knowing which absorbs several contradictions.

1. In the first instance, it absorbs the contradiction

between legalistic judgment and moralistic judgment. In any concrete situation, it weighs the alternatives presented from the perspective of legality which is the alternate of conformism. And it weighs the alternatives presented from the perspective of morality, from a sense of internalized, subjective postulates. The application of either an exclusively legalistic or an exclusively moralistic framework is no longer possible in phronesis. What phronesis requires is the juggling of internalized subjective postulates, the restructuring of the value roster in each concrete situation.

2. At the same time, phronesis straddles the contradiction between abstract morality and real social Ethics. In any concrete situation, phronesis judges alternatives from the abstract Ought perspectives of law and morality: Abstractions which define the good and the just. And it also judges alternatives from the perspective of social ethics -- which is the unity of ought and real possibilities. "All the alternatives are evil; which is the lesser evil."

3. To absorb these contradictions between legalistic/moralistic abstraction and the real social ethics, phronesis uses a bourgeois standard. This is the criterion of consequence, a caliper which marks the mean between legalistic and moralistic perspectives, between abstraction and real social possibilities. In phronesis judgment sifts through a whole range of abstract norms, rejecting some, reinterpreting others. This shuffling is

always directed to real social possibilities; norms are rearranged in an effort to orient oneself to individual concrete situations. But the shuffling is not regulated by some communal ethic. It is guided by the judgment of consequence. This weighing of consequence is the hallmark of a bourgeois, individualistic ethic. In phronesis, the responsibility of "will judgment" -- is an individualistic burden. It is the responsibility of "astuteness." It requires an accurate account of the situation, an astute recognition of consequence. The presence of decisionistic/utilitarian ethics is to this day an important part of phronesis.

4. Finally, phronesis requires that these contradictions be resolved in practice, again and again. The contingency of phronesis is masked by the label "utilitarianism," for the judgment of consequence is something which must be worked out in practice, again and again.

#### 2.7 Nurses as Contemporary Social Actors: Recognizing the Genesis of Our Historical Selves

Self-reflection brings to consciousness those determinants of a self-formative process of cultivation and spiritual formation [Bildung] which ideologically determine a contemporary praxis of action and conception of the world. Analytic memory thus embraces the particulars, the specific course of self-formation of an individual subject (or of a collective held-together by group identity). . .Self-reflection leads to insight due to the fact that what has previously been unconscious is made conscious in a manner rich in practical consequences: analytic insights intervene in life. . .[51].

This brief step of historical recovery has attempted something different than rational reconstruction. It has brought to consciousness some selected aspects of a self-formative process which "ideologically determine" contemporary praxis and conceptions of the world for nurses. Scientized production, technocratic theory and scientized politics are all aspects of a bourgeois tradition which nurses as social actors have inherited. This is bringing to consciousness the particulars or the specific course of self-formation for social actors in contemporary bourgeois society.

But this process of recovery differs from rational reconstruction if it has "practical consequences." Self-reflection produces analytic insights and these, in turn, "intervene in life." They change our previous ways of reasoning and speaking. They produce a new self, with new modes of praxis and new conceptions of the world. Recognizing the genesis of our historical selves then sets in motion other steps in radical reflection. These are the steps of critique, imagination and negotiation.

Remaining chapters of the investigation will continue these steps in radical reflection. Here it seems important to identify some of those "practical consequences" or some changes in thinking and speaking which are suggested from this first hermeneutic step and its self-knowledge.

One of the most powerful insights produced in this recovery

is a self-understanding about nursing's technocratic interpretations of reality and the human condition. As social actors, nurses have inherited contemporary bourgeois traditions. This means that nurses participate in a Weltanschauung which includes scientized politics ("political science"), decisionism or utilitarian ethics, scientized (as opposed to contemplative) theory and theoretically grounded technology.

The "fusions" discussed in this chapter were very real historical events which have had dramatic effects upon the way nurses (as contemporary social actors) constitute reality and act-in-the-world.

Scientific understanding for nurses is no longer a contemplative activity whose end is the intuitive union with an object. Episteme and techne are now intimately related or interlocked, thanks to centuries of institutional connections between science and technology. Science now is characterized predominantly by its instrumental (technocratic) cognitive orientation; scientific theory now finds its application in technology.

Of equal importance, the fusion of phronesis and techne has eroded the Greek meaning of "practical" activity. Nurses as social actors do not participate in a communal ethic. The principle of the mean now seems hopelessly old fashioned as a framework to anchor ethicopolitical activity. There is instead the more technocratic orientation of utilitarian ethics and

Machiavellian political doctrine to orient contemporary practical (political) activity.

Finally, the kind of understanding found in production, techne, has increasingly been "minimized" or devalued. This occurs when, as science and technology interlock, social actors place more confidence in the understanding of scientific experts than in the understanding of skilled practitioners. In the self-formative process of the human species, increasing mastery of natural processes has actually been the result of a combination of both these ways of knowing.

In nursing, social actors can begin to look more critically at some of these "fusions." A critical perspective like the one expressed here, would begin to question or doubt the continued legitimacy of these fusions, at least in some of their consequences.

In the social institution of nursing, for example, it might be argued that nursing practice is, could or should be, characterized by three distinct modes of knowing: episteme, techne, and phronesis. A scientific understanding is part of nursing practice when it provides theoretical knowledge concerning natural processes (e.g., pathophysiology, biochemistry, etc.). These forms of scientific understanding provide nurses with formulas which guide action. In Habermas' pragmatist language, they are beliefs whose consequence is successful instrumental action.



But techne, the understanding of skilled craftsmen, is also an important part of understanding in nursing practice. This is the understanding which Aristotle rightly recognized as part of medicine, navigation, agriculture, etc. It is a skill which comes from accumulated experience, an understanding which is tied directly to the kind of labor found in nursing practice.

In industrial society, nurses, of course, participate in many forms of labor. Specialization and its attendant social stratification make nursing practice an eclectic array of activities which struggles to maintain itself as a single social institution. But the Aristotelian tripartite distinction (in a contemporary form) can still be used meaningfully to address the category of labor/techne in nursing.

In her political philosophy, Hannah Arendt drew a distinction between labor, work and action. She saw these as different kinds of human activity, and gave an account of each which is helpful in understanding the dimensions of labor and techne in nursing practice.

Arendt argued that labor corresponds to and is a response to the human condition of life.

. . .labour. . .includes all those activities whose basic purpose is to attend to life's needs. At the most basic level, man must eat, drink, clothe himself, sleep, attend to basic functions, etc. He must also earn his living, that is, take part in the collective process of material production and secure the means by which to meet his basic wants. He must also preserve the species and undertake such activities as raising children. . .In short, labour covers a wide range of activities, which although different in other respects, share one essential feature in common, namely they

have no other purpose but to serve life by sustaining, preserving, perpetuating or helping it periodically recuperate its lost energies. They owe their origin to the fact that man is an embodied being who wishes to preserve himself [52].

These kinds of activities, tied directly to the life process, are a form of productive activity which Aristotle could have included in the category of poiesis. Although they do not produce an enduring object, they produce the space of man's life, they serve life, preserve it, or perpetuate it.

The category of labor corresponds to the kinds of activities found among slaves in Greek society. Activity which is tied directly to the life process relies very much upon techne, although this techne may differ subtly from the understanding used by Aristotle's artisans. While craftsmen rely on understanding from accumulated experience to produce artifacts, laborers (e.g., domestic slaves) rely just as strongly upon a kind of understanding which comes from accumulated experience. The techne of labor (in Arendt's sense) is accumulated from experience with the cyclical, repetitive nature of the work itself.

Arendt argues that since labour is required by the needs of the body, which is a natural organism, it has all the phenomenal characteristics of nature. It is necessary and cannot be avoided. It is also cyclical and repetitive in the sense that it follows the circular movement of our bodily functions and recurs with unerring regularity. . . Its products are used by the life process the moment they are produced and must be continually produced afresh. . . although necessary labor is also "futile" in the sense that the expenditure of human energy involved in it is constantly used up and has nothing lasting to show. . . Since its movements are dictated by the life process, labour requires

little initiative or thought [53].

The kind of understanding required in this activity, techne is a common feature of most "service" activities. Those kinds of work which are tied most intimately to the human body and to the life process demonstrate these circular, repetitive rhythms, with a routine which repeats itself over and over again. Competence in these activities comes from experience, from techne, from surrendering to the rhythm of the work itself.

This kind of understanding, techne, is an important part of women's experience in domestic labor. British feminist Sheila Rowbotham described the cyclical, futile qualities of labor in a domestic context in the following way.

Housework is not only excluded from the prevailing economic notion of value, the actual nature of the work makes it invisible in another sense. . .The days routine of tasks is not apparent because they result merely in the creation of a normal environment. . .Within the space of the house and the time of the day there are certain tasks to be done. The tasks are the boundaries of a woman's work in the home. Get up, breakfast, wash up, make beds, dress the children, take them to school, clean, polish, wipe, shopping, collect children, eat, wash up, put children to bed, talk to husband, go to bed, make love. The day is carefully delineated, the operations are repeated again and again. . . [54].

Here, it seems important to suggest that nursing labor, especially in hospital settings, is characterized by many of these same properties. It is activity which is tied directly to the life process. It is cyclical, repetitive, invisible or dissolving and it frequently seems futile, in the sense that it produces no enduring object and makes no lasting mark in the world

of appearances. It can and frequently does, proceed on the basis of very little initiative or thought, following instead the circular movement of human bodily processes. The rhythm and routine of day, evening and night hours in hospital settings are very real phenomenological evidence of these properties in nursing labor.

These analyses suggest that in addition to scientific understanding, techne or the understanding of productive labor is also an important dimension of nursing's social reality. A critical perspective would extend this analysis to include a reflective look at the experience of alienation in nursing practice [55]. This would identify the dialectics of subjective/objective experience in nursing practice, where techne is externalized and converted into a reified, alienated social reality. Where techne guides nursing decisions and action, it is a subjective blueprint which is acquired through accumulated experience. Where that subjectivity is externalized and reified, then techne turns into an alienated task orientation and labor/techne stands over against nurses as something alien and dominating; labor controlling humans.

The understanding of techne and the understanding of science are then two kinds of knowing contained in the existential reality of nurses. A third kind of knowing is the ethicopolitical understanding used by nurses as social actors in bourgeois society. Phronesis, or ethicopolitical activity in nursing practice fol-

lows those same contours of decisionistic behavior found in bourgeois society writ large. Ethical judgment in nursing proceeds along lines of utilitarian theory and practice. Political judgment and political activity follow those same contours of Machievellian doctrine found in bourgeois society, writ large. This is a form of phronesis in other words which is characterized by an erosion of communal ethics and by its technocratic orientation.

### 2.8 When Insights Intervene in Life: Pragmatic Consequences

The insights generated by these kinds of self-knowledge can have some very real, pragmatic consequences. One possible consequence, is the genesis of "revolutionary" consciousness, or a shift in thinking and speaking which rejects the validity of bourgeois society. Such a shift occurs when one recognizes that alienation in nursing labor will not be overcome, unless it is overcome in bourgeois society, writ large. This is recognizing that the struggle against alienation in nursing is a particular; it rests upon the struggle against alienation in society writ large.

Another "shift" which can occur as a pragmatic consequence of these insights is the rejection of bourgeois ethics and politics, or phronesis, in its current hegemonic form. This rejection can occur for example, when one begins to notice the contradictions and "foundering" of decisionism, when one

recognizes the absence of humanism in Machiavellian politics, when one discovers the emptiness and technocratic orientation in bourgeois definitions of virtue and well-being. The emptiness of contemporary definitions of well-being (or "health") stand in hollow contrast to the communal definition expressed in the principle of measure.

These are insights which can provoke an awareness that the contradictions of ethicopolitical judgment in nursing are only examples of the contradictions found in bourgeois society writ large. This is recognizing that the struggle against current hegemonic forms of phronesis in nursing is a particular; it rests upon the struggle against those same contradictions in bourgeois society, writ large.

A positive characterization of these insights can be summarized as follows: Self-reflection can have the pragmatic consequence of provoking utopian thinking and speaking. Utopian conceptions have long been a part of Western discourse and their emergence frequently occurs in conjunction with episodes of self-reflection. In this instance, analytic insights can provoke thinking and speaking which struggles for a communal ethic and the erosion of alienation in society, writ large.

The struggle for a communal ethic and for the erosion of alienation is expressed in a democratic socialist conception of the world. A commitment to this interpretation of the human condition and a commitment to the struggle for this tradition can

be the pragmatic consequence of these pieces of self-reflection. Nurses who undergo this ideological shift, who experience these new, reflexive, critical interpretations, commit themselves to negotiation or to the pragmatics of persuasion, in a commitment to alter the reality of bourgeois society, and thereby, to alter the bourgeois reality of nursing.

Endnotes

1. H.G. Gadamer, Truth and Method. (New York, Seaburg, 1975) p. 23.
2. It will be acknowledged here that the term man as it appears in the entire text, refers to man in the generic sense. While I do not intend to denigrate feminist arguments, the continued debate over "man" as sexist language begins to wear thin, becoming in some instances a real distraction. Here, I assume that the reader has confronted the presence of sexist semantics in the English language and that s/he can accept the conditional use of "man" as a less cumbersome symbol for homo sapiens.
3. This section draws heavily on the work of N. Lobkowitz, Theory and Practice (Notre Dame, U of Notre Dame Press, 1967) (hereafter TP), and that of Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (Chicago, U of Chicago Press, 1958) hereafter HC.
4. The terms Vita Activa and Vita Contemplativa were used by Arendt in HC. See especially pp. 12-17.
5. Lobkowitz, TP, pp. 3-6.
6. Ibid., p. 8.
7. Ibid., pp. 7,8.
8. Ibid., p.
9. Lobkowitz, TC, p. 53.
10. Theoria was directed to things that happen always or for the most part, to the unchangeable and eternal, that is, to the divine. It might properly lay claim to apodictic knowledge, episteme, of the order and nature of the cosmos." T. McCarthy, CTJH, p. 2.
11. Ibid., p. 22.
12. By traditional political philosophy, Arendt had in mind the Western tradition of political thought found in Augustine, Aquinas, Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, Bentham, Hegel and Marx. One of her major criticisms of this tradition is its failure to recognize the dignity which could be a part of politics, the moral value of public space and public appearance. See the discussion of this point in B. Parekh, Hannah Arendt and the Search for a New Political Philosophy (London, Macmillan, 1981, pp. 1-19 (Hereafter, Parekh, HA).



13. A. Heller, Renaissance Man (New York, Macmillan, 1978), p. 157.
14. A related point made by Hannah Arendt concerns the difference between governance and ruling. She explicitly identified a shift in political ideology following the Greeks away from issues of governance to issues of ruling. The distinction between governance and ruling involves the different means of persuasion versus coercion. Historical changes in social and political organization, especially changes in the structure of the modern state, have entailed this shift from governance by persuasion to ruling by coercion. See the discussion of this point in Arendt's HC, pp. 22-58. Also Parekh, HA, pp. 14-16.
15. T. McCarthy, The Critical Theory of Jurgen Habermas (Cambridge, MIT Press, 1981) p. 2 (Hereafter, McCarthy, CTJH).
16. Lobkowitz, TP, p. 11.
17. Ibid., p. 30.
18. Arendt, HC, p. 26.
19. While there is no time to address the point here, it would be an important contribution to nursing's political consciousness to explore the works of Bakunin, Fanon and Sartre as they address the ontological and moral properties of violence. Also Arendt's work, On Violence (Harcourt, Brace & Jovanovich, 1970).
20. Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, as quoted in A. Heller, Renaissance Man, p. 96.
21. A. Flew, A Dictionary of Philosophy (New York, St. Martins Press, 1982), p. 27.
22. T. McCarthy, CTJH, p. 2.
23. H.G. Gadamer, Truth and Method (New York, Seaburg Press, 1975), pp. 21, 22 (hereafter, Gadamer, TM).
24. A. Heller, Renaissance Man, p. 305.
25. For an excellent review of the transition from classical to bourgeois politics, see J. Habermas, "The Classical Doctrine of Politics" in Theory and Practice (Boston, Beacon Press, 1973) pp. 41-81.

26. Gadamer, TM, p. 280.
27. Ibid., p. 279.
28. Ibid., pp. 279-280.
29. Ibid.
30. N. Lobkowitz, Theory and Practice: The History of a Concept (Notre Dame, 1967), p. 36 (hereafter, Lobkowitz, TP).
31. T. McCarthy, CTJH, p. 2-3.
32. Gadamer, TM, pp. 281-282.
33. N. Lobkowitz, TP.
34. Gadamer, TM, p. 283.
35. N. Lobkowitz, TP, p. 81. It will be noted here in passing that an important task for nursing is the recognition of techne as one important form of understanding contained in its practice.
36. T. McCarthy, CTJH, p. 3.
37. N. Lobkowitz, TP, pp. 92, 102.
38. Ibid., p. 107.
39. Ibid., p. 86.
40. Ibid., p. 88.
41. J. Habermas, TP, p. 42.
42. Ibid.
43. Ibid., p. 43.
44. A. Heller, Renaissance Man (London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978), p. 306.
45. Ibid., p. 307.
46. These insights were captured by Kant in his Critique of Practical Reason.
47. Ibid., pp. 307-308.

48. Ibid., p. 347
49. Ibid., p. 349.
50. Ibid.
51. J. Habermas, TP, pp. 22-23.
52. B. Parekh, Hannah Arendt and the Search for a New Political Philosophy (London, Macmillan Press, 1981), p. 110.
53. Ibid., p. 110-111.
54. S. Rowbotham, Woman's Consciousness: Man's World (Penguin Books, 1973) pp. 70-71.
55. The analysis of alienation in nursing is beyond the scope of this work; but it remains as an important task for organic intellectuals in nursing. Such analyses would explore the different dimensions of work, labor and action in nursing practice, along the lines suggested by Arendt. Further, it would explore the experience of alienation in nursing labor, as this concept was originally developed by Hegel and then by Marx. For an excellent analysis of the notion of labor and alienation, see the work by N. Lobkowitz, Theory and Practice, pp. . Also for one of the best contemporary analyses of alienation, see the work by B. Ollman, Alienation (Cambridge University Press, 1971).

## CHAPTER 3

### CRITIQUE: RECOGNIZING THE DIALECTIC OF ENLIGHTENMENT

#### 3.1 Introduction

Enlightenment is man's release from his self-incurred tutelage. Tutelage is man's inability to make use of his understanding without direction from another. Self-incurred is tutelage when its cause lies not in lack of reason but in the lack of resolution and courage to use it without direction from another. Sopere aude'. "Have courage to use your own reason" -- that is the motto of the enlightenment. [1].

This chapter attempts to recover a dialectical tension between two forms of consciousness in Western intellectual traditions. This is the tension between a dogmatic constitution of reality and an enlightened, emancipatory one. Kant's exhortation expressed the critical spirit of Enlightenment ideology. This was the resolution to overcome dogma and myth in a critical, self-conscious, emancipatory use of reason. The dialectic of enlightenment, then contains both moments of consciousness: the prereflective moment of dogma, or hypostatized world views and the reflective moment of self-conscious, critical thinking.

In this chapter, I have tried to look more closely at the notion of a dialectic in enlightenment. This is not an original

or self-discovered problematique. A similar kind of exploration occurred in an early work from the Frankfurt School, The Dialectic of Enlightenment, by Adorno and Horkheimer.

The Dialectic of Enlightenment is not about the period in the history which goes by the name of Enlightenment. The central figures of the Enlightenment are hardly touched upon at all. Instead the book is about enlightenment, without the definite article and with a small "e." It is about enlightenment in general. In philosophical parlance, enlightenment is the emancipation of man from the despotism of myth. Horkheimer and Adorno take exception to this traditional definition which led to the errors of rationalism and progressivism. Far from being straightforward, emancipatory enlightenment has had a dialectical career, carrying within itself the seeds of regression. Horkheimer and Adorno speak of the aporia of enlightenment, for it is at once emancipation from myth and the destruction of areas of freedom already won [2].

The intent of this chapter is to briefly critique the dialectical career of enlightenment, as it has occurred in Western intellectual traditions. This is a step of critique which roughly approximates ideologiekritik. It roughly identifies problems or limits in Western interpretations of reality. This step of critique argues that the history of Western thought has demonstrated an ongoing tension between dogma and critical spirit. This dialectic is an historical characteristic of Western intellectual traditions which seems important for a self-conscious nursing praxis to recognize. It seems important, in other words, to recognize that intellectual traditions inherited by contemporary nurses have contained this dialectical relationship between dogma and critical spirit.

### 3.2 Empiricism and Enlightenment Ideology

Western enlightenment ideology, expressed during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, typically argued that order and predictability characterize the universe and that human reason, freed of superstition and metaphysical belief in divine will, could secure knowledge of this regularity by discovering nature's laws.

To error, we owe the oppressive chains which despots and priests everywhere forge for the people. To error we owe the slavery in which people languish in almost all countries. To error we owe the religious terrors which freeze human beings in fear and make them slaughter each other for the sake of figments of the mind [4].

This example of enlightenment ideology echoed Kant's challenge, that humans could achieve emancipation by enlightenment; that humans could liberate themselves from despotic myth by exercising the will to be rational. The challenge to "use your own reason" was at once the invitation to release man from the fear and terror of myth and also the invitation to release humans from the domination of nature. Enlightenment ideology challenged humans to direct their own consciousness to the natural environment, to uncover the "laws" of nature and free themselves from natural constraint.

The work of an early empiricist, Francis Bacon, expressed this ideology using reason to dominate nature. This was an early indication of a Western interest in using science to free humans from the constraint of the natural environment.

[For] Bacon, scientific knowledge [was] potential power -- the instrument or tool which can be used to master nature. Science is the key to the control of nature and (as Bacon well recognized) of human beings. By obeying nature one can, on Bacon's account, command her "for you have but to follow and as it were hound nature in her wanderings, and you will be able, when you like, to lead and drive her afterwards to the same place again" [4].

Presented this way, reason offers itself as an instrument to liberate humans from the domination of nature. By knowing nature's regularities and limits, humans simultaneously learn which aspects of nature they are free to manipulate and which aspects are beyond human control. Reason under Enlightenment ideology then came to have an emancipatory connotation. It was presented as a form of knowledge which frees humans from situations of bondage and domination.

But, paradoxially, reason as constituted during the Enlightenment also came to have a repressive connotation. With nature conceived as pure, neutral matter, reason came to stand for a form of understanding which allows humans to control, manipulate or dominate nature. Reason then became a repressive force, a form of power to be used for domination and control.

Human knowledge and power coincide, for ignorance of the cause deprives one of the effect. Nature to be commanded must be obeyed; and that which in contemplation is as the cause in operation is as the rule [5].

Knowledge, in other words, was power. It was control and dominance of the natural environment; it was coercion of nature.

It is no coincidence that the sexist language used by Bacon to describe nature was language which matches the history of

science as it developed in Western sexist civilization. At least since empiricist philosophers like Bacon, Western discourse has demonstrated the desire to coerce and dominate nature -- an ideology espoused by males who were incapable of even noticing that they characterize nature according to gender.

For you have but to follow and as it were hound nature in her wanderings, and you will be able, when you like, to lead and drive her afterwards to the same place again [6].

Bacon's comments are evidence of a rather peculiar tendency in Western patriarchal discourse to characterize the natural environment in a paradoxical way: as neutered object (an absolute, fully determinate objectivity) and as feminine subject (possessing "feminine" tendencies; e.g., "wanderings" even purposes, which are capable of being decoded and, more importantly, controlled).

The dialectic of Enlightenment in early empiricist discourse then contained the two moments: 1) patriarchal coercion directed at nature and 2) a humanistic liberating focus, which struggled for emancipation and an uplifting of the human condition. Empiricist discourse then contained the two moments of prereflective, repressive consciousness and reflective emancipatory, critical consciousness.

This dialectic expressed itself over and over again, as empiricists struggled to discover the right method for coercive/emancipatory consciousness. Francis Bacon, for example, argued that science could achieve predictive capacity



if it adopted the pattern of inductive inference. This was arguing that induction based upon controlled experiments, could provide the instrument or the power to coerce nature.

The method usually followed by philosophers should be inverted. Instead of coming down from axioms to particular conclusions, as in syllogistic deduction, the scientist should go instead from particular experiments and observations up to axioms -- induction, in other words, should replace deduction. . . Then and only then, may we hope well of the sciences, when in a just scale of ascent, and by successive steps not interrupted or broken, we rise from particulars to lesser axioms and then to middle axioms, one above the other, and last of all to the most general. . . [7].

Bacon's confidence in inductive inference came at a time in history when Western civilization had experienced a marked increase in accumulated levels of productive efficiency. During the Middle Ages, material changes in the development of technology gave man increased control over the natural environment. This was roughly a time in history when man had learned to use techne to solve large scale, survival problems. Bacon succeeded in explicating the steps of this learning process, and in elevating those steps to a formal, abstract level which he called science. The confidence he expressed in scientific method was part of a more general social attitude found in Western civilization during the Enlightenment. This was a progressive spirit which believed in the power of instrumental reason to improve the human condition.

In his confidence, Bacon expressed a fundamental assumption common in Enlightenment ideology. This was the idea

that reason could be practical or that reason could be used to solve practical (survival) problems and thereby improve the human condition. This kind of Enlightenment ideology was emancipatory; it challenged humans to discard the despotism of myth (in this case, religious dogma) and have the courage to use their own reason. Bacon's early empiricism argued that reason, so applied, could improve the human condition.

In his critical, enlightened spirit, Bacon rejected deductive inference as the only legitimate mode of reality construction. His skepticism launched the empiricist tradition. This was a program which argued for the integration of sense experience (observations) through the use of inductive inference, a form of inquiry which produced synthetic knowledge, or knowledge of empirical events. Induction through experimental method could provide humans with knowledge (or power) to control the natural environment. Reason could be practical.

In later years, David Hume extended empiricism's critical spirit, becoming a critic of empiricism itself. Hume shared the empiricist commitment to sense experience and inductive inference in scientific inquiry. But he retained a self-consciousness about empiricism which became critical of the empiricist project. That critical spirit enabled Hume to identify weaknesses or limits in empiricist methods.

It was Hume who drew the famous distinction between

analytic and synthetic knowledge, discovering that deductive inference explicates analytic truths, and that inductive inference amplifies synthetic truth. Hume's critical thought then went on to discover that the principle of causal connection contained in empiricist dogma could not be justified, either by reference to logical necessity (analytic truth) or by reference to experience (synthetic truth) [8]. Hume's critique of the law of causal connection delivered a devastating blow to Enlightenment ideology. It threatened a key enlightenment assumption: that reason could be practical or that there could be connection between theory and practice.

So powerful was the effect of Hume's criticism that it provoked a critical "awakening" in other European intellectuals. Kantian critical philosophy, for instance, was an especially important European response to Hume. In his critical spirit, Kant kept alive the dialectic of Enlightenment. His was a nearly self-conscious examination of reason, a critical, reflexive moment in European intellectual history which struggled to discover a connection between theory and practice.

### 3.3 Kantian Critical Philosophy

In his philosophy, Kant shared with other European intellectuals, a commitment to the project of Enlightenment. He became critical of scholastic dogma, believing that human rationality could be used to improve man's existential reality. He committed himself, in other words, to the problematique of

theory and practice; to the project of understanding how rationality could be practical or how self-conscious man could use reason to improve his own existential condition.

But Kant was terrifically disturbed by Hume's critique; so disturbed that he spent his entire career struggling to overcome Hume's skepticism, struggling to discover how reason could be practical. His was a commitment to explain how far rationality could be extended to solve all kinds of practical (existential) problems.

Kant's work contained the same themes found previously in the dialectic of enlightenment. His was a critical spirit which argued for the emancipation of man from myth and which simultaneously carried within itself the seeds of regression, mythology and hypostatized world views.

Late in the eighteenth century, Kant made a last major effort to salvage the natural sciences, mathematics and metaphysics from the consequences of Hume's skepticism. Kant admitted that Hume's discoveries had wakened him from a "dogmatic slumber," for when Hume demolished justification for belief in causal connection, he also demolished claims made by metaphysicians (i.e., substance is permanent, the world has, as to time and space, a beginning limit).

In the prevailing scholasticism of his time, metaphysical propositions such as these were presented as a priori, necessary truths. But Kant extended the implications of Hume's critique

to metaphysics and demonstrated that all propositions made in metaphysics are like the law of causal connection: they can be derived neither from logical necessity nor from experience. Kant's distrust of speculative metaphysics was the problematique of his major work, The Critique of Pure Reason [9].

Kant's constructions have been characterized as radical or revolutionary in that he submitted dogmatic claims to critical analysis instead of accepting them in a prereflective manner. His critique of speculative metaphysics was a radical renunciation of dogmatism in metaphysics: a renunciation which argued that metaphysics was speculation or a dogmatic acceptance of metaphysicians claims to have a priori knowledge without an a priori examination of the scope and limits of knowledge. The philosophy which he proposed to replace speculative metaphysics would have been First Philosophy or Critical Philosophy, which provides a "scientific" foundation because it has ascertained the limits of theoretical knowledge.

To appreciate this project, it is helpful to consider how Kant began. He was a follower of Cartesian rationalism, a position which asserted that:

All knowledge was or could become scientific in the rationalistic sense -- that is complete, systematic, apriori [sic], apodictic and dogmatic. All things in the world, whether experienced or not were, for this philosophy, in principle rationally comprehensible [10].

This sort of anchoring never left Kant's work, although the dogmatism underwent somewhat of an erosion. The questions he

pursued, "How do we know?" "How much do we know?" were examples of epistemology: consciousness first becoming conscious of itself. These were questions in which dogmatic rationalism acknowledged the possibility of its own limits; questions which acknowledged the possibility of contingency in human knowing. But the answers from Kant always emerged within a rationalistic framework, a structure which eventually organized all of his conclusions into a systematic, a priori and apodictic formulation.

In his dissertation, Kant argued that space and time were "sensitive concepts," or forms of sensibility which apply to the world of sense experience or phenomena. They were not properties of things in reality, but categories which organize experience or the appearance of things. Later, cause and substance were similarly presented as intellectual concepts which do not apply to noumenal reality, but to the phenomenal world.

Kant was led to this position concerning the subjective organization of appearances by the discovery of four fundamental antinomies. These were contradictory metaphysical propositions, each of which can be proved to be true of reality, if we take intellectual concepts to be characterizing reality, in itself. The four antinomies contained the following theses and antitheses:

- I
- a) The world has, as to time and space, a beginning limit  
 b) The world is, as to time and space, infinite
- II
- a) Everything in the world consists of elements that are simple  
 b) But there is nothing simple, but everything is composite
- III
- a) There are in the world causes through freedom  
 b) There is no freedom, but all is nature
- IV
- a) In the series of world-causes there is some necessary being  
 b) There is nothing necessary in the world, but in this series all is contingent [11].

With the discovery of the antinomies, Kant argued that concepts such as time, space (I), substance (II) and cause (III and IV) could not, justifiably, be held to apply to reality, in itself:

If we, as is commonly done, represent ourselves the appearances of the sensible world as things in themselves, if we assume the principles of their combination as principles universally valid of things in themselves and not merely of experience. . .there arises an unexpected way: because the thesis, as well as the antithesis, can be shown by equally clear, evident and irresistible proofs. . [12].

Kant's critical philosophy resolved the problem of antinomies by rejecting the realist premise: that knowledge is an organization of principles which characterize things in themselves. In his Critique of Pure Reason, Kant argued that synthetic knowledge -- knowledge of factual matters -- does not describe things as they are in themselves, but rather things as they appear to us. This was his derivation of the transcendental aesthetic, a phrase which literally means that

appearance is the basis of experience.

Kant argued that transcendental aesthetic was valid because it explains not only the antinomies but also the existence of a priori synthetic truths. He discovered that, beyond Hume's categories of a priori analytic truths and a posteriori synthetic truths, another category, which he called a priori synthetic judgments were found in mathematics, natural science and metaphysics. He argued that mathematical judgments are true both a priori (in that they follow necessarily) and synthetically (in that they provide new information by going beyond given concepts).

First of all, we must observe that all strictly mathematical judgments are a priori, and not empirical, because they carry with them necessity, which cannot be obtained from experience. . . . But on close examination. . . . [we discover] the essential and distinguishing feature of pure mathematical knowledge among all other apriori knowledge is that it cannot proceed from concepts. As therefore in its propositions it must proceed beyond the concept to that which its corresponding intuition (sense experience) contains, these propositions neither can, nor ought to, arise analytically, by dissection of the concept, but are all synthetical [13].

Similar arguments were made concerning a priori synthetic judgments in metaphysics (e.g., judgments about substance). Kant believed that he had discovered a system of a priori (universal and necessary) truths about space and nature. This collection of propositions about space and nature, true both necessarily and synthetically, held the promise of refuting Hume's skepticism concerning predictive knowledge of natural events.



With the discovery of a priori synthetic judgments, and with the discovery of his antinomies, Kant argued that empiricist epistemology contained major weaknesses; that empiricist confidence in sense experience as it "mirrors" nature was ungrounded. In his rationalist construction, a priori synthetic judgments were possible only if one gave up the assumption that such propositions represent things in themselves. Mathematics, especially geometry, could be a priori synthetic knowledge, because it did not describe things as they are in themselves, but only things as they appear to us.

It is only the form of sensuous intuition (sensuous experiences) by which we can intuit things a priori [sic]; but by which we can know objects only as they appear to us (to our senses), not as they are in themselves, and this assumption is absolutely necessary if synthetical propositions a priori [sic] be granted as possible, or if, in the case they actually occur, their possibility is to be comprehended. . .[14].

In similar arguments, with a more specific reference to propositions concerning space and time, Kant went on to argue that his "sensitive concepts" were themselves part of the transcendental aesthetic:

Intuitions of mathematics; space and time, if we omit from empirical intuitions (sense experience) of bodies and their alterations (motion) everything empirical that is, belonging to sensation, space and time remain; which are therefore pure intuitions that be a priori [sic] at the basis of the empirical. . .They are mere forms of our sensibility, which must precede empirical intuition [15].

With these discoveries, Kant established a foundation for his philosophical system. Everything else stood on the premise that propositions characterize the appearance of reality, and

not reality in itself. This was a formal elaboration of a position which accepts a subject/object distinction. Such a distinction meant that human knowledge of objective (external) reality can never achieve certainty concerning that external reality, as something in itself. Human knowledge is rather the subjective organization of objects -- as they appear.

Kant recognized that his position concerning the transcendental aesthetic might easily be construed as idealism and he was quite concerned to refute this interpretation:

Idealism consists in the assertion that there are none but thinking beings, all other things which we think are perceived in intuition, being nothing but representations in the thinking beings, to which no object external to them in fact, corresponds. I, on the contrary, say that things, as objects of our senses, existing outside us, are given, but we know nothing of what they may be in themselves, knowing only their appearances, that is, the representations they cause in us by affecting our senses. . . the existence of a thing is not thereby destroyed, as in genuine idealism, but it is only shown that we cannot possibly know it by the senses as it is in itself [16].

Kant's refutation of objective idealism was a remarkable example of eighteenth century epistemology; eighteenth century thought becoming conscious of itself. If all that could be known of external reality were its appearances, then humans needed a theory of knowledge which understands how appearances come to be known. What the natural sciences, mathematics and metaphysics required was a scientific explanation for how such appearances are "caused" in us when external objects affect our senses.

Kant presented his critical epistemology as a solution which could salvage the sciences from Hume's skeptical conclusions. While he accepted the discovery that there could be no predictive knowledge concerning things in themselves, Kant retained just enough dogmatism to argue that humans could know, with a priori certainty, how such external objects make their appearance. This was another way of saying that it is possible for humans to have predictive knowledge concerning the way in which things will always appear. By getting clear on how the medium or tool of knowledge works, humans could regain confidence in their ability to predict, at least the appearance, of natural events.

Specifying the nature and limits of human knowledge was the task of critical philosophy. By identifying the conditions of possible knowledge (that is, by knowing the conditions under which objects "cause" their appearances), Kant could predict which aspects of reality were objects of possible understanding and which aspects of reality were beyond the limits of knowledge (in other words, unknowable). Those aspects of reality which were, in principle, unknowable were best left to "rational faith." Western reason, especially (science), could extend its knowledge of external reality by focusing on the appearance of objects of possible understanding. Science could continue to generate predictive laws -- (laws of appearances), if it understood the a priori nature of theoretical reason and

the apodictic manner in which such principles are constituted.

Kant's Critique of Pure Reason specified the conditions under which a priori synthetical judgments are made. These conditions he labeled broadly the transcendental analytic, a phrase which meant that at the basis of appearances is thinking. Kant developed the transcendental analytic then as the ground for his transcendental aesthetic. He believed that appearances ultimately were derived from transcendental, a priori conditions which govern thinking.

The analytic conditions which Kant discovered included the analytic of concepts and the analytic of principles. Roughly, he argued that concepts and principles are used universally to organize experience. He proposed that thinking proceeds by the organization of representations into judgments. But Kant would not reduce such judgments to the private association of ideas. His was not a psychologistic argument concerning the way in which individual psychic faculties work.

Rather, Kant argued that all judgments reflect four universal modes of organizing representations. These were logical (not psychological) forms of union; a priori, necessary modes of judgment for any consciousness, whatsoever. His logical table of judgments then was presented as a discovery containing an exhaustive account of all functions performed in any act of judgment (e.g., as to quantity, as to quality, as to relations, as to modality).

Kant next derived pure concepts or categories of understanding which run parallel to judgments. His concepts reflected the logical functions of judgment; for example, the intellectual concept of cause reflects the logical function of making judgments concerning relations. The categories or concepts are then applied to the world of experience or to empirical phenomena in space and time. This application of the concepts gives rise to universal, a priori principles or laws. These are a priori synthetic judgments (e.g., principle of causation) which the understanding legislates for nature; a priori rules which apply to all our experiences. The result is an organization of sensuous experience by the understanding. This organization is nature, which is phenomena under law [17].

Kant used these findings as premises which provide a scientific grounding for propositions generated in mathematics, the natural sciences and metaphysics. His transcendental concepts/categories allow humans to determine, in an a priori manner, the limits of theoretical understanding. Kant argued that when the categories are applied beyond sensuous experience, they yield knowledge of a speculative nature (e.g., nature of soul, freedom of will, existence of God).

### Theoretical Knowledge versus Practical Knowledge

In his Critique of Pure Reason, Kant established a distinction between theoretical reason and practical reason,

using sense experience to make this distinction. Theoretical reason, when applied to sense experience, provided knowledge of nature. But reason applied beyond the realm of sense experience provided another kind of knowledge: practical understanding. Kant rejected the metaphysics which resulted from practical reason's attempt to explain sense experience. But he held that practical reason was an important source of grounding for action in the world -- especially for moral action. Practical reason makes judgments concerning moral conduct -- judgments which are not based on any empirical grounding.

Kant's separation of theoretical reason from practical reason allowed him to bifurcate any knowing subject into two kinds of ego. In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant had presented the ego as a unity of mental activity or of judgments concerning sense experience. This was an ego who knows empirical/natural events, ego in the epistemological sense. In the Critique of Practical Reason, Kant had presented the ego as a subject who knows moral judgments in its conduct, who engages in practical activity which is governed by moral judgments. This was ego in the practical sense.

To preserve a form of reason which would allow humans to be moral and free, Kant separated theoretical knowing from practical knowing and derived a priori grounds for both. The Critique of Practical Reason was apparently modeled on the Critique of Pure Reason [18] as it presented Kant's a priori

ground for any possible (moral) judgment. This was the famous categorical imperative, another a priori synthetic principle to organize the activity of humans in practical affairs.

For Kant, the moral interests pursued in the context of everyday life were grounded in the principle: "act only on that maxim which you can at the same time will to become a universal law." Practical reason, anchored in this principle, could, according to Kant, organize practical activity in such a way that freedom and morality were preserved.

Like his other a priori synthetic judgments, this imperative was held to organize moral experiences in such a way that moral obligation and the sense of duty occur with a priori necessity. The ground could not be derived from empirical experience; empirically conditioned or "natural" human feelings and inclinations do not motivate moral conduct or guarantee a sense of moral obligation. But as with Kant's other a priori synthetic truths, the principle organizes experience in such a way that a sense of moral obligation, specifically duty, is transcendental.

The moral judgments which humans experience then were not threatened by the sphere of theoretical understanding. Humans could continue to "have their cake and eat it too;" discover causally determined appearances, but enjoy/pursue human freedom, free will and moral responsibility.

This was the grand paradox of the [Enlightenment frame of

reference:]law governed the universe, determining the smallest motion of the least grain of sand, but men need not necessarily believe this to be true and even if they do, they are free to ignore its consequences [19].

To preserve those pure practical interests (freedom, morality) Kant broke off a piece of rationality and presented it as different in kind from the reason humans exercise in theoretical understanding. The distinction between theoretical and practical reason helped Kant to carry on the Enlightenment project. His pure theoretical reason explained how men could improve the material conditions of existence through one form of rationality; and Kant's practical reason explained how man could improve the human condition through another form of ethicopolitical rationality.

Kant's critical philosophy argued against Hume, that reason in all its forms, was practical or that rationality could not help but apply to the human condition. In the Critique of Pure Reason, he argued that theoretical reason, when applied appropriately to sense experience, organizes that experience to provide man with an understanding of appearances -- or natural events as they appear. This use of theoretical reason was practical, in the sense that it gave man knowledge of appearances which could then be used to predict and control natural events. Kant's formulations about theoretical reason then fit with the Enlightenment project: to use reason to free man from the constraint of the natural environment.

Similarly, in the Critique of Practical Reason, Kant argued



that a different kind of reason organizes man's ethicopolitical or moral experience. Practical reason, when applied appropriately to man's existential activity, gives humans a different kind of judgment or understanding. This is a practical understanding which can guide man's ethicopolitical activity. These formulations again fit with the Enlightenment project: to recognize and use man's own practical reason to improve the human condition.

Kant's critical spirit then pushed the Enlightenment project to a new level of reflexivity. He argued for a new self-consciousness; for the emancipation of humans from myth. He dissolved both rationalist and empiricist mythology in his discovery of two kinds of rationality which could be practical. His work then contained an emancipatory moment; an interest which struggled to overcome myth and dogma.

But paradoxically, Kant's work also contained the dialectical moment of regression or retrenchment into new forms of myth. While his critical philosophy pushed against hypostatized world views and struggled for emancipation through self-consciousness, it simultaneously created new forms of myth and lost areas of freedom already won.

The dialectical, hypostatized or regressive moment of critical philosophy was uncovered in Hegel's critique of Kant.

### 3.4 Hegelian Critique

Hegel's work was launched by the same critical spirit found in Kantian critical philosophy. Hegel also took up the Enlightenment project of exposing myth and uncovering dogma, a project which was driven by an interest in emancipation. Hegel, however, focused his critical gaze on Kant's work and uncovered mythology there concerning the knowing process and the knowing subject.

Kant's philosophy was based upon a specific notion of knowledge which saw knowledge as an organon, a medium or a tool.

Those who conceive the enterprise of the critique of knowledge as an examination of the means of knowledge start with a model of knowledge that emphasizes either the activity of the knowing subject or the receptivity of the cognitive process. Knowledge appears mediated either by an instrument, with whose help we form objects or as a medium through which the light of the world enters the subject. Both versions accord in viewing knowledge as transcendently determined by the means of possible knowledge [20].

Kant had used such an organon model of knowledge in his critique. When he identified the transcendental conditions of possible knowledge, he focused his examination upon knowledge as a tool and as a medium. He examined the thinking activity (judgment) of any possible knowing subject and presented knowledge as a tool which is used by the knowing subject. Similarly, in his examination of the receptivity of transcendental cognitive processes (transcendental analytic), Kant presented knowledge as a medium through which external objects are known.

However, the critique of knowledge, in its use of the organon model, began with presuppositions concerning the knowing subject who uses the tool/medium. The critique also included presuppositions concerning the category of activity/receptivity which would count as a legitimate instance of the tool/medium. These were hidden presuppositions concerning an ahistorical epistemic subject and an ahistorical knowing process.

#### Ahistorical Knowing Process

Hegel [21] identified the first presupposition in Kant's critique as an ahistorical and normative conception of the knowing process (tool/medium). Kant began his criticism with an acceptance of mathematics and contemporary physics as prototypical knowledge. In this Kant revealed his dogmatism. He accepted the principles of mathematics and physics as a priori (necessary) and then used these principles to draw conclusions about the necessary organization of all theoretical reason.

For Kant, the logical categories of judgment and the correlative physical principles which existed in the eighteenth century were a priori and therefore unchanging. In order for the appearance of the thing-in-itself not to change, the conditions under which it made its appearance (i.e., the knowing process) had to be permanent (i.e., unchanging).

Hegel's arguments, on the contrary, presented the knowing

process (judgments, categories, principles) as temporal, or something which undergoes historical transformation. Kant had rejected the relativism which is entailed by this suggestion. He rejected relativism in conditions of possible knowledge whether they were derived from psychologistic grounds (a form of justification which was also unacceptable to Hegel) or from radical subjective idealism (the claim which Hegel made). Instead, Kant derived his transcendental conditions from logical grounds, particularly from the law of contradiction and the law of the excluded middle. This was a derivation which justified his concepts as necessary and cast them as permanent categories of all possible experience.

This was a dogmatism, an uncritical acceptance of claims made by mathematicians and physicists (or philosophers studying their work). According to Hegel, this dogmatism occurred because Kant had ignored the self-formative process of consciousness. For Hegel, the claims made by logicians, mathematicians and physicists were the result of historical transformations in thought. On his account, all thought, including scientific consciousness, is involved in a self-formative process which proceeds, historically, from an initial state of sense-certainty to a final state of self-consciousness, eventually characterized as absolute knowledge.

In the transition from sense-certainty (this, here, now) to perception of the physical object, concepts are employed (e.g.,

red, ball). In the succeeding stage, understanding occurs, a stage in which objects of consciousness are not observable physical things, but laws and forces. In the transition from perception to understanding, concepts are also employed; in fact they become the object of consciousness (e.g., mass, velocity). These objects of consciousness, themselves unobservable, are the explanatory constructs of physical theory.

It is at this stage of understanding that consciousness recognizes its objects (theoretical constructs) to be both the object and the product of understanding. Consciousness, in having these constructs (e.g., laws) as its object actually has itself for an object. Consciousness then has become conscious of itself; it has become self-conscious [22].

It is by means of this final stage, that reflexive scientific thought is able to transform itself, historically. Science which is truly self-conscious recognizes that its concepts are products of an historically changing form of consciousness. It recognizes its concepts as finite constructs which have been applied to an infinitely large and complex reality [23].

In an uncritical and dogmatic way, Kant's critique of the knowing process had ignored these self-formative conditions of genesis and transformation in scientific consciousness. With his ahistorical, a priori conclusions concerning the knowing process, Kant's system would have frozen scientific understanding

in those eighteenth century categories of judgment. His system could not predict that Euclidean geometry would be challenged by non-Euclidean systems. And it would have difficulty with the contradictions which emerged in principles of quantum mechanics [25].

In his metacritique, Hegel exposed myth and dogma in Kant's normative conception of the knowing process. According to Hegel, Kant had failed to see that logical, mathematical or scientific judgments are examples of a knowing process which gradually changes, exposing the limited, finite nature of its understanding. This was an ahistorical conception of science itself. Additionally, Kant failed to see that scientific consciousness, was itself only one form of knowledge undergoing these historical transformations. He failed to recognize that scientific consciousness was only one finite part of an infinite, absolute consciousness.

#### Ahistorical Knowing Subject

The assumption of an ahistorical knowing process was not the only dogma contained in Kant's critical philosophy. His work also demonstrated the presupposition of an ahistorical, fixed or determinate knowing subject. The universality of Kant's categories lay in his claim that they are found, a priori, in every thinking subject. This claim reveals an assumption in the critique of knowledge concerning the identity of an ego, a presupposition which again ignores the self-formative nature of

consciousness.

For Hegel, the categories or concepts used in consciousness are not fully formed, determinate principles, innate or "inevitably constructed" in every human subject. Forms of consciousness, states of perception and understanding, develop historically as humans work over their environment. Forms of consciousness develop in and are inextricably intertwined with actual social processes in history [26].

In the process of interaction, the ego is formed. Hegel's discussion of the Master/Slave relation in the Phenomenology of Spirit [27] traces the origin of the I (ego) in the Not-I (non-ego). This was more like an existential (as opposed to epistemological) account of the self-formative process of consciousness.

In his examination of consciousness in the epistemological sense, Hegel had argued that consciousness does not automatically possess an awareness of itself. The knowing process instead moves through an historical experience, where it gains consciousness itself. In a similar way, Hegel maintained that the knowing subject (ego) does not automatically possess a full awareness of itself. The identity of the ego is not given a priori; it is created, again in the self-formative process of consciousness. The subject exists first in a state of naive, unreflexive consciousness. This is a specific natural experience which is characterized by the naive intuition of an

object as a thing-in-itself. The object, as something standing over against, or opposing the subject, is the "not-I" or the non-ego. It is defined, at least in part, by its being something different than the subject. This opposition and exclusion of the subject helps to define the object.

However gradually, in the transition from perception to understanding to self-consciousness, the ego comes to the reflexive awareness that the object, far from being a thing-in-itself, exists for it, the knowing subject. The transition from the natural attitude (which knows an object in itself) to the phenomenological attitude (which knows an object as it exists for us) is a reflexive experience in which the subject becomes aware of itself through the object. The non-Ego or "not-I" has then helped to define the Ego or the "I". This is an event which enables consciousness to have a specific experience of itself via its object [28].

An especially important element in this reflexive experience is the moment of radical doubt contained in it. Just as the notion of a fully determinate object (as thing-in-itself) is dissolved into a contingent awareness that the object exists as perceived-by-me, so too, the notion of a fully determinate ego is dissolved in the awareness of a contingent ego, which achieves its identity only via non-egos. Ego is thus provisional; deriving its identity not from itself, but through its ongoing opposition to objects and other subjects [29].



The ego which has achieved this level of self-awareness has become truly transparent to itself. It recognizes that it is formed in the act of reflection and negation. Paradoxically, the ego is also contained as an element in this act of reflection and negation. This experience constitutes a circle in which radical doubt is never erased. The self-conscious subject is forever caught in the practico-epistemological circle of chasing after itself and forming itself, all the while, negating previous levels of consciousness.

Kant had not considered this self-formative process of the subject. He had begun his critique with the assumption of an ego already in possession of its identity, already characterized by the Cartesian certainty "I am." A truly critical examination would have reconstructed the genesis of any knowing subject, beginning from the initial state of natural consciousness and working up to a provisional view which acknowledges the contingency of any knowing subject.

Again, the proposition of such contingency was a form of relativism which Kant could not accept. But the rejection of an historically changing ego had important consequences for Kant's very own work. Because Kant considered the knowing subject to be ahistorically fixed and determinate, he began his critique with an ahistorical blindspot concerning his very own plan. The critical project, to examine the medium of knowledge, was a reflexive form of consciousness. It was recognizing

metaphysical claims as the conceptual products of dogmatic consciousness. In examining these claims, eighteenth century metaphysical thought actually had itself for an object. Kant refuted speculative metaphysics, and in a pattern which bears an amazing resemblance to Hegel's stoical consciousness, he proposed transcendental conditions, a pure universality of thought or epistemological autonomy as a solution to naive, unreflexive metaphysics. This was epistemology almost, but not quite conscious of itself.

Hegel's critique then accurately exposed a moment of myth or dogma in Kant's critical project. Kant's semireflexive examination had occurred with a consciousness which was not yet transparent to itself [30]. Kant had not come to see critical philosophy itself as a form of consciousness which had emerged at a particular point in history in opposition to dogmatism. He had not recognized his own critical spirit as a provisional attitude which was emerging in opposition to and negation of, something else (dogmatism). Because Kant neglected the self-reflexive piece of analysis which would have reconstructed the evolution of critical spirit, Kant blindly ignored the contingent nature of his project and issued dogmatic, permanent standards of critique, permanent criteria for determining the limits of knowledge.

Had Kant's philosophy been radically critical, it would have recognized the state of self-consciousness, reflexivity, or

critique as a perpetually circular or elusive project. In this project, the standards of critique are continually dissolved and reformulated at every successive stage of criticism. This form of critical consciousness would not have been stoical (as was Kant's); it would not have been hypocritically skeptical (as was Hume's); it would have been a perpetually unhappy (elusive, circular) consciousness. This is something like Otto Neurath's famous characterization of epistemology.

There is no way of taking conclusively established pure protocol sentences as the starting point of the sciences. No tabula rasa exists. We are like sailors who must rebuild their ship on the open sea, never able to dismantle it in dry-dock and to reconstruct it there out of the best materials [31].

In his critique, then, Hegel had exposed myth where Kant had claimed to be dissolving it. Hegel exposed an absence of reflexivity in Kant's work which kept critical philosophy from fulfilling its emancipatory interest. Because Kant had not achieved self-consciousness concerning his own critical project, his work remained anchored within preconceived standards of critique. It exposed only so much myth and then it relapsed into new dogma.

On Hegel's critique, critical philosophy lost its critical moment when it perpetuated 1) the dogma of appearance versus reality, 2) the dogma of theoretical versus practical reason and 3) the dogma of an ahistorical knowing process and an ahistorical knowing subject. These were points of myth in critical

philosophy which kept it from achieving the interest of Enlightenment. They were aspects of a natural consciousness which kept critical philosophy from achieving a radicalized critique of knowing.

### German Idealism and the Philosophy of Identity

Hegel's struggle to radicalize Enlightenment discourse was grounded in German idealism's peculiar notion of identity. The philosophy of identity involves the notion that nature and external objects are ultimately externalizations of an absolute subjectivity. Hegel's objective idealism (absolute idealism) was grounded in this monistic premise that all that exists is a form of one absolute spirit (absolute mind) [32]. The philosophy of identity which characterized Hegel's work proposed the identity of thought and being, of subject and object and maintained that history, as a series of transformations in the universal spirit, progressively overcomes these oppositions [33].

The philosophy of identity, which joined knowing and acting, thought and being, subject and object into one absolute spiritual reality, allowed Hegel to reject Kant's distinction between "thing-in-itself" and appearances. The whole of Hegel's work was characterized by a fundamental argument which rejected Kant's distinction between things and appearances. By accepting the distinction, humans surrendered the hope of having absolute

knowledge and could only be satisfied with knowledge of appearances, which really was "no knowledge at all."

By giving up this opposition between appearance and reality, humans could retain the potential of deriving absolute knowledge (knowledge of the absolute). The philosophy of identity held the premise of revealing to humans how their knowing and acting were part of the same universal progression toward (spiritual) freedom. Hegel's objective was to reveal that previous forms of consciousness dissolving in history, previous modes of knowing and acting, previous oppositions between nature and subject were only apparent oppositions, putatively opposed categories which were actually connected parts of a larger infinite whole. Kant's critique of reason had failed in its critical objective precisely because it had failed to recognize the connection between finite historically limited forms of being/knowing and this absolute whole.

Hegel argued that the whole of history was a sequence in which ascending forms of consciousness appear, with the dissolution of previous finite or limited forms. He maintained that this historical progression was driven by an internal principle of autonomy; that the human spirit seeks self-sufficiency or freedom. This basic "drive" or principle of autonomy explained the linear development of the ascending forms of consciousness.

In agreement with the philosophy of identity, it was not

just forms of consciousness in the epistemic sense, which were driven by this principle of autonomy. Hegel maintained that knowing and being were part of the same infinite reality. Knowing and being were two sides of the same existence which was driven by the principle of self-sufficiency or freedom. Therefore being or practical activity in the world demonstrated the same pattern of progressively becoming more and more contradictory or limited, and then being dissolved into new forms of practical activity which are more autonomous.

Additionally, Hegel argued for the identity of object and subject -- or nature and subject -- by proposing that nature was the externalization of universal subjectivity. The contradictions in opposing forms of consciousness were matched by contradictions in the essential being of the world. Ultimate reality, which for Hegel was universal spirit, was itself beset with contradictions.

These were the idealist premises that grounded Hegel's examination of the history of ideas. On Hegel's account, the history of human thought reveals a series of transformations which have occurred when finite human concepts are applied to this infinite, absolute and contradictory reality. The finite categories of human understanding (e.g., Kant's judgments) when applied to infinity, yield "nests of contradictions" [34]. "Conceptual" knowing (i.e., rational understanding in the form of theoretical reason) therefore seemed relatively useless. It

could never provide humans with the kind of behavioral certainty hoped for under Enlightenment ideology.

Other German idealists (romanticists) used similar arguments to reject the use of conceptual/analytic modes of understanding. Jacobi [35], for example, argued that since historically, all conceptual modes of knowing have proven to be finite and ineffective, conceptual knowing (analysis) should be rejected. Intuitionism then emerged as the argument that the absolute or infinity cannot be known analytically/conceptually. It can only be grasped intuitively -- or "felt."

Hegel rejected these forms of intuitionism. He argued that finite concepts are necessary in the study of finite limited objects; they allow humans to make clear distinctions, to eliminate ambiguity and vagueness from understanding. This is the function which concepts perform in creating sense from non-sense [36], the role which concepts assume in the categorization of contingent ambiguous sense experience into a conditionally structured conceptual representation. Concepts provide intelligibility in the practical realm of representation and action. Without this fundamental level of clarification, human reality/existence could not proceed beyond a chaotic level of ambiguity.

So concepts, when applied to finite/limited aspects of reality, are essential for human understanding. But on Hegel's account, this application of concepts to an unlimited reality or to infinite objects (i.e., existence) leads to "nests of

contradictions." While finite concepts function usefully to distinguish or categorize finite aspects of reality, gradually as they are applied to greater/extended aspects of reality, their opposition leads to contradictions, contradictions which eventually necessitate the dissolution of previous categories of understanding.

Hegel was then faced with the contradictory discovery that finite concepts are both indispensable and unfit for absolute knowledge. Faced with this dilemma, he developed a mode of conceptual analysis, the dialectic, which he used in his Science of Logic [37].

This method consists in examining the understanding's pairs of putatively opposed categories and showing that these categories, ordinarily thought to be mutually exclusive, really involve each other. . . Putatively opposed categories are shown to be actually one sided abstractions from a concrete whole of which each is only a partial aspect. . . The dialectic preserves pairs of putatively opposed categories as the necessary elements of more concrete categories. But as necessary elements of a more concrete category, their mutually exclusive character is removed or negated. These categories are both preserved and negated -- they are aufgehoben [38].

In its application as a form of conceptual analysis, the dialectic has been characterized as follows:

What distinguishes the dialectical method in its recognition of the insufficiencies and imperfections of "finished" systems of thought. The dialectical method is a critical method, for it reveals incompleteness where completeness is claimed. . . Through continuous criticism and reconstruction, the partiality of perspective can be progressively overcome. For Hegel, every "point of view" has a place in the unfolding of the universal, absolute Idea -- the final transcendence of all subject-object differentiation. The closer our knowledge comes to this limit, the closer it is to truth [39].



As a method of conceptual analysis, the dialectic under Hegel clearly reflects the philosophy of identity. The dissolution of partial perspectives into more comprehensive, encompassing ones is based on the presupposition that perspectives which seem to be mutually exclusive, actually are parts of a larger identity. This was the identity of the absolute, a state of universal subjectivity in which even the putative distinctions between subject and object would be dissolved.

An important property of the dialectic, one which also derives from the principle of identity, was its dynamic or the process by which it proceeds. This has been labeled "determinate negation" -- a process which has been characterized as follows:

The centrality of the governing principle of dialectical thought [was] Hegel's concept of determinate negation. . . . The process whereby consciousness attempts to come to terms with the world around it involves continuous negation; that is, continuous criticism and reconstruction of the knowledge of subject and object and of their relation to one another. The development of consciousness through determinate negation consists precisely in the experience of surmounting old forms of consciousness and in incorporating these moments into a new reflective attitude [40].

The dialectic under Hegel was a form of conceptual knowing with a structure which matched the structure of reality. If it was successful in explicating contradictions in the history of ideas (e.g., Kant's critical philosophy) this was because history itself contained contradictions. If it was successful in identifying false distinctions between knowing and thinking,

this was because such distinctions were historically real, pseudodistinctions dissolving in history. In other words, the dialectic was a form of knowing which was successful because its structure "fit" the structure of absolute mind, or reality itself.

On idealist premises, Hegel was arguing for the identity of theoretical and practical forms of consciousness. These forms of consciousness had been falsely separated by Kant; the interest pursued by humans in practical activity using practical reason was, for Hegel, the same as the interests pursued by humans in theoretical activity using theoretical reason. Both forms of consciousness were aspects of the same historically evolving human spirit driven by the interest in autonomy, or the drive for self-sufficiency.

Hegel argued (on idealist premises) that the separation of the knowing subject from an acting subject was a false separation. In his "practico-epistemological" forms of consciousness, categories of apprehending the world and norms of action were connected. The reversal of previous levels of consciousness meant that previous fixations and identifications were overcome.

A form of life that has become an abstraction cannot be negated without leaving a trace or overthrown without practical consequences. The revolutionized situation contains the one that has been surpassed because the insight of the new consists precisely in the experience of revolutionary release from the old consciousness. . . This figure of a determinate negation applies not to an immanent

logical connection but to the mechanism of the progress of a mode of reflection in which theoretical and practical reason are one [41].

When such a level of reflective awareness occurs, whether in history or in the life of an individual, it is not only false views about the world that are dissolved; habitual attitudes and modes of action also change. When a critical consciousness challenges dogmatic assertions about the nature of reality, reflexive humans also question and change the dogmatic patterns of activity which have accompanied those views.

In history, for example, the enlightenment interest in emancipation and free will emerged concomitantly with a critical theoretical understanding. The rejection of a speculative metaphysics brought about a new kind of theoretical reason -- science. But as humans rejected dogma about predestination, they experienced more than a change in theoretical reason. Practical reason also changed. Man's attitudes about himself and the human condition changed. This revolutionary release from old forms of consciousness had some very real practical consequences. Existential modes changed, man changed his pattern of being-in-the-world and entered and the era of bourgeois social reality.

On idealist premises then, Hegel was arguing against the separation of theoretical and practical reason. He acknowledged that during the eighteenth century, these two forms of reason were in fact historically separate. But against Kant, he saw

the separation as a transitory state, and argued that the opposition between theoretical and practical reason would be overcome, because of the progression of absolute mind. This was the argument that the development of universal spirit would push human rationality and human being-in-the-world to levels of greater and greater autonomy.

Hegel's critique was itself a remarkable example of enlightenment ideology. His critical gaze uncovered the myth or hypostatized moments of Kant's work. He exposed the ahistorical blindspot in critical philosophy, pushing against the hypostatized horizon of an ahistorical knowing process and an ahistorical knowing subject.

But Hegel's work was itself characterized by a dialectical moment of myth and dogma. While he carried on the emancipatory project of an enlightened humanity, conscious and self-conscious of its own reason and freedom, Hegel prolonged the myth of humanity constrained by something greater, constrained or dominated by universal spirit. This was a piece of myth in Hegel's work which escaped his critical gaze.

The dialectic of enlightenment then recurred in Hegel's work, as it had in Kant's. In his critique, Hegel came very near to achieving the aim of enlightenment. He abandoned presuppositions and thereby exposed myth. But Hegel was not able to abandon all presuppositions, and those which he retained turned into the hypostatized moments of mythology contained in

his critique.

Hegel shows that the critique of knowledge, if it unconditionally follows its own intent, must abandon. . . presuppositions; instead, it must let the standard of critique emerge from the experience of reflection. Because he does not proceed logically, but relativizes the critique of knowledge as such according to the presuppositions of the philosophy of identity, Hegel arrives at the concept of speculative scientific knowledge. In relation to this norm, sciences that proceed methodically, whether of nature or mind, can only prove themselves to be limitations of absolute knowledge and discredit themselves. Thus the paradoxical result of an ambiguous radicalization of the critique of knowledge. . .[42].

When Hegel accepted the challenge of Kantian critical philosophy, he adopted the cognitive posture of unconditional doubt to expose myth and dogma. But in his critical journey, Hegel confronted the specter of relativity in knowing without giving up his major presupposition, which was the fundamental assumption that there can be something like absolute knowledge.

He had exposed the circularity in knowing by identifying the historical dissolution of standards for knowing. The conditions for possible knowledge were always passing away into new conditions. But the discovery of this circularity about knowledge did not lead Hegel to a radical position concerning the critique of reason. The absolute contingency of reason, the possibility that historically changing conditions never move reason closer to truth, the possibility that there is no absolute truth; these were outcomes never entertained by Hegel. The Hegelian critique of reason could only present a unilinear progression in understanding, a progression which would

(inevitably) lead to absolute knowledge.

The alternative to this myth is a genuinely radicalized critique of knowledge. This is a critical gaze which is entirely circular; which is self-consciously aware of the relativized conditions of possible knowing; which is perpetually "unhappy." The circularity of relativized conditions of possible understanding has been characterized as the hermeneutic circle. It has been described in the following way.

In Hegel's philosophy, consciousness of each historical era is a stage in the progress of reason coming to know itself and gradually discovering itself as the only "essense" of being [reality]. . . This realization has been reflected in philosophical hermeneutics as the notion of "hermeneutic circle." Understanding means going in circles: rather than a unilinear progress toward better and less vulnerable knowledge. It consists in an endless recapitulation and reassessment of collective memories -- ever more voluminous, but always selective. It is difficult to see how any of the successive recapitulations can claim to be final and conclusive, still more difficult would be to substantiate this claim [43].

The possibility of an unconditionally relativized understanding was a prospect too radical for Hegel. Having raised the specter of relativity in knowing, he dogmatically suppressed it with his confidence in the progression of thought toward the state of absolute truth. Even his dialectic and its dynamic of determinate negation were conceptual strategies which avoided the possibility of unconcluded contradictions or unresolved circularity.

The dogmatic ingredients of German idealism, its universal subjectivity and the philosophy of identity, were elements in

Hegel's work which kept it from fulfilling Enlightenment intentions. These were pieces of mythology which kept the Hegelian critique from demonstrating how reason could be practical or how man in his own reflexivity could go on improving the human condition.

Hegel's critique instead lost its emancipatory moment and dissolved into a form of mysticism, arguing that human rationality should "surrender" to the life of the spirit. Hegelian metaphysics, in effect, rejected the prospect of reason which could be practical. Hegel could not argue that the human condition would improve because of human rationality, because humans have the courage to use their own reason. He argued, instead, that human spiritual reality would improve, and this, only if man learned how to surrender to the life of absolute mind.

The moments of myth in German idealism, its universal subjectivity and the philosophy of identity, were elements of Hegel's work which Marx (and later the Frankfurt School) rejected. While he accepted the historical purview of Hegel's critique, Marx rejected its philosophy of history. Hegel's critique of an ahistorical transcendental framework had made important discoveries; findings concerning historical transformations in the knowing process and in the knowing subject and findings concerning the connection between theoretical and practical reason.

But for Marx (and in the later neomarxist critique), Hegel had made the right discovery for the wrong reasons. If historical transformations occur in the knowing process, in the knowing subject, and in the connection between knowing and acting, this was a reflection of historical transformations in the material conditions of existence. Conditions of possible knowledge change, not because of changes in universal spirit, but because actual man, an embodied being, changes the conditions of his existence.

### 3.5 Marx and the Theory of Knowledge as Social Theory [44]

The greatness of Hegel's phenomenology. . . is that Hegel grasps the self-generation of man as a process. . . that he grasps the essence of labor and comprehends objective man, who is true man because of his reality, as the result of his own labor [45].

Marx stood in a structural (chronological) position which allowed him to inherit the critical moments of Hegel's work. He saw in Hegel the historical recognition which had been absent from so much Enlightenment discourse. In his treatment of consciousness, Hegel had recognized the self-formative process of the species man. He had linked changing forms of consciousness and changing conditions of possible knowledge to the history of man, to the self-formative process of a species which produces the conditions of its own existence.

But because of his entrenchment in German idealism, Hegel



grounded those historical changes in consciousness to a universal spirit. His idealism prevented him from discovering an anthropological grounding for the critique of knowledge. Marx, on the other hand, could not help but see this anthropological grounding. He saw conditions of possible knowledge change because of changes in the natural history of man, because of changes in man's existential activity; because of changes in the existential category of labor. Marx's theory of history, then contained an emancipatory moment which struggled to fulfill the intent of Enlightenment. He saw reason as eminently practical. His historical materialism struggled for a critique of knowledge which would demonstrate how rational man, real living men, could improve the human condition. This was the emancipatory moment of materialist ideology; an interest in understanding how actual man could improve the conditions of his own existence.

In his critique of Hegel, Marx rejected idealist premises, but he maintained an historicist perspective about conditions of possible knowledge.

The crucial assumption of the [historicist program] is that understanding is the work of history. . .that understanding cannot become universal until historical development paves the way to the rule of reason. . .The historicist solutions differ [from rationalist] in their refusal to believe that correct understanding is possible in all conditions, given the accessibility of effective methods. Knowledge, as ignorance, is historically determined. History must "mature" to objective understanding. The range of improvement which may be accomplished by better methods in the self-consciousness of an age is and will remain limited until history "transcends itself" and creates conditions in

which understanding can be freed from historical limitations and rise to the level of objectivity [universality] [46].

Under Marx's historicist program, reason reflects the historical conditions in which it is used; reason is a part of the social/natural reality it wishes to know. As such, reason can only reflect limitations (or perhaps utopian universality) found in actual historical conditions. Marx's historicism rejected the assumption that the externality of the world could be overcome by "intellectual maturity" by reason somehow freed from its historical context. Under Marx, the externality of the natural world, its objectivity, did not reflect immaturity in intellect; it reflected an "immaturity" in actual natural conditions of existence. Humans had not yet developed the practical capacity for overcoming nature's domination. Before the externality of the world could be overcome by reason, it had to be overcome in practice.

[The] world is and will remain real and objective; at present, however, it is objective as something external to human being, something which does not belong to its being "and which overpowers it." Hence the feeling of a chasm between subject and object, which is but a necessarily perverted reflection of the fact that man has no control over his world, that the world is to him an alien, merciless, inhuman force. Before this, strangeness of the world may be transcended intellectually, it has to be overcome in practice [47].

In his rejection of German idealism, Marx preserved the prospect of natural man improving his own existential reality. Reason could be practical and man could use it to overcome an alien, inhuman world. But before consciousness could become

universal (or absolutely free) man had to secure his own freedom in practice, he had to overcome the constraint of the natural environment.

Along with this emancipatory moment in Marx's work, however, the project of historical materialism contained its own moment of dogma. Marx uncovered the myth in Hegel's idealism, but failed to recognize the dogma in his own materialist premises. This was an absence of reflexivity in Marx's work which resulted in an hypostatized theory of social evolution.

As Habermas identified, Marx viewed the history of the human species as grounded primarily in the category of labor. He viewed historical changes in forms of consciousness as arising primarily from changes in productive activity. If the conditions of possible knowledge change, this is because of changes in human productive efficiency or changes in the instrumental category of labor.

With his more or less dogmatic emphasis on the mode of instrumental activity, Marx minimized the experience of reflection, as Hegel had conceived it, and he minimized the existential mode of communicative activity, as Habermas conceived it. Changes in forms of consciousness followed "natural law," they occurred with lawful regularity, only as humans increased their productive efficiency. If history contained any improvement in the human condition, this was a movement which was regulated by natural law, a lawlike

progression in man's productive efficiency.

Marx considers the movement of society as a process of natural history, governed by laws that are not only independent of the will, consciousness and intention of men, but instead and conversely determine their will, consciousness and intentions [48].

It was this moment of dogma in Marx's work which eventually turned into a positivistic bias concerning the science of man. Marx reified the category of instrumental activity and argued that social evolution followed the same sort of lawlike progression found in the natural realm. Because the species operated primarily in the instrumental mode of labor, and because the development of man's productive efficiency was tied so closely to the laws of the natural environment, social evolution would follow a lawlike course of development. Social theory or a science of man was possible, but it would be a positivistic kind of science.

If Marx had not thrown together interaction and work under the label of social practice (praxis), and had he instead related the materialist concept of synthesis likewise to the accomplishments of instrumental action, and the nexuses of communicative action, then the idea of a science of man would not have been obscured by identification with the natural sciences. . .It would have made clear that ultimately a radical critique of knowledge can be carried out only in the form of a reconstruction of the history of the species, and that conversely social theory . . .is possible only as the self-reflection of the knowing subject [49].

Marx's singular error was a reification of the category of labor. He could not relate historical changes in consciousness to the synthesis of man as a reflective being, a communicative being, and an instrumentally oriented being. He saw epistemology,

not as an act of self-reflection, but rather as an act of science, and, he saw social theory, not as an experience of self-reflection by the knowing subject, but rather as a scientific project, which could scientifically explain man's social evolution.

The dogma in Marx's work kept him from fulfilling the Enlightenment project of emancipation. While he exposed the mythology of German idealism, he created a new moment of mythology in his scientifically oriented materialism. For Marx, an adequate understanding of man could occur only within the experience of scientific consciousness. It could not move within the coordinates of phenomenological experience (which is perpetually circular). The science of man, for Marx, would not have been a form of hermeneutic understanding.

Marx did not develop this idea of the science of man. By equating critique with natural science, he disavowed it. Materialist scientism only reconfirms what absolute idealism had already accomplished: the elimination of epistemology in favor of unchained universal "scientific knowledge" -- but this time of scientific materialism instead of absolute knowledge [50].

The new moment of myth in Marx's work was a dogmatic stance which reified scientific materialism. If man's social evolution was governed by the same sort of natural laws found in nature, then reason should uncover these laws. Scientific materialism proposed to do just this; to uncover those natural laws which govern man's social history. This was the myth of a positivistic science of man; producing better and better knowledge,

approaching absolute knowledge, as it discovered laws of the "second nature" [51].

The dialectic of Enlightenment then repeated itself in Marx's critical/dogmatic work. What began as a critical challenge against the mythology of German idealism collapsed into the mythology of scientific materialism. Reason could be practical for Marx, because it could struggle for more than spiritual freedom. This was an emancipatory, enlightened moment in Marx's work. His critique of Hegel was a critical struggle against the complacency and resignation of German idealism. Far from being satisfied with spiritual emancipation, Marx's critical spirit struggled for the elimination of human suffering and the furthering of concrete happiness. He argued that this practical emancipation could occur in the progression of history beyond class society.

But Marx's work lost its emancipatory moment when it became scientific consciousness. Reason, for the later Marx, could only be practical as it became scientific, as it surrendered to laws of the "second nature;" as it provided a positivistic account of the laws of history. This was reason constrained by something external to man's reason; rationality constrained just as tightly as medieval scholasticism; reason predestined now by "material" forces which "drive" history.

Marx's historicism occurred at a time in history when most European intellectual discourse was obsessed with the idea of

right method for reason. While Marx argued that reason could only mature with the maturation of history, other intellectuals struggled to purify reason, to suppress its historical contingency, to discover an ahistorical form of "right" rationality. This was a struggle to find the best methods for reason, to make rationality "right" -- so that humans could go on improving their existential conditions.

### 3.6 Positivism and the Critique of Positivism

The term positivism now functions more as a polemical epithet than as a designation for a distinct philosophical movement. Even leaving aside the positive philosophy of Saint-Simon and Comte, the evolutionary positivism of Spencer and Haeckel, and the phenomenalism of Mach and Avenarius and concentrating on the "logical positivism" of the Vienna circle and its descendants, it is difficult to specify a common "positivist" perspective. The subsequent development of the more or less unified program of the original members of the circle has led to its disintegration as a distinct philosophical movement. This is not to say that logical positivism has disappeared without a trace; on the contrary, it has been absorbed into such influential traditions as empiricism, pragmatism and linguistic analysis. The net result is that the legacy of logical positivism -- a legacy of convictions and attitudes, problems and techniques, concepts and theories -- pervades contemporary thought [52].

The legacy of positivism remains as one of, if not the most pervasive influence upon contemporary thought. The philosophy of positivism surfaced in an especially intense way under Saint-Simon and Comte in nineteenth century France. They gave expression to the idea of a "positive" knowledge of man. This would have been an understanding of the human condition which

progressed beyond metaphysical and theological explanations. Positivism expressed the hope that there could be a systematic study of the human world; a positive science of man which could produce knowledge comparable to that found among the established natural sciences.

As with Marx, this confidence in "positive" knowledge was another example of Enlightenment ideology. It contained the emancipatory hope that "positive" knowledge of the human world could be used to understand and improve the human condition. But it also contained a regressive moment; a moment which hypostatized the human world under its hypostatized scientific consciousness.

While positivism, as a distinct philosophical movement may have "disintegrated" during the last half of the twentieth century, remnants of positive philosophy still influence contemporary thought. From a contemporary standpoint, philosophy which adheres to some version of the following five tenets still retains a positivist interpretation of reality.

All (synthetic) knowledge is founded in sensory experience. Meaning is grounded in observation. Concepts and generalizations only represent the particulars from which they have been abstracted. Conceptual entities don't exist in themselves -- they are names; positivism is (normally) associated with nominalism. Sciences are unified according to the methodology of the natural sciences. The ideal pursued is knowledge "in the form of a mathematically formulated universal science deducible from the smallest possible number of axioms, a system which assures the calculation of the probable occurrence of all events." Values are not facts and hence values cannot be given as such in sense experience, value judgments cannot be accorded the status of knowledge claims [53].



Many of these tenets were developed by members of the Vienna circle, an elite group of intellectuals (mostly mathematicians and physicists) who established the tradition of logical positivism, also called logical empiricism. The tradition undertook, as its major effort, the forging of an intellectual synthesis containing aspects of rationalism and empiricism.

With empiricism, positivism accepted the distinction between a priori analytic truths and a posteriori synthetic truths. It likewise accepted the assumption that synthetic knowledge, or knowledge of empirical events, is grounded in sensory experience. But against some aspects of early empiricism, positivism did not reduce the empirical ground of science to a passive reception of sense contents.

It argued instead that sense experience is tied very closely to observation -- and that observation is always "theory laden." Positivism argued that "observation statements" (or "protocol statements") were the empirical ground of science.

In science, it is observation rather than perception which plays the decisive part. But observation is a process in which we play an intensely active part. An observation is a perception but one which is planned or prepared. We do not "have" an observation (as we may "have" a sense experience) but we "make" an observation. . . . An observation is always preceded by a particular interest, a question, or a problem -- in short, by something theoretical [54].

In Karl Popper, logical positivism achieved an important critique of traditional empiricist assumptions. It was Popper's

principle of falsifiability which replaced empiricist notions about verification. Under rigorous science, observation statements were subjected to repeated attempts at falsification, not verification. Popper argued that in the history of science, there have been repeated attempts at falsification. After repeated, unsuccessful attempts to falsify, there is a conventional assignment of truth to certain basic statements. These conventions were held by Popper to be well founded. In the course of the history of science, certain basic observation statements have resisted repeated empirical attempts at falsification. They have become more or less foundational.

These were revisions of empiricism's assumptions which produced a new kind of empiricism under "positive philosophy." Logical empiricism argued that basic observation statements are gradually linked through "hypothetico-deductive" method. They are linked by the logical and empirical operations of observers. Hypothetico-deductive operations, performed by independent observers, gradually confirm the lawful, regular occurrence of social and nonsocial events.

With these fundamental epistemological tenets, positivism has frequently committed itself to the unity of scientific method or unified science.

Despite differences the specific concepts and techniques proper to diverse domains of inquiry, the methodological procedures of natural science are applicable to the sciences of man; the logic of inquiry is the same in both cases. More particularly, the goals of inquiry, explanations and prediction -- are identical, as is the

form in which they are realized: the subsumption of individual cases under hypothetically proposed general laws. Scientific investigation, whether of social or nonsocial phenomena aims at the discovery of lawlike generalizations that can function as premises in deductive explanations and predictions. An event is explained by showing that it occurred in accordance with certain laws of nature as a result of certain particular circumstances. If the laws and circumstances are known, an event can be predicted by employing the same deductive form of argument [55].

The commitment to unified science under logical positivism brought with it the methodological requirement that individual cases of social phenomena (social action) be brought under general laws. This requirement contains the presupposition that a causal explanation of social action is possible (causality here being understood in the post-Humean sense of exceptionless repetition and irreversibility). Causal explanation of the social world then uncovers an empirically verifiable pattern of regularity resembling the uniformities which characterize natural processes. Under the tenets of logical positivism, this form of explanation was prototypical and exhaustive: No other form of understanding was required. Explanation concerning the social only required that a particular social event or phenomenon be shown to have occurred in accordance with a general law as a result of particular antecedent conditions.

But increasingly in the twentieth century, reflexive social scientists have questioned this logical positivist assumption about unified science. Even Max Weber (who, thanks to Talcott Parsons, has been characterized as predominantly positivistic)

demonstrated an important methodological ambivalence concerning explanation of social phenomena.

Weber acknowledged that causal adequacy was a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for explanation of the social. Social action, as distinct from natural processes, is intentional action. It is social just because acting individuals attach a subjective meaning to it. Because social phenomena are intentional (imbued with meaning), they are accessible to a different form of understanding -- motivational understanding, Verstehen, a form of knowing which presents an interpretation of actions in terms of their subjective meanings.

What Weber calls "explanatory understanding" consists in placing a particular act in an understandable sequence of motivation which corresponds to an empirically verifiable regularity of behavior. Its correctness is a function of both "adequacy at the level of meaning" and causal adequacy. . .It was [Weber's] view that "if adequacy in respect of meaning is lacking, then no matter how high the degree of uniformity and how precisely its probability can be numerically determined, it is still an incomprehensible statistical probability. Statistical uniformities. . . constitute sociological generalizations only when they can be regarded as manifestations of the understandable subjective meaning of a course of social action" [57].

The arguments for a different form of explanation under social science, derive mainly from the claim (made above by Weber) that the object domain of the social sciences is different, in kind, from the domain of material objects encountered in the natural sciences. This is the argument that social phenomena constitute a symbolically structured object domain; that the sphere of the social is a linguistically based

matrix, which, because of its communicative, symbolic nature, includes meaning as a basic category. It is because humans interact via symbols (language) that meaning may not be eliminated as an element in understanding of the social.

In contrast, under the logical positivist "verifiability theory of meaning," a social event had no significance or meaning beyond the empirical operations performed in its verification. The explanation of social phenomena only required that a particular phenomenon be shown to have occurred in accordance with a general law, as a result of particular antecedent circumstances. The meaning which social actors attach to this phenomenon then became a "useful fiction" or an epiphenomenon.

The most extreme examples of a logical positivist program in the social sciences came under the project of behaviorism (e.g., psychology, social psychology, learning theory) where there was a fundamental denial of the necessity to understand meaning. Here the attempt was to transform any statement about intentions into statements about behavior. Under behaviorism, human action was reduced to behavior and was studied in much the same way as animal behavior.

But as later criticisms of behaviorism acknowledged, the reduction of social action to behavior ignored the crucial role which is played by language in human behavior. Reflexive social science argued that, at the level of culture, language plays the

unique function of transforming species-specific drives into "meaning mediated" action. It is this critical function played by language which differentiates human action from animal behavior.

At the level of animal behavior, the element of intentionality is not yet disconnected from behavioral modes and transformed in symbolic systems. Action is first made possible when intentional contents have been rendered independent in language. A more or less stringent system of drives. . .is released from univocal correlations with the environment only at the cultural level.

[At the level of culture, the system of drives is] itself subjected to new definitions through a linguistic system with variable significations. . .The symbolic significations rendered independent in linguistic systems have acquired power to react back on the interpretation of needs themselves. . .the motive for action shifts from the level of the drive system to that of linguistic communication [58].

Under these premises, explanation of the social must somehow account for the way in which behavior is mediated by a system of symbols. It must include an account of the way in which symbols transform animal drives into human signification, meaning or motivation. This is the argument that because of language, the sphere of objects studied under social science (humans) is different in kind than the domain of objects studied in the natural sciences. "A general theory of action cannot simply abstract from the symbolic dimension of social life; it must somehow integrate it into its basic categories, assumptions and procedures [59].

These kinds of criticisms then rejected a key assumption in the positivist program of unified science. They rejected the

positivist notion that explanation of social phenomena could be modeled on the kind of explanation found in the natural sciences. This was arguing that the logic of inquiry is different in the sciences of man. Because of a fundamental (ontological) difference in their object domains, the science of man and the science of nature could not help but differ in their modes of explanation.

The argument against a unified science has been part of a later twentieth century critique of positivism. In this critique, the program of unified science has come under increasing criticism by reflexive social scientists. Critical social scientists have argued against the program of unified science on the additional ground that the natural and social sciences share fundamental differences in their respective modes of access to data.

As discussed above, it has been argued that the social sciences involve themselves in attempts to gain access to a symbolically structured object domain. The critique of positivism has rejected the program of unified science because it fails to account for the symbolic nature of social reality. This criticism has argued that access to a symbolically structured object domain requires procedures which are different from those used in the natural sciences. This criticism calls for procedures which are similar, at least in some respects, to those used in the humanities.

While the natural sciences and the humanities are able to live side by side, in mutual indifference if not in mutual admiration, the social sciences must resolve the tension between the two approaches and bring them under one roof. Here the research practice itself forces us to reflect on the relationship between analytic and hermeneutic procedures [60].

This is a position which preserves the methodological tension first expressed by Weber. An adequate understanding of social reality searches for empirical regularities, but preserves the category of meaning as an irreducible element in social reality. Under this criticism, hermeneutic procedures, those approaches common to the humanities, are valued and retained as a form of access to social data. Hermeneutic methodology is retained because it provides an interpretation of the meaning found in social events. In this function, hermeneutic approaches provide a different form of understanding than that found in causal explanations.

In search of such hermeneutic procedures, early neopositivist critique tried to gain access to the category of meaning via Motivverständnis. This was the attempt to understand meaning via empathy or sympathetic imagination. Here the effort was to understand human action by applying personal experience to observed behavior. In this form of social inquiry, scientists imputed to social agents certain psychological states (motives, beliefs, values, emotions) which might account for an observed sequence of behavior [61].

This operation of understanding the meaning behind social



action involves an introspective process whereby the scientist/observer internalizes the stimulus, internalizes the response and then applies a behavioral maxim to account for the action. The empathic mode of understanding, however, has been rejected on the grounds of its subjectivism and its failure to address intersubjectivity or the symbolic, communicative matrix of social interaction.

As social scientists have long noted, behavior in society depends on the agent's "definition of the situation": social actors themselves have an interpretation of their behavior, ideas about what they are doing and why they are doing it. But this definition of the situation, through which agent's behavioral reactions are mediated is not simply a matter of subjective motivation of "an intervening process located inside the human organism" The meanings to which social action is oriented are primarily intersubjective meanings constitutive of the social matrix in which individuals find themselves and act: inherited values and world views, institutionalized roles and social norms and so forth [62].

The elusive focus on subjective motivation or an interpretive process which is interior or "inside" the human organism ignores the collective, behavioral expectations or the cultural tradition within which individuals interpret their action. Agents define their situation according to an inherited framework of institutionalized expectations, values or world views. The meaning which social actors give to their action is thus not an independently, or individualistically created psychological state. Rather, the significance which individuals find or give to their behavior presupposes an inherited cultural tradition, a framework which fixes the possible world views

available to social actors.

This cultural tradition is symbolically structured. It is within the matrix of language, an intersubjective, communicative structure that individuals acquire expectations concerning institutionalized (norm governed) behavior. It is within this symbolically structured cultural tradition that social actors appropriate various interpretations for their action.

Empathic motivverstandnis presupposes a Sinnverstandnis of the cultural and institutional setting, which gives the behavior to be explained its significance. And the latter cannot be reduced to a "construction of psychological models." It involves a Symbolverstehen that is similar in important respects to the hermeneutic appropriation of traditional meanings. Thus the experiential bases of social inquiry, the mode of access to social reality, is neither the controlled observation and experimentation of the natural sciences nor an empathic identification based on introspection and imagination. It is rather a kind of linguistically based "communicative experience" . . .[63].

On this account of understanding, empathy or sympathetic imagination presupposes another "meta" level of understanding. This Symbolverstehen is something like a shared, linguistically based communicative experience. A social scientist wishing to penetrate the meaning of social life must first master the available stock of interpretations. This mastery occurs where social scientists and social actors share a common linguistically based experience.

In the intersubjective sphere of the social, where actors share a common cultural tradition, they also share a common language. It is via symbols that culture presents a matrix of possible interpretations and world views. In these assumptions

concerning social reality, it is necessary to acknowledge that language (in at least a very loosely structured way) fixes the range of available interpretations or meanings. Additionally, there is something about the structure of ordinary language which establishes criteria for appropriating various meanings.

This is the (late Wittgensteinian) point that language establishes a stock of available action descriptions and that language also contains criteria (rules) for determining the correct use of those descriptions. The ability of social actors to appropriate meaning in social action is then a function of mastering language games or becoming communicatively competent.

Because social actors take their meaning from an available stock of interpretations, social inquiry must, as a prerequisite, master this available complex of interpretations, world views, values and expectations. Further it must, as a prerequisite, master the criteria for choosing appropriate behavioral interpretations. Before science can even impute a motive, meaning or psychological state to the experience of social actors, it first must achieve a shared communicative experience, mastering the cultural, linguistically based tradition within which social actors are met. Social scientists must first possess an interpretive understanding of social reality as prerequisite to identifying correctly demarcated social phenomena and their appropriate meaning.

The issues raised in this critique of positivism include

the following methodological implications:

Seen in this light, the problems that the understanding of meaning raises for the program of unified science are much more wide-ranging and fundamental than neo-positivists have supposed. In fact, Habermas considers this to be the Achilles heel of the positivist theory of science. "It is the gate through which methodology must pass if positivistically paralyzed reflection is to be brought to life once again." . . . If we are to capture the characteristically symbolic dimension of social action and do so without abstracting from the specific cultural and institutional settings in which it is located, there seems to be no way of avoiding a "Sinnverstehenden" access to the data. Since the "meanings" that have to be grasped have at the same time the status of "facts," of something empirically entered, the experiential basis of social inquiry must somehow combine both understanding and observation [64].

The combination of understanding and observation, means that one must have first penetrated the symbolic dimension of social activity, mastering interpretive schema before one can make culturally meaningful, appropriate observations. Understanding then moves in a circle, interpreting particular aspects of social reality in terms of an ever expanding mastery of cultural tradition.

The recognition of hermeneutic understanding in social science has been an important step in the critique of positivism. Criticisms such as those have challenged the legitimacy of unified science, arguing that there are important differences between the science of man and the science of nature. Late twentieth century critique has argued for the separation of social and natural sciences because of fundamental differences in their modes of explanation and access to data.

One last point of criticism has identified another important source of myth in the positivist program. Increasingly, critical social science has challenged positivism's tenet which claims value neutrality for positivistic modes of inquiry. As mentioned earlier, in the positivist commitment to unified science, there has been an implicit presupposition that scientific inquiry provides value-free facts.

Scientific investigation, whether of social or nonsocial phenomena, aims at the discovery of lawlike regularities. An event is explained by showing that it occurred in accordance with lawlike empirical uniformities as a result of certain particular circumstances. Explanation then aims at uncovering laws which enable social actors to predict and control social and nonsocial processes.

Scientific investigation, whether of social or non-social phenomena, aims at the discovery of lawlike generalizations that can function as premises in deductive explanations and predictions. . . If the appropriate general laws are known and the relevant initial conditions are manipulable, we can produce a desired state of affairs, natural or social. But the question of which state of affairs are to be produced cannot be scientifically resolved. It is ultimately a matter of decision, for no "ought" can be derived from an "is," no "value" from a "fact." Scientific inquiry is itself "value-free;" it strives only for objective (intersubjectively testable) value-neutral results [65].

The claim to provide value-neutral results is grounded in the positivist assumption that scientific forms of explanation are value-neutral forms of consciousness. As mentioned earlier,

explanation under positivism was a form of consciousness which aims only at empirical regularities. Since the object of this form of consciousness, natural laws, are essentially value neutral, scientific consciousness may claim for itself the property of ethically neutral intentionality.

Under contemporary criticism, however, this claim of value neutrality has been rejected. In its criticism, for example, the Frankfurt School uncovered a hidden value orientation in the positivist program -- a value orientation which hypostatizes the status quo as it constitutes social reality from the standpoint of prediction and control.

The Frankfurt theoreticians rejected the place accorded to prediction by positivist philosophers. Within the positivist framework, all data can be classified with a view to predicting future facts and can be formulated as laws or law-like generalizations. . . A scientific theory is tested by checking the validity of its law-like hypotheses. Since the law-like structure of explanation is held to be identical with the logical structure of a prediction, tests are made by comparing the events expected with those observed. However, this manner of testing hypotheses is an insufficient test for theory. As Adorno put it "the cheap satisfaction that things actually come about in the manner which the theory of society has suspected" ought not to "delude the theoretician that he has penetrated society." In fact, the theoretician has, in all likelihood, conflated social and natural processes and hypostatized a particular stage of development of society. Predictability does not lead to truth. Rather, it highlights the extent to which social relations are relations of unfreedom [66].

These points of criticism uncover the hidden value orientation in scientific assumptions which model social explanation upon forms of explanation found in the natural sciences. Positivist explanation of the social is a gaze

which hypostatizes the status quo of social reality. When social explanation is reduced to prediction, then science of the social is grounded in the expectation that social events or phenomena will not deviate from current structural patterns of organization. This is a value orientation which conflates social and natural phenomena, collapsing social processes into the same form of organization found among natural phenomena. It is a presupposition which reduces the possibility for social inquiry to address and uncover developmental potentialities in the sphere of the social.

With its commitment to unified science, positivism held that the pattern of objectification was the same in both social and natural scientific inquiry. Contemporary criticism, like that found in critical sociology, has rejected this assumption as an objectification mistake. In his critique, for example, Bauman has criticized positivistic approaches in the cultural sciences as making this kind of objectification mistake. He has characterized such approaches collectively as "the science of unfreedom."

. . .[in] the triumphant ascent of positive science of the social, science views "society" as nature in its own right, as orderly and regular as the "first nature" appears to the natural scientist, and legislating for human action as much as the "first nature" . . .[in positivistic science] it has been accepted without question that their social world confronted men the way nature does -- as something they could live with, and sometimes even turn to their advantage, but only if they unconditionally surrendered to its command. . .From the start, the "second nature" has been introduced to intellectual discourse, not as an

historical phenomenon. . .but as an aprioric assumption. . .  
 As a "second nature" . . .society is what imposes itself  
 from without upon the individual; what imposes itself with  
 irresistible force; . . .the authority which demands to be  
 respected. . .it dominates not only our sensitivity, but  
 the whole of our nature, even our rational nature . . .  
 [positive] science [of the social], as we know it, can be  
 defined as knowledge of the ["second nature"]; knowledge of  
 unfreedom [67].

The hidden value orientation in positivistic social inquiry is a core of convictions and assumptions which objectifies social reality as a fully determinate, fixed objectivity. Following the logic of inquiry found among natural sciences, this kind of social inquiry constitutes the sphere of the social as an object domain governed by fully determinate laws, with a fixed or determinate structural organization. Social reality so constituted takes on the characteristics of a "second nature;" something which constrains human action in much the same way as do laws of the "first nature" or the natural order. This form of objectification (explanation) constitutes the social order as unfreedom, as an object domain which imposes itself with an irresistible force -- dominating both sensitivity and rationality.

The commitment to this particular form of objectification in social science also commits social science to the same kind of value orientation found in the natural sciences. This is a value orientation which is means-end oriented, which wants to constitute social reality from the standpoint of prediction and control. This kind of means-end value orientation is the hidden



value orientation found in bourgeois technological rationality.

[The positivistic] concepts of . . . legitimate knowledge restricts science's findings to a technical function. . . Science can judge the efficiency of means for given ends, but it cannot contribute to the formation of an objective basis for values. . . this form of [reason] is not, as positivists maintain, value-free. For it embodies a formal (means-end) rationality and centers its interests on efficiency and economy of means to given ends. . . The effect on social theory of this hidden value commitment is a conceptualization of problems and alternative solutions which encourages the development of technological rationality and mentality. Only those problems which are amenable to scientific-technological solutions are rationally decidable. Ultimate goals are supposedly not accessible to rational decision and therefore are beyond the control of science and rational dialogue [68].

In the pursuit of its (value laden) technical interest, positivistic reason constitutes reality and legislates rationality within a monolithic technological dimension. In its refusal to acknowledge the legitimacy of other forms of understanding, positivism elevates one value orientation, the interest in technical control, to a position of such hegemony, that other human interests/values are eclipsed; they are beyond the grasp of rational discourse. If human problems cannot be presented in terms of scientific-technological solutions, then they are inaccessible to rational discourse. The disastrous consequence of such a position is that those aspects of the human condition which are beyond technological solutions become increasingly intractable. Since they cannot be resolved through rational discourse which moves within the dimension of technological rationality, they are abandoned to individual, subjective experience. Issues of "value" and morality, for

example, are resolved in a subjective experience of decisionism.

These are extremely important criticisms of positivistic consciousness as a form of reality construction which has had a pervasive influence in bourgeois society. In its tenets, positivism expressed the self-consciousness or confidence of technological rationality in bourgeois society. But this was confidence in a form of reason which has been paradoxically useful and harmful in the existential reality of bourgeois society.

The belief in the fact/value, theory/practice dichotomies has, within these terms of reference paradoxical results. In the name of value-freedom, a certain value-orientation is championed to the exclusion of all others [technical interest]. In the name of the separation of theory and practice, a particular form of practice is sanctioned [instrumental action]. Seemingly passive, contemplative reason masks an underlying level of committed reason. Not being open to rational investigation and solution, practical questions become the province of the private individual and in the end can be justified only by reference to a decision or a commitment of belief or faith. By confining rational decision procedures to those utilized by the natural sciences, positivists reduce ethics to decisionism and close off ultimate principles and values from the possibility of rational justification [69].

These points of contemporary criticism disclose the paradoxical consequence of positivistic consciousness. Positivism argued for a clear distinction between facts and values. In the case of natural sciences, it was argued that facts describing empirical regularities in the natural order, give no information concerning the value of natural objects. Natural science only discovers how to manipulate the natural

environment. The question of what form of technical control is best or which technically achievable ends should be pursued is a matter which science cannot address. Atomic physics derives information concerning the manipulation of natural matter; the question of whether or not humans should manipulate matter in ways which produce atomic bombs, is a question which is not accessible to matters of fact, these kinds of practical questions become increasingly intractable. They cannot be resolved through rational investigation and solution; they may be resolved only through recourse to decisionistic ethics.

From the standpoint of contemporary criticism, early twentieth century confidence in positivism seems to have been somewhat misplaced. Contemporary critique then has uncovered another instance of the dialectic of Enlightenment in the philosophy of "positive science." What emerged during the early twentieth century under a critical spirit of emancipation or Enlightenment, lost its critical moment and generated new forms of dogma or myth. This is recognizing the dialectic of Enlightenment in positivism.

As with other Western intellectual traditions, positivism emerged as an expression of the hope which is contained in Enlightenment ideology. It was another example of the exhortation first expressed by Kant, "Have the courage to use your own reason!" In its critical reworking or synthesis of empiricist and rationalist assumptions, positivism began as an

intellectual struggle for "right method" in science. In this struggle, positivism reasserted an Enlightenment commitment to rationality as the source of hope for humanity. This was the hope and the confidence that the human condition could be improved through "right reason."

In this critical, emancipatory moment, positivism appropriated many of the insights which had been laid down in other intellectual traditions. It inherited Bacon's confidence in reason as an instrument and as power. It inherited Hume's insights concerning causality and his critical questions concerning the possibility of reason being practical. It inherited a Kantian bias about appearance and reality and like Kant, it modeled positive knowledge on the understanding of the natural sciences.

But there was very little evidence in positivism to indicate that its participants had heard the critique of Hegel or of Marx. There was very little evidence of a self-consciousness among positivists; little to suggest that the movement had a reflexive self-understanding; an awareness of itself as an historical event, as a form of consciousness which had emerged along with technocratic rationality in bourgeois society.

In its lack of self-understanding, positivism could not recognize the functional and epistemic problems which accompanied the program for unified science. It could not

recognize the epistemic problem which arises when positivism objectifies social phenomena in the same way as natural phenomena. It could not see the functional problems which occur when science hypostatizes the social world, objectifying it as a "second nature." It could not see its own hidden technocratic value-orientation as an instance of technocratic rationality ascending in the West.

Because of this absence of reflexivity, positivism produced new hegemonic sources of myth and dogma. It reified technocratic consciousness. It lost freedoms which it could have expressed. It became regressive and repressive. It lost sight of other kinds of rational discourse. It placed all of its confidence in the prospect of technocratic reason being practical. But it failed to see that this confidence was misplaced; that it reified the social world and preserved the status quo. It overlooked the role of practical reason or hermeneutic understanding as a mode of rational discourse which is also practical [70]. It eclipsed the awareness of another kind of reason, practical reason, which man can also have the courage to use, for the improvement of the human condition.

While positivism elevated technocratic consciousness to a position of hegemony, there were other intellectual traditions which emerged in protest against positivistic consciousness. One of the most ambitious and radical critiques of positivism came in the work of Edmund Husserl, who struggled to create a

new foundation for understanding in phenomenology.

### 3.7 Phenomenology

In The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology, Husserl . . .sought to criticize the currents of thought that support the "mathematization of nature" and idealization of reality into a "mathematical manifold." He objected to [positivism's] typically unselfconscious presentation of quantified, ideational forms of nature as the only real and true forms. . .he unfolded sciences' prescientific foundations in the life-world [Lebenswelt] -- the world of human praxis, intentional activity and everyday knowledge and beliefs. . .Husserl's analysis highlights. . . the illusionary nature of modern science's claim to neutrality; the concern with exactness, calculability and foresight predisposes science to seek knowledge of a particular type and form namely knowledge for prediction and, therefore, technical control [71].

Phenomenology emerged under Husserl as a radical criticism against naive assumptions contained in positivism. Husserl struggled to go beyond the dogmatic natural attitude which had become a part of consciousness under positivism. He argued that, far from giving the one, true account of reality, positivism only gave a "one-sided" or one-dimensional account of that reality, this being through and through, a technocratic account.

Husserl began his struggle against the ascent of positivism by returning to what he believed to be the root of understanding. His work was a radical return to consciousness. He argued tirelessly that scientific knowledge rested upon the foundation of consciousness and that science had neglected to recognize its own foundation in the structure of consciousness. If science, or any other form of knowing, was to provide an adequate account of the spatio-temporal world, it must first

account for the way in which consciousness provides access to this spatio-temporal world.

Husserl argued that judgments about reality could not be cleansed of the influence of consciousness. He argued relentlessly that positivist confidence in the natural attitude; could be justified only if science understood the transcendental structure of consciousness. The whole of his career was a struggle for method which could get behind the natural attitude, a method which could expose the structure of consciousness itself.

Phenomenological reduction is different from all previous attempts to extricate the kernel of certain knowledge from the husk of appearances. . . Husserl's doubt is sharply focused: It is aimed at eliminating all ideas related to the existence of objects our consciousness tells us about: to be exact -- the existence of objects apart from and independently of their presence in our consciousness. . . Husserl wishes to emancipate us from. . . our compulsive efforts to go beyond consciousness, into the world existing over there. What we need, therefore, is nothing less than transcendental epoche [suspension]: let us suspend the essential thesis of the natural attitude, let us put in brackets absolutely everything which such attitude exhorts us to assume. The act of epoche, so Husserl tells us, differs essentially from supposedly similar operations accomplished by philosophers in the past. It does not mean denying the world in the style of the sophist, nor questioning its existence in the style of the skeptics. Epoche means simply a methodological limitation which allows us to make only such judgments as do not depend for their validity on a spatio-temporal world [72].

In his radical critique, in his bracketing of the natural attitude, Husserl suspended positivist assumptions about reason and reality. He wanted to confirm positivist confidence in an external independent reality governed by natural law. In his

epoche, Husserl wanted to uncover the way in which consciousness presents us with a spatio-temporal world; the way in which consciousness is the transcendental medium of access to spatio-temporal reality.

In its critical moment, phenomenology emerged as a radical challenge against myth and dogma in positive philosophy. It was a radical call to suspend naive assumptions about a noumenal reality. Conversely, it was also a relentless attempt to restore confidence in those assumptions, a radical attempt to confirm them. In this critical spirit, phenomenology expressed the emancipatory moment of Enlightenment ideology. It was a critical "awakening," an exhortation to recognize transcendental subjectivity as the basis of consciousness, reason and experience itself. Phenomenology then expressed the enlightenment interest in using reason to solve human problems. "Have the courage to recognize consciousness as the source of human access to reality!"

At least part of phenomenology's project then was in agreement with the interest of Enlightenment. If the structure of consciousness could be understood, then man could have renewed confidence in the use of reason to solve human problems. This was wanting an exhaustive account of consciousness so that humans could proceed confidently, using it to improve the human condition.

But Husserl's radical challenge contained its own repressive



seed.

What is intended [in the epoche] is the elimination of historical, cultural and social factors as operators of understanding. Husserl was deeply impressed by . . .the idea that whatever is genuinely true must be so eternally and exterritorially. Anchoring truth, tying it down to a specific time, place, rigours of concrete practice -- all this may only result in distortions. Whatever is handed in by history is transient and incomplete; Whatever is offered by culture is almost by definition prejudiced and pre-selected. . .If one wishes to grasp truth in its eternal purity and radically cleanse it of all and any corruption, one has to get rid of history, culture and society [73].

The confusing struggle for transcendental subjectivity was a project which occupied Husserl for his entire career. He kept insisting that there were essential meanings which could be grasped by a phenomenologically reduced consciousness and that only through the reduction, by removing the passions of the life world, could those essential meanings be comprehended. This was a struggle to ground reason in transcendental subjectivity. It was an attempt to remove biases or "flaws" in consciousness which occur because reason is embedded in man's existential activity. It was an attempt to get beyond this temporal existential reality to an ahistorical, transcendently necessary structure of consciousness.

In this moment, phenomenology contained its own dialectical point of dogma and myth. It repeated the regressive moment of Kantian philosophy, arguing for an ahistorical knowing process and an ahistorical knowing subject. Husserl could not recognize consciousness as a temporal entity, which, while it is the

medium of access to reality, is nevertheless grounded in the natural history of the human species. He could not see consciousness as embedded in the existential activity of man.

With his commitment to transcendental subjectivity, Husserl could not make good the challenge of Enlightenment. If reason was constrained by a transcendentially necessary structure, then how could reason be practical? How could man use it freely to solve existential problems? The call "have the courage to use your own reason!" was a deception, for however courageous man may be, he will still be saddled with an instrument he cannot change, a weapon he cannot forge -- hypostatized consciousness.

The attempt to tie consciousness down to an ahistorical, logically necessary structure was a tragic moment of repressive ideology in Husserl's work. Toward the end of his career, Husserl seemed to recognize this failure. He moved much closer to a recognition of the existential grounding of consciousness when he acknowledged the irreducible layer of the Lebenswelt. This was a recognition that reason can be practical because it is grounded in the intersubjective layer of real human activity.

It is true that Husserl spent the last part of his life haunted by the realization that his solution to the problem of understanding was evidently ethereal. He tried hard to build a bridge from the phenomenologically reduced, back to the "life" world, over the gap between the two which he himself had dug. . . Drafts published post-humously revealed how painfully was Husserl aware of this fatal flaw in his system and how feverishly he tried to rectify it. As Schutz remembers: "When I asked him once why he had refrained from publishing the second volume of Ideen, he answered that at that time he had not found a solution to

the problem to the constitution of intersubjectivity [74].

Husserl repeated the dialectic of Enlightenment when he committed himself to the myth of transcendental subjectivity. He wanted reason to be grounded in something beyond the contingency of man's existential activity. But this grounding kept phenomenology from fulfilling the interest of Enlightenment. With its transcendental prejudice, phenomenology could not account for the intersubjectivity of reason, or for its collective use by humans to improve the human condition. Phenomenology then regenerated the myth of rationality which is predestined; reason which is constrained by something other than collective rational man.

### 3.8 Conclusion: Nursing's Inheritance of the Dialectic of Enlightenment

These sections of the investigation have involved the steps of recovery and critique. They have reconstructed Western intellectual traditions, including British Empiricism, Kantian Critical Philosophy, Hegelian metaphysics, Marxian critique, Positivism, and the Critique of Positivism and Husserlian phenomenology. This recovery has been undertaken in an attempt to recognize the historical genesis of intellectual traditions, in an attempt to reconstruct intellectual traditions which nursing has inherited. This is recovering the genesis of an historical knowing process. It is recognizing ourselves as historical knowing subjects, contemporary intellectuals who have

inherited the influence of these traditions.

But this step has also included a moment of critique. It has identified a dialectic in Western intellectual traditions, called the Dialectic of Enlightenment. This chapter has argued that there has been an historically real tension in Western intellectual traditions which moves between the moments of emancipation or critical spirit and repression or dogma.

Enlightenment ideology emerges as a critical, reflexive awareness that humans have the freedom to use their own reason. It surfaces as an emancipatory call, as an exhortation to "throw off the chains" of myth and dogma. This is reflexive humans challenging each other in Kant's critical spirit: "Have the courage to use your own reason!" It is self-conscious humanity, pressing for the use of human reason, struggling to improve the human condition.

But in the history of Western intellectual discourse, this spirit of Enlightenment seems also to have contained within itself the seed of repression or regression back to hypostatized interpretations of reality; back to myth and dogma. This moment of myth has generally included the notion that reason is constrained in an ahistorical knowing process; that there are ahistorical conditions of possible knowledge; and that human rationality, if it would be "right" or correct, should conform to these transcendental conditions. This is viewing reason as constrained by something other than historically rational man.

Nursing occupies a structural position in bourgeois society where it may now inherit the influence of this dialectic. The inheritance of positivism, for example, has exerted an especially strong influence in the contemporary reality of nurse practitioners, researchers, educators and administrators. As in bourgeois society writ large, contemporary versions of positivism exert a pervasive influence on the social construction of reality in nursing.

In practice, in research, in education and in administration, nursing relies almost exclusively upon the mode of positivistic consciousness to constitute reality. When nursing research, for example, appropriates the methodologies of hard science to compete for biomedical research monies, it illustrates the ascendancy of technocratic consciousness in the West.

This is an expression of the success of the natural sciences in providing technologically useful information. It is recognizing that technocratic consciousness allows nurses to constitute reality from the perspective of prediction and control. This "mathematization of nature" helps nurses to compete as technicians alongside other professionals in bourgeois society.

But this kind of technocratic consciousness has had the paradoxical result of improving the human condition (biomedically) while it erodes other vitally important forms of rationality. Positivistic consciousness among nurses repeats all

of the paradoxical consequences found in positivistic society writ large. It perpetuates the myth of a fact/value distinction so that nurses do not see themselves as elevating a hegemonic technocratic value orientation. It hypostatizes the social world, so that nurses do not see themselves as reifying social reality -- turning it into a "second nature," participating in the "science of unfreedom." It loses the opportunity to constitute the existential reality of humans from the perspective of potentiality, emancipation or "becoming."

The critique of positivism and the critique of Enlightenment ideology, does not commit this investigation to a position of absolute skepticism. The insight that there may have been a dialectic in enlightenment does not obviate a commitment in nursing to the pursuit of Enlightenment ideology. As members of bourgeois society, nurses will hopefully continue to participate in this ideology.

But the recognition of a dialectic in Enlightenment can help nurses to become more reflexive or self-conscious about our use of reason. This investigation has suggested in fact that the strongest moments of critical spirit and emancipatory struggle have occurred at points when humans have been intensely self-conscious. Reflexivity seems to have been the prerequisite for emancipatory, critical movement.

The conclusion which is suggested by this analysis seems to be that nursing can come closest to fulfilling the emancipatory

interest in Enlightenment if it develops and preserves a critical, self-consciousness concerning reason. Especially at this point in history, nursing needs to become more self-conscious about the historical nature of reason, about the changes which have occurred and those which will occur in human rationality.

Perhaps most importantly, nursing needs to be more self-conscious about the existential grounding of human reason. It needs to see contemporary modes of reality construction as historically changing frames of reference; as "quasitranscendental" frames of reference which orient human being-in-the-world. It needs to recognize reason, in all of its forms, as anthropologically rooted, as tied to the existential reality of historical man. It needs to become more conscious of the way in which modern bourgeois existence anchors human reason.

Nursing needs to recognize how our own aspirations for enlightenment are tied up with the existential reality of nursing labor. It needs to become conscious of how bourgeois existence has influenced the development of Enlightenment ideology in nursing; how the existential activity of nurses had led us to positions of scientism, professionalism and feminism.

Endnotes

1. I. Kant, "What is Enlightenment?" quoted in T. McCarthy, CTJH, p. 77.
2. C. Lenhardt, "The Wanderings of Enlightenment" in On Critical Theory, J. O'Neill (Ed.), New York, Seabury Press, 1976, p. 36.
3. Paul Thiry d'Holbach, Nature and Her Laws by Mirabaud (London, 1816) cited by Habermas in Theory and Practice, p. 257.
4. D. Held, Introduction to Critical Theory, p. 151. This passage contains a quotation from Francis Bacon's The Advancement of Learning (translation of De Augmentis Scientiarum).
5. F. Bacon, Novum Organum, as quoted in N. Lobkowitz, Theory and Practice, p. 89.
6. F. Bacon, *supra*, p. 7.
7. F. Bacon, Novum Organum, quoted in M. Harris, The Rise of Anthropological Theory (New York, Crowell Pub., 1968) p. 287.
8. See the discussion of Hume in M. Harris Cultural Materialism (New York, Random House, 1980) pp.9-11. Also in A. Flew A Dictionary of Philosophy (New York, St. Martins Press, 1979) p. 142, and in I. Kant, Prolegomena To Any Future Metaphysics (Indianapolis, Bobbs-Merrill, 1950) editors introduction, pp. iii-ix.
9. Immanuel Kant, The Critique of Pure Reason, 1781. This section draws heavily upon Kant's later work, Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics (1783) which has been used as a summary/condensation of arguments developed in the Critique.
10. I. Kant, Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics, p. ix.
11. *Ibid.*, parag. 51, p. 87.
12. *Ibid.*, parag. 52a, p. 87.
13. *Ibid.*, parag. 2c, p. 17.
14. *Ibid.*, parag. 10, p. 30.
15. *Ibid.*, p. 31.



16. Ibid., p. 37.
17. See the editors discussion, Prolegomena, p. xvii and Kant's arguments, parags. 21-23, pp. 50-53.
18. J. Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests, p. 208. Also see A. Flew, A Dictionary of Philosophy (New York, St. Martin's Press, 1979), pp. 175-178.
19. M. Harris, Rise of Anthropological Theory, p. 41
20. J. Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests (Boston, Beacon Press, 1971), p. 10.
21. The discussion of Hegel has been taken primarily from I. Soll, An Introduction to Hegel's Metaphysics (Chicago, U. of Chicago Press, 1969) and J. Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests, pp. 7-24. This section regretfully limns Hegel's critique of Kant and his famous explication of ascending forms of consciousness (both epistemological and practical) contained in Phenomenology of Spirit (1807).
22. See the discussion in I. Soll, An Introduction to Hegel's Metaphysics, pp. 8-9.
23. This argument was contained in Hegel's discussion of infinity and the absolute. Particularly in his Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences (1830), Hegel examined the finite nature of Kant's categories of judgment. Kant had maintained that scientific concepts were adequate for the understanding of sense-experience. This application of the categories Kant termed theoretical reason. The categories were inappropriately and unsuccessfully applied to aspects of reality beyond sense experience. This application was termed practical reason.  
  
Hegel, in contrast, rejected Kant's distinction between theoretical and practical reason. Hegel argued that the failure of scientific categories to provide metaphysical understanding lay in their finitude; they were limited (opposing) constructs being applied to the infinite, absolute reality. Hegel believed that knowledge of this infinity was possible and that this would occur as finite categories, through their opposition, progressively dissolved into more concrete (encompassing) concepts. See the discussion in I Soll, Hegel's Metaphysics, pp. 111-127.
24. For a fairly reflexive awareness of scientific concepts dissolving through history, see T. Kuhn, The Structure of

Scientific Revolutions (University of Chicago Press, 1970) and I. Lakatos "Science and Pseudo-Science" in The Methodology of Scientific Research Programs (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1978, pp. 1-7. While this latter state of reflexive awareness has transcended the natural attitude (general thesis), in recent times, it has also turned into scientism. This is the assertion that, although concepts are a product of scientific consciousness, this form of consciousness, science, is coextensive with knowledge itself. No other form of consciousness provides legitimate concepts.

25. For a dogmatic (scientistic) explanation of these recalcitrant experiences, see H. Reichenbach, The Rise of Scientific Philosophy (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1951). For a more critical explanation, see W.V. Quine, "Two Dogmas of Empiricism" in From a Logical Point of View (New York, Harper, 1953).
26. D. Held, An Introduction to Critical Theory, p. 203.
27. See the discussion by I. Soll, An Introduction to Hegel's Metaphysics, pp. 9-46.
28. J. Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests, pp. 16-17.
29. An important part of this argument was Hegel's notion that the ego or forms of self-consciousness are derived, not just by opposing the external world, but by "negating" it. This was his proposition that consciousness and self-consciousness, all forms of knowing and acting, participate in the same basic drive of the human spirit, which is autonomy and self-sufficiency. Driven by this principle of autonomy, self-consciousness paradoxically preserves and destroys the external world. Other practical aspects of self-consciousness which participate in this negation were stoicism, skepticism and the unhappy consciousness. See the discussion by I. Soll, Hegel's Metaphysics, pp. 11-46.
30. J. Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests, p. 16.
31. O. Neurath, The Unity of Science (London, Kegan Paul, 1932).
32. For a discussion of Burkelian, transcendental (Kantian) and objective idealism, see the comments by A. Flew, A Dictionary of Philosophy, p. 149.
33. For a discussion of Identitätsphilosophie, see the translators note in Habermas, Knowledge and Human

Interests, p. 320.

34. I. Soll, Hegel's Metaphysics, p. 122.
35. See Soll's discussion of this point, *Ibid*, pp. 64, 83, and 127-128. Also see the discussion of romanticism in Z. Bauman, Hermeneutics and Social Science (London, Hutchinson, 1978) pp. 23-26 and 31-33.
36. The direct reference here is to M. Merleau-Ponty, particularly The Primacy of Perception (Northwestern University Press, 1964). His theories of perception do not parallel this argument precisely in that he maintained that perception is not the classical "gaze" whereby concepts are passively layed upon sense experience. M. Merleau-Ponty's notion of perception was much more like a practical (active) synthesis, in which reality is constituted (with the aid of concepts) in practice. Here reality is a synthesis of perspectives which develop in practical "working over" the environment. The indirect reference here is to the generally accepted view that there is no "raw" sense experience; that all sensuous experience is mediated by historically/culturally conditioned concepts or that observation is always mediated by theory. This argument generally takes the form of refuting the myth of the given. See for example the discussion of Willard Sellars, "Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind" in Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science. Also P. Churchland, Scientific Realism and the Plasticity of Mind (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1979).
37. I. Soll, *Ibid.*, pp. 134-139.
38. See the discussion in Soll, Hegel's Metaphysics, p. 134.
39. D. Held, An Introduction to Critical Theory, p. 177.
40. *Ibid.*, p. 176.
41. J. Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interest, p. 18.
42. J. Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interest, p. 24.
43. Z. Bauman, Hermeneutics and Social Science, p. 17.
44. This section summarizes the analysis by Habermas of the same name. See "The Idea of the Theory of Knowledge as Social Theory" in KHI, pp. 43-63.
45. K. Marx and F. Engels. Gesamtausgabe, as quoted by J.

- Habermas, KHI, p. 43.
46. Z. Bauman, Hermeneutics and Social Science, p. 46-47.
  47. Ibid., p. 52.
  48. K. Marx, as quoted in J. Habermas, KHI, p. 46.
  49. J. Habermas, KHI, pp. 62-63.
  50. Ibid., p. 63.
  51. For an excellent treatment of the positivistic turn in Marx's work, see N. Lobkowitz, Theory and Practice. Lobkowitz places Marx within the sociohistorical context of nineteenth century intellectual Germany. This treatment helps to explain the remarkable absence of reflexivity in Marx's later work.
  52. T. McCarthy, The Critical Theory of Jurgen Habermas, p. 137.
  53. D. Held, An Introduction to Critical Theory, pp. 163-164.
  54. K. Popper, Objective Knowledge, quoted in McCarthy, CTJH, p. 45.
  55. T. McCarthy, The Critical Theory of Jurgen Habermas, p. 138.
  56. See an example of critical sociology in the work of Z. Bauman, Towards a Critical Sociology: An Essay on Commonsense and Emancipation (London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1976).
  57. T. McCarthy, CTJH, p. 142. This passage contains a quote from M. Weber, Economy and Society.
  58. J. Habermas, Towards a Logic of the Social Sciences, quoted in T. McCarthy, CTJH, p. 151.
  59. T. McCarthy, Ibid, p. 152.
  60. J. Habermas, Logic of the Social Sciences, quoted in T. McCarthy, CTJH, p. 140.
  61. See the discussion of Abel and Verstehen in T. McCarthy, CTJH, pp. 145-149.
  62. T. McCarthy, CTJH, p. 147.

63. Ibid.
64. Ibid., pp. 148, 155.
65. Ibid., p. 139.
66. D. Held, Introduction to Critical Theory, pp. 171-172.
67. Z. Bauman, Towards a Critical Sociology: An Essay on Commonsense and Emancipation (London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1976), pp. 6-15.
68. D. Held, An Introduction to Critical Theory, pp. 169-170.
69. Ibid., p. 170.
70. Indeed, Habermas has argued that they precede or are presupposed as the intersubjective ground of technocratic consciousness.
71. D. Held, An Introduction to Critical Theory, pp. 166-167.
72. Z. Bauman, Hermeneutics and Social Science, p. 119.
73. Ibid., pp. 120-121.
74. Ibid., p. 127.

## CHAPTER 4

### TOWARD A CRITICAL NURSING PROCESS: NURSING PRAXIS

Praxis in the narrow sense of the Greek. ..had nothing to do with techne, the skillful production of artifacts and the expert mastery of objectified tasks. In the final instance [praxis] was always directed toward the formation and culturation of [virtuous] character, it proceeded pedagogically and not technically [1].

#### 4.1 Introduction

In preceding sections, the investigation has passed through the initial steps of radical reflection. In the step of recovery, the investigation moved through layers of tradition, recovering the memory of existential and intellectual traditions which have preceded ours. This recovery was an experience which can help nurses to recognize our own self-formative process. It can help us to see how we came to be the subjects we are, with these existential modes and these interpretations of reality.

In the step of critique, reflection passed through a critical questioning of presuppositions and assumptions contained in bourgeois interpretations of reality. This was a passage which discovered problems in the course of enlightenment. It was an exploration of western bourgeois ideology which

identified epistemic and functional problems in that ideology. It uncovered problems which can occur when intellectual traditions are unreflexive.

In this chapter, the investigation will pass through two final steps in the experience of radical reflection. These are the steps of imagination and negotiation. Beginning sections of this chapter will review the work of Berger and Luckman who extended the sociology of knowledge tradition in their analysis of the social construction of reality. The work of Berger and Luckman demonstrates a very strong resemblance to the philosophical frame of reference expressed by Habermas. It avoids an hypostatized or ahistorical view of reality construction. It suspends these presuppositions and engages in "free variation of imagination;" it attempts to uncover structural properties in the process of reality construction which are "essential." It identifies structural qualities in the self-formative process of man which guide the constitution of reality.

The work of Berger and Luckman, like the work of Habermas, can help nurses to engage in the step of imagination. It does this first by identifying structures in the process of reality construction which are anthropologically grounded, structures which are relatively invariant or necessary for species survival. This recognition can help nurses to see, secondly, that the social construction of reality is also a process of

becoming. It is a self-formative process whereby man creates the conditions of his own existence. It is a process which is continually changing, and becoming something different.

Recognizing this existential grounding can help nurses to imagine other existential modes, different ways of being-in-the-world and different interpretations of reality.

#### 4.2 The Existential Determination of Thought and the Social Construction of Reality [2]

The existential determination of consciousness is an important ingredient in the sociology of knowledge tradition. Proponents of the tradition begin with existential conditions and examine the way in which knowledge, reason, consciousness or understanding flow from historically real, material being-in-the-world. This is a perspective which argues that historically changing interpretations of reality are anchored in the real life activity of humans.

The sociology of knowledge tradition asserts that humans, in their real social activity, construct the parameters of existence, producing both the material and ideological conditions of existence at the cultural level.

All non-human animals, as species and as individuals, live in closed worlds whose structures are predetermined by the biological equipment of the several animal species. By contrast, man's relationship to his environment is characterized by world-openness. Not only [have humans] succeeded in establishing [themselves] over the greater part of the earth's surface, [their] relationship to the surrounding environment is everywhere imperfectly



structured by [their] own biological constitution. The fact that [humans] continue to live a nomadic existence in one place and turn to agriculture in another cannot be explained in terms of biological processes. This does not mean of course that there are no biologically determined limitations to [human] relations with the environment. [Humans do] have drives, of course. But these drives are highly unspecialized and undirected. This means that the human organism is capable of applying its constitutionally given equipment to a very wide and constantly variable and varying range of activities. . .[3].

Moreover,

Despite the obvious physiological limits to the range of possible and different ways of becoming [human], the human organism manifests an immense plasticity in its response to the environment. . .It is an ethnological commonplace that the ways of becoming and being human are as numerous as [the cultures of humanity]. Humanness is a socio-cultural variable. In other words, there is no human nature in the sense of a biologically fixed substratum determining the variability of socio-cultural formations. There is only human nature in the sense of anthropological constants (for example, world-openness and plasticity of instinctual structure) that delimit and permit man's socio-cultural formations. But the specific shape into which this humanness is molded is determined by those socio-cultural formations and is relative to their numerous variations. While it is possible to say that man has a nature, it is more significant to say that man constructs his own nature, or more simply that man produces himself [4].

In these analyses, Berger and Luckman argue that in their real social activity, humans produce and reproduce the conditions of their existence. "Man produces himself" and "the self-formative process of the human species" are different ways of saying that in their real, material activity, humans produce the mode of existence and the conditions which are taken up as adequate for humanness. Additionally, in their real activity, humans reproduce this mode of existence in a social formation which is passed on to successive generations.

The self-formative process of the human species is then a social enterprise. Humans together produce the material and ideological environment which constitute specific social formations. The social nature of this enterprise makes it a process which cannot be reduced to mechanistic/deterministic dynamics. Rather, the social construction of reality is an exceedingly dialectical process--one which originates in conditions of existence and simultaneously transforms those conditions.

Berger and Luckman characterized this dialectic, the social construction of reality, as a process which contains the three moments of externalization, objectivation and internalization.

Man is capable of producing a world that he then experiences as something other than a human product. . .it is important to emphasize that the relationship between man, the producer, and the social world, his product, is and remains a dialectical one. That is man (in his collectivities) and his world interact with each other. The product acts back on the producer. Externalization [human being externalized in activity] and objectivation [the process by which externalized products of human activity attain the character of objectivity] are moments in a continuing dialectical process. The third moment in this process. . .is internalization [by which the objectivated social world is retrojected into consciousness in the course of socialization] [5].

The dialectics of externalization, objectivation and internalization constitute the process by which humans create social formations, or the conditions of existence. While specific properties of the dialectic may vary in history, it is important to recognize that the structure is invariant. The

dynamic organization of all three moments is governed by a structure or Gestalt which is unique to the human species. This is the structure of dialectics, an internal relation which has organized the sweep of history -- one which has enabled man to produce himself.

### Externalization

In the moment of externalization, subjectivity or the subjective experience of human being is first externalized in real (objective) human activity.

Externalization as such is an anthropological necessity. Human being is impossible in a closed sphere of quiescent interiority. Human being must ongoingly externalize itself in activity. This anthropological necessity is grounded in man's biological equipment. The inherent instability of the human organism makes it imperative that man himself provide a stable environment for his conduct. Man must specialize and direct his drives [6].

The externalization of self occurs in embodied activity. This is another way of saying that humans externalize their being in real human action. It is also saying that truly human being requires this externalization; that being is not human unless it is externalized in real, embodied activity. In this externalization (in real labor), humans produce the self.

The significance of this thesis has not been recognized in most contemporary nursing discourse. It is an assertion which can help us understand both our patients and ourselves. If the externalization of self occurs in real embodied activity, which is human labor, then the production of self clearly occurs

throughout life. The genesis of self, in other words, is not confined to early childhood development. If humans produce the self by externalizing subjectivity in labor, then it becomes critically important to understand the nature of labor under capitalism. It becomes important to understand labor as a condition which fixes the parameters of life and health (well being) under capitalism.

To appreciate the significance of this assertion, it might help to look briefly at one concrete example of externalization via labor. If one accepts the proposition that nurses, for example, produce the self through embodied activity, then it becomes important to understand the dynamics of externalization in nursing labor. It becomes important, in other words, to examine the structure of externalization in the real embodied activity of nurses [7].

The externalization of self via nursing labor is an activity which contains many of the same properties found in women's labor in general. For example, this externalization occurs in embodied activity which does not produce a concrete, durable object. At the end of a shift, or following years of labor, there is no lasting evidence of the self. This means that in nursing, as in most women's labor, the self is an ambiguous invisible phenomenon.

The invisible nature of nursing labor, and its structural properties make it a form of externalization which can be

compared meaningfully with women's domestic labor. In the following example, similarities in patterns of externalization are easily recognized. It is only necessary to replace the image of a female homemaker with the image of female hospital staff nurses, working in a patriarchal environment between morning and evening medical rounds.

The actual nature of housework. . . makes it invisible. Men do not generally see it being done. The woman in the home works in isolation while the man is away. When he returns, he notices absences, things which have not been done. The day's routine of tasks is not apparent because they result merely in the creation of a normal environment for him. Only the woman and perhaps the children look at the room and remember its transformations through the day. . . The maintenance and surpassing of the work routine is a constant effort. The housewife tries to save time, she tries to accumulate space and time in order to push out the boundaries so she can have a little "time to herself." The attempt disintegrates continuously. A complex of forces prevent her from ever getting ahead of herself. One big spurt and the floor gleams, one achievement. . . The achievement itself disappears almost as it is accomplished. Children with dirty shoes they forgot to wipe come home from school -- one dirty floor [8].

The invisible quality of externalization and its constant disintegration are experienced in the process of hospital nursing labor from admission through discharge of patients. The reality of service settings is that they are characterized by a routine filled with tasks, i.e., nurses externalize themselves via activity which remains task oriented (at least in part). Shifts are filled with the routine of receiving report, making patient rounds, assessing patient status, providing physical assistance and emotional support, listening to patients, interpreting physicians' recommendations to patients

(brokerage), administering medications, transcribing orders, charting progress and finally, giving report to an oncoming shift.

These are tasks which are only visible (recognized) when they are not done. They maintain a "normal environment," in the sense that they produce recovery for patients and maintain an orderly environment in the hospital. But they are only recognized when they are absent, e.g., when because of blatantly negligent nursing care, patients do not recover, or when, in the event of an oversight or inattention to a myriad of details, the routine of the next shift dissolves into chaos.

Even when nursing labor externalizes itself in the form of a visible concrete object (e.g., nursing care plans or nursing progress notes) that externalization disintegrates as soon as patients are discharged. The feeling of never being able to get ahead of oneself is experienced by every hospital staff nurse who discharges a patient only to be faced with a new admission even before the bed is stripped and cleaned.

While the particular characteristics of externalization in nursing labor would fill a volume of empirical analysis here, it is only important to recognize that this externalization of self occurs in real embodied activity. This is an irreducible part of human existence, a part of human being which converts the interiority (subjectivity) of being into something external, i.e., activity. Labor is that process of externalization.

But according to the frame of reference under discussion, humans do more than just externalize their subjective experience. They also objectivate it. Even in the moment when the self is being externalized, it is converted into a product and an object. Embodied activity is at once the subjective experience of my self and the objective experience which produces something objectively real. In this moment of existence, human being passes from the state of subjective interiority to something external and objective, something "out there" which stands over against the "me, inside here."

### Objectivation

The process by which the externalized products of human activity attain the character of objectivity is objectivation. . .objectivations serve as more or less enduring indices of the subjective processes of their producers, allowing their availability to extend beyond the face-to-face situation in which they can be directly apprehended. . .The reality of everyday life is not only filled with objectivations; it is only possible because of them [9].

Objectivation is the moment of human existence which converts the products of human activity into objective or object-like phenomena. This is a "continuation" of externalization so to speak. It converts externalized human being into something objective, something "object-like." In the course of real, embodied activity, human products are created. The transition from externalized being (embodied activity) to an objectively real human product includes the moment of

objectivation.

The category of "product" -- means more than material objects (tables, chairs, artifacts). "Human products" is a category which also includes such quasitangible objects as social institutions; e.g., the modern state, church, family, marriage, class, etc. These are "objectively real" products of human activity in the sense that they have an objective status -- they are relatively enduring products of human activity.

In the moment of objectivation then, humans are producing both the objective and subjective conditions of existence, or the material and ideological conditions of human being.

In objectivation, social actors produce material products and material conditions. For example, humans produce material resources which guarantee survival. Humans produce a mode of subsistence, such as sedentary or migratory agriculture, which provides control over the natural environment. But also in objectivation, social actors produce ideological products and ideological conditions of existence. For example, humans produce and reproduce institutionalized social relations, such as the class structure of modern capitalism. Social actors produce and reproduce world views, beliefs and assumptions, or ideological conditions which frame human access to reality. These are ideological conditions which provide mutual understanding or intersubjectivity. As with the case of material conditions, these ideological conditions are



existential requirements; they are products of human activity which are necessary for life at the cultural level.

Until now, it may have been possible to speak of externalization, objectivation and internalization as an individual (personal) process; but this is not entirely accurate. As Berger and Luckman indicated, the dialectics of reality construction is a social enterprise or an intersubjective process. The production of self and the creation of human products never occurs in isolation. It occurs among others whose labor is also externalization and objectivation. Human products, both material and ideological, are then products of collective objectivation. Quasitangible products, such as the institutionalized social relations found in class society, are important examples of this collective objectivation. They are ideological conditions produced in a social enterprise.

To illustrate the moment of objectivation, it may help to look briefly at one extreme example of its presence. A special case of objectivation occurs when ideological or quasitangible products of human activity take on an object-like status which seems nonhuman. This extreme example of objectivation occurs frequently with humanly produced institutions. It has been labeled reification.

Reification is the apprehension of human phenomena as if they were things, that is, in non-human, or possibly supra-human terms. Another way of saying this is that reification is the apprehension of the products of human

activity as if they were something else than human products -- such as facts of nature, results of cosmic laws or manifestations of divine will. Reification implies that man is capable of forgetting his own authorship of the human world, and further -- that the dialectic between man, the producer and his products is lost to consciousness. . . . It is important to keep in mind that the objectivity of the institutional world, however massive it may appear to the individual, is a humanly produced, constructed objectivity. The institutional world is objectivated human activity, and so is every single institution. Despite the objectivity that marks [institutions] in human experience, they do not thereby acquire an ontological status apart from the human activity which produced them. . . . As soon as an objective social world is established, the possibility of reification is never far away. The objectivity of the social world means that it confronts man as something outside himself. The decisive question is whether he still retains the awareness that however objectivated, the social world was made by men -- and therefore can be remade by them. In other words, reification can be described as an extreme step in the process of objectivation, whereby the objectivated world loses its comprehensibility as a human enterprise and becomes fixed as a non-human, non-humanizable inert facticity [10].

The significance of this assertion, again, seems unrecognized in contemporary nursing discourse. Twentieth century nursing labor has inherited the humanly produced conditions of class society. This is an existential condition which nurses cannot ignore. Institutionalized social relations (i.e., class and class conflict) will continue to fix the parameters of practice, determining what nurses can and cannot do. Presently, nurses sell their labor as a commodity. The value of that labor depends in part upon the procurement of credentials, which in turn are a commodity, purchased with capital in the course of secondary education. To reiterate, capital and labor are social phenomena which fix the parameters

of nursing practice.

Class society and its organization around capital and labor are perhaps the greatest massivity encountered in reflexive nursing discourse. Those concerned with national policy watch the spiral of health care costs as though it were a nonhuman phenomenon with a will of its own. This is the reification of internal contradictions in capitalism. It is the concretizing of a wage spiral, reflecting laborers' demands to keep up with an inflationary cost of middle class living. And it is the concretizing of an interest spiral; demands made by those who own capital (private ownership of property) to receive a return on investments. Taken together, this massivity of labor and capital becomes reified as institutionalized social relations. They are experienced by nurses and most other Americans as a nonhuman, nonhumanizable, inert facticity. The social world then loses its comprehensibility as a genuinely human product. If nursing discourse is to make any meaningful contribution to the health care needs of society, it needs to confront this specific example of objectivation/reification; the "second nature" of class society.

The effects of objectivation are so powerful (especially in the case of reification) and its presence so unavoidable, that it seems important to recognize how and why it occurs. According to Berger and Luckman, one important reason for the presence of objectivation is the human use of symbols. The

transition from embodied activity to humanly created products occurs primarily through the use of symbols.

Language provides the fundamental superimposition of logic on the objectivated social world. The edifice of [social reality] is built upon language and uses language as its principal instrumentality. . .The common objectivations of everyday life are maintained primarily by linguistic signification. . .that is, by the human production of signs. A sign may be distinguished from other objectivations by its explicit intention to serve as an index of subjective meanings. . .Language, which may be defined here as a system of vocal signs, is the most important sign system of human society. Language provides me with a ready made possibility for the ongoing objectification of my unfolding experience. Language is pliantly expansive, so as to allow me to objectify a great variety of experiences coming my way in the course of my life. Language also typifies experience, allowing me to subsume them under broad categories in terms of which they have meaning not only to myself, but also to my fellow men. . . [This is] the capacity of language to crystalize and stabilize for me my own subjectivity. . .It can therefore be said that language makes "more real" my subjectivity, not only to my [fellow humans], but also to myself [11].

The importance of symbols and language in the self-formative process of man seems to have been overlooked in most contemporary nursing discourse [12]. The blindspot may have occurred because of the heavy biopsychosocial eclecticism in contemporary health science and because of a relative absence of cultural awareness in nursing discourse. But for whatever reason, the absence of a cultural frame of reference in nursing's understanding of man, has meant that the role of language as it molds existential parameters has not been recognized. The cultural frame of reference is one which specifically recognizes the use of symbols as an irreducible part of existence at the cultural level.

The analysis of Berger and Luckman provides such a cultural frame of reference. They begin from the cultural phenomenon of linguistic signification. This is the use of symbols, particularly language, to indicate subjective experience. In the process of signification, a sign expresses or indicates the subjective experience of its user. Words and numbers, for example, indicate or "stand for" thoughts, emotions, sensations, judgments, etc. Linguistic signification then is the externalization of something more interior; it is the externalization/expression of subjective experience. Human expressivity is unique in its level of such "indexicality." No other species has the ability to indicate or externalize with the degree of complexity found in human signification [13].

Externalization, however, is not the only process which occurs in signification. Human expressivity not only externalizes subjectivity, it also objectifies it. A symbol serves as an object-like sign -- an index which stands for subjectivity. Signs are then another quasitangible product. They are products created by humans to signify subject experience. A word, for example, is a quasitangible object which, when spoken, objectivates a patient's experience with pain. The word transforms his subjective experience into a relatively enduring product. The word as product lasts beyond our face-to-face encounter. It becomes part of his memory and mine.

Symbols then, and particularly language, are objectivating in their very function. They are quasitangible objects which are produced to stand for or indicate something less object-like. They convert subjective reality into objective reality. This objectivating function of symbols is a primary reason for the presence of objectivation in man's self-formative process.

But language is a source of objectivation for other reasons besides its function. Symbols are objectivating partly because they come "ready-made." They are inherited objectivities which pliantly coerce experience into ready-made categories. This is another way of saying that language molds a virtually infinite array of human experience into a relatively plastic mold of categories which are shared by members of a linguistic community.

The "ready-made" nature of language is something which can be used to explain both particular variation in cross-cultural objectivation as well as universal regularity. The fact that members of different linguistic communities inherit different collections of symbols is a condition which may be used to explain variations in the social construction of reality. This interpretation, however, when it is overextended, leads to a kind of linguistic relativism which is so particularistic that it has little explanatory power. By the same token, the overemphasis upon a universal structure of syntax, or upon the logical form which is concealed beneath the surface of everyday

discourse, lends itself to a form of determinism which again has limited explanatory power [14].

A more moderate explanation would propose that the particular collection of symbols inherited by a linguistic community and the structural properties found in that collection are important reasons for the objectivation found in human existence. In their function as indices and in their status as an inherited commodity, symbols transform subjective experience into object-like products. They objectivate an infinite array of subjective experience into a more or less cohesive cultural tradition, a tradition which is then inherited by successive generations.

Although this brief analysis of language has been much too superficial, its main intent has been just to recognize the use of symbols as a primary ingredient in the self-formative process of man. Language in particular is an important part of this process. Language is a humanly created product which is then taken up and used in the production of other products. Language influences the production of both the material and the ideological conditions of existence. It is the medium which carries agreement (consensus) or disagreement (conflict) concerning production of those conditions. It is the source of intersubjectivity in society.

The inheritance of a collection of symbols and the continued use of those symbols is the reason that humans achieve

mutual understanding. Intersubjectivity springs from the communicative processes of ordinary language use. The use of ordinary language is the source of agreement or mutual understanding achieved between parents and children, employers and laborers, between males and females and between the self I am now and the self I was years ago. Without this hermeneutic understanding, which is achieved in ordinary language, humans could not continue to produce themselves -- they could not continue to produce the ideological and material conditions of existence.

The significance of language in this process might be demonstrated by looking briefly at one concrete example. The current discussion has been examining the moment of objectivation -- the process whereby the externalized products of human activity attain the character of objectivity. The argument has been that objectivation occurs because of human labor and symbol use, because humans, through their labor and symbol use, create object-like products, or an objectively real social reality.

In this moment of objectivation, the influence of language might be best illustrated by the example of sexist occupational vocabulary. In our labor, nurses achieve objectivation when we produce an objectively real social reality along with patients and other health care professionals. In hospital settings, for example, this is the social construction of an institutional



reality. The social construction of this objectivity still includes blatantly sexist, patriarchal or coercive language. For example, a die-hard part of hospital nursing labor is still the transcription of physician's "orders."

This sexist language objectivates my experience in labor. It coerces my subjective experience into the inherited tradition of male domination and gender specific discrimination. It is language which fixes the coordinates of my experience, coercing it, so to speak, into dominated boxes. I may passively and uncritically accept those coordinates; I may accept them begrudgingly; or I may protest these coordinates by protesting the use of sexist vocabulary and the presence of sexist role behavior. Such language is objectivating also because it designates or fixes an objectively real meaning in my experience; it means that I am still part of a master/slave relationship, no matter how subtle. In sum, the objectivation of self in this category of labor and via this language deposits a sexist objectivity in the common experience of nurses.

### Internalization

Until now, the discussion has focused on two moments of the social construction of reality; externalization and objectivation. These moments, however, account for only part of the self-formative process of man. The third moment of this process is the retrojection of existential conditions into the

consciousness of humans. This is the moment of internalization, the process by which the socially constructed world is internalized in individual consciousness.

The individual member of society simultaneously externalizes his own being into the social world and internalizes it as an objective reality. . . In the life of every individual, there is a temporal sequence, in the course of which he is inducted into participation in the societal dialectic. The beginning point of this process is internalization: the immediate apprehension or interpretation of an objective event as expressing meaning, that is, as a manifestation of another's subjective processes which thereby become subjectively meaningful to myself. . . Internalization is the basis first, for an understanding of one's fellowmen and, second, for the apprehension of the world as a meaningful and social reality. This apprehension does not result from autonomous creations of meaning by isolated individuals, but begins with the individual "taking over" the world in which others already live. . . Only when he has achieved this degree of internalization is an individual a member of society. The ontogenetic process by which this is brought about is socialization, which may thus be defined as the comprehensive and consistent induction of an individual into the objective world of a society or a sector of it. Primary socialization is the first socialization an individual undergoes in childhood, through which he becomes a member of society. Secondary socialization is any subsequent process that inducts an already socialized individual into new sectors of the objective world of his society [15].

In primary and secondary socialization, the parameters of the lived world are internalized. The objectivity of the social world is internalized when humans take over a tradition, when they learn or master the specific interpretations of reality which enable them to participate in the social world. This internalization involves the absorption of different definitions of reality, the absorption and mastery of roles and role behavior and the development of identity.

In both primary and secondary socialization, the experience of internalization involves both the preservation and modification of social reality. The objective reality of externalized being, the objectivity of roles and institutions, the objectivity of social formations is reproduced in the consciousness of individuals. Institutionalized modes of existence are internalized as fixed objectivities; in other words, they are preserved, during socialization experiences when those definitions of existence are accepted without any significant change. But socially constructed definitions may also be rejected as a situation which produces "deviance." Individuals and collectivities deviate from institutionalized norms when they "take over" the world with a modified interpretation of reality.

To take just one example, the internalization of the objective social world includes the absorption of gender specific interpretations. An important example is the universal presence of gender specific interpretations concerning labor [16]. Primary and secondary socialization includes the internalization of hegemonic definitions which specify some forms of labor as open to women, other forms being relatively closed to women. Nursing, like domestic labor, has traditionally been internalized as a labor process which includes female role behavior (service) and a female (servile/matriarchal) identity.

Feminist perspectives, as they have entered secondary socialization in nursing at several points in history, struggle to produce deviance -- to overthrow a patriarchal definition of reality for nursing. But feminist perspectives in nursing education are still weighed down by the contradiction of sexism in primary socialization. So long as children are socialized via a patriarchal construction of reality under capitalism, it seems likely that these attempts to produce deviance in an adult labor force will continue to be riddled with contradiction [17].

Internalization, externalization and objectivation then are the three moments of a dialectical process which is the self-formative process of man. The dialectic of reality construction has been presented as a "steering" mechanism in history. It is the mechanism which guides conscious human activity, an underlying structural dynamic which directs or steers the production of material and ideological conditions of existence.

#### 4.3 Imagination and Negotiation

The review of Berger and Luckman brings this investigation back full circle to Marxian-existentialist premises about the human species and the sociohistorical construction of reality. Like Habermas, Berger and Luckman locate relatively invariant structures in the natural history of man. They argue that the constitution of reality is anthropologically grounded; that it is anchored in the survival requirements of man.

These are premises which emerge in the step of dialectical imagination. In the step of bracketing, the natural attitude is suspended. In the step of reconstruction, reflection recovers the genesis of our historical selves. Then reflection moves through the phenomenological experience of free-variation in imagination. This is struggling to identify structures in the constitution of reality which are relatively invariant.

Imagination is a step which struggles to discover if "things could be other than thus." It recognizes contingency in the genesis of our historical selves. It recognizes that bourgeois interpretations of reality are not the only possible interpretations available to man. There have been others in the past and there could, in principle, be others in the future.

Dialectical imagination then struggles to recognize how "things could be other than thus." It is a step which tries to uncover those aspects of the human condition which are changing and those aspects which are relatively invariant. It is a step which tries to imagine other possibilities -- possibilities which coincide with invariant existential requirements of man.

Dialectical method, on this account, seeks to free all being from the appearance of rigidity and from ahistorical interpretations. It treats all objects as many-faced, coming-into-being, acting and passing away in time. As a result, reality is comprehended as a process of becoming in which reality as a whole, as well as each particular, individual part, is understood as developing out of an earlier stage of its existence and as evolving into something else. This entails grasping not only an object's positive features but also its negative qualities, what the historical object has been. . . what it is becoming, and what it is not -- for all of these contribute to its

character [18].

Dialectical imagination is then a step which tries to discover which aspects of the human condition are changing. It struggles to recognize those aspects of reality construction which are invariant and those aspects which are becoming something different. This is a step which humans undertake because they want to know the point at which they may act. The purpose of this step is to govern action.

An active being is concerned with what is not always the same as it is, but can also be different. In it, he can discover the point at which he has to act. The purpose of his knowledge is to govern action [19].

Habermas, Berger and Luckman all identify the same invariant structures in the natural history of man. These are the structures of labor and language. They argue that the human condition is tied to the relatively invariant sociohistorical categories of labor and language; that the social construction of reality moves within boundaries which are established in real embodied labor and in ordinary language use. This is the argument that in work and in words, man produces his changing historical self.

With an acceptance of this argument, reflection then may enter a new experience of ideological struggle. This experience can occur, for example, when one recognizes that the human condition can change through the categories of labor and signification. This is recognizing that social actors can change the human condition if they act, in their real embodied

labor and in their communicative interaction, to create the conditions for that change. In this step, reflexive humans have discovered the points at which they can act.

In nursing, these steps of radical reflection can bring one to the final step of negotiation. This is an experience in which one puts aside dogma and hypostatized world views and enters human discourse as a full, equal partner. This is entering conversations in a new way, because one has discovered new points at which to act.

#### 4.4 Negotiation in Nursing

In the case of reinterpreting the historical experience of a group, the authentication of an alternative interpretation requires the previous active presence of a relevant hypothesis and a properly organized process of its negotiation. . . the enlightenment process consists therefore in a dialogue in which critical theorists attempt to negotiate the alternative meanings they offer and apply persuasion to convince their partners of their adequacy. Whether they will succeed or not depends, on the whole, on the degree of correspondence between the interpretive formula contained in the critical theory and the volume of experience collectively accumulated and commonsensically assimilated by the group. Such correspondence must be given the opportunity of being carefully considered and scrupulously assessed by all participants. . . The sign of authentication is precisely the former patient's emerging from his subordinate position on the receiving end of the dialogue and assuming the role of a fully developed creative agent of meaning negotiation [20].

Remaining sections of this investigation will present hypotheses or an interpretive formula for reflexive nursing action. This is locating points in the contemporary reality of nursing at which reflexive nurses can act; points at which a

reflexive nursing praxis could act to improve the human condition.

### The Critique of Scientistic Consciousness in Nursing

Beginning sections of this study discussed the epistemological frame of reference presented by Habermas. This is a frame of reference which can help contemporary nursing discourse to clarify the appropriate use of science. It can help nurses to understand why scientific inquiry is necessary and helpful in some aspects of reality construction and why, at other times, the normal science paradigm is inappropriately used to constitute reality.

The framework presented by Habermas was not a version of epistemological anarchism. It argued that, while multiple interpretations of reality may in principle be possible, the history of the human species has been characterized by three. These three frames of reference "take precedence" so to speak; they are necessary for species survival.

The framework of instrumental reason is a mode of reality construction which, according to Habermas, is necessary. Historically, it has been a frame of reference which allows man to engage in successful instrumental action. It allows humans to produce and reproduce the material conditions of existence.

Empirical analytic inquiry is then an important and useful part of human being-in-the-world. Sciences which engage in



empirical-analytic inquiry provide technologically useful information; information which allows humans to predict and control natural processes. Empirical-analytic inquiry is then a mode of reality construction which enables humans to become better and better technicians.

This argument can help nurses to recognize the appropriate use of science in nursing and abuses of science in nursing. Nurses can use an empirical-analytic mode of inquiry to constitute reality, if we wish to become better technicians. Science, in this form, provides technologically useful information which nurses could, in principle, use to predict and control "natural" processes in the human body. Biochemical research, physiological research, and other forms of "hard" science are then important sources of knowledge in nursing's construction of reality.

But with the ascent of positivism in recent history, nurses, along with other social actors in bourgeois society, have frequently internalized a contemporary social attitude which reifies empirical-analytic inquiry as a privileged perspective. This is the tendency in nursing to view empirical-analytic inquiry as the only legitimate mode of reality construction. Such a view reifies science; it generates "scientistic" thinking in nursing.

Scientism means that we no longer understand science as one form of possible knowledge but rather identify knowledge with science [21].

The struggle against scientific consciousness in nursing is a critically important project for organic nurse-intellectuals [22]. The critique of scientism, however, progresses erratically.

Most nurses recognize the one-dimensional nature of scientific thinking, once they reflect about it. Nursing represents the accumulated experience of a predominantly female labor force whose members are very intimately involved with men and women engaged in existential struggle. This kind of intimate human contact quickly uncovers the one dimensional character of scientific knowledge. Nursing ideology frequently expresses this recognition: that scientific understanding only provides the technical ground for nursing practice; and that genuine authentic, human interaction in nursing practice flows from another kind of understanding. Science allows us to be competent technicians. Hermeneutic understanding enables us to be participants with our patients in authentic human dialogue.

But the critique of scientific consciousness in nursing does not occur in a vacuum. Critical theorists who struggle to counter the influence of scientism in nursing do this within the sociohistorical context of modern industrial capitalism. This is a context where science and technology are "interlocked," a context in which there is a systematic, institutionalized connection between science and technology. In modern bourgeois society, this institutionalized connection has become hegemonic;

it seems, at times to be steering society, rather than the converse.

This is an institutionalized connection (between science and technology) which has gained ascendancy in modern industrial society. Habermas would argue that it has gained ascendancy because it gives humans power over the natural environment. It increases man's productive efficiency.

But under institutionalized social relations in class society, social actors do not participate equally in the development of science and technology. Under modern industrial capitalism, the production of technologically useful information is a social enterprise, it is controlled predominantly by the upper socioeconomic strata of society whose representatives are predominantly caucasian and male. This is recognizing that the contemporary institution of science and technology itself reflects institutionalized power relations. It reflects the power and privilege of gender, class and racial relations in modern bourgeois society.

Nursing may not remove itself from this sociohistorical context simply by choosing to ignore it. It ought rather to be confronted. The struggle against scientific consciousness in nursing is a struggle which will be waged within the context of institutionalized power relations. Scientific thinking has occurred in modern bourgeois society because power relations support and nurture this kind of thinking. Those with technolo-

gically exploitable knowledge do have power and privilege in class society. The desire for scientific understanding in nursing is then wrapped up tightly with the desire for power and privilege. It is the hope that scientific knowledge can give nurses power and privilege in the health care industry.

These arguments suggest that in modern class society, science has been used, at least in part, as an instrument to preserve and extend class privilege. Because of its embeddedness in class society, scientific thinking is a "mindset" which is especially difficult to dislodge. Nurses in all areas of practice (service, education, research) may recognize its one dimensional character, but because of contemporary social aspirations, because of the aspiration for social mobility, nurses may continue to accept the legitimacy of a scientific frame of reference. This is hoping that science will give nurses power and privilege in class society. It is using science to secure (new) class privileges for nurses.

From a bourgeois perspective, this use of science may seem emancipatory for nurses. Using science to extend new class privileges to nurses may seem entirely laudable. If nurses can become better technicians through science, then why not extend class privileges to them? This is a common response; one which demonstrates the difficulty of dislodging scientific thinking in modern bourgeois society.

The activity of technicians can only be rewarded as more

valuable than other forms of labor because members of class society preserve those value distinctions in categories of labor. The dream of socialist society is that labor in all its forms is equally valuable; since it is equally necessary for species survival that all members of society should participate in all forms of labor equally and be rewarded equally. This is the utopian dream of an egalitarian society, the dialectical imagining of a social formation where technicians, philosophers, artists, politicians, and domestic workers experience equal privileges because they participate equally in the production of existential conditions. But its vision can help nurses to recognize important contradictions in our use of and abuse of science.

Scientific consciousness in nursing is part of a greater scientific consciousness in society writ large. It is a consciousness which elevates the understanding of technicians above other forms of understanding. This elevation is a consequence of power relations as they presently exist in modern industrial capitalism. The hegemony of science and technology is linked very closely to the power and privilege of class position. The erosion of this hegemony (scientific thinking) then seems possible only in conjunction with the erosion of superfluous power relations or superfluous domination in class society.

The struggle against scientific consciousness in nursing

then appears as part of another contextual struggle, that is the struggle against scientific thinking in society, writ large and the struggle against superfluous power relations which prolong this thinking. This is recognizing that nursing's social reality may not be "decontextualized." The contradictions which we experience are only particular instances of contradictions found in bourgeois society. Resisting those contradictions in nursing seems schizophrenic, unless one also resists related contradictions in bourgeois society writ large.

#### Details

The specific details of a critical nursing praxis which resists scientific consciousness in nursing are the responsibility of reflexive nurses, as individuals actors and as a collective. The specific ways in which critical insight intervenes in the life of a group are not "written on any wall," and there is no "blueprint for action" which can emerge as a conclusion from reflexive analysis.

Instead, these insights must be recognized as hypotheses which, if accepted, intervene in the lives of individuals, changing attitudes and changing lifestyles. Nurses who accept these insights then become different social or political actors. They conduct research differently, they practice differently, they educate differently, and they administer differently. The specific details of this kind of reflexive practice then should

be seen as something like the experience of a partner who emerges from successful psychoanalysis. It is authentic, autonomous human praxis, practice which thinks critically, which rejects dogma, which struggles to cultivate virtuous conduct, in itself and among others.

As in psychoanalysis, the specific details of this praxis have to emerge from the experience of negotiation itself. Neither the patient nor the therapist can know in advance what kind of lifestyle will emerge. But political actors in nursing could clarify this process by continued critical analysis (including empirical analyses) of at least the following critical hypotheses.

1. Secondary education (nursing education) is a social institution which legitimates scientific thinking in nursing.

Nursing's political actors could struggle meaningfully against scientific consciousness by uncovering the ways in which nursing education reinforces a scientific world view among nurses. This would be helping nursing educators, researchers, administrators and students to resist the contradictions and abuses which accompany scientific consciousness.

2. Professional organizations are social institutions which legitimate scientific thinking in nursing.

Again, nursing's political actors could resist scientific consciousness by uncovering the ways in which professional organizations legitimate scientific consciousness in nursing.

This would include an analysis of the National League for Nursing and the American Nurses' Association accreditation criteria, as these reinforce scientific interpretations in nursing education and research.

3. The state is a social institution which legitimates scientific thinking in nursing.

Finally, political actors in nursing could resist scientific consciousness by uncovering the ways in which the state reinforces a scientific world view among nurses. This analysis might describe the way in which state board test pools legitimate scientism through the mechanism of licensure; the way in which local state support for colleges of nursing reinforces scientism among faculty and administrators and finally, the ways in which federal support reinforces scientism in nursing education and research.

#### The Critique of Bourgeois Professional Ideology in Nursing

The critique of scientism in nursing is tied very closely to the critique of bourgeois professional ideology in nursing. As mentioned earlier, scientific thinking in nursing is part of a greater contextual reality where science has been used, at least in part, to preserve and extend class privileges. Physicians are an ideal type example of the use of science to appropriate professional power and privilege.

Nursing has experienced a similar, yet oddly less than



successful, attempt to appropriate professional power and privilege. Nursing ideology has, for years, espoused the belief in professionalism as a vehicle which could secure these ingredients of power and privilege for nurses. Critical theory offers alternative hypotheses which challenge the legitimacy of professional ideology.

Professional status is, of course, accorded to social actors who complete an intense socialization process, producing something beyond technical competence. Professionals function differently than do technicians. They do this partly because they have a greater stock of recipe knowledge, but also because they are granted more privileges to use their knowledge in their labor. Professional status is then tied very closely to institutionalized power relations and privilege in bourgeois society. Professional status is class status. It is a form of institutionalized social relations (power relations).

It is no wonder that nursing's political elite (mostly its educational elite) have repeatedly resurrected the ideology of professionalism as a vehicle to appropriate more power and privilege for nurses. In the greater context of twentieth century industrial society, the professions have, in fact, enjoyed greater levels of power and privilege. Participating in this reality and experiencing the effects of minimal privileges and minimal power, it seems only natural that nursing would have internalized bourgeois strategies to improve its own position.

But there has been a peculiar tension in this experience. While nursing discourse espouses the ideology of professionalism, nursing activity, in many contexts, still does not seem like other forms of professional activity. There is still a widespread recognition that nurses enjoy very little power or privilege. The tension in this experience can produce critical hypotheses about professionalism in nursing.

If nurses accept the Marxian-existentialist framework expressed in this study, then their critical analyses will begin by looking at nursing practice from a different starting point. It will begin by looking at the nature of nursing labor, at the structural properties which characterize the work of nurses.

Preceding sections of this study have suggested that nursing practice, as it presently exists, resembles Arendt's category of labor. It is tied very intimately to the natural processes of the human body. It produces no lasting object; it is cyclical and repetitive, it serves life.

Like the dialectic found in domestic labor, nursing labor can include moments of externalization, internalization and objectification, which become a dissolving thing.

But in this activity, nurses can and frequently do experience a very intimate kind of contact with human life. At the staff level, nurses feed and bathe debilitated patients. We lift, transfer, reposition and massage immobilized patients. We handle body secretions, which is a culturally symbolic activity.

We create conditions for rest and we provoke activities of daily living. We participate in the moments of childbirth and death. We create conversations in which patients reconstruct their own existential reality. We witness sorrow and joy and we may also share these sentiments with our patients.

These experiences are tied very closely to the life process. Because that process, in its more mundane details, can be so cyclical and repetitive, nursing labor seems sometimes to be invisible and futile. This futility seems even more salient when nurses recognize a relative absence of power and privilege within our own ranks to control this labor process. The organization of nursing labor frequently moves within parameters which are established by others (e.g., administrators, physicians). This is recognizing that conditions of nursing labor frequently are established by others who have more power and privilege than do nurses.

These are dimensions of a labor process which make bourgeois ideology appealing. It seems legitimate for nurses to experience more control over this labor process through the appropriation of professional power and privilege. Bourgeois ideology then seems emancipatory for nurses.

But the activity of professionals can only be rewarded as more valuable than other forms of labor because members of class society preserve these value distinctions in categories of labor. Members of society can accord professionals increased

power and privilege only if the labor of experts is valued more than the labor of practitioners. This is certainly not the only possible form of social organization available to historical man. While it is common to class society, it could, in principle disappear, if social organization ever became egalitarian.

Nursing, of course, has an interest in accepting bourgeois ideology. The appropriation of professional privileges holds the premise of improving the existential reality of nurses. This makes it very difficult to dislodge bourgeois professional ideology from the consciousness of nurses.

But the appropriation of a professional position in society commits nurses to a specified structural position vis a vis patients. It sets up and reproduces a definite class barrier between nurses and patients; also between professional nurses and "auxilliary personnel." The struggle for professionalism then emerges as a strategy used by nurses to extend or increase our own power and privilege in class society.

While this strategy may seem emancipatory for nurses, it seems also to hypostatize or reproduce class barriers as they presently exist under modern industrial capitalism. This is a situation which has occurred frequently in contemporary political reality: the oppressed become oppressors; those who have experienced domination appropriate power, are corrupted by that power and in turn use their power to dominate others. From

this critical perspective, professional ideology in nursing appears as the legitimation of professional privilege as a struggle to create another subset of professional experts in bourgeois society. This is not necessarily an emancipatory interest; at least it is not emancipatory for society writ large. It is the continuation of an ever-present threat in bourgeois society,

. . .the splitting of human beings into two classes -- the social engineers and the inmates of closed institutions [23].

Nursing praxis does not have to commit itself to the continuation of this split. Nursing praxis could, as an alternative, find its identity in its own labor process. It could argue that labor, in all its forms, is necessary for species survival. The labor of experts is no more valuable than the labor of practitioners. The labor of managers is no more valuable than the labor of workers. The activity of physicians and administrators is no more valuable than that of nurses. And the labor of registered nurses is no more valuable than the labor of practical nurses or nursing assistants.

This is a utopian vision of egalitarian society. It is admittedly counterfactual; history has yet to see a social formation which is genuinely egalitarian. But this is an emancipatory possibility which nursing could, in principle, struggle for. Struggling for this possibility keeps nursing from generating new forms of class barriers; it prevents the

further splitting of human beings into two classes: nurse-social engineers (professional experts) and inmates of closed institutions (nonprofessional workers and patients).

### Details

The specific details of a critical praxis which resists bourgeois professional ideology in nursing are again the responsibility of reflexive nurses. There cannot be a "blueprint" which outlines specific characteristics of an alternative ideology for nursing. Instead, the ideology and practice which can replace professionalism must emerge in the negotiation of reflexive nurses.

The interpretation of this author is that an alternative to bourgeois professionalism can occur in the existential mode of democratic (humanistic) socialism. Health workers in this kind of egalitarian social formation would not perpetuate class barriers. Professionalism would not be an ingredient in this form of social organization. Unfortunately, however, there is not as yet, an example in history which shows us how to make this transition.

Political actors in nursing could help to clarify this process by continued critical investigation of hypotheses like those found below.

1. Professional organizations are social institutions which legitimate class barriers.

Political actors in nursing could struggle meaningfully against bourgeois professional ideology by uncovering

the ways in which this ideology legitimates class barriers between clients and nurses; and the way in which it legitimates class barriers between nurses and nonprofessional workers. The role of professional organizations and labor unions as they legitimate this class barrier is also an important topic for critical nursing research.

2. Secondary education is a primary mechanism for the production and internalization of bourgeois professional ideology.

Again, nursing's political actors could resist bourgeois professional ideology in nursing by uncovering the ways in which secondary education produces this ideology and then promotes its internalization among nursing students. This would be helping nursing educators and students at all levels to resist the contradictions of internalized professional ideology.

### The Critique of Sexism in Nursing

The critique of professionalism in nursing is tied very closely to a critique of sexism in nursing. From a Marxian-existentialist perspective, the desire for professional privilege in nursing is related to another contextual struggle, which is the emancipation of women from coercive social relations. Arguing from feminist premises, nursing and other predominantly female labor forces have expressed a growing rejection of coercive power relations which spring from the sexual division of labor. Feminist perspectives are a growing

trend in nursing discourse [24].

A critical perspective in nursing would acknowledge the relevance of feminist arguments. However it would emphasize the need for contemporary nurses to become more reflexive about different versions of feminism.

Two versions of feminism which seem most popular in contemporary nursing discourse are liberal and radical feminism. Liberal feminism argues that the source of oppression is located in a lack of civil rights and educational opportunities. Radical feminism argues that the oppression of women cannot be removed by related social changes (e.g., educational opportunities or the abolition of class society). Radical feminism argues that women's liberation can only occur through the abolition of institutionalized gender discrimination [25].

Socialist feminism, on the other hand,

. . .emphasizes the mutual reinforcement of capitalism and patriarchy. Women will not be able truly to determine the conditions of their own lives without eliminating the double oppression of a classist society and institutionalized gender relations [26].

Socialist feminism is then a perspective which struggles for a reversal of coercive power relations along the lines of gender and class. It is the perspective expressed in this investigation. Critical theory would use this perspective to address the social reality of nursing in terms of both class and gender. It would argue against liberal feminism that increased educational opportunities perpetuate one important source of



coercive social relations: class. Professional education may improve the educational opportunities of nurses, but it prolongs class discrimination. It perpetuates a professional strata in society. On this account, liberal feminism may be criticized as an elitist strategy which attempts to preserve class privileges for "well educated" women.

Socialist feminism, in contrast, argues that the liberation of nurses is tied to both gender and class. It argues that if coercive social relations are to be abolished in nursing, this will occur with the abolition of capitalism and patriarchy; an overcoming of class society and institutionalized gender relations. The struggle for a socialist feminist perspective in nursing is an important task for organic intellectuals.

### Details

The specific details of a critical praxis which resists sexism in nursing are again the responsibility of reflexive nurses. There cannot be a "blueprint" which outlines specific characteristics of a socialist feminist form of nursing praxis. Instead, the ideology and practice which can replace sexism in nursing must emerge in the reflexive negotiation of nurses.

Political actors in nursing could help to clarify this process by continued critical investigation of hypotheses like the one expressed below.

1. Secondary education is a social institution which helps to shape a liberal feminist world view.

Nursing's political actors could struggle against sexism by uncovering the ways in which secondary education shapes a feminist world view in nursing. This would be helping nurse educators and nursing students at all levels to resist the contradictions of sexism. A socialist feminist critique would also help nurses to resist the contradictions of liberal and radical feminism.

#### 4.5 Conclusion

In these last sections, the investigation has presented hypotheses for negotiation among political actors in nursing. This is concluding the process of radical reflection by inviting other nurses to participate in the "negotiation of meanings." It is entering new conversations about the social reality of nursing; entering into the "pragmatics of persuasion."

The spirit of these hypotheses is not dogmatic. Negotiation is an act which does not presume to impose its interpretations of reality upon others. Rather, these hypotheses have been presented in the spirit of Antonio Gramsci's "good sense." In his Prison Notebooks, Gramsci examined the distinction between an unreflexive hegemonic conception of reality and a reflexive, critical or skeptical conception of the world. He presented this distinction as a difference between common sense and good sense.

. . .everyone is a philosopher, though in his own way and unconsciously, since even in the slightest manifestation of

any intellectual activity whatever. ..there is contained a specific conception of the world [common sense]. [One] then moves on to the second level, which is that of awareness and criticism [good sense]. . .one proceeds to the question -- is it better to "think" without having critical awareness, in a disjointed and episodic way? . . . Is it better to take part in a conception of the world mechanically imposed by the external environment, i.e., by one of the many social groups in which everyone is automatically involved from the moment of his entry into the conscious world. . .? Or, on the other hand, is it better to work out consciously and critically one's own conception of the world and thus, in connection with the labors of one's own brain, choose one's sphere of activity, take an active part in the creation of the world. . .[27].

In coming years, nursing can look forward with eager anticipation, hope and optimism to the genesis of its own "good sense." This is looking forward, toward a critical nursing process: nursing praxis.

Endnotes

1. J. Habermas, Theory and Practice, p. 42.
2. This section of analysis draws heavily on the work by P. Berger and T. Luckman, The Social Construction of Reality (New York, Doubleday, 1966). Their extension of the sociology of knowledge framework was the continuation of a tradition which included K. Mannheim, A. Schutz and G.H. Mead. The Social Construction of Reality was a phenomenological investigation which focused on the existential determination of the "life-world."
3. Berger and Luckman, The Social Construction of Reality (pp. 47-48 (hereafter, SCR)). Brackets in these quotes reflect editing which has removed the word "man" and inserted the word "human."
4. Ibid., p. 49.
5. Ibid., p. 61.
6. Ibid., p. 52.
7. Intellectuals in nursing have yet to produce a phenomenological examination of this process. This would be a descriptive analysis of the invariant structure present in nursing labor. It would focus on the real embodied activity of nurses and would describe the moments of externalization, objectification, and internalization in nursing labor. This kind of phenomenological investigation would be an invaluable contribution to nursing discourse. It would be an important ideological shift in nursing's self-understanding, an alternative to the heavy psychological or cognitive focus which characterizes so many studies of "nursing process."
8. S. Rowbotham, Woman's Consciousness, Man's World (Middlesex, Penguin, 1973), pp. 70-71. While time and space prevent it here, the systematic identification of structural similarities in nursing and domestic labor would be an invaluable contribution to nursing's feminist discourse. Regretfully, the similarities are only barely suggested here.
9. Berger and Luckman, SCR, pp. 60, 34-35.
10. Ibid., pp. 89, 60.
11. Ibid., pp. 64, 37, 35.

12. To my knowledge, the philosophical frames of reference contained in most contemporary nursing theory do not identify the role of language in man's self-formative process. Theoretical constructions like those of Rogers and Newman were actually versions of philosophical anthropology, which could have made this connection. However, neither of these works appear to recognize the importance of language in man's existential reality.
13. The discussion will acknowledge but not enter the debate about language use among other species. For treatment of this point, see Z. Bauman, Culture as Praxis (London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1973) pp. 48-52.
14. This is a rather oblique reference to the early Wittgenstein and the analytic philosophy of language. Wittgenstein's early work emphasized a universal, logically necessary structure in language (syntax) which guides or steers the constitution of reality. The compromise between this deterministic emphasis on language and a relativistic position about language occurred of course in French Structuralism. The history of this movement includes the controversial Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, which posited a close relationship between cultural categories and language. French structuralism attempted to escape both the deterministic and the relativistic consequences of linguistic theory by distinguishing deep from surface structures in language. This was an important attempt to illuminate the relationship between culture and language. While there is no space here to analyze this aspect of the history of cultural anthropology, good reading includes E. Sapir, "The Status of Linguistics as Science," and B. Whorf, "The Relation of Habitual Thought and Behavior to Language;" both in Highpoints in Anthropology (eds.) Bohannon and Glazer, (New York, Knopf, 1973), pp. 143-173.
15. Berger and Luckman, SCR, pp. 29-30.
16. The gender specific division of labor cross-culturally has been demonstrated repeatedly in ethnography. See, for example, the classic study by Murdock and Provost, "Factors in the Division of Labor by Sex: A Cross-Cultural Analysis" in Ethnology (Vol. 12), 1973.
17. The issue of sexism in nursing labor is a critically important one to pursue. Later sections of this chapter discuss different versions of feminism and the way in which they can address a sexual division of labor in nursing.

18. D. Held, An Introduction to Critical Theory, p. 229.
19. H.G. Gadamer, Truth and Method, p. 280.
20. Z. Bauman, Towards a Critical Sociology: An Essay on Commonsense and Emancipation, pp. 106-107.
21. J. Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interest, p. 4.
22. This reference to organic intellectuals in nursing acknowledges the work of Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks (New York, International Press, 1971).
23. J. Habermas, Theory and Practice, p. 282.
24. See the discussion by P. Chinn, "Women's Health" in Advances in Nursing Science, 1981, 1 (1), 1-125.
25. See the discussion of these in K. Macpherson, "Feminist Methods: A New Paradigm for Nursing Research" in Advances in Nursing Science, 1 (1), 1983, pp. 17-25.
26. Ibid., p. 21.
27. A. Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, p. 323.

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