When Crisis Promotes Proximity: Patterns of Social Control at the Lebanese University

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During the Lebanese war of 1975 to 1990, the only public university of Lebanon branched out into more than 40 locations all over the country. While this deed reflects the inner division of Lebanon, it also moved the University nearer to the country's geographical and social peripheries. Employing field research, newspaper articles, and grey literature this article gauges the effects of fragmentation in terms of the dynamics of social control that resulted from it. It shows that by the perspective of social control, sectarianism and clientelism can be observed as related with, but distinct from one another.

Keywords: Higher education, Clientelism, Lebanese University, Sectarianism, Social Control

Introduction

Much has been written about sectarianism and sectarian clientelism in Lebanon from the viewpoint of political history (Sinno; Sharāra; Makdissi). Little has been published about how it works on the micro-sociological level, certainly when it comes to the country's highly diverse education system (Nucho; Deeb and Harb).

In the context of political systems such as the Lebanese, sectarianism or communalism (Arabic: *madhhabiyya* or *ṭāʾifiyya*) is a mode of distributing legal, political and administrative power among different religious groups. Beyond this meaning, sectarianism is often used to mark a mentality, a pattern of loyalty which channels contacts and forges relationships. This concept of sectarianism widely overlaps with the one of clientelism. Both concepts, sectarianism and clientelism by themselves have little explanatory or illustrative power in order to understand institutional relations. To look a bit deeper into the mechanisms, by which they work, I was searching for a different perspective when studying the Lebanese higher education landscape.

Considering the academic benefits and costs of the Lebanese University's (LU's) institutional change, I got the impression that, besides the scattering of material and intellectual resources, the mode of social

control is an important standard by which the price for the apparent gain in access and social mobility can be illustrated. Browsing sociological theoreticians for the concept of social control, my attention was drawn to Horwitz (see table 1), who has shown that under conditions of individuation and anonymity, groups tend to rule by values, norms, and judiciary, whereas under conditions of proximity, group loyalty is prior to individual legal interest, and the mechanisms of rule are rather negotiation, settlement etc., in which personal social capital has more impact. Hence, with Horwitz, I theorize the modus of social control as a continuum between proximity and anonymity.

In the context of higher education these concepts apply in that the separation of the individual university student from her/his former social context of family, kinship, childhood and school time peers and neighborhood releases resources of time and energy to have contact with academic peers in an environment – usually an urban one – where her/his formerly earned reputation is widely disregarded. Basically, such an anonymous setting levels the playing field for the students' chances to build up an academic reputation through academic merit, independent of the social capital each of them had accumulated in their native environment before enrolling

	Proximity/collective		**Anonymity/individual**	
	Conciliatory	Compensatory	Penal	Therapeutic
Harm	Relational	Material	Value	Personality
Liability	Shared	Group	Individual	*none*
Goal	Reconciliation	Settlement	Retribution	Normality
Solution	Negotiation	Payment ("deal")	Penalty	Treatment

Table 1: Major styles of social control according to Horwitz
Source: Horwitz, Allan V. *The Logic of Social Control.* Plenum Press, 1990, p. 22.

at university. In other words, a student living in a dorm or shared flat in the capital is less likely to be asked e. g. to take care of her/his smaller siblings, sick relatives or of any communal issue; she or he will more likely spend her/his leisure time with classroom peers talking about issues concerning their studies than a student living at her family's home far from the capital, where only a small section of the university is situated.

Of course, the change in connectivity affects professors, too. A professor of LU's Faculty of Law, Political and Administrative Science Branch 1 complained in an interview with me that after the relocation of the faculty branch from central Beirut to the new built campus in Ḥadath (about ten kilometers to the South of Beirut) in 2007, their networking patterns changed considerably. Whereas in the Hamra district in Beirut they had had contacts with colleagues from other universities and from many cultural backgrounds for lunch or after work, their daily encounters with colleagues in al-Ḥadath nowadays are usually restricted to colleagues from the same campus and from fewer socio-cultural backgrounds (LU Political Science 1 Senior; similar LU Political Science 2 Junior, who taught at three different campuses).

Most importantly, both a professor's as well as a student's academic performance and personality will less be looked at through the glasses of their general personality and their personal history when anonymity instead of proximity applies, and fewer people at university know them from their pre-academic and extra-academic contexts.

This article is based on data from two research-projects: one being a collective project titled "Local, Regional and

International Borrowing and Lending in Social Sciences at Egyptian and Lebanese Universities", which I coordinated between 2010 and 2015 as a research associate at the Orient-Institut Beirut, later at the Department of Oriental & Islamic Studies of the Ruhr-Universität Bochum.[1] A group of four researchers and four student assistants, we gathered data at four universities in Egypt and two in Lebanon, consisting of 40 semi-structured interviews with faculty members and a standardized survey administered to several hundred students, plus the universities' bylaws and annual reports. The second project, "History Writing at Lebanon's Universities" I conducted as a research associate of the Orient-Institut Beirut between 2015 and 2018. For it, I cross-analyzed titles and content tables of doctoral theses in history from different branches of the Faculty of Arts and Humanities, and newspaper articles from leading daily newspapers of Lebanon. The data presented here, namely five faculty interviews and a number of newspaper articles and reports are but a small part of what we collected. Additionally, I analyzed three lectures and two scholarly articles by academics, who had studied LU as a subject of their own research while they belonged to its faculty or student cadre.

From the sources, a picture of communalism as both a legal and an informal mode of social control emerges by focusing LU as part of the administrative and service apparatus of the Lebanese Republic. The dialectic of communalism with either proximity or anonymity will be illustrated. To that end, socio-geographical and administrative changes implemented at LU since 1977 are highlighted in the next two sections. Section 4 shows a number of examples of how styles of social control impact on decision making at LU in matters of faculty appointment and the organization of student activities. Section 5 gives an outlook on the public debate about the problems resulting from the situation of LU and possible policy consequences in light of the existing patterns of social control.

The Lebanese University Re-Structured Over Time

The Lebanese University (LU), which was founded in the course of the 1950s and 1960s with the intention to merge and integrate the Lebanese communities on the level of intellectual and professional leadership, serves a highly illustrative example of how communalism dismembered an institution, which was intended to counteract it and become an integrating force for the young nation.

The Lebanese war of 1975 to 1990 divided the country into different regions characterized by different religious and ethnic communities through guarded and hard-fought demarcation lines. As one of many calamities that sprang from this, large numbers of university students and staff across the country were not able to arrive at their institutions for work and study anymore. Soon, some universities responded by opening branch campuses in regions or neighborhoods other than their main campuses. LU, the largest university of the country, and its only public one, branched out into more than 40 locations, from Tripoli in the north to Tyre in the south and the Bekaa valley in the east, based on a ministerial decree of 1976.[2] As the earliest measure of this process, additional branches were created East of Beirut in predominantly Christian areas, whereas before the war, most of LU had been situated in West Beirut. This measure had been considered already before the war with the intention to de-centralize LU, but had been opposed by Muslim and leftist stakeholders (al-Amin, "Al-Jāmiʿa" 21). While it reflects the inner division of Lebanon, it also moved LU nearer to the country's geographical and social peripheries and enabled a kind of socio-geographical inclusion different from the cultural-confessional inclusion initially

intended: the fact that, nowadays, people living far from the capital can go to university without leaving their families has made higher education accessible especially for unmarried women from traditional homes. The proximity to the geographical periphery also facilitated studying at LU to many people who already work in non-academic professions, are married and have founded families in places far from Beirut. So LU's fragmentation added an element of social mobility to Lebanon's educational landscape (Abou Rjeily; al-Hakam).

Social equality, however, comes at a certain expense pertaining to the character of higher education: as one of the consequences of LU's fragmentation, its resources are stretched (Moussawi, "Al-Jāmiʿa al-Lubnānīya" 301-303; al-Amin et al. 46-47). LU's budget, supplied annually by decision of Parliament, has to allocate funding for several locations of the same faculty instead of just one, as was initially the case. Up to five student offices instead of one, along with a faculty secretariat, and a library etc. have to be funded. Hence, libraries, for instance, are severely underequipped. The 56 faculty libraries of LU, which cater to more than 60,000 students and 3,000 professors, possess 700,000 printed volumes altogether (12,500 per branch library; Moussawi, "Al-Jāmiʿa"). For comparison, the libraries of the American University of Beirut (AUB) and of the Lebanese American University, enrolling 6,000 students each, feature libraries with far over 400,000 printed volumes each, and a far larger number of subscriptions and electronic publications than LU has (Khalifeh 17). A central library doesn't exist at LU and it is difficult to order a book or journal from another branch to one's own location.

Fig. 1: Cover sheets of doctoral theses from the Faculty of Arts/Lebanese University. Source: Courtesy of the author.

Research is hence not very strong: LU produces only a third in number of the published titles visible via Scopus that the AUB shows (Khalifeh 17), although it enrolls about ten times the number of students and three times as many professors. A high percentage of LU's dissertations deals with local topics detailed on hun-



Fig. 2: Governance structure of the Lebanese University before 1977.
Source: Courtesy of the author.

dreds of pages in highly descriptive style. Titles such as *The Development of School Education in the City of Tabnin 1982-2012* (accepted in 2013), *Yamuna and the Role of its Municipality in its Development 1925 to 2009* (2013), *Bint Jbeil from independence until 1970* (1981), *The Economic, Social and Political History of Ainata, 1920 to 1978* (2005) were legion on the dissertation shelves that I searched in local libraries of the Faculty of Arts and Humanities in West Beirut, Sidon, Dekwaneh and al-Fanar in 2016 (see fig.1).

From Self-Administration to Political Administration[3]

Before LU was branched out in the late 1970s, it was self-administered through an internationally common structure: a University Council, over which the University President presided, Faculty Councils over which the Deans presided, and Department Councils over which their Departmental Chairs presided (see fig. 2).[4] In the late 1970s, with two, three or five branches to most of the faculties, the position of a Director for each of these branches was created along with a branch council, hence a fourth level of administration (see fig. 3).

The branch directors are selected for their management skills, not their academic skills (Lebanese Republic, "Law 66/2009", §§ 78, 79, 81; al-Amin: personal interview). The Deans have their offices in separate locations, distant from the faculty branches. The councils on every level have become inactive for long periods of time, and decision making has become rather personalized around the person of the LU President, supervised by the government or the Minister of Education. This concerns the appointment of full time faculty and higher administrative positions, as well as major curricular and financial decisions. Minor decisions in the everyday management of academic life are now mostly in the hands of the branch directors. In sum, the academic personnel in the departments have much less power over the course of the university's activity than was initially intended by LU's bylaws, because



Fig. 3: Governance structure of LU as it emerged after 1977.
Source: Courtesy of the author.

they are not represented in their faculty councils anymore, but in the branch councils. Conversely, the government and administration have more decision making power than before.

During two long phases, institutions of LU's self-administration were officially suspended: From 1977 to 1993, the University Council was suspended and branch directors put in office; in 1997 it was decreed that professors be appointed by the government; in 2004, the LU Council was suspended again until 2014, when it was placed back into power and the Deans were granted back their original power of voting and decision making. LU's budget is delimited by parliament. The LU self-administration has no say in the acquisition and little power over the allocation of its resources.

Examples of Social Control at the Lebanese University

The de-centralization of LU had a deeper impact than the above described, however, and it can be associated with the forms of social control as outlined in Horwitz. When, after our conversation, the above mentioned political science Professor and I walked out of his office toward the entrance of the building, we passed a large window overseeing the inner court of the faculty building. On the wall facing us hung flags of the AMAL movement in a row alternating with *ʿAshūra* flags – as the *ʿAshūra* holidays had ended shortly before. AMAL means hope in Arabic, and is also the acronym for Afwāj al-Muqāwama al-Islāmīya (English translation: Batallions of the Islamic Resistance). It is the Shīʿi political movement next in prominence and constituency to the one calling itself Hizbollah (English translation: God's Party, in the following HA) and sharing electoral lists and certain spaces of influence with the latter (Kriener, *Lebanese* 38-43). *ʿAshūra* is the anniversary of the battle of Karbala/Iraq in 680 CE/61AH, the founding myth of the Shīʿa. It lasts ten days. Any sort of political symbols and activities on LU's campuses had been offi-

cially prohibited by LU's administration the same year (Lebanese University). However, in Lebanon religious holidays and symbols are often charged with political discourse. My interlocutor pointed to those flags remarking that under these influences, many students were ill at ease to come to campus and study. He pointed to the other side of the corridor, where another large window oversees the neighborhoods of the southern, Shi'a dominated suburbs of Beirut, the *ḍāḥiyah*, and added that "parties, tribes (*qabāʾil*) and clans (*ʿashāʾir*)" from there were exerting these influences (LU Political Science 1 Senior).

The following sections show a few examples of the mechanisms of social control practiced in LU institutions. They concern the appointment of faculty and some campus activities organized by the student councils.

1) Appointment of Faculty

As al-Amin ("Al-Jāmiʿa" 21-22) claims, after LU's fragmentation

> "The selection of Branch Directors goes on in accordance with the geo-political particularities of the area in which the branch is situated. Hence, anyone of them enjoys political authority bestowed on him by the local forces."

Similar procedures are applied to the selection of the LU President (al-Amin, "Al-Jāmiʿa" 31) and even the professors. Although the LU Council and the Faculty Councils were working again for a few years in the early 1990s, the government remained in charge for the appointment of the leading personnel and the professors of LU. The problems of clientelism, indiscriminate creation of positions and programs, and irregular demand of resources, however, which were intended to be addressed by this measure, were not mitigated. Instead, they were shifted into the political realm. The number of professors and administrative positions has grown considerably since then, because the politicians tend to just add to the nominated candidates those they are in favor of ("Al-Jāmiʿa" 26 ; al-Amin et al., 59-60; al-Haj; Moussawi "al-Taʿlīm"; Haidar: al-Taʿlīm).

In 2010, the following occurred at the Faculty of Humanities, Branch 1 in West Beirut, according to one of its professors, whom I interviewed: the Dean split a faculty position into two, because they wanted a Shīʿite applicant to be appointed, although only Sunni and Christian applicants had been shortlisted in light of the formal criteria in place. My interlocutor, who was a member of the commission processing the appointment, at first refused to sign the proposed arrangement. However, after he saw the Dean, a friend of his, come under pressure from the Minister of Education, he finally gave in and signed, so that two Shi'a were appointed as professors, who were actually not qualified for that position (LU Arts 1 Senior).

Later the same year, according to a newspaper report (Khoder, "Menacée et agressée"), the secretary of Branch 2 of the Faculty of Information, Laura Abi Tayyeh, quit her position after having been menaced at daylight on her way to work by two gunmen. She was known as being affiliated with the *Forces Libanaises*, a political party of the March 14 alliance favored by Christians. Soon, her position was filled by Antoine Khoury Harb, an adherent to the Christian dominated party in the opposite camp of the political spectrum, i.e. the Free Patriotic Movement. As stated in the report, the case was not examined any further by LU's administration, while a large group of students adherent to the same political camp as Abi Tayyeh staged a strike for several weeks. The same Antoine Khoury Harb seems to have been dismissed from his post as branch director three years later likewise in non-observance of the bylaws (al-Haj).

In another example, a high ranking employee of the Ministry of Energy and

Fig. 4: The flag of the AMAL movement next to the Lebanese flag in the entrance area of a faculty building on the al-Ḥadath campus.
Source: Al-Nahar Newspaper.

Water, Jean Aziz Boulos was appointed full time professor at LU in December 2012, just a week before he reached his age of retirement. The case produced a scandal not least because, at the same time, files that had been submitted for the promotion of faculty from contracted to full time personnel at LU were pending already for a long time: more than 600 contracted faculty members fulfilling the criteria for full time appointment had already been waiting for their promotion for up to seven years (Haidar: Muwaẓẓaf; al-Hakam; "Deterrent Strike"; Touma) Non-observance of bylaws in appointment procedures was a feature in many of my interviews and of the newspaper reports, regardless of the political allegiance of the authors.

2) Student Activities

Before the war, the Union of LU Students had been founded in 1971 (al-Amin, "Al-Jāmiʿa" 18). It organized elections of student representatives to the councils on all levels at LU: the University Council, Faculty Councils, and Department Councils (see fig. 2). In all these, their role was strictly advisory.

During the early war years, not only did these councils become inactive, but the Student Union also dissolved under the centrifugal forces of the ongoing political strife and LU's fragmentation. What remained until present, are student councils on the branch level, whose function is to represent the students towards the professors and the administration, and to organize students' campus activities, such as holiday celebrations etc. (al-Amin, "Al-Jāmiʿa" 23). Student Council elections have not taken place since 2008 for fear of unrest. Hence, representatives have often bequeathed their office to younger students of the same political party when they left university (LU Political Science 2 Junior). They tend to be particularly active in branches, where one political party or electoral block is clearly predominant (see fig. 3).

One such location is the large new university campus in Ḥadath. In fact, the new Ḥadath campus did unite different parts of LU, namely several disciplines of Branches 1 and a number of disciplines which had never been branched out. It did not unite

different branches of the same discipline, though. Thus, it created a sort of subsection of the university for the southern suburbs. Here, the student councils exert an influence to a degree so great that at times they enforce the enrolment of students against official criteria, and even influence the appointment of professors against the will of the faculty leadership (Noor Addin, "Al-Anshiṭa al-Ṭullābiyya fī-l-Jāmiʿāt"; al-Mosawi).

Campus life is culturally influenced by the dominant groups respectively (see fig. 4 and fig. 5). At the Western entrance of the Ḥadath campus, for instance, the one pointing to the predominantly Shi'i southern suburbs, where HA and AMAL are the dominant political forces, I was greeted by huge portraits of leading clerics and operatives of HA and AMAL on my field visits, although the display of any sort of political symbols or pictures on campus has been prohibited since 2012 (Lebanese University). On the eastern entrance, facing the Ḥadath neighborhood, which has a less clear-cut political allegiance, and in branches 2 of several faculties I visited east of Beirut I never saw portraits of politicians or other political symbols; whereas religious symbols are common there, too.[5] After Branch 1 of the Faculty of Fine Arts (*Kulliyyat al-Funūn*) was transferred from

Fig. 5: Statue of the virgin Mary at the entrance to the campus of the Faculty of Arts (Kulliyyat al-Ādāb) in al-Fanār.
Source: Courtesy of the author.

the center of Beirut to the campus in al-Ḥadath, its work has been disturbed by students from other faculty branches situated there, who consider it to contradict religious principles. Students of the Fine Arts were bullied for their participation in theater or film projects, and called gays and whores. Paintings and photographs to be exhibited at the end of semester were destroyed overnight. The student council of the campus, which is dominated by the two large Shi'i parties, put pressure on the campus administration to restrict or prohibit theater, movie and music events. In reaction to the pressure, the newly built assembly hall is not used for the exhibition of semester works anymore, but these are exhibited in classrooms instead. Also rehearsals and other preparatory meetings were interrupted and sabotaged by religious political activists. Remarkably, these cases were reported in an extensive report in the pro-HA daily *Al-Akhbār* (Hayek, "Ṭullāb al-Funūn taḥt al-Ḥiṣār").

In another example, a group of 30 student adherents of HA interfered in a commemoration ceremony for a student who had died in an accident, because music by two famous Lebanese singers was planned for the event. The students organizing the event claimed to have taken permission for that from the director of the faculty branch, Khaled Tawil. The HA students, however, argued that their interference was in accordance with an agreement reached three years before between the Student Council, the campus administration, and the Office of the Student Movements active on the campus (i. e. HA and AMAL), which rules that any such event could only be permitted by agreement between all three sides ("Interdiction de chansons"; "Vague d'indignation"). While the students suggested this as a justification of their conduct, the incident shows, in fact, how a settlement practice has actually reached the status of implicit rule and replaced official regulation, thus granting the Student Council competences clearly beyond those intended in the bylaws.

Notwithstanding the attitude taken against the songs by Fairuz and Julia Boutros in the mentioned incident, HA student activists do play music on the Ḥadath campus in the form of Political and religious songs, e.g. during celebrations of *ʿAshūra*, and on 25 May, the commemoration day for the withdrawal of the Israeli Army from South Lebanon in 2000, as a doctoral student from a Faculty in al-Ḥadath reported in a lecture at an AUB conference. Moreover, high ranking political and religious officials are often invited to give lectures or hold speeches at graduation ceremonies, and at events of religious mobilization, such as the delivery of prizes for the best veiled female students (*akhawāt*) or the Day Against Offending the Prophet (*dhudh Isāʾat al-Rasūl*), despite the general prohibition to do so by the university administration (Noor Addin, "Al-Anshiṭa al-Ṭullābiyya fī-l-Jāmiʿāt"). Professors in Branch 2 of the Faculty of Law and Political Science, conversely, strictly abstained from inviting politicians as speakers in line with the new ruling. They were even instructed by their branch administration to abstain entirely from discussing current national politics in classrooms, as a political science professor asserted to me, which he found hard to apply in light of the subject matters of the discipline (LU political science 2 senior).

When negotiation does not bring the intended results, violence is sometimes employed in conflicts among students, some of which are not political in cause, but are quickly charged with ideological meaning (Moussawi, "Tajaddud Ishtibākāt"; Mushallab, "Ishtibāk", "Tajaddud").

Outlook

The examples in this article hint that a great many decisions at LU are made by way of negotiation and settlement, sometimes with the help or under threat of violence, while unlawful acts are committed without penalty. With LUʿs departments nearer to the places of origin of their constituencies, contacts between different players now follow a logic of proximity rather than of anonymity, thereby tightening the politico-religious ties often labeled as sectarianism. The decrease in power of the councils opened the doors for interference on different levels of loyalty rather than explicit regulation. LU's proximity to its students' and professors' native politico-religious environment seems systemic. Some observers even report that the character of teaching, too, and the character of nominally the same university degree vary from branch to branch, depending on the given communal influences (al-Amin, "Al-Jāmiʿa" 22; "Al-Baḥth" 8). However, to explore the effects of LU's fragmentation on its teaching contents and practices is beyond the scope of this paper, and can probably only be done by insiders.

In the public and academic discourse LU's fragmentation (*tafrīʿ*) is often associated

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with a decline in quality and independence (al-Amin et al.; Moussawi, "al-Taʿlīm"; Khalifeh; and many of our interlocutors). However, this move seems irreversible. The creation of the new Ḥadath campus in 2007 with its relative pluralism of cultural backgrounds in faculty and student body is what comes nearest to a step in the direction of unification, which was not followed through. So, maybe al-Ḥadath shows a kind of vision of LU's future if re-unification were implemented. Complete re-unification, however, would mean a reduction of positions and resources, on which a large number of individuals and networks operate. Many groups and stakeholders would certainly resist it, openly or silently, especially in light of the asymmetries in populace, mobilizational and paramilitary capacity between the different politico-religious teams.
Much of the debate around LU has a nostalgic air and presents somewhat tautological arguments: there is no accountability and no transparency, because the LU cadres play a stitch-off or are to „weak" to create transparency or accountability (Moussawi, "Al-Jāmiʿa al-Lubnānīya" 298–299). The examples in this article show that under conditions of proximity with their socio-cultural background, contacts among interest groups have an almost compelling dynamic that can hardly be resisted, except perhaps in rare cases of outstanding personal strength. Under such circumstances, it is hard for the cadres to play according to rules and norms of a national, i.e. super-communal character. Further we read that LU is corrupt because of its communal structure, or it remains confessional, because of its clientelism (Khalifeh 20-21). Clientelism is certainly a problem also at other universities around the world, though, where positions do not have to be distributed among a variety of confessional groups.
Some participants in the debate about a reform brought up the idea that LU might fare better if its parts established themselves as widely independent institutions. If the different parts became independent concerning their academic emphases and the acquisition and allocation of their resources, that could make them more flexible and set free the creative forces of competition among them (e. g. "Al-Baḥth"). It seems reasonable that, when services are de-centralized, also policy-making should be. Independent in their policies, the different parts of LU could set up regulations that take local values and needs better into account. Rule by negotiation could perhaps then decrease in favor of more locally designed explicit regulations; decision making could become less personalized and more accountable, in what is now a national symbol widely devoid of the integrating force hoped for by its founders. Applying Horwitz' perspective of social control it seems that, this way, clientelism could be contained even in a sectarian environment that will most probably remain in place for the foreseeable future.

Notes

[1] We thank the Volkswagen Foundation for funding two years of this work in the frame of its program Civil Societies in the Middle East. Evaluation of part of the gathered data and authoring of an article was made possible through a funded fellowship in the Re-Configurations network at the Center for Near and Middle East Studies of Marburg University. For some of the results see Kriener, “Different Planets”, “Al-ʿUlūm”, Mougheeth.

[2] The causes and impact of this decision have been elaborated as early as 1999, see Amin et al.: *Qadhāyā*, particularly chapters 2 and 3. Since then, the fragmentation has made considerable progress, see Moussawi, “Al-Jāmiʿa”, “Al-Taʿlīm”; Amin,“Al-Jāmiʿa”.

[3] This section, including the organizational charts in it, is based on Lebanese Republic, “Law 75/67” and “Law66/2009”; Amin,“Al-Jāmiʿa”; Moussawi,“Al-Taʿlīm”, “Al-Jāmiʿa”; and Amin, Personal interview.

[4] The organizational charts in Figures 2 and 3 depict only four out of 19 units of LU: The Faculties of Law, Political and Administrative Sciences, of Literature and Humanities, of Pedagogy, and the Institute of Social Science. Blue: faculty, red: students, green: Government/public administration. Green arrows symbolize discretionary power, orange arrows symbolize advisory function. I left out most arrows in Figure 2, not necessarily because competences aren't delimited, but because, from my level of insight, I couldn't tell. The party symbols in Figure 3 are randomly situated near certain institutions. They do not depict the factual composition of their presence in a given branch, but only symbolize the fact that particular compositions of their presence prevail in different branches.

[5] Portraits of the President of State can be found in halls and offices all over LU.

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ISSN: 2196-629X
https://doi.org/10.17192/meta.2019.13.8091