

WELCOME TO THE MACHINE: THE RHETORICAL INVENTION  
OF COLLECTIVITY IN PEACEFUL UPRISING

by

Megan O'Byrne

A dissertation submitted to the faculty of  
The University of Utah  
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

Department of Communication

The University of Utah

December 2017

Copyright © Megan O'Byrne 2017

All Rights Reserved

# The University of Utah Graduate School

## STATEMENT OF DISSERTATION APPROVAL

The dissertation of Megan O'Byrne  
has been approved by the following supervisory committee members:

Danielle Endres, Chair 8/17/2017  
Date Approved

Mary S. Strine, Member 8/17/2017  
Date Approved

Leonard C. Hawes, Member 8/17/2017  
Date Approved

Tarla Rai Peterson, Member 8/17/2017  
Date Approved

Brett Clark, Member 8/17/2017  
Date Approved

and by Danielle Endres, Chair/Dean of

the Department/College/School of Communication

and by David B. Kieda, Dean of The Graduate School.

## ABSTRACT

Peaceful Uprising grew out of civil disobedience actions taken in 2008 by Tim DeChristopher on behalf of the environment, when he illegally bid on Bureau of Land Management (BLM) land parcels to withhold them from businesses that would exploit that land. The resulting collective is the focus of this dissertation. The examination of the collective Peaceful Uprising reveals how collectivity is essential to social protest and how it is a rhetorical process that is essential to social movement rhetoric. This collectivity is defined as both a group that makes a whole and the qualities that make up and maintain that group, such as feelings of belonging, staying power, and an affect of hope. Additionally, these are the major rhetorical processes by which a social movement creates and maintains a sense of the collective. In understanding how collectivity is created and maintained within social movements, *machines of mobilization*—the active creation and deployment of a collectivist cultural assemblage focused on social protest and change—is a unique heuristic that allows social movement rhetoric scholars to better understand the rhetorical invention of collectivity. The rhetorical processes of collectivity and machines of mobilization are primarily examined through the participatory critical research (PCR) method, wherein I became part of the Peaceful Uprising movement in order to critically observe how they, as a machine of mobilization, interact with the state; how they use music/song rhetorically, particularly the utilization of citationality; and their use of place/space, especially in a post-9/11 world of restrictions.

*For those fighting the good fight.*

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

|  |     |
|--|-----|
| ABSTRACT .....   | iii |
| Chapters   |     |
| 1. INTRODUCING THE RHETORICAL INVENTION OF COLLECTIVITY AND MACHINES OF MOBILIZATION ..... | 1   |
| The Role of Collectivity in Social Movement Rhetoric .....                                 | 4   |
| Theoretical Framework—Machines of Mobilization .....                                       | 7   |
| Critical Approach .....  | 13  |
| Methods .....  | 29  |
| Chapters Preview .....   | 34  |
| 2. PEACEFUL UPRISING: THE CASE .....   | 39  |
| Announcing the Charges .....   | 42  |
| Inventing Peaceful Uprising .....  | 44  |
| The Legal Push/Pull .....  | 45  |
| The Trials .....   | 48  |
| 3. RADIANT SHADES OF GRAY: THE WAR MACHINE AND THE STATE .....                             | 52  |
| Theoretical Perspective: War Machine and State .....                                       | 54  |
| Method .....   | 62  |
| A Changing State .....   | 64  |
| Embodied Protest Tactics .....   | 71  |
| Becoming Tactical .....  | 74  |
| Conclusion .....   | 83  |
| 4. SINGING LIKE A MOVEMENT: AFFECTING MACHINES .....                                       | 86  |
| Group Singing .....  | 87  |
| Machining Affect: Theoretical Development .....  | 94  |
| Affecting Methods .....  | 99  |
| Singing Like a Movement .....  | 104 |
| Conclusion .....   | 121 |
| 5. BEING NEITHER-HERE-NOR-THERE: THE POLITICS OF PROXIMITY IN PROTEST .....                | 124 |

|   |     |
|---|-----|
| Conceptualizing Space and Place .....             | 127 |
| Method .....                                      | 133 |
| The BLM Parcels as Place-Based Rhetoric .....     | 135 |
| Place-as-Rhetoric .....                           | 149 |
| Conclusion .....                                  | 156 |
| 6. CONCLUSION.....                                | 159 |
| Primary Findings.....                             | 160 |
| Contributions to Literature.....                  | 164 |
| Lessons Learned.....                              | 172 |
| Implications and Areas for Future Study .....     | 174 |
| Appendices  |     |
| A. BECOMING-BIDDER 70 .....                       | 182 |
| B. MAP OF BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT PARCELS ..... | 183 |
| WORKS CITED .....                                 | 184 |

## CHAPTER 1

### INTRODUCING THE RHETORICAL INVENTION OF COLLECTIVITY AND MACHINES OF MOBILIZATION

Near the conclusion of his second presidential term, George W. Bush authorized the sale of oil and gas rights on properties that had not previously been available for drilling (Magill, 2009c). This sale involved parcels of land adjacent to protected areas in Utah including Arches and Canyonlands National Parks and Dinosaur National Monument (Magill, 2009c). This sale, an auction conducted by the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) in Salt Lake City, Utah, on December 19, 2008, did not go unnoticed. It was challenged on several fronts prior to the sale date by organizations and individuals that lobbied for widespread reconsideration of the parcels on the block, as many of them were adjacent to federally protected park lands (Sands, 2010).

In addition to before-the-fact contestations, which did not have the effect of removing all of the parcels from the lease offer, there were also onsite protests the day of the auction. Notable among those who showed up to protest the auction was Tim DeChristopher, a University of Utah student and long-time environmental activist. Having grown tired of the legal avenues of protest (i.e., sign holding, letter writing, persuading representatives), DeChristopher took a unique opportunity to amplify his protest efforts by engaging in civil disobedience when he was mistakenly offered a



bidding paddle for the auction. In obtaining the paddle, DeChristopher misrepresented himself as an eligible bidder willing to pay for any leases he won. Given this unique series of events, he opted to capitalize on this case of mistaken identity, treating it as an opportunity to circumvent the system and attempt to protect the parcels from gas and oil development (K. Johnson, 2009; Magill, 2009a; Sands, 2009b). Using bidder paddle number 70, he won 14 parcels of land for which he could not possibly pay.

While other protesters chose more traditional, culturally sanctioned, or legal tactics that day, DeChristopher seized the opportunity to protest climate change by “bidding his conscience”<sup>1</sup> and attempting to protect wilderness from development. His act of civil disobedience drew immediate attention from major national and international news outlets (K. Johnson, 2009; Magill, 2009a, 2009b; Vick, 2009). Almost as immediate as the news firestorm was an outpouring of support from empathetic members of various environmental movements, sympathizers, and friends, including Bill McKibben, Robert Redford, Terry Tempest Williams, and Peter Yarrow.

In the wake of his illegal bids, subsequent arrest, and impending trial, a community of supporters, some of whom began an organization that came to be known as Peaceful Uprising, or PeaceUp, embraced DeChristopher. It was under the umbrella of this group that DeChristopher found not only support and counsel but also a cadre of individuals willing to work on his behalf in promoting climate justice. Peaceful Uprising is a social movement collective—or group of people working together to affect change—

---

<sup>1</sup> This phrase, a simplified summary of DeChristopher’s actions, is generally taken from Jonzen (2009), who wrote “I sat there for about half an hour grappling with my conscience,” he says. “I knew that if I were to make a bid, there would be serious consequences. I was cautious at first—I just wanted to push up the cost of the land parcels.”

made up of people, ideas, actions, and affects that began as a series of decisions to protest and act on DeChristopher's behalf. The maintenance of this collective depended on continuous choices thereafter to remain intentionally supportive of DeChristopher through his trial, to work toward DeChristopher's goal of climate justice, and to remain hopeful and motivated in the face of a dire future.

It is on this collective that this dissertation focuses. More specifically, I am interested in thinking through collectivity as a broader concept that is essential to social protest. By collectivity, I mean both a group that makes a whole and the qualities that make up and maintain that group, such as feelings of belonging, staying power, and an affect of hope. Collectivity, then, is not just an organizational description for social protest, but also a complicated rhetorical process that is integral to social movement rhetoric (Foust, Pason, & Rogness, 2017). In the *rhetorical invention of collectivity* within social protest we can see the building blocks of social movements. By rhetorical invention of collectivity I mean the rhetorical processes by which a social movement creates and maintains a sense of the collective, as well as qualities that allow the movement to continue and help solidify adherence to the movement. Some questions that guide my investigation into the rhetorical invention of collectivity include: How is it that people come to see themselves as members of, or to align themselves with, particular movements? What is it that keeps those members invested and connected over the long haul?

In understanding how collectivity is created and maintained within social movements, I also introduce *machines of mobilization* as a unique heuristic that allows social movement rhetoric scholars to better understand the rhetorical invention of

collectivity. I define machines of mobilization as the active creation and deployment of a collectivist cultural assemblage focused on social protest and change. Machines of mobilization, then, are a critical heuristic for examining the qualities of collectivity as not static, predetermined concepts but as a rhetorical process. I address the rhetorical invention of collectivity in this dissertation by closely examining the story of DeChristopher and Peaceful Uprising as an embodied, affective, and place-based machine of mobilization. Accordingly, the following research questions animate my study:

- How does affect aid in initial moments of collectivity and act to keep members invested?
- In what ways are rhetorical instances of collectivity impacted by and related to bodies?
- In what ways do rhetorics of place and space function in the rhetorical invention of collectivity?

### **The Role of Collectivity in Social Movement Rhetoric**

As unique as DeChristopher's civil disobedience actions were in December 2008, the protests that happened in opposition to his prosecution in 2011 were in good company with a variety of notable contemporaneous protest actions happening around the world. These included, among others, the Arab Spring and Occupy Wall Street. When PeaceUp took to the streets in 2011, protests were so prevalent that *Time* magazine named "The Protester" their person of the year (Altman, 2010). For the various reasons that protesters hit the streets in 2011 (i.e., financial, governmental, sexual, environmental oppression/s),

their actions have all been critically read as social movements (Allagui, 2014; Al-Rawi, 2014; K. DeLuca, Lawson, & Sun, 2012; Feigenbaum, 2014; Min, 2015). In the early days of studying social movements in communication, scholars debated the specifics of what a uniquely *rhetorical* approach could/should/might be and how best to approach social movements from a rhetorical perspective, as opposed to organizational or historical perspectives (Cathcart, 1980, 2006; Griffin, 2006; Haiman, 2006; Scott & Smith, 2006; Simons, 1970; Smith & Windes, 2006). One touchstone for me is McGee's assertion that the "theoretical description of 'social movements' . . . ought to [focus] . . . on the fact of collectivity" (McGee, 2006, p. 123). While his original assertion was based on the argument that social movement is not a phenomenon but a movement of meaning intended to reorient the locus of questioning in studying the rhetoric of social movements, I return to his focus on the importance—the primacy—of collectivity.

Collectivity itself is elusive. It is not always a public practice. There are plenty of groups working behind the scenes for change. Other groups, ranging in level of organization from anarchist to hierarchical, aren't public *yet*. They are working on ramping up their efforts before taking their cause public. This elusive quality makes it more difficult to pin down how rhetorical choices are made during the invention of collectivity. Even when the collective is observable or known, public or not, it is still challenging to get a handle on their processes because collectives are also elastic, ever-changing, permeable, flexible, and comprise an array of working components. Collectives are embodied, made of people—their ideas, expressions, and actions. Collectives are inter/connected, inter/active, and messy: They are affective. For any of the various reasons why people articulate with particular collectives, they provide sites for finding

affective similarity and passing it along to others. Collectives also negotiate ideas of place and space whether they advocate for particular areas (as in environmental movements) or they access and reimagine public spaces as sites of resistance. The fact that a collective exists also indicates desire for social change and progress. Toward those ends collectives are productive, generative sites of (possible) change, places where unrest is heard, where dissent is voiced, where the status quo is challenged. What seems like a simple directive from McGee to focus on collectivity is exceedingly difficult in all of its working parts.

Machines can serve as a framework for analyzing the rhetorical nature of collectives and their various and changing articulations as sites of generative interactivity (Deleuze & Guattari, 2000). Machines, in a simplistic sense, are complex social assemblages or collectives comprised in large part of bodies and discourse; for example, hospital machines, military machines, ship machines, hotel machines, circus machines, and war machines (Deleuze & Guattari, 2000, p. 88). To this, I add the concept of machines of mobilization, which is an activist material/rhetorical collective that is focused on social protest and change. Machines of mobilization is not simply a new name for social movements, but a critical heuristic for examining how social movements rhetorically invent collectivity (over and over again). Machines of mobilization is a useful concept because it provides a way to get a handle on the working parts of the rhetorical invention of collectivity while also theorizing the rhetorical work that happens within the machine.

In this chapter I introduce a theoretical framework for the rhetorical invention of collectivity as it works in machines of mobilization. In the next section I develop the

theoretical basis for machines of mobilization as based on Deleuze and Guattari's notion of machines and their components. Within that section, and throughout, I pay particular attention to bodies, affect, and place/space as consistent touchstones. Then, I apply this conceptual framework to existing rhetorical literature on social movements, activism, and social protest to demonstrate how using machines of mobilization as a critical heuristic can complement and expand our current understandings of social movements and provide additional avenues of research and knowledge production. That production is specifically developed through critical attention to the rhetorical invention of collectivity. Next, I discuss participatory critical rhetoric (PCR) as my methodological approach to this case study. Finally, I provide a brief précis of the chapters.

### **Theoretical Framework—Machines of Mobilization**

In order to refocus attention usually given to social movements as a whole to the specific moments of the invention of collectivity, I introduce the novel theoretical concept of machines of mobilization. This decision to focus on movements not just as movements but also as machines allows the working parts of collectivity to become more readily apparent. Concentrating even more specifically on the embodied, affective, and spatial commitments made in those rhetorical moments of invention provides a unique heuristic for examining collectivity as it begins to grow and develop. In this section I begin with discussions of Deleuze and Guattari's separate concepts of machines and mobilization before introducing *machines of mobilization* as my own unique theoretical contribution. That discussion is followed by an elaboration of the ways that bodies, affect, and place/space play in machines of mobilization.

## Machines

Deleuze and Guattari define machines as “a *system of interruptions* or breaks” (2009, p. 36). They visualize machines in this way:

Every machine functions as a break in the flow in relation to the machine to which it is connected, but at the same time is also a flow itself, or the production of a flow, in relation to the machine connected to it. (p. 36)

In more concrete terms we can see machines at work in our everyday lives. The exhaust machine on your car is an independent part/machine, yet it is attached to the muffler machine, which is attached to the catalytic converter machine and up through the rest of the engine machine. Each machine has its own job to do and represents a break from other machines, but when working together they create a single, working car machine.

Crucial to understanding machines is the related concept of assemblages.

Assemblages can be thought of as the sites at which the building blocks of machines are collected. Deleuze and Guattari (2000) explain assemblages as consisting of two elements, “one of content [bodies and material forms], the other of expression [enunciation and discursive forms]” (p. 88). By dint of their basic elements, assemblages (and therefore machines) are both material and discursive. These two elements intermingle and collect in assemblages through a process of articulation. Laclau and Mouffe (1985) define articulation as: “any practice establishing a relation among elements such that their identity is modified as a result of the articulatory practice” (p. 105). Assemblages, even once articulated, are not static. They are constantly transforming; there is always potential for reconfiguration and for the re/dis/articulation of elements (Deleuze & Guattari, 2000, p. 82). Assemblages, as the collecting point of machines, are particularly vital in the examination of the rhetorical invention of collectivity as we see individual human machines assembling in vulnerable affective

bodies working together in a machinic form on behalf of an also-vulnerable environment.

One further clarification of the use of machines in this discussion is the introduction of abstract machines. Deleuze and Guattari argue that “[t]he abstract machine is always singular, designated by the proper name of a group or individual, while the assemblage of enunciation is always collective, in the individual as in the group” (2000, p. 100). For our purposes then, the abstract machine is designated by its proper name—Peaceful Uprising. The collective assemblage of enunciation becomes then the discursive or expressive forms undertaken by the abstract machine or, for our purposes, their rhetorical invention of collectivity. The assemblage and the abstract machine work interdependently.

### **Mobilization**

For the context of my study, mobilization indicates movement—to mobilize for or against something—whether that is a cause, a candidate, a change, and so forth. Not theoretically developed by Deleuze and Guattari, they use mobilization in the same context. It also suggests an active force working toward a specific change or type of changes. Mobilization can then be thought of as the active assembly and deployment of bodies, goods, intentions, funds, and so forth, bound for specific purposes. This may take the shape of mobilizing volunteers to deploy warm weather gear to the homeless, mobilizing a medical team in reaction to a trauma, mobilizing inactive military members in response to a natural disaster, mobilizing sponsors to fund a candidate’s bid for office, or even mobilizing people to engage in civil disobedience.



## **Machines of Mobilization**

Machines of mobilization offer, as a theoretical concept, the opportunity to step back from the various ways we have seen and studied social movements and instead concentrate on the machinic nature of movements themselves. In focusing on how the various parts of the machine aggregate, and by attending to the articulations within the machine and the various offerings/products made possible by those articulations, we can see more clearly how and why particular rhetorical inventions of collectivity are produced within particular machines and at specific times.

Unlike their other machinic counterparts—hospital machines, cruise ship machines, family vacation machines—machines of mobilization have particular social goals. Those goals may intersect with other types of machines: Hospital machines likely desire healthcare reform and coverage just as a “Save Planned Parenthood”-oriented machine of mobilization does. The differences between these types of machines are potentially manifold, including the various ways they obtain constituents and funding; the ways they interact with the State, whether via lobby or protest; and how they locate themselves as interior or exterior to the system. While the hospital machine may desire social change that keeps patients healthy or that ensures bills get paid, it has different access points to that social change than does a machine of mobilization. The hospital machine has donors and lobbies. They employ not only highly paid doctors and other well-respected community members, but also legal teams meant to serve their best interest. The machine of mobilization has far more limited access to the State and is likely unable (depending on its articulation) to work strategically within the State system to make change (de Certeau, 2002). Instead, it is likely to find itself on the fringe,

agitating on the cusp of social impropriety for a different system. All the while, their legal protections are far less secure, their people less well paid, and their message much more easily overlooked or unheard. Machines of mobilization must then be tactical, creative, resilient, and well-aware of the onerous demands placed on them by the State system as they work for social change.

To do this work is to take seriously the Deleuzo-Guattarian perspective on machines as independent but co-productive parts of the aggregate whole. It also means taking seriously the materiality of those machines, their members, ideas, and enunciations, as well as the conditions out of which they developed and the various exigencies to which they respond. To understand machines of mobilization as specialized versions of machines—ones intent on producing social change and motivating the realization of desires—is also to recognize that they are uniquely embodied, affective, and rooted in place/space.

### **Bodies at Work in the Machine of Mobilization**

As one of the two critical components of assemblages, bodies are essential to machines. Machines work as a “precise state of intermingling of bodies in a society, including all the attractions and repulsions, sympathies and antipathies, alterations, amalgamations, penetrations, and expansions that affect bodies of all kinds in their relations to one another” (Deleuze & Guattari, 2000, p. 90). In their intermingling, bodies come together to produce new ways of being in relation to one another and to society. In so doing the offshoots of their production may include intervening in and changing State functions, social norms, and cultural values, among others. Without bodies there are no

machines. Bodies are the cogs that make the wheels turn. Without people and their ideas and all forms of creativity that may come from those interactions, machines would not work.

### **Affect and Machines of Mobilization**

Deleuze and Guattari (2000) argue that assemblages are “compositions of desire” (p. 399). In those desiring states, machines employ affect as weapons (p. 400). That outward discharge of affect is their recourse against the State, which uses feelings introspectively as tools (p. 400). Affect then is a critical component of any affective machine as it is left with little recourse and even fewer resources against a State with seemingly unlimited tools at their disposal. Affect becomes integral to articulation and steadfastness in machines of mobilization as those outward desires become forms of enunciation. Machines of mobilization need affect because it isn't a paycheck holding members to the work; it is the desire for change. That desire, those affective transpiercings, become the articulatory force not only aggregating machines in the assemblage but also holding them together even when the work is not immediately rewarded.

### **Place/Space and Machines of Mobilization**

One quality of assemblages that we have not yet addressed is their territorial nature. Deleuze and Guattari argue that “the assemblage is fundamentally territorial” (p. 323). Such territory is not a firmly bounded static place, as we may be familiar with in State parlance, but is instead a “malleable state of passage” that “maintains an internal

organization” (Message, 2005, p. 275). Unhindered by State boundaries, machines of mobilization create, work within, and move over their territories as part of their embodied actions. Recall, for example, the Civil Rights era. Not delimited to a single U.S. state, the Civil Rights machine of mobilization centered itself on the southern U.S. region most directly impacted by Jim Crow. The specific actions of this machine may have varied from state to state in response to local exigencies and happenings, but the territory for the Civil Rights machine of mobilization was amorphous and unbounded. Thus, machines of mobilization operate in, influence, and are influenced by place/space.

### **Critical Approach**

My critical approach to the study of social movements is specifically oriented toward the rhetorical invention of collectivity. In paring social movements back to their collectivity and focusing on the forces that aid articulation (embodied, affective, and emplaced rhetorics), we can come to see how the movement is shaped by the decisions made in initiating the assemblage. To this end, I see social movement, similarly to K. M. DeLuca and McGee, as the social result of the discursive efforts to affect change (K. M. DeLuca, 1999, 2006; McGee, 2006). K. M. DeLuca (2006) notes: “social movements are changes in the meanings of the world, redefinitions of reality, with such realities always being constructed through the filter of rhetoric” (p. 36). In other words, to study a social movement is to interrogate social change by examining the rhetorical tactics and strategies that enabled that change to come about. Particularly, in this study I attend directly to the influence that the rhetorical invention of collectivity has on the articulation of the machine of mobilization and what will eventually become the tactics and strategies

they employ.

In examining the rhetorical invention of collectivity in social movements and introducing machines of mobilization as a critical heuristic for the assemblage of collectivity, it is prudent to return to the literature on the rhetoric of social movements in order to examine the ways in which collectivity has been historically overlooked. While collectivity, as I will argue, has been left out of the conversation, critical components of collectivity—namely the materiality of embodied, affective, and emplaced rhetorics itself—have been ever more present in rhetorical literatures. My argument in this section is that the concept of machines of mobilization offers a productive vocabulary for examining the rhetorical invention of collectivity.

### **Rhetoric of Social Movements and the Invention of Collectivity**

The rhetorical study of social movements grew out of the social upheaval and subsequent activism of the 1960s and 70s (Benson & Johnson, 1968; Brooks, 1970; Chesebro, 1972; Coughlin & Coughlin, 1973; Cox, 1974; Freedman, 1976; Gregg, 1971; Hahn & Gonchar, 1971; McCarthy & Zald, 1977; Peele & Morse, 1969; Pinard, Kirk, & von Eschen, 1969; Rosenwasser, 1972; Simons, 1970, 1971, 1972, 1982; Zarefsky, 1977). In those early examinations of social movements, the unit of analysis had not yet shaken out. Researchers took a variety of perspectives, some of which are still used today. Others fell by the wayside or have been adapted for contemporary use. For example, Simons became a prominent early scholar of social movements. Yet he largely ignored the rhetorical aspects of movements, focusing instead on organizational or managerial structures in movements (K. M. DeLuca, 2006, pp. 27–34). While valuable in

its own right, this approach lent itself to arguments focused on how movements are organized, how they are led, and what makes for a “successful” movement. Emphasizing organizational elements in these studies meant that the rhetorical, discursive, or communicative aspects of movements were largely ignored. Given this argumentative focus, movements became textually linked to organizations instead of to society, which was arguably doing the “moving.” Simons’ early approach conflated the term social movement with social movement organizations (Simons, 1970, 1971, 1972, 1976, 1980, 1991; Simons, Mechling, & Schreier, 1984). In this view an organization is a movement and vice versa. McGee (2006) interrupts this approach by arguing that a “social movement is a set of meanings and not a phenomenon” (p. 115). In making this argument he realigns critical effort away from the organization and toward the rhetorical approach and outcomes that have changed society in some way. He further explains that “‘social movement’ ought to be a *conclusion*, a carefully considered and well-argued inference that changes in human consciousness are of such a nature that ‘social movement’ has occurred” (p. 123). We see here that “social movement” has nothing to do with an organization and everything to do with how society and culture react to rhetorical activities aimed at changing meaning.

K. M. DeLuca continues in this vein, deconstructing Simons’ approach and developing the ideas of Cathcart (1980, 2006) and McGee (2006). He contends that the focus of a rhetoric of social movements should be “changes in human or collective consciousness or changes in the symbolic interpretation of the environment [or case at hand]” (K. M. DeLuca, 2006, p. 34). This perspective is markedly different from the study of the movement as organization *a la* Simons. K. M. DeLuca is asking instead that

we consider movements as flows of ideas and sites of potential cultural change. He is being careful not to conflate social movements and their operating organizations as one and the same. That is not to say that he asks us to disregard the organizations, but that he redirects the focus of arguments on rhetorical elements and the social change they facilitate. In doing this, K. M. DeLuca works to excise “social movement” from social movement organizations. He writes:

The point is not that groups do not exist, just that they are not the social movements themselves. Instead, groups, as well as individuals or institutions, through their rhetorical tactics and strategies create social movements, changes in public consciousness with regards to a key issue or issues, measurable through change's [sic] in the meanings of a cultures [sic] key terms in public discourse. (2006, p. 36)

Here we see that K. M. DeLuca has firmly redirected rhetorical focus to the ways that groups and individuals deploy discourse that creates social change. It is through the actions or facilitation of a social movement organization that these changes in public consciousness can come to take place. The machines of mobilization framework feeds nicely into this perspective, allowing for the examination of any variety of articulations deemed relevant to the researcher. For those most interested in the organizational route, machines of mobilizations allow for that. Importantly though, the organizational route is not the only one available. The rhetoric of collectivity is in part about the movement of social consciousness. It is also about all of the embodied, affective, and place-based aspects that keep the collective moving. In this way, there is a focus not just on the outcome of the movement of meaning, but the rhetorical factors that keep those meanings moving through a collective that continues to buy into and work for the movement. Indeed, the machines of mobilization framework is amenable to a variety of different types of studies, including those focused on rhetorical force; leadership; and, as we will

see in the following chapters, the deployment of tactical protest.

Beyond the argument and evolution of what it meant to study social movement as a text, these early studies provide rhetorical precedent for the closer examination of the rhetorical invention of collectivity. Consider Bitzer's (1968) rhetorical situation. His "constraints" actually imply at least the need for collectivity. Defined as "persons, events, objects, and relations which are parts of the situation because they have the power to constrain decision and action needed to modify the exigence," constraints are essentially the elements that enable/disable the invention of collectivity in response to a need, injustice, or exigence (Bitzer, 1968, p. 8). When constraints (be they individual, social, cultural, or environmental) are too extreme to be overcome even in the face of a clear and present exigence, collectivity itself is constrained. Here we see why it is that sometimes movements fail to grow and address even those situations seemingly most in need of attention.

Cox (1974) then used those constraints as a means to discuss the rhetoric of the anti-Vietnam war movement. Specifically, he examined the various constraints acting upon the "*collective* behavior" of the movement and its leaders (italics in original, p. 255). In so doing he focuses on the circumstances and discourse surrounding the antiwar movement without specifically interrogating the collectivity of the movement itself. In this example, the rhetorical invention of collectivity is assumed, meaning that when there is an unpopular war, of course people are protesting, and these are their rhetorical realities while so doing. Conversely, I am interested in taking a step back and interrogating how the collective is created and maintained through rhetoric.

Coming just a bit closer to the rhetorical invention of collectivity are Pinard, Kirk,



and von Eschen (1969), who examine the recruitment or attraction to a particular movement. They argue that it is necessary to differentiate between the reasons why members join a movement and their “intensity of activity” inside that movement once they have joined (p. 356). They utilize “strain” as a rhetorical tool to explain the impetus to join a movement. These are usually material changes for the worse in living, economic, political, or social conditions (p. 356). Strain and recruitment are problematized here as the authors note that it is often the case that those most affected by the worsening conditions are least able to participate in the movement for reasons ranging from economic insecurity to concerns about personal safety. For Pinard et al., this explains the sheer number of white participants in the Civil Rights movement. Though perhaps less directly impacted by the social and economic issues driving the movement, sympathetic white people were more easily recruited due to their economic abilities to take time away from their lives to participate in movement activities. Those more directly impacted by the aims of the movement itself were late joiners, but they were more actively involved than those who joined the movement earlier. One of the lessons that Pinard et al. take from this disparity in activity and strain among the different groups of participants is that it may be reasonable to begin the movement with more instrumental goals rather than the ultimate status goals<sup>2</sup> in order to recruit membership from the more affected communities. The implication then is that the way initial and ultimate movement goals are determined and communicated at the outset of movement activity rhetorically determines the act of collectivity. Not only in who articulates with the movement but also

---

<sup>2</sup> Instrumental goals here include welfare goals such as housing and job opportunities. Status goals include the more difficult to obtain voting and public accommodations goals (Pinard et al., 1969, p. 368).

why they choose to overcome strain and participate in movement activities. While I have real concerns about the ways in which strain impedes participation among those most impacted (consider for example how environmental degradation is targeted at poor communities of color), I'm less concerned with the ultimate dividing lines in the collective—how it proportions itself along economic, racial, gender lines, and so forth—because those that do participate, regardless of their strain levels, do so because of their affective commitment to the ideas of the collective. At that point it becomes a risk to focus on instrumental goals up front as that limits not only the rhetorical invention of collectivity but also the potential affective commitments of the group. Consider how the instrumental directive “Please Recycle” is rather mundane and even boring when not paired with the ultimate goal “Save the Planet.” Focusing solely on recycling and ignoring the planetary aim limits the ways the collective might be invented both rhetorically and affectively.

### **Bodies in the Rhetorical Invention of Collectivity**

The rhetorical invention of collectivity is dependent on bodies as sites of both invention and collectivity. Collectives are inherently embodied and rhetorical invention comes from those in and around the collective. Bodies have not always been taken seriously as text, especially in much of the corpus of early rhetoric. Yet growing numbers of scholars have emphasized that bodies are textual in their visibility, vulnerability, materiality, and position within movements (Blair, 1999, 2001; Blair, Jeppeson, & Pucci, 1991; Brouwer, 2001; K. M. DeLuca, 1999, 2006; Dickinson, 1997, 2002; Enck-Wanzer, 2006, 2012; Endres & Senda-Cook, 2011; Griffin, 2006; McKerrow, 1998; Pezzullo,

2001, 2003, 2007; Senda-Cook, 2012, 2013). Bodies are not only the beacons that attract attention to the arguments of the movement but “the site and substance of the argument itself” (K. M. DeLuca, 1999, p. 10). Pezzullo (2007) follows in similar lines, arguing that some human displays within social movements act as “embodied rhetorics” (p. 3). It is in displays of embodied rhetoric that K. M. DeLuca argues further that we “have challenged and changed the meanings of the world not through good reasons but through vulnerable bodies, not through rational arguments but through bodies at risk” (1999, p. 11). Here we see directly that social movements are made up of various forms of embodied rhetoric.

While this study is more about embodied protest than about bodies as a site of research, the importance of bodies as they articulate within the machine cannot be overstated. DeChristopher renders his body vulnerable by situating the climate justice movement around his actions. These are actions that are considered punishable by law. The impetus for DeChristopher’s action was to put his body on the line as a means by which to speak for the environment (Jonzen, 2009). Anticipating the future degradation and environmental harm that would come from developing these lands, and thereby the harm to future bodies, Peaceful Uprising as a machine of mobilization has always/already been *about* bodies.

Being out of line as an environmental protester has often meant being “unreasonable” and using “illegal” means to make statements about governmental actions. That unreason harks back to K.M. DeLuca’s (1999) argument that meanings have been changed “not through good reasons but through vulnerable bodies, not through rational arguments but through bodies at risk” (p. 11). The articulation of bodies and risk played a key role in the advancement of the arguments presented by DeChristopher and

Peaceful Uprising. Just as DeChristopher became frustrated with his lack of progress playing by the rules and following the codes of decorum for protests, K. M. DeLuca confirms that these rational arguments are not where progress is made. It is now, and traditionally has been, that progress comes through putting bodies on the line, presenting them as vulnerable.

### **Affect in the Rhetorical Invention of Collectivity**

To this point, I've been making the case for the further study and understanding of the rhetorical invention of collectivity. I will now argue that affect is a key component to the articulation of collectivity in machines of mobilization (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985). In this section I will lay out that argument by beginning with a definition of affect, followed by consideration of the ways affect works with the body, and ending with a discussion of the direct relationship affect has on the rhetorical invention of collectivity.

Massumi (1995) notes that affect is “most often used loosely as a synonym for emotion” (p. 88). Yet he differentiates emotion from affect by equating affect instead with intensity, which “follow[s] different logics and pertain[s] to different orders” than emotion (p. 88). Affect then is a material physical experience. Related not to a mental or emotional state, or even a personal feeling, affect is a bodily state. Deleuze and Guattari (2000) draw from and augment Spinoza in considering affect to be an “intensity corresponding the passage from one experiential state of the body to another” and in that state, affect is considered to be the “encounter between the affected body and a second, affecting, body,” wherein “body” is given the broadest definition of personal, mental,

physical, and ideal<sup>3</sup> (p. xvi). Affect then, like the body itself, is neither static nor constant. It is always in flux. Seigworth and Gregg (2010) characterize affect as “born in in-between-ness,” neither here nor there but always on the way to another form of being (p.

2). They write:

Affect, at its most anthropomorphic, is the name we give to those forces—visceral forces beneath, alongside, or generally other than conscious knowing, vital forces insisting beyond emotion—that can serve to drive us toward movement, toward thought and extension, that can likewise suspend us (as if in neutral) across a barely registering accretion of force-relations, or that can even leave us overwhelmed by the world’s apparent intractability. (p. 1)

Here we see how affect impacts the body in a physical sense. It influences the ways we act in the world and the choices we make. According to K. Stewart (2007), those affective influences articulate us with those movements, ideas, objects, passions, and endeavors (e.g., deciding to become official members of the Sierra Club, deciding which social justice causes to support, identifying our own stances on animal cruelty, deciding our level of Congressional in/action, and the like) that we choose to pursue, just as much as it also drives us in the mundanity of everyday choices (e.g., which socks to wear, where to shop for groceries). Affect, as we see in these examples, is as Massumi (1995) argues: autonomous. There is no choosing to give or receive affect. It works autonomously between bodies, “escap[ing] confinement in the particular body whose vitality, or potential for interaction, it is” (p. 96). Just as it escapes bodies it is also taken in by others and by that taking, the complexity of affect is absorbed. Massumi continues, “The body doesn’t just absorb pulses or discrete stimulations; it infolds *contexts*, it infolds volitions and cognitions that are nothing if not situated” (pp. 90–91). Affective

---

<sup>3</sup> Seigworth and Gregg (2010) define this type of body as “defined not by an outer skin-envelope or other surface boundary but by their potential to reciprocate or co-participate in the passages of affect” (p. 2).

intensities impact bodies in all of their contexts both mundane and unique, in actions both recognized and unthought-of, and in interactions with other bodies.

Affect is an articulatory element that brings people into collectives. Affect is communicable, moving between bodies. As Gibbs (2001) describes it, “[b]odies can catch feelings as easily as catch fire: affect leaps from one body to another, evoking tenderness, inciting shame, igniting rage, exciting fear” (p. 1). The catching nature of affect is pronounced in the close quarters of street-level protest. Chants and bullhorns pass along sentiments of rage and determination while instructing and directing members. The energy of the action—marching, chanting, singing, quiet reflection, hopeful serenade—passes from person to person, articulating members to the group and each other via affect. In these moments we can parse the differences between traditional persuasive tactics and affective ones. We might come to think of traditional persuasion as instrumental. In this form of traditional persuasion there is a logical basis for decisions to work together as a collective. Facts are given, reason is applied, and rhetorical choices are made to incense people to become part of a collective. Surely we cannot join an anti-group if we do not understand that there is an exigence. Instrumental persuasion turns the corner into affect when the cognitive understanding of the facts and reason compel bodies to act in certain ways. In those moments when pathos and desire take over from logic, the messages coming from the bullhorn—the ones that carry important, traditionally persuasive messages—become more than actual words. They are *felt* words. While there is logic in the message, the meaning becomes far more than reason, it becomes affective unreason, compelling people to act even when logic defies their action. In this way, affect is just as important as traditional persuasion to the invention and maintenance the

collectivity necessitates to carry on a social movement.

Due to its catching, articulatory nature, affect then also helps us to see more clearly the collectives with which we desire to engage. Seigworth and Gregg (2010) argue, “[a]ffect marks a body’s *belonging* to a world of encounters or; a world’s belonging to a body of encounters but also, in *non-belonging*, through all those far sadder (de)compositions of mutual in-compossibilities” (p. 2). In collectives, especially social movement collectives, we can read this as the sorting that happens when people come to see themselves as either one with, or separate from, the ideas and ideals of the movement. For some, affect will attract and articulate them to the movement helping them to see and feel their *belonging* in that particular world. For others, the affect is less inviting, maybe even repulsive. They come to see themselves as more appropriately acting and affecting in a different realm of possibilities. In this self-sorting, which many will do unconsciously/affectively/intensely and others will attempt through other, more intentional, manners, we see that collectives articulate and rearticulate. Indeed, Anderson (2010) argues that the power of the transmission of affect lies in “its movements, disruptions and resonances,” which work then as “intensifying, multiplying, and saturating material-affective processes through which bodies come in and out of formation” (p. 162). That formation is precisely the act of collectivizing. The collectivization may begin with traditional persuasion in calling out and marking injustice. But it catches fire, intensifies, and multiplies when persuasion becomes affective. Thus the rhetoric of the invention of collectivity relies on the articulatory force of affect to bring bodies and ideas together in an affectively productive manner.

## **Collectivity in Place and Space**

Before delving into the specific place/space based actions of Peaceful Uprising (which will come in Chapter 5), I will first orient here the relationship between the rhetorical invention of collectivity and emplaced rhetoric. This will be my basis for understanding rhetoric broadly as well as interactions with place/space not only as a researcher but also as a site at which the rhetorical invention of collectivity aggregates. Developed by M. Middleton, Hess, Endres, and Senda-Cook (2015), the notion of emplaced rhetoric “views rhetoric as a symbolic/material experience of intersecting physical structures, configurations of bodies in place, environment, sensorial phenomenon, performances and practices” (p. 96). Their orientation to rhetoric as a whole foregrounds place/space in ways it has not been traditionally viewed. Rather than regarding it as just a simple part of the milieu in which rhetoric happens, these authors choose to take seriously the idea that “rhetoric always happens in a place and that place influences the rhetorics that circulate with(in) it” (p. 92). Without belaboring and simply rehashing their points here, instead I will focus first on the relationship between emplaced rhetoric and the rhetorical invention of collectivity. Second, I will illuminate the ways in which their assumptions about emplaced rhetoric align with my vision of the rhetorical invention of collectivity. Finally, I will delve into some of their ideas about the field, specifically highlighting the ways in which reorienting our understanding of the field can impact not only the ways in which we approach research but also our understandings of place/space.

**Relationship between emplaced rhetoric and the rhetorical invention of collectivity.** The idea of emplaced rhetoric grows out of the commitment to



understanding the interrelationship of rhetoric and place/space espoused by M. Middleton et al. (2015). They argue that place and space are participants in rhetorical acts and that they impact the “invention, dissemination, circulation, and criticism of rhetoric” (p. 92). Their work in that realm is productive for my discussion of the rhetorical invention of collectivity in that it helps to illuminate the ways in which emplaced rhetorics motivate rhetorical inventions. Those inventions are eminently provocative to me in that they can also motivate collectivity. This case grew out of contestations of place/space, which was active on two separate fronts (in the city and directed at the parcels), and was oriented against State understandings of place/space. To that extent, emplaced rhetoric is a vital orientation toward the relationship between rhetorical inventions of collectivity and place/space as they played out in the Peaceful Uprising machine of mobilization.

In their reconfiguration of the relationship between place/space and rhetoric as emplaced rhetoric, M. Middleton et al. (2015) lay out a set of assumptions that illustrate their thinking. I will highlight a few of those assumptions here to demonstrate the ways in which emplaced rhetoric complements and dovetails with the rhetorical invention of collectivity. My summary of their assumptions is that emplaced rhetoric views rhetoric as intersectional and place/space as one of the many possible formulations of rhetoricity; that other rhetorical forms are always already emplaced; that place/space is not a static configuration but one “made, maintained, challenged, and performed through a co-relationship between bodies and environment”; that the material aspects of rhetoric are emphasized in emplaced rhetoric; and, finally, that environments are themselves participants in rhetorical invention (pp. 96–97). Many of these assumptions echo ideas we have already placed in conversation here. My overall view of rhetoric is that it is material

and these authors have highlighted the material nature of emplaced rhetoric. Their views of emplaced rhetoric complement my work on the rhetorical invention of collectivity insofar as their understanding of the nature of both rhetoric and place/space align with mine. The idea that both built and natural environments are participants in rhetorical invention speaks directly to their eventual collectivity, especially when threatened or as reframed in protest, as I will discuss in later chapters.

**Field and demonstrable interactions.** M. Middleton et al. (2015) set out four axes of interaction between the field and emplaced rhetoric through their approach to participatory critical rhetoric. I will focus on three of those here. First, they argue (in axis two) that “emplaced rhetoric looks at how the field of community meaning interacts with an emplaced rhetorical invention” (p. 105). Taking seriously the ways in which community members and meanings interact with and influence eventual rhetorical invention aligns neatly with my understandings of the rhetorical invention of collectivity as directly impacted by vernacular attitudes toward place/space. From the outside, remote nonpark parcels are valued only as prime areas for potential oil and gas development. But the field of community meaning intersected with ideas of place/space to negotiate a groundswell of rhetorical invention, specifically of collectivity, to demonstrate their own valuing structures, and to more accurately define the vernacular value of the land.

A second alignment of their notion of the field that engages with my vision of the rhetorical invention of collectivity is their insistence that the field itself is not simply text, but also context (M. Middleton et al., 2015, p. 107). Their view means then, that place/space is not just a site at which rhetoric happens but that they prefer a vision of emplaced rhetoric where the “rhetoricity of place/space [can be seen] as co-participant in

rhetorical performances” (p. 107). This embrace of place/space as co-participant is particularly salient not only within my case study but also in the rhetorical invention of collectivity. It is often ideas of, conflict with, development on, and possession of, place/space that demands the invention of collectivity. M. Middleton et al. (2015) also remind us that “to think of rhetoric as emplaced is to think of rhetoric as always happening in a particular place” (p. 108). That particular place then directly impacts the rhetorical invention of collectivity by enabling and constraining different forms of rhetoricity. Consider, for example as we will see in Chapter 3, the ways that confinement to a Free Speech Zone (FSZ) enables specific rhetorical inventions while inhibiting others. Choosing to apply for a permit for the FSZ, deciding to demonstrate “free speech” only in that area, and remaining peaceable, are all only one step away from potential arrest. Deciding to forego any one of those factors can lead directly to prosecution. The rhetoric though, which develops from that particular place, is decidedly and perceptibly different from differently emplaced rhetorics invented outside of the constraints of an FSZ.

The third and final alignment of emplaced rhetoric with the rhetorical invention of collectivity that I will explore here is that the field itself is a rhetorical actor. The previous two examinations have been leading up to this point wherein we are reminded that “thinking of rhetoric as emplaced and the field as (rhetorical) place suggests that the field is not just a place of research, community meaning, and context, it is also a rhetorical actor and participant” (M. Middleton et al., 2015, p. 111). In that way, the rhetorical invention of collectivity that may have worked to intervene on behalf of remote BLM parcels in Utah is not directly transferrable to other contestations over place/space.

Again, in Chapter 5 I will explore Peaceful Uprising's interactions with both built urban places, remote nonpark places, and ideas of space in both of those places, but it is important to bookend this work with the reminder that the field itself is a rhetorical actor and participant. Consider even just the fact that Peaceful Uprising and their constituents protest State decisions to offer these BLM parcels for sale without ever going there. They were able to make their voices heard without setting foot on the parcels. That same rhetorical invention of collectivity would not have transferred, say, to the protests over the Dakota Access pipeline wherein tribal members, their supporters, veterans, and others in the collective encamped on lands that were slated for pipeline construction. That field became a rhetorical actor and participant beyond community meanings and the various contexts in which it could be understood, but also in the harsh winter weather that descended upon the protesters and the government agents. The weather itself became part of the emplaced rhetoric of that particular protest and it enabled new rhetorical inventions, particularly as government use of water cannons in freezing temperatures became a point of contestation (Barajas, 2016; Hawkins, 2016; A. Taylor, 2016).

### **Methods**

My methodological approach, in common with one of my favorite social movements, can be summarized as “by whatever means necessary.” To that end I adopt the overall approach of the bricoleur, one who Denzin and Lincoln (2005) assert “uses the aesthetic and material tools of his or her craft, deploying whatever strategies, methods, and empirical materials are at hand” (p. 4). As a critical methodological approach this also means that “bricolage exists out of respect for the complexity of the

lived world and the complications of power” (Kincheloe & McLaren, 2005, p. 317). At its heart then, bricolage is a means of constructing “research methods from the tools at hand rather than passively receiving the ‘correct,’ universally applicable methodologies” (Kincheloe & McLaren, 2005, p. 317). Lacking a generalized belief in anything “universally applicable” from airplane seats to television remotes to methodologies, the approach of the bricoleur opened up fruitful avenues of research in this case study.

Additionally, regarding the research approach, I employ participatory critical rhetoric, or PCR (M. Middleton et al., 2015). PCR is an especially fruitful avenue by which to examine machines of mobilization for two predominant reasons: 1) it allows me to gather texts firsthand instead of relying on reporting, and 2) because it encourages widespread theoretical ties, including critical rhetoric, performance studies, and ethnography while also allowing room to grow and develop within the method. PCR was developed as “a set of research practices that bring qualitative methods of data collection...into the process of doing rhetorical criticism” (M. Middleton et al., p. xiv). Bringing those two methodological practices together afforded me the opportunity to engage in participant observation while also examining the rhetoric of the machine of mobilization as it was invented (M. Middleton et al., p. xv). PCR, like rhetorical field methods (McHendry, Middleton, Endres, Senda-Cook, & O’Byrne, 2014; M. K. Middleton, Senda-Cook, & Endres, 2011) and critical-rhetorical ethnography (Hess, 2011) before it, relies and expands on the various forms of in situ research already being performed by critical rhetoricians (Blair, 2001; Blair et al., 1991; Dickinson, 1997, 2002, 2006; Dickinson, Ott, & Aoki, 2005, 2006, 2013; Hasian & Wood, 2010; Katriel, 1987, 1993; McCormick, 2003; Medhurst, 2001; M. K. Middleton et al., 2011; Pezzullo, 2001,

2003, 2007; Simonson, 2010; Stromer-Galley & Schiappa, 1998; B. C. Taylor, 1998; Zagacki & Gallagher, 2009).

As fleeting, often-underreported events, social movements and the public deployment of their tactics are at risk of being poorly understood or misinterpreted because much of the “stuff” of the movement is never seen by those who do not experience it directly (Hauser, 1999; Ono & Sloop, 1995; Pezzullo, 2003; Sloop & Ono, 1997). PCR recognizes this potential loss and encourages the researcher to engage with and capture these potentially fleeting moments of rhetorical invention (M. Middleton et al., 2015, p. xvi). M. K. Middleton et al. (2011) argue “These efforts at in situ rhetorical analysis are valuable because they sharpen the ability for CR [critical rhetoric] to engage seriously the voices of marginalized rhetorical communities and mundane discourses that often evade critical attention” (p. 387; see also: Blair, 2001; Pezzullo, 2003). It is in an attempt to provide critical attention to the fleeting discourse of the public protest events of Peaceful Uprising that I have found PCR to be the most productive methodological machine.

### **Artifacts**

For this study, I have assembled various texts and artifacts, including songbooks and other documents produced by Peaceful Uprising; screenshots of the Peaceful Uprising Facebook page around days of action; audio recordings of public events, including protests and performance events; my own video and still images taken at public events; and ethnographic field notes. These field notes, images, and recordings were drawn from various events surrounding preparation for DeChristopher’s trial, actions at

his trial, and the events surrounding his sentencing hearing. On February 18, 2011, I attended a “Revolution-Sing-Along” event to rehearse protest songs before the trial events started. That rehearsal was a way to gear up for a midnight vigil to be held the night before/early morning of DeChristopher’s initial trial. I also attended that midnight vigil spanning the night of February 27th into the morning of the 28th, 2011. The trial started on February 28, 2011, and Peaceful Uprising held a major day of action including a long, complicated march through the city during the morning commute hours, followed by a full day of activity in the FSZ across the street from the Federal Courthouse. I was present for the entire event. DeChristopher’s second hearing, intended to hand down his sentence, occurred on July 26, 2011. Peaceful Uprising planned and conducted a rally, again in the FSZ, for this trial. There were also pseudo-spontaneous actions immediately after the sentencing, which included the arrests of many members and supporters of Peaceful Uprising (myself included). I have audio recordings, field notes, video recordings, and still images from all of these events.

The case is rooted in live action, mostly protest-oriented, large-group events. These types of events can never be fully reported or represented in post-facto journalistic style documentation. The depth and breadth of the action, while entirely public, is not easily translatable into accounts typical of newspaper reporting. Even if this type of full reporting were possible, it is not likely to be printed in full given the constraints of space, editorial decisions, and readership preferences. While I incorporate public reporting into my artifact group, I select PCR as a method because it allows me to weave in my own experiences and observations. By participating in Peaceful Uprising’s public actions, I came to see the workings of the machine firsthand. Blair (2001) argues that it is in “being

there” that we are able to make the rhetoric of the event or place “matter” (p. 275). Following her lead, my commitment is to not only show the importance of the event but also to provide material weight to the happenings. This commitment to in situ or “live” research also echoes and expands on McKerrow’s (1989) notion of the critical rhetoric orientation. PCR orients the researcher as part of what they observe, not sitting on the sideline. It was not enough for me to simply stand alongside, documenting and observing the actions. Feigning disinterest or distance, observing the actions as if separate from the group and their intentions would not have been a natural orientation for me. Instead I chose to participate with the group and their actions.

Beyond orienting myself in this particular fashion during live events and in gathering texts, I intend to analyze these collected artifacts in an inductive manner, drawing from rhetorical theories and concepts that prove particularly salient for the work at hand. Given the nature of the case and the use of PCR, ongoing conversational threads emerged that emphasized the concepts of bodies, affect, and place/space. I discuss these concepts here as an orienting tactic as each plays a role in the analysis chapters.

### **Performance Methodologies**

Performance undergirds this project insofar as I continually assess the public performance of protest and remain attuned to performance studies methodologies in this rhetorical endeavor. The field of performance studies inflects PCR in that it attunes “the critic to the contingent, improvisational nature of live(d) rhetorical practice” (M. Middleton et al., 2015, p. 23). These live and ongoing processes are a stretch for the traditional rhetorician more accustomed to examining “stable, finished texts that



represent past rhetorical actions” (p. 23). PCR instead asks the critic to interrogate “rhetorical practice that is unfolding in the presence of those critics and whose consequences may not be fully known at the time critics leave the field to write up their analysis” (p. 23). In the end, taking performance studies methodologies seriously within PCR means that “participatory critical rhetoric practitioners take member meanings seriously in their participation with, as well as collection and analysis of, field rhetorics” (p. 18).

PCR, like rhetorical field methods before it, productively integrates rhetoric with performance studies by acknowledging the performative potential of rhetoric itself. M. K. Middleton et al. argue for the articulation of performance studies with critical rhetoric in rhetorical field methods. They note that the integration of performance studies “can help shape the constitutive, strategic, politically motivated, and social justice-oriented readings of domination and freedom made by critical rhetoricians” (2011, p. 388). I share the authors’ inclination to incorporate concepts of performance, particularly in this case given the multiple ways the machine of mobilization purposely inclined itself toward performance. DeChristopher performed dissent in the act of bidding, PeaceUp performed protest on his behalf, and all the while there was a deliberate integration of both musical and theatrical performances throughout the public protest events.

I am especially interested in these multifaceted layers of performance as “performance attunes rhetorical field methods to moments when rhetorical intervention might improvise within, and attempt to change, the constraints of social practice” (M. K. Middleton et al., 2011, p. 391). As we see, machines of mobilization are specifically tuned toward changes in social practice. In the following chapters I argue that attending

to the various performances of the machine will illuminate social changes.

### **Chapters Preview**

In what follows I develop five chapters highlighting the importance of the rhetorical invention of collectivity and establishing machines of mobilization as a theoretical tool. The first is a recounting of the case grounding the analysis chapters, which provide three vantage points on this case study. Each illuminates different ways in which collectivity is rhetorically invented, influencing Peaceful Uprising as a machine of mobilization. Each chapter specifically questions the rhetorical invention of collectivity while employing the machinic language developed in this chapter. Additionally, they all expand on affect theory and emphasize the advantages of methodological investment in PCR. They each have separate foci concentrating on the rhetorical invention of collectivity and engaging the protest tactics employed by the machine of mobilization. In what follows I provide a brief précis of the upcoming chapters.

#### **Chapter 2—Peaceful Uprising: The Case**

This short chapter recounts Tim DeChristopher's story from the day of his original bid in December 2008 through the rhetorical invention of collectivity of Peaceful Uprising, and through their protest actions concluding at his sentencing hearing. Rather than analyzing, this chapter establishes the context for the chapters that follow. Recounting the story in full with clear chronological progression in this chapter prevents disjointed retellings of the relevant portions in later chapters.

### **Chapter 3—Radiant Shades of Gray: The War Machine and the State**

In Chapter 3, I further refine the machines of mobilization discussion by positing Peaceful Uprising as a war machine. This is productive as it allows me to examine the relationship between the war machine and the State as theorized by Deleuze and Guattari. This war machine/State framework allows for analysis of the possibilities and limitations of protest in a post-9/11 context. Missing from traditional social movement studies, such analysis is vital to on-the-ground protest and protesters as they negotiate the boundaries between punishable and nonpunishable actions. Importantly, these post-9/11 conditions both constrain and enable the rhetorical invention of collectivity as it works to agitate and create social change. To that end, I demonstrate how Peaceful Uprising in its capacity as a war machine illuminated the potential of liminal positions within an otherwise binary State understanding of ideas like legal/illegal, interior/exterior, and reasonable/unreasonable. Bursting these binaries and writing into the productive space between them, this chapter demonstrates the useful theoretical tools that social movement theory, and Deleuzo-Guattarian theory offer when read in dialogue with one another. I employ data gathered via PCR-style participant observation and more textual background data specifically in exploring the current formation of the State as it appeared in this case study.

### **Chapter 4—Singing Like a Movement: Affecting Machines**

Chapter 4 addresses a lacuna in social movement studies of protest music. While many such studies exist (Bailey, 2006; Bayton, 1993; Beebee, 1991; Booth, 1976; Carter, 1980; Chesebro, 1972; Drewett, 2007; Dunlap, 2006; Francesconi, 1986; Gonzalez &

Makay, 1983; Halasa, 2010; Hurner, 2006; Irvine & Kirkpatrick, 1972; Knupp, 1981; Kosokoff & Carmichael, 1970; Mohrmann & Scott, 1976; Rodnitsky, 2006; Sanger, 1995, 1997; C. J. Stewart, Smith, & Denton Jr., 2001; Weinstein, 2006), none employ field methods allowing the researcher to participate in and experience the affective performances of group singing, until now. In this chapter I work through that methodological gap using PCR to argue that group singing is a critical affective component of the rhetorical invention of collectivity in street-level performances of protest (M. Middleton et al., 2015). Drawing out Deleuze and Guattari's machinic components of collective enunciation and incorporeal transformation, I work through the various ways in which Peaceful Uprising employed music affectively. This examination includes interrogation of the uses of group singing in two different street-level demonstrations, the use of citationality in redeploying long-used protest songs, as well as the affective impact of rewriting the lyrics of those songs to reflect the present circumstances.

### **Chapter 5—Being Neither-Here-Nor-There: The Politics of Proximity in Protest**

In this chapter I concentrate on the performances of place and space, both as rhetoric and in protest (Endres & Senda-Cook, 2011). In analyzing both place-as-rhetoric and place-in-protest, following Endres and Senda-Cook, I also argue that individual and cultural connection to places and spaces aids the rhetorical invention of collectivity as protesters unite to protect land from degradation. To that end I demonstrate first, in a section on place-as-rhetoric, that Peaceful Uprising and the newspaper reports surrounding DeChristopher's trials and travails attempted to argue that the affordances of

space (as related to national parks) should extend to cover the material place of nonpark BLM parcels. In the second section on place-in-protest I support Endres and Senda-Cook's (2011) observations regarding shifting notions of place and argue that the deployment of protest songs can also interrupt notions of both place and space in protest.

## **Chapter 6—Conclusion**

In this concluding chapter, I synthesize and forward my arguments regarding the importance of interrogating the rhetorical invention of collectives in relationship to social movements, the usefulness of machines of mobilization as a way to envision movements, PCR as a methodological approach, performances of protest, and the deployment of music within the machine. I also explain the ways in which this work extends the literature in each of those areas, but most specifically the rhetorical oeuvre of social movement literature as it pertains to collectivity. In addition to this extension, I discuss the implications that my research has for contemporary social movements, critical rhetoric and rhetorical criticism, rhetorical theory, and PCR approaches to group action while also making suggestions for future areas of research.

## CHAPTER 2

### PEACEFUL UPRISING: THE CASE

As outlined in the introduction, this project focuses on the actions of Tim DeChristopher and the generation of Peaceful Uprising as a case study for examining the rhetorical invention of collectivity in machines of mobilization. In this brief chapter, I provide a historical narrative of the case as a means of supplying background for the analysis in subsequent chapters. While I employ some of the theoretical language developed in the first chapter, I am not setting out at this point to begin arguments and analysis based on those theoretical underpinnings. I begin the story with DeChristopher's actions at the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) auction and follow the major plotlines through his sentencing. While DeChristopher and Peaceful Uprising are still extant and active on the environmental scene today, I have chosen to limit my examination of the case to actions that took place between the initial bid (December 2008) and the prison sentencing (July 2011). After that time, Peaceful Uprising began dispersing their efforts to other climate justice causes, moving away from solely concentrating on DeChristopher's plight (Peaceful Uprising, 2014a). In selecting these dates to circumscribe the case study, I am able to pay special attention to the early development of Peaceful Uprising and their major on-the-ground protest events that centered on DeChristopher's trial dates.

The story of the case begins at a BLM oil and gas rights lease auction in Salt Lake City on December 19, 2008 (Sands, 2010). Recall that DeChristopher and other environmentalists took particular umbrage at the inclusion of parcels of land that were adjacent to national parks and landmark sites in Utah (Magill, 2009c). Lobbying efforts before the event did not succeed in getting all of these sensitive parcels removed from the sale bill. On the day of the sale, a cadre of protesters gathered outside of the sale venue marching and holding signs. DeChristopher was well-acquainted with that mode of protest and was seeking to do something more. He, like these sign-holding protesters, had previously followed all the rules of activism, stating in *The Washington Post*:

I've been an environmentalist for pretty much all my life and done all the things that you're supposed to do that are supposed to lead toward change. I've marched and held signs. I've volunteered in national parks. I've written letters and signed petitions. I've sat down with my congressman, Jim Matheson, for a long time. Ultimately, I felt like those things were only mildly effective. And it was having a very tiny effect on a very large problem. (Vick, 2009)

When DeChristopher arrived at the BLM building that day, there were about 100 protesters already on site, but “there was a feeling of resignation” among them (Jonzen, 2009). Those protesters were following the rules of protest decorum. They could hold their signs but they were not, in DeChristopher’s estimation, making a real difference. DeChristopher said that he knew: “I had to make more of a nuisance of myself than that” (Jonzen, 2009). He later told David Letterman (June 25, 2013) that he knew he needed to cause more of a stir. “My plan was to do anything that I could to stand in the way of this [auction].” While standing “in the way” was his intent, he did not go into the auction with a specific plan of action. He thought his commitment to “stand in the way” might lead him to make a speech or shout. He noted in his interview with Letterman that the auction took place “right after that guy threw the shoe at Bush so that was kind of in the back of

my mind” (DeChristopher, 2013).

It was in this realm of possibilities that DeChristopher was mistakenly allowed into the auction itself. An auction official asked him if he was there for the auction and if he was a bidder. After answering in the affirmative to both, he undertook the relatively simple process of registering to bid by confirming his identity and his willingness to pay for any parcels he won (Sands, 2010). While all of the information he provided was factual (i.e., his actual identity and address), these confirmations were false in that he was not there to represent a qualified bidding entity (he registered to bid on behalf of himself) and he did not have the ability or intent to pay any amount of money spent. With these affirmations in place, he was given bidding paddle number seventy—the origin of the Bidder 70 slogan—and took his seat among the buyers (Jonzen, 2009).

On first taking his seat among the other bidders, DeChristopher was reluctant to take action, knowing full well that there were criminal implications to his misrepresentations. After half an hour of contemplation and wavering, he initially decided to start bidding with the intention of driving up the parcel prices, not winning bids outright (Jonzen, 2009). These actions made DeChristopher stand out in a room where the other bidders knew one another. David Terry, a Salt Lake City man who regularly attends BLM auctions, noted DeChristopher’s actions in *The Washington Post*: “I leaned forward to one of my colleagues and said, ‘This guy behind us is just running up the prices.’ And my friend said, ‘Yeah, he’s going to get stuck with a tract’” (Vick, 2009). Eventually, DeChristopher did begin to win parcels and then simply held his bidding paddle above his head at all times, even between offerings (Vick, 2009). It was only after winning twelve parcels in a row, however, that the auction was paused and



DeChristopher was led outside for questioning (Vick, 2009). In several hours of questioning by federal officers, DeChristopher held strong to his insistence that he was there to disrupt the auction (Sands, 2009a). By that point, DeChristopher understood that he might go to jail, but he had decided that was a better option than “seeing all the disastrous effects of climate change in our future” with which he “didn’t want to have to live” (Vick, 2009). DeChristopher’s actions that day were those of an environmentalist fed up with the system. He was frustrated with the continued degradation of wilderness in the name of energy development. In his determination to stand in the way, to shake up the system, he managed to change the course of his life, alter the narrative of the environmental machine of mobilization, and begin the rhetorical invention of collectivity that would become Peaceful Uprising.

### **Announcing the Charges**

It took just over three months after the December auction for DeChristopher to find out the charges he would face. He was charged with two felony counts. The first count was a violation of the Federal Onshore Oil and Gas Leasing Reform Act, stemming from his failure to pay for the leases. This primary charge carried a potential penalty of up to five years in federal prison and a \$500,000 fine. The second count carried a maximum penalty of five years in prison and a \$250,000 fine. This count held that DeChristopher knowingly made a “false and fraudulent statement” in completing the bidder registration form at the auction (Magill, 2009a). So it became the case that, after a day of intentionally disrupting an oil and gas rights lease auction, DeChristopher found himself facing a future of up to ten years in prison and \$750,000 in fines.

Magill also reported that, in response to these charges, Interior Secretary Ken Salazar “said the indictment ‘contains serious allegations of fraud,’ and that BLM ‘will not tolerate future conduct which undermines the integrity of the bidding process’” (2009b). Echoing this line of thought was Brett Tolman, U.S. Attorney for Utah, who applauded the charges as a “victory for the rule of law” (Magill, 2009b). Tolman cited DeChristopher’s repeated intention to disrupt the auction as a basis for heralding the rule of law. This dual hardline becomes an important part of DeChristopher’s story as his intent to disrupt the system was not legally interpreted as something like civil disobedience or environmental protectorship, but instead as a criminally fraudulent act, making him the temporary poster boy for government hardline prosecution.

While it was Salazar who defended the integrity of the bidding process, he also took action to nullify the sale of some of the same parcels. As noted, this auction was controversial even before it began. It drew the ire of environmental groups and activists, including the Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance (SUWA), the National Resources Defense Council (NRDC), and actor/activist Robert Redford (Sands, 2009b). In response to legal action by SUWA, on February 4, 2009, Salazar cancelled 77 of the 116 leases sold at the auction. Eleven of those cancellations were among the 14 originally purchased by DeChristopher (Sands, 2010). Salazar acknowledged the controversial and rushed nature of the sales, stating:

In its last weeks in office, the Bush administration rushed ahead to sell oil and gas leases at the doorstep of some of our nation’s most treasured landscapes in Utah. We need to responsibly develop our oil and gas supplies to help us reduce our dependence on foreign oil, but we must do so in a thoughtful and balanced way that allows us to protect our signature landscapes and cultural resources. (Hansen & Karey, 2009)

In response to Salazar’s nullification, NRDC attorney Sharon Buccino noted that

the action “reaffirms the priceless value of America’s wilderness and signals a new day for Washington” (Hansen & Karey, 2009). She also said that developing the leases “would not have had any real impact on our energy security,” adding that “we don’t need to sacrifice the West’s last wild places at the hands of the oil industry” (Hansen & Karey, 2009). In light of these nullifications, DeChristopher felt largely vindicated (K. Johnson, 2009). He set out to protest a sale that he found to be improper and, given time, the government came to agree with him—but not to the extent that his criminal indictment was dropped. The irony of Salazar’s defense of the bidding process is most notable as it was DeChristopher’s disruption of the same process that arguably drew enough attention to this particular sale to eventually get parcels rescinded. Had DeChristopher not made a mockery of the system in this way and drawn attention to this particular issue, those lands could well have been rushed into development, despite Salazar’s later admission that a flawed process originally led to the tracts being offered for sale.

### **Inventing Peaceful Uprising**

DeChristopher’s actions became a viral sensation in local and national media (K. Johnson, 2009; Magill, 2009a; Sands, 2009b). Local friends and supporters rallied around DeChristopher after his arrest. They started a group called Peaceful Uprising to support him and his cause. Ashley Anderson, DeChristopher’s friend and cofounder of Peaceful Uprising, said of DeChristopher’s actions: “Tim woke a lot of people up. It started an avalanche, and the story caught on” (K. Johnson, 2009). The groundswell of support that was growing for his actions meant that he was able to start collecting funds intended to pay for the leases he bought as a way to mitigate the legal implications of his decision to

bid. While paying for the leases was never his intention, given the seriousness of the charges and the support he was getting from fellow activists, paying seemed to be a way, according to DeChristopher, to “reinforce the act of civil disobedience and [have] a much better chance of protecting that land” (Sands, 2009a). The theory was that if DeChristopher could legally hold those parcels under his own name, then the lands would be protected, as he had no intention to use them for energy development. DeChristopher’s attorneys entered talks with BLM and the U.S. Attorney’s Office to see if they would accept an initial payment of \$45,000 (Sands, 2009a). That payment was rejected and court proceedings continued.

### **The Legal Push/Pull**

Prior to the criminal trial, as attorneys for each side were building their cases, Judge Dee Benson sent down two major decisions limiting the available choices for defense. These decisions impinged not only on how the defense was able to build their case but also on what could be said in the courtroom. These decisions shaped the way the jury was able to come to know DeChristopher as a defendant and environmentalist and revoked DeChristopher’s ability to speak on his own behalf during the criminal trial.

### **Choice of Evils Defense**

Judge Benson’s first rejection was the defense’s intent to use the “choice of evils” defense (Hansen, 2009). The classic law school case of the choice of evils defense is the theoretical example of a person lost in the woods who finds a cabin and must break in to survive (K. Johnson, 2009). In that example, the person is violating the law by breaking

and entering, but that choice is found preferable to following the law and potentially dying of exposure. DeChristopher's defense team had intended to use the defense in demonstrating that his choice to break the law (by lying about his eligibility to bid and intent to pay) was preferable to the potentially devastating environmental degradation that would come of developing that land for energy production. The BLM attorneys originally issued their challenge to this defense on the grounds that it would have "no bearing on the elements of the offenses charged," and that it would serve to "improperly inflame or confuse the jury" (Hansen, 2009). They noted that DeChristopher "may be passionate, sincere, and even articulate in trying to explain that there was some sort of emergency that justified his criminal acts," but "there was no 'personal danger,' 'direct harm,' or 'real emergency' that any court would recognize as one that could support a necessity defense" (Hansen, 2009).

Following the BLM challenge, defense attorney Patrick Shea said that the government's motion essentially sought to limit the scope of the defense. Shea's interpretation of the challenge was such that the BLM was asking the judge to rule that the defense could only argue "the facts surrounding the events of the bidding process" (Sands & Magill, 2009). Consequently, Shea argued that "The 4th, 5th, 6th and 14th Amendments guarantee any defendant, and Mr. DeChristopher in particular, the right to defend himself in whatever manner possible" (Sands & Magill, 2009). Shea continued, noting that the judge has the right to make rulings about any defense presented during a trial, "but cannot define or censor the trial before it's begun" (Sands & Magill, 2009).

Despite Shea's opposition of the challenge, Judge Benson concurred with the prosecution, writing: "The court finds that DeChristopher's necessity defense fails

because there were reasonable, legal alternatives open to DeChristopher other than his alleged criminal acts” (Hansen, 2009). The preferred “legal alternatives” include peacefully protesting outside (as others were doing and as he had done in the past) and participating in the lawsuit brought on by SUWA and others. Specific to this point, Benson wrote, “[i]mpatience with or failure to take less visible and more time-consuming alternatives does not constitute an absence of legal alternatives” (Hansen, 2009). The extension of the breaking and entering case above would, as an extension of Benson’s logic, also hold that it might be more “time-consuming” to build or find other suitable shelter but that is still an option and the preferable one given that breaking and entering is a known legal offense.

### **Others Also Fail to Pay**

Also prior to the trial, DeChristopher’s defense attorneys requested that the prosecution provide the names of other individuals who, like DeChristopher, won bids at all prior BLM lease sales and failed to pay for their commitments but, unlike DeChristopher, were never prosecuted. This information was requested as a means of proving that the government was unfairly singling out DeChristopher in order to make an example of his actions (Sands & Magill, 2009). Shea noted that “several people in the BLM and US Attorney’s Office” said that they intended to prosecute DeChristopher in order to teach him and others like him a lesson. Shea responded by noting that part of his job was to ensure that the government prosecutors use their immense legal power evenhandedly and without discrimination (Sands & Magill, 2009). Choosing to make an example of DeChristopher as a means of forestalling future similar actions (by

DeChristopher, his supporters, or others) is discriminatory in Shea's view.

Judge Benson denied that request for information and the possible defensive strategy on March 15, 2010. Benson based his rejection on the fact that DeChristopher stated that his intentions were to interfere with the sale (Henetz, 2010b). Because his motive was publicly stated, Benson argued, DeChristopher could not make a claim of discrimination. In a similar case, from which DeChristopher's attorneys also attempted to draw, a man made false bids at a 2007 auction in New Mexico and was never prosecuted. But, Benson held that because that case did not take place in Utah, there was no legal precedent for the defense to pursue on the grounds of discrimination (Henetz, 2010a). In these two challenges to the defense, it became nearly impossible to legally prove that there was a logical, purposeful reason to break the law—as DeChristopher did—in this case.

## **The Trials**

### **Criminal Trial**

DeChristopher's criminal trial was held in Salt Lake City, February 28 through March 3, 2010. The defense had been legally stifled such that they were not even allowed to discuss DeChristopher's motivations. They were limited to only tangentially alluding to his "strong environmental beliefs" (K. Johnson, 2011b). The prosecution closed their arguments by reinforcing to the jury that the "'rule of law' was a boundary of civil society that passion and zeal for a cause could not justify crossing" (K. Johnson, 2011b). The jury agreed and DeChristopher was found guilty on both counts. For "disrupting a federal auction and making false statements on federal forms to enter the auction" he

found himself facing up to ten years in prison and potentially \$750,000 in total fines (K. Johnson, 2011b).

**Peaceful Uprising criminal trial presence.** Peaceful Uprising was a constant presence at (and even before) DeChristopher's criminal trial. Ten days before the trial, there was a Revolution-Sing-Along (February 18, 2011) held at the Unitarian Universalist church in Salt Lake City meant to build community in the process of practicing the protest songs that would eventually comprise the Peaceful Uprising songbook. The sing-along was also meant as practice for the midnight vigil held the night before the trial began, which featured an appearance by Peter Yarrow (a member of the 1960s group Peter, Paul, and Mary). On the first morning of the criminal trial, Peaceful Uprising began a day of action with an elaborate march to the Federal Courthouse from nearby Pioneer Park. The day continued with further singing, speeches, a theatrical performance, and group support of DeChristopher from outside the courthouse. Smaller contingents of Peaceful Uprising were also present for the subsequent days of the criminal trial.

### **Sentencing Trial**

DeChristopher's sentencing hearing followed on July 26, 2010. With the guilty verdict already in hand, it was left only to determine the punishment for his crimes. At the end of the day, it was announced that he would serve two years in prison, pay \$10,000 in fines, and serve three years' probation (Dobner, 2011). The severity of the sentence was a surprise to the optimistic members of Peaceful Uprising and others supporting DeChristopher and following his progress through the case. Bill McKibben, environmentalist and founder of 350.org, said of the sentencing:



It was very clear that the government was trying to send a message with that sentencing and the message was, “Sit down and shut up—the federal government is in the oil and gas business, and we don’t want to hear any of your whining about it.” (Gordon, 2011)

So it is within this milieu of action and inaction, pollution and profiteering, reason and unreason that DeChristopher not only chose to speak for the land in protest of a sale he found to be immoral (and which was later deemed illegal), but that he was held to a higher standard than so many others who reneged on their commitments to pay for auction purchases.

**Peaceful Uprising sentencing trial presence.** Similar to the initial trial, Peaceful Uprising held a day of action corresponding with DeChristopher’s sentencing. Group members again occupied the Free Speech Zone (FSZ) across the street from the Federal Courthouse for a day of singing, sign-holding, speeches, theatrical performances, and showing support for DeChristopher. Group action moved out of the FSZ and across the street to directly in front of the courthouse as the anticipated time for verdict declaration drew near. Immediately following his sentencing, there were also pseudospontaneous/semiplanned actions that induced the arrest of twenty-six members and supporters of Peaceful Uprising (myself included). Those actions, which some planned to undertake in the event of a negative sentencing outcome and others joined spontaneously, largely involved decamping to the intersection of 400 South and Main Street during rush hour, effectively shutting down traffic in all directions, stopping light rail transit on two routes through the intersection, and impeding public bus transit.

DeChristopher was transferred immediately into the penal system. He spent two years in prison, was assigned to a half-way house in Salt Lake City, and transitioned out of the system in April 2013. He served three-years’ probation while attending Harvard

Divinity School (Peaceful Uprising, n.d.-d). Peaceful Uprising remains an active group, taking action on climate justice issues locally and nationally. They continue to protest tar sands mining in Utah (Peaceful Uprising, 2014b), took a negative stance on the construction of the Keystone XL pipeline, and actively work against structural and environmental racism (Peaceful Uprising, 2014a). With this full narrative in hand, we can continue to the analysis chapters wherein different elements of this story will recur.

## CHAPTER 3

### RADIANT SHADES OF GRAY: THE WAR MACHINE AND THE STATE

*“I want you to join me in standing up for the right and responsibility of citizens to challenge their government. I want you to join me in valuing this country’s rich history of nonviolent civil disobedience.”*<sup>4</sup>

—Tim DeChristopher’s statement to the court, 7/26/2011

When Peaceful Uprising took to the streets in 2011, they were quite literally but also metaphorically, not alone. Nationally and internationally, various protest movements were taking their causes to the streets to air grievances against state and national governments and corporations. The Arab Spring took the world by surprise as citizens demanded fairer government in Egypt, Syria, Libya, and Tunisia (Abdullah, 2012; Hubbard & Gladstone, 2013; Khouri, 2011; Nasr, 2011). Faced with legislation unfavorable to unions and state employees, protests grew throughout Wisconsin and centered loudly in Madison as public school teachers demanded fairer treatment from Governor Scott Walker (Ashenmacher, 2011; Cullen & Sims, 2011; N. Johnson, 2011; Jonsson, 2011a, 2011b). The Occupy Wall Street movement swept the nation as citizens camped in public, notably Zuccotti Park in New York City, demanding that corporations be held accountable for their role in the economic crisis (Berman, 2011; Hertzberg, 2011;

---

<sup>4</sup> DeChristopher’s statement was reproduced in full by the web-based environmental magazine *Grist* (DeChristopher, 2011).

Keller, 2011; Kimmelman, 2011). Operating on a much smaller scale and with considerably less fanfare, Peaceful Uprising entered the fray of public protest in 2011, demanding climate justice and a livable future for all (“Peaceful Uprising,” n.d.-b). As a scaled-down contemporary to these larger movements, Peaceful Uprising runs the risk of being unheard or forgotten in the fray of international protest.

While these movements vary in size and scope, they all occurred in a post-9/11 world and display embodied tactical protest.<sup>5</sup> In this chapter I argue that the embodied performance of collective protest is fundamentally different, especially in the American context, due to the enactment and enforcement of laws and dictates post-9/11. To make that argument I develop a framework that expands on the relationship between Deleuze and Guattari’s ideas of the war machine and the State by putting it in conversation with the rhetorical invention of collectivity. I position DeChristopher and Peaceful Uprising as a war machine and understand the U.S. justice system as the State in order to see how, in traversing the boundaries between these two positions, DeChristopher was able to develop an embodied rhetorical invention of collectivity responsive to post-9/11 conditions. In making that claim I also argue that there is space in the liminal areas between the State and the war machine to find inventive, productive, and transformational collective rhetorics. For Peaceful Uprising and their enactment of protest in the post-9/11 legal context, those spaces became not only vocal positions of dissent, but also a factor that they needed to address both tactically and rhetorically. Reading the war machine/State relationship alongside the rhetorical invention of

---

<sup>5</sup> Note that there are a number of other possible similarities to be drawn between these movements. I concentrate here on their post-9/11 nature as a means to feed the argument in this chapter, which hinges on changes in the way protest is/was dealt with after the terrorist attacks.

collectivity is a productive contribution in that this perspective allows us to see how collectivity is born and thrives in liminal positions between the war machine and the state and how that liminality provides space for creative rhetorical invention.

### **Theoretical Perspective: War Machine and State**

This case study provides useful avenues for seeing how the post-9/11 relationship between the U.S. government (the State) and Peaceful Uprising (a war machine) played out. While I have, to this point, been discussing Peaceful Uprising as a machine of mobilization, in this chapter I add another layer of terminology, positioning it as a war machine. In brief, machines are interior to the State when they recognize and follow State rule thereby accepting State sovereignty. They are exterior, and become war machines, when they reject State sovereignty and willfully place themselves outside of the realm of what is expected by the State (Deleuze & Guattari, 2000, p. 352). To clarify, not all machines of mobilization are also war machines. It is possible to assemble a machine of mobilization that is not intentionally exterior to the State. The Girl Scouts, for example, are a machine of mobilization but not a war machine because they do not, as an organization, deny the sovereignty of the State nor take up an exterior position.

Positioning each party by its appropriate terms is relevant because the relationship between the war machine and the State, in many ways, dictates the options open to each side in producing, effecting, thwarting, and repressing change and rhetorically inventing their collectivity. Each of these options and the changes they would affect are material and have material consequences (Aune, 2003; Blair, 1999; Cloud, 1994, 1999, 2003; Cox, 1990; Greene, 1998). That is to say that protest produces matter—whether

discursive, embodied, performative, or legislative. The production of that matter is enabled and constrained by the relationship between the war machine and the State. It is in the interrelationship between the war machine and the State that the possible options for performing dissent and inventing collectivity are negotiated. In this case study we see Peaceful Uprising, as a war machine, work through the available options for developing their rhetorical invention of collectivity, performing embodied dissent, and the legal ramifications of doing so in a post-9/11 judicial system.

In this section, I draw from Deleuze and Guattari (2000) to discuss the relationship between and distinguishing features of war machines and the State. I set up the argument that Peaceful Uprising acts as a war machine that is “at once antithetical and complementary” to the State (p. 351). I begin by providing definitions for both terms. Then I illuminate the differences that animate their relationship and further discuss how DeChristopher, as an agent of the war machine, is viewed and constrained within the dual system. I conclude this section with a discussion of some of the ways the State changed post-9/11, specifically during the George W. Bush presidency, and how those changes enabled and constrained Peaceful Uprising’s options for the rhetorical invention of collectivity through embodied protest.

## **State**

The State is precisely what you would imagine. It is government, governance, hierarchy, and order. With ultimate control in making and enforcing laws, ensuring jurisprudence, and controlling assets, the State is a bulwark. Deleuze and Guattari argue that the State is defined “by the perpetuation or conservation of organs of power” (p.

357). The State is the centralized set of assets and power “that makes possible the undertaking of large-scale projects, the constitution of surpluses, and the organization of the corresponding public functions. The State is what makes the distinction between governors and governed possible” (p. 359). Controlling not only financial assets but also human capital, the State defines everything it controls in relation to itself.

The State in this case study is most closely represented by the U.S. government as enforced by the Federal court system. The State is also occasionally enforced by the state of Utah. The oil and energy industrial complex also has a close relationship to the State in a governmental structure where corporations are people (Parker, 2011) and money counts as votes. In the case of Peaceful Uprising, I argue that big oil and gas companies act essentially as sanctioned arms of the U.S. government. With seemingly inexhaustible resources they are able to compel not only members of the legislative branch (via lobbying and campaign contributions) but also the judicial system as they attempt to secure beneficial legal rulings ranging from issues of leases for exploratory purposes (as in this case) to the 2010 Gulf oil spill. These companies act as an arm of the State in ordering and securing the prosecution of those they find inconvenient to their bottom line.

This contentious relationship between the State and those they would command, according to Deleuze and Guattari (2000), is part of the very formulation of the State:

the State itself has always been in a relation with an outside and is inconceivable independent of that relationship. The law of the State is not the law of All or Nothing (State societies *or* counter-State societies) but that of interior and exterior. (p. 360)

In the case of Peaceful Uprising, interior subjects (American citizens) refuse to grant State sovereignty (e.g., not accepting the sale of State lands for oil exploration or refusal to submit to unregulated climate change), thereby declaring their own exteriority. The

friction between these two positions generated action in many forms—legal petitions, letter writing campaigns, and a variety of types of protest at the auction. For his part, DeChristopher loudly proclaimed his exteriority and put himself in a compromising position by bidding. Yet he was still subject to State power via prosecution of his crime, even though he personally refused the State by knowingly and intentionally breaking the law.

### **War Machine**

War machines are more difficult to precisely define than the State. States are well known, well understood, and they refuse to be ignored. War machines, on the other hand, take many different shapes, have any variety of driving motivators, and may never surface as well-known agents. Let's start by clarifying that the war machine is "not contained" within the State apparatus (Deleuze & Guattari, 2000, p. 352). It is exterior to that apparatus and yet, while not contained, it is subject to the rules and laws of the State. The exterior and uncontained status of war machines translates to a subordinate status. As exterior subordinate subjects, war machines are left then with tactical responses (see de Certeau, 2002) to State rule. Consider the Civil Rights movement as a war machine. In separating themselves from the State by decrying segregation, voting rights infringement, and racial injustices, Civil Rights workers, activists, and Freedom Riders were parts of a war machine not contained within the State. However, in their opposition they were still subject to the rules and laws of the State. Indeed, members of the Civil Rights war machine were ostensibly *more* subject to State punishment, persecution, and prosecution because of their vocal exteriority.



The value of exteriority is that war machines can become organizing positions for people and ideas that do not fit neatly within the State system. By that accounting, Peaceful Uprising fits within the definition of war machines because the driving motivation is a fundamental disagreement with the State regarding the best use of public lands and the impact that use has on climate. That disagreement, which constitutes a refusal of State sovereignty in blatantly and vocally choosing to oppose State laws, defines the exterior positionality of Peaceful Uprising. While it remains fruitful to acknowledge that Peaceful Uprising is a machine of mobilization, it is also necessary to understand that in staking its exterior position, Peaceful Uprising became a war machine. Because they insist that they cannot be locally appropriated by the State, the war machine develops a contentious relationship with those who would wish to control them (Deleuze & Guattari, 2000, p. 360). The insistence on exteriority and an understanding of State desires necessitated a responsive rhetorical invention of collectivity that could rankle the State while also remaining productive.

### **War Machine/State Relationship**

Even though they are reasonable and comparatively agile in their ability to navigate positionalities, war machines are not guaranteed success in their endeavors. Setting the war machine against the State is to enunciate a “struggle that is lost from the start” (Deleuze & Guattari, 2000, p. 355). This losing battle is demonstrative for several reasons. Firstly, that war machines continue to push back against the State with the foregone conclusion that they cannot and will not “win” is an interesting point of fact. The quiet implication here is that it is impossible to push the State far enough outside the

status quo to effect real change. Many legions of war machines have beat ineffectively against the mighty chest of the State to no avail. They lost. What's more, they lost from the start; loss was foregone. What we know, of course, is that some war machines do "win." They manage to agitate long and hard enough to effect change in the State. Their causes are picked up and the status quo shifts. Recently we saw this in the Supreme Court decision to legalize marriage among all couples in all states (Liptak, 2015). A cause that was arguably destined for failure fought long enough, hard enough, and won largely by continuously prodding at the legal denial of equality to American citizens.

Secondly, part of the undercurrent in this continuous loss is that in "winning" any struggle, the war machine necessarily gives up what it is, what it does, and what it wants as the State appropriates those affective truths. For example, the "win" of the early suffragette movement was attaining votes for women. Prior to that time, suffrage workers were operating within a war machine, refusing to acquiesce to laws and regulations that they found unfair and discriminatory. For decades they fought within a patriarchal and masculinist system that denied their truths, demeaned their personhood, and punished their bodies. Then, once the State accepted their demands, they appropriated the suffragette movement's entire reason for being, thereby disintegrating the war machine. This appropriation is familiar to environmental movements as platforms like the Clean Air Act (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 2013) and the National Environmental Policy Act (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 2015) were taken up by the State, removing them from their war machine origins. Similar outcomes continue to occur within various civil rights movements: The struggle is long and arduous, the war machine is ridiculed and its members punished, and then, once rights are granted it is the

prerogative of the State to misremember how cultural change happened (via insistent struggle) and simply appropriate ideas and change as part of its identity.

Operating then in this perverse relationship where the State always wins by deflecting the war machine or disintegrating it entirely, the definition of what it means to lose must be reconsidered. The best case scenario for the Peaceful Uprising war machine would be to agitate itself successfully out of a job via appropriation by the State. That would mean absorption by the State, which would be to lose the war machine itself but to win the cause. In inventing their collectivity, Peaceful Uprising foresaw the possibility of their eventual disintegration. In their core principles they state: “Protecting Peaceful Uprising as an institution will never take precedent over our commitment to the fight for a healthy and just world” (Peaceful Uprising, n.d.-c). Again, this scenario is similar to the suffragette movement wherein the war machine disintegrated when the State appropriated and accepted the cause. So it then becomes better, even a win, to lose the war machine as opposed to the loss incurred by maintaining the war machine as a result of, or at the expense of, not being able to successfully modify the State.

### **Illuminating the Liminal Areas**

As an agent of the war machine, DeChristopher remains subject to State power simply because, as Deleuze & Guattari note, it is impossible to be truly exterior to the State. He uses the productive tensions in the war machine/State dichotomy to both demonstrate the potential to navigate the two systems simultaneously and the difficulty of doing so given the very different operational goals that drive them. In essence, DeChristopher’s actions illuminate a liminal space in a State system that is purportedly

binary. In a world where actions are presented as either legal or illegal, humans are either jailed or free, and land is either protected or abused, DeChristopher's actions are a foil to demonstrate the absurdities of the State while illuminating the possible alternatives offered from a different worldview. It was in traversing the two spheres simultaneously, in hopping back and forth between his chosen seat in the war machine and his subject position in the State, that he was able to manifest the liminal position of the war machine as a productive position from which to take on the State system.

Historically, liminal positions in the State are illuminated by war machines, which often employ civil disobedience to demonstrate that the status quo in the legal/illegal binary is unjust. It was in exposing the wrongs in the State system by doing wrong (i.e., civil disobedience) that Civil Rights demonstrators pushed back against a State that legally (at that time) disenfranchised and discriminated against African Americans. It was through the constant application of pressure at the fissure between legal and just treatment of citizens and the illegal laws limiting the potential and movement of African Americans that the space between legal/illegal, right/wrong, just/unjust was exposed and the State was forced to respond and to right itself—at least on paper. This righting took place legally as African Americans were granted a fairer place at the table. We have seen time and again that it is in illuminating the wrongs of the State that exterior positions are exposed and righted (to some extent) through sustained pressure and agitation. Women's rights, voting rights, clean water rights, and labor laws were all granted after development and pressure from a war machine. Once these expanded rights have been granted, the State returns to its preferred binary based on right or wrong, legal or illegal, cut and dried to deliver certain rights to classes of people who historically were underserved. In the

next section I explain how a methodological commitment to participatory critical rhetoric (PCR) opens up critical space in examining the war machine/State relationship and liminal areas as productive sites of rhetorical inventions.

### **Method**

I intend in this chapter to examine the ramifications and limitations of carrying out a social movement in a post-9/11 world and to develop some insight into how those constraints variously enable the rhetorical invention of collectivity. Doing so means that I will specifically examine points of contact between the State and the Peaceful Uprising war machine in order to illuminate the tensions in that interrelationship that enable and constrain actions by both parties. While still technically a rhetorical examination of a social movement, this study represents a break from extant studies in that it does not focus on how Peaceful Uprising worked as an organization (see Carmin, 1999; Davis, McAdam, Scott, & Zald, 2005; Diani & Donati, 1999; Fantasia & Stepan-Norris, 2007; Gray, 2009; Kousis, 1999; Schlosberg, 1999; Simons et al., 1984; Van Der Heijden, 1999); how DeChristopher functioned as a leader (see Joosse, 2012; Morris & Staggenborg, 2007; Murphy, 1997; Simonson, 2010; Wolfe, 2007); or how ideas flowed into culture creating social change (see K. M. DeLuca, 1999, 2006; Gardner, 2011; Pezzullo, 2007). Instead, in focusing on the possibilities present in the liminal position between the State and the war machine, I examine the rhetorical invention of collectivity that came as a response to DeChristopher's bidding actions and the development of the Peaceful Uprising war machine, which was brought about by the State's determination of his illegality in misrepresenting himself as a bidder.

As discussed in the introductory chapter, I approach this set of texts via PCR (M. Middleton et al., 2015). This methodological approach is especially productive and complementary toward the Deleuzo-Guattarian theoretical approach because it enables me to interrogate the interrelationship of the war machine and State through the embodied rhetoric of the Peaceful Uprising collective. Participating in and textualizing these embodied rhetorics allowed me to see not only how the tensions in the war machine/State relationship have been built but also how they play out on the ground in protest moments. By using PCR to capture and record the fleeting moments of lived, embodied protest, we can begin to see, hear, and feel how that tense war machine/State relationship manifests even in a seemingly mundane performance of protest. As such, this chapter draws on texts collected during the multiple protests held on DeChristopher's behalf.

Beyond examining the multiple iterations of Peaceful Uprising and their interactions with the State, this chapter also draws on government documents establishing post-9/11 protocol and newspaper accounts detailing the legal battle under discussion. The addition of government documents and newspaper accounts is necessary and enriching to the case study as they provide detail for context in ways that cannot be observed. For example, I will provide context for the creation, enactment, and State necessity of Free Speech Zones (FSZs) from government and newspaper accounts and augment that with experiential data on participating in a FSZ. In so doing, I mix PCR with more traditional rhetorical methods of text collection and analysis outside of participant observation. The value of this intentionally blended approach is that it provides for a more nuanced and rounded analysis of the war machine/State relationship,

especially as many State dealings are most often not observable by the public but are typically well documented. These dealings typically happen behind closed doors. They are often reported on but rarely create or occur in observable State-level actions.

PCR is an especially effective method of observing how the rhetorical invention of collectivity worked in the liminal spaces between the war machine and State because we can see how Peaceful Uprising negotiated the different frames of reason espoused by both parties. At a base level, legality and reason changed within the State after the 9/11 attacks, making it easy to link dissent to terrorism via the USA PATRIOT Act and to effectively silence protesters in FSZs. These are material constraints on the war machine and the State in a post-9/11 world. Given these exigencies and contingencies, I examine the development of a repertoire of embodied collective action and the rhetorical invention of collectivity undertaken by Peaceful Uprising as a war machine grappling with the State in its post-9/11 assemblage. In the next section I begin the analysis with a discussion of changes to the State post-9/11 that affected the liminal spaces between the war machine and the State.

### **A Changing State**

Even though we recognize the State as a bulwark, we should not also assume that it is static. The State recognizes, adapts, and changes, but not all change is for the better. Indeed, some changes to the State create more sites of contestation than they close, opening even more liminal spaces, providing more opportunities for creative rhetorical inventions of collectivity, and inviting protest. In this section, I will discuss two changes in the State that happened at least in part during the presidency of George W. Bush.

These changes opened liminal spaces directly impacting Peaceful Uprising and their eventual rhetorical inventions. This discussion examines the political change and attendant consequences on political discourse and action surrounding the legal view of civil disobedience and the creation and enforcement of FSZs. These seemingly small changes also have direct consequences for individual rights and bodies and the repercussions of the performance of protest necessitating unique rhetorical inventions of collectivity.

### **Civil Disobedience**

Civil disobedience has a long and storied history in the U.S., where citizens hold dear their right to protest government (in)action and call attention to injustice as they see fit (Ivie, 2005). Notable historical figures<sup>6</sup> exercised their rights to disagree with government policy at will. The legal ramifications of protesting through civil disobedience took a sharp right turn with the passage of the USA PATRIOT Act in 2001 (USA PATRIOT Act, 2001).<sup>7</sup> Coming about in an era of fear and terrorism, the USA PATRIOT Act was ostensibly intended to protect Americans at home and abroad from terrorism. It also, however, withdrew the right of those same American citizens to legally speak back to a State that they found unjust.<sup>8</sup> The implementation of the USA PATRIOT Act then opened a gray space where citizens were able to see themselves, their discourse,

---

<sup>6</sup> Any number of Americans fit this description: Henry David Thoreau, Rosa Parks, Martin Luther King, Jr., and even Julia Butterfly Hill.

<sup>7</sup> The USA PATRIOT Act is an acronym standing for Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act.

<sup>8</sup> See Simone (2009) for a discussion of the interplay of surveillance, security, liberty, and danger in the USA PATRIOT ACT.



and their priorities falling through the cracks of the State system meant to protect them. I argue that this gray area, like so many before it, created the space for contestation and invited civil disobedience while also regulating the legal means of protest to that same oppression. Any rhetorical invention of collectivity following the passage of the USA PATRIOT Act had to be responsive to the changed State views of legality and expression.

To be clear, civil disobedience usually encompasses illegal actions. Sitting in at lunch counters was an illegal act in the 1960s, protesting apartheid was illegal in the 1980s, and boarding ships to protest the importation of protected lumber was illegal in 2002. Each of these actions on a typical day would warrant an arrest, a court appearance, and the assessment of a fine. The change that occurred during the Bush era, under Ashcroft specifically, was the potential to escalate the initially minor, usually misdemeanor, charges these actions incurred to major felony charges with higher costs and ramifications. Legal scholars note that the Act makes illegal “any activity, which tries to coerce a civilian population—even if by means of peaceful protest” and legally shifts that act into the realm of potential “terrorist activity” (Bell, 2012, p. 195). Understanding that actions that were once seen as civil disobedience can be legally defined as terrorist activities in the post-PATRIOT Act State warrants a careful rhetorical invention. While causes may be just and action warranted, being labeled a terrorist has serious legal ramifications. Actions intended to “coerce” civilian populations could be marching, picketing, distributing pamphlets, or any number of peaceful endeavors. That is similar to what happened to Greenpeace in 2002-2003 when their entire organization was cited for the “free speech activities” of some of its members who protested the

importation of protected and illegally harvested Brazilian wood (Nimmo, 2003). The previous status quo would have warranted charges only against the individuals responsible for the actions. Under the PATRIOT Act though, the entire organization—which is large enough that it was not likely engaged in planning or executing the protest action at the highest level—was charged and held accountable for the actions of a few members. This escalation is also familiar in the DeChristopher case where his act of civil disobedience translated into two felony charges, which were aggressively prosecuted even after the land sale itself was declared illegal.

While DeChristopher was not specifically indicted under the PATRIOT Act, I argue that the prevailing legal ethos disallowed a more generous interpretation of his activities. An interpretation that perhaps would have allowed the State to recognize the erroneous process that brought the lands up for sale without also prosecuting DeChristopher for pointing out that error. It is not so much that the State in this case refused to grant DeChristopher the honor of viewing him as a conscientious objector but that the State, after the adoption of the USA PATRIOT Act, became *unable* to view him as such. While DeChristopher developed a peaceful invention of collectivity with the intention to challenge the system, the State could simply not see him as a harmless protester. While he was not personally branded a terrorist by the State, he was prosecuted to the fullest extent possible.

The larger framework of punishing Americans for acts against the government, as was prevalent post-9/11, did not leave room for DeChristopher to be framed as anything other than a criminal by governmental and judicial authorities. While his friends, followers, and communities of environmentalists were comfortable viewing him as an

environmental hero—a modern day reviver of civil disobedience, even a martyr to the cause—those in charge of his arrest and prosecution were informed and guided by the pathos of the PATRIOT Act and chose to make an example of his actions. Given the new realm of prosecutorial fervor under the PATRIOT Act where misdemeanors became felonies, citizens became potential domestic terrorists, and avenues of dissent that were explored without serious legal consequence in previous generations were closed down, DeChristopher did not find friendly faces within the judiciary. While his rhetorical invention of collectivity was recognized by the State he was also punished for pointing out the flaws in their system and for constituting followers in his quest.

### **Free Speech Zones**

While the constitution guarantees rights of free speech, assembly, and privacy, the State began infringing on and redacting those rights in a heavy-handed manner during the presidency of George W. Bush. It was during his presidency that the American public saw the proliferation of FSZs, or “protest cages” (Bovard, 2004; Hightower, 2004; Kenny, 2014). The FSZ is yet another gray area between the war machine and State. While free speech is technically allowed, it is spatially constrained and any pursuant rhetorical inventions of collectivity must reckon with the fact that while protesters have the right to speak, they do not necessarily have the right to be seen or heard. A second negotiation occurs as the State pulls the exterior war machine closer to itself in making protesters accept State sovereignty in assenting to the FSZ rules or risk arrest for speaking out of place. War machines are forced out of their preferred exterior position as they make the compromise of accepting State rules in order to formally express their

newly curtailed first amendment rights. In addition to isolating America's right to free speech by designating a zone for speaking, the "proper" use of FSZs also requires obtaining permission to use the zone, restricting access to the number of attendees permitted, adhering to the time allotted, and subjecting dissenters to police surveillance during said action (Endres & Senda-Cook, 2011; Hightower, 2004). Additionally, a consequence of the "proper" use of FSZs is the reframing of spatial politics such that free speech becomes something that "happens only in specific, designated areas" (Endres & Senda-Cook, 2011, p. 277). All of these restrictions are blatant violations of individual rights, but in the context of State power (i.e., when the President says so), citizens have very few outlets to resist it.

The Peaceful Uprising machine of mobilization, as a war machine, was subject to the rules and regulations of using a FSZ in their protest actions at both of DeChristopher's trials. The FSZ in this case was subject to all of the regulations outlined by Hightower (2004) above. Proper (read: legal) use of the FSZ required obtaining permission to use the zone, restricting access to the number of attendees permitted, adhering to the time allotted, and subjecting dissenters to police surveillance during the action. In this case though, the FSZ was neither distant nor hidden from the site/sight of protest as in cases described by Bovard (2004) and Kenny (2014). The designated FSZ was at Exchange Place, a historic district directly across the street from the Federal Courthouse where DeChristopher was being tried. Granted, that street included four lanes of traffic, two each north and southbound, and two sets of light rail commuter tracks. That distance considered, it did allow for free movement and was nonrestrictive unlike those caged in during Bush protests. The FSZ was under constant surveillance by, to my

count, about a dozen police officers watching from outside the courthouse across the street as well as various foot and bike patrols who made their way through the crowds.

Even after following all State rules in regard to occupying the FSZ, the Peaceful Uprising war machine remained in State control and had to make further concessions. After the first day of the sentencing trial when it became apparent that jury selection alone was taking far longer than anticipated, the war machine applied for an extension to stay in the FSZ for the duration of the trial. The group was granted permission to stay in the FSZ for four days, enough to encompass the trial in its entirety. That extension, though, came with the stipulation that the group agreed to discontinue using sound amplifiers in the FSZ (Jensen, 2011a). Voice amplification was used widely during the morning of the first day to broadcast speeches and songs into the crowd of hundreds gathered. That same amplification drew the ire of local businesses who made noise complaints and became the hinge on which the FSZ permit turned. The group conceded rather than face the repercussions of refusing, and continued to inhabit the FSZ throughout the trial. Even when properly permitted, occupied, and surveilled, the right to “free speech” in the FSZ was limited and contingent upon the convenience (or lack thereof) of neighboring businesses. The State granted the Peaceful Uprising war machine the right to have their say but only under certain conditions. Conditions that were imposed and upheld in the Bush era ultimately limited the ability of Peaceful Uprising to speak its piece (or “Peace,” as may have been more appropriately the case).

In this historical and case-specific discussion of the FSZs, it is important to keep in mind the relationship between the State and the war machine as it changes and develops. While the State grants the right to free speech on the one hand, on the other it

also strictly enforces the use of FSZs as it sees fit and for those it deems necessary to quarantine. While the war machine in this case was not literally fenced away from the action as so many others have been, it was threatened with eviction from the FSZ if it did not cease using amplification and was under constant surveillance. The Peaceful Uprising war machine was forced to navigate and adjust their rhetorical inventions to the multitone gray area between their desire to speak against the State from an exterior position and the choice to do so legally by accepting State regulation of the FSZ. While they may have preferred to keep the State at arm's length in their protest, the war machine had to edge closer to the State in order to legally voice their opposition. This change in State policy regarding the use of FSZs takes on a grayish hue as the State continues to redact first amendment rights from the arena of accepted/right and place those rights into an oppressive/conditional arena. We can see then that FSZs have direct effects on both rhetorical inventions of collectivity in terms of what can be said and on embodied protest insofar as they circumscribe where those things can be said, assuming the protesters are intent on avoiding arrest.

### **Embodied Protest Tactics**

Taking on the State is a daunting task even when the rules of the game are not constantly changing as they were in the immediate post-9/11 context. Deleuze and Guattari (2000) argue that the tension that arises from being both an agent of the war machine and a subject of the State is analogous to being “between a rock and a hard place, between the war machine that nourishes and inspires them and the State that imposes upon them an order of reasons” (p. 362). The implication here is that the power

of the State can override and even crush the nourishing, inspirational components that feed agents of the war machine. Just as they note that the struggle between the State and war machine is “lost from the start,” Deleuze and Guattari also find the agent of the war machine to be “at once eccentric and condemned” (p. 355). The agent is an oddity destined to lose their struggle. As such, willfully entering the position of agent of the war machine comes with a full set of complications, tensions, losses, and condemnations. Becoming trapped between the war machine and the State does not seem to be a hopeful place, yet people—notably DeChristopher—continue to enter the trap. Even facing certain loss, this liminal position remains a productive space for the invention of collectivity. In naming and shining a light on oppression and illegal State actions, DeChristopher and Peaceful Uprising had an opportunity to control and develop their own rhetorical invention of collectivity while also knowing that they could not shift the State using all of their words and deeds. Sometimes, facing a losing battle suggests opportunities and tactics that might be deemed too risky or untried in facing a fairer opponent. In this section I demonstrate some of the potential for embodied collective resistance that exists within the war machine.

Rhetorical scholars understand the body as a site of social protest (Corrigan & Edgar, 2015; K. M. DeLuca, 1999; Deseriis, 2014; Enck-Wanzer, 2012; Finnegan & Ott, 2011; Foust, 2010; Gorsevski & Butterworth, 2011; Hoyt, 2016; Khrebtan-Hörhager & Kononenko, 2015; Lila Steinberg, 2014; Lunceford, 2012; Murray Yang, 2011; Pezzullo, 2003). Lunceford (2012) suggests that “[i]n protest, the body becomes something more than a representative individual that desires change; it becomes a site of resistance” (p. 5). K. M. DeLuca (1999) agrees, arguing that bodies are not only the beacons that attract

attention to the arguments of social movements but “the site and substance of the argument itself” (p. 10). Pezzullo (2007) follows in similar lines, arguing that some human displays within social movements act as “embodied rhetorics” (p. 3). It is in displays of embodied rhetoric that K. M. DeLuca (2006) argues further that we “have challenged and changed the meanings of the world not through good reasons but through vulnerable bodies, not through rational arguments but through bodies at risk” (p. 11). DeChristopher’s decision to bid, and thereby risk his body, was motivated (as we saw in the last chapter) largely by his frustration with the lack of results that came from his more reasoned approaches. Following DeChristopher’s risk, Peaceful Uprising also chose embodied protest tactics to demonstrate their resistance.

In choosing to fight locally for the global issue of climate justice, Peaceful Uprising joined the continuing fray of that longstanding argument and they chose to do so using the time honored technique of nonviolent protest. As Gorsevski and Butterworth (2011) argue:

One of the novel characteristics of nonviolent rhetoric is its simultaneous embodiment, disembodiment, and re-embodiment: it eventually spreads messages from one body to many bodies across time. The persistent, widespread human refusal to cooperate with injustice transcends the impermanent human body because the bodily message inevitably fades (as with the assassinations of X or King as corporeal messengers) but the *collective political, social body prevails*. (italics in original, p. 64)

In this way, Peaceful Uprising’s rhetorical invention of collectivity is one point in the diachronic lineage of climate protest. Recognizing its ties to historic climate action, how it can be most efficacious currently, while also accepting its charge to carry the torch into the next generation, Peaceful Uprising situated itself within this “*collective, political, social body*” (Gorsevski & Butterworth, 2011, p. 64). Their particular iteration of embodied resistance to climate injustice is just one of many throughout time that



depended on the “strategy of using *threats of potentially ensuing violence to push for nonviolent social change*” (italics in original, p. 63). The ensuing violence here is, of course, the immanent environmental degradation that follows resource exploration and extraction. Using embodied, nonviolent tactics, Peaceful Uprising followed those before them who were successful, maybe not in an individual lifetime but through repeated embodiment, with their causes. It is in putting bodies in the fray and performing protest that the State is forced (again, over time) to alter its policies. The State prefers status quo but we have seen that policies have changed for the better as a result of collective embodied protest. DeChristopher renders his body vulnerable by situating the climate justice movement around his actions.

As much as it is possible to simply point out injustice by the State and request a legal change, logical and legal persistence do not equate to progress. The State is able to ignore quiet bodies, to appease those who would politely ask for change, and to cast aside those who would stand in legislative line. These rational forms of argumentation are ineffective as tactics in the war machine. As we have seen, rational arguments are not where progress is made. It is true now, and traditionally has been, that progress comes through putting bodies on the line, presenting them as vulnerable, and performing protest. Peaceful Uprising chose similar, if nonviolent, forms of embodied collective action, marking their place in the lineage of the climate movement.

### **Becoming Tactical**

In staking their claim as a war machine in a contentious relationship with the State, Peaceful Uprising adopted a set of tactics for their street protests that were

embodied, affective, citational, and that would not get them all immediately arrested (de Certeau, 2002). These tactics were then necessarily responsive not only to the vision of the war machine itself but also to the previously discussed post-9/11 strictures on protest and civil disobedience. Ranging from copformance of protest songs (discussed in the next chapter), to marching in the street, carrying signs, staging theatrical performances, and hosting speakers in support of DeChristopher, most of the tactics deployed by the war machine are familiar from other eras. Less familiar though, was their active encouragement of becoming-Bidder 70. In this section I argue that becoming-Bidder 70 is the driving tactical force of the Peaceful Uprising war machine. In so doing, I examine the development and deployment of becoming-Bidder 70 as an all-encompassing, embodied, and performative tactical response to a legal system insistent on punishing DeChristopher in order to forestall further activism using similar tactics. Becoming-Bidder 70 demonstrated that punishing DeChristopher's body only succeeded in agitating the rest of the war machine. Vibrating in the gray space between what was perceived as "legal" and what they saw as "right," becoming-Bidder 70 was a tactical embodiment of the rift between the war machine and the State. This embodied becoming was then also a tactical rhetorical invention underlining their intention to support DeChristopher and to do so collectively.

### **Becoming-Bidder 70**

Part of the tactical creativity in this case is becoming-Bidder 70. This becoming illustrated a path out of State rule and oppression into another creative potential within the war machine. Deleuze (1995) defines becoming as "those individual and collective

struggles to come to terms with events and intolerable conditions and to shake loose, to whatever degree possible, from determinants and definitions” (p. 170). These struggles against intolerable conditions are familiar here already insofar as that is the agitation that happens in the gray spaces. When conditions, policies, and structures are incongruous with preferred ways of life, *becomings* are one manifestation of the path out of the shadows. Together, Deleuze and Guattari (2000) argue that becoming implies “two simultaneous movements, one by which a term (the subject) is withdrawn from the majority, and another by which a term (the medium or agent) rises up from the minority” (p. 291). Here again we see the direct connection between DeChristopher’s (the subject) initial choice to reject the State in choosing to break the law by bidding in order to protect the environment (the agent, via Bidder 70). There is also a rather dual form of withdrawal happening here: As DeChristopher rejected and withdrew from the State so too did the State reject him.

These dual rejections also make explicit the possibilities that arise in the gray area as DeChristopher and the State withdrew from one another. As they withdrew, the space between them became greater, the liminal area grew wider; *becomings* are perfectly suited to in-betweenness: “A becoming is always in the middle; one can only get it by the middle...it is the in-between” (Deleuze & Guattari, 2000, p. 293). Neither entirely State nor completely war machine but dictated to by both, DeChristopher was the physical manifestation of a becoming. He found himself in fruitful abundance in the gray areas between conflicting positions. In negotiating the in-between spaces, there is room for change, transformation, and ideally even a positive, affirmative outcome. We are already familiar with these types of risks and *becomings* in the context of social movements: The

Civil Rights movement negotiated the space between State law and human rights, the suffragette movement operated in the becoming space between wo-man and hu-man. Massumi (1992) writes: “Becoming is always marginal, a simultaneous coming and going in a borderland zone between modes of action. The place of invention is a space of transformational encounter, a dynamic in-between” (p. 106). The pivotal point at which DeChristopher made his decision to exclude himself from the State is the same point at which the war machine works. He decided to step out of line in order to draw attention to climate injustice and government misconduct. In agitating on that borderland between the State and war machine, the global desire then becomes a re-joining or acceptance of the environmental stance within the State system.

This becoming was facilitated directly by DeChristopher. Bidder 70 is a direct reference to the number on the bidding paddle that he received at the land auction. He used that paddle in attempt to preserve and protect public lands from detrimental exploration. The paddle gave him the power to insinuate his body, and his preferences for conservation, into the State system. The act of bidding was a reflection not only of DeChristopher’s environmental sentiments but also of the same sentiments held by other environmentalists. This group of people, organized or not, understands the human relationship with the environment as one that can be moderated and changed for the better. They see the future as inherently unlivable if the status quo of fossil fuel exploration, development, and eventual burning continues with its concomitant level of carbon emissions. Massumi (1992) argues that becomings “are initiated by preexisting populations who develop a collective sensitivity” to the constraints and injustices

oppressing them and join together to push back (pp. 102–103).<sup>9</sup> DeChristopher began the process of pushing back with his bidding paddle.

Becoming-Bidder 70 then, as an element of the Peaceful Uprising war machine, gave people an axis point about which to revolve. It became a shared space within which environmental and climate justice concerns could concretize into action and agitation. This becoming drew supporters back into the gray area out of their more familiar State or war machine positions (already held before the bidding occurred). It was in that in-between space that the potential for change flourished and becoming-Bidder 70 became a real transformation. They cohabitated the gray area demonstrated by DeChristopher—the space between “legal” and “responsible” land stewardship—and in that space they held mutual becomings-Bidder 70.

### **Demonstration of Resistance to State**

In obtaining a bidding paddle by less-than-legal means, DeChristopher subjected himself to State punishment. Bidder 70 became a slogan, a series of signs, an identifying feature, and a film. Members of the war machine began to identify themselves as Bidder 70 in a fashion similar to “I am Spartacus.” In becoming-Bidder 70, his followers were identifying with his politics and choices and also insinuating themselves into the equation, putting emphasis on their belief that DeChristopher was not acting alone or irrationally. Indeed, in the process of becoming, other members of the war machine were asking to be read in the same light as DeChristopher not only to endorse his beliefs and actions but also to prove that he was not acting alone.

---

<sup>9</sup> This definition will sound familiar to the scholar of rhetorical social movements as similar to that of constituting audiences. See Charland (1987).

Becoming-Bidder 70 is most apparently tactical in its embodied performance on the street (See Appendix A for images depicting this becoming). Taking Bidder 70 to the street made visible a personal or machinic becoming that is not inherently visible. Outside of the space of protest, becoming-Bidder 70 does not necessarily carry physical markers. It is an ideological becoming after all, one with physical manifestations in protest but without physical change in personal appearance (we might call this an incorporeal transformation consistent with the assemblage of enunciation discussed in other chapters). When becoming-Bidder 70 is performed in private, behind closed doors, there is no clear exterior evidence of that becoming, but when taken to the street, this becoming is far more than an individual event, it is a tactic.

One of the main purposes of prosecuting and sentencing DeChristopher was to deter future action by himself or his followers and to demonstrate that the State could shut down his war machine by punishing his body (Sands & Magill, 2009). The war machine saw this strategy and responded with a tactical becoming—rendering visible, through bodies performing Bidder 70, the multitude of articulations that would not only reproduce DeChristopher’s actions but also prevent the war machine from fading away. During the first major protest in the street, before DeChristopher’s criminal trial, there was a long march and hundreds of followers carried signs and banners singing their way through downtown Salt Lake City. Prevalent among these signs were spray painted, block letter 70s (see Appendix A). A literal visual symbol of becoming-Bidder 70, these signs repeated the message that DeChristopher did not stand alone in his actions and reiterated solidarity within the war machine. Visual and embodied repetition may seem like a rudimentary tactic, but that identification, that articulation, that becoming, was the crux

of not only the visual argument but also the point of dissent that bound the group together.

In enacting this becoming-Bidder 70, the war machine is actively trying to work its way out of a job. If their environmental practice and demands could be accommodated within the State system then their very existence as a war machine would become unnecessary. Successful agitation in the gray spaces means that those liminalities get addressed, rectified, and closed. Massumi explains this:

Tactical sabotage of the existing order is a necessity of becoming, but for survival's sake it is just as necessary to improve the existing order, to fight for integration into it on its terms. These are two sides of the same coin, and they should be practiced in such a way as to reinforce rather than mutually exclude one another. Neither is an end in itself. Their combined goal is a redefinition of the conditions of existence laid down by the molar order: their conversion into conditions of becoming. (1992, p. 104)

In a world where the State could “redefine” its own conditions, the war machine would have to reorganize, cease to exist, or redirect its becoming. Again, this situation is not entirely unfamiliar. Civil and women's rights movements specifically have seen their causes taken up by the State in ways that transformed both the State system and the direction of the war machine. Women were assured the right to vote by constitutional amendment and thus the object of their dissent, the locus of their agitation shifted to other causes (e.g., equal rights, equal pay, legal rights in marriage) and the machine underwent a dramatic change in that shift. In the process of resisting the State and declaring their outsider status, the best Peaceful Uprising could hope for was that their ideas might be adopted by the State and their *modus operandi* dissolved. At that point their collectivity would no longer be necessary and members could individually move on to commit to other assemblages.

## **Affective Commitment**

Many of the tactics the group was using in the street hinge on affect. A focus on affect and bodies as part of the repertoire of collective action is interesting and necessary here as “Becoming can only proliferate with carefully formulated group strategies”<sup>10</sup> (Massumi, 1992, pp. 102–103). Becoming-Bidder 70 acts as the umbrella tactic as it organizes constituents, demonstrates solidarity to the State, and does both of these under the valence of solidifying affective commitment (recall the discussion of affect in Chapter 1). If we consider affect to be the embodied commitment to a telos, a means of “transpiercing” others with ideas and ideals, affect in becoming-Bidder 70 means identifying with the environment, with DeChristopher, with the plight of others, and moving in the direction of change. Seigworth & Gregg (2010) situate affect, similar to becoming, as a state of “in-between-ness” (p. 1). They argue that affect is “found in those intensities that pass body to body, in those resonances that circulate about, between, and sometimes stick to bodies and worlds” (p. 1). Affect then is beyond emotion or feeling, it is not so much a thinking or sensing, as a doing. Affect acts. We see affect declaring itself in this war machine as DeChristopher’s supporters carry signs and rename themselves Bidder 70. We see the passage of intensities in the performance of group singing as the force and intensity of song flows through bodies. This flow “transpierces” other bodies in the crowd, enlivening and reinforcing commitments to joy and resolve while also aurally communicating affective unity in group singing. In those moments, the protesters are in-between who they know themselves to be outside of the context of becoming and the

---

<sup>10</sup> Note that I would substitute “tactics” for “strategies” here though Massumi and I mean the same thing in this instance.



person they would become in embodying Bidder 70. They are affectively becoming. They will never quite *be* Bidder 70 but neither will they be able to fully return to their previously known personhood. The process of becoming has changed them affectively, ideologically, and experientially. No longer inside and not quite outside of themselves, they perform a third position of hopeful resistance. This third position shatters binaries of inside/outside, war machine/State. It necessarily ruptures the notion of an either/or position, demanding instead that we see individuals and relations from a both and, and, and... perspective. In being both a citizen and an environmentalist, DeChristopher demonstrates the liminality of identity production and performance.

In a sort of “best possible outcome” situation, becoming-Bidder 70 would do more than identify DeChristopher and his environmental beliefs/actions as a point of articulation within the war machine. Becoming-Bidder 70 would ideally also become a State call-to-action wherein transformative legislation would alter the State’s relationship with the environment away from capitalism and exploitation toward protection and conservation. Ideal becomings are few and far between in the real world. Luckily enough, given this unflattering aspect of reality, Deleuze and Guattari privilege process over product in machines. Simply taking the stance and doing the work of the war machine, facilitating the becoming, and negotiating the distance between the State and the war machine is enough, regardless of any potential outcome. What we know of the short term is that many of the sales were redacted, DeChristopher was sent to prison, and there has yet to be any sweeping legislative change. But we also know that war machines, when they are able to produce the “best possible outcome,” work under such conditions for years, decades, even centuries. It would seem that Peaceful Uprising’s work has only just

begun.

### **Conclusion**

In this chapter we have seen how the deployment of Deleuzo-Guattarian theoretical perspectives opened the field of criticism to a more nuanced understanding of the limitations and expectations imposed on social movements in their quest to alter State actions and policies. The framework Deleuze and Guattari provide allows for laser focus on the interrelationships between the war machine and the State, facilitating a specific exposition of the complications and gray areas that developed in that relationship post-9/11. This specific interrelationship is a productive one to understand in the context of social movements as it can become a fruitful site for the invention of collectivity. This perspective also provided space for an understanding of the tactics undertaken by the war machine in their thrust against the State. These unique tactics, which were intentionally eclectic, became reasonable responses to an otherwise unjust system. We have seen here how the liminal spaces helped to define what could/could not be said and done while also providing fodder for creative rhetorical inventions and embodied tactics.

It is, as we have seen here, in agitating in the gray areas where the State is incongruous to itself and the goals of the electorate that war machines are best able to activate and advocate their causes using time-honored tools like civil disobedience alongside novel incarnations of dissent such as tactical becomings. In illuminating the areas in which the status quo is inoperable, the places where State policy and understanding of the “legal” conflicts with what is “right,” the war machine is able to productively vibrate for change even when, as in the case of DeChristopher, the eventual

legal outcomes are unfavorable. Refusing to go gentle into that good night, the Peaceful Uprising war machine employed embodied performative protest to announce, enhance, and spread their cause resolutely and with great joy despite the legal ramifications of doing so. Proclaiming these gray areas, liminal spaces, and points of oscillation (Mansbridge, 1994) between various identity nodes, we have seen how the either/or binaries have been shattered as neither position is enough to encompass the whole story. Additionally, I have argued that it is in the movement between these more recognized spaces, in traversing the permeable bounds between war machine and State that production occurs.

This case study contributes to social movement theory in its intentional juxtaposition of the war machine and the State. While social movement studies may be more comfortable with rigid distinctions between States and their resisters (Benson & Johnson, 1968; Coughlin & Coughlin, 1973; Lomas, 1960; Zarefsky, 1977), in this chapter I have worked to establish the antithetical yet complementary relationship between these poles. Introducing the State as a player that conceives of itself in terms of interior and exterior relations provides the opportunity to refocus the theoretical gaze away from the binary and instead on how one traverses interiority and exteriority simultaneously. Recognizing and examining the State as a major player in contemporary social movements is a necessary move in post-9/11 America as State punishment of otherwise peaceful bodies has become an approved strategy.

Additionally, this study provides an examination of the development of a repertoire of collective action through embodied protest tactics in response to that shift in State power. The tactical response of becoming was itself an exploration of navigating

interior and exterior positions as the war machine negotiated its own identity and went about its business while drawing nearer and backing away from the State as necessary. I have worked to highlight the notion that there is no clear separation between State and war machine but that instead each works on a continuum, allowing for tactical, in-the-moment adjustments in proximity. If we are to truly examine social movements we must attend to the inherent struggles with the State in this case study. Working within the Deleuzo-Guattarian framework provides an example of how the war machine/State interplay can be understood while deepening potential avenues of study not only in critical theory but also social movements and in understanding rhetorical inventions of collectivity.

## CHAPTER 4

### SINGING LIKE A MOVEMENT: AFFECTING MACHINES

“We will be a movement when we sing like a movement.”  
—Tim DeChristopher

Irvine and Kirkpatrick (1972) called for the study of “the place of music in social movements” (p. 284). In this chapter I heed that call, arguing that the most crucial role of music in social movements is affective. Indeed, music, specifically group singing, played a vital role in the rhetoric of invention of collectivity in the case of Peaceful Uprising. Even though Irvine and Kirkpatrick sent their call nearly 50 years ago—and there have been many studies in the intervening years—affect remains an enigma in how it connects music to collectivity in social movements. In this chapter I examine group singing as a form of protest performed by the Peaceful Uprising machine of mobilization. First, I briefly define group singing and provide context for its use in previous studies. Then I develop a theoretical framework that supports my argument that affect represents a gap in social movement literature. Then I speak back to early studies in the rhetoric of music and the rhetoric of social movements by providing a demonstration of the role of music in on-the-ground protest as well as a discussion of the affective potential of group singing. Then I discuss this lacuna as a methodological problem that is most effectively

approached by *in situ* field work. Next in the analysis I consider the impact of citationality on affect and group singing. Finally, I offer some insight into the potential implications of highlighting affect as a crucial component of the rhetorical invention of collectivity.

### **Group Singing**

In what follows I make liberal usage of the term “group singing.” I consider this to be nearly self-explanatory as singing performed by a group, typically civilian or nonprofessional, as opposed to a choir, solo artist, or professional musical group performance. This is similar to previous definitions of “community singing,” which Scholes (1955) defines as performances with “the audience as its own vocal performer” (p. 211). Scholes continues by marking the potential impact of community singing on the audience/performer:

The social effect of community song is marked; it diffuses a spirit of friendliness, the common effort tending to sink temperamental differences and class distinctions. At any time when unity of spirit is particularly essential ... community singing is found to be of enormous public value. (p. 212)

Reflecting on the impact of the performance of Christian songs during the Communist era in Estonia, Jones (1999) notes: “Singing together unites, or reunites, people by redrawing the boundaries of community in which there is a responsibility to both perform and to listen” (p. 864). Russell (2008), in his study of group singing in England post-WWI, comments similarly on the enhanced perception of community among singers. He writes that “singing represented both literally and symbolically, a socially united nation in which people were working in harmony with others, irrespective of their social sphere” (p. 126). A crucial component to this effort in building community across social barriers

is the potential for group singing to unite people in spite of, or even because of, social tension. Group singing becomes, as Love (2002) suggests, “a powerful and largely unacknowledged medium for creating...social movements” (p. 74). Music, and its expression in public group singing, then develops as a communicative tool to acknowledge unity in expressing desire for social change.

### **Relating Music to Affect**

In the first chapter, I defined affect from the Deleuzo-Guattarian perspective as an “intensity corresponding to the passage from one experiential state of the body to another” (Deleuze & Guattari, 2000, p. xvi). In the following two sections I work through existing studies relating music to affect and follow with other work on the employment of music in social movements. While the connections between affect and music as well as those between music and social movements have been made clear to a certain extent in existing literature, I argue that there has not been enough focus on the affective nature of music as it plays a role in social movements, specifically at the point of the rhetorical invention of collectivity.

Indeed, affect is an integral factor in the rhetorical invention of collectivity. Just as social movements are an embodiment of the desire to move between experiential states, affect provides a means by which to communicate and navigate the space between the present and a preferred vision of the future. In the context of protest, affect as an embodied in-betweenness can translate to hope. There is a penetrating hope of an affectively changed future, ostensibly one of less discrimination, hatred, and inequality. But, in this liminal position between the current and future affective states, it must be

acknowledged that the promise of hopeful change can just as readily become something less hopeful (Turner, 1982, 1987). Consider the street demonstrations of the Civil Rights era when hopeful protesters were faced with fire hoses, attack dogs, corporal punishment, and worse. Affect took people into the streets to demand a different future, and in the short run, many of those individual futures were foreshortened.

Affect, then, is not always a positive state, but one of “intense and thoroughly immanent neutrality” (Seigworth & Gregg, 2010, p. 10). In one sense this means that affect is not always positive, nor is it necessarily negative: affect itself is neutral and the felt sentiments are added. It is as though affect is a vessel waiting to be filled. The vessel is not positive, negative, hopeful, hateful, or anything in between. In another sense, to call affect neutral is not to make a political statement as much as it is to directly note that what feels like hope in the moment may not blossom into a predicted form of positive change. Barack Obama instilled an active state of affective hope among many in the U.S. in 2008. Occupying a liminal position between the elongated Bush era and an uncertain future, many of his followers subscribed to a hopeful future, one that many of the same would say was not borne out by the end of his presidency.

Dechaine (2002) provides a baseline for this discussion by writing that affect in music is an “embodied understanding of musical experience” (p. 80). In that embodiment, the false binary between the mind and body is exploded and music is experienced on all levels. Breaking down the walls between physical and mental/emotional experiences takes us back to the definition Deleuze and Guattari provide for affect as an “intensity corresponding the passage from one experiential state of the body to another” (2000, p. xvi). Complementary to this understanding of



experiential states through affect is Frith (1996), who writes that through our own sonic experiences we are drawn into “affective and emotional alliances” and that we “absorb songs into our own lives and rhythm into our own bodies” (p. 273). These experiences of music as affective then also enable us to “place ourselves in imaginative cultural narratives” (p. 275). Intensities carry through loudly in Frith’s work as he provides us with an understanding of music as embodied, experiential, and transformative. It is the affective component of music, in his vision, that allows us to view ourselves as part of not only cultural moments but also maybe even cultural change through reimagined futures.

Hemment (2004) adapts Deleuze and Guattari’s definition for musical experiences in his work on popular electronic music. His approach is to see “music as *affect*, as an intensity that carries an ability to affect and be affected” (p. 77). Hemment moves the argument forward by positing that music is not just *affective* but that music is *affect*. Understanding that music is itself affect, we gain a greater insight into how those intensities can come to impact the transference of affect from body to body. It is not just the music that charges the experience but the movement of affect. Gibbs (2001) describes the movement of affect by noting that, “bodies can catch feelings as easily as catch fire: affect leaps from one body to another, evoking tenderness, inciting shame, igniting rage, exciting fear” (p. 1). The catching nature of affect is pronounced in the close quarters of street-level protest. Chants and bullhorns pass along sentiments of rage and determination while instructing and directing members. The energy of the action—marching, chanting, singing, quiet reflection, hopeful serenade—passes from person to person, articulating members to the group, to each other, and to different visions of the future via affect. In

those moments of ignition, DeChaine (2002) also argues that “affect is thus the circuit through which the past and present, as well as imaginings of the future, become confluent” (p. 86). In that space, transference is facilitated by the affecting nature of music, especially music with a message as in social movements. The persuasive nature of these songs asks the group singer to envision a different future, to enter the liminal space between an uninviting present and an untenable future.

Affect itself is neither “good” nor “bad” but imbued with potential that should be approached in a guarded manner, acknowledging that there are limitless directions the future may take regardless of the affectively preferred decision. The same can be said of social movements—machines of mobilization—that rise and die seemingly without impacting future directions. The ability of affective states and bodies to impact one another is much more certain than the ability of these same affective states and bodies to impact the future. Yet hope remains. Affect continues to drive protest even when the future is uncertain. I argue that this is the case because affect, as a bodily state, is potentially pleasurable in the sense that doing nothing “feels bad” while actively participating in change can, at the very least, feel hopeful even if the outcome is uncertain or less than ideal. Keep in mind, too, that what feels hopeful is not necessarily affectively positive. Angry, brick throwing protesters may be affectively different from their joyously singing counterparts but they are no less hopeful for a better/different future (even if they choose to get there through destructive forces).<sup>11</sup>

In this section, we have seen how affect is a part of the continued draw toward

---

<sup>11</sup> Also note that these protest actions, which are possible to perceive as affectively pleasurable, are not necessarily permanent states. Activist burnout, familiar especially to long-reaching and sustained movements, could signal a loss of the hopeful affect, a loss of the pleasure of that hopeful in-between.

decisions to collectivize. It is not necessarily “reason” that compels people into the streets to demonstrate for change. It may not be “reasonable” to spend time, money, energy, and resources to fight for climate justice, especially when Peaceful Uprising acknowledges that what we consider planetary status quo is no longer viable because environmental degradation has already gone too far. Demonstrations very rarely have immediate or even measurable impact. Demonstrating also requires the ability and resources to prioritize action on the street over other necessities of daily life like work and family obligations. Choosing to enter into a machine of mobilization that is working for something as hopeless, yet vital, as environmental change is a calculated risk. For many, doing nothing at all is even more affectively untenable than the likely prospect of “losing” the fight. This is the hinge where reason meets unreason. Affect is liminal, and articulatory, and hopeful, and deflating all at once, but it is also a force that compels and propels change in machines of mobilization and social movements. Recognizing affect as an articulatory force that adheres people to movements, ideas to actions, objects to passions, and group singing to hope, we can then see that affect plays a profound, if understudied, role in machines of mobilization and social movements. In this chapter I will demonstrate that the act of group singing affectively transpierces the body. Affect is a force working from the outside in, penetrating layers of reason with hope. And, finally, group singing is a vehicle by which affect hops from body to body, igniting the fire within.

### **The Music of Social Movements**

Moving forward with the understanding that music is affective, or maybe even affect itself, and that affect is transferable in musical settings, I will now demonstrate that

music has been thoroughly considered in the rhetoric of social movements but that extant works do not thoroughly consider 1) that the music of social movements is affective, and 2) that the music itself has a singular impact on the rhetoric of invention of collectivity (not only through expression of thoughts, affect, and desire but also through citationality and recognition of liminality).

Growing out of the Civil Rights Era and encountering anti-Vietnam focused protest songs, rhetoricians began grappling with the use of music in social movements in the middle of the last century. Reaching as far back as the World War II era, Mohrmann and Scott (1976) listen to popular music of the time to see how attitudes and values about the war and the war effort were revealed in music. Based not so much in protest or a traditional “anti” movement, they found that the musical stylings of the time reflected cultural values related to the war effort. Moving more toward the social movement focus, Irvine and Kirkpatrick (1972) demonstrate a need to rhetorically analyze texts outside of the traditional rhetorical canon, including music. They argue that examination of rhetorical form is especially potentially productive in understanding the role of music in protest and in social movements. Theirs was the first of many studies to make that direct link between music and rhetoric and to begin exploring the use of music in social movements (Beebee, 1991; Carter, 1980; Drewett, 2007; Dunlap, 2006; Francesconi, 1986; Hurner, 2006; Kizer, 1983; Knupp, 1981; Kosokoff & Carmichael, 1970; Mondak, 1988; Rodnitzky, 1971, 1999; Sanger, 1995, 1997; Weinstein, 2006). In many ways, these studies are consistent with the earlier arguments about the connection between affect and music, but they do not make that specific reference. For example, writing about the experience of listening to music, Booth (1976) argues that the listener “enters

into a common pattern of thought, attitude, emotion, and achieves it” in communion with the rest of the audience (p. 247). This commonality is borne out, as his argument goes, based on the artistic use of words in music. While his argument may have been grounded in the artful use of words, or the rhetoric of music, the “common pattern” rippling through the audience hearkens directly back to affect. In the next section I argue that beyond its affective implications, group singing also functioned as a desiring-utterance in the machine of mobilization and became material product of that machine.

### **Machining Affect: Theoretical Development**

Facing insurmountable odds, namely the climate crisis and more immediately the impending sentencing of Tim DeChristopher, members of the Peaceful Uprising machine of mobilization had few options for voicing or demonstrating their position. They wanted a future wherein the actions of DeChristopher were framed not as illegal, but as heroic. They wanted to see their comrade go free and to serve as an example of how the civil disobedience of one person could positively change environment/State interactions while unmasking the collusion between big oil and the State. Options for voicing these desires were limited for several reasons, not the least of which are the myriad ways that legal limits have been imposed on what counts as appropriate public conduct of dissent, as discussed in the previous chapter. In this chapter I am dealing more specifically with a difficulty that is harder to explain, nearly impossible to voice, and even more vital to the rhetorical invention of collectivity. How does one go about adequately putting into words the fear of entering an environmentally unlivable future? Or the anger at corporate and governmental deals that degrade the land while imprisoning people? Or the injustice of

trying, sentencing, convicting, and jailing DeChristopher for bidding on lands that were eventually removed from the sale? How do you express the physical pain of holding all of these thoughts together? Is it even possible to hold all of these thoughts together while knowing that there is a solution that will not be pursued simply because it is not profitable to save the environment?

This series of questions, at once down-trodden and elated, motivates my thinking about the development of the rhetoric of collectivity. They also lead toward a two-part discussion of the role of group singing in the Peaceful Uprising machine of mobilization and its impact on the rhetorical invention of their collectivity via music. In the following sections I first introduce desiring-utterances as a component of machines, arguing that in the act of group singing Peaceful Uprising was vocalizing their desiring-utterance. Second, I argue that music and group singing are dually material, both creating and reflecting cultural values.

### **Desiring-Utterances**

Desiring-utterances are where desire meets or articulates with discourse. Desiring-utterances are an element of machines as they make up part of the assemblage of enunciation (see Hawes, 2015). At work in a machine of mobilization, desiring-utterances take the form of demands for change, vocalized investments in a better world, and preferred changes to the status quo. In those ways, desiring-utterances are also a component of collective enunciation as they provide the spoken or communicative work of the machine. At the confluence of desire and discourse we see, in this case, protesters using group singing to communicate their hopeful wishes for a better future. Desiring-

utterances took many shapes in the Peaceful Uprising machine of mobilization but none were more poignant than the articulation of desire and group singing. That particularly song-full variety of desiring-utterances delivered a view of the protesters' reality as both material and affective. Rather than simply delivering demands or a treatise for change, Peaceful Uprising demonstrated their desiring-utterances in lyrical form, recalling a history of protest movements using songs for change and affectively delivering them again as a way to voice their aspirations. In those lyrics we find desiring-utterances beyond the generalized "We shall overcome," but more specifically, "this land is your land, this land is my land," and "don't it always seem to go that you don't know what you've got till it's gone."<sup>12</sup> Reminding their audiences as well as themselves that public lands are worth fighting for and any change or development may be irrevocable, Peaceful Uprisings desiring-utterances carried both material and affective weight. In shaping their desiring-utterances around familiar protest songs, the group also gave form to their rhetorical invention of collectivity. They materially produced a collective intent on musical affirmation of their cause as well as affective lyrical articulation of members.

Let's take a moment to recall the two material and affective components of assemblages: 1) the machinic assemblage of bodies and objects; and 2) the assemblage of enunciation (which we see more specifically in this chapter as desiring-utterances). Deleuze and Guattari (2000, pp. 439 & 504) argue that these two parts are intertwined, acting and reacting simultaneously in machine. But it is important to understand how what is said (in the assemblage of enunciation) differs from, corresponds with, reacts to, and is attributed to what is done (in the machinic assemblage). As these are simultaneous

---

<sup>12</sup> Lyrics and song titles from, in order of appearance: "We Shall Overcome," "This Land is Your Land," Woody Guthrie, and "Big Yellow Taxi," Joni Mitchell.

productions, it is difficult to parse one from the other and indeed I do not intend to belabor the difference between what is said and what is done in the machine of mobilization because I find saying and doing to be equally material products of communication. Of importance to my argument, the connection between what is said and what is done in machines of mobilization coalesces around materiality and affect. Part of that juxtaposition of saying and doing also includes the incorporeal transformation of people<sup>13</sup> into protesters, advocates, activists, victims, and blamers. Shifting their labels transforms what is expected of them by society and also what they anticipate for themselves. It is in calling someone, for example, a “protester” working with the Peaceful Uprising machine of mobilization, that we see them not only articulating with the machine (connecting protest with Peaceful Uprising) but also potentially affectively impacted by that articulation. Once articulated with the machine, that protester then is invited to participate in the collective enunciation of desiring-utterances, many of which were accomplished in this case by group singing.

### **Materiality in Song**

In beginning here with the collective assembly of enunciation and its use of desiring-utterances, I also want to place an emphasis on the importance of what a machine of mobilization says, how these things are said, how bodies are incorporeally transformed, and what is communicatively produced as a result. I argue that the

---

<sup>13</sup> Recall from the introductory chapter that incorporeal transformations are those statements that change not a person’s body but how that body is governed and perceived. Classic examples include: 1) the guilty verdict which incorporeally transforms the defendant into “prisoner,” and 2) the pronouncement of married status on a couple in a wedding ceremony. In both of these cases the bodies themselves do not change but their legal status, governance, and societal expectations shift.



communicative outcomes of the machine are material, made from the material at hand, expressed in material bodies and language, and materially pleasurable all at the same time. Note that songs and group singing are dually material. Not only do they materially constitute groups and membership while articulating ideology, they also reproduce and draw from material culture. To the first point, in giving voice to their desires, members of the Peaceful Uprising machine of mobilization were expressing ideological commitments. As McKerrow (1989) noted in his introduction of critical rhetoric: “An ideology exists, in a material sense, in and through the language that constitutes it” (p. 102; see also McGee, 1975, 1980). Here we begin to skirt tautology as we tie together ideology, materiality, and language into desiring-utterances. But, in running that risk, note that when Peaceful Uprising members gave voice to their desires via discourse they were doing so in a way that was both ideological and material.

Beyond the material implications of ideology and desire, songs themselves are material artifacts as argued by Eyerman & Jamison (1998) in their study of the music of social movements (p. 23). In print, in songbooks, in vocalized lyrical form as during the act of singing, and in the impression they make on the hearts and minds of those who follow, songs, and thereby group singing, are material. Grossberg (1986) makes a similar argument about rock and roll: “rock and roll selects and uses pieces of its material environment as the raw material with which to articulate a youth culture” (p. 55). The same can be said of movement music or songs deployed in machines. These employ elements of the “material environment” —degradation, the plight of DeChristopher, injustice, hope—as the matter by which to articulate the machine of mobilization itself.

Music and group singing are also material in that they produce, again as

Grossberg argues, “real material pleasure” in listening and performing (1986, p. 52). Regarding rock and roll specifically, Grossberg points to the “sheer volume and repetitive rhythms” in addition to the potentially physically pleasurable vibrations found at large rock concerts (p. 52). I argue that the pleasure of group singing is differently material in that the singers are the primary producers of the music, unlike at rock concerts where singers in the audience are more like knowing participants to the extent that they are aware of and able to perform the lyrics. Music in copformance allows the singers to be both performers and listeners, producers and recipients. Whereas music in concert style performance, by the apparatus and logistics of amplification, prioritize the production and performance of the band (as Grossberg is discussing) over that of the (still singing) audience. Music in copformance is materially pleasurable and affective. That sense of infective pleasure is part of the tactical tool belt in inventing the rhetorical collectivity of the movement. It is, in part, the real material pleasure of group singing that keeps members active in embodied performance. In the next section I discuss participatory critical rhetoric (PCR) as a methodological commitment that makes it feasible to locate affect in the street-level performance of protest songs within a social movement.

### **Affecting Methods**

When Tim DeChristopher declared “we will be a movement when we sing like a movement” he not only laid down a challenge to his Peaceful Uprising followers, he also framed his vision of what it means to be a real movement. His vision was one that communicated through song while also articulating with centuries of singing tradition in social movements. The role of music in social movements has been studied from a

variety of communication perspectives (Bailey, 2006; Bayton, 1993; Beebee, 1991; Booth, 1976; Carter, 1980; Chesebro, 1972; Drewett, 2007; Dunlap, 2006; Francesconi, 1986; Gonzalez & Makay, 1983; Halasa, 2010; Hurner, 2006; Irvine & Kirkpatrick, 1972; Knupp, 1981; Kosokoff & Carmichael, 1970; Mohrmann & Scott, 1976; Rodnitsky, 2006; Sanger, 1995, 1997; C. J. Stewart et al., 2001; Weinstein, 2006). These studies broadly cover the role of music in social movements and the impact of that music on identity formation, adherence to the cause, and in creating and reinforcing bonds between members and movement ideals. What has been overlooked is how music, in collective performance by protesters themselves, works to affectively bind the movement and protester together. Extant studies instead examine the textual/lyrical rhetoric of music (Hurner, 2006; Sanger, 1995); performances of protest-related songs by established professional singers/groups (Beebee, 1991; Dunlap, 2006; Gonzalez & Makay, 1983); or even memories of those performances written later in autobiographies and movement studies (Sanger, 1997). None of these studies address the affective potential of group singing from immediate personal accounts (instead of remembered tellings), in situ perspectives (rather than textual/rhetorical frames), or accounts of group singing in performance (again, rather than as remembered later, as televised, or as imagined given the music on the page). This gap in the literature leaves out the performative, embodied, affective influence of group singing for social movements. Those are important musical elements, I argue, to the machine of mobilization as it communicates its message, gains (new) member adherence to that message, and sustains its cause for the long haul. It is not just lyrically (and therefore through the meaning of the lyrics) that members of the machine come to see themselves as articulated to the cause, it is also through the affective

embodied copformance of that music that the machine is strengthened or indeed formed. The most likely reason why these scholars have not attended to affect in their previous work on the rhetoric of music in social movements is a methodological one. In this section I lay out my commitment to in situ methodological approaches and discuss the importance of PCR to locating affect in protest.

As forcefully as I have argued that affect is a missing critical component of rhetorical perspectives on social movements, it has not been excluded in a premeditated manner. Indeed, it is difficult to cogently express affect. And, as difficult as it is to describe, affect is potentially even more difficult to capture methodologically. Affect requires a certain set of methodological commitments predicated on, at minimum, in situ approaches open to seeing affect in action. Such commitments are relatively new to the rhetorical canon. It is in pursuing in situ methods of research that we can begin to tune into affect especially as it is apparent and transmitted through group singing. In this section I explore PCR as my methodological commitment (M. Middleton et al., 2015) and explain how PCR allows me to attend to affect. I argue that affect, in this case, looks at the confluence of bodies and music and that this interaction is difficult to capture without copresence.

Introduced as a means to synthesize the various forms of in situ research already being performed by critical rhetoricians, PCR provides a flexibly useful framework for “being there” as a rhetorician (M. Middleton et al., 2015). Particularly useful in the context of protest events not likely to enter the mainstream or to be fully reported by media outlets, PCR allows not only for coparticipation but also for the collection of texts and data sets that would otherwise likely be ignored (Hauser, 1999; McHendry et al.,

2014; M. K. Middleton et al., 2011; Ono & Sloop, 1995; Pezzullo, 2003; Sloop & Ono, 1997). As discussed in the first chapter, the texts for the study were collected while following Peaceful Uprising along their song-filled journey of protest. Specific to this chapter, I draw from notes and texts that point to the use of music, group singing, and affect.

Growing out of PCR as a method and a commitment to developing a participatory epistemology, I am able then to approach music from a different angle than previous textually or lyrically driven accounts (Beebee, 1991; Carter, 1980; Dunlap, 2006; Eyerman & Jamison, 1998; Gonzalez & Makay, 1983; Hurner, 2006; Russell, 2008; Sanger, 1995, 1997). These studies remain valuable, but they cannot stand alone to tell the story of the role of affect in the rhetorical invention of collectivity or how it impacts the music of social movements. Fortunately, in my examination of the Peaceful Uprising machine of mobilization, my unique data set allows me to not only analyze the lyrical content of the songs but also the collective performance of the group singing the songs. A focus on group singing, by putting those songs in the street and hearing them from the perspective of the protest context, helps us to understand why time and again music becomes a tactical response in dissent, how those elements are impacted by affect, and how collectivity is rhetorically constructed.

A major factor in music's endurance as a protest tactic operates at the confluence of music and bodies. Group singing, as an embodied and performative experience, positions music as the material and affective glue that cocreates the group. Singing together, members of the movement create not only the music but also the affect of the group, and this experience is both material and pleasurable. Employing PCR to explore

the confluence of music and bodies is novel, but the notion that affect and music are intertwined is not. Sanger (1997) retrospectively examined protest songs “not as the songs themselves, but, rather what the activists had to say about the songs as a form of communication” during the Civil Rights era (p. 180). In that study she comes very close to identifying affect. She argues that much of the “symbolic behavior seems to have been designed to invite and inspire one another to engage in additional rhetorical undertakings, such as sit-ins, freedom rides, marches, and imprisonment” (p. 181). She links directly to personal feelings, noting that song “gave them [protesters] special opportunities to express emotion and to encourage emotional involvement in the movement” (p. 179). While trapped in the language of “feeling” and “emotion,” Sanger clearly identifies music as the glue that attached members to the movement. Employing participatory critical rhetoric allows me to expand on Sanger’s distanced study of protest music because I placed my body, experiences, feelings, interactions, and musical perceptions into the fray in ways that rhetorical scholars have not historically done.

Articulating members to the group, ideas to members, and participants to one another, group singing is one of the more pleasurable elements of public protest and that factor likely accounts for the continued deployment of song in machines of mobilization. In a near refrain of the difficulties found in writing about affect, DeChaine (2002) takes up the confusion of bodies and music, writing: “the problem of talking about music—of being able to locate and articulate its power—is hopelessly, or gloriously, compounded by the body as a site of musical experience” (p. 80). Music is far more than words on a page, notes from an instrument, carried harmonies, or rhythmic interpretation. It lives in and works its way out of bodies. It resonates in our very being. Deleuze and Guattari say

that sound, the core element of music, “invades us, impels us, drags us, transpierces us” (2000, p. 348). Even this description of the way sound acts on the body insists upon a particularly embodied experience. As difficult as it would be to parse the point at which bodies start and music stops, it is even more difficult to consider them separately. They are “gloriously” intertwined.

### **Singing Like a Movement**

With this theoretical and methodological base in hand, I turn now to an analysis of the interplay of affect and music as it was deployed through group singing by the Peaceful Uprising machine of mobilization as part of their rhetorical invention of collectivity. In the upcoming section I argue that Peaceful Uprising, through desiring-utterances, employed historical affect via citationality as demonstrated first through the use of “traditional” social movement songs and second in modifying songs to include lyrical content that reflected the immediate context. The awareness of the rhetorical impact of their decision to use both traditional and modified lyrics demonstrates the uniqueness of their rhetorical choices in collectivizing. I begin this element of the analysis with citationality in song, turning then to the lyrics themselves as they were deployed during street-level protest.

### **Citationality and Affect**

**Historical citationality.** Here I use citationality in a shared Derridean/Butlerian sense to demonstrate the affective potential of employing music familiar to historical social movements in contemporary contexts. According to Derrida (1983), citationality

occurs when a word “cites, re-cites, and makes legible” other uses of the word (p. 98). And in its use by Butler, citation similarly calls forth the performative nature of words and meaning such that deployment of a citational signifier calls forth previous meanings of the sign (Butler, 1990). In this case, beyond a single word or sign, Peaceful Uprising re-cited whole repertoires of songs from other eras and struggles, including the Civil Rights era and the labor movement. The very repetition of these songs in the modern era, and in largely unrelated contexts, reminds the performer of previous iterations of, in this case, the lyrics that spoke to historical social movements. Carrying forward these lyrics also calls forth the recollected or imagined affect incited by their previous use. Here I imagine that for some participants the affect of a previous movement may have actually been recalled. It is foreseeable, for example, that someone who sang “We Shall Overcome” with the Civil Rights Movement may also have sung it again with a movement like this one, thus enabling them to recall their previous affective experience. On the other hand, many (like myself) who participated with Peaceful Uprising had never been in a similar circumstance. Even though I had never sung “We Shall Overcome” as a group, I certainly had affective ideas about the impact that song had on the Civil Rights Movement and conjured images related to that time.

So in re-citing the lyrics, Peaceful Uprising was also benefitting from re-citing the affect of other deployments of those songs. That affect, beyond being re-cited was also multiplied as it spread through the group. Brennan (2004) argues that affect is transmissible from person to person interacting in a particular environment (p. 3). Arms linked, singing together, re-citing both lyrics and affect (remembered or imagined), the warmly felt affective experience transmitted down the front-line of singers. Eyerman and



Jamison (1998) made a similar observation: “we saw, and felt, how songs could conjure up long-lost social movements, and how music could provide an important vehicle for the diffusion of movement ideas into a broader culture” (p. 1). This conjuring-by-citing phenomena then also acts as a means by which affect may be transmitted.

So it is in recognizing its historical place that this machine of mobilization comes to reasonably cite such heady and heavy signs as “We Shall Overcome” and “This Little Light of Mine.” The Peaceful Uprising machine of mobilization manifested articulations with historical machines of mobilization and previous cultural struggle by citing and redeploying historical movement songs in a modern context. This reiterative articulation served the purpose of emphasizing the seriousness of the occasion. Indelibly linked to the struggles of the Civil Rights era, “We Shall Overcome” carries signifiers that are not lightly deployed. As a well-known and often-cited movement, the Civil Rights era and its songs are redeployed to link the affective commitment of a long-haul struggle with great sacrifice against inequality. Beyond the affective link to the necessity of endurance there is also the constant hopeful reminder that change may come. In their quest for climate justice and their hope for a just outcome to DeChristopher’s trial, Peaceful Uprising cited “We Shall Overcome” as a means of contextually placing these struggles affectively alongside the plight of those working to resolve racial injustice.

Beyond the use of this specifically iconic Civil Rights era song, Peaceful Uprising employed music familiar to the wider scope of the Civil Rights movement as well as slave spirituals, labor movement ballads, and environmental movement selections. These songs also recalled a history of strife as people fought for and eventually gained the rights due to them. In calling forth the previous meanings of the historical iterations of songs

like “This Little Light of Mine,” “Have You Been to Jail for Justice,” “If I Had a Hammer,” “This Land is Your Land,” and “Blowin’ In the Wind,” Peaceful Uprising calls on not only the citational *meaning* of these songs but also on their citational affect. Participants are implicitly asked to sense the world around them in a similar fashion as the original performers of those songs. Citationality via coperformance of historically significant musical selections then impacts the affective atmosphere in an on-the-ground movement as it asks the participants to not only experience the affect of the current movement (in this case joy and resolve with a dash of hope), but also the affect of the movement most known for deploying the same songs. Whether recalling a religious moment, a figure like Mother Jones or Woody Guthrie, or contemplating their own commitment to the movement (would you, for example, go to jail or use a hammer?), participants have the opportunity to connect with their own diverse affective commitment(s). Some became committed to the movement because they knew DeChristopher personally or counted him among their friends and family. Others were standing up for the environment and protesting resource exploration specifically. Yet others affiliated themselves with Peaceful Uprising as an offshoot of their commitment to other groups like the Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance or Greenpeace. Whatever the initial reason for their decision to collectivize, the music gave them the space to revel in both their diversity of meaning and singularity of support.

Deeply personal and again hard to capture methodologically, I can only truly speak for myself when I note that on various occasions I was moved to the brink of tears and to sheer elation through the affective use of music. For example, on my very first night in the field with PeaceUp (at the Revolution Sing-Along), I found myself

contemplating the potential severity of the charges against DeChristopher. He sat in the row in front of me singing along with the song book and I couldn't help but realize how much he had potentially given up for the cause. We are close in age and I could not imagine myself being so selflessly motivated as to choose to bid and then so resolute as time passed and the trial approached. Singing "We Shall Overcome" together with DeChristopher in a church meeting room in Salt Lake City helped me understand the immensity of affect. The stakes were high, not only for DeChristopher or the environment but also in terms of legal precedent, and I couldn't help but cry.

**Modified songs for affect.** In addition to the use of songs with their more-or-less intact historical affective implications, Peaceful Uprising also adapted songs with lyrics to fit the situation at hand. These adaptations continue to refer to the original/historical contexts in which the songs were first deployed but add credence and identification with the situation at hand, inviting affective responses. The lyrics in original deployment were meant to call up the citational affects of previous movements. However, in modified use through calling up the specific place and circumstances, they also invite affective articulation with the movement at hand. In using group singing as a protest tactic, Peaceful Uprising lyrically adapted many traditional spirituals and protest songs to suit the occasion. Adapting these lyrics served to place this protest in a long line of other conflicts heralded as being on the right side of history. The familiar songs of the Civil Rights era call up memories of intense struggle, personal sacrifice, and eventual vindication. Literally placing DeChristopher's story into these songs helped members of the machine to see their cause as just and worthy, though drawn out and unfair. Some of these lyrical adjustments were made before the trials began by Peaceful Uprising song

leaders and others were made on-the-fly in performance during the trials. An early adjustment to “We Shall Overcome” was the change from “we shall overcome someday” to “we shall overcome *today*.” This seemingly simple single-word change enabled the protesters to view their hopeful vision not as one that would make a return on investment “someday.” As a desiring-utterance, that change instead allowed protesters to view their participation in that lyric as a hopeful vision wherein their actions “today” meant something and that immediate return is an affectively positive lyrical shift. The desire expressed in that lyrical shift was a material one clearly noting their preferred change: that “today” change would come rather than waiting for something else down the line. In the moment it was also a desiring-utterance meant specifically for DeChristopher, arguing that he should find relief from his criminal proceedings that very day. That one lyric change, while certainly a desiring-utterance, is also one that the protesters might have wished could become an incorporeal transformation. Just as renaming these otherwise ordinary citizens “protesters” or “supporters of Peaceful Uprising” changed the expectations that society placed on them, so too did their own expectations of the world change as a result of that incorporeal transformation. They also hoped that shifting that lyric might become more than a desiring-utterance, more than a single wish, and instead a transformation wherein the labels like “criminal” might be replaced, incorporeally transforming DeChristopher back to “regular citizen,” “student,” and “free person.” That song was also adapted at various times for new verses including “Tim is not alone” and “we shall heal the earth.” The implication in the first lyric is that Tim is not alone because the entire machine of mobilization is on his side. He was not alone physically or in his ideals. “We shall heal the earth” acts to reinforce the largest goal of the machine and

reminds people that they are working for a worthy cause.

Another spiritual that Peaceful Uprising adapted for their purposes was “When the Spirit says do.” They rewrote a verse to include “Bid when the Spirit says bid.” In the song, the Spirit typically “says” to laugh, dance, sing, and shout. In affirming the decision to enact any of these behaviors when so compelled by the Spirit, the singer is given permission to act of his or her own accord even when under oppressive conditions (such as slavery in the origins of the song). Adding “bid” to the list of actions that the Spirit may compel a person to perform, DeChristopher and his choice to bid on the land parcels as a means to stand for the environment is reified, justified, and dignified. He bid not because it was the logical or easy choice but because he was compelled to do so by the Spirit even though he found himself facing punishment in an oppressive atmosphere. This specific lyric not only ties into the events preceding DeChristopher’s trials, it also immediately references the Bidder 70 slogan. In this way it is also another means of becoming-Bidder 70, as discussed in the previous chapter. The modified song, then, rhetorically expresses the invention of collectivity, tells the story to the group, which reaffirms its cause, solidifies articulations, and reminds members that the right thing to do is not always the legal thing.

The Peaceful Uprising machine of mobilization also lyrically inserted themselves into songs more familiar to the Civil Rights era. Developing a verse for Bob Dylan’s “Blowin’ in the Wind,” Peaceful Uprising was ready to deploy this new verse in the songbooks and prepared to sing it in the street:

//How many trials must a man endure,  
before he’s allowed to speak truth?  
How many years must a man sacrifice,  
to stand up for those in their youth?

Yes and how many people will stand on the side,  
'cause they are unsure what to do?  
The answer, my friend, is blowin' the wind  
The answer is blowin' in the wind.//

In adding this verse to a well-known and highly recognizable protest song, Peaceful Uprising is intentionally citational as it positions DeChristopher alongside, and in discussion with, leaders and agitators of the Civil Rights and antiwar eras. That positioning rhetorically legitimizes and validates his work. In these lyrics we see the virtues of DeChristopher and his actions being extolled and heralded as right and just in the face of State injustice, just as those who came before him were. In this case, as the verse was developed before the protest actions themselves (some lyrical changes to other songs were improvised on the spot), music clearly became an intentional figure in the rhetorical invention of collectivity. In that rhetorical choice, the collective were asked to see themselves in parallel with historical protest actions and to understand their cause as worthy of musical intervention. Insofar as DeChristopher was placed lyrically in song, so too were his followers who were asked to affectively identify with those agitators who came before them. This was achieved not only through the use of the original lyrics but also by placing themselves and their cause into song. They were able to call upon the citational affect of those who had previously deployed the song in protest, and by the inclusion of a verse specific to DeChristopher and his struggles, they were enabled to make new affective connections with an old song, to see historical protest as modern, and to see DeChristopher as citationally and affectively similar to the heroes of other movements. These modified songs work to heighten affect by writing current circumstances into historical, or well-known, songs as a way to interlock the present with the past, the current struggle with historical ones, and thereby implicate cop performers as

relevant, important, on the right side of history, and likely to “overcome” if they perform for the long haul.

### **Group Singing and Affect**

C. J. Stewart et al. (2001) argue that music, when used in social movements, acts to reinforce member commitment for the long haul. In other words, music can both invent and sustain the affectivity of the collective. In the next section I demonstrate this reinforcement and argue further that affect itself is the reinforcing glue. Initially I demonstrate the pragmatic role that group singing played in on-the-ground protest as a means by which to entertain and retain participants. This pragmatic section is meant to speak directly to C. J. Stewart et al. (2001), to draw a clearer image of what that reinforcement means in on-the-ground protest, and to show that their claims are still accurate in the post-9/11 era. This is an important note to make as the previous chapter was dedicated to showing what does and does not work tactically for activists in post-9/11. Given my questioning of how State responses to 9/11 changed the protest atmosphere, it is also necessary to interrogate whether previous claims about the effectiveness of music in protest remain true. I argue here that they do. Then, still focused on the copformance of protest music, I shift the frame toward the affective outcomes of group singing. There are notable differences in my affective response at each of the three events under discussion here: the Revolution Sing-Along, the protest held for DeChristopher’s criminal trial, and later at his sentencing trial. These differences are indicative that the same group of people (largely), singing the same songs (almost entirely), can have powerful yet differing affective responses dictated largely by the

circumstances at hand.

**The pragmatics of group singing.** As an on-the-ground practice, group singing by the Peaceful Uprising machine of mobilization helped sustain members in a number of different ways. Not least among them was simply giving protesters something to do. The minutia and physical labor of a full day of group protest cannot be underestimated. For a group of activists, standing around in the elements for a day marked by bursts of intense action followed by stretches of tedium and boredom, it was group singing that literally held the crowd together. Leaders of the group, or at least those in charge of the order of events, recognized the potential of singing to bring the group together. As the protest settled into the Free Speech Zone (FSZ) after the extended march before the start of the criminal trial, one of the leaders announced: “But right now we are going to launch into song because instead of just chanting all the time we are going to bind, bond together by singing and join together that way.” Here we see the recognition that singing is a good way to “sustain” and “reinforce” a movement, but in a very specific context wherein group singing acts as a means for immediate retention in the face of the labor and dullness of extended protest. This is a very pragmatic use of group singing as a tactic but at the same time it proved necessary and effective. Without the promise of something to do, it would have been easier to get distracted, move out of the crowd, and lose interest.

Group singing fortified resolve not only by giving the group something to do—wandering off from the crowd in the face of boredom is not a clear way to perform resilience—but also by lending emphasis to the task at hand. Singing louder, more forcefully, with more group connection became ways to demonstrate affective unity and resolve even as battle casualties stacked up (more convictions, longer sentences). Group



singing also provided a mechanism by which to perform joy. While the acts of group singing were not celebratory or even necessarily happy in tone, they did enact joy by empowering group members to perform their identity; clarifying their attitudes toward DeChristopher, the environment, and the State; and allowing them a vehicle by which to deliver their sentiment that was both legal and public. Demonstrating that joy and resolve publicly, loudly, and unquestionably became a way for the Peaceful Uprising machine of mobilization to take control of the message. In the face of a State system intent on punishing DeChristopher in ways that Peaceful Uprising thought corrupt, they developed a series of core principles. Among those is the assertion that “The best response to intimidation is joy and resolve” (Peaceful Uprising, n.d.-c). In forming that principle they intentionally set the course for the rest of their rhetorical invention of collectivity. They would not proceed in an angry manner, rather they would nonviolently pursue the truth and stand joyfully resolute in the face of intimidation. That core principle also demanded that rather than sitting by quietly, writing letters, or working behind the scenes, they take their grievance to the street in an embodied and flagrant manner, provoking attention and requiring that people see the physical manifestation of joy and resolve in the process. That message remained a good one not only for the out-group but also for the in-group as it helped control and channel the frustrations inherent in a losing legal battle. Investment in affect is key when facing these strict and difficult realities. Even though the actions of the protesters were not going to immediately impact the trials, protesters were empowered to believe that they could still make a difference. And, while hopeful affect articulated protesters to the machine of mobilization, initially it was the durability of that affect that helped them remain even when the news from the courtroom was bad.

A second pragmatic consideration of street-level group singing was the difficulty in orchestrating a nonprofessional group of singers through technically difficult material. In some cases, as I will discuss, the potential gain of affectively citing some songs is outweighed by the cost of risking group cohesion and even collectivity simply by trying too hard to force difficult lyrical material on an untrained group. While it was an intentional choice to rhetorically invent collectivity through music, some songs are more affectively appropriate and effective than others due solely to the simplicity of their performance. The repeatable, memorizable, and adaptable nature of many of the songs like, “If I had a Hammer” and “We Shall Overcome” fare well in street-level or call-and-response settings. Once the singers have an idea of what comes next, these songs are relatively easy to perform. Other songs are deceptively difficult. A song like “This Land is Your Land,” which is both thematically relevant to the issues at hand and relatively well known, became wildly complicated to perform while on the march. For many Americans, repeated exposure to that song makes the chorus quite simple to perform, and the first couple of verses nearly second nature. What I and others on the street with me did not appreciate is the sheer number of verses contained in that well-known song. I found myself mumbling through the song, trying to read from the songbook while not tripping over myself or plowing over fellow marchers. It was a technically difficult song, but one that people seemed to know, at least to a certain extent.

At another level of difficulty is a song like Joni Mitchell’s “Big Yellow Taxi.” I knew *of* this song, but it was not one that I recognized by its title. To me it was the song where “they paved paradise to put up a parking lot.” That alone makes it less suitable to street-level deployment, even though, like “This Land is Your Land” it is topically

relevant to the environmental purpose of the day. This song was similar to “This Land is Your Land” in that it was a song I really only knew by its chorus. The verses were unfamiliar and I had to return again to reading the lyrics, concentrating less on being in the moment than on trying to get the song right. The song is less adaptable to the situation at hand, as we saw in the previous section, and it is not one that translates well to call-and-response or a song leader type setting. The difficulties of performing these songs impeded affective engagement. I was forced to concentrate more on the specifics of the lyrics than on the substance of the songs. While I was committed to at least attempting to follow the songs, others around me stopped singing once the lyrics became difficult. This invitation to disengage by insisting on performing these songs in their entirety impeded affective engagement and threatened collectivity itself.

These pragmatic considerations cannot be underestimated. Simply having something to do or a way to remain connected to the group fostered an affective articulation that lingered even when the event was not entertaining or when the news from the courtroom was disheartening. Finding ways to adapt songs for street-level performance, not just in connecting lyrically to the event, but also in making it feasible to sing incredible movement music, should be rather simple to accomplish. The easiest answer is to have plentiful and available songbooks with reprintings of lyrics. Those available lyrics should be condensed to the most relevant or most well known. The impact of singing “This Land is Your Land” can be easily accomplished in two or three verses, there is no need to belabor the amateur singer with all seven.

**Affective articulation.** While it is entirely possible to understand the affect of a movement from afar (geographically or temporally) through its music (it is, for example,

difficult to hear Creedence Clearwater Revival's "Fortunate Son" and not affectively recall the anti-Vietnam war movement), coperforming that music in a protest event heightens affective engagement in ways that solo listening cannot. I experienced group-singing-induced affect on my first encounter with Peaceful Uprising. I had previously heard of DeChristopher and understood his plight, but I did not go into the field with serious personal emotional investments in his case or the larger cause. Yes, I too find protecting the environment to be a priority and I am frustrated by the judicial barriers enacted by the State in this case. But I did not personally know DeChristopher or any other members of Peaceful Uprising. I was surprised then, during the Revolution Sing-Along as previously discussed, to find that there were a few times when I was moved to tears. Something about the immensity of the moment, the voices raised in unison, and the shared cause—it was my affective moment. I was unexpectedly moved by the music and then motivated to become part of the movement. While I understood the factual stakes of DeChristopher's actions and the environmental reasons Peaceful Uprising was supporting him, singing with that group helped me to affectively engage. It was no longer a simply reasonable or logical decision to join, affect compelled me to do my part. I felt as if I had a voice and I had to raise it.

Even though I did not know DeChristopher, I did know the music. Slave spirituals, rousing labor movement ballads, 1960s era protest songs, and contemporary environmental pieces connected me to the group, the cause, and affectively linked me to the machine. Those songs carry their own citational weight in culture, but are also personally important for me as I grew up in a household where protest music, especially of the 1960s and 1970s, was ever present. I knew that music, identified with it, and in

coperforming it at the sing-along, I was moved. Not being someone quick to tears, I realized that the music had literally moved me not only affectively but also physically to join the movement. Redeploying the citational musics of my childhood, I was asked to affectively engage with them through citing not just the songs in their own time but in the present. I was empowered to feel that the struggle in the music was not a thing of the past but something of my present, of the planet's future, and the collective's mission.

A similar form of affective identification occurred during DeChristopher's criminal trial. Reflecting on both the midnight vigil and the initial march/day of action I came to see the affective impact of group singing and understood not only affect but also collective enunciation. In those moments of embodied protest it felt like our singing was really *doing* something. At one point during the criminal trial, the group of protesters moved out of the street-side FSZ to a large grassy area to make aerial art. We were instructed to place our bodies inside a rough drawing on the ground. When photographed from the top of a nearby building we embodied an upraised fist—the image of empowerment that Peaceful Uprising had chosen as their trademark. As we were being sorted and organized into that fist, a core leader of the group asked us to hurriedly return to the FSZ as DeChristopher was making his way into the Federal Courthouse. We ran back, reorganized, and began a moving round of “We Shall Overcome,” linked arms and all, as our lyrical escort of his entrance into trial. With so much singing and so much repetition throughout the two days, there were just some songs and some times when it was apparent that something was happening. This was one of those times. We had sung “We Shall Overcome” countless times in a variety of iterations up to that point, but that time there was more heart, more volume, more love, more caring, and seemingly more

change. It felt to me, at that moment, like the singing itself was making a change. That change may not have been something that we could put our hands on, not something that would influence the eventual outcome of the trial, not something that made a material difference in the world outside of our own beings, but we were affectively and collectively impacted in a more powerful form in that iteration of the song than in previous versions of the same.

In all of the contexts in which researchers discuss reasons to sing as a movement, the idea that singing is actually *doing* something gets overlooked. Surely group singing gave us something to do that day. It filled the time and kept us from getting bored. It helped us “bond” together as a group and gave us a common language to speak. But more than that, it *felt good* to sing together. It made me feel powerful, as though I, a single cog in the machine, could make a difference and that together we were creating change. In those moments, voices raised, arms linked, hearts full, adrenaline pumping, group singing was a transformative experience. I went from feeling hopeful for change to feeling as if I was a part of a group actually producing change.

Once it was clear that the State tide had already turned against DeChristopher, my experiences in the movement helped me to see that group singing, or lack thereof, played a big part in dictating the tone of the events. As the criminal trial began there was a serious emphasis on group singing as a demonstration of joy and resolve. For example, on the first day of the trial the crowd was cohesive, well-integrated, and essentially jubilant. There was singing and dancing and laughing. The demonstrators celebrated a true showing of JOY and resolve. This stands in contrast though to the tone of the events as DeChristopher’s sentencing trial got underway. It is notable that there was less reason

to be joyous at that point. DeChristopher had already been convicted of crimes that members found to be less than criminal. While members of Peaceful Uprising largely understood at the start of the first trial that things were not likely to go in DeChristopher's favor, there was still room for hope. As the sentencing trial started though, that hope was diminished as the best there was to hope for was a light sentence. Additionally, many key members of the machine—rally organizers, song leaders, band members—chose to sit in the courthouse for the sentencing trial. They were largely close friends of DeChristopher's and they chose to show their support from inside rather than on the street. This meant that those most experienced with leading songs, bringing people together, and dealing with the messy and disorganized parts of mass public gatherings were not available to reprise that role. Therefore, there was less group singing overall during the demonstration at the sentencing rally. As a result there was an affective and tonal shift in the protest actions at the second trial. From the time I got to the plaza, the crowd was a little more lackluster. Not really jubilant, not celebratory, not really even joyous. They were only loosely gathered for much of the day, and not really cohesive in the way the crowd had been at the earlier criminal trial. There was just a spark missing this time around. I think that change largely had to do with the way the "leaders" or organizers kept things going (or not) and the smaller focus on music/singing. It was genuinely harder to exude joy and resolve during the second trial because we were even more frustrated, downtrodden, and even angry at the system.

While the organizers had consciously chosen to bring joy and resolve along affectively in the first set of demonstrations, those hopeful and positive affects were more difficult to rouse for the criminal trial as DeChristopher's imprisonment seemed

imminent. In my notes and observations, I linked this decrease in group singing with a less cohesive affect. All of this meant there was a dramatic shift in tone between the two events and that lack of group singing became a common denominator in the shift. In these three examples we have seen the affective potential of group singing: the articulatory potential of affect in group singing; the ways that particular affective formations can come together to enable the protester to feel like she is making a difference; and the interrelationship between affect and group singing and how, at least in this example, when one lags so does the other, impacting the tone of the event. These are all factors that link directly back to the assertion made by C. J. Stewart et al. (2001) that music is a crucial element of protest, but that have not been previously represented in rhetorical examinations of music in social movements.

### **Conclusion**

In their early work examining the rhetoric of music, Irvine and Kirkpatrick (1972) called specifically for greater examination of the “place of music in the rhetoric of social movements” (p. 284). This is, in part, my response (several decades on) to their call. In this chapter I examined the music of a social movement from the perspective of affect as a form of glue that can invent and maintain collectivity in a movement. In essentially putting my ear to the ground and listening to the force of group singing I was able to see the affective, embodied, performative elements of singing in social movements that is not represented in textual studies. While this study echoes many textual examinations of protest music in reinforcing decisions to stay with the movement, there are also important additions. Understanding singing as the tie that binds a group together by providing



affective connections and a shared language among people who were otherwise strangers reinforces the argument that music is indeed a communicative rhetorical act and adds the importance of embodied experience to the situation. Music was then a tool used to speak back in the face of oppression and to lyricize undesirable State actions. In adding my own experiences, in hearing the whole group sing, in empowering the group as performer, I have extended the available literature relevant to social movement studies and communicative examinations of music.

A methodological commitment to PCR enabled me in this study to ask and answer questions about the group in performance, to see and feel the embodied experience of the group, and to extend the literature along those lines. If I had the opportunity to join another group in a similar manner, I would make some changes. Notably, this is essentially a pilot study. I entered the field with eyes and ears wide open, and without any assumptions about what I would find or feel. If I had it to do again, I would be more attuned to affect. But even given that opportunity, I cannot say for sure that I would capture affect more clearly than I did here, if for no other reason than that affect is subjective and is not always to be expected (DeChaine, 2002).

As important as it was for Peaceful Uprising to choose, bring along, and perform joy and resolve consistently, I am not advocating an emphasis on “happy” protesters. Joy worked for Peaceful Uprising. It was a good choice for them in their contextual milieu and geographical positioning. Salt Lake City is not really prepared for angry protests. I do not find it necessary to be joyous to protest, one need not put a happy face on catastrophic issues. Additionally, while joy and hope were pervasive in the affect of these protest events, anger, rage, frustration, and exasperation are all equally affective. A member

could just as easily articulate to the group through an affect of rage as of hope, and for that matter rage can be hopeful. So while joy and resolve were driving affective forces of this group, and I have hinged my analysis and arguments on these sentiments, please note that affect “works” with other forces as well.

Although I was not a group member in the beginning, not heavily invested in this specific machine or its products, I became engrossed. I came to identify with DeChristopher’s goals and his movement became my movement. I wanted to expose the injustices to which he had been subjected just as much as I stood with him to protect wild lands from oil and gas exploration. And through it all we sang, communicating our values and hoping also to create change in the world. At times it really felt like something was happening; we created something in lifting our voices together. At other times though, hopelessness set in. There was simply no way to “win” against the State when real lives were on the line. But, even in those moments approaching despair, the collective assemblage of enunciation working within the machine of mobilization created change. We created change in the movement, in identification with the cause, in developing affirmative affect, and in making beautiful lyrical arguments for change.

## CHAPTER 5

### BEING NEITHER-HERE-NOR-THERE: THE POLITICS OF PROXIMITY IN PROTEST

When Tim DeChristopher arrived at the hotly contested Bureau of Land Management (BLM) auction in Salt Lake City in December 2008, he intended to metaphorically “wave a red flag,” drawing attention to the unprecedented auction that opened up lands previously unavailable for resource exploration (K. Johnson, 2011a). Most of these parcels were national park-adjacent<sup>14</sup> lands in Southern Utah being offered for exploratory oil and gas rights leases. If purchased, explored, and drilled, the final effect would be lasting oil and gas extraction rigs on land immediately adjacent to national parks in Southern Utah. DeChristopher’s metaphorical red flag took the physical form of a bidding paddle, which he used to purchase 14 lease parcels spanning over 22,000 acres at the price of nearly \$1.8 million before the auction was shut down (Magill, 2009a). He noted that his hope was to “block legitimate bidders” who would pursue commodity extraction (Magill, 2009b).

DeChristopher was not alone in his protest of the sale. Immediately after the sale

---

<sup>14</sup> Here and throughout, park-adjacent is used to designate the parcels available for lease by BLM, many of which directly bordered national parks or were potentially visible from inside the parks. See Appendix B for a visual representation of the park-adjacent parcels proposed near Arches National Park.

was announced, recriminations came from various environmental activists and organizations, including Robert Redford, Bill McKibben/350.org, the National Resources Defense Council, and the Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance (Gordon, 2011; Magill, 2009b; Sands, 2009b). These attentions were somewhat fruitful as prior to the sale the BLM pulled 80,000 acres from the auction block at the request of the National Park Service (Hansen & Karey, 2009; Sands, 2009a, 2009b). Proceedings questioning the legality of the sales continued even after the auction and BLM agreed to postpone issuing leases until further legal challenges related to other parcels were resolved (Sands, 2009b). In response to legal action by the Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance, on February 4, 2009 U.S. Secretary of the Interior Ken Salazar cancelled 77 of the 116 leases sold at the auction. Eleven of those cancellations were among the 14 originally purchased by DeChristopher (Sands, 2010). This course of action—offering the lands, pulling some from the block before auction day, and nullifying the sale of other lands after the fact—illustrates not only the controversy over these lands but also the illegality of portions of the State’s process that brought these parcels to auction.

Even amidst all of the retractions and nullified sales, DeChristopher was strictly prosecuted for his “disruptive” bidding actions (Gordon, 2011; K. Johnson, 2011b). As the legal contest in DeChristopher’s case progressed, so too did protests contesting the meaning of place and space in relation both to the park-adjacent parcels of land and urban protests in Salt Lake City. In this chapter I argue that place—in the ways protest was performed both *in* and *about* place—plays a critical role in the invention of collectivity. In discussing place and space I rely on Endres and Senda-Cook’s (2011) notions of place-based rhetoric and place-as-rhetoric. That discussion inflects the “whys” and “wheres” of

protesting relative to DeChristopher's actions and subsequent trials. Part of that discussion includes the ways that place became a prominent part of protest singing on site at the protest events. Place was reimagined and renegotiated lyrically as well as juridically. Beyond the in situ performances of place in protest, I also examine the ways that newspaper accounts of the park-adjacent parcels rhetorically invented a place in need of protest and thus in need of collectivity to defend it. I argue in this chapter that the meanings of place and space in Utah were both rhetorically remade in the process of valuing park-adjacent lands as spaces where oil and gas development should not be undertaken. In that process I will argue that the park-adjacent parcels were represented as idealized, even mythical, by news outlets in place-based rhetoric while spatial and place-based meanings of protest in Utah were reinvented. Throughout we will see that what remains under-theorized in the rhetorical canon is how ideas of place and space impact and motivate the rhetorical invention of collectivity.

I first draw from space and place theory to conceptualize those two terms, illuminate their differences, and discuss their dual political implications. Next I introduce Endres and Senda-Cook's (2011) idea of place-based rhetoric and place-as-rhetoric. Then, I cover the methodological approach and text collection as they relate to the rhetorical study of space and place. In the analysis I provide an extended discussion of how: 1) place-based arguments were developed to protect the park-adjacent parcels and 2) place-as-rhetoric was used in Salt Lake City protests conducted by Peaceful Uprising to reshape urban spaces as appropriate places to give voice to their desire to halt development on the parcels. I conclude with commentary on the efficacy (both long- and short-term) of tactically deploying both place-based rhetoric and place-as-rhetoric in one

social movement.

### **Conceptualizing Space and Place**

In this section I provide the theoretical framework for the rhetorical examination of space and place. Conceptualizing place and space here is important because they played a vital role in the rhetorical invention of collectivity of Peaceful Uprising. The very ideas of place and space as important and threatened motivated DeChristopher's decision to bid and activated the collectivization of the movement. Thus, I begin with a brief overview of space and place as concepts. Then, I more specifically define place-based rhetoric and place-as-rhetoric as they form the basis of the analysis (Endres & Senda-Cook, 2011). Finally, I discuss how the simultaneous reading of place-based rhetoric and place-as-rhetoric in a single case study offers a contribution to spatial rhetoric.

Formulations of place and space are proliferating in academic work as scholars work to conceptualize the relationship between people and their geographies. There is a growing body of rhetorical studies of a variety of texts, including memory places, memorials, and museums (Blair, 2001; Blair, Dickinson, & Ott, 2010; Blair et al., 1991; Blair & Michel, 2000; Brady, 2011; Dickinson, Blair, & Ott, 2010; Dickinson et al., 2005, 2006; Kelly & Hoerl, 2012; B. C. Taylor, 2010; Zagacki & Gallagher, 2009); places of capitalistic consumption (Dickinson, 1997, 2002; Modesti, 2008; J. Stewart & Dickinson, 2008); and social movements (Endres & Senda-Cook, 2011; Endres, Senda-Cook, & Cozen, 2014; Singer, 2011; West, 2007, 2010). These scholars make arguments based on the assumption that place and space are forms of material rhetoric (Blair, 1999).

Beyond spaces and places themselves being rhetorical, they also enact, encourage, and produce “consequential rhetorical performances” (Endres et al., 2014, p. 125).

It is important to foreground the assertion that place and space are not actually the same. Although it should be noted that place and space are often seen as “approximately equivalent terms,” Blair et al. (2010) note that the terms are “used more often to emphasize a difference in how physical situatedness is experienced. In such usages, a *place* that is bordered, specified, and locatable by being named is seen as different from open, undifferentiated, undesignated, *space*” (p. 23). Similarly, Endres and Senda-Cook (2011) define place as “particular locations that are semi-bounded, a combination of material and symbolic qualities, and embodied” (p. 259). These are identifiable entities—a national park, a BLM parcel, the federal courthouse, or jail. In each of these instances there is a boundary (visible or not) that enables an inhabitant of that place to say “I am here, not there.” This is as simple as noting that one is visiting Arches National Park and not Bryce Canyon, or to distinguish either of those parks from one’s home or office. Of course, the boundary looks and acts differently if we are talking about a BLM parcel or the federal courthouse. The courthouse has clear boundaries, the building itself is well defined, identifiable, and looming. The parcels though are much more “semi-bounded,” meaning that the (semi-) boundary can be “a matter of debate, change over time, or be re-drawn” (Endres & Senda-Cook, 2011, p. 259). As it relates to the BLM parcels, semi-boundedness then also means that their limits are porous, unclear, or are not consistently visually observable.

While place may seem to have an easy or clearly understandable definition, space “refers to a more general notion of how society and social practice are regulated (and

sometimes disciplined) by spatial thinking” (Endres & Senda-Cook, 2011, p. 260). Endres and Senda-Cook provide examples of this definition including “capitalist modes of production” and “gendered notions of private and public spaces” (p. 260). Those examples are useful in providing means of thinking about the rhetorical construction of space, in this case, as dominated by capitalism specifically in oil and gas production, constrained by the configuration of the State post-9/11, and glossed entirely by local constructions of religion as a dominant mode of being (in relation to both the State and the environment). Much of the work from Chapter 2 demonstrating the change in the relationship between the war machine and the State post-9/11 applies to the prevailing factors that construct the space of protest.<sup>15</sup> Restrictions in protest, enhanced charges and sentencing, greater wariness of civil disobedience as a tactic, and less willingness to understand disagreement as a valid response to democratic changes all constrain what it means to be a civic actor in the space.

---

<sup>15</sup> D. Harvey (2001) would say here that the machine plays a “mediating role” in translating between the particular instance (DeChristopher and his fight to preserve the BLM parcels) and its universal comparative or outcome (climate justice; p. 194). More than mediating between the particular and the universal though, D. Harvey argues that grassroots movements (his term) can be the arbiter between fixed State institutions (e.g. BLM, justice system) and spatial forms on the one hand and “new socio-spatial possibilities” on the other (p. 195). So, we see that in rupturing the static state system and questioning the spatial practices of BLM (wherein nonpark land = nonpark space), Peaceful Uprising not only threw a wrench in the state machine, it opened up a new realm of possibility for reimagining spatial politics not only at protest sites in the city but also in park-adjacent parcels. It could be argued that removing parcels from the auction block was a return to the status quo. Those parcels had never been offered before and their removal was simply a return to park-style spatial protections (meaning no development or resource extraction). However, in returning to not-for-lease status after their public debacle in 2008, these parcels became more officially protected as their stint in the limelight concluded when it was determined that more study was needed to assess the impact of drilling on air quality and to consider the potential for permanent damage to public lands (Goldstein, 2009; O’Neil, 2009). The mediated argument for that same scientific position makes up the first half of the analysis in this chapter.



As important as it is to separate place and space as rhetorical figures, granting each their own production and implications, it should be noted that their relationship is neither binary nor necessarily oppositional (Blair et al., 2010, p. 23). Indeed, Blair et al. (2010) argue that they inform each other in a “mutually constitutive” relationship (p. 23). As embodied and material entities, space and place continuously work to inform and influence the other. These frameworks remain malleable and indeed continuously reinscribe meanings and ideas on one another. If we think of urban sprawl, what was a year ago a producing field is this year a new housing development. The spatial practice of capitalism inflects the place continuously (whether in harvesting crops or purchasing houses), but the larger spatial ideas of the practices of what happens in that place (whether planting or living) and how we value those undertakings differ.

### **Place-Based Rhetoric**

Endres and Senda-Cook (2011) define place-based arguments as those that “discursively invoke images or memories of a place to support an argument . . . and make salient that dominant place meanings are sometimes linked to systems of power that discourage protest” (p. 258). The use of imagery and memory square quite well with the mediated representations of BLM parcels and their nearby national park companions. It is easy enough to call up images or memories of an idealized place, like a national park, set aside for future enjoyment and to incite frustration at the idea of endangering that place for resource development and commodification. These images were strong enough to motivate Peaceful Uprising to collectivize to protect them from resource development. Just the idea of developing the park-adjacent parcels was enough to incite collective

action. In the analysis I will demonstrate how the rhetoric of place was reconstructed for the BLM parcels by inflecting new politics of space.

### **Place-as-Rhetoric**

According to Endres and Senda-Cook (2011), place-as-rhetoric “assumes that the very place in which a protest occurs is a rhetorical performance that is part of the message of the movement” (pp. 258-59). They further argue that place-as-rhetoric can be refined into three separate ways in which “places act rhetorically” (p. 259). They contend that protesters themselves can “*build on a pre-existing meaning of a place*” (emphasis in original) to help imbue their protest with meaning. Second, they find that “protests can *temporarily reconstruct the meaning* of a particular place” (emphasis in original) by interrupting the dominant or accepted interpretations of place. Finally, they posit that “*repeated reconstructions over time* can result in new place meanings” (emphasis in original, p. 259). The first two subsets of the ways in which place-as-rhetoric acts in place as protest are salient for my work here. In the analysis I will demonstrate how place-as-rhetoric transformed otherwise mundane places into places of protest. Particular to that analysis is a discussion of how place-as-rhetoric was used in song to reinforce attachment to the collective.

### **Placing the Rhetorical Invention of Collectivity**

When we hold together ideas of place and collectives, extant work demonstrates the importance of place in public memory. Whether they be particular public places where memorable events happened such as battles, historical speeches, tragic events

(Dickinson, 1997), or specific structures erected for the purpose of collecting memories such as museums and memorials (Blair, 1999, 2001; Blair et al., 1991; Blair & Michel, 2000, 2007; Dickinson et al., 2010, 2005, 2006, 2013; B. C. Taylor, 2010; Zagacki & Gallagher, 2009), most of the rhetorical work on place and collectivity recalls a specific past. Saying in effect, let us gather here where we can recall and pay homage to specific events, people, ideas, and even industries. My argument here, though, is that place also has a vital impact on the rhetoric of collectivity in the present and future tenses, as in, we should gather our efforts around this place *now* in order to protect it for the *future*. Ostensibly, similar work has been done in the creation of, say, the Buffalo Bill Museum. Efforts were made, funds were gathered, and ground was broken to build a place to collect and memorialize. Similar work is done when entities gather to preserve places. The battlefield at Gettysburg was set aside and reclaimed from potential development, and efforts continue to this day to restore, even replant, the battlefield to its 1863 state in order to give visitors a specific experience as they collect to memorialize this historic battle.<sup>16</sup> What remains under-theorized in the rhetorical canon is how the ideas of place and space impact and motivate the rhetorical invention of collectivity seeking not to invoke memory but to incite collective action. Later in this chapter I examine newspaper accounts that rhetorically shaped the parcels as places in need of protection and song lyrics that contested place in order to examine how these artifacts speak to the rhetorical invention of collectivity.

---

<sup>16</sup> On a nonresearch related trip to Gettysburg in March 2016, I learned these things on the regular public tour. The National Parks Service continues its efforts to preserve the battlefield (to reclaim parcels from developers, for example) and to restore it to “original” status in order that contemporary visitors can align their vistas with 1863 accounts of, for example, marching through the peach orchard.

### **Contributing to Place in Protest**

The second key contribution I make in this chapter is a demonstration of how place-based rhetoric and place-as-rhetoric can work together in a single case study. I show here how Peaceful Uprising simultaneously worked to rhetorically reshape the meaning of space in park-adjacent BLM parcels (largely in mediated accounts) while also reconstructing urban spaces of protest in Salt Lake City. Their dual approach to protest aimed not only to forward their attempt to protect the parcels from fossil fuel exploration and potential development, but to also support DeChristopher through his trials as he sacrificed his own freedom for climate justice. We will also see in this chapter how, while working on two geographically separate fronts, Peaceful Uprising managed to engage park-adjacent parcels as an idealized, even mythical form of place-based rhetoric while simultaneously reinventing the spatial and place-based meanings of protest in Utah. All the while, of course, I will be arguing that place and space play a crucial role in the rhetorical invention of collectivity.

### **Method**

This chapter, like those before it, draws from both traditional textual analysis of media and the use of participatory critical rhetoric (PCR) to collect and analyze protest rhetoric (McHendry et al., 2014; M. Middleton et al., 2015; M. K. Middleton et al., 2011). These methods, as have been made clear by Endres and Senda-Cook (2011) and M. Middleton et al. (2015), are particularly beneficial for the study of place and space in protest events as they provide both contextual and participant-observation style documentation of the protest events. The largest benefit of using PCR along with textual

analysis to study the spatial rhetoric of Peaceful Uprising is that it allowed me to observe not only the rhetorical performance of place at the Free Speech Zone (FSZ) downtown but also the rhetorical construction of the park-adjacent parcels that were up for auction as an imagined or idealized place out “there” in the wilderness.

### **Place and Space as Artifact**

Place itself serves as the artifact of this study in two ways. The first part of the analysis uses mediated texts to analyze the place-based rhetoric of Peaceful Uprising. Drawn from newspaper accounts of DeChristopher’s saga, his trials, and the push-pull with the BLM over land offerings (see Chapter 2 for a fuller discussion of the back-and-forth with the government over parcels being made available, unavailable, sales being redacted, payment being denied, etc.) these descriptions of the park-adjacent parcels form the fulcrum of my argument about place-based rhetoric. As they dealt with the park-adjacent BLM parcels, and Peaceful Uprising never physically took its protest to those places, these accounts were ones I could not have possibly collected via *in situ* research. Yet, as I will demonstrate, these accounts did effectively shape how the audience was instructed to envision the parcels.

The second part of the analysis is built almost entirely on participant observation to analyze the ways that Peaceful Uprising used place in their performance of protest and rhetorically reconstructed the urban Salt Lake City landscape into one of protest. Observational data here was key because it allowed me to fully experience and record practices of protest that would never be fully reported in the media. Endres & Senda-Cook (2011) argue, “Place in protest builds from the notion that place is rhetorical to

specifically show how the rhetorical performances of place in protest are a rich intersection of bodies, material aspects, past meanings, present performances, and future possibilities” (p. 261). Dickinson (2002) similarly argues that because the “non-discursive” nature of place makes a traditional or symbolic reading of the text virtually impossible, it is the examination of material place that pushes us to “think about the materiality of rhetoric” itself (p. 6). It is in those fleeting moments of place-in-protest that protesters construct, re-create, and/or idealize the places they occupy and hope to protect.

### **The BLM Parcels as Place-Based Rhetoric**

In this section I argue that mediated textual accounts of Peaceful Uprising’s actions employed place-based rhetoric to depict the BLM parcels as similar to the adjacent national park land, thereby demanding the types of protections and valuations that would be given to officially recognized park land. I argue that this mediated rhetorical invention impacted the eventual collectivity of Peaceful Uprising. The parcels were rhetorically invented as being not only of-value but also worthy of protection. Readers, when encountering that characterization, might begin to see themselves as agents speaking for the land, protecting that which could not protect itself. Such agency begets collectivity. News accounts also became an integral basis of the rhetoric of collectivity for Peaceful Uprising after DeChristopher’s arrest. I begin this section with a discussion of the spatial practices expected in national parks. I follow that with a discussion of how space was constructed in the park-adjacent parcels. Then I delve into a three-part examination of the ways in which mediated accounts of the parcels reconstructed the valuation of the parcels. In evaluating the mediated messages it

becomes clear that the parcels are being written about as scenic, sensitive, and pristine. Each of those characteristics is highly valued in the writings and they are presented as in danger of permanent damage or destruction should resource exploration and exploitation happen on these park-adjacent lands. Anticipating this danger calls forth the rhetoric of the collective as the reader is asked to envision a future where development and degradation mars public lands, including these park-adjacent parcels. The articles reinforce the idea that action must be taken now to preserve them for the future.

### **Spatial Practices in National Parks**

Beyond the previously discussed predominant spatial practices (i.e., late capitalism, post-9/11 discourses of safety) that dictate American cultural production, national park lands and wilderness areas are inflected with their own set of spatial practices and expectations. In order to understand my broader argument about extending the affordances of park lands to nonpark lands, we must begin with a primer in the spatial practices of national parks. I argue that the spatial practices of national parks covers all of the parks in their various places whether desert, mountain, forest, swamp, or grassland (among others), and does not pertain to single parks in the National Park Service, which encompasses over 84 million acres at 407 sites (National Park Service, 2015). These practices were inaugurated with the passing of the National Park Service Organic Act in 1916. The agency's mission was clearly laid out at that time:

to conserve the scenery and the natural and historic objects and the wild life therein and to provide for the enjoyment of the same in such manner and by such means as will leave them unimpaired for the enjoyment of future generations.  
(National Park Service, 2015b)

The assumptions here about unimpaired enjoyment directly inform the spatial practices of

the park services as a whole. The place of the park then enables certain spatial practices and expectations. Think of this as similar to the relationship between the place and space of church. A clearly bounded place, working under the umbrella of culturally dominant spatial practices, which has expectations of what one does, says, wears, acts, and how one generally spatially embodies the place of church (denomination notwithstanding), is the result of the coconstruction of space and place. The idea of the space of church remains largely unchanged regardless of the place. One might adhere to different expectations depending on sect or religion, but even in singing, praying, dressing, dancing, repeating, or performing religion differently, the space of church still connotes certain practices. In that same manner, the space of national parks translates across the various places so designated. One may variously hike, bike, snorkel, swim, or climb depending on the park, but the spatial identity of the park remains the same.

One final point to make about the relationship between space and the parks is that park land, by virtue of being set aside for “unimpaired” enjoyment, is off-limits for resource development. Unlike many other nonpark but government-owned lands (e.g., BLM land), park lands are generally protected from activities such as ranching, mining, and timber extraction.<sup>17</sup> This means that park space has historically escaped natural resource commodification common to other lands under capitalist modes of production. That is not to say that the park, itself a natural resource, isn’t commodified. Indeed, park-

---

<sup>17</sup> Note that there are some exceptions to this. Activities like grazing or hunting are permitted in areas demarcated for these purposes. For example, Glen Canyon—a national recreation area (one of the many different designations of land type within the park system) —was admitted into the system in 1972. At that point, cattle and sheep grazing had been undertaken on those lands for over 100 years and an exception for grazing was written into the legislation that designated Glen Canyon as a national recreation area. Grazing continues there today under management and supervision by the park service (National Park Service, 2007).



goers pay up-front fees for the privilege to enter. Further, while vendors are allowed to run hotels and restaurants within national parks, extraction, commercialization, sprawl, and industrial builds are all verboten on park land. With this understanding of place and space as coconstituted—national parks are inscribed with a set of spatial practices that reserve the land for public enjoyment rather than commodification—we can now turn to the shift in spatial valuation of park-adjacent lands.

### **Constructions of Space in BLM Parcels**

The parcels that sparked DeChristopher's actions are park-adjacent BLM owned lands that, prior to 2008, had never been offered for resource exploration (see Appendix B). To be clear, these lands are *not in* national parks or protected wilderness areas.<sup>18</sup> Although mapping and boundaries, perhaps rather arbitrarily, designate that they are not part of those legally protected places, the parcels are in many ways visually, ecologically, and biologically indistinct from park lands. There are certainly legal, mapped boundaries to the national parks and there are neatly squared parcels surveyed by BLM for lease. Those boundaries, while invisible to the observer, directly affect the politics of space in the parcels. Being “outside” the park, those lands are then legally available for resource exploration and thus still subject to the systems of commodification of capitalism that the parks largely escape. Their “outside” status sets up an assumption that these parcels are open to development and subject to BLM practices, as opposed to the spatial assumption of the adjacent park lands that are to be protected, undeveloped, and unimpaired.

---

<sup>18</sup> Though recall that the parcels were near or immediately adjacent to designated park lands and wilderness areas including Dinosaur National Monument and Arches and Canyonlands National Parks (Magill, 2009c).

But those boundaries between park and BLM land do not adequately contain the visual politics of space. In these wide open, otherwise indistinct vistas, the unmarked place boundaries do not provide a visual distinction between park and nonpark lands. Instead, these adjacent lands are easily enough *seen* as part of the parks. This visibility was a key marker in the argument made by Peaceful Uprising and various media sources positing that development on park-adjacent lands would mean visible (and audible, and smellable) intrusion into protected park lands. This intrusion, in their estimation, would negatively impact the experiences of park-goers. That negative impact recalls Senda-Cook's (2012) concept of "experiential degradation," which she defines as "the perceived loss of an expected experience" (p. 130). The experience of being in those nearby park spaces would be degraded by these various intrusions from the BLM parcels. The conclusion of this argument, by extension, would then be that even though the BLM parcels are not in the national parks, they should be granted the same spatial affordances as the parks. This is an attempt to reject the accepted spatial practices of park-adjacent land and to assert a new type of spatial practice that values the lands differently, more similarly to the national parks they border. Here we see contestation over the meaning of these spaces and the politics of space being reimagined. Cresswell (1996) argues that "value and meaning are not inherent in any space or place—indeed, they must be created, reproduced, and defended from heresy" (p. 9). The value and meaning of these park-adjacent parcels was contested and re-created, and reproduced in the process of defending them from development.

In this case, the politics of park space have bled out to influence how people understand nonpark places. This is an example of how "[p]laces exist in the

interrelationship with spaces” (Endres & Senda-Cook, 2011, p. 260). In *Peaceful Uprising*’s arguments, the notion of park space as worthy of protection from development has permeated actual nonpark boundaries and is inflecting those actual places with new meanings. Endres and Senda-Cook (2011) envision this reimagination as a means by which “social movements construct and reconstruct places in line with their challenges to the status quo” (p. 258). The status quo in this case was simply that some lands are national park lands and others are BLM lands. Those nonpark BLM lands are reasonably/legally available for development, in this case oil and gas development. As we will see in the next section, *Peaceful Uprising* and their supporters, including favorable media coverage, worked to interrupt that status quo and to instead reinvision the happenings on nonpark lands as directly impacting the parks themselves, thereby making park-adjacent lands unsuitable for development.

### **Writing About the Parcels—Reconstructing Space**

The use of place-based rhetoric—verbal and visual invocations of place—was the fulcrum for the very being of *Peaceful Uprising*. DeChristopher’s decision to bid (and his subsequent arrest and prosecution) was based on his desire to protect park-adjacent lands from imminent gas and oil exploration and development. Invocations of those lands and the harms that would befall their intrinsic value were a constant refrain in the build-up and performance of protest. To this point, DeChristopher emphasized not just the impacts of extraction on the lands themselves but also the eventual “costs of health care and global-warming mitigation” should overreliance on fossil fuels continue (Vick, 2009). The very idea of protecting those lands, otherwise unsullied by “big oil,” animated the

protest/ers.

As DeChristopher's story broke in the media, a number of sympathetic—or at least descriptive—accounts were published telling his story. In this section I analyze three different characterizations of these park-adjacent lands as they were presented in the media. Each of these depictions, as in place-based rhetoric, “rely less on physical presence” in the parks or parcels and instead work to evoke “non-physically present places” through language and argument (Endres & Senda-Cook, 2011, p. 265). As verbal descriptions that work to evoke memory and imagination about the BLM parcels under consideration, these mediated accounts contribute to the rhetorical construction of space in and near national parks as scenic, sensitive, and pristine. These accounts are all pulled from media coverage beginning in early 2009, as major outlets picked up DeChristopher's story, and running into 2011 as his trial(s) proceeded. It is worth noting that these are representative examples of the language used to frame these lands. In the age of the Associated Press, many stories in various outlets ended up using exact, or near exact, verbiage in their accounts. The point of this analysis is not simply to show the number of times specific turns of phrase or characterizations of place found their way into print but instead to argue that the media coverage of DeChristopher's arrest and trials contributed to the invention of collectivity through these reimagined notions of the parcels as park-adjacent lands worthy of the same protections and spatial practices applied to park lands. This was done by continuously constructing the parcels as similar to park lands and deserving of the same protections as the parks themselves based on their scenery, sensitivity, and pristine nature. While I support the rhetorical construction of the lands as scenic and of development having deleterious effects on the scenic nature

of both the parks and park-adjacent parcels, I take issue with mediated characterizations of the lands as sensitive and pristine. In what follows I interrogate the rhetorical construction of the parcels in news media.

**Rhetorically inventing the scenic vista.** The BLM parcels under contest at the 2008 auction were rhetorically reconstructed as important to the proper scenic appreciation of the parks themselves. Just as your neighbor's trash heap disrupts your scenic view, so too would oil and gas exploration on nearby lands impinge upon the scenic value of national parks. One significant way these arguments were constructed was to build a framework to remind the reader that what happened on these adjacent parcels would impact national park goers. Sands and Magill (2009) wrote for *Platts Inside Energy* that one of the major bases for early complaints about putting these lands up for lease for the first time ever was that "development would harm air quality and scenic views in two nearby national parks": Arches National Park and Canyonlands National Park. Similarly, Repanshek (2008), writing for the National Parks Traveler website, noted that it would be possible to see drilling rigs from Delicate Arch—the crown jewel of Arches National Park—if the leases and exploration moved forward (see also, Park Rangers for Our Lands, n.d.). Even though those drilling rigs would be physically outside of actual park lands, the scenic experience of the park would be qualitatively diminished should the specter of the rig appear, especially in iconic places such as Delicate Arch.

In these arguments we see that the politics of park space—meant for recreation and visual enjoyment—was harmed by the semibounded nature of the place in the indistinguishable boundary between park and nonpark land. Existing outside of the

semibounded actual place of the parks, these parcels are not visibly distinguishable enough from the parks to exclude them from the visual protections provided to the parks themselves, though their legal protections do not extend so far. While the limits and bounds of park lands are apparent in government and survey documents, there is nothing to delineate what counts as park land to visitors. No wall, fence, or other visual feature telling visitors where to stop looking. There are, however, plenty of indicators of when and where to look. Driving into national parks, welcome signs herald the beginning of the experience, even when the park entrance is visually similar to the land around it. The welcome sign indicates the beginning of the park experience. Similarly, “scenic overlook,” “scenic view,” and “photo opportunity” signs direct visitors to vistas, thereby prioritizing some acts of gazing and spatial appreciation above others (see K. M. DeLuca & Demo, 2000).

When it comes to interrupting scenic views, whether inside or outside of the national parks, K. M. DeLuca and Demo (2000) argue that images do not simply represent nature, but create it. Just as Half Dome in Yosemite is constructed as an “icon of pristine wilderness” through the “confluence of multiple discourses,” so too were the lands made available by the BLM for oil/gas leases re/constructed rhetorically as scenic icons in danger of degradation (p. 244). This argument is developed in two ways. First, media coverage revealed a sense of panic in potentially interrupting these scenic views with big oil equipment. As Repanshek (2008) wrote, “should one day the views through Delicate Arch and other ‘windows’ in the park be of drilling rigs?” The images of Delicate Arch that circulate, not only in the public imagination but also notably on the Utah quarter in your pocket, would be remade if the leases went forward. That

eventuality was deemed in the media coverage as unacceptable because not only would oil development arguably damage air quality and possibly even the many “delicate” arches themselves, but also hinder the iconic scenery beheld at a place as notable as Delicate Arch.

Second, media coverage argued that the only way to ensure that what happens on neighboring lands does not disrupt park goes is to give those lands the protections afforded to the parks themselves. Beyond arguing that “air quality and scenic views” as mentioned previously would be harmed, others noted that the precarious, often delicate natural features of adjacent parks would be “endangered by drilling” in the parcels (Vick, 2009). The argument, then, suggests that in order to preserve the value of parks as places, we must also secure the value of adjacent lands. One more voice in the confluence about what it means to “preserve” lands for their scenic value is DeChristopher and Peaceful Uprising as they construct park-adjacent lands in Utah as pristine and valuable beyond the economic potential of their subterranean natural resources. After his arrest, DeChristopher recalled that he took an economics final exam on the day of the auction that included a question asking about the “true cost” of leases like those offered by BLM (Vick, 2009). He was focused then, during the auction, not only on raising the overall price of the parcels to reach closer to the “true cost,” but also on recognizing the environmental toll that the development would create. This collective insistence that the parcels were part of the scenic value of park lands represents one way that media coverage of the movement rhetorically reimagined this place such that it would fall within the spatial practices afforded to national parks.

**Rhetorically inventing *sensitive* lands.** Beyond declaring BLM parcels worthy

of protection based on their proximity to the parks and the visual impact that development would have in those close quarters, the parcels were also problematically rhetorically constructed as environmentally sensitive. This is another attempt to reframe what it means to be adjacent to similar park lands that have a protective order over them. In arguing that the lands need protection based on their “sensitive” nature (sensitivity was never explicitly defined or quantified in the news accounts), we see another example of how the media coverage claimed the umbrella protections afforded to parks for these park-adjacent parcels. By constructing adjacent parcels as sensitive places just like their nearby park neighbors, the place-based rhetoric in media coverage articulated the parcel lands with park lands, and therefore also with the typical definition of park land as sensitive and in need of protection (National Park Service, 2006, 2015c). In this section, I demonstrate how media coverage rhetorically constructed the BLM parcels as sensitive in a non-specific manner that encouraged the reader to enthymematically assume a parallel between “sensitivity” and “needing protection.” This collective invocation demands that the reader view the nonpark parcels as places that should remain undeveloped by asking that those parcels be afforded the same protections as registered park lands.

Magill’s (2009c) article in *Platts Oilgram News* provides an example of this argument, writing: “Environmental groups complained that the sale, held in the closing days of the George W. Bush administration, improperly included parcels near Arches and Canyonlands National Parks, Dinosaur National Monument and other environmentally sensitive places.” In this article we see that it was the proximity itself, the nearness to bounded park lands that drew the attention of environmental groups. Because the lands are physically proximal, the argument goes, the sensitivity of the lands bordering the



parcels must be taken into consideration when making development decisions. At no point is it made clear what exactly it means to be sensitive. Johnson (2011b) tempered the argument in his article for *The New York Times*, referring to the “perceived risk to sensitive lands in southern Utah.” This construction also does not define what it means to be sensitive and allows environmental risk to become a perceptual problem rather than a scientific one.

Further complicating this characterization of lands as “sensitive,” Magill penned a description of the relationship between the Department of the Interior and BLM in the wake of removing lands from the auction block. He wrote in *Platts Oilgram News* that the Department of the Interior will now “issue guidance to assist BLM officials in making leasing decisions on lands that are near parks and other sensitive landscapes, including parcels that have wilderness characteristics or other values that may not be consistent with oil and gas development” (2009c). In this argument, parks, lands proximate to parks, and other sensitive lands all require the same type of treatment. While the previous two characterizations of the land as sensitive both seemed to indicate that the parcels themselves were only *near* sensitive lands (i.e., parks), they were not explicitly labeled as sensitive themselves. In this piece though, Magill suggests that BLM acknowledges sensitivity not just in park lands but recognizes “other sensitive landscapes” that may not already be protected by park restrictions. The lack of definitional surety about what it means for lands to be sensitive allows the argument to be made that the park-adjacent parcels are both sensitive and in need of protection. Reading further into Magill’s quote, it is unclear exactly what makes a parcel “consistent” with oil and gas development, except that lands with “wilderness characteristics” and “other values” are inherently

inconsistent. The connotation here is that only unvalued or not valued land should be eligible for development, but it is unclear what that land might look like. Even in attempting to read between the lines of this cooperation between the Department of the Interior and BLM, it is unclear what sensitive lands are and how they are best treated. Reading further for “wilderness characteristics,” we see that “wilderness” is often conflated with “uninhabited.” Protecting lands with “wilderness characteristics” from development then leaves only “habited” lands, which are likely always/already inconsistent with resource development. This definition of “wilderness” was constructed in the Wilderness Act of 1964: “A wilderness in contrast with those areas where man and his works dominate the landscape, is hereby recognized as an area where the earth and its community of life are untrammelled by man, where man himself is a visitor who does not remain” (Wilderness.net, n.d.). In the end, while it may have been productive to frame the lands as sensitive from the standpoint of rhetorically inventing collectivity, readers and participants were led to make wholesale assumptions about what sensitive lands are and how best to protect them.

**Rhetorically inventing *pristine* . . . and exploited lands.** Another problematic rhetorical frame used to describe the park-adjacent space was “pristine.” Much like wilderness, “pristine” assumes a place untouched by humans. This human disconnect has been ingrained in culture and policy as K. M. DeLuca and Demo (2000) note: “Viewing nature as pristine wilderness apart from humanity becomes cultural convention and environmental policy” (p. 254). Wilderness is seen as an area unsullied, perfect, and in its original shape; of course, this ideal is also impossible. Even if, somehow, there were a place unexplored by any human ever, it would still be touched by air pollution, runoff,

and climate issues all caused by industry and development. Still, we see another frame that turns “sensitive” lands into “pristine” and attempts to capitalize on the proximity to national park lands as a way to sneak them under the umbrella of protected park space.

Eilperin (2009) described the BLM parcels as “near pristine areas such as Nine Mile Canyon, Arches National Park and Dinosaur National Monument.” This characterization at least correctly marks the parcels as separate places: near the “pristine” but not quite pristine themselves. Yet Sands and Magill (2009) fail to distinguish a difference between park and nonpark spaces, instead claiming that the parcels are “pristine” in their summary of DeChristopher’s motive to stop “the exploitation of pristine wilderness for oil and gas development.” In this example, both “pristine” and “wilderness” are applied to the BLM parcels, which are nonpark spaces. In calling these places pristine, the implication emerges that some lands deserve to be or to remain pristine while others do not. The problem arises when the eye literally cannot see the difference, or boundary, between lands that deserve one set of protections or another.

To further complicate our understanding of park-adjacent lands as deserving of the same spatial practices of park lands, recall that it does not take the specter of a drilling rig to remind the National Park visitor that she—despite her best efforts—is still encapsulated in the capitalist system even when she seeks to commune with nature. Enter the quandary. The first reminder of capitalism is not the oil rig we see marring the scenic vista after a hike through the desert. We have never, in fact, left the spatial politics of capitalism behind. The traffic jams and crowded parking lots that greet us upon entering many parks during peak season remind us that we depend on oil production to (literally) fuel our ability to visit these places set aside for posterity. The well-manicured and

carefully maintained paths that direct us to “points of interest” throughout the park, though they may be built of native materials and appear natural, are one more reminder that our “adventures” through these wild places are always/already mapped out for us (K. M. DeLuca & Demo, 2000; M. Harvey, 2007; Senda-Cook, 2012, 2013; Sutter, 2007).

In this section we have seen how media coverage employs a variety of place-based arguments about the parcels that rhetorically and materially shift park-adjacent lands under the protective umbrella offered to national parks. This series of arguments attempted to reconstruct what it means to be spatially proximate to parks and posited that the spatial affordances of parks should be available to nearby, sensitive, pristine wilderness, or at least that what happens just across the park borders impacts the value of the parks themselves. Just as Endres and Senda-Cook (2011) argued that “space and place are socially constructed and imbued with meaning,” here we see an attempt to rewrite and reconstruct these meanings (p. 260). All of these park-adjacent lands were at one point or another, for one reason or another, bounded outside of the parks. Meaning was inscribed upon those lands at that point: they were nearby parks, but not parks themselves. Close but not protected. This series of Bush-era actions, auctions, BLM hearings, and DeChristopher’s decision to bid warranted—for some—a reinscription of meaning upon those lands. Where they were once close to, but not quite, parks, their materiality was reevaluated in the 2008-2011 time period such that they warranted rhetorical, if not legal, protections. In these actions, the meaning of the space itself was socially reconstructed by the actions of DeChristopher and the Peaceful Uprising movement.

### **Place-as-Rhetoric**

While the parcels were rhetorically constructed as places in need of protection through place-based rhetoric, urban spaces in the city became sites of collective action that reimagined otherwise mundane cityscapes as place-as-rhetoric. In this section I turn to Endres and Senda-Cook's (2011) notion of place-as-rhetoric to demonstrate the ways place was collectively invented, interrupted, and tactically questioned during Peaceful Uprising's urban protest events in Salt Lake City. As place and space are coconstituted, this section begins with a discussion of the spatial politics that envelop places of urban protest. Then, picking up two of Endres and Senda-Cook's three means by which movements use place tactically, I delve into the ways that Peaceful Uprising built on the "pre-existing meaning of a place" in their urban protest. This is followed by a discussion of how they "temporarily reconstructed" place in the city into a place for protest (p. 266). Finally, I discuss the use of music as a protest tactic that helps to reconstruct Utah as a place of protest.

### **Utah in Protest**

Utah is not likely to top a mental list of places where inhabitants are wont to stand up and revolt. Historically though, protest groundwork in Utah was laid by labor greats including Joe Hill of the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW) and Mother Jones of the United Mine Workers (UMW; Archives, n.d.; "Faces of Protest," 2015; Nichols, 1995). Public memory of the work of Hill and Jones is likely overshadowed by midcentury characterizations of the largely Mormon population of Utah as accepting the fallout from the nuclear test site in Nevada with "overwhelming docility" (Fradkin, 1989, pp. 11, 25).

The cultural practice of accepting as fact the word of authorities when they told locals not to worry about nuclear fallout had devastating consequences. I mention these consequences not to be flippant about a traumatic history, but to point out that this population has been framed as one so unlikely to protest that they have effectively been written out of history (Hayes, 1997; Perkins, 2006; Spangler, 2001; White, 1990).

### **Reconstructing Protest in Utah**

It was in that rather unwelcoming space that Peaceful Uprising took up the mantle of protest, pushing back against not only the State in its attempt to punish DeChristopher but also against powerful local/regional social norms that would silence protest as a genre. In this section I demonstrate the tactics that Peaceful Uprising used to push back against those spatial constraints and to reimagine Utah as a site of collective protest. First, as a way to “build on a pre-existing meaning of a place,” the Peaceful Uprising protesters encamped at the FSZ across the street from the Federal Courthouse (Endres & Senda-Cook, 2011, p. 259). The courthouse stands as a symbol of the State and judicial systems that protesters believed were wrongfully prosecuting DeChristopher. Holding protests at that site placed the protesters in close proximity to the trials with hopes that their protesting/singing voices could literally be heard inside the courtroom as the proceedings unfolded. The tactical move of holding the protest in that specific place also allowed the courthouse to be seen as the enemy or aggressor, one that they hoped to influence with their presence. Establishing the courthouse as a place of protest also helped to reframe it as a place where the decisions handed down from the courts could and should be protested. Rather than simply seeing the word of the judge as infallible, these protesters

took umbrage at the arrest and prosecution and found their voices of protest in the FSZ.

Additionally, Peaceful Uprising protesters took to the street to “temporarily reconstruct the meaning” of that place of transit (Endres & Senda-Cook, 2011, p. 259). They “reconstructed” the street in two events, each with a different approach and outcome. First, on the morning of February 28, 2011, they engaged in a long complicated march through the downtown streets of Salt Lake City leading protesters from Pioneer Park to the FSZ across from the Federal Courthouse. This (fully permitted and policed) interruption of traffic during the morning commute transformed routine transit into a waiting game as drivers were rerouted or were stuck waiting for the joyous, colorful, loud, singing marchers to proceed. The street was transformed from a place of quotidian commuting to one of celebratory protest.

Second, after DeChristopher’s sentence was handed down on July 26, 2011, Peaceful Uprising protesters once again took the streets to interrupt that space of transit. This time though, they were not there in a sanctioned capacity. Instead, they were out-of-place, acting as a rogue entity intent on drawing attention to their disgust with the outcome of the trial. In this nonpermitted, nonpolice-sanctioned flocking into the street, singing Peaceful Uprising protesters occupied a busy downtown intersection during afternoon rush hour. They spread themselves across car, bus, and light-rail paths, blocking traffic in all directions. Electing to be arrested and to stand demonstrably with DeChristopher, twenty-six protesters were removed peaceably from the street by city police and charged (Hollenhorst, 2011; Jensen, 2011b; Loomis, 2011; McEntee, 2011; Mims, 2011; O’Donoghue, 2011). These two similar, yet legally different, disruptions of the street as a place of commute versus protest reconstructed vital thoroughways into

alternate avenues of communication. Rather than transporting people quickly and seamlessly from home to work and back again, in these instances, city streets transported ideas and protest. They also demonstrated to otherwise uninvolved commuters that Salt Lake City is a place of protest, even if that demonstration caused annoyances and delays for those attempting to use city streets for their more ordinary purposes.

### **Singing Place in Protest**

Meanings of place were also “temporarily reconstructed” through song. Song became a medium through which images of ideal places and perceived environmental injustices were used to incite collective action. In this section I argue that song was used productively as a tactic of place-in-protest and as a means of interrupting what it means to protest in Utah. Beyond simply making the interruption, the song also acknowledges that the interruption was intentional and places singers as active producers of not only dissent but also place. In singing a modified version of Woody Guthrie’s “Union Maid,” Peaceful Uprising rhetorically inscribed a new value set on Utah as a place of protest. Notably, Utah is indeed a place where protest typically occurs. This song-based interruption signals not only a change in the meaning and performance of space (as open to protest) but it also heralds a shift in the embodiment of place-as-protest by specifically calling out and occupying place.

In their use, the song was retitled “Oh, You Can’t Scare Me” and replaced “union” with “movement.” The song itself was also condensed by cutting out the verses and simply changing the, also rewritten, repeated lines in the chorus. That means that a single repeat of the chorus-only song would go:



//Oh, you can't scare me,  
 I'm sticking with the movement  
 I'm sticking with the movement  
 I'm sticking with the movement  
 Oh, you can't scare me,  
 I'm sticking with the movement  
 I'm sticking with the movement  
 I'm sticking with the movement  
 'till we all breathe free//

This construction highlights movement priorities while also reinforcing articulation. By continuously repeating the line “I’m sticking with the movement,” the singer both reifies and performs her commitment, even when it gets scary as when being pulled off the street and arrested. The reiteration of these lyrics in protest at the FSZ enacts a spatial resistance and temporary reconstruction of place as one where collective action is reasonable, necessary, and resilient. Other repeated lines do more work to highlight the construction of place-in-protest. These include:

//I'm working for the planet//  
 //I'm singing at the Court House//  
 //I'm shouting in Exchange Place//  
 //We're rising up in Utah!//

Here we see each of these places reconfigured as places of protest. What are otherwise legal, urban, or state spaces have become sites of active resistance. These places have been reimaged as different from their typical workaday definitions and have lyrically become sites of protest. It is also notable that as each of these lines are repeated three times in two sets, “I” is the active and present individual while the collective does not enter until the final set of repeats when “we” are incredulously “rising up in Utah!” In the sung version, “Utah” is emphasized with questioning excitement and lucid disbelief, the tonal implications of this lyric indicates a shift in the politics of place. Moving away from the long-held idea that Utah is not a place for protest, this lyric instead asks, “Really? Are

you sure this is Utah? This is something that can be done in Utah?” And it answers its own question by asserting that indeed, protesters are rising up in Utah.

This continued, emphatic questioning of place works to reconstruct what it means to perform as a social actor in a place that is not usually associated with protest.

Continued repetition of specific place names including the Court House and Exchange Place serve to not only locate the protest in its place, but also to reconfigure what can be done in those places. It is not traditional to sing, shout, or rise up in any of those places. Yet Peaceful Uprising has lyrically positioned itself to perform each of them and in singing, has done each in sequence.

### **The Two-Prong Approach to Place**

In the previous two sections we have seen how Peaceful Uprising pursued both place-based rhetoric and place-as-rhetoric as tactics in their quest for climate justice. These park-adjacent parcels were, as Endres and Senda-Cook (2011) argued, “linked to systems of power that discourage protest” (p. 258). That power structure was evident in the rush to make the parcels available even before adequate environmental surveys and legal action were taken. Bringing the protests against this action into the city, setting up in the FSZ, aiming their protests at the Federal Courthouse, and shifting the conversation toward the locus of power enabled productive protest. Spotlighting the problem in the city brought about an entirely different politic of visibility—ready access to the media, obvious demonstration, intrusion on the routines of the local population—than a protest at the parcels themselves could ever bring about. It is difficult to engage in a protest of inconvenience—blocking traffic, legally or illegally—when there’s no one around. Here

we see how the use of place-as-rhetoric in the urban spaces of Salt Lake City helped to renegotiate the power center of the conversation, shifting the power away from the silencing practices used to keep the parcels themselves hidden and quiet per the place-based rhetoric of those park-adjacent lands.

It was the place-based rhetoric of the parcels that spurred the protests and brought people together. DeChristopher's bidding actions were aimed at protecting those lands and Peaceful Uprising took up his cause. For many, it was DeChristopher's bid to protect these park-adjacent lands that motivated their actions to collectivize. Protests at the parcels themselves weren't feasible, though, for all of the logistical, travel, and visibility reasons. The choice to move the protests to the city and focus on place-as-rhetoric not only decentered the power structure, it also provided the protesters with access. Simultaneously tracking place-based rhetoric and place-as-rhetoric allowed Peaceful Uprising to not only re-create the spatial value of the parcel lands from afar but also to firmly argue that Utah can be a place of protest. Not only is Utah a place where protest *can* happen, it is a place that deserves to be protected even if it takes protest to assert that right. In this approach, Peaceful Uprising has done more than simply revalue the park lands or show that protest can happen in Salt Lake City, they have made it clear that Utah is not docile or complacent any longer. They have demonstrated that illegal State actions will be noticed and acted upon even when the stakes are high and the course arduous.

### **Conclusion**

In this chapter I have worked to draw out, support, and link together Endres and Senda-Cook's notions of place-as-rhetoric and place-based rhetoric. In demonstrating that

these two ideas can work together in a single case study I have shown the rhetorical potential that exists in using both approaches simultaneously. The outcome of pursuing both place-based rhetoric and place-as-rhetoric was a mixed bag. If we were to talk in terms of wins and losses, Peaceful Uprising definitely “won” the case that nonpark lands deserve the valuation and protection provided to the parks themselves. Not only did they successfully make that case for most of the park-adjacent parcels in this auction, they effectively put BLM on notice by showing this arm of the State that their actions—legal, illegal, or simply of subterfuge—would not go unchecked. Peaceful Uprising helped establish the precedent that “new” parcels on the block for development would be questioned and must stand up to the government’s own established review process (for a more recent example of this questioning see Maffly, 2014).

On the other hand, while I maintain the argument that they helped to establish Utah as a place for protest and that future social movements will benefit from their work, the place-as-rhetoric tactics of Peaceful Uprising saw less immediate success. Taking the short view of a long-term problem like climate justice is possibly wrong-headed (especially when butting up against the judicial system), but the immediate gains of the place-based rhetoric tactic set the bar pretty high. If the more reasonable goal of the place-as-rhetoric tactical approach was to demonstrate unity with DeChristopher, to show that he had support and was not acting alone, then perhaps my measure of the implications of this tactic would be different. Also, someone more removed from the situation than I am might judge DeChristopher’s willing sacrifices as productive in reshaping protest in Utah, and that is what matters.

Finally, while there is still more work to be done in this area, I see the articulation

of the rhetorical invention of collectivity and place/space as a productive one. While it may be easy enough to say that we are willing, collectively as a society, to protect places where extraordinary things happen (the National September 11 Memorial and Museum is a good example of how we acted collectively—if through some dispute—about how to remember 9/11 via place), it is less easy to say that we protect places where seemingly nothing occurs. Those parcels were government land but not in the parks. They were unproductive at least on paper, and yet their spatial politics made them important enough to warrant collectivizing.

## CHAPTER 6

### CONCLUSION

The case of Tim DeChristopher and Peaceful Uprising provided an incredible opportunity to observe the rhetorical invention of collectivity in real time. DeChristopher's personal decision to bid on the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) parcels as an act of civil disobedience in an attempt to intervene on behalf of climate justice launched the birth of a social movement organization. That small, locally oriented group of individuals chose to stand beside DeChristopher in his quest for climate justice and in the process they got to take on the federal government and big oil together.

The case also afforded a chance to see how the State then chose to deal with DeChristopher's criminality. Even when there was enough financial support from like-minded others pay for the parcels, DeChristopher was prevented from paying and attempting to decriminalize his actions. Even though many of the parcels DeChristopher purchased were eventually rescinded after the sale due to illegal State action, he was still prosecuted to the fullest extent. We saw that the judge in the case expressly made an example of DeChristopher in order to discourage others from following in his illegal footsteps.

At the same time that DeChristopher was being tried and sentenced inside the Federal Courthouse, this case also provided an opportunity to see how local law

enforcement dealt with the protest actions of Peaceful Uprising on the street. Navigating the permitting process to march through the streets, obtaining and retaining access to the Free Speech Zone (FSZ), affixing themselves to the courthouse steps, and eventually moving illegally into the street to protest, we saw how local law enforcement dealt with nonviolent protesters in a post-9/11 era. That included the arrest of twenty-six of DeChristopher's followers who were intentionally arrested in order to demonstrate that he was not alone and that the federal judge did not dissuade them in their desire for climate justice.

In the end, with all of its entanglements and intricacies, this case delivered an opportunity both to observe the origination of an environmental social movement and to see it work its way through the rhetorical invention of collectivity in real time. In the primary findings section of this chapter I review the original research questions that animated this project and discuss how each question was addressed in the chapters. Then I work through the contributions this research has made to scholarship. Next I outline lessons learned, especially as they relate to future environmental movement work. The discussion rounds out with implications and areas for future study.

### **Primary Findings**

In the opening chapter I introduced three research questions that drove my work and curiosity on this project. Here I reopen a discussion of those questions and review how they were addressed in the case study chapters. This conversation breaks down into two basic sections. Questions one and two are primarily addressed in Chapters 3 and 4 while Chapter 5 is devoted to question three.

Research question one asked, how does affect aid in initial moments of collectivity and act as an adherent that keeps members invested? In Chapter 3 I argued that DeChristopher's supporters participated affectively in becoming-Bidder 70. While they will never quite *be* Bidder 70, neither will they be able to fully return to their previously known personhood. The process of becoming has changed them affectively, ideologically, and experientially. No longer inside and not quite outside of themselves, they perform a third position of hopeful resistance. This third position shatters binaries of inside/outside, war machine/State. It necessarily ruptures the notion of an either/or position, demanding instead that we see individuals and relations from a both and, and, and . . . perspective. In being both a citizen and an environmentalist, DeChristopher demonstrates the liminality of identity production and performance. This becoming was not only an impetus to collectivize but also an investment that kept members working for the cause. Similarly, in Chapter 4 we saw that the use of music in the machine of mobilization also had an affective impact in getting people involved as well as helping them to maintain their interest and commitment to the cause. When DeChristopher declared "we will be a movement when we sing like a movement," he not only challenged his Peaceful Uprising followers, he also framed his vision of what it means to be a real movement. He envisioned a movement that communicated through song while also articulating with centuries of singing tradition in social movements. To that end, I argued that redeploying long-used social movement songs presented an affective citational pull in group singing as members were asked to identify with both the historical and present-day affect found in those songs. Rewriting familiar songs with new lyrics also aided in heightening affective potential by integrating the singers and their personal



experiences into the already moving songs.

Research question two asked, in what ways are rhetorical instances of collectivity impacted by and related to bodies? While we discussed the affective importance of becoming above, becoming is also an embodied practice. Becoming-Bidder 70 is most apparently tactical in its embodied performance on the street. Taking Bidder 70 to the street made visible a personal or machinic becoming that is not inherently visible. Outside of the space of protest, becoming-Bidder 70 does not necessarily carry physical markers. It is an ideological becoming after all, one with physical manifestations in protest but without physical change in personal appearance (we might call this an incorporeal transformation consistent with the assemblage of enunciation discussed in other chapters). When becoming-Bidder 70 is performed in private, behind closed doors, there is no clear exterior evidence of that becoming, but when taken to the street, this becoming is far more than an individual event, it is a tactic. This becoming, like their other tactics, was a nonviolent, embodied method of protest that Peaceful Uprising employed in order to declare their lineage in nonviolent movements. They took that stance even though they found bodies to be imperiled by climate justice and further at risk because of changes to the State system post-9/11.

Affect and embodiment were shown to be intertwined in Chapter 4 as I argued that the practice of group singing provided affective connections and a shared language among the protesters. This intertwining reinforces the argument that music is indeed a communicative rhetorical act and adds the importance of embodied experience to the situation. This embodiment is a major factor in music's endurance as a protest tactic given that it operates at the confluence of music and bodies. Group singing, as an

embodied and performative experience, positions music as the material and affective glue that cocreates the group. In singing together, members of the movement create not only the music but also the affect of the group, and this experience is both material and pleasurable. Even though the actions of the protesters were not going to immediately influence the trials, protesters were empowered to believe that they could still make a difference. And, while hopeful affect articulated protesters to the machine of mobilization, initially it was the durability of that affect that helped them remain steadfast with the collective even when the news from the courtroom was bad. The embodied experience of group singing drove home the rhetorical invention of collectivity for this group. Not only did they have a purpose to fight for, they also had a common language to use in expressing their discontent.

Research question three asked, in what ways do rhetorics of place and space function in the rhetorical invention of collectivity? This question was taken up specifically in Chapter 5. In that chapter I argue that place—in the ways protest was performed both *in* and *about* place—plays a critical role in the invention of collectivity. Many of the ideas about place and space in that chapter are conceptualized and driven by mediated accounts of the park-adjacent parcels and DeChristopher's decision to bid. These news accounts became an integral part of the rhetoric of collectivity for Peaceful Uprising after DeChristopher's arrest as they allow readers to see themselves as agents in speaking for the land, protecting that which cannot protect itself. This agency begets collectivity. The idea that place/space is important and threatened motivated DeChristopher's decision to bid and activated the collectivization of the movement. By continuously constructing the parcels as similar to park lands and deserving of the same

protections as the parks themselves based on their scenery, sensitivity, and pristine nature, the mediated accounts contribute to the invention of collectivity through these reimagined notions of the parcels as park-adjacent lands worthy of the same protections and spatial practices applied to park lands. So we see that rhetorics of place and space became the fulcrum on which the rhetorical invention of collectivity balanced in this case.

Finally, while there is still more work to be done in this area, I see the articulation of the rhetorical invention of collectivity and place/space as a productive one. While it may be easy enough to say that we are willing, collectively as a society, to protect places where extraordinary things happen (the National September 11 Memorial and Museum is a good example of how we acted collectively—if through some dispute—about how to remember 9/11 via place), it is less easy to say that we protect places where seemingly nothing occurs. Those parcels were government land but not in the parks, they were unproductive at least on paper, and yet their spatial politics made them important enough to warrant collectivizing.

### **Contributions to Literature**

To briefly recap the main contributions made to literature in this study I will begin here with the rhetorical invention of collectivity. We all too often overlook the moments and actions that germinate into social movements. Focusing on the invention of that collectivity and the rhetoric that spawned the movement can be instructive in terms of why and how movements grow. In Chapter 3 I discussed those collective moments when the potential for tactical leverage exists in the liminal position between the war machine

and the State. In this case, adapting to post-9/11 conditions that were particularly harsh on civil disobedience or anti-State actions proved vital in creating the situations in which Peaceful Uprising was allowed to voice their dissent in embodied and public ways.

Another key takeaway here is that music—especially in its relationships with citationality and affect—is a critical component in rhetorically inventing social movements. Finally, this case study of a localized environmental movement shows us at a base level that we are not done advocating and protesting for the environment. Indeed, I demonstrate how the environment can be a spur for the rhetorical invention of collectivity and how Endres and Senda-Cook's (2011) ideas of place-based rhetoric and place-as-rhetoric can productively function together in a single case study.

### **The Rhetoric of Dissent in a Post-9/11 Environment**

Dissent is an important part of our American democracy. The legal right to disagree with the government and to take a stand when the situation calls for it remains a vital, if controversial, American right (Ivie, 2005). In Chapter 3 I demonstrated some of the myriad ways that public enactment of dissent and the use of free speech to protest the government was altered in response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Those changes, including the USA PATRIOT Act and the confinement of protesters to FSZs, directly impact the rhetorical invention of collectivity and the expression of ideas for social protesters. Protesters' ability to be seen and heard publicly has been restricted both legally and spatially. In response to those restrictions, Peaceful Uprising developed a variety of tactics directed at circumventing the strategies of the State. By choosing to obtain permits to march legally through the streets, garnering the appropriate paperwork

to secure their space in the FSZ, and then choosing to forego the use of amplification in that FSZ when noise complaints threatened their use of free speech in that designated space, Peaceful Uprising chose tactics that demonstrated their peacefulness, responsibility toward otherwise hostile neighbors, and their willingness to play by the rules. They also employed tactics of embodied performance, group singing, and continued group presence as a means of demonstrating that their cause was worthwhile and that DeChristopher was not a rogue actor in his quest for climate justice.

Throughout this dissertation I have discussed the various ways that Peaceful Uprising worked within those legal confines to express their displeasure at State action and how they subsequently chose to step outside of the law in support of DeChristopher. Additionally, this particular machine of mobilization gives us a static view of how a single local environmental group chose to navigate the rhetorical invention of their own collectivity as they grew from a handful of DeChristopher's friends, family, and supporters immediately after the auction into a larger network of people willing to sacrifice their time and energies to demonstrate for his cause. That work contributes to literature in the rhetoric of social movements, free speech, and post-9/11 discourse. Focusing on the rhetorical invention of collectivity speaks to how contemporary social movements find their spark and grow. Limitations to free speech and peaceful protest put in place with the USA PATRIOT Act impinge upon citizens' first amendment rights and Peaceful Uprising had to work within a new set of strictures to make their voices heard. As the State has adapted to post-9/11 contexts in its judicial practices so too must protesters tailor their tactics to meet shifting State demands.

## Revisiting Music in Social Movements

Music remains one of the few constants in social movements. Causes and actors change over time, but somehow the music stays largely the same. In examining Peaceful Uprisings intentional choice to tactically employ group singing in their demonstrations, I consider Chapter 4 to be a contribution to the literature not only of social movements but also most especially to the niche focused on the music of movements. That contribution comes in three unique parts: 1) citationality, 2) affect, and 3) the use of music in the rhetorical invention of collectivity.

**Music as citational.** The music of any given social movement is often drawn from the same songbook, regardless of era or cause. While it may seem like there is little invention in movement music, the actual purpose of recycling those songs is citational. According to Derrida, citationality occurs when a word “cites, re-cites, and makes legible” other uses of the word (Derrida, 1983, p. 98). And in its use by Butler, “citation” similarly evokes the performative nature of words and meaning such that deployment of a citational signifier calls forth previous meanings of the sign (Butler, 1990). In this case, beyond a single word or sign, Peaceful Uprising re-cited whole repertoires of songs from other eras and struggles, including the Civil Rights era and the labor movement. The very repetition of these songs in the modern era, and in largely unrelated contexts, reminds the performer of previous iterations of, in this case, lyrics that spoke to historical social movements. Peaceful Uprising manifests articulations with historical machines of mobilization and previous cultural struggle by citing and redeploying historical movement songs in a modern context. This reiterative articulation served the purpose of insisting on the seriousness of the occasion. Indelibly linked to the struggles of the Civil

Rights era, “We Shall Overcome” carries signifiers that are not lightly deployed in any context. As a well-known and often-cited movement, the Civil Rights era and its songs are redeployed to link the affective commitment of a long-haul struggle with great sacrifice against inequality. In calling forth the previous meanings of the historical iterations of songs like “This Little Light of Mine,” “Have You Been to Jail for Justice,” “If I Had a Hammer,” “This Land is Your Land,” and “Blowin’ In the Wind,” Peaceful Uprising calls on not only the citational *meaning* of these songs but also on their citational affect. Participants are implicitly asked to sense the world around them in a similar fashion as the original performers of those songs. In this case study we see that citationality serves to link the movement with historical struggles by re-citing their words and lyrics in order to legitimize the work that Peaceful Uprising was doing. At the same time, those re-citations also redeploy and make legible to a new generation of songful agitators that protest music is a common language.

**Music as affective.** Citationality and affect flow together through music. One of my goals was to demonstrate that while music has been viewed from a variety of lenses in the rhetoric of social movements, extant works have not thoroughly grappled with the affective nature of music in social movements. While many have studied the role of music in social movements (Beebee, 1991; Carter, 1980; Drewett, 2007; Dunlap, 2006; Francesconi, 1986; Hurner, 2006; Kizer, 1983; Knupp, 1981; Kosokoff & Carmichael, 1970; Mondak, 1988; Rodnitzky, 1971, 1999; Sanger, 1995, 1997; Weinstein, 2006) and others have argued that music is affective (DeChaine, 2002; Deleuze & Guattari, 2000; Frith, 1996; Hemment, 2004), there is no prior research that connects the dots and understands that it is the affective potential of music that makes it an important tool for

social movements. In this research I draw out those connections and demonstrate further that customizing some of the standard social movement songs with contemporary ideas or specific language helped to situate protesters affectively.

**Music as a tool in the rhetoric of invention of collectivity.** A final contribution to the literature on the music of social movements resulted from witnessing how a local environmental group chose their musical voice as they rhetorically invented their own collectivity. From the beginning, and stemming from the desires of DeChristopher himself, this movement chose to sing. Following the imperative: “We will be a movement when we sing like a movement,” they developed their songbook, planned a Revolution Sing-Along, and allied themselves with Peter Yarrow who had been singing his way to justice for over fifty years. They chose to make music the citational and affective hinge upon which their protest actions and planetary ambitions swung. Seeing firsthand the ways in which they chose to practice their songs, develop and change their songbook, and then disseminate and use their material consistently throughout their protest actions—favoring singing over chanting, speech making, or even chatting—I got to see how that particular rhetorical invention impacted their eventual collectivity and effectiveness on the ground during protest actions.

### **Vitality of Place/Space in Social Movements**

Environmental protection and climate justice animated not only this entire dissertation but also clearly the existence and work of Peaceful Uprising. While seemingly unassuming park-adjacent parcels sparked the entire rhetorical invention of collectivity in this case, rhetorical and environmental studies scholars alike can find value



in this work. Two major contributions to literature that came about in Chapter 5 were 1) demonstrating that ideas of place and space impact and motivate the rhetorical invention of collectivity, and 2) linking directly Endres and Senda-Cook's (2011) ideas of place-based rhetoric and place-as-rhetoric in a single case study.

**Placing the rhetorical invention of collectivity.** In the beginning of Chapter 5 I argued that what remains under-theorized in the rhetorical canon is how the ideas of place and space impact and motivate the rhetorical invention of collectivity. Existing work demonstrates the importance of place in public memory. Whether addressing particular public places where events requiring memory happened such as battles, historical speeches, tragic events (Dickinson, 1997), or specific structures erected for the purpose of collecting memories such as museums and memorials (Blair, 1999, 2001; Blair et al., 1991; Blair & Michel, 2000, 2007; Dickinson et al., 2010, 2005, 2006, 2013; B. C. Taylor, 2010; Zagacki & Gallagher, 2009), most of the rhetorical work on place and collectivity addresses a specific past. Saying, in effect, let us gather here where we can recall and pay homage to specific events, people, ideas, and even industries. My argument though is that place also has a vital impact on the rhetoric of collectivity in the present and future tenses. As in, we should gather our efforts around this place *now* in order to protect it for the *future*. Ideas of place were circulated, in this case, largely through mediated (mostly newspaper) accounts that presented the parcels as places in need of protection. Peaceful Uprising was able to capitalize on this shaping of the parcels and to inform their own rhetorical invention of collectivity through the use of tactics and song lyrics that contested place. In that way, these remote, park-adjacent parcels spurred the actions of DeChristopher and the rhetorical inventions of collectivity that Peaceful

Uprising used to present the parcels as valuable. I see the articulation of the rhetorical invention of collectivity and place/space as a productive one. This case also demonstrates that place/space can spark collectivity even when the place itself is not particularly notable for its historical impact, collective memory, or community sentiment. Developing collectivity around remote, non-human-inhabited lands shows the power of place/space to generate the rhetorical invention of collectivity.

**Holding together place-based rhetoric and place-as-rhetoric.** A specific contribution to theory arises from putting place-based rhetoric and place-as-rhetoric in direct conversation. When Endres and Senda-Cook (2011) developed this phrasing they did so using separate movement activities to elucidate their points. In Chapter 5 I employed those theoretical concepts together in examining a single case study. Peaceful Uprising simultaneously worked to rhetorically reshape the meaning of space in park-adjacent BLM parcels (place-based rhetoric) while also reconstructing urban spaces of protest in Salt Lake City (place-as-rhetoric). Their dual approach to protest not only attempted to protect the parcels from gas and oil exploration and potential development, but to also support DeChristopher through his trials as he sacrificed his own freedom for climate justice. Through their work on two geographically separate fronts, Peaceful Uprising managed to engage park-adjacent parcels as an idealized, even mythical form of place-based rhetoric, while simultaneously reinventing the spatial meanings of protest in Utah. While this was, to be sure, a unique movement granting that opportunity, I find it important to see how place-as-rhetoric and place-based rhetoric work together in concert and inform one another in a specific example.

### Lessons Learned

As I write this, American president Donald Trump has just withdrawn the nation from the Paris Climate Accord (Shear, 2017; “Trump climate agreement,” 2017). It is increasingly apparent that a safe and healthy environment is not a right but something that citizens must demand. History has taught us that those demands are largely made through organizing and social movement action. Now, as ever, it remains of vital importance that we examine the rhetoric of environmental movements not just for interest in their organizing but in hope for the planet. One of Peaceful Uprising’s core demands was for a “liveable future,” which they hoped to attain through climate justice (Peaceful Uprising, n.d.-a). Regardless of the means, attaining the end of a livable future is vital. I see my work on this local environmental movement providing a voice that might otherwise be lost in the mainstream melee. Having covered the important findings and contributions to literature, we should also consider some of the pragmatic lessons learned along the way especially as they relate to environmental movements.

**Protecting distant environs.** When arguments are made for preserving particular tracts of land there is usually an emphasis on the importance of that particular area. Perhaps it is undeveloped but highly visible and developing it will impede the day-to-day enjoyment of the permanent neighbors (as in the case of energy producing windmills). Maybe that land has sacred value, or is of particular historical importance to the local community. Very little of that discussion pertains to why these particular park-adjacent parcels were singled out for preservation. These seemingly nonproductive tracts were located in largely remote wilderness areas and they had already been deemed as unworthy of inclusion in the parks themselves when those boundaries were initially

mapped out. The work of Peaceful Uprising and their allies made tactical contributions that may prove useful to future movements in their successful protection of these remote lands. Again, especially as we see the Trump administration working to undermine climate protections and position jobs as more important than environment, there is a push to begin exploring and developing government land in the Western U.S. (Eilperin, 2017; Finley, 2016; Irvin, 2017; Robbins, 2017). In times of trouble we need to observe the successes of our predecessors, like Peaceful Uprising, and to learn from their tactics and successes.

**Environment as a spur for rhetoric of invention of collectivity.** Finally, and importantly, I had the opportunity to examine the rhetorical invention of collectivity within this particular environmental movement and to follow them as they took their dissent into the street. As we move forward with a climate in peril and an American administration apparently actively seeking to do harm, there are lessons to be learned here. Lessons about how a local movement can make a difference. Lessons about how actions on government-controlled land can be resisted, protested, and ultimately changed. We need to remember, as this case showed, that the government can make hasty and uninformed decisions (namely putting the parcels on the block without careful study) and that citizens can call them on those actions, demanding and obtaining change. There are also lessons about how even the most overlooked parcels in a state like Utah, which has an abundance of government-owned land, can be protected by citizens willing to pay attention and to raise their voices (Ballotpedia, n.d.; D. Johnson & Rejala, 2016; “Land Ownership,” n.d.). As we saw in this case, those voices can effectively form a collective, agitate for change, and develop tactics to deal with State roadblocks as they pursue

justice.

## **Implications and Areas for Future Study**

### **Collectivity and Social Movements**

Even though I consider this to be follow-up work on the studies promoted by McGee many decades ago, it is clear that the understanding of collectivity in social movements has not yet been exhausted (McGee, 2006). What I have worked to demonstrate here is that there remains a need to examine the rhetorical invention of collectivity—thereby also examining collectivity itself—in changing times. In many ways the “why?” of collectivity is still unanswered. What is it that drives movements to form and endure? Take for example the rise of the Black Lives Matter movement. This movement directly responds to the deaths of unarmed black Americans (largely men and boys) at the hands of State agents (largely police officers). To be sure, this is not a new problem, but the movement itself has only recently gained national traction and leverage (Altman, 2015; Cobb, 2016; The Movement for Black Lives, n.d.). There are lingering questions about what it was about the moment in time when that movement launched, the particular case/s involved, the national political setting, and the leaders that inspired the movement. Answers to these questions will tell us even more about the rhetorical invention of collectivity as a group took up a national issue.

Although Black Lives Matter has become a nationally recognized movement responding to pertinent cultural issues revolving around matters of life and death, there is a glaring (to my eye) lack of exasperation or movement around the fact that transwomen of color are the most vulnerable population in the U.S., with extremely high murder rates

and correspondingly low life expectancies of only 35 years (G. M. Johnson, 2017; Michaels, 2015; Pittman, 2015; Vincent, 2015). Transwomen of color are incredibly vulnerable and seem to be treated as an expendable part of the population. What is it about this group and this series of murders that has yet to warrant mass collectivity? I fully understand that answering the question is much more complicated than asking, that the politics of translife in America seem to be changing but these people are not yet safe and equal, and that transwomen of color live risky lives as triple minorities. I see these areas where collectivity may soon burgeon as productive sites of rhetorical invention. Asking questions about why there is not yet national recognition of the perilousness of life for transwomen of color, asking where such collectivity might come from, and then looking around for other issues that seem to lack agitation might illustrate how the rhetorical invention of collectivity succeeds or fails. Whether the movement is old or new, contemporary or historical, burgeoning or still quiet, rhetoricians and social movements scholars need to spend more energy on the rhetorical invention of collectivity. We owe it to social movement studies to carefully examine the seed of the movement in order to understand how it grows and prospers.

### **Affect and Social Movements**

As I discussed in Chapter 4, there has not yet been enough research on the function of affect within social movements in general and there certainly has not been enough attention paid to the affective use of music in protest settings. I argued in that chapter that this gap in the research is largely due to the limitations of methods traditionally employed by rhetorical and even musical scholars. Putting the researcher in

proximity with the movement whenever possible, asking them not only to see and record but also to experience and feel the action for themselves provides the opportunity to ask different questions and to gain first-person insight. With a growing rhetorical field of research using participatory, critical, and fieldwork based methods now is the time to continue to examine affect in the field and to make dual contributions to rhetoric and affect studies.

### **Music and Social Movements of Faith**

In calling for greater attention to fieldwork and affect I would be remiss to focus only on social movement studies even though that has been the focus of this dissertation. Consider, for example, the potential use of fieldwork to examine affect and music in religious settings. Specifically, Christian churches currently facing a dwindling congregation. Membership is aging and younger members are steadily turning away from the church. If I were a religious scholar or even one who turned a critical eye toward the relationship between music and culture, I would focus on the musical practices within a particular sect or congregation. Even if the message from the pulpit stayed the same, even if the religious practice, teachings, and documents remained unaltered, I might attempt to generate a bit more affirmative affect and see if music might have a binding effect with younger members in particular. A number of scholars have approached the broader area of religion and music but none have stepped into the realm of the affective potential of religious music (Abelman, 2006; Banjo & Williams, 2011; Bentley, 2012; Gormly, 2003; Harrison, 2005; Hatch, 2002; Jousmaki, 2011; Livengood & Book, 2004; Pauley, II, 2005; Radwan, 2004, 2006; Williams & Banjo, 2013). The critical point here is that if the

young faithful are becoming disenfranchised with the church and leaving the congregation, examining the potential for affect in music could become a heuristic approach to sparse membership rosters. Sometimes all it takes is that one particularly affective element to find (or remember) affect in the rest of the religious experience.

### **Music and Society**

Beyond the use of music in specifically targeted areas such as religion, I believe there is benefit in seeing further work interrogating the use of music as an articulatory affective practice. When music becomes affective and articulatory, I see major changes in the way people approach the world. Some of the work I presented here on group singing drew from what I would consider to be fandom literature. Consider sports fans. When soccer fans sing together affective articulation happens. It is not just my own experience telling me that but also other literatures that are approaching affect but not exploring it fully. They do everything but say the word. It is time for researchers studying the rhetoric of music to methodologically place themselves in a position to address affect. Assuming that affect and articulation can remain on the table as necessary components of rhetorical understandings of music, there are other areas that could benefit from a broader undertaking of the study of music. I will work through two examples here.

First, pop music offers a number of avenues for a broader understanding of cultural formations via studies in the rhetoric of music. Pop music is responsive to and reflective of what happens in culture. Consider the ongoing national conversation surrounding bullying, teen suicides, and queer/body shaming. A variety of interventions have been put in place to change the status quo and to work toward a future wherein



young Americans are not driven to a permanent solution (i.e., suicide) to a temporary and changeable situation (i.e., high school, bullying). Musicians entered this conversation using the tools at their command. P!nk's "Raise Your Glass" celebrated those who are "wrong in all the right ways," while Katy Perry's "Firework" takes things a little further. She sings: "You don't have to feel like a waste of space, you're original, cannot be replaced. If you only knew what the future holds, after the hurricane comes a rainbow." Bruno Mars reminded listeners, "You're amazing just the way you are." Notably, these songs appeared together in the Top 5 during the same week in 2010. Not only did these songs respond to the cultural impetus to shift the conversation toward acceptance, they did so in a very popular format.

Another example emerging from popular music that has me intrigued is the interrogation of the economy in general and economic crisis specifically. Andy Grammer's song "Keep Your Head Up" takes a generally optimistic tone. The song opens with a note about his general lack of money: "Income's breadcrumbs, I've been trying to survive." But the overall message and tone of his song is the recommendation to "keep your head up" and things will get better. Lorde's "Royals" takes a different tack on the economy, noting that she did not grow up rich and has few resources, but her lyrics more often reflect wildly luxuriant expenditures than her lived experience. She establishes in the beginning that she is from an under-resourced neighborhood: "I'm not proud of my address . . . no post code envy." But the chorus lists all of the resources that other songs/singers continue to flaunt. In the end, she does not care that she counts her "dollars on the way to the party" and does not have access to, among others, "gold teeth, Grey Goose, Maybach, jet planes." These two short examples provide different

perspectives on the economy, crisis, and economic class. There are many arguments left to be made about pop music, particularly as it relates to cultural shifts. The enormous, and generally young, listening audience of popular music is a demographic that retailers and politicians alike wish to reach. Aside from the instrumental uses of market research, a rhetorical approach to this music could help us more specifically attend to culture as it shifts.

### **Environment and Social Movements**

The role of environment in this case study also suggests that there is a need for further studies in environmental rhetorics. While a variety of studies about social movements are developing out of areas such as pollution, energy, not in my backyard (NIMBYism), and protections for specific sites or sacred lands (Allagui, 2014; Al-Rawi, 2014; Blair et al., 1991; Brady, 2011; K. M. DeLuca & Demo, 2000; Devine-Wright, 2009; Dickinson et al., 2010, 2006, 2013; Endres, 2009, 2012; Endres, Cozen, Barnett, O'Byrne, & Peterson, 2016; Endres & Senda-Cook, 2011; Hubbard & Hasian, Jr., 1998; Joosse, 2012; Oravec, 1981; Peeples, 2011; Porrovecchio, 2007; Rygg, 2012; Singer, 2011; J. Stewart & Dickinson, 2008; Swofford & Slattery, 2010; van der Horst, 2007; Waldo, 2012), there are none addressing remote, uninhabited areas like these BLM parcels. The fact that these park-adjacent tracts spurred a movement based on their visibility from popular destinations suggests that we have not yet exhausted the myriad reasons why we choose to collectivize to protect the environment. The greater case here is, of course, that any natural resources lying below the surface of these parcels should, for the good of the planet, remain below the surface. That is clear enough. In some ways

then, this case echoes the NIMBYism of those protesting the installation of windmills off the coast of Massachusetts as they were seen as disturbing the view (Follett, 2017; “Kennedy tries to halt windmills,” 2006). That view though was that of moneyed residents who preferred not to be party to the production of clean energy. That contradicts the view of these parcels on which the potential production of fossil fuels would only be seen by those intrepid outdoors enthusiasts who intentionally sought out the parks and then as a result were exposed to the visible production on the parcels. We see here the dual nature of collectivizing to protect the land and how that intersects with energy and climate justice. This suggests that there is room for future study of rhetorical inventions of collectivity within environmental movements specifically.

History has taught us that nothing worth achieving comes easily. It is our continuous job to ask if a livable planet is worth preserving and what we will do—personally and collectively—to protect it. We also know that humans are bound to make poor choices. In those moments we must stand together to repeal unjust laws, to remind legislators that they work for a populace not a corporation (though this is becoming ever more difficult as we see individual representatives reaping enormous personal profits from lobby groups, including big energy). It is time to hold the president responsible for his repeated promise to return the coal industry to greatness, even as we move toward more renewable and cleaner sources of power. We have seen the benefit to our own local environments made by initiatives such as those at the Environmental Protection Agency, where cleaner air and waterways were a direct result. The reducing, defunding, or shuttering of those kinds of governmental agencies directly harms both the environment and the people directly. While a few may profit greatly from a refund ability to conduct

their business without consequences for pollution, the communities around them will continue to suffer. In those moments, in our present and foreseeable future, we must find ways to collectively resist. Those movements will, I'm sure, be embodied, affectively song-filled, and place-driven as communities work against State barriers to create better lives.

## APPENDIX A


### BECOMING-BIDDER 70



Visual representations of becoming-Bidder 70. Photos taken during the trial rallies on 2/28/2011 and 7/26/2011. Author photos.

## APPENDIX B

### MAP OF BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT PARCELS



A 2008 map depicts Arches National Park and the surrounding area. The darkened areas represent the potential drilling areas as offered by BLM. Note that many of these parcels immediately touch or are in the direct vicinity of the park. Source: Repanshek, 2008.

## WORKS CITED

- Abdullah, A. (2012, January 2). Arab Spring could deliver more good news. *The Frontier Post*. Retrieved from <http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.lib.utah.edu/lnacui2api/api/version1/getDocCui?lni=54MD-NDS1-DY8G-X17W&csi=270944,270077,11059,8411&hl=t&hv=t&hnsd=f&hns=t&hgn=t&oc=00240&perma=true>
- Abelman, R. (2006). Without divine intervention: Contemporary Christian music radio and audience transference. *Journal of Media & Religion*, 5(4), 209–231. doi: 10.1207/s15328415jmr0504\_1
- Allagui, I. (2014). Waiting for spring: Arab resistance and change. *International Journal of Communication*, 8, 983–1007.
- Al-Rawi, A. K. (2014). The Arab Spring and online protests in Iraq. *International Journal of Communication*, 8, 916–942.
- Altman, A. (2010, March 8). Spotlight: Toyota hearings. *Time*. Retrieved from <http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1968086,00.html>
- Altman, A. (2015). TIME Person of the Year 2015 runner-up: Black Lives Matter. *Time*. Retrieved June 12, 2017, from <http://time.com/time-person-of-the-year-2015-runner-up-black-lives-matter/>
- Anderson, B. (2010). Modulating the excess of affect: Morale in a state of “total war.” In M. Gregg & G. J. Seigworth (Eds.), *The affect theory reader* (pp. 161–185). Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- Archives, U.S. (n.d.). The State of Utah vs. Joe Hill. Retrieved from <https://archives.utah.gov/digital/joe-hill.html>
- Ashenmacher, W. (2011, February 18). Hundreds demonstrate to support Wisconsin public employees. *St. Paul Pioneer Press*. St. Paul, MN. Retrieved from <http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.lib.utah.edu/lnacui2api/api/version1/getDocCui?lni=5270-FF41-JCB3-40R9&csi=270944,270077,11059,8411&hl=t&hv=t&hnsd=f&hns=t&hgn=t&oc=00240&perma=true>

- Aune, J. A. (2003). An historical materialist theory of rhetoric. *American Communication Journal*, 6(4), 1–20.
- Bailey, A. (2006). The rhetoric of music: A theoretical synthesis. *Rocky Mountain Communication Review*, 3(1), 20–35.
- Ballotpedia. (n.d.). Federal land ownership by state. Retrieved June 12, 2017, from [https://ballotpedia.org/Federal\\_land\\_ownership\\_by\\_state](https://ballotpedia.org/Federal_land_ownership_by_state)
- Banjo, O. O., & Williams, K. M. (2011). A house divided? Christian music in black and white. *Journal of Media & Religion*, 10(3), 115–137. doi: 10.1080/15348423.2011.599640
- Barajas, J. (2016, November 21). Police deploy water hoses, tear gas against Standing Rock protesters. *PBS NewsHour*. Retrieved from <http://www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown/police-deploy-water-hoses-tear-gas-against-standing-rock-protesters/>
- Bayton, M. (1993). Feminist musical practice: Problems and contradictions. In T. Bennett, S. Frith, L. Grossberg, J. Shepherd, & G. Turner (Eds.), *Rock and popular music: Politics, policies, institutions* (pp. 177–192). London: Routledge.
- Beebee, T. O. (1991). Ballad of the apocalypse: Another look at Bob Dylan’s “Hard Rain.” *Text & Performance Quarterly*, 11, 18–34.
- Bellas, C. M. (2012). The USA Patriot Act: Legislative (in) justice? *Homeland Security Review*, 6(3), 191–206.
- Benson, T. W., & Johnson, B. (1968). The rhetoric of resistance: Confrontation with the warmakers. *Today’s Speech*, 16(3), 35–42.
- Bentley, J. M. (2012). A uses and gratifications study of contemporary Christian radio web sites. *Journal of Radio & Audio Media*, 19(1), 2–16. doi: 10.1080/19376529.2012.667025
- Berman, P. (2011, October 17). Why I support Occupy Wall Street. *The New Republic*. Retrieved from <http://www.newrepublic.com/article/politics/96283/berman-ows-tk>
- Bitzer, L. F. (1968). The rhetorical situation. *Philosophy & Rhetoric*, 25, 1–14.
- Blair, C. (1999). Contemporary U.S. memorial sites as exemplars of rhetoric’s materiality. In J. Selzer & S. Crowley (Eds.), *Rhetorical Bodies* (pp. 16–57). Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.
- Blair, C. (2001). Reflections on criticism and bodies: Parables from public places. *Western Journal of Communication*, 65(3), 271–294.



- Blair, C., Dickinson, G., & Ott, B. L. (2010). Introduction: Rhetoric/memory/place. In G. Dickinson, C. Blair, & B. L. Ott (Eds.), *Places of public memory: The rhetoric of museums and memorials* (pp. 1–54). Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press.
- Blair, C., Jeppeson, M. S., & Pucci, E. (1991). Public memorializing in postmodernity: The Vietnam Veterans Memorial as prototype. *Quarterly Journal of Speech*, 77(3), 263.
- Blair, C., & Michel, N. (2000). Reproducing civil rights tactics: The rhetorical performances of the civil rights memorial. *Rhetoric Society Quarterly*, 30(2), 31–55. doi: 10.1080/02773940009391174
- Blair, C., & Michel, N. (2007). The AIDS memorial quilt and the contemporary culture of public commemoration. *Rhetoric & Public Affairs*, 10(4), 595–626.
- Booth, M. W. (1976). The art of words in songs. *Quarterly Journal of Speech*, 62(3), 242–250.
- Bovard, J. (2004, January 4). Quarantining dissent / How the Secret Service protects Bush from free speech. Retrieved from <http://www.sfgate.com/opinion/article/Quarantining-dissent-How-the-Secret-Service-2816927.php>
- Brady, M. J. (2011). Mediating indigenous voice in the museum: Narratives of place, land, and environment in new exhibition practice. *Environmental Communication*, 5(2), 202–220. doi: 10.1080/17524032.2011.562649
- Brennan, T. (2004). *The transmission of affect*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Brooks, R. D. (1970). Black power: The dimensions of a slogan. *Western Speech*, 34(2), 108–114.
- Brouwer, D. C. (2001). ACT-ing UP in congressional hearings. In R. Asen & D. C. Brouwer (Eds.), *Counterpublics and the State* (pp. 87–109). Albany, NY: SUNY Press.
- Butler, J. (1990). *Gender trouble: Feminism and the subversion of identity*. London: Routledge.
- Carmin, J. (1999). Voluntary associations, professional organisations and the environmental movement in the United States. *Environmental Politics*, 8(1), 101–121. doi: 10.1080/09644019908414440
- Carter, D. A. (1980). The industrial workers of the world and the rhetoric of song. *Quarterly Journal of Speech*, 66(4), 365–374.
- Cathcart, R. S. (1980). Defining social movements by their rhetorical form. *Central States Speech Journal*, 31(Winter), 267–273.

- Cathcart, R. S. (2006). Movements: Confrontation as rhetorical form. In C. E. Morris III & S. H. Browne (Eds.), *Readings on the rhetoric of social protest* (2nd ed., pp. 95–103). State College, PA: Strata Publishing.
- Charland, M. (1987). Constitutive rhetoric: The case of the People Quebecois. *The Quarterly Journal of Speech*, 73(2), 133–150.
- Chesebro, J. W. (1972). Rhetorical strategies of the radical-revolutionary. *Today's Speech*, 20(1), 37–48.
- Cloud, D. L. (1994). The materiality of discourse as oxymoron: A challenge to critical rhetoric. *Western Journal of Communication*, 58(3), 141–163.
- Cloud, D. L. (1999). The null persona: Race and the rhetoric of silence in the uprising of '34. *Rhetoric & Public Affairs*, 2(2), 177–209.
- Cloud, D. L. (2003). Beyond evil: Understanding power materially and rhetorically. *Rhetoric & Public Affairs*, 6(3), 531–538.
- Cobb, J. (2016, March 14). Where is Black Lives Matter headed? *The New Yorker*. Retrieved from <http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2016/03/14/where-is-black-lives-matter-headed>
- Corrigan, L. M., & Edgar, A. N. (2015). “Not just the levees broke”: Jazz vernacular and the rhetoric of the dispossessed in Spike Lee’s *When the Levees Broke*. *Communication & Critical/Cultural Studies*, 12(1), 83–101. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14791420.2014.995685>
- Coughlin, E. M., & Coughlin, C. E. (1973). Convention in petticoats: The Seneca Falls Declaration of Woman’s Rights. *Today's Speech*, 21(4), 17–23.
- Cox, J. R. (1974). Perspectives on rhetorical criticism of movements: Antiwar dissent, 1964-1970. *Western Speech*, 38(4), 254–268.
- Cox, J. R. (1990). On “interpreting” public discourse in post-modernity. *Western Journal of Speech Communication*, 54(3), 317–329.
- Cresswell, T. (1996). *In place/out of place: Geography, ideology, and transgression*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Cullen, S., & Sims, P. (2011, February 27). Capitol protests: Saturday’s gathering was largest so far at 70,000 plus; state budget crisis. *Wisconsin State Journal*, p. A1.
- Davis, G. F., McAdam, D., Scott, W. R., & Zald, M. N. (2005). *Social movements and organization theory*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
- de Certeau, M. (2002). *The practice of everyday life* (1st ed.). Berkeley: University of California Press.

- DeChaine, D. R. (2002). Affect and embodied understanding in musical experience. *Text and Performance Quarterly*, 22(2), 79–98. doi: 10.1080/10462930216609
- DeChristopher, T. (2011, July 28). Tim DeChristopher's statement to the court. Retrieved from <http://grist.org/climate-energy/2011-07-27-tim-dechristophers-statement-to-the-court/>
- DeChristopher, T. (2013, June 25). Interview by David Letterman [Tape recording]. *Late Show with David Letterman*. Retrieved from [http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=C\\_3a4aMv6Ig&feature=youtube\\_gdata\\_player](http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=C_3a4aMv6Ig&feature=youtube_gdata_player)
- Deleuze, G. (1995). *Negotiations, 1972-1990*. New York, NY: Columbia University Press.
- Deleuze, G., & Guattari, F. (2000). *A thousand plateaus: Capitalism and schizophrenia*. (B. Massumi, Trans.). Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Deleuze, G., & Guattari, F. (2009). *Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and schizophrenia*. New York: Penguin Classics.
- DeLuca, K., Lawson, S., & Sun, Y. (2012). Occupy Wall Street on the public screens of social media: The many framings of the birth of a protest movement. *Communication, Culture & Critique*, 5(4), 483–509. doi: 10.1111/j.1753-9137.2012.01141.x
- DeLuca, K. M. (1999). Unruly arguments: The body rhetoric of Earth First!, Act Up, and Queer Nation. *Argumentation & Advocacy*, 36(1), 9.
- DeLuca, K. M. (2006). *Image politics: The new rhetoric of environmental activism*. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
- DeLuca, K. M., & Demo, A. T. (2000). Imaging nature: Watkins, Yosemite, and the birth of environmentalism. *Critical Studies in Media Communication*, 17(3), 241.
- Denzin, N. K., & Lincoln, Y. S. (2005). Introduction: The discipline and practice of qualitative research. In N. K. Denzin & Y. S. Lincoln (Eds.), *The SAGE handbook of qualitative research* (3rd ed., pp. 1–32). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.
- Derrida, J. (1983). *Dissemination* (1st ed.). Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Deseriis, M. (2014). The people's mic as a medium in its own right: A pharmacological reading. *Communication & Critical/Cultural Studies*, 11(1), 42–51. doi: 10.1080/14791420.2013.827349
- Devine-Wright, P. (2009). Rethinking NIMBYism: The role of place attachment and place identity in explaining place-protective action. *Journal of Community & Applied Social Psychology*, 19(6), 426–441. doi: 10.1002/casp.1004

- Diani, M., & Donati, P. R. (1999). Organisational change in Western European environmental groups: A framework for analysis. *Environmental Politics*, 8(1), 13–34. doi: 10.1080/09644019908414436
- Dickinson, G. (1997). Memories for sale: Nostalgia and the construction of identity in Old Pasadena. *Quarterly Journal of Speech*, 83(1), 1–27.
- Dickinson, G. (2002). Joe's rhetoric: Finding authenticity at Starbucks. *Rhetoric Society Quarterly*, 32(4), 5–27. doi: 10.1080/02773940209391238
- Dickinson, G. (2006). The pleasantville effect: Nostalgia and the visual framing of (white) suburbia. *Western Journal of Communication*, 70(3), 212–233. doi: 10.1080/10570310600843504
- Dickinson, G., Blair, C., & Ott, B. L. (Eds.). (2010). *Places of public memory: The rhetoric of museums and memorials*. Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press.
- Dickinson, G., Ott, B. L., & Aoki, E. (2005). Memory and myth at the Buffalo Bill Museum. *Western Journal of Communication*, 69, 85–108. doi: 10.1080/10570310500076684
- Dickinson, G., Ott, B. L., & Aoki, E. (2006). Spaces of remembering and forgetting: The reverent eye/I at the Plains Indian Museum. *Communication & Critical/Cultural Studies*, 3(1), 27–47. doi: 10.1080/14791420500505619
- Dickinson, G., Ott, B. L., & Aoki, E. (2013). (Re)Imagining the West: The Whitney Gallery of Western Art's sacred hymn. *Cultural Studies ↔ Critical Methodologies*, 13(1), 21–34. doi: 10.1177/1532708612464633
- Dobner, J. (2011, July 28). Green hero goes to jail. *Australian Financial Review*, p. 14. Retrieved from LexisNexis Academic database
- Drewett, M. (2007). The eyes of the world are watching now: The political effectiveness of "Biko" by Peter Gabriel. *Popular Music & Society*, 30(1), 39–51. doi: 10.1080/03007760500504929
- Dunlap, J. (2006). Through the eyes of Tom Joad: Patterns of American idealism, Bob Dylan, and the folk protest movement. *Popular Music & Society*, 29(5), 549–573. doi: 10.1080/03007760500238510
- Eilperin, J. (2009, February 5). Salazar voids drilling lease on public lands in Utah. *The Washington Post*, p. A02. Retrieved from LexisNexis Academic database
- Eilperin, J. (2017, March 15). Interior Department to withdraw Obama-era fracking rule, filings reveal. *The Salt Lake Tribune*. Retrieved from <http://www.lexisnexis.com/lncui2api/api/version1/getDocCui?lni=5N3J-RV21-JCB3-X4YD&csi=270944,270077,11059,8411&hl=t&hv=t&hnsd=f&hns=t&hgn=t&oc>

- =00240&perma=true. Retrieved from LexisNexis Academic database
- Enck-Wanzer, D. (2006). Trashing the system: Social movement, intersectional rhetoric, and collective agency in the Young Lords organization's garbage offensive. *Quarterly Journal of Speech*, 92(2), 174–201. doi: 10.1080/00335630600816920
- Enck-Wanzer, D. (2012). Decolonizing imaginaries: Rethinking “the people” in the Young Lords' church offensive. *Quarterly Journal of Speech*, 98(1), 1–23. doi: 10.1080/00335630.2011.638656
- Endres, D. (2009). The rhetoric of nuclear colonialism: Rhetorical exclusion of American Indian arguments in the Yucca Mountain nuclear waste siting decision. *Communication and Critical/Cultural Studies*, 6(1), 39–60. doi: 10.1080/14791420802632103
- Endres, D. (2012). Sacred land or national sacrifice zone: The role of values in the Yucca Mountain participation process. *Environmental Communication: A Journal of Nature and Culture*, 6(3), 328–345. doi: 10.1080/17524032.2012.688060
- Endres, D., Cozen, B., Barnett, J., O'Byrne, M., & Peterson, T. R. (2016). Communicating energy in a climate (of) crisis. In E. Cohen (Ed.), *Communication Yearbook* (Vol. 40, pp. 419–447). New York, NY: Routledge.
- Endres, D., & Senda-Cook, S. (2011). Location matters: The rhetoric of place in protest. *Quarterly Journal of Speech*, 97(3), 257–282. doi: 10.1080/00335630.2011.585167
- Endres, D., Senda-Cook, S., & Cozen, B. (2014). Not just a place to park your car: Park(ing) as spatial argument. *Argumentation & Advocacy*, 50(3), 121–140.
- Eyerman, R., & Jamison, A. (1998). *Music and social movements: Mobilizing traditions in the twentieth century*. Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press.
- Faces of protest. (2015, September 21). Retrieved from <http://www.kued.org/whatson/kued-local-productions/joe-hill/faces-of-protest>
- Fantasia, R., & Stepan-Norris, J. (2007). The labor movement in motion. In D. A. Snow, S. A. Soule, & H. Kriesi (Eds.), *The Blackwell companion to social movements* (pp. 555–575). Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell.
- Feigenbaum, A. (2014). Resistant matters: Tents, tear gas and the “other media” of Occupy. *Communication & Critical/Cultural Studies*, 11(1), 15–24. doi: 10.1080/14791420.2013.828383
- Finley, B. (2016, November 27). BLM planners need another five years. *The Denver Post*, p. 3B.

- Finnegan, C. A., & Ott, B. L. (2011). Review essay: Assessing rhetorics of social resistance. *Quarterly Journal of Speech*, 97(3), 334–347. doi: 10.1080/00335630.2011.585171
- Follett, A. (2017, February 24). Left-wing Massachusetts town trying to stop wind turbines. Retrieved from <http://dailycaller.com/2017/02/24/massachusetts-clean-air-group-rails-on-local-wind-turbine-installations/>
- Foust, C. R. (2010). *Transgression as a mode of resistance: Rethinking social movement in an era of corporate globalization*. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books.
- Foust, C. R., Pason, A., & Rogness, K. Z. (2017). *What democracy looks like: The rhetoric of social movements and counterpublics*. Tuscaloosa: The University of Alabama Press.
- Fradkin, P.L. (1989) *Fallout: An American nuclear tragedy*. Tucson: University of Arizona Press.
- Francesconi, R. (1986). Free jazz and black nationalism: A rhetoric of musical style. *Critical Studies in Mass Communication*, 3(1), 36–50.
- Freedman, M. N. (1976). Studying the rhetoric of social movement leaders: Methodological innovations. *Communication*, 5(1), 170–184.
- Frith, S. (1996). *Performing rites: On the value of popular music*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Gardner, C. J. (2011). *Making chastity sexy: The rhetoric of evangelical abstinence campaigns*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Gibbs, A. (2001). Contagious feelings: Pauline Hanson and the epidemiology of affect. *Australian Humanities Review*, 24. Retrieved from <http://www.australianhumanitiesreview.org/archive/Issue-December-2001/home.html>
- Goldstein, D. (2009, January 21). US judge halts Utah land sale after activists sue. *Platts Oilgram News*, p. 9. Retrieved from LexisNexis Academic database
- Gonzalez, A., & Makay, J. J. (1983). Rhetorical ascription and the gospel according to Dylan. *Quarterly Journal of Speech*, 69(1), 1–14.
- Gordon, M. (2011, August 8). Greens to risk arrest at White House to protest major oil-sands pipeline. *Inside Energy with Federal Lands*. Retrieved from LexisNexis Academic database
- Gormly, E. (2003). Evangelizing through appropriation: Toward a cultural theory on the growth of contemporary Christian music. *Journal of Media & Religion*, 2(4), 251–265.

- Gorsevski, E. W., & Butterworth, M. L. (2011). Muhammad Ali's fighting words: The paradox of violence in nonviolent rhetoric. *Quarterly Journal of Speech*, 97(1), 50–73. doi: 10.1080/00335630.2010.536563
- Gray, M. L. (2009). "Queer Nation is dead/long live Queer Nation": The politics and poetics of social movement and media representation. *Critical Studies in Media Communication*, 26(3), 212–236. doi: 10.1080/15295030903015062
- Greene, R. W. (1998). Another materialist rhetoric. *Critical Studies in Mass Communication*, 15(1), 21–40.
- Gregg, R. B. (1971). The ego-function of the rhetoric of protest. *Philosophy & Rhetoric*, 4(2), 71–91.
- Griffin, L., M. (2006). The rhetoric of historical movements. In C. E. Morris III & S. H. Browne (Eds.), *Readings on the Rhetoric of Social Protest* (2nd ed., pp. 9–14). State College, PA: Strata Publishing.
- Grossberg, L. (1986). Is there rock after punk? *Critical Studies in Mass Communication*, 3, 50–74.
- Hahn, D. F., & Gonchar, R. M. (1971). Studying social movements: A rhetorical methodology. *Speech Teacher*, 20(1), 44.
- Haiman, F. S. (2006). The rhetoric of the streets: Some legal and ethical considerations. In C. E. Morris III & S. H. Browne (Eds.), *Readings on the Rhetoric of Social Protest* (2nd ed., pp. 14–28). State College, PA: Strata Publishing.
- Halasa, M. (2010). Fight the power. *Index on Censorship*, 39(3), 46–49. doi: 10.1177/0306422010379803
- Hansen, B. (2009, November 23). Judge: Anti-drilling activist can't use global-warming defense at his trial. *Inside Energy with Federal Lands*, p. 11. Retrieved from LexisNexis Academic database
- Hansen, B., & Karey, G. (2009, February 9). Salazar reverses Bush policy on Utah oil, gas leases. *Inside Energy with Federal Lands*, p. 1. Retrieved from LexisNexis Academic database
- Harrison, M. F. (2005). "ERACE-ing" the color line: Racial reconciliation in the Christian music industry. *Journal of Media & Religion*, 4(1), 27–44. doi: 10.1207/s15328415jmr0401\_3
- Harvey, D. (2001). *Spaces of capital: Towards a critical geography*. New York, NY: Routledge.
- Harvey, M. (2007). Loving the wild in postwar America. In M. Lewis (Ed.), *American wilderness: A new history* (pp. 187–203). New York, NY: Oxford University

- Press.
- Hasian, M., & Wood, R. (2010). Critical museology, (post)colonial communication, and the gradual mastering of traumatic pasts at the Royal Museum for Central Africa (RMCA). *Western Journal of Communication*, 74(2), 128–149. doi: 10.1080/10570311003614484
- Hatch, J. B. (2002). Rhetorical synthesis through a (rap)prochement of identities: Hip-Hop and the gospel according to the gospel gangstaz. *Journal of Communication & Religion*, 25(2), 228–267.
- Hauser, G. A. (1999). *Vernacular voices: The rhetoric of publics and public spheres*. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press.
- Hawes, L. C. (2015). *New philosophy of social conflict: Mediating collective trauma and transitional justice*. New York, NY: Bloomsbury Publishing.
- Hawkins, D. (2016, November 21). Police defend use of water cannons on Dakota Access protesters in freezing weather. *The Washington Post*. Retrieved from [https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2016/11/21/police-citing-ongoing-riot-use-water-cannons-on-dakota-access-protesters-in-freezing-weather/?utm\\_term=.c04ed9dbaf6e](https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2016/11/21/police-citing-ongoing-riot-use-water-cannons-on-dakota-access-protesters-in-freezing-weather/?utm_term=.c04ed9dbaf6e)
- Hayes, T. (1997, June 1). Protesters dump on proposed N-dump. *Deseret News*. Retrieved from <http://www.deseretnews.com/article/563900/Protesters-dump-on-proposed-N-dump.html?pg=all>
- Hemment, D. (2004). Affect and individuation in popular electronic music. In I. Buchanan & M. Swiboda (Eds.), *Deleuze and Music* (pp. 76–94). Edinburgh, United Kingdom: Edinburgh University Press.
- Henetz, P. (2010a, February 5). U.S. attorney seeks to block another DeChristopher defense. *The Salt Lake Tribune*. Retrieved from [http://www.sltrib.com/utah/ci\\_14344003](http://www.sltrib.com/utah/ci_14344003)
- Henetz, P. (2010b, March 15). DeChristopher loses again in preparing defense. *The Salt Lake Tribune*. Retrieved from [http://www.sltrib.com/ci\\_14680017](http://www.sltrib.com/ci_14680017)
- Hertzberg, H. (2011, October 10). A walk in the park. *The New Yorker*. Retrieved from <http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2011/10/17/a-walk-in-the-park>
- Hess, A. (2011). Critical-rhetorical ethnography: Rethinking the place and process of rhetoric. *Communication Studies*, 62(2), 127–152. doi: 10.1080/10510974.2011.529750
- Hightower, J. (2004, August 16). Bush zones go national. *Nation*, 279(5), 27–29.
- Hollenhorst, J. (2011, July 27). Police, protesters profess praise over 26 arrests in



- DeChristopher demonstration. *Deseret News*. Retrieved from LexisNexis Academic database
- Hoyt, K. D. (2016). The affect of the hashtag: #HandsUpDontShoot and the body in peril. *Explorations in Media Ecology*, 15(1), 33–54. doi: 10.1386/eme.15.1.33\_1
- Hubbard, B., & Gladstone, R. (2013, August 15). Arab Spring countries find peace is harder than revolution. *The New York Times*, p. 11.
- Hubbard, B., & Hasian, Jr., M. A. (1998). Atomic memories of the Enola Gay: Strategies of remembrance at the National Air and Space Museum. *Rhetoric & Public Affairs*, 1(3), 363–385. doi: 10.1353/rap.2010.0084
- Hurner, S. (2006). Discursive identity formation of suffrage women: Reframing the “cult of true womanhood” through song. *Western Journal of Communication*, 70(3), 234–260. doi: 10.1080/10570310600843512
- Irvin, L. B. (2017, February 1). BLM goes forward with oil, gas lease sale. *Farmington Daily Times*, p. E2.
- Irvine, J. R., & Kirkpatrick, W. G. (1972). The musical form in rhetorical exchange: theoretical considerations. *Quarterly Journal of Speech*, 58(3), 272–284.
- Ivie, R. L. (2005, Fall). Democratic dissent and the trick of rhetorical critique. In *The Poynter Center Newsletter* (pp. 4–19). Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Jensen, D. P. (2011a, March 1). DeChristopher trial rally: “Free Tim, free Tim.” *The Salt Lake Tribune*. Retrieved from <http://archive.sltrib.com/article.php?id=13786740&itype=storyID>
- Jensen, D. P. (2011b, July 28). DeChristopher sentence riles protesters, spurs arrests. *The Salt Lake Tribune*. Retrieved from LexisNexis Academic database
- Johnson, D., & Rejala, P. (2016, January 5). Here’s where the federal government owns the most land. *Time*. Retrieved June 12, 2017, from <http://time.com/4167983/federal-government-land-oregon/>
- Johnson, G. M. (2017, March 3). Silence on trans violence has deadly consequences. Retrieved from <http://thegrio.com/2017/03/03/silence-on-trans-violence-has-deadly-consequences/>
- Johnson, K. (2009, October 10). Legal cost for throwing monkey wrench into the system. *The New York Times*, p. 11. Retrieved from LexisNexis Academic database
- Johnson, K. (2011a, March 3). Protester says he didn’t plan lease bids. *The New York Times*, p. 15. Retrieved from LexisNexis Academic database
- Johnson, K. (2011b, March 4). Utah man convicted of fraud at 2008 energy auction. *The*

- New York Times*, p. 14. Retrieved from LexisNexis Academic database
- Johnson, N. (2011, February 17). Protests against Walker plan set. *The Janesville Gazette*. Retrieved from <http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.lib.utah.edu/lnacui2api/api/version1/getDocCui?lni=526T-3R11-DYNS-3049&csi=270944,270077,11059,8411&hl=t&hv=t&hnsd=f&hns=t&hgn=t&oc=00240&perma=true>
- Jones, L. G. (1999, September 8). Why are they singing? *The Christian Century*, 864.
- Jonsson, P. (2011a, February 18). Wisconsin protests: Why “week of rage” matters to rest of America; Wisconsin protests at the state Capitol pit a new wave of tea party-inspired Republicans against Democrats defending their most cherished ideals. It’s a political drama that echoes across the country and could play out again across the newly “red” Midwest. *The Christian Science Monitor*. Retrieved from <http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.lib.utah.edu/lnacui2api/api/version1/getDocCui?lni=526S-BVN1-DYRK-B189&csi=270944,270077,11059,8411&hl=t&hv=t&hnsd=f&hns=t&hgn=t&oc=00240&perma=true>
- Jonsson, P. (2011b, March 12). Wisconsin protests: “democracy in action” or “mob rule”?; Some critics say Wisconsin protests were borderline unconstitutional because they threatened the orderly processes of state government. At issue is an obscure clause in the Constitution. *The Christian Science Monitor*. Retrieved from <http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.lib.utah.edu/lnacui2api/api/version1/getDocCui?lni=52CF-PTN1-DYRK-B4YG&csi=270944,270077,11059,8411&hl=t&hv=t&hnsd=f&hns=t&hgn=t&oc=00240&perma=true>
- Jonzen, J. (2009, January 11). I may be skint but I own this desert: To thwart the sale of Utah wilderness to big oil, a student bid for it at auction—and won, reports Jessica Jonzen. *The Sunday Times*, p. 9. Retrieved from LexisNexis Academic database
- Joosse, P. (2012). Elves, environmentalism, and “eco-terror”: Leaderless resistance and media coverage of the Earth Liberation Front. *Crime, Media, Culture*, 8(1), 75–93. doi: 10.1177/1741659011433366
- Jousmaki, H. (2011). Epistemic, interpersonal, and moral stances in the construction of us and them in Christian metal lyrics. *Journal of Multicultural Discourses*, 6(1), 53–66. doi: 10.1080/17447143.2010.535611
- Katriel, T. (1987). Rhetoric in flames: Fire inscriptions in Israeli youth movement ceremonials. *Quarterly Journal of Speech*, 73(4), 444–459. doi: 10.1080/00335638709383818
- Katriel, T. (1993). “Our future is where our past is:” Studying heritage museums as

- ideological and performative arenas. *Communication Monographs*, 60(1), 69–75. doi: 10.1080/03637759309376296
- Keller, B. (2011, October 30). Beyond Occupy. *The New York Times*. Retrieved from <http://www.nytimes.com.ezproxy.lib.utah.edu/2011/10/31/opinion/keller-beyond-occupy.html>
- Kelly, C. R., & Hoerl, K. E. (2012). Genesis in hyperreality: Legitimizing disingenuous controversy at the Creation Museum. *Argumentation & Advocacy*, 48(3), 123–141.
- Kennedy tries to halt windmills. (2006, March 2). *The Washington Times*. Retrieved from <http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2006/mar/2/20060302-124537-9804r/>
- Kenny, J. (2014, June 9). Betraying liberty with “free speech zones.” *The New American*, 30(11), 30–31.
- Khouri, R. (2011, August 18). Arab Spring or revolution?; “Spring” is a passive phenomenon. It doesn’t recognize that Arab citizens are shedding their docility and threatening to take control of their own societies. *The Globe and Mail*, p. A17.
- Khrebtan-Hörhager, J., & Kononenko, I. (2015). Of fighters and frames: Femen’s corporeality between the old, the new, the yellow and the blue. *Journal of Intercultural Communication Research*, 44(3), 224–251. doi: 10.1080/17475759.2015.1034754
- Kimmelman, M. (2011, October 15). Wall Street protest shows power of place. *The New York Times*. Retrieved from <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/16/sunday-review/wall-street-protest-shows-power-of-place.html>
- Kincheloe, J. L., & McLaren, P. (2005). Rethinking critical theory and qualitative research. In N. K. Denzin & Y. S. Lincoln (Eds.), *The SAGE handbook of qualitative research* (3rd ed., pp. 303–342). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.
- Kizer, E. J. (1983). Protest song lyrics as rhetoric. *Popular Music and Society*, 9(1), 3–11. doi: 10.1080/03007768308591202
- Knupp, R. E. (1981). A time for every purpose under heaven: Rhetorical dimensions of protest music. *The Southern Speech Communication Journal*, 377–389.
- Kosokoff, S., & Carmichael, C. W. (1970). The rhetoric of protest: Song, speech, and attitude change. *Southern Speech Journal*, 35, 295–302.
- Kousis, M. (1999). Sustaining local environmental mobilisations: Groups, actions and claims in Southern Europe. *Environmental Politics*, 8(1), 172–198. doi: 10.1080/09644019908414443

- Laclau, E., & Mouffe, C. (1985). *Hegemony and socialist strategy: Towards a radical democratic politics* (2nd ed.). New York, NY: Verso.
- Land Ownership. (n.d.). Retrieved June 12, 2017, from <https://gis.utah.gov/data/sgid-cadastre/land-ownership/>
- Lila Steinberg, R. (2014). The Occupy assembly. *Journal of Language & Politics*, 13(4), 702–731. doi: 10.1075/jlp.13.4.06ste
- Liptak, A. (2015, June 26). Supreme Court ruling makes same-sex marriage a right nationwide. *The New York Times*. Retrieved from <http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/27/us/supreme-court-same-sex-marriage.html>
- Livengood, M., & Book, C. L. (2004). Watering down Christianity? An examination of the use of theological words in Christian music. *Journal of Media & Religion*, 3(2), 119–129.
- Lomas, C. W. (1960). The agitator in American politics. *Western Speech*, 24(2), 76–83.
- Loomis, B. (2011, July 28). DeChristopher sentenced to prison, 26 protesters arrested. *The Salt Lake Tribune*. Retrieved from LexisNexis Academic database
- Love, N. S. (2002). “Singing for our lives”: Women’s music and democratic politics. *Hypatia*, 17(4), 71.
- Lunceford, B. L. (2012). *Naked politics: Nudity, political action, and the rhetoric of the body*. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books.
- Maffly, B. (2014, September 16). BLM energy leases panned in Utah’s Uinta Basin. *The Salt Lake Tribune*. Retrieved from <http://www.sltrib.com/sltrib/news/58416172-78/blm-parcels-suwa-leasing.html.csp>
- Magill, J. (2009a, April 3). Activist accused of false bidding in US lease sale. *Platts Oilgram News*, p. 8. Retrieved from LexisNexis Academic database
- Magill, J. (2009b, April 6). Activist who disrupted Utah lease sale indicted on two felony criminal counts. *Platts Inside Energy*, p. 12. Retrieved from LexisNexis Academic database
- Magill, J. (2009c, June 12). Interior may reinstate pulled Utah leases. *Platts Oilgram News*, p. 7. Retrieved from LexisNexis Academic database
- Mansbridge, J. (1994). Using power/fighting power\*. *Constellations*, 1(1), 53–73. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-8675.1994.tb00004.x
- Massumi, B. (1992). *A user’s guide to capitalism and schizophrenia: Deviations from Deleuze and Guattari*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

- Massumi, B. (1995). The autonomy of affect. *Cultural Critique*, 31, 83–109. doi: 10.2307/1354446
- McCarthy, J. D., & Zald, M. N. (1977). Resource mobilization and social movements: A partial theory. *American Journal of Sociology*, 82(6), 1212–1241.
- McCormick, S. (2003). Earning one's inheritance: Rhetorical criticism, everyday talk, and the analysis of public discourse. *Quarterly Journal of Speech*, 89(2), 109–131. doi: 10.1080/00335630308176
- McEntee, P. (2011, July 30). McEntee: In DeChristopher and protesters, courage found its voice. *The Salt Lake Tribune*. Retrieved from LexisNexis Academic database
- McGee, M. C. (1975). In search of “the people”: A rhetorical alternative. *Quarterly Journal of Speech*, 61(3), 235.
- McGee, M. C. (1980). The “ideograph”: A link between rhetoric and ideology. *The Quarterly Journal of Speech*, 66(1), 1–16.
- McGee, M. C. (2006). “Social movement”: Phenomenon or meaning? In C. E. Morris III & S. H. Browne (Eds.), *Readings on the rhetoric of social protest* (2nd ed., pp. 115–126). State College, PA: Strata Publishing, Inc.
- McHendry, G. F., Middleton, M. K., Endres, D., Senda-Cook, S., & O’Byrne, M. (2014). Rhetorical critic(ism)’s body: Affect and fieldwork on a plane of immanence. *Southern Communication Journal*, 79(4), 293–310. doi: 10.1080/1041794X.2014.906643
- McKerrow, R. E. (1989). Critical rhetoric: Theory and praxis. *Communication Monographs*, 56, 91–111.
- McKerrow, R. E. (1998). Corporeality and cultural rhetoric: A site for rhetoric’s future. *Southern Communication Journal*, 63(4), 315–328.
- Medhurst, M. J. (2001). The contemporary study of public address: Renewal, recovery, and reconfiguration. *Rhetoric & Public Affairs*, 4(3), 495–511. doi: 10.1353/rap.2001.0048
- Message, K. (2005). Territory. In A. Parr (Ed.), *The Deleuze dictionary* (pp. 274–276). New York, NY: Columbia University Press.
- Michaels, S. (2015, June 26). It’s incredibly scary to be a transgender woman of color right now. *Mother Jones*. Retrieved from <http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2015/06/transgender-women-disproportionately-targeted-violent-hate-crimes/>
- Middleton, M., Hess, A., Endres, D., & Senda-Cook, S. (2015). *Participatory critical rhetoric: Theoretical and methodological foundations for studying rhetoric in*

- situ*. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books.
- Middleton, M. K., Senda-Cook, S., & Endres, D. (2011). Articulating rhetorical field methods: Challenges and tensions. *Western Journal of Communication*, 75(4), 386–406.
- Mims, B. (2011, July 29). Protesters from DeChristopher's sentencing released from jail. *The Salt Lake Tribune*. Retrieved from LexisNexis Academic database
- Min, S.-J. (2015). Occupy Wall Street and deliberative decision-making: Translating theory to practice. *Communication, Culture & Critique*, 8(1), 73–89. doi: 10.1111/cccr.12074
- Modesti, S. (2008). Home sweet home: Tattoo parlors as postmodern spaces of agency. *Western Journal of Communication*, 72(3), 197–212. doi: 10.1080/10570310802210106
- Mohrmann, G. P., & Scott, F. E. (1976). Popular music and World War II: The rhetoric of continuation. *Quarterly Journal of Speech*, 62, 145–156.
- Mondak, J. J. (1988). Protest music as political persuasion. *Popular Music and Society*, 12(3), 25–38. doi: 10.1080/03007768808591322
- Morris, A. D., & Staggenborg, S. (2007). Leadership in social movements. In D. A. Snow, S. A. Soule, & H. Kriesi (Eds.), *The Blackwell companion to social movements* (pp. 171–196). Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell.
- Murphy, J. M. (1997). Inventing authority: Bill Clinton, Martin Luther King, Jr., and the orchestration of rhetorical traditions. *Quarterly Journal of Speech*, 83(1), 71–89.
- Murray Yang, M. (2011). Still burning: Self-immolation as photographic protest. *Quarterly Journal of Speech*, 97(1), 1–25. doi: 10.1080/00335630.2010.536565
- Nasr, V. (2011, August 28). If the Arab Spring turns ugly. *The New York Times*, p. 4.
- National Park Service, U.S. Department of the Interior. (2006, June). Great Basin National Park: Listing sensitive and extirpated species. Retrieved from <http://www.nps.gov/grba/learn/nature/upload/SENSIT~1.pdf>
- National Park Service, U.S. Department of the Interior. (2007). Glen Canyon: National recreation area, AZ, UT (2007, August). Retrieved from <http://www.nps.gov/glca/learn/nature/grazing.htm>
- National Park Service, U.S. Department of the Interior. (2015a, February 25). National Park Service Overview. Retrieved from <http://www.nps.gov/news/upload/NPS-Overview-2015-update-2-25.pdf>
- National Park Service, U.S. Department of the Interior. (2015b, May 25). Organic Act of

1916. Retrieved from <http://www.nps.gov/grba/learn/management/organic-act-of-1916.htm>
- National Park Service, U.S. Department of the Interior. (2015c, June 5). Sequoia and Kings Canyon: National parks, California. Retrieved from [http://www.nps.gov/seki/learn/nature/sensitive\\_plant.htm](http://www.nps.gov/seki/learn/nature/sensitive_plant.htm)
- Nichols, J. D. (1995, March). Mother Jones came to help striking Utah coal miners. Retrieved from [http://historytogo.utah.gov/utah\\_chapters/mining\\_and\\_railroads/motherjonescame-tohelpstrikingutahcoalminers.html](http://historytogo.utah.gov/utah_chapters/mining_and_railroads/motherjonescame-tohelpstrikingutahcoalminers.html)
- Nimmo, K. (2003, October 24). Ashcroft's war on Greenpeace. Retrieved from <http://www.counterpunch.org/2003/10/24/ashcroft-s-war-on-greenpeace/>
- O'Donoghue, A. (2011, July 26). Activist Timothy DeChristopher sentenced to 2 years in prison. *Deseret News*. Retrieved from LexisNexis Academic database
- O'Neil, L. (2009, February 9). Interior Secretary scaling back on leasing activity in Utah, Wyoming. *Natural Gas Week*. Retrieved from LexisNexis Academic database
- Ono, K. A., & Sloop, J. M. (1995). The critique of vernacular discourse. *Communication Monographs*, 62, 19–46.
- Oravec, C. (1981). John Muir, Yosemite, and the sublime response: A study in the rhetoric of preservationism. *Quarterly Journal of Speech*, 67(3), 245–258.
- Park Rangers for Our Lands. (n.d.). Arches and Canyonlands National Parks. Retrieved March 20, 2015, from <http://parkrangers.org/issues/national-parks-at-risk/arches-and-canyonlands-national-parks>
- Parker, A. (2011). "Corporations are people," Romney tells Iowa hecklers angry over his tax policy. *New York Times*, p. 12.
- Pauley, II, J. L. (2005). Jesus in a Chevy? The rhetoric of boundary-work in contemporary Christian music. *Journal of Communication & Religion*, 28, 71–98.
- Peaceful Uprising. (2014a, February 4). Taking the mic: Why structural & environmental racism matter. Retrieved from <http://www.peacefuluprising.org/TakingTheMic>
- Peaceful Uprising. (2014b, May 29). Storm brewing: Permanent protest setup at proposed tar sands strip mine. Retrieved from <http://www.peacefuluprising.org/storm-brewing>
- Peaceful Uprising. (n.d.-a). Our mission. Retrieved June 12, 2017, from <http://www.peacefuluprising.org/about/our-mission>
- Peaceful Uprising. (n.d.-b). [Home page]. Retrieved January 26, 2015, from

- <http://www.peacefuluprising.org/>
- Peaceful Uprising. (n.d.-c). Peaceful Uprising core principles. Retrieved June 12, 2017, from <http://www.peacefuluprising.org/about/peaceful-uprisings-core-principles>
- Peaceful Uprising. (n.d.-d). Tim's story. Retrieved March 10, 2014, from <http://www.peacefuluprising.org/tim-dechristopher/tims-story>
- Peele, S., & Morse, S. J. (1969). On studying a social movement. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 33(3), 409.
- Peeples, J. A. (2011). Downwind: Articulation and appropriation of social movement discourse. *Southern Communication Journal*, 76(3), 248–263. doi: 10.1080/1041794x.2010.500516
- Perkins, N. (2006, May 14). “Divine Strake” test fuels Dixie protest. *Deseret News*. Retrieved from <http://www.deseretnews.com/article/635207374/Divine-Strake-test-fuels-Dixie-protest.html?pg=all>
- Pezzullo, P. C. (2001). Performing critical interruptions: Stories, rhetorical invention, and the environmental justice movement. *Western Journal of Communication*, 65(1), 1–25. doi: 10.1080/10570310109374689
- Pezzullo, P. C. (2003). Resisting “national breast cancer awareness month”: The rhetoric of counterpublics and their cultural performances. *Quarterly Journal of Speech*, 89(4), 345–365. doi: 10.1080/0033563032000160981
- Pezzullo, P. C. (2007). *Toxic tourism: Rhetorics of pollution, travel, and environmental justice*. Tuscaloosa: University Alabama Press.
- Pinard, M., Kirk, J., & von Eschen, D. (1969). Process of recruitment in the sit-in movement. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 33(3), 355.
- Pittman, T. (2015, November 24). Four years to live: On violence against trans women of color. *HuffPost*. Retrieved from [http://www.huffingtonpost.com/trav-pittman/trans-woman-of-color-4-years-to-live\\_b\\_8637038.html](http://www.huffingtonpost.com/trav-pittman/trans-woman-of-color-4-years-to-live_b_8637038.html)
- Porrovecchio, M. (2007). Lost in the WTO shuffle: Publics, counterpublics, and the individual. *Western Journal of Communication*, 71(3), 235–256. doi: 10.1080/10570310701515894
- Radwan, J. (2004). Religious identity via pop music: “Shine.” *Journal of Communication & Religion*, 27(2), 187–216.
- Radwan, J. (2006). Music and mediated religious identity: “Jesus freak.” *Journal of Media & Religion*, 5(1), 1–23. doi: 10.1207/s15328415jmr0501\_1
- Repanshek, K. (2008, November 12). Arches National Park finds its birthday



- overshadowed by drilling concerns. Retrieved from <http://www.nationalparkstraveler.com/2008/11/arches-national-park-finds-its-birthday-overshadowed-drilling-concerns>
- Robbins, J. (2017, May 31). With Trump, a full-scale assault on protections for U.S. public lands. *Yale Environment 360*. Retrieved from <http://e360.yale.edu/features/with-trump-a-full-scale-assault-on-protections-for-u-s-public-lands>
- Rodnitsky, J. (2006). The decline and rebirth of folk-protest music. In I. Peddie (Ed.), *The resisting muse: Popular music and social protest* (pp. 17–29). Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing.
- Rodnitzky, J. L. (1971). The decline of contemporary protest music. *Popular Music and Society*, 1(1), 44–50. doi: 10.1080/03007767108590972
- Rodnitzky, J. L. (1999). The sixties between the microgrooves: Using folk and protest music to understand American history, 1963-1973. *Popular Music and Society: Bowling Green*, 23(4), 105–122.
- Rosenwasser, M. J. (1972). Rhetoric and the progress of the Women’s Liberation Movement. *Today’s Speech*, 20(3), 45–56.
- Russell, D. (2008). Abiding memories: The community singing movement and English social life in the 1920s. *Popular Music*, 27(01), 117–133. doi: 10.1017/S0261143008001505
- Rygg, B. J. (2012). Wind power—An assault on local landscapes or an opportunity for modernization? *Energy Policy*, 48, 167–175. doi: 10.1016/j.enpol.2012.05.004
- Sands, D. (2009a, January 19). Protestor may try to pay for bids he made at BLM Utah lease sale. *Inside Energy with Federal Lands*, p. 15. Retrieved from LexisNexis Academic database
- Sands, D. (2009b, June 1). Feds seek to block lease-sale protester from espousing climate views at trial. *Inside Energy with Federal Lands*, p. 11. Retrieved from LexisNexis Academic database
- Sands, D. (2010, February 15). Activist claims “selective prosecution” in case over Utah oil and gas leases. *Inside Energy with Federal Lands*, p. 10. Retrieved from LexisNexis Academic database
- Sands, D., & Magill, J. (2009, September 21). Judge to decide if lease-sale protester can use “lesser-of-evils” defense at trial. *Platts Inside Energy*, p. 9. Retrieved from LexisNexis Academic database
- Sanger, K. L. (1995). Slave resistance and rhetorical self-definition: Spirituals as a strategy. *Western Journal of Communication*, 59(3), 177–192.

- Sanger, K. L. (1997). Functions of freedom singing in the Civil Rights Movement: The activists' implicit rhetorical theory. *Howard Journal of Communications*, 8(2), 179–195.
- Schlosberg, D. (1999). Networks and mobile arrangements: Organisational innovation in the US environmental justice movement. *Environmental Politics*, 8(1), 122–148. doi: 10.1080/09644019908414441
- Scholes, P. A. (1955). *The Oxford companion to music, self-indexed and with a pronouncing glossary and over 1,100 portraits and pictures* (9th ed.). London: Oxford University Press.
- Scott, R. L., & Smith, D. K. (2006). The rhetoric of confrontation. In C. E. Morris III & S. H. Browne (Eds.), *Readings on the Rhetoric of Social Protest* (2nd ed., pp. 28–35). State College, PA: Strata Publishing.
- Seigworth, G. J., & Gregg, M. (2010). An inventory of shimmers. In M. Gregg & G. J. Seigworth (Eds.), *The affect theory reader* (pp. 1–28). Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- Senda-Cook, S. (2012). Rugged practices: Embodying authenticity in outdoor recreation. *Quarterly Journal of Speech*, 98(2), 129–152. doi: 10.1080/00335630.2012.663500
- Senda-Cook, S. (2013). Materializing tensions: How maps and trails mediate nature. *Environmental Communication*, 7(3), 355–371. doi: 10.1080/17524032.2013.792854
- Shear, M. D. (2017, June 1). Trump will withdraw U.S. from Paris Climate Agreement. *The New York Times*. Retrieved from <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/01/climate/trump-paris-climate-agreement.html>
- Simone, M. A. (2009). Give me liberty and give me surveillance: A case study of the US government's discourse of surveillance. *Critical Discourse Studies*, 6(1), 1–14. doi: 10.1080/17405900802559977
- Simons, H. W. (1970). Requirements, problems, and strategies: A theory of persuasion for social movements. *Quarterly Journal of Speech*, 56(1), 1–11.
- Simons, H. W. (1971). Psychological theories of persuasion: An auditor's report. *Quarterly Journal of Speech*, 57(4), 383–392.
- Simons, H. W. (1972). Persuasion in social conflicts: A critique of prevailing conceptions and a framework for future research. *Speech Monographs*, 39(4), 227–247.
- Simons, H. W. (1976). Changing notions about social movements. *Quarterly Journal of Speech*, 62(4), 425.

- Simons, H. W. (1980). On terms, definitions and theoretical distinctiveness comments on papers by McGee and Zarefsky. *Central States Speech Journal*, 31(4), 306–315. doi: 10.1080/10510978009368071
- Simons, H. W. (1982). Genres, rules, and collective rhetorics: Applying the requirements-problems-strategies approach. *Communication Quarterly*, 30(3), 181–188.
- Simons, H. W. (1991). On the rhetoric of social movements, historical movements, and “top-down” movements: A commentary. *Communication Studies*, 42(1), 94–101.
- Simons, H. W., Mechling, E. W., & Schreier, H. N. (1984). The functions of human communication in mobilizing for action from the bottom up: The rhetoric of social movements. In C. C. Arnold (Ed.), *Handbook of rhetorical and communication theory* (pp. 792–867). Boston, MA: Allyn & Bacon.
- Simonson, P. (2010). The streets of Laredo: Mercurian rhetoric and the Obama campaign. *Western Journal of Communication*, 74(1), 94–126.
- Singer, R. (2011). Visualizing agrarian myth and place-based resistance in South Central Los Angeles. *Environmental Communication*, 5(3), 344–349. doi: 10.1080/17524032.2011.593638
- Sloop, J. M., & Ono, K. A. (1997). Out-law discourse: The critical politics of material judgment. *Philosophy & Rhetoric*, 30(1), 50–69.
- Smith, R. R., & Windes, R. R. (2006). The innovational movement: A rhetorical theory. In C. E. Morris III & S. H. Browne (Eds.), *Readings on the Rhetoric of Social Protest* (2nd ed., pp. 82–95). State College, PA: Strata Publishing.
- Spangler, J. (2001, February 11). N-activist’s career began with a light in the sky. *Deseret News*. Retrieved from <http://www.deseretnews.com/article/250010267/N-activists-career-began-with-a-light-in-the-sky.html?pg=all>
- Stewart, C. J., Smith, C. A., & Denton Jr., R. E. (2001). *Persuasion and social movements* (4th ed.). Prospect Heights, IL: Waveland Press.
- Stewart, J., & Dickinson, G. (2008). Enunciating locality in the postmodern suburb: FlatIron Crossing and the Colorado lifestyle. *Western Journal of Communication*, 72(3), 280–307. doi: 10.1080/10570310802210148
- Stewart, K. (2007). *Ordinary affects*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press Books.
- Stromer-Galley, J., & Schiappa, E. (1998). The argumentative burdens of audience conjectures: Audience research in popular culture criticism. *Communication Theory*, 8(1), 27–62. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-2885.1998.tb00210.x
- Sutter, P. (2007). Putting wilderness in context: The interwar origins of the modern

- wilderness idea. In M. Lewis (Ed.), *American wilderness: A new history* (pp. 167–185). New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
- Swofford, J., & Slattery, M. (2010). Public attitudes of wind energy in Texas: Local communities in close proximity to wind farms and their effect on decision-making. *Energy Policy*, 38(5), 2508–2519. doi: 10.1016/j.enpol.2009.12.046
- Taylor, A. (2016, November 21). Water cannons used against Dakota pipeline protesters. *The Atlantic*. Retrieved from <https://www.theatlantic.com/photo/2016/11/water-cannons-and-tear-gas-used-against-dakota-access-pipeline-protesters/508370/>
- Taylor, B. C. (1998). The bodies of August: Photographic realism and controversy at the National Air and Space Museum. *Rhetoric & Public Affairs*, 1(3), 331–362. doi: 10.1353/rap.2010.0070
- Taylor, B. C. (2010). Radioactive history: Rhetoric, memory, and place in the post-Cold War nuclear museum. In G. Dickinson, C. Blair, & B. L. Ott (Eds.), *Places of public memory: The rhetoric of museums and memorials* (pp. 57–86). Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press.
- The Movement for Black Lives. (n.d.). Platform. Retrieved June 12, 2017, from <https://policy.m4bl.org/platform/>
- Trump climate agreement: Rest of world rallies around Paris deal. (2017, June 2). *BBC News*. Retrieved from <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-40136908>
- Turner, V. (1982). *From ritual to theatre: The human seriousness of play*. New York, NY: Performing Arts.
- Turner, V. (1987). Betwixt and between: The liminal period in rites of passage. In L. C. Mahdi, S. Foster, & M. Little (Eds.), *Betwixt & between: Patterns of masculine and feminine initiation* (pp. 3–22). Peru, IL: Open Court Publishing.
- USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56 (2001).
- U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (2013). Air pollution and the Clean Air Act. Retrieved from <http://www.epa.gov/air/caa/>
- U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. (2015). NEPA homepage [Overviews & factsheets]. Retrieved May 24, 2015, from <http://www.epa.gov/compliance/nepa/>
- Van Der Heijden, H. (1999). Environmental movements, ecological modernisation and political opportunity structures. *Environmental Politics*, 8(1), 199–221. doi: 10.1080/096444019908414444
- van der Horst, D. (2007). NIMBY or not? Exploring the relevance of location and the politics of voiced opinions in renewable energy siting controversies. *Energy Policy*, 35(5), 2705–2714.

- Vick, K. (2009, January 12). Guerrilla tactics at oil-lease auction: Activist drives up prices with bidding. *The Washington Post*, p. A02. Retrieved from LexisNexis Academic database
- Vincent, A. R. (2015, August 13). State of emergency continues for trans women of color. Retrieved from [http://www.huffingtonpost.com/addison-rose-vincent/the-state-of-emergency-co\\_b\\_7981580.html](http://www.huffingtonpost.com/addison-rose-vincent/the-state-of-emergency-co_b_7981580.html)
- Waldo, Å. (2012). Offshore wind power in Sweden—A qualitative analysis of attitudes with particular focus on opponents. *Energy Policy*, *41*, 692–702. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2011.11.033>
- Weinstein, D. (2006). Rock protest songs: So many and so few. In I. Peddie (Ed.), *The resisting muse: Popular music and social protest* (pp. 3–16). Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing.
- West, I. (2007). Performing resistance in/from the kitchen: The practice of maternal pacifist politics and La WISP's cookbooks. *Women's Studies in Communication*, *30*(3), 358–383. doi: 10.1080/07491409.2007.10162519
- West, I. (2010). PISSAR's critically queer and disabled politics. *Communication and Critical/Cultural Studies*, *7*(2), 156–175. doi: 10.1080/14791421003759174
- White, G. E. (1990, October 28). U.S. kept ignoring evidence about fallout's deadly effects. *Deseret News*. Retrieved from <http://www.deseretnews.com/article/129362/us-kept-ignoring-evidence-about-fallouts-deadly-effects.html?pg=all>
- Wilderness.net. (n.d.). 1964 Wilderness Act. Retrieved March 15, 2015, from <http://www.wilderness.net/NWPS/legisact>
- Williams, K. M., & Banjo, O. O. (2013). From where we stand: Exploring Christian listeners' social location and Christian music listening. *Journal of Media & Religion*, *12*(4), 196–216. doi: 10.1080/15348423.2013.845027
- Wolfe, D. P. (2007). Sidestepping environmental controversy through a rhetoric of security: George W. Bush in Summerhaven, Arizona. *Western Journal of Communication*, *71*(1), 28–48. doi: 10.1080/10570310701199178
- Zagacki, K. S., & Gallagher, V. J. (2009). Rhetoric and materiality in the museum park at the North Carolina Museum of Art. *Quarterly Journal of Speech*, *95*(2), 171–191. doi: 10.1080/00335630902842087
- Zarefsky, D. (1977). President Johnson's War on Poverty: The rhetoric of three "establishment" movements. *Communication Monographs*, *44*(4), 352.