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## 'Putting everything up there': framing how we navigate the intricacies of privacy and security on social media.

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Keywords:	Code of the Street, Social Media, Privacy, Security
Abstract:	<p>Posting commentary via social media can have very real consequences and these can drive how users navigate the world of social media. The aim of this paper is to develop a deeper appreciation of how users comprehend their security and privacy within their social media interactions. I turn to Anderson's (2000) work on street-life in attempting to draw upon the decisions made in navigating particular environments – especially those with associated risks. This I argue is similar to how users rationalise their social media behaviour to protect themselves and/or view others. Both are learned behaviours that are at times habituated, reactionary or temporary in the face of heightened threats. Using findings from 27 interviews with UK social media users I present 3 codes that may be useful in framing just how users navigate and comprehend their experiences of social media privacy and security.</p>

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## Introduction

*One of the things we talked about with the social workers was the danger of putting stuff online that would make you traceable to the birth parents, who might want to find you.*

*When we were adopting, I'd check the Facebook page of the birth mother, so I was able to check her out that way. She probably put certain things on there that she shouldn't have done, so that made me quite aware of the fact that other people can just go in and read it.*

*(Male, 42, self-employed)*

To search and observe through social media is not unusual; in the above quote, an adoptive father has been told not to post about his daughter online to prevent her identification. Nevertheless, he has searched and viewed the activities of the child's birth mother through the material she has placed on social media. Evident in such calculations is an interesting juxtaposition, where certain information is kept private and secure, but viewing the vested information of others is enticing and immediately available. Similar sentiments could be applied to how employers view the social media activity of employees (Sánchez Abril et al. 2012; McDonald et al 2016). In these instances, the consequence of posting information has the potential to expose employees to the vulnerability of losing their jobs – if they post ill-advisedly. Decisions on what to post or what not to post (or what to view) all have very real consequences and can drive how users navigate the world of social media. The aim of the paper therefore is to develop a deeper appreciation of how users comprehend their security and privacy within their social media interactions. I turn to Anderson's (2000) work on street-life in attempting to draw out the decisions made in navigating particular environments – especially those with associated risks. Life online and life on the streets both engage learned behaviours that are at times habituated, reactionary or temporary, particularly when faced with heightened threats.

Anderson's (2000) 'Code of the Street' reviews the everyday practices of a marginalised community in the USA. He examines a black neighbourhood in Philadelphia and seeks to understand the role of violence in the area. The Code of the Street is largely defensive and Anderson concentrates on the social order and everyday practices that underscore life in the neighbourhood – how people interact,

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3 how people present themselves, the rules of living in this environment. Typical rules of order, policing  
4 and the law have been altered due to socio-economic deprivation or a sense of lawlessness in the  
5 neighbourhood. *Decency* and *violence* frame the Code of the Street - one indicates a hardworking and  
6 morally guided way of life, the other a more risk embracing and brutal attitude that often works  
7 beyond the law and civil society (see Elias & Jephcott 1978; Keane 2013). By teenage-hood most in  
8 Anderson's neighbourhoods have internalised the Code of the Street and are keenly aware of how to  
9 operationalise this knowledge to avoid violence (Anderson, 2000:72). Moreover, the etiquette of the  
10 street also draws on a performance, one often centred on demonstrations designed to display status,  
11 protection, power and popularity. On social media the same logic can apply when traversing between  
12 effervescent communications or risky and manufactured behaviours that expose personal or  
13 compromising information (Bailey and Steeves 2015; Shin 2010). Users share information to gain  
14 'attention' from networked audiences (Abidin 2016; Díaz Sánchez 2016) and, in parallel, social media  
15 presents risks such as bullying, harassment, self-harm and suicide (see Gabriel 2014; Luxton et al.  
16 2012; Wise 2016). Alternatively, concerns have been raised about 'perpetual contact', 'hyper-  
17 coordination', not being able to 'switch-off' or grooming (Berriman and Thomson 2015; Hall 2016;  
18 Madden et al. 2013; Tennant et al. 2015), as well as having information stolen or identity theft (see  
19 Huq 2015; Khan et al 2017). In what follows I want to introduce how some social commentators have  
20 considered the dilemma of privacy and security online and I then frame 3 codes that I argue can help  
21 in developing our understanding of how social media is appreciated by those who use it. I expand on  
22 these codes through my interviews with social media users. Finally, I return to Anderson and echo his  
23 sentiments as to how we may be able to extract sociological meaning from the order that is integral  
24 to life on the streets and online.

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55 I begin by considering how for contemporary urban ethnographers the physical environment of the  
56 street and life online are inextricable entangled; indeed, urban researchers have applied Anderson's  
57 Code of the Street to explain how poor, young, black residents use social media to manage exposure  
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3 to violence in their neighbourhoods. Stuart (2019), for instance, considers the new rules of gang  
4 conflict online that may deescalate gang violence offline. As Stuart highlights gang crime in urban areas  
5 has decreased in recent years and he argues social media transforms rather than amplifies offline gang  
6 violence. An insult on twitter, for example, may initiate a very different response as opposed to the  
7 same insult being delivered face-to-face and on the street. In extending this point, Stuart poses a very  
8 pressing methodological question, how do we know social media posts actually cause a violent act to  
9 occur? For him, greater attention or a systematic approach is needed to extract or challenge  
10 presumptions that social media gang posturing directly contributes to violence. Moreover, Lane (2019)  
11 emphasises the beneficial element of social media for the youth of these neighbourhoods, particularly  
12 for young women who may share and model positive experiences and thus impress on their audiences  
13 an affirmative message. Yet within the urban literature, there is a prominence toward gang members  
14 use of social media to instil violence. For Patton et al (2013) 'internet banging' is a form of social media  
15 communication used to incite fear or trade insults when street posturing moves online. Patton et al.  
16 draw upon the Post-Fordian landscape where industrial masculine identities have become lost and  
17 into such a vacuum gang membership and cultural outlets, such as *Hip Hop*, reconfigure identity  
18 through rehearsed masculine displays used to establish credibility. The online presentation of the gang  
19 members often display references to violence, wealth, drugs or sex with a deliberate and recognisable  
20 message for their audiences. Urbanik and Haggerty (2018) extend this further, with some generational  
21 considerations, where street criminals of old (or non-digital natives) frown upon new methods of  
22 display. Previously, criminal activities were concealed; now such activities are overt and celebrated  
23 through social media – all with incriminatory potential. The social media users considered in this paper  
24 face limited risk of physical violence, as compared to street life, however their online worlds do expose  
25 certain kinds of dangers related to privacy and security and it is how they comprehend and react to  
26 these dangers, as we will see, that has comparable rationales to life on the street.  
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3 Anderson's work provides a useful framework to enhance understandings of social media; yet, I am  
4 not setting up privacy and security as binary notions, instead I am interested in how social media  
5 activities are rationalised through lens of security and privacy. Privacy in an online context ensures the  
6 appropriate use of data and a regard for private, family and home life (see Council of Europe 2017).  
7  
8 In the UK, privacy law is guided by Article 8 of European Convention on Human Rights and abuses  
9 might include excessive collection of information, unauthorised exposure of information or other  
10 misuses of this information, such as monitoring communications (see ICO 2014). Whereas, online  
11 security centres on keeping data safe from theft, hacking or other instances of abuse where data is  
12 compromised. For example, passwords stolen to access sensitive information (see CNN 2017).  
13  
14 Moreover, the General Data Protection Regulation, which governs UK and European data, is a  
15 statutory right protecting the unlawful use of personal data (see European Commission 2018; ICO  
16 2018). What underscores these definitions and how they are considered in the paper are the tensions  
17 as to how personal information is understood by social media users (Andrejevic 2006). Social media  
18 organisations hold sizeable amounts of users' information (see Ellison and boyd 2013; Uldam 2016);  
19 for example, date of birth, password, email address, contact list, communication history, photographs,  
20 etc. In addition, fellow users can view the whereabouts, pictures, comments or preferences of others  
21 (see Albrechtslund 2008). Furthermore, 'human-data interaction' is a relatively new field of enquiry  
22 and forms of 'reflexive self-monitoring' invite others to watch and comment on activities and  
23 information shared (Lupton 2016). Such activities include the way in which people interact and make  
24 sense of their digital data, as well as 'data materialisation' or how users make their data real, material  
25 and visible online.

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52 Nissenbaum (2010) for example considers 'contextual integrity', context is grounded in the system  
53 that sets expectation and if these expectations are abridged then anxieties soon follow. Trust and faith  
54 is held within the system, for instance, passwords, professionalism, data rights or laws will protect  
55 (Nissenbaum 2011). In other contexts, Nissenbaum draws upon how a patient may go to their GP to  
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3 discuss a medical problem. The patient enjoys professional confidentiality, but later that night the GP  
4 shares with their spouse or dinner guests the nature of the patient's problem. The patient's name is  
5 not mentioned but the problem is. Nissenbaum's observations serve to highlight the complex nature  
6 of the lived experience of privacy or security. Indeed, Marwick and boyd (2014) build on this notion  
7 with 'privacy harms' evident in social media interactions. As they demonstrate, teenagers acclimatise  
8 to online harms and rather than relying on the protection of platforms or other users; their sharing  
9 online is framed by the assumption all will be viewed (Correa 2016). 'Networked privacy' presumes  
10 'privacy can easily be violated by any individual connected to the user' (Marwick and boyd 2014: 1064).  
11 In addition, 'context collapse' may also be a useful concept to explore imagined audiences and their  
12 guiding force when actors accentuate their identities in particular ways and quietly hide other identity  
13 aspects (Goffman 2002). The collapse is the flattening of multiple audiences into one, for example,  
14 audiences that are conceived as separate – work colleagues, family, ex-lovers – are merged (see Davis  
15 and Jurgenson, 2014; Marwick and boyd 2010; Vitak 2012).

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33 Other commentators have used the metaphor of the *boundary* to explain the choices made when  
34 sharing information (see Petronio 2012). Privacy is mediated through the transfer of individual privacy  
35 boundaries to collective privacy boundaries, when for instance information is posted on Facebook and  
36 control is held by the network of 'friends' rather than by the user. Disclosure of this sort is also due to  
37 the norm of reciprocity - if a friend provides some information to you, then you provide information  
38 in return. This lubricates conversations and friendships, but also provides a mutual responsibility as to  
39 how the information is managed and the boundary maintained. It builds closeness and trust, and  
40 intimacy develops the more information is exchanged (Henderson and Gilding, 2004). Failure to follow  
41 boundary rules lead to breaches in friendships and violation of expectations, or termination of  
42 relationships. Therefore, there are expectations in the management and control of information,  
43 'friends' enjoy privileges and responsibilities (Acquisti and Gross 2006). Contextual integrity,  
44 networked privacy or boundaries offer insight into how privacy and security are negotiated in digital  
45 contexts; indeed, they also point toward the tensions inherent in how users value the communication

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3 potential of social media, as well as the problematics of disclosure or exposure (Shin 2010; Tsay-Vogel  
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5 et al. 2018). Yet, as I want to expand there are also specific codes that ground how such rules are  
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7 understood, much like those experienced by Anderson's neighbourhood residents.  
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### 10 11 12 13 14 **Social media code**

15 The codes I refer to emerged and developed from my research interviews with social media users (see  
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17 below) and the codes focus on *presentation*, *protection* and *surveillance*. Firstly, the code of  
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19 presentation is integral to the Street; an individual should display presentations of being 'streetwise'  
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21 in order to traverse and navigate the street. The biggest, badest and meanest persona prevails on the  
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23 street and much of the pantomime is about presenting a 'don't mess with me' air of authority. Equally,  
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25 grooming, stance and clothing can be used to deter violence or intimidate, and 'is shaped by what he  
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27 thinks others are thinking of him in relation to his peers' (Anderson 2000: 73). Thus, the presentation  
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29 on the street formulates uniformity as to how one should present oneself if a particular expectation  
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31 is required and this can be mirrored in social media interactions (Allmer 2014; Bailey and Steeves  
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33 2015). Central to participation on social media is carefully curating an online presence and profile, one  
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35 that often details users' identity, preferences and past-times (see Quinn and Papacharissi 2014). In  
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37 addition, gossip, eavesdropping, sharing, and watching are all elements of social media and offer  
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39 reflections on the self-policing, conformity and self-monitoring practice it may instil (Andrejevic 2009;  
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41 Tifentale and Manovich 2015). On social media, a homogenising effect is also encouraged and is  
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43 attentive to the interpretation of others and the formation of identities (see Smith 2016). Becoming  
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45 part of an online group, for instance, may encourage exaggerated performances that are designed to  
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47 appeal and conform to the inferred preferences and approval of the group. Smith (2016; 2016a), for  
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49 instance, draws on the cultural shift to visibility within digital communications; sharing information  
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51 online provides opportunities for expansive creation and pseudo-individualization, as users are free  
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53 to promote, reveal and visualise in the ways they see fit – for example creating a stylized identity  
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3 (Mascheroni et al., 2015). Indeed, Smith has used the example of the Instagram star Essena O’Neill  
4 and her disillusionment with the performative element of posting, posing and positioning herself  
5 online. As O’Neill tells us, ‘nothing about this is real’, rather it is ‘contrived perfection made to get  
6 attention’ (see Guardian 2015a). For her, as a social media ‘star’, performances are calculated to  
7 generate reactions from audiences, endorsements from companies or advance fame. As we will see  
8 similar performances and calculations are made by ‘non-star’ users in how they communicate and in  
9 the code of presentation that directs their behaviour.  
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22 Secondly, a code of protection on the street can be understood in terms of ‘I got yo’ back’ (Anderson  
23 2000: 88) which refers to friends being vigilant to potential harms or when an individual ensures a  
24 degree of personal protection. Equally, the role of protection extends to those with whom the  
25 individual associates or perhaps, the individual is from a well-known family in the area and this  
26 membership provides deterrence and protection. On social media the need to prevent physical harm  
27 may be less pressing (but not exempt, as we will see), however harms such as others using personal  
28 data, protection of reputation or popularity and the cost of seeking to protect these and maintain the  
29 social capital of the user are comparable (see Tuten and Solomon 2014). However, maintaining an  
30 appearance of being up-to-date, being social, being clever, being popular or being ‘cool’ consigns  
31 demands on users – this may not apply to all users, but invariably users do seek to project identities,  
32 images and perceptions of themselves and others (Murthy 2012; Smith 2016a). Marwick and boyd  
33 (2014a) and Lenhart *et al.* (2011) attest that for ‘youth’ users maintaining their privacy is routinised  
34 and clearly practiced – i.e. keeping their parents ‘separate’ from the information they post on social  
35 media platforms. Evident in the practices of users is an awareness of protection – more specifically,  
36 what users should do, much like those on the street hoping to avoid violence or, in the case of social  
37 media, compromises to reputation, privilege or status.  
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3 Thirdly, a code of surveillance, can take the form of a community watching each other for opportunity,  
4 as well as for altruistic or policing intent. For example, if a drug dealer is removed from an area, a rival  
5 and observant dealer may profit by filling that space. Equally, surveillance by 'decent' members of the  
6 community may deter wrong-doing by their mere presence (Tilley 2014) – knowing there are  
7 witnesses can curb criminal intent. On the street, information could be determined by detailing the  
8 time an individual leaves their home, who they are likely to meet on a street corner or even what  
9 shops they frequent – these details may be advantageous to those who seek to know the movements,  
10 likes and preferences of those on the street. Whereas, social media details user's friends, their hobbies,  
11 their preferences, their families, their leisure time and so on (Correa 2016), this in turn presents an in-  
12 depth timeline of communications, as well as networks of acquaintances (Yang et al. 2012) - which  
13 track activity and intent. The State, of course, has the authority to seek this information and  
14 smartphone logs, GPS locations, text messages, internet search history or social media posts are all  
15 part of this remit. Moreover, a growing body of work has considered how police forces and police  
16 officers use social media (Davis et al. 2014; Deneff et al. 2013; Trottier and Fuchs 2014). Alternatively,  
17 government have sought to target and decrypt WhatsApp conversations in order to prevent terror  
18 attacks (Guardian 2017). Other work still, concentrates on the dilemmas of social media, especially  
19 when personal and professional participation collide. Pressing here is when police forces  
20 communicate through social media inadvisably (Goldsmith 2015); for example, the London Met Police  
21 helicopter photographed a well-known comedian crossing a London street and included the image  
22 with the tweet, 'Whilst on tasking [sic] in central London this morning we spotted a certain energetic  
23 funny man ... Can you guess who?'. There was no suggestion the comedian had done anything wrong  
24 and the tweet was supposedly light-hearted; yet questions remain about the protection of the  
25 comedian's privacy and security (see Guardian 2015). These are the moments when privacy and  
26 security are confronted online.  
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## The Study

The empirical work that informs the paper is taken from a large research project reviewing societal resilience to surveillance, the findings presented here concentrate on internet use and in particular the actions of social media users in select locations in the UK. To be considered a 'user', interviewees were those who had a social media presence and used it on a least a weekly basis. Recruitment began with flyers placed in a shop local to my home. The shop, located in a small UK city, is popular with the local community and has high levels of footfall; staff were also extremely accommodating in helping to promote the research. The flyers had a colourful word-cloud on one side with words such as 'privacy', 'user', 'data' and 'online'. On the reverse, it stated that I was interested in experiences of how surveillance and monitoring touched upon everyday life.

I intended recruitment to grow in a relatively organic manner, as I simply waited for participants to contact me. I had hoped self-selection in this manner would recruit a multifarious and enthusiastic sample. The flyers had two effects; they produced a demographic spread of the local population and after the completion of these initial interviews participants were asked to recommend others whom they felt would be interested in participating. 'Snowball sampling' has in the past proved effective in gaining access to hard-to-reach communities (see Browne 2005; Noy 2008), where the promotion of the research by a known community member acts as a virtual gatekeeper. In this case snowballing encouraged an interactional dynamic, one very much in keeping with the logic of the paper - how users communicate online, participants voluntarily tweeted and posted about the research, which aided recruitment. I set no agenda as to the demographic make-up of those I wished to interview; rather everyone who contacted me was interviewed. Interviews took place within a 6-month period - due to funding constraints. Interviews were semi-structured, conversationally driven and were recorded and transcribed. In total I conducted 27 interviews with a diverse range of users; for instance, participants were aged between 18 and 70, the gender balance was 15 male and 12 female, 26 participants were white and 22 had or were about to receive a university education. Participants' professions included; student, medical doctor, private detective, retired police officer, writer, rights

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3 activist, lawyer, unemployed, academic, archaeologist and shop manager. Interviews typically took  
4 place in participants' homes or coffee shops and were on average an hour in duration. In total, I  
5 travelled to four UK cities, as well as two regional towns in the south of the UK.  
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### 10 11 12 13 **Social Media Privacy and Security**

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15 Privacy and security on social media are not exclusive, as both influence, and at times are inter-related:  
16 for example, users speak of securing their privacy. Nevertheless it is the tensions felt toward how  
17 personal information is communicated via social media that drives, for instance, what users might  
18 want to keep offline or for audiences that are privileged, i.e. 'friends', as against the wider viewing  
19 public of the internet. In what follows the 3 codes of *presentation*, *protection* and *surveillance* are  
20 used to frame how security and privacy influence thoughts and actions of users. I begin with the code  
21 of presentation.  
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#### 30 31 32 33 **Presentation**

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35 The following participant responds to the question, what sort of information do you put up on your  
36 Facebook profile?  
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40 *Pretty much everything. I guess, photos, date of birth, where you live, who you're friends with,*  
41 *what school you go to, where you work, so a lot of information.... I'm pretty sensible. If I was*  
42 *taking drugs or something, I wouldn't put that up, but I don't. I probably should censor some*  
43 *things, but I don't. ...*  
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46 *(Female, 18, student)*  
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49 As the participant above suggests, activities that may be illegal or embarrassing are edited from her  
50 profile, yet other details are forthcoming, such as her date of birth and home address. She  
51 acknowledges she should be more careful with her information; yet the urge to share details with her  
52 audience outweigh the potential risks associated with disclosing this personal information (see  
53 Sebescen and Vitak 2016; Solove 2015). In similar contexts, users can and do make risqué comment  
54 for the benefit of their audience, no matter how unintended their consequences. For example, a UK  
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3 politician making a perceived humorous tweet, that had derogatory intent, something she either failed  
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5 to recognise or sacrificed for dramatic impact (see BBC 2014). Indeed, when participating in social  
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7 media users at times assign trust to the system, much as Nissambaum's contextual integrity suggests,  
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9 users may be more willing to express controversial statements due to expected levels of protection,  
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11 anonymity or being unaware of traceability. As a participant continues,  
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15 *When Thatcher died, the censor barriers just fell down and there was a whole load of blue*  
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17 *bloody murder going on. And now I think, oh, shit. Even at the time I thought, this is really*  
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19 *stupid because I know that it's not that hard to follow these things up. .... I was the drunk*  
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21 *bloke at the bar who was telling everybody the time of day... and my whole point about the*  
22  
23 *Thatcher death is that you say things that are just wrong, and you know they're wrong. It*  
24  
25 *doesn't matter if it's, somebody that you don't know personally. But, actually, when it is*  
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27 *somebody you do know ... I don't know. ... If you had two friends around, you're not going to*  
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29 *say something that's going to absolutely fuck one off just because it amuses the other one.*

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31 *(Male, 42, Archaeologist)*

32 Evident, for this participant, is an awareness of social etiquette which influences his personal  
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34 interactions, such as not goading friends for amusement, and the dilemma here mirrors Anderson's  
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36 tensions about making choices and understanding the consequences of those choices. For Anderson  
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38 decency is a means of distinguishing oneself – i.e. you are not 'street'. Much of what Anderson  
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40 contemplates is a drive for social capital, 'street' equals hipness or contempt for conventional 'white'  
41  
42 lifestyles and for those of a street persuasion doing well in school or speaking standard English are  
43  
44 frowned upon. But, the consequences of presenting oneself as 'street' increases the likelihood of  
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46 becoming embedded in the socio-economic depravation of the neighbourhood and its associated  
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48 disadvantages. Code-switching, as Anderson calls it, presents an advantageous dexterity to those who  
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50 can and do traverse between the extremes of violence and decency; 'the decent kid' seeks credibility  
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52 in both spheres; on the street they exert 'street knowledge' through style of dress or acting 'tough',  
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54 all designed to ward off danger. At home, or perhaps in school, they are courteous and work hard on  
55  
56 their studies, with the aim of enhancing opportunities to further their life (see Anderson 2000: 98-  
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3 106). Working code advantageously may also be evident in the following participant's use of social  
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5 media to gain benefits, such as vouchers or discounts by befriending and following particular accounts.  
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8 *I don't have any friends on Facebook, I just sign up for things that I like and want to get*  
9  
10 *information on... I don't want to engage with people I don't know. Maybe it's not entering into*  
11  
12 *the full spirit of social media, but that is what I do.*

13  
14 *(Male 44, Journalist)*  
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16 Here engagement and presentation is tailored through an account that provides none of the usual  
17  
18 personal or social inputs that are expected in social media, instead through a coded participation he  
19  
20 receives the promotional incentives that are on offer and retains his detachment.  
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#### 23 24 25 Protection

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27 The user below uses an assumed name on Twitter and avoids Facebook. This is a precaution because  
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29 he is an ex-police officer and as he admits there are individuals who may seek retribution,  
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33 *I don't particularly want to have somebody banging on my door, so I'm not on Facebook.*

34  
35 *(Male, 62, retired police officer)*  
36

37 Again, there is a presentation evident here, however this presentation is very much rationalised by a  
38  
39 fear of physical violence and a desire for protection. Indeed, these measures are advisable in the face  
40  
41 of his previous occupation. Much like Anderson's brash presentations of 'street' the above  
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43 presentation is tailored to the potential of violence. Yet on social media there remains a tenuous  
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45 balance to posting and sharing information due to its real potential to expose participants to risk.  
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47 More common however for those I spoke to was having their information violated, invariably an  
48  
49 account was hacked or a comment they had posted was misconstrued. These are revelatory moments  
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51 because their security and privacy had been viscerally challenged. Yet also pressing are the tensions  
52  
53 induced as users work to manage their social media privacy and security. The following participant  
54  
55 elaborates,  
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3 *I had a really bad experience once where a guy at work, who I'd never met before, he was*  
4 *going to be working with me and he invited me to a meeting, and I walked in and he had a*  
5 *picture of me on his computer and the first thing he said to me was, oh, it was [daughter's*  
6 *name] birthday last week, wasn't it, and you went to the – he was a digital guy – and you went*  
7 *to the zoo, didn't you, with your sister and fed the giraffes. ... and I was like, oh my god!*

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10  
11 *(Female, 43, Publishing Manager)*

12  
13 The shock felt when information posted on social media is accessed and visualised by a fellow user is  
14 plain to see. To some degree her personal and private life was violated within a work context. Yet,  
15 despite presenting her information freely on social media (and with no privacy settings), there was  
16 little expectation on her part that others (outside of her family and friends) would view her posts. As  
17 the participant suggests this was a revelatory moment, details of a family outing were not something  
18 she was willing to share with a colleague she did not know. Following the event this user reset her  
19 privacy setting and is now 'much more careful'.

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30 Diligence and protecting information is a strenuous activity (Lenhart et al. 2011); the following  
31 participant describes a 'security fatigue' toward his protection

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34  
35 *I'm aware of how vulnerable your own networks are but I suspect, like a lot of people, I suffer*  
36 *from security fatigue. When I set my passwords I'm slightly idle. When I've put a password in*  
37 *and they said moderate security and I've tried various permutations and it's still moderate, I*  
38 *can't be arsed to find one which says high-level. Which is ridiculous, really, because I'd like to*  
39 *think I'm reasonably well-versed in the threats out there. But, again, it's a kind of security*  
40 *fatigue.*

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45 *(Male, 42, shop manager)*

46  
47 Protecting an account and changing passwords or developing new ones is time consuming, as well as  
48 taxing on memory - as the participant highlights the 'fatigue' felt outweighs the demands required.  
49 Wegner (2010) found when students were given 2 options in creating a password, the first option  
50 without any direction on how to create the password and the second option providing guidelines –  
51 i.e. word length symbols etc. – 50% of the students chose the first option because it was easier, despite  
52 knowing the second option provided better security. Equally, Bada and Sasse (2014) argue 'high  
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3 usability = low security' and 'high security = low usability' are preferable to most users. Quite possibly,  
4  
5 there is a tipping point where the management of privacy becomes a hindrance to the practicalities  
6  
7 and conveniences of using social media – especially when persuading users to perform what are  
8  
9 perceived as tedious tasks (Furnell and Thomson 2009). Unlike 'network privacy' where expectations  
10  
11 of harm are embedded in how the system is understood and used, here awareness of harm and  
12  
13 countering harm are transient and pliable.  
14  
15

16  
17 The following participant draws on generational observations on the potential dangers of social media  
18  
19 and ultimately draws on traditional understandings of protection,  
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22  
23 *I was speaking to my Nan the other day ...She's recently found out about Facebook and stuff.*  
24  
25 *She said, don't use that because people have got a bad eye. .... so from a cultural point of view,*  
26  
27 *it's like you're very private about photos ... She was like, a bad eye and people don't even know*  
28  
29 *they have it but they can look at the photo and really almost curse it without even realizing it.*  
30  
31 *... I don't know. It's just an Indian thing.*  
32

33  
34 *(Female, 33, stay-at-home mum)*  
35

36  
37 In this context, tradition dictates mother and baby stay in-doors and away from bad spirits for a  
38  
39 number of days after birth, for the participant's Nan, placing photographs of children online heightens  
40  
41 such potential risk. The participant has an awareness of superstition but still places the photographs  
42  
43 online. For others certain interactions, as the following participant stresses, should remain within the  
44  
45 privacy of the relationship,  
46  
47

48  
49 *I've seen, for example, in the last year, a couple, a guy and a girl that I've known for 15 years*  
50  
51 *who were just friends, I've seen them get together and split up on Facebook. It's the most*  
52  
53 *unedifying spectacle the way they've slagged each other off and all this kind of thing and you*  
54  
55 *just like that's not the kind of conversations I want to be having in public.*  
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58 *(Male, 45, PhD student)*  
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3 During a relationship breakdown emotions are high; however, there is a counter tension of sharing  
4 too much and as the participant suggests, it is 'unedifying' to witness the detail and vitriol of a  
5 conversation that for him should be conducted away from public audiences and in a private setting.  
6  
7 In a similar vein, Anderson (2002) describes *Joe Dickens*, a lone father with unruly children who play  
8 on the street 'at all hours', his parenting and the behaviour of his children are frowned upon by his  
9 neighbours. Mostly because it disrupts the neighbourhood, but also because it goes against decency  
10 and what a family should do. Much like the examples here, there is a tension as to what is acceptable  
11 on social media and, more importantly, an acknowledgement of the consequences to posting  
12 particular information or behaving in potentially damaging or offensive ways.  
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## 26 Surveillance

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28 The following participant mainly uses Facebook as a source of information,  
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31 *Facebook, for example, very little goes up from me. I use it more to track what people are*  
32 *doing and where my friends are.*  
33

34  
35 *(Female, 64, Charity project manager)*  
36

37 Crawford (2009) describes this type of behaviour as 'lurking' and argues lurkers play an important role,  
38 one of the gathered audience, without whom social media has little impact. More accurately, perhaps,  
39 this is a form of 'social surveillance', where the masses watch the masses, thus instilling a sense of  
40 control on what users do online (Marwick 2012). Unlike more traditional 'top-down' forms of  
41 surveillance here self-policing and self-monitoring are peer generated. Yet, fears of being monitored  
42 by authoritative organisations do prevail. The following participant stresses how his social media input  
43 is inhibited and self-censored due to his political allegiances and previous arrest,  
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53 *I've put maybe over time one or two photos from demos up there, because I'm aware that I*  
54 *would have been noticed ... I was arrested once on that demo just after the invasion of Iraq,*  
55 *... I would have been noticed before, just by my involvement in [protest] group ... I'm not going*  
56 *to put anything politically rated on Facebook.*  
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3 (Male, 43, unemployed)  
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6 Users are at times aware of the incriminating evidence their posts can reveal, equally there is  
7  
8 investigatory potential to social media users and fellow users can observe, monitor and report on illicit  
9  
10 or untoward behaviours. The private investigator, below, refers to a commission from an insurance  
11  
12 company seeking to verify certain information while processing insurance claims. As the participant  
13  
14 states when starting to investigate a person he begins with genealogy websites to establish place of  
15  
16 birth, date of birth, parent's names and the person's full name. His second source of information is  
17  
18 social media, even when individuals do not have a social media presence:  
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22  
23 *I'll search for one of your brothers or sisters who's got an unusual name. I'll look at their friends'*  
24 *list. I'll find you. And again, even if you haven't got Facebook, one of your family will have. I*  
25 *say to people when they say, oh, you'll never find any photographs of me online. You say, have*  
26 *you been to a family party in the last ten years. And they go, yes. Anybody take your picture?*  
27 *Well, yes, but I haven't got anything online. No. But they have. It's not what you do. It's what*  
28 *everyone else does.*  
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33 (Male, 49, Private Investigator)  
34

35 Social media makes users visible in ways that may not always be immediately clear (Albrechtslund  
36  
37 2008; Trottier 2012; Trottier, 2013; Trottier and Lyon 2012) and audiences such as law enforcement  
38  
39 agencies, marketers or fraudsters can easily circumvent privacy and security (boyd 2007). The quotes  
40  
41 in this section offer examples of contextual collapse, as the information presented is used by a  
42  
43 separate audience to trace and monitor the social media activities of the target person. The audience  
44  
45 is one. Yet online representations are often exaggerated or controversial and so the verifying process  
46  
47 afforded by social media allows others to view and make decisions on what may be 'real', acceptable  
48  
49 or lawful (Anderson 2000: 313). Indeed, what can also be extracted from social media presentations  
50  
51 are undeniable truths, such as evidence users were in a certain location when they claim to be  
52  
53 elsewhere (as when GPS locators on Instagram positioned a Russian Tank in a prohibited area of  
54  
55 Ukraine, see Szoldra 2014). Or, in the case of the private investigator proving someone was skiing  
56  
57 when their insurance claim suggested they were having difficulty walking. This is the landscape of  
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3 social media where codes are orientated by worlds offline and online – and this may be an additional  
4 contextual collapse, where what is said online has repercussions offline. Moreover, controversies such  
5 as Cambridge Analytica further demonstrate (see Guardian 2018) - where the details of up to 50  
6 million Facebook users was used without consent - that consent and privacy laws offer limited  
7 protections from surveillance of this nature, as social media companies have clearly abused their  
8 positions of guardianship toward users' data.  
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### 20 **Codes of Privacy and Security**

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22 In moving towards a conclusion, I want to revisit the 3 codes highlighted and their relevance to  
23 Anderson's (2000) observations. As we have seen social media communications are at times  
24 immediate and reactionary, at other times attentive and careful - and this is the crux of privacy and  
25 security on social media. Repercussions of posting incendiary comments, or the 'bad eye', or posting  
26 about drug-use impact on the reputations, social currency and, in the case of the police officer,  
27 physical well-being of users. Codes of *presentation* demonstrate how users mobilise currency such as  
28 popularity or social connectivity (Daily, 2014) and are conscious of presentation to specific audiences  
29 (Khamis et al. 2017). Anderson would attest equivalent posturing is evident in the Code of the Street  
30 where the presentation of personas readily identifiable with violence and decency are forthcoming  
31 and used to strategic effect.  
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46 Codes of *protection* on social media demand vigilance because presentations may divulge sensitive  
47 and offensive messages to their audiences, as users stated, 'I probably should censor some things',  
48 'the censor barriers just fell down'. For others, privacy and security is a tiring process, as alluded to by  
49 the 'fatigue' of the shop manager. In a networked privacy context, information is co-constructed  
50 (boyd, 2012) and users ensure levels and means of privacy by tailoring what they put online. They also  
51 make informed decisions, 'very little from me goes up', much like teenagers sanitizing Facebook  
52 comments because they know their parents are on their friend's list (see Marwick and boyd 2014). As  
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3 we have seen, things can, and do, go wrong which adds to the tension of social media. Knowing  
4 someone went to the zoo or knowing they were arrested on a demo impart detailed, personal and in-  
5 depth information. What for Anderson is 'the predatory influence of the street' (2000: 286), in the  
6 world of social media, can be seen in pressures to conform, putting information online that represents  
7 the image the user wishes to portray . Alternatively, when posting in states of turmoil or inebriation  
8 tension abound with ill-judged comment or comment that pays limited regard to a code of protection.  
9 Social media may be self-monitoring *extraordinaire*: on the one hand, it is the collection of data by  
10 organisations or the authoritative power of governmental agencies; on the other, users monitor their  
11 posts or observe the comments of others – as the adoptive father has done. Andrejevic (2009) speaks  
12 of 'digital enclosure' where every action generates information, and so nothing goes to waste. Indeed,  
13 social media offers much thought to monitoring and surveillance because social media quantifies in  
14 very real ways the opinions and thoughts of individuals precisely because the interactions of users  
15 become measurable, traceable and visible - and are ultimately never forgotten (Trottier and Lyon  
16 2010). Equally as the private detective states, it is often not about what you do online, rather 'its what  
17 others do' that can expose details and indeed the management of your privacy moves beyond  
18 personal actions to those of acquaintances and platforms controllers.

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41 Privacy management on social media can also be governed by adverse experiences or tailoring  
42 presentations to suit peers, family and/or audiences. This is the code of *surveillance* where users are  
43 aware of the expectation of audiences and perhaps remain aware of the damage an ill-conceived  
44 commentary can make. Nevertheless, activity is often out-weighted by the drive to communicate or,  
45 simply, cautionary intent wanes and fatigues. Anderson speaks of similar transitions when he refers  
46 'Training Again' - when individuals move from the world of violence to the world of decency. For  
47 instance, when a one-time drug dealer decides to live a life inside the law and the skills of dealing on  
48 the street are redundant in their new interactions with their communities. Inevitably, the gravitas  
49 once held is lost as the threat of violence is reduced and the individual has to start again, normally in  
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3 low status positions of employment. For the once 'respected' drug dealer the transition is often  
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5 difficult and the prospect of return to their old ways is high. In a similar way for some users their  
6  
7 appreciations of security and privacy may follow trajectories that start with good intentions of being  
8  
9 secure but through security fatigue are tempted toward a less protective or surveillance-aware  
10  
11 outlook. Users, as we have seen, have experienced trouble online and the space of social media is  
12  
13 where participants are exposed to risks, more so, than possibly elsewhere in their offline everyday  
14  
15 lives. Being social media smart – i.e. avoiding trouble – is an intuitive or learned sense that has  
16  
17 equivalences to 'street' astuteness, all of which highlights how social media users approach and adapt  
18  
19 their online privacy and security.  
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## 25 **Conclusion**

26  
27 Anderson's (2000) 'Code of the Street' is premised on challenging the notion that street violence is a  
28  
29 random act with little or no formal reasoning to it. Instead he argues there is an organisational logic  
30  
31 to the street. Anderson's observations are telling in highlighting the informal rules to how life  
32  
33 functions in a run-down neighbourhood of Philadelphia and such a code is undoubtedly replicated in  
34  
35 many communities. In the vein of Goffman (2002), Becker (2008) or Duneier and Carter (1999) the  
36  
37 etiquettes of how 'things are done' presents rich material for the sociologist. Anderson's (2000)  
38  
39 observations highlight what the informal code of a specific environment can bring to sociological  
40  
41 understandings. This paper in turn has addressed how those who use social media are impacted by  
42  
43 codes that guide their behaviours and understandings. These codes mirror Anderson's work in  
44  
45 highlighting how specific populations make sense of their environments and learn how to interact  
46  
47 within these settings. As we have seen security and privacy are influential to the intentions of social  
48  
49 media users; often in ways that are visceral, in ways that change behaviours, or in ways that fatigue  
50  
51 users. Nevertheless as the paper has argued these are the codes that help to highlight just how users  
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53 navigate their security and privacy on social media.  
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3 The codes of presentation, protection and surveillance as have been used here demonstrate the  
4 associations users hold with privacy and security in their online lives. Additionally they highlight  
5 acceptances that if you are using social media then there are risks that you may cause offense, identify  
6 yourself to others or create 'unreal' presentations. These risks are off-set by the advancement and  
7 enjoyment of information received and relayed and we must not lose sight of the fun and  
8 communicative value of social media as this is an important component to its popularity and being.  
9  
10 Where the 3 codes are helpful is in framing how these aspects are appreciated by users and in  
11 particular how users rationalise their actions and the consequences of these. In this regard, social  
12 media use demonstrates the projections of users as they seek to communicate and observe their  
13 audiences. While codes of protection are guided by shock or realisations of vulnerabilities to intrusion  
14 by audiences. Whereas codes of surveillance presents the underlying monitoring presence of social  
15 media and how this is understood and used by users. All of which offer a perspective on the erudition  
16 of users in making the choices they do. Key to this paper has been how privacy and security may guide  
17 those choices, and much like Anderson's decency and violence, these serve as beacons in the  
18 navigation process. Both offer indicators of what may happen and it is for the user or resident to  
19 comprehend how the environment functions and accordingly how they act within the codes of these  
20 environments.  
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