



© Copyright by

Katie Valliere Streit

August, 2016

BEYOND BORDERS: A HISTORY OF MOBILITY, LABOR, AND IMPERIALISM  
IN SOUTHERN TANZANIA

---

A Dissertation

Presented to

The Faculty of the Department

of History

University of Houston

---

In Partial Fulfillment

Of the Requirements for the Degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

---

By

Katie Valliere Streit

August, 2016

BEYOND BORDERS: A HISTORY OF MOBILITY, LABOR, AND IMPERIALISM  
IN SOUTHERN TANZANIA

---

An Abstract of a Dissertation

Presented to

The Faculty of the Department

of History

University of Houston

---

In Partial Fulfillment

Of the Requirements for the Degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

---

By

Katie Valliere Streit

August, 2016



## Abstract

This dissertation analyzes the gradual transformation of southern Tanzania from a thriving precolonial frontier into an impoverished, peripheral borderland during the twentieth century by examining the region's history of mobility— from long-distance caravan networks to the expansion of motorized road transportation. It argues that southern Tanzania's real and perceived peripheralization began as a consequence of colonial warfare in the early 20<sup>th</sup> century, particularly the First World War. Poverty and famine defined the Ruvuma borderland of southern Tanzania and northern Mozambique in the aftermath of the war due to the wide-spread use of modern weaponry, scorched earth tactics, forced conscription, and raiding by colonial armies. The Portuguese and British colonial administrations neglected the Ruvuma borderland during the interwar era because the region lacked adequate manpower, environmental conditions, and transportation infrastructure to produce and export large quantities of cash crops that imperial markets prioritized. The failure of colonial development schemes attempted in southern Tanzania after the Second World War, particularly the East African Groundnut Scheme, propagated and engrained negative stereotypes of the region as being incapable of “development.” Southern Tanzania's dilapidated transportation infrastructure served as a persistent symbol, symptom, and justification for the region's isolation and impoverishment throughout the colonial and postcolonial eras.

While examining the reasons behind and adverse consequences of the colonial and national states' failures to construct all-weather roads in southern Tanzania, this dissertation argues that the region's road transportation history provides an alternative narrative of local initiative and prosperity. Since the second millennium C.E., inhabitants of the Ruvuma borderland utilized their mobility to improve their lives and relocate in response to famines, droughts, warfare, and exploitative authority. The introduction and expansion of motor vehicle transport during the 1920s and 1930s offered a valuable avenue for local populations to pursue socioeconomic opportunities within and beyond the peripheral borderland. Although colonists intended for automobiles to serve as “civilizing” and “modernizing” technologies, African producers and migrant laborers living in proximity to the main and district roads in southern Tanzania appropriated motor vehicles to pursue advantageous labor and commercial markets.

While some Africans associated roads and automobiles with forced labor practices and the loss of migrant laborers' autonomy, others perceived them as pathways and tools for socioeconomic advancement.

Rather than examining automobility from the standard perspective of African-European relations, this dissertation also explores Asian contributions. It argues that Indian entrepreneurs, wholesalers, and retailers were the driving force behind the expansion and success of road transportation in southern Tanzania between the 1920s and 1960s. One road transportation firm, in particular, spearheaded the growth of an Indian-dominated transportation sector in the south during the late colonial era – the Tanganyika Transport Company Ltd. or *Teeteeko*. In the postcolonial period, automobiles became important tools that Indian businessmen utilized to contest anti-Asian national discourse portraying them as exploitative parasites. The Indian community in southern Tanzania tried to prove its value and allegiance to the nation by offering their vehicles in support of neighboring anticolonial struggles, humanitarian relief, and nation-building operations. Although their efforts ultimately failed, the Indian transportation sector left a lasting impact on southern Tanzania's socioeconomic landscape. African drivers and mechanics, meanwhile, utilized their technological knowledge and social networks to find and retain high-paying, high-status jobs during the economically turbulent decades of the 1970s and 1980s. In the end, this dissertation argues that southern Tanzania remained a dynamic region whose multiethnic population utilized their mobility to pursue socioeconomic opportunities locally, regionally, and internationally. Southern Tanzania's roads became physical manifestations and symbolic representations of the region's impoverishment and peripheralization, as well as its vitality and innovation in the face of neglectful or exploitative state authority.

## Acknowledgements

Perhaps one of the most challenging, humbling, and rewarding tasks in completing a dissertation is thanking all the individuals and organizations who made this journey possible. It is with profound honor and humility that I begin by thanking my dissertation committee. To my advisor, Karl Ittmann – this project became a reality thanks to your unwavering support. When I first expressed an interest in Modern British and African history, you immediately embraced the challenges and opportunities that such a line of research offered. You helped me negotiate the numerous hurdles of applying for external funding, research clearance, and academic conferences, all while keeping me focused on the end goal of completing this dissertation. Thank you for your encouragement, criticism, and patience as you reviewed chapter drafts over and over again. I hope to one day emulate the time and effort you offered this project with my own students. To Greg Maddox – who all but in official title served as a co-advisor. Thank you for agreeing to lead that seminar three years ago and sharing your passion for Tanzania and its history. I could not have successfully navigated the challenges of researching and travelling in Tanzania without your advice and assurance. Thank you for pushing me to approach this project as an Africanist, and for reminding me to enjoy my time in Tanzania. Many of the greatest insights and lessons that I learned occurred when I stopped working and lived in the moment. To Kairn Klieman – thank you for first inspiring my passion for African history and for always sharing your honest opinions about my work, academia, and life in general. To Martin Melosi – thank you for opening my mind to the potential of researching at the intersection of technology, environment, and social history, and for not allowing me to settle for “good” work. This dissertation is a credit to each of your insights, criticisms, and encouragement.

I also wish to express my gratitude to the History faculty at the University of Houston, who demand excellence from their students while creating an atmosphere where they can succeed. I am especially grateful to Nancy Young, Lawrence Curry, Sarah Fishman, Hannah Decker, Catherine Patterson, Frank Holt, Sally Vaughn, Bailey Stone, and Robert Palmer. Thank you to my fellow graduate students, who continually inspired me with their knowledge and enthusiasm for history, including (but not

limited to): Carlos Cantú, John Huntington, Dan LeClair, Frances Joseph, Alana Aleman, Deanne Morgan Ashton, Stephanie Weiss, Nathan D. Fell, Andrew Gustafson, Sandra Enriquez, and Allison H. Robinson. I am also grateful for the feedback, inspiration, advice, and friendships that I received from colleagues outside my institution, including: Sean Smith, Frank Edward, Morgan Robinson, Christina Casey, Stephen Pierce, Joanna Tague, Joshua Grace, Jennifer A. Hart, Michael Panzer, and Matthew Pawlowicz. For their kindness and enthusiasm, I wish to thank the TSU faculty members and students that I travelled with to Tanzania in 2013 and 2014. There are a number of senior scholars that I wish to thank for graciously offering their feedback and advice, including: Timothy Scarnecchia, Jim Brennan, and Erik Gilbert. I am especially grateful to Jim Giblin and his family, Jamie Monson, and Sheryl A. McCurdy for their generous hospitality, practical help, expert knowledge, and kindness during my stays in Dar es Salaam.

I will always feel gratitude towards my colleagues who conduct research in southern Tanzania, especially Felicitas Becker, Andrea Seligman, Priya Lal, and Husseina Dinani. Thank you for sharing your practical advice on accommodations, travel, restaurants, etc., as well as your experiences and insights into the region. I will never forget arriving in Songea town for the first time at 11:00pm after an all-day bus journey from Masasi and mentally thanking Andrea for helping me set up hotel accommodations in advance. I am also grateful to Felicitas for sharing her road stories and introducing me to my research assistant, Zuhura Mohamed. To Zuhura – your local connections, expert language skills, and companionship helped to make my fieldwork in southern Tanzania a reality. Thanks to your tireless efforts, we regained the history of *Teeteeko* – a history that I fear would have been lost in the next two decades.

I would also like to thank the staff at various institutions where I conducted research. I want to start by thanking the library staff at the University of Houston, particularly in the Interlibrary Loan Department. When I moved to Washington D.C., I had no idea how much I would miss the benefits of my institution's library. The ILL department was always ready to help – scanning and mailing me numerous manuscripts. I am also grateful for the help I received while working in the United States National

Archives (College Park) and Library of Congress. In Tanzania, I want to thank Yusufu Q. Lawi of the Department of History (University of Dar es Salaam), the Tanzania Commission of Science and Technology (Dar es Salaam), and government officials in Lindi and Mtwara regions for their support of my research project. I am also grateful for the tireless assistance offered by the staff at the University of Dar es Salaam Library and Tanzania National Archives (Dar es Salaam) as they tracked down countless books and documents during the course of my two research trips. Thanks are also due to the staff of the ELCT Language and Orientation School (Morogoro) and Professor Frank Wangendo of Howard University for their knowledge, patience, and sense of humor as I learned Kiswahili. Thank you for reminding me that it was better to make a mistake than remain perfectly silent.

I am also grateful to the staff of the British National Archives (Kew) who never failed to find a record I requested and helped me rummage through the card catalogue that I suspect had long been forgotten. Thank you to Lucy McCann, Commonwealth and African Studies Archivist at the Bodleian Libraries (University of Oxford), and the library staff for their help during my brief research visit. I look forward to the day that I can return and conduct more research in your superb facilities. I am also grateful for the professionalism and generosity of Debra Francis and the staff at the library for the Institute of Civil Engineers (London). I will never forget arriving on the appointed day and all of the texts that I requested and a couple exciting surprises were waiting for me. These research trips and my graduate education would not have been possible without the generous financial support of the Murry Miller Fellowship and Doctoral Student Tuition Fellowship from the University of Houston. I am also grateful to the College of Liberal Arts and Social Sciences for believing in my project and awarding me a Dissertation Completion Fellowship.

A special thank you is due to an amazing group of Catholic Sisters – the Adorers of the Blood of Christ (ASC). Before departing for my first trip to Dar es Salaam in 2013, I happened to sit next to S. Tarcisia Roths at a friend's wedding reception. S. Tarcisia was a former professor/president and current administrator of my undergraduate college – Newman University. When I told her about my upcoming trip, she excitedly proclaimed, "We have sisters in Tanzania!" With the generous help of S. Tarcisia and

S. Therese Wetta in Wichita, Kansas, I contacted the leader of the order in Tanzania, S. Euphrasia. During the course of the next three years, I visited the sisters in Morogoro and Dodoma, and stayed with their community in Dar es Salaam for over two months. They watched over me like a family member, and their home became my home. I was able to share in the joys of their opening a new medical clinic at Vikawe, just as they comforted me during the passing of my grandmother. Their friendship and faith is one of the greatest gifts that I have received and for which I will forever be grateful.

I also feel an overwhelming sense of gratitude to the men and women that I interviewed in Lindi and Mtwara regions. Thank you for graciously sharing and entrusting your life histories with me. I am grateful to the countless people that I met while travelling across thousands of miles in Tanzania and England. In the current age, many people are gripped with fear of terrorism – too afraid to travel and wishing to close their borders to strangers. The hospitality, generosity, and kindness that I consistently experienced during my journeys reaffirmed my faith in the goodness of others and the importance of learning about the world rather than retreating from it.

There are no words to aptly express my gratitude to my friends and family for all that they have done for me these past five years. To my in-laws – Jerry and Sue Streit, Chris and Nikki Streit, and Jenna, Andy, and Lucas Hill – thank you for your constant support and for loving me like a daughter and sister. To my brother – Joey Valliere – thank you for helping me keep a sense of humor and for always having my back both with this project and everything that I do. My father – David Valliere – inspired and shared my passion for history since a young age, while my mother – Suzanne Valliere – encouraged me to return to a career in history when I ventured on a different path. Thank you both for acting as my champions amid the nay-sayers. It is because of your infinite love and faith that I believed that I could become a doctor. Finally, to my husband – Jason Streit – you inspired this dream and made it possible through your unconditional love and support. You stood by my side through all the ups and downs, never allowing me to give into self-doubt and reveling in my successes. Thank you for the sacrifices you made and for the countless joys you bring to my life every day. For all that and more, I dedicate this to you.

## Table of Contents

Abstract	iii-iv
Acknowledgements	v-viii
Table of Contents	ix-x
List of Figures and Tables	xi-xiii
Introduction	1
Chapter 1: Precolonial Mobility and Trade Networks in the Ruvuma Frontier	33
Formation of the Rufiji-Ruvuma Macro-Region	35
Overseas Influences on the Southern Swahili Coast and Rufiji-Ruvuma Interior	40
Changing Complexion of Trade (17 <sup>th</sup> -19 <sup>th</sup> Century)	45
The Southern Trade Corridors	49
Reimagining and Negotiating the Frontier Landscape: European Exploration of Southern Tanzania and Northern Mozambique	55
Negotiating the Economic Landscape of the Ruvuma Frontier – Indian Intermediaries	65
Conclusion	76
Chapter 2: Destruction and Construction: European Colonialism and the First World War in the Ruvuma Borderland (1880s-1918)	78
German and Portuguese Colonial Rule in the Ruvuma Borderland (1880s-1905)	79
Rebellion and Colonial “Pacification” Campaigns	91
Aftermath of the Colonial Military Campaigns – Instability and Opportunities World War I in East Africa	94
A Smuggling Zone: Early War Years in the Ruvuma Borderland (1914-1916)	111
From Smuggling to the Frontlines	112
A War Against Nature	117
Wartime Construction amid the Destruction: Building a New Infrastructure in the Borderland	120
Legacy of the War and Conclusion	128
Chapter 3: Governing a Lonely Station: The Interwar Era in the Ruvuma Borderland (1914-1945)	144
Postwar Instability in the Borderland – Northern Portuguese East Africa in the 1920s	146
British Rule in Southern Tanganyika – 1920s	155
Colonial Development and the Neglected Southern Province	165
“Care and Maintenance”: The Depression Era	172
Road Driven Imperialism	183
“Rehabilitating” Southern Tanganyika through Road Construction and the Private Agents of “Development”	194
On the Road	205
Conclusion	215

Chapter 4: World War II and Postwar Colonial Development in Southern Tanganyika (1939-1954)	218
The Second World War in Southern Tanganyika: Increased State Intervention and Deteriorating Transportation Infrastructure	219
Postwar and Positive Development	231
Putting Cinderella on the Center Stage: Southern Tanganyika and the Groundnut Scheme	233
Dilemmas, Delays, and Disappointments	238
Failed Infrastructure Development and the Uncontrollable Labor Market of the Borderland	247
African Laborers' Responses to the GNS	251
The Unexpected Rise of Automotive Transport and Collapse of the Southern Road Network	270
Turning Failure into Opportunity	289
Conclusion	292
Chapter 5: Issues of Identity and Belonging – The Road Transportation Sector in Postcolonial Southern Tanzania (1960s-1980s)	296
End of Empire and Tanzanian Independence	297
New Government – Persistent Economic and Infrastructure Problems	301
The Southern Road Transportation Service Sector (mid-1950s to mid-1960s)	312
<i>Ujamaa</i> and African Liberation Movements	319
Negotiating a Place in the New Nation	326
End of an Era	334
Seizing Opportunities: African Drivers and Mechanics in Southern Tanzania	340
Negotiating the New Transportation Era (1970s-1980s)	355
Liberalization and the Next Era of Transport in Southern Tanzania	364
Conclusion	367
Conclusion	372
Bibliography	392



## List of Figures and Tables

### Figures

I.1	Dar es Salaam bus station and typical road conditions along the Dar es Salaam-Lindi Road, July 2015	2
I.2	Crossing the Rufiji River towards Lindi, July 2015	3
1.1	Distribution of Ethnolinguistic Communities in East-Central Africa	37
1.2	Indian Ocean Trade Routes	40
1.3	Depiction of the City of Kilwa Kisiwani (1572)	42
1.4	18 <sup>th</sup> Century Trade Routes	47
1.5	Livingstone's Journeys up the Rovuma	57
1.6	"Map of the Rovuma River and the Region to the South, illustrating the journeys of Mr. Joseph Thomson and the Rev. Chauncy Maples, M.A." 1880.	62
2.1	District Headquarters and Sub-District Offices in southern GEA	87
2.2	"Nyasa Under Company Rule"	88
2.3	Area of the Maji Maji Rebellion	91
2.4	Proposed Route for the Lindi-Masasi Road, March 1911	105
2.5	Manually Operated Monorail Proposed for the Lukuledi Valley	107
2.6	Map of Narrow-Gauged Railway and Location of European Plantations	109
2.7	"Port Amelia in Portuguese Nyasaland. Photo taken from troop ship in harbour."	114
2.8	"German East African Campaign. Dar-es-Salaam. Indian troops embarking for Kilwa, October 1917."	118
2.9	The Allies Advance into GEA, 1917	119
2.10	"German East Africa. Battle of Mahiwa. The Kashmir Mountain Battery in action at Nyangao against Mahiwa, 16th - 19th October 1917."	120
2.11	"Section of Field Ambulance on the march en route for Mahiwa, October 1917. Nigerian Brigade."	122
2.12	"German East African Campaign, Armoured cars, Ndanda, January 1918"	123
2.13	"5" howitzer firing at Chiramaka, near Mtama, in action on Lindi Line in October 1917."	123
2.14	"Voisin two-seater biplane used by 1st Squadron RNAS in German East Africa. Mtua Lindi Line, November 1917."	123
2.15	"Making bush stretchers for wounded at Nyangao. Nigerian Brigade."	125
2.16	"Wounded ready to be moved from Nyangao, after the Battle of Mahiwa; October 15th-19 <sup>th</sup> 1917. Nigerian Brigade"	125
2.17	Southeastern Portion of "Military Road Map, August 1917"	129
2.18	"Bridges built by No.1 section, 2 Road Corps, and constructed almost without nails or dogs. They were so built to take the heaviest likely load. Nakin River, on the Kilwa Line. October 1917."	130
2.19	"Motor Park, Ndanda, January 1918. All kinds of motor cars were used, but the Ford cars managed to get through where no heavier make of car could possibly stand the road for even one journey. In East Africa the Ford was nicknamed the "Jigger" after the jigger flea, for, like the insect, it could get anywhere."	131
2.20	"Drafts of Nigerians for the Nigerian Brigade disembarking at Lindi. December 1917."	133
2.21	"IWT up Lindi Creek delivering supplies at Mingoyo."	133
2.22	"Barges and small steamers were brought up to this wharf at Mingoyo, at the top of Lindi Creek, and put on the trains; from trains to cars; from cars to porters. Very heavy fighting took place between Mingoyo and Ndanda, from June to August 1917."	134
2.23	"Supply train, Mtama, January 1918."	134

2.24	“Nigerian troops on the march on Lindi Line.”	135
2.25	“Ford Convoy with ammunition at Moambika (The Loop); Lindi Line GEA, about October 1917.”	135
2.26	“Motor Transport Repairing Shop. One of many placed at various points along the lines of communication. Ndanda, January 1918.”	136
2.27	“Portuguese East Africa. Nigerians crossing Rovuma River, two miles from Ngomano, December 1917. The 1 <sup>st</sup> and 3 <sup>rd</sup> Nigerian Regiments crossed in the first week of December.”	136
2.28	“No. 10 Workshop Unit moving forward on Line of Communication in Portuguese Nyasaland - about to trek a small part of their journey through a swamp, transport other than porters being impossible.”	137
2.29	“An RASC Motor Repair Shop, near Lindi. Owing to the nature of the ground to be traversed, the percentage of breakdowns was very high.”	139
2.30	“All bridges were constructed with very few nails, dogs, etc. Supports were fixed in a position by the weight that was laid on afterwards. Near Ndanda. January 1918. Second Road Corps.”	141
2.31	“Bridge and road made by 2 <sup>nd</sup> Road Corps, near Ndanda. December 1917.”	142
3.1	Edward Humphrey Manisty Leggett, “Sketch Map of the Tanganyika Territory,” 1922.	144
3.2	Longland’s Sketches for Constructing Road Gradients, Curves and Roads on Hillsides, Culverts, and Wood Bridges	189
4.1	Motor Traffic Density, Tanganyika, 1945	226
4.2	“Southern Province Railway and Pipeline,” June 1949	241
4.3	“Mtwara port from the air”	245
4.4	Mkwaya Port	249
4.5	“Tanganyika Territory: Motor Traffic over Main & Grade ‘A’ Road,” 1946 and 1947	271
4.6	“Tanganyika Territory: Motor Traffic over Main & Grade ‘A’ Road,” 1948 and 1949	272
4.7	Damaged OFC Vehicles in Nachingwea	277
4.8	Destruction of the Muhuwezi River Bridge by Flood Waters, Tunduru, 1956	288
5.1	Two newspaper articles addressing Tanzanian defense in the southern borderland	324
5.2	One of Dirubhai’s properties in downtown Lindi that was nationalized in 1971	336
5.3	Previous <i>Teeteeko</i> headquarters and garage in Mtwara	337
5.4	Two additional Indian properties that were nationalized in 1971 (Ghana/Market Street, downtown Lindi)	338
5.5	Dhirajlal (Dirubhai) Savailal C. Amin at his home near Mkwaya (Lindi), October 2015	340
5.6	Part of the former <i>Teeteeko</i> garage in Mtwara	348
5.7	Victor Said, Fatuma Juma Akini, and Zuhura Mohamed, Namatumbusi (Masasi)	360
5.8	Pictures of one of Husein Mohamed Mzaina’s vehicles and his radio/cassette player.	366
6.1	Construction Progress on Lindi Port, September 2015	376
6.2	Lindi-Songea Road entering Masasi, Masasi bus station, and exiting the town	385
6.3	Construction progress on Masasi-Songea Road (outside Masasi)	386
6.4	Examples of various stages of road construction work on Masasi-Songea Road	387
6.5	Two bridge construction projects along Masasi-Songea Road	388
6.6	Typical road conditions, Masasi-Songea Road	389
6.7	Conditions within the bus	389
6.8	Roadwork at elevation (between Tunduru and Songea)	390
6.9	Chinese workers’ camp (highlands outside of Songea)	390
6.10	Passengers disembarking before the men pushed the bus back on the road (Songea District)	391

**Tables**

1.1	“Slaves Exported from Kilwa Kivinje, 1862-1896”	50
2.1	Notable European Plantations in the Lukuledi Valley	99
3.1	Inverse Ratio of Tanganyika Export Quantity vs Value, 1929-1933	173
3.2	Principal Commodities Exported from Lindi prior to Depression	176
3.3	Value of General Trade through Lindi Port	176
3.4	Average Vehicles Per Day on Lindi-Masasi Road, 1935-1938	208
3.5	“Labourers Leaving the Songea District in search of work”	211
3.6	Comparative Transport Rates (rail, automobile, and/or steamer) for Laborers, 1931-32	213
4.1	Licensed Vehicles in Tanganyika Territory	222
4.2	Expectations vs Reality: Groundnut Scheme Progress 1947-1949	242
4.3	Estimated Labor Requirements, Southern Province, 1948	255
4.4	Seasonal Labor Fluctuations: Monthly Labor Position, Southern Province, 1952	257
4.5	SILABU Contracted African Laborers, Southern Province	260
4.6	Traffic Rates, 1949	271
4.7	Public Works Department’s Annual Expenditure and Revenue, 1948-1959	285
5.1	“Proposed Expenditure on roads during First Five Years Plan period”	307
5.2	“Expenditure of District Councils for Road Maintenance in 1966” (in TShs.)	311
5.3	“Size Distribution of Road Freight Transport Industry” in Tanzania, Nov. 1967	318

## Introduction

As I loaded onto a large, “luxury” bus liner at downtown Dar es Salaam’s bustling station in July 2015, I was filled with a mixture of excitement and trepidation for my first journey to Lindi.<sup>1</sup> After years of reading historical works and archival records about southern Tanzania, I was finally going to see and experience life in the region first hand. My unease did not stem from a fear of travelling to a new place. My accommodations and research assistant were organized thanks to the contacts of my colleagues. I was also prepared with the necessary paperwork and patience to get authorization to conduct research in the region, district, and town. My anxiety more so fixated on the looming drive. I had read and heard numerous accounts about extremely uncomfortable, multi-day journeys that individuals had endured while heading along the horrendous Dar es Salaam-Lindi road. The tarmacked road remained incomplete throughout the early 2000s and annually closed for multiple months when the Rufiji River and its tributaries washed away sections of the road and bridges during the rainy season. There were stories of passengers waiting hours or days for a ferry to take them across the river; buying food from local villagers and choosing to sleep in the buses at night out of fear of lions. Buses also broke down frequently with overheated engines or broken axels – unable to take the punishing abuse of the dirt road with its countless potholes. Passengers had no choice but to wait indefinite periods for another vehicle to be dispatched.

My eight-hour and 454 km trip could not have been more different than these accounts. I sat comfortably in a reclined seat with air-conditioning blasting in my face, watching movies and snacking on sweets and juice offered by the bus conductor. There were no chicken cages under my feet, mattresses strapped to the bus’s roof, or passengers standing crammed together in the aisle – all of which I would experience when travelling on much smaller buses from Lindi to Masasi and Masasi to Newala and Mtwara. Only twice did we encounter short deviations from the main road onto the bumpy, dirt frontage road, but otherwise the trip proceeded without incident. After comfortably crossing the massive bridge

---

<sup>1</sup> The bus company was Millennium Coach Ltd. The ticket cost TShs. 27,000 (or approximately \$17) in 2015. There were numerous other bus liners departing two to three times a day to Lindi, Mtwara, Masasi, and the other major towns in the southeast. The group of Catholic Sisters I resided with in Dar es Salaam arranged my passage, insisting that Millennium was one of the more reliable and comfortable carriers.

over the Rufiji River, I spent the rest of the journey enjoying the passing sites of villages, cashew nut and baobab trees, and the glistening Indian Ocean as we approached Lindi town.<sup>2</sup> None of my subsequent road journeys to Lindi, Masasi, Newala, Mtwara, and Songea would match the comfort and ease of this trip, and some were physically punishing. This drive, however, left an indelible mark as I reflected upon the interplay between perception and reality. Inadequate infrastructure contributed to southern Tanzania's impoverishment and isolation from national and global markets and politics during the twentieth century. Poor roads were both a consequence and justification for government neglect during the colonial and postcolonial eras, and helped to propagate negative stereotypes about the development capacity of the region and its populace. At the same time, did these stereotypes partially distort reality? I suspected that southern Tanzania's roads had another story to tell about local agency, innovation, and opportunity.



Figure 1.1 Dar es Salaam bus station and typical road conditions along the Dar es Salaam-Lindi Road, July 2015

---

<sup>2</sup> The Rufiji River Bridge (or Mkapa Bridge) is 13.5 km (8.39 miles) long, cost approximately \$30 million, and was officially opened in August 2003. See "Rufiji Bridge Completion, Awakening the Sleeping Giant," *Africa News Service*, 1 August 2003, accessed June 2016, <http://ic.galegroup.com.ezproxy.lib.uh.edu>.



**Figure 1.2 Crossing the Rufiji River towards Lindi, July 2015<sup>3</sup>**

Utilizing a broad range of archival materials, secondary sources, and oral histories, this dissertation explores the historical processes that culminated in southern Tanzania’s socioeconomic peripheralization during the twentieth century. By analyzing the history of mobility in southern Tanzania – from precolonial long-distance trade networks to motorized road transportation – this dissertation offers new insights into the region’s gradual transformation from a thriving frontier region into an impoverished, peripheral borderland by the end of the British colonial era. While analyzing the region’s gradual marginalization and impoverishment, it also challenges stereotypes of the region as stagnant and backwards. Since the early second millennium, southern Tanzania formed a dynamic frontier where populations from across Central-East Africa and the western Indian Ocean interacted through long-distance trade networks. The imposition of Portuguese and German colonial rule and the demarcation of the Ruvuma River as a border between southern German East Africa (GEA) and northern Portuguese East Africa (PEA) constricted and reoriented local and long-distance networks. However, the movement of people, goods, and ideas across the borderland continued. The devastation caused by colonial forces during the Maji Maji Rebellion (1905-07), Portuguese “pacification” campaigns (1900-1910s), and the First World War (1914-19) undermined stability and economic growth in the Ruvuma borderland. In the years following the war, northern PEA’s landscape was largely defined by exploitative plantations, isolated government forts, poorly maintained roads, and vacated African villages and *shambas* (fields).

---

<sup>3</sup> Photographs taken by author.

Across the border, the new British administration governing the Mandated Territory of Tanganyika aimed in the interwar era to create a landscape of concentrated African settlements connected through a network of interregional roads and engaged in cash and food crop cultivation and exportation. The central state in Dar es Salaam, however, neglected the south and invested its limited resources in the more profitable cash crop producing regions serviced by the Tanga and Central Railway Lines. With limited access to exterior markets and lacking high-value commodity exports, southern Tanganyika became an impoverished periphery within the Territory and the British Empire. The failure of colonial development schemes attempted in the region after the Second World War (due in part to inadequate infrastructure and local labor supply) propagated and engrained negative stereotypes of the region and its populace as being incapable of “progress” and “development.”

The inability of the colonial state to construct all-weather transportation infrastructure in southern Tanganyika contributed to the region’s real and perceived peripheralization, but it also created opportunities for local initiative and prosperity. The underfunded and understaffed British administration depended upon local leaders and private contractors to construct and maintain the region’s road networks. While road conditions remained poor in the face of adverse climatic and geographic conditions, they became the lifeline of the southern economy and administration during the interwar era. Motor vehicle transportation grew steadily as Indian traders exploited their speed and flexibility to expand trade networks and intensify their domination over the southern economy. African producers and migrant laborers also used motor vehicles to pursue socioeconomic opportunities within and beyond the Ruvuma borderland region. When southern Tanganyika became the site of Britain’s postwar development schemes (most notably the East African Groundnut Scheme), these independent firms and entrepreneurs often prospered. They utilized their mobility and socioeconomic networks to profit from advantageous labor and commercial markets in the late 1940s and early 1950s. One road transportation firm, in particular, spearheaded the expansion of passenger and cargo transport across the region in the late colonial era – the Tanganyika Transport Company Ltd. The company led an Indian-dominated transportation sector that

offered cultivators, traders, and migrant laborers improved access to regional and territorial markets into the postcolonial period.

Similarly to its colonial predecessor, the independent Tanzanian national government lacked the resources to improve southern Tanzania's infrastructure and control the movements of its highly mobile populace following independence in 1961. The state instead depended upon the assistance of the private transportation sector to support its numerous objectives in the region, including; assisting landlocked Zambia, providing humanitarian relief to refugees streaming across the Ruvuma border during the Mozambique War of Independence, and offering military support to FRELIMO soldiers fighting against colonial forces in northern Mozambique. Many Indian transportation owners offered their vehicles in support of the state in order to prove their value and allegiance to the new nation amid rising anti-Asian nationalist discourse. The alliances created between the private transportation sector and the Tanzanian government collapsed in the early 1970s as the state nationalized private businesses and the housing sector. A new age of state-controlled transport followed, but did not last more than a decade due to the economic crises that gripped Tanzania in the 1970s and early 1980s. African drivers and mechanics in southern Tanzania utilized their technological knowledge and networks of reciprocity to adapt to the economic turbulence. They also took advantage of the opportunities that appeared in the transportation sector following the liberalization of Tanzania's economy in the mid-1980s. In the end, this dissertation argues that southern Tanzania remained a dynamic region whose multiethnic population utilized their mobility to pursue socioeconomic opportunities locally, regionally, and internationally in the face of neglectful, discriminatory, invasive, and/or exploitative centralized authority.

### **Background and Historiography**

This dissertation began from a desire to determine how road transportation – both the construction of roads and usage of motor vehicles – impacted lives and livelihoods in Tanzania during the German and British colonial eras. The topic was inspired by the burgeoning historiography concerning roads and motor vehicles in Africa. American historians first pioneered analyses into the ambiguous social, cultural, economic, political, and environmental impacts of automobility – a term encompassing



motor vehicles, roads, and the automobile industry.<sup>4</sup> Americanists such as John B. Rae, James J. Flink, Virginia Scharff, and Clay McShane examined the role that mass-produced motor vehicles and modern hard-surfaced highways had in the formation and expansion of an industrialized, capitalist, consumer-oriented economy and society in America.<sup>5</sup> Automobiles encouraged and enabled the expansion of American capitalism by revolutionizing production techniques, integrating urban and rural markets, accelerating the circulation of goods, and facilitating the accumulation of capital within numerous automotive-based industries.<sup>6</sup> The automobile also introduced new conceptions of space in America. New automotive landscapes of gas stations, repair shops, drive-thru restaurants, highways, parking lots, and suburban neighborhoods proliferated across the country. Despite the integral role automobility played in American economic expansion during the twentieth century, it also produced ecological damage and reinforced gender, class, and racial divisions. Portrayed as a symbol of freedom and prosperity, historians argued that white middle- and upper-class American men used automobiles as tools to preserve social segregation and discrimination according to status, gender, and race.

Building upon the American historiography, numerous scholars conducted historical, anthropological, ethnographic, and sociological studies examining the ambiguous impact of automobility around the world.<sup>7</sup> A wide range of explicitly road-related studies have emerged within African studies

---

<sup>4</sup> Originally termed by John Chynoweth Burnham, "The Gasoline Tax and the Automobile Revolution," *The Mississippi Valley Historical Review* 48, no. 3 (1961): 435-459.

<sup>5</sup> The following overview synthesizes the predominate arguments produced by the following historians: John B. Rae, *The Road and the Car in American Life* (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1971); John Robinson, *Highways and Our Environment* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1971); James J. Flink, *The Car Culture* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1975); Peter J. Ling, *America and the Automobile: Technology, Reform, and Social Change* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1990); Virginia Scharff, *Taking the Wheel: Women and the Coming of the Motor Age* (New York: The Free Press, 1991); Clay McShane, *Down the Asphalt Path: The Automobile and the American City* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994); Ronald Kline and Trevor J. Pinch, "Users as Agents of Technological Change: The Social Construction of the Automobile in the Rural United States," *Technology and Culture: The International Quarterly of the Society for the History of Technology* 37, no. 4 (1996): 763 – 95; and Martin V. Melosi, "The Automobile and the Environment in American History," *Automobile in America Life and Society*, 2004-2010, <http://www.autolife.umd.umich.edu/Environment.htm>.

<sup>6</sup> Automotive industries encompass industries involved with the manufacturing, distribution, servicing, and usage of motor vehicles – including road construction, oils and petrochemicals, and steel and rubber production.

<sup>7</sup> Sean O'Connell, *The Car in British Society: Class, Gender and Motoring, 1896-1939* (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 1998); and Matthew Paterson, "Car culture and global environmental politics," *Review of International Studies* 26 (2000): 253-70. Notable edited volumes include: P. M. Townroe, ed., *Social and Political*

during the past three decades. These studies stretched spatially across the continent and temporally from the colonial to the postcolonial era. They concentrated on the lives and labor of drivers, passengers, road construction workers, street traders, and roadside entrepreneurs. Historians and anthropologists examined how these actors engaged in informal economies, constructed unique work cultures, built identities as “modern” citizens, negotiated racial and gender hierarchies, and contested state authority.<sup>8</sup> Luise White led scholarship that analyzed representations and symbolic meanings of roads, motor vehicles, and automobile operators in oral histories.<sup>9</sup> She argued that complex social discourses are bound in rituals and stories concerning roads, automobiles, spirits, and vampires. Specialized technology often reflected insecurities and anxieties that communities felt about new labor processes, shifting conceptions of masculinity, and experiences of exploitation and extraction by colonial and national states.<sup>10</sup> In the introduction to the edited volume, *Speed of Change: Motor Vehicles and People in Africa, 1890-2000*, Jan-Bart Gewald argued that the,

[...] arrival of the motor vehicle was the single most important factor for change in Africa in the twentieth century. Its impact extended across the totality of human existence; from ecological

---

*Consequences of the Motor Car* (Newton Abbot: David and Charles, 1974); Daniel Miller, ed., *Car Cultures* (Oxford: Berg, 2001); Mike Featherstone, Nigel Thrift, and John Urry, eds., *Automobilities* (London: Sage, 2005); James E. Snead, Clark L. Erickson, and J. Andrew Darling, eds., *Landscapes of Movement: Trails, Paths, and Roads in Anthropological Perspective* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Museum of Archaeology and Anthropology, 2009); Phillip Vannini, ed., *The Cultures of Alternative Mobilities: Routes Less Travelled* (Farnham: Ashgate, 2009); and Tim Cresswell and Peter Merriman, eds., *Geographies of Mobilities: Practices, Spaces, Subjects* (Farnham: Ashgate Publishing, 2011).

<sup>8</sup> The scholarship includes (but is not limited to): Alison Brown, Michal Lyons, and Ibrahima Dankoco, “Street traders and the emerging spaces for urban voice and citizenship in African cities,” *Urban Studies* 47, no.3 (2010): 666–83; Gabriel Klaeger, “Rush and Relax: the Rhythms and Speeds of Touting Perishable Products on a Ghanaian Roadside,” *Mobilities* 7, no.4 (2012): 537–554; Libbie J. Freed, “Conduits of Culture and Control: Roads, States, and Users in French Central Africa, 1890–1960” (PhD diss., University of Wisconsin-Madison, 2006); and Brenda Chalfin, “Cars, the customs service, and sumptuary rule in neoliberal Ghana,” *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 50, no.2 (2008): 424–53. There are also works that examine the subculture of drivers and owners by analyzing inscriptions on vehicles. For example, see Eugenia Date-Bah, “The inscriptions on the vehicles of Ghanaian commercial drivers: a sociological analysis,” *Journal of Modern African Studies* 18, no.3 (1980): 523–31; and George H. Lewis, “The philosophy of the street in Ghana: mammy wagons and their mottos – a research note,” *Journal of Popular Culture* 32, no.1 (1998): 165–71.

<sup>9</sup> Luise White, “Cars Out of Place: Vampires, Technology, and Labor in East and Central Africa,” *Representations* 43 (Summer 1993): 27–50; and *Ibid.*, *Speaking with Vampires: Rumor and History in Colonial Africa* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2000).

<sup>10</sup> Also see Rebekah Lee, “Death in slow motion: funerals, ritual practice and road danger in South Africa,” *African Studies* 71, no.2 (2012): 195–211.

devastation to economic advancement, from cultural transformation to political change, and from social perceptions through to a myriad of other dimensions.<sup>11</sup>

Gewald and his fellow contributors examined the ambivalence of roads and motor vehicles in Africa. Automobiles provided some Africans with improved access to health care, education, political movements, information, and new occupations. Automobiles were also tools that strengthened and extended colonialism, spread diseases, increased socioeconomic inequalities, and undermined community relationships.

The ambivalence of automobility is a predominate theme within the African historiography. Adeline Masquelier promoted the theme in her well-known article, “Road Mythographies: Space, Mobility, and the Historical Imagination in Postcolonial Niger.”<sup>12</sup> She argued that roads simultaneously symbolized fear, disappointment, resentment, hope, and desire for the Mawri of post-colonial Niger. While roads opened markets and offered opportunities for socioeconomic advancement, they were also associated with memories of colonial forced labor practices and disillusionment towards the nation-state’s promises of prosperity. The Mawri envisioned roads as “the promise of a more rewarding life and the system’s failure to deliver the long-awaited blessings of modernity.”<sup>13</sup> Published shortly after Masquelier’s article, Jan-Bart Gewald and Erdmute Alber analyzed the ambivalence of automobiles in colonial Namibia and Dahomey. Motor vehicles simultaneously represented colonial intimidation and domination, as well as African wealth, power, and innovation.<sup>14</sup> Europeans used automobiles to consolidate colonial rule by visiting more households, collecting more taxes, and standardizing their presence among African populations. Automobiles also reaffirmed colonial racial social orders.

---

<sup>11</sup> Jan-Bart Gewald, Sabine Luning and Klass van Walraven, eds., *The Speed of Change. Motor Vehicles and People in Africa, 1890-2000* (Leiden, Boston: Brill, 2009), 1. The edited volume contains multiple case studies (historical, economic, and anthropological) that examine the social, political, economic, and cultural effects that automobiles had and continue to have on Africa individuals and nations throughout the continent.

<sup>12</sup> Adeline Masquelier, “Road Mythographies: Space, Mobility, and the Historical Imagination in Postcolonial Niger,” *American Ethnologist* 29, no. 4 (2002): 829-856.

<sup>13</sup> Masquelier, “Road Mythographies,” 836.

<sup>14</sup> Jan-Bart Gewald, “Missionaries, Hereros, and Motorcars: Mobility and the Impact of Motor Vehicles in Namibia Before 1940,” *International Journal of Historical Studies* 35, no. 2-3 (2002): 257-285; and Erdmute Alber, “Motorization and Colonial Rule: Two Scandals in Dahomey, 1916,” *Journal of African Cultural Studies* 15, no. 1 (2002): 79-92.

Europeans initially monopolized car ownership and operation, while Africans were often expected to line the road when Europeans passed. Alber contended that African spectators were physically and symbolically relegated to an inferior, subservient position in the imagination of Europeans – a lesser being who needed the guidance of technologically superior Europeans.<sup>15</sup> Gewald and Alber, however, noted that the impact of automobiles was felt unevenly among African societies. While the expansion of roads brought some communities under the purview of the colonial state for the first time, those not accessible by road became virtually independent of colonial interference.<sup>16</sup> The introduction of automobiles also offered advantages for some African individuals and communities. Herero men in Namibia created a new class of high-status, skilled professionals, including drivers and mechanics. Gewald concluded that possessing an automobile allowed Herero men to “improve their own status as well as to make a statement regarding both the sociopolitical situation in which they found themselves and their own modernity as vibrant human beings in tune with the technological age.”<sup>17</sup> Jennifer A. Hart reached a similar conclusion with Ghanaian drivers. They used their technological knowledge and mobility to create new identities as “modern men” and wealthy entrepreneurs. Drivers also made claims to citizenship that forced the state to engage with them in political and policy discourse.<sup>18</sup> In Tanzania, Joshua Grace argued that colonial and postcolonial states used automobiles to enforce their authority and implement social engineering projects, such as *ujamaa* in the 1970s. Tanzanian men and women (mechanics, drivers, and passengers), however, appropriated motor vehicles to improve their

---

<sup>15</sup> Alber, “Motorization and Colonial Rule,” 83.

<sup>16</sup> Gewald, “Missionaries, Hereros, and Motorcars,” 263.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, 270.

<sup>18</sup> Jennifer A. Hart, “‘Suffer to Gain’: Citizenship, Accumulation, and Motor Transportation in Late-Colonial and Postcolonial Ghana” (PhD diss., Indiana University, 2011); *Ibid.*, “‘One Man, No Chop’: Licit Wealth, Good Citizens, and the Criminalization of Drivers in Postcolonial Ghana,” *International Journal of African Historical Studies* 46, no. 3 (2013): 373-396; and *Ibid.*, *Ghana on the Go!: African Mobility in the Age of Motor Transportation* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2016). (Unfortunately, Hart’s book was not available at the time that this dissertation was completed.)

socioeconomic status and construct identities that challenged discriminatory racial and gender social orders.<sup>19</sup>

Roads were similarly ambiguous symbols of colonial oppression and African agency. Alber argued that the construction and maintenance of roads literally and symbolically reaffirmed colonial authority,

A neat, wide road without weeds gave a different picture of government and its control of the population than crooked paths between unstable settlements. The road therefore symbolized the new order in which the rulers could reach their subjects (and *vice versa*) on straight tracks. Although at first hardly anyone needed wide roads, they did convey a different notion of security and a sense of control, planning and government to the colonial officers.<sup>20</sup>

Roads also became symbols of colonial oppression as their construction often relied upon forced labor. Kwabena Opare Akurang-Parry found that compulsory labor was essential for infrastructure projects in the Gold Coast from 1900 to 1940. British officials passed various labor ordinances in the 1930s and 1940s that appeased international criticism of forced labor practices while permitting their continuation for the sake of “development.”<sup>21</sup> Elizabeth Wrangham, however, argued that Africans voluntarily constructed 450 of 600 miles of roads in the Gold Coast during the First World War in order to facilitate local and international trade.<sup>22</sup> In the case of Dahomey, Alber argued that African leaders reacted differently to forced labor policies. Some leaders resisted while others supported the measures because roads provided valuable access to markets, political and health centers, and other social spaces that amplified their power and influence.<sup>23</sup> In the August 2013 edition of *Africa: The Journal of the*

---

<sup>19</sup> Joshua Grace, “Modernization *Bubu*: Cars, Roads, and the Politics of Development in Tanzania, 1870s-1980s” (PhD diss., Michigan State University, 2013); and *Ibid.*, “Heroes of the Road: Race, Gender and the Politics of Mobility in Twentieth-Century Tanzania,” *Africa: The Journal of the International African Institute* 83, no. 3 (August 2013): 403-425.

<sup>20</sup> Alber, “Motorization and Colonial Rule,” 87.

<sup>21</sup> Kwabena Opare Akurang-Parry, “Colonial Forced Labour Policies for Road-Building in Southern Ghana and International Anti-Forced Labor Pressures, 1900-1940,” *African Economic History* 28 (2000): 1-25. Masquelier similarly found that the Mawri experienced violent reprisals for refusing to construct roads during the colonial era. According to Masquelier, “villages were systematically plundered and burned, men decapitated, children hung from trees, and women taken as captives when they were not killed on the spot.” See Masquelier, “Road Mythographies,” 830.

<sup>22</sup> Elizabeth Wrangham, “An African Road Revolution: The Gold Coast in the Period of the Great War,” *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 32, no.1 (January 2004): 1-18.

<sup>23</sup> Alber, “Motorization and Colonial Rule,” 87.

*International African Institute*, five studies examined how everyday Africans experienced both the “perils and possibilities of roads, roadsides, traffic and transport” during and after colonialism in Kenya, Tanzania, Senegal, Ghana, and Sudan.<sup>24</sup> Scholars illustrated that roads and motor vehicles acted as liberating, empowering, and oppressive technologies in Africa. They aided in the extension of colonial rule, intensified socioeconomic inequalities, and undermined community relationships. They also improved access to medical care and education, created new occupations, and offered individuals opportunities to contest discriminatory social orders.

This dissertation builds upon the historiography to examine how automobiles were used as tools for colonial rule and exploitation, as well as African and Asian innovation and agency in southern Tanzania. I chose to concentrate on southern Tanzania after examining colonial records concerning road and railway competition in Tanzania during the 1930s. The British colonial state instituted legislation strictly controlling road transport near the Central and Tanga Railways in order to protect railway revenues and discourage road competition.<sup>25</sup> Southern Tanzania was not affected by the restrictive legislation because it lacked rail services. Without a railway or consistent coastal steamship services, southern Tanzania seemingly offered a prime opportunity to evaluate the ambivalent impacts of road transportation upon local populations and the colonial administration. Historians who studied southern Tanzania repeatedly correlated the region’s insufficient transportation infrastructure with its real and perceived isolation and impoverishment in relation to the rest of the nation. Felicitas Becker and Chau P. Johnsen Kelly argued that the scarcity of roads between interior villages, markets, and coastal towns and

---

<sup>24</sup> Gabriel Klaeger, “Introduction: The Perils and Possibilities of African Roads,” *Africa: The Journal of the International African Institute* 83, no.3 (August 2013): 359-366; Mark Lamont, “Speed Governors: Road Safety and Infrastructural Overload in Post-Colonial Kenya, c. 1963-2013,” 367-384; Caroline Melly, “Ethnography on the Road: Infrastructural Vision and the Unruly Present in Contemporary Dakar,” 385-402; Grace, “Heroes of the Road,” 403-425; Kurt Beck, “Roadside Comforts: Truck Stops on the Forty Days Road in Western Sudan,” 426-445; and Gabriel Klaeger, “Dwelling on the Road: Routines, Rituals and Roadblocks in Southern Ghana,” 446-469.

<sup>25</sup> The committee reports included: *Report of select committee appointed to report on a road to connect Dar es Salaam with the north and central road systems, 1928* (Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 1928); *Report of a Committee appointed to Inquire into the question of Competition between Road Transport and Railways in the Tanganyika Territory* (Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 1935); and *Report of a Committee appointed to Inquire into the Question of Competition between Road Transport and Railways and the possibility of co-ordinating the various forms of Transport in the Tanganyika Territory* (Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 1937).

ports undermined economic growth in southern Tanzania during the colonial era. High transportation costs cut into local revenues and discouraged foreign investments.<sup>26</sup> Without all-weather roads connecting the coast to interior districts and the capital of Dar es Salaam, “Britain treated the southeastern coast as a veritable island.”<sup>27</sup> Pekka Seppälä argued that residents in the south and outsiders continued to associate the region’s lack of roads with a “lack of modernity” after the colonial era.<sup>28</sup> According to Priya Lal, inadequate transportation infrastructure occupied a “central position” in state development discourse in the postcolonial era. Many residents of Mtwara believed that poor roads hindered the region’s economic growth and deprived them of valuable state resources and “developmental capital.”<sup>29</sup> Lal continued, “being left *out* of the new nation-state in terms of spatial integration was inextricable from a sense of being left *behind* the rest of the world in developmental terms.”<sup>30</sup>

Despite recognition of the integral role road transportation played in southern Tanzania’s practical and perceived peripheralization, an in-depth regional history of road construction and transportation had not been conducted.<sup>31</sup> My dissertation fills this gap and analyzes the extent to which inadequate roads were a cause, consequence, and justification for southern Tanzania’s marginalization and isolation during and after the colonial era. While examining the failures of the colonial and postcolonial states to improve southern Tanzania’s infrastructure, this dissertation argues that the region’s roads offer an alternative narrative of local initiative, resilience, and prosperity. The introduction and

---

<sup>26</sup> Felicitas Becker, “A social history of Southeast Tanzania, ca 1890-1950” (PhD diss., Cambridge University, 2002), 154-55; and Chau P. Johnsen Kelly, “A Tale of Two Cities, Mikindani and Mtwara: Consuming Development in Southeastern Tanganyika, 1910-1960” (PhD diss., University of California Davis, 2010), 255-57.

<sup>27</sup> Kelly, “A Tale of Two Cities, Mikindani and Mtwara,” 13.

<sup>28</sup> Pekka Seppälä, “Introduction,” in *The Making of a Periphery: Economic Development and Cultural Encounters in Southern Tanzania*, eds. Pekka Seppälä and Bertha Koda (Uppsala, Sweden: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 1998), 7-37: 11.

<sup>29</sup> Priya Lal, “Between the Village and the World: Imagining and Practicing Development in Tanzania, 1964-1975” (PhD diss., New York University, 2011), 164.

<sup>30</sup> Lal, “Between the Village and the World,” 212-13.

<sup>31</sup> S. Mesaki and J. Mwankusye examined political debates and public discourse concerning the construction of the Mtwara-Lindi-Dar es Salaam roadway during the postcolonial era. They detailed the social, political, and economic ramifications of the state’s failure to construct the all-weather road linking from the south to the economic and political center of Tanzania. S. Mesaki and J. Mwankusye, “The Sage of the Lindi-Kibiti road: Political Ramifications,” in *The Making of a Periphery: Economic Development and Cultural Encounters in Southern Tanzania*, eds. Pekka Seppälä and Bertha Koda (Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 1998), 58-74.

expansion of motor vehicle transport during the 1920s and 1930s provided a valuable avenue for local populations to pursue socioeconomic opportunities within and beyond the peripheral borderland. While some Africans associated roads and automobiles with forced labor practices and the loss of autonomy, others perceived them as pathways and tools for social and economic advancement. African producers and migrant laborers living in proximity to the main and district roads appropriated motor vehicles to pursue advantageous labor and commercial markets during the final decades of colonialism. This dissertation also challenges the historiography of automobility in Africa to consider the contributions of Asians, rather than limiting the analysis to African-European experiences. It argues that Indian entrepreneurs, wholesalers, and retailers spearheaded the expansion and success of road transportation in southern Tanzania between the 1920s and 1960s. In the postcolonial period, automobiles served as important political tools that Indian businessmen utilized to contest mounting anti-Asian national discourse portraying them as exploitative parasites. The Indian community in southern Tanzania tried to prove its value and allegiance to the nation by offering their vehicles in support of neighboring anticolonial struggles, humanitarian relief, and nation-building operations. Although their efforts ultimately failed, the Indian transportation sector left a lasting impact on southern Tanzania's social and economic landscape.

In order to determine the automobile's impact in southern Tanzania, it was necessary to understand mobility patterns prior to the introduction of motor vehicles during the colonial era. Historians such as Edward Alpers and Andrea Seligman argued that dynamic inland and overseas long-distance trade networks linked South-and Central-East Africa and the western Indian Ocean since the early second millennium.<sup>32</sup> When examining the directionality, composition, and purpose of these precolonial networks, I began reconceptualizing my perspective of "southern Tanzania" as a region. Southern Tanzania was not always an impoverished periphery demarcated by administrative and international borders; rather, it served as a fluid and profitable frontier during the precolonial era. The space

---

<sup>32</sup> Edward Alpers, *Ivory and Slaves in East Central Africa* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975); and Andrea Seligman, "Encircling Value: Rufiji Ruvuma Communities, Trade, and the Wider East African – Indian Ocean World, c. 0-1700 C.E." (PhD diss., Northwestern University, 2014).



encompassing southern Tanzania today and the identity of the people within it are the product of human interactions with one another and their surrounding environment over the course of centuries. My dissertation concurs with historians, anthropologists, political geographers, and social scientists who argue that “space” impacts human thoughts and actions as it is (re)constructed and negotiated by humans.<sup>33</sup> Rather than providing an irrelevant framework in which social life and historical events occur, “the spatial is an actively changing dimension of all aspects of life, a dimension that affects how people act and think.”<sup>34</sup> While space is physical (as defined by geographers and surveyors), there are also social and analytical spaces. Humans physically and mentally construct social spaces through their interactions – creating kin and family networks, courts and administrative offices, overseas trade networks, shrines and churches, religious and intellectual associations, and so forth. According to Allen M. Howard,

[...] physical space becomes social space as people create relationships by interacting with one another, building and naming things, giving meaning to particular places, perceiving the similarities and differences among places, discoursing about the relationship of people distributed over space— and so on. All such acts are contested, but general agreement or understanding about social space may be reached among a given group of people, at least temporarily.<sup>35</sup>

Analytical spaces are the abstractions people “use to understand the complexities of physical and social space, usually by applying formal conceptual tools.”<sup>36</sup> Regions, frontiers, borderlands, and landscapes are

---

<sup>33</sup> Henri Lefebvre, *The Production of Space*, translated by Donald Nicholson-Smith (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991); Doreen Massey, *For Space* (Los Angeles: SAGE Publications, 2005); Allen M. Howard and Richard M. Shain, eds., *The Spatial Factor in African History: The Relationship of the Social, Material, and Perceptual* (Leiden: Brill, 2005); and Ulf Engel and Paul Nugent, eds., *Respacing Africa* (Leiden: Brill, 2010). In the introduction of *Respacing Africa*, Ulf Engel and Paul Nugent make the important observation that within the African historiography, there are countless studies implicitly incorporating spatial elements in their analyses concerning the Atlantic and Indian Ocean slave trade, precolonial kinship networks, trans-regional and transcontinental migrations, religious networks, urbanization, migrant labor, colonial and national borderlands, African diaspora, cross-border and transnational trade networks, and globalization. See Ulf Engel and Paul Nugent, “Introduction: The Spatial Turn in African Studies,” in *Respacing Africa*, eds. Ulf Engel and Paul Nugent (Leiden: Brill, 2010), 1-9.

<sup>34</sup> Allen M. Howard, “Nodes, Networks, Landscapes, and Regions: Reading the Social History of Tropical Africa 1700s-1920,” in *The Spatial Factor in African History: The Relationship of the Social, Material, and Perceptual*, eds. Allen M. Howard and Richard M. Shain (Leiden: Brill, 2005), 21-140: 25.

<sup>35</sup> Allen M Howard, “Actors, Places, Regions, and Global Forces: An Essay on the Spatial History of Africa Since 1700,” in *Respacing Africa*, eds. Ulf Engel and Paul Nugent (Leiden: Brill, 2010), 11-44: 12.

<sup>36</sup> Howard, “Actors, Places, Regions, and Global Forces,” 12.

a few of the analytical concepts scholars and ordinary individuals employ to talk about natural and social spaces.<sup>37</sup>

The process of constructing space and encoding it with meaning through actions, discourses, and ideologies – living in houses, worshipping at shrines, trading at markets – does not occur in a mechanical, predetermined manner. The process instead involves continuous cooperation, conflict, and negotiation that inevitably produce landscapes with plural meanings and realities.<sup>38</sup> Jan Bender Shetler, for example, examined the diverse and contested meanings that African populations, colonial governments, and international organizations inscribed on the landscape of the Western Serengeti during the precolonial, colonial, and postcolonial eras.<sup>39</sup> Shetler contended that since the beginning of human memory, “the Western Serengeti has been a profoundly humanized landscape with the stories, hopes, and challenges of its people deeply embedded in its rocks and hills, pools and streams, vistas and valleys.”<sup>40</sup> The ancestors of the Western Serengeti peoples (early Bantu-speaking farmers) conceived of the landscape in ecological, social, and sacred terms. These “imagined” landscapes were challenged during the course of the nineteenth century by a series of ecological disasters, episodic raiding by Maasai pastoralists, and the region’s integration into the global Indian Ocean. The physical landscape of the Western Serengeti changed as the local population integrated Maasai pastoralist approaches of interacting with the landscape with their own understandings and “strategies of survival.”<sup>41</sup> Some areas were depopulated and others recolonized into fortified settlements.<sup>42</sup> The colonial era again impacted the western Serengeti’s real and imagined landscape. Shetler argued that British conceptions of the Serengeti as a resource for economic

---

<sup>37</sup> Howard, “Nodes, Networks, Landscapes, and Regions,” 25; and Howard, “Actors, Places, Regions, and Global Forces,” 12.

<sup>38</sup> Howard, “Nodes, Networks, Landscapes, and Regions,” 27. Borrowing from David William Cohen and E.S. Atieno Odhiambo, landscape is defined as “the physical land, the people on it, and the culture through which people work out the possibilities of the land.” See David William Cohen and E.S. Atieno Odhiambo, *Siaya: The Historical Anthropology of an African Landscape* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1989), 9.

<sup>39</sup> Jan Bender Shetler, *Imagining Serengeti: A History of Landscape Memory in Tanzania from Earliest Time to the Present* (Athens, USA: Ohio University Press, 2007). In the introduction, Shetler offers an excellent overview of landscape analyses in historical works, especially those concerning African history.

<sup>40</sup> Shetler, *Imagining Serengeti*, 1.

<sup>41</sup> *Ibid.*, 135.

<sup>42</sup> *Ibid.*, 136.

exploitation and “development” conflicted with global conservationists’ visions of the landscape as pristine wilderness in need of protection from human exploitation.

Shetler is one of a number of historians who analyzed the manner and means by which colonialism attempted to (re)construct social and physical spaces throughout the world. According to Edward Said, Westerners simplified complex foreign societies into the inherently inferior, backwards, and immutable “other” – a process that allowed Westerners to justify their conquest and control of indigenous societies around the world.<sup>43</sup> Map-making was a crucial tool in shaping European imaginations of foreign spaces. Benedict Anderson argued that maps and geographical surveys demarcated imperial boundaries, while censuses filled in the bordered spaces with inhabitants divided by quantifiable categories (race, ethnicity, religion, language, etc.).<sup>44</sup> Imperial powers further subdivided their colonial possessions according to internal administrative boundaries in order to more effectively govern classified populations. According to Gregory Maddox,

Just as colonial states externally defined areas as different colonies, they internally imposed a vision of spatial demarcation, dividing land into provinces, districts, chiefdoms, and tribal areas. Land use mirrored supposed ethnic divisions. Colonial officials tried to spatially segregate resource use, designating regions as “game reserves” and “forest reserves,” alienating some areas for immigrant use and pairing them with native reserves.<sup>45</sup>

“Natural” spaces were delineated into exploitable economic units based upon readily available resources and their future economic potential – cash crop production, food staple cultivation, labor reserves, mineral extraction, and so forth.<sup>46</sup> Historians, however, have shown that colonial rule did not attain validity and

---

<sup>43</sup> Edward W. Said, *Orientalism* (New York: Vintage Books, 1979).

<sup>44</sup> Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, revised edition (London: Verso, 1991), 163-185. Also see Martin W. Lewis and Kären E. Wigen, *The Myth of Continents: A Critique of Metageography* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997); and Richard L. Kagan, “Projecting Order,” in *Mapping Latin America: A Cartographic Reader*, ed. Jordana Dym and Karl Offen (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011), 46-50.

<sup>45</sup> Gregory Maddox, “Networks and Frontiers in Colonial Tanzania,” *Environmental History* (1998): 436-459, 437.

<sup>46</sup> Allen M. Howard offers a brief overview of the historiography concerning colonial spatial patterns in “Actors, Places, Regions, and Global Forces,” 21-25. Notable works include Timothy Mitchell, *Rule of Experts: Egypt, Techno-Politics, Modernity* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002); C. Crais, *The Politics of Evil: Magic, State Power, and the Political Imagination in South Africa* (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002); Garth A. Myers, *Verandahs of Power: Colonialism and Space in Urban Africa* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2003); Henrietta L. Moore and Megan Vaughan, *Cutting Down Trees, Gender, Nutrition, and Agricultural Change in*

authority simply by drawing lines on a map and signing treaties. Terrence Ranger, Eric Hobsbawm, and Benedict Anderson pioneered the argument that traditions were invented and formally instituted to give meaning, cohesion, and authority to imagined nations, colonies, and empires.<sup>47</sup> Imperial flags, ceremonies, legislation, taxation, monetary economies, military force, forced labor practices, and the construction of administrative buildings were a few of the devices colonists employed to make their authority concrete in the daily lives and consciousness of the colonizers and colonized. Ranger argued that British officials used traditions from military regiments, great houses, and public schools in order to instill in Africans their “proper” place within a new colonial social order; Europeans ruled and Africans obeyed.<sup>48</sup> Social spaces were also reconceptualized according to racial and gender hierarchies.<sup>49</sup> Colonial legislation often dictated an individual’s employment, education, place of residence, and political rights according to their racial status. After World War I, the British increasingly organized “African” spaces according to ethnic identities.<sup>50</sup> When confronted with ethnically-mixed societies (such as in southern Tanzania), the British created “tribes” and “chiefs.”

Technological artifacts were also critical to colonial space-shaping and shape-defining processes. Railways, steamships, roads, and airplanes were administrative, economic, and “civilizing” tools that Europeans employed to exploit colonial resources while strengthening colonial authority, economies, and racially-based social orders.<sup>51</sup> Europeans used transportation technologies to direct and control the movement of colonial resources – whether loading cash crops into railway cars destined for steamships and imperial markets, or crowding migrant laborers into the back of lorries destined for mines or

---

*the Northern Province of Zambia 1890– 1990* (Portsmouth: Heinemann, 1994); and Kirk Arden Hoppe, *Lords of the Fly: Sleeping Sickness Control in British East Africa, 1900-1960* (Westport, USA: Praeger, 2003).

<sup>47</sup> Eric Hobsbawm and Terrence Ranger, eds., *The Invention of Tradition* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983); and Anderson, *Imagined Communities*.

<sup>48</sup> Terrence Ranger, “The Invention of Tradition in Colonial Africa,” in *The Invention of Tradition*, eds. Eric Hobsbawm and Terrence Ranger (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 211-261.

<sup>49</sup> Ann Laura Stoler, *Carnal Knowledge and Imperial Power: Race and the Intimate in Colonial Rule* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002).

<sup>50</sup> Penelope Hetherington, *British Paternalism and Africa, 1920-1940* (London: F. Cass, 1978).

<sup>51</sup> Daniel R. Headrick, *The Tools of Empire: Technology and European Imperialism in the Nineteenth Century* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1981); and Casper Anderson, *British Engineers and Africa, 1875-1914* (London: Pickering & Chatto, 2011).

plantations.<sup>52</sup> As previously discussed, Alber and Gewald illustrated how motor vehicles extended and consolidated colonial authority, while reaffirming racial stereotypes between “superior” colonists and “inferior” Africans.<sup>53</sup> Historians, however, have convincingly argued that imperial powers were unable to unequivocally construct and transform social and physical spaces according to their designs and desires. Although colonialism imposed new “spatial constraints” and “structural realities,”<sup>54</sup> Howard contended that indigenous populations continually negotiated with each other and Europeans “over the meaning of places and the form and content of networks.”<sup>55</sup> The sites chosen for colonial “development” projects, in particular, became embroiled in intense conflict and negotiation between local populations, colonial officials, and international contractors and business interests.<sup>56</sup> Conceptions of identity, race, gender, and citizenship also remained fluid and ambiguous as the colonized and colonists negotiated their relationships and understandings of one another.<sup>57</sup> Howard insisted that social markers of race and gender

---

<sup>52</sup> In the Tanzania historiography, see Erik Gilbert, *Dhows and the Colonial Economy of Zanzibar, 1860-1970* (Oxford: James Curry Ltd, 2004); Stephen J. Rockel, *Carriers of Culture: Labor on the Road in Nineteenth-Century East Africa* (Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann, 2006); and James L. Giblin, *A History of the Excluded: Making Family a Refuge from State in Twentieth-Century Tanzania* (Oxford: James Currey, 2005).

<sup>53</sup> Gewald, “Missionaries, Hereros, and Motorcars,” 260; and Alber, “Motorization and Colonial Rule,” 83.

<sup>54</sup> Howard, “Re-Making on the Past,” 303 and 343.

<sup>55</sup> Howard, “Nodes, Networks, Landscapes, and Regions,” 128-29.

<sup>56</sup> The literature that has analyzed development and underdevelopment in Africa is immense and varied. Notable works include (with particular attention to the East African historiography): E.A. Brett, *Colonialism and Underdevelopment in East Africa: The Politics of Economic Change, 1919-1939* (New York: NOK Publishers, 1973); A.G. Hopkins, *An Economic History of West Africa* (Longman, London 1973); Walter Rodney, *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa* (Washington: Howard University Press, 1974); Ralph A. Austen, *African Economic History: Internal Development and External Dependency* (London: J. Currey, 1987); Frederick Cooper, *Decolonization and African Society: The Labor Question in French and British Africa* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Frederick Cooper and Randall Packard, eds., *International Development and the Social Sciences: Essays on the History and Politics of Knowledge* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997); Joanna Lewis, *Empire State-Building: War and Welfare in Kenya, 1925-52* (Oxford: James Currey, 2000); Kirk Arden Hoppe, *Lords of the Fly: Sleeping Sickness Control in British East Africa, 1900-1960* (Westport, Conn: Praeger, 2003); Joseph Morgan Hodge, *Triumph of the Expert: Agrarian Doctrines of Development and Legacies of British Colonialism* (Athens Ohio: Ohio University Press, 2007); Rohland Schuknecht, *British Colonial Development Policy after the Second World War: The Case of Sukumaland, Tanganyika* (Münster: LIT Verlag, 2010); Helen Tilley, *African as a Living Laboratory: Empire, Development, and the Problem of Scientific Knowledge, 1870-1950* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011); Toyin Falola and Jessica Achberger, eds., *The Political Economy of Development and Underdevelopment in Africa* (New York: Routledge, 2013); and Leander Schneider, *Government of Development: Peasants and Politicians in Postcolonial Tanzania* (Bloomington, IN, USA: Indiana University Press, 2014). Scholarship concerning British colonial development will be addressed in chapters three and four.

<sup>57</sup> Ann Laura Stoler, *Carnal Knowledge and Imperial Power: Race and the Intimate in Colonial Rule* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002). Other studies concerning issues of contested identity within the British Empire and the metropole include (but not limited to): Robert A. Huttenback, *Racism and Empire: White Settlers*

were “constantly being produced through interaction and exchanges in places, through networks, and in dynamic regions.”<sup>58</sup> In the case of the western Serengeti, Shetler examined how the British colonial state redefined local communities into imagined “tribes” as part of their effort to reconceptualize the region according to administrative units. When local communities passively resisted colonial attempts to transform the ecological landscape into “consolidated peasant farmsteads,” the British responded by reimagining western Serengeti peoples “as lawless and unruly renegades, uncivilized and backward natives, and, ultimately, cruel and indiscriminate ‘poachers.’”<sup>59</sup> These stereotypes remained contested and impacted relationships between Western Serengeti peoples, the Tanzanian government, and international conservationist organizations to the current day. Shetler concluded that colonialism was one of multiple forces impacting the way in which individuals perceived and engaged with one another and the physical environment in the Western Serengeti.

In order to understand the historical processes that culminated in southern Tanzania’s marginalization and impoverishment, this dissertation explores how European, African, and Asian interactions and perceptions of the region changed during the course of the twentieth century, especially in the context of failed road construction projects and the expansion of motor vehicle transport. Borrowing from Howard, “region” is defined as a “dynamic zone of interaction.”<sup>60</sup> Since humans partake in a multitude of interactions and networks, there are numerous criteria scholars could use to define southern Tanzania as a region. Defining southern Tanzania in terms of religious, kinship, or political interactions would produce varying regional parameters. This dissertation instead defines southern

---

*and Colored Immigrants in the British Self-Governing Colonies, 1830-1910* (Ithaca: Cornell University, 1976); Paul B. Rich, *Race and Empire in British Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986); Anna Davin, “Imperialism and Motherhood,” *History Workshop* 5 (1978): 9-65; Ronald Hyam, *Empire and Sexuality: The British Experience* (New York: Manchester University Press, 1990); Margaret Strobel, *European Women and the Second British Empire* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1991); Antoinette M. Burton, *Burdens of History: British Feminists, Indian Women and Imperial Culture, 1865-1915* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, 1994); Clare Midgley, ed. *Gender and Imperialism* (New York: Manchester University Press, 1998); and Thomas W. Gallant, *Experiencing Dominion: Culture, Identify, and Power in the British Mediterranean* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2002).

<sup>58</sup> Howard, “Actors, Places, Regions, and Global Forces,” 11.

<sup>59</sup> Shetler, *Imagining Serengeti*, 172-73.

<sup>60</sup> Howard, “Nodes, Networks, Landscapes, and Regions,” 53.

Tanzania as a region based upon an analysis of long-distance trade and labor migration networks. This choice is not arbitrary. Howard contended that regions “are created and sustained through people’s mobility and exchanges.”<sup>61</sup> This dissertation argues that trade and labor networks constantly and powerfully shaped the social, economic, and political landscape of southern Tanzania since the early second millennium C.E. For the purpose of this study, southern Tanzania’s regional parameters stretch south from Kilwa to the Ruvuma River, and west from the Indian Ocean to Songea District and Lake Malawi.<sup>62</sup> The region shares two seasons – the rainy and dry season. The rains typically last from November to March, giving way to the dry season from April to October. Unpredictable and irregular rainfall is common throughout southern Tanzania, and the region’s vegetation, soils, and geological features are diverse. Moving westward from the red-laterized or “black cotton” soils of the coast (which supports an abundance of copra, coconuts, and mangroves), the land rises steeply into a series of plateaus. Ascending approximately 700 to 900 meters, the Makonde Plateau has an area of approximately 3,100 km<sup>2</sup> and consists of very dense vegetation, permeable sandy soils, and insufficient surface water. Despite the lack of a permanent water supply, the plateau accommodates seasonal millet, sorghum, and maize production, as well as an important famine-relief crop – cassava. The floodplains of the Ruvuma and Lukuledi Rivers (south and north of the plateau respectively) offer rich, well-watered soils. The Mwera or Rondo plateau rises north of the Lukuledi River, gradually giving way to the Machinga-Matumbi hills and the lightly wooded open country of Liwale to the north (and west of Kilwa). Heading west from the plateaus, the land flattens into undulating plains of wooded grasslands and increasingly dry, sandy soils.

---

<sup>61</sup>Howard, “Actors, Places, Regions, and Global Forces,” 13. The “mobility” and “spatial turn” in African studies were discussed and utilized in a series of edited volumes, including: Vannini, *The Cultures of Alternative Mobilities*; Snead et al., eds., *Landscape of Movement*; and Tilo Grätz, ed., *Mobility, Transnationalism and Contemporary African Societies* (Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2010).

<sup>62</sup> These geographic parameters differ from those given by most scholars, who instead set southern Tanzania’s western border in Tunduru District (east of Songea). Songea’s history of large political chiefdoms and close political, social, and economic relations with communities to the north differ from the common narrative told of southern Tanzania – a region of small, stateless, matrilineal-based, multiethnic communities, who oriented their economies towards the Swahili coast. Colonial governments also excluded Songea from southern Tanzania’s administrative borders until 1932. Colonial administrative divisions often reflected perceived ethnic regions and economic linkages. I chose to include Songea within my regional definition of “southern Tanzania” because of the sustained and integral trade links that existed between the coast and Songea since at least the seventeenth century.

Although numerous tributaries cut through the plains and support large- and small-game populations, the plains are sparsely populated by humans. Hilly country with increasingly rich soil reappears approaching Lake Malawi to the west. The geological features are very similar south of the Ruvuma River in northern Mozambique, in which the Mueda Plateau gives way to plains, wooded, and hilly country before reaching Lake Malawi.

When analyzing the socioeconomic changes that occurred in southern Tanzania during the twentieth century, it is imperative to examine the region as part of a larger borderland with northern Mozambique. Borderland scholars have repeatedly argued that the visual representation of borders as fixed lines on a map mask the reality that they are “changeable spatial units” that are influenced by interactions between and among local populaces, regional elites, and central states on both sides of the border.<sup>63</sup> J.A. Mbembé and Steven Rendall argued that colonial borders in Africa reflected,

[...] commercial, religious, and military realities, the rivalries, power relationships, and alliances that prevailed among the various imperial powers and between them and Africans through the centuries preceding colonization proper.<sup>64</sup>

While every border has its own history (some more ancient than others), each is strategically utilized by local people in ways unintended by their creators. Michiel Baud and Willem Van Schendel observed that borders became tools for revolutionaries and refugees to find protection under another sovereign. Borderland residents and traders, in comparison, traversed borders to access better health and education services, cheaper products, and lesser taxes.<sup>65</sup> Baud and Schendel insisted that,

No matter how clearly borders are drawn on official maps, how many customs officials are appointed, or how many watchtowers are built, people will ignore borders whenever it suits them. In doing so, they challenge the political status quo of which borders are the ultimate symbol.<sup>66</sup>

---

<sup>63</sup> Michiel Baud and Willem van Schendel, “Towards a Comparative History of Borderlands,” *Journal of World History* 8, no.2 (1997): 211-242, 222. Ellwyn R. Stoddard and Américo Paredes’ analyses of the United States-Mexico border were credited with pioneering borderland studies. For a brief overview of the evolution of borderland studies see David Coplan, “Siamese Twin Towns and Unitary Concepts in Border Inequality,” in *Reshaping Africa*, eds. Ulf Engel and Paul Nugent (Leiden: Brill, 2010), 71-87.

<sup>64</sup> J.A. Mbembé and Steven Rendall, “At the Edge of the World: Boundaries, Territoriality, and Sovereignty in Africa,” *Public Culture* 12, no.1 (2000): 259-284, 265.

<sup>65</sup> Baud and van Schengel, “Towards a Comparative History of Borderlands,” 211.

<sup>66</sup> *Ibid.*



Paul Nugent and A.I. Asiwaju offered similar conclusions regarding African borders in their edited volume, *African Boundaries: Barriers, Conduits and Opportunities*. They argued that borders attempted to “corral sets of people” and control resources, yet borders created zones “of interaction rather than representing a genuine partition.”<sup>67</sup> Eric Allina-Pisano concurred, arguing that colonial borders in Africa “were simultaneously a means by which colonial powers divided African people and territories; portals through which people, goods, and ideas might pass; and zones of opportunity for the ambitious and intrepid.”<sup>68</sup> As people traversed international borders, they also crossed and transformed internal borders. Maddox insisted that ordinary Africans refused to be mere “cogs in a territorial and international division of resource exploitation with linkages controlled by a powerful core area.” They instead took advantage of and contested the “malleable and permeable” frontiers that existed throughout colonial Tanzania.<sup>69</sup> In the case of southern Tanzania and northern Mozambique, state control over the border and trans-Ruvuma migrations was virtually non-existent for much of the twentieth century. Local populations exploited the unregulated and porous nature of the border to their advantage. With the exception of the First World War and Mozambique War of Independence, inhabitants of the Ruvuma borderland regularly and freely

---

<sup>67</sup> Paul Nugent and A.I. Asiwaju, “Introduction: The Paradox of African Boundaries,” in *African Boundaries: Barriers, Conduits and Opportunities* (London: Pinter, 1996), 1-18, 2.

<sup>68</sup> Eric Allina-Pisano, “Borderlands, Boundaries, and the Contours of Colonial Rule: African Labor in Manica District, Mozambique, c. 1904-1908,” *International Journal of African Historical Studies* 36, no.1 (2003): 59-82, 59-60. There are numerous studies examining the ambiguity of colonial and national borders in North America, Africa, and around the world. A few notable studies published within the past two decades include Jeremy Adelman and Stephen Aron, “From Borderlands to Borders: Empires, Nation-States, and the Peoples in between in North American History,” *The American Historical Review* 104, no.3 (1999): 814-41; Susan Bibler Coutin, “Confined within: National territories as zones of confinement,” *Political Geography* 29 (2010): 200-208; Frederick Söderbaum and Ian Taylor, “State, Region and Space in Africa,” in *Rescaling Africa*, eds. Ulf Engel and Paul Nugent (Leiden: Brill, 2010): 45-70; David Ludden, “The Process of Empire: Frontiers and Borderlands,” in *Tributary Empires in Global History*, eds. C.A. Bayly and Peter Fibiger Bang (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011): 132-150; Juliana Barr, “Geographies of Power: Mapping Indian Borders in the ‘Borderlands’ of the Early Southwest,” *The William and Mary Quarterly* 68, no. 1 (January 2011): 5-46; Martin Doevenspeck, “Constructing the border from below: Narratives from the Congolese-Rwandan state boundary,” *Political Geography* 30 (2011): 129-142; Timothy Raeymaekers, “Reshaping the state in its margins: The state, the market and the subaltern on a Central African frontier,” *Critique of Anthropology* 32, no. 3 (2012): 334-350; Lissa K. Wadewitz, *The Nature of Borders: Salmon, Boundaries, and Bandits on the Salish Sea* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2012); and Sandro Mezzadra and Brett Neilson, *Border as Method, or, the Multiplication of Labor* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2013). The formation of ABORNE, African Borderlands Research Network, in 2007 reflected growing interdisciplinary interest in African borderland studies.

<sup>69</sup> Maddox, “Networks and Frontiers in Colonial Tanzania,” 437.

moved between colonial systems; evading oppressive colonial regimes and taking advantage of labor and trade markets. Southern Tanzanians often shared closer socioeconomic ties and a common identity with populations across the Ruvuma than with communities elsewhere in Tanzania. This dissertation evaluates the events occurring in northern Mozambique and the complex relations between the neighboring governments and residents in order to better understand how southern Tanzania's socioeconomic landscape changed during and after the colonial era.

This dissertation ultimately examines the complex interactions between traders, producers, transporters, migrant laborers, private contractors, local leaders, and state officials as they constructed, negotiated, and transformed southern Tanzania's trade and labor networks over the past three centuries. Their interactions were constantly mediated by technological and natural forces. The expansion of automotive transportation, in particular, produced ambiguous socioeconomic consequences as European, Asian, and African populations utilized the technology according to their own needs and objectives. Colonial officials employed motor vehicles with the intention of "civilizing" and "modernizing" southern Tanzania by improving administrative efficiency, introducing monetized import-export economies, and controlling the movement of raw material exports and human resources – namely African migrant laborers. Asian and African merchants, producers, and laborers, however, utilized automobiles to pursue socioeconomic opportunities within and beyond the Ruvuma borderland – actions that simultaneously supported and subverted colonial policies and authority. In every case, the region's challenging climatic and soil conditions mediated the use of automobiles by inhibiting the construction of all-weather roads. In the end, this dissertation argues that the history of road transportation of southern Tanzania offers an avenue to gain new insights into how perceptions of southern Tanzania as an unprogressive, isolated, and impoverished region were created, impacted human interactions, and were challenged or embraced by local communities according to their needs. The dissertation also challenges the validity of negative stereotypes about southern Tanzania, illustrating the agency and innovation of local populations, who utilized their mobility to survive and thrive in a peripheral region. Finally, this dissertation advocates for a deeper understanding of southern Tanzania's regional history so as to gradually strip away engrained

stereotypes about the region and enable current state officials, private companies, local leaders, and ordinary citizens to collaborate for the betterment of the region and nation.

### Overview of Sources

Researching and writing a regional history requires the synthesis of original research and secondary source materials. This dissertation is comprised of archival research conducted in Tanzania, Britain, and the United States over the course of three years. It also incorporates oral histories collected and translated with the help of my research assistant – Zuhura Mohamed – in Lindi, Masasi, and Mtwara town and outlying villages in 2015.<sup>70</sup> This dissertation builds upon the work of many scholars who have studied the spaces and communities that have come to make up southern Tanzania, including [but not limited to]: J. Gus Liebenow, Terrence Ranger, Edward A. Alpers, Felicitas Becker, Chau P. Johnsen Kelly, Matthew Pawlowicz, John Albert Rauf Wembah-Rashid, Priya Lal, Hussein Dinani, Andrea Seligman, and the contributors of Pekka Seppälä and Bertha Koda's *The Making of a Periphery*.<sup>71</sup> In order to situate southern Tanzania in its proper historical context, this dissertation also transcends academic borders. Howard convincingly argued that regional histories must be part “of a multi-leveled analysis that includes the local and the macro-regional or global – with many scales in between.”<sup>72</sup> One cannot understand trade and labor patterns in southern Tanzania without being mindful of events occurring elsewhere in East Africa, India, and Europe from the sixteenth century to the present day.

---

<sup>70</sup> Unfortunately, the Tanzanian government rejected my application to conduct research in the Ruvuma Region (including Tunduru and Songea) in 2015. As a result, the oral histories I collected concerning transportation in the postcolonial era were only conducted in the Mtwara and Lindi Regions.

<sup>71</sup> J. Gus Liebenow, *Colonial Rule and Political Development in Tanzania: The Case of the Makonde* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1971); Terrence Ranger, “European Attitudes and African Realities: The Rise and Fall of the Matola Chiefs of Southeast Tanzania,” *The Journal of African History* 20, no.1 (1979): 63-82; Alpers, *Ivory and Slaves in East Central Africa*; Becker, “A social history of Southeast Tanzania, ca 1890-1950”; Kelly, “A Tale of Two Cities”; Matthew Pawlowicz, “A Review of Ceramics from Tanzania, Malawi, and Northern Mozambique, with Implications for Swahili Archaeology,” *African Archaeology Review* 30 (2013): 367–398; John Albert Rauf Wembah-Rashid, “Socio-Political Development and Economic Viability in a Rural Community: The Case of Nakarara Village, Mtwara Region Tanzania” (Ph.D. diss., University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 1983); Lal, “Between the Village and the World”; Hussein Dinani, “En-gendering the Postcolony: Women, Citizenship and Development in Tanzania, 1945-1985” (PhD diss., Emory University, 2013); Seligman, “Encircling Value”; and Pekka Seppälä and Bertha Koda, eds., *The Making of a Periphery: Economic Development and Cultural Encounters in Southern Tanzania* (Uppsala, Sweden: Narodiska Afrikainstitutet, 1998). Several articles by Alpers and Becker are also referenced throughout the dissertation.

<sup>72</sup> Howard, “Nodes, Networks, Landscapes, and Regions,” 54.

Despite perceptions of southern Tanzania as an isolated periphery since the 1920s, the region always influenced and was influenced by local, territorial/national, and international forces.<sup>73</sup> This dissertation, therefore, synthesizes historical studies concerning the western Indian Ocean, India and the Indian diaspora, Mozambique, and the Portuguese, German, and British Empires. It also utilizes methodological approaches from the history of technology, borderland, development, African, and imperial historiographies. I do not claim mastery of each of these fields, but rather attempt and advocate a transnational and interdisciplinary approach to conducting regional histories.

I also recognize that by labelling and evaluating southern Tanzania as a region, I am participating in the space-shaping and space-defining process. Since my point of departure and underlying intention is to offer a history of southern Tanzania, my analysis is innately biased. This dissertation situates southern Tanzania at the center of a regional analysis. Its conclusion, therefore, may differ from those who place southern Tanzania in the periphery. The decision to concentrate on trade and labor networks also produced conclusions that may differ from regional analyzes focusing on political institutions, kinship networks, or religious affiliations across the south. Finally, my analysis of the region prior to independence is largely based upon archival materials written and maintained by European sources, including missionaries, early explorers, and colonial officials. As a consequence, much of the dissertation assesses how Europeans perceived and reconceived southern Tanzania as a borderland region through their interactions with local populations. The voices, memories, and opinions of Tanzanians from the townships of Lindi, Masasi, and Mtwara are interwoven into the analysis of the late colonial and postcolonial era. Interviews with former employees of the Tanganyika Transport Company Ltd. – including the General Manager, drivers, mechanics, carpenters, and passengers – as well as other private traders and drivers, offer valuable insights into the socioeconomic impact that the expansion of mechanized road transportation had in southern Tanzania before and after Tanzanian independence.

---

<sup>73</sup> Thomas Hüsken convincingly argued that the “image of a periphery without connection to national and global developments is inappropriate.” See Thomas Hüsken “The Neo-tribal Competitive Order in the Borderland of Egypt and Libya,” in *Respacing Africa*, eds. Ulf Engel and Paul Nugent (Leiden: Brill, 2010), 169-205: 198.

## Chapter Outlines

The first chapter examines ruptures and continuities in mobility patterns in southern Tanzania and northern Mozambique during the precolonial period. Prior to the imposition of European colonial rule in the 1880s, a dynamic web of overland and overseas trade networks connected South-and Central-East Africa and the western Indian Ocean. The inland trade networks gave shape to a macro-region – termed the Rufiji-Ruvuma region<sup>74</sup> – that stretched east-west from the southern Swahili coast to Lake Malawi, and north-south from the Rufiji River to central Mozambique. Social, political, and cultural practices varied across the Rufiji-Ruvuma region, yet coastal and inland populations were participating in centuries-old trade networks when the Portuguese arrived in East Africa in the sixteenth century. Southern Tanzania and northern Mozambique formed a fluid and dynamic frontier region within the macro-region. The Ruvuma frontier consisted of a variety of ethnolinguistic groups, who migrated and interacted through local and long-distance trade networks. The natural environment continually influenced the creation, location, directionality, and composition of these trade networks, as well as the social relationships and structures that sustained them.

Beginning in the sixteenth century, mobility patterns in the Rufiji-Ruvuma macro-region underwent a series of changes as East Africa became increasingly integrated into global capitalist markets. The Ruvuma frontier entered an unparalleled era of insecurity and instability during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries as international demand for slaves and ivory escalated and Portuguese-Omani competition intensified along the East African coast. The small, dispersed communities of the Ruvuma region responded to intensified slave-raiding and devastating famines during the mid-nineteenth century by relocating to geographical strongholds and/or the security offered by a growing number of Yao “sultans,” Ngoni “chiefs,” and self-made “big men” who appeared along two trade corridors that crisscrossed southern Tanzania and northern Mozambique. These leaders utilized the instability created by the slave trade as an opportunity to expand their power and influence. They also entered into advantageous alliances with Indian merchants and European missionaries and explorers, who

---

<sup>74</sup> Term adapted from Seligman, “Encircling Value,” 18.

increasingly traded and settled in the interior.<sup>75</sup> Indian merchant capitalists helped to integrate local, regional, and long-distance trade economies within the global capitalist market. European missionaries and explorers, meanwhile, reimagined the Ruvuma region as a potentially lucrative agricultural landscape of cash crop plantations and African peasant farms. Conflict and negotiation, exploitation and cooperation, adaptation and accommodation defined complex African-European-Asian relationships within the dynamic frontier during the nineteenth century. The first chapter concludes that the slave and ivory trade of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was a space-destroying and space-creating process in southern Tanzania and northern Mozambique. While some areas were depopulated (voluntarily or forcefully), others witnessed the emergence of major trade centers and more centralized socioeconomic and political authority that attracted foreign interest, trade, and settlement. Mobility remained an essential strategy of survival and prosperity in the region throughout the precolonial era – providing both the means to evade environmental and social threats, while building social and economic networks.

The second chapter analyzes southern Tanzania's transition into a peripheral borderland region as a consequence of German and Portuguese colonialism and the First World War. The creation of European colonies and designation of the Ruvuma River as a colonial border between Mozambique (Portuguese East Africa - PEA) and Tanzania (German East Africa - GEA) in the 1890s splintered the Rufiji-Ruvuma macro-region. Rather than serving as a frontier, southern GEA and northern PEA formed an unregulated and uncontrolled borderland between two colonial administrative and economic systems. Both the German colonial state and Nyassa Company administration lacked the resources to drastically alter the borderland landscape. Long-distance caravan routes remained operational under the overlapping authority of African "big men." Indian merchants continued to function as indispensable financiers and middlemen. The violent German colonial campaigns to suppress the Maji Maji Rebellion (1905-07) and the Nyassa

---

<sup>75</sup> Throughout the dissertation, I use the term "Indian" to refer to people of South Asian descent. Although the South Asian population in Tanzania was diverse in terms of origin, language, religion, caste, and class, "Indian" or "Mhindi" were the main terms of reference and self-reference during much of the period this dissertation will examine. As James Brennan argued, the use of "alternative terms, 'South Asian' and 'Asian,' are far too artificial and inexact, respectively, to bear constant repetition." For Brennan's arguments in favor of using the term "Indian," see *Taifa: Making Nation and Race in Urban Tanzania* (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 2012), 20.

Company's "pacification" campaigns (1900-1910), however, undermined the region's stability and economic prosperity. As a consequence of the unrest, the Portuguese largely abandoned their agricultural and infrastructure "development" projects for northern PEA and instead aimed to exploit local resources on the cheap. Across the border, colonial warfare bred destruction and opportunity. Local populations – particularly along the Kilwa trade corridor – contended with violence, famine, mass migrations, the encroachment of tsetse flies and wildlife, and drastic changes in local and regional power dynamics. Many of the "big men" of the Lindi trade corridor, in contrast, allied with the Germans and took advantage of the political and economic opportunities created in the aftermath of the rebellion vis-à-vis their rivals. Producers and traders along the Lindi trade corridor also profited from the political and economic decline of Kilwa and German efforts to reorient the southern economy around agricultural exportation. In contrast to their Portuguese counterparts, European plantation owners and businessmen in southern GEA remained convinced of the region's economic potential and invested their own funds towards improving the transportation infrastructure. The incomplete railway and roads extending from Lindi town at the onset of World War I represented the ambivalent impact of colonial rule in the Ruvuma borderland in the early twentieth century.

German economic "development" schemes ceased with the onset of the First World War. The war produced an era of extraordinary destruction and instability throughout the Ruvuma borderland. In contrast to the previous decade of colonial warfare, the First World War produced massive population displacement, severely disrupted food production, and undermined local power structures on a much larger scale. Local leaders struggled to build advantageous alliances with the competing German, British, and Portuguese forces that flooded into their lands – each army demanding allegiance and keen to punish those who refused. These armies forced thousands of local men to fight as soldiers, haul supplies and weapons as carriers, and/or build roads to facilitate troop and supply movements. The Allies' attempts to construct a new transportation landscape failed in the face of neglect and adverse climatic conditions. The Allies and Germans proved far more successful at destroying the region's agricultural productivity by depriving it of valuable male labor, confiscating available crops, and destroying the unused crops in order

to deprive their adversaries of resources. Mobility no longer served as an effective survival strategy for local populations as they encountered famines throughout and beyond the borderland region. The abandoned and decrepit roads found throughout southern GEA and northern PEA reflected the fortunes of the Ruvuma borderland in the aftermath of the war – a region decimated and then neglected by colonial powers, who perceived it as an unprofitable, unhealthy, and isolated periphery that was incapable of “development.”

The third chapter examines the Portuguese and British responses to wartime devastation and instability in the Ruvuma borderland during the interwar era of the 1920s and 1930s. Whereas the Nyassa Company focused on short-term profits and exploited readily available resources, the new British administration governing the Mandated Territory of Tanganyika was torn between the conflicting aims of stabilizing and revitalizing the regional economy, while also exploiting local resources for the metropole’s benefit. With a limited budget and personnel, the British central administration in Dar es Salaam invested in the more prosperous cash crop producing regions along the Central and Tanga Railways. Despite the lack of external support, the undermanned and underfunded southern provincial administration aimed to transform the isolated, impoverished borderland into a prosperous exporting region of agricultural produce and migrant laborers. In order to achieve this objective, road construction and transportation rested at the heart of the colonial development plans in southern Tanganyika throughout the interwar era. British officers specifically targeted the Lindi-Songea main road as the transportation artery through which they would revitalize the southern economy and improve administrative efficiency. In the wake of the Great Depression, the southern administration found itself without the staff, finances, labor, and equipment needed to maintain over 380 miles of dirt and gravel road that washed out annually during the rains. The colonial state turned to the private sector for assistance and authorized two contractors – the Tanganyika Transport Company, Ltd. and L. Rousham Roberts – to assist the Public Works Department (PWD) in maintaining the main road. Neither the contractors nor the PWD succeeded in improving the main road to an all-weather standard, yet their efforts enabled the expansion of southern Tanganyika’s automotive transportation sector. Indian



wholesalers and retailers, in particular, used automobiles to reestablish and expand their trade network between the coast and interior districts. African producers and migrant laborers also appropriated motor vehicles to pursue advantageous labor and trade markets within and beyond the borderland region, regardless of the policies implemented by British and Portuguese authorities. The chapter concludes that the Lindi-Songea main road was an ambiguous symbol of colonial authority and impotence; private initiative and discrimination. The inadequacy of the roadways was a symptom, symbol, and justification for the region's marginalization – limiting its economic growth and propagating stereotypes of its isolation, backwardness, and underdevelopment. Road transportation, however, became the life-line of the southern economy during the interwar era and offered some inhabitants opportunities to prosper.

The fourth chapter analyzes mounting conflict among and between British officials, private contractors, and local communities in southern Tanzania during and after the Second World War. The onset of the war signaled the introduction of a more interventionist British colonial state that aimed at better integrating the south's trade and labor markets within the territorial and imperial economy. The colonial state, however, refused to allocate resources to improve southern Tanganyika's infrastructure. Scrutiny of private contractors, instead, intensified and threatened to undermine the cooperative state-civilian relationship that sustained and improved the southern infrastructure and economy during the interwar era. Following the war, southern Tanganyika entered the imperial spotlight for the first time. It became the central target of one of the largest development projects attempted in the British Empire, the East African Groundnut Scheme. Although numerous factors contributed to the failure of the Groundnut Scheme, the inability and/or unwillingness of colonial planners to recognize existing transportation and labor conditions in southern Tanganyika proved disastrous. The British state and development planners invested in the Southern Province Railway and Mtwara port without devising strategies to recruit and sustain a permanent labor force and effectively tackle the adverse environmental conditions that had thwarted infrastructure projects for decades. They also disregarded the immense challenges of reorienting the southern economy around the railway when the region's population was accustomed to road transportation. As contractors struggled to complete the railway and port, the roads rapidly deteriorated

due to a massive spike in vehicle traffic and the unwillingness of the central state and contractors to expend necessary funds on their upkeep and improvement. African laborers and entrepreneurs, meanwhile, took advantage of the competitive labor market and advantageous commercial markets created by the scheme. Local Indian entrepreneurs, like Savailal C. Amin and Dhirajlal Savailal Amin, also exploited the lack of transportation services to create a thriving cargo and passenger firm that grew to dominate the southern roadways. The collapse of the Groundnut Scheme and Southern Province Railway confirmed to outsiders that southern Tanganyika was incapable of “development.” In reality, the state failed because it ignored or overlooked local initiative and knowledge.

The fifth and final chapter examines significant transformations in southern Tanzania’s road transportation sector during the postcolonial era. The southern borderland returned to the national spotlight during the mid-to-late 1960s as it became embroiled in anti-colonial struggles in neighboring Mozambique and Zambia. The combat that occurred across the Ruvuma border as part of the Mozambique War of Independence gave southern Tanzania renewed strategic importance as the site where the new Tanzanian government would defend its sovereignty and fulfill its promise of supporting anti-colonialism. The Tanzanian government utilized wartime insecurities to build local support for the state, enforce greater control over regional and trans-Ruvuma migrations, and implement its socialist *ujamaa* agenda (particularly the relocation of scattered settlements into large, centralized villages conducting communal agriculture and serviced by state cooperatives). Indian firms and private transporters used their control over southern Tanzania’s transportation system to negotiate deteriorating Asian-African relations in the 1960s. By offering their vehicles in support of the state, the Indian population challenged popular anti-Asian nationalist discourse and validated their value, allegiance, and belonging to the new nation. The alliances created between the private transportation sector, state-controlled cooperatives, and the Tanzanian government eventually collapsed in the early 1970s. The state stripped the Indian community of its decades-old control over the transportation, housing, wholesale, and retail markets. A new age of state-controlled transport began, but collapsed within fifteen years. The chapter concludes by examining how African drivers and mechanics in southern Tanzania utilized their

technological knowledge and social networks to improve their socioeconomic status as “modern” men while negotiating the tumultuous economic decades of the 1970s and 1980s.

The dissertation concludes with some reflections about the legacy of southern Tanzania’s gradual peripheralization, particularly in respect to recent local-state tensions regarding the off-shore, natural-gas concession in Mtwara and government promises of “development” in the south. Local protest in 2013 regarding the government’s decision to construct a pipeline from the Mtwara concession to Dar es Salaam must be understood within the context of local and regional histories. Southern Tanzanians perceived the government’s decision as further evidence of their second-class citizenship within an impoverished and continually neglected region. Frustrations, however, have recently given way to tentative optimism among populations in Lindi and Mtwara. Many of the individuals interviewed for this dissertation perceived the long-awaited completion of an all-weather road between Lindi and Dar es Salaam, the expansion of numerous construction projects (including a new port at Lindi), and the prospective of new oil operations along the southern coast as evidence of the region’s growth and probability of future prosperity. The collapse of global oil prices in 2015-2016 threatens these visions of the future and leaves one concerned that southern Tanzanians may once again have to endure the disappointment of unfilled promises. This dissertation, however, concludes with the belief that southern Tanzanians will continue to utilize their mobility to successfully negotiate the challenges and opportunities available to them within and beyond the peripheral southern borderland.

## Chapter 1 Precolonial Mobility and Trade Networks in the Ruvuma Frontier

In 1963, Alison Smith offered the following assessment for the southern interior of precolonial East Africa:

It was a pagan world: a world not of cities, connected with one another and with the other lands bounding the Indian Ocean by a sea-borne trade, but of self-sufficient villages, where even the largest centres of population, linked only by the portage of human head or shoulder, hardly knew anything approaching an exchange economy.<sup>1</sup>

Subsequent historians have vigorously challenged Smith's assertion that the region comprising modern-day southern Tanzania and northern Mozambique were stagnant and lacked regional or international commercial ties. Pekka Seppälä argued in 1998 that "Rather than being an isolated corner, southern Tanzania was historically a central point of entry for Arabs and Europeans. The history of encounters is as long and detailed as in any other part of Tanzania."<sup>2</sup> This chapter concurs with Seppälä's claim, arguing that African populations residing in southern Tanzania and northern Mozambique used their mobility to survive and thrive in the region's diverse and challenging environments since the first millennium CE. Prior to the imposition of European colonial rule in the 1880s, a dynamic web of overland and overseas trade networks connected South- and Central-East Africa and the western Indian Ocean. The inland trade networks gave shape to a macro-region – termed the Rufiji-Ruvuma region<sup>3</sup> – that stretched east-west from the southern Swahili coast to Lake Malawi, and north-south from the Rufiji River to central Mozambique. Although social, political, and cultural practices varied across the Rufiji-Ruvuma region, coastal and inland populations were participating in centuries-old trade networks when the Portuguese arrived on East African shores in the sixteenth century. Within the macro-region, southern Tanzania and northern Mozambique formed a fluid and dynamic frontier region where a variety of ethnolinguistic groups migrated and interacted through local and long-distance trade networks. Natural forces and

---

<sup>1</sup> Alison Smith, "The Southern Section of the Interior 1840-1884," in *History of East Africa*, vol. 1, eds. Roland Oliver and Gervase Mathew (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963), 253-296: 253.

<sup>2</sup> Pekka Seppälä, "Introduction," *The Making of a Periphery: Economic Development and Cultural Encounters in Southern Tanzania*, eds. Pekka Seppälä and Bertha Koda (Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 1998), 7-37: 15.

<sup>3</sup> Term adapted from Andrea Seligman, "Encircling Value: Rufiji Ruvuma Communities, Trade, and the Wider East African – Indian Ocean World, c. 0-1700 C.E." (PhD diss., Northwestern University, 2014).

features continually influenced the creation, location, directionality, and composition of these trade networks, as well as the social relationships and structures that sustained them. Populations that resided within the challenging ecosystem of the frontier region geared their interactions with one another and their physical environment towards accommodation and flexibility.<sup>4</sup> They chose to live in small-dispersed communities with flexible political and social systems that facilitated the construction of alliances and incorporation of various groups.<sup>5</sup> Identity was also flexible within the “elastic landscape,”<sup>6</sup> and mobility remained crucial for survival and prosperity.

Mobility patterns and overland trade networks in the Rufiji-Ruvuma region underwent a series of changes from the sixteenth century onward as East Africa became increasingly integrated into global capitalist markets rife with competing Arab, Asian, European, and African agendas. During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the Ruvuma frontier entered into an unparalleled era of insecurity and instability as international demands for slaves and ivory escalated, and the Omani Empire exerted its dominance along the East African coast in competition with the Portuguese.<sup>7</sup> African and Indian traders in the Ruvuma frontier took advantage of their liminal position between two economic systems – Portuguese to the south and Omani to the north – in order to maximize profits. By the nineteenth century, two distinct yet overlapping trade corridors crisscrossed southern Tanzania and northern Mozambique. Political and economic power within these corridors gradually became centralized under African “sultanates” and “big men.” These local and regional leaders utilized the instability created by the slave trade as an opportunity to build ethnically-mixed followings and expand their power and influence. They also exploited alliances with Asian merchants and European missionaries and explorers, who increasingly traded and settled in the interior. Through their expeditions and interactions with local communities, Europeans reimagined the

---

<sup>4</sup> Felicitas Becker, “A social history of Southeast Tanzania, ca 1890-1950” (PhD thesis, Cambridge University, 2002), 2.

<sup>5</sup> Priya Lal, “Between the Village and the World: Imagining and Practicing Development in Tanzania, 1964-1975” (PhD diss., New York University, 2011), 170-71; and John Albert Rauf Wembah-Rashid, “Socio-Political Development and Economic Viability in a Rural Community: The Case of Nakarara Village, Mtwara Region Tanzania” (PhD diss., University of Illinois, 1983), 44.

<sup>6</sup> Lal, “Between the Village and the World,” 203.

<sup>7</sup> Abdul Sheriff, *Slaves, Spices and Ivory in Zanzibar: Integration of an East African Commercial Empire into the World Economy, 1770-1873* (London: James Curry 1987).

Ruvuma frontier as a potentially lucrative agricultural landscape of cash crop plantations and African peasant farms. In order to realize their ambitions, Europeans first aimed to end the slave trade and “civilize/modernize” local communities (who they defined in ethnic terms) under the leadership of pro-Christian, pro-European leaders. Conflict and negotiation, exploitation and cooperation, adaptation and accommodation defined the complex relationships between local peoples, Europeans, and Asian intermediaries residing and moving across the dynamic frontier during the nineteenth century. The socioeconomic networks created between these local and foreign communities impacted the real and imagined landscape of the Ruvuma region. This chapter synthesizes archeological and historical secondary sources with primary accounts from Arab and European traders, missionaries, and officials in order to recreate the history of precolonial trade networks in southern Tanzania and northern Mozambique. It analyzes the ruptures and continuities in mobility patterns in response to environmental, social, and economic forces generated at the local, regional, and international level.

### **Formation of the Rufiji-Ruvuma Macro-Region**

Reconstructing precolonial trade networks in southern Tanzania and northern Mozambique is a formidable task due to the lack of written records prior to the seventeenth century. Combining limited archeological data with historical linguistics, Andrea Seligman has produced one of the most thorough reconstructions of migration, settlement, and trade patterns of the Rufiji-Ruvuma language family in southern Tanzania and northern Mozambique from the first millennium to the seventeenth century.<sup>8</sup> She contended that “Proto Rufiji Ruvuma communities” first settled on the Songea-Njombe plateau in southwestern Tanzania at the start of the first millennium CE.<sup>9</sup> They employed mixed resource traditions that combined cultivation with hunting, trapping, fishing, wild resource collection (especially honey),

---

<sup>8</sup> Andrea Seligman, “Encircling Value: Rufiji Ruvuma Communities, Trade, and the Wider East African – Indian Ocean World, c. 0-1700 C.E.” (PhD diss., Northwestern University, 2014).

<sup>9</sup> Seligman, “Encircling Value,” 83-84. The proto Rufiji Ruvuma peoples were Bantu-speakers. The Bantu languages are a sub-group of the Niger-Congo language family. According to contemporary archeologists and historical linguists, Bantu-speaking farmers likely began expanding from the territory between Cameroon and Nigeria sometime around 3000 BCE. The Bantu Expansion took place over a millennium and resulted in Bantu languages being spoken from modern-day Senegal to Tanzania and South Africa. Seligman argued that the proto Rufiji Ruvuma communities began migrating and settling around the southern East African lakes between 1500-500 BCE.

domestic small animal husbandry, and artisanal work.<sup>10</sup> Climate changes combined with resource and population pressures gradually pushed the Proto Rufiji Ruvuma communities from the plateau around 300 CE.<sup>11</sup> The Rufiji-Ruvuma family gradually splintered into two distinct language groups – Rufiji and Ruvuma. The Rufiji communities migrated eastward, while the Ruvuma communities headed south into the wooded hills and river valleys along the Ruvuma River. The Rufiji communities splintered further as they engaged in a myriad of local exchange networks and two long-distance trade networks.<sup>12</sup> East Rufiji communities engaged with the Swahili coast and western Indian Ocean, as well as their Ruvuma neighbors to the south and inland communities in the Southern Highlands.<sup>13</sup> Central and Western Rufiji communities also traded with their southerly Ruvuma neighbors while maintaining numerous overlapping local trade networks. The Ruvuma language group, meanwhile, splintered into Yao and Makonde language communities.<sup>14</sup> Despite increasing linguistic and cultural differentiation, the Yao and Makonde shared a mixed resource tradition. Hunting, fishing, and wild resource collection fostered local and long-distance interactions between themselves, Makua speakers in central Mozambique, and Maravi communities near Lake Malawi.<sup>15</sup>

---

<sup>10</sup> Ibid., 90-104. Seligman theorized that the Rufiji Ruvuma communities lived in small-scale settlements with extended family members. The densely wooded area had adequate rainfall and soil to support the cultivation of well-known root-crops.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid., 105. Seligman referenced a study by Paul Barker which concluded that a wet spell occurred around 300 CE, which would have made lowlands and riverine regions more attractive for settlement. The wet spell was followed by a return to drier conditions.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid., 149-60.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid., 161. According to Seligman, lexical evidence suggests that the East Rufiji communities preferred the southerly contact.

<sup>14</sup> Ibid., 122. The Greater Makonde subdivided into Makonde and Machinga communities, while the Greater Yao splintered into Yao and Mwela speakers by the early second millennium.

<sup>15</sup> Edward Alpers, *Ivory and Slaves in East Central Africa* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975), 5. Although the Ruvuma River supported small canoe trade, it did not become a major artery of long-distance trade.




Figure 1.1 Distribution of Ethnolinguistic Communities in East-Central Africa<sup>16</sup>

Edward Alpers and Andrea Seligman similarly noted that ironworking likely served as a source of early exchange between the Yao and their neighbors.<sup>17</sup> Yohanna B. Abdallah (a local historian and Anglican priest writing in the early 1900s) credited the Wachisi – a Yao clan – with the expansion of iron production and exchange in Central-East Africa. They earned acclaim as wealthy blacksmiths, who traveled extensively selling their iron hoes and tools:

These Wachisi went all over the country peddling their hoes. In the territories of the Amachinga, the Wambemba, Amasaninga, the Achingoli across the Rovuma, and the Wamwela, of the Wanjese, the Amakale, Wamkula, Amalambo and the Amagoche. There was no country which the Wachisis did not visit.<sup>18</sup>

<sup>16</sup> Alpers, *Ivory and Slaves*, 9.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, 10-17 and 23. Alpers argued that an unequal distribution of salt and iron ore deposits drew the Makua into trade relations with salt-sufficient coastal communities and ironworking Yao communities further in the interior. Salt deficiencies similarly induced Yao communities to enter into long-distance exchange with the coast and Mang'anja (Maravi) communities to the west in the fertile region of the Shire Valley. Alpers' description of the Makua and Maravi speakers' reliance on cultivation, hunting, fishing, and trading indicated that they employed a mixed livelihood tradition similar to neighboring Ruvuma speakers.

<sup>18</sup> Yohanna B. Abdallah's passage from *The Yaos, Chikala cha Wayao* was quoted in Seligman, "Encircling Value," 126. Abdallah detailed the awe and reverence that communities showed to a Yao traveler: "[...] he who knew other countries was always listened to with respect, the people hanging on his words delighted, all of them gazing at him, sometimes with awe, saying, 'Good lord! you are a wonder! Eh! but you have travelled!' And the people would believe anything he told them." Alpers argued that Abdallah's father was a Makua from Newala who claimed to be a Yao because of the prestige it offered. Abdallah lived and worked in Ugungu – a Yao area of



Trade in ironware brought the Yao into wider exchange networks through which they could barter tobacco, hoes, and hunting products for salt, cloth, copper, and beads.<sup>19</sup> Seligman concluded that elite rulers and small-scale resource specialists from across Central-East Africa innovated and participated in a multitude of east- and westward-oriented commercial networks in the early to mid-second millennium (1200s-1500s).<sup>20</sup> When the Portuguese arrived in East Africa during the sixteenth century, they observed material evidence (clothing, jewelry, tools, and decorations) of “several generations of exchange between local Swahili, Yao, and other communities.”<sup>21</sup>

The long-distance trade networks crisscrossing Central-East Africa gave shape to the Rufiji-Ruvuma macro-region. The edges of the macro-region blurred to the east along the southern Swahili coast (stretching from Kilwa to Cape Delgado); south into Makua-speaking territories; north to the Rufiji River; and west-southwest in Lake Malawi. Southern Tanzanian and northern Mozambique rested at the center of the macro-region, forming a fluid and dynamic frontier where a variety of ethnolinguistic groups migrated and interacted. Mwela and Yao speakers populated much of the inland area from today’s Lindi

---

Mozambique. For the original passage and Alper’s biographical essay on Abdallah, see Yohanna B. Abdallah, *The Yaos, Chiikala cha Wayao*, ed. and trans. Meredith Sanderson, second edition (London: Cass, 1973). For further discussion regarding the Wachisi (or Cisi), see Edward A. Alpers, “Trade, State, and Society among the Yao in the Nineteenth Century,” *The Journal of African History* 10, no. 3 (1969): 405-420.

<sup>19</sup> Archeological and linguistic evidence suggests that pottery was also a significant source of early exchange among communities near Lake Malawi, the early Swahili coast, and central Mozambique during the first millennium. Matthew Pawlowicz compared the ceramic traditions at the coastal town of Mikindani (southern Tanzania) with those found near Lake Malawi. Mikindani’s ceramics initially mirrored ceramic characteristics found in coastal towns to the north and the south. By the second millennium, however, Mikindani’s ceramic traditions reflected those produced in the interior of northern Mozambique and the northern shores of Lake Malawi. Pawlowicz theorized that competition with the island-port of Kilwa Kisiwani and/or “more attractive interior alternatives” influenced Mikindani residents and merchants to shift their relations away from the Swahili coast and towards interior networks. Seligman found lexical evidence concerning pottery graphite decoration that substantiated Pawlowicz’s conclusion that trade and cultural links existed between the coast, interior, and the region around Lake Malawi (Seligman, “Encircling Value,” 109-120). The chronicles of Mikindani and Lindi provided further evidence of important relationships between the Swahili coast and non-Swahili interior – specifically with Makua and Makonde populations. Whereas Arabs or Shiraz appeared prominently in the historical chronicles for Kilwa, African ethnic groups played an enduring role in the settlement histories of Lindi and Mikindani. See Matthew Pawlowicz, “Finding Their Place in the Swahili World: An Archaeological Exploration of the Southern Tanzanian Coast” (PhD diss., University of Virginia, 2011); and Matthew Pawlowicz and Adria LaViolette, “Swahili Historical Chronicles from an Archaeological Perspective: Bridging History and Archaeology, and Coast and Hinterland, in Southern Tanzania,” in *The Death of Prehistory*, eds. Peter R. Schmidt and Stephen A. Mrozowski (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013).

<sup>20</sup> Seligman, “Encircling Value,” 136-37.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*, 137.

District in southeast Tanzania heading southwest towards the northern regions of Mozambique and Lake Malawi. Makonde speakers, meanwhile, lived in the highland plateaus resting north and south of the mouth of the Ruvuma River.<sup>22</sup> According to Seligman, each “speech community, in turn, was divided into various mostly decentralized communities of smaller settlements.”<sup>23</sup> Matrilineal-based political and social structures typically defined these communities, which designed their rites, institutions, and ceremonies towards the incorporation of diverse populations rather than the formation of exclusive, distinct ethnic identities.<sup>24</sup> Large kingdoms and trade centers did not develop in the Ruvuma frontier partially because of the region’s adverse environmental conditions. The lack of surface water beyond the Ruvuma River and its tributaries and the unpredictable and erratic nature of rainfall in the region resulted in recurrent droughts and famines. Local communities responded by gearing their interactions with the physical environment “towards flexibility and survival rather than intensive exploitation, and veering between sedentarism and migration.”<sup>25</sup> Mobility was an essential survival strategy for inhabitants of the Ruvuma

---

<sup>22</sup> Seligman, “Encircling Value,” 183. According to Felicitas Becker, six peoples composed the bulk of the population in the Ruvuma frontier of southern Tanzanian and northern Mozambique by the onset of the twentieth century: the Yao, Makua, Makonde, Mwera, Ngindo/Donde, and Swahili-speakers of the coast. See Becker, “A social history of Southeast Tanzania,” 24-28.

<sup>23</sup> Seligman, “Encircling Value,” 183.

<sup>24</sup> Wembah-Rashid, “Socio-Political Development,” 44; J. Gus Liebenow, *Colonial Rule and Political Development in Tanzania: The Case of the Makonde* (Evanston: Northwestern Publishing House, 1971), 41-45; and Lal, “Between the Village and the World,” 170-71. According to Wembah-Rashid, “rites, institutions and ceremonies strive to incorporate people rather than exclude them in order to widen the net of relationship. While the settlement pattern provides for the dispersal of kin groups over large area of territory, their ties remain and mutual aid is maintained especially in times of crisis.” J. Gus Liebenow examined the flexible social and political systems of the Makonde – one of the most numerically prominent ethnolinguistic groups in southeastern Tanzania. The Makonde had two primary units of membership – a matrilineal kin group (called *litawa*) under the authority of the *mwenyekaya* and a territorial grouping (or *chirambo*) under the *mkulungwa*. The *mkulungwa* was the first settler of the *chirambo* and had spiritual duties to protect it. *Virambo*, however, fractured frequently and formed new communities. There was plenty of land for individuals and families to form a new *chirambo* in response to population pressure, undesirable authority, and/or to find fertile land to practice “stump cultivation” or “bush fallowing.” Although an underlying tension existed between one’s loyalty to their *litawa* versus their *chirambo*, important social links and alliances were maintained through marriages, promises of aid, shared rituals, and *utani* joking relationships.

For readers unfamiliar with Kiswahili, you will notice that prefixes for Swahili nouns change depending upon the noun class and whether the noun is singular or plural. In the case of *chirambo/virambo*, the former is singular and the latter is plural. In the case of humans, the prefix “Wa-” is used as the plural prefix. For instance, one teacher is “mwalimu” while multiple teachers are “walimu.” Similarly, one child is “mtoto,” while children are “watoto.” At various times during the dissertation, I will use the abbreviated Wamakonde and Wayao when discussing Makonde and Yao peoples.

<sup>25</sup> Becker, “A social history of Southeast Tanzania,” 2.

frontier. It facilitated trade and social interactions, as well as enabling populations to relocate in response to famines, droughts, infertile soil, population pressure, warfare, raiding, and undesirable authority.

Mobility continued to serve as an important strategy as volatile overseas markets penetrated the interior of the Rufiji-Ruvuma region from the sixteenth century onward.

### Overseas Influences on the Southern Swahili Coast and Rufiji-Ruvuma Interior

Indian Ocean monsoon winds and ocean currents drew East Africa into maritime exchange with populations from across the western Indian Ocean since the first century CE.<sup>26</sup> From November to March, northeasterly monsoon winds blew into the East African coast from the Arabian Peninsula. The winds shifted to the south-southeast by late March or April until October, taking ships to Arabia, the Persian Gulf, and western India.




Figure 1.2 Indian Ocean Trade Routes<sup>27</sup>

<sup>26</sup> Martha Spencer Honey, "A History of Indian Merchant Capital and Class Formation in Tanganyika c. 1840-1940" (PhD diss., University of Dar es Salaam, 1982), 35.

<sup>27</sup> Map adapted from Alpers, *Ivory and Slave Trade*, xx.

Resource scarcities in the southern coast of Yemen and Oman initially drove seaborne contact between East Africa, Arabia, and the Persian Gulf.<sup>28</sup> According to Randall L. Pouwels, the Arab coastal ports depended “for many centuries on African cereals to supplement their diets; timber to build their homes; and slaves to provide labor, armed protection, and various domestic ‘services.’”<sup>29</sup> By the ninth century, a “fully articulated commercial system” existed in the western Indian Ocean wherein East African ivory, timber, grains, and other goods were exchanged for Arab, Indian, and Chinese pottery, glassware, glass beads, ironware, jewelry, and indigo-dyed cotton goods.<sup>30</sup> Gold exports drew the southern Swahili coast – particularly Kilwa Kisiwani in southern Tanzania – more fully into the maritime trade networks.<sup>31</sup> Kilwa rested at the southern limits of the range that merchant ships could sail to and from Arabia during one monsoon season. Merchants, therefore, used Kilwa Kisiwani as an entrepôt to access markets at Mozambique Island, Angoche, Sofala, and Madagascar.<sup>32</sup> The appearance of stone architecture in the late

---

<sup>28</sup> Randall L. Pouwels, “Eastern Africa and the Indian Ocean to 1800: Reviewing Relations in Historical Perspective,” *International Journal of African Historical Studies* 35, no. 2-3 (2002): 385-425, 389. Coastal populations at Muscat, Zufar, Shihr, and Mukalla were largely cut off from their hinterland due to mountains and extremely arid conditions in the “Empty Quarter.” Pouwels explained, “Historically, rather than following the Bedouin life ways of their interior neighbors, peoples of the coastlands have eked out a hard living from the sea, trapping sardine and anchovy, pearl fishing, and seafaring, as well as from animal husbandry and subsistence-level cultivation of sorghum, millet, sesame, and dates.” The coastal populations were also afflicted with frequent Bedouin raids and inadequate local food production.

<sup>29</sup> Pouwels, “Eastern Africa and the Indian Ocean to 1800,” 388. Ports along the Red Sea also maintained trade links to India, Sri Lanka, and Himyaritic caravan traffic.

<sup>30</sup> *Ibid.*, 391-394. The dominate Red Sea maritime routes of the first two centuries CE were gradually replaced by routes through the Persian Gulf. According to Pouwels, the commercial system of the ninth century centered on the Abbasid court at Baghdad. The installation of the Shiite Fatimids in Egypt in the tenth century reoriented the East African trade back to the Red Sea, Yemen, Hadhramawat, and outwards towards the Mediterranean and European markets. Aden in southern Yemen acted as a “lynchpin” in the western Indian Ocean trade networks. Pouwels detailed the role of Aden as such: “At Aden the spices and peppers of Malacca, the porcelains and brocades of China, the slaves and cereals of Massawa and Zayla, vermilion and quicksilver from Jidda, beads and cloth from western India, and gold and grains from Mombasa and Malindi were traded on a scale found nowhere else in the western Indian Ocean, while Yemeni artisans dealt in locally produced cloth and the coarse, distinctive black-on-yellow pottery” (391-99).

<sup>31</sup> Alpers, *Ivory and Slaves*, 40; and Pouwels, “Eastern Africa and the Indian Ocean to 1800,” 387.

<sup>32</sup> Pouwels, “Eastern Africa and the Indian Ocean to 1800,” 385-86. The alternative was venturing into the strong currents of the Mozambique Channel that ran contrary to the difficult southeasterly winds (which historically forced traders to “winter” in East Africa).

twelve century indicated Kilwa Kisiwani's prosperity and hegemonic position over the southerly coastal network that linked Pemba, Zanzibar, Mafia, Sofala, the Comoro Islands, and Madagascar.<sup>33</sup>



**Figure 1.3 Depiction of the City of Kilwa Kisiwani (1572)**

Kilwa Kisiwani arose as one of the most powerful and wealthy commercial centers along the entire East African coast after it seized control of Sofala gold exports from Mogadishu in the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries.<sup>34</sup> Kilwa's engagement with overland trade networks in the Rufiji-Ruvuma region, in

<sup>33</sup>Edward John Pollard, "The maritime landscape of Kilwa Kisiwani and its region, Tanzania, 11th to 15th century AD," *Journal of Anthropological Archeology* 27, no. 3 (2008): 265-280; and Pouwels, "Eastern Africa and the Indian Ocean to 1800," 400. Edward Pollard found additional archeological evidence of Kilwa's integral role within the southerly East African coastal trading system. He contended that the causeways and platforms made of un-cemented coral reef located along a 120 km stretch of the East African coast to the Kilwa Kisiwani harbor were navigation aids for ships participating in Sofala-Kilwa gold trade route in early 14<sup>th</sup> and 15<sup>th</sup> centuries. See Edward Pollard, "Safeguarding Swahili trade in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries: a unique navigational complex in south-east Tanzania," *World Archeology* 43.3 (2011): 458-477.

The circulation of goods and people across the Indian Ocean was also reflected in Kilwa's racially-mixed population. Numerous historians, linguists, and ethnographers have recently contested assumptions that the origins of coastal Swahili cities – particularly Kilwa – were fundamentally "Arab." They have instead illustrated that coastal cultures were African, though foreign influences from India, Arabia, and Persia were also important. By the seventeenth century, the coastal populations gradually coalesced into a distinct "Swahili" society and culture that shared Islamic beliefs and a common Swahili-language. See John Iliffe, *A Modern History of Tanganyika* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 37; Becker, "A social history of Southeast Tanzania," 24-26; and Pouwels, "Eastern Africa and the Indian Ocean to 1800," 410-411.

<sup>34</sup>Edward A. Alpers, "Gujarat and the Trade of East Africa, c. 1500-1800," *The International Journal of African Historical Studies*, Vol. 9, no. 1 (1976): 22-44.

contrast, was minimal. Although interior African communities supplied food staples to Kilwa, the entrepôt remained “outwardly directed” until the Portuguese incursion in the sixteenth century.<sup>35</sup>

The Portuguese inadvertently drew the southern Swahili coast and overland trade networks into closer union. During the sixteenth century, the Portuguese employed their naval power to gain control over the Indian Ocean sea lanes and monopolize trade in Persian silver, East African gold, and Asian spices.<sup>36</sup> Portuguese forces strove to drive out all rival shippers (Arab, Indian, and European), displace the ruling elite in coastal cities, and profit from custom duties and monopolies. They successfully attacked and occupied important commercial centers and strategic ports, including: Sofala, Kilwa, Mombasa, Brava, Shihr, Muscat, Ormuz, and Goa.<sup>37</sup> They founded the capital of the *Estado da India* (State of India), high court of appeals, Board of Trade, and Board of Conscience (for ecclesiastical matters) in Goa during the 1530s.<sup>38</sup> The Captaincy of Sofala and Mozambique was established in East Africa, and it quickly became one of the most prestigious and valuable captaincies in the Indian Ocean.<sup>39</sup> The authority of the Portuguese in the western Indian Ocean and East Africa, however, was neither omnipotent nor omnipresent. Erik Gilbert contended that the Portuguese did not “fundamentally transform the nature and patterns of western Indian Ocean trade,” but instead “superimposed themselves on a pre-existing trade system without changing it very much.”<sup>40</sup> Portuguese administrators, private traders, and military

---

<sup>35</sup> Alpers, *Ivory and Slaves*, 40. There is a debate as to whether an overland gold route existed to Kilwa. See Honey, “A History of Indian Merchant Capital,” 39 (footnote).

<sup>36</sup> Malyn Newitt, *A History of Mozambique* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995), 16-17. The Portuguese entered Indian Ocean markets with the intention of exporting local commodities to Europe (specifically Antwerp) in exchange for silver. The silver would cover payment deficits due to the European banking houses that financed Portuguese maritime enterprises.

<sup>37</sup> Alpers, *Ivory and Slaves*, 39; and Pouwels, “Eastern Africa and the Indian Ocean to 1800,” 399.

<sup>38</sup> Honey, “A History of Indian Merchant Capital,” 43; Iliffe, *A Modern History of Tanganyika*, 36; Pouwels, “Eastern Africa and the Indian Ocean to 1800,” 417-20; and Newitt, *A History of Mozambique*, 107-108

<sup>39</sup> Newitt, *A History of Mozambique*, 109-119. The captain held a three year term and maintained a Crown-sanctioned commercial monopoly that extended north along the Swahili coast (including Kilwa). Each Captain profited immensely by engineering high prices for imports while exploiting local peasants, leaders, and Portuguese merchants.

<sup>40</sup> Erik Gilbert, “Coastal East Africa and the Western Indian Ocean: Long-Distance Trade, Empire, Migration, and Regional Unity, 1750-1970,” *The History Teacher* 36, no. 1 (Nov. 2002): 7-34. The Portuguese failed to establish authority over Aden, and thus could not control the Red Sea.

personnel stationed in East Africa were forced to negotiate with local leaders and communities.<sup>41</sup> In Kilwa, for example, the Portuguese negotiated with the leading merchant families over issues of tax collection, trade licenses, price setting, and general commercial control in the sixteenth century.<sup>42</sup> Although these families regained political authority over Kilwa seven years after the port's razing in 1501, they struggled to rebuild their maritime trade economy as the Portuguese gained control over the gold trade in the 1530s.<sup>43</sup> Coastal inhabitants responded by reorienting and/or intensifying their trade activities with the interior of the Rufiji-Ruvuma region.<sup>44</sup> According to Alpers, contact between Yao caravan traders and Kilwa merchants grew gradually "from a limited regional trade in hides, ironware, and agricultural products [...] to a thriving, well-organized trade in ivory by the end of the seventeenth century."<sup>45</sup> Portuguese authority and interference in the overland trade networks were minimal throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.<sup>46</sup> In contrast to the gold fields along the Zambezi River, southern Tanzania and northern Mozambique lacked commodities that the Portuguese wanted to exploit. The Portuguese residing along the coast and in isolated forts in the interior instead depended upon local

---

<sup>41</sup> *Ibid.*, 110.

<sup>42</sup> Newitt, *A History of Mozambique*, 17; Iliffe, *A Modern History of Tanganyika*, 36-37; and Pouwels, "Eastern Africa and the Indian Ocean to 1800," 399. When the Portuguese arrived in Kilwa at the turn of the sixteenth century, they found the city in a state of political instability and commercial decline. Mombasa and Malindi were replacing Kilwa as commercial epicenters along the coast. Kilwa, however, still played an integral middleman role – serving as a waystation for ships needing repairs and "as a port of call and transshipment for merchants unable to complete voyages to the south in a single season." Many of the leading merchant families left Kilwa following its razing and the construction of the Portuguese fort and trade factory.

<sup>43</sup> Newitt, *A History of Mozambique*, 19 and 68-70; and Alpers, *Ivory and Slaves*, 50. According to Edward Alpers, "Theimba crossed to Kilwa by night, and in the ensuing massacre slaughtered and captured some three thousand inhabitants of the island. Only a handful managed to flee. After reportedly devouring their victims, theimba – leaving Kilwa a ghost town – continued to march northwards along the coast until they arrived opposite of Mombasa." According to Gaspar Bocarro, the interior of the Ruvuma Region also experienced destruction at the hands of Maravi raiders. During his fifty-three day, overland expedition from Tete to Kilwa in 1616, Bocarro recounted traveling "seven days through a deserted country" north of the Ruvuma River that "had been devastated by the zimbas, who passed over it with an army." See Antonio Bocarro, "Gaspar Bocarro's Journey From Tete to Kilwa in 1616," translated by G.M. Theal, in *The East African Coast: Select Documents from the First to the Earlier Nineteenth Century*, ed. G. S. P. Freeman-Grenville (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962).

<sup>44</sup> As previously discussed in footnote nineteen, Matthew Pawlowicz found archeological evidence suggesting that coastal residents in Mikindani already had strong ties with the interior of northern Mozambique and the northern shores of Lake Malawi dating back the second millennium CE.

<sup>45</sup> Alpers, *Ivory and Slaves*, 44.

<sup>46</sup> Newitt, *A History of Mozambique*, 77.



communities to attain foodstuffs and commodity goods, like beeswax.<sup>47</sup> African communities incorporated the Portuguese as new participants in existing local, regional, and long-distance exchange networks that remained eastwardly and westerly oriented.<sup>48</sup> According to Seligman, “the initial centuries of Portuguese contact were on the whole an advantageous, not disruptive, period” for African populations in the Rufiji-Ruvuma region.<sup>49</sup>

### **Changing Complexion of Trade (17<sup>th</sup>-19<sup>th</sup> Century)**

Ties between the Rufiji-Ruvuma interior, coast, and overseas markets intensified as Portuguese authority in the Indian Ocean waned and international demand for slaves and ivory heightened during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The Dutch and English repeatedly attacked the Portuguese in the Mozambique Channel during the 1610s-1620s before signing a peace and reestablishing good commercial relations in the 1640s.<sup>50</sup> During the following decade, the Ya’rubi Imams of Oman expelled the Portuguese from Muscat.<sup>51</sup> Omani forces then allied with coastal populations in expelling the Portuguese from Kilwa and Fort Jesus, Mombasa by 1698. A turbulent period followed along the East African coast

---

<sup>47</sup> Seligman, “Encircling Value,” 185 and 199-206; and Newitt, *A History of Mozambique*, 29 and 63-65. Seligman argued that beeswax was likely the first commodity that drew Portuguese and local communities into common trade. The Portuguese offered brass bangles and/or copper armbands in return for the beeswax and other local goods. During Bocarro’s expedition, he exchanged cloth, calico, beads, bracelets, and necklaces for food, protection, and guides from local leaders. Seligman noted that Bocarro offered commodity goods according to each community’s preference. Bocarro, for example, offered cloth and beads in central Mozambique versus copper bracelets near the Ruvuma River. See R. A. Hamilton, “The Route of Gaspar Bocarro From Tete to Kilwa in 1616,” *The Nyasaland Journal* 7, no. 2 (July, 1954): 7-14, 7; and Seligman, “Encircling Value,” 191-98.

<sup>48</sup> Seligman, “Encircling Value,” 182.

<sup>49</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>50</sup> Newitt, *A History of Mozambique*, 169-171. Dutch forces attacked the Portuguese on Mozambique Island three times during the first decade of the seventeenth century with the hopes of turning Mozambique into “the westernmost pivot of the new Dutch Empire.” These attempts failed. The Dutch then joined with the British in renewing their campaigns against the Portuguese in the 1620s, resulting in major sea battles in the Mozambique Channel and off Mozambique Island. The Dutch and English naval forces also conducted assaults against the Portuguese in Indonesia, northern India, and the Gulf. After the peace settlement, the Portuguese Crown transferred the archipelago of Bombay (India) to English King Charles II in 1661 as part of the dowry and treaty of marriage for the Portuguese *infante* Catherine of Braganza. An English royal charter in December 1667 gave the English East India Company authority over Bombay, including the island’s fort, English garrison, stores, and 10,000-12,000 inhabitants. In exchange for the charter, the Company paid a nominal tribute of £10 a year. Royal patents also allowed the Company to dispose of and alienate land, draw rents and assess taxes, defend the island and use marital force, appoint and dismiss governors, and passing legislation. For more about the early history of the Company and its antagonistic relationship with the Portuguese, see Philip J. Stern, *The Company-State: Corporate Sovereignty and the Early Modern Foundations of the British Empire in India* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).

<sup>51</sup> Pouwels, “Eastern Africa and the Indian Ocean to 1800,” 399.



as the rulers and merchants of Kilwa, Oman, and Portugal competed for authority over the coast and its commerce.<sup>52</sup> Yao traders in the interior of the Rufiji-Ruvuma region responded to the unrest by redirecting their caravan routes south to Mozambique Island where merchants from Diu continued to regularly import Indian cloth.<sup>53</sup> Approximately 400 to 500 *bars* of ivory arrived annually to Mozambique Island by the 1750s – to the great benefit of the Portuguese economy.<sup>54</sup> The orientation of Yao trade routes to Mozambique was short-lived. Sultan Said ibn-Ahmed of Oman wanted to profit from the growing demand for East African slaves from the Persian Gulf and French sugar plantations on the Mascarene Islands (east of Madagascar).<sup>55</sup> Zanzibar offered an ideal geographical position for the Omani to control maritime trade in slaves, ivory, and other commodities between the interior of East Africa and markets in Madagascar, the Red Sea, Persian Gulf, India, and further abroad.<sup>56</sup> Merchants could access the island and return to their home ports within one monsoon season. Zanzibar also offered a safe harbor capable of stockpiling goods and providing reliable, safe water.<sup>57</sup> Zanzibar rapidly arose as the major entrepôt within expanding global trade networks that included formal trade relations with the United States (1833), Britain (1839), and France (1844).<sup>58</sup>

---

<sup>52</sup> Alpers, *Ivory and Slaves*, 75; and Newitt, *A History of Mozambique*, 179. Kilwa's maritime economy struggled as the Omani merchants failed to fulfill the economic role of the Captain of Mombasa. Kilwa's merchants instead engaged in trade with smaller coastal towns between the Rufiji River Delta and Cape Delgado. They also traded with Mafia, Kerimba, and Comoro Islands.

<sup>53</sup> Newitt, *A History of Mozambique*, 179.

<sup>54</sup> *Ibid.*, 70-81 and 104. Newitt explained that a *bar* equated to c. 518 pounds. R. W. Beachey reported that an additional 30,000 lbs. of ivory was annually exported from the port of Sofala during the sixteenth century. See R. W. Beachey, "The East African Ivory Trade in the Nineteenth Century," *The Journal of African History* 8, no. 2 (1967): 269-290, 269.

<sup>55</sup> Honey, "A History of Indian Merchant Capital," 48; Alpers, *Ivory and Slaves*, 95; Gilbert, "Coastal East Africa," 23-24; and Iliffe, *A Modern History of Tanganyika*, 41. East African slaves were also exported to plantations in Oman, Madagascar, and French Brazil and San Domingo.

<sup>56</sup> Gilbert, "Coastal East Africa," 24; Erik Gilbert, *Dhows and the Colonial Economy of Zanzibar, 1860-1970* (Oxford: James Curry Ltd, 2004), 57; and Honey, "A History of Indian Merchant Capital," 40-41. Zanzibar also exported copal, cloves, mangrove poles, ambergris, leopard skins, rice, honey, beeswax, iron, and timber.

<sup>57</sup> Iliffe, *A Modern History of Tanganyika*, 42.

<sup>58</sup> Honey, "A History of Indian Merchant Capital," 51; and Beachey, "The East African Ivory Trade in the Nineteenth Century," 277-78.




Figure 1.4 18<sup>th</sup> Century Trade Routes<sup>59</sup>

French adventurer Jean-Vincent Morice observed in 1776 that merchants from Kilwa, Mafia, Mombasa, Pate, and the other coastal ports arrived in Zanzibar to exchange ivory tusks, slaves, and provisions procured from the mainland for foreign cargo imported on Indian ships.<sup>60</sup> British Captain T. Smee reported in 1811 that Zanzibar was exporting between 6,000 and 8,000 slaves annually to Muscat, India, and the Mascarene Islands.<sup>61</sup> Ivory, however, was the top export commodity during the nineteenth century. Europeans, Arabs, and Asians desired the “soft” ivory of East Africa that could be made into wedding bangles, piano keys, and billiard balls. Between 1820 and 1840, the price for Zanzibar-exported ivory rose six fold.<sup>62</sup> Ivory exports increased from 242,975 lbs. to 488,600 lbs. between 1856 and 1859.<sup>63</sup> Zanzibar supplied approximately 75% of the world’s total ivory market by 1891.<sup>64</sup> In exchange for East African raw materials, industrial goods flooded Zanzibar and the interior. Hides and oil seeds were imported from Somalia, while Arabs imported dried fish, salt, ghee, Muscat cloth, mats, livestock, coffee,

<sup>59</sup> Alpers, *Ivory and Slaves*, 123.

<sup>60</sup> *Ibid.*, 131.

<sup>61</sup> Honey, “A History of Indian Merchant Capital,” 49.

<sup>62</sup> Iliffe, *A Modern History of Tanganyika*, 42. T

<sup>63</sup> Alpers, *Ivory and Slaves*, 234.

<sup>64</sup> Beachey, “The East African Ivory Trade in the Nineteenth Century,” 289.

dates, shark oil, and passengers.<sup>65</sup> Indian merchants were regularly importing a myriad of trade goods, including; cloth, glass beads, copper and metal wares, furniture, salt, rice, and onions.<sup>66</sup> Jeremy Prestholdt argued that East African consumers drove the international market, dictating which goods foreigners imported in exchange for ivory and slaves. Europeans relied upon agents in Zanzibar to know the specific style, size, and color of beads, brass-wire, and cloth desired by communities in the interior:

Red beads, for instance, were the only kind salable in Unyamwezi, whereas black beads were currency in Ugogo, though worthless everywhere else. ‘Egg’ beads were valuable in Ujiji and Uguha, but refused elsewhere. White beads were popular in Ufipa and parts of Usagara and Ugogo, but disliked in Uzigua and Ukonongo. The bright yellow *samuli* (Swahili: “ghee”) was in demand among Chagga and Maasai consumers, but found no market further south.<sup>67</sup>

By the late-1840s, unbleached cottons from America (called *merikani*) superseded indigos from Kutch as the most commonly imported cloth in East Africa.<sup>68</sup> When the American Civil War disrupted trade, Indian firms in Bombay flooded the East African market with knockoff cotton products and other consumer goods.<sup>69</sup> In addition to textiles and beads, Europeans also exported obsolete muskets and breech-loaders.<sup>70</sup> These weapons became important tools in the process of political centralization that occurred across the Ruvuma frontier – a process which will be discussed later in the chapter. Zanzibar ultimately rested at the center of East Africa’s integration within the expanding global capitalist economic system in the nineteenth century. It acted as a “conveyor belt,” supplying the industrialized, capitalist markets of the

---

<sup>65</sup> Gilbert, *Dhows and the Colonial Economy of Zanzibar*, 51.

<sup>66</sup> Honey, “A History of Indian Merchant Capital,” 40-41; and Robert G. Gregory, *India and East Africa: A History of Race Relations with the British Empire, 1890-1939* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971), 42.

<sup>67</sup> Jeremy Prestholdt, *Domesticating the World: African Consumerism and the Genealogies of Globalization* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008), 65. Manufacturers across Europe, America, and India also sent samples to their agents in Zanzibar to ensure that their cargo would have a market.

<sup>68</sup> Prestholdt, *Domesticating the World*, 75.

<sup>69</sup> *Ibid.*, 78-81. Prestholdt contended that traders in Salem, Massachusetts used the raw materials and profits from East African trade to build the first steam-powered mill in North America, revitalize existing industries (especially tanneries and varnishing making), and open new industries. Salem traders generated so much capital that they successfully competed with the other major American ports (namely New York and Boston) and transitioned from mercantilism to industrial manufacturing.

<sup>70</sup> R. W. Beachey, “The Arms Trade in East Africa in the Late Nineteenth Century,” *The Journal of African History* 3, no. 3 (1962): 451-467. European armies transitioned to repeated rifles in the 1870s and 1880s.

west with raw materials and luxury goods while consuming and distributing those nations' manufactured goods to the Rufiji-Ruvuma region and broader East African interior.<sup>71</sup>

### **The Southern Trade Corridors**

The physical, socioeconomic, and political landscape of the Ruvuma frontier underwent significant changes due to the instability and opportunities created by the penetration of international capitalist markets in the nineteenth century – markets driven by demands for slaves and ivory and underwritten with Indian capital and consumer goods. The Rufiji-Ruvuma macro-region fractured as the Portuguese and Sultan of Zanzibar erected competing zones of political and economic authority in East Africa. The Ruvuma frontier became a frontier borderland separating Portuguese and Omani sovereignty. According to Malyn Newitt, Cape Delgado in northern Mozambique became “a geographical point at which real political, cultural and economic interests divided” between Portuguese and Portuguese Indians to the south and Omani Arabs and Indians to the north. Although British missionaries and explorers recognized the Ruvuma River as the demarcation between Portuguese and Omani hegemony, their authority hardly penetrated the interior. African and Asian traders in the Ruvuma frontier instead took advantage of their liminal position between two economic systems and reoriented their trade routes in order to exploit the most lucrative markets available (just as they had during the preceding centuries). Instability in the Ruvuma frontier intensified, however, as Kilwa, Lindi, and Mikindani (southern Tanzania) arose as major slave ports during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Europeans estimated that the number of slaves exported from Kilwa Kivinje fluctuated between 10,000 and 20,000 per year during the mid-nineteenth century.<sup>72</sup>

---

<sup>71</sup> Sheriff, *Slaves, Spices and Ivory in Zanzibar*, 1.

<sup>72</sup> Alpers, *Ivory and Slaves*, 237

**Table 1.1 “Slaves Exported from Kilwa Kivinje, 1862-1896”<sup>73</sup>**

Year	Number of Slaves
1862-63	18,500
1863-64	17,500
1864-65	16,821
1865-66	22,344
1866-67	22,038
1867-68	N/A
1868-69	14,944 (ending Aug 1869)
Total	112,147

The small, decentralized communities residing in southern Tanzania and northern Mozambique were particularly susceptible to attacks by slave raiders. Whereas the majority of slaves initially originated from the coastal hinterland south of the Kilwa, a growing number came from the Lake Malawi area by mid-century.<sup>74</sup> By the early 1880s, an estimated 20,000 slaves were brought to the coast from the Lake Malawi area per annum. Long-distance caravans with 500 to 2,000 slaves were commonly seen.<sup>75</sup> In addition to the raids (and perhaps as a consequence of them), populations in the Ruvuma frontier faced a series of droughts and famines during the mid-nineteenth century. J. Gus Liebenow shared Makonde accounts of the devastating impacts of warfare and famine in the region:

[...] dead bodies outnumbered the living and that there were few persons left to bury the dead. The desperate struggle for food found the surviving Makonde fighting one another, and the additional slaughter brought about another exodus across the Ruvuma into the Ndonde area of Masasi District. Both the famine and the fratricidal warfare were referred to as *Mapende*, which means ‘that which has no reason.’<sup>76</sup>

<sup>73</sup> Ibid., 238. Alper’s statistics were based upon those published by Richard Francis Burton in 1872.

<sup>74</sup> Alpers, *Ivory and Slaves*, 160 and 239; Iliffe, *A Modern History of Tanganyika*, 41; and Newitt, *A History of Mozambique*, 247. Newitt offered two pieces of evidence that the slave trade was concentrated in northern Mozambique and southern Tanzania: the existence of “vigorous trade at Mongallo (between Kilwa and Cabo Delgado) in the 1780s” and a treaty between the French and Kilwa in 1776.

<sup>75</sup> Gwyn Campbell, “The East African Slave Trade, 1861-1895: The ‘Southern Complex’” *International Journal of African Historical Studies* 22, no. 1 (1989): 1-26, 23. Campbell argued that the 20,000 slaves exported per year in the 1890s were comparable to the number of slaves exported during the previous three decades. During his expedition along the Ruvuma River, Joseph Thomson encountered three caravans that averaged 150 slaves each. See Joseph Thomson, “Notes on the Basin of the River Rovuma, East Africa,” *Proceedings of the Royal Geographical Society and Monthly Record of Geography*, New Monthly Series 4, no. 2 (Feb. 1882): 65-79, 78.

<sup>76</sup> Liebenow, *Colonial Rule and Political Development in Tanzania*, 26-27.

Makonde, Makua, and Yao populations partook in a series of northerly migrations to escape the famine conditions, warfare, slave raiding, and Portuguese encroachment occurring south of the Ruvuma River.<sup>77</sup> Some migrants settled along the Ruvuma and Lukuledi river valleys. Masasi attracted many migrants due to its prosperous tradition of iron-working and salt-making.<sup>78</sup> Resting along the Lindi-Lake Malawi trade route, residents of Masasi also made a living by supplying passing caravans with provisions.<sup>79</sup> According to Lorne Larson, the devastation and population displacement caused by slave raiding was so severe that caravans from Lindi and Kilwa “were forced to lay enough provisions at Masasi to sustain them for a westward journey lasting 14-17 days through a depopulated zone.”<sup>80</sup> Since the river valleys and plains of southern Tanzania were susceptible to raiding, a large number of people chose to relocate to the geographical stronghold of the Makonde Plateau. The plateau’s steep escarpment and dense thickets provided protection to scattered homesteads.<sup>81</sup> Joseph Thomson described the immense difficulties of travelling through the plateau’s thickets in 1882:

The labour of pushing through such a country with a loaded caravan is simply enormous, and it is one of the most painful experiences of the native porter, who has to tramp along with bent back under a load of from 60 to 70 lbs. The pathways are so many low tunnels through the dense thicket, where one is ever in danger of being tripped by trailing roots and creepers, or caught in the face by others at a higher level; and, to make matters worse, the road is studded with the sharp stumps of cut bushes, which wound and lame the feet of the men sadly.<sup>82</sup>

The protection offered by such thickets and the ability to grow cassava (a famine-relief crop) outweighed the obvious drawback of living atop the plateau – a lack of surface water.<sup>83</sup> Regular cereal surpluses

---

<sup>77</sup> Felicitas Becker, “Traders, ‘Big Men’ and Prophets: Political Continuity and Crisis in the Maji Maji Rebellion in Southeast Tanzania,” *Journal of African History* 45 (2004): 1-22, 4.

<sup>78</sup> Terence Ranger, “European Attitudes and African Realities: The Rise and Fall of the Matola Chiefs of Southeast Africa,” *The Journal of African History* 20, no.1 (1979): 63-82, 64.

<sup>79</sup> Ranger, “European Attitudes and African Realities,” 64. Makua and Yao elephant hunters followed elephants to the wooded plains near Masasi where they eventually settled and traded ivory with Indian and Swahili buyers along the coast.

<sup>80</sup> Lorne Larson, “The Ngindo: Exploring the Center of the Maji Maji Rebellion,” in *Maji Maji: Lifting the Fog of War*, eds. James Giblin and Jamie Monson (Boston: Brill, 2010): 71-114, 73.

<sup>81</sup> Liebenow, *Colonial Rule and Political Development in Tanzania*, 27.

<sup>82</sup> Thomson, “Notes on the Basin of the River Rovuma, East Africa,” 68-69.

<sup>83</sup> Women and children spent countless hours each day traveling up and down the escarpment to attain necessary water supplies.

enabled the plateau populace to enter into mutually advantageous trade relations with their neighbors and populations in the plains below.<sup>84</sup>

While slave raiding displaced populations, it also created opportunities for political centralization. The first to profit economically and politically from the slave trade were the Yao “sultanates” near Lake Malawi.<sup>85</sup> Most of these sultans – including Mataka, Makanjila, Mponda, Mtalika, Macemba, Kawinga, Jalasi, and Matipwiri – did not arise from pre-existing dynasties.<sup>86</sup> They instead established and maintained their authority by building large followings and extensive alliances. Both processes were assisted by the incorporation and selling of slaves. While Yao sultans gained immediate profits from selling slaves, they improved the likelihood of perpetrating and defending against future raiding and warfare if they incorporated slaves. Slaves also provided labor that improved agricultural subsistence and surplus production for local consumption and trade. Women were particularly valuable as they enhanced a society’s (re)productive capabilities in terms of childbirth, crop cultivation, and marriage alliances.<sup>87</sup> As the sultan’s followers produced and procured more commodities (including slaves, ivory, and agricultural produce), he could enter into social and military alliances with neighboring leaders. The sultan could also engage in long-distance trade economies. The acquisition and distribution of foreign trade goods (cloth, beads, brass wire, etc.) enabled the sultan to maintain and strengthen his following.<sup>88</sup>

---

<sup>84</sup> Ranger, “European Attitudes and African Realities,” 64. Ranger explained that plateau cultivators sold their surpluses to the plains inhabitants and passing caravans in return for slaves. The slaves were used to produce cereal surpluses and solidify alliances with other inhabitants on the plateau.

<sup>85</sup> Becker, “Traders, ‘Big Men’ and Prophets,” 5; and Becker, “A social history of Southeast Tanzania,” 56. Becker explained that Yao chiefs were more often referred to a “sultans,” or “*sultani*” in Swahili.

<sup>86</sup> Alpers, “Trade, State, and Society,” 413.

<sup>87</sup> *Ibid.*, 411-413; Howard, “Actors, Places, Regions, and Global Forces,” 16.

<sup>88</sup> Alpers, “Trade, State, and Society,” 410-14. The story of Mataka offers one example of the meteoric rise of a Yao sultan. Mataka separated from his grandmother’s authority to establish a new clan that initially traded baskets for iron hoes, and the iron hoes for slaves. Mataka eventually abandoned basket weaving for slave raiding. By the 1860s, his authority extended over an area stretching from Mwembe to Lake Malawi. Mataka also broke from matrilineal authority, empowering himself and his brothers as the leaders. Felicitas Becker, however, reported that “matrilineal principles of succession and inheritance prevailed” in the nineteenth century among Yao, Makua, Makonde, and Mwera rulers in southeast Tanzania. See Becker, “A social history of Southeast Tanzania,” 39.

By the nineteenth century, two distinct yet overlapping trade networks crisscrossed southern Tanzania and northern Mozambique.<sup>89</sup> One connected Kilwa with Songea, while the second linked Lindi and Mikindani to Lake Malawi in northern Mozambique.<sup>90</sup> Yao dominance over these long-distance trade networks was challenged by Ngoni raiders in the mid-nineteenth century. The Ngoni migrated from South Africa in response to the military successes of Chaka during the Zulu Wars.<sup>91</sup> They raided settlements throughout the interior and coast of southern Tanzania and northern Mozambique. The number of raids near coastal towns increased as the Ngoni established their bases of power in the Songea area in the 1870s.<sup>92</sup> Mshope, for example, sent a raiding party of approximately three thousand warriors to the coastal hinterland of Mikindani in 1894. The party returned to Ungoni with ivory as tribute and two thousand captives – mainly women and children – from along the Ruvuma River.<sup>93</sup> Similarly to the Yao, slave raiding strengthened the Ngoni's military power and territorial control.<sup>94</sup> Yao sultanates responded to Ngoni incursions by shifting their operations towards the ports of Lindi, Mikindani, Ibo, and

---

<sup>89</sup>Alpers, *Ivory and Slaves*, 58; Becker, "A social history of Southeast Tanzania," 44; and Smith, "The Southern Section of the Interior 1840-1884," 286-87.

<sup>90</sup> Becker, "Traders, 'Big Men' and Prophets," 5-8. J. Gus Liebenow also discussed the existence of southerly trade routes. See Liebenow, *Colonial Rule and Political Development in Tanzania*, 23; and Beachey, "The East African Ivory Trade in the Nineteenth Century," 271.

<sup>91</sup> Alpers, *Ivory and Slaves*, 248-49. Zwangendaba led the main group of Ngoni that settled in the southeastern region of Lake Tanganyika (Fipa) in 1840. A smaller group led by Mputa Maseko crossed the Zambezi and settled in Chewa. In 1846, Maseko's group continued migrating north and settled in Songea District of southern Tanzania. According to Alpers, warring occurred between the Ngoni and Yao, who had previously settled in Songea and Tunduru Districts. The defeated Yao were incorporated. Helge Kjekshus cited P.M. Redmund's findings that the number of Wangoni who migrated from South Africa numbered only 200 to 400 people. Their numbers rose to 16,000-18,000 in southern Tanzania by the early 1880s due to the Wangoni's successful incorporation of surrounding populations. The main group in Fipa splintered following the death of Zwangendaba in 1848. One of the splintered groups, led by Zulug-Gama and Mbonani, eventually settled in the Songea area after driving the Maseko Ngoni back south (settling in an area south-west of Lake Malawi).

<sup>92</sup> Liebenow, *Colonial Rule and Political Development in Tanzania*, 56; and Larson, "The Ngindo," 72-73. Some communities – identified as Magwangwara – adopted Ngoni language, customs, and military tactics. They also conducted raids in the Masasi and Newala regions of southern Tanzania. See Liebenow, *Colonial Rule and Political Development in Tanzania*, 27.

<sup>93</sup> Heike Schmidt, "'Deadly Silence Predominates in this District': The Maji Maji War and Its Aftermath in Ungoni," in *Maji Maji: Lifting the Fog of War*, eds. James Giblin and Jamie Monson (Boston: Brill, 2010): 183-220, 191.

<sup>94</sup> Becker, "A social history of Southeast Tanzania," 57. Helge Kjekshus cited P.M. Redmund's findings that the number of Wangoni who migrated from South Africa numbered only 200 to 400 people. Their numbers rose to 16,000-18,000 in southern Tanzania by the early 1880s due to the Wangoni's successful incorporation of surrounding populations. See Helge Kjekshus, *Ecology Control and Economic Development in East African History: The Case of Tanganyika 1850-1950*, second edition (London: James Currey, 1996), 20-21.



Mozambique.<sup>95</sup> Felicitas Becker contended that by the end of the century, the Yao and Ngoni had unofficially divided authority over two trade corridors traversing the Ruvuma frontier. Ngoni chiefdoms dominated the Kilwa-Songea corridor, while the Yao sultans controlled the Lindi-Lake Malawi corridor.<sup>96</sup>

Although the two trade corridors were not exclusively Ngoni- and Yao-controlled (some Ngoni traded in Lindi and some Yao traded in Kilwa), Becker argued that an important distinction existed between them. The Yao-dominated corridor “incorporated several hubs within the southeast, where strong local rulers preyed on, taxed, supplied, redirected and traded with caravans.”<sup>97</sup> Becker labelled these local rulers as “big men.” Similar to the Yao sultans, a big man’s power was based upon his military successes, trade links, patronage, and diplomacy, rather than his kinship status or dynastic authority. His success also depended upon his proximity to major caravan routes and fertile environments. Matola I, for instance, migrated with his followers across the Ruvuma in the 1860s. He settled under the authority of a Makua headman – Mwawa – along the edge of the Makonde plateau escarpment. Matola I established a widespread reputation as a great hunter and warrior, who successfully perpetrated and defended against slave raids. Control of people, guns, and prestige objects enabled Matola to build a series of trade, military, and political alliances. These relationships were often bound through marriage ties and offerings of female slave wives as gifts.<sup>98</sup> “Big men” like Matola employed various strategies to obtain and maintain their followers – mixing “slave trading and harbouring escaped slaves, raiding and diplomacy, extortion and intimidation, as well as patronage and the ceremonial display of power and wealth.”<sup>99</sup> They also employed flexible social structures that aimed at incorporating rather than excluding people. They built ethnically-mixed followings, networks, and alliances rather than creating boundaries and borders.<sup>100</sup>

---

<sup>95</sup> *Ibid.*, 57-59. They also traded with the British Lakes Company via the Shire River.

<sup>96</sup> Larson, “The Ngindo,” 72-73; and Schmidt, “Deadly Silence Predominates in this District,” 183-219. By the 1870s, Songea had arisen as a trade center between Central Africa and the southern Swahili ports. It was affirmed as “the westward anchor of the southern trade route” after the Arab trader (Rashid bin Masoud) established a trade community in the southern Njelu Ngoni Kingdom in 1889.

<sup>97</sup> Becker, “A social history of Southeast Tanzania,” 59.

<sup>98</sup> Ranger, “European Attitudes and African Realities,” 65-66.

<sup>99</sup> Becker, “Traders, ‘Big Men’ and Prophets,” 6.

<sup>100</sup> *Ibid.*, 5. Becker explained that the three major power brokers along the Lindi trade route each led ethnically diverse followings: “Hatia, a Makua governing Makua, Mwera and Makonde subjects; Nakaam, a man of Makua

In the end, mobility continued to serve as a critical strategy for human survival and prosperity during this era of increased volatility – allowing people to relocate from vulnerable, war-torn areas and find security in geographical strongholds and/or under the protection of strong leaders.

### **Reimagining and Negotiating the Frontier Landscape: European Exploration of Southern Tanzania and Northern Mozambique**

As Ngoni chiefs, Yao sultans, and “big men” reshaped the political and economic landscape of the Ruvuma frontier during the nineteenth century, the British exerted their influence over economic and political matters in East Africa and the western Indian Ocean. The British state increased its influence in the Indian Ocean in the mid-eighteenth century by asserting its authority over the East India Company, which had established itself as an “early modern government” in India and a major maritime trading power.<sup>101</sup> Following the Indian Rebellion (Mutiny) of 1857, the British Crown nationalized the Company and assumed authority over its Indian possessions, administration, and armed forces. The new British government in India strove to maintain close diplomatic and commercial relations with the Persian Gulf, particularly with the Omani Sultanate.<sup>102</sup> According to Abdul Sheriff, British influence in the Omani Empire intensified during the final years of Sultan Said’s rule (1840s-1856). British interests and trade relations with Zanzibar and East Africa grew as Said strove to transform Zanzibar into a premier entrepôt in the western Indian Ocean and increase its integration with global markets. The Sultan increasingly depended upon Britain because Omani dynastic structures proved insufficient to sustain imperial cohesion from Muscat to Zanzibar. The British Consul’s decision to support Majid’s succession as ruler of Zanzibar following Zaid’s death in 1856 and Zanzibar’s partition from the Omani kingdom helped to

---

immigrant ancestry who preferred to be spoken as a Yao immigrant, and Matola, a Yao with a mixed, predominately Yao and Makua following.” Hatia was the only one who had dynastic authority. It is interesting to note that Kiswahili was not the *lingua franca* of the trade routes. According to John Iliffe, Yao was the dominate language spoken along the southern trade route. Kiswahili was only used when dealing with coastal traders. See Iliffe, *A Modern History of Tanganyika*, 79.

<sup>101</sup> Stern, *The Company-State*, 208-209. The Company received a royal charter from the English Crown in 1600. Stern argued that the Company borrowed legitimacy from the English crown and Asian leaders, while also proving its authority by campaigning against pirates, establishing courts, and controlling sea lanes through its maritime might.

<sup>102</sup> Sheriff, *Slaves, Spices and Ivory in Zanzibar*, 202.

solidify Britain's influence over the Busaidi dynasty.<sup>103</sup> Although British relations temporarily soured with the ascension of Sultan Barghash in 1870, slave trade treaties continued to provide a “convenient path for the penetration of British influence and power into East Africa under a humanitarian guise.”<sup>104</sup> Britain expanded its authority in Zanzibar with a new slave trade treaty in 1873 wherein the Sultan agreed to abolish the slave trade, close all slave markets, protect liberated slaves, and prohibit Indians from possessing slaves.<sup>105</sup>

As the British consuls jockeyed for political and economic power in Zanzibar, missionaries and explorers directed their attention to the mainland and investigated the largely unknown Rufiji-Ruvuma region. Gaspar Bocarro's expedition to Kilwa in 1616 was one of the few conducted in northern Mozambique and southern Tanzania prior to the 1860s.<sup>106</sup> A growing number of Europeans conducted expeditions during the second half of the nineteenth century in an effort to better understand the slave trade, assess the region's economic potential, and identify potential trade routes to Central Africa. The famous explorer David Livingstone and botanist John Kirk conducted one of the first expeditions up the Ruvuma River in March 1861.<sup>107</sup> They wanted to determine if the river served as an outlet for Lake Malawi (then called Nyasa).<sup>108</sup> The British also sought an alternative river route to Central Africa after the

---

<sup>103</sup> Ibid., 212. Sheriff concluded that the interception of Thuwaini's (eldest son and ruler in Muscat) expedition against Majid in Zanzibar and the suppression of revolt in Zanzibar “had at last made the British arbiters in the affairs of the Omani kingdom.”

<sup>104</sup> Ibid., 201.

<sup>105</sup> Ibid., 238.

<sup>106</sup> Bocarro, “Gaspar Bocarro's Journey from Tete to Kilwa in 1616”; John Kirk, “Ascent of the Rovuma, East Africa,” *Proceedings of the Royal Geographical Society of London* 9, no. 6 (1864 - 1865): 284-288; John Kirk, “Notes on Two Expeditions up the Rovuma River, East Africa,” *Journal of the Royal Geographical Society of London* 35 (1865): 154-167; and Horace Waller, *The Last Journals of David Livingstone in Central Africa From Eighteen Hundred and Sixty-Five to His Death* (New York: Harper & Brothers, Publishers, 1875), <https://archive.org/stream/lastjournalsdav03livigoog#page/n4/mode/2up>.

<sup>107</sup> Livingstone's brother (Charles) and the Anglican Bishop Charles Frederick Mackenzie (UMCA) also accompanied the expedition. German geographer and explorer, Dr. Albrecht Roscher, preceded Livingstone and Kirk's expedition. He ventured from Kilwa to Lake Malawi with Arab traders. His fatal journey is noted in David Livingstone's field notebook (August 1862 to March 1863) and Livingstone's despatch to British Foreign Secretary, Earl Russell, 16 October 1862. See George Shepperson, *David Livingstone and the Rovuma* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1965), 99 and 161.

<sup>108</sup> European explorers and colonial governments referred to Lake Malawi as Lake Nyasa. Although the Tanzanian government continues to call it Lake Nyasa, the United Nations and United States of America refer to it as Lake

Portuguese restricted access along the long-established Zambezi River route.<sup>109</sup> The expedition only travelled thirty miles before turning around because the water level was too low for their steamer, the *Pioneer*.<sup>110</sup>




Figure 1.5 Livingstone's Journeys up the Rovuma<sup>111</sup>

Despite the difficulties, Livingstone and Kirk believed that the Ruvuma was a good avenue for transporting local produce and likely the best entrance to East Africa.<sup>112</sup> Both men returned to the river in September 1862.<sup>113</sup> Livingstone not only hoped to locate the river's headwaters in Lake Malawi, but also determine the feasibility of establishing a missionary community along the river to help stop the slave

---

Malawi. For the purpose of this dissertation, the lake will be referred to as Lake Malawi, unless I am directly quoting a source.

<sup>109</sup> Kirk, "Ascent of the Rovuma, East Africa," 284-288; Kirk, "Notes on Two Expeditions up the River Rovuma," 154-167; and Shepperson, *David Livingstone and the Rovuma*, 18.

<sup>110</sup> "David Livingstone Field Notebook," in *David Livingstone and the Rovuma*, 153. Shepperson explained that the *Pioneer's* draught was increased from three to five feet in order to make the journey from Britain. The steamship repeatedly ran aground as it returned to the coast.

<sup>111</sup> Shepperson, *David Livingstone and the Rovuma*, 205.

<sup>112</sup> *Ibid.*, 24; and Kirk, "Ascent of the Rovuma, East Africa," 284-288.

<sup>113</sup> Livingstone also unsuccessfully attempted to locate the headwaters of the Ruvuma while exploring Lake Malawi in September-October 1861. The 1862 expedition included Charles Livingstone and an engineer, George Rae. Rae returned to the coast after two days due to severe dysentery. See Shepperson, *David Livingstone and the Rovuma*, 25-27.

trade.<sup>114</sup> Navigation was extremely difficult from the onset as the water levels had decreased considerably in the dry season. Livingstone described how in many places the Ruvuma “divided into two or three channels, there was not water enough in any of them for a boat drawing three feet, so we had to drag ours over the shoals.”<sup>115</sup> It took the expedition a month to travel 156 miles. Navigation was impossible once they reached the upper cataracts – still a three days march from the lake.<sup>116</sup> Reviews of the river’s potential were mixed. Livingstone described the Ruvuma as a fertile and potentially profitable landscape:

All we saw of the land seemed fertile and with the exception alluded to the inhabitants were friendly and industrious. Food was abundant but a sense of insecurity was apparent for while the people had villages on land they preferred to live on sand banks while the river was low. Large quantities of grain were stored away in the woods but they seemed less anxious about that than about themselves. The oil yielding seed Sesame which is largely exported from Mozambique to France is produced in large quantities and a great deal of honey is secured by hives placed on trees. Cotton is cultivated but we did not see much. Gum copal is found and is probably collected for the Zanzibar market. In addition to these articles of trade the Rovuma is famous for ebony. There it attains a size seldom seen in commerce. A wood called on the Zambesi ‘Pangire’ is well adapted for ship building and many other woods quiet new to us would probably be valuable in trade.<sup>117</sup>

Livingstone hoped that lucrative trade could be developed along the river.<sup>118</sup> Kirk, in contrast, offered a bleak picture of the landscape with entire sections devoid of human inhabitants due to the slave trade. Kirk privately called the expedition a “great blunder,”<sup>119</sup> and publicly concluded that “the Rovuma is of no value for trade with the interior.”<sup>120</sup>

---

<sup>114</sup> Shepperson, *David Livingstone and the Rovuma*, 28.

<sup>115</sup> Extract from David and Charles Livingstone, *Narrative of an Expedition to the Zambesi and its Tributaries*, in *David Livingstone and the Rovuma*, 182.

<sup>116</sup> Shepperson, *David Livingstone and the Rovuma*, 35.

<sup>117</sup> David Livingstone, despatch to British Foreign Secretary, Earl Russel, 16 October 1862, in *David Livingstone and the Rovuma*, 162. Livingstone noted in *Narrative of an Expedition to the Zambesi and its Tributaries*, the abundance of food and extensively cultivated land among the “Nyamatolo” people along the Ruvuma River. The villages had large quantities of grain, sesame, and tobacco that were offered for sale. Small quantities of gum copal were also present. The exception Livingstone noted in regards to the inhabitants’ friendless referred to an incident when “river pirates” attacked the party during their ascent of the river. For an account of the “river pirates”, see “David Livingston’s Field Notebook,” in *David Livingstone and the Rovuma*, 83. For an account of the Nyamatolo people, see Shepperson, *David Livingstone and the Rovuma*, 192-93.

<sup>118</sup> Livingstone, despatch to Earl Russel, 16 October 1862; and Extract from David and Charles Livingstone, *Narrative of an Expedition to the Zambesi and its Tributaries*, both in *David Livingstone and the Rovuma*, 162 and 182.

<sup>119</sup> Shepperson, *David Livingstone and the Rovuma*, 37-38. Shepperson recorded Kirk’s quote from a letter to his brother dated in 1863. James Stewart similarly concluded that the exploration was a failure – “Nothing can be

Livingstone's assessments of southern Tanzania were more critical when he returned four years later. His expedition departed from Mikindani in 1866 and travelled through the Lindi trade corridor – following the Ruvuma River and passing through Mataka's town of Moémbe before reaching Lake Malawi. In contrast to a “three weeks' easy sail up the Zambesi and Shiré [Rivers],” the journey to Mataka's town took “four weary months.”<sup>121</sup> Livingstone detailed the horrendous conditions of travelling overland through the region, which was overcome by famine and slave raiding. His expedition constantly struggled from a lack of food. They passed rivulets that were “mere mountain torrents filled with sand” and dead bodies of those who had apparently starved to death.<sup>122</sup> Livingstone also reported the discovery of a number of slaves who were “abandoned by their master from want of food; they were too weak to be able to speak or say where they had come from; some were quite young.”<sup>123</sup> He questioned local populations as to why areas spanning hundreds of miles were depopulated. Their responses included slave wars and famine.<sup>124</sup> James Frederick Elton provided a similarly bleak assessment of the southern Swahili coast and Kilwa trade corridor. He encountered numerous slave caravans while traveling south from Dar es Salaam to Lindi in 1873-74. He estimated passing 1,280 slaves during the course of one week.<sup>125</sup> Elton doubted whether the slave trade could be stopped when the Sultan's authority remained so weak and the prices per slave so high – averaging between 30-40 dollars per person.<sup>126</sup>

The plain truth is, and there can be no disputing facts, that a brisker slave-trade has seldom been known than the one carried on from Kilwa via the Kisiju road by the scoundrels who hold it in their power, and who will continue to use it until put down by a strong hand; Burghash's orders

---

made of that river.” Shepperson recorded Stewart's quote from *The Zambezi Journal of James Stewart, 1862-1863* (London, 1952).

<sup>120</sup> Kirk, “Notes on Two Expeditions up the River Rovuma,” 161. Kirk continued, “During the dry season it is not navigable to boats, for while we succeeded in urging our own forwards, the process could not be called navigation. During flood, too, we already knew that the stream could not enable to pass such a vessel as the Pioneer. Still, it was an interesting geographical problem, and might one day serve as a path for explorers while the Zambesi remained closed.”

<sup>121</sup> Waller, *The Last Journals of David Livingstone*, 78.

<sup>122</sup> *Ibid.*, 45-46 and 52.

<sup>123</sup> *Ibid.*, 64.

<sup>124</sup> *Ibid.*, 83.

<sup>125</sup> J. Frederic Elton, *Travels and Researches among the Lakes and Mountains of Eastern and Central Africa*, ed. H.B. Cotterill (London: John Murray, 1879), accessed April 2015, <https://archive.org/stream/travelsandreseas01fredgoog#page/n8/mode/2up>, 87.

<sup>126</sup> *Ibid.*, 87.

being totally disregarded, except absolutely on the sea-coast villages and towns, and even there only respected when they do not run counter to local and private interests.<sup>127</sup>

Kilwa itself was referred to as the ‘Places of Skulls,’ while the country behind it was “a desert for a week’s journey; and at every step some new experience of the desolation of the slave-trade is apparent.”<sup>128</sup> Indian communities in Kilwa reported to the British Consul of Zanzibar that areas within ten or twelve days’ journey from the coast were entirely uninhabited. The Consul also shared the account of an Arab returning from Lake Malawi:

‘he travelled for seventeen days through a country covered with ruined towns and villages which a few years ago were inhabited by the Mijana and Mijan tribes and where now no living soul is to be seen’.<sup>129</sup>

Despite the devastation, Europeans also observed the material gains that Africans obtained from trade between the interior and coast. Kirk noted that some Makua on the north side of the Ruvuma traded in Ibo and Mozambique. The little fabric owned by the Makonde along the Ruvuma River was entirely of foreign manufacturing.<sup>130</sup> Livingstone passed people along the Ruvuma in 1865 that were “so well supplied with white calico by the slave-trade from Kilwa that it is quite a drug in the market: we can not get food for it.”<sup>131</sup> Livingstone encountered another large population a week later that was “so well supplied with calico (Merikano) that they would not look at ours. The market was in fact glutted by slavers from (Quiloa) Kilwa.”<sup>132</sup> He also observed that the mixed population of Makua and Yao living along the Ruvuma River wore inland combs, arm-coils of thick brass wire, and “fine” blue and black

---

<sup>127</sup> *Ibid.*, 83-85. Elton passed one caravan – originating near Lake Malawi – that included approximately 400 slaves. He learned that slave traders received 35 dollars a head upon arrival at a northerly port (chosen by the purchaser). The enslaved would then be smuggled to Pemba.

<sup>128</sup> *Ibid.*, 102. The number of slaves exported overseas gradually dropped due to the intensification of British anti-slavery naval patrols during the 1870s and the anti-slave trade treaty between Sultan Seyyid and the British in 1873. According to Campbell, a clandestine slave trade from the southern Swahili coast, across the Madagascar Channel, to Madagascar and Comoro Islands continued to thrive in the late nineteenth century. The Merina Empire and the French plantations both desired slaves from Central-East Africa. Slavery exports from the mainland reached 13,000 to 15,000 by the 1840s. Approximately 5,000 slaves were transported from Lindi to the Comoro Islands and Madagascar forty years later in 1882. At that time, Lindi maintained a stockyard that could contain 800 slaves. See Campbell, “The East African Slave Trade,” 1-26.

<sup>129</sup> R. Coupland, *The Exploitation of East Africa* (London: Faber and Faber, 1939), 140. Passage cited in Helge Kjekshus, *Ecology Control and Economic Development in East African History*, 14.

<sup>130</sup> Kirk, “Notes on Two Expeditions up the River Rovuma,” 164.

<sup>131</sup> Waller, *The Last Journals of David Livingstone*, 62-63.

<sup>132</sup> *Ibid.*, 66.

beads that were “in fashion.”<sup>133</sup> South of the Ruvuma, Elton encountered a chief who carried a “red cotton umbrella of Hindu manufacture, the grotesque caricature of the Prime Minister in Offenbach’s ‘Grande Duchesse.’”<sup>134</sup>

Although Livingstone, Kirk, and Elton’s accounts of the devastation caused by slave raiding deterred capitalist investors in southern Tanzania and northern Mozambique, their reports helped to validate British claims that their military, political, and moral intervention was needed in East Africa. The accounts also attracted missionaries to the Ruvuma frontier with the aim of eradicating the slave trade. Two years after Bishop Steere travelled from Lindi to Mataka’s village of Mwembe in 1875, the Universities’ Mission to Central Africa (UMCA) established a mission station and village of released slaves at Masasi. Chauncy Maples conducted multiple excursions throughout southern Tanzania and northern Mozambique to determine the viability of establishing a line of UMCA mission stations from Masasi to Lake Malawi.<sup>135</sup> Maples also strove to establish and maintain cooperative relationships with the “big men” of the Lindi trade corridor. These alliances would offer protection for UMCA settlements and hopefully propagate Christianity and the cessation of slave trading. While Maples conducted his expeditions, Joseph Thomson and H.E. O’Neill explored the Ruvuma frontier further. The Sultan of Zanzibar commissioned Thomson to conduct a geological survey of the Ruvuma Valley and surrounding districts to determine the potential value of coal reportedly found along the Ruvuma.<sup>136</sup> Traveling from Mikindani through the Makonde Plateau with sixty men, he reported that the coal was insufficient in

---

<sup>133</sup> Ibid., 68

<sup>134</sup> Elton, *Travels and Researches*, 212.

<sup>135</sup> Chauncy Maples, “Masasi and the Rovuma District in East Africa,” *Proceedings of the Royal Geographical Society and Monthly Record of Geography*, New Monthly Series 2, no. 6 (June 1880): 337-353; and Chauncy Maples, “Makua Land between the Rivers Rovuma and Luli,” *Proceedings of the Royal Geographical Society and Monthly Record of Geography*, New Monthly Series 4, no. 2 (Feb. 1882): 79-90. Rev. W.P. Johnson and Rev. C.A. Janson also conducted an expedition in 1882. Chauncy Maples was an Anglican missionary who worked at the UMCA mission station in Masasi. He eventually became the Bishop of Likoma.

<sup>136</sup> Thomson, “Notes on the Basin of the River Rovuma, East Africa,” 65-79. Livingstone had first noted the presence of coal along the Ruvuma. Sultan Bargash of Zanzibar sent an Arab and Parsee engineer, who confirmed rich deposits. John Kirk, then British Consul at Zanzibar, encouraged the Sultan to send the experienced geologist, Joseph Thomson, to investigate further. See Shepperson, *David Livingstone and the Rovuma*, 49.



quality and quantity for commercial exploitation.<sup>137</sup> Two years later, H.M. Consul O'Neill traversed northern Mozambique to determine whether slave trading was occurring from Lake Malawi to the coast (particularly to Tunghi Bay, just south of Cape Delgado). He observed that the Makanwara and Maviti slave raiders depopulated entire districts: "entire tribes cut up and dispersed; vast areas of country devastated; in short, murder, famine, and slavery are the direct results of their predatory habits."<sup>138</sup> Of the European explorers, O'Neill distinguished himself for penetrating the Mueda Plateau.



Figure 1.6 "Map of the Rovuma River and the Region to the South, illustrating the journeys of Mr. Joseph Thomson and the Rev. Chauncy Maples, M.A." 1880.<sup>139</sup>

<sup>137</sup> Thomson, "Notes on the Basin of the River Rovuma, East Africa," 70. French Engineer M D'Angelvy reached a different conclusion when he conducted a similar survey in 1884. See "Introduction" in Karl Weule, *Native Life in East Africa: The Result of an Ethnological Research Expedition*, trans. Alice Werner (London: Sire Isaac Pitman & Sons, Ltd., 1909), xvi.

<sup>138</sup> H. E. O'Neill, "Journey in the District West of Cape Delgado Bay, Sept.-Oct. 1882," *Proceedings of the Royal Geographical Society and Monthly Record of Geography*, New Monthly Series 5, no. 7 (July 1883): 393-404, 397-98.

<sup>139</sup> "Map of the Rovuma River and the Region to the South, illustrating the journeys of Mr. Joseph Thomson and the Rev. Chauncy Maples, M.A., (1880)" in "Notes on the Basin of the River Rovuma, East Africa."

The expeditions conducted by Maples, Thomson, and O'Neill and the reports issued by other European settlers and missionaries shaped European perceptions – real and imagined – of southern Tanzania and northern Mozambique. Their geographic, geologic, and botanic maps of the frontier region created a foundation from which European colonial powers would demarcate imperial boundaries. These maps could also be utilized to delineate “natural” spaces into exploitable economic units based upon readily available resources and their future economic potential – cash crop production, food staple cultivation, labor reserves, mineral extraction, and so forth. The European missionaries and explorers also reconceptualized social spaces in the Ruvuma frontier by promoting racial hierarchies (with Europeans at the pinnacle) and inventing ethnic identities that classified complex African communities into overtly simplistic categories. The character traits that Europeans attributed to the different ethnic groups, however, varied considerably based upon an individual’s interactions with local leaders and communities. Thomson and Maples, for example, offered different assessments of the Wayao when comparing them to the Wamakua. Maples argued that the Wamakua exhibited moral superiority, honesty, and better domesticity in comparison to the habitually lying Wayao. Maples trusted Makua chiefs, but found the Yao to be “shifty, sly, and deceitful.”<sup>140</sup> Although Thomson agreed that the Wamakua occupied “the first position in industry, intelligence, and business capacity,”<sup>141</sup> he offered his most complimentary assessment to the Wayao for their energy, intelligence, and business savvy:

The Wahyao are perhaps without exception the most industrious and energetic people to be found in East Africa [...] Nearly all my best men, with Chuma at their head, are Wahyao, and the experience of many other travellers has been the same. Physically they are superior to any of the other Rovuma tribes. [...] Their most promising trait is their eagerness to trade and their love of visiting the coast. Their business capabilities are very high, and they may be said to be to Nyassa what the Wanyamwesi are to Tanganyika and Victoria Nyanza. Unfortunately, however, their country is not blessed with any natural wealth, so that they have to depend entirely upon ivory and slaves, which they gather from the greater part of the Nyassa region. Indeed, this desire to

---

<sup>140</sup> Maples, “Masasi and the Rovuma District in East Africa,” 341-42.

<sup>141</sup> Thomson, “Notes on the Basin of the River Rovuma, East Africa,” 79. Thomson experienced no problems with the Makua, who had previously been described as a “dangerous and exclusive tribe.” He complimented the “very independent position” Makua women held, and suggested that “advocates of women’s rights might take a few hints from them.”

trade has made them the greatest slave producers we now have in the Nyassa and Rovuma districts.<sup>142</sup>

Thomson declared the Wamakonde, in contrast, as “about as ugly a set of people as are to be found in East Africa, and certainly occupy a very low grade.”<sup>143</sup> O’Neill instead argued that the Wamakonde of northern Mozambique were hospitable, generous, and “a particularly simple-minded, harmless folk.”<sup>144</sup> Harry G. West argued that O’Neill attempted to transform the image of the Makonde from the regional villains to victims, who needed British protection and stewardship. British “statesmen, entrepreneurs, and churchmen” used O’Neill’s accounts as proof that the Portuguese were unable and/or unwilling to eliminate the slave trade and guarantee the protection of local communities.<sup>145</sup>

Despite Thomson, Maples, and O’Neill’s efforts to categorize and interact with local communities according to fixed ethnic identities, the men were forced to recognize that identity and power was fluid in the Ruvuma frontier. Maples abandoned his idea for Matola I to create and lead a pure Yao confederation once it became clear that most of Matola’s followers were Makua and Makonde.<sup>146</sup> While the sultans and “big men” of the Ruvuma frontier continued to employ flexible and incorporative social systems to build and maintain their followings, they also sought to integrate the new European actors into existing power structures and relations. Local and regional leaders exploited alliances with Europeans to expand their power and influence vis-à-vis their rivals. Matola I, for example, requested that Maples establish a mission station and school under his patronage in order for Matola to strengthen his position over his ritual superior, Mwawa. Matola’s power grew further as the missionaries relied upon him to establish and settle diplomatic negotiations between the peoples of Masasi, Newala, and Ngoni-

---

<sup>142</sup> Ibid., 77-78.

<sup>143</sup> Thomson, “Notes on the Basin of the River Rovuma, East Africa,” 74.

<sup>144</sup> O’Neill, “Journey in the District West of Cape Delgado Bay, Sept.-Oct. 1882,” 401.

<sup>145</sup> Harry G. West, “Villains, Victims, or Makonde in the Making? Reading the Explorer Henry O’Neill and Listening to the Headman Lisehe,” *Ethnohistory* 51, no.1 (2004): 1-42.

<sup>146</sup> Ranger, “European Attitudes and African Realities,” 71. Along with mental and physical characteristics, the Europeans also correlated ethnic identity to occupation. As evident in the quotes above, Europeans associated caravan traders and elephant hunters with the Wayao. The Makua and Makonde were local producers and refugees of slave raiding.

speaking raiders.<sup>147</sup> At the same time that Matola positioned himself as a useful ally for the British missionaries, his rival (Machemba) also reached out to the UMCA.<sup>148</sup> Although the Europeans failed to impose their imagined ethnic identities upon local communities during the precolonial era, the negotiations and alliances they entered into with African leaders influenced the power landscape of southern Tanzania and northern Mozambique – giving validity to some African leaders while undermining the authority of others.

### **Negotiating the Economic Landscape of the Ruvuma Frontier – Indian Intermediaries**

As Europeans worked to establish alliances with local power brokers, they debated the economic value and future of the Ruvuma frontier region. Like Livingstone, Kirk, and Elton before them, Maples, O'Neill, and Thomson offered mixed conclusions. Some likened southern Tanzania and northern Mozambique “to an Arctic region newly emerged from beneath a glacier; while the other condemned it as bare and uninteresting, monotonous, and dreary.”<sup>149</sup> Although Thomson observed “immense tracts of country laid waste,” he also detailed the “extremely fertile” soil found on the Makonde Plateau.<sup>150</sup> Maples also observed the rich soil fertility at Masasi where cassava, sorghum, sesame, rice, and newly-introduced fruit trees excelled.<sup>151</sup> Kirk believed that the region’s riches lay in india-rubber, reporting that Mikindani exported 40,000 *frasil* (35 lbs. each) of rubber in one season.<sup>152</sup> Kirk and Maples – two champions of the anti-slavery movement – concluded that Europeans could profit from the rich soils and plentiful cultivatable lands along the coast and Ruvuma if the slave trade ended. To stop the trade, Europeans needed to increase their commercial participation in East Africa and replace the Arab slave traders. According to Maples, the local “big men” were willingly to abandon the slave trade for ivory, copal, and

---

<sup>147</sup> *Ibid.*, 68. Matola’s sons and relatives were granted privileged and exclusive access to education.

<sup>148</sup> Maples, “Masasi and the Rovuma District in East Africa,” 348-49.

<sup>149</sup> Comments by John Kirk following Maples, “Makua Land, between the Rivers Rovuma and Luli,” 88. J.T. Last commented on the “desolation of the country” when he travelled from Lindi to Blantyre for eleven weeks, beginning in October 1885. See the “Introduction” in Karl Weule, *Native Life in East Africa*, xvii.

<sup>150</sup> Thomson, “Notes on the Basin of the River Rovuma, East Africa,” 68.

<sup>151</sup> Maples, “Masasi and the Rovuma District in East Africa,” 342. The plateau supported large crops of various grains despite the absence of surface water.

<sup>152</sup> Comments by Kirk, *Proceedings of the Royal Geographical Society*, 88.

rubber trade “if such things were asked for.”<sup>153</sup> The British had to intervene directly in the borderland region of the Ruvuma River, otherwise slave traders would continue to “play fast and loose between the territories of Zanzibar and Portugal.”<sup>154</sup>

In order to exploit the agricultural potential of the Ruvuma frontier, Europeans would also have to enter into commercial alliances with the Indian intermediaries who had dominated trade between the interior, coast, and international markets since the seventeenth century.<sup>155</sup> Prior to the Portuguese incursions, Muslim elites and trading families supplied the bulk of the credit that underwrote East African-Indian Ocean maritime trade networks. The long delays between shipments (due to the monsoon season) and the high risk of loss from storms or hostile encounters with pirates and enemies made credit essential to maritime trade. Portuguese disruption of Arab dominance in the Indian Ocean presented an opportunity for Indian entrepreneurs to invest the large amounts of capital they accumulated under the Mughal Empire in commercial enterprises along the Indian coast and abroad.<sup>156</sup> When looking to East Africa, Indian creditors and merchants targeted the risky yet lucrative ivory markets of Mozambique.<sup>157</sup> Lacking financial resources, the Portuguese permitted Indian investments in order to sustain commercial networks and supply trade factories along the coast and up the Zambezi River.<sup>158</sup> The Surat merchant Abdul Ghafur reportedly maintained a trading fleet of twenty ships (three to eight hundred tons each) that conducted the same quantity of trade as the entire English East India Company at the end of the

---

<sup>153</sup> Maples, “Masasi and the Rovuma District in East Africa,” 348-49.

<sup>154</sup> Comments by Kirk, *Proceedings of the Royal Geographical Society*, 88.

<sup>155</sup> Due to the lack of written sources, it is difficult to determine with accuracy when Indians began trading and settling along the East African coast. *Periplus of the Erythraean Sea* (composed in the mid-first century CE) provided the first concrete proof of Indian engagement in East Africa. According to Robert G. Gregory, the author “described a flourishing Indian commerce not only with Rome, Egypt, and Axum through the ports of Myos Hormos and Adulis in the Red Sea, but also with Barbarica, that part of present-day Somalia north of Cape Guardafui, and with Azania, the East African coast to the south.” The Indian merchants who traded in East Africa during the fourteenth century originated primarily from the Gulf of Cambay (northwestern India). Gujarat arose in 1392 as a powerful land-based state. By the mid-sixteenth century, the Gujarat ports of Diu and Surat linked local Hindu, Jain, and Muslim merchants with Arab, Turkish, Persian, and Egyptian Muslims from across the western Indian Ocean littoral. See Gregory, *India and East Africa*, 9; and Alpers, “Gujarat and the Trade of East Africa,” 22-44.

<sup>156</sup> Newitt, *A History of Mozambique*, 180-81.

<sup>157</sup> Alpers, *Ivory and Slaves*, 86-87; and Beachey, “The East African Ivory Trade in the Nineteenth Century,” 277.

<sup>158</sup> *Ibid.*, 177.

seventeenth century.<sup>159</sup> Indian engagement in and control over the Mozambican ivory trade intensified after the Banyan Company of Mazanes received a tax-free trade monopoly between Mozambique Island and the Indian port of Diu in 1686.<sup>160</sup> Major Indian trading houses from Cambay ports sent agents and independent associates to reside along the East African coast. These men – generically referred to as Banyans – imported goods not monopolized by the *Junta do Comércio* (Board of Commerce), financed Portuguese trading enterprises, and established rival trade networks.<sup>161</sup> Portuguese settlers and traders increasingly depended upon Indian creditors for the cloth and beads needed to conduct business with African ivory traders.<sup>162</sup> The Portuguese, however, struggled to compete with rival Indian merchants and trading houses, which offered better prices and had stronger commercial networks in the interior thanks to their African and “mulatto” agents. According to Edward Alpers, Indian merchants used “considerably more acumen in their personal, as well as commercial, relations with them [African traders] than did the Portuguese.”<sup>163</sup> The gradual formation of Indian commercial monopolies fueled resentment among Portuguese settlers and officials. Multiple attempts were made to strip Indians of their economic power in Mozambique during the eighteenth century, but the policies were ineffective and had disastrous consequences for the colonial economy.<sup>164</sup> For example, the Governor-General of Mozambique (Fr. José de Vasconcelos de Almeida) passed measures preventing Banyans from trading on the mainland with Wayao. Indian traders responded by not ordering cloth from Diu in 1780-81, which resulted in the Portuguese losing approximately 35,000 *cruzados* in revenue from import duties.<sup>165</sup> The Portuguese’s

---

<sup>159</sup> Alpers, *Ivory and Slaves*, 88.

<sup>160</sup> H. E. O'Neill, “On the Coast Lands and Some Rivers and Ports of Mozambique,” *Proceedings of the Royal Geographical Society and Monthly Record of Geography*, New Monthly Series 4, no. 10 (Oct. 1882): 595-605; Alpers, “Gujarat and the Trade of East Africa, c. 1500-1800,” 41; and Newitt, *A History of Mozambique*, 182.

<sup>161</sup> Alpers, “Gujarat and the Trade of East Africa,” 40-41; and Newitt, *A History of Mozambique*, 182. The Board replaced the captain’s monopoly in 1675 and operated in the Crown’s name. Indians from Goa – many of whom were Catholic – also migrated as administrators, traders, soldiers, or ecclesiastics (Newitt, 181).

<sup>162</sup> Alpers, *Ivory and Slaves*, 87.

<sup>163</sup> *Ibid.*, 145.

<sup>164</sup> *Ibid.*, 113-116. Alpers detailed the Portuguese’s various attempts to undermine or strip Indian traders and bankers of their economic power.

<sup>165</sup> *Ibid.*, 145.

decision to increase import taxes for Indian cloth and raise the “official” price for Mozambican ivory further crippled Mozambique’s markets in the 1780s.<sup>166</sup>

Omani-controlled Zanzibar, in contrast, offered a lucrative market in which Indians were actively encouraged to participate. Omani leadership posted Indians as customs officials in Zanzibar and along the *Mrima* coast, while other Indian immigrants found positions as private traders, artisans, and moneylenders.<sup>167</sup> The Indian population in Zanzibar reached seven to eight thousand in the early 1870s as a result of Zanzibar’s prosperous trade economy and the incentives offered by the Sultan, including; religious tolerance, a minimum 5% duty on imports, land ownership, and equal privilege with Arab traders.<sup>168</sup> Four-fifths of Zanzibar’s entire trade passed through Indian hands [primarily from Kutch or Bombay] by 1863 despite their lack of political power.<sup>169</sup> The Indian commercial community in Zanzibar

<sup>166</sup> Ibid., 174-175. Alpers argued that the rapid rise in the “official evaluation and the market price paid” for Mozambican ivory artificially inflated prices so as to make the product uncompetitive in the Indian ivory market. The price of ivory in the Gulf of Cambay ports doubled in the first decade of the nineteenth century, and “by 1809 the local price of ivory at Mozambique was equal to that of the London market in 1808.”

<sup>167</sup> Liebenow, *Colonial Rule and Political Development in Tanzania*, 75; Honey, “A History of Indian Merchant Capital,” 56-58 and 72-73; Juhani Koponen, *Development for Exploitation: German colonial policies in Mainland Tanzania, 1884-1914* (Helsinki, Finland: Tiedekirja, 1994), 151; and James R. Brennan, “South Asian Nationalism in an East African Context: The Case of Tanganyika, 1914-1956,” *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East* 19, no.2 (1999): 24-39, 24. The *Mrima* coast was the mainland coastal strip opposite of Zanzibar controlled by the Sultan. The Indian firm of Jairam Sewji served as chief customs collector in Zanzibar for almost seventy years. The firm actively recruited hundreds of Bhatia Hindus to migrate to Zanzibar and East Africa. According to Honey, other Hindu communities – notably the Lohanas and Vanias (Wanias) – also settled in East Africa and worked as traders and artisans in their traditional caste occupations. The majority of the Indian population in Zanzibar, however, consisted of Muslims - particularly Ismaili Khoja. Encouraged by the Aga Khan, the Khoja established a community and religious center by 1820. Unlike the Hindu population, the Khoja adopted Arab dress and names, learned Swahili, and brought women from overseas (many of whom worked in the family businesses). One of oldest and largest Muslim trading and shipping firms in East Africa - Karimjee Jivanjee – was comprised of Muslim Bohoras. According to Honey, the Bohoras often acted as pedlars, artisans, and retail dealers in hardware, and marine and household supplies. The men were recognized by their traditional long white coat, loose white cotton trousers, and small round caps. Women were tightly veiled. Christians, Sikhs, Jains, Parsis, and Sinhalese Buddhists from South Asia also migrated to East Africa in the search of economic opportunities. The following population figures were part of the “Census of British Indian Subjects In Zanzibar and Along the Tanganyika Coast, August 1887”:

	Khojas	Bohoras	Hindu	Parsis	Memons	Sindhis	Total
Kilwa	196	5	40	-	9	2	252
Lindi-Mik	190	11	90	-	1	-	292
Total	3075	577	867	79	120	119	4837

<sup>168</sup> Ibid., 57-58.

<sup>169</sup> Prestholdt, *Domesticating the World*, 79. Commercial links between Zanzibar and Bombay intensified in the 1870s as Bombay firms filled the void created by the departure of American exporters and their *merekani* cotton during the American Civil War. As Bombay merchants and financiers industrialized their operations in India, Sultan

also financed caravan expeditions and plantation enterprises on the mainland, as well as serving as middlemen for American and European importers, exporters, and shippers.<sup>170</sup> Europeans not only observed the economic power of Indian communities in Zanzibar, but also in small- and large-scale coastal trade centers stretching hundreds of miles from Dar es Salaam to Mozambique Island. Sir Bartle Frere reported in 1873,

[...] it is hardly an exaggeration to say that all trade passes through Indian hands; African, Arab and European, all use an Indian agent or Banian to manage the details of buying and selling, and without the intervention of an Indian, either as capitalist or petty trader, very little business is done. They occupy every place where there is any trade ...<sup>171</sup>

Frere continued by stating that along the African coastline, “the Indian trader is, if not the monopolist, the most influential, permanent, and all-pervading element of the commercial community.”<sup>172</sup> Eight years later, H.E. O’Neill observed that agents of Indian houses in Mozambique and Ibo had established innumerable points of collection for African exports, including oil-seeds, india rubber, ivory, and copra. Whereas wholesale European merchants operated at the major trade centers, the Banyans were “found in every accessible port and river of the coast, bartering European manufactures for native produce, and thus, by searching out new markets and creating trade, stimulating the industry of the native Makua.”<sup>173</sup>

---

Bargash of Zanzibar introduced six steamship services running from Bombay to Zanzibar and Madagascar. A telegraph station was also constructed in Zanzibar to enable instant communication between Bombay firms and Zanzibar agents. According to Jeremy Prestholdt, “Bombay firms quickly began cosigning thousands of tons of cargo to each voyage. [...] With lower shipping rates, firms based in Zanzibar and Bombay began to saturate East Africa with unbleached, merekani look-alike sheeting, kaniki (usually English cotton indigo-dyed in India), as well as rice, wheat, sugar, furniture, and wood – all products that would come essential to the Bombay export trade in the 1880s and contribute to Bombay’s position as the premier entrepôt in the western Indian Ocean.” See Prestholdt, *Domesticating the World*, 79-81.

<sup>170</sup> Honey, “A History of Indian Merchant Capital,” 53-54.

<sup>171</sup> *Correspondence respecting Sir Bartle Frere’s Mission*, quoted in Honey, “A History of Indian Merchant Capital,” 100. Another sign of Indian commercial dominance within the Zanzibar commercial empire was the replacement of the Maria Therasa dollar with the Indian rupee as the main currency. See Honey, “A History of Indian Merchant Capital,” 57.

<sup>172</sup> Sir Bartle Frere to Earl Granville, *Correspondence*, C 820, 27 February 1873, referenced in Gregory, *India and East Africa*, 38-39.

<sup>173</sup> O’Neill, “On the Coast Lands and Some Rivers and Ports of Mozambique,” 602-03.



The numerous Indian communities that James Frederick Elton visited from Dar es Salaam to Lindi (1873-74) were involved in the trade of copal, rubber, and agricultural produce.<sup>174</sup> Elton offered the following observation of African-Asian negotiations and transactions near the Rufiji River:

The trading generally takes place at night in the house of the Indians (whose principal business is in copal), and should no bargain be arrived at, the Washenzi leave before daylight, sleep in the woods, and return again at dusk to resume negotiations. As the gum is brought in, it is an admixture of the tree-copal (Chakazi), and the true (so called fossil) copal, and, I fancy, is still further doctored on its way before reaching European merchants.<sup>175</sup>

Further down the coast at Kitmangao, Elton encountered a “purely Indian town on the coast” that was the principal copal-trading station in the Kwalé District.<sup>176</sup> Elton observed that the Banyans “appear quite at home in their settlement; they have built an enclosure and planted a garden round a covered and raised terrace, on which they meet for meals, which, with inner sheds, forms at once a fort and a pleasant lounge”.<sup>177</sup> Elton insisted that copal constituted the “most lucrative commerce of the Indian settlers at the small trading ports” in the Rufiji delta.<sup>178</sup> According to Thaddeus Sunseri, the Indian trading diaspora was

---

<sup>174</sup> Elton’s mission was to enforce British anti-slavery laws among Britain’s Indian subjects on the mainland. By mid-February, Elton boasted that he had freed 1,285 slaves. Thaddeus Sunseri explained that many Indians hired slaves from slave owners or acted a “labor brokers” for coastal merchants and planters. Slave owners mortgaged or pawned slaves to Indian creditors to settle debts. Lumwe bin Kizungu, for example, pawned his slaves to pay off his debt with the Indian Musaji Malji. Sunseri also offered the example of an agreement between Asmuni bin Ayubu and Muhamadi bin Ganji el-Hindi. Asmuni rented five slaves to Muhamadi for three years on the stipulation that each slave received 4 Rps. per month plus food. The slaves could not work for anyone else during the three year period. See Thaddeus Sunseri, *Vilimani: Labor Migration and Rural Change in Early Colonial Tanzania* (Portsmouth, NH, USA: Heinemann, 2002), 30-31.

<sup>175</sup> Elton, *Travels and Researches*, 78-79. Trading at night was not universal. Elton insisted that the night bartering at Tuliani and Mgogoni was a consequence of the “outlying tribes have lost all confidence in the *boa fides* of the Arab authorities” (Elton, 89). Elton’s use of the Swahili term “Washenzi” – or “barbarians” – to describe the African traders offers insights into his prejudices against Africans in comparison to Indians and Arabs living along the coast. Malicious stereotypes of Africans as “barbarians” were common among Europeans. In the introduction to Elton’s journal, for example, Frederick Holmwood (H.M Assistant Political Agent in Zanzibar) argued that Africans lived in a “universal state of barbarism” primarily because of their “disinclination to any settled employment, no matter what the incentive to labour. This may be a consequence of generations of slavery, or the defect may be inherent in the race; it is fostered by the warm equable climate and by the immense fertility of the soil [...]” (19).

<sup>176</sup> *Ibid.*, 88.

<sup>177</sup> *Ibid.*, 89. The layout of the village was bifurcated. Nine houses of the Khojas rested on one side of the swamp, each with an upper loft and rough ladder for the storage of goods. The Battiahs lived on the other side of the swamp with a half-dozen Waswahili.

<sup>178</sup> Captain F. Elton, “The African Gum Copal,” *The Indian Forester: A Quarterly Magazine of Forestry*, edited by W. Schlich, vol. 1 (July 1875 to April 1876): 36-45, accessed February 2015, [https://books.google.com/books?id=c7VOAAAAMAAJ&pg=PA43&lpg=PA43&dq=Kitmangao&source=bl&ots=8Awd6if8NI&sig=L2pk\\_cGlg33MMNdo\\_wEWtqSf3eE&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjZsavCxaLKAhVFlh4KHeeoA4EQ6AEIITAB#v=onepage&q=Kitmangao&f=false](https://books.google.com/books?id=c7VOAAAAMAAJ&pg=PA43&lpg=PA43&dq=Kitmangao&source=bl&ots=8Awd6if8NI&sig=L2pk_cGlg33MMNdo_wEWtqSf3eE&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjZsavCxaLKAhVFlh4KHeeoA4EQ6AEIITAB#v=onepage&q=Kitmangao&f=false). Captain Elton was then 1<sup>st</sup> Assistant to Political Agent and Vice-Consul,

attracted to the Rufiji River area due to the large quantities of and steady market for forest products, including wild rubber, timber, copal, wax, and honey.<sup>179</sup> In addition to bartering for copal, sesame, and grains, Indians in proximity to the Rufiji River delta also engaged in grain speculation and exported cowries and plantation produce.<sup>180</sup> Indian populations in the ports of Kilwa, Lindi, and Mikindani profited from their incorporation within global markets through Zanzibar and trade in rubber, arms, forest produce, rice, grain, and other crops during the 1870s.<sup>181</sup> Maples reported in 1880 that Banyan merchants in Lindi purchased rubber from Africans in exchange for foodstuff. Two years later, Joseph Thomson observed a “considerable colony of Banyans and Hindi” residing and trading in Mikindani.<sup>182</sup> Thomson also detailed Mikindani’s transformation between Livingstone’s visit and his own sixteen years later. Whereas the town had no cattle, few houses, and small trade in gum copal and orchilla weed in 1866, Thomson observed in 1882:

---

Zanzibar. Systematic trade was found at eleven stations in the Kwale District. Regular supply of copal, however, was not guaranteed during the dry season. Elton explained: “[...] no pressure can induce an increase when enough gum has been bartered to satisfy the present demand so the petty Chiefs. Neither do the Indians venture to send out parties of their own, each village and each working is represented by a headman or ‘Jumbe,’ and the natives are only too ready to unite against the slightest encroachment on their monopoly[...].” The labor was also not organized. Nonetheless, Elton observed copal traders on the path daily, “each party led by a few men armed with old muskets and bows and arrows, and consisting of women and lads, carrying baskets.”

<sup>179</sup> Thaddeus Sunseri, “The War of the Hunters: Maji Maji and the Decline of the Ivory Trade,” in *Maji Maji: Lifting the Fog of War*, eds. Jim Gibling and Jamie Monson (Boston: Brill Academic Publishers, 2010): 117-148, 127.

<sup>180</sup> Elton, *Travels and Researches*, 94.

<sup>181</sup> Honey, “A History of Indian Merchant Capital,” 107-108; and Iliffe, *A Modern History of Tanganyika*, 129-31. Lindi exported 500 to 830 tons of rubber in 1879. Kilwa and Mungao also exported 1,000 tons. The expansion of “legitimate” commerce in East Africa occurred elsewhere in the continent during the second half of the nineteenth century. In response to the Industrial Revolution and the gradual collapse of the trans-Atlantic slave trade, European and American demands on West African export markets shifted from slaves towards palm oil, palm kernels, groundnuts, latex, and food products (as well as gold and ivory). For accounts about the economic transition and its consequences in Africa and the “west”, see Donald R. Wright, *The World and a Very Small Place in Africa: A History of Globalization in Niimi, The Gambia* (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2004); John Thornton, *Africa and Africans in the Making of the Atlantic World, 1400-1800*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. (Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998); J.F. Ade Ajayi, ed., *General History of Africa, VI: Africa in the Nineteenth Century Until the 1880s* (Paris: UNESCO, 1989); Joseph C. Miller, *Way of Death: Merchant Capitalism and the Angolan Slave Trade 1730-1830* (Madison, USA: University of Wisconsin Press, 1988); Walter Rodney, *How Europe underdeveloped Africa* (Washington D.C: Howard University Press, 1981); Basil Davidson, *Black Mother: Africa and the Atlantic Slave Trade*, rev. ed. (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1980); J. Forbes Munro, *Africa and the International Economy, 1800-1960: An Introduction to the Modern Economic History of Africa South of the Sahara* (London: J.M. Dent, 1976); and Philip D. Curtin, *Economic Change in Precolonial Africa: Senegambia in the era of the slave trade* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1975).

<sup>182</sup> Maples, “Masasi and the Rovuma District in East Africa,” 339; and Thomson, “Notes on the Basin of the River Rovuma, East Africa,” 67. Africans collected rubber in forests 20 miles from Lindi town and sold it in response to food shortages.

[...] trade has increased exceedingly, almost the entire produce of the Rovuma region finding its way there – gum copal, rubber, millet, rice, and other grains being the chief articles, though the trade in ivory and slaves from the Makua and Wahyao districts is by no means unimportant. South of Bagamoyo, Mikindany will now rank in importance next after Kilwa and Lindy [Lindi].<sup>183</sup>

When investigating smaller ports in northern Mozambique, O'Neill observed that a growing number of Battias and Banyans were replacing the dwindling Arab trade communities.<sup>184</sup> Trade in amendoim, calumba, wax, and rubber at the small port of Simuku were all “brought in and stored in the houses of the few Indian traders who have stationed themselves there, and by whom this trade is solely conducted.”<sup>185</sup> O'Neill concluded that for more than a century, “Banyans, Battias, and other castes of India have settled, for trading purposes, in almost every nook and cranny of the coast.”<sup>186</sup> Indian trade activities and residency were not limited to the coast. Elton encountered a Banyan colony that actively participated in the export of local commodities (including timber, coffee, grains, and india-rubber) while travelling through “Makuani” in Mozambique in 1876. One of the merchants, originally from Cutch, had traded along the Mkubwa River for fourteen years and was “undoubtedly possessed of a great deal of local influence.”<sup>187</sup> Livingstone questioned a Makonde man along the Ruvuma if he had seen Englishmen before. The man replied that he had heard of the English, but actually “seen Banians.”<sup>188</sup>

Like the Portuguese before them, the early British explorers and missionaries often held unfavorable views of Indian merchants, petty traders, and financiers despite their integral role within East African trade economies. In contrast to the Portuguese, the British tried to manipulate (rather than eradicate) the economic power and political influence of Indian merchants and financiers in order to amplify Britain's power in East Africa. Abdul Sheriff described how the British Consul and Political Agent, Atkins Hamerton, began a campaign in the 1840s to gain legal jurisdiction over all Indians in Zanzibar (immigrants and native born) and change their legal status to British subjects. The undertaking

<sup>183</sup> Thomson, “Notes on the Basin of the River Rovuma, East Africa,” 67.

<sup>184</sup> O'Neill, “Journey in the District West of Cape Delgado Bay, Sept.-Oct. 1882,” 395.

<sup>185</sup> O'Neill, “On the Coast Lands and Some Rivers and Ports of Mozambique,” 596. Simuku served as an outlet for the Makua chief, Nampwita.

<sup>186</sup> *Ibid.*, 600.

<sup>187</sup> Elton, *Travels and Researches*, 207-209. The Banyan had revisited India on two occasions.

<sup>188</sup> George Shepperson, *David Livingstone and the Rovuma*, 83.

was challenging, especially in the case of the Kutch populace because Kutch was not under the jurisdiction of the English Crown in India.<sup>189</sup> Over the course of three decades, Hamerton's successors gradually legitimized British judicial authority over the Indian population in Zanzibar by bringing Indian slave-owners to trial and punishing them under anti-slavery legislation. By the 1870s, the British consuls clearly exerted authority over the most economically powerful merchant class in Zanzibar, and therefore gained influence over the Omani state.<sup>190</sup>

While the British increasingly enforced their authority over Indian communities in Zanzibar, their influence was limited among Indians conducting trade along the mainland coastline and the interior. Europeans instead depended upon these Indian traders and investors to provide the capital and consumer goods that drove commercial networks between the interior, coast, and international markets. Their inability to control the Indian population on the mainland perhaps underscored the negative perceptions that the British held towards Indians in the nineteenth century. The British homogenized the diverse Indian communities of East Africa and categorized them as “non-natives” – a group who ranked higher in intelligence and acumen than the African “natives,” yet whose supposed propensity towards greed and cunning often made them morally repulsive in the eyes of many Britons. Maples criticized Banyan merchants in Lindi for undercutting African profits when buying rubber – offering two dollars-worth of rice or sorghum when the real value was seven or eight dollars.<sup>191</sup> Some Britons shared the contempt that a Portuguese Governor-General in Mozambique expressed when describing Banyan traders – “they are selfish, false, and cunning, given to lying and usury; that they know not how to keep a contract, and that it is a part of their religious creed to deceive and rob a Christian.”<sup>192</sup> When Elton compared a Portuguese official, Arab woman, and Banyan trader in the Indian Quarter of Mozambique, the latter received the most unfavorable portrayal:

---

<sup>189</sup> Sheriff, *Slaves, Spices and Ivory in Zanzibar*, 203.

<sup>190</sup> *Ibid.*, 207-08.

<sup>191</sup> Maples, “Masasi and the Rovuma District in East Africa,” 339.

<sup>192</sup> O'Neill, “On the Coast Lands and Some Rivers and Ports of Mozambique,” 602-03. ” O'Neill hypothesized that Portuguese antagonism was heightened because Indians did not invest their profits in Mozambique, but instead sent it to India.

[...] an unhealthy-coloured yellow face, and long, lank, black moustache, caste marks on his forehead, and gold-twisted turban on his head, loose and silken as regards his coat, with folds of fine muslin waving about his nether limbs, and a pink calico umbrella of immense and skeleton-like proportions in his hand; crafty, money-making, cunning, intensely polite, his soul bound only to his body by the one laudable and religious anxiety of its helping him to turn over his coin to better advantage.”<sup>193</sup>

Elton offered similarly uncomplimentary descriptions of Indians in Zanzibar – “fat Indian kine, eager traders and money-changers” and “hooked nosed” Banyans shrilly singing as part of religious processions.<sup>194</sup> Europeans also frequently commented on Indian clothing and material possessions when critiquing Indian character. Scarlet and gold turbans, fine linen, pure white muslin, and large cotton and calico umbrellas were, for the British, not merely symbols of Indian prosperity, but also their insatiable greed.<sup>195</sup> Elton’s criticism of Indians (perhaps influenced by his participation in repressing the Indian Mutiny) was mediated by his appreciation for the financial difficulties they faced as intermediaries along the Omani-controlled coast:

The Indian trader on the Mrima has many extortions to fight against and heavy duties to pay, neither can his life be a very pleasant one, spent, as it is, in one continual succession of haggling and quarrelling with the natives, in competition with his neighbours, and a monotonous round of coast fever. The local Jumbe extracts a ground rent from him, and he is fortunate, if only one claimant to territorial dues appears on the scene! The Jumbe is followed by the Jemadar, who levies an arbitrary percentage on his supposed profits, and besides estimates the amount himself in order to save discussion. The Custom House then abstracts 20 frasilahs from every 100 frasilahs of copal shipped as the Government duty, and, in addition, charge him on expenses, storage, and delay. Add to all this, freight and interest on money, and a considerable addition is made to cost price.<sup>196</sup>

The Indians residing and trading along the southern Swahili coast and in the Ruvuma frontier were largely defenseless against economic exploitation. They were technically British “non-native subjects” residing in a foreign territory controlled by a foreign sovereign, who in turn exerted little authority over a host of

---

<sup>193</sup> Elton, *Travels and Researches*, 30.

<sup>194</sup> *Ibid.*, 36 and 52. It is interesting to note that in July 1874 Elton served as the Protector of Immigrants in Natal while recovering from an illness. Elton’s language fluency made him an excellent candidate for the position. For the next three months, Elton was responsible for ensuring that every arrangement was made for the reception of Indian immigrants from Calcutta. See Elton, *Travels and Researches*, 118.

<sup>195</sup> *Ibid.*, 68.

<sup>196</sup> Elton, “The African Gum Copal,” 44-45. Elton estimated that copal in Kwale fetched three to 5 ¼ dollars per *frasilah*. The price varied according to the season, number of workers, demand, etc. Merchants at Zanzibar bought the copal at seven to eight dollars. Despite the price differentiation, Elton reported that the copal trade offered large gains to all concerned during the 1870s.

African power-brokers, who dictated trade at the local level. While Elton recognized the steep financial price Indian communities paid for conducting trade in East Africa as “outsiders,” he and other Britons continued to condemn Indians for their allegedly unscrupulous practices, particularly their support of the slave trade. H.M. Assistant Political Agent at Zanzibar (Frederick Holmwood), for example, expressed his disdain for Indian merchants from Kutch and Bombay who supplied the capital that funded the slave caravans.<sup>197</sup>

Despite European animosity, Indian communities successfully negotiated the opportunities and limitations that their intermediary position offered within the East African commercial economy. They exploited their status as British subjects when advantageous, but more commonly ignored proclamations by the British, Omani, and Portuguese. They instead continued to trade profitably with their local and regional contacts. Horace Waller complained about the “duplicity” of Indians, who were “anxious enough to ‘run’ with the Arab slave dealer when dollars are tolerably safe, and forward enough to ‘hunt’ with the representatives of our Flag, and claim a British subject’s rights if it serves their purpose.”<sup>198</sup> Indians ultimately served as linchpins within the expanding trade networks that linked the East Africa interior, coast, and overseas markets. Indian capital and commodities underwrote the slave and ivory trade that redefined the socioeconomic and political landscape of northern Mozambique and southern Tanzania. The Indian merchant class inadvertently fueled the political centralization that occurred along the trade corridors in the Ruvuma frontier, as well as providing the British an avenue to build their political influence in East Africa. Indian merchants and financiers continued to impact the socioeconomic landscape of the Ruvuma frontier and African-European relations within it as the nineteenth century gave way to European colonialism in the twentieth century.

---

<sup>197</sup> Frederick Holmwood, “Introduction,” in *Travels and Researches among the Lakes and Mountains of Eastern and Central Africa*, by J. Frederic Elton, edited by H.B. Cotterill (London: John Murray, 1879), 5.

<sup>198</sup> Horace Waller, “Preface,” to *Travels and Researches among the Lakes and Mountains of Eastern and Central Africa*, by J. Frederic Elton, ed. H.B. Cotterill (London: John Murray, 1879), v.

## Conclusion

The final two decades of the nineteenth century witnessed a calming of European rivalries in Africa as the major western powers divided up the continent according to artificial colonial borders. In East Africa, Zanzibar became a British Protectorate, while the Ruvuma River became an imperial border demarcating German East Africa to the north and Portuguese East Africa to the south. Based upon the reports issued by missionaries, explorers, and diplomats, Europeans incorrectly assumed that the Ruvuma region was populated by poor, helpless subsistence cultivators, who had either been cut off from the world and unchanged by time or ravaged by the atrocities of the slave trade. The new colonial governments and private investors aimed to transform and “develop” the landscape of the Ruvuma borderland. The slave and ivory trade economy would be replaced by a thriving plantation-based, cash crop economy. The existing long-distance trade networks would initially be utilized to transport agricultural produce, minerals, and migrant laborers to the coastal ports and cash crop plantations. A “modern” transportation infrastructure of railways and roads would eventually replace these routes and connect all the major trade and administrative centers between the coast and interior. Local “big men” and “sultans” would ensure the success of this economy and enforce law and order by serving as colonial administrators. Those leaders who refused to submit to colonial authority would be eliminated and replaced. Indian merchants and financiers would continue to supply the capital and commodity goods needed to integrate local, regional, and long-distance trade economies within a monetized colonial economy and global markets.

Making these “development” visions a reality, however, would prove exceptionally difficult in the Ruvuma borderland of northern Portuguese East Africa (PEA) and southern German East Africa (GEA). Neither the Portuguese nor the Germans had the manpower, finances, and resources to impose their will upon a highly mobile, multiethnic populace accustomed to its autonomy. African populations in the Rufiji-Ruvuma region and Ruvuma frontier had relied upon their mobility to survive and thrive in the diverse and challenging environments of the region since at least the first millennium CE. Multidirectional trade networks provided the basis from which the culturally, politically, socially, and

linguistically diverse societies of the Rufiji-Ruvuma region created mutually advantageous alliances with one another and populations from across Central-East Africa and the western Indian Ocean. Inhabitants of the Ruvuma frontier, in particular, utilized their mobility to adapt to resource scarcities, population pressure, warfare and raiding, undesirable authority, and new trade markets. As the precolonial era gave way to the colonial era, the Ruvuma borderland remained a dynamic frontier where local leaders, traders, and ordinary individuals exploited competing colonial systems; taking advantage of markets and utilizing alliances with Europeans to consolidate and extend their authority within existing political and economic power structures. Local inhabitants and communities adapted centuries-old mobility patterns in order to exploit the instability and opportunities created by colonialism. Conflict, negotiation, exploitation, cooperation, adaptation, and accommodation continued to define African-Asian-European relations in the Ruvuma borderland during the first decades of colonial rule.



## Chapter 2

### Destruction and Construction: European Colonialism and the First World War in the Ruvuma Borderland (1880s-1918)

The creation of the Ruvuma borderland was partially spurred by the actions of a young German adventurer, Carl Peters. Peters entered into a number of suspect “treaties” with African leaders in the East African interior in 1884.<sup>1</sup> German Imperial Chancellor, Otto von Bismark, officially endorsed Peters’ treaties and granted the *Deutsch-Ostafrikanische Gesellschaft* (German East African Company or DOAG) imperial protection over the territorial possessions in February 1885.<sup>2</sup> Several bilateral treaties between British, German, Portuguese, and Belgian diplomats during the 1880s and 1890s established the colonial borders of East Africa.<sup>3</sup> By December 1886, the Germans and Portuguese decided upon the Ruvuma River as the border between their colonial possessions: *Deutsch Ostafrika* or German East Africa (GEA) to the north and Portuguese East Africa (PEA) to the south.<sup>4</sup> Colonial authorities and private investors aimed to exploit the natural resources of the Ruvuma borderland and transform it into a lucrative, cash crop producing region. The construction of engineered roads and railways were crucial for the successful implementation of European “development” designs. Insufficient manpower and funds, however, inhibited European plans and forced settlers and district officers to negotiate with local leaders and Indian traders, who continued to dominate the region’s social, political, and economic landscape. Despite the imposition of colonial rule, the borderland remained a dynamic and porous frontier where local inhabitants freely moved between colonial systems; evading oppressive colonial regimes and exploiting advantageous labor and trade markets. A series of rebellions and military “pacification” campaigns on both sides of the Ruvuma River during the first decades of the twentieth century produced intense instability in the borderland region. As a consequence of the unrest, the Portuguese largely abandoned

---

<sup>1</sup> Juhani Koponen, *Development for Exploitation: German colonial policies in Mainland Tanzania, 1884-1914* (Helsinki, Finland: Tiedekirja, 1994), 73-74. For information on Peters and his ambitions of establishing colonies in South America, Southern Angola, and Zimbabwe, see Koponen, *Development for Exploitation* 70.

<sup>2</sup> Koponen, *Development for Exploitation*, 55-85. Koponen offered a detailed overview of the various arguments as to why Bismarck supported German colonialism and an East African colony.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, 75. According to Koponen, British politicians and traders welcomed German colonialism so as to hinder the spread of French colonialism.

<sup>4</sup> John Iliffe, *A Modern History of Tanganyika* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 91.

their agricultural and infrastructure “development” projects and instead aimed to exploit local resources on the cheap. European plantation owners and businessmen in southern GEA, in contrast, remained convinced of the region’s economic potential and invested their own funds towards improving the transportation infrastructure. The half-finished roadways and railway extending from the town of Lindi at the onset of World War I represented the ambiguous impact of colonialism in the Ruvuma borderland during the first three decades of colonial rule.

The First World War ended German economic “development” schemes in the borderland region and resulted in an era of extraordinary destruction and instability. After serving as a smuggling zone during the first two years of the war, the Ruvuma region became the frontline for armed conflict between the Germans and Allied forces. Migration once again proved an invaluable survival strategy for local populations trying to escape violence, scorched earth tactics, bombardments, forced conscription, famine, starvation, and disease. The presence of large armies in the borderland, however, inhibited mobility and thousands of local civilians and conscripted soldiers died during and after the war. As modern weaponry scarred the physical landscape of the borderland, Allied forces attempted to construct a new landscape of motorable roads and an extended railway. They built the infrastructure projects out of necessity in order to facilitate the movement of troops, arms, and supplies in pursuit of the fleeing German forces. The roads quickly deteriorated in the face of neglect and adverse climatic conditions. The abandoned and decrepit roads reflected the fortunes of the Ruvuma borderland in the aftermath of the war – a region decimated and forgotten by colonial powers, who perceived it as an unprofitable, disease-ridden, and isolated periphery that was incapable and/or unworthy of “development.”

### **German and Portuguese Colonial Rule in the Ruvuma Borderland (1880s-1905)**

As the German and Portuguese governments settled upon the Ruvuma as the demarcating line between their colonial possessions in East Africa, they employed private companies to govern the new territories. The arrival of DOAG agents in Kilwa, Lindi, and Mikindani in August 1888 signaled the

beginning of German colonialism in southern GEA.<sup>5</sup> The initial takeover was peaceful as the DOAG agents found that many of the local leaders (*liwalis*) had already left to Zanzibar.<sup>6</sup> A violent uprising, however, occurred along the Swahili coast later in the year – referred to as the “Arab revolt.”<sup>7</sup> Lindi and Mikindani negotiated peace in 1890 following a series of German victories along the northern coast. The Germans reclaimed Kilwa in May 1890 after a three day bombardment.<sup>8</sup> Following the “Arab revolt,” administrative control of GEA passed from the DOAG to the *Kaiserliche Gouvernement* (German imperial government) in January 1891. The imperial government conducted lengthy campaigns of conquest throughout GEA, including those against Ngoni chiefs in Songea.<sup>9</sup> Private corporate rule lasted decades longer across the Ruvuma River in northern PEA. The bankrupt Portuguese government awarded a Portuguese-owned and British-financed company – *Companhia do Nyassa* or Nyassa Company – a thirty-five year charter to pacify and administer the northern district of PEA.<sup>10</sup> In return, the Nyassa Company received a monopoly over tax collection and exclusive rights for any profits produced in the region.

Neither the German imperial government nor the Nyassa Company administration instituted uniform colonial doctrines and policies; rather, district officers and commissioners (*Bezirksamtman*, *Chefes do Concelho*, and *Chefe do Posto*) adjusted their governance to accommodate local conditions. These colonial agents “held widely varying opinions as to what the actual goal of their actions was and

---

<sup>5</sup> Iliffe, *A Modern History of Tanganyika*, 91. The Germans occupied Dar es Salaam in May 1887 and were granted control over customs throughout the coast in April 1888. The whole of the mainland came under German authority following a treaty with the Sultan of Zanzibar in 1890. The typical representations of German colonial rule in the interior were small compounds consisting of two or three European officers and a dozen African troops.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, 92.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, 93.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, 97.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, 98-122.

<sup>10</sup> Leroy Vail, “Mozambique’s Chartered Companies: The Rule of the Feeble,” *The Journal of African History* 17, no.3 (1976): 389-416; Barry Neil-Tomlinson, “The Nyassa Chartered Company: 1891-1929,” *The Journal of African History* 18, no. 1 (1977): 109-128, 114-15; and Malyn Newitt, *A History of Mozambique* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995), 373. According to Vail, the Portuguese hoped that awarding concessions would “disprove the old allegation that Portugal was too effete and decadent to rule her empire effectively.” A British group, Ibo Syndicate, took controlling interest over the Nyassa Company.

how they should try to reach it.”<sup>11</sup> The German administration and Nyassa Company, however, shared the underlying objective of exploiting the mineral resources found in the Ruvuma borderland and transforming the region into a thriving agricultural landscape of cash crop plantations. The Nyassa Company intended to establish sugar plantations along the coast, coffee plantations in the uplands near Lake Malawi, and exploit the mineral deposits found throughout the interior.<sup>12</sup> The German colonial state similarly aimed to exploit southern GEA’s supply of rubber, copal, and minerals. While conducting an expedition through southern GEA from 1897 to 1900, Friedrich Fülleborn reported that overexploitation had virtually extinguished the vine stock of rubber along the Mwera and Makonde Plateaus by 1900. Copal, however, remained abundant. A total of 55,585 lbs. of copal was shipped from the Lindi District at a value of 25,871 Rupees (Rps).<sup>13</sup> The district’s hinterland also produced large quantities of wax, precious stones, coal, and garnet.<sup>14</sup> The German colonial state prioritized a “plantation imperative” in the colony, which stressed the mass production of cotton using scientific methods and large-scale mechanized techniques.<sup>15</sup> The Germans concentrated their efforts to create cotton plantations in the hinterland of Kilwa and the Rufiji delta. Kilwa port and the Kilwa trade corridor, however, steadily declined in economic importance and political stability under German colonial rule. German retaliation against Kilwa’s coastal elite during the “Arab revolt” and campaigns against the Ngoni in Songea disrupted trade

---

<sup>11</sup> Koponen, *Development for Exploitation*, 37.

<sup>12</sup> Berry Neil-Tomlinson, “The Nyassa Chartered Company” 112.

<sup>13</sup> Dr. Friedrich Fülleborn, *Das Deutsche Njassa- und Ruwuma-Gebiet, Land und Leute, nebst Bemerkungen über die Schire-Länder* [*The German Nyassa and Ruwuma region, country and people, along with comments on the Shire country*] (Berlin: Dietrich Reimer, 1906), 40, accessed September 2015, <[https://archive.org/stream/deutschostafrik00stuhgoog/deutschostafrik00stuhgoog\\_djvu.txt](https://archive.org/stream/deutschostafrik00stuhgoog/deutschostafrik00stuhgoog_djvu.txt)>. Fülleborn described how individual Africans dug countless pits in the hopes of finding a few rupees worth of copal.

<sup>14</sup> Fülleborn, *Das Deutsche Njassa- und Ruwuma-Gebiet*, 40. According to Fülleborn, the price for garnet collapsed by 1902/03 due to a saturation of the market. (Residents in the Newala-area easily collected large amounts from the surface.) Indians and Europeans pulled out of the enterprise as transportation costs dwarfed the meager product prices. The Lindi District also produced sorghum, maize, cassava, various types of beans, sweet potatoes, rice, peanuts, sesame seeds, cucumbers, pumpkins, castor, tobacco, and some sugar cane (Fülleborn, 100). The first German *Bezirksamtmann* (District Officer) in Lindi identified a similar list of products produced in Lindi’s hinterland. See Felicitas Becker, “A social history of Southeast Tanzania, ca 1890-1950” (PhD diss., Cambridge University, 2002), 33.

<sup>15</sup> Thaddeus Sunseri, *Vilimani: Labor Migration and Rural Change in Early Colonial Tanzania* (Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann, 2002), 12.

and power relations that had underscored Kilwa's prosperity and power.<sup>16</sup> The collapse of the slave and ivory trade further undermined patronage networks that sustained many of the "traditional" leaders. Kilwa's elites adapted to the changing economy by participating in the lucrative rubber trade.<sup>17</sup> Conflict mounted, however, as coastal elites and Germans expanded their trade and plantation enterprises into the interior and infringed upon the authority and profits of local leaders.<sup>18</sup> Felicitas Becker argued that as the power landscape in the Kilwa trade corridor became increasingly tumultuous, "a vast array of people, from military strongmen to petty traders, struggled to carve out, seize or rebuild opportunities."<sup>19</sup> The climate of instability coincided with mounting animosity towards colonial rule. Rising tax rates, compulsory labor, and the cruelty shown by some German administrators and settlers bred resentment among local communities.<sup>20</sup>

The Lindi trade corridor and Lindi port, in contrast, profited from the expansion of the colonial plantation economy and from alliances between African "big men" and the German administration. In contrast to Kilwa, Lindi's fertile hinterland offered space for ex-slave traders and owners, Arabs, Indians, and Europeans to establish plantations – especially cotton, sisal, and oil-rich crops like sesame and groundnuts.<sup>21</sup> In addition to cash crops, Lindi District excelled at the production and export of food crops.

---

<sup>16</sup> Becker, "A social history of Southeast Tanzania," 65.

<sup>17</sup> Felicitas Becker, "Sudden Disaster and Slow Change: Maji Maji and the Long-Term History of Southeast Tanzania," in *Maji Maji: Lifting the Fog of War*, eds. James Giblin and Jamie Monson (Boston: BRILL, 2010), 295-321: 304.

<sup>18</sup> Becker, "Sudden Disaster and Slow Change," 13-14.

<sup>19</sup> Felicitas Becker, "Traders, 'Big Men' and Prophets: Political Continuity and Crisis in the Maji Maji Rebellion in Southeast Tanzania," *Journal of African History* 45 (2004): 1-22, 8.

<sup>20</sup> Koponen found that German employers and administrators across the territory frequently utilized corporal punishment, particularly floggings, with African laborers and the general populace. The *kiboko*, a whip of hippopotamus hide, was found "almost everywhere, not only in military stations and plantations but also in many villages and mission stations." See Koponen, *Development for Exploitation*, 360.

<sup>21</sup> Becker, "A social history of Southeast Tanzania," 77-78 and 130. Slavery did not end quickly in German East Africa. The colonial government did not legally abolish slavery due to concerns that such a policy would undermine the power of slave-owning coastal elites, who served as valuable colonial intermediaries. Although the number of slaves gradually declined under German colonial rule due in part to the Germans' efforts to stop slave raiding and trading, the state adopted measures that permitted the continued ownership and "renting" of existing slaves. Many slaves gained their freedom by running away, purchasing their freedom, and working as porters, urban laborers, and railway or plantation workers on European-owned estates. Third-party ransoming was also practiced. For more on the "slow death" of slavery in GEA, see Becker, "A social history of Southeast Tanzania,"

By the 1890s, Lindi District rapidly became known as the breadbasket of the colony (*Kornkammer der Kolonie*).<sup>22</sup> The district exported six million pounds of sorghum in 1890, nearly a half-million pounds of peanuts in 1900/01 (valued at 20,000 Rps.), and nearly a million pounds of sesame (valued at more than 60,000 Rps.) in 1900/01.<sup>23</sup> Lindi port also exported 4,782,064 lbs. of millet and 209,682 lbs. of maize in the 1902/03 season. Mikindani exported an additional 483,572 lbs. of millet and 143,119 lbs. of maize in the same year.<sup>24</sup> While most of the export produce was sent to other parts of the GEA coast, a considerable portion was shipped abroad.<sup>25</sup> The commercial sector in Lindi town correspondingly grew. In addition to the DOAG, the Lindi register included 59 Indian, 14 Arabic, and 4 Swahili companies by 1899. There was a European-run Trade & Planters Society in Lindi (*Lindi Handels & Pflanzungsgesellschaft*) and an Indian commercial sector in the town (called *Inderstrasse*), which resembled those in Mombasa, Tanga, and Dar es Salaam.<sup>26</sup> When Fülleborn visited Lindi in 1898, the town boasted evening lantern lighting, clean streets, and a small zoo that included monkeys, antelopes, birds of prey, a porcupine, and more.<sup>27</sup> A small team of German administrators kept busy each day with customs and administrative transactions, drilling Africans soldiers, supervising construction work, and

---

124-130; Koponen, *Development for Exploitation*, 198-201; Sunseri, *Vilimani*, 26-44; and J.G. Deutsch, *Emancipation Without Abolition in German East Africa, c. 1884-1914* (Oxford: James Currey, 2006).

<sup>22</sup> Fülleborn, *Das Deutsche Njassa- und Ruwuma-Gebiet*, 4; and Iliffe, *A Modern History of Tanganyika*, 130.

<sup>23</sup> Fülleborn, *Das Deutsche Njassa- und Ruwuma-Gebiet*, 4.

<sup>24</sup> Becker, "A social history of Southeast Tanzania," 73. Kilwa, in comparison, exported 1.5 million kg. of millet in 1889. Becker noted that the figures for millet and maize exports comprised peasant- and plantation production. Porters transported the bulk of the produce to the coast at the turn of the twentieth century.

<sup>25</sup> Fülleborn, *Das Deutsche Njassa- und Ruwuma-Gebiet*, 4. Fülleborn did not indicate how much produce was shipped overseas – "In den 90er Jahren des vorigen Jahrhunderts war Sorghum das Hauptezeugnis des Bezirks, und Lindi galt als die Kornkammer der Kolonie, die nicht nur andere Teile der Deutsch-ostafrikanischen Küste versorgte, sondern auch beträchtliche Mengen ins Ausland verschiffte sondern auch beträchtliche Mengen ins Ausland verschiffte[...]" He also acknowledged that the district's production rates vacillated in relation to outbreaks of crop diseases, locust, and periodic droughts.

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.*, 3; and Karl Weule, *Native Life in East Africa: The Result of an Ethnological Research Expedition*, trans. Alice Werner (London: Sire Isaac Pitman & Sons, Ltd., 1909), 41, <<https://books.google.com/books?id=im4LAQAIAAJ&printsec=frontcover&dq=Native+Life+in+East+Africa>>. Ten years after Fülleborn's visit, German geographer and ethnologist Karl Weule offered the following description of the Indian sector: "It is true that the long winding street in which the Indians have their shops is just as ugly – though not without picturesque touches here and there – as the corresponding quarters in Mombasa, Tanga and Dar es Salaam."

<sup>27</sup> Fülleborn, *Das Deutsche Njassa- und Ruwuma-Gebiet*, 12. Fülleborn resided with the German administrators in the spacious, clean, and functional government *boma* along the banks of the Lukuledi River. He likened Lindi to a German village rather than a city.

offering medical treatment at the state-run clinic. Evenings were spent with sunset walks, visiting the Arab baths, or drinking alcohol at the “Greeks.”<sup>28</sup> Lindi town was named the administrative headquarters of the south in 1899. Kilwa’s decline and Lindi’s ascension as the major economic and political capital in the south served as evidence that German efforts to reorient the borderland’s economy from slave and ivory trading towards large-scale agricultural production and exportation were showing signs of success at the end of the twentieth century.<sup>29</sup>

In order to fully exploit the resources of the Ruvuma borderland’s interior and transform its landscape according to a plantation-based economy, both the Germans and Portuguese sought to improve and “modernize” the region’s transportation infrastructure with engineered roads and railways. The existing caravan routes that traversed the borderland were,

[...] at their best no more than single-file trails through long grass or bush which had to be broken afresh each season, often nothing beyond the experience of the guide from one village or one landmark to another, they vary their course from season to season, from year to year.<sup>30</sup>

The British merchant, Sir William Mackinnon, led the first attempt to construct a broad-cleared road from Dar es Salaam to Lake Malawi in 1876.<sup>31</sup> The project was abandoned five years and 73 miles later due to harsh working conditions and the prevalence of tsetse flies (which spread sleeping sickness among humans and killed livestock by transmitting trypanosomiasis). Despite the failure, Europeans believed that the road had a “civilizing” influence on the local population and stimulated agricultural production in

---

<sup>28</sup> Ibid., 12. Fülleborn explained that an Armenian, rather than a Greek, owned the drinking establishment. According to Fülleborn, “Greek” became synonymous with pub-owners in GEA because Greeks typically operated the all-purpose shops that poured drinks. Over five years after Fülleborn’s visit, Weule described how lavish meals interrupted mundane life in Lindi. Lunches consisting of two courses and a desert were followed by dinners that in Germany would be considered a “public banquet.” The meals were justified in order to strengthen the men’s minds and bodies against the “deleterious influence of the climate.” Weule described his own voracious appetite: “Personally, though I wield quiet a creditable knife and fork at home, my performances out here would make me the terror of most German housewives.” See Weule, *Native Life in East Africa*, 43.

<sup>29</sup> Becker, “Sudden Disaster and Slow Change,” 303-04.

<sup>30</sup> Alison Smith, “The Southern Section of the Interior 1840-1884,” in *History of East Africa*, vol. 1, eds. Roland Oliver and Gervase Mathew (Oxford, 1963), 253-296: 267.

<sup>31</sup> Details about the Mackinnon road can be found in numerous text, including: Rolf Hofmeier, *Transport and Economic Development in Tanzania with particular reference to roads and road transport* (München:Weltforum Verlag, 1973); Frank M. Chiteji, *The Development and Socio-Economic Impact of Transportation in Tanzania, 1884-Present* (Washington D.C.: University Press of America, 1980); and Joshua Grace, “Modernization *Bubu*: Cars, Roads, and the Politics of Development in Tanzania, 1870s-1980s” (PhD diss., Michigan State University, 2013), 71-72.

adjacent lands.<sup>32</sup> James F. Elton praised the supposedly philanthropic enterprise for encouraging “others to come forward to aid in opening up this vast continent in which they have so practically interested themselves.”<sup>33</sup> More road development projects followed, including those along the southern trade corridors. The Sultan of Zanzibar allegedly planned to construct ““a road to the coast”” through the Ruvuma borderland.<sup>34</sup> Chauncy Maples also advocated to the Royal Geographical Society (RGS) in London the construction of a permanent road from Lindi to Lake Malawi via the Lukuledi Valley and Masasi:

It is our belief that, making allowances for a detour in order to avoid hills, a tolerably level road might be made connecting Lindi with the lake at Losewa, whose length need not exceed 400 miles, and which should follow the line of population and strike directly through the country where to this day the slave trade is briskly carried on: it would cross the Rovuma near Majeje, and at the point where the main caravan route from the lake to Kilwa strikes it, and thence through the country where the great Yao tribe has its centre to the shores of the lake.<sup>35</sup>

Reverend Randolph of the RGS applauded Maples suggestion, arguing that a permanent road to Masasi would assist local missionaries and offer “the very best means of opening up the country.”<sup>36</sup> Following their acquisition of GEA, the German colonial government expressed interests in replacing the single-file, caravan footpaths in the southern region with permanent roads for wagon and automobile traffic.<sup>37</sup> The government, however, debated whether road construction was economically viable considering that they would need to level steep gradients, bridge numerous watercourses, and annually remove the shrubbery

---

<sup>32</sup> Hofmeier, *Transport and Economic Development in Tanzania*, 55-56. Hofmeier quoted John Kirk (then British Consul of Zanzibar) and his assessment of the road: “As a philanthropic undertaking it has been eminently successful and its civilizing influence upon the people is very apparent. It has yet, however, reached no highway of commerce, and the local trade, though fast increasing, is small. Unfortunately the presence of the tsetse-fly after the first forty miles from the coast makes it hopeless to attempt the use of horses and bullocks. Now anyone may traverse the country unarmed. I noticed that along many miles the natives have formed extensive fields in the adjacent lands and had commenced to settle in open and cleared spaces.”

<sup>33</sup> James Frederick Elton, *Travels and Researches among the Lakes and Mountains of Eastern and Central Africa*, ed. H.B. Cotterill (London: John Murray, 1879), 21. Elton assumed that the road would make speedy progress once “experience is gained and managing the native labourer and dealing with the chiefs through whose districts the road must pass.”

<sup>34</sup> Terence Ranger, “European Attitudes and African Realities: The Rise and Fall of the Matola Chiefs of Southeast Africa,” *The Journal of African History* 20, no.1 (1979): 63-82.

<sup>35</sup> Chauncy Maples, “Masasi and the Rovuma District in East Africa,” *Proceedings of the Royal Geographical Society and Monthly Record of Geography*, New Monthly Series 2, no. 6 (June 1880): 337-353, 339.

<sup>36</sup> Maples, “Masasi and the Rovuma District in East Africa,” 352. Randolph, however, argued that the roadway should be metaled to permit the passage of wagons and traction engines, such as on Zanzibar.

<sup>37</sup> Fülleborn, *Das Deutsche Njassa- und Ruwuma-Gebiet*, 16-17.



that quickly invaded all pathways.<sup>38</sup> The government ultimately prioritized railway construction over roadworks. Across the African continent, European colonial powers and private investors envisioned railways as the most effective mode of transport for opening the African interior for colonial rule and economic “development” – namely the efficient and cheap export of bulk goods to the coast and overseas markets.<sup>39</sup> The Germans began constructing the Tanga Line in 1893. The government also made plans to construct a central line from Dar es Salaam to Kigoma and a southern line from Kilwa to Lake Malawi.<sup>40</sup> Across the Ruvuma border, the Nyassa Company planned to construct a rival rail through northern PEA to Lake Malawi to open the interior for coffee and sugar plantations and the mining of gold, silver, iron, and coal deposits.<sup>41</sup>

Both the Nyassa Company and German administrations struggled to realize their visions for the future of the Ruvuma borderland. Neither administration possessed the necessary finances and manpower to exert their authority, exploit local resources, construct a new infrastructure, and alter indigenous economic and mobility patterns. The number of the German civilian officials in GEA declined from 241 to 198 men between 1899 and 1904, while the number of German military officers rose from a meager 162 to 218 between 1896 and 1905.<sup>42</sup> Juhani Koponen argued that the number of German officials and officers remained minimal because of their cost: “white manpower was by far the costliest ingredient of

---

<sup>38</sup> Ibid., 16-19. Fülleborn described that a number of new rest houses were constructed along the caravan routes. He also complimented local communities for their skill with constructing wood bridges. Most rivers, however, had to be waded through.

<sup>39</sup> Daniel R. Headrick, *The Tools of Empire: Technology and European Imperialism in the Nineteenth Century* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1981); Daniel R. Headrick, *The Tentacles of Progress: Technology Transfer in the Age of Imperialism, 1850-1940: Technology Transfer in the Age of Imperialism, 1850-1940* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988); Michael Adas, *Machines as the Measure of Men: Science, Technology, and Ideologies of Western Dominance* (Ithaca, USA: Cornell University Press, 1989); and Casper Anderson, *British Engineers and Africa, 1875-1914* (London: Pickering & Chatto, 2011).

<sup>40</sup> Hofmeier, *Transport and Economic Development*, 57; and Chau P Johnsen Kelly, “A Tale of Two Cities, Mikindani and Mtwara: Consuming Development in southeastern Tanganyika, 1910-1960” (PhD diss., University of California Davis, 2010), 53. Lack of funds interrupted railway construction numerous times. The Tanga Line did not reach Moshi until 1911.

<sup>41</sup> Neil-Tomlinson, “The Nyassa Chartered Company,” 112.

<sup>42</sup> Koponen, *Development for Exploitation*, 133-134.

the colonial state, and the scantiness of the resources which were put at its disposal called for the utmost economizing.”<sup>43</sup>




Figure 2.1 District Headquarters and Sub-District Offices in Southern GEA<sup>44</sup>

Only a small fraction of the 5,279,255 Marks of state expenditures granted to GEA in 1890/91 was earmarked for development activities across the territory.<sup>45</sup> The financial and manpower situation was worse across the Ruvuma border. The Nyassa Company’s concessionary could hardly obtain the £10,000 required to activate its charter and initiate “development.”<sup>46</sup> The group of bankrupt merchants running the company’s board prioritized speculative stock manipulation rather than investing directly in the concession.<sup>47</sup> With only a few custom posts in the interior, the company collected a mere £776 in hut taxes over an area of 80,000 sq. miles in 1898.<sup>48</sup>

<sup>43</sup> Ibid., 134.

<sup>44</sup> Ibid., 111. The squares indicate the district headquarters and the circles indicate the sub-district offices.

<sup>45</sup> Ibid., 135-36. Koponen found that GEA received “preferential treatment in budget matters” over the other German colonies “because it was thought to be the colony with most attraction for private capital.” Koponen, however, calculated that the combined colonial budgets equated to “less than one per cent of all the imperial German expenditure in the 1890s.”

<sup>46</sup> Vail, “Mozambique’s Chartered Companies,” 393.

<sup>47</sup> Neil-Tomlinson, “The Nyassa Chartered Company,” 114-115.

<sup>48</sup> Vail, “Mozambique’s Chartered Companies,” 397-98.



introduced a three rupee hut tax in 1898 to stimulate wage employment. The state also implemented *Gesinde* regulations (similar to the British master-and-servants ordinances), which introduced labor contracts and criminalized contract breaches and desertion. Those who failed to pay their taxes or refused to work for wages were forced to work on the plantations and/or corvée projects, such as road construction.<sup>54</sup> The state's gradualist emancipation policy permitted the continued use of slaves on coastal plantations.<sup>55</sup> Despite the state's efforts, labor demand exceeded supply.<sup>56</sup> Thaddeus Sunseri argued that local peasants and long-distance migrants leveraged labor shortages to demand better wages and working conditions on European plantations in the hinterland of Kilwa and Lindi prior to 1905.<sup>57</sup> The region's long-distance trade economy, meanwhile, continued to be controlled by local "big men" and Indian merchants operating on both sides of the Ruvuma border. Much of the rubber, ivory, and tobacco exported from Lindi and Mikindani ports was produced in and transported from PEA by Africans.<sup>58</sup> The handful of European traders and DOAG agents who dealt in crude rubber, beeswax, and other African commodities at the onset of German colonialism struggled to compete with Indian merchants and their well-developed trade and credit networks.<sup>59</sup> The German administration was so out-of-touch with the

---

<sup>54</sup> *Ibid.*, 55 and 62-66. In addition to convicts, European plantations also employed indentured Asians. The state imposed additional corvée obligations (beyond that required of tax-defaulter laborers) for men, women, and children until 1905. These laborers were unpaid.

<sup>55</sup> *Ibid.*, 31-40. Sunseri described how the Germans combined the German practice of *Gesindewesen* with East African practices of slave pawning, hiring, and ransoming to permit and control slave working on German plantations.

<sup>56</sup> *Ibid.*, 52-59 and 65. Sunseri argued that many men continued to work for the caravans. Caravanning offered men an avenue to avoid corvée and plantation labor and earn money to pay taxes and buy commodities. As a consequence, women were increasingly left to shoulder the burden of agricultural production and colonial taxation. Those women who were unable to pay the tax were put to work clearing roads, draining swamps, and constructing bridges and irrigation channels.

<sup>57</sup> *Ibid.*, 70-71.

<sup>58</sup> Fülleborn, *Das Deutsche Njassa- und Ruwuma-Gebiet*, 39. German military campaigns in Ungoni and the construction of a military station in Songea stimulated long distance trade by reducing the risks of raiding. The number of caravans dispatched from Kilwa rose from 5,050 to 11,334 loads between 1897 and 1903. Iliffe argued that German colonialism ushered in a brief period of prosperity to southern GEA in comparison with nineteenth century experiences of slave raiding and Ngoni incursions. See Iliffe, *A Modern History of Tanganyika*, 130; Becker, "A social history of Southeast Tanzania," 57-59; Becker, "Traders, 'Big Men' and Prophets," 9; and Lorne Larson, "The Ngindo: Exploring the Center of the Maji Maji Rebellion," in *Maji Maji: Lifting the Fog of War*, eds. James Giblin and Jamie Monson (Boston: BRILL, 2010): 71-114, 94.

<sup>59</sup> J. Gus Liebenow, *Colonial Rule and Political Development in Tanzania: The Case of the Makonde* (Evanston: Northwestern Publishing House, 1971), 80; Iliffe, *A Modern History of Tanganyika*, 129; Nicholas J. Haan,

regional trade networks that the first German commander in Lindi depended upon an informant in the Lindi business community to simply know when caravans arrived near the town.<sup>60</sup>

The southern German administration responded to their ineptitude at controlling regional labor and trade markets by adopting attitudes of “entreaty, extortion, and manipulation” when engaging with African “big men” and Indian traders.<sup>61</sup> The powerful “big men” of the Lindi corridor, in turn, exploited alliances with German authorities in order to consolidate and extend their power vis-à-vis their rivals. German officers interfered minimally with the authority of these local rulers, as long they maintained peace, commerce, and the illusion of German rule – such as displaying the German flag.<sup>62</sup> There was little German administrators could initially do when African leaders disobeyed colonial authority. Machemba, for instance, ruled autonomously for eight years in the hinterland of Mikindani and became known as one of the “most formidable and persistent opponents of the original imposition of German rule”.<sup>63</sup> A large German campaign in 1899 finally drove Machemba and his followers into PEA. Machemba, however, continued to disrupt German trade by causing unrest on the Mueda Plateau.<sup>64</sup> He also conducted a lengthy campaign of resistance against Portuguese rule.<sup>65</sup> The imposition of colonial taxation, corvée labor, and plantation economics impacted communities in the Ruvuma borderland unevenly during the final decades

---

“Transitioning Economies, Cultures, and Woodlands – Cashews and Deforestation in Southeastern Tanzania” (PhD diss., Clark University, 2002), 85; Thaddeus Sunseri, “The War of the Hunters: Maji Maji and the Decline of the Ivory Trade,” in *Maji Maji: Lifting the Fog of War*, eds. James Giblin and Jamie Monson (Boston: BRILL, 2010): 115-148, 127; and Thaddeus Sunseri, “Reinterpreting a Colonial Rebellion: Forestry and Social Control in German East Africa, 1874-1915,” *Environmental History* 8, no. 3 (July 2003): 430-451, 435. Although Fülleborn described Indians as the usurers of the country, he marveled at the intelligence and skill of the Indian craftsmen operating in the southern coastal towns. He also offered a slightly softer portrayal of successful Indian businessmen than his European contemporaries. He detailed how one prominent Indian businessman, named Sewa Haji (Seba Hajji), utilized his wealth to sponsor charitable foundations and the construction of a namesake hospital for the non-European population of Dar es Salaam. See Fülleborn, *Das Deutsche Njassa- und Ruwuma-Gebiet*, 7-8 and 14.

<sup>60</sup> Becker, “A social history of Southeast Tanzania,” 57-59.

<sup>61</sup> *Ibid.*; and Sunseri, “The War of the Hunters,” 129.

<sup>62</sup> Michael Pesek, “The Boma and the Peripatetic Ruler: Mapping Colonial Rule in German East Africa, 1889-1903,” *Western Folklore* 66, No. 3/4 (Summer - Fall 2007): 233-257, 247. Pesek aptly characterized German colonial rule in East Africa as peripatetic. German officers periodically arrived at villages, performed a “ritual” that reaffirmed German colonial rule, and left. In some cases, a colonial officer visited every other year.

<sup>63</sup> Becker, “Traders, ‘Big Men’ and Prophets,” 5.

<sup>64</sup> Fülleborn, *Das Deutsche Njassa- und Ruwuma-Gebiet*, 58. According to Fülleborn, Machemba damaged the rubber trade in Mikindani by making the rubber-rich areas of northern PEA unsafe.

<sup>65</sup> Iliffe, *A Modern History of Tanganyika*, 98.

of the nineteenth century. Many communities in the interior were not incorporated under colonial authority, and instead exploited their liminal position between two colonial economic and political systems to their advantage.

### Rebellion and Colonial “Pacification” Campaigns

The relatively stable conditions in southern GEA and northern PEA during the 1890s gave way to a wave of violence in the first decades of the 1900s. The first major disturbance in the Ruvuma borderland began in southeastern GEA on July 28, 1905. On that date, the Maji Maji uprising began with African rebels attacking Kibata and nearby cotton plantations. More rebel violence followed in August – from the burning of the Liwale *boma* and killing of its garrison; to the annihilation of a small *Schutztruppe* detachment on its way from Songea to Liwale; and the destruction of the Benedictine Mission station at Lukuledi and UMCA mission station at Masasi.<sup>66</sup>



Figure 2.3 Area of the Maji Maji Rebellion<sup>67</sup>

<sup>66</sup> Becker, “A social history of Southeast Tanzania,” 91. A few of the seminal works in the Maji Maji historiography include: John Iliffe and Gilbert Gwassa, *Records of the Maji Maji Rising, Part One* (Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1968); John Iliffe, “The organisation of the Maji Maji rebellion,” *JAH* 8 (1967): 495-512; Gilbert Gwassa, “Kinjikitile and the Ideology of Maji Maji,” in *The Historical Study of African Religion*, eds. Terrence Ranger and Isaria N. Kimambo (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972), 202-218; and James Giblin and Jamie Monson, eds., *Maji Maji: Lifting the Fog of War* (Boston: BRILL, 2010).

<sup>67</sup> Miximilian Dörrbecker, “Maji-Maji-Aufstand,” [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Maji\\_Maji\\_Rebellion](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Maji_Maji_Rebellion). Translations for the map: *Maji Maji Aufstand* (Maji Maji Insurrection); *Gebiet der Aufstände* (Area of the insurrection); and

Although the uprising and guerilla warfare continued until 1907, the rebellion had largely ended along the southeastern coast by 1906. When visiting Lindi town in July 1906, German geographer and ethnologist, Dr. Karl Weule, observed that two groups predominated on the town's streets – African rebels in chain-gangs and the *askari* (African soldiers) guarding them.<sup>68</sup> As Weule ventured into the interior, he witnessed the destructive impact of German “pacification” efforts against the rebellion. The Wamwera in Lindi District survived in deplorable conditions without shelter after troops leveled their villages to ground. The women and children who came out of hiding were emaciated, filthy, and suffering from skin-diseases.<sup>69</sup> People left the main caravan routes during and after the rebellion in order to avoid retribution and forced conscription by the colonial state. They also sought to avoid porters and *askari* who plundered food supplies throughout the southern districts.<sup>70</sup> According to Weule,

Every caravan of inland natives on their way to the coast, whether to sell their supplies of wax, tobacco or what not, or to engage themselves as labourers to some European, considered that they had a natural right to expect food and drink from the villagers along their route. Even the caravan of a white man is apt to make the same sort of demands on the villagers. [...The villager] therefore prefers to pull down his huts and build new ones in the bush at a distance from the main road, where they can only be reached by narrow side paths.<sup>71</sup>

Labor recruiters also pillaged villages. A recruiter named Wisliceny ordered his 200 recruits, porters, and *askari* to raid the villages they passed from Songea to Lindi for food in 1909. Thaddeus Sunseri recounted the story,

They emptied all grain storage bins in half dozen villages, dug potatoes and cassava out of the fields, and plundered stores of rice, beans, and blankets. The villager Kalindo testified that Wisliceny's men stole four *pishi* (about 24 lbs.) of salt. When another villager fought a porter who was pillaging his millet field, Wisliceny had him beaten twenty-five times and confiscated all his possessions.<sup>72</sup>

---

*Volksstamm* (ethnic group). Also note the German variations of spelling for Songea (Ssongea) and Masasi (Massassi).

<sup>68</sup> Weule, *Native Life in East Africa*, 28. Karl Weule conducted more than six months of research among African peoples on the Makonde and Mwera Plateaus. While in Lindi, Weule observed the execution of rebels, including Seliman Mamba. Weule also observed tension among the town's small German community. Following the rebellion, the military administration in GEA was replaced with civilian personnel. According to Weule, the military element in Lindi looked down upon the new civil administration. See Weule, *Native Life in East Africa*, 53.

<sup>69</sup> *Ibid.*, 41.

<sup>70</sup> Sunseri, *Vilimani*, 117.

<sup>71</sup> Weule, *Native Life in East Africa*, 52.

<sup>72</sup> Sunseri, *Vilimani*, 140.

To the west, nearly a hundred Ngoni “aristocrats” were hung, effectively destroying the “Ngoni military society.”<sup>73</sup> With the power structures and patronage networks of the Kilwa corridor in shambles, many traders and plantation owners suffered financial ruin as their goods and crops were destroyed and looted.<sup>74</sup> Coastal elites struggled to rebuild Kilwa’s economy after the uprising. Efforts to restore the rubber trade failed as plantation-produced rubber from Southeast Asia came to dominate the international market in 1912.<sup>75</sup> Kilwa also lost access to the profitable forest produce in its hinterland after the German administration established a series of forest and wildlife reserves. These reserves limited access to the centuries-old Kilwa-Songea caravan routes as well.<sup>76</sup> Although the rebellion disrupted trade through the Lindi corridor, many of the “big men” were spared German reprisals because they allied with the Germans at the onset of the rebellion. These “big men” positioned themselves to take advantage of the political and economic opportunities created in the aftermath of the rebellion vis-à-vis rival leaders who chose to support the rebellion and lost.<sup>77</sup>

Many individuals and communities fled across the Ruvuma in response to the Maji Maji uprising, but prospects were hardly better in northern PEA. The reorganization of the Nyassa Company and an infusion of British and South African mining capital in 1908 enabled the company to conduct widespread occupation operations.<sup>78</sup> The campaigns were met by determined resistance from African “big men” and

---

<sup>73</sup> Iliffe, *A Modern History of Tanganyika*, 200.

<sup>74</sup> Ibid. Becker offered the account of one of Kilwa’s largest traders, Rashid bin Masoud, whose debts amounted to nearly 10,000 rupees. The German government and DOAG bailed out Rashid bin Masoud because of his support of the campaigns against Maji Maji in Songea. See Becker, “Sudden Disaster and Slow Change,” 304.

<sup>75</sup> Ibid.

<sup>76</sup> Sunseri, “Reinterpreting a Colonial Rebellion” 443; and Thaddeus Suseri, *Wielding the Ax: State Forestry and Social Conflict in Tanzania, 1820-2000* (Athens, USA: Ohio University Press, 2009), 103. By the end of German colonial rule, the Germans had dedicated over 63,000 hectares of land as reserves in the Rufiji district. The British colonial state amalgamated the reserves into the Selous Reserve in 1928.

<sup>77</sup> Ibid.; and Becker, “A social history of Southeast Tanzania,” 68.

<sup>78</sup> Prior to 1908, the Nyassa Company had two boards, one in Lisbon and one in London. The chairman of the Lisbon board, Dr. Antonio Centena, largely controlled the company’s operations. When the Nyassa Company found itself on the precipice of financial ruin, it was saved by a subsidiary company formed in London - the Nyassa Consolidated Company. The Consolidated Company was controlled by a well-known financial firm from London and Johannesburg that had ties to mining operations – Lewis and Marks. The Consolidated Company exerted considerable influence over Nyassa Company’s operations, especially since they had intimate links with the London branch of the Nyassa Company. (They shared the same chairman and secretary.) See BNA FO 367/291 Portugal



chiefs, including Mchemba and Mataka. Mchemba's forces defeated 400 men sent by the Nyassa Company in 1907. The British consulate in Beira concluded that Mchemba and his people were in "full and undisputed possession [of the territory]" and the "influence of the governing Company is wholly unfelt."<sup>79</sup> Mataka also repelled a number of company incursions and led successful raids in the first decade of the twentieth century. Mataka was finally defeated in 1912, and was forced to flee across the Ruvuma into Tunduru District with his followers.<sup>80</sup> Only the Makonde plateau remained outside the company's control by 1918.<sup>81</sup>

### **Aftermath of the Colonial Military Campaigns – Instability and Opportunities**

The violent campaigns conducted on both sides of the Ruvuma undermined the stability and economic growth of the borderland region. Local populations contended with violence, famine, plagues of wild pigs and vermin, encroachment of tsetse flies and wildlife, and significant changes in local and regional power dynamics.<sup>82</sup> African communities depended upon their mobility to escape the increasingly oppressive colonial regimes and adverse environmental conditions that threatened their lives and livelihoods. Many responded to the violence and instability by migrating to more secure areas of the borderland or immigrating out of the region. Weule observed countless migrations and new settlement in southern GEA in 1906,

---

1912, Letter from Dr. L. Bostock transmitted from Errol MacDonell, Consul General Lourenço Marques, to Sir Edward Grey, 5 July 1912; Vail, "Mozambique's Chartered Companies," 399-400; and Neil-Thomlinson, "The Nyassa Chartered Company," 116-17.

<sup>79</sup> BNA FO 367/48 Portugal 1907, H.B.M. Consulate, Beira, to Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, "Fighting in the Nyasa Company's Territory," 12 March 1907.

<sup>80</sup> Neil-Thomlinson, "The Nyassa Chartered Company," 116-117; and Edward A. Alpers, "Trade, State, and Society among the Yao in the Nineteenth Century" *The Journal of African History* 10, no. 3 (1969): 405-420, 420. The "unprecedented size" of the Portuguese force included 18 Europeans, 370 sepoys, and 2,500 African 'auxiliaries'.

<sup>81</sup> BNA FO 608/216 Peace Conference British Delegation 1919 (724/1/1-751/1/1), Thos. Aspling, "Nyassa Consolidated Limited: Part 2 Very Private and Confidential, Makonde Affair," 3 July 1919; and Vail, "Mozambique's Chartered Companies," 398.

<sup>82</sup> Iliffe, *A Modern History of Tanganyika*, 199-202; Ross Anderson, *The Forgotten Front: The East African Campaign 1914-1918* (Stroud, Gloucestershire: Tempus Publishing Limited, 2004), 39; and Jamie Monson, "Relocating the Maji Maji: The Politics of Alliance and Authority in the Southern Highlands of Tanzania, 1870-1918," *Journal of African History* 39 (1998): 95-120, 117. Becker warned against isolating Maji Maji as the sole cause for the marginalization of southern Tanzania. She argued that the Maji Maji was "part of a sequence of disasters," beginning with the violence and destruction caused by nineteenth century raiding and continuing with the First World War. See Becker, "Sudden Disaster and Slow Change," 300.

[...] the immigration of foreign (though still African) elements takes place, here in the south, quietly and almost imperceptibly – a band, a horde, a group of families, sometimes, but not always, under the command of a chief, appears one fine day, hoes a piece of land at a suitable place in the *pori*, builds a few airy huts, and the immigration is complete.<sup>83</sup>

According to John Iliffe, twelve per cent of Dar es Salaam's population originated from southern GEA by 1905 and over 6,000 Africans in the south annually left for the coast by 1910.<sup>84</sup> As local populations relocated within and beyond the borderland region, the colonial governments reevaluated their development plans for the region in the aftermath of their "pacification" campaigns. The Nyassa Company chose to abandon its original agricultural development schemes, believing that plantations could not remain solvent and pay for military occupation over such a vast and inaccessible territory:

In this case, the cost of conquest was too high and the likely returns from agriculture too low and too uncertain for the vision of economic development to persist.<sup>85</sup>

The company instead reconceived northern PEA as a labor reservoir for South African mines, and entered into a lucrative labor recruitment agreement with Witwatersrand Native Labor Association (WNLA).<sup>86</sup> Contracts were also given to private firms to exploit local resources, including the Nyassa Rubber Company.<sup>87</sup> Most of these enterprises, however, failed. The lucrative contract with the WNLA also collapsed in May 1913 after labor recruiting for South African mines was prohibited above 22°S.<sup>88</sup> Thereafter, Nyassa Company's revenues became almost exclusively tied to the collection of hut taxes. Company officers and police (Portuguese and African) committed innumerable abuses in their efforts to collect sufficient revenues for the company and generate individual profits by forcing local Africans to work on their private plantations. The British reported cases of beatings, murder, rape, and robbery as

---

<sup>83</sup> Weule, *Native Life in East Africa*, 49.

<sup>84</sup> Iliffe, *A Modern History of Tanganyika*, 161.

<sup>85</sup> Neil-Thomlinson, "The Nyassa Chartered Company," 118-19.

<sup>86</sup> Vail, "Mozambique's Chartered Companies," 398.

<sup>87</sup> *Ibid.*, 399-400. Lewis and Marks controlled the Nyassa Consolidated Company, Nyassa Rubber Company, and Nyassa Trading Company.

<sup>88</sup> Neil-Thomlinson, "The Nyassa Chartered Company," 119-20.

early as 1901.<sup>89</sup> Bishop J.E. Hine, for example, reported that Portuguese and African soldiers acted without impunity along the eastern coast of Lake Malawi:

They carry off the people's fowls and goats, raid villages, burn houses, compel whole villages to work like slaves, just at the time of year when it is imperative that they should be hoeing and planting their gardens, else there will be a famine. They insult the Chiefs, they insult the women (grossly I hear – but I have not yet got clear enough evidence on this point to make it public): but the Portuguese, José &c., seemed to look upon it as a matter of course that the women of the village should be at the service of the lusts and brutality of these coast men whom he is supposed to command.<sup>90</sup>

Corruption and violence were especially common among company officers in distant outposts following the pacification campaigns. A medical officer of the WNLA and subsequent British Vice-Consul of Porto Amelia, Dr. Bostock, filed reports accusing officers of collecting excessive taxes for personal benefit and forcing African men and women to work on the officers' plantations without pay and adequate food.<sup>91</sup> Dr. Bostock argued that the hut tax generated a renewable supply of free labor from defenseless women:

The method of collection is extremely simple. At tax collection time, (particularly if labour is required on the plantation of the *Chefe do Posto*), armed soldiers are sent out in all directions, to arrest every woman on whom they can lay hands. The women are brought in as prisoners, they work on the *Chefe's* plantation all day, and are locked up all night, while frequently they are underfed. Here the women remain until their fathers or husbands bring in the money to pay the hut tax, or until less labour is required on the plantation. They are in fact temporary slaves. [...] But in general, there is plenty of labour available, and new gangs are impressed every few days or weeks.<sup>92</sup>

---

<sup>89</sup> The validity of British accusations must be scrutinized in the context of tense diplomatic relations between the British and Portuguese. The British and Portuguese were rivals in Central Africa. The Portuguese leveraged their control of the coast and Zambezi River, which the British in Nyasaland relied upon. Livingstone believed that the Portuguese sought to “gain by the labor & enterprises of others,” and disapproved of Portuguese commercial restrictions, slave-raiding, and out-of-date methods of production. Livingstone quoted a Portuguese merchant in Tette as proof of their greedy pretenses in Africa: “What do I care for this country?” said the most enterprising of the Tette merchants, “all I want is to make money as soon as possible, and then go to Bombay and enjoy it.” [George Shepperson, *David Livingstone and the Rovuma*, (Edinburg: Edinburg University Press, 1965), 19, 101, and 198.] The next chapter will discuss the numerous reports British personnel filed regarding Portuguese atrocities committed during and immediately after the First World War.

<sup>90</sup> BNA FO 2/667 Major Spilsbury's Expedition in Portuguese Nyasaland, Letter from Bishop J.E. Hine to Canon Holland, 1 January 1901. The available primary documentation did not indicate if there were existing tensions between coastal and inland populations.

<sup>91</sup> BNA FO 367/344 Portugal 1913, Letter from Dr. Leonard Bostock, British Vice-Consul, Porto Amelia to Errol MacDonnell, Consul-General Lourenço Marques, 6 September 1913. Portuguese officials insisted that the laborers were tax defaulters.

<sup>92</sup> BNA FO 367/291, Letter from Dr. L. Bostock, Medical Officer to the Witwatersrand Native Labour Association to Errol MacDonnell Consul-General Lourenço Marques, 10 June 1912; and BNA FO 367/344, Letter from Dr. Leonard Bostock, British Vice-Consul Porto Amelia, to Errol MacDonnell, Consul-General Lourenço Marques, 6 September 1913.

Some of the imprisoned women could not be rescued because their husbands were working in mines abroad. A Nyassa Consolidated employee in the interior, named Cazes, reported that women often worked without pay, food, or tools on the sub-district commissioners' plantations:

[...] women are dying at a rate of 1,2,3,4 or 5 every day; that their bodies are thrown out on the veld without burial, and are eaten by lions; that on one occasion a dog carried a head back to the Boma, and continued to eat it sitting among the other prisoners [...].<sup>93</sup>

Company superiors rarely investigated incidents brought to their attention. Guilty European officers were typically "punished" with retirement and a free passage back to Lisbon.<sup>94</sup> Dr. Bostock suspected that company officials and shareholders in Lisbon and London covered up "scandals" to assure the continuation of the Nyassa Company charter.<sup>95</sup> In an effort to maximize profits and minimize costs, the Nyassa Company chose to ignore its charter following their "pacification" campaigns. It made little-to-no effort to construct new transportation infrastructure, build hospitals, and improve education, health, and social services.<sup>96</sup>

The situation across the Ruvuma border in southern GEA was noticeably different. An influx of Europeans came to southeastern GEA (particularly Lindi District) in the aftermath of the Maji Maji uprising. When Weule returned to Lindi at the conclusion of his expedition (November 1906), he found that the town was booming. An influx of capital and new arrivals from Germany were "setting about their economic exploitation," specifically the creation of new plantations.<sup>97</sup> Although the "plantation imperative" ended as a state policy in the wake of the uprising and Dernburg Reforms, the period after

---

<sup>93</sup> BNA FO 367/344, Letter from Dr. Leonard Bostock to Errol MacDonnell, 6 September 1913.

<sup>94</sup> Ibid. African victims were supposedly too afraid to report crimes to senior Portuguese officials because culpable soldiers acted as interpreters for the Portuguese (who typically did not speak the local languages). Dr. Bostock recounted two particularly heinous stories. In the first instance, a Portuguese *Chefe do Concelho* (named Fereira) thought one of his female workers (forced to work on his plantation) was not working hard enough. He proceeded to take her babies and put them in the large money chest in his office. When she completed her work, she found her children dead. Not long after, Fereira was dismissed, but no public investigation was held and he eventually left the territory. Bostock also heard of a Portuguese *Chefe do Chondelho* at Medo who murdered people, cut off women's breasts, hung up men by the legs and dropped them so their heads hit a large stone. The man was dismissed and allowed to leave the country.

<sup>95</sup> Ibid.

<sup>96</sup> Vail, "Mozambique's Chartered Companies," 400.

<sup>97</sup> Weule, *Native Life in East Africa*, 393. Weule reported that women in the Newala area wore new calico that their "gallant husbands" had recently purchased from Indian traders at Lindi or Mrweka "at great expense" (222).

1906 was “the high tide of plantation development as the number of small-scale settlers and large corporate plantations [throughout GEA] tripled in number by 1910.”<sup>98</sup> Most settlers gravitated to the Usambara highlands and along the Central Railway, yet a number of Europeans established plantations in the Lukuledi Valley in the southeast.<sup>99</sup> W. Werneyer and Paul Kaiser, for example, established cotton and rubber plantations up the Lukuledi in 1907. The Greek brothers and former Egyptian cotton growers – Kritikos – established a successful plantation in Muinguro in 1910. Reinhold Körner also owned a number of plantations – the largest at Narunyu. Other Europeans were preparing to invest in Lindi’s hinterland in the 1910s, including the leader of the Lindi Trade & Planters Society (Mr. Kindt), who intended to open a 1,500 ha plantation in the upper Mahumbika Valley for rubber and foodstuff production. The food crops were expected to alleviate food shortages experienced in the south due to a drop in agricultural production during the rebellion (and as consequence of the crop destruction inflicted by German scorched earth tactics).<sup>100</sup>

---

<sup>98</sup> Sunseri, *Vilimani*, 137.

<sup>99</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>100</sup> TNA G1/39, Kaiserliche Bezirksamtmann Lindi, an Kaiserliche Gouvernement, Daressalam, “Betrifft. Verkehrsmittel in Lukuledital,” August 1911 and 8 December 1912.

**Table 2.1 Notable European Plantations in the Lukuledi Valley<sup>101</sup>**

	<b>Owner Plantation Location Founding Year</b>	<b>Type of Goods</b>	<b>Shipping tons per year</b>	<b>Distance from Lindi (km)</b>	<b>Handling and Total Freight Fee (per year)</b>
1	Gebrüder Kritikos Muinguro 1910	Cotton, Rubber, & General Cargo	50	Waterway	500 Rupees
2	A. Kleinschmidt Mtwere 1912	Cotton & General Cargo	235	8 km train & waterway	3,200 Rupees
3	R. Körner Narunyu-Kiherutal	“”	1100	20 km train & waterway	20,000 Rupees
4	Reinhard Stauss Mkwaya 1910	Cotton, Rubber, & General Cargo	355	10 km train and waterway	5,000 Rupees
5	W. Werneyer Mtua 1907	“”	400	32 km train and waterway	10,000 Rupees
6	Paul Kaiser Mtama 1907	“”	ca 133	32 km train and waterway	3,000 Rupees

These plantation owners increasingly depended upon incentives, rather than forced labor practices and state assistances, to procure sufficient laborers to work their lands. The first comprehensive labor ordinance passed by the German colonial state in 1909 embraced a free-labor policy and permitted freedom of movement – *freizügigkeit* – for African laborers.<sup>102</sup> Although some instances of forced labor persisted, in most cases plantations enticed local and migrant laborers with “high wages, recruitment bonuses, food rations, and amenable plantation living conditions.”<sup>103</sup> Border residents and migrant laborers perceived wage-employment on coastal plantations as a valuable supplement to household production and subsistence farming. Thaddeus Sunseri argued that many Africans who resided near plantations worked on them seasonally according to the needs of their households. He contended that a “thirty-day work contract might be worked off gradually over half a year or longer, making it clear that local labor was discretionary.”<sup>104</sup> Herr Wendt reported that many Africans residing on the south bank of

<sup>101</sup> Compilation of statistics from TNA G1/39 Kaiserliche Bezirksamtman, “Lindi-Lukuledibahn;” and Kaiserliche Bezirksamtman Lindi, an Kaiserliche Gouvernement, Daressalam, 8 December 1912.

<sup>102</sup> Sunseri, *Vilimani*, 136-38.

<sup>103</sup> *Ibid.*, 138. Sunseri noted that recruiters continued to pay off local leaders for workers (147).

<sup>104</sup> *Ibid.*, 150.

the Ruvuma worked on the German plantations during the day and returned home at night to exploit the higher wages offered in GEA; ten to twelve rupees a month versus four rupees in northern PEA.<sup>105</sup> Migrant laborers from the interior districts of GEA and PEA also worked seasonally, often restricting their employment to three months so that they could return home to help with their family farms.<sup>106</sup> Since labor demands continued to outstrip supplies, local and migrant laborers had an immense amount of leverage to choose their employer, negotiate wages and contract terms (or work without one), and desert if they were dissatisfied with their employment.<sup>107</sup> Sunseri concluded that European planters and the colonial state lacked “control of the laboring environment in the last few years of German rule” and were instead held “hostage to high wages, the fear of worker desertion, or even another uprising”.<sup>108</sup> As in the century preceding, African populations relied upon their mobility to navigate the dangers and possibilities of the Ruvuma borderland.

While African laborers exerted immense influence over the labor market in southern GEA in the post-rebellion era, the regional economy remained firmly in the hands of the Indian commercial community. Indian traders took advantage of the protection offered by the German military presence in the interior to expand their business enterprises into remote villages.<sup>109</sup> Kurt Pfund observed Arab and Indian traders bartering goods, extending credit, and retrieving debts from villagers in the interior during the harvest season in 1912:

They remain in the villages, usually as guests of the jumbe and at his expense, until they are paid in rubber (since cash is obviously not available). And afterwards they provide new goods on extended credit. In this way almost all the jumbes are indebted to Arabs and Indians for large amounts, trapped by the imprudence of their people.<sup>110</sup>

---

<sup>105</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>106</sup> *Ibid.*, 158.

<sup>107</sup> *Ibid.*, 148. Sharecroppers and wartime refugees (from GEA and PEA) also comprised the plantation labor. According to Sunseri, sharecroppers worked on the plantation for 120 days per year in exchange for free housing and land for their own food plots.

<sup>108</sup> *Ibid.*, 158.

<sup>109</sup> Becker, “A social history of Southeast Tanzania,” 72. Germans reported in 1897 that four to five Manyans (Indian traders) were touring the interior, travelling to the middle Ruvuma, and establishing *dukas*. The number of Asians in the interior of GEA rose from 58 in 1901 to 2,591 by 1912.

<sup>110</sup> Kurt Pfund, *Kreuz und quer durch Deutsch-Ostafrika* (Berlin, 1912), quoted in Larson, “The Ngindo,” 96.

One of the reasons that Indian traders succeeded at driving out rival Arab traders and establishing networks of *dukas* (shops) at the terminuses of interior trade routes was their employment of local African agents. Martha Spencer Honey described how upcountry Indian merchants employed upwards of fifty African petty traders. The Indian merchants gave petty traders goods on credit in order to conduct trade for local produce. Indian merchants would pay for the produce procured from their African associates with imported commodities rather than cash (kerosene, matches, umbrellas, etc.).<sup>111</sup> According to Juhani Koponen, the *duka* became the nexus of the colonial economy – “the place where the Africans could buy cloths and other popular imported goods and where they could sell their agricultural and animal husbandry products to be relayed further on.”<sup>112</sup> Despite the strong prejudice that German commercial houses (including DOAG, Hansing, and O’Swald) shared against Indians, they employed Indian merchants and petty traders to take advantage of their commercial networks.<sup>113</sup> With the support of its Indian employees, the DOAG came to dominate the credit system in Lindi District after the rebellion.<sup>114</sup> When the Indian commercial community came under attack by the Governor’s Council in 1906 and Secretary of Colonial Affairs (Bernard Dernburg) in 1908, German firms came to their defense and argued that Indian traders performed an indispensable middleman role in the colonial economy.<sup>115</sup> Indians in GEA stimulated peasant production and the monetization of the economy by offering a steady supply of desirable goods at their *dukas*.<sup>116</sup> Indian traders were allegedly more successful than their European counterparts because of their ability to “set up his *duka* in the smallest and remotest places and survive

---

<sup>111</sup> Martha Spencer Honey, “A History of Indian Merchant Capital and Class Formation in Tanganyika c. 1840-1940” (PhD diss., University of Dar es Salaam, 1982), 161.

<sup>112</sup> Koponen, *Development for Exploitation*, 152-53.

<sup>113</sup> *Ibid.*, 153 and 294-95; and Iliffe, *A Modern History of Tanganyika*, 140. Hans Meyer, for example, described the Indian trader as “a parasite who exploits whomever he can whenever he can with dishonest business practices.”

<sup>114</sup> Becker, “A social history of Southeast Tanzania,” 126-27. According to Becker, the DOAG held debts as large as 6,333 Rupees and 6,719 Rupees following the war. Most of the debts belonged to slave owners, who could not adapt to the post-slavery, colonial economy.

<sup>115</sup> Koponen, *Development for Exploitation*, 294-96. The campaigns aimed at restricting immigration and intensifying control over Indian business affairs.

<sup>116</sup> *Ibid.*, 296.



there with a modest rate of turnover.”<sup>117</sup> Governor Rechenberg also came to the defense of large- and small-scale Indian shop owners and merchants, arguing that African-European commercial relations depended upon Indian intermediaries. The status of Europeans within the colonial social hierarchy would be threatened if they participated in petty trade with Africans. Indians, in contrast, could engage with Africans on equal footing since both shared the same rights as “natives.”<sup>118</sup> The anti-Indian reforms were ultimately dropped. Indian traders and their *dukas* continued to integrate local, regional, and long-distance trade economies within the monetized colonial economy.

By the 1910s, the future of northern PEA and southern GEA seemed to be headed on different trajectories. The Nyassa Company exerted minimal authority over its European and African officials, who exploited the local populace and resources, rather than attempting to improve the region’s health, education, infrastructure, and welfare services.<sup>119</sup> The German central administration also exerted minimal authority over the European settlers and German administrators in the south, who aimed to exploit local resources. Europeans in southern GEA, however, remained committed to transforming the region into a lucrative agricultural landscape of European cash crop plantations and African peasant farms. In order to fulfill this vision and capitalize on the economic growth evident in Lindi, the European community applied political pressure and personal funds to construct a “modern” transportation infrastructure of engineered roads and railways that linked the interior to the coast. European settlers were increasingly dissatisfied with head portage as an inefficient and expensive mode of transportation. They found that wage increases, “encouragement,” and coercion were all ineffective methods at procuring sufficient porters to carry large, bulky loads to the coast.<sup>120</sup> The poor quality of roads inhibited the use of

---

<sup>117</sup> Ibid. Koponen argued that German merchant companies and the Foreign Office also defended Indian rights in GEA out of concern for the British response. They worried that discrimination could “release a counter-reaction from Britain which would endanger far more important German commercial interests in India and elsewhere in the ‘British’ tropics.” German trade was much higher in India than with GEA. South Asians in GEA also responded to colonial discrimination by forming the first Indian political association in 1914 – the Tanga Indian Association.

<sup>118</sup> Ibid., 295.

<sup>119</sup> Vail, “Mozambique’s Chartered Companies,” 400.

<sup>120</sup> TNA G1/39, Kaiserliche Bezirksamt Lindi, an Kaiserliche Gouvernement, Dar es Salaam, “Betrifft. Verkehrsmittel in Lukuledital,” August 1911; and TNA G1/39, Pflanzungsbesitzer W. Werneyer, an Kaiserliche Gouvernement, Dar es Salaam, 10 August 1911.

hand- or pushcarts as an alternative. Carts travelling from Lindi to Masasi, for instance, quickly became bogged down in the road's sandy soil during the dry season.<sup>121</sup> Inadequate roads also inhibited the expansion of motor vehicle traffic. The first road specifically designed for motor vehicles was not constructed until 1909/10 in West Usambara, and only 26 motor vehicles existed in GEA at the beginning of 1914.<sup>122</sup> The rebellion and a lack of government funding put plans for a southern railway on hold.<sup>123</sup> Exorbitant transportation rates in southern GEA caused one plantation owner (Kaiser) to give up his cotton and refuse to purchase peasant-produced cotton in 1911.<sup>124</sup> Another European plantation owner (Werner) threatened to discontinue his thriving cotton plantation if the state failed to rectify the transportation situation.<sup>125</sup> European settlers and the southern German administration argued that without a railway or all-weather roads for motor vehicles, the southern region would fail to fulfill its rich potential.<sup>126</sup>

The Maji Maji uprising offered the first opportunity for the southern German administration to conduct a wide-scale, inexpensive, road infrastructure development program. Following the uprising, the government aimed to improve the roads between "every place of the slightest importance with all other settlements" in order to improve administrative efficiency and the military's mobility.<sup>127</sup> The administration kept costs low by forcing rebel participants and their alleged supporters to complete the

---

<sup>121</sup> TNA G1/39, Kaiserliche Bezirksamt Lindi, an Kaiserliche Gouvernement, Dar es Salaam, "Betrifft Hauptverkehrsstrassen," March 1911.

<sup>122</sup> Koponen, *Development for Exploitation*, 449; and Hofmeier, *Transport and Economic Development in Tanzania*, 59. Mail in southern GEA was delivered by African runners: "With letter and papers packed in a water-tight envelope of oiled paper and American cloth, and gun on shoulder, the messenger trots along, full of the importance of his errand, and covers enormous distances, sometimes, it is said, double the day's march of an ordinary caravan." See Weule, *Native Life in East Africa*, 110.

<sup>123</sup> Ibid. Hofmeier explained that other railway schemes (new constructions and/or extensions) were similarly delayed or abandoned due to a lack of government funds. Steamship traffic to and from the southern ports was also limited. Two passenger steamers – the *Rufiji* and *Ruvuma* – conducted the "South Tour" (Dar es Salaam to Lindi) at irregular intervals. Lacking space for many passengers, the steamers primarily transported mail and small consignments of cargo. See Weule, *Native Life in East Africa*, 20-23.

<sup>124</sup> TNA G1/39, Kaiserliche Bezirksamt Lindi, an Kaiserliche Gouvernement, Dar es Salaam, "Betrifft Hauptverkehrsstrassen," March 1911.

<sup>125</sup> TNA G1/39, Pflanzungsbesitzer W. Werner, an Kaiserliche Gouvernement, Dar es Salaam, 10 August 1911.

<sup>126</sup> Ibid.; and TNA G1/39, Kaiserliche Bezirksamt Lindi, an Kaiserliche Gouvernement, Dar es Salaam, "Betrifft Verkehrsmittel in Lukuledital," August 1911.

<sup>127</sup> Weule, *Native Life in East Africa*, 239.

roadwork as their punishment. Weule noted that roads “were in perfect order” in those places that took “an active part in the rebellion”<sup>128</sup> Those communities that remained neutral or supported the Germans, however, were also forced to participate in roadwork as part of a tax reform in 1905 that declared road construction and maintenance to be a common responsibility.<sup>129</sup> Local authorities were responsible for collecting sufficient laborers to conduct the roadwork.<sup>130</sup> The Makonde reportedly maintained an excellent road from Newala to Nchichira because of the sustained pressure from the German administration in Lindi, rather than personal interests.<sup>131</sup> Weule reported that his easiest march occurred along that road,

Had I not bestridden my well-tryed old mule, I could have wished for a bicycle; even a motor could have been driven quite comfortably along this road. No steep hills and no deeply eroded gorges, but a plain with a gentle and almost imperceptible eastward slope, covered throughout with dense bush, in which the industrious Makonde have here and there cleared their little patches for cultivation, and through which run broad, well-kept roads, sometimes perfectly straight for a kilometer at a time.<sup>132</sup>

The southern administration also focused on improving roads with economic value, such as the one approaching Lindi town. When Weule entered Lindi in November 1906, he found the road to be a “masterpiece of engineering: it only wants a few motor cars to be a perfect picture of twentieth-century civilization.”<sup>133</sup> A lack of funds and equipment, however, limited the capabilities of the southern administration and local leaders to improve the regional road infrastructure. The Lindi District Officer, for example, found the condition of the Lindi road unacceptable beyond 6 km of the town in 1911. The

---

<sup>128</sup> Ibid., 58. Weule continued that “the territory of the friendly tribes [the roads] were nearly impassable with high grass, and sometimes bush.”

<sup>129</sup> Koponen, *Development for Exploitation*, 404. Weule noted that Matola’s land, for instance, had “Broad roads, as straight as a rule can make them, and planted with rubber-trees, run north, east, and west from the square surrounding the *baraza*” (Weule, 138).

<sup>130</sup> Ibid., 448.

<sup>131</sup> Karl Weule, *Native Life in East Africa*, 333-34.

<sup>132</sup> Ibid., 333-34. The only problem with the road was the occasional stretches of loose, deep sand. Weule noted “one is thankful to find it does not occur everywhere, but only in the depressions, where it has been washed down from the higher parts of the road. In these spots it seems all but bottomless.”

<sup>133</sup> Ibid., 404.

construction of a permanent, hard surfaced (metaled) roadway from Lindi to Masasi (140 km) was not possible without investments from the central administration in Dar es Salaam.<sup>134</sup>




Figure 2.4 Proposed Route for the Lindi-Masasi Road, March 1911<sup>135</sup>

The District Officer argued that the estimated road construction cost of 700,000 Marks was worthwhile in economic and political terms. The road would cross through land already under European and African cotton production, and would permit existing European plantations in the Lukuledi Valley to expand their operations without fearing heavy transport costs. Capital was available for the opening of new cotton plantations west of Mtua as soon as the transport costs dropped. The roadway would also make the mass production of peanuts, sesame, *mtama* (sorghum), and maize profitable. Wood stocks at Litipo, Chitowa, Nagapemba, Liwengula, and Rondo would become accessible with a road connection to the coast. The

<sup>134</sup> TNA G1/39, Kaiserliche Bezirksamt Lindi, an Kaiserliche Gouvernement, Dar es Salaam, "Betrifft Hauptverkehrsstrassen," March 1911. The officer advocated the route over a competing line from Kilwa to Songea because Lindi's hinterland was more fertile and heavily populated by Africans and Europeans. Although Kilwa Kisiwani offered an excellent harbor, the District Officer noted that Lindi harbor could be expanded in the future to accommodate the large DOA steamers already frequenting the port.

<sup>135</sup> *Ibid.*

District Officer also argued that the road would integrate an estimated 27,000 huts along the northern part of the Makonde Plateau within the colonial economy – both in terms of selling their produce and tax collection. He calculated that the 50,000 huts directly affected by the road would produce 2.5 million Rps. worth of trade along the roadway. The road would also attract the growing population west of Masasi (many of whom came from PEA) and large-scale traffic from across the Ruvuma.<sup>136</sup> The District Officer concluded that with government funding, the Lindi-Masasi road would generate innumerable benefits for the southern region and colony in general.<sup>137</sup>

The District Officer's preference for a metaled road for motor vehicles was not shared by the European settlers in Lindi District.<sup>138</sup> Plantation owners instead made numerous petitions for the construction of a government-financed, narrow-gauged railway through the Lukuledi Valley. Three rail options were initially proposed in lieu of the abandoned major railway project. The cheapest option was a manually operated monorail. The cars would have been operated by one or more men and could have carried up to 1,000 kg.

---

<sup>136</sup> Ibid. The original transcription reads: "Ausserdem würde der nördliche Teil des Makondeplateaus mit 25000 Hütten aus der Strasse bedeutenden Vorteil ziehen, desgl. die weitem Strecken westlich Masasi, die in zunehmendem Umfange mit Eingeborenen aus portug. Gebiet besiedelt werden." The District Officer also argued that an energetic road construction campaign in GEA would make a good impression on border residents and local communities, who had allegedly witnessed for several years the seeming inexhaustible resources of British capital at work in the Nyassa Company concession. The original transcription reads: "Ein energisch durchgeführter Strassenbau würde besonders auch auf die Grenzanwohner nördlich und südlich Rovuma einen nachhaltigen und günstigen Eindruck machen, denen nun schon seit mehreren wahren Jahren das englische Kapital vor Augen hält, mit welchem unerschöpflich scheinenden Mitteln jene Nation zu arbeiten weiss, wenn sie auf ein sich gesetztes Ziel hinarbeitet. Wie vorstehend berichtet, sind die aufgeweckten Elemente nicht blind gegen den Unterschied. Auf die Dauer ist es aber nicht möglich, die fehlenden Geldmittel nur durch Arbeit und Energie aufzuwiegen."

<sup>137</sup> Ibid.

<sup>138</sup> Ibid. The District Office estimated that a train would cost around 10 million Marks.




Figure 2.5 Manually Operated Monorail Proposed for the Lukuledi Valley<sup>139</sup>

The second option was a manually operated, two-track rail with a narrow gauge of 500-600 mm.

Although the cars had the same carrying capacity, the operator would not have to worry about maintaining the car's balance. European planters strongly advocated the third option – a manually-operated, narrow-gauged rail that could be adapted for a locomotive engine in the future. A 600 mm gauge would again be used, but the rails would have a higher profile to allow for heavier engine weight.<sup>140</sup> From 1911 to 1913, Werneyer and Körner repeatedly petitioned the Lindi District Office and central administration for funding to construct the narrow-gauged railway. The planters' arguments in support of the rail echoed those expressed by the District Officer for the Lindi-Masasi road: without improved infrastructure, local peasant farms and settler plantations could not be profitable or expand.<sup>141</sup>

In 1912, the Lindi District Office threw his support behind the narrow-gauged railway plan, arguing that

<sup>139</sup> TNA G1/39, "Betrifft: Transportanlagen im Lukuledital," 28-29.

<sup>140</sup> Ibid.

<sup>141</sup> TNA G1/39, Reinhold Körner, an Kaiserliche Bezirksamt Lindi, 6 August 1911; and TNA G1/39, Pflanzungsbesitzer W. Werneyer, an Kaiserliche Gouvernement, Dar es Salaam, 10 August 1911. For discussion about the railway's potential benefits for African cotton producers, see TNA G1/39, F. Christen, an das Kaiserlichen Bezirksamt Lindi, 11 August 1911.

an estimated 3,000 tons of sorghum, maize, sesame, beans, iron, salt, additional raw materials, and imported goods would be transported along the railway, as well as 60 European and 1,000 African passengers (one way).<sup>142</sup> Plantation owners argued that construction of the rail line was urgently needed not only for their interests and local peasant producers, but also to combat the actions of the Portuguese across the border.<sup>143</sup> The Nyassa Company commissioned a survey for a rival rail line from Port Amelia to Lake Malawi and landlocked British Nyasaland in 1913. With the backing of British capital, construction of the railway was set to begin following completion of the survey.<sup>144</sup> The Germans feared that a railway in northern PEA could draw laborers and trade away from GEA and its southerly ports.

Neither the German government nor the Nyassa Company had the money to make a long-distance railway a reality in the Ruvuma borderland. The colonial state in Dar es Salaam doubted the profitability of investing in an apparently unruly region devastated by an uprising and military reprisals. The petitions issued by the Lindi District Office and European plantation owners fell on deaf ears as the colonial government concentrated its limited resources on completing the Tanga and Central Railway Lines in order to better exploit the more lucrative, cash crop producing regions.<sup>145</sup> In February 1913, Governor Schnee announced that no revenues would be allocated for the planned light rail in southern GEA.<sup>146</sup> One plantation owner decided to take matters in his own hands. Körner offered to help fund and oversee the

---

<sup>142</sup> TNA G1/39, Kaiserliche Bezirksamt Lindi, an Kaiserliche Gouvernement, Dar es Salam, 8 December 1912.

<sup>143</sup> TNA G1/39, Kaiserliches Bezirksamt Lindi, an Kaiserliche Gouvernement, Dar es Salaam, March 1912.

<sup>144</sup> "Notes on Railway Construction," *Journal of the Royal African Society* 12, no. 47 (April 1913): 290-95. The northern PEA line was not welcomed by supporters of a competing railway in southern PEA (Beira-Port Herald-Blantyre and the Zambezi-Shire river systems) because the former would have considerably reduced the travel time to Lake Malawi. For earlier plans about the railway from Lake Malawi south to the Zambesi-Shire river system, see Alex. Johnston, "Fresh Fields for African Railways," *Journal of the Royal African Society* 3, no. 11 (April 1904): 271-276.

<sup>145</sup> TNA G1/39, W. Werneyer, Pflanzung Mtua bie Lindi, DOA, an Kaiserliche Gouvernement, Dar es Salaam, 11 May 1912; W. Werneyer, Pflanzung Mtua bie Lindi, DOA, an Kaiserliche Gouvernement, Dar es Salaam, 25 July 1912; and Hofmeier, *Transport and Economic Development in Tanzania*, 57-58. Eighteen years after construction began, the Tanga (or Usambara) Line finally reached Moshi in 1911. Construction for the Central Railway Line from Dar es Salaam began in 1905 and reached Kigoma in 1914.

<sup>146</sup> TNA G1/39, Governor Schnee, an das Kaiserliche Bezirksamst Lindi, "In Anschluss an meinen Erlass vom 15 Februar 1913," 26 April 1913. He also demanded a detailed report clarifying the region's transportation needs, existing and anticipated traffic volume (from GEA and PEA), the railway's impact on labor, length and routing, in-depth cost estimates, financing options (for construction and maintenance), and the military and political significance of the train.



construction and maintenance of a narrow-gauge railway to Mtua.<sup>147</sup> The Imperial Government and Treasury, Lindi District Office, Colonial Economic Committee, DOAG, and Körner conducted negotiations throughout 1913 over Körner's contract, track procurement and placement, passenger and freight rates, distribution of government and private financing, interest rates, and amortization.<sup>148</sup> A 17km manually-operated, 600 mm, narrow-gauge track ran up Lindi creek by 1914.<sup>149</sup>




Figure 2.6 Map of Narrow-Gauged Railway and Location of European Plantations<sup>150</sup>

When considering the distances from Lindi to Masasi (140 km) and Lindi to Songea (600 km), the 17 km railway in the Lukuledi Valley hardly made an impact on the broader economy and mobility

<sup>147</sup> TNA G1/40, Kaiserliche Bezirksamt Lindi, an Kaiserliche Gouvernement, 16 November 1913.

<sup>148</sup> TNA G1/39, Kaiserliches Bezirksamt Lindi, an Kaiserliche Gouvernement, 8 December 1912; Kolonial Wirtschaftliches Komitee, an das Kaiserliche Gouvernement von Deutsch-Ostafrika, Daressalam, 18 October 1913; TNA G1/40, Kaiserliches Bezirksamt Lindi, "Betritt:Baumwollbahn," 1 May 1914; and TNA G1/40, Kaiserliches Bezirksamt Lindi, "Betritt: Auf en Erlass von 20 Juni 1914 Jno 12231/14 betr. Konsession für Betritt der Lukuleditalbahn," 28 October 1914.

<sup>149</sup> TNA G1/40, Keller (Techniker), "Bericht: über den Stand der Arbeiten an ger Baumwollbahn im Lukuledi-tal Bezirk Lindi," 27 March 1914; and Becker, "A social history of Southeast Tanzania," 154.

<sup>150</sup> TNA G1/39.



patterns in the Ruvuma borderland region. Carriers remained the principal mode of transport as the borderland became a warzone during the First World War. The incomplete railways and roads on both sides of the Ruvuma reflected the ambiguous impact that colonialism had on the borderland region from the 1880s to the 1910s. Lindi's ascension over Kilwa reflected a shift in the region's economy from the precolonial slave and ivory trade towards a monetized, agriculture-based, colonial economy. The fortunes of the southern coast, however, had undergone similar fluctuations over the centuries as new markets came and went – first gold and then slaves, ivory, rubber, and cash crops. Indians continued to supply the capital and commodity goods that underscored colonial economies, just as they had for the slave and ivory trade during the previous century. The new colonial economy also did not radically alter centuries-old mobility patterns; rather, Africans adapted mobility patterns to exploit new opportunities. Porters continued to arrive at the coast, transporting crops and raw materials instead of ivory and slaves. The caravan routes were also adapted to accommodate a growing number of migrant laborers seeking wage-employment at plantations along the southern coast and to the north along the Tanga and Central Railway Lines. The European colonial impact on the borderland's political landscape was also ambiguous. The Portuguese and Germans used their military strength to penetrate further into the interior and displace old power structures more thoroughly during the early 20<sup>th</sup> century than in preceding centuries. Colonial authority, however, was felt unevenly throughout the borderland. Some communities were left untouched, such as the Makonde along the Mueda Plateau of northern PEA. In most cases, the understaffed and overworked colonial officers depended upon African allies to enforce colonial legislation, taxation, and forced labor policies. Some leaders (such as the “big men” of the Lindi trade corridor) consolidated and extended their authority by entering into alliance with colonial authorities. These alliances mirrored those conducted between local leaders, chiefs, sultans, and foreign interlopers centuries before. Volatility continued to define the political landscape of the borderland. Leaders rose and fell as populations moved from one place to another in response to raiding, warfare, famine, drought, population pressure, alliances, and economic opportunities. The borderland populace utilized their mobility to evade, resist, and/or exploit the colonial systems on either side of the Ruvuma.

The difficulties that European settlers experienced with constructing the railway in southern GEA underscored the fact that transforming the borderland's landscape would require immense amounts of capital, manpower, patience, and cooperation from a host of players – the colonial state, local leaders and communities, and Indian intermediaries. Europeans could not simply use new technologies of mobility to impose their visions of a lucrative, “modernized,” and “civilized” region upon southern GEA and northern PEA. Adaptation, negotiation, conflict, and accommodation continued to be the hallmarks of life in the Ruvuma borderland region during the twentieth century, just as they had been for the Rujiji-Ruvuma language communities in the first millennium.

### **World War I in East Africa**

*“No part of Africa suffered more severely from the ravages of the Great War than the Tanganyika Territory. Fighting took place more or less continuously over the greater part of the territory for over four years, and the loss of life, especially among the native population, and the destruction and decay of property were severe.”*<sup>151</sup>

German attempts to (re)build southern GEA after the Maji Maji rebellion came to an abrupt halt with the onset of the First World War. War was not a foregone conclusion in East Africa when conflict erupted in Europe. European rivalries in the continent had largely subsided since the 1880s, and the colonies had the option to remain neutral according to the Berlin Act of 1885. Strategic naval concerns, however, quickly drew East Africa into the war.<sup>152</sup> The British targeted GEA ports and naval vessels – particularly the German cruiser SMS *Königsberg* – in order to defend vital shipping and troop convoys moving through the Indian Ocean from Australia, New Zealand, India, and the Suez Canal.<sup>153</sup> British forces in surrounding Uganda, East Africa Protectorate (Kenya), Northern Rhodesia, and Nyasaland allied with forces from the Belgian Congo against the German *Schutztruppe* and their commander-in-chief, Colonel

---

<sup>151</sup> “Report of the East Africa Commission,” (London: His Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1925), 113.

<sup>152</sup> Ross Anderson, *The Forgotten Front: The East African Campaign 1914-1918*, new edition (Gloucestershire: Spellmount, 2014); Edward Paice, *World War I, The African Front: An Imperial War on the African Continent* (New York: Pegasus Books, 2008); and Brian Digre, *Imperialism’s New Clothes* (New York: Peter Lang, 1990). According to Brian Digre, British political and military officials wanted to acquire GEA so as to ensure naval supremacy in the Indian Ocean, fulfill the Cape-to-Cairo Railway Scheme, have direct access to the supposed richness of colony, and firmly establish British dominance throughout the region. According to Edward Paice, the Germans had similar war aims as they hoped to establish “a ‘second Fatherland’ in Mittelfrika.” None of the European powers in East Africa had invested heavily in strengthening their colonial defenses against foreign military threats prior to 1914.

<sup>153</sup> Anderson, *The Forgotten Front*, 19; and Paice, *World War I*, 14-17.

(later General) Paul Emil von Lettow-Vorbeck.<sup>154</sup> The East African campaign began in November 1914 and concluded two weeks after the armistice in Paris.<sup>155</sup> In comparison to the large-scale battles and trench warfare on the Western Front, combat in East Africa involved smaller skirmishes and guerrilla warfare. Lettow-Vorbeck's mobile company columns moved independently through the bush and obtained supplies from local communities.<sup>156</sup> Scorched earth tactics, modern weaponry, and the forceful conscription of the African male population by German and Allied forces devastated the physical, social, and economic landscape of the Ruvuma borderland. The presence of armies on both sides of the border inhibited local people's mobility – depriving many of a crucial survival strategy. Thousands of civilians died due to conflict, famine, starvation, and disease during and after the war. In the wake of the destruction, Allied forces attempt to create a new infrastructure of motorable roads to improve the mobility of troop and supply lines in pursuit of the retreating German forces. Their inability to construct and maintain an all-weather road network inhibited the Allied war effort, prolonged the war's duration, and contributed to the death of hundreds to thousands of porters, who were forced to shoulder the workload of the motor vehicle units.

### **A Smuggling Zone: Early War Years in the Ruvuma Borderland (1914-1916)**

The Ruvuma borderland saw limited military action during the first two years of the war.<sup>157</sup> South of the Ruvuma, Portuguese troops were extremely limited in number and equipment.<sup>158</sup> Under a status of quasi-neutrality, the Portuguese sent 1,500 troops from Lisbon to Porto Amelia on November 1, 1914 to

---

<sup>154</sup> Anderson, *The Forgotten Front*, 25-26; and Paice, *World War I*, 5-6. Lettow-Vorbeck received command of the *Schutztruppe* in January 1914. He previously participated in the Boxer Rebellion in China (1900-01) and the suppression of the Herero Revolt in German Southwest Africa (1904-05).

<sup>155</sup> Anderson, *The Forgotten Front*, 42-49; and Paice, *World War I*, 58. The Allied campaign began with a humiliating defeat at Tanga. Nearly 15% of the invading force was listed as casualties.

<sup>156</sup> Anderson, *The Forgotten Front*, 26-28. Each company typically consisted of two officers, one doctor, two German NCOs, 150 Askari, two machine guns, 322 carriers, 100 Askari "boys", and 13 European "boys."

<sup>157</sup> Anderson, *The Forgotten Front*, 38; and Paice, *World War I*, 22-23. A minor incident occurred in August 1914 when Dr. Weck led a group of German *askari* on an attack of a small Portuguese fort at Maziua, along the south bank of the Ruvuma River and 250 miles inland from Porto Amelia. The attack occurred as Portugal declared its neutrality. German-Portuguese relations returned to normal after the Germans formally apologized and promised to punish the raiding officer.

<sup>158</sup> Anderson, *The Forgotten Front*, 23.

strengthen border defenses.<sup>159</sup> The Nyassa Company, however, failed to reconstruct port facilities after a cyclone struck earlier in the year. With inadequate medical and food supplies, housing, and sanitation, the Portuguese troops quickly succumbed to illness.<sup>160</sup> Over 20% of the First Expeditionary Force became casualties due to illness six months after their landing.<sup>161</sup> Replacements sent in November 1915 fared no better. When General José Cesar Ferreira Gil arrived in June 1916, he found 75% of the 1915 expedition force incapacitated by disease.<sup>162</sup> An elephant hunter by the name of Arimuthu Naicker reported to the British Vice Consul at Porto Amelia in December 1915 that the border lay “absolutely unprotected either by our [British] Intelligence Department or by the Portuguese authorities.”<sup>163</sup> The Ruvuma border was also unmanned on the German side. Lettow-Vorbeck had little respect for Portuguese military capabilities. A single company was stationed at the Lindi garrison, while the southwestern region between Mahenge and Songea was virtually empty of *Schutztruppe*.<sup>164</sup>

---

<sup>159</sup> Paice, *World War I*, 136. The World War sparked political instability in the Portuguese metropole. A republic replaced the monarchy, and at least forty-five different governments held power by 1926.

<sup>160</sup> Anderson, *The Forgotten Front*, 49; and Paice, *World War I*, 140-41.

<sup>161</sup> Anderson, *The Forgotten Front*, 166.

<sup>162</sup> *Ibid.*, 137. General José Cesar Ferreira Gil was the third man appointed as commander-in-chief. The military leaders selected by Lisbon lacked military experience in the colonies and were chosen for their political ideologies.

<sup>163</sup> BNA WO 106/580 Portuguese Forces in Mozambique 1916: Enclosure in Consul General Errol MacDonell's Despatch No 18 (290/16/16), Mr. Arimuthu Naicker to British Vice Consul Porto Amelia, 3 December 1915. Mr. Arimuthu Naicker was born of British Indian parents in Natal.

<sup>164</sup> Anderson, *The Forgotten Front*, 78-79 and 132; and Paice, *World War I*, 142. Governor Schnee insisted that the garrison remain in Lindi out of fear of another Maji Maji uprising.



Figure 2.7 “Port Amelia in Portuguese Nyasaland. Photo taken from troop ship in harbour.”<sup>165</sup>

The Germans exploited the porous nature of the Ruvuma borderland and used it as a smuggling zone from 1914 to 1916. Prior to the war, William Philippi & Company and the *Deutsche Ostafrika-Linie* monopolized steamship traffic along the PEA coast. When the war began, these German firms took advantage of Portugal’s neutrality to unload mail, personnel, and supplies for the German war effort at Portuguese ports. The firms not only smuggled a “great deal” of food and supplies across the border, but also provided military intelligence.<sup>166</sup> Portuguese shipping firms were also complicit in the smuggling operations. The *Empresa Nacional de Navegação*, for instance, transported Germans under false papers to the border. In at least once instance, a German agent contracted an *Empresa Nacional de Navegação* vessel to deliver medical supplies, leather, boots, socks, and other equipment to PEA for the German war effort.<sup>167</sup> Once unloaded, local merchants and employees of the Nyassa Company helped move the information and goods across the Ruvuma border.<sup>168</sup> The British Minister in Lisbon, Sir Lancelot

<sup>165</sup> ©IWM (Q 15530), Dale C. (Lt) Collection, “Ministry of Information First World War Official Collection,” <http://www.iwm.org.uk/collections/item/object/205250392>.

<sup>166</sup> BNA FO 371/2440 Portugal 1915, No 97290 “Trade in Nyassa Territory,” July 1915.

<sup>167</sup> BNA WO 106/580, 4 February, 1916; and Paice, *World War I*, 143. MacDonell reported that the Germans communicated across the whole of PEA, without fear of interception, throughout 1915.

<sup>168</sup> Anderson, *The Forgotten Front*, 38, 91, and 125; and Paice, *World War I*, 143.

Carnegie, reported that as “long as German officers and agents have a free hand in the northern part of the Portuguese colony, it renders the blockade of German East Africa practically a dead letter.”<sup>169</sup> By mid-1915, the Portuguese Government in Lisbon, the Governor General in Lourenço Marques, and the Minister of Colonies had ordered Portuguese forces to stop the flow of information and contraband into southern GEA. Northern PEA, however, was not under Lisbon’s control. Nyassa Company governed the region, and a group of Germans had purchased controlling interest of the company’s parent company (Nyassa Consolidated Ltd.) a couple of months before the outbreak of the war.<sup>170</sup> The British government pressed the Portuguese government to cancel the charter and thus eliminate German influence in northern PEA. When the Portuguese failed to adopt the proposal, the British sequestered the German shares of the company.<sup>171</sup> The British also restricted English firms, such as Lewis and Roswell, from conducting import trade along the northern PEA coastline. The Foreign Office explained that there was “no guarantee that anything imported into Palma or Porto Amelia at the present moment will not be used to supply the German forces across the frontier, thus stultifying our blockade of German East Africa.”<sup>172</sup> The British government would not encourage British traders to operate in the region until “the officials of the

---

<sup>169</sup> Quoted in Paice, *World War I*, 143. According to Paice, “an official blockade” of the East Coast was declared on 28 February 1915.

<sup>170</sup> BNA FO 371/2440, No. 27589 “Companhia do Nyassa,” 1915; and BNA CO 525/127/4 Nyasaland: Original Correspondence, *Companhia do Nyassa*, Thos. Aspling, “Companhia do Nyassa: Control,” 17 January 1929. With the exception of Lewis and Marks, several South African shareholders sold their shares of the Nyassa Consolidated Ltd. to a Dutch citizen and three Germans. The four men acquired over 60% of the company’s 368,844 shares. The British Government did not initially know who these buyers were, but suspected that they were all backed by the Deutsche Bank and DOAG. By the end of May, they had identified the four men: Mr. Pieter Vuyk of Amsterdam (registered holder of 229,290 shares), Mr. Amandus Brakhan of London (100 shares), Mr. J. Zutrauen of London (100 shares); and Mr. R.W. Greeff of London (100 shares). The last three men were all put on the Board of Nyassa Consolidated Ltd. by German interests. Brakhan and Zutrauen were not naturalized citizens and resigned their positions on the board when the war began. Greeff, in contrast, was a naturalized citizen and retained his seat.

<sup>171</sup> BNA FO 371/14154 Portugal 1929, 5545/307/36 “Charter of Nyasa Company,” June 1929. Prior to the seizure, Consul General Errol MacDonell suggested the formation of an Anglo-Portuguese Company in replacement of the *Companhia do Nyassa*. This new company would have a permanent committee in London and Lisbon. British officials would be stationed throughout the territory in order to encourage the development of natural resources, safeguard the interests of British shareholders, and prevent abuses “which are inseparable from Portuguese Colonial administration.” MacDonell’s proposal was never adopted. See BNA FO 371/2440, Errol MacDonell to HM Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 23 June 1915.

<sup>172</sup> BNA FO 371/2440, No. 97290 “Trade in Nyassa Territory,” July 1915.

*Companhia do Nyassa* [Nyassa Company] were determined to stop all supplies to the German colony and were maintaining a more effective control over traffic across the frontier”.<sup>173</sup>

The British eventually pushed the Portuguese to seize the German vessels in their neutral ports (February 1916) and declare war on Germany (March 9, 1916). The Portuguese aligned themselves with the Allied forces in order to secure the future of their colonial possession against South African ambitions of land aggrandizement.<sup>174</sup> The Portuguese, however, failed to control the Ruvuma border and movement across it. In addition to the illicit trade, local populations continued to cross into GEA to escape the repressive rule of Nyassa Company officers. Naicker offered a disturbing report of the abuses, destitution, and starvation African populations experienced in the northern districts of Lugenda, Ruvuma, and Medo in 1915:

[...] it seems so bad that the natives are selling children in German East Africa for little bits of grain, others again catching unprotected women and children and selling them for grain on the German side, others again waiting on the border for those that return from German territory and murder them for the little bit of grain they carry, in most cases not more than a couple lbs.<sup>175</sup>

According to Naicker, the government did not assist the local populace, but continued to collect taxes and catch all able-bodied men for plantation labor.<sup>176</sup> The inability of the Portuguese to close their northern border was matched by the British Navy’s failure to secure the southern GEA ports. In March 1916, the German vessel, *Marie*, unloaded 1,500 tons of cargo at Sudi Bay (between Lindi and Mikindani). It took African carriers eight days and nights to unload everything. Although the British Navy eventually spotted and bombarded the *Marie*, the ship escaped to the neutral Dutch port of Batavia in Java. This operation proved more costly to the Allies war effort than the smuggling operations conducted across the Ruvuma as the Germans became equipped with,

[...] four of the most modern 10.5cm howitzers, two 7.5cm mountain guns, 2,000 modern rifles, three million rounds of ammunition, and some 50,000 porter loads prepacked with medicine,

---

<sup>173</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>174</sup> Anderson, *The Forgotten Front*, 125.

<sup>175</sup> BNA WO 106/580, Mr. Arimuthu Naicker to British Vice Consul Porto Amelia, 3 December 1915.

<sup>176</sup> *Ibid.* Naicker evidently reported the matter to the territory’s Secretary, Mr. Gouvaia. Gouvaia supposedly responded to the allegations by arguing that “the natives are lazy and would not work.”

uniforms, food and equipment of every conceivable description (including 200kgs of precious quinine).<sup>177</sup>

The Allies eventually captured the southern ports of Kilwa, Lindi, Sudi, and Mikindani by the end of September 1916, but the damage was already done.

### **From Smuggling to the Frontlines**

The Ruvuma borderland gradually transitioned from a smuggling zone to the forefront of the war by autumn of 1916. The Allies southern advance to the Rufiji River inspired the Portuguese to conduct a series of offensives across the Ruvuma from April to October 1916.<sup>178</sup> A force of 400 men reclaimed the Kionga Triangle (along the mouth of the Ruvuma) against a few German border guards in April 1916.<sup>179</sup> Portuguese attempts to occupy the northern bank of the Ruvuma during the following month, however, ended in failure with the Germans capturing two gunboats and killing thirty-three men.<sup>180</sup> In October 1916, a Portuguese force of 1,500 re-crossed the border and successfully occupied Newala. Local Makonde assisted their efforts by providing intelligence, serving as guides, and attacking German forces. The Portuguese success was short-lived. Lettow-Vorbeck dispatched four *Schutztruppe* companies to regain the food-growing area, eliminate the Portuguese threat, and crush the Makonde “rebellion.”<sup>181</sup> The German force of 520 rifles defeated the Portuguese by depriving them of water and unleashing almost continuous bombardments. The Portuguese retreated under the cover of darkness on 28 November, and the Germans proceeded to reoccupy all the posts north of the Ruvuma.<sup>182</sup> The Allied efforts north along

---

<sup>177</sup> Paice, *World War I*, 210. The crew also shared magazines and newspapers from Germany.

<sup>178</sup> Anderson, *The Forgotten Front*, 100 and 126. The Portuguese aimed to strike across the Ruvuma, reoccupy the Kionga triangle, and seize the ports of Mikindani and Lindi. They would then land additional forces and conduct a campaign west to Songea. With the land between the Rufiji and Ruvuma seized, the Portuguese would finally swing north to Tabora. The Portuguese wanted combat victories in order to strengthen their position in future peace talks – making credible claims for German land and defending their current possessions against South African ambitions. The diseased-ridden, ill-equipped, and inexperienced Portuguese forces never came close to fulfilling these ambitions.

<sup>179</sup> Paice, *World War I*, 267. A German gunboat had seized the 215 square mile area in 1894, driving the Portuguese to Cape Delgado.

<sup>180</sup> *Ibid.*, 268; and Anderson, *The Forgotten Front*, 122.

<sup>181</sup> Anderson, *The Forgotten Front*, 165-66; and Paice, *World War I*, 271.

<sup>182</sup> Anderson, *The Forgotten Front*, 165-66; and Paice, *World War I*, 273. The German collected large stores of ammunition and equipment in the wake of the Portuguese humiliating retreat. The commanding German officer, Captain Max Looff, considered it to be “the biggest haul from the enemy” – including vehicles, horses and mules,



the Rufiji River, east from Kilwa, and west in Mahenge ground to a halt with the onset of the rainy season.<sup>183</sup> Troop buildup and port improvements occurred at Kilwa and Lindi (the new base of operations) as the Allies waited to renew their offensive in June 1917.<sup>184</sup> Military forces from Britain, India, South Africa, East Africa Protectorate, Uganda, Northern Rhodesia, Nyasaland, Nigeria, the Gold Coast, the Belgian Congo, and Portuguese East Africa all converged onto southern GEA. They sought to prevent a German retreat into PEA and to end the war as quickly as possible so that crucial manpower, supplies, and shipping could be redirected to the European Front.<sup>185</sup>



Figure 2.8 “German East African Campaign. Dar-es-Salaam. Indian troops embarking for Kilwa, October 1917.”<sup>186</sup>

100,000 rounds of ammunition, rifles, medical supplies, and provisions (Paice, 273). The new headquarters at Mocimboa da Rovuma was destroyed and the Ngomano station was abandoned.

<sup>183</sup> Anderson, *The Forgotten Front*, 146-162.

<sup>184</sup> *Ibid.*, 146 and 162-68. The Lindi column or LINFORCE was under the leadership of Brigadier General O’Grady. During the troop buildup, General O’Grady led naval and land forces in creating a small bridgehead in the plantation-rich area of Lukuledi Valley. The Allied forces secured a twelve mile area around Lindi after a daring night-time amphibious landing against the German position at “Arab House” and “Schaeffer’s Farm” on Lindi Creek. The Allies utilized British naval steamships and motor boats, old harbor boats, and two lighters to land 3,000 troops and porters, rations, baggage, and ammunition. One of the Royal Naval Air Service airplanes provided signaling communication for ground units and the *Hyacinth*, which shelled the enemy’s position at Schaeffer’s Farm. The German forces ultimately utilized the Lindi Tramway to evacuate their guns further into the interior around Narunyu. See BNA CAB 45/67 Extracts from Naval Papers: Lindi Operations Jun-Sept 1917.

<sup>185</sup> Anderson, *The Forgotten Front*, 212, 216.

<sup>186</sup> ©IWM (Q 15679), Powell L.A.W. (Lt) Collection, “Service of Lieutenant Powell with the Nigerian Brigade in East Africa, 1916-1918,” <http://www.iwm.org.uk/collections/item/object/205250528>.



Figure 2.9 The Allies Advance into GEA, 1917<sup>187</sup>

Neither objective was met. Over the next six months, Allied forces slowly drove the *Schutztruppe* west up the Lukuledi Valley, southeast and east from Mahenge and Songea, and south from Kilwa and Liwale. Some of the bloodiest battles of the entire East African campaign were fought in southern GEA, particularly the Battle of Mahiwa.<sup>188</sup> Lettow-Vorbeck's forces escaped encirclement on the Makonde Plateau by heading south to the Ruvuma. The *Schutztruppe* inflicted another humiliating defeat upon the Portuguese forces at Ngomano on November 25, 1917 before spreading out across northern PEA.<sup>189</sup> A reduced Allied force desperately tried to corral the German forces, which proceeded to raid posts

<sup>187</sup> Map adapted from Anderson, *The Forgotten Front*, 229.

<sup>188</sup> Anderson, *The Forgotten Front*, 248; and Paice, 330-333. The British suffered at least 1,455 casualties at the Battle of Mahiwa, while the Germans lost 611 men. Anderson concluded that neither side won a tactical advantage during the battle and both lost nearly a third of their fighting strength. The Nigerian Brigade was decimated after surviving encirclement for three days. For an account of the Nigerian's encirclement, see BNA WO 95/5325 Lindi Force, Nigerian Brigade Headquarters (1917 Oct – 1918 Jan); WO 95/5325, 4<sup>th</sup> Service Battalion Nigerian Brigade (1917 Oct); and Paice, *World War I*, 331.

<sup>189</sup> Anderson, *The Forgotten Front*, 260; and Paice, *World War I*, 339-40. In November 1917, Lettow-Vorbeck's troops defeated the Portuguese garrison with approximately 1,200 troops, and seized six machine guns, several hundred modern rifles, and a quarter of a million rounds of ammunition.

throughout PEA for the next ten months.<sup>190</sup> After threatening Quelimane in July 1918, the Germans returned north, re-crossed the Ruvuma River, and headed west into Northern Rhodesia. Lettow-Vorbeck and his forces finally surrendered on November 25, 1918.<sup>191</sup>



**Figure 2.10 “German East Africa. Battle of Mahiwa. The Kashmir Mountain Battery in action at Nyangao against Mahiwa, 16th - 19th October 1917.”<sup>192</sup>**

### A War Against Nature

While fighting in the Ruvuma borderland, the Allies and Germans encountered a landscape devoid of all-weather roads and prevalent with tsetse flies, both of which inhibited troop and supply movement by motor vehicles or pack animals. As a result, the German and Allied forces depended upon

<sup>190</sup> BNA WO 95/5325, Nigerian Brigade Headquarters (1917 Oct – 1918 Jan), “Appendix 3: Portuguese Posts and Garrisons surrendered or evacuated during the period 25.11.17 to 27.11.17”; Anderson, *The Forgotten Front*, 257-63; and Paice, *World War I*, 343. The German columns spread out and foraged throughout the fertile areas from Mwembe to Chirumba, Lusinje, and Medo. Within two weeks, the Germans were no longer under threat of starvation and had successfully seized 680,000 rounds of ammunition and 750 rifles. Within three weeks, Lettow-Vorbeck and Wahle’s forces alone had collected eighteen tons of foodstuffs from Portuguese garrisons. The Nigerian Brigade offered a detailed list of Portuguese posts successfully raided by German forces in late November and December 1917. The commander concluded the report stating, “it is believed that this is the last of the several Portuguese detached posts which have so far provide quiet incapable of defending themselves and have been successfully exploited by the enemy for the purpose of replenishing their supplies of food, arms, ammunition and equipment.”

<sup>191</sup> Paice, *World War I*, 387; and Anderson, *The Forgotten Front*, 294. The forces included General Lettow-Vorbeck, Governor Schnee, 155 Germans, 1,168 askari (261 from PEA), 1,500-2,000 carriers, 130 POWs, and 427 wives.

<sup>192</sup> ©IWM (Q 15458), Mann (LtCol) Collection, The Campaign in German East Africa During the First World War,” <http://www.iwm.org.uk/collections/item/object/205250321>.

human portage to move their food, ammunition, weaponry, and baggage. Although the use of porters dated back to the beginning of the war, the Allied Commander – General Jan Smuts – made portage the “bedrock of his transport system” following the Allied advance of March-May 1916.<sup>193</sup> Over a million Africans worked for the British as porters during the course of the war (most without a choice), and an unknown number worked for the Germans and Portuguese.<sup>194</sup> Death rates were extremely high among the carriers. In the aftermath of the Battle of Mahiwa, Linforce headquarters demanded an explanation for the high mortality rate among Allied carriers. The Senior Medical Officer suspected that the “exhausting conditions,” overexposure, and inadequate rations increased the carriers’ vulnerability to diseases.<sup>195</sup> In the end, an estimated 100,000 carriers died due to starvation, exhaustion, exposure, disease, and in conflict during the course of the war in East Africa.<sup>196</sup>

---

<sup>193</sup> Paice, *World War I*, 280.

<sup>194</sup> David Killingray, “Labour Exploitation for Military Campaigns in British Colonial Africa 1870-1945,” *Journal of Contemporary History* 24 (1989): 483-501.

<sup>195</sup> BNA WO 95/5323/2, Senior Medical Officer (1917 Oct – 1918 Jan). The Surgeon-General ordered all medical officers to conduct weekly inspection of carriers. One or more sections of the Field Ambulances had to be detailed to receive sick porters. Finally, no favoritism was to be shown towards African soldiers over carriers in regards to food rations. See *Ibid.*, Surgeon-General Hunter, General HQ Dar es Salaam, “Porters on Columns,” 18 September 1917.

<sup>196</sup> G.W.T. Hodges, “African Manpower Statistics for the British Forces in East Africa, 1914-1918,” *The Journal of African History* 19, no.1 (1978): 101-116; Anderson, *The Forgotten Front*, 296; Paice, *World War I*, 280-290 and 389; and Iliffe, *A Modern History of Tanganyika*, 250-51. Some men, such as Percy Motleno of the Anti-Slavery and Aborigines Protection Society, were imprisoned in England in 1917 for questioning the treatment of carriers and challenging the British recruitment system. They were arrested under the Defence of the Realm Act. Intelligence Scouts in southern GEA also warned against the use of local porters in the field. Scouts like Major Petorious, however, were less concerned about the porters’ health than their desertion: “I notice that local natives from this District [Mtama] are enlisted as porters. I consider this a dangerous undertakings, first of all because it is too near to the firing line; if any pressure were used either in work or at the firing line, the natives would simply drop their loads and if any other relatives were still with the enemy or in unoccupied Country, they would simply clear back to the enemy side. I should therefore advise not to recruit labour less than 20 miles behind our firing line.” See BNA WO 157/1153 East Africa Lindi Force: Intelligence Reports and Information (November-December 1917).



Figure 2.11 “Section of Field Ambulance on the march en route for Mahiwa, October 1917. Nigerian Brigade.”<sup>197</sup>

Without adequate supply lines, the Allies and *Schutztruppe* military forces stationed in the Ruvuma borderland struggled to combat disease, starvation, and dehydration in some of the most difficult terrain of the campaign. The war in the Ruvuma borderland was as much two armies battling a hostile environment as it was a military conflict. In some areas, the bush was so heavy that large columns of troops passed within a mile of each other without knowing.<sup>198</sup> The Nigerian Brigade reported the difficulties of marching along the Kilwa front:

Reached NARUMBEGO 13.30 hours but distance only about 8 miles and guide apparently mistook road. Very trying march and 5 Europeans fell out. Country mountainous with thick bush and grass making it necessary [to] proceed with caution.”<sup>199</sup>

<sup>197</sup> ©IWM (Q 15396), Mann (LtCol) Collection, <http://www.iwm.org.uk/collections/item/object/205250261>.

<sup>198</sup> Paice, *World War I*, 327.

<sup>199</sup> BNA WO 95/5325, Nigerian Brigade Headquarters (1917 Oct – 1918 Jan), 7 October 1917. Their march was no easier the following day as numerous donkeys in the supply column died on the road “and a number of European fell out owing to the heat and length of the march.” Five hundred carriers were sent back to bring up the loads over a large hill. The ammunition column finally reached the camp at midnight.

Caution was necessary as enemy forces utilized the bush to set ambushes and reinforce defensive positions. The bush also rendered modern weaponry ineffective. Spotters for heavy artillery and airplane bombardiers struggled to identify enemy targets and determine where the weapons exploded.<sup>200</sup>



Figure 2.12 "German East African Campaign, Armoured cars, Ndanda, January 1918"<sup>201</sup>



Figure 2.13 "5" howitzer firing at Chiramaka, near Mtama, in action on Lindi Line in October 1917."<sup>202</sup>



Figure 2.14 "Voisin two-seater biplane used by 1st Squadron RNAS in German East Africa. Mtua Lindi Line, November 1917."<sup>203</sup>

<sup>200</sup> BNA CAB 45/67, C-in-C Cape Station to Secretary of the Admiralty, "Report of combined Naval and Military Operations on 10<sup>th</sup>-11<sup>th</sup> June 1917," 18 June 1917. "Ancient" seaplanes stationed at Lindi were utilized as spotters for the heavy artillery and dropped bombs on enemy targets. (They literally dropped the bombs by hand.) Aerial observations, however, were frequently undermined by cloud cover and dense bush.

<sup>201</sup> ©IWM (Q 15646), Powell L.A.W. (Lt) Collection, <http://www.iwm.org.uk/collections/item/object/205250498>.

<sup>202</sup> ©IWM (Q 15508), Dale C. (Lt) Collection, <http://www.iwm.org.uk/collections/item/object/205250371>.

<sup>203</sup> ©IWM (Q 15507), Dale C. (Lt) Collection, <http://www.iwm.org.uk/collections/item/object/205250370>.

Disease proved more effective at generating casualties than modern weaponry. Malaria, dysentery, and pneumonia decimated all ranks. Three-quarters of the Portuguese force was sick by July 1916.<sup>204</sup> As quickly as the HMHS *Gascon*, *Ebani*, *Neuralia*, and *Dangola* evacuated Allied troops from Kilwa and Lindi during the rainy season of 1917, hundreds more filled the hospitals.<sup>205</sup> Half of the 25<sup>th</sup> Royal Fusiliers in Lindi were in the hospital in June 1917.<sup>206</sup> The high number of ill troops and carriers was a significant reason why the Allies repeatedly delayed their advances in southern GEA.<sup>207</sup> The *Schutztruppe* also suffered from illnesses, though their medical resources per capita were more plentiful and nearer at hand than their adversaries up to mid-1917.<sup>208</sup> Illness and scarcity of supplies ultimately compelled the Germans to reduce their fighting force before entering PEA in November 1917. They left over 700 Europeans and 2,000 *askari* behind to be captured.<sup>209</sup> The remaining *Schutztruppe* force, its carriers, and followers suffered over the next ten months from severe weight loss, influenza, pneumonia, and

---

<sup>204</sup> Paice, *World War I*, 268-69. Of the 700 casualties recorded for the 21<sup>st</sup> Infantry Regiment of the Secondary Expeditionary Force, only 19 were combat related.

<sup>205</sup> BNA WO 95/5376 East Africa LOC [Lines of Communication], No 19 British Stationary Hospital (1916 Feb-1918 Dec). No 19 British Stationary Hospital at Kilwa reported that as the rainy season progressed, the “number of cases of malaria greatly increasing – also number of deaths – S.A. coloured entering hospital in large numbers and considerable number of deaths.” A total of 1,018 “Cape” boys were admitted to the hospital in March alone, and “practically all the white population believe [to be] suffering severely.”

<sup>206</sup> BNA WO 95/5325, 25<sup>th</sup> BN Royal Fusiliers (1917 May – Sept). Of the 155 men on parade on 26 June, only thirty-six of them were fit for action. The 25<sup>th</sup> Royal Fusiliers, or “Frontiersmen,” had one of the most unique compositions of individuals to serve in the war. Founded by fifty-five year old Lieutenant Colonel Daniel Patrick Driscoll, the battalion included big-game hunters (including Frederick Courteney Selous), an American millionaire (William Northrup), a naturalist (Angus Buchanan), a famous photographer (Cherry Kearton), a few American cowboys, an opera singer, veterans of the French Foreign Legion and Spanish-American War, an Arctic explorer, and a lion tamer. For more about the “old and bold,” see Byron Farwell, *The Great War in Africa, 1914-1918* (New York: WW Norton & Company, 1986), 257-58.

<sup>207</sup> Anderson, *The Forgotten Front*, 242. In 1918, the East African Mechanical Transport Corps put a minimum height requirement for all African recruits at 5’6”. See BNA WO 95/5377 East Africa L of C [Lines of Communication], East African Mechanical Transport Corps (1917 Feb – 1918 May).

<sup>208</sup> Paice, *World War I*, 304. The Germans moved their network of field hospitals and laboratories from the northeast to the south and continued to use innovative medical techniques, such as distilling quinine from the bark of cinchona trees.

<sup>209</sup> Anderson, *The Forgotten Front*, 255-56; and Paice, *World War I*, 336-37. The reduced force that continued into PEA included nearly 300 Germans, 1,700 *askari*, and 3,000 porters.

malaria.<sup>210</sup> The health of Allied forces south of the Ruvuma was not much better. European and African troops and carriers battled malaria, pneumonia, anemia, and acute diarrhea caused by parasites.<sup>211</sup>



Figure 2.15 “Making bush stretchers for wounded at Nyangao. Nigerian Brigade.”<sup>212</sup>



Figure 2.16 “Wounded ready to be moved from Nyangao, after the Battle of Mahiwa; October 15th-19th 1917. Nigerian Brigade”<sup>213</sup>

<sup>210</sup> Anderson, *The Forgotten Front*, 290.

<sup>211</sup> BNA WO 95/5323/2 East Africa Lindi Force SMO, Appendix VI, “Extract from Report of SMO Nigerian Brigade,” 3 January 1918.

<sup>212</sup> ©IWM (Q 15392), Mann (LtCol) Collection, <http://www.iwm.org.uk/collections/item/object/205250257>.

<sup>213</sup> ©IWM (Q 15394), Mann (LtCol) Collection, <http://www.iwm.org.uk/collections/item/object/205250259>.



In addition to the difficult physical terrain and diseased environment, the German and Allied forces also contended with water and food scarcity throughout the Ruvuma borderland. Access to food and water dictated troop movements. One of the reasons that nearly half of the German and Allied forces fought up the fertile Lukuledi Valley from Mingoyo to Ndanda was the ample supply of water. British intelligence officers and technical troops (or engineers) worked much harder to locate, construct, and sustain water holes along the Kilwa front from the Mbemkuru River to the Lukuledi River. In some cases, African carriers transported water to forward areas. The 61<sup>st</sup> (King's George's Own) Pioneers, for instance, forced approximately forty African stretcher bearers to carry water tins twenty-three miles between the Ruponda and Lukuledi posts.<sup>214</sup> Some of the fiercest battles were fought in defense of water sources. The *Schutztruppe*, for example, vigorously defended their position at Narungombe because it was the last source of water to sustain a large force above the Mbemkuru River.<sup>215</sup> During engagements, enemy forces also sought to deprive one another from water sources by covering them with heavy machine gun fire. Troops and carriers of the Nigerian Brigade suffered a large number of casualties at the Battle of Mahiwa trying to obtain water while surrounded by enemy forces.<sup>216</sup>

Both sides also vigorously defended and tried to deny food to their adversary. Before the onset of the southern campaign, German forces established a network of supply dumps in southern GEA (the largest at Ndanda and Masasi).<sup>217</sup> German officers in Lindi and Kilwa oversaw the storage of an estimated 470,000 kg of foodstuffs for troop usage by January 1917.<sup>218</sup> The German supply system, however, primarily depended upon the looting of local villages and *shambas*. According to Ross Anderson, Lettow-

---

<sup>214</sup> BNA WO 95/5368 East Africa Lines of Communication (LOC), 61<sup>st</sup> (King's George's Own) Pioneers (1917 Oct-Nov), 22 November 1917. Both the East Africa Pioneer Company and 61<sup>st</sup> Pioneers were assigned with digging and deepening water holes and fixing pumps and water troughs.

<sup>215</sup> Paice, *World War I*, 328; and Anderson, *The Forgotten Front*, 226.

<sup>216</sup> BNA WO 95/5325, 4<sup>th</sup> Service Battalion Nigerian Brigade (1917 Oct), 17 October 1917; Nigerian Brigade Headquarters (1917 Oct – 1918 Jan), 15-17 October 1917; and Nigerian Brigade, 1<sup>st</sup> Service Battalion Nigerian Regiment (1917 Oct). The brigade survived a three day enemy encirclement despite dwindling ammunition and provision. The brigade headquarters reported that seven British officers, six British NCOs, 135 African troops, and nine porters were killed or missing in combat from October 15-20. The 1<sup>st</sup> Service Battalion reported that its total force of 207 troops (including 14 Europeans) experienced 150 African casualties and seven Europeans killed or wounded.

<sup>217</sup> Paice, *World War I*, 326.

<sup>218</sup> Becker, "A social history of Southeast Tanzania," 144.

Vorbeck “was quite ruthless in devastating districts for food, both for his own supplies as well as denying his pursuers sustenance. He was quite prepared to leave a district absolutely destitute regardless of the consequences for the African population.”<sup>219</sup> As the Germans retreated south, they employed scorched earth tactics to force the Allies to depend upon their over-stretched supply lines.<sup>220</sup> For example, the Germans burned four tons of food at Luchemi as they retreated from the Makonde Plateau in mid-November 1917.<sup>221</sup> The *Schutztruppe* were not alone in their ruthlessness. Two Allied commanders-in-chief advocated scorched earth policies in the Ruvuma borderland. General Smuts pressed the Portuguese in January 1917 to clear all food in the area 80 km south of the Ruvuma and prevent locals from planting any crops in January and February so that retreating German forces would have to surrender or starve. The Portuguese were unable to fulfill the request.<sup>222</sup> Smuts’ successor, General van Deventer, similarly called for the creation of a foodless barrier along the Ruvuma River. Despite the Colonial Office’s strong opposition, the general received sanctions for the operation. Once again, the scale of the plan made it impractical for the Allied forces to undertake.<sup>223</sup> Still, British Intelligence Officers operating in northern PEA were ordered to purchase or destroy all stores found on their patrols from Ngomano to Medo:

[...] get into touch with the natives en route and make sure that no possible sources of food supplies exist which could be of use to the enemy. If you discover any such stores you should destroy such as you couldn’t carry away or which you couldn’t induce the natives to remove and give them compensation in cash or cloth, your action in each case will of course depend largely on the attitude of the natives themselves. You should tell them all, that we intend to retain G.E.A. and that the war in Europe is likely to last for a long time.<sup>224</sup>

The food situation in the Ruvuma borderland also became critical because the Germans and Allies forcefully conscripted local able-bodied men as carriers. Agricultural production declined as displaced communities (consisting largely of women, children, and the elderly) struggled to complete the necessary

---

<sup>219</sup> Anderson, *The Forgotten Front*, 269.

<sup>220</sup> Paice, *World War I*, 329.

<sup>221</sup> BNA WO 157/1153, Loyd “Intelligence Summary 19/11/17.”

<sup>222</sup> Anderson, *The Forgotten Front*, 190.

<sup>223</sup> *Ibid.*, 273; and Paice, *World War I*, 339.

<sup>224</sup> BNA WO 157/1153, Captain Intelligence Officer LINFORCE HQ NDANDA to Lt. Weinhold ID. LINFORCE Headquarters issued a similar order to Lt. Blake to get in touch with locals in northern PEA and either buy or destroy local foodstuffs.

manual labor amid wartime violence and instability, while also defending against pests and encroaching wildlife.

### **Wartime Construction amid the Destruction: Building a New Infrastructure in the Borderland**

In the wake of countless artillery shells, fires, and raids that struck the Ruvuma borderland, the Allies attempted to construct a new infrastructure landscape to rectify the supply and troop mobility issues that undermined the war effort. In addition to water holes and telegraph lines, the Allies created a massive network of roads across southern GEA and northern PEA.<sup>225</sup> The first large-scale road construction effort occurred in 1915 south of the Ruvuma. Before being recalled to Lisbon, the Portuguese First Expeditionary Force constructed a 300 km road and telegraph link from Porto Amelia, across the Mueda Plateau, to Moçimboa do Rovuma.<sup>226</sup> Little additional road construction occurred in northern PEA until British-led forces crossed the Ruvuma in pursuit of Lettow-Vorbeck in 1918. The British treated construction and improvement of roads in southern GEA as a top priority throughout the campaign in 1917. The pursuit of German forces often dictated where and when the Allied forces cut and cleared roads. The East African Pioneers worked over twelve hour days, cutting an average of four to five miles daily from Mnero to Ruponda, Nachingwea, and Lukuledi in pursuit of the *Schutztruppe* along the Kilwa front.<sup>227</sup> Three companies of the 61<sup>st</sup> (King's George's Own) Pioneers also cut and corduroyed roads from Ruponda to Masasi, and constructed bridges over the Mbemkuru, Mahiwa, and Lukuledi rivers.<sup>228</sup> Technical detachments were not alone in their efforts; rather, African soldiers and carriers assigned to fighting units were frequently reassigned to construct and improve roadways as they marched through southern GEA.<sup>229</sup> During the *Schutztruppe*'s retreat across the Makonde Plateau, all available

---

<sup>225</sup> For accounts about the telegraph lines, see BNA WO 95/5325, Signal Company (1917 June to 1918 November).

<sup>226</sup> Anderson, *The Forgotten Front*, 67; Paice, *World War I*, 141.

<sup>227</sup> BNA WO 95/5368, East African Pioneers Coy, HQ and Sections (1917 Oct-1918 Oct), October 1917.

<sup>228</sup> BNA WO 95/5368, 61<sup>st</sup> (King's George's Own) Pioneers (1917 Oct-Nov), November 1917.

<sup>229</sup> BNA WO 95/5325, 1<sup>st</sup> Brigade HQ: 1917 Dec – 1918 Jan, "1<sup>st</sup> Brigade to GSO, LINFORCE, "Program for Training of First Brigade," 11 December 1917. Instructions for marching discipline in 1917 included the cutting of roadways by advance troops: "(9) General principles march discipline – never march in single rank unless absolutely forced, even if road has to be cut, at least 3 tracks should be made a few yards apart, ports in the middle, soldiers in outer tracks. Advance troops must see to the cutting of tracks, and certain men will be told off for this purpose and changed. Overhead obstructions to be removed on account of porters."

pioneers, fighting units, and carriers were redeployed for road work on the plateau.<sup>230</sup> Major R.

Tomlinson of Linforce reported that “when not engaged with the enemy or on the march the troops were at work on the roads upon which an immense amount of labour has been expended.”<sup>231</sup>




Figure 2.17 Southeastern Portion of “Military Road Map, August 1917”<sup>232</sup>

In addition to quickly cutting and clearing roads in pursuit of German troops, the Allies’ supply needs dictated their infrastructure programs. Unlike their adversary, the Allied forces were too large to live off the land.<sup>233</sup> They needed a transportation network to move imported provisions, ammunitions, and

<sup>230</sup> BNA WO 95/5369 East Africa Lindi Force, No. 4 Column, 5<sup>th</sup> Indian Light Infantry (1917 Nov-1918 Jan); BNA WO 95/5368, East African Pioneers Coy, HQ and Sections (1917 Oct-1918 Oct), November 1917; and BNA WO 95/5324-5325 East Africa Lindi Force HQ (1917 Sept-1918 Jan), BGGS to LINFORCE 31 October 1917.

<sup>231</sup> BNA WO 95/5324-5325 LINFORCE June-Oct 1917, R Tomlinson Major LINFORCE, 10 December 1917. The troops and carriers suffered immensely on the plateau: “A meager water supply. The intense heat and the frequent counter marching due to the conflicting reports upon the enemy’s movements have tried the troops sorely. And whilst operating over the Makonde plateau the nights were intensely cold in comparison with the great heat of the day and the troops being without blankets – which could not be carried on account of the lack of transport – suffered from the extreme variations in temperature. The hardships were, however, cheerfully endured by all ranks, and all orders were readily responded to.”

<sup>232</sup> BNA WO 300/373 East Africa Military Road Map, S.A. & No.6 Topographical Sects., “Military Road Map,” August 1917. The locations circled (from northeast to west) are Lindi, Mahiwa, Ruponda, Masasi, Newala, Rovuma Boma, Ngomano, and Tundururu. The solid red lines indicate main roads. The dotted red lines indicate secondary routes.

<sup>233</sup> There were numerous incidents when the Allies subsisted on local goods due to the breakdown of supply networks. When the Allies found themselves with insufficient foods along the Rufiji River during the rainy season

medical supplies to the frontline. To the southwest, South African engineers organized the construction of nearly 1,500 miles of motor roads from Madibira to Malangali, Lupembe, Songea, and Tandala by early 1917 using conscripted labor. Motor vehicle and porters carried forward goods that originated from Durban and Cape Town, South Africa.<sup>234</sup> Along the Kilwa front, the East African Pioneer Company and 61<sup>st</sup> (King's George's Own) Pioneers constructed hundreds of miles of earth roads for the motor transport units advancing to the Lukuledi River.<sup>235</sup>



**Figure 2.18 “Bridges built by No.1 section, 2<sup>nd</sup> Road Corps, and constructed almost without nails or dogs. They were so built to take the heaviest loads. Nakin River, on the Kilwa Line. October 1917.”<sup>236</sup>**

of 1916, General Smuts permitted widespread looting of food. According to Paice, the food situation was so desperate that Nigerian troops ate roots, corpses of dead animals, bush rat pie, and monkey brains. During the southern campaign, the Nigerian Brigade received orders from General Beves that the column was “to live on country as far as possible” as they conducted a four days march south to Mahiwa with only one day’s supply of rations on hand. It appears that the column did not have to exercise the order as supplies were brought forward two days later. When the 1<sup>st</sup> Service Battalion Nigerian Regiment left Santorium for Mahiwa on 16 October, they had a “train of over 3,000 non-combatants” (including prisoners) carrying all supplies, reserve SAA, baggage for the whole column, cable, signals, gun ammunition, and stokes guns reserve shells. See BNA WO 95/5325, Nigerian Brigade Headquarters (1917 Oct – 1918 Jan), 9 October 1917; and Paice, *World War I*, 301.

<sup>234</sup> Paice, *World War I*, 264-65. Supplies were transported along one of two routes. The first route began with the shipment of goods from Durban to Beira. Small steamers then carried the goods 80 miles to Chinde. River boats brought them up the Zambezi to Chiromo. A railway delivered them at Blantyre. They travelled overland to Lake Malawi and then crossed 200 miles across the lake on steamers. The secondary route from Cape Town was railed 700 miles to Livingstone, carried by human porter 700 miles, and canoed through Northern Rhodesia to Fife. In either supply network, the goods rested only at the rear of Norforce’s operations and had to be carried an additional 200 miles in GEA.

<sup>235</sup> Anderson, *The Forgotten Front*, 187. According to Anderson, “a single Ford car of 135 kg cargo capacity could match the efforts of 300 carriers.”

<sup>236</sup> ©IWM (Q 15666), Powell L.A.W. (Lt) Collection, <http://www.iwm.org.uk/collections/item/object/205250529>.



**Figure 2.19 “Motor Park, Ndanda, January 1918. All kinds of motor cars were used, but the Ford cars managed to get through where no heavier make of car could possibly stand the road for even one journey. In East Africa the Ford was nicknamed the “Jigger” after the jigger flea, for, like the insect, it could get anywhere.”<sup>237</sup>**

As the Kilwa and Lindi fronts converged at Mtama (along the Lukuledi River) and the Germans concentrated their forces on the Makonde Plateau, the Allies redoubled their efforts to maintain and improve two essential transportation arteries in the southeast – the Lindi railway and Lindi-Masasi main road. Fighting occurred along the entirety of the narrow gauge railway (or tramway) from its railhead at Mingoyo (at Lindi Creek) to Mtua. The Germans initially utilized the tramway to evacuate their heavy artillery further into the interior.<sup>238</sup> Once the Allies secured the railhead, they deployed labor to enlarge the landing site at Mingoyo, acquire new trolleys, and extend the rail line.<sup>239</sup> By the end of 1917, the

<sup>237</sup> ©IWM (Q 15653), Powell L.A.W. (Lt) Collection, <http://www.iwm.org.uk/collections/item/object/205250505>.

<sup>238</sup> Anderson, *The Forgotten Front*, 221. The Germans used the rail to evacuate a gun from *Königsberg*, which had been recovered from the sunken cruiser in the Rufiji Delta.

<sup>239</sup> BNA WO 95/5325, East Africa Lindi Column Headquarters (1917 March – Aug). In June 1917 there was one engine for the Mingoyo-Mtua line, but it was unworkable due to a “want of oil.” The Allies’ solution was to ship a serviceable locomotive from Kikwetu Sisal Plantation (north of Lindi) to the Mingoyo line. There was an idea of converting the line into a motor road, but a work party concluded that such a scheme would take “too much time and labor.” Improving the tramway also required considerable labor. During August, Lindi Column Headquarters called upon the administrative staff to increase the number of laborers “the lack of which threatens to interfere with tramline construction and future operations.” The sick and wounded were also evacuated by the tramway. In the immediate aftermath of the Battle of Mahiwa, over 700 cases were evacuated to Mingoyo by the tramway in two days. Orders were issued by the Senior Medical Officer Minogyo for the disinfection of the trolleys when

tramline had only been extended 9 km to Mtama.<sup>240</sup> The Allies were therefore forced to transport the bulk of their supplies along the Lindi-Masasi main road. Masasi served as the supply and communication center – linking Songea to the west, Lindi to the east, and Newala to the south. As the Germans escaped into PEA, all available men worked to improve the main road and construct an extension to Ngomano on the Ruvuma River in preparation for an offensive.<sup>241</sup> By the end of 1917, all troops, provisions, medical supplies, and ammunition were shipped from Lindi to Mingoyo, railed to Mtama, caravanned or driven approximately 120 miles to the Ruvuma River, and forwarded into PEA by porters and pack donkeys.<sup>242</sup>

---

carrying cases of infectious disease. See BNA WO 95/5323/14 East Africa Lindi Force, No 2 South African Field Ambulance (1917 Aug – 1918 Feb); and BNA WO 95/5323/2, Senior Medical Officer (1917 Oct – 1918 Jan), Senior Medical Officer Mingoyo, “Disinfection of Trolleys” 1 October 1917.

<sup>240</sup> Anderson, *The Forgotten Front*, 244 and 254.

<sup>241</sup> BNA WO 95/5324-5325 LINFORCE June-Oct 1917. The Nigerian Brigade furnished working parties of carriers, totaling 600, that worked in two reliefs along the Mtama-Nyangao section of the main road. The shifts were from 7:30am to 1:00pm and 1:00pm to 6:00pm. The East African troops of the 4/4<sup>th</sup> Battalion KAR were also designated towards roadmaking throughout the first week of December. At the same time, Thomlinson reported that all assistant field engineers and Pioneers were employed on constructing and improving the southern infrastructure: “Where no roads existed they had to be made to allow of the movement of transport and existing roads had to be widened and otherwise improved and many bridges had to be constructed. The value of the work performed by the Department cannot be overestimated.” See BNA WO 95/5325, 4<sup>th</sup> Service Battalion Nigerian Brigade (1917 Oct); and BNA WO 95/5369 East Africa LOC, 4<sup>th</sup> Battalion King’s African Rifles (1917 Nov-Dec).

<sup>242</sup> BNA WO 95/5324-5325 LINFORCE June-Oct 1917, December 1917.

**Photographs of the Lindi Supply Line**  
 (Lindi-Mingoyo-Ndanda-Masasi-Ngomano-Portuguese East Africa)



Figure 2.20 "Drafts of Nigerians for the Nigerian Brigade disembarking at Lindi. December 1917."<sup>243</sup>




Figure 2.21 "IWT up Lindi Creek delivering supplies at Mingoyo."<sup>244</sup>

<sup>243</sup> ©IWM (Q 15370), Mann (LtCol) Collection, <http://www.iwm.org.uk/collections/item/object/205250235>.

<sup>244</sup> ©IWM (Q 15490), Dale C. (Lt) Collection, <http://www.iwm.org.uk/collections/item/object/205250353>.





Figure 2.22 “Barges and small steamers were brought up to this wharf at Mingoyo, at the top of Lindi Creek, and put on the trains; from trains to cars; from cars to porters. Very heavy fighting took place between Mingoyo and Ndanda, from June to August 1917.”<sup>245</sup>



Figure 2.23 “Supply train, Mtama, January 1918.”<sup>246</sup>

<sup>245</sup> ©IWM (Q 15654), Powell L.A.W. (Lt) Collection, <http://www.iwm.org.uk/collections/item/object/205250506>.

<sup>246</sup> ©IWM (Q 15643), Powell L.A.W. (Lt) Collection, <http://www.iwm.org.uk/collections/item/object/205250495>.



Figure 2.24 "Nigerian troops on the march on Lindi Line."<sup>247</sup>



Figure 2.25 "Ford Convoy with ammunition at Moambika (The Loop); Lindi Line GEA, about October 1917."<sup>248</sup>

<sup>247</sup> ©IWM (Q 15484), Dale C. (Lt) Collection, <http://www.iwm.org.uk/collections/item/object/205250347>.

<sup>248</sup> ©IWM (Q 15505), Dale C. (Lt) Collection, <http://www.iwm.org.uk/collections/item/object/205250368>.



Figure 2.26 "Motor Transport Repairing Shop. One of many placed at various points along the lines of communication. Ndanda, January 1918."<sup>249</sup>



Figure 2.27 "Portuguese East Africa. Nigerians crossing Rovuma River, two miles from Ngomano, December 1917. The 1<sup>st</sup> and 3<sup>rd</sup> Nigerian Regiments crossed in the first week of December."<sup>250</sup>

<sup>249</sup> ©IWM (Q 15635), Powell L.A.W. (Lt) Collection, <http://www.iwm.org.uk/collections/item/object/205250487>.

<sup>250</sup> ©IWM (Q 15444), Mann (LtCol) Collection, <http://www.iwm.org.uk/collections/item/object/205250307>.



**Figure 2.28 “No. 10 Workshop Unit moving forward on Line of Communication in Portuguese Nyasaland - about to trek a small part of their journey through a swamp, transport other than porters being impossible.”<sup>251</sup>**

The new landscape of roads crisscrossing southern GEA largely vanished after the rainy season of 1918. Most of the roads had been constructed out of necessity rather than for future use. Troops hastily cut roads without consideration of proper alignment and drainage. When faced with difficult terrain, the Allies typically employed quick-fixes to make the roads passable for the short-term. Technical troops, for example, ordered thick bundles of grass to be laid over roads of sandy soils.<sup>252</sup> The method proved “very satisfactory” at binding the soil and allowing for the passage of motor vehicles, howitzers, and field batteries. New bundles of grass, however, had to be continually reapplied to prevent deep tire ruts from forming.<sup>253</sup> The technique ultimately required an “enormous” amount of African labour in order to keep

<sup>251</sup> ©IWM (Q 15528), Dale C. (Lt) Collection, <http://www.iwm.org.uk/collections/item/object/205250390>.

<sup>252</sup> The British District Officer of Newala explained that once the light sandy soil “is parted from the small quantity of clay and lumus which binds it together the pure sand remaining leads to wheel spin and wheel spin churns up the surface below so that the sand is continually deepened.” See Newala District Book, “Main, District and Village Roads – District Roads Grade B,” 1941.

<sup>253</sup> BNA WO 95/5368, 2<sup>nd</sup> Road Corps 1917 (Jan-September), Serial No. 126 “Confidential War Diary of 2<sup>nd</sup> Road Corps from January 1917 to September 17<sup>th</sup> 1917,” August 1917; and East African Pioneers Coy, HQ and Sections (1917 Oct-1918 Oct), October 1917.

the roads passable.<sup>254</sup> Large amounts of labor were also expended to corduroy sections of black cotton soil found in low-lying areas throughout southeastern GEA. Black cotton soil flooded when the rains set in and rendered motor vehicle transport impossible. Considering the amount of manpower and resources necessary to construct and maintain roads, it is a small wonder why Allied forces made little or no efforts to maintain or improve road surfaces once troops advanced from an area. Poor road conditions, however, resulted in frequent vehicle breakdowns and high attrition rates among drivers, both of which undermined the Allies' supply lines.<sup>255</sup>

---

<sup>254</sup> BNA WO 95/5324-5325 East Africa Lindi Force HQ (1917 Sept-1918 Jan), 23 October 1917. LINFORCE headquarters reported: "All available natives being employed upon road which are in bad condition. The soil over the whole country traversed by motor cars is very sandy and experience has proved that the only means of preserving the roads and making them passable for cars is to cover them with grass over the surface length. The labour involved is enormous."

<sup>255</sup> BNA WO 95/5324-5325 LINFORCE June-Oct 1917, December 1917; BNA WO 95/5368, East African Pioneers Coy, HQ and Sections (1917 Oct-1918 Oct). As an example, it took the Senior Medical Officer at Ndanda two days to reach Lindi by car and boat during the second week of January 1918. The car quickly broke down after leaving Ndanda at 9:30am on 12 December. The party did not arrive at Mtama until 4:20 pm, and proceeded to Mtua at 6:00pm. The road was so bad that the car axel and startup gear were damaged. The car was repaired the following morning. It took another two and a half hours to reach Mingoyo due to the heavy rains and terrible road conditions. Since the road from Mingoyo to Lindi was closed, the party took a tow to Lindi town and arrived after 8pm.

The life of a driver was very difficult. The new African drivers assigned under Lt. Oakes convoy in the Kilwa Area drove an average of 10 hours and 72 miles a day during their first week on the front. By the end of November, the drivers were alternating between 88 and 103 miles a day. Concerns about overworking the drivers and vehicles were ignored: "if necessary we should be sacrificed for sake ending campaign our luck and we must do best we can and be proud have opportunity show how far we can go before dropping aaa explain position to men." By mid-December, disease and exhaustion were crippling the drivers. Oakes reported that the cause of the drivers' poor health was "excessive hours on road – convoy averaging 90 miles a day over bumpy roads with sand and delayed by weather over black soil patches." See BNA WO 95/5377 East Africa L of C: East African Mechanical Transport Corps (1917 Feb-1918 May), November 1917.



**Figure 2.29 “An RASC Motor Repair Shop, near Lindi. Owing to the nature of the ground to be traversed, the percentage of breakdowns was very high.”<sup>256</sup>**

The Allies’ failure to construct a permanent infrastructure network in southern GEA ultimately hampered their efforts to conduct a large offensive across the Ruvuma River during the spring of 1918 and bring the war to an end. Major Tomlinson at Linforce headquarters explained that an offensive required large supply reserves to be accumulated at the forward stations along the Ruvuma. Such a buildup had not happened before the rains; rather, all troops stationed from Ndanda to the border were on half rations.<sup>257</sup> Officials blamed the dire supply situation on the railway, which proved incapable of meeting “the excessive demands made upon it.”<sup>258</sup> Bad weather, defective roads, petrol shortages, and a temporary shortage of motor cars and drivers also prevented the accumulation of supplies at forward positions. In order to feed the Allied forces at Tunduru and along the Ruvuma without food reserves, the Allies would need to transport 330,000 pounds daily – or a total of 660 cars. The roads could not sustain such heavy vehicle traffic in the rains, and pack animals died far too rapidly from trypanosomiasis and

<sup>256</sup> ©IWM (Q 15477), Dale C. (Lt) Collection, <http://www.iwm.org.uk/collections/item/object/205250340>.

<sup>257</sup> BNA WO 95/5323/3 East Africa Lindi Force SMO, December 1917. After being on half rations for over a week, the Senior Medical Officer reported that all troops from Masasi downward “were emaciating and losing their powers of resistance against disease. The numbers of sick are increasing. Yesterday 25 cases of pneumonia alone were admitted to hospital.”

<sup>258</sup> BNA WO 95/5324-5325 LINFORCE June-Oct 1917, 1 December 1917; and BNA WO 95/5323/3 East Africa Lindi Force SMO, December 1917.

other diseases. The only option left was portage. In order for the Ruvuma River force to attain the required 51,000 lbs. of food daily, an estimated 30,000 porters were needed to transport supplies from Mingoyo to the Ruvuma.<sup>259</sup> An addition 75,000 carriers were required for the advance through northern PEA.<sup>260</sup> Tomlinson concluded that such a scheme was impossible “owing to the heavy consumption of food by porters: the greater the distance to be traversed the less amount of food can be carried forward to the operating troops as the requirements of the porters along the whole route have to be met.”<sup>261</sup> The overland offensive was cancelled and most of the Allied forces were either shipped south to Porto Amelia or back home to India, South Africa, and West Africa.<sup>262</sup> As the war shifted south through central PEA, the Allies retained a minimal force in southern GEA. The remaining East African Pioneers were tasked with maintaining and improving the main road from Lindi to Songea during the wet season of 1918 (January to April): widening, corduroying, metaling small stretches, improving drainage, and erecting numerous bridges and culverts.<sup>263</sup> When the rains subsided in June 1918, No. 2 Company spent two weeks repairing the road and bridges from Ngomano to Lindi.<sup>264</sup> The same company then spent the entirety of August, September, and October improving the main road from Tunduru.<sup>265</sup> Across the Ruvuma border, Allied forces also extended the motor road from Medo to Nampula to permit the transport of troops and supplies by vehicles (rather than ships) to the Moçambique front.<sup>266</sup> None of these roads were made of permanent bituminous materials and most became impassable with the next year’s rains.

---

<sup>259</sup> BNA WO 95/5324-5325 LINFORCE June-Oct 1917, December 1917.

<sup>260</sup> Paice, *World War I*, 346.

<sup>261</sup> BNA WO 95/5324-5325 LINFORCE June-Oct 1917, December 1917.

<sup>262</sup> Anderson, *The Forgotten Front*, 263.

<sup>263</sup> BNA WO 95/5325, Nigerian Brigade Headquarters (1917 Oct – 1918 Jan), December 1917; and BNA WO 95/5368, East African Pioneers Coy, HQ and Sections (1917 Oct-1918 Oct), November 1917.

<sup>264</sup> BNA WO 95/5368, East African Pioneers Coy, HQ and Sections (1917 Oct-1918 Oct), June 9-23, 1918.

<sup>265</sup> *Ibid.* The main road to Tunduru was improved to allow motor vehicle transport at the end of December 1917. A washout near Masasi, however, closed the roadway within a couple of weeks. See BNA WO 95/5324-5325 LINFORCE June-Oct 1917, 24 December 1917.

<sup>266</sup> Anderson, *The Forgotten Front*, 286.



**Figure 2.30 “All bridges were constructed with very few nails, dogs, etc. Supports were fixed in a position by the weight that was laid on afterwards. Near Ndanda. January 1918. Second Road Corps.”<sup>267</sup>**

### **Legacy of the War and Conclusion**

The First World War in the Ruvuma borderland was a time of construction and destruction, with the balance weighing overwhelmingly in favor of the latter. The Allies constructed hundreds of miles of infrastructure throughout southern GEA and northern PEA from 1917 to 1918. Thousands of European, Indian, and African troops and carriers worked unknown hours constructing networks of roads that connected the major coastal ports to one another, the interior, and across the Ruvuma border. In theory, the British administration that took authority over GEA (thereafter Tanganyika) should have had easy access to all the major centers in the south. In reality, the Allies constructed the transportation infrastructure haphazardly and according to short-term, military needs rather than economically-based, development visions for the borderland. Whereas German settlers and District Officers prior to the war designed and built roads and railways to improve administrative efficiency and advance commercial ties between the interior and coast, the Allies cut and cleared roads with the sole objective of more efficiently moving troops and supplies in pursuit of German forces. Without continual maintenance from a large

<sup>267</sup> ©IWM (Q 15626), Powell L.A.W. (Lt) Collection, <http://www.iwm.org.uk/collections/item/object/205250479>.



labor force, the roads rapidly deteriorated into broad paths that were somewhat graded and cleared of bush. The poorly constructed culverts and timber bridges washed away with the rains.



**Figure 2.31 “Bridge and road made by 2<sup>nd</sup> Road Corps, near Ndanda. December 1917.”<sup>268</sup>**

The destruction and dilapidation of the roadways echoed the general devastation and massive loss of life that occurred in the Ruvuma borderland. The fertile Lukuledi River Valley experienced four months of almost continuous fighting and heavy artillery bombardments. The Makonde Plateau suffered from punitive German raids and scorched earth tactics. To the west, German forces raided the area from Songea to Mwembe (along the Lugenda Valley in northern PEA) at least four times by the end of the war. When the Germans returned through the area in September 1918, there was practically nothing left to plunder.<sup>269</sup> The forcible conscription of the male population as carriers for both armies prevented the sowing of crops throughout the borderland.<sup>270</sup> The prevalence of troops, armed conflict, and forced conscription hindered the mobility of local communities, thus depriving them of an integral and centuries-old strategy of survival. An untold number of people died of starvation and thousands succumbed to diseases, including the Spanish influenza pandemic, which killed an estimated 50,000-80,000 people in

<sup>268</sup> ©IWM (Q 15627), Powell L.A.W. (Lt) Collection, <http://www.iwm.org.uk/collections/item/object/205250480>.

<sup>269</sup> Paice, 382.

<sup>270</sup> Killingray, “Labour Exploitation for Military Campaigns in British Colonial Africa 1870-1945,” 495.

Tanganyika between 1918 and 1920.<sup>271</sup> A report from Masasi declared that “every hut possessed its sufferers.”<sup>272</sup> Impoverishment defined the Ruvuma borderland, as people wore bark cloth and refugees overwhelmed Lindi town and its vicinities.<sup>273</sup>

The war ultimately shattered European ambitions of creating a thriving agricultural landscape in the Ruvuma borderland and instead solidified the region’s peripheralization within Tanganyika and PEA, the British and Portuguese Empires, and international markets. The Ruvuma borderland was no longer a central point of long-distance trade networks, nor was it considered a land of agricultural promise for European settlers. Wartime experiences instead propagated perceptions that the borderland was an unhealthy, unprofitable, and unstable region. There were seemingly no financial incentives for the British and Portuguese to invest in the borderland, so they neglected it during the interwar era of the 1920s and 1930s. The region’s inadequate transportation infrastructure became a symptom, justification, and symbol for its economic peripheralization and physical isolation. The roads also served as a vivid reminder of the brutality of colonial rule, especially for those who were forced to construct them, carry goods across them, and/or march as soldiers along them. The socioeconomic and political instability found throughout the Ruvuma borderland after the war, however, bred opportunity for local leaders and economic entrepreneurs who were willing to exploit the weaknesses of the colonial states on both sides of the border for their own advantage. The ability to move and adapt remained the keys to survival and prosperity in the Ruvuma borderland during the interwar era, as it had for centuries before.

---

<sup>271</sup> Paice, *World War I*, 395-399; Gregory Maddox, “Mtunya: Famine in Central Tanzania, 1917-20,” *The Journal of African History* 31, no. 2 (1990): 181-197; and BNA WO 95/5376 East Africa L of C [Lines of Communication], No. 19 British Stationary Hospital (1916 Feb-1918 Dec). The exact timing of the arrival of influenza in East Africa is unclear because medical professionals struggled to recognize it amid the other diseases and ailments afflicting troops and civilians. According to Paice, the epidemic was in Mombasa and South Africa in September, southern Nyasaland in early October, and PEA in mid-October. No. 19 British Stationary Hospital reported that the flu had broken out in Port Amelia in November 1918 and was completed by the end of December. The disease allegedly spread along troop supply lines, railways, lake steamers, among carriers returning home, and migrant laborers. An estimated 200,000 men, women, and children died in British East Africa, and over 1.5-2 million people died in sub-Saharan Africa.

<sup>272</sup> Iliffe, *A Modern History of Tanganyika*, 270

<sup>273</sup> Becker, “A social history of Southeast Tanzania,” 147-48.

### Chapter 3

#### Governing a Lonely Station: The Interwar Era in the Ruvuma Borderland (1914-1945)

When the British Empire took responsibility for the newly Mandated Territory of Tanganyika following the First World War, it constituted the “largest, most populous, and most varied territory” under British authority in East Africa.<sup>1</sup> Encompassing an area a third the size of British India, Tanganyika had an estimated population of 2,447 Europeans, 15,000 Asians, and over four million Africans in 1921.<sup>2</sup>




Figure 3.1 Edward Humphrey Manisty Leggett, “Sketch Map of the Tanganyika Territory,” 1922.<sup>3</sup>

The new administration struggled to revitalize the territory, which had been devastated by scorched earth tactics, modern weaponry, forced conscription, famine, starvation, and disease during the war. Postwar instability was particularly intense in the war-torn Ruvuma borderland of southern Tanganyika and northern Portuguese East Africa (PEA). With a limited budget and personnel, the British central

<sup>1</sup> “Report of the East Africa Commission,” report presented by the Secretary of the State for the Colonies to the British Parliament (London: His Majesty’s Press, 1925), 113.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid.

<sup>3</sup> Edward Humphrey Manisty Leggett, “The Tanganyika Territory,” *Journal of the Royal Society of Arts* 70, no. 3643 (September 1922), 737-752.

administration in Dar es Salaam invested in regions that seemed to promise the quickest and most profitable returns, specifically the cash crop producing regions along the Central and Tanga Railways. Southern Tanganyika, in contrast, lacked high value crops and had an infrastructure of deteriorating, ill-designed dirt roads. As a result, the colonial state in Dar es Salaam and London neglected the region throughout the 1920s and early 1930s. They only looked to the peripheral borderland when it became embroiled in international disputes with the Portuguese and Nyassa Company across the border or internal scandals as during the Tunduru famine incident in 1930/31. Officers stationed to southern Tanganyika, however, saw economic potential in the region and hoped that the “Cinderella province may yet achieve her destiny and arouse the envy of her ugly sisters.”<sup>4</sup> Similar to their German predecessors, the southern provincial administration envisioned a landscape of concentrated African settlements engaged in cash and food crop cultivation and export. Rural communities would be integrated into the colonial state and economy through a network of intra- and interregional roads. Throughout the interwar era, road construction and transportation rested at the heart of colonial development plans for the Southern Province. British officers specifically targeted the Lindi-Songea main road as the transportation artery through which they would transform the Southern Province from an isolated, unprofitable borderland to one of the most lucrative exporting regions of agricultural produce and migrant laborers in the Territory.

Inadequate funds, equipment, technical staff, and laborers undermined these hopes for southern Tanganyika during the interwar era. In the wake of the Great Depression, the colonial state was forced to turn to the private sector for assistance with its infrastructure plans. Private road construction and maintenance contractors failed to improve the main road to an all-weather standard, yet their efforts helped to stimulate a growing motor vehicle transportation sector in the south. Indian wholesalers and merchants took advantage of the speed and flexibility that automobiles offered to reestablish and expand their trade networks between the coast, interior towns, and rural communities. African producers and migrant laborers, meanwhile, appropriated motor vehicles to pursue socioeconomic opportunities within

---

<sup>4</sup> DSM, A.E. Kitching, “Southern Province,” *Tanganyika Territory: Annual Report of the Provincial Commissioner on Native Administration for the year 1935* (Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 1936).

and beyond the Ruvuma borderland region. The interwar years marked southern Tanganyika's growing impoverishment and isolation for the larger Territory, British Empire, and global markets, yet it was also a time of opportunity for local communities, traders, and private firms, who exploited a new mode of mobility to their advantage.

### **Postwar Instability in the Borderland – Northern Portuguese East Africa in the 1920s**

Local communities residing in the Ruvuma borderland depended upon their mobility to navigate the instability that defined the region in the aftermath of the First World War. While populations on both sides of the Ruvuma contended with the effects of wartime devastation (destruction of homes and land, population displacement, political upheavals, and mass loss of life), populations living in northern Portuguese East Africa (PEA) encountered increasingly violent and exploitative colonial rule under the Nyassa Company.<sup>5</sup> British officers first reported cases of Portuguese “atrocities” and the “wholesale murder of hapless natives” by Portuguese district officers and their African *askari* (soldiers) during the war in 1917.<sup>6</sup> While stationed along the Ruvuma border, Captain Burke (South African Special Service Company) was approached several times by chiefs who asked permission to relocate their people into the

---

<sup>5</sup> BNA FO 371/4123 Maltreatment Natives in PEA 1919-20, “Incident on Northern border of Portuguese East Africa,” 161630 “Appearance of Portuguese Askaris on British side of Border of PE Africa,” October 1919.

<sup>6</sup> BNA FO 371/4123, 47343 Maltreatment Natives in PEA 1919-20, Major A. Russell (GCO) to SAO Lumbo, 5 November 1918; and C.P. Tindall, General Officer Commander-in-Chief East African Expeditionary Force to Director of Military Intelligence (War Office), 24 November 1918. Abuses were not restricted to northern PEA. Lieutenants G.M. Willox and A.B. de Kotze offered some of the most gruesome evidence of the abuses carried out on local African populations by Portuguese officials and *askari* along the Lurio River (Mozambique Company Territory). Multiple chiefs reported that Portuguese forces were cutting off women's breasts and torturing men to death for assisting the British and being absent when taxes were due. When Willox confronted the Portuguese Captain Commandant about the allegations, the Portuguese officer insisted that he was permitted to hang and kill “all natives who had not paid their taxes and those that had assisted the Germans.” When the lieutenants examined the Commandant's *boma*, they found a stockyard (20x30 yards) filled with 200-300 old women and children. Willox reported that the “the stench and human filth was appalling.” The women were evidently held hostage for the men who were employed by the British or hiding in the bush. The women were also used as laborers and messengers; returning to their villages with the heads of their executed husbands as a warning. Lt. Kotze photographed the compound and the gallows nearby. While at the village of Mututuri, the two British officers also took pictures of two recently decapitated bodies. Lt. Kotze insisted that such violence “had been going on now as far as I can gather from the natives for the last seven or eight months, and also long before the war so the Portuguese trying to make out that they are doing this because the natives helped the Germans is only a blind to save their own miserable selves from exposure.” See BNA FO 371/4123, 47343, J.P.M. Molony, Recruiting Officer MLC to DDML, Port Amelia, 23 March 18; and BNA FO 608/216 Peace Conference British Delegation 1919, 608/216/13 “Atrocities in Portuguese East Africa.”

British territory. These chiefs explained that African police entered villages, raped and abducted the women, and confiscated anything they wanted.<sup>7</sup> If anyone resisted or a policeman was injured, the Portuguese would hunt the guilty parties “like wild beasts.”<sup>8</sup> The British Administrative Political Officer in Lindi – Sd. G.St.J. Orde-Browne – collected statements by refugees who witnessed and/or partook in similar atrocities after the war in northern PEA. A former policeman, Musa bin Ahmadi of Kionga, claimed that anyone who refused to pay taxes was captured and sent to the Portuguese *boma* (district headquarters or fort).<sup>9</sup> Once at the station, the tax defaulter was flogged with a hide whip or had their hands beaten with a *baramatola*.<sup>10</sup> While women suffered the same punishment as men, European officers and African police detained those that they considered attractive as long “as they are found pleasing.”<sup>11</sup> Jumbe Mperembe bin Nambiu contended that the violence was not only conducted at the Portuguese *bomas*.<sup>12</sup> He accused *askari* of brutally beating and murdering his brother in their village on the pretext that he failed to pay taxes. Jumbe Mperembe estimated that the *askari* killed 160 of his people by

---

<sup>7</sup> Military reports about abducted women were issued by BNA FO 371/4123, Major F.M. Stokes, Port Amelia, to Officer Commanding PAMFORCE, “Detention of Local Carrier’s Women by Portuguese,” 4 March 1918; DDML Pamela to Commanding Pamforce; and J.P.M. Molony, Recruiting Officer MLC to DDML, Port Amelia, 23 March 1918.

<sup>8</sup> BNA FO 371/5491 Political Western Portugal 1920 (Files 329-876), “Commissioner of Enquiry to deal with alleged ill-treatment of Indians and natives in Portuguese East Africa,” Captain Burke, 17 November 1920. For additional accounts see the reports issued by B. General C.P. Tindall and Major Russell in BNA FO 371/4123, 47343 Maltreatment Natives in PEA 1919-20.

<sup>9</sup> BNA FO 371/4123, 161630 “Appearance of Portuguese Askaris on British side of Border of PE Africa,” Statement by Musa bin Ahmadi, Mwswahili of Kionga, statement taken by Sd. G.St.J. Orde Browne, Lindi, 23 October 1919. Musa bin Ahmadi claimed that he fled to Mikindani after he severely punished his subordinates for robbing local villagers. The subordinates were preparing to complain about the abuse to a Portuguese officer, who was known for his severity.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.* A *baramatola* was a flat, bat-shaped piece of wood, about two feet in length, with a few holes bored in the wide portion. An individual’s palms were beaten anywhere from 20 to 200 or 300 times. The abuse left an individual’s hands useless for two to three months, and the fingers often remained drawn up and contracted. According to Musa bin Ahmadi, the same punishment was inflicted on women and men.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.* According to Musa bin Ahmadi, no records were kept of the abuse and corporal punishments.

<sup>12</sup> BNA FO 371/4123, 161630 “Appearance of Portuguese Askaris on British side of Border of PE Africa,” Statement by Jumbe Mperembe bin Nambiu, statement taken by Orde Browne, Lindi, 15 October 1919. Mperembe bin Nambiu was a *jumbe* of Mahiwa in northern PEA – a six hour journey from the Ruvuma River.

bayonets, rifle butts, or axes. The treatment towards women was “worse than the men.” They were reportedly abducted, raped, mutilated, impaled, and/or burned to death.<sup>13</sup>

One explanation offered for the violence and extortion occurring in northern PEA was that the *askari* and police were underpaid. According to Musa bin Ahmadi, an ordinary policeman in northern PEA earned 7/25 Rps. per month of which two were automatically deducted for uniform payments. Musa bin Ahmadi contended that the wages were “not nearly enough for a man to live on, and to buy clothes for his wife: so we all relied on money paid by people who were arrested: and many policemen used to steal food or other things from the country people: it was the only way in which we could live.”<sup>14</sup> The existence of independent communities of ex-soldiers and deserters in northern PEA added to the region’s instability. These men allegedly lived “a freelance existence in a series of miniature native republics.”<sup>15</sup> The ex-soldiers were welcomed by locals because their rifles provided meat and protection against Portuguese exploitation. The *askari* and police sent to collect taxes often found themselves in a dangerous position. They could be attacked by locals for collecting taxes and/or beaten by district officers for failing to bring back enough money.<sup>16</sup> Discarded ammunitions and arms from the East African campaign, easily found throughout northern PEA, fueled the violence.<sup>17</sup> While some communities fought against the abuses of Nyassa Company rule, many migrated into southern Tanganyika. Nyassa Company officers and police responded by pursuing the migrants across the border and conducting raids in Tanganyika. Orde-Browne and the Assistant Political Officer of Masasi investigated the raids and concluded that the Portuguese forces,

[...] endeavour to catch all parties making for the Rovuma, directing their efforts at the women in particular, in accordance with their custom; and if a party succeeds in getting over the border,

---

<sup>13</sup> Ibid. Jumbe Mperembe stated that the violence was new and unwarranted as his people had paid their taxes. One of his followers, Tangari bin Mtembwe, confirmed Mperembe’s account. Tangari claimed that his brother was killed when trying to flee from his *askari*. Tangari’s wife was raped and forced to eat filth before she was returned. Many of his relations had been killed or disappeared, and their villages had ceased to exist.

<sup>14</sup> BNA FO 371/4123, Statement by Musa bin Ahmadi, 23 October 1919.

<sup>15</sup> BNA FO 371/4123, “Northern border of Portuguese East Africa,” Political Office (Lindi) to the Secretary to the Administration (Dar es Salaam), “Enclosure in Secrete dispatch of 1<sup>st</sup> March 1919,” 8 February 1919.

<sup>16</sup> BNA FO 371/4123, Statement by Musa bin Ahmadi, 23 October 1919.

<sup>17</sup> Ibid.

there is of course a great tendency for the pursuers to follow up. They then try to collect people on our side of the boundary, and carry on their usual food raids, with, naturally, serious results.<sup>18</sup>

British-Portuguese tensions escalated as the Portuguese detained Tanganyika residents who attended to their farms in northern PEA, especially in the Kionga District (at the mouth of the Ruvuma River). Prior to the war, several Arab and Swahili men owned farms and plantations south of the Ruvuma while living on the north bank. After the war, the Portuguese introduced regulations forcing every property owner to live on his land. Those men who continued to crisscross the border were liable to lose their fields and incur “various penalties even indefinite periods in jail in default of payment of exorbitant fines.”<sup>19</sup> The handful of British officers stationed in the south feared that if armed Portuguese incursions and unwarranted detentions continued, local populaces in Tanganyika would retaliate, causing further disorder in the borderland and a potential international incident between England and Portugal.<sup>20</sup>

The British administration in Dar es Salaam responded to the growing crisis by ordering Orde Browne to take “whatever steps he considers expedient to protect the natives of his district from attacks of this nature and to resist, if necessary by force, any further incursions of armed parties in his district.”<sup>21</sup> The British government in London, meanwhile, pressured the Portuguese government to conduct a formal investigation into the alleged atrocities, dispense punishments, and implement measures to stop future violence in the Nyassa concession.<sup>22</sup> When the Portuguese were slow to respond, the British threatened to

---

<sup>18</sup> BNA FO 371/4123, 106331 “Incident on Northern border of Portuguese East Africa,” and 161630 “Appearance of Portuguese Askaris on British side of Border of PE Africa,” October 1919. The evidence collected included sworn statements, photographs, and medical documentation of the victims. The APO Masasi, Gerard Barnes, conducted the initial investigation into three raids and the shooting of British subjects by armed Portuguese forces in September 1919. Three Portuguese *askaris* and one European “Bwana Achiwachanzi” were involved in the raids. “Bwana Achiwachanzi” was in charge of five stations in Ngomano, Uzimbwa, Nangadi, Nanchemba, and Mponda Nyali and the surrounding country. He was allegedly “thought very highly of by the Portuguese Government and was given his present position in reward for his war service.” Orde-Browne followed up the report by recording seven sworn statements from the victims, including: Asongilage binti Issa, Achiganisya binti Mzima, Chiondo bin Chinyenya; Daudi bin Ngatala, Shamburiani bin Muza, Adimu bin Chipungula, Ali bin Namagalo. The victims’ statements can be found in the above file.

<sup>19</sup> BNA FO 371/4123, 94583 “Northern border of Portuguese East Africa,” Political Officer (Lindi) to the Secretary to the Administration, (Dar es Salaam), “Enclosure in Secrete dispatch of 1<sup>st</sup> March 1919,” 8 February 1919.

<sup>20</sup> BNA FO 371/4123, 106331 “Incident on Northern border of Portuguese East Africa,” and 161630 “Appearance of Portuguese Askaris on British side of Border of PE Africa,” October 1919.

<sup>21</sup> Ibid.

<sup>22</sup> BNA FO 608/216/13, “Atrocities in Portuguese East Africa.”



make the allegations public in the House of Commons and use the reports against the Portuguese at the Paris Peace Conference. Earl Curzon of Kedleston warned the Portuguese Chargé d'Affaires in April 1919:

These atrocities, I said, were of so hideous a character that, if they were published and made the subject of a debate in the House of Commons, people would almost wonder whether such incidents were not too high a price to pay for the Portuguese Alliance; and should they come, as was not impossible, before the Peace Conference in Paris, the account of them might react most unfavourably upon the claims of Portugal to retain her share in the administration of African territories and populations.<sup>23</sup>

The Portuguese government responded the following month by appointing the Judge of the Court of Appeal in Lisbon (Monsieur Dr. Botelho da Costa) to preside over an official inquiry.<sup>24</sup> The Portuguese, however, allegedly utilized the inquiry to build a defense for the Portuguese officers and collect damning evidence against British forces during the war.<sup>25</sup> The British quietly dropped the matter after reams of Colonial Office reports regarding the atrocities and the names of the offenders went missing.<sup>26</sup> The British government, thereafter, directed its petitions to the new English firm controlling the Nyassa concession.

---

The British government filed its first petition for an official inquiry into allegations of the ill-treatment of African and British Indian subjects in January 1917. The author could not find records detailing the crimes committed against the Indian population in the Nyassa Company Territory. There was mention in one file of Portuguese forces defiling a mosque used by the Indian community in Ibo. After the British received no response to their initial appeal, they petitioned the Portuguese again in March 1917. The Minister of Foreign Affairs finally responded in April that an inquiry would occur. Four months later, the British asked for an update. The British government sent petitions again in February 1918, December 1918, and January 1919.

<sup>23</sup> BNA FO 371/4123, 52345 "Ill treatment of British Indians in Portuguese East Africa," No. 1 Earl Curzon of Kedleston to Sir L. Carnegie, April 2 1919.

<sup>24</sup> BNA FO 371/4123, 75139 "Atrocities in Portuguese East Africa," May 1919.

<sup>25</sup> BNA FO 371/4123, 151596 "Portuguese Commission of Enquiry into alleged ill-treatment of Natives and British Indians in Portuguese East Africa," HBM Consulate General Lourenço Marques to HM Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, "Enclosure in Consul-General Errol MacDonnell's dispatch Confidential No 68 dated Oct 4<sup>th</sup> 1919"; and BNA FCO 371/5491, "Commissioner of Enquiry to deal with alleged ill-treatment of Indians and natives in Portuguese East Africa," H.C. McClelland, HBM Consulate General Lourenço Marques to HM Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 16 August 1920. Consulate General McClelland shared a report that Dr. Costa heard testimony from a local educated African (José Albansini). Albansini claimed that the African populace was frequently flogged and ill-treated by authorities. Medical arrangements in interior were also very unsatisfactory. The judge evidently responded that "thrashing was quite necessary on occasions." He also disbelieved Albansini's assessment of the medical situation was an exaggeration.

<sup>26</sup> BNA FO 371/4123, 82728 "Atrocities in Portuguese East Africa." The reversal of the British attitudes towards allegations of Portuguese atrocities is evident in the Foreign Office records. When the Foreign Office received a report from Captain Burke in September 1920 about atrocities committed in PEA during the war, G.H. Villiers responded: "I expect it's quite true but it's not our business and we should do no good by intervening. I hardly think we need send any reply to Captain Burke; but perhaps we had better tell the C.O. [Colonial Office] that we do not propose to take any action." See BNA FCO 371/5491, "Ill-treatment of natives in Portuguese East Africa," December 1920.

As discussed in the previous chapter, the British government seized the controlling shares of Nyassa Company's parent firm, Nyassa Consolidated Ltd., from a group of Germans during the war.<sup>27</sup> The British government convinced Lord Kysant (Sir Owen C. Philipps) of Union Castle Mail Steamship Company to purchase 52% of the company's share capital from the Receiver of Enemy Properties Department.<sup>28</sup> When allegations of abuses by Nyassa Company officials publicly resurfaced in the House of Commons in 1922, the Foreign Office was unwilling to make representations to the Portuguese government since there was "no *locus standi*" for such "unwarrantable interference."<sup>29</sup> The Foreign Office instead pressed Lord Kysant to exert his influence to ensure the guilty were punished and steps were taken to prevent future abuses. Lord Kysant's response did little to instill confidence that such measures would occur:

The matter was brought before the Board of the Nyassa Consolidated, Limited, on 29<sup>th</sup> May, when it was decided to ask the London Board of the Companhia do Nyassa to make strong representations to the Lisbon Board and to request that the culprit be discharged from the service of the Company and rigorously prosecuted.<sup>30</sup>

With no oversight and intervention from the Portuguese or British governments, the old abuses of the Nyassa Company continued with impunity throughout the 1920s.<sup>31</sup> The British Consulate-General in PEA, Joseph Pyke, reported in 1926 that the "further north one travels within the limits of Portuguese

---

<sup>27</sup> BNA FO 371/11932 Portugal 1926, 8305/1243/26 "Extension of the Charter of the Companhia do Nyassa." Nyassa Consolidated Ltd. owned nearly 80% of the *Companhia do Nyassa* shares.

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*, Lord Kysant to Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Foreign Office, 2 September 1926; and BNA CO 525/127/4 Nyasaland: Original Correspondence, *Companhia do Nyassa*, Thos Aspling, "Companhia do Nyassa: Control," 17 January 1929. Lewis and Marks Ltd. controlled an additional 24%, and the balance was owned by 400 small shareholders.

<sup>29</sup> BNA FO 371/8377 Political Western Portugal 1922, 3913/2994/36 "Ill-treatment of natives in Portuguese East Africa," British Consulate-General (Lourenco Marques) Hall to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, April 13, 1922. During a session of the House of Commons, Lord Robert Cecil asked whether the Colonial Office was aware of cruelties committed in the Portuguese territory of Nyasaland.

<sup>30</sup> BNA FO 371/8377, 4581/2994/36 "Ill-treatment of natives in Portuguese Nyasaland," Sir Owen Phillips, Union Castle Line, to G.H. Villiers, 31 May 1922.

<sup>31</sup> BNA FO 371/7104 Political Western Portugal 1921 (386-459), "Activities of new Governor of Companhia do Niassa," Hall, Consul-General (Lourenco Marques), to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 24 February 1921. A new Governor was appointed to the Nyassa concession at the beginning of 1921. The Acting British Vice-Consul at Porto Amelia complimented Governor Abilio Soeiro for raising all salaries by 60% and "doing his utmost to clean up things and has re-published in the 'Boletim' the regulations against trading, etc., by officials of the Companhia." Governor Soeiro, however, resigned the next month due to illness. The old district officials were also leaving "as fast as possible," and the company was struggling to find replacements.

East Africa, the worse and the harsher is the treatment accorded to the native.”<sup>32</sup> Forced labor practices continued, while tax rates rose annually, increasingly from two Escudos in 1921 to 85 Escudos in 1928.<sup>33</sup> Company officers and police continued to detain and violate large numbers of women (both at their homes and when under arrest).<sup>34</sup> The company owners, meanwhile, hardly invested in the territory’s economic, transportation, education, or health infrastructure. Only three hospitals existed in the whole concession, and the one in Ibo was in a rented house. Porto Amelia’s port facilities were poorly installed and “extremely deficient.”<sup>35</sup> The roads constructed during the war were not maintained and there was still no railway.<sup>36</sup> When Joseph Pyke visited Porto Amelia in 1930, he reported:

Words fail me to express the absolute lack of any work done during the thirty-five years of the Company’s life, and I can only quote you the statement of Mr. Vice Consul Allford made to him by Robertson Gibb when he called there in 1929: ‘Is this all that has been done? For goodness sake put me back on board the steamer – it might go without me.’<sup>37</sup>

During the same year, the Government Council of the Colony of Mozambique offered the following assessment of the Nyassa Company’s failures:

---

<sup>32</sup> BNA CO 533/659 Native Labour Conditions in Portuguese African Colonies, Joseph Pyke, British Consulate-General (Lourenço Marques), to His Majesty’s Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, “Native Labour Conditions in Portuguese African Colonies,” 15 November 1926.

<sup>33</sup> Barry Neil-Tomlinson, “The Nyassa Chartered Company: 1891-1929,” *The Journal of African History* 18, No. 1 (1977): 109-128, 121-125; Leroy Vail, “Mozambique’s Chartered Companies: The Rule of the Feeble,” *The Journal of African History* 17, no.3 (1976): 389-416, 413; BNA FO 371/8377, 9502/2994/36 “Migration of natives from Portuguese East Africa to the Tanganyika Territory,” Acting Governor Tanganyika Territory, A.C Hollis, to His Majesty’s Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 4 October 1922; and BNA FO 371/8377, 3913/2994/36 “Ill-treatment of natives in Portuguese East Africa,” Hall, British Consulate-General (Lourenço Marques) to His Majesty’s Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 13 April 1922. The Tanganyika government reported that the Portuguese collected taxes in silver, but paid wages in devalued paper currency. (Neil-Tomlinson acknowledged that fluctuations in the Escudos’ value meant that the tax increases between 1921 and 1928 was not exactly fortyfold.) Company authorities also collected local laborers at low wage rates and sent them to plantations owned by company officers and large private firms (like Sena Sugar Estates).

<sup>34</sup> BNA FO 371/8377, 9502/2994/36 “Migration of natives from Portuguese East Africa to the Tanganyika Territory,” Acting Governor Tanganyika Territory, A.C Hollis, to His Majesty’s Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 4 October 1922.

<sup>35</sup> BNA FO 371/15015 Portugal 1930, Enclosure in Mr. Consul General Pyke’s dispatch No. 50 of 8/4/30: “Minutes of the twenty-third session, extraordinary, of the Government Council of the Colony of Mozambique held at Lourenço Marques on the 17<sup>th</sup> October 1929, under the presidency of His Excellency the Governor General.”

<sup>36</sup> BNA FO 371/11932, 2206/1243/26 “Proposed extension of charter for Nyasaland,” Lord Kysant to Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 16 March 1926; and BNA CO 525/127/4 “Companhia do Nyassa Part I,” Joseph Pyke, “Memorandum on the Territory of the Companhia do Niassa” 25 September 1928.

<sup>37</sup> BNA FO 371/15015, Joseph Pyke, British Consulate General (LM) to Sir F. Lindley, His Majesty’s Ambassador Lisbon, 7 July 1930.

The few roads which exist are bad and made with the least possible cost, all of them having been made by means of native labour – forced and gratuitous labour. The only telegraph line which exists is mounted on wooden posts, sometimes on trees, so that it is continuously damaged and interrupted. Improvements in the ports do not exist. Nor are there any lighthouses. Native relief is absolutely unknown in the territories.<sup>38</sup>

Nyassa Company and its parent company refused to invest funds until the Portuguese government agreed to a thirty year extension of their concession. The Portuguese originally offered to extend the charter if the Company gave up its administrative powers. Lord Kyslant refused the terms and pressured the British government to aid him in forcing the Portuguese to come to a more favorable arrangement. The Colonial and Foreign Offices assisted Lord Kyslant's campaign out of a sense of obligation to him and anxiety that he might sell controlling interests to a German firm.<sup>39</sup> When the Portuguese chose to cancel the concession in 1928, the British government prepared to take the Portuguese government to arbitration before the Permanent Court of International Justice at the Hague.<sup>40</sup> The trial never happened and the Portuguese government assumed authority over northern PEA.<sup>41</sup>

---

<sup>38</sup> BNA FO 371/15015, "Enclosure in Mr. Consul General Pyke's dispatch No. 50 of 8/4/30." The British were not alone in voicing condemnation of Portuguese colonialism in Africa. In 1925, a commission led by sociologist Edward A. Ross (University of Wisconsin) and physician R. Melville Cramer (New York) investigated labor conditions in Angola and PEA (from Lourenço Marques and Beira to Umtali). With the help of translators, they interviewed thousands of Africans in villages, plantations, and work sites. They also spoke with European missionaries, plantation owners, and labor recruiters. Although the commission recorded some favorable statements regarding the Portuguese Africa labor system, the report ultimately called for "severe condemnation" of the Portuguese system. The commission reported numerous allegations that laborers were underpaid and/or unpaid. Compulsory, unpaid, and unrationed African laborers built roads in both colonies. Women comprised a large percentage of the road labor force. The commission also reported widespread instances of "labor stealing," and officials rarely defended indigenous rights. Portuguese officers lacked control over their fellow nationals. African police conducted gross abuses and there were no channels for victims to make complaints. See Edward Alsworth Ross, *Report on Employment of Native Labor in Portuguese Africa* (New York: The Abbott Press, 1925).

<sup>39</sup> BNA CO 525/127/4, A.W.A. Leeper, Foreign Office, to F.D.C. Caborne, 16 May 1929. The British Government feared German investments in East Africa, particularly in proximity of Tanganyika. The Foreign Office rejected a proposal by a German firm in 1922 that aimed to develop 67,000 hectares in northern PEA. The report argued, "To encourage the plantation of a German colony on its frontiers would, when one remembers the German character and what German 'penetration' means, be an act of lunacy." A number of Germans, however, established plantations near the Ruvuma border in PEA as early as 1924. See BNA FO 371/8375 Portugal 1922, 1220/1220/36 "Projected German colonial enterprise in Portuguese Nyasaland," 1922; and BNA FO 371/10592 Portugal 1924, 10890/10890/36 "German activities in Mozambique," Consul General Dickie (Lourenço Marques) to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 18 November 1924.

<sup>40</sup> BNA CO 525/127/4 "Companhia do Nyassa Part I," 1929; and BNA CO 525/127/5 "Companhia do Nyassa Part II," 1929. When the British threatened arbitration, the Portuguese argued that the British Government had no right to interfere. The situation involved a Portuguese company under Portuguese law acting in a Portuguese territory. The matter, therefore, should be taken up in Portuguese Courts. The *Senhor Charge d'Affaires* plainly stated that "the Portuguese Government cannot recognise that any other Government, however friendly the bonds between them

Nyassa Company, its investors, and employees focused on short-term profits and exploited readily available resources. Exploitative plantations, isolated *bomas*, poorly maintained roads, and vacated African villages and *shambas* defined much of the northern PEA landscape. Southern Tanganyika, in comparison, seemingly offered a more stable and potentially profitable landscape in the interwar era. The existence of centuries-old trade and familial networks that unified the Ruvuma borderland made Tanganyika particularly attractive to migrants. Edward Alpers explained that “when individuals and household units in northern Mozambique were faced with what they perceived to be excessive exactions, they had available to them a familiar option which represented something more positive than a desperate leap into the unknown.”<sup>42</sup> An estimated 3,000 to 5,000 migrants crossed the unregulated and porous Ruvuma border into southern Tanganyika annually in the early 1920s.<sup>43</sup> These individuals and families were not simply fleeing Portuguese oppression, but also choosing to relocate “as

---

– and the Portuguese Government considers the bonds between Portugal and Great Britain closer than any other – has the right to pronounce upon the legality or illegality of Portuguese legislation, promulgated in the execution of other Portuguese laws and relating to a Portuguese Company; nor can they consent that such Company should substitute an appeal to diplomacy and to the assistance of another Government for recourse to the Courts.” See BNA CO 525/127/5, Translation of letter from to Senhor Charge d’Affaires, British Embassy Lisbon, 1929.

<sup>41</sup> BNA FO 371/14155 Portugal 1929, 11748-307/36 “Nyassa Company,” 13 December 1929; and BNA CO 525/127/5 “Companhia do Nyassa Part II,” 1929. Kysant told the Foreign Office that he decided to sell his shares to a German syndicate and wipe his hands of the matter. Rather than protesting Kysant’s decision, the British government immediately dropped their representations to the Portuguese. The Foreign Office, however, ensured that the withdrawal could “not be construed as an admission of the soundness of the Portuguese contentions as to our right of intervention or on the merits of the present case.” In the end, it turned out that Lord Kysant was bluffing. He had no foreign interests willing to buy his shares. The British Government was unwilling to support Lord Kysant’s subsequent claim for financial compensation from the Portuguese Government at the sum of £500,000. Mr. Bottomley recorded a note on August 20, 1919 that the members of the Colonial and Foreign Offices had discussed the situation fully “and it was agreed that the time had come to make it clear to Lord Kysant that H.M.G. were unable to support his contention on the legal point, and to point out to him that the only course left open was for him to endeavour to obtain some compromise from the Portuguese Government, perhaps in the nature of a new concession which would not contain ‘administrative rights’. It should be made clear to Lord Kysant that that H.M.G. could not support his claim for such rights.” British Consulate General Joseph Pyke advised the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs not to support Kysant’s £500,000 claim because it could hurt other British interests in PEA, “which might quiet conceivably be attacked by way of reprisal and in an attempt to recover from them some, at least, of the money payment made to the Nyassa Company.” See FO 371/15015, Joseph Pyke, British Consulate General (LM) to His Majesty’s Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 18 July 1930.

<sup>42</sup> Edward A. Alpers, “‘To Seek a Better Life:’ The Implications of Migration from Mozambique to Tanganyika for Class Formation and Political Behavior,” *Canadian Journal of African Studies* 18, no. 2 (1984): 367-388, 371.

<sup>43</sup> FO 371/8377, 9502/2994/36 “Migration of natives from Portuguese East Africa to the Tanganyika Territory,” Acting Governor Tanganyika Territory, A.C Hollis, to His Majesty’s Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 4 October 1922.

a preferred strategy for survival under colonial domination.”<sup>44</sup> The Tanganyika government permitted the peaceful settlement of immigrants, but refused to offer active assistance in border crossings or “sanction official reception of women and children refugees.”<sup>45</sup> In reality, the officers in southern Tanganyika exerted no control over the trans-Ruvuma migrations. The migrants instead encountered an ill-equipped and undermanned British administration hardly more efficient than its Portuguese counterpart.

### **British Rule in Southern Tanganyika – 1920s**

Tanganyika’s administrative structure underwent significant alterations in the mid-1920s in accordance with changing British attitudes towards colonial rule. Prior to the First World War, the basic objectives of British imperialism were the creation of self-sufficient colonies and the preservation of law and order. There was no effort at uniformity and little coordination between the Colonial Office’s geographically-structured departments. Each colonial governor could introduce political and administrative measures without the approval of the Secretary of State for the Colonies.<sup>46</sup> In the immediate aftermath of the war, the first Governor of Tanganyika (Sir Horace Archer Byatt) decided to retain the German’s administrative structure and its twenty-two administrative districts. The administration consisted of a Governor, Administrative Political Officers, and local African leaders. Each Administrative Political Officer exerted executive and judicial authority over a district, while one or two European assistants presided over sub-districts.<sup>47</sup> Local governance fell under the authority of *akidas* – African leaders who had been appointed by the Germans. The unprecedented physical destruction and loss of life that occurred during the First World War, however, forced Europeans to question “the previously undaunted faith in human reason, progress, and improvement” that supposedly defined

---

<sup>44</sup> Alpers, “To Seek a Better Life,” 372.

<sup>45</sup> BNA FO 371/8377, 5453/2994/36 “Migration of Yaos and Makua from Portuguese East Africa to Tanganyika territory,” Acting Governor Tanganyika Territory to the Governor of Nyasaland, 21 May 1922.

<sup>46</sup> S.R. Ashton and S.E. Stockwell, “Introduction,” in *Imperial Policy and Colonial Practice, 1925-1945*, eds. S.R. Ashton and S.E. Stockwell (London: HMSO, 1996).

<sup>47</sup> Some of the officers were District Officers in the surrounding British colonies prior to the war. Sir Philip Mitchell, for example, was a D.O. in Nyasaland before coming to GEA with the King’s African Rifles. He joined the Tanganyika administrative staff and served as Secretary of Native Affairs. He proceeded to have a highly distinguished career as the Governor of Uganda, the Governor of Kenya, and the High Commissioner of the Eastern Pacific. See BLCAS MSS. Afr. s. 1738 (27), E.K. Lumley, “Forgotten Mandate,” unpublished version, 30 May 1972, 21.

Western civilization.<sup>48</sup> International critics demanded more accountability from imperial governments and increased protection of indigenous populations from colonial exploitation.<sup>49</sup> As anticolonial sentiments mounted, Frederick Lugard advocated a new theory of colonial governance – indirect rule. The system called for colonial governments to employ “traditional” African leaders to govern Native Administrations.<sup>50</sup> John Iliffe explained that each Native Administration consisted of,

[...] a native authority – chief, council, or some combination of these – with legislative and executive powers; native courts; and a native treasury, which collected all taxes, remitting a percentage to central government and retaining the rest to pay the native authority and finance local works and services.<sup>51</sup>

The administrations were organized according to tribal identities. According to Iliffe, the British mistakenly “believed that every African belonged to a tribe, just as every European belonged to a nation.”<sup>52</sup> British officers oversaw the administrations and instructed a new class of African elites about their duties and responsibilities. Penelope Hetherington argued that the British maintained a paternalistic belief that Europeans possessed the superior intellect needed to “civilize” and educate “primitive” Africans, who were still at the earliest stages of the development process according to contemporary social evolutionary theories.<sup>53</sup> Lugard believed that indirect rule would encourage the gradual incorporation of western ideologies and practices into African societies without causing social, cultural, and political instability.<sup>54</sup>

Sir Donald Cameron – a trusted lieutenant of Lugard in Northern Nigeria – introduced indirect rule to Tanganyika in 1925.<sup>55</sup> He reorganized the twenty-two administrative units into a provincial

---

<sup>48</sup> Joseph Morgan Hodge, *Triumph of the Expert: Agrarian Doctrines of Development and Legacies of British Colonialism* (Athens, USA: Ohio University Press, 2007), 91.

<sup>49</sup> Penelope Hetherington, *British Paternalism and Africa, 1920-1940* (London: Frank Cass, 1978), 45-46.

<sup>50</sup> Hetherington, *British Paternalism and Africa*, 133; and R.D. Pearce, *The Turning Point in Africa: British Colonial Policy 1938-48* (London: Frank Cass and Co, Ltd., 1982), 6-7.

<sup>51</sup> John Iliffe, *A Modern History of Tanganyika* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 319-320.

<sup>52</sup> Iliffe, *A Modern History of Tanganyika*, 323.

<sup>53</sup> Hetherington, *British Paternalism and Africa*, 66.

<sup>54</sup> *Ibid.*, 137. The Colonial Office also advocated the use of vernacular in village schools, as well as training in “traditional” occupations and manual agricultural labor.

<sup>55</sup> J. Gus Liebenow, *Colonial Rule and Political Development in Tanzania: The Case of Makonde* (Evanston, Northwest University Press, 1971), 94.

administrative system that sought to bring the Territory under stricter supervision and control.<sup>56</sup> Southern Tanganyika was divided into Lindi and Mahenge Provinces in 1926. Lindi Province initially comprised the districts of Lindi (Newala and Mikindani sub-districts), Masasi (Masasi and Tunduru sub-districts), and Kilwa (Kibata and Liwale sub-districts). The composition of the provinces and districts underwent numerous changes during the next six years, including the incorporation of Songea District in 1932.<sup>57</sup> Provincial Commissioner A.E. Kitching spearheaded the renaming of Lindi Province as the Southern Province in 1933. Just as companies today change a product's name to more accurately describe the item and/or invigorate public interest, Kitching believed Lindi Province needed a name change that more accurately represented its geographic parameters, while discarding any negative associations with the region: "The Province suffers from its name and a letter will reach you shortly recommending that the title should be altered to 'Southern Province'. An alteration is long overdue and a sound case has been put up."<sup>58</sup> Seven administrative districts comprised the Southern Province during the remainder of the interwar era: Kilwa, Liwale, Lindi, Mikindani, Newala, Masasi, Tunduru, and Songea. A Provincial Commissioner (PC) oversaw the province and the subordinate District Commissioners (DC) and District Officers (DO), who supervised the districts and Native Administrations.

British officers stationed in southern Tanganyika after the war attempted to alleviate famine conditions, revitalize foodstuff production, stabilize labor conditions, and establish law and order under Native Administrations. The last objective – the creation a new political landscape of Native Authorities based upon tribal identities – presented a host of problems due to the proliferation of ethnically-mixed

---

<sup>56</sup> LOC, 29026, "Guide to The Microfilms of Regional and District Books," *The United Republic of Tanzania Ministry of National Education: National Archives Division* (Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 1973), 1; and Margaret L. Bates, "Tanganyika: The Development of a Trust Territory," *International Organization* 9 no.1 (Feb. 1955): 32-51. A Legislative Council of appointed Europeans was created in 1926 with the role of advising the Governor.

<sup>57</sup> LOC 29026, "Guide to The Microfilms of Regional and District Books," 1. Newala and Mikindani were amalgamated in 1926 to form Mikindani District. Masasi and Tunduru were temporarily reabsorbed into the Lindi District and then detached as the Masasi District in 1928. Tunduru and Newala became full administrative districts in 1930.

<sup>58</sup> DSM, A.E. Kitching, "Lindi Province," *Tanganyika Territory: Annual Report of the Provincial Commissioner on Native Administration for the year 1933* (Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 1934); and BNA FCO 141/17729 Southern Province Provincial Commissioner Monthly Newsletters 1930-35, A.E. Kitching to the Chief Secretary, 3 January 1934. Kitching worked in the Secretariat in Dar es Salaam from May 1930 to May 1933. For the remainder of the chapter, the title "Southern Province" will be used.



communities. J. Gus Liebenow argued that colonial officers often failed “to comprehend the nature of the political (and other) relationships that they [were] attempting to preserve (under Indirect Rule)”.<sup>59</sup> Without proper anthropological training and/or experience in the region, Provincial Commissioner A.M. Turnbull and his officers conducted short surveys of “traditional” systems, promoted whoever appeared to be the most prominent local leader, and created tribal organizations where none existed.<sup>60</sup> When it came to the Wamakonde, the British typically elevated the leader of a *chirambo* – the *mkulungwa* – as a headman or chief. The British then empowered the leaders with executive and judicial authority over local communities, including the rights to fine, imprison, and force disobedient and law-breaking individuals to work on communal projects as punishment.<sup>61</sup> With the leaders selected, the British then reorganized the vague borders of the *virambo* to ensure that every community was subject to the jurisdiction of a Native Authority.<sup>62</sup> The British hoped that within these boundaries, the local population could be counted, their movements monitored and controlled, and more taxes collected.<sup>63</sup> Some African leaders recognized that the Native Authority system offered a new avenue to political authority and economic privilege and actively assisted the British in the creation of new political and social units.<sup>64</sup> The appointed leaders, however, often struggled to negotiate their intermediary position between the colonial state and local communities. In the case of the Wamakonde, the British failed to recognize that the *mkulungwa* was,

[...] merely one of the significant political actors within his *chirambo* and that his role was narrowly circumscribed by the authority of the elders who represented their respective *litawas* [kinship group]; by the operation of the vituperative alliances, or *utani* relationships; by the informal bonds created during the puberty rights; and by other forces within his society.<sup>65</sup>

---

<sup>59</sup> Liebenow, *Colonial Rule and Political Development in Tanzania*, 95.

<sup>60</sup> *Ibid.*, 97; and Iliffe, *A Modern History of Tanganyika*, 330. Liebenow noted that Indirect Rule was introduced in Lindi District after only a two-month survey by an officer suffering from blackwater fever, while Newala’s system was based upon the findings of a young cadet who had less than a year’s administrative service.

<sup>61</sup> Liebenow, *Colonial Rule and Political Development in Tanzania*, 105-111.

<sup>62</sup> *Ibid.*, 101.

<sup>63</sup> *Ibid.*, 102.

<sup>64</sup> Iliffe, *A Modern History of Tanganyika*, 324. Liebenow reported that forty-seven claims to “traditional” authority were made in Newala District between 1928 and 1935. All but five were rejected. See Liebenow, *Colonial Rule and Political Development in Tanzania*, 99.

<sup>65</sup> Liebenow, *Colonial Rule and Political Development in Tanzania*, 97-98.

Abuses of power added to tensions between headmen and local communities, who already questioned or resented their authority. Such tensions forced the British to abandon the system in the late 1930s and 1940s.<sup>66</sup>

As British officers struggled to monitor the Native Administrations in southern Tanganyika, a myriad of other responsibilities overwhelmed them. Liebenow described the physical and mental exhaustion British officers routinely experienced:

A district commissioner had to be, at one extreme, the supreme legislator, executive, and judge for over a hundred thousand charges, while at the same time he would have to descend to the menial tasks of selling postage stamps, exchanging rat-eaten shilling notes for new ones, and instructing Makonde in the art of digging latrines.<sup>67</sup>

In most instances, one European oversaw an entire district stretching hundreds of miles. L.A.W. Vickers-Haviland, for instance, was the only European officer stationed in the sub-district of Mikindani from 1922 to 1924. He exerted minimal authority over the district's export economy, which remained in the hands of the Indian commercial community. The Indians' economic power in Mikindani was made apparent in April-May 1923 when they closed their shops as part of a territorial-wide protest against new Trade Licensing Laws.<sup>68</sup> Trade in Mikindani came to a standstill until the protest ended. Despite the disturbance, Vickers-Haviland concluded that "no Community could be more loyal and helpful in every way than the Indians of Mikindani."<sup>69</sup> Trade revenues rose rapidly through the efforts of the Indian community and the introduction of regular monthly steamship services by the British India Steam Navigation Co.<sup>70</sup> Vickers-

---

<sup>66</sup> Ibid., 114-117. Some of the abuses included monetary extortion and exempting kinsmen from communal labor. The system was abandoned in Lindi and Mikindani Districts in 1937. During the Second World War, local governance throughout the province was gradually replaced with the *liwali* system.

<sup>67</sup> Ibid., 140.

<sup>68</sup> BLCAS MSS. Afr. s 1047, Vickers-Haviland, Annual Report Mikindani Sub-District 1923 and 1924. The majority of the protestors were prosecuted and fined. The relationship between the Indian community and administration returned to "cordial terms" by the end of the year.

<sup>69</sup> BLCAS MSS. Afr. s 1047, Vickers-Haviland, Annual Report Mikindani Sub-District 1923.

<sup>70</sup> BLCAS MSS. Afr. s 1047, Vickers-Haviland, Annual Report Mikindani Sub-District 1923 and 1924. Port traffic was supplemented by hundreds of dhows and infrequent visits by additional steamers (such the East Indian Steam Navigation Co.). Twenty steamers and 116 dhows visited Mikindani port in 1924. Trade revenues increased from Shs. 1,142,664/71 to Shs. 1,460,645/71 between 1923 and 1924. With the exception of 600 tons of sisal, the exports were exclusively African products, particularly *mtama* (sorghum). Populations from PEA also utilized Mikindani port to ship copra and other produce. Gum copal exports, however, plunged in 1924. Vickers-Haviland

Haviland also lacked the power to rectify deteriorating labor relations on the district's coastal plantations. In 1922, Mikindani estates employed 3,000 African laborers. By the next year, locals communities had "definitely tabooed the plantations altogether, a few only working as mechanics & clerks."<sup>71</sup> As a result, estates recruited laborers from Tunduru, Songea, and PEA. Complaints, however, filled the *boma* regarding labor desertions and "nonfulfillment of contract."<sup>72</sup> Contract-breaches were prosecuted under the Master and Servants Ordinance, but the fines issued were useless.<sup>73</sup> Vickers-Haviland also exerted little authority over the Native Administrations in the interior. The lack of roads and assistant officers (save two Indian clerks) constrained his mobility almost exclusively to Mikindani town and port. The problems that Vickers-Haviland experienced – inadequate staff and funds, unsupervised rural administrators, and poor labor relations – grew worse the further one travelled into the interior of the Southern Province.

The southern administration was not only undermanned, but also unstable and inexperienced.

Officers frequently rotated in and out of the province during the interwar era. Provincial Commissioner

---

credited the fall to the "laziness" of the Wamakonde, who "only search for the product in times of hardship and food shortage." Since there was no food shortage in 1924, there was no incentive to collect copal.

<sup>71</sup> BLCAS MSS. Afr. s 1047, Vickers-Haviland, Annual Report Mikindani Sub-District 1923

<sup>72</sup> Ibid.

<sup>73</sup> BLCAS MSS. Afr. s 1047, Vickers-Haviland, Annual Report Mikindani Sub-District 1924. The inability of colonial officers to enforce master and servants legislation, especially in the face of worker desertion, was a common problem throughout the British Empire in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Douglas Hay and Paul Craven's edited volume – *Master, Servants, and Magistrates in Britain and the Empire, 1562-1955* – examined the limitations and conflict surrounding the creation and enforcement of master and servants laws in England and the Empire. Hay and Craven noted that in the early years of the Kimberley mining operations in South Africa, the demands for black laborers were so high that "attempts to impose stringent master and servant legislation and similar measures like wage cutting did not succeed: workers responded by leaving the market, leading mine holders to attempt to retrain them by ignoring or subverting the regulations." Desertion was also common among voluntary and forced black laborers in Southern Rhodesian gold mines in the early twentieth century. Hay and Craven found many mine managers often chose not to prosecute men through the ordinance because the process was "difficult and time-consuming." The managers instead "relied on frequent unauthorized flogging and extralegal fines". In Australia, workers also resisted master and servants laws by evading the terms and conditions of contracts – deserting, sabotage, engaging in "go-slows," and going on strike. Michael Quinlan offered an example of shearers, who "failed to appear, absconded, or threatened to leave at the commencement of the shearing season in order to secure higher wages." In most cases, these men were not prosecuted and the higher wages were given. Female servants also broke agreements knowing that "their exemption from imprisonment made prosecution unlikely." Many employers chose to cooperate with workers rather than prosecute them and fear retaliation and/or labor scarcities. See Douglas Hay and Paul Craven, "Introduction," 1-58 (52-54), and Michael Quinlan, "Australia, 1788-1902: A Workingman's Paradise?" in *Master, Servants, and Magistrates in Britain and the Empire, 1562-1955*, eds. Douglas Hay and Paul Craven (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2004), 219-250: 241.

C.H. Grierson complained to the Chief Secretary that it was impossible “to carry on the administration of the Province when I cannot know from one moment to another, what staff I am to have.”<sup>74</sup> Provincial Commissioners also complained about the number of young and inexperienced Assistant District Officers and cadets assigned to the southern administration.<sup>75</sup> Cadets were typically men in their twenties with degrees from Oxford or Cambridge in fields such as history, archeology, anthropology, and botany.<sup>76</sup> They arrived in Dar es Salaam after attending a year-long Colonial Service Course.<sup>77</sup> The cadets assigned to the Southern Province often lacked the training or knowledge to fulfill the responsibilities of their new posts. For example, the young surgeon assigned as Lindi’s Native Sanitary Inspections Officer in 1929 had “neither knowledge of nor training in health work which he detests.”<sup>78</sup> Richard Buswell Allnut’s first

---

<sup>74</sup> BNA FCO 141/17729, C.H. Grierson to the Chief Secretary, 8 September 1931.

<sup>75</sup> BNA FCO 141/17729, F.C. Hallier to the Chief Secretary, 30 September 1930.

<sup>76</sup> BLCAS MSS. Afr. s. 1738, Sukumaland. The University of Oxford interviewed many former colonial officers who participated in the major agricultural scheme conducted in Sukumaland, Tanganyika, in the 1940s. The records offer valuable insights into the reasons and means by which young men entered the Colonial Service in Tanganyika during the Depression Era. Many of the cadets – including H.S. Senior, John Edward Seaton Griffiths, Hugh Francis Ivo Elliot, and Geoffrey William Young Hucks – were born and/or raised overseas in families with parents and/or relatives involved in missionary or colonial services. For example, H.S. Senior was born in Ceylon in February 1908. His father was a teacher in the Holy Orders and his mother’s father was the first Anglican Bishop of Japan. Senior credited his entrance to the Colonial Service in 1930 to his History degree and participation as a cricketer for the Oxford University Authentics. John Edward Seaton Griffiths was born in South Africa and his uncle worked in the agricultural department in Kenya. After majoring in law and social anthropology, Griffiths joined the South African Native Affairs Department. His uncle’s work and his own experiences in South Africa gave him “a taste for ‘native affairs’ work in, preferably, East Africa.” After speaking with a Provincial Commissioner on holiday in Cape Town, Griffiths attended the yearlong Colonial Service Course at Selwyn College, Cambridge, in 1930. He recalled that most of the cadets attending the course spent their downtime boxing or playing rugby. Hugh Francis Ivo Elliot was born in India in 1913. His father was employed in the Indian Civil Service and his mother was the daughter of a retired China tea merchant. His paternal grandfather was the Secretary to the Board of Agriculture and Fisheries. After receiving 2<sup>nd</sup> class honors in “‘Mods’ and ‘Greats’” from University College Oxford in 1936, Elliot joined the colonial service: “In keeping with the family Civil Service tradition and on the advice of the University Careers Office, I then obtain a place on the Devonshire Colonial Service Course at Oxford.” Geoffrey William Young Hucks decided to enter the colonial service after speaking with an Administrative Officer on leave from Uganda: “when he came on leave and told tales of the sort of life he led I became keen on following in his footsteps.” He earned dual degrees in archeology and anthropology in 1928, attended the Colonial Service Course at Cambridge, and headed to Tanganyika.

<sup>77</sup> BLCAS MSS. Afr. s. 358-363, J. Ford, Tanganyika Diaries, “Diary 1923: October 6 – January 15, 1924.” Steamships, such as the “Nevasa,” typically unloaded passengers, mail, and cargo at Port Said, Port Sudan, Aden, Kilindini (Kenya), and Zanzibar before arriving in Dar es Salaam. Upon arrival, each cadet was posted in a district for training and experience under a two year probationary period. A cadet was promoted to Assistant District Officer if his performance was satisfactory and he passed higher tests in Swahili and the territory’s criminal code. For copies of tests from the 1920s, see BLCAS Mss. Afr. s. 1047, Vickers-Haviland.

<sup>78</sup> BLCAS MSS. Afr. s. 101, Sir Philip E. Mitchell Diaries, 1929. The surgeon’s superior officer allegedly ordered him to Lindi to “do nothing.” Mitchell contravened the order and instructed him to protect the water supply from

assignment as a cadet in 1930 was to serve as the agricultural officer over three massive districts – Masasi, Newala, and Tunduru. His specialized training in cattle breeding and pasture management was largely wasted in the tsetse-ridden districts.<sup>79</sup> Superior officers tended to distrust the capabilities of young officers to operate in isolated posts. Provincial Commissioners Hallier and Grierson, for example, questioned whether the young District Officer of Tunduru, G.D. Popplewell, could handle the responsibilities of the one-main station, located 215 miles from the provincial headquarters and 120 miles from the nearest telegraph line.<sup>80</sup> Grierson wanted District Officer Troup reassigned from Liwale, arguing that “a more experienced officer is desirable for an outstation so far away from the coast, and cut off during the rains.”<sup>81</sup> More experienced officers, however, were not necessarily an improvement on their younger colleagues.<sup>82</sup> In 1930, Grierson severely criticized the officers holding senior posts:

This Province has been hardly treated in the way of staff. I have had two persons of whom the least one can say is that they were unbalanced; two of who either cannot get on with their juniors or allow them to be demoralised, and one whose mental capacity did not equal the requirements of his post, all holding senior posts, save one.<sup>83</sup>

Secretary of Native Affairs – Philip E. Mitchell – similarly expressed reservations about the capabilities of the southern administration. While he praised some for their energy, wit, and effectiveness, he

infections and contagious diseases, and to “take such reasonable measures” as might be necessary after consulting with the Provincial and District Commissioner.

<sup>79</sup> BLCAS MSS. Afr. s. 1738 (1), Richard Buswell Allnutt. Allnutt was still qualified for the position considering that he had experience and higher education in agricultural botany.

<sup>80</sup> BNA FCO 141/17729, F.C. Hallier to the Chief Secretary, 6 April 1931; and Provincial Commissioner C.H. Grierson to Chief Secretary, 12 October 1931. Grierson suggested the Popplewell be placed under District Officer Walden although he was more inexperienced: “It is true that he has had less experience than Popplewell, but Walden is a very bright and capable officer and far above the average old Cadets who I have ever met, and I am sure he would be well up there.” Similar favoritism continuously impacted appointments across Tanganyika.

<sup>81</sup> BNA FCO 141/17729, C.H. Grierson to the Chief Secretary, 7 August 1931. Grierson was not shy about reporting his doubts about subordinate officers. He was particularly keen about removing District Officer Barnes from Mikindani. He mentioned Barnes in multiple monthly reports in 1931 and 1932, reporting the man as “nervous and highly strung” and “extremely neurotic and hysterical person.” The two men had known each other since 1915, and one doubts whether Grierson’s assessments were as unprejudiced as he proclaimed them to be in October 1931. Barnes was eventually replaced by District Officer Lyons in February 1932.

<sup>82</sup> A few young officers, such as A.H. Pike, inspired confidence in their superiors. See BNA FCO 141/17729, Guise Williams to the Chief Secretary, 8 September 1933.

<sup>83</sup> BNA FCO 141/17729, C.H. Grierson to the Chief Secretary, 8 September 1931. Grierson was equally critical of the majority of the Asian clerks, who “either go sick or start Bolshevistic attitudes.”

privately censured others as “stupid and unhelpful,” a scared “invertebrate,” or “a useless sort of creature.”<sup>84</sup>

The lack of all-weather roads in southern Tanganyika represented the main impediment to administrative efficiency and coordination between British officers, local headmen, and the central administration in Dar es Salaam. The Lindi-Songea main road remained the only major thoroughfare in the south, but it was still plagued by sandy soils and black cotton patches. The road annually closed for five to six months during the rains which swept away bridges and washed out or silted up side drains, causing the road to become a water course. Travel during the dry season was little better. Secretary Mitchell experienced first-hand the dilapidated conditions of the southern roads while conducting a month-long tour of the province in August 1929.<sup>85</sup> The stretch from Songea to Tunduru took two days and deteriorated until it became “really appalling.”<sup>86</sup> The next stretch from Tunduru to Masasi (121 miles) vacillated from “quiet good, & then appalling bad, & then just mediocre but from neglect is just falling to bits.” Mitchell diverted from the main road to Newala and the Makonde Plateau. The excellent plateau road worsened as it approached Mikindani on the coast.<sup>87</sup> The “last 30 miles [were] perfectly appalling.”<sup>88</sup> The coastal road from Mikindani to Lindi was hardly an improvement. Mitchell’s convoy travelled relatively quickly from Lindi to Masasi, Ruponda, Liwale, and Kilwa despite the poor quality of the roads. The seven hour and forty minute drive from Liwale to Kilwa (155 miles) was considered “very

---

<sup>84</sup> BLCAS MSS. Afr. s. 101, Sir Philip E. Mitchell Diaries, 1929 and 1930.

<sup>85</sup> BLCAS MSS. Afr. s. 101, Sir Philip E. Mitchell Diaries, 1929. His journey south from Njombe to Songea proved challenging. At one point, one of the lorries in his convoy fell through a bridge. All the vehicles traversed the Luwegu River, though the last lorry had water up over its back axel.

<sup>86</sup> Ibid. Mitchell returned to the same stretch of road a year later when conducting an investigation into a famine situation in Tunduru. On the return trip to Songea, Mitchell’s driver injured his eye while mending a spring. Mitchell offered the following descriptions of the 60 mile journey: “driving a heavy loaded lorry on a hilly road when it has no brakes, the accelerator does not work properly, & the steering wobbles, is by no means easy.” See BLCAS MSS. Afr. s. 101, Sir Philip E. Mitchell Diaries, 1930 (December).

<sup>87</sup> J. Gus Liebenow accredited the Newala District Officer, J.W. Large, for the extensive road construction work completed on the Makonde Plateau. During Large’s term from December 1927 to July 1936 (one of the longest tenures in the province), he personally traced many of the roads “in an effort to bring every *chirambo* into contact with the *boma*, or district headquarters.” See Liebenow, *Colonial Rule and Political Development in Tanzania*, 144.

<sup>88</sup> BLCAS MSS. Afr. s. 101, Sir Philip E. Mitchell Diaries, 1929.

good and the record.”<sup>89</sup> Mitchell also criticized of the infrequent coastal steamship traffic offered in the south.<sup>90</sup> Without steamship services or an all-weather road to Dar es Salaam, the province was cut off from the economic and political center of the territory for at least five months each year.<sup>91</sup>

The lack of transportation infrastructure not only undermined government efficiency, but it also facilitated lawlessness in the borderland region. Some of the white civilians who remained in southern Tanganyika after the war, such as “Dynamite Dan” Eldridge, took advantage of the lack of authority exercised on both sides of the border for their advantage. Former District Officer H.C. Baxter (“Bones”) recalled that “Dynamite Dan” and a group of nine bachelors met in Dar es Salaam after the armistice. They shared a mutual urge to remain in the territory and became elephant hunters.<sup>92</sup> All the men participated in the southern campaign and knew that the Ruvuma River was excellent elephant country. They took up residence on an island in the western section of the river, well aware that neither Portugal nor Britain exerted clear sovereignty over the islands.<sup>93</sup> The group proceeded to purchase one hunting license from PEA. The license was much cheaper than those offered in Tanganyika and it allowed the holder to kill an unlimited number of elephants, regardless of size, tusk, or sex.<sup>94</sup> All nine men used the same license to shoot elephants on *both* sides of the river. In order to avoid suspicion from Portuguese officers, the poachers legally exported a small portion of the ivory through PEA ports once a year. Porters

---

<sup>89</sup> Ibid. Mitchell’s journey from Lindi to Masasi took 5 hours and 20 minutes. Mitchell wrote that he could not complain about the journey from Masasi to Ruanda considering they drove 113 miles in six and a half hours.

<sup>90</sup> Ibid. Mitchell described his two day wait for the *Dumra* to arrive in Lindi as a “great nuisance for I am through here & merely wasting time, but I must wait for the mail.” Lindi Provincial Commissioners frequently remarked about the irregularity of steamship traffic in 1930. See FCO 141/17729, C.H. Grierson to Chief Secretary, 31 May 1930 and 4 August 1930.

<sup>91</sup> Rolf Hofmeier, “Trunk Road Transport and the Possibility of a National Transport Company in Tanzania” *Economic Research Bureau*, University of College, Dar es Salaam 68, no.3 (1968).

<sup>92</sup> BLCAS MSS Afr. s. 609, Harry Churchill Baxter, “The Ivory Poachers.” Baxter shared the legend behind Dynamite Dan’s name. Supposedly he threatened a group of friends with a dynamite stick when they refused to buy a drink one day as part of an intervention against Dan’s alcoholism.

<sup>93</sup> Ibid. Baxter explained: “the border was the river; it wasn’t the north bank, - it wasn’t the south bank – it was just the river; so, an island in the middle could be termed ‘No Man’s Land.’”

<sup>94</sup> Ibid. According to Baxter, a major source of revenue for the Portuguese was customs fees, including fees on exported ivory. The Portuguese, therefore, offered a license for Shs. 40 that permitted unlimited hunting. The Major Game License in Tanganyika, in contrast, cost Shs. 200. An additional Shs. 200 was payable for the first elephant killed. A licensed hunter paid another Shs. 300 for the second elephant and Shs. 400 for a third. Hunters were legally limited to three elephants a year and the government confiscated all female ivory and tusks under 30 lbs.

acquired locally and from PEA smuggled the rest of the ivory to the coast and Zanzibar four times a year. Since the British staff was “infinitesimal” and there were few roadways to or along the river, the poachers were safeguarded from government interference and prosecution. The poachers prospered for seven years before Baxter became the District Commissioner of Songea in 1931. He only learned of the group’s existence by accident from a subordinate District Officer.<sup>95</sup> He then concocted and implemented a clever scheme to capture the men’s September consignment of 1,000 lbs. of ivory. The gang pled guilty, paid the fine, and disbanded. Baxter noted that ironically two of the men became Inspectors of Police and two were employed as Elephant Control Officers in the Game Department.<sup>96</sup> Underfunded and undermanned, the British officers of the Southern Province could not regulate the movement of peoples and trade across the Ruvuma border let alone within their assigned districts and sub-districts.

### **Colonial Development and the Neglected Southern Province**

If the southern administration wanted to improve government coordination and tighten its authority over southern Tanganyika and the Ruvuma border, it needed to improve the regional road networks. Calls for improved transportation infrastructure, however, were being heard throughout the British Empire in the 1920s. Colonial states and capitalist investors saw railways, in particular, as essential tools to access and profit from the untapped wealth of the British Empire. In 1924, the new Colonial Secretary – Leopold Amery – advocated Joseph Chamberlain’s “development” philosophy of

---

<sup>95</sup> Ibid. The District Officer was touring a local village and decided to visit the men. The D.O. quickly left after receiving a very cold greeting. Considering that multi-day parties were thrown whenever a European visitor arrived elsewhere in the area, Baxter questioned why the D.O. did not investigate the men’s suspicious behavior further. The D.O. admitted that he did not pry because he heard a story that the men threw a Portuguese administrator into the river. The D.O. continued, “And if you will excuse a slight exaggeration, sir, I warn you, there appears to be more crocodiles than water in that stretch of the Rovuma.”

<sup>96</sup> Ibid. Baxter did not provide identification for these men. “Dynamite Dan” appeared sporadically in colonial documents and personal memoirs during the next thirty years of colonial rule. Charles Meek recalled that the Lindi administration employed him during the Second World War because at “that stage of the war everybody was employed for something or other.” Meek wrote that “Dynamite Dan” was best remembered for “shooting his cook and being acquitted of murder.” [See Charles Innes Meek, *Brief Authority: A Memoir of Colonial Administration in Tanganyika*, ed. Innes Meek (London: Radcliffe Press, 2011), 49-50.] The Southern Provincial Commissioner also suggested the employment of “Dynamite Dan” when confronting a hippopotamus problem at Lake Maliwe during the Liwale Settlement Scheme (1946-48). Other potential solutions offered for the “vermin” problem included a hippopotamus-proof canoe or iron barge, mass shootings, bombs, depth-charges, a ring of fire around the lake, tear gas, and draining the lake. See Kilwa District Book, “Liwale Closer Settlement Scheme,” 1948.



“Constructive Imperialism.” Both men perceived Britain’s tropical dependencies as “great ‘undeveloped estates’” that the British government “had a moral responsibility” to improve through increased agricultural production, infrastructure, and disease control.<sup>97</sup> They expected increased production in the dependencies to open new markets and stimulate British industry and trade.<sup>98</sup> A new group of colonial reformers tempered this “Chamberlainite” enthusiasm. They argued that the colonial governments were first-and-foremost “trustees,” that needed to prioritize African health, sanitation, education, and rural welfare over material exploitation and profits.<sup>99</sup> Material “development” could only occur once the health and social issues of a colony were rectified. A growing body of scientific experts conducted field research into the “human side” of development in the colonies during the 1920s; examining issues of rural health care, disease control and sanitation, labor utilization, education, and peasant agricultural.<sup>100</sup> Most colonial governments, however, remained “preoccupied with turning these territories into vibrant producers of agricultural commodities and natural resources for the global export market.”<sup>101</sup> According to Joseph Morgan Hodge, the “Chamberlainite” conception of colonial development that Amery advocated,

[...] involved increasing the production of primary products for export through improved transportation and communication facilities, and the application of scientific research in order to maximize agricultural productivity and ameliorate the poor health conditions that were seen as holding back the tropical dependencies.<sup>102</sup>

The East African Commission of 1925 cleverly utilized the “humanitarian” rhetoric of “trusteeship” to disguise their “Chamberlainite”-oriented development objectives for Britain’s East Africa territories. The Commission portrayed the relationship between Europeans and Africans as “that of a guardian to a ward, and that out duty is to protect the interests of someone less capable of safeguarding his or her own interests”.<sup>103</sup> At the same time, the Commission claimed that Britons were not only trustees

---

<sup>97</sup> Hodge, *Triumph of the Expert*, 94; and Helen Tilley, *African as a Living Laboratory: Empire, Development, and the Problem of Scientific Knowledge, 1870-1950* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011), 64.

<sup>98</sup> Hodge, *Triumph of the Expert*, 94.

<sup>99</sup> *Ibid.*, 116-19.

<sup>100</sup> *Ibid.*, 118; and Tilley, *Africa as a Living Laboratory*, 115-216.

<sup>101</sup> *Ibid.*, 147.

<sup>102</sup> *Ibid.*, 94.

<sup>103</sup> “Report of the East Africa Commission,” 21. The Commission was appointed by Mr. J. H. Thomas, Secretary of State for the Colonies, and consisted of three members of Parliament from the three political parties - W. Ormsby-

for Africa's "development and advance in civilisation," but also acted as trustees "for the world of very rich territories."<sup>104</sup> It was therefore the responsibility of the British and colonial governments to "develop the vast economic resources of a great continent" for all.<sup>105</sup> In the case of East Africa, the Commission called upon the colonial governments to "insist on orderly cultivation" of high-value cash crops.<sup>106</sup> Colonial officers were expected to improve agricultural efficiency by stopping the nomadic habits of pastoral and agricultural communities, introducing fixed land tenure systems, and providing intensive instruction in proper seed selection and crop rotation methods.<sup>107</sup> These efforts to stimulate "native" and "non-native" crop production, however, would fail without improved regional transport facilities, particularly railways.<sup>108</sup> Without access to a railway, large areas of East Africa would remain "quite undeveloped, in the sense that they are unable to produce profitably any crop for exports," nor import commodity goods from the metropole.<sup>109</sup> The Commission also shared the commonly-held belief among Europeans that railways would "civilize" and "modernize" Africans by bringing them into contact with western consumer markets and better health and education services.<sup>110</sup> Observers favored railways over roads because colonial states lacked the materials and funds necessary to construct permanent roads and

---

Gore, A.G. Church, and F.C. Linfield. A Colonial Office permanent official accompanied the party as the secretary. The commission visited the five British dependencies of Northern Rhodesia, Nyasaland, Kenya, Uganda, and Tanganyika. Their objective was to report on the measures being taken and those that should be taken to accelerate economic development in the dependencies and closer co-ordination between them. The commission was also tasked with determining the probable social and economic effects of such development on African populations, as well as offer recommendations for improving the social and physical conditions for Africans. Finally, they were responsible for reporting on the economic relations between "natives and non-natives" (especially in terms of labor), and the conditions of taxation and services directed towards African populations.

<sup>104</sup> Ibid., 22.

<sup>105</sup> Ibid.

<sup>106</sup> Ibid. The Commission particularly emphasized the plantation of sisal hemp, groundnuts, coffee, cotton, and copra.

<sup>107</sup> Ibid., 25 and 33.

<sup>108</sup> Ibid., 182.

<sup>109</sup> Ibid., 10.

<sup>110</sup> Stephen Constantine, *The Making of British Colonial Development Policy, 1914-1940* (London: Frank Cass & Co., Ltd., 1984), 18-19; and Casper Anderson, *British Engineers and Africa, 1875-1914* (London: Pickering & Chatto, 2011), 12 and 115.

bridges over long distances in difficult terrain.<sup>111</sup> A.G. Church detailed the difficulties of constructing sustainable all-weather roads in East Africa:

[It] would involve an enormous initial expense, and large current expenditure for their maintenance. It would also involve the maintenance of a large army of labourers for road repairs, for even metalled roads cannot withstand the extremes of temperature and the torrential rainfall of Africa.”<sup>112</sup>

The East African Commission concluded that “A railway, and a railway alone, can develop this valuable territory to the full capacity of its population.”<sup>113</sup> The Commission insisted that Britain’s “moral responsibility” to fund improvements for East Africa’s transportation facilities also offered a great financial opportunity:

To our mind the financing of transport facilities in East Africa not only is one of the finest possible investments for British trade, but is a moral responsibility resting upon the Mother Country. The development of Africa’s resources is needed by the trade of the world, and it will be nothing short of a dereliction of duty if British initiative, both public and private, fails to rise to the height of its opportunity.<sup>114</sup>

The Commission concluded that the “initial sacrifice” British taxpayers made to stimulate “development of its great tropical possessions” would be repaid in full and more as trade and production intensified within the Empire.<sup>115</sup>

Like the Germans before them, the British ultimately envisioned the transformation of Tanganyika’s socioeconomic and physical landscape into a network of cash crop plantations and peasant farms linked by modern railways and governed by Native Administrations under the guiding hand of British officers and scientific experts. Tanganyika, however, remained on the periphery of the British

---

<sup>111</sup> “Report of the East Africa Commission,” 10. The East African Commission argued that the construction of permanent bridges was “the most vital element for the making of an adequate road system throughout the greater part of East Africa.”

<sup>112</sup> A.G. Church, “The Inter-Relations of East African Territories,” *The Geographical Journal* 67, no. 3 (March 1926): 213-231, 223. The East Africa Commission recommended the Roadless Tractor Service as an alternative to road and animal transport in areas inaccessible to railways. The roadless tractor was developed from war-time caterpillar-wheel vehicles (like tanks) and claimed to traverse swamps, stumps, and loose ground without difficulty. See “Report of the East African Commission,” 224.

<sup>113</sup> “Report of the East Africa Commission,” 10.

<sup>114</sup> *Ibid.*, 21.

<sup>115</sup> *Ibid.*, 182.

Empire.<sup>116</sup> It received roughly 10% of the £8,875,000 of loans and grants recommended under the Colonial Development Fund between 1929 and 1940.<sup>117</sup> The central administration in Dar es Salaam lacked the resources needed to enact colonial development across a territory stretching 365,000 square miles. The colonial state instead directed the bulk of its investments towards the Southern Highlands and the northeastern highlands of the Usambara Plateau and Mount Kilimanjaro. They preferred Kilimanjaro and Arusha due to their proximity to railway services and the existence of Greek, Dutch, and English plantations. Arusha coffee planters already produced the most valuable coffee in East Africa, averaging £10 per ton more than Kenyan coffee.<sup>118</sup> Producers in Tabora, Tanga, and Mwanza also cultivated profitable groundnuts and cotton exports, but porters were still needed to transport the produce hundreds of miles to the railways and ginneries along Lake Victoria. Funding, therefore, concentrated on improving and extending the Central Line (780 miles from Dar es Salaam to Kigoma on Lake Tanganyika) and the Tanga Line (237 miles from Tanga to Moshi) into the surrounding cash crop producing districts. Southern Tanganyika, meanwhile, was not a popular investment destination for the colonial state or private businesses. There was no major railway and the dilapidated Lindi-Songea main road barely deserved the name. Since the region lacked high-value export goods, little incentive existed to improve the infrastructure. According to Felicitas Becker, exports in groundnuts, beeswax, and cotton remained below 1,000 tons each in the 1920s. Sisal production grew continuously during the decade, rising from 2,904 to

---

<sup>116</sup> Iliffe, *A Modern History of Tanganyika*, 302.

<sup>117</sup> Overseas Development Institute, *British Aid – 5: Colonial Development: a factual survey of the origins and history of British aid to developing countries* (London: ODI Publications, 1964). The Colonial Development Act of 1929 allowed (for the first time) the issuing of loans and grants for colonial “development” projects. Prior to 1929, the dependencies received assistance in the form of grants-in-aid, “emergency help,” “privileged treatment of loans in the London market,” and research and advisory services (10). The Palestine and East Africa Loans Act of 1926 was in “some respects” a precursor of the Colonial Development Act of 1929. The act “provided that the Treasury might guarantee the principal and interest of loans raised by the government of Palestine (up to £4½m), or by the Governments of Kenya, Uganda, Northern Rhodesia, Nyasaland or Tanganyika (up to £10m), for certain specified purposes of capital expenditure. The principal was to be repaid over 40 years (this was altered to 60 years by the 1929 Act)” (14). The stated purpose of the 1929 Act was “of aiding and developing agriculture and industry in the colony or territory, and thereby promoting commerce with or industry in the United Kingdom” (14). Advances under the 1929 Act were made on recommendation of the Colonial Development Advisory Committee and the approval of the Treasury and Secretary of State for the Colonies. The Committee and Treasury emphasized capital works projects “of an economic nature” (16). The Committee recommended assistance equaling £8.875 million between 1929 and 1940 – 30% of which were transport projects.

<sup>118</sup> “Report of the East Africa Commission,” 116.

6,833 tons from Lindi between 1924 and 1932 – the latter figure representing nearly 10% of the colony's sisal exports.<sup>119</sup> Sesame and grains, however, continued to dominate peasant crops.<sup>120</sup> Sesame from the Lindi hinterland and Liwale made up more than half the territory's sesame exports, but its share in the territory's total grain exports fluctuated from 50% (1924) to 25% (1927).<sup>121</sup> Kilwa and Mikindani exported copra, while the Makonde plateau produced a large share of the province's rice. Wartime destruction coupled with the lack of high-value cash crops or readily-extractable minerals ultimately convinced the central administration in Dar es Salaam to invest their limited resources outside of the Southern Province.

Without an infusion of capital and manpower, southern Tanganyika's infrastructure remained inadequate to the frustration and detriment of the provincial administration. Provincial Commissioner Grierson complained in 1930 that it was "almost impossible to reach the outlying Stations after December; which means that for at least five months of the year I cannot visit any place other than the coastal Stations."<sup>122</sup> While stationed in Tunduru District in 1931, Assistant District Officer E.K. Lumley described how the "water-logged roads were impassable, and the bridges across the two rivers between Tunduru and Lindi were down."<sup>123</sup> After the rains abated, it took several months to reopen the roads for motor traffic. Anxious to return to Lindi, Lumley attempted to drive his vehicle along the Lindi-Songea main road at the onset of the dry season. Three "servants" accompanied him on the arduous journey. They only averaged twenty miles a day. They repeatedly dug out the car from "countless boggy sections and remove[d] trees that had fallen across the track, some having been knocked over by elephants."<sup>124</sup> Visibility was "virtually nil" as Lumley encountered tall grass that reached as high as six feet in some

---

<sup>119</sup> Felicitas Becker, "A social history of Southeast Tanzania, ca 1890-1950," (PhD thesis, Cambridge University, 2002), 181.

<sup>120</sup> Becker, "A social history of Southeast Tanzania," 156.

<sup>121</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>122</sup> BNA FCO 141/17729, C.H Grierson to the Chief Secretary, 31 May 1930.

<sup>123</sup> BLCAS MSS. Afr. s. 1738 (27), Lumley, "Forgotten Mandate," 85-86. Lumley quickly depleted his stock of tinned food and whiskey. The former was a problem since the district lacked fish and meat, while the latter was considered a "real hardship, because alcohol is an essential part of the white man's diet in a tropical climate." Lumley sustained himself on lime juice squeezed from wild limes, tea, local chicken, a cake made of ground cassava, and wild spinach that "was just about edible."

<sup>124</sup> *Ibid.*, 87-89.

areas. The lack of visibility resulted in Lumley nearly plunging down a twenty foot ravine.<sup>125</sup> The near disasters convinced him to slow the rate of travel, which “necessitated frequent stoppages to allow the boiling engine to cool.”<sup>126</sup> Whereas it took months to reopen roads, it only took a few hours or a day of heavy rain to cripple motor transport. District Commissioner Baxter recorded his arduous twenty-three day journey from Songea to Lindi at the onset of the rainy season in 1931.<sup>127</sup> He left Songea on Boxing Day accompanied by the District Officer of Songea, a South African mechanic, five African lorry drivers, various turn boys (drivers’ assistants), and additional servants. They drove in one touring car, one box-body, and five lorries. The 400 mile journey normally took five days “travelling comfortably.” The party, however, hit a major delay between Songea and Tunduru. After a day of rain, flood waters carried away the bridge over the Muhuwezi River, which was 120 yards wide and 8 feet deep at the crossing. The travelers hatched an ingenious and dangerous plan to get the vehicles, supplies, and men across the river. The cars and lorries were stripped of any parts that would have been ruined by the water. All entry points on the engines were blocked with “oil-soaked wads of cotton wool hammered in with mallets.”<sup>128</sup> The hoods were strapped down and the general superstructures removed. Each lorry’s wire rope (used for haulage) was tied together and canoed to one of two islands in the river. Twenty porters stood on the nearest island (waste deep in water) and held the wire. One vehicle at a time was slowly lowered into the river and pulled to the island. Each car was surrounded by porters and a European to ensure that it did not turn on its side. As the vehicle reached the westerly island, the porters occupying the island moved to the second island. The entire process was repeated to the second island and again to the eastern bank. In total,

---

<sup>125</sup> *Ibid.*, 88-89. He avoided the drop because the automobile was going six miles an hour. Local villagers helped tow the vehicle “through the bush to point where it could be manhandled across the other side and back on the main road again.” Twenty-five villagers were also recruited to carry the vehicle across shoulder-deep rivers. At another point in the journey, the car suddenly fell sideways and threw all the cargo into the bush. The main priority was not retrieving the goods, but rather righting the car before the valuable oil and petrol were lost.

<sup>126</sup> This was not Lumley’s only run in with car troubles. H.S. Senior recalled that Lumley overturned and lost a brand new motor car when trying to ferry the Malagaresi River in Kibondo, on the Urundi border. Senior stated, “I have often wondered why he [Lumley] bothered to have a car – roads were non-existent. My D.C. relied on a large Triumph Motor Cycle, highly tricky in the sandy rut of the so-called roads, which, of course, were entirely ‘out’ during the six months of the ‘short’ and ‘long rains.” See BLCAS MSS. Afr. s. 1738 (38), H.S. Senior.

<sup>127</sup> BLCAS MSS Afr. s. 609, Harry Churchill Baxter, “River Crossing.” According to Baxter, people throughout the south remembered the journey as the “Great Trek Eastward.”

<sup>128</sup> *Ibid.*

the “feat had to be completed another six times, with the second car and the lorries.”<sup>129</sup> It took four days to move the vehicles and loads. There were no casualties, though the South African mechanic lost his grip at one point and was rescued by a canoe half-a-mile downriver. The South African rebuilt the engines, replaced the superstructures, and had all the vehicles working within an hour.<sup>130</sup>

Lumley and Baxter’s first-hand accounts were not extraordinary; rather, they were emblematic of the immense difficulties of vehicular transport in southern Tanganyika during the interwar era. Officers assigned to the “lonely,” one-man stations in the interior (like Tunduru) went several months without speaking with or seeing other Europeans.<sup>131</sup> While some men allegedly became “queer” and “mad” in the isolated posts, others enjoyed the isolation and viewed the occasional visit by another officer as an unwanted intrusion.<sup>132</sup> In either case, officers made decisions and implemented policies without the guidance of the provincial and central administration. The isolation and independence rarely produced satisfactory results in eradicating famine conditions and stabilizing/improving tax revenues. The lack of an interregional road network also hampered the colonial economy by inhibiting interior-coastal trade relations. Southern Tanganyika’s transportation infrastructure ultimately served as a symbol, symptom, and justification for the region’s isolation and impoverishment in relation to the rest of the Territory. The acute staff and funding shortages that plagued the Southern Province administration, economy, and infrastructure during the 1920s intensified with the onset of the Great Depression.

#### **“Care and Maintenance”: The Depression Era**

The Tanganyika colonial state first balanced its budget in 1926. For the next three years, the Territory was self-sufficient and began building up a considerable surplus. The period of stability and relative prosperity ended in 1930 when the world depression hit.<sup>133</sup> A Draft Memorandum from the

---

<sup>129</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>130</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>131</sup> BLCAS MSS. Afr. s. 1738 (27), Lumley, “Forgotten Mandate,” 5.

<sup>132</sup> *Ibid.* 5. E.K. Lumley, for instance, felt it was better “to stick it out on one’s own than suffer the interim intrusions of well-meaning visitors.”

<sup>133</sup> African headmen, elders, and the general public in Lindi Province expressed concerns about declining prices and the sale of foodstuff in 1929. See C.H.A. Grierson, “Lindi Province,” in *Native Affairs Annual Report 1920*, ed. D.J. Jardine (Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 1930).

Secretary of State for the Colonies in 1935 described the disaster that Tanganyika endured during the early 1930s:

Commodity prices fell heavily; the value both of exports and imports were reduced in consequence; revenue was adversely affected, and the accumulated surplus had to be used to make good large budget deficits, especially the deficits on the working of the railways, which had suffered heavily owing to the contraction of traffic, including through traffic to and from the Belgian Congo. As a consequence of this position, what may be called development work in the Territory virtually ceased.<sup>134</sup>

Cultivators tried to compensate for the reduction in global prices by increasingly production. The chart below, however, illustrates that producers received less value for more produce.

**Table 3.1 Inverse Ratio of Tanganyika Export Quantity vs. Value, 1929-1933<sup>135</sup>**

Export Quantity	1929	1930	1931	1932	1933
Rice, <i>cwts</i>	51,884	90,131	95,095	107,694	125,858
Coffee, <i>cwts</i>	177,140	230,940	185,020	227,240	254,360
Groundnuts, <i>tons</i>	7,765	17,333	3,070	15,873	19,177
Cotton, <i>centals</i>	110,821	82,224	54,349	71,888	113,677
Sisal, <i>tons</i>	45,728	49,962	55,939	60,554	69,600

Export Value	1929 £	1930 £	1931 £	1932 £	1933 £
Rice	58,985	73,682	51,209	62,939	62,382
Coffee	588,871	397,040	247,037	463,597	429,523
Groundnuts	120,448	186,567	28,700	182,010	166,223
Cotton	487,863	247,413	119,752	183,747	276,864
Sisal	1,485,593	1,172,315	707,177	698,202	881,772

As prices dropped, trade fell to “a dangerously low level” and revenues from native taxes dried up. A “succession of lean years” gripped the Territory.<sup>136</sup> All government officials experienced a 10 to 15% reduction in their salaries.<sup>137</sup> All allowances for district travel were also eliminated. According to former

<sup>134</sup> BNA CO 691/141/2 Development Scheme: Road Construction and Telegraph Lines Allocated from E.A. Guaranteed Loans (For C.D.F. Scheme), “Draft Memorandum on behalf of the Secretary of State to the CDA Committee,” February 1935. L.S. Smith, Secretary to the CDA Committee, submitted the final draft on 5 March 1935.

<sup>135</sup> *Ibid.* “Cwts” represented hundredweight or cental in the British Imperial measurement system. One cental equaled 112 pounds.

<sup>136</sup> BNA CO 691/152/4 Labour. Appt. of Committee to Advise on Questions Relating to the Supply and Welfare of Labour, Chief Secretary D.M. Kennedy, “Notice. Appointment of a Committee to Report and Advise on Questions Relating to the Supply and Welfare of Native Labour in Tanganyika, 29 January 1935,” *Tanganyika Gazette*, 7 February 1936.

<sup>137</sup> BLCAS MSS. Afr. s. 1738 (38), H.S. Senior; and MSS. Afr. s. 1738 (27), Lumley, “Forgotten Mandate,” 5. Senior recalled that the administration promised to reward the deduction when things improved. The reimbursement



District Officer E.K. Lumley, “only the more dedicated men carried out the duty of touring their districts” during the depression era.<sup>138</sup> British officials accepted the pay decrease to avoid the alternative – retrenchment. Officers in the Labour Department were the hardest hit, as the entire department was disbanded. The Public Works Department (PWD) remained intact, but its expenditure fell from £296,605 in 1929/30 to £9,600 in 1934.<sup>139</sup> PWD programs decreased and railway construction stopped.<sup>140</sup> In order to improve the Territory’s tax and revenue situation, the government instituted a “plant-more-crops” campaign in 1931. Colonial officials demanded the increased production of cash crops, particularly cotton, among local communities.<sup>141</sup> Non-African agriculturalists maintained their output, but slashed wages for African laborers.<sup>142</sup> The wages for sisal employees in Tanga, for instance, dropped from Shs. 30 without rations and Shs. 24 with rations in 1930 to Shs. 20 and Shs. 14 respectively by 1932. Wages plunged to Shs. 10 without rations by 1933.<sup>143</sup> The former director of the Labor Department, Orde-Browne, complained to the International Labour Office that men could not feed themselves and pay taxes with such meager wages. Without a Labour Department to protect the rights of African laborers, Orde-Browne feared that Tanganyika had “sunk to being one of the worst of the African countries for its labour conditions.”<sup>144</sup> Without adequate funding and staff, the “sole practicable objective” of the Tanganyika administration became “bare maintenance.”<sup>145</sup>

---

never came – “At the age of nearly 73 I am still waiting!” The officers’ salaries were also taxed in 1931. See FCO 141/17729, C.H. Grierson to Chief Secretary, 11 December 1931.

<sup>138</sup> BLCAS MSS. Afr. s. 1738 (27), Lumley, “Forgotten Mandate,” 5.

<sup>139</sup> BNA CO 691/141/2, “Draft Memorandum on behalf of the Secretary of State to the CDA Committee,” February 1935. With the exception of a £52,000 loan allocation for urgent road and bridge works in 1933 and £12,000 loan for water supply schemes in 1934, there was “practically no expenditure on development in Tanganyika” from 1931 to 1934.” The PWD did not issue Annual Reports from 1930 to 1932.

<sup>140</sup> BNA CO 691/152/4, Chief Secretary D.M. Kennedy, “Notice. Appointment of a Committee to Report and Advise on Questions Relating to the Supply and Welfare of Native Labour in Tanganyika, 29 Jan 1935,” *Tanganyika Gazette*, 7 February 1936.

<sup>141</sup> Iliffe, *A Modern History of Tanganyika*, 349.

<sup>142</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>143</sup> BLCAS MSS. Afr. s. 1117, Orde-Browne, Box 3/4, ff 1-47, Letter from Orde Browne to Weaver, International Labour Office, 14 June 1933.

<sup>144</sup> *Ibid.* Orde Browne argued that he had to report the labor situation to the ILO because “Tanganyika is much less in the lime-light than Kenya, and there is no one in particular to make a fuss.” He was disturbed that the “present governmental policy is to insist that everything is splendid”. Weaver responded two weeks later that he had addressed Orde-Browne’s concerns at the latest Mandates Commission. Sir Stewart Symes of Tanganyika assured

By September 1930, the “trade slump” hit the Southern Province. Sisal prices crashed and cotton earned a meager 25 cents per kilo (a third the price from 1929).<sup>146</sup> The Lindi Province Planters’ Association responded by cutting wages for African laborers. Sisal estates similarly reduced the salary of African laborers and European staff by as much as 20%.<sup>147</sup> Coastal estates also reduced their employees by 15-20%.<sup>148</sup> Messrs. Karimjee Jivanjee closed its Narunyu Sisal Estate and dismissed 2,000 laborers in Mikindani.<sup>149</sup> Bartering replaced cash transactions between traders and cultivators in the interior. Provincial Commissioner Grierson reported that “Traders upcountry seem to have little or no cash and do their best to persuade natives to take cloth.”<sup>150</sup> Without money in circulation, tax revenues plummeted. Provincial tax collection fell from £57,000 in 1926 to £15,400 in 1931/32.<sup>151</sup> The government’s “plant-more-crops” campaign failed to increase cotton production in the south. Becker argued that while local producers in southeastern Tanganyika were willing to produce cotton when “they considered it profitable,” that was “rarely the case” in the 1930s.<sup>152</sup> Cotton instead increasingly became seen as “a compulsory crop whose cultivation was directly linked with taxation.”<sup>153</sup>

---

the Commission that there were five or six officers “specifically seconded for labour duties” and the numbers would increase as the need arose. He denied any decrease in efficiency. The Governor also stated that he was in favor of a good wage policy, and the “scandals of non-payment of wages” were over. Weaver concluded to Orde-Browne that they must now “wait and see how the situation develops.”

<sup>145</sup> BNA CO 691/141/2, Governor of Tanganyika, Harold MacMichael, to Sir Philip Cunliff-Lister, Secretary of State, 13 November 1934.

<sup>146</sup> BNA FCO 141/17729, C.H. Grierson to the Chief Secretary, 9 September 1930; and DSM, F.C. Hallier, “Lindi Province,” *Annual Report 1930*. Kikwetu Estate reported a loss of 30/- per ton of sisal in September 1930 due to the low market prices versus high production and transport costs. Mr. Stutz reported that the market price was £21/10/0, yet it cost £17 a ton to produce and £6 a ton to transport.

<sup>147</sup> BNA FCO 141/17729, F.C. Hallier to the Chief Secretary, 28 February 1931. British officers and African headmen witnessed similar “drastic reductions” in their wages. See DSM, F.C. Hallier, “Lindi Province,” *Annual Report 1930*; and C.H. Grierson, “Lindi Province,” *Tanganyika Territory: Annual Report of the Provincial Commissioner on Native Administration for the year 1931* (Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 1932).

<sup>148</sup> Ibid.

<sup>149</sup> BNA FCO 141/17729, C.H. Grierson to the Chief Secretary, 9 Sept 1930.

<sup>150</sup> Ibid., and 7 August 1931. Acting Provincial Commissioner Hallier reported a year earlier that “The Indian traders in the greater part of the Province are reported to be dealing with natives solely by barter.” In March 1932, the Indian merchant community in Lindi entered an arrangement with the government whereby they guaranteed to purchase specified products in cash. The agreement covered purchases in Lindi, Masasi, and Mikindani. Traders agreed to black list anyone who broke the promise.

<sup>151</sup> BNA CO 691/133/6 Alleviation of Famine Relief in Lindi Province 1933, Governor’s Deputy D.J. Jardine to Sir Philip Cunliffe-Lister, Secretary of State for the Colonies, 19 October 1933.

<sup>152</sup> Becker, “A social history of Southeast Tanzania,” 165.

<sup>153</sup> Ibid., 164.

**Table 3.2 Principal Commodities Exported from Lindi prior to Depression**<sup>154</sup>

Export Produce	1927	1928	1929	1930
Sisal (tons)	2,171	2,374	2,871	3,319
Cotton (centals)	3,571	4,736	5,339	3,636
Groundnuts (tons)	346	484	438	264
Grain (including maize) (cwts)	20,770	82,577	31,846	26,745
Simsim (tons)	1,693	1,822	2,672	1,980
Rice (cwts)	4,315	9,475	1,957	14,878

**Table 3.3 Value of General Trade through Lindi Port**<sup>155</sup>

Value	1928 (£)	1929 (£)	1930 (£)
Imports	85,677	97,785	83,007
Exports	189,252	200,126	129,099

Despite the failure of cotton production, total agricultural export figures from Lindi rose by nearly Shs. 260,000 between October 1932 and October 1933.<sup>156</sup> Grains produced by African peasants, especially in Masasi and Newala Districts, represented the bulk of the province's exports.<sup>157</sup> The 4,000 tons or more of grain annually exported from the province constituted over a third of the Territory's grain exports.<sup>158</sup> Becker, however, noted that while "peasants' produce consistently outweighed sisal in bulk in most years, sisal outweighed peasant production in value in the 1930s."<sup>159</sup> Sisal exports quickly rebounded from the depression with the province's plantation industry exporting 13,755 tons in 1938 (or nearly 14% of the colony's total sisal exports).<sup>160</sup>

<sup>154</sup> BNA CO 691/117/9 Alleviation of Famine Distress (Tunduru District), "Memorandum for Colonial Development Advisory Committee," 1931.

<sup>155</sup> Ibid.

<sup>156</sup> BNA FCO 141/17729, Williams to the Chief Secretary, 6 October 1933.

<sup>157</sup> Becker, "A social history of Southeast Tanzania," 166. Becker noted that the "security from game and the greater reliability of rainfall in Newala district, as well as good, regular cassava harvests in the sandy soil of the plateau kept populations here the strongest in the province, long after its advantages from security in war had lost their importance. In 1953, Newala was found to have both the highest population density and the highest crop production per head in the Southern Province."

<sup>158</sup> Ibid; and BNA CO 691/133/6, Governor's Deputy D.J. Jardine to Sir Philip Cunliffe-Lister, Secretary of State for the Colonies, 19 October 1933; and "An Extract From a Memorandum by Mr. K. Latham, Senior Agricultural Officer, Regarding Recurrent Food-Shortages in Certain Parts of the Lindi Province." No indication is given in the files as to whether the grains were exported to the rest of Tanganyika, East Africa, and/or abroad.

<sup>159</sup> Becker, "A social history of Southeast Tanzania," 181.

<sup>160</sup> Ibid.

Although the Southern Province earned the nickname as the “Granary of the Territory,” it suffered from recurrent famines between 1928 and 1932.<sup>161</sup> The threat of famines was common in the Southern Province since the war and cost the government upwards of £7,000 in relief.<sup>162</sup> The famine conditions resulted in part from the scorched earth tactics and the forceful procurement of local crops by German and Allied forces during the war, which left entire areas of the Ruvuma borderland devoid of food crops. The forced conscription of male laborers further disrupted agricultural production and resulted in insufficient yields. Erratic, delayed, or excessive rainfall, locusts, and pests (like rats) exacerbated famine conditions after the war. Chau P. Johnsen Kelly argued that colonial officials typically contributed the recurring food shortages to “African cultivators’ fiscal irresponsibility in crop choices and agricultural mismanagement,” rather than erratic rainfall, pests, or other environmental factors.<sup>163</sup> In reality, African producers aggravated famine conditions by choosing (whether at the insistence of colonial administrators or not) to sell more of their food crops to compensate for poor market prices during the depression. High transport costs to the coast ate away at the meager profits they received for their produce. Unable to purchase large quantities of food with their cash and with low food reserves at home, African peasants in southern Tanganyika became susceptible to hunger.<sup>164</sup> Food shortages were further aggravated by the decision of thousands of men (especially in the interior districts) to abandon cultivation in favor of wage employment on plantations along the coast or north along the Central and Tanga railways. The women

---

<sup>161</sup> BNA CO 691/133/6, Governor’s Deputy D.J. Jardine to Sir Philip Cunliffe-Lister, Secretary of State for the Colonies, 19 October 1933.

<sup>162</sup> *Ibid.* Becker offered the following list of food shortages and famines in the Southern Province: Kilwa District (1924), Masasi District (1926, 1932-34, 1936, and 1938), Tunduru District (throughout the 1930s), and provincial-wide (1928-29). The cost of famine relief in Masasi and Tunduru in 1932 was £4,500. See Becker, “A social history of Southeast Tanzania,” 171-72.

<sup>163</sup> Chau P. Johnsen Kelly, “A Tale of Two Cities, Mikindani and Mtwara: Consuming Development in southeastern Tanganyika, 1910-1960” (PhD diss., University of California Davis, 2010), 151.

<sup>164</sup> Becker, “A social history of Southeast Tanzania,” 175-76. David Anderson argued that African producers in Kenya similarly responded to the drop in prices by increasing their cultivation acreages. Increased agricultural production was sometimes the result of government encouragement (as with Tanganyika “Plant-More-Crops”), and sometime “a more independent response to local economic conditions.” See David Anderson, “Depression, Dust Bowl, Demography, and Drought: The Colonial State and Soil Conservation in East Africa during the 1930s,” *African Affairs* 83, no. 332 (July 1984): 321-343, 325.

and elders left behind struggled to produce sufficient grain yields for their own consumption and to sell for cash to pay colonial taxes.<sup>165</sup>

Colonial officers in southern Tanganyika found themselves in a very difficult position when determining how to approach the taxation and famine crises. If they did not collect enough taxes they would not have sufficient revenues to maintain the province and would incur the wrath of the central administration. If they put too much pressure on locals to produce cash crops in lieu of food crops or sell their foodstuffs to get tax money, famines would continue to occur.<sup>166</sup> The inability of the southern provincial administration to implement a unified response resulted in conflict. In at least one instance, the central administration was forced to intervene in a famine scandal that gripped Tunduru District in 1930-1931. Acting Provincial Commissioner Hallier received unofficial reports in November 1930 that famine conditions existed in Tunduru District that required immediate government assistance. District Officer Dewhurst of Tunduru refuted the reports and argued that local populations made false claims in order to evade taxes and obtain free food. Dewhurst was known by the Lindi administration as an “obstinate” officer, who disappeared when visitors came to his station and treated the district “as a private preserve.”<sup>167</sup> Hallier, therefore, decided to send an assistant district officer, E.K. Lumley, to investigate the situation. Lumley reported that parts of the district were experiencing a famine. After personally surveying the district, Hallier requested Dewhurst’s immediate transfer. He reported to the Chief Secretary:

DEWHURST culpably responsible hunger and now famine conditions at Tunduru which have existed over the period of two years and were reported to him by Native Authorities early in the

---

<sup>165</sup> *Ibid.*, 174; TNA Native Affairs 19365, Acting Governor D.J. Jardine to Secretary of State for the Colonies, 13 February 1931; “Extract from Report by Mr. Latham, the Senior Agricultural Officer in Lindi Province Dated 10 December, 1930”; and P.C. Hallier to Chief Secretary, “Famine: Tunduru District,” 19 March 1931. Mr. Latham identified eight issues that contributed to the famine conditions in Tunduru: (1) disorganization of tribal government; (2) political unrest; (3) communities too widely scattered; (4) migrations to the coast; (5) unmarried mothers; (6) an idle class of native; (7) arbitrary increases in food prices; and (8) successive food shortages.

<sup>166</sup> BNA FCO 141/17729, F.C. Hallier to the Chief Secretary, 31 October 1930; and C.H. Grierson to Chief Secretary, 1 May 1931. Grierson reported, “We are between two fires, that of seeing the native is not worried into selling too much food to pay for his tax, and the other of seeing a big deficit in our normal collections.”

<sup>167</sup> BNA FCO 141/17729, C.H. Grierson to the Chief Secretary, 5 July 1930.

current year and last month when definite assistance was requested he persistently disbelieved them.<sup>168</sup>

The Chief Secretary and central administrators initially doubted Hallier's claims. Earlier evaluations of Dewhurst suggested that he maintained good relationships with African leaders and was perhaps "too easy going towards his people."<sup>169</sup> Chief Secretary D.J. Jardine instead suspected that Hallier had "gone off the deep end again unnecessarily."<sup>170</sup> The Secretary of Native Affairs, Philip E. Mitchell, privately shared Jardine's reservations about the situation: "I have some doubt whether Hallier has not rushed in like a bull at a gate & made a mess of things – Nor can I understand the charge of hard heartedness and indifference which he makes against Dewhurst."<sup>171</sup> The situation deteriorated further when Dewhurst sent Jardine two unauthorized telegrams addressed as the Provincial Commissioner, defending his behavior and claiming there were no shortages. Jardine was willing to overlook the "gross break in discipline," believing that it was "unwise to remove from Tunduru the one man who must know most of the country and the conditions of the people, and send somebody else knowing nothing at all of the position."<sup>172</sup> The central administration finally intervened when Hallier reported that Dewhurst had curtailed his famine relief arrangements.<sup>173</sup> Jardine assigned Secretary Mitchell to conduct a formal investigation, and the

---

<sup>168</sup> TNA Native Affairs 19365, Letter from Provincial Commissioner to Chief Secretary, 26 November 1930.

<sup>169</sup> *Ibid.*, Handwritten Note, 1 December 1930. Lumley offered a different account of Dewhurst's relationship with the local populace in Tunduru. Gerald Sibold initially told Lumley about Dewhurst's habit of going on evening strolls at the end of each work day. When sunset approached, Dewhurst would hang his hat on a tree and return home. The first African who passed the hat was expected to return the hat to Dewhurst's home regardless of whether he/she was heading in the opposite direction. Lumley explained that the locals did not ignore the hat out of "fear that D's Intelligence service would catch up with him." Although Lumley did not originally believe the account, he found the notorious hat while on an evening stroll. Lumley did not wish to cast Dewhurst "in the role of a feudal overlord," and therefore offered an example of his "kinder side" when Dewhurst chose not to report a younger officer who attempted to take a pair of unregistered bull tusks. See, BLCAS MSS. Afr. s. 1738 (27), Lumley, "Forgotten Mandate," 82-83.

<sup>170</sup> *Ibid.*, Handwritten Note from Chief Secretary D.J. Jardine to Y.E., 27 November 1930.

<sup>171</sup> BLCAS MSS. Afr. s. 101, Sir Philip E. Mitchell Diaries, December 1930. A week later, Mitchell wrote: "Dewhurst & Hallier appear to be both mad and it is impossible to make out what the truth is. I am afraid I shall have to go down there."

<sup>172</sup> TNA Native Affairs 19365, Handwritten Note from Chief Secretary D.J. Jardine to Y.E., 1 December 1930.

Officials in Dar still maintained the opinion that Hallier "may be getting famine on the brain." (*Ibid.*, Handwritten Note, 5 December 1930).

<sup>173</sup> *Ibid.*, Letter from Chief Secretary Jardine to Dewhurst, 29 December 1930. Dewhurst also closed a Food Dump established along the Songea road and turned away 300 people who helped establish the dump with the promise of relief.

inquiry found in favor of Hallier. Mitchell reported that if Hallier had “not acted with intelligence, vigour and efficiency,” the government would have faced “an exceedingly unpleasant situation and there would have been great suffering in Tunduru District.”<sup>174</sup> As a result of the report, Jardine levied thirteen charges against Dewhurst including dereliction of duty, numerous counts of insubordination, and willfully misleading the Chief Secretary.<sup>175</sup> Dewhurst obstinately maintained his opinion that famine conditions did not exist in the district and that the issuing of famine relief deprived local populations of their self-sufficiency. He also justified his insubordination as an effort to stop Provincial Commissioner Hallier from committing the government “to enormous unnecessary expenditure and loss of tax.”<sup>176</sup> Despite the evidence against Dewhurst, no disciplinary charges were brought against him. Jardine concluded that Dewhurst had “become unbalanced” due to the “difficulties of the situation and the life which he has been compelled to lead in a lonely station.”<sup>177</sup>

The Tunduru famine scandal illustrated a growing divide in how the Tanganyika administration approached governance during and after the depression. Whereas Dewhurst distrusted the local population and advocated their self-sufficiency with minimal government interference, Hallier and the central administration argued for direct government intervention to prevent further food scarcities. The Senior Agricultural Officer in the Southern Province (Mr. Latham) proposed plans for colonial administrators and scientific experts to “rehabilitate” the famine-ridden and cash-poor province by teaching locals “proper” planting techniques, introducing a greater variety of crops (particularly higher-

---

<sup>174</sup> Ibid., Report from Secretary of Native Affairs (Mr. Mitchell) to the Chief Secretary, 20 December 1930. After meeting with Hallier and the Senior Agricultural Officer in Lindi (Latham), Mitchell privately came to the opinion that “Dewhurst has made all this fuss simply through pigheadedness.” After reviewing a 150 page famine report and visiting the famine areas, Mitchell privately concluded, “I am afraid Dewhurst has got a bit queer; he resented Hallier’s interference & took the most improper steps to obstruct his P.C.” Mitchell attributed Dewhurst’s “queerness” to his being in Tunduru “too long.” Mitchell suspected that Dewhurst’s service would be over. He believed some of the blame rested with Hallier, “who did not handle him in the right way, but that is no excuse for Dewhurst.”

<sup>175</sup> Ibid., Letter from Chief Secretary Jardine to Dewhurst, 29 December 1930.

<sup>176</sup> Ibid., Letter from Dewhurst to the Chief Secretary, 30 December 1930.

<sup>177</sup> Ibid., Handwritten note from the Chief Secretary to Y.E., 31 December 1930.

value cash crops), and resettling scattered homesteads into centralized villages.<sup>178</sup> Calls for increased government intervention in southern Tanganyika reflected a broader, “radical” redefinition of colonial development and rule occurring in the British Empire during the 1930s.<sup>179</sup> David Anderson explained that the Colonial Office in London and administrators in East Africa responded to the Great Depression, American Dust Bowl, demographic pressures, and droughts of the 1930s by becoming increasingly preoccupied with “the apparent threat posed to the productive capacity of African lands by overcrowding, overproduction, and soil erosion.”<sup>180</sup> British conceptions of “development” became more “conservationist.” According to Joseph Morgan Hodge, colonial agricultural policy rapidly shifted from one of developing and exploiting the empire’s resources, “toward a policy whose first objective was the

---

<sup>178</sup> Kelly, “A Tale of Two Cities,” 162-167; and TNA Native Affairs 19365, “Extract from Report by Mr. Latham [...] 10 December, 1930”; and BNA FCO 141/17729, Williams to the Chief Secretary, 7 December 1933. According to Thaddeus Sunseri, the justifications offered for resettlement schemes in Tanganyika and the British Empire were multifaceted: “Colonial officials believed that dispersed peasant settlements undermined agricultural modernization and deprived the state of labor. Once resettled in villages under colonial oversight, peasants would plant cash crops, do corvée and wage labor, and pay taxes— in short, act as colonial subjects. Officials furthermore came to see closer settlement as a panacea for other colonial problems, including population loss through sleeping sickness, the protection of wildlife, and the prevention of an American-style dust bowl said to be caused by peasant and pastoral misuse of the land” (*Wielding the Ax*, 97). The resettlement schemes envisioned for southern Tanganyika aimed to create villages with 20 families per square mile. These communities would emulate government-run experimental farms that utilized the “best” cultivation techniques. Tax defaulters were expected to work on the government plantations, as well as “clearing and felling of land for others to cultivate, to establish plantations of cassava, dig tanks, or effect permanent improvement in feeder roads to connect with the proposed main road.” The administration believed that concentrated settlements offered local populations protection from sleeping sickness, famine, and wild animals. Jardine argued that it was the government’s “obligation to persuade” Africans to “alter” their mode of life so as to ensure their prosperity and advancement to “civilization.”

During the following decade, the British administration attempted one of the most infamous resettlement schemes in southern Tanganyika. The Liwale Resettlement Scheme of the 1940s failed due to inadequate road transportation, chronic staff shortages, and local resistance. The D.O. reported in 1948 that “At no time has the Scheme for the evacuation of Liwale gone smoothly and the old files tell the same story for each move; opposition from the people, lack of transport, failure of rains, hunger and hardship.” Of the 3,000 families that were forcefully resettled by the colonial state, most returned to their homelands by 1948. For the history of resettlement in Liwale District, see Thaddeus Sunseri, *Wielding the Ax: State Forestry and Social Conflict in Tanzania, 1820-2000* (Athens, USA: Ohio University Press, 2009), 104-116; Kelly, “A Tale of Two Cities,” 260- 271; and Kilwa or Nachingwea District Book, “Liwale Closer Settlement Scheme,” 1948. For more about settlement schemes in Tanganyika, see Kirk Arden Hoppe, *Lords of the Fly: Sleeping Sickness Control in British East Africa, 1900-1960* (Westport, Conn: Praeger, 2003); Rohland Schuknecht, *British Colonial Development Policy after the Second World War: The Case of Sukumaland, Tanganyika* (Münster: LIT Verlag, 2010); and Julie M. Weiskopf, “Resettling Buha: A Social History of Resettled Communities in Kigoma Region, Tanzania, 1933-1975” (PhD diss., University of Minnesota, 2011).

<sup>179</sup> Hodge, *Triumph of the Expert*, 146.

<sup>180</sup> Anderson, “Depression, Dust Bowl, Demography, and Drought,” 322.



conservation of natural resources in order to safeguard them for future capitalist accumulation.”<sup>181</sup> The “conservationist” philosophy not only required more rigorous field research and statistical analysis, but also intensified government intervention to ensure the reconstruction and “betterment” of rural African societies.<sup>182</sup> Hodge argued that by the onset of the Second World War,

Development had come to mean planned, state-directed projects for improving agriculture, particularly local food production, and providing community welfare and social services in an attempt to allay the misery of growing unemployment and poverty and the flow of rural emigration, not in Britain, but *in the colonies themselves*.<sup>183</sup>

The “more active and interventionist strategy to administration” and colonial development of the mid-to-late 1930s greatly impacted colonial ideologies and practices in the postwar era.<sup>184</sup> During the interwar era, however, the Tanganyika administration hesitated to embrace the more interventionist approach due to inadequate funding and personnel. The new approach was also not universally welcomed in the Southern Province where district officers and commissioners, like Dewhurst, were accustomed to their administrative independence and objected to outside interference. Superior officers in the provincial and central government remained hesitant to intervene in local matters, and instead showed a predilection to trust the actions of district officers, who supposedly had intimate knowledge of local circumstances. The central administration only intervened in the Tunduru scandal when the conflict between Dewhurst and Hallier spiraled out-of-control and potentially threatened the well-being of the African population and the prestige of the colonial government.<sup>185</sup> For the rest of the interwar era, it would remain the responsibility

---

<sup>181</sup> Hodge, *Triumph of the Expert*, 111.

<sup>182</sup> *Ibid.*, 143 and 148. P.J. Cain and A.G. Hopkins argued that Britain’s response “to the question of poverty in Africa and to the need to find new, secure sources of revenue was to be not less government but more.” See P.J. Cain and A.G. Hopkins, *British Imperialism 1688-2000*, second edition (England: Longman, 2001), 588.

<sup>183</sup> Hodge, *Triumph of the Expert*, 145-146. Hodge argued that the “new thinking” was driven by “specialist advisers and metropolitan experts enlisted as part of the CO’s advisory network in London,” as well as “local technical officers and research practitioners operating on the ground”.

<sup>184</sup> Anderson, “Depression, Dust Bowl, Demography, and Drought,” 322.

<sup>185</sup> Two months after the Tunduru incident concluded, the Chief Secretary launched another investigation into allegations of torture of African prisoners in Songea. The government inquiry not only found evidence substantiating the allegations of torture of suspects held for the robbery of a government cash box, but it also uncovered proof that the District Officer had deliberately misled the Provincial Commissioner regarding the situation in Songea. The investigation concluded that the D.O. knew “beyond all shadow of doubt, that there had been a serious miscarriage of justice,” but he deliberately concealed evidence exonerating the accused suspects and failed to report the abuses that had been carried out against the detainees while in custody.” The investigator

of the provincial administration and private investors to tackle the socioeconomic difficulties gripping southern Tanganyika.

### **Road Driven Imperialism**

Although the southern provincial administration made efforts to intervene in local agricultural practices and relocate populations into centralized settlements during the 1930s, the solution most commonly espoused to rectify southern Tanganyika's socioeconomic difficulties was infrastructure development – namely road construction. Throughout Africa, colonial administrations and private industries increasingly perceived road construction and motor vehicle transport as a more cost effective method of stimulating trade and labor markets. Joshua Grace offered four explanations for why colonial governments favored road transportation over railways in the 1930s. Railways required “massive amounts of labour [that] officials were unable to mobilize” – both in terms of railway construction and carrying bulk shipments from the fields and/or mines to the distant lines. Railways also required large capital expenditure “that was increasingly difficult to justify during global economic depression and war.”<sup>186</sup> According to Rolf Hofmeier, Tanganyika Railway generated major deficits during most of the interwar era. Low traffic volume meant that the railways could not generate enough revenues to cover their operating costs, “let alone depreciations and interest on capital.”<sup>187</sup> The diversion of Congo traffic to the Atlantic Coast during the depression further reduced traffic volumes and revenues.<sup>188</sup> The third explanation Grace offered for why Europeans increasingly disfavored railway transport was because it was an “inflexible technology with limited uses outside of the corridors created by tracks.” Finally, migrant laborers preferred not to use the state controlled railways.<sup>189</sup> Motor vehicles, in contrast, were a

---

argued that the D.O. needed to be punished so that the local populace knew who was responsible for the crimes, rather than continuing to believe that the “Government had tortured men and one old woman in a brutal manner to recover Shs. 652/- of Government money.” See BNA CO 691/116/7, “Native Unrest: Ill-Treatment of Natives in the Songea District,” February 1931.

<sup>186</sup> Joshua Ryan Grace, “Modernization *Bubu*: Cars, Roads, and the Politics of Development in Tanzania, 1870s-1980s” (PhD diss., Michigan State University, 2013), 74-75.

<sup>187</sup> Rolf Hofmeier, *Transport and Economic Development in Tanzania: with particular reference to roads and road transport* (München: Weltforum Verlag, 1973), 62.

<sup>188</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>189</sup> Grace, “Modernization *Bubu*,” 74-75.

flexible technology that “facilitated the movement of goods, opened new markets, and expanded the reach of administrative officials to previously unreachable areas.”<sup>190</sup> From Namibia to Dahomey, French Central Africa, and Tanganyika, colonial governments recognized that motor vehicles amplified the radius and speed in which a single official could oversee local communities and enforce colonial policies. Roads facilitated the introduction of import-export markets and cash economies to remote areas; supposedly “civilizing” and “modernizing” the population in the process.<sup>191</sup> The state could also better control and direct the movement of raw material exports and human resources – namely migrant laborers. In the case of interwar Tanganyika, Grace found that some colonial administrators, like Orde-Browne, envisioned the creation of a new social landscape centered on roads and motor vehicles that would simultaneously solve the “problems” of labor migration, open new markets, and reinforce colonial order:

He and others envisioned a network of motorable roads connecting the busiest hubs of trade and migration. Each hub was to have a ‘labour camp’ where migrants could sleep, eat, receive medical care, and even read colonial literature. Built of concrete and timber instead of mud, labor camps were designed to stop the spread of disease – especially, tick-borne illnesses – and rearrange African bodies through European architecture. Conceivably, this mobile population would then carry the good news of modern social services across new roads to their sites of work and to their homes.<sup>192</sup>

In regions and territories without formal colonial authority, private British industries often served as agents of infrastructure development. According to Karl Ittmann, British oil companies in Trinidad and the Middle East acted as “quasi-states” and invested heavily in road construction and transportation in order to improve their operational efficiency and exploit resources in inaccessible regions.<sup>193</sup> European

---

<sup>190</sup> *Ibid.*, 76, referencing Libbie Freed, “Networks of (Colonial) Power: Roads in French Central Africa after World War I,” *History and Technology* 26, no. 3 (2010): 203-223.

<sup>191</sup> Jan-Bald Gewalt, “Missionaries, Hereros, and Motorcars: Mobility and the Impact of Motor Vehicles in Namibia Before 1940,” *International Journal of Historical Studies* 35, No. 2-3 (2002): 257-285; Erdmute Alber, “Motorization and Colonial Rule: Two Scandals in Dahomey, 1916,” *Journal of African Cultural Studies* 15, no 1 (2002): 79-92; Libbie Freed, “Networks of (Colonial) Power: Roads in French Central Africa after World War I,” *History and Technology* 26, no. 3 (2010): 203-223; Joshua Grace, “Heroes of the Road: Race, Gender and the Politics of Mobility in Twentieth Century Tanzania,” *Africa: The Journal of the International African Institute* 83, no. 3 (Aug. 2013): 403-425; and Grace, “Modernization *Bubu*,” 49-104.

<sup>192</sup> Grace, “Modernization *Bubu*,” 76-77.

<sup>193</sup> Karl Ittmann, “Doing the Work of Empire-Oil Companies as Agents of Development,” (paper presented at the annual meeting of the North American Conference on British Studies, Little Rock, Arkansas, November 13-15, 2015). Ittmann contended that oil companies acted as “agents of development,” constructing infrastructure for production, ground transportation, electricity, water supply, shipping, and medical services. He, however, noted

officers and civilians also perceived motor vehicles as prestige objects and material manifestations of their technological, intellectual, and moral superiority. Erdmute Alber argued that the relegation of Africans to spectators when Europeans passed in an automobile “confirmed and constituted the social, economic and technological difference between rulers and subordinates.”<sup>194</sup>

Technical and scientific advancements in road construction and maintenance helped promote road driven imperialism during the interwar era. The British government first created a Road Board and associated laboratory within the National Physical Laboratory (Teddington) prior to the First World War. Before the Road Board, all special knowledge of road surfacing materials and methods in Britain was confined to road contracting firms, which were mostly owned by or in close alliance with firms that sold bitumen and asphalts. In comparison to the private firms, the research conducted by the Road Board Laboratory (in conjunction with the Engineering and Chemical Departments) was shared freely with road authorities.<sup>195</sup> All research and road work at Teddington stopped after the onset of the war.<sup>196</sup> Following the war, Colonel R.E. Crompton of Crompton Laboratory petitioned the Department of Scientific and Industrial Research (DSIR) and the British government to reconstitute the Road Board Laboratory in order to develop the “quickest, best and cheapest method” of constructing waterproof road surfaces with bituminous materials.<sup>197</sup> Crompton insisted that there were “very great difference” between road construction in the late Victorian era versus the 1920s, and surveyors often lacked proper knowledge of road engineering and/or the best methods of applying their knowledge.<sup>198</sup> He argued,

It is not difficult for me to show the large sums that have been wasted in the past, and are certain to be wasted in the future, if the expensive materials now used for road surfacing are put into the hands of Road Surveyors, who are only trained in the old methods of road surfacing, and are unacquainted with the modern chemical and physical qualities of the bituminous tare, pitches and

---

that the impact of infrastructure development often remained limited to the needs of the companies’ operations and expatriate staff prior to the late 1940s.

<sup>194</sup> Alber, “Motorization and Colonial Rule,” 83.

<sup>195</sup> BNA DSIR 17/130 Road Board Research at National Physical Laboratory 1919-1920, Colonel R.E. Crompton of Crompton Laboratory to Secretary, Department of Scientific and Industrial Research, 8 May 1919; and “Memorandum on Road Material Research,” 18 March 1920.

<sup>196</sup> Wartime research continued in America.

<sup>197</sup> BNA DSIR 17/130, Colonel R.E. Crompton to Secretary of DSIR, 8 May 1919.

<sup>198</sup> BNA DSIR 17/130, “Notes on the recording of Interviews in Procedure, Minute No. 17, memorandum of Interview on 20 March 1919 with Colonel Crompton.”

similar substances which are used either together or separately. Experience has shown that Surveyors who have not this knowledge are at the mercy of the sellers of these materials and that they are unable to test for the qualities they require and which tests we were in a fair way of standardising at the time that the Laboratory was shut down.<sup>199</sup>

The Road Board and its laboratory were reinstated in 1920 under the DSIR and quickly became one of the leading research and instructional institutions in England regarding the best materials and methods for surfacing permanent roads for automobile traffic.<sup>200</sup> British researchers also shared their data and results with the international community at the annual International Road Congress. Founded in 1906, the organization offered Road Authorities and Highway Engineers of various countries an opportunity to exchange expertise and opinions on “questions relating to Construction, Maintenance, and Organisation of Road Systems.”<sup>201</sup> The British contingent presented a paper entitled, “The Construction of Roads in new countries such as Colonies and undeveloped regions,” at the 6<sup>th</sup> International Road Congress in Washington D.C. (October 1930). The report comprised a compilation of PWD reports from Tanganyika, Nigeria, Kenya, Gold Coast, Sierra Leone, Uganda, Ceylon, and the Federated Malay States.<sup>202</sup> However, none of the Directors of Public Works consulted for the paper appeared at the conference.<sup>203</sup>

The degree to which research on road materials and construction was conducted in and propagated throughout the British Empire is a topic in need of more research.<sup>204</sup> It was not until 1948 that the Institute of Civil Engineers (ICE) founded the biannual Conference on Civil Engineering Problems in

---

<sup>199</sup> BNA DSIR 17/130, Colonel R.E. Crompton to Secretary of DSIR, 8 May 1919

<sup>200</sup> BNA DSIR 17/130, Secretary of D.S.I.R. to the Road Department, Ministry of Transport, 19 June 1920.

<sup>201</sup> BNA E 384/5 International Road Congress, 5<sup>th</sup> International Road Congress, Milan 1926. Participants discussed issues ranging from the construction of concrete, bituminous, and asphaltic roads, to the standardization of road material tests, conducting traffic censuses, and assessing traffic effects on the development of towns and town planning.

<sup>202</sup> BNA E 384/5, 6<sup>th</sup> International Road Congress, Washington, D.C., October 1930. The individual reports from each colony can be found in the same file.

<sup>203</sup> Ibid. The paper was compiled and presented by Major Robert Bruce (Chief Engineer, Perth-Inverness Road), Lt. Col. R.W. Butler (Divisional Road Engineer, Ministry of Transport), A.J.R. Hope (High Commissioner for India), J.W. Spiller (Crown Agents for the Colonies), and Major S.H. Warren (County Surveyor, Norfolk County Council).

<sup>204</sup> For a comparative analysis of civil engineering and road development in the Dutch East Indies, see Marie-Louise ten Horn-van Nispen and Wim Ravesteijn, “The road to an empire: Organisation and technology of road construction in the Dutch East Indies, 1800-1940,” *Journal of Transport History* 30 (June 2009): 40-57.

the Colonies (1948-1971).<sup>205</sup> The conference was first suggested by a British engineer working in West Africa – Alexander Macdonald – who believed “more might be done for colonial engineers, that is, engineers serving in the colonies.”<sup>206</sup> ICE established the conference in response and invited colonial engineers to present reports on the problems and advances in road construction and transportation and other engineering matters across the Empire.<sup>207</sup> Seven years after ICE instituted the conference, the Road Research Laboratory established a Colonial Section.<sup>208</sup> Its first task was surveying colonial soils and their uses in road construction. Of the 218 individuals taking road construction courses through the Road Research Laboratory that winter, forty-four were engineers assigned in colonial territories.<sup>209</sup> While colonial-specific engineering research and professional training opportunities for British colonial engineers expanded after the Second World War, there appears to have been few avenues through which engineers could access and/or participate in international research during the interwar era. Even if there were avenues, most of the men overseeing and conducting roadworks in Tanganyika were District Officers – not trained engineers and surveyors. A District Officer in Tanganyika – F. Longland – recognized that British officers assigned to “isolated stations” would have to complete the duties of an “old-time estate bailiff” without sufficient knowledge or experience:

For example, they may be required to make surveys, to put a roof on a house, to improve a water supply or a road, and to carry out many other similar tasks. It sometimes happens that although

---

<sup>205</sup> ICE, Institution of Civil Engineers, *Civil Engineering Problems in the Colonies, 1948-1971*. ICE renamed the conference as the Conference on Civil Engineering Problems Overseas after 1958. Although the president of the 1958 conference – Arthur Whitaker – claimed that the name change reflected an “extension” of the conference’s interests, the change was likely a consequence of independence movements occurring throughout the Empire.

<sup>206</sup> ICE, “Conference on Civil Engineering Problems in the Colonies, 1948.” The Secretary of State for the Colonies, A. Creech Jones, offered a lengthy opening address at the first conference, discussing the role of engineers in colonial development.

<sup>207</sup> *Ibid.* The Council chose to hold the conference in July when they suspected more colonial engineers were on leave. The first conference lasted three days and included reports from East Africa, Jamaica, Malaya, West Africa, Fiji, Nigeria, British Guiana, British Honduras, and the British West Indies on issues of road improvement, railway rehabilitation and gauge problems, colonial housing, public water supplies, hygiene, swamp drainage, and anti-mosquito methods. Major-General Desmond Harrison presented a paper on the “Civil Engineering Problems of the East African Groundnut Scheme.”

<sup>208</sup> ICE, “Conference on Civil Engineering Problems in the Colonies, 1956.”

<sup>209</sup> *Ibid.*

such tasks must be carried out there is little or no information concerning methods or materials, and little experience to guide one.<sup>210</sup>

He therefore published a pocket-sized reference guide in 1935, entitled *Field Engineering: A Handbook on Simple Construction*, instructing officers on conducting public works.<sup>211</sup> The text provided information about survey instruments and surveying, buildings and building works, building sanitation, water supply and power, water lifting plants, irrigation, and roadwork and bridges. The information was based upon a compilation of notes from various textbooks, papers, plans, catalogues, and other sources materials.<sup>212</sup> Longland's goal was to present the information as "simply and as accurately as possible."<sup>213</sup> In the case of road work, Longland's text guided officers in determining the proper location for roads in differing terrain, determining and measuring gradients and slopes, and setting out a road and its curves.<sup>214</sup> He also gave advice and instruction about road clearing, banks, and surfacing on level and hilly ground. Finally, the text instructed readers on locating and constructing fords, causeways, various types of culverts, and various types of bridges with different materials (timber, concrete, etc.).<sup>215</sup>

---

<sup>210</sup> F. Longland, "Preface (11 July 1935)," *Field Engineering: A Handbook on Simple Construction*, second edition (Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 1942), v. The second edition cost Shs. 5/-.

<sup>211</sup> The handbook was republished in 1942, 1943, 1944, 1948, and 1952.

<sup>212</sup> Longland, *Field Engineering*. Longland listed 25 texts in his bibliography. These included: McConnell's "Agricultural Note Book," Buckley's "Irrigation Pocket Book" (1921 version), "Concrete Year Book," Trautwine's "Civil Engineer's Pocket Book," Robertson's "Engineering Notes," and Tanganyika PWD's "Notes on Roadwork."

<sup>213</sup> *Ibid.* Sketches supplemented the texts. There were some mathematic compilations, but Longland declared "there is nothing in them which should frighten any one."

<sup>214</sup> *Ibid.*, 126-130. The Newala District Officer cited Longland when considering the proper amount of ant-heap needed to surface earth roads in 1940. See Nachingwea District Book, "Labour Notes," March 1940.

<sup>215</sup> *Ibid.*, 134-150.







Figure 3.2 Longland's Sketches for Constructing Road Gradients, Curves and Roads on Hill-sides, Culverts, and Wood Bridges<sup>216</sup>

<sup>216</sup> Ibid., Plates 32 and 34-36.



When it came to road maintenance, Longland instructed officers to begin road work at the end of the rains due to the “comparative softness of materials.”<sup>217</sup> Grass should be cut (not uprooted), and ruts filled with dry materials. Longland stressed that dirt roads could not succeed without proper drainage. He insisted that if drainage was “neglected they [the roads] will eventually be destroyed. Good drainage may turn a bad road into a good one”<sup>218</sup> Longland’s advice was easier read than done. District Officers in southern Tanganyika struggled to pinpoint the correct timing and methods of road reconditioning after the rains. Grass cutting, in particular, caused headaches. The Nachingwea District Commissioner, for instance, wanted road work to begin in March. The first step was clearing the grass, which was an “enormous” task. Grass cutting was useless, however, until after the April rains. Scrapping the ground would minimize the delay, but the practice increased erosion and the sandiness of the road. There was no choice but to wait, delaying general maintenance operations and the roads’ reopening.<sup>219</sup> In most cases, however, there were too few District Officers and Commissioners in the Southern Province to maintain hundreds of miles of roads in addition to their other responsibilities. Road maintenance and improvement operations, therefore, often fell to Native Authorities and local headmen, who were assigned to maintain specific sections of district and village roads. They were responsible for employing local labor in road gangs, while the Native Treasuries paid for the upkeep.<sup>220</sup>

Despite the challenges of constructing and maintaining roads in difficult climatic and geographic conditions with inadequate technological knowledge and equipment, colonial administrators in Africa were attracted to road construction because of the low labor costs. Across the continent, Europeans used

---

<sup>217</sup> *Ibid.*, 133.

<sup>218</sup> *Ibid.*, 131.

<sup>219</sup> Nachingwea District Book, “Labour Notes,” March 1940.

<sup>220</sup> *Ibid.* In Liwale District, for example, the people of Kipule maintained the Liwale-Masasi road and the Kipule road. The people of Mbemba maintained the Mbemba road and assisted with Mbwemkuru bridge maintenance on the Liwale-Masasi road. The Liwale Native Authority supplied laborers for the Liwale-Mataka and Liwale-Kinwicheo road sections, while Nyera laborers oversaw the Mtondo-Kilwa border and Kimambi-Utete road sectors. The complete list of assigned sectors can be found in “Labour Notes.” Expectations for labor output varied from district to district. Nachingwea District Officer, for instance, expected laborers to complete one of the following duties in an eight-hour work day: uproot 300sq. yards of grass (shoulder to head high), uproot 500 sq. yards of grass (knee to waist high over area already hoed), cut 2,000 sq. yards of grass (shoulder to head high), cut 5,000 sq. yards of grass (knee to waist high), dig out 100 bushes with roots, or lay 120 sq. yards of ant-heap of roads, runways, etc.

forced labor to build transportation infrastructure.<sup>221</sup> Libbie Freed found that colonial officials in French Equatorial Africa and Cameroon in the 1920s chose roads because they “*could* be built cheaply and simply, using forced local labor and locally available materials and, often, little expert knowledge, and still be considered to ‘work’ as roads, even if they were not ideal.”<sup>222</sup> The practice of using forced labor came under increasing pressure from the Anti-Slavery Society, League of Nations, and International Labour Organization (ILO) during the late 1920s.<sup>223</sup> As a signatory of the Slavery Convention of 1926 and Forced Labor Convention of 1930, Britain vowed to end all forms of compulsory or forced labor as soon as possible.<sup>224</sup> Kwabena Opere Akurang-Parry, however, noted that both conventions allowed the continuance of forced labor “under exceptional circumstances: if the work at hand is urgent, if it is beneficial to the community, and if voluntary labor could not be attained.”<sup>225</sup> In the Gold Coast, British officials utilized the loop-hole to their advantage. When reclassifying roads in the territory, they made sure to indicate that the roads benefited local communities, thus satisfying ILO requirements that “forced labor could be used as long as communities from which laborers were recruited gained from it and as long as voluntary labor was lacking.”<sup>226</sup> The colonial state in Tanganyika implemented similar road classification systems and legislation in the 1930s that appeased international criticism of forced labor while rationalizing its continuation for public works projects. The Native Authority Ordinance and Native Tax Ordinance of 1934 authorized Native Authorities and government departments to requisition labor,

---

<sup>221</sup> Kwabena Opere Akurang-Parry, “Colonial Forced Labor Policies for Road-Building in Southern Ghana and International Anti-Forced Labor Pressures, 1900-1940,” *African Economic History* 28 (2000): 1-25, 3.

<sup>222</sup> Freed, “Networks of (Colonial) Power,” 204. According to Erdmute Alber, forced labor was a necessary “precondition for motorization” in French colonial Dahomey in 1916. See Alber, “Motorization and Colonial Rule,” 83-84.

<sup>223</sup> Kevin Grant, *A Civilised Savagery: Britain and the New Slaveries in Africa, 1884-1926* (New York: Routledge, 2005), 135-167.

<sup>224</sup> Akurang-Parry, “Colonial Forced Labor Policies for Road-Building,” 17.

<sup>225</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>226</sup> *Ibid.*, 20; and Grant, *A Civilised Savagery*, 165. Grant noted that the Slavery Convention of 1926 introduced forced labor as an “illegal condition of oppression” for the first time, yet the legislation legitimized its continuation by imperial states for public purposes. He also highlighted that the failure of the Convention to guarantee African land rights assisted the imperial state with acquiring wage laborers: “Without rights to the land and fruits of the soil, African would not be able to sustain themselves, trade, or pay taxes, except through labor in the imperial economy.”

<sup>226</sup> Akurang-Parry, “Colonial Forced Labor Policies for Road-Building,” 17.

including tax-defaulters, for necessary and/or emergency public works projects. Native Authorities and headmen were also expected to compel all able-bodied men to complete “annual communal labor” projects on local roads. These projects consisted of clearing village and district roads of grass, filling in holes, and providing bamboo and ropes for bridges during the dry season.<sup>227</sup>

The southern provincial administration in Tanganyika heavily relied upon such compulsory labor to complete roadworks during the financially stringent years of the Great Depression. The Secretary of State for the Colonies and the Colonial Development Advisory Committee allocated £4,000 for road construction activities along the Tunduru stretch of the main road in 1931. The funds were approved based upon the scheme’s “development” potential – namely facilitating the export of thousands of tons of crops to the coast. The money, however, never reached southern Tanganyika. Acting Chief Secretary F.J. Durman reported to the Southern Provincial Commissioner in July 1931 that the territory’s financial situation had deteriorated so severely due to the Depression that the government could not undertake development projects unless “of outstanding importance and urgency.”<sup>228</sup> Without government funding, the Provincial Commissioner authorized British officers to use tax defaulter labor on the main, district, and village roads. The District Officer of Newala was permitted to employ an unlimited number of tax-defaulters on road work projects in 1931.<sup>229</sup> All able-bodied men that received famine relief in Lindi and Tunduru in 1931 were also forced to work on the main and district roads as repayment for food and the next year’s planting seeds.<sup>230</sup> One hundred and twelve miles of district roads were “made fit for motor

---

<sup>227</sup> Newala District Book, “Roads,” 1931; Songea District Book, F.W.C. Morgans Espr D.O., “Main/District/Village Roads,” July 1930; and Lindi District Book, “Native Administration – Note on Roads,” 1928/29. The British rewarded such “communal labor” with “communal rewards,” typically in the form of cash or salt that would be split among the participating *chirambos* (clans).

<sup>228</sup> TNA Native Affairs 19365, Acting Chief Secretary F.J. Durman to Provincial Commissioner Lindi, 10 July 1931.

<sup>229</sup> Newala District Book, “Roads,” 1931. The tax defaulters assigned to the main road were issued labor tickets and rationed “from the somewhat meagre Main Road allocation granted by the Senior Assistant Engineer.” Those laborers employed near their homes worked fewer days because they provided their own rations. A total of Shs. 663/- was expended for labor on the main road in April and May. See TNA ACC 16 Mtwara, 13/17 Labour Recruiting in Tunduru District, Provincial Commissioner Grierson to Chief Secretary, “Labour Recruiting and General Conditions in the Tunduru District,” 16 July 193; and DSM, Grierson, “Lindi Province,” *Annual Report 1931*.

<sup>230</sup> TNA ACC 16, 13/17, C.H. Grierson to the Chief Secretary, “Labour Recruiting and General Conditions in the Tunduru District,” 16 July 1931. Laborers on district roads were supposedly employed “comparatively brief periods at a time and for a total not exceeding 60 days per annum.”

traffic as part of repayment of the relief afforded".<sup>231</sup> When massive tax deficits threatened the province the following year, Secretary of Native Affairs Mitchell instructed officers to compel tax defaulters to work on roads, brick buildings, and other projects of "solid and permanent value."<sup>232</sup> Mitchell told District Officer Lawrence of Songea that he "must get it into his head that every man must pay or work; not till that is the practice will things be satisfactory."<sup>233</sup> Mitchell reasoned that the defaulters could repay the Shs. 4/- in tax after 16 days of work in the district. At the end of 1932, Provincial Commissioner Grierson reported that "some forty-seven miles of roads passable for motor traffic was completed, linking up centres along the Rovuma Valley."<sup>234</sup> African responses to roadwork varied. Some apparently preferred employment in "native labor gangs" for lengthier construction and maintenance projects because it offered a valuable source of income beyond subsistence farming.<sup>235</sup> Tax-defaulters in Newala also appeared to prefer road labor over paying taxes. In 1931, the District Officer complained that tax-defaulters should be "sent to work with gangs away from their homes, as many tax-defaulters are only too glad to do 24-30 days near their homes instead of paying tax."<sup>236</sup> In most cases, however, Africans

---

<sup>231</sup> DSM, Grierson, "Lindi Province," *Annual Report 1931*.

<sup>232</sup> BLCAS MSS. Afr. s. 101, Sir Philip E. Mitchell Diaries, 1933 (September 19-27). Mitchell's tone sounded different nine months earlier. When addressing the administrative staff in Lindi, he told the officers that "no one was asked or expected to go beyond the law" when procuring tax-defaulter labor for public works. See Sir Philip E. Mitchell Diaries, 1933 (January 4-7).

<sup>233</sup> *Ibid.* He similarly instructed the District Officer Tunduru to "get on with it & start calling on defaulters in the worst areas straight away." In Masasi, he told the D.O., "There must be strong pressure to collect tax or get work instead combined with repeated reminders that a modicum of energy could remove all difficulty."

<sup>234</sup> DSM, C.H. Grierson, "Lindi Province," *Tanganyika Territory: Annual Report of the Provincial Commissioner on Native Administration for the year 1932* (Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 1933). The total cost was £1,000.

<sup>235</sup> These gangs numbered 40 to 50 men and were supervised by European Officers, a "reliable" Native Authority member, and/or African foremen. Besides the head foremen and unskilled laborers, other positions within the labor gangs included: assistant road foremen, muster roll keeper, time keepers, sundry headmen, subheadmen, cook and camp caretaker, *fundis* (artisans who repaired tools, made road stamps, sawed timber, etc.), and "tribal dressers" who were later called "Rural Medical Aides." Wages varied depending upon the districts and positions. They were typically based upon *kipande* cycles, which were thirty day work obligations or contracts. Whereas laborers in Nachingwea received money and *posho* (rations) for completing their *kipande*, the paid laborers in Songea were responsible for bringing their own food. The Songea district officer recommended that the duration of gang labor not exceed one month because they supplied their own rations (typically brought to them by women). See Songea District Book "Main/District/Village Roads," July 1930; and Nachingwea District Book, "Roads in Liwale District as at August 1<sup>st</sup>, 1942," August 1942.

<sup>236</sup> Newala District Book, "Roads," 1931-35. P.H. Gulliver interviewed Wangoni men in the Southern Highlands and found that many were glad to construct roads and bridges near their homes for the PWD rather than migrating for employment elsewhere. Not all road laborers, however, were content with their situation. Gulliver found that some Wangoni believed that the PWD "cheated them" by paying them lesser wages than could be found on sisal

detested road work and resisted volunteering for road construction operations. Acting Provincial Commissioner Hallier, for instance, reported that 67% of the taxes were collected in Kilwa and Masasi after a rumor spread that all defaulters would be put to work on the Lindi-Tunduru road and a number were called to work on the district roads.<sup>237</sup>

### **“Rehabilitating” Southern Tanganyika through Road Construction and the Private Agents of “Development”**

Reactions to the wave of road driven imperialism sweeping across the Empire in the 1930s varied in Tanganyika. The central administration continued to perceive railways as the “mainstay of the transport system,” and instituted strict controls and licensing regulations on road transporters in order to prevent road-railway competition.<sup>238</sup> The legislation did not affect southern Tanganyika because there was no competition. Rather, the southern administration pinpointed road construction as the solution for the province’s economic and social problems. Road closures were not only an inconvenience for officers, but they also disrupted trade and reduced tax revenues. Colonial officers argued that they could retain the southern male population and increase the circulation of cash by employing male laborers on road construction projects – especially along the Lindi-Songea main road. Improving the Lindi-Songea main road, in turn, would stimulate inter-district trade and offer colonial officials more accessibility to the interior districts. British officers could better supervise African populations and ensure that locals

---

plantations. Wangoni men were aware that the 22 ½ shillings per *kipande* offered by PWD in Songea was well below the 39 shillings plus free rations (amounting to 26 shillings) given to sisal cutters on estates. See P.H. Gulliver, *Labour Migration in a Rural Economy: A Study of the Ngoni and Ndendeuli of Southern Tanganyika* (Uganda: East African Institute of Social Research, 1955).

<sup>237</sup> BNA FCO 141/17729, F.C. Hallier to Chief Secretary, 6 April 1931.

<sup>238</sup> Hofmeier, *Transport and Economic Development in Tanzania*, 67. The colonial government formed multiple committees in the 1920s and 1930s in order to determine the cost of road competition on the railway services and recommend measure to effectively coordinate Tanganyika’s transportation system. In response to the committees’ recommendations, the government passed two significant laws to curb road competition: the “Carriage of Good by Motor (Control) Ordinance” in 1931/32 and the “Ordinance to provide for the Prohibition of the Carriage of Goods by Motor Vehicles between certain places in the Territory” in 1934. The committee reports include: Tanganyika, *Report of select committee appointed to report on a road to connect Dar es Salaam with the north and central road systems, 1928* (Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 1928); Tanganyika, *Report of a Committee appointed to Inquire into the question of Competition between Road Transport and Railways in the Tanganyika Territory* (Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 1935); and Tanganyika, *Report of a Committee appointed to Inquire into the Question of Competition between Road Transport and Railways and the possibility of co-ordinating the various forms of Transport in the Tanganyika Territory* (Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 1937).

produced food and cash crops (particularly tobacco). By producing cash crops, the local population could earn money locally without having to sell their food crops for cash – therefore breaking part of the famine cycle.<sup>239</sup> The improved main road would also lower transportation costs, thus ensuring that African producers in the interior received maximum value for their crops. Producers could then use their profits to pay taxes, reinvest in the land, and purchase luxury commodities like calico and beads. This commerce would stimulate the expansion of monetarily-based trade networks for the benefit of the colonial economy.<sup>240</sup> The southern provincial administration ultimately believed that by improving the region's road system with African labor, they could eradicate famines, stabilize the population and labor force, increase tax revenues, and bring prosperity to southern Tanganyika.

Inadequate finances yet again threatened to undermine road development plans in the south. The use of cheap/free tax defaulter labor declined during the course of the 1930s as pressure from the ILO and League of Nations mounted and the threat of labor strikes and unionism intensified.<sup>241</sup> While forced labor continued on village and district roads, the PWD had to construct and maintain the Lindi-Songea main road with paid, voluntary labor. The southern provincial administration, however, had lost all faith in the PWD staff and repeatedly criticized the Public Works Inspector and Senior Assistant Engineers for their inefficiency. Grierson reported in May 1931 that the Senior Assistant Engineer “will never set the Thames on fire, and it is so awkward when he is the Authority for the whole Trunk Road from here to the Songea border and has the funds and the direction of work.”<sup>242</sup> The PWD allegedly worked only on a 50 mile section of the nearly 400 mile road. District Officers in Masasi and Tunduru were willing to maintain the

---

<sup>239</sup> TNA Native Affairs 19365, Acting Governor D.J. Jardine to Secretary of State for the Colonies, 13 February 1931; “Extract from Report by Mr. Latham [...] 10 December, 1930”; and P.C. Hallier to Chief Secretary, “Famine: Tunduru District,” 19 March 1931.

<sup>240</sup> Ibid. The files are also available at BNA CO 691/117/9 Alleviation of Famine Relief (Tunduru District) 1931, Acting Governor D.J. Jardine to Lord Passfield, Secretary of State for the Colonies, 13 February 1931.

<sup>241</sup> Frederick Cooper, *Decolonization and African Society: The Labor Question in French and British Africa* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 58-73. Strikes occurred in the West Indies and elsewhere in Africa between 1935 and 1938.

<sup>242</sup> BNA FCO 141/17729, C.H. Grierson to Chief Secretary, 30 May 1931. Grierson made a similar complaint in the monthly newsletter for May 1930.

sections passing through their district, but the PWD failed to allocate sufficient funds.<sup>243</sup> The British Treasury, meanwhile, continued to oppose large scale expenditures from loan funds in the aftermath of the depression.<sup>244</sup> It refused to support projects unless they could “be confidently expected to lead at a fairly early date to increased revenue (general or railway) more than offsetting the capital and maintenance charges involved.”<sup>245</sup>

In order to transform the southern landscape through a network of well-constructed and well-maintained roads, the British administration turned to the private sector. Just as the Lindi plantation community spearheaded the Lindi Tramway during the German colonial era, a private company became responsible for the maintenance and improvements of the Lindi-Songea main road during the 1930s. An ex-Rhodesian policeman and veteran of WWI – Gerald Sibold – and an ex-army officer – Carnegie Browne – founded the Tanganyika Transport Company, Ltd. (TTCo).<sup>246</sup> The men started the company as a haulage firm and attained a government contract in the 1920s for the transport of all government loads, stores, and personnel in the south.<sup>247</sup> Sibold and Carnegie Browne were well-known and respected by British officers throughout the province. Sibold was District Officer Lumley’s sole European companion during his five month stay in Tunduru, and he assisted Baxter’s crossing of the Muhuwezi River.<sup>248</sup> The lorries in Baxter’s convoy were TTCo property and the South African mechanic was a company employee.<sup>249</sup> In addition to transporting government personnel and loads, TTCo assisted famine relief

---

<sup>243</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>244</sup> BNA CO 691/141/2, Response by Treasury to L.S. Smith, Secretary to the Colonial Development Advisory Committee, 21 February 1935.

<sup>245</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>246</sup> There are discrepancies in the records whether the proper spelling is “Sibold” or “Sibold.” The author cross referenced the files to ensure that they referred to the same person. Unfortunately, the author could not identify a document signed by Mr. Sibold. The more frequently used spelling of “Sibold” will be used for the purpose of this dissertation. TTCo became a private limited company in 1931. See BLCAS MSS. Afr. s. 1738 (27), Lumley, “Forgotten Mandate,” 81; and BNA FCO 141/17729, Grierson to Chief Secretary, 8 September 1931.

<sup>247</sup> TNA ACC 16, 13/17, Labour Recruiting in Tunduru District, “Labour Recruiting and General Conditions in the Tunduru District,” C.H. Grierson (Lindi Provincial Commissioner) to the Chief Secretary, 16 July 1931; and BLCAS MSS. Afr. s. 1738 (27), Lumley, “Forgotten Mandate,” 81.

<sup>248</sup> Sibold supposedly consumed the majority of Lumley’s whiskey, and diagnosed the young officer’s constant headaches as sun-stroked caused by the corrugated iron roof in his bedroom.

<sup>249</sup> BLCAS MSS Afr. s. 609, Harry Churchill Baxter, “River Crossing.” The lorries were being taken to Lindi for maintenance and storage in TTCo’s main garage for the duration of the rainy season

measures and organized the transportation of migrant laborers from Tunduru to plantations throughout Tanganyika.<sup>250</sup> Carnegie Browne was also very active in Lindi town's political and economic affairs, serving as the secretary for the influential Lindi Province Planters' Association in 1931.<sup>251</sup> Provincial and District Commissioners routinely consulted Sibold and Browne about road conditions, construction, and operations.<sup>252</sup> As TTCo took advantage of the void of transportation services in the south, the company owners also aimed to profit from the inability of the colonial state to maintain the southern road infrastructure. In 1928 and 1929, TTCo received its first minor road maintenance contract for the Lindi-Mingoyo stretch of the main road.<sup>253</sup> Sibold also supervised the construction of twelve miles of road on both sides of Tunduru village in 1931 because the road foreman "promised by the P.W.D." never appeared. Sibold's efforts produced "excellent results."<sup>254</sup> When the provincial administration contemplated awarding TTCo a maintenance contract for the entirety of the main road in 1933, the PWD objected. The inability of a Greek firm to properly maintain the Lindi Tramway between 1930 and 1933 added to the PWD's reservations about granting infrastructure contracts to private companies.<sup>255</sup> The

---

<sup>250</sup> BLCAS Mss. Afr. s. 1738 (27), Lumley, "Forgotten Mandate," 84; and TNA ACC 16, 13/17, "Labour Recruiting in Tunduru," Response from Labor Commissioner Morogoro to Acting Chief Secretary P.E. Mitchell, 11 March 1931; and Labour Commissioner's Office Morogoro to Mr. G.M. Sibold, The Tanganyika Transport Company, Tunduru, 8 June 1931. The Labour Commissioner believed that Messrs. Sibold and Kyriazi did a good job of transporting African laborers as the men returned "always conspicuously healthy and cheerful." There were complaints in 1932, however, that the company lorries were overcrowding African laborers. See TNA ACC 16, 13/60 Attestation of Contracts of Service and Contract Labour, Chief Secretary L.S. Waterall responds to Provincial Commissioner Lindi, February 1932.

<sup>251</sup> BNA FCO 141/17729, C.H. Grierson to Chief Secretary, 7 August 1931.

<sup>252</sup> BNA FCO 141/17729, F.C. Hallier to the Chief Secretary, 10 January 1930 and C.H. Grierson to Chief Secretary, 30 May 1931; and TNA ACC 16, 13/22 Transport of Recruited Labour and Labour Routes, Lindi Provincial Commissioner to Chief Secretary, "Motor Transport Over Main Labour Route," 12 September 1932.

<sup>253</sup> TNA ACC 30, CT/9 Registration of Contracts Lindi Province, "Registration of Contractors," Managing Director of Tanganyika Transport Company, Ltd. to Director of Public Works, 12 April 1935, 22.

<sup>254</sup> TNA ACC 16, 13/17, Labour Recruiting in Tunduru District, "Labour Recruiting and General Conditions in the Tunduru District," C.H. Grierson to the Chief Secretary, 16 July 1931, 17-27.

<sup>255</sup> BNA FCO 141/17729, Guise Williams to Chief Secretary, 7 December 1933. In October 1933, plantation owner Mathuradas Kalidas issued a complaint about the theft of 10 miles (or 6,000 sections) of Lindi Tramway rails. An investigation determined "gross neglect on the part of the Greek contractors, who through lack of organization or, more probably, deliberately, abandoned quantities of material in the bush, some of which was retrieved by local natives, who then considered it anybody's property." General amnesty was granted to those locals who returned the rails. While the policy had some results, "nothing like the quantity alleged to have disappeared has been recovered. Prosecutions of natives have been dropped." The individuals who profited the most were those who repurchased of the rails from local Africans. Mathuradas Kalidas, for instance, supplied his brother in Uganda with



PWD, however, needed help. Their limited staff employed the “strictest economy both as regards ways and means.”<sup>256</sup> Provincial Commissioner Grierson argued that the resident Senior Assistant Engineer (R. E. Ponsoby) was incapable of maintaining even a short stretch of the main road from Lindi to Mahiwa:

Ponsonby doles out small allocations when I attack him, but wants to keep most of his money for the Lindi/Mahiwa section, as well as the greater part of the balance of the £5000 provided in last year’s Estimates. I have written officially on the subject and Ponsonby has departed for Tunduru to see for himself. About 20 miles of the road outside of Lindi is good now, but the Mtua to Mahiwa section is dangerous in places and bad throughout.<sup>257</sup>

Grierson concluded that a private contractor was a necessity because it was impossible to maintain and improve the main road with “a single handed Officer who has numerous other calls on his time, when funds are inadequate and lorry traffic heavy.”<sup>258</sup> TTCo, in contrast, already had a head office, garage, workshop, and transport depot in Lindi. The workshop included equipment rarely found in the Southern Province: “a tip-lorry, a hand or power driven concrete mixer, a block-making machine, mason’s tools, and a plentiful stock of road-labourers hand-tools of every description.”<sup>259</sup> Browne and Sibold’s personal relationships with government officers also inspired confidence and improved their chances of earning a contract in competition with other tenders.<sup>260</sup>

The colonial government ultimately sided with Grierson and awarded TTCo a yearly contract in 1932 to maintain the entirety of the main road at the price of £2,400. The state also renewed TTCo’s

a large quantity of rails. The rails were delivered at a much lower cost than they would have been delivered from Europe.

<sup>256</sup> BLCAS 754.14 s.5 Tanganyika Public Works Department Report 1925-1953, C.Y. Stevenson, *Tanganyika Territory: Annual Report of the Public Works Department, 1933* (Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 1934). By the end of 1933, the PWD staff in the entire territory number sixty-one, including: 13 engineers, 1 architect, 24 inspectors, 14 road Foremen, and 1 transport office. The use of road making machinery was “a luxury which has had to be almost entirely dispense with.”

<sup>257</sup> BNA FCO 141/17729, C.H. Grierson to the Chief Secretary, 3 July 1931. Ponsonby was ultimately retrenched by March 1932. His name resurfaced in the archives in 1935 as a member of “Monnas & Ponsonby: Civil Engineers Contractors.” The men owned Tanga Mill in Tanga and completed five public works contracts, including a £120,000 contract for Moshi-Arusha Railway Construction. See TNA ACC 30, CT/9, “Registration of Contractors.”

<sup>258</sup> TNA ACC 16, 13/17, “Labour Recruiting and General Conditions in the Tunduru District,” C.H. Grierson to the Chief Secretary, 16 July 1931.

<sup>259</sup> TNA ACC 30, CT/9, “Registration of Contractors,” Managing Director of Tanganyika Transport Company, Ltd. to Director of Public Works, 12 April 1935, 22.

<sup>260</sup> *Ibid.* The Public Works Department received applications from the following tenders (with their rates per mile) for the Lindi-Mingoyo Road project in 1932: Edward de Souza (Shs. 6/20 per); Major A. King (Shs. 5/-), IT K.(Shs. 4/90), and Mr. L. Tzulakis, Esq. (Shs.4/50). See TNA ACC 30, CT/6 Contracts Lindi Province, “Notice: Tenders for Contract,” R.E. Ponsonby, Senior Assistant Engineer, Public Works Department Lindi, 3 February 1932, 5.

contract to provide weekly mail and passenger service from Lindi to Songea.<sup>261</sup> The company's construction contract got off to an inauspicious start. Grierson visited Songea four months into the contract and observed that some stretches were greatly improved, but "the regular maintenance and inspection procedure is lacking."<sup>262</sup> Grierson's report the following month was dire as he suspected that TTCo was undergoing a "financial crisis":

They seem to be trying to do too much with too little capital and heavy overhead expenses. There is not the old personal supervision now, and too many makeshifts. I hope they will weather the storm, as they are a most useful local asset.<sup>263</sup>

Despite Grierson's doubts about Sibold and Carnegie Brown's ability to manage the company, he recommended the continuance of their contract. After all, there was no alternative as the PWD was self-admittedly incapable of properly managing Tanganyika's road system:

The existing road maintenance organization has been stretched to its elastic limit. In some cases sections exceeding 200 miles are in charge of a single road foreman. In spite of increased mileages, reduced funds and the continually increasing volume of traffic recorded the road systems have been maintained in a fair condition throughout the Territory although it has not been possible to undertake improvement works to any great extent. Such a position cannot be maintained indefinitely and sooner or later deterioration of roads generally will set in unless countered by increased expenditure and supervision.<sup>264</sup>

Grierson concluded that "at £8 per mile, I do not think a more economic or comprehensive scheme could be produced" than the arrangement with TTCo.<sup>265</sup> The central administration agreed and renewed TTCo's contract in 1933. Carnegie Browne assumed full control over the company during the year due to Sibold's resignation from the company's board.<sup>266</sup> The work completed by road gangs stationed at five mile

---

<sup>261</sup> Ibid. TTCo retained the mail and passenger service contract until 1953.

<sup>262</sup> BNA FCO 141/17729, C.H. Grierson to the Chief Secretary, 7 August 1932.

<sup>263</sup> BNA FCO 141/17729, C.H. Grierson to the Chief Secretary, 4 September 1932.

<sup>264</sup> BLCAS 754.14 s.5, C.Y. Stevenson, *Tanganyika Territory: Annual Report of the Public Works Department, 1934* (Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 1935).

<sup>265</sup> BNA FCO 141/17729, C.H. Grierson to the Chief Secretary, 22 October 1932. Grierson reported that "Sibold – who does all the work – has been laid up for some weeks and Carnegie Brown is not the same energetic and hard working person he used to be."

<sup>266</sup> BNA FCO 141/17729, C.H. Grierson to the Chief Secretary, 10 May 1933; and Williams to the Chief Secretary, October 1932. Sibold resigned after finding gold in Tundururu and Liwale Districts. He registered seven gold claims by September 1933. Sibold's gold site between Mbwemkuru and Ngurumahiga was allegedly last worked in 1941 for a short time, without profit. (See Nachingwea District Book, "The Native Administration of Liwale District 1942.") Carnegie Brown also pegged a claim during the Liwale alluvial gold strike in 1933. He, however, remained the local

intervals along the main road was satisfactory enough to warrant the extension of TTCo's exclusive contract until December 1936. TTCo, however, lacked the capital and resources to overcome the natural obstacles that had made road construction so challenging in the Ruvuma borderland for the past thirty years. Poor soil conditions and numerous streams that crisscrossed the road at various intervals plagued road maintenance. The company's main adversary remained the annual rains. During the rainy season, all operations came to a halt. The roads were closed and bridges literally picked up and set aside. From March to May, TTCo employed large road gangs to reconstruct and prepare the road and its bridges for their reopening in May. The strength of the road gangs declined from July to December as the company completed major maintenance tasks.<sup>267</sup> When the rainy season commenced, TTCo reduced its labor force to two bridge gangs.<sup>268</sup> The rains proceeded to wash away most (if not all) of the year's work.

As the Southern Province's economy continued to rebound from the depression era, the colonial state increasingly disapproved of TTCo's low maintenance standards.<sup>269</sup> The annual closure of the main road inhibited year-round trade between the interior and coast, while rough road surfaces drove up transportation costs. Senior Agricultural Officer K. Latham explained that grain received Shs. 6/- per kilo at Lindi port. It cost a cultivator in Masasi Shs. 5/- to transport his produce by vehicle to Lindi, leaving him with a profit of Shs. 1/- per 100 kilograms. In order to earn Shs. 5/- cash, the producer needed to sell 500kgs locally or make three journeys to the coast (each a week's duration).<sup>270</sup> The situation became more severe as the distance from Lindi increased. Traders in the interior would not purchase local grain because they could not profitably transport it to the coast. The traders, instead, contracted someone to bring grain from Lindi to Masasi – "the very grain which has been labouriously carried down to the coast on the

---

director of TTCo and temporarily appointed his wife in Sibold's place. Browne went on to serve as the company's General Manager until 1945.

<sup>267</sup> TNA ACC 16, 4/3 Lindi-Songea Main Road: Acquisition of Land and New Road Plans, "Road Maintenance Contract," Tanganyika Transport Co., Ltd. to the Southern Provisional Commissioner, 7 November 1942, 905-07.

<sup>268</sup> These gangs were composed of one headman and 10 laborers, who received half-pay.

<sup>269</sup> DSM, Kitching, "Lindi Province," *Annual Report 1933*; and BNA FCO 141/17729, Kitching to the Chief Secretary, 3 January 1934.

<sup>270</sup> BNA CO 691/133/6, "An Extract From a Memorandum by Mr. K. Latham, Senior Agricultural Officer, Regarding Recurrent Food-Shortages in Certain Parts of the Lindi Province."

heads of Masasi and Newala (and quite possibly Tunduru or Liwale) natives.”<sup>271</sup> Porterage remained a common practice among African producers in interior districts like Masasi and Tunduru Districts because of the exorbitant costs of motor transport.<sup>272</sup> The provincial and central administration found this reality unacceptable, especially as it deprived the government of potential revenue. The colonial state remained convinced that improved roads would reduce transport costs, stimulate rapid and cheap vehicle traffic, and thus encourage local producers to cultivate and sell more produce for cash and commodity goods. The Tanganyika state and British metropole would profit from the expansion of inter-regional trade networks in the form of increased tax revenues, customs duties, and fees associated with a growing import-export market.<sup>273</sup>

Since TTCo lacked the capital necessary to improve the Lindi-Songea main road to an all-weather standard and no viable alternatives existed in the private sector, the southern provincial administration petitioned Dar es Salaam for funds.<sup>274</sup> The central administration, in turn, asked London for funding to

---

<sup>271</sup> Ibid.

<sup>272</sup> DSM, Kitching, “Southern Province,” *Annual Report 1934*.

<sup>273</sup> BNA CO 691/133/6, Governor’s Deputy D.J. Jardine to Sir Philip Cunliffe-Lister, Secretary of State for the Colonies, 19 October 1933.

<sup>274</sup> The government rejected a number of “development” proposals for southern Tanganyika by private entrepreneurs in the 1930s. Two proposals were issued in 1936. One was fantastical, and the other somewhat tempted the Colonial Office. The outlandish proposal came from an unknown German firm, German East Africa Settlement, Farm, and Southern Railway Co. Ltd. The Managing Director, Ottokar Froesk, petitioned the Colonial Office for a massive concession covering the entire Southern Province, rivers of Kilombero and Rufiji, highlands of Ubena and Uhehe, forests of Ufinde, Dabaga, Iranga and Mahenge, and the uplands between Lakes Nyasa and Tanganyika. The grandiose scheme called for the settlement of 20,000 peasants (each granted 100 acres); 7,000 construction workers and laborers; 2,500 merchants; 1,000 railway and administration officials; and an untold number of doctors, dentist, nurses, teachers, veterinarians, etc. These individuals would build and govern their own villages and towns under a 99 year government lease. They would also construct a 1,485 km railway. Froesk insisted that the scheme would provide 52,000 Africans with employment and help build the bonds between Germany and Britain against communism. While neither the Foreign Office nor the Colonial Office took the proposal serious, they investigated the unknown company and manager. The investigation concluded that Froesk was a “man of no substance whatever,” and the scheme “only existed in Herr Froesk’s imagination.” See BNA CO 691/150/8 German East Africa Settlement, Farm and South Railway Co Ltd.

The other scheme proposed in 1936 came from seemingly more reputable sources. A syndicated comprised of Lord Chesman, Colonel W.J.M. Hill, and Captain H. Hughes proposed to carry out investigations and surveys for potential development in Lindi, Mikindani, Masasi, Songea, Mbeya, Songwe, Njombe, and Iringa Districts. In addition to soil surveys, other surveys would examine potential mineral and petrol deposits, sources for water power, constructing a harbor at Mikindani, and constructing a railway from Mikindani to Mwenzo in Northern Rhodesia (through Masasi, Tunduru, Songea, Njombe, and Mbeya). The syndicate proposed that the government grant them three years to conduct all preliminary surveys and investigations. If the potentialities proved satisfactory, the syndicate would become a public company and the government would reward them a

improve the regional and territorial-wide road network. Governor Harold MacMichael argued that a lack of investment since the First World War had rendered southern Tanganyika impoverished and undeveloped:

The Lindi Province is at present the least developed area in the Territory and we are of opinion that the reason for this is not to be found in the nature of its soil or of its population but in the fact that capital expenditure in the province since the war has been practically nil. During the period from 1920 to 1929 when the Territorial revenue was at its highest very little money was expended in this area. Whereas the Northern and Central areas of the Territory have had the benefit of their respective railway systems and the Southern Highlands is able to export its produce along the Great North Road, Lindi has had to be content with a single road which at present is barely useable even in the dry season.<sup>275</sup>

Chief Secretary Jardine argued that if London took no action, the Southern Province would continue its socioeconomic decline to utter ruin:

[...] at the best a static condition varied by periodic famines and at the worst a progressive deterioration leading through increasingly frequent famine relief to a pauperized population no longer capable of maintaining itself and so constituting a permanent drain on the resources of the Territory.<sup>276</sup>

The economic arguments in favor of the roadway – its ability to stimulate agricultural production and exports – ultimately convinced the Secretary of State for the Colonies and Colonial Development Advisory Committee to issue a £27,000 loan to improve the Lindi-Masasi section of the main road and feeder roads in southern Tanganyika. The funds were part of a larger £253,000 loan awarded to the Tanganyika government from the East African Guaranteed Loan to complete ten road improvement

---

concession to carry out all relevant development proposals. The syndicate listed several other conditions, including that they be given all the necessary land for a harbor, railway and stations, roads, irrigation, reservoirs and channels, hydroelectric installations, transmission lines, water supply pipelines, aerodromes, and so forth. The Colonial Office was unwilling to adopt a critical attitude to the scheme as they desperately wanted and needed surveys of the Southern Province. The Chief Secretary of Tanganyika was unwilling to deny or accept a proposal that amounted “to a suggestion that development in two provinces should be undertaken by a company in return for grants of valuable exclusive rights to water and minerals and over large land areas.” The scheme ultimately fell apart as Lord Chesman was unwilling and/or uninterested in funding the project. Nothing was known about Captain Hughes and Colonel Hill besides that the latter served in the Scots Guard. By June 1936, the syndicate was “dead.” The Colonial Office concluded that “these are not people who are likely to command sufficient money to make anything of a development scheme in the South of Tanganyika other than something to hawk about the City.” See BNA CO 691/152/10 Survey Scheme for Development of Southern Tanganyika (Project of Capt. Hughes Syndicate) 1936.

<sup>275</sup> BNA CO 691/141/2, Governor Harold MacMichael to Sir Philip Cunliff-Lister, Secretary of State for the Colonies, 13 November 1934.

<sup>276</sup> BNA CO 691/133/6, Governor’s Deputy D.J. Jardine to Sir Philip Cunliffe-Lister, Secretary of State for the Colonies, 19 October 1933.

schemes and one telegraph line.<sup>277</sup> A thousand men were employed on the Lindi-Masasi project when road construction commenced at the end of August 1935.<sup>278</sup> Problems, however, quickly emerged. The original project estimates were based upon conjecture. A road survey had never been undertaken by the PWD in the Southern Province and there “was no technical data available on which to base a firm estimate.” When a detailed survey was completed by December 1935, the revised estimate amounted to £36,760; £28,860 for the main road and £7,900 for feeder roads.<sup>279</sup> The feeder project was immediately scrapped. The high cost of transporting permanent materials – such as metal or murrum – prohibited their use in the region. The Lindi-Songea main road would remain a dirt road for the foreseeable future.

Although the government intervened to help the Southern Province acquire much needed funds for its infrastructure, the administration resumed its hands off approach when it came to the application of those funds. The colonial government terminated TTCo’s exclusive road maintenance contract in 1937, and assigned the PWD to maintain the Lindi-Masasi section using the guaranteed loan funds. The central administration, however, failed to provide the PWD the additional funds, equipment, or trained personnel it needed to properly maintain the section, let alone the larger network of district roads. The government, therefore, divided responsibility for the more challenging and sparsely populated sections of the main road from Masasi to Songea between two private contractors. TTCo became responsible for the Masasi section ending at the Nampungu Bridge in Tunduru, while L. Rousham Roberts of Songea maintained the

---

<sup>277</sup> BNA CO 691/141/2, Treasury to the Under Secretary of State, Colonial Office, 16 March 1935. The other schemes included: the Tukua Lupa Telegraph Line (£5,000); Lupa-Itigi Road (£61,000); Kilosa-Ifakara Road (£78,000); Turiani-Morogoro Road (£40,300); Morogoro-Mlali-Mgeta Road (£4,500); Lusahunga-Katale Road (£12,700); Arusha-Makyuni-Oldeani Road (£12,800); Makyuni-Babati Road (£3,100); Oldeani-Serengeti Plain Road (£7,000); and the Mafia Island Road (£1,600). Justifications for each program can be found in “Report of a Committee Appointed to Consider Schemes for the Development of the Territory” by H.L. Bayles (Treasurer and Chairman), J. Lindsey Allan (Land Officer), Major W.C. Lead, A.B. Massie, A.A. Adamjee, and M.G. Lewis (Secretary), 15 Sept 1934,” and “Draft Memorandum on behalf of the Secretary of State to the CDA Committee – Feb 1935.”

<sup>278</sup> BNA FCO 141/17729, Williams to the Chief Secretary, 14 October 1935. The following work was accomplished by the end of 1935: 9 miles cleared; 10 miles road formation; 15,000 cubic yards of excavation and embankment; 7.5 miles of surfacing; 49 culverts; 305 lineal feet of stone pitched drifts; and 7 bridges of total length of 138 ft. Williams reported in November that two-thirds of the labor force was rationed with maize meal from Kenya. See BLCAS 754.14 s.5, *Tanganyika Territory: Annual Report of the Public Works Department, 1935* (Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 1936).

<sup>279</sup> BNA CO 691/147/4 Road Development 1936, D.M. Kennedy, Governor’s Deputy to Secretary of State J.H. Thomas, 14 December 1935.

bridge and the rest of the road to Songea. Both contractors assumed responsibility for all works at their own risks and costs, including the supply of all materials and labor.<sup>280</sup> The Tanganyika Government also left the organization of labor to the discretion of TTCo and Roberts with the stipulations that the companies would supply all necessary tools and camps, employ sufficient headmen, and submit monthly labor returns detailing the number of men employed and conditions of their employment.<sup>281</sup> PWD engineers gave TTCo and Roberts detailed descriptions as to what constituted proper road maintenance and construction.<sup>282</sup> Colonial and PWD officers, however, rarely intervened in the work programs designed and implemented by the contractors.<sup>283</sup> Neither contractor had the resources to conduct year round maintenance and construct an all-weather road for vehicle traffic.<sup>284</sup> Routine labor shortages, in particular, crippled TTCo and Robert's work programs. Roadwork often supplemented household production for African laborers. These workers returned to their *shambas* when the cultivation and harvest seasons began. When agricultural prices were high, there was less incentive to return to the roadwork. Roberts, for example, struggled to find laborers during the tobacco boom in 1938 and 1939. He

---

<sup>280</sup> TNA ACC 30, CT/6, Provincial Commissioner Grierson to the Director of Public Works, "General Form of Contract," 13 July 1932; and TNA ACC 16, 4/3, "Contract for the Maintenance of the Main Road between Masasi and Nampungu," Tanganyika Territory and Tanganyika Transport Company, Ltd., 6 January 1940, 793-802.

<sup>281</sup> The monthly labor returns for both companies from 1937 to 1944 can be found in TNA ACC 16, 4/36 Masasi-Songea Road Maintenance Contract: Returns of Labourers, Masasi-Songea Road Maintenance Contract: Return of Labourers.

<sup>282</sup> Instructions were given with respect to embankments, cuttings, surfaces, clearing, formation, drainage, culverts, bridges, and extraordinary duties.

<sup>283</sup> TNA ACC 16, 4/3, "Road Maintenance Contract," Tanganyika Transport Company, Ltd. to the Southern Provisional Commissioner, 7 November 1942, 905-07; and TNA ACC 16, 4/36, L. Rousham Roberts to Provincial Commissioner, "Labour Return Records," 1938-39. Both began maintenance work in March by cutting grass along the roadways and filling in the largest holes and ruts. Attention then turned to filling in smaller potholes and resurfacing rougher stretches of the road. The road gangs focused on improvement projects by June, including widening narrow sections, constructing drains, removing bad bends, clearing thick bush, and constructing new bridges.

<sup>284</sup> DSM, A.E. Kitching, "Southern Province," *Tanganyika Territory: Annual Report of Provincial Commissioner on Native Administration for the year 1938* (Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 1939); and A.E. Kitching, "Southern Province," *Tanganyika Territory: Annual Report of Provincial Commissioner on Native Administration for the year 1939* (Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 1940). The Provincial Commissioner's assessment of the contractors' work was generally favorable. In the Annual Report for 1938 and 1939, the Provincial Commissioner reported that the "Masasi-Songea section has been maintained in good order by two contractors." The Lindi-Masasi section was open throughout the year by 1938.

recognized that wages of Shs. 8/- per month were no longer appealing.<sup>285</sup> Despite the obvious limitations and failures of TTCo and Roberts' respective operations, the colonial state had no viable option but to renew their contracts until the mid-1940s. The Lindi-Songea main road – the “backbone of the system” in southern Tanganyika – thus remained a poorly designed dirt road throughout the interwar era. The contractors' efforts, however, were not pointless. They helped to stimulate the expansion of the region's motor vehicle transportation sector for the benefit of regional traders, local producers, and migrant laborers.

### **On the Road**

Indians, not Europeans or Africans, were the driving force behind the expansion of motor vehicle transport in southern Tanganyika and the wider territory. The Indian commercial class quickly adapted to the new political and economic situation in Tanganyika following the First World War. They reorganized their businesses towards British and Kenyan capital, and purchased one-third of the German properties seized by the Allies during the war.<sup>286</sup> Successful merchants diversified their businesses and reinvested in transportation, manufacturing, construction, and land purchases.<sup>287</sup> Indian immigration to Tanganyika doubled between 1921 and 1931 as the legal status for Asians changed from “native” to “non-native.” James R. Brennan explained that the new classification gave Indians a commercial advantage over Africans, who could not legally borrow money nor own individual property without administrative approval.<sup>288</sup> Although European planters, businessmen, and colonial administrators continued to feel antipathy towards Southeast Asians (as during the precolonial and German colonial eras), the colonial state gained a number of advantages by empowering the Indian commercial communities of Tanganyika. On the one hand, they could profit from the decades- to centuries-old trade networks that Indian

---

<sup>285</sup> TNA ACC 16, 4/36, L. Rousham Roberts to the Provincial Commissioner, “Labour Return Records,” 13 March, 4 September, 3 October, and 1 November 1938; and 16 February and 7 December 1939. In December of 1939, Roberts reported that “all of my old labourers and headmen are now planting tobacco” and “apparently going tobacco mad” because of the high prices available.

<sup>286</sup> Martha Spencer Honey, “A History of Indian Merchant Capital and Class Formation in Tanganyika c. 1840-1940” (PhD diss., University of Dar es Salaam, 1982), 222-258; James Brennan, *Taifa: Making Nation and Race in Urban Tanzania*, (Athens, USA: Ohio University Press, 2012), 52; and Kelly, “A Tale of Two Cities,” 71.

<sup>287</sup> Brennan, *Taifa*, 53; and Kelly, “A Tale of Two Cities,” 71.

<sup>288</sup> Brennan, *Taifa*, 53.



wholesalers and retailers had established between the interior and coast. Indian communities also helped to reinforce colonial social and political hierarchies, in which Europeans were at the pinnacle and Africans at the base. Perhaps most importantly, Indian businessmen and intermediaries served as valuable scapegoats for the state when facing international criticism of colonial economic exploitation, as well as African resentment when market economies turned unfavorable as during the Great Depression.<sup>289</sup> The East Africa Commission reported in 1925 that “the bulk of the trade with the natives in East Africa is in the hands of Asiatics, Europeans in the main compromising only Government officials, missionaries, planters, and the higher professional classes.”<sup>290</sup> Over the next decade, Europeans became convinced that Indians would retain their commercial supremacy for the foreseeable future. The Report to the League of Nations in 1939 stated that entrepreneurial Africans had little hope of competing with Indian wholesalers and retailers –

[...] until trade is regarded as a whole time profession and a shrewd business sense is developed after years of practice. At present it is a part-time occupation for a few old men who are without any business sense whatever and are as likely to give away as to sell their wares; the result is failure. Openings in trade are there for Africans but there are few Africans trained to take advantage of them.<sup>291</sup>

When the Tanganyika government tried to curtail Indian commercial dominance by passing discriminatory legislation in the 1920s and 1930s, Indian Muslims and Hindus successfully defended their rights with a number of effective *hartals* – shop closures.<sup>292</sup> The strikes, however, adversely affected Indian-African relations. African consumers resented the shutdowns, which drove up food prices.<sup>293</sup> Relations continued to deteriorate during the depression as Indian middlemen dramatically cut the prices they offered to African producers in response to the collapse of international prices.<sup>294</sup>

---

<sup>289</sup> Ibid., 3 and 34; and Robert G. Gregory, *India and East Africa: A History of Race Relations with the British Empire, 1890-1939* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971), 477.

<sup>290</sup> “Report of the East African Commission,” 5.

<sup>291</sup> *Report to the League of Nations on Tanganyika Territory* (Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 1939).

<sup>292</sup> James R. Brennan, “South Asian Nationalism in an East African Context: The Case of Tanganyika, 1914-1956,” *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East* 19, no.2 (1999): 24-39, 26. *Hartals* occurred in 1923, 1929, 1930, 1932, and 1937. The most successful *hartal* in 1923 lasted for 54 days.

<sup>293</sup> Brennan, “South Asian Nationalism in an East African Context,” 28; and Brennan, *Taifa*, 71. According to Brennan, foodstuffs prices rose from 100 to 300 percent within two weeks of the 1923 *hartal*.

<sup>294</sup> Gregory, *India and East Africa*, 477.

Despite racial tension and discriminatory legislation, Tanganyika's Indian commercial class continued to solidify its control over the territory's economy during the 1930s. Robert G. Gregory estimated that the Indian population controlled 17% of non-African agricultural land, 90% of township property, 80% of cotton and sisal industries, 50% of imports, and 60% of exports during the interwar era.<sup>295</sup> According to Brennan, the Indian merchant community succeeded because it was –

[...] well-capitalized, attuned to working with minimal government support, and well-disposed toward British imperial commerce. They exploited advantages of community and kinship to channel information, goods, and capital between villages, provincial towns, and trading centers in East African and India.<sup>296</sup>

Indian wholesalers and retailers similarly dominated southern Tanganyika's economy. Indian entrepreneurs, including Karimjee Jivanjee and Mathuradas Kalidas owned many of the coastal plantations in Lindi and Mikindani.<sup>297</sup> They formed the backbone of the politically and economical influential Lindi Province Planters' Association and subsequent Lindi Province Sisal Grower's Association.<sup>298</sup> Indian wholesalers and retailers also extended their economic networks into the interior with the support of newly immigrated relatives. The parents of Rasall Hussein S. Dhalla, for instance, came to Tanzania in 1936 to work in their brothers' business in Newala. The couple eventually established their own shop in Newala.<sup>299</sup> Athomani Wadi Mlaponi of Namatumbusi recalled a symbiotic relationship between Indian shopkeepers and African producers outside of Masasi. Indians employed Africans, extended credit, and purchased their produce.<sup>300</sup> In return, Indian retailers and wholesalers financially profited from the commerce.

---

<sup>295</sup> Ibid., 484.

<sup>296</sup> Brennan, *Taifa*, 53.

<sup>297</sup> Mtwara District Book, Volume 1, "Non-Native Estates," 1938; and Kelly, "A Tale of Two Cities," 138-139. Karimjee Jivanjee & Co. allegedly possessed 99-year leases for approximately 93,000 acres of land in the Southern Province at Kapisera, Kisiwa, Mbuo (two locations), Mirumba, and Mtwara (two locations) in 1938. (Kelly, in contrast, reported that the Karimjee Jivanjee possessed 80,000 acres of sisal land from Tanga to Mikindani.) A number of "Arab" land owners were also mentioned, but the size of their properties were not recorded.

<sup>298</sup> BNA FCO 141/17729, Provincial Commissioners' Monthly Newsletters 1930-34. The Lindi Planters' Association dissolved in October 1932. The Lindi Province Sisal Grower's Association was formed in its place, but initially excluded all Indians from membership. The European and Indian sisal interests amalgamated a year later (October 1933) under the same name - Lindi Province Sisal Grower's Association.

<sup>299</sup> Interview with Rasall Hussein S. Dhalla (Lindi, October 2, 2015).

<sup>300</sup> Interview with Athomani Wadi Mlaponi (Masasi, October 8, 2015).

Indian traders were the first to take advantage of the flexibility and speed that motor vehicles offered in order to enhance their control over intra- and interregional trade networks. Following a slump in imports during the depression, the number of vehicles in Tanganyika increased by 60% from 1934 to 1939.<sup>301</sup> By 1939, the Indian population in Tanganyika controlled an estimated 80% of the territory's transportation services, including bus and lorry companies.<sup>302</sup> In the Southern Province, the average number of vehicles on the main road from Lindi to Masasi rose annually from 1935 to 1938.

**Table 3.4 Average Vehicles Per Day on Lindi-Masasi Road, 1935-1938<sup>303</sup>**

Route	1935	1936	1937	1938
Lindi-Mingoyo	8.3	10.3	20.2	26.4
Mingoyo-Mtama	6.8	10.4	26.0	19.1
Mtama-Mahiwa	1.8	12.5	-	-
Mtama-Masasi	N/A	N/A	23.6	34.1
Average for Territory (main roads)	16.4	15.8	17.4	19.2

Provincial Commissioner A.E. Kitching noted in 1936 that “Indian traders have taken full advantage of the opportunities which cheap mechanized mechanical transport has thrown open to them and their activities are extending in an ever-widening circle.”<sup>304</sup> District Officer E.A. Leakey similarly reported that there was “no lack of competition in the motor business” in Mtwara as several Indian merchants ran lorries for hire at a shilling a mile.<sup>305</sup> Four ton lorries were observed “racing up and down” the Songea section from November to December 1938. The tobacco exported from Songea was matched by a rush of

<sup>301</sup> Hofmeier, *Transport and Economic Development in Tanzania*, 63-67. According to John Iliffe, buses and lorries had largely replaced long-distance portage as the primary means of transportation along main roads throughout Tanganyika by the mid-1930s. See Iliffe, *A Modern History of Tanganyika*, 287-88; Jumanne Mkama, “Transportation and Economic Development in Tanzania,” (M.A. Thesis, University of British Columbia, 1968), 16; and Henry Rwamasasa Munyanganizi, “Impact of Rural Feeder Roads on Rural Development: A Case Study of Kilosa District,” (M.S. Thesis, University of Dar es Salaam, 1983), 42.

<sup>302</sup> Gregory, *India and East Africa*, 484.

<sup>303</sup> Compilation of statistics derived from the PWD Annual Reports found at BLCAS 754.14 s.5 Tanganyika Public Works Department Report 1925-1953. The data was obtained from headmen of road maintenance gangs, who counted the number of vehicles that passed. The Director of Public Works acknowledged that the system “cannot be described as thoroughly reliable.” The Lindi-Mahiwa road scored the lowest traffic average in 1934 at the rate of 3.4. Statistics were offered for the Mtama-Masasi section in 1937 because that was the year when the PWD took control over the Lindi-Masasi stretch of the main road. No statistics were collected on the stretch from Masasi to Songea.

<sup>304</sup> DSM, A.E. Kitching, “Southern Province,” *Tanganyika Territory: Annual Report of the Provincial Commissioner on Native Administration for the year 1936* (Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 1937).

<sup>305</sup> Mtwara District Book, E.A. Leakey, “Communication – Motor Transport,” 1938.

imported Indian *duka* (shop) cargo from Lindi.<sup>306</sup> District Officers also noted heavy traffic along the Newala-Mikindani and Newala-Mtwara roads. These secondary routes facilitated the export of agricultural produce from the Newala District. Unlike other roads in the province, there was no reason to close these two district roads during the wet season since they sustained adequate traffic.<sup>307</sup> From 1933 to 1939, the number of Indians applying for trading licenses in Newala tripled.<sup>308</sup> Hussein's family utilized two lorries to export African-produced cashew nuts to Lindi and import commodity goods to their shop in Newala.<sup>309</sup> Motor vehicle transport also enabled Indian merchants to establish *dukas* in "even the remotest villages."<sup>310</sup> The Indian *dukas* and depots impacted rural Africans' trading and mobility patterns. Africans of all ages and both sexes increasingly sold or exchanged their produce for international good at these shops rather than undertaking arduous journeys to the coast.<sup>311</sup> By 1935, motor lorries transported the bulk of African produce from Liwale District, replacing porters and sparing hundreds of individuals "the tiresome annual journey to the coast in search of salt."<sup>312</sup> Officials, like Provincial Commissioner Kitching, applauded the replacement of foot journeys by motor vehicles, believing that the old form of mobility wasted labor and caused food shortages as men left their villages at critical periods in the agricultural year.<sup>313</sup> A growing number of African communities also resettled along the main and district

---

<sup>306</sup> TNA ACC 16, 4/36, L. Rousham Roberts to the Provincial Commissioner, "Labour Return Records," 10 August, 3 October, and 1 November 1938. It is unclear whether "Indian Duka Cargo" indicated imported trade goods originating from Indian stores in the east and/or goods for Indian shops in Songea.

<sup>307</sup> Mtwara District Book, E.A. Leakey, "Communication – Motor Transport," 1938. E.A. Leakey of Mtwara counted over thirty lorries traveling along the Newala-Mikindani road during the harvest season in a twenty-four hour period.

<sup>308</sup> DSM, A.E. Kitching, "Southern Province," *Tanganyika Territory: Annual Report of the Provincial Commissioner for year 1939* (Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 1940).

<sup>309</sup> Interview with Rasall Hussein S. Dhalla, Lindi, Tanzania, October 2, 2015.

<sup>310</sup> DSM, Kitching, "Southern Province," *Annual Report 1936*.

<sup>311</sup> *Ibid.* Liebenow contended that Indian shopkeepers "brought the material culture of the West to the Makonde and in the process offered a more positive incentive to the acceptance of a money economy than that provided by the European tax collector." See Liebenow, *Colonial Rule and Political Development in Tanganyika*, 151.

<sup>312</sup> Kitching, "Southern Province," *Annual Report 1935*.

<sup>313</sup> DSM, A.E. Kitching, "Southern Province," *Tanganyika Territory: Annual Report of the Provincial Commissioner on Native Administration for the year 1934* (Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 1935).

roads to take advantage of the opportunities offered by motor vehicle transport. Kitching considered these voluntary resettlements to be “one of the most remarkable developments of recent years.”<sup>314</sup>

As motor vehicles increasingly transported produce and trade goods across the Southern Province, African migrant laborers also took advantage of the speed motor vehicle transport offered to pursue wage labor employment across district, provincial, and territorial borders. John Iliffe argued that the interwar period intensified the trend in Tanganyika “towards greater reliance on long-distance migrants from peripheral areas unable to meet cash needs by marketing crops or cattle.”<sup>315</sup> While the Nyamwezi, Sumbwa, and Sukuma remained the largest migrant groups in the early 1920s, “migrants came increasingly from remote, peripheral regions” during and after the depression, including the Southern Province.<sup>316</sup> Since there was no system of labor identification in Tanganyika or labor camps in the Southern Province, British officer could not collect accurate statistics about the number of migrant laborers, their point of origin, labor routes, and destination. Migration patterns also fluctuated annually due to labor, agriculture, and market conditions within and beyond the province. Colonial officers, however, were certain that a large proportion of the migrant laborers originated in Masasi, Tunduru, Songea, and northern PEA. An estimated 2,210 contracted laborers and 8,000 non-contracted laborers left Songea District in 1929. The chief Recruiting Agent in Songea – W.J.T. Leeman –forwarded an estimated 2,000 laborers by the end of July during a “good average season” (such as 1929).<sup>317</sup> For the next fifteen years, the number of migrants fluctuated from an estimated 2,500 to 9,500 laborers.<sup>318</sup>

---

<sup>314</sup> Ibid.

<sup>315</sup> Iliffe, *A Modern History of Tanganyika*, 305.

<sup>316</sup> Ibid.

<sup>317</sup> TNA ACC 16, 13/22 Transport of Recruited Labour and Labour Routes, District Commissioner Songea to Provincial Commissioner C.H. Grierson, 16 September 1932; and Grierson to the Chief Secretary, “Transport of Recruited Labourers,” 24 September 1932. Leeman’s name appears sporadically in colonial documents from the 1930s to the 1950s.

<sup>318</sup> TNA ACC 460, 541/18 Recruitment from Portuguese East Africa and from other Colonies and Territories, volume 2, “An Extract from Notes on Southern Province and Native Labour: Labourers Leaving the Songea District in search of work,” 1935.

**Table 3.5 “Labourers Leaving the Songea District in search of work”<sup>319</sup>**

Year	Contract Labor	Non-contract Labor	Immigrant Labour in transit (estimate)
1929	2,240	8,000	2,000
1930	1,573	8,000	2,000
1931	319	5,000	800
1932	654	4,500	400
1933	1,010	1,500	500
1934	59	2,000	600
1935	577	2,500	1,000

Thousands of men also migrated from Tunduru District because there was no valuable produce or local paid employment available.<sup>320</sup> The estimated 4,000 men who left Tunduru District in 1930 caused a great deal of alarm within the provincial administration, which correlated manpower shortages with recurrent famines and political instability in the district.<sup>321</sup> However, over half the migrant laborers that moved through the Southern Province originated from PEA. By the 1930s, the annual influx of laborers from PEA was no longer a source of tension between the British and Portuguese administrations. Both sides recognized that the Ruvuma River served as a border on paper only:

The boundary is an administrative but not an ethnologic frontier and the country on either side is populated by natives who are closely connected racially and have many interests in common. Movements of people across the boundary are inevitable in the circumstances and in practice take place on a considerable scale but there rarely give rise to any difficulties and relations with officers of the Portuguese Government have always been of the most cordial nature. The exercise of tolerance and forbearance is necessary from time to time on either side of the frontier, particularly among the native authorities, but this always suffices and nothing in the nature of an incident ever occurs.<sup>322</sup>

District officers initially viewed the PEA migrants with disapproval verging on hostility. Officers complained that immigrants stole local food and jobs, failed to pay taxes, and illegally smuggled produce to avoid heavy PEA export duties. Provincial Commissioner Grierson noted that migrant laborers often

<sup>319</sup> TNA ACC 460, 541/18, vol. 2, “An Extract from Notes on Southern Province and Native Labour,” 45.

<sup>320</sup> Becker, “A social history of Southeast Tanzania,” 173.

<sup>321</sup> TNA ACC 16, 13/17, “Labour Recruiting in Tunduru,” 25 April 1931. Felicitas Becker reported that Tunduru had 7,864 taxpayers in 1920, “i.e. able-bodied men such as the sisal estates hired.” Although she suspected that the total male population had risen by 1931, four thousand men departing the district remained a significant number. Becker also argued that administrative opinions differed regarding the degree to which migrant labor harmed local agriculture. See Becker, “A social history of Southeast Tanzania,” 173.

<sup>322</sup> DSM, Kitching, “Southern Province,” *Annual Report 1936*. Two years later, Kitching repeated that PEA immigrations were permitted by the Portuguese Government “without hindrance.” He credited the “tolerant and accommodating attitude which their officers adopt in their matter that so extensive a boundary causes so little administrative difficulty.”

traveled with “their womenfolk and dogs, doing a few weeks’ work at one plantation, and then passing further afield, submitting themselves to no control and paying no dues.”<sup>323</sup> He also reported in October 1931 that the Wamakonde in Tanganyika were “greatly disturbed, as numerous thefts and burglaries have occurred there recently.”<sup>324</sup> The Chief Secretary, however, informed the Provincial Commissioner that it was “desirable” for “alien Natives” to settle in the Southern Province and/or enter into contracts to work in the province or other regions of Tanganyika.<sup>325</sup> The southern provincial administration’s disfavor and suspicion of the PEA immigrants vanished when it became evident that the migrants provided a crucial labor reservoir for the southern economy.<sup>326</sup> Provincial Commissioner A.E. Kitching reported in 1933,

The Mawia have their critics and they are no doubt an unattractive and occasionally a tiresome feature in the administrative landscape, but in the present circumstances they are very valuable and, indeed, an almost indispensable addition to the economic resources of the Province.<sup>327</sup>

Plantation owners and industries in southern Tanganyika faced growing competition from plantations in the Tanga, Mahenge, and Moshi Provinces in hiring PEA and Tanganyika laborers. By the mid-1930s, recruiters from estates in Musoma, Tanga, Moshi, and Mbeya regularly used motor vehicles to transport laborers from villages in the south.<sup>328</sup> Motor vehicles cut in half the traditional nine to ten weeks it took laborers to travel to northern plantations by foot.<sup>329</sup> Officials remarked that laborers transported by lorries arrived at their employment “as fit and strong as when they left their villages and not, as formerly, in a state of physical and nervous exhaustion.”<sup>330</sup>

---

<sup>323</sup> DSM, Grierson, “Lindi Province,” *Annual Report 1931*.

<sup>324</sup> BNA FCO 141/17729, Provincial Commissioner C.H. Grierson to Chief Secretary, 12 October 1931.

<sup>325</sup> TNA ACC 16, 13/60, L.S. Waterall (Chief Secretary) to Provincial Commissioner, February 1932, 4.

<sup>326</sup> BNA FCO 141/17729, Grierson to the Chief Secretary, 9 September 1930, 23 February 1933, and 4 April 1933; TNA ACC 16, 13/60, Lindi Provincial Commissioner to Chief Secretary, January 1932.

<sup>327</sup> TNA ACC 16, 13/25 Annual Labour Reports, “Lindi Province Annual Report of Labour 1933,” Acting Provincial Commissioner (Southern Province), 27 January 1934.

<sup>328</sup> DSM, Kitching, “Southern Province,” *Annual Report 1936*.

<sup>329</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>330</sup> *ibid.* In the north, officials expressed concerns about the new migrants that mirrored concerns expressed earlier in the southern districts. The Tanga Labour Officer reported that P.E.A. laborers were “notorious thieves” who raided plantations at night. The District Officers of Tanga, Korogwe, and Pangani agreed with the Labour Officer’s assessment that the immigrants were “quiet undisciplined and wander about at will from estate to estate. [...] I look upon these natives without proper control as being a decided danger to law and order.” The Labor Officer, however, failed in his attempt to gain administrative support in stopping the flow of immigrant labor. A.E. Kitching reported that it was “administratively impracticable to restrict the movements of these immigrants. Further, any

Poor road conditions, which inhibited transport in the rainy season and drove up transport costs, remained the main problem with motor transport. The average cost of transporting migrant laborers (per head) by motor vehicle, rail, and/or steamer from the Southern Province to plantations in the Eastern and Tanga Provinces were the highest recorded in the Territory in 1931/32.<sup>331</sup>

**Table 3.6 Comparative Transport Rates (rail, automobile, and/or steamer) for Laborers, 1931-32**

From	To Lindi* Shs. Cts.	To Mikindani* Shs. Cts.	To Morogoro Shs. Cts.	To Dar es Salaam Shs. Cts.	To Handeni Shs. Cts.	To Pangani Shs. Cts.	To Tanga Shs. Cts.
<b>Songea</b>	19 05	20 50	22 65	26 35	27 45	30 65	31 75
<b>Tunduru</b>	10 85	12 30	30 95	34 65	35 75	38 95	40 05
<b>Masasi</b>	4 55	6 00	-	-	-	-	-
Tukuyu	-	-	22 60	26 30	27 40	30 60	31 70
Njombe	-	-	17 90	25 60	22 70	25 90	27 00
Mwanza	-	-	14 70	16 90	20 80	24 00	25 10
Tabora	-	-	10 40	12 60	16 50	19 70	20 80
Singida	-	-	10 00	12 30	15 00	18 20	19 30
Iringa	-	-	9 95	13 60	14 75	17 95	19 05

\* "Motor transport throughout. Motor road to Mikindani via Mingoyo."

Recognizing that the quick and efficient transport of migrant laborers was essential to the provincial and territorial economy, the southern provincial administrations consulted Carnegie Browne of TTCo in 1932 about the best and cheapest routes to transport migrant laborers by automobile from Masasi, Tunduru, and Songea to plantations in Tanga. He suggested two options, but he believed that neither was practical. The first required the transport of recruits eastward along the Lindi-Songea road to the coast, and then shipping them to Tanga. This option was too expensive. The second option required the recruits to be driven westward to Songea and then north via Mahenge, Ifakara, and Korogwe. They would travel the rest of the way by rail. Carnegie Browne did not favor this option,

---

attempts to do so would be received with howls of protest from the Tanganyika Sisal Growers Association." The Tanganyika Labour Commissioner agreed and offered the half-hearted suggestion for the Tanga Labour Officer to try and "dissuade managers of estates from accepting this labour, though how far you are likely to be successful, you are best able to judge." See TNA ACC 460, 541/18/Vol. 2, August-October 1940.

<sup>331</sup> TNA ACC 16, 13/22, "Transport of Labour," 1933. The chart listed above is an abbreviated version from the ones found in the file. A total of sixteen places of origin, eight destinations in the Eastern Province, and eight destinations in the Tanga Province were listed with fares. According to the document, the "railway and steamer fares are calculated at three-quarters of the third class fare (concession rate granted to batches of ten or more persons), and motor transport rates at five cents per mile per person." The statistics do not give an indication of the percentage of each journey that was conducted by rail, road, or steamer.



[...] on account of the enormous distance, and on account of the fact that lorries, or ‘buses’ or even tractor with train of trailers would be unladen for most of the return journey. Furthermore the road from Songea to Mahenge is too arduous for the maintenance of anything but a most expensive service.<sup>332</sup>

The customary transport of laborers’ wives and families would have further increased costs for labor recruiters and estate owners. The impracticality of transporting laborers by road, however, did not outweigh TTCo’s ambitions to turn a profit. The company offered to drive laborers from Songea to Lindi and Tunduru to Lindi under a government contract for Shs. 10/- and Shs. 7.50 per person respectively.<sup>333</sup> The 1930s ultimately witnessed rising competition between transportation firms and labor recruiters over the right to transport laborers. The Acting District Officer of Songea observed the disadvantage transport companies faced in having to comply with the Traffic Ordinance and Traffic Rules of 1932. Whereas companies needed a license to transport passengers and could not drive more than 15 miles per hour, a labor recruiter could “put 40 persons or more on board [the exact same vehicle] and drive at 50 miles an hour and yet not commit any offence.”<sup>334</sup> The Acting D.O. advocated easing traffic restrictions in 1937 so as to alleviate the territory’s labor difficulties:

I would put forward the opinion that the solution of the labour problem in this Territory lies in rapid, easy and cheap transport to and from the labourer’s homes and the employment areas with as great a freedom as possible from obnoxious and irritating restrictions, but the interest of the labourers should be protected against the use of unsatisfactory and dangerous vehicles whether by transport companies, estates or labour recruiters.<sup>335</sup>

Provincial Commissioner Kitching similarly advocated the introduction of cheap motor transport for contracted and independent laborers.<sup>336</sup>

---

<sup>332</sup> TNA ACC 16, 13/22, Tanganyika Transport Company’s Managing Director (Carnegie-Brown) to Lindi Provincial Commissioner, 14 September 1932.

<sup>333</sup> Ibid. The company would not offer services from Masasi to Lindi because it was supposedly “easy walking distance.” At the time, laborers were occasionally transported from Songea to Kikwetu Estate in Lindi at a cost of Shs. 5/- per person. There was no transport firm in Songea with the equipment to conduct regular transport operations.

<sup>334</sup> TNA ACC 16, 13/22, “Transport of Labourers. Traffic Ordinance 1932 and Traffic Rules 1932,” Acting District Officer Songea to Provincial Commissioner, 19 February 1937. Recruiters exploited the clause stipulating that individuals could transport “personal servants, employees or gratuitous invitees” without need of a license.

<sup>335</sup> Ibid.

<sup>336</sup> DSM, Kitching, “Southern Province,” *Annual Report 1937*.

In 1938, Kitching reported that all contracted and many independent migrant laborers from southern Tanganyika insisted upon motorized transport for themselves and their families on their outward and homeward journeys.<sup>337</sup> When assessing the role of motor vehicle transport in Tanganyika, the Central Development Committee of 1939 concluded that,

[...] road transport is the most intimate to man's life and his activities and the framework on which economic development is erected. Without it no increased production is advantageous, no more intensified form of transport is necessary, no accumulation of wealth is obtainable, and no improvement in social condition is possible. It forms the bridge between labour and its reward.<sup>338</sup>

British officers, however, were unable to effectively regulate the new form of mobility used by traders, laborers, and agricultural producers. Migrant laborers chose the location, duration, and conditions of their employment based upon their knowledge of labor markets and the needs of their personal economy, rather than the desires of the colonial state or private recruiters. Despite their hideous conditions, the Lindi-Songea main road and various district roads of the Southern Province were increasingly utilized as avenues of opportunity and prosperity for Indian traders, African cultivators, and migrant laborers moving across district, provincial, and territorial borders.

## Conclusion

Historians have viewed the interwar era as the period when southern Tanganyika's isolation and impoverishment solidified.<sup>339</sup> Instability defined life on both sides of the Ruvuma border in the immediate aftermath of the First World War. Exploitation and violence committed by European officers and African police in northern PEA drove thousands of individuals across the Ruvuma border into Tanganyika. Once there, they encountered an underfunded, undermanned, and inexperienced British administration struggling to rebuild the regional economy and impose law and order. Numerous abuses were committed in southern Tanganyika as the administration attempted to stimulate the regional economy and strengthen

---

<sup>337</sup> DSM, Kitching, "Southern Province," *Annual Report 1938*.

<sup>338</sup> Tanganyika, *Report of the Central Development Committee: Roads*, (Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 1939), 5.

<sup>339</sup> Liebenow, *Colonial Rule and Political Development*, 88; Kelly, "A Tale of Two Cities," 14-16; and Felicitas Becker, "Sudden Disaster and Slow Change: Maji Maji and the Long-Term History of Southeast Tanzania," in *Maji Maji: Lifting the Fog of War*, eds. James Giblin and Jamie Monson (Boston: Brill, 2010): 295-321. Becker contended that the first two and a half decades of British rule entrenched the "status of the southeast as a backwater" (302-303).

colonial authority through infrastructure “development” schemes. Unknown numbers of Africans were forced to construct roads despite pressures from the ILO and League of Nations to stop compulsory labor practices in the 1920s and 1930s. While some Africans utilized road construction to supplement household production, many came to view roads as symbols of colonial oppression. Joshua Grace argued that the use of compulsory road labor in Tanganyika transformed roads,

[...] from a technology through which Africans could be turned into controllable, wage earning, and tax-paying subjects into hated sites of forced labor. [...] First touted as an answer to African slavery by abolitionist in the 1870s, in oral histories, colonial road labor is recalled as yet another form of enslavement.<sup>340</sup>

The use of compulsory labor ultimately failed to rectify the major deficiencies in the southern roadways. The PWD and private contractors similarly failed to implement year-round work programs to improve the region’s road system to an all-weather, motorable standard. While many regions in Tanganyika suffered from inadequate infrastructure during the interwar era, the dilapidated roads of the Southern Province became a powerful symbol of the region’s isolation and poverty.<sup>341</sup> The lack of an all-weather road from Lindi to Dar es Salaam, in particular, came to represent the region’s literal and metaphysical disconnection from the rest of the territory. As Pekka Seppälä explained, the lack of roads was interpreted as a lack of modernity; differentiating the active “modern” people of Dar es Salaam and northern Tanganyika from the passive, “traditional” people of the southern periphery.<sup>342</sup>

When examining the history of road transportation in southern Tanganyika, however, one recognizes that the interwar era was not simply a period of intensified isolation and impoverishment. While southern Tanganyika was certainly isolated from and neglected by the colonial state, it remained part of a dynamic borderland. Africans, Asians, and Europeans residing in the borderland embraced and

---

<sup>340</sup> Grace, “Modernization *Bubu*,” 102.

<sup>341</sup> Tanganyika, *Report of the Central Development Committee: Roads*, 5. The Central Development Committee of 1939 determined that fluctuations in spending and/or the utter lack of adequate government funding prevented a well-maintained and integrated road network from being systematically constructed throughout the Territory: “[...] staffs have been collected and dispersed, organizations have been built up and broken down, the lessons of local conditions and construction have been learned and the knowledge dissipated, and the quality of the work has suffered from the haste of construction during the various spasms.”

<sup>342</sup> Pekka Seppälä and Bertha Koda, eds., *The Making of a Periphery: Economic Development and Cultural Encounters in Southern Tanzania* (Uppsala, Sweden: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 1998), 11.

exploited the lack of state intervention and services to their advantage. Ex-soldiers (like “Dynamite Dan” and the nine poachers) exploited the lawlessness of the border for their personal wealth. Private contractors (like TTCo and Roberts) profited from the lack of state-funded road construction and transportation services. They helped construct and maintain the main transportation artery of the south – the Lindi-Songea main road – while Indian wholesalers and retailers expanded the motor vehicle transportation sector in order to strengthen their dominance over intra- and inter-regional trade networks. African cultivators and migrant laborers from northern PEA and southern Tanganyika exploited the lack of border enforcement, the growing network of Indian *dukas*, and vehicle transportation services to pursue socioeconomic opportunities across provincial and territorial borders. The southern roadways were simultaneously and paradoxically symbols of the southern Tanganyika’s alleged backwardness and resilience. The roads were poor, yet they served as integral life-lines for wholesalers, retailers, migrant laborers, and producers. The interwar era crystalized negative perceptions of southern Tanganyika among outsiders, while at the same time the autonomy and self-reliance of the local populace, private firms, and district administrators were strengthened. As southern Tanganyika shifted from a marginalized, peripheral borderland of the British Empire to a region at the heart of Britain’s “second colonial occupation” after the Second World War, these independent firms and entrepreneurs often prospered – building upon their existing networks with local communities, traders, and colonial officers.

#### **Chapter 4**

### **World War II and Postwar Colonial Development in Southern Tanganyika (1939-1954)**

The onset of the Second World War signaled a significant shift in British colonial policy as the state took a more active and interventionist approach towards trade, agricultural production, education, health, and labor throughout the British Empire. Southern Tanganyika, however, remained a neglected periphery that received minimal funding from a central administration prioritizing the needs of more lucrative and better connected provinces. The Tanganyika government refused to allocate resources to improve the region's infrastructure despite repeated petitions from the southern provincial administration and private sector. Scrutiny of private road construction contractors, instead, intensified and threatened to undermine the cooperative state-civilian relationship that enabled the restoration and improvement of the southern infrastructure and economy during the interwar era. After struggling through another war, southern Tanganyika drew attention as the British Empire entered into a new era of colonial development. The postwar British state envisioned and utilized colonial development as a way to rebuild the national economy and justify the continuance of imperialism. Tanganyika and its southern borderland became the central targets of one of the largest development schemes attempted in the Empire, the East African Groundnut Scheme. Millions of pounds were invested to transform the agricultural and transportation landscape of Tanganyika through mechanized clearing and construction techniques. The construction of a new port and railway in southern Tanganyika attracted private investors, who sought to exploit the region's untapped agricultural, timber, water, and mineral resources.

The Groundnut Scheme and many of the other development programs implemented in the "Cinderella Province" during the 1950s ended in failure. A central reason why the schemes did not succeed was because the Tanganyika government and development contractors failed to accurately identify and rectify southern Tanganyika's transportation problems. The British state and development planners invested in the Southern Province Railway and Mtwara port without devising strategies to deal with the adverse environmental conditions and highly mobile labor force that threatened to undermine both projects. They also disregarded the immense challenges of reorienting the southern economy around

new transportation facilities when the region's migrant laborers, traders, and cultivators were accustomed to utilizing road transportation to pursue opportunities within and beyond the Ruvuma borderland. The state invested millions of pounds into a poorly designed, constructed, and maintained railway, while allowing the roads to gradually deteriorate under the strain of hundreds of vehicles and thousands of tons of cargo. The hybrid system of road development collapsed as the British state relied upon new British contractors to maintain roads in a region that they neither knew nor cared for, especially once it became apparent that the Groundnut Scheme was a failure. The collapse of the Groundnut Scheme and Southern Province Railway confirmed to outsiders that southern Tanganyika was incapable of "development." In reality, the state failed because it ignored and/or overlooked local initiative and knowledge. The inability of the state to transform southern Tanganyika's transportation infrastructure, however, unexpectedly created an opportunity for an ambitious Indian family to build one of the largest road transportation firms in the Territory.

### **The Second World War in Southern Tanganyika: Increased State Intervention and Deteriorating Transportation Infrastructure**

When Prime Minister Winston Churchill declared war with Germany on September 3, 1939, Governor Mark Young immediately enacted war measures in Tanganyika. Arrests of all male enemy nationals commenced.<sup>1</sup> The colonial government called up the military reserves, increased police strength, and enacted a host of special ordinances.<sup>2</sup> As the war progressed and the Allies suffered defeats in Southeast Asia, British perceptions of the colonies and their role within the Empire underwent significant changes. The British state embraced a highly interventionist approach towards colonial

---

<sup>1</sup> BNA CO 323/1654/82 Tanganyika Territory: Measures taken WWII, Governor Mark Young to Malcolm MacDonald, Secretary of State for the Colonies, 15 September 1939. For the remainder of this chapter, the Secretary of State for the Colonies will be referred to as S.O.S. in the footnotes.

<sup>2</sup> The "Road Transport Order, 1939," for instance, gave the Road Controller (Director of Public Works and Transport) authority to requisition motor vehicles for government service. He also controlled all manufacturing, purchasing, importing, exporting, delivery, or other dealings involving motor vehicles in the territory. The "Control of Food-stuffs (Distribution, Use and Consumption) Order, 1939" likewise empowered the Food Controller (Director of Agriculture) to oversee the selling and distribution of foodstuffs. The Food Controller also set maximum retail and wholesale prices for raw, preserved, or manufactured foodstuffs. See BNA CO 323/1654/82, C.Y. Stevenson, Director of Works and Road Transport, Road Transport Order, 1939, 26 August 1939; A.J. Wakefield, "Control of Food-stuffs (Distribution, Use and Consumption) Order, 1939," 28 July 1939; and A.J. Wakefield, "The Control of Prices Order, 1939," 26 August 1939.

production, trade controls, coordination of money payments, bulk purchase agreements, imperial preference, and sterling usage throughout the Empire.<sup>3</sup> Tanganyika and the other colonies endured higher consumer prices and rationing of resources as a result of the Secretary of State for the Colonies ordering the extension of import controls in 1941.<sup>4</sup> People throughout Tanganyika could not attain desirable commodities, such as “cooking pots, enameled ware, knives, lamps, and so forth, up to and including bicycles and sewing machines [...]; piece goods, expensive and shoddy, alone formed a limited attraction.”<sup>5</sup> The Tanganyika government instituted a system of price controls to prevent the “unnecessary increase in prices” and minimize profiteering. The controls were partially successful. There was not a dearth of essential goods in southern Tanganyika as during the First World War when most Africans were reduced to bark cloth.<sup>6</sup> The price of some commodities (like cloth), however, skyrocketed.<sup>7</sup> As import prices rose, the prices the state paid for exports from the territory fell.<sup>8</sup> Tax collections suffered and the

---

<sup>3</sup> J.M. Lee and Martin Petter, *The Colonial Office, War and Development Policy* (London: M.T. Smith for the Institute for Commonwealth Studies, 1982); and Michael Cowen and Nicholas Westcott, “British Imperial Economic Policy During the War” in *Africa and the Second World War*, eds. David Killingray and Richard Rathbone (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1986): 20-67. The sterling became the major international currency with Britain’s ascension as the world’s premier creditor and greatest exporter of new capital in the 19<sup>th</sup> century. After the collapse of the gold standard during the Great Depression, the British created the Sterling Bloc/Area with its dominions and dependent colonies. The Sterling Bloc was intended to maintain the sterling as a stable currency. The Bloc also acted as a mechanism to preserve Britain’s access to overseas markets and sources of supplies. In order to defend its currency against the dollar, the British instituted a system of exchange restrictions that limited expenditure in and imports from the Dollar Area. For more information about the Sterling Bloc, see Allister Hinds, *Britain’s Sterling Colonial Policy and Decolonization, 1939-1958* (Westport, CT, USA: Greenwood Press, 2001).

<sup>4</sup> BNA CO 691/184/12 Tanganyika Provincial Commissioners Conferences 1940-42, “Provincial Commissioner’s Conference, Dar es Salaam, 12<sup>th</sup>-16<sup>th</sup> May 1941,” 21.

<sup>5</sup> BNA CO 822/130/2 Labour: Report by Orde-Browne, Major G. St. J. Orde Browne, “Labour Conditions in East Africa,” (London: His Majesty’s Press, 1946). Orde Browne reported that thefts of stores and houses became common as goods became scarcer.

<sup>6</sup> DSM, L.H.L. Foster, “Southern Province,” *Tanganyika Territory: Annual Report of Provincial Commissioner on Native Administration for the year 1941* (Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 1942), 40. The price of cloth increased 100% by 1941. Foster used the exorbitant cloth prices as justification for not increasing taxation rates in the Southern Province in 1944. See BNA CO 691/184/13 Tanganyika Provincial Commissioners Conferences 1943, “Provincial Commissioner’s Conference, Dar es Salaam, 23<sup>rd</sup>-27<sup>th</sup> August 1943,” 19.

<sup>7</sup> BNA CO 691/184/12, “Provincial Commissioner’s Conference, Dar es Salaam, 12<sup>th</sup>-16<sup>th</sup> May 1941,” 21. The importation of essential foods from the United Kingdom was also controlled. For statistics and debates about Tanganyika’s monthly allocations and average annual imports, see BNA CO 852/327/3 Food Supplies Tanganyika Territory, 1940.

<sup>8</sup> DSM, A.E. Kitching, “Southern Province,” *Annual Reports of the Provincial Commissioners for the year 1940* (Dar es Salaam Government Printer, 1941).

territorial revenue dried up, resulting in drastic cuts in funding and staff.<sup>9</sup> The government minimally invested in regions with clear military strategic importance or the potential to generate significant profits in the form of cash crops and mineral extraction. Southern Tanganyika was not a priority, despite serving as a vital labor reservoir and food producing region – or the “Granary of the Territory.”<sup>10</sup> Former British Officer Charles Innes Meek offered a bleak assessment of the Southern Province and its capital of Lindi during the war.<sup>11</sup> As Meek offloaded from the T.R.S. *Azania* as a new cadet in July 1941, he immediately “understood the looks of commiseration” he received in Dar es Salaam when he named his post.<sup>12</sup> Lindi was “a dump”:

A squalid little African township, a handful of Indian shops with little to sell as wartime shortages got worse; a fringe of European houses along an unappetising beach and some more straggling up the hill behind; a seedy little hotel and a club with a single tennis court and a parched nine-hole golf course; that was it.<sup>13</sup>

The Southern Province’s isolation and impoverishment intensified during World War II. The hybrid system of road development created during the interwar era began to crumble as conflict mounted between the central state in Dar es Salaam, the southern provincial administration, local employers, and road construction firms. The southern administration and private sector fought against transportation policies issued by the central administration that threatened to cripple the regional economy. As officers and employers demanded that the state invest in the southern infrastructure, the Public Works Department (PWD) turned against the private firms that maintained the Lindi-Songea main road. The regional

---

<sup>9</sup> TNA Native Affairs 28887/5 Produce Marketing Under War Conditions Southern Province, Lindi Provincial Commissioner to Chief Secretary, 25 July 1940 to 22 October 1940.

<sup>10</sup> BNA CO 691/133/6 Alleviation of Famine Relief in Lindi Province 1933, Governor’s Deputy D.J. Jardine to Sir Philip Cunliffe-Lister (S.O.S.), “An Extract From a Memorandum by Mr. K. Latham, Senior Agricultural Officer, Regarding Recurrent Food-Shortages in Certain Parts of the Lindi Province,” 19 October 1933; and DSM, A.E. Kitching, “Southern Province,” *Annual Reports of the Provincial Commissioners for the year 1939* (Dar es Salaam Government Printer, 1940).

<sup>11</sup> Charles Innes Meek, *Brief Authority: A Memoir of Colonial Administration in Tanganyika*, ed. Innes Meek (London: Radcliffe Press, 2011).

<sup>12</sup> Meek, *Brief Authority*, 33.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.* According to Meek, the club was the center of the British community in Lindi: “That was where we got our exercise, had our evening drink, ran a monthly dance, but above all where we gathered at six each evening to listen to the BBC and news of the war” (41).



economy and infrastructure suffered as the cooperative relationship between the state and private enterprises unraveled.

Relations first began to sour when the central administration imposed a territorial-wide transportation policy in 1941 to reduce petrol consumption and the “wear and tear on motor vehicles.”<sup>14</sup> The number of private and public vehicles in Tanganyika had risen steadily since the Great Depression.

**Table 4.1 Licensed Vehicles in Tanganyika Territory<sup>15</sup>**

Year	Motor Cycles	Taxi Cabs	Other Cars	Total Cars	Public Service Vehicles	Other Vehicles	Total Lorries
1933	510	84	1,630	<b>1,714</b>	187	938	<b>1,125</b>
1934	483	106	1,758	<b>1,864</b>	239	1,040	<b>1,279</b>
1935	436	112	1,981	<b>2,093</b>	283	1,212	<b>1,505</b>
1936	424	118	2,296	<b>2,414</b>	290	1,387	<b>1,677</b>
1937	448	N/A	N/A	<b>2,703</b>	N/A	N/A	<b>1,863</b>
1938	491	89	2,864	<b>2,953</b>	311	1,420	<b>1,731</b>
1939	490	156	2,812	<b>2,968</b>	311	1,273	<b>1,584</b>
1940	403	76	2,661	<b>2,737</b>	330	976	<b>1,306</b>
1941	373	125	2,533	<b>2,660</b>	293	1,004	<b>1,297</b>
1942	370	116	2,264	<b>2,380</b>	179	1,089	<b>1,268</b>
1943	345	40	2,235	<b>2,275</b>	144	1,093	<b>1,227</b>

Although motorcars and cycles were looked upon as “necessities in the business and private life of the community,” they consumed large quantities of petrol and rubber needed for the war.<sup>16</sup> Under the new

<sup>14</sup> TNA ACC 16 Mtwaru, 4/9 Communication, Roads: Closing and Opening of Roads and General Instructions, Volume 2, Acting Director of Public Works (C.H. Reynolds) to the Acting Chief Secretary, 23 September 1927; and District Officer Lindi to the Provincial Commissioner, “Closing Roads,” 6 December 1927. Restrictions on road traffic were not unique wartime measures. As early as 1927, the Director of Public Works and Chief Secretary of the Government ordered restrictions on motor lorry traffic during the wet season throughout the Territory. Under the Highway Ordinance of 1932, the colonial state had the power to limit the weight of vehicles along certain roadways and restrict or entirely prohibit any or all classes of vehicular traffic in order to preserve and protect road surfaces. Provincial officers published advance notices about the location and duration of these closures at the *bomas*, post offices, government notice boards, etc.

<sup>15</sup> J.R. Farquharson, *Tanganyika Transport A Review* (Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 1945), 17. Michael Havinden and David Meredith reported that the volume of British motor vehicles imported to Tanganyika declined from 1,147 in 1938 to 223 (1942) and 134 (1944). Imports rebounded the following two years, reaching 500 (1945) and 757 (1946). Kenya witnessed similar ebbs and flows with their vehicle imports; dropping from 3,407 (1938) to 767 (1942), 874 (1943), 913 (1944), 371 (1945), and 1,716 (1946). (See Michael Havinden and David Meredith, *Colonialism and Development: Britain and its Tropical Colonies, 1850-1960* (London: Routledge, 1993), 210.) The most popular British truck in Tanganyika was the Bedford. There was also an agent for the British Austin. A growing number of agents in Tanganyika, however, were selling the “more popular” American Chevrolet and Dodge trucks. Director of Public Works, McLuckie, found the Territory’s motor transport industry “unhealthy” in 1940 because it was “largely in the hands of the American manufactures.” See TNA F2 (Customs and Trade), 25989 Encouragement of British Motor Manufacturers, Director of Public Works McLuckie to Surridge, 29 April 1940.

<sup>16</sup> Farquharson, *Tanganyika Transport A Review*, 17.

transportation policy, only vehicles with a valid permit could travel along the Lindi-Songea main road. District Officers could not issue petrol permits for the carriage of goods coastwise by automobile except during the rainy season.<sup>17</sup> Any person caught traveling without a permit was liable to steep fines ranging from three hundred to five hundred shillings or imprisonment up to three months per infraction.<sup>18</sup> Road traffic was redirected towards coastal steamship services. The Tanganyika government arranged for the T.R.S. *Azania* to run fortnightly services from Dar es Salaam and Mafia to the three southern ports in 1941. Provincial Commissioner L.H.L. Foster sent a confidential letter ordering the District Commissioners in Lindi, Kilwa, and Mikindani “to see to it that *Azania* is employed to the fullest possible extent for the transport of government and Native Treasury personnel and stores. You must also do your utmost to persuade merchants to use the services.”<sup>19</sup>

The central administration’s transportation policy was a complete failure. Local merchants refused to use the *Azania* because the steam line refused to give merchants a customary 10% rebate.<sup>20</sup> The permit system, in turn, could not be enforced due to a lack of personnel. The Senior Agricultural Officer reported that local traders “while politely accepting the permits, generally went about their own affairs as they pleased.”<sup>21</sup> Even if local merchants had reconsidered using steamers, they were unlikely to find any in the southern ports after 1941. The Admiralty ordered the suspension of regular steamer services to the south in 1942 in order to support Tanga-Dar es Salaam railway traffic. Provincial Commissioner Foster reported that the infrequent and erratic nature of the coastal services caused a “considerable loss of

---

<sup>17</sup> TNA 16, 4/9/Vol. 2, “Warning of Restriction of Traffic on Highways,” Road Authority to Public Works Department (Lindi), 3 December 1942 and 30 November 1944. These permits were for one way journeys only. Restrictions were also issued for specific sections of highways throughout the Southern Province.

<sup>18</sup> Ibid. The policy stated: “in the case of first conviction to a fine not exceeding three hundred shillings or imprisonment with or without hard labour for a term not exceeding one month and in the case of a second or subsequent conviction to a fine not exceeding five hundred shillings or imprisonment with or without hard labour for a term not exceeding three months.”

<sup>19</sup> TNA ACC 16, 4/10 Government Steamer Services (Lindi), L.H.L. Foster (Provincial Commissioner) to the District Commissioners of Lindi, Kilwa, and Mikindani, 2 September 1941.

<sup>20</sup> TNA ACC 16, 4/10, District Commissioner Lindi to Provincial Commissioner, 2 September 1941; and General Manager’s Office to Provincial Commissioner, 27 October 1941.

<sup>21</sup> DSM, L.A.W. Vickers-Haviland, “Southern Province,” *Tanganyika Territory: Annual Reports of the Provincial Commissioners* for the year 1943 (Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 1944).

efficiency” throughout the province.<sup>22</sup> Approximately 105 tons of groundnuts intended for the Economic Control Board rotted at the customs house at Mikindani port because a steamer never arrived. *Mtama* (sorghum) supplies urgently required for famine relief in the Central Province were similarly delayed. The Southern Province was prepared to export 35,000 tons of produce in 1942 – 13,000 tons more than in 1941 – but there was nowhere for it go. With limited storage facilities, dhows worked at “full capacity” to export produce within and beyond the province while also fulfilling local needs. As the Southern Province struggled to export produce, it also suffered from a lack of essential imports. Kilwa reported that erratic shipping in 1943 and 1944 caused chronic shortages on flour, sugar, ghee, wheat, tea, and cigarettes. The Kilwa Merchant Syndicate was particularly frustrated when their shipment of Indian textiles arrived two months late (September 1944). The Syndicate tried to get a petrol permit, but the Economic Control Board refused the application, arguing that the textiles would eventually be sent by the *Azania*. The decision sent repercussion throughout the provincial economy, as coastal merchants were short of money at the beginning of the trade season.<sup>23</sup> The failing transportation system similarly undermined the Tanganyika Sisal Growers’ Association’s (TSGA) operations:

Traveling by road is objected to by the Authorities on the grounds of consumption of petrol, wear and tears of tyres, while sea facilities are spasmodic and that too with limited passenger accommodation.<sup>24</sup>

Although it was apparent that mechanized road transportation was the only reliable form of mobility available in the Southern Province (besides foot traffic), the central administration refused to invest in road maintenance or improvement. There were no metaled roads in the province and practically

---

<sup>22</sup> TNA ACC 16, 4/10, Provincial Commissioner L.H.L. Foster to Chief Secretary, 13 January 1943, 34.

<sup>23</sup> The conditions did not improve in 1945. Kilwa continued to suffer shortages because the *Tayari* refused to anchor. Provincial Commissioner J. Rooke Johnston reported that the ship did not stop in Kilwa or Kilwa Kisiwani because it did not want to lose “one penny” of its “fabulous profits.” The Central Civil Depot, meanwhile, was overfilled with sisal and military recruits waiting to be sent north. See BNA FCO 141/17730 Tanganyika: Southern Province: Provincial Commissioner’s Monthly Newsletter 1944-1955, J. Rooke Johnston to Chief Secretary, 3 August 1945.

<sup>24</sup> TNA ACC 16, 4/11 Coastal Shipping Services, Tanganyika Sisal Growers Association to the Provincial Commissioner, 3 December 1943, 21.

all roads and bridges were closed during the rains.<sup>25</sup> The only “all-weather” road was the Lindi-Masasi section of the main road, but it too frequently closed during the rainy season. The southern provincial administration and private enterprises issued a chorus of complaints towards the central administration and demanded that it increase resource allocations to improve the southern infrastructure. The Senior Agricultural Officer found it ludicrous that roads were annually closed and bridges removed even though it was clear that “Lorry transport is the life-line of this province as all produce must come from the hinterland to the coast.”<sup>26</sup> When Vickers-Haviland returned to the Southern Province as the new Provincial Commissioner in 1944, he wrote to the Director of Public Works (DPW) in utter disbelief at the state of the Southern Province’s road transportation system:

[...] it is obvious from what I have already seen that road communications here play such a vital part in the evacuation of produce that considerably more attention must be given to them. I think that you will agree that the condition of many of the roads is far inferior to that of roads of similar grades in other parts of the Territory and the consequent wear and tear on lorries and tyres is most uneconomic and contrary to the Economic Control Board’s policy which is to conserve transport vehicles as much as possible.<sup>27</sup>

The Secretary of the Economic Control Board, F. Crawford, also wrote a letter to the DPW arguing that the “fact that the Southern Province is at present the only considerable net exporter of foodstuff merits the most favourable consideration being given to their road and transport requirements.”<sup>28</sup> The response by the Director of Public Works was swift and blunt. While he agreed that the conditions of certain roads in the Southern Province were “far inferior to that of roads of similar grades in other parts of the Territory,”

---

<sup>25</sup> The main bridge crossing the Mbwemkuru River in Liwale District, for example, was literally picked up and set aside on or around January 1<sup>st</sup>. The Liwale District Commissioner explained that the removal was necessary because “the river in flood is a powerful torrent carrying much heavier matter which piled against the bridge breaks it down if left up for the rains.” The planks, poles, and nails were stored under a paid “caretaker.” Smaller bridges elsewhere in the district were similarly taken down and re-erected in May. Locals adapted by making footbridges, which could hold if the rains were not excessive. The post, meanwhile, was swum across the river “by especially employed swimmers.” See Nachingwea District Book, “Roads in Liwale District as at August 1<sup>st</sup> 1942.”

<sup>26</sup> DSM, L.A.W. Vickers-Haviland, “Southern Province,” *Annual Reports 1943*.

<sup>27</sup> TNA ACC 16, 4/47 Main and Grade “A” Roads: Maintenance and Improvements, Volume 2, L. Vickers-Haviland (Provincial Commissioner) to Director of Public Works (Dar es Salaam), 7 January 1944. Vickers-Haviland was stationed in Mikindani from 1922 to 1924.

<sup>28</sup> TNA ACC 16, 4/47/Vol. 2, F. Crawford (Secretary Economic Control Board) to the Director of Public Works (Dar es Salaam), 11 January 1944.

he could not accommodate Haviland's requests.<sup>29</sup> Roads in the Southern Province did not have the same military and public service importance as roads elsewhere.<sup>30</sup>




Figure 4.1 Motor Traffic Density, Tanganyika, 1945<sup>31</sup>

The Director concluded that while the “need is fully recognised, and has been the subject of close personal study by myself in your predecessor’s time,” no additional staffing, funding, or machinery would be made available in the foreseeable future.<sup>32</sup>

The PWD tried to redirect frustration from itself and the central state towards the private contracting firms responsible for the maintenance of the Lindi-Songea main road. At the onset of the war, a few District Officers and private estate owners (like the Honorable A. King of the Ngurumahamba Estate) issued complaints about the seasonal work schedules employed by L. Rousham Roberts and the Tanganyika Transport Company Ltd. (TTCo). They wanted continuous road and bridge maintenance in

<sup>29</sup> TNA ACC 16, 4/47/Vol. 2, Director of Public Works to Provincial Commissioner, 11 January 1944.

<sup>30</sup> Ibid.; BLCAS 754.14 s.5 Tanganyika Public Works Department Report 1925-1953, A.J. Mitchell, “Tanganyika Territory: Annual Report of the Public Works Department, 1945,” (Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 1946). The principal road works were carried out in the Tanga, Eastern, and Northern Provinces in 1944 and 1945.

<sup>31</sup> BLCAS 754.14 s.5, A.J. Mitchell, “Tanganyika Territory: Annual Report of the Public Works Department, 1945.”

<sup>32</sup> Ibid. Three years earlier, DPW Fairley warned that the central administration was unlikely to allocate funding to the Southern Province infrastructure because the War Office prioritized the Great North Road improvement schemes “over anything else.”

order to accommodate the rising traffic rates among district officers and private traders.<sup>33</sup> Tunduru District Officer Charles S. Hall's discontent with the private contractors reached its apex in 1942 when he suggested giving TTCo's maintenance contract to "local Indians." He believed "that they would make a better job than would the T.T.Co. because they have a more personal interest in the road being all-weather."<sup>34</sup> The DPW used this criticism to his advantage. Rather than focusing on the inability of the state to provide resources for the southern infrastructure, the Director conducted a series of road inspections that highlighted the contractors' failings. The DPW's 1941 assessment criticized TTCo's efforts. He identified numerous examples of "very poor and badly cut" drainage, severe erosion and scouring along roadways, rotten bridge bearers, and poor alignments in which the road "twists to no purpose."<sup>35</sup> The Director was still dissatisfied by TTCo's progress the following year, and issued a warning that the company needed to improve the road's alignment, bridges, and erosion problems immediately or lose its contract.<sup>36</sup>

Neither TTCo nor Roberts shrank from the mounting criticism, but instead vigorously defended their operations and the continuation of their contracts. Both contractors blamed the lack of state funding for any deficiencies in their operations. Roberts argued that the government's allocation of seven pounds per mile in 1941 was insufficient to conduct extensive repairs, especially on the sandy soils that were made worse by rising, heavy vehicle traffic.<sup>37</sup> More funds were also needed to retain a permanent labor

---

<sup>33</sup> TNA ACC 16, 4/3 Lindi-Songea Main Road: Acquisition of Land and New Road Plans (ALNRP), Hon'ble A. King to the Director of Public Works (Dar es Salaam), 14 August 1941; and District Officer Tunduru to the Provincial Commissioner, 21 April, 1942. A. King was particularly critical about the annual removal of the Muhawezi River and Hanga River bridges, which made traffic west of Masasi impossible. Tunduru District Officer Charles S. Hall, meanwhile, complained that neither contractor properly maintained the Nampungu River bridge. Hall considered the bridge a "considerable asset" to the district's administration and provincial economy.

<sup>34</sup> TNA ACC 16, 4/47/Vol. 2, District Commissioner Tunduru to Provincial Commissioner, 23 December 1942.

<sup>35</sup> TNA ACC 16, 4/3 (ALNRP), Director of Public Works to the Contractor, Tanganyika Transport Co Ltd. (TTCo.), Lindi, "Road Inspection Notes: Masasi-Tunduru-Songea Road," 1941. The Director noted issues of drainage and erosion along Roberts' section of the main road.

<sup>36</sup> TNA ACC 16, 4/3 (ALNRP), Director of Public Works to the Provincial Commissioner, "Inspection of Masasi-Nampungu Section," 18 September 1942; "Masasi Tunduru Songea Road (section Masasi to Nampungu): Notes D.P.W. Visit," 21 August 1942; and TNA ACC 16, 4/47/Vol. 2, Public Works Department to Provincial Commissioner, 20 December 1943.

<sup>37</sup> TNA ACC 16, 4/3 (ALNRP), L. Rousham Roberts to Provincial Commissioner, "Concerning Labour Returns for Main Road, Section Songea to Nampungu River," 10 October 1941; and TNA ACC 16, 4/36 Masasi-Songea Road

force to conduct year-round maintenance.<sup>38</sup> Two years later, Roberts again stated that if the government increased its rates per mile he could improve his stretch of the main road to “practically all weather, at least one could always get along without too much differoulty [*difficulty*]” within two to three years.<sup>39</sup> Whereas Roberts adopted a more apologetic tone when corresponding with the colonial state, TTCo took a more confrontational stance towards government criticism.<sup>40</sup> When the DPW requested that TTCo construct a permanent bridge across the Muhuwezi River (200 ft. wide and 25 ft. high in flood) in 1941, Carnegie Browne flatly refused.<sup>41</sup> The alternative of operating a pontoon ferry was equally unreasonable. Carnegie Browne argued that his company lacked the resources to improve the river banks and purchase and install the necessary steel pontoon along a steel cable. TTCo was willing to oversee a pontoon service if the Public Works Department installed it. TTCo was also willing to keep the main road open throughout the year if the government paid an additional Shs. 4,700 per year so that the company could employ the necessary one laborer per mile.<sup>42</sup> Without additional funds, TTCo could only construct timber bridges, earth embankments, and other works “not requiring special technical knowledge.” When the

---

Maintenance Contract: Returns of Labourers, L. Rousham Roberts to Provincial Commissioner, “Labour Return Records,” 3 November 1939. Roberts argued that the dilapidated road condition in Songea District was a consequence of heavy trucks carrying upwards of four tons of cargo – two tons more than in the 1930s. These trucks allegedly “rac[ed] up and down that Section all day long with tobacco and *kuni* [wood], particular *kuni*, tons and tons of which are used for the tobacco factory boiler, the whole of this is cut a few miles out of Songea on the Main Road.” Within a month or two of repairing the road sections, the trucks had torn them up again. Roberts contended that this situation gave the impression “that no work at all had been done on that particular part.”

<sup>38</sup> TNA ACC 16, 4/36, “Labour Return Records,” L. Rousham Roberts to the Provincial Commissioner, 13 March 1938, 4 September 1938, 3 October 1938, 1 November 1938, 16 February 1939, and 7 December 1939. Roberts recognized that his African laborers participated in seasonal employment to supplement their subsistence agriculture. Roberts faced particular labor difficulties during the tobacco boom in 1938 and 1939 when his wages of Shs. 8/- per month no longer attracted laborers.

<sup>39</sup> TNA ACC 16, 4/3 (ALNRP), L. Rousham Roberts to Director of Public Works, “Songea-Tundururu Main Road,” 15 August 1943.

<sup>40</sup> Roberts submitted detailed progress reports and frequently apologized for failures reported in government road inspections. The apologies were quickly followed by a variety of excuses and/or justifications. See Roberts’ correspondence in TNA ACC 16, 4/36.

<sup>41</sup> TNA ACC 16, 4/3 (ALNRP), Provincial Commissioner L.H.L. Foster to the Hon’ble A. King, 16 August 1941; and TTCo. Managing Director to the Southern Provincial Commissioner, 24 December 1941. The DPW knew that a bridge construction project would “be no easy business even under normal conditions.”

<sup>42</sup> TNA ACC 16, 4/3 (ALNRP), TTCo. Managing Director to Provincial Commissioner, 24 December 1941.

DPW renewed his criticism in 1942, Carnegie Browne again went on the offensive.<sup>43</sup> He not only provided evidence that extra gangs had been specifically assigned to the repairs required by the Director, but also argued that the Director's emphasis on erosion wasted money that should have been directed towards new road alignments. Carnegie Browne ultimately highlighted the PWD's lack of local expertise and its failure to offer enough funds to allow private contractors to abandon their seasonal work programs and construct an all-weather road network in the Southern Province.<sup>44</sup>

In the end, Roberts and TTCo maintained their contracts throughout the war, but neither received additional funding from the colonial state.<sup>45</sup> The Tanganyika government and southern administration simply lacked a viable alternative to the contractors. The PWD staff in the Southern Province consisted of two officers overwhelmed with building construction, sanitation, water works, and road maintenance for the Lindi-Masasi section and all Grade "A" district roads.<sup>46</sup> Provincial Commissioner L.A.W. Vickers-Haviland commended the men's efforts, but bluntly reported that their work was "not adequate to the needs of the province," which was equivalent to the size of England and Wales.<sup>47</sup> The undermanned and underfunded District Officers similarly struggled to maintain nearly 2,000 miles of District Grade "B"

---

<sup>43</sup> TNA ACC 16, 4/3 (ALNRP), TTCo. Managing Director to Provincial Commissioner, "Road Maintenance Contract," 7 November 1942.

<sup>44</sup> *Ibid.* Browne argued that continuous maintenance under the present scale of payment would have been uneconomical for the company for the following reasons:

- a. "If working had to be done in January and February on road surface, strength of road gangs from March to June, (when the most useful work can be done) would have to be reduced, if the costs from January to June were to be the same.
- b. Work done in January and February would be washed away by heavy rains and wasted
- c. There is a general shortage of labour in December, January and February, as local natives are attending to their own shambas."

<sup>45</sup> Provincial Commissioner Foster also restrained criticism of the contractors' operations. He warned District Officer Hall against further criticism of TTCo which had the "approval of the Government." See TNA ACC 16, 4/3 (ALNRP), Provincial Commissioner Foster to District Officer Tunduru, 9 November 1942.

<sup>46</sup> The PWD staff consisted of one Senior Inspector of Works and one Second Grade Clerk in 1943. PWD records are unavailable during the war years, but it is apparent that the department's European staff was reduced during the war. The total European staff declined from 60 men at the beginning of 1938 to 47 at the beginning of 1945. The DPW complained about persistent staff shortages in 1945. He reported the following year, "The advent of new recruits which has occurred has so far served barely to replace the wastage caused by immediate post-war retirements and the acute staff shortage still persists. Furthermore the new appointments have had little opportunity of becoming familiar with local conditions by serving with experienced officers before having to operate in what would normally be regarded as posts for experienced officers." See BLCAS 754.14 s.5, A.J. Mitchell, "Tanganyika Territory: Annual Report of the Public Works Department," 1945 and 1946.

<sup>47</sup> DSM, L.A.W. Vickers-Haviland, "Southern Province," *Annual Reports 1943*.



and village roads.<sup>48</sup> These officers reportedly had the “best will in the world,” yet “lacked the experience, training and time to produce the best results for expenditure.”<sup>49</sup> Road maintenance funding and operations continued to fall to the Native Treasuries, Native Authorities, and local headmen.<sup>50</sup> In Liwale District, for example, a road foreman (named Muhuruti) traveled by bicycle to review and supervise maintenance operations throughout the district.<sup>51</sup> While the District Commissioner credited Muhuruti and a local foreman with doing “their best,” they were not properly trained. Inadequate skilled labor, supervision, labor camps, rations, and water supplies further inhibited proper road maintenance.<sup>52</sup>

Despite rising state-local tensions, the hybrid system of road development in southern Tanganyika remained intact throughout the duration of World War II. Private contractors and local African communities maintained the roads that served as life-lines for southern Tanganyika’s economy and colonial administration. As vehicular traffic rates and the cost of road maintenance rose, however, these private agents found themselves without the finances, staff, and equipment necessary to construct and/or maintain a sustainable road system against adverse environmental conditions and mounting traffic densities. The southern economy suffered as transportation costs rose due to the deplorable road surfaces, costly vehicle breakdowns, annual road closures, and recurrent petrol shortages.<sup>53</sup> Producers and traders found it uneconomical to transport low priced foodstuffs by automobile from an area more than 130 miles

---

<sup>48</sup> Lindi Provincial Book, Acting Provincial Commissioner, “Roads,” 26 April 1941. The Southern Province had a total of 2,626 miles of roads by 1941. Tanganyika Territory as a whole had 15,394 miles of roads. See Farquharson, *Tanganyika Transport A Review*, 15.

<sup>49</sup> DSM, L.A.W. Vickers-Haviland, “Southern Province,” *Annual Reports 1943*. District Officers continued to reference F. Longland’s, *Field Engineering: A Handbook on Simple Construction*, when conducting public works, especially road construction and maintenance. For an example, see Nachingwea District Book, “Labour Notes,” March 1940.

<sup>50</sup> Nachingwea District Book, “Labour Notes,” March 1940.

<sup>51</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>52</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>53</sup> TNA ACC 16, 4/10, L.H.L. Foster, Provincial Commissioner to Chief Secretary, 13 January 1943. The lack of adequate shipping resulted in serious petrol shortages. Foster reported in 1943 that petrol deficiencies caused “an almost complete breakdown on the transport of the province as a result of which produce has been left on the hands of merchants who could not get it to the ports before the rains closed the roads.” In 1945, Lindi District had only 80 tins of petrol. Songea District had none and was compelled to stop road traffic. A barge arrived in Lindi with 4,000 tins, but they were filled with aviation fuel. The *Tayari* finally arrived with 4,000 tins to improve the situation.

from the southeastern ports.<sup>54</sup> The situation was so bad, that it was reportedly “impossible to market Songea wheat flour in competition with flour so far away as Australia.”<sup>55</sup> As another world war came to a close, southern Tanganyika remained a neglected and isolated region within a peripheral territory of the British Empire. Provincial Commissioner Vickers-Haviland aptly compared the Southern Province with “the stone that the builders rejected.”<sup>56</sup> The continual failure of the Tanganyika government to invest in the south’s transportation infrastructure not only hampered the economic growth of the region, but also had lasting and damaging repercussions for the colonial state’s ambitious postwar development plans.

### **Postwar and Positive Development**

The conclusion of the Second World War witnessed a new era in colonial rule and development throughout the British Empire. Two visions of colonial development – humanitarian and Chamberlainite – reemerged as avenues by which the British government could stabilize, defend, and reinvigorate the nation and empire. Under the leadership of Oliver Stanley, the Colonial Office embraced a constructive, positive vision of colonial development that aimed to improve the social and economic welfare of indigenous peoples in the colonies. The Colonial Development and Welfare Acts of 1940 and 1945 were passed with the intention of supporting welfare-oriented, colonial development programs. The British government publicly embraced the positivist rhetoric and mission of colonial development in order to justify the continuance of the Empire against international and colonial criticism of imperialism.<sup>57</sup> In reality, it financed “Chamberlainite”-oriented development schemes that maximized the extraction of

---

<sup>54</sup> DSM, L.A.W. Vickers-Haviland, “Southern Province,” *Annual Reports 1943*.

<sup>55</sup> Ibid.

<sup>56</sup> Ibid.

<sup>57</sup> D.J. Morgan, *The Official History of Colonial Development. Vol. 2: Developing British Colonial Resources, 1945-1951* (New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1980); Stephen Constantine, *The Making of British Colonial Development Policy, 1914-1940* (London: Frank Cass & Co., Ltd., 1984); L.J. Butler, “The Ambiguities of British Colonial Development Policy, 1938-48” in *Contemporary British History 1931-1961: Politics and the Limits of Policy*, eds. Anthony Gorst, Lewis Johnman, and W. Scott Lucas (London: Pinter, 1991), 119-140; Frederick Cooper, “Modernizing Bureaucrats, Backward Africans, and the Development Concept,” in *International Development and the Social Sciences: Essays on the History and Politics of Knowledge*, eds. Frederick Cooper and Randall Packard (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), 64-92; and Joseph Morgan Hodge, *Triumph of the Expert: Agrarian Doctrines of Development and the Legacies of British Colonialism* (Athens, USA: Ohio University Press, 2007).

colonial resources for the benefit of the British national economy.<sup>58</sup> The top priorities of the postwar British government, Treasury, and Board of Trade were stabilizing and reviving the national economy, strengthening the Sterling Area, and balancing payments with the United States.<sup>59</sup> In order to meet these objectives, the British state continued to embrace a highly interventionist approach towards colonial production, trade controls, coordination of money payments, bulk purchase agreements, imperial preference, and sterling usage throughout the Empire.<sup>60</sup> The British retained wartime monopolistic trade conditions and erected barriers to prevent colonies from spending their colonial sterling reserves, which had accumulated in London during the war. The British used the reserves to support the pound and stabilize the metropolitan economy. In order to improve Britain's balance of payment crisis, the colonies were also expected to curb imports from and increase exports to dollar areas. After the British government failed to restore the pound to full international convertibility in 1947, it dedicated more resources towards colonial development schemes that would increase the production and exportation of dollar earning and dollar saving commodities.<sup>61</sup> Atlee's postwar Labour administration ultimately adopted a pragmatic and

---

<sup>58</sup> Cooper, "Modernizing Bureaucrats," 64-92; Allister Hinds, *Britain's Sterling Colonial Policy and Decolonization, 1939-1958* (Westport, USA: Greenwood Press, 2001); L.J. Butler, "Reconstruction, Development and the Entrepreneurial State," *Contemporary British History* 13, no. 4 (2008): 29-55. Chamberlain's neo-mercantilist ideas from the turn of the century argued that it was Britain's right and duty to develop the productivity of the colonial "estates" for the benefit of the British and indigenous populations.

<sup>59</sup> Morgan, "Introduction," in *The Official History of Colonial Development*; Cowen and Westcott, "British Imperial Economic Policy During the War," 20-67; Joanna Lewis, "The Ruling Compassions of the Late Colonial State: Welfare versus Force, Kenya, 1945-1952," *Journal of Colonialism and Colonial History* 2, no. 2 (Fall 2001); Hinds, *Britain's Sterling Colonial Policy and Decolonization*, 89-150; L.J. Butler, "The Ambiguities of British Colonial Development Policy, 1938-48," 124-125 and 128-130; and "Introduction," in *The Labour Government and the End of Empire 1945-1951*, ed. Ronald Hyam (London: HMSO, 1992), xxiii-lxxiii. Hyam contended that the Cold War and Russian expansion were additional concerns that impacted the Labour Government's colonial policy from 1945 to 1951.

<sup>60</sup> Partha Sarathi Gupta, *Imperialism and the British Labour Movement, 1914-1964* (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1975), 303-348; John Darwin, *Britain and Decolonization: The Retreat from Empire in the Postwar World* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1988); John Kent, *British Imperial Strategy and the Origins of the Cold War 1944-49* (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1993); and P.J. Cain and A.G. Hopkins, *British Imperialism: Crisis and Deconstruction 1914-1990* (London: Longman, 1993), 263-281.

<sup>61</sup> Hinds, *Britain's Sterling Colonial Policy and Decolonization*, 89-150; Butler, "The Ambiguities of British Colonial Development Policy, 1938-48," 124-125 and 128-130; "Introduction," in *Imperial Policy and Colonial practice*, xlii-xlv; and Havinden and Meredith, *Colonialism and Development*, 227-234.

paternalistic approach towards colonial development; leaning on Africa as a solution to Britain's economic problems while hiding behind a welfarist rhetoric.<sup>62</sup>

### **Putting Cinderella on the Center Stage: Southern Tanganyika and the Groundnut Scheme**

A more interventionist, centralized, and homogenized colonial state in London oversaw the "second colonial occupation" in Africa following the Second World War.<sup>63</sup> With the assistance of the Colonial Development Corporation, the colonial state organized over seventy major agricultural development plans and numerous cooperative farming, resettlement, drainage, and irrigation endeavors throughout the Empire.<sup>64</sup> In order to defray costs and quiet accusations of exploitation, the late colonial state encouraged private investors and experts to participate in colonial development schemes.<sup>65</sup> Private enterprises pinpointed Tanganyika as a territory ripe for investment. Frank Samuel, Managing Director of United African Company (UAC), was particularly captivated by the economic potential of Tanganyika.<sup>66</sup> In March 1946, Samuel advocated a massive, high-cost development scheme aimed at alleviating the worldwide shortage of fats and oils. Named the East African Groundnut Scheme, the plan originally called for the clearance of 2.5 million acres of unoccupied land in East Africa and the annual cultivation of 400,000 tons of shelled ground nuts.<sup>67</sup> The development program would cost £8 million and produce an

---

<sup>62</sup> Butler, "The Ambiguities of British Colonial Development Policy, 1938-48," 123-124; and John Kent, "Bevin's Imperialism and the Idea of Euro-Africa," in *British Foreign Policy, 1945-56*, eds. M. Dockrill and John Young (London: Macmillan, 1989), 47-76.

<sup>63</sup> D.A. Low and A. Smith, "The New Order," in *History of East Africa, Volume III*, eds. D.A. Low and A. Smith (Oxford: Clarendon, 1976), 12; John Iliffe, *A Modern History of Tanganyika* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 436; Joanna Lewis, "'Tropical East Ends' and the Second World War: Some Contradictions in Colonial Office Welfare Initiatives," *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 28, no. 2 (2000): 42-66; and Joanna Lewis, *Empire State-Building: War and Welfare in Kenya 1925-52* (Oxford: James Currey Ltd., 2000).

<sup>64</sup> Hodge, *Triumph of the Expert*, 208.

<sup>65</sup> Butler, "Reconstruction, Development and the Entrepreneurial State," 40-49.

<sup>66</sup> UAC was a subsidiary of Lever Brothers and Unilever Limited.

<sup>67</sup> There are numerous secondary sources that have examined the history of the East Africa Groundnut Scheme; from its planning and justifications to its implementation and ambiguous impacts. The works include (but are not limited to): Michelle Bourbonniere, "Ripple Effects: The Groundnut Scheme Failure and Railway Planning for Colonial Development in Tanganyika, 1947-1952," *Canadian Journal of African Studies* 47, no.3 (2013): 365-83; Rohland Schuknecht, *British Colonial Development Policy after the Second World War: The Case of Sukumaland, Tanzania* (Berlin: Lit Verlag, 2010); Chau P. Johnsen Kelly, "A Tale of Two Cities, Mikindani and Mtwara: Consuming Development in southeastern Tanganyika, 1910-1960" (PhD diss., University of California Davis, 2010); Thaddeus Suseri, *Wielding the Ax: State Forestry and Social Conflict in Tanzania, 1820-2000* (Athens, USA: Ohio University Press, 2009); Hodge, *Triumph of the Expert*, 209-213; Matteo Rizzo, "What Was Left of the Groundnut Scheme?"

estimated 160,000 tons of oil a year.<sup>68</sup> The British government dispatched an official commission to East Africa in June 1946 to determine the viability of Samuel's scheme.<sup>69</sup> The former Director of Agriculture in Tanganyika and then Inspector General of Agriculture in the West Indies, A.J. Wakefield, led the commission as it completed a nine week tour over 13,000 miles of East Africa by air, road, and rail. The Wakefield Mission found in favor of the East African Groundnut Scheme. It set a more ambitious objective of clearing 3.21 million acres of land in Tanganyika, Kenya, and Northern Rhodesia by 1952 at a cost of £24 million.<sup>70</sup> A total of 2.4 million acres would be cleared in Tanganyika, yielding 600,000 tons of shelled nuts. Fifty-five of the agricultural plots in Tanganyika were located in the Southern Province. Southern Tanganyika's infrastructure required a massive upgrade for the clearing, planting, and production operations to proceed on schedule. The commission proposed the construction of a new port and railway at an estimated cost of £3,090,000.<sup>71</sup>

After a second detailed investigation, the British government decided to proceed immediately with the scheme advocated by the Wakefield Mission. The justifications offered in the White Paper (Cmd.

---

Development Disaster and Labour Market in Southern Tanganyika 1946–1952," *Journal of Agrarian Change* 6, no.2 (April 2006): 205-238; Matteo Rizzo, "The Groundnut Scheme Revisited: Colonial Disaster and African Accumulation in Nachingwea District, Southeastern Tanzania, 1946-67" (PhD diss., School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, October 2004); Iliffe, *A Modern History of Tanganyika*, 440-443; Havinden and Meredith, *Colonialism and Development*, 276-83; Jon Hogendorn and K.M. Scott, "Very Large-Scale Agricultural Projects: The Lessons of the East African Groundnut Scheme," in *Imperialism, Colonialism and Hunger: East and Central Africa*, ed. Robert Rotberg (Lexington, USA: Lexington Books, 1983): 167-98; Jon Hogendorn and K.M. Scott, "The East African Groundnut Scheme: Lessons of a Large-Scale Agricultural Failure," *African Economic History*, no. 10 (1981): 81-115; David John Morgan, *The Official History of Colonial Development: Vol. 4: Changes in British aid policy, 1951-1970* (Atlantic Highland, NJ, USA: Humanities Press, 1980); Andrew Coulson, "Agricultural Policies in Mainland Tanzania," *Review of African Political Economy*, no. 10 (1977): 74-100; and Cyril Ehrlich, "The Poor Country: Tanganyika Economy from 1945 to 1960," in *Oxford History of East Africa*, Vol. 3, eds. D.A. Low and A. Smith (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976): 290–330. Matteo Rizzo offered a review of the literature on the scheme in his dissertation, "The Groundnut Scheme Revisited," 26-32.

<sup>68</sup> BNA CO 691/204/4 Groundnut Scheme Policy and Principle, Overseas Food Corporation, *First Annual Report and Statement of Accounts for the period Ended March 31, 1949* (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1949). Britain imported 95% of its oil and fats (with the exception of butter). Its usual supply of groundnuts from India was drastically reduced from 1946 to 1947, dropping from 120,000 tons to 12,000 tons.

<sup>69</sup> BNA CO 691/204/4, OFC, *First Annual Report [...] period Ended March 31, 1949*, 5. The British government was hesitant to commit itself to the scheme "without a good deal of thought, further technical advice, and consultation with responsible officials on the spot." The Wakefield Commission also included J. Rosa (Colonial Office) and D.L. Martin (Plantation Department of the UAC).

<sup>70</sup> Ibid.

<sup>71</sup> Iliffe, *A Modern History of Tanganyika*, 440; and Native Affairs 35781, General Manager J.R. Farquharson of Tanganyika Railways and Ports Services, "Groundnut Schemes in Southern, Central, and Western Province of the Tanganyika Territory – A Preliminary Note on the Transport Problems," 8 October 1946.

7030) – “A Plan for the Mechanised Production of Groundnuts in East and Central Africa” – interwove humanitarian and Chamberlainite development rhetoric. The Groundnut Scheme was intended to benefit African peoples, East African colonies, Britain, and the Empire:

‘The progressive health, nutrition, housing, welfare and labour policies that will be integral parts of the scheme will not only raise the standard of life of the undertaking’s employees and their families; the increased national income and revenue from taxation will also make possible higher standards of living and better social services throughout the territories.’<sup>72</sup>

However, a number of flawed assumptions under laid the Groundnut Scheme (GNS). The planners believed that the areas targeted for development were uninhabited “waste lands” that were “virtually unchanged from Biblical days.”<sup>73</sup> They assumed that Africa was inflicted by an “agrarian problem” that required an “agricultural revolution.”<sup>74</sup> Without Western scientific knowledge and technology, uneducated and incapable Africans would exhaust the soil to a point of no return.<sup>75</sup> Development planners and supporters assumed that “primitive” indigenous communities and their “primitive methods” and tools of cultivation could and should be “modernized” with “the whole range of Western agricultural science –

---

<sup>72</sup> The White Paper insisted that the scheme would improve African living standards, while the colonial state profited from increased agricultural production and taxation. The villages constructed on work sites were expected to introduce improved standards of housing, health, nutrition, education, and welfare for African laborers and their families. By providing the best housing and social amenities for African laborers, the scheme would also help stabilize the labor population and inspire improved labor conditions across East Africa. Africans would further benefit from the clearance of tsetse-infested bush, establishment of water supplies, and improved communications. Improved communications, in turn, would open new areas with mineral, agricultural, and livestock potential for the benefit of the territory and Empire. The White Paper was quoted in Mtwara (Lindi) Provincial Book, “Full Scale Groundnut Scheme Now Approved: three Million Acres: 23 Million Pounds: 600,000 Tons Yearly,” *The Tanganyika Standard*, 8 February 1947; “Oil Nuts from Barren Land in Africa: £25,500,000 Plan to Develop 3,250,000 Acres,” *The Tanganyika Standard*, 1947; “Groundnuts Scheme and Local Industry,” *The Tanganyika Standard*, 8 February 1947; and BNA CO 691/204/4, OFC, *First Annual Report [...] period Ended March 31, 1949*, 5.

<sup>73</sup> Frank Samuel quoted in Mtwara (Lindi) Provincial Book, “A Blow at Roots of Basic Agrarian problems of Africa: Groundnut Scheme Director Interviewed,” *The Tanganyika Standard*, 1947.

<sup>74</sup> Frank Samuel quoted in Mtwara (Lindi) Provincial Book, “A Blow at Roots”; Hodge, *Triumph of the Expert*, 210; and Havinden and Meredith, *Colonialism and Development*, 277. The White Paper also argued that “the most important long-term advantage of the scheme from the African point of view is, however, the revolution in agricultural techniques which it represents [...]” See Mtwara (Lindi) Provincial Book, “Oil Nuts from Barren Land in Africa.”

<sup>75</sup> Sir Philip Mitchell (then Governor of Kenya) argued that it was the Empire’s responsibility to guide African cultivators: “[...up] the steep and difficult hill which leads from uncaptialized subsistence farming carried out with hand tools to a form of agriculture which, by increasing the production of primary wealth by each unit engaged in it, will enable the standard of living of all to be raised.” Quoted in Mtwara (Lindi) Provincial Book, “Oil Nuts from Barren Land in Africa.”

the bulldozer, the tractor, soil analysis, fertilisers, rotation of crops and mechanical harvesting.”<sup>76</sup> Frank Samuel envisioned the Groundnut Scheme as a “dramatic struggle with Nature”<sup>77</sup> and an avenue for Africa’s ascension and prosperity:

[The Groundnut Scheme would...] teach the African to be economically productive unit, and at the same time to rebuild the fertility of the soil by fertilisers and scientific agricultural methods; and so to lay a solid and sure foundation for a steady increase in the living standards of the African people.<sup>78</sup>

According to Joseph Morgan Hodge, the Groundnut Scheme was to serve as “a showcase of what science, technology, and the state could achieve”.<sup>79</sup> Jon Hogendorn and K.M. Scott argued that proponents of the scheme believed it would validate the benefits of governmental development policy while serving “as an example for the rest of Africa of such long-term benefits as improved productivity, health, social welfare, and prosperity”.<sup>80</sup> Samuel and fellow development planners disregarded the practical reasons why cultivation was not attempted in the development areas – infertile soil, inadequate water, insufficient transportation, etc. – and assumed all obstacles would be overcome with technology. They shrugged off supply issues and assumed that they could resolve the scheme’s financial problems at a later date.<sup>81</sup> They also assumed that it would be easy to procure thousands of skilled, semi-skilled, and unskilled laborers in remote locations.<sup>82</sup> In the case of southern Tanganyika, planners failed to acknowledge that the region’s mobile labor force was accustomed to pursuing the best working conditions and wages regardless of distance and state objectives.

---

<sup>76</sup> Mtwara (Lindi) Provincial Book, “A Blow at Roots”; and Hodge, *Triumph of the Expert*, 210.

<sup>77</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>78</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>79</sup> Hodge, *Triumph of the Expert*, 211; and Schuknecht, *British Colonial Development Policy*, 212.

<sup>80</sup> Hogendorn and Scott, “Very Large-Scale Agricultural Projects,” 170.

<sup>81</sup> Mtwara (Lindi) Provincial Book, “Full Scale Groundnut Scheme”; TNA Native Affairs 35781, Note by Mr. Hutt, 15 October 1946; and “Note on a Meeting held by Government House on 29<sup>th</sup> October 1946 to consider the Report of the Groundnut Commission to East and Central Africa as it affects Tanganyika,” 21 A. Of the £3 million required to construct the railway and port facilities in the Southern Province, only £810,000 was financeable through the Development Plan. This left a deficit of £2.28 million. This price tag did not account for maintenance, engineering operations, traffic, management, bags and handling, and other miscellaneous costs. There was also no plan for determining when the Tanganyika government would assume financial and administrative responsibility for the new facilities. British officials recognized that if they handed over the port and railway before they were financially sound, it would cause the “dislocation of the economy of Tanganyika.” See TNA Native Affairs 35781, Note by F.S., 16 October 1946.

<sup>82</sup> TNA Native Affairs 35781, S.O.S. to the Governor of Tanganyika [henceforth Governor], 9 November 1946.

Part of the blame for the false assumptions rested with the Tanganyika government. Both the Governor and Southern Provincial Commissioner approved of the scheme's agricultural and infrastructure development projects.<sup>83</sup> The Provincial Commissioner even encouraged additional cultivation in Tunduru and a railway extension to potential coal bearing areas in Songea.<sup>84</sup> The southern provincial administration confidently predicted that tens of thousands of laborers would voluntarily turn out for work as long as they were offered reasonable wages, good working conditions, and an adequate supply of consumer goods.<sup>85</sup> The southern provincial administration also assured Dar es Salaam and London that the road networks could handle heavy traffic while the railway was under construction. Although road transport was difficult from December to April, it was not impossible. Four-axel trailers and tractors could pass over wood bridges and culverts as long as they took precautions. These bridges and culverts, however, were designed for lighter two-ton lorries and annually washed away with the rains. London also received assurances that the PWD would improve the Lindi-Songea main road to an all-weather standard in a few months – a feat not completed in forty years of colonial rule.<sup>86</sup> It is not surprising that the southern administration largely endorsed the GNS. Even with the foreseeable problems and lingering concerns, why would the administration say “no”? Colonial officials were finally going to receive the infusion of finances, manpower, and modern equipment that they had been asking for the last thirty years in order to recreate the region's physical and socioeconomic landscape.<sup>87</sup> Provincial Commissioner J.

---

<sup>83</sup> TNA Native Affairs 35781, S.O.S. to Governor, 2 November 1946.

<sup>84</sup> TNA Native Affairs 35781, T.J.R., 3 December 1946.

<sup>85</sup> TNA Native Affairs 35781, Mr. Molohan, Acting Labour Commissioner, to General Manager Tanganyika Railways, Director of Agricultural Production, Financial Secretary, and A.M.B Huff, October 1946.

<sup>86</sup> TNA Native Affairs 35781, S.O.S. to Governor, “Notes in Reply to Secretary of State Secret Despatch No. 761 of 2.11.46,” 26.

<sup>87</sup> Felicitas Becker, “A social history of Southeast Tanzania, ca 1890-1950” (PhD diss., Cambridge University, 2002), 289-91; Peter Johnston, “The Groundnut Scheme – a Personal Memoir,” *Habitat Intl.* 7, no.1 (1983): 5-16. Johnston was a British officer stationed in the Southern Province during the Second World and Groundnut Scheme. He recalled “that all of us in the Tanganyika Administration serving in the Southern Province were 100% ‘groundnutters’. Here was a development project on a vast and unprecedented scale which could bring funds and considerable economic development to the oft forgotten ‘Cinderella Province’. So we worked long and arduous hours to hasten the Scheme along.” Becker, however, argued that some officers were unhappy about being left outside the scheme's command structure and expressed concerns about potential negative side-effects of the scheme, including increased crime rates and the dispossession of African peasants.



Rooke Johnston was filled with optimism that the GNS and the new transportation infrastructure would radically transform the Southern Province:

As I close this report there is on the horizon a glimpse of a shining future for this neglected, 'isolated and backward' Province, in a project which if successful cannot fail to bring in its train great social and economic benefits not only to its inhabitants, but to many more outside its boundaries. This project, which almost exceeds the limits of a dream, is the scheme for the mass production of groundnuts, in which progressive health, nutrition, housing, welfare and labour policies will all play an integral part and will raise the standard of living of all concerned to a higher level than has yet been contemplated. It will bring permanent benefits to an area which can almost be described as having been blasted and lain moribund since its people were decimated by the Germans in the Maji Maji rebellion in 1905-1906.<sup>88</sup>

As the Groundnut Scheme got underway, Frank Samuel confidently prophesized, "I believe that in a hundred years' time the historian of the development of Africa will regard the beginning of this scheme as marking the critical date in the agricultural progress of tropical Africa."<sup>89</sup> The colonial state and development planners shared his conviction that millions of pounds, western scientific knowledge, and modern machinery could radically transform the East Africa physical and socioeconomic landscape in six short years.

### **Dilemmas, Delays, and Disappointments**

The United Africa Company Ltd. (UAC) became the Managing Agent of the Groundnut Scheme at the invitation of the Ministry of Food in 1947.<sup>90</sup> They concentrated landing clearing and planting

---

<sup>88</sup> DSM, J. Rooke Johnston, "Southern Province," *Tanganyika Territory: Annual Reports of the Provincial Commissioner for year 1946* (Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 1947). The government's endorsement of the GNS, however, came with a caveat. The Tanganyika government clearly and repeatedly stated that it could not and would not accept financial liability for the GNS and its ancillary projects (railway, port, and roads). They instead granted H.M.G. a thirty-three year lease and permitted the UAC to do the work as agents for H.M.G. It is unlikely that any protest from the southern administration and/or Tanganyika government would have stopped the GNS's momentum. While the S.O.S. asked for the Governor's approval, he also ordered the "immediate repeat immediate start to be made on project roughly of proportion suggested for the first year's operations in Mission's Report." The Minister of Food and S.O.S. acknowledge there were financial issues that needed to be investigated, but "in view of overriding need for speed in starting project, such discussion must proceed concurrently with action necessary to implement scheme." See TNA Native Affairs 35781, S.O.S. to Governor, 2 November 1946 (received 3.11.46); and Governor to Secretary of State, 4 November 1946, 27 (response to #25).

<sup>89</sup> Mtwara (Lindi) Provincial Book, "'Critical Date in Agriculture of Tropical Africa': United Africa Chief Describes Groundnut Scheme," *The Tanganyika Standard*, 1 February 1947.

<sup>90</sup> BNA CO 691/204/4, OFC, *First Annual Report [...] March 31, 1949*; and Mtwara (Lindi) Provincial Book, "A Plan for East Africa"; and "Oil Nuts from Barren Land in Africa." UAC was selected because of its intimate involvement in the planning phase, as well as its "experience with large-scale plantations in Africa." The plan called for the UAC to eventually hand over the enterprise to the local governments, who would act as trustees and managers until

operations in Kongwa (Tanganyika) because of the area's proximity to the Central Railway. Planners also assumed that clearing would be the easiest there.<sup>91</sup> To the south, development planners focused on upgrading southern Tanganyika's transportation infrastructure before conducting land clearing and production operations. Railway construction, however, could not begin until the location of the port was chosen.<sup>92</sup> After months of debate, a small technical mission recommended Mto Mtwara.<sup>93</sup> The new port would have two deep water berths and connect to a 120 mile railway to Nachingwea.<sup>94</sup> Development planners aimed to complete the new port and an oil pipeline from Mtwara to Nachingwea by 1948.<sup>95</sup>

---

African communities could manage the land and production on their own. The White Paper speculated that the scheme might be controlled on a cooperative basis in the future.

<sup>91</sup> TNA Native Affairs 35781, S.O.S. to Governor; and Telegram No. 791, 11 November 1946; TNA Native Affairs 36826 Groundnut Scheme Progress Reports Vol. 1, "East African Groundnut Scheme: Review of Progress to the end of November, 1947," (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1947); and Meredith and Havinden, *Colonialism and Development*, 278.

<sup>92</sup> BNA MAF 83/1804 East African Groundnut Scheme: Estimate of Traffic on Roads, Ports and Railways in Lindi Province, "East African Groundnut Scheme: Port and transport facilities needed in Southern Province of Tanganyika," 13 January 1947; and F. Hollins, "East African Groundnut Scheme: Planning of Railway, Road and Port Construction," 10 January 1947.

<sup>93</sup> BNA MAF 83/1804, "Copy of Cable to Governor Tanganyika from S. of S. Colonies Dated 1.2.47." The southern provincial administration approved the choice of Mtwara. While making "no claim to prophetic powers," Provincial Commissioner Rooke Johnston predicted that Mtwara "port and town will be the most beautiful and healthy place on the coast of East Africa." (BNA FCO 141/17730, J. Rooke Johnston to Chief Secretary, 13 May 1947). According to historian Chau P. Johnsen Kelly, Mtwara town was "designed as a model city, one that might provide a blueprint for future urban development in Africa, in general, and British Africa, in particular." Mr. Harry Ford planned all aspects of the future city – electricity, water, housing, cemeteries, and market spaces. (See Kelly, "A Tale of Two Cities," 281-295). Mtwara District Commissioner P.H. Johnston, however, expressed trepidation about constructing a major port "from scratch." Johnston hoped that "our planners will really plan soundly." (Mtwara District Book Vol. 1, P.H. Johnston, "Mtwara Bay," 3 December 1948).

<sup>94</sup> Iliffe, *A Modern History of Tanganyika*, 440; Mtwara (Lindi) Provincial Book, "Background to Nuts," *The Tanganyika Standard*, 28 January 28 1947; Mtwara (Lindi) Provincial Book, "Full Scale Groundnut Scheme Now Approved"; and S.O.S. and the Minister of Food, "The Future of the East African Groundnut Scheme," November, 30, 1950, accessed December 1, 2013, <http://filestore.nationalarchives.gov.uk/pdfs/small/cab-129-43-cp-289.pdf>.

<sup>95</sup> BNA CAB 129/23/18 East African Groundnut Scheme, Strachey, "East African Groundnuts Scheme: Review of Progress to the end of November, 1947." Governor Twining officially opened the Shell and Anglo-Iranian pipeline from Mtwara to Nachingwea on 25 November 1949 thanks to the construction efforts of Taylor Woodrow (pipeline) and Messrs. Alpheus Williams Dowse (oil tanks). The pipeline and booster belonged to the OFC, while the terminals belonged to Shell Company of East Africa and Anglo-Iranian Oil Company East Africa. Ocean-going tankers from Abadan were expected to discharge thousands of tons of fuel through a submarine pipeline to Mtwara's shore tanks. The fuel then travelled along the 6-inch diameter pipeline to Nachingwea at a maximum pumping rate of 40 tons an hour. Two or three tankers were expected to arrive a year. See BNA FCO 141/17730, A.H. Pike to Chief Secretary, 22 December 1948, 12 April 1949, and 9 December 1949; BNA CO 822/139/1 East Africa Railways and Harbours Admin. Port of Mtwara and Hinterland Railway for O.F.C., "Groundnut Area Pipeline Open," *Financial Times*, 26 November 1949; and "Southern Port and Railway Tanganyika: Note of a talk with the Provincial Commissioner, Southern Province," 1949; and TNA Native Affairs 36826, vol. 1, "Progress Report East Africa Groundnut Scheme," No. 14, 15 and 19, June, July, and November 1949.

Preliminary construction began in June and July 1947. Foreign personnel employed on the projects poured into the province “by every ship, charter plane and East African Airways Corporation.”<sup>96</sup> Officers in Lindi and Mikindani *boma* (district headquarters) were overwhelmed every day by new arrivals requesting information and assistance.<sup>97</sup> Progress on the infrastructure projects, however, was virtually nonexistent. When the first shiploads of rails (900 tons) were offloaded at the end of 1947, only nine miles of railway formation were complete.<sup>98</sup>

---

<sup>96</sup> BNA FCO 141/17730, J. Rooke Johnston to Chief Secretary, 23 July 1947. According to Rolf Hofmeier, “Imperial Airways” inaugurated civilian air services in East Africa as it transported passengers from England to Kisumu. In the following years, services were extended to Nairobi, Dar es Salaam, Mafia, Moshi, Dodoma, Mbeya, Mwanza, Lindi, Kilwa, and Cape Town. Gordon Pirie reported that by 1939, British air passengers could fly to Egypt in 30 hours, South Africa in five days, and Australia in eight days. Nairobi-based “Wilson Airways” conducted much of the internal air travel in East Africa during the 1930s. In Tanganyika, air travel became increasingly popular among administrators. Senior officers in the central administration stopped conducting southern tours by road during the decade, and instead flew from station to station. When Secretary Mitchell visited the province in September 1933 to examine the progress of tax collection, he flew from Songea to Tunduru (1 hour 35 minutes), Tunduru to Masasi (1 hour 5 minutes), Masasi to Mikindani, Mikindani to Lindi (15 minutes), Lindi to Kilwa, and Kilwa to Dar es Salaam. Mitchell’s hour drive from the aerodrome to Lindi town took almost the same time to fly from Tunduru to Masasi. When travelling to Tunduru in October 1933, Provincial Commissioner Guise Williams noted that air travel reduced his time in district from five days (by road) to two days. Air travel was also cheaper, costing Shs 232/- less than lorry transport. The following February, Provincial Commissioner A.E. Kitching flew all the D.O.s to Lindi for a group meeting at the height of the rainy season – a feat that was impossible with lorries. Liwale and Newala were the only districts that planes could not yet land. The total cost of 25 flying hours was £55. After the war, the three British East African colonies created the East African Airways Corporation as an independent commercial company under the supervision of the East African High Commission. Although the company never received monopolistic rights over internal air travel in East Africa, it profited throughout the postwar era and began conducting international flights to England, Central Europe, and India in 1957. See BLCAS MSS. Afr. s. 101, Sir Philip E. Mitchell Diaries, 1933; BNA FCO 141/17729 Southern Province Provincial Commissioner Monthly Newsletters 1930-35; Rolf Hofmeier, *Transport and Economic Development in Tanzania, with particular reference to roads and road transport* (München: Weltforum Verlag, 1973), 63 and 71; Gordon Pirie, *Air Empire: British Imperial Civil Aviation 1919-1939* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2009), 225; and Michael Dale Collins, “Forging a Modern Empire of the Air: Race and Gender in Early British Aeronautics, 1908-1933” (PhD diss., University of California Davis, 2014).

<sup>97</sup> Ibid.

<sup>98</sup> BNA FCO 141/17730, J. Rooke Johnston to Chief Secretary, 19 December 1947.



Ltd. [Mtwara port], Messrs. Pauling and Company [Mtwara-Ruo railway section], and Taylor Woodrow & Co.[oil pipeline].<sup>102</sup> The OFC and contractors struggled to fulfill their obligations. Deadlines were missed while costs rose steadily. The Mkwaya-Nachingwea railway branch opened on October 25, 1948, but the Mtwara-Ruo railway branch and Mtwara port remained far from complete.<sup>103</sup> Only four of the 2,500 50-ton blocks required for the deep-water berths had been made after eighteen months of work.<sup>104</sup> The Southern Provincial Commissioner did not expect the opening of the first deep-water berth until mid-1951.<sup>105</sup> His prediction was off by an additional two and a half years.

By the end of 1949, only 7,200 acres were cleared in the Southern Province, 50,000 acres in Urambo, and 90,000 acres in Kongwa.<sup>106</sup>

**Table 4.2 Expectations vs. Reality: Groundnut Scheme Progress 1947-1949<sup>107</sup>**

Year	Original Program Acreage Cleared	Original Program Acreage of Groundnuts	Actual Achievement Acreage Bush-flattened	Actual Achievement Acreage Planted
1947	150,000	150,000	13,750	7,500
1948	600,000	600,000	78,400	48,800
1949	1,455,000	1,230,000	167,000	84,500

The Ministry of Food, Colonial Office, British Treasury, and British Parliament debated ending the Groundnut Scheme and accepting the loss of £30 million.<sup>108</sup> The Minister of Food pressed for its

<sup>102</sup> Ibid.; TNA Native Affairs 36826, vol. 1, "Progress Report East Africa Groundnut Scheme" No. 13, May 1949, 92D; BNA CO 822/139/1, "History of the Southern Province Railway Line," extract from *Tanganyika Standard*, 27 October 1949; BNA CO 691/211/1-3 Future of the Overseas Food Corporation and Overseas Food Corporation Policy, "E.M.C. to Take Over in Southern Province," *Our World* 2, no. 7 (February 1950); and BNA FCO 141/17730, A.H. Pike to Chief Secretary, 12 April 1950. Messrs. Coode, Vaughan-Lee, Frank and Gwyther served as consulting engineers for the port construction. Mr. S. Karageorgelis, Messrs. Modern Constructions (Tanganyika) Ltd., and Messrs. The Tanganyika Engineering and Contracting Co. Ltd. were contracted for earthworks for the railway. Mr. S. Karageorgelis laid the tracks. Earth Moving and Construction Company Ltd. – a subsidiary of OFC – took over all clearing work in the Southern Province when Mowlem and Woodrow's respective contracts expired on March 31, 1950.

<sup>103</sup> Native Affairs 36826, vol. 1, "Progress Report East Africa Groundnut Scheme" No. 18, October 1949, 101 A.

<sup>104</sup> BNA CO 822/139/1, Governor Edward F. Twining to A.B. Cohen, Colonial Office, 14 November 1949.

<sup>105</sup> BNA CO 822/139/1, "Southern Port and Railway Tanganyika: Note of a talk with the Provincial Commissioner, Southern Province," 1949. The oil jetty was already eliminated "as a luxury."

<sup>106</sup> Secretary of State, "The Future of the East African Groundnut Scheme," 1.

<sup>107</sup> BNA CO 691/213/5 Groundnut Scheme - Report by DOF Scientific Adviser (Ministry of Food), Dr. Norman Wright, "Report on the Overseas Food Corporation's East African Groundnut Scheme," November 1950.

<sup>108</sup> The Treasury believed the scheme was an economic failure that could never become a commercial undertaking. The Treasury also demanded that the Scheme's financing come from Parliamentary vote rather than the Overseas Development Act. The OFC, in contrast, argued that the scheme was necessary in order to learn "whether this means of development in Africa is economically feasible or not." The Ministry of Food and Colonial Office agreed

continuance, arguing that the scheme would strengthen the sterling area, improve domestic food rations, bring “development” to underdeveloped countries, and ensure global peace by fighting global hunger.

The Minister admitted,

[...] in some respects we under-estimated the difficulties of opening up Africa. Quite frankly the job has turned out to be bigger than we thought. Yet in the light of all the difficulties and all the criticisms I am convinced that today even more than in 1946, we still need to go ahead with this scheme.<sup>109</sup>

The Treasury, OFC, and Tanganyika government ultimately reached a tripartite agreement allowing for the continuance of the scheme under a revised plan that concentrated on southern Tanganyika.<sup>110</sup> The Groundnut Scheme, however, failed to recover. The OFC conceded in January 1951 that “the original aims of the scheme have proved incapable of fulfilment”.<sup>111</sup> The OFC proposed another revised plan – the Long Term Plan – which involved “a radical change in the whole conception of the scheme.”<sup>112</sup> Instead of exclusively producing groundnuts and oils, the Corporation would cultivate experimental agricultural plots that included food crops.<sup>113</sup> To keep costs low, the European staff was drastically reduced and hand

---

that the scheme needed more time. The prestige of the British Colonial Administration would “suffer calamitously” in Africa and internationally (particularly in America) if the scheme was suddenly abandoned. One official noted that giving up the scheme would seem to prove critics right who said “that all we were after was cheap margarine.” The Ministry of Food also believed that the Treasury’s financial recommendations were wrong. They would “impose such a strait jacket on the Scheme [...] Morale would suffer an intolerable blow and the effect on planning and operations would be disastrous.” See BNA CO 691/204/4, “Draft: Note of a Meeting at Dean Bradely House on Tuesday, 1<sup>st</sup> November at 10.15am,” 1949; OFC Memo “Overseas Food Corporation: Memorandum on East African Groundnut Scheme,” G.S. Bishop (Ministry of Food) to A.B. Cohen (Colonial Officer) 30 September 1949; handwritten note by the S.O.S., “The Tanganyika Groundnut Scheme,” 26 October 1949; and Folio #24, 6 October 1949; Hodge, *Triumph of the Expert*, 212; and Kelly, “A Tale of Two Cities,” 297-300.

<sup>109</sup> Ibid.

<sup>110</sup> Ibid; BNA CO 691/211/1-3, Overseas Food Corporation, “The Future of the Overseas Food Corporation,” (London, His Majesty’s Press, 1951). The OFC was to bring 600,000 acres under production. Of this total, Kongwa and Urambo would produce 90,000 acres each. The Kongwa proportion was reduced to 12,000 acres for three years due to two “extremely disappointing season.” The Urambo figure was also reduced to 65,000 acres. A total of 20,000 would be cleared in the Southern Province at the end of 1950, and the balance of 400,000 acres would be cleared by the end of 1954.

<sup>111</sup> BNA CO 691/211/1-3, White Paper (Cmd. 8125), Overseas Food Corporation, “The Future of the Overseas Food Corporation,” (London, His Majesty’s Press, 1950 [or Jan 1951]). The OFC recognized that they could not clear the 600,000 acres promised in the November 1949 agreement. Only 150,000 acres of the 420,000 acres intended for cultivation in Nachingwea were available for agriculture. To make that acreage productive, expensive soil protection measures and a much more extensive road construction program were necessary.

<sup>112</sup> BNA CO 691/211/1-3, White Paper (Cmd. 8125).

<sup>113</sup> BNA CO 691/213/5, “Report on the Overseas Food Corporation’s East African Groundnut Scheme,” November 1950; and BNA CO 691/211/1-3, White Paper (Cmd. 8125). The plan called for the clearance of 200,000 acres by 1957. An estimated 70,000 acres would be dedicated to groundnuts, while the rest would be devoted to foodstuff

labor largely replaced mechanical techniques.<sup>114</sup> The Corporation acknowledged that their optimism for mechanical cultivation and disparagement of “traditional” production techniques in East Africa were mistaken:

The short point which I wish to make is that the Corporation’s agriculture in Tanganyika has little or no advantage over comparable farming in East and Central Africa and has comparative disadvantages which need to be tackled.<sup>115</sup>

The OFC’s new aim was determining if “unproductive bush can be economically developed for productive purposes.”<sup>116</sup>

Although the Groundnut Scheme was in shambles, officials in Tanganyika remained committed to the completion of the Southern Province Railway and Mtwara port.<sup>117</sup> The administration argued that Southern Tanganyika had “all the natural resources required for general prosperity.”<sup>118</sup> The region seemingly offered an unlimited supply of land that could be utilized by Africans and “non-natives” in a range of enterprises, including the cultivation of exportable foodstuffs and high-value cash crops, the production of hydro-electric power, and the exploitation of timber and mineral resources.<sup>119</sup> The British

crops (maize, sorghum, and millet), cotton, and tobacco. The land would be sub-divided into 1,500-6,000 acre plots independently farmed by men “who can gain an intimate knowledge of the peculiarities of the land on their own farm; peculiarities which vary from farm to farm.”

<sup>114</sup> BNA CO 691/211/1-3, White Paper (Cmd. 8125). The new plan was estimated to cost £6,000,000. The OFC tractor fleet was reduced to thirty.

<sup>115</sup> BNA CO 691/214/1 OFC Agricultural Policy 1950-51, Sir Charles R. Lockhart (OFC), “Notes on Agriculture Policy,” 27 November 1950.

<sup>116</sup> Ibid. Although some officials in London opposed the Long Term Plan, the S.O.S. yet again defended agricultural development on its humanitarian and diplomatic merits. Abandonment of the scheme would likely garner the belittlement and condemnation of the international community – including the United Nations and colonial peoples. Continuance of the scheme in its new form would contribute to the agricultural productivity and economic prosperity of Tanganyika. The produce and knowledge gained for the experimental farm might also help to rectify food shortages in Tanganyika and around the world. See BNA CO 691/211/1-3, White Paper (Cmd. 8125); and “Brief for Secretary of State for Second Reading Debate on Overseas Resource Development Bill on 20.2.51.”

<sup>117</sup> BNA CO 691/211/1-3, White Paper (Cmd. 8125). There were serious doubts in London about whether or not to continue with the infrastructure development programs since the OFC no longer expected a high volume of goods.

<sup>118</sup> DSM, A.H Pike, “Southern Province,” *Annual Reports of the Provincial Commissioners for the year 1951* (Dar es Salaam Government Printer, 1952).

<sup>119</sup> BNA CO 822/553 Plan for Development Southern Province Tanganyika, G.W. Baker, District Officer, *A Review of Development Plans in the Southern Province of Tanganyika 1953*; BNA CO 691/208/7 Development in Tanganyika: Southern Province Plan 1950-51; Sunseri, *Wielding the Ax*, 129. Sunseri argued that the railway was also justified on strategic grounds. The railway would provide a valuable outlet for strategic raw materials from Rhodesia (including copper) – resources which would be used to fulfill Britain’s postwar obligations under the European Recovery Program. The Tanganyika government, meanwhile, believed that the Southern Province’s

government ultimately approved the Long Term Plan, while two Tripartite Agreements between the Tanganyika government, OFC, and East Africa Railways and Harbours Administration financed the completion of the port and railway in January 1954.<sup>120</sup>



**Figure 4.3 “Mtwara port from the air”<sup>121</sup>**

The renewed promise of development invigorated a wave of private investment in southern Tanganyika. Thousands of acres of land from Lindi to Songea were alienated as commercial, agricultural, and residential plots.<sup>122</sup> The rising international demand and prices for cashew nuts, in particular, inspired

---

mineral prospects – particularly the coal deposits in the southwest – could “be enough to change the whole economy of Tanganyika.”

<sup>120</sup> DSM, S.A.S. Leslie, J.F.R. Hill, and J.R. Farquharson, “Report of Communications Survey Committee” (1950); A.H. Pike, “Southern Province,” *Annual Reports 1951*; TNA Native Affairs 39131 Colonial Development Corporation Annual Reports, Colonial Development Corporation, “Reports and Accounts for 1952,” 21A; BNA CO 691/213/3 Groundnut Scheme Amendment of Overseas Resources Development Act 1951, Extract Commonwealth Survey, 30.3.51, “Addendum The Overseas Resources Development Act, 1951”; and BNA T 220/413 Overseas Food Corporation Tripartite Agreement 1953. The 15,000 acres cleared in Nachingwea District were divided into twenty farms. Seventeen farms became known as the “Production farms,” while the other three were used for the African Tenant Scheme. “Native” agricultural and mechanical ploughing experimental sites were also located Kilwa, Lindi, Newala, and Tunduru Districts. See Rizzo, “Groundnut Scheme Revisited,” 109-136; and Hogendorn and Scott, “Very Large-Scale Agricultural Projects,” 186.

<sup>121</sup> BNA CO 822/553, Baker, *A Review of Development Plans 1953*.

<sup>122</sup> In 1950, the OFC applied for the Right of Occupancy over 52,000 acres. The sisal industry applied for the alienation of 5,000 acres at Rushingi (Lindi) and 2,000 acres at Mkwaya. A survey was also completed in 1950 over 60,000 acres for tobacco in southern Songea (a total of forty 500 acre plots). During the following year, two major leases were issued for 1,000 acres each in Tunduru for tobacco production. There were also plans to alienate land for sisal production in western Lindi, cashew production in Masasi, three plots in Tunduru, and 2,000 acres in



applications to construct plantations and processing plants.<sup>123</sup> A number of foreign trading houses established branches along the coast, including: Messrs. A Baumann & Co., Ltd., Twentsche Overseas Maatschappe, van Eeghen and MacLaine Ltd., and Dalgetys Ltd.<sup>124</sup> Oil and coal prospecting in the interior gained renewed vigor as well.<sup>125</sup> Many of the enterprises, however, collapsed within five years.

---

Songea. Ex-colonial officers familiar with the region were occasionally employed to oversee these new ventures. Former Provincial Commissioner Rooke Johnston, for example, became director of the Southern Province Farms Limited in Songea District in 1952 after being employed as a consultant (“African Adviser”) for Taylor Woodrow. The Steel Brothers (Tanganyika Forests) Ltd., meanwhile, processed hundreds of tons of timber on the Rondo Plateau. The large business house also operated in Burma. They began work on their 1,500 square mile concession in 1950. The southern provincial administration expected the number of applicants for land alienation to increase following the completion of the railway and its extension towards Songea. See Sunseri, *Wielding the Ax*, 131-142; DSM, *Annual Reports of the Provincial Commissioners, 1950-1954*; BNA FCO 141/17730, ? to Chief Secretary, 10 September 1952; and BNA FCO 141/17722 Tanganyika Chief Secretary monthly newsletters to Provincial Commissioners 1949-1950, June 1949.

<sup>123</sup> BNA FCO 141/17730, A.H. Pike to Chief Secretary, 15 March 1952 and 10 December 1952. Cashew trees were first introduced to the region by the Portuguese in the seventeenth century. They were well-suited for the variable climate of the region. According to Pekka Seppälä, Indian traders “were the first major exporters during the colonial period.” After World War II, colonial interest in cashew crops grew with the discovery of new uses of cashew oil in plastic and other modern industries. Cashew exports rose from 173 tons in 1942 to 7,000 tons in 1950/51. The Tanganyika government wanted to profit from the “dollar-earning product” – selling it directly to American markets, rather than continuing to ship unshelled nuts to India. Messrs. A Baumann & Co, Ltd. was one firm that opened a cashew nut barbeque and storage depot in the south during the 1950s. By 1965, the cashew crops from Newala earned Shs. 12,260,000. For secondary literature, see J. Gus Liebenow, *Colonial Rule and Political Development in Tanzania: The Case of Makonde*, (Evanston, Northwest University Press, 1971), 155; Becker, “A social history of Southeast Tanzania,” 298-303; Nicholas J. Hann, “Transitioning Economies, Cultures, and Woodlands – Cashews and Deforestation in Southeast Tanzania” (PhD diss., Clark University, 2002); and Pekka Seppälä, “The Recovery of Cashew Production in Southern Tanzania,” in *The Making of a Periphery: Economic Development and Cultural Encounters in Southern Tanzania*, eds. Pekka Seppälä and Bertha Koda (Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 1998): 118-137, 122. For archival sources, see BNA CO 691/208/7, Provincial Agricultural Officer, H.L. Brett to Provincial Commissioner Southern Province, “Development – Southern Province,” 18 September 1950; Provincial Commissioner “Report on the Southern Province Development Plan (Up to 31<sup>st</sup> December, 1951)” (E/7); and BNA CO 822/553, G.K. Whitlamsmith, Public Relations Officer, “Press Article: Development Plans in the Southern Province of Tanganyika,” 22 May 1953.

<sup>124</sup> BNA CO 691/208/7, Provincial Commissioner “Report on the Southern Province,” (E/7); and BNA CO 822/553, Whitlamsmith, “Development Plans in the Southern Province of Tanganyika.” The Standard Bank of South Africa and National Bank of India both planned to open banks in Lindi. Pike reported that by the end of 1949, hotels were “springing up everywhere.” The two new hotels in Mtwara were considered better than the “general run of hotels in Dar es Salaam.” See BNA FCO 141/17730, A.H. Pike to Chief Secretary, 11 August and 12 September 1949.

<sup>125</sup> BNA CO 852/1202/6 Tanganyika, Marketing and Oil, Acting Governor to Secretary of State, “Re: Application for Oil Exploration Licence” June 1951. Shell Overseas Exploration Company Limited and D’Arcy Exploration Company Limited (exploration organization of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. Ltd.) applied for an oil exploration license along the Tanganyika littoral from the Kenya border to the PEA border. The two companies had applied for a provisional license in 1937, but abandoned the license in February 1938 due to adverse prospecting reports submitted by their geologists. As the oil companies conducted oil explorations, the Colonial Development Corporation (CDC) conducted detailed explorations of coalfields in Songea District and across the Njombe provincial border.

Tobacco production declined and sisal prices plummeted from £240 to £90 per ton in 1952.<sup>126</sup> The CDC and Tanganyika government quietly abandoned plans to exploit coal deposits in southwestern Tanganyika, while many of the trading houses abandoned their operations.<sup>127</sup> The Chairman of the Southern Province Chamber of Commerce and Agriculture reported in 1955 that development plans in the south had “slowly ground to a standstill. Indeed, in some measure, they may be said to have retrogressed.”<sup>128</sup>

### **Failed Infrastructure Development and the Uncontrollable Labor Market of the Borderland**

A central reason why postwar colonial development projects failed in southern Tanganyika was because the Tanganyika government, OFC, and contractors failed to accurately identify and rectify the environmental and labor challenges that undermined the construction of sustainable, all-weather transportation infrastructure in the region.<sup>129</sup> The OFC knew that the “future development of the Southern

---

<sup>126</sup> BNA CO 691/208/7, Provincial Commissioner, “Report on the Southern Province,” (E/12), 23 May 1953. The loss of an estimated £1,200,000 in sisal revenue was partially compensated by £605,745 in revenue generated by other agricultural produce, particularly cashew nut.

<sup>127</sup> The CDC’s coal investigation found 40 million tons of extractable coal in southwestern Tanganyika. The coal deposits were abandoned partially due to prohibitive costs of constructing a railway extension to Songea from the Central or Southern Province Railway Lines. A railway survey conducted by Sir Alexander Gibb & Partners with Overseas Consultants Incorporated determined that construction of the Nachingwea-Makumbako route was cheaper than the alternate Kapiri Mposhi-Mashombo route (£32,947,500). The Nachingwea route, however, would still require over seventeen million pounds, involve extremely heavy construction, and take nearly a decade to complete. Officials increasingly doubted whether the investments were worthwhile considering that oil was quickly replacing coal. The locomotives in Uganda and Kenya had already switched to oil and Tanganyika Railways was making the change. Sir Reginald Robins – Commissioner for Transport for the East Africa High Commission – argued that “oil holds the field and is a most satisfactory fuel from our point of view.” Robins feared that Tanganyikan coal was unlikely to find a profitable market in East Africa and bunkering or exporting the coal would prove too costly. Robins and the CDC worried that the coal scheme could become yet another multi-million pound failure: “The question arises, therefore, as to the extent to which the British taxpayer is able or willing to deny himself, or to devote his savings to the development in East Africa, with, so far as he can see, no hope of material satisfaction to himself” (BLCAS MSS Afr. s.1751, Sir Reginald E. Robins, “Transport Memorandum No 31: Central African Rail Link Development Survey,” 24 September 1952). For information about the CDC coal exploration and debates about the railway extension, see BNA CO 691/215/8 Colonial Development Corporation; TNA Native Affairs 39131, CDC, “Reports and Accounts” for 1950, 1951, and 1952; and BLCAS MSS Afr. s. 1751, EAR&H, “North South Rail Link Survey: Summary of Engineering Report,” June 1952; and Sir Reginald E. Robins to Marshall Clark, 27 June 1952.

<sup>128</sup> BNA CO 822/975 Plans for the Development of the Southern Province of Tanganyika (1954-56), “Trading Houses Pulling out of Tanganyika’s Southern Province ‘Development Plans have Ground to A Standstill,’” August 1955.

<sup>129</sup> Historians have noted the link between the Groundnut Scheme’s failure and Tanganyika’s poor transportation infrastructure, including; Hogendorn and Scott, “Very Large-Scale Agricultural Projects,” 174-78; “Introduction,” in *The Labour Government and the End of Empire 1945-1951*, xlvii; Kelly, “A Tale of Two Cities,” 275; and D.R. Myddelton, *They Meant Well: Government Project Disasters* (London: Institute of Economic Affairs, 2007), 72-74.

Province areas depended in the first instance entirely on communications, which were virtually non-existent.”<sup>130</sup> The colonial state and development planners saw railway transportation as the future mode of mobility in southern Tanganyika despite the protests of critics and evidence of a growing road transportation sector. Opposition to the railway first came from Sir Reginald Robins – former General Manager of Tanganyika Railways and Harbours and then General Manager of Kenya and Uganda Railways and Harbours. During the early planning phases of the GNS, Robins argued that the Wakefield Mission failed to appreciate “the enormous cost of an isolated railway.”<sup>131</sup> In addition to the high costs of constructing a new railway, there were additional costs of provisioning locomotives, rolling stock, and overheads. Without a connection to another railway line – such as the Central Line – the Southern Province Railway would be hard-pressed to obtain adequate stores and skilled assistance for its construction and operation. Robins concluded that the costs were “totally out of proportion to a short railway of about 120 miles.”<sup>132</sup> The Chief Engineer of East African Railways and General Manager of Tanganyika Railways (J.R. Farquharson) did not oppose the railway, but doubted the viability of constructing one from Mtwara.<sup>133</sup> Farquharson favored a railway from Lindi town and port. It was allegedly cheaper and more profitable as it would traverse a populated area producing 10,000 tons of crops. Lindi port had the added advantages of existing banks, shops, limited port facilities, and a “fair road system.”<sup>134</sup> Farquharson insisted that the Lindi route was the “dream of the railway location engineer and the transport economist – an evenly graded valley going straight from the production area to the sea – giving a falling grade for the export traffic and an even rising grade for the lighter import traffic.”<sup>135</sup> While Governor William Denis Battershill endorsed Farquharson’s choice, three foreign harbor and

---

<sup>130</sup> BNA CO 691/204/4, OFC, *First Annual Report [...] period ended March 31<sup>st</sup> 1949*.

<sup>131</sup> TNA Native Affairs 35781, Sir Reginald Robins, Kenya and Uganda Railways and Harbours General Manager Office, to C.B., 5 October 1946.

<sup>132</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>133</sup> BNA MAF 83/1800 East African Groundnut Scheme: Transport Problems and Maps of Lindi Area, J.R. Farquharson, “Groundnut Schemes in Central, Western and the Southern Provinces of Tanganyika.”

<sup>134</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>135</sup> *Ibid.* Construction of the Lindi line could also begin sooner due to the existence of a German railway survey.

shipping experts convinced London to invest in Mtwara.<sup>136</sup> The railway suffered as a consequence. A survey determined that it was impossible to construct a railway directly from Mtwara to Nachingwea because of the Makonde Plateau. The railway had to follow the Lukuledi Valley, and the difficult terrain and soil conditions south of the Lukuledi River required heavy work.<sup>137</sup> Planners also had to split construction work between Mtwara and Lindi because Mtwara could not handle the thousands of tons of imported construction materials and mechanical equipment. One railway branch ran from a temporary dock at Mkwaya to Nachingwea, while the second connected Mtwara to Ruo.<sup>138</sup>



Figure 4.4 Mkwaya Port<sup>139</sup>

Sir Reginald Robins' earlier warnings about the high cost of constructing and operating an isolated railway and new port came to fruition. The price for both rose from £1.25 million, to £4.55

<sup>136</sup> BNA MAF 83/1804, "Copy of Cable to Governor Tanganyika from S. of S. Colonies Dated 1.2.47." Although Farquharson advocated Lindi as the more economic choice, he did not completely reject Mto Mtwara. If Lindi was found inadequate "for the growing needs of the Territory, development there could be stopped and Mto Mtwara could be developed as the main port for the southern ports of Tanganyika."

<sup>137</sup> ICE, Major-General Desmond Harrison, "Conference on Civil Engineering Problems in the Colonies, 1948," in "Civil Engineering Problems of the East African Groundnut Scheme, 1948," 18-31; and BNA CO 822/139/1, "History of the Southern Province Railway Line," extract from *Tanganyika Standard*, 27 October 1949.

<sup>138</sup> Mkwaya was located just south of Mingoyo and up the Lukuledi River from Lindi Creek. Planners initially planned on using Mingoyo pier (just as during World War I). The pier, however, could only handle 300 tons per day. A 600 ft. long lighterage quay was constructed at Mkwaya. A 20,000 ft<sup>2</sup> storage area was established near the landing beach, while a separate 150 ft<sup>2</sup> area was designated as a fuel dump. Development planners hoped that the Mkwaya branch would "facilitate the construction of the Valley section and provide as early as possible a transport route of some considerable capacity from the Coast to the cultivation areas." The two lines would eventually converge at Ruo. See BNA MAF 83/1804, cable to Martin, 14 July 1947; BNA CAB 129/23/18, Strachey, "East African Groundnuts Scheme: Review of Progress to the end of November, 1947" (or TNA Native Affairs 36826/ Vol I); BNA CO 822/553, G.W. Baker, *A Review of Development Plans 1953*; and BNA CO 822/139/1, "History of the Southern Province Railway Line," extract from *Tanganyika Standard*, 27 October 1949.

<sup>139</sup> BNA CO 822/553, Baker, *A Review of Development Plans 1953*.

million, and over £6.5 million by 1953.<sup>140</sup> The haste to complete the railway as quickly as possible led to costly mistakes. The high cost and scarcity of steel after the war forced contractors to use timber sleepers rather than steel sleepers.<sup>141</sup> The Forestry Department and railway engineering staff, however, knew “little or nothing about their [local timber] suitability for railway sleepers.”<sup>142</sup> They estimated that hardwood from the interior would last six years and coastal mangroves would last twelve years. In reality, the hardwoods lasted anywhere from six months to four years after being placed on the road bed due to dry rot, white ants, and pinhole borera. Large quantities of the hardwood also “deteriorated badly while still in stack.”<sup>143</sup> The mangrove timber resisted ants, but splintered at the spikes. The splintering meant that the rails could not hold “true to gauge and making the permanent way dangerous.”<sup>144</sup> The sleepers also deteriorated rapidly because none of them were subjected to preservative treatments before being laid. It was too expensive to replace the timber sleepers with steel by 1953 as the cost had doubled to Shs. 60/- per sleeper.<sup>145</sup> The General Manager of East Africa Railways and Harbours admitted in 1955 that the railway had been built “far too hurriedly and far too cheaply” over some of the “worst country possible” and that it “would be foolish to say there would not by any more trouble in future years because there would be.”<sup>146</sup>

---

<sup>140</sup> BNA BT 193/43 Port and Dock Conditions and Development Africa: Tanganyika and Kenya, Part II, Commissioner for Transport to Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies, 6 August 1953.

<sup>141</sup> TNA Native Affairs 35781, S.O.S. to the Governor, 2 November 1946; BNA BT 193/43, Tanganyika and Kenya, Transport Advisory Council, Council Memorandum No. 290, “Southern Province Railway and Port: Revised Estimates,” 4 August 1953. Steel sleepers were nearly triple the price of local timber sleepers: Shs.29/- versus Shs.11/50. The timber came primarily from the Central Railway, coastal areas, and Southern Province. An additional 66,000 tons came from the Rhodesian War Stores Disposal Organisation, but it was softwood and failed more rapidly than the local timbers.

<sup>142</sup> BNA BT 193/43, Transport Advisory Council, Council Memorandum No. 290 .

<sup>143</sup> Ibid.

<sup>144</sup> Ibid.

<sup>145</sup> Ibid. It would have cost £1,015,000 to complete re-sleepering with steel. The lifetime of the steel sleepers, furthermore, was only four years.

<sup>146</sup> BNA CO 822/975, “Trading Houses.” His prediction was correct. The Southern Railway suffered flood damage at the beginning of 1956, halting passenger services from mid-February to the end of June. (DSM, D.S. Troup, “Southern Province,” *Annual Report 1956*.)

## African Laborers' Responses to the GNS

The railway scheme also failed because the state and private employers could not stabilize the labor population in the Ruvuma borderland. Laborers in southern Tanganyika and northern Portuguese East Africa (PEA) were accustomed to traversing the porous and unregulated territorial border to pursue the best employment opportunities. During the Second World War, economic factors pushed laborers away from southern Tanganyika and pulled them to the north, south, and west. In 1942, the southern provincial administration noted a growing trend among migrant laborers limiting their employment in the Southern Province. They worked only long enough to procure adequate cash and provisions to travel to the sisal estates along the Central and Tanga Railways.<sup>147</sup> Migrant laborers preferred employment in the north because of better wages, housing, rations, and labor conditions.<sup>148</sup> An investigation by the Labour Department in September 1944 reported that conditions on all of the southern sisal plantations (with the exception of Kikwetu Estate) were “atrocious.”<sup>149</sup> Migrant laborers from Tanganyika and PEA knew that labor conditions were better elsewhere:

---

<sup>147</sup> DSM, L.H.L. Foster, “Southern Province,” *Annual Reports 1942*; and TNA ACC 460 Ministry of Labour, 541/18/ Vol. 2, “Notes on Visit to Southern Province (?) November to 1 December 1944: Portuguese East Africa Labour,” 23. Laborers often sold their partly completed *vipande* at “present value” prices to other laborers, who carried them to completion. PEA migrant laborers worked an additional month or so in the Southern Province before returning across the Ruvuma.

<sup>148</sup> Plantations in the south were notorious for offering no rations and lesser wages to their African employees than the northerly estates. Kikwetu and Mtwero Estates offered the following wages in May 1939: cutters (Shs. 14/-), corona (Shs. 14/- to 16/-), bush (Shs. 14/- to 18/-), and hoeing (Shs. 12/-). Only contracted men received rations. The rest purchased food at Indian *dukas* and markets on the estate. Food stuff prices, however, were not controlled and were much higher than usual. Estate housing sanitation was “often badly neglected.” See James L. Giblin, *A History of the Excluded: Making Family a Refuge from the State in Twentieth-Century Tanzania* (Oxford: James Currey, 2005), 127; TNA ACC 460, 4/25/6 Inspection Report Kikwetu Sisal Estate Ltd., Lindi (1939-55), “Lindi Province: Kikwetu and Mtwero Estates,” 16 May 1939; TNA ACC 16, 13/25 Annual Labour Reports, District Commissioner Lindi to Provincial Commissioner, “Labour Report, 1942,” January 1943; Provincial Commissioner, “Southern Province Labour Report 1943,” 7 February 1944; DSM, L.A.W. Vickers-Haviland, “Southern Province,” *Annual Reports 1943*; and Rizzo, “What Was Left of the Groundnut Scheme,” 216.

<sup>149</sup> BNA FCO 141/17730, J. Rooke Johnston to Chief Secretary, 25 September 1944. There were debates within the Colonial Office about the role of colonial governments for providing workers' housing, education, hospitals, and other welfare facilities. Orde-Browne argued that the colonial government put too much of the responsibility on the employers. Mr. Dalgleish and the Colonial Labour Advisory Committee Africa contended that after an industry was established and a sizeable worker community existed, then “there was an obligation upon Governments to provide the same social services which were their concern elsewhere.” In the case of Tanganyika, the territorial government argued that it lacked the manpower and resources to properly oversee private employers, let alone assist/provide welfare facilities. The Colonial Office recognized the “practical realities” as they existed in East Africa and encouraged the Tanganyika government, its Labour Department, and provincial administrations to do their

The average Mawia immigrant has now a very shrewd idea in the comparative labour conditions prevailing in the Northern Areas, compared with this Province, and this information is furnished by Mawia labourers returning to Portuguese East Africa.<sup>150</sup>

Laborers were also attracted north by the efforts the Tanganyika Sisal Growers' Association's Labor Bureau – SILABU. The TSGA created the centralized recruiting and forwarding agency in 1944.<sup>151</sup>

Networks of local agents recruited contracted (attested) laborers to work for a fixed term – averaging nine months – on designated plantations in return for free transport to and from the estates, rations, housing, and wages.<sup>152</sup> SILABU utilized motor vehicles to quickly and efficiently transport thousands of migrant laborers throughout the Territory.<sup>153</sup> By 1950, the Ruvuma borderland formed “part of the nucleus of the labour reserve for the territory.”<sup>154</sup>

---

best in ensuring that employers fulfilled their obligations to laborers' welfare. See BNA CO 822/130/2, Governors' Deputy of Tanganyika to the S.O.S. (G.H. Hall), November 1945; “Draft Minutes of the Second Meeting of the Africa Sub-Committee of the Colonial Labour Advisory Committee held in the Colonial Office on 14<sup>th</sup> June, 1946,” 29 June 1946; “Colonial Labour Advisory Committee-Africa Sub-Committee,” October 1946; and Governor of Tanganyika to A.B. Cohen, May 1947.

<sup>150</sup> TNA ACC 16, 13/25, Labour Officer Lindi (JFM Kenny-Dillon) to Labour Commissioner, “Southern Province Yearly Report 1945,” 28 January 1946.

<sup>151</sup> The TSGA worked under a permit recruiting system after 1941. The permits stipulated which districts were open to recruitment and how many laborers could be contracted. For example, no permits were issued for Lindi, Mikindani, Masasi, or Newala Districts in 1941. Recruiting in Tunduru was restricted due to an outbreak of cerebrospinal meningitis. The permit system did not apply to voluntary, non-contracted laborers. See TNA ACC 16, 13/25, L.H.L. Foster, “Southern Province Report on Labour, 1941,” 14 January 1942, 40-44.

<sup>152</sup> Giblin, *A History of the Excluded*, 111. SILABU's facilities in southern Tanganyika were initially inadequate. There were only a few agents in Tunduru, Songea, and Kilwa Districts. The agents included: W.J.T. Leeman (Songea), Lalj and Dadoo & Sons (Tunduru), and Narendra Vaidya (Kilwa). Leeman had been recruiting laborers from Songea for nearly twenty years. Between 1944 and 1945 the number of attested laborers from the Southern Province actually declined from 1,411 to 1,386 – in comparison to 10,164 and 13,370 in the rest of the Territory. Most PEA laborers refused to be attested. They were also suspicious of and objected to medical examinations because they believed it put them under contract. See TNA ACC 460, 515 Tanganyika Sisal Growers Association Labour Bureau Recruiting Organisation Tanga, Vol. 1, “Annual Report T.S.G.A. Labour Bureau for the Year 1945,” 494A; and W.J.T. Leeman to Secretary TSGA Labour Bureau, 10 September 1945, 348B; and TNA ACC 16, 13/25, Labour Officer Lindi (JFM Kenny-Dillon) to Labour Commissioner, “Southern Province Yearly Report 1945,” 28 January 1946, 127-134.)

<sup>153</sup> It is important to note that laborers walked to Njombe when the Songea-Njombe road became impassable to vehicles after November. Foot journeys from Njombe to Tanga could take at least thirty days and much longer if the man worked for provisions *en route*. To the southeast, most migrant laborers continued to travel by foot in the early 1940s. One of the more popular labor routes allegedly passed through Liwale District. According to the District Officer of Liwale, laborers from PEA, Songea, and Tunduru converged at Naapata and then continued up the Mlembwe valley to the Matanau and north to Mpapuli Juu via Mkanya. The labor route then divided west (towards Morogoro and Kilosa) and east (towards Utete, Dar es Salaam, and onward). The Labour Commissioner offered a slightly different labor route for the PEA migrants in 1945. He claimed that most migrants found their way to Mtama (45 miles west of Lindi) and headed to Mingoyo. Three routes diverged north from Mingoyo and re-converged at Mtandi, across the Mbwemkuru River. Migrant laborers then followed the telegraph line to Kilwa Kivinje and headed north to Dar es Salaam (some using the coastal road via Muhoro). The journey from Lindi or

High prices for “native” produce, uncontrolled markets, and increased labor opportunities in PEA drew laborers south across the Ruvuma during the war.<sup>155</sup> High-paying mining jobs also attracted PEA and Tanganyika laborers to South Africa, Northern Rhodesia, and Southern Rhodesia.<sup>156</sup> Poor working conditions and wartime conscription policies, meanwhile, pushed African laborers away from southern Tanganyika.<sup>157</sup> The southern provincial administration expressed concerns when PEA migrants failed to

Mikindani to Dar es Salaam took anywhere from ten to fourteen days. These migrants often travelled without adequate rations, accommodations, and medical facilities. British officers advocated vehicle and railway transport because laborers arrived in better physical and mental condition in comparison to the arduous foot journeys. For an excellent historical analysis of labor migrations from Njombe, see Giblin, *A History of the Excluded*. For archival documentation about labor migrations, see DSM, “Southern Province,” *Annual Reports 1939 and 1942*; TNA ACC 460, 541/18/Vol. 2, Southern Provincial Commissioner to Labour Commissioner, 16 May 1945; TNA 16, 13/22 Transport of Recruited Labour and Labour Routes, District Officer Liwale to Provincial Commissioner, “Labour Routes, Liwale District,” 12 May 1941; TNA ACC 16, 13/25, Labour Officer Lindi (JFM Kenny-Dillon) to Labour Commissioner, “Southern Province Yearly Report 1945,” 28 January 1946; District Commissioner Lindi to Provincial Commissioner, “Labour Report, 1942,” January 1943; and W.J.T. Leeman Labour Agent, 31 December 1947.

<sup>154</sup> TNA ACC 460, 8/94 T.S.G.A. Labour Bureau Recruiting Organisation, Vol. I, “Notes as basis for discussion on Recruiting for the Sisal Industry within the Southern Province,” 16 September 1950.

<sup>155</sup> Malyn Newitt, *A History of Mozambique* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995), 464 and 471; TNA ACC 16, 13/25, “Labour Report – Mikindani District 1942,” 56; and “Southern Province Labour Report 1943,” 7 February 1944, 113-15.

<sup>156</sup> DSM, L.H.L. Foster, “Southern Province,” *Annual Reports 1942*; J. Rooke Johnston, “Southern Province,” *Annual Reports 1946*; T.O. Pike, “Southern Province,” *Tanganyika Territory: Annual Reports of the Provincial Commissioner for year 1947* (Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 1948); and TNA ACC 16, 13/25, D.H. Thwaites Labour Officer Lindi to Labour Commissioner, 21 January 1947, 146-53. The British administration found itself unable to determine with accuracy the number of laborers (PEA and Tanganyika) arriving in, leaving, and/or returning to the Southern Province. An estimated 1,292 men from Songea left for work in the Union of South Africa and Northern and Southern Rhodesia in 1942.

<sup>157</sup> DSM, L.A.W. Vickers-Haviland, “Southern Province,” *Annual Reports 1943*. The conscription of African labor was first authorized under the Compulsory Service Ordinance 23 of 1940. Under the ordinance 100 African laborers were conscripted for road work in 1940. An additional 1,260 laborers completed road work, telegraphs, the Ordnance Depot in Arusha, and the production of wooden sleepers for the railways in 1941. Two years later, the Governor of Tanganyika asked the S.O.S. to authorize a boarder implementation of the Compulsory Service Ordinance: “[...]where normal methods failed; that the numbers were unlikely to be large; that the period would be limited to urgent requirement of certain crops; that wage rates would be fixed under the Ordinance and that treatment would be safeguarded by Government and the natives engaged on the production of essential foodstuffs would not be called up” (Orde-Browne, “Labour Conditions in East Africa.”). The S.O.S. approved the petition, though he stressed the importance of limiting conscription for private employers and providing safeguards for laborers’ pay, rations, housing, and general conditions of service. Conscription was introduced with quota requirements for military service. The Military Labour Service and the Pioneer Corps were largely comprised on conscript labor. The conscripted laborers received the “ruling market rate” of Shs. 12/- per month, free transport, full government-scale rations, accommodations, medical attention, and a blanket.

According to Orde-Browne, the collection of conscripted labor in Tanganyika began with an estimation of the manpower resources of the various districts: “Provincial and District Commissioners were then notified of the number expected from them and the Native Authorities concerned were thus informed; it remained for them to collect the men and forward them to the assembling centres. The men selected by the Native Authorities were sent to the District Commissioner who personally interviewed them; any obviously unfit were weeded out and



return to Tanganyika in large number after the war despite rising taxes, increased forced labor practices, and the establishment of disadvantageous food controls in PEA.<sup>158</sup> British officers attributed the low migration rates to Portuguese border restrictions, better consumer markets in PEA, and an intensification of mining recruitment activities.<sup>159</sup> Labour Officer Kenny-Dillon warned that unless labor conditions in the Southern Province improved to the level found in the Central and Tanga areas, the borderland would not attain its net labor requirements and would lose its surplus labor supply from PEA.<sup>160</sup> Despite the warnings, the southern estates felt little incentive to improve their wage rates and working conditions after the war since their labor forces remained adequate and there was virtually no oversight from the Labour

---

those who claimed exemption for some reason were then given a hearing in which the District Commissioner had the assistance of representative Elders for the area concerned." Once selected, the men were moved to the main camps for medical inspection, allocation, registration, etc. Accepted men were vaccinated, quarantined for disease, supplied with blankets, and sent to their respective units. The terms of service and number of conscripted laborers for non-military operations rose from 8,420 in 1942 to 26,256 in 1945. After being strongly opposed to conscription, the sisal industry "was reluctantly compelled to ask" for laborers in 1943. Orde-Browne credited the industry's reversal to the increased international demand for sisal. In 1945, the industry procured 11,816 conscripted workers. Conscription for the sisal industry in Tunduru, however, was "most unpopular" and the Native Authorities refused to help. Young men also fled to the bush or across the Ruvuma into PEA. Since there was no system of identification in Tanganyika, it was impossible to collect accurate statistics about where the conscripted laborers originated from. See BNA CO 691/184/6 Compulsory Labour Service 1940-42; BNA CO 691/184/7 Compulsory Service Reports 1942; and BNA CO 822/130/2, Major G. St. J. Orde Browne, "Labour Conditions in East Africa," (London: His Majesty's Press, 1946).

<sup>158</sup> TNA ACC 16, 13/25, Labour Officer Lindi (JFM Kenny-Dillon) to Labour Commissioner, "Southern Province Yearly Report 1945," 28 January 1946; TNA ACC 460, 541/18/Vol. 2, Provincial Commissioner to Labour Commissioner, 16 May 1945; BNA FCO 141/17730, J. Rooke Johnston to Chief Secretary, 10 November 1945; and Newitt, *A History of Mozambique*, 464 and 471. Taxes in PEA were Shs. 16/- versus Shs. 7/- in Tanganyika. A kilo bag of mtama cost Shs. 20/- in PEA versus Shs. 12/- in Mikindani. Forced labor practices increased as the Portuguese administration relaxed restrictions on recruitment methods in 1942.

<sup>159</sup> The Portuguese posted armed guards at six different Ruvuma crossings to prevent northward migrations, but their efforts were only partially successful as migrants continued to cross the river at night in pursuit of "better wages and more congenial conditions." See BNA FCO 141/17730, J. Rooke Johnston to Chief Secretary, 7 March 1945 and 10 October 1947; A.H. Pike to Chief Secretary, 8 September 1948; DSM, A.H. Pike, "Southern Province," *Annual Reports of the Provincial Commissioners for the year 1949* (Dar es Salaam Government Printer, 1950); "Southern Province," *Annual Reports 1952*; TNA ACC 460, 541/18/Vol. 2, "Notes from the Labour Officer, Lindi Quarterly Report for the Quarter Ended 30 September 1951"; and TNA ACC 460, 541/19/Vol. 3 Migration of Tanganyika Labour to Rhodesia and South Africa.

<sup>160</sup> TNA ACC 16, 13/25, Labour Officer Lindi (JFM Kenny-Dillon) to Labour Commissioner, "Southern Province Yearly Report 1945," 28 January 1946, 127-134; and TNA ACC 460, 4/25/6, Sgd. J. Dickson Labor Officer, "Labour Report: Kikwetu and Mtwero Sisal Estates Lindi," 5 September 1944.

Department.<sup>161</sup> The southern sisal industry only increased its wages to those found in Tanga in 1948 in response to rising competition with GNS contractors.<sup>162</sup>

The southern provincial administration estimated that 180,000 persons were available for employment in the Southern Province at the onset of the Groundnut Scheme. On paper, this labor supply was adequate to meet the needs of the scheme, port and railway construction, and local employers.<sup>163</sup>

**Table 4.3 Estimated Labor Requirements, Southern Province, 1948**

Mkwaya-Nachingwea Railway	3,500
Balfour Beatty (Mtwara Harbor)	3,000
John Mowlem (OFC Contractor)	3,500
Paulings & Co. Ltd. (Mtwara-Ruo railway)	4,000
Taylor Woodrow (Oil Pipeline)	1,000
<b>Total</b>	<b>15,000</b>

Labor demands, however, exceeded labor supplies from 1947 to 1952.<sup>164</sup> The railway and port contractors experienced the largest deficits and highest turnover rates. Messrs. Pauling & Co. Ltd. and Messrs. Karageorgelis & Co. had few laborers completing more than one or two *kipande* for railway construction.<sup>165</sup> The East African Railways & Harbours fell 50% short of their labor requirements for the Mtwara-Ruo railway construction project in 1950.<sup>166</sup> The turnover rates for Pauling and Balfour Beatty reached as much as 50% during the same year.<sup>167</sup> Without adequate labor, completion of the railway was delayed year after year.<sup>168</sup> Seasonal labor fluctuations also frustrated all contractors as they found their

<sup>161</sup> BNA CO 822/130/2, Major G. St. J. Orde Browne, "Labour Conditions in East Africa," (London: His Majesty's Press, 1946). The Labour Department was only reestablished in 1940. Orde Browne reported the department's workload continually rose, yet additional staff was unobtainable. He concluded that the "very few officers available did their best but it was most unfortunate that there was not a strong organisation to deal with this emergency."

<sup>162</sup> BNA FCO 141/17730, A.H. Pike to Chief Secretary, 9 July 1948; and Kelly, "A Tale of Two Cities," 315-317.

<sup>163</sup> TNA ACC 16, 13/25, "Annual Report for 1947 Part I," 12 January 1948, 165-74.

<sup>164</sup> Rizzo, "The Groundnut Scheme Revisited," 82; and Kelly, "A Tale of Two Cities," 310-311.

<sup>165</sup> BNA CO 859/195/2, Labour Commissioner, "'Quarterly Report on Labour Problems of the Groundnut Scheme for Period 1<sup>st</sup> October to 31<sup>st</sup> December 1948' – Mr. E Parry, Assistant Labour Adviser and Labour Commissioner preliminary visit to all three GNS Areas between Dec. 28 1948 to Jan. 15 1949," (Report sent by Governor to Secretary of State, 16 February 1949).

<sup>166</sup> TNA ACC 460, 491/2 Labour Matter Southern Province, "Notes on visit to Lindi on 24<sup>th</sup> and 25<sup>th</sup> February 1950," 185.

<sup>167</sup> TNA ACC 16, 13/25, "Annual Labour Report for 1950," 233-35. The firms recruited 80% of their six thousand laborers from Newala District.

<sup>168</sup> *Ibid*; and DSM, H.S. Senior, "Southern Province," *Annual Reports 1950*.

operations short 2,000 to 3,000 laborers after turning away workers a few months before.<sup>169</sup> The magnitude and timing of these fluctuations corresponded with the annual agricultural cycle. Most casual laborers worked for GNS contractors long enough to earn sufficient cash to supplement their subsistence agriculture. As Matteo Rizzo explained, “Employment on the scheme was considered, by the large majority of workers, as a supplement, not an alternative, to small farming gains.”<sup>170</sup> As a result, the success or failure of an agricultural season often dictated labor turnout for the GNS and ancillary projects. Rizzo argued,

The oscillating fortunes of small farmers in the province depended above all on the fluctuations of rainfall, which were then, in effect, the main determinant of labour supply: a bad harvest year was followed by expanded labour supply, and an average or good year by labour supply inadequate to employers’ needs. Attempts by employers to prolong workers’ stay in employment by increasing wages compounded rather than resolved the problem, as workers simply earned their ‘target’ income more quickly.<sup>171</sup>

The first year of the scheme, for example, witnessed a record harvest. Temporary bulk storages were overflowing and Lindi port was inundated with thousands of tons of produce awaiting export. By the end of the 1947, Lindi looked like a town “waiting to be bombed, the streets are lined with sacks stacked six to ten feet high of produce waiting for shipping and shipping is very slow in arriving.”<sup>172</sup> The massive harvest was offset by a dearth of consumer goods in local shops. With money in hand and little to buy, there was no incentive for wage labor.<sup>173</sup> The labor turnout in 1952, in comparison, was satisfactory due

---

<sup>169</sup> BNA CO 859/195/2, Labour Commissioner, “Quarterly Report on Labour Problems [...]Period 1<sup>st</sup> October to 31<sup>st</sup> December 1949.” Planting typically occurred between October and February, and the harvest season lasted from April to July.

<sup>170</sup> Rizzo, “The Groundnut Scheme Revisited,” 42.

<sup>171</sup> Rizzo, “What Was Left of the Groundnut Scheme,” 236.

<sup>172</sup> BNA FCO 141/17730, J. Rooke Johnston to Chief Secretary, 29 November 1947. Some markets in the interior closed due to a lack of gunny bags. Cultivators in Tunduru profited an extra Shs. 11,595/- by selling their produce to the UAC for higher prices than those offered by local merchants. See BNA FCO 141/17730, J. Rooke Johnston to Chief Secretary, 28 August 1947 and 12 September 1947.

<sup>173</sup> TNA ACC 16, 13/25, “Annual Report for 1947 Part I,” 12 January 1948, 165-74; and DSM, T.O. Pike, “Southern Province,” *Annual Reports 1947*. Labour Officer W.F. West concluded that with “no consumer and piece goods on the market and a full larder at home what inducement was there for the labour to turn out to work.”

to a cyclone destroying crops in April and the rise in Poll Tax rates from Shs. 5/- to Shs. 18/-.<sup>174</sup> Seasonal fluctuations, however, still occurred (as can be seen in the chart below).

**Table 4.4 Seasonal Labor Fluctuations: Monthly Labor Position, Southern Province, 1952**<sup>175</sup>

Employers	Jan	Feb	March	Apr	May	June	July	Aug	Sept	Dec
Sisal Industry	12,926	14,871	16,683	17,842	18,128	17,360	17,262	16,050	13,513	13,904
OFC	5,786	6,964	7,262	7,003	5,424	4,812	4,736	4,307	3,548	2,550
Mtwara Port*	1,269	1,239	1,152	1,156	958	987	976	1,126	1,008	799
Railway Contractors**	1,209	1,376	1,356	1,424	1,295	1,296	1,300^	900	796	465
East African Railways & Harbours	-	-	-	320	253	209	750	1,060^^	1,419	970

\* Messrs. Balfour Beatty & Ltd.

\*\* Messrs. Karageogelis & Co. and Tanganyika Engineering & Construction Co., Ltd.

^ Karageogelis finished its contract and dismissed its workforce of 400 men. EAR&H employed the discharges.

^^ EAR&H assumed authority over the Mikindani-Ruo railway section.

Labor supply finally exceeded demand in 1953 due to a drought and the reduction in labor requirements among the OFC and contractors.<sup>176</sup> With employment opportunities dwindling, the labor supply generally exceeded demand in the Southern Province for the rest of the decade.

The GNS did not radically alter the labor market in the Ruvuma borderland; rather, most local laborers exploited new employment opportunities according to existing labor patterns that combined seasonal employment with subsistence agriculture. Increased access to free motor vehicle transport via labor recruiters made it easier for laborers to travel to the coast to work a few months, pay their taxes, and purchase goods at larger shops before returning home for the cultivation and harvest seasons. Rather than creating a permanent labor force, the GNS amplified African laborers' bargaining power over the labor

<sup>174</sup> ACC 460, 491/Vol.2, "Excerpt from Quarterly Report for the Quarter Ending 31 March 1952 by Labour Officer Lindi," 216; and BNA FCO 141/17730, A.H. Pike to Chief Secretary, 3 May 1952.

<sup>175</sup> Statistics compiled by the monthly labor reports submitted by the Southern Province Labour Officer to the Labour Commissioner found in TNA ACC 460, 491/Vol. 2 Labour Matter Southern Province (17.2.50-18.355).

<sup>176</sup> DSM, D.S. Troup, "Southern Province," *Annual Reports 1953*. All the major contractors (except Balfour Beatty) finished their work and left the province during the year. Tanganyika Engineer & Contract Co., Ltd. completed railway earthwork in May and laid off 200 men. The workforce employed by the railway was also reduced from 868 to 500. Balfour Beatty reduced its employees from 600 to 400. The OFC slashed its labor requirements to 2,500 (1,000 skilled and 1,500 unskilled). The loss of employment was partially compensated by building construction conducted by firms like Patel Construction Company, Ltd. of Nairobi. See TNA ACC 460, 491/Vol. 2, "Excerpt from Labour Officer Lindi's Monthly Report for the Month of April, 1953 and August, 1953," 243; and TNA ACC 460, Labor Officer Inspection Reports Groundnut Scheme Southern Province 1948-52 (forthwith referred to as Inspection Reports GNS SP), "Labour Officer Quarterly Report [...] Ending June 30, 1952."

market. Africans took advantage of the competitive labor market, switching between jobs and playing employers off one another to get the best pay and work conditions.<sup>177</sup> Labour Officer West reported,

There is no doubt that the labour in the Lindi District now peregrinate where the work is easiest, moving from U.A.C. to John Mowlem, the Railway contractors, and the sisal estates, and although not proved, it is practically a certainty that many of these labourers have current labour cards with two or more of these employers.<sup>178</sup>

Contractors tried to attract more laborers by seeking the support of African leaders and reducing daily workloads.<sup>179</sup> Railways to the north, for example, expected an ordinary laborer to excavate 100 cubic feet of earth per diem. John Mowlem & Co., Ltd., in comparison, expected a laborer to excavate only 27 cubic feet per day. The “Greeks” were forced to reduce their workloads to match Mowlem’s “ridiculously low” requirements.<sup>180</sup> The low labor output brought railway construction to a “standstill.”<sup>181</sup> In order to reach their deadlines, contractors intensified their reliance on machinery. Elevated graders, for instance, could construct embankments at 200 cubic yards per hour.<sup>182</sup> Machines, however, were more expensive – costing up to eight times more than manual laborers.<sup>183</sup> They also broke down rapidly. Only 22 of the 113 tractors in the Southern Province were serviceable in July 1948.<sup>184</sup> The OFC and contractors reverted to

---

<sup>177</sup> TNA Native Affairs 38697 Monthly Meetings Between Representatives of the Government and of the Overseas Food Corporation, “Record of the Meeting Held at Government House at 10am on Monday December 6, 1948 to discuss matters of common interest to the Government and the O.F.C.,” 6A; and Becker, “A social history of Southeast Tanzania,” 292. In 1947, for example, a laborer could choose between the following wages offered by three of the GNS railway contractors: Shs. 18/- for 30 days plus free housing and rations from Managing Director Modern Construction (Tanganyika) Ltd.; Shs. 18/- to 21/- and rations working for Dickson; and Shs. 20/- plus full government rations under Mr. Karageorgelis. See TNA ACC 460, 541/47 Railway Construction Southern Province Labour For, Labour Officer to Labour Commission, 3 November 1947.

<sup>178</sup> TNA ACC 16, 13/25, “Annual Report for 1947 Part I,” 12 January 1948, 165-74.

<sup>179</sup> BNA FCO 141/17730, A.H. Pike to Chief Secretary, 6 October 1948; and Rizzo, “What Was Left of the Groundnut Scheme,” 225. African leaders were encouraged to visit the GNS worksites. While the leaders seemed impressed and enthusiastic, labor turnout did not improve.

<sup>180</sup> TNA Native Affairs 38697, “Record of the Meeting [...] Monday December 6, 1948 [...] Government and the O.F.C.”; and TNA ACC 460, 541/47, “Notes on Labor Position for Groundnut Scheme and Ancillary Works,” August 1948.

<sup>181</sup> BNA FCO 141/17730, A.H. Pike to Chief Secretary, 8 September 1948.

<sup>182</sup> BNA FCO 141/17730, A.H. Pike to Chief Secretary, 22 December 1948, 12 April 1949, and 9 December 1949; DSM, A.H. Pike, “Southern Province,” *Annual Reports 1948*; and BNA CO 859/195/2, Labour Commissioner, “Quarterly Report on Labour Problems of the Groundnut Scheme for Period 1<sup>st</sup> January to 31<sup>st</sup> March 1949’ – Mr. E. Parry, Assistant Labour Adviser visit to all three GNS Areas,” (report sent by Governor to Secretary of State, 1 May 1949).

<sup>183</sup> BNA FCO 141/17730, A.H. Pike to Chief Secretary, 22 December 1948 and 7 January 1949. Pauling allegedly decided to construct the whole Mtwara-Ruo section by mechanical means as far as possible.

<sup>184</sup> Wood, *The Groundnut Affair*, 143.

manual labor practices following calls for more economic methods of construction and cultivation during the Groundnut Debate (1949) and Long Term Plan (1951). Labor requirements consequently rose and switched from skilled and semi-skilled employees to unskilled manual laborers.<sup>185</sup> Demand, however, continued to exceed supply.<sup>186</sup> Earthworks for the railway and port remained extremely unpopular with African laborers.<sup>187</sup> African workers also resisted the reversion to manual labor techniques. According to Provincial Commissioner A.H. Pike, there was “no doubt that the African is no longer content to work continuously on heavy work without the assistance of machines.”<sup>188</sup> Contractors employed private recruiters and utilized the Territory’s “Labour Exchange” program to import laborers from outside the Southern Province.<sup>189</sup> The OFC even considered employing local lepers to rectify their labor difficulties in 1951.<sup>190</sup>

---

<sup>185</sup> TNA ACC 460, 491/Vol. 2,?, 208; DSM, A.H. Pike, “Southern Province,” *Annual Reports 1949 and 1952*; and Becker, “A social history of Southeast Tanzania,” 293. Employment in the Southern Province rose from 15,000 in 1947 to 35,500 in 1949 and 40,000 in 1951 and 1952.

<sup>186</sup> TNA ACC 460, 491/Vol. 2, “Notes on visit to Lindi on 24<sup>th</sup> and 25<sup>th</sup> February 1950,” 185; and TNA Native Affairs 41838 Groundnut Scheme: Policy Decisions and Other Matters Dealing with OFC Disposals and Surpluses, Stuart Gillett (new chairman OFC), memorandum “Labour Requirements of the Overseas Food Corporation in the Southern Province (1951),” August 1951, 2A.

<sup>186</sup> DSM, A.H. Pike, “Southern Province,” *Annual Reports 1951*. The OFC found itself short 2,000-2,200 workers in 1951.

<sup>187</sup> BNA FCO 141/17730, A.H. Pike to Chief Secretary, 22 December 1948 and 7 January 1949.

<sup>188</sup> A.H. Pike, “Southern Province,” *Annual Reports 1951*.

<sup>189</sup> TNA ACC 460, Inspection Reports Groundnut Scheme Southern Province, “Labour Officer Quarterly Report on the Groundnut Scheme Southern Province for the Quarter Ending June 30, 1952”; TNA ACC 16, 13/25, “Annual Labour Report for 1953,” 270; “Mtwara Harbour Works Contractors: Labour Commissioner Molohan to Agent Balfour Beatty,” 7 January 1950; and Becker, “A social history of Southeast Tanzania,” 293. Attempts to recruit laborers from outside the province typically failed in the planning stages. The recruitment of Waha from Kigoma on Lake Tanganyika, for example, was unfeasible as the laborers requested “semi-fabulous wages.” The OFC and railway contractors imported Wagogo laborers from the Central Province in 1952, but they were released the following year with reparations. A small labor force from Ruanda-Urundi also resided in the Southern Province from 1950 to 1952 (226 men, 191 women, and 70 children). See TNA ACC 16, 13/25, “Annual Labour Report for 1952”; TNA ACC 460, 541/47 Railway Construction Southern Province Labour For; TNA ACC 460, 8/98 Recruitment of Labour Balfour Beatty & Co., Ltd., Mtwara Harbour Works Contractors: Labour Commissioner Molohan to Agent Balfour Beatty, 7 January 1950; and BNA CO 859/195/2, Labour Commissioner, “Quarterly Report on Labour Problems of the Groundnut Scheme for Period 1<sup>st</sup> July to 30<sup>th</sup> September 1949,” 5 November 1949.

<sup>190</sup> TNA ACC 460, Inspection Reports GNS SP, “Extracts from Notes on Visit to the Southern Province by Mr. C.W. Howard and Dr. A.G. Farr from 24<sup>th</sup> September 1951 to 6 October 1951”; and A.G. Specialist Industrial Health, “Utilization of Lepers as Labour Force,” 11 October 1951. The lepers would have received treatments in return for their labor. They would have been segregated from the rest of the labor force and given lower wages because they would (theoretically) complete less work. The OFC vowed to continue the men’s treatment when they were not employed during the off-season. The plan did not come to fruition partially out of fear that healthy Europeans and Africans would refuse to work with lepers.

Whereas as some African laborers exploited the employment opportunities generated by the GNS, many continued to work for the sisal industry.<sup>191</sup> SILABU annually forwarded between 10,000 and 20,000 adult men and dependents from the Southern Province to sisal plantations in Tanganyika.<sup>192</sup>

**Table 4.5 SILABU Contracted African Laborers, Southern Province**

Years	Total Contracted Labor			Labor Forwarded out of the Southern Province			Proportion from PEA
	Men	Dependents	Total	Men	Dependents	Total	Male Laborers
1948 <sup>193</sup>	1,671	529	2,200	1,323	467	1,790	N/A
1949 <sup>194</sup>	6,398	2,434	8,932	5,172	2,054	7,226	N/A
1950 <sup>195</sup>	3,325	929	4,807-8,138	778	526	1,304-2,400	N/A
1951 <sup>196</sup>	9,969	6,645	16,614	5,651	4,886	10,537	N/A
1952 <sup>197</sup>	9,113-9,974	6,250-10,057	15,363-20,031	5,749-6,896	4,684-7,005	10,433-13,901	5,010 <sup>198</sup>
1953	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
By October 1954 <sup>199</sup>	5,169	4,118	9,287	2,989	2,673	5,662	4,954
By October 1955 <sup>200</sup>	5,408	3,828	9,236	2,869	2,468	5,337	4,666

SILABU's unauthorized recruiting efforts across the Ruvuma border also attracted PEA migrant laborers, whose numbers began to rebound in 1951 due to higher wages offered in southern Tanganyika, improved consumer markets, and lower Poll Taxes (Shs. 30/- versus Shs. 100/- in PEA).<sup>201</sup> The Portuguese did not

---

In addition to shortages, the OFC also contended with desertion. It tried to remedy the situation by posting desertion lists on the Labour Utilisation Board. The Corporation also contemplated the introduction of loyalty bonds, subsidizing fares from recruiting areas, and improving welfare facilities with radios and cinemas. See TNA ACC 460, Inspection Reports GNS SP, "Extracts from Notes on Safari to Southern Province by Mr. C.W. Howard Agricultural Department Labour Commissioner, from 25<sup>th</sup> to 29<sup>th</sup> August 1952," 153.

<sup>191</sup> DSM, A.H. Pike, "Southern Province," *Annual Reports 1948 and 1951*.

<sup>192</sup> DSM, H.S. Senior, "Southern Province," *Annual Reports 1950*; TNA ACC 460, 8/94/Vol. I, Molohan to Barclay Leechman (Member for Social Services), 18 August 1951; and TNA ACC 460, 8/94/Vol. I, "Extract from L.O. Lindi's Quarterly Report for the Quarter Ending 30<sup>th</sup> September 1951."

<sup>193</sup> TNA ACC 460, 8/94/Vol. I, "Excerpt from Lindi Quarterly Report for the Period Ending 30 September 1950," 205.

<sup>194</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>195</sup> *Ibid.* The statistics at the higher end of the spectrum were reported in TNA ACC 16, 13/25, "Annual Labour Report for 1950," 233-35.

<sup>196</sup> TNA ACC 460, 8/94/Vol. I, "Extract from L.O. Lindi's Quarterly Report for the Quarter Ending 30<sup>th</sup> September 1951," 135.

<sup>197</sup> The lower values were derived from ACC 16, 13/25, "Annual Labour Report for 1952," 252. The higher values were derived from ACC 460, 491/Vol. 2, "Excerpt from the Annual Report from Labour Officer, Lindi (1952)," 238.

<sup>198</sup> TNA ACC 460, No 491/Vol. 2, "Excerpt from the Annual Report from Labour Officer, Lindi (1952)," 238. The men were accompanied by 4,533 dependents

<sup>199</sup> TNA ACC 460, No 491/Vol. 2, "Extract from Annual Report of the Labour Officer Lindi for the Year 1954," 310.

<sup>200</sup> TNA ACC 460, 8/94/Vol. 2, "Extract from Annual Report from Labor Officer, Lindi for the year 1955," 39.

<sup>201</sup> TNA ACC 460, 541/18/Vol. 2, Provincial Commissioner to Labour Commissioner, "Recruiting Newala District P.E.A.," 1 August 1950, 79; and ACC 460, 515/Vol. VI, "Report on visit to Recruiting Areas [...] 25<sup>th</sup> September 1951 to 14<sup>th</sup> October 1951," 1138 A. Exact figures were not taken, but an estimated 10,000 men and dependents

actively oppose their subjects finding employment in southern Tanganyika, but they strongly objected to “the exodus of Mawia to the Central and Tanga Lines because it is felt that only a small percentage of these people ever return home.”<sup>202</sup> Tension between the British and Portuguese was partially alleviated by a number of diplomatic visits across the Ruvuma.<sup>203</sup> The British credited good diplomatic relations with enabling the annual flow of PEA migrants.<sup>204</sup> In reality, British-Portuguese relations had a minimum impact on trans-Ruvuma migrations. Economic factors instead dictated the direction and volume of labor traffic as it had before and during the Second World War. Africans consciously chose the location, duration, and conditions of their employment based upon their knowledge of labor markets and the needs of their personal economy. The sisal industry retained its dominance over the Ruvuma borderland labor market because it had built a reputation among laborers of providing free transport and better wages, housing, and working conditions than their competitors.<sup>205</sup> SILABU’s network of local recruiters and

---

crossed the border in 1951 and 1952. SILABU’s General Secretary warned the SILABU Newala Agent (Mr. Sinclair) that any SILABU propaganda found in PEA was Sinclair’s responsibility. See BNA FO 371/97238 Despatch to Lisbon regarding an incident on the Mozambique-Tanganyika Border, Secretariat Dar es Salaam to British Consulate Beira, 31 December 1951

<sup>202</sup> DSM, H.S. Senior, “Southern Province,” *Annual Reports 1950*, 124. The Portuguese concerns were reemphasized in DSM, A.H. Pike, “Southern Province,” *Annual Reports 1952*; and TNA ACC 460, 491/Vol. 2, “Memorandum on Labour Policy in the Southern Province,” (Date?), 223. Portuguese frustration regarding trans-Ruvuma migrations occasional turned into incidence of violence and detention. See BNA FO 371/97238, Secretariat Dar es Salaam to British Consulate Beira, 31 December 1951.

<sup>203</sup> DSM, “Southern Province,” *Annual Reports 1950 and 1951*; and BNA FO 371/80814, British Consulate Beira to Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 3 March 1950.

<sup>204</sup> DSM, A.H. Pike, “Southern Province,” *Annual Reports 1951*. As discussed in the previous chapter, PEA migrant laborers were not universally welcomed in the north. According to Major Orde-Browne (then the Labour Advisor to the S.O.S.), employers’ opinions varied “astonishingly; by one they will be described as the best labour in the territory while another will proclaim them a public menace which ought to be stopped at its source.” Orde-Browne called for closer supervision and control of the Ruvuma migrant population since they originated from sleeping-sickness areas. It was impossible, however, to offer specific measures of migrant control because there was “so little reliable information available about the routes followed and the particulars of their wanderings or even the number involved.” Despite the need for further investigation, the administration was more concerned about the influx of migrant laborers from Ruanda-Urundi. See BNA CO 822/130/2, Major G. St. J. Orde Browne, “Labour Conditions in East Africa,” (London: His Majesty’s Press, 1946); and TNA ACC 460, 541/18/Vol. 2, “Labourers from Portuguese East Africa,” A.C. Donne (Labour Commissioner) to Labour Officer Tanga, 18 October 1940.

<sup>205</sup> TNA ACC 16, 13/25, “Annual Labour Report for 1953,” 270; TNA ACC 460, 8/94/Vol. 1, “Extract from Annual Report, 1951, by the Labour Officer Lindi,” 153; and 8/94/Vol. 2, “Extract from Handing over Notes LO Lindi,” 32. By 1951, SILABU had transit camps in Masasi, Tunduru, Newala (two camps), Songea, and a temporary camp in Kilwa. With the exception of Kilwa, the camps could handle between 100 and 150 occupants. Recruitment in the Southern Province was overseen by Mr. N.J. Sinclair (Newala Agent) and Mr. Braganza (Lindi Agent) in 1954.



forwarding offices used all manners of propaganda to attract laborers – including mobile loud-speakers.<sup>206</sup>

SILABU also established relationships with air, shipping, and road transportation firms to assure that laborers arrived to the estates regardless of the season.<sup>207</sup> SILABU's success, however, was not ubiquitous. Jim Giblin found that many migrant laborers from Njombe felt SILABU stripped them of their autonomy.<sup>208</sup> Giblin contended that sisal laborers used “*manamba*” as a term of self-reference in order to convey –

[...] their feeling that SILABU had deprived them of their dignity and autonomy by subjecting them to medical examination and classification, loading them aboard guarded lorries and delivering them to plantations. It conveyed their resentment of a bureaucracy that demanded the surrender of autonomy and acceptance of regimentation as the price of avoiding the perils and hardships of long walking journeys.<sup>209</sup>

Large number of laborers, therefore, chose to walk from Songea to Kilosa (via Ifakara) in order to retain their autonomy and avoid medical examinations, government regulation, and unfavorable contracts.<sup>210</sup>

The power that African laborers from the Ruvuma borderland exerted over the labor market in southern Tanganyika contrasted sharply with the uncoordinated and conflicting approaches that government officials and private employers adopted to rectify the labor difficulties that undermined the GNS and its infrastructure projects. The OFC and contractors frequently blamed their labor difficulties on

---

<sup>206</sup> TNA ACC 460, 8/94/Vol. I, “Extract from Annual Report, 1951, by the Labour Officer Lindi,” 153; TNA ACC 460, 8/94/Vol. 2, “Extract from L.O. Lindi’s Monthly Report for Month of April 1953”; and Kelly “A Tale of Two Cities,” 309-14. The mobile loud-speaker used in 1953 played sisal propaganda, music, short stories, and news.

<sup>207</sup> SILABU airlifted laborers as early as 1950. Charter aircrafts transported over 1,500 laborers out of Lindi in 1951. The *Tanganyika Standard* reported that 500 recruits were airlifted first class in Airway Dakotas from Lindi to Dar es Salaam the following year. The M.V. *Mombasa* also made special trips from Dar to Lindi and back with the sole intention of transporting 1,250 sisal recruits. The M.V. *Tayari* transported an additional 150 recruits. See DSM, H.S. Senior, “Southern Province,” *Annual Reports 1950*; TNA ACC 16, 13/25, “Annual Labour Report for 1950” and “Annual Labour Report for 1953”; and TNA ACC 460, 8/94, “Great Air-Sea Exodus of Sisal Workers from Southern Province,” extract from *Tanganyika Standard*, 29 January 1952.

<sup>208</sup> Giblin, *A History of the Excluded*, 131.

<sup>209</sup> *Ibid.* SILABU also threatened to destroy the sense of mutual responsibility among migrant laborers and the networks they created with communities along the labor routes stretching hundreds of miles. Giblin likened the SILABU system with wartime civilian conscription: “Both systems subjected labourers to bureaucratic control through written registration and physical examination, transported them by motor vehicle and railway, kept them under armed guard while in transit and punished them for deserting.”

<sup>210</sup> TNA ACC 460, 515/Vol. VI, “Report on visit to Recruiting Areas in the Southern Highlands and Southern Provinces by the General Secretary from 25<sup>th</sup> September 1951 to 14<sup>th</sup> October 1951,” 1138 A.

one another, the colonial state, and local Africans.<sup>211</sup> The Labor Department and southern provincial administration, in contrast, held local merchants and development contractors culpable for the labor problems. Retail traders were accused of not increasing the quantity and quality of their inventories. Local Africans had money, but shops were full of “third-rate cloth and goods which the African is unwilling to buy in quantity; bicycles, gramophones, sewing machines, reasonable shoes, trousers, coats, sweaters, etc. and even decent Dietz lamps cannot be bought but every shop seems to be full of trash.”<sup>212</sup> The province needed high-grade trade goods to “skim off some of the surplus of floating money.”<sup>213</sup> Without trade incentives, Africans were less inclined to turnout for wage-labor employment or increase their agricultural production. The government also blamed the OFC and contractors for their “short-sightedness” in not supporting a central labor recruiting and distribution agency in 1948. Without a universal recruiting

---

<sup>211</sup> BNA FCO 141/17730, J. Rooke Johnston to Chief Secretary, 12 September 1947 and A.H. Pike to Chief Secretary, 9 July 1948; TNA ACC 16, 13/25, “Annual Report for 1947 Part I,” 12 January 1948, 165-74; TNA ACC 460, 8/98, George Howarth (Esq. Managing Director Messrs. Balfour Beatty) to the Labour Commissioner, 21 March 1949; Rizzo, “The Groundnut Scheme Revisited,” 77-79; and Kelly, “A Tale of Two Cities,” 315-317. The sisal industry accused railway contractors of starting a “wage war” by offering laborers Shs. 20/- plus rations (totaling Shs. 35/-) in comparison to the sisal estates’ wages of Shs. 20/- plus a Shs. 5/- bonus. The sisal industry also brought accusations against the southern provincial administration for biased attitudes and practices against sisal employment. Provincial Commissioner Rooke Johnston defended himself against allegations that he forcefully conscripted laborers for the GNS to the detriment of sisal growers and used police *askari* to divert labor intended for sisal plantations to the GNS. Balfour Beatty, meanwhile, led complaints about the state’s failure to apply economic/fiscal pressure on rural communities to encourage wage employment. The contractors also complained that the local populace was “physically and mentally of very poor quality.” Since well before the Second World War, Europeans across the continent shared the belief that Africans were inherently lazy and of poor quality. It is a common theme addressed in the historiography, most notably Frederick Cooper, *Decolonization and African Society: The Labor Question in French and British Africa* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); and Cooper, “Modernizing Bureaucrats,” 64-92.

<sup>212</sup> *Ibid.* Pike noted in October 1948 that the stocks in retail shops were “exceedingly poor” in Songea, Tunduru, Kilwa, and Newala. There were also problems with ramped inflation throughout the territory due to the large amounts of money in circulation. See BNA FCO 141/17730, A.H. Pike to Chief Secretary, 6 October 1948; BNA CO 691/204/4, Governor E.R.E. Surridge to Secretary of State, 2 March 1949; and Becker, “A social history of Southern Tanzania,” 285.

<sup>213</sup> *Ibid.*; Rizzo, “The Groundnut Scheme Revisited,” 82-85; Rizzo “What Was Left of the Groundnut Scheme,” 228-229; and Kelly, “A Tale of Two Cities,” 398-403. Kelly contributed consumer shortages to the Economic Control Board in Dar es Salaam, rather than Indian merchants. The board tightly regulated high demand, manufactured imports, such as *kangas* from England. When Provincial Commissioner Pike requested 2,000 *kangas*, he was only guaranteed 300 by the Economic Control Board. According to Kelly, Africans were less inclined to substitute durable goods for the specific branded products they desired, including Raleigh bicycles, Singer Sewing Machines, inexpensive Swiss watches, and Dietz brand kerosene lamps.

mechanism, competition between employers intensified.<sup>214</sup> The Labour Department also critiqued the contractors' low wages, poor working conditions, terrible housing accommodations, inexperienced European managers, and inadequate recruiting efforts.<sup>215</sup> African laborers typically resided in overcrowded, make-shift camps comprised of tents or grass huts with poor sanitation.<sup>216</sup> In a few rare instances, the accommodations for European employees were worse and resulted in poor productivity and morale.<sup>217</sup> Many of the Europeans were ill-qualified for work in Tanganyika. None of Mowelm's European staff in 1948, for example, spoke Kiswahili reliably. The provincial administration complained that most were "fresh from home and have not yet learnt how to handle Africans."<sup>218</sup> Governor Surridge reported that many of the European employees were attracted by high pay and had "no interest in Africa or the Africans."<sup>219</sup> Labor Officers argued that poor supervision resulted in labor wastage.<sup>220</sup> In 1950, the

---

<sup>214</sup> BNA CO 859/195/2, Labour Commissioner, "Quarterly Report on Labour Problems [...] Period 1<sup>st</sup> October to 31<sup>st</sup> December 1949." A bill enacted in November 1948 called for the creation of a central authority overseeing labor recruitment, distribution, and allocation in Tanganyika. Before it came into force, however, the TSGA and OFC reneged on their support. The Transport Administration also expressed doubts about the plan. No universal recruiting mechanism was instituted. See BNA CO 859/191/7 Recruitment of Labour Tanganyika, "The Labour Supply Corporation Ordinance, 1948 (No. 47 of 1948): Legal Report"; "Extracts on Labour conditions from the Report of the United Nations Visiting Mission to Tanganyika, 1948; and telegram to Cohen, Colonial Office, March 1949; and TNA Native Affairs 38697, "Record of the Meeting [...] Monday December 6, 1948 [...] Government and the O.F.C.," 6A.

<sup>215</sup> TNA ACC 460, Inspection Reports GNS SP, P. Digges La Touche, Senior Superintendent Special Branch, to Labour Commissioner, "OFC African Labour at Nachingwea," 20 August 1951; and "Extract from Notes on visit by Labour Commissioner to the Southern Province on 8-14/1/49"; BNA CO 859/195/2, Labour Commissioner, "Quarterly Report [...] 1<sup>st</sup> October to 31<sup>st</sup> December 1948"; and Rizzo, "What Was Left of the Groundnut Scheme," 226-228.

<sup>216</sup> TNA ACC 460, Inspection Reports GNS SP, Labour Officer to Labour Commissioner, 1 March 1948; Labour Commissioner, "Notes on Visit to Groundnut Scheme camps, Southern Province 23<sup>rd</sup> to 28<sup>th</sup> August 1948"; "Extracts from Minutes of Monthly Meeting at Provincial Commissioner's Office, Lindi on 27<sup>th</sup> August 1949 – Squatter Huts at Nachingwea"; and Labour Officer to Labour Commissioner, 15 September 1949; BNA CO 859/195/2, Labour Commissioner, "Quarterly Report [...] 1<sup>st</sup> October to 31<sup>st</sup> December 1948"; Hogendorn and Scott, "Very Large-Scale Agricultural Projects," 177; and Becker, "A social history of Southeast Tanzania," 293.

<sup>217</sup> The Labour Commissioner reported in November 1948 that European housing in Nachingwea was an "utter disgrace." The overcrowded European messes typically served canned goods. Fresh vegetables, milk, and meat were virtually nonexistent in the south. For reports of the Europeans' conditions, see BNA CO 859/195/2, Labour Commissioner, "Quarterly Report [...] 1<sup>st</sup> October to 31<sup>st</sup> December 1948"; TNA ACC 460, "Extract from Notes on visit by Labour Commissioner to the Southern Province on 8-14/1/49"; Labour Commissioner, "Part 1 of Report by Labour Commissioner on his visit to the Southern Province 28<sup>th</sup> Oct to 2<sup>nd</sup> November 1948"; TNA ACC 460, Inspection Reports GNS SP, "Six Times the Size of Kongwa: Hard Work and Bright Prospects of Southern Province Groundnut Scheme," *Tanganyika Standard*, March 4, 1948; BNA FCO 141/17730, A.H. Pike to Chief Secretary, 6 October 1948; and BNA CO 691/204/4, OFC, *First Annual Report [...] period ended March 31<sup>st</sup> 1949*.

<sup>218</sup> BNA FCO 141/17730, T.O. Pike to Chief Secretary, 13 March 1948.

<sup>219</sup> BNA CO 691/204/4, Report from E.R.E. Surridge, Governor of Tanganyika to S.O.S., 2 March 1949.

OFC published a reference book, “Task and Man Management of African Labour,” in order to help inexperienced European supervisors and employers get the highest standard of output from their African laborers.<sup>221</sup> The Tanganyika government also blamed labor shortages on the OFC and contractors’ poor recruiting efforts, which failed to attract PEA laborers.<sup>222</sup> Messrs. Pauling and Balfour Beatty employed 400 PEA laborers in 1950 and the OFC employed sixty in 1951.<sup>223</sup> The sisal industry, in comparison, employed between 3,000 and 7,000 PEA laborers annually.

Dissent, however, existed within the colonial ranks over labor matters. Some members of the southern provincial administration advocated embargos on labor recruitment and emigration, especially in respect to SILABU’s operations. They argued that southern Tanganyika should no longer be considered “a labour reservoir for the rest of the territory.”<sup>224</sup> As during the 1930s, British officers argued that the

<sup>220</sup> BNA CO 859/195/2, Labour Commissioner, ““Quarterly Report [...] 1<sup>st</sup> October to 31<sup>st</sup> December 1948.”” Labour Officers frequently observed Africans standing “about idle or being transported in empty lorries.” Messrs. Balfour Beatty, in particular, was accused of “gross wastage and mal-utilization of labour.” Only Taylor Woodrow Construction Ltd. was credited with sustaining an adequate workforce and conducting their contracts in a “business-like and orderly manner.”

<sup>221</sup> BNA CO 859/195/2, Labour Utilization Officer, Overseas Food Corporation, “Task and Man Management of African Labour,” (Dar es Salaam: The Tanganyika Standard, March 1950).

<sup>222</sup> The OFC, for example, had established a haphazard recruiting network with different recruiters operating in each district by 1951. The Corporation employed a private recruiting organization in Lindi and Mikindani that was comprised of six Indian Assistant Recruiters and sixteen African Assistant Recruiters. Eight lorries stationed in Mtama drove to the assistant recruiters’ locations, picked up the recruits, and drove them to Nachingwea (via Mtama). A private Indian transportation firm recruited laborers in Kilwa District for the OFC. Another Indian recruiter operated a private recruiting network in Ruponda. The OFC employed a European Recruiting Officer at Masasi, who had his own network of sixteen assistant recruiters. The Masasi operation used four lorries to transport recruits from outlying areas in Masasi and Tunduru to Nachingwea. In the far west, a former District Commissioner recruited laborers in Songea for the OFC. He similarly operated a private network of assistant recruiters. The OFC paid most of their recruiters on commission per capita. The Kilwa recruiters, for instance, received Shs. 40/- per fit recruit delivered to Nachingwea. The rate dropped to Shs. 38/- per person if over 100 men were delivered. The ex-District Commissioner operating in Tunduru similarly received Shs. 35/- per head for each fit recruit that arrived in Nachingwea. The recruiters in Ruponda, in contrast, received Shs. 10/- per head. The OFC also relied upon local headmen and chiefs in the main recruiting areas to encourage greater labor turnouts. The OFC, however, found it “impossible to attract and retain the numbers of unskilled labour required to implement the plan.” Although ninety percent of the recruits agreed to a 120-day contract, they typically “worked as long as they feel inclined to.” See TNA Native Affairs 41838, Stuart Gillett, memorandum “Labour Requirements of the Overseas Food Corporation in the Southern Province (1951),” August 1951.

<sup>223</sup> TNA ACC 460, 491/Vol. 2, “Excerpt from Lindi Quarterly Report for the Period Ending 30 September 1950,” 205; and TNA ACC 460, Inspection Reports GNS SP, “Extracts from Notes on Visit to the Southern Province [...] 24<sup>th</sup> September 1951 to 6 October 1951.”

<sup>224</sup> DSM, “Southern Province,” *Annual Reports* 1949-1951. Provincial Commissioner H.S. Senior argued that in order to meet the internal labor demands for development projects and the expanded agricultural program, it was

migration of thousands of workers and dependents threatened to produce famines and social unrest.<sup>225</sup> Masasi District, for instance, feared an impending famine because nearly 40% of its male population was away from home in 1950. Those men who resided in the district were increasingly living off the cash they obtained from wage labor rather than farming.<sup>226</sup> Famine was likewise feared in Tunduru District as an estimated 60% of the district's male population (ages 18-40) was absent at any one time.<sup>227</sup> Food crop yields declined as those women and elderly who were left behind were unable to perform the heavy manual labor required to improve the land during the dry season.<sup>228</sup> Not all women stayed behind as "grass widows."<sup>229</sup> Thousands took their children and accompanied their husbands to the coast or further north. District officers were equally concerned about these family migrations which threatened to denude interior districts of their populations.<sup>230</sup> The central administration in Dar es Salaam, however, hesitated to restrict labor migration. Tanganyika law permitted the free flow of voluntary labor in the Territory.<sup>231</sup> The state refused to institute a stricter pass system similar to those found in Kenya because officials

---

"necessary to conserve every potential worker. Indeed it is not beyond the bounds of possibility that the Province will, in future, become an importer of labour" (*Annual Reports 1950*).

<sup>225</sup> TNA ACC 460, Inspection Reports GNS SP, "Extracts from Notes on Visit to the Southern Province [...] 24<sup>th</sup> September 1951 to 6 October 1951"; TNA ACC 16, 13/25, "Annual Labour Report for 1952," 252; Rizzo, "The Groundnut Scheme Revisited," 80-82; and Rizzo, "What Was Left of the Groundnut Scheme," 222-226.

<sup>226</sup> ACC 16, 13/25, "Annual Labour Report for 1950," 233-35.

<sup>227</sup> DSM, A.H Pike, "Southern Province," *Annual Reports 1951*.

<sup>228</sup> DSM, A.H. Pike, "Southern Province," *Annual Reports 1949*; and TNA ACC 460, 491/Vol. 2, District Commissioner Tunduru "Recruited Labour and Native Authorities," 7 August 1950, 204A. District officers also argued that the unrestricted outflow of migrant laborers from the southern districts caused marriage instability and a rising number of court cases concerning absentee husbands. Elders voiced concerns about disobedience shown by women in Masasi and Tunduru Districts as they began "throw[ing] off many of their old restraints". See DSM, A.H. Pike, "Southern Province," *Annual Reports 1949*; TNA ACC 460, 491/Vol. 2, District Commissioner Tunduru "Recruited Labour and Native Authorities," 7 August 1950; Iliffe, *A Modern History of Tanganyika*, 530-31; Giblin, *A History of the Excluded*, 138-156; Rizzo, "The Groundnut Scheme Revisited," 88-89 and 146-147; and Kelly, "A Tale of Two Cities," 314 and 321-22.

<sup>229</sup> TNA ACC 16, 13/25, District Commissioner Songea, "Songea District Annual Report on Labour, 1943," January 1944.

<sup>230</sup> Officers also raised concerns about the employment of children on sisal estates and development sites. Rather than going to schools, children were drinking, gambling, and participating in "attendant evils." (TNA ACC 460, 491/Vol. 2, Labour Officer to Labour Commissioner, 1 August 1950.) For historical analyzes of child labor in Africa, see Beverly Carolease Grier, *Invisible Hands: Child Labor and the State in Colonial Zimbabwe* (Portsmouth: Heinemann, 2006); Beverly Carolease Grier, "Struggle over African Childhood: Child and Adolescent Labor, 1890-1920," in *The Global History of Childhood Reader*, ed. Heidi Morrison (London: Routledge, 2012): 197-222; and Catherine Koonar, "'Christianity, Commerce and Civilization': Child Labor and the Basel Mission in Colonial Ghana 1855-1914," *International Labor and Working Class History* 86 (Fall 2014): 72-88.

<sup>231</sup> TNA ACC 16, 13/25, "Annual Labour Report for 1952," 252; and TNA ACC 460, 8/94/Vol. I, Labour Commissioner to General Secretary of TSGA Labour Bureau, 21 October 1950, 87.

suspected that the United Nations would condemn such policies and neighboring colonies would retaliate by closing their borders or instituting unfavorable immigration quotas.<sup>232</sup> The Tanganyika government was also concerned about interfering with SILABU's operations since the sisal industry supplied the bulk of the territory's revenue.<sup>233</sup> The government tried to limit the outflow of labor from the south by setting recruiting limits for SILABU. In 1951, SILABU was permitted to recruit 1,800 contracted laborers in Songea and Tunduru, 700 from the Makonde Plateau, and 3,000 from the rest of the Southern Province.<sup>234</sup> The quotas, however, did not apply to uncontracted volunteer laborers. It was estimated in 1952 that for every four laborers recruited, there were five "volunteers."<sup>235</sup> Accusations were levied against SILABU that they exceeded their quotas by purposefully mis-categorizing laborers as volunteers when they were actually recruits.<sup>236</sup>

Faced with an ineffective quota system, some District Commissioners took matters in their own hands. The administration in Tunduru District discouraged SILABU propaganda and enacted the *cheti cha njia* pass/licensing system to prevent labor emigrations and SILABU recruitment.<sup>237</sup> All migrant

---

<sup>232</sup> Charlotte Lee Miller, "Who are the 'permanent inhabitants' of the state?: citizenship policies and border controls in Tanzania, 1920-1980" (PhD diss., University of Iowa, 2011), 36.

<sup>233</sup> TNA ACC 460, 8/94/ Vol. I, Labour Commissioner to the General Secretary of the TSGA Labour Bureau, 21 October 1950.

<sup>234</sup> TNA ACC 460, 8/94/Vol I, Labour Commissioner John V. Shaw to TSGA Labour Bureau, 6 January 1951.

<sup>235</sup> Provincial Commissioner H.S. Senior estimated that as many as 20,000 Africans were permanently absent from the province, mostly in central and northern Tanganyika. See DSM, H.S. Senior, "Southern Province," *Annual Reports 1950*.

<sup>236</sup> TNA ACC 460, 515/Vol. VI, "Report on visit to Recruiting Areas [...] 25<sup>th</sup> September 1951 to 14<sup>th</sup> October 1951"; TNA ACC 460, 8/94, Labour Commissioner Molohan to Barclay Leechman, 18 August 1951; and BNA CO 822/553, Baker, *A Review of Development Plans 1953*.

<sup>237</sup> TNA ACC 460, 515/Vol. VI, "Report on visit to Recruiting Areas [...] 25<sup>th</sup> September 1951 to 14<sup>th</sup> October 1951." District Commissioner Anderson shared his predecessor's belief that the district was disintegrating due to the exodus of men and dependents. He was particularly concerned with out-of-province migrations. Whereas most men who travelled to the southern coast returned within the year, out-of-province migrants departed for two years or longer. When Anderson's proposal to stop all out-of-province recruiting for two years was rejected, he prohibited propaganda and implemented the pass policy. Anderson did not allow "Mambe Leo" pictures or pamphlets in the Court House or Market Places and refused to allow the erection of SILABU boards in the district. He also implemented the *cheti cha njia* system, which had been utilized in the Territory since the onset of the British rule. Some officials proposed making labor identity cards compulsory for all male laborers throughout Tanganyika under the Identity Ordinance (1935). Supporters of policy argued that it would help rectify issues like "detrribalization," labor desertion, and tax collection aversion. Charlotte Miller argued that the Ordinance was a "significant piece of legislation that demonstrates how uneasy both the government and European employers were about the mobility of African laborers." The central administration passed the ordinance in 1935, but it was not implemented due to a lack of funding. For information about the *cheti cha njia* system, see Miller, "Who are

laborers had to obtain a *cheti cha njia* from their Native Authority and pay taxes before they left the district. A man could not attain the pass unless he arranged support for his dependents while away. Anyone caught without a *cheti* was liable to a fine of Shs. 50/-.<sup>238</sup> The pass policy provoked backlash from SILABU and the GNS contractors who recruited from Tunduru.<sup>239</sup> The General Secretary of SILABU met with District Commissioner Anderson in October 1951 in an attempt to resolve the conflict. The Secretary's mission failed. He found that Anderson had "very decided views and no amount of arguing will alter them. He is quiet outspoken and perfectly honest in expressing the opinion he has obtained in consultation with local Chiefs and Native Authorities."<sup>240</sup> The General Secretary also failed to find support in Lindi. Provincial Commissioner A.H. Pike shared Anderson's views and insisted that the "development of the Province is being neglected by denuding it of its manpower, for the benefit of other parts of the Territory."<sup>241</sup> Anderson continued to "place obstacles in the way of Africans" seeking out-of-district employment during the following year. He instructed all chiefs and *wakilis* that no one could leave without a *cheti cha njia*. Chief Mataka, thereafter, instructed his subordinates to immediately suspend issuing passes until he notified them.<sup>242</sup> SILABU's Area Manager and the General Secretary called upon the Provincial Commissioner to stop Anderson from his "unwarranted interference" with SILABU operations.<sup>243</sup> A.H. Pike was torn. On the one hand, he still wanted to stop the "drain of migrant labour

---

the 'permanent inhabitants' of the state?" 63-70. For archival records about Anderson and his policies, see DSM, A.H Pike, "Southern Province," *Annual Reports 1951*; and TNA 8/94/Vol. 2, Provincial Officer Tunduru Albert E. Mwanjesa to Provincial Commissioner Southern Province, "Labour Recruiting in Tunduru District is Menace to Population and Development: Serious Danger of Famine," 25 September 1951.

<sup>238</sup>TNA ACC 460, 491/Vol. 2, Labour Officer to Labour Commissioner, 17 July 1950.

<sup>239</sup> Ibid.

<sup>240</sup> TNA ACC 460, 515/Vol. VI, "Report on visit to Recruiting Areas [...] 25<sup>th</sup> September 1951 to 14<sup>th</sup> October 1951," 1138A. The two men had a heated argument, but reportedly parted "on the most friendly terms, agreeing to disagree." The Secretary complimented Anderson as being a "most hospitable and an excellent host."

<sup>241</sup> Ibid.

<sup>242</sup> TNA ACC 460, 8/94/Vol. I, Area Manager Southern Province, A.E. Etton to District Commissioner Tunduru, "Cheti Cha Njia."

<sup>243</sup> TNA ACC 460, 8/94/Vol. I, General Secretary A.L. LeMaitre to Provincial Commissioner, 19 Dec 1952; TNA, ACC 16, 13/17 Labour Recruitment Tunduru, A.E. Elton (Area Manager Southern Province, TSGA Labour Bureau, Masasi) to District Commissioner Tunduru, 11 October 1952; and General Secretary of TSGA Labour Bureau to Provincial Commissioner, 19 December 1952.

from the Province.”<sup>244</sup> On the other hand, he knew it was illegal to prevent the free flow of voluntary labor in Tanganyika.<sup>245</sup> The government could ask SILABU to withdraw their recruiters from Tunduru after they met their annual quotas, but they could not prevent SILABU from accepting and transporting voluntary laborers.<sup>246</sup>

The Tanganyika government and Labour Department ultimately supported SILABU. The colonial state wanted to control the mobility of African laborers in the postwar era, and it recognized that SILABU offered an avenue through which the state could better monitor and stabilize labor markets and recruitment. The bureau lessened instances of unauthorized, illegal recruiting by headman from the northern estates.<sup>247</sup> It also made labor migration more efficient by providing free transport by air, rail, and road. In the end, the Labour Department recognized that migrant laborers existed well before SILABU and restrictions on recruiting would not stop their migrations. African laborers from Tunduru were already getting around the *cheti cha njia* policy by walking to Songea or Masasi and signing up at SILABU offices. Some of the migrants proceeded directly from Tunduru to Kilosa along the “old walking” routes.<sup>248</sup> As long as SILABU promised to prioritize local employment in the south over the northern estates, the Labor Department welcomed its recruiting and transportation networks.<sup>249</sup> Southern employers unhappy with the situation needed to improve their wages, rations, accommodations, transport, and welfare facilities to attract and retain a permanent labor force.<sup>250</sup> The government proceeded to raise SILABU’s annual recruiting quota to 15,000 men in the Southern Province (excluding Lindi and Mtwara)

---

<sup>244</sup> DSM, H.H. McCleery, “Southern Province,” *Annual Reports of the Provincial Commissioners for the year 1952* (Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 1953).

<sup>245</sup> TNA ACC 16, 13/25, “Annual Labour Report for 1952,” 252; TNA ACC 460, 8/94/Vol. I, Labour Commissioner to General Secretary TSGA Labour Bureau, 21 Oct 1950.

<sup>246</sup> TNA ACC 460, 8/94/Vol. I, General Secretary TSGA Labour Bureau to Labour Commissioner, 7 March 1952; and Molohan to Barclay Leechman, 18 August 1951.

<sup>247</sup> TNA ACC 460, 8/94/Vol. I, Molohan to Barclay Leechman, 18 August 1951.

<sup>248</sup> TNA ACC 460, 8/94/Vol. 2, Acting Labour Commissioner to ?, 10 September 1953.

<sup>249</sup> It is interesting to note that Labour Commissioner Molohan was self-admittedly “completely out of touch” with labour situation in the Southern Province. He finally visited the province after a three year hiatus in 1952. See TNA ACC 460, 8/94/Vol. I, Labour Commissioner Molohan to Provincial Commissioner Pike, 31 July 1951; ACC 460, Inspection Reports GNS SP, “Extracts from Notes by Labour Commissioner on Safari to Southern Province from 15<sup>th</sup> to 22<sup>nd</sup> October 1952.”

<sup>250</sup> TNA ACC 460, 8/94/Vol. 2, “Extract from Handing over Notes L.O. Lindi.”



from 1953 to 1955, a level SILABU never reached.<sup>251</sup> In the end, the infrastructure scheme envisioned for the south collapsed because the British state and development contractors failed to recognize the autonomy and initiative of African laborers. Construction of the new railway and port suffered because the colonial government and private employers could not resolve how to approach labor issues in the Ruvuma borderland and create a large, permanent labor pool. African laborers instead exploited the competitive labor market for their own benefit and utilized motor vehicles to pursue economic opportunities within and beyond the Ruvuma borderland.

### **The Unexpected Rise of Automotive Transport and Collapse of the Southern Road Network**

Despite its objective of reorienting and modernizing the southern infrastructure around the Southern Province Railway, the GNS inadvertently solidified road transportation as the predominate form of long-distance mobility in southern Tanganyika. From the onset, the scheme stimulated a massive increase in motor vehicle traffic. With thousands of tons of cargo arriving by ocean-going steamers and no railway to the interior, development planners had no choice but to use automobiles.<sup>252</sup> Motor vehicle traffic in the south increased from a pre-scheme amount of 200 lorries a month to well over 2,000 in 1948.<sup>253</sup> A PWD census on the Lindi-Songea main road determined that an average of 581 OFC vehicles

---

<sup>251</sup> DSM, D.S. Troup, "Southern Province," *Annual Reports 1953*; TNA ACC 460, 8/94/Vol. 2, "Extract from Handing over Notes LO Lindi," 32; and "Master and Native Servants (Recruitment) Ordinance for TSGA Labour Bureau 1954." SILABU averaged between 6,000-7,000 contract laborers each year – half of whom originated in PEA. By 1959, the Labour Department acknowledged that SILABU recruitment was a "necessary part of the economic life of Tunduru." Ironically, SILABU's recruitment practices ended the same year due to the collapse of the sisal industry. See TNA ACC 460, 491/Vol. 2, District Commissioner Tunduru, "Recruited Labour and Native Authorities," 7 August 1950; TNA ACC 460, 515/Vol. VI, "Report on visit to Recruiting Areas in the Southern Highlands and Southern Provinces [...] to 14<sup>th</sup> October 1951"; and TNA ACC 460, 8/94/Vol. 2, Acting Labour Commissioner, 10 September 1953, and "Extract from Monthly Report from LO Lindi for the Month May 1959."


<sup>252</sup> BNA FCO 141/17730, T.O. Pike to Chief Secretary, 13 March 1948; and Native Affairs 36826, vol. 1, "Monthly Report of OFC," No. 20, December 1949. OFC, for example, discharged 213 tons per week at Lindi in October 1949. This included pipes, rails, cement, vehicles, and assorted cargo.

<sup>253</sup> DSM, A.H. Pike, "Southern Province," *Annual Reports 1948*. When A.H. Pike returned to Lindi as the Southern Provincial Commissioner in May 1948, he was amazed by the increase in traffic in the town: "Traffic has increased out of all knowledge, the harbour sometime has as many as five ocean going ships at once; all sorts of motor transport are seen everywhere and our beaches near the jetty are like Normandy beaches full of bulldozers, auto patrols and such like modern contrivances." See BNA FCO 141/17730, A.H. Pike to Chief Secretary, 9 July 1948.

utilized the Lindi-Masasi section per day in 1949.<sup>254</sup> By comparison, the highest traffic density of any road in the Territory in 1947 was 65 vehicles per day on the Arusha-Moshi road.<sup>255</sup>

**Table 4.6 Traffic Rates, 1949<sup>256</sup>**

Road	Vehicles (per day)
Lindi-Mingoyo	66
Mingoyo-Nanganga	580
Nanganga-Masasi	30
Nanganga-Ruponda	13
Lindi-Kikwetu	27
Mingoyo-Mikindani	77
Mikindani-Mtwara	81
Mtama-Mkonde	43
Lindi Township	330



**Figure 4.5 "Tanganyika Territory: Motor Traffic over Main & Grade 'A' Roads," 1946 and 1947<sup>257</sup>**

<sup>254</sup> BNA FCO 141/17730, A.H. Pike to Chief Secretary, 6 June 1949. The month before, the PWD reported that the section from Mingoyo and Nanganga on the main road carried approximately 600 vehicles per day by May 1949. The PWD, however, struggled to conduct accurate traffic census because most of the roads had "intermittent peaks depending on crop production and rains. Local contractors tend to run their vehicles in convoy and the clearing of ships from the ports effect the day to day running. The traffic is increasing with the development of the O.F.C. area and the C.D.C.'s activity in Songea and will do so until the railway is established." The Southern Provincial Commissioner insisted that government funding allocations remained insufficient because vehicle traffic rates were underestimated. See TNA Native Affairs 39007 Road-Construction by Agreement with O.F.C., Director of Public Works (McLuckie) to Chief Secretary, 3 May 1949; TNA ACC 16, 4/47, Provincial Commissioner to Provincial Engineer (PWD, Mtwara), "Territorial Annual Report 1950," 25 February 1952, 292; and Provincial Engineer to Provincial Commissioner, "Territorial Annual Report 1950," 7 March 1952, 293.

<sup>255</sup> TNA Native Affairs 39007, "Extract from Minutes by Mr. Hutt to H.E. after his visit to the Southern Province – 'Roads,'" 1949.

<sup>256</sup> Ibid.

<sup>257</sup> BLCAS 754.14 s.5 Tanganyika Public Works Department Report 1925-1953. The average intensity of motor traffic during the year was indicated by the width of the strip. Each 1/10<sup>th</sup> inch represented 20 vehicles per day.




Figure 4.6 “Tanganyika Territory: Motor Traffic over Main & Grade ‘A’ Roads,” 1948 and 1949<sup>258</sup>

Although a large percentage of vehicular traffic in southern Tanganyika was related to the GNS and ancillary projects, a growing number of private lorries appeared in the province.<sup>259</sup> Labor recruiters used automobiles to transport laborers from the interior districts to the development sites and coastal plantations. Coastal traders and producers in Masasi, Tunduru, and Songea Districts similarly accessed one another by road because the Southern Province Railway only provided access to the OFC agricultural sites and the small consumer market in Mtwara. Provincial Commissioner H.S. Senior reported in 1950 that there was “little inducement for the public to use this form of transport [railway] because the terminus is in no way connected with areas of production.” A seventy mile railway extension from Nachingwea to Lumesule Juu was supposed to tap into the Tunduru and Songea traffic, but frequent railway closures caused by washouts, erosion, and rotten wood sleepers confirmed the greater reliability and flexibility of automotive transport.<sup>260</sup> Producers and traders exploited the growing fleet of motor vehicles to move their goods through the established trade center of the Southern Province – Lindi town.

<sup>258</sup> Ibid.

<sup>259</sup> BNA FCO 141/17730, A.H. Pike to Chief Secretary, 8 November 1949.

<sup>260</sup> DSM, SAS Leslie, JFR Hill, and JR Farquharson, “Report of Communications Survey Committee,” 1950; A.H Pike, “Southern Province,” *Annual Reports 1951*; and TNA Native Affairs 39131, Colonial Development Corporation, “Reports and Accounts for 1952.”

Lindi housed the major trading houses and wholesalers in the south. Mtwara, in comparison, had one small building and a few banks erected along Broadway.<sup>261</sup> Lindi's "large consumer public" was partially the consequence of the GNS as thousands of tons of imports and exports passed through the port while Mtwara harbor was under construction for seven years.<sup>262</sup>

Roads deteriorated as the colonial state invested its resources into the floundering railway rather than the flourishing road transportation sector. The southern road network began "showing every sign of extreme strain" by 1948. The heavy volume and weight of the five- and ten-ton vehicles destroyed road surfaces.<sup>263</sup> Provincial Commissioner A.H. Pike reported in 1948 that the road surface of the Lindi-Songea main road was "ground to powder; all it needs is a few inches of rain to turn it into a quagmire and then all work will have to stop."<sup>264</sup> The "all-weather" categorization of the Lindi-Masasi section was also a misnomer – "Intrepid hardy drivers manage to force their vehicles through to Masasi at all times of the year, but during the rains this is impossible for the average driver."<sup>265</sup> Songea was only accessible

---

<sup>261</sup> BNA FCO 141/17730, L.H.L. Foster to Chief Secretary, 14 February 1953. The capital was moved as a sign of the administration's "earnest" intentions "that Mtwara is to be, no matter what happens, the Provincial capital and main port."

<sup>262</sup> Ibid.

<sup>263</sup> As the GNS lorries, tractors, and trailers ground up road surfaces in the southeast, the Colonial Development Corporation's "Lindi Convoy" tore up the main road heading west to Songea in 1949. Lord Trefgarne allegedly concocted the convoy scheme to transport tractors and other agricultural equipment from Lindi to Nyasaland in support of colonial development initiatives in the neighboring colony. The Lindi-Songea road provided an alternative route to the Portuguese-railway from Beira to Southern Nyasaland. The first "Lindi Convoy" departed in July and consisted of sixty men and thirty vehicles carrying 100 tons. The tractors, trailers, and other equipment were driven along the main road, to the Songea-Mbamba Bay district road, and shipped across Lake Nyassa to Nkata Bay. According to Provincial Commissioner Pike, the CDC scheme came under attack from the "yellow press in England." Governor Twining similarly reported that the scheme received "a good deal of ridicule as a result of the unwonted publicity which was given to the Tiger of Lindi." The East Africa High Commission's Commissioner of Transport, R.E. Robins, strongly opposed the convoy because it was uneconomic in terms of skilled manpower, materials, and maintenance depots. He disapproved of three government or "quasi-Government agencies" (CDC, OFC, and Transport Administration) competing for traffic in the Southern Province. See BNA CO 822/139/1, R.E. Robins to Under Secretary of State for the Colonies, 3 November 1949; and Governor Edward F. Twining to A.B. Cohen, Colonial Office, 14 November 1949; and BNA FCO 141/17730, A.H. Pike to Chief Secretary, 6 June and 11 August 1949.

<sup>264</sup> BNA FCO 141/17730, A.H. Pike to Chief Secretary, 10 August 1948.

<sup>265</sup> DSM, A.H. Pike, "Southern Province," *Annual Reports 1949*. The rainy season of 1945 was so severe that the "all-weather" road to Masasi was closed and most road communications elsewhere were "Nil." In March, it was just possible to reach Masasi "and with luck to get to Mikindani via Newala." The road was not reopened to Songea until June. The coastal road to Dar remained closed and would not reopen "for sometime" due to the high water levels of the Mbemwemkuru. See BNA FCO 141/17730, J. Rooke Johnston to Chief Secretary, 7 March 1945 and 6 April 1945.

during the rainy season by fortnightly air flights.<sup>266</sup> The conditions of district roads were no better and perhaps worse. Three Grade “B” District Roads carried large amounts of traffic – Lindi-Dar es Salaam, Lindi-Mikindani-Mtwara, and Songea-Njombe roads. PWD Engineer Sgd. K.L. Hardaker estimated that the Mingoyo-Mikindani-Mtwara road carried over 3,000 vehicles a month in the dry season.<sup>267</sup> It became unusable after half an inch of rain.<sup>268</sup> Sir P.E. Mitchell (then Chairman of the East Africa High Commission) half-heartedly joked about the road conditions after travelling from Lindi to Mtwara to inspect the harbor and railway progress: ““Not so bad, not so bad. In no place were they more than waist deep.””<sup>269</sup> The condition of the Lindi-Dar es Salaam road was equally poor. A.H. Pike insisted that the road was “hardly worthy of the name.”<sup>270</sup> It also became impassable after a half-inch of rain due to the black cotton soil and numerous streams. The road closed for at least seven months from December to June.<sup>271</sup> When open, the large volume of coastal traffic bottlenecked at the Rufiji River ferry. Only one

---

<sup>266</sup> BNA FCO 141/17730, A.H. Pike to Chief Secretary, 8 February 1949. The number of airports in Tanganyika expanded in the postwar era, and Dar es Salaam was brought up to an international standard. In addition to Dar es Salaam, seventeen other airports were regularly serviced by East African Airways’ domestic flights, including Kilwa, Lindi, Mtwara, Nachingwea, and Songea. Hofmeier reported that southern Tanganyika was “comparatively well served by EAA flights [in the 1960s] as a compensation for the otherwise unsatisfactory transport situation in respect to railway lines or high-standard all-weather roads.” See Hofmeier, *Transport and Economic Development in Tanzania*, 45 and 71; Pirie, *Air Empire*, 225; and Robin Higham, *Speedbird: The Complete History of B.O.A.C.* (London: I.B. Tauris & Co. Ltd., 2013).

<sup>267</sup> TNA ACC 16, 4/46, Sgd. K.L. Hardaker, Engineer PWD Southern Division to DPW; “Improvements to Mingoyo-Mikindani-Mtwara Road,” 24 February 1949; TNA Native Affairs 39007, Director of Public Works (McLuckie) to Chief Secretary, 3 May 1949.

<sup>268</sup> BNA FCO 141/17730, A.H. Pike to Chief Secretary, 8 November 1949.

<sup>269</sup> BNA FCO 141/17730, A.H. Pike to Chief Secretary, 11 March 1949.

<sup>270</sup> BNA FCO 141/17730, A.H. Pike to Chief Secretary, 4 November 1948.

<sup>271</sup> BNA FCO 141/17730, T.O. Pike to Chief Secretary, 10 April 1948. Acting Provincial Commissioner T.O. Pike reported that local Africans employed a special technique of ferrying loads across the Mbwemkuru River in large beer pots when the river flooded and bridges were removed.

vehicle crossed the river each hour.<sup>272</sup> Bridges were also a “constant source of worry” throughout the province as they suffered “substantial damage” from numerous and overweight vehicles.<sup>273</sup>

The southern provincial administration repeatedly argued that poor road conditions and annual roads closures were “one of the principal factors limiting development” and economic growth of southern Tanganyika.<sup>274</sup> Mechanical equipment could not be efficiently transported to agricultural sites. High freight rates for exporting produce from the interior hindered the profitability and expansion of African and European cultivation. It was roughly £3 per ton cheaper to transport cassava 6,600 miles by sea from Lindi to London than the 386 miles by lorry from Lindi to Songea.<sup>275</sup> Agricultural schemes in Tunduru were “held up through lack of all-weather communications,” while Songea District was deemed “too remote and without adequate communications to attract new settlers.”<sup>276</sup> Many of the foreign trading firms established along the coast in the early 1950s departed because of the failure of the British colonial administration to provide the “elementary necessities for development” – namely adequate, all-weather roads. It was too expensive to transport consumer goods inland so as to stimulate African participation in the market economy. The Colonial Development Corporation briefly funded a road haulage firm in the Southern Province and Southern Highlands, but it collapsed a year later. The CDC concluded in 1951 that

---

<sup>272</sup> DSM, A.H. Pike, “Southern Province,” *Annual Reports 1951*; and BNA FCO 141/17730, A.H. Pike to Chief Secretary, 4 November 1948. The *Tanganyika Standard* published an interesting description about the Utete ferry crossing at the Rufiji River in 1949. The ferry consisted of a wood platform tied across four bound canoes. Four 45-gallon drums were “lashed underneath the platform” when one of the lorries was driven aboard. The ferry floated, but water “was lapping within three inches of the top of the canoes as the boatmen dug their long poles into the mud and started the long half mile crossing to the other side.” The lorry appeared to be resting on “a half-sunk match box.” It took half an hour to reach the other side. See BNA CO 822/139/1, “‘Well, That’s The Biggest Obstacle Crossed’: Major Haulage Transport and Some Snags,” extract from *Tanganyika Standard*, 1 October 1949.

<sup>273</sup> DSM, A.H. Pike, “Southern Province,” *Annual Reports 1948*; and TNA Native Affairs 38697, “Draft Minutes of the Secrete Meeting Between Representatives of O.F.C. and Government held in the office of the Member of Finance, Trade and Economy at 10am on Monday 10<sup>th</sup> January 1949,” 45A.

<sup>274</sup> DSM, A.H. Pike, “Southern Province,” *Annual Reports 1949*; BNA FCO 141/17730, A.H. Pike to Chief Secretary, 10 August 1948; BNA CO 691/213/5, Wright, “Report on the Overseas Food Corporation’s East African Groundnut Scheme”; and Provincial Commissioner “Report on the Southern Province Development Plan (up to 31<sup>st</sup> December 1952),” (E/12), 23 May 1953.

<sup>275</sup> BNA CO 822/553, Baker, *A Review of Development Plans 1953*.

<sup>276</sup> DSM, “Southern Province,” *Annual Reports 1952*; and D.S. Troup, “Southern Province,” *Annual Reports 1953*. All the Mgwina tobacco “pioneers” had left Songea by 1954 due to poor communications and labor shortages. Land alienation, however, continued in Tunduru. Fifteen farms of 1,000-2,000 acres each were alienated in 1954 for tobacco cultivation. A further eleven applications for farms had been received and were under investigation at the end of 1954. DSM, D.S. Troup, “Southern Province,” *Annual Reports 1954*.


road transportation in the south was “definitely unprofitable.”<sup>277</sup> The poor condition of the roads drove up freight rates and vehicle maintenance bills which made road transportation unprofitable. Most of the second-hand automobiles operating in the south were unfit to handle the rough dirt surfaces. Damaged vehicles were left derelict for months because of a lack of spare parts. In order to compensate for the shortages, damaged vehicles were often “cannablized.”<sup>278</sup>

---

<sup>277</sup> TNA Native Affairs 39131, Colonial Development Corporation, “Reports and Accounts for 1951.” The CDC awarded the Tanganyika Roadways Ltd. £150,000 in 1950 based upon its “development value” rather than its commercial worth. Returns on investment were not expected for several years. The company, however, was bothered “by legacies of the past” and “earlier liabilities” that the CDC underestimated. The company’s second-hand vehicles were also plagued by breakdowns and many were scrapped. By the end of 1950, the CDC reported that the scheme was “an unhappy experiment.” The CDC expended an additional £150,000 to take over and reorganize the firm, its working capital, and operations. It then relocated Tanganyika Roadway Ltd. operations to the more populace and prosperous areas of Eastern, Tanga, and the Northern Provinces. The move caused conflict with the EAR&H Administration who feared competition with the Tanga and Central railways. Tanganyika Roadway Ltd. proceeded to operate in noncompetitive areas that relied “on the uncertain and unorganised services of Indian lorry owners who are literally here today and gone tomorrow.” See TNA Native Affairs 39131, Colonial Development Corporation, “Reports and Accounts for 1950” and “Reports and Accounts for 1951”; and BNA CO 534/4200 Transport Colonial Development Corporation Scheme in Southern Tanganyika 1951, Brook to A. Emanuel Colonial Office, “Tanganyika Roadways Ltd.,” 3 May 1951.

<sup>278</sup> Petrol shortages and wastage were additional problems hampering automobile traffic. Erratic shipping in the late 1940s caused shortages in petrol and lubricants, while the wastage was the result of petrol being transported in “fragile” tin debes – four-gallon cans – rather than drums. The wastage was reportedly “enormous.” Provincial Commissioner A.H. Pike recollected that one consignment lost 9% of its petrol before it left the oil depot. The opening of the Shell and Anglo-Iranian pipeline from Mtwara to Nachingwea in November 1948 helped alleviate some of these problems. See BNA FCO 141/17730, A.H. Pike to Chief Secretary, 22 December 1948, 12 April 1949, and 9 December 1949.





**Figure 4.7 Damaged OFC Vehicles in Nachingwea**<sup>279</sup>

The roads deteriorated due to the collapse of the hybrid system of road development employed in southern Tanganyika since the interwar era. Cooperation between the colonial government and local private contractors unraveled during the GNS. The state rejected local assistance – most notably TTCo – and road maintenance reverted to the Public Works Department (PWD). Since the PWD still lacked the resources necessary for wide-scale, mechanized construction, the Tanganyika government authorized new British contractors to manage the main roads in the southeast.<sup>280</sup> The UAC received a government contract in October 1947 to reconstruct the first 100 miles of the Lindi-Masasi road.<sup>281</sup> The UAC employed Messrs. Pauling & Company and Messrs. Mowlem & Company to fulfill the contract. The two

<sup>279</sup> BNA CO 691/213/5, Wright, "Report on the Overseas Food Corporation's East African Groundnut Scheme."

<sup>280</sup> TNA Native Affairs 35781, Note from W.D.B., 7 November 1946.

<sup>281</sup> TNA Native Affairs 39007, S.A.S. Leslie (Chief Secretary of the Government) to United Africa Company (Managing Agency), Ltd., 9 October 1947, 1. The Tanganyika government agreed to pay £900 for each mile of road reconstructed, totaling £90,000. The Director of Public Works would determine if the work was satisfactory for payment. The Governor would arbitrate any payment disagreements.



contractors also employed road crews to improve the Lindi-Mikindani road and its branch to Mkwaya.<sup>282</sup> The OFC adopted the contract when they took responsibility from the UAC. The OFC and subcontractors, however, had no experience working in the region nor did they feel a sense of obligation to the Tanganyika government or the Southern Province. Whereas local contractors like TTCo had to retain an amicable relationship with colonial officers and fulfill their obligations in order to maintain their contracts, the OFC was under the authority of the Ministry of Food and British Parliament. The Corporation did not answer to the Tanganyika Government and willingly exploited their connections with powerful figures in London to force the Tanganyika government to accommodate its needs.

Antagonism between the OFC and the Tanganyika government emerged in 1949. The OFC accused the Tanganyika government and PWD of failing to provide “an adequate system of all-weather roads.”<sup>283</sup> The Corporation believed it deserved all-weather infrastructure since it paid the government an estimated Shs. 429,979/- in licensing and Shs.1,005,743/- in petrol duties.<sup>284</sup> The Secretary of State advocated for the OFC and applied pressure on the Tanganyika government to provide better infrastructure. The Acting Chief Secretary of Tanganyika (F.A. Montague) responded by ordering the Director of Public Works (DPW) to rectify the road situation immediately:

I am now to state that urgency and importance is attached to this matter in view of assurances which this Government have given to the Secretary of State that everything possible will be done to improve the particular roads mentioned, as well as other public roads in the Southern Province used by the Overseas Food Corporation, their contractors, and railway contractors.<sup>285</sup>

The PWD insisted that they could keep many of the southern roads open year-round (or at least reduce the closure time), but they needed more staff, machinery, and funds.<sup>286</sup> When Montague petitioned the OFC and contractors to contribute their resources, the OFC retorted that they were under no obligation to

---

<sup>282</sup> TNA Native Affairs 36826, Vol. 1, G.A. Drew to T.J.R. Dashwood, 13 October 1947; G.A. Drew to T.J.R. Dashwood, 12 November 1947; and BNA FCO 141/17730, J. Rooke Johnston to Chief Secretary, 19 December 1947.

<sup>283</sup> TNA Native Affairs 39007, Controller of Finance Overseas Food Corporation to Chief Secretary of the Government, 9 April 1949.

<sup>284</sup> Ibid.

<sup>285</sup> TNA Native Affairs 39007, F.A. Montague (Acting Chief Secretary) to Hon'ble Director of Public Works, 6 April 1949.

<sup>286</sup> DSM, A.H. Pike, “Southern Province,” *Annual Reports 1949*; and TNA ACC 16, 4/47, Executive Engineer's Office (PWD, Lindi) to Director of Public Works, “P.W.E. 35: Road Improvements- Other Roads 1949,” 21 February 1949.

maintain any road other than those within their specified development areas.<sup>287</sup> The OFC was only prepared to help the PWD at a price. The Corporation tried to negotiate a new cost-benefit or fixed price contract to bring the Lindi-Nanganga-Nachingwea road to an all-weather standard. The Tanganyika government recognized that this was practically the same stretch of road that the OFC was already contracted to maintain.<sup>288</sup> The PWD reported that the OFC failed to complete any maintenance work on the contracted section.<sup>289</sup> The OFC responded that the earlier contract was plagued by a “considerable amount of misunderstanding and lack of co-ordination.” OFC engineers determined that the rate of £900 per mile was insufficient to construct an all-weather, non-bituminized surface for the weight and density of traffic using the road.<sup>290</sup>

The OFC’s offer received mixed reviews in Lindi and Dar es Salaam. Some colonial officers argued that the Corporation did not deserve preferential treatment over other tax payers, many of whom had contributed to the colonial state longer than the OFC. Road works were “gradually being done as funds, staff, etc. permit, but on this basis the O.F.C.’s requirements should take their place on the list after the urgent requirements of many undertakings which have been paying taxes before the O.F.C. was ever heard of.”<sup>291</sup> The Director of Public Works (McLuckie) also pointed out that the Corporation vehicles caused most of the road damage in Tanganyika. Others shared McLuckie’s rejection of the new contract, who found it “astounding that an organisation with such a reputation for extravagance would even suggest such an idea.”<sup>292</sup> All members of the Tanganyika government agreed *in theory* that the OFC should “be treated on the same basis, and if they want anything better they must pay.” The circumstances *in practicality* were more complicated. The government and PWD needed the Corporation, just as they

---

<sup>287</sup> Ibid.

<sup>288</sup> TNA Native Affairs 39007, Controller of Finance Overseas Food Corporation to Chief Secretary, 9 April 1949. The OFC also requested a road maintenance contract for the Tabora-Urambo, Kongwa-Dodoma, and Kongwa-Mpwapwa roads.

<sup>289</sup> TNA Native Affairs 39007, M.167 (Intd) B.H. to A.C.S. (Acting Chief Secretary), 23 March 1949.

<sup>290</sup> Ibid. The OFC offered an alternative arrangement wherein they would maintain the road if all of its vehicles were exempted from annual taxes and petrol customs duty. The Government would also reimburse OFC the differential cost between Corporation and non-Corporation vehicles using the roads.

<sup>291</sup> TNA Native Affairs 39007, ? to Chief Secretary, 9 May 1949 (*response to file 21*).

<sup>292</sup> TNA Native Affairs 39007, Director of Public Works to the Chief Secretary, 25 April 1949; and ? to Chief Secretary, 9 May 1949 (*response to file 21*).

needed TCo in the 1930s and continued to depend upon L. Rousham Roberts in Songea. The department possessed “neither the staff nor the equipment to set up maintenance work and the only solution is to make agreements with the contractors on the spot similar to the one made in respect of the Lindi-Masasi Road in 1947”.<sup>293</sup> The government had to decide how far it was willing to compromise with the OFC.<sup>294</sup>

Chief Secretary A.M.B. Hutt ultimately offered the Controller of Finances for the OFC (J.F.G. Troughton) a contract whereby the Corporation would maintain the Lindi-Masasi and Mingoyo-Mtwara roads at a price of £1 per mile per annum per vehicle per day in excess of 20 vehicles but not exceeding 200 vehicles.<sup>295</sup> Troughton rejected the proposal. He argued that the Corporation’s sole responsibility was to produce groundnuts. It was the government’s responsibility to improve the roads so that the GNS could succeed for the “great benefit to the national income and taxable capacity of the Territory.”<sup>296</sup>

Furthermore, the Corporation threatened that if the government failed to improve the roads or offer a more agreeable contract, they would “make the strongest possible representation to H.M. Government in the U.K. through the Ministry of Food.”<sup>297</sup> Frustration grew in Dar es Salaam. Chief Secretary Hutt questioned whether the Corporation “seriously contend that an adequate road system for a territory of 360,000 miles can be built up at short notice.” Tanganyika’s revenue, after all, was only £6.5 million. It was clear to Hutt that the OFC was “more interested in our [government] paying for roads than in effecting any immediate improvements of them.”<sup>298</sup> No agreement was reached. The PWD resumed control over road maintenance despite the fact that local officers had “neither enough maintenance money nor enough machinery to make any attempt to deal with our main road problem.”<sup>299</sup> Tensions temporarily

---

<sup>293</sup> TNA Native Affairs 39007, “Extract from Minutes by Mr. Hutt to H.E. after his visit to the Southern Province – ‘Roads,’” date?.

<sup>294</sup> TNA Native Affairs 39007, M.19 PARS to F.S., 3 May 1949 (*response to file 20*).

<sup>295</sup> TNA Native Affairs 39007, A.M.B. Hutt to Controller of Finances, Overseas Food Corporation, Kongwa, 17 June 1949.

<sup>296</sup> TNA Native Affairs 39007, J.F.G. Troughton (Controller of Finance O.F.C.) to Chief Secretary, 25 June 1949.

<sup>297</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>298</sup> TNA Native Affairs 39007, C.S. to D.F.S., 6 July 1949.

<sup>299</sup> BNA FCO 141/17730, A.H. Pike to Chief Secretary, 8 November 1949. Between 1946 and 1949, the PWD experienced acute shortages in staff and serviceable mechanical equipment. The department’s mechanical and transport plants were aging rapidly, making the “efficient maintenance of the road system a matter of increasing difficulty” in 1946. The department purchased an “abnormal number of secondhand vehicles” in 1947 because of

eased when the OFC loaned the PWD equipment for road maintenance operations, including scrapers, graders, and Diesel road rollers.<sup>300</sup>

The government's aggravation with the OFC resurged when the Corporation demanded that the government reimburse them Shs. 31,866/- for reconstruction work on the Lindi-Mohumbika bridge.<sup>301</sup> The OFC demanded an additional £13,500 for construction and maintenance along the Mahumbika-Nachingwea Road. The Corporation also vigorously petitioned that all of their vehicles be partially exempted from licensing requirements and fees.<sup>302</sup> The Tanganyika colonial government responded in disbelief. In the case of the bridge, the DPW found OFC vehicles culpable for the collapse of two bridges. A PWD engineer had entered into a verbal agreement with an OFC officer that the Corporation would pay for the reconstruction of one bridge while the PWD fixed the other. The PWD estimated that the OFC incurred a cost of Shs. 5,000 – not Shs. 31,866.<sup>303</sup> The bridge incident made it clear to the Tanganyika government that entering into any future “gentleman’s agreements” with the OFC was “obviously dangerous.”<sup>304</sup> The OFC agreed to a settlement of £300 for the bridge, although “it was not seen as

---

the protracted delays in delivering orders from the U.K. (12-18 months or more). The department's vehicle fleet (lorries, cars, and motor cycles) rose from 150 to 173 the following year, but its supply of spare parts was unsatisfactory, especially in respect to the ex-military vehicles of American make. The government relied upon local agents to get much needed supplies. The government decided the following year that Bedford would be the “future standard Government vehicle.” Difficulties with spares were expected to continue until the fleet was standardized. By the end of 1949, the department's mechanical plant included 12 heavy motor graders, 6 heavy tow graders, 12 light tow graders, 2 heavy scrapers, 3 heavy tracked tractors, 3 light tracked tractors, 18 wheeled tractors, 16 stone crushers, 19 power rollers, 31 drag rollers, 30 concrete mixers, 18 tar sprayers and boilers, 37 mowers, 24 trailers, 13 tile machines, 14 pugmill and block machines, and 11 road rippers (etc.). See BLCAS 754.14 s.5, “Tanganyika Territory: Annual Report of the Public Works Department,” 1946-1949.

<sup>300</sup> TNA Native Affairs 39007, “Extraction from the Minutes of Meeting of the Southern Province Coordinating Committee held on the 15<sup>th</sup> April 1950.”

<sup>301</sup> TNA Native Affairs 39007, J.F. Troughton to Hon. Member for Finance, Trade, and Economics, 24 October 1949. The work was completed by Mowlem & Co. under PWD supervision.

<sup>302</sup> Vehicles solely used for agricultural purposes were exempt from licensing under the Traffic Rules 1932. The OFC recognized that they could not fully exercise the Rule since their vehicles used major highways to convey personnel, produce, and merchandise (food and agricultural implements). The Corporation, therefore, requested exemption for 90% of its fleet with the promise to continue paying customs duty on petrol consumption. See Native Affairs 35744 Groundnut Scheme Motor Vehicles: Licensing of, G.L. Allaway, Chief Transport Officer, OFC to C.S., 17 January 1950; TNA Native Affairs 39007, OFC to Acting Member for Communication, Works, and Development Planning Robertson, 30 October 1952; and Commissioner of Police to Provincial Superintendent of Police (Lindi), “Licensing of O.F.C. Vehicles in Southern Province,” 7 November 1952.

<sup>303</sup> TNA Native Affairs 39007, Director of Public Works to Secretariat, 21 November 1949. The costs were incurred when removing the damaged concrete and reinforcing the concrete deck.

<sup>304</sup> TNA Native Affairs 39007, Chief Secretary to EOD, date?.

adequate.”<sup>305</sup> Reimbursement for the corporation’s road work on the Mahumbika-Nachingwea road was not settled quickly or easily. The DPW estimated the cost at £1,750 – not £13,500. The Corporation refused the government’s offer of £2,800 as a “contemptuous rejection of our claim.”<sup>306</sup> The debate continued well into 1950. The Tanganyika government gained some much needed support against the OFC from the journal, *Roads and Road Construction*. The journal published a blistering article in March 1950 criticizing the OFC’s handling of road transportation in Tanganyika.<sup>307</sup> The OFC reportedly constructed only 25 miles of main roads and 403 miles of secondary roads while operating 1,536 lorries, 733 trailers, 57 cars, 168 jeeps, 185 Land Rovers, 11 motorcycles, and all land clearing and agricultural equipment. The company spent £164.12s per mile for new road construction versus £1.3 million worth on its vehicle fleet. Even when considering the depreciation of the fleet’s value, the Corporation spent ten times more on vehicles than on roads. The article concluded that:

Investment of the taxpayers money by the OFC in a modern fleet of vehicles is of little use if, at the same time, the Corporation neglects to provide adequate roads on which the fleet can operate.<sup>308</sup>

Despite the journal’s harsh review, the OFC continued to quarrel with the Tanganyika government over their rights and responsibilities in regards to road transport. The debates increasingly shifted from road construction to road ownership and vehicle licensing. The government initially awarded the Corporation licensing exemptions in the Southern Province.<sup>309</sup> The issue reemerged in 1952 when the government offered to maintain the OFC’s private road from Masasi to Nachingwea. Public traffic was already using the road because of its better alignment than the old government road. When the government considered reclassifying the road as a public highway, the OFC put up “private road” signs. The OFC did not want to pay the vehicle licensing fees that would come if the road was made public. The OFC used the road as leverage – threatening to restrict access unless the government exempted them from

---

<sup>305</sup> TNA Native Affairs 39007, J.F.G. Troughton to Chief Secretary, 4 March 1950. The government initially offered OFC a settlement package of £250 and 20% overhead charges for work not done by the PWD. The OFC agreed to the £300 because of the “loose manner of negotiations” between Mowlem’s agent and the PWD prior to the work.

<sup>306</sup> TNA Native Affairs 39007, Sir Charles Leckhart to Hon E.R.E. Surridge, Secretariat, 29 March 1950.

<sup>307</sup> TNA Native Affairs 39007, “Roads and Groundnuts,” *Roads and Road Construction* 28, no. 327, March 1950.

<sup>308</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>309</sup> TNA Native Affairs 35744, Commissioner of Police to Member of Law and Order, 1 September 1951.

licensing fees. The OFC wanted the double advantage of not paying for road maintenance or licensing fees. The Tanganyika government was fed up. The Acting Assistant Governor of Tanganyika found the OFC “extremely tiresome in this matter,” while the DPW reported that a “typical bit of nonsense is going on over the public use, or non-use, of the 11 miles of O.F.C. Ridge Road at Nachingwea.”<sup>310</sup> The DPW continued, “What benefit is it to the Colonial Empire if two of its servants cannot agree to provide the obvious answer in this case?”<sup>311</sup>

The conflict between the Tanganyika government and contractors also embroiled the southern provincial administration. The PWD and central administration increasingly dictated to the southern provincial staff how they should maintain roads and govern motor vehicle transport. The PWD, for example, instituted a territorial-wide road permit system in January 1951.<sup>312</sup> Any vehicle over 3.5 tons operating on main roads and 1.5 tons on district roads required a permit from the Road Authority.<sup>313</sup> In the Southern Province, no lorries over five tons would receive a permit to operate from Tunduru to Songea. No permits were issued throughout the province during the rainy season.<sup>314</sup> Problems quickly emerged with the application of the mandate. Provincial Engineers in Songea and Lindi issued permits without checking with district officers about road conditions in neighboring districts, which led to road damage and rising tempers.<sup>315</sup> In other instances, southern officers rejected the external interference and

---

<sup>310</sup> TNA Native Affairs 39007, DPW to DEVSEC “OFC Roads, Nachingwea,” 20 July 1953; and Acting Assistant Governor to Chief Secretary, response 186.

<sup>311</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>312</sup> TNA ACC 16, 4/9/Vol. 1, Director of Public Works to all Provincial Commissioners, “Authority to Move Heavy Vehicles on Public Roads in Tanganyika,” 31 January 1951. The department determined it was “necessary to exercise a greater measure of control over the movement” of automobile traffic “in order to avoid damage to roads and bridges.”

<sup>313</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>314</sup> *Ibid.*; TNA ACC 16, 4/9/Vol. 1, Provincial Engineer (PWD Southern Province) to Provincial Commissioner Lindi; “Warning of Restriction of Traffic on Highway,” January 1951; and District Commissioner Tunduru, “Notice,” January 1951.

<sup>315</sup> TNA ACC 16, 4/9/Vol. 1, District Commissioner Tunduru to Provincial Engineer (PWD Lindi), “Tunduru Section of Songea Lindi Road,” 12 January 1951. In one instance, the Provincial Engineer in Lindi authorized a driver of Tanganyika Roadways (Mr. Bush) to drive a five-ton lorry without chains to Songea. The vehicle caused approximately Shs. 1000/- worth of damage along an eleven mile stretch in the Tunduru District. The District Commissioner of Tunduru was obviously upset. He insisted that the “valiant effort” made by the Tunduru Road Foreman would “be destroyed if the P.W.D. Lindi issue permits in direct contravention of the rules in this district.”

refused to recognize the PWD's authority over their roads. Tensions mounted between the PWD's Southern Provincial Engineer and the District Commissioner of Mikindani when the former accused the D.C. of "high handed action" in regards to the maintenance and reopening of the Lindi-Mtwara Road. The Provincial Engineer insisted that the road was his concern and he would decide when it would reopen "be they right or wrong." He continued:

Likewise the responsibility for maintaining the road is mine, and it is difficult work. If damage is done to the road by heavy vehicles now it means the road will be worse than it need be for the rest of this year and my department takes the knocks for it, and the general public suffers. I have had your co-operation in the past, and you mine, and I hope this will continue. But I want it clearly understood that the decisions affecting the roads I control must be mine, and cannot be anyone else's.<sup>316</sup>

Although the conflict was settled "amicably," it underscored the lack of cooperation between Dar and the southern provincial administration.<sup>317</sup> District Officers and Commissioners were accustomed to their isolation and conducting business as they saw fit. While the officers believed that they knew what was best for their districts, they also knew that they needed help. After all, the provincial staff in 1950 was "only adequate for keeping the Province on a 'care and maintenance' basis and not adequate for expansion."<sup>318</sup> With a meager staff, it was "impossible" to conduct development plans.<sup>319</sup> The officers ultimately wanted help on their own terms. The OFC, PWD, and Tanganyika government, however, also wanted to shape the southern transportation infrastructure on their terms. Each party blamed the other for the deteriorating road conditions and was unwilling to invest resources necessary to dramatically improve the situation. Colonial development plans and the economy of southern Tanganyika suffered as state-civilian cooperation dissipated and turned into conflict.

---

The District Commissioner demanded that the PWD Lindi and Songea order all drivers to report to each district Road Authority before proceeding on their journey.

<sup>316</sup> TNA ACC 16, 4/9/Vol. 1, PWD Southern Provincial Engineer to District Commissioner Mikindani, "Lindi-Mtwara Road," 17 May 1950. The Southern Provincial Commissioner noted that the letter was "Rather a hot number!!"

<sup>317</sup> Ibid.

<sup>318</sup> BNA CO 691/208/7, Provincial Agricultural Officer (H.L. Brett) to Provincial Commissioner, "Development – Southern Province," 18 September 1950.

<sup>319</sup> Ibid. The provincial leadership became increasingly turbulent after A.H. Pike's departure at the end of 1952. Four officers held the title of Provincial Commissioner in 1953. See BNA FCO 141/17730, 1953.

Throughout the remainder of the 1950s, the PWD struggled to improve southern Tanganyika's main transportation artery from Mtwara and Lindi to Songea without adequate funds, equipment, and manual labor. With the exception of 1954, the department's expenditure rose steadily until the end of the decade.

**Table 4.7 Public Works Department's Annual Expenditure and Revenue, 1948-1959<sup>320</sup>**

Year	Expenditure (£)	Revenue (£)
1948	845,396	62,128
1949	1,273,176	65,037
1950	2,258,247	75,882
1951	2,677,448	91,738
1952	3,566,732	105,422
1953	4,977,497	143,746
1954 (1/2 year)	2,265,998	81,988
1954/55	4,484,903	223,436
1955/56	5,629,350	260,529
1956/57	6,808,628	317,820
1958	6,639,115	404,461
1959	6,210,671	NA

The department's Road Branch also became increasingly mechanized with a wide range of graders, tip trucks, tractors, excavators, stone crushers, rollers, concrete mixers, tar sprayers, and other equipment. Director of Public Works, G. Morgan, decided to slowly consolidate the department's mechanical equipment into units (construction, betterment, and tipper units) in 1950, rather than allowing individual machines to be loaned out across the territory – a common practice that he believed was “most unreliable and inefficient”.<sup>321</sup> Road Construction Unit 1 of the PWD was deployed to Lindi in April 1951 in order to improve the Lindi-Mingoyo section of the main road to an all-weather, bitumen standard.<sup>322</sup> The unit was supposed to use a mechanized road plant offered by the OFC, but a lack of spare parts undermined operations. The following year witnessed a massive rise in costs and scarcities “of all engineered resources, materials, plant and labour” across the Territory:

<sup>320</sup> BLCAS 754.14 s.5, F.H. Woodrow, “Tanganyika Territory: Annual Report of the Public Works Department, 1957,” (Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 1958). The statistics for 1958 and 1959 came from Woodrow's Annual Reports for those years. Woodrow reported that approximately 80% of the department's revenue came from water supply.

<sup>321</sup> BLCAS 754.14 s.5, G. Morgan, “Tanganyika Territory: Annual Report of the Public Works Department, 1951,” (Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 1952). Loaning of individual machines continued into 1957.

<sup>322</sup> *Ibid.*



The local price of cement, obtainable at between £5 and £6 per ton in the United Kingdom, reached £17.5s. per ton in Dar es Salaam and even more alarming heights in the more remote areas of the territory. The “Abadan Affair” resulted in increases in prices of fuel oils and lubricants and in bitumen products of the order of 12% and 25% respectively above 1951 levels. Engineering plant cost increases varied between 25% and 50% over the past three years.<sup>323</sup>

Although the PWD’s supply situation – in terms of vehicles, machines, and spare parts – improved during the rest of the decade, it was clear that road work would never become fully mechanized in

Tanganyika.<sup>324</sup> Director Morgan reported in 1951, “Mechanization is likely to play an increasingly important part in road improvements and construction, but it cannot replace hand labour on petty day-to-day tasks.”<sup>325</sup> Three years later, Morgan’s successor, F. H. Woodrow, argued that wherever mechanical road maintenance was carried out, “a large number of labourers would still have to be employed and this will normally amount to a force averaging ten thousand men.”<sup>326</sup> Woodrow repeated the sentiment in 1959, insisting that a “certain amount of hand work by labour resident along the roads will always be necessary.”<sup>327</sup> The PWD’s labor supply, however, deteriorated annually between 1955 and 1959. The department could not find sufficient workers nor keep them employed. The department partially overcame these deficiencies by intensifying its reliance on prison labor.<sup>328</sup>

Three years after the Lindi-Mingoyo project began, the Road Construction Unit was recalled having completed only fifteen miles of improvements – five miles of which were bituminous and the rest

---

<sup>323</sup> BLCAS 754.14 s.5, G. Morgan, “Tanganyika Territory: Annual Report of the Public Works Department, 1952,” (Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 1953). The “Abadan Affair” referred to the events that transpired as Iran nationalized the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company in 1951. See Mary Ann Heiss, “The United States, Great Britain, and Iranian Oil, 1950-1954” (PhD diss., Ohio State University, 1991).

<sup>324</sup> Director Woodrow reported that the Territory experienced no delivery difficulties of imported goods when the Suez Canal closed in 1956. Commodities reportedly became abundant in 1958 as the market changed from a seller’s to a buyer’s market. See BLCAS 754.14 s.5, F.H. Woodrow, “Tanganyika Territory: Annual Report of the Public Works Department, 1956,” (Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 1957) and “Tanganyika Territory: Annual Report of the Public Works Department, 1958,” (Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 1959).

<sup>325</sup> BLCAS 754.14 s.5, Morgan, “Annual Report of the Public Works Department, 1951.”

<sup>326</sup> BLCAS 754.14 s.5, F.H. Woodrow, “Tanganyika Territory: Annual Report of the Public Works Department, 1954,” (Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 1955).

<sup>327</sup> BLCAS 754.14 s.5, F.H. Woodrow, “Tanganyika Territory: Annual Report of the Public Works Department, 1959,” (Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 1960).

<sup>328</sup> BLCAS 754.14 s.5, F.H. Woodrow, “Tanganyika Territory: Annual Report of the Public Works Department, 1955,” (Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 1956); and “Annual Report of the Public Works Department, 1957.” The use of prison labor for roadwork dated back to the German colonial era and was reported annually in Tanganyika’s Blue Books.

graveled.<sup>329</sup> The entire section was finally bituminized in 1955, but problems with erosion and “slips in high embankment and cuttings” (due to poor soil conditions) were already apparent the following year.<sup>330</sup> Director Morgan proudly reported that biweekly transport service was carried out from Lindi to Songea without interruption during the rainy season for the first time in 1953.<sup>331</sup> Three years later, however, massive amounts of rain caused the destruction of the bridges spanning the Muhwezi and Lumesule rivers – bringing transportation from Songea to Lindi to a halt for multiple months.<sup>332</sup>

---

<sup>329</sup> BLCAS 754.14 s.5, “Annual Report of the Public Works Department, 1954.”

<sup>330</sup> BLCAS 754.14 s.5, Woodrow, “Annual Report of the Public Works Department, 1955.”

<sup>331</sup> BLCAS 754.14 s.5, G. Morgan, “Tanganyika Territory: Annual Report of the Public Works Department, 1953,” (Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 1954).

<sup>332</sup> BLCAS 754.14 s.5, Woodrow, “Tanganyika Territory: Annual Report of the Public Works Department, 1956.”




Figure 4.8 Destruction of the Muhuwezi River Bridge by Flood Waters, Tunduru, 1956<sup>333</sup>

<sup>333</sup> *ibid.*

The Southern Province did not receive its own “Grader Patrol” for road work – consisting of three power graders, two tow graders, two wobbly wheel rollers and supporting tippers – until 1956. By 1959, the PWD reported that all major river crossings in the south had permanent bridges and bitumen surfacing had begun from Mingoyo to Mtama. The vast majority of the Lindi-Songea road, however, remained dirt surfaced and susceptible to climatic conditions. The Dar es Salaam-Lindi road and most of the rest of the southern road infrastructure closed annually for five to six months during the rains, thus isolating countless villages, towns, and the entire province from regional, territorial, and global markets.

### **Turning Failure into Opportunity**

The failure of the colonial state to promote road transportation for the benefit of the colonial economy, administration, and “development” schemes turned into a lucrative opportunity for one Indian family in Lindi.<sup>334</sup> The Amin family exploited the transportation vacuum left by the state to create *the* dominant passenger and cargo transport firm in southern Tanganyika. Beginning in the 1930s, Indian retail and wholesalers increasingly took advantage of the flexibility and speed that motor vehicles offered

---

<sup>334</sup> Historians have recently turned their attention from the policy and planning failures of the Groundnut Scheme to analyzing the short- and long-term impacts that the scheme had for local people. Meredith and Havinden insisted that the Groundnut Scheme was a failure “from every point of view”: “It did nothing to ease Britain’s vegetable oil and fat shortages, it consumed more food locally than it produced and diverted labour from regional food production. It lost the British government over £36 million and yet it was of no benefit to Tanganyika” (*Colonialism and Development*, 281). Iliffe argued that the scheme’s “real significance” was that it was “Europe’s last major attempt to restructure Tanganyika’s economy” (*A Modern History of Tanganyika*, 442). In the case of southern Tanzania, Becker, Kelly, and Rizzo argued that the influx of cash and goods during the scheme had immediate positive impacts on the local populace (such as higher labor wages and produce prices). Long-standing issues of crop production, education, and inadequate inter-regional transportation facilities, however, remained unresolved. Rizzo concluded, “In the Southern Province, the scheme funded a dramatic rise in the number of people in wage employment, the improvement of roads, and the building of better health and educational facilities. It also stimulated rampant inflation of both goods and wages, and social unrest, of which the spread of alcoholism, prostitution and theft were the most obvious symptoms (Rizzo, “What Was Left of the Groundnut Scheme,” 211). Rizzo continued that the mass influx of money in the province “augmented the spending power and welfare of many local people, at least for a few years,” while some local entrepreneurs exploited the economic opportunities to begin “a process of capital accumulation” that lasted for decades (Ibid., 236). Julius Mtenda, for example, used the opportunities created by the GNS to create a thriving business selling high-demand goods at inflated prices within the OFC Labour Camp. With the capital he accumulated, Mtenda built a permanent shop and “restaurant-cum-bar” in Nachingwea and temporarily leased OFC land for agricultural production. After the GNS collapsed, Julius Mtenda successfully adopted new wealth-accumulation strategies in order to keep his businesses operating in the 1950s. See Matteo Rizzo, “Becoming wealthy: the life-history of a rural entrepreneur in Tanzania, 1922-80s,” *Journal of Eastern African Studies* 3, no. 2 (July 2009): 221-239; Becker, “A social history of Southeast Tanzania,” 283-84; and Kelly, “A Tale of Two Cities,” 336 (quote).

to maintain their control over intra- and interregional trade networks. By 1939, the Asian community in Tanzania controlled an estimated 80% of territory's transportation services.<sup>335</sup> Those Indian retailers and wholesalers who purchased and operated automobiles in the south typically owned one or two vehicles to conduct import-export trade.<sup>336</sup> Whereas most traders utilized motor vehicles to improve the efficiency of their businesses, Savailal C. Amin took advantage of the dearth of transportation services in the south to create a profitable transportation firm. Amin originally emigrated from India to Mombasa in search of employment during the First World War. He worked in a bank before finding employment in the colonial postal service. As a Post Master, Amin served in Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania.<sup>337</sup> While working as the Lindi Post Master in 1943, Amin met the co-owner and General Manager of the Tanganyika Transport Company Ltd. (TTCo) – Carnegie Browne. While TTCo still maintained its transportation contract for government employees and mail, its road construction business was in shambles. As discussed earlier, TTCo came under increasing scrutiny from the colonial state during the war about its inability to maintain the Masasi-Tunduru main road year round. TTCo finally lost its maintenance contract in December 1944. The criticism and contract withdrawal might have been why Carnegie Browne “severed all connection” with TTCo in 1945.<sup>338</sup> He sold his shares and controlling interests to Savailal C. Amin.<sup>339</sup>

Amin was unable to run the company's operations since he still worked for the government, and instead hired his twenty-two year old son – Dhirajlal Savailal Amin (or Dirubhai) – as the company's

---

<sup>335</sup> Gregory, *India and East Africa*, 484.

<sup>336</sup> Interview with Rasall Hussein S. Dhalla (Lindi, October 2, 2015).

<sup>337</sup> Interview with Dhirajlal Savailal Amin (Dirubhai) (Mkwaya, 17 September 2015 and 3 October 2015). Savailal C. Amin's wife and family accompanied him in East Africa. The eldest daughter and son (Dirubhai) were born in India, while the younger son and three daughters were born in East Africa. Dirubhai recalled that the family travelled by caravan in the early years. They utilized shoulder carriers and often encountered wild animal along way. The large size of the caravans (10-20 people) offered protection and safety. Dirubhai was almost 92 years old at the time of our interview.

<sup>338</sup> The exact reasons for Carnegie-Browne's decision to sell remain unknown. Provincial Commissioner J. Rooke Johnston included the news in his monthly report for October 1945: “Those who have served the Southern Province will remember that as Manager of the Company Mr. C.W. Carnegie-Browne ran a very efficient transport service.” See BNA FCO 141/17730, J. Rooke Johnston to Chief Secretary, 10 November 1945.

<sup>339</sup> Interview with Dhirajlal Savailal Amin (Mkwaya, 17 September 2015).

General Manager.<sup>340</sup> As Dirubhai assumed authority over the Tanganyika Transport Company (henceforth *Teeteeko*), he utilized existing social and business networks to rebuild *Teeteeko* as a passenger and cargo transportation firm.<sup>341</sup> In addition to their close personal relationship with the Indian trade community, the Amin family cultivated connections with colonial administrators – socializing with officers and throwing them farewell parties when they transferred from the province.<sup>342</sup> Dirubhai utilized these networks to ensure the continuance of the company’s transport contract for government loads, personnel, and mail. The company fleet of five, 5-ton lorries also began transporting demobilized African troops to their home districts after they returned from wartime service to Lindi.<sup>343</sup> The Groundnut Scheme spurred more traffic and profits for the company. Before the development contractors’ vehicles arrived in Lindi, the contractors hired *Teeteeko* to transport their men and materials to and from Nachingwea.<sup>344</sup> *Teeteeko* continued to transport produce for the OFC after the company’s fleet arrived.<sup>345</sup> *Teeteeko* also offered services to local producers, traders, and passengers. From May to December, the company transported maize, pulses, groundnuts, sesame, cashew nuts, and other produce to the coast. The profits *Teeteeko* generated allowed Dirubhai to expand the company’s operations; purchasing hundreds of new vehicles and establishing branches in Dar es Salaam and Songea run by his brother and father. Dirubhai introduced the region’s first bus services from Lindi to Mingoyo in 1948.<sup>346</sup> By the following year, six buses were running between Lindi-Dar es Salaam, Lindi-Songea, Songea-Njombe, Songea-Mamba Bay, and Songea-Litui.<sup>347</sup> *Teeteeko* was not only moving produce and passengers, but it also profited from an agreement

---

<sup>340</sup> Ibid. Dirubhai briefly lived in Tanganyika as a child before returning to India with his brother (Yeshvanj Savailal Amin) for schooling. The two men returned to Kenya in 1943. He worked as a clerk in the Kenya Farmer’s Association before his father requested his presence in Lindi.

<sup>341</sup> Dirubhai explained that the company’s emblem and moniker were changed to *Teeteeko* because it worked better with Kiswahili.

<sup>342</sup> Interview with Dhirajlal Savailal Amin (Mkwaya, 17 September 2015).

<sup>343</sup> Ibid., and 3 October 2015.

<sup>344</sup> Ibid. Dirubhai remembered one instance when the GNS contractors unloaded 200 vehicles at Lindi. The OFC maintained its own mechanics and workshop at Nachingwea. When the scheme failed, the vehicles and supplies were auctioned.

<sup>345</sup> Dirubhai typically received a fifteen or thirty day notice that his vehicles were needed. If he did not have enough automobiles for the request, he would hire on more.

<sup>346</sup> Interview with Dhirajlal Savailal Amin (Mkwaya, 17 September 2015 and 3 October 2015).

<sup>347</sup> Interview with Dhirajlal Savailal Amin (Mkwaya, 17 September 2015).

with the TSGA to transport migrant laborers.<sup>348</sup> Ten to twelve vehicles were hired to transport recruits along the Ruvuma River to SILABU camps in Masasi, Newala, and Tunduru. *Teeteeko* vehicles then brought the recruits to Lindi and Dar es Salaam.<sup>349</sup> Those who went to Dar es Salaam were distributed to plantations in Morogoro, Tanga, and Central Provinces. The “big business” of moving *manaymba* lasted from June to December.<sup>350</sup> *Teeteeko* survived the “slack season” during the rains by continuing to transport government personnel across the province.<sup>351</sup> Dirubhai insisted that the colonial government remained very helpful “because they knew that I was doing much of their work, government work, nearly 100%.”<sup>352</sup> By the time of Tanganyika’s Independence in 1961, *Teeteeko* was the only major transportation firm in the south offering government officers, farmers, traders, and migrant laborers reliable road transport across district and provincial borders.<sup>353</sup>

## Conclusion

By 1956, the Southern Province Railway was generating an annual operating deficit of £195,000.<sup>354</sup> The Southern Province Railway Working Party determined that most traders and cultivators from Masasi, Tunduru, and Songea Districts utilized motor vehicle to transport their goods to Lindi,

<sup>348</sup> Ibid.; and Interview with Omari Issa Chiluma (Mtwara, October 15, 2015).

<sup>349</sup> Interview with Abdalla Issa Naenda (Lindi, 1 October 2015). Those transported to Lindi were divided between four sisal plantations – Mitwero, Mitoto, Kikwetu, and Mkowe. Abdalla Issa Naenda recalled that the estates requested “x” number of recruits and the laborers were divided according to the requests. The son of a sisal plantation worker, Abdalla began working at Mitwero when he was ten years old (1954). Abdalla recalled that male laborers performed all cutting, brushing, and cleaning of sisal. They also cleared the fields (*mashamba*) and helped construct/maintain railway tracks on the estates. Women typically cleaned the *mashamba*, while children planted small sisal seeds. As a boy, Abdalla received 60 cents per day, or Shs. 18 per month. As Abdalla got older, he worked as a brusher. He eventually left for Mtwara to work as a tailor and lived there for fifteen years before returning to Mitwero to help with his father’s coconut and cashew nut *shamba*. Abdalla continues his tailoring work to the present day.

<sup>350</sup> Interview with Dhirajlal Savailal Amin (Mkwaya, 17 September 2015).

<sup>351</sup> Interview with Dhirajlal Savailal Amin (Mkwaya, 17 September 2015 and 3 October 2015). Provincial officers hired *Teeteeko* vehicles and drivers for one to two months to complete their inspection tours. They also hired vehicles to transport themselves, family, personal staff, and goods when they transferred outside of the province. Dirubhai occasionally accompanied the officers on their journeys, providing him with the opportunity to visit nearly every region in Tanganyika.

<sup>352</sup> Ibid. The EAR&H and Tanganyika Transport Ltd. were considered “the only other two road transport concerns in the territory which are properly organised” (in addition to the Tanganyika Roadways Ltd.) See BNA CO 534/4200, Brook to A. Emanuel Colonial Office “Tanganyika Roadways Ltd.,” 3 May 1951.

<sup>353</sup> Interview with Selemani Rashid Ngozi (Lindi, 25 September 2015); Saidi A. Mtutile (Lindi, 29 September 2015); Abdalla Issa Naenda (Mitwero, 1 October 2015); and Wilium Njaidi (Masasi, 8 October 2015).

<sup>354</sup> East African Railway and Harbour Administration, *Southern Province Railway Working Party Report* (Dar es Salaam, Government Printer, 1956), paragraph 64.

rather than by rail to Mtwara. The commission bluntly reported that local Africans “did not ask for the port of Mtwara or the railway to be built and who could happily continue to trade profitably without either installation.”<sup>355</sup> The commission had no simple solutions for diverting the “roadborne” traffic. They rejected the idea of constructing a railway branch to Masasi because of the high cost and the presence of “well served roads.” They also recommended against restrictive legislation on road traffic.<sup>356</sup> The commission concluded that “considerable development of African production has taken place and will take place without a railway. A railway does not in itself bring development to an agricultural area which is already productive.”<sup>357</sup> The Southern Province Railway, Groundnut Scheme, and several other colonial development projects implemented in southern Tanganyika following the Second World War failed because the colonial state and development planners repeatedly ignored the autonomy of the local African labor populace and the integral role that road transportation fulfilled in the borderland region.

Perceptions of the Southern Province as a backwards, unprofitable, and isolated periphery of Tanganyika dated back to the interwar era, intensified during the Second World War, and informed how the late British state approached the region when planning and implementing the Groundnut Scheme. During the war, the central administration ignored petitions by local officers and the private sector to invest in the region’s road network, which served as the province’s economic and administrative life-line. Local-state tensions increased as the colonial state shifted blame for the failing infrastructure on the private contractors entrusted with the maintenance of the Lindi-Songea main road. With the hybrid system of road development on the verge of collapse, private contractors and African communities struggled to maintain roads with inadequate resources and in the face of adverse environmental conditions and a growing volume of heavy vehicular traffic. Southern Tanganyika’s peripheral position within the Territory and British Empire, however, experienced a radical reversal following the Second World War. It received a massive infusion of manpower, machinery, and finances as the British aimed to utilize Western scientific knowledge and technology to transform the region’s socioeconomic and physical landscape;

---

<sup>355</sup> *Ibid.*, 77.

<sup>356</sup> *Ibid.*, 27.

<sup>357</sup> *Ibid.*, 26.



revolutionizing agricultural production in the process for the benefit of local peoples, Tanganyika, East Africa, Britain, and the Empire. The British state and development planners confidently believed that by constructing a new railway and port in southern Tanganyika they could transform the forgotten periphery into a productive and modernized region. These planners, however, neither fully understood nor respected the environmental, social, and economic forces that had been at work in the borderland region for centuries. Joseph Morgan Hodge argued that,

[...] the men who dreamed up and inexplicably pushed on with this colossus among misguided projects in the face of mounting evidence of failure, were, like Goethe's Faust, driven by an insatiable and illusory vision of what was possible which blinded them to the basic economic and ecological facts.<sup>358</sup>

The British state abandoned its trust in local knowledge and capabilities in favor of the “expertise” promised by contractors and trading houses that flooded into the Southern Province in pursuit of profits. These companies, however, lacked the experience, networks, and patience needed to operate in a region that had experienced approximately forty years of neglect and isolation from the central administration. Conflict abounded between the state and foreign “experts,” who owed no loyalty to Tanganyika or the Southern Province. Conflict, however, bred opportunity. The highly mobile people of the Ruvuma borderland exploited the conflict and competition that existed between and among colonial officials and private contractors – playing employers off one another to get the best working conditions while continuing to engage in seasonal employment to supplement subsistence farming. Entrepreneurs, like Savailal C. Amin and Dhirajlal Savailal Amin, exploited the lack of transportation services in the south (whether by rail, road, or ship) to create a thriving cargo and passenger firm that grew to dominate the southern roadways.

In the end, the new landscape imagined by GNS planners went unrealized. There was a new port, but it struggled to compete with Lindi. The railway generated deficits instead of profits as its structure rapidly fell apart. Travel by air and sea provided the only access to the province during the rains as most roads continued to close for six months each year. The lack of an all-weather road across and beyond the

---

<sup>358</sup> Hodge, *Triumph of the Expert*, 213.

Southern Province prevented the region's economic and agricultural growth. Chau P. Johnsen Kelly argued that the province's poor roads in the postwar era were "the single greatest obstacle to the region's greater economic development and integration into the state."<sup>359</sup> The highly public nature of the GNS's collapse as a financial disaster helped to solidify and propagate opinions of southern Tanganyika as an unprofitable periphery. In actuality, the state failed because it overlooked and underestimated the initiative and knowledge of the local populace.

---

<sup>359</sup> Kelly, "A Tale of Two Cities," 408.

## Chapter 5

### Issues of Identity and Belonging – The Road Transportation Sector in Postcolonial Southern Tanzania (1960s-1980s)

In 1961, Tanganyika officially declared independence from Britain and entered a union with Zanzibar three years later to form the United Republic of Tanzania.<sup>1</sup> The early years of independence were filled with expectation as the postcolonial state – led by President Julius Nyerere and the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) – promised economic development and social equality. Southern Tanzania quickly entered the national spotlight as it became embroiled in anti-colonial struggles and African liberation movements in neighboring Mozambique and Zambia. The Tanzanian government utilized wartime measures as opportunities to try to transform the region according to the state's socialist, *ujamaa* vision following the Arusha Declaration in 1967. Despite southern Tanzania's integral role in the state's strategic, economic, and social programs during the 1960s and 1970s, the postcolonial state failed to rectify the region's transportation issues. Like its colonial predecessors, the postcolonial state lacked the funding and resources to overcome the immense challenges of constructing an all-weather regional transportation network.

While offering analysis of the underlying problems of road construction and maintenance in postcolonial southern Tanzania, this chapter primarily examines the region's road transportation services. It assesses how the Tanzanian state gradually replaced the south's private, Indian-dominated transportation sector with state-run, regional cooperatives between the 1950s and 1970s and the consequences of these actions. Despite mounting pressure from African cooperatives and labor unions, Indian communities retained and extended their control over southern Tanzania's transportation, commercial, and real estate markets following national independence. As Asian-African relations deteriorated in the mid-to-late 1960s, Indian automotive firms and operators utilized their dominance over the transportation sector to defend their financial interests and negotiate a new place within the nation. By

---

<sup>1</sup> Zanzibar declared independence in 1963. A year later, the Zanzibar Revolution occurred and resulted in the overthrow of the Sultan of Zanzibar by the Afro-Shirazi Party. Tanganyika also experienced a short-lived, unsuccessful military uprising against the government in 1964.

offering their vehicles in support of agricultural cooperatives, anticolonial war efforts, humanitarian relief, and nation-building operations, the Indian population in southern Tanzania challenged popular anti-Asian discourse that portrayed them as exploitative parasites. They instead intended to prove their value, allegiance, and belonging to the nation. The alliances created between the private transportation sector and the Tanzanian government collapsed in the early 1970s. The state not only stripped the Indian community of its decades-old dominion over transportation, but also their control over the housing, wholesale, and retail markets. A new age of the state-controlled transport began. A decade of economic crises followed and concluded with the liberalization of the Tanzanian economy and transportation sector. The chapter concludes by examining how African drivers and mechanics in southern Tanzania utilized their technological knowledge and networks of reciprocity to adapt to the turbulent economic decades of the 1960s to the 1980s and improve their socioeconomic status as “modern” men.

### **End of Empire and Tanzanian Independence**

The 1950s not only witnessed a proliferation of colonial development projects across the British Empire, but also the rise of Asian and African nationalism. Frederick Cooper argued that British labor policies and colonial development schemes facilitated the collapse of the Empire rather than ensuring its continuation. The promotion of African trade unions and improved labor welfare provided avenues through which African labor and political leaders could demand more entitlements, including rights to sovereignty.<sup>2</sup> The use of authoritarian force by postwar colonial states further escalated local-state tensions and the popularity of nationalist movements.<sup>3</sup> The collapse of ill-conceived and expensive development projects (most notably the East African Groundnut Scheme) intensified British

---

<sup>2</sup> D.A. Low, *Eclipse of Empire* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991); Frederick Cooper, *Decolonization and African Society: The Labor Question in French and British Africa* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); and Frederick Cooper, “Modernizing Bureaucrats, Backward Africans, and the Development Concept,” in *International Development and the Social Sciences: Essays on the History and Politics of Knowledge*, ed. Frederick Cooper and Randall Packard (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), 64-92. African politicians in the 1950s and 1960s tied the universal rights of workers to citizenship arguments and contended that Africans should manage the social change that the Europeans advocated.

<sup>3</sup> Low, *Eclipse of Empire*, 164-214; James Scott, *Seeing Like and State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed* (New Haven, USA: Yale University Press, 1998); and Joanna Lewis, *Empire State-Building: War and Welfare in Kenya, 1925-52* (Oxford: James Currey, 2000).

disillusionment towards colonialism. Britain's continued investments in the Empire made little financial sense once the three colonies with the largest sterling reserves and highest production of dollar-earning goods gained independence (Ghana 1957, Malaya 1957, and Nigeria 1960).<sup>4</sup> In the end, many members of the British state believed that it was cheaper to give up the formal Empire and try to maintain influence over the new African states through government channels and multinational corporations and development agencies.<sup>5</sup>

In the case of Tanganyika, the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) spearheaded the nationalist movement in the mid-1950s.<sup>6</sup> Arising out of the Tanganyika African Association (TAA), TANU aimed to gain national independence "by means of popular support and the threat of disorder".<sup>7</sup> The first phase of nationalist growth occurred between July 1954 and November 1955 with the politicization of Dar es Salaam and mobilization of TANU supporters "beyond the commercially prosperous areas to food-producing and labour-exporting regions."<sup>8</sup> Nyerere also worked closely with the Asian Association "to secure Asian financial and electoral support for both TANU and non-African, TANU-sympathetic candidates."<sup>9</sup> Asian-African relations, however, were tenuous at best in the 1950s. Postwar price fixing and restrictions on crop marketing fueled popular antagonism towards Indians.<sup>10</sup>

---

<sup>4</sup> Allister Hinds, *Britain's Sterling Colonial Policy and Decolonization, 1939-1958* (Westport, USA: Greenwood Press, 2001); and Cooper, *Decolonization and African Society*, 392-406.

<sup>5</sup> J. M. Lee, *Colonial Government and Good Government: A study of the ideas expressed by the British official classes in planning decolonization 1939-1964* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967); John Darwin, *Britain and Decolonization: The Retreat from Empire in the Postwar World* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1988); Cooper, *Decolonization and African Society*; and Cooper, "Modernizing Bureaucrats," 78-79.

<sup>6</sup> John Iliffe, *A Modern History of Tanganyika* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 485.

<sup>7</sup> Iliffe, *A Modern History of Tanganyika*, 485. According to Iliffe, Governor Sir E. Twining's response to rising nationalism was threefold: strengthen administrative control over nationalist organizations; implement multiracialism in local and central government; and strengthen the African middle class by altering agricultural, land, and education policies (552-55).

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, 515-537 (quote on 526). Iliffe argued that while much of the impetus towards nationalism came from the northeast and Sukumaland, leadership from Dar es Salaam was necessary otherwise TANU could "not have produced an effective nationalist movement".

<sup>9</sup> James R. Brennan, *Taifa: Making Nation and Race in Urban Tanzania* (Athens, USA: Ohio University Press, 2012), 146.

<sup>10</sup> Jim Giblin, *A History of the Excluded: Making Family a Refugee From State in Twentieth Century Tanzania* (Oxford: James Currey, 2005), 186-87. Wartime economic controls and rationing of consumer goods sharpened identity categories and helped "to create political races." Brennan discussed how the food rationing system in Dar

African-Asian relations deteriorated further as TANU rejected constitutional multiracialism.<sup>11</sup> According to James Brennan, “African development was becoming popularly interpreted as African self-sufficiency and freedom from non-African economic forces.”<sup>12</sup> Incidents of violence towards Asian businessmen in 1960 (including shop destruction in Moshi and the murder of an Asian man near Morogoro) convinced some Asians to “cut their losses and leave the Territory”.<sup>13</sup> There were also reports of “an increased exodus of Asian and European money” from Tanganyika and a “rush, mostly by Hindus, to take out, or renew, passports” as a result of a “number of aggressive and irresponsible statements by minor TANU leaders” about non-Africans.<sup>14</sup> Brennan argued that Nyerere regretted TANU’s exclusion of non-Africans and demonstrated a “political empathy rarely seen among African nationalist leaders of his time”–

He worked closely with non-African politicians and once famously attempted to reframe the racial-national question as one of ‘Tanganyikan’ nationalism by stating that the path to democracy was ‘to say we have 123 tribes in Tanganyika, the youngest and relatively the most educated being the European and Asian tribes.’<sup>15</sup>

When speaking to an African and Asian crowd in Newala in 1956, Nyerere argued that the Wamakonde’s poverty was not a product of Asian manipulation and exploitation, but of poor investments by Africans:

Do you ever see Asians, who come all the way from India, remain poor? No! They may come barefoot, but after they have been here a little while they are riding around in fancy cars. Why?

---

es Salaam perpetuated public humiliation for Africans. For example, Africans had to wait in long lines to renew their ration cards once a week. Non-Africans, in contrast, renewed their cards by mail once a month. Brennan concluded that racial inequality in food and housing “formed the foundation of popular racial politics in Dar es Salaam” (100). Richa Nagar argued that the social, political, economic, and spatial isolation that the colonial racial order created between Asians and Africans reinforced stereotypes that Asians were “exploitative,” “cunning,” and “greedy,” and Africans were “lazy” and “backward.” Nagar also insisted that the colonial racial hierarchy obfuscated the immense diversity in Tanganyika’s Asian community (in terms in class, caste, gender, religion, and origins) and solidified the myth of Asian homogeneity. See Iliffe, *A Modern History of Tanganyika*, 375; Giblin, *A History of the Excluded*, 186-87; James Brennan, “South Asian Nationalism in an East African Context: The Case of Tanganyika, 1914-1956,” *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East* 19, no.2 (1999): 24-39, 29; Brennan, *Taifa*, 86 and 99; and Richa Nagar, “The South Asian Diaspora in Tanzania: A History Retold,” *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East* XVI, no. 2 (1996): 62-80, 64-65.

<sup>11</sup> The British colonial state advocated multiracialism, which called for equal elected representation of the three races – European, African, and Asian – in Tanganyika’s Legislative and Executive Councils. For more discussion on multiracialism, see Iliffe, *A Modern History of Tanganyika*, 475-84.

<sup>12</sup> Brennan, *Taifa*, 147. Brennan argued that Nyerere regretted the exclusion of non-African politicians.

<sup>13</sup> BNA CO 822/2063 Governor’s Reports Tanganyika: 1960-62, Deputy Governor to Colonial Office (P.D. Webber), 10 November 1960.

<sup>14</sup> BNA CO 822/2063, Deputy Governor to Colonial Office (P.D. Webber), 27 September 1960.

<sup>15</sup> Brennan, *Taifa*, 149.

Because they can always rely upon their brothers to help them get a start in business instead of everyone having to fend for himself. And then, instead of spending their little money on *pombe* [beer], fine clothing, and soft chairs, they pinch themselves even further until they are really able to afford their fancy cars. [...] If you got together and bought a lorry instead of bicycles, you could all be as rich as Indians.<sup>16</sup>

Brennan concluded that Nyerere was unable to directly challenge TANU's "racial exclusivity, based on racial imagination of continental origins and 'homelands,'" and was instead forced to defend himself against criticism that he was too "multiracial."<sup>17</sup> Although there was no marked increase in the outflow of Asian funds and population early in 1961, the British acknowledged that there was "undoubtedly, an undercurrent of uneasiness amongst the Asians who remain apprehensive about their ultimate position in an independent Tanganyika".<sup>18</sup>

In southern Tanganyika, TANU membership was "miniscule" prior to Nyerere's visit in July 1956.<sup>19</sup> Nyerere's appearance marked the first major TANU recruitment drive in the south. Although TANU gradually gained political dominance in the region after 1956, none of the southern towns formed "main centers of TANU strength and action" as in Dar es Salaam, Mwanza, Tabora, Arusha, and other northern towns.<sup>20</sup> In the case of the Wamakonde of southeastern Tanzania, J. Gus Liebenow argued that "geographic isolation, compounded by lethargy and the political fractionalization of Makonde leadership, had relegated the Makonde to the role of passive responder to vital decisions made elsewhere in the territory."<sup>21</sup> Iliffe contended that TANU "polarised local politics" in Masasi.<sup>22</sup> The organization also experienced resistance from Yao rulers in Tunduru, who strenuously opposed TANU's resolution to disband chiefs after independence and give their authority to executive officers.<sup>23</sup> Despite some opposition, TANU achieved sweeping victories in the south and across the Territory during the

---

<sup>16</sup> Quoted in J. Gus Liebenow, *Colonial Rule and Political Development in Tanzania: The Case of Makonde* (Evanston, Northwest University Press, 1971), 229.

<sup>17</sup> Brennan, *Taifa*, 150.

<sup>18</sup> BNA CO 822/2063, "Political Intelligence Report, Tanganyika, Covering the Period 10<sup>th</sup> November 1960 – 10<sup>th</sup> February, 1961."

<sup>19</sup> Liebenow, *Colonial Rule and Political Development in Tanzania*, 228.

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*, 257

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>22</sup> Iliffe, *A Modern History of Tanganyika*, 534.

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*, 569.

Legislative Council election of 1958-59. This election paved the way for the transfer of power from the British to a new national government.<sup>24</sup> With British policy in East and Central Africa in crisis in 1959, the new Conservative leader of the Colonial Office, Iain Macleod, abandoned Britain's gradualist approach towards decolonization and worked with Nyerere to accelerate Tanganyika's path towards independence.<sup>25</sup> Tanganyika received complete internal self-government in May 1961 and formal independence on December 9, 1961.<sup>26</sup> Two years after Nyerere oversaw the formation of Tanganyika as a democratic republic (December 9, 1962), Tanganyika and Zanzibar merged to form the United Republic of Tanzania.

### **New Government – Persistent Economic and Infrastructure Problems**

The top priorities of the Tanzanian government in the first years following independence were building national unity, economic development, Africanizing the state, and assisting anti-colonial struggles elsewhere in the continent.<sup>27</sup> The state banned political parties based upon tribal identity and abolished the position of traditional chief in 1961 in an effort to unify the nation's multiethnic population and solidify TANU's authority. Elected district and village councils replaced the Native Authorities the following year.<sup>28</sup> Africanization of the civil service also began immediately. The number of Africans posted in senior and middle grade posts rose from 1,170 to 1,821 between 1961 and 1962, while the number of non-Africans dropped from 3,282 to 2,902.<sup>29</sup> When Liebenow returned to Mtwara, Newala, and Lindi Districts in 1967, he observed the wide-scale Africanization of government and missionary positions.<sup>30</sup> Despite calls to speed up the Africanization of the national economy and education system, the government moved "gingerly" during the first two to three years out of "fear of losing the talents and

---

<sup>24</sup> Ibid., 561-62.

<sup>25</sup> Ibid., 565-66.

<sup>26</sup> Ibid.; and Liebenow, *Colonial Rule and Political Development in Tanzania*, 274.

<sup>27</sup> Iliffe, *A Modern History of Tanganyika*, 573-74.

<sup>28</sup> Liebenow, *Colonial Rule and Political Development in Tanzania*, 276-77; and Gibling, *A History of the Excluded*, 260. The state also banned political parties based on tribal identity.

<sup>29</sup> Nagar, "The South Asian Diaspora in Tanzania," 65.

<sup>30</sup> Liebenow, *Colonial Rule and Political Development in Tanzania*, 286. Liebenow reported that most of the Europeans had been displaced from their government positions (with the exception of some technicians). Africans were also rapidly replacing the leadership and members of Christian missions.



capital of Europeans and Asians – whether residents or expatriates.”<sup>31</sup> The national government had more pressing concerns with trying to stimulate and diversify its struggling, agricultural-based economy. Tanganyika was one of the poorest countries in the world, with a “gross domestic product estimated at £21 per head”.<sup>32</sup> Whereas the average cash income per head in Tanganyika in 1961/62 was estimated at £12 and £20 (“if the value of subsistence production is taken into account”), Kenya’s rate was £26 and £34 and Uganda’s rate was £16 and £22.<sup>33</sup> Agriculture and domestic livestock represented over half the gross domestic product in Tanganyika and approximately 80% of the territory’s export earnings just prior to independence. The main agricultural exports were sisal (30%), coffee, and cotton (combined for 35-40%).<sup>34</sup> Southern Tanganyika’s economy continued to rely upon agricultural exports, particularly cashew nuts. The region’s cashew exports rose from 1,312 tons in 1947 to 41,288 tons in 1960.<sup>35</sup> Production grew steadily in the 1960s and 1970s with the value of raw nut exports rising from TShs. 36 million in 1961 to TShs. 196 million in 1974.<sup>36</sup> The lack of diversification in the regional and national economy, however, left both susceptible to global market fluctuations. When comparing the economic prospects of Britain’s three East African colonies, the Colonial Office reported that Tanganyika and Uganda were “more at the

---

<sup>31</sup> Ibid., 278-79. Also see Iliffe, *A Modern History of Tanganyika*, 573; and Brennan, *Taiifa*, 184-85. According to Iliffe, Nyerere believed that the government had to ensure secondary and higher education for the populace in order to fully Africanize the civil service sector and maintain high standards.

<sup>32</sup> Iliffe, *A Modern History of Tanganyika*, 574.

<sup>33</sup> BNA CO 822/2573 Development Plan in Tanganyika 1960-1962, “June Discussions, Tanganyika Government Paper No. F7: Development Expenditure 1961/62-1965/66.”

<sup>34</sup> BNA CO 822/2573, “The Financial Position and Prospects of the East African Territories. Memorandum by Colonial Office.” Agriculture and domestic livestock represented 40% of Kenya’s gross domestic product and 50% of Uganda’s product. Coffee and cotton constituted 85% of Uganda’s exports, while Kenya’s main exports were coffee (30-50%), sisal (10%), and tea (10%).

<sup>35</sup> Iliffe, *A Modern History of Tanganyika*, 454. Iliffe did not indicate how the produce was transported. It was likely a combination of motor vehicle and foot traffic. The spread of cashew production was driven by international market forces, as well as the ample supply of land resources and small labor output in planting trees and collecting the fallen nuts. The trees also adapted well to the light, sandy soils of the southeast and could be inter-planted with drought-resistant cassava crops. Cashew trees provided many commercial products from cashew kernels to cashew nut shell liquid, cashew apples, the cashew nut shell, and cashew wood. See Pekka Seppälä, “The Recovery of Cashew Production in Southern Tanzania,” in *The Making of a Periphery: Economic Development and Cultural Encounters in Southern Tanzania*, eds. Pekka Seppälä and Bertha Koda (Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 1998): 118-137; Nicholas J. Hann, “Transitioning Economies, Cultures, and Woodlands – Cashews and Deforestation in Southeastern Tanzania” (PhD diss., Clark University, 2002), 161-63; and Felicitas Becker, “A social history of Southeast Tanzania, ca 1890-1950” (PhD diss., Cambridge University, 2002), 298-303.

<sup>36</sup> Seppälä, “The recovery of cashew production in southern Tanzania,” 119 and 123.

mercy of commodity price trends than Kenya because the market in Kenya crops is more a quality market and because the development of secondary industries is further advanced in Kenya and the economy is more diversified.”<sup>37</sup> The British concluded that Tanganyika had “a long way to go before its people have the wealth and resources which its East African neighbours enjoy today.”<sup>38</sup> The World Bank encouraged the Tanzanian government to continue to promote peasant cash crop production while investing in “settlement schemes where African capitalist farmers could be guided ‘under close supervision.’”<sup>39</sup>

British civil servants drafted Tanzania’s First Three-Year Development Plan (1961-64), which emphasized the formation and development of import substituting industries.<sup>40</sup> An estimated £24 million was earmarked towards “agriculture and pastoralism, communications, and secondary and technical education, while leaving industrial development to private enterprise.”<sup>41</sup> An estimated 60% of the budget was devoted to economic services and “services which should increase the country’s wealth”.<sup>42</sup> The government also vigorously supported African cooperatives. African cooperatives in Tanzania dated back to the 1930s when farmers worked together in order “prevent crop disease, facilitate marketing, and generally advance their group interests.”<sup>43</sup> Following World War II, many African cultivators and traders in southern Tanzania pooled their resources to form cooperatives that could buy, sell, and transport

---

<sup>37</sup> BNA CO 822/2573, “The Financial Position and Prospects of the East African Territories. Memorandum by Colonial Office.” The secondary industry reportedly rested “to a large extent on agriculture, but it also serves the local East African market as a whole which protects it to some extent from the direct impact of export charges.”

<sup>38</sup> Ibid.

<sup>39</sup> Iliffe, *A Modern History of Tanganyika*, 575, quoting A.C. Coulson, ‘A simplified political economy of Tanzania,’ UAESSC paper, 1973.

<sup>40</sup> Hann, “Transitioning Economies, Cultures, and Woodlands,” 93.

<sup>41</sup> Iliffe, *A Modern History of Tanganyika*, 575.

<sup>42</sup> BNA CO 822/2573, “June Discussions, Tanganyika Government Paper No. F7: Development Expenditure 1961/62-1965/66.” At the time of independence, the British government agreed to offer financial assistance to the Tanzanian government, including the remaining balance of the Colonial Development and Welfare money allocated to Tanganyika (£4.75 million), a special grant (£4 million), and a Commonwealth Assistance loan from 1961-64 up to £4 million (if the aid promised and those offered from other sources were insufficient to finance the development plan). Two additional loans totaling £9 million were given to the Tanzanian government to assist with costs for the “compensating scheme for overseas officers” and the “commutation of pensions for officers retiring from the Government’s service.” The British government also promised to provide the Tanzanian government with technical assistance after independence. See BNA CO 822/2086 Secretary of State’s Annual Report to Parliament – Tanganyika, “Chapter II: Independence in 1961-62”; and BNA CO 822/2985 U.K. Technical Assistance for Tanganyika After Independence, 1960-1962.

<sup>43</sup> Iliffe, *A Modern History of Tanganyika*, 294.

produce and piece goods. They aimed to challenge Indian economic domination over produce and commercial markets, which had been strengthened by the policies of the Economic Control Board (staffed by Europeans and Asians) and its quota system for controlled goods.<sup>44</sup> British officials estimated that only twenty African retailers received a portion of the government quotas in the Southern Province prior to 1947.<sup>45</sup> Dissatisfied with the colonial system, Manzi Matamula formed a trade group in 1948 with African shopkeepers and small itinerant traders in the Southern Province. Liebenow described how Matamula traveled between Lindi and Songea, “collecting produce orders, making bulk purchases at the coast, and delivering the produce.”<sup>46</sup> African retailers in southern Tanganyika also began demanding that the colonial state award equal distribution of quota goods between African and Indian retailers in 1947. Indian wholesalers and retailers were willing to allocate 5% of the provincial quota to African traders, but African traders protested until they were awarded 25-30% of the provincial piece-goods quota.<sup>47</sup> The British administration in southern Tanganyika felt “great satisfaction” that African traders were clearly “breaking into the non-native monopoly in the distributive trades.”<sup>48</sup> The number of cooperative unions in

---

<sup>44</sup> Ibid.; Giblin, *A History of the Excluded*, 254-55; and Brennan, *Taifa*, 99 and 117. Giblin analyzed numerous cooperatives in Njombe, including the Ubena Welfare Society, Lupembe Native Coffee Growers Cooperative Society, and Mdandu African Traders Association.

<sup>45</sup> BNA FCO 141/17730 Tanganyika: Southern Province: Provincial Commissioner's Monthly Newsletters to Chief Secretary (1944-1955), J. Rooke Johnston to Chief Secretary, 19 February 1947.

<sup>46</sup> Liebenow, *Colonial Rule and Political Development in Tanzania*, 246-47. The trade group did not last long after Matamula accepted a position as a *liwali* for the colonial government.

<sup>47</sup> BNA FCO 141/17730, J. Rooke Johnston to Chief Secretary, 8 April 1947; and DSM, T.O. Pike, “Southern Province,” *Tanganyika Territory: Annual Reports of the Provincial Commissioner for year 1947* (Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 1948). The negotiations of 1947 were an unexpected consequence of a strike carried out by Indian retailers in response to a government order that all accounts be kept in English or Kiswahili. African entrepreneurs pounced at the opportunity to take Shs. 116,000/- worth of the provincial piece-goods quota before the Economic Control Board stopped the African allocations. See BNA FCO 141/17730, Rooke-Johnston to Chief Secretary, 19 February 1947.

<sup>48</sup> BNA FCO 141/17730, J. Rooke Johnston to Chief Secretary, 8 April 1947; and DSM, T.O. Pike, “Southern Province,” *Annual Reports 1947*. Indian wholesalers continued to prevent new African retailers from entering the market by refusing to sell their piece goods to retailers without cash. Provincial Commissioner A.H. Pike reported in 1948 that the “old relationship between wholesaler and retailer has disappeared and no credit system has taken its place.” Pike advocated a return to the “old prewar ‘laissez faire system,’” in order to “speed up the movement of trade, increase the supply of trade goods, and provide the incentives to increase the supply of labour.” Indian wholesalers in southern Tanganyika, however, advocated for the continuance of the Economic Control Board quota system for piece-goods after the war because it reinforced their economic dominance. See BNA FCO 141/17730, A.H. Pike to Chief Secretary, 6 October 1948 and 4 November 1948; and BNA CO 691/208/7

Tanganyika rose from three in 1944, to 79 in 1949, and 691 in 1960.<sup>49</sup> Most African retailers and cultivators in the interior districts, however, still depended upon Indian middlemen to transport their goods to and from the coast. Many Africans in southern Tanganyika lacked the cash and credit required to buy their own vehicles.<sup>50</sup> The collapse of the Groundnut Scheme (GNS) in 1951 further hampered African access to credit and temporarily bolstered Indian commercial dominance in the region.<sup>51</sup> Even Matamula's operations depended upon the support of sympathetic Asian businessmen, who rented him vehicles. The cooperative movement, however, experienced a boom after independence. Between 1961 and 1964, cooperatives in Mtwara Region rose "from virtually nothing" to nearly 100% coverage in

---

Development in Tanganyika: Southern Province Plan 1950-51, Provincial Agricultural Officer Southern Province, H.L. Brett, to Southern Provincial Commissioner, "Development – Southern Province," 18 Sept 1950.

<sup>49</sup> *Ibid.*, 464.

<sup>50</sup> Access to credit was increasingly difficult in the region after the war because many Asian wholesalers had abandoned the 90 day bill credit system. Under a 90 day bill, retailers worked off their debts by sending produce (purchased from African cultivators) to the wholesalers. It is important to note that no formal market centers existed in the south before 1945. The closest thing Newala District had to a trade center was the "small squalid 'bandas'" that locals erected in main population centers of population and charged fees for people to sell vegetables and fish. That year marked the introduction of a new market system in the Southern Province based upon a model used in the Lake Province. The government ordered that all controlled produce had to be sold at market prices set by the state and in new markets established at Lindi (25), Kilwa (3), Mikindani (7), Masasi (2), and Newala (5). Depending upon the rains and state of the roads, the markets typically opened on or around May 15<sup>th</sup> and remained open until December 1<sup>st</sup>. Buyers had to measure all goods according to a standardized weight - kilogram. African communities were initially suspicious of the market centers. Indian merchants and European missionaries were antagonistic and spread propaganda against the system that threatened to undermine their control over market prices and transactions. The new system, however, quickly became popular among African producers, who reportedly liked that their goods were weighed and paid for in hard cash on the spot. The creation of interior markets also enabled farmers to profitably sell their goods with neighboring districts, rather than transporting all their goods to the coast. The tonnage of foodstuffs marketed at the twenty-five centers in Lindi rose from 3,529 tons to 4,476 tons between 1945 and 1946. Twice as much produce went through the four markets in Masasi in 1946 despite a poor harvest. The success of the market system encouraged the formation of a local African Trader's Co-operative Society in Newala District. See DSM, Tanganyika Territory, "Southern Province," *Annual Reports of the Provincial Commissioner for the year 1945* (Dar es Salaam Government Printer, 1946); J. Rooke-Johnston, "Southern Province," *Annual Reports of the Provincial Commissioner for the year 1946* (Dar es Salaam Government Printer, 1947); Newala District Book, "Notes on the Market System," 1947; and Lindi District Book, "Market System – Lindi District," 1950.

<sup>51</sup> Matteo Rizzo found that even wealthy African businessmen, like Julius Mtenda, had to adopt wealth-accumulation strategies that partially depended upon Asian assistance in order to keep their businesses operating in the 1950s. After the GNS collapsed, Mtenda worked as a produce sub-buyer for Asian traders in Lindi and Mtama in order to earn the capital necessary to expand his network of retail outlets in the Nachingwea District. Giblin similarly found that prosperous African traders in Njombe "could not escape a precarious dependence on Indian merchants." See Matteo Rizzo, "Becoming wealthy: the life-history of a rural entrepreneur in Tanzania, 1922-80s," *Journal of Eastern African Studies* 3, no. 2 (July 2009): 221-239; and Giblin, *A History of the Excluded*, 184.

1964.<sup>52</sup> The cooperative share of the region's cashew crops rose from 10% in 1961 (2,500 tons), to 55% in 1962/63 (25,626 tons), and 87% in 1963/64 (36,814 tons). The number of primary marketing societies increased from 50 to 104 between 1962 and 1964. Their activities were coordinated under the Mtwara/Ruvuma Regional Co-operative Union after 1963. By the following year, the union had branches in Masasi, Newala, and Lindi, and from these branches "the primary societies receive[d] the services of cash distribution, supply of safes, scales, gunnies etc., in fact, all the services of secondary organization, including produce transport."<sup>53</sup>

In order to ensure the success of African cooperatives and the growth of the general economy, the Tanzanian government prioritized infrastructure development. The state largely adopted its predecessor's road policy of constructing a nationwide, integrated, high-standard network of trunk roads. After World War II, the colonial state's ideal road design for Tanganyika consisted of a "grid of four north-south and three east-west arteries that were to traverse the whole country."<sup>54</sup> The colonial government aimed to improve "a limited mileage of the most important trunk roads to a high standard with a solid base and an 18-foot bitumen surface."<sup>55</sup> Most of the road projects of the 1950s were concentrated in the northeastern parts of the Territory, i.e. Arusha, Kilimanjaro, Tanga, Morogoro, and Coast Regions. Rising construction costs forced the government to adapt their road policy towards "low-cost roads" after 1955. Rolf Hofmeier explained:

Apart from the complete new construction of the high-standard bitumen roads and of closing still existing gaps in the trunk road network it was an urgent necessity during this period (and also

---

<sup>52</sup> BNA DO 185/15 Reports by British High Commission staff on visits, tours, and safaris to the Mtwara Region of Tanganyika, Press Release issued by Information Services Division, "Dramatic Progress of Co-Operative Movement in Mtwara Region," 27 October 1964.

<sup>53</sup> *Ibid.*; Liebenow, *Colonial Rule and Political Development in Tanzania*, 323. According to Liebenow, the union moved from its "exclusive concern" with cashews to cassava in 1965. The next step for the union was to enter into the manufacturing and processing of produce. Liebenow noted the existence of additional produce-marketing societies in the region that were not affiliated with the union. These societies covered timber and blackwood (7), savings and credit (4), tailoring (2), fisheries (2), building (1), carpentry (1), and the distributive traders (1).

<sup>54</sup> Rolf Hofmeier, *Transport and Economic Development in Tanzania, with particular reference to roads and road transport* (München: Weltforum Verlag, 1973), 72.

<sup>55</sup> Hofmeier, *Transport and Economic Development in Tanzania*, 72.

later until the present) to structurally improve existing roads particularly in regard to alignment, drainage and bridges.<sup>56</sup>

The Tanzanian government similarly aimed to construct a nationwide system of “low-costs roads” while improving the nation’s trunk road network of three north-south and three east-west arteries (including the Southern Trunk and Link Road from Dar-es-Salaam to Lindi-Mtwara-Songea-Njombe).<sup>57</sup>

**Table 5.1 “Proposed expenditure on roads during First Five Years Plan period”<sup>58</sup>**

Northern Trunk Road	£1,173,375
Western Trunk Road	£1,000,000
Eastern Trunk Road	£928,000
<b>Southern Trunk Road</b>	<b>£257,000</b>
Central Trunk Road	£231,900
Great North Road	£98,500
<b>Total Trunk Road</b>	<b>£3,688,775</b>
Major Link Roads	£1,515,625
Major Feeder Roads	£4,890,600
Minor Feeder Roads	£935,000
Miscellaneous	£770,000
<b>Total</b>	<b>£11,800,000</b>

The Ministry of Communications and Transport (Comworks) became responsible for administering and maintaining the nation’s trunk, territorial main, and local main roads (amounting to nearly 10,500 miles).<sup>59</sup> The engineers assigned to the Roads and Aerodrome Division of Comworks (headquartered in Dar es Salaam) designed road and bridge work and supervised major construction projects.<sup>60</sup> Regional Engineers were responsible for routine maintenance works, emergency measures, and the execution of construction works for all trunk and main roads, aerodrome, and public works projects within each

<sup>56</sup> Ibid. Although a total of £21.5 million was spent on road maintenance and construction between January 1950 and June 1961, funding for road projects steadily declined during the second half of the 1950s. Road improvement and maintenance schemes received only 16% in the fiscal years of 1958/29 and 1959/60 versus 45% in 1953.

<sup>57</sup> Ibid., 79. According to Hofmeier, the Tanzanian government based their idea of low-cost roads on the definition given at the 10<sup>th</sup> International Road Congress in 1955: “A low cost road is one which, having regard to consideration of climate and traffic, has been located and built to geometrical standards commensurate with future requirement, but has been constructed with bases and surface to meet the recent traffic requirements. It is, however, one which should be so designed, constructed and maintained that it allows for stage construction when traffic requires it and improvement in economic conditions permits.”

<sup>58</sup> DSM, Bureau of Resource Assessment and Land Use Planning, “A Guide to Same Data on Road Transport in Tanzania.”

<sup>59</sup> Hofmeier, *Transport and Economic Development in Tanzania*, 38 and 83. An estimated 1,568 miles had bitumen surface.

<sup>60</sup> Ibid., 224.

Region.<sup>61</sup> District Councils oversaw maintenance and improvement operations for district roads, while city and town councils managed all township and urban roads.<sup>62</sup> Small road gangs executed most of the routine road maintenance during the 1960s and early 1970s, including the cleaning of embankments and ditches, refilling potholes, and manually grading road surfaces.<sup>63</sup>

Although the Tanzanian government spent approximately TShs. 740 million on road investments between 1961 and 1970/71, insufficient funding, trained personnel, and mechanical equipment undermined road maintenance and improvement operations as it had during the colonial era.<sup>64</sup> The Tanzanian government contended with “serious manpower” deficiencies after many of the colonial officers left the country in the late 1960s. Only six of seventeen Regional Engineers were fully qualified.<sup>65</sup> The lack of trained experts was one reason why foreign consulting firms typically conducted feasibility studies of major infrastructure projects in Tanzania.<sup>66</sup> The men hired for routine maintenance also lacked proper training and experienced acute shortages in mechanical equipment and vehicles. Every

---

<sup>61</sup> *Ibid.*, 207 and 224. The Tanzanian government reorganized the administrative provinces as regions following independence.

<sup>62</sup> *Ibid.*, 38-39.

<sup>63</sup> *Ibid.*, 208. According to Hofmeier, a typical gang consisted of one foreman and four regularly employed laborers, along with unskilled laborers during peak construction season. These gangs were supposed to live in Comworks camps along the road at ten mile intervals.

<sup>64</sup> *Ibid.*, 83. Although the government stressed the importance of improving the nation’s feeder road networks in its Three-Year Development Plan (1961-64) and First Five-Year Development Plan (1964-69), the vast majority of all road expenditures went to the main roads. Hofmeier reported that only 12.5% of all road expenditures were spent on feeder roads during the first three years. Allocation improved to 46% during the following five years (81).

<sup>65</sup> *Ibid.*, 210. The Tanzanian government increasingly encouraged formal education for road construction engineers in the 1970s-80s. According to one Tanzanian engineer, Shaiba A. Mohammed Buriyani, Nyerere opened technical universities and sent students abroad for formal training. The students were split between “Western” and “Eastern” nations – all of which aimed to indoctrinate young Tanzanians with their political ideologies. After attending Moshi Technical and Dar es Salaam Technical, Shaibi was sent to East Germany to complete his bachelor’s and master’s degrees. He traveled with seven other Tanzanian students (engineers, agriculturalists, doctors, etc.), all of whom were assigned to different cities and universities. Shaibi received a year of practical training; building silos and roads. He married a woman and had a child in Germany. When he returned to Tanzania, he worked with a Canadian joint venture to build the Ministry of Technology building and Tungumu-Songea road. At the time of the interview, Shaiba was working as a private consulting civil engineer for road construction projects in southern Tanzania. He was also very interested in politics and was trying to become an elected member of the municipal government. See interview with Shaiba A. Mohammed Buriyani (Mnazi Mmoja, 16 September 2015).

<sup>66</sup> *Ibid.*, 227. International creditors also demanded that reputable foreign firms conduct feasibility studies before they would agree to fund Tanzania’s infrastructure projects.

five road crews (or gangs) were supposed to have one to two lorries at their disposal, yet Comworks vehicles were continually out of order due to “bureaucratic hindrances” in attaining spare parts and the “generally bad organization of servicing and maintenance.”<sup>67</sup> Hofmeier reported that the lack of vehicles in 1968 was “so acute that these lorries are hardly ever available and that the job of the road labourers under this present system is confined to pure manual work.”<sup>68</sup> Saidi A. Mtutile’s father, for example, worked as a road foreman for construction projects in Kilwa, Masasi, and Lindi during the 1960s. His construction crews primarily used hand tools, rather than bull dozers and graders.<sup>69</sup> Many of the district councils across the nation failed to dedicate the standard rate of TShs. 400/- per mile for road maintenance on district roads.<sup>70</sup> According to Hofmeier, District Councils did very little maintenance of local roads “since their finances are normally completely exhausted with other duties.”<sup>71</sup> The central government tried to rectify the problem in 1967/68 by gradually incorporating district roads under the authority of the Comworks. A lack of money, maintenance machinery, and vehicles prevented wide-scale implementation of the program under the First Five-Year Plan.<sup>72</sup> As during the German and British colonial eras, the Tanzanian government relied upon private contractors to conduct all major construction projects. Hofmeier explained, “in general the direct construction activities of Comworks are confined to medium-sized and smaller projects that are normally financed out of local Tanzanian funds. Even for the completion of these projects Comworks often employs local firms as contractors.”<sup>73</sup>

In southern Tanzania, the central state closed the Southern Province Railway in 1962/63 due to the rail’s exorbitant annual financial deficit.<sup>74</sup> The government instead focused on improving the Mtwara-Mingoyo and Lindi-Masasi roads to an engineered-gravel standard during the first three years of

---

<sup>67</sup> Ibid., 209. Hofmeier explained that spare parts could only be obtained through government stores.

<sup>68</sup> Ibid.

<sup>69</sup> Interview with Saidi A. Mtutile (Lindi, 29 September 2015).

<sup>70</sup> Hofmeier, *Transport and Economic Development in Tanzania*, 215.

<sup>71</sup> Ibid., 207.

<sup>72</sup> Ibid., 216. The program began in Mwanza, Mara, and Shinyanga Regions.

<sup>73</sup> Ibid., 227.

<sup>74</sup> Ibid., 77. The annual deficit in 1961 was £245,000. Portions of the track were relocated to Uganda.



independence. The roads' surface quality, however, remained of "a fairly low standard."<sup>75</sup> Between 1964 and 1968, road improvement projects were conducted along the Njombe-Songea-Tunduru-Masasi road to meet the requirements of road transportation operations between Mtwara and Zambia (operations which will be discussed later in the chapter).<sup>76</sup> The mountainous conditions between Njombe and Songea, however, prevented "fundamental improvement".<sup>77</sup> The government instead invested in a bitumen road from Dar es Salaam to Tunduma (on the Zambian border), to the detriment of the Mtwara port and southern economy.<sup>78</sup> The conditions of district and local roads in southern Tanzania were hardly better, and in most cases worse. According to Liebenow, government officials in Mtwara "complained of the costs and time involved in keeping the feeder roads cleared of the bamboo, wild rubber, and vine-covered thickets which constantly intrude upon any cleared area."<sup>79</sup> Despite the efforts of district councils to fund district road improvement projects, officials still struggled to reach remote areas during the rains due to road and bridge washouts.<sup>80</sup>

---

<sup>75</sup> Ibid., 82.

<sup>76</sup> Ibid.; and Liebenow, *Colonial Rule and Political Development in Tanzania*, 288.

<sup>77</sup> Hofmeier, *Transport and Economic Development in Tanzania*, 82.

<sup>78</sup> Ibid., 82-83; and Liebenow, *Colonial Rule and Political Development in Tanzania*, 289. Monson noted that the Americans were building a paved highway from Dar to Zambia while the Chinese were constructing the TAZARA railway. Jamie Monson, *Africa's Freedom Railway: How a Chinese Development Project Changed Lives and Livelihoods in Tanzania* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2009), 1-2.

<sup>79</sup> Liebenow, *Colonial Rule and Political Development in Tanzania*, 289.

<sup>80</sup> Ibid. District officers also received minuscule petrol allowances, which were typically exhausted by the middle of each month "and touring came to halt." According to Liebenow, petrol shortages resulted from the government prioritizing Zambia and Mozambique-related operations.

**Table 5.2 “Expenditure of District Councils for Road Maintenance in 1966” (in TShs.)<sup>81</sup>**

District	Total Revenue (including grants from Central Government)	Total Expenditures	Expenditure for road maintenance	Share of road maintenance out of total expenditure (%)	Expenditure per mile of district roads
Kilwa	1,321,000	1,422,000	114,000	8.1	375
Lindi	2,778,000	2,796,000	142,000	5.1	640
Masasi	4,266,000	4,397,000	147,000	3.4	835
Mtwara	1,746,000	1,563,000	88,000	5.6	760
Nachingwea	1,099,00	1,278,000	30,000	2.3	200
Newala	3,600,000	3,822,000	190,000	5.0	1,900
Tunduru	1,391,000	1,326,000	101,000	7.6	665
Songea	2,007,000	2,124,000	101,000	4.8	725
Tanzania	193,088,000	194,643,000	6,434,000	3.3	605

Only two main roads were usable year round in Mtwara District in 1967.<sup>82</sup> Mtwara regional development officers and the Mtwara Development Committee repeatedly pinpointed inadequate transportation and water infrastructure as the major impediments to economic development and health advances in the region from 1967 to 1970.<sup>83</sup> Poor infrastructure prevented peasant access to government services and led “to enormous administrative problems by preventing the tasks of planning, surveying, and assessing development progress” in a systematic way during the 1960s and 1970s.<sup>84</sup>

Citizens of southern Tanzania often complained to national newspapers that the lack of transportation infrastructure – particularly an all-weather road to Dar es Salaam – epitomized their “literal and symbolic exclusion from substantive national membership.”<sup>85</sup> Whereas the Dar es Salaam-Lindi road annually closed for five to six months throughout the 1960s and 1970s, a complete bitumen road system was constructed between Dar es Salaam, Morogoro, Tanga, Moshi, and Arusha between 1966 and 1969.<sup>86</sup>

<sup>81</sup> Hofmeier, *Transport and Economic Development in Tanzania*, 340. The table above is an abbreviated version of the one offered in Hofmeier’s appendix. A few comparative rates include: Rufiji (1,646,000; 1,560,000; 94,000; 6.0; 360), Njombe (3,854,000; 3,579,000; 221,000; 6.2; 800), Tanga (4,559,000; 4,729,000; 425,000; 9.0; 2,670), and Kilimanjaro (14,582,000; 13,984,000; 222,000; 1.6 ; 945).

<sup>82</sup> Liebenow, *Colonial Rule and Political Development in Tanzania*, 289.

<sup>83</sup> Priya Lal, *African Socialism in Postcolonial Tanzania: Between the Village and the World* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 147.

<sup>84</sup> Lal, *African Socialism in Postcolonial Tanzania*, 147.

<sup>85</sup> *Ibid.*, 153.

<sup>86</sup> Hofmeier, *Transport and Economic Development in Tanzania*, 82; Liebenow, *Colonial Rule and Political Development in Tanzania*, 288; and S. Mesaki and J. Mwankusye, “The Sage of the Lindi-Kibiti Road: Political

Priya Lal argued that southeasterners juxtaposed the region's poor infrastructure with the central state's principles of socialist equality and its development promises for the "Cinderella" region in order to gain more national resources. According to Lal, "In calling for the construction of a Southern Link road, these citizens simultaneously portrayed the region as a discrete unit worthy of investment and called for the erosion of its separateness."<sup>87</sup> The state responded to popular discontent in southern Tanzania by authorizing a number of feasibility studies for the construction of an all-weather, 300 mile road to Dar es Salaam. The Overseas Technical Cooperation Agency published a survey report in 1971 that estimated construction costs at TShs. 261,447,000. Three years later, no construction work had been done.<sup>88</sup>

### **The Southern Road Transportation Service Sector (mid-1950s to mid-1960s)**

As the Tanzanian government struggled to improve the south's transportation infrastructure in the 1960s, it exerted minimum authority over the region's Asian-dominated road transportation services sector. Despite the horrid conditions of the southern roads, the Tanganyika Transport Company Ltd. (*Teeteeko*) transported government and private goods, mail, and passengers to all the major townships in the south, Mbamba Bay, Njombe, and Dar es Salaam by 1956.<sup>89</sup> The company's General Manager, Dhirajlal (Dirubhai) Savailal Amin oversaw the expansion of *Teeteeko's* fleet from 5-10 vehicles to

---

Ramifications," in *The Making of a Periphery: Economic Development and Cultural Encounters in Southern Tanzania*, eds. Pekka Seppälä and Bertha Koda (Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 1998), 58-74.

<sup>87</sup> Lal, *African Socialism in Postcolonial Tanzania*, 153.

<sup>88</sup> S. Mesaki and J. Mwankusye offered an analysis of the Tanzanian state's struggles to complete an all-weather road from Lindi to Dar es Salaam in, "The Sage of the Lindi-Kibiti Road: Political Ramifications."

<sup>89</sup> TNA ACC 460 Ministry of Labour, 4/25/4 Tanganyika Transport Co Limited, Lindi (30.1.54-20.9.61), Labour Officer Lindi to Labour Commissioner, "Transport Changes," 22 August 1955; and Southern Provincial Commissioner "T.T.Co-Government Contracts," 23 August 1956. Colonial officers were contracted to use *Teeteeko* vehicles along the following routes in 1956: Lindi-Kilwa-Dar es Salaam; Lindi-Nachingwea; Lindi-Masasi-Tunduru-Songea; Lindi-Mkwaya-Mtwara; Songea-Mbamba Bay; Songea-Njombe; Songea-Lituhi; and Mtwara-Newala-Masasi. *Teeteeko* also maintained a contract to clear and forward government stores and goods at the ports of Lindi and Mtwara at a rate of Shs. 6/- per ton (weight or measure) with a minimum of Shs. 2/-. Dirubhai established major branches in Dar es Salaam and Songea under the authority of his brother and father. Smaller offices also opened in Njombe, Masasi, and Mtwara between 1945 and 1964. Dirubhai's mother and sisters were not involved in the business. According to Dirubhai, women were not involved in businesses in the 1940s and 1950s. Today, in contrast, most of the upcountry stores are operated by women. Interview with Dhirajlal Savailal Amin (Mkwaya, 17 September 2015).

nearly 200 hundred lorries and buses between 1945 and 1964.<sup>90</sup> The company's employees correspondingly grew from 20-30 to between 200 and 250.<sup>91</sup> Labor unionism offered the most significant obstacle to *Teeteeko*'s continued economic growth during the late 1950s.<sup>92</sup> Labor unions targeted *Teeteeko* because they recognized that an agreement with the company – one of the largest employers of African laborers in the south – would help strengthen union claims against other smaller transport employers in the region and the broader regional labor market. The Tanganyika Transport and Allied Workers Union (TT&AWU) issued demands on behalf of *Teeteeko*'s employees in 1957, including; work hours, rights of termination, holidays, paid leave, and off-season pay (during the rainy season).<sup>93</sup> The

---

<sup>90</sup> TNA ACC 460, 4/25/4, Sd. J. Dickson, Labour Officer (Morogoro), "Inspection report Tanganyika Transport Co. Limited, Lindi," 28 October 1942; and interview with Dhirajjal Savailal Amin (Mkwaya, 17 September 2015). *Teeteeko* was a customer of Shell Company. *Teeteeko* supposedly did not experience petrol shortages, and was looked after "very well" by Shell.

<sup>91</sup> Interview with Dhirajjal Savailal Amin (Mkwaya, 17 September 2015).

<sup>92</sup> According to John Iliffe, collective labor consciousness and solidarity among Tanganyika Africans grew between 1929 and 1947. Unionization began with civil servants and moved through the service and transport sector before reaching industrial workers in the 1950s. Many of the first registered trade unions were established during the Second World War, including the African Cooks, Washermen, and House Servants Association (1939), Tanganyika African Government Servants Association (1944), African Teachers Association (1944), and Railway African Association (1944). The first well-documented union among automobile drivers appeared in 1944 in the Southern Highlands. While drivers had excellent communication avenues, Iliffe argued that it was difficult for them to form coordinated labor organizations because drivers were "excessively dispersed, mobile, and individualistic." Dockworkers, in comparison, were more successful at building solidarity and conducting union strikes. Southern Tanganyika experienced strikes at Lindi harbor and among transport workers in 1947 and 1948. African trade unionism temporarily declined after a disastrous strike in Dar es Salaam in 1950. Brennan described how a strike of some 1,500 casual dockworkers on the morning of February 3, 1950 turned into a violent mob of 400-600 people in Mnazi Mmoja. In the aftermath, many African trade unions deregistered or collapsed. There were no registered African trade unions in the territory after the African Tailors Union closed in 1951. Brennan, however, noted that some unions carried on illegally. Educated men with close ties to the territory's leading African nationalist parties – TAA and TANU – revived unionism in the mid-1950s. These leaders sought to "create a labour movement from above, on a territorial scale, and with the overt leadership which most earlier labour actions had lacked." The Tanganyika Federation of Labour was launched in October 1955, precipitating a massive growth of unionization among Tanganyika workers (reaching 42% by 1961). Iliffe contended that the greatest impact was felt among "dispersed, largely unskilled, and often migrant sisal workers" (540). See Iliffe, *A Modern History of Tanganyika*, 396-404 and 537-39; Becker, "A social history of Southeast Tanzania," 316; and Brennan, *Taifa*, 115.

<sup>93</sup> TNA ACC 460, 4/25/4, "The Tanganyika Transport and Allied Workers Union Lindi Branch," 2 September 1958. T&AWU demanded a 45 hour work week where employees worked 7:30am-noon and 14:00-17:00pm (Monday-Friday) and 7:30am-noon (Saturdays). The employees would receive overtime if they exceeded 45 hours. When an employee was not working during the rains, he would receive half pay. T&AWU also demanded that employees receive double pay for working on holidays, including: New Years, Good Friday, Easter Monday, Mohamedan Year, Queens Day, Christmas, and Boxing Day. After one year of continuous employment, an employee should receive fourteen days of leave with full pay at the full rate. Those who worked for two years continuously should receive

union also demanded a dramatic increase in wages per month: Shs. 500/- for drivers, Shs. 400/- for skilled mechanics, Shs. 200/- for carpenters, and Shs. 90/- for turn-boys (drivers' assistants).<sup>94</sup> Negotiations in September 1958 soon stalled as the General Secretary of TT&AWU allegedly used profane language and threatened to finish off *Teeteeko* "in no time."<sup>95</sup> Dirubhai refused to negotiate until the General Secretary apologized for his "rude insulting behavior." Dirubhai eventually withdrew the request and instead asked that the secretary refrain from using profane language in the future.<sup>96</sup> Negotiations proceeded slowly as Dirubhai found the demands to be too numerous and difficult.<sup>97</sup> TT&AWU responded by threatening to unleash a strike, even though it was unclear whether *Teeteeko* employees could legally strike.<sup>98</sup> The agreement signed by both parties on October 6, 1958 did not meet the union's demands, but did create a precedent for future negotiations and helped legitimize TT&AWU in southern Tanganyika.<sup>99</sup> After

---

21 days, and three year employees should receive 72 days of leave. Those men on monthly contract should be notified a month in advance of their employment termination.

<sup>94</sup> Ibid. Additional wage increases included: semi-skilled mechanics (Shs. 250/-), *kulis/coolies* (Shs. 90/-), grease boys (Shs. 75/-), masons (Shs. 200/-), and night watchman (Shs. 100/-). During Carnegie Browne's management in 1942, drivers were receiving Shs. 60/- to Shs. 110/- per month plus a bonus of Shs. 10/. The turn-boys received between Shs. 15/- and Shs. 18/-. There were only ten lorries operating at that time between Lindi and Songea. See TNA ACC 460, 4/25/4, Sd. J. Dickson, Labour Officer (Morogoro), "Inspection report Tanganyika Transport Co. Limited, Lindi," 28 October 1942.

<sup>95</sup> TNA ACC 460, 4/25/4, Managing Director (*Teeteeko*) to General Secretary of the Tanganyika Transport and Allied Workers Union (TT&AWU), 22 September 1958.

<sup>96</sup> TNA ACC 460, 4/25/4, Managing Director (*Teeteeko*) to the President (TT&AWU), 16 September 1958; and Managing Director (*Teeteeko*) to General Secretary (TT&AWU), 22 September 1958. Dirubhai also asked that the union president join the negotiations, but this request was denied. The president was Mustapa Mohammed. He wrote to Dirubhai on September 23<sup>rd</sup> expressing his surprise that *Teeteeko* refused to negotiate with the General Secretary. He urged the men to continue the negotiations and promised to look into the matter. See TNA ACC 460, 4/25/4, General Secretary (Muhidin) to Managing Director (*Teeteeko*), 24 September 1958.

<sup>97</sup> TNA ACC 460, 4/25/4, Managing Director (*Teeteeko*) to General Secretary (TT&AWU), 29 September 1958.

<sup>98</sup> TNA ACC 460, 4/25/4, General Secretary (Muhidin) to Managing Director (*Teeteeko*), 16 September 1958 and 3 October 1958; and TNA ACC 460, 4/25/4, Labour Commissioner (K.L. Sander) to Ministerial Secretary, Ministry for Social Services, "Trade Dispute [Arbitration and Settlement] Ordinances 1950: Schedule of Essential Services," 6 October 1958. A strike might have been unlawful if the colonial state determined that *Teeteeko* provided essential services as a contractor for the East Africa Posts and Telecommunication Administration. Before the colonial Legal Office made a ruling on the matter, the labor negotiations were settled.

<sup>99</sup> TNA ACC 460, 4/25/4, "An Agreement by Tanganyika Transport and Allied Workers Union and the Tanganyika Transport Co. Ltd., concluded in Lindi on the 6<sup>th</sup> October 1958, and which shall have effect as from the 1<sup>st</sup> November 1958." The wage rates were not half of what the union requested: Shs. 175/- for drivers, Shs. 90/- for skilled mechanics, Shs. 90/- for carpenters, and Shs 50/- for turn-boys. The work hours for workshops and offices in Lindi, Dar es Salaam, and Songea were set at 7:30-noon and 14:00-17:00 (Monday-Friday) and 7:30-noon (Saturdays). Drivers and turn-boys, however, still had to work the hours required by the company. They were entitled to a rest period at the end of each trip and a minimum rest of four to six hours per day. When a driver was

settling with *Teeteeko*, the union immediately entered into negotiations with other transporters in Lindi and Mikindani.<sup>100</sup>

Within five months, TT&AWU expressed dissatisfaction with the agreement and redirected complaints against *Teeteeko*. The colonial Labour Office in Lindi was unwilling to interfere, instructing the union that they had to reopen negotiations if they wanted to make amendments.<sup>101</sup> TT&AWU's successor, the Transport and General Workers Union (T&GWU), terminated the agreement with *Teeteeko* in October 1959 and demanded new terms.<sup>102</sup> The union's Regional Secretary initially demanded that the minimum wage for unskilled laborers be set at Shs. 80/- a month. *Teeteeko* found the raise unaffordable and Lindi's colonial Labour Officer was inclined to agree. *Teeteeko* countered at Shs. 60/-, but the union raised its demands to Shs. 150/-.<sup>103</sup> A pattern of labor demands, threats of strikes, and failed negotiations continued throughout 1959-60.<sup>104</sup> The colonial Labour Department watched the proceedings nervously as they recognized that a strike could cause serious damage: "As Tanganyika Transport Co. are the main

---

not working during the rains, he would receive Shs. 75/- per month. A turn-boy would receive Shs. 5/- per month. The drivers and turn-boys would receive double wages on holidays, but the holidays were limited to Idd-el-Fitr, Idd-el-Haji, Christmas, and Boxing Day. The company did not have to give notice of termination for men who worked for *Teeteeko* for less than a year. Those who worked a year or more would receive a one month notice. Additional wages increases included: *kulis/coolies* (Shs. 90/-), grease boys (Shs. 50/-), watchman (Shs. 60/-), office boys (Shs. 60/-). The drivers were also awarded a safari allowance if they traveled outside the normal published route.

<sup>100</sup> TNA ACC 460, 4/25/4, "Extract from Monthly Report from Labour Officer Lindi for month October 1958."

<sup>101</sup> TNA ACC 460, 4/25/4, Labour Commissioner to Labour Officer Lindi, "Agreement between the Tanganyika Transport Co. Ltd and the Tanganyika Transport and Allied Workers Union"; and Labour Officer Southern Province (John Hennessey) to Labour Commissioner, 23 March 1959.

<sup>102</sup> TNA ACC 460, 4/25/4, Labour Officer (John Hennessey) to Labour Commissioner, "Dispute: Tanganyika Transport Co. Ltd and Transport and General Workers Union," 26 July 1960.

<sup>103</sup> *Ibid.* Labour Officer Hennessey reported that the Regional Secretary was willing to accept a minimum wage at 80/-, but the union headquarters demanded no less than Shs. 100/-.

<sup>104</sup> Dirubhai, for example, was prepared to counter at Shs. 65/- (13% raise) at a meeting on 22 July 1960, but the union representatives appeared an hour and fifteen minutes late. The parties agreed to another meeting on the 27<sup>th</sup>. Two days before the meeting, T&GWU threatened a strike for August 16<sup>th</sup> because *Teeteeko* had failed to respond to union demands. See TNA ACC 460, 4/25/4, Regional Secretary T&GWU to Managing Director (D.S. Amin) *Teeteeko*, 25 July 1960; D.S. Amin (*Teeteeko*) to the Regional Secretary, 26 July 1960; and Labour Officer (John Hennessey) to Labour Commissioner, "Dispute: Tanganyika Transport Co. Ltd and Transport and General Workers Union," 26 July 1960. (D.S. Amin refers to Dirubhai.)

haulers, passenger carrier and mail contract holders in the Province a strike could be serious.”<sup>105</sup> *Teeteeko* and T&GWU reached a settlement on August 15, 1960 with the company agreeing to increase the minimum wage to Shs. 70/- per month.<sup>106</sup> Less than a week later, the union issued further demands, including: turn-boy wage rates at Shs. 100/- per month, fourteen day leave, five public holidays, one month termination notice, and *safari* pay.<sup>107</sup> Dirubhai was frustrated, but decided to start negotiations with the assistance of a third party rather than eliciting the help of the Labour Office.<sup>108</sup> According to Lindi’s Labour Office, Dirubhai described the August-September 1960 “negotiations as ‘agreement by blackmail.’”<sup>109</sup> The company simply could not afford a strike. *Teeteeko* concluded the bitter negotiations on September 5<sup>th</sup> having agreed to pay unskilled workers a minimum wage of Shs. 100/- and drivers a minimum wage of Shs. 250/- per month. All workers already paid over Shs. 250/- would receive a raise of Shs. 30/-, while workers paid between Shs. 100/- and 250/- would receive a wage increase of 12.5%. Additional benefits were met regarding leave, medical, and holidays.<sup>110</sup> Dirubhai bluntly notified the southern provincial administration that the colonial government had to increase its contracted passenger and cargo transport rates with *Teeteeko* in order to compensate for the losses the company incurred by the

---

<sup>105</sup> TNA ACC 460, 4/25/4, Labour Officer (John Hennessey) to Labour Commissioner, “Dispute: Tanganyika Transport Co. Ltd and Transport and General Workers Union,” 26 July 1960.

<sup>106</sup> TNA ACC 460, 4/25/4, Acting Senior Labour Officer to Labour Commissioner, “Dispute T.T.Co. Lt. and General Workers Union,” 15 August 1960. A 10%-12.5% wage increase was also awarded to employees already earning over Shs. 70/-.

<sup>107</sup> TNA ACC 460, 4/25/4, Acting Senior Labour Officer to Labour Commissioner, “Tanganyika Transport Company Ltd.,” 19 August 1960.

<sup>108</sup> TNA ACC 460, 4/25/4, D.S. Amin (T.T.C.Ltd. Austin Cars and Trucks Agents for Southern Province) to the Regional Secretary T&GWU, 22 August 1960; and Acting Senior Labour Officer to Labour Commissioner, “Dispute Tanganyika Transport Co. Ltd., and General Workers Union,” 29 August 1960. The British Labour Officer suggested Mr. Jiwan Jeraji as a neutral third party. The prominent businessman declined the offer out of fear of potential repercussions to his business.

<sup>109</sup> TNA ACC 460, 4/25/4, Acting Senior Labour Officer to Labour Commissioner, “Dispute Tanganyika Transport Co. Lt. and Transport and General Workers Union,” 5 September 1960.

<sup>110</sup> *Ibid.*; and Acting Senior Labour Officer to Labour Commissioner, 23 September 1960. The agreement also stipulated that all workers employed for twelve continuous months would receive 14 days of annual leave. Employees would receive two full months of sick leave, and the company would pay all medical expenses. Employees would receive double pay if they worked on Sunday and/or all public gazette holidays. The wages for clerks and semi-skilled employees rose to Shs 200/- and 175/- respectively. The company also had to introduce a provident fund. Employees set aside 5% of their monthly pay, and the company matched it.

wage raises.<sup>111</sup> When looking back on the union disputes in 2015, Dirubhai did not recall any difficulties working with the unions. Negotiations were admittedly tough, but they always came to terms and no grievances occurred afterwards.<sup>112</sup> The colonial records, however, offer a different version of the events. Labour Officer John Hennessey reported in July 1960 that *Teeteeko* privately admitted that it would have been better if it had never worked with the unions two years earlier and that it was impossible to deal with “irresponsible and unrealistic union officials.”<sup>113</sup>

To what extent did the labor union agreements improve the work conditions of *Teeteeko* employees and impact the large transportation sector in southern Tanganyika? Elders’ memories and assessments of the trade unions were mixed. While some praised the unions for listening to workers’ complaints and getting solutions, others did not see any benefits.<sup>114</sup> If a driver wanted a higher wage, he still had to negotiate with the owner directly.<sup>115</sup> Labor disputes also failed to impact *Teeteeko*’s operations and dominance over the southern road transportation sector. The company remained unrivalled in offering relatively inexpensive and reliable long-distance passenger transport along the main roads within and beyond southern Tanganyika, especially among students and government personnel traveling on warrants.<sup>116</sup> Migrant laborers continued to utilize *Teeteeko*’s services to reach the sisal plantations along

---

<sup>111</sup> Before the agreement could be enforced, *Teeteeko* employees went on strike on September 19<sup>th</sup>. The men returned to work once they were assured that they would be paid the negotiated amount. See TNA ACC 460, 4/25/4, Acting Senior Labour Officer to Labour Commissioner, “Transport & General Workers Union and Tanganyika Transport Co. Ltd. and General Labour in Lindi,” 19 September 1960.

<sup>112</sup> Interview with Dhirajlal Savailal Amin (Mkwaya, 17 September 2015).

<sup>113</sup> TNA ACC 460, 4/25/4, Labour Officer (John Hennessey) to Labour Commissioner, “Dispute: Tanganyika Transport Co. Ltd and Transport and General Workers Union,” 26 July 1960. The idea that union leaders and members were poorly trained, uneducated, illiterate, irresponsible, and/or prone to creating industrial chaos was a common British argument. See Cooper, *Decolonization and African Society*, 323-360.

<sup>114</sup> Interview with Mohamed Nasoro (Lindi, 14 September 2015); Said Mohamed Shahame (Lindi, 15 September 2015); and Juma Said Aly (Lindi, 18 September 2015).

<sup>115</sup> Interview with Mohamed Nasoro (Lindi, 14 September 2015).

<sup>116</sup> Interview with Shaiba A. Mohammed Buriyani (Mnazi Mmoja, 16 September 2015); Hamis Mohamed Likokola (Lindi, 29 September 2015); Husein Mohamed Mzaina (Lindi, 28 September 2015); Saidi A. Mtutile (Lindi, 29 September 2015); and Athomani Wadi Mlaponi (Masasi, 8 October 2015). Athomani recalled using *Teeteeko* buses to attend school in Masasi in the 1950s. Shaiba was another student-user during the 1960s. He was born in 1954 and was attending Standard I when Tanzanian independence occurred. He still recalls celebrating Empire Day with school competitions. He remembered that some vehicles would be designated as student-only buses. These buses delivered students to and from their homes during holidays.



the southern coast and north in Tanga.<sup>117</sup> Unionism also did not hinder the expansion of the road transportation service sector among Indian businessmen, traders, and creditors in the late 1950s and early 1960s. *Chekacheka*, Mtwara Roadways, A.P. Kanji, K.J. Motors, and Tanzania Transport Company (not to be confused with *Teeteeko*) all offered transportation services from Lindi or Mtwara during the 1960s. Their vehicle fleets and operational areas, however, were much smaller in comparison to *Teeteeko*, whose supremacy over interregional cargo and passenger transport remained intact.<sup>118</sup> In the coastal towns, Indian and African entrepreneurs also began establishing small-scale, independent transport businesses that consisted of one or two vehicles transporting passengers within the town and surrounding villages. Hofmeier reported a similar trend across the nation in the late 1960s, wherein a “fairly large number of smaller operators with just one or two vehicles” offered local transport, while a few large, specialized transportation firms dominated the transport business.<sup>119</sup>

**Table 5.3 “Size Distribution of Road Freight Transport Industry” in Tanzania, Nov. 1967<sup>120</sup>**

	Number of License Holders	Number of Lorries and Tankers	Average size of vehicle fleet
Licenses with 1-2 vehicles	1,462 (92%)	1,735 (62%)	1.2
Licenses with 3-9 vehicles	118 (7%)	515 (18%)	4.4
Licenses with 10 or more vehicles	17 (1%)	549 (20%)	32.3
Total	1,597 (100%)	2,799 (100%)	1.7

Although the African labor unions failed to fundamentally transform the landscape of the southern road transportation sector, the unions lessened the power that Indians exerted over the transportation labor

---

Although most of the interviewees said the price of travel with *Teeteeko* was cheap, they also explained that acquiring money was very difficult during the 1950s-1970s. Rukia A. Mrope, for example, recalled that migrants from Mozambique often walked from Masasi to Lindi with their goods and children on their backs because they could not afford vehicular transport. On the other hand, she remembered that *Teeteeko* allowed relatives to pay for passengers on arrival rather than at the time of departure. Interview with Rukia A. Mrope (Lindi, 15 September 2015).

<sup>117</sup> Interview with Rukia A. Mrope (Lindi, 15 September 2015); and Juma Said Aly (Lindi, 19 September 2015).

<sup>118</sup> Interview with Mohamed Nasoro (Lindi, 14 September 2015); Said Mohamed Shahame (Lindi, 15 September 2015); Dadi Mkonyoka Yusufu (Lindi, 17 September 2015); Juma Said Aly (Lindi, 19 September 2015); Athomani Wadi Mlaponi (Masasi, 8 October 2015); and Juma Hemed Alli (Mtwara, 13 October 2015).

<sup>119</sup> Hofmeier, *Transport and Economic Development in Tanzania*, 155.

<sup>120</sup> *Ibid.*

market. The Tanzanian government, meanwhile, contemplated ways in which they could align with the Indian firms and gradually exert their authority over an industry that had operated relatively autonomously during the previous thirty years.

### ***Ujamaa* and African Liberation Movements**

During the course of the 1960s, the Tanzanian government became increasingly antagonistic towards private trade and individual wealth accumulation.<sup>121</sup> President Julius Nyerere announced the Arusha Declaration in 1967, officially instituting the Tanzanian socialist policy of *ujamaa* or “familyhood.” *Ujamaa* rejected capitalism and strove for national self-sufficiency and self-reliance through rural development. It “promoted agricultural production and the distribution of state services by encouraging rural resettlement into communal villages throughout the country.”<sup>122</sup> In the aftermath of the Arusha Declaration, all commercial banks, insurance companies, milling industries, and food-processing industries were nationalized.<sup>123</sup> The state revoked licenses for large Asian import-export traders and encouraged the amalgamation of local cooperatives into large regional cooperatives.<sup>124</sup> It empowered the regional cooperatives with preferential bank credit and control over crop marketing.<sup>125</sup> The Co-operative Societies Act in 1968 stripped Asian private traders of their influence over agricultural marketing.<sup>126</sup> Richa Nagar contended that the Ismailis who established shops in remote rural areas were hit hard by the

---

<sup>121</sup> Nagar, “The South Asian Diaspora in Tanzania,” 68; and Giblin, *A History of the Excluded*, 245-46.

<sup>122</sup> Priya Lal, “Between the Village and the World: Imagining and Practicing Development in Tanzania, 1964-1975,” (Ph.D. diss., New York University, 2011), 37. In her manuscript, *African Socialism in Postcolonial Tanzania*, Lal argued that *ujamaa* “simultaneously drew on major themes of international socialism – by rejecting exploitation and inequality in favor of collective effort and welfare – and departed from the existing global repertoire of development policy – by proposing a decentralized, pastoral version of socialist democracy. Rather than proclaiming *ujamaa* a fixed blueprint for revolutionary change, Tanzanian leaders styled it as a flexible, improvisational utopian project driven by a shifting dialectic between state-oriented policy and popular subjective transformation. [...] At the heart of these development prescriptions was an elevation of the communal village as both the embodiment of Tanzania’s socialist ideals and the tool by which to achieve them on a national scale” (8).

<sup>123</sup> Nagar, “The South Asian Diaspora in Tanzania,” 68-69. The major industries included Kilimanjaro Breweries and Tanganyika Extract Company.

<sup>124</sup> Ibid.

<sup>125</sup> Giblin, *A History of the Excluded*, 256.

<sup>126</sup> Nagar, “The South Asian Diaspora in Tanzania,” 69.

changing market conditions and forced to relocate their businesses to larger towns.<sup>127</sup> Cooperative unions also threatened small African traders because they “monopolized both the purchase of key crops and the transporting of these crops in government-subsidized vehicles.”<sup>128</sup> According to Liebenow, the Makonde grew increasingly pessimistic towards cooperatives by the late 1960s. They suspected that the government used unions to monitor earnings “in order to levy higher taxes.” They also believed that fixed prices “gave them less freedom of choice than they had had under the old system of bargaining with the Asians.”<sup>129</sup> Giblin argued that the Tanzanian government gradually transformed cooperatives from tools to challenge racial economic inequalities during the colonial era into “instruments of control” for the state over rural private enterprises.<sup>130</sup>

The ways in which *ujamaa* was interpreted and implemented in southern Tanzania were intricately linked with the anti-colonial campaigns being conducted in the borderland.<sup>131</sup> During the 1950s, anti-colonial sentiment rose steadily across the Ruvuma border in Mozambique. The Portuguese colonial government authorized the *Polícia Internacional e de Defesa do Estado* (PIDE) to suppress anti-colonial groups and arrest those who organized or participated in political meetings, particularly intellectuals and students.<sup>132</sup> Northern Mozambique became a hot bed for anti-colonialism after government troops fired into a crowd of demonstrators at Mueda in June 1960 – dubbed the “Mueda massacre” and the “Mozambican version of Sharpeville.”<sup>133</sup> Tanzania’s independence spurred the militarization of the Ruvuma border as the Portuguese feared that Tanzanians entered Mozambique with

---

<sup>127</sup> Ibid.

<sup>128</sup> Liebenow, *Colonial Rule and Political Development in Tanzania*, 324 and 329.

<sup>129</sup> Ibid., 324.

<sup>130</sup> Giblin, *A History of the Excluded*, 256.

<sup>131</sup> Lal offered new, valuable analyses into the ways that the Cold War, Pan-Africanism, and “Third World socialism” impacted the ideology and implementation of *ujamaa* in Tanzania. See Lal, *African Socialism in Postcolonial Tanzania*, 27-77.

<sup>132</sup> Charlotte Lee Miller, “Who are the ‘permanent inhabitants’ of the state?: citizenship policies and border controls in Tanzania, 1920-1980” (PhD diss., University of Iowa, 2011), 160-61.

<sup>133</sup> Ibid., 161; and Mayln Newitt, *History of Mozambique* (London: Hurst & Company, 2009), 521. Nationalist leaders of the União Makonde de Moçambique (later part of the Mozambique African National Union - MANU) had organized local peasants in Mueda for months. The district governor invited the leaders to discuss their grievances. The leaders, however, were arrested, sparking a demonstration. The governor responded by ordering troops to fire into the crowd.

the intention of spreading nationalist rhetoric and supporting nationalist organizations. Portuguese officials were also concerned that migrant laborers were returning from Tanzania indoctrinated with nationalists ideologies promoted by labor unions.<sup>134</sup> A British report in May 1961 stated that the –

Portuguese are conscious of a developing threat and are taking energetic steps to strengthen internal security. Troops are being increased and dispersed along the Nyasaland and Tanganyika border: communications and airfields are being improved and the civil population is being alerted, trained and armed.<sup>135</sup>

Five months later, another British intelligence report indicated that the Portuguese were erecting barracks and forts along the Ruvuma border.<sup>136</sup> Many Mozambican nationalist leaders, however, migrated to Tanzania (especially Dar es Salaam) because of the nation's support for Pan-Africanism and African liberation movements.<sup>137</sup> The three regionally and ethnically-based liberation movements in Mozambique unified into the *O Frente de Libertação de Moçambique* (the Mozambique Liberation Front or Frelimo) in June 1962.<sup>138</sup> With the support of the Tanzanian government and President Julius Nyerere, Frelimo established military bases in southern Tanzania. Trained, armed, and advised with the assistance of foreign powers (including the Soviet Union, China, and Algeria), Frelimo deployed male and female forces across the Ruvuma to engage in guerrilla warfare beginning in 1964.<sup>139</sup> During a visit to southern Tanzania in 1966, American Ambassador Burns reported that,

---

<sup>134</sup> BNA CO 822/2877 Border Incidents between Tanganyika and Mozambique; BNA CO 822/2131 Mozambique African National Union of Tanganyika; and BNA FCO 141/17895 Portuguese Territory, "Mozambique. Political. African Nationalists Threat to Mozambique," 10 May 1961.

<sup>135</sup> BNA CO 822/2131, Extract from Tanganyika Intelligence Report, "Portuguese East Africa," May 1961.

<sup>136</sup> BNA CO 822/2131, Extracts from Tanganyika Intelligence Report, "Portuguese East Africa," September 1961 and October 1961.

<sup>137</sup> Miller, "Who are the 'permanent inhabitants' of the state," 162.

<sup>138</sup> Michael G. Panzer, "A Nation in Name, A 'State' in Exile: The FRELIMO Proto-State, Youth, Gender, and the Liberation of Mozambique 1962-1975" (PhD diss., State University of New York at Albany, 2013), 3-4. The three liberation movements were UDENAMO (The National Democratic Union of Mozambique), MANU (Mozambican African National Union), and UNAMI (The National African Union of Independent Mozambique).

<sup>139</sup> United States National Archives, College Park (NACP), RG 59, A1 (5710), Tanganyika and Zanzibar (1963-1975), "Trip Report No.4 Southern Safari – September 1966"; and interview with Juma Hemed Alli (Mtwara, October 13, 2015). American Ambassador Burns reported seeing Russian-built military trucks driven by FRELIMO "freedom fighters" from the southern coast to Songea. In addition to supplies, the truck transported "several female auxiliaries of rather formable demeanor." Burns also recounted Father Cox's testimony that he had " 'frequently' seen Chinese coming and going at the Nachingwea airport" and heard that eight Chinese men were stationed in the Frelimo camp near Nachingwea. Alli recalled Russian and Chinese instructors training Frelimo soldiers.

Many of the tribesmen drift back and forth across the Mozambique border regularly. Among them there are now substantial numbers who have been actively engaged in the fighting against the Portuguese. Many of these individuals come for a rest in Tanzania, and return to Mozambique after a short stay with relatives.<sup>140</sup>

Mozambican refugees also flocked north across the Ruvuma border to find shelter from the devastation caused by colonial troops and Frelimo guerrilla fighters. The Tanzania Christian Refugee Service (TCRS) resettled over 40,000 Mozambican refugees in settlements in southern Tanzania.<sup>141</sup> Thousands more resided with friends and relatives. In addition to supporting Frelimo, the Tanzanian government also sought to assist land-locked Zambia. International economic sanctions placed on Southern Rhodesia after its declaration of unilateral independence in November 1965 precipitated an economic crisis in Zambia. Most of the nation's petroleum – which was crucial for the Zambian copper industry – came from Rhodesian refineries. In an effort to lessen Zambia's dependence upon apartheid South Africa, Rhodesia, and colonial Mozambique, the Tanzanian government offered an alternative import-export trade route to the Indian Ocean through Tanzania.<sup>142</sup> Tanzania agreed to import oil to Zambia and export its copper and foreign trade goods through the ports of Mtwara and Dar es Salaam.<sup>143</sup>

Southern Tanzania entered the national and global spotlight as the site where Tanzania would defend its sovereignty and fulfill its “commitment to global anti-colonialism”.<sup>144</sup> As the war in Mozambique progressed, however, the elastic quality of the Ruvuma border and mobility within the borderland became increasingly constrained. Charlotte Miller argued that the border became a problematic space for the Tanzanian government as it tried to welcome refugees and “freedom fighters,” but also defend against security threats that imperial forces, spies, and mercenaries presented to Tanzanian sovereignty and unity.<sup>145</sup> Some TANU leaders feared that Tanzanian border residents might be susceptible to Portuguese propaganda and colonial indoctrination because of their isolation from the rest

---

<sup>140</sup> NACP, RG 59, A1 (5710), “Trip Report No.4 Southern Safari – September 1966”.

<sup>141</sup> Miller, “Who are the ‘permanent inhabitants’ of the state,” 179.

<sup>142</sup> Lal, “Between the Village and the World,” 69.

<sup>143</sup> Hofmeier, *Transport and Economic Development in Tanzania*, 164; Monson, *Africa's Freedom Railway*, 15-17; and Lal, “Between the Village and the World,” 69.

<sup>144</sup> *Ibid.*, 199.

<sup>145</sup> Miller, “Who are the ‘permanent inhabitants’ of the state,” 12.

of the nation.<sup>146</sup> MPs for Songea and Tunduru warned about popular dissent as a result of the government's development failures in the south, especially its neglect of the region's infrastructure.<sup>147</sup>

Widespread local support for the nation-state and anti-colonialism was revived in 1967 following reports by the Tanzanian government that Portuguese commandos had laid land mines in Tanzania and attacked Tanzanian border residents.<sup>148</sup> While Europeans doubted the validity of these stories, they recognized that the accounts produced "widespread security-consciousness (pronounced spy-phobia) all along the southern border of Tanzania."<sup>149</sup> Second Vice-President Rashid Kawawa instructed southern Tanzanians to be vigilant – preventing anyone from crossing the border from Mozambique no matter their business, and reporting migrations to the police.<sup>150</sup>

---

<sup>146</sup> Ibid., 186.

<sup>147</sup> Ibid., 186-87.

<sup>148</sup> BNA FCO 25/286 Political Relations: Tanzania/Mozambique border incidents, telegrams No. 441 and No. 442 of 13 April 1967 to the Commonwealth Office; BNA FCO 31/169 Border Incidents with Mozambique, "Be Vigilant, Look Out for Infiltrators" in *The Nationalist*, 14 April 1967; "Arms for border residents" in *The Nationalist*, 25 April 1967; and "Border Guards" in *The Standard* 27 July 1967; Liebenow, *Colonial Rule and Political Development in Tanzania*, 289; and Lal, "Between the Village and the World," 116. British telegrams expressed doubts about the alleged Portuguese bombings along the northern bank of the Ruvuma; calling the reports "fishy." The telegram continued, "There could be no Portuguese purpose served by laying mines to blow up Tanzanian villagers, and if it were intended to destroy a unit of Frelimo Freedom fighters, it would still seem inept."

<sup>149</sup> BNA FCO 25/293 Political Relations: Tanzania/Mozambique, William Wilson (Canadian High Commission, British Interest Section) to R.H. Hobden (East Africa Department, Commonwealth Office), "Mozambique/Tanzania," 1 January 1968. In addition to reports of Portuguese laying land mines in Tanzania, the South African Broadcasting Corporation broadcast a news bulletin in late December 1968 that Portuguese troops had penetrated 70 miles into Tanzania. While Wilson was certain the reports were untrue, he questioned whether the report was spread by the Tanzanian government "to make the flesh of their citizens creep at the Portuguese threat". The British Consulate General at Lourenco Marques, H.J. Downing, also believed the SABC report to be "obvious nonsense" and agreed that the other reports "of Portuguese offensive action, minelaying etc. should be taken with a very large pinch of salt. I do not believe that the Portuguese would risk the international furore and complications that would follow action of this kind. I do not exclude the possibility that Portuguese patrols may occasional have pursued fleeing Frelimo elements across the border or have crossed the border for reconnaissance purpose, though I have no evidence that they had done either of these things." Downing knew that the Portuguese had infringed on the Malawi border, but he noted that the border was unmarked in comparison to the Ruvuma River. See BNA FCO 25/293, H.J. Downing to W. Wilson "Mozambique/Tanzania," 18 January 1968.

<sup>150</sup> BNA FCO 25/286, telegrams No. 441 and No. 442 of 13 April 1967 to the Commonwealth Office; BNA FCO 31/169, "Be Vigilant, Look Out for Infiltrators" in *The Nationalist*, 14 April 1967; "Arms for border residents" in *The Nationalist*, 25 April 1967; and "Border Guards" in *The Standard* 27 July 1967; Liebenow, *Colonial Rule and Political Development in Tanzania*, 289; and Lal, "Between the Village and the World," 116.



Figure 5.1 Two newspaper articles addressing Tanzanian defense in the southern borderland<sup>151</sup>

Men and women between the ages of 18 and 50 were recruited for border duty, while the Tanzanian government posted soldiers of the Tanzania People's Defence Forces (TPDF) in camps throughout the borderland.<sup>152</sup> The Tanzanian government also reinforced Mtwara with "anti-aircraft guns and some armoured cars or Bren-gun carriers."<sup>153</sup> William Wilson of the Canadian High Commission observed Zanzibari troops manning road blocks around Mtwara and stopping vehicles to examine the passengers' identity cards. These troops "exhibited excessive suspicion of everyone, especially non-Africans."<sup>154</sup> Wilson and many other foreign visitors to the southern region found their mobility increasingly restricted by the state and its forces:

No official statement has ever been made that the Southern Region is a prohibited area (apart from the orders to the civil aviation authorities<sup>155</sup>) but special difficulties are certainly made for

<sup>151</sup> BNA FCO 31/169, "Be Vigilant, Look out for Infiltrators," *The Nationalist*, 14 April 1967; and "Tanzanians Ready to Fight- Kawawa," *The Nationalist*, 26 May 1967.

<sup>152</sup> BNA FCO 31/169, "Border Guards," extract from *The Standard*, 27 July 1967; and Lal, "Between the Village and the World," 200-201.

<sup>153</sup> BNA FCO 25/286, William Wilson (Canadian High Commission, British Interest Section) to R.H. Hobden (East Africa Department, Commonwealth Office), "Situation in Mtwara," 17 October 1967. Wilson doubted the validity of stories regarding Portuguese-planted mines along village tracks in southern Tanzania.

<sup>154</sup> BNA FCO 25/286, William Wilson, "Situation in Mtwara," 17 October 1967.

<sup>155</sup> In September 1967, all aircraft (beyond East African Airways scheduled flights) were order to receive permission from the Second Vice President's Office to travel to southern Tanzania. Mr. Adams of Smith Mackenzie had his aircraft impounded in Mtwara despite carrying a letter of authority from Second Vice President Kawawa. See BNA FCO 31/169, T.E.F. Williams (Canadian High Commission, British Interests Section) to R.H. Hobden (East Africa

visitors to the area. Quite apart from my own experiences, the representative here of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees has been prevented from obtaining access to the refugee camp in the area.<sup>156</sup>

The mobility of Mozambican refugees was also constricted. Those who did not find refuge with relatives were concentrated into one of five refugee camps in the south where their movements could be monitored and their labor utilized for the benefit of the Tanzanian state.<sup>157</sup> Both the Tanzanian and Mozambican states also tried to regulate the mobility of their citizens/subjects by relocating rural communities into centralized settlements - *ujamaa* and *aldeamentos* villages.<sup>158</sup> By 1968, local Tanzanians living near the Ruvuma were being relocated into *vijiji vya ulinzi* (defense villages) in order that Tanzanians could better defend themselves and the nation against “imperialist infiltration”.<sup>159</sup> According to Priya Lal, these villages were “expected to morph into *ujamaa* villages practicing collective agriculture.”<sup>160</sup> The young men stationed to defend the villages and borders became enforcers of national development policies and the compulsory villagization drive in 1973.<sup>161</sup> Lal detailed the dangers of empowering young militant men

---

Department, Commonwealth Office), “Border Incidents,” 29 September 1967; and William Wilson, “Situation in Mtwara,” 17 October 1967

<sup>156</sup> BNA FCO 25/286, William Wilson, “Situation in Mtwara,” 17 October 1967.

<sup>157</sup> Miller, “Who are the ‘permanent inhabitants’ of the state,” 149 and 179-190; and Joanna Tague, “A War to Build the Nation: Mozambican Refugees, Rural Development, and State Sovereignty in Tanzania, 1964-1975” (PhD diss., University of California Davis, 2012). The five official settlements in southern Tanzania were at Rutambo, Lundo, Matekwe, Muhukuru and Mputa. They were maintained by the Tanzanian government in coordination with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Tanganyika Christian Relief Services, and Mozambique Liberation Front (or Frelimo).

<sup>158</sup> Lal, “Between the Village and the World,” 115; Newitt, *History of Mozambique*, 525; and BNA FCO 25/270 Mozambique Liberation Movements, H.J. Downing, British Consulate-General to T.H. Gillson, West and Central African Department, 7 March 1967. American Consul-General Harry Reed was impressed by the chain of *aldeamentos* that existed along the coast to Port Amelia, south-west to Monte Puez, and up the coast of Lake Nyasa by 1967. He reported that “a large extent of the hinterland has been virtually cleared of its population as could be seen when flying over it from the evidence of abandoned fields and roofless villages.” According to Reed, each village had about 1,000-2,000 inhabitants and about 20 militia in vicinity with a single white policeman in charge. All the villages reportedly had schools and some rudimentary medical facility.

<sup>159</sup> Lal, “Between the Village and the World,” 115 and 201.

<sup>160</sup> *Ibid.*, 201.

<sup>161</sup> *Ibid.*, 122; and Lal, *African Socialism in Postcolonial Tanzania*, 81-102. Lal explained that village resettlements began as a voluntary effort but because a compulsory drive (Operation *Vijiji*) between 1973 and 1975. She argued that “before villagization became compulsory by nation-wide decree in 1973, Youth Leaguers and Militia members in places like Mtwara complied with orders by local officials to forcefully enact villagization, often eager to take the initiative with regard to interpreting and administering national development policy, just as they were accustomed to taking matters of national security and policing into their own hands.”



without proper oversight and clear criteria as to who constituted an enemy of the state and what was anti-*ujamaa* behavior:

[...] young men frequently assumed the power of judgment along with the ability to enforce it. Whereas the targets of militant power and sometimes violence during Operation Vijiji were peasants who refused to comply with villagization policy, on other occasions, those persecuted included South Asian shopkeepers accused of black market profiteering, wealthy landowners, or even farmers deemed lazy.<sup>162</sup>

### Negotiating a Place in the New Nation

As the Tanzanian state placed its southern borderland at the heart of its strategic and socialist policies, it encountered a major problem – a lack of transportation services. The national and regional governments lacked the resources to fulfill all transportation operations required for the anti-colonial campaigns, *ujamaa* rural development, cooperatives, and local necessities. The transportation cooperative created in the Mtwara Region during the early 1960s – the Lindi Transport Society – failed despite the support of the other cooperative organizations.<sup>163</sup> The government responded by petitioning the help of the largest private transportation firm in southern Tanzania, *Teeteeko*. Second Vice President Kawawa approached Dirubhai in 1964 and “encouraged” him to merge *Teeteeko* with three regional agricultural cooperatives – Mtwara Regional Cooperative Union, Matengo Cooperative Union, and Mbinga Cooperative Union.<sup>164</sup> Dirubhai agreed to the union, but retained his majority shares (51%).<sup>165</sup> Two years after the merger, Dirubhai relocated *Teeteeko*'s headquarters and main garage to Mtwara, which served as

---

<sup>162</sup> Lal, *African Socialism in Postcolonial Tanzania*, 100. In 1967, stories of Tanzanian and Zanzibari troops murdering civilians began to circulate. William Wilson expressed concern whether the “cure” of arming the southern borderland was “worse than the disease.” See BNA FCO 25/286, William Wilson, “Situation in Mtwara,” 17 October 1967.

<sup>163</sup> BNA DO 185/15, Press Release issued by Information Services Division, “Dramatic Progress of Co-Operative Movement in Mtwara Region,” 27 October 1964.

<sup>164</sup> Interview with Dhirajlal Savailal Amin (Mkwaya, 17 September 2015); and “Transportation in Southern Tanzania,” *The Nationalist*, 19 November 1968. Although the company was renamed Tanganyika Transport Co. (1964) Limited, it was still known as *Teeteeko*.

<sup>165</sup> As part of the merger, the Minister of Agriculture and Co-operatives received the authority to appoint the company chairman. The first chairman selected was Dickson Nkembo. The Board of Directors in 1968 consisted of S.F. Mkumbukwa (Chairman and Administrative Secretary, Mtwara), D.S. Amin (Managing Director), Y.S. Amin (Director), J.A. Chamba (Mtwara Regional Co-operative Union Ltd.), P Ndimbo, and W. Ndunguru. See “Transportation in Southern Tanzania,” *The Nationalist*, 19 November 1968.

the south's economic and administrative capital.<sup>166</sup> Many of the large Indian wholesalers also shifted their operations to Mtwara after the Tanzanian government decided in May 1962 that Mtwara port would service all ocean-going traffic in the Southern Province and Lindi port would only service coastal dhow traffic.<sup>167</sup> Lindi town suffered rising unemployment and steady economic decline as a result.<sup>168</sup>

Dirubhai acknowledged that the merger with the cooperatives jeopardized his continued control over *Teeteeko*, but it proved an economically profitable and politically savvy decision in the short-term. *Teeteeko* gained a virtual monopoly on agricultural produce exported by the cooperative unions from the south. *Teeteeko* vehicles exported cashew nuts, cassava, and sesame from Masasi, Nachingwea, and Newala Districts, and imported *duka* cargo and cement from Dar es Salaam and Mtwara. The company annually transported nearly 135,000 tons in cashew nuts alone.<sup>169</sup> *Teeteeko* also exported tobacco, maize, and groundnuts from Tunduru and Songea Districts, including the produce generated by the Tropical and

---

<sup>166</sup> The repair garage in Mtwara was fully underway in 1968.

<sup>167</sup> BNA BT 193/43/Vol II Port and Dock Conditions and Administration Africa: Tanganyika and Kenya, Press Release issued by Tanganyika Information Services, "Ocean Going Traffic to Concentrate on Mtwara: Lindi Becomes Coastal Port," 18 May 1962; and interview with Dhirajlal Savailal Amin (Lindi, 17 September 2015); and Mussa Aidhamel Salum (Lindi, 18 September 2015). The government and East African Railways and Harbours Administration agreed that concentrating traffic at Mtwara would "achieve a considerable reduction in the combined loss at the two ports." Lindi's deep ship facilities were gradually withdrawn and the permanent employees of the EAR&H and cargo handling contractors were offered employment opportunities at other Tanganyika ports. On the same day, the Tanganyika government announced the closure of the Southern Province Railway (146 miles) which had an operating deficit of £245,000 in 1961. The government argued that by removing and disposing of these assets it could plan "a more substantial programme of road development in the Southern Region."

<sup>168</sup> Interview with Hamis Mohamed Likokola (Lindi, 29 September, 2015); Mohamed Nasoro (Lindi, 14 September 2015); Saidi A. Mtutile (Lindi, 29 September 2015); Mussa Aidhamel Salum (Lindi, 18 September 2015); Juma Said Aly (Lindi, 18 September 2015); Abdalla Issa Naenda (Mitwero, Lindi, 1 October 2015); Musa Said Omar (Mitwero, Lindi, 5 October 2015); and Victor Said (Namatumbusi, Masasi, 10 October 2015). Mtwara town was still very small with few buildings and houses. According to Dirubhai, most of the buildings along the main thoroughfare to the harbor were not constructed until 1964-66. Many men who decided to work in Mtwara went unaccompanied by their families due to the lack of housing. Abdalla Issa Naenda's family, for example, stayed in Mitwero. Dirubhai traveled to Lindi every weekend to visit his family who stayed behind. Juma Said Aly recalled that some drivers slept in their cars. The construction of national housing partially rectified the situation. Mohamed Nasoro, however, noted that the housing layout produced more problems. Houses were too far apart, which hampered a feeling of community. Athomani Wadi Mlaponi, in contrast, did not complain about the houses after moving to Mtwara from a rural village in the interior. He suggested that men from Lindi town complained because they were accustomed to living in a place where more things were available. See interviews with Mohamed Nasoro (Lindi, 14 September 2015); Dhirajlal Savailal Amin (Mkwaya, 17 September 2015); Juma Said Aly (Lindi, 18 and 19 September 2015); Saidi A. Mtutile (Lindi, 29 September 2015); Abdalla Issa Naenda, Mitwero, 1 October 2015); and Athomani Wadi Mlaponi, (Masasi, 8 October 2015).

<sup>169</sup> Interviews with Dhirajlal Savailal Amin (Mkwaya, 17 September and 3 October 2015).

Coffee Unions in Songea.<sup>170</sup> The company maintained its monopoly over long-distance passenger transport as well – carrying government officials, students, traders, and ordinary civilians on their daily mail and express buses.<sup>171</sup> *Teeteeko*'s rivals – including Mwana Hirji Transport Company – struggled to stay competitive.<sup>172</sup> According to Dirubhai, the road licensing board protected *Teeteeko* from unwanted

---

<sup>170</sup> Interview with Dhirajlal Savailal Amin (Mkwaya, October 3, 2015); Juma Said Aly (Lindi 19 September 2015); Hamis Mohamed Likokola (Lindi, 29 September 2015); Saidi A. Mtutile (Lindi, 29 September 2015); and Athomani Wadi Mlaponi (Masasi, 8 October 2015). The tobacco was typically transported to Moshi and Dar es Salaam. Athomani recalled transporting cereals from Dar es Salaam to Zambia as part of famine relief measures. The government allegedly hired *Teeteeko* and gave its drivers passports to enter Zambia.

<sup>171</sup> Interview with Rukia A. Mrope (Lindi, 15 September 2015); Dhirajlal Savailal Amin (Mkwaya, September 17 and October 3, 2015); Saidi A Mtutile (Lindi, 29 September 2015); Hamis Mohamed Likokola (Lindi, 29 September 2015); Wilium Njaidi (Masasi, 8 October 2015); Athomani Wadi Mlaponi (Masasi, 8 October 2015); Juma Hemed Alli (Lindi, 13 October 2015); Mohamed Saidi Msusa (Mtwara, 14 October 2015); and Omari Issa Chiluma (Mtwara, 15 October 2015). It is unclear when women began traveling by motor vehicle more frequently. Born in 1959, Rukia A. Mrope recalled no fear or dangers for female travelers. Women, however, typically traveled to destinations after their husbands or male family members had established a new home or business. Wilium Njaidi, meanwhile, recollected that passenger distinctions were based less upon gender than class. Passengers were people with money – a commodity difficult to attain in the south during the 1960s and 1970s. Mohamed Saidi Msusa in Mtwara argued that women increasingly traveled by vehicle as passengers and traders after 1974. Victor Said and Fatuma Juma Akini in rural Masasi believed that more women began traveling and stopped listening to their parents in the 1980s. Musa Said Omar of Lindi contended that the change occurred in the 1990s as a result of women entering the trade economy and generating their own income outside of marriage. Although elders disputed the exact timing of the growth in female travelers in southern Tanzania, there was a consensus that few women traveled by motor vehicle prior to Tanzania independence. Various reasons were offered for the lack of female passengers. Shaiba A. Mohammed Buriyani and Mohamed Saidi Msusa argued that it was a matter of culture. Shaiba argued that just as European women did not always travel independently, Tanzanian women did not travel alone from the onset. Victor Said and Fatuma Juma Akini contended that women in rural villages used to obey their parents, staying away from the road side and accepting their place in the home. Fatuma was too afraid to travel after her parents warned her of the supposed dangers of road transport– being attacked by men, tricked by conmen, or acquiring sexually-transmitted diseases. Abdalla Issa Naenda, in contrast, explained that women did not travel prior to independence out of fear of *Mumiani*. The *Mumiani* hid in the bush, attacked women traveling alone, and drained them of their blood. My research assistant, Zuhura Mohammed, heard similar tales of *Mumiani* among sisal plantation workers in Tanga. The colonial government needed blood for injured soldiers during World War II, but local people were unwilling to contribute. Red Cross vehicles abducted people and drained them of their blood. Abdalla offered no explanation for the disappearance of the *Mumiani*, but he insisted that travel was safe in the current day. Luise White has been a leading figure in scholarship concerning the representations and symbolic meanings of *Mumiani*, roads, motor vehicles, and automobile operators (including fire fighters and ambulance drivers) in oral histories in Africa. See Luise White, "Cars Out of Place: Vampires, Technology, and Labor in East and Central Africa," *Representations* 43 (Summer 1993): 27-50; Luise White, *Speaking with Vampires: rumor and history in colonial Africa* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2000); and interview with Rukia A. Mrope (Lindi, 15 September 2015); Shaiba A. Mohammed Buriyani (Mnazi Mmoja, 16 September 2015); Abdalla Issa Naenda (Lindi, 1 October 2015 (Mitwero, Tanzania); Musa Said Omar, 5 October 2015; Wilium Njaidi (Masasi, 8 October 2015); and Victor Said and Fatuma Juma Akini (Namatumbusi, 10 October 2015).

<sup>172</sup> Interview with Dhirajlal Savailal Amin (Mkwaya, 17 September 2015).

competition by denying applications that threatened *Teeteeko*'s market.<sup>173</sup> Liebenow argued in 1967 that the "operations of the cooperative societies and the Tanganyika Transport Company were gradually removing Asians from the more lucrative economic activities, and they were finding it difficult to diversify their interests to keep pace with the Africanization of the economy."<sup>174</sup>

Political necessity also drove Dirubhai's decision to merge with the cooperatives. Anti-Asian rhetoric intensified in political and popular discourse during the course of the 1960s. A 1966 article in *The Nationalist* detailed the myriad of reasons why Indians did not belong to the nation and prevented its prosperity, including: their refusal to participate in nation building activities, *ujamaa* rural development, learn Kiswahili, attend national functions, Africanize their businesses, and set fair prices for African producers and consumers.<sup>175</sup> Brennan insisted that the Arusha Declaration spurred a national debate as to who belonged to the nation and the *ujamaa* family.<sup>176</sup> Citizenship was increasingly defined by an individual's commitment to combating exploitation and parasitism. Who then were the exploiters within the nation? Many politicians, the media, and the general public targeted the Indian community, which had long been perceived as the unpopular, untrustworthy, and privileged "other" within African imaginations.<sup>177</sup> Lal similarly argued that following the Arusha Declaration, Asian Tanzanians "were implicated by a racialized national imaginary that colored them as both 'foreign' and frequently actively opposed to the principles of *ujamaa*."<sup>178</sup> Lal continued that the "embedded nativism of the *ujamaa*

---

<sup>173</sup> Ibid. When a company applied for a license, the Licensing Board allegedly contacted Dirubhai and the other transporters in the south for their opinion. If the license was for a route already maintained by *Teeteeko*, Dirubhai would argue that a new license was not necessary. Liebenow also found evidence of a proposal made by a group of Makonde that cooperatives should purchase their own vehicles, rather than relying on *Teeteeko*. The government opposed the proposal and the "outright purchase of vehicles, since it was not demonstrated that they would have a legitimate use between harvest season, and the cost of maintenance would more than offset any savings." See Liebenow, *Colonial Rule and Political Development in Tanzania*, 324.

<sup>174</sup> Liebenow, *Colonial Rule and Political Development in Tanzania*, 286. Liebenow also argued that the cooperative monopolies drove independent African traders out of business, "since the crops they depended upon for their narrow margin of profit were those taken under the cooperatives' jurisdiction" (324).

<sup>175</sup> Sections of the article are reprinted in Brennan, *Taifa*, 177-180.

<sup>176</sup> James R. Brennan, "Blood Enemies: Exploitation and Urban Citizenship in the Nationalist Political Thought of Tanzania, 1958-75," *The Journal of African History* 47, no. 3 (2006): 389-413, 395; and Brennan, *Taifa*, 163.

<sup>177</sup> Ibid., 176-77.

<sup>178</sup> Lal, "Between the Village and the World," 156.

imaginary legitimated even more radical enactments of racism in the name of nationalism,” including the harassment and expulsion of many Asians from major Tanzanian cities immediately following the Arusha Declaration.<sup>179</sup> Asian traders and businessmen, in particular, were targets of verbal and physical assaults because they were portrayed in print media and by politicians as exploitative parasites and “blood suckers.”<sup>180</sup> Black Tanzanian parliamentarians frequently called for their expulsion, while the press inflamed anti-Indian sentiment with stories of Asian exploitation and collaboration with imperialists.<sup>181</sup>

The “climate of fear” created in Asian communities was palpable in southern Tanzania in 1967. Although Indians in Mtwara had built a thriving commercial community, Liebenow found that only members of the Aga Khan Ismaili community “appeared to be optimistic about their prospects for continued residence.”<sup>182</sup> In order to ensure the continuance of his transportation business, Dirubhai sought to align his company with the mission of the new nation-state and build relationships with government officials as he had with their colonial predecessors. By agreeing to merge *Teeteeko* with the African cooperatives, Dirubhai proved his and his family’s allegiance and value to the nation. *Teeteeko* not only assisted the state by moving cooperative produce, but it also hired unemployed TANU members. Clement K. Njaidi, for example, joined the TANU youth branch in Mtwara after working on sisal plantations in Tanga for three years.<sup>183</sup> The Regional Commissioner did not have enough money to support the youth

---

<sup>179</sup> *Ibid.*, 157.

<sup>180</sup> *Ibid.*, 156-57; and James R. Brennan, “Blood Enemies,” 389-413.

<sup>181</sup> Brennan, “South Asian Nationalism in an East African Context,” 33; and Lal, “Between the Village and the World,” 157.

<sup>182</sup> Liebenow, *Colonial Rule and Political Development in Tanzania*, 286. In 1967, Liebenow observed that the Asian community had constructed a “fairly impressive commercial block” in Mtwara in comparison to the scattered shops established in abandoned sisal fields ten years earlier. He observed other improvements to Mtwara town, including the construction of a new airport, expansion of the port, a new luxury hotel by Israelis, and vastly improved housing with sixty low-cost rental houses by the National Housing Board. There were plans to double the housing in 1967. Parks, sport fields, churches, schools, bars, and a new cannery and cashew-processing plant were also in the planning stages or under construction. Liebenow noted that Asians were continuing to preserve “in such projects as building schools and clinics, which would be of use to the entire Tanzania community.”

<sup>183</sup> Interview with Clement K. Njaidi (Mtwara, 15 October 2015). Clement was born in 1937 in Marambo near Masasi. One of his first jobs was cutting timber in a saw mill in Nachingwea in 1953. He was then recruited by SILABU to work on a sisal plantation in Tanga from 1955 to 1959. SILABU’s agents determined where he worked (he was not given an option to work in the south). He was transported with 20-30 other recruits, all of whom stood in the back of an open-board lorry. He worked with machinery to clean the sisal. Many of his fellow workers

members, and instead found them local employment. Clement received a job with *Teeteeko* as a turn-boy (driver's assistant) transporting cargo across southern Tanzania.<sup>184</sup> *Teeteeko* also offered its transportation services in promotion of the liberation struggle in Mozambique. The company dedicated anywhere from 20 to 40 vehicles to transport goods arriving in Mtwara to Frelimo bases in Nachingwea.<sup>185</sup> Former *Teeteeko* drivers remembered transporting male and female, Tanzanian and Frelimo soldiers to camps in Nachingwea, Masasi, Tunduru, and throughout the bush along the Ruvuma border. Former drivers also recalled moving military goods shipped from China to Mtwara.<sup>186</sup> *Teeteeko* transported refugees on open board lorries and distributed medical supplies, food, and clothing to refugee camps.<sup>187</sup> Dirubhai insisted, "The southern region could not move without *Teeteeko*. That was the situation."<sup>188</sup> The situation made a strong argument against anti-Asian discourse and in support of the Amin family's value to the nation.

Other Indian firms and operators in the southern transportation sector also employed their vehicles to assist liberation struggles and nation-building activities. The Tanzania Transport Company (TZT), for example, was an Indian-owned firm that transported Indian *duka* cargo to the interior and groundnuts from Mtwara to Dar es Salaam. A large portion of TZT's profits, however, came from exporting copper from Zambia in exchange for sugar and clothing.<sup>189</sup> According to Hofmeier, several small private transporters began importing oil to the Zambian border in the middle of December 1965.

---

originated from Burundi. Clement relocated to Mtwara and worked as a driver for *Teeteeko* from 1974 until its collapse.

<sup>184</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>185</sup> Interview with Dhirajlal Savailal Amin (Mkwaya, 17 September 2015).

<sup>186</sup> Interview with Dhirajlal Savailal Amin (Mkwaya, 3 October 2015). Juma Said Aly recalled one story in which a *Teeteeko* vehicle was transporting explosives under an armed guard from Nachingwea to the border. Allegedly one of the explosives became active and the driver and turn-boy were able to evacuate the vehicle before it exploded. The government paid *Teeteeko* for the damages. Interview with Juma Said Aly (Lindi, 19 September 2015).

<sup>187</sup> Interview with Dhirajlal Savailal Amin (Mkwaya, 17 September 2015). Dirubhai recalled that there were "a lot, a lot, a lot" of refugees flooding into southern Tanzania during the course of the war.

<sup>188</sup> *Ibid.* More research is needed to determine how successful the cooperatives were in southeastern Tanzania and how thoroughly *Teeteeko* controlled the transport market in cooperative-designated goods. Giblin, for instance, found evidence that dissatisfied farmers participated in smuggling and parallel marketing to get better prices in the southwest. The Njombe Cooperative Union responded by instituting road checkpoints and transportation permits to try and curb the parallel trade. See Giblin, *A History of the Excluded*, 257.

<sup>189</sup> Interview with Mohamed Nasoro (Lindi, 14 September 2015); Said Mohamed Shahame (Lindi, 15 September, 2015); Dadi Mkonyoka Yusufu (Lindi, 17 September 2015); and Victor Said (Namatumbusi, 10 October 2015).

Tanzania, Zambia, and a subsidiary of the Fiat concern founded the Zambia Tanzania Road Services Ltd. (ZTRS) in April 1966 in order to better meet Zambia's import-export requirements. The firm quickly became "the largest road transport company in the whole of Africa" with 450, 30-ton lorry-and-trailer units.<sup>190</sup> Private transporters, however, continued to assist operations. An estimated 2,000 vehicles were employed full-time at the peak of operations in early 1968:

All transporters together in 1967 carried about 270,000 tons of copper from Zambia to the coast and moved 234,000 tons of petroleum products and 51,000 tons of general cargo in the reverse direction into Zambia.<sup>191</sup>

TZT drivers endured at least a two week journey from Mtwara to Tunduma and back with the Zambian copper.<sup>192</sup> The company also transported Frelimo soldiers to the border and refugees to camps like Rutamba. Two drivers recalled transporting weapons from a Frelimo base – Farm 17 in Nachingwea – to spots along the border.<sup>193</sup> Smaller Indian businessmen similarly employed their vehicles in service of the nation – whether transporting refugees, Zambian copper, humanitarian relief aid, or TANU members.<sup>194</sup> Victor Said, for example, worked as a private driver for an Indian businessman from Nachingwea. The Indian employer aspired to become a politician within TANU, and therefore frequently loaned his Land Rover to the TANU branch in Lindi for free – transporting office workers to various meetings and

---

<sup>190</sup> Hofmeier, *Transport and Economic Development in Tanzania*, 165; and Joshua Grace, "Modernization *Bubu*: Cars, Roads, and the Politics of Development in Tanzania, 1870s-1980s" (PhD diss., Michigan State University, 2013), 277.

<sup>191</sup> Hofmeier, *Transport and Economic Development in Tanzania*, 165. Hofmeier remarked on the "truly stupendous size" of the Zambian road operations. Approximately 2,000 vehicles with a total capacity of 30,000 tons worked on one road from Dar es Salaam to the Zambian border. In comparison, an estimated 2,800 vehicles with a total capacity of 15,500 tons were employed under a Public Carrier Licence to conduct normal haulage operations throughout Tanzania.

<sup>192</sup> Interview with Mohamed Nasoro (Lindi, 14 September 2015); and Said Mohamed Shahame (Lindi, 15 September 2015). The drive from Lindi to Songea averaged two to three days during the dry season. An additional two to three days were needed to reach Njombe and Mbeya from Songea. The journey was longer during the rainy season, reaching upwards of two weeks. Victor Said also recalled driving Tanzania Transport Company vehicles to Rukwa in order to collect fish from Lake Tanganyika. He unloaded the fish at Lindi and Newala for local consumption. See interview with Victor Said (Namatumbusi, 10 October 2015).

<sup>193</sup> Interview with Dadi Mkonyoka Yusufu (Lindi, 17 September 2015); and Victor Said (Namatumbusi, 10 October 2015). Although the vehicles had Frelimo escorts, the drivers feared accidental explosions.

<sup>194</sup> Interview with Juma Hemed Alli (Lindi, 13 October 2015); Leonard M. Haule (Mtwara, 14 October 2015); and Omari Issa Chiluma (Mtwara, 15 October 2015).

campaigns.<sup>195</sup> Indian creditors and investors also helped African entrepreneurs break into the transportation market. Mohamed Selemani, for example, was an African driver who decided to start his own passenger transport business in the late 1960s. He began by renting one vehicle from an Indian businessman, and then expanded with a couple more. African men and women utilized Selemani's services to travel to villages outside of Lindi town to cultivate and harvest their family *shambas* (farms) and/or conduct local trade.<sup>196</sup> Local African passengers preferred the smaller operators because of their accessibility. Whereas the smaller operators allowed people to pay as they jumped on and off, *Teeteeko* required that an individual purchase a ticket from one of their offices.<sup>197</sup>

Indians in southern Tanzania ultimately utilized their motor vehicles as tools to generate profits and protect their assets against an increasingly antagonistic government and general populace. By transporting cooperative produce, Zambian copper, refugees, TANU passengers, and military forces, Indian businessmen contradicted stereotypes about Asian propensities towards greed and disinterest in the nation. Indians in southern Tanzania employed their resources to make a compelling claim that they belonged to and were needed in Tanzania. Indian vehicle-owners, however, knew that they were negotiating a fine line between allies and enemies of the state. They remained open to allegations of

---

<sup>195</sup> Interview with Victor Said (Namatumbusi, 10 October 2015).

<sup>196</sup> Interview with Hamis Mohamed Likokola (Lindi, 29 September 2015). Hamis Mohamed Likokola was born in the 1930s in Lindi. He learned to drive from his brother, who was a driver for *Teeteeko*. Hamis joined his brother on safari and learned along the way. Hamis started his twenty-year employment with Mohamed Selemani as a turn-boy. He then served as a conductor, collecting bus fares before being promoted as a supervisor. It is important to note that not all African operators relied upon Indian creditors to purchase vehicles. Matteo Rizzo, for example, interviewed one of the most successful African transportation entrepreneurs in the south, Dunstan Olotu Zakaria Masumbuko. He first worked as an apprentice in two European-run automobile workshops in Moshi from 1945 to 1949. He then worked for the Groundnut Scheme in southern Tanganyika, conducting minor vehicle repairs. He saved enough money to buy a cheap, inoperable lorry that was auctioned off after the GNS collapsed. He was able to assemble enough spare parts to get the vehicle operating, and then moved to Mtwara where there was limited competition in the private transport sector. Masumbuko was able to save enough money to purchase a 7-ton lorry in the 1960s. Matteo partially credited Masumbuko's success to his cooperation with TANU; providing transport and monetary donations to political leaders. His business blossomed during the 1970s as he acquired more vehicles and built a garage. See Matteo Rizzo, "The Groundnut Scheme Revisited: Colonial Disaster and African Accumulation in Nachingwea District, Southeastern Tanzania, 1946-67" (PhD diss., University of London, 2004), 171-176.

<sup>197</sup> Interview with Hamis Mohamed Likokola (Lindi, 29 September 2015); and Abdalla Issa Naenda (Mitwero, 1 October 2015).



“exploitation” and stereotypes as “blood suckers” because they financially profited from renting out their vehicles. When accusations were leveled against Indian transportation firms, they were quick to defend themselves by using nationalist rhetoric about interracial cooperation. When TZT, for example, came under accusations of discriminating against African employees, its Indian managers and shareholders immediately petitioned the Minister of Communications, Transport and Labour:

We make this offer in all humility, for we are proud of the close co-operation that exists in our Company between shareholders of different racial origins and from different walks of life. [...] We sincerely hope, Sir, that you will help us extricate ourselves from the suspicions that have been created against us. We look upon you for your paternal guidance and, should you come to the conclusion that the content of our Company or any member of our Company is not beyond reproach, we shall willingly submit ourselves to any admonition or punishment that you may feel we merit.<sup>198</sup>

Rather than hampering the nation’s development, the Indian transportation sector in southern Tanzania helped to fulfill the state’s national and pan-African objectives.

### **End of an Era**

The government’s relationship with Dirubhai and the rest of the Indian transportation sector in southern Tanzania was an alliance of necessity. The state was overtaxed with commitments in Zambia and Mozambique, as well as its *ujamaa* campaign. The government lacked the incentive or means to directly interfere with *Teeteeko*’s operations and the larger industry in the 1960s. By November 1968, *Teeteeko* had 350 employees and 150 vehicles operating over 2,000 miles. Their vehicles carried at least 100,000 passengers a year and handled “about 90% of the transportation business in the Ruvuma and Mtwara regions.”<sup>199</sup> *Teeteeko* and the EAR&H Road Services in the Southern Highlands formed the two largest transportation firms in the country at the onset of the 1970s, controlling nearly 7% of all vehicles and 9% of overall tonnage of commercial goods transported by road.<sup>200</sup> The *Nationalist* reported that

---

<sup>198</sup> TNA ACC 601, CW 50262 Tanganyika Transport Co. *Teeteeko Ushirika* Vol. 2, “Re: Tanzania Transport Co. Ltd,” 2 October 1969.

<sup>199</sup> “Transportation in Southern Tanzania,” *The Nationalist*, 19 November 1968. Dirubhai reported to the *Nationalist* that between “Mtwara and Ruvuma we transport mainly building materials, foodstuff and fuel as well as sugar (from Njombe as this comes from Kilombero) while from Dar es Salaam we bring in sundry goods such as piece goods.”

<sup>200</sup> Hofmeier, *Transport and Economic Development in Tanzania*, 155.

*Teeteeko*'s "success is a tribute to the determination, hard work and nation-building spirit of the people of this vast region."<sup>201</sup> Dirubhai, however, believed that a take-over of his majority shares was inevitable.<sup>202</sup>

According to an article in *The Nationalist*, the company merger in 1964 gave the three regional cooperatives the option of taking over the company complete in 1970.<sup>203</sup> Indications that the state was preparing an assault on the private transportation sector were clear by 1970. When addressing a crowd in Dar es Salaam, President Nyerere discussed the necessity of ensuring that buses were tools for the people rather than tools for individual capitalist profits:

Something foundational for our economy, like buses, should be our buses and not those of some official who says, 'That's my bus.' Your bus? And the driver inside, the same person may say, 'That's my driver.' Your driver? Is it possible for you to have your own driver? A driver is only able to be a driver of the socialist community, not 'your' driver.<sup>204</sup>

During 1970, the Ministry of Communication, Transport, and Labour collaborated with the three regional cooperatives to purchase Dirubhai's controlling interest of *Teeteeko*. The buyout was finalized in 1972-73 at a price tag of TShs. 1,800,000.<sup>205</sup> Dirubhai contended that the cooperatives wanted to control the company and did not want outsiders.<sup>206</sup> Although Dirubhai did not receive payment until ten years later, he immediately handed over all vehicles, parts, buildings, and repair garages. The company was renamed *Ushirika Teeteeko*, and proceeded to absorb the other Indian-owned transportation firms operating in the south – including TZT and Mwana Hirji.<sup>207</sup> The collapse of the Indian-dominated transportation sector in southern Tanzania was quickly followed by the collapse of the Indian-dominated wholesale and real estate markets. After the government nationalized wholesale trade in 1970, it passed the Buildings Act of 1971. The legislation nationalized all housing worth over TShs. 100,000 and not entirely occupied by the

---

<sup>201</sup> "Transportation in Southern Tanzania," *The Nationalist*, 19 November 1968.

<sup>202</sup> Interview with Dhirajlal Savailal Amin (Mkwaya, October 3, 2015).

<sup>203</sup> "Transportation in Southern Tanzania," *The Nationalist*, 19 November 1968.

<sup>204</sup> Julius Nyerere speech, Dar es Salaam, July 1970, quoted in Grace, "Modernization *Bubu*," 238.

<sup>205</sup> Interview with Dhirajlal Savailal Amin (Mkwaya, 17 September 2015).

<sup>206</sup> Interview with Dhirajlal Savailal Amin (Mkwaya, 3 October 2015).

<sup>207</sup> Interview with Said Mohamed Shahame (Lindi, 15 September 2015); and Dadi Mkonyoka Yusufu (Lindi, 17 September 2015).

owner.<sup>208</sup> Between 1971 and 1974, a total of 2,484 buildings worth five hundred million shillings were acquired and brought under the control of the National Housing Corporation.<sup>209</sup> Dirubhai recalled waking up one morning, reading the paper, and learning that he had lost his properties in Lindi, Mtwara, Tunduru, and Songea to nationalization.<sup>210</sup> The government allowed Dirubhai to continue living in his rental property in downtown Lindi, but he had to pay rent as an “ex-owner.”<sup>211</sup>



**Figure 5.2 One of Dirubhai’s properties in downtown Lindi that was nationalized in 1971. Note the family logo top-center – “Amin Building 1951” – and the national housing logos below the second floor patio – “Shirika la Nyumba la Taifa.”<sup>212</sup>**

<sup>208</sup> Brennan, *Taifa*, 191-92; and Nagar, “The South Asian Diaspora in Tanzania,” 69. The Education Act of 1969 brought all private and public schools, teachers, and curriculum under the control of the government.

<sup>209</sup> Brennan, *Taifa*, 192; and Nagar, “The South Asian Diaspora in Tanzania,” 70.

<sup>210</sup> Interview with Dhirajlal Savailal Amin (Mkwaya, 3 October 2015). Dirubhai had diversified his profits into a number of ventures over the years. He purchased a rental property and go-down in downtown Lindi and a rice mill in Tunduru. Started in 1953, the mill processed rice purchased from local farmers. It handled six to seven tons a day from July to November/December. Trucks were used to transport the rice to the mill from long-distances. The trucks also exported the milled rice to the Masasi depot and Lindi, where they were sold. Over a hundred Africans were employed in the operation. The properties that Dirubhai lost to nationalization included his rental apartment (Lindi), go-down (Lindi), house (Songea), rice and oil mill (Tunduru), and garages (Lindi, Mtwara, and Songea).

<sup>211</sup> Interview with Dhirajlal Savailal Amin (Mkwaya, 3 October 2015).

<sup>212</sup> Picture taken by the author, Lindi, 4 October 2015.



Figure 5.3 Previous *Teeteeko* headquarters and garage in Mtwara<sup>213</sup>

Dirubhai was not the only victim of nationalization. The urban landscape of downtown Lindi still tells the story of nationalization. Many buildings with the names of the wealthy Indian families are covered over with the national housing stamp.



<sup>213</sup> Picture taken by the author, 22 September 2015. The building is now owned by the Catholic Diocese.





**Figure 5.4 Two additional Indian properties that were nationalized in 1971 (Ghana/Market Street, Lindi). Note the family logos top-center and the national housing logos painted on the balcony and over the family name.<sup>214</sup>**

The Indian population found itself powerless to prevent or oppose the legislation that devastated their interests in Tanzania. Dirubhai simply explained that the orders came from the top and there was no arguing with them.<sup>215</sup> Brennan argued that the 1971 act “permanently alienated large numbers of Indians who had invested their life savings in housing, in part to demonstrate their long-term commitment to the

<sup>214</sup> Pictures taken by the author, Lindi, 4 October 2015.

<sup>215</sup> Ibid. Some Europeans residing in Tanzania also lost their properties, including Victor Bobbit. A former Regimental Sergeant Major of the Welsh Guard, Bobbit owned and operated one of the first hotels in Mtwara, the Southern Cross Hotel. Mr. Gilmour stayed in the Southern Cross Hotel in August 1963 as part of a B.I.S. safari in Mtwara-Masasi-Nachingwea. He described Bobbit as a “man of formidable personality and girth, but runs the place in a reasonably business-like way. He has a predilection for Siamese cats; I encountered eight.” American Ambassador Barnes stayed in the hotel three years later, and described the proprietor as a “large, paunchy man in his mid-fifties. He wears Victorian mutton chop sideburns, a generous moustache and gives the general appearance of a rather seedy beachcomber.” The hotel’s appearance and function allegedly matched the proprietor: “Screens are encrusted with rust, the rooms none too clean, and the lobby filled with beer cases. Nonetheless, the ensemble has great, if decadent charm, due in no small part to the wit of Mr. Bobbit, who commands his small empire from a high stool behind the bar.” Bobbit reportedly ran the commercial hotel like a private club and refused to serve drinks to thus who incurred “his disfavor, but chats amiably with all others while swigging generous gulps of brandy and soda.” Bobbit reported to the American party that he was prepared to sell the hotel. Before he could sell the property, the government nationalized it and deported Bobbit after he made some “awkward remarks” about the state. See BNA DO 185/15, A.J. Gilmour, “B.I.S. Safari in Mtwara-Masasi-Nachingwea Area. August 5<sup>th</sup>/15<sup>th</sup>, 1963,” 28 August 1963; NACP, RG 59, A1 (5710), “Trip Report No.4 Southern Safari – September 1966”; and interview with Dhirajlal Savailal Amin, (Mkwaya, 3 October 2015).

independent nation.”<sup>216</sup> Housing nationalization in Tanzania and the forced expulsion of all Indians from Uganda in 1972 led to a mass exodus of the Tanzanian Indian community.<sup>217</sup> The total Indian population in Tanzania was cut in half, declining to 60,000 in 1973. Many members of the Hindu and Ismaili communities from southern Tanzania emigrated to Canada and the United Kingdom.<sup>218</sup> Dirubhai’s wife and brother were among them, leaving for the U.K. in 1972.<sup>219</sup> Dirubhai stated that his brother, Yeshvanj, “started his life there” as a post office agent.<sup>220</sup> Dirubhai, however, stayed behind. Richa Nagar argued that it was common practice in Tanzania for one or more family members to remain and maintain any property not nationalized.<sup>221</sup> Dirubhai invested his remaining assets in a sisal plantation at Mkwaya that an Indian family sold in 1972 before heading overseas.<sup>222</sup> The era of the private, Indian-dominated road transportation sector in southern Tanzania had come to an end and a new era of state-controlled transportation had begun.

---

<sup>216</sup> Brennan, *Taifa*, 192.

<sup>217</sup> Brennan, “Blood Enemies,” 408; and Nagar, “The South Asian Diaspora in Tanzania,” 67-70. Nagar argued that racial violence and confiscation of property during and after the Zanzibar Revolution drove Asians to the mainland and/or abroad. An estimated 3,500 Asians remained in Zanzibar by 1972, in comparison to 18,334 in 1958.

<sup>218</sup> Nagar, “The South Asian Diaspora in Tanzania,” 70. Nagar recorded that about 80% of the Ismaili population in Tanzania left for Canada in the 1970s. The emigration was a community effort led by the Aga Khan that began in 1971 and escalated between 1973 and 1975. Many from the middle and lower classes went to Canada because of the “encouragement and help that they received from the various Ismaili organizations there.” Ithna Asheris, Hindus, Sikhs, and Goans also traveled to Canada and the U.K. An estimated 40,000 Asians went to the U.K. within six months of the building nationalization. Brennan noted that the familial and financial ties between Indians in Tanzania and India had become increasingly tenuous after the Second World War. There was a new generation of South Asians born and raised in Tanganyika, and Indian capital was increasingly invested locally (Brennan, *Taifa*, 145).

<sup>219</sup> Three of Dirubhai’s four children were already in the U.K. for schooling. Only one of his sons resides in Tanzania.

<sup>220</sup> Interview with Dhirajlal Savailal Amin (Mkwaya, 17 September 2015).

<sup>221</sup> Nagar, “The South Asian Diaspora in Tanzania,” 70. Nagar stated, “People were also uncertain about their future prospects overseas and did not want to burn all their bridges by completely abandoning what they had in Tanzania.”

<sup>222</sup> Interview with Dhirajlal Savailal Amin (Mkwaya, 3 October 2015). According to Dirubhai, the estate was initially owned by Germans, but was confiscated by the British during World War I. It was then sold to Indian investors. The Groundnut Scheme railway branch from Lindi Creek to Nachingwea passed through his property. The jetty used to offload goods was also part of Dirubhai’s property and rested 6 km from his home. Dirubhai allowed the pier’s lease to expire some years ago. Afterwards, local peoples broke apart the pier and took the stone and anything of value. The railway line similarly disappeared about ten years ago.



Figure 5.5 Dhirajlal (Dirubhai) Savailal C. Amin at his home near Mkwaya (Lindi), October 2015<sup>223</sup>

### Seizing Opportunities: African Drivers and Mechanics in Southern Tanzania

One group profited through the rise and collapse of the Indian-dominated transportation era in southern Tanzania – African drivers and mechanics. When first introduced to East Africa, motor vehicles were supposed to be “tools of empire” and a “technology of intimidation and domination” that would transform African societies and economies according to European designs.<sup>224</sup> According to Jan-Bart Gewald, motor vehicles and airplanes were “seen by colonists as a material manifestation of their technological superiority and hence by extension their natural moral superiority, which in turn legitimated

<sup>223</sup> Picture taken by author.

<sup>224</sup> Grace, “Modernization *Bubu*,” 163; and Joshua Grace, “Heroes of the Road: Race, Gender and the Politics of mobility in Twentieth Century Tanzania,” *Africa: The Journal of the International African Institute* 83, No. 3 (August 2013), 403-425: 407; and Jan-Bart Gewald, “Missionaries, Hereros, and Motorcars: Mobility and the Impact of Motor Vehicles in Namibia Before 1940,” *International Journal of Historical Studies* 35, no. 2-3 (2002): 257-285.

their right to rule.”<sup>225</sup> Historians, however, have illustrated how Africans appropriated motor vehicles to their advantage. From Namibia to Ghana, African drivers utilized motor vehicles to forge new identities as “modern men,” wealthy entrepreneurs, and political citizens during and after colonial rule.<sup>226</sup>

Tanzanian men were similarly aware of the socioeconomic mobility offered to them by employment as drivers and mechanics. Joshua Grace argued that Tanzanian African male and female drivers, mechanics, and itinerant traders appropriated automobiles as tools to accumulate wealth, elevate their social rank, and contest racial and gender social orders created by colonial and postcolonial states. Grace found that most first generation African drivers and mechanics in Dar es Salaam began their careers working for the colonial government during and after World War I. Following WWII, the Public Works Department (PWD) became an important center for Africans to train and work as drivers and mechanics.<sup>227</sup> Grace contended that African men from various social and education backgrounds strove to become drivers because they saw it as “the bridge from daily wage labor to monthly salaries, paid leave, and ultimately, a new kind of colonial citizenship.”<sup>228</sup> While the British refused to consider African drivers as skilled laborers, they were paid as “a highly qualified group of colonial employees because of their attachment to an important tool of empire and for their role in a wide range of colonial development projects”.<sup>229</sup> Many young African men gained access to PWD garages through family connections or by proving their worth in lesser positions within the PWD (such as working for PWD road gangs or as porters). Entrance into the driving profession was highly restrictive. Grace found that colonial drivers constituted roughly one per

---

<sup>225</sup> Gewald, “Missionaries, Hereros, and Motorcars,” 260.

<sup>226</sup> Grace, “Modernization *Bubu*,” 270; Grace, “Heroes of the Road,” 407; Gewald, “Missionaries, Hereros, and Motorcars,” 257-285; and Jennifer A. Hart, “‘One Man, No Chop’: Licit Wealth, Good Citizens, and the Criminalization of Drivers in Postcolonial Ghana,” *International Journal of African Historical Studies* 46, No. 3. (2013): 373-96. Jennifer A. Hart’s dissertation, “‘Suffer to gain’: Citizenship, accumulation, and motor transportation in late-colonial and postcolonial Ghana,” and book, *Ghana on the Go*, were not publically available when completing this dissertation.

<sup>227</sup> Grace, “Modernization *Bubu*,” 209.

<sup>228</sup> *Ibid.*, 124.

<sup>229</sup> *Ibid.*, 123



cent of the territory's population.<sup>230</sup> Ex-British soldiers and Asians typically monopolized the high-ranking positions, while Africans employees filled roles as “native assistants.”<sup>231</sup>

While some African drivers in southern Tanzania started their careers working for the PWD, opportunities were scarce because the region's PWD remained minuscule throughout the colonial era. The mechanical training and English skills Mohamed Saidi Msusa acquired as a driver for PWD proved very valuable when the Groundnut Scheme got underway in the late 1940s. He worked as a driver for John Mowlem, Balfour Beatty, and Messrs. Paulings on port and railway construction projects.<sup>232</sup> Most drivers in southern Tanganyika, however, learned their craft by working as turn-boys for Indian employers. Although a turn-boy's main responsibility was to operate the vehicle when the driver became tired or ill on *safari*, he also assisted with repairs, loaded cargo, washed vehicles, and cooked while on the road.<sup>233</sup> When the lorry became stuck in the mud, the turn-boy was expected to get out and push.<sup>234</sup> If a truck struggled to ascend the hills in Songea and Njombe Districts, the turn-boy jumped out and put blocks behind the wheels. He unloaded the cargo and helped push the vehicle up the hill. He then returned for the cargo left below and carried it up to the waiting vehicle (sometimes with and sometimes without the help

---

<sup>230</sup> Ibid.

<sup>231</sup> Ibid., 209.

<sup>232</sup> Interview with Mohamed Saidi Msusa (Mtwara, 14 October 2015). Mohamed was born in Mtwara Region in 1929. His father was originally from Tunduru, but left his village in 1922 due to family conflict. He walked to Mikindani to work on the sisal plantations. Mohamed explained that at that time, men in the interior learned about coastal plantation work through word of mouth. Men traveling to the coast for fish and salt would return with news of job opportunities. The estates gradually began sending out their own vehicles to recruit men from the interior districts because they could not hire locals. Mohamed chose not to work on sisal plantations, and instead worked as a fisherman. He eventually found a job shipping goods between Tanga and Mikindani. He then went to work for the PWD, driving engineers and building materials throughout the province while learning English. During his employment with Balfour Beatty (1949-53), Mohamed transported the underwater divers employed to construct the Mtwara port. He also transported other workers and supplies between the government store in Mikindani and Mtwara harbor. He helped move the excavated dirt for Pauling's railway works as well. After independence, Mohamed worked as a driver for Community Development. He then drove the *Teeteeko* express buses and cargo lorries from 1966 to 1980. FINNIDA employed him from 1980 to 1983 as a driver, transporting containers and goods for water wells. He finally retired from driving and resumed farming to the current day.

<sup>233</sup> Interview with Said Mohamed Shahame (Lindi, 15 September 2015; Dadi Mkonyoka Yusufu (17 September 2015); Dhirajjal Savailal Amin (Mkwaya, 17 September 2015); and Athomani Wadi Mlaponi (Masasi, 8 October 2015). Whereas as turn-boys accompanied cargo drivers, conductors accompanied passenger drivers. Conductors collected fares. Not all turn-boys were paid.

<sup>234</sup> Interview with Clement K. Njaidi (Mtwara, 15 October 2015).

of the driver).<sup>235</sup> After two to three years of practical training, turn-boys were typically promoted to drivers. Said Mohamed Shahame and Juma Hemed Alli (Polo) began their careers working as turn-boys for Fadhil Ladha, transporting goods and building materials around the Lindi area.<sup>236</sup> Dadi Mkonyoka Yusufu, Mohamed Nasoro, and Husein Mohamed Mzaina also began their driving careers as turn-boys for small Indian-owned businesses in and around Lindi town.<sup>237</sup> Young men in the interior districts relied even more heavily upon employment with local Indian *duka* owners as they were often the only ones who owned vehicles. Born to a family of farmers in the rural village of Lukwika (Masasi), Athomani Wadi Mlaponi began working in an Indian *duka* at Nangomba. Part of his responsibilities included driving to Lindi to collect shop goods and traveling to surrounding villages to buy maize and other produce.<sup>238</sup> Wilium Njaidi, in comparison, began his career as a turn-boy for an Indian-owned sawmill in Nachingwea thanks in part to the recommendation of his uncle, who already worked as a driver for the

---

<sup>235</sup> Interview with Dadi Mkonyoka Yusufu (Lindi, 17 September 2015); and Dhirajlal Savailal Amin (Mkwaya, 3 October 2015).

<sup>236</sup> Interview with Said Mohamed Shahame (Lindi, 15 September 2015); and Juma Said Aly (Lindi, 18 September 2015). Said Mohamed Shahame was born in 1935. After working as a turn-boy for Fadhil Ladha, he worked for the Tanzanian Transport Company from 1965 to 1973. Juma Hemed Alli was born in Mchinga, Lindi in 1933. His father worked as a farmer and mason for the railway. Juma went to school in Mchinga before working with Fadhil Ladha from 1958 to 1960. He briefly worked for Dirubhai during the dry seasons in 1960 and 1961. He then found employment as a driver for Indians in Masasi and for *Shakuru* in Mtwara (1970s-1980). The latter employers participated in the Zambian copper trade. After the 1980s, Juma bought his own lorries and transported cashew nuts. He also rented out his vehicles for a profit.

<sup>237</sup> Interview with Mohamed Nasoro (Lindi, 14 September 2015); Dadi Mkonyoka Yusufu (Lindi, Tanzania, 17 September 2015); and Husein Mohamed Mzaina (Lindi, 28 September 2015). Dadi Mkonyoka Yusufu was born near Lindi (year unknown – suspected late 1930s). He began working as a turn-boy for D.K. Company in Lindi. He became a full driver while working for Ibrahim Somali. He then worked as a driver for the TZT Co. from 1970 to 1972. Afterwards, he moved to Tanga and worked as a driver at a salt works. He also worked for the government. He eventually returned to southern Tanzania and drove small individual cars to and from Masasi and Lindi.

Husein Mohamed Mzaina was born near Lindi in 1928. He learned to drive from a relative, attained a Class “C” license in Lindi town, and became a private driver for an Indian trader – Mehto Saiban. Rather than transporting goods, Husein served as a personal driver for his employer. He then moved to Tanga and worked for Sachan in 1964. He came back to southern Tanzania in 1966 and worked for *Teeteeko* as a passenger driver until the 1970s. He was promoted as a supervisor during his time with *Teeteeko*. He began operating his own transportation business after the collapse of *Teeteeko*.

Mohamed Nasoro was also born in Lindi. He worked as a turn-boy for small transportation companies before joining TZT Co. as a driver from 1958 to 1965. He then worked for “Trankaroadi” – a government construction company – until 1990. His employment was terminated in 1992 due to redundancy. He can no longer drive because of a foot condition.

<sup>238</sup> Interview with Athomani Wadi Mlaponi (Masasi, 8 October 2015). Athomani was born in 1937 in Lukwika (near the Ruvuma River between Mtwara and Ruvuma Regions). Athomani went on to work for TZT Co. and the PWD.

mill.<sup>239</sup> Victor Said also began his driving career as a turn-boy for an Indian-owned saw mill in Newala, but his journey to the position was more challenging due to his lack of familial networks.<sup>240</sup> Victor was born in the rural village of Chilolo in the 1930s. After primary school, he decided to become a driver, but there were no vehicles operating nearby. Villagers were still carrying their produce by foot to Masasi town and the Indian *dukas*. Victor decided to leave without his father's permission and travel by foot to Newala to find employment as a turn-boy.<sup>241</sup> He knew no one and failed to find a job. He left for Nachingwea after hearing about employment opportunities with the Groundnut Scheme. When he failed to find work yet again, he returned to Newala and finally found employment with a saw mill. He worked as an office messenger and cleaner before switching positions to machine cutting timber. The owners decided to make Victor a turn-boy after Victor suffered a work accident.<sup>242</sup> After several years of training, Victor eventually became a driver and transported lumber to Lindi and neighboring worksites.<sup>243</sup>

Working as a turn-boy represented not only a rite of passage into the driving profession, but also a rite of passage into manhood. As a driver, a young man was able to accumulate the wealth and prestige needed to enter manhood – purchase a home, get married, and provide for his family(ies).<sup>244</sup> Drivers also gained sexual experience by visiting prostitution houses while on the road.<sup>245</sup> Traveling extensively and returning home with food and goods from across Tanzania elevated a young man's prestige within his

---

<sup>239</sup> Interview with Wilium Njaidi (Masasi, 8 October 201). Wilium was born near Masasi in 1945. After attending school, he worked as a turn-boy for the two Indian (*Singa-Singa*) sawmill factories in Nachingwea during the 1960s. In 1970, he briefly worked as a turn-boy for the Nachingwea Trade Union, and spent the rest of the year as a driver for *Teeteeko*. He left *Teeteeko* in 1973 and worked for the District Council in Nachingwea. He then purchased his own vehicle and transported goods until 2004.

<sup>240</sup> Interview with Victor Said (Namatumbusi, 10 October 2015). Victor was born in the 1930s in Chilolo outside of Masasi. His birth name was Hussein Ibrahim, but he adopted the Christian name "Victor" to attend the Anglican missionary school in Masasi.

<sup>241</sup> *Ibid.* When Victor returned, his father tried to prevent him from leaving again out of fear that Victor would die alone.

<sup>242</sup> *Ibid.* Victor accidentally cut his hand with the machine. The Indian owners allegedly paid for his hospital treatment and gave him compensation for his injuries.

<sup>243</sup> *Ibid.* After working as a personal driver for an aspiring Indian politician, Victor drove for TZT Co. from the 1960s until 1975. He returned to farming his *shamba* at Namatumbusi for two years before working as a driver for an Indian merchant in Masasi. He worked for the Cashew Nut Authority until 2003. He now attends to his *shamba*.

<sup>244</sup> Grace, "Modernization *Bubu*," 127-28.

<sup>245</sup> Interview with Husein Mohamed Mzaina (Lindi, 28 September 2015). Husein described that there were prostitution houses in all the major towns. These houses were frequented by drivers and businessmen alike.

home community.<sup>246</sup> By taking on turn-boys, drivers elevated their rank within the profession and created networks of dependency that they could rely upon in the future. Grace argued that the “turn boy system” became an important African “institution” as it built relationships “of reciprocity among maturing African men.”<sup>247</sup> Experienced automotive mechanics and carpenters also created networks of reciprocity by training younger men.<sup>248</sup> Grace argued that apprenticeship in repair garages provided young men with technological knowledge and “a flexible set of technical skills they could use for a variety of trades as well as social networks that provided the human and material resources necessary for different stages of their lives.”<sup>249</sup> Opportunities to learn from experienced mechanics in southern Tanganyika during the 1940s and 1950s, however, were limited. Some men, such as Selemani Rashid Ngozi, paid experienced “Swahili” carpenters Shs. 100-200 to learn their craft.<sup>250</sup> Juma Said Aly, in comparison, received his training as a mechanic from a South African while working in Arusha during the 1950s. Although the men did not speak the same language, they communicated through basic words and a numbering system for the spare parts. Juma ultimately learned by doing and found employment as a mechanic for *Teeteeko* from 1957 to the early 1970s.<sup>251</sup> Whether by learning from Europeans or fellow Africans, young drivers and mechanics gained valuable technological skills that allowed them to successfully enter adulthood with high-paid and high-valued employment.<sup>252</sup>

---

<sup>246</sup> Interview with Said Mohamed Shahame (Lindi, 15 September 2015); Mohamed Nasoro (Lindi, 14 September 2015); and Mohamed Saidi Msusa (Mtwara, 14 October 2015).

<sup>247</sup> Grace, “Modernization *Bubu*,” 127.

<sup>248</sup> Grace, “Modernization *Bubu*,” 230.

<sup>249</sup> *Ibid.*, 189.

<sup>250</sup> Interview with Selemani Rashid Ngozi (Lindi, 25 September 2015). Selemani was born in Machinga in 1933. He began working for *Teeteeko* as a carpenter in the 1940s. He left *Teeteeko* after the company moved its headquarters and main garage to Mtwara. He also worked for the PWD. He then worked for the government as a Ward Councilor/Representative.

<sup>251</sup> Interview with Juma Said Aly (Lindi, 18 September 2015). Before receiving his training, Juma Said Aly worked in Zanzibar moving goods in the harbor.

<sup>252</sup> It is unclear when opportunities for formal education in automotive mechanics became available. Juma Said Aly recalled a strike among experienced mechanics at *Teeteeko* because younger mechanics, trained at technical schools, were receiving higher pay. The strike was successful in driving up their wages. Interview with Juma Said Aly (Lindi, 18 September 2015).

With their training complete, drivers and mechanics sought out the best pay and working conditions. The largest employer of drivers in southern Tanzania up to the early 1970s was *Teeteeko*. *Teeteeko* drivers were split into two categories – cargo transport and passenger transport. The passenger lorries were further subdivided into express buses and mail lorries.<sup>253</sup> *Teeteeko* employed drivers from every district in Tanzania and targeted experienced drivers.<sup>254</sup> Mohamed Saidi Msusa, for example, had nearly twenty years of experience driving vehicles for the Groundnut Scheme and Public Works Department prior to his employment with *Teeteeko*.<sup>255</sup> Dirubhai also recruited skilled European mechanics released from the Groundnut Scheme, as well as skilled mechanics originally from the Seychelles, India, and Kenya.<sup>256</sup> Dirubhai insisted that the repair garage was essential for the company's success: "If your garage is doing well, you are doing well."<sup>257</sup> *Teeteeko* also hired local African mechanics and carpenters, such as Juma Said Aly and Selemani Rashid Ngozi. Juma Said Aly recalled being regularly deployed to repair broken down vehicles on the road.<sup>258</sup> Drivers had limited resources to

---

<sup>253</sup> Interview with Wilium Njaidi (Masasi, 8 October 2015); and Juma Said Aly (Lindi, 19 September 2015).

<sup>254</sup> Dirubhai recalled the salaries were Shs. 70. He admitted this was "very, very low" compared to current wages. Incentives were introduced in which a driver received a token sum (Shs. 1 to Shs. 5) for completing "x" number of miles in a month. Former drivers listed their salaries from Shs. 100-400 per month during the 1950s to the 1970s.

<sup>255</sup> Interview with Mohamed Saidi Msusa (Mtwara, 14 October 2015). Mail lorries made frequent stops to deliver mail contained in compartments within the vehicle. Express buses drove directly to the major towns in the south and on route to Dar es Salaam.

<sup>256</sup> Interview with Juma Said Aly (Lindi, 19 September 2015); and Dhirajlal Savailal Amin (Mkwaya, 17 September 2015). Dirubhai praised one European mechanic – Mr. Lawton – for his organizational, managerial, and mechanical skills. Juma Said Aly recalled working with the mechanic from the Seychelles. Allegedly the mechanic was repairing vehicles for a sisal plantation in Lindi when Dirubhai arrived (by chance) with a broken-down vehicle. Durbahi was impressed with the mechanics skills and tried to recruit the man, but the mechanic left for a job in Dar es Salaam. He later returned to Lindi and entered employment with *Teeteeko*.

<sup>257</sup> Interview with Dhirajlal Savailal Amin (Mkwaya, 17 September 2015). During Carnegie Browne's management in 1942, the Lindi garage employed two "half cast" mechanics that earned Shs. 150/- and Shs. 200/- per month. There were also seven blacksmiths and three carpenters. See TNA ACC 460, 4/25/4, Sd. J. Dickson, Labour Officer (Morogoro), "Inspection report Tanganyika Transport Co. Limited, Lindi," 28 October 1942.

<sup>258</sup> Interview with Juma Said Aly (Lindi, 18 September 2015). Most of the breakdowns occurred during the rainy season and involved the gear boxes. During our interview, Juma boasted about his excellence as a mechanic. He claimed that drivers routinely requested him because he could repair their vehicles in half the time of the other mechanics. He complained that *Teeteeko* did not reward him with more money for his superior work. He did not receive a travel allowance, but was offered overtime if he slept out on the road. Joshua Grace discussed the propensity and purpose of bragging among mechanics in his dissertation, "Modernization Bubus."

fix minor problems while in transit.<sup>259</sup> When encountering a major problem, drivers were forced to wait for a passing vehicle or walk to the nearest government station to call their garage at the coast. Some assistance was available at small garages and petrol stations in Masasi, Tunduru, Songea, Njombe, and Iringa, but these repair garages often lacked the supplies or technical knowledge necessary to fix major problems.<sup>260</sup> *Teeteeko* carpenters, meanwhile, constructed, installed, and repaired custom-designed seating for open board lorries at the Lindi garage. Prior to the 1980s, the seats in most vehicles consisted of a wood or steel bench covered with a sponge-like product.<sup>261</sup> With the assistance of machine tools, the carpenters constructed seating for thirty to forty passengers (depending upon the size of the vehicle) that ranged from first to third class.<sup>262</sup> Selemani Rashid Ngozi recalled that construction and installation averaged one month and 10-15 days after the vehicles arrived from Dar es Salaam (having been imported from abroad).<sup>263</sup> Damaged seats could be repaired or replaced in a single day.<sup>264</sup>

---

<sup>259</sup> Interview with Dadi Mkonyoka Yusufu (Lindi, 17 September 2015); and Mohamed Nasoro (Lindi, 14 September 2015). Dadi explained that TZT Co. drivers were equipped with a spade or bush knife.

<sup>260</sup> Interview with Husein Mohamed Mzaina (Lindi, 28 September 2015); Dadi Mkonyoka Yusufu (Lindi, 17 September 2015); Juma Said Aly (Lindi, 18 September 2015); and Mohamed Saidi Msusa (Mtwara, 14 October 2015). Dadi explained that the phone lines were very poor prior to the 1980s. It could take upwards of a week for the telephone line to work, and perhaps an additional week for the mechanic to arrive.

<sup>261</sup> Interview with Selemani Rashid Ngozi (Lindi, 25 September 2015); and Musa Said Omar (Mitwero, 5 October 2015). Most of the wood was procured from villages surrounding Lindi.

<sup>262</sup> Interview with Selemani Rashid Ngozi (Lindi, 25 September 2015); and Juma Said Aly (Lindi 19 September 2015). According to a report issued by the Lindi Labour Officer, first class seats were those located beside the driver within the body of the lorry and considered “suitable” to an Administrative Officer and his authorized personnel. A second class seat was similarly defined as a seat within the lorry considered “suitable” to the Administrative Officer and authorized personnel. Juma recalled that the difference was a matter of price. Selemani argued that the distinctions were race and class-based (rather than the quality of the actual seats) – European and Indian passengers versus the rest. See TNA ACC 460, 4/25/4, Labour Officer Lindi to Labour Commissioner, “Transport Charges,” 22 August 1955

<sup>263</sup> According to interviewees, the most popular automobile brands in southern Tanzania were Benz, “Coma” or Leyland Comet (British), Bedford (British), “Austini,” and Land Rover. Accessibility to imported vehicles and spare parts became increasingly constrained during the course of the 1960s and 1970s. Joshua Grace argued that private “*bubu*” mechanics filled the void created when the Tanzania social state failed to fulfill its “role as a distributor” by “fabricating and re-purposing the used parts they had collected over their careers and traded amongst themselves.” See Grace, “Modernization *Bubu*” 233; and interviews with Mohamed Nasoro (Lindi, 14 September 2015); Dadi Mkonyoka Yusufu (Lindi, 17 September 2015); Selemani Rashid Ngozi (Lindi, 25 September 2015); Husein Mohamed Mzaina (Lindi, 28 September 2015); Athomani Wadi Mlaponi (Masasi, 8 October 2015); and Wilium Njaidi (Masasi, 8 October 201).

<sup>264</sup> Interview with Selemani Rashid Ngozi (Lindi, 25 September 2015). Selemani received between Shs. 300 and Shs. 600 a month for his labor.



Figure 5.6 Part of the former *Teeteeko* garage in Mtwara<sup>265</sup>

Fortunately for those drivers, mechanics, and carpenters who could not find jobs with *Teeteeko*, the private transportation sector was growing in the late 1950s and 1960s. Omari Issa Chiluma's career offers insights into the various employment opportunities available for African drivers in southern Tanzania. After learning to drive from his brother (a *Teeteeko* driver), Omari worked as a turn-boy for a construction business in Lindi (1952-55). He then switched employers and transported migrant laborers from Tunduru to coastal sisal plantations from 1955 to 1957.<sup>266</sup> He briefly worked for *Teeteeko* transporting migrant laborers and agricultural produce during the dry season of 1957 before obtaining a job with another road construction firm operating along the Masasi-Mtwara road (1956-67). During the 1970s, Omari exported Zambian copper and bronze for Dunstan M. Zacharia.<sup>267</sup>

All of the drivers interviewed stressed a sense of mutual responsibility among drivers regardless of their employers. While many drivers from the 1950s and 1960s boasted that earlier vehicle models were stronger than those used today, they admitted that their jobs were physically challenging,

<sup>265</sup> Picture taken by the author, 22 September 2015.

<sup>266</sup> Interview with Omari Issa Chiluma (Mtwara, 15 October 2015). Omari was born in a village near Lindi in 1936.

<sup>267</sup> For more information on Dunstan Olotu Zakaria Masumbuko, see footnote 196.

exhausting, and occasionally dangerous.<sup>268</sup> Drivers expended a lot of energy steering and manually shifting vehicles over horrible roads conditions.<sup>269</sup> When road and climate conditions were good, the journeys were relatively quick. During the dry season, it took two days to reach Songea from Lindi and two days to reach Dar es Salaam from Songea.<sup>270</sup> It took a day to travel to Dar es Salaam from Lindi *if* the Utete ferry was operating and not overloaded with users. It was more common for drivers and passengers to wait one to two days before crossing the Rufiji River.<sup>271</sup> The journey's duration quickly multiplied after a minor rainfall. The black cotton soil found throughout the Dar es Salaam-Lindi road rapidly turned into heavy mud and brought traffic to a standstill.<sup>272</sup> Drivers and passengers could be on the Lindi-Dar es Salaam road anywhere between three days and two weeks depending on road and weather conditions.<sup>273</sup> When the Lindi-Dar es Salaam road closed during the rainy season, traffic was diverted towards coastal shipping or the far western route via Iringa, Njombe, and Songea.<sup>274</sup> The journeys from Lindi to Songea

---

<sup>268</sup> Interview with Hamis Mohamed Likokola (Lindi, 29 September 2015); Husein Mohamed Mzaina (Lindi, 28 September 2015); and Dadi Mkonyoka Yusufu (Lindi, 17 September 2015).

<sup>269</sup> Interview with Husein Mohamed Mzaina (Lindi, 28 September 2015); and Juma Hemed Alli (Mtwara, 13 October 2015).

<sup>270</sup> Interview with Husein Mohamed Mzaina (Lindi, 28 September 2015).

<sup>271</sup> Interview with Dhirajlal Savailal Amin (Mkwaya, 17 September 2015); Husein Mohamed Mzaina (Lindi, 28 September 2015); Mohamed Hassan Mkandinga (Lindi, 1 October 2015); Musa Said Omar (Mitwero, 5 October 2015); Mussa Aidhamel Salum (Lindi, 18 September 2015); and Athomani Wadi Mlaponi, (Masasi, 8 October 2015). Hussein recalled that the pontoon cost Shs. 200 or 300 to cross. Mussa Aidhamel Salum noted that the wood pontoon was preferable to the mechanical ferry. The machine often grounded into the sandy river base when the water level dropped.

<sup>272</sup> Interview with Hamis Mohamed Likokola (Lindi, 29 September 2015); and Juma Said Aly (Lindi, 18 September 2015). Juma argued that the front of *Coma* vehicles were more prone to getting stuck in the mud in comparison to *Bedford* vehicles. Some drivers decided not to wait, and instead cut new paths through the bush. The *Austini* vehicles worked well in the bush.

<sup>273</sup> Interview with Mohamed Nasoro (Lindi, 14 September 2015); Musa Said Omar (Mitwero, 5 October 2015); Saidi A. Mtutile (Lindi, 29 September 2015); and Shaiba A. Mohammed Buriyani (Mnazi Mmoja, 16 September 2015). According to Mohamed, some people walked when their vehicles broke down. Individuals were still walking to/from Dar es Salaam between the 1970s and 1990s. When sleeping on the road, passengers were advised to remain in the bus to avoid lion attacks. None of the drivers and passengers interviewed actually experienced a lion attack. Both Husein and Dadi explained that the vehicle's lights scared the lions. See interviews with Dadi Mkonyoka Yusufu (Lindi, 17 September 2015); Husein Mohamed Mzaina (Lindi, 28 September 2015); Rukia A. Mrope (Lindi, 15 September 2015); and Musa Said Omar (Mitwero, 5 October 2015).

<sup>274</sup> Interview with Husein Mohamed Mzaina (Lindi, 28 September 2015); Mohamed Nasoro (Lindi, 14 September 2015); and Dadi Mkonyoka Yusufu (Lindi, 17 September 2015). Goods were shipped from Dar es Salaam to Mtwara. They were then driven to Lindi. The coastal ships arrived twice a month.



and Songea to Dar, however, took a week each during the rains.<sup>275</sup> The long duration was not just a consequence of distance, but more so a result of the difficult terrain and poor road conditions. While conducting a *safari* in southern Tanzania in September 1966, American Ambassador Burns described the poor conditions of the Lindi-Songea and Songea-Njombe roads:

The drive from Masasi to Songea was long and dusty. Once beyond Tunduru we began to climb and the landscape changed from flat, dry, scrub brush to rolling hills, flowing streams and more abundant foliage. Some of the views on this route were spectacular and worth the discomfort of the dusty, twisting, rough road.

[...] The road to Mtwara [from Songea] is long, bad at the best of times, and virtually impassable during most of the long rainy season. The road which connects Songea to the Great North Road is even worse. It twists through the mountains on steep gradients with numerous difficult turns.

[...] The road from Songea to Njombe is the most difficult section of the road which links Mtwara with the Great North Road. The road winds through mountains with steep gradients, numerous hairpin turns, and it is said to be very treacherous during the rainy season. It climbs from 3,800 feet at Songea to well over 7,000 feet before reaching Njombe, which is at 6,500 feet.<sup>276</sup>

While navigating the treacherous mountain roads in Songea and Mbeya Districts, African drivers had to reduce their speed and monitor their gears, which were known to fail among the heavy cargo and passenger lorries.<sup>277</sup> When traveling along the Lindi-Songea main road, drivers had to be careful of mud and uneven road surfaces. Drivers occasionally asked their passengers to disembark and help push the vehicle out of muddy sections. If the vehicle could not be extracted, another would be sent forward to continue the *safari*.<sup>278</sup> Without the benefit of passengers' manual labor, cargo drivers often had to wait for the roads to dry and river currents to recede before proceeding; sleeping in their trucks and preparing food

---

<sup>275</sup> Interview with Hamis Mohamed Likokola (Lindi, 29 September 2015).

<sup>276</sup> NACP, RG 59, A1 (5710), "Trip Report No. 4 Southern Safari – September 1966," 21 and 23 and 34.

<sup>277</sup> Interview with Dhirajlal Savailal Amin (Mkwaya, 17 September 2015 and 3 October 2015); Husein Mohamed Mzaina (Lindi, 28 September 2015); and Mohamed Nasoro (Lindi, 14 September 2015). In some instances, passengers were also forced to disembark from their lorry and walk up a hill. They would reload on the descent and continue on their way. Husein recalled that passengers also had to disembark when climbing the hill outside of Lindi town (*Mmonga*).

<sup>278</sup> Interview with Husein Mohamed Mzaina (Lindi, 28 September 2015); and Athomani Wadi Mlaponi (Masasi, 8 October 2015).

for themselves in the meanwhile.<sup>279</sup> If a driver did become stuck in the mud or his vehicle broke down, other drivers were quick to come to his aid. Some drivers even drove in convoys in order to assist each other.<sup>280</sup>

The sense of mutual responsibility between drivers did not solely pertain to offering assistance when a vehicle broke down. Drivers typically gave their colleagues and relatives free fares around the region, and sometimes provided the guest driver with free food.<sup>281</sup> Drivers also agreed to look in on one another's families. While some drivers remained single during their careers, many married and owned *shambas* for family consumption and to supplement wages.<sup>282</sup> Some drivers hired individuals to protect and cultivate their fields, but in most cases, the wife was left in charge to maintain the home and *shamba*.<sup>283</sup> During the *ujamaa* era, the "onus of maintaining food security" often fell on women throughout Tanzania.<sup>284</sup> Women were expected to fulfill the role as homemakers and "custodians of social welfare" of their families, villages, and the nation.<sup>285</sup> Victor Said's wife – Fatuma Juma Akini – reflected

---

<sup>279</sup> Interview with Dadi Mkonyoka Yusufu (Lindi, 17 September 2015); Mohamed Nasoro (Lindi, 14 September 2015); and Clement K Njaidi (Mtwara, 15 October 2015). Whereas *Teeteeko* did not give its drivers a travel allowance, TZT Co. provided its drivers with Shs. 200 for travel expenses. Passengers also brought food with them on their journeys. When traveling as a student, Shaiba A. Mohammed Buriyani recalled that there were no food vendors at bus stops, nor were there locals crowding the bus to sell their produce (as is common today). A passenger instead yelled at the driver to stop when he/she saw food they wanted to purchase. Interview with Shaiba A. Mohammed Buriyani (Mnazi Mmoja, 16 September 2015).

<sup>280</sup> Interview with Wilium Njaidi (Masasi, 8 October 2015). Passage during the dry season was also difficult due to erosion and potholes. Dirubhai explained how the rains eroded road edges and elevated the middle section of the road surface. Drivers were likely to damage the undercarriage of their vehicles if they proceeded too quickly. Interview with Dhirajlal Savailal Amin (Mkwaya, 17 September 2015).

<sup>281</sup> Interview with Husein Mohamed Mzaina (Lindi, 28 September 2015); Victor Said (Namatumbusi, 10 October 2015); and Juma Hemed Alli (Mtwara, 13 October 2015). *Teeteeko* mechanics, carpenters, and their family members also received free passage.

<sup>282</sup> Wilium Njaidi, for instance, remained single.

<sup>283</sup> Interview with Husein Mohamed Mzaina (Lindi, 28 September 2015); Fatuma Juma Akini (Namatumbusi, 10 October 2015); Hamis Mohamed Likokola (Lindi, 29 September, 2015); and Said Mohamed Shahame (Lindi, 15 September 2015). While working as a conductor, Hamis Mohamed Likokola maintained a *shamba* near Newala with the help of his wife. Hamis ensured that his wife and family had enough maize and food supplies to last the duration of his *safaris*.

<sup>284</sup> Lal, *African Socialism in Postcolonial Tanzania*, 112.

<sup>285</sup> *Ibid.*, 103. The government established training centers and programs where women were supposed to learn "more refined and 'modern' domestic habits" (108). Lal argued that the postcolonial state's methods of training rural women in "modern" home economics "echoed a distinctly colonial and missionary approach" (103). For more information, see Lal, *African Socialism in Postcolonial Tanzania*, 102-114.

upon the benefits and detriments of being married to a driver. It was prestigious, especially when he returned to their rural village in the vehicle with various goods from distant places. When Victor was on *safari*, however, people would express concern about her being without a husband for many weeks (perhaps indefinitely if an accident occurred).<sup>286</sup> Victor and the other husbands tried to leave enough money and food stockpiles with their families to last the duration of their *safari*.<sup>287</sup> Drivers also sent money home – asking a colleague to drop off the funds when passing by the home village or town.<sup>288</sup> Many of the men, however, had multiple wives and families. Husein Mohamed Mzaina, for example, had to provide for his four wives and their children in Lindi, Tunduru, and Dar es Salaam.<sup>289</sup> If the food and money ran out, his family would pay for goods on credit until he returned.<sup>290</sup> More research is needed into the experiences of drivers' wives, who might have been a new iteration of the “bush widows” from the colonial period. Whereas the wives of migrant laborers could accompany their husbands to sisal plantations during the colonial era, the wives of drivers remained at home to care for their families during the economically challenging decades of the 1970s and 1980s.<sup>291</sup>

Drivers also looked after one another by not reporting when a fellow driver made a mistake or broke regulations while on *safari*.<sup>292</sup> The typical reasons for a driver's termination were damaging the vehicle (due to neglect or carelessness), driving intoxicated, stealing or losing cargo in transit, and

---

<sup>286</sup> Interview with Fatuma Juma Akini (Namatumbusi, 10 October 2015).

<sup>287</sup> Interview with Hamis Mohamed Likokola (Lindi, 29 September, 2015); and Said Mohamed Shahame (Lindi, 15 September 2015).

<sup>288</sup> Interview with Fatuma Juma Akini (Namatumbusi, 10 October 2015); Said Mohamed Shahame (Lindi, 15 September 2015); and Dadi Mkonyoka Yusufu (Lindi, 17 September 2015). Relatives also watched over the driver's family(ies).

<sup>289</sup> Interview with Husein Mohamed Mzaina (Lindi, 28 September 2015). One wife resided in Mikindani, two in Lindi town, and one in Songea.

<sup>290</sup> *Ibid.* Husein was the only driver to mention how drivers curbed their sexual desires while on *safari*. He explained that there were prostitution houses at all the major towns. The houses in Dar es Salaam allegedly included many women from Mwanza and Arusha.

<sup>291</sup> Husseina Dinani conducted important research on the lives of women in rural Lindi and their responses to the immense socioeconomic changes that occurred during the colonial and postcolonial periods. Dinani evaluated the ways in which women's farming and household work shaped their understanding and engagement with colonialism, independence, and postcolonial development projects like *ujamaa*. Unfortunately, her dissertation was not publically available at the time of this dissertation's completion. See Husseina Dinani, “En-gendering the Postcolony: Women, Citizenship and Development in Tanzania, 1945-1985” (PhD diss., Emory University, 2014).

<sup>292</sup> Interview with Mohamed Nasoro (Lindi, 14 September 2015).

transporting unauthorized cargo and passengers.<sup>293</sup> The latter practice was common, especially among drivers of the smaller, independent transportation enterprises found in urban towns (notably Lindi and Mtwara).<sup>294</sup> Some drivers preferred working for the smaller transporters because they had freer work schedules and more negotiation powers vis-à-vis their bosses in comparison with drivers working for large firms, especially *Teeteeko*. One of the dangers for working for these small transport operators, however, was the unreliable and unstable pay. Wage rates fluctuated monthly with the profitability of the enterprise. Drivers responded by skimming a portion of the passenger fares and/or pocketing money given by extra passengers and cargo picked up in route.<sup>295</sup> Although *Teeteeko* drivers received stable and regular pay, they also transported illicit cargo and passengers for individual profit. The practice was much riskier because Dirubhai was frequently on the road checking that drivers were on schedule, sober, and transporting authorized cargo only.<sup>296</sup> In one alleged instance, Dirubhai stopped a cargo lorry covered with a tarp and asked the driver if he was carrying any passengers. The man denied the accusation. Dirubhai responded loudly in Kiswahili that if the driver was telling the truth, Dirubhai could shoot his gun into the cargo. Men immediately jumped out of the back of the truck and ran. The driver was terminated.<sup>297</sup> Dirubhai admitted that his random inspections left drivers “always afraid that if they are not

---

<sup>293</sup> Interview with Dhirajlal Savailal Amin (Mkwaya, 17 September 2015).

<sup>294</sup> Interview with Juma Said Aly (Lindi, 18 September 2015); and Athomani Wadi Mlaponi (Masasi, 8 October 2015).

<sup>295</sup> Interview with Dadi Mkonyoka Yusufu (Lindi, 17 September 2015). In the case of the Tanzania Transport Company (TZT Co.), Said Mohamed Shahame insisted that the bosses allowed drivers to pick up extra goods and passengers if their vehicles were not full. Dadi Mkonyoka Yusufu, in contrast, recalled that drivers were fired if patrol cars caught them with unauthorized cargo. More common reasons for termination included drivers losing cargo in transit or neglecting/damaging their vehicles. Dadi Mkonyoka Yusufu also remembered that drivers approached their bosses directly for raises. If the boss said no, it was up to the driver to accept the decision or quit. Mohamed Nasoro insisted that TZT Co. was willing to offer wage advances to those drivers who were experiencing financial difficulties. Interview with Mohamed Nasoro (Lindi, 14 September 2015).

<sup>296</sup> Interview with Dhirajlal Savailal Amin (Mkwaya, 17 September 2015); and Juma Said Aly (Lindi, 18 September 2015). Dirubhai recalled arising every day at five a.m. to ensure that the buses left Lindi on time and that any complaints from passengers, drivers, or turn-boys were resolved. In instances where passengers had insufficient funds, Dirubhai often made arrangements for the passengers to pay when they arrived at their destination. He stated, “for a few shillings you cannot destroy his safari.” After the first bus departed at six a.m., Dirubhai returned home for breakfast and accounting work. He was back in the office by 8:00-8:30am.

<sup>297</sup> Interview with Saidi Malindi (Masasi, 8 October 2015). Saidi allegedly heard the story from Dirubhai while working as his personal assistant. Saidi was born in Mtwara in 1969. His family moved to Mkwaya where Saidi did

going on time, they will be caught.”<sup>298</sup> Dirubhai rewarded the hardworking, “good” drivers (who completed their routes quickly) with newer vehicles and supervisory positions.<sup>299</sup> Even these “good” drivers, however, tried to make unrecorded profits in transit.<sup>300</sup> The drivers took precautions – keeping informed of Dirubhai’s location and reselling the tickets of passengers who disembarked on the way.<sup>301</sup> *Teeteeko*’s mechanics similarly made money on the side by fixing vehicles on the road or in the garage after work hours.<sup>302</sup> Few of the small transport operators in southern Tanzania employed a mechanic. *Teeteeko* mechanics requested permission to work on cars outside of the company fleet in order to generate more income for themselves and the company.<sup>303</sup> Grace found similar evidence of drivers transporting illicit cargo and mechanics conducting repairs outside of normal work hours in Dar es Salaam. Drivers participated in parallel markets in order to create their own economic networks and earn the profits necessary to “produce the type of gendered adulthood they desired.”<sup>304</sup> Mechanics, meanwhile, perceived the extra evening and weekend work hours as a “critical and enjoyable time of experimentation and modification.”<sup>305</sup>

---

some studying before finding work with Dirubhai in 1988. Saidi worked as a chef and driver. Afterwards, he found employment with a South African as a workshop foreman and driver at a sisal plantation in Mikindani. He followed the South African to Moshi and Arusha, working in other plantation workshops. A company in Dar es Salaam (Mohamed Enterprises) recommended Saidi to an Indian-based company looking to educate Tanzanians in operating their tractors. The company sponsored Saidi to attend a school in Tanga where he learned how to operate and repair tractors used for cultivation activities. Saidi returned to Masasi as a contracted coordinated for the company. In addition to loaning (and repairing) company tractors to local famers and communities, Saidi also runs his own repair garage.

<sup>298</sup> Interview with Dhirajlal Savailal Amin (Mkwaya, 17 September 2015).

<sup>299</sup> Interview with Husein Mohamed Mzaina (Lindi, 28 September 2015). Some transportation companies promoted drivers as supervisors and/or allowed drivers to nominate one of their fellow drivers to act as a spokesperson for their needs and concerns. Said Mohamed Shahame, for example, was nominated by his fellow drivers as a spokesperson within TZT Co. When the bosses wanted to fire an individual, Said attended the meeting and ensured there was a just explanation for the termination.

<sup>300</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>301</sup> Interview with Juma Said Aly (Lindi, 19 September 2015).

<sup>302</sup> Interview with Juma Said Aly (Lindi, 18 September 2015).

<sup>303</sup> Interview with Juma Said Aly (Lindi, 19 September 2015); and Hamis Mohamed Likokola (Lindi, 29 September 2015). Juma Said Aly insisted that *Teeteeko* mechanics could only work on private and other company vehicles with a boss’s permission. Once the boss approved the costs for the other company/individual, then the mechanic could get to work.

<sup>304</sup> Grace, “Modernization *Bubu*,” 142-44.

<sup>305</sup> *Ibid.*, 214 and 229.

### Negotiating the New Transportation Era (1970s-1980s)

The collapse of the private, Indian-dominated transportation sector in the 1970s ushered in an era of instability and opportunity for African drivers in southern Tanzania. *Ushirika Teeteeko* absorbed many drivers, but few stayed very long. Within seven years, the company was in shambles. Previous employees accredited *Ushirika Teeteeko*'s rapid demise to poor management, derelict vehicles, and irregular salaries.<sup>306</sup> Rather than a strong central manager – like Dirubhai – multiple managers ran *Ushirika Teeteeko*. Communication among and between these managers and the drivers were poor and operations suffered.<sup>307</sup> At least one former driver accused some of the managers of worrying more about their own interests than those of the company.<sup>308</sup> Documentary evidence points to inept accounting as another contributing factor to the collapse of *Ushirika Teeteeko*.<sup>309</sup> As expenses grew larger, employees' pay became irregular and unreliable.<sup>310</sup> Many experienced drivers left to find better working conditions and regular salaries.<sup>311</sup> Some went to work for the state and private employers in southern Tanzania. Victor Said temporarily returned to his *shamba* outside of Masasi, before finding work as a driver for an Indian businessman in Masasi. He went on to work for the Cashew Nut Authority, collecting and transporting

---

<sup>306</sup> Interview with Musa Said Omar (Mitwero, 5 October 2015); Wilium Njaidi (Masasi, 8 October 2015; Athomani Wadi Mlaponi (Masasi, 8 October 2015); and Clement K. Njaidi (Mtwara, 15 October 2015).

<sup>307</sup> Dirubhai, in comparison, was considered a hardworking and strict manager, who expected his employees to follow his instructions to the letter. I was warned by locals to arrive on time to my meeting with Dirubhai as punctuality was very important to him. Juma Said Aly suggested that Dirubhai was too strict and physically punished disobedient or reckless employees. No other interviewee offered such testimony of Dirubhai. Mohamed Saidi Msusa admitted to getting in disputes with Dirubhai, but Dirubhai never held it against him and greeted him friendly the following day. Dirubhai was also willing to give second chances when people made mistakes. Hamis Mohamed Likokola recalled that Dirubhai was well liked because he helped his workers and people in the community. Husein Mohamed Mzaina similarly recalled Dirubhai as a good boss, who offered Husein valuable advice as he began his own transport business. Saidi A. Mtutile contended that many people respected Dirubhai as a powerful and wise man due to his ownership of so many vehicles. See interview with Juma Said Aly (Lindi, 18 September 2015); Hamis Mohamed Likokola (Lindi, 29 September 2015); Husein Mohamed Mzaina (Lindi, 28 September 2015); Athomani Wadi Mlaponi (Masasi, 8 October 2015); Saidi Malindi (Masasi, 8 October 2015); and Mohamed Said Msusa (Mtwara, 14 October 2015).

<sup>308</sup> Interview with Wilium Njaidi, Masasi, 8 October 2015.

<sup>309</sup> TNA ACC 601, CW 50262, Tanganyika Transport Co. Teeteeko *Ushirika* Vol 2.

<sup>310</sup> Interview with Mohamed Shahame (Lindi, 15 September 2015); Dadi Mkonyoka Yusufu (Lindi, 17 September 2015); Athomani Wadi Mlaponi (Masasi, 8 October 2015); and Wilium Njaidi (Masasi, 8 October 2015).

<sup>311</sup> Interview with Musa Said Omar (Mitwero, 5 October 2015); Wilium Njaidi (Masasi, 8 October 2015); Athomani Wadi Mlaponi (Masasi, 8 October 2015); and Clement K Njaidi (Mtwara, 15 October 2015).

cashew nuts from Tunduru, Newala, Nachingwea, and Masasi until 2003.<sup>312</sup> He favored working for the government over private businessmen because it offered greater job security and employee rights. Athomani Wadi Mlaponi also preferred employment with the government. While working for TANROADS, Athomani received national holidays and worked standard hours.<sup>313</sup> Mohamed Saidi Msusa did not enter the government sector, but rather worked as a driver with the Finnish International Development Agency (FINNIDA) in southern Tanzania from 1980-83 before retiring to a life of farming.<sup>314</sup> Still other drivers and mechanics took their skills outside of southern Tanzania. Juma Said Aly went to Dar es Salaam in the 1970s and worked as a mechanic with the large firm, Tanganyika Motors, for twenty years.<sup>315</sup> He eventually returned to Lindi and purchased a home. Dadi Mkonyoka Yusufu found employment in Tanga as a driver with a salt works company after TZT was incorporated with *Ushirika Teeteeko*. He eventually worked for the government. The job offered less pay, but more security.<sup>316</sup> The owners of *Ushirika Teeteeko* allegedly tried to revive the company by offering Dirubhai the position of General Manager, but he refused.<sup>317</sup> *Ushirika Teeteeko*'s vehicles were auctioned off in 1978-79, and the company split apart into regionally-based cooperatives in 1980, including: *Kaumu* in Mtwara, *Kauli* in

---

<sup>312</sup> The government continued to rely upon the “turn-boy system” to train their drivers. Saidi A. Mtutile did not receive formal training from the government before becoming a driver for road construction operations. Saidi was born in Lindi Hospital in 1954, and worked as a government driver from 1976 to 2008. Interview with Saidi A. Mtutile (Lindi, 29 September 2015).

<sup>313</sup> Interview with Athomani Wadi Mlaponi (Masasi, 8 October 2015).

<sup>314</sup> In 1972, the Tanzanian government “internationalized” national development, pairing foreign development agencies with specific regions in Tanzania. The government of Finland assisted development projects in Lindi and Mtwara Regions. (The Finnish government had provided assistance to Tanzania since 1962.) According to Lal, FINNIDA (the Finnish International Development Agency) and British consultants prepared and funded Rural Integrated Development Programmes in Mtwara for the next two decades. See Lal, *African Socialism in Postcolonial Tanzania*, 169.

<sup>315</sup> Interview with Juma Said Aly (Lindi, 18 September 2015). His wages rose from Shs. 300 to Shs. 600 per month.

<sup>316</sup> Interview with Dadi Mkonyoka Yusufu (Lindi, 17 September 2015). Hamis Mohamed Likokola and Said Mohamed Shahame also found employment as drivers outside of the southern borderland. After leaving his employment with Mohamed Selemani in Lindi, Hamis worked for a bus company headquartered in Mbeya. He received better working conditions and drove newer buses along a route from Dar es Salaam to Masasi and Newala. Said Mohamed Shahame found employment in Dar es Salaam as a driver for Rubby Roads from 1973-78. After being plagued by medical issues for two years, he began driving individual cars in Lindi until he retired in 1983. Interview with Hamis Mohamed Likokola, (Lindi, 29 September 2015); and Said Mohamed Shahame (Lindi, 15 September 2015).

<sup>317</sup> Interview with Dhirajlal Savailal Amin (Mkwaya, 17 September 2015).

Lindi, and *Rideco* in Songea. When asked about *Teeteeko*'s collapse, Dirubhai simply stated, "We were not happy, but what can we do? It is not in your hand."<sup>318</sup>

*Ushirika Teeteeko*'s struggles corresponded with the growing economic crisis that gripped Tanzania from the mid-1970s to the mid-1980s. After nationalizing the building and wholesale sectors, the government established the National Price Commission and declared villagization compulsory nationwide in 1973.<sup>319</sup> During the same year, a global recession tied to an oil crisis triggered a slump in Tanzania's cash and food crop production and exportation.<sup>320</sup> The following two years witnessed the decline in agricultural production and worsening imbalance of payments.<sup>321</sup> Food shortages were apparent in the southeast by 1973, while production levels for southern Tanzania's top export – cashews – fell dramatically after 1974.<sup>322</sup> Production rates declined from a high of 145,080 tons in 1973 to 115,864 tons in 1974 and 40,550 tons by 1979.<sup>323</sup> Nation-wide food shortages and distribution problems intensified throughout the country in 1976, partially as a result of Operation *Maduka*. The government instituted the policy in an attempt to replace private retailers with communal owned (*ujamaa* or *ushirika*) shops in every village.<sup>324</sup> The Regional Working Committee in Lindi District gained supervisory authority over the distribution of essential items in rural areas, and private shop-owners were given ten days to close their shops.<sup>325</sup> Implementation of Operation *Maduka* slowed considerably once it became apparent that rural

---

<sup>318</sup> Ibid.

<sup>319</sup> Lal, "Between the Village and the World," 122; and Miller, "Who are the 'permanent inhabitants' of the state," 242. The government set prices for over 400 consumer goods.

<sup>320</sup> Lal, *African Socialism in Postcolonial Tanzania*, 162.

<sup>321</sup> Nagar, "The South Asian Diaspora in Tanzania," 71.

<sup>322</sup> Lal, *African Socialism in Postcolonial Tanzania*, 163.

<sup>323</sup> Ibid., 161; Seppälä, "The recovery of cashew production in southern Tanzania," 123-126; Hann, "Transitioning Economies, Cultures, and Woodlands," 167-69; and Chau P. Johnsen Kelly, "A Tale of Two Cities, Mikindani and Mtwara: Consuming Development in southeastern Tanganyika, 1910-1960" (PhD diss., University of California Davis, 2010), 422. Historians have offered a number of explanations for the drastic reduction in cashew production figures, including: the old age of fruit-producing trees, fungal disease, smuggling of nuts into Mozambique, declining global market prices, and *ujamaa* villagization, which interrupted cropping patterns and access to trees.

<sup>324</sup> Ibid., 69; and Göran Hydén, *Beyond Ujamaa in Tanzania: Underdevelopment and an Uncaptured Peasantry* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), 132.

<sup>325</sup> Hydén, *Beyond Ujamaa in Tanzania*, 132.



communities were suffering from severe shortages of foods and commodity goods.<sup>326</sup> A series of domestic and international incidents in 1979-81 further intensified nation-wide scarcities and inflation.<sup>327</sup> The East African community collapsed in 1977, forcing the Tanzanian government to invest funds in establishing new aviation, harbor, and railway administrations and other central services. Tanzania waged a war with Uganda (1978/79) that increased defense spending by 137%.<sup>328</sup> The massive spike in global oil prices in 1979 and drought conditions in the early 1980s further undermined Tanzania's economy. The government's relationship with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) also collapsed in 1980 after the latter insisted that Tanzania agree to a structural adjustment program. International assistance to Tanzania subsequently dropped from \$702 million in 1981 to \$487 million in 1985.<sup>329</sup>

Communities throughout southern Tanzania experienced shortages of essential items (especially sugar, rice, and cloth) as a result of the national economic crisis.<sup>330</sup> My research assistant, Zuhura Mohamed, recalled acute shortages of meat. No butcher existed in Lindi in the late 1970s, and families only ate meat to celebrate Eid or Christmas (if available and affordable). Goat meat might appear at a wedding.<sup>331</sup> Rukia A. Mrope (Zuhura's mother) recalled women waiting in lines outside *ushirika* stores in Lindi all day for sugar and rice, but many returned home empty handed and were forced to wait another month for more supplies to arrive.<sup>332</sup> Individuals also paid their relatives waiting in line to buy extra goods, and fights occasionally broke out between women who tried to leave stones as place markers in the lines. Villagers outside Mtwara, in comparison, would supply rural shopkeepers with money to procure items from the Regional Trading Corporation (RTC) – a wholesaler supplying *ushirika* shops and *dukas*

---

<sup>326</sup> Ibid. By March 1977, there were 3,284 *ujamaa* or cooperative shops in villages around the country.

<sup>327</sup> Nagar, "The South Asian Diaspora in Tanzania," 71; and Leander Schneider, *Government of Development: Peasants and Politicians in Postcolonial Tanzania* (Bloomington, IN: Indian University Press, 2014).

<sup>328</sup> Many southern Tanzanians accredited the food and consumer goods scarcities to the Uganda War in 1979, which left the government bankrupt. See interview with Denis Lukiano Ching'andilo (Masasi, 9 October 2015); and commentary by Zuhura Mohammed during an interview with Rukia A. Mrope (Lindi, 15 September 2015).

<sup>329</sup> Haan, "Transitioning Economies, Cultures, and Woodlands," 100; and Nagar, "The South Asian Diaspora in Tanzania," 71.

<sup>330</sup> Interview with Musa Said Omar (Mitwero, 5 October 2015); and Shaiba A. Mohammed Buriyani (Mnazi Mmoja, 16 September 2015).

<sup>331</sup> Commentary by Zuhura Mohammed during an interview with Rukia A. Mrope (Lindi, 15 September 2015).

<sup>332</sup> Interview with Rukia A. Mrope (Lindi, 15 September 2015).

in rural villages.<sup>333</sup> Communities in Mtwara similarly pooled their money and selected a leader to get goods from the RTC.<sup>334</sup> Often there were not enough supplies, and villagers were left to wait a month or more to try again.<sup>335</sup> While living in a remote village outside of Masasi, Fatuma Juma Akini recalled a time when all the women wore the same *kanga* – both in color and material.<sup>336</sup> Fatima was fortunate that her husband (Victor Said) worked as a driver for the Cashew Nut Authority at the time and had ready access to food through the *ushirika* shop.<sup>337</sup> Rukia was also fortunate that her husband worked in the local *ushirika* store and set aside five kilos of sugar for the family.<sup>338</sup>

---

<sup>333</sup> Interview with Athomani Wadi Mlaponi (Masasi, 8 October 2015).

<sup>334</sup> Interview with Juma Hemed Alli (Mtwara, 13 September 2015); and Lal, *African Socialism in Postcolonial Tanzania*, 197. According to Lal, the RTC was supposed to stock all *ujamaa* stores with basic goods. The *ujamaa* stores were established by village funds.

<sup>335</sup> Interview with Athomani Wadi Mlaponi (Masasi, 8 October 2015); and Juma Hemed Alli (Mtwara, 13 September 2015). Athomani commented that even the Indian shopkeepers lacked sugar.

<sup>336</sup> Interview with Fatuma Juma Akini (Namatumbusi, 10 October 2015). Only a few women in the village received new cloth per year as there was not enough to distribute to everyone.

<sup>337</sup> Interview with Victor Said (Namatumbusi, 10 October 2015).

<sup>338</sup> Interview with Rukia A. Mrope (Lindi, 15 September 2015). Lal reported instances of corruption and conflict at *ujamaa* stores in the villages of Mdui, Rwelu, and Nanguruwe (southeast Tanzania) during the 1970s. See Lal, *African Socialism in Postcolonial Tanzania*, 197-201.



**Figure 5.7 Victor Said, Fatuma Juma Akini, and Zuhura Mohamed, Namatumbusi (Masasi)<sup>339</sup>**

Large numbers of young men from the southeast migrated to northern cities, especially to Dar es Salaam, to work as traders or *wamachinga* in response to the food scarcities, lack of industrialization, and agricultural production crises during the 1980s.<sup>340</sup> Some African drivers and entrepreneurs, however, took advantage of the parallel markets that emerged and thrived in Tanzania as the “formal” economy worsened and shortages became more acute in the late 1970s and 1980s.<sup>341</sup> Musa Said Omar offered insights into how individuals became involved in and negotiated parallel markets during the late *ujamaa* era in southern Tanzania. Musa first entered the trade economy in 1964 by selling coconuts from his father’s *shamba* in Mitwero to Lindi town. Musa eventually expanded the business, transporting his family’s and neighbors’ coconuts to markets in the interior

<sup>339</sup> Picture taken by the author, 10 October 2015.

<sup>340</sup> Lal, *African Socialism in Postcolonial Tanzania*, 169. *Wamachinga* are street vendors. They were called such because many came from the Machinga ethnic group. The term also plays on the expression “marching guy.”

<sup>341</sup> Nagar, “The South Asian Diaspora in Tanzania,” 71; interview with Juma Said Aly (Lindi, 18 September 2015); and Musa Said Omar (Mitwero, 5 October 2015).

districts and Dar es Salaam.<sup>342</sup> During the mid-1970s, Musa became a middleman between traders in Lindi and African rice and maize producers in Tunduru and Songea Districts. Musa's operations began with him finding a machine owner in Lindi who was willing and able to grind the raw rice and maize into a finished product. The mill owner agreed to finance the enterprise, paying for Musa's transport to and from the interior villages. Musa traveled to the interior during the harvest season accompanied by five or six young, independent traders. While each man might have his own machinist and buyer(s) in Lindi, they traveled and organized their activities as a team. They targeted villages without go-downs or *ushirika* shops, and collected farmers' stock door by door. When Musa and the other traders gathered enough produce, one man returned to Lindi and requested a lorry. The lorry was privately owned and operated – not a part of the state-controlled cooperative fleet. The bags were brought to the machinist, who turned the raw goods into finished products. Musa then sold the produce to Indian and African wholesalers in Lindi.<sup>343</sup> Musa split the profits between himself and the machinist (reimbursing him for the transport and grinding operations). Musa spent two to three months upcountry, starting with the rice harvest and finishing with the maize harvest. Depending on the size of the harvest and the market, Musa might make two or three trips to the coast.<sup>344</sup> His business became more difficult after 1974 as the Tanzanian government passed legislation restricting inter-regional trade. The government instituted road blocks, gates, and check points between Lindi and Tunduru to enforce the policy. Traders found it difficult to get authorization (*kibali*) to conduct lawful trade. When a trader received permission, he overestimated the number of bags he would transport so that his colleagues could sneak their loads in with the authorized load.<sup>345</sup> Other traders attempted to smuggle the goods from the interior to the coast, often bribing the police at the checkpoints. Grace found that drivers elsewhere in Tanzania bribed police and border patrols, hid illicit goods with authorized cargo, and drove at night to move goods across borders and checkpoints.<sup>346</sup>

---

<sup>342</sup> Interview with Musa Said Omar (Mitwero, 5 October 2015). Musa was born in 1942 in Ng'apa (ten miles outside of Lindi town). He originally traveled to Dar es Salaam because it offered a bigger market. Musa recalled that it cost between Shs. 40,000 and 50,000 to transport goods to Dar in 1964.

<sup>343</sup> Ibid. If it was a large harvest, wholesalers from Kilwa would also come to Lindi to purchase the produce.

<sup>344</sup> Ibid. Musa recalled earning between Shs. 400,000 to 500,000 for sixty bags of rice. Although the main road was still not tarmacked beyond Masasi, the road was fair enough to keep transport costs low enough for traders to make a small profit.

<sup>345</sup> Ibid.

<sup>346</sup> Grace argued that drivers turned "state regulated commodities from Tanzania's formal market into parallel system of distribution that was not regulated by the government." While the "easiest" item for drivers to distribute was petroleum, they transported a variety of items. Grace found that Tanzanian businesswomen also used buses and hitchhiking to participate in parallel markets in order to create a "settled life in a manner they

Musa Said Omar successfully continued his trade because one of his relatives worked as a policeman in Masasi. Musa only abandoned the trade when he became manager of the *ushirika* shop at Ng'apa in 1983.<sup>347</sup> The willingness and ability of drivers and traders in southern Tanzania to circumnavigate government controls on road transportation and exploit parallel markets mirrored the actions and attitudes of drivers and traders during the colonial period, especially those who ignored transportation restrictions during the Second World War.

The Tanzanian government implemented increasingly severe measures to curb nation-wide food shortages, high inflation, and illicit trading in 1979-81. The state also criminalized drivers.<sup>348</sup> Rather than viewing drivers as “modern men who contributed to national development by putting things in motion,”<sup>349</sup> they became “economic saboteurs” who harmed the nation by facilitating parallel markets and spreading HIV/AIDS.<sup>350</sup> Matteo Rizzo described the case of Francis Owino, who operated a successful private transportation and timber distribution business from Nachingwea during the 1960s.<sup>351</sup> Owino was arrested in 1974 and his lorries confiscated because he attracted workers from the Nachingwea Trading

---

could control.” Grace, however, acknowledged that it took multiple interviews for drivers to open up about their previous roles in illicit trade. See Grace, “Modernization *Bubu*,” 143-49.

<sup>347</sup> Interview with Musa Said Omar (Mitwero, 5 October 2015). He worked his *shamba* in the morning and then headed to the shop in the afternoon. The shop did not rectify the supply shortages in the village – especially sugar, rice, and cloth.

<sup>348</sup> Grace, “Modernization *Bubu*,” 150.

<sup>349</sup> *Ibid.*, 134. Grace argued that as HIV/AIDS became a national emergency in the early 1980s, drivers were increasingly “defined in public health narratives through stereotypes of hyper-sexuality and irresponsible social and economic behavior.”

*Ibid.*, 134-35. Jennifer A. Hart similarly found that the postcolonial government, press, and general public in Ghana increasingly criminalized drivers from the 1950s to the 1980s. They argued that drivers were exploiters, liars, thieves, and the source of Ghana’s struggling economy, rather than respectable and responsible entrepreneurs. Hart argued that the “independence and entrepreneurial success of drivers, which had once been the foundation of their respect and status as cosmopolitan, modern men, became their greatest liability during the ‘era of decline’ that lasted from independence through the early-1980s.” While the drivers’ practices and prosperity did not change radically, their attempts to make money during economically challenging times produced condemnation from the general public and state. More research is needed to determine the extent to which Tanzanian drivers’ “entrepreneurial activity” was “transformed into a national threat by postcolonial state and society.” See Hart, “One Man, No Chop,” 373-396.

<sup>351</sup> Rizzo, “The Groundnut Scheme Revisited,” 164-65. According to Rizzo, Owino was born in Kisumu District (Kenya) and trained as a mechanic while serving in the British army during World War II. After the war, he found employment with the OFC in Kongwa. He briefly returned to Kenya before being sent to Nachingwea. He deposited part of his salary with an Asian trader, who was also originally from Kisumu and moved to Nachingwea. Owino purchased a 4-ton lorry in 1958 and started transporting goods across the region for another Asian trader in Lindi (a contact he met through his Asian “patron”). He quickly accumulated capital and added three vehicles to his fleet within four years. Owino’s patron also provided him with a business connection to a sawmill owner in Mtwara. Owino then began supplying timber in addition to his transport business.

Corporation (NATCO) to his forestry business by offering substantially better pay. Owino successfully challenged his imprisonment and regained his lorries, but they were once again seized and “lent” to the government to assist in the Tanzania-Uganda war effort (1978-80).<sup>352</sup> The government also cracked down on traders and local government officials with the passage of the Economic Sabotage Act (No. 9 of 1983). The act intended to stop hoarding, overpricing, and other types of “economic sabotage.” It gave extensive powers to officials to investigate and detain individuals suspected of black marketing and hoarding. Special tribunals were set up to try offences, but they frequently ignored rules of evidence and denied defendants bail or legal representation.<sup>353</sup> Brennan described the government’s war on “economic saboteurs” in March 1983 as the “darkest moment for Tanzania’s Indian population.”<sup>354</sup> More than half of the 4,216 saboteurs held in prison were South Asians, “charged with hoarding, smuggling, and profiteering.”<sup>355</sup> Two prominent Indian businessmen in Lindi – Dirubhai and Rasall Hussein S. Dhalla – recalled that groups of police (typically seven or ten men) ransacked homes and shops and confiscated items – including watches and tooth brushes – from traders in Lindi, Mtwara, and Newala.<sup>356</sup> Rasall’s home and shop were checked by the police, but he was not arrested like so many others. Rasall recalled that the Indian and African men who were detained stayed in prison for a nearly a year before being

---

<sup>352</sup> Rizzo, “The Groundnut Scheme Revisited,” 165. Rizzo also recounted the life history of Titus Ananstansi Mihimba, who owned three lorries and transported agricultural produce between the 1950s and 1970s. In 1980, the government forced him to join with six other transporters in Nachingwea to form a cooperative. The cooperative went bankrupt and Mihimba was left with nothing but a small farm (167).

<sup>353</sup> Haan, “Transitioning Economies, Cultures, and Woodlands,” 100; and Nagar, “The South Asian Diaspora in Tanzania,” 72.

<sup>354</sup> Brennan, *Taifa*, 199.

<sup>355</sup> *Ibid.*; and Nagar, “The South Asian Diaspora in Tanzania,” 72. The remainder were African public servants.

<sup>356</sup> Interview with Dhirajlal Savailal Amin, 3 October 2015; Rasall Hussein S. Dhalla (Lindi, 2 October 2015). Rasall was born in Newala in January 1939. His parents moved to Tanzania in 1936 and worked in a relative’s store in Newala. Eventually they opened their own shop and purchased goods from Lindi. They eventually began exporting locally-produced cashew nuts to Lindi and returned with consumer products to sell at their store. Rasall’s parents had a total of eleven children (seven girls and four boys). Rasall went to primary school in Newala and secondary school in Lindi. He eventually took over the family business, supporting his siblings through secondary school and university. Rasall relocated the family business to Lindi in 1970. He slowly expanded the business, buying goods from Dar es Salaam. While Rasall stayed in Lindi during the era of nationalization, most of his siblings went overseas. Four siblings currently reside in the U.K., four in Toronto, one in Kenya, and one in Tanzania. Rasall’s son remained in Lindi and manages the family store, while Rasall owns and manages a downtown petrol station.

called before a judge and released. Many of the Indian detainees left Tanzania, and none of them received compensation for the goods taken, which amounted to millions of shillings.<sup>357</sup>

### **Liberalization and the Next Era of Transport in Southern Tanzania**

The 1980s crackdown failed to alleviate scarcities and convinced many Tanzanians that the “black market was better than not having anything.”<sup>358</sup> With the national economy on the brink of collapse, the Tanzanian government repealed the Economic Sabotage Act and took steps towards implementing an IMF structural adjustment program in 1984.<sup>359</sup> Nyerere resigned as president in 1985 and the new president (Ali Hassan Mwinyi) embraced the free market capitalism advocated by the World Bank and IMF.<sup>360</sup> The national economy became export-oriented, businesses were privatized, and controls on prices and production levels were gradually scaled back and/or disbanded.<sup>361</sup> The government’s decision to liberalize the economy in the mid-1980s and 1990s transformed the transportation sector in southern Tanzania yet again. Some African transporters, who had created large, profitable transport firms during the *ujamaa* era, experienced economic decline following liberalization. Dunstan Olotu Zakaria

---

<sup>357</sup> The reason(s) why Rasall and Dirubhai were not targeted by the police and government are unclear. There is no evidence that either man offered bribes to officials. Rasall insisted he was not arrested because he did not participate in black marketing, yet the interview left some room for doubt about the validity of this claim. When discussing the shortages after nationalization, Rasall stated: “We used to buy from nationalized companies. Naturally, when they had losses and they don’t have goods, we also do not have goods. But then we have to manage our business, so we look for those same goods from other places. So even the government when they saw there was shortages, then they started allowing other traders and some people from outside.” When asked if he used the black market to find the goods, he replied that some people used the black market to sell and/or buy goods. A few minutes later, he insisted that he was not arrested because: “I never dealt in black market. I always used to sell properly and buy properly. They came and checked my house and everything and I show everything and then they went away. They did not take us to jail. Those people who were found with goods and some of them said that they had investigated prior to making the crackdown; they knew which traders were doing this black market business. They knew all of them. So, they just went there and took them even if they did not find anything from their house. They just took them. They were on the list. That was a very heart breaking thing you see [...]” He alleged that half the traders in Lindi had no problems with officials, whereas most the traders in Mtwara were arrested. One possible explanation for Rasall and Dirubhai’s protection was their participation in Lindi’s Lion Club. The organization sponsored eye wellness campaigns, blood drives, and similar activities for the benefit of the local community in Lindi. The men’s participation in the club might have reinforced/validated their place as respected members of the community rather than exploitative outsiders.

<sup>358</sup> Nagar, “The South Asian Diaspora in Tanzania,” 72.

<sup>359</sup> Ibid.

<sup>360</sup> Haan, “Transitioning Economies, Cultures, and Woodlands,” 100.

<sup>361</sup> Ibid., 101; and Nagar, “The South Asian Diaspora in Tanzania,” 73.

Masumbuko, for example, explained to Matteo Rizzo that the devaluation of Tanzanian currency between 1983 and 1996 left him unable to purchase new vehicles with foreign currency. He also struggled to keep his fleet operational as the cost of spare parts (largely imported) skyrocketed.<sup>362</sup> Masumbuko's business further suffered against an explosion of transport competition as a myriad of small-scale African owners and operators sought to profit from the collapse of the cooperatives.<sup>363</sup> While some Africans operated 10-15 buses, most only owned one or two vehicles.<sup>364</sup> Former drivers of *Teeteeko* and TZT were among those that bought vehicles and operated successful businesses.<sup>365</sup> For example, former *Teeteeko* driver, Wilium Njaidi, purchased a vehicle and transported cashew nuts from Masasi to Mtwara and maize from Tunduru and Songea to Masasi, Nachingwea, and Newala until 2004.<sup>366</sup> Musa Said Omar hired these independent vehicles as he returned to his inter-regional trade after the collapse of the *ushirika* shops.<sup>367</sup> The prevalence of African drivers gave the impression that road transportation in Southern Tanzania had entered another era; however, many Africans were yet again obtaining credit and motor vehicles from Indian financiers and businessmen. Another former *Teeteeko* driver, Husein Mohamed Mzaina, borrowed two lorries from an Indian creditor in Dar es Salaam in order to start a business transporting produce (coconut, mango, rice, and maize) and passengers across southern Tanzania.<sup>368</sup> Husein paid the creditor TShs. 2,800 per month for a total of TShs. 70,000.

---

<sup>362</sup> Rizzo, "The Groundnut Scheme Revisited," 176-78. For information about Masumbuko, reference footnote 196.

<sup>363</sup> *Ibid.*; interview with Abdalla Issa Naenda (Mitwero, 1 October 2015); and Hamis Mohamed Likokola (Lindi, 29 September 2015). Elders in Lindi recalled several well-known African operators providing passenger transport, including; Mohamed Selemani, Chepe, Said Mbaraka, and Namkumba.

<sup>364</sup> Interview with Rasall Hussein Dhalla (Lindi, 2 October 2015).

<sup>365</sup> Interview with Husein Mohamed Mzaina (Lindi, 28 September 2015); Rasall Hussein S. Dhalla (Lindi, 2 October 2015); and Wilium Njaidi (Masasi, 8 October 2015); and Omari Issa Chiluma (Mtwara, 15 October 2015).

<sup>366</sup> Interview with Wilium Njaidi (Masasi, 8 October 2015).

<sup>367</sup> Interview with Musa Said Omar (Mitwero, 5 October 2015). He stopped trading in 1992 due to an eye disease. He continues to work his twenty acres of cashew nuts.

<sup>368</sup> Interview with Husein Mohamed Mzaina (Lindi, 28 September 2015). He put a radio in the vehicle to attract customers with music. He also painted various slogans on his vehicles, including: "Tuswali kabla ya kuswalia," "Sauti ya dume chuma tu," "Mwislam nenda msikitini," and "Mkristu nenda kanisani." Omari Issa Chiluma was another driver turned entrepreneur. He purchased a vehicle and profited by renting it to local farmers.





**Figure 5.8 Pictures of one of Husein Mohamed Mzaina's vehicles and his radio/cassette player. During the interview, Bwana Mzaina played two of the cassettes he used to draw public attention.**<sup>369</sup>

James Brennan argued that many of the Indian traders who remained in Tanzania after nationalization had positioned themselves to take advantage of the liberalized economy:

Those Indian traders who remained, however, profited from numerous gray or black-market opportunities, and found themselves ideally placed to take advantage of liberalization policies initiated in the mid-1980s. Urban wealth would be rebuilt within parallel informal markets by an even more wary and cosmopolitan Indian commercial community.<sup>370</sup>

While the Asian community amounted to less than 100 in Lindi town after the 1970s, those Indian business owners who stayed behind emerged from the economic crisis with their businesses largely intact. They quickly rebuilt their credit in order to invest in a plethora of new economic endeavors. Rasall, for example, utilized the profits from his wholesale business in downtown Lindi to purchase a downtown

<sup>369</sup> Pictures taken by the author, 28 September 2015.

<sup>370</sup> Brennan, *Taifa*, 194.

petrol station in 1989 (where you can still find him at work).<sup>371</sup> In contrast, many small-scale African vehicle owners or their children (who inherited the businesses) became overwhelmed by the financial responsibilities of operating a private transportation business.<sup>372</sup> As the supply of vehicles began to exceed demand, men like Juma Hemed Alli were unable to run a profitable business and sold their vehicles.<sup>373</sup> Many men retired to a life of farming after decades as drivers. Additional research is needed to determine the extent to which the road transportation sector in the southern Tanzania has been controlled by African or Indian creditors and businessmen since the government liberalized the economy in the 1980s. More research is also needed into the role that international financial organizations and construction companies fulfilled in the planning, funding, and execution of road construction projects across southern Tanzania and the nation following liberalization – such as the Mkapa Bridge between Lindi and Dar es Salaam during the 1990s.

## Conclusion

The postcolonial era of the 1960s to the mid-1980s was yet another period of intense instability, conflict, and opportunity in southern Tanzania. The implementation of *ujamaa*, villagization, and neighboring liberation movements had ambiguous impacts on the region's physical and socioeconomic landscape. Intensified import-export relations with Zambia had the opportunity to generate an economic boom for Mtwara. The government invested in improving the Mtwara-Songea main road and upgraded the Mtwara airport to an international standard in order to assist with the air lift of Zambian copper. The airport, however, was never used for this purpose and Hofmeier recognized in 1967 that there was "little

---

<sup>371</sup> Interview with Rasall Hussein Dhalla (Lindi, 2 October 2015).

<sup>372</sup> *Ibid.*; and Husein Mohamed Mzaina (Lindi, 28 September 2015). Husein stopped driving in the 1980s due to unexplained financial difficulties and rising government taxes. He went back to work on his *shamba* and currently resides in Lindi town.

<sup>373</sup> Interview with Juma Hemed Alli (Mtwara, 13 October 2015). Juma argued that owning a vehicle no longer guaranteed profits. He explained that the numerous overseas contractors currently working and residing in Mtwara for natural gas production operations typically brings their own vehicles. Juma also complained about dishonesty among young employees, who were inclined to steal. He argued that in the past, a person could leave a broken-down vehicle to get spares and the vehicle would still be there when he returned. That dynamic no longer exists.

chance of it being used for any international traffic in the foreseeable future.”<sup>374</sup> The government instead invested millions into an oil pipeline, bitumen road, and railway from Zambia to Dar es Salaam – bypassing the southern region entirely.<sup>375</sup> The impact of the war in Mozambique on southern Tanzania was similarly ambiguous. Joanna Tague argued that Mozambican refugees played a critical role in nation-building operations in southern Tanzania. Refugees physically transformed the region’s landscape – improving the social, economic, and health care infrastructure by building roads, school, clinics, farms, and cooperatives.<sup>376</sup> The state’s response to the refugees, meanwhile, shaped its conceptions and application of socialist rural development.<sup>377</sup> The war also gave the borderland region renewed strategic importance as the site where the new national government would defend its sovereignty and fulfill its promise of anti-colonialism. Investments in the region’s infrastructure to facilitate the movement of troops, weapons, and supplies abated once the war ended. Perhaps the war’s greatest impact in southern Tanzania was that it created a climate of insecurity that allowed the central state to enforce villagization on an unprecedented scale. The impact of villagization, however, was also ambivalent. Lal argued that while some southern Tanzanians experienced *ujamaa* and villagization “as a form of dislocation and loss,” others “seized it as an opportunity for accumulating status, wealth, and personal security”.<sup>378</sup> Villagization provided some individuals with proximity to state services, access to power, new independence from “generational hierarchies,” and “augmented forms of mutual assistance and sociability”.<sup>379</sup> Individuals and communities, however, also suffered from a lack of access to their private farms, conflict and corruption, loss of status, and land ownership disputes.<sup>380</sup> In the end, many simultaneously viewed *ujamaa* and villagization from negative and positive perspectives – as an experience of disruption and opportunity. Lal concluded that,

---

<sup>374</sup> Hofmeier, *Transport and Economic Development in Tanzania*, 45.

<sup>375</sup> *Ibid.*, 82-83; Liebenow, *Colonial Rule and Political Development in Tanzania*, 289; and Monson, *Africa’s Freedom Railway*, 1-2.

<sup>376</sup> Tague, “A War to Build the Nation,” 3.

<sup>377</sup> *Ibid.*, 3.

<sup>378</sup> Lal, *African Socialism in Postcolonial Tanzania*, 177.

<sup>379</sup> *Ibid.*, 225.

<sup>380</sup> *Ibid.*

[...] the villagization process exhibited continuities with as much as ruptures from the longer life histories of elderly men and women in the Mtwara countryside, which were marked by repeated adjustments to both gradual and sudden changes throughout the region.<sup>381</sup>

Southern Tanzania ultimately emerged from the wars, socialist development schemes, and economic woes of the 1960s-1980s with its stigma as an underdeveloped, backward, and isolated periphery still intact. Southern Tanzanians and outsiders continued to associate the region's inadequate transportation infrastructure – particularly the Dar es Salaam-Lindi road – with the region's peripheralization and impoverishment in relation to the rest of the nation. Despite a TShs. 150 million loan from Japan in 1980 for construction of an all-weather road from Mtwara to Dar es Salaam, the road remained incomplete and closed annually during the 1990s. Frequent mechanical breakdowns, shortages of equipment, “dubious” contractors, adverse climatic and geographic conditions, high costs, and inadequate funding undermined road construction and maintenance as it had throughout the colonial era.<sup>382</sup> Pekka Seppälä argued that the Tanzanian state and “northerners” often interpreted inadequate road communications in the south as a sign of the region's lack of modernity:

Those who are cut off physically are also perceived to be cut off from the strivings towards change. The simple question of isolation expressed by the lack of a road appears also as a constitutive element of a cultural relationship where the centre is differentiated from the periphery; modern people are distinguished from traditional people; and active people are differentiated from passive.<sup>383</sup>

The lack of all-weather access to the rest of the nation reinforced perceptions of southern Tanzanians as “others” and the “mythology of Mtwara as a stagnant, isolated periphery” among local citizens and outsiders well into the 2000s.<sup>384</sup>

Southern Tanzania's roads not only tell the story of state neglect and the region's peripheralization, but also the dynamism of Indian and African entrepreneurs living, working, and moving across the peripheral region. The postcolonial era brought opportunities and perils for Indians and

---

<sup>381</sup> Ibid.

<sup>382</sup> Mesaki and Mwankusye, “The Sage of the Lindi-Kibiti Road,” 58-74.

<sup>383</sup> Pekka Seppälä, “Introduction,” *The Making of a Periphery: Economic Development and Cultural Encounters in Southern Tanzania*, edited by Pekka Seppälä and Bertha Koda (Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 1998), 7-37: 11. Seppälä referred to “northerners” as those living in Dar es Salaam and Europe.

<sup>384</sup> Lal, “Between the Village and the World,” 211.

Africans involved in southern Tanzania's road transportation service sector. Led by Dhirajlal Savailal Amin, *Teeteeko* helped pioneer inter-regional automotive transport in southern Tanzania during the twentieth century. For decades, it was the only large company providing relatively cheap and reliable passenger transport to the major southern towns and Dar es Salaam. It also transported thousands of tons of produce from villages to go-downs and markets in major towns and coastal ports.<sup>385</sup> In addition to pioneering the expansion of large-scale, commercial road transport in the south, *Teeteeko* supported a generation of African drivers and mechanics. *Teeteeko* and the rest of the Indian transportation sector utilized their control over motor vehicles in the south to try to negotiate a place of belonging within postcolonial Tanzania. Despite their efforts to align their business interests with the international and domestic interests of the Tanzanian government, the Indian transportation sector failed to defend itself against a highly interventionist postcolonial state that increasingly perceived Asians as exploitative outsiders who threatened to undermine that state's visions of a socialist Tanzania. African drivers and mechanics utilized their technological knowledge and networks of reciprocity to survive and prosper during the turbulent era of state-controlled transport and nation-wide economic crisis that followed in the 1970s and 1980s. Many of these men went on to fill the void created in the transportation sector when the cooperatives collapsed in the 1980s, operating countless private, small-scale, cargo and passenger transportation enterprises across southern Tanzania. These drivers also passed their skills on to the next generation, teaching relatives and turn-boys – male and female – how to drive and maintain vehicles.<sup>386</sup>

Most elders agreed that road transportation improved after the collapse of *Teeteeko* and the cooperatives because more employment opportunities emerged for drivers, while passengers and

---

<sup>385</sup> Interview with Selemani Rashid Ngozi (Lindi, 25 September 2015); Husein Mohamed Mzaina (Lindi, 28 September 2015); Hamis Mohamed Likokola (Lindi, 29 September 2015); Saidi A. Mtutile (Lindi, 29 September 2015); Wilium Njaidi (Masasi, 8 October 2015); Athomani Wadi Mlaponi (Masasi, 8 October 2015); and Mohamed Saidi Msusa (Mtwara, 14 October 2015).

<sup>386</sup> Interview with Dadi Mkonyoka Yusufu (17 September 2015); Husein Mohamed Mzaina (Lindi, 28 September 2015); Athomani Wadi Mlaponi (Masasi, 8 October 2015); and Mohamed Saidi Msusa (Mtwara, 14 October 2015). These men taught their sons how to drive. Those sons, in turn, taught relatives and others outside of the family. Some drivers also taught their daughters. The wife of Mussa Aidhamel Salum learned how to drive from her first husband, but she stopped driving after an accident. Joshua Grace discussed the experiences of female drivers after independence in his dissertation, "Modernization *Bubu*," 174-86.

producers had more transportation service options.<sup>387</sup> A vast variety of private buses, lorries, *piki-pikis*, *boda-bodas*, and other automobiles exist in the major towns of southern Tanzania today. With few records available, *Teeteeko* survives in the memory of a dwindling generation of employees and passengers. During our first interview, Dirubhai shared his surprise at learning that someone wished to speak to him about *Teeteeko*: “I was amazed. Who is that at this hour remembering this company?” Dirubhai never returned to the transportation sector after he lost *Teeteeko* in the 1970s. He instead concentrated on his plantation, transforming the land from sisal, to timber, and finally cashew nut production.<sup>388</sup> One wonders why Dirubhai remained in Tanzania. All but one of his children reside in the U.K. and America, and his life is not necessarily easy in Tanzania. Every two years he spends over \$3,000 to renew his residency permit, and the government continues to buy out his land piece by piece. Yet, Dirubhai has no thoughts of leaving. Whether people remember him or not, Dirubhai helped build the southern region and larger nation over the past sixty years. He sees Tanzania as his home – for better or worse.

---

<sup>387</sup> Interview with Rukia A. Mrope (Lindi, 15 September 2015); Selemani Rashid Ngozi (Lindi, 25 September 2015); Husein Mohamed Mzaina (Lindi, 28 September 2015); Hamis Mohamed Likokola (Lindi, 29 September 2015); and Juma Hemed Alli (Mtwara, 13 October 2015). Selemani noted that the new transporters were not as reliable as *Teeteeko*. Passengers had to wait longer for vehicles, which did not always adhere to set time tables. They also complained that buses would not transport passengers unless they could pay the fare up front.

<sup>388</sup> When the sisal industry collapsed, Dirubhai concentrated on timber operations. He used the sisal equipment on his plantation to cut blackwood. It was exported overseas to Germany, France, and Britain where it was used for musical instruments. His sons continued the business from Dar es Salaam and London, trading with buyers in China and Japan. Dirubhai, meanwhile, concentrated on cashew nut cultivation.

## Conclusion

My fieldwork ended similarly to how it began with two long bus trips west from Masasi to Songea (461 km) and then north-east from Songea to Dar es Salaam (940 km). My journey to Songea in October 2015 could not have been more different than the one from Dar es Salaam to Lindi described in the introduction. In comparison to the large bus liners found in Dar es Salaam, the small bus I boarded in Masasi had no undercarriage for cargo, reclining seats, DVD player, or air conditioning. Whatever could not fit in the upper storage rack was shoved under the seat. With my knees pressed firmly against the seat before me, the bus disembarked Masasi station at six in the morning. Within thirty minutes of leaving the town, the bus diverted from the main road onto an extremely bumpy frontage road. It would not reencounter a tarmacked road for another 15 ½ hours when it finally reached the outskirts of Songea town. Travelling no faster than 20-30 mph, the conditions of the road became so poor at times that I felt I was breaking into seizures or preparing to explode from a rocket. The incessant rattling of my open window nearly drove me mad, but the intense heat prevented me from closing it. My only attempts to close the window came when large construction trucks barreled past, pouring dust throughout the bus's compartment. My efforts failed and by the end of the journey, my skin and clothes were covered in an inch thick layer of dirt. There was no space to spread out as my bench – designed for two bodies – accommodated three. I could not complain about the cramped quarters for at least I was sitting. Village after village, people crammed aboard and stood for hours – trying to keep their balance and ignore the oppressive heat. The brief lunch break at Tunduru at 1:00 pm provided much relief for all the passengers.

My own emotions fluctuated from denial (the road could not be like this the whole way), to disbelief, anger (how could the road be this bad in the current day), and grudging acceptance (this is how it is – deal with it). Passengers explained to me that these conditions were not so bad; try coming during the rainy season when the roads and bridges were washed out. It was not until 3:00 pm (seven hours in and nearly eight hours to go) that my frustrations turned to respect. Respect for the drivers and passengers who made this journey day after day in order to make a living. Respect for the drivers and passengers who came before them – who struggled upon worse road conditions from the 1920s to the 1960s. Respect for

the construction crews led by Chinese contractors and supervisors who were working on the roads as we drove by. They were trying to bring hundreds of miles of road to an all-weather, bitumen standard in the face of adverse terrain and climatic conditions – a feat that had not been accomplished in over hundred years and which could bring immense improvements to the southern economy and social networks. While bumping along the Masasi-Songea road, I again encountered the parallel narratives of road transportation in southern Tanzania – one of a region’s peripheralization and impoverishment, and the other of local initiative and optimism for a better future.

During the past decade, local populations in southern Tanzania have continued to express conflicting feelings of frustration, resentment, and optimism when contemplating the region’s existing conditions and future prospective for economic growth. In 2013, domestic and international news agencies reported on violent “gas riots” in Mtwara. The first protests occurred in January in response to the Tanzanian government’s plans to construct a 310-mile gas pipeline from Mtwara’s off-shore, nature-gas concession to Dar es Salaam.<sup>1</sup> A gas processing plant would also be constructed in Dar es Salaam. A meager portion of the project’s total income (0.3%) would be allocated to Mtwara. While the government struggled to justify the allocation amount, it insisted that Dar es Salaam had the requisite facilities “to convert gas to electricity and upload it to the national power grid.”<sup>2</sup> While protests occurred in Mtwara, a delegation (the “Mtwara Elders”) traveled to Dodoma to “publicly demand that the gas be processed and converted within Mtwara.”<sup>3</sup> Mass demonstrations resumed in May after the Tanzanian Parliament published its budget confirming construction plans for the Mtwara-Dar es Salaam pipeline.<sup>4</sup> The violent demonstrations that gripped Mtwara town in January and May resulted in the burning, stoning, and

---

<sup>1</sup> “Protests Over Mtwara Gas Pipeline Leave Four Dead, 12 Injured,” *Africa News Service*, January 29, 2013, accessed June 2015, <http://ic.galegroup.com.ezproxy.lib.uh.edu>; and Kilasa Mtambalike, “Mtwara Protests Cause Sh1.5 Billion Loss,” *Africa News Service*, January 31, 2013, accessed June 2015, <http://ic.galegroup.com.ezproxy.lib.uh.edu>; and “Tanzania Mtwara gas riots: 'Pregnant woman killed,’” *BBC: Africa*, May 24, 2013, accessed January 2015, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-22652809>.

<sup>2</sup> Priya Lal, *African Socialism in Postcolonial Tanzania: Between the Village and the World* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015).

<sup>3</sup> Lal, *African Socialism in Postcolonial Tanzania*, 228.

<sup>4</sup> “Tanzania Mtwara gas riots: 'Pregnant woman killed,’” *BBC: Africa*, May 24, 2013, accessed January 2015, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-22652809>.



vandalization of shops, government buildings, automobiles, and the houses of prominent politicians and journalists.<sup>5</sup> The May protestors also reportedly blockaded and damaged the Mikindani Bridge into Mtwara and turned against journalists, who they believed failed “to properly report their grievances” and “sabotage[ed] the interests of Mtwara residents.”<sup>6</sup> Riot police used tear gas and live ammunition to disperse demonstrators.<sup>7</sup> An unknown number of citizens and police were injured and killed in the unrest and door-to-door searches that the Tanzania People’s Defence Force conducted in the aftermath of the May demonstrations.<sup>8</sup> Schools and businesses were closed for multiple days, and some residents reportedly fled the town.<sup>9</sup> These protests did not dissuade the government’s construction plans, and the pipeline was completed in early 2015.

In the immediate aftermath of the May violence, there was some speculation that “foreign forces” might have been behind the unrest – intending to thwart the Chinese-financed pipeline scheme.<sup>10</sup> Resistance to the pipeline and the government’s development plans, however, had deep historical roots. Priya Lal insisted that “the turmoil in Mtwara brought older and deeper questions about citizenship and development to the surface of national politics”.<sup>11</sup> The central state argued that Mtwara residents were being selfish by putting their interests and those of the region above the needs and prosperity of the

---

<sup>5</sup> Mtambalike, “Mtwara Protests Cause Sh1.5 Billion Loss”; and “Tanzania Mtwara gas riots.”

<sup>6</sup> Abdallah Bakari and Samuel Kamndaya, “Chaos hits Mtwara after gas project confirmed,” *The Citizen*, May 22, 2013, accessed June 2015, <http://www.thecitizen.co.tz/News/national/-/1840392/1860180/-/11wdmm0z/-/index.html>.

<sup>7</sup> “Tanzanian Police Arrest 90 in Mtwara Over Gas Pipeline Protests,” *Africa News Service*, May 27, 2013, accessed June 2105, <http://ic.galegroup.com.ezproxy.lib.uh.edu>; and Bakari and Kamndaya, “Chaos hits Mtwara after gas project confirmed.”

<sup>8</sup> African News Service reported that four people died and twenty-six were injured in the January protests. Damages from the protests were estimated to cost over TShs 1.5 billion. A pregnant woman was shot dead when security forces conducted house searches for people suspected of partaking in the May riots and clashes with police. At least 90 people were arrested in the aftermath. See Mtambalike, “Mtwara Protests Cause Sh1.5 Billion Loss”; “Tanzania Mtwara gas riots”; and “Why Mtwara violence is beyond gas pipeline,” *The Citizen*, May 23, 2013, accessed June 2015, <http://www.thecitizen.co.tz/News/national/Why-Mtwara--violence-is-beyond-gas-pipeline/-/1840392/1861170/-/86en1qz/-/index.html>; and “Tanzanian Police Arrest 90 in Mtwara Over Gas Pipeline Protests.”

<sup>9</sup> Abdallah Bakari and Samuel Kamndaya, “Chaos hits Mtwara after gas project confirmed,”

<sup>10</sup> “Why Mtwara violence is beyond gas pipeline,” *The Citizen*, May 23, 2013, accessed June 2015, <http://www.thecitizen.co.tz/News/national/Why-Mtwara--violence-is-beyond-gas-pipeline/-/1840392/1861170/-/86en1qz/-/index.html>. The pipeline project alone was estimated to cost the \$1.22 billion. It was chiefly financed with a Chinese loan of \$39.4 million and grants from the World Bank and African Development Bank.

<sup>11</sup> Lal, *African Socialism in Postcolonial Tanzania*, 228.

nation. President Jakaya Kikwete insisted that Mtwara's natural-gas resources belonged to the entire country, not just southern Tanzania.<sup>12</sup> Residents in Mtwara, however, wanted a local processing plant because it would have stimulated new jobs, increased trade, and improved transportation and electrical infrastructure. Improved infrastructure would have encouraged additional private investment in the south. Southern Tanzanians perceived the government's decision as further evidence of their second-class citizenship within an impoverished and neglected region. While some of the elders that I interviewed in Lindi in 2015 harbored similar negative perceptions of the state and its lack of support for the south, many unexpectedly expressed optimism for southern Tanzania's economic future. These elders associated the completion of the all-weather, tarmacked road from Lindi to Dar es Salaam as proof of the town's and region's prosperous future. Men and women could now comfortably, safely, and reliably travel to and from Dar es Salaam in a day.<sup>13</sup> Cultivators and traders could sell perishable produce (like tomatoes and mangos) at the highest price in Dar es Salaam without fear of it rotting in-transit as was common in previous years when trips were delayed two or three days.<sup>14</sup> Lindi residents also gained improved access to goods from Dar es Salaam and neighboring districts thanks to the improved road networks.<sup>15</sup> The discovery of off-shore, natural-gas north of Lindi town also provided impetus for much of the elders' optimism. The perspective of oil production already attracted new businesses and stimulated building construction in 2015 – all of which generated new employment opportunities.<sup>16</sup> Government plans to

---

<sup>12</sup> Mtambalike, "Mtwara Protests Cause Sh1.5 Billion Loss"; and "Tanzania Mtwara gas riots"; and "Tanzanian Police Arrest 90 in Mtwara Over Gas Pipeline Protests."

<sup>13</sup> Interview with Rukia A. Mrope (Lindi, 15 September 2015); Dadi Mkonyoka Yusufu (Lindi, 17 September 2015); Saidi A. Mtutile (Lindi, 29 September 2015); and Abdalla Issa Naenda (Mitwero, Lindi, 1 October 2015).

<sup>14</sup> Interview with Dadi Mkonyoka Yusufu (Lindi, 17 September 2015); Mussa Aidhamel Salum (Lindi, 18 September 2015); Juma Said Aly (Lindi, 19 September 2015); Saidi A. Mtutile (Lindi, 29 September 2015); Mohamed Hassan Mkandinga (Lindi, 1 October 2015); and Musa Said Omar (Mitwero, Lindi, 5 October 2015).

<sup>15</sup> Interview with Dadi Mkonyoka Yusufu (Lindi, 17 September 2015); and Rukia A. Mrope, Lindi, 15 September 2015). Mrs. Mrope noted that Lindi residents had improved access to meat in part to the better road.

<sup>16</sup> Interview with Dadi Mkonyoka Yusufu (Lindi, 17 September 2015); Musa Said Omar (Mitwero, Lindi, 5 October 2015); and Rasall Hussein S. Dhalla (Lindi, 2 October 2015).

revive Lindi port were underway, and there were suggestions that the southern railway and Lindi airport would be reconstructed in the coming years.<sup>17</sup>



**Figure 6.1 Construction Progress on Lindi Port, September 2015<sup>18</sup>**

When asked of Lindi's future prospective, Dirubhai confidently stated "very bright. Very bright."<sup>19</sup> Such enthusiasm, however, sharply contrasted with the sentiments expressed by international petroleum workers in Mtwara. They explained that oil exploration and production firms were drastically scaling back their operations (in Mtwara and abroad) due to the collapse of global oil prices in 2015-2016. It was unlikely that construction of oil production and distribution facilities in Lindi would begin in the near future. I was left to wonder whether southern Tanzanians would once again have to endure the disappointments of unrealized hopes and unfulfilled state promises in the years to come.

When contemplating the fluctuating fortunes of southern Tanzania and the larger Ruvuma borderland region during the past three centuries, this dissertation argued that the region's real and

<sup>17</sup> Interview with Dhirajlal Savailal Amin (Mkwya, 3 October 2015); and Mohamed Hassan Mkandanga (Lindi, 1 October 2015). Dirubhai believed that if the railway scheme was enacted it would be "a tremendous job for them to complete that project." He noted that the government had not completed any work beyond a survey.

<sup>18</sup> Photograph taken by the author.

<sup>19</sup> Interview with Dhirajlal Savailal Amin (Mkwya, 17 September 2015).

perceived peripheralization began as a consequence of colonial warfare in the early 20<sup>th</sup> century. Prior to the imposition of German and Portuguese colonialism, southern Tanzania and northern Mozambique formed a dynamic and thriving frontier region where a variety of ethnolinguistic groups migrated and interacted through local and long-distance trade networks. Gold, slaves, and ivory exports transformed Kilwa and Lindi into two of the most prosperous ports along the East African coast at various times during the precolonial era (14<sup>th</sup>-19<sup>th</sup> century). International trade attracted European explorers and missionaries to the Ruvuma region in the nineteenth century. Through their expeditions and interactions with local populations, Europeans reimagined the region's landscape and aimed to replace long-distance slave caravans with "modern" railways and roads that would transport lucrative cash crops and minerals to coastal ports and international markets. Pro-Christian, pro-European "big men" and "sultans" would ensure the success of a monetized colonial economy and enforce law and order by serving as colonial administrators.

Europeans, however, lacked the resources to make their "development" visions a reality during the initial decades of colonial rule. German and Portuguese authority failed to penetrate the interior of southern German East Africa (GEA) and northern Portuguese East Africa (PEA). The Ruvuma borderland remained a dynamic frontier where local leaders, traders, and ordinary individuals exploited the two colonial systems; taking advantage of competitive markets and utilizing alliances with Europeans to strengthen their authority within existing political and economic power structures. Indian merchants and investors also profited as colonial intermediaries, while gradually expanding their commercial networks between the interior, coast, and international markets. The Maji Maji uprising and Portuguese "pacification" campaigns during the first decade of the 1900s brought significant changes to the socioeconomic, political, and physical landscape of the Ruvuma borderland. With the exception of the Mueda Plateau, most African women and men residing in northern PEA were brought under the authority of the highly exploitative Nyassa Company regime. In an effort to maximize profits and minimize costs, the company made little-to-no effort to construct new transportation infrastructure, build hospitals, and improve transportation, education, and health infrastructure or social services. The company abandoned

its large-scale agricultural “development” schemes and reconceived northern PEA as an unprofitable periphery and labor reservoir for South African and Rhodesian mines and local plantations. Across the border, the political and economic networks that sustained the Kilwa trade corridor collapsed in the aftermath of the Maji Maji rebellion. German retaliation against rebellious local leaders and the Ngoni in Songea left regional power structures and patronage networks in shambles. Traders and plantation owners also suffered financial ruin as their goods and crops were destroyed or looted. The collapse of the ivory, slave, and rubber trade and the lack of a fertile hinterland for cash crop production prevented Kilwa’s economic revival. As a consequence of the rebellion, the German administration increasingly pushed the south to the periphery. They retracted funding for a planned railway, believing it unwise to invest in such an “unruly” region. The Maji Maji rebellion, however, did not guarantee southern GEA’s peripheralization and impoverishment. Unlike their Portuguese counterparts, Europeans in the south remained committed to transforming the region into a lucrative agricultural landscape. They applied political pressure and personal funds to construct a “modern” transportation infrastructure of engineered roads and railways that linked the interior to the coast. Local inhabitants of the Ruvuma borderland, meanwhile, responded to colonial violence and instability by migrating to more secure areas of the borderland or immigrating out of the region – as they had in the century preceding. Trade routes were reoriented towards Lindi, which grew in economic importance as a major exporter of agricultural produce. Local leaders entered into mutually advantageous alliances with German authorities so as to take full advantage of the political and economic opportunities created in the aftermath of the rebellion.

The First World War brought an unprecedented level of devastation and instability to the Ruvuma borderland. Unlike the slave raiding parties of the nineteenth century and small colonial expeditionary forces of the 1890s-1900s, the large German and Allied forces lingered in the borderland for months and years with no aim beyond the defeat of their enemy. Using modern weaponry and scorched earth tactics, the colonial armies destroyed the resources they could not consume. Few areas of the Ruvuma borderland were spared from colonial raids, and several were repeatedly plundered. The region’s productivity further declined as the Allies and Germans forcefully conscripted the male population as soldiers, carriers, and

laborers. Local women, children, and elders struggled to meet their basic subsistence needs in the wake of the violence, destruction, and encroachment of wildlife. Existing trade networks and power structures crumbled. Local leaders struggled to maintain their large followings (the foundation of their power) and build alliances with competing German, British, and Portuguese forces. Impoverishment and famine defined the Ruvuma borderland in the aftermath of the war.

The Nyassa Company responded to the wartime devastation by continuing their exploitative labor and taxation practices and refusing to invest in the region's economic, transportation, education, and health infrastructure during the interwar era. The British tried to transform the socioeconomic landscape of the newly Mandated Territory of Tanganyika by creating Native Authorities organized along "tribal" affiliations and under the authority of "traditional" leaders. The territorial economy fixated on the exportation of high-value agricultural produce within imperial markets. Southern Tanganyika, however, lacked the manpower, environmental conditions, and transportation infrastructure to produce and export large quantities of cash crops in comparison to their northern neighbors along the Tanga and Central Railways. The southern provincial administration could not force locals to produce cash crops out of fear that such policies would aggravate existing famine conditions, whose alleviation cost the government thousands of pounds. Administrators also struggled to prevent the annual migration of thousands of male laborers, who sought wage employment on sisal plantations along the southern coast and to the north in order to pay colonial taxes and purchase imported commodities. Although southern Tanganyika arose as the "Granary of the Territory" during the interwar era, its southern ports slid into obscurity within imperial markets. Felicitas Becker argued,

At the core of the economic decline of Southeast Tanzania lay the simple fact that sesame and millet were not as profitable as slaves and ivory had been; and the harbours of the area more marginal to the transport networks of the twentieth than to the Indian Ocean trade of the preceding centuries.<sup>20</sup>

The central administration in Dar es Salaam and private businesses had few economic incentives to invest in southern Tanganyika; rather, they prioritized those regions that seemed to promise the quickest and

---

<sup>20</sup> Felicitas Becker, "A social history of Southeast Tanzania, ca. 1890-1950" (PhD diss., University of Cambridge, 2011), 322.

most profitable returns on investment, specifically the cash crop producing regions along the railways. The dilapidated roads of the Southern Province not only served as a powerful symbol of the region's isolation and poverty, but also an important justification for the state's neglectfulness.

Southern Tanganyika experienced a brief reversal of fortunes after the Second World War as it became the central target for the East African Groundnut Scheme. Despite a massive infusion of money and manpower, the scheme collapsed within five years. Its failure was partially a result of the inability of government officials and development planners to properly identify the transportation needs of the region and implement a construction program that could overcome the soil and climate conditions that inhibited infrastructure improvements for the past forty years. The British Treasury, Overseas Food Corporation, and Tanganyika government reached a tripartite agreement that allowed for the completion of the new Southern Province Railway and Mtwara Port after the Groundnut Scheme was abandoned. Their decision was no longer driven by the hopes of major economic profits (considering that southern Tanganyika's only promising export at the time was cashew nuts). Rather, the British hoped to save face within the international community, which had suspected that postwar colonial development was a misnomer for colonial exploitation. In the final decade of colonial rule, the railway's deficit grew annually and the Public Works Department made limited improvements to the regional road infrastructure without adequate funds, equipment, and manual labor. The vast majority of the Lindi-Songea road remained dirt surfaced and susceptible to climatic conditions. The Dar es Salaam-Lindi road and most of the rest of the southern road infrastructure closed annually for five to six months during the rains, thus isolating countless villages, towns, and the entire province from regional, territorial, and global markets.

Southern Tanzania's inadequate transportation infrastructure continued to serve as a symbol, symptom, and justification for the region's isolation and impoverishment throughout the postcolonial era. The Tanzanian government abandoned the southern railway and concentrated on improving the region's road infrastructure as part of their efforts to assist neighboring Mozambique and Zambia. Government investments, however, were short-lived and inadequate to overcome the region's natural obstacles. There was little incentive to continue investing in the southern roads once the war in Mozambique ended and the

movement of troops, weapons, and supplies ceased. The government further neglected the south after it chose to build a multi-million dollar oil pipeline, bitumen road, and railway from Zambia to Dar es Salaam with the help of foreign investors and contractors. Repeated promises by the colonial state to improve the Lindi-Dar es Salaam road to an all-weather standard went unrealized decade after decade. Southern Tanzanians pinpointed their region's inadequate transportation infrastructure as the cause for their economic misfortunes and the main inhibitor to economic improvement. They used poor roads as proof of the south's marginality and government neglect so as to "claim a bigger piece of the proverbial national cake."<sup>21</sup> The region's lack of infrastructure simultaneously served as a justification for the central government and private businesses to invest elsewhere in Tanzania. The poor roads also validated stereotypes first propagated in the colonial era that southern Tanzania was incapable and/or undeserving of "progress" and "modernity." These long-standing stereotypes and local-state tensions underscored the animosity that emerged during the Mtwara riots of 2013.

When examining the history of road transportation in southern Tanzania, however, another narrative exists beyond that of the region's gradual peripheralization and impoverishment. Inhabitants of southern Tanzania and the broader Ruvuma borderland region utilized their mobility as a survival strategy and means of prosperity for centuries. Mobility facilitated trade and social interactions since Ruvuma-Rufiji language communities first began settling across southern Tanzania and northern Mozambique during the second millennium C.E. It enabled populations to relocate in response to famines, droughts, infertile soil, population pressure, warfare, raiding, and undesirable authority. Mobility continued to serve as a crucial strategy during the tumultuous nineteenth century when the region was integrated into global capitalist markets driven by international demands for ivory and slaves and underwritten by Asian creditors and traders. Slave and ivory traders continually reoriented their long-distance caravans towards the most advantageous markets in order to maximize profits. Local communities escaped slave raiding and corresponding famines by relocating to geographical strongholds or the protection offered by strong

---

<sup>21</sup> Priya Lal, "Between the Village and the World: Imagining and Practicing Development in Tanzania, 1964-1975," (PhD diss., New York University, 2011), 213.



local leaders. African “sultanates” and “big men” along the Lindi and Kilwa trade corridors incorporated slaves and refugees to build their power and influence. They also exploited alliances with Asian merchants and European missionaries and explorers, whose perceptions of the borderland were shaped through trade networks and expeditions. Local communities also depended upon their mobility to escape the violence of colonial “pacification” campaigns during the first decade of the twentieth century and the adverse environmental conditions that followed in their wake.

Whereas most southern Tanzanians and northern Mozambicans could not escape the violence of the First World War, they used their mobility to negotiate the instability and opportunities created in the war’s aftermath. Cultivators, traders, migrant laborers, and European hunters exploited the lack of border enforcement along the Ruvuma River to evade colonial policies and exploit competing markets to their advantage. European entrepreneurs, like Carnegie Browne, Gerald Sibold, and L. Rousham Roberts, also took advantage of the weakness of the British southern provincial administration to build successful road construction and maintenance firms during the interwar era. The introduction and expansion of motor vehicle transport during the 1920s and 1930s offered an important tool for local populations to take advantage of what economic opportunities existed within the peripheral borderland and pursue better labor and trade markets beyond it. Indian wholesalers and retailers spearheaded the expansion and success of road transportation in the south as they employed automobiles to expand and strengthen their trade network between the coast, interior towns, and rural communities. African producers and migrant laborers living in proximity to the main and district roads utilized the motor vehicles to pursue socioeconomic opportunities along the coast and northern plantations. Although some individuals and communities associated the southern roads and automobiles with forced labor practices and the loss of migrant laborers’ autonomy, others perceived them as pathways and tools for social and economic advancement. In the postwar era, the highly mobile populace of the Ruvuma borderland exploited the competitive labor and trade market created during the Groundnut Scheme. Increased access to motor vehicle transport via labor recruiters made it easier for workers to travel to the coast to work a few months, pay their taxes, and purchase goods before returning to their farms. A few African entrepreneurs took advantage of inflated

prices to build successful businesses and eventually purchase cars to expand their trade networks. The southern road transportation sector, however, largely rested in Indian hands prior to the 1970s. The failure of the Southern Province Railway coupled with the lack of state-sponsored, road transportation services provided an excellent opportunity for Savailal C. Amin and Dhirajlal Savailal Amin (Dirubhai) to create *the* dominant passenger and cargo transport firm in southern Tanganyika. By the time of Tanganyika's independence in 1961, *Teeteeko* was the only major transportation firm in the south offering government officers, farmers, traders, and migrant laborers reliable road transport across district and provincial borders.

Automotive ownership and knowledge was even more valuable in the postcolonial era. Indian businessmen, like Dirubhai, used their motor vehicles as tools to defend their financial interests and negotiate a new place within a nation that exhibited growing hostility towards its Asian population. By offering their vehicles in support of state cooperatives, anticolonial war efforts, humanitarian relief, and nation-building operations, the Indian population in southern Tanzania tried to prove their value and allegiance to the nation and nation-state. Their efforts ended in failure as their properties were seized and businesses replaced with state-run cooperatives. African men, meanwhile, sought out careers as drivers and mechanics. Working as turn-boys or workshop apprentices not only offered young men the skills and knowledge necessary to acquire high-status, high-paying jobs. Their apprenticeships also served as a rite of passage into manhood. As a driver or mechanic, a young man was able to accumulate the wealth and prestige needed to purchase a home, get married, and provide for his family(ies). By taking on turn-boys and apprentices, drivers and mechanics elevated their professional rank and created networks of reciprocity that they could rely upon in the future. African drivers and mechanics also utilized motor vehicles to challenge colonial racial stereotypes of Africans as mentally inept and “unmodern” – stereotypes that were especially predominate for men from the peripheral south. Drivers and mechanics in southern Tanzania instead forged new identities as “modern” adult men. The knowledge, skills, and networks that they attained during the Indian-dominated transportation era proved extremely valuable during the turbulent economic period of the 1970s and 1980s. When so many people were struggling to

find work and feed their families, drivers and mechanics were typically able to find gainful employment in the government or private sector across the territory. Following the liberalization of the Tanzanian economy in the mid-1980s, many drivers and mechanics utilized their skills and knowledge to build successful, small-scale transportation businesses (often with the backing of Indian creditors). Motor vehicles continue to serve as important tools for traders, laborers, and entrepreneurs pursuing socioeconomic opportunities within and beyond southern Tanzania today.

In the end, roads and motor vehicles are not simply technologies that humans use to move people and goods from one place to another. The physical use of and imagined meanings that we imbue upon roads and automobiles impact human interactions and perceptions of one another and our physical environment. European colonists, for instance, perceived and used automobiles and roads as tools to “civilize” and “modernize” African lands and peoples. Indian and African traders, drivers, mechanics, cultivators, and migrant laborers instead appropriated motor vehicles to contest racial stereotypes and discriminatory social orders while pursuing socioeconomic opportunities. In the case of southern Tanzania, roads became physical manifestations and representations of the region’s impoverishment and peripheralization in the minds of local residents and outsiders from the colonial era to the current day. At the same time, they serve(d) as testaments to the region’s dynamism and local innovation in the face of neglectful or exploitative state authority.

**Road Conditions and Construction Work along the Masasi-Songea Main Road, October 2015<sup>22</sup>**



**Figure 6.2 Lindi-Songea Road entering Masasi, Masasi bus station, and exiting the town**

<sup>22</sup> All of the following photographs were taken by the author.



**Figure 6.3 Construction progress on Masasi-Songea Road (outside Masasi)**





Figure 6.4 Examples of various stages of road construction work on Masasi-Songea Road



**Figure 6.5 Two bridge construction projects along Masasi-Songea Road**






**Figure 6.6 Typical road conditions, Masasi-Songea Road**



**Figure 6.7 Conditions within the bus**





**Figure 6.8 Roadwork at elevation (between Tunduru and Songea)**



**Figure 6.9 Chinese workers' camp (highlands outside of Songea)**



**Figure 6.10** Passengers disembarking before the men pushed the bus back on the road (Songea District)

## Bibliography

### I. Archives and Special Collections

British National Archives, Kew (BNA)

BT 193/43, Port and Dock Conditions and Development Africa: Tanganyika and Kenya, Vol I and II

CAB 45/67, Military East Africa: Lindi Operations (1917 June – September )

CAB 129/23/18, East African Groundnut Scheme

CO 323/1654/82, Tanganyika Territory: Measures taken WWII

CO 525/127/4-6, Nyasaland: Original Correspondence, *Companhia do Nyassa* (Part 1-3)

CO 533/659, Native Labour Conditions in Portuguese African Colonies

CO 534/4200, Transport Colonial Development Corporation Scheme in Southern Tanganyika

CO 691/116/7, Native Unrest: Allegations of Ill-Treatment of Native in Songea District

CO 691/117/9, Alleviation of Famine Distress in Tunduru District

CO 691/133/6, Alleviation of Famine Relief in Lindi Province

CO 691/141/2, Development Scheme: Road Construction and Telegraph Lines Allocated from E.A. Guaranteed Loans

CO 691/147/4, Road Development

CO 691/150/8, German East Africa Settlement, Farm and South Railway Co. Ltd.

CO 691/152/4, Appt. of Committee to Advise on Questions Relating to the Supply and Welfare of Labour, Tanganyika

CO 691/152/10, Survey Scheme for Development of Southern Tanganyika

CO 691/184/6, Compulsory Labour Service

CO 691/184/7, Compulsory Service Reports

CO 691/184/12, Tanganyika Provincial Commissioners Conferences (1940-42)

CO 691/184/13, Tanganyika Provincial Commissioners Conferences (1943)

CO 691/204/4, Groundnut Scheme Policy and Principle

CO 691/208/7, Development in Tanganyika: Southern Province Plan (1950-51)

CO 691/211/1-3, Future of the Overseas Food Corporation and Overseas Food Corporation Policy

CO 691/213/3, Amendment of the Overseas Resources Development Act

CO 691/213/5, Report on the Overseas Food Corporation's East African Groundnut Scheme

CO 691/214/1, Overseas Food Corporation: Development of Agricultural Policy

CO 691/215/8, Colonial Development Corporation

CO 822/130/2, Labour Report by Sir G. Orde-Browne

CO 822/139/1, Port of Mtwara and Hinterland Railway

CO 822/553, Plan and Review of Development in the Southern Province, Tanganyika (1951-1953)

CO 822/975, Plans for the Development of the Southern Province of Tanganyika (1954-56)

CO 822/2063, Governor's Reports, Tanganyika

CO 822/2086, Secretary of State's Annual Report to Parliament, Tanganyika

CO 822/2131, Mozambique African National Union of Tanganyika

CO 822/2573, Development Plan in Tanganyika 1960-1962

CO 822/2877, Border Incidents between Tanganyika and Mozambique

CO 822/2985, U.K. Technical Assistance for Tanganyika After Independence, 1960-1962

CO 852/327/3, Tanganyika Territory, War Trade and Import Requirements of the Colonies

CO 852/1202/6, Tanganyika, Marketing and Oil

CO 859/191/7, Recruitment of Labour Tanganyika

CO 859/195/2, Reports on Groundnut Scheme, Tanganyika

DO 185/15, Reports by British High Commission staff on visits, tours, and safaris to the Mtwara Region of Tanganyika

DSIR 17/130, Road Board Research at National Physical Laboratory

E 384/5, International Road Congress

FO 2/667, Major Spilsbury's Expedition in Portuguese Nyasaland.

FO 367/48, Portugal 1907 (7568 – 42585)

FO 367/291, Portugal 1912 (19,079 - 55,461)

FO 367/344, Portugal 1913 (31737 – 58598)

FO 371/2440, Portugal 1915 (3323-8048)

FO 371/4123, Spain and Portugal 1919 (8375-18217)

FO 371/5491, Portugal 1920 (329-876)

FO 371/7104, Portugal 1921 (386-459)

FO 371/8375, Portugal 1922 (1102-1294)

FO 371/8377, Portugal 1922 (2669-3117)

FO 371/10592, Portugal 1924 (10326-11340)

FO 371/11932, Portugal 1926 (1044-1693)

FO 371/14154, Portugal 1929 (307: papers 5342 - 10576)

FO 371/14155, Portugal 1929 (307: papers 10686-end)

FO 371/15015, Portugal 1930 (67: papers 3250-end)

FO 371/80814, Talks between the Governor of Mozambique and the Tanganyika Government

FO 371/97238, Despatch to Lisbon regarding an incident on the Mozambique-Tanganyika Border

FO 608/216, Peace Conference, British Delegation 1919

FCO 25/270, Mozambique Liberation Movements

FCO 25/286, Political Relations: Tanzania/Mozambique border incidents

FCO 25/293, Political Relations: Tanzania/Mozambique

FCO 31/169, Border Incidents with Mozambique

FCO 141/17722, Tanganyika: Chief Secretary's Monthly Newsletters to Provincial Commissioners

FCO 141/17729, Tanganyika: Southern Province Provincial Commissioner's Monthly Newsletters

FCO 141/17730, Tanganyika: Southern Province: Provincial Commissioner's Monthly Newsletter

FCO 141/17895, Tanganyika; Portugal and its Overseas Territories

MAF 83/1800, East African Groundnut Scheme: Transport Problems and Maps of Lindi Area

MAF 83/1804, East African Groundnut Scheme: Estimate of Traffic on Roads, Ports and Railways in Lindi Province

T 220/413, Overseas Food Corporation Tripartite Agreement (1953)

WO 95/5323, Lindi Force Headquarters and Troops

WO 95/5324, Lindi Force

WO 95/5325, Lindi Force

WO 95/5368, East Africa Lines of Communication

WO 95/5369, East Africa Lines of Communication

WO 95/5376, East Africa Lines of Communication

WO 95/5377, East Africa Lines of Communication

WO 106/580, Portuguese Forces in Mozambique and Portuguese Border Intelligence

WO 157/1152, East Africa, Lindi Force: Intelligence Reports and Information

WO 300/373, East Africa, Military Road Map

## Bodleian Libraries Commonwealth and African Collections, University of Oxford (BLCAS)

754.14 s.5, Tanganyika Public Works Department, Annual Reports, 1925-1953  
 MSS. Afr. s. 101, Sir Philip E. Mitchell  
 MSS. Afr. s. 358-363, J. Ford  
 MSS. Afr. s. 609, Harry Churchill Baxter  
 MSS. Afr. s. 1047, Vickers-Haviland  
 MSS. Afr. s. 1117, Orde-Browne  
 MSS. Afr. s. 1738, Papers relating to the development of Sukumaland, Tanganyika (1900-1984)  
     Box I, Allnutt-Griffiths  
     Box II, Hall-Loosmore  
     Box III, E.K. Lumley  
     Box IV, Lunan-Wright  
 MSS. Afr. s.1751, Sir Reginald E. Robins

## Imperial War Museum (IWM)

Mann (Lt. Col.) Collection  
 Dale C. (Lt.) Collection  
 Powell L.A.W. (Lt.) Collection

## Institute of Civil Engineers, London (ICE)

Institution of Civil Engineers, *Civil Engineering Problems in the Colonies*, 1948-1971  
 Tanganyika Public Works Department, Annual Reports, 1925-1953

## Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. (LOC)

29026, "Guide to The Microfilms of Regional and District Books, Tanganyika."  
*Regional and District Books, Tanganyika Territory*. Microfilm. Dar es Salaam: Tanzanian National Archives, 1965-68.

## Tanzania National Archives, Dar es Salaam (TNA)

## ACC 16: Mtwara

4/3, Lindi-Songea Main Road: Acquisition of Land and New Road Plans  
 4/9, Roads: Closing and Opening of Roads and General Instructions, Volume II  
 4/10, Government Steamer Services (Lindi)  
 4/11, Coastal Shipping Services  
 4/25/4, Tanganyika Transport Co. Limited, Lindi (30.1.54 - 20.9.61)  
 4/36, Masasi-Songea Road Maintenance Contract: Returns of Labourers  
 4/46, Maintenance and Classification of Grade "B" Roads  
 4/47, Main and Grade "A" Roads: Maintenance and Improvements, Volume II  
 13/22, Transport of Recruited Labour and Labour Routes  
 13/25, Annual Labour Reports  
 13/17, Labour Recruiting in Tunduru District  
 13/60, Attestation of Contracts of Service and Contract Labour

## ACC 30: Public Works Department

CT/6, Contracts Lindi Province  
 CT/9, Registration of Contracts Lindi Province

## ACC 460: Ministry of Labour

- 4/25/6, Inspection Report Kikwetu Sisal Estate Ltd.
- 8/94, T.S.G.A. Labour Bureau Recruiting Organisation, Volumes I and II
- 8/98, Recruitment of Labour Balfour Beatty & Co., Ltd.
- 491/Vol. II, Labour Matter Southern Province
- 515/Vol. I-VI, Tanganyika Sisal Growers Association Labour Bureau Recruiting Organisation
- 541/18, Recruitment from Portuguese East Africa and from other Colonies and Territories, Volumes I and II
- 541/19, Migration of Tanganyika Labour to Rhodesia and South Africa, Volume III
- 541/47, Railway Construction Southern Province Labour For
- Labor Officer Inspection Reports Groundnut Scheme Southern Province 1948-52

## ACC 601

- CW 50262, Tanganyika Transport Co. Teeteeko *Ushirika* Vol 2

## F2: Customs and Trade

- 25989, Encouragement of British Motor Manufacturers

## German Colonial Records

- G1/39
- G1/40

## Native Affairs

- |       |       |
|-------|-------|
| 19365 | 38697 |
| 28887 | 39007 |
| 35744 | 39131 |
| 35781 | 41838 |

## United States National Archives, College Park (NACP)

- Records Group 59, A1 (5710), Lot 68D339, Box 1, Tanganyika and Zanzibar (1963-1975), "Trip Report No.4 Southern Safari – September 1966."

## University of Dar es Salaam (DSM)

- Bureau of Resource Assessment and Land Use Planning. "A Guide to Same Data on Road Transport in Tanzania."
- Leslie, S.A.S., J.F.R. Hill, and J.R. Farquharson. "Report of Communications Survey Committee." 1950.
- Tanganyika Territory: Annual Report of the Provincial Commissioners, 1930-1956.

**II. Interviews** (organized by location and date)

## Lindi

- Mohamed Nasoro, 14 September 2015
- Said Mohamed Shahame, 15 September 2015
- Rukia A. Mrope, 15 September 2015
- Dhirajlal Savailal Amin, 17 September 2015 and 3 October 2015 (Mkwaya)
- Shaiba A. Mohammed Buriyani, 16 September 2015 (Mnazi Mmoja)
- Dadi Mkonyoka Yusufu, 17 September 2015
- Mussa Aidhamel Salum, 18 September 2015

Juma Said Alli, 18 and 19 September 2015  
 Selemani Rashid Ngozi, 25 September 2015  
 Husein Mohamed Mzaina, 28 September 2015  
 Hamis Mohamed Likokola, 29 September 2015  
 Saidi A. Mtutile, 29 September 2015  
 Mohamed Hassan Mkandinga, 1 October 2015  
 Abdalla Issa Naenda, 1 October 2015 (Mitwero)  
 Rasall Hussein S. Dhalla, 2 October 2015  
 Musa Said Omar, 5 October 2015 (Mitwero)

#### Masasi

Athomani Wadi Mlaponi, 8 October 2015  
 Wilium Njaidi, 8 October 2015  
 Saidi Malindi, 8 October 2015  
 Denis Lukiano Ching'andilo, 9 October 2015  
 Victor Said and Fatuma Juma Akini, 10 October 2015 (Namatumbusi)

#### Mtwara

Juma Hemed Aly (aka Polo), 13 October 2015  
 Mohamed Saidi Msusa, Mtwara, 14 October 2015  
 Leonard M. Haule, 14 October 2015  
 Omari Issa Chiluma, 15 October 2015  
 Clement K. Njaidi, 15 October 2015

### III. Published Primary Sources

Coupland, R. *The Exploitation of East Africa*. London: Faber and Faber, 1939.

East African Railway and Harbour Administration. *Southern Province Railway Working Party Report*. Dar es Salaam, Government Printer, 1956.

Elton, J. Frederic. "The African Gum Copal." *The Indian Forester: A Quarterly Magazine of Forestry*, Volume 1. Edited by W. Schlich. (July 1875 to April 1876): 36-45.  
<https://books.google.com/books?id=c7VOAAAAMAAJ&pg>.

----- *Travels and Researches among the Lakes and Mountains of Eastern and Central Africa*. Edited by H.B. Cotterill. London: John Murray, 1879.  
<https://archive.org/stream/travelsandrese01fredgoog#page/n8/mode/2up>,

Farquharson, J.R. *Tanganyika Transport A Review*. Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 1945.

Fülleborn, Friedrich. *Das Deutsche Njassa- und Ruwuma-Gebiet, Land und Leute, nebst Bemerkungen über die Schire-Länder*. Berlin: Dietrich Reimer, 1906.  
[https://archive.org/stream/deutschostafrik00stuhgoog/deutschostafrik00stuhgoog\\_djvu.txt](https://archive.org/stream/deutschostafrik00stuhgoog/deutschostafrik00stuhgoog_djvu.txt).

Gulliver, P.H. *Labour Migration in a Rural Economy: A Study of the Ngoni and Ndendeuli of Southern Tanganyika*. Uganda: East African Institute of Social Research, 1955.

Johnston, Alex. "Fresh Fields for African Railways." *Journal of the Royal African Society* 3, no. 11 (April 1904): 271-276.

- Kirk, John. "Ascent of the Rovuma, East Africa." *Proceedings of the Royal Geographical Society of London* 9, no. 6 (1864 - 1865): 284-288.
- , "Notes on Two Expeditions up the Rovuma River, East Africa." *Journal of the Royal Geographical Society of London* 35 (1865): 154-167.
- Leggett, Edward Humphrey Manisty. "The Tanganyika Territory." *Journal of the Royal Society of Arts* 70, no. 3643 (September 1922): 737-752.
- Longland, F. *Field Engineering: A Handbook on Simple Construction*. Second edition. Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 1942.
- Maples, Chauncy. "Masasi and the Rovuma District in East Africa." *Proceedings of the Royal Geographical Society and Monthly Record of Geography*, New Monthly Series 2, no. 6 (June 1880): 337-353.
- , "Makua Land between the Rivers Rovuma and Luli." *Proceedings of the Royal Geographical Society and Monthly Record of Geography*, New Monthly Series 4, no. 2 (Feb. 1882): 79-90.
- "Notes on Railway Construction." *Journal of the Royal African Society* 12, no. 47 (April 1913): 290-95.
- O'Neill, H. E. "Journey in the District West of Cape Delgado Bay, Sept.-Oct. 1882." *Proceedings of the Royal Geographical Society and Monthly Record of Geography*, New Monthly Series 5, no. 7 (July 1883): 393-404.
- , "On the Coast Lands and Some Rivers and Ports of Mozambique." *Proceedings of the Royal Geographical Society and Monthly Record of Geography*, New Monthly Series 4, no. 10 (Oct. 1882): 595-605.
- "Report of the East Africa Commission." London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1925.
- Report to the League of Nations on Tanganyika Territory*. Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 1939.
- Shepperson, George. *David Livingstone and the Rovuma*. Edinburg: Edinburg University Press, 1965.
- Tanganyika. *Report of the Central Development Committee: Roads*. Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 1939.
- , *Report of a Committee appointed to Inquire into the Question of Competition between Road Transport and Railways and the possibility of co-ordinating the various forms of Transport in the Tanganyika Territory*. Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 1937.
- , *Report of a Committee appointed to Inquire into the question of Competition between Road Transport and Railways in the Tanganyika Territory*. Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 1935.
- , *Report of select committee appointed to report on a road to connect Dar es Salaam with the north and central road systems, 1928*. Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 1928.
- Thomson, Joseph. "Notes on the Basin of the River Rovuma, East Africa." *Proceedings of the Royal Geographical Society and Monthly Record of Geography*, New Monthly Series 4, no. 2 (Feb. 1882): 65-79.



Waller, Horace. *The Last Journals of David Livingstone in Central Africa From Eighteen Hundred and Sixty-Five to His Death*. New York: Harper & Brothers, Publishers, 1875.  
<https://archive.org/stream/lastjournalsdav03livigoog#page/n4/mode/2up>.

Weule, Karl. *Native Life in East Africa: The Result of an Ethnological Research Expedition*. Translated by Alice Werner. London: Sire Isaac Pitman & Sons, Ltd., 1909.  
<https://books.google.com/books?id=im4LAQAAIAAJ&pg>

Wood, Alan. *The Groundnut Affair*. London: The Bodley Head, 1950.

#### IV. Newspapers

*Africa News Service*

*BBC: Africa*

*The Citizen*

*The Nationalist*

*The Tanganyika Standard*

#### V. Dissertations and Theses

Becker, Felicitas. "A social history of Southeast Tanzania, ca 1890-1950." PhD diss., Cambridge University, 2002.

Collins, Michael Dale. "Forging a Modern Empire of the Air: Race and Gender in Early British Aeronautics, 1908-1933." PhD diss., University of California Davis, 2014.

Dinani, Husseina. "En-gendering the Postcolony: Women, Citizenship and Development in Tanzania, 1945-1985." PhD diss., Emory University, 2013.

Freed, Libbie J. "Conduits of Culture and Control: Roads, States, and Users in French Central Africa, 1890-1960." PhD diss., University of Wisconsin-Madison, 2006.

Grace, Joshua. "Modernization *Bubu*: Cars, Roads, and the Politics of Development in Tanzania, 1870s-1980s." PhD diss., Michigan State University, 2013.

Haan, Nicholas J. "Transitioning Economies, Cultures, and Woodlands – Cashews and Deforestation in Southeastern Tanzania." PhD diss., Clark University, 2002.

Hart, Jennifer A. "'Suffer to Gain': Citizenship, Accumulation, and Motor Transportation in Late-Colonial and Postcolonial Ghana." PhD diss., Indian University, 2011.

Heiss, Mary Ann. "The United States, Great Britain, and Iranian Oil, 1950-1954." PhD diss., Ohio State University, 1991.

Honey, Martha Spencer. "A History of Indian Merchant Capital and Class Formation in Tanganyika c. 1840-1940." PhD diss., University of Dar es Salaam, 1982.

Kelly, Chau P. Johnsen. "A Tale of Two Cities, Mikindani and Mtwara: Consuming Development in Southeastern Tanganyika, 1910-1960." PhD diss., University of California Davis, 2010.

- Lal, Priya. "Between the Village and the World: Imagining and Practicing Development in Tanzania, 1964-1975." PhD diss., New York University, 2011.
- Miller, Charlotte Lee "Who are the 'permanent inhabitants' of the state?: citizenship policies and border controls in Tanzania, 1920-1980." PhD diss., University of Iowa, 2011.
- Mkama, Jumanne. "Transportation and Economic Development in Tanzania." M.A. Thesis, University of British Columbia, 1968.
- Munyanganizi, Henry Rwamasasa. "Impact of Rural Feeder Roads on Rural Development: A Case Study of Kilosa District." M.S. thesis, University of Dar es Salaam, 1983.
- Panzer, Michael G. "A Nation in Name, A 'State' in Exile: The FRELIMO Proto-State, Youth, Gender, and the Liberation of Mozambique 1962-1975." PhD diss., State University of New York at Albany, 2013.
- Pawlowicz, Matthew Christopher. "Finding Their Place in the Swahili World: An Archaeological Exploration of Southern Tanzania." PhD diss., University of Virginia, 2011.
- Rizzo, Matteo. "The Groundnut Scheme Revisited: Colonial Disaster and African Accumulation in Nachingwea District, Southeastern Tanzania, 1946-67." PhD diss., School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, October 2004.
- Seligman, Andrea. "Encircling Value: Rufiji Ruvuma Communities, Trade, and the Wider East African – Indian Ocean World, c. 0-1700 C.E." PhD diss., Northwestern University, 2014.
- Tague, Joanna. "A War to Build the Nation: Mozambican Refugees, Rural Development, and State Sovereignty in Tanzania, 1964-1975." PhD diss., University of California Davis, 2012.
- Weiskopf, Julie M. "Resettling Buha: A Social History of Resettled Communities in Kigoma Region, Tanzania, 1933-1975." PhD diss., University of Minnesota, 2011.
- Wembah-Rashid, John Albert Rauf. "Socio-Political Development and Economic Viability in a Rural Community: The Case of Nakarara Village, Mtwara Region Tanzania." PhD diss., University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 1983.

## **VI. Published Secondary Sources**

- Adas, Michael. *Machines as the Measure of Men: Science, Technology, and Ideologies of Western Dominance*. Ithaca, USA: Cornell University Press, 1989.
- Adelman, Jeremy, and Stephen Aron. "From Borderlands to Borders: Empires, Nation-States, and the Peoples in between in North American History." *The American Historical Review* 104, no.3 (1999): 814-41.
- Ajayi, J.F. Ade, ed. *General History of Africa, VI: Africa in the Nineteenth Century Until the 1880s*. Paris: UNESCO, 1989.

- Akurang-Parry, Kwabena Opare. "Colonial Forced Labour Policies for Road-Building in Southern Ghana and International Anti-Forced Labor Pressures, 1900-1940." *African Economic History* 28 (2000): 1-25.
- Alber, Erdmute. "Motorization and Colonial Rule: Two Scandals in Dahomey, 1916." *Journal of African Cultural Studies* 15, no. 1 (2002): 79-92.
- Allina-Pisano, Eric. "Borderlands, Boundaries, and the Contours of Colonial Rule: African Labor in Manica District, Mozambique, c. 1904-1908." *International Journal of African Historical Studies* 36, no.1 (2003): 59-82.
- Alpers, Edward A. "Gujarat and the Trade of East Africa, c. 1500-1800." *The International Journal of African Historical Studies* 9, no. 1 (1976): 22-44.
- , *Ivory and Slaves in East Central Africa*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975.
- , "'To Seek a Better Life': The Implications of Migration from Mozambique to Tanganyika for Class Formation and Political Behavior." *Canadian Journal of African Studies* 18, no. 2 (1984): 367-388.
- , "Trade, State, and Society among the Yao in the Nineteenth Century." *The Journal of African History* 10, no. 3 (1969): 405-420.
- Anderson, Benedict. *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. Revised edition. London: Verso, 1991.
- Anderson, Casper. *British Engineers and Africa, 1875-1914*. London: Pickering & Chatto, 2011.
- Anderson, David. "Depression, Dust Bowl, Demography, and Drought: The Colonial State and Soil Conservation in East Africa during the 1930s." *African Affairs* 83, no. 332 (July 1984): 321-343.
- Anderson, Ross. *The Forgotten Front: The East African Campaign 1914-1918*. Stroud, Gloucestershire: Tempus Publishing Limited, 2004.
- Ashton, S.R., and S.E. Stockwell, eds. *Imperial Policy and Colonial Practice, 1925-1945*. London: HMSO, 1996.
- Austen, Ralph A. *African Economic History: Internal Development and External Dependency*. London: J. Currey, 1987.
- Barr, Juliana. "Geographies of Power: Mapping Indian Borders in the 'Borderlands' of the Early Southwest." *The William and Mary Quarterly* 68, no. 1 (January 2011): 5-46.
- Bates, Margaret L. "Tanganyika: The Development of a Trust Territory." *International Organization* 9, no. 1 (Feb. 1955), 32-51.
- Baud, Michiel, and Willem van Schendel. "Towards a Comparative History of Borderlands." *Journal of World History* 8, no.2 (1997): 211-242.
- Beachey, R. W. "The Arms Trade in East Africa in the Late Nineteenth Century." *The Journal of African History* 3, no. 3 (1962): 451-467.

- , "The East African Ivory Trade in the Nineteenth Century." *The Journal of African History* 8, no. 2 (1967): 269-290.
- Beck, Kurt. "Roadside Comforts: Truck Stops on the Forty Days Road in Western Sudan." *Africa: Journal of the International African Institute* 83, no.3 (August 2013): 426-445.
- Becker, Felicitas. "Sudden Disaster and Slow Change: Maji Maji and the Long-Term History of Southeast Tanzania." In *Maji Maji: Lifting the Fog of War*, edited by James Giblin and Jamie Monson, 295-321. Boston: BRILL, 2010.
- , "Traders, 'Big Men' and Prophets: Political Continuity and Crisis in the Maji Maji Rebellion in Southeast Tanzania." *Journal of African History* 45 (2004): 1-22.
- Beinart, William, and Joann McGregor. *Social History & African Environments*. Oxford: James Currey, 2003.
- Blackburn, David. *The Conquest of Nature: Water, Landscape, and the Making of Modern Germany*. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2006.
- Bocarro, Antonio. "Gaspar Bocarro's Journey From Tete to Kilwa in 1616." Translated by G.M. Theal. In *The East African Coast: Select Documents from the First to the Earlier Nineteenth Century*, edited by G. S. P. Freeman-Grenville. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962.
- Bourbonniere, Michelle. "Ripple Effects: The Groundnut Scheme Failure and Railway Planning for Colonial Development in Tanganyika, 1947-1952." *Canadian Journal of African Studies* 47, no.3 (2013): 365-83.
- Brennan, James R. "Blood Enemies: Exploitation and Urban Citizenship in the Nationalist Political Thought of Tanzania, 1958-75." *The Journal of African History* 47, no.3 (2006): 389-413.
- , "South Asian Nationalism in an East African Context: The Case of Tanganyika, 1914-1956." *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East* 19, no.2 (1999): 24-39.
- , *Taifa: Making Nation and Race in Urban Tanzania*. Athens, USA: Ohio University Press, 2012.
- Brett, E.A. *Colonialism and Underdevelopment in East Africa: The Politics of Economic Change, 1919-1939*. New York: NOK Publishers, 1973.
- Brown, Alison, Michal Lyons, and Ibrahima Dankoco. "Street traders and the emerging spaces for urban voice and citizenship in African cities." *Urban Studies* 47, no.3 (2010): 666-83.
- Burnham, John Chynoweth. "The Gasoline Tax and the Automobile Revolution." *The Mississippi Valley Historical Review* 48, no. 3 (1961): 435-459.
- Burton, Antoinette M. *Burdens of History: British Feminists, Indian Women and Imperial Culture, 1865-1915*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, 1994.
- Butler, L.J. "The Ambiguities of British Colonial Development Policy, 1938-48." In *Contemporary British History 1931-1961: Politics and the Limits of Policy*, edited by Anthony Gorst, Lewis Johnman, and W. Scott Lucas, 119-140. London: Pinter, 1991.

- ."Reconstruction, Development and the Entrepreneurial State." *Contemporary British History* 13, no. 4 (2008): 29-55.
- Cain, P.J., and A.G. Hopkins. *British Imperialism 1688-2000*. Second edition. England: Longman, 2001.
- Campbell, Gwyn. "The East African Slave Trade, 1861-1895: The 'Southern Complex.'" *International Journal of African Historical Studies* 22, no. 1 (1989): 1-26.
- Chalfin, Brenda. "Cars, the customs service, and sumptuary rule in neoliberal Ghana." *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 50, no.2 (2008): 424-53.
- Cohen, David William, and E.S. Atieno Odhiambo. *Siaya: The Historical Anthropology of an African Landscape*. Athens: Ohio University Press, 1989.
- Constantine, Stephen. *The Making of British Colonial Development Policy, 1914-1940*. London: Frank Cass & Co., Ltd., 1984.
- Cooper, Frederick. *Decolonization and African Society: The Labor Question in French and British Africa*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.
- , and Randall Packard, eds. *International Development and the Social Sciences: Essays on the History and Politics of Knowledge*. Berkley: University of California Press, 1997.
- ."Modernizing Bureaucrats, Backward Africans, and the Development Concept." In *International Development and the Social Sciences: Essays on the History and Politics of Knowledge*, edited by Frederick Cooper and Randall Packard, 64-92. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997.
- Coplan, David. "Siamese Twin Towns and Unitary Concepts in Border Inequality." In *Respacing Africa*, edited by Ulf Engel and Paul Nugent, 71-87. Leiden: Brill, 2010.
- Coulson, Andrew. "Agricultural Policies in Mainland Tanzania." *Review of African Political Economy*, no. 10 (1977): 74-100.
- Coutin, Susan Bibler. "Confined within: National territories as zones of confinement." *Political Geography* 29 (2010): 200-208.
- Cowen, Michael, and Nicholas Westcott. "British Imperial Economic Policy During the War." In *Africa and the Second World War*, edited by David Killingray and Richard Rathbone, 20-67. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1986.
- Crais, C. *The Politics of Evil. Magic, State Power, and the Political Imagination in South Africa*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002.
- Cresswell, Tim and Peter Merriman, eds. *Geographies of Mobilities: Practices, Spaces, Subjects*. Farnham: Ashgate Publishing, 2011.
- Cronon, William. *Nature's Metropolis: Chicago and the Great West*. New York: W.W. Norton, 1991.
- Curtin, Philip D. *Economic Change in Precolonial Africa: Senegambia in the era of the slave trade*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1975.

- Darwin, John. *Britain and Decolonization: The Retreat from Empire in the Postwar World*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1988.
- Date-Bah, Eugenia. "The inscriptions on the vehicles of Ghanaian commercial drivers: a sociological analysis." *Journal of Modern African Studies* 18, no.3 (1980): 523–31.
- Davidson, Basil. *Black Mother: Africa and the Atlantic Slave Trade*. Revised Edition. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1980.
- Davin, Anna. "Imperialism and Motherhood." *History Workshop* 5 (1978), 9-65.
- Deutsch, J.G. *Emancipation Without Abolition in German East Africa, c. 1884-1914*. Oxford: James Currey, 2006.
- Digre, Brian. *Imperialism's New Clothes*. New York: Peter Lang, 1990.
- Doevenspeck, Martin. "Constructing the border from below: Narratives from the Congolese-Rwandan state boundary." *Political Geography* 30 (2011): 129-142.
- Ehrlich, Cyril. "The Poor Country: Tanganyika Economy from 1945 to 1960." In *Oxford History of East Africa*, Volume 3, edited by D.A. Low and A. Smith, 290-330. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976.
- Engel, Ulf, and Paul Nugent, eds. *Respacing Africa*. Leiden: Brill, 2010.
- , and Paul Nugent. "Introduction: The Spatial Turn in African Studies." In *Respacing Africa*, edited by Ulf Engel and Paul Nugent, 1-9. Leiden: Brill, 2010.
- Falola, Toyin, and Jessica Achberger, eds. *The Political Economy of Development and Underdevelopment in Africa*. New York: Routledge, 2013.
- Farwell, Byron. *The Great War in Africa, 1914-1918*. New York: WW Norton & Company, 1986.
- Featherstone, Mike, Nigel Thrift, and John Urry, eds. *Automobilities*. London: Sage, 2005.
- Fiege, Mark. *Irrigated Eden: The Making of an Agricultural Landscape in the American West*. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1999.
- Flink, James J. *The Car Culture*. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1975.
- Freed, Libbie J. "Networks of (Colonial) Power: Roads in French Central Africa after World War I." *History and Technology* 26, no. 3 (2010): 203-223.
- Gallant, Thomas W. *Experiencing Dominion: Culture, Identify, and Power in the British Mediterranean*. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2002.
- Gewald, Jan-Bart. "Missionaries, Hereros, and Motorcars: Mobility and the Impact of Motor Vehicles in Namibia Before 1940." *International Journal of Historical Studies* 35, no. 2-3 (2002): 257-285.
- , Sabine Luning, and Klass van Walraven, eds. *The Speed of Change. Motor Vehicles and People in Africa, 1890-2000*. Leiden, Boston: Brill, 2009.

- Giblin, James L. *A History of the Excluded: Making Family a Refuge from State in Twentieth-Century Tanzania*. Oxford: James Currey, 2005.
- , and Jamie Monson, eds. *Maji Maji: Lifting the Fog of War*. Boston: BRILL, 2010.
- Gilbert, Erik. "Coastal East Africa and the Western Indian Ocean: Long-Distance Trade, Empire, Migration, and Regional Unity, 1750-1970." *The History Teacher* 36, no. 1 (Nov. 2002): 7-34.
- , *Dhows and the Colonial Economy of Zanzibar, 1860-1970*. Oxford: James Curry Ltd., 2004.
- Grace, Joshua. "Heroes of the Road: Race, Gender and the Politics of Mobility in Twentieth-Century Tanzania." *Africa: Journal of the International African Institute* 83, no. 3 (August 2013): 403-425.
- Grant, Kevin. *A Civilised Savagery: Britain and the New Slaveries in Africa, 1884-1926*. New York: Routledge, 2005.
- Grätz, Tilo, ed. *Mobility, Transnationalism and Contemporary African Societies*. Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2010.
- Gregory, Robert G. *India and East Africa: A History of Race Relations with the British Empire, 1890-1939*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971.
- Grier, Beverly Carolease. *Invisible Hands: Child Labor and the State in Colonial Zimbabwe*. Portsmouth: Heinemann, 2006.
- , "Struggle over African Childhood: Child and Adolescent Labor, 1890-1920." In *The Global History of Childhood Reader*, edited by Heidi Morrison, 197-222. London: Routledge, 2012.
- Gupta, Partha Sarathi. *Imperialism and the British Labour Movement, 1914-1964*. New York: Holmes and Meier, 1975.
- Gwassa, Gilbert. "Kinjikitile and the Ideology of Maji Maji." In *The Historical Study of African Religion*, edited by Terrence Ranger and Isaria N. Kimambo, 202-218. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972.
- Hamilton, R.A. "The Route of Gaspar Bocarro From Tete to Kilwa in 1616." *The Nyasaland Journal* 7, no. 2 (July, 1954): 7-14.
- Hart, Jennifer A. *Ghana on the Go!: African Mobility in the Age of Motor Transportation*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2016.
- , "'One Man, No Chop': Licit Wealth, Good Citizens, and the Criminalization of Drivers in Postcolonial Ghana." *International Journal of African Historical Studies* 46, no. 3 (2013): 373-396.
- Havinden, Michael, and David Meridith. *Colonialism and Development: Britain and its Tropical Colonies, 1850-1960*. London: Routledge, 1993.

- Hay, Douglas, and Paul Craven, eds. *Master, Servants, and Magistrates in Britain and the Empire, 1562-1955*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2004.
- Headrick, Daniel R. *The Tentacles of Progress: Technology Transfer in the Age of Imperialism, 1850-1940: Technology Transfer in the Age of Imperialism, 1850-1940*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1988.
- . *The Tools of Empire: Technology and European Imperialism in the Nineteenth Century*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1981.
- Hetherington, Penelope. *British Paternalism and Africa, 1920-1940*. London: F. Cass, 1978.
- Higham, Robin. *Speedbird: The Complete History of B.O.A.C.* London: I.B. Tauris & Co. Ltd., 2013.
- Hinds, Allister. *Britain's Sterling Colonial Policy and Decolonization, 1939-1958*. Westport, USA: Greenwood Press, 2001.
- Hobsbawm, Eric, and Terence Ranger, eds. *The Invention of Tradition*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983.
- Hodge, Joseph Morgan. *Triumph of the Expert: Agrarian Doctrines of Development and Legacies of British Colonialism*. Athens, USA: Ohio University Press, 2007.
- Hodges, G.W.T. "African Manpower Statistics for the British Forces in East Africa, 1914-1918." *The Journal of African History* 19, no.1 (1978): 101-116.
- Hofmeier, Rolf. *Transport and Economic Development in Tanzania: with particular reference to roads and road transport*. München: Weltforum Verlag, 1973.
- . "Trunk Road Transport and the Possibility of a National Transport Company in Tanzania." *Economic Research Bureau*, University of Dar es Salaam 68, no.3 (1968).
- Hogendorn, Jon, and K.M. Scott. "Very Large-Scale Agricultural Projects: The Lessons of the East African Groundnut Scheme." In *Imperialism, Colonialism and Hunger: East and Central Africa*, edited by Robert Rotberg, 167-198. Lexington, USA: Lexington Books, 1983.
- . "The East African Groundnut Scheme: Lessons of a Large-Scale Agricultural Failure." *African Economic History*, no. 10 (1981): 81-115.
- Hopkins, A.G. *An Economic History of West Africa*. Longman, London 1973.
- Hoppe, Kirk Arden. *Lords of the Fly: Sleeping Sickness Control in British East Africa, 1900-1960*. Westport, USA: Praeger, 2003.
- Howard, Allen M. "Actors, Places, Regions, and Global Forces: An Essay on the Spatial History of Africa Since 1700." In *Respacing Africa*, edited by Ulf Engel and Paul Nugent, 11-44. Leiden: Brill, 2010.
- . "Nodes, Networks, Landscapes, and Regions: Reading the Social History of Tropical Africa 1700s-1920." In *The Spatial Factor in African History: The Relationship of the Social, Material, and Perceptual*, edited by Allen M. Howard and Richard M. Shain, 21-140. Leiden: Brill, 2005.



- , and Richard M. Shain, eds. *The Spatial Factor in African History: The Relationship of the Social, Material, and Perceptual*. Leiden: Brill, 2005.
- Hüsken, Thomas. "The Neo-tribal Competitive Order in the Borderland of Egypt and Libya." In *Respacing Africa*, edited by Ulf Engel and Paul Nugent, 169-205. Leiden: Brill, 2010.
- Huttenback, Robert A. *Racism and Empire: White Settlers and Colored Immigrants in the British Self-Governing Colonies, 1830-1910*. Ithaca: Cornell University, 1976.
- Hyam, Ronald. *Empire and Sexuality: The British Experience*. New York: Manchester University Press, 1990.
- , ed. *The Labour Government and the End of Empire 1945-1951*. London: HMSO, 1992.
- Hydén, Göran. *Beyond Ujamaa in Tanzania: Underdevelopment and an Uncaptured Peasantry*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980.
- Igler, David. *Industrial Cowboys: Miller & Lux and the Transformation of the Far West, 1850-1920*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001.
- Iiffe, John. *A Modern History of Tanganyika*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979.
- , and Gilbert Gwassa. *Records of the Maji Maji Rising, Part One*. Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1968.
- , "The organisation of the Maji Maji rebellion." *JAH* 8 (1967): 495-512.
- Johnston, Peter. "The Groundnut Scheme – a Personal Memoir." *Habitat Intl.* 7, no.1 (1983): 5-16.
- Kagan, Richard L. "Projecting Order." In *Mapping Latin America: A Cartographic Reader*, edited by Jordana Dym and Karl Offen, 46-50. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011.
- Kent, John. "Bevin's Imperialism and the Idea of Euro-Africa." In *British Foreign Policy, 1945-56*, edited by M. Dockrill and John Young, 47-76. London: Macmillan, 1989.
- , *British Imperial Strategy and the Origins of the Cold War 1944-49*. Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1993.
- Killingray, David. "Labour Exploitation for Military Campaigns in British Colonial Africa 1870-1945." *Journal of Contemporary History* 24 (1989): 483-501.
- , and Richard Rathbone, eds. *Africa and the Second World War*. New York: St. Martins, 1986.
- Kjekshus, Helge. *Ecology Control and Economic Development in East African History: The Case of Tanganyika 1850-1950*. Second edition. London: James Currey, 1996.
- Klaeger, Gabriel. "Dwelling on the Road: Routines, Rituals and Roadblocks in Southern Ghana." *Africa: Journal of the International African Institute* 83, no.3 (August 2013): 446-469.

- , "Introduction: The Perils and Possibilities of African Roads." *Africa: Journal of the International African Institute* 83, no.3 (August 2013): 359-366.
- , "Rush and Relax: the Rhythms and Speeds of Touting Perishable Products on a Ghanaian Roadside." *Mobilities* 7, no.4 (2012): 537-554.
- Kline, Ronald and Trevor J. Pinch. "Users as Agents of Technological Change: The Social Construction of the Automobile in the Rural United States." *Technology and Culture: The International Quarterly of the Society for the History of Technology* 37, no. 4 (1996): 763 – 95.
- Koonar, Catherine. "'Christianity, Commerce and Civilization': Child Labor and the Basel Mission in Colonial Ghana 1855-1914." *International Labor and Working Class History* 86 (Fall 2014): 72-88.
- Koponen, Juhani. *Development for Exploitation: German colonial policies in Mainland Tanzania, 1884-1914*. Helsinki, Finland: Tiedekirja, 1994.
- Lal, Priya. *African Socialism in Postcolonial Tanzania: Between the Village and the World*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015.
- Lamont, Mark. "Speed Governors: Road Safety and Infrastructural Overload in Post-Colonial Kenya, c. 1963-2013." *Africa: Journal of the International African Institute* 83, no.3 (August 2013): 367-384.
- Larson, Lorne. "The Ngindo: Exploring the Center of the Maji Maji Rebellion." In *Maji Maji: Lifting the Fog of War*, edited by James Giblin and Jamie Monson, 71-114. Boston: Brill, 2010.
- Lee, J.M. *Colonial Government and Good Government: A study of the ideas expressed by the British official classes in planning decolonization 1939-1964*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967.
- , and Martin Petter. *The Colonial Office, War and Development Policy*. London: M.T. Smith for the Institute for Commonwealth Studies, 1982.
- Lee, Rebekah. "Death in slow motion: funerals, ritual practice and road danger in South Africa." *African Studies* 71, no. 2 (2012): 195–211.
- Lefebvre, Henri. *The Production of Space*. Translated by Donald Nicholson-Smith. Oxford: Blackwell, 1991.
- Lewis, George H. "The philosophy of the street in Ghana: mammy wagons and their mottos – a research note." *Journal of Popular Culture* 32, no.1 (1998): 165–71.
- Lewis, Joanna. *Empire State-Building: War and Welfare in Kenya, 1925-52*. Oxford: James Currey, 2000.
- , "The Ruling Compassions of the Late Colonial State: Welfare versus Force, Kenya, 1945–1952." *Journal of Colonialism and Colonial History* 2, no. 2 (Fall 2001).
- , "'Tropical East Ends' and the Second World War: Some Contradictions in Colonial Office Welfare Initiatives." *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 28, no. 2 (2000): 42-66.

- Lewis, Martin W., and Kären E. Wigen. *The Myth of Continents: A Critique of Metageography*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997.
- Liebenow, J. Gus. *Colonial Rule and Political Development in Tanzania: The Case of the Makonde*. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1971.
- Ling, Peter J. *America and the Automobile: Technology, Reform, and Social Change*. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1990.
- Low, D.A. *Eclipse of Empire*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991.
- , and A. Smith. "The New Order." In *History of East Africa*, Volume III, edited by D.A. Low and A. Smith. Oxford: Clarendon, 1976.
- Ludden, David. "The Process of Empire: Frontiers and Borderlands." In *Tributary Empires in Global History*, edited by C.A. Bayly and Peter Fibiger Bang, 132-150. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011.
- Maddox, Gregory. "Mtunya: Famine in Central Tanzania, 1917-20." *The Journal of African History* 31, no. 2 (1990): 181-197.
- , "Networks and Frontiers in Colonial Tanzania," *Environmental History* (1998): 436-459.
- , James L. Gibling, and Isaria N. Kimambo, eds. *Custodians of the Land: Ecology and Culture and History of Tanzania*. London: James Currey LTD, 1996.
- Masquelier, Adeline. "Road Mythographies: Space, Mobility, and the Historical Imagination in Postcolonial Niger." *American Ethnologist* 29, no. 4 (2002): 829-856.
- Massey, Doreen. *For Space*. Los Angeles: SAGE Publications, 2005.
- Mbembé, J.A., and Steven Rendall. "At the Edge of the World: Boundaries, Territoriality, and Sovereignty in Africa." *Public Culture* 12, no.1 (2000): 259-284.
- McShane, Clay. *Down the Asphalt Path: The Automobile and the American City*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1994.
- Meek, Charles Innes. *Brief Authority: A Memoir of Colonial Administration in Tanganyika*. Edited by Innes Meek. London: Radcliffe Press, 2011.
- Melly, Caroline. "Ethnography on the Road: Infrastructural Vision and the Unruly Present in Contemporary Dakar." *Africa: Journal of the International African Institute* 83, no.3 (August 2013): 385-402.
- Melosi, Martin V. "The Automobile and the Environment in American History." *Automobile in America Life and Society, 2004-2010*. Accessed October 2014.  
[http://www.autolife.umd.umich.edu/Environment/E\\_Overview/E\\_Overview1.htm](http://www.autolife.umd.umich.edu/Environment/E_Overview/E_Overview1.htm)
- Mesaki, S., and J. Mwankusye. "The Sage of the Lindi-Kibiti Road: Political Ramifications." In *The Making of a Periphery: Economic Development and Cultural Encounters in Southern Tanzania*,

- edited by Pekka Seppällä and Bertha Koda, 58-74. Uppsala, Sweden: Narodiska Afrikainstitutet, 1998.
- Mezzadra, Sandro, and Brett Neilson. *Border as Method, or, the Multiplication of Labor*. Durham: Duke University Press, 2013.
- Midgley, Clare, ed. *Gender and Imperialism*. New York: Manchester University Press, 1998.
- Miller, Daniel, ed. *Car Cultures*. Oxford: Berg, 2001.
- Miller, Joseph C. *Way of Death: Merchant Capitalism and the Angolan Slave Trade 1730-1830*. Madison, USA: University of Wisconsin Press, 1988.
- Mitchell, Timothy. *Rule of Experts: Egypt, Techno-Politics, Modernity*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002.
- Moore, Henrietta L., and Megan Vaughan. *Cutting Down Trees, Gender, Nutrition, and Agricultural Change in the Northern Province of Zambia 1890–1990*. Portsmouth: Heinemann, 1994.
- Monson, Jamie. *Africa's Freedom Railway: How a Chinese Development Project Changed Lives and Livelihoods in Tanzania*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2009.
- , "Relocating the Maji Maji: The Politics of Alliance and Authority in the Southern Highlands of Tanzania, 1870-1918." *Journal of African History* 39 (1998): 95-120.
- Morgan, D.J. *The Official History of Colonial Development: Vol. 2: Developing British Colonial Resources, 1945-1951*. Atlantic Highland, USA: Humanities Press, 1980.
- , *The Official History of Colonial Development: Vol. 4: Changes in British Aid Policy, 1951-1970*. New Atlantic Highland, USA: Humanities Press, 1980.
- Munro, J. Forbes. *Africa and the International Economy, 1800-1960: An Introduction to the Modern Economic History of Africa South of the Sahara*. London: J.M. Dent, 1976.
- Myddelton, D.R. *They Meant Well: Government Project Disasters*. London: Institute of Economic Affairs, 2007.
- Myers, Garth A. *Verandahs of Power: Colonialism and Space in Urban Africa*. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2003.
- Nagar, Richa. "The South Asian Diaspora in Tanzania: A History Retold." *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East* 16, no. 2 (1996): 62-80.
- Neil-Tomlinson, Barry. "The Nyassa Chartered Company: 1891-1929." *The Journal of African History* 18, no. 1 (1977): 109-128.
- Newitt, Malyn. *A History of Mozambique*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995.
- Nugent, Paul, and A.I. Asiwaju. "Introduction: The Paradox of African Boundaries." In *African Boundaries: Barriers, Conduits and Opportunities*, edited by Paul Nugent and A.I. Asiwaju, 1-18. London: Pinter, 1996.

- O'Connell, Sean. *The Car in British Society: Class, Gender and Motoring, 1896-1939*. Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 1998.
- Overseas Development Institute. *British Aid – 5: Colonial Development: a factual survey of the origins and history of British aid to developing countries*. London: ODI Publications, 1964.
- Paice, Edward. *World War I, The African Front: An Imperial War on the African Continent*. New York: Pegasus Books, 2008.
- Paterson, Matthew. "Car culture and global environmental politics." *Review of International Studies* 26 (2000): 253-70.
- Pawlowicz, Matthew. "A Review of Ceramics from Tanzania, Malawi, and Northern Mozambique, with Implications for Swahili Archaeology." *African Archaeology Review* 30 (2013): 367–398.
- , and Adria LaViolette. "Swahili Historical Chronicles from an Archaeological Perspective: Bridging History and Archaeology, and Coast and Hinterland, in Southern Tanzania." In *The Death of Prehistory*, edited by Peter R. Schmidt and Stephen A. Mrozowski. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013.
- Pearce, R.D. *The Turning Point in Africa: British Colonial Policy 1938-48*. London: Frank Cass and Co, Ltd., 1982.
- Pesek, Michael. "The Boma and the Peripatetic Ruler: Mapping Colonial Rule in German East Africa, 1889-1903." *Western Folklore* 66, no. 3/4 (Summer - Fall 2007): 233-257.
- Pirie, Gordon. *Air Empire: British Imperial Civil Aviation 1919-1939*. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2009.
- Pollard, Edward John. "The maritime landscape of Kilwa Kisiwani and its region, Tanzania, 11<sup>th</sup> to 15<sup>th</sup> century AD." *Journal of Anthropological Archeology* 27, no. 3 (2008): 265-280.
- , "Safeguarding Swahili trade in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries: a unique navigational complex in south-east Tanzania." *World Archeology* 43, no. 3 (2011): 458-477.
- Pouwels, Randall L. "Eastern Africa and the Indian Ocean to 1800: Reviewing Relations in Historical Perspective." *International Journal of African Historical Studies* 35, no. 2-3 (2002): 385-425.
- Prestholdt, Jeremy. *Domesticating the World: African Consumerism and the Genealogies of Globalization*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008.
- Pritchard, Sara B. *Confluence: The Nature of Technology and the Remaking of the Rhône*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2011.
- Quinlan, Michael. "Australia, 1788-1902: A Workingman's Paradise?" In *Master, Servants, and Magistrates in Britain and the Empire, 1562-1955*, edited by Douglas Hay and Paul Craven, 219-250. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2004.
- Rae, John B. *The Road and the Car in American Life*. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1971.

- Raeymaekers, Timothy. "Reshaping the state in its margins: The state, the market and the subaltern on a Central African frontier." *Critique of Anthropology* 32, no. 3 (2012): 334-350.
- Ranger, Terence. "European Attitudes and African Realities: The Rise and Fall of the Matola Chiefs of Southeast Tanzania." *The Journal of African History* 20, no.1 (1979): 63-82.
- . "The Invention of Tradition in Colonial Africa." In *The Invention of Tradition*, edited by Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, 211-261. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983.
- Reuss, Martin, and Stephen H. Cutcliffe, eds. *The Illusory Boundary: Environment and Technology in History*. Charlottesville, USA: University of Virginia Press, 2010.
- Rich, Paul B. *Race and Empire in British Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986.
- Rizzo, Matteo. "Becoming wealthy: the life-history of a rural entrepreneur in Tanzania, 1922-80s." *Journal of Eastern African Studies* 3, no. 2 (July 2009): 221-239.
- . "What Was Left of the Groundnut Scheme? Development Disaster and Labour Market in Southern Tanganyika 1946–1952." *Journal of Agrarian Change* 6, no.2 (April 2006): 205-238.
- Robinson, John. *Highways and Our Environment*. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1971.
- Rockel, Stephen J. *Carriers of Culture: Labor on the Road in Nineteenth-Century East Africa*. Portsmouth, USA: Heinemann, 2006.
- Rodney, Walter. *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa*. Washington: Howard University Press, 1974.
- Said, Edward W. *Orientalism*. New York: Vintage Books, 1979.
- Scharff, Virginia. *Taking the Wheel: Women and the Coming of the Motor Age*. New York: The Free Press, 1991.
- Schmidt, Heike. "'Deadly Silence Predominates in this District': The Maji Maji War and Its Aftermath in Ungoni." In *Maji Maji: Lifting the Fog of War*, edited by James Giblin and Jamie Monson, 183-220. Boston: Brill, 2010.
- Schneider, Leander. *Government of Development: Peasants and Politicians in Postcolonial Tanzania*. Bloomington, USA: Indiana University Press, 2014.
- Schuknecht, Rohland. *British Colonial Development Policy after the Second World War: The Case of Sukumaland, Tanganyika*. Münster: LIT Verlag, 2010.
- Scott, James. *Seeing Like and State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed*. New Haven, USA: Yale University Press, 1998.
- Seppällä, Pekka, and Bertha Koda, eds. *The Making of a Periphery: Economic Development and Cultural Encounters in Southern Tanzania*. Uppsala, Sweden: Narodiska Afrikainstitutet, 1998.
- . "Introduction." In *The Making of a Periphery: Economic Development and Cultural Encounters in Southern Tanzania*, edited by Pekka Seppällä and Bertha Koda, 7-37. Uppsala, Sweden: Narodiska Afrikainstitutet, 1998.

- , "The Recovery of Cashew Production in Southern Tanzania." In *The Making of a Periphery: Economic Development and Cultural Encounters in Southern Tanzania*, edited by Pekka Seppällä and Bertha Koda, 118-137. Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 1998.
- Sheriff, Abdul. *Slaves, Spices and Ivory in Zanzibar: Integration of an East African Commercial Empire into the World Economy, 1770-1873*. London: James Curry 1987.
- Shetler, Jan Bender. *Imagining Serengeti: A History of Landscape Memory in Tanzania from Earliest Time to the Present*. Athens, USA: Ohio University Press, 2007.
- , "'Region' as Historical Production: Narrative Maps from the Western Serengeti, Tanzania." In *The Spatial Factor in African History*, edited by Allen M. Howard and Richard M. Shain, 141-176. Leiden: Brill, 2005.
- Smith, Alison. "The Southern Section of the Interior 1840-1884." In *History of East Africa*, Vol. 1, edited by Roland Oliver and Gervase Mathew, 253-296. Oxford: Clarendon Press 1963.
- Snead, James E., Clark L. Erickson, and J. Andrew Darling, eds. *Landscapes of Movement: Trails, Paths, and Roads in Anthropological Perspective*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Museum of Archaeology and Anthropology, 2009.
- Söderbaum, Frederick, and Ian Taylor. "State, Region and Space in Africa." In *Respacing Africa*, edited by Ulf Engel and Paul Nugent, 45-70. Leiden: Brill, 2010.
- Stern, Philip J. *The Company-State: Corporate Sovereignty and the Early Modern Foundations of the British Empire in India*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011.
- Stoler, Ann Laura. *Carnal Knowledge and Imperial Power: Race and the Intimate in Colonial Rule*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002.
- Strobel, Margaret. *European Women and the Second British Empire*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1991.
- Sunseri, Thaddeus. "Reinterpreting a Colonial Rebellion: Forestry and Social Control in German East Africa, 1874-1915." *Environmental History* 8, no. 3 (July 2003): 430-451.
- , "The War of the Hunters: Maji Maji and the Decline of the Ivory Trade." In *Maji Maji: Lifting the Fog of War*, edited by Jim Giblin and Jamie Monson, 117-148. Boston: Brill Academic Publishers, 2010.
- , *Vilimani: Labor Migration and Rural Change in Early Colonial Tanzania*. Portsmouth, USA: Heinemann, 2002.
- , *Wielding the Ax: State Forestry and Social Conflict in Tanzania, 1820-2000*. Athens, USA: Ohio University Press, 2009.
- ten Horn-van Nispen, Marie-Louise, and Wim Ravesteijn. "The road to an empire: Organisation and technology of road construction in the Dutch East Indies, 1800-1940." *Journal of Transport History* 30 (June 2009): 40-57.

- Thornton, John. *Africa and Africans in the Making of the Atlantic World, 1400-1800*. Second edition. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998.
- Tilley, Helen. *African as a Living Laboratory: Empire, Development, and the Problem of Scientific Knowledge, 1870-1950*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011.
- Townroe, P. M., ed. *Social and Political Consequences of the Motor Car*. Newton Abbot, USA: David and Charles, 1974.
- Vail, Leroy. "Mozambique's Chartered Companies: The Rule of the Feeble." *The Journal of African History* 17, no. 3 (1976): 389-416.
- Vannini, Phillip, ed. *The Cultures of Alternative Mobilities: Routes Less Travelled*. Farnham: Ashgate, 2009.
- Vansina, Jan. *Oral Tradition: A Study in Historical Methodology*. Translated by H.M. Wright. London: Routledge & K. Paul, 1965.
- . *Oral Tradition as History*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1985.
- Wadewitz, Lissa K. *The Nature of Borders: Salmon, Boundaries, and Bandits on the Salish Sea*. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2012.
- West, Harry G. "Villains, Victims, or Makonde in the Making? Reading the Explorer Henry O'Neill and Listening to the Headman Lishehe." *Ethnohistory* 51, no.1 (2004): 1-42.
- White, Luise. "Cars Out of Place: Vampires, Technology, and Labor in East and Central Africa." *Representations* 43 (Summer 1993): 27-50.
- . *Speaking with Vampires: Rumor and History in Colonial Africa*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2000.
- White, Richard. *Organic Machine: The Remaking of the Columbia River*. New York: Hill & Wang, 1996.
- Wrangham, Elizabeth. "An African Road Revolution: The Gold Coast in the Period of the Great War." *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 32, no.1 (January 2004): 1-18.
- Wright, Donald R. *The World and a Very Small Place in Africa: A History of Globalization in Niimi, The Gambia*. New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2004.