

REANCHORING TERRORISM STUDIES: AN APPLICATION  
OF SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORY TO THE  
CONCEPT OF DOMESTIC TERRORISM

by

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## ABSTRACT

In large part due to the events of September 11, 2001, terrorism has emerged as a predominant object of study within the sociological community. This dissertation observes terrorist violence through the lens of social movement theory in order to prevent its decoupling from contentious politics more broadly defined. The concepts of political opportunity structures (POS) form the theoretical underpinnings for three analyses. First, domestic terrorism is observed as part of the extralegal POS. This analysis compares the effects of corruption and terrorism as dual paths for goal attainment. Second, domestic terrorism is analyzed based on the more conventional POS tenets of regime type and repressive capacity. Finally, the models outlined in the previous analyses are re-evaluated with respect to several distinct forms of contentious politics. Results indicate that domestic terrorism can be observed to operate similar to corruption in extralegal POS. Mainstream models of POS also support the prevalence of domestic terrorism, though they are not substantially predictive of the severity of that violence. Finally, support exists for the inclusion of many forms of contentious politics within the social movement repertoire--including domestic terrorist violence--but further research must be accomplished in order to improve the models' predictive capacity with respect to each individual form.

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## CHAPTER 1<sup>1</sup>

### INTRODUCTION

#### The Problem

Many would argue that terrorism has existed for millennia. From the Zealots of Judaea to the Assassins of Nizari Islam, the enacting of indiscriminant violence in an effort to advance a shared idea has long been a tactic of subordinate and minority groups. The advent of the modern nation-state provided these groups with a more stable target and a political platform that allowed for the emergence of modern terrorism. Though debate continues on a universal definition of terrorism, the Federal Research Division of the Library of Congress provides a reasonably adequate definition of the term: "the calculated use of unexpected, shocking and unlawful violence against noncombatants and other symbolic targets perpetrated by a clandestine member of a sub-national group for the purpose of publicizing a political/religious cause and/or intimidating or coercing a government or civilian population into accepting demands on behalf of the cause" (Hudson and Majeska 1999). The study of such violence has grown in a peculiar fashion over the past 100 years, increasing exponentially in the last 15 years. In large part as a

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<sup>1</sup> The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the United States Air Force, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government

result of the events of September 11, 2001, terrorism has emerged as a predominant object of study within the sociological community.

Unfortunately, the increased attention to terrorist violence also fosters the potential to mislead researchers and policy-makers. The academic community appears to be on the course of decoupling terrorism from the broader category of collective action to which it pertains. The singularity of the 9/11 attacks produced volumes of research. This intense inquiry may have decoupled terrorism from political violence by hyper-focusing on the act itself and not the broader context within which it manifests itself. There existed a semblance of parity in proliferation on the two subjects prior to 2001. However, since that time, articles on terrorism have outpaced those on political violence at a rate of five to one. In a special issue of the journal *Terrorism and Political Violence* (itself a testament to the growing separation of the two concepts), Michael Boyle (2012) recognized this decoupling and identified two dangers in allowing it to continue: 1) "defining an area of study as 'terrorism studies' will implicitly treat terrorism as an exceptional act, rather than as a type of political violence with some unique features"; and 2) seen as an independent field inquiry, the study of terrorism might become "oddly sealed off" from advances in research on other forms of political violence. Boyle's warnings imply that terrorism *should* be considered a particular form of political violence, and that it should be understood through the same mechanisms--particularly through the concepts and structures of social movement theory.

### Resolving the Problem

The present group of studies attempts to bring the attention on terrorist violence back to the theoretical foundations of social movement theory in order to prevent the decoupling described by Boyle. The origins of social movement theory, from collective action to rational actor, opportunity structures and the political process model accommodate a vast array of actions within the concept of collective action in general and political violence more specifically. The intent of this introductory chapter is to briefly describe the current theoretical perspectives of social movement theory--the development of its relevant theories, the structure it establishes, and the actions that can be interpreted through its employment. In this manner, the course will be set to strengthen the position of how terrorist violence can be better understood as social movement action.

### Social Movement Theory

Social movement theory began as an attempt to answer the question of why individuals participate in group action against the status quo. Key to answering this question was the idea of shared grievances. Seminal theorists such as Olsen, Park, Burgess, and Blumer centered their research around the concepts of collective behavior and mass society, relegating the individual actor to a dutiful cog in a larger organism that espoused this grievance.

As these initial concepts faced the realities of the protests of the 1960s, additional theorists began to question this univariate "mindless follower" perspective. They posited that additional factors were involved in the emergence and development of social movements. One area from which vast amounts of research developed was that of

resource mobilization. This perspective, outlined initially by McCarthy and Zald (1977), recognized that conditions beyond shared grievances, such as the availability of resources, might play essential roles. As its name suggests, resource mobilization theory focused on the mobilization of a variety of resources (i.e., human, financial, political, structural) through a process of creating a base of support, forming recruitment networks, arousing motivation through framing issues, removing barriers to participation, and building collective identity to maintain levels of commitment.

Building upon all of this, contemporary social movement theory recognizes that social movements are realized only after certain conditions are present. Remaining true to its founders, first and foremost among these conditions is that individuals harbor significant grievances of some kind. Additionally, these individuals must recognize that others share these grievances and that by organizing themselves they can effect some change concerning them. Thirdly, sufficient resources must be made available to such organizations in order for them to operate independently. Finally, the political environment must be amenable to the formation of such organizations and the vocalization of such grievances. For social movements to evolve into successful organizations, these grievances must be framed in a manner that will garner the support of those directly involved in the grievances as well as the support of those with the resources required for the development of the movement while utilizing the opportunity structures available within the political environment. It is through the presence and effective employment of varying levels of these four conditions that social movements emerge and attempt to enact change. While the lineage of social movement theory has to this point been succinctly summarized, it would be useful to define the objects of inquiry

to which contemporary social movement theory is applied before describing how these objects operate to produce successful social movements.

### Social Movements

Simply stated, social movements are "conscious, concerted and sustained efforts by ordinary people to change some aspect of their society by using extra-institutional means" (Goodwin and Jasper 2009). Their appearance in modern society has been linked with the emergence of the modern nation-state. Meyer (2007) attributes their origin to the dual concepts of checks and balances of state authority and the general population's ability to influence and direct state power that developed particularly in the evolution of American and British governance in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. These concepts provided state stability and afforded aggrieved citizens a manner of redress "to ensure they are less likely to topple the system as a whole" (Meyer 2007). This method of governance spread, and as more and more governments became beholden to their constituents for their perpetuation, these same constituents began demanding greater and greater levels of rights and liberties. Each of these pushes--or movements--toward some change in responsibility on the part of the state can be seen as a social movement. As noted above, in its infancy, social movement theory saw in these mass demands only the sum of often innumerable individual actors deciding to join the movement as a sort of mass hysteria. However, as observations of movements and governments' reactions continued, a better understanding of the structure and rationale behind these movements emerged.

## Organizational Structure of Social Movements

Research from the 1960s and 70s postulated that social movements acted similar to companies operating in the economy and began applying the concepts and theories of economic industry to the development of social movements. Accordingly, several terms were incorporated into the lexicon of social movement theory; chiefly, *social movement organizations*, *social movement industry*, and *social movement sector*. In their article outlining what became known as resource mobilization theory, McCarthy and Zald (1977) defined these three concepts:

*Social Movement Organization*: A complex, or formal, organization which identifies its goals with the preferences of a social movement or a countermovement and attempts to implement those goals. (p. 1218)

*Social Movement Industry*: All SMOs that have as their goal the attainment of the broadest preferences of a social movement. (p. 1219)

*Social Movement Sector*: All SMIs in a society no matter to which SM they are attached. (p. 1220)

Utilizing these concepts, McCarthy and Zald shed light on the organizational world of social movements. They identified how organizations within it acquired resources, were staffed, branded, and interacted with other organizations and the environment within which they operated. The concepts of *constituents*, *adherents*, *conscious adherents*, *conscious constituents*, and *potential beneficiaries* described the involvement of individuals with SMOs. They proffered hypotheses on how the lifespan of SMOs--as seen through this new light--would be affected. Others built upon this foundation by describing how social movement organizations comprised a unique organizational form.



## Organizational Forms

The emergence, existence, and demise of organizational forms have enjoyed an abundance of attention within the study of organizational ecology as researchers have attempted to answer Hannan and Freeman's (1977) now classic question: "Why are there so many kinds of organizations?" Theorists from a variety of organizational paradigms have provided the groundwork to answer this question based on the specific tenets of their disciplines. Ruef (2000) provides an excellent summary of three such paradigmatic perspectives in his exploration of the emergence of organizational forms. One of these is the neo-institutionalist perspective on organizational ecology, which views organizations as existing within a population of similar organizations. According to this view, each population of organizations shares a core set of qualities that distinguish one population from another. The absence of these core qualities exclude an organization from membership to the particular form. Pólos (2002) established this method of observing organizational forms, and his method has been utilized by prominent researchers to identify form emergence (McKendrick and Carroll 2001).

A key tenet within the discipline of organizational ecology is that as new organizations emerge, they seek to gain legitimacy through identification with a particular organizational form in order to survive. As the density of organizations within a form increases, organizations begin to experience competition for resources. As this competition forces some organizations to exit (either by dissolving, being absorbed into other organizations, or transforming into a different form), the population stabilizes over time (Hannan and Carroll 1992). Organizational theorists have focused their efforts to establish support for this process on a variety of industries within the market and have

identified numerous organizational forms. Hsu and Hannan (2005) provide a list of twenty prominent studies whose purpose was to define specific forms. Often, these studies demonstrate how such forms tend to exhibit the general behaviors of density-dependent legitimation and competition as outlined above.

The majority of forms identified by organizational researchers pertain to firms engaged in mainstream commercial endeavors such as the automotive industry (Hannan et al. 1995), the semiconductor industry (Podolny, Stuart, and Hannan 1996), the health care industry (Singh and Lumsden 1990), and financial institutions (Ranger-moore, Banaszak-holl, and Hannan 1991), as well as niche markets such as microbreweries (Carroll and Swaminathan 2000). A key similarity among organizations within these forms is that in their effort to operate in their respective markets, they conform to state and international laws with respect to meticulous documentation and making available records of human and financial resources, expenditures, and profits. The availability of data for such firms participating in the global economic machine make identifying and understanding the specific characteristics of these organizational forms an easy target for researchers. It may be that research on this community of organizational forms is representative of the total population of organizational forms; however, organizational forms do exist for which similar data are not so readily available. Hsu and Hannan (2005) specifically mention forms of this type, labeling them nonconventional industries and giving examples such as worker cooperatives and social movement organizations. While this research has successfully defended the social movement organizational form as adhering to the tenets of organizational theory, the specific development of social

movement organizations must also be addressed in order to properly set the stage for the studies to be presented ahead.

### Social Movement Organization Formation

As previously identified, the success of modern social movement organizations rely on the interactions between the opportunity structure available to the potential organizers, the presence of grievances against some larger and more powerful group (often the state), the capacity to frame these grievances effectively, the ability to mobilize and coordinate sufficient resources, and the selection of actions intended to bring the organization closer to its goals. The interrelatedness of these components will be briefly expounded upon.

#### Opportunity Structure

Arguably, the most significant factor in the development of social movement organizations is the environment within which such organizations have the potential to form. In his book *Regimes and Repertoires*, Charles Tilly (2010) describes how government capacity--"the extent to which governmental agents control resources, activities, and people anywhere within the government's jurisdiction"(p. 25)--and degree of democracy constitute the political environment within which organizations can emerge (Tilly calls this "regime space"). He identifies three zones within this environment-- the zone of fragmented tyranny, the zone of authoritarianism, and the zone of citizenship-- which directly influence to what extent grievances can be expressed or even recognized; to what extent resources are available; and which repertoires of contention are accessible

to potential organizations. McAdam (1996) offered a more detailed observation of these opportunity structures and identified four key components: 1) the relative openness or closure of the institutionalized political system (similar to the level of democracy in Tilly's model), 2) the stability or lack thereof in the alignments among elites, 3) the presence or absence of elite allies, and 4) the capacity and propensity of the state to repress its citizens (Tilly's government capacity). Variation in the levels of these components produces expansive or constrictive effects on the types of collective action social movements can implement.

### Grievances

Of course, social movements would never occur in the first place if there were no issue, real or perceived, over which some individual or group felt wronged or harmed to such a degree as to voice a dissident opinion. The statement that "if two people agree on everything all the time, only one of them is doing the thinking" applies well to the larger interactions of society. Organizational psychologists have demonstrated the ill effects that this "group-think" has on group dynamics, and history is replete with examples of its affects at the societal level.

It should be of some comfort that society at large has evolved in such a way as to allow for grievances to become the impetus for change. Such grievances arise as an inevitable consequence of human interaction. These differences assist in the healthy development of society. Where such grievances involve the manner by which a particular society agrees to be ordered, these grievances often form political conflict, or as stated by Maurice Duverger:

Reduced to its greatest simplicity...political conflict opposes those who are more or less satisfied with the existing social order, who want to conserve it, and those for whom this order is unsuitable, who want to change it. (Oberschall 1973, p. 33)

Grievances interpreted in this manner became the foundation of early theorization in social movement formation (Gurr 1970, Smelser 1963, Turner and Killian 1972), and can be distilled into a simple two-part typology: 1) immediate and localized (basic human rights), and 2) long-developing and global (social issues). The development of a social movement--particularly its repertoire of contention--is heavily influenced by which of the two categories the espoused grievances are most associated with. More extreme actions can be more easily presented as acceptable when grievances involve significant threat to the safety and security of the individual and when the opposition is geographically accessible. When grievances of a more ideological basis coalesce into social movements--especially in Western democracies--conformity to the political process and the use of acceptable legal actions allows the movement to gain the necessary legitimacy, to attract the appropriate constituency, and to operate effectively within the much larger system it intends to change.

### Framing and Mobilization

When sufficient impetus emerges behind a particular set of grievances to warrant the need for action against the status quo, proponents of these perspectives must garner support in order to most effectively influence the political reality. This is accomplished through presenting the viewpoint as relevant, necessary, and attainable to as large an audience as possible (Meyer 2007). Piven and Cloward (1977) identify this as the process by which "the social arrangements that are ordinarily perceived as just and

immutable...come to seem both unjust and mutable" (p. 12). Understanding how this process unfolds has been a significant emphasis of sociological research. The central idea of this process revolves around Goffman's concept of frames--the mechanisms by which we "locate, perceive, identify and label" our experiences in everyday life. Frames give these experiences meaning, which in turn influence action.

Applying the concept of frames to social movements, Snow et al. (1986) provide a comprehensive analysis of how the broadcasting of frames by movement organizers affects the greater public. Successful social movements arise when these frames can be aligned (frame alignment) with individual frames to generate the desire to associate with the movement (frame resonance). The result of this process is the creation of a collective action frame, described as the "action-oriented sets of beliefs and meanings that inspire and legitimate the activities and campaigns of a social movement organization" (Benford and Snow 2000, p. 614).

Collective action frames are directly related to the process of increasing the capabilities of the organization to effect change. The study of this process and its effects on social movement success are at the heart of the resource mobilization approach. This approach highlights the dual efforts of social movements, evinced through the goals they espouse. In general, social movement organizations develop goals comprising a particular dyad: 1) goals that allow for the organization to perpetuate itself (process goals) and 2) goals that realize the purpose for which the organization has come together in the first place (outcome goals). Process goals target constituents, bystanders, and the primary audience capable of satisfying their demands for change (usually a governing body at some level). The purposes behind these goals include the generation of revenue,

recruits and public concern, and the disruption of governance--or in the words of Sidney Tarrow, to "maintain solidarity, attract new supporters, and keep opponents off-balance" (2011). Outcome goals are, on the whole, more simplified in that they seek some social change. While this end state can range from instituting some level of particular rights (i.e., human, women's, animal, environmental) to removing and replacing entire state structures (Islamic caliphate, socialism, fascism, democracy, etc.), the ultimate outcome is generally quite focused and well articulated by the organization. What is common to both process and outcome goals is the performance of actions to accomplish them.

### Action

The existence of grievances, the manner by which they are presented to the masses, the level of support this presentation garners in the way of resources all culminate in a sustained expression of discontent toward the opposition of a social movement. This expression occurs as social movement action. These actions, in aggregate, are the focus of the research presented ahead. The demonstrative actions available to a particular social movement are influenced by the composition of its constituents and the resources they provide, the severity of the grievances it espouses, and the level of access it has to the political process. These factors were at the heart of Charles Tilly's (2006) understanding of repertoires of contention, or the "limits [to potential actions] set by the [claim-making routine(s)] already established for [the] place, time and [claimant-object] pair" (p. 35). He utilizes this concept to explain why today's activists in Europe adopt a nonviolent mix of "public meetings, press statements,

demonstrations, and petitions," while activists from other areas of the world adopt more violent forms of protest such as riots, destruction of property, assaults, and terrorism.

While repertoires of contention continually evolve, the actions related to them can be distinguished--as Tilly did--by whether or not they involve violence. This distinction will be evident throughout the remaining chapters of this dissertation as terrorist acts--the focus of this dissertation--are by definition acts of violence. Chapter 2 will more explicitly detail the relationship between the broad concept of political violence and the specific characteristics of terrorist violence that fall under its purview.

Tilly highlights the role regimes play in the development of these repertoires of contention, and some distinguishing characteristics emerge that directly influence the use of violent or nonviolent actions. Collective actions of the violent order are more readily observed where the state exhibits a reduced capacity to maintain order. Following Tilly's model, these would include states of fragmented tyranny and young democracies. This typology matches well with research on state polity and repression, which observes that weak and failing states (low capacity) and states in transition between autocratic and democratic governance experience greater rates of political violence. Chapters 4 and 5 will further develop this relationship by specifically observing the effects of particular factors evident in conventional opportunity structures (regime type, repression, capacity, etc.) on domestic terrorist violence and nonviolent social movement actions.

### Perspective and Way Forward

The preceding review of social movement's theories and concepts paves the way for the situation of the ideas presented in the remainder of this dissertation within the



realm of social movement studies as well as for the identification of how this work will enhance the field of study on terrorism as social movement action. The presentation of terrorism as a specific form of political violence and therefore a collective action utilized by social movements will be approached mainly through the lens of political opportunity structures. This has been alluded to by the emphasis placed on opportunity structures above and the attempt to synthesize the major theories on social movements.

The innovative application of the concepts and theories of political opportunity structures to the utilization and performance of terrorist violence as a social action contributes to the greater literature in three distinct ways. First, it allows for researchers to study how terrorist violence fits conceptually within political opportunity structures. Chapter 3 will investigate whether terrorist violence can be shown to function as a form of extralegal influence within political opportunity structures. This will be accomplished by contrasting terrorist violence with another known form of extralegal influence-- corruption. Second, it provides a means to determine the influence political opportunity structures exert on the choice by social movement organizations to use terrorist violence. As noted above, Chapter 4 will attempt to answer the question of whether or not terrorist violence operates effectively within the more conventional real of political opportunity structures by observing the variation in counts and severity of terrorist violence as affected by regime type, level of repression, and state capacity. Finally, it provides a means of empirically testing whether or not terrorist violence can be studied as social movement action with the theoretical underpinnings it espouses. Chapter 5 will evaluate terrorist violence against other forms of social movement action--both violent and non-violent--in order to determine what limitations and weaknesses exist in the application of

social movement theory to terrorist violence. Chapter 6 will summarize the various efforts to recouple terrorist violence to the broader concept of political violence, synthesize the findings of these three contributions, and highlight their applicability to future research.

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## CHAPTER 2

### POLITICAL VIOLENCE AND TERRORISM

Arguably, the watershed moment in the modern study of political violence remains the acts conducted on September 11, 2001. The images of the World Trade Center, the Pentagon, and the grassy field in Pennsylvania continue to fuel potent emotions more than a decade after their occurrence. At the time, the incidents motivated President George W. Bush to direct "the full resources for [U.S.] intelligence and law enforcement communities to find those responsible and bring them to justice" (Bush, 2001). Utah's ubiquitously well-mannered Senator Orin Hatch summed up the nation's intention in less scrupulous verbiage: "We're going to find out who did this, and we're going after the bastards!" (CNN, 2001). Efforts to fulfill those promises have resulted in the second-longest war in which the United States has ever been involved, and the expenditure of roughly \$6 trillion, eclipsing the \$4 trillion (inflation adjusted) U.S. costs of World War II. The events of that day had a similar effect on the pursuit of our understanding of political violence. Prior to 2001, sociological research on political violence--terrorism in particular--was relatively scarce. A simple online search for peer-reviewed published articles on *political violence* shows that of the roughly 6,800 articles published since 1950, nearly 4,700 have been published since September of 2001. To make the point even more emphatically, a similar search on *terrorism* returns the figure

of 2,900 articles published prior to September, 2011, and an astounding 25,000 articles since. It is apparent that just as the events of 9/11 have produced an unprecedented monetary expenditure, they have also resulted in an unprecedented intellectual expenditure. It is as if the academic community stood with President Bush and Senator Hatch and announced: "We're going to find out who did this, and we're going to *understand* the bastards!"

### Defining the Concepts

The simplest manner to understand terrorism's place within the broader classification of political violence is to establish the conceptual definitions of each. The theoretical underpinnings associated with these definitions will provide sufficient support for the close association emphasized by Boyle (Chapter 1) as being in potential peril within the broader research community. I will associate the two concepts by beginning with the broadest societal classification of action--collective action--and successively scoping this classification down through the concept of political violence with a final refinement to terrorism.

### Collective Action

Collective action has been generally accepted to consist of any effort by a representative of a group whose purpose is to improve the conditions of that group. Theoretically, there are two main approaches to interpreting this phenomenon, and it is through the lenses of these two theoretical approaches that the subsequent levels of violent protest will be observed. Early theorizing on collective action viewed such

incidents as spontaneous occurrences arising from a cumulative build-up of tension that eventually erupted in a demonstrable form of action. These unstructured actions were performed by nonrational actors outside of normative constraints (Morris 1981). Known as the deprivation or breakdown theory of collective violence, this approach saw the dissolution of traditional social formations as the result of rapid social change caused by social disorganization, demographic pressures, and environmental imbalance (Gurr 1970, Oberschall 1978). This collective behavior approach pointed to the food riots of the 18th century as an ideal type, and was characterized as reactive (Tilly 1978). The second approach views the actor in collective violence as rational. This perspective implies that the actor assesses the environment within which he exists and, based on those assessments, selects the manner in which he will respond. This social milieu consists of various associations and structures within which the actor navigates to varying degrees of effectiveness. Two subsequent and related theories emerge out of this perspective: resource mobilization theory and political process (or political opportunity) theory. Briefly, resource mobilization theory contends that collective action (and therefore collective violence) follows a task-oriented, economic, rational-choice model that is less reliant on aggrieved populations as the support base than deprivation theory and that utilizes the infrastructure provided by society to accomplish its goals (McCarthy and Zald 1977). Political process theory incorporates this mobilization process into the broader context of available opportunities within the political structure and the framing of grievances within the dominant structure (McAdam 1999, McAdam 2001, Tarrow 2011). To summarize, collective action as a broad category can be viewed through the lens of political process theory, which synthesizes the theories of grievance, framing, resource

mobilization and opportunity structures in an attempt to best understand and explain this phenomenon.

### Political Violence

According to Charles Tilly (1978), collective (political) violence is "the struggle that results when the undertaking of large action by one group which directly or indirectly stakes a claim is challenged by another group." Such actions reside in the more coordinated levels of his typology of interpersonal violence; namely, scattered attacks, coordinated destruction, broken negotiations, and violent rituals (Tilly 2003). Though Tilly specifically avoids terms such as political violence and terrorism in an effort to remove the negative emotions attached to these labels, they can both be identified within the typology. Tilly recognizes that a large portion of collective violence occurs on the political stage and is accompanied by political motivations. He rightly identifies that collective violence tends to "cluster around the entry and exit of groups with the polity," and identifies particular actions that can be encompassed by collective violence (riots, strikes, organized marches, sit-ins, etc.) (Tilly 1978). Senechal de la Roche (1996) elaborates on such actions, adding to the list lynchings, vigilantism, and terrorism.

To this point, the concept of political violence has been nested within the larger concept of collective action that has been theorized extensively by researchers utilizing the social movement theories of deprivation, resource mobilization, and the political process model. Doing so provides a base and superstructure within which the remainder of the analysis can be situated. The next step in the process requires delving into the



varied concepts contained within the realm of political violence in order to isolate terrorism as a specific subset of political violence.

### Terrorism

The link between political violence and terrorism is robustly outlined by the research project *Transnational Terrorism, Security, and the Rule of Law*. As one of its deliverables, the project published a research paper entitled "Defining Terrorism." Within this publication, the project devotes a significant effort to distinguishing terrorism from other forms of strategic violence such as organized crime and the various forms of inter- and intrastate warfare (COT/ISSCM 2008). The report demonstrates how terrorism shares political violence's inherent characteristics of the illegitimate use of force and the goal of changing dominant societal norms and behaviors. In this manner, terrorism also shares the three central aspects of the broader typology of political violence identified by Buijs (2001), namely: the instruments that are used, the aims that are sought, and the effects that are brought about. Wilkinson (1986) included domestic and international terrorism among the forms of political violence sharing these characteristics and typology (others were sabotage, political gang warfare, assassination, localized guerrilla operations, armed rebellion, revolution, and riots). While the foregoing demonstrates how terrorism can be encompassed by the broader scope of political violence, delineating the boundaries of terrorism within political violence requires an actual definition.

Terrorism as a concept has been defined by researchers in myriad ways, and researchers have often compiled, compared, and contrasted these definitions (Goodwin 2006, Lizardo and Bergesen 2003, Schmid 1984, Schmid 1988). However, as these

researchers conclude, coming to a consensus on a single definition of terrorism out of all of these proves difficult. Inevitably, the definitions evolve into increasingly complex classifications in attempts to satisfy the needs of each party's specific inquiry and interests. In fact, Alex Schmid (1984), author of *Political Terrorism: A Research Guide*, devotes over 100 pages to defining the term, but does not arrive at an acceptable definition. In later works, he provides the frequencies of common elements of 109 definitions of terrorism (Schmid 1988), and ultimately offers an exhaustive definition rife with the theoretical underpinnings of political process theory:

Terrorism is an anxiety-inspiring **method** of repeated violent actions **employed** by (semi-) clandestine individual, group, or state actors, **for idiosyncratic, criminal or political reasons**, whereby – in contrast to assassination – the direct targets of violence are not the main targets. The immediate **human victims of violence are generally chosen** randomly (targets of opportunity) or selectively (representative or symbolic targets) from a target population, **and serve as message generators**. Threat- and violence-based communication processes between terrorist (organization), (imperiled) victims, and main targets are used **to manipulate the main target** (audience(s)), turning it into a target of terror, a target of demands, or a target of attention, depending on whether intimidation, coercion, or propaganda is primarily sought. (Schmid and Jongman, 2005: 28, emphasis added)

Perhaps the difficulty in defining terrorism is due to the fact that the term implies more than a simple act being conducted. Some researchers have expounded on this perspective, realizing that at the end of any effort, what is most commonly accepted is that the term terrorism is a pejorative term. As stated by Bruce Hoffman, professor and director of the Center for Security Studies at Georgetown University, "it is a word with intrinsically negative connotations that is generally applied to one's enemies and opponents, or to those with whom one disagrees and would otherwise prefer to ignore"

(Howard, Sawyer and McCaffrey 2003). In practice, actors perpetrating acts of terrorism rarely frame them as such. The popular adage "one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter" attests to this distinction. Turk (2004) agrees with Hoffman, further elaborating on the derogatory nature of the term in stating that "the construction and selective application of definitions of terrorism are embedded in the dynamics of political conflicts, where ideological warfare to cast the enemy as an evildoer is a dimension of the struggle to win support for one's own cause." The overtones of the previous statements lend very well to the idea that the labeling of terrorism is of instrumental use to the "legitimated" incumbent group as a means of counterattack and results from the effectiveness of the "illegitimate" actions taken by the insurgent group. The statements are also explainable through the theories of resource mobilization and framing in that the groups seek the support of their respective populations through demonstrating their level of commitment to bringing change (the act itself) or by framing the act in a negative way. Due to this ongoing political struggle for legitimacy, a consensus on a definition of terrorism is rarely reached when the parties involved stand on opposite sides of the struggle. Indeed, the United Nations has failed to agree on a concise definition of terrorism for this very reason. As a result, gaps in the existing thirteen piecemeal conventions to combat terrorism cannot be filled by a unifying, over-arching convention due to several states' disagreement with how to classify "the struggle for the rights of self-determination by people under foreign occupation."

### Terrorism and Social Movement Theory

Irrespective of the political issues surrounding the definition of the concept of terrorism, if the positioning of terrorism within the realm of political violence as has been theoretically constructed in this analysis is to be upheld, its observance must likewise be sustained by the political process model. Accordingly, one would expect to observe acts of terrorism as acts of violence conducted by individuals or groups as a result of perceived grievances against the dominant regime that have been successfully framed as such by a particular group seeking social change and that are dependent upon the political opportunity structure available to the aggrieved individual or group. Research is replete with such evidence. Several articles on the Irish Republican Army during the 1970's demonstrate how this social movement organization framed the oppression by the British government (White 1993). Turk (2004) concludes that terrorism is "best understood as a response to feelings of indignity and frustration developed in repressive regimes." In an earlier work, Turk (1982) demonstrates that "relational dynamics" within and between groups involved in political conflict affect the emergence of terrorism dependent upon the manner in which the issues are framed and terrorist actions are "encouraged." Pape (2003) observes that leaders of terrorist groups have linked the use of suicide bombing to success in achieving the groups goals, framing the conflict in such a way as to convince actors of the usefulness of this specific subset of terrorism. Beyond simply being produced through framing processes, these acts should also be mitigated by the available resources of the group seeking social change, as well as the composition of the structures and constraints of the political processes within which the groups find themselves. Kurzman (1996) demonstrates how structural conditions overpower the framing of

perceived opportunities in the Iranian revolutionary movement of 1977-1979. Dugan, LaFree, and Piquero (2005) utilize a rational-choice model to demonstrate how the implementation of structural modifications (UN conventions and widespread use of metal-detectors) negatively affected attempts at airline hijacking. Lafree, Dugan, and Korte (2009) demonstrate that reactions to such structural modifications and actions by legitimate authority can have either a deterrence or a backlash effect largely dependent on the cultural impact and interpretation by the aggrieved group. In this manner, terrorism is adequately couched in the political process model and the concepts of grievance, framing, resource mobilization, and political opportunity of which it is comprised.

Defining terrorism in the manner outlined above provides ample evidence for its inclusion as a subordinate to the larger concept of political violence. Political violence encompasses all forms of aggression motivated by a desire to influence others. However, as with the relationship between all species and subspecies, though "terrorism is political violence, not all political violence is terrorism"(Laqueur 1999). While these forms of aggression may be utilized in terrorist activity, what sets terrorism apart as a specific form of political violence is that the aggression is intended to "influence an audience" through "an organized and systematic attempt to create fear and change the political order" (COT/ISSCM 2008). This key difference is recognized in Schmid's breakdown of terms used in the definitions of terrorism. The concepts of "fear and emphasis on terror" and "political nature" are surpassed only by the overriding concept of "violence." The remainder of the terms, though not exclusive to terrorism by themselves, produce a unique typology when taken as required elements in order to distinguish the event from other forms of political violence. A report prepared under the Federal Research Division

of the Library of Congress succinctly articulates these elements in distinguishing terrorism from other forms of political violence based on the presence of all of the following factors: "1) the calculated use of 2) unexpected, shocking and unlawful violence 3) against noncombatants and other symbolic targets 4) perpetrated by a clandestine member of 5) a sub-national group 6) for the purpose of publicizing a political/religious cause and/or intimidating or coercing a government or civilian population into accepting demands on behalf of the cause" (Hudson and Majeska 1999).

The herculean effort undertaken by the U.S. government and military as a result of President Bush's pledge to identify and bring to justice the perpetrators of the 9/11 attacks can now be classified as winding down. The purported results of this effort have affected the use of terrorist violence by organizations around the world, greatly diminished the influence of al Qaeda (one such organization) in the governance of Afghanistan, and brought to justice hundreds of operatives of organizations utilizing terrorism as a tactic of strategic influence. The simultaneous intellectual effort continues. Terrorism has been defined and dissected, its agents and mechanisms continue to be investigated, and several theories have been applied to the phenomenon. Unfortunately, comprehending the complexity and nuances of what brings individuals and organizations to use terrorism as a tactic has proven more difficult than clearing the caves of the mountains of Afghanistan and the Kashmir. Though we have identified and brought many of them to justice, we have yet to completely understand the bastards.

We have, however, made some progress. Researchers have studied this phenomenon and political opportunity structures for decades, and their efforts will be incorporated into the studies presented ahead. To that end, the remainder of this chapter

will focus on two points that require substantial attention. First, in viewing terrorist violence from the perspective of the political process model and the opportunity structures provided therein, it is important to highlight those factors identified in extant research that already comprise the influential characteristics of political opportunity structures. Second, as the studies herein rely on the observance of performances of terrorist violence, some attention should be paid to the many efforts undertaken to collect information on these performances.

### The Influence of Domestic and International Factors on Terrorism

Collective action has been defined as any effort by a representative of a group whose purpose is to improve or defend the conditions of that group. Political violence, as a subset of collective action, has been defined most broadly as "the struggle that results when the undertaking of large action by one group which directly or indirectly states a claim is challenged by a second group" (Tilly 1978). This definition encompasses all deprivations of asserted human rights, but can be scoped more narrowly to entail any use of physical force, or most narrowly as physical force prohibited by the legitimate normative order (1978). Singling out a specific form of political violence, terrorism can reasonably be defined as the "premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually to influence an audience" (Code 2007).

These three levels of action, aside from being nested within each other, possess the inherent quality that they arise out of the ordinary interactions between groups--that is--out of social life. Though social interactions range from the individual level to that of

the international level, the majority of sociological research on collective action and its subcategories focuses on the interactions of groups with the highest level of discernible legitimate normative order, the level of the state. It is at this level that distinguishable characteristics between entities can be measured and evaluated in an effort to understand which characteristics at what levels engender similar or distinct forms of collective action, political violence, and terrorism.

A precise understanding of the causes of these confrontational interactions requires knowing every characteristic and previous interaction of each member involved. As this is impossible to achieve, researchers have sought to identify the most influential of these characteristics for both the dominant group (the polity) and the dissenting group (the challenger). Of interest in the present study are the characteristics of the dominant group--the state. These characteristics can be distinguished between those internal or domestic--mainly a product of the composition of the population, its cultures, norms, and values--and those external or international--a product of how the state differs from and subsequently interacts with other states and the international community. Accordingly, we will first evaluate those domestic characteristics identified in extant literature that contribute to the production of the three types of contentious political interactions described above. Next, attention will turn to the international processes affecting these domestic issues. Throughout, I will document the changes in relevance of these characteristics and processes over time and how domestic characteristics and international processes interact with each other to produce the specific profile of contention observable in each state.



### Domestic Factors

Research has identified four key domestic characteristics of contentious politics. Taking the attention given them by researchers as an indicator of their influence, these characteristics can be listed by their order of relative importance: 1) inequality; 2) government coercion and regime repressiveness; 3) cultural fractionalization; and 4) education. A description of each of these characteristics as well as their relevance to the topic of contentious politics follows.

#### Inequality

In Ted Gurr's *Handbook of Political Conflict*, Harry Eckstein (1980) sums up a basic theoretical model (Tilly) of collective violent action: 1) *Some group wants something it does not have*; 2) *A fair number of people agree that their claim is justified*; 3) *the group is not successfully suppressed to begin with*; 4) *the group controls some suitable resources (and wants to control more)*. The first point in this model addresses the idea of inequality. Inherently, a group will only want something it doesn't have if it sees that another group has it. This is the basis for inequality. Inequality can take many forms; however, given the dominance of the capitalist market society, the form most prominent, and therefore most investigated, is that of economic inequality: the difference in the distribution of wealth or income between individuals or populations. Nearly all research on inequality relies on the theoretical perspective of relative deprivation. Muller (1985) postulated--through relative deprivation theory--that income inequality would increase political violence. His empirical analysis demonstrated that this relationship was indeed significant in the direction theorized when restricting the factors to the internal

characteristics of the state (Muller and Weede 1990). In his study of corruption's effect on economic growth, Mo (2001) recognizes that "inequality in opportunities, which is similar to income and wealth inequality, will lead to frustration and sociopolitical instability" (p. 67), a proposition upheld by empirical research (Alesina and Perotti 1996, Fein 1995). Mo (2001) later states that, specific to income, higher levels of inequality give groups at the lower end of the distribution greater incentive to participate in collective action, particularly political violence. Research observing collective violence as a form of social control demonstrates how status inequality "measured by wealth and other variables" is positively correlated with particular forms of political violence such as lynching, vigilantism, riots, and terrorism (Senechal de la Roche 1996). One caveat to the claim that the inequality/contentious politics nexus is the sole domain of relative deprivation theorists exists in Boswell and Dixon's (1990) study on dependency and rebellion. Here, they highlight income inequality as a central cause of rebellion--an additional form of collective political violence--in nearly all social theories (1990), a sentiment echoed by others (Lichbach 1989).

### Regime Repressiveness

The second state-level characteristic, regime repressiveness and government coercion, relates to collective action through the third point in Tilly's model--*the group is not successfully suppressed to begin with*. Inferred here is the notion that in the ideal state, with its legitimate monopoly of force and bureaucracy, dissidence is dealt with in a manner that precludes escalation to forms of contentious politics. Theoretically, repression corresponds to political opportunity structures, and was envisioned as a key

component in McAdam's (1996) dimensions of political opportunity. However, variation in the manner by which such dissidence is quelled produces varying levels of success; hence, varying levels of contentious politics. The operationalization of this concept is often viewed as a combination of the level of repressiveness within a regime--viewed on a rising scale of how democratic (low repression) to how autocratic (high repression) its polity--and the pervasiveness of government coercion--viewed as how often the regime utilizes its monopoly of force to influence its population. The link between the polity and coercive capacity of a country and the prevalence of contentious politics has been well documented (Aksoy, Carter, and Wright 2012, Chenoweth 2010, Li 2005, Muller 1985). The research demonstrates that democracies experience greater activity than autocracies. Associated with this research, Muller and Weede (1990) describe a nonmonotonic relationship between the polity of a state and incidents of political violence. At the extreme ends of strong autocracy and strong democracy, political violence tapers off, while in the central region (occupied by weak democracies, weak autocracies, and states in transition) political violence is elevated (Muller and Weede 1990). This phenomenon was articulated by Helen Fein (1995) as "more murder in the middle." An implication for research with respect to regime repressiveness and government coercion is that data on states residing at the highest levels of repression and coercion may be significantly unreliable as both have the tendency to control the flow of information. This can be seen historically in the increasing amounts of data available for former communist states in the post-Cold War era.

### Cultural Fractionalization

The third characteristic, cultural fractionalization, refers to the amount of cultural diversity that exists within a state. The differentiation between subpopulations of a state based on ethnic, linguistic, and religious variations provides the propensity for discrimination. Based on the ruling party, opportunities can be extended or withdrawn from subpopulations, which can give rise to grievances. Fein's previously mentioned research outlined several factors by which life-integrity violations varied among states. Beyond repressiveness, her research also investigated how higher levels of ethnic discrimination slowed economic growth, and increased political instability and conflict--a linkage supported by others (Canning and Fay 1993, Hibbs 1973, Mauro 1995). Others have disputed this relationship. In their influential work on ethnicity, insurgency, and civil war, Fearon and Laitin (2003) challenge the conventional thought that increased ethnic and religious fractionalization account for increased levels of political violence and internal conflict. Their results demonstrate no significant relationship when controlling for other factors that "favor insurgency" such as population size, poverty, political instability, and terrain (2003). In an attempt to correct for an oversight in this civil war literature, Cederman and Girardin (2007) find that once power relations with the state are accounted for, ethnic identity exhibits a positive and significant correlation with political violence. Separating violence into ethnic and nonethnic categories, Olzak (2011) finds that ethnic fractionalization correlates negatively and positively (respectively) to significant levels.

## Education

The final key domestic characteristic available in extant literature is education. As a state-level characteristic, education is a derivative in no small part of the level of infrastructure, economic development, and openness of the state. As with most of the characteristics of states, the level attained in one is dependent upon the varying levels of others. Great disparity in income inequality will affect the overall education level of the state; as will the dynamics associated with regime type and cultural fractionalization. However, education is key in the emergence of contentious politics as those seeking redress can only avail themselves to the actions afforded by differing levels of education. Initial forays into collective behavior did not take account of education, and saw the raw emotive reaction to grievance as animalistic, arguably equivalent to no discernible education level. Later theorizing accounted for education, and grievances were articulated through access to the political opportunity structure. Education was also seen as a requirement to frame issues in order to mobilize constituents and resources. The literature on education as a state-level characteristic demonstrates its applicability to the concept of contentious politics in all of these fashions. Alesina and Perotti (1996) observed that higher levels of education resulted in increased political stability, reducing the potential for political violence by channeling political action within the opportunity structure of the polity (Hibbs 1973, Huntington 1968). However, Besançon (2005) revealed that tertiary education levels corresponded to increased participation in revolutionary violence, and Urdal (2008) reported a high correlation between expanding higher education and incidents of domestic terrorism. Synthesizing these observations, Lee (2011) found that "among the politically involved, poverty and education are

important predictors of involvement in violence" in that lower levels leave few options other than violence, mid-levels produce a rational-action approach based on the socioeconomic benefits and obligations attached, and high levels stimulate critical and revolutionary thinking. Mid-level education then appears to exhibit a negative relationship with political violence, which stands as part of a larger concept that improved socio-economic conditions result in reduced political violence (Caruso and Schneider 2011, Freytag et al. 2011).

### International Factors

Critics of Muller's study on inequality and political violence point to the lack of consideration for external factors influencing state action (Bornschier and Chase-Dunn 1985, London and Robinson 1989). The grand process subsuming the international factors affecting the variation of contentious politics among states is globalization. The spread of the market economy and the economic interaction among states throughout the world has resulted in relationships that have influenced the internal opportunity structures of states in significant ways.

### Foreign Investment

Among these external factors is the level of influence exerted by other states as well as international organizations and businesses through investment in the observed state's economy. Viewing such influence as transnational corporate penetration or foreign direct investment reveals state structures acquiescing to the demands of their creditors (states as well as international organizations and businesses) at the expense of their

constituents. The effect of foreign direct investment on economic growth and political instability has long been studied within dependency theory. With respect to the differing levels of contentious politics, the results from these studies have been contradictory. London and Robinson (1989) found that increased levels of transnational corporate penetration, measured by capital stocks (a la Bornschieer and Chase-Dunn, 1985), increased the likelihood of political violence. However, Li and Schaub (2004) observed that such investments only affected rates of violence indirectly (negatively) through promoting economic development. Focusing on the narrowest band of political conflict in this study, Robison, Crenshaw, and Jenkins (2006) find a significant negative effect of foreign direct investment when limiting political violence to leftist and Islamist forms of transnational terrorism.

### Technology

Another manner by which globalization has affected contentious politics within states is through the spread of technology. Events of the Arab Spring of 2011 and the more recent "Facebook" revolution in Egypt and "YouTube" uprising in Syria demonstrate just how vulnerable regimes can be to the spread of dissident ideas through modern technological devices. While researchers have yet to produce much literature involving such recent events, one had the foresight to hypothesize about the increased availability of technology and the information it offered. In his book *Information and American Democracy*, Bruce Bimber (2003) lists what he saw as the hypothetical effects of contemporary information technology on organizing collective action. Among these he lists the increased speed with which dissident groups would organize and affect

change, mainly based on a second effect--the drastic reduction of resources required to mobilize. Both effects can be seen in the most recent technology-aided revolutions and uprisings; and certainly, as technology advances, these effects will continue to be of critical importance.

### International Organizations

A final external factor, brought about in large part due to globalization's increased relations among states, is the influence of international organizations like the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and specifically the United Nations. The major effects of the World Bank and IMF have been covered under the category of investment. The role of the United Nations in influencing contentious politics arises as a result of the need for states to "play with the rest of the world." Sanctions levied with the backing of the UN have forced regimes to acquiesce to the demands of their constituents. At the same time, the implementation of specific conventions related to terrorist actions has limited those actions through a closure of certain opportunities. Specifically, the convention on the marking of plastic explosives that has been signed by 148 states demonstrates a negative correlation with the number of terrorist events within a country based on their year of signing. It appears from these observations that the international organization of states mitigates contentious politics on both sides of the conflict.

While it has been noted in specific cases, some emphasis should be made as to the general effect of these factors and processes on the different levels of contentious politics. Oberschall (1978) theorized that the conditions that lead to violent protest were similar to those that lead to other forms of collective action. The deciding factor in which form finally emerges may simply boil down to the political process theory ideas of framing and



mobilization in that the more severe the perceived differentiation within the population, the more distilled the expression of contentious politics will be evinced. Acute differences of a pervasive nature will lend themselves to the more physical forms of political violence and terrorism.

The domestic characteristics and international processes outlined in the foregoing review demonstrate a dynamic relationship. While internal factors have effects of their own on the potential for groups to enter the field of contentious politics, those effects are dramatically influenced by the external mechanisms within which states operate at the global level. As changes in those processes have occurred over time, their interactive effects have and will continue to change. Staying abreast of these changes and continuing to interpret their effects will ensure researchers maintain and build upon our understanding of contentious politics, whether viewed as collective action, more narrowly as political violence, or even more narrowly as terrorism.

Several of the factors highlighted in the preceding review will be incorporated in the models of social movement action in the subsequent chapters, particularly as the pertain to terrorist violence, and Chapter 5 will view their effects on the entire spectrum of collective action. However, as terrorist violence is the focus of this chapter and the emphasis of the overarching thesis, I turn now to how information on the performance of this social movement action has been collected and made available to researchers.

#### Terrorism Data

The Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR) identifies several efforts to quantify the performance of terrorist violence. Touted as "the

world's largest archive of behavioral and social science research data," it was to this source that Alex Schmid and Albert Jongman turned in their review of data and databases on nongovernmental terrorism (Schmid and Jongman 2008). While their guide to terrorism studies has been updated from the 1988 version, they did not include in this update information on the progress of data collection. As a result, they identify fourteen datasets that began to be compiled in the late 1960s, but do not provide information on datasets past the late 1980s. Of these fourteen datasets, three emerge as prominent sources in current research on terrorist events: 1) RAND Database of Worldwide Terrorism Incidents (RDWTI), 2) World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators (WHPSI), and 3) International Terrorism: Attributes of Terrorist Events (ITERATE), held for some time as the most comprehensive and authoritative source for terrorism data.

What were not covered in the Schmid and Jongman review were the Pinkerton Global Intelligence Service (PGIS) data on terrorist events. A private security agency, PGIS maintained a handwritten database of these events starting in 1970. The evolution of this last dataset culminated in the development of the Global Terrorism Database (GTD), which incorporated the PGIS data as well as data from the Center for Terrorism and Intelligence Studies, and is continually updated through the efforts of the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism.

These four databases constitute the majority of sources upon which researchers rely in the study of incidents of terrorist violence and are highlighted in Ivan Sascha Sheehan's (2012) work on comparing terrorism data sources. As a result of the analysis conducted by Sheehan--particularly his praise for certain aspects of the GTD and the criticism that researchers re-evaluate the "near-canonical reputation of datasets such as

ITERATE" (p. 36)--, the public availability of the datasets, and the frequency of updates to the datasets, the GTD emerged as the source for incidents of terrorist violence for each of the subsequent studies. A detailed description of this data is discussed in the next chapter.

Having couched terrorist violence within the broader context of political violence, described the state-level characteristics most likely to influence social movement action like terrorism, and provided and justified the source for data on terrorist events, it is time to put theory and data to test.

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## CHAPTER 3

### TERRORISM AND CORRUPTION<sup>2</sup>

This study theorizes on the connection between corruption and political violence. It attempts to uncover whether domestic terrorism--as a specific form of political violence--can be more accurately depicted as an insurgent effort to reduce corruption or as an incumbent effort to exert influence when the channel of corruption has been rendered ineffective. Specifically, the concepts of terrorism and corruption are defined, and the relationship between the two is investigated through competing hypotheses based on social movement theory's (SMT) mechanisms of opportunity structures and grievances. Using a fixed effects longitudinal negative binomial regression based on Muller's model of domestic political violence, this study finds a statistically significant negative relationship between a leading measure of perceived corruption and changes in the rate of terrorist violence for 106 countries over the period of 1990-2010. Results identify corruption and terrorism as shared avenues within an extralegal opportunity

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<sup>2</sup> This chapter is a version of an article accepted for publication in the Summer 2014 issue of the *International Journal of Sociology* titled *Terrorism and Corruption: Alternatives for goal attainment within political opportunity structures*.



structure and demonstrate that where the avenue of corruption has been restricted, countries experience greater rates of terrorist violence.

### Introduction

Since the end of the Cold War, democracy and capitalism have enjoyed relatively unhindered expansion. The inherent freedoms provided by both of these concepts have often led to the development of processes outside of the legitimate structures of governance. When such procedures involve the manipulation of governance through bribery, rent seeking, or coercion, they are grouped within the larger concept of corruption. When they involve collective action such as protests, riots, strikes, and terrorism, they pertain to the concept of political violence. Both concepts provide mechanisms by which individuals and organizations can accomplish their goals when the legitimate structure fails to do so.

The lens of SMT brings into sharp relief how these two manipulative concepts interact with each other. The intuitive link between corruption and political violence is a reactive one. Those with significant financial and relational power attempt to accomplish their organizational goals by using them to clear the roadblocks that arise through bureaucracy and enforceable regulations. In this manner, they 'capture' the process, manipulating it to their will. Participants in the process who lack sufficient resources to 'play the game' work within the legitimate structure to decreasing levels of effectiveness. As those within the observant public recognize the ineffectiveness of their efforts to counter this state capture through the legitimate opportunity structure, they can theoretically turn to increasingly violent means of protest. Where such efforts succeed,

anticorruption programs limit the ability of the former to accomplish their goals. When this occurs, these individuals and organizations can utilize the same mechanism of political violence in an effort to regain control of the process. Viewed in this light, corruption can be seen to act as an indicator of political violence. The levels of corruption, and changes in those levels over time, would affect the propensity of those on both sides of the issue to use violent means to attain their individual/organizational goals. This study will investigate both of these lines of thought by uncovering whether a specific subset of political violence--terrorism--can be accounted for by efforts to reduce corruption (perspective #1), or to exert influence when the illegitimate channel of corruption has been rendered ineffective (perspective #2).

### Terrorism and Its Correlates

Chapter 2 demonstrated the feasibility of incorporating terrorism within the broader context of political violence. While the amount of research on terrorism has exploded, a detailed understanding of the factors contributing to terrorist violence has been slow to emerge. Investigating the potential for causal connections, researchers have found there to be little direct connection between poverty, education, and terrorism (Krueger and Maleckova 2003). This contradicts findings that inequality (as an indicator of relative deprivation) positively influences the larger concept of collective political violence (Muller 1985) and that "among the politically involved, poverty and education are important predictors of involvement in violence" (Lee 2011).

Higher levels of education have been observed to result in increased political stability (Alesina and Perotti 1996), while higher tertiary education levels have

corresponded with increased participation in revolutionary violence (Besançon 2005). Setting aside the contradictory findings by Besançon, education and political violence appear to exhibit a negative relationship, supporting the concept that improved socio-economic conditions result in reduced political violence (Caruso and Schneider 2011, Freytag et al. 2011).

The effect of foreign direct investment (FDI) on economic growth and political instability has long been studied within dependency theory. Unfortunately, the results from these studies are contradictory. London and Robinson (1989) found that increased levels of FDI, measured by capital stocks, increased the likelihood of political violence. However, Li and Schaub (2004) observed that such investments only affected rates of violence indirectly (negatively) through promoting economic development. Adding to the controversy, Robison, Crenshaw, and Jenkins (2006) find a significant negative effect of FDI when limiting political violence to leftist and Islamist forms of transnational terrorism.

Some research on potential factors is less contradictory. The link between the repressiveness of a country and the prevalence of terrorist activity has been well documented (Aksoy, Carter, and Wright 2012, Chenoweth 2010, Li 2005). Research demonstrates that open polities experience greater activity than closed. Associated with this research, Muller and Weede (1990) described a nonmonotonic relationship between the repressiveness of a state and incidents of political violence--a phenomenon articulated by Helen Fein (1995) as "more murder in the middle."

### Corruption

Like terrorism, corruption has only recently emerged as a prominent object of analysis in sociological research. In large part, this new focus was the result of the failures of the economic policies of the Washington Consensus espoused by many developing nations after the end of the Cold War. As researchers sought to explain the unexpected results of the implementation of trade openness, government divestiture of firms, and prudent fiscal policy, they increasingly argued that "key reform initiatives, such as privatization, had been distorted due to large-scale corruption" (Azfar, Lee, and Swamy 2001). In the wake of such statements, researchers scrambled to better understand corruption and its effects on governance.

In earlier research, corruption had been seen as an extra-institutional mechanism by which some minimal percentage of revenue was affected in the course of getting the business of governance accomplished. Huntington (1968) and Leff (1964) went so far as to suggest that in the presence of repressive or cumbersome economic policies, corruption improved the delivery of basic services. However, researchers found that the failures associated with implementing the economic policies of the Washington Consensus could be linked to the propensity for political corruption. Cultural and social norms regarding workarounds, payoffs, and rent-seeking that had been part of the existing political opportunity structure soon threatened the basic rule of law, property rights, and the enforcement of contracts (Azfar, Lee, and Swamy 2001). Researchers quickly began applying theoretical insights in their search for root causes of corruption and to isolate the effects of corruption on a variety of socioeconomic factors.

Those who study corruption usually defer to some form of the definition espoused by the international corruption-fighting agency Transparency International: "the abuse of entrusted power for private gain" (Anderson and Tverdova 2003, Knack 2007, Ledet 2011). Inferred in this definition is the understanding that some individual or group is inhibited from equal access to some resource, be it economic, political, or social. This inference lends to the application of SMT as a method for understanding the effects of corruption on governance. As will be demonstrated below, several studies have attempted to link corruption with the emergence of political violence.

Corruption has chiefly enjoyed attention from the fields of economics and political science. To a great extent, economists have focused on defining and refining the varied typologies of corruption (Hwang, Jung, and Lim 2010, Méndez and Sepúlveda 2010). Unfortunately, investigating corruption's direct effect on political violence is less well represented in the literature. Efforts allude to the *potential* for corruption to be intrinsically linked to instability (Mauro 1995); that corruption has a significant positive effect on political *instability* (Mo 2001); that there is a *possibility* for changes in the patterns of corruption to effect levels of conflict more than its prevalence (Le Billon 2003); and that it erodes the legitimacy of the political system (Seligson 2002), leading to citizen's loss of confidence in government (Ledet 2011) and requiring *exogenous shocks* to correct (Anderson and Tverdova 2003). Other research emphasizes citizens' rights to resist predatory governments (Macpherson 1977, Warren 2004). Though the above research bolsters the case for including corruption as a factor of social movement formation, no direct connection from corruption to political violence is made. Institutional and sociopolitical factors like corruption have been emphasized by

researchers looking at political assassinations (Iqbal and Zorn 2006), where the lack of institutionalized mechanisms to address grievances against the regime existed as preconditions to the emergence of political violence (Tilly 1978). However, in describing the factors present in such failed institutional mechanisms, they do not include corruption (Iqbal and Zorn 2006).

From a theoretical standpoint, corruption can be viewed as a source of grievance from which social movements might develop and by which they might win resources (McCarthy and Zald 1977). The argument here is that in countries where political activists observe higher levels of corruption, those activists will tend to resort to acts of violence at a greater rate than in countries with low observed corruption. This argument leads to the following testable hypothesis:

*H1a: Higher levels of perceived corruption within a country will increase the number of terrorist events within that country.*

In similar fashion, as the level of a country's perceived corruption changes over time, changes in the rates of terrorist violence should follow. If a country is perceived as becoming more corrupt, the rate of terrorist violence should increase. As perceived corruption decreases, rates should also decrease. This leads to a second testable hypothesis:

*H1b: Increases in levels of perceived corruption within a country will increase the rate of terrorist events within that country.*

A second premise views corruption as part of an opportunity structure that provides organizations with extrainstitutional channels by which they might influence governments. Terrorist violence may be one of these channels. Research demonstrates

that terrorist violence is highly correlated to political regimes in which corruption is embedded in the political opportunity structure (Thachuk 2005). Where corruption limits the capability of certain organizations, it benefits organizations willing and able to use this particular extrainstitutional channel. Where the channel of corruption is well established, organizations will select it over terrorist violence. This argument produces the following competing hypothesis:

*H2a: Levels of perceived corruption within a country will decrease the number of terrorist events within that country.*

As these organizations find the particular avenue of corruption closed by transparency and accountability efforts, they may select terrorism as an operational alternative. This argument produces a second competing hypothesis:

*H2b: Changes in the levels of perceived corruption within a country will decrease the rate of terrorist events within that country.*

### Method and Data

Understanding the correlates of terrorism from a comparative perspective goes back to Edward Muller's (1985) domestic model of political violence, which was grounded in the seminal work of Hibbs (1973). According to Muller's model, state-level factors include levels of regime repressiveness, sociocultural heterogeneity, income inequality, economic development, governmental acts of coercion, and the "heritage" of rebellion. In order to better understand the effects of dependency on political violence, Boswell and Dixon (1990) introduce an additional variable of transnational corporate penetration. Most recently, Nasir, Ali, and Rehman (2011) add a measure for human

capital in the form of level of education to the expanded model. The measures included in these models correspond well with the factors already identified in the extant literature. The present analysis utilizes these models as a base and follows a similar expansion by including corruption as a factor in the emergence and magnitude of political violence.

An aggregated dataset was constructed from existing secondary historical data. With the exception of the key independent variable, these data were extracted from datasets that were freely accessible through online sources. The datasets are described in further detail below under the variable(s) to which they pertain.

### Measurement

The models required the measurement of the following key concepts: political violence, perceived corruption, government coercion, regime repressiveness, cultural fractionalization,<sup>3</sup> inequality, economic development, "heritage" of rebellion, transnational corporate penetration, level of education, and population.

Dependent variable. Considering the ongoing issue surrounding the definition of terrorism, it is understandable that records of terrorist attacks may include, exclude, minimize, or exaggerate events based on political motives. The selection of data sources for political violence can be troublesome (Lafree and Dugan 2007, Olzak 2006). Research has shown that databases limited to international media reports do not provide adequate representation across the globe (Herkenrath and Knoll 2011). Fortunately, a

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<sup>3</sup> Over the timeframe of the present study, country-level data on cultural fractionalization (linguistic, religious, and ethnic) consist of a single measure for each country. As a fixed-effects model will be employed, this factor will be incorporated by definition, and will not be included as a separate variable.



more detailed and comprehensive database on incidents of terrorism has recently become available.

The Global Terrorism Database (GTD) maintained by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) at the University of Maryland contains information on over 98,000 incidents from 1970 to 2010. The intent of the GTD is to be as inclusive as possible without falling prey to the methodological inaccuracies of previous compilations. Subsequently, each event must be intentional, entail some level of violence or threat of violence, and be perpetrated by subnational actors. Additionally, each event must meet at least two of the following criteria:

- 1) Be conducted to attain a political, economic, religious, or social goal.
- 2) Evince the intention to convey some message to a larger audience than the immediate victims.
- 3) Be outside the context of legitimate warfare.

As a result of this broad yet clear conceptualization of terrorism, the GTD is currently the "most comprehensive unclassified data base on terrorist events in the world" (START 2011) and an ideal database for use in this study.

The unit of analysis for the GTD is at the incident level spanning 1970 to 2010. Annual counts for each country were developed in order to extract information for the timeframe of this study (1990-2010). To do so, a summation of the number of events by the country code associated with the location of each event was generated. As the intent of this analysis was to determine to what extent certain factors influenced *domestic* political violence, the data were further constrained to include only those incidents where there was no doubt that the incident might be related to some other form of political violence; where the target and location of the violence matched; and to exclude those events perpetrated by external groups--an attempt to isolate international terrorism. The

result of these aggregations and filters is a dataset of over 43,000 events of domestic terrorist violence covering 209 states and territories.<sup>4</sup>

Key independent variable. Attempts to measure *actual* corruption fall prey to the reality that corruption is inherently secretive. It is preferable to rely on more subjective measures of corruption (Ledet 2011). In a review of the three most popular corruption indices in the literature, Donchev and Ujhelyi (2011) found that these indices measured the *perception* of corruption within a state better than they measured the level of *actual*, or experienced, corruption. The utilization of these three measures of corruption is consistent with the literature (Egger and Winner 2006, Foster, Horowitz and Mendez 2012, Koyuncu and Yilmaz 2008, You and Khagram 2005). However, researchers caution of the difficulty involved in measuring corruption and the limits of current measures of corruption (Knack 2007). Ideally, indices should rely on both firm-level and systemic household surveys for measuring corruption. Unfortunately, the latter often proves extremely difficult. On the other hand, results indicate that elite perceptions match well with the mass public (Canache and Allison 2008). Regrettably, only one of the three corruption indices, Political Risk Services' *International Country Risk Guide* (ICRG), reaches back beyond 1995. As a result, it is the only index utilized in the present analysis.

The ICRG contains 22 components which measure political, financial, and economic risk, and has been published since 1984 (PRS Group 2011). Within the political risk factors, PRS includes a measure for corruption that takes into account both financial corruption in the form of demands for special payments as well as "excessive

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<sup>4</sup> In order to eliminate outliers, country/year pairings of >300 events were excluded from the analysis.

patronage, nepotism...and suspiciously close ties between politics and business" (O'Leary 2004). The resulting score falls on a scale of 0 to 6, where 0 indicates high corruption and 6 indicates low corruption. In order to facilitate interpretation, this scoring was inverted such that 0 indicates low levels of perceived corruption and 6 indicates high levels. Corruption data on the period of the present study covers between 110 and 134 countries.

Government coercion. Original models utilized the coercive government sanctions data from the World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators. Data collection for the most recent iteration of this data began in 1990 but fails to provide data beyond 2004. The *physical integrity rights index* of the Cingranelli-Richards (CIRI) Human Rights Dataset, with inclusive dates of 1981-2011, provides equivalent data for the entire period of the present study. This index is based on the dataset's torture, extrajudicial killing, imprisonment, and disappearance indicators and ranges from a score of 1 to 8, with higher scores indicating increasing government respect for these four rights. It is anticipated that a government coercion scores will negatively affect the rate of political violence in the form of terrorism pursuant to the theorizing of Boswell and Dixon.

Regime repressiveness. Consistent with the literature expounding on Muller and Weede's (1990) inverted U-shaped relationship between political violence and regime repressiveness, a combined measure of civil liberties and political rights was produced by averaging the *civil liberties* and *political rights* variables from Freedom House's (2011) *Freedom in the World* ratings that have been collected and published since 1973. This averaged variable was then squared to demonstrate the nonlinear decrease in violence as

regimes approach the extreme ends of openness and repressiveness. The variable is measured on an ordinal scale of increasing repressiveness from 1 to 7. It is anticipated that this basic measure of regime repressiveness will positively affect terrorist events, while the polynomial function will exhibit a negative correlation.

Inequality. The degree of inequality within a country was measured using the GINI index reported by the World Bank. The GINI index is presented as a percentage of the maximum area between the Lorenz curve and a line of perfect equality, 0 representing perfect equality and 100 representing perfect inequality. A positive relationship is expected between inequality and terrorist violence, consistent with extant literature on political violence.

Economic development. Each country's level of development was measured by the gross domestic product per capita as reported by the World Bank. GDP/cap is measured in current U.S. Dollars and has been subjected to a logarithmic scale consistent with standard practices. Economic development is expected to have a positive relationship with terrorist violence.

Heritage of rebellion. Previous research operationalized this factor by including a dichotomous variable indicating the presence of civil war within a country in the prior year (Muller 1985). As the present study is focused on terrorism specifically, a variable consisting of a 1-year lag of the dependent variable was introduced as a simple measure of period effects. It is anticipated that this variable will exhibit a positive relationship with terrorism, consistent with existing models of political violence.

Transnational corporate penetration. This factor was operationalized as the level of foreign direct investment in a country's economy. Data on this measure were obtained

from the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development and is a subset of the inward foreign direct investment stocks data on individual economies. This variable consists of the percentage of the GDP attributable to foreign direct investment. Where the present study is limiting political violence to terrorism, its relationship with foreign investment is expected to be negative, supporting similar research (Robison, Crenshaw and Jenkins 2006).

Level of education. While the emulated model (Nasir, Ali, and Rehman 2011) utilized literacy rate from the World Bank's World Development Indicators as a measure of education, this measure is severely limited when integrated with the final dataset--a limitation that persists even after interpolating for missing data. In order to attain better coverage, primary education levels were used as a basic education measure to replace literacy level. To incorporate the findings on tertiary education's impact on political violence, the tertiary education level for each country was also measured. Both measures were derived from the Barro-Lee Education Attainment dataset (Barro and Lee 2013). The Barro-Lee data reports the percentage of total population over age 15 having completed primary and tertiary education from 1950 to 2010 in 5-year intervals with interpolated data for intervening years. It is anticipated that the relationship between a country's level of both primary and tertiary education and terrorist events will be negative, reflecting the results of prior research noted in Chapter 2 that improved socio-economic conditions (including higher levels of education) correlate to a reduction in the proliferation of political violence (Caruso and Schneider 2011, Freytag et al. 2011).

Restricting the data to a balanced sample resulted in 1411 observations covering

106 countries. Summary statistics and correlations are available from the author upon request.

### Results

Initial observations of the dependent variable demonstrate a general increase in events from 1970 to 1992. This trend was reversed from 1993 through 2004 but returned again from 2005 through 2010 (see Fig. 3.1). Two dummy variables representing the initial trend ending in 1992 and the surge in events from 2005-2010 were included in the models to account for this general shift. Figure 3.1 also demonstrates an affinity toward the second set of hypotheses when the globally averaged corruption data are superimposed. As the general trend of corruption increased between 1993 and 2004, the total number of terrorist events decreased. This inverse relationship was maintained over the period of 2005 through 2010 as an increase in terrorist violence appears to correspond to a decrease in global perceived corruption.

Analyses were conducted using a series of longitudinal negative binomial regression equations to evaluate the relationship between corruption and incidents of terrorism. Expecting a disproportionate number of zero-incident country/year pairings, this method was selected for its ability to account for overdispersion. In order to demonstrate the relationship of changes in levels of corruption and terrorism within countries over time, a fixed-effects model was selected.

A total of three models are presented in Table 3.1. The first model replicates the previous findings of Muller, Boswell, and Dixon and Nasir et al., and investigates whether the directionality of the relationships between relevant factors continue to hold




Figure 3.1. Global trends in terrorist violence and perceived corruption 1970-2010 (Source: Data drawn from GTD and ICRG).

Table 3.1. Incident Rate Ratios (t-statistics) from models of corruption's effect on terrorist violence.

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
corruption		0.74*** (-3.93)	0.69*** (-4.40)
corruptchg			0.83* (-2.03)
coerc	0.79*** (-5.28)	0.79*** (-5.32)	0.79*** (-5.47)
L.coerc	0.91* (-2.23)	0.89* (-2.57)	0.90* (-2.55)
repress	1.92* (2.55)	2.00** (2.75)	1.96** (2.64)
repress2	0.95+ (-1.62)	0.94* (-1.96)	0.94+ (-1.84)
loggdp	0.64* (-2.07)	0.68+ (-1.85)	0.68+ (-1.87)
inequality	0.97+ (-1.85)	0.97+ (-1.69)	0.97+ (-1.75)
logpop	0.01*** (-6.75)	0.01*** (-6.24)	0.01*** (-5.86)
fdistock	1.00 (-0.88)		
primary	1.03** (2.77)	1.04*** (3.30)	1.04*** (3.35)
tertiary	0.86** (-2.64)	0.91+ (-1.66)	0.92 (-1.58)
L.domestic	1.01*** (5.96)	1.01*** (5.83)	1.01*** (5.89)
gtd1984	0.74+ (-1.73)	0.83 (-1.05)	0.82 (-1.13)
gtd2005	2.06** (3.15)	2.15*** (3.38)	2.07** (3.20)
N	1411	1411	1411
Pseudo R-sq	.1852	.1866	.1872
BIC	6760.87	6825.45	6828.54



when limiting political violence to acts of terrorism. It was theorized that shifts in activity would be best observed over a 2-year period as groups reacting to such changes would delay the use of terrorist violence in order to both ensure the change was durable and to mobilize the necessary resources to conduct such actions. Model 2 introduces a 2-year lagged variable for levels of corruption (*H1a* and *H2a*). Model 3 adds to this a variable accounting for the change in those levels over 2 years (*H1b* and *H2b*).<sup>5</sup>

Consistent with Boswell and Dixon's modification to Muller's domestic model of political violence, Model 1 demonstrated a negative correlation between terrorist events and government coercion. The positive effect of repression was also upheld, as was the nonmonotonic relationship between regime repressiveness and terrorism. Model 1 also corroborated the result from Boswell and Dixon's model with a weak negative relationship between FDI and terrorist events that failed to reach significance and was therefore dropped from subsequent models. While the effects of tertiary education corroborated the findings of Nasir, Ali, and Rehman, the effects of primary education were significant and opposite the predicted direction. The effects of inequality, development, and education on terrorist violence were each significant and directionally opposite previous findings. While this may appear troublesome, Muller noted that as the samples in his model became more comprehensive, the particular effect of inequality weakened. More importantly, as the present analysis restricted political violence to terrorism, the underlying relationship may be fundamentally changed (this theme is relevant to all control variables in the models). The results of Model 1 demonstrate that

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<sup>5</sup> Tests for multicollinearity demonstrated minimal effects for each of the models, with max correlations under .57 and VIFs (max/mean) of 2.27/1.47 (Model 1), 2.28/1.48 (Model 2) and 2.26/1.48 (Model 3).

terrorist violence conforms somewhat to the broader category of political violence while exhibiting distinct differences. Additional research is needed to further interpret these differences.

The introduction of levels of perceived corruption to Model 2 produced results that maintained the directionality and significance of all previous control variables (though some variation in level of significance was observed). Levels of perceived corruption exhibited a negative correlation with rates of terrorist violence. On average, a one-level increase in perceived corruption scores corresponds to a 26% decrease in the rate of terrorist violence within a country, holding all other variables constant ( $p < .001$ ).

Incorporating changes in levels of perceived corruption, Model 3 continued to maintain the directionality and significance of variables in the initial model, with the exception of tertiary education that fell from significance. Changes in levels of perceived corruption also exhibited a negative correlation with rates of terrorist violence. On average, a one-level increase in 2-year change scores of perceived corruption corresponds to a 17% decrease in the rate of terrorist violence within a country, holding all other variables constant ( $p < .05$ ).

### Discussion

Corruption's relationship with terrorist violence was posited to have one of two competing effects. The first set of hypotheses stated that perceived corruption and increases in perceived corruption over time would lead to the development of grievances that would materialize in the form of terrorist violence. Results from the analyses demonstrate that there was a significant effect; however, not in the direction theorized. In

fact, the results demonstrate that the more corrupt a country was perceived to be, the less likely that country was to experience higher rates of terrorism. Additionally, while accounting for these levels of perceived corruption, increases in perceived corruption over time decreased the rate of terrorist violence. These results cast doubt on the notion that terrorist violence is the expression of grievances developed in response to perceived corruption within the political process.

The second set of hypotheses inferred that organizations already utilizing extra-legal methods such as corruption to accomplish their goals would turn to alternative extra-legal methods such as terrorism if the country in which they operated maintained or implemented sufficiently high control on corrupt practices. Results from the analyses demonstrate that greater levels of corruption control correlated to higher rates of terrorism. These findings support the theoretical perspective of terrorism and corruption as components of an extra-legal opportunity structure used by organizations to accomplish their political goals. In instances where the particular path of corruption could not be employed to gain political influence, these organizations utilized alternative strategies--terrorism being high on the list--to fill the gap. While outside the scope of the present study, identifying the remaining components of this extra-legal opportunity structure may provide greater insight into the particular organizations involved in such activities, as well as the ability to counteract or even preempt the formation of these organizations.

The fact that the analyses supported the second hypothesis over the first may also provide insight as to the discrepancies observed among the control variables. Inequality's generally accepted positive effect on political violence turned negative when that

violence was limited to terrorist acts. These unexpected results may be due to differences in the underlying motivations for each type of violence. When restricted to the subset of terrorist violence, traditional motivations for political violence may not persist.

Additional research is needed in order to better understand the specific relationships between terrorist violence and inequality, development, and primary education completion rates.

Limiting the type of political violence to terrorism did not have deleterious effects on its relationship with government coercion or regime repressiveness. Increased respect for human rights and higher levels of political rights and civil liberties decreased the rate of terrorist violence. Also consistent with the broader literature, repressiveness exhibited a nonmonotonic effect on terrorist violence. Weaker and transitioning polities had significantly higher rates of violence than those that were either substantially open or repressed. While this holds true for political violence in general, the theoretical approach upheld in this analysis may contribute to an understanding of why this extends to terrorist violence in particular.

Any inquiry results in the emergence of certain limitations and opportunities for future research. In the present analysis, the corruption measures are based on perception and are being used as a substitute for actual levels of corruption. Although this may be an adequate substitute for corruption as intended under the grievance hypothesis, its use as a measure under the opportunity structure hypothesis may be less than ideal. Where grievances are based in observed inequalities and arguably through the perceptions of individuals, the use of opportunity structures--especially those outside regulated means--are much less visible. Therefore, the corruption measures used in the present study quite

certainly understate the level of corruption within the political opportunity process. Developing a better measure for actual corruption, difficult as this might be, would improve the analysis.

The GTD itself provides unprecedented detail on individual terrorist events. Further analysis of this invaluable resource will no doubt shed increased light on the phenomenon of terrorism. For example, the GTD reports casualty and property damage estimates. Such information could be utilized to estimate the available resources of terrorist organizations (Overgaard 1994). Combining these data with the present analysis could lend additional support to the theoretical premise that terrorism can be studied through the lens of SMT.

### Conclusion

The present study sought to identify the relationship between corruption and terrorist violence through SMT's concepts of grievance and political opportunity structures. Analyses demonstrated that corruption and terrorist violence exhibit an inverse relationship that supports the theoretical perspective that they are shared avenues within an extralegal opportunity structure, demonstrating that where the avenue of corruption has been restricted, countries experience greater rates of terrorist violence. This initial attempt to quantify the relationship between terrorist violence and corruption requires further analysis in order to identify under which conditions, in which regions, and over which time periods this relationship may vary.

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## CHAPTER 4

### REGIMES AND TERRORIST VIOLENCE

#### Introduction

The history of any scientific theory reveals how its current state is derived from the surviving ideas of prior attempts to explain the object of its study. Social movement theory is no different. Though continually evolving, the mainstream theoretical perspective for explaining the emergence and operations of current social movements remains political process theory. While incorporating the ideas of deprivation and resource mobilization theory, political process theory adds to these by expressly incorporating a third component--political opportunity.

As noted in Chapter 1, political opportunity structures are the mechanisms by which organizations and individuals can access the political process and reflect the vulnerability of that process to challenges from below. McAdam (1996) identified four key--though not all-inclusive (Goodwin and Jasper 1999)--factors that aid in determining what type of political opportunity structure challengers face: 1) relative openness of the institutionalized political system, 2) stability among elite alignments, 3) presence of elite allies, and 4) capacity and propensity for state repression. While the stability of alignments among elites and their ties to causes are important to the emergence of social

movements, the focus of the present study will be on the relative openness of the political system to those who would demand change and the state's ability to repress them. Where the preceding chapter sought to view terrorist violence as part of a nonconventional, illicit, or extra-legal political opportunity structure, the overarching emphasis of the dissertation--that terrorist violence should be more clearly considered as a social movement action--requires that this violence be investigated with respect to the more mainstream components of political opportunity structures. Taking terrorist violence as the object of study, both incidence and magnitude of violence will be investigated. To this end, the present chapter observes the effects of regime type and repression on the rate and severity of terrorist violence.

### Regimes and Repression

Most research on terrorism as an object of study identifies three relevant groups involved in the process--originators, bystanders, and targets. This research is distinguished by whether the focus is placed on the originator or the target. In observing originators of terrorist violence, researchers often rely on commonalities in organizational structure, goals, ideologies, and individual member psychology. When studying targets of terrorism, the characteristics of the location where the event occurred are more central, generally relying on the state-level factors of structure (autocratic/democratic), civil liberties, length of regime, economic growth, cultural fractionalization, etc. As the unit of analysis for this dissertation is the state, it is not coincidental that these characteristics closely resemble those representative of the political opportunity structures mentioned above, including the two of primary interest in this chapter.

## Regime Type

As noted above, the characteristics of the regime, especially state structure, are of key interest when investigating terrorist violence as social movement action. A consensus within the literature links the proliferation of terrorist violence specifically with the presence of democratic regimes (Brooks 2009, Chenoweth 2010, Kis-Katos, Liebert, and Schulze 2011, Li 2005, Weinberg and Eubank 1998, Weinberg, Eubank, and Francis 2008). Most of this research demonstrates that the number of terrorist events increases in the presence of democracy, though it does so nonmonotonically (in strong and well-established democracies terrorist violence decreases).

The key theoretical perspective running through these studies views democracy as an enabling force, allowing for mobilization and expression of dissenting views. This freedom of association is seen to most often foster nonviolent participation in the political process, but also allows for the generation and perpetration of violence against the state--especially when the state has recently experienced or is currently undergoing a shift toward greater levels of democracy. However, the type of regime that characterizes the state is only one factor among the many that produce the unique personality of each state. As noted at the outset of this chapter, the capacity of the regime to repress its members is also of great import.

## State Capacity and Repression

The relative openness of the political process described above accounts for one of the foundations of the political opportunity structure upon which social movements avail themselves in their attempts to create social change. Its sister consists of the capacity of

the state to control dissent. Tilly (2010) described this concept as the "degree to which governmental actions affect distributions of populations, activities, and resources within the government's jurisdiction, relative to some standard of quality and efficiency" (p. 21). With respect to political violence, this concept has traditionally been operationalized under three categories: military capacity, bureaucratic capacity, and the quality of political institutions (Hendrix 2010). The conflation of the latter with regime type is apparent when observing the primary measure used by studies following this method of operationalization...polity, or the quality of democratic rule (Hegre et al. 2001, Marshall and Jaggers 2009). However, the remaining two categories deserve some additional scrutiny.

Military capacity refers to the level to which the state maintains a monopoly over the use of violence in order to deter challenges to its authority. This Weberian concept of the state is most readily represented by the size of the state's military apparatus. A crucial point in the observance of military capacity as a proxy for the state's capacity to repress is whether or not the state has employed this force in an effort to control dissent. That is, there are two ways to measure military capacity with respect to repression: latent and manifest capacity. Both of these aspects have been demonstrated to be useful in the measurement of repression (Davenport 2007b). Relying on the size of the state's military is one method of measuring this latent capacity, or the *potential* of the state to repress. The alternative is to observe this potential when it is put in use. Manifest capacity, or the *actual* repression enacted by the state, is often described according to two categories: personal integrity rights violations, and civil liberties violations. Both of these categories relate to the state's imposition of force in an effort to limit the rights of the individual. In

the first instance, the rights involved encompass the generally universal human right to life and are violated through wrongful imprisonment, disappearings, kidnappings, and assassinations. Studies on the employment of such violations demonstrate that the impetus behind their use nearly always stems from protest against the regime and that constraint against their employment only occurs under the higher levels of democratic governance (Davenport and Armstrong 2004, Harff 2003, Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999). The second instance of manifest capacity involves the limiting of rights to expression, association, assembly, and belief. Employment of this type of repression often includes arrests, bannings, and curfews (Davenport 2007a). By simply maintaining a significant military apparatus or by overtly employing it, states utilize military capacity in the suppression of dissent.

Bureaucratic capacity measures the state's capacity to repress from an alternative angle. Fearon and Laitin (2003) describe how a state's inability to identify, locate, and monitor potential dissenters directly relates to the emergence and sustainment of social movement action. Viewed as the state's ability to collect and manage information, studies on how this form of capacity to repress influences political violence focus on two categories of measures: revenue-generating capacity, and bureaucratic quality or rule of law. Revenue-generating capacity refers to the ability of the state to extract revenue from those it rules. Higher levels of bureaucratic capacity emerge when the state must rely on more administrative means of extraction, such as taxation, as opposed to the reliance on natural resources for revenue, which requires less extraction from society, and thus a lower level of bureaucracy and bureaucratic capacity. This distinction has been evinced in the literature on rentier-states (Chaudhry 1989, Franke, Gawrich, and Alakbarov 2009,

Moore 2011). Bureaucratic quality influences the state's capacity to repress by isolating the administrative process from rapid changes in leadership, and by providing the state with increased ability to gather and interpret information on those who would foster dissent. Studies investigating this category of bureaucratic repressive capacity often utilize the index developed by Political Risk Services' *International Country Risk Guide*, which measures the ability of the state to remain insulated from political pressure, maintain merit-based recruitment and advancement processes, and the capacity to operate during changes in state leadership (Knack 2001). Bureaucratic capacity provides an alternative to military capacity in measuring the state's ability to repress. Inclusion of both categories in the models ahead will only serve to enrich the interpretation of analyses of repressive capacity's effect on terrorist violence. This interpretation becomes even more enhanced when the effects of repressive capacity are combined with regime type.

### The Interaction of Regime Type and Repression

In his study of how regimes affect contentious politics and vice-versa, Charles Tilly (2010) emphasized the importance of including both regime type and repression in analyses of social movement action. His work on regimes and repertoires of contention focuses on the interplay between government capacity and democracy, and how varying combinations of the two produce differing catalogues from which social movements select actions to perform. Reproduced here as Figure 4.1, Tilly's typology provides a method for placing regimes in one of four quadrants, which he labeled *high-capacity*






Figure 4.1. Charles Tilly's "Regime Space"

*democratic, high-capacity nondemocratic, low-capacity democratic, and low-capacity nondemocratic.*

When it comes to the particular social movement action of political violence against the state, the typology postulates that each of these pairings produces its own level of activity. *High-capacity democratic* regimes produce low violence because the more open political opportunity structures allow for grievances to be more readily expressed and the state's effective control of the means of violence dissuades opponents from becoming violent. Both *low-capacity democratic* regimes and *high-capacity nondemocratic* regimes produce medium levels of violence, but for different reasons. *Low-capacity democratic* regimes, while providing access to the political process, demonstrate weakness in their ability to repress dissidence, which increases the potential for the use of violence by opposing groups when the process slows or produces

unsuccessful results. *High-capacity nondemocratic* regimes, exhibiting strong control over the means of violence but limited access to the political process, see political violence limited to those windows when the opportunity structures open enough for dissent to develop into action. With little ability to repress and little opportunity to engage the political process, *low-capacity nondemocratic* regimes foster greater variation in repertoires of contention that would produce the highest levels of political violence against the state.

With respect to terrorist violence, the preceding postulates have been born out in recent research to varying degrees; however, a comprehensive analysis is still lacking. Utilizing economic development as a proxy for state capacity, de la Calle and Sanchez-Cuenca (2012) studied territory and non-territory-based conflicts and found that non-territory-based conflicts (including terrorist violence) decreased with greater capacity and democracy, though incidents increased among intermediate developing states. In his study of Somalia, Ken Menkhaus (2013) describes how the government's lack of capacity to control the use of violence left the state virtually unprotected from terrorist violence used to promote instability and further the claims of the political groups who employed its use. Conrad et al. (2014) demonstrate that, in autocracies, the weaker the tyrant's capacity to repress--in the form of multiple veto players--results in higher incidents of terrorist violence. Davenport and Armstrong (2004) identify a threshold of domestic democratic peace that describes how up to a certain level, democracy has no impact on whether or not the state participates in repressive actions. Beyond that threshold, democracy produces a dampening effect. What has not been reported to date in the literature is how regime type, repressive capacity, and their influence on each other

influence terrorist violence on a grand scale. Such is the intent of the present study. By observing the effects of both regime type and repressive capacity together on terrorist violence in a comprehensive cross-national time-series model, I hope to shed some light on whether the typology presented by Tilly can be extended specifically to terrorist violence as a social movement action influenced by the political opportunity structure under which it emerges.

### Counts and Casualties

A point with respect to the measurement of terrorist violence should be raised before embarking on the present study. Research on terrorism predominantly focuses on its prevalence, with data depicting the number of terrorist events in a given timeframe, for a given country, or a pairing of both. This was the manner by which the study in Chapter 2 was organized. However, as data on terrorist violence become more and more detailed, new methods for describing terrorist violence as a dependent variable emerge. For instance, given the disruptive effect of political violence--especially terrorist violence--on economic trends both nationally and internationally, viewing the damages of such events as the costs incurred by the state as opposed to the raw number of events that have occurred would produce a more refined analysis. Analyzing instances of terrorist violence through the lens of organizational theory would be better suited if the events were coded by organization, producing results that focus on the number of organizations actively utilizing terrorist violence within the borders of the state and how variation in those numbers may be affected by state-level characteristics. Of particular interest in the present study is the organization of data on terrorist violence to depict its severity within

the state, given the specific characteristics of regime type and repressive capacity. Detailed accounts of the number of casualties resulting from the use of terrorist violence by social movements within a state would provide improved understanding of its use across the regime space depicted by Tilly in Figure 4.1, specifically with respect to the interaction of regime type with repressive capacity. Indeed, the severity of terrorist violence has been a topic of research in several instances (Asal, Phillips, and Rethmeyer 2013, Bloom 2005, Enders and Sandler 2000, Hoffman 1999, Pape 2003, Piazza 2009) and this trend seems to be increasing commensurate with the availability of quality data. With the methods for depicting data on terrorist violence increasing over the past decade thanks to the tireless efforts of independent researchers, nonprofit organizations, state-funded academic pursuits, and state agencies, the potential for investigating the effects of terrorist violence on ever-expanding areas of social research increases. But does such detailed data, sorted and sliced in so many new ways, produce profiles distinct from one another? Does observing counts of terrorist violence *look* different than observing its severity?

### Counts of Terrorist Violence

Data indicate that terrorist violence has ebbed and flowed over the past 40 years. The rate of terrorist violence showed a marked decline from 1994 to 2004--a roughly 80% drop--prompting researchers to investigate the preconditions and precipitants of this form of contentious politics (Crenshaw 1991, Enders and Sandler 2000, Enders and Sandler 1999). This trend has reversed itself since 2004, demonstrating a return to nearly the highest level of activity on record. Utilizing data from the Global Terrorism Database

(GTD), Figure 4.2 demonstrates the overall trend in domestic terrorist events from 1970 to 2010.<sup>6</sup>

### Casualties from Terrorist Violence

The severity of terrorist violence has been measured as the total number of individuals wounded or killed in each event. The general trend in the literature favors an increasing lethality (Asal and Rethemeyer 2008, Asal, Phillips, and Rethmeyer 2013, Enders and Sandler 2000, Kurtulus 2011, Restrepo, Spagat, and Vargas 2003). Again utilizing data from the GTD, Figure 4.3 demonstrates the total number of people wounded and killed from terrorist violence.<sup>7</sup> While some parity exists between number and severity, several




Figure 4.2. Global trend in terrorist violence, 1970-2010

<sup>6</sup> Data from the GTD are continuous from 1970 to the present with the exception of the year 1993. Due to a loss of a large portion of the historical records for that year, no data are reported. The National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) which houses the database is working to recover this data and to provide a complete dataset in the future.

<sup>7</sup> The data indicate an abnormally large spike in casualties in 1983. Upon further investigation, including inquiries to START, it was determined that this spike was due to a database coding error which replaced the number of casualties with the estimate of damages in \$US (10,000). Extensive analysis determined no other erroneous codings, and the error will be corrected in the next release of the GTD.




Figure 4.3. Severity of terrorist violence, 1970-2010.

variations emerge. The general increase from 1970-1992 remains intact; however, the dramatic 80% drop in the rate of terrorist violence from 1994-2004 is not as clearly defined in the casualty data. Here, only a 50% drop occurs over a shorter period of 1998-2003. The trends then demonstrate considerable increases, mirroring each other from 2004 to 2007 before once again diverging. These trends have caused problems for researchers seeking to link the two. For the period from 2008 through 2010, the decline in casualties coupled with the increase in the rate of violence produces a paradox that runs contrary to the findings of several researchers that the lethality of terrorist violence is on the rise (Asal and Rethemeyer 2008, LaFree 2011, Laqueur 1999, Neumann 2009).

In an effort to better understand how terrorist violence is affected by the political opportunity structure within which it presents itself, both counts of terrorist violence and the severity of this violence--as measured by the number of casualties--will be used in the forthcoming models. By providing alternative methods for calculating levels of terrorist

violence within a state, it is hoped that more detailed information will emerge on how the interaction of repressive capacity and regime type affect terrorist violence.

Modeling the Effects of Political Opportunity Structure  
on Terrorist Violence

The model for investigating the relationships between regime type, repressive capacity, and their interactive effects (as key factors of the political opportunity structure within a state) and terrorist violence (as an expression of social movement action) is based on that used by Kis-Katos, Liebert, and Schulze (2011) in their efforts to distinguish determinants of domestic terrorism from those of international terrorism. Within their research design, they accurately refine determinants of terrorist activity into three groups of characteristics that closely align with the factors of political opportunity structures highlighted in the present study: 1) economic conditions (citing GDP/capita, economic freedom, and human development index), 2) political freedom and civil liberties (as a direct measure of the state's expressed repressive capacity), and 3) political stability (citing state structure and durability). Specific to the present study, their results demonstrate that “for each additional year of the past five years that a country spent in anarchy or transition, the number of terror incidents goes up by between 20 and 25%” and that “strongly democratic transition” (represented by at least a 3-level shift toward democracy)...has a strong [positive] impact on domestic terrorist violence” (Kis-Katos, Liebert, and Schulze 2011). This model supports the overarching theoretical basis of this dissertation, mainly that opportunity structures--here represented by regime type and repression--play a significant role in the manifestation of terrorist violence within states.

The "baseline specification" model utilized in the Kis-Katos, Liebert, and Schulze study relied on the number of domestic terrorist events as the dependent variable, with independent variables of population, GDP per capita (often representative of state capacity), trade openness, level of democratic effectiveness, and history of conflict. In order to expound upon their findings, this "baseline specification" will be utilized to first corroborate their results and then will be expanded to include two measures found to be significant in their advanced models that measure communication and percentage of population living in urban environments both proxies for economic development and level of infrastructure. The full model includes one of three variables to account for repression and a variable to model the interaction of democracy and the particular repression variable. Consistent with all of Kis-Katos, Liebert, and Schulze models, this first set of models rely on estimations utilizing fixed effects negative binomial regression (due to the overdispersion of country/year pairings with 0 events and the desire to observe changes within a state over time).

As a final analysis, each of these models is further tested by replacing the dependent variable of terrorist events with the severity of terrorist violence. These last models are constructed using a two-step selection process described by Greene (1994). The first step in this process consists of a probit model based on the presence or absence of events in a given year, requiring that the initial dependent variable be recoded as a simple bivariate for the presence or absence of terrorist events in a given country-year pair. The second incorporates a negative binomial regression based on the number of casualties in a given year for the selected cases and the inclusion of the inverse Mill's ratio from the probit model.



## Data

Number of domestic terrorist events. This variable is similar to the count variable constructed for Chapter 3. The GTD data will be refined to only those incidents of domestic terrorism. The circumstances and motivations behind terrorist violence differ greatly when distinguishing between events generated from within as opposed to those targeting foreign entities. Distinguishing domestic from transnational terrorist violence is difficult when data on the initiator of this violence are scant. Most events recorded in the GTD are realized by unknown actors. Two general arguments support the method for which domestic terrorist events will be coded for the present analysis. First, events are coded by the geographic location of the event as well as the nationality of the target of the event. Where target and location are equivalent, the event may be considered an attack from within. Where target and location differ, the event may be considered an external attack. Second, organizations perpetrating international terrorist events do so with an increased expectation for recognition. These organizations would therefore claim events at a higher rate than those performing acts within their own country. Organizations working from a weaker position within their own country may seek the protection of anonymity at greater rates than those working further out of reach of the targeted country. Given these two premises, a dummy variable for domestic terrorism will be created by filtering the data from the GTD such that if the location and target nationality are the same and the event is not claimed by an organization external to the location of the event, the event will be coded "1" for being an event of domestic terrorism. The remaining events will be coded "0" for transnational terrorism. This constitutes the best method for discerning between the two types of terrorist violence

given the limitations present in the available data and has been utilized by researchers to best separate the two species of events (Enders, Sandler, and Gaibullov 2011, Kis-Katos, Liebert, and Schulze 2011). These data will be aggregated at the yearly level by country. The result is a time-series data set for 210 countries from 1970 through 2012, and includes 46,261 instances of domestic terrorism.

Number of domestic casualties from terrorist events. This variable, derived from the domestic-only dataset constructed above, consists of two measures which will be aggregated annually. The first consists of the total number of individuals (targets and perpetrators) killed in any given event within a given country for a given year. The second consists of the total number of individuals (targets and perpetrators) wounded in any given event within a given country for a given year. A summation of the two measures yields the total casualties occurring for a given country/year pairing. Results of this calculation for the same 1970-2012 timeframe incorporate 106,477 wounded and 109,190 deaths from domestic terrorist events, culminating in 215,677 total casualties. It should be noted that the reported numbers of deaths and wounded are subject to some scrutiny, as the accuracy of reporting is difficult to determine in some instances. This is especially the case with nonlethal injuries. Given the GTD's propensity to report only the most accurate data available, a certain number of events show casualties and deaths as missing (6% of incidents for deaths; 9% of incidents for wounded). In any event, it is safe to assume that the numbers are a conservative estimate, and that the actual counts of wounded and killed by domestic terrorist violence are only greater.

State structure. The Polity IV Project by the Center for Systemic Peace provides a dataset of several measures that account for the differences between state structures.

Observing the general path of states toward a democratic or autocratic structure, a composite measure is provided for the level of authority characteristics for each path, resulting in an annual score for autocracy and democracy. Each of these is represented by an additive 11-point scale of 0 to 10, with 10 being highly autocratic/democratic, and 0 being no discernible characteristics of autocracy/democracy--often recognized as failed states, a state in transition, or under foreign occupation. A third measure derived from the previous two will be utilized for the present models. This measure, known as *polity2*, combines the autocratic and democratic measures by subtracting one from the other, resulting in a scale from -10 to 10 with -10 representing highly autocratic structures and 10 representing highly democratic structures. These data are available from 1800-2010. For the data during the 1970-2010 timeframe of this study, the data are available for between 132 and 166 countries.

Capacity. Researchers have utilized a variety of methods to measure state capacity. The previously reviewed comprehensive analysis of these measures conducted by Hendrix (2010) revealed that the most appropriate measure of state capacity--when investigating civil conflict--was bureaucratic quality. This factor was measured using the International Country Risk Guide's *bureaucratic quality* variable from the Political Risk Services Group. Data are constructed using a scale from 0 to 4 that relies on surveys of area experts with respect to a particular country's capacity to govern without drastically altering policy or interrupting government services. On this scale, higher scores indicate higher quality and thus greater capacity. However, as the manner by which repressive capacity is defined has been shown to support differing theoretical perspectives, the present analysis also incorporates measures of both latent and manifest military capacity

in the form of military strength and violations of personal integrity rights. Military strength is measured as the number of military personnel per 1000 members of the population. These data are derived from the Total Armed Forces Personnel and the Total Population data available from the World Bank database. The resulting data are available for 168 to 199 countries over the period of 1985 to 2010.<sup>8</sup> Violation of personal integrity rights was measured using the physical integrity index scores from the CIRI Human Rights Dataset developed by Cingranelli, Richard, and Clay (2014). This index utilizes *US State Department Country Reports on Human Rights Practices* and Amnesty International's *Annual Report* to derive scores based on the violation of rights to freedom from extrajudicial killing, disappearance, torture, and political imprisonment, which constitute a *physical integrity* score. This score is based on a scale of from 0 to 8 with higher numbers equating to greater respect for personal integrity rights. In order to more easily interpret the regression results, this variable was inversely coded such that 8 represented the highest level of violation and 0 represented the lowest. Data for this measure are available from 1981 and provide data on 202 countries.

Trade openness. Included in the models as an economic control, the openness of the economy for each state is measured by adding the state's annual exports and imports and dividing that sum by the total gross domestic product. These figures are derived from the Penn World Table maintained by the Center for International Comparisons at the University of Pennsylvania. Data for this measure are available from 1950 to 2010, and cover roughly 190 countries and territories.

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<sup>8</sup> World Bank data for Total Armed Forces Personnel are available in 1985 and from 1990-present. Data for 1986-1989 were produced through linear interpolation where both 1985 and 1990 data were present.

History of conflict. A variable was included in the Kis-Katos, Liebert, and Schulze model that demonstrated the level to which individual states may have been predisposed to political violence. Theoretical grounding for including this variable in the present study--other than to match the published findings--lies in Tilly's concept of repertoires of contention. A society mainly draws upon the program of violence it has experience with. Accounting for the state's experience with internal conflict will allow for interpretations free from bias in this regard. Data on conflict were derived from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP)/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset. This dataset lists each conflict, the years over which the conflict occurred, and the primary and secondary parties involved on both sides of the conflict from 1946 through 2010. Constructing this variable required parsing out which states were involved in each conflict, regardless of which side of the conflict the state was on or whether the state had a primary or secondary role in the conflict. Following the Kis-Katos, Liebert, and Schulze methodology, each country/year pairing was coded "1" if the state was involved in at least one conflict, and "0" if the state was not involved in any conflict. A running summation of the previous 5 years produces the variable utilized in the present models, ranging from 0 to 5 years of historical conflict.

Beyond accounting for historical state-level conflict, an additional variable providing the average number of terrorist events over the previous 5 years is included to account for the state's specific history of terrorist violence.

Decline. In order to capture the trend in the data on incidents of domestic terrorist violence, a period effect was introduced to identify the decline in terrorist activity from

1992 to 2004. The inclusion of this variable will aid in removing some of the noise inherent in the model.

Finally, several factors from the World Development Indicators of the World Bank are also utilized. These include *Population (total)* (as noted above), *GDP per capita (constant 2005 \$US)*, *Urban Population (% of total)*, as well as *Mobile Cellular Subscriptions* and *Telephone Lines* (aggregated to produce a composite indicator of the level of communications infrastructure). All World Bank indicators are available from 1980 to the present, with varying levels of coverage.

### Results and Discussion

All initial models were run on a constant sample of the data, resulting in 1740 observations of 77 countries over an average of 22.6 years.<sup>9</sup> These results are presented in the form of incidence rate ratios, demonstrating to what factor expected domestic terrorist violence increases for each unit increase in the explanatory variable of the model. The result is a value truncated at 0, but open on the positive end of the scale. The ratios are interpreted as decreasing for values less than 1.00 and increasing for values greater than 1.00. Thus a value of 0.05 would be interpreted as a 95% reduction in the dependent variable for each 1-level increase in the explanatory variable, and a value of 2.45 would be interpreted as a 145% increase in the dependent variable for each 1-level increase in the explanatory variable. All models were conducted using year fixed effects in order to account for any time-independent factors relating to the state such as terrain,

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<sup>9</sup> Tests for multicollinearity demonstrated effects within tolerances for each of the models. Max correlations < .56, VIFs (max/mean) Model 1 (5.8/2.85) Model 2 (5.93/2.95) Model 3 (6.98/3.74) Model 4 (5.85/2.77) Model 5 (5.86/2.84) Model 6 (6.66/3.05) Model 7 (7.94/4.01)

cultural fractionalization, etc. Table 4.1 presents the results of the first set of models evaluating the effects of repression on the prevalence of terrorist violence. Column 1 represents the baseline specification. These results are consistent with those of Kis-Katos, Liebert, and Schulze in direction, magnitude, and significance, giving confidence that the models and results can be compared and contrasted. Columns 2 through 7 represent models testing each of the three measures of state capacity to repress along with their interaction effects with regime type.

Immediately apparent in these results is that inclusion of each of the variables and interactions measuring state repressive capacity does not alter the direction of any of the baseline factors. The significance of these baseline factors varies only slightly, the greatest being the increase related to the urban variable when observing the measures of military capacity (manifest and latent), where results moved from nonsignificant to significant. When observing the effect of manifest military capacity to repress (*physint*), both the net effect and its interaction are positive and significant. A one-level increase in violation of physical integrity rights equates to a 20% increase in domestic terrorism. Substituting the repression variable for latent capacity to repress (*imilperspc*) demonstrates similar results for both the term and its interaction, though not as strong in magnitude. A one-level increase in the ratio of military personnel/1000 results in a 3% increase in incidents of domestic terrorism. The final measure, bureaucratic capacity for repression (*bureaucratic*), exhibits a similar result for the net effect, though the interaction effect is opposite those observed with the military capacity variables. A one-level increase in bureaucratic quality equates to an 11.1% increase in domestic terrorism.

Table 4.1. Repression and incidence results, negative binomial panel regressions with fixed effects

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	Kis- Katos	repress 1	interact 1	repress 2	interact 2	repress 3	interact 3
logpop	1.256** * (0.086)	1.195** (0.082)	1.186* (0.081)	1.243** (0.082)	1.332** * (0.095)	1.229** (0.085)	1.253** (0.088)
L.loggdppc	1.363** (0.102)	1.618** (0.128)	1.584** (0.125)	1.351** (0.101)	1.304** (0.099)	1.276** (0.105)	1.340** (0.115)
L.openc	0.995** (0.002)	0.993** (0.002)	0.993** (0.002)	0.992** (0.002)	0.995* (0.002)	0.995** (0.002)	0.995* (0.002)
L.polity2	1.057** (0.011)	1.066** (0.011)	1.042** (0.014)	1.063** (0.011)	1.049** (0.012)	1.054** (0.011)	1.081** (0.017)
conflict5yr	1.229** (0.030)	1.168** (0.029)	1.167** (0.029)	1.200** (0.030)	1.190** (0.030)	1.234** (0.030)	1.243** (0.030)
avgtotal5yrs	1.003** (0.001)	1.002* (0.001)	1.002** (0.001)	1.003** (0.001)	1.003** (0.001)	1.003** (0.001)	1.003** (0.001)
logcom	0.811** (0.036)	0.787** (0.034)	0.789** (0.034)	0.838** (0.037)	0.829** (0.036)	0.811** (0.036)	0.804** (0.035)
urban	0.992 (0.005)	0.989* (0.005)	0.988* (0.005)	0.987** (0.005)	0.989* (0.005)	0.994 (0.005)	0.994 (0.005)
decline	0.599** (0.045)	0.581** (0.043)	0.572** (0.043)	0.592** (0.044)	0.589** (0.044)	0.592** (0.045)	0.595** (0.045)
L.invphysint		1.200** (0.031)	1.254** (0.040)				
L.physintXpolit			1.009* (0.004)				
L.imilperspc				1.030** (0.007)	1.030** (0.007)		
L.milXpol					1.002** (0.001)		
L.bureaucratic						1.111+ (0.062)	1.184** (0.075)
L.burXpol							0.984* (0.008)
Country fixed	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
No.	1740	1740	1740	1740	1740	1740	1740
No. countries	77	77	77	77	77	77	77

Exponentiated coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses

+ p&lt;0.10 \* p&lt;.05 \*\* p&lt;.01 \*\*\* p&lt;.001"



## Regimes and Repression Revisited

Kis-Katos, Liebert, and Schulze found that democracy was positively related to incidence of terrorist violence. They argue that this is due to the fact that the presence and level of democracy does not reduce grievance to the same degree that it increases government constraint to use repressive measures. Their findings quietly assume the correlation between regime type and repression discussed earlier. Unfortunately, they do not offer any measurement of repression (latent or manifest) in their model to support this argument. By including the three measures of repressive capacity in models 2, 4, and 6, and their interactions in models 3, 5, and 7, we can more clearly understand this relationship and how it relates to the typology articulated by Tilly. Predicted values were attained for each of the interaction models based on thresholds specifying the four quadrants of Tilly's typology and are presented below as Figure 4.4 in order to facilitate further discussion.

The models indicate that--for domestic terrorist violence--greater levels of democracy correlate to greater numbers of events. A one-level increase in democracy results in a 4-8% increase in events. As shown above, the net effect of state capacity for repression on domestic terrorism varies based upon the measure used, though all three indicate increases in events with increases in repressive capacity.

Tilly's *high-capacity democracies* were theorized to exhibit low levels of violence based on open access to the political process and effective control of the means of violence. Interestingly, the interactions between polity and repression demonstrate the strongest effect in this category. Strong democracies exhibit the highest predicted increases in domestic terrorist events when their capacity to repress is greatest. The




Figure 4.4. Predicted domestic terrorist events based on measures of repressive capacity and regime type

effect is most evident when observing manifest repression in the form of physical integrity rights violations. Examples from the models of the most enduring of these repressive democracies include Colombia, India, the Philippines, Turkey, and Venezuela. While the effect is not strong enough to reverse the trend when observing latent bureaucratic capacity, it is attenuated. Higher levels of democracy and bureaucratic quality are predicted to produce lower rates of domestic terrorism. Countries from the models fitting this profile include Belgium, Canada, France, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Sweden, Thailand, and the United States. The key difference then is in the employment of repressive capacity. When the threat exists but is not used, events are predicted to decrease as Tilly's typology would suggest. When the threat is actively carried out, predicted events increase.

*Low-capacity democracies* (i.e., Bolivia, El Salvador, Haiti, Mali, Nicaragua, Senegal, and Sierra Leone) and *high-capacity nondemocratic* regimes (i.e., China, Iran, Jordan, Kenya, Libya, Niger, Syria, and Zimbabwe) exhibit the predicted intermediate levels of domestic terrorist violence. This appears to be the case regardless of the measure of repressive capacity. *Low-capacity nondemocratic* regimes (i.e., Congo (Kinshasa), Gabon, Haiti, Liberia, Paraguay, and Togo), thought to produce the highest levels of political violence, in fact demonstrate the lowest predicted rates of domestic terrorist violence. This counter-intuitive result may be due to differences in the nature of terrorist violence and political violence more generally. A weak despotic government may face substantial claims against it by more direct forms of violence. Remembering that terrorist violence is perpetrated against civilians by weaker organizations in order to promote change in the stronger regime, when that regime has little repressive capacity,

more conventional methods of political violence may outpace terrorism. Observing the levels of additional forms of political violence in these *low-capacity nondemocracies* may shed light on whether this postulate holds true. The next chapter will deal somewhat with this inquiry.

### Severity and Regime Type/Repression Models

The final series of models substitutes the dependent variable of domestic terrorist events with the number of casualties from these events.<sup>10</sup> The final constant sample resulting from the probit models consists of 617 observations of 59 countries over the same 22.6 year average. Results from the two-step selection models are presented in Table 4.2. Presented in incident rate ratios, these results depict to what degree the inclusive factors alter the predicted number of casualties per year.

The casualties baseline specification model aligns with the event-based model for the openness, regime type, percent urban, period effect, and conflict variables; however, only the openness and conflict variables retain any significance. Each one-level increase in openness results in a 1% reduction in casualties, while one additional year of conflict results in an 11% increase and a one-level increase in average events results in an increase of less than 1%. The population and GDP/capita variables retain significance, but in the opposite direction, as does the factor for communications. Where increases in population and economic development resulted in 26% and 36% increases in the events

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<sup>10</sup> Tests for multicollinearity produced VIFs (max/mean) that remain tolerable while warranting caution: Model 1 (6.75/3.05), Model 2 (7.00/3.18), Model 3 (7.73/3.87), Model 4 (6.83/3.00), Model 5 (7.06/3.18), Model 6 (6.84/3.14), Model 7 (8.78/4.09). High collinearity existed between variables for % living in urban areas and GDP/Capita (.82); however, this was expected as urbanization is a natural consequence of economic development.

Table 4.2. Repression and severity, 2-step selection model of negative binomial panel regressions (fixed effects)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Domestic	1.005*** (0.000)	1.005*** (0.000)	1.005*** (0.000)	1.004*** (0.000)	1.004*** (0.000)	1.004*** (0.000)	1.004*** (0.000)
Logpop	0.805** (0.067)	0.812* (0.067)	0.824* (0.069)	0.811* (0.076)	0.875 (0.091)	0.799** (0.067)	0.817* (0.069)
L.loggdppc	0.797** (0.063)	0.887 (0.080)	0.928 (0.088)	0.750*** (0.061)	0.729*** (0.061)	0.755** (0.066)	0.786** (0.073)
L.openc	0.995* (0.002)	0.993** (0.002)	0.994** (0.002)	0.994** (0.002)	0.997 (0.003)	0.995* (0.002)	0.995* (0.002)
L.polity2	1.003 (0.012)	1.000 (0.014)	1.014 (0.018)	1.007 (0.014)	0.992 (0.015)	1.003 (0.012)	1.017 (0.018)
conflict5yr	1.100** (0.039)	1.101** (0.039)	1.099** (0.039)	1.106** (0.042)	1.104* (0.043)	1.103** (0.039)	1.107** (0.040)
avgtotal5yrs	1.002+ (0.001)	1.001+ (0.001)	1.001+ (0.001)	1.003** (0.001)	1.003** (0.001)	1.002* (0.001)	1.002+ (0.001)
Logcom	1.116** (0.047)	1.092* (0.049)	1.081+ (0.049)	1.129** (0.050)	1.106* (0.052)	1.110* (0.047)	1.100* (0.047)
Urban	0.993+ (0.004)	0.989* (0.005)	0.989* (0.005)	0.995 (0.005)	0.998 (0.005)	0.994 (0.005)	0.994 (0.005)
Decline	0.921 (0.076)	0.919 (0.076)	0.909 (0.076)	0.911 (0.076)	0.906 (0.076)	0.916 (0.075)	0.903 (0.074)
Imr	0.366*** (0.101)	0.392** (0.130)	0.421** (0.141)	0.388** (0.124)	0.410* (0.144)	0.373*** (0.102)	0.380*** (0.104)
L.invphysint		1.047 (0.034)	1.022 (0.036)				
L.physintXpolity2			0.994 (0.004)				
L.imilperspc				1.004 (0.009)	0.992 (0.011)		
L.milXpol					1.002* (0.001)		
L.bureaucratic						1.089 (0.063)	1.141* (0.075)
L.burXpol							0.989 (0.008)
Country fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
No. of observations	664	659	659	640	640	664	664
No. of countries	61	61	61	60	60	61	61

Exponentiated coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses

+ p&lt;0.10 \* p&lt;.05 \*\* p&lt;.01 \*\*\* p&lt;.001

model, they result in decreases in casualties by rates of 20% and 23%, respectively. The communications factor, however, produces a positive effect. A one-level increase results in a 12% *increase* in casualties from domestic terrorism as opposed to a 19% *decrease* in domestic events.

In the discussion on methods for calculating the level of terrorist violence, it was hoped that by evaluating models based on the severity of violence we might gain greater insight into the influence of regime space on this particular form of contentious politics. The results of the models provide some evidence that this is the case. Most notably, the effects of regime space on the level of terrorist violence differ greatly from their effects on its severity. Approached from the perspective of these two tenets of political opportunity structures, it appears that severity is much more difficult to predict than prevalence. Clearly, population and economic development have a dampening effect on the severity of terrorist violence. However, the history of conflict--as measured by the number of years in the previous 5 in which the state was involved in some form of state-level conflict--matters much more than the level or the type of repressiveness the regime exhibits. The same is true for the state's history with domestic terrorism. In both cases, greater exposure leads to greater severity regardless of the number of events occurring in the given year. Across the board, the inverse Mills ratios lend to the argument that the more likely a state is to experience an event of domestic terrorism, the less likely it is that it will result in large numbers of casualties. The converse may also be true--the less likely the country is to experience an event, the more likely it is that when an event occurs, it will be severe.

One surprising finding involves the reverse in the direction of the effects of the communications variable. Measuring the total number of telephone lines and mobile phone subscriptions, this variable was intended to account for state-level characteristics of development and infrastructure, as control over this means of communication has been theorized to contribute to the state's bureaucratic capacity. However, the positive and significant effect in the severity models may speak to support of the resource mobilization component of political process theory. As a mobilizing technology, communication lines--especially the ongoing improvements to mobile phones--may serve as a mobilizing platform for more severe incidents of domestic terrorism. Alternatively, this technology may be viewed as a tool of the Weberian state to either repress or protect its citizens. To this extent, the control and use of communications technology may be a resource available to both the state and those opposing it. Further research on the influence of this particularly salient resource on terrorist violence--and social movements in general--could yield promising insights into its prominent role during the proliferation of recent movements known as the Arab Spring.

Of course, the present study is subject to several limitations that may influence both the magnitude and significance of the results for both dependent variables. First, the present study took into account two of the four standard tenets of political opportunity structures--regime type and capacity and willingness to repress--in order to include some empirical measures of political opportunity structure in the models where they only inferred as much. Including measures on the remaining tenets--the presence/absence of elite allies and the stability among elite alignments--might more clearly delineate the effects of Tilly's regime space on both the prevalence and severity of domestic terrorism.

In addition, the factors involved measure the level of action against the state as well as certain state-level characteristics. What is not included is any measure specifically accounting for the state's response. Including such responses supports the idea of continuous interaction between states and social movements, and is of significant import. This is a point made by Oliver (1993) in her review of models of collective action. Some data exist for measuring state responses, for example, the World Handbook of Political Indicators IV provides data from 1990 to 2004 on government sanctions and relaxations. Though somewhat limited in scope and duration, incorporating these measures into the models may account for significant amounts of error.

Though modeling the effects of repressive capacity and regime type on terrorist violence does not precisely fit within Tilly's predictions of political violence within his typology, with respect to the prevalence of domestic terrorism, the general models do conform to the findings of Kis-Katos, Liebert, and Schulze--as well as the majority of research studying this specific form of contentious politics. This supports the premise that domestic terrorist violence, though not identical to all other forms of political violence, can be studied utilizing tools designed to understand political opportunity structures.

### Summary

Much research has focused on the effects of democracy on social movements. Most findings support the argument that democracies, with liberalizing concepts such as civil liberties and political rights, give space for dissenting opinion to develop into manifestations such as demonstrations, general strikes, riots, and terrorist activity.



Results from the analyses in this chapter support that general trend. However, by utilizing Tilly's regime space typology to insert an additional dimension, these analyses provide further insight into that relationship. Focusing on the interaction of regime type with repressiveness, this chapter demonstrates that while domestic terrorist events are predicted to increase with democracy regardless of level of repressiveness, different types of repressiveness produce different results. Both latent and manifest repressive capacity--as measured by military size and physical integrity rights violations respectively--add to that effect. Bureaucratic quality attenuates the effect of regime type on domestic terrorist violence but does not reverse the trend. This final form of repression mitigates the effects of polity but does not overcome them. Perhaps this is simply due to the overtness of the former two and the covertness of the latter. Media coverage of state-directed atrocities and the presence of military personnel as a symbol of state power may fuel the embers of dissent, while bureaucratic quality--though increasing the state's capacity to process information about potential discord--provides some beneficial improvement to the quality of life of its members, cooling those embers but not extinguishing them. What is more difficult to predict is the intensity of the flames those embers produce. Further improvements in data collection and research to identify the particular factors most influential in this process are needed.

For now, it is time to determine whether or not models predicting domestic terrorist violence, as theorized throughout this dissertation, share any salient connections with other forms of contentious politics and collective action. Identifying these connections may ensure that terrorist violence and contentious politics do not continue the process of separation and isolation noted by Boyle in Chapter 1.

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## CHAPTER 5

### DOMESTIC TERRORISM AND NONVIOLENT PROTEST: ARROWS IN THE QUIVER OF SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

#### Introduction

The substance of the argument set forth at the outset of this dissertation is that there must be a strengthening of ties between the study of terrorist violence and the theories espoused by researchers on social movements. Boyle's warning that proceeding down the present path would be detrimental to both the study of social movements and the study of terrorist violence formed the initial spark for the analyses of the previous two chapters. By focusing on the specific tenet of political opportunity structures, it has been demonstrated that terrorist violence--much like corruption--can act as an alternative route to gaining power in the political process. It has also been demonstrated that terrorist violence seems to operate similar to other forms of political violence when observing the effects of two of the foundational concepts of political opportunity structures on its prevalence--regime type and capacity and willingness to repress. However, one final analysis must be made if the overarching argument--that terrorist violence should be considered a social movement action--is to aid in preventing Boyle's predictions that research on both terrorism and larger concept of contentious politics would suffer.

This final analysis will determine to what extent terrorist violence and non-violent protest--the most prominent and distinguishing feature of 20th-century social movement action--are influenced by the unique characteristics of the targets of their demonstrations--mainly, the state. The question comes down to whether or not social movement actions and other types of contentious politics are similarly influenced by the characteristics of regimes as the targets of those actions. Here the focus will again be on political opportunity structures as the point of interaction between claimant and target, but will also incorporate the extra-legal opportunity structure identified through the analysis of corruption and terrorist violence. Particularly, I will demonstrate whether terrorist violence and other forms of contentious politics such as nonviolent protest behave similarly under mainstream political opportunity structures and to what extent nonviolent protest, as an accepted and credible avenue of access to the political process, differs from terrorist violence when observed from the aspect of extralegal opportunity structures. These findings can significantly bolster the case for including terrorist violence within the repertoire of social movements. Before this analysis can be conducted, some additional groundwork surrounding social movements in general must be laid.

### The Social Movement Repertoire

Chapter 4 discussed the work of Charles Tilly (2010) with respect to regimes and repertoires of contention. Within that work, Tilly distinguishes between social movements and a host of other manifestations of contentious politics (i.e., military coups, civil wars, and revolutions). He highlighted these differences by stating that "they

[involve] sustained challenges to power-holders in the name of one or more populations living under the jurisdiction of those power-holders by means of public displays dramatizing those populations' worthiness, unity, numbers, and commitment (WUNC)" (Tilly 2010). In outlining the properties of social movements as a form of contentious politics, Tilly argues that "the causal regularities of social movements are those of contentious politics in general" (Ibid, p. 183) but that social movements are set apart from contentious politics by "the combination of sustained campaigns, public performances, and demonstrations of [WUNCs]" (Ibid, p. 185). The case for inclusion of terrorist violence within the repertoire of social movements--something Tilly avoids at great lengths-- is made based on the commonalities among the elements he assigns to it: campaigns of claim-making; an *array of public performances* (the repertoire); and repeated public displays designed to mobilize and perpetuate support (i.e., displaying signs, wearing colors, singing militant songs). What remains to be shown is whether this case can be empirically demonstrated. In order to accomplish this, the various forms of social movement action must first be identified and quantified.

Fortunately, this herculean feat has been undertaken as part of the massive ongoing effort to collect and collate sociologically significant state-level data initiated by Arthur Banks known as the Cross-National Time-Series (CNTS) Data Archive . As part of this effort, Banks and his colleagues have identified eight unique forms of domestic conflict and amassed counts of their occurrence since the early 1960s. These social movement actions are among the many forms of action by which groups may contend with each other in determining the manner by which society is to function. Within this repertoire, as discussed in Chapter 2, are means both peaceful and violent. Seven of



Banks' eight forms can quickly be separated into these two identifiers. Assassinations, guerrilla warfare, purges (government initiated), riots, and revolutions comprise the form of violent conflict while general strikes and antigovernment demonstrations comprise the nonviolent form of conflict. In order to accomplish the goals of this final analysis, actions from both types must be compared with the main object of inquiry throughout this dissertation--domestic terrorism.

### Actions and Their Precipitants

The simplest method for doing this is to utilize the models derived for predicting political violence used in the previous chapters and replace the dependent variable of domestic terrorist violence with incidents of the other forms of contentious politics highlighted by the CNTS data archive. First, however, some mention must be made of how the predictive factors of terrorist violence stack up when attempting to predict the nonviolent actions on the other end of the scale. Evidence in the literature supports the inclusion of many of the factors identified in the models for political violence as also being predictive of these additional forms of contentious politics--especially nonviolent antigovernment protest. Prior research on the key factors of regime type and repressive capacity, as well as economic development, urbanization, and education is outlined below.

With respect to regime type, Scarritt, McMillan, and Mozaffar (2001) find that democracy and worker-student protests were mutually reinforcing in their study of ethno-political protest in Africa. In his study of antinuclear protests in Europe, Kitschelt (1986) observed that strong and open regimes (Tilly's upper right quadrant of *high-*

*capacity democracies*) exhibited the most effective programs of antinuclear nonviolent protest while the same strategy in weak and closed regimes resulted in little policy change. This sentiment is echoed in a letter to John Saul by Rusty Bernstein, the outspoken proponent of the anti-apartheid campaign in South Africa. In it, Bernstein discusses the ineffectiveness of nonviolent political protest in repressive regimes, stating that the turning point in the liberation of South Africa came with the decision to abandon its exclusive reliance on nonviolent campaigning (Bernstein and Saul 2007). Though not the main means of liberation--and later abandoned by the anti-apartheid movement--the use of violent conflict emphasized the campaign's commitment and pressed the regime in ways that nonviolent protest could not (Zunes 1999). These points emphasize the statement that political opportunity structures, as mapped by Tilly's regime space, explain the "enormous concentration of social movements in democratic regimes, especially high-capacity, democratic regimes" (Tilly 2010).

The effect of urbanization on both nonviolent and violent contentious politics has been shown to reduce the propensity for contentious politics (Buhaug and Urdal 2013). More urban populations have been theorized to be easier to control, being more proximal to the governmental means of authority (Herbst 2000). Education has been demonstrated to increase the commitment of social movements to nonviolent action and increase the desire to contest repressive regimes (Hall, Rodeghier, and Useem 1986). How education level affects nonviolent protest when observing its incidence rate in extra-legal opportunity structures may differ substantially. Though their effects may vary greatly in direction and magnitude, what is noteworthy is that each of the aforementioned factors have been observed as precipitants of social movement action in general, regardless of

the violent or nonviolent nature of that action. This lends to the overarching emphasis of this dissertation--that domestic terrorism should be considered a form of social movement action and studied similarly.

Based on the reviewed literature and the previous studies, it is anticipated that the results of the comparisons to follow will be somewhat intuitive. First, the nonviolent forms of contentious politics should more readily approximate the models of violent protest when attempting to predict them from the more traditional views of political opportunity structures. In the models observing regime type and repressive capacity, we would expect the impact of factors to be more similar between violent and nonviolent actions. In the extra-legal models--which attempt to capture the effects of factors outside the more polite, peaceful, and civilized process of political dissent--we would expect greater disparity between the two types, culminating in very poor predictive capacity for the less violent forms.

#### Data on Forms of Contentious Politics (Social Movement Action)

Nearly all of the data used in the analyses in this chapter have been described in the previous two chapters. The only data not introduced to this point are those depicting the alternative dependent variables. Though a brief overview was provided earlier in this chapter, a more detailed description of the CNTS data is called for here before proceeding to the analyses. The CNTS data archive includes--among its vast array of state-level characteristics--the eight domestic conflict event variables mentioned above. These variables are adopted from Rudolph J. Rummel's (1963) "Dimensions of Conflict Within and Between Nations" and are described as follows:

*Assassinations*--Any politically motivated murder or attempted murder of a high government official or politician

*General Strikes*--Any strike of 1,000 or more industrial or service workers that involves more than one employer and that is aimed at the national government policies or authority

*Guerrilla Warfare*--Any armed activity, sabotage, or bombings carried on by independent bands of citizens or irregular forces and aimed at the overthrow of the present regime

*Major Government Crises*--Any rapidly developing situation that threatens to bring the downfall of the present regime--excluding situations of revolt aimed at such overthrow

*Purges*--Any systematic elimination by jailing or execution of political opposition within the ranks of the regime or the opposition

*Riots*--Any violent demonstration or clash of more than 100 citizens involving the use of physical force

*Revolutions*--Any illegal or forced change in the top government elite, any attempt at such a change, or any successful or unsuccessful armed rebellion whose aim is independence from the central government

*Antigovernment Demonstrations*--Any peaceful public gathering of at least 100 people for the primary purpose of displaying or voicing their opposition to government policies or authority, excluding demonstrations of a distinctly antiforeign nature

The present analyses rely only on data for the *Assassinations*, *Riots*, *General Strikes*, and *Antigovernment Demonstrations* variables. This restriction is due to the fact that the *Revolutions* and *Guerrilla warfare* variables are too closely related to the definition of terrorist violence espoused throughout these chapters, that the *Government Crises* variable is too vague in its definition, and that the *Purges* variable contains data on both the opposition and the state. As it stands, the analyses will include the reference category of domestic terrorist violence along with two measures each of violent and non-violent actions. The data for each variable are mostly derived from mentions in The New

York Times, and represent the number of events of each particular sort in a given year for a given country. Data are available from 1815 through 2012, and cover over 200 countries. A note should be made as to the validity of data derived from the CNTS data archive. While the data have been utilized extensively by sociological researchers, some have noted that overreliance on the single source and arbitrary coding methods may contribute to significant bias (Bell et al. 2013, Nam 2006). However, as the availability of more detailed are not available, the risk of potential bias will have to be assumed.

As indicated, models from the previous two chapters will be utilized as a platform for determining the feasibility of measuring the five different forms of contentious political action in the same way. Each of the four additional forms will be analyzed first with the extra-legal opportunity structure model of Chapter 3 before being analyzed with each of the three measures for repression in the political opportunity structure models of Chapter 4.

## Results

Table 5.1 represents the results of the extra-legal opportunity structure models across the various forms of contentious politics contained in the CNTS data archive. Tables 5.2-5.4 represent the results of models measuring the regime type and repressive capacity tenets of the more mainstream political opportunity structure. All models are negative binomial fixed effects regressions and were run utilizing constant samples, though the sample between each set of models differed somewhat.

Table 5.1 Negative binomial regressions for extra-legal POS models with various forms of contentious politics

	(1) domestic terror	(2) Assassin	(3) general strikes	(4) riots	(5) anti-gov protests
Corruption	0.844+ (0.076)	0.735+ (0.117)	0.782 (0.119)	1.200 (0.160)	1.135 (0.116)
L2.corruption	0.784** (0.065)	0.938 (0.145)	0.581*** (0.091)	0.862 (0.108)	0.960 (0.091)
coerc	0.774*** (0.034)	0.802** (0.065)	0.945 (0.065)	0.818** (0.057)	0.921 (0.049)
L.coerc	0.901* (0.039)	0.819* (0.064)	1.010 (0.065)	1.026 (0.072)	0.975 (0.051)
repress	1.923** (0.477)	0.701 (0.268)	1.289 (0.509)	1.825 (0.709)	1.784* (0.479)
repress2	0.935* (0.029)	1.072 (0.050)	0.960 (0.054)	0.946 (0.046)	0.951 (0.033)
loggdppc	0.120*** (0.050)	0.175+ (0.160)	0.093** (0.083)	3.085* (1.735)	1.313 (0.607)
ieineq	0.966* (0.016)	1.049 (0.034)	1.019 (0.029)	1.027 (0.024)	1.024 (0.019)
logpop	0.008*** (0.006)	0.007** (0.010)	0.133 (0.204)	0.604 (0.713)	0.537 (0.478)
primary	1.038*** (0.011)	0.988 (0.017)	0.976 (0.019)	0.978 (0.016)	1.012 (0.012)
tertiary	0.949 (0.049)	0.981 (0.104)	0.716*** (0.064)	0.936 (0.084)	0.998 (0.061)
L.eventnat	1.005*** (0.001)	1.002+ (0.001)	0.999 (0.001)	1.001 (0.001)	1.000 (0.001)
gtd1984	0.657* (0.111)	0.504* (0.142)	0.914 (0.213)	1.807* (0.457)	1.083 (0.211)
gtd2005	2.505*** (0.507)	0.620 (0.230)	0.574 (0.237)	0.704 (0.212)	0.720 (0.160)
No. of Observations	1254	1252	1252	1251	1252
No. of Countries					
Country Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
BIC	6559.417	1846.771	1523.623	2217.525	3161.811

Exponentiated coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses

+ p&lt;0.10 \* p&lt;.05 \*\* p&lt;.01 \*\*\* p&lt;.001

Table 5.2 Negative binomial regressions for POS models (polity and physical integrity rights violations)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
	terror	terror interaction	assassin	assassin interaction	riots	riots interaction	gen strikes	gen strikes interaction	anti-gov protests	protests interaction
logpop	1.206** (0.083)	1.213** (0.083)	1.512* (0.245)	1.586** (0.261)	1.110 (0.144)	1.152 (0.152)	2.736* (1.126)	2.730* (1.082)	1.066 (0.108)	1.098 (0.114)
L.loggdppc	1.601*** (0.124)	1.545*** (0.120)	1.404+ (0.255)	1.315 (0.245)	0.651*** (0.084)	0.632*** (0.083)	0.910 (0.173)	0.904 (0.171)	0.823+ (0.082)	0.804* (0.081)
L.openc	0.993** (0.003)	0.992** (0.003)	1.003 (0.005)	1.003 (0.005)	0.990* (0.005)	0.991* (0.005)	1.004 (0.006)	1.004 (0.006)	0.998 (0.003)	0.999 (0.003)
L.polity2	1.061*** (0.010)	1.018 (0.014)	1.035* (0.017)	0.992 (0.023)	1.009 (0.013)	0.980 (0.019)	1.033* (0.016)	1.019 (0.026)	0.988 (0.010)	0.969* (0.015)
conflict5yr	1.147*** (0.028)	1.144*** (0.027)	0.991 (0.047)	0.991 (0.047)	1.016 (0.036)	1.015 (0.036)	1.063 (0.044)	1.062 (0.043)	1.099** (0.032)	1.097** (0.032)
avgtotal5yrs	1.002** (0.001)	1.002*** (0.001)	1.003* (0.001)	1.004** (0.001)	0.996** (0.002)	0.996* (0.002)	0.998+ (0.001)	0.998+ (0.001)	0.998* (0.001)	0.998* (0.001)
logcom	0.795*** (0.032)	0.791*** (0.031)	0.669*** (0.057)	0.665*** (0.056)	0.882* (0.051)	0.870* (0.050)	0.557*** (0.054)	0.557*** (0.053)	0.858** (0.041)	0.849*** (0.041)
urban	0.991* (0.004)	0.991* (0.004)	0.997 (0.011)	0.998 (0.011)	1.034*** (0.009)	1.034*** (0.009)	1.028+ (0.015)	1.027+ (0.015)	1.036*** (0.008)	1.036*** (0.008)
decline	0.552*** (0.043)	0.539*** (0.042)	1.880*** (0.252)	1.786*** (0.240)	0.603*** (0.069)	0.585*** (0.067)	0.906 (0.110)	0.899 (0.110)	1.102 (0.091)	1.079 (0.090)
L.invphysint	1.213*** (0.030)	1.310*** (0.042)	1.194*** (0.053)	1.265*** (0.065)	1.091* (0.037)	1.121** (0.041)	1.108** (0.043)	1.128** (0.053)	1.120*** (0.030)	1.145*** (0.035)
L.physintXpolity2		1.016*** (0.004)		1.016* (0.007)		1.009+ (0.005)		1.004 (0.006)		1.006 (0.004)
No. of Observations	1394	1394	1394	1394	1394	1394	1394	1394	1394	1394
No. of Countries	47	47	47	47	47	47	47	47	47	47
Country Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
BIC	5854.230	5845.802	1647.041	1648.137	2266.833	2270.305	1573.526	1580.289	3417.458	3422.062

Exponentiated coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses

+ p<.10 \* p<.05 \*\* p<.01 \*\*\* p<.001

Table 5.3 Negative binomial regressions for POS models (polity and size of military)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
	terror	terror interaction	Assassin	assassin interaction	riots	riots interaction	gen strikes	gen strikes interaction	anti-gov protests	protests interaction
Logpop	1.435*** (0.102)	1.442*** (0.104)	1.337 (0.246)	1.359 (0.254)	1.124 (0.161)	1.134 (0.164)	2.507** (0.890)	2.522* (0.916)	1.054 (0.117)	1.069 (0.118)
L.loggdppc	1.260** (0.103)	1.267** (0.106)	1.217 (0.249)	1.058 (0.226)	0.724* (0.102)	0.684** (0.098)	1.112 (0.260)	1.142 (0.281)	0.865 (0.094)	0.815+ (0.091)
L.openc	0.999 (0.003)	0.999 (0.003)	1.001 (0.005)	1.001 (0.005)	0.996 (0.005)	0.995 (0.005)	1.001 (0.005)	1.001 (0.005)	0.997 (0.003)	0.997 (0.003)
L.polity2	1.043*** (0.012)	1.047** (0.016)	1.024 (0.019)	0.982 (0.026)	1.004 (0.015)	0.980 (0.020)	1.021 (0.020)	1.027 (0.025)	0.996 (0.012)	0.971+ (0.017)
conflict5yr	1.197*** (0.032)	1.197*** (0.032)	1.076 (0.050)	1.079 (0.051)	1.022 (0.040)	1.015 (0.040)	1.090* (0.047)	1.092* (0.047)	1.112*** (0.035)	1.112*** (0.035)
avgtotal5yrs	1.004*** (0.001)	1.004*** (0.001)	1.005*** (0.001)	1.005*** (0.001)	0.998 (0.002)	0.998 (0.002)	0.999 (0.001)	0.999 (0.001)	0.999 (0.001)	0.999 (0.001)
Logcom	0.827*** (0.033)	0.824*** (0.034)	0.687*** (0.059)	0.694*** (0.061)	0.885* (0.052)	0.906 (0.055)	0.588*** (0.055)	0.585*** (0.056)	0.875** (0.043)	0.889* (0.044)
Urban	0.992+ (0.005)	0.992+ (0.005)	0.999 (0.012)	1.005 (0.013)	1.024* (0.010)	1.025** (0.010)	1.002 (0.015)	1.001 (0.016)	1.025** (0.008)	1.027*** (0.008)
Decline	0.512*** (0.041)	0.510*** (0.041)	1.860*** (0.252)	1.908*** (0.257)	0.608*** (0.074)	0.627*** (0.077)	0.984 (0.125)	0.976 (0.125)	1.114 (0.098)	1.140 (0.101)
L.imilperspc	1.045*** (0.010)	1.051** (0.019)	0.983 (0.022)	0.949+ (0.028)	0.992 (0.018)	0.956 (0.028)	0.987 (0.026)	0.998 (0.038)	1.000 (0.015)	0.967 (0.022)
L.milXpol		0.999 (0.002)		1.009* (0.004)		1.005+ (0.003)		0.998 (0.004)		1.005* (0.003)
No. of Observations	1209	1209	1209	1209	1209	1209	1209	1209	1209	1209
No. of Countries	44	44	44	44	44	44	44	44	44	44
Country Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
BIC	4959.133	4966.083	1513.995	1516.253	1855.825	1860.126	1351.045	1357.988	2906.122	2908.846

Exponentiated coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses

+ p<0.10 \* p<.05 \*\* p<.01 \*\*\* p<.001



Table 5.3 Negative binomial regressions for POS models (polity and bureaucratic quality)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
	terror	terror interaction	assassin	assassin interaction	riots	riots interaction	gen strikes	gen strikes interaction	anti-gov protests	protest interaction
Logpop	1.215* (0.104)	1.237* (0.106)	1.515* (0.283)	1.486* (0.277)	1.075 (0.169)	1.104 (0.175)	2.895** (0.940)	3.181** (1.120)	1.068 (0.132)	1.067 (0.132)
L.loggdppc	1.369*** (0.129)	1.418*** (0.136)	1.276 (0.268)	1.353 (0.292)	0.500*** (0.092)	0.541** (0.105)	1.070 (0.270)	1.206 (0.339)	0.871 (0.128)	0.879 (0.133)
L.openc	0.995+ (0.003)	0.995+ (0.003)	1.003 (0.005)	1.003 (0.005)	0.991+ (0.005)	0.991+ (0.005)	1.002 (0.005)	1.003 (0.005)	0.997 (0.003)	0.997 (0.003)
L.polity2	1.045*** (0.012)	1.076*** (0.021)	1.039* (0.020)	1.065* (0.030)	0.980 (0.017)	1.008 (0.026)	1.018 (0.020)	1.049* (0.026)	0.970* (0.013)	0.973 (0.018)
conflict5yr	1.310*** (0.036)	1.316*** (0.036)	1.091+ (0.054)	1.092+ (0.054)	0.985 (0.042)	0.994 (0.043)	1.059 (0.052)	1.075 (0.053)	1.081* (0.037)	1.082* (0.037)
avgtotal5yrs	1.002*** (0.001)	1.002*** (0.001)	1.003* (0.001)	1.004* (0.002)	0.998 (0.002)	0.997 (0.002)	0.999 (0.001)	0.999 (0.001)	0.999 (0.001)	0.999 (0.001)
logcom	0.819*** (0.040)	0.817*** (0.040)	0.596*** (0.062)	0.603*** (0.062)	0.929 (0.063)	0.925 (0.062)	0.539*** (0.059)	0.546*** (0.059)	0.919 (0.050)	0.920 (0.051)
urban	0.990+ (0.005)	0.990+ (0.005)	1.005 (0.012)	1.001 (0.013)	1.040*** (0.012)	1.039** (0.012)	1.016 (0.018)	1.009 (0.020)	1.026* (0.010)	1.026* (0.010)
decline	0.489*** (0.041)	0.490*** (0.041)	1.845*** (0.260)	1.857*** (0.262)	0.580*** (0.074)	0.583*** (0.074)	0.993 (0.134)	1.001 (0.134)	1.181+ (0.110)	1.183+ (0.110)
L.bureaucratic	1.133* (0.071)	1.250** (0.101)	1.018 (0.115)	1.127 (0.157)	1.364*** (0.128)	1.419*** (0.140)	1.090 (0.136)	1.279+ (0.181)	1.034 (0.074)	1.043 (0.081)
L.burXpol		0.981+ (0.010)		0.980 (0.016)		0.983 (0.012)		0.966* (0.015)		0.997 (0.009)
No. of Observations	1089	1089	1089	1089	1089	1089	1089	1089	1089	1089
No. of Countries	44	44	44	44	44	44	44	44	44	44
Country Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
BIC	4505.095	4508.373	1433.081	1438.533	1652.260	1657.097	1248.413	1250.548	2567.742	2574.655

Exponentiated coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses

+ p<0.10 \* p<.05 \*\* p<.01 \*\*\* p<.001

### Extra-legal Opportunity Structure Models

In the models predicting levels of action based on factors pertinent to illicit opportunity structures (Table 5.1), the models have very poor predictive capacity outside of terrorist violence. The next-most-closely associated form of social movement action is that of assassinations. Here, the models share significance and direction for change in corruption level (increased corruption = decreased action), physical integrity rights (greater respect = fewer actions), economic development (improvement = fewer actions), population (higher pop = fewer actions), and history of violent action (more incidents in previous year = more actions in the current year).

The similarities in results for these two violent forms of actions may be due to the fact that both lie on the extreme end of actions and they both rely on fewer participants to carry out the action than the remaining forms of riots, strikes, and protests. In those instances, the models' predictive power is very poor. Perceived corruption only reaches significance when observing general strikes against the government, and then only when observing its lagged effect. This finding is intriguing, as it would be expected that higher levels of corruption would increase the propensity for action. What may be at play here is the effectiveness of the illicit opportunity structure in co-opting protest. Future research on the interplay of corruption and the means of dissent is needed to corroborate this speculation.

Another significant observation is that under the illicit opportunity structure model, economic development demonstrates a significantly large effect on the prevalence of riots. The basic interpretation of this effect is that richer countries experience greater numbers of riots. It appears that per-capita GDP, which can be utilized as a proxy for a

host of underlying factors, is soaking up a large proportion of the variance in the model. Adjusting the model to incorporate more specific factors predictive of riotous violence may attenuate this rather large effect.

Finally, with respect to antigovernment protests, the only factor reaching significance is the measure for repression (a combination of civil liberties and political rights scores from Freedom House's Freedom in the World ratings). This finding is significant when expanding to the general thesis that social movement actions consist of a variety of violent and nonviolent means--including terrorist violence. These results demonstrate that repression influences the prevalence of more moderate forms of action even in the presence of factors indicative of more illicit opportunity structures.

#### Political Opportunity Structure Models

Overall, the models investigating non-violent protest that produce the most significance are those pertaining to the inclusion of actual repression as opposed to those including measures of repressive capacity. This may attest to the idea that actual repression is a more tangible and salient touchstone for protest in any form than the potential that states may possess to repress. When including the measure of violations against physical integrity rights, polity and its interactive effect with physical integrity rights, conflict, communications, economic development, urbanization, and repression all produce significant results for a majority of the actions tested. This is especially the case for the interaction of polity and physical integrity rights violations (see Fig. 5.2). Here, while increases in violations predict significant increases in events of every sort, the interactive effects only predict significant increases with respect to the violent forms of

protest. Reaching back to Tilly's regime space, the results provide evidence for the prediction that--when exercising their high-capacity--democratic regimes, may experience greater levels of violent antigovernment action.

Of particular note, the two measures for conflict (state-level conflict over the past 5 years and the average number of total of terrorist events over the same period) behave differently when observing violent and nonviolent action. While increases in state-level conflict result in increases in actions of every sort, only the more violent forms of domestic terrorism and assassinations are predicted to increase in the presence of higher averages of terrorist violence. All other forms (including riots) are predicted to decrease with more terrorism. This may speak to the rational-choice perspective of social movement action. When terrorism is an active component, other forms of contentious politics may not be as effective.

There is one final note to be made with respect to the effectiveness of the models. As indicated by the BIC statistics for each set of models, while the domestic terrorism models produce the most significance, they do not provide the best fit among the forms of contentious politics. This may be due to both the rarity of terrorist events and the clustering of these events within certain regions and countries. Observing regional effects for the models may help improve this limitation.

### Summary

The intent laid out at the beginning of this chapter was to determine to what extent the various forms of contentious politics can be said to operate in similar fashion under similar conditions as described by the characteristics of their target--the state.

Although there are some similarities between the different types of actions available to social movements, significant differences remain. Support exists for the inclusion of all of these forms of action within the social movement repertoire, but further research must be accomplished in order to improve the models predictive capacity with respect to each individual form. The effect of communication on all forms of contentious politics remains a significant finding and the primary point of departure for continuing research. As viewed through the tenets of political opportunity structures, its varied effects on the prevalence of these distinct forms of action may provide substantial understanding on the diverse outcomes of movements in the recent phenomenon of the Arab Spring.

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## CHAPTER 6

### CONCLUSION

The overarching theme to this dissertation has been the idea that domestic terrorist violence can and ought to be considered as one of the many forms of social movement action. Viewed as social movement action, domestic terrorist violence becomes a response to the state by those wishing to alter the current form of social order. Reviewing the sociological theories available for defending this position, the most cogent and easily presented theoretical basis for this idea lies in the concept of political opportunity structures. With the capacity for accommodating numerous factors influencing the particular structure created in each instance, observing political opportunity structures seems an ideal fit for attempting to understand the varied experiences states have with domestic terrorist violence. In each instance, a social movement's interaction with a particular political opportunity structure presents a profile of action and potential use of those actions (Tilly's "repertoires of contention"). Adhering to this line of reasoning, the various analyses demonstrated the unique characteristics domestic terrorist violence exhibits when viewed as social movement action. Couched in the concepts of political opportunity structures, the empirical analyses of this dissertation attempted to answer three poignant questions:

- 1) How does domestic terrorist violence fit conceptually within the concept of political opportunity structures?
- 2) How does variation in the characteristics of the political opportunity structure alter the manifestation of terrorist violence?
- 3) Do other forms of social movement action (both violent and nonviolent) behave in a similar manner as domestic terrorist violence?

Chapter 3 focused specifically on the concept of state-level corruption as it pertains to the emergence of domestic terrorist violence. This effort sought to determine if corruption operated as a catalyst for domestic terrorist violence by those unable to access the legitimate political opportunity structure or if it mitigated domestic terrorist violence by allowing those utilizing corruption to 'peaceably' maintain the level of influence they desired. The outcome of the study demonstrated that the latter is much more consistent with the data. Corruption and domestic terrorist violence share space as components of an extralegal opportunity structure. When the avenue of corruption was diminished by anticorruption campaigns, domestic terrorism increased significantly. In instances where the particular path of corruption could not be employed to gain political influence, organizations seeking that influence utilized alternative strategies--terrorism being a significant item on the list--to fill the gap.

Chapter 4 observed the effects of two of the conventional tenets of political opportunity structures on the prevalence and severity of domestic terrorist violence. Results from this study demonstrated that regime type and repressive capacity significantly influenced the prevalence of terrorism, but not its severity. The findings in the literature that democracy increases the prevalence of social movement action--



political violence specifically--are corroborated by the results of this study. While the effect of democracy held true, including the repressive capacity of the state produced results that differed significantly from those expected by Tilly in his description of regime space. These results refined Tilly's concept of regime space with respect to political violence. While Tilly expected to observe low levels of violence in *high-capacity democratic* regimes, when observing terrorist violence, greater levels of democracy and capacity exhibit the greatest levels of terrorist violence. These findings attest to the inclusion of domestic terrorism as a form of political violence--and therefore social movement action--while at the same time demonstrating its distinct nature in the face of more complex models of political opportunity structures.

At the outset of this dissertation, terrorist violence was theorized to exist within the realm of social movement action. Chapter 5 sought to compare several disparate types of social movement action utilizing the models from the previous analyses in an effort to demonstrate their interrelatedness. Analyzing the results of the models applied to various forms of both violent and nonviolent action demonstrated that none of these forms conformed to the extralegal opportunity structure model to the degree of domestic terrorism. This attests to the notion that terrorist violence--as an action--may be employed by diverse groups for similarly wide-ranging purposes, and that at least two of those purposes include accessing the political opportunity structures of the state. The remaining models produced results upholding this notion. While the results of the models somewhat approximated those of the domestic terrorism models, the differences demonstrate the need to distinguish and accurately model these disparate types of social movement action. Based on the results of this latter analysis, the space of social

movement action might be roughly conceptualized by the Venn diagram presented in Figure 6.1. Here, while the less violent forms of general strikes and protests may overlap substantially in description and contributive factors, they share some of that space with the more violent forms of action. The diagram in Figure 6.1 is notional, and only marginally influenced by the results of the analyses contained in this dissertation, but it provides a initial canvas upon which to work. Further research in understanding this space of social movement action will clarify these relationships. Still, this is not the only potential source for future research on domestic terrorism's inclusion as social movement action.

### Future Research

I imagine the goal of any researcher is to answer the question initially stated at the commencement of the research process. It has become much clearer to me, as this process has unfolded, that one of the greatest benefits in attempting to achieve that goal is the proliferation of additional questions that arise throughout the journey. Effective




Figure 6.1. Conceptualization of actions within repertoire of social movements

research, while not always providing answers to the initial question, stimulates additional inquiry. Throughout the process of producing this dissertation, a plethora of tangential questions have arisen. It is as if the end result were to be compared to the construction of a well. Though hastily dug and meagerly protected, some water has been found at the bottom. This well's rough-hewn structure now provides a source from which to draw a lifetime of research. As testament to the richness of the resource tapped by this well, several of the questions that have arisen are outlined below.

In defining the repertoires available to social movements, Tilly (2010) makes a particular point that "activists in today's European cities...stay away from suicide-bombing, hostage-taking, and self-immolation" (p. 35) because it is outside the "repertoire already established for their place, time and [claimant-object] pair" (p. 35). However, in other parts of the world, it appears that this established repertoire allows for such actions. Of significant interest and potential implications, regional differences may provide substantial insight into the emergence and perpetuation of domestic terrorism as social movement action. This factor was not included in the models replicated in the analyses conducted for this dissertation; however, observing the event data demonstrates that a significant number of these events occur during specific times in specific locations. During the 1980s, events clustered in the countries of Central and South America. The most recent era centers terrorist activity in the Maghreb, Middle East, and South Asia. Observing under what conditions were present as domestic terrorism arose in each of these periods and contrasting these with particular regions with similar conditions where terrorism did not proliferate would provide greater understanding of how and where it can be expected to emerge in the repertoire.

The previous research question might be subsumed under a broader investigation of social movement action in general. The final analyses of Chapter 5 were far from all-inclusive in describing the relationships between the various forms of social movement action. Seeking out improved data sources on each of these actions, identifying the trends of their emergence, and uncovering the potential interrelatedness and dependence of these disparate types of action on each other will aid in better telling the story of social movement action. It may also provide insight and some predictive capacity on when and in what manner the more violent forms might manifest themselves.

While political opportunity structures provided the 'structure' upon which the analyses were constructed, the concept of extra-legal opportunity structures has also been raised. These structures are inherently more difficult to define and quantify. However, two of the components--corruption and domestic terrorism--have been linked through the results in Chapter 3. What other mechanisms operate within these structures and how do they relate to each other? Identifying these additional tenets of extra-legal opportunity structures would shine light on a corner of the political process model that could explain significant amounts of the variance seen in models relying solely on the formal process.

The second set of models from Chapter 4 produced poor results as to predictive capacity of the severity of domestic terrorist violence. Though difficult to predict to this point, improving upon the initial model---or developing a more appropriate one with respect to the severity of violence--is an effort that needs to be made. Through better understanding the factors leading to the most severe cases of terrorist violence, researchers may be able to stem the tide of loss of life and severe injury, relegating terrorist violence to a more terror-less form. Related to this inquiry is the idea that

among the groups that utilize terrorist violence, some are more violent than others, inflicting greater casualty rates. What relationship exists between those who practice indiscriminant violence to an indiscriminant degree of severity, and those who do so selectively? Is there a form of terror-less terrorism that relies on the fear of severe casualties without ever inflicting them themselves?

A surprising finding emerged when conducting a meta-analysis of the results of the severity models in Chapter 4 and final analyses of Chapter 5. In both sets of models, communication was included as an independent variable. Operationalized as the total number of telephone lines and mobile phone subscriptions, this variable resulted in significant effects across nearly all models. In observing its effect on the rate of domestic terrorist violence, as well as the rates of all other tested forms of social movement action, communication exhibited significant negative effects. Though still significant, when observing communication's effect on the severity of domestic terrorist events, the effects were positive. The conflicting results, first noted in Chapter 4, are enhanced by the finding that this cuts across all forms of social movement action. Understanding how communication may be co-opted by either side in their quest to mobilize resources would further cement the findings of these analyses within the literature on social movements.

Finally, while the analyses in this dissertation focused on the political opportunity structure tenets of regime type and repressiveness, the effects of McAdam's (1996) remaining two tenets--stability of elite alignments and presence of elite allies--remain to be seen. Theorizing, operationalizing, and modeling the relationships of these two final tenets and incorporating them into a full model of political opportunity structure would provide more refined results and improve the predictive capacity of the models.

The six topics briefly described above are a short list of the many potential departure points generated by the research contained in this dissertation. Further development and refinement of the analyses contained within it, as well as these topics, will provide sufficient water to quench the thirst of this researcher for years to come.

### Summary

The events of September 11, 2001 resulted in a windfall for researchers studying political violence in the United States. Funding poured from government coffers as policy makers attempted to justify their efforts to better understand the threat they faced from terrorist violence on a scale not seen before. The deluge of studies that followed provided such a detailed level of analysis on the concept of terrorist violence--from its very definition to who engages in it and what effects it has on every aspect of social life--that it threatened to allow researchers to view terrorism as *sui generis*, decoupling it from the broader concepts of political violence and social movements. As research on this highly controversial and still politically relevant topic continues, what is of utmost concern is that researchers discover and investigate the *similarities* of terrorist violence with other forms of political violence--and social movement action more broadly--as often and as thoroughly as they discover and investigate what sets terrorist violence apart.

This is the goal set by Boyle in his treatise on the progress of political violence research. The analyses provided in this dissertation constitute an effort to do just that. Re-anchoring terrorist violence within the theories of social movements--especially the concept of political opportunity structures--facilitates comparisons to other forms of political violence and social movement action. Identifying the similarities and

extrapolating from the differences in order to shed light on potential avenues for future inquiries will ensure that the benefits from the vast amounts of research on political violence and social movements that have been generated in the past 20 years will not be restricted solely to the particular form of violence under investigation.

The insights gained from the analyses in this dissertation should be applied to the approach taken by states as well as the international community in any attempt to accomplish goals that might result in the emergence of domestic terrorist violence as a particular form of social movement action. From anticorruption programs to aiding fledgling democracies or monitoring the overthrow of repressive regimes, the particular profile of the political opportunity structures available directly affect the type of actions those demanding or protesting change may take. Under the right conditions--some of which have been detailed in this dissertation--social movement action can become violent...terrifyingly so.

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