

Title:

Joining Forces against ‘Strike Terrorism’: The Public-Private Interplay in Policing Strikes in Imperial Germany, 1890–1914

Author:

Amerigo Caruso

This is the accepted manuscript (version updated to include the author’s revisions after peer review, prior to any typesetting for the journal) of an article published in *European History Quarterly*. The version of record is available online at <https://doi.org/10.1177/0265691419864007>

The article is protected by copyright and reuse is restricted to non-commercial and no derivative uses in accordance to SAGE's Green Open Access policy.

Cite as:

Caruso, A. (2019). Joining Forces against ‘Strike Terrorism’: The Public-Private Interplay in Policing Strikes in Imperial Germany, 1890–1914. *European History Quarterly*, 49(4), 597–624.
<https://doi.org/10.1177/0265691419864007>



Joining Forces against ‘Strike Terrorism’: the Public-Private Interplay in Policing Strikes in Imperial Germany, 1890–1914*

Amerigo Caruso

Saarland University, Germany

Abstract

This article examines the blurred boundaries between public and private repressive practices in Wilhelmine Germany with a special focus on the legal and administrative framework drawn up to redistribute security tasks and delegate the use of violence to non-state actors. While the rapid escalation of political violence in Central and Eastern Europe after 1917 has been widely discussed in the recent historiography, the structure of violence in the pre-war period remains less explored, especially with regard to the public-private interplay in the policing of popular protests. After the first massive strike by Ruhr miners in 1889, the Prussian authorities began to support the formation of semi-private armed protection groups in an effort to tackle ‘strike terrorism’. The idea of privatizing repressive practices arose as a result of widespread fears of social and political disintegration. Yet, although it may seem paradoxical, the precondition for delegating the use of violence to non-state actors was Prussian administrators’ confidence in the state’s solidity and efficiency. The ambivalence in contemporary discourses concerning the vulnerability of the existing social and political order is crucial to explaining why the Prussian authorities implemented strategies for legally distributing arms to those groups that were considered part of the ‘loyal classes’. The mobilization against ‘strike terrorism’ involved not only officially organized armed groups, such as the *Zechenwehren*, but also more informal or extra-legal strategies such as private use of the municipal police, the distribution of arms to strike-breakers and the militarization of white-collar workers and supervisors.

Keywords

armed groups, Imperial Germany, security, social conflicts, violence

* This project received funding from the European Research Council (ERC) under the European Union’s Horizon 2020 Research and Innovation programme (G.A. 677199 – ERC-StG2015 “The Dark Side of the Belle Époque. Political Violence and Armed Associations before the First World War”).

‘The *Zeichenwehren* auxiliary corps were fully armed with revolvers and batons before the beginning of the war. In the meantime, weapons had been confiscated and used for different purposes’.¹ The management of the Gutehoffnungshütte mining company wrote this concerned note to the Essen Police President only a few months before Germany’s defeat in 1918 and the outbreak of the November Revolution. After four years of total war, both state authorities and the managers of major Ruhr companies were highly concerned about the risk of strikes and political upheaval. They therefore attempted to reorganise semi-private armed groups known as the *Zeichenwehren*, which had been formally regulated in the mid-1890s. The *Zeichenwehren* reached their peak during the miners’ strikes of 1905 and 1912, when more than 2,000 white-collar workers and mining supervisors joined anti-strike formations in 117 companies in the Ruhr area.² Over the two decades prior to the First World War, the Prussian administration had demonstrated consistent interest in encouraging the formation of these auxiliary groups, which could legally support police repression and reinforced the unity of the ‘loyal classes’ against supposed revolutionary threats.

The *Zeichenwehren* saw action only infrequently and the show of force was seemingly more important than its actual use. However, the fact that these armed groups were openly supported by the Prussian authorities raised the question of whether they effectively protected strikebreakers and maintained public order or whether, in contrast, they contributed to radicalising social conflicts and delegitimising the Wilhelmine state. The controversial definition of violence as a legitimate course of action and the blurred boundaries between legal and extra-legal repression are problems that had already emerged during the period of relative peace and progress prior to 1914. The aim of this article is to analyse the changing concept of security and the legitimate use of physical force in times of industrial unrest, with a particular focus on the public-private interplay in policing strikes and popular protests. In late Imperial Germany, collaboration between public and private practices of repression involved not only officially organised armed groups, such as the *Zeichenwehren*, but also more informal or extra-legal strategies such as the semi-privatisation of municipal police forces, the distribution of arms to strikebreakers and the militarisation of white-collar workers and supervisors.

The supposedly defensive nature of the *Zeichenwehren* (the term literally means ‘colliery defence’) and the desire for better protection of ‘willing workers’ during periods of industrial unrest were closely linked to the perception of strikes as social infractions that posed a threat to national security. In Wilhelmine society, the rapid process of nation building and industrialisation, and openly declared imperial ambitions increased anxieties over subversion and the ‘unpatriotic opposition’ of the Social Democrats. The expansionist *Weltpolitik* heightened international tensions, while the emerging narrative of encirclement showed that the *Kaiserreich* was a fragile entity

pervaded by a general sense of superiority and self-overestimation.³ Indeed, strong military and bureaucratic traditions coexisted with delegitimised aspects of politics, such as the restrictive suffrage law in Prussia and legal discrimination against the Social Democratic milieu. Even though there was no clear democratic deficit on the part of Germany when compared to France, the United Kingdom and the United States, the clash between ‘subversive forces’ and ‘parties of order’, as well as the Reich’s growing debts and the scandals that plagued the Kaiser, destabilised German political life and fostered a fear that the established order was being threatened.⁴

The social approach to German history broadly developed during the 1970s, although surprisingly few studies have focussed on the use of repressive practices against strikes and popular protests in the pre-war period.⁵ During the early 1990s, Klaus Tenfelde noted that a systematic history of the social and political conflicts in the Ruhr area had not yet been written, and this observation remains true today.⁶ New studies on criminality and terrorism have shown that the European states made a comprehensive effort to expand and modernise their police and justice apparatus around 1900.⁷ However, the formal and informal efforts to privatise repressive practices remain largely unexplored and the mobilisation of thousands of *Zechenwehr* auxiliary policemen has been persistently underestimated in the literature.⁸ While organised violence after 1917 has been widely discussed by historians, the structure of violence within the German Empire has been less well explored, especially with regards to the interplay between public law enforcement and private security.⁹ I begin this article by examining the repressive responses to strikes and the disciplining strategies adopted by employers and state authorities between the early 1890s and the First World War. The second section then focusses on public law enforcement and the privatisation of repressive practices. In the third section, I will analyse the legal framework and activities of *Zechenwehr* auxiliaries. The fourth section systemises the different forms and features of the mobilisation of the ‘loyal classes’ in the two decades before 1914. In the concluding section, I will explore the continuities and changes from Wilhelmine Germany to the early post-war years.

Social Discipline and the Structure of Violence in Wilhelmine Germany

Due to the unrestricted right to buy and keep arms and the ready availability of cheap revolvers, the circulation and handling of weapons was widespread in Wilhelmine society.¹⁰ Potential or symbolic forms of violence materialised during military parades, war memorial services and commemorations, which perpetuated the high social value of arms and uniforms. After the *Kaiserreich* was proclaimed at Versailles following three victorious wars, construction of a German national identity became closely linked with militarism and the cult of honour.¹¹ The colonial wars, modern conscription and mass participation in veterans’ organisations, shooting clubs and

associations providing military training to teenage boys (*Jungdeutschland-Bund*) also contributed to the development of a commitment to the military among the German public.¹² Along with these forms of potential and symbolic violence, different forms of physical violence were a normal part of daily life, such as in the repression of crime and subversion, but also duelling, academic fencing and pub fights.¹³ Everyday violence was more widespread in East Prussia due to the nationality conflict between Germans and Poles and anti-Semitic sentiments.¹⁴ Eventually, the performative nature of organised violence emerged in the context of strikes and popular protests. Despite the low numbers of casualties and the largely peaceful nature of strikes, popular protests always involved verbal confrontations and low-level violence, due in part to state repression, in part to violent actions perpetrated by protesters, but more frequently to the violent incidents that broke out between strikers and strikebreakers.¹⁵

Following the first major strike by the Ruhr miners in 1889 and the abolition of the anti-socialist laws one year later, the Prussian authorities feared they would be unable to guarantee the maintenance of public order in the case of massive strikes.¹⁶ As noted by James Retallack, the common aim of the parties of order was to ‘make Germany safe again’ during an era of political modernisation and Social Democratic electoral triumphs.¹⁷ The perceived weakness of the state’s security organisations was exacerbated by the mass movements of domestic and international migrants from rural areas to the booming industrial regions that had taken place. In the province of Westphalia, for example, the population increased from 1.7 to 4.1 million between 1870 and 1910.¹⁸ During the strike wave of 1889–1893, massive use of infantry and cavalry units had been necessary to maintain order and intimidate organised workers, not only in Westphalia, but also in Saarland and Upper Silesia. In 1889, several workers and members of their families were killed or seriously injured by Prussian troops and police officers in cities in the Ruhr area, such as Hörde, Gladbeck, Bochum, Bottrop and Brackel, near Dortmund.¹⁹

Alongside the wave of strikes that took place around 1890, the growth of the socialist-oriented Free Unions created an urgent sense that new repressive and disciplining strategies needed to be adopted. Although Germany was a functioning *Rechtsstaat*, the legislation governing associations and public order was quite restrictive and allowed the Prussian state to discretionally employ repressive practices. Prior to the more liberal Law of Associations being passed in 1908, the Prussian authorities and employers’ associations, which made extensive use of lockouts, could legally repress the labour movement.²⁰ Nevertheless, membership of the Free Unions passed the two million mark in 1910 and the number of labour disputes remained high until 1914.²¹ One possible strategy for intensifying authoritarian control over social movements was to ask the army to perform police functions, although this was largely unpopular. Even though there had been massive military involvement in strikes around 1890, the civilian authorities hesitated to call for

military intervention, which was considered a measure of last resort. In 1906, for example, the Berlin Police Chief remarked that he was 'more afraid of the soldiers' rowdiness than of the Social Democrats'.²² Prussian military commanders were not adequately prepared to intervene in the policing of civilian society and they tended to avoid inter-institutional cooperation with civil servants.²³ The security architecture of the German Empire rested on the assumption that the military had to support the police in cases of great labour unrest; however, the focus of the army was clearly on external threats.²⁴ As a result, military involvement in the policing of industrial areas resulted in fewer deadly confrontations in Imperial Germany than in France and Austria-Hungary.²⁵

Another possible repressive response to strikes and popular protests was to reinforce the ordinary police forces, which was associated with high costs and practical difficulties, such as providing the necessary training and equipment to thousands of new police officers. For this reason, new concepts of security during times of industrial unrest, such as temporarily delegating the use of force to armed protection groups, were viewed as positive strategies for limiting security costs and avoiding the unpopular move of using the army to suppress strikers. The idea of privatising repressive practices also gained traction from the Prussian administrators' confidence in the state's solidity and in the loyalty of a large portion of the population. The perceived urgency of opposing social disintegration and, although it may seem paradoxical, the fact that the Wilhelmine elites were confident in their own strength created the precondition for delegating the use of violence to non-state actors. The ambivalence of contemporary discourses concerning strength and weakness is crucial in explaining why the Prussian state tolerated or even actively drew up and implemented strategies for sharing security tasks with groups that were considered to belong to the 'loyal classes'.

Public Law Enforcement and the Privatisation of Repressive Practices in Industrial Regions

The Prussian authorities considered strikes in mines and collieries to be even more threatening than those in other industrial sectors. The mining companies produced goods that were fundamental to the national interest, but they were often geographically isolated and therefore difficult to control. In addition, they had significant stocks of dynamite that could potentially be stolen by striking workers. For these reasons, the need for law enforcement and the formation of armed protection groups such as the *Zechenwehren* seemed particularly urgent in the mining and metallurgical sector. In 1889, more than 100,000 Ruhr mineworkers went on strike for almost a month, with the labour unrest also involving the industrial conurbations of Upper Silesia, Saxony and Saarland. Immediately after the strike, Ernst Ludwig Herrfurth, the Prussian Interior Minister, travelled to the Ruhr area and ordered that the gendarmes be armed with revolvers. He also took the initiative to

reinforce the Gendarmerie corps, which was originally deployed in rural areas but now had to also serve in industrial conurbations.²⁶ Furthermore, the Prussian local authorities and the Gendarmerie started to monitor more closely the activities of the miners' mutual-aid societies that had emerged from corporatist traditions and were suspected of being 'infected' with socialist ideas.²⁷ The Prussian administration also sought the collaboration of major companies in an effort to control the activities of 'foreign agitators' and to uncover more details about the organisation of strikes.²⁸

Remarkably, this intensification of authoritarian control did not go hand in hand with increased violence and extra-legal activities on the part of the trade unions in the mining sector. The labour movement was largely nonviolent and openly demonstrated its loyalty by sending a delegation to the Kaiser during the strike of 1889. The socialist newspapers and the labour press continually repeated the mantras of 'demonstrate peacefully', 'keep calm' and 'avoid confrontation with the police'.²⁹ After 1889, the next case of large-scale violent confrontation during the labour conflicts in the Ruhr area was the so-called Polish riot in Herne, which took place some ten years later. The Herne strike had been initiated by Polish workers and it culminated in the 'Battle of the Bahnhofstrasse' during the last days of June 1899.³⁰ This was one of the few cases of industrial unrest in which armed groups of striking workers were involved in violent confrontations with gendarmes, Prussian troops and the *Zechenwehren*. The Prussian authorities deliberately overreacted because they regarded the strike as a conspiracy by Polish nationalists supported by the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD), even though, ironically, the German trade unions stigmatised the riot in Herne as a 'childish prank' carried out by 'alcoholics' and 'intellectually lower' Polish workers.³¹ In the case of Herne, and more generally in relation to Polish labour organisations, social fears and the repression of popular protests overlapped with nationalist tensions, migration-related conflicts and ethnocentric attitudes, resulting in a disproportionately harsh reaction against minorities.³²

In other booming industrial regions, such as the Saar district, the situation was somewhat different from that in the Ruhr area because the state mining companies had not been privatised and the SPD had almost no influence over organised labour. During the strike of 1893 in Saarland, the overreaction of the Prussian Gendarmerie and the moral panic of the bourgeois elites radicalised the conflict. Local socialist newspapers, such as the *Bote von der Saar*, advertised the 'Rechtsschutz-Revolver' (workers' legal protection gun) and approximately 800 of them were sold to miners shortly before the outbreak of the strike.³³ Despite massive intervention by the Gendarmerie, the miners used firearms and even dynamite to attack the strikebreakers.³⁴ The strike was not dissimilar to a small guerrilla war, with armed miners taking control of certain forest paths and rural areas while the Prussian administration was temporarily unable to maintain order in the region. The

possession of firearms was also widespread among miners in the Ruhr area and the gun market was booming all over the country.³⁵ Some industrial towns, such as Hamborn, were no-go areas for the police, while the Prussian authorities in the county of Essen recorded more than 1,300 violations of firearms regulations between 1898 and 1900.³⁶

During the first half of the 19th century, the Prussian state controlled only two relatively small police corps: the Land Gendarmerie Corps, which was established during the Napoleonic Wars, and the Royal Guards, which had been created during the revolution of 1848 in Berlin. Both the Gendarmerie and the Royal Guards were well organised, although they operated with less than 3,000 officers, almost half of whom were stationed in Berlin.³⁷ In other major Prussian towns, such as Dortmund, Magdeburg and Cologne, only 30 or 40 officers were available per 100,000 residents. In rural areas, the difference was even more dramatic, there being only eight officers per 100,000 residents.³⁸ However, after 1848, the situation changed and all the Prussian police corps were gradually enlarged. During the early 1870s, the Prussian Ministry of the Interior decided that at least one police officer per 1,500 residents should be employed in urban areas. This goal was reached in the 1880s and after the turn of the century the proportion of policemen to residents in the major towns was even higher, standing at approximately one to 700.³⁹ The total number of Land Gendarmerie, Royal Guards and municipal police officers reached the 40,000 mark in 1913, at which time Prussia had a population of 40 million.⁴⁰ This unprecedented expansion of the police forces was not just quantitative but also qualitative, since the policemen were better trained and armed. The total amount of money spent by the Prussian state on policing increased from 26.5 million marks in 1891 to 86.5 million marks on the eve of the First World War.⁴¹ The most evocative symbol of this ground-breaking development of police forces was the gigantic new building constructed in Alexanderplatz to house the Berlin Police Department, which was completed in 1889 and where nearly 6,000 watchmen, criminal commissars and inspectors were based.⁴²

The expansion of the Prussian police was only in part directed by the central administration. Almost 40% of available police officers in 1900 belonged to municipal police units, which were dependent on the city administration and therefore susceptible to the influence of local elites. The centrally controlled Royal Guards were only dispatched to the major industrial towns after 1909, which meant that during the late 19th century the local administrations desperately needed financial resources to expand their municipal police forces. This resulted in industrial magnates being formally or informally allowed to pay for local police enforcement. Semi-privatisation of the municipal police was more widespread in industrial areas, where there was a particularly urgent need to increase the size of the security forces. In these regions, the perceived vulnerability to

‘strike terrorism’ was the main argument used by employers and managers to demand military protection for ‘willing workers’ and, if their request for more protection was rejected, to justify privatisation of the use of force.⁴³

Figure 1. A group of police officers and inspectors pose in front of the Oberhausen colliery along with two private guards and the general manager of the company. Photograph, March 1912, 130-35014-2, Stiftung Rheinisch-Westfälisches Wirtschaftsarchiv, Cologne, Germany.

Bourgeois newspapers such as the *Rheinisch-Westphalische Zeitung* and the *Kölnische Zeitung* were in direct contact with the managements of big companies in the Ruhr area. They provided anti-strike propaganda and in exchange called for support from leading industrialists to increase newspaper circulation among white-collar workers.⁴⁴ Members of the Prussian Landtag, such as Wilhelm Hirsch, also openly supported the Ruhr industrialists’ lobby.⁴⁵ The Prussian authorities were, of course, aware of this orchestrated dissemination of disinformation and lobbying pressure. In 1905, the police of Recklinghausen reported that the employers’ professed need for more military protection should be considered false and irrational.⁴⁶ The strike of 1905 heightened tensions between the Ruhr industrialists and the government in Berlin. Important members of the Bülow cabinet, such as Arthur von Posadowsky-Wehner, who served as Secretary of the Interior and Vice Chancellor, were disappointed by the ‘egoistic’ and ‘irresponsible’ autocratic management style of employers who refused to enter into negotiations with union representatives.⁴⁷ In 1912, the year of the third and final major strike by the Ruhr miners during the pre-war period, several mining and metal companies in the Ruhr area complained again about the lack of protection for strikebreakers and invented episodes of violence and intimidation against them. The police department of Essen explicitly denied the credibility of these claims.⁴⁸ When the management of the Gutehoffnungshütte mining company recognised that anti-strike propaganda was ineffective in persuading the state police and the Governor of Westphalia to intervene, the company decided to place more pressure on local authorities to obtain support against ‘strike terrorism’.⁴⁹

Despite the ongoing expansion of the police forces, the lack of policemen was still a real problem in many areas peripheral to the industrial regions. In the town of Neunkirchen, for example, three policemen had to control more than 18,000 residents. Neunkirchen was the hometown of the steel magnate Karl Ferdinand von Stumm, a prominent member of the Reichstag and the Pan-German League. Due to the very limited presence of police officers, Stumm had to rely on his foremen, white-collar workers and skilled workers to help maintain order and discipline. He

strongly supported the formation of shooting clubs and veterans' associations where highly paid workers could gain social respectability and learn to use weapons. Although supervisors and white-collar workers could not always join pre-existing nationalist and militarist groups, they successfully created their own organisations. In 1904, the Prussian authorities granted the highly paid workers at the ironworks in Burbach, in the Saar district, the right to establish their own association, which was authorised to wear uniforms and issue orders and decorations. They participated in public commemorations and celebrations, created a club flag and were symbolically armed with axes.⁵⁰

Consolidation of the internal hierarchy of the mining and metallurgic sector was symbolised by group photos, in which supervisors and mine foremen appeared as a separate entity from the mass of workers. They formed a distinctive group that impressed with their superior clothes and posture, which tended to imitate the dominant habitus of the bourgeoisie or military and aristocratic elites. The disciplinary tasks carried out by supervisors and highly paid employees were supported by leading industrialists, such as Stumm and Krupp, who considered the hierarchy and discipline of the Prussian army to be the best model for their factories.⁵¹ In Neunkirchen, Stumm provided his supervisors with revolvers and sticks to encourage them to 'defend themselves' against subordinate workers.⁵² He claimed to have quasi-feudal rights in his ironworks and, in his mind at least, he was the only person who could legitimately manage discipline and punishment.⁵³ White-collar workers and supervisors were the long arm of the autocratic paternalism of German industrialists and, as noted by Jürgen Kocka, they assumed responsibility for authoritarian control and repression on behalf of the company.⁵⁴ Private companies also granted special benefits to 'loyal workers'. After the strike of 1912, for instance, the Westende colliery near Duisburg decided to make extraordinary payments of 200 marks to its managers and 50 to 150 marks to its supervisors.⁵⁵

As mentioned above, alongside the militarisation of white-collar workers and supervisors against potential labour insurgency, German industrialists also paid local administrations for the dedicated services of municipal police officers. This widespread, albeit not formally regulated, phenomenon positioned local police officers as a *de facto* semi-private police force. By the mid-19th century, employers were seeking to corrupt state agents and offered benefits such as free flats to police officers who agreed to provide full-time patrol services for private companies. During the 1870s, German industrialists attempted to cooperate more formally with local administrations with the aim of regulating the private use of police forces. The idea of accepting private funding to increase the numbers of police officers in industrial regions was also supported by the Ministry of the Interior.⁵⁶ In 1875, Krupp paid the salaries and retirement contributions of six gendarmes who worked exclusively in the area surrounding the company. While Krupp's aim of establishing a private police force remained an unrealised project, private use of municipal police became a

common practice in pre-war Germany. The presence of regular police officers in the Krupp factory continued throughout the First World War after the creation of a special police unit, the *Polizeistelle Krupp*, with the aim of controlling the foreign workers who were compelled to work for the company.⁵⁷

Other major steel producers in the Ruhr region adopted the same strategy as Krupp. The Thyssen plant in Hamborn, for example, paid for the services of eight police officers in 1908, and during the strike of 1905 the city council allowed Thyssen to arm his mine foremen with revolvers and sticks.⁵⁸ Along with policemen being regularly paid by private companies, there were occasional acts of corruption, especially during labour disputes. In 1912, the management of the Gutehoffnungshütte mining company agreed that the company would make a payment of three marks and give free meals to Prussian gendarmes who came from outside the Ruhr area to support the local police. The Gutehoffnungshütte management also directly employed local police officers as security guards and paid them between three and five marks a day depending on their rank.⁵⁹ After the strike, the mine owners and managers organised a meeting near Gelsenkirchen to approve extraordinary payments to police officers who had served during the labour unrest. The meeting was attended by 14 managers who agreed that 11 companies should pay a total of 20,880 marks for the services of state police officers.⁶⁰ The Phoenix colliery, for example, paid out a total of almost 2,000 marks in benefits and extraordinary payments.⁶¹ A few days later, the Gelsenkirchen Police President received the money and sent his thanks to the local employers' association.⁶² By contrast, the Berlin Police Executive rejected the payment with the argument that police officers could not receive payments from non-state actors.⁶³

It was not only the Berlin Police Executive that showed increasing scepticism about the privatisation of regular police forces, since the Prussian authorities also did. Following a tumultuous debate in the Landtag in 1883, the Ministry of the Interior refused to approve new requests by employers to 'hire' regular police officers. However, the partnership between public and private repressive practices continued on a more informal basis. Major companies like Krupp paid for the private use of gendarmes until 1910. It was also still possible to convince local authorities with a generous offer of cash and benefits to allow the semi-private use of public officers. In 1904, 30% of all municipal police officers in the Recklinghausen district were salaried or given benefits by private companies. In addition, almost 20% of gendarmes in the districts of Hamm and Gelsenkirchen were co-funded by employers and sometimes the local authorities took the initiative to demand that private companies pay for the hiring of new police officers.⁶⁴ In 1909, the highest German court issued a kind of legal approbation of mixed private-public funding of police forces. The court implicitly stated that the semi-private use of police officers was tolerated and that

policemen, even if they always served within a private factory, should be considered officers in the normal execution of their duties.⁶⁵

The Legal Framework and the Activities of the *Zechenwehren*

Following the strike of 1889, the Prussian authorities drew up and implemented a new legal and administrative framework for the formation of armed protection groups in the mining sector. In September 1894, the office of the Governor of Westphalia published official guidelines for the activities of auxiliary policemen, which were transmitted to the local authorities of the Ruhr area.⁶⁶ The guidelines regulated the formation and function of the *Zechenwehren* and stated that the mining companies had to pay for the salaries, armament and equipment of all auxiliary formations.⁶⁷ Despite the fact that they were privately funded, the guidelines presented the *Zechenwehren* as a top-down initiative and noted that they would only be temporarily mobilised in the case of major strikes with the primary aim of guarding company property. According to the ‘service instructions’ for the *Zechenwehren*, the members of armed protection groups were supposed to assist the police in protecting strikebreakers, although they could only operate on the company’s property.⁶⁸

The armed protection groups were composed of white-collar workers, mine foremen, supervisors and, in few cases, also the managers who were already employed by the company within which the *Zechenwehren* were created. In 1912, for example, the Gewerkschaft Barmen company informed the local authorities that 18 employees had been selected as members of the *Zechenwehr*. The director of the company was part of the armed group, along with two white-collar workers, ten supervisors and two mine foremen.⁶⁹ At the Bergmannsglück colliery, the armed protection group had 25 members in 1912, among them ten supervisors and six foremen, while all the auxiliaries at the Holland colliery near Gelsenkirchen were mine supervisors.⁷⁰ The workers who joined the *Zechenwehren* were mostly Prussian subjects between 30 and 40 years of age who had served in the regular army.⁷¹ The fourth paragraph of the official guidelines stated that members of the *Zechenwehren* had to be officially designated as *Hilfspolizeibeamten* (auxiliary policemen) by local authorities after swearing an oath. They had to wear uniforms similar to those of the police, with a black and white cockade, a hat and an armlet bearing the distinctive Prussian emblem. At the end of the administrative procedure, *Zechenwehr* members were legally granted the temporary status of police officers, which was important if they were to be protected by article 113 of the German Criminal Code, particularly the paragraph on ‘Civil Disorder’ and resistance to police officers.

Figure 2. Members of the ‘Streikkommando’ pose in front of the Alma colliery near Gelsenkirchen during the strike of 1893. From left to right, Prussian gendarme Kivar, gendarme Leest, gendarme Glaubitz, police officer Gosse, manager Koch, mine foreman Brinkmann, gendarme Laforet, mine foreman Keller, office worker Henschke, gendarme Zimmermann and gendarme Neumann. Photograph, January 1893, BBA 070410901701, Montanhistorisches Dokumentationszentrum, Deutsches Bergbau-Museum, Bochum, Germany.

Following publication of the official guidelines in 1894, the Prussian administration took further steps to regulate the *Zechenwehren*. Special firearms licences, general service instructions and detailed instructions for the use of firearms were printed and distributed to auxiliary policemen.⁷² The service instructions and firearms licences had been in circulation since 1895 and they also served as a form of identification for legally authorised *Zechenwehr* auxiliaries. In 1896, for example, the central state government’s representative in Dortmund ordered the printing of 500 of these special ID cards.⁷³ They were also in use in other districts of the Ruhr area around 1900.⁷⁴ The firearms licences were validated with a police authority seal and they gave the *Zechenwehr* auxiliaries permission to carry and use weapons during strikes and public demonstrations. Although German legislation imposed no formal restrictions on the right to buy and bear arms, there were some politically motivated limitations that did not apply to the *Zechenwehren*.⁷⁵

According to the preamble of the General Service Instructions of 1895, municipal councils had the right to appoint members of the *Zechenwehren* in cooperation with the managements of the mining companies. The instructions also stated that auxiliary policemen, who were armed with revolvers and bayonets, must promptly carry out the orders of their superiors, who were members of the local government.⁷⁶ The police authorities were also directly involved and sent officers to protect the mining companies during strikes and to take command of the *Zechenwehren*.⁷⁷ Strict observance of the law, a fearless attitude in service and absolute loyalty to the Kaiser were explicitly mentioned as the guiding principles of militancy in the auxiliary formations.⁷⁸ In both the General Service Instructions and the Instructions for the Use of Firearms, the Prussian authorities stressed that weapons could only be used if strictly necessary, and even where the use of weapons was deemed necessary, the auxiliaries were to avoid causing fatal injuries.⁷⁹ They had to carry their revolvers, which must always be loaded with six cartridges, in a leather sheath on their right side and they had to immediately inform the local authorities if they had used their weapons or arrested someone.⁸⁰

The Prussian authorities were also concerned with practical problems, such as the delivery of weapons and the procedure for ordering police equipment. In 1911, the Essen Police President

asked the Gutehoffnungshütte mining company to organise a *Zechenwehr* unit and a few weeks later he advised the company of the urgency of providing auxiliary policemen with weapons and official armbands. The company management was invited to buy the necessary equipment in Berlin from the official supplier to the Prussian army and navy.⁸¹ In the same letter, the police authorities suggested the use of revolvers as standard weapons, since they were considered to be less dangerous than other handguns. Remarkably, the Gutehoffnungshütte administration decided to buy Browning handguns, despite the fact that the police considered these weapons to be too dangerous for the *Zechenwehren*.⁸² Two years later, the Gutehoffnungshütte company was again asked to reinforce its armed protection group and to provide its auxiliaries with police hats, armbands, revolvers and sticks.⁸³ The company agreed and informed the local administrative office that the auxiliary formation now had 14 new members, mainly former soldiers and mine supervisors.⁸⁴

After the turn of the century, the Prussian state started to buy several coal mines in the Ruhr area. In 1902, the Royal Coal Mines' Administration was established in Recklinghausen. Remarkably, even the state-owned companies decided to organise *Zechenwehr* units. While in the case of private companies the legal status of anti-strike formations was characterised by a mix of private and state support, in the case of state-owned coal mines the situation was even more complicated, since the auxiliaries (who were already employed by a state-owned company) were supposed to work temporarily for the state as auxiliary police officers. In 1905, the local office of the Royal Coal Mines' Administration in Dortmund reported the high expenses incurred for the purchase of revolvers, ammunition and other weapons. Ironically, the state-owned company asked the Prussian Ministry of Commerce to pay for the *Zechenwehren*'s armaments and equipment.⁸⁵ The incident in Dortmund was not an isolated one; for example, the local offices of the Royal Coal Mines' Administration in Buer and Vienenburg also advised the headquarters in Recklinghausen that their companies had established armed protection groups.⁸⁶

The concept and formal regulation of the *Zechenwehren* were already well developed in the 1890s, although it was only during the decade leading up to the First World War that legal anti-strike formations became a widespread phenomenon. One reason for the late institution of the *Zechenwehren* is that after the major strike of 1889 industrial peace had largely been re-established and had lasted until there was a new peak in labour unrest between 1903 and 1907. In 1904, the Deutschland colliery rejected the 'kind suggestion' of the District President of Schwelm to establish an auxiliary formation, as they considered it to be counterproductive and even a possible source of the radicalisation of labour conflicts.⁸⁷ The strike of 1905, which involved more than 200,000 miners, marked a fundamental turning point when initially recalcitrant companies decided to create their own *Zechenwehren*. The Gewerkschaft Barmen mining company, for example, urged the Prussian authorities to approve their request to organise an armed protection group and then

emphatically declared that there was no other option than to ‘directly assume the responsibility of protecting the company against major threats’.⁸⁸

The local authorities in the Ruhr area were primarily involved in drawing up the administrative rules for the *Zechenwehren*. The Westphalian nobleman Eberhard von der Recke von der Horst was a key player in the centre-periphery of the political spectrum. In 1895, after serving as President of the Regional Administration for Düsseldorf, he was appointed Prussian Minister of the Interior and between 1899 and 1911 he served as the Governor of Westphalia. After the strike of 1905, von der Horst reported positively to the Kaiser on the organisation and activities of the *Zechenwehren*.⁸⁹ Investigations and memoranda regarding the spread of armed protection groups reached the highest level of the Wilhelmine state, and the office of the Governor of Westphalia frequently asked local administrators to compile detailed registers of the strength, armament and internal organisation of the *Zechenwehren*. Between 1904 and 1912, the Prussian authorities compiled at least 11 general records concerning auxiliary police units, listing the names and professions of their members.⁹⁰

The general statistics from 1904 recorded 162 mines and other major metallurgic companies with more than 100 employers in the districts of Bochum, Dortmund, Gelsenkirchen, Hagen and Hamm. In 41 of the 162 companies *Zechenwehren* had already been organised and 35 anti-strike formations were armed with revolvers. A total of more than 500 auxiliary policemen were active and the average strength of the armed protection groups was 13 members. After the strike of 1905, the total number of *Zechenwehr* auxiliaries rapidly grew to more than 2,500, while the average strength of the *Zechenwehren* also increased. Some companies were able to organise quite large armed groups, such as the Germania and Mont Cenis collieries, both of which had more than 70 auxiliary policemen, and the Shamrock and Pluto mining companies, which had respectively 115 and 126 armed men, all equipped with revolvers.⁹¹

In 1907, Friedrich von Moltke, the new Prussian Minister of the Interior and brother of the Chief of the General Staff, asked the local government of Westphalia for more detailed information on the *Zechenwehren*. The 11 questions posed by Moltke indicate that the local authorities in the Ruhr area were recalcitrant in terms of sharing information with the central government. Moltke wanted to know more, not only about the *Zechenwehren*’s strength and armament, but also about their official field of activity, functions and legal status.⁹² He received a detailed report in early 1908, although the formal regulation of armed protection groups had actually been in place since the mid-1890s when the official guidelines, firearms licences and general service instructions appeared. Moltke was probably badly informed by his predecessor or his colleagues in Berlin; however, it does seem that the regional and local authorities tended to hold a monopoly of information and decision making over the *Zechenwehren*. This may be why these auxiliary units

remained confined to the Ruhr area, despite attempts to extend their use to Upper Silesia.⁹³

Another possible reason why the *Zeichenwehren* remained limited to the Ruhr area is that in other industrial hotspots, such as the Saar district, strike activity was less intense and the labour movement was weaker. In Saxony, the most industrialised federal state of Imperial Germany, the Free Unions and the SPD were even more widespread than in the Ruhr area, but the political and constitutional situation, the bureaucracy and Landtag differed from those in Prussia. The authorities in Dresden did not implement the legal and administrative framework for the *Zeichenwehren*, although auxiliary formations known as *Wohlfahrtsbeamten* were used to help Saxon gendarmes during the suffrage reform demonstrations of 1905.⁹⁴ Along with the Saxon *Wohlfahrtsbeamten*, special constables in the United Kingdom were another formation of volunteer officers somewhat similar to the *Zeichenwehren*. Special constables were also private citizens who were often recruited among clerks and foremen chosen by their employers to oppose striking workers. They were legally transformed into constables by local judges and worked alongside regular officers.⁹⁵

Mobilisation of the ‘Loyal Classes’ and the Search for National Cohesion

In an effort to keep the *Zeichenwehren* under control, the local police authorities regularly visited the mining companies where auxiliary formations had been organised in order to verify information regarding their members.⁹⁶ As a result of multiple attempts to control the numbers of *Zeichenwehren* and their operations, the local authorities compiled detailed registers of auxiliary police units and investigated whether their members were ‘patriotic’ and ‘loyal’ citizens.⁹⁷ The Gewerkschaft Barmen company, for example, proudly reported to the District President of Schwelm that the members of its *Zeichenwehr* were ‘extremely reliable workers, who clearly support the national community and would never join a revolutionary movement’.⁹⁸

The Prussian administration was concerned not only about the political backgrounds of the auxiliary policemen, but also about the efforts of private companies to rigorously implement the official guidelines and instructions for the *Zeichenwehren*. A report written by the District President of Münster to the Governor of Westphalia in 1904 analysed the situation in two collieries that had different approaches to the official guidelines. In the case of the General Blumenthal colliery in Recklinghausen, the instructions had been strictly followed: the 30 members of its auxiliary formation had been officially approved and the necessary police-style equipment was available for use. By contrast, the management of the Harpener Bergbau company refused to formally organise a *Zeichenwehr* and claimed they improvised mobilisation of armed groups of white-collar workers and supervisors during strikes. This unorganised extra-legal approach was, of course, heavily criticised by the Prussian authorities.⁹⁹

During the period between 1905 and 1907, the regional and local administrators in the Ruhr area systematically evaluated the activities of the *Zeichenwehren* to gain a better understanding of whether they could provide reliable support for the regular police forces. Immediately after the strike of 1905, Felix von Merveldt, the District President of Recklinghausen, reported enthusiastically on the *Zeichenwehren*. According to von Merveldt, the mobilisation of fully armed and equipped auxiliary units had proved to be very efficient. He described the *Zeichenwehren* as a ‘great support’ for the police, even though, ironically, there had been no occasion to really test the auxiliary units because the strike was largely peaceful.¹⁰⁰ Von Merveldt also reported that the auxiliary policemen never operated independently and were always under the control of the regular police. The local authorities in Arnsberg and Münster also thought that armed protection groups offered good support for public law enforcement. They stressed the importance of recruiting ‘loyal citizens’ and of restricting the operations of auxiliary formations to the protection of the company.¹⁰¹ In his memorandum to the Governor of Westphalia, the District President of Arnsberg expressed his general satisfaction with the activities and patriotic attitude of the *Zeichenwehren*. He emphatically suggested reactivating armed protection groups in the event of major disorders.¹⁰² Although other high functionaries, such as the District President of Düsseldorf, cautiously criticised the auxiliary formations, the final report on the strike of 1905 sent to the Prussian Minister of the Interior described the *Zeichenwehren* positively as ‘groups of responsible workers who actively supported regular police forces’.¹⁰³

The mobilisation of armed protection groups was part of a broader picture that involved the intensification of nationalist and anti-socialist militancy in late Imperial Germany. In addition to the spread of yellow unions and professional strikebreaking, a plurality of non-state actors, such as veterans’ and ex-soldiers’ organisations, the Imperial League Against Social-Democracy, the Federation of Yellow Workers and the League of Patriotic Workers (the last two having been established in 1907), joined the ‘parties of order’.¹⁰⁴ Some of these groups of veterans and nationalist workers were directly involved in episodes of violent repression. In Blumberg, near Potsdam, members of the local veterans’ club brutally attacked Social Democratic agitators in 1890 and a year later a meeting of socialist workers in the town of Eisleben was attacked by the local nationalist miners’ union.¹⁰⁵ Although mobilisation of the ‘loyal classes’ did involve violent repression, its symbolic dimension was even more important because it emphasised the unity of the national community against the potential threats posed by internal and external enemies. Non-state actors played a key role in orchestrating the cohesion of Wilhelmine society in response to fears of political and social disintegration. The drive for national cohesion, despite its ambiguities and partial ineffectiveness, reflected the idea of ‘rallying together’ anti-socialist forces, which was crucial in the political culture of Imperial Germany.¹⁰⁶

The formation of legal armed groups to oppose the labour movement was part of the wider mobilisation of the 'loyal classes', although it must be underlined once again that, compared with nationalist pressure groups or armed groups of strikebreakers, the *Zechenwehren* were legally armed and permitted to use force. The Social Democratic newspapers sarcastically nicknamed the *Zechenwehren* 'the German Pinkertons', although this comparison is misleading because in Germany it was mainly the state – actively supported by certain leading industrialists – that took the initiative to formally redistribute coercive tasks and delegate the use of force to non-state actors.¹⁰⁷ The *Zechenwehren* embodied the idea of mobilising civil society to protect the national community and, like other anti-socialist organisations that emerged during the same period, the show of force played a much more substantial role than its actual use.

The fact that the *Zechenwehr* units were directly involved in remarkably few episodes of armed repression was also closely related to their legal and strictly state-controlled status. The Social Democratic newspapers and the labour press reported quite infrequently on the activities of the *Zechenwehren* as they were more interested in episodes of intimidation and violence involving armed strikebreakers. Nevertheless, there were some notable episodes in which Social Democratic politicians explicitly criticised the *Zechenwehren*. During the strike of 1905, for example, the socialist member of the Reichstag, Theodor Bömelburg, denounced the brutality of auxiliary policemen. According to Bömelburg, despite armed protection groups being ordered to limit their use of force, they violently intimidated workers and forced them to return to work. He further claimed that members of the *Zechenwehr* in the municipal area of Herne brutally beat a striker with their revolvers until he collapsed.¹⁰⁸ Bömelburg and Otto Hue, another Social Democratic member of the Reichstag, criticised the fact that police authorities tolerated the distribution of arms to strikebreakers and that the Prussian state supported not only the activities of the officially organised *Zechenwehren*, but also their extra-legal repressive practices against the labour movement. Hue reported that in the Lothringen colliery near Bochum more than 300 rifles were ready to be used against striking mineworkers.¹⁰⁹ In the Kaiserstuhl colliery near Dortmund 65 steel-reinforced sticks had been distributed, not only to members of the *Zechenwehr*, but also to strikebreakers. Bömelburg created a huge sensation when he showed one of the *Totschläger* sticks to the Reichstag assembly during his speech.¹¹⁰

The *Zechenwehren* helped to increase the disproportionate strength of the Wilhelmine state in relation to the labour movement and they also demonstrated national cohesion against perceptions that the established order was being threatened. During the Herne riot in 1899, more than 2,100 Prussian soldiers, along with hundreds of regular officers, were mobilised against less than 1,800 striking workers.¹¹¹ In addition to this disproportionate show of strength, the local

administration urged the mine companies to mobilise the *Zechenwehren*. These armed groups represented the authorities' response to the perceived lack of protection in industrial areas, where 'strike terrorism' appeared to be a threat to both private interests and national security. However, the activities of the auxiliary formations were intentionally limited. The Prussian authorities were more interested in the show of force, which created a climate of intimidation and emphasised the unity of the 'loyal classes' against revolutionary threats. After 1905, the spread and formal regulation of the *Zechenwehren* did not notably change until 1914. However, they did partially lose importance due to growing efforts to expand the regular police forces and the rise of powerful employers' associations that implemented effective strategies against the labour movement, such as the formation of yellow unions and the use of blacklists and lockouts.

Conclusion

During the period between the major miners' strikes of 1889 and 1912, the Prussian authorities formally supported, or at least tolerated, a plurality of repressive practices against the labour movement. The intensification of authoritarian control and the partial privatisation of security tasks had three main aspects. The first was the militarisation of white-collar workers and supervisors in order to discipline subordinated workers. With the aim of mobilising 'loyal workers', private companies granted material benefits, such as higher salaries and extraordinary payments, but also immaterial benefits, such as the right to use weapons and entrance to the bourgeois social circles of Wilhelmine society. The second was another more formal type of state-supported repression that was founded on the unprecedented growth of police forces in industrial areas. However, while the Gendarmerie Corps and the Royal Prussian Police were more strictly controlled from above, the municipal police force underwent forms of semi-privatisation, since its officers had been paid by, or were materially dependent on, private companies. The third and final type of repressive practice was related to the spread of officially organised armed protection groups in the Ruhr area. The blurred boundaries between private interests and national security in the context of labour conflicts are clearly recognisable in the creation of *Zechenwehren* not only in private companies, but also in the state-owned collieries of the Royal Coal Mines' Administration.

Recognition of the plurality of the mixed public-private repressive practices examined in this article provides a better understanding of the patterns of continuity and change between Wilhelmine and Weimar Germany. Despite the fact that in both the pre-war and post-war periods the Prussian authorities had emphasised the auxiliary role of the 'defence organisations', the *Zechenwehren* remained regionally and numerically limited compared with the paramilitary militias

and vigilante formations that proliferated after the November Revolution. In the province of Brandenburg, the citizens' militias (*Einwohnerwehren*, originally called *Bürgerwehren*) increased from 108 formations with 8,153 members in early 1919 to almost 2,000 units with more than 66,000 members just one year later, whereas the *Zeichenwehren* never mobilised more than 3,000 members.¹¹² The *Einwohnerwehren* also spread to other German states, such as Bavaria, where they had been established by war veterans and were able to mobilise 200,000 members within a few months.¹¹³ Before they were abolished in 1920, almost one million citizens armed with 690,000 rifles and bayonets had joined civic guards in the entire German Reich.¹¹⁴

While the *Zeichenwehren* only operated in the Ruhr valley, post-war armed associations such as the citizens' militias were a translocal and transnational phenomenon with centralised administration: the *Zentralstelle für Einwohnerwehren* and, in the case of the Bavarian militias, the *Organisation Escherich*. Structured into several departments (propaganda, armament, etc.), the *Zentralstelle* organised lobbying activities in Berlin and published a propaganda organ. The growing constellation of post-war *Wehren* was not restricted to the field of industrial unrest, but had rather a plurality of motivations and purposes, such as the fear of Bolshevism, the repression of criminality and disorder, and the promotion of national cohesion. In this latter aspect they were, at least to a certain extent, comparable to the *Zeichenwehren*, although they were not directly involved in political conflicts and ideological antagonism in the same way that the post-war paramilitary units and citizens' militias were.

The guidelines for the *Zeichenwehren* issued in 1894 stressed the auxiliary role of legal armed groups, which remained formally under the control of state police authorities. During the post-war period, the citizens' militias were also formally defined as an auxiliary corps, although they were a *de facto* paramilitary organisation with greater similarities to the *Freikorps* than to the *Zeichenwehren*. Nevertheless, the guidelines governing the *Zeichenwehren* and the *Einwohnerwehren* had some things in common, such as the definition of members as auxiliary policemen and the possibility to place suspects under temporary arrest.¹¹⁵ In Wilhelmine Germany, legal armed groups were officially approved and controlled by local authorities and the initiative to form auxiliary units to oppose striking workers came from above. After 1918, by contrast, the spread of 'defence organisations' was more spontaneous, although the Weimar state also aimed to control recruitment and to politically instrumentalise the *Einwohnerwehren*. During the first years of the Weimar period, armed associations were led by charismatic figures and linked to military authorities and right-wing paramilitary units, which would have been unthinkable in the case of the pre-war armed groups.

The *Technische Nothilfe* (Technical Emergency Corps), which was created in early 1919

after the so-called Spartacist uprising in Berlin, was also substantially different from the *Zechenwehren*, although both organisations were controlled by civilian authorities and aimed at tackling ‘strike terrorism’ in industrial sectors of national importance. The *Technische Nothilfe* was originally established as a paramilitary formation by the *Garde-Kavallerie-Schützen-Division*.¹¹⁶ Aimed at temporarily replacing striking workers, it had close connections with right-wing paramilitaries as well as the regular army. The *Zechenwehren*, by contrast, had no association with the old Imperial Army and nor were they supposed to replace strikers. However, both the *Zechenwehren* and the *Technische Nothilfe* were state-supported and formally regulated groups that could be mobilised in the case of major labour disputes. The *Technische Nothilfe*, which already had more than 150,000 volunteer members in 1921, was headed by former Army Pioneers officer Otto Lummitzsch and supported by the Minister of Defence, Gustav Noske, a Majority Social Democrat.¹¹⁷ Initially under the supervision of the Ministry of Defence, the corps was placed under the control of the Ministry of the Interior after the signing of the Treaty of Versailles, which limited the size of the German army. This governmental strikebreaking organisation also became an emergency response unit that provided help after fires, storms and other natural disasters. The civilian volunteers of the *Technische Nothilfe* had no connection with private companies, unlike the *Zechenwehren*, whose members were already employed by the companies in which they served with the temporary status of auxiliary police officers. Remarkably, the ‘weak’ Weimar state was able to at least partly finance the Technical Emergency Corps, whereas the weapons, equipment, uniforms and salaries of the *Zechenwehren* were paid for by private companies.¹¹⁸

Without a doubt, the mobilisation of anti-strike and anti-communist organisations in the post-war period was much more politically and ideologically charged and more violent than before 1914.¹¹⁹ Although it would be misleading to overemphasise the similarity of the repressive practices seen during the pre- and post-war years, some aspects of continuity can be discerned. The notion of defence (*Wehr*) and the official guidelines and motivation for the auxiliary formations in Wilhelmine Germany partly overlapped with those of the legal armed groups that emerged after 1918, such as the *Einwohnerwehren* and the *Technische Nothilfe*. The pre- and post-war *Wehren* shared certain characteristics, such as the recruitment of auxiliary forces from among the ‘loyal classes’ in order to satisfy demands for more protection and, in theory at least, to enforce the social and political order against broadly perceived threats.

The formal and informal collaborations between public and private repressive practices were intended to temporarily fill a power vacuum. In pre-1914 Germany, the vulnerability of the established order was linked to unprecedented intensification of labour conflicts and the extraordinary growth of both the SPD and the Free Unions. Although private companies were given

broad autonomy in terms of recruiting and organising armed protection groups, the *Zechenwehren* were directly supervised, coordinated and bureaucratically controlled by the Prussian authorities. The Wilhelmine state was better able to effectively control and regulate the formation of auxiliary units than the early Weimar Republic. The rise of armed groups and the redistribution of security tasks against revolutionary threats had already intensified around 1900 and the motivations were similar, although the results were different, after 1918, when the collapse of the state's authority gave rise to a previously unknown level of social protest, ideological antagonism and violent repression.

¹ Correspondence from the Gutehoffnungshütte mining company to the Essen Police President, 29 May 1918, Box 30101, Folder 18, Bergwerksabteilung I/II, Stiftung Rheinisch-Westfälisches Wirtschaftsarchiv (RWWA), Cologne, Germany.

² Ralph Jessen, *Polizei im Industrierevier: Modernisierung und Herrschaftspraxis im westfälischen Ruhrgebiet 1848-1914* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1991), 143. See also Anja Johansen, *Soldiers as police: the French and Prussian armies and the policing of popular protest, 1889-1914* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005), 164.

³ Xu Qiyu, *Fragile Rise: Grand Strategy and the Fate of Imperial Germany, 1871-1914*, trans. Joshua Hill (Boston: MIT Press, 2017).

⁴ Frank Lorenz Müller, "Perhaps also useful for our election campaign: The Parliamentary Impasse of the Late Wilhelmine state and the British Constitutional Crisis, 1909-1911," in *Wilhelmine Germany and Edwardian Britain. Essays on Cultural Affinity*, ed. Dominik Geppert and Robert Gerwarth (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 67–87. On the political culture and the supposed democratic deficit of Germany when compared with England, France and the United States, see Margaret Lavinia Anderson, "Ein Demokratiedefizit? Das Deutsche Kaiserreich in vergleichender Perspektive," *Geschichte und Gesellschaft* 44, no. 1 (2018): 367–398; Hedwig Richter, *Moderne Wahlen: eine Geschichte der Demokratie in Preußen und den USA im 19. Jahrhundert* (Hamburg: Hamburger Edition, 2017).

⁵ Among the few studies dedicated to these topics, see Richard J. Evans, "Red Wednesday in Hamburg: Social democrats, police and Lumpenproletariat in the suffrage disturbances of 17 January 1906," *Social History* 4, no. 1 (1979): 1–31; Ralph Jessen, "Unternehmerherrschaft und staatliches Gewaltmonopol. Hüttenpolizisten und Zechenwehren im Ruhrgebiet 1870-1914," in *Sicherheit und Wohlfahrt: Polizei, Gesellschaft und Herrschaft im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert*, ed. Alf Lüdtke (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1992), 161–186; Johansen, *Soldiers as police*; Klaus Weinbauer, "Protest, kollektive Gewalt und Polizei in Hamburg zwischen Versammlungsdemokratie und staatlicher Sicherheit ca. 1890-1933," in *Kollektive Gewalt in der Stadt: Europa 1890-1939*, ed. Friedrich Lenger (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2013), 69–102.

⁶ Klaus Tenfelde, "Soziale Schichtung, Klassenbildung und Konfliktlagen im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert," in *Das Ruhrgebiet im Industriezeitalter. Geschichte und Entwicklung*, ed. Wolfgang Köllmann and Franz-Josef Brüggemeier (Düsseldorf: Schwann, 1990), 199.

⁷ See, for example, Philipp Müller, "But we will always have to individualise. Police Supervision of Released Prisoners, its Crisis and Reform in Prussia (1880-1914)," *Crime, History & Societies* 14, no. 2 (2010): 55–84; Arnaud Houte, *Le Métier de gendarme au XIXe siècle* (Rennes: Presses Universitaires de Rennes, 2010); Karl Härter, "Legal Responses to Violent Political Crimes in 19th Century Central Europe," in *Vom Majestätsverbrechen zum Terrorismus. Politische Kriminalität, Recht, Justiz und Polizei zwischen Früher Neuzeit und 20. Jahrhundert*, ed. Karl Härter and Beatrice de Graaf, (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 2012), 161–178.

⁸ Traditional historiography concerning the social history of the Ruhr miners has dedicated only a few sentences to the auxiliary police units, while recently published overviews of German mining history have failed provide new insights into the *Zechenwehren*. See Helmuth Trischler, "Arbeitsbeziehungen im deutschen Bergbau 1848 bis 1933," in *Motor der Industrialisierung deutsche Bergbaugeschichte im 19. und frühen 20. Jahrhundert*, ed. Klaus Tenfelde and Toni Pierenkemper (Münster: Aschendorff, 2016), 377–421. Still fundamental regarding the miners of the Ruhr are classical studies such as Klaus Tenfelde, *Sozialgeschichte der Bergarbeiterschaft an der Ruhr im 19. Jahrhundert* (Bonn: Verlag Neue Gesellschaft, 1977) and Franz-Josef Brüggemeier, *Leben vor Ort. Ruhrbergleute und Ruhrbergbau 1889-1919* (Munich: C.H. Beck, 1983).

⁹ See Heinz-Gerhard Haupt, "Using Violence to Govern: The German Empire and the French Third Republic," in *Imperial Germany Revisited: Continuing Debates and New Perspectives*, ed. Sven Oliver Müller and Cornelius Torp (New York: Berghahn, 2013), 97–106. Among the many studies dedicated to political violence and social conflicts in post-war Germany, see Dirk Schumann, *Political Violence, 1918-1933: Fight for the Streets and Fear of Civil War* (New York: Berghahn, 2009); Mark Jones, *Founding Weimar: Violence and the German Revolution of 1918-1919* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016).

- ¹⁰ The possession of guns was not restricted, but there were limitations to the right to carry arms in public. See Dagmar Ellerbrock, “Gun-violence and control in Germany 1880-1911. Scandalizing Gun Violence and Changing Perceptions as Preconditions for Firearm Control,” in *The Control of Violence in Modern Society: Multidisciplinary Perspectives, From School Shootings to Ethnic Violence*, ed. Wilhelm Heitmeyer et al. (New York: Springer, 2010), 185–212.
- ¹¹ On militarism, war remembrance and nation-building in pre-war Germany, see, among many studies, Frank Becker, *Bilder von Krieg und Nation: die Einigungskriege in der bürgerlichen Öffentlichkeit Deutschlands 1864-1913* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2001); Ute Frevert, *A Nation in Barracks: Modern Germany, Military Conscription and Civil Society*, trans. Andrew Boreham (New York: Berg, 2004); Jörn Leonhard, *Bellizismus und Nation: Kriegsdeutung und Nationsbestimmung in Europa und den Vereinigten Staaten 1750-1914* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2008); Birgit Aschmann, *Preußens Ruhm und Deutschlands Ehre. Zum nationalen Ehrdiskurs im Vorfeld der preußisch-französischen Kriege des 19. Jahrhunderts* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2013).
- ¹² Nationalism and militarism were the answers to the challenges of a mass society throughout Europe, not only in Germany. See Jakob Vogel, *Nationen im Gleichschritt: der Kult der Nation in Waffen in Deutschland und Frankreich, 1871-1914* (Göttingen 1997).
- ¹³ See Ute Frevert, *Ehrenmänner: das Duell in der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft* (Munich: C.H. Beck, 1991).
- ¹⁴ See William W. Hagen, *Germans, Poles, and Jews: The Nationality Conflict in the Prussian East, 1772-1914* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980).
- ¹⁵ Johansen, *Soldiers as police*, 126.
- ¹⁶ The first ‘modern’ strikes of the Ruhr miners occurred in 1868 and 1872; however, it was only during the major unrest of 1889, 1905 and 1912 that more than 100,000 miners went on strike. Other smaller strikes and local disputes occurred in the Ruhr region in 1891, 1893 and 1899. See S.H.F. Hickey, *Workers in Imperial Germany. The Miners of the Ruhr* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985), 169–225. On the international strike wave of 1889–1890 as a turning point in labour history see Friedhelm Boll, *Arbeitskämpfe und Gewerkschaften in Deutschland, England und Frankreich* (Bonn: Dietz, 1992).
- ¹⁷ James N. Retallack, *Red Saxony: Election Battles and the Spectre of Democracy in Germany, 1860-1918* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 624.
- ¹⁸ See Stefan Berger, “Building the Nation Among Visions of German Empire,” in *Nationalizing Empires*, ed. Stefan Berger and Alexei Miller (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2015), 247–308.
- ¹⁹ Tenfelde, *Sozialgeschichte der Bergarbeiterschaft*, 584.
- ²⁰ Petra Weber, *Gescheiterte Sozialpartnerschaft - Gefährdete Republik?: Industrielle Beziehungen, Arbeitskämpfe und der Sozialstaat. Deutschland und Frankreich im Vergleich (1918-1933/39)* (Munich: Oldenbourg 2010), 32.
- ²¹ See Klaus Tenfelde and Heinrich Volkmann, ed., *Streik. Zur Geschichte des Arbeitskampfes in Deutschland während der Industrialisierung* (Munich: C.H. Beck, 1981), 294–313.
- ²² Retallack, *Red Saxony*, 400.
- ²³ In France, military involvement in the policing of popular protests was more frequent than in Prussia, and French military authorities extensively cooperated with the local administration. See Johansen, *Soldiers as police*, 249 and 282.
- ²⁴ See Peter Keller, “Die Wehrmacht der Deutschen Republik ist die Reichswehr”: die deutsche Armee 1918-1921 (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2014) 129.
- ²⁵ Anja Johansen, “Policing and Repression: Military Involvement in the Policing of French and German Industrial Areas, 1889-1914,” *European History Quarterly* 34, no. 1 (2004), 69–98.
- ²⁶ See Albrecht Funk, *Polizei und Rechtsstaat. Die Entwicklung des staatlichen Gewaltmonopols in Preußen 1848-1914* (Frankfurt: Campus, 1986), 233–235.
- ²⁷ Brian McCoo, *The Borders of Integration: Polish Migrants in Germany and the United States, 1870-1924* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2011), 41.
- ²⁸ Correspondence from the public prosecutor’s office to the Hibernia company, 14 May 1899, BBA 32/4253, Montanhistorisches Dokumentationszentrum, Deutsches Bergbau-Museum, Bochum, Germany.
- ²⁹ See, for example, “Streikende Bergarbeiter!,” *Bergarbeiterzeitung*, January 28, 1905.
- ³⁰ Klaus Tenfelde, “Die Krawalle von Herne im Jahre 1899,” *Internationale Wissenschaftliche Korrespondenz zur Geschichte der deutschen Arbeiterbewegung* 15, no. 1 (1979): 71–104.
- ³¹ McCoo, *Borders of Integration*, 67.
- ³² See Ulrich Herbert, *Geschichte der Ausländerbeschäftigung in Deutschland 1880 bis 1980: Saisonarbeiter, Zwangsarbeiter, Gastarbeiter* (Bonn: Dietz, 1986), 71–81. On the Germanisation policy in Prussian Poland between the Bismarck era and the First World War, see also Hans-Erich Volkmann, *Die Polenpolitik des Kaiserreichs. Prolog zum Zeitalter der Weltkriege* (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2016).
- ³³ See Klaus-Michael Mallmann, *Die Anfänge der Bergarbeiterbewegung an der Saar 1848-1904* (Saarbrücken: Minerva, 1981), 123. The *Rechtsschutzverein* (Organisation for Legal Protection) was the major Catholic union of the Saar miners, with more than 20,000 members in 1892.
- ³⁴ See Horst Steffens, *Autorität und Revolte. Alltagsleben und Streikverhalten der Bergarbeiter an der Saar im 19. Jahrhundert* (Weingarten: Drumlin, 1987), 90–96.
- ³⁵ Dagmar Ellerbrock, “Generation Browning. Überlegungen zu einem praxeologischen Generationenkonzept,” *Geschichte im Westen* 26, no. 1 (2011), 7–34.

³⁶ Johansen, *Soldiers as police*, 127.

³⁷ Wolfgang Knöbl, *Polizei und Herrschaft im Modernisierungsprozeß. Staatsbildung und innere Sicherheit in Preußen, England und Amerika 1700-1914* (Frankfurt: Campus, 1998), 307.

³⁸ Ralph Jessen, "Preußische Polizei und Arbeiterschaft im Kaiserreich," in *Die Deutsche Polizei und ihre Geschichte*, ed. Peter Nitschke (Hilden: Deutsche Polizeiliteratur, 1996), 46–71.

³⁹ Knöbl, *Polizei und Herrschaft*, 297 and 307.

⁴⁰ Not only the number of police officers, since the number of administrative personnel also increased from less than 750 in 1891 to more than 2000 in 1913. In terms of the total number of police officers in 1913, Albrecht Funk gives more cautious estimations than Ralph Jessen, who indicates a total of 40,000 police officers. See Jessen, *Polizei in Industrieviertel*, 359. According to Funk, the Land Gendarmerie increased from 4698 in 1891 to 5800 in 1913, while the Royal Guards grew much more rapidly from a total of nearly 6000 in 1891 to 16,500 in 1913. The municipal police increased from 2393 in 1889 to 8200 in 1914. The total number of Prussian police forces indicated by Funk for 1913 is nearly 31,000 (up from nearly 13,000 in 1891). See Funk, *Polizei und Rechtsstaat*, 213–216.

⁴¹ Funk, *Polizei und Rechtsstaat*, 219.

⁴² See Benjamin Carter Hett, *Death in the Tiergarten. Murder and Criminal Justice in the Kaiser's Berlin* (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 2004), 13.

⁴³ See Hansjoachim Henning, ed., *Die Sozialpolitik in den letzten Friedensjahren des Kaiserreichs (1905 bis 1914). Das Jahr 1905* (Wiesbaden: Steiner, 1982), 98.

⁴⁴ Correspondence from the director of the *Rheinisch-Westphalische Zeitung* to the Bergwerkgesellschaft Hibernia, 9 May 1889, 7 June 1889 and 28 June 1889, BBA 32/4253, Montanhistorisches Dokumentationszentrum, Deutsches Bergbau-Museum, Bochum, Germany.

⁴⁵ Gerald D. Feldman, *Hugo Stinnes: Biographie eines Industriellen; 1870-1924* (Munich: C.H. Beck, 1998), 106.

⁴⁶ Henning, *Sozialpolitik*, 100.

⁴⁷ See Reinhold Zilch, ed., *Die Protokolle des Preußischen Staatsministeriums 1817-1934/38, Band 9: 23. Oktober 1900 bis 13. Juli 1909* (Hildesheim: Berlin-Brandenburgischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 2001), 112–113.

⁴⁸ Correspondence from the police department of Essen to the Gutehoffnungshütte, 30 March 1912, Box 301052, Folder 23, Stiftung Rheinisch-Westfälisches Wirtschaftsarchiv (RWWA), Cologne, Germany.

⁴⁹ See the documents and letters written by the management of the Gutehoffnungshütte, 12 May 1912 and 6 April 1912, Box 301000, Folder 7, Stiftung Rheinisch-Westfälisches Wirtschaftsarchiv (RWWA), Cologne, Germany.

⁵⁰ See Klaus-Michael Mallmann, "Verfleißigung und Eigensinn. Bergmännische Lebenswelte," in *Industriekultur an der Saar. Leben und Arbeit in einer Industrieregion 1840-1914*, ed. Richard van Dülmen (Munich: C.H. Beck, 1989), 105.

⁵¹ Michael Epkenhans and Ralf Stremmel, *Friedrich Alfred Krupp. Ein Unternehmer im Kaiserreich* (Munich: C.H. Beck, 2010), 288.

⁵² Antje Fuchs, "Nach der Schicht. Zur Freizeitkultur von Hüttenarbeitern," in *Stumm in Neunkirchen. Unternehmerherrschaft und Arbeiterleben im 19. Jahrhundert*, ed. Richard van Dülmen (St. Ingbert: Röhrig, 1993), 79–114.

⁵³ Fabian Trinkaus, *Arbeiterexistenzen und Arbeiterbewegung in den Hüttenstädten Neunkirchen/Saar und Düdelingen/Luxemburg (1880-1935/40)*, (Saarbrücken: Kommission für Saarländische Landesgeschichte, 2014), 291.

⁵⁴ See Jürgen Kocka, *Unternehmensverwaltung und Angestelltenschaft am Beispiel Siemens 1847-1914: zum Verhältnis von Kapitalismus und Bürokratie in der deutschen Industrialisierung* (Stuttgart: Klett, 1969).

⁵⁵ See the report written by the Westende colliery, 25 April 1912, BBA 41/175, Montanhistorisches Dokumentationszentrum, Deutsches Bergbau-Museum, Bochum, Germany. Along with extraordinary gratification, the supervisors also typically received regular monthly monetary benefits.

⁵⁶ Jessen, *Polizei in Industrieviertel*, 120.

⁵⁷ Kai Rawe, "... wir werden sie schon zur Arbeit bringen!". *Ausländerbeschäftigung und Zwangsarbeit im Ruhrkohlenbergbau während des Ersten Weltkriegs* (Essen: Klartext, 2005), 178.

⁵⁸ Jessen, *Polizei in Industrieviertel*, 125. See also Elaine Glovka Spencer, *Management and Labor in Imperial Germany: Ruhr Industrialists as Employers, 1896-1914* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1984), 126.

⁵⁹ See the reports of the Gutehoffnungshütte, 23 March 1912 and 27 March 1912, Box 301052, Folder 23, Stiftung Rheinisch-Westfälisches Wirtschaftsarchiv (RWWA), Cologne, Germany.

⁶⁰ See the "Niederschrift über die Besprechung wegen der Verteilung der den Schutzmannschaften im Stadt- und Landkreis Gelsenkirchen zugeordneten Belohnungen für die Zeit des Bergarbeiterausstandes", 22 March 1912, BBA 41/175, Montanhistorisches Dokumentationszentrum, Deutsches Bergbau-Museum, Bochum, Germany.

⁶¹ Correspondence from the Gelsenkirchener Bergwerks-Aktien Gesellschaft to the colliery Phoenix, 20 March 1912 and 23 March 1912, BBA 41/174 and BBA 41/175, Montanhistorisches Dokumentationszentrum, Deutsches Bergbau-Museum, Bochum, Germany.

⁶² Correspondence from the Police President of Gelsenkirchen to Bergrat Randebrock, 18 April 1912, BBA 41/175, Montanhistorisches Dokumentationszentrum, Deutsches Bergbau-Museum, Bochum, Germany.

⁶³ See the report written by the mining company Zeche Consolidation, 15 October 1912. BBA 41/175, Montanhistorisches Dokumentationszentrum, Deutsches Bergbau-Museum, Bochum, Germany.

⁶⁴ Jessen, *Polizei in Industrieviertel*, 123.

⁶⁵ Jessen, *Polizei in Industrieviertel*, 125.

⁶⁶ “Instruktion über die dienstliche Verwendung von Zechenwehren im Falle größerer Arbeiterbewegungen im Kohlenrevier”, 23 September 1894, Abteilung VII, no. 50, vol. 2, 5–6, Landesarchiv NRW, Münster, Germany. Another copy of the official guidelines is conserved in the archive records of the Royal Coal Mines’ Administration of Recklinghausen, BBA 32/4262, Montanhistorisches Dokumentationszentrum, Deutsches Bergbau-Museum, Bochum, Germany.

⁶⁷ On the circulation of the guideline among the Landräte, see the following documents: K 001/Oberpräsidium Münster, no. 6562, 154; K 201/Regierung Münster, no. VII-50, vol. 2, 1-6 and K 201/Regierung Münster, no. VII-50, vol. 2, 137, Landesarchiv NRW, Münster, Germany.

⁶⁸ See “Dienstanweisung für die Beamten der Zechenwehr”, 1894, Oberpräsidium, no. 6562, 1–4, Landesarchiv NRW, Münster, Germany.

⁶⁹ Correspondence from the Gewerkschaft Barmen to the Landrat of Schwelm, 7 March 1912, Kreis Schwelm, vol. 1, Landratsamt, 14 Sicherheitspolizei, 153 Zechenwehren (1894-1912), Landesarchiv NRW, Münster, Germany.

⁷⁰ See the report written by the Holland colliery, 2 April 1912, BBA 41/174, Montanhistorisches Dokumentationszentrum, Deutsches Bergbau-Museum, Bochum, Germany. See also the report written by the Bergmannsglück colliery, 4 March 1912, Abteilung VII, no. 50, vol. 2, p. 176, Landesarchiv NRW, Münster, Germany.

⁷¹ See the detailed list of auxiliary policemen at the Vondern colliery, Box 30101, Folder 18, Betreff Zechenwehren 1911-1918, Stiftung Rheinisch-Westfälisches Wirtschaftsarchiv (RWVA), Cologne, Germany.

⁷² The original designations of these documents are: “Ausweiskarte über die Befugnis zur Führung eines Revolvers für das Mitglied der Zechenwehr”, “Dienstanweisung für die Beamten der Zechenwehr” and “Anweisung über die Ausrüstung mit dem Revolver und über den Gebrauch desselben”. They are conserved in the regional archives of Münster, Landesarchiv NRW, Staatsarchiv Münster, Oberpräsidium (1894), nr. 6562, 1–6.

⁷³ See the invoices of the Bagel publishing company in Düsseldorf, 14 April 1896, B 455 Kreis Dortmund, Landratsamt, 618, Einrichtung von Zechenwehren (1893-1907), Landesarchiv NRW, Münster, Germany.

⁷⁴ On the circulation of special firearms licenses, see K 201/Regierung Münster, no. VII-50, vol. 2, p. 127 and 137, Landesarchiv NRW, Münster, Germany.

⁷⁵ Bearing weapons was prohibited during labour disputes, such as the miners’ strike of 1905, and weapons were generally not allowed during public meetings and demonstrations according to the Prussian Law on Public Associations (1850) and the Imperial Penal Code of 1871. In addition, article 97 of Prussian Penal Code and article 127 of the Imperial Penal Code prohibited public activities on the part of armed associations without explicit legal permission.

⁷⁶ See “Dienstanweisung für die Beamten der Zechenwehr”, §3.

⁷⁷ Correspondence from the management of the Holland colliery to the Police President of Gelsenkirchen, 8 March 1912, BBA 41/174, Montanhistorisches Dokumentationszentrum, Deutsches Bergbau-Museum, Bochum, Germany.

⁷⁸ See “Dienstanweisung für die Beamten der Zechenwehr”, §1.

⁷⁹ See “Dienstanweisung für die Beamten der Zechenwehr”, §9 and “Anweisung über die Ausrüstung” § 9 and 10.

⁸⁰ See “Anweisung über die Ausrüstung” §4 and 13.

⁸¹ Correspondence from the Gutehoffnungshütte mining company to the Essen Police President, 10 May 1911 and 23 June 1911, Box 30101, Folder 18, Stiftung Rheinisch-Westfälisches Wirtschaftsarchiv (RWVA), Cologne, Germany. Several bills from the *Warenhaus für Armee und Marine* are conserved in the records of the Royal Coal Mines’ Administration of Recklinghausen. See BBA 32/4262, Montanhistorisches Dokumentationszentrum, Deutsches Bergbau-Museum, Bochum, Germany.

⁸² Correspondence from the Gutehoffnungshütte mining company to the Essen Police President, 2 February 1912, Box 30101, Folder 18, Stiftung Rheinisch-Westfälisches Wirtschaftsarchiv (RWVA), Cologne, Germany.

⁸³ Correspondence from the local administrative office in Osterfeld to the Gutehoffnungshütte, 3 October 1913, Box 30101, Folder 18, Stiftung Rheinisch-Westfälisches Wirtschaftsarchiv (RWVA), Cologne, Germany.

⁸⁴ Correspondence from the Gutehoffnungshütte to the local administrative office, 8 October 1913 and 2 December 1913, Box 30101, Folder 18, Stiftung Rheinisch-Westfälisches Wirtschaftsarchiv (RWVA), Cologne, Germany.

⁸⁵ Correspondence from the Berginspektion Dortmund to the Minister of Commerce, 25 March 1905, BBA 32/4262, Montanhistorisches Dokumentationszentrum, Deutsches Bergbau-Museum, Bochum, Germany.

⁸⁶ Correspondence from the Berginspektion in Buer and Vienenburg to the Royal Coal Mines’ Administration in Recklinghausen, 1 October 1907 and 4 April 1910, BBA 32/4262, Montanhistorisches Dokumentationszentrum, Deutsches Bergbau-Museum, Bochum, Germany.

⁸⁷ Correspondence from the Deutschland colliery to the Landratsamt, 16 July 1904, Kreis Schwelm, vol.1, Landratsamt, 14 Sicherheitspolizei, 153 Zechenwehren (1894-1912), Landesarchiv NRW, Münster, Germany.

⁸⁸ Correspondence from the Gewerkschaft Barmen to the Landrat of Schwelm, 7 March 1912, Kreis Schwelm, vol. 1, Landratsamt, 14 Sicherheitspolizei, 153 Zechenwehren (1894-1912), Landesarchiv NRW, Münster, Germany.

⁸⁹ Henning, *Sozialpolitik*, 120.

⁹⁰ The regional archives of Münster conserve hundreds of statistics and investigations concerning the *Zechenwehren*. See the following documents: B 455 Kreis Dortmund, Landratsamt, 618, Einrichtung von Zechenwehren (1893-1907) and K 001/Oberpräsidium Münster, no. 6562, 161–228, Landesarchiv NRW, Münster, Germany.

- ⁹¹ The statistical data have been elaborated on the basis of files conserved in Landesarchiv NRW, K 001/Oberpräsidium Münster, no. 6562, 161–173.
- ⁹² Correspondence from the Prussian Minister of the Interior to the Governor of Westphalia and the local administration, 11 November 1907, K 001/Oberpräsidium Münster, no. 6562, 216–218, Landesarchiv NRW, Münster, Germany.
- ⁹³ Jessen, *Polizei in Industrierevier*, 319 and 146.
- ⁹⁴ Retallack, *Red Saxony*, 397.
- ⁹⁵ See Karen Bullock and Andrew Millie, ed., *The Special Constabulary: Historical Context, International Comparisons and Contemporary Themes* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2018).
- ⁹⁶ See the report about the visit of police officers written by the Phoenix company, 2 April 1912, BBA 41/174, Montanhistorisches Dokumentationszentrum, Deutsches Bergbau-Museum, Bochum, Germany.
- ⁹⁷ The first article of the Instructions for the Use of Firearms (1895) stated that ‘Members of the *Zechenwehren* shall be armed with revolvers only if they are trained in the use of these weapons and if they have reliable behaviour and respectable way of life’.
- ⁹⁸ Correspondence from the Gewerkschaft Barmen to the Landrat of Schwelm, 7 March 1912, Kreis Schwelm, vol. 1, Landratsamt, 14 Sicherheitspolizei, 153 *Zechenwehren* (1894–1912), Landesarchiv NRW, Münster, Germany.
- ⁹⁹ Correspondence from the District President of Münster to the Governor of Westphalia, 13 November 1904, K 001/Oberpräsidium Münster, no. 6562, 136, Landesarchiv NRW, Münster, Germany.
- ¹⁰⁰ Correspondence from the Landrat of Recklinghausen to the District President of Münster, 28 March 1905, K 001/Oberpräsidium Münster, no. 6562, 154, Landesarchiv NRW, Münster, Germany.
- ¹⁰¹ Correspondence from the District Presidents of Arnsberg and Münster to the Governor of Westphalia, 9 March 1905 and 31 March 1905, K 001/Oberpräsidium Münster, no. 6562, 151–153, Landesarchiv NRW, Münster, Germany.
- ¹⁰² Correspondence from the District President of Arnsberg to the Governor of Westphalia, K 001/Oberpräsidium Münster, no. 6562, 222, Landesarchiv NRW, Münster, Germany.
- ¹⁰³ Henning, *Sozialpolitik*, 642.
- ¹⁰⁴ See Klaus Mattheier, *Die Gelben. Nationale Arbeiter zwischen Wirtschaftsfrieden und Streik* (Düsseldorf: Schwann, 1973); Thomas Rohkrämer, *Der Militarismus der kleinen Leute: Die Kriegervereine im Deutschen Kaiserreich 1871–1914* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1990).
- ¹⁰⁵ Torsten Kupfer, *Geheime Zirkel und Parteivereine: die Organisation der deutschen Sozialdemokratie zwischen Sozialistengesetz und Jahrhundertwende* (Essen: Klartext, 2003), 104.
- ¹⁰⁶ James Retallack, “What Is to Be Done? The Red Specter, Franchise Questions, and the Crisis of Conservative Hegemony in Saxony, 1896–1909,” *Central European History* 23, no. 4 (1990), 271–312.
- ¹⁰⁷ Jessen, *Polizei im Industrierevier*, 147.
- ¹⁰⁸ See *Verhandlungen des Reichstages*, 23 January 1905, vol. 201, 3988.
- ¹⁰⁹ *Verhandlungen des Reichstages*, 23 January 1905, vol. 201, 3905.
- ¹¹⁰ *Verhandlungen des Reichstages*, 23 January 1905, vol. 201, 3990.
- ¹¹¹ Tenfelde, “Die Krawalle von Herne,” 71–104.
- ¹¹² Rüdiger Bergien, *Die bellizistische Republik. Wehrkonsens und Wehrhaftmachung in Deutschland 1918–1933* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2012), 94.
- ¹¹³ Adam R. Seipp, *The Ordeal of Peace: Demobilization and the Urban Experience in Britain and Germany, 1917–1921* (Farnham: Ashgate, 2009), 185.
- ¹¹⁴ Peter Bucher, “Zur Geschichte der Einwohnerwehren in Preußen 1918–1921,” *Militärgeschichtliche Mitteilungen* 9, no. 1 (1971), 15–59.
- ¹¹⁵ See Nadine Rossol, “Incapable of securing order? The Prussian police and the German Revolution of 1918/19,” *Germany 1916–23. A Revolution in Context*, ed. Klaus Weinbauer, Anthony McElligott and Kirsten Heinsohn (Bielefeld: transcript, 2015), 59–82.
- ¹¹⁶ The *Garde-Kavallerie-Schützen-Division* was directed by the anti-communist officer Waldemar Pabst, who played a major role in the suppression of the Spartacist Uprising and who was responsible for the assassination of Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg on the night of 15 January 1919.
- ¹¹⁷ Michael H. Kater, “Die Technische Nothilfe im Spannungsfeld von Arbeiterunruhen, Unternehmerinteressen und Parteipolitik,” *Vierteljahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte* 27, no. 1 (1979), 30–78.
- ¹¹⁸ The Weimar state financed the operating costs of Technical Emergency Corps (mainly the fixed costs), whereas employers that benefited from the Corps’ anti-strike activities had to refund the costs resulting from the one specific operation (*Einsatzkosten*, i.e. transporting, supplying, and remuneration). See Ernst Lorenz, *Handbuch für den Dienstbetrieb der Technischen Nothilfe beim Reichsministerium des Innern* (Berlin: Reichsdienststellen der Technischen Nothilfe, 1921), 25.
- ¹¹⁹ See Andreas Wirsching, “Politische Gewalt in der Krise der Demokratie im Deutschland und Frankreich der Zwischenkriegszeit,” in *Demokratie in Deutschland und Frankreich 1918–1933/40: Beiträge zu einem historischen Vergleich*, ed. Horst Möller and Manfred Kittel (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2002), 131–150.