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Building a Lifeline: A Proposed Global Platform and Responsibility Sharing Model for the Global Compact on Refugees

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**BUILDING A LIFELINE:
A PROPOSED GLOBAL PLATFORM
AND RESPONSIBILITY SHARING MODEL
FOR THE GLOBAL COMPACT ON REFUGEES**

SARNATA REYNOLDS & JUAN PABLO VACATELLO*

ABSTRACT

In 2016, the leaders of 193 governments committed to more equitable and predictable sharing of responsibility for refugees as part of the New York Declaration, to be realized in the Global Compact on Refugees. To encourage debate, this paper presents the first global model to measure the capacity of governments to physically protect and financially support refugees and host communities. The model is based on a new database of indicators covering 193 countries, which assigns a fair share to each country and measures current government contributions to the protection of refugees. The model also proposes a new government-led global platform in support of refugee protection and human development.

In January 2019, an overwhelming majority of U.N. Member States adopted a resolution affirming the Global Compact on Refugees. This pact of international solidarity and cooperation is more important today than ever—as powerful countries double-down on xenophobia, promote

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toxic politics, and drastically narrow their contributions to refugee protection. While the Refugee Compact has the potential to provide better protection and care for refugee and host communities, it is not legally binding. Its promises may only be realized through the adoption of a concrete model for equitable and predictable responsibility sharing based on each nation's capacity to receive and/or care for refugees. The responsibility sharing model presented here is put forward to challenge policymakers and help shape discussions toward an agreed upon approach to determining each nation's capacity based on a data-driven approach as contemplated in the Refugee Compact.

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INTRODUCTION

A. Refugee Protection and the Role of Civil Society and Governments

Over and over again, through conflicts and across decades, ordinary people, mayors and mukhtars, families and organizations, have taken on the responsibility to welcome and protect refugees. Almost seventy years after the passage of the 1951 U.N. Refugee Convention,¹ governments generally accept that people fleeing conflict and persecution have the right to seek protection in another country,² and countries neighboring those in conflict have protected tens of millions of refugees for protracted periods of time.³

Over the past forty years, millions of women, men, and children from dozens of countries have been resettled elsewhere.⁴ States have also contributed billions of dollars in support to refugees and their host countries, but with an unprecedented twenty-six million refugees in the world today, both the needs and the contributions are increasing. Every single refugee who receives protection and care is a testament to our best intentions in action, when we work together and share responsibility for the rights that each of us enjoys.

1. The United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (1951) was created after the Second World War to address the issue of the large numbers of displaced persons in Europe. In 1967, an Additional Protocol was adopted to expand the scope of protection to the entire world. There are 145 state parties to the two documents. U.N. Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and Stateless Persons, *Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees*, 2-3, U.N. Doc. COM&PI/C.1·CONV&PRO (Dec. 2010), <http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/3b66c2aa10.pdf#zoom=95> [<https://perma.cc/544E-HTXG>].

2. This does not mean that some countries do not attempt to avoid their responsibilities. Indeed, the fact that some actively attempt to justify pushbacks, refoulement, and mass deportations as exceptions in specific circumstances demonstrates the general acceptance of refugee rights to access other countries and receive protection.

3. As the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, Filippo Grandi, noted in early 2017, “most refugees stay in the countries neighboring their war-torn homelands.” For instance, since the beginning of the Syrian crisis in 2001 thousands of Syrians have been accommodated in Jordan, Lebanon, and Iraq. Only recently, Bangladesh has accepted over 600,000 refugees fleeing over its border with Myanmar. Nor is the protection of neighboring countries a new phenomenon: Tanzania and Uganda, for instance, still provide protection to people who fled conflict in their neighboring home countries in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1990s. *Poorer Countries Host Most of the Forcibly Displaced, Report Shows*, UNHCR (Feb. 27, 2017), <https://www.unhcr.org/news/latest/2017/2/58b001ab4/poorer-countries-host-forcibly-displaced-report-shows.html> [<https://perma.cc/S69Z-ZQVQ>].

4. *Resettlement Data Finder*, UNHCR, <https://rsq.unhcr.org/en/#I6HV>.

In Lesbos, the refugee crisis caught us by surprise. Numbers were overwhelming and we were unprepared. But despite the economic crisis that is still affecting our families, we knew we had a moral duty to open our doors, at least locally, in a time when countries were closing their borders. We knew that we could be in their shoes at any time, and therefore we tried to treat them as we would like to be treated if we ourselves were refugees.

—Spyros Galinos, Mayor of Lesbos, Greece⁵

However, we know that there is also a darker side to many societies, driven by toxic politics and nativist, racist, and/or xenophobic sentiments. In contrast to the energy and goodwill local communities have dedicated to rallying around refugees, we have also seen governments reject or attempt to avoid their responsibilities. Over the past two decades, both the U.S. and the EU have erected physical and bureaucratic barriers to drastically limit the ability of refugees and others seeking protection to reach or cross their borders, resulting in thousands of deaths in the Mediterranean Sea and along the U.S.–Mexico desert border.⁶ After decades of hosting more than one million Afghan refugees, in 2016, Pakistan forcibly deported hundreds of thousands of them back to Afghanistan.⁷ And in 2015, Rohingya refugees were stranded for weeks

5. Speaking to Elena Sánchez-Montijano of the Barcelona Centre for International Affairs (CIDOB) in 2016. *Meeting at CIDOB with Spyros Galinos, Lesbos' Major*, CIDOB (Mar. 16, 2016), https://www.cidob.org/en/news/issues/migrations/migration/meeting_at_cidob_with_spyros_galinos_lesbos_major [<https://perma.cc/H2UG-LRN4>].

6. Under the Trump Administration, the United States is in a downward spiral, with the administration withdrawing from multilateral agreements, blatantly violating human rights, and dehumanizing migrants and refugees. In 2019, the administration introduced a variety of measures aimed at shutting down the southern border to asylum seekers. While these efforts have been enjoined by U.S. federal courts on many occasions, the cumulative effect has been devastating to both the refugee and asylum programs, and they will likely take years to recover. *See, e.g.*, HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, DELIVERED TO DANGER: ILLEGAL REMAIN IN MEXICO POLICY IMPERILS ASYLUM SEEKERS' LIVES AND DENIES DUE PROCESS (Aug. 2019), <https://www.humanrightsfirst.org/sites/default/files/Delivered-to-Danger-August-2019%20.pdf> [<https://perma.cc/7FZ5-3B77>]. *See generally* AMNESTY INT'L, IN HOSTILE TERRAIN: HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT IN THE US SOUTHWEST (2012), https://www.amnestyusa.org/files/ai_inhostile_terrain_final031412.pdf [<https://perma.cc/F6E4-9EW5>]; RAPHAEL SHILAV, OXFAM, BEYOND 'FORTRESS EUROPE': PRINCIPLES FOR A HUMANE EU MIGRATION POLICY (2017), https://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/file_attachments/bp-principles-humane-eu-migration-policy-111017-en.pdf [<https://perma.cc/EC6W-8WX4>]. This outlines some of the costs of European migration policies that aim to prevent people from arriving irregularly in Europe.

7. *See Pakistan Coercion, UN Complicity: The Mass Forced Return of Afghan Refugees*, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Feb. 13, 2017), <https://www.hrw.org/report/2017/02/13/pakistan-coercion-un>

on Asia's Andaman Sea because no country in the region would allow them to dock—it was local fishermen who ultimately rescued many of them.⁸

And yet this has also been a time of real leadership. Turkey's mission representative to the U.N., HE Ali Naci Korum, stated in 2017, "The situation on the ground requires a mentality shift within the international community. We definitely need a comprehensive approach to support refugees and host countries and to deliver durable solutions." He continued, "Equitable and meaningful burden and responsibility sharing is necessary."⁹ Over the last two years, Colombia and other countries neighboring Venezuela have received and protected more than three million refugees and migrants seeking protection and refuge from persecution, violence, and poverty.¹⁰ This is even more impressive given that Colombia remains in transition to peace after a decades-long civil war, and millions of its own citizens remain displaced both inside and outside the country.

More of this kind of measured and specific political and pragmatic leadership, which both acknowledges challenges and aims to tackle them, is sorely needed from leaders around the world. And we can do this. Indeed, despite incredible odds, in April 2016, representatives of 160 countries came together to agree on the terms of the Paris Agreement on climate change.¹¹ Although the agreement was expected to take years to

complicity/mass-forced-return-afghan-refugees [https://perma.cc/2UWU-97E7] (detailing the "mass refoulement" of Afghan refugees).

8. UNHCR, SOUTH-EAST ASIA: MIXED MARITIME MOVEMENTS 4 (April–June 2015), <https://www.unhcr.org/53f1c5fc9.pdf> [https://perma.cc/FD4S-TGWN].

9. *Statement of Turkey to the First Thematic Discussion: "Past and Current Burden and Responsibility Sharing Arrangements"*, GLOBAL COMPACT ON REFUGEES (July 10, 2017), <http://www.unhcr.org/59885f777.pdf> [https://perma.cc/4H4G-95DE] (statement of His Excellency Mr. Ali Naci Korum, Turkey Mission).

10. UNHCR, GLOBAL TRENDS: FORCED MIGRATION IN 2018, at 24 (2019), <https://www.unhcr.org/5d08d7ee7.pdf> [https://perma.cc/6LYS-QK7L].

11. The Paris Agreement, an agreement under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), provides that each party will make commitments to take steps to keep rises in global temperature to below 2°C above pre-industrial levels. Somewhat unexpectedly, states agreed to pursue efforts to limit the temperature increase even further, to 1.5°C. As of November 2017, 195 UNFCCC members had signed the agreement, and 170 had become party to it. See generally U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, Apr. 22–Dec. 8, 2016, 7 U.N.T.S. XXVII (eff. Nov. 4, 2016); *Paris Agreement*, U.N. TREATY COLLECTION, https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXVII-7-d&chapter=27&clang=_en [https://perma.cc/YX7C-ZHL7].

come into effect as it needed fifty-five ratifications, in fact this occurred in less than two years. And while turning aspiration into action continues to be an uphill struggle, there is now a global consensus on the problems caused by climate change and an agreed roadmap for addressing them.¹²

In a similar way, refugee crises are not inevitable and governments are not powerless when faced with them. Our research demonstrates that a number of governments around the world, including those of Turkey, Uganda, Jordan, Colombia, and Germany, consistently exhibited composure and generosity when faced with the arrival of large numbers of refugees—although initial responses do not necessarily continue indefinitely. In a matter of a few weeks between August and October 2017, Bangladesh received and protected more than 600,000 Rohingya refugees running from Myanmar's genocide campaign.¹³ Many other governments, however, including those of Australia, the United States, and the European Union, are failing to provide their fair share of physical protection and financial support to refugees and their host countries. These states, among so many others, have the capacity and resources to do much better, and they have no credible justification for doing so terribly.

B. *An Unprecedented Opportunity: The Global Compact on Refugees*

Crisis after crisis, conference after conference, it seems inaction is the only thing that the international community can agree on Let us hope that today's conference will be different, and that the international community

12. No doubt the Trump Administration's decision to withdraw from the Paris Agreement was a setback, and yet quickly thereafter, dozens of U.S. governors, mayors, and other local authorities committed to reducing greenhouse gases even if the federal government would not. It is these bright spots, among many other attacks on progress, that demonstrate the will and ability of people and their governments to collectively do better. Rebecca Hersher, *Mayors and Governors Rebut Trump Administration Position at Climate Summit*, NPR (Dec. 12, 2018, 10:50 AM), <https://www.npr.org/2018/12/12/676001283/mayors-and-governors-rebut-trump-administration-position-at-climate-summit> [<https://perma.cc/4RCR-9WBB>].

13. *Situation Report: Rohingya Refugee Crisis*, HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE: INTER SECTOR COORDINATION GROUP, https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/documents/files/171105_weekly_iscg_sitrep_final.pdf [<https://perma.cc/K389-WYTB>] (finding per the International Organization for Migration Needs and Population Monitoring, as of November 5, 2017, roughly 609,000 new arrivals had been reported in Bangladesh since August 25, 2017, adding to more than 200,000 Rohingya refugees already in the country). See also *The Plight of the Rohingya*, U.S. HOLOCAUST MEMORIAL MUSEUM (2019), <https://www.ushmm.org/confront-genocide/cases/burma/introduction/the-plight-of-the-rohingya> [<https://perma.cc/FC63-T6MV>].

is going to share responsibility for refugees Our message to you, world leaders: in our small way refugees are already taking the action, we want world leaders to do the same.

—Mohammed Badran, Syrian Volunteers Netherlands (SYVNL), Syrian youth representative to the U.N. Summit for Refugees and Migrants, September 19, 2016

In 2016, U.N. Member States agreed that the protection of refugees was a shared international responsibility that must be borne more equitably and in a more predictable manner.¹⁴ Among other outcomes, this led to the adoption of the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants, which achieved consensus from 193 governments.¹⁵ The Declaration marks the first time that the U.N. General Assembly expressed a collective commitment to sharing responsibility for refugees, regardless of where they live and regardless of whether a nation was a signatory to the 1951 Refugee Convention.

To address the needs of refugees and receiving States, we commit to a more equitable sharing of the burden and responsibility for hosting and supporting the world's refugees, while taking account of existing contributions and the differing capacities and resources among States.

—Paragraph 68, New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants, United Nations, September 19, 2016¹⁶

And as previously noted, at the United Nations General Assembly in January 2018, all 193 U.N. member states, except the United States and Hungary, adopted a resolution including the Compact. While this global approach to a global challenge may seem impossible to imagine less than three years later, in reality, some of our greatest collective achievements

14. *UN Summit for Refugees and Migrants 2016*, U.N. REFUGEES & MIGRANTS, <https://refugeesmigrants.un.org/summit> [<https://perma.cc/D7SV-LA2E>].

15. At the U.N. Summit on Refugees and Migrants, hosted by the U.N. General Assembly in New York on September 19, 2016, the New York Declaration was unanimously adopted by all 193 Member States (Resolution 71/1). It was a milestone in that 193 governments reached consensus on global solidarity and refugee protection at a time of unprecedented displacement (yet, migration overall has held steady at about three percent of the world's population over decades, despite what might be suggested by recent media attention). The Declaration is intended to improve the way in which the international community responds to large movements of refugees and migrants, including protracted refugee situations. G.A. Res. A/71/L.1, at 1/25 (Sept. 13, 2016); http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/71/L.1.

16. G.A. Res. A/71/L.1, at ¶ 68 (Sept. 13, 2016).

have been birthed out of our darkest moments, including the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the 1951 Refugee and Statelessness Conventions—all coming into effect less than ten years after World War II.

Indeed, asserting the need for a standing mechanism for responsibility sharing that is both predictable and equitable is certainly not a new idea. The 1951 Refugee Convention specifically raised the necessity of international cooperation when it stated that:

[T]he grant of asylum may place unduly heavy burdens on certain countries, and that a satisfactory solution of a problem of which the United Nations has recognized the international scope and nature cannot therefore be achieved without international co-operation.¹⁷

This statement, contained in the preamble of the Convention, recognizes that: 1) there is a responsibility to protect refugees and asylum seekers; 2) this may place a disproportionate burden on states hosting large numbers of refugees; and 3) states should share responsibility and alleviate the challenges of hosting refugees through international cooperation. However, despite this clear directive stated in the 1951 Refugee Convention itself, developing a concrete mechanism for responsibility sharing has proven very difficult over the years.

That the world continues to react to refugee rights and needs in an ad hoc manner is not due to a lack of opportunity,¹⁸ or to a lack of positive regional responses,¹⁹ or pressure from non-government organizations

17. U.N. Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and Stateless Persons, *Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees*, 13, U.N. Doc. COM&PI/C.1-CONV&PRO (Dec. 2010), <http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/3b66c2aa10.pdf#zoom=95> [<https://perma.cc/544E-HTXG>].

18. For example, in 2001 UNHCR launched a process of global consultations, culminating in the UNHCR Agenda for Protection, which had as one of its six protection goals, “Sharing burdens and responsibilities more equitably and building capacities to receive and protect refugees.” In an attempt to generate concrete action based on the goals identified in the Agenda for Protection, UNHCR launched the Convention Plus initiative in 2003, aiming both to reinforce the relevance of the 1951 Refugee Convention and address its “gaps,” including responsibility sharing; unfortunately, however, the Convention Plus was largely unsuccessful in bringing about much real change. Agenda for Protection in 2003. UNHCR, Dep’t of Int’l Protection, *Agenda for Protection*, 1, 9-10, 21-29, 55-61, U.N. Doc A/AC.96/965/Add.1 (June 26, 2002), <http://www.unhcr.org/protection/globalconsult/3e637b194/agenda-protection-third-edition.html> [<https://perma.cc/C7PS-VX77>].

19. For instance, the International Conference on Central American Refugees, 1987–1994 (CIREFCA) and the Comprehensive Plan of Action for Indo-Chinese Refugees, 1989–1997

(NGOs), academics, and others.²⁰ During the summer of 2016, almost 100 civil society organizations (CSOs) jointly urged states to adopt a concrete mechanism for responsibility sharing during the negotiations around the New York Declaration,²¹ and this collective call continued throughout the period in which the Compact was developed.²² However, the Declaration as adopted did not provide concrete ideas on how responsibility would be shared more equitably and predictably. The decades-long failure to operationalize responsibility sharing is wholly political in nature. However, this should not be considered inevitable.

(Indochinese CPA), while not perfect, are both seen as relatively successful examples of regional cooperation and responsibility sharing in relation to refugees. The attempts to find more comprehensive and sustainable solutions for displaced persons shown by African states, in the form of the OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, and in Central America through the Cartagena Declaration on Refugees also demonstrate the potential for cooperation at a regional level. UNHCR, *The Global Compact on Responsibility-sharing for Refugees*, §§ 2.2-2.3 (July 5, 2016), <http://www.unhcr.org/57836fb54.pdf> [<https://perma.cc/2XL9-SG62>]; UNHCR, *OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa*, U.N. Doc. MRPI/C.3-OAU (Oct. 2006), <https://www.unhcr.org/about-us/background/45dc1a682/oau-convention-governing-specific-aspects-refugee-problems-africa-adopted.html> [<https://perma.cc/CS75-JG9X>]; UNHCR, *Cartagena Declaration on Refugees*, U.N. Doc. MRPI/C.4-Cartagena (Oct. 2006), <https://www.unhcr.org/about-us/background/45dc19084/cartagena-declaration-refugees-adopted-colloquium-international-protection.html> [<https://perma.cc/42K5-U74J>].

20. See, for instance, the models for more predictable and equitable responsibility sharing suggested by academics such as Hathaway and Neve, as long ago as 1997, and Milner in 2016. James C. Hathaway & R. Alexander Neve, *Making International Refugee Law Relevant Again: A Proposal for Collectivized and Solution-Oriented Protection*, 10 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 115 (1997); JAMES MILNER, GLOBAL LEADERSHIP & COOPERATION FOR REFUGEES, PAPER NO. 2, WHEN NORMS ARE NOT ENOUGH: UNDERSTANDING THE PRINCIPAL AND PRACTICE OF BURDEN AND RESPONSIBILITY SHARING FOR REFUGEES (Dec. 2016), https://www.cigionline.org/sites/default/files/documents/Refugee%20Paper%20no2web_3.pdf [<https://perma.cc/U3U4-BBBS>].

21. See Civil Society Committee on the UN High-Level Summit on Refugees and Migrants 2016, *UN Summit for Refugees and Migrants 2016*, UN REFUGEES & MIGRANTS (2016), <http://refugeemigrants.un.org/summit> [<https://perma.cc/RBS4-A3QV>]. In particular, see the civil society response and scorecard for the New York Declaration, *Civil Society Response and Scorecard for the UN High-Level Summit “New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants”*, CIVIL SOCIETY (2016), http://refugees-migrants-civilsociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/0685-HLD_Act-Now-GB-DIGI-03_04-October.pdf [<https://perma.cc/X3XV-L5FK>]; and Amnesty International’s AMNESTY INT’L, THE GLOBAL REFUGEE CRISIS, GENUINE RESPONSIBILITY-SHARING: AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL’S FIVE PROPOSALS (2016), <https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/IOR4043802016ENGLISH.PDF> [<https://perma.cc/22ME-LBWH>].

22. See, e.g., UNHCR, NGO KEY MESSAGES FOR THE 10TH HIGH COMMISSIONER’S DIALOGUE ON PROTECTION CHALLENGES “TOWARDS A GLOBAL COMPACT ON REFUGEES” (Dec. 12-13, 2017), <https://www.unhcr.org/en-my/5a33d5917.pdf> [<https://perma.cc/2GWG-QHRB>].

The New York Declaration specifically envisioned a new approach that would improve the experience of refugees seeking protection and the ability of states to assist and protect them through greater international cooperation.²³ This new agreement, finalized in September 2018 and called the Refugee Compact, is operational in nature, and includes as a goal a mechanism for equitable and predictable responsibility sharing.²⁴ With rigorous and continued debate, the support of civil society and other stakeholders, and positive political will, a concrete system for responsibility sharing is attainable through this Global Compact and its follow-up mechanisms.²⁵

Annex I of the New York Declaration called on the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to develop and initiate a Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRRF) in situations that involved large movements of refugees, in close coordination with national and local authorities and involving other U.N. agencies and a broad range of actors.²⁶ The CRRF had four stated objectives:

- ease pressures on host countries;
- enhance refugees' self-reliance;
- expand access to third-country solutions;

23. G.A. Res. A/71/L.1, at 3 (Sept. 13, 2016) (specifying the impetus and goals behind the New York Declaration).

24. UNHCR, The Global Compact on Refugees (Final Draft) 2 (June 26, 2018), <https://www.un.org/pga/72/wp-content/uploads/sites/51/2018/07/Global-Compact-on-Refugees.pdf> [<https://perma.cc/H2PM-PC2W>] (“[T]he global compact on refugees intends to provide a basis for *predictable and equitable burden- and responsibility-sharing* among all United Nations Member States, together with other relevant stakeholders as appropriate”) (emphasis original). See also Rep. of the U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, *Global Compact on Refugees*, 73 U.N. G.A.O.R. Supp. No. 12, ¶ 4, U.N. Doc. A/73/12 (Sept. 13, 2018), https://www.unhcr.org/gcr/GCR_English.pdf [<https://perma.cc/94AE-39CY>].

25. UNHCR, The Global Compact on Refugees (Final Draft) 17 (June 26, 2018), <https://www.un.org/pga/72/wp-content/uploads/sites/51/2018/07/Global-Compact-on-Refugees.pdf> [<https://perma.cc/H2PM-PC2W>].

26. Rep. of the U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, *Global Compact on Refugees*, 73 U.N. G.A.O.R. Supp. No. 12, ¶ 7-13, U.N. Doc. A/73/12 (Sept. 13, 2018), https://www.unhcr.org/gcr/GCR_English.pdf [<https://perma.cc/94AE-39CY>]; *Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework*, UNHCR, <http://www.unhcr.org/comprehensive-refugee-response-framework-crrf.html> [<https://perma.cc/DZ3Z-P5RP>].

- support conditions in countries of origin for return in safety and dignity.

UNHCR advocated for the Global Compact on Refugees to be based on lessons learned through application of the CRRF and a ‘Programme of Action’ that set out specific approaches that could be taken—both by Member States and by other relevant stakeholders—to underpin the CRRF and to ensure its concrete implementation, including more equitable sharing of responsibility for refugees.²⁷

The four key pillars of the CRRF related to:

- refugee reception and admission;
- support for immediate and ongoing needs;
- support for host countries and communities;

The Programme of Action was the subject of formal consultations and negotiations with Member States and other stakeholders early in 2018,²⁸ and ultimately the Global Compact on Refugees was a state-owned document—subject to the politics and policies of Member States, individually, as regional negotiating groups, and as part of other alliances.

C. *Issues Left Unresolved By The New York Declaration and Refugee Compact*

1. *Protection and Support for IDPS*

Of the seventy million displaced people in the world, more than forty million have never crossed an international border and are internally displaced persons (IDPs).²⁹ Like refugees, they experience the loss of livelihoods, protection, education, healthcare, and community networks, but they do not benefit from any internationally agreed protection

27. UNHCR, TOWARDS A GLOBAL COMPACT ON REFUGEES, CONCEPT PAPER 2-17 (2017), <http://www.unhcr.org/59dc8f317.pdf> [https://perma.cc/SB4Y-GWAE]

28. *Formal Consultation on the Global Compact on Refugees*, UNCHR, <http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/formal-consultations-on-the-global-compact-on-refugees.html> [https://perma.cc/HEY2-RYNL].

29. UNHCR, GLOBAL TRENDS: FORCED MIGRATION IN 2018, at 35 (2019), <https://www.unhcr.org/5d08d7ee7.pdf> [https://perma.cc/6LYS-QK7L]; Adrian Edwards, *Forced Displacement at Record 68.5 Million*, UNHCR (Jun. 19, 2018), <http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/news/stories/2018/6/5b222c494/forced-displacement-record-685-million.html> [https://perma.cc/29P8-5HV9].

framework, although regional commitments do exist in Latin America and the Caribbean,³⁰ as well as in Africa.³¹

The rights and needs of IDPs have been championed by a few key states, but a sufficient number of countries were unwilling for them to be included in the New York Declaration, which foreclosed their treatment in the Refugee Compact.³² The Declaration noted only the “need for reflection on effective strategies to ensure adequate protection and assistance for internally displaced persons and to prevent and reduce such displacement.”³³

With two-thirds of the world’s seventy million displaced people being IDPs—many in protracted situations of displacement and many facing similar challenges to those faced by refugees, including food insecurity, lack of livelihood opportunities, and poor or no services—there is indeed an urgent need for such reflection and action.

2. Climate Change, Disasters, and Displacement

The growing impact of climate change and disasters was also left largely unaddressed in the New York Declaration.³⁴ Displacement linked to climate change is not a future threat but a current and growing reality, affecting millions of women, men, boys, and girls around the

30. In 1994, the San José Declaration extended protections in the regional Cartagena framework to IDPs. In Colombia, for example, there are particular protections for IDPs under the country’s 2011 Victims and Land Restitution Law. L. 1448/11, junio 10, 2011, 40.096 DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] art. [13] (Colom.). See also Marissa Esthimer, *Protecting the Forcibly Displaced: Latin America’s Evolving Refugee and Asylum Framework*, MIGRATION POL’Y INST., (Jan. 16, 2016), <https://www.migrationpolicy.org/print/15534#.W89UrFVKiM9> [<https://perma.cc/PPQ6-Z8WH>].

31. The Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa (the Kampala Convention) was the first international treaty to specifically address IDPs. See African Union, *Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa (Kampala Convention)* (Oct. 23, 2009), https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/7796-treaty-0039_-_kampala_convention_african_union_convention_for_the_protection_and_assistance_of_internally_displaced_persons_in_africa_e.pdf [<https://perma.cc/5DXW-PMPM>].

32. IDPs were included in discussions at the World Humanitarian Summit (WHS) held in Istanbul in May 2016, but the WHS was not a state-led meeting resulting in an outcome document by consensus, but rather sought individual commitments. Press Release, Deputy Secretary-General, Deputy Secretary-General, at World Summit Round-Table Event, Stresses Need to Move Away from Line Dividing Humanitarian, Development Efforts, U.N. Press Release DSG/SM/968-IHA/1396 (May 23, 2018), <https://www.un.org/press/en/2016/dsgsm968.doc.htm> [<https://perma.cc/57MY-BZF5>].

33. G.A. Res. A/71/L.1, at 5 (Sept. 13, 2016).

34. G.A. Res. A/71/1, at ¶ 1 (Sept. 19, 2016).

world. Climate change is increasing the frequency and risk of disasters caused by extreme weather events, including floods and storms. In 2016, some 23.5 million people were displaced internally by extreme weather disasters.³⁵ At the same time, rising sea levels, shifting rainfall patterns, and other changes are eroding people's livelihoods and security, and putting many more people at risk of displacement in the future. Oxfam's analysis of data on new displacements over the period 2008-2016 showed that people in low- and lower-middle-income countries were about five times more likely than people in high-income countries to be displaced by sudden-onset extreme weather disasters.³⁶

It is important that responding to the growing threat of displacement in the context of climate change begins with much stronger action to minimize displacement, through tackling its root causes and supporting communities facing various threats by reducing their vulnerability and building resilience. At the same time, work is needed to strengthen protection and legal recognition for those who are on the move as a result of disasters and climate change. While recognizing that all possible measures must be taken to avoid displacement, in cases where migration may be the only option for a family or community, it is necessary to support proactive, long-term strategies to ensure that those who are forced to move are able to do so safely, with dignity, and on their own terms. UNHCR's Assistant High Commissioner for Protection, Volker Türk, publicly asserted that individuals and families displaced by disasters should fall under the remit of the Global Compact on Refugees,³⁷ and while this did not ultimately come to pass, there is no doubt that a growing number of individuals and families forced across borders by climate change and disasters will require more than ad hoc protection and support.

35. Based on the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC)'s dataset for Disaster-Related New Displacements in 2016. *Global Internal Displacement Database*, IDMC (2016), <http://www.internal-displacement.org/database/> [https://perma.cc/5ENM-YJWR].

36. See OXFAM, *UPROOTED BY CLIMATE CHANGE: RESPONDING TO THE GROWING RISK OF DISPLACEMENT 25* (2017), https://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/file_attachments/bp-uprooted-climate-change-displacement-021117-en.pdf [https://perma.cc/8FDX-3HHX]. Specifically, the report recommends that the CRRF should be applicable to people displaced across borders by sudden-onset disasters, including extreme weather events.

37. Faye Leone, "*Sea Change*" *Refugee Compact Discussed in New York*, SDG KNOWLEDGE HUB (June 28, 2018), <http://sdg.iisd.org/news/sea-change-refugee-compact-discussed-in-new-york/> [https://perma.cc/9KYR-UHX2].

*D. A Responsibility Sharing Model and a New Global Platform:
A Proposal for a Way Forward*

As a means of stimulating debate and discussion, this paper proposes, for the first time, a model that assigns 193 governments across the world their fair share of responsibility for physical protection and financial support for refugees and host communities. The proposed model comprises two components: first, the building of a comprehensive database and methodology to facilitate measurement of the capacity and resources available to each nation in support of these aims, regardless of location; and second, the development of a new Global Platform on Protection, Human Development, and Durable Solutions to support this initiative.³⁸

Both proposals have been reviewed and commented on by refugees and refugee-led organizations, and by more than twenty experts from academia, civil society, U.N. agencies, and different government bodies. The proposals are intentionally challenging, to encourage debate and engagement with and among governments, policymakers, advocates, and academics around the world as the Refugee Compact transitions from a collection of promises into a concrete operational platform for action.

It is not asserted that these proposals are the definitive models which states should adopt. However, by offering a concrete mechanism for responsibility sharing—with specific measurements, indicators and assignments of fair share—the intention is to be provocative. It is our hope that this discussion paper will spur a robust discussion among states, policymakers, and other key stakeholders that goes beyond a general call for international cooperation to an overdue debate on how to make it happen. Ultimately, we hope that this will result in the emergence of a new platform for action that is concrete, operational, fully articulated, and agreed to by the time of the second Global Refugee Forum in 2023.³⁹

38. For more detail on the methodology, see the Annexes. Further information on the database is available from the authors.

39. Rep. of the U.N. High Comm'r for Refugees, *Global Compact on Refugees*, 73 U.N. G.A.O.R. Supp. No. 12, ¶ 101-03, U.N. Doc. A/73/12 (Sept. 13, 2018), https://www.unhcr.org/gcr/GCR_English.pdf [<https://perma.cc/94AE-39CY>].

I. MAIN FINDINGS IN APPLYING THE RESPONSIBILITY SHARING MODEL

A. *Short Methodology and Some Limitations of the RSM*

In this paper, a proposal is outlined for a new Responsibility Sharing Model (RSM) that identifies each nation's fair share of responsibility for hosting, protecting, and assisting refugees and supporting host communities.⁴⁰ This proposal is straightforward yet comprehensive. It originates in the 1951 Refugee Convention and 1967 Protocol, and seeks to promote the rights of all refugees to protection, education, assistance, healthcare, and livelihood opportunities⁴¹ by ensuring that all states have the capacity to progressively meet the needs of refugees. This methodology first considers and weights the GDP and population of every state, to achieve a preliminary fair share of responsibility and burden sharing. For these two data points, the authors relied on the 2016 World Bank Database, which contained the latest available data at the time of development.⁴² The methodology then adjusts the baseline number by a multiplier based on the Human Development Index,⁴³ which

40. For more detail on the methodology, see the Annexes.

41. Most of the provisions relating to employment, self-employment, and welfare under the Refugee Convention state that refugees shall be given "the most favorable treatment" accorded to other non-citizens "in the same circumstances." Restrictions on the employment of non-citizens must not be applied to refugees who have been in the country of refuge for over three years, who are married to a national of the country of refuge, or who have children possessing the nationality of the country of refuge. In addition, in respect of housing and education, other than elementary education, refugees are again to be granted "treatment as favorable as possible and, in any event, not less favorable than that accorded to aliens generally in the same circumstances." In relation to elementary education, public relief and assistance, and the rationing of products in short supply (where a rationing system exists), refugees are to receive better treatment. The U.N. Refugee Convention provides that refugees are to get "the same treatment as nationals" in these areas. *Convention Plus at a Glance*, UNHCR, <http://www.unhcr.org/403b30684.pdf> [https://perma.cc/CTC5-LQ7S]; U.N. Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and Stateless Persons, *Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees*, 21, U.N. Doc. COM&PI/C.1-CONV&PRO (Dec. 2010), <http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/3b66c2aa10.pdf#zoom=95> [https://perma.cc/544E-HTXG].

42. Data available on *World Bank Open Data*, WORLD BANK (2019), <https://data.worldbank.org/>.

43. UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2016: HUMAN DEVELOPMENT FOR EVERYONE (2016), http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/2016_human_development_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/LZ98-GDF9].

is one measurement of each nation's progress toward the SDGs.⁴⁴

The authors considered excluding low-lying island states from the RSM, but as there is no definitive index listing those states that face an existential threat of ruin, this was not included. When discussing a concrete methodology for responsibility sharing, countries should take into account the inherent vulnerability of these states and integrate this into a fair share approach.

After identifying each nation's fair share based on this methodology, we then applied the Fragile States Index.⁴⁵ All states assigned "alert" status in the index (90 points or higher)⁴⁶ were removed from the responsibility sharing allocations, because by definition they are already unstable. Given their fragility, it is not fair to those countries to assign responsibility for supporting refugees, although more than seven million refugees (almost one-third of the total) do currently reside in fragile

44. *Transforming Our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development*, UN SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT (2015), <https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/post2015/transformingourworld> [<https://perma.cc/3BRS-X6NZ>].

45. The Fragile States Index ranks 178 nations based on their levels of stability and the pressures they face, according to the Fund for Peace's proprietary Conflict Assessment Tool (CAST). Scores are given to each country based on twelve key political, social, and economic indicators, with over 100 sub-indicators, indicating its level of stability. For more details, see *Data for Peace*, FFP (2018), <http://fundforpeace.org/fsi/data/>. The authors were conflicted as to whether to use the Fragile States Index for purposes of assessing the capacity of a nation to receive and protect refugees, given fair and detailed criticism of the Index on a number of fronts, including: (1) that the Index suffers from a Eurocentric bias favorably weighting democracies in the global north, despite their poor performance on many fronts including xenophobia and racism, which is currently even more apparent; and (2) an unwillingness to account for, or wrestle with, the fact that many of the states deemed most fragile are also states that have been subject to the intervention of wealthier nations, including Iraq, Syria, and Libya. Nonetheless, the authors chose to factor in the Fragile States Index because its inclusion demonstrates incontestably that wealthier nations have the capacity and can do much more to receive and protect refugees, given that most of the countries deemed most at risk of emergency are also countries hosting hundreds of thousands of refugees. The authors also note that whether included or excluded, the Fragile States Index does not materially alter the findings of the RSM. A detailed explanation of this conclusion can be found in Annex I, Methodology.

46. The higher a country's score on the Fragile States Index, the more unstable it is. Countries with a score of 90 or above are categorized as "alert" (e.g. Timor-Leste at 90.5 and Burundi at 98.9), those above 100 as "high alert" (e.g. Ethiopia at 101.1 and Chad at 109.4), and those above 110 as "very high alert" (e.g. Sudan at 110.6 and South Sudan with the highest score of 113.9). These figures are taken from the 2017 Fragile States Index. FFP, 2017 FRAGILE STATES INDEX (2017), https://issuu.com/fundforpeace/docs/951171705_fragile_states_index_annu.

states.⁴⁷ The fact that one-third of all refugees reside in fragile states is a clear demonstration that the current system of refugee “protection” is utterly broken.

This model then converts each nation’s fair share of responsibility for refugees into a specific number of refugees,⁴⁸ based on the 2016 UNHCR Population Statistics Database⁴⁹ and 2016 figures from the U.N. Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA).⁵⁰

B. Some Limitations of the RSM

This proposal does not pretend to address every opportunity or challenge involved in the protection and support of refugees and host communities. Sections highlight the specific limitations of each proposal, but there are a few overall limitations that are worth highlighting here.

These proposals provide a global approach to refugee protection and assistance only and cannot substitute for context-specific knowledge, address circumstances that create challenges and opportunities in different regions, or offer detailed analysis of how each government’s proposals or positions are developed. Wherever possible, the authors have worked with civil society and refugees in affected countries to best reflect their understanding of specific contexts, politics, and government efforts.

Nevertheless, in a broad and propositional methodology such as this, some individual countries may be picked out as “high performers” in terms of responsibility sharing because they permit the entry of large numbers of refugees (offering physical protection), even though their

47. See Annex 3. Roughly 7.6 million refugees were recorded as being hosted in states that scored above 90 on the Fragile States Index in 2016.

48. For purposes of this paper, “responsibility” includes physical protection, whether through refugee resettlement or the processing of people seeking asylum, and contributions of both humanitarian and development support to host countries. Except in very limited circumstances, neither physical protection nor the contribution of funds alone would satisfy a nation’s responsibility, as states hosting the largest numbers of refugees consistently require the sharing of physical and financial protection. The authors assert that states should provide physical support, through refugee resettlement or asylum protection, to at least 10% of the total number of refugees for which they are responsible.

49. An overview can be found at: *Population Statistics*, UNHCR (2018), <http://popstats.unhcr.org/en/overview>.

50. See UNRWA, *IN FIGURES* (2016), https://www.unrwa.org/sites/default/files/content/resources/unrwa_in_figures_2016.pdf [<https://perma.cc/P5YG-KQRU>].

domestic practices may not sufficiently support the human development of refugees and host communities (e.g. access to education, livelihood opportunities, adequate housing, and healthcare, among others).⁵¹ Other countries may be “low performers” in terms of physical protection, but may extend key human rights quickly and broadly.⁵² However, on balance we consider that the proposals put forward provide a strong foundation from which to gauge the capacity of governments to extend protection and support to refugees and host communities, while measuring the current gaps and some of their consequences.

C. Main Findings After Application of the RSM

Once a methodology⁵³ for the model approach to responsibility sharing was agreed upon, the authors applied the formula to the 193 U.N. Member States in order to better understand the fair share of each country in terms of protecting and supporting refugees, whether and how countries are currently meeting their fair shares, and to begin to identify opportunities for improvement and to propose paths forward.

These findings are ultimately represented through the assignment to each country of a specific number of refugees, based on the current population of twenty-six million plus refugees and asylum seekers globally.⁵⁴ The tables, data sets, and analysis that follow are based on the current picture of refugee needs and response. But this snapshot is

51. Jordan, for instance, is the highest-performing country according to this mechanism. However, Human Rights Watch reports that 80,000 Syrian children in Jordan had no access to education in 2016, and between January and June restrictions on freedom of movement left thousands of asylum seekers stranded in harsh conditions with limited access to food, water, and medical assistance. *Jordan: Events of 2016*, HUM RTS. WATCH (2017), <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2017/country-chapters/Jordan> [<https://perma.cc/TP5P-T7XA>]. Lebanon, which is the third highest performer, has strict residency regulations that restrict refugees' access to work, education, and healthcare, and which put them at risk of detention. *Lebanon: New Refugee Policy a Step Forward*, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Feb. 14, 2017, 12:00 AM), <https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/02/14/lebanon-new-refugee-policy-step-forward> [<https://perma.cc/W8GQ-QXEC>].

52. For example, Portugal, which fulfilled only two percent of its fair share, supports refugees on many of their key rights, including the provision of temporary free housing, language classes, and the ability to work while claims are processed. Argentina hosted 3,293 refugees in 2016, also only two percent of its fair share, but it recognizes migration as a right, provides social assistance to refugees, and provides access to healthcare and education to foreigners under the same conditions as nationals, regardless of their migration status.

53. The detailed methodology is provided in Annex 1.

54. UNHCR, FORCED DISPLACEMENT IN 2017 (2018), <https://www.unhcr.org/5b27be547.pdf> [<https://perma.cc/J8SD-GQ2A>].

not the end of the analysis. The Responsibility Sharing Model (RSM) allows for updating at any time—weekly, monthly, annually, or otherwise. Indeed, it could be employed by countries, U.N. agencies, and other stakeholders as a new crisis is unfolding.


Whatever model for a predictable and equitable responsibility sharing mechanism is agreed upon should be used dynamically so that as populations of refugees arrive in countries, states have an immediate ability to determine their fair share of responsibility for physical protection and financial support, analyze how they can best support refugees and host communities, and act accordingly. Some key findings of the RSM are set out in the following subsection.

1. Most Countries Should be Doing Much More, but Some are Taking on a Disproportionate Amount of Responsibility for Refugees and Host Communities

The first and most important point is that the twenty biggest economies in the world, which have the greatest capacity to both physically protect and support refugees globally, are failing miserably. Based on a review of UNHCR data in 2016, members of the G20 contribute less than 40% of their fair share to refugee protection, whereas the rest of the world, with far fewer resources and less capacity, is extending a huge six times its fair share (see Figure 1).⁵⁵ Significantly, Turkey accounts for almost 40% of all the refugees hosted in G20 nations. If Turkey were excluded from this analysis, the G20 countries would be taking responsibility for less than 15% of their fair share.

55. *Population Statistics*, UNHCR (2018), <http://popstats.unhcr.org/en/overview>.

FIGURE 1: CONTRIBUTION OF G20 COUNTRIES TO PHYSICAL PROTECTION COMPARED WITH THE REST OF THE WORLD



In total, 113 of the 193 countries analyzed are doing less than half of what they could fairly be expected to do in terms of protecting refugees, when looking only at the numbers being hosted. At the same time, thirty-five countries are surpassing their fair share of responsibility, with ten doing more than ten times their fair share.⁵⁶

56. See Annex 3: Application of the RSM to determine performance of individual states.

FIGURE 2: COUNTRIES' OVERALL FAIR SHARE OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR REFUGEES BASED ON THE RSM




FIGURE 3: WHERE REFUGEES ARE PHYSICALLY RESIDING CURRENTLY





Figure 3 takes into account physical protection only. All of the named countries except the United States and the European Union, however, take on much more than 100% of their fair share of physical protection and they contribute millions of dollars domestically in support of these populations, meaning that they do not have an additional responsibility for financially supporting refugees not already residing in these countries. It is fair to criticize Figure 3 for being incomplete, as it does not take into account the financial contributions made to host states by others, such as the United States, the European Union, and Canada. Unfortunately, and as discussed below, it is exceptionally difficult to determine the financial contributions of states to refugee and host communities beyond those made to UNHCR and UNRWA each year (which the authors do provide below). The authors would encourage all countries to provide

comprehensive data on their financial contributions in support of refugees and host communities each year, so that whatever RSM is eventually adopted may accurately account for these contributions. Even accepting the criticism, though, almost no high capacity state (except Germany and Sweden) comes close to extending physical protection to ten percent of the refugees for whom it bears responsibility.

2. *The Vast Majority of Refugees Reside in Africa and Asia*

FIGURE 4: FAIR SHARE VS. CURRENT REFUGEE POPULATION



Particularly in the United States and the European Union, there is often a false sense among some elected leaders, policymakers, political pundits, and citizens that they are shouldering the majority of responsibility for refugees, and that all refugees would travel to one of these regions if given the opportunity. This is not true. In fact, the vast majority of refugees live in Africa or Asia (including the Middle East) for as long as the underlying driver of their displacement continues.

3. *The Vast Majority of Refugees are in a few Countries*

Table 1 below applies the RSM to identify the seven countries globally hosting the highest numbers of refugees. The first column identifies the percentage of the refugee population that each country should be responsible for based on the RSM. The second column applies the fair share percentage to the total number of refugees globally, resulting in a specific responsibility. The third column identifies the total number of

refugees that were actually being hosted in each country in 2016, based on UNHCR's Statistics Database.⁵⁷ For example, based on the fair share model, Turkey is responsible for 1.03% of the world's refugees, which equals 261,096 individuals. Yet Turkey is hosting almost three million refugees, exceptionally above its fair share.

Based on the RSM, Pakistan's fair share is 0%, because it is considered a fragile state. Uganda and Ethiopia are also fragile states and therefore are not assigned a specific responsibility for refugees, and the Occupied Palestinian Territory (OPT) is not recognized as a state by most U.N. members. That said, despite their fragility, Pakistan was hosting more than a million refugees in 2016, while Uganda, Ethiopia, and a number of other fragile states were hosting up to millions of refugees.⁵⁸

TABLE 1: COUNTRIES HOSTING THE MOST REFUGEES GLOBALLY AND THEIR FAIR SHARES

	Country	Fair share (RSM) % responsibility	Fair share # of refugees	# of refugees currently hosted
1	Turkey	1.03%	261,096	3,115,376
2	Jordan	0.06%	14,395	2,897,303
3	Lebanon	0.06%	15,160	1,476,671
4	Pakistan	0.00%	-	1,357,416
5	Germany	5.37%	1,365,599	1,256,828
6	Uganda	0.00%	-	982,715
7	Iran, Islamic Rep.	0.62%	156,841	979,526

57. *Population Statistics*, UNHCR (2018), <http://popstats.unhcr.org/en/overview>.

58. As noted earlier, the authors were conflicted about including the Fragile States Index in the RSM. That said, each of these states is still well above its fair share, even absent the Fragile States Index. See Annex I, Methodology.

4. *The Countries Doing the Most to Support Refugees and Host Communities Based on Their Fair Share*⁵⁹

Table 2 applies the RSM to the top hosting countries globally. The first column again identifies the percentage of the refugee population globally that each country should be responsible for, based on the RSM. The second column applies the fair share percentage to the total number of refugees, resulting in a whole number. The third column identifies the total number of refugees that were actually being hosted in each country in 2016, based on UNHCR's Statistics Database.⁶⁰ The fourth column represents the difference between the number of refugees that a country should be hosting or supporting, based on the RSM, and the number of refugees actually being hosted in that country. The fifth column represents the percentage by which they are extending refugee support over and above their fair share, which is determined by dividing the second column by the third column.

All of the countries shown in Table 2 are taking far above their fair share of responsibility for refugees, in terms of both physical protection and humanitarian support. Large host governments are often assumed only to be providing physical protection for refugees, but the reality is that they also absorb the vast majority of the costs of infrastructural expansions to schools, healthcare systems, and housing, as well as the cost of deterioration of infrastructure such as roads and other services overly stressed by the rapid arrival of thousands of refugees. Of course, countries hosting large numbers of refugees may also extend additional support to refugees around the world, beyond those in their territories. Indeed, Sweden, Austria, and Jordan, which are all at or above their fair share of physical protection, contribute substantially to refugee protection and support beyond the refugees they host domestically (as evidenced in Table 3 below).

Uganda, Pakistan, and Ethiopia are also hosting well above their fair share, as shown in Table 2. They are fragile states and therefore should

59. Table 2 is limited to countries hosting at least 50,000 refugees.

60. The authors decided to include only those identified as refugees for the purposes of this analysis. Some countries, such as Germany, also have hundreds of thousands of asylum seekers recorded, but because recognition for these people and their ability to remain are dependent on a legal status that has not been determined, including them in the totals would be misleading. The authors acknowledge the extensive support and assistance provided by Germany and other nations to asylum seekers while they undergo the asylum process.

not be responsible for refugees at all—even though in reality they take on a disproportionate share of responsibility for protection and care. This is not to take away from their acts of solidarity and generosity, but rather to highlight the need for much greater solidarity and welcome on the part of wealthier and more able countries around the world.

TABLE 2: TOP HOSTING COUNTRIES ARE PERFORMING FAR IN EXCESS OF THEIR FAIR SHARE

	Country	Fair share (RSM) % responsibility	Fair share # of refugees	# of refugees currently hosted	Gap between fair share quota and current refugee pop.	% over performance (hosted/FS)
1	Jordan	0.06%	14,395	2,897,303	(2,882,908)	20127%
2	Lebanon	0.06%	15,160	1,476,671	(1,461,511)	9740%
3	Tanzania	0.07%	17,892	290,037	(272,145)	1621%
4	Turkey	1.03%	261,096	3,115,376	(2,854,280)	1193%
5	Iran, Islamic Rep.	0.62%	156,841	979,526	(822,685)	625%
6	South Africa	0.27%	67,885	309,942	(242,057)	457%
7	Ecuador	0.12%	30,281	127,390	(97,109)	421%
8	Bangladesh	0.30%	75,106	276,208	(201,102)	368%
9	Egypt, Arab Rep.	0.39%	99,365	263,407	(164,042)	265%
10	Sweden	0.74%	189,152	313,267	(124,115)	166%

5. *The RSM Applied to the Amount of Funding Provided by each Country to UNHCR and UNRWA in 2016*

Table 3 applies the RSM to the humanitarian funding contributed by countries to UNHCR and UNRWA in 2016. The first column shows the RSM-based fair share of responsibility. The second column shows the difference between the number of refugees represented by a country's fair

share and the number of refugees actually hosted in that country in 2016. The number of refugees hosted is subtracted for purposes of this analysis because those refugees represent a taking up of physical and financial responsibility.

The third column identifies the total monetary contributions made to UNHCR and UNRWA in 2016. That total is then divided by the remainder of refugees (column two) for which countries have responsibility, and identifies how much funding is received by each refugee for which the country has responsibility. The fourth column identifies this amount for each country—a more meaningful measurement of support to refugees for whom they have responsibility, rather than simply looking at the total amount of funding provided by each country.

Sweden, Austria, Turkey, and Jordan are identified as contributing “Fair share +” because not only did they meet their fair share of responsibility through refugee hosting and financial support alone, but through UNHCR and UNRWA they also each contributed significant amounts of funding to refugee support globally (\$195m, \$8.8m, \$2.5m, and \$1.5m respectively).

For example, based on the RSM, Norway is responsible for 129,457 refugees. In 2016, it hosted 59,522 refugees. In this analysis, the number of refugees hosted was subtracted from the total fair share, leaving a remainder of 71,897 refugees that the country is *not* hosting. Norway contributed a total of \$147,089,541 to UNHCR in 2016 and UNRWA in 2016 which is the equivalent of \$2,045.84 per refugee.

As another example, as in other years, the U.S. contributed more funding overall in 2016 than any other nation (almost \$2bn). While this is a significant amount of support to UNHCR and UNRWA, based on the fair share the U.S. contributed only \$314 per refugee in 2016—plainly an inadequate amount.

TABLE 3: COUNTRIES CONTRIBUTING THE MOST HUMANITARIAN FUNDING PER REFUGEE TO UNHCR AND UNRWA, 2016⁶¹

	Country	Fair share (RSM) % responsibility	Gap between fair share quota and current refugee pop.	Total contributions to UNHCR and UNRWA \$	Funding per refugee not hosted \$
1	Sweden	0.74%	(124,115)	195,037,096	Fair share +
2	Austria	0.54%	(33,068)	8,848,959	Fair share +
3	Turkey	1.03%	(2,854,280)	2,500,000	Fair share +
4	Jordan	0.06%	(2,882,908)	1,508,265	Fair share +
5	Germany	5.37%	108,771	433,749,680	3,987.7
6	Norway	0.57%	76,945	143,256,207	1,861.8
7	Denmark	0.46%	77,371	75,397,849	974.5
8	Luxembourg	0.08%	16,586	14,258,804	859.7
9	Saudi Arabia	0.88%	223,514	162,426,790	726.7
10	Kuwait	0.14%	33,069	22,066,762	667.3
11	Finland	0.33%	60,321	33,315,916	552.3
12	Switzerland	1.00%	140,254	8,471,013	488.2
13	Netherlands	1.17%	184,569	81,173,021	439.8
14	Iceland	0.03%	7,152	3,047,602	426.1
15	Belgium	0.66%	101,511	38,841,344	382.6
16	United Kingdom	3.85%	813,558	295,336,636	363.0
17	United States	27.17%	6,095,830	1,882,266,188	308.8
18	Canada	2.28%	459,511	134,732,852	293.2

61. Countries that contributed more than \$1m in 2016.

D. Some Limitations

1. Funding Analysis is Limited to UNHCR and UNRWA

Table 3 applies the RSM to the humanitarian funding contributed by countries to UNHCR and UNRWA in 2016 only.⁶² Without a doubt, this does not give a full picture of financial support to refugee-hosting countries. Many countries contribute to displacement response through emergency funding via the U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA),⁶³ direct contributions to NGOs, and direct support to governments hosting refugees. Many countries contribute to pooled funding—for example, European countries providing support through ECHO and DEVCO.⁶⁴ Multiple states, U.N. agencies, and international financial institutions (IFIs) are engaged in joint programs of work, including the Jordan and Lebanon Compacts.⁶⁵

62. UNHCR, CONTRIBUTIONS TO UNHCR (2016), http://reporting.unhcr.org/sites/default/files/donor_ranking/2016%20-%20UNHCR%20Donor%20Ranking%20by%20Country.pdf [<https://perma.cc/KF4P-PB9Z>]; UNRWA, PLEDGES TO UNRWA (2015), https://www.unrwa.org/sites/default/files/2015_donors_ranking_overall.pdf [<https://perma.cc/84AE-ZBPH>].

63. OCHA's Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) and its Country-Based Pooled Funds (CBPFs) provide, respectively, a global fund and country-based pooled funds which can be used to rapidly provide initial funding at the onset of a humanitarian crisis, and which can provide support for poorly funded humanitarian response operations. *Who We Are*, U.N. CENT. EMERGENCY RELIEF FUND, <https://cerf.un.org/about-us/who-we-are> [<https://perma.cc/6862-5MNL>]; U.N. DOCS FOR THE COORDINATION OF HUMAN AFFAIRS, COUNTRY-BASED POOLED FUNDS AND THE GRAND BARGAIN (June 5, 2017); https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/documents/files/cbpf-gb_factsheet_0.pdf [<https://perma.cc/TL5J-DHNS>].

64. The European Commission's Directorate-General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (ECHO) primarily provides humanitarian aid from the EU through the funding of partner organizations that deliver to beneficiaries, including the U.N., the Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement, and NGOs. The Commission's Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development (DG DEVCO) works with other Commission services, as well as with the European External Action Service (EEAS) and Commission services, on external action to facilitate cooperation and ensure the coherence of development and thematic policies. Monique Pariat, *Message From the Director-General*, EUR. CIVIL PROTECTION & HUMANITARIAN AID OPERATIONS (Jan. 7, 2016), https://ec.europa.eu/echo/who-we-are/about-echo/director-general_en [<https://perma.cc/2CRP-ENNS>].

65. These compacts are mutual commitments made between the EU and Jordan and the EU and Lebanon respectively. They aim to fulfill pledges made at the London conference on supporting Syria and the region in February 2016, in order to improve the living conditions of refugees and vulnerable host communities in Jordan and Lebanon. The commitments include financial contributions by the EU (including humanitarian aid, macro-financial assistance, and bilateral assistance), in return for which Jordan and Lebanon have agreed to improve conditions and services for refugees living within their borders. EUR. COMM'N, EU-JORDAN PARTNERSHIP

It is exceptionally difficult, if not impossible, to identify all the humanitarian and development funding that each country contributes toward refugees and host communities in a single year. In some cases, this is due to a lack of transparency, which is an issue in its own right that needs to be addressed. In other cases, financial contributions may not be earmarked specifically for refugee or host communities but may have a direct or indirect impact on their lives and experiences. In still others, financial contributions move through pooled or other complex structures and are very difficult to follow to their final destinations.

Equally importantly, both UNHCR and UNRWA are mandated as the primary actors for the protection of refugees. Their core responsibility is constantly undermined, however, because they are chronically underfunded. This has real consequences for refugees and host communities, including the absence of or insufficient programs that support education, livelihood opportunities, healthcare, and protection programming for survivors of sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV).⁶⁶

States should continue to explore new and collaborative approaches to humanitarian and development funding. The new global model proposed in this paper could certainly serve as a focal point for these discussions, but states should also ensure that both UNHCR and UNRWA are always funded in full: they are the primary lifeline for millions of refugees around the world.

(Mar. 2017), <https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/jordan-compact.pdf> [<https://perma.cc/7DAQ-4KHD>]; EUR. COMM'N, EU-LEBANON PARTNERSHIP (Aug. 2017), <https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/lebanon-compact.pdf> [<https://perma.cc/NY46-V2C9>].

66. The results of underfunding in 2016 can be demonstrated by just a handful of concrete examples from hosting countries. In Lebanon, for instance, funding of only 75 percent of need meant that 120,000 refugees were unable to renew their UNHCR refugee registration certificates. In Ethiopia, at 70 percent of required funding, no practical solution could be implemented for the energy shortages faced in most refugee camps. In Iran, at 54 percent of required funding, UNHCR was able to support the construction of only 16 of the 30 schools it had planned to build. In Pakistan, with funding at 40 percent of need, an estimated 20,000-40,000 refugee children were unable to access education. And in Turkey, at only 36 percent of required funding, UNHCR's cash assistance was able to cover less than 2 percent of the non-Syrian caseload and the backlog of refugee status determination cases continued to increase. For country-by-country outlines, see *Reporting*, UNHCR, <http://reporting.unhcr.org/operations>.

2. *The RSM Does Not Measure the Quality of Protection*

Many of the “high-performing” countries also provide refugees with access to basic rights and services beyond permitting them to remain while conflict persists in their home countries. Sweden, Turkey, Jordan, Uganda, and Lebanon, among others, all extend access to education, livelihood opportunities, and healthcare to refugees, although the levels of access are different and often vary based on the refugees’ nationalities.⁶⁷

There are also high-performing countries which, while permitting people to cross their borders, do not allow them to access other basic rights such as education, healthcare, adequate housing, or livelihood opportunities, and may require refugees to live in camps or otherwise restrict their movement. While their respect for the fundamental principle of non-refoulement should be acknowledged, these countries should still be taking steps to fulfill other basic rights for refugees while they are in exile. When they do not have sufficient capacity or infrastructure to absorb newly arriving, or longstanding, populations of refugees, other states should be supporting them in a timely manner with humanitarian and development funding, as well as committing to taking responsibility for at least 10% of the physical protection of refugees, through resettlement and/or other alternative pathways (see below).

The establishment of a global platform is proposed in Section II to support cooperation between countries when physical protection and financial support is required. To directly address issues related to the quality of protection, it could set as a precondition that hosting states submit a concrete plan for achieving refugee access to education, livelihood opportunities, healthcare, and adequate shelter, among other rights. These plans could then be analyzed and further developed and funded within the structure of the proposed global platform.

67. See, e.g., Rep. of the U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees Covering the Period 1 July 2016-30 June 2017, ¶ 31-34, 72 U.N. G.A.O.R. Supp. No. 12, U.N. Doc. A/72/12 (Aug. 15, 2017), <https://undocs.org/A/72/12> (Uganda).

E. The Countries Doing the Least to Support Refugees and Host Communities Based on Their Fair Share

Table 4 applies the proposed RSM to countries hosting at least 50,000 refugees, and then ranks them based on the amount of physical protection they provide. The first column again identifies the percentage of the refugee population globally (26 million +) that the country should be responsible for, based on the RSM. The second column applies the fair share percentage to the total number of refugees, resulting in a whole number. The third column identifies the total number of refugees that were actually being hosted in each country in 2016. The fourth column represents the difference between the number of refugees that a country should be hosting or supporting, based on the RSM, and the number of refugees actually being hosted in that country. The fifth column represents what percentage of their fair share countries are meeting in the physical protection of refugees. As above, this table does not take into account humanitarian and development funding, but none of these countries come close to meeting their fair share of responsibility overall.

TABLE 4: COUNTRIES DOING THE LEAST TO PHYSICALLY SUPPORT REFUGEES AND HOST COMMUNITIES

	Country	Fair share (RSM) % responsibility	Fair share # of refugees	# of refugees currently hosted	Gap between fair share quota and current refugee pop.	% under performance (hosted/FS)
1	Singapore	0.45%	114,468	-	114,468	0%
2	Vietnam	0.30%	75,721	-	75,721	0%
3	Saudi Arabia	0.88%	223,704	190	223,514	0%
4	Philippines	0.38%	95,813	622	95,191	1%
5	Colombia	0.33%	82,682	644	82,038	1%
6	Japan	7.24%	1,842,779	21,315	1,821,464	1%
7	U. Arab Emirates	0.43%	110,606	1,507	109,099	1%
8	Kazakhstan	0.20%	51,103	790	50,313	2%
9	Korea, Rep.	2.12%	540,192	8,668	531,524	2%
10	New Zealand	0.28%	70,226	1,724	68,502	2%
11	Mexico	1.28%	326,804	8,849	317,955	3%
12	Portugal	0.27%	69,830	2,052	67,778	3%
13	Argentina	0.77%	196,599	7,284	189,315	4%
14	Romania	0.27%	69,549	2,979	66,570	4%
15	Indonesia	1.06%	269,975	14,405	255,570	5%
16	Chile	0.36%	91,716	4,960	86,756	5%
17	Czech Republic	0.29%	73,057	4,419	68,638	6%
18	Spain	1.76%	446,622	33,349	413,273	7%
19	Brazil	2.13%	541,574	45,153	496,421	8%
20	Poland	0.71%	180,683	15,178	165,505	8%
21	Ireland	0.43%	110,431	10,053	100,378	9%
22	Peru	0.24%	59,872	6,041	53,831	10%
23	China	12.19%	3,101,168	317,923	2,783,245	10%

Table 5 highlights countries that are doing very little to support refugees financially, based on the RSM. As before, the first column shows the RSM-based fair share of responsibility. The second column is the difference between the number of refugees according to a country's fair share and the number of refugees actually hosted in that country in 2016. The number of refugees hosted is subtracted for the purposes of this analysis because those refugees represent a partial taking up of responsibility.

The third column identifies the total monetary contributions made to UNHCR and UNRWA in 2016 and that monetary number is divided by the remainder of refugees (column two). The fourth column identifies the amount that each country provided in support of each of the remainder of refugees for which it had responsibility—a more meaningful measurement of contributions than simply looking at the total monetary amount of funding provided. Ranging from \$0.02 to \$3.00 per refugee per year, the support they are providing is woefully inadequate. These states can and should be doing much more to ensure basic protection and support to refugees, regardless of their location.

TABLE 5: COUNTRIES CONTRIBUTING THE LEAST HUMANITARIAN FUNDING PER REFUGEE TO UNHCR AND UNRWA BASED ON THEIR FAIR SHARE

	Country	Fair Share (RSM) % responsibility	Gap between fair share quota and current refugee pop.	Total contributions to UNHCR and UNRWA \$	Funding per refugee not hosted \$
1	Philippines	0.38%	95,191	20,000	0.21
2	Indonesia	1.06%	255,570	65,000	0.25
3	Sri Lanka	0.14%	33,930	10,000	0.29
4	Singapore	0.45%	114,468	60,000	0.52
5	Peru	0.24%	53,831	49,642	0.92
6	Chile	0.36%	86,756	82,500	0.95
7	Mexico	1.28%	317,955	305,000	0.96
8	Morocco	0.11%	22,308	24,299	1.09
9	China	12.19%	2,783,245	3,117,942	1.12
10	Israel	0.46%	73,143	100,000	1.37
11	Costa Rica	0.07%	10,092	15,453	1.53
12	Uruguay	0.07%	16,368	30,000	1.83
13	India	3.03%	563,794	1,264,788	2.24
14	Kazakhstan	0.20%	50,313	124,916	2.48
15	Azerbaijan	0.06%	14,072	40,007	2.84
16	Argentina	0.77%	189,315	563,420	2.98

The authors explored but ultimately decided not to assign a monetary value required to support a refugee anywhere in the world, given ethical concerns about assigning a “cost” to refugees and the wide variance in the extension of protection and rights, based on economics, politics, social contexts, and regional practices. Instead, this paper proposes that countries pledge a combination of support for refugees that both extends physical protection (hosting, resettlement, and alternative pathways) to at least 10% of their fair share, and contributes to the protection and support of refugees financially, regardless of where they are located.

That said, in 2016, UNHCR budgeted \$7.5 billion for a total of 22.5 million refugees. When the amount of refugees is divided into the budget request, this equals \$333.33 per refugee. This would already seem to be inadequate to support the protection and rights of a refugee for a year. Worse, neither UNHCR nor UNRWA received close to that amount of funding from the international community. In 2016, UNHCR received just under \$4 billion,⁶⁸ and UNRWA received just under \$1.25 billion⁶⁹ for a total together of just over \$5 billion. When divided across all refugees under the protection mandate of UNHCR and UNRWA, (26 million +) refugees were allocated just \$223 for protection and assistance in 2016. This is unacceptable.⁷⁰

This paper proposes that countries aim to provide physical protection to at least 10% of their fair share of refugees based on need and regardless of ethnicity, religion, or country of origin.⁷¹ This amount is based on UNHCR assessment that about 10% of all refugees are in need of resettlement every year due to specific vulnerabilities.⁷² The arrival of

68. UNHCR, CONTRIBUTIONS TO UNHCR (2016), http://reporting.unhcr.org/sites/default/files/donor_ranking/2016%20-%20UNHCR%20Donor%20Ranking%20by%20Country.pdf [<https://perma.cc/KF4P-PB9Z>].

69. UNRWA, 2016 PLEDGES TO UNRWA'S PROGRAMMES (2016), https://www.unrwa.org/sites/default/files/donor_ranking_with_un_agencies_overall.pdf [<https://perma.cc/7DBE-CJMP>].

70. In 2018, the Trump Administration ceased all U.S. funding to UNRWA, a devastating blow that has been felt in Palestinian homes, schools, and communities. *See* DARYL GRISGRABER, REFUGEES INT'L, THE THOUSANDTH CUT: ELIMINATING U.S. HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TO GAZA (Nov. 2018), <https://static1.squarespace.com/static/506c8ea1e4b01d9450dd53f5/t/5be84ae10e2e721437a5e13b/1541950186414/Gaza+Report+-+November+2018+-+Final+11.11.pdf> [<https://perma.cc/93JE-NUTH>].

71. *See, e.g.*, *Trump v. Hawaii*, 585 U.S. ___, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2403, 2415, 2417, 2421 (2018) (finding the restriction of entry for people from certain majority-Muslim countries "squarely within the scope of Presidential authority under the [Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f) (2018)][" and further that, "[Presidential Proclamation No. 9645, 82 Fed. Reg. 45,161 (2017)] is expressly premised on legitimate purposes: preventing entry of nationals who cannot be adequately vetted and inducing other nations to improve their practices. The text says nothing about religion." Despite then-candidate Trump calling for a "total and complete shutdown of Muslims entering the United States until our country's representatives can figure out what is going on." "[O]ne of the [now-]President's campaign advisers explained that when the President 'first announced it, he said, "Muslim ban." He called me up. He said, "Put a commission together. Show me the right way to do it legally."").

72. UNHCR estimates that roughly 10% of refugees require resettlement based on particular needs that cannot be addressed in the country in which they have sought protection, including those requiring special legal and physical protection or medical attention, survivors of violence and torture, women at risk, children and adolescents and the elderly, and those in need of family

asylum seekers should not be used to justify the curbing of resettlement programs. Receiving and protecting asylum seekers is a domestic responsibility that is related to, but is not the same as, the responsibility to resettle the most vulnerable refugees from countries of first asylum. Similarly, development funds should not be used to resettle refugees domestically. Development assistance is designed to alleviate and ultimately eradicate poverty overseas. Applying development funds to resettlement costs undermines these goals.⁷³

Moreover, every country should make commitments both to extend physical protection to refugees through asylum, refugee hosting, refraining from pushbacks and other actions that put refugees and vulnerable migrants at heightened risk of serious human rights violations (including breach of the principle of non-refoulement)⁷⁴ and to

reunification or who lack prospects for local integration. Unfortunately, while more than a million refugees were identified as being in need according to these criteria in 2015, less than 1% were resettled in that year; clearly, there is a need to provide physical protection for these refugees as a very minimum standard that is not currently being met. *See, e.g.*, UNHCR, REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT TRENDS 2015 (2015), <http://www.unhcr.org/protection/resettlement/559ce97f9/unhcr-refugee-resettlement-trends-2015.html>.

73. While poverty reduction in all countries, both at home and abroad, is important, categorizing domestic spending as part of “development funding” risks “aid inflation,” as well as the increased chance that funds will not go towards genuine development activities. Development assistance should contribute to poverty eradication, with regard to Agenda 2030, and focusing on domestic refugee resettlement risks impeding the development of this policy framework and undermining the aid effectiveness principles. For more on the misapplication of development funds in the areas of migration and displacement, see OXFAM, AN EMERGENCY FOR WHOM? (2017), https://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/file_attachments/bp-emergency-for-whom-eutf-africa-migration-151117-en_1.pdf [<https://perma.cc/54TM-ZA7W>]; and CONCORD AIDWATCH 2017, EU AID UNCOVERED (2017), https://concordeurope.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/CONCORD_AidWatch_Report_2017_web.pdf?1fdb40&1fdb40 [<https://perma.cc/B6ED-QRX7>].

74. The Principle of Non-refoulement is a founding principle of the 1951 Refugee Convention, which prohibits a state from expelling or returning a refugee “in any manner whatsoever” to the frontiers of territories where his/her life or freedom would be threatened on account of her race, religion, ethnicity, political opinion, or membership in a particular social group. The principle is also embedded in human rights law, which prevents, for instance, the return of persons to a place where they would be subject to torture or other cruel or inhuman treatment. The principle is widely considered part of customary international law (*see, e.g.*, U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, *The Principle of Non-Refoulement as a Norm of Customary International Law. Response to the Questions Posed to UNHCR by the Federal Constitutional Court of the Federal Republic of Germany in Cases 2, ¶ 3*, BvR 1938/93, 2 BvR 1953/93, 2 BvR 1954/93 (Jan. 31, 1994), <http://www.refworld.org/docid/437b6db64.html> [<https://perma.cc/NZG9-PYRU>]) and thus must be respected by all states, regardless of whether they are parties to the relevant conventions.

contribute to the support of refugees and host communities through financial contributions and technical support. In all cases, it is of the utmost importance that countries make efforts to reunite family members who are separated,⁷⁵ resettle refugees who remain in danger in countries of first asylum, and are willing to take responsibility for the rapid evacuation of individuals who are in immediate danger. The RSM is not designed to *require* refugee relocation or resettlement (this is a decision to be made ultimately by refugees themselves), but is instead designed so that countries can determine how to ensure the availability of safe passage consistent with their 10% commitment, if this is needed or desired by a refugee.

Finally, countries should not view fulfilling the responsibility to physically protect refugees as a burden. A variety of studies demonstrate that refugees bring much needed economic stimulus to economies and skill-sets that are often of great use.⁷⁶ For example, Saudi Arabia is not

Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, art. 33, July 28, 1951, 19 U.S.T. 6259, 189 U.N.T.S. 137.

75. The right to protection of family life is enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 16(3) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Articles 17 and 23(1), as well as in a number of regional human rights instruments and in the domestic laws of many nations. In the Human Rights Committee, 39th Session, 1990, General Comment 19 on Article 23, paragraph 5, the Committee noted that if the members of a family did not have a right to live together, there would be no family to protect. This was upheld in practice in, for example, the case of *Hendrick Winata, et al. v. Australia*, Jurisprudence U.N. Human Rights Committee, No. 930/2000, CCPR/C/72/D/930/2000 (Aug. 16, 2001), where the Human Rights Committee found that deporting the parents of an adolescent Australian resident would have been in violation of the international law guarantees providing for family life. The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 1966, article 10(1) states: "The widest possible protection and assistance should be accorded to the family" The African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, 1981, article 18(2), states: "The State shall have the duty to assist the family" See also the Convention on the Rights of the Child, 1989, 5th preambular paragraph. *See, e.g.*, G.A. Res 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 183 plen. mtg. at 74 (Dec. 10, 1948); Convention on the Rights of the Child, Hein's No. KAV 7285 (Feb. 16, 1995); Comm. on Protection of the Family, the Right to Marriage and Equality of the Spouse, H.R.C. on its Thirty-Ninth Sess. (July 27, 1990); African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, 26363, 1520 U.N.T.S. 217, 249 (June 27, 1981); Int'l Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, 14668, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 179 (Dec. 19, 1966); Int'l Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 14531, 993 U.N.T.S. 3, 7 (Dec. 16, 1966).

76. These economic improvements can be attributed to increased trade, economic activity, and the availability of aid money. There are also cases reported where the influx of a large group of refugees leads to rising prices, competition over scarce jobs, and wage depression. *See* CRAIG LOSCHMANN ET AL., CONSIDERING THE BENEFITS OF HOSTING REFUGEES: EVIDENCE OF REFUGEE CAMPS INFLUENCE LABOR MARKET ACTIVITY AND ECONOMIC WELFARE IN RWANDA (draft version Aug. 2017), <https://www.wider.unu.edu/sites/default/files/LOSCHMANN%20et%20al%20-%20Considering%20the%20Benefits%20of%20Hosting%20Refugees%20Evidence%20of%20Refugee%20Camps%20Influence%20Labor%20Market%20Activity%20and%20Economic%20Welfare%20in%20Rwanda.pdf>

a signatory to the Refugee Convention nor the 1967 Protocol, and more than two million refugees live in the country without recognition or rights.⁷⁷ Even without being a signatory, however, Saudi Arabia made commitments in the New York Declaration to share responsibility for refugee protection and support.⁷⁸ Even without a resettlement program, it could do this by setting aside labor and family-based visas for at least 10% of the refugees for whom it has responsibility according to the RSM, about 20,000 refugees. For Saudi Arabia, a country with millions of migrant workers, this is neither unreasonable nor unattainable. It is a matter of exercising positive political will.

1. *The Performance of the BRICS Countries Could Be Better*

The BRICS countries are Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa. They are emerging economic powers and are leading a shift in global power away from the developed G7 economies and toward the developing world. In light of their growing social, political, and economic power on the world stage, the BRICS countries have the opportunity to exercise a much greater role in responsibility sharing consistent with their capacities, and could be doing so. Currently, only South Africa is demonstrating this kind of leadership.⁷⁹

20al_paper.pdf [https://perma.cc/GC5U-XP5G]. A study on the impact of Congolese refugees in Uganda found evidence of a small economic gain and increased consumption for locals living in areas with high numbers of refugees.

77. In 2015, officials from the Saudi Ministry of Foreign Affairs were cited as stating that the country had issued residency permits to 100,000 Syrians, although the kingdom had “made a point not to deal with them as refugees.” *Saudi Arabia Says Criticism of Syria Refugee Response ‘False and Misleading’*, GUARDIAN (Sept. 11, 2015, 10:15 PM), <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/12/saudi-arabia-says-reports-of-its-syrian-refugee-response-false-and-misleading> [https://perma.cc/Z79X-QNL7]. In a statement submitted to the UNHCR Thematic Discussion One on the Global Compact on Refugees, on July 10, 2017, Saudi Arabia stated that it had hosted roughly 2.5 million Syrians since the beginning of the crisis, and “has considered as visitors the Yemeni brothers who sought refuge in Saudi Arabia.” *Pillars of the Kingdom Humanitarian Assistance and Efforts to Supporting Refugees*, UNHCR (July 10, 2017), <https://www.unhcr.org/events/conferences/5968bff37/statement-saudi-arabia-first-thematic-discussion-10-july-2017.html> (statement of the Permanent Mission of Saudi Arabia).

78. In the same statement, Saudi Arabia stated that it “will spare no effort to continue to work with international organizations and States that believe that collective effort is the best way to achieve international peace and security as well as the welfare of humanity. The Kingdom is continuing to play its humanitarian, political and economic role with a sense of responsibility, moderation and fairness . . .” *Id.*

79. Pedro Morazán et al., Directorate-General for External Policies of the Union (European Parliament), *The Role of BRICS in the Developing World* (April 2012) (EUR.), <https://www.ab>.

**TABLE 6: CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE BRICS COUNTRIES
BASED ON PHYSICAL PROTECTION**

Country	Fair share (RSM) % responsibility	Fair share # of refugees	# of refugees currently hosted	Gap between fair share quota and current refugee pop.	% under performance (hosted/FS)	Total funding \$	Funding per refugee not hosted \$
South Africa	0.27%	67,885	309,942	(242,057)	457%	343,399	Fair share+
Russian Fed.	1.92%	489,536	232,029	257,507	47%	2,000,000	7.8
India	3.03%	770,864	207,070	563,794	27%	1,264,788	2.2
China	12.19%	3,101,168	317,923	2,783,245	10%	3,117,942	1.1
Brazil	2.13%	541,574	45,153	496,421	8%	2,394,778	4.8

II. A PROPOSAL TOWARDS A GLOBAL PLATFORM ON PROTECTION, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT, AND DURABLE SOLUTIONS

A. *Why a New Global Platform?*

It is not inevitable that neighboring states should bear the bulk of the responsibility for hosting refugees for long periods of time. The Global Compact on Refugees needs to address the gap between the rights laid out in the 1951 Refugee Convention, the 1967 Protocol, and the New York Declaration and the reality that there are no defined operational mechanisms for realizing these rights.

The following proposal for discussion is put forward to support efforts toward envisioning the Global Compact on Refugees as a New Way of Working (NWoW)⁸⁰ and suggests that, for it to be effective, it requires a

gov.tr/files/ardb/evt/1_avrupa_birligi/1_9_politikalar/1_9_8_dis_politika/The_role_of_BRICS_in_the_developing_world.pdf [https://perma.cc/6Z9T-BXNG].

80. The 2016 World Humanitarian Summit (WHS) identified the need for a “New Way of Working” (NWoW) that meets people’s needs during a humanitarian crisis but also reduces their vulnerability. The NWoW was included in the WHS Commitment to Action and was signed by the U.N. Secretary-General and the Principals of UNICEF, UNHCR, WHO, OCHA, WFP, FAO, UNFPA, and UNDP and endorsed by the World Bank and the International Organization for

new global platform that brings together a variety of diverse stakeholders in a shared vision. NWoWs are envisioned as being multi-stakeholder processes by design and not “owned” by any one entity.

The scope of work envisioned by the New York Declaration and to be covered by the Global Compact on Refugees requires more than either UNHCR or UNRWA has the authority or capacity to deliver, but this does not diminish the mandate of these agencies as the primary protectors of refugees. Rather, it should bolster their ability to protect refugees and support host communities in the short, medium, and long terms.

It would be self-defeating for the proposed Global Platform to duplicate existing efforts, instead, it should promote collaboration by bringing together many different U.N. agencies which frequently work alongside each other though not with each other, and IFIs and private sector actors who are taking on increasing responsibility for support related to forced displacement but who do not have formal roles in U.N. structures. While the Refugee Compact envisions “Support Platforms,”⁸¹ the ad hoc and temporary nature does not provide enough opportunity for states and agencies to grapple with difficult policy and operational challenges, and forecloses the possibility of joint learning, negotiating, and pledging for emerging crises. An established Global Platform would support these opportunities, and could also formalize and centralize a Refugee Major Group.⁸² For many years, U.N. agencies, NGOs, and governments have paid lip service to refugee voice and representation. The integration of refugee leadership, and particularly the


Migration. Working to achieve “collective outcomes” is a central concept of the NWoW. The initiative is not about reallocating funding from one to sector to another but about driving humanitarian and development actors not only to work better together, but to design their cooperation toward specific goals that reduce the needs, risks, and vulnerabilities of people affected by crises. The NWoW calls on actors to invest in outcomes, rather than fragmented projects and activities. U.N. OFFICE FOR THE COORDINATION OF HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS, *NEW WAY OF WORKING 4-6* (2017), https://www.unocha.org/sites/unocha/files/NWOW%20Booklet%20low%20res.002_0.pdf [<https://perma.cc/FKA5-M8AQ>].

81. Rep. of the U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, *Global Compact on Refugees*, 73 U.N. G.A.O.R. Supp. No. 12, ¶ 22-27, U.N. Doc. A/73/12 (Sept. 13, 2018), https://www.unhcr.org/gcr/GCR_English.pdf [<https://perma.cc/94AE-39CY>].

82. See, e.g., UNITED NATIONS SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON ENVIRONMENT & DEVELOPMENT, *AGENDA 21*, at 23.1-32.14 (1992), <https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/Agenda21.pdf> [<https://perma.cc/U4A2-NBEX>] (Section III, “Strengthening the Role of Major Groups”).

leadership of refugee women, within this new global platform could represent a significant step toward turning that rhetoric into reality.

FIGURE 5: STRUCTURE OF THE PROPOSED GLOBAL PLATFORM ON PROTECTION, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT, AND DURABLE SOLUTIONS



B. Structure of the Global Platform

This paper proposes that the Global Platform on Protection, Human Development and Durable Solutions would best be realized if it were led by U.N. Member States and not limited by the mandates or structures of any one U.N. entity. It also suggests that it be co-led by two countries, one of which is already exceeding its fair share of responsibility for refugees, while the other is already at 75% of its fair share and actively working to bridge the gap.

This makes sense because the proposed platform is designed to promote and support better performance by individual countries. By having as one co-chair a country that is at or over its fair share, it is immediately apparent that meeting fair shares is wholly possible, while that particular country obviously has expertise in the challenges and needs faced by others in similar situations. Having the platform co-chaired by a second country that is actively working to achieve its full fair share of responsibility creates space for discussions about transforming good intentions into reality, often in the context of political, economic, or social challenges. Highlighting these challenges and exploring ways to facilitate positive outcomes could be useful both in the leadership of the proposed Global Platform and as an example for other members.

Membership of the Secretariat could require a plan of action that would position each country to meet its fair share of refugee protection and support within a set number of years. Alternatively, if a country was already technically meeting its fair share but had laws, policies, or practices that undermined the rights of refugees at its borders, in protection, or in humanitarian and development programming, this paper suggests that it be required to submit a plan for reforming such laws or enacting new rights that promote the protection of refugees and their right to assistance. An Office of Monitoring, Oversight, and Accountability could be placed within the Secretariat as a support system, both identifying areas where states could improve their policies and practices and issuing reports on the progress of different states toward meeting their fair share of responsibility for refugees.

Political and infrastructural challenges that prevent the extension of education, healthcare services, adequate housing, and livelihood opportunities, among others, could be reviewed jointly by humanitarian and development actors, as well as by already existing or new regional

responsibility sharing groups, which could be empowered to negotiate regional approaches. Recently, countries in Latin America and the Caribbean have entered into an agreement of exactly this type so that they could better share and manage the increased movement of refugees in the region.⁸³ This new agreement grew out of discussions and partnerships between UNHCR and individual countries, and while it does not include the full weight of the World Bank, the private sector, or other key stakeholders, it could play a critical role, particularly in countering obstacles to refugee rights and meeting the needs of host communities.

As another example, domestic law, policy, and/or practice that prevents the movement of refugees, outsources responsibilities for asylum, or results in arbitrary detentions and/or deportations could be brought to the attention of the platform by affected countries, refugees and their families, civil society, or other stakeholders. While the Global Platform would not have the authority to call for the eradication of practices that block refugees' rights and undermine international cooperation around migration and displacement, it could be designed with the authority to assess practices and propose better approaches that address the concerns of states, promote the rights of refugees, and reduce negative impacts on refugees and neighboring states.

1. Refugee Major Group

In consultation with refugee groups and refugee advocacy organizations, the establishment of a Refugee Major Group is proposed, which would be an independent and formally recognized body within the Global Platform. This model is based on the organizing of core stakeholders, or "major groups," which emerged out of the Earth Summit in 1992 and has since been replicated in significant processes, including the SDGs.⁸⁴ Like the other major groups, the proposed Refugee Major

83. The Comprehensive Regional Protection and Solutions Framework (MIRPS is the acronym in Spanish) is a new framework supported by UNHCR and designed to address the full scope of forced displacement from its root causes, strengthening asylum and protection systems, and working on durable solutions. UNHCR, COMPREHENSIVE REGIONAL PROTECTION AND SOLUTIONS FRAMEWORK (2018), <https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/58749> [<https://perma.cc/S4YD-YW28>].

84. See, e.g., UNITED NATIONS SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON ENVIRONMENT & DEVELOPMENT, AGENDA 21, at 23.1-32.14 (1992), <https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/Agenda21.pdf> [<https://perma.cc/U4A2-NBEX>] (Section III, "Strengthening the Role of Major Groups").

Group would be empowered to engage directly with states and U.N. processes to ensure that refugee-led organizations have an authentic voice and meaningful participation, along with a formal opportunity both to provide input and shape how responsibility sharing and refugee rights are made operational and implemented in different national, regional, and global contexts.

2. *Working Groups*

Finally, three working groups are proposed that represent an attempt to address challenging policy and operational issues through all parts of the displacement cycle: emergency protection concerns, human development in displacement, and the development of durable solutions. Achieving any of these often requires extensive multilateral efforts, and good practices can be eroded quickly by political, economic, social, and security concerns.

The international community needs a refugee system that is resilient and flexible as, at some point, somewhere, politicians and elected leaders will stoke nativist and xenophobic impulses when it is politically expedient for them to do so. The proposed Global Platform, independent of any one government and made up of a broad range of actors, including refugees and host communities, will be insulated from these time-bound and geographically shifting dynamics, and will be able to act credibly, coherently, and with due regard for the rights and needs of refugees and host communities. The authors propose that a stable and independent space is urgently needed to sustain protection as a priority, regardless of political, economic, and social contexts.

Each of the working groups proposed includes gender equality as a primary function. The experiences of women and girls are regularly overlooked, but they should be considered, designed for, and integrated into all phases of displacement and return—across emergency, humanitarian and development phases. For example, due to traditional gender roles in their home countries, female refugees often have less formal education and weaker language skills than their male counterparts, which poses barriers to finding employment and accessing services, including legal advice, in a new country where they do not speak the language.

Family responsibilities, social isolation, and lack of resources can make accessing and utilizing healthcare services particularly challenging

for refugee women. Yet as the primary care-givers in the household and because of pregnancy and childbirth, women often have greater need than men of regular and reliable access to health services. Additionally, in terms of personal and professional development, the lack of affordable childcare is a major barrier for refugee women seeking to participate in language or skills training. Yet without these skills, they are unable to access employment and earn an income, which leads to a vicious cycle of poverty.

Furthermore, adjusting to a new culture brings about changes in roles and family dynamics, which can strain relationships and make women more vulnerable to domestic violence. The Global Platform proposed is designed to highlight the need for debate and to ultimately agree to concrete and funded programs that counter these challenges, among others. Indeed, no global, regional, or national refugee policy will succeed if the experiences and rights of those on the move, and particularly women, are not put at its center. In their absence, new approaches may reinforce inequality and vulnerability.

Again, the proposal for a global platform is one approach put forward to move states, international agencies, and organizations beyond talking about the challenges inherent in working collaboratively to actually debating what kind of structure is needed to make it happen. This is the right moment for such an initiative.

III. REFUGEE VOICES AND CHOICES: ENVISIONING THEIR OWN FUTURES

A. *Refugee Voices and Refugee Inclusion*

For all the talk and intentions around increasing the agency and self-reliance of refugees and of including their perspectives and capacities in the design and implementation of programs and policies addressing their needs, they are consistently excluded from the corridors of power.

In the process of preparing this paper, the authors engaged directly with refugees, refugee-led organizations, and refugee rights organizations around the world in a variety of ways including interviews, shared drafts for comment, and an in-person workshop held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. While these are good initial steps, they are not sufficient to ensure that the experiences and choices of refugees in different parts of the world, with different abilities and ages, levels of education, gender and experiences of persecution and conflict, are adequately represented in the

proposed model. Refugees and refugee-led organizations should be included in discussion and debate as countries review, discuss, and debate these proposals and others.

Most important is the meaningful integration of refugee women in the design and development of any support platform. Forced migration is gendered right from the start. Conflict and persecution are exacerbated by how gender interacts with poverty, violence, exploitation, climate change—and power. Refugee women are often subject to discrimination and violence as women, but also as refugees, and due to other elements of their identities, whether race, ethnicity, real or perceived sexual orientation, age, or disability. Together, these factors can constrain the ability of women to take decisions and to be able to act in their own best interests.

Perhaps just as dangerously, these factors can create a perception that women do not have the ability, agency, or authority to take decisions and actions to improve their own situations—relegating them to a passive role as victims and excluding them from participation in the creation of law, policy, and practice approaches. Women should be at the center of such discussions.

The capacity of women, and their families and communities, to cope with and to escape cycles of displacement hinges on women's ability to gain full access to their rights: including education, decent work, healthcare, and sexual and reproductive rights.

Much greater efforts should be made to more clearly understand the socio-economic characteristics and backgrounds of female refugees in terms of education, skills, work experience, the ordeals they have been through, and what they need and want for the future. Representation mechanisms for refugees and host communities are often lacking, and therefore people are often not involved in the design and implementation of programs and policies that affect them.

The Global Platform proposed would specifically include women's rights organizations, refugee-led organizations, and local leadership in the Refugee Major Group. While this is not enough to ensure that the whole diversity of experience and identity are sufficiently represented, we would recommend that the Refugee Major Group have the same access to decision making as governments and other institutions, to be developed alongside the platform's broader stakeholder committee.

Organizations led by refugee women should be prioritized as this Refugee Major Group is developed.

B. Refugee Choices and Refugee Rights

In an ideal world, the wishes of all refugees in terms of residence during exile would be respected and realized. The current reality is that human rights and refugee law do not make the fulfilment of the refugees' choices of residence mandatory. Whenever possible, however, refugees' preferences for resettlement and relocation should be respected. Policies and practices aimed at reuniting families should be a priority. And a refugee's desire to be resettled in a specific country or region, regardless of pre-existing links, should be a core consideration in determining their destination, when needed. Refugees and their families are best equipped to determine where they are most likely to succeed in exile. This may take into account family links, language, and cultural similarities, or it may be based on an entirely different and personal analysis. It is vital that refugees can exercise their own best judgments.

IV. WHAT NEXT?

There is no "one size fits all" approach to delivering the right policy framework and program interventions for every conflict and crisis across the world. Each state and region has its own complex mix of social, economic, and political challenges—ranging from fragility to demographic challenges, from ethnic tensions and internal conflicts to weak economies, corruption, and a lack of accountable state structures.

While this reality presents complex challenges, each person has fundamental rights that do not change depending on when and how they move, and these rights must be promoted and protected. The Global Compact on Refugees is an unprecedented opportunity to finally meet this challenge. To do so, countries will need to agree on an equitable and predictable mechanism for sharing responsibility and a new and independent body dedicated to supporting countries in the delivery of these responsibilities. While the Refugee Compact has been adopted, the work of realizing its promises are only beginning, and the authors encourage countries to robustly discuss and debate these proposals among others, and develop workable approaches to refugee protection and care. This is a shared effort. Let us begin in haste.

ANNEX 1: DETAILED METHODOLOGY
OF THE RESPONSIBILITY SHARING MODEL

SHORT SUMMARY

The authors designed a Responsibility Sharing Model (RSM) which assigns a percentage of total responsibility for refugee protection to each country in the full list of U.N. Member States (193 countries). This approach takes the gross domestic product (GDP) and population of each nation as the primary measures of that state's ability to receive, protect, and assist refugees and host communities, and to contribute funding to the reception and care of refugees regardless of their location.

The model can then be utilized to convert the percentage of responsibility into a number of total refugees that each country should accept or, alternatively, should provide funding for other countries to accept and support those refugees. The authors explored whether a base "cost" could be assigned to a refugee anywhere in the world, but ultimately concluded that this was not a sound approach, for two reasons. First, given the significant differences in economic, social, and political contexts of nations around the world, the "cost" of hosting a refugee cannot be fixed as a monetary unit. More importantly, the authors believe that every nation has the obligation both to receive refugees who are in need of protection and to support the ability of other states to receive, protect, and support refugees regardless of their location. With a fixed "cost" assigned to each refugee, some nations might agree only to meeting their fair share by providing financial support, thereby shifting part of their responsibility by "buying" it out and making refugee protection a transactional event. This raises ethical concerns, may reinforce xenophobic tendencies among some elected officials and members of the public, and may also be legally suspect.

The model attempts to combine hard numbers (e.g. GDP and population) and to modify these, based on the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), through further development indexes, specifically the Human Development Index and the Fragile States Index.

This section describes in detail the principles behind the RSM, the methodology used to construct it, and the many data sources that have been considered in the process.

MODEL CONSTRUCTION

Goal

The goal of the RSM is to create a transparent, equitable, and predictable model that assigns a percentage of total responsibility for accepting the world's refugee population, both current and future, or for providing, in combination, adequate funding to support other countries to accept and protect the funding country's quota of refugees. The result is a percentage value assigned to each country (the sum of which values represents 100% of the total refugee population), and which can be converted to a number of total refugees assigned to that country.

Participating Countries and Components

The RSM was constructed first by taking the full list of 193 U.N. member states. Hard components incorporated into the model were:

GDP (Current U.S. \$)

Official definition: GDP at purchaser's prices is the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion and degradation of natural resources. Data are in current U.S. dollars. Dollar figures for GDP are converted from domestic currencies using single-year official exchange rates. For a few countries where the official exchange rate does not reflect the rate effectively applied to actual foreign exchange transactions, an alternative conversion factor is used.

Source: World Bank National Accounts Data (2016)⁸⁵

Population

Total population is based on the de facto definition of population, which counts all residents regardless of legal status or citizenship.

Source: World Bank National Accounts Data (2016)⁸⁶

The model identified GDP and population as the starting point for our

85. *World Bank National Accounts Data*, WORLD BANK (2016), <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD>.

86. *Id.*

analysis. The use of GDP places emphasis on national wealth, so that the richer the country, the larger its fair share of responsibility. In the case of population, it is implied that the larger the population, the less impact arriving refugees would have on current social, economic, and political dynamics (the per capita concept). This has been the primary starting point in most discussions of responsibility sharing models.⁸⁷ But while the authors used this as a starting point for the model, we did not assume this was the only way to approach fair share, and explored a variety of different approaches before settling on the approach put forward in this paper. After exploring a variety of different ratios, the authors settled on a 75% weight on GDP and a 25% weight on population. This baseline number was then multiplied by key context-specific dynamics that work together to assess the capacity of states (as discussed below).

Development Indexes Applied

Because the authors believed it was important to account for nations' efforts toward progress on the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development in determining a fair share for each country, it explored how to take into account access to education, healthcare, inequality, density, gender equality, and wealth. These data points enhance the methodology.

In 2015, nations adopted the 2030 Agenda, which includes seventeen SDGs that would “*leave no one behind*” by ending extreme poverty and prioritizing policies and investments that have long-term, transformative impacts on communities and nations. Exceptional efforts are under way across communities, nationally, and internationally for the achievement of the SDGs by 2030. It makes sense that a mechanism for refugee responsibility sharing would both consider and be inclusive of these goals.

Indeed, the arrival of tens of thousands of refugees can create stresses on already overloaded public utilities and institutions, including water

87. However, such models have not gone without criticism. For example, the EU's emergency relocation mechanism, set up in 2015 for a two-year period, included a distribution key based on size of population, GDP, number of spontaneous asylum applications, and employment rate. Yet the mechanism failed to reach its intended goals of responsibility sharing, as the vast majority of member states did not fill their allocated quota. Further, strict eligibility criteria and lack of political will to engage in a meaningful process resulted in asylum seekers being stranded in Greece for months on end in substandard conditions. See OXFAM ET AL., MORE THAN SIX MONTHS STRANDED—WHAT NOW? A JOINT POLICY BRIEF ON THE SITUATION FOR DISPLACED PERSONS IN GREECE 10 (2016), <https://oxf.am/2szF6yJ> [<https://perma.cc/FAC8-U8PG>].

and sanitation, housing, and education. This in turn may create greater challenges for the development of national action plans consistent with the SDGs and may diminish the ability of host communities and refugees benefiting from these advances. Second, every refugee has the right to protection, education, healthcare, and livelihood opportunities, among other rights, and so a fair share mechanism should include an assessment of the state's ability to fulfill these rights, including the exercise of women's and girl's rights equal to those of men and boys.

The authors studied a variety of indexes and measurements (the Oxfam Inequality Index, the Gini coefficient, the Gender Inequality Index, and density and GDP per capita, among others) and finally settled on the Human Development Index because it is:

- widely legitimized
- calculates almost all the countries (188 out of 193)
- measures clear aspects of personal and social development, life expectancy (health parameter), expected years of schooling (education parameter), and gross national income (GNI) per capita in PPP terms (wealth parameter).

Human Development Index (HDI)

The HDI is a summary measure of average achievement in key dimensions of human development: a long and healthy life, being knowledgeable, and having a decent standard of living. The HDI is the geometric mean of normalized indices for each of these three dimensions.

The health dimension is assessed by life expectancy at birth, while the education dimension is measured by mean years of schooling for adults aged twenty-five years and more and expected years of schooling for children of school entry age. The standard of living dimension is measured by GNI per capita. The HDI uses the logarithm of income, to reflect the diminishing importance of income with increasing GNI. The scores for the three HDI dimension indices are then aggregated into a composite index using a geometric mean.

Source: United Nations Development Programme (2016)⁸⁸

88. *Human Development Index (HDI)*, UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME (2016), <http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/human-development-index-hdi> [<https://perma.cc/RRC2-72W7>].

Fragile States Index

The authors also explored a variety of ways to account for the experiences of refugees, for example by considering global human rights surveys, but ultimately decided that fragile states, by definition, are already in a state of emergency, and so it would not make sense to add the responsibility for supporting refugees to the volatility of their situations.

The rankings in the Fragile States Index⁸⁹ are based on twelve indicators of state vulnerability, grouped by category: social (four), economic (two), and political (six). The scores are obtained via a process involving content analysis, quantitative data, and development review. In the content analysis phase, millions of documents from over 100,000 English-language or translated sources (social media are excluded) are scanned and filtered through the Fund for Peace's Conflict Assessment System Tool (CAST), which utilizes specific filters and search parameters to sort data linked to indicators, and assigns scores based on algorithms. Following CAST analysis, quantitative data from sources such as the United Nations, World Health Organization, Transparency International, World Bank, and Freedom House are incorporated, which then leads to the final phase of development reviews of each indicator for each country.

Considered together in the index, these twelve indicators are a way of assessing a state's vulnerability to collapse or conflict, ranking states on a spectrum of categories labelled "sustainable," "stable," "warning," and "alert." A state that is fragile has several attributes, and such fragility may manifest itself in various ways. Nevertheless, some of the most common attributes of state fragility may include: the loss of physical control of territory or a monopoly on the legitimate use of force, the erosion of legitimate authority to make collective decisions, an inability to provide reasonable public services, and the inability to interact with other states as a full member of the international community.

The authors determined that states already at a level of "alert" (90 points on the index or higher) would not be included in its fair share analysis. That said, we found that thirty-five fragile states are currently hosting refugees.

The authors want to disclose that they did struggle with whether to

89. *Data for Peace*, FFP (2018), <http://fundforpeace.org/fsi/data/>.

include the Fragile States Index as it has been the subject of fair and vigorous criticism on a number of fronts, including: (1) that the Index suffers from a Eurocentric bias favorably weighting democracies in the global north, despite their poor performance on many fronts including xenophobia and racism, which is currently even more apparent; and (2) an unwillingness to account for, or wrestle with, the fact that many of the states deemed most fragile are also states that have been subject to the intervention of wealthier nations, including Iraq, Syria, and Libya. Nonetheless, the authors chose to factor in the Fragile States Index because its inclusion demonstrates incontestably that wealthier nations have the capacity and can do much more to receive and protect refugees, given that most of the countries deemed fragile, or most at risk of emergency, are also countries hosting hundreds of thousands of refugees. The authors also note that whether included or excluded, the Fragile States Index does not materially alter the findings of the RSM, as the tables below demonstrate.

Top Five Fragile Countries	Without Fragility Index
Pakistan	0.31%
Nigeria	0.30%
Iraq	0.16%
Congo, Dem. Rep.	0.12%
Myanmar	0.08%

Top Five Countries	Fair Share with Fragility Index	Fair Share without Fragility Index
United States	27.17%	26.73%
China	12.19%	11.99%
Japan	7.24%	7.13%
Germany	5.37%	5.28%
United Kingdom	3.85%	3.79%
Total	55.82%	54.92%

Weighting and Standardization

The model takes the full list of data for GDP and population for each of the 193 U.N. member countries, and converts it into a percentage of the total (% of total GDP in current US\$, and % of total population).

Example: Brazil

% of world's GDP: 2.41%

% of world's population: 2.80%

Then a weight of 75% is applied to the GDP percentage value for each country, and a weight of 25% to the population percentage value for each country. This results in the model giving a new combined modified weighted percentage value for each country, with the total list still adding up to 100%.

% of world's GDP: $2.41\% \times 75\% = 1.81\%$

% of world's population: $2.80\% \times 25\% = 0.70\%$

Total = 2.51%

With the goal of modifying this GDP/population percentage value for each country to account for progress toward the 2030 Agenda, the authors incorporated the HDI into the model by multiplying each country's weighted percentage value by the corresponding HDI percentile ranking, which resulted in a new quotient.⁹⁰

Brazil's HDI: 0.754; percentile ranking of HDI = 0.58 (based on full list of 188 countries in the HDI)

Finally, the authors incorporated the Fragile States Index, and in every country with more than 90 points (which is considered an 'alert' condition) multiplied the previous value by zero, eliminating the responsibility sharing portions for those countries. All other nations were assigned a multiplier of 1, thus maintaining their previous results.

Brazil's RSM: 68.20 → 68.20 < 90 = multiply by 1

We then normalized the final values, creating final percentages of responsibility sharing for the remaining countries. Again, applying this to Brazil:

% of world's GDP: 2.41% x 75% = 1.81%

% of world's population: 2.80% x 25% = 0.70%

Total = 2.51%

Brazil weighted % value x HDI (percentile ranking) x 1 (<90 FSI)

2.51 x 0.58 (HDI) x 1 (fragility) = 1.46

Normalized result (which is completed after all the RSMs are determined) = 2.13%

→ |2.51% x 0.58 x 1| = 2.13%

90. Based on the HDI, each nation received a number between 0 to 1, with quotients nearing 0 connoting that a nation scored poorly on the HDI indicators, and those nearing 1 connoting more successful indicators of human development outcomes. For the five countries that did not have an HDI score assigned, the authors applied a value of 0.5.

ANNEX 2: FAIR SHARE CALCULATION FOR EACH NATION
BASED ON THE RSM FINDINGS OF THE
RESPONSIBILITY SHARING MODEL

The table below shows the overall global RSM results for each of the 193 members of the United Nations.

Country	Fair share normalized
Afghanistan	0.00%
Albania	0.02%
Algeria	0.24%
Andorra	0.00%
Angola	0.00%
Antigua and Barbuda	0.00%
Argentina	0.77%
Armenia	0.02%
Australia	1.85%
Austria	0.54%
Azerbaijan	0.06%
Bahamas, The	0.01%
Bahrain	0.04%
Bangladesh	0.30%
Barbados	0.01%
Belarus	0.08%
Belgium	0.66%
Belize	0.00%
Benin	0.01%
Bhutan	0.00%

Country	Fair share normalized
Bolivia	0.04%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	0.02%
Botswana	0.01%
Brazil	2.13%
Brunei Darussalam	0.02%
Bulgaria	0.08%
Burkina Faso	0.00%
Burundi	0.00%
Cabo Verde	0.00%
Cambodia	0.03%
Cameroon	0.00%
Canada	2.28%
Central African Republic	0.00%
Chad	0.00%
Chile	0.36%
China	12.19%
Colombia	0.33%
Comoros	0.00%
Congo, Dem. Rep.	0.00%
Congo, Rep.	0.00%
Costa Rica	0.07%
Cote d'Ivoire	0.00%
Croatia	0.07%
Cuba	0.12%

Country	Fair share normalized
Cyprus	0.03%
Czech Republic	0.29%
Denmark	0.46%
Djibouti	0.00%
Dominica	0.00%
Dominican Republic	0.07%
Ecuador	0.12%
Egypt, Arab Rep.	0.39%
El Salvador	0.03%
Equatorial Guinea	0.01%
Eritrea	0.00%
Estonia	0.03%
Ethiopia	0.00%
Fiji	0.01%
Finland	0.33%
France	3.54%
Gabon	0.01%
Gambia, The	0.00%
Georgia	0.02%
Germany	5.37%
Ghana	0.05%
Greece	0.29%
Grenada	0.00%
Guatemala	0.06%

Country	Fair share normalized
Guinea	0.00%
Guinea-Bissau	0.00%
Guyana	0.00%
Haiti	0.00%
Honduras	0.02%
Hungary	0.18%
Iceland	0.03%
India	3.03%
Indonesia	1.06%
Iran, Islamic Rep.	0.62%
Iraq	0.00%
Ireland	0.43%
Israel	0.46%
Italy	2.62%
Jamaica	0.02%
Japan	7.24%
Jordan	0.06%
Kazakhstan	0.20%
Kenya	0.00%
Kiribati	0.00%
Korea, Dem. People's Rep.	0.00%
Korea, Rep.	2.12%
Kuwait	0.14%
Kyrgyz Republic	0.01%

Country	Fair share normalized
Lao PDR	0.02%
Latvia	0.04%
Lebanon	0.06%
Lesotho	0.00%
Liberia	0.00%
Libya	0.00%
Liechtenstein	0.01%
Lithuania	0.06%
Luxembourg	0.08%
Macedonia, FYR	0.01%
Madagascar	0.02%
Malawi	0.01%
Malaysia	0.41%
Maldives	0.00%
Mali	0.00%
Malta	0.02%
Marshall Islands	0.00%
Mauritania	0.00%
Mauritius	0.02%
Mexico	1.28%
Micronesia, Fed. Sts.	0.00%
Moldova	0.01%
Monaco	0.00%
Mongolia	0.02%

Country	Fair share normalized
Montenegro	0.01%
Morocco	0.11%
Mozambique	0.01%
Myanmar	0.00%
Namibia	0.01%
Nauru	0.00%
Nepal	0.00%
Netherlands	1.17%
New Zealand	0.28%
Nicaragua	0.02%
Niger	0.00%
Nigeria	0.00%
Norway	0.57%
Oman	0.09%
Pakistan	0.00%
Palau	0.00%
Panama	0.07%
Papua New Guinea	0.01%
Paraguay	0.03%
Peru	0.24%
Philippines	0.38%
Poland	0.71%
Portugal	0.27%
Qatar	0.19%

Country	Fair share normalized
Romania	0.27%
Russian Fed.	1.92%
Rwanda	0.00%
Samoa	0.00%
San Marino	0.00%
Sao Tome and Principe	0.00%
Saudi Arabia	0.88%
Senegal	0.01%
Serbia	0.06%
Seychelles	0.00%
Sierra Leone	0.00%
Singapore	0.45%
Slovak Republic	0.12%
Slovenia	0.07%
Solomon Islands	0.00%
Somalia	0.00%
South Africa	0.27%
South Sudan	0.00%
Spain	1.76%
Sri Lanka	0.14%
St. Kitts and Nevis	0.00%
St. Lucia	0.00%
St. Vincent and the Grenadines	0.00%
Sudan	0.00%

Country	Fair share normalized
Suriname	0.00%
Swaziland	0.00%
Sweden	0.74%
Switzerland	1.00%
Syrian Arab Republic	0.00%
Tajikistan	0.02%
Tanzania	0.07%
Thailand	0.51%
Timor-Leste	0.00%
Togo	0.01%
Tonga	0.00%
Trinidad and Tobago	0.02%
Tunisia	0.06%
Turkey	1.03%
Turkmenistan	0.03%
Tuvalu	0.00%
U. Arab Emirates	0.43%
Uganda	0.00%
Ukraine	0.20%
United Kingdom	3.85%
United States	27.17%
Uruguay	0.07%
Uzbekistan	0.11%
Vanuatu	0.00%

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Country	Fair share normalized
Venezuela, RB	0.43%
Vietnam	0.30%
Yemen, Rep.	0.00%
Zambia	0.03%
Zimbabwe	0.00%

ANNEX 3: APPLICATION OF THE RSM TO DETERMINE
THE PERFORMANCE OF INDIVIDUAL STATES

The table below shows the overall application and analysis of the RSM to 158 U.N. Member States (excluded are the 35 fragile states, which drop out based on the analysis). The first seventy states listed (Afghanistan through Sierra Leone) are states whose performances are over 100% of their fair share. The next ten states listed (Ghana through Benin) are between 50% and 100% of their fair share. The remainder of states are under 50% of their fair share.

Country	Fair share normalized	Fair share number of refugees	Number of refugees currently hosted	Gap between fair share quota and current refugee population	% performance (hosted/fair share)
Afghanistan	0.00%	-	59,899	(59,899)	Fragile
Angola	0.00%	-	45,698	(45,698)	Fragile
Burundi	0.00%	-	61,082	(61,082)	Fragile
Cameroon	0.00%	-	378,666	(378,666)	Fragile
Central African Republic	0.00%	-	12,419	(12,419)	Fragile
Chad	0.00%	-	393,160	(393,160)	Fragile
Congo, Dem. Rep.	0.00%	-	453,283	(453,283)	Fragile
Congo, Rep.	0.00%	-	53,132	(53,132)	Fragile
Cote d'Ivoire	0.00%	-	1,683	(1,683)	Fragile
Eritrea	0.00%	-	2,350	(2,350)	Fragile
Ethiopia	0.00%	-	793,595	(793,595)	Fragile
Guinea	0.00%	-	5,176	(5,176)	Fragile

Country	Fair share normalized	Fair share number of refugees	Number of refugees currently hosted	Gap between fair share quota and current refugee population	% performance (hosted/fair share)
Guinea-Bissau	0.00%	-	9,295	(9,295)	Fragile
Haiti	0.00%	-	10	(10)	Fragile
Iraq	0.00%	-	273,346	(273,346)	Fragile
Kenya	0.00%	-	494,863	(494,863)	Fragile
Korea, Dem. People's Rep.	0.00%	-	-	-	Fragile
Liberia	0.00%	-	18,999	(18,999)	Fragile
Libya	0.00%	-	38,547	(38,547)	Fragile
Mali	0.00%	-	17,801	(17,801)	Fragile
Mauritania	0.00%	-	74,735	(74,735)	Fragile
Myanmar	0.00%	-	-	-	Fragile
Nepal	0.00%	-	25,321	(25,321)	Fragile
Niger	0.00%	-	166,158	(166,158)	Fragile
Nigeria	0.00%	-	1,834	(1,834)	Fragile
Pakistan	0.00%	-	1,357,416	(1,357,416)	Fragile
Rwanda	0.00%	-	320,145	(320,145)	Fragile
Somalia	0.00%	-	24,368	(24,368)	Fragile
South Sudan	0.00%	-	264,352	(264,352)	Fragile
Sudan	0.00%	-	437,518	(437,518)	Fragile
Syrian Arab Republic	0.00%	-	559,047	(559,047)	Fragile
Timor-Leste	0.00%	-	-	-	Fragile

Country	Fair share normalized	Fair share number of refugees	Number of refugees currently hosted	Gap between fair share quota and current refugee population	% performance (hosted/fair share)
Uganda	0.00%	-	982,715	(982,715)	Fragile
Yemen, Rep.	0.00%	-	278,880	(278,880)	Fragile
Zimbabwe	0.00%	-	8,378	(8,378)	Fragile
Jordan	0.06%	14,395	2,897,303	(2,882,908)	20127%
Djibouti	0.00%	177	25,744	(25,567)	14547%
Lebanon	0.06%	15,160	1,476,671	(1,461,511)	9740%
Burkina Faso	0.00%	613	32,676	(32,063)	5330%
Gambia, The	0.00%	265	7,940	(7,675)	2996%
Nauru	0.00%	27	757	(730)	2781%
Tanzania	0.07%	17,892	290,037	(272,145)	1621%
Turkey	1.03%	261,096	3,115,376	(2,854,280)	1193%
Malawi	0.01%	2,666	30,415	(27,749)	1141%
Mozambique	0.01%	1,608	17,651	(16,043)	1098%
Togo	0.01%	1,396	13,274	(11,878)	951%
Iran, Islamic Rep.	0.62%	156,841	979,526	(822,685)	625%
Senegal	0.01%	3,671	17,803	(14,132)	485%
Belize	0.00%	504	2,431	(1,927)	482%
South Africa	0.27%	67,885	309,942	(242,057)	457%
Zambia	0.03%	7,523	32,669	(25,146)	434%
Armenia	0.02%	4,210	17,968	(13,758)	427%
Ecuador	0.12%	30,281	127,390	(97,109)	421%
Bangladesh	0.30%	75,106	276,208	(201,102)	368%

Country	Fair share normalized	Fair share number of refugees	Number of refugees currently hosted	Gap between fair share quota and current refugee population	% performance (hosted/fair share)
Papua New Guinea	0.01%	3,091	9,553	(6,462)	309%
Egypt, Arab Rep.	0.39%	99,365	263,407	(164,042)	265%
Serbia	0.06%	14,788	36,652	(21,864)	248%
Malta	0.02%	3,838	8,850	(5,012)	231%
Bulgaria	0.08%	19,996	33,856	(13,860)	169%
Sweden	0.74%	189,152	313,267	(124,115)	166%
Swaziland	0.00%	682	1,113	(431)	163%
Algeria	0.24%	61,644	99,944	(38,300)	162%
Cyprus	0.03%	7,281	11,572	(4,291)	159%
Venezuela, RB	0.43%	110,200	172,957	(62,757)	157%
Namibia	0.01%	2,373	3,432	(1,059)	145%
Malaysia	0.41%	103,432	148,574	(45,142)	144%
Panama	0.07%	17,445	21,821	(4,376)	125%
Austria	0.54%	136,591	169,659	(33,068)	124%
Greece	0.29%	73,262	86,413	(13,151)	118%
Sierra Leone	0.00%	606	690	(84)	114%
Ghana	0.05%	13,735	13,236	499	96%
Germany	5.37%	1,365,599	1,256,828	108,771	92%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	0.02%	6,044	5,324	720	88%
Gabon	0.01%	3,285	2,840	445	86%
Thailand	0.51%	129,049	111,457	17,592	86%
Tajikistan	0.02%	4,330	3,160	1,170	73%

Country	Fair share normalized	Fair share number of refugees	Number of refugees currently hosted	Gap between fair share quota and current refugee population	% performance (hosted/fair share)
Montenegro	0.01%	1,749	1,056	693	60%
Botswana	0.01%	3,646	2,173	1,473	60%
Albania	0.02%	4,872	2,890	1,982	59%
Benin	0.01%	2,018	1,023	995	51%
Russian Fed.	1.92%	489,536	232,029	257,507	47%
Norway	0.57%	144,023	67,078	76,945	47%
Switzerland	1.00%	253,735	113,481	140,254	45%
Costa Rica	0.07%	17,918	7,826	10,092	44%
France	3.54%	900,752	367,317	533,435	41%
Belgium	0.66%	167,790	66,279	101,511	40%
Georgia	0.02%	6,285	2,437	3,848	39%
Israel	0.46%	117,766	44,623	73,143	38%
Netherlands	1.17%	296,724	112,155	184,569	38%
Italy	2.62%	665,341	247,291	418,050	37%
Denmark	0.46%	117,217	39,846	77,371	34%
Finland	0.33%	84,322	24,001	60,321	28%
India	3.03%	770,864	207,070	563,794	27%
Morocco	0.11%	29,041	6,733	22,308	23%
Canada	2.28%	580,778	121,267	459,511	21%
Luxembourg	0.08%	20,845	4,259	16,586	20%

Country	Fair share normalized	Fair share number of refugees	Number of refugees currently hosted	Gap between fair share quota and current refugee population	% performance (hosted/fair share)
Macedonia, FYR	0.01%	3,337	658	2,679	20%
Ukraine	0.20%	51,051	9,875	41,176	19%
Hungary	0.18%	45,620	8,161	37,459	18%
Moldova	0.01%	3,024	517	2,507	17%
United Kingdom	3.85%	979,337	165,779	813,558	17%
Australia	1.85%	471,289	71,778	399,511	15%
Nicaragua	0.02%	4,398	665	3,733	15%
Kyrgyz Republic	0.01%	3,733	459	3,274	12%
United States	27.17%	6,911,438	815,608	6,095,830	12%
China	12.19%	3,101,168	317,923	2,783,245	10%
Peru	0.24%	59,872	6,041	53,831	10%
Azerbaijan	0.06%	15,495	1,423	14,072	9%
Ireland	0.43%	110,431	10,053	100,378	9%
Belarus	0.08%	21,468	1,881	19,587	9%
Lesotho	0.00%	551	48	503	9%
Poland	0.71%	180,683	15,178	165,505	8%
Brazil	2.13%	541,574	45,153	496,421	8%
Bolivia	0.04%	10,028	792	9,236	8%
Liechtenstein	0.01%	2,345	183	2,162	8%
Spain	1.76%	446,622	33,349	413,273	7%

Country	Fair share normalized	Fair share number of refugees	Number of refugees currently hosted	Gap between fair share quota and current refugee population	% performance (hosted/fair share)
Lithuania	0.06%	15,739	1,175	14,564	7%
Dominican Republic	0.07%	18,987	1,388	17,599	7%
Czech Republic	0.29%	73,057	4,419	68,638	6%
Chile	0.36%	91,716	4,960	86,756	5%
Indonesia	1.06%	269,975	14,405	255,570	5%
Trinidad and Tobago	0.02%	6,271	318	5,953	5%
Kuwait	0.14%	34,831	1,762	33,069	5%
Latvia	0.04%	9,859	497	9,362	5%
Tunisia	0.06%	14,390	682	13,708	5%
Suriname	0.00%	995	47	948	5%
Slovenia	0.07%	16,613	781	15,832	5%
Croatia	0.07%	18,396	861	17,535	5%
Iceland	0.03%	7,492	340	7,152	5%
Romania	0.27%	69,549	2,979	66,570	4%
Estonia	0.03%	8,692	365	8,327	4%
Uruguay	0.07%	17,051	683	16,368	4%
Argentina	0.77%	196,599	7,284	189,315	4%
Bahrain	0.04%	10,313	371	9,942	4%
Cambodia	0.03%	6,829	243	6,586	4%
Sri Lanka	0.14%	35,110	1,180	33,930	3%

Country	Fair share normalized	Fair share number of refugees	Number of refugees currently hosted	Gap between fair share quota and current refugee population	% performance (hosted/fair share)
Slovak Republic	0.12%	31,700	1,028	30,672	3%
Oman	0.09%	21,808	683	21,125	3%
Paraguay	0.03%	7,783	237	7,546	3%
Portugal	0.27%	69,830	2,052	67,778	3%
Monaco	0.00%	1,158	32	1,126	3%
Mexico	1.28%	326,804	8,849	317,955	3%
New Zealand	0.28%	70,226	1,724	68,502	2%
Guatemala	0.06%	15,647	302	15,345	2%
Korea, Rep.	2.12%	540,192	8,668	531,524	2%
Kazakhstan	0.20%	51,103	790	50,313	2%
Guyana	0.00%	746	11	735	1%
U. Arab Emirates	0.43%	110,606	1,507	109,099	1%
Japan	7.24%	1,842,779	21,315	1,821,464	1%
Bahamas, The	0.01%	2,696	31	2,665	1%
Cuba	0.12%	30,014	343	29,671	1%
Madagascar	0.02%	5,967	55	5,912	1%
Fiji	0.01%	1,484	12	1,472	1%
Colombia	0.33%	82,682	644	82,038	1%
El Salvador	0.03%	6,964	46	6,918	1%
Qatar	0.19%	49,133	319	48,814	1%
Philippines	0.38%	95,813	622	95,191	1%
Jamaica	0.02%	4,440	24	4,416	1%

Country	Fair share normalized	Fair share number of refugees	Number of refugees currently hosted	Gap between fair share quota and current refugee population	% performance (hosted/fair share)
Honduras	0.02%	6,105	26	6,079	0%
Turkmenistan	0.03%	8,465	27	8,438	0%
Mongolia	0.02%	4,042	11	4,031	0%
Uzbekistan	0.11%	28,456	27	28,429	0%
Saudi Arabia	0.88%	223,704	190	223,514	0%
Andorra	0.00%	1,092	-	1,092	0%
Antigua and Barbuda	0.00%	450	-	450	0%
Barbados	0.01%	1,478	-	1,478	0%
Bhutan	0.00%	554	-	554	0%
Brunei Darussalam	0.02%	4,020	-	4,020	0%
Cabo Verde	0.00%	461	-	461	0%
Comoros	0.00%	196	-	196	0%
Dominica	0.00%	142	-	142	0%
Equatorial Guinea	0.01%	1,551	-	1,551	0%
Grenada	0.00%	296	-	296	0%
Kiribati	0.00%	57	-	57	0%
Lao PDR	0.02%	3,945	-	3,945	0%
Maldives	0.00%	820	-	820	0%
Marshall Islands	0.00%	67	-	67	0%
Mauritius	0.02%	4,053	-	4,053	0%
Micronesia, Fed. Sts.	0.00%	82	-	82	0%

Country	Fair share normalized	Fair share number of refugees	Number of refugees currently hosted	Gap between fair share quota and current refugee population	% performance (hosted/fair share)
Palau	0.00%	93	-	93	0%
Samoa	0.00%	239	-	239	0%
San Marino	0.00%	375	-	375	0%
Sao Tome and Principe	0.00%	98	-	98	0%
Seychelles	0.00%	435	-	435	0%
Singapore	0.45%	114,468	-	114,468	0%
Solomon Islands	0.00%	218	-	218	0%
St. Kitts and Nevis	0.00%	251	-	251	0%
St. Lucia	0.00%	379	-	379	0%
St. Vincent and the Grenadines	0.00%	199	-	199	0%
Tonga	0.00%	130	-	130	0%
Tuvalu	0.00%	13	-	13	0%
Vanuatu	0.00%	184	-	184	0%
Vietnam	0.30%	75,721	-	75,721	0%

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