



**Car Wash, Crisis, and Political Cataclysm  
Corruption Narratives in the Brazilian Mediascape**

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*Publication date:*  
2018

*Document version*  
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record

*Document license:*  
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*Citation for published version (APA):*  
Damgaard, M. B. (2018). *Car Wash, Crisis, and Political Cataclysm: Corruption Narratives in the Brazilian Mediascape*. Det Humanistiske Fakultet, Københavns Universitet.

# Car Wash, Crisis, and Political Cataclysm: Corruption Narratives in the Brazilian Mediascape

*Mads Bjelke Damgaard*

## Abstract

A wave of corruption disclosure, leaks, and media exposés engulfed the Brazilian democracy in the period 2014-2018. Below the surface of an uncommonly successful investigation into high-level corruption, undercurrents of political crisis swept President Dilma Rousseff from office through impeachment proceedings. Rousseff was ousted in 2016 by members of the political elite - themselves embroiled in the scandal going by the name of Operação Lava-Jato or "Operation Car Wash" – long before she even became indicted in the corruption case. Thus, the scandal featured a curious temporality and a displacement of crisis that dragged Rousseff, her popular presidential predecessor Lula and their party with it in the undertow. The media built up a crisis of increasing complexity as the investigations became ever more wide-spread in an avalanche of evidence and plea bargains.

This thesis analyzes the Lava-Jato scandal as a textual system, unfolding in the Brazilian mediascape and governed by a set of narrative structures. Countering the existing hesitance of media studies to draw in narrative theory, the thesis constructs a theoretical and methodological foundation to analyze intertextual narrative structures emerging in a distributed manner across a system of news texts dealing with scandal. With this, the thesis attempts to answer why the Lava-Jato scandal ended with such surprising and self-contradictory results, and how, theoretically, narrative theory can contribute to the field of scandal studies. Inspired by Frederick Jameson's reading of Greimas, it is argued that the intertextual narratives that underpin the production of news texts on scandal constrain and co-constitute the field of political action. Thus, to understand the outcomes of the Lava-Jato scandal, it is necessary to analyze how the disequilibrium of Brazilian democracy was symbolically solved in the narratives interpreting the scandals and the impeachment.

## Resumé

En bølge af korruptionsafsløringer ramte Brasilien i 2014-2018. I kølvandet på en usædvanligt effektiv politiundersøgelse af politisk korruption blev landets præsident, Dilma Rousseff, suget med af bølgen og afsat gennem en rigsretssag i 2016. Bag rigsretssagen stod medlemmer af den politiske elite som selv var under efterforskning i sagskomplekset kendt som Operation Bil-Vask (*Operação Lava-Jato*), men afsættelsen fandt sted før Rousseff blev sigtet for korruption. Både Rousseff, hendes folkekære forgænger Lula og deres parti blev trukket med af skandalens bemærkelsesværdige temporalitet og transponering af krisestemning. Mens politiundersøgelsernes net blev bredere og bredere, byggede medierne en stadigt større og mere kompleks fortælling op om korruptionen på det højeste politiske niveau.

I denne afhandling afdækkes måden hvorpå Lava-Jato skandalens tekst-system udfoldede sig igennem narrative strukturer i Brasiliens medielandskab. Trods modviljen mod narrativ teori i gængse medie-teoretiske tilgange opbygges der i afhandlingen et teoretisk og metodisk grundlag til at analysere den slags intertekstuelle narrative strukturer som opstår i et distribueret tekstunivers på tværs af nyheder om skandaler. På dette fundament forsøger afhandlingen at besvare hvorfor Lava-Jato skandalen højst overraskende betød at en korrupt vicepræsident kunne overtage magten i Brasilien. Teoretisk består bidraget i at afdække hvordan skandalestudier kan integrere narrativ teori. Med afsæt i Frederick Jamesons læsning af Greimas hævdes det her at intertekstuelle narrativer i nyhederne former og begrænser de politiske handlerum. Derfor må man forstå hvordan Brasiliens demokratiske systems uligevægt forsøges løst i disse narrativer for at forstå hvordan rigsretssagen og skandalerne udviklede sig, som de gjorde.

## Dedications

*I thank, in narrative order of appearance*

- for supporting my first trip to Brazil: Kirsten Schottlænder Fonden, Solarfonden, Oticonfonden, Dansk Tennis Fond, Augustinusfonden, KU's Internationaliseringsfond and Københavns Kommune
- Lars Højer and Daniella Kuzmanovic, for setting me on the path in the study of media narratives of states and the fluid phenomenon that is corruption
- Anne Marie Ejdesgaard for pushing me to pursue the academic career, and for introducing me to Georg, who I can never thank enough
- Vinícius and Thomas Taro and the Ephemera crew and peer reviewers for publishing and editing my first scientific articles on the matter
- Ralf Hemmingsen and Jørn for committing the University of Copenhagen to the study of Brazil
- Inge-Birgitte Siegumfeldt and the rest of the EGR assessment committee for going with a number 4
- VIRK for letting me go, and the endless bureaucracy of the Brazilian embassy for finally, in October 2015, letting my passport go as well, just as events heated up in Brazil
- The Dean himself for unfreezing the frozen travel funds
- Rebeca Abner and Luis Felipe of UnB for housing me academically
- Guilherme, Milena and Lily for AirBnB hosting
- Daniel, Rachel, Kevin, Gustav, Annalisa, Niels and Lia for opening their homes to me and my wife
- Lucy for walks and desperate jogging in the vicinity of Vila Planalto and Palácio de Alvorada
- João Feres Júnior and Fernando Lattman-Weltman for interesting talks and opportunities, including the interview with *O Globo*
- *O Globo* for messing up the editing and thereby providing an excellent example of the power of textual (in)coherency
- Marie Kolling for inviting me to discuss, collaborate, and for sharing the strange tasks of the media machine while incredulously watching the chaos of impeachment process
- My office roommates Jesper and Ana Vera for helping me focus through mere presence
- The bubble crew; Vincent, Hannah, Mads and Joachim in particular
- Thiago Herdy and colleagues (not named but not forgotten) for discussing the backstage of reporting and writing in the circles of power
- Colleagues and discussants abroad, such as Einar Braathen, Celina, Yuri, Andreia Carmo, Karin Wahl-Jørgensen, Ricardo Fabrino Mendonça,
- Colleagues at the University of Copenhagen with eager minds, inspiring perspectives, and time to listen, such as my fellow fellows Jakob, Michael, Martina, Tue, Troels, Nils, Astrid, Stephanie, and senior colleagues Carsten Meiner, Pia Schwartz Lausten, Lisbeth Verstraete-Hansen, Sille Obelitz, Stig Hjarvard, Nete Nørgaard-Kristensen, and Olivier Driessens
- First and last, my loved ones who push me on and carry me through

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## Abbreviations

### Accountability institutions of Brazil

MPF – Ministério Público Federal (The Public Prosecutors' Office)  
 PF – Polícia Federal (The Federal Police)  
 PGR – Procurador-Geral da República (The Prosecutor-General)  
 STF – Supremo Tribunal Federal (The Supreme Court)  
 STJ – Superior Tribunal de Justiça (The Superior Tribunal of Justice)  
 TCU – Tribunal de Contas da União (The Tribunal for the Accounts of the Union)  
 TSE – Tribunal Superior Eleitoral (The Supreme Electoral Court)

### Political parties of Brazil (mentioned in this thesis)

DEM – Democratas  
 PDT - Partido Democrático Trabalhista  
 PMDB - Partido do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro (renamed MDB in 2018)  
 PP - Partido Progressista  
 PR – Partido da República (until 2006 PL, Partido Liberal)  
 PRB - Partido Republicano Brasileiro  
 PSB - Partido Socialista Brasileiro  
 PSD - Partido Social Democrático  
 PSDB - Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira  
 PT – Partido dos Trabalhadores  
 PTB – Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro

# Introduction

## Embedded Contradictions and Political Fantasies

Political corruption is a central concern to any democracy. However, the problems of political corruption go beyond sub-optimal decision-making and the economic loss to society. The outcome of a corruption scandal should not be conceived as an isolated matter - as individuals being held accountable, or failing to be held accountable. Corruption scandals can have wildly varying consequences for the involved persons; even if convicted for corruption, individuals holding positions of trust and public authority, as appointed or elected representative of citizens, can still in many cases count on impunity, due to political protection or judicial sluggishness. In other cases, scandalizing information is disclosed to great effect, and public officeholders must face the pressure of courts, their own constituencies and the electorate in general. But disclosure of scathing information may also impinge upon the quality of government and democracy in a wider sense. Exposés can be a political game-changer, even if the information turns out to be inaccurate or false. Disclosing corruption may thus wreak havoc in consolidated as well as emergent democracies, and the effects of corruption scandals, of disclosing transgressions and alleging moral misconduct, can be traced beyond the immediate horizons of individual punishment or impunity.

The research object of this thesis is the complex Brazilian corruption scandal that since 2014 has gone by the name of Operação Lava-Jato. The Lava-Jato case had profound impacts - impacts that went well beyond the individuals investigated in the case. Spinning off from the Lava-Jato case, the President Dilma Rousseff was impeached, political reforms were obstructed for years, and scores of federal representatives, senators and governors became targets as investigations mushroomed off of the original probe. The Vice-President Michel Temer stepped in for Rousseff in May 2016, despite being under suspicion himself, and he picked a cabinet from the ranks of his party which had every key figure under scrutiny in the very same, initial corruption probe. In the midst of scandal, with no elections held, and despite the absence of criminal charges against the impeached President, the political orientation of the Brazilian government changed completely overnight, disrupting social conquests made in Brazil in the last decade and manifesting the prevalent Latin-American trend towards (or back to) neo-liberal economic politics. The ousting was the climax of a monumental process, breaking the 13 years of a neo-developmental state-centered model of governance, spearheaded by the Brazilian Worker's Party (PT). As key figures of the PT cadre, including ex-President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, became indicted, charged and sentenced, the party image was severely tarnished, leaving the left wing of Brazilian politics in tatters. Furthermore, by breaking with the established pattern of impunity common to Brazilian political corruption cases, the probe and resultant trials heralded – perhaps prematurely - the end of one of the mechanics that made the particular Brazilian hybrid regime of coalitional presidentialism work in practice.

However, at the time of writing (June 2018), that promise of an end to impunity did not result in sentences to the many politicians and parties embroiled in the corruption case - aside from the PT. Conspicuously, the execution of arrest warrants for members of the government nucleus parties PP and PMDB (now MBD) has been stonewalled in all but three cases, while two indictments of the President Temer have also been blocked in Congress. Likewise, leaders of the former opposition parties of PTB, DEM, and PSDB, who also appeared in the inquiry, escaped seemingly unscathed by

the probe even after the obtainment and publication of hard evidence of their corruption. This unequal application of the rule of law appears at least as a contradiction in terms, if not a way of doing politics by other means (Peruzzotti 2006:256). The paradox of substituting one allegedly corrupt president for another president also under suspicion is another of the central contradictions of this case.

The Lava-Jato scandal made possible not only the sea change of political orientation, but also drove radical outsider candidates to the front of the polls, undermined a generation of political leaders, and obliterated the citizens' already negligible trust in political authorities and institutions. Furthermore, targeting the top construction companies of the country as well as the state oil company Petrobras, the scandal brought to a standstill investment and public works in an already retracting economy. The disclosure of corruption in the Brazilian political and economic elite had critical consequences for the whole political paradigm of the nation, for the state apparatus and economy, as well as the balance between the branches of government. Although such disclosure in principle should strengthen democracy, the Lava-Jato case laid bare a range of accountability problems in the political system, the judicial system, and the media system, exacerbating crises and tensions between actors of those systems (Damgaard 2018b). Political life was shaped by the spectacle of the ongoing scandal (Edelman 1988, Kellner 2002), and this "molding force" of the media (Hepp 2012) must be unpacked, if we want to grasp how the tensions and contradictions of the case played out.

This thesis posits the importance of news media in scandals, not only for disclosing corruption, but for narrating solutions to the contradictions and tensions of political and social struggles that emerge in scandals. When disclosure demands closure, and political crisis provokes calls for regime change, it is urgent to analyze the deep structures underpinning the media's employment of scandalous events and projections of possible solutions. In line with theories of the discursive turn in social and political sciences (Torfing 2005:22), I believe it necessary to pay attention to narratives, or, as Frederic Jameson remarked in *The Political Unconscious*, to detect "the structure of a particular political fantasy" because "the fantasy or protonarrative [is] the vehicle for our experience of the real" (Jameson 1981:33). Adapting Jameson's literary theory, I propose to transfer this attention to narrative structures to the study of political discourse in the news, ultimately breaking down the disciplinary limits between studies of political science and of media representations. Because media representations of corruption invoke a distinct set of narratives and metaphors (Breit 2011, Forsberg and Severinsson 2015, Kajsio 2014), and because such narratives trigger political and institutional conflict, it is pertinent to grasp how narratives configure the horizons of political space. Therefore, I draw methodological tools from narrative theory and share its ultimate goal of analysis, summarized here by the Dutch narrative theorist Mieke Bal:

the aim of textual analysis is not to account for the process of writing, but for the conditions of the process of reception. The distinction emphatically does not imply that the one layer exists before the other. How is it that a narrative text comes across to the reader in a certain manner?" (Bal 1997:78)

The texts that spark the scandal, elevate it to the attention of a public, and maintain it as central object of the agenda will within them contain some of these "conditions of the process of reception." While a scandal obviously also comprises other elements such as judicial processes and material evidence, media texts are the vehicles of this particular informational and political

phenomenon, by narrating, in their totality, an unfolding and episodified story (Bird 1997), which constitutes the continuously updated horizon of political agency for the involved actors. What is encompassed and what is excluded by the scandal might change dynamically, related to the strategic interests of the actors, and that might bring with it changing usage, connotations, and definitions of the term “corruption”—and for this reason, I will refrain from providing a definition of the term. Corruption may be thought of as an “empty signifier” *par excellence* (Koechlin 2013). Analyzing the media representations of corruption is but the first step to understanding what corruption comes to signify in a local context, and how the formatting of corruption scandals come to shape a political field in the way that the Lava-Jato investigations did in Brazil. The next step is to consider the media texts systematically, specifically, to see “narrative as a system of exchange” (Silverstone 1981:94), and its “achievement [as] the resolution of disequilibrium” (ibid.:93).

This thesis asks how narratives emerging in news on scandals may shape and restrain the field of political action. To seek answers to this on the basis of narrative theory and literary studies may seem unconventional, but, as Pietilä observed (1992), many seminal studies of news claim to see narratives in news texts. The concept is however mostly cursorily treated; only in a few cases is the concept of narrative treated methodically and deployed to excavate systems of meaning (e.g. Silverstone 1981, Hartley 1982). Recently, several scholars (e.g. Matheson 2010, Montgomery 2007) have even argued emphatically that news should not be treated as narratives. Therefore, after a review of these different arguments, I will start the thesis by assembling a methodology for reconstructing the unfolding narratives that informed production of news on the Lava-Jato scandal in the mainstream media of Brazil. This method is then deployed to analyze how the disequilibrium of Brazilian democracy is symbolically solved in the narratives interpreting the scandals and the impeachment.

The goal of the thesis is thus not merely to explain the remarkable results of the Lava-Jato case and the impeachment proceedings which, in conjunction, pushed the Brazilian democracy precariously close to a Constitutional abyss of coalitional deadlocks. The neign-rupture of Brazilian democracy (a democracy that was perceived as increasingly consolidated) and the attempts to “stop the bleeding of the political elite” (Valente 2016) through overt political interventions are very important topics that has been discussed intensely lately (Albuquerque 2017, Avritzer 2016a, Damgaard 2018a, 2018b, Gentili et al. 2016, Guimarães et al. 2016, Souza 2016). Here, I will not merely shed light on the intricacies of the case and the meanings produced in this particular scandal, but consider it as a case that may help to produce an explicit theory of narrative structures found in political news.

A fundamental question in this type of research is how events come to be signified in the media as transgressions, as elements of a scandal, since such semiotic processes are often what triggers the interventions of accountability institutions (Porto 2011a:112). Which actions qualify as scandalous and breaking news, what is merely considered business-as-usual, and what is the role of media in arbitrating political accountability? The period of 2014-2018 provided a multitude of Brazilian corruption cases of different magnitude in the public eye, but the explosion of high-level corruption investigations also created problems of accountability in its messy transparency. Among the extensive investigations recently probing into the Brazilian political and business elite, only a limited range of suspicions, allegations and pieces of evidence ever made the front-pages and remained salient in the mainstream media for more than a few hours. The dilemma of longevity is of course



built into the limited temporal scope of news. But the criteria for even including some events in a corruption scandal on the media agenda, and not others, are worth considering in more detail. Most audience members will naturally accept that some events make the news, while others don't. In order to make news, scores of newswriters decide on the newsworthiness and public relevance of disclosed events, before finding the best angle from which to write. This yields two ways to think about the phrase "making the news": What (event) makes the news? Who makes the news? Semantically, "the news" is betwixt and between hard realities, social construction, and textual performance. Temporally, events are newsworthy only if they can be incorporated into meaningful wholes and assembled to connect previous and future events deemed important. Thus, already in the construal and construction of each event as newsworthy, journalistic production sets into motion mechanisms of narrative imagination: The news, in each instance, is performed as one meaningful moment that arrests the flow of time (Bødker 2016), narrates, and thereby "puts together a story, even as it is happening... captures, *live*, the essential temporal structure and dynamic of the living moment" (Scannell 2014:174-5).

Some events seem to demand media attention instantly, to have that special quality that makes the event instantly ubiquitous in news. In most media systems today, scandals rank high on the list of issues that commandeers newswriters by sheer force of the news values, maybe only surpassed by acts of terror, natural disasters, and perhaps elections. During elections, scandals may take center stage, triggering electoral accountability (or vertical accountability, see Mainwaring and Welna 2003). In a much less transparent way, scandals may also configure the political field in the periods between elections by locating candidates and parties in adverse narrative environments, as objects of opprobrious discourse (Thompson 2000). In doing so, the scandal narratives may change the course of the next election, or indeed, history. This happens when a (scandalous) event seems to radically transgress the limits of what is normally possible, manifesting the spirit of the times so perfectly that the newswriters deem it "historic." If events make history, they must be endowed with meaning. But how does this happen? This question reflects the main themes and research problems of this thesis: the political impact of scandals and media's narration of scandalous events.

It is a platitude that scandals are born in media, but even so, it is worthwhile to probe this uterine environment of scandals (*ibid.*), or, to be more precise, the stratum of the mediascape we know as news media. I will throughout this thesis use Arjun Appadurai's term *mediascape* for the purpose of designating a consistent if fluid repertoire of media discourse and imagery in the global flows of imagination. "The imagination has become an organized field of social practices" (1996:31), and this field, which Appadurai terms the imaginary, is both a form of practice and a site for negotiation of agency and possibility. Stemming from Benedict Anderson's notion of imagined communities (1983), Appadurai envisioned that this field was organized by sometimes homogeneous (e.g., Americanized) and sometimes heterogeneous cultural flows (see also Fiske 1994). These flows run through many-layered global currents and cultural interchanges. Identifying five such flows, Appadurai coined the terms *ethnoscape*, *mediascape*, *technoscape*, *financescape*, and *ideoscape*. They are perspectival and may look different from various analytical angles, but are undoubtedly connected and related in empirically verifiable ways. The scapes are also fluid, but congeal around certain configurations. Mediascapes and ideoscapes are "image-centered, narrative-based accounts of strips of reality, and what they offer to those who experience and transform them is a series of

elements (such as characters, plots, and textual forms) out of which scripts can be formed of imagined lives” (Appadurai 1996:35).

In mediascapes, the circulation of narratives informs various genres: “Narrative is present in myth, legend, fable, tale, novella, epic, history, tragedy, drama, comedy, mime, painting...” according to Roland Barthes (1977:79), and Catherine Riessman added “memoir, biography, autobiography, diaries, archival documents, social service and health records, other organizational documents, scientific theories, folk ballads, photographs, and other art work” to Barthes’ list (2008:4). Thus, it should not surprise that news could articulate proto-narrative structures, given the ubiquity of narrative structures in just about every possible cultural form, media and discourse type (Virtanen 1992, Ryan 2004). However, as I will discuss in chapter 1, the idea that news articulates narrative structures has been contested by scholars and students of media discourse since the 1980s. Chapter 2 and 3 contribute to the field of media studies by revisiting this debate and its fundamental questions - questions that should also be posed to the events constituting the Lava-Jato scandal: Can news be considered to have narrative qualities in general or in the specific case of scandals? By developing an answer to this, the thesis also contributes to the body of theory on scandals, which is often content with typologically registering phases in scandals, rather than considering the meaning and import of narrative temporality. Chapter 1 and 2 thus sort out the theoretical challenge of reconciling theories of narrative analysis with prevailing paradigms of media research.

The following two chapters do not attempt to give a comprehensive view or the ultimate definition of the concept “scandal,” however. I will use the word “case” to refer to legal processes, while “scandal” will refer to the media representation of an action regarded as transgressive (Adut 2008:13, Allern and Pollack 2012, Thompson 2000). Throughout the thesis I work under the assumption that acts and events perceived as transgression, corruption, and scandal, are in fact defined as such through media-borne discursive activities; interpretation and narration, in particular. Scandals, and media hypes in general, are products of journalistic pack behavior (Damgaard 2018b, Vasterman 2005), rather than individual feats of investigative journalism. Media actors and journalists, referring to other media actors (Kristensen and Mortensen 2015:360) and partaking in “media hunts” (Allern and Pollack 2012:22), recycle the same basic speech acts and perspectives. Thereby, they mutually constitute disclosed information as scandalous, construct certain acts as corrupt, and define what is “historic.” To constitute something as “historic” and “transgressive” requires more than description, as Koselleck observed (1985:106), and should be seen essentially as an act of narration. The recycling of narratives should however not blind researchers to the fact that the constitution of events as scandalous is often a contested act (Damgaard 2015b), appearing as a maze of utterances with different truth claims (Eckel and Leiendecker 2013) in a particular form of distributed narrative (Walker 2004).

An initial problem for conceptualizing news as narrative is the common-sense parceling of news as reality and narrative as fiction. News media organizations are inhabited by a kind of journalists with specific ideological and professional roles, goals, and foundational myths (Schudson 1978, 2003), and their claim to societal legitimacy rests upon the professed goal of modern news journalism: to depict the state of the world as close to reality as possible in service of the general readership, providing facts and sources (Chalaby 1996, Tuchman 1978:82-103), whilst avoiding value judgements (Vliegthart and Skovsgaard 2017:90), or containing judgments in the so-called op-ed

pieces. While nothing prevents facts and sources from being arrayed in a narrative sequence in the so-called “hard news,” the limited mandate for fictional creativity (Cornfield 1992:50) means that, ideally, such news writing should resist transforming and narrating events in ways that support or work to the detriment of specific political or social causes. The ideal of objectivity, although viewed with some reservations in Latin American media (Biroli and Miguel 2012, Waisbord 2000), can be hoisted as a professional flag in order to downplay situations of self-censorship, vested interests of media owners, and clientelistic allegiances (Albuquerque and da Silva 2009, Porto 2012:172).

In the age of fake news and post-factuality, simple distinctions of objective/fictional and hard news/soft news are clearly challenged, although the challenge may not necessarily arise from within the legacy news media. In any case, despite the claims to objective reporting and fact-centered news, news media may still draw upon narrative resources found in a cultural stock (Alexander and Jacobs 1998:29), reflecting a publicly shared symbolic system (Geertz 1973) in their textual production. Even in the supposedly golden age of investigative journalism, even in the carefully patrolled newsrooms of public service outlets, the substratum of news media is not necessarily distinct from fictional or mythological cultural strata present in the mediascape (Hall 1984, Silverstone 1981). Taking one step back from the linguistic and text-centered approach of news discourse analysis found in seminal studies (such as Bell 1991, Fowler 1991, Fairclough 1995, Hartley 1982, van Dijk 1988), I argue in Chapter 2 that narrative structures still function by tying events together in news texts and thereby assigning meaning to events. Following Roger Silverstone, I believe it is necessary to grasp media texts (generally, and scandal texts especially) not as singular texts, but as elements of a general structure (in Saussurean terms, *parole* as instances of *langue*):

Any attempt to face the problems of a text’s semantic quality involves moving away from a close concern with its manifest structure, with its visible patterns, and a correlative movement away from a desire to preserve the text’s integrity. Questions about a text’s meaning necessarily involve leaving the particular, albeit temporarily, in order to establish the generality according to which that particular becomes possible. Structure replaces classification, logic chronology, and by and large, deduction replaces induction. The analysis of a text, which might be a folktale or an individual myth, becomes the analysis of meaning, of language or of myth as such. (Silverstone 1981:91)

By foregrounding meaning as it appears in a totality of texts, I thereby deliberately downplay the individual contributions of journalists, editors, and pundits. From these initial considerations, Chapter 2 establishes the theoretical model and methodological approach deployed in the thesis. Most importantly, the second chapter defines the distributed and never-closed narrative structures as *fabulas* (Bal 1997). The fabulas of news are the blueprints that precede each particular news item, and it is the fabulas that retain narrative structures such as plot and temporality, which may unfold to different degrees in particular instances of news text. Events are endowed with meaning through the fabula’s emplotment. By combining this understanding of plot and emplotment with the notion of intertextuality, I arrive at the research object of this dissertation: fabulas that emerge in and across news texts precisely in the emplotment of a common narrative structure. Drawing together news texts that select and establish relations of the same elements and emplot events within the same causal logic, I attempt to identify intertextually recurring fabulas that translate and organize events into coherent and symbolically meaningful story arcs.

Seminal newsroom studies (Bell 1991, Gans 1980, Tuchman 1978) have explored the modern media organization, the labor of newswriters, and the news values and textual styles governing the

production of news texts in minute detail. I will not repeat the insights of these authors, nor consider how each text is conceived journalistically and morphs as it wanders from sources to journalists and across editorial desks on to eventual publication. The relations between the production of news and political institutions in Brazil do merit a closer look, though, and Chapter 3 therefore provides a short description of the Brazilian media organizations, following the media system theory of Hallin and Mancini (2004, 2011). Chapter 3 outlines the contours of the mediascape, as well as the place of corruption discourse in recent examples of Brazilian political journalism. Based on the review of the media system, I motivate the choice of sampled media outlets, formats, and texts.

The shared newsroom culture and news values across the sampled outlets – the shared textual webs of facticity (Tuchman 1978, ch. 5) - are arguably the main reasons that scandals appear as uniformly newsworthy to media organizations: A scandal constitutes the moment *par excellence* when the media's role as society's watchdog is invoked, drawing upon ideals harking back to founding moments of American press (Schudson 2004). In this sense, I see more continuity than rupture in the mediascape, and because of these continuities, I will analyze Brazilian mainstream media texts as parts of the same textual system.

The chapters that follow the third are then situated to gradually excavate layers of meaning in the emergent fabulas of corruption. Chapter 4 presents one hundred fragments of text, large and small, together with a few exemplary visual fragments from the Brazilian mediascape (located in appendix A). These examples of news texts are used to assemble the unfolding storylines of the Lava-Jato scandal and the impeachment process, their emplotment and characterizations of actors. Then, the empirical material is gradually rarefied: whereas Chapter 4, in a synoptic manner, presents quotes and paraphrases of the texts as they appeared, Chapter 5 abstracts the chronology and causal relations of events, as well as the subject-actants in order to analytically construct the fabulas of the Lava-Jato scandal and the impeachment. Starting with a brief consideration of how seriality is achieved in media in general, the fifth chapter discusses how narrative desire and time in the news are thoroughly intertwined. Through six examples, I explore the idea that the timing of telling in the media, as well as the specific temporal scopes of each of the fabulas, strategically limited the scope of visibility for the political consequences. Having explored the temporality and narrative desire of media texts, I then present six fabulas, constructed on the basis of the corpus of media texts presented in the previous chapter. The timing and temporality of the six fabulas are analyzed and connected to the sequence of political events in Brazil in 2016.

Chapter 6 reduces the syntagmatic relations of the fabulas – their plot and temporality - to fundamental semiotic systems, distilling the underpinning ideological relations of the fabulas. With this, the complexity of actors and fragments of narrative is boiled down to the basic oppositions and tensions that govern the fabulas and their circulation and permutations in the Brazilian mediascape. In this textual system, the issues of impunity and opposing political truth claims play out and find narrative solutions on the backdrop of a pervasive conflict between the abstract historical entities of State, Politics, Citizens and Justice. In the vein of Jameson, I finally consider how the news stories on the Car Wash operation were delimited by this specific political unconsciousness which gave rise to the successful impeachment through fabulas about corruption, crisis, and political cataclysm. In four appendices, I provide various visual examples of media representations, a timeline, transcripts, and some of the quantitative data collected during my research on the Lava-Jato scandal.

# Chapter 1

## Literature Review

Journalists do not write articles. They write stories. (Bell 1991:147).

[We] cannot overstate the importance of the concept of “story” when analysing scandals. The need for stories is basic to all societies, even pre-literate ones. A scandal is not just a logical reporting of damaging facts, no matter how shocking they may be. In a scandal, the story triumphs over facts at some point and in doing so takes on a life of its own. (Lull and Hinerman 1997:13)

One becomes aware of the powerful impact of narrative in making myth appear to be real. [...] I think in that sense we make an absolutely too simple distinction between narratives about the real and the narratives of fiction. (Hall 1984:5-6)

If scandals (like news articles) are indeed stories, as suggested by authors such as the above-quoted, one obvious methodological path to understanding scandals should be narrative analysis. After all, narrative analysts and researchers of narratology have developed fine-grained analytical tools to describe the dimensions of temporality, spatiality, and focalization in diverse genres. Scandals, however, emerge in news media, and the extant academic literature on news discourse of the last decades does not generally incline towards narrative analysis. In this chapter, I will review the state of the art of several strands of media studies, not only to demonstrate the reluctance to use narrative as a concept, but also to argue that there is still conceptual space in this literature to claim a place for narrative as a relevant (albeit under-researched) category.

The general stance found in countless studies of news is that news is a particular order of discourse which ultimately locates an identifiable collective (a public) in space and time. Influential writers have argued that the idea of nationhood is an artefact of news (Anderson 1983) and that public spheres and deliberative democracy co-evolved with the production of news, insofar as the political conditions provided a marketplace (Habermas 1989[1962]). Although such historical insights have been challenged in various ways (Calhoun 1992), they still underpin many assumptions of what news used to be, but neither insight specify the content of news, thus leaving us with the question: What is news texts, or what is it news texts do? Can news be considered narration? This would perhaps be the assumption in disciplines adjacent to media studies, given the fact that “the narrative turn” in the 1980s introduced the concept of narrative into psychology, historiography, anthropology, and social movement theory with much success.

The notion that news is story-telling (in general or only in specific types of news such as scandals) can however be questioned and has indeed been challenged on many grounds. First of all, whether news can be characterized as narration or can be said to contain narratives depends on theoretical approach and method. This is the case for both terms of the equation, so that one may reject the statement either based in definitions of news or in definitions of narrative. In the following, I will briefly unpack the objections to an equivalence of news and narrative.

News, for one thing, has particular linguistic structures and features that sets it apart from other story-telling in media or in face-to-face communication. Newspaper texts, especially front-page texts, have developed unique features:

Stories are written in the past tense, headlines in the present. Paragraphs are short, perhaps one to three sentences. Sentences generally contain fewer than twenty words and avoid words of more than two syllables. Word order is different from that of spoken language [...] newswriting is often “news-speak,” full of awkward lengthy sentences, packed with nouns connoting facticity... (Tuchman 1978:106)

The linguistic features (which I get back to in the next section) reflect, in a way particular to the discourse of news, a claim to facticity, as Tuchman implies in the above quote. This claim is central to the professional identity, and prescribes that the material of news should be accounted for, not narrated (Schudson 1978:88ff). News is a genre that accounts for facts, and the inherent truth claim of this statement entails, somehow, that journalists should resist the human urge to tell stories, or, to be more precise, the urge to fictionalize events (Kormelink and Costera Meijer 2015). The professional ideology of avoiding narrativization of real events, however, exists in tension with the equally present demand for getting to the core of the story, which means accentuating news values such as conflict and framing aspects of the reported facts to ensure that the text appears as an accessible, coherent and easily interpreted whole (Bell 1991, Entman 1993, Galtung and Ruge 1965).

If news per definition differs from narrative, this may also be a categorical statement concerning the properties of narratives, depending on the definition of a narrative: Is narrative simply an account of two or more temporally ordered events (Labov and Waletzky 1967) or should we look for “well-made stories [...] with] coherence that permits us to see ‘the end’ in every beginning” (White 1981:23)? While no-one would deny that events are represented (and linked together) in news texts, both in textual and verbal-visual forms, literary theorists (such as Genette 1980:216 or Barthes 1977) went further and explicitly assumed that news did narrate in a more elaborate way, even if they did not apply their analytical vocabularies to news narratives.

Donald Matheson has argued that, apart from the formal linguistic differences, modern news texts also deny a dramatic story world, distant from the audience’s personal or social experiential world. This was not always so, but did in fact develop as a stylistic trait of reporting (especially) in the 20<sup>th</sup> century. His argument is built on the difference between everyday lived experience and the experience of fiction:

The news genre diverges markedly here from genres that are governed by a narrative logic because it rejects the power to imagine an elsewhere or elsewhen or to construct characters who drift toward the archetypal. The reader is not released from the here and now. (Matheson 2010:46)

In its style and claims to reality, a news text thus sets itself apart from narrative realities or, in other words, apart from the story world. His view, however, ties together the concepts of fiction and narrative. Contrary to Matheson, one could also see narrative as a mode, rather than a substance; a mode of organizing speech or text which works in many kind of genres and discourse types (Bal 1997:xi). Riessmann (2008:4) contends that narratives are encountered in a variety of discourse formations, and may be present, to lesser or greater degree, in almost any genre, while Virtanen, from a more functional than substantial viewpoint, claims that narrative type of text seems to be

able to formally realize any type of discourse (Virtanen 1992:303). By seeing narrative as a mode rather than a type of discourse, the notion of a distinct narrative logic must also be denied.

This opens the theoretical debate of the way that a narrative logic may be imposed upon narrated events by authors, even when accounting for real events. Matheson argues that this does not happen in news, but I suspect, with Hayden White, that this really is an attempt to cover the fact that the plot is always “an embarrassment [that] has to be presented as ‘found’ in the events rather than put there by narrative techniques” (White 1981:20). White was a central scholar in what has been termed “the narrative turn,” a movement that triggered debates about narrative structures’ influence on methods and theoretical approaches in various fields of the human and social sciences (Bruner 1986, Somers 1994, Polletta et al. 2011, Polkinghorne 1988, Riessman 2008). This turn, starting in the 70s and maintaining the impetus well into the 80s, saw influential authors in anthropology, psychology, historiography, and even science and technology studies reflect on the fundamental epistemological consequences of thinking narratives as basis for writing and thinking scientifically (Clifford and Marcus 1986, White 1973, Latour and Woolgar 1979:257-8, 261). In the field of philosophy, MacIntyre even argued that narrative is the structure by which humans understand action and, at the same time, the structure which we all live out in our lives (1984:212).

Narrative can thus be defined either as a cognitive and experiential structure (in the very embracing way of MacIntyre, Bruner, and Polkinghorne), or as a particular mode of discourse with specific traits, or simply an account of an ordered sequence of events (de Fina and Georgakopoulou 2012, 2015). The latter definition, pioneered by Labov, gained traction in media studies in the 1980s, but, as we shall see in the following sections, full-blown narrative analysis of news never caught on.

### 1.1 The Debate on Narrative and Temporal Structures in News

Several influential media scholars have advocated a turn to narrative, most prominently Roger Silverstone (1981, 1988), and implicitly Daniel Dayan and Elihu Katz (1986, 1992). Many more have agreed that news are story-like, and such a view is captured in this chapter’s initial quotes, but most researchers shy away from actually taking the next logical step and analyzing texts within a narrative framework. Pietilä (1992:61) concluded that many studies of news broaching the topic of narrative typically “fail to consider in any detail the structural properties of narratives and the possible implications of these to the analysis of news as narrative,” mentioning Altheide (1974, 1985), Dahlgren (1981, 1985), Fiske (1987), Gans (1980), Hallin and Mancini (1985), Hartley (1982), Manoff (1989), Manoff and Schudson (1987), Schudson (1982, 1989) and Tuchman (1976, 1978) in an extended list of references. I will elide reproducing the literature review that led to Pietilä’s conclusion and instead go to the few examples where narrative analysis actually was explicitly used. From this, I will present (in this section) arguments *against* a view of news-as-narrative and (in the following sections) two influential strands of media theory that tried to relegate or remove narrative entirely from the vocabulary. The state of the nomenclature today suffers a great deal from these attempts, and the conceptual confusion is compounded by imprecise or non-explicated claims about news-as-narratives, such as those referenced above.

Martin Montgomery (1991, Hartley and Montgomery 1985) and Allan Bell (1991) worked precisely with the framework of narrative analysis proposed by Labov and Waletzky, but some

methodological problems arose from applying structural narrative analysis to news studies, as we shall see shortly. In Labov and Waletzky's seminal study (1967), the basic elements of narrative structures are abstracted from oral narratives of simple personal experience. Labov and Waletzky argue that this kind of narrative must be fundamental to more developed and poetic narrative types, and thus must exhibit the minimum elements constitutive of narrative. The elements that defines narrative, in their analysis, are the Abstract, Orientation, Complicating action, Evaluation, Resolution and the Coda (ibid.:32ff). Inspired directly by Labov and Waletzky, Bell (1991), analyzed news reports as doing the same things: providing abstracts (through headlines), orienting, marking out conflict and complications, evaluating and possibly providing some sense of resolution. With this argument, the opening clause of one chapter in *The Language of News Media* affirmed: "Journalists do not write articles. They write stories." (ibid.:147). Going a little deeper, Bell saw abstracts as optional, but common, and Orientation and Evaluation he found to be compressed in the lead sentence of reports, but, like other researchers, he acknowledged that the structure of news text is not linear, especially in regard to chronology. Bell affirmed that news texts of the "report" genre usually consist of Headline, Lead, any number of satellites describing episodes (and events within the episodes, which could be commentary, background and follow-ups) (Bell 1991:164-174), and possibly a Wrap-up (Fairclough 1995:72, 85). Bell concluded that the "central action of the news story is told in non-chronological order, with result presented first followed by a complex re-cycling through various time zones down through the story" (Bell 1991:154-5).

The non-chronological re-ordering of elements was also present in Labov and Waletzky, but news texts, unlike personal narratives, do not recycle and reorder elements in order to build up to a Resolution. Indeed, resolution may be suspended because news frequently unfolds *in media res* (Motta 2013:97), with the possibility of resolution always located in the future. Furthermore, Bell pointed out that the news texts have four stylistic traits that sets them apart from personal narratives, namely 1) that they are impersonal (due to journalistic conventions); 2) that they use sources and quotes to present alternative, personal viewpoints; 3) that the use of numbers is much more frequent and precise in news stories relative to personal narratives; 4) and finally, that syntax in news stories tend to be much more complex than in oral narratives (Bell 1991:155).

Matheson argues that the analytical use of a narrative framework (such as Bell's, or the one I intend to deploy) at times forces news texts uncomfortably into predefined boxes of plot and sequence, when in fact news texts cohere in a number of ways and not necessarily through use of narrative structures (Matheson 2010). Matheson goes further still, as he points out that at the functional level of news texts, the scattering of chronology and the inversed-pyramid organization of text in fact undermine the functions identified by Labov and Waletzky. To Matheson, this means that suspense and equilibrium is not constructed in news texts by emplotment, and the Orientation and Coda elements do not perform the sense-making functions of introduction and removal from the story world (ibid.:44ff).

Another critique of the explanatory force of narrative in analyses of broadcast news was brought forth by Montgomery, who used to use a Labovian model for analyzing talk radio (1991) and a narrative approach of analyzing point-of-view in television news (Hartley and Montgomery 1985:247-251). However, Montgomery recently changed his mind on the matter of narrative, seeing television news as fundamentally working through and accomplishing communication with deixis –



demonstrating “here and now” - rather than through narration. Montgomery today argues that television news only “intermittently relies on narrative [...] television news is not so much about telling the structure of events as about showing where incidents are located” (Montgomery 2007:108). Contesting Bell’s story-centric perspective (ibid.:90-91), he characterizes televised news as a “curious kind of mimesis as much as it is diegesis” (ibid.:108), drawing on the Aristotelian tradition. However, he adds, “some news events and some genres give rise to storyable forms” (ibid.:109).

Montgomery’s last comment makes one wonder about the analytical location of “storyable” forms. Earlier, Hartley and Montgomery argued that “the news is active in the *politics* of sense-making” (1985:260), and in particular they saw that the “verbal component of film reports” offer a narrative point of view “from which the viewer can make sense of the story” (ibid.:251). Sense-making requires some story-telling on broadcast news, as deixis and direct representation of voices is not always enough to reliably let the viewer sort out the intended points of view. Similarly, one could argue that it is not enough to show pictures of Congress to understand what’s going on inside Congress, and so deixis on television is not particularly useful for making sense of complex political interactions. Furthermore, Herman (2004:263ff) has argued that a narrative normally lays out the spatial structure of the story world, partly defeating Montgomery’s argument for rigidly removing instances of deixis from narrative structure. Turning back to Matheson, another assumption in his critique seems problematic, as it appears locked up in his methodological focus on singular news texts. A similar text-close approach has also led Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) to avoid narrative in analysis of news texts. However, as we shall see now, it may be more appropriate to say that narrative is partly located outside of texts themselves, which may even explain how narrative anyway reappears in that strand of media studies.

## 1.2 The Narrative Lacuna of Critical Discourse Analysis

While the concept of narrative caught the attention and inspired a range of social and human science approaches, for a variety of reasons, the concept remained marginal in the CDA tradition led by Teun van Dijk. Unpacking his critique is worthwhile here, because it clarifies the differences between the content or event-material dealt with in news text and the narrative clauses found therein, on the one hand, and the composite narratives that emerge in unfolding intertextual systems, on the other.

Van Dijk, in his social-cognitivist approach laid out in *News as Discourse*, locates narrative as a superstructure outside of texts, and within the short-term or long-term memory of readers of news texts (and, of course, producers of news texts) (van Dijk 1988:104).

Narrative categories are used to analyze and order text segments of a story and help the representation of stories in memory. Such additional structuring of a discourse is also relevant during retrieval: Discourse segments that correspond to a narrative category (like setting, event, reaction, or similar general categories) can be retrieved better because language users can use the story grammar categories as a routine retrieval cue. (ibid.:149)

Narratives are not present in texts as such, according to van Dijk, because news texts in themselves exhibit quite different structures from the assumed cognitive narrative model (or, for that matter,

different structures from that of Labovian first-hand narratives or literary narratives). Notice that this argument is different from Matheson's, as it is based in textual features. Van Dijk points out that news texts, as a matter of convention, convey the main thrust of events first (in the headline and the lead), and then supply the details - non-chronologically - in descending order of importance. "Dispensing with suspense" (Bird and Dardenne 1988:76), news can thus not claim any kind of emplotment, since the goal of news is to provide the gist of the "story" up front and then elaborate on details later. In this functional view, emplotment is therefore not to be found in news texts, and, since this approach is solidly grounded in actual news texts and the functions of linguistic units, analyses in the vein of van Dijk would consequently have to avoid narrative analysis. Narratives were instead made the objects of research in neighboring fields of reception research concerning story grammars (e.g. Mandler and Johnson 1977) and cognitive studies of text-processing (such as van Dijk and Kintsch 1983, Turner 1996), but kept out of analyses of news texts.

This is not the entire story, however. Van Dijk also points out that for "at least certain discourse types, it is useful to speak also about the schematic structure. Thus, stories can be characterized by a narrative schema" (van Dijk 1988:189). News discourse should not generally be seen as structured by a narrative macrostructure, but van Dijk instead introduces the term "scripts" to denote semantic macrostructures that may provide news texts with overall coherency:

information may be subsumed by a macroproposition if it refers to normal conditions or components of the macroevent. This subsumption takes place on the basis of our general knowledge of the script about [...] politics (political events, acts, politicians, political talks, visits, etc.) (ibid.:36)

This "general knowledge" of how situations play out is shortly thereafter termed "script" by van Dijk. Scripts are apparently what allows readers to reconstruct events as they read tersely written news texts that may be incomplete or presuppose much information. In other words, scripts are here seen as implicit standard structures of events which journalists draw upon.<sup>1</sup> By relegating the term "narrative" to cognition, and introducing the term "script" as shorthand for the standardized event sequences used by readers and writers, van Dijk avoided to go into the categories and aspects of narrative analysis. This choice may be contested on empirical grounds however, since journalists indeed do narrate (infrequently in quality newspapers, more frequently in weekly magazines and long-reads), as do pundits. Thirty years later, van Dijk, even situated in the media storm of Brazil during the exact events that this thesis treats, continued to ignore this<sup>2</sup> (van Dijk 2017). I do agree with van Dijk that newswriters and audience members may draw upon a pool of generalized knowledge, ordered in so many scripts, when describing and understanding recurring public events. Such scripts are not necessarily invested with much moral meaning or greater significance, but they provide a model for reporting on public events. Quite simply, a script provides the standard pattern of such events; the list of actions and reactions to be expected of a speech in parliament, a state visit, a primary election, and so forth. Because the reader is supposed to have seen these numerous times, and because they usually conform to the standard, the implicit script allows the journalists to rewrite and often shorten texts by operations such as deletion and implication (van Dijk 1988:36, see also Fairclough 1992:200-201, Wodak 1999:34).

There is however another strand of CDA that provides another view of narrative. Norman Fairclough suggested, in a direct reply to van Dijk, that narrative belongs to the macrostructural level of

intertextuality. In this view, narrative is not purely located in the mental models of readers or text-producers and function as the cognitive scaffold behind realized discourse.

Whereas linguistic analysis shows how texts selectively draw upon linguistic systems (again, in an extended sense), intertextual analysis shows how texts selectively draw upon *orders of discourse* - the particular configurations of conventionalized practices (genres, discourses, narratives, etc.) which are available to text producers and interpreters in particular social circumstances... (Fairclough 1992:194, italics in the original)

To Fairclough, narratives appear intertextually in the analysis as conventions in linguistic systems. He added that narrative may be understood as one intertextual property of particular texts, and emphasized that any given text should thus not be conceived of as a homogeneous expression within a single genre or order of discourse, but rather a stitched-together work.

Intertextual analysis draws attention to the dependence of texts upon society and history in the form the resources made available within the order of discourse (genres, discourses, etc.); genres according to Bakhtin are 'the drive belts from the history of society to the history of language' [...] from this perspective, accounts of individual genres and discourse types appear to be largely accounts of ideal types, for actual texts are generally to a greater or lesser degree constituted through mixing these types. (ibid.:194-5)

Fairclough refers to both Bakhtin's writings (especially Bakhtin 1981, containing the dialogical notion of textual *heteroglossia*) and Kristeva in his development of intertextuality, but Fairclough has a less embracing view of intertextual systems than Kristeva. According to the editor of Kristeva's *Desire in Language*, Kristeva was misread by many, and probably Fairclough as well (Roudiez in Kristeva 1980:15). Rather than particular texts or identifiable authors in dialogue with other texts or authors, Kristeva's original vision of intertextuality was oriented to textual systems of signs spanning centuries and the operations and functions of these systems. Jameson contributed to this line of thinking by showing how textual systems could sediment into specific forms, carrying ideological messages of their own (Jameson 1981:84). I must elide Bakhtinian and Kristevan concepts for now to avoid unnecessary confusion of terms, however.

Misreading Kristeva or not, Fairclough advocates for the use of intertextual analysis (opposed to the purely linguistic analysis), but grounded in a close reading of texts, since "intertextual properties of texts are realized in linguistic features" (ibid.:195). Taking my cue from Fairclough, I think that intertextuality could be a key to discovering narratives not just in, but *across* or *between* texts and speech events. For now, I will reserve a theoretical space for narratives, so that I can argue for the importance of narrative a little later, all the while maintaining the insight of Fairclough that narratives appear in dialogue with other discursive orders and textual genres present in news (interviews, op-ed pieces, news reports, etc.) as well as the genres of cultural production in a wider sense (i.e. crime novels or telenovelas).

I will now briefly turn to the theory of framing and frames, not just to explain why narratives also disappeared conceptually from this field, but especially to clarify possible overlaps to narrative theory and to argue for the ultimately limited relevance of framing to my present endeavor by way of an empirical example from the mediascape of Brazil.

### 1.3 Disentangling Frames and Narratives: A Theoretical Review and an Example

Framing analysis has been frequently used within mainstream media studies, but most authors using this approach also avoid the concept of narrative. This is not surprising, since the concept of “frame” has been the topic of extended turf wars (with agenda-setting analysis, in media studies, and definitional struggles with psychology and political science, see Chong and Druckman 2007, Van Gorp 2007). Even after extended conceptual debates of this field, one still encounters problems when trying to distinguish between a “narrative” and a “frame,” as I will show here, since either could be analytically constructed on the basis of news texts.

The embedding or successive nesting of related concepts of “frames” and “framing” in a range of scientific fields makes some preliminary disentanglement necessary. Initially, the concept was picked up from the social interactionism of Goffman (1956) and to some extent the cognitive theory of Gregory Bateson (Bateson 1972). Bateson, in the essay “A Theory of Play and Fantasy” (written in 1955, but included in his later book *Steps to an Ecology of Mind*), stated that

a frame is metacommunicative. Any message, which either explicitly or implicitly defines a frame, ipso facto gives the receiver instructions or aids in his attempt to understand the messages included within the frame. (1972:188)

The concept of framing then took off in media and communication studies, but it was also developed in the fields of political science, social movement theory and psychology. Between all these “frames,” however, the scope is not clear in each field nor across the board (Aalberg, Strömbäck and de Vreese 2011, Reese 2007, Cacciatore, Scheufele and Iyengar 2016), and the cumulative ambiguity of the term “frame,” when viewed from several theoretical perspectives, is staggering.

In psychologically or socio-cognitively inclined studies, the frame is the clue that defines an entire context, setting up expectations and interpretative schemata for the relevant situation. This was the view of Gregory Bateson, referencing Margaret Mead (1934), as well as Erving Goffman. The frames are socially instituted and enacted, define a range of possible scripts for each situation, and can be specified with increasing degrees of complexity; from Bateson's crude “this is play” frame that even animals may signal to Goffman's “how to interact in a restaurant” and even “how to behave rudely as a waiter in this restaurant without apparently breaking decorum” (Goffman 1959, 1974). In economics and prospect theory, Kahneman and Tversky (1979, 1982) performed experiments concerning test subjects’ responses to inversely worded frames, and the concepts of equivalency framing (concerning logically but not emotionally equivalent wordings of a given context) and emphasis framing (concerning omission and highlighting of certain subsets of attributes of a context) were coined. These proved hard to apply consistently in studies of actual political talk (Chong and Druckman 2007, Sniderman and Theriault 2004).

Shanto Iyengar (1990), in a famous study of news frames of the American poor, distinguished between episodic frames and thematic frames, which he thought stimulated variations in the audiences’ attributions of responsibility. Reducing frames to attribution of either personal or systemic responsibility is of limited value when analyzing scandals, however, as responsibility is precisely the perennial battle zone invoked in news reports on scandals. This is the first problem of framing theory when researching scandals: The form of scandal gives priority to a frame that locates guilt or innocence (Kepplinger, Geiss and Siebert 2012). This conveniently reduces complexity for

the reader, but also the potential of analytical insights for the researcher, and I will argue below that news texts covering scandals in fact bring more issues to the table than just the guilt of particular individuals.

Communication scholars often take the formulation of Entman (1993) as the canonical. Here, Entman takes the function of frames, or rather the process of framing, to be transfer of salience. In this definition, framing “essentially involves selection and salience. To frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item described” (ibid.:52, italics removed from the original). In a later formulation, Entman defined framing as “selecting a few aspects of a perceived reality and connecting them together in a narrative that promotes a particular interpretation [...] Framing works to shape and alter audience members’ interpretations and preferences” (Entman 2010:391).

One strand of media studies has taken a more inclusive and less functionalist view than Entman and Iyengar. Gamson and Modigliani thought of frames as “a central organizing idea or story line that provides meaning to an unfolding strip of events ...The frame suggests what the controversy is about, the essence of the issue” (1987:143; compare with Appadurai 1996:35 quoted in the introduction). In such a formulation, it seems that frames and narratives converge theoretically. After all, how can research ever determine where a frame stops, and a narrative begins? More to the point, when is it theoretically viable to say that a framing invokes a narrative structure? Under what circumstances can research check if “an organizing idea” was really a condensed narrative, or whether an “emphasis frame” actually emphasized an emplotment? In order to answer this, I will describe a bit of the news media sphere in Brazil in 2015 and 2016. The example, hopefully, demonstrates how this may be solved, by showing that frames and narratives differ in scope and partly in function.

After months of news coverage that gradually revealed how many politicians and political parties benefitted from kickbacks from the sub-contracts of Petrobras, the scandal became part of the established web of facticity in political reporting (Tuchman 1978). This meant that a lot of news reports about the corruption cases and investigations were included on the media agenda, referring to this overall “frame” or to the developing back-log strip of events, gathered under the heading of “Lava-Jato.” Even minor processes in Congress or in the courts could be justified as interesting and newsworthy on the media agenda because the journalists made the connection to the corruption case salient. This was *the* standard frame, so to speak, accumulating the media events of the case and implicitly inscribing each minor event in the larger story line but without necessarily spelling out any narrative structure or causality. The “corruption of Petrobras” frame could have been (but never was) countered, say, by a frame describing Petrobras as a company with a fundamentally healthy business model and continuing market dominance – again, a frame without an intrinsic narrative structure.

In contrast, once the process of presidential impeachment got underway in December 2015 and especially in 2016, the legitimacy of the process was increasingly contested through two interpretive models that could be called frames, but really featured very clear narrative structures. Rousseff and the PT tried to unmask the impeachment process as a coup d’état, or *golpe*, and by this they meant

that Eduardo Cunha, President of the *Câmara dos Deputados* or the Lower House of Congress, had started the process to protect himself (as well as his party colleagues from PMDB and supporters in Congress) from judicial persecution. In this way, it was not a legitimate attempt to remove the President, but a subversive strike to secure impunity for the corrupt political elite that had grown disenchanted with Rousseff's leadership. Facing off against this narrative, an inverted tale was also found: PT and Rousseff had installed themselves in the center of power to corrupt the national legacy that is Petrobras, and using the spoils of this corruption to lure Congressmen, they had plans to sustain their hegemonic project of power indefinitely. The impeachment was perfectly legitimate, since it would put an end to this project, even if it required the signature of Cunha (who in 2016 was turning into a pariah in public discourse, if not in actual back-stage politics of the *Câmara*). I return to narrative and counternarrative in Chapters 4 and 5.

In news texts of 2016, portions both large and small of either or both narratives were recycled endlessly. Characteristic wordings for each narrative (such as *golpe*) provided short-hand cues on which frames could be constructed by journalists in order to interpret the commotion of the Congress; in other words, the narratives were central organizing ideas, and an unfolding strip of events was tied together by these narratives, even as various frames about political conflict and denunciations of corruption were also used in parallel in particular texts. Such frames had a more limited scope that focused on particular happenings and speech acts. To mention a few examples of some of the frames that were used, newspapers and newscasts foregrounded aggression, horse-race politics (Cappella and Jamieson 1997), and backstage deals, but the textual devices of these framings hinged upon the story arcs of the narratives about the impeachment.

The limited conceptual reach of "a frame" - its lesser organizing affordances - is but one problem of applying a frame research design to extensive scandals such as the Lava-Jato scandal (and, admittedly, precisely what makes frame analysis interesting for comparative research between political contexts, while narratives are more unwieldy). Another problem is the fact that conventional framing analysis impedes access to the diachronic level of analysis, being locked up in the synchrony of "frame A versus frame B." To analyze evolving scandals over time, with frames that emerge, merge, or supersede earlier ones, this research design is then inadequate, as would be more advanced models of competitive frames (Chong and Druckman 2007). Even to find out whether or not frames engender changes in political beliefs or preferences would require the researcher to isolate audiences from external interventions, but such an artificial sequestering of the audience (Sniderman and Theriault 2004) is hardly feasible. It would have been hopeless to assess the actual effect of specific frames concerning Brazilian politics in this period, since the scandals were so massively visible as to defy the "sequestering" or control-group isolation needed to determine effects. "Ultimately, in the case of the Lava Jato probe and the impeachment process, it is highly unlikely that any one journalistic framing would produce any effect at all, since the case is so central to the contemporary public debate of Brazil, and audience members would be likely to have formed opinions before encountering specific texts" (Damgaard 2018a:120).

Due to these doubts about the terminological ambiguity and utility of framing research designs, I think it is necessary that research into news coverage of corruption scandals takes the temporally and casually ordered sequences of event - in a word, the emplotment - into account. As is apparent in the above examples, it is an imminently strategical practice to deploy specific narratives (and

frames organized by these narratives) in the most prestigious news media. It is a political and communicative practice that journalists partake in, knowingly, albeit presumably with different goals than political actors. Whereas the point of narrating, for the political actor, would be to define agency and political space in strategic terms to his or her cause, the journalist will, ideally, faithfully represent the differing voices and different narratives juxtaposed to an objective recounting of recent relevant events. Whether the journalistic practice can ever be unbiased is another discussion, and whether Brazilian media actors in fact do produce “news” with this “objective” ideology at heart has been discussed extensively (Biroli and Miguel 2012, Feres Júnior 2016, van Dijk 2017).

Even though frames might be interesting, I have tried to show that the presence of narrative macrostructure is what enables certain news frames, which I see as dependent microstructures that can be deployed by journalists in order to fit together events and different textual material. Indeed, one might suspect that frames may only be “selected” by news text producers if they fit within established narratives: For instance, Petrobras could never be represented as anything but “broken,” because that would not fit with primary definition of the problem (Hall et al. 1978:57-59), that is, the established fact of the corruption. In the perspective of thinkers such as Barthes or MacIntyre, in which narrative affords and enables cognitive processes, events may only ever be truly apprehended if they find a place in such a narrative.

The third problem I will discuss is the problem of delimiting frames vis-à-vis narratives, exacerbated by the mired conceptual ground between them and the fluffy use of the term “narrative.” In CDA, the idea of a common-knowledge “script” used by news producers was also introduced, constituting yet another concept adjacent to “frame.” While van Dijk (1988), as we saw, explicitly denies narratives conceptual space in news texts (locating narratives instead in the minds of text readers and producers), the concept of scripts still indicates the existence of textual cues that cohere because they refer to a structure outside of a particular text. These structures can in some cases also be thought of as frames (say, when the script of elections is being framed as contest or sports match).

The scripts, if I read van Dijk correctly, are of a generic type or “standard story lines” (Cappella and Jamieson 1997:46). Gamson and Modigliani’s accounts of strips of events seem to be located outside of specific texts, like those generic scripts and like several related concepts not discussed here, such as public narratives (Green, Strange, and Brock 2002) and story lines (Hajer 2005). Unlike scripts, however, I assume that such narrative-based accounts of strips of events (Appadurai 1996:35) must logically have definite, non-generic content, and have identifiable story elements. Why? Because such accounts or the various types of “organizing ideas” precisely pick out and pull together events, rather than generically calling up themes. A border-line case is the concept of master narratives, which to some scholars are of the generic type, but to others seem more culturally bound and historically defined (Jameson 1981, Lyotard 1984). Various narratives could certainly be of the same generic plot type (a quest, a contest, and so forth, i.e. Dayan and Katz 1992). Generic invocation of themes would fall under the category of an order of discourse, while to my mind intertextuality implies the specific case of dialogical reference between particular (textual) events, rather than the recycling of words and metaphors in broader terms.

Concepts of scripts, frames, and narratives may furthermore reside in metaphorical “containers” (Lakoff 2002). In sum, the theoretical indeterminacy and complexities of distinguishing between script, frame, narrative, metaphor, public narratives or even discourse strands (Link and Link-Heer 1990, Jäger 2001) are staggering. They are all analytical concepts corresponding, to various degrees, to empirical discursive phenomena, and one could be tempted to put much the same content into each formula. For example, a news report on a tough court sentence might invoke

- A disciplinary discourse (Fairclough 1995:96)
- A frame that makes discipline salient as value and model for judging action
- A strict-father metaphor (Lakoff 2002:65, 390)
- A transgression-and-just-punishment narrative
- A “trial in court” or a “justice fulfilled” script

These examples overlap each other to different degrees and in different dimensions: Some are located mentally, some textually; the elaboration varies; and some concepts could be nested within (several) others. For example, a (textual) frame might cue a (cognitive) narrative (Cappella and Jamieson 1997:77).

I have here argued briefly that the frames found in the empirical material presented later in this thesis are nested within narratives, and that frame analysis for scandals is generally of little use if only considering framings of guilt and responsibility. The bottom line of all this, however, is not to say that frame analysis is not worth pursuing in general, but rather that it is worthwhile to elucidate why some researchers seem to reach an upper limit of the concept, a boundary zone that shades into narrative territory.

#### 1.4 State of the art in scandal studies

Researchers of scandals, like other media scholars, have also remarked on the relevance of narrative, but like studies of media in general, scandal research has gained little ground in understanding why exactly narrativity is important, and either ignored narrative analysis or created customized frameworks that explain the event structures of scandals *outside* of news (which may still be reflected in coverage, of course).

I will briefly summarize some of the seminal studies that are ultimately unsatisfactory as models for approaching narratives emerging in news during corruption scandals. Some of these studies work in a no-man’s land between political science, history, and media studies, without a methodological basis in news analysis, and it therefore sometimes appear, despite disclaimers to the contrary, as if scandals are a social phenomenon distinct from news.

Lull and Hinerman could not “overstate the importance of the concept of ‘story’ when analyzing scandals” (1997:13). Their typology of scandals, however, only differentiates different casts of characters, and they present diachronic criteria for defining “the status of these stories as scandals” (ibid.:11), but ignore the synchronic development of such stories. In the same edited volume, Bird and Thompson pick up the narrative strand (and I shall return to Bird’s arguments in the following



chapter). Thompson's arguments were developed further a few years later in his book *Political Scandal*, which contains the following acute observation:

... one key feature of mediated scandals is that they are essentially *open-ended*... if one is situated in the midst of a mediated scandal and watching (or participating in) its development in real time, it is extremely difficult to predict how it will unfold... mediated scandals are of interest to readers and viewers [because], for those who are witnessing the unfolding events as they occur, the eventual outcome is intrinsically unclear. Hence they fuel speculation and, like a good novel, they constantly test the capacity of readers and viewers to assess the veracity of the protagonists, to figure out the end and to predict its resolution. (Thompson 2000:73)

This quote suggests that Thompson is keenly aware of the unfolding, enthralling and almost literary quality of mediated scandals. He constructs a basic as well as a more elaborate model of the scandal's unfolding events (2000:24-5), a model which was also partly present in his contribution to Lull and Hinerman's volume (1997:39). Thompson specifically sees scandal as "a kind of narrative with multiple plots and subplots" (2000:25), but he then ends up developing a social theory of scandal based on the theory of Bourdieu (*ibid.*:245). In this concluding part, scandal (in the political field) is seen as a negotiation of symbolic capital and reputation, and Thompson connects this to trust in political leader figures. Perhaps because of the profound complexity of the unfolding itself, or because of his huge range of historical examples, Thompson avoids connecting the model of scandal phases to the theory of political impact. Other recent examples of researchers working with the trajectory or "career" of scandals include Tiffen (2002), Adut (2008) and Breit (2011:99f), mostly as descriptive categories characterizing shifts in the content and tone of media coverage.

The connection between scandal events and outcome could perhaps be explained more satisfyingly through comparative studies. Hypothetically, such comparisons could shed light on the different trajectories of media "plots and subplots" and their contribution to the thrust of events. This line of thinking is central to Pujas' research design (2002), to Canel and Sanders (2006), and to the contributions in the volume edited by Allern and Pollack (2012). Canel and Sanders made an inventory of framing devices across Spanish and British scandals, but failed to connect this to outcomes (2006:154-68). Pujas highlighted the factors in the legal system and the journalistic profession that had an impact on the trajectory of two similar scandals in France and Spain, while several of the Scandinavian political scandals compared by Allern and Pollack explored how variables of gender and political career length influenced the outcome. Allern and Pollack expands Thompson's framework and, like him, acknowledge the narrative and dramatic aspects of scandals (2012:17-9), but in their conclusion to seven hypotheses about scandals emphasize intra-media agenda-setting and framings of personal wrong-doing as the significant parameters of scandal coverage (*ibid.*:181-8).

A literature review of Brazilian scandal research (Silva 2013:164) showed that Brazilian authors frequently base their work on Thompson (e.g. Chaia 2015, Feres Júnior and Sassara 2016, Miguel and Coutinho 2007). Other Brazilian researchers study scandals and public opinion in an aggregate sociological manner (Baptista 2017, Meneguello 2011), or, like Guazina, Prior and Araújo (2017) state that they work with framing analysis, but end up discussing narrative structures and plots. Prior (2015) bases his characterization of scandals in news on Motta (2013), but Motta, surprisingly, tries to salvage narrative from the concept of macro-proposition found in van Dijk (1988), thus going against the explicit grain of van Dijk's argument.

Although they make no connection to narration there, Lull and Hinerman's criteria of scandals resemble phases of a scandal (1997:11-13), while Tiffen (2002) explicitly presents stages of scandals, like Thompson (2000:24). If stages are important, it is somewhat surprising that typologies such as these never consider stages or phases as epiphenomena of media coverage or as rules for slicing up material for a narrative analysis, despite the postulated critical importance of the concept of story (e.g. Lull and Hinerman 1997:13). When historical and sociological analyses thus remain unconnected to emplotment, it becomes difficult to explain why the media's representations (whether narrative or not) are even important to the outcome. I would argue that scandals should not be seen as fundamentally different from other news, nor do they require special typologies. What is needed, however, is to take the narrative injunction seriously, and furthermore to explicitly establish links to the methods found in media studies and literary studies.

Another trait of this type of news, often alluded to in the above studies, is the newsworthiness of scandals. Because scandals are essentially reports on alleged transgressions of the ideal frontstage role (Goffman 1956) of public office-holders, scandals embody just about every news value: relevance, drama, scandal, negativity, conflict, human interest, proximity, and suspense. These newsworthiness criteria (originally discussed in Galtung and Ruge 1965, see also Bell 1991:155-160) are loosely and heuristically applied principles for justifying what material *could* be included and what *should* be excluded, and on what grounds, with the express intent of capturing large shares of the audience population of a given region. Thus, in principle, news about niche segments of society would only be selected for prime-time or mainstream news if the journalist is able to connect the news to something within the cultural horizon of a wider audience, unfamiliar with that segment, and thereby make it *relatable* (or, in other words, "tellable" and intelligible). News media, in this way, are supposedly extremely influential in defining what is hegemonic and what is divergent, who belongs to subgroups or majorities, and so on (Fowler 1991:54, Fairclough 1995:125). Thus, if some event or individual manages to make the prime-time news, it can be inferred normatively by the audience that this event or person is very important and that the audience *should* pay attention. Corruption scandals in the media perform this double trick by going into "alarm mode" (Boydston 2013) and moving the spotlight (and thus preliminarily allocating blame). Even more importantly, when reporting "that a politician has been charged with corruption, it suggests, *sotto voce*, that corruption is bad and that politicians should be honest" (Gans 1980:40). Such moral considerations are normally assumed to hold for all of society, and the assumptions are not only implicit or *sotto voce*, but may also be articulated and cast in narrative forms in commentary, to which I now turn.

### 1.5 Plot and Prediction in Political Commentary and Punditry

While I intend to apply a model of news that takes into consideration narrative emplotment to a specific set of scandals, such a model of news could generate insights into an adjacent area of research that also has a blind spot for narratives. Political experts are important "talking heads" on TV, and yet, in Lunt and Livingstone's seminal work *Talk on TV*, the authors only consider storytelling as the layman's discourse, disdained or rarely used by experts that prefer other rhetorical strategies (Lunt and Livingstone 2002:139). Working with talk show material, Lunt and Livingstone's study should not be generalized, but their view is perhaps a symptom of this blind spot: Expert knowledge is not supposed to be imparted through narratives. It is striking that the rise of the so-called political pundits has been discussed from various angles, but rarely is it discussed how pundits

actually produce and narrate their interpretations of the political field. The function, use and scope of pundits is increasing across the globe according to this literature, and in some countries (such as Portugal and the US), pundits even shift careers to become central political actors. The most frequently researched questions relating to pundits have to do with their ascension in the media hierarchy, their authoritative status and privileged access to the production of interpretations (Allern 2010, Altermann 1999, Bengtsson 2015, Bro 2016, Hopmann and Strömbäck 2010, McNair 1999, Neveu 2002, Nimmo and Combs 1992). According to a recent typology of research on pundits,

descriptive, textual research is essential for a better understanding of the phenomenon. Currently, we have little knowledge, and our intuitions about the genre need to be qualified [...] there is to my knowledge no research taking a textual, evaluative approach to political commentary (Bengtsson 2015:12)

Thus, it is not easy to find research that explores how, why, and in which ways commentary is distinct from regular reporting, even though commentary deals in fact-centered news (but see Letukas 2014, especially ch. 6). To answer such questions and the previous question concerning attribution of meaning, we need to go beyond the extant literature on political pundits and commentators, as well as the literature discussed in the previous sections.

To take one example, in the quote of Thompson (the section above), speculation was purely supposed to be found at the level of the audience. Nimmo and Combs, to take one example from the pundit literature, initially argue that pundits connect events in their interpretations, but they never return to this initial observation:

For major events, the anchor turns to someone who gives a brief interpretation: This is happening because of X, Y, and Z but not A, B, and C; it is happening now because of D, E, and F preceded it; we can expect H, G, and I to come from what is happening but not J, K, and L. [...] Journalists not only reported the event, they often interpreted it. (Nimmo and Combs 1992:2, 12)

While not delving further into the emplotment of events presented by such interpreting newswriters and pundits, it seems clear that Nimmo and Combs see interpretation as a plot-centric practice. The meaning of events depends on other events in the past and expectations of future events. Likewise, Nord, Enli, and Stúr (2012:91) describe pundits commenting on scandals as “professional storytellers.” Perhaps it is a general condition that thinking about political action – such as the cognitive processes of audiences, journalists, pundits and professional politicians – is always-already cast in a narrative form (echoing MacIntyre’s idea that narrative permeates all human meaning-work, 1984:212). In this view, interpretations of political actions can perhaps be expressed but barely be thought without an emplotment of events. Even if the reader (perhaps of a transcendental Kantian bend) is not convinced to take the narrative-epistemological stance with me in believing that humans experience the world through narratives, it is still possible, I think, to accept the fact that newswriters, whether pundits, editors, or journalists, have stories at heart.

I would argue that apart from inside knowledge of political structures, the culturally specific availability of narratives is precisely what allows commentators, pundits, and other newswriters to infer and ascribe meaning to events. Tuchman observed that “reporters work to apprehend and attribute meaning when they identify some items, but not others, as news” (Tuchman 1978:188). It is necessary to unpack the exact way that this attribution of meaning works, and the texts made by pundits arguably provide a prime site for finding material in which attribution of meaning occurs.

Preliminarily, I will point to two themes that appear scattered across the literature on pundits, both of which have to do with sense-making and attribution of meaning. Because of the dearth of thick description-style analysis of pundit texts and discussions (Bengtsson 2015), these themes are still incipient. In the literature, the major difference between news reporting and commentary appears to be that pundits and commentators are allowed to go beyond the “objective,” purely “fact-based” reporting of other newswriters when engaging in a) prediction and b) ascription (all the while acknowledging that ascription and prediction sometimes enter “fact-based” reporting, hence the quotation marks). In doing so, pundits may present more or less coherent narratives, although this is certainly not the only thing that characterizes this caste of newswriters.

Punditry frequently involves prediction, and this was first pointed out by Alterman (1992) and Sigelman, Manheim and Pierce (1996). Forecasts of political events “feed the insatiable appetite of [political elites and political elite media] for fresh political information” (ibid.:33-34). Tea-leaf reading and fortune-telling might be scorned by political scientists, but in the business of filling out dead air when information flows are momentarily clogged, the pundit has full license to interpret not only past events, but also future ramifications through conjecture (Montgomery 2007:120-5).

Another mode of punditry is the guessing game of deducing intentions, which I term ascription. Historians like White and Mink worked on the problem of narrativizing representations of reality (White 1973, 1981, Mink 1965, 1981). Indirectly, Mink stumbled upon one problem that also may arise in striving for coherency in news: ascriptions. “Intentions and states of mind are not events, but their ascription may be a necessary part of any narration of these events” (Mink 1981:236). In order to present political action meaningfully, it is necessary to infer intentionality and state of minds on the part of political actors. Pundits do so frequently and with such an air of facticity that readers and viewers may well forget that they never have direct access, but must infer, guess or even invent. Audiences are never privy to the exact mechanic by which newswriters select among possible ascriptions, and are rarely provided with several possibilities, because this would expose the fragile claim to representing reality. Newswriters, commentators in particular, simply ascribe intentions to actors, and are never called out to account for this practice, even if the commentators’ ascriptions attain substantial agenda-setting and framing power (Nord, Enli, and Stúr 2012:101).

Neither prediction nor ascription are purely fictitious, but parts of a reflexive practice that (again) builds on the established web of facticity provided by the media and institutionalized by the inter-media consensus of newsworthiness principles and hegemonic traditions of political reporting. In the production of journalistic material distributed on many authors and editors in news organizations, the news values and interpretation practices work in tandem to construct and legitimize certain points of view and truth regimes (Foucault 1980). The evaluation of newsworthiness is always already an interpretation performed, say, with an eye to future political developments in the existing institutional order (Tuchman 1978:190, Hall et al. 1978:58-60). Fowler observed that journalists take into account and continuously re-evaluate newsworthiness (or, as he terms it, news values), based on their reflexive interpretation of the landscape of media. Thus, newsworthiness of events cannot be judged on the basis of a static check-list of news values:

News values are rather to be seen as qualities of (potential) reports [,] not simply features of selection, but, more importantly, features of representation; and so the distinction between ‘selection’ and ‘transformation’

ceases to be absolute: an item can only be selected if it can be seen in a certain light of representation, and so selection involves an ideological act of interpretation. (Fowler 1991:19)

Thus, selection of stories depends not as much on the actual event at hand as the potential selected features and news values that could propel the reporting of the event over the threshold of attention (the editor's attention if not the audience's). This means that pundits, like editors and journalists in general, take into account the information at disposal, their own perception of the situation, and what they hear through the grapevine, and integrate all of this with a view to the implicit reader of the newspaper. In doing so, they account for events and shape their comments on these events so as to fit (or perhaps criticize) the editorial line and the implicit public idiom (Hall et al. 1978:61), other public interpretations current *en vogue*, and the interpretations and justifications given by the implicated political actors. This means that pundits partake in the general economy of telling stories, but with a distinct license to connect or, rather, emplot events, through the modes of ascription and prediction. Finally, pundits may also introduce entirely new perspectives once in a blue moon, or revive historical events in a comparative manner. In the next chapter, I discuss how prediction works upon and within narrative structures.

### 1.6 State of the Art and Nomenclature

In this chapter, I have identified several theoretical lacunas and a range of problems relating to nomenclature. Although the concept of narrative has cropped up repeatedly in seminal media studies, somehow it has done so without a common methodology coalescing that might address how news narratives are different from literary narratives (Pietilä 1992:61). Thus, we are left without the desirable analytical precision that could be attained after the narrative turn and the complex vocabulary developed in the wake of French structuralism. Worse still, research has lost sight of the theoretical and empirical overlaps, and might be fooled into believing in a "simple distinction between narratives about the real and the narratives of fiction" (Hall 1984:5-6).

For reasons that have to do with diverging theoretical approaches and disciplinary scopes, nomenclature problems have emerged in relation to the definitions of narrative (whether "narrative" refers to a full-bodied plot with a moral subject or merely to a chain of events), in relation to the exact relationship between news production and narration, in relation to the narrative properties of scripts in either the sense of grand moral tales or mental common-knowledge schematas, and in the overlapping empirical extension of the concepts "script," "frame," and "narrative."

Apart from the divergent uses of terms and concepts, this chapter has also identified some crucial theoretical and ensuing methodological gaps in existing approaches to news, and in particular to media scandals. I will briefly recap them here in order to motivate the development of a theoretical model in the next chapter.

- Though some scholars think that news tell stories, it has been argued that it is not always feasible to press specific news texts into the template of narrative analysis. In this view, news in print media do not create suspense or narrative closure, and news reports on television rely on images and deixis rather than emplotment.
- Some scholars assume that narrative governs the reception-level activity, so that narrative can be explored only in experimental or anthropological studies of audiences.
- While it is plausible that common knowledge of recurring scripted public events is used by newswriters in order to compress or elide background explanation in news texts (e.g. van Dijk 1988), and broadcasts utilize “grand script” (such as Coronations, Conquests, Contests and Disasters, see Dayan and Katz 1992, Katz and Liebes 2007), this has not led to the use of narrative analysis to dissect such scripts; indeed Thompson mentioned that the framework of Dayan and Katz is not applicable to scandals (2000:76, note 5), and Silverstone argued that television news “masks its [narrative] forms” (1981:83).
- Even theories of media scandals that do emphasize the importance of narrativity shy away from the next logical step: analyzing texts within a narrative framework.
- Analyses of political commentary partially suffer from the same “narrative blind spot.”

Thus, either by overlooking or denying the relevance of narratives, or else by locating narratives in the human cognition, at the level of reception, or beyond the purview of the textual frames, media studies have not assembled a coherent set of tools to grasp the way that distributed narratives emerge at the aggregate and intertextual level through a recurrent textual system governed by narrative structures. All the tools are there, but because of these lacunas, it has been impossible to cross-fertilize media studies and scandal studies with the insights gained from narrative analysis.

The most important problems of the above, I think, are the bounded view of narrative and author, and the influence of discourse theory. First, it is generally overlooked that narratives may not reside in a single, bounded “container,” say, within the pages of a magazine or the frame of a newspaper article. This relates to the second theoretical limit: the bounded view of narrative authorship, attributing texts to identifiable authors. This is an unacknowledged positivist (or at least a text-centered) stance that may have blinded media research to the aggregate aspect of news and its reliance on collective, non-authored narratives. News organizations churn out texts by recycling texts spewing forth from numerous national and international news agencies (Aguiar 2014), and news media outlets are comprised of layers of editors cutting and trimming sentences to produce texts that, ultimately, can hardly be attributed to single authors (Bell 1991). In this aspect news stories appear like the camp-fire story, like myth and folklore: shared, evolving, and laden with cultural significance. I would argue that the story ambience of earlier epochs, when communities recycled and imperceptibly developed their myths and legends through essentially un-authored story-telling, is not so different from modern mediascapes where news organizations incessantly spin news stories out of public events. Precisely because narrative structures emerge “between” texts, I will dismiss the critique fielded by Matheson: while the news genre in each particular instance of text may not be determined or structured by narrative logic, a group of news texts may cohere and be understood to audiences and researchers exactly because they share a narrative logic and structure.

That cultures and cultural identity is defined by the stories told was an inaugural insight for the modern humanities: In the late 19<sup>th</sup> century, scientists from several emerging branches in the humanities (folklorists and historians of religion) established comparative readings of myths in and across cultures, and theorized the existence of cultural repertoires or inventories of quasi-mythical narrative. Similar insights have cropped up in various media studies (Alexander and Jacobs 1998, Cottle 2006, Hall 1984, Carey 1988, Silverstone 1988), but has not been methodically developed.

The reason that news stories are rarely seen *as stories* in the aggregate could be due to the influence of the Foucauldian concept of discourse that attracted much disciplinary interest. Discourse theory is often more attuned to the synchronic rather than diachronic features of speech acts, however. I return to discourse theory below. For now, I will emphasize that several interesting research questions crop up if news is seen as drawing upon not just various strands and orders of discourse (e.g. Fairclough 1995, Jäger 2001), but upon culturally shared narratives, in a way that is similar to how pre-modern societies reproduced myth and lore. What are the narrative patterns available to modern-day journalism in different media systems? Do such patterns align or create space for contestation? Which production processes of contemporary media are influenced by an explicit or tacit inclination towards pre-existing narrative patterns? What does the degree of alignment or contestation between actual events and narrative patterns mean to selection and gate-keeping processes in media? These are four initial questions that cannot be answered by a view of narrative bound up on particular, closed-off texts with identifiable authorial voices.

To answer such questions, narratives must instead be approached as constructs located outside of actual texts (verbal or written), in an intertextual space. To several scholars interested in scandals (Bird and Dardenne 1988, Bird 1997, Tiffen 2002, Thompson 2000) this was, in a way, the stated research object – the trajectory of a developing corpus of news texts dealing with a transgression of public or political morality. However, scandal studies such as the ones mentioned above claim coherence in the composite corpus of texts that relate to the scandal, but such coherence is in fact a problematic assumption: Texts may be heterogeneous and try out various narratives to make sense of events and to articulate multiple visions of society, and so coherence cannot be assumed. Rather, it is the contestation of social boundaries and the posed solutions to societal tensions and conflicts that need to be analyzed (Damgaard 2015b), and in the following chapter, I develop a model for doing so.

## Chapter 2

### A Theoretical Model for Narrative Analysis of News on Scandals

Media scholars may see narratives in news, but rarely stop to describe the way that narratives emerge in news, or declare their procedure or theoretical grounds for detecting such narratives. This leaves fundamental questions of how news texts could be analyzed as narratives given their non-fictional material, and how the narratives emerging in news intersect with other kinds of narrative production in culture. These are the main issues to be addressed in this chapter, as I seek to establish the methodological ground for the later analysis of news, and thereby remedy the lacunas pointed out in the previous chapter. In this chapter, I will develop a model to address the way that news on scandals articulate narrative structures drawn from a cultural stock or repertoire, and argue that this can generate insights into the political unconscious (Jameson 1981) of the mediascape. Moreover, I will link the cultural repertoire of narratives to the wider sociological questions of cultural production and the circulation of textual forms.

#### 2.1 Intertextuality

At the end of the previous chapter, I argued that news must be understood not just as singular instances of text, but as units partaking in and expressing shared narrative structures. I will unfold this view here as a first step of the theoretical model of this thesis, arguing that intertextuality could be a key to discovering narratives not just in, but *across* texts and speech events.

The idea of intertextuality emerged in parallel with French structuralism, and was articulated by Julia Kristeva on the basis of earlier writings by Mikhail Bakhtin. Bakhtin saw any discourse as dialogically oriented to other utterances, to “the already known” (Bakhtin 1981:279). Narrative discourse in particular has the common property of orientation to conventions outside of the text, which is what allows us to understand some utterance as narrative, and usually to peg it down as belonging to a certain genre. Less abstractly, we recognize, for instance, crime novels and detective shows as distinct narrative formats (partly due to the media-technological specifics) but situated within a common genre using some of the same plot elements; even more elementary, our kids are taught in schools to recognize fairy tales by conventional utterances such as “Once upon a time...” and “the End.” Such cues (or similar resources in other cultures that pre-structure the reception of narrative, e.g. Lyotard 1984:20) are available to language users across many genres, and this allows for mixing of discourse types and the embedding of narratives, in this case narration or insertion of fairy tale-styled narratives. Of course, language users are not limited to using the cues that introduce or round off narratives, nor are they restricted to the canonical 31 operations found in fairy tales (Propp 1928). Rather, the dialogic aspects of text work in tension within or against narrative conventions and patterns, and language users may refer to generic or particular segments and slices of a wider narrative and cultural production.

Kristeva subscribed to Bakhtin’s view of dialogically engaged textual analysis, and she even expanded its conceptual extension. To Kristeva, the object of semiotics and literary theory should rather be “a permutation of texts, an intertextuality” (Kristeva 1980:36) or a “mosaic of quotations.” By this, she meant systems of semiotic practices, and she redefined the analytical vocabulary to



make “text” signify “culture,” while “the novel” came to mean the totality of novelistic production (ibid.). Later discourse analysts, such as Fairclough, took a more limited view of intertextuality, arguing that “intertextual properties of texts are realized in linguistic features” (Fairclough 1992:195). He asserted that intertextual analysis should show “how texts selectively draw upon orders of discourse - the particular configurations of conventionalized practices (genres, discourses, narratives, etc.) which are available to text producers and interpreters” (ibid.:194). Fairclough argued that intertextual analysis is necessary to grasp “the dependence of texts upon society and history in the form the resources made available within the order of discourse (genres, discourses, etc.)” In the micro-example above, I exemplified this with the conventional narrative introduction “Once upon a time” - a narrative practice that has the function of cueing an “elsewhen” and setting the stage for narration. This cue is indeed textually present at the surface level, as Fairclough argues, and not only present in the abstract functions and operations of Kristevan ideologue-analysis.

Returning to news texts, I will start out from Fairclough’s assumption (that intertextuality is realized linguistically in texts), and the question is then: What narrative conventions and structures are used by producers of news texts, and how do they emerge? In the context of this thesis, I will argue that in the intertextuality of news, narratives appear because they are shared resources for speech acts and the range of discursive practices (Fairclough 1995:58) arising in news media genres. News narratives emerge in intertextual strings of texts that relate and build on top of each other (Cornfield 1992:49). This argument is in line with recent research into narratives across speech events, underscoring the dialogic nature of narrative discourse (Agha and Wortham 2005, Hiramoto and Park 2010, Wortham and Rhodes 2015, Wortham and Reyes 2015). Wortham and Rhodes, for instance (2015:160), argue that discourse connects across speech events, and linked speech events are essential to social life. Because of this structuring, events can be recognized as events, belonging to a set or being distinct from the background noise of history. Wortham and Rhodes claim that the connected events constitute narratives, which

are joined together in chains or trajectories, through discursive processes that link speech events to each other, such that signs and individuals move along chains of narrating events that occur in different spatio-temporal locations... [Through] chains of linked narratives [...] cultural models, personal identities, and other social phenomena are established as a linked trajectory of narrating events takes shape. (ibid.:161)

As events unfold in linked text chains, they are not closed off, unlike completed literary sequences found in novels, for instance. Journalists may know the typical stages of scandals (e.g. Tiffen 2002:291, Lull and Hinerman 1997:11-13, Thompson 2000:24ff), but the narration of real events is always at risk of not reaching narrative closure (Silverstone 1981:136ff), and may peter out at any moment (and, as Brazilian corruption research attests, the lack of a proper ending to political scandal stories is always likely; see Power and Taylor 2012:252). This lack of closure, and ultimately the instability of developing chains of news stories, is not necessarily a problem for approaching news with a narratological method, however.

If one follows Bakhtin, narratives *across speech events* are not and could never be stable and closed objects of research: Rather, discourse is always in dialogue and responding or commenting, contingently unpacking or refolding other discursive instantiations. Thus, each iteration (each news text, in this case) may always select different elements from the relevant order of discourse (or even

importing elements from adjacent orders). This means that narratives proliferate, gradually transmute, and fade away. How to deal methodologically with the erosion of intertextual stability?

To answer this would in a way be to pose a response to the problem of infinite semiosis and the implicit regression *ad nauseam* resulting from Bakhtinian thought: How can we ever analytically close off a chain of linked speech events? My answer would be that in the case of scandals, it is feasible to do so and even jettison the entire metaphor of the chain used by Wortham and Rhodes, because news texts about scandals and the discourse that arise from such texts are not exactly chains stretching indefinitely back into time – not in their narrative structures, anyway. Rather, they emerge in specific historic moments as disclosure of particular sets of information, with a range of potentials, and project a trajectory towards the possible endpoints of the scandal. Because of the particular characteristic scandals, I will work with the assumption that the structure of these intertextual constructs are more like arcs than like infinite chains: The metaphor of story arc, I think, is more apt to capture the way that events are constructed and emplotted to cohere, to move along a trajectory of telling, to reach narrative closure, and thus to make sense as a whole. In this sense, although I argued earlier against a bounded view of narrative, I do see certain contingent limits to intertextuality.

The lack of narrative closure, organized by one or more identifiable authors, is not only a feature of the narration of real-life events, but of many kinds of distributed narrative:

Distributed narratives are stories that aren't self-contained. They're stories that can't be experienced in a single session or in a single space. They're stories that cross over into our daily lives, becoming as ubiquitous as the network that fosters them. (Walker 2004:1)

The common-sense notion of a “story,” already articulated in Aristotle’s *Poetics*, holds that narratives are governed by a tripartite plot structure: “poetic imitation which is narrative in form... should have for its subject a single action, whole and complete, with a beginning, a middle, and an end. It will thus resemble a living organism in all its unity” (*Poetics* chapter 23, see also 50b26-34). However, the classic and intuitive view of narratives, once we think about it, does not hold for all fiction; many serialized media products, for example, do not end neatly nor respect the principle of dramatic unities. Literature and Hollywood movies may try to contain their narrative, but fan fiction, sequels, prequels and other rehashing and rewriting fundamentally challenge the boundary of the artefact. SMS-based novels have exploded even the physical boundary of the traditional novel. Television series are open-ended until funding runs dry, and always hold potential for revival if the fan base turns out to be sufficiently active and loud. Roleplaying games (offline and some online versions) contain infinite storylines within them, although pre-defined to various extents. Diaries and weblogs distribute open-ended personal narratives, as do social media in a certain sense. This thesis works towards a similar conclusion for the case of journalism: News constitute or create sequences of events across a non-finite number of instances.

That news create chains of events seems especially clear in the case of scandals, but as discussed in the previous chapter, neither seminal studies of scandals from the Anglophone world (Lull and Hinerman 1997, Thompson 2000) nor newer studies of Brazilian and Latin American scandals (Balán 2011, 2014, Llanos and Marsteintredet 2010, Michener and Pereira 2016, Pérez-Liñán 2014, Prior 2015) work systematically with the narrative properties of scandals. In the next section, I will discuss

how the chaining-together of events in a distributed media environment is accomplished, giving rise to plot, even if the events of such plot remains without an ending or definite closure, but still emerge chained together in a narrative structure across the surface manifestations of text.

## 2.2 Emplotment: Identifying Intertextual Narratives

Writing news texts intelligibly requires emplotment, just like other “realist” types of discourse that accounts for events, whether fictional or factual. I will follow Ricoeur, who defines plot thus:

By plot I mean the intelligible whole that governs a succession of events in any story. This provisory definition immediately shows the plot’s connecting function between an event or events and the story. A story is *made out of* events to the extent that plot *makes* events *into* a story. (Ricoeur 1981:167)

While Ricoeur’s definition of plot is useful here, I think his complex definition of emplotment (in *Time and Narrative*, Ricoeur 1984) is of less use for the present purposes. Instead, in the following, I will take plot to be the result of the practice of emplotment, a practice which invokes a specific causal logic in order to organize discourse:

narrative always involves, due to the logic of emplotment, a strong implication of causality: “one thing because of another.” The same point is implicit in E. M. Forster’s well-known aphorism in *Aspects of the Novel*. “The king died and then the queen died,” said Forster, is a chronicle. “The king died and the queen died of grief” is a story. (Dowling 2011:5)

Emplotment is a textual practice, found commonly but certainly not exclusively in news. Somers offers this insight on emplotment specifically relevant to social science research, with a focus on the importance of emplotment and narrativity for the social agency involved in identity politics:

From diverse sources it is possible to identify four features of a reframed narrativity particularly relevant for the social sciences: 1) relationality of parts, 2) causal emplotment, 3) selective appropriation, and 4) temporality, sequence, and place. Together, these dimensions suggest narratives are constellations of relationships (connected parts) embedded in time and space, constituted by causal emplotment. Unlike the attempt to produce meaning by placing an event in a specified category, narrativity precludes sense-making of a singular isolated phenomenon. Narrativity demands that we discern the meaning of any single event only in temporal and spatial relationship to other events. Indeed, the chief characteristic of narrative is that it renders understanding only by connecting (however unstably) parts to a constructed configuration or a social network of relationships (however incoherent or unrealizable) composed of symbolic, institutional, and material practices.

The connectivity of parts is precisely why narrativity turns “events” into episodes, whether the sequence of episodes is presented or experienced in anything resembling chronological order. This is done through “emplotment.” It is emplotment that gives significance to independent instances, not their chronological or categorical order. And it is emplotment that translates events into episodes. As a mode of explanation, causal emplotment is an accounting (however fantastic or implicit) of why a narrative has the story line it does. (Somers 1994:616)

By combining this understanding of plot and emplotment with the above the notion of intertextuality, I can now specify the research object of this thesis: narratives that emerge in and across news texts precisely in the emplotment of a common narrative structure. When a group of news texts select the same elements and establish similar relations between these elements and

emplot the events within the same causal logic, I take texts of this group to be variations of a single narrative structure. The texts, then, partake intertextually in translating events into coherent story lines or story arcs that may hold symbolic meanings in the cultural context in which they are situated, and I discuss this in the sections below, after some initial caveats concerning emplotment.

Not every shared phrase found in news should be understood as a narrative, of course. I will dispel this potential misunderstanding of my argument with a few brief examples. In news on Brazilian politics, the figure of ex-president Lula has been central for four decades. However, this mostly takes on the form of references to the person Lula as a public figure, and while reference is certainly intertextual, it is not narrativity. References may shade into something more, however. For instance, the phrase “nunca antes neste país” – never before in this country – has been a staple in Lula’s public speeches, a catchphrase of his that highlighted the so-called social conquests (of political rights and social security) during his presidential periods (Kitzberger 2010:26). Quotes or paraphrases of this figure of speech that appear in news texts may either be considered as a reference to specific speeches or more generally a reference to his reputation as orator and president. While also intertextual, the referenced event (a given speech) is not necessarily connected causally to other events, nor necessarily reported as such. A reference to the phrase “republic of Curitiba” (Castro 2016, see Chapter 5 and footnote 9), on the other hand, could be considered to invoke the conflict between the ex-president and the Lava-Jato task force. In this sense, I would consider a news text reporting on the phrase “republic of Curitiba” to partake in a plot structure shared with other texts. It is this kind of publicly available textual configuration of events found across news texts that I wish to approach with narrative analysis.

A second caveat is the ubiquity of discourse about corruption in Brazilian news. So many news texts tangentially touch upon corruption and the diverse trials and investigations of political corruption in Brazil that some delimitation of the corpus of news texts is needed (discussed in the next chapter), together with a procedure for identifying and distinguishing between narrative structures. Not every news text mentioning corruption is full-blown narrative, and intertextual references may be so blurry as to defy categorization. In principle, to identify a narrative in public media texts, the researcher must do what any discourse analyst does: Tentatively home in on the discursive phenomenon, while gradually sharpening the attempts to produce a formal definition in a back-and-forth manner. At the outset, this means trying to come up with some defining features of the phenomenon, and then rigorously checking the margins of the corpus in order to see what gets excluded by using those features as the criterion for inclusion.

A clearly identifiable, unique plot structure that crops up time and again in texts would prove an excellent criterion by which one could establish the existence of a recurrent narrative across news texts. However, less may also do: A simpler starting point could be a clearly delimited spatial or temporal marker present in the news discourse at hand (i.e. a text about the Second Gulf War). If this seems too generic, the reference to specific persons, institutions, and circumstances, could also mark out a recurring media narrative (i.e., “the hunt for Osama bin Laden”). Using this procedure, more general issues without specific emplotment (i.e. “public security”) cannot by itself conceptually constitute a narrative, and must be excluded. The same goes for news texts that refer to corruption without any emplotment of events. Some issues tend to be mainly cast as narratives in discourse because they give rise to storyable forms (Montgomery 2007:109), while other issues

become too encompassing to really work as narratives (shading over into metaphor, trope, or topos).

A less rigid but still useful criterion for detecting a narrative structure could be the special discursive markers that journalists use in order to abbreviate reference to such event structures. This intertextual referencing practice constructs a repertoire of short-hand lingo for easy-to-read headlines. Such condensational labels or symbols (Canel and Sanders 2006:144) can work metonymically to conjure up the organizing idea with a single phrase, and are frequently used to designate *affaires* and scandals, in the form of specialized pronouns or suffixes like –gate or –lão: Since the Watergate scandal, many scandals in the US have been named by media with a –gate suffix (Schudson 2004:1232), a pattern that has been picked up by Brazilian journalists since the Mensalão scandal, giving rise to the monikers Trensão and Petrolão. Such short-hand tags are not unique to scandals, but are generally used to designate and fold up complex story lines (Hajer 2005:301). The keywords emerging in a mediascape may thus provide useable starting points for figuring out whether a text shares plot structure with a group of texts.

Let me exemplify the dialectical process of discovering what the Petrobras scandal (not the Lava-Jato scandal) “meant” during the first months of media coverage of the case. By “meant,” I only intend to say “designated,” “covered,” or “referenced.” The example may prepare the ground for some of the themes and events that emerge in the chapters to come, as well as clarify some of the conceptual problems of the procedure sketched out above.

In a follow-up operation to the initial operation called Lava-Jato, the Petrobras ex-director Paulo Roberto Costa was arrested on March 20, 2014. Commenting on the arrest, the political commentator Eliane Cantanhêde, writing for *Folha* at that time, wrote

Com Dilma enfraquecida pela economia e pressionada pelas pesquisas, a oposição tenta mostrar a cara e avançar justamente quando os dois escândalos do momento se cruzam: o da Petrobras e o da Operação Lava Jato da PF. (Cantanhêde 2014, E13/4 2014)

Here, the scandal of the “Lava-Jato operation” is distinct, but also linked (“*se cruzam*”) to the scandal of Petrobras. This second scandal to which Cantanhêde refers was a case covered in the same weeks that the money-laundering ring of the *doleiro* Alberto Youssef came under public scrutiny. Both cases are seen as potentially problematic for the “weakened” President Rousseff. “The Petrobras scandal,” at this moment, meant the full purchase of the Texan oil refinery Pasadena in 2006, a purchase that was forced upon Petrobras through a so-called *put option* in the contract whereby Petrobras had originally acquired half of the ownership of the refinery. The purchase of the Pasadena refinery had turned out to be a really bad deal for Petrobras, because the Belgian co-owners of Astra Oil pulled out and a US court eventually forced Petrobras to buy Astra’s shares at elevated prices relative to the prevailing value (Almeida 2016:158, Paduan 2016). Dilma Rousseff, then chief of staff in government (*ministra da Casa Civil*), was also head of the Petrobras Board of Administrators when the first half of the Pasadena refinery was bought, and Paulo Roberto Costa was one of the directors. In February 2014, public prosecutors argued that a criminal investigation into the buyout was necessary, and the losses incurred in Petrobras was heavily debated in the public sphere. Because of the coincidence of time and persons, editorials, commentary (such as the above), news reports and infographics from this period frequently treat both the costly Pasadena

buyout and the notion of large-scale corruption next to each other; similarly, the name Dilma Rousseff frequently appeared in news texts adjacent to that of Paulo Roberto Costa. Note, however, that the emplotment of events is distinct, although Rousseff is the (suspected) antagonist of both scandals.

The juxtaposition of the two scandals is interesting because it implies a causal narrative link, already present in the quote of Cantanhêde above. Somehow, the opposition can gain from the two scandals, and somehow, both scandals will have an impact upon Dilma Rousseff. It is not spelled out there,<sup>3</sup> but in other texts, the implicit assumption of Cantanhêde is encountered in a narrative form: Dilma Rousseff knew about the put option clause of the Pasadena contracts, but she denied it, just as she knew about the large-scale corruption back when she headed the administrative board of Petrobras. Only six months later after the quoted commentary piece, the Pasadena scandal would fade away and only be mentioned intermittently, and the Petrobras scandal came (interchangeably called the Lava-Jato scandal or simply “the Lava Jato”) to signify solely the corruption and party-allocation of the company’s directorates.

This example demonstrates the procedure of identifying the intertextually emerging plot structures that underpin the Lava-Jato case (as well as to the reporting of the impeachment). The easiest way is to start with some discursive markers or signposts found in texts (references to scandals in Petrobras, to Rousseff’s corruption, Lula, Eduardo Cunha, etc.), and then work out if the texts present events in recurring “narrative-based accounts of strips of reality” (Appadurai 1996:35). The example above also shows the dilemma of delimiting narratives that really are emergent and evolving textual phenomena. If one rigorously pursued the narrative of “the Petrobras scandal” based on the media interpretations found in early 2014, the Lava-Jato case would, counterintuitively, have to be excluded. If, on the other hand, one excluded the scandal pertaining to the Pasadena buyout, then it would not be readily apparent why Dilma Rousseff was repeatedly mentioned in news about a money-laundering scheme in Paraná. The linkage, in the above quote, is presented as a proposition without any explanation (the two scandals are simply “crossing”); in later examples of media texts, I will show how the proposition is formulated in and through narratives. Having discussed the working definition of plot and narratives in news texts, and having outlined how I will go about identifying and distinguishing them, I now turn to the question of analyzing them.

### 2.3 Fabulas

The narrative structures that emerge in textual configurations of events across news texts have certain trajectories, structures, and temporal properties. “Narrative structure” has been used a little loosely until now. In order to clarify the distinction between a shared narrative structure and a surface manifestation of such a structure (actual texts), and to disambiguate the word “structure,” I will briefly introduce the narratological terminology of Mieke Bal. Above, I have in certain places used “narrative structure” to mean either a generic structure or specific variations coined from the generic type. In principle, any given narrative of the type “politician-commits-a-corrupt-act-and-is-indicted-but-denies-everything” is built up in the same way. Now, I want to specify the terminology so as to distinguish between surface manifestations, specific intertextually emergent narratives, and generic types of narratives. Bal’s terminology, which expands formalist (Shklovsky 1925) and

structuralist (Genette 1980) categories of narrative layers, provides a useful tool for making this distinction between (news) texts, specific story-tellings of shared event structures, and the shared event structures in themselves. An on-going discussion of levels of text analysis in the field of narratology gave birth to these distinctions: In the 1960s and 1970s, structural narratologists understood narrative in a strict sense as a text-type (and the associated activity of narration that produces this text-type). Benveniste, to take one example, suggested a narrow concept of narrative, based on linguistic criteria, limited “by a certain number of exclusions and restrictive conditions” (Genette 1976:11). After such exclusions, narrative meant to Benveniste only texts told in the past tense with no personal pronouns, but through an absent third person narrator (ibid.:8) so that in narrative, no one speaks and the text is free of its utterance.

Benveniste’s contemporary Gerard Genette was wary, however, of the linguistic-technical definition that limited narrative to narrator-free narration (ibid.:10), and equally wary of the common-sense formulation that took narrative to be any written or spoken representation of a series of events (be they real or fictitious). Instead, Genette suggested a definition of story (*histoire* in French) as “the signified or narrative content” while narrative discourse (*discours* or *recit*) was the specific layer of the spoken or written text itself that narrates (ibid., Genette 1980:27). To Genette (who did not take up Foucault’s usage of the term), discourse meant something closer to “utterance,” the broadest possible mode of language, open to all forms. The distinction of *histoire* and narrative *discours* helped to uncover the different ways it is possible to recite or tell the same narrative in very different ways without changing the underlying causal-historical structure of events (the *histoire*) by way of temporal shifts (flashbacks, divinations, etc.) or changing viewpoints of the narrators. A similar distinction was used by Russian formalists, one of whom coined the terminological pair *fabula-syushet* with *fabula* being the raw material, a purely abstract sequence (the analytical ground zero), and *syushet* being the sequence that actually happens to be narrated and realized in a particular way (Shklovsky 1925).

Once the *fabula-syushet* distinction was introduced, it became possible to analyze the formal features of emplotment, that is, the many ways in which causal sequences of events can be reshuffled in the narration. Bal’s later standard work on narratology keeps narrative as a general term, but avoids using the term for specific analytical levels of narratives (Bal 1997). Bal argued for a triple division (instead of the dichotomy) with the terminology *fabula-story-text*. The Russian formalists’ concept of *fabula* is preferred in Bal over Genette’s concept of story (but retains basically the same meaning), while “story” moves position in the model and now designates the realized account of events. Finally, by introducing the extra subdivision, that of *text*, Bal highlights that research also could and should take into account what different configurations of the actual word sequence means to narratives, even when story and *fabula* remain identical. Identical story-*fabula* levels can be found in simplified versions of the same narrative - say, versions for children, or when translations render different texts from identical stories and *fabulas*, or in the surface variations of folklore myths with the same content. Even if told in the same chronological sequence and with the same moral conclusion, fairy tales or folk tales like *Snow White* can still be considered as distinct in different narrative media and in different tellings, because the texts of these instances are distinct. Schematically, in the context of news, the tripartite distinction of Bal could be expressed thus:

### *Mieke Bal's three levels of narratological analysis – in the context of news*

Text: The concrete text, unfolded with a specific grammar, choice of words, and quotes

Story: The sequential deployment of events; the alignment and relations of characters

Fabula: The abstract-causal thrust of events; chronology; the attributes of actants

This trichotomy calls attention to the distinct textures of storytelling media and storytelling styles, and I adapt it here to analysis of news, so that “news text” henceforth means the concrete surface manifestation, while a “news story” is taken to be an ordered sequence of events (not necessarily chronological) and actants. Fabula, then, is found intertextually (as in Fairclough 1992) and in a distributed manner (see Walker 2004) as a trajectory of emplotted events that forms a resource and pattern for each re-telling of a news story.

Let me provide one compact example of how this distinction could work: Three media outlets produce texts on the same event, and in doing so they are reporting the same story (actor A said or did X in public, provoked by disclosure Q). Given the characterizations and intertextual links, however, the ultimate “meaning” of the reported events may shift, generating different ideas about the underlying fabula (what is the veracity of Q, what did actor A really mean, and why did he say or do what he did). So, while the same event(s) can be expressed differently at the textual level, it would still generate the same story. In some cases, the reader could be left with the work of linking a story to a general fabula; however, a text also provides an “invitation” for the reader (van Gorp 2007:63) to connect the story to a fabula, and a text could even deploy several events totally similar at the level of the text, but through the emplotment of the story connect them to different fabulas through more elaborate narrative entwinements.

The tripartite distinction of text, story and fabula is of further interest when reading news texts as narratives, because it is useful for generating insights into the effects at the level of narration of direct/indirect speech, truth claims, effects of narrated or authorial interference (or rather, journalistic and editorial), as well as embedding of narratives into other narratives. I will return to these aspects below, and, to the extent that space permits, in Chapter 4.

The notion of a distributed fabula, intertextually cohering across many texts, has interesting temporal implications, because each text is situated *in media res*, and only “tells” part of the story and contributes only a fragment to the fabula. This brings me to the first of the methodological tools from narratology that have importance for analysis of news texts and fabulas emerging across news texts: temporality, futures, pasts, and conjunctives.

#### 2.4 Land of the Future Tense: Temporality in Brazilian News on Scandals

While news is normally written in the past tense, news that deals with scandals features more complex temporal structures. In this section, I will show that it is crucial to understand the tempus of news texts in order to see how narrative desire drives the plot of these texts towards the endpoints of fabulas, that is, towards closure of story arcs. Again, the narratological tools of Genette and Bal are brought to bear on news texts.



Analyzing the pseudo-autobiographical complexity of *À la recherche du temps perdu* by Marcel Proust, Genette created fine-grained categories of temporal analysis across the *fabula-syuzhet* divide, and his narratology thus provides a good starting point for analyzing temporality in narratives. The crucial point in Genette is the observation that “to study the temporal order of a narrative [text] is to compare the order in which events or temporal sections are arranged in the [story] with the order of succession these same events or temporal sections have in the [fabula]” (1980:35) (for the ease of reading, I have here aligned Genette’s wording with Bal’s terminology above). The various types of discordance between the orderings of fabula and story are termed anachronies. Anachrony is a very important temporal feature of scandal texts, and not just for stylistic reasons, or because the anachrony sets scandal news apart from say, a sports report in the simple past tense. The way that events are organized in the story-line of news texts, in the shuffling and juxtaposition of past and future events next to reported events, crucially contributes to creating doubt or claiming facticity.

Brooks have observed (using the Russian formalist terminology) that “the fabula – ‘what really happened’ – is in fact a mental construction that the reader derives from the *sjuzet* [sic], which is all that he ever directly knows” (1992:13). Seen this way, the fabula as such is an unreachable signified. For practical analytical purposes, however, this theoretical difficulty is generally disregarded; so, according to Genette: “[We] implicitly assume the existence of a kind of zero degree that would be a condition of perfect temporal correspondence [between story and fabula]” (1980:36). Working with the fabula/story distinction allows for a crucial observation concerning the mental work involved in the sense-making and writing practices described above. This observation concerns the plot directionality, storytelling orientation, or *emplotment*, of the news texts in scandals: audience members (and journalists or researchers) construct knowledge about ‘what really happened’ on the basis of the texts they encounter and the stories that are *emplotted* in the texts. To follow a story means “understanding the successive actions, thought, and feelings in question insofar as they present a certain directedness” (Ricoeur 1981:170). In this way, as we gradually comprehend the plot, “we are pushed ahead by this development and [...] we reply to its impetus with expectations concerning the outcome” (*ibid.*).

In the process of turning textual representations into mental constructions, various considerations of credibility and fit with extant knowledge are taken into account by audience members. The goal of this cognitive activity, i.e. the goal of any audience member's process of construction, as Genette almost but not quite implies, is this zero degree, this perfect correspondence – knowledge of what really happened. That narrative desire, in which we indulge when reading detective stories, is mirrored in the production and consumption of journalistic texts about secrecy, corruption, and political plots. While the reader wants to know what happened, the literary plot plays with this desire. The mental construction of knowledge about the fabula of a crime plot is not aimless, but rather oriented towards resolution – “who did it?”, as it were. The disclosure is suspended by the literary author to create resolution, and the same resolution is delayed in corruption scandals, but in other ways. The accumulation of multiple news items, weeks and months of revelations and disclosed information, presumably brings the public closer to the zero degree – total transparency, perfect knowledge of what really happened. The confusion and amount of dis/misinformation might however be larger after weeks of denunciations and leaks; the readers might wrongly assume that they know more, simply because of the volume of news, and not through any qualitative measure.

To arrive at the zero degree, to acquire “knowledge” of the actual events, is notoriously difficult in corruption scandals. Because of this, as mentioned above, narrative closure is (almost) always delayed in the unfolding scandalous news events (as well as reporting on natural disasters, wars, and other ultimately unscripted “live” events – even if such events are increasingly mediatized and premediated, i.e. Grusin 2010, Liebes and Katz 2007, Stepinska 2010). Unlike other unfolding here-and-now events such as natural disasters, the past of corruption scandals is furthermore always doubled, in the sense that two (or even more) conflicting emplotments exist to account for the past. Disclosure of corruption affirms one previously unsuspected past, and this is generally denied through alternative orderings of events and different interpretations.

Grammatically, news items that report on disclosure and contradiction exhibit far more sentences in the conditional and subjunctive than normally seen in the news. There are many reasons for this. At least a part has to do with the professional ideology, guidelines of reporting, and the rituals of objectivity which constrain newswriters (Albuquerque and da Silva 2009:389, Biroli and Miguel 2012, Tuchman 1972). Statements that are difficult to fact-check and future horizons must always be treated delicately by journalists so as to stay within the normally accepted limits of objective reporting and the taken-for-granted web of facticity. The uncertainty of the past, due to the contesting claims discussed above, is also a cause of textual doubt/non-factuality, and this is compounded by the problems that inhere from the sourcing of revelations and disclosure. The most important problems of sourcing include:

- incomplete information
- not-completely verified witness accounts
- obviously biased sources
- debatable credibility of information
- construction of inferences, based on or executed by one or more of the above.

All of this requires (mainstream) journalists to emphasize that statements and predictions are merely *possibly* true in order to stay on safe professional ground. Such grammatical and hypothetical hedging means that revelations and corruption stories branch into the territory discussed in literary theory of the fictional. In terms of temporality and narratology, this produces several kinds of retrospective tense, zig-zag, ellipsis and heterodiegetic analepses that goes back, forth, and beyond the immediate context and past horizon of the reported event itself (Genette 1980:35-78). Sources may reach back into past decades to explain or deny allegations. Furthermore, the “inverted pyramid” style and satellite-structure of news (Bell 1991:150-155) yield phrases and paragraphs that are linked not by chronology but by reverse causality: “The result is placed before the action which caused it” (ibid.:153).

If the past is complex and fundamentally in doubt, the present *tempus* of news reporting on corruption scandals seems more straightforward. The “now” of daily newspapers is conventionally established by the media format itself. Anderson argued (and I return to this below) that the “date at the top of the newspaper, the single most important emblem on it, provides the essential connection - the steady onward clocking of homogeneous, empty time. Within that time, 'the world' ambles sturdily ahead” (Anderson 1983:33). The emblematic date is then unfolded in the present of the headlines, contradicting the usual past tense of reports (Tuchman 1978:106). Connecting

present headlines to the past-tense reports, the lead usually continues the temporal and spatial deixis, determining the “when” and the “why” (Bell 1991:175-85). The lead, in the words of Carey, is a “distinctive and tyrannical aspect of daily journalism [...] the injunction that the elements be assembled, arrayed, and accounted for in the lead, the topic sentence, or at best – here is where the inverted pyramid comes in – the first paragraph” (Carey 1987:148). Leads have a specific equivalent, as shown below, in broadcast news, but both kinds of news in principle strives to account for all or most of the central facts in the lead, defined sometimes as the five W’s – the what, who, when, where, and why. In newscasts, visual cues are important in establishing spatial deixis and also contemporaneity or present-timeliness, which is a lead-like function. By showing, rather than telling, the deictic function locates stories at a live or recent “now” and at a tangible place (Montgomery 2007:104).

The medium of television is fundamentally attuned to “the essential temporal structure and dynamic of the living moment” (Scannell 2014:174-175). Emulating this, and transgressing the somewhat more historical “now” of the newspapers’ date-line and the live-cast visual cues, web media are becoming just as obsessed with temporality and liveness as television. This has meant shorter news cycles (Barnhurst 2011) and acceleration of production in a no-deadline climate (Bødker 2016). Taking advantage of the no-print, always-updatable format of news on the internet, online news platforms have re-invigorated the “live” feel of print media in a way comparable to live television by breaking away from a fixed publication schedule. Live-streaming journalism and tight integration with Twitter and other social media are two modes of providing timely and updated news. Some examples from the context at hand include the live-update feature sites, found at most of the mainstream media outlets’ sites, reporting on important roll-call votes in Congress and trials in Brazil’s Supreme Court.

Foreshadowing (in Genette’s terms: *temporal prolepsis*) is not as frequent in literature as analepsis (Genette 1980:40, 67), but in analysis of scandal reporting, the future tense is as rich an area in temporal complexity as the past tense. Since narrative closure is usually delayed in scandals, the two main kinds of prolepses - anticipation and expectation - are very present in such texts. The distinction between anticipation and expectation extends Genette’s vocabulary. These two temporal categories contribute to the creation of horizons for political agency and, crucially, to defining the immediate future of political action. News create a horizon for understanding political action in two ways: by evaluating and analyzing the current events covered in relation to coming events, and by locating certain points in the future as central for interpreting the current events. At a glance, these two possibilities look similar, but their temporal direction features inverse causality: In the first case (an expectation), for example, the revelation of A is reported to be of importance to a later event B; while the second case (an anticipation) could be a report stating that due to the future event B, actor X has just now performed action A. An anticipation builds up inverse causality, starting from the future and going back to the present.

<u>Future temporality</u>		(Direction of Causality)	
Expectation:	rA	$\varepsilon$ ---->	$\varepsilon$ B
Anticipation:	$\varepsilon$ A	<---- $\varepsilon$	$\varepsilon$ B

By setting up specific [event B will be affected by revelation A] as well general sets of expectations [the government will be weakened henceforth by revelation A], and by anticipating political and judicial events [the likelihood of event B caused actor X to reveal A], the contingencies and many possible horizons of the political future are constrained in the narration.

The expected and anticipated future temporality of news in corruption scandals contribute to defining political reality and the space of agency, even when the events are still virtual, waiting to happen. The virtual existence of future events in the mediascape is a curious phenomenon that has much to do with the questions of ascription and prediction (see above), and which furthermore provides political actors with cues with which to decide amongst possible actions. When journalists tend to cluster their reports and questions around a shared set of events on the horizon, the common prediction of the future comes to constitute the *de facto* political reality that decision makers need to address (even if the electorate has other concerns). Thus, though not yet realized, even the virtual existence of future realities defines political space. Admittedly, the gap between journalistic predictions and actual events can be minimal at times; but sometimes, the reality of politics escapes even the most oracular political experts in the Brazilian media. In this way, reporters and political pundits act as producers of narrative desire.

Narrative desire, then, is not only about acquiring certain knowledge of a contested past, but also about arriving to the point of understanding “the whole” of a narrative to recognize the trajectory of the plot (as in Aristotle, see Ricoeur 1984:38). In this view, there is a theoretical affinity between the concept of narrative desire I import from literary theory and the notion of framing discussed in the previous chapter. Combined, they can be used to understand how textual elements in news discourse construct specific frames for the interpretation of reported events and, crucially, their consequences. Some news frames make future events salient in order to let the reader perceive the likely resolution of conflict, say, or political struggles. A framing of struggle may be linked to an intertextual fabula. For example, in news texts on scandals, the story arcs deployed to make sense of denunciations and consequences invoke certain futures for the political arena. These possible futures, in turn, are interesting to research because they are textual phenomena - objectively present - that shape the condition of something much less tangible, namely the reception and the possible cognitive schemas used by audience members for interpretation.

Neither journalist nor pundit are creating the suspense out of nowhere, as this is already provided by the event structure of the scandal. Any journalist reporting on corruption, however, knows that the reader would like to find out what happened, and, in all likelihood, wants to get to the bottom herself. The implied reader of such journalistic texts is *presupposed*, by and through the journalistic oeuvre, to want resolution. Although many possible patterns of media text consumption can be imagined, and no single consumption pattern exhaustively determines the meaning-carrying possibilities of the text (Hall 1980[1973]), the fulfilment of that desire is certainly a significant aim for consumption when producing texts that reveal secret information. If a news report on corruption sometimes reads like a detective novel, it is no coincidence.

Whereas literature, according to Bal, has some structural limitations regarding anticipation and foreshadowing (because anticipation kills suspense), news media are more attuned to the live moment and even to prediction about futures (see the section 1.5 on pundits): The journalists and

especially commentators are thrown in to the here-and-now but may venture informed guesses in order to present coherency and legitimize claims of newsworthiness. Conjecture enters the journalistic production of apparent facts, although the guess-work is hedged through various modalities and linguistic inflections (Montgomery 2007:125). This is one of the major implicit claims of news media, but one that is rarely acknowledged and needs to be unpacked: When standing in the stream of time, gauging the flow, anticipating the future, newswriters perform a service to the public by structuring expectations of the event horizon. The prerogative and competence of journalists and pundits to anticipate futures are rarely questioned, however.

In television news, the prediction and conjecture is furthermore ultimately sanctioned by the whole media organization in the metonymical form of the anchor, who occupies and embodies the authoritative position of the whole media institution. As Montgomery (*ibid.*:129) notes, the anchor always duly thanks the on-site reporter or commentator, as if they had not in advance agreed to the exact insights presented. Even more than the two-way with on-site reporters, the two-way with pundits allows for this exchange of authority and conjecture: Assessments of political strength, intentionality, space for agency etc. is discussed with the commentator, as are the possible consequences of transpired events. Through these two-ways, the behind-the-scenes are represented and the “real” intentions of the actors are described and evaluated.

The combination of uncertain pasts, conjectural interpretations and contested readings of the future means that each event may be reported as a phase in an on-going process (and this may be represented in any number of ways: through contest frames, sports match metaphors, or structures from a quest fabula, to mention a few). The way that trials are covered by Brazilian media tend to take on the form of a power struggle, as does the maneuvers executed by Congressmen to delay or enact bills, votes, or reforms. Because reporting is done in *media res*, narrative closure is delayed, but some moments of closure do exist which are often institutionally defined. I will demonstrate the desire for closure, and the staging of political trench-warfare at work, in the following chapters, in the reporting and commentary surrounding the trial of the Mensalão scandal, the impeachment proceedings, and the disciplinary process of Eduardo Cunha.

The desire for narrative closure is the point where temporality is connected to characters, invested with values. Most story arcs on corruption point towards an endpoint - usually an ending with either the fall of the accused (through impeachment, removal from office, or sentence and prison time), or, inversely, the accused politician’s success in overcoming the legal processes and political problems.

## 2.5 Characters, Focalization, and Value Systems

The description of individual actors is usually, but not exclusively, limited to the factual in the news – titles, positions, relations, party allegiance. This doesn't rule out that readers might infer a range of information from the actions described in the news, especially from the modality and vocabulary used to describe them. Minimal characterizations are sometimes colored by verbs and adverbs describing actions or speech acts – e.g. calm and purposeful, or heated and furious – fitting both with the emplotment and the “clustered conventions of news story genres” (Cornfield 1992:50).

When quoting direct speech or reproducing (textual) public statements, news texts may allow sources to impose their self-evaluations upon the reader: Letting a source express a "vehement" rebuttal of allegations, or citing the president's "laments" about the condition of Brazilian politics. Such quotes combine with the rest of the news discourse to produce representations of the subject that partly overlap with the self-presentation (Goffman 1959). This, in some cases, has the effect of focalizing the text. The notion of focalization in narratology designates the point-of-view, in common parlance, or the perceiving and representing angle of vision (Bal 1997:142). This notion in principle has no room in journalistic texts, but even though the style of news reports ideally dictates an external narrator, some news items are actually focalizing the view of characters – the witnesses, the investigators, the defenders. Thus, "the personalization of politics" (Vliegienthaart, Boomgarden and Boumans 2011), a term in common discourse that carry derogatory connotations, is partly an effect of certain focalization styles used in news media, ascribing agency to individuals rather than the political system as a whole. In Brazilian reporting on scandals, this style is frequently used. While the daily newspapers of Brazil rarely "peek over the shoulder" of a character by reframing individual narratives of corruption or innocence, the weekly magazines often use a more explicitly narrative style, recounting how certain decisions were made and events transpired (see for example section 4.1, quotes E#889 and F20/6).

In the media narration of scandals, just like in oral storytelling, the continuous circulation of story elements and actors explores and expresses societal values:

... scholars assume that those stories with a long "shelf-life" are significant in some larger sense: They speak to the moral values, fears or fantasies of the people. Media scandals, or any media story that has staying power, should be explored in the same way, for the values and boundaries they are expressing (Bird 1997:107).

Scandals thus allocate value to the actants and the social space described. Political scandals (in contrast to financial or sexual-political scandals), "are based on the disclosure of activities which infringe the rules governing the acquisition and or exercise of political power as such" (Thompson 2000:121). Corruption scandals do not play out solely in the legal field, however, and thus do not only explore the legal aspects of transgression in public office:

... corruption cannot be seen strictly as a legal concept. In the tangled web of legality and morality, the concept of corruption often goes beyond the category of the criminal. We can observe this when a public servant has juggled a bit too deftly with principles and codes of conduct, or when a politician has grafted or embezzled, but still slid through the cracks of the legal system: The condemnations of the act and the outrage displayed in press and visual media shows that transgression is not only perceived in relation to a legal framework. Laws, whether bendable or clear-cut, are just one set of configurations enacting a moral order of justification. Other values can be at stake, and critique of perceived corruption frequently invokes extra-legal moralities (although such moral frames may very well be implicit). Thus, in many cases people perceive a corrupt act to be offensive, even if the act is not strictly illegal. Why? Because a corrupt act constitutes a transgression relative to several ideas about the common good and their associated modes of justifying or criticizing actions.

This, of course, makes for good television as well as flaming headlines: As the scandal breaks, critique and condemnation forms the bulk of the news material until (if ever) evidence is produced and a juridical process is initiated. Across a range of positions, including economic, liberal-democratic, juridical, institutional, developmental and moral standpoints, the normative condemnation of corruption is agreed upon. But every position in this repertoire hinges upon a particular notion of the common good: for the sake of equality before the law, for mutual economic benefit, for the quality of public institutions... (Damgaard 2015b:414)

Thus, scandals do not simply deal with a hegemonic public morality, but bring forth a range of value judgements from multiple perspectives. An unjustifiable action that harms the common good demands some kind of reaction that enforces the boundary, but a scandal does not automatically or necessarily bring about punishment. Loopholes, political and legal tactics may save the transgressor. In this way, the problem of justice appears in scandals overlaying the motif of transgression and infringement, and the rule of law (whether effective or fraught) is interwoven into the set of themes and values that are actualized in scandals.

The fabulas found in news on scandal locate individual actants in such complex systems of values. The actants are not necessarily locked in the corners of such a system, but may move around, depending on the development of the scandal (see for example Gronbeck 1997 on the Clinton couple's skilled management of the Lewinsky affair). Before I consider the dynamic possibilities of developing and permutating fabulas, I will sketch out a view of actantial value positions in plotment from classic narratology.

Even if though the subject-actants of narratives are not explicitly characterized through qualifying attributes, their location in the plot still endows them with qualities. To the Russian formalist Propp, characters were reducible to their narrative functions; the hero of a quest tale was never a psychological subject like in a novel, but a vehicle for the development of the story (Propp 1928). In the later French structuralism of Lévi-Strauss and especially Greimas, the characters came to be seen as invested with values. To be more precise, to Greimas a character "is defined, in a way analogous to society, by the assumption of contents in which he invests and which constitute his personality, and by the disclaiming of contents which he rejects" (Greimas and Rastier 1968:95-96). Greimas worked out the logical limits of categories of social values, based on Lévi-Strauss' anthropological analysis of sexual relations. With several overlaid systems of values – for example, basic economic value combined with a schema of socially sanctioned or prohibited sexual relations – Greimas could pin down the complex relationship characteristics of Balzac's characters.

Figure 2.1. Three value schemas of sexual relations (Greimas and Rastier 1968)

Social system (Lévi-Strauss)		Individual system	
<u>Permitted and unacceptable sexual relations</u>		<u>Desired and feared sexual relations</u>	
(matrimonial)	(abnormal)		
Prescribed	forbidden	desired	feared
X			X
permitted	not prescribed	not feared	not desired
(normal)	(non-matrimonial)		
<u>Economic model of sexual relations</u>			
Profitable	Harmful		
X			
Non-harmful	Unprofitable		

I will here attempt to create similar schemas of values, relevant to political scandals. First, a schema identical to the first Lévi-Straussian schema above, that maps out a field of political transgression:

*Figure 2.2. A double value schema of prescribed and forbidden political behavior*

Political system	
<u>Politically sanctioned and transgressive behavior</u>	
(Obligations)	(Transgression)
Prescribed	Forbidden
X	
Permitted (non-transgressive)	Not prescribed (Non-obligations)

Dutifully complying with the obligations of public office, a politician is expected to stay within the left-side zone, but she or he can also in some cases act as a private person (in contradiction to their role in public office) as long as this does not transgress the obligations of office. A politician may still vote at elections, for example, or hold aesthetic opinions and promote personal causes in their off-time. The area of transgression increases with the importance of office, so that presidents have very limited space to be “private,” while state representatives in Congress in some situations are expected to think of their local constituencies first, and the common good second.

Such a schema of political transgressions could be overlaid in scandals with another schema of sanctions and justice. In this second schema, we see the logical possibilities of impunity and miscarriage of justice, as well as the legally-normatively desired zones of innocent and sentenced individual positions:

*Figure 2.3. A double value schema of guilt and punishment*

Legal system	
<u>Individual object positions in judicial processes</u>	
No sanction	Impunity
Innocent	Guilty
X	
Not guilty	Not innocent
Punished	Punished

In other words, once political transgression is observed and made public, the transgressor shifts status or position in the schema: the upper-left position is changed for the upper-right. If a trial finds the transgressor guilty, this action shifts the position again, this time to the bottom-right position. A miscarriage of justice, then, is the bottom-left corner, where no crime has been committed, but punishment still has been enacted. This maps out the logically possible oppositions of culpability and punishment of antagonists.



In a narrative about a corruption investigation and consequent trial, the logical protagonists of would be judges and prosecutors (or to be more precise, if the fabula as endpoint a final confrontation in court, it inevitably lends protagonism to judicial actors). A separate schema could govern the value system pertaining to these authorities as they strive to establish truth and make correct judgments:

Figure 2.4. A double value schema of prescribed behavior of judicial actors

Legal system	
Individual subject positions in judicial world	
(Truthful)	(Biased)
Competent	Partisan
X	
Non-partisan	Incompetent
(Non-biased)	(Deceitful)

Journalists might also be thought of as the protagonists, in the sense that they expose wrong-doing, bring about political pressure and even trigger purifying events such as hearings in the Ethics Commission of Congress. Both journalistic and judicial protagonists' roles are thus ideally located at one far end of a continuum between disclosure and occultation, transparency and secrecy. Logically, their quest for truth could be corrupted by partisan interests or incompetence.

It should be noted, with Jameson, that even if Greimas' schemas appear as static as Propp's actant-functions, the advantage in Greimas' model of actants is that the manifest characters do not need to "fit" 1:1 with the values found in the corners of the model:

From this point of view, what is problematical about Propp's character-functions (hero, donor, villain) or Greimas' more formalized actants emerges when it turns out that we are merely being asked to drop the various elements of the surface narrative into these various prepared slots... this method celebrates its true triumphs, and proves to be a methodological improvement over Propp, precisely in those moments in which Greimas is able to show a disjunction between the narrative surface and the underlying actantial mechanisms. Actantial reduction is indeed particularly revealing in those instances in which the surface unity of "character" can be analytically dissolved, by showing, as Greimas does in certain of his readings, that a single character in reality conceals the operation of two distinct actants. (Jameson 1981:112)

Non-person actors are possible within a fabula, according to Bal. Immaterial concepts are sometimes implied as actors - Justice could be an object, and the justice system could be an opponent, just as groups (parties, coalitions, populations, judicial or media professionals) should be considered as actors. The Constitution of 1988 frequently emerges as a factor in discussions and editorials (e.g. Guazina, Araújo and Prior 2017:14), viewed as a non-person actor, either as an obstacle (opponent) or guarantee of justice (helper).

While the analytical tools of narratology pertained originally to works of fiction, the same tools may generate insights into the textual functions of news texts. Chief among these functions, as described above, is the function of focalization, which centers the plot around a person or even a non-person actor, and the investment of values in the actants of a story. The values are structured in systems, and I have argued above that the structural theories of Lévi-Strauss and Greimas may engender

insights into the value systems expressed in news texts. However, these theories may also be used to question the unsaid and unsigned of such texts.

## 2.6 The Political Unconscious of the Brazilian Mediascape

In his seminal 1981 book, *The Political Unconscious*, Fredric Jameson revisited the structuralist ideas and methods of Lévi-Strauss and Greimas in order to propose an imminently political (and Althusserian Marxist) reading of literature. This came just at the moment where French post-structuralism (from Derrida, Deleuze and Guattari to Baudrillard and Lyotard) had gained prominence in international literature and cultural studies. Jameson however insisted that it still made sense to search for structures in the socially symbolic acts of literature, although he (like Deleuze) balked at the idea of reducing all such acts to one set of meaning through the application a previously given master code or master narrative (1981:6-7). Such “master narratives have inscribed themselves in the texts as well as in our thinking about them” (ibid.:19).

Instead, Jameson developed the notion that everything is political (ibid.:5), as the conceptual act of hedging off the private and psychological should be seen as a reification of the symptom of contemporary life. His project, in *The Political Unconscious*, is to detect the traces of class struggles in the “single vast unfinished plot” of human history, and to restore “to the surface of the text the repressed and buried reality of this fundamental history” (ibid.:4). Paraphrasing Lévi-Strauss, Jameson urged researchers to recover the *pensée sauvage* of various historical moments in order to unearth the contradictions of the particular political struggles upon which any text work. Unlike some Marxist scholars of the period, Jameson was wary of equating social structures and cultural products, and he denounced several theoretical concepts (such as “mediation” and “homology”) that to him simplified the relation between text and Umwelt (ibid.:20-30).

Having paved the way, he suggested a method for analyzing “the structure of a particular political fantasy” (ibid.:33) that sets out from Greimasian semiotics, with the caveat that his method should not produce a totalizing system of ultimate meaning in the text, but instead show how ideological closure is projected (sometimes realized, sometimes unrealized) in particular symbolic systems that underpin texts. Semiotic structures, like the systems of values described by Greimas, are immanent in human cultures, but not necessarily complete at any given point:

... the various superposed and homologous quadrants—e.g., for sexual relations, the four logical possibilities of marital relations, normal relations, abnormal relations and extramarital relations; for rule systems, those of prescriptions, taboos, nonprescriptions, nontaboos—far from designating the concrete kinship or legal systems of any specific and historical human community, on the contrary **constitute** the empty slots and logical possibilities necessarily obtaining in all of them, against which the content of a given social text is to be measured and sorted out. In this sense, the semantic or semiotic structures articulated in Greimas' scheme seem to **map out** what he takes to be **the logical structure of reality itself, and stand as the fundamental categories of that reality**, whatever its particular historical form; if this is the case, then his would be what Umberto Eco has termed an “ontological structuralism,” one for which structure is transhistorical and endowed with at least the being and the permanence of the categories of logic or mathematical thought.

... [Greimas'] apparently static analytical scheme, organized around binary oppositions rather than dialectical ones... can be re-appropriated for a historicizing and dialectical criticism by designating it as the very locus and model of ideological closure. Seen in this way, the semiotic rectangle becomes a vital instrument for exploring the semantic and ideological intricacies of the text—not so much because, as in Greimas' own work, it yields the objective possibilities according to which landscape and the physical elements, say, must necessarily be

perceived, as rather because it maps the limits of a specific ideological consciousness and marks the conceptual points beyond which that consciousness cannot go, and between which it is condemned to oscillate. (ibid.:31-32, emphasis mine)

In Chapter 6, I return to this instrument for an analysis of the intricacies of Brazilian scandal fabulas. With Jameson, I will hypothesize that the fabulas are solutions to contradictions; or rather that the fabulas must set in motion contradictions of the social world from which they emerge, acting out or attempting to act out possible solutions to these contradictions. As expressions of the same socio-political dilemmas, or as proposed solutions to such dilemmas, fabulas emerging from news stories are also bound to certain story logic, trapped within logical boundaries and contradictions embedded in the material and social world. This move also decenters individual newswriters as authors: their texts should be understood, in their totality and intertextuality, as acts of storytelling, but the site of the tribe's campfire is now relocated to so many instances of textual, audio-visual, printed or online sites of narration. Like premodern narrators until Homer, the narrators of news partake in a shared storytelling practice, bound to oscillate within the limits of a certain political unconsciousness. Like premodern narrators, the journalistic storytelling voice is a cultural, non-individualistic point of enunciation. The news report, evolved in the course of two centuries of gradually developing genre conventions of objectivity and fact-centricity, (Schudson 1978), however preserves some of the mythical in its format, narratives, and ideology (Silverstone 1981).

## 2.7 Imagining the Nation, the State, and Culture

Not coincidentally, the journalistic conventions and public consciousness of the Nation emerged in tandem. The act of imagining national community, according to Benedict Anderson, was in fact tied to the development of quintessential media formats such as newspaper and novel. The imagined national community is partly constructed by the media practices that invoke this community textually (Anderson 1983:28-46) or, to be more precise, practices that invoke this community *intertextually*. Media discourse articulating concepts of nation and nationality groups together and organizes individuals in specific ways, all the while excluding other groupings and other ways of belonging together. "The Nation," imagined to be co-extant with the community of readers, emerges as an intertextual construct from the practice and everyday sense-making and reading of news and literature. Anderson considers

the basic structure of two forms of imagining which first flowered in Europe in the eighteenth century: the novel and the newspaper. For these forms provided the technical means for 're-presenting' the kind of imagined community that is the nation. [...The novel] is clearly a device for the presentation of simultaneity in 'homogeneous, empty time,' or a complex gloss upon the word 'meanwhile'. (ibid.:24-25)

The emergence of national communities, and with them notions of "nationhood," are symptoms of abrupt discontinuities of consciousness, similar to the discontinuity between Classical thought and modern discourse formations uncovered by Foucault. It is an evolving global consciousness, with a "conception of the newspaper [that] implies the refraction of even 'world events' into a specific imagined world of vernacular readers" (ibid.:63). Anderson connects the imagination of a national readership to the national subject, through a literary example from Indonesia. The example features an embedding of a fictional newspaper quote, which Anderson characterizes as fitting,

for, if we now turn to the newspaper as cultural product, we will be struck by its profound fictiveness. What is the essential literary convention of the newspaper? If we were to look at a sample front page of, say, *The New York Times*, we might find there stories about Soviet dissidents, famine in Mali, a gruesome murder, a coup in Iraq, the discovery of a rare fossil in Zimbabwe, and a speech by Mitterrand. Why are these events so juxtaposed? What connects them to each other? Not sheer caprice. Yet obviously most of them happen independently, without the actors being aware of each other or of what the others are up to. The arbitrariness of their inclusion and juxtaposition (a later edition will substitute a baseball triumph for Mitterrand) shows that the linkage between them is imagined. This imagined linkage derives from two obliquely related sources. The first is simply calendrical coincidence. The date at the top of the newspaper, the single most important emblem on it, provides the essential connection - the steady onward clocking of homogeneous, empty time. Within that time, 'the world' ambles sturdily ahead. The sign for this: if Mali disappears from the pages of *The New York Times* after two days of famine reportage, for months on end, readers do not for a moment imagine that Mali has disappeared or that famine has wiped out all its citizens. The novelistic format of the newspaper assures them that somewhere out there the 'character' Mali moves along quietly, awaiting its next reappearance in the plot. (ibid.:33)

Nations may thus appear as quasi-characters, historical entities moving forward in time, in the newspaper imaginaries. Here, the manifest characters deployed in the fabula – police agents, judges, politicians, money-launderers, and journalists – could be considered as tokens or avatars of specific parts of the nation, as allegories of collective subject-actants within the nation in a larger system of class discourse (Jameson 1981:72).

The media exposé of power, or something similar to it, has been a feature of public life since the very start of the structural transformation of the bourgeoisie public spheres described by Habermas (1989[1962]). Disclosure of the vices of power can be traced to the very start of the industrial revolution, to Elizabethan England and France under Louis XIV, where pamphleteers lampooned members of political and royal elites for their moral sins (Thompson 2000:42-50, Adut 2008:75-6). The scandal today is a cultural semiotic production that is publicly available (if you know the code), common to practically all societies of the modern global world; a cultural production that speaks of power, and against power.

Scandalous coverage, like news coverage and news media in general, functions as mediator of value systems (Martín-Barbero 2006:281), and indeed the very possibility of hegemonic national culture in Latin America was tied to the projects of establishing modern media (Martín-Barbero 1997). According to Martín-Barbero, scandal and sensationalist coverage in popular newspapers was always a mix of news, poetry, and popular narratives (ibid.:245), displaying celebrities and the elite as cultural heroes or villains in melodramas. Thus, the roots of scandal in Latin America runs deep into the soil of myth. In this sense, scandal at large may be thought of as Text (in the sense of Kristeva 1980:37), a semiotic practice within general culture that exists as permutations of an intertextuality. A particular instance of scandal – a news report, say – is merely one utterance among many utterances, sharing the same function in the literary play of forms (Jameson 1981:61).

Even the State itself could be an actant of fabulas, sometimes protecting, sometimes leeching off the Nation. The imaginary of the corrupt State was explored by Akhil Gupta, who pointed out that the Indian state appeared as an imagined entity that people made sense of by telling and reading stories about corruption. Given the theme of this thesis, a combination of Gupta's and Anderson's insights may provide clues as to how the story-telling and media coverage dealing with the Lava-Jato case can also be construed as textual constructions of "Brazil" or "the Brazilian State."

Gupta noted that the state was becoming “implicated in the minute texture of everyday life” through “the everyday practices of local bureaucracies and the discursive construction of the state in public culture.” Gupta, like Anderson, saw that nations and states do not “map unproblematically onto different spaces,” but emerges from public cultural practices that are enacted in a contested space (Gupta 1995:375-377). In his research, Gupta unfolded the practices that enable a discourse of the State which was interlaced constantly with a discourse of corruption. Both discourse formations were informed by and cast in the language of media texts, even if individuals have first-hand knowledge of corrupt practices, so that the stories that people tell about state corruption take on forms and utilize structures found in media coverage. Thus, if “culture is ordinary,” as Raymond Williams argued (1989[1958]), the everyday recycling of stories about corruption is no less an everyday cultural production of meaning about the nation-state (Billig 1995:114).

The industry of news media, I believe, contributes to and engages in “complex strategies of cultural identification and discursive address that function in the name of ‘the people’ or ‘the nation’ and make them immanent subjects of a range of social and literary narratives” (Bhabha 1994:140). So, with Hall I think that “we make an absolutely too simple distinction between narratives about the real and the narratives of fiction” (Hall 1984:6), and the claim to facticity of news obfuscates the representational and story-telling aspects of this cultural production.

In this chapter, I have argued that even if news seems to be treating real events, the many authors involved in the production of news seem unable to resist narrativity, and students of news must take this into account when analyzing news texts (Hall 1984). I propose that news be understood in a distributed or decentered way, as fragments of a veritably un-authored cultural production. Narrativity function to structure semantic spaces temporally and causally by locating actors, contexts and frames in plots. Narratives are assemblages of not only problems and solutions, but integrated ontologies of the social. Connecting agency and characters through emplotment (Somers 1994:616), narratives possess temporally configurative capacities that enable meaning-making and project identity-formation (Polletta 1998:139). Because news texts partake in intertextually emergent narrative structures, narrative analysis, especially the temporal and value-thematic aspects of narratology, can be deployed to generate insights into the structural limits of meaning constructed in news. News on scandals, specifically, partake in a cultural form that can be traced back centuries, wherein hidden truths are unmasked and the machinations of power are revealed in plots featuring political elites and even Nations and States moving along on story arcs.

Before I can commence such an analysis of the Lava-Jato case, however, I will first describe the Brazilian mediascape in order to characterize the contemporary political journalism, the recent textual production concerning scandals in Brazil, and present the arguments for restricting my sampling of journalistic texts on scandals to a subset of the Brazilian media outlets.

## Chapter 3

### The Brazilian Media System

The first sections of this chapter provide background knowledge for readers unfamiliar with the Brazilian media system. First, I will outline the basic descriptive parameters used by Hallin and Mancini (2004, 2011) in their comparative analysis of media systems. Several scholars of Brazilian media have criticized the relevance of these parameters in the Brazilian context (Albuquerque 2011), as well as the way that the model of media systems categorizes national media systems (*ibid.*, Miguel, Biroli and Mota 2012). In this thesis, at least three of the four main parameters compared in Hallin and Mancini's original work - *Development of mass media*, *Political parallelism*, and *Role of the state* – have a direct bearing on the media environment that produced the scandals analyzed in the following chapters. These three parameters are crucial factors in the production and texture of political journalism.

The first of the three parameters cover how media outlets of different kinds and through various technologies have grown historically and found audiences. As I describe this parameter of the Brazilian media system, I mostly focus on the print and television news industries, identify the key actors, and assess their relative strengths and salience in the population. The second parameter, political parallelism, deals with the relationship between media outlets and specific societal sectors and political bases, while the parameter third covers the relationship between state and media industry. These two parameters can be thought of as explanatory factors for textual phenomena such as advocacy journalism, political instrumentalization and ideological bias, which are discussed extensively among Brazilian scholars as the background of the latest decade of scandals (e.g. Lattman-Weltman and Chagas 2016, Nascimento 2013, Feres Júnior 2016:284). The latter two parameters (concerning political parallelism and the role of the state) are described here with emphasis on the coverage of parties and governments, and the ideological leanings of the central media outlets in Brazil. I have opted not to discuss the parameter of professionalization, and the reader may instead refer to (Albuquerque and Silva 2009, Herscovitz 2012) for more on this parameter. With a map describing the lay of the land, we might get a sense of the particular ground that shook during the Lava-Jato scandal.

Finally, I will unfold three key examples of interaction between the Brazilian media and politics: the electoral coverage of the last decades, the coverage of the Mensalão scandal 2005-2012, and the coverage of the protests in June 2013. These examples constitute the historical precedents immediately leading up to the political scandals of 2014-2018, but they also illustrate the three parameters of the media systems model.

This chapter also explains the choice and limits of the empirical scope in this dissertation. One important starting point for this chapter (and for the sampling strategy chosen for this thesis) is the concentration of ownership and vertical integration of Brazilian media, as well as the lack of strong public broadcasting media (Lima 2006, Matos 2008, 2012a). Because of the integration and concentration, the same kinds of news are recycled and similar media agendas propagate through chains of news outlets. The largest media conglomerate, the Grupo Globo, controls much of the regional media in both TV, radio, and print, as well as the most-viewed national channel, the second-

most viewed news channel, the third-largest newspaper (*O Globo*) and weekly magazine (*Época*) and the largest financial newspaper (*Valor*) (Porto 2012, Newman et al. 2015:40).

The Grupo Globo is owned by one family, like the rest of large Brazilian media conglomerates. Globo's owners are brothers who inherited the executive positions from their father, Roberto Marinho, who held much political influence since the dictatorship period and throughout the transition (Lima 2004). Today, the media business empire of the Marinhos mostly faces challenges on the market for news production from the evangelical bishop Edir Macedo (who owns the broadcasting network Rede Record), by the Saad family running the Bandeirantes network, by the Mesquita family (owning the newspaper *Estado de S. Paulo* and the news agency Broadcast), by the Frias brothers (controlling the newspaper *Folha de S. Paulo* and the UOL online platform), and by the Civita family managing the Abril group with the flagship weekly *Veja* (which is traditionally the most-read weekly magazine, ahead of *IstoÉ* and Grupo Globo's *Época*).

Currently, all of the broadcasting networks refashion their news content for internet platforms: The current market leader is, again, Globo (Newman et al. 2017:107), with the online news service G1 and the web version of Globo News (the conglomerate's 24-hour news channel). For national and regional political news, G1 mostly relies on the journalistic content produced in Brasília and regional affiliated newsrooms. Many commentary spots from the Globo news program *Jornal das Dez* and news reports from *Jornal Nacional* are shovelled (a term defined as "repackaging content produced for other media," Paterson and Domingo 2008:7) unto the G1 platform. The journal *O Globo* also shovels most material unto the site [oglobo.globo.com](http://oglobo.globo.com), and *Época* does the same. Like Globo, Rede Record produces shovelware on the platform R7.com by recycling material from their repertoire of programs, as does SBT (at their site [Jornal do SBT online](http://Jornal do SBT online)) and Bandeirantes (at [BandNews Online](http://BandNews Online)).

The rest of the Brazilian regional and metropolitan newspapers, news sites, and broadcasts get their national political news mainly from three news agencies and mother-organizations behind those news outlets.

Not only the penetration of [Rio- and São Paulo-based] newspapers is much higher [sic] than the press from other regions, but they also tend to dominate what the other newspapers publish. Upon analyzing the credited sources of stories published by the newspapers (about 14% of stories are credited to news agencies), it is found that the news agencies associated with two newspapers (*Folha* and *Estado*) are responsible for 90% of all agency-credited news published by the newspapers... Adding the Globo agency, the percentage is 95%. This does not count news items that are simply appropriated by a newspaper without credit, a very common phenomenon. (Abramo 2007:99)

In Abramo's study, the power of the vertically integrated media organization structure is apparent: News emerges in the regional and local spheres of media according to the organizational links to national media organizations and news agencies. However, according to Abramo, the coverage is then modified by local relevance and political ties, so that regional media will publish material on national corruption if a local politician is implicated, but, in many cases, will actively omit such information because of personal ties to media owners (ibid.:101). The same tendency is especially salient in the area of radio broadcasting (Boas and Hidalgo 2011:871).

Given the vertical integration of news media organizations online, in print, radio, and broadcasting, the media system is highly concentrated, dominated by a few family-owned conglomerates, with a

few centrally placed newsrooms of what may be termed legacy media that produce news on national politics. In the following three subsections, I will describe how this media system structure emerged, how it currently relates to political interests and state regulation, and how this structure is reflected in the sampling of material for the following chapter.

### 3.1 Development of mass media in Brazil

The historical development of a mass press is a defining parameter of a media system. The printing press was banned in Brazil until 1808, and even after this, the crown maintained prerogatives for restricting freedom of press (Sodré 1977). In the first half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, Brazilian newspapers were tied to individual political projects, as the bourgeoisie was small and literacy very restricted. In the second half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, (relatively) large-scale industrial print runs of newspapers emerged in the Southeastern state capitals (such as *Estado de São Paulo*, founded in 1875 as *A Província de São Paulo*; *Jornal do Brasil*, founded in Rio de Janeiro 1891; and *Correio do Povo*, founded in Porto Alegre in 1895). *O Globo* and *Folha de São Paulo* (then *Folha da Manhã*) were both founded in 1925 (Azevedo 2006:93). The relative circulation of such newspapers reached an apogee in the 1950's but declined soon after: "In the early fifties, the newspaper industry in Brazil was selling 110.6 copies per 1,000 people, a penetration figure that, by the end of the 1960's, had declined to 45.4 copies and then went further down to 36.7 copies in 2014" (Carro 2016:4).

An alternative press emerged as a reaction to the censorship of the military regime, with *O Pasquim*, *Opinião*, *Repórter*, *Movimento*, and *Pif-Paf* as some of the most important and most read publications (Kucinski 1991). During the transition to democracy (1985-88), the alternative press mostly faded away, as did a number of newspapers (*Jornal do Commercio*, *A Notícia*, and *Correio da Manhã*) and weeklies (such as *Revista da Semana*, *Fon-Fon*, *O Cruzeiro*, and *Manchete*) that had been important in the middle of the century (ibid., Sodré 1977). By 1996, the UNESCO figures of newspaper circulation had dropped to 40 per 1,000 adult citizens, the lowest of the countries considered in Hallin and Papathanassopoulos (2002:177). This figure partly disguises the fact that Brazil's weekly magazines are perhaps the only print media which could be properly termed "mass" media, reaching much larger print runs than the daily newspapers. The leader, *Veja*, was printed in around 1 million copies in 2015, and at various points of modern media history the magazine saw print runs of more than one million copies. *Veja* is published by the Abril group and was founded in 1968 in the format of the US weekly magazine *Time*. The *Veja* editor and founder Mino Carta left the magazine in 1976 to launch the competing magazine *IstoÉ* for the Editora Três (Porto 2010:114). The Globo conglomerate launched *Época* as another rival to *Veja* in 1998, and this dominant trio of weeklies (Nascimento 2013) has taken strong anti-PT stances in the last two decades (Biroli and Miguel 2012:39ff). CartaCapital, founded as a monthly magazine by Mino Carta in 1994 (weekly since 2001), provides a counterpoint to the three mainstream weeklies for a left-wing audience. In 2014-2016, *CartaCapital* had only a few competitors competing for that target audience, most prominently the printed magazines *Caros Amigos* and *Revista Piauí*, (Damgaard 2018b:26).

Since the transition, with a growing population, growth in the middle-class and the economy in general, the media industry expanded (Nielsen and Levy 2010:12) as did the "vibrant print media sector" (Porto 2010:113). However, the three quality papers that are normally considered national



publications (despite their regional character) began see to declining circulation around the time of the financial crisis, coinciding with improved internet access in the Brazilian middle-class:

The years of decline of already low-circulation papers have left Brazil with three traditional, prestigious, quality newspapers with national outreach: *Folha de São Paulo* and *Estado de São Paulo* (located in the ideological space between liberal and conservative viewpoints), and the Rio-based *Jornal O Globo*, culturally liberal but orthodox in its economic editorial opinions (Fonseca 2005, Lattman-Weltman and Chagas 2016). In practice, relatively few newsstands in Rio de Janeiro offer the São Paulo papers and vice-versa. The economy-oriented *Valor Econômico*, created in 2000 by *Folha* and the Globo group (but recently bought out by Globo), accompanies this trio nationally, with a distinct appeal to the business elite (thus, it has considerably lower circulation of 40 thousand printed copies). In an already small market by global standards, the print runs of the national newspapers have in effect been cut in half in the last two decades. The São Paulo-based newspapers have also cut staff lately in their newsrooms in consequence of the revenue loss from direct sales and the accompanying declining revenue from advertisement sales (Becker and Waltz 2017:119, note 9). (Damgaard 2018b:25-6)

Table 3.1 provides the circulation figures relevant to the case at hand plus some of the key figures of the last decades in five-year intervals (2005, 2010 and 2015), for the three traditional “quality papers” and two of their main competitors, based on data from IVC (the Brazilian Institute for Verification of Circulation).

**Table 3.1: Print runs of Brazilian newspapers, 2005-2016**

Newspaper	2005	2010	2015	2016
<i>Folha de S. Paulo</i>	309383	295558	175441	154700
<i>O Globo</i>	276385	257262	183404	181000
<i>Extra</i>	267225	248119	136000	128000
<i>Estado de S. Paulo</i>	231165	212844	149241	146000
<i>Zero Hora</i>	174617	No data available	144191	122365

Sources: 2005 figures reported in Albuquerque 2011:78; 2010 figures reported in Porto 2010:113; 2015 and 2016 figures reported in Instituto Verificador de Circulação 2016. Figures for *Extra* in 2015 and 2016 reported in Rocha Filho 2016.

In addition to the trio of nationally distributed newspapers, many daily newspapers are printed and circulated in regional capitals or states. These newspapers are often purely advertisement-financed, or very subsidized, and are referred to as “popular papers” by most scholars, because the focus of these papers are sports and celebrity content (Lattman-Weltman and Chagas 2016:341). The landscape of regional newspapers changes frequently, and in 2016 comprised *Extra*, *Super Notícia*, *Meia Hora*, *Zero Hora*, *Aqui*, *Destak*, *Agora São Paulo*, *Diário Gaúcho*, *Expresso* and *Metro São Paulo*. Though these papers account for a large part of the total national circulation, they rarely produce content about national politics themselves, but instead reproduce material from the news agencies of *Folha*, *Estado* and *Globo* (Damgaard 2018b:26)

Brazilians with internet access (68 percent of the population in 2017) habitually consume news via online news sites, but news consumption via social media (especially Facebook and WhatsApp) recently saw a decline after years of growth (Newman et al. 2017:107). The leading newspapers are also leaders on the online market for news (ibid.), with the *Folha*-affiliated *UOL* platform slightly ahead of *G1* and *O Globo Online*, followed by *Folha’s* news site. *Folha* also boasted the largest number of page views at the height of the political crisis in 2016, according to IVC research – just below 100 million page views in each week of March, with an apogee of 155 million weekly page

views for the third week. That week (described in detail in section 4.4), the closest competitors were *Estado's* page *Estadão*, at 47 million page views, *ClicRBS* at 42 million, and *O Globo* at 39 million.

Online consumption of news has not dethroned television, so prime-time newscasts remain a central news source for many Brazilians, and has been so for five decades (Porto 2010). During the period of the dictatorship (1964-1985), the military authorities actively subsidized and groomed the growing television industry as an ideological instrument (I return to the role of the state below). Even though the news were filtered heavily by censorship restrictions and collusion between the regime and editors, the newscast *Jornal Nacional* of TV Globo, the main broadcaster, was ubiquitous in the political arena (Lima 2004, Porto 2012). TV Globo's hegemony was established in the late 1960s and 1970s, but was challenged by Silvio Santos's *Sistema Brasileiro de Televisão* (SBT) in the early 1980s, while the older Rede Record reappeared as a contender on the scene in the 1990s (Matos 2012a, Porto 2012:70). Record's newscast conquered some of the audience in the evening news slot, going from 4 percent of the audience in 1996 to 17 percent in 2008, but the *Jornal Nacional* has remained at the top of the broadcast market, while SBT's and Records newscasts compete for the second place (ibid.:72). Today, *Jornal Nacional* usually captures two to three times the audience of *Jornal da Record* and about five times the audience of *Jornal do SBT* (Ribeiro 2017:113), and the newscast was usually the most watched or the second-most watched program in 2015-2016, only surpassed by hit telenovelas and semi-global entertainment formats like *Big Brother*.

Apart from Globo, SBT and Record, five broadcasting groups dominate regional television: Rede Brasil Sul, affiliated with Globo, in the South; TV Anhanguera and Organizações Jaime Câmara in Central and Eastern regions; the Rede Amazônica de Rádio e Televisão to the North; Northeastern Brazilian television is locally provided by Sistema Verdes Mares; and the Grupo Zahran broadcasts in the large states of Mato Grosso and Mato Grosso do Sul (Cabral 2017:51). In the domain of 24-hour newscasts, Globo's GloboNews channel (which is paid-for) has recently surpassed RecordNews in terms of audience, even though the latter is an open channel. Even in urban Brazil, where most citizens tend to reject traditional media as news source, reliance on TV is still almost the world's highest, with 81 percent using TV as source of news on a weekly basis – despite the self-identification of the majority of these respondents as mainly digital (Newman et al. 2015:54). For non-digital users and for vast rural areas, reliance on TV for news can be assumed to be even higher, given the limited print media circulation and internet coverage. Of the total advertisement expenditure in Brazil, 60 percent was located in television in 2009 (Porto 2010:116), and for these reasons, researchers such as Porto have previously concluded that “broadcast television remains the dominant medium” (ibid.:110) – although the advertising market is shifting towards global internet players (Carro 2016:20).

In sum, despite a diverse regional media market and increasing internet access, information concerning the national political arena in Brasília is still filtered initially through very few newsrooms – a triumvirate of broadcasters, a handful of quality newspapers, and a few weekly magazines and tabloids. This configuration of the media system motivates the sampling strategy of the thesis, discussed in the following.

### 3.2 Methodological Implications for Sampling Strategy

The Brazilian media system at a glance presents a complex and diversified mediascape, but with some delimitations, this thesis may still arrive at a reasonably manageable empirical corpus: I will limit the scope of the thesis to the legacy media outlets with the most influence on the national political agenda, with special attention paid to those newsrooms that set off political scandals. The daily news on politics flow primarily from newsrooms and agencies connected to the Globo conglomerate, *Folha* and *Estado de S. Paulo* (Abramo 2007:99), and these “quality” newspapers are especially important to include as their newsrooms are close to the national political circles. Television, in particular TV Globo’s newscast - as the news source with most agenda-setting power (Porto 2010, 2012) – will also be included to capture the televised aspects of the mediascape. Since the weekly press was and still is extremely attuned to coverage of scandals (Nascimento 2013), the largest weeklies should also be included in the sampling, while radio outlets, less researched, and with less resources and no national outreach, are omitted for the sake of coherency in research design and reasons of space.

Because the newsrooms of the legacy newspapers are usually first to report on disclosure of corruption, and their news are subsequently filtered down to affiliated regional media and spill over to broadcast media, I consider their journalistic productions to be the most relevant starting point to explore the news narratives of the Lava-Jato case and the impeachment of President Rousseff. The discourse found in these media outlets’ coverage of the scandals is likely to be echoed in the vertically integrated media ecology. As the agenda-setters and top of the agency-news chain (Aguiar 2014), the quality papers are instrumental in influencing the agenda of associated media, be it radio or the “popular” newspapers (Lattman-Weltman and Chagas 2016). Combining this with weeklies *Época*, *IstoÉ*, and *Veja* and several editions of TV Globo’s main newscast *Jornal Nacional*, I am able to cross several flows of the Brazilian mediascape and see how elite media, tabloid media, and newscasts mutually constitute and manage the narrative-based accounts of reality presented to their audiences. The more or less independent media outlets that have emerged online usually reflect and offer counterpoints to the coverage of scandals provided in the legacy media (Carvalho and Albuquerque 2017, Becker and Waltz 2017:124-5). With emphasis on the so-called quality papers *O Globo*, *Folha* and *Estado de S. Paulo*, one might object that the thesis focus on material that is not representative of all Brazilian media, nor of the average Brazilian’s news consumption. More likely, the material sampled reflects what the members of the nation’s political elite are reading and watching. This delimitation is perfectly in tune with the overall argument of the thesis, however, concerned as it is with the narrative structures that shape and constrain the agency of the political elite.

The key factor for choosing quality papers and weeklies as starting point is the special access to information that journalists of these traditional news media have. The concentration of access and gatekeeping power is potentially problematic, because biased coverage may rapidly propagate down the chain of vertically integrated media; from a news agency to media platforms, regional newspapers and sites, or from a national broadcast to a range of affiliated radio and broadcast stations, for example. In the following subsection, I will go into more detail on the question of political influence, bias, and parallelism in the Brazilian media.

### 3.3 Political parallelism

The work of Hallin and Mancini builds partly on Seymour-Ure's (1974) concept of *parallelism* between media organizations and political parties or movements. Party-press parallelism, or political parallelism, concerns the coincidence not only of formal structures, but also the overlapping of audiences and voters or members, of career paths across the media/politics divide, and of course parallels in the media content and party discourse (Hallin and Mancini 2004:27-33).

Hallin suggested that the Southern European press tradition of a media system basically provides a good model of understanding how print media evolved in Brazil. In Southern European countries, in contrast to Northern Europe and North America, printed news media "never developed as a cultural industry with a mass market sufficient to provide an independent economic base" (Hallin and Papathanassopoulos 2002:183). Instead, media organizations were harnessed by local oligarchs and specific political interests, often in competition with other similar organizations. This model is termed "polarized pluralist" by Hallin and Mancini, and advocacy journalism and political control of media outlets are its two key features. Papathanassopoulos (2007) connects the model to clientelistic socio-political relationships, and suggests that the late development of democratic and rational-legal institutions in the Mediterranean is linked to the instrumentalization of media.

However, in Brazil, the polarized pluralist model of the Mediterranean is only applicable up to a certain point. While dependent on private patronage throughout the 19<sup>th</sup> and first half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, stable relationships between print media and parties did not develop in Brazil at a national scale. Eventually, the newspaper market turned to a catch-all business model reminiscent of North America, skipping the process of untangling press and parties. Thus, "political parallelism does not apply easily to the Brazilian media, both because political parties do not play a central role in presidential countries such as Brazil and because the leading media organizations have adopted a catch-all attitude regarding their public" (Albuquerque 2011:73). Brazilian scholars therefore contend that the liberal media system model in Hallin and Mancini (2004:75) would be a better fit for the Brazilian case, although

It is possible to understand the Brazilian case by making use of the three models of media systems elaborated by Hallin and Mancini for Western European countries and North America, namely polarized pluralist, democratic corporatist and liberal. These authors suggest that Latin American countries will come close to the polarized pluralist model (Hallin and Mancini 2004, p. 306; also Hallin and Papathanassopoulos 2002), which is marked, among other aspects, by a significant political parallelism – which is to say that the media mirrors the party system. It would be better, though, to define Brazilian media as a manifest adherence to the liberal model, of media neutrality and independence vis-à-vis political interests, although this is only imperfectly accomplished. (Miguel, Biroli and Mota 2012:138)

Furthermore, "instrumentalization is most evident in the case of the regional media: regional newspapers and broadcasting companies are typically owned by local oligarchs who use them to solidify their political control" (Hallin and Papathanassopoulos 2002). In Brazil, radio was especially prone to political capture and instrumentalization, and local bosses owning radio stations are nicknamed *coronéis eletrônicos*, literally electronic colonels or patrons, in the literature (Lima and Lopes 2007, Nunes Leal 1997, Motter 1994). The finer points of the conceptual relation between instrumentalization of media and political parallelism notwithstanding (Albuquerque 2013:748, Mancini 2012), there is ample evidence of a "media opening" in Brazil at the national level after the first free elections of 1989 (Porto 2012). Like TV Globo, *Folha* and *O Globo* strove to present a

balanced coverage of elections in 2002 (Azevedo 2006:108), which of course did little to hinder regional oligarchs maintaining their influence in local media (Abramo 2007).

The academic perception of liberal, catch-all media outlets (such as the view expressed above by Miguel, Biroli and Mota) however began to face serious challenges after 2005, and especially since 2012. Brazilian researchers have pointed out that the newspapers have lately been taking stronger positions regarding economic policy (pro-austerity) and engaged in extensive coverage of national scandals in the Worker's Party, with negative framings and bias complementing the increasingly outspoken anti-socialist discourse of mainstream news media in the recent decade (Albuquerque 2017:9, Feres Júnior and Sassara 2016, Mont'Alverne and Marques 2013). This reflected both the changing economic realities of the media market as well as the changing role of media in the political landscape. The few national newspapers left have faced pressure by different popular and paid-by-ads newspapers in metropolitan areas. To counter the economic pressures on this news media market, the three large daily papers have strengthened their political profile in the last decade or so, bringing about what Lattman-Weltman has termed *repartidarização* – the resurgence of the party press (Lattman-Weltman and Chagas 2016). With a stronger focus on political news, *Estado*, *Folha* and *O Globo* have tried to distinguish themselves from popular newspapers with more focus on celebrity, sports and quotidian news. This move has been to secure the share of the news consumers actually willing to pay for quality news, since the advertisement is moving towards other online channels (Carro 2016:26), and the revenue of advertisement is moving from the quality newspapers to new mediating companies in the value chain of the advertisement industry.

The concept of political parallelism does not describe the contemporary Brazilian mediascape accurately, then. No doubt, the legacy print press favor economically orthodox positions and anti-socialist rhetoric, with *Estado de São Paulo* being the most openly conservative and *Folha de São Paulo* the most explicitly balanced in the op-ed section (Albuquerque 2011:81, Biroli and Mantovani 2014:207, Goldstein 2016, Mont'Alverne and Marques 2013:98). Three of the largest broadcasting networks (apart from Globo also Bandeirantes and SBT) exhibit the same tendency as the print media, being supposedly catch-all but employing various commentators, experts, and even news anchors with high-profiled right-wing or anti-PT views (examples of this include Rachel Sheherazade of SBT newscasts, and Merval Pereira of *O Globo* and Globo News). Given the fragmented landscape of Brazilian parties, it is hard to say exactly which party line these mainstream media reflect. On the left-wing, it is arguably more obvious, where *CartaCapital*, *Caros Amigos* and *revista Piauí* provide counterpoints to the ideological leanings of the mainstream media, bolstered by a few independent online sources and blog sites: *Jornal GGN*, *CartaMaior*, *Brasil247*, *Diário do Centro do Mundo* (Carvalho and Albuquerque 2017), the citizen-journalist platform *Mídia NINJA*, and a number of pro-PT blogs (Becker and Waltz 2017:124).

Because the mainstream outlets have increased their negative coverage of the PT, and since regional media and radio stations are allied to or owned by exactly these media organizations, one might think that the Brazilian case still fits the polarized pluralist model. However, Albuquerque (2011) has provided another grid for interpreting the situation, adding another set of sub-parameters, namely the strength of the ideological positions and party lines (clear/unclear) and the strength of media activism in politics (active/passive). This re-fits Hallin and Mancini's model:

**Table 3.2: Media activism and Party lines**

<b>Party lines – Activism:</b>		<b>Politically active media</b>	<b>Politically passive media</b>
<b>Party lines</b> Clear		Polarized pluralist (Political parallelism)	Democratic corporatist (Public service ethos)
<b>Party lines</b> Unclear		Moderating role of media (Media as active agent)	Liberal ("Objective," non-opinion news)

Adapted from Albuquerque 2011:93.

The mainstream media outlets of Brazil are not exactly located inside the advocacy tradition of the polarized pluralist model, but rather present a mix of “objective” news in the North American tradition and more or less one-sided interpretive journalism and commentary from a distinct political perspective. With 28 different parties in Congress on one hand, and a hegemonic system of news media outlets dominated by one political ideology on the other, parallelism doesn’t do justice as a concept. Rather, the media conglomerates should be understood as an institution or an active agent in their own right (Albuquerque 2011, Cook 2006). Interpreting the political environment and expressing the ideas in similar ways, Brazilian mainstream news mostly validate itself recursively, as “they constitute a web of facticity by establishing themselves as cross-referents to one another” (Tuchman 1972:86). Although some counter-hegemonic news outlets have emerged online (Becker and Waltz 2017), this coherent worldview in the media system is another argument for the sampling strategy sketched out above: The textual-ideological redundancy makes it possible to treat the total textual production as one system, decentering individual journalistic voices or editorial positions.

### 3.4 Role of the State in the Brazilian Media System

During the dictatorship years, the Brazilian state exerted political control and censorship of media, as many Latin American military regimes did, and the state supported and invested in the media infrastructure of telecommunications (Matos 2012a:50). Since the transition to democracy, Brazilian governments have maintained a model of regulation, subsidies, and allowed the vertical integration of media groups to continue, thus concentrating media in a few conglomerates. The media policy that resulted in concentration of media ownership mostly had the aim of reinforcing governmental powers, rather than promoting democratic forms of communication. After the transition to democracy, the Brazilian state maintained the role of the regulator, but governments, at different times since 1988, have utilized the concession rights and “the distribution of radio and television licenses as a form of political patronage” (ibid.: 51). The archaic press law that dates back to 1967 has not been effectively updated (Porto 2011a:122), and “broadcasting industry regulation has been notoriously designed around private companies’ demands to expand consumer markets” (Guedes-Bailey and Jambeiro 2008:53). Despite the constitutional legislation (article 54) prohibiting media ownership for elected politicians, senators and representatives frequently do own major shares of local broadcasting networks, because the law is rarely enforced (Lima 2001:107).

The traditional media policies that had fostered the concentration of ownership as well as private and political control of media outlets were challenged during the Lula government. Media subsidies, which in the 90s went to a few hundred outlets in only 182 municipalities, were split up and

redistributed to thousands of smaller outlets across the country (Biroli and Miguel 2013:89). Augmenting this shift, the government initiated a new phase of state-media relations with the creation of centralized, federal public service broadcasting: The Empresa Brasil de Comunicação (EBC) was founded in 2007 by a provisory decree, ratified in 2008 in order to fuse the Radiobrás with TVE Brasil and develop a public service news agency (Matos 2012a, 2012b). It has not conquered large shares of the national audience, however (Becker and Waltz 2017:118). In the 2010 elections, debate arose concerning the possible pro-PT bias of EBC (Matos 2012a:57). In addition to the EBC, both chambers of Parliament broadcast through respective channels (TV Câmara and TV Senado) in different formats (interviews, studio news on politics, as well as transmission of parliamentary debates and votes). The Supreme Court followed suit in 2002 and now broadcasts most of its plenary sessions through the TV Justiça and its YouTube channel.

The state-led opening of the media sector did little to change the ways of the established media conglomerates, however. The process of opening in the Globo conglomerate slowed as Ali Kamel was appointed General-Director in 2009 (Porto 2012:172), and the relationship between the state and the media conglomerates such as Globo has been increasingly conditioned by the clash between the PT-led governments and editorial focus on scandals. As is the pattern in much of Latin America, PT leaders have, through the last two decades, increasingly perceived and denounced a threat from non-state media organizations and actors (Kitzberger 2014, 2016). Admittedly, the PT administrations acted less aggressively through policy than in Venezuela or Argentina, but it is true for all three cases that “governments have frequently clashed with dominant media companies identified with conservative economic and political interests. Presidents have regularly criticized leading media companies for representing anti-popular interests and conspiring to overthrow them” (Waisbord 2013:134). Instead of paraphrasing this critique, I will now unfold some of the important moments of recent history where Brazilian governments and political parties felt the presence of media organizations – in the coverage of elections, scandals, and popular protests.

### 3.5 Elections, TV Globo, and the Charge of Political Bias

The problems arising from political parallelism and vested interests of media conglomerates are best exemplified by a brief review of the scholarly debate concerning political bias of coverage during elections in Brazil. The presidential elections, free since 1989, have provided researchers with a microcosm of data for exploring the patterns of coverage and assess the possible impact of media attention upon the votes cast. In some instances, politically skewed coverage, especially of certain presidential candidates, has been interpreted as a general political bias in Brazilian mainstream media. In this section, I will describe how that charge gradually evaporated, but then reappeared. Starting in the period 2005-2012 with the coverage of the Mensalão scandal (discussed next), and increasingly since then, TV Globo has been denounced by actors in both scholarly and political fields for adopting a role opposing PT government with pronounced consequences for the coverage and public agenda.

TV Globo’s historical dominance is linked to the political project of the military governments (Guedes-Bailey and Jambeiro 2008:58, Matos 2012b:867, Lima 2004:51). In the 1980s, the charge of political bias lingered, but with a twist. Already before the first free elections, the censorship institution was abolished, and this led to an explosion of corruption scandals during the presidency

of José Sarney. Sarney was civilian, and had been elected Vice-president by an Electoral College in a restricted election, taking the mantle before the dying president-elect Tancredo Neves could be sworn in (Skidmore and Smith 2001:174). The explosion of exposés under Sarney was attributable both to high incidence of political corruption and the newfound freedom of press. The problems of political bias in political coverage (and, especially, in scandals), however, is normally located by researchers after Sarney's term. Even so, Porto highlights the fact that Sarney was friends with Roberto Marinho, leader of the Globo conglomerate (Porto 2012:106). This, according to Lima (2004:53), eventually resulted in situations going far beyond bias in news coverage, when Sarney at the end of his term needed Marinho's blessing before appointing ministers. Thus, the oligarch Marinho exerted a remarkable but opaque influence on national politics via his powerful media organization, distorting the democratic potential of vertical accountability inherent in media (Smulovitz and Peruzzotti 2000).

Bias in news can be more or less precisely defined, but for each free presidential election since Sarney's presidency, the kind of bias emphasized and criticized by scholars has changed. For this reason, it makes little sense to try to establish an exact definition here. Political bias in news coverage is demonstrably a moving target, at least in the presidential elections (Porto 2012, ch. 4). But it is worthwhile, as context for this thesis, to have a brief look at the ways in which Globo exerted influence in election situations.

The first free and direct presidential elections saw the young Alagoas governor Fernando Collor de Mello project an image as a "Hunter of Maharajas," fighting the fat cats of the corrupt public bureaucracy. The Collor candidacy, (especially Collor's image and program statement) was perhaps favored indirectly through the political discourse embedded in the telenovelas *Vale Tudo, Que Rei Sou Eu?* and *O Salvador da Pátria* of 1988 and 1989 that aired on TV Globo (Porto 2011b:61, Lima 1993, Rubim 1989, Weber 1990). However, the news coverage of Globo did not favor Collor in the first round, according to a content analysis of *Jornal Nacional* coverage (Porto 2012:79-86). In the lead-up to the 1989 elections, TV Globo covered PSDB and PMDB candidates Covas and Guimarães more than other candidates. Without much party support behind him, Collor won the second round of elections over Lula, but ironically, his administration and the president-elect quickly fell victim to investigative journalism through disclosure of corruption. Exposés in *Veja*, *IstoÉ*, and *Folha* eventually brought enough scathing evidence to light that the governing coalition behind him fell apart, and he resigned just prior to an impeachment vote on December 29, 1992. The exposés of this era have been considered the "heyday of Brazilian investigative journalism," when newsroom began establishing structures for investigations (Matos 2012a:108).

Other researchers have argued that investigative journalism in Brazil was really replaced by *denuncismo* (Abreu and Lattman-Weltman 2000:3, Fernandes 2011:197, Miguel and Coutinho 2007), which loosely translates into exposés based on unsubstantiated allegations, fueled by "a journalistic culture obsessed about the dealings of government and that consistently applies identical patterns to unveil wrongdoing" (Waisbord 2000:88). Waisbord observed that "closeness between journalists and official sources is also indispensable for the media to delve into official wrongdoing," and that this proximity "results from the organization of news-making and a journalistic culture that highly prizes official news" (ibid.:93).



The collusion between Brazilian journalists and their official sources gives rise to problems of counter-denunciations: “Journalists’ dependence on officials also allows some sources to avoid denunciation, while at the same time ensuring that the media will publicize accusations against rivals” (Porto 2011a:111). Institutional actors, such as the public prosecutors, are well aware of the journalistic interest in juicy bits from investigations, and have been known to give interviews and disclose information to media that would benefit their court strategies (Arantes 2002:157-162, Chaia and Teixeira 2000). Since this thesis is not a newsroom study, and since I have elsewhere accounted for the journalist-source relationships in the Lava-Jato case (Damgaard 2018b, Chapter 3), I will not expand on the problems of doing “politics by other means” through *denuncismo* (Peruzzotti 2006:256), but only note that the political power of denunciations and scandals in the Brazilian political system seemed to wane in the mid-90s, following the exposés of Collor’s corruption and a parliamentary budget graft scandal in 1993 (Nobre 2013a:9).

Collor’s vice-president Itamar Franco stepped in after Collor resigned, but Franco did not run for the 1994 elections, launching instead his minister of Finances, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, as the incumbent candidate. With balanced coverage, TV Globo could not be faulted in the 1994 elections for uneven distribution of airtime, but rather for the unilateral praise of the financial rescue program Plano Real, masterminded in 1993 by Cardoso (Azevedo 2006). Since this praise would be associated with Cardoso, one could argue that the coverage of the economy by proxy supported Cardoso’s ideas and results (Porto 2012:87).

In the 1998 elections, the political coverage was reduced to a minimum in the months that preceded election day (Azevedo 2006:108, Miguel 1999, Porto 2008:258, 2012:89). Social problems and high unemployment in some regions were also allegedly under-reported in newscasts (Kucinski 1998, Miguel 2000:68), while economic issues were largely framed in a pro-government way (Porto 2012:90-91). Thus, the coverage leading up to the election of Cardoso was biased by omission of any critical stance or coverage of competing candidates. The charge of bias was finally (although only temporarily) silenced in the 2002 elections, as TV Globo in its newscasts created a policy to ensure impartiality in coverage (*ibid.*). In contrast to the three preceding elections, Lula and PT (in his fourth bid for presidency) were not at a disadvantage through the evasion of social issues on the media agenda, negative framings, or limited air-time. In his first period, however, Lula came under media scrutiny with the disclosure of the Mensalão case, to which I now turn.

### 3.6 The Mensalão Scandal

The scandal known as the *Mensalão* case was characterized as a watershed for many reasons. The scandal (named for the neologism used to describe the big monthly payments to parliamentarians) ended with prison sentences to top-level politicians, rather than the impunity to which Brazilian politicians are accustomed. The case first drew headlines throughout the country in 2005 and 2006, and ignited anew the conflict between President Lula and the media conglomerates. In his winning campaign in 2002 and in the first half of the period, Lula had managed to establish a truce with the mainstream media (Kitzberger 2016:453), except perhaps *Veja*. The truce broke down once these media alleged that money had been pulled from slush funds of Lula’s PT and dealt out to Congressmen in order to sway votes. While Lula’s mandate remained unscathed, and while he succeeded in getting re-elected in 2006, central members of his inner circle in government and the

party were indicted and went on trial, after many delays, in 2012. In this section, I will describe the scandal, how it was interpreted in the media, and what it meant to the relationship between political actors and media organizations.

The case started with a minor disclosure: An undercover journalist posing as a lawyer recorded with a hidden camera how a bribe money - a relatively small amount of 3000 R \$ - changed hands in the Brazilian Postal Service (Vasconcellos 2006:15). *Veja* put it on the front page on May 18, 2005, exposing the way that bribes for contracts with the Postal Service eventually resulted in kickbacks to the government-supporting party PTB (Junior 2005). The scandal then snowballed, and the first to roll with it was the party leader of PTB, Roberto Jefferson. On the secret recordings from the Postal Service, Jefferson was named as the responsible for receiving money in exchange for securing public procurement deals. In response, in June 2005, Jefferson chose to ignore the unspoken rule of silence governing corrupt networks, revealing far more than the minor incident disclosed in *Veja* (Lo Prete 2005). Interviewed by *Folha*, Roberto Jefferson denounced the PT treasurer Delúbio Soares for channeling monthly payments to parliamentarians of the parties PP, PL and Jefferson's PTB, in return for political support in decisive congressional votes. The government's coordinator, chief of staff and minister José Dirceu (PT), a former student union leader and revolutionary, had in 2004 listened to Jefferson's internal whistle-blowing, and even promised him to end the corruption, but nothing happened, according to Jefferson.

The disclosure prompted further revelations and extensive criticism of President Lula. Dirceu became the first to resign in consequence of the case, at a press conference on June 16. Dirceu rejected the charges but stated that he would resign from office, head held high, in order to "return to the grassroots" and fight for the party against "those who want to interrupt the democratic and political process, and those who want to destabilize the government of Lula" (Dirceu 2005). A month later, on July 14, Lula for the first time responded to the case in public, in an interview with an independent journalist. Here, Lula acknowledged that his party had made mistakes, but had not done anything that wasn't usual in Brazilian politics (Monteiro 2005). Lula's alleged role in the scandal made the media compare the situation with Collor case, and floated the idea of impeachment once again (Barreiros and Amoroso 2008, Anderson 2011:5). Soares, the PT treasurer, resigned from office on July 6, and PT party president Genoíno resigned three days later.

Dirceus's denials were belied by confessions from the inner circle of the president: Lula's media adviser Duda Mendonça, whose PR strategy was regarded as the decisive factor for the election victory in 2002, confessed to having received payment in tax havens for the entire 2002 campaign - 10,5 million R\$ in a Bahamas offshore company (Souza 2011:80, Anderson 2011:2). On August 12, President Lula appeared on national television, ostensibly to present a cabinet reshuffle in consequence of Dirceus's resignation. During the speech, Lula finally made a planned, public statement concerning the case, as he apologized to the nation and took the first steps towards rejuvenating the PT leadership (da Silva 2005). Mendonça, Soares and Genoíno were indicted by the federal police in late August, as was the businessman Marcos Valério.

The case was opened as a corruption investigation under the Supreme Court by the MPF (the federal public prosecutor) in July 2005, which meant relocating the jurisdiction from the federal court of the state of Minas Gerais to the Supreme Court in Brasília. The Congress set up parallel investigative

commissions that interviewed various involved in the following months. In April 5, 2006, a joint congressional committee published a report about the case (Pereira, Power and Raile 2011:34), while the Prosecutor-General indicted 40 individuals, describing José Dirceu as the mastermind behind the bribe and kickback scheme in Congress, and Valério as the man commanding the money laundering and distribution system.

The media reveled in the investigations, committees, and denunciations. The Mensalão exposés initiated a significant general rise in the scandal coverage found in the weekly press, so that “the average number of stories containing denunciations almost tripled since 2002” (Nascimento 2013:68), going from a weekly total average of 0,3 denunciation items in *Veja*, *IstoÉ* and *Época*, to 1,3 and 1,5 items by the end of 2010 (ibid.:72). Like the rest of the press (Rubim and Colling 2007), TV Globo presented the 2006 presidential campaign under the sign of scandals relating to the PT (Porto 2012:95), as the conclusion of “16 uninterrupted months of negative coverage of the Lula government” (Biroli and Miguel 2013:78), from May 2005 to October 2006, with an emphasis on corruption exposés. Despite having his image tarnished, Lula managed to pull off a win in the second round of the presidential elections in October that year (Porto 2012:117).

That President Lula remained popular with voters did not help PT in the legal trials. By the end of 2006, the eleven judges of the Supreme Court decided in their plenary session not to divide the case between the different arms of the organization behind the bribe scheme. The case thus continued as a rather unwieldy and complex judicial case, with scores of lawyers involved. For this reason, it took until July 2007 for the Supreme Court to schedule the initial hearing in the case, and on August 28, the charges against the 40 politicians and businessmen were accepted, turning them into defendants and starting the trial called *Ação Penal 470*. The court established a schedule for obtaining witness statements for the defendants, a process that lasted one and a half years. In the meantime, Lula had left the presidential Palácio do Planalto and succeeded in getting his hand-picked successor, former minister of Mines and Energy, Dilma Rousseff, elected in October 2010 (Magalhães, da Silva and Dias 2015). She commenced her term with a tough-on-corruption stance, quickly sacking seven ministers suspected of wrongdoing (Chaia 2015:13, Araujo et al. 2016).

It was not until June 2011 that the Supreme Court judge responsible for the process, *ministro relator* Joaquim Barbosa, finished the instruction phase of the process, demanding preliminary statements from the defense lawyers and the prosecutors. In December 2011, Barbosa presented his account of the investigation, but the case's legal auditor in the court, *ministro auditor* Supreme Justice Ricardo Lewandowski, delayed another half year in releasing the process from processual audit and putting it on the agenda of the Supreme Court Plenary. Thus, seven years passed from the initial disclosure to the start of the trial process.

As the trial started, in August 2012, three interpretations of the case had coalesced (Damgaard 2015a). In *Globo's* publications, as in those of *Veja*, the case was hailed as

a watershed in Brazilian society. Piloted by staunch judges, the trial changed the rules of the national political game, making it clear that the law henceforth is upheld for common citizens and aloof politicians alike. This narrative postulates a basic discontinuity effected by the mensalão trial. Operating within a progressive temporality, the Brazilian nation has come to be prosperous but pestered by corruption and other forms of dysfunctional governing. This narrative, in turn, relies on several other narratives and conceptions, each of

those projecting certain ideals and beliefs about the actors and institutions involved in this “milestone” narrative. The journalists and editors in several instances use the case to emphasize the role of investigative media as the fourth branch of government, monitoring the quality of democracy on behalf of the people. (ibid.:213)

The trial lasted six months and ended with hitherto unseen severe sentences to most of the involved, including Jefferson. Dirceu was sentenced to more than 10 years of prison, while Marcos Valério was sentenced to 40 years. In the left-wing media such as *CartaCapital*, the stiff sentences and the remarkable media attention was interpreted as

a farce, constructed by the media and executed by the judiciary branch. Certain business leaders, standing to gain from the displacement of attention, hover behind the conspiracy, and the inconsistencies of the mensalão trial are due to the forged origin of the case. In this version, the sinister motives and corrupt networks can be traced to the top of the STF and the boards of the media conglomerates (ibid.:215-6)

*Folha* and *Veja*, in some instances, also represented the trial as incomplete, but inverted the notion of the cover-up. In this inversion,

the trial has not reached the root of the problem, which stems from the former president himself. A select cadre from the PT and their pater familia Lula are responsible for framing Valerio and other of the defendants, while escaping conviction themselves. (ibid.)

This interpretation – as we shall see – would linger and crop up again in the Lava-Jato case. Another important interpretation highlighted the growing independence of the judiciary and the Supreme Court, even with a majority of PT-appointed judges (apart from Barbosa, the judges Fux, Toffoli, Lewandowski, Weber, Lúcia, and Peluso, who was substituted by Teori Zavascki in September 2012). Based on research reported in my master’s thesis, I have characterized this variant as a narrative in which

the judiciary branch has initiated a tectonic movement in the power bases of society. In a dramatic struggle for political power between the Congress and the STF, the scale has tipped in favour of the judiciary branch. This shift strikes a new balance between the democratic institutions, by founding the legitimacy of government not on elections but rather on juridical and constitutional processes. Distinct from the first narrative, this third narrative entertains the idea of several possible configurations of power and the oscillation between them.

This narrative of conflict follows a classic and easily constructed narrative schema (Polletta 2006:13) in media texts, involving two opponents and some contested ground. In this case, it concerns legitimacy in government. Dramatizing a political question in this way has consequences, however. First of all, the personification of the contesting state powers reduces it to a question of supporting one or the other contestant. The individuals eclipse the system in this mode of representing the workings of political and juridical institutions, resulting in a clear-cut story of conflict... Secondly, this narrative’s mediatization of the mensalão trial as a conflict of government branches supersedes the issue of corruption. The rampant corruption and impunity, already mentioned in narrative 1, turns out to be a symptom of the struggle for power and legitimacy.

The struggle between power bases and upturning of the usual pattern contains racial elements as well. The shift in power is alluded at in *Estado*, but clear in the issue of *Veja* hailing Barbosa’s triumph, emphasizing his concern for the *democracia racial* of Brazil (Marques & Diniz 2012:72). As the first black president of the STF, his ascent through the courts might spell not merely justice for corrupt politicians, but also a visual shift in the image of legitimate power, adding more skin hues to the palette, and framing the typical white elite parliamentarians as villains.

Finally, the increased focus on the importance of the STF in Brazilian politics underscores the process of *judicialization*, the society-wide tendency for resolving conflicts through legal action (Porto 2012:150, Cavalcanti 2006:40, Kapiszewski 2010:52, Werneck Vianna et al. 2007). Represented by *Veja* and *Estado* as the rightful locus of order and democratic progress, the STF gains legitimacy, and ferments this itself by feeding into the news media's hunt for more news items, interviewees and comments. (ibid.:219-20)

Several important traits of the Mensalão scandal should be highlighted in conclusion; traits that seem to have contributed to the coverage of the Lava-Jato case. Similar to what has happened in European scandals (Adut 2004, Mandel 1995), the figure of an independent and media-savvy judge ascended to stardom in the Brazilian media, with judge Barbosa filling out the role of the protagonist to the utmost (see section 4.5.1 in the next chapter). Second, the conflict between the Supreme Court and the government was also a focus of the coverage. Third, while path-dependency is perhaps too strong a word, the way that the Mensalão trial became an exception to the pattern of impunity certainly created an expectation for future trials of political corruption. Finally, the idea lingered that Dirceu and other PT leaders covered for Lula, and the narrative desire to finally bring Lula to justice was reflected in some texts appearing in the Lava-Jato scandal.

### 3.7 Jornadas de Junho: The Giant Awakens, Confused

The topic of corruption, which had been predominant on front pages during the six months of the Mensalão trial in 2012, was not initially the topic of protests starting in 2013. In June, however, the mainstream media revived the issue of corruption on the national agenda by deliberately sifting the heterogeneous calls for action observed in the protests that came to be known as the *Jornadas de Junho*, or *Jornadas de 2013*.

Smaller protests against bus fare hikes occurred early in 2013: 200 people united in February in Porto Alegre protesting augmented public transportation fares, and similar protests occurred in Manaus (March 30), in Natal, Rio Grande do Norte (May 15) and in Goiânia the following day. Salvador da Bahia saw protests on June 2 (Cardoso and Di Fatima 2013:159, Peralva et al. 2017), but it was the movement called Movimento Passe Livre (MPL), arguing for free public transport, that triggered the avalanche (Mendonça 2018:9), starting in São Paulo on June 3 and June 6.

The MPL demonstration in Avenida Paulista, São Paulo's main thoroughfare, where the largest enterprises, banks and business associations are based, was criticized by the press for disrupting the flow of traffic, for vandalism, and for making unrealistic demands. The demonstration was attacked by the police, and many arrests followed. (Saad-Filho 2013:658)

At this moment, TV Globo framed the protests in a clearly negative way (Avritzer 2016a:70), with one commentator framing the protesters' motives as "politically ignorant stupidity mixed with rancor" (Alzamora and Arce 2014:6). Minor street protests ensued on June 10, and 11 (Singer 2013:24), and the São Paulo protests on June 11 and 13 were again violently repressed by the police (ibid.). The violence galvanized Brazilians online, and was denounced on social media (and in alternative media such as *Midia NINJA*, see Avritzer 2016a:74 and Gomes 2016:383). The word about follow-up protests

spread through social media and gathered over one million people on the streets of São Paulo on the 16th and 17th of June, with similar results in Rio de Janeiro on the 20th of June. In spite of the massive participation

online and offline, as well as the presence of different causes and ideologies, no official leaders appeared and no public speeches were given. Information would circulate on Facebook pages and through Twitter accounts, displaying sometimes a very high number of followers and comments, as well as shared images and videos about the ongoing events. (Pischetola 2016:168)

In spite of the lack of central themes for the protests, “press coverage pushed the rapidly growing mobilizations towards a cacophony loosely centred on civic issues and, especially, state inefficiency and corruption, in order both to drown out the left and to delegitimize the federal government” (Saad-Filho 2013:659). This cacophony has been analyzed based on corpora of interviews (Mendonça 2018), protester profiles (Singer 2013, Avritzer 2016a:68) hashtags (Malini et al. 2016), and themes (Avritzer 2016a:75ff). The online reflections of the protests, particularly on Twitter, has been analyzed in order to assess the weight of the different issues on the protest agenda. Malini et al. (2016:403ff) categorized the hashtags as either convocations, (geo-)informations, demands, or critique. The last category included hashtags against Rousseff, Lula, the FIFA president Sepp Blatter, the World Cup, and the Globo conglomerate. Many online expressions of protests simply called for change and for mobilization (under the slogan “Vem pra rua” - a slogan with a genealogy going back well before 2013, *ibid.*:394). The slogan #OGiganteAcordou, the Giant Awoke, also took off on Twitter in this period. But what was the effect of this supposed awakening and mobilization?

MPL pulled out of the amorphous mega-protests, and Globo changed their stance to a more positive one, even as the network itself was the object of protests (Alzamora and Arce 2014). June 20 saw dozens of large-scale protests across the country, covered extensively by mainstream media, with some violent incidents and a brief occupation of the Congress by protesters in Brasília (Avritzer 2016a:72, Singer 2013:26). In the third week of June, the slogans for change and protests against transportation fare hikes were supplanted by political topics concerning public expenditure, health and security (*ibid.*:78). The topic of corruption and discontent with the Rousseff administration, around June 20, began to claim the spotlight in the Twittersphere and in the mainstream media coverage of the same period (Avritzer 2016a:81, 92). On national TV, Rousseff announced the need for political reform, suggesting a new Constitutional process, and again pledged to a tough-on-corruption policy (*ibid.*:78, Singer 2013:26). Not much reform resulted, however.

As the protest wave petered out, a plunge in Rousseff’s approval ratings became apparent (Singer 2013:34). While street protests disappeared in the second half of 2013 (Peralva et al. 2017:5), the online mobilization remained vigorous in some sectors, especially in groups that emphasised the problems of corruption (Singer 2013:36). Facebook groups such as Revoltados Online and Mobilização Patriota remained active after the street protests and even grew. The “contents of these pages are extremely right-sided, nationalist and very critical to the government and the party represented by president Dilma” (Pischetola 2016:169). The Vem Pra Rua slogan coalesced as the name of an organizing and mobilizing group in the later protests of 2015 and 2016, emphasizing the fight against corruption, while the abbreviation MPL (from Movimento Passe Livre) was hi-jacked and turned into MBL, the Movimento Brasil Livre, again with strongly liberal and mostly anti-PT views.

The shift of political emphasis in the digital public spheres and the Globo turn-around in relation to the protests were two symptoms of a new discursive alliance – between, on one hand, discontented younger citizens in street protests (traditionally a left-wing symbol), now endowed with anti-left

wing views endorsed by new online mobilizing groups, and on the other hand a conservative elite interested in channeling the discontent into negative coverage of the PT governments prior to the 2014 elections (Avritzer 2016a, Peralva et al. 2017:27, Souza 2016:106). Springing from the transport protests, the heterogeneous critique of the political system and the attempts to claim a space for direct and radical democracy were quickly superseded by a media agenda emphasizing misuse of public funds and corruption (Mendonça 2018, Nobre 2013b:145). News concordant with this frame was recycled by the new right-wing online groups, while attempts at reinvigorating the democratic system withered. In the next chapter, I return to examples of coverage of protests spinning off from events in the Lava-Jato case, with characteristics similar to those discussed above. The underlying motif of the discontent and the outrage, according to Singer (2013:37), was a critique of bloated and corrupt state institutions dominated by an establishment who are not working in the best interest of the citizens. I return, in Chapter 6, to the identification of the State with PT; an identification that became a central semiotic link of the scandals in the following years.

In sum, several important events preceded the Lava-Jato case, and the pattern of their coverage in Brazilian mainstream media partly spelled out the fate of the coverage to come. These media outlets increasingly became polarized and politicized in the last decade (Lattman-Weltman and Chagas 2016, Feres Júnior and Sassara 2016:210), and scandals and exposés grew to be the main material of the weeklies and the “quality” newspapers. The events highlighted in this chapter set the standard for the coverage of the Lava-Jato case, analyzed in the next chapter. First, the election of Lula as the first left-wing president since the return to democracy shifted media attention to the increasingly established left-wing political elite, primarily organized around PT. Whereas media exposés in his predecessor’s government had been less effective, the first scandal involving Lula’s ministers quickly led to resignations, and the public prosecutors accumulated independence in his presidential periods (Arantes 2011), especially at the top-level, as became apparent during the Mensalão trial (Michener and Pereira 2016). The expectation that the negative coverage of the scandal would undermine Lula’s support and the re-election chances of involved parliamentarians was not met in the 2006 elections, however (Pereira, Rennó and Samuels 2011:94, Rennó 2011).

Because of the academic perception of increasing *denuncismo* and propensity for scandals, groups of scholars began to measure the valency of news on parties and candidates leading up to the 2014 elections, arguing that such negative coverage of well-known candidates should have negative electoral results (Feres Júnior 2016:282). This implicit critique of political bias in the media conglomerates, which could be seen as an expression of political parallelism in the Hallin-Mancini model, has been challenged by Miguel, who argued that if it is even possible to measure slant as such (and eventually aggregate news items by ignoring relative weight of importance), negative or positive coverage must be still decoded by audiences (Miguel 2015:174, drawing upon Hall 1980). Negative coverage does not translate uniformly nor directly into political preferences, in other words. In any case, the media conglomerates’ attention to scandals made Lula’s successor Rousseff keenly aware of the importance of signaling zero-tolerance for corruption suspicions, but her administration was nonetheless caught up in (and caught off-guard by) the wave of protests in June 2013. After barely winning the 2014 elections, Rousseff immediately faced calls for impeachment, but it was the Lava-Jato scandal that created the narrative conditions for her impeachment. In the next chapter, I show how these scandals and processes intertwined in news texts.

## Chapter 4

### Unfolding the Lava-Jato Scandal

Before commencing an analysis of news texts and newscasts, I will make three preliminary remarks regarding my way of referencing the selected news texts, the organization of the material, and the presented emplotment. First, the examples are referenced in an unconventional way, in order to give the reader as many clues about the context as possible with a minimum of reference-checking needed. Instead of author names and years, I give the media outlet and date of quoted daily papers, sites, and newscasts, and the edition number for the weekly magazines, in the following manner:

#### Abbreviation list:

Abbreviation of Newspaper		Magazine		Newscast	
E2/3	<i>Estado de S. Paulo</i> (March 2)	V#2500	<i>Veja</i> , edition 2500	JN24/5	<i>Jornal Nacional</i>
F18/1 2015	<i>Folha de S. Paulo</i> (January 18, 2015)	I#2465	<i>IstoÉ</i>	G1-19/1	g1.globo.com
G25/9	<i>O Globo</i> (September 25)	E#870	<i>Época</i>	V-2/12	Veja.abril.com.br

Second, the news texts are organized in order provide the reader with a coherent reading experience. To create cohesion across the more than one hundred quoted texts is by itself a kind of literary practice; or at least theoretically informed emplotment in action. By bringing forth plots, admittedly, I engage in the rewriting of already “contested codes and representations” (Clifford and Marcus 1986:2), and like writing cultures, this is a hermeneutic endeavor with political consequences. “Literary processes... affect the ways cultural phenomena are registered” (ibid.:4) in cultural anthropology as well as in the news media narratology pursued here.

The hermeneutic endeavor of this chapter poses certain ethical choices concerning selection, validity, and representation. First of all, I use each bit of text to exemplify and thus articulate narrative elements such as plot structures or focalization of actants. This, however, also means that for every text presented and unfolded here, I have de-selected numerous texts covering the same event, and sometimes, this means ignoring less salient or marginalized textual accounts of the same event. These are contingent analytical choices and other researchers might pick out different variations within a group of texts. The organization of the empirical material here aims to do justice to the salience of material in the sampled segment of the mediascape – highlighting the material which was highly visible and explaining it, as far as space permits, in its complexity. The de-selection, then, smoothens the reading experience as it levels or flattens the ruptures found across news texts. However, to counter this inevitable reduction of complexity, I return, in Chapter 6, to investigate the margins of the corpus and the political unconscious governing it.

While I attempt to let the texts speak for themselves as much as possible, this representation of representations nevertheless doubly reflects the political situation of Brazil, caught between the voices of journalistic texts and my backgrounded strategy for reading, selecting, and re-representing



them. This is a double reflection, I believe, because my strategy is undoubtedly informed by what I more or less consciously consider to be “the real story” behind the news texts. I will strive not to let my assumption of the “real story” influence this part of the analysis, but I acknowledge that the production of a persuasive (or at least coherent) interpretation demands the imposition of some kind of literary order on the material. This goes for the pundit as well as the academic writer, but the academic writer is obliged to declare the terms of engagement.

This leads me to a third and final remark concerning emplotment. In the analysis, I will bring out moments of emplotment shared between a range of news texts. While I follow the intertextual trajectories in order to present and analyze them, while not supposing them to be the “real” or the only explanations for the political events - far from it. Only by mapping out the shared plot structures is it possible to discover what such plot structure means to the organization of material and interpretation of events, and ultimately how the plot structure is deployed as catalyst for political action and speech acts.

To guide the reader, I will start by briefly outlining the six sections in this chapter. In the first section of analysis, I will present selected passages from the sampled weekly magazines and daily newspapers that deal with the Petrobras directors and businessmen of the construction sector who were initially arrested by the Lava-Jato investigations in 2014-2015. In some texts, the cartel of subcontractors appears as the obvious antagonist of the plot, but in several examples the businessmen took on the role of scapegoats, or pawns in a larger scheme led by PT. In order to prepare for a fabula that emerged somewhat later, I also present the weeklies’ emplotment of the arrest of Marcelo Odebrecht, the heir to the Odebrecht construction company, as the final example. While the position of antagonist in the narratives of the Lava-Jato was split in news texts between political, criminal and financial or business actors, depending on the occasion for any particular news text, the protagonist role was firmly established early on. In the second section of analysis, I analyze the characterizations of the protagonists – judge Sérgio Moro and the Prosecutor-General Rodrigo Janot in particular - facing the corrupt businessmen and politicians.

From these crude baseline observations of antagonists and protagonists, I begin to unfold the more complex role played by various politicians in the third, fourth, and fifth sections of analysis. In the first half of 2015, the corruption scandal of Petrobras was threatening to embroil most of Congress and the Rousseff administration – with the latter focalized as responsible for the Petrobras graft. In the second half of 2015, the government coalition began to break up, and impeachment of President Rousseff was discussed with increasing intensity; both of these political developments were tied to the polemical figure of Eduardo Cunha, then President of the Câmara. Through examples from news texts found in *Estado* and *Folha*, these events take up the third section of analysis, which shows not only how the media increasingly covered Cunha negatively, but also the media’s narration of a complex coalitional power game that ended with most of the government coalition jumping ship.

In the fourth section, I analyze TV Globo’s *Jornal Nacional* newscasts from March 4 and March 16 in depth. I selected these two newscasts because they contain crucial material that established a narrative link between Rousseff and Lula and contributed to a common emplotment of the impeachment and the Lava-Jato scandal. These newscasts also contain material that demonstrates the apogee of the symbolic power of Sérgio Moro, as well as an articulation of the value axis pitting

Lula (as the antagonist) against members of the judiciary. The two newscasts are prime examples for showing how postulates of proximity between Lula and the Petrobras scandal were seemingly enough to discredit him or indeed any member of PT. This association contaminated (Adut 2008:24) the Rousseff presidency entirely in the second newscast, while the strands of the corruption probe investigating other central political actors were ignored; even on the very day when Cunha faced charges in the STF, this news item and its relevance to the impeachment case was relegated to the margin of the newscast. Finally, this section relates to section 3.7 above concerning the protests of June 2013, by discussing the contrasting representation of “legitimate street protests” and “acts of violence.”

The fifth section of analysis unpacks examples sampled from the complex corpus of news on impeachment, going back to the coverage found in the daily newspapers and their online platforms in early 2015, skipping the backstage events already described in the third section, instead fast-forwarding to the moments when the Lava-Jato scandal came to influence and boost the impeachment process. In this section, I also show the transfer of narrative desire from the Lava-Jato to the impeachment process, as well as the patterning from earlier scandals involving PT. The sixth and final section provides examples of an imagined end to the political elite as a whole, transcending the focus on PT demonstrated in the previous sections.

#### 4.1 Doleiro, Delator, Scapegoat

On March 17, 2014, the police operation code-named Lava-Jato (or *Lava Jato* without hyphen) was launched. That morning, the *doleiro* (money launderer) Alberto Youssef, working out of Curitiba, Paraná, was apprehended by federal police officers. Youssef had been identified as a key actor in a criminal network linked to the gas station Posto da Torre in the hotel sector of central Brasília. The police operation was code-named *Lava-Jato*, literally “Jet Wash,” referencing both the car wash (*lava a jato* in Portuguese) in that gas station and implying that the amounts of money laundered surpassed the value of a jet (Netto 2016:28).

The operation that apprehended Youssef did not quite catch the eye of the national media, however. While the case was covered briefly on March 18, it was not linked to Petrobras before it became known that a former director of Petrobras, Paulo Roberto Costa, was in cahoots with Youssef. Costa, who had headed the oil giant’s Supply Department until 2014, happened to be arrested in a follow-up operation a few days later. On March 20, Costa was apprehended by the Federal Police, because he, on the morning of Youssef’s arrest, had called on his family to destroy evidence in his office and remove large amounts of money. The ex-director’s family members were nearly caught red-handed by the police, who rapidly accessed surveillance tapes from the very same morning and eventually stopped the destruction of evidence (ibid.).

From March and until September 2014, the investigation of large-scale corruption in Petrobras was in an embryonic state, and the jurisdiction of the case was questioned in the Supreme Court. In the media, a few political pundits discussed the possible ramifications of the investigation, and the astonishing figure of R\$ 10 billion - the financial damage inflicted by the corruption - was mentioned.

The first politician caught up in the media scandal, André Vargas, actually had little to do with Petrobras. Vargas, a PT parliamentarian in the Câmara (and vice-president of the Câmara at that time) had texted Youssef about Youssef's façade company Labogen, and about the loan of a private jet. The text messages were leaked to *Folha* (F1/4 2014). In return for the access to Youssef's jet, Vargas supposedly helped Labogen obtain contracts with the Ministry of Health. Vargas asked for a temporary leave from the Câmara and avoided the process of expulsion from PT by leaving the party himself (Netto 2016:180). Through a disciplinary process in the Ethics Council of the Câmara, his mandate was annulled on the 10<sup>th</sup> of December that year. Vargas was not the only one to benefit personally from knowing Youssef; the *doleiro* had generously bestowed a Land Rover upon Paulo Roberto Costa, which led the police to Costa. In an op-ed piece penned by Eliane Cantanhêde (F4/4), Costa's bribe-taking configured a link, however opaque, between President Dilma Rousseff and the corruption of Petrobras. Cantanhêde here works explicitly with implicature and with the expected denial of a relation between Rousseff and Costa:

No mínimo, a turma [de Petrobras] é ruim de fazer negócios. O pior é que a presidente Dilma Rousseff está no centro das discussões. [...] Para complicar, um mesmo *doleiro*, Alberto Youssef, deu um Land Rover para Paulo Roberto Costa, outro ex-diretor da Petrobras enrolado com Pasadena, e emprestou seu jatinho para o petista André Vargas, vice-presidente da Câmara, e seus familiares. Youssef e Costa foram presos na Operação Lava Jato, da PF. Vargas tenta justificar o injustificável. Nada a ver? Sim, pode ser. Mas está tudo muito embolado. (F4/4 2014)

In news reports of the same period dealing with a congressional investigative committee looking into Petrobras (the *CPI de Petrobras*), similar implicature is used. Another example (a *Folha* news report) unfolds the implication through of Costa's interrogation in the CPI session on June 9: The headline and lead from the interrogation of Costa in Congress is drawn from a direct quote of Costa: "Petrobras não era balcão de negócios, diz ex-diretor que esteve preso." The quote is presented in its entirety in the third paragraph of the report: "Repudio com veemência que a [Petrobras] era organização criminosa. [A Petrobras] não era balcão de negócios, uma casa de negócios" (F10/6 2014). The question posed by an unnamed senator implies an emplotment similar to the pundit's above - a corrupt ex-director of a state company trying to cover his tracks. Just as in the column cited above, Costa's apparent corruption is then taken as evidence of a larger problem in Petrobras. This is organized textually by juxtaposing corruption and criminal networks in the management of Petrobras to the story of the Pasadena deal. After Costa's quotes and his history of arrest and release from prison, the problems of the Pasadena buy-out are summarized. Quoting Rousseff, the report describes the buy-out as "a bad deal and a loss to Brazil": "a compra de Pasadena acabou sendo um mau negócio com prejuízo para o Brasil." The juxtaposition of the corruption of Petrobras and the Pasadena deal was introduced in Chapter 2, but here, it is more apparent that the senators of the CPI (and journalists reporting on it) are looking for a causal connection between the Pasadena scandal and Costa's alleged corruption. However, the link is absent from the surface level of the text:

Costa é acusado de participar de esquema comandado por *doleiros* que movimentou, de forma suspeita, R\$ 10 bilhões. A Polícia Federal afirma que o esquema pode ter desviado R\$ 400 milhões. Em resposta aos senadores, Costa também comentou a polêmica compra da refinaria de Pasadena, nos Estados Unidos. (F10/6 2014)

Like other news and columns in this early phase of the scandal, the scope of the corruption is localized and contained to the *doleiro* Youssef, Paulo Roberto Costa, and in some cases the PT politician Vargas, but an implicit wider scope lingers in some of the texts. In most cases, it is “the Rousseff government” that is implicated, although a few examples can be found in which several governing parties are mentioned:

Zavascki determinou a soltura de 12 investigados na Operação Lava Jato, que apura um vultoso esquema de lavagem de dinheiro com ramificações em partidos como PT, PP, PMDB e Solidariedade. Segundo a Polícia Federal, essa organização criminoso, da qual participaria o doleiro Alberto Youssef, movimentou mais de R\$ 10 bilhões. (F21/5 2014)

Youssef, in August 2014, signalled that he would reveal the scope of the corruption in Petrobras to reduce his expected total prison sentence of one hundred years. A plea bargain is commonly known as *delação premiada* in Brazilian news (although the legal term is *colaboração premiada*, see Damgaard 2018b:7), and the testifying individual is then known as *delator*. The word *delator* carries the connotations of informer, snitch, and whistleblower. In the article “Preso desde março, doleiro Alberto Youssef quer colaborar com a Justiça,” reporting Youssef’s expected plea bargain (F10/8 2014), the strategy of snitching is disapproved by Youssef’s lawyer, Antonio Augusto Figueiredo Basto. He argued that Youssef was really just a scapegoat in the grander scheme of things: “O Alberto é mero bode expiatório num esquema muito maior, sobre o qual não há nenhum interesse em investigar. Você acha que ele teria feito tudo de que é acusado sem um parlamentar?” The figure of a scapegoat for the political elite is interesting, as it expands the scope of the scandal, building on the notion of a large corruption scheme that involves the Congress. The scapegoat figure, furthermore, was also used for characterizing all businessmen that attempted to negotiate plea bargains, as we shall see below.

Some of the names involved in the corruption scheme were disclosed a few weeks later, providing the shadow menace with faces and positions - in the top tier of Congress. Paulo Roberto Costa had successfully negotiated a plea bargain shortly after Youssef began his negotiations, on August 27, 2014, and this was revealed by *Veja* on September 5. In the report “O Delator Fala” (V#2390, see appendix A, figure A.3) penned by Rodrigo Rangel, many prominent politicians are named by Costa as “participants in the corruption scheme”: Congress leaders Henrique Eduardo Alves (President of the Câmara) and Renan Calheiros (President of the Senate), minister of Mines and Energy Edison Lobão, and “the eternal government spokesperson of any government,” senator Romero Jucá (all four from PMDB). The PMDB governor of Maranhão, Roseana Sarney, the PMDB ex-governor of Rio Sérgio Cabral, and several PP politicians are also mentioned, as well as PT Congressman Cândido Vaccarezza. This already impressive list of political actors was eclipsed completely the following month, however. In October, several weeklies cut to the chase and cast PT as the mastermind behind the corruption scheme that Youssef and Costa disclosed. In the *IstoÉ* report “Campanha de Dilma sob suspeita,” Costa is indirectly quoted, dragging the president into the scandal:

O ex-diretor foi assertivo ao apontar o PT como o maior beneficiário dos desvios... a idealização e a montagem da rede de corrupção remetem a 2004, com a nomeação de Paulo Roberto Costa para a Diretoria de Abastecimento. Na cúpula da estatal, ele teve grande importância na ampliação do poder do cartel das empreiteiras e na geração de mais divisas para a ala de políticos da quadrilha. Por isso, contou com o lobby de fortes lideranças do cenário nacional para chegar ao posto, com o aval do [governo]. (I#2342)

Leaked details from Youssef’s testimony were also published in *Veja*. In a lightning-strike special issue out of the normal publication schedule, the Friday before the second round of election, *Veja*’s front-page headline read “They knew it all” - printed on top of the faces of Rousseff and ex-president Lula, both looking pale and desperate against a black and foreboding background (V#2397, see appendix A, figure A.4). In the feature report, the corruption in the Petrobras and the losses to the state were denounced. The PT leaders lashed out against *Veja* for what they saw as an attempt to sway the voters by publishing unproven allegations (Baptista 2017:125, Chaia 2015:20, Goldstein 2016:8), and Rousseff won the election with 3,46 million more votes than runner-up Aécio Neves (PSDB) that Sunday, October 26.

Even if Youssef’s claims were not backed up by much evidence at the time, the information disclosed by Costa and Youssef led to a large-scale arrest warrant issued by judge Moro, executed in the aptly titled 7<sup>th</sup> phase of Lava-Jato “Juízo Final” – the “Final Judgment.” 27 preventive and temporary arrests were made on November 14, 2014, as well as nine compulsory testimonies. With these arrests, *Época* foresaw an earthquake about to destroy Rousseff’s next government:

Escândalo da Petrobras: Partidos e empreiteiras no juízo final  
Em um ataque à corrupção de proporções inéditas, a Justiça prende empreiteiros e um ex-diretor que operava na Petrobras sob as ordens do PT. A ação deverá provocar um terremoto para o governo Dilma. (E#859)

The businessmen were publicly shamed on front pages following the arrests (G15/11 2014). *O Globo* had by then begun to designate the disclosure of corruption in Petrobras as a serialized event, with the overarching headline “Escândalos em série” encompassing the various sub-items of the front page (see appendix A, figure A.1). This mark of seriality (Bødker 2016) remained on the *O Globo* front-pages the following years, signalling spin-offs from the Lava-Jato investigations. After six months’ worth of coverage, weekly magazines and daily newspapers alike had settled on the same emplotment, featuring the Petrobras directors and subcontractor CEOs as the footmen of a government-led corruption scheme, and the judge of the case as central protagonist.

#### 4.1.1 The Businessmen – corrupted and betrayed by political allies

The weekly magazines continued to cover the imprisoned business elite in 2015, and the plot that cast PT as the mastermind in the corruption scheme persisted there. In a report in *Veja* on the imprisoned members of the subcontractor cartel, the former jet-borne freedom and luxury of the members of this billion-dollar-club is contrasted to the Curitiba prison cell:

Eles são acusados de integrar um cartel que dividia entre si os contratos bilionários da Petrobras em troca do pagamento de propinas para os políticos que lhes abriam caminho na estatal. Na carceragem da Polícia Federal em Curitiba, capital em que correm os processos da Lava-Jato, tem sido dura a rotina dos integrantes do chamado clube do bilhão, que até recentemente cruzavam os céus do país a bordo de jatos particulares. (V#2408)

The cartel, organized in a self-styled “club” of subcontractors, had expanded from nine to 17 member organizations in the decade following Lula’s election. According to *Veja*, they are merely scapegoats, and this metaphor again locates PT as the real force behind the cartel activities of the businessmen:

fica evidente o desconforto dos empreiteiros de estarem sendo, pelo menos até agora, os bodes expiatórios da complexa rede de corrupção armada na Petrobras. Eles têm razão. Nas denúncias oferecidas pelo Ministério Público Federal e aceitas pelo juiz Sergio Moro, o esquema de corrupção na Petrobras parece ser apenas o conluio de empreiteiros gananciosos com meia dúzia de diretores venais da Petrobras. Nada mais longe da verdade. Como Paulo Roberto Costa revelou com toda a clareza, tratava-se de um esquema de desvio de dinheiro para partidos e campanhas políticas organizado [sic] pelo partido no poder, o PT. (V#2408)

Scapegoats are less to blame than the transgressors who designated the scapegoats; the characterization thus establishes a hierarchy. The hierarchy of transgression is also marked out by the qualifying phrase that states that the corruption could appear to be “*only* the collusion of greedy contractors,” but “nothing could be farther from the truth.” The cartel is not, in this view, as important as political corruption of PT – and this implicitly motivates the focus of the news report, despite the lack of evidence against PT available at that point.

The businessmen are represented as betrayed by their political allies, but they will not accept their scapegoat role: “Os empreiteiros presos repetem aos visitantes que não estão dispostos a figurar como únicos vilões do megasquema de corrupção.” One central member of the cartel, Ricardo Pessoa (ex-CEO of the company UTC), “arose to dizzying heights” as friend of Lula, and the report affirms that he is now making “veiled threats” against president Rousseff:

Foi a partir do primeiro governo Lula que a UTC Engenharia, a principal empresa de Pessoa, experimentou uma ascensão vertiginosa. O empreiteiro considera-se amigo do ex-presidente, com quem conversava regularmente até ser preso, no fim do ano passado, na sétima etapa da Operação Lava-Jato. ... [Anotações feitas por Pessoa contêm] queixas contra os antigos parceiros de negócios e ameaças veladas a políticos. Em um dos trechos, o empreiteiro liga os contratos sob suspeita assinados entre as empreiteiras e a Petrobras ao caixa de campanha eleitoral da presidente Dilma Rousseff. (V#2408)

Ricardo Pessoa is not the only businessman represented by *Veja* as betrayed by Lula. Leo Pinheiro, the president of the large Brazilian construction company OAS, was arrested with the other businessmen in November 2014, and his relations to Lula came under even closer scrutiny (V#2423, see appendix A, figure A.2). The bribes and corruption stemming from this relationship was what eventually became the basis of the legal trial ending in Lula’s incarceration in 2018.

In April 2015, a year before the MPF even indicted Lula for corruption, *Veja* denounced Lula and Léo Pinheiro’s “loyal friendship” (V#2423). An exposé detailed how a ranch in Santa Bárbara, Atibaia (in the interior region of greater São Paulo) was also under scrutiny, because the ranch and the rapid renovation of the site possibly constituted kickbacks for Lula. A pool had been enlarged, a porch added, and so on, allegedly at Lula’s request, despite the fact the estate was not actually owned by Lula, but by friends of his. According to the investigation, the total value of the renovation amounted to around R\$1 million. Furthermore, the front page and the report revealed how OAS had built a few select beachside apartments in a larger construction project originally planned by a bank employee association named Bancoop. The real estate project, located in Guarujá, São Paulo, was co-owned by the shareholders of Bancoop, with the imprisoned PT treasurer João Vaccari Neto also having a share – as well as a commanding position in Bancoop. Although many apartments were never build, Pinheiro had the beachside apartment built, allegedly at Lula’s request. In *Veja*’s account of the OAS director’s testimony, Bancoop had actually been used as a façade to funnel money into PT campaigns:

Léo Pinheiro fez um segundo favor ao ex-presidente no ramo imobiliário. O empreiteiro conta que, a pedido do ainda presidente Lula, a OAS incorporou prédios inacabados da Cooperativa dos Bancários (Bancoop), entidade ligada ao PT que, em 2006, deu o golpe em 3 000 mutuários em São Paulo. Durante anos, dezenas de famílias que pagaram fielmente suas mensalidades à Bancoop tiveram seu suado dinheirinho desviado para as campanhas eleitorais do PT. (V#2423)

When Bancoop went bankrupt in 2009, OAS never completed constructing the apartments it was supposed to provide for the Bancoop shareholders. This information, however, was merely a repeat of an *O Globo* article from December 2014 (G7/12 2014), detailing how Lula's wife had acquired a share in the association and the rights to an apartment. After the bankruptcy of Bancoop, OAS merely executed the construction of some of the buildings, in the end only providing apartments to 5,000 of the 8,000 shareholders, Lula's wife amongst them. The apartment (known as a *triplex*) allegedly intended for Lula's wife, moreover, had an elevator fitted, separate from the rest of the building. The case of the Bancoop bankruptcy and its alleged role as façade for PT and Lula was brought before the prosecutors of São Paulo state in August 2015. The sale of the apartment was ultimately never finalized, as Lula and his wife declined to buy it in November 2015.

The intimate friendship between Lula and Pinheiro is described in the second paragraph of the report:

De todos os empresários presos na Operação Lava-Jato, Léo Pinheiro é o único que se define como simpatizante do PT. O empreiteiro conheceu Lula ainda nos tempos de sindicalismo, contribuiu para suas primeiras campanhas e tornou-se um de seus mais íntimos amigos no poder. Culto, carismático e apreciador de boas bebidas, ele integrava um restrito grupo de pessoas que tinham acesso irrestrito ao Palácio do Planalto e ao Palácio da Alvorada. Era levado ao "chefe", como ele se referia a Lula, sempre que desejava... essa relação evoluiu para o patamar da extrema confiança — a ponto de Lula, ainda exercendo a Presidência e depois de deixá-la, recorrer ao amigo para se aconselhar sobre a melhor maneira de enfrentar determinados problemas pessoais. Como é da natureza do capitalismo de estado brasileiro, as relações amigáveis são ancoradas em interesses mútuos. Pinheiro se orgulhava de jamais dizer não aos pedidos de Lula. (V#2423)

*Veja* continued to publish on the case, and reported that Lula had been seen at the apartment several times. Footage of this only surfaced in March the following year, however. Similar exposés were published in *Veja* about Pinheiro, and these reports recycled the same content:

O empreiteiro Léo Pinheiro, ex-presidente da construtora OAS, foi durante muitos anos um dos mais fiéis amigos de Lula no poder. Ao longo dos dois governos do petista, transformou a construtora em um império com milhões de dólares do BNDES em investimentos no Brasil e no exterior. A proximidade entre os dois era tal que Lula ficava à vontade para pedir toda sorte de favor. Preso em novembro do ano passado, Pinheiro sentiu-se abandonado e começou a rascunhar o esboço do que seria uma possível delação premiada. Essas anotações revelaram como era lucrativa a amizade de Lula com o empreiteiro. Logo depois de deixar o governo, Lula ocupou um sítio em Atibaia, no interior de São Paulo. O empreiteiro também construiu o triplex de Lula no Guarujá (SP). A pedido do petista, Léo Pinheiro realizou uma reforma de luxo na propriedade de Atibaia sem cobrar do ex-presidente um único tostão. (V#2435)

In the above examples drawn from the first half of 2015, we see a consistent emphasis on intimate relations between the construction sector magnates and PT leaders, in particular Lula. Substantial parts of *Veja's* reports are devoted to the theme of the close relations. Why is the friendship stressed, and where is this placed in the plot? I will argue that this particular representation of the relation between the businessmen and specific political actors accomplishes several things. First of

all, the assertion of friendship pre-empts a contrary, but equally valid narrative (given the available information at that moment) that the cartel of subcontractors and the Petrobras directors acted for their own enrichment. Some reports in the same period account for the exorbitant riches that businessmen and directors confess to having siphoned off; such confessions and the “hard” numerical evidence however lacked in the case of politicians. Thus, in lieu of scathing evidence that attested directly to the benefits gained, the alleged close relationships to imprisoned businessmen connote corruption and transgression. Blame is assigned by association, in short, or rather, the narrative of long-standing friendship moves blame from the cartel to the supposed political masterminds behind the corruption.

Furthermore, the emphasis on friendly relations localizes the corruption to a handful of companies and Lula in particular; thereby the systemic dimensions of corruption in Brazil are denied as a relevant factor, and other political actors involved in the Petrobras graft are backgrounded (a containment strategy common to many of the coming examples). The suspicion clinging to personal relations draws upon the commonplace discourse that describes corruption in Brazilian bureaucracy as related primarily to influence networks (Johnston 2007, Power and Taylor 2011). Finally, the emplotment here locates specific decision-making power (e.g. the power to direct investments in the state investment bank BNDES) solely in the hands of the president, and the emplotment associates the rise of certain companies with their ability to corrupt public office-holders (rather than other factors).

To avoid redundancy, I will not exemplify the coverage of other arrested Petrobras directors and CEOs such as Nestor Cerveró or Renato Duque, nor expand on the shifts in coverage of Paulo Roberto Costa over the course of the investigations. Instead, I now turn to the coverage of the magnate Marcelo Odebrecht.

#### 4.1.2 Marcelo Odebrecht – the prince of business

Even if Leo Pinheiro was regarded as especially close to Lula, the arrest of the magnate Marcelo Odebrecht resulted in more front-pages in the weeklies, headlines and news reports. Although numerous CEOs had already been incarcerated for months at that point, the ramifications of Marcelo Odebrecht’s arrest were represented as extraordinary. On June 19, 2015, *Folha* reported that his unexpected arrest constituted a “trophy for the investigators of Lava Jato.” The newspaper characterized him as a man of strong opinions, perceived as arrogant:

Marcelo achava muito remota a possibilidade de ser preso, embora outros executivos do grupo não mostrassem tanta certeza... é uma pessoa de opiniões fortes. Esse traço de personalidade lhe custou a antipatia da presidente Dilma Rousseff, que achava Marcelo arrogante desde que era ministra... Por causa da fama de pavio curto, Marcelo também enfrentou alguma desconfiança da parte dos funcionários mais antigos quando assumiu a empresa. (F19/6 2015)

*Jornal Nacional* (JN20/6 2015), on the following day, highlighted the codename of the operation - “erga omnes” – rendering this as “the law applies to everyone” – pointing out, through one of many quotes attributed to Sérgio Moro, that Odebrecht had especially sophisticated ways of paying kickbacks. The emplotment in *Jornal Nacional* and *Folha* is similar, as it combines the notion of a trophy or ultimate target and the idea that Odebrecht had escaped by being clever, but that the



rule of law prevails in the end. *Época* likens Marcelo Odebrecht to his father, Emílio, the patriarch of the family's business empire, and, like *Folha*, characterizes Marcelo as having explosive temperament:

... o patriarca tem temperamento forte, volátil e não tolera ser contrariado. Também repetia constantemente que o filho não “tinha condições psicológicas de aguentar uma prisão”. Marcelo Odebrecht parece muito com o pai. Nas últimas semanas, segundo fontes ouvidas por *ÉPOCA*, teve encontros secretos com petistas e advogados próximos a Dilma e a Lula. Transmitiu o mesmo recado: não cairia sozinho. Ao menos uma dessas mensagens foi repassada diretamente à presidente da República. Que nada fez.

Quando os policiais amanheceram em sua casa, Marcelo Odebrecht se descontrolou. Por mais que a iminência da prisão dele fosse comentada amiúde em Brasília, o empresário agia como se fosse intocável. Desde maio do ano passado, quando *ÉPOCA* revelara as primeiras evidências da Lava Jato contra a Odebrecht, o empresário dedicava-se a desancar o trabalho dos procuradores. Conforme as provas se acumulavam, mais virulentas eram as respostas do empresário e da Odebrecht. Antes de ser levado pela PF, ele fez três ligações. Uma delas para um amigo que tem interlocução com Dilma e Lula – e influência nos tribunais superiores em Brasília. “É para resolver essa lambança”, disse Marcelo ao interlocutor, determinando que o recado chegasse à cúpula de todos os poderes. “Ou não haverá República na segunda-feira”. (E#889)

With this characteristic of the powerful, well-connected choleric business leader, *Época* hints that the Odebrecht dynasty presented a threat to the entire republic (see section 4.6 below). Eventually, as Marcelo Odebrecht received a 19-year prison sentence, *Veja* referred to him as the “convicted prince” (V#2469).

According to one of *Folha*'s leading political commentators, Mônica Bergamo, Marcelo himself had an alternative view of the scandal: An unidentified source relates that Odebrecht felt personally betrayed by President Rousseff herself, as she left him to his fate at the hands of the federal judge Moro. Bergamo's short-form column focalizes Marcelo and his reactions in two short narrative paragraphs, and it points out that Marcelo Odebrecht was recently seen socializing with PSDB leaders, under the provoking sub-headline “All the Teams.” The sentences under this subheading thus explicitly provides an alternative view of the emplotment of PT as the only party in the circles of power:

A pergunta recorrente ontem entre advogados e políticos era: qual a chance de Marcelo Odebrecht fazer delação premiada? “Zero”, diz um dos advogados da equipe do empreiteiro. [...] Pouco antes de ser preso, Marcelo Odebrecht não escondia sua contrariedade com Dilma Rousseff. Ele afirmou a mais de um interlocutor que a presidente, acreditando que ao juiz Sérgio Moro só interessaria punir as empreiteiras, poupando o governo, teria, digamos, se desinteressado do caso.

#### A VÍTIMA

Na visão de Odebrecht, Moro evita aprofundar o envolvimento de políticos para que o caso não saia de suas mãos -quando alguma pessoa com cargo público é citada, a investigação tem que ser encaminhada ao STF (Supremo Tribunal Federal). Ao juiz restaria condenar as empreiteiras por cartel, em que o governo é vítima.

#### FORA DE CONTROLE

Neste raciocínio, só um fio estaria até então “desencapado”: o do empreiteiro Ricardo Pessoa, da UTC, que fez acordo de delação premiada em Brasília. Ele, sim, poderia envolver políticos do mais alto escalão do governo no escândalo da Lava-Jato.

#### VERSÃO DA VERSÃO

A tensão no governo Dilma, por sinal, já vinha aumentando nos últimos dias justamente por causa da delação premiada de Pessoa. De acordo com versões que circulam no alto escalão do governo, ele teria citado ministros da cota pessoal da presidente. A informação não é confirmada. [...]

#### TODAS AS TURMAS

Ainda Marcelo Odebrecht: muito próximo de Lula e do PT, o empreiteiro foi também estrela de eventos que reuniram a nata do PSDB nos últimos meses. Num jantar oferecido a Fernando Henrique Cardoso em maio, ele se sentou na mesa principal, ao lado do ex-presidente e do governador Geraldo Alckmin, de SP. Houve discursos mas, por educação, ninguém tocou no tema de corrupção nem citou a Lava-Jato...

#### NOTA FISCAL

E notas fiscais da Polis Digital, encontradas na contabilidade da Odebrecht, chamaram a atenção de investigadores. Eles imaginavam ter encontrado pagamentos ao marqueteiro de Dilma, João Santana. Na verdade, a empresa é da enteada dele, que presta serviços de internet. Os valores, em dois anos, somaram R\$ 98 mil. (F20/6 2015)

It is also noteworthy that according to Bergamo's source close to Odebrecht, the testimony of the cartel leader Ricardo Pessoa could counter the government's claim that the cartel acted without political support, and that the government is the real victim. Above, we saw that this was exactly the claim that was pre-empted in *Veja* (#V2408). Now, we learn that there is a hierarchy of degrees of proximity to the current president, and that Odebrecht had been closer to Lula than to Rousseff. Both texts anticipate future legal steps in a trial. Bergamo's final paragraph, describing the confiscation of evidence at the Odebrecht headquarters which turned up documents linking Odebrecht to Rousseff's marketing expert, is even more prophetic, as it foreshadows the suspicions of bribes and the arrest of Santana eight months later (see section 4.5.1).

In the examples above, drawn from weekly magazines in the period from August 2014 till June 2015, I have highlighted the emplotment of characters, consistent across the three weeklies. In this plot, a chain-of-command starting at the presidential palace in Brasília has extended to the top-floor offices of Petrobras and the private construction sector. In face of the imprisonment of the businessmen, the PT government is expected to succumb to an imminent earthquake, threatening the very Republic. Lula, in particular, has been abusing his status and gained privately and illicitly from his friendships with elite businessmen, but is now ignoring his erstwhile friends behind the bars in Curitiba. Although some news reports mention other parties, it is either "the party in power" – PT *en toto* – or Lula himself that is cast as the antagonist of the plot. In the next section, I will turn to the main protagonists of this plot. The looming earthquake provoked by the scapegoats' disclosure of corruption works like a prophecy, in that it predicts a future crisis for the government; a crisis that might either end in the fall of the Republic (E#889), or with a triumph of justice. The desire for justice and an end to impunity is especially evident in the texts of the same period that deal with the protagonism of the federal judge in Curitiba, Sérgio Moro.

## 4.2 Protagonist: Sérgio Moro

In order to understand the importance of the federal judge Sérgio Moro, we need to reconstruct his trajectory in the public imagination - or rather, the trajectory of the fabulas that represent him. Although a counter-narrative eventually emerged, I will initially only consider the character of Moro in the position of the protagonist. In the weeklies, Moro was characterized as an "iron fist," an "invincible" "leader of a revolution" of Brazilian justice, poised to "end impunity of the corrupted":

No braço de ferro com os acusados, Moro não apenas continua invicto. Com passos estudados, vem ganhando terreno e vencendo obstáculos que antes pareciam irremovíveis, como a lentidão da máquina da Justiça. (V#2411)

*Época* also featured Moro on the front-page (see appendix A, figure A.5):

Nada vai pará-lo

O juiz Sergio Moro empareda políticos e empresários poderosos – e lidera uma revolução que tem tudo para pôr fim à impunidade dos corruptos brasileiros (E#891)

Under the headline “Nothing can stop him,” the lead affirms that Moro directs a revolution in the fight against corruption: “The unstoppable impetus of Lava-Jato relocates the center of power from Brasília to Curitiba, where judge Sergio Moro leads a revolution in Brazil’s fight against corruption.” In the same news report, after several oracular digressions concerning the next plea bargains to come, we learn that Moro, like some of public prosecutors on the task force, is a man of moral virtue, strategic vision, and disciplined work ethic:

Nenhum gabinete, portanto, concentra tanto poder neste momento no Brasil quanto aquele no 2° andar na Avenida Anita Garibaldi, 888. É de lá que despacha Sergio Moro, o cérebro e centro moral da Lava Jato. A Operação, na verdade, envolve dezenas de procuradores da República, delegados e agentes da PF, equipes na Procuradoria-Geral da República, em Brasília, além do ministro do Supremo Teori Zavascki. Todos têm poder para definir, em alguma medida, os rumos das centenas - isso, centenas - de casos de corrupção investigados na Lava Jato. Alguns casos tramitam em Brasília - aqueles que envolvem políticos com foro no Supremo. Mas a maioria fica em Curitiba e de lá não sai. Moro alia virtudes raríssimas para a missão: preparo jurídico, pensamento estratégico, inflexibilidade de princípios, coragem moral e disciplina de trabalho. Entra cedo, sai tarde e prossegue na lida mesmo de casa. Alguns dos procuradores da força-tarefa compartilham, em maior ou menor grau, as mesmas características. Estudaram muito, trabalham sem parar e entendem que estão fazendo história.

Após mais de um ano de Lava Jato, já está claro que esses homens e mulheres - pelo tamanho dos presos, pela força das provas, pelos nomes envolvidos e pelo dinheiro recuperado - estão promovendo uma revolução na luta contra a grande corrupção no Brasil. (E#891)

A hierarchy of morally good actors in the Lava-Jato scandal is unfolded here, with Moro focalized as he organizes the Lava-Jato investigation, characterizing him as both the brain and moral center of the case. Moro stands over and above the police agents that investigate, the prosecutors that conduct the legal parts of the cases, and the teams allocated from the Prosecutor-General’s office. Moro could even be construed here as superior to the remote Supreme Court judge Zavascki.

The daily newspapers rarely have the space for such extended descriptions, but examples of characterization there aligns with the weeklies’ description above, e.g. “Sérgio Moro, the magistrate who rigorously conducts the Lava-Jato” (E19/1 2016). In 2014, when his name was less familiar to readers, *Folha* characterized Moro in the same way, as a hardliner judge; tough-but-fair and highly competent: “Moro is considered a very tough judge, but with unexcelled technical qualifications in the legal field of financial crimes and money laundering” (F10/8 2014).

In late 2015, it was obvious to readers who Moro was, and his name barely needed introduction; by then, a suspicion had emerged in public that political forces would try to put an end to the investigation. As a response, on November 24, 2015, Moro was quoted (with little variation) on the

front-pages of all three major newspapers (E/F/G 24/11 2015) utilizing a biblical metaphor of a voice that preaches in the desert to characterize the Lava Jato investigations.

Moro: Lava Jato é 'voz no deserto' contra corrupção

Condutor das ações da Lava Jato, o juiz Sérgio Moro disse que a operação é "voz pregando no deserto" e, sozinha, não vai livrar o País da corrupção. Ele afirma não ver mudanças por parte do Congresso e do governo. (E24/11 2015)

The metaphor both invokes a biblical narrative and prophecy, while at the same time referencing the possible threats to the investigation. Originally found in Isaiah 40, an apocalyptic vision of Kingdom Come, the same image of the voice in the wilderness appears initially in both Mark's and Matthew's accounts of John the Baptizer, preaching in the desert. By drawing upon this metaphor, the Lava-Jato task force is located as herald of the end-times, and as the lone guardian of the country in a fight against corruption. Alone in the desert, the preacher or apocalyptic prophet calls for repentance and conversion. As implied in the *Estado* quote above, it might be a vain hope that government or Congress will repent; in the front-page teaser in *Folha*, Moro is quoted as being disappointed in Congress and in the government (F24/11).

Moro's authority is underscored by the tacit understanding, common to all three front-pages, that Moro was newsworthy, and in a position to legitimately comment on corruption in the government and Congress. Even more interesting, Moro is endowed with a religious-moral position from which he may both preach and denounce the Brazilian authorities for being corrupt like the Roman authorities running Jerusalem in biblical times. The reader may also infer an implicit appeal for help from civil society, since the lone preacher cannot "free the country from corruption" alone.

Since Sergio Moro did not have jurisdictional competency to investigate public office-holders, but only businessmen, *doleiros*, and ex-politicians, it was perhaps surprising that he arose to the position of a national icon. *O Globo* named Moro the person of the year in March 2015 (Netto 2016:169), and his name and face were on display in street protests against corruption and against PT. The uncommon celerity of the trials in his Curitiba court, and the stiff sentences delivered certainly set his processes and sentences apart from many trials against members of the political elite. This was only possible, however, because a division of labour and jurisdiction emerged between Moro's court and the Supreme Court in Brasília. In the Brazilian system of political privileges and court prerogatives, every politician in office holds the so-called *foro privilegiado*, which can be translated as the right to be judged before a court of a higher tier than common citizens. Ex-parliamentarians hold no such privilege, however, and so with the authorization judge Moro, the federal police could apprehend ex-Congressmen – or ex-presidents. The *foro* also extends to the right of denunciation, so that duty of investigating and eventually indicting politicians in federal office falls to the Prosecutor-General of the Republic (abbreviated PGR). Because of this jurisdictional split, Rodrigo Janot, Prosecutor-General in 2013-2017, also took center stage in the narratives of corruption, and I will now turn to the most salient characterizations of Janot.

#### 4.2.1 Protagonist: Prosecutor-General Rodrigo Janot

For the above-mentioned reasons of jurisdiction, the testimonies of Youssef and Costa could only be used legally for investigations of government leaders and federal representatives if the PGR

chose to pursue the inquiry, and only if the Supreme Court then authorized investigations. This, effectively, delayed investigations of politicians in public office. Even so, already by the end of 2014, rumors floated in the weekly magazines about the likelihood of such investigations. Many names, supposedly involved in the Petrobras graft, leaked from Youssef and Costa's testimonies, as described above. In February 2015, the rumors of Brasília had it that the PGR's office was close to requesting authorization to open investigations against a long list of parliamentarians (see also quote from E#874, next chapter, and appendix A, figure A.6). The list constituted the third major step in the Lava-Jato investigations, after the imprisonment of money launderers and cartel leaders. The list compiled in the Prosecutor-General's office was dubbed "Lista de Janot" by the press:

... despertou no meio político nesta semana um sentimento batizado por alguns de "tensão pré-Janot". O motivo é que dezenas de nomes de parlamentares apareceram nos depoimentos dos delatores, entre eles os dos presidentes da Câmara dos Deputados e do Senado, Eduardo Cunha (PMDB-RJ) e Renan Calheiros (PMDB-AL), que negam as acusações. Conforme revelou o Estado em dezembro, só na lista de Costa são ao menos 28 políticos mencionados. Assim, o clima nos últimos dias foi de apreensão nos corredores do Congresso. (E28/2 2015)

Janot's list metonymically stands in for range of investigations, while also personalizing the entire office of public prosecutors (the MPF). Janot, as Prosecutor-General, becomes a symbol that generated "tension" and "fear" in Congress. The list was eventually finalized on March 3, 2015, and sent to the Supreme Court, where the Supreme Justice Teori Zavascki authorized and publicized the inquiries on March 6. The list, based on requests for 28 inquiries, included the names of 49 individuals, 47 of them in public office or formerly in office. Two non-parliamentarians, the *doleiro* Fernando "Baiano" Soares and the treasurer of PT, João Vaccari Neto, were included on this list in virtue of their political ties. The PGR decided, at that point, to archive the inquiries pertaining to senator (and presidential runner-up) Aécio Neves and senator Delcídio do Amaral, and the federal deputies Alexandre Santos and Henrique Eduardo Alves, as well as dropping one of two inquiries dealing with senator Romero Jucá. The PGR also requested inquiries opened to investigate the governors of Rio and Acre, Luiz Fernando Pezão and Tião Viana, but these requests were sent to the Supreme Tribunal of Justice (STJ), the court with jurisdictional competency in cases involving governors.

Throughout 2015, the news reports continued to consider Janot in opposition to the political elite, primarily as opponent of Eduardo Cunha - even when the PGR did actually not mention Cunha:

À frente da Operação Lava Jato, o procurador-geral da República, Rodrigo Janot, mandou nesta sexta-feira, 23, um recado aos políticos brasileiros... o chefe do Ministério Público Federal, afirmou, sem citar diretamente o peemedebista [Cunha]: "Não adianta esconder bens fora do Brasil porque a cooperação internacional intensa permite identificar esses valores e a recuperação desses valores". O recado do procurador-geral elevou o grau de apreensão em Brasília, principalmente entre os parlamentares e demais políticos citados na operação (E23/10 2015)

The above example illustrates how the coverage of corruption investigations, even when acknowledging that many politicians were under suspicion, kept returning to a limited set of actors. I will return, in Chapter 6, to the implications of this focalization of political actors, while I turn now to a prominent antagonist in the news reports on corruption, namely Eduardo Cunha.

### 4.3 Eduardo Cunha: Ascendant, Warmonger, Pariah

Although it might appear so by judging from the weekly magazines' front pages in 2015, PT was not the only political actor under scrutiny in the Lava-Jato investigations. In particular, the recently elected President of the Câmara, Eduardo Cunha (PMDB), found himself in the eye of the storm from June 2015. In the first half of 2015, Cunha had been treated gingerly by the weeklies, and daily papers even treated him reverently until a crucial leak spilled from the Lava-Jato investigations.

The general elections of 2014 had resulted in a fragmented Congress, more so than ever before; this time, the updated party roster of the Lower House of Parliament registered 28 parties. However, there was a discernible pattern in the apparent chaos of party monikers, because a growing proportion of parliament was agglutinating in certain issue-centred conservative groups across party divides. The most influential groupings were commonly referred to *en bloc* as the *bancada BBB (bíblia, bala e boi)* - the parliamentary group of bullets, bulls, and bibles. This fused group of evangelical politicians, land-owners and firearm supporters in many cases took parliamentary seats from the workers' unions and syndicates (Chaia 2016:52). Eduardo Cunha, PMDB leader from Rio de Janeiro, was at the helm of the evangelical group. Cunha had been in Congress for quite some time, and amassed a lot of power through conservative cross-party networks in Congress.

On January 7, 2015, *Folha* revealed that one of the charged persons in the case, the *doleiro* Jayme Alves "Careca," had identified Cunha as benefactor of the corruption in Petrobras (F7/1 2015). Paulo Roberto Costa's plea bargain had also implicated Cunha, but weekly magazine *IstoÉ* had evaded this through reticence, as the report in October 2014 did not state his name outright:

Mesmo sem poder citar nomes, o ex-diretor [Costa] forneceu informações que, de forma indireta, tiram o sono de muitas autoridades. O delator descreveu, por exemplo, uma consultoria prestada a *um político fluminense candidato a cargo majoritário*, que queria fazer um plano de governo direcionado ao setor de energia para captar recursos de financiamento de campanha das empresas da área. (I#2342, emphasis added)

Similar leaked claims relating Cunha explicitly or implicitly to the Petrobras graft made Cunha deny that PMDB was ever involved in the Petrobras scandal, in *Folha* (F29/12 2014) as well as in *Veja* (V#2400). During February, Cunha's name, however, was rumored to be on the list of investigation requests that the Prosecutor-General Rodrigo Janot was compiling. The rumors were eclipsed in the news media by Cunha's bid for presidency of the Câmara, a position previously held by his ally Henrique Eduardo Alves (also of the PMDB) and by his party president and Vice-President of the Republic, Michel Temer. In fact, PMDB held that position in at least one half of every presidential term since the 1989 elections. On February 5, 2016, Cunha took the central seat of the Lower House, successfully outmaneuvering the PT candidate Arlindo Chinaglia with 267 votes against Chinaglia's 136. Assuming the presidency of the Câmara, Cunha installed parliamentary investigative commissions, including a commission targeted at the Petrobras case (the third special commission since 2009, in fact, to investigate corruption in the state company).

His victory, and the perception that he had a solid grip on proceedings in Congress, was the theme of the first of the news items dealing with Cunha that will be analyzed here. From this first example and through the following 21 examples analyzed, one may notice that Cunha gradually changes actantial status; he shifts from being represented as "powerful" to "aggressive," a "commander" of "shock troops," and in November 2015, a few days before starting the impeachment proceedings,

as negotiating a “cease-fire” with the government. Eventually, Cunha was expelled and became a political pariah, had his mandate cancelled and became incarcerated in October 2016.

### O Poderoso Cunha

On March 21, 2015, *Veja*'s front page headline read: “The sudden force of Eduardo Cunha,” and the title of the article inside *Veja* was “O Poderoso Cunha,” or “Cunha the Powerful” (V#2418). The force or power projected in these titles are demonstrated early in the article: Cunha succeeded in removing one of the President's ministers, Cid Gomes, because Gomes had referred to Congress as “three or four hundred blackmailers” (*achacadores*). Cunha, then, “flexed his muscles” and announced that the minister would resign before any governmental announcement had been made public. This demonstration of force is contrasted to the impotence of President Rousseff, textually positioning Cunha and Rousseff as opponents.

Despite appearing on the recently-publicized “Lista de Janot,” the article points out that “Congressman Eduardo Cunha appears to be the one stable point of reference in a political world melting away.” As background, the report in *Veja* recounts his career in the Collor administration, his rapid ascension and resignation from public administration of Rio de Janeiro in the mid-90s, and finally asks “how such a nebulous past could produce such a meteoric career?” only to reply thus: In spite of his past, “not a monument of ethics,” Cunha always “escaped the tsunami of investigations” and “none of the accusations made in the judicial arena had any consequences.” Thus, the text inserts Cunha's power not only in courtrooms and in politics but also in the domain of morals and, in effect, asserts that his staying power and political relations have secured his impunity hitherto.

### Cunha on the Stand

The article on “Cunha the Powerful” did not mention a very central incident in the Lava-Jato case. Having himself authorized the opening of a parliamentary investigative committee (CPI) in the case, Cunha appeared on the stand voluntarily and non-scheduled on March 12. The journalists of the political beat all perceived this moment as yet another demonstration of force.

*Estado* reported on the event with a headline that contrasted suspicions of corruption to the praise of his peers: “Under suspicion, Cunha goes to CPI and receives eulogies from colleagues” (E12/3 2015). In the line following the lead, the text reports that “practically all parties lauded Cunha,” but the authoring journalists interpret this not so much as a favour to Cunha as a strategy for protecting the parliamentarians named on Janot's list the preceding week. The reporters go on to quote Cunha's critique of the Prosecutor-General's “fragile” allegations, and Cunha's assertion that the list is merely the government's attempt to “transfer the crisis from one side of the road [the Presidential palace of Planalto] to the other” (where the Congress is situated). Then, a paragraph establishes the accusations of Cunha's corruption, mentioning the testimonies given by Alberto Youssef and the *doleiro* Careca. However, the report states that Careca's testimony had been withdrawn by the defendant himself. A PT spokesperson, Sibá Machado, is then quoted for saying that nothing connects Cunha to the list, despite “the open conflict between PT and PMDB the preceding weeks.”

Three different parliamentarians criticize Cunha, including Clarissa Garotinho (daughter of Cunha's former political mentor Anthony Garotinho), in the final paragraph of the report.

The CPI session, according to *Folha's* lead, turned into "an act of redress" with "applause and words of solidarity" directed at Cunha (F12/3 2015). The lead is followed by two sentences establishing his relation to the Petrobras investigations, through the testimony of Alberto Youssef. Cunha's critique of the inclusion of his name on the Prosecutor-General's list and the quote about the government's transfer of the crisis is included next, followed by quotes from both PSDB and PT spokesmen. Critique of Cunha is given ample coverage in the end, with four quotes of two paragraphs, under the heading of "Dissonant voices." In both the print version and the online version, the article is accompanied by a flow-chart graph showing the route of the kickbacks from Petrobras sub-contracts to political actors.

*O Globo's* headline the same day echoed *Folha's*: "Eduardo Cunha's testimony in the CPI of Petrobras turns into act of redress" (G12/3 2015). The lead of *O Globo's* online news report establishes the circumstances of the CPI session much as *Folha*, but instead ends the lead sentence with the critique levied by Clarissa Garotinho. The second sentence continues with a direct quote from Garotinho, in which she connects Cunha not only to Alberto Youssef, but also to the *doleiros* Lúcio Funaro and Fernando Soares. The next paragraph echoes this one, with a four-line quote from PSOL's Ivan Valente. Only then, as the fourth paragraph, are Cunha's statements reported, followed by a statement by Sibá Machado of PT - the same quote reported in *Estado*. In *O Globo*, this is interpreted as an attempt "to clear out a tense ambience between Cunha and the Planalto." Machado is furthermore quoted for his critique of the use of plea bargains. The reporters interpret this as an indirect reference to the testimonies against the PT treasurer Vaccari Neto, who had recently been arrested. Three more "eulogies" praising Cunha round off this article.

In each of these reports, the responses to Cunha's statements are the focus of attention, and the story is framed around the politicians' repudiation of the Prosecutor-General's list. Cunha thus comes to be presented as the leader of parliamentary majority, and the Prosecutor-General Janot is located as opposing them. The *O Globo* account is clearly more critical of Cunha, giving much space to direct quotes from his political opponents, and virtually no direct quotes of Cunha's own. This text, in effect, contains two different stories (in the sense of Bal 1997). *Estado* includes an emphasis on the inconsistency of one testimony, an emphasis that is absent in the other reports, and this underscores the conflicting truth claims.

What is missing from each of these accounts, however, is Cunha's statement concerning bank accounts. The accounts are obliquely mentioned in the broadcast report of the same evening: In TV Globo's *Jornal Nacional*, a news report starts off with Cunha's defense, which in the voice-over reporter words consisted of reading out each mention of his name in the investigation petition, and pointing out the contradictions (JN12/3 2014). However, these contradictions are not detailed then, as the reportage goes on to show the PGR headquarters and, still in voice-over, describing the suspicions of the prosecutors. A picture of the *doleiro* (and supposed PMDB henchman) Fernando "Baiano" Soares is shown, while the voice-over finishes the allegations of Cunha's and PMDB's corruption. Then, the report turns to footage of Cunha in the CPI. Cunha, seated in front of the session room, denies Baiano's relation to PMDB in two sentences. The voice-over then resumes and



quotes Cunha indirectly, saying that Cunha also denied Careca's testimony about delivering money to Cunha's home in Rio de Janeiro on Youssef's orders. The footage, meanwhile, shows more shots from the CPI session and then turns to (older) footage of Youssef's arrest, as he taken into custody by the federal police. Returning to the CPI footage, Cunha points out that Careca had changed his testimony. The voice-over then summarizes Cunha's critique of the Prosecutor-General (showing Janot in a press conference), and mentions the omission of senator Delcídio do Amaral on the list of investigated names, accompanied by first footage of the senator and then Cunha explaining how this omission (and the inclusion of his own name on the list) was politically motivated.

The newscast reporter, Júlio Mosquera, then appears as on-site reporter in the CPI conference room inside Congress, narrating the events of the CPI and the eulogies made by "the majority" in session. Footage of Carlos Sampaio's (PSDB) and Sibá Machado's quotes, also featured in the print news, are shown, followed by a summary of the critique made by Ivan Valente, identified as "one of the few who questioned Cunha." Valente, amongst other issues, asked that Cunha's bank accounts be subjected to investigation. While Valente is only indirectly quoted, the answer given by Cunha is shown directly, and Cunha at this point states that he "has no problem with giving access" to the bank accounts. Finally, the anchor Renata Vasconcellos, back in the studio, informs that PGR Janot declines to comment on Cunha's accusations of politically motivated investigation. The exact moment in the session where Cunha denies having hidden funds, being partner in corporations, or having bank accounts overseas, was not picked up by the media at this point. This response came during a phase of questions from the CPI members. The denial would, however, turn out to be crucial.

In any case, minute differences between the framings in the texts and representations are discernible: *O Globo's* report gives more emphasis to the critical questions than TV Globo's evening broadcast. The broadcast report and *Folha* demonstrates the link between Cunha and Alberto Youssef, and the broadcast report and *Estado* mentions the retraction of the testimony of Careca. All of the reports mention, quote or show footage of the PT spokesperson supporting Cunha. The visibility and weight given to the corruption probe authorized by the PGR varies: The denunciations of Youssef and the corruption mechanism are graphically present in *Folha*, by way of the flow chart, presenting the kickbacks as factual in the explanatory text, rendered in the imperfect past tense. In the *Jornal Nacional*, the prosecutor's suspicions are given emphasis by the location in the first part of the report, and their suspicions are here put in the conjunctive and conditional tense, in line with Portuguese journalistic conventions: "A Procuradoria-Geral da República suspeita que Cunha tenha recebido propina da cota de PMDB, que na Petrobras seria representado pelo operador Fernando Soares..."

The variations and differences between the reports also exhibit more or less tightly knit webs of facticity (Tuchman 1978) – in *Estado*, for instance, the doubts about plea bargains open for more doubt about the denunciations against Cunha, while the text of *Folha* presents more information as facts and thereby implies that something is missing in Cunha's defense which casts doubt upon the eulogies of his colleagues. "Facts," quotes, and voices are distributed differently across the texts. For instance, the voice of left-wing Valente is omitted in *Estado*, indirectly presented in the *Jornal Nacional*, but very present in the text of *Folha*. In effect, the veracity of statements made by multiple political actors is positioned in several layers of conflicts through the textual location and

interpretation offered by journalists: Not just Cunha versus his denouncers, but also the Prosecutor-General's office, the PT playing a double game to appease Cunha and to avoid persecution, and the dissonant PSOL parliamentarians unwilling to play along in the CPI with the critique of the corruption probe. Though not present at the surface level, there is a general tension between the Lava-Jato investigation, represented here through the PGR, and the responses of the investigated politicians, represented in the flesh like Cunha or through proxies such as Sibá Machado. This tension flows along with, on the hand, the narrative of conflict between PT and Cunha, and on the other the Garotinho-Valente attacks on Cunha.

As the months of April, May and June went by, most media interest stayed with the CPI and the new phases of the Lava-Jato investigations, leaving Cunha to his work leading Congress. While some news concerning Cunha appeared, they created little hubbub in Congress or in the social media. One example is the scoop of *O Globo*, repeated and extended in *Folha* (F18/6 2015, G18/6 2015), concerning Cunha's relations to the *doleiro* Funaro and the ways in which Cunha and his political ally Solange Almeida had put pressure on companies from the Petrobras cartel in the preceding years. According to these reports, Cunha had ghost-written two of Almeida's requests for clarification and interrogation in Congressional hearings; this was allegedly Cunha's way of inserting himself into the graft schemes by way of threats and blackmailing. The June disclosure of Cunha's backstage manoeuvres was only one of many to come; the next leak reached the front-pages in mid-July.

#### The Leaked Testimony

On July 15, *O Globo* published leaked contents from a plea bargain in the Lava-Jato investigations. The testifying witness, Júlio Camargo, had negotiated a plea bargain with the public prosecutors in December 2014, and he testified to judge Sérgio Moro in July. The video of this testimony was made public by Moro's court on July 16, but *O Globo* anticipated this the day before (G15/7 2015), leaking contents of Camargo's testimony and highlighting the fact that the Camargo implicated Cunha. Despite having previously testified to the opposite, the former Samsung representative and then Toyo Setal consultant Júlio Camargo testified to Sérgio Moro that he had accepted paying kickbacks to Eduardo Cunha – to be rid of an old debt to PMDB that secured Samsung the contracts with Petrobras for drillship construction.

The lead of the news report reveals that in 2006, Cunha asked for the release of 10 million US\$ in kickbacks in order to close a 1,2 billion deal on drilling ships for Petrobras' explorations in the deep-sea areas. Half of the US\$ 10 million were to be Cunha's personal prize. Following the first paragraph, the report quotes only a single word of Cunha's reply: "mentiroso" – "liar." Then, in a paragraph-length direct quote, Cunha expands on this by pointing out that Camargo had previously denied paying bribes to him. The next sections confirm this point, and the article then goes on to describe another part of Camargo's testimony, involving a secret meeting with the then-minister of Mines and Energy Edison Lobão (PMDB) in order to avoid a congressional audit of the Petrobras contracts. Several parts of this narrative are direct quotes taken from the testimony session before Sérgio Moro. In the next part of this article, a new characterization of Cunha appears. Whereas he was depicted in *Veja* in March as "powerful," he is now depicted by *O Globo*, through an indirect quote, as aggressive, fearsome, and dangerous:

Júlio Camargo afirmou que Cunha teria lhe dito que estava “no comando de 260 deputados” e mostrado “agressividade” na conversa. Ao ser questionado por que não havia revelado esses fatos antes, o consultor afirmou que tinha medo de possíveis retaliações às empresas que ele representava e à sua própria pessoa. (G15/7 2015)

### Cunha’s backlash after the Camargo leak

What was crucial in this leak and subsequent publishing was not so much the disclosure but the political aftermath. Camargo’s testimony against Cunha stirred far more interest, visible in the social media statistics, than did Cunha's denials three months before. In response to this, Cunha again criticized the Prosecutor-General's office, stating that the timing was suspicious. On the next day, a pre-recorded statement aired nationally, in which Cunha declared his break with the government, and in a follow-up press conference, Cunha claimed that PT had ordered the PGR to leak this to the muckraking press.

That weekend (July 20), *Época* highlighted that Cunha’s break with the Rousseff administration would be instrumental, if not sufficient for impeachment. An official Congressional rejection of the state accounts would also be needed:

A insurreição de Cunha não é suficiente para levar ao impeachment de Dilma. Mas, se o cenário político piorar e se as contas do partido forem rejeitadas pelo Tribunal de Contas da União [...], Cunha estará muito mais predisposto a encaminhar um pedido de impeachment na Câmara do que estaria há uma semana. Antes ele pensaria dez vezes; agora talvez pense, no máximo, duas. Claro que, paralelamente a isso, Cunha terá de lidar com as acusações (E#893)

*Veja*, in the commentary “Escalão superior” (“Higher echelon”) penned by Daniel Pereira on July 22, offered the same view:

Cunha acusou Camargo de ser mentiroso. O deputado alega que o lobista [Camargo] sofreu pressão do procurador-geral da República, Rodrigo Janot, e do governo para emendar sua delação premiada e citar seu nome. Na sexta-feira passada, Cunha reagiu anunciando o rompimento com a presidente Dilma e a base governista: “Tem um bando de aloprados no Planalto”. Ele se disse agora parte da oposição e informou que a Câmara abrirá CPIs para apurar desmandos no BNDES e nos fundos de pensão. Na quinta-feira de manhã, Cunha disse que rechaçaria tentativas de cassação de Dilma com base em decisões tomadas por ela no mandato anterior, caso das “pedaladas fiscais”. Menos de 24 horas depois, ele estava com outro ânimo. A aliados, disse que vai encomendar pareceres de juristas renomados para sustentar a tese de que a reprovação das contas do governo em 2014 pode, sim, levar ao impedimento de Dilma. “Agora, é guerra”, disse Cunha. (V#2435)

Cunha’s “declaration of war” also identifies the weapon of choice in this war: the so-called *pedaladas fiscais*. I will return, in section 4.5, to these fiscal manoeuvres or delays. For now, it is enough to register that an eventual impeachment process based in these delays was perceived by the *Veja* reporter as Cunha’s retaliation against PGR Janot.

The break from government was similarly interpreted by *Estado* as a response to the Camargo testimony: “Late in the morning, Cunha announced that he joined the opposition. It was the first response to the allegation, made by the lobbyist Júlio Camargo, that Cunha had demanded a bribe

of US\$ 5 million” (E17/7 2015). While Cunha broke from government, or rather, from PT, and urged PMDB to do the same, the party simply stated in a press announcement that they respected his personal political choice, which was not the party's. Immediately afterwards, Cunha prepared the process of impeachment as another response to the allegations of corruption against him. 10 “citizens” were asked to revise their petitions, and Cunha declared that he was expecting a clarifying report from the Câmara’s legal advisors on the matter:

O deputado ainda encaminhou ofício ao deputado Jair Bolsonaro (PP-RJ) e a outros dez “cidadãos” para que refizessem em dez dias, por erro de formatação, seus pedidos de impeachment contra a presidente Dilma Rousseff. Nesta sexta, via redes sociais, Cunha informou que vai receber “em 30 dias parecer jurídico sobre pedido de impeachment” de Dilma. (E17/7 2015)

Another *Estado* journalist interpreted the rapid establishment of two investigative congressional committees as a sign that Cunha knew what was coming from the investigations in Curitiba, and that he had prepared his exit and consequential entry in the opposition coalition:

...os tucanos [PSDB] vão aguardar os desdobramentos da crise desencada na última quinta-feira com o depoimento do lobista Julio Camargo, que acusa Cunha de ter cobrado US\$ 5 milhões de propina. O efeito imediato foi uma aproximação dele com a oposição, o que resultou na criação das CPIs do BNDES e dos Fundos de Pensão... (E19/7 2015)

Even if the media attention was drawn to the impeachment petitions, to new committees, the government crisis, and the national fiscal situation, Cunha remained under scrutiny in the Lava-Jato investigation. Júlio Camargo’s plea bargain became the basis of the first formal denunciation of Cunha. On August 20, the PGR indicted Cunha and Solange Almeida for extortion and graft in a Petrobras contract process where Samsung eventually won the bid for constructing two new exploration vessels (the case revealed on June 18). On the same day, the PGR also indicted the ex-president, senator Fernando Collor de Mello, and four other persons in the corruption case related to the Petrobras subsidiary BR Distribuidora.

### [Outmaneuvering the Ethics Council](#)

After the indictment, however, Cunha’s process stalled in the Supreme Court, and it took eight months before he was charged before the Court (in a session on March 3 the following year). Before that happened, another indictment and several other investigations of Cunha had been initiated by the PGR. When evidence of Swiss bank accounts, in Cunha’s name, was leaked soon after the denunciation, the minor left-wing party PSOL filed for a disciplinary action in the Câmara. Cunha had specifically denied having accounts in the exterior during the March CPI session. This bald-faced lie against peers was a clear breach of decorum, enough to annul a mandate in Congress. The internal disciplinary commission of the Câmara, the Ethics Council, moved somewhat faster than the Supreme Court, but the resulting disciplinary process was restarted multiple times, because Cunha was able to command the Board of the Câmara and the institutional resources even before the process began.

The media reported extensively upon the disciplinary process during October and November 2015. During these two months, the formal process was not even opened, but postponed through different procedural loopholes. Only on November 4 did the Ethics Council get to appoint a speaker

(*relator*) on the case. The daily press depicted half of the Ethics Council as Cunha's "shock troop" and his "allies," helping him obstruct the very act of reading reports in the Council and thereby avoid the case on formal grounds (E20/11 2015). These war metaphors align with Cunha's declaration of war against Rousseff (V#2435). The bellicose metaphors and frames had a tangible side, as well: Several meetings in the Ethics Council were highly agitated, featuring everything from verbal abuse to physical infight.

Through the delay maneuvers, the elected speaker of the case, Fausto Pinato, was hindered in reading his preliminary report on the matter because Cunha had the Câmara plenary convene, obstructing meetings of sub-commissions. However, towards the end of November, it became clear that the Council president and a small majority in the Council would not dismiss the case, and the day of voting for opening the case was set for December 1. In the week leading up to the session, deliberations within PT were reported by the press. The three PT members of the Ethics Council could, in principle, add their votes to the Cunha's shock troops, letting him off the hook. Implicitly or explicitly, depending on the report, that would mean that Rousseff and Cunha had agreed to a truce, protecting him from disciplinary action and her from impeachment. However, the PT congressman Zé Geraldo stated outright that this was blackmail, "a knife to the throat," and that he and his two colleagues in the Ethics Council were less than happy holding the trigger for the impeachment (de Almeida 2016:105-106). According to several media, Rousseff's ministers, or sometimes even Lula, had negotiated a ceasefire with Cunha:

...emissários do governo [foram mandados] para buscar uma trégua. Foram necessárias ao menos duas tentativas frustradas dos dois ministros para que Cunha desse algum sinal de que estava disposto a dialogar com o governo. A divulgação de encontros e telefonemas entre os dois lados alimentou equivocados rumores de que um "acordão" seria costurado. Tanto o governo quanto o presidente da Câmara negam com veemência a existência e a possibilidade de um acordo. Cunha nega, simplesmente, porque não precisa fazer um acordo com o governo. Com os seguidores que tem na Câmara, está confiante em que conseguirá ver o processo contra si arquivado no Conselho de Ética. (E#906)

If the terms of the truce were in fact negotiated, the ceasefire was never enacted: The PT representatives looked hesitant in the session of the Ethics Council on December 1, and deliberated in hushed voices, following the debate. As the meeting dragged out, the national president of PT tweeted (and media promptly reported) that PT had demanded that the Congressmen should vote for opening a case against Cunha (F2/12a 2015). The meeting ended, but the members never got around to vote, postponing the process yet another day. However, December 2 was the day of the Congress vote on a revised state budget for 2015. The president of the Ethics Council again postponed the council meeting in Cunha's case to the following week, while the PT deputies finally settled the vote intention: The three representatives would vote with Pinato, opening a disciplinary process against Cunha that could eventually lead to his removal from office.

A few hours later, the National Congress (Senate and Câmara in conjunction) had accepted the government's proposal of a state budget deficit for 2015 of 119,9 billion R\$. The impact of paying back debt created by the TCU's verdict on the *pedaladas* amounted to 57 billion R\$, almost half the total deficit. Opposition parliamentarians maintained that the law of fiscal responsibility had been transgressed by the government. While Renan Calheiros, as President of the Senate, closed the joint parliamentary session he had conducted, Eduardo Cunha stepped out of his office and announced

that he would accept one of the petitions for impeachment of president Rousseff. Already in the first reports, the start of the impeachment is interpreted as Cunha's retaliation:

Eduardo Cunha acata pedido de impeachment contra Dilma Rousseff. Em retaliação ao PT e ao Planalto, que não asseguraram votos para enterrar seu processo de cassação, o presidente da Câmara dos Deputados, Eduardo Cunha (PMDB-RJ), anunciou às 18h38 desta quarta-feira (2) a deflagração do principal pedido de impeachment contra Dilma Rousseff. (F2/12b 2015)

The same evening, Rousseff gave a televised speech, flanked by many ministers (but symbolically without the Vice-President (de Almeida 2016:113). *Jornal Nacional* and the other evening news all livecast Rousseff's speech, in which she denied having committed wrongdoings, affirmed that the petition was not founded in any legal base, and that it was not her having secret, Swiss bank accounts, alluding to Cunha's case (JN2/12 2015).

The motif of Cunha's revenge is a focalization of the Cunha-Rousseff (or Cunha-PT) conflict. Effectively, it eclipses agency of the person who stood to gain the most from impeachment: the vice-president. As the media had already uniformly portrayed the political negotiations relating to the disciplinary process as the cause of Cunha's choice, the pressure from other actors within government or in the opposition is not considered as cause. Impeachment, in the news texts of December 2015, is emplotted as the resolution and, in consequence, the escalation of the conflict between Cunha and PT. Even in the openly pro-impeachment editorial universe of *Estado*, this emplotment appeared several times:

Eduardo Cunha é alvo de inquérito no STF, que pode evoluir para denúncia aceita, tornando-o réu. Isto poderá gerar uma mudança no atual cenário de forças para o impeachment, sobretudo quando pairam suspeitas que a abertura do impeachment se dá como vingança a uma possível cassação pela Comissão de Ética. (E3/12c 2015)

The above quote is from the political commentary "Supremo Em Pauta," co-written by a group academics led by Eloísa Machado. The same suspicion of vengeance as the driving force appeared across the board of the media studied here: PT members denounced it as "explicit blackmail" (E3/12a 2015), an interpretation repeated by the *Estado* pundit Marco Aurélio Nogueira (E3/12b 2015) and the political analyst Otávio Amorim, and in a translated Economist editorial on December 5 reproduced in *Estado* (E5/12 2015). However, the, *Estado* editors later explicitly denied the vengeance motif:

Como primeiro ponto a ser difundido pela militância, o governo federal tenta vincular o pedido de impeachment ao deputado Eduardo Cunha (PMDB-RJ), presidente da Câmara dos Deputados. Trata-se da primeira falácia. O impeachment não nasceu da vontade de Cunha, como se fosse um ato de vingança pessoal do presidente da Câmara contra a presidente da República. (E18/1 2016)

By denying the focalization and personal vested interest, this editorial argues that the impeachment is really all about the compliance with the fiscal responsibility law. I will return to the impeachment below. Now, I will focus on another emplotment of Cunha's antagonistic relations, this time in opposition to the PGR Janot.

During the STF sessions, several other events worked towards weakening the position of Cunha. On December 15, the Lava-Jato investigations visited the homes and offices of Cunha and his ally and predecessor in the Câmara leader role, Minister of Tourism Henrique Eduardo Alves, along with many other prominent PMDB names (among these were Celso Pansera, newly appointed minister of Science, and senator Edison Lobão, former minister of Mines and Energy). Though this phase had no arrests, cellular phones and documents were apprehended at all searched locations. The STF denied the police warrant for searching the home of Renan Calheiros, in contrast to the extensive searches in locations related to Cunha. The offices of PMDB in Calheiros' home state Alagoas were also searched, and the subsidiary of Petrobras Transpetro was investigated in the operation as well. The operation was dubbed "Catilinas," referencing a series of speeches by Cicero, in which the Roman consul denounced the senator Catiline's attempt at a coup d'état (see appendix B).

The following day, the PGR finalized a request to the STF for removing Cunha from office, arguing that he abused the powers of his position in the Ethics Council, in the CPI de Petrobras, but above all abuse of public office for criminal and corrupt activity. The same day, Cunha evaded public servants trying to present the document of the Ethics Council, stating that he was officially on trial for breach of parliamentary decorum.

The Prosecutor-General's request for removing Cunha was expected. Both *Folha* and *Veja* columnists had speculated that Cunha wanted to initiate impeachment proceedings before the PGR made such a request, to reinforce the argument that PGR Janot was in reality not independent, but acting as a henchman for the Rousseff government:

Nos bastidores da Câmara, deputados creditam a decisão de Cunha de dar seguimento ao processo de impeachment de Dilma Rousseff a rumores de que a Procuradoria-Geral da República (PGR) pode pedir o afastamento dele da presidência da Câmara a qualquer momento. Desde o início da semana, essa possibilidade vem sendo ventilada pelos corredores da Casa. Representantes da base e da oposição ingressaram no Ministério Público pedindo a saída de Cunha sob o argumento de que ele estaria usando a estrutura da Câmara para atrapalhar as investigações contra ele no esquema de corrupção da Petrobras... Caso o pedido de afastamento se confirme, o peemedebista tem um argumento na ponta da língua: deve dizer que a PGR agiu em retaliação a ele, reforçando sua tese de que Rodrigo Janot atua em benefício do Planalto. (V-2/12 2015)

The intertextual shift demonstrated across these texts dislocated Cunha from the role of the conservative protagonist that could overcome the Dilma Rousseff administration to the role of embarrassing midwife in the transfer of power to Michel Temer, a liability that resides menacingly at the margin of the impeachment process.

The shift is visible in the characterizations of Cunha's actions: his retaliation, his threats, his blackmailing, the knife to the throat, and his shock troops – all of them invoking the story of warring mafia-like factions within Congress. Reports on Cunha's lie in the CPI and subsequent disclosure of Swiss bank accounts paved the way for reports on backstage deals, blackmail and a ceasefire that gave way to metaphors and statements about outright war; and with these unfolding plotlines, the seed of the most discussed narrative of all – that of a coup d'état, or *Golpe* – was sown. The metaphors and characterizations that changed the meteorically rising Cunha to the Roman senator Catiline made this alternative emplotment possible, because they moved Cunha into the position of the antagonist, and thus fed into the counternarrative launched by PT supporters (see section 4.5.3 below).

In the first days of March, Cunha's corruption cases took a decisive step forward, as he was charged before the STF (on March 3) and indicted a second time by the PGR (on March 4). However, a massive testimony leak appeared on the website of *IstoÉ* on March 3, and on March 4, news on Cunha were also completely eclipsed by a new phase of the Lava-Jato investigations to which I now turn.

#### 4.4 The Apogee of the Political Crisis: Lula and Rousseff Conjoined

March 3 and 4 marked the onset of an infostorm that engulfed both Rousseff and Lula (Damgaard 2018b), joined them together in opposition to the Lava-Jato task force, and preceded the impeachment vote in the Câmara. This period was characterized in the media as a period of tension and crisis, combining new instances of corruption disclosure, the leak of the incarcerated Senator Delcídio do Amaral's plea bargain testimony, a wave of street protests, and the dramatic coercive witness interrogation of Lula.

In the following two sections, I describe in detail how the figure of crisis was presented and how TV Globo marked out this moment of crisis as the apex (or point-of-no-return) of an on-going narrative. Introductorily, I will briefly provide the contours of the narrative that brought together Lula and Rousseff. While the media as little as three months earlier had been keen on exposing the differences and disharmony between the current and the former ex-president (e.g. G1-29/10 2015), this pattern changed in February and March 2016. Crucially, Lula's alleged corruption in these two real estate cases then became Rousseff's problem, because a narrative developed around their close relationship and combined efforts to stop the Lava-Jato probe, or at least to obstruct it. Historically, the metaphors of *criador/criatura* (creator and creation) or mentor and pupil were common-place descriptions of the relationship between Lula and Dilma. This metaphor-set was now reinvigorated as Dilma considered the idea of nominating Lula for the powerful position of presidential chief of staff, *ministro da Casa Civil*.

The background of the events on March 4 can be traced to the real estate cases that implicated Lula as recipient of kickbacks: Exposés in *Veja* and *Folha* (e.g. F29/1 2016, V#2463) pointed out that two locations frequented by Lula after his period as president was in fact connected to the cartel of construction companies that grew enormously in his presidency (aligning with earlier exposés concerning OAS and Odebrecht in 2015, e.g. V#2423). The ties between Lula and the construction company OAS had been pursued by journalists of all the main media in January and February, gradually turning up pieces of documentary evidence, witness accounts and archive files that showed how OAS had worked on two real estate sites linked to Lula. None of this seemed to leak from investigations, but turned up through investigative journalism.

Based on this evidence, Cassio Conserino, a public prosecutor of the São Paulo state, had stated on January 22 in an interview in *Veja* (V#2462) that he would indict Lula. Conserino argued that Lula was corrupted by OAS, and that he tried to hide that he was the owner of the renovated beachside "triplex" apartment in Guarujá. A few days later, the Lava-Jato investigations searched the apartment and the whole building, linking the imprisoned PT treasurer Vaccari to the lawyer Nelci Warken, who appeared to have connections to the Panamanian law firm Mossack Fonseca (the firm



that went on to be exposed in the Panama Papers). Despite Conserino's statement in *Veja*, or perhaps because of it, Lula's lawyers succeeded in challenging the competency of the São Paulo prosecutors, starting a series of legal struggles in February about jurisdiction of the case. The question was which prosecuting body had the right to indict Lula, and which court that would adjudicate the eventual trial of the triplex.

Since the 2015 exposés, Lula had testified in investigation processes three times, but no footage appeared of this in the media. In contrast, due to the visibility, the events of March 4 were reported with great urgency and cast in extraordinary terms. Premonitions of Lula's indictment and perhaps preventive arrest had been part of the mediascape for six weeks by then. It was not entirely surprising then, that Lula was forced to testify on March 4, being escorted from his home in São Paulo at dawn. The Globo news team was ready with cameras at the ex-president's house before the police arrived, which suggests a leak in either the local police force or in the task-force.

#### 4.4.1 Analysis of *Jornal Nacional*, March 4, 2016

TV Globo's evening newscast that night compressed the many elements of coverage that had unfolded during the day's live coverage (on GloboNews and the competing news channels). Rather than the usual two or three political-oriented "hard news" reports, the first hour of the *Jornal Nacional* comprised nine different news reports, all accounting for the ex-president's case and the repercussion of the so-called coercive testimony. The reader may consult appendix D for a transcript of this and the next newscast analyzed. Here, I will deal with the following themes:

- Hierarchy and Integration of Elements; Distribution of Attention
- Urgency and Uncommonness
- Labelling and Demonstrating Transgression
- Actors: Protesters, Protagonists and Antagonists
- Graphics
- Narrative Emplotment in Uncertain Conjunctive

#### Hierarchy and Integration of Elements; Distribution of Attention

I start out from the assumption that the ordered sequence and various timeslots allotted to sections of a newscast reflect editorial choices. While viewers may drop in and out of a newscast, that does not mean that the newscast is not a carefully crafted product, and this may be even more true in situations that are seen as nationally important and historically exceptional. By describing the overall structure of this particular newscast, I will unpack the sequence, implicit hierarchy, and emplotment and integration of events.

The *Jornal Nacional* newscast on March 4 starts off with a complex *escalada* (initial headline sequence, see Montgomery and Feng 2016) that outlines the events of the day and the coming content. Unlike most other editions, the *escalada* on this day only covered one issue – the interrogation of Lula. The *escalada*, like the following sequence of news reports, foregrounds the street-level protests, and characterize them as violent (but the *escalada* elides the protests in front of PT's headquarters). This initial script is read alternatingly by the two anchors:

A operação Lava Jato chega ao ex-presidente. Policiais federais obrigam Lula prestar depoimento numa sala no aeroporto de Congonhas. A ação policial atrai manifestantes pro e contra a o ex-presidente, e as provocações de lado a lado terminam em violência.

During the first two minutes, the *escalada* summarizes the day's events, the prosecutors' suspicions, and Lula's response. The first report of the newscast consists in five minutes of on-site footage, shifting between helicopter shots, street-level shots from protests, 20 seconds of on-site explanation by a reporter, 30 seconds of footage from a police press conference (both explaining the unusual location of the testimony), and a final sequence of helicopter shots with a short indirect quote of denial from Lula, related through an interview with PT Congressman Paulo Teixeira. The first protests covered are those in front of Lula's house, followed by protests in front of and inside the São Paulo airport Congonhas. The focus of this news report is violence in the protest, which was also highlighted in the *escalada*. In the section on "Discrediting actors" below, I will detail how the so-called "pro-Lula" protesters are discredited through the attribution of violence. Very few hurt people are seen in the images, and the only wound displayed is demonstrated by an individual in the national football shirt, while the most violent person filmed wears an orange-red shirt, possibly alluding to his left-wing sympathies.

While the first report consists of on-site elements, the following two reports (from 7:16 to 20:00 minutes) are remarkably static. In total, 13 minutes are devoted (in the sense of sacerdotal coverage, Blumler and Gurevitch 2002:55) to long quotes from a police press conference in Curitiba, interspersed with quotes from the interrogation warrant justifying the quasi-arrest of Lula. There is much more direct quoting than "reporting," i.e. journalistic meta-text, with 22 quotes lasting a full 10 minutes. 10 (slightly edited) quotes from the documents containing the judicial warrant and 12 direct quotes with footage the press conference. These direct quotes are made up of 10 statements by the Lava-Jato task force prosecutor Carlos Fernando dos Santos Lima and two statements made by a tax auditor. The ample space given to the task force imbues its members with actantial agency.

The initial key quotes are centered around the suspicions of corruption. The anchor, William Bonner, quotes the investigators, affirming that there are good reasons ("proofs and evidence") for investigating the ex-president, and the following footage of the prosecutor Lima explicates the suspicion of a "criminal organization within the government, utilizing Petrobras and other companies for political financing and personal gain as well." This moral and political transgression is then explained through a patchwork of elements from press conference footage and voice-over quotes of the investigation's judicial warrant for interrogating Lula. The second news report in this section quotes the tax auditor's impression of the cash flow between Lula's company, his institute, and his sons' companies. However, this new set of document quotes is displayed on a graphic background of Petrobras oil pipes, implying the connection between the cash flow and the original transgression of Lula's criminal organization within the government.

The fourth and fifth news report (from 21:25 to 32:05) summarize the investigation's accumulated evidence pertaining to the two real estate cases. Here, intertextuality to earlier events and exposés is clear: The anchor references the scoop that was presented in the *Jornal Nacional* the previous day (images of Lula and Leo Pinheiro of OAS together inside the Guarujá apartment), and reporters refer to the disclosure, published in January, that the landscaping redesign of the Atibaia ranch was paid by Odebrecht. The Aloprados scandal of 2006 is also referenced (at 26:00).

The sixth news report shows footage from other arrests and interrogations, as well as one interview that also took place that day, related to the 24<sup>th</sup> phase of the Lava-Jato investigations. Paulo Okamoto, director of Instituto Lula (the quasi-political organization founded by Lula after stepping down), is interviewed after testifying, and a list of interrogated individuals is then presented on a new graphic background: An animation of oil pipes spilling out stacks of money bills. The background animation is again making a symbolic reference (common to other newscasts of TV Globo) to the scandal of Petrobras' leaky economy and grafted subcontracts.

The seventh news report returns to the theme of violent protests, this time in front of the PT headquarters. The violence is this time reported to be directed at journalists, and an interview with the ex-minister Gilberto Carvalho (PT) is cut short by angry protesters, presumably demonstrating the violent attitude of PT partisans. The angry attitudes are not explained or framed as an attitude specifically directed at Rede Globo, although many Brazilians would infer as much. Similarly, the chorus of protesters chanting "não vai ter golpe!" is shown, but not explained or related to the political events.

Only in the eight news report, after two commercial breaks and 39 minutes of newscast, does Lula himself make an appearance. Lula's voice is only presented at two moments until then, in two brief quotes: A 15-second shot in the escalada and a 30-second sequence in the seventh report, culled from a cell phone video recordings made by a PT member and posted on Facebook. Lula's speech is reported in nine sections of quotes, for a total of seven minutes of raw footage, interspersed with shorter sequences in the newscast studio. Relegating his statements to the end of the newscast could be critically interpreted as a characterization of relevance or truth value, or simply as a necessary sequence of representing an accusation and the consequent defense. However, by splitting each denunciatory claim from the counterclaim, it is not at all times clear how these relate, and half of the sequences from Lula's press conference are preceded by an introduction by the newscast anchors that disqualifies or throws into doubt Lula's explanations. Thus, in four out of seven subsections of this nine-minute report on the conference, the anchors start by pointing out the flaws and omissions of the argument presented by the ex-president. In this conference, Lula made a simile that *Veja* turned into a front page collage (see appendix A, figure A.24), likening himself to an arrowhead viper. The final two news reports treat the support for Lula expressed by the president Rousseff, and, in the very last minutes, it is related that Eduardo Cunha was indicted again by the public prosecutors.

The overall organization of material emphasizes the integration of the judiciary actors' statements by contextualizing them extensively, while focalizing on these actors and the truth claims they make. Hierarchical priority is given to the investigation rather than the ex-president, locating authority rather strongly with the Lava-Jato task force. Aside from the ex-president, a number of PT members are discredited, and the violent aggression is more clearly attributed to the supporters of this party than the more diffuse "other side," at one point symbolically identified simply as "Brazil." The criminal organization is the central narrative nucleus, and this notion makes much of the text and quotes cohere, so that it can be interpreted not just as amassed facts of alleged favors benefiting the ex-president and his family bestowed by at least eight different named agents (OAS, Odebrecht, Fernando Bittar, Jonas Suassuna, José Carlos Bumlai, Granero Transportes, Três Poderes Mudanças,

and Cinco Estrelas). Rather, the organization keeps returning to the graft in Petrobras in order to qualify each of the favors as evidence of Lula being involved in the large-scale corruption - as actual corrupt behavior in an intelligible historical narrative. The actual act of office that would constitute a causal link between Lula's post-presidential period and the subcontractors is backgrounded or missing from the text, however, so that it remains unclear if these companies gained anything in return from channeling money and favors to Lula through real estate renovations, transportation and storage of the presidential archive, and contracts for public talks.

### Urgency and uncommonness

This newscast signaled that the situation was extraordinary and urgent in various ways. From the outset, urgency was evident in the way that the newscast's initial headline sequence was completely oriented to the situation of Lula, thus departing from the standard practice of the *escalada*. Only the final phrase of the *escalada* (at 1:50) refers to another event (the second indictment of Cunha).

The first of the headlines in the *escalada* is introduced by the anchor Bonner: "the operation Lava-Jato arrives at the ex-president." This is followed immediately by footage from Lula's house, with police agents leading Lula out of the garage and into a black car. The extraordinariness of the images - an ex-president seemingly being arrested - is underscored by the unusual position of the footage, right at the beginning of the *escalada*, in contrast to the initial headline sequence that would normally be mostly located in the studio. By leaving the standard pattern of the introduction, and by making a cutaway to on-site footage immediately, a sense of urgency is established at the formal level, matching the content. Similarly, several of the news reports are uncommonly long and repetitive, lasting between six and nine minutes a piece with few shifts in the material, in passages of up to two uninterrupted minutes, and the overall elimination of all other news items is significant as well. In other words, the production testifies to the urgency of the events by selecting an uncommon amount of almost raw footage.

### Labelling and Demonstrating Transgression

Moving on to the scripted text of the newscast, the apparent arrest of Lula is motivated a few seconds after the first headline, indirectly quoting the prosecutors of the Lava-Jato task force, who "affirmed that the institute and the company received payments and donations from the five Petrobras contractors most involved in the graft (*desvio*) of money from Petrobras." This is the first mention of wrong-doing, supplemented a little later (at 0:58) by "pagamento de vantagem indevida," meaning "payment for an illicit advantage," and the mention of the company OAS having paid for storage for Lula's "objects." The objects referred to are gifts of public office, which had been bestowed upon Lula during his presidency. The word corruption is not used initially, but the synonym "desvio" and the juridical-technical term "vantagem indevida" is used instead, both clearly signaling transgressions.

Moreover, an intertextual link is established that signals transgression: the footage of the president being escorted into a car by police officials, immediately followed by pictures of the two real estate locations that had been the topic of headlines during February. The combination of these elements prompts the interpretation that the earlier suspicions of corruption had now been proved, traced to Lula, and that justice arrived, literally and figuratively, at the ex-president's doorstep - as declared in the first sentence of the headline sequence: "A operação Lava Jato chega ao ex-

presidente.” The transgression is initially shown even more clearly than it is labelled or described: The ranch, the pool area, the beachfront apartment – three seemingly concrete proofs of corruption.

#### Actants: Protesters, Protagonists, Antagonists

The most visible actors in the newscast are the participants from the Lava-Jato task-force investigating the ex-president, with the federal prosecutor Carlos dos Santos Lima as the principal face of the task-force. Three other investigators (Igor Romário de Paula, Roberto Leonel, and Eduardo Mauat) receive much less on-screen time. Towards the end of the newscast, Lula makes his entry in a long news report, and the president Rousseff appears briefly at the very end. A number of unnamed actors should also be mentioned, because several protesters in various stages of conflict are highlighted in the first and seventh news report. While judge Sergio Moro is quoted indirectly and implicitly several times, the only footage of him (at 4:00) lasts two seconds.

The public prosecutor Lima is established from the very beginning as the protagonist, a righteous republican. Already in the *escalada*, in his first appearance, he exhorts the equal application of justice. The operation code-name is rendered from Greek by the anchor Bonner as “the search for the truth.” Lima returns as truth-seeking protagonist at several points in the newscast, starting with the introduction by the anchor Vasconcellos (at 7:22), who quotes Lima for saying that the “suspicions are based in proofs and testimonies,” linked to “the criminal scheme in Petrobras.”

The truth claims of Lima (standing in for all the prosecutors and the investigation in general) are presented by anchors in the unmarked form, in contrast to the representation of claims made by Lula (see below). In this way, a hierarchy of legitimate newsmakers is constructed and the differences of legitimacy marked out linguistically, in order to dismantle the common-sense perception of presidents as responsible public office-holders (Tuchman 1978:86-87), and specifically to call into question Lula’s status as trustworthy.

A few other sources are present directly in the newscast. In the fifth news report, two citizens interviewed on-site affirm facts that attest to Lula’s relation to the Atibaia site. Immediately afterwards, through indirect quotes enunciated by the anchors, several defense lawyers and the press office of Instituto Lula deny wrongdoing in a short sequence. Affirmations of facts are shown directly (a locksmith, a citizen of Atibaia, and especially the investigators), while denials are only quoted. The exceptions are the 10-second, rather incoherent statement by PT Congressman Paulo Teixeira (at 06:55), who states that it is “beyond the purview of the police and public prosecutors,” as well as a 20-second interview with the Instituto Lula director Paulo Okamoto (at 32:46-33:06), and, finally, the footage from Lula’s press conference towards the end of the newscast.

The absence of any political commentators, of experts on legal issues, of the São Paulo state prosecutor Conserino and of judge Sérgio Moro is noteworthy. Ignoring the larger question of the political situation, eliding the uncertain legal situation of the São Paulo indictment, and relegating news about the second indictment of Cunha, the newscast (almost) contains and limits the issue to a question of Lula’s corruption revealed by the virtuous investigation.

The contrast between Lula and the task-force is mirrored vicariously in the footage of conflicting protests, expanded through the strategy of discrediting protesters who support Lula. Protests were mentioned already in the first seconds of the *escalada* - “the provocations from both sides ended in violence” - and in the first report of the newscast, violence is covered again, for an entire minute, from 05:00 to 06:00. In this time, eight or nine instances of violence is depicted, and in the majority of the situations, it is depicted and described as being a conflict between two “sides.” In a few situations, police are also involved. The interpretation of “sides” is prompted by the introduction in the *escalada*: “A ação policial atrai manifestantes pro e contra o ex-presidente, e as provocações de lado a lado terminam em violência.” Thus, the question for the protesters is not reported to be the Lava-Jato investigations, or the coercive interrogation of Lula, but the person of the president himself. The emphasis on this division – a pro/contra, or us/them dichotomy – runs parallel to the deployment of protagonist/antagonist roles.

The violence in the streets and the need for surprising Lula at home and moving him to Congonhas is linked. Two motivations for the moving of the interrogation to Congonhas are presented in the very start of the first news report. Given the claims of violence presented in the *escalada*, the claim made by an on-site reporter, that Congonhas would be a safer place to do the interrogation (“mais protegida”) implies that security, public order, and possibly the execution of the interrogation was in danger. A strip of images from the federal police press conference (at 3:25), with direct quotes of the police detective Igor Romário de Paula, explicates the warrant for this type of quasi-arrest called “condução coercitiva,” or “coercive apprehension.” The agent states that persons linked to Lula would try to hinder the interrogation, a claim that works as a premonition of the violent PT supporters depicted at Congonhas in the following footage sequence. Thus, the necessity and claim to legality for the coercive apprehension hinges upon the claim of violence; or, put another way, without violent protests, it would have made no sense make a quasi-arrest. Without the quasi-arrest, the protests wouldn’t have happened as they did, however.

A second reason for the coercive measure is given in voice-over, quoting the judicial warrant (at 4:33). Here, the justification for moving the interrogation refers to the previous interrogation of Lula (ordered by the prosecutor Conserino). This interrogation which was voluntary, but Lula ended up not testifying due to protests. In voice-over, the reporter quotes the document (supposedly signed by Sergio Moro), saying that the earlier “tumultuous” protests resulted in people being wounded.<sup>4</sup>

All the instances of violence shown are, in a way, rather petty. In a nation with very high homicide rates and serious public security issues, it is peculiar that pushing and yelling between groups of non-armed, aging protesters would merit a minute of prime-time television. However, the intention of emphasizing violence in protests can be interpreted as a way of robbing the protests of their democratic merit. But the violence is not depicted equally among both “sides,” and one “side” is thus clearly more discredited through this contrast: While one protester, in a red shirt (visibly decoded as PT supporter) is shown as violent, attacking, another protester clothed in the national football team shirt is shown as wounded – it could probably be the other way around, but it is hardly coincidental that these images have been chosen so. Aggressive violence is attributed to the PT supporters, while the Brazilians at large (denoted by the national team shirt) are the victims.

It is never explained exactly why protesters in SP are angry with (Globo) journalists, although it is the central problem of the protests. Similarly, while in one instance the protest slogan “Não vai ter golpe” – there will not be a coup – is shown (at the protest in front of the PT headquarters), the political situation of impending impeachment and the contested interpretations of this is never discussed. The audience members must either know about the historical and contemporary critique of Globo (see sections 3.4 and 3.6) or else suspect that people are hell-bent on destruction of the hapless journalists. The violent mob is supporting Lula, and this also discredits Lula.

Just after Lima's first appearance in the *escalada*, footage of Lula's spontaneous post-testimony press conference was shown. This juxtaposition underscored the opposition of actors. Lula, at first indirectly quoted by both anchors in rapid succession, “refutes the accusations, criticizes the coercive apprehension, and says that he would have given clarifications if invited to testify” (at 1:08). Since Lula was in fact not accused formally then, the word “accusation” is ascribed to Lula himself via an indirect quote. Then, the voice-over of anchors give way to a short bit of Lula's speech. In the footage, Lula looks disconcerted and indignant. The selected quotes continue Lula's condensed critique of the coercive apprehension: “Lamentably, they preferred to use the superiority, arrogance, in a spectacle of pyrotechnics” (at 1:22).

Later (and lengthier) passages in the newscast further establishes Lula as the antagonist: Between 8:37 and 9:40, PGR Lima speaks at length, in two sections of footage, about the “criminal organization” installed in the federal government, orchestrated through a “chain of command” (at 8:42) that had previously revealed the transgressions of ex-minister José Dirceu (convicted in the Mensalão scandal, preventively arrested in the Lava-Jato case) and the treasurer Vaccari Neto (convicted in the Lava-Jato case). The implication is that Lula was at the top of this chain, as he was the political leader of both convicts. Lima does not say as much, however, but instead phrases it this way:

Fazemos uma investigação da continuidade dessa cadeia de comando. Hoje, nós estamos analisando evidências de que o ex-presidente e sua família receberam vantagens para - eventualmente - consecução de atos dentro do governo (9:13-39).

A bit later, the warrant for arrest and search is quoted in a voice-over, making the connection between Lula and the Petrobras graft clear:

O ex-presidente Lula, além de líder partidário, era o responsável final pela decisão de quem seriam os diretores da Petrobras e foi um dos principais beneficiários dos delitos. De fato, surgiram evidências de que os crimes o enriqueceram e financiaram campanhas eleitorais e o caixa de sua agremiação política. (10:52)

Immediately before this, two other parties are mentioned – PMDB and PP (at 9:50) – but these parties are not, apparently, considered among the main antagonists, since they are only mentioned very briefly here (and again at 14:40). Not surprisingly, these parties deny everything.<sup>5</sup>

Lula's spontaneous press conference was only covered much later in the newscast than other events. Apart from the short sequence in the *escalada*, Lula's voice is only heard again at 36:38-37:05, as he criticizes Sérgio Moro. A cell phone footage of Lula speaking about the interrogation is included in the seventh report, and then better quality footage takes up most of the eight news

report. This report starts off with an uninterrupted two-minute quote Lula denying the necessity of coercive interrogation and the redundancy of the questions posed to him. Then, the anchor Bonner points out that Lula did not comment on the investigator's reasons for searching the homes of his sons, setting up a 35-second sequence where Lula states that there is no good reason for those search warrants. With the preemptive discrediting of Lula's interpretation of the situation, Lula appears to be evading the questions posed by the prosecutors.

The following sections has the same structure: The anchor Vasconcellos highlights that Lula spoke of "unnamed persons" who wants to destroy his legacy, and this makes the following 20-second footage of Lula's declarations seem slightly conspiratorial. In the next section, Vasconcellos introduces the public talks that Lula gave after his presidency, quoting Lula for saying that these talks were "results of the successes of his government." In the 50-second sequence of footage, Lula points out that people want to hear about the miraculous results that changed the country, and due to these results, he could be the "most well-paid public speaker in the world next to Bill Clinton." The anchor Bonner then points out that Lula avoided mentioning OAS and the suspicion of corruption when speaking about the presidential archive, again setting up the following footage of Lula. Vasconcellos then introduces Lula's explanations about the Atibaia site by establishing a conflict between the Lava-Jato task force and the ex-president: "Lula again said that it is his friends' estate, and he sought to disqualify what the Lava-Jato investigators consider indications of his ownership." Next, Bonner re-introduces Lula's explanations about the public talks, stating that Lula "defended the subcontractors of Petrobras that payed for the talks" and that he "downplayed the fact that they were involved in the grafting off of Petrobras." In sum, Lula's arguments are presented by the anchors as covering for the facts of corruption.

Two more sequences of footage from Lula's press conference are presented by Bonner and Vasconcellos through simple summaries, rounding off the nine minutes of news report from the conference with indirect quotes from the decision by Supreme Justice Rosa Weber, who denied a petition to cancel the investigations.

In the newscast, a general pattern discredits PT members by association. Syntactically, this works by locating sentences describing PT leaders in conjunction with sentences that calls their authority into question (just as in the above examples). Early in the *escalada* read by the anchors, President Rousseff is discredited by being linked to a plea bargain: "President Dilma Rousseff expresses her solidarity with ex-president Lula and deny affirmations in the plea bargain made by Senator Delcídio do Amaral" (at 1:35).

Right after the coverage of violence in the protests, another PT member, Luiz Carlos da Silva, is linked to the violent protests (by proximity) but also, explicitly, to the Mensalão scandal: "Professor Luizinho, founding member of PT, was in the airport. He was investigated in the Mensalão case and was acquitted" (at 5:53). Right after this intertextual link to the earlier mega-scandal, the ex-politician is depicted rambling on to another protester (presented not as such, but as a "passenger" in the airport), while brandishing, for no apparent reason, male undergarments. The reporter, in voice-over, notes that "he discussed with a passenger; demonstrated a pair of underpants; and formed the letter 'L', for Lula, with his hand" (6:03). The laconic presentation of Luizinho's acts demonstrates them as incoherent, and this function is a form of distancing, by making his side (Lula's



side, in effect) seem abnormal. The gesture of the empty undergarment was supposedly meant as a contrasting reference to a 2005 case where a PT congressman's aide tried to hide that he transported US dollars unto an airplane in his underpants.

In another intertextual reference to the Mensalão scandal, the figure of ex-minister of PT and convict in the Lava-Jato case José Dirceu provides a link that demonstrates Lula's guilt: "the criminal organization certainly had a leadership. This was verified and we are here making the accusation that the ex-minister Zé Dirceu was part of this leadership..." - "we know that José Dirceu was really harnessing Petrobras to siphon off resources" (8:56).

Finally, although the PT politician Paulo Teixeira is indirectly quoted at length, which works as a summary of Lula's actual testimony, his direct quote is less felicitous as a speech act. In the end of the quote (6:55), Teixeira speaks to a number of journalists, giving a non-answer to the (implied) question of ownership of the Atibaia ranch and the swan boats of the lake by the ranch. This non-answer, supposedly reproducing Lula's non-answer, is that the ex-president "was indignant" in response to the question. PT actors and Lula supporters are not covered favorably, in sum: They are either violent (street-level supporters), incoherent and choleric (Luizinho), denounced and discredited (Dilma), or evasive (Teixeira).

### Graphics

Throughout the months of covering Lava-Jato, the graphic designers of TV Globo had developed a number of life-like computer-animated backgrounds on which official documents and pieces of evidence could be demonstrated. The backgrounds carried significant symbolic weight, by showing Petrobras (and sometimes BR Distribuidora, the gas station retail branch of Petrobras) icons next to oil pipes leaking stacks of Brazilian reais. The leaky oil pipe graphic (see appendix A, figure A.7) is first deployed in this newscast at 04:30 minutes, exactly to underscore and legitimate the police action:

A justificativa de Ministério Público para a condução coercitiva do ex-presidente é que [official document appears, parts of text sections are highlighted and swoop to the center of the screen] a medida é necessária por evitar tumultos políticos,

The deixis of the leaky pipe graphic works by symbolically linking 24<sup>th</sup> Lava-Jato phase (the operation being signified by the graphic) to the verbal cue that refers to the ex-president.

### Narrative emplotment in uncertain conjunctive

If we consider all of the mentions of transgression, we might conclude as to whether Lula is framed as guilty (of corruption) or not – or whether the newscast avoids arbitrating the case.

I have already shown the example of the motivation for the coercive apprehension, in which expected violence of PT supporters provides the grounds for taking Lula away. Another example of the emplotment of transgression is the very first quote from the prosecutor Lima, who states (at 1:00) that this is a "Republican moment" and that no-one should be exempt from investigation in this country. That statement implies that Lula had been kept out of investigations before. That Lula had in fact testified before is only mentioned 30 minutes later, in the footage from Lula's press conference. However, the selection of that quote supports the police action not only by indicating

that it was about time that the ex-president was investigated, but also that what had happened until then was not “Republican,” that is, supposedly contrary to the will of the Brazilian people.

A third example exhibits differing degrees of certainty in relation to the transgression and culpability. Lima includes the qualifying injection “eventualmente,” introducing uncertainty into the otherwise clear causality of his phrase: “We are today analyzing evidence that the ex-president and his family received benefits for eventually securing acts within the government” (at 9:18, quoted above). This qualifier is not in the selected sentences from the warrant, however, where a simple past imperfect tense states that “the ex-president was responsible, in the end, for whom should be director of Petrobras, and was one of the primary beneficiaries of the crimes” (at 10:54, quoted above). The prosecutor makes two potential statements, and a dependent clause (and here I will quote in Portuguese for precision’s sake): “... se ele conhecia as vantagens indevidas pagas, e se ele recebeu vantagens indevidas, nós estamos ainda em investigação” (at 10:00). The uncertainty is restated in other terms at 10:18, but quickly negated, as the prosecutor then states that “evidence has accumulated” pointing to the fact that Lula “clearly benefitted” (at 10:32). After this, Lima and the voice-over reporter explicates the connection: Lima is quoted directly for saying that that the “benefit [...] need not be directly linked to the act [of governance]...” (12:08), and the voice-over concludes (12:47-13:02) that “when the ex-president was exercising his mandate [...] his influence was possibly used before and after his mandate – and that is the object of this investigation – to make the scheme exist or continue.”

This pattern is characteristic of the whole newscast: Causality, and thus culpability, is at times reported to be clear, while, seconds later, reported to be only potential or merely possible; in general, denials and accusations are kept distant in the organization of material. In a nutshell, the editors are technically beyond reproach, because the doubtful or non-verifiable is hedged linguistically. On the other hand, these doubts are never presented in a consistent fashion, but consistently located next to sentences demonstrating evidence, proof, or referring to such.

Summing up, the text and footage of the March 4 edition of *Jornal Nacional* was produced in a way that underscores the concern for establishing the urgency of the situation. The protests surrounding the coercive apprehension of Lula (covered in the first report) implicitly justifies the severity of the situation and the choice to skip all other news in order to focus on a string of background reports on Lula, which were essentially non-urgent past events (reports 2 through 5). Then, short reports on the police operation of that morning (report 6) and the impromptu press conference (report 7 and 8) in the PT headquarters continues the more “live” part of the newscast. Substantially, the primary issue at stake is the problem of establishing the legal foundation for the police operation that morning, and this is reflected in the long sequences devoted to description of potentially criminal transgressions committed by Lula. The ex-president’s counterpoints to the various background sections that describe the evidence of these transgressions are presented by the anchors with various degrees of distrust and hedging, while no other voices are represented to comment on the situation, although the entire situation was discussed widely and intensely across Brazil and in other media outlets. The other important omission in the reports is the causal link between the alleged kickbacks and the “political benefit” gained by the companies mentioned.

#### 4.4.2 Obstruction of Justice: Pundit Interpretations in *Folha* and *Estado*

In order to understand the development between the newscasts of March 4 (above) and March 16 (below), I will here draw upon three political commentary pieces, one by Dora Kramer in *Estado*, two by Mônica Bergamo in *Folha*, and furthermore cite a *Folha* news report. All four news items deal with the potential nomination of Lula as minister, and all four present the same interpretation: Nominating Lula would be tantamount to obstruction of justice.

Dora Kramer characterizes an eventual nomination as an obvious maneuver to escape from Moro. Although Kramer initially states that she will refrain from qualifying such a move as “stupid,” she then affirms that it will be perceived as Lula’s outright admission of guilt.

A fim de não incorrer em imperdoável grosseria, evitemos qualificar como “de jerico” a ideia de levar a presidente Dilma Rousseff a nomear Luiz Inácio da Silva para um ministério a fim de dar a ele o foro especial de Justiça reservado a autoridades de primeiro escalão dos Poderes Executivos e detentores de mandatos eletivos. Melhor dizer que mais parece ideia de inimigo.

Lula demonstra tirocínio ao resistir à sugestão e a presidente da República demonstraria bom senso ao recusar esse tipo de colaboração. Ruim para os dois em todos os aspectos. Para ele, seria o equivalente a assinar um recibo de culpabilidade e uma confirmação de que tenta mesmo fugir da alçada do juiz Sérgio Moro. Manobra óbvia. (E10/3 2016)

In a remarkably similar analysis, *Folha*’s columnist Mônica Bergamo explains the same dilemma. Like Kramer, Bergamo also reports Lula’s expressed hesitance, and like Kramer she characterizes it like a “confession of guilt.” To Bergamo, accepting a cabinet position is a risky, rather than a stupid move, because the nomination would be perceived as abuse of office and would quickly be subject to legal challenges:

Setores do PT e do governo seguem insistindo na ideia de que o ex-presidente Lula seja nomeado ministro para ganhar foro privilegiado, o que impediria que ele seguisse sendo investigado na Operação Lava Jato em Curitiba... Há conselheiros muito próximos do ex-presidente, no entanto, que combatem veementemente a possibilidade de nomeação. Eles têm dito a Lula que isso pareceria uma confissão de culpa. O próprio petista sempre usou esse argumento para não ir para o governo. [...] A possibilidade [de nomeação] é vista como extremamente arriscada. A presidente já foi inclusive alertada para a chance de a iniciativa ser questionada no STF (Supremo Tribunal Federal) numa ação acusando a petista de desvio de poder. (F10/3 2016)

Four days later, Bergamo reported in another column (F14/3 2016) that Lula was about to accept nomination for minister of the Casa Civil. Unnamed PT leaders are quoted indirectly with a rebuttal against the accusation that the move was a way of “fleeing from Justice” (with a capital J). However, Bergamo observes that the “ex-president was more willing to accept the nomination after the judge Maria Priscilla Veiga Oliveira, of the 4<sup>a</sup> Vara Criminal da Capital, declined to authorize his imprisonment and decided to send the petition to be analyzed in Curitiba...”

The following morning, *Folha* reporters could report that opposition leaders would plan to do exactly what Bergamo foresaw, again seeing the acceptance of a cabinet position as implying guilt:

"Isso é um escárnio, um tapa na cara da população. O povo foi às ruas e se manifestou, já disse que não quer Lula e não quer o governo do PT", afirmou o líder do DEM na Câmara, Pauderney Avelino (AM). DEM, PPS, PSDB e SD vão protocolar, de forma conjunta, ação popular em 27 estados contra a possível nomeação de Lula.

Para o líder do PPS, Rubens Bueno, dar um posto estratégico no governo a Lula objetiva "atrapalhar o andamento da investigação" contra o petista no caso da Lava Jato. "É uma clara tentativa de obstrução da Justiça, além da nomeação caracterizar desvio de finalidade, já que seu único objetivo é garantir ao petista foro privilegiado". O coordenador jurídico do MBL (Movimento Brasil Livre), Rubens Nunes, entrará também com um pedido de liminar caso Lula seja nomeado.

Hoje Lula é investigado pela 13ª Vara Federal, em Curitiba, sob o comando do juiz Sergio Moro. Ao tomar posse como ministro, o caso sobe para o STF (Supremo Tribunal Federal), uma vez que Lula ganha foro privilegiado.

Bueno avalia ainda a nomeação do histórico quadro do PT como ministro como uma confissão de culpa. "Vai transparecer que, ao contrário do que ele galhofa em seus discursos e depoimentos, não tem como se explicar e está com medo de ser preso por determinação do juiz Sergio Moro". (F15/3 2016)

Again, the possible escape from Sérgio Moro's jurisdiction is interpreted as an "obstruction of Justice," and public indignation is invoked in Avelino's characterization of the nomination as a "mockery, a slap in the population's face."

In all interpretations and analyses, the move is considered primarily as a judicial maneuver, and sometimes as a way of regaining traction with a rebellious Congress. Only once (F14/3 2016) is it explained that escaping the jurisdiction of Sérgio Moro does not really mean immunity, but a move of jurisdiction to the Supreme Court. In the other instances, it is tacitly implied that the Supreme Court provides virtual immunity (due to the tardiness of trials there). As it turned out, the pundits accurately predicted the nomination, and I will now turn to the newscast representation of Lula's nomination for minister.

#### 4.4.3 Analysis of *Jornal Nacional*, March 16, 2016

The newscast that aired on March 16 had a rather different structure and quality than the one analyzed above, although this newscast also let the legal-political issues suppress all other news. I will present a somewhat shorter analysis here, highlighting some of the same themes as in the analysis above. The analysis is divided into the following themes:

- Urgency (and motivation for Urgency)
- Labelling and Demonstrating Transgression I: Influencing authorities
- Labelling and Demonstrating Transgression II: Obstructing justice
- Actants: Antagonists, Protagonists, Protesters
- Indirect representation of discourse

The overall event structure of the day looked like this, according to the newscast (albeit organized in a different order here):

A nomeação de Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva como novo ministro-chefe da Casa Civil, seis dias depois de promotores estaduais de São Paulo terem pedido a prisão dele, foi anunciada no início da tarde. Mas começou a se concretizar na noite de terça-feira numa reunião no Palácio da Alvorada. (2:02)

Dilma nem pedalou, como de costume, retomou a conversa com Lula no café da manhã com ministros. Ainda precisaram de quase três horas de conversa para chegar finalmente a um termo. Mal acabou a reunião e líderes do PT no congresso já anunciavam a decisão pela internet. (3:00)

Antes que o Diário Oficial efetivasse a nomeação de Lula como ministro, o juiz Sérgio Moro retirou o sigilo de toda a investigação sobre o ex-presidente e com isso tornaram-se públicas no fim da tarde conversas telefônicas de Lula. (1:33)

The publication of phone taps involving ex-President Lula, President Rousseff, and a number of other political actors close to Lula, was the focus of the newscast. The taps on Lula's phone had been legally ordered by judge Sérgio Moro, executed by the federal police, and the recordings had been made public officially as much other evidence in the Lava-Jato case. What seemed to be a leak thus first appeared as legal, although recording a president should be within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, and then only if he or she were officially investigated. So, by publicizing the phone tap in relation to a criminal case without authorization of the STF, Moro overstepped his jurisdiction, and this particular conversation, moreover, had actually occurred after the authorized period of tapping Lula's phone had ended (in contrast to the rest of the recordings). Thus, as evidence in a trial, it would not even be legal on formal grounds – but this only entered the public debate the following days, as did Moro's possible political motives for publicizing the phone taps immediately after recording them.

I will show in this analysis that the newscasts continued and expanded the pundit interpretations seen above, by interpreting the judicial maneuver as a moral transgression underscoring Rousseff's culpability, and by interpreting the publication of the recordings as the climax in a series of crises, which justified Moro's celerity.

#### Urgency (and motivation for Urgency)

The *escalada* begins with the claim that the political crisis is peaking: “A crise no governo Dilma Rousseff atinge o ponto mais alto” (a claim that is repeated three more times – at 1:28, 11:19, and at 18.46 mins). At first, the claim is related to the nomination of Lula for the cabinet, without mentioning initially why a nomination in itself can constitute a crisis. It is, however, implicitly justified by the third sentence of the *escalada*, which states that the nomination lets Lula escape the reach of Sergio Moro (at 0:16) and the Lava-Jato investigations – an interpretation consonant with political commentary discussed above. Immediately afterwards, the *escalada* then turns to presenting the phone taps of the ex-president's phone, and at 0:35 goes right into a play-back of the recording in which Rousseff explains to Lula that she will send the official document appointing him as minister to Lula in São Paulo “in case of necessity.” The transcript of the first minute, minus the phone conversation, consist of the following:

A crise do governo Dilma Rousseff atinge o ponto mais alto.

Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva é nomeado Ministro-Chefe da Casa Civil; ele sai do alcance de juiz Sérgio Moro, o juiz federal do Paraná responsável pela Lava Jato, e passa a ter o chamado foro privilegiado no Supremo Tribunal Federal. O juiz Moro suspende o sigilo e a Justiça Federal torna públicos os grampos telefônicos do ex-presidente, um deles de hoje a tarde. Lula recebeu ligação da presidente Dilma. (0:05)

Concluding the playback, the anchors explicitly deliver the motivation for both claims of crisis, urgency, and supposedly for the nomination itself:

Os grampos têm indícios fortes de que o objetivo da ida de Lula para ministério foi mesmo tirá-lo do alcance do juiz Moro e indicam que o ex-presidente tentou influenciar várias autoridades para se proteger. (1:00)

In this interpretation, the nomination was, exactly as anticipated by the pundits the previous days, a move to protect Lula from Moro. Crucially, the phone tap appears to attest to this interpretation because “the case of necessity” is supposed to be an arrest warrant for Lula, that could be dodged with an official document in hand: “The members of the Lava-Jato [task force] affirm that there are indications of attempts to obstruct the investigations” (at 1:47). Thus, the crisis presented in the opening sentence is predicated on the nomination having this subversive intention, dodging the expected arrest warrant. The transcript of this recording (and the same interpretation) also dominated every front-page of the national newspapers the following morning, and *O Globo* featured the whole phone conversation (filling more than half the front page) under the headline “Dialogue threatens Dilma” (see appendix A, figures A.8 and A.9).

#### Labelling and Demonstrating Transgression I: Influencing authorities

Two actions are considered transgressions: The nomination (with its subversive motivation) and Lula’s attempts at illegally influencing authorities. The second transgression is covered late in the newscast, but I will start here. As it turned out, Lula in fact complains that Eugenio Aragão, sub-prosecutor of the PGR and soon-to-be-appointed PT minister of Justice, should help him as “a friend,” but has proved unwilling:

Lula teria inclusive buscado influenciar ou conseguir ajuda de autoridades do Ministério Público Federal e até de ministros do Supremo Tribunal Federal... de acordo com a Polícia Federal, há indícios de que no diálogo, Lula esteja se referindo ao ministro indicado da Justiça Eugenio Aragão que também é subprocurador-Geral da República [graphic representation of oil refinery pipes, connotating Lava-Jato]. Lula disse: “O problema é o seguinte, Paulinho, nós temos que comprar essa briga, eu sei que é difícil, sabe?! Eu as vezes fico pensando até que o Aragão deveria cumprir um papel de homem, porque o Aragão parece nosso amigo, parece, parece, mas tá sempre dizendo ‘olha...’” (22:51)

This indirect quote of Lula is repeated *ad verbatim* by the anchor in the studio a bit later in the newscast, so that the quote appears at 23:10 and again at 25:26, after a commercial break.

If the yet-to-be-minister of Justice was unwilling to help out a friend before he even took office, it seems that Lula was even less lucky with influencing the Supreme Court judge Rosa Weber. Weber had been assigned to judge a petition from Lula’s lawyers that argued for cancelling the investigations due to illegal methods, and Weber was also mentioned in one phone conversation. This phone conversation, like the above, is read out by the reporter, instead of a direct playback of the published audio file. The quote is read out in voice-over with a background graphic of refinery tubes, from which money bundles flow. A logo of the gas station (and Petrobras subsidiary BR) is visible, and this graphic, like the following background footage of the Curitiba federal police building, thus renders the conversation as belonging to the Lava-Jato case (see newscast above and appendix A, figure A.7).

Lula falou: Eu acho que eles quiseram antecipar o pedido nosso que tá na Suprema Corte, que tá na mão da Rosa Weber... Lula falou: Mas viu, querido, ela tá falando dessa reunião, ô Wagner, que queria que você visse agora, falar com ela, já que ela tá aí, falar o negócio da Rosa Weber, que tá na mão dela pra decidir. Se homem não tem saco, quem sabe uma mulher corajosa possa fazer o que os homens não fizeram. (23:52)

Lula wants both Aragão and Rosa Weber, in the respective cases, to “act like a man,” and this expression is interpreted as an attempt to stop the investigations. However, despite the tap on Lula’s phone (and taps on his aides’ phones), in neither case did Lula and these “figures of authority” actually talk over the phone. No face-to-face meetings have been documented, either. The claim in the escalada that Lula had attempted to “influence authorities to gain protection” is thus a stretch, since the taps only provide evidence of Lula’s wishful thinking. The news report even specifies that Weber then denied Lula’s petition for annulling the investigation on formal grounds. We can surmise that the Lava-Jato investigations did not find more proof than the above of backstage deals, but it remains unknown whether Weber or Aragão at this moment heard Lula’s pleas via other channels, even if they did not attend to them.

#### Labelling and Demonstrating Transgression II: Obstructing Justice

While Lula did not seem to actually obtain help from the relevant authorities in extra-legal ways, the perfectly legal move of nominating him for a cabinet position was at heart of the postulated crisis. In the second news report of the newscast, the on-site reporter, standing in the anteroom of the Congress, concludes that no matter the argument, the fact remains that Lula now escapes Sérgio Moro: “No matter the argument, fact is that [the nomination] implies *foro privilegiado*, that is, he escapes from the hands of judge Sérgio Moro” (at 3:53). A bit later (at 4:58), the anchor Vasconcellos points out that it was unusual to have an official publication of the appointment in the *Diário Oficial* (the state publication that heralds new laws and appointments) before the swearing-in ceremony, casting doubt on the legality of the appointment by pointing out the unusually hasty and round-about sequence of legal procedures.

The mere nomination of Lula is then interpreted as morally tainted, even if legally valid, in footage of two on-the-fly interviews with prominent members of the opposition. The Congressman Pauderny Avelino (DEM) explains that president Rousseff is using a legal act to do an illegal one (at 6:30), namely, the nomination of an indicted person for cabinet (although an indictment is neither a charge nor a sentence), and that the nomination was solely enacted to shield Lula from “federal Justice,” in which STF apparently does not partake. Senator Aécio Neves is quoted (at 6:50), calling the act “absolutely condemnable” (indirectly quoted) and (then directly quoted) enacted “with one primary aim, that is to impede the successful process of the investigation, those of operation Lava-Jato, as well as those of Ministerio Publico de São Paulo” (7:00).

Neither of the Congressmen refer to phone taps or the suspicion that sending the official appointment in “case of necessity” was a way of shielding Lula from arrest ordered by Sérgio Moro. Apparently, the footage was taped in the early afternoon (which is corroborated by the broad daylight seen in the footage), before the moment of publication of the audio files. In other words, *Jornal Nacional* is adeptly bending temporality: The quotes of Neves and Avelino apparently support the interpretation that Rousseff’s legal maneuvers with nominations and official documents has the ultimate aim of shielding Lula from impending arrest, which would constitute an ethical transgression. However, Neves and Avelino are in fact simply repeating the strategy of the opposition parties to legally challenge the appointment of Lula; a strategy that was already prepared and had nothing to do with the intricacies of paperwork and jurisdiction in the hours between nomination and the swearing-in. Towards the end of the newscast (37:00), an on-site news report

account for the later reactions of the opposition, who at that point demanded Lula's immediate arrest and Rousseff's resignation.

Like in the newscast of March 4, a counterpoint is only presented very late (at 31:00), totally separated from the denunciations of transgression. This counter-argument, presented by the anchor as an indirect quote from the State Attorney José Eduardo Cardozo, simply states that the document containing the official appointment should be sent to Lula because he would maybe not appear in the swearing-in ceremony the following day.

#### Actants: Antagonists, Protagonists, Protesters

By establishing Lula and Rousseff as complicit in evading Justice, the central narrative opposition is also established: Justice is here incarnated in the figure of Moro and Moro only - which, as the PT Senator Humberto Costa noted (6:12), "disrespectfully" implied that the STF would not take good care of investigations or indictments. Moro is not interviewed, and no footage of him is shown, however, but his interpretation of the evasion of justice (warranting disclosure of the phone taps) is quoted at 34:55. In the first reports, the evasion of justice is mostly attributed to Rousseff, which shifts her towards the position of antagonist (although the anchor Bonner in the end of the escalada describes this in a nominalization: "the Lava-Jato members affirm that this indicates an action to obstruct the investigations" (at 1:50). However, the interpretation of opposition members above personalizes this, pointing to Rousseff's illegal intention. In the fifth news report (at 15:34-16:30), Rousseff repeats the objection that obtaining *foro privilegiado* does not mean obstructing investigations, that the belief that a federal judge should make better judgments than STF judges would be "an inversion of the hierarchy"; and, finally, that the obstruction-of-justice hypothesis is an attempt to cloud the fact that her government would be strengthened with Lula's nomination. That news report is followed directly by a report from the STF, summarizing the decision not to interfere in the impeachment process. Lula does not comment the situation at any point in the newscast. In sum, the newscast's first part focalizes Rousseff and her intentions, although the outrage of the protests is seemingly much more directed towards Lula. This is foregrounded in the third protest covered, where "protesters demand Lula's imprisonment" (32:18) and are shown with inflatable dolls depicting a cartoon-like Lula in the black-and-white stripe clothes of a prison inmate.

The first on-site news report quickly characterized the growing street protest as "not violent," neither from the side of police nor the 5000 protesters; however, in the background, there are loud booms and shouting, and the palpable street-level tension in Brasília is ignored by the reporter.<sup>6</sup> In two instances, reporters emphasize that the protests started already in the afternoon, before the publication of the recordings, but "began to grow (*ganhar mais corpo*) now, in the evening, after the phone taps were published." The protesters "would not accept the nomination of Lula," (9:24) and began to assemble already before news reached the public about Rousseff's possible involvement in the obstruction of the Lava-Jato investigations. It should be noted that the "peaceful" protests against Lula are not discredited here, but are represented as legitimate, unlike the "violent" pro-Lula protest two weeks earlier.

#### Indirect representation of discourse

The urgency of the newscast is premised on the disclosed phone taps. Strangely, it is only the very first recording that is actually played. Several other recordings are instead read aloud alternately



by the two anchors in the second half of the newscast. The indirect representation of Lula's discourse is curious because it is so rare in contemporary newscasts; it calls attention to itself as format by its unusualness. Typically, shorter quotes are interspersed in other reporting or at the very end of a news report. Here, it becomes the only substance for more than four minutes (25.30-30.00) The unusual indirect representation perhaps hides the fact that not much of the content is exactly newsworthy. First, Lula's conversation concerning the minister of Justice (that had already been quoted in the sixth news report) is read aloud again, followed by a conversation in which Lula laments that PGR Janot denied four cases against Aécio Neves but accepted an investigation of Lula. The next recorded phone conversation read out became famous on social media, although it was devoid of any politically sensitive content. In a taped conversation between the ex-president and Eduardo Paes, then mayor of Rio de Janeiro, the two talk derogatively about the town Maricá. The selection of this material (heavily live-edited by anchor Bonner so as to avoid Lula's and Paes' cursing) mostly appears to exacerbate the already undermined position of Lula, perhaps filling out for the lack of comments from him or his press officers. In a final conversation, read aloud by anchor Vasconcellos, Lula tells Nelson Barbosa, then minister of Finances, that his phone is tapped.

Summing up, these two days in March 2016 were narrated by the *Jornal Nacional* as the two critical moments of an evolving political crisis. The newscast discredited PT in general and emplotted Lula specifically as the central antagonist in the plot unravelled in the course of the Lava-Jato investigations. For the Rousseff administration, this spelt trouble: Despite the fact that Lula's cabinet nomination was botched because numerous federal judges revoked it in the following days, and because the STF judge Gilmar Mendes ultimately cancelled the act (Damgaard 2018b:135), parties of the coalition still used the nomination and the crisis as an excuse to jump ship. With PT increasingly isolated, nothing could stop the impeachment process that was then reaching its first crucial vote in Congress. The lead-up to this vote is discussed in the following.

#### 4.5 Impeachment

The impeachment petition, submitted in October 2015, that eventually led to the ousting of President Rousseff in August 2016, was based on several charges, many of them related to the corruption of Petrobras (Bicudo, Reale Júnior, and Paschoal 2015:3-9). However, according to the law defining impeachment proceedings (law 1079 of 1950), acts anterior to the mandate of the incumbent cannot legally ground an impeachment process. That clause meant that even if conclusive evidence of Rousseff's active or passive acceptance of corruption in Petrobras had surfaced, as long as the crime had happened before her presidential period starting in 2015, she would have been shielded from such charges (although the allegations or evidence could still be used in TSE trial). Despite this restriction of the impeachment law's scope, the arguments concerning Dilma's role in the graft of Petrobras contracts were still present in most of the stages of the process: In the initial petition (*ibid.*), in the public and Congressional debates, in the reports of the special commissions of the Câmara and Senate, as well as in the final accusation, the *libelo acusatório* (Wink 2017). In order to provide a firmer ground for initiating the process of impeachment, the opposition could not rely only on the allegations concerning Rousseff's culpability in the Petrobras case, but had to frame the impeachment petition around Rousseff's personal responsibility for certain fiscal delays and state budget manoeuvres. These were dubbed *pedaladas fiscais*, and a description of the impeachment demands a brief exposition of the history of those

delays. The following section cannot do the complexity of the constitutional and fiscal intricacies justice, but may give the reader some sense of what the delays came to signify in public discourse.

During 2014, the Finance Ministry had expanded an existing and common practice of delaying transfers of funds between the State Treasury and public banks. Three public financial institutions (the Caixa Federal, the Banco do Brasil, and the FGTS) transferred money to citizens in several conditional cash transfer programs, as well as to companies through several lines of credit for industrial companies and agribusinesses, but the State Treasury would then “pedal” for a while, only dispensing funds some days later. Shifting temporarily the financial burden of the programs onto other public institutions, the delays somewhat masked the fact that the state accounts were in bad shape after years of plummeting oil prices and the great slow-down of the Chinese economy, the most important export market of Brazil. The expansion of this practice, reaching at one point 3,5 billion R\$ in delayed funds from day to day, was revealed by journalists from the financial beat of *Estado* in April 2014. While the secretary-general of the State Treasury, Arno Augustin, denied that this constituted an illegal budget manoeuvre, the government still stopped that practice in 2014. The Lava-Jato scandals and the elections pushed the case of the *pedaladas* from the headlines (Villaverde 2016). In 2015, after extensive discussion of the possibility of impeaching Dilma Rousseff, the *pedaladas* were uncovered as a viable means to that end.

From February to April 2015, the following six quotes from interviewees, editors and journalists of *Veja* may serve as an illustration of how quickly the idea of impeachment became a topic and discussed as a plausible possibility – yet without the argument that could bring down the Rousseff presidency. In defending the admissibility of an impeachment process, the juridical issues and requirements of an impeachment process were discussed, and Rousseff’s connection to the Petrobras scandal was debated.

No documento — de 64 páginas e datado de 23 de janeiro —, o jurista afirma que "o assalto aos recursos da Petrobras, perpetrado durante oito anos, de bilhões de reais, sem que a Presidente do Conselho (Dilma presidiu o conselho de administração da Petrobras) e depois Presidente da República o detectasse, constitui omissão, negligência e imperícia, conformando a figura da improbidade administrativa, e enseja a abertura de um processo de impeachment". A VEJA, Gandra Martins negou que tenha produzido o parecer por encomenda de empreiteiras e [...] disse ainda que a análise da viabilidade do processo contra Dilma "é estritamente jurídica, sem conotação política". (V#2411)

The following week, Eduardo Cunha, then newly-elected president of the Câmara, was asked to comment. He pointed out that impeachment would only be admissible if the alleged transgressions of the president were acts within the current mandate, thus ruling out the Petrobras corruption:

Um dos juristas mais renomados do país, Ives Gandra Martins diz que já há base jurídica para um pedido de impeachment da presidente da República. O senhor concorda com essa tese?  
"Não conheço os argumentos dele e, por isso, não posso comentá-los. Mas acho que não é cabível um pedido de impeachment em razão do petrolão. Os atos que estão sob investigação e que porventura resultem em algum tipo de culpabilidade aconteceram no mandato anterior, e você não pode punir alguém por exercício de mandato anterior." (V#2412)

The editorial of *Veja* two weeks later stated that it would not be wise to seek the rupture of the presidential mandate, ignoring Cunha’s temporal delimitation of the admissible acts for starting an

impeachment. *Veja's* editor, Mailson Nobrega, emphasized the constitutional legitimacy of impeachment, and claimed that such a process requires less evidence than a standard trial in court:

Conversas e especulações sobre um eventual impeachment de Dilma aumentaram com a forte queda de sua popularidade, que se explica pelos desastres derivados de má gestão. Sobressaem o escândalo na Petrobras, o risco de racionamento de energia e os maus resultados na economia. Apesar disso, a menos que novos fatos venham a justificá-la, não parece boa a ideia de buscar a interrupção de seu mandato. [...] O impeachment é um recurso legítimo e constitucionalmente válido para descontinuar más administrações. É um processo político. Não requer prova inequívoca, típica dos casos que envolvem crime. Indicações de que o dinheiro da corrupção na Petrobras serviu para financiar a campanha eleitoral de Dilma bastariam. Ocorre que buscar o impeachment poderia não ser a estratégia mais conveniente. Mesmo que protestos de rua acontecessem em escala crescente, o governo ainda reuniria condições para manter a maioria no Congresso. (V#2414)

The editorial conditions the government's survival on Congress, "even if protests of the streets should grow," and this conditionality calls the popular support for the president into question – despite Rousseff's re-election, or, rather because of the close presidential race five months before. If the Congress might protect Rousseff, other unnamed "strategies" for removing the president may be "more convenient," and this sentence probably references the petitions for annulling the 2014 elections that had been filed by PSDB in the supreme electoral court.

The following month, a thematic article in *Veja* related the "six steps of impeachment," that is, the juridical and political sequence of institutional acts. The lead of the article affirmed that government was a disaster, and that the idea of impeachment is no longer taboo but very much "on the agenda":

O segundo mandato de Dilma Rousseff começou de forma tão desastrosa que, antes de completar cem dias, o tema do impeachment deixou de ser tabu e passou a fazer parte da pauta política - mesmo que ainda de forma incipiente. (V#2417)

In the same issue as this juridical-political walk-through, a report in *Veja* concerning the recent protests against the government stated that the vice-President Temer considered an impeachment process to be unthinkable – on the record. However, the Twittersphere is reported to be aglow with the notion of impeachment:

.... Desde fevereiro, os usuários do Twitter publicam em média 4000 tuítes por dia mencionando o afastamento da petista, segundo levantamento da consultoria Bites. Sobre essa questão, PT, PMDB e PSDB compartilham a mesma posição: são todos contra. O vice-presidente Michel Temer, o primeiro na hierarquia na eventual vacância do cargo de presidente da República, declarou na sexta-feira: "Sobre essa história de impeachment, eu nem falo nisso, porque é absolutamente inviável, impensável, é uma quebra da institucionalidade que não é útil para o país. Se o país passa uma dificuldade, você supera essa dificuldade, mas não pensa nessa hipótese". (V#2417)

Even if the vice-president denied it, PSDB senators had argued strongly for impeachment in the Congress, and *Veja* reported on April 22 that the theme was heating up, going from "cold to boiling in one month"

o discurso sobre o tema passou de frio a borbulhante em um mês [...] Cássio Cunha Lima [foi] um dos primeiros no partido a levantar a bandeira do impeachment ("a presidente terceirizou a gestão da economia e a gestão da política, mas não pode terceirizar o crime de responsabilidade que praticou", declarou o senador. (V#2422)

The PSDB senator Cassio Cunha Lima had debated impeachment in the Senate floor as early as the 9<sup>th</sup> of February. Given the interest in political circles, on Twitter, and in *Veja* (as well as in other news outlets), vice-President Temer's denial seemed disingenuous. More importantly, both his denial and the debate of early 2015 in general lacked the legally valid argument. Bad governance of the economy was gradually brought up as a sufficient cause for impeachment (instead of the Petrobras investigations, which, as Cunha had declared in the February interview, could not legally lead to impeachment).

A solution to the lack of a transgression on which an impeachment process could be based was eventually constructed: the infringement of the fiscal compliance law (Lei de Responsabilidade Fiscal), the so-called *pedaladas*, came to be considered "the silver bullet": After Eduardo Cunha broke with government, *Estado* reported that Cunha's allies in the opposition were expecting the 2014 accounts of the union to be rejected by the TCU (the Tribunal for the Accounts of the Union), and that this would bring impeachment. In an interview, titled "Parecer 'será nossa bala de prata' diz líder do PSDB na Câmara" published on August 3, the opposition leader Carlos Sampaio (PSDB) was asked:

[Estado interviewer] O tema do impeachment voltará para a agenda da Câmara na volta do recesso?

[Sampaio:] Volta totalmente. E, se comprovado o crime de responsabilidade, ou seja, que ela de fato falseou as contas nas pedaladas fiscais, esse terá um formato muito mais técnico (E3/8 2015)

In so many words, the PSDB leader affirmed that technical arguments, such as the *pedaladas*, would be the preferred way of gunning down the president in the months to come. The journalist was of course not surprised by the answer, since the topic had been on the agenda for months. The choice of *pedaladas* as the "silver bullet" in the impeachment (or, rather, the expectation of a budget audit asserting that fiscal delays should be considered a transgression of the law of fiscal responsibility) had already been suggested in April, when anti-government protesters of the Movimento Brasil Livre (see section 3.7) had handed in their impeachment petition to Cunha. Furthermore, the image of a "silver bullet" in the headline signalled the righteous slaying of transgressive and unholy forces.

The *pedaladas* were not only the solution to the juridical impasse, but also to the problem of a lacking plot device: If only acts within the current mandate could count as transgressions, then the Petrobras scandal could not provide grounds for impeachment. The electoral court had already in February denied one of the PSDB petitions for annulling the 2014 presidential election. So, to build a case against Rousseff, as well as a narrative, a new transgression had to be assigned to her. This emplotment worked metonymically, that is, by chaining the responsibility of fiscal transfers between public credit institutions and the State Treasury to not just the Secretary of the Treasury, nor the Minister of Finances, but all the way to the presidency. A similar chain-of-command story logic had been used in the Mensalão case, both in media (see section 3.6) and in the legal argument leading to the conviction of PT leaders (Greco and Leite 2014). In the impeachment process, this chain appeared with several weak links, however, and perhaps for that reason, the chain of responsibility sometimes disappeared completely in the news reports describing the impeachment petition:

Nesta terça, a oposição deve apresentar novo pedido de impeachment assinado pelo promotor aposentado Hélio Bicudo, pelo ex-ministro da Justiça Miguel Reale Júnior e pela advogada Janaína Paschoal. O texto incluirá

tanto as chamadas pedaladas fiscais praticadas em 2014 – e já condenadas pelo Tribunal de Contas da União (TCU) – quanto os atrasos nos repasses de recursos pelo Tesouro Nacional para bancos públicos, como o BNDES, feitos neste ano. A repetição das manobras contábeis em 2015 foi apontada em relatório do procurador do Ministério Público junto ao TCU, Júlio Marcelo de Oliveira. (E19/10 2015)

In the above quote, the hand of Rousseff in cooking the books via *pedaladas* is backgrounded completely. At other times, it is the presidential decrees that appear to link Rousseff to financial transgression, more than the *pedaladas*; while the Petrobras corruption is ascribed more to Cunha than to Rousseff:

Suspeito de esconder contas bancárias na Suíça e acusado de envolvimento no esquema de corrupção da Petrobras, o presidente da Câmara, Eduardo Cunha (PMDB-RJ), recebeu na manhã desta quarta-feira (21) o novo pedido de impeachment contra Dilma Rousseff. Assinada pelo ex-petista Hélio Bicudo e pelo jurista Miguel Reale Jr., a peça é chancelada pela oposição e tem entre os argumentos justamente os desvios na estatal. Como informou o Painel, o novo pedido de impeachment contempla também decretos assinados pelo governo em 2015 que aumentaram em R\$ 800 milhões as despesas do Executivo sem autorização do Congresso. Os novos argumentos são uma forma de tentar provar que Dilma continuou a cometer neste ano irregularidades fiscais que levaram o TCU (Tribunal de Contas da União) a reprovar as contas de 2014 da presidente (F21/10 2015)

As shown in the section above on Cunha, the initiation of impeachment proceedings, on December 2, was emplotted as an act of retaliation or vengeance by various voices in the newspapers. This created a contested space, with all the main arguments of the impeachment petition as well as the formal act itself under close scrutiny. I will not here detail the formal and legal critique of the impeachment petition, the reports of the special commissions of the Câmara and Senate, nor of the final *libelo acusatorio* (see instead Bahia, Bacha e Silva, and de Oliveira 2016, Damgaard 2018b, ch. 6, Wink 2017).

No matter the arguments, the process of impeaching Rousseff came down to simple math in the end: Technically, the way to stop impeachment proceedings for Rousseff was to ensure at least one-third of Câmara voting against the petition. The vote in the Câmara was eventually scheduled for April 17. Failing to get a third of the votes there, a third of the Senatorial votes in two subsequent votes could stop the process. The crucial parties in this calculus were ideologically located to the right of PT. PT by itself occupied only 70 seats in the Câmara, and even with the aid of the left-wing parties, one-third of the 513 seats was a long way off for Rousseff and PT. Getting aid from the larger left-center parties PDT and PSB was far from secure, as these parties preferred not to be associated with the corruption attributed to PT and eventually be able to launch their own presidential candidates, hopefully capturing the left-wing voters then. So, PT was at the mercy of PMDB, in a reversal of Cunha's situation in the disciplinary committee. Similar to Cunha's case, the political space of negotiations and struggle prior to the impeachment vote in the Câmara was affected by the events of the Lava-Jato investigations, and this reciprocal relation between the two processes is covered in the next section.

#### 4.5.1 Juxtaposing Impeachment and the Lava-Jato Investigations

As mentioned, the impeachment petition of Bicudo, Reale and Paschoal included many arguments for removing Rousseff that had to do with the corruption of Petrobras, despite the legal constraints of the impeachment law. This was not the only way that the disclosure of the Lava-Jato case

intruded in the impeachment process. The examples above from *Jornal Nacional* also demonstrated how Lula's corruption cases contaminated Rousseff's attempt to reinvigorate her government by nominating him as minister. But before March 16, when the phone taps were published, and before the large-scale street protests of March 13, the specter of the Lava-Jato case already hung above the impeachment in the media representations of the process. In this section, I provide some examples of the narrative transfer occurring between the two sets of events.

In February 2016, the 23<sup>rd</sup> phase of the Lava-Jato investigations revealed a connection between Odebrecht, the *doleiro* Zwi Skornicki, and PT's marketing expert João Santana. Santana and his wife were arrested on February 23. With this excuse, PMDB sources filled the political commentary and news report with the quotes that spelled the end of the Rousseff administration:

A prisão do marqueteiro João Santana reacendeu, dentro do PMDB, discussões sobre a viabilidade do impeachment da presidente Dilma Rousseff (PT). A avaliação é que, com o avanço das investigações sobre pagamentos feitos ao marqueteiro por pessoas vinculadas ao petrolão, "a Lava Jato subiu a rampa do Planalto" e o governo perdeu o controle do processo. (F26/2 2016)

With the pressure of the Santana revelations as rhetoric backup, the opposition, including parts of PMDB, renewed the efforts to press impeachment through the STF. In the above text, the slow-down of that process is implicit, but the reason for the lost momentum, also according to *Folha*, was judicial appeals and complications:

Deflagrado no início de dezembro do ano passado, o impeachment perdeu força após ter seu rito suspenso pelo STF, que agora analisa recursos apresentados pelo presidente da Câmara, Eduardo Cunha (PMDB-RJ), os chamados embargos. Com a prisão de João Santana —marqueteiro das três últimas campanhas presidenciais do PT—, a oposição tem a esperança de que o impeachment de Dilma ganhe um novo fôlego na Câmara. (F23/2 2016)

In other words, even though it was not of processual relevance to the impeachment process, the disclosure of corruption close to President Rousseff stoked the fire in that process (and, more appropriately, the parallel trial into the presidential campaign of 2014 in TSE, the Supreme Electoral Court). The contagion or spill-over effect was more pronounced than earlier in 2016, when Jacques Wagner (then chief of staff in the Rousseff administration) had been implicated by a leak of text messages from OAS president Leo Pinheiro, and rumors had it that the incarcerated PT senator Delcídio do Amaral was about to negotiate a plea bargain. The two situations had forced Wagner away from public spotlight, though he occupied the ministerial position usually assigned to the first line of defense. The arrest of senator Amaral and his plea bargain were projected (by the same journalist of *Folha*, and probably the same sources within PMDB) to become the new centerpieces of the impeachment process:

A ala do PMDB que defende o afastamento da presidente Dilma Rousseff acredita que, se homologada pelo STF (Supremo Tribunal Federal), a delação do senador Delcídio do Amaral (PT-MS) resultará "na mais robusta peça de impeachment" já formulada contra a petista, o que empurrará o restante da sigla para a oposição. Após a revista "IstoÉ" publicar detalhes do conteúdo do acordo de delação proposto pelo senador, a bancada do PMDB no Congresso oscilou entre a perplexidade e a expectativa sobre os desdobramentos do mais novo capítulo da crise que dragou a administração petista. (F4/3 2016)

Already in the 23<sup>rd</sup> phase of the Lava-Jato investigations, *Folha* editor Fabio Zanini saw the disastrous potential of the arrest of the marketing expert Santana:

Para Dilma Rousseff, a investida sobre João Santana é potencialmente mais desastrosa [...] Seja via impeachment, até aqui visto como improvável, seja pela cassação pelo Tribunal Superior Eleitoral, alternativa que começa a ganhar força. (F22/2 2016)

It is noteworthy that the TSE trial is seen as the most likely solution to crisis at this moment; to the editor, it might have been a more pleasant way of ousting Rousseff, since the TSE case had substantial and not merely tangential relation to the corruption scandals. In any case, the leaks and arrests of Lava-Jato become potent strawmen arguments, standing in for the actual substance of the impeachment petition. Put another way, the arguments of the petition were perhaps not strong enough to tear down the governing coalition, but the double position of Rousseff as both embroiled in the Lava-Jato scandals and the impeachment made her political allies – at least those left in PMDB – overlay one schemata on the other. Without a doubt, the comparison of the double trajectory of expectations in the TSE trial and the impeachment proceedings is the backbone of the last quote.

That comparison is only the less salient comparison in that analysis, however. In its entirety, the *Folha* editor also compares Rousseff's situation to that of Lula, at the onset of the Mensalão scandal:

Uma década depois, um publicitário estrela volta a ameaçar um governo petista. Em 2005, Duda Mendonça assombrou o país ao confessar à CPI dos Correios que recebeu no exterior pela campanha de Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva de 2002, sem que os recursos fossem contabilizados. Lula balançou, mas ainda com reservas de popularidade e num momento de economia em início de recuperação, segurou-se no cargo. Duda acabou absolvido pelo STF. Para Dilma Rousseff, a investida sobre João Santana é potencialmente mais desastrosa. O contexto econômico é ruinoso, e ela tem apenas fiapos de aceitação popular. O eventual comprometimento de seu marqueteiro e de sua campanha de 2014 com pagamentos ilegais, possivelmente por meio da Odebrecht, principal empresa envolvida no petrolão, seria o fim da linha. (F22/2 2016)

I will conclude this section with the observation that each of the above four quotes is built upon the same narrative structure: Santana's arrest (and Amaral's testimony) draws Rousseff directly into the general plot of the Petrobras corruption. Implicitly, more tenuous relations to the scandal – via the imprisoned PT leaders Vaccari and Dirceu, for example – are thus overwritten or eclipsed, and the allegations become more robust. The new revelations are seen as the crucial and "robust" evidence that was hitherto missing. The disclosure "brings the Lava-Jato up the ramp and into the presidential palace" (in an allusion to the actual architecture of the Planalto palace). The leak and the arrest will "push the rest of PDMB to jump ship," "breathing new life" in the process in the Câmara, and will prove to be the "end of the line" for Rousseff.

#### 4.5.2 From Mensalão to Petrolão

The above quote compared the Mensalão scandal to the Lava-Jato case, which in some instances is also named "Petrolão," underscoring the similarities of the scandals (see section 2.2). Such comparisons between the two scandals and news reports identifying causal links between the two constitute another important set of transferred narrative structures, to which I now turn. The naming itself foregrounds the comparison between the scandals and implicitly aligns or connects them as instances in a series. The characters are also carried over from one scandal to the other

(see for example the reference to José Dirceu, section 4.4.1). In examples such as the following, it appears to be the mere mention of certain actors (rather than the actions and actual events) that connects the two scandals:

Agora, emerge um novo nome que liga mensalão e petrolão. É Bumlai, o amigo de Lula – contra o ex-presidente, é bom repetir Moro, “não há nenhuma prova”. Bumlai, afirma Moro no seu despacho, foi acusado em 2012 por ninguém menos que Marcos Valério, o operador do mensalão, de transferir parte do dinheiro do empréstimo fraudulento do Banco Schain [sic] para o PT pagar uma chantagem do empresário de Santo André Ronam [sic] Maria Pinto, que ameaçava denunciar o envolvimento de petistas graduados no assassinato do prefeito de Santo André, Celso Daniel, em 2002. Em troca, disse Valério, a Construtora Schain [sic] conquistou um contrato para construir uma sonda da Petrobras. (G1-25/11 2015)

This commentary was published on the day of the arrest of the cattle king José Carlos Bumlai (on November 25, 2015, in a phase of Lava-Jato investigations called “Passe Livre”). At that point, neither Valério and Ronan Maria Pinto were targets of the Lava-Jato investigation, but the intertextual reference turns the arrest of Bumlai into a piece of a larger puzzle. The authoring pundit, Hélio Gurovitz of G1 and *Época*, reminds the reader that Bumlai had already been accused by one of the main culprits in the Mensalão case, Marcos Valério, during that trial three years earlier. This accusation dealt with events that went all the way back to the murder of the PT mayor of Santo André in 2002. This murder allegedly involved top-level PT members who had Bumlai transfer hush money to the businessman Ronan Maria Pinto; money that Bumlai got from the Schahin banking clan, whose construction company then won the bid for a drill-ship contract with Petrobras. Thus, the arrest of Lula’s friend Bumlai is an outer layer that may be peeled off, revealing older and more sinister motives and transgressions.

On April 1, 2016, two weeks before the scheduled vote on impeachment in the Câmara, the Lava-Jato investigations actually arrested Ronan Maria Pinto and the ex-treasurers of PT Sílvio Pereira and Delúbio Soares, thereby rejuvenating elements from precisely those earlier scandals involving PT alluded to by the pundit in the above quote: The Celso Daniel case and the Mensalão scandal. That Lava-Jato phase was symbolically named “Carbono-14,” implying the forensic or archaeological uncovering and reconstruction of former scandals – and hinting at the narrative desire of linking the current criminal case to the former. The Lava-Jato investigations thus provides a resolution to several loose ends in the Mensalão case, as well as the “solution” to the never-solved case of Celso Daniel’s murder.

Gurovitz continued to produce comparisons of Mensalão and the Lava-Jato case, emphasizing the symmetry and literary qualities of the two scandals and the adept story-telling strategies of the Lava-Jato task force (akin to the “narrative talent” displayed by the star of the Mensalão case, ex-STF judge Joaquim Barbosa):

A simetria entre mensalão e petrolão vai além dos personagens comuns e da sequência comprovada, em que um substitui o outro no financiamento do projeto petista de poder. O mensalão também inspirou a força-tarefa da Lava Jato num dos requisitos essenciais para a caça e a perseguição a corruptos e corruptores – a construção de uma narrativa sedutora, uma história capaz de convencer e engajar o público.

Relator do processo do mensalão, o ex-presidente do Supremo Tribunal Federal (STF) Joaquim Barbosa – cuja origem também está no Ministério Público – desenvolveu uma forma clara, didática e persuasiva de narrar os crimes, de modo a levar os réus à condenação. Dividiu os acusados em núcleos – operacional, empresarial e



político – e demonstrou, com base em provas robustas, o caminho do dinheiro dos contratos de publicidade fraudados até o bolso de deputados e políticos.

De tão boa, a história contada por Barbosa parecia uma novela de Walcyr Carrasco. Sem ela, a quadrilha do mensalão – defendida se não pelos melhores, com certeza pelos mais bem remunerados advogados do Brasil – poderia ter ficado impune. O talento narrativo dele inspirou a força-tarefa de procuradores da Lava Jato a também construir uma narrativa sedutora para explicar o petrolão. Mas a novela contada por eles é mais intrincada, tem mais personagens acessórios e vários pontos obscuros... (G1-8/2 2016)

Gurovitz almost works like a literary critic here, comparing the plots and the narration of Petrolão and Mensalão. At the same time, his commentary makes explicit the causal links of the connecting plot: The corruption scheme of the Mensalão was a way to finance “the PT project of remaining in power” and, once disclosed, the money flow from that system was substituted by the Petrobras graft. The transposition of the structure here is contrasted, in the following section, by an operation that changes the narrative structures through inversion.

#### 4.5.3 The Coup and Original Sin: Counternarratives

In November 2015, PT had pointed out that the Lava-Jato investigations seemed to benefit PSDB, but mostly targeted PT politicians although evidence implicated many other parties:

No documento distribuído a seus militantes para contra-atacar a Operação Lava Jato, o Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT) descreve o juiz Sérgio Moro como um aliado dos tucanos e diz que ele e “sua ‘equipe’ de delegados da PF e procuradores do MPF do Paraná fazem de tudo (até mesmo anistiar criminosos confessos) para atingir o PT”. “Eles não querem detectar os criminosos e acabar com a corrupção”, diz o texto. “O objetivo é prejudicar a imagem do PT e de seu governo.” (G1-25/11 2015)

After Cunha initiated impeachment proceedings, this “counter-attack” on the Lava-Jato operation morphed and acquired a new focus, because the possibility of an ousting of President Rousseff afforded a new angle for comparisons to Brazil’s history of democratic breakdowns, likening the impeachment to a coup d’état. President Rousseff’s argument was, primarily, the lack of a legal ground for impeaching her:

A presidente Dilma Rousseff reafirmou [...] que não irá renunciar. [...] “Se eu renunciar, esconde-se para debaixo do tapete esse impeachment sem base legal e, portanto, esse golpe. É confortável para os golpistas que a vítima desapareça”, disse. (E3/5 2016)

A secondary argument for the illegality of the impeachment had to do with Cunha. PT and the party’s supporters pointed out that when Cunha initiated impeachment, he did so with personal interests at heart (see section on Cunha above). The abuse of power, according to former minister of Justice and (then) Attorney-General of the Rousseff administration, José Eduardo Cardozo, robbed the whole process of legitimacy:

“É uma prova muito importante no sentido de que ele (Cunha) usava o cargo para finalidades estranhas ao interesse público, como aconteceu no caso do impeachment. No caso do impeachment foi exatamente isso que estamos alegando: ele usou com desvio de poder, usou o impeachment injustamente em benefício próprio, quando ameaçou a presidente da República de que ele abriria o processo se o PT não desse os votos (no Conselho de Ética)”, disse Cardozo (F5/5 2016)

The role of Cunha as instigator of the process was considered, in some accounts and in statements by Rousseff, as “the original sin,” an act that contaminated the process in its entirety and provided opposition members “that couldn’t win the election with a shortcut to the power” (F27/4a 2016).

Crucially, the initial role of Cunha and the motives for impeaching Rousseff tended to gradually be backgrounded in the coverage of the final stages of the impeachment process. Relegating Cunha to a backstage role, the use of the coup d’état references and the “original sin” trope were both barred from the front-pages of the main newspapers. In the following, I will recount and expand on several observations, originally put forth by Miranda (2016), concerning the newspapers’ coverage of impeachment as the day of the decisive vote in the Câmara approached.

#### 4.5.4 The Vote for Impeachment

Weeks ahead of the decisive vote for impeaching Rousseff, both major newspapers of São Paulo started counting the expected votes of Congressmen in order to provide the readers with a prediction of the virtual endpoint of the political struggle of the impeachment. This was constantly graphically present at the top of the newspaper web edition, easily readable as in a sports match of (see appendix A, figures A.10, A.11, and A.12). The same “sports score board” design and horse race framings (Cappella and Jamieson 1997, Aalberg, Strömbäck and de Vreese 2011) were present in the final week before the vote in the Câmara. The score board was expanded in more graphically creative forms on the printed newspapers on the day of the vote (F17/4, E17/4).

In the days between the vote in the Câmara and the Senate, the ousting of Rousseff was viewed as a virtual fact: *Folha*’s headline “Dilma admits to allies that ousting is inevitable” (F27/4b) implied a private admittance of defeat, while a *Folha* pundit inversely lamented that Rousseff would not admit defeat and resign voluntarily, as this left the corrupt Congressmen to judge her:

Renúncia é desistência e isso não bate com o ideário esquerdista. Renunciar como estratégia política não funciona muito, a história deste país prova, e até nossos congressistas já aprenderam que é mais seguro apanhar no cargo. Dilma vai preferir a morte lenta do impedimento. Confia que deixar o Planalto com o braço esquerdo erguido bradando que a luta continua, como José Dirceu fez ao ser preso, será seu ritual final de purificação. Mas está enganada. Dilma entrará para história como uma presidente incompetente, na política e na economia, capaz até de, em meio ao maior dos escândalos de corrupção, cair sem, de fato, ter se locupletado. Pior, julgada por um Congresso com contas na Suíça e campanhas pagas com dinheiro público propinado por empreiteiras. (F14/4 2016)

The virtual rout of Rousseff was underscored graphically in the week leading up to the vote in the Câmara, when the newspapers’ front pages demonstrated a visibly isolated (F11/4, E13/4, G14/4, G15/4), angry (F13/4, E13/4) and even symbolically decapitated president (E14/4). Examples are provided in Appendix A. Just prior to the vote in the Senate, Rousseff was even (figuratively speaking) burnt in-implicit-effigy on the front-page of *Estado* (E4/5), as an unintended visual side-effect of a pre-Olympic ceremony. The anticipation of both a “victory speech” leaked by Temer, as well as his plan of government, combined with these symbolic images and texts on the front-pages to present the impeachment as a *fait accompli* (Miranda 2016). Both *Estado* and *Folha* featured festive front-page designs on April 18 (see appendix A, figure A.17 and A.18), arguably marking the celebrations of the opposition-cum-governing parties as the newspapers’ own editorial stances.

Curiously but not incidentally, the celebrations in Congress were clothed in national flags, banners, and metaphors, and I return to this in Chapter 6.

The news value of the impending impeachment underpinned the publication of a very wide range of stories in the period, and few of these will probably be remembered. The main varieties of news items printed in *Estado* and *Folha* that tangentially or substantially connected to the impeachment of Rousseff included reports on a) new impeachment petitions (most prominently the one handed in by the Brazilian Bar Association OAB) and revisions of the existing pending petitions (based on Delcídio do Amaral's testimony), b) various commentary and op-ed pieces on the legality of petitions, *pedaladas* and the rejection of the state accounts by the TCU, and c) comparisons (in background articles) to the impeachment of Collor in 1992. These three themes related to legal or quasi-legal matters, while a range of items treated d) the crumbling government coalition and especially e) the struggle for control of the PMDB group in the Câmara (again with Cunha as antagonist) and the expulsion of PMDB dissident ministers Katia Abreu and Celso Pansera, plus the f) last-minute efforts to secure PP and PR support for the Dilma government and g) derived discussions of the legality of such negotiations. In a few instances, reports were published on h) the negotiations about the politicians who were expected to eventually form a new cabinet. Another spin-off was i) the impeachment petitions that targeted Temer for breaking the same law as Rousseff when signing decrees with budgetary effects without Congress assent, and j) the petition to impeach STF judge Marco Aurelio de Mello who had ratified these petitions against Temer and who had forced Cunha to install a special commission on the matter. Many news reports dealt with k) street protests and the events in public spaces on the day of the vote in the Câmara on April 17. A subset of these reports dealt with l) the reactions of parliamentarians and civic society to Jair Bolsonaro's laudation during his vote in favor of impeachment. Bolsonaro dedicated his vote to the colonel Ustra, who commanded interrogations and torture of left-wing activists during the dictatorship, including that of Rousseff. Some coverage dealt with m) a range of equally extreme and unexpected expressions of discontent related to the impeachment, including death threats. Finally, a number of news reports accounted for n) Rousseff's activities as her mandate hung by a thread embroiled in the impeachment, including a trip to the UN assembly in New York, a cancelled trip to Greece, and the always-newsworthy reports on presidential bicycling around Brasília's Planalto area.

The total number of texts published in *Estado* and *Folha* that in one way or the other tied into impeachment, often through one (or several) of the themes mentioned below, reached more than 3,000 between November 2015 until the day (May 12 2016) when Rousseff was removed temporarily and Temer took office (Damgaard 2018a). I have argued elsewhere (Damgaard 2018b) that the sheer volume of news on the impeachment process had a political effect, as it effectively eclipsed relevant information on other political actors under scrutiny for corruption – just as the front-pages of April and May tended to ignore crucial questions concerning the political actors coming into power when (rather than *if*) Rousseff would be ousted. A parallel argument to this is developed in the next chapter. Rousseff was temporarily removed, at first, on May 12, after the Senate ratified the vote of the Câmara. In the following months, the special commission of the Senate and the plenary repeated the decision of the Câmara, and like the lower house of Congress, interpreted fiscal delays as a violation of the president's fiscal responsibility. Rousseff was

permanently removed on August 31, while the interim President Michel Temer was installed permanently as the nation's 37<sup>th</sup> President.

#### 4.6 The End-of-the-World Testimony

Temer's cabinet was quickly embroiled in scandals, as was his party PMDB. Strands of the Lava-Jato investigation unraveled the role of PMDB (and several other parties coming into power) in corruption schemes tied to the cartel of construction companies, most prominently the Odebrecht group. The front page of *Veja*, November 2, 2016, featured the following headline (in gradually darker hues of grey on a completely black background):

A Delação do Fim do Mundo – As revelações da Odebrecht sobre corrupção já somam 300 anexos e deixam os políticos em estado de pânico. Sergio Moro: 'Espero que o Brasil sobreviva' (V#2502)

This headline drew upon a moniker of a plea bargain that the executives of the Odebrecht group had sought to negotiate for six months. As the first November issue of *Veja* hit the newsstands, the 77 top leaders of the company had been involved in lengthy negotiations to specify what kinds of information and evidence about whom they could deliver to the MPF. *Estado* journalists, like *Veja's*, wrote of the "sense of terror" instilled in the hearts of politicians as these negotiations progressed (E8/10 2016). Since August 2016, *Veja* and *Folha* had been handed out morsels of information from the investigations the proposed plea bargains and the revelations they contained. In this way, the so-called End-of-the-World-Testimony was kept current in the political landscape (e.g. V#2490, F6/8 2016, F7/8 2016, F28/10 2016), even as the polarity of the political spectrum switched definitively after the final vote for impeachment in the Senate on August 31. With a new Executive and a new cabinet, *Veja* and *Folha* increasingly shifted attention away from PT, while *Estado* maintained the party as focus of the reporting on corruption. On October 25, the plea bargain was settled, but had at that point been a virtual political fact for eight months.

In March 2016 the Lava-Jato investigations made a new set of crucial discoveries concerning the construction company. The 23<sup>rd</sup> phase was triggered on February 22, with several *doleiros* and middlemen arrested or taken into custody, along with the Odebrecht employees Benedicto Barbosa and the secretary Maria Lúcia Tavares. The operation was dubbed "Acarajé" after the Odebrecht-internal practice of referring to kickbacks by the name of the Bahian deep-fried seafood sandwich. Tavares quickly decided to negotiate a plea bargain, which allegedly stirred frantic meetings between the top echelon of Odebrecht and their chief lawyers (F8/3 2016). The "prince of the contractors" (V#2469), heir to the dynasty Marcelo Odebrecht, had been imprisoned preventively for nine months at that point.

With information from Tavares, the police learned not only the company's culinary code-names for bribes and kickbacks, but eventually a whole system of bribe distribution. One month later (March 22, 2016), the 26<sup>th</sup> phase (dubbed "Xepa") continued the scrutiny of the Odebrecht organization, this time targeting the headquarters of the company. The phase name was a reverse-wordplay implying that the investigations reached the apex of the organization. The "Xepa" phase revealed the extent of a secret department within the Odebrecht company solely tasked with moving bribes and laundering money. Tavares was a low-level employee in what became known as the "department of bribes." The task force in Curitiba, on the day of the 26<sup>th</sup> phase, publicized many of

the documents seized during the 23<sup>rd</sup> phase concerning the unravelling of the department of bribes. In particular, plans detailing the bribes to more than 300 individuals of 24 parties had been publicized (F22/3b 2016). Next to each code-named politician or local party office, values of tens or hundreds of thousands reais, supposedly bribes, were listed.

However, judge Moro, realizing that the Curitiba court did not have the jurisdiction of the hundreds of federal Congressmen, soon decreed the secrecy of those documents, but journalists of UOL had already downloaded and publicized them (Rodrigues 2016), and the plans were disseminated and discussed in all the daily papers the following day. However, arguing that one could not know whether it was really a plan of legitimate donations or criminal kickbacks, the *Jornal Nacional* cautiously opted to only mention the names of the parties in a short section of the newscast that night (JN22/3 2016). Instead, the newscast spent the time on the upcoming impeachment vote. The Globo commentator Merval Pereira argued exactly the same in an op-ed piece in *O Globo* three days later (G25/3 2016). The cautiousness of the Globo editors starkly contrasted the rapid dissemination, one week earlier, of secret recordings of Lula and Rousseff.

On the day of the Xepa phase, *Folha* revealed that the top executives of Odebrecht including Marcelo Odebrecht was now looking to negotiate a plea bargain. Marcelo's testimony was expected to be "explosive," and the (F22/3a 2016), and the bribe department secretary Tavares was called the "secretary-bomb" (F22/3b 2016).

The following day, the *Folha* columnist Clovis Rossi pointed out, in an op-ed piece entitled "A delação do fim do mundo" that if the plans could be substantiated, "not a stone would be left unturned" in the political elite. A "strict" or even "ultimate confession" (*confissão terminante*) of Odebrecht leaders would effectively mean a scenario "like the end of the [political] world":

Como todos os grandes partidos políticos são parte do sistema, é inevitável que não sobre pedra sobre pedra do conjunto todo. O efeito será certamente devastador para o governo Dilma Rousseff [...] O problema é que os parlamentares incumbidos de julgar o governo, no processo de impeachment, também tendem a ser atingidos –o que de fato configura um cenário de fim de mundo. (F23/3 2016)

This op-ed piece gave the media a moniker for the plea bargain, which at time was neither official nor initialized, but which materialized later in 2016. The moniker became the established shorthand term for the plea bargain, as seen on the *Veja* front-page in November. The End-of-the-World Testimony worked, like all harbingers of apocalypse, as herald of the end times; in other words, a narrative future is projected. The temporal horizon for Clovis Rossi is first the destruction of the Rousseff administration, but because the "whole gamut" of parliament is next in line, the second temporal horizon is open, indefinite, and existentially threatening. The *Veja* front-page quotes judge Sérgio Moro's perception of a threat to the nation: "I hope that Brazil survives."

The agents of this narrative are positioned like dominos, one triggering the fall of the next: The Odebrecht secretary's bomb is what triggers the ultimate confession from the leaders of the business group, and this generates the subsequent explosion of the political world. An editorial in *Folha* expected this to create a backlash against the Lava-Jato operation, hoping for a rebirth of Brazilian democracy after the "explosive list" (F25/3 2016). This implies a cathartic motive, with the Lava-Jato task-force in the position of the punisher. A rebirth motive is also implied in the quote of

judge Moro on the *Veja* front-page (V#2502). Odebrecht was eventually forced to repent in public: On December 2, 2016, after striking plea bargain, the company bought advertisement space in the national newspapers and declared *mea culpa*.

#### 4.6.1 Political cataclysm: The hour of the final judgment

*IstoÉ* spelled out the significance of the political moment in just five words on the front page, mid-March 2017. The result of a huge collective plea bargain had now materialized, and it would shake the foundations of the Republic. The lead of the feature article stated:

A hora do Juízo Final.

No aguardo dos pedidos de inquéritos do procurador-geral da República, Rodrigo Janot, Brasília estremece. O STF já prepara HDs para armazenar as delações dos 77 executivos da Odebrecht. A Lava Jato chega, enfim, à classe política. Começa o fim do mundo. Detentor dos mais recônditos segredos capazes de abalar a República, o Procurador-Geral Rodrigo Janot carrega um semblante que, de tão sereno e tranquilo, contrasta com o da esmagadora maioria dos políticos. [...] revelarão indícios veementes de pagamentos de propina para mais de uma centena de políticos, incluindo a cúpula do governo, petistas de altíssimo calibre, como os ex-presidentes Lula e Dilma Rousseff, e lideranças de PMDB e PSDB. (I#2465)

The notion of a final judgment (which was already used as a code-name for the 7<sup>th</sup> phase of the Lava-Jato investigations) is of course apocalyptic and biblical. The artwork or collage on the front page also paraphrases satirically the Michelangelo fresco of the same name (displayed in the Sistine Chapel), showing all major (non-PSDB) politicians of the recent years are depicted in Renaissance nude or with cloth draped around their angelically muscular bodies. Eduardo Cunha's face has the prominent position closest to the spectator, strung up on the cross. Above them all, PMDB and PT leaders alike, hovers the face of Marcelo Odebrecht.<sup>7</sup> In text and in art work, the political elite (equal to "Brasília" by synecdoche) is thus awaiting – but not waiting much longer – for a final verdict in consequence of the plea bargain negotiated with the executives of the Odebrecht group. The verdict, if the notion of "the end of the world" is to make sense, must thus be a verdict with dire consequences for the political elite.

Also in March 2017, *Veja* (V#2520) ran a front-page with a burning electoral ticket and the faces of Dilma Rousseff and Michel Temer half-consumed by the fire (see appendix A, figure A.24). This parallel expression of an impending negative verdict made sense in the context of the court trial against both in the TSE. Whether in the STF or TSE, "the political class" was thus facing "its crucial moment" (quoting here the *IstoÉ* front-page I#2465, see figure A.19). The result of this "final judgment" is symbolically provided by both *Veja* and *IstoÉ*: The end of the world in terms of well-known party leaders from PT, PMDB and PSDB, and the cancellation and conflagration of the 2014 presidential elections.

I will return to the notion of "the end of the world" shortly. Before doing so, I must mention the consequent horizon of the political as it was articulated then, what some commentators termed the "day after." With political cataclysm impending in one or the other courtroom, the prospects of the 2018 general elections were wide open and "more unpredictable than any other presidential election since the transition to democracy" (F6/4 2018).<sup>8</sup> Notice how the unpredictability of the 2018 elections yields an open-ended narrative structure: Unlike the impeachment stories discussed below, it was difficult to formulate any coherent stories about the political world after October

2018, as the horizon of possibilities was too wide and therefore too distant. Unlike the crisis of impeachment, which presented a storyable solution in its very theme, the cataclysm catalyzed by the Lava-Jato case did not appear to have a clear end to be projected and narrated ahead of the fact: A crisis may have solutions, while cataclysms, as a rule, don't. A threatened political elite did not constitute a crisis on the same scale as the impeachment, as the problem here is not instability, but unpredictability; an epistemic threat to the whole system, rather than a periodic malfunction that may be solved through constitutional means.

While the closure to this narrative remains to be discovered, the protagonists are ready at hand: Personified in the "serene and tranquil" PGR Janot, "guardian of the most recondite secrets capacious of shaking the Republic" in tandem with the institutional, de-personified protagonist of the STF. In conjunction with the biblical visual connotations, Janot is represented as an angelic guardian next to the ultimate seat of judgment, which again brings biblical symbolism to mind. If the politicians depicted are close to their judgment, then Janot is a sentinel, symbolically placed in a Purgatory-like interim space.

To understand this complex metaphor of apocalyptic proportions, we must however read more than the Bible. The reader's assumed previous knowledge includes a sense of the overall Lava-Jato case (at this point targeting most of the major politicians in Congress), but also some technical knowledge about the judicial process. It is, for instance, assumed that the reader knows how politicians are indicted by the PGR and that the STF can then choose to judge or not. Moreover, the debate of the veracity of plea bargains is denied relevance in the quote, as the "secrets" and vehement indicia" are implied to have the potential of "shaking the Republic," which supposedly would require the evidence to be found truthful. Indeed, we are given to understand that the importance of the Odebrecht plea bargain is due to its truthfulness. This, finally, brings with it the assumption that the reader knows that the "final judgment" would be possible only because of the scope and level of detail of the testimonies given by the bosses of the Odebrecht group, the largest of Brazil's construction companies.

#### 4.6.2 The Fall of the Republic

The notion of future grave ramifications of Odebrecht's inside knowledge was already foreshadowed when Marcelo Odebrecht was imprisoned, and the motive of a "threat to the Republic" was foregrounded on *Época's* front page on June 22, 2015 (E#889): "Ele ameaça derrubar a República."

Emilio Odebrecht acredita, sem evidências, que o governo do PT está por trás das investigações lideradas pelo procurador-geral da República, Rodrigo Janot. "Se prenderem o Marcelo (Odebrecht, filho de Emilio e atual presidente da empresa), terão de arrumar mais três celas", costuma repetir o patriarca, de acordo com esses relatos. "Uma para mim, outra para o Lula e outra ainda para a Dilma."... Os comentários de Emilio Odebrecht eram apenas bravata, um desabafo de pai preocupado, fazendo de tudo para proteger o filho e o patrimônio de uma família? Ou eram uma ameaça real a Dilma e a Lula? Os interlocutores não sabem dizer. (E#889)

Here, the threat works metonymically: a threat to Dilma and Lula equals a threat to the Republic. The vision of members of the business elite overthrowing the Republic would grow to involve more than just the PT leaders in 2016 in consequence of the Odebrecht plea bargain. That development

also entailed another kind of emplotment: Logically, whereas a narrative of a final judgment implies an institutional arena in which corrupt politicians could be tried, a threat to the Republic would require more earth-shattering revelations - a rupture of the entire institutional order. When such ruptures appeared on the horizon, and the very ground shook under Brasília, the narrative of the national threat also reappeared. After all, if the Supreme Court turned out to be corrupt, how could any (secular) final judgment be trusted?

The fear that political actors even pulled the strings of the Supreme Court judges was a part of the Lula leaks (see above, section 4.4.3), although Lula's supposed attempts did not succeed. Another leak revealed similar plans being hatched by PMDB shortly thereafter: *Folha*, on May 23, 2016, published recordings (taped before the impeachment became a reality) which featured a key witness in the Petrobras case. Sergio Machado - witness, former senator, and president of the Petrobras subsidiary Transpetro - discussed the removal of Rousseff with major political actors of PMDB, such as the President of the Senate, Renan Calheiros, and ex-President José Sarney. In the conversations, the politicians agreed that it was necessary to end the corruption probes into the political establishment, which threatened to "put an end to the political class." On the recordings, another key actor, PMDB Senator Romero Jucá, stated that someone needs to "stop the bleeding" caused by the Lava-Jato investigations. This could be done by changing government and ending the Prosecutor General's project of cleaning politics:

Tem que resolver essa porra... Tem que mudar o governo pra poder estancar essa sangria. Acabar com a classe política para ressurgir, construir uma nova casta, pura, que não tem a ver com [corrupção] [...] Caiu. Todos eles. Aloysio, Serra, Aécio. ... tudo mundo na bandeja para ser comida. (cited in Valente, 2016 - F23/5)).

Machado was called the "human bomb" as the media quickly picked up on the explosive potential of his eventual testimony in a plea bargain, that would make the leaked "testimony of Delcídio do Amaral look like a Disney tale" (F26/5 2016). *Veja* claimed that the Lava-Jato task force for more than a year had viewed Machado as "the perfect way to get to the big sharks of the Petrobras corruption scheme, especially the PMDB leadership," which would explode as a result of the taps:

As gravações de conversas entre Sérgio Machado e seus aliados do PMDB já provocaram a queda de dois ministros, Romero Jucá, do Planejamento, e, na semana passada, Fabiano Silveira, da Transparência. Foi apenas uma amostra do que a delação de Sérgio Machado pode produzir. As revelações mais graves e explosivas ainda estão por vir, e vão implodir a cúpula do PMDB, o partido que dividiu com o PT os lucros do petróleo. (V#2481)

Jucá, on the same recording, also implied that a backstage deal between the STF and the military forces was under construction to enact his project of "stopping the bleeding." He sketched out a "national pact, with the Supreme court, with everybody" in the leaked recording (F23/5 2016), which could limit the reach of the investigations. Jucá stepped down after the leak, as did another recorded cabinet member, but the sense that "deep state" actors of the old elite were doing everything in their power to stop the Lava-Jato trials lingered.

A year later, in May 2017, the wording of this vision changed with a new leak involving Michel Temer: The threat to the Republic was now the impending "the Fall of the Republic." The fall would be precipitated by a new plea bargain, negotiated by Joesley and Wesley Batista, two meat tycoons and brothers. The Batistas, leaders of the large JBS group, had apparently helped Temer pay hush money to the imprisoned Eduardo Cunha. Cunha himself declared the end of the Republic in the



event of a plea bargain: “Se a JBS delatar, será o fim da República”, diz Eduardo Cunha” (E17/5 2017), read one *Estado* headline. However, Temer weathered the storm, explaining away the arrest of his aide who carried R\$ 500,000 in cash, and also ignoring the leaks of the conversation with Joesley Batista in which he consented to maintain payments to pay for Cunha’s silence. Counting on the immobility of the institutional checks and balances and the legislative shield of Congress (Pérez-Liñán 2014) to stop corruption probes against him, Temer simply absorbed the scandal and continued to govern. A majority in the Câmara voted not to let a trial against Temer commence (with 251 votes against 233). Moreover, other leaks from the Batista case hinted that Supreme judges could be bought, and the office of the PGR was later scandalized as it turned out that one of the public prosecutors working directly under Rodrigo Janot had assisted the meat tycoons in obtaining very favorable terms in their plea bargain.<sup>9</sup>

#### 4.7 Forecasting Elections and the Fear of Chaos

Rounding off this chapter, I will briefly review the solutions to political problems offered across these texts. Overall, the Lava-Jato processes promised to solve the central democratic contradiction – persistent suspicions of corrupt political leaders, who anyway get elected - by bringing members of the political elite and the business leaders to trial, more swiftly and more decisively than ever before. In particular, the lingering suspicions about Lula and PT leaders left from the previous scandals (the Mensalão and the Celso Daniel case) were pursued by the Lava-Jato probe and it seemed to unwind the plot that had successfully kept PT in power and grafted millions and millions from the coffers of Petrobras and other state companies. However, other plots were also unmasked, giving rise to new contradictions, most importantly the problems of the impeachment process, which could either be interpreted as a parliamentary coup d’état which would shield investigated politicians, or as a shortcut to re-establishing economically sound governance model of the public sector. The texts thereby also establish or undermine legitimacy of Rousseff’s and Temer’s governments and of Brazil’s representative democracy – and this issue of legitimacy was brought forth by the erratic disclosure of the Lava-Jato scandal.

Undeniably, the texts of the Lava-Jato case also opened discussions of the legitimacy and equity of the Judiciary. Did the trials and investigations represent the effective rule of law, or did vested interests drive these processes? The roles played by Moro, by Janot, and by the STF in various cases came under intense scrutiny, especially in the cases with weak or entirely missing causal links: How could Lula be charged with corruption in lieu of a specific corrupted action performed as president – and was it plausible that the bribes and kickbacks of his hypothetical corruption only materialized years after his presidency? The Lava-Jato task force insisted that “no specific act of government” was needed (section 4.4.1). A similar logic was employed in the arguments for impeaching Rousseff, where a tangible Presidential order for the fiscal delays in the State Treasury could not quite be found, and evidence from the Lava-Jato case was legally barred from spilling over. Ultimately, of course, the President could be considered responsible for every act of state, even if no specific deed was documented.

The legal contradictions were resolved to the disadvantage of the PT leaders, with Rousseff impeached and Lula going to jail on April 7, 2018, sentenced to 12 years of prison in the first of eight corruption cases. The proportions of these legal outcomes seemed excessive to many, especially as

the PGR and the STF did not come off as particularly efficient in pressing charges against other investigated Senators and Congressmen. As Temer's inner circle became exposed for hatching backstage plans to stop the Lava-Jato investigation, the injustice appeared even more appalling and the contradiction of substituting one president suspected of corruption for another was evident.

Because of Temer's deft hand in avoiding prosecution and annulment of his mandate (Damgaard 2018b:105), this contradiction not really be solved, but the desire for a solution was clearly present in the texts; only the total destruction of the whole political elite, the "Fim-do-Mundo," would fulfil the desire. But who or what would rise in the ensuing power vacuum, after the Fall of the Republic? While the Lava-Jato probe and trials in various emplotments did offer solutions to various problems, new challenges to Brazilian democracy arose on the horizon as the presidential elections of October 2018 drew closer: In May 2018, the Brazilian economy was stopped in its tracks due to a paralyzing truck driver strike, leaving gas stations empty and even the military with precious little fuel. *Folha* pundit Celso Rocha de Barros interpreted the situation as "chaos," and this chaos would be a decisive factor that could lead the right-wing candidate Jair Bolsonaro to the presidency:

Bolsonaro apoia a greve dos caminhoneiros porque o desabastecimento vai deixar a população com fome, e Bolsonaro quer a população com fome. Bolsonaro quer isso tudo porque sabe que quanto mais você estiver com raiva, medo e fome, quanto mais estiver desesperado e sem saber o que fazer, menor será sua capacidade de pensar direito. E ninguém jamais votará em Bolsonaro se estiver pensando direito. Bolsonaro apoia a greve para produzir desordem agora e vender ordem em outubro. Cai nessa quem for otário... É incapaz de criticar as milícias que aterrorizam o Rio de Janeiro. E agora torce pelo caos. (F28/5 2018)

The pundit here ascribes an electoral motivation to Bolsonaro (whose candidature was based on military nostalgia and authoritarian law-and-order policies), asserting that Bolsonaro would benefit from chaos, because such chaos would push the increasingly desperate population to take desperate measures in the voting booth. Many other editorials and pundits expressed similar fears of the imprudent gut-level reactions of voters to the years of scandals, but few connect the figure of national chaos to the candidate Bolsonaro so directly.

Observing the waves of corruption allegations, scandals, and crises retrospectively, it becomes clear that the extent and ramifications of the disclosure of corruption grew gradually as new narrative structures emerged and coalesced on top of earlier ones. To recapitulate, all the way back in April 2014, the scandal of Petrobras was merely "a bad deal" (F4/4 2014) involving PT. Four years later, successive revelations, exposés and leaks had spread like rings in the water, bringing Brazilian democracy to the brink of the abyss. The story of the Car Wash was expanded to a crisis and eventually to a tale of political cataclysm, but this escalating sequence of course only appeared as such in the rear-view mirror. At each moment, the crisis seemed to be the ultimate one, and in the next chapter, I turn to this distinctly temporal limitedness of the scandal, or moment-to-moment effect of the media narration.

## Chapter 5

### Time and Narrative Desire in Scandal News

The previous chapter deliberately delayed a concluding summary of contrasting or consonant emplotments of the disclosure, leaks and scandals in Brazil's political sphere 2014-2018 – and yet, a reader with a knack for narrative may have gleaned the contours of several plots already. The goal of this chapter is to establish the possible plots informing the texts presented in the previous chapter. Using the terminology presented in Chapter 2, I name such analytical constructions *fabulas* in the following.

This is not the first task undertaken in this chapter, however. The a posteriori analytical construction of such *fabulas* may gloss over the contingency of the moment, the risk of an unfolding event series with no guarantee of resolution. Unlike intertextual *fabulas* that may be analytically re-constructed as meaningful wholes after the fact, media texts rarely account for events only in the retrospective; rather, the texts point both backwards and forwards in time. Situated *in media res*,

Journalism constitutes a series of interrelated practices for the social construction of time. It *arrests* the ordinary and the unusual in various forms of texts that create feelings of simultaneity, help to define the contemporary, *outline possible futures*, and shape our understanding and memories of the past. (Bødker 2016:55, emphases mine)

Before I present the *fabulas* that I have constructed from the news texts, I must therefore first explore the significance of the texts' temporality in the middle of the plot, so to speak. The textual practice linking reported events to previous *and* upcoming events is an important feature of these narrative structures, and only after we grasp this can we begin to consider how the incremental development of the scandals had an impact on the political field.

#### 5.1 Timing the Tale: Seriality and Coverage *In Media Res*

In a constantly updated landscape of news, we must now more than ever consider “news as something constantly unfolding” (Bødker 2016:60), accumulating content and weaving journalistic material together.

Stories that matter are stories that persist and take different turns over days or weeks or longer. [...] as time passes, the story grows the ripples spread out into past and future, the time span enlarges backward and forward, the reverberations to past and future become the news context for the story. (Schudson 1987:89)

The characteristic “linking” and continuous replacement of news stories is enhanced by hypertext (Bolter and Grusin 1999:43-4, Bødker 2016:59), but such linking is not a property exclusive to digital news; in fact, serialization is as old as the penny press. Serialization of real events was found in famous historical scandals such as the Dreyfus affair, while fictional serials were popular and common content in newspapers, with Conan Doyle's “penny dreadfuls” as one of many examples. Mussell has argued that it was a defining genre characteristic of the developing news press: “It was through formal properties – from their materiality to their seriality – that newspapers and periodicals constituted a distinct print genre. [...] The two most important formal properties are

miscellaneity and seriality” (Mussell 2012:50). In this continuation of texts, any specific newspaper is the same while the news content gradually changes; so it is the recurrent formal features that stabilize the slowly mutating format across editions (ibid.:42-54). “Repetition is a vital and overlooked component of periodical form” (ibid.:50), and repetition especially took the form of seriality in the 19<sup>th</sup> century papers and periodicals.

In the previous chapter, the overarching headline “Escândalo em série,” printed in *O Globo*, was mentioned. It appeared already in late 2014, overtly signalling seriality. For more than three years, this overarching headline underscored the *feuilleton*-like character of the Lava-Jato investigations and the snow-balling series of not just police actions against major companies and political players, but also the cascade of plea bargains, one leading to another. This patterning of the scandal as an *affaire*, an ongoing narrative that unfolds and is publicly contested, is supposed to keep up and direct the audience’s interest by maintaining the elements of the overarching story arc (Boltanski 1999:59). The seriality established on the *O Globo* front page is an editorial choice echoed in all of the newspapers, print as well as online: Every outlet tagged online content “Lava Jato” or “Lava-Jato” and created subsections of their websites gathering the scandal-specific productions under this moniker, thus playing on an already existing everyday-language shorthand. The volume of content on the scandal gathered in these subsections frequently surpassed the “regular” political news in 2015 and 2016. In this way, the semantic evolution of the word Lava-Jato turned from reference to a police operation to a symbolic signifier of the whole gamut of political unravelling and the earthquake slowly eroding Brazil’s political institutions.

Each instance of serialized media texts is thus poised at a point on a story arc that stretches ahead *in media res* (Motta 2013:97). Because of this, news on political scandals often narrate both (contested) pasts and (possible) futures. I will briefly consider six examples of this temporality. The first example deals with the PGR’s request for investigations into 49 current or former public-office holders, a request that was authorized by the STF judge Teori Zavascki in March 2015.

Janot e sua equipe prepararam a lista com uma estratégia cautelosa. Para evitar ataques de advogados e desarmar alguns dos ministros mais conservadores, os procuradores optaram por não usar nenhuma prova colhida no decorrer de um ano de investigação da Lava Jato. Centraram-se somente nas delações de Paulo Roberto Costa e Alberto Yousef, já homologadas por Teori. Caso fizessem uso das provas, boa parte das acusações ficaria mais robusta. Permitiram até a denúncia, etapa seguinte ao pedido de abertura de inquérito. Na avaliação de Janot e sua equipe, porém, o risco jurídico era demasiado. “Abriríamos flancos perigosos”, diz um dos procuradores da equipe. “Pode-se argumentar que cada político, por ter foro no Supremo, requer um processo que comece do zero, apenas pela delação homologada.” A esperança dos procuradores é que Teori e os demais ministros da Segunda Turma do Supremo, responsáveis pelo caso, permitam a produção de provas. Precisam autorizar quebra de sigilos bancários, fiscais, telefônicos, além de outras medidas sigilosas. (E#874)

In this example, the text presents the situation as a legal trench-style warfare with “dangerous flanks” that poses “legal risks” to the whole investigation. The strategy and hopes of the prosecutors for the upcoming stages of the pre-trial phase are described, and the choice of strategy is based on specific assessments of the strength of previously accumulated evidence. The uncertain future projects a narrative risk (Silverstone 1981:136), a disappointing ultimate outcome of the trials.

In narratological terms, the text above is structured in a complex way; primarily as a past-tense (but contemporary) account focalizing the team of national-level prosecutors headed by PGR Janot.

What complicates matters here is multiple futures, an extended backstory, and the short interview quote which is cited in the present tense (“diz” rather than “disse”), underscoring the here-and-now tempus. The likelihood of future legal attacks by defense lawyers are pre-empted by their strategy of only basing the petition for investigation in material from plea bargains, and an alternative strategy is presented as too dangerous; thus, two immediate futures are spelled out here, plus a more long-term future with a possible extended phase of gathering more evidence, depending on the goodwill of the STF. The past tense reaches back one year, to the start of the Lava-Jato operation, but implicitly goes even further, since the plea bargains detail events going back decades. Elsewhere in the text, several events of political transgression are mentioned, going all the way back to the PSDB government of Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995-2002). Emblematically, the headline of the article is “The list was only the start,” encapsulating the future projection or narrative desire for more investigations and revelations. The question prompted by the headline – the start of what, exactly? – is answered shortly after the above quote:

Mas o Supremo, mais uma vez, ocupa o centro das atenções. Pouco tempo depois do mensalão, um julgamento que rompeu, na cúpula do judiciário, a cultura da impunidade dos poderosos, os ministros terão de se voltar a um caso que paralisa Brasília e eletriza o Brasil. Os quatro ministros responsáveis pela Lava Jato - Teori, Cármen Lúcia, Celso de Mello e Gilmar Mendes - terão anos difíceis pela frente. (E#874)

The Lava Jato is here presented as a case of high-level corruption that is doomed to either confirm the milestone of the Mensalão case, or else disappoint the “electrified” nation.

The future is not the only thing that may be presented as full of doubts and risks. The next example demonstrates the contested nature of pasts. Here, a news item presents several contested pasts discussed in the immediate past, leading to a future process in the Ethics Commission of the Câmara.

O presidente da Câmara dos Deputados, Eduardo Cunha (PMDB-RJ), disse nesta terça-feira (3) que irá provar no Conselho de Ética que não faltou com a verdade. A declaração foi dada horas após o conselho instaurar processo para investigar se Cunha cometeu quebra de decoro parlamentar por não ter declarado à Justiça Eleitoral ter contas bancárias na Suíça atribuídas a ele e a parentes. Segundo a Procuradoria Geral da República, documentos enviados pelo Ministério Público suíço confirmam a existência dessas contas. Em depoimento à CPI da Petrobras, em março, Cunha negou ter qualquer conta no exterior. (G1 3/11 2015)

Above this text, a short bit of *Jornal Nacional* coverage is embedded as video. A part of the fourth phrase (“o conselho instaurar processo”) is a hyperlink to the earlier news piece on the start of the Ethics Committee process the same day, and just below the quoted section, five other hyperlinks to news from October and November 2015 are provided as background material for the case, covering the main news on Cunha’s involvement in the Lava-Jato case. Each of these, in turn, contains more hyperlinks, through which one can eventually trace the story back to the CPI session of March 2015 mentioned in the quote. Systematically, the sentences of the news item can be broken down into the following elements:

- I. Immediate past (the speech act – Cunha’s statement)
  - i. presidente da Câmara dos Deputados, Eduardo Cunha (PMDB-RJ), disse nesta terça-feira (3)
- II. Future (the object of the statement)
  - ii. que irá provar no Conselho de Ética
- III. Factual but contested past (Cunha spoke in CPI session)
  - iii. que não faltou com a verdade.

- IV. Pre-immediate past (the background event of Cunha’s statement)
  - iv. A declaração foi dada horas após o conselho instaurar processo
- V. Possible past #1 (the object of the coming ethics committee investigation – determining if it was a breach of decorum)
  - v. para investigar se Cunha cometeu quebra de decoro parlamentar por não ter declarado à Justiça Eleitoral ter contas bancárias na Suíça atribuídas a ele e a parentes.
- VI. Factual Past (evidence of the accounts)
  - vi. Segundo a Procuradoria Geral da República, documentos enviados pelo Ministério Público suíço confirmam a existência dessas contas.
- VII. Factual Past (Cunha spoke in CPI session)
  - vii. Em depoimento à CPI da Petrobras, em março, Cunha negou
- VIII. Possible past #2 (Cunha’s denial of the factual past #2)
  - viii. ter qualquer conta no exterior.

This text, like the previous one, exists in a serial relationship to other texts: The latter example relates to the ongoing coverage of Cunha’s alleged lies and accounts, while the former example serializes political scandals intertextually, linking Petrolão to Mensalão and even further back. Both examples demonstrate the back-and-forth zig-zag movements of *tempus* (common to many kinds of news, see Bell 1991:150), where the context of the past motivates coverage of immediate-past events; the inclusion of future events, meanwhile, foreshadows resolution to conflicts presented or implied in the recent event. Such emplotment of resolution is not only intertextual, but may also crop up in the text itself. In the latter example, the relationship between Cunha’s trial in the Ethics Committee and the trials in the STF is mentioned later, with one potential resolution mentioned: “o processo no Supremo já tem como consequência, no caso de condenação, a perda de mandato, o que dispensaria a necessidade do Conselho de Ética.” (G1 3/11 2015). In fact, the consequence turned out to be not only a revoked mandate, but a unanimous prison sentence in the STF.

Another example of serial coverage shows that, even caught *in media res*, a news item may still have an endpoint which terminates the arc of the fabula. This news item, with the headline “Favorável ao impeachment, líder do PR na Câmara entrega cargo,” deals with the gradual rupture of the government coalition, specifically the break-off of the coalition support party PR, and the text clearly projects the future outcome of that event, namely, the impeachment of Dilma Rousseff:

Favorável ao impeachment de Dilma Rousseff (PT), o deputado Maurício Quintela [sic] Lessa (PR-AL) entregou no fim da tarde desta segunda-feira (11) a liderança do partido na Câmara, cargo que ocupava desde o início do segundo mandato da petista. A Executiva Nacional do PR é contrária à saída de Dilma, mas a maioria dos 40 deputados do partido na Câmara, a quinta maior bancada da Casa, é favorável ao impeachment.

[...] Os deputados da sigla estão liberados para votar como quiserem, mas Maurício Quintela calcula que, dos 40, entre 25 e 30 votos devem ser pelo impeachment no próximo domingo, dia 17 de abril, quando está prevista a votação no plenário. “Não só tenho absoluta certeza de que houve o crime de responsabilidade, como, do ponto de vista político, achamos que o governo da presidente Dilma não tem a menor condição de tirar o país da crise que se encontra hoje. Achamos que com o governo novo, o país terá pelo menos a esperança de dias melhores, credibilidade, oportunidades de voltar a crescer”, justificou Lessa sua posição. (F11/4 2016)

In this example, the temporal aspects are seemingly much more straight-forward than in the first two examples. With only the party boss’ voice present, Rousseff’s crime is represented “with absolute certainty,” motivating the expected ousting, and Quintella’s direct quote even spells out a

hope for a better future for the country when the impeachment of Rousseff succeeds – with his aid and the aid of his partisans.

The temporal concepts of anticipation and expectation, discussed in section 2.4, may help understand how news constructs horizons of political agency. The above example of temporal prolepsis demonstrates how the fall of the Rousseff government is clearly anticipated in the media texts; in fact, it is precisely the increasing possibility of impeachment that makes news such as the statements of the PR party boss newsworthy. Every bit of information that mattered in the struggle for votes against or in favour of impeaching Rousseff was turned into a news piece online by the daily newspapers, so that the total volume of news on impeachment sky-rocketed in March, April and May 2016 (see appendix C). While by themselves insignificant, the accumulation of news items became a torrent of signals that indicated the likelihood of Rousseff losing the vote and eventually being removed from office – just as in the example above.

The gradual realization, provoked by the evidence leaking from the Lava-Jato investigations, that the Petrobras subcontractors paid off not just government leaders, but scores of Congressmen across the board, only rarely challenged the expected outcome. The example below is one of few reports which mention the possibility of the Lava-Jato investigations producing results that could change the course of the impeachment:

Marcelo Odebrecht decide fazer delação premiada na Lava Jato  
Maior empreiteira do País, no dia em que foi alvo de mais uma fase das investigações de corrupção na Petrobrás admitiu em nota oficial acordo de 'colaboração definitiva' de seus executivos com o Ministério Público Federal... Mais influente empreiteira do País, a Odebrecht mantém sólidos contatos com o universo da política brasileira. Por isso, o anúncio agitou os gabinetes de Brasília no início da noite de ontem. A expectativa é de que Marcelo Odebrecht e os demais executivos possam revelar detalhes capazes de impactar até o processo de impeachment da presidente Dilma Rousseff. (E22/3 2016)

Overall, as described in section 4.5.4, impeachment appeared to be a *fait accompli* in March and April of 2016; the endpoint of that story would be realized as a matter of when, rather than if. In the same vein, the previous chapter contained several other examples of teleology in news reports, projecting, for instance, “the end of the Republic” or the fall of Cunha through various legal processes, just after his “meteoric ascension” to power. It might not seem surprising that legal trials such as Cunha’s are presented with textual reference to the resolution or expected outcome of a sentence. However, because of the usual impunity in Brazilian corruption cases, such an outcome carried strong symbolic aspects. Since actual cases of court sentencing of politicians were few and far between, that most iconic moment thinkable – the ex-president Lula being taken away by police agents in handcuffs – was considered to be even more symbolic. That moment did not actually manifest itself in 2016, but the expectation of it was no doubt present. A number of news items discussed the legality and issues pertaining to Lula’s coercive testimony (reported in the *Jornal Nacional* on March 4), and some pundits claimed that Lula had expected hand-cuffs as part of the police operation. One pundit, using ascription (see section 1.5), even had Lula insist on being taken away in handcuffs, with the aim of underscoring his narrative of political persecution:

[Segundo relatos, Lula] teria dito que só iria algemado. E depois usou de todo o seu carisma e verve para falar aos seus seguidores. Se Lula condena Moro por um “espetáculo”, pretendeu combater espetáculo com espetáculo, numa estratégia de vitimização. (E9/3 2016)

In an op-ed two days later, also in *Estado*, the expectation of handcuffs is repeated, as element in a predictive interpretation wherein Lula wants to appear as victim. However, in this interpretation, Lula came off much too angry to pull off convincingly the stance of the unjustly arrested and oppressed citizen:

As crises assumem ritmos mais rápidos no seu final. A reação de Lula na entrevista coletiva, ao sair da PF, não me pareceu a de um candidato. Em 2002 foi difícil vencer com o “Lulinha paz e amor”. Em 2018 será impossível vencer como jararaca. Um candidato não se identifica com uma cobra peçonhenta. Nem se considera a alma mais honesta do Brasil. Verdade que seu marqueteiro está na cadeia. Mas onde está a intuição política que sempre lhe atribuem? Ele perdeu a cabeça e, com ela, a chance de representar a serenidade do inocente. Seu marqueteiro representou. Não evitou a cadeia, mas, pelo menos, era um script mais elaborado. Lula queria ser algemado. (E11/3 2016, see also appendix A, figure A.24)

Through this temporal prolepsis - a hypothetical but non-realized situation with Lula in handcuffs - the event is located as part of a pattern, as one in a rhythmic series of “crisis moments.” One paragraph later, the same pundit considers the coming end of the Rousseff government and the likely fall of Cunha (who had at that point been charged before the Supreme Court) as the next critical moments that could lead to some optimism on the market with a recovery of the national economy. The moments are then tied into the street protests planned for the following Sunday:

Apesar de seu ritmo, os últimos dias têm trazido uma ponta de otimismo, mesmo nos mercados, que são tão voláteis. Esse otimismo está baseado na queda de Dilma, mas deve ser estendido também a Eduardo Cunha. Os dois são rejeitados pela maioria. Não se trata apenas de festejar uma queda, desfazer-se de uma pedra no caminho. É criar uma chance de, superando o impasse político, recuperar a economia.

O que move as pessoas no domingo não é só a unânime luta contra a corrupção, mas também a clareza sobre as dificuldades cotidianas. Elas podem não ter uma noção clara do que deva ser feito. Mas sabem que algo precisa ser feito. E urgente. (E11/3 2016)

That the pundit identifies a rhythm is interesting because that interpretation of events summons forth the pattern before the events have even manifested themselves. The events linked in the example are also the most important mediated events in the course of the Lava-Jato scandal, judging by the political consequences. Hundreds of legal trials have been initiated, but the removal of Cunha and Rousseff, the incarceration of Lula and the protests during March 2016 were certainly the most highly-profiled moments. The author could not know their political significance, but clearly had a well-developed sense of where things would go. The example is, for exactly that reason, good for summarizing the findings of this section. It shows how news items and political commentary is always located *in media res* but with a sense of an end-point and point of departure, or temporal compass markings that may be revealed by analyzing temporal modes.

By ascription and prediction, interpretations are stabilized and chains of events established that point towards an endpoint and a resolution. The resolution works to conclude an emplotted seriality between certain events, contingently selected (Somers 1994), and the relevance of any information presented in the news items is linked to this seriality. In other words, the narrative emplotment is an important resource for claiming newsworthiness. When intertextually stretching towards resolutions or end-goal (say, impeachment, a court sentence, or Lula being taken to jail), such news generates what I will characterize, in the following, as narrative desire.



## 5.2 Narrative Desire in Emplotment of Real Events

In the above examples (and in various examples of the previous chapter, e.g. V#2435, E17/7 2015, and the quotes of the prosecutor Santos Lima in section 4.4.1), several different narrative desires are articulated. I introduced the concept of narrative desire in Chapter 2 with these words: The desire for narrative closure is the point where temporality connects with the cast of characters, invested with values. As discussed above, most story arcs that deal with corruption are directed towards an endpoint - usually an ending with either the fall of the accused (through impeachment, removal from office, or sentence and prison time), or, inversely, the accused politician's success in overcoming the legal processes and political problems. I have here analyzed the temporal features of several media texts that may serve as illustrations of modes of temporality that generate narrative desire through anticipation; specifically, the desire for ousting Rousseff, the desire for Cunha's fall and for corruption trials against other corrupted Congressmen, and the desire to see Lula in handcuffs at Sérgio Moro's bidding. In this section, I will develop the argument that these desires are defining features of fabulas (see section 2.3), using the just mentioned examples of narrative desires.

First, I will clear up one potential misunderstanding: I am not implicitly blaming Brazilian journalists for being biased against PT and Cunha, unconsciously or not. While that claim is often explicitly made by various Brazilian scholars of media and politics (e.g. van Dijk 2017, Albuquerque 2017, Chaia 2016:52, Souza 2016), my claim is more limited. With the examples above, I simply hope to show that events in scandals are covered because they are deemed newsworthy on the grounds of their likely consequences. Those consequences are defined institutionally, and the projection of futures found in the news are basically accounts of likely scenarios within the relevant institutional frameworks. As such, the journalists merely reproduce the "webs of facticity" and the commonplace, institutionally sanctioned interpretations of events. What emerges both in and especially between singular instances of news reporting on real life events, however, is the narrativization of these scenarios, as hypothesized in Chapter 2. Some journalists would argue that the telling has nothing to do with narratives; the notion of narrative structures and desires impinging upon factual, objective reporting seems embarrassing. Hayden White offered an explanation as to why narratives are embarrassments in the accounts of real events:

It is because real events do not offer themselves as stories that their narrativization is so difficult. What is involved then, in that finding the "true story", that discovery of the "real story" within or behind the events that come to us in the chaotic form of "historical records"? What wish is enacted, what desire is gratified, by the fantasy that *real* events are properly represented when they can be shown to display the formal coherency of a story? In the enigma of this wish, this desire, we catch a glimpse of the cultural function of narrativizing discourse... (White 1981:4)

Coherency does not simply present itself to the journalist: It is always constructed, and co-constructed with the reader's interpretations. So, in the op-ed piece from *Estado* directly above, coherency is almost forced upon the material, although it may seem textually fragile to the outsider: What is the pattern or rhythm that links protests, the fall of Rousseff and of Cunha, and the not-manifested handcuffing of Lula together? How does coherency emerge here?

The last few paragraphs of the op-ed piece above postulate the optimism of the market, linking this to economic recovery. What provokes optimism is the anticipation of Cunha's and Rousseff's fall

(which in turn is linked to Lula, as discussed in the previous chapter). The protesters, or rather “people” in general (“as pessoas”), know that “something must be done,” urgently, in the “unanimous” fight against corruption, even “without a clear notion” of what that “something” should be. Their protests will however demonstrate the political support for impeachment, thus precipitating Rousseff’s fall and strengthening the virtuous cycle beginning in the “volatile stock markets.” This projection of the future connects the text to one emergent fabula – a fabula of the cleaning of Brazilian politics, starting with the Lava-Jato investigations. The desired narrative resolution (popular protests) to the supposed or perceived main problem (political leaders like Rousseff or Cunha) gives a strong clue about the kind of fabula that this text draws upon. This narrative desire directs attention and demands confirmation: If the protests turn out to be a success, then the success of the impeachment proceedings is accordingly more likely. Similarly, every time a coalition party breaks from government (like the PR party), it brings the impeachment a little closer, and is narrated as doing so. Causality works forwards in this emplotment, because the news item stands *in media res* (Motta 2013:97).

The temporal horizon of this desired forward-movement limits the temporal extent of fabulas. That is, the limits of a given fabula’s scope is based on the narrative desire: The interrogation or coercive testimony of Lula generates the expectation of a trial, and the eventual trial will generate the expectation of a sentence (rendering Lula ineligible in the 2018 elections), and this should ultimately be followed by incarceration. The smaller events of day-to-day politics and trials are thus made meaningful and gain importance (that is, made newsworthy) because they actualize and even “speed up” the present-now towards a narrative climax or solution. The desire for resolution is built into the ongoing sense-making activity of constructing a coherent emplotment of complex political events and horizons of action.

The construction of coherency usually involves reducing complexity and ignoring large swathes of political reality. In other words, to produce meaningful but readable journalistic material, newswriters and political pundits expound on the basis of the available pool of fabulas, which may serve to cut short extended background explanations, handle doubt and “hedges,” and abbreviate the forecasts of future events. Therefore, the presence of narrative desire (e.g. to see PT leaders in jail) in news texts is not necessarily a clear-cut case of ideological bias on the part of the journalist – but a property of the developing, intertextually emergent fabulas. That is not to say that counter-narratives do not exist, and that journalists and commentators are totally restrained in their choice of fabulas from which they may draw emplotments of events. I merely point out that the genre of news and the institutional circumstances of scandals together engender this specific temporal orientation and narrative desire for resolution in the texts. If the texts failed to explain the root causes or ultimate consequences, they could hardly be recognized as newsworthy, nor as truly reporting on the series to which they belong, and so they would likely be discarded by editors.

Journalists are sometimes prompted by their sources to look for symbolic significance that may emerge as emplotment in the text. In the previous chapter, we saw how Cunha and Lula defined the investigations as political persecution; such definitions may carry over into the media texts (and into intertextually emerging fabula). Politicians are not the only one to play at that game, however. Arantes noted that the Brazilian press since the early 00s “has been filled with cleverly named police operations,” and the catchy names engage public and media attention, giving “a sense of the result

and the likely responsibility of those being implicated” (Arantes 2011:201). The symbolic naming of operations provides, simultaneously, an informational shortcut, a hashtag-like function for digital and cognitive retrieval, and a discursive node in public debate. The moniker “Lava-Jato” itself was certainly less laden with symbolism than later investigative phases, but has by 2018 gathered up all of the political history, and can now signify everything from the specific police agents and prosecutors to the historical moment and the combat against corruption in general.

With the power to name operations in clever ways, the agents and prosecutors of the Lava-Jato task-force have also invoked story arcs and specific narrative desires. Notable examples include the police operations christened “Final Judgement”, “Xepa”, “Aletheia”, to name the most salient. Almost every operative phase, that is, every sequence of the Lava-Jato investigations that involved arrests, coercive interrogations, and search warrants, was named by the task-force (three early phases and the 46<sup>th</sup> phase were never named). Some names were clearly chosen for their symbolic relation to the task-force’s interpretation of events: “Aletheia,” the revelation of truth, is referring both to Heideggerian and ancient Greek concepts of the unveiling truth moment (for Lula), while the operation “Resta Um” targeted the Petrobras sub-contractor that had avoided being investigated until that day. The name of the “Xepa” phase (the word “apex” backwards) signified that the task-force reached the top of the corruption scheme – the Odebrecht group. In appendix B, I have compiled a list of phase names (and their timeline and targets). The mythological and graphological implications of such naming suggest certain endpoints and outcomes of the investigations. Several other phase names are wordplays on the investigated targets, and some are named after classical Greek and Roman figures. A number of phases are named for Italian concepts and films as a kind of tribute to the Mani Pulite operation that was carried out in Italy in the 1990s against a vast corruption network in national politics. Because it broke the rule of silence in mafia-politics (the rule called the “Omertá,” which became another phase name), this operation served as inspiration to judge Moro (Moro 2004), although it brought with it the ascension of Silvio Berlusconi. By maintaining the overall Lava-Jato moniker for the task-force, and continuing to refer to this ur-disclosure of corruption in Petrobras even when investigating cases completely outside of the state company, the police force is also utilizing the effect of seriality.

In the section above, we saw pseudo-seriality at work linking the Lava-Jato investigations to the revelations and, crucially, to the outcome of the Mensalão scandal. This outcome was deemed successful at first because it broke the *de facto* rule of impunity for Brazilian politicians, and that is then the standard by which the Lava-Jato trials are measured. The Mensalão outcome provides not only a pattern for the Lava-Jato case (or Petrolão, as it was called from time to time), but also the demand to reveal certain gaps left by the Mensalão. In that scandal, the suspicion lingered that Lula was aware and even responsible for the kickback schemes distributed to Congress members (see Chapter 3 and Damgaard 2015a). Although Petrobras had nothing to do with the slush funds revealed in the Mensalão case, the narrative desire for a sentencing of Lula could thus perhaps be remedied through the revelations of the Lava-Jato case. Thus, this is pseudo-seriality, or a transfer of the elements of the same narrative structure and desire.

Another case of narrative transfer was demonstrated in the previous chapter, where we saw four examples (see section 4.5.1) of the overlaps of Lava-Jato exposés to the gradual crumbling of the governing coalition in early 2016; here, the outcome expected is a new government taking the reins

from Rousseff, and the means to that end is the undermining of Rousseff through corruption allegations, however unrelated to the fiscal manoeuvres of the *pedaladas* (see section 4.5).

Two other specific outcomes are worth unpacking further, because they link fabulas in non-serial ways. Instead, these two outcomes appear to provide narrative resolutions to the respective desires in more complex ways than mere seriality.

First, although the notion of Eduardo Cunha's retaliation was developed already in November 2015, the contours of the fabula of *Golpe*, a coup d'état, only solidified as actors besides Cunha (leaders from both PMDB and PSDB) were revealed to work from less-than-Republican motives. Various leaks and hints gradually allowed for a retrospective re-writing of the impeachment and trials of PT members as a backstage deal in Congress orchestrated to stop the Lava-Jato investigations from reaching them. With the Supreme Court's removal of Cunha as President of the Câmara in May, elements of this fabula of *Golpe* was even officially sanctioned, but not in time to save Rousseff's mandate. The temporality here could be considered as internal analepsis (Genette 1980:49), a second-order narrative interfering with the structure and causal links of the surface story.

A second example of such a complex temporality is the combination of Lula's interrogation and Rousseff's increasingly close relation to Lula in March 2016. Since Lula had been an outsider to Rousseff's government for several years, and frequently critical (in 2015) of the perceived orthodox economic team led by Joaquim Levy, the increasing narrative intertwinement of their fates was in a way surprising. With the interrogation of Lula, the suspicions that clung to him apparently undermined the idea of reinforcing the Rousseff cabinet. Nonetheless, the close connection between Lula and Rousseff as the twin masterminds of the Petrobras corruption (which *Veja* had denounced on the eve of the 2014 second round of elections; see appendix A, figure A.4) was not present in the coverage of Lula's corruption seen, for instance, in the *Jornal Nacional* (detailed in the previous chapter). The testimony of Delcídio do Amaral had helped resuscitate the fabula of a Rousseff-Lula scheme somewhat; and with the published recordings of March 2016, a new focal point of the scandal emerged in which both are "caught in plotting." Since the particular and personal responsibility of Rousseff in fiscal delays and state budget expenditure overshoots was still a bit unclear, the phone taps provided a convenient cause for indignation that could ground the coalition parties jump-ship strategy (Balán 2011). The temporal structure of the story level here is complex, as it combines and subsumes two independent storylines of the past (of *pedaladas* in Rousseff's period and of the Petrobras graft in Lula's period) and only ties them together with the botched nomination of Lula for minister. This heterodiegetic analepsis (Genette 1980:50) of two stories can only come together in combination with a third story, that of the Lava-Jato task-force and judge Moro's successful operations, which provokes the disclosure of Lula's corruption and requires Rousseff to shield Lula with the *foro privilegiado* of a cabinet position.

The complex organization of time in news is nothing new, but still, studies that look to temporal organization of news discourse have not linked such organizing structures to political action – precisely because analyses of news items tend to balk at going on to the analysis of intertextually emergent temporal structures of discourse. This is the topic of the following sections, treated through a presentation of six fabulas that I have abstracted from the material presented in the previous chapter, followed by a discussion of how the fabulas cropped up as the purported grounds

and discursive backdrop of a range of political events and judicial interventions (all the while acknowledging that completely different motives also played a role). The narrative desires and structures are reflected in the actions and utterances of political actors (such as the moment where Lula, in the quoted speech in the *Jornal Nacional* on March 4, calls out the desire to persecute him, or in Rousseff's various denunciations of the imminent *golpe*). The actors' adherence to narrative structures is not merely rhetorical, however. Below, I argue that the fabulas constrain and co-constitute the field of political action, and in the following chapter, I will discuss how the fabulas presented here have limits beyond which action cannot be thought nor articulated.

### 5.3 Six Fabulas of the Lava-Jato scandal and the Impeachment Process

The previous chapter and the above sections have shown, in glimpses, several different desires for narrative solutions to the scandals. On one hand, many texts can be grouped by the extension of the desire for punishment and political change. In particular, many texts focus on the eventual ousting of Rousseff, while fewer texts have a scope of desire that encompasses all of Congress and consider the political elite *en bloc* to be the problem that needs to be treated. Some texts present the Lava-Jato case and earlier scandals as peas in a pod, but represent the Lava-Jato case as a decisive break or rupture that may solve the historic inability to hold politics accountable. On the other hand, many texts articulate the inversed notion that impeachment of Rousseff and the trials of Lula were staged pseudo-legal processes to gain political power. By casting the events as stages of a coup d'état, these texts resolve different problems or contradictions, first and foremost the contradiction of an elected government and President with little popular support.

I here divide up the six fabulas that I have constructed on the basis of the textual analysis of the previous chapter into three groups. The first two fabulas tell the stories of a successful crusade against corruption and Impeachment of a President, while the next two stories invert the interpretation, seeing the same events as political persecution and a coup d'état. Finally, two more mirrored stories expand the cast of characters to encompass not just the PT leaders, seeing the imminent downfall of the political elite as either perfectly positive or democratically dangerous.

The method of analytically constructing these fabulas was discussed in Chapter 2. The main points of this can be boiled down as follows: Fabulas are constructed analytically from intertextual convergences between groups of texts that exhibit identical emplotment of events and identical temporal structures, actors, and arcs. They are models, much like Max Weber's ideal-types (Weber 1922, 1.1.6), that are intentionally purified of the empirical clutter, but the elements making up each fabula are abstracted from actual texts. Certain keywords cling to some text groups, and I use these monikers for naming the fabulas. In each summary of the fabulas, I will mostly ignore the many possible narrated versions (which in the narratological terminology would be termed *stories*), by reducing the temporal sequence to straightforward chronology starting from a transgression event and ending with a resolution. As mentioned at the start of Chapter 4, the constructed fabulas are the contingent results of a hermeneutic procedure, developed in order to improve understanding of the possible meanings distributed across the analyzed textual system.

## **Fabula 1 – Crusade against Corruption**

### *[Transgression event]*

The graft in Petrobras via overpriced construction contracts was installed by PT governments, maintained while the Mensalão scandal unfolded, and it kept PT in power throughout three presidential periods.

### *[Resolution]*

However, the adroitly executed investigations, commanded with surprising celerity by the Curitiba Lava-Jato task force under the auspices of Sérgio Moro, exposed the plot that for a decade had cost the Brazilian nation billions, bringing the main culprits to trial: Dirceu, Vaccari Neto, and first of all Lula. In the trials, justice was served when their guilt was demonstrated and sanctioned by several independent instances of the judicial system. The PT masterminds, like the corrupt subcontractors, received severe sentences. The revelation of the corruption and the punishment of PT leaders thus ended the 13 years of socialist governments in Brazil.

### *[Narrative Solution to Contradiction]*

The Petrolão scandal and trials concluded the earlier trial of the Mensalão scandal: This trial did not find proof of Lula's guilt, and even the PT leaders that were convicted in 2012 were let off the hook too easily by presidential pardons. With the exposure of Lula's role as instigator of the abuse of state resources for political and private purposes, and with his sentence in 2017 and prison term in 2018, the failures of the earlier trial found a resolution.

## **Fabula 1a - Impeaching the incompetent and corrupt President**

### *[Transgression event]*

By masking budget deficits, Dilma Rousseff tried to hide the fact from Congress and the Brazilians that the state budget was in bad shape, and she let the public banks take the brunt of the fiscal problems in 2014. This was an intentional act, ordered from the Planalto, in violation of the fiscal responsibility law (LRF). Rousseff in effect financed the unjust distribution of wealth through the programs "Minha Casa, Minha Vida" and the Bolsa Familia program by denying the banks their interest rates, working around the norms of transparent financial governance of the state budget, and by painting an optimistic picture of the national economy. Even if the interest rates were paid back to the banks in 2015, other sanctioned limits to the budget deficit were still violated by the Rousseff administration.

### *[Resolution]*

The trio of lawyers Bicudo, Reale and Paschoal formulated a coherent criticism of the violations, and Cunha accepted their petition for impeaching Rousseff, which was ratified in four instances, by both special commissions of the Câmara and the Senate, and by the plenaries of Congress, overseen by the Supreme Court President Lewandowski. Thus, the legality of the proceedings was observed throughout, and Rousseff was forced to step down in August 2016 in consequence of her transgressions.

### *[Narrative Solution to Contradiction]*

The voluminous documentation of pedaladas and other violations of the LRF effectively provides the grounds for removing Rousseff and installing new fiscal management of the state, including the eventual budget limit law (*PEC de Teto dos Gastos*), which was widely unpopular, but necessary because of the mismanagement of the state coffers under Rousseff. The impeachment was a necessary adjustment to irresponsible fiscal policies and a just response to the deceit of voters who believed the lie that Rousseff had things under control.

## **Fabula 2 – Coup d'état**

### *[Transgression event]*

The original sin of this fabula is the manoeuvres of Eduardo Cunha: Using impeachment as a threat in order to protect his own interests in the Ethics Council, Cunha initiated the impeachment process in order to divert attention from his own case and to lift his colleague Temer to the presidency. The media played along with this, and the over-exposure of corruption in PT was symptomatic of the anti-socialist bias in the Brazilian media. While most of the political parties ought to be implicated in the scandal, the Lava-Jato task-force mostly fed the media with bits of information that implicated PT actors. Several leaks were obviously designed to create a political climate hostile to President Rousseff (for example, the leak of Alberto Youssef's testimony prior to the second round of elections in 2014, and the leak before Lula took office in March 2016). With the constant media attacks on PT and Rousseff, the rest of the political parties that had gained from the graft in Petrobras negotiated a backstage deal to oust Rousseff and then put Vice-President Temer in power with the ultimate aim of stopping the investigations once PT had been removed. By impeaching Rousseff, the sovereign decision of the electorate was revoked, and the impeachment was thus a coup d'état.

### *[Resolution]*

Ex-senator and Transpetro director Sergio Machado had recorded PMDB actors discussing how to go about the ousting, revealing their vested anti-democratic intentions. With these recordings and later phone taps of Temer and Aécio Neves, it became apparent that for the government parties that jumped ship in March 2016, as well as for the former opposition, the point of ousting Rousseff was to save their own hides by intervening in the police investigations, and to implement several unpopular reforms. The reforms to the pension system, budget limits, and labor market legislation would then leave the next president in a better political position, freed from the costly negotiations needed to secure reforms without electoral support.

### *[Narrative Solution to Contradiction]*

This fabula explains two problems for Rousseff: the corruption allegations and the low support during her second term. The Rousseff administration was never a corrupt government, and removing her only succeeded through a thoroughly anti-democratic and legally fraught impeachment proceeding, executed against the will of the people by a small group within the political elite. The low approval ratings of the Rousseff government were an artifact of the media barrage, and the unpopularity of Rousseff was eventually exceeded by Temer. The fabula explains both the political crisis and impeachment process as stages in the old elites' subversive self-preservation strategy, aided by media conglomerates.

## **Fabula 2a – Political Persecution by the República da Curitiba**

### *[Transgression event]*

Casting any and all of Lula's projects in his post-presidential period as corrupt, the Lava-Jato task-force (called the "República da Curitiba," see Castro 2016 and footnote 9) executed a media campaign to tarnish Lula's image and keep him from being a viable presidential candidate in 2018. Swan boats, public talks, and diplomatic missions to secure overseas contracts for Brazilian companies; any item or activity could be linked to Lula's alleged friends in the business world and could be construed as a kickback paying for political influence in Petrobras, BNDES, and Congress. The quality of the evidence however vanishes into thin air, especially in the real estate cases, because Lula either never benefitted (Guarujá and Instituto Lula cases) or never knew that Petrobras subcontractors had been involved in renovating the real estate (Atibaia case).

*[Resolution]*

The fabula ends in tragedy, with the Supreme Court deciding not to interfere in the political persecution directed from Curitiba. Even as Lula continued to appear in the polls as the eventual winner of the presidential elections in 2018, the trials, imprisonment, and TSE verdict (yet to be announced) demolished Lula's chance to even present his candidature.

*[Narrative Solution to Contradiction]*

This fabula inverts the first fabula by presenting the Lava-Jato project as a fundamentally political project that sought to interfere judicially by waging "lawfare." Thus, it provides a solution to the cognitive mismatch of a very popular ex-president being dragged through nine trials, by postulating the denunciations as exaggeration or fiction (Damgaard 2018b:118-36).

### **Fabula 3 – Cleaning Congress**

*[Transgression event]*

The corruption of Brazilian politics runs far and deep, through the current political elite to the *coroneis* of yore. Fortunately, the Lava-Jato task-force, the federal police, the Prosecutor-General(s), and several valiant and indomitable judges managed to change the tide by taking the old elite to trial; Lula, Cunha, Aécio Neves, and the PMDB leaders of Rio de Janeiro first and foremost. By cleaning up politics, the way is paved for a new generation of politicians. The parties in power tried to buy time and avoid the current that would sweep them out, and the old elite tried to protect itself by appointing new leaders of the PF, CGU, and PGR. They mutilated anti-corruption bills and proposed laws to punish judges who would interfere, but the tide could not be turned once the principal leaders of the old elite had been weakened by incarceration, by the many exposés, and the multitudes manifesting popular will through street protests.

*[Resolution]*

Paving the way for a new generation of politicians and supported by a new wave of social movements, the Lava-Jato became an impulse or catalyst that not only helped the people shed the heavy yoke of a bloated and bureaucratic socialist state, but also moving Brazil towards a freer and less protectionist state of society. It required the heavy hand of justice, principally directed by Sérgio Moro, to break the spell of impunity that the old elite clung to. The cleaning up of politics set the stage for a new and morally better State and Congress, and it forced even the recalcitrant Supreme Court Judges to concede their monopoly on judging the federal representatives, senators and ministers.

*[Narrative Solution to Contradiction]*

In this fabula, the so-called "excesses" of the Lava-Jato investigations were necessary measures to combat the extreme capillarity and embeddedness of corruption in the institutions of power, where everyone is protecting someone else and thus producing a spiral of silence. If the judiciary attack on the old elite seems one-sided and partial, it is a misinterpretation of the situation: The necessary but legitimate use of force and rule of law to uncover the evidence (and to avoid the destruction of evidence) was wielded in prudent measure. Most plea bargains were negotiated while the defendant was still free, and the extended preventive arrests were only used in cases where more corruption schemes were likely to be unearthed.



### **Fabula 3a – Fall of the Republic**

#### *[Transgression event]*

After various political backstage deals and the excessive judicial interventions into politics, the Brazilian democracy and its institutional structures are precariously close to collapsing. With two Constitutional crises between the Legislative and the Judiciary Branches, with street protests that threatened to turn violent, with a General of the Armed Forces hinting at military intervention through Twitter, and an increasingly polarized political discourse in the social networks, the country have seen all the symptoms of a hitherto-unseen institutional stress as well as several harbingers of the imminent implosion of the system. Bribes and kickbacks - the currency of exchange for making coalitional presidentialism work in practice - devaluated too quickly for any insider to take the reins and restructure the system. At the outset, the rapid deterioration of traditional political consensus mechanisms and the undermining of checks and balances not only gave the judiciary new powers, but it also made the 2018 elections the most unpredictable and potentially groundbreaking in decades. The PSDB-PT axis of political orientation was shattered, along with the veto-player model of *peemedebismo* (Nobre 2013b), and together with these two cornerstones of congressional politics it is predicted that the virtual prerogative of Congress to benefit in whatever way from directing the federal machine and the billion-dollar budget amendments will also erode.

#### *[Resolution]*

The expectation of a new-comer bodes no well for Brazil, unfortunately, as the high-volatility states of the political, judiciary and military systems in conjunction amount to a bomb waiting to explode – a Trump-presidency situation in the making with added class tensions and an economy not ready to step out of the recession. Thus, the Lava-Jato investigations blindly pulled the thin threads that kept the democracy, with all the flaws and errors, from running seriously afoul in the historical backwaters of populist and military rule.

#### *[Narrative Solution to Contradiction]*

The fabula of the fall of the Republic is an apocalyptic narrative, hopelessly defending the return to the uneasy alliance of traditional political elites with socialist-welfare state redistribution politics and gradual social inclusion – even at the cost of the probably Utopian moral purity in politics. While not exactly an excuse for corruption, the fear of the violent Christian right-wing discourse embodied in Jair Bolsonaro condones the Lava-Jato movement for pushing a fragile democracy close the edge of authoritarian populism.

The six fabulas can be reencountered as the underlying narratives of both journalistic and scientific works about the Lava-Jato case and the political upheaval. Fabula 1 provided the motif for books by Paduan (2016) and the TV Globo journalist Netto (2016), while fabula 1a underpins the book-length resumé of the pedaladas (Villaverde 2016) and the anthology put together by pro-impeachment law scholars (Martins et al. 2016). Scientific works using fabula 2's leitmotif of *golpe* abound (e.g. Albuquerque 2017, Souza 2016:106-116, Proner et al. 2016, Gentili 2016), and many scholars have also contributed to works on the political persecution of Lula along the lines of fabula 2a (Avritzer 2016b, Bahia, Bacha e Silva, and de Oliveira 2016, Guimarães et al. 2016, and Zanin Martins et al. 2017). My own work tends towards the pessimistic fabula 3a (Damgaard 2018b), but there is currently a remarkable dearth of academic work along the more optimistic lines of fabula 3.

#### 5.4 Time of the Crisis: Temporal Scope

On the basis of the abstracted fabulas presented above, I will now turn to the practical implications of these, starting with the temporal scopes of the fabulas. At first glance, all of the fabulas draw upon the Brazilian history of corruption scandals, but for the most part the emplotted events coincide with the 2014-2018 electoral cycle; there is rarely much *longue durée* to be found here, for all its fire and brimstone, crisis and apocalypse. The temporal scope of the Brazilian news during the Lava-Jato scandal is somehow quite limited, even when looking to the future. The compressed scope of the future horizons at the maximum stretch until the 2018 general elections, while in the case of news and fabulas about the impeachment, the scope of foresight is cut short at the expected moment of the ousting. Thus, compared to the torrent of news pieces about special commissions and vote counts, not that many news pieces of March and April 2016 began to consider the government that was about to take over. This begs the question: Why is the temporal aspect of these fabulas so constrained?

In the past decade, breaking news, real-time news, live feeds, Twitter and web-based broadcasting formats have become ubiquitous, and studies of the temporal horizon of news have discussed the idea that time is accelerated and compressed by news (Hassan 2012, Bødker 2016, Bødker and Brügger 2018, Verón 2014). Such observations of acceleration are linked to epochal characterizations of sociology, such as Giddens' thoughts on high modernity (1991) and Harvey's discussion of time-space compression (1989). Already in the 1980s, as the cable networks began developing the 24-7 news format, did Schudson notice the well-developed journalistic fetish for the present (while warning that timeliness "in news is defined in practice not only by the recency of a reported event but by its coincidence with the searchlight of the journalistic institution," Schudson 1987:82).

A special kind of compressed time is the crisis – a discursive phenomenon that has much to do with media and narration (e.g. Boydston and Russell 2017, Deacon 2012). In this section, I will analyze the temporal structures of the fabulas (rather than the temporal modes of particular news texts), and argue that a particular time scope of the crisis (or crises) was established through the storytelling found in the news on corruption and scandals. Because of this particular temporal scope, and because the electoral cycle and the Constitution remained the framework of these fabulas, the legitimacy of the entire system of democracy in Brazil was virtually beyond critique. Put simply, the struggle to preserve the Constitution and the constitutionality of the impeachment process were two major concerns (van Dijk 2017); no solutions to either crisis or impending democratic catastrophe coming from outside of the Constitution or the ballot-boxes could ever be thought nor told. Even the coverage of the large-scale protests concealed the contradictions by simply interpreting the protests as "social movements" with the goal of replacing of one President with another – although both president and vice-president were then under scrutiny and suspicion.

The crisis moments attracted special attention in the mainstream strata of the mediascape, and various textual measures were introduced to cut up time in even smaller slices when moments of crisis were identified. This compression took various forms, depending on the media outlet: The newspapers produced real-time updated reports online, while the broadcast outlets modified the standard flow of programming through "breaking news" interruptions. In the previous chapter, the latter was seen in the extended editions of *Jornal Nacional* in March, which ignored other news

completely (and in parallel provided a full day of coverage of Lula's interrogation on the GloboNews 24-7 news channel). The first temporal rupture of normal media time in the course of the Lava-Jato scandal – but certainly not the last – was the moment just prior to the 2014 election's second round, when the weekly magazine *Veja* went outside of the normal publication schedule and published a denunciation of Rousseff and Lula, presumably to maximise the electoral impact of the exposé. As the scandal went from the stage of rumours to actual trials, focus in the news outlets increasingly shifted towards the courts, especially the Supreme Court. For instance, the STF sessions on December 16 and 17, 2015, were covered through real-time text streams by both *Folha* and *Estado*, because these sessions re-configured the rules of the impeachment process laid down by Cunha, and were seen as the first legal battle for the constitutionality and legitimacy of the impeachment process. Online, the two outlets even kept updating score boards (as in a football match) to orient the reader as to which way the judges seemed to incline – in favour of Rousseff or in favour of Cunha's interpretation of the process guidelines.

In the *Jornal Nacional* (in the headline sequence described in section 4.4.3 above), the arc of crisis moments was narrated as reaching its zenith on March 16. The street protests on March 13 had also called for special all-day coverage in the online media outlets and the 24-7 news channels, and the spontaneous protests of March 16 likewise drew attention outside of the ordinary programming. The first vote for impeachment, on April 17, was set up and formatted, again, as a sports match, with large screens and sections of Brasília's central esplanade divided between the two "teams" of "supporters," and the roll-call vote was broadcast live by Globo, Record, and Rede Bandeirantes. The decisive debates and stages of the vote carried out in the Senate in the following months were also covered intensely by newspapers through constantly updated feeds that interpreted the political events. On top of the media conglomerates' scrutiny, the official broadcasting service of Congress also covered the events from start to end, as did the TV Justiça in the Supreme Court plenary sessions. The coverage at this stage of scandal and crisis was never hesitant nor ambiguous, since the trials in court and Congress, like the protests, were pre-endowed with meaning – and the meaningfulness of the events was derived precisely from the fabulas discussed above. That is, the sampled media outlets' coverage of the sequences of the impeachment process was produced to fit into the story arc 1a with a climactic media spectacle (Pozobon and Prates 2017, Kellner 2002).

Even the happenings that seemingly appeared out of the blue had been foreseen by the media organizations, and planned ahead to some extent. Two examples speak volumes: The Lava-Jato task-force was looking into the PT marketing expert's company Polis, and this was the topic of news items a month before judge Moro authorized the arrest warrant for João Santana and his wife, both of whom were away in Panama. Teams of TV reporters were ready to cover their arrest as they returned to Brazilian soil. Similarly, the interrogation of Lula was expected (by both Lula and the media), and TV Globo had sent a helicopter to circle the ex-president's house in order to get footage of the early-morning police operation on March 4.

In general, extraordinary events such as these may gain a second-life outside of the newsroom frenzy, further adding to the sense of compressed time of crisis, with updates appearing every minute. The unfolding stages of these events are "breaking on Twitter, discussed on blogs and Facebook, and followed and developed by legacy news institutions" (Bødker 2016:60). In other words, the elements of scandal-related events get processed and published through fast "breaking

news” cycles, and they are interpreted instantaneously by pundits and news commentators, hours before quality newspapers and evening news broadcasts are edited. Furthermore, because “news are [sic] almost seamlessly immersed in everyday practices through apps on mobile devices” (Bødker and Brügger 2018:58), breaking news is delivered rapidly, and this means that it is mostly packaged and framed in accordance with the intertextual resources ready at hand. Interpretations based on the fabulas and gut-level reactions of indignation provide the most immediate repertoire for understanding suddenly disclosed information, leaked phone recordings, or footage of coercive testimonies. In a fast-paced media environment, it is not surprising that certain patterns and interpretations are reproduced over and over.

The compression and acceleration of time may derive from the event itself, so that the presence of crisis reverberates instantaneously with the audience (or so that a critical event is represented as reverberating throughout the nation). But acceleration might also be experienced and analyzed in a serial manner, which I touched upon in the beginning of this chapter. The rhythm of exposés and revelations may speed up and slow down, contributing to the experience of a crescendo of crisis. Along this line, it was obvious that just prior to the impeachment vote in April 2016, the breaking news on the Lava-Jato scandal came at a much faster pace than the two years up to that moment. The afore-mentioned political commentary about Lula in handcuffs corroborates this perception of rhythmical intensification. In February, the arrest of the PT marketing expert Santana, followed by the incarcerated PT senator Delcídio do Amaral leaked plea bargain on March 3 (a scoop published online by *IstoÉ*), and Lula’s coercive testimony on March 4. Thus, the impetus of the protests in mid-March was boosted by the news “storm” (Boydston, Hardy and Walgrave 2014).

The groups Movimento Brasil Livre and VemPraRua – who had also rallied protests in 2015 - had convened street protests on March 13, 2016, and these turned out to muster massive support. Both *Folha* and *Estado* dedicated their front pages to illustrating the crowds massing in São Paulo (see appendix A, figures A.20-23), reporting that the protests were the largest seen in Brazilian history, with estimates of the police reaching 1.4 million and the Datafolha counting 500,000 protesters downtown (Datafolha 2016). The Rio de Janeiro police force did not estimate the turn-out, but the organizers claimed that one million protesters marched in the streets. In the protests, the recent spate of news was recycled in various forms in the speeches and pamphlets, Moro’s face was turned into an iconic mask, and small inflatable dolls of Lula in the clothes of an inmate were sold. The protesters did not exclusively take to the streets to call for impeachment, though that certainly was an important issue; that afternoon, top politicians of PSDB had to escape from the Avenida Paulista (the central São Paulo street) after protesters extended their complaints verbally and physically to all members of the political elite. Protests occurred in over 200 cities, and various critiques naturally emerged in this multitude of political discontent. Nonetheless, a major outcome of the large protests was the mainstream media’s portrayal of wide-spread popular support for the impeachment process.

Based on head counts, the protests were represented as historical by the media outlets studied here, and the massive turnout was interpreted as reactions to Rousseff’s government and the scandals proliferating around it. Perhaps counterintuitively, the dynamic spill-over effects of the protests in Congress resulted in four major coalition parties leaving the government only to re-constitute themselves as coalition parties two months later. Thus, if anybody had a vain hope of

cleaning up politics through such protests, that hope could only be sustained by ignoring the continuity of centre-right parties in government. In short order, PMDB and the centre-right parties in the governing coalition PTB, PRB, PR and PP declared full or partial support for impeachment in the following two weeks, while the special commission of the Câmara settled on a report recommending impeachment:

On March 16, the PRB announced that it would leave the government. “This crisis cannot be endured, or be allowed to continue. The Brazilians are suffering,” said the PRB president Marcos Pereira, referencing the wave of protests (on March 13) and the negative news about the PT (especially the leak of the imprisoned Senator Delcídio do Amaral the week before). The party also announced that its minister of Sports, George Hilton, would leave the position. In response, Hilton left PRB, announced his affiliation with Pros, and remained minister of Sports until the impeachment of Rousseff. The then-president of PTB, Cristiane Brasil, likewise, announced that she would vote for the impeachment of Rousseff, on March 18, although the party only officially recommended impeachment on April 13.

PMDB had been deliberating internally when to leave ever since Cunha urged the party to leave the year before. During the parliamentary recess and the internal elections for party president, the discussions had demonstrated increasing hostility toward Rousseff, and a party convention was called shortly after the 2016 carnival. The agenda was simple: A vote whether or not to leave the government. Henrique Eduardo Alves left his minister position on the eve of the convention, on March 28. The following day, PMDB pulled off the shortest party convention ever seen in Brazil, as the sole point on the agenda was resolved in three minutes. After a symbolic vote, the senator Romero Jucá, who would become minister for a fortnight before resigning after a new leak, announced that the motion for withdrawing from government was approved. Next to Jucá stood Eduardo Cunha, and the event ended with the 100 delegates shouting “Brasil pra Frente, Temer Presidente” (“Go Brazil, Temer for President”). Nonetheless, the ministers Celso Pansera, Marcelo Castro, and Katia Abreu remained ministers in the Rousseff administration until she was ousted.

Sensing that a new majority was about to form, the strategy of jumping ship suddenly became attractive to the rest of the coalition parties, and the exit of PMDB therefore started a wave of defections: On April 12, PP announced their decision to abandon government, support impeachment, and Occhi left the Ministry of National Integration the following day. The same day, April 13, the PSD group leader in the Congress, Rogerio Rosso, declared that there was a broad consensus about supporting impeachment, and that the minister of the party, Kassab, was known to respect the will of the parliamentary group. Kassab resigned two days later, despite stating that he “was convinced of the President’s personal integrity.” The parliamentarians of PR never decided upon an official party line and ended up mostly voting for impeachment (with the votes 26 for and 10 against), but the PR minister Rodrigues continued in the cabinet until the final removal of Rousseff. (Damgaard 2018b:71-2)

This paved the way for the decisive vote in the highly mediatized format on April 17, as the culmination of two months of straight negative news on PT, Lula and Rousseff (Damgaard 2018a:124, 2018b:163, and appendix C). In the following, I will uncover the coverage that was buried in the avalanche of news on impeachment, and call attention to the questions that were delayed while the proceedings unfolded.

### 5.5 Timing Suspicions and Burying Allegations

If the rapid succession of exposés underscored the suspicions of corruption in the PT government, it underplayed similar suspicions in the coalition party PMDB. Cunha’s corruption case was well underway in both the Ethics Committee of the Câmara and in the Supreme Court, but the rest of

the party elite was absent from the news. The most telling example is the coverage of suspicions pertaining to the president-to-be, Michel Temer.

Temer's alleged corruption cases made the front-pages of *Estado de S. Paulo*, *Globo*, and *Folha de S. Paulo* at several moments (see appendix C, table C.2). Even so, the media interest quickly died out. When the testimony of Sergio Machado, director of the state company Transpetro, was published by the press on June 16, 2016, including elements indicating Temer's involvement in grafting the state company, *Estado* even noted on their front page coverage of this plea bargain that this was "the first time in the Lava-Jato case that Temer was linked to illicit funding." In fact, *Estado* had reported a similar claim made by Delcídio do Amaral two months before, on March 15 (and printed it on the front page the following day), and in the claim to novelty boldly ignored the exposé printed in *Folha* in December 2015 about Temer receiving kickbacks from OAS (like Lula), as well as the case of bribes in the Porto de Santos (admittedly unrelated to Lava-Jato). However, even when they made the front pages (see the appendix C for data on front page headlines mentioning Temer in corruption investigations), these exposés were never included in the reporting on his taking over of the presidency; nor were the cases reported as an ethical problem for the parties supporting his coming into power.

Like the front-page coverage of the period prior to the impeachment, the news items found in the subsections of *Folha* and *Estado* on politics neither maintained attention nor unearthed new material in the cases of corruption where Temer was mentioned. However, a lot of attention was paid to the fact that Temer had acted as Head of State when signing decrees for extra expenses, hypothetically putting him in the same predicament vis-à-vis the law of fiscal responsibility as Rousseff. This theme, spurred by the general interest in impeachment, got much more traction in early April than all the previously mentioned cases combined (see the appendix C, figure C.2). In sum, suspicions that Temer was involved in corruption only spurred brief interest, and without follow-up coverage, those cases were simply buried – at least until Temer took office as President.

The testimony of Sergio Machado exposed not just Temer, but two newly appointed PMDB-affiliated ministers in the new cabinet at the end of May 2016, ten days after the ousting of Rousseff. On May 22, *Folha* published recorded conversations between a number of PMDB bosses and Sérgio Machado. Machado knew that he was a potential target of the Lava-Jato probe, and had taped backstage discussions to be used as bargaining chip should he be arrested and eventually needed to negotiate a plea bargain. The newly appointed Minister of Planning and Budgets, Romero Jucá, affirmed on the tapes that it was necessary to "stop the bleeding" of the political class by changing government and ending the PGR's and the Lava-Jato task-force's project of cleaning Brazilian politics. A number of PMDB bosses, including ex-President José Sarney, argued likewise in the conversations that were recorded. Jucá and the Minister of Transparency, Fabiano Silveira, left office, while Jucá, upon stepping down, returned to his seat in the Senate, and participated in the Senate's final impeachment verdict against Rousseff on August 31, when Michel Temer was permanently proclaimed President. In the following fourteen months, two other PMDB ministers from Temer's cabinet (Geddel Viera Lima and Henrique Alves) were forced to leave office on Lava-Jato-related corruption suspicions and both were subsequently incarcerated.

The insight that can be gleaned from this specific example may contribute to studies of political scandals with the insight that the timing of scandals matters a great deal to the way that political events play out. In the present example, the fact that the temporal scope found in the news on the scandals was governed and constrained by certain fabulas is of enormous interest, because it was not merely fortuitous timing (for Temer, that is). Although suspicions flourished concerning corruption involving various politicians, possible ramifications were only projected for some of these actors. Case in point: Michel Temer, even when mentioned by some of the very same testimonies that implicated Rousseff, rarely appeared as subject of follow-up news items in these cases – and those cases were rarely presented as a future problem for his government by the media outlets studied here. The temporal scope was restricted so that no “imminent earthquake” appeared to be in store for his cabinet-to-be, unlike the Rousseff administration.

Even more thought-provoking is the probability of *Folha* having had access to the Machado tapes even before Temer took the mantle from Rousseff in May. The leak was published within a fortnight of his taking over, but the recordings were made during March. It is uncertain when, exactly, the journalist Rubens Valente obtained these from either the federal prosecutors, or from Machado or his lawyers – but the value of the scoop undoubtedly increased once Jucá and Fabiano Silveira had taken office as ministers. Such a scandalous disclosure of information is a commodity in the media market with a fluctuating price tag, depending on the timing of the disclosure. It is also possible that the delay of the publication was a strategy on the part of the PGR, who might want to disrupt the new government as soon as possible, but not jeopardize the impeachment of Rousseff. By waiting to leak, the scandal involving PMDB actors received maximum attention, which it perhaps would not have if Rousseff had managed to cling to her mandate. Had the PGR chosen another (earlier) time and place of the leak, and if this had turned out to be of consequence to the impeachment vote in the Senate, the prosecuting institution as such might have been prone to the accusation of defending PT by selectively leaking to the press.

Ultimately, what is more disconcerting than the hypothetical delay of the leak by either of the gatekeepers of that disclosure, is the limited scope of the impeachment in general. Why would media organizations that had reported on Temer’s involvement in the Lava-Jato case tacitly stand by while he replaced Rousseff? Society’s supposed watchdog seemed to have been pacified (Porto 2011a); and even if the impeachment petition against Temer raised some eyebrows and became the topic of some thirty news items in *Estado* and *Folha*, the day-to-day coverage did not question the legitimacy of the take-over. *Folha* produced the editorial “Nem Dilma, Nem Temer” (“Neither Dilma Nor Temer”), but the authoring editor only pointed out that Temer lacked sufficient popular support and that the Supreme Electoral Court trial against Rousseff could result in Temer’s downfall as well (F2/4 2016) (see also de Almeida 2016:201, Marques, Mont’Alverne and Mitozo 2017).

Similarly, the media texts in April and May 2016 at no point mentioned the possibility of two presidents removed from power in a row, even as the leaks of the backstage considerations materialized and the first couple of ministers was forced to resign. The idea that Temer might be forced to step down before the 2018 elections only emerged as the trial of the Supreme Electoral Court moved decisively forward in late 2016 and early 2017; and with the JBS leak of May 2017, the rumours became much more persistent. During the impeachment proceedings, however, the horizon of future political outcomes did not include this as a problem of legitimacy, and the risk of

the Supreme Electoral Court trial removing Temer was mostly disregarded as a remote possibility, given the tardiness of the Court. Even twice indicted by the PGR in the second half of 2017, the journalists of the political beat reported on the low probability of Temer's corruption cases being sent to the Supreme Court for a criminal trial.

The lenient coverage of Temer was perhaps the result of the source-journalist relationship; negative reports on the new president could sour the source relationships that journalists need to produce material. In the first half of Temer's presidency, his support in Congress for passing bills was one of the highest witnessed by any Brazilian president since the return to democracy (Pereira 2018). The Congress support was perhaps reflected in the timid treatments in media coverage, even if popular support fell away quickly. *Folha's* editors even deliberately misread a survey conducted by the associated poll service DataFolha in order to present a coherent positive picture of the economy and the president (Damgaard 2018b:58). In sum, the representation of crisis gave way to normalization for a few months, at least as far the presidency was concerned, consistent with the exclusion of exposés concerning Temer in the lead-up to the ousting of Rousseff. Business-as-usual resumed, and transgressions that seemed scandalous in March 2016 (such as nominating Lula for minister) were reduced to background information in comparable cases (with Temer changing the ministerial status of Moreira Franco's secretariat to the same effect) (ibid.:135).

### 5.6 Crisis as Argument in Judicial and Legislative Solutions to Corruption Scandals

The Supreme Court did not enjoy post-impeachment peace, and a climate of business-as-usual did not emerge in the august court of the nation. Rather, several judicial interventions led to small-scale institutional crises (ibid.:115-8), and the tendency of judicialization (Tate and Vallinder 1995, Werneck Vianna et al. 1999, Werneck Vianna, Burgos and Salles 2007) continued with increasing intensity, based on the string of crises. With the disclosure of the corruption in the Lava-Jato cases, many judicial review processes that had been dormant in the drawers of the Supreme Court surfaced and, under intense public and media scrutiny, small majorities of Supreme Court judges have changed important pieces of legislation. In this section, I will briefly discuss how crisis triggered judicial and legislative proposals and solutions to the impasses of Brazilian democracy during the Lava-Jato scandal (Avritzer 2016a).

The STF judges, to different degrees, have argued for the need to change existing legislation on the basis of the public demand and outrage provoked since the Lava-Jato investigations became "national legacy." The first area was the judicial review of campaign donations from companies, which was banned in 2015 by the STF. The next important change was the decision, on February 17, 2016, to reduce the number of appeal options that can prevent incarceration to two, that is, from the moment a culprit is found guilty in two instances, a prison term may be realized. The third and massively debated review is the restriction of the prerogative of being judged before the STF. The parliamentary prerogative called *foro privilegiado*, on May 3, 2018, was restricted to trials of criminal actions committed as acts of office. A fourth change of jurisprudence, effected by the STF on June 14, 2018, deemed coercive testimonies unconstitutional (such as Lula's testimony described in the previous chapter). Each of the judicial reviews was debated intensely in the climate of increasing political crisis of legitimacy which gradually also became a crisis of legitimacy of the STF. On top of the STF's internal problem of case overload (Falcão, Arguelhes and Recondo 2016),



exacerbated by the Lava-Jato investigations, idiosyncratic decisions made by Supreme judges (especially Gilmar Mendes and Dias Toffoli) sparked public controversy. For reasons of space, I cannot show the trajectory of the court decisions nor the public debates on these issues, but the bottom-line of the many, highly mediatized discussions, however, was the demand for judicial action to solve problems remaining after disclosure of corruption, including problems of procedural delays, the sense of impunity, and the perpetual problems of lobby activities (ibid., Guimarães et al. 2016, Napolitano, Vicente and Soares 2017, Proner et al. 2016).

The interventions of the STF and other courts into cabinet nominations were also closely tied to the media's disclosure of corruption. Lula's cancelled nomination for minister was discussed in section 4.4.3, and three other ministerial nominations were also legally contested, namely those of Wellington Cesar Lima and Eugenio Aragão (both in 2016 for the Ministry of Justice), and, in 2018, Cristiane Brasil (of PTB). Brasil was hindered in taking office as Minister of Labour, and her substitute later had his office searched by the police. In November 2015, the STF authorized the arrest of Senator Delcídio do Amaral during his term, a measure hitherto unseen. The STF also intervened to revoke both the Câmara's and the Senate's choice of Presidents, but with very different results: Eduardo Cunha was effectively removed and later incarcerated, while Renan Calheiros ignored the Court decision and remains Senator. In the case of Lula, Cunha and Calheiros, the extraordinary situations pertaining to high-level corruption were invoked in the warrants of the public prosecutors and repeated by the courts. Both executive and legislative branches have argued strongly that the interventions of the judiciary are unconstitutional. Most of these cases of interventions and judicial review were sparked directly by the political struggle arising from the dispute for executive power in the wake of corruption disclosure. Frequently, the active and interventionist stance of the STF has been based on arguments about the "state of exception."

The representation of a crisis and state of exception petered out in the transition of power in August 2016; after that, the STF lost the force to enforce decisions upon the Senate (in the case of Renan Calheiros), and did not revoke the nomination of PMDB leader Moreira Franco, despite the similarity to the case of Lula (Damgaard 2018b:135). Tension soared again with Lula's appeal cases in April 2018, as one of the Armed Force's Generals tweeted that the STF should take the "right decision." Thus, the STF has been at the brink of constitutional rupture at several points (ibid.:115-6), adding to the fabula of exceptional times (or apocalyptic end-times). This was both the challenge and the condition for the strategy of judicial reviews in the court: To appear both legitimate and decisive - and to act decisively - in time of extraordinary need, visibility, and public scrutiny.

The legislative branch, meanwhile, also responded to the disclosure of corruption and the state of crisis with a range of bills, none of which passed in the end: First, the so-called crisis of governability in the Rousseff administration was answered by bills laying out a fundamental shift from presidential system to a (semi-)parliamentarian system (on top of scattered calls for the restoration of monarchy). Second, the MPF proposed ten bills that would improve the efforts towards reducing impunity and increasing efficiency in corruption investigations; most proposals were altered heavily in the Congressional committee preparing the process prior to the bills going to the floor of Congress, however. Third, several bills aimed at increased punishment for judges overstepping the constitutional bounds when interfering with politics. Fourth, various bills dealt with issues of oversea bank accounts, aiming at reduced taxation or removing fines for declaring funds that had

been hidden. Fifth, new rules for district gerrymandering also entered the floor of Congress. Finally, as the only passed bill, electoral financing to parties from a public fund was increased.

At the time of writing, few permanent changes seem to have resulted in the legal realm after the crises. No electoral reform has been enacted, and the oscillating majorities of the STF have recently put into question the changes enacted through judicial reviews. This means that both the use of coercive testimonies and the reduction of appeal instances before incarceration appears as legal instruments that may be changed at whim. The reduction of the parliamentary protection (see above and section 4.2) seems to hold, for now. The publicity of investigation into political corruption is still a local decision – although the arguments fielded by Sérgio Moro for the utmost degree of publicity in high-level corruption cases were accepted and extended by Supreme judges Teori Zavascki and Edson Fachin, it is not a principle automatically transferred to all corruption probes on Brazilian soil. However, the Lava-Jato case did prove to be a watershed case of transparency, but, as discussed above, that did not translate into perfectly equilibrated agenda-setting, as cascades of news reports skewed attention to a few of the many corruption cases, especially those involving Lula. In the next chapter, I will expand on what could be termed a narrative outcome of the judicialization, namely the extensive focalization of judges and prosecutors as protagonists of the political fantasy.

Arguably, the most profound legal-political outcome of the strings of crises was the incarceration of the ex-president Lula and the impeachment of President Dilma Rousseff. As the final part of this chapter, I now turn to consider how the fabulas were reflected in the moment of Rousseff's impeachment.

### 5.7 History, Temporal Scope, and Epochalization

As argued initially, the most basic chronological function of news is to establish seriality and relation between texts, but as seriality develops, it inevitably begs the question of conclusion, of closure. Especially in the case of a series of episodes with a crime novel-like plot, a demand for revealed truth or full transparency is engendered: Disclosure demands closure. One such moment of ultimate closure, a final turn of the page, was in evidence on August 29, 2016, when Rousseff defended herself in the Senate prior to the vote that would ultimately remove her from the presidency. In her speech, she articulated a variation of fabula 2, where the temporal scope was radically expanded to encompass national history, and she insisted that history would acquit her, as she stood on “the right side of history”:

Se alguns rasgam o seu passado e negociam as benesses do presente, que respondam perante a sua consciência e perante a história pelos atos que praticam. A mim cabe lamentar pelo que foram e pelo que se tornaram. E resistir. Resistir sempre. Resistir para acordar as consciências ainda adormecidas para que, juntos, finquemos o pé no terreno que está *do lado certo da história*, mesmo que o chão trema e ameace de novo nos engolir. Não luto pelo meu mandato por vaidade ou por apego ao poder, como é próprio dos que não tem caráter, princípios ou utopias a conquistar. Luto pela democracia, pela verdade e pela justiça. Luto pelo povo do meu País, pelo seu bem-estar. [...] Hoje o Brasil, o mundo e a história nos observam e aguardam o desfecho deste processo de impeachment. No passado da América Latina e do Brasil, sempre que interesses de setores da elite econômica e política foram feridos pelas urnas, e não existiam razões jurídicas para uma destituição legítima, conspirações eram tramadas resultando em golpes de estado. (Rousseff 2016, emphasis mine)

Using this turn of phrase, Rousseff reflected and implicitly criticized the editorials and commentary of the media in those days, in which many observed her ousting as the end of an epoch. The epochalization in these news texts discussed the end of the PT “cycle,” 13 years of government with a model that could neither sustain economic growth nor the popular and elite support. In the weeks of 2016 when the media crisis and scandal coverage grew most intense, a profound lack of foresight was evident, as detailed in the sections above. The crisis had a definite short-term scope. As the impeachment proceedings reached their endpoint, the scope had widened to that of historical time, and the fabula spanned not just Brazil, but was widened to include both Latin America (comparing Rousseff to Cristina Kirchner and Brazil to Venezuela, for instance) and the entire globe. The crisis moments of March compressed and closed off the temporal scope of the fabulas presented in news, but in August 2016, in contrast, the already defeated President Rousseff shifted the perspective, as did many pundits, towards geopolitical history (as well as back to the prior presidential breakdowns of Brazil). Similar epochal interpretation of political events and similar conceptions of historical significance surfaced when Lula was incarcerated in April 2018 (Feres Júnior 2018). These two moments were presented as momentous or laden with symbolic significance of another temporal order than the rapid, live-on-air struggles of leaks, judicial interventions, and backstage manoeuvres.

Epochal characterizations are more obviously the stuff of op-eds and political speeches than of run-of-the-mill news reports. The temporal scope of the mediascape’s narrative strips probably always varies according to the strata or type of news; but it is remarkable that the moments of crisis compress the temporal horizons, drawing in close on the minute details, while the moments of “solutions” expand the vista. This mechanism of grand-scale storytelling is apparent in Rousseff’s speech above, with the nation appearing as the subject of history and as victim of conspiracies.

In some media texts presented in this and previous chapters, the Lava-Jato case and the impeachment became treatments for an ailing Nation beleaguered by crises: The first Lula administration had a crisis of governability, leading to a moral crisis (and a corruption, via Dirceu if not Lula, of the model of creating Congressional majorities). The Rousseff administration then, taking over the reins of government, also inherited a party and its electoral base in crisis because of the moral crisis (or rather, because of the Mensalão scandal). With less PT representatives, Rousseff had to manage a more ideologically distant (and more rebellious) support base in Congress as a result of the electoral and moral crisis, and her government then faced an even more severe governability crisis, with PMDB leaders forcing fiscal strain upon the state budget through legislative measures unchecked by the executive branch, thus deepening the economic crisis that began to form at the end of her first period. In parallel, the scandals grew to ever larger dimensions (The Postal Service scandal led to the disclosure of the much bigger Mensalão scandal, which was then surpassed by the Lava-Jato scandal), and the protests of June 2013 were outsized by those in 2016. So, the impeachment and the Lava-Jato scandal in combination were narrated as the culmination or climax of a series of nation-spanning crises, one crisis overtaking the next in size and impact. I will return to the theme of the Nation in the following chapter.

To conclude this chapter, I will highlight that temporal orientation and even a sense of history are embedded in news texts and political utterances in scandals. But, because certain fabulas exist ready to hand, with a sense of closure (as well as narrative risk), a limited range of potential

consequences is drawn upon by journalists and pundits. In the case of the Lava-Jato scandals and impeachment, this also created a situation where several fabulas reciprocally permeated each other, as the emplotment of events in one fabula could introduce risk and change the odds of particular outcomes in the others. Within this constructionist view of news and political history, I have attempted to account for the ways in which the moments of crisis in news produced certain presentations of past and future time, as well as how crises come to be interwoven. The most important overlaps and ruptures of temporality included the overlaps (discussed in the last chapter) between the Lava-Jato scandal and the issue of fiscal delays, juxtaposed to the declining approval of the Rousseff government and grafted onto the fabula of corruption in Petrobras. Then, in early 2016, the conjunction of rapidly emerging arrests and allegations embroiling PT combined with the street protests led by VemPraRua and MBL to provide centre-right parties of the Congress with legitimate grounds for jumping ship and, eventually, be re-installed in a new cabinet with Temer at the helm. Temer himself benefitted from a blind spot of the mainstream media in March and April, but his honeymoon days as president were also cut short. In the following two years, cycles of crises triggered the apocalyptic premonitions of fabula 3a and gave birth to the fear of the chaos ensuing if PT and the old elite would be swept from Congress and presidency in October 2018.

The theoretical argument of this chapter, then, asserts that the conjunctions and disjunctions of temporality, structured through premonitions and narrative desire for certain outcomes, are exceedingly important phenomena in scandals because they delimit the scope of news, and moreover form the base of textual strategies of containment and contagion in time, that is, of which elements of a fabula that may interact with one another. The identification of particular narrative desires for resolutions to the emplotment was used for establishing the endpoints of the fabulas; in the next chapter, I will go on to look at the ways in which narrative desire organizes actants, the acting units of the fabulas, around axes of values. The next chapter will also rephrase the question of what lies outside of these fabulas, replacing the temporal scope with a focus on the actors within the limits of the narrative structure of the fabula.

## Chapter 6

### The Political Unconscious of the Lava-Jato Case

In this chapter, I will move from questions of temporal structures and the endpoints of story arcs to synchronic issues concerning value systems. Narrative desire does not only provide impetus and movement; it desires certain solutions set within ideological structures. A solution emerging in the intertextually emergent fabulas of the Lava-Jato scandal is not necessarily ideologically closed off, given the distributed and non-authored nature of the fabulas, that may contain several rudimentary or unarticulated fragments of value systems in tension and contradiction with one another. Therefore, scandals should be understood as composition (Pietilä 1992) performance (Motta 2013:99), or contested assertion of norms (Thompson 2000:16), rather than a simple reproduction of public morality (Prior 2015:103).

Like Elizabeth S. Bird, I think that “media scandals [...] should be explored [...] for the values and boundaries they are expressing” (Bird 1997:107), underscoring the plural here. I will therefore not start this chapter by defining a finite set of hegemonic moral claims or norms supposedly prevalent in Brazilian society and then connect this set to the fabulas outlined in the previous chapter. Rather, I will return to these fabulas and analyze the values that seem to be at stake, and how the solutions presented express conflicting value systems. In doing so, I will return to the theoretical line of Chapter 2, considering how Greimasian actant-subjects desire and transfer values as the fabulas of the Lava-Jato progress. On the basis of this analysis, it will then be possible to characterize the inner limits of the value systems and consider what lies outside the boundaries of the Political Unconscious in the Lava-Jato scandal.

Preliminarily, I will assign the notion of “value” to dichotomous concept-pairs such as the ones discussed by Lévi-Strauss and Greimas (Greimas 1987:84), and let “ideology” designate more complex sets of political preferences and worldviews. The two concepts may gradually shade into each other, however. Highlighting one relevant example, the “value” of morality is especially problematic. The morally right may be contrasted to the morally corrupt in a seemingly obvious way in everyday talk, in news texts and even in academic literature, but this binary opposition black-boxes the ideologically laden concept of “moral.” Scholars analyzing Brazil’s scandals often identify scandals as ritual acts with moral implications, for example stating that:

The scandals that put into question the norms and values of societal or political order are often moments of reflection and debate, moments when society faces its weaknesses and in which particularly the media claim for strengthening norms and conventions meanwhile broken. Transgressions are revealed, offenders are identified and, in some cases, punished, in some kind of ritual that ultimately contribute to the purification of the political institutions and for the recovery of public morality. (Prior 2015:103-4)

However, even where the concept of struggle is foregrounded, a view of public order and public morality in the singular may be overly simplistic. Gans noted that morality is merely an assumption:

...news also assumes a consensus about values that may not exist, for it reminds the audience of values that are being violated and assumes that the audience shares these values. When a story reports that a politician

has been charged with corruption, it suggests, *sotto voce*, that corruption is bad and that politicians should be honest. (Gans 1980:40)

Such claims to norms may however not have much resonance in every part of society. In the context of African corruption discourse, Koechlin argues, with Laclau, that

“corruption” is not so much a practice or structural feature, but rather a nodal point which enables different claims, interests and identities to link up and structure the political in new ways. Corruption is, in the terms of political discourse theory, an ‘empty signifier’, a catalyst of social and political organisation. Key here is not so much what corruption ‘is’, key here is the ways in which different actors relate to what ‘corruption’ signifies and the ways they seek to differentiate or link up in relation to this signifier. My key hypothesis is that the very discourse of corruption provides the terrain in which these struggles take place. The overarching interest and the main objective of the following chapters is, consequently, the exploration of the political and social spaces that ‘corruption’ opens up (or closes down), i.e. the manifold political and social articulations that feed off corruption as a reference. My premise is that although the discourse of corruption may take on a hegemonic (in the sense of dominating) shape, it actually provides the terrain for the articulation of particular struggles – and potentially may lead to the creation of a plurality of political spaces and public spheres. (Koechlin 2013:93)

I have elsewhere argued along the same lines (Damgaard 2015b), and I still think that the “broken norms and conventions” and the “public moral” referred to by Prior are not a priori defined, but rather contested and created in the very discursive acts relating to corruption. In order to see such struggles, it is necessary to answer how both values and ideologies come to be articulated in the texts, stories, and fabulas I have analyzed. This leads me back to the semiotics of Greimas introduced in Chapter 2.

### 6.1 A Greimasian Reading of the Lava-Jato case

In Greimas (1987:71-81), the subject-actants of narratives, as they perform and embody narrative functions, become vested with values, or rather engage in the transfer of values. Greimas’ way of mapping out thematic values of narratives is particularly useful, according to Jameson, because “it maps the limits of a specific ideological consciousness and marks the conceptual points beyond which that consciousness cannot go, and between which it is condemned to oscillate” (Jameson 1981:32). In Jameson’s conceptualization of Greimas,

Such a vision is not to be taken as the logical articulation of all the political positions or ideological possibilities objectively present [...], but rather as the structure of a particular political fantasy, as the mapping of that particular "libidinal apparatus" in which [...] political thinking becomes invested—it being understood that we are not here distinguishing between fantasy and some objective reality onto which it would be "projected," but rather, with Deleuze or with J.-F. Lyotard, asserting such fantasy or protonarrative structure as the vehicle for our experience of the real. When Greimas' system is used in this fashion... it furnishes the graphic embodiment of ideological closure as such, and allows us to map out the inner limits of a given ideological formation and to construct the basic terms of this particular libidinal apparatus or "desiring machine" (ibid.:48)

Following this, I take it that fabulas articulate various values that can be expressed in a logical structure, and the desires for certain values expressed by the subject-actants form a good starting point for exploring the structure of the value system. One obvious desire articulated in the disclosure of corruption is the desire for truth, as Lull and Hinerman note in their introduction to the seminal volume *Media Scandals*: “Truth is always at issue” (1997:1). In the fabulas presented in the previous chapter, as well as in text examples from the various media outlets, this is readily

apparent. In the fabulas, various protagonists reveal the truth of corruption, of hidden backstage deals, or of political manipulation in the legal system. Seen from this angle, at least a part of the fabula will read like a quest, where actants seek the truth and expose the lack of truth on the part of the antagonists. Truth is projected as beyond morals, a background condition for understanding the very reality of the scandalous disclosure. Truth is furthermore tempered by uncertainty and delays. The latter was discussed in the previous chapter, but the former merits further consideration. Uncertainty and doubt are obstacles to be overcome during the pursuit of truth, and the operation that transfer value is thus all about shifting actants from liminal and uncertain spaces to positions of certain, evident truth: A revelation must be followed by the legal stages of investigation, indictment, charge and ultimately a verdict, so that the truth is legally established and no longer subject to the risk of being challenged. This is the trajectory of the fabulas 1, 1a, and 3, which can be expressed schematically through this semiotic square:

Semiotic schema of truth and doubt

Truth	Falsehood	(axis of knowledge)
	X	
Not proven false	Not proven true	(axis of the contradictories (Greimas 1987:51))

In fabula 1 and 1a, the PT ex-presidents and the party try to deny or hide their responsibility for the broken economy of Petrobras and Brazil in general. The protagonists of this fabula set strive to reveal the truth, dispel the doubt, and to repair the lack of knowledge through disclosure. This operation will move the respective antagonists to the position of proven falsehood in the schema. The contradiction that is solved in either set of fabulas is precisely the problem of doubt and contradiction which lies at the heart of scandals: History needs revision, the web of facticity is torn, and trust in public office is challenged. Overcoming these obstacles by unmasking the truth, the syntactic operations or narrative utterances (ibid.:71) perform a transfer of value, attributing the value of truth to one actant while depriving it of other actants.

The fabulas 2 and 2a play out an inversion of the revelation of truth presented in fabulas 1 and 1a, by positing (political/ethical) transgressions in the very accountability institutions and procedures of Congress that are supposed to hold politicians accountable. Thus, fabulas 2 and 2a inverse the allocation of truth to the judicial actors (and also deny moral qualities to the prosecutors and to Moro). Note, however, that even if the truth claim is inverted in 2 and 2a, the aim is still unmasking truths – only this time about the miscarriages of justice and the hidden motives of the puppet-masters orchestrating the coup d'état and the political persecution. The desire is fundamentally the same as regards to truth. So, in fabula 2 and 2a, on the axis of knowledge, actants of the judicial system know that PT is persecuted, but falsely continue to assert the impartiality of justice.

Once a public denunciation of political transgression creates public awareness and suspicions of corruption, actant-subjects of the fabulas may then be positioned in another grid of values, dealing not with truth claims and the unmasking of falsehood but with the status of guilt and sanction, defined in the legal arenas. This semiotic schema mapping out the logical positions in judicial processes was developed in Chapter 2, and importantly, it defines whether actants can continue as active agents in the political sphere:

Individual object positions in judicial processes

No sanction	Impunity
Innocent	Guilty
	X
Not guilty	Not innocent
Punished	Punished

The above semiotic schema of value lays two sets of axes on top of each other, that of sanction and that of guilt. This generates two positions that are problematic or contradictory and in need of resolution: The position of impunity and the position of a miscarriage of justice containing the innocent-but-punished. By understanding texts and fabulas about investigations and trials as narrative utterances, Brazil’s historical tendency of impunity for political corruption is thus rediscovered as one logical possibility of contradictories in a Greimasian framework.

The subject-actants are moved around and allocated values in different ways in each set of fabulas: While most politicians claim innocence (the important historical exceptions of the Lava-Jato case being Delcídio do Amaral, Antônio Palocci, and Pedro Vargas), a great many could potentially be seen as being located in the top-right corner. In fabula 1 and 1a, we find a number of PT politicians, but, as the trials progressed in Curitiba, Lula, José Dirceu, Delúbio Soares, Silvio Pereira, and João Vaccari Neto moved to the “punished” category, all of them however countering this (in the fabula 2a) by self-identifying as not-guilty but punished, the lower left corner. In the fabulas of coup d’état and political persecution or witch-hunt (fabula 2 and 2a), the guilty (located top-right) remain free, and impunity reigns in Brasília with the *golpistas* running the government and attempting to stop further investigations. Fabulas 1/1a and 2/2a thus have inversed value schemas: The sentenced PT actants switch place horizontally between the two sets, as does the political actors who succeeded in removing Rousseff. Cunha appears as actant only in the second set:

<u>Fabula 1/1a</u>		<u>Fabula 2/2a</u>	
Judiciary	Impunity (empty)	(empty)	Impunity PSDB, Temer
	X		X
(empty)	Lula /PT Punished	Lula/Rousseff/PT Innocent/punished	(Cunha) Punished

In the third set of fabulas, “Cleaning Congress” and “Fall of the Republic,” the old political elite *en bloc* (be it PT, PMDB or PSDB) who are traditionally found in the upper-right corner, governing in a corrupt way but enjoying impunity, are falling like a line of dominos, one for one caught, trialled, and transferred to the lower-right corner. The public prosecutors, judges and police agents are here located in the position of Helpers, in the Proppian terminology, who contribute to bringing about the change, rather than protagonists in their own right.



### Fabula 3/3a

A new leader	X	Impunity (a few remaining)
(empty)		Old elite: PT, PMDB, PSDB Punished

Whereas the advent of new faces replacing the old elite is positively assessed in fabula 3, in fabula 3a this change has the unfortunate effect of pushing an untainted but unfit person in position to claim the presidency through illegitimate and excessive judicial interventions. In fabula 3, the legitimacy of attaining power lies precisely in the top-left position; even the association with politicians from the right-hand side contaminates a candidacy. In fabula 3a, legitimate rule cannot be founded solely upon popular will electing a “clean” candidate, as this will only prolong the shadow influence of economic elites upon the political field.

In this third fabula set, the issue of legitimate use of force is also at stake, and the discussions of prolonged preventive arrests and plea bargains contrasts the necessary use with the excessive use of judicial measures. The suspicion that the political elite wants to be rid of the Lava-Jato investigation escalates the conflict, and by investing such sinister motives in all of actants of Congress and government, normal measures are deemed insufficient. The extraordinary measures match the extraordinary need for swift and effective judicial intervention, and this provides a narrative solution to the contradiction of a judicial system that flirts with extra-judicial instruments and unequal treatment before the law.

### Value schema characterizing judicial interventions

Normal legitimate	X	Abnormal illegitimate
Exceptional but excessive		Exceptional but necessary, thus also legitimate

The legitimacy of judiciary and judicial decisions was of course also a theme in the other fabulas. As described above, the value schema of truth may be flipped (throwing doubt upon that which is perceived and therefore “known” as truth), and this generates the contrasting 1/1a and 2/2a value schemes, concerning the righteous or unfair judicial status of diverse political actants.

This contest for true interpretations and true identifications of transgressions (whether in the judiciary, legislative, or executive branch) then generates second-order conflicts of values, where the issue at stake is the legitimacy of power and resistance: The legitimate use of presidential power, the legitimacy of judicial interventions, and the legitimacy of civic society resistance against either of the former. The themes of legitimacy and resistance are differently distributed in the fabulas, as are the temporal horizons (discussed in the previous chapter):

<b>Theme</b>	<b>Fabula:</b>	<b>1, 1a, 3</b>	<b>2, 2a, 3a</b>
Legitimation of power (Rousseff)		Illegitimate presidency	Legitimate presidency
Legitimation of power (Temer)		Legitimate presidency*	Illegitimate presidency
Legitimation of public opinion		Legitimate protests	Overwhelming media bias
Resistance		PT Capture of State Power	Excess of Judiciary and Moro
Power balance		Functioning institutions	State of Exception
<b>Temporality</b>			
Time of crisis		A crisis overcome	The cataclysm
Time of the Nation		Crusade against corruption	Fim-do-mundo

Note that the Temer presidency at most moments appeared as less than fully legitimate, even if judged to be capable of enacting necessary policy changes. However, because the Temer administration seemed to deliver some of the desired political reforms, the illegitimacy of the presidency itself was downplayed in editorials of the mainstream outlets. Perhaps for the same reasons, the crises relating to the Temer presidency were never presented as symbolically and historically important as the crisis pertaining to Lula and Rousseff.

The necessity and legitimacy in resisting state authority were also determined by the location in either set of fabulas: In the fabulas with PT acting as antagonists, it was necessary and legitimate to resist the corrupt state through public protests, *panelaços*, online mobilization, and so forth. In the fabulas where Moro and the Congress deliberately executed pseudo-trials with no respect for the rule of law, resistance to the judicial authorities was likewise cast as legitimate and necessary.

Because of the contested space of truth, “public morality” becomes ambiguous in the Lava-Jato scandal, and the sets of values discussed above inherit this ambiguity, so that judicial intervention, accountability processes, court sentences, and even political change at large can be either good or bad. Even more fundamentally, the foundation and edifices of democracy were called into question as the legitimacy of institutional processes came under serious scrutiny in news texts invoking the various fabulas. Because these are themes not normally called into question, the instability of norms provoked by the recycling of contesting fabulas merits the term “crisis.” In consequence of the instability and diverging structures of values, the fabulas needed different solutions which yielded the diverging endpoints of each fabula.

## 6.2 Ideology and the Limits of Political Imagination

So far, I have reviewed how value sets such as true-false, guilty-innocent, or legitimate-illegitimate could be arranged in logical structures that allowed for synchronic comparison of the fabulas abstracted from the diachronic operations of the previous chapter. However, these basic value pairs and structures have little to do with political preferences and worldviews, or in a word, ideology. Indeed, in some assessments of corruption scandals, the discourse of news has been characterized as individualizing, emptying the political field of ideology, filling this field instead with vague moral admonishments concerning individual public decency (e.g. Allern and Pollack 2012:183, Delli Carpini and Williams 2001:178, Gronbeck 1997:135-7, Thompson 2000:111-6). When scandals take center

stage, personality and individual credibility become the issue, turning public attention away from substantive issues, according to this argument.

The argument that scandals eclipse ideology has resonance in the context of Brazilian media. First off, the political arena as displayed in Brazilian media is generally a space of personal ethics and personal biography, rather than party-based ideology. While the parties of the Congress generally consistent act in a consistent manner (Power and Zucco Júnior 2011), there is increasing fragmentation of Congress (with 28 parties represented in the 2015-2018 period), confusingly similar abbreviations, and the trajectories of many important politicians easily span three or four ideologically heterogeneous parties within two decades of public life (Pereira, Power and Raile 2011:36). The media system responds to this with a presidential focus (Albuquerque 2011:91) and limited interest to party-internal issues (apart from the PT). Most main parties are themselves internally ideologically heterogeneous, either because they are catch-all centrist parties, because of regional considerations and traditions, or due to the erratic trajectories of individual politicians who will likely be incorporated by diverse parties (Borges and Sanches Filho 2016:9) mostly for the sake of visibility and votes. Thus, the problem of ill-defined ideological orientation could be seen as one symptom of an “empty” or non-ideological political field. In such a field, scandals provide tests of credibility (Thompson 2000:115) that are more symbolically significant in public than the party card.

According to this view, because scandals emphasize personalization or individualization of politics (Allern and Pollack 2012:183, van Aelst, Shaefer and Stanyer 2011) and focalize the person over the (party) ideology (Albuquerque 2011:91), power – that is, the legitimate exercise of political power – is grounded more in the moral qualities of the incumbent or the candidate rather than the political project. The “empty” political character of scandal does not hold up to closer scrutiny, however: In the Lava-Jato case, certain features made the scandal intensely aligned with party lines and ideological preferences; and in theory, the absence of political preferences and ideologically motivated actions relating to political transgressions is not a necessary feature of a scandal. Furthermore, comparative research has yielded interesting insights into the backstage level of scandals, where relative party strength may be the parameter most accurately predicts occurrence of scandals. In other Latin American cases, there is a clear pattern of scandals having much to do with the relative levels of power and influence in inter- and intragovernmental struggles (Balán 2011, see also studies of US politics in the same vein by Nyhan 2017 and Rottinghaus 2014). In this interpretation, scandals are a front, barely disguising the brutal melee between political actors of different factions, usually divided along ideological lines and only unstably united by the will to rule.

The question of a party-specific bias in the Lava-Jato investigations was raised early on, due to the aggregate trajectory of the trials, conflicts of jurisdictional competency, and appeal cases. In early 2015, the arrest of the PT treasurer Vaccari Neto cast suspicion on the party apparatus as a whole, while other arrested in the case were not tied directly to parties in news media texts. For example, although it was well known that the Petrobras director Paulo Roberto Costa was appointed by the party PP, and that the *doleiro* Youssef distributed kickbacks to this party, this was rarely seen as a problem for the party; nor did it mean that PP was expelled from Rousseff’s cabinet (and indeed the party later became a vital support for the Temer government, despite being the target of an enormous civil lawsuit moved by public prosecutors, see Damgaard 2018b:129).

The unevenly distributed focus on parties and party allegiance (see appendix C) reached a whole other level with the incarceration of Lula on April 7, 2018. Denunciations of anti-PT bias in the media, present in fabula 2 and 2a, had been common in left-wing politics since the Mensalão case (Damgaard 2015a, Biroli and Mantovani 2014:209). This theme was increasingly present in news meta-reports in CartaCapital and JornalGGN, for instance, in the build-up to the impeachment of Rousseff, boiling up again as Lula was interrogated by Sérgio Moro and later sentenced (in July 2017), but it reached its climax as the ex-president faced incarceration in 2018 (Feres Júnior 2018). Since Lula was the ultimate political icon of socially inclusive politics and redistribution of wealth, class discourse with explicit ideological content could hardly avoid being invoked in the course of the scandals and judicial processes.

Given that Lula and PT is associated with certain governance models and a leftist ideology, it comes as no surprise that the second set of fabulas could be interpreted not just as miscarriages of justice and backstage politics at its worst, but as an ideological struggle barely masked as scandal and economic crisis. This ideological interpretation, commonly found in left-wing entrepreneurial online media such as *JornalGGN* or *Mídia NINJA* or print/web outlets such as *CartaCapital*, expands the semiotic squares of basic values constructed in the above section, so that I may add new connotations to the value schemas already established:

Fabula 2/2a - ideological aspects

	<i>(guilty but counting on impunity in the courts)</i>
	Metropolitan elite
(empty)	Conservatives
	Oppressors
	PSDB, Temer
	Mainstream media
	X
Grassroots and PT	
Lula/Rousseff	
Oppressed	(empty)
Workers	
Common people	
<i>(unjustly punished by courts)</i>	

The actual scandal at hand, in this fabula, thus becomes a tragic allegory expressing the eternal conflict of master-slave relations in Brazilian history, transposed unto the social terrain of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. In this second horizon of a Jamesonian analysis (1981:66, 79), the contradiction of a popular (and poll-leading) but convicted and incarcerated ex-president is solved by denying the truth value of the mainstream fabula (fabula 1 and 1a) and, by inverting the truth value, constructing a prism for understanding all prior and subsequent acts of the scandal.

Because of the (frequently articulated) claim that the prosecutors acted in the interest of the conservative elite, the Lava-Jato task-force and PGR Janot often denied partisan leanings, for

example in the statement of the federal prosecutor Carlos dos Santos Lima, section 4.4.1: “This is a Republican moment” in which “no-one should be exempt from investigations.” Religion sometimes substituted for ideology, furthermore, and the evangelical inclination of Lima’s colleague in the task-force, public prosecutor Deltan Dallagnol, was sometimes remarked upon by left-wing actors.

A right-wing version of the above value scheme is likewise easily found, sometimes echoing religious positions (evangelical denominations have long opposed PT policies on abortion and gay politics, e.g. Biroli and Miguel 2011:81). This value scheme appears occasionally in political commentary, and pervasively in the social media discourse of VemPraRua, Revoltados Online, and Movimento Brasil Livre, the organizations behind the street protests of 2015 and 2016. To them, the PT actors received their just punishment for attempting to “perpetuate their power project” (a quote found in such strata of the media but also in the samples above, e.g. G1-8/2 2016). The PT power project, in this view, was a clandestine co-optation of the Brazilian state aiming to destroy the nuclear family, endorse gay politics, help out communist powers in Latin America such as Cuba and Venezuela, and of course to get rich all the while.

Fabula 1/1a - ideological aspects

<i>Innocent</i>		<i>Guilty</i>
(Judiciary actors)		
Liberal political actors		
Evangelical		(empty)
Nuclear family values		
	X	
		PT
(empty)		Communist
		Secular
		Gay
		<i>Punished</i>

This set of ideological values opposed in this version is not dissimilar to the liberal/conservative values and metaphor categories discussed by Lakoff (2002), as the right-wing schema projects an image of PT according to a “demonology” (ibid.:171), in caricature of left-wing discourse informed by the worst possible violations of a conservative moral order. In sum, ideology may very well become vested in the subject-actants of fabulas on corruption. In this specific case, the operation works through binary oppositions articulated as contrasts between the PT (with its specific historical allegiances and public image) and the forces opposing PT.

Importantly, when either set of fabulas is extended to include ideology (or demonology, the caricature of ideology), the capture of the state apparatus appears as the ultimate goal of the antagonists, to the detriment of the citizens and democracy. In fabulas 1 and 1a, PT seized power and made the state a part of the party machinery. Inversely, in fabulas 2 and 2a, the judiciary actors (with vested interests) and the corrupt legislative branch conspired successfully to take over the state that was previously ruled democratically. Although the timing is different, the narrative operations in both sets of fabulas are isomorph: The State was/is corrupt, corrupted by political actors, and needs to be saved for the sake of the citizens.

The association of PT with the Brazilian state in the underlying narrative structure of the fabulas 1 and 1a, and the association of conservative elites recapturing the state in fabulas 2 and 2a, yield another way of looking at ideology. Thinking about ideology in this way, as a contrast between corrupt elite politics and the citizenry, provides a third option for interpreting the ideological value of the Lava-Jato case, which is even consonant with the fabulas 3 and 3a. I consider this interpretation to be a populist reading of the whole scandal and political crisis. In this view, the “cleaning of Congress” is essentially anti-elitist, and the movement will pave the way for populist-style presidential candidates, Jair Bolsonaro most (in)famously, but with various other possible candidates appearing and disappearing from time to time (Luciano Huck and Joaquim Barbosa as the most salient candidates highlighted as “newcomers”). Even if such candidates were aligned with political parties, their main claim as candidates was their status as outsiders, fresh faces not associated with the old-elite, willing to take bold steps to ensure a new beginning for Brazilian politics (see footnote 8).

This interpretation also highlights the tension between the judiciary branch of government and the political branches (legislative and executive). If the judiciary actors, Moro in particular, are considered as the just and morally incorruptible subject-actants, they are positioned diametrically across from the corrupt State actors that have been sentenced by Moro in the period 2015-2018 – the list includes Petrobras directors, PT politicians, businessmen prospering from the corruption, and Lula as the mastermind. In other words, the State is “guilty” and “punished” in this schema, which I will unfold in two steps:

State contra Judiciary

*Innocence*  
 Judiciary  
 Rule of law

X

Guilty of corruption  
 State (legislative and executive branch)  
*Punished*

Now, if we remember that the basic axes of this scheme is guilty/punished and innocent/not punished, the so-far empty slot in the top-right suggestively demands to be filled in. In this corner, we may locate Politics in general – yet to be punished (in fabulas 2, 2a, 3, and 3a) due to the pervasive impunity, but certainly guilty.

### State-Judiciary-Politics

Innocence	Impunity (not innocent, not-punished)
Judiciary	Politics
Rule of law	Private interests (corrupted)
X	
	Guilty of corruption
	State
	Punished

This opposes Politics to the State, i.e. private interests actively corrupting the passive State actors. Subject-actants in Politics do not attempt to represent specific constituencies and their collective political interests, but rather to live like kings through their corruption of the State. Who then suffers from a corrupted State and from the corrupted Politics? The obvious candidate for the slot of a punished and suffering (but essentially innocent) subject, opposed to politics and subjugated to the State, would be the citizens. The citizens, “o Povo,” are deceived by the actants of the right axis, but potentially liberated by the Judiciary. This attempt at constructing a more complete schema of State-Judiciary-Politics-Citizen relations then looks like this:

### State-Judiciary-Politics-Citizen

<i>Innocence</i>	<i>Impunity</i> (not innocent, not-punished)
Judiciary	Politics
Rule of law	Private interests (corrupted)
X	
Suffering subject	Guilty of corruption
Citizens	State
Punished, but innocent	<i>Punished</i>

In this schema of positions, all the abstract institutional and collective entities of the democratic system acting in the Lava-Jato scandal are allocated guilt, innocence, and moral value relative to the public good. If this graphic embodiment adequately illustrates ideological closure of the fabulas, not just 1 and 1a, but really all six fabulas, then it becomes apparent that they all spring from the same narrative engine producing desire, an underlying political fantasy (Jameson 1981, paraphrasing Deleuze and Guattari 1977[1972]).

In this fantasy, the ideal of the Judiciary is to establish and secure the rule of law. The ideal may be realized (in fabulas 1 and 1a), or be manipulated for political (fabula 2 and 2a) or indeed anti-democratic purposes (3a). The Judiciary is facing off against potent and anti-democratic forces, however, threatening to undo each conquest of justice.

Politics is the perennial space of corruption; even as the Lava-Jato investigations moved on to new targets and while evidence mounted against PSDB, the disappointment that the 2018 elections still only provided “old” candidates was tangible, because these candidates (such as Geraldo Alckmin) were part of the established system, ever under suspicion.

The State, whether in the hands of Temer or of Rousseff, was corrupted by power. In fabulas 1, 1a, 3, and 3a, this is intrinsic. Even in fabulas 2 and 2a, the system of governance is full of problems and vices and ever in need of political and electoral reform. Sacrifices had to be made, compromises and deals must be struck through pork-barrel politics, nominations and negotiations to win the vote of every veto-player.

Thus, the democratic pillars of legislative, executive and judiciary branches of government stand in eternal tension, and the Citizens (or “o povo” - the people) are perpetually suffering from the abuse of the state apparatus. The next corruption scandal always lurks, and replacing one president with the next is no guarantee for a radical renewal of politics. The population at large also remains passive and disqualified from politics (in an echo of the “povo bestializado” discourse, Wink 2008:270), awaiting the salvation delivered by the judiciary.

Each fabula has distinct syntagmatic relations between the terms:

**1/1a:** Judiciary > (punishes) Politics > (for corrupting) the State > (thus saving) the Citizens  
**2/2a:** Politics > (corrupts) Judiciary > (that punishes) the State > (which manipulates) the Citizens  
**3/3a:** Judiciary > (interferes) Politics > (destroying) the State > (setting loose) the Citizens

It could be argued that the Judiciary should not be interpreted as protagonist in the fabulas 2/2a, but rather as antagonist. However, the self-proclaimed victims of *golpe* and persecution repeatedly appeal to a sense of justice. Even as she was being ousted, Rousseff insisted on that politics should not interfere in the judiciary, hoping against hope that the judiciary would let justice prevail. Ultimately, she invoked the metaphor that history would judge the current political situation. Likewise, Lula appealed, literally, to the supposedly greater and less corrupted judicial instance of the UN. Thus, a vestige of the desire for an independent and morally uncorrupted legal system remained in the fabulas 2/2a, even if the particular trials turned out as miscarriages of justice.

### 6.3 National Struggles and Unity in Media Discourse

The battleground in these fabulas is only obliquely mentioned: In the previous chapters' hundred examples of media texts, the word “nation” is never mentioned, and “country” and “Brazil” are rare occurrences (almost exclusively used by politicians). The concept of the “Republic” is textually manifest only at the apices of the crises. Nonetheless, the fabulas do present a nation torn from within, split between warring institutions and the citizens awaiting a gallant rescue. Citizens, in all three fabula sets, are opposed to state actors: To Congressmen who does not truly represent the people and corrupt the state companies; or to unjust and politicized Judiciary crusaders, judges and magistrates or to corrupt federal governments - led by Temer, Lula, or Rousseff, it matters not; the citizens find the enemy within (the state). This emplotment parallels the position of the State as external to the Nation in various historical Brazilian discourse formations, either as a colonizing apparatus or as an entity appropriated by patrimonialist interests (Chauí 2000:42, Sorj 2000).

The Nation, then, is the contested space of these fabulas, and the primordial and eventual unity of the national community is quintessentially a discursive effect (to return to Anderson's argument (1983)). But how can unity be achieved discursively, if the concept of nationhood only infrequently



appears in the news on corruption? I will argue that the (incomplete) suppression of national categories is actually significant in relation to the ideological split discussed in the previous section. Simply put, the struggles between Brazilian classes is not narrated as such in these fabulas. Instead of a contested ideological space, the conflict of the fabulas are instead located inside the nation-state. At the same time, this projects a desire for unity among the Brazilian citizens while erecting an abyss between citizens and the seat of power in Brasília.

Although discussions that imply conflict within Brazilian society is more common in the coverage found in left wing blogs and commentary of right-wing social media (especially with MBL, Movimento Brasil Livre), the mainstream media also to some extent acknowledged the ideological conflict, especially in the coverage of protests. Protesters were stereotyped (with gastronomical-pejorative terms) as either *coxinhas* (anti-PT) or *mortadelas* (pro-PT). More significantly, elements of the anti-PT protests underscored the association of the national with anti-corruption and anti-socialist discourse: The national football shirt (see section 4.4.1), the slogan “Our banner shall never be red” used in the protests (“*A nossa bandeira jamais será vermelha*”), and the constant presence of the national flag during the impeachment vote in the Câmara (see appendix A.11 and A.18) were three obvious examples of the use of national symbols. These symbols, beyond contrasting the symbolic red color of traditional socialist banners to the national flag’s green and yellow, also opposed the Brazilian nation (inhabited by citizens) to the Brazilian state (colonized by politics). In other words, precisely in the moment when the unity of the nation is invoked through national symbols, it is used to mark out a difference within the nation. Bhabha observed that claims of national community are “poised on the fissures of the present becoming the rhetorical figures of the past” (Bhabha 1994:142), and this goes for the present example as well: The nation appears in narration of already-superseded ambiguities and conflicts, even as that conflict rages.

The twin themes uncovered in the Greimasian reading above – the enemy within the State, always leeching parasitically on the Citizens, and the double assignment of political corruption to specific ideological positions – are related, moreover, to the nation through the mediatized point of enunciation. The fabulas emerge intertextually in Brazil’s mainstream media which maintain what may be termed an “omnibus stance” in their discourse, even if the media organizations are well aware of their elite or conservative audiences. Nonetheless, their implicit proposition is that they deal in news of national import and from a unified national perspective – the weeklies and *Jornal Nacional* most obviously, but also the national editions of the metropolitan newspapers. In their enunciation to a general, national public, we find the discursive imprint of an imagined community (Anderson 1983) and a singular public sphere (Habermas 1989[1962]), even as the media report on the apparent rupture of the political field and the conflict of street protests. In the fabulas of the mainstream media, we rarely encounter an explicit rupture in the national community, and the media never present their perspective as one-sided, biased – that would go completely against the grain of news as a political institution delivering independent “omnibus” news for all (Cook 2006, Allern and Blach-Ørsten 2011). Instead, the conflict of the fabulas is transposed from the ideological level, from the clash of classes to the institutions, so that various institutional positions are infused with popular legitimacy to curb corruption: First and foremost judge Sérgio Moro (fabula 1/1a), but also the judges that can safeguard against the *golpe* and persecution (2/2a), or even the deus-ex-machina solution of a political newcomer (fabula 3). “The people” is always unified in these fabulas,

because the political conflict is denied its class dimensions, and because the narration departs from the omnibus media's foundational claim to national singularity.

By partly eclipsing the multiplicity of perspectives, the discursive strategies of cultural identification at work in mainstream media works just like the counter-narratives of the left-wing, as they transpose or displace the multiple identities of the citizens and instead propose a single community:

Counter-narratives of the nation that continually evoke and erase its totalizing boundaries... disturb those ideological manoeuvres through which 'imagined communities' are given essentialist identities. For the political unity of the nation consists in a continual displacement of the anxiety of its irredeemably plural modern space... (Bhabha 1994:149)

The omnibus stance of the mainstream media bars the specific assignment of political corruption to ideological positions, locating the conflicts triggered by corruption in the institutional field instead. This displaces the anxiety of the radical possibilities contained within the protests – constitutional rupture, violence, revolution. Here, news work like the national discourses of the nineteenth century did, constructing national identity “on an imaginary plane that hid and/or eliminated differences” (Hardt and Negri 2000:103).

Tellingly, some editorials heralded the anti-corruption efforts of the Lava-Jato case as “a national legacy” – the very same words that once described Petrobras and the wealth of oil resources which could have made Brazil the Land of the Future (in the words of Zweig 1941). However, in the interpretations consonant with fabulas 2/2a, the Lava-Jato case is considered “a political project,” and the probe is thus politicized in the very moment it is claimed as national. Crucially, if one is to optimistically argue for the “national” significance, then fabula 1 or 1a must be invoked, while in pessimistically denying it, one is sucked into the fabulas 2/2a. In this way, a discourse of the nation (i.e. political claims and references to the national) seems to emerge in response to the fabulas of state corruption (Gupta 1995), with the markers of this discourse distributed exactly according to the fabulas. Like other national representations, the need for declaring the Lava-Jato case a national milestone however only arises the moment it has been questioned and unmasked as subservient to specific ends rather than to truly collective, national interests (Hardt and Negri 2000:104).

#### 6.4 The Limits of Political Imagination in Scandal Fabulas

Even articulated in six different versions, the persistent features of the scandal fabulas are significant. These features are constituted by the structural limitations imposed upon the political imagination by the particular ideology of form governing this cultural production. Because of these limitations, divergent value systems cannot perturb or penetrate the flows of the mediascape, and so the positions of actants and positions are only inversed and shuffled around. No other political imaginaries and desires are conceivable here, or they are dismissed as outdated vestiges of the Brazilian and Latin American history. In the stratum of mainstream news, revolution is not an option, and the only resolution to the impasse of an exposed but still hegemonic corrupt political system is crusades led by the judiciary.

The primacy of the legal in this extended genre of news on scandals (accessed here in the forms of newscasts, in magazines, tabloids and newspapers, in blogs and commentary, tweeted and recycled

across social networks) is perhaps the effect of its determinate set of raw semantic materials: Legal processes, denunciations, indictments, evidence from investigations, leaks of plea bargains and testimonies, and secret phone taps – elements from which to create a state of exception and crisis. Producing citizens as passive subjects and politics as a space of barely disguised personal interests and hypocrisy, the fabulas emerging from this material allocate, or, more properly, bind the actants in value systems of transgression and guilt. The fabulas – even the ones that inverse the allocation of corruption - are trapped along the fault lines of their story arcs flowing in a single system of ideological closure. They are temporally locked to certain endpoints (as discussed in the previous chapter), and the fabulas' resolutions are also corralled into a legal territory: The corruption trials and even the configuration of a split nation can only be solved in the domain of the courts, where the questions of guilt and responsibility are settled, and where terabytes of data and scores of testimonies can ultimately be evaluated. Because the crises following the corruption disclosure are imagined to be solvable only in the judicial domain, the Constitution, governed in the final instance by the STF, frames and closes off the fabulas. This is of course paradoxical, because the most fundamental problem of Brazilian political corruption is the morose pace of higher courts in both judicial review and criminal trials, and the repeated instances of non-legitimate but legally valid candidates assuming office within the constitutional bounds.

With Jameson (1981:73) and Kristeva (1980), the mainstream media's intertextual system could be considered an ideologeme – an intertextual function materialized at different structural levels within specific historical and social coordinates (ibid.:36). The ideologeme is what unites the mediascape's "series of elements (such as characters, plots, and textual forms) out of which scripts can be formed" (Appadurai 1996:35). As they are recycled and recombined as strands of DNA in the cultural pool of plots, the same actants surface across the many different textual instances: Not social classes, but a nation of citizens pitted against the elite; this elite is not characterized so much by political projects and ideologies as by their power to corrupt, and when ideology rears its head, it is cast in the visual symbolic language of a folk demonology (see appendix A, figure A.24-26): A hydra-like Lula, Temer as the Devil's Advocate, and Rousseff as a burning witch. The ideologeme draws solutions to the social problems and contradictions from the ideoscape while drawing genres, metaphors and expressive potentiality from the mediascape. The ideologeme is historically situated, building upon decades of scandals in the news as well as popular presentations of the political sphere in crime fiction and telenovelas (Porto 2011b). It becomes apparent with the Greimasian reading that modern ideals of rule of law and objective news media performing as the watchdog also delimit this political fantasy. Thus, the fabulas are trapped in the presidential system of Brazil but also in the complex and convoluted federal union - a many-layered system of opposing interests, in which the state is ever in danger of being "taken over" by politics through the transition mechanism at every election and its accompanying political appointment system in state companies. It was symbolically very fitting that the gargantuan state oil company Petrobras provided fuel for fabulas of the conflagration of the Republic. But despite the apocalyptic tenor, the inclination towards judicial solutions within the framework of the 1988 Constitution anchors this ideologeme to the currently malfunctioning institutional checks and balances, with inconsistent Supreme judges, politically savvy but independent prosecutors, and all too well-protected politicians.

## Chapter 7

### Concluding Remarks

What did the monumental re-writing of Brazil's recent political history accomplish, in the end? Apart from dispelling the optimistic predictions that emerged with the commodities boom and the discovery of Brazil's rich deep-sea oil deposits, and apart from shattering the notion of an increasingly well-consolidated and accountable democratic system, what was the point and morale of this particular story? In the telling of the fabulas about the Lava-Jato scandal and the impeachment of Rousseff, a story subject coalesced: A nation at the end of an epoch, caught in a descending spiral of crises, one propelling the next; but equally, a moment of disclosure, of resistance to existing ways of doing politics, of civic mobilization, and of a Judiciary branch wrestling free from traditional patterns, no longer content shielding the elite. Crises and conflicts of different scales and with different solutions were narrated and distributed across the mediascape. Although an optimistic belief in the rule of law applying to all Brazilians may briefly have flourished, at the time of writing, the outcome seems to have been a sea change in politics as well as in public opinion, thrust forward by disenchantment in the wake of corruption disclosure.

After the series of scandals linked to the Lava-Jato investigation and the impeachment, the latest polls reveal a depressing picture: 97 percent of the population believes that the current government governs for personal gains, while only 13 percent of citizens are satisfied with democracy (Latinobarómetro 2017:9-10). The disapproval of Congress is now at 60 percent, higher than ever in the period since the transition back to democracy (Datafolha 2017), and political corruption is perceived to be rampant, with 78 percent of surveyed Brazilians saying that corruption seems to be increasing (Pring 2017). Not surprisingly, a record-high number of voters are expected to vote blank or forfeit their votes in the 2018 general elections.

The Lava-Jato case at first appeared as a solution to Brazilian democracy's historical problem of impunity in political corruption cases. If the disclosure of the Petrobras graft could not prevent Rousseff from being re-elected, it did provide an ambience of crisis capable of undermining her support, and the scandal combined rather well with the *exposés* of the *pedaladas* and Congress's rejection of the state accounts. The series of scandals thus offered a satisfying end to the Mensalão case as well as a cause for ousting a president, plus a convenient excuse to jump ship for coalition parties (Balán 2011). At the end of the fabula symbolically solving the problem of impunity lay the electoral destruction of PT and of Lula's image, and ultimately the end to socialist rule in Brazil. A variant of this fabula also endowed legitimacy to the "correction" of the re-election of Rousseff in 2014, although it required turning a blind eye to the problems of accountability on the horizon for the cabinet and president coming into power. To report and narrate this required de-selecting news for publication and delaying *exposés* that could call the impeachment process into question.

Two fabulas emerged to counter these by inverting the actantial roles. The main strip of events narrated in the *Golpe* fabula cast the impeachment as a variation of a coup d'état, while the counternarrative emplotting a political persecution of Lula drew upon Brazil's history of suppressing left-wing ideology (and left-wing presidents). These variations of counternarratives did not escape the boundaries of the previous emplotments of corruption fabulas, as they simply displaced the

mark of corruption unto a different part of the political elite. They did, however, solve the problem of explaining why the popular PT leaders suddenly found themselves under siege in trials, in Congress, and stuck in a lame-duck situation with little control of the national economy: The impeachment and its legal base constituted a way to trigger a non-democratic regime change, which would eventually benefit the old and corrupt elite as they re-conquered the state apparatus.

Finally, two more fabulas sprang from the spiraling corruption investigations, projecting either a moral cleansing or a fall of the Republic. With increasing political instability and never-ending media exposés of politicians, barely contained by the Temer administration through diverse judicial maneuvers, the first fabula of this set proved that excessive judicial means and various innovations of jurisprudence were necessary in order to reach that extraordinary Utopian end to impunity. The second fabula of the third set inverted the Utopian forecast and projected an apocalyptic result of the proliferating police investigations and judicialization of politics, ultimately playing presidential power into the hands of authoritarian outsiders, or even predicting a return to military rule.

The entwined stories of the impeachment and the Lava-Jato scandal, as told in the mainstream media, conspicuously avoided telling certain stories and asking certain questions, though. As argued in the last chapter, the solutions proposed to political crises were confined to the frame of the 1988 Constitution and four-year electoral cycles, and the possibility of non-scheduled direct elections was rarely discussed for long; likewise, the very concept of a presidential line of succession was not the object of critique, even as every politician in that line came under suspicion of corruption at the same moment. The role of political parties in the web of accountability was and remains completely overlooked, making it inconceivable that Brazil's many parties could play any positive role in producing accountability to their constituencies. The net effect of the fabulas' deadlock in a value system of punishment and impunity is, surprisingly perhaps, stasis: Little electoral reform, no new model for coalitional cohesion, and certainly no guarantee of an end to impunity in corruption cases, Lula's and Cunha's incarcerations notwithstanding. I argue that this is due to the limits and operations of the political unconscious, which splits ideology down a stereotyped divide and projects the political stereotypes unto a simplistic conceptual semiotic diagram reflecting the basic narrative tension governing the production of fabulas about corruption. In this value schema, Politics is always corrupted and the State is always opposed to the Nation. Moreover, the citizens of the Nation are somehow always addressed as a unity, even when class conflict abounds and social and economic inequality skyrocket.

The media conglomerates' role in setting up these narrative structures, patrolling their boundaries and consequently gate-keeping them so as to only allow information that fits with these narratives would be the material for another research project, directed at newsrooms, editorial and journalistic principles and practices. However, I have here theoretically made the case that the news should not be considered "objective" in the sense of not-invented; indeed, news never was an objective representation of encountered facts and events. In the journalistic, editorial and interpretive practices of newsmakers in the political beat, all the elements - headlines, leads, quotes from sources, ascriptions and predictions - are crafted in order to cohere and to answer not merely the "what," the "where" and the "who," but especially the "why" (Carey 1987). With linguistic and text-centric approaches to news (such as critical discourse analysis in the vein of van Dijk, or framing studies), it is always hard to approach the source of coherence, the origins of the

macropropositions that provide scaffolding for the diverse elements of news texts and, ultimately, the textual tether that constitutes the “why.” Therefore, I have argued in this thesis that in the specific case of scandals, researchers must pay heed to shared but distributed narrative structures that organize actants and events along story arcs. Such narrative structures provide the “why,” supply criteria for selecting and construing events as newsworthy, and condition the possible frames and metaphors. Unfolding within a fluid mediascape through a set of literary forms and conventions (Schudson 2003:178), a scandal ought to be studied as a cultural product, and should be interrogated in its textual and visual dimensions with the aim of uncovering its limited universe of realized fabulas, or what Jameson would term its specific *ideology of form* (Jameson 1981:62, 84).

The approach developed here – a narratology of political news - may contribute to the toolbox of political science as a method for determining how solutions to political crises may emerge, while others remain inconceivable. The empirical matter of the thesis, meanwhile, is in itself a case which may pose new theoretical questions. Despite – or even because of - its status as a unique scandal, a hundred-year wave engulfing Brazil, the Lava-Jato scandal is especially relevant to both media studies and political science as an extreme case study (Flyvbjerg 2004). Within political science, such a wide-flung scandal may help researchers expand on findings of Balan (2011), Maier (2011) and others who measure political impact of scandals. Furthermore, the case prompts new theoretical questions to theories of coalition formation, agenda-setting, and accountability: President Temer’s resilience to scandal and the effects of corruption allegations across the entire political spectrum are two decidedly non-standard aspects of the Lava-Jato case that merit more research in the field of political science, as does the issue of accountability. With a multitude of politicians investigated and terabytes of data disclosed in the court processes, the scandal prompted a plethora of perplexing questions and paradoxes concerning the staying power of the coalitional presidentialist system and the strength of Brazil’s institutions, not to mention the efficiency of accountability processes and the real independence of accountability institutions.

Undeniably, the Lava-Jato scandal challenges the perfectly logical but still flawed assumption that disclosure of corruption improves the quality of democracy. It is therefore difficult to conclude whether the corruption probe was a boon or a curse to democracy, although it probably did not help dispel the sense of impunity – removing Rousseff but leaving Temer to govern and to escape two indictments and the revocation of his mandate in the Supreme Electoral Court. At the time of writing, the jury is still out, debating the long-term benefits of the Lava-Jato trials, while the judges are fighting it out, alternately annulling and reinstalling prison sentences for Lula, Dirceu, and arrested PMDB leaders such as Henrique Alves and Geddel Vieira Lima. Future research should explore how the fabulas analyzed here leaves an imprint on public opinion and electoral preferences, identifying the links between the discourse of media and policy initiatives, social and political mobilization. Many questions remain in this area: What is the relation between these fabulas of corruption (especially the limits of this political unconscious articulated across the emerging fabulas) and civic society? If scandals, even more than other political news, may initiate a spiral of cynicism and distrust in government institutions (Cappella and Jamieson 1997, Mesquita 2014), can civic society then be expected to provide the basis of political revitalization? Will the Lava-Jato scandal, like its Italian forebear operation Mani Pulite (Moro 2004), ultimately thrust populist and anti-democratic forces to the fore?

Within the field of media studies, the narrative approach developed here could contribute not only by rescuing the notion that news may be cast in a narrative form, but also by explaining how the storyable forms turn out as they do: As imagined solutions to real social and political problems. I have taken the assertions of earlier authors such as Bell, Hall, Tuchman and Schudson at face value, and treated the intertextual assemblages of linked news texts as narrative constructs. Echoing Silverstone (1981:91), I left the particular in order to establish the generality of the textual system, abstracting the actantial positions and temporal structures. I believe that these structures – here termed fabulas - govern specific textual articulations, and that the fabulas offer solutions to the contradictions found in surface manifestations of textual accounts of the real events. The fabulas, I believe, will become not just the backgrounded blueprints of future news texts and political commentary, but also inform the proto-narratives underlying scientific arguments and, ultimately, underlying Brazilian history. I have argued, with Jameson, Koselleck, MacIntyre, and others, that this is because History can only be imagined and represented on the basis of narrative forms and structures. These sedimentary structures in the political unconscious may very well contain a number of contradictions and tensions, even as they delimit the inventory of possible solutions to conflicts and the horizon of political agency. Therein - in the continuous circulation of fragments of such fabulas - lies the power of media in times when scandal and crisis wash over democracies.

## Notes

1) This notion of script is thus conceptually similar to that of Erving Goffman (1956, 1959) who launched the influential idea that individuals constantly co-constitute and mutually project definitions of their interactions, based on socialized expectations of various everyday situations (how to act as a consumer or purchaser, in educational settings, in colloquial and festive settings, etc.). With several metaphors from the world of theatre, Goffman drew attention to the ways in which people manage the reciprocal impressions and expressions of these standardized but non-written interactional situational scripts, or routine “pre-established patterns of action” (1956:8). In the second version (1959) of his seminal book on the *Representation of Self in Everyday Life*, the word “script” was introduced, and the term caught on so that “cultural scripts” are now common parlance in cultural studies.

2) Van Dijk specifically argued, in private correspondence on February 18, 2016, that narrative cannot be used conceptually here:

*... in the strict sense your media data are not narratives (even when journalists talk of stories), according to the more specific meaning of the terms, you would not need a narrative analysis.... The fact that the news actors referred to seem like personages of a story, and the events the complicating events, with a resolution (in terms of the narrative theory of Labov), do not make the media discourse type narrative...For your research this means the following:*

- 1. The actual 'real' sociopolitical events of corruption: kickbacks, etc.*
- 2. The ways these are represented mentally (in Episodic Memory, part of Long Term memory by different participants... The event models of journalists (or readers) are not only influenced by the "real" events (which they usually know about indirectly, namely through other discourses (of other media, witnesses, police reports, the internet, etc.) but also by their socially shared, more general attitudes about corruption, and these (and other attitudes may be based on the fundamental professional (journalistic) and sociopolitical ideologies (e.g., neoliberal, socialist, nationalist, etc.) of the journalists.*
- 3. The various discourse types or genres expressing these subjective models, for instance in everyday conversational stories, in news reports, editorials, columns, background articles, opinion articles, letters to the editor, reportages, and other media genres. These are different discourse genres, and only some are narratives... News "stories" do NOT have this schematic story of a narrative, but their own news schema... It is theoretically very muddy and vague to call all these genres "stories".*

3) In the overlapping Petrobras/Pasadena scandals, one could perhaps glimpse another plot structure that elides the scandals, instead focalizing the weakened Rousseff, pressed by external forces (economy and electoral surveys), but without attributing personal culpability. Indeed, several researchers have observed news frames representing Rousseff as incompetent (see Cioccarri 2015, Guazina, Prior, and Araújo 2017, Mont'alverne and Marques 2013) from the start of her mandate and especially after the period after the 2013 protests, when her popularity dropped in the surveys (Baptista 2017). However, it is not feasible to disentangle effects of scandals from other negative coverage in the survey studies and link it causally to poll performance; in all likelihood, it was a feedback-phenomenon (Boydston 2013:157-8). At this point, it suffices to say that news texts and frames may strategically or involuntarily be situated in multiple discursive formations and even give rise to several different fabulas, since discourse is fundamentally open-ended.

4) In earlier TV Globo news reports, there is no documentation of actual wounds sustained during Lula's planned interrogation at the Forum Criminal da Barra Funda in São Paulo; then, the newscast only showed a brief clip of agitated protesters, while the situation was reported to be overall "tranquil"; see <https://globoplay.globo.com/v/4819420/>.

5) A comparison of the anchor Vasconcellos' body language in her quotes of denials is interesting: Whereas her somber facial expressions of this newscast in general seem to underscore accusations, with nods of the head and similar bodily emphasis on words of dire significance, she inverts the pattern by disapprovingly shaking her head when quoting the particular denials of PP and PMDB, confirming their voices by corporally denying the accusation.

6) I was personally present as observer right in front at the protest that day in Brasília. The reporter of the first news report either did not know about or simply ignored the fact that fireworks had been thrown at the police shortly before nightfall, and he downplays the violence of the moment when PMDB Congressman Carlos Marun was surrounded by shouting and hooting people as he crossed from the Congress to the Palácio do Planalto. This is reported as a "group of Congressmen from the opposition were expelled" (at 9:51), but not reported as violence, and neither is the fireworks thrown.

7) Possibly, the satire takes on a double meaning, illustrating the comment, still fresh in the newspapers of early March, uttered by senator Romero Jucá who stated that if the STF wanted to abolish the *foro privilegiado*, it should be general, not just for specific situations; "everybody in the orgy [*suruba*], not just a hand-picked orgy." With this connotation, the catharsis of the final judgment on the *IstoÉ* front page gains a sexual undertone, and the faces of politicians appear as writhing in painful glee in face of their punishment before the Supreme Court.

8) What especially complicated the picture of pollsters and commentators was the all-inclusiveness of the Lava-Jato investigations (though the same inclusiveness did not extend to the court rooms). With the four previous second-turn contenders Rousseff, Lula, Serra and Neves out, the only candidates with experience from previous races were Geraldo Alckmin and Marina Silva. In late 2017 and early 2018, a dozen parties prepared to launch their own candidates in hope of snatching discontented voters. The roster then included Manuela d'Ávila, Guilherme Boulos, Ciro Gomes, Rodrigo Maia, Henrique Meirelles, Joaquim Barbosa, Alvaro Dias, Flávio Rocha, Paulo Rabello and even Fernando Collor de Mello. The theme of "new" and "clean" outsiders, most clearly expressed in the never-realized candidacy of TV anchor Luciano Huck, had as its mirror the fear of the right-wing pre-candidate Jair Bolsonaro with a strongly authoritarian discourse and symbolically important (albeit empirically limited) military connections.

9) With this revelation, Temer and PMDB began to denounce the PGR for vested political interests, just like PT had criticized Sérgio Moro and the Curitiba task-force, building on Lula's phrase about the "Republic of Curitiba." This is a paraphrase of an older expression, coined after legal maneuvers in 1954 put pressure on then-President Getúlio Vargas, who eventually committed suicide. The maneuvers relocated an investigation of manslaughter from the police to the Federal Air Force, situated at Galeão in Rio de Janeiro. The investigation rapidly advanced towards the presidential palace by blaming the president's brother for ordering the manslaughter. The independence of the Air Force investigation made Galeão seem a Republic apart from the rest of Brazil, earning the air force commanders the nickname *República do Galeão*. In this vein, the counter-narrative of Lula intertextually rephrased the historical existence of interstate conflict. The phrase was even inversed, in a contrastingly laudatory sense, by Lula and Rousseff's opponents during the vote on impeachment in the Câmara (Castro 2016).



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All URLs have been retrieved and checked on August 14, 2018.

## References – news texts (in chronological order)

### News texts from 2014

Date	Code - Media Outlet	Subject 1	Subject 2	Author(s)	
4/4 2014	F4/4 2014	Folha	Petrobras	Paulo Roberto Costa	Eliane Cantanhêde
<a href="http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/fsp/opiniaio/159669-tudo-embolado.shtml">http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/fsp/opiniaio/159669-tudo-embolado.shtml</a>					
13/4 2014	F13/4 2014	Folha	Petrobras	Dilma Rousseff	Eliane Cantanhêde
<a href="https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/colunas/elianecantanhede/2014/04/1439915-oposicao-mostra-a-cara.shtml">https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/colunas/elianecantanhede/2014/04/1439915-oposicao-mostra-a-cara.shtml</a>					
10/06 2014	F10/6 2014	Folha	Petrobras	Paulo Roberto Costa	Mateus Leitão
<a href="http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2014/06/1467860-petrobras-nao-era-balcao-de-negocios-diz-ex-diretor-que-esteve-presos.shtml">http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2014/06/1467860-petrobras-nao-era-balcao-de-negocios-diz-ex-diretor-que-esteve-presos.shtml</a>					
21/5 2014	F21/5 2014	Folha	Petrobras	Jurisdictional competence	Editorial
<a href="http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/fsp/opiniaio/166889-competencia-e-prensa.shtml">http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/fsp/opiniaio/166889-competencia-e-prensa.shtml</a>					
10/8 2014	F10/8 2014	Folha	Alberto Youssef	Plea bargain	Mario Cesar Carvalho
<a href="http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2014/08/1498307-presos-desde-marco-doleiro-alberto-youssef-quer-colaborar-com-a-justica.shtml">http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2014/08/1498307-presos-desde-marco-doleiro-alberto-youssef-quer-colaborar-com-a-justica.shtml</a>					
5/9 2014	V#2390	Veja	Petrobras	Paulo Roberto Costa	Rodrigo Rangel
<a href="https://veja.abril.com.br/brasil/exclusivo-paulo-roberto-costa-comeca-a-revelar-nomes-dos-beneficiarios-do-esquema-de-corrupcao-da-petrobras/">https://veja.abril.com.br/brasil/exclusivo-paulo-roberto-costa-comeca-a-revelar-nomes-dos-beneficiarios-do-esquema-de-corrupcao-da-petrobras/</a>					
10/10 2014	I#2342	IstoÉ	Petrobras	Paulo Roberto Costa	Josie Jerônimo
<a href="https://istoe.com.br/387126_DELATOR+DA+PETROBRAS+DIZ+QUE+A+CAMPANHA+DE+DILMA+EM+2010+FOI+BENEFICIADA+POR+DINHEIRO+DESVIADO/">https://istoe.com.br/387126_DELATOR+DA+PETROBRAS+DIZ+QUE+A+CAMPANHA+DE+DILMA+EM+2010+FOI+BENEFICIADA+POR+DINHEIRO+DESVIADO/</a>					
14/11 2014	E#859	Época	Petrobras	Cartel	Murilo Ramos, Marcelo Rocha, et al.
<a href="https://epoca.globo.com/tempo/noticia/2014/11/bescandalo-da-petrobrasb-partidos-e-empresas-no-juizo-final.html">https://epoca.globo.com/tempo/noticia/2014/11/bescandalo-da-petrobrasb-partidos-e-empresas-no-juizo-final.html</a>					
15/11 2014	G15/11 2014	O Globo	Petrobras	Cartel	<i>(O Globo front page editor)</i>
<a href="http://www.estemundopossivel.com.br/upfiles/fckeditor/image/CAPA%20%20GLOBO%20LAVA-JATO.jpg">http://www.estemundopossivel.com.br/upfiles/fckeditor/image/CAPA%20%20GLOBO%20LAVA-JATO.jpg</a>					
17/11 2014	V#2400	Veja	Petrobras	Eduardo Cunha	Reinaldo Azevedo
<a href="https://veja.abril.com.br/blog/reinaldo/cunha-candidato-a-presidencia-da-camara-diz-que-reforma-politica-ele-quer-feita-pelo-congresso-com-financiamento-privado-voto-majoritario-e-sem-reeleicao/">https://veja.abril.com.br/blog/reinaldo/cunha-candidato-a-presidencia-da-camara-diz-que-reforma-politica-ele-quer-feita-pelo-congresso-com-financiamento-privado-voto-majoritario-e-sem-reeleicao/</a>					
7/12 2014	G7/12 2014	O Globo	Lula	OAS	Germano Oliveira
<a href="https://oglobo.globo.com/brasil/cooperativa-entrega-triplex-de-lula-mas-tres-mil-ainda-esperam-imovel-14761809">https://oglobo.globo.com/brasil/cooperativa-entrega-triplex-de-lula-mas-tres-mil-ainda-esperam-imovel-14761809</a>					
29/12 2014	F29/12 2014	Folha	Petrobras	Eduardo Cunha	Andréia Sadi
<a href="http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2014/12/1568027-entrevista-da-2-camara-nao-poupara-envolvidos-na-lava-jato-diz-cunha.shtml">http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2014/12/1568027-entrevista-da-2-camara-nao-poupara-envolvidos-na-lava-jato-diz-cunha.shtml</a>					

### News texts and broadcast news from 2015

7/1 2015	F7/1 2015	Folha	Petrobras	Eduardo Cunha	Severino Motta, Gabriel Mascarenhas
<a href="http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2015/01/1571474-lider-do-pmdb-sera-alvo-da-procuradoria-na-lava-jato.shtml">http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2015/01/1571474-lider-do-pmdb-sera-alvo-da-procuradoria-na-lava-jato.shtml</a>					
12/1 2015	V#2408	Veja	Petrobras	Ricardo Pessoa	Rodrigo Rangel
<a href="http://www.manancialvox.com/diario/VEJA-14-01-2015.txt">http://www.manancialvox.com/diario/VEJA-14-01-2015.txt</a>					
4/2 2015	V#2411	Veja	Impeachment	Dilma Rousseff	R. Rangel, R. Bonin, B. Megale
No link available					
11/2 2015	V#2412	Veja	Impeachment	Dilma Rousseff	<i>(no author of interview)</i>
No link available					
25/2 2015	V#2414	Veja	Impeachment	Dilma Rousseff	Mailson Nobrega
No link available					
28/2 2015	E28/2 2015	Estado	Petrobras	Rodrigo Janot	B. Bulla, D. Carvalho, T. Fernandes
<a href="https://politica.estadao.com.br/noticias/geral,estresse-domina-congresso-a-espera-dos-pedidos-de-inquerito-do-procurador-geral,1641898">https://politica.estadao.com.br/noticias/geral,estresse-domina-congresso-a-espera-dos-pedidos-de-inquerito-do-procurador-geral,1641898</a>					

<i>Date</i>	<i>Code - Media Outlet</i>	<i>Subject 1</i>	<i>Subject 2</i>	<i>Author(s)</i>
12/3 2015 <a href="https://oglobo.globo.com/brasil/depoimento-de-eduardo-cunha-cpi-da-petrobras-vira-ato-de-desagravo-15574079">https://oglobo.globo.com/brasil/depoimento-de-eduardo-cunha-cpi-da-petrobras-vira-ato-de-desagravo-15574079</a>	G12/3 2015	O Globo	CPI de Petrobras	Eduardo Cunha Chico de Gois, Eduardo Bresciani
12/3 2015 <a href="http://politica.estadao.com.br/noticias/geral,sob-suspeita-cunha-vai-a-cpi-e-e-alvo-de-elogios-dos-colegas,1649829">http://politica.estadao.com.br/noticias/geral,sob-suspeita-cunha-vai-a-cpi-e-e-alvo-de-elogios-dos-colegas,1649829</a>	E12/3 2015	Estado	CPI de Petrobras	Eduardo Cunha D. Carvalho, D. Cardoso, P. Venceslau
12/3 2015 <a href="http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2015/03/1601786-sessao-da-cpi-vira-evento-de-desagravo-a-eduardo-cunha.shtml">http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2015/03/1601786-sessao-da-cpi-vira-evento-de-desagravo-a-eduardo-cunha.shtml</a>	F12/3 2015	Folha	CPI de Petrobras	Eduardo Cunha Gabriel Mascarenhas, Aguirre Talento
12/3 2015 <a href="https://globoplay.globo.com/v/4031161/">https://globoplay.globo.com/v/4031161/</a>	JN12/3 2015	Nacional	CPI de Petrobras	Eduardo Cunha JN newsroom
14/3 2015 <a href="https://veja.abril.com.br/politica/entenda-como-funciona-um-processo-de-impeachment/">https://veja.abril.com.br/politica/entenda-como-funciona-um-processo-de-impeachment/</a>	V#2417	Veja	Impeachment	Dilma Rousseff Gabriel Castro
14/3 2015 No link available	V#2417	Veja	Impeachment	Dilma Rousseff M. Barros, Daniel Pereira, Pieter Zalis
21/3 2015 <a href="https://veja.abril.com.br/brasil/o-poderoso-cunha/">https://veja.abril.com.br/brasil/o-poderoso-cunha/</a>	V#2418	Veja	Petrobras	Eduardo Cunha Adriano Ceolin
22/4 2015 No link available	V#2422	Veja	Impeachment	Dilma Rousseff
29/4 2015 <a href="https://veja.abril.com.br/brasil/os-favores-do-empresiteiro/">https://veja.abril.com.br/brasil/os-favores-do-empresiteiro/</a>	V#2423	Veja	Lula	Leo Pinheiro Kalleo Coura, Hugo Marques
18/6 2015 <a href="http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2015/06/1644488-aliada-de-cunha-fez-requerimento-a-pedido-de-corretor-ligado-ao-deputado.shtml">http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2015/06/1644488-aliada-de-cunha-fez-requerimento-a-pedido-de-corretor-ligado-ao-deputado.shtml</a>	F18/6 2015	Folha	Eduardo Cunha	Solange Almeida Rubens Valente
18/6 2015 <a href="https://oglobo.globo.com/brasil/aliada-de-cunha-pressionou-executivos-da-schahin-envolvida-na-lava-jato-16478499">https://oglobo.globo.com/brasil/aliada-de-cunha-pressionou-executivos-da-schahin-envolvida-na-lava-jato-16478499</a>	G18/6 2015	O Globo	Eduardo Cunha	Solange Almeida Chico Otavio
19/6 2015 <a href="http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2015/06/1645019-presidente-da-maior-empresiteira-do-pais-nao-tinha-medo-de-ser-presos.shtml">http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2015/06/1645019-presidente-da-maior-empresiteira-do-pais-nao-tinha-medo-de-ser-presos.shtml</a>	F19/6 2015	Folha	Odebrecht	Arrests David Friedlander, Raquel Landim
20/6 2016 <a href="https://globoplay.globo.com/v/4267836/">https://globoplay.globo.com/v/4267836/</a>	JN20/6 2015	Nacional	Odebrecht	Arrests Jornal Nacional newsroom
20/6 2016 <a href="http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/esp/illustrada/223240-monica-bergamo.shtml">http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/esp/illustrada/223240-monica-bergamo.shtml</a>	F20/6 2015	Folha	Odebrecht	Arrests Mônica Bergamo
22/6 2015 <a href="https://epoca.globo.com/tempo/noticia/2015/06/marcelo-odebrecht-ameaca-derrubar-republica.html">https://epoca.globo.com/tempo/noticia/2015/06/marcelo-odebrecht-ameaca-derrubar-republica.html</a>	E#889	Época	Petrobras	Marcelo Odebrecht F. Coutinho, T. Bronzatto, D. Escosteguy
6/7 2015 No link available	E#891	Época	Petrobras	Sérgio Moro T. Bronzatto, L. Loyola, D. Escosteguy
15/7 2015 <a href="https://oglobo.globo.com/brasil/delator-da-lava-jato-diz-que-cunha-pediu-propina-de-us-5-milhoes-16790059">https://oglobo.globo.com/brasil/delator-da-lava-jato-diz-que-cunha-pediu-propina-de-us-5-milhoes-16790059</a>	G15/7 2015	O Globo	Eduardo Cunha	Julio Camargo Renato Onofre, Thais Skodowski
17/7 2015 <a href="https://politica.estadao.com.br/noticias/geral,cunha-cira-cpi-do-bndes-apos-romper-com-governo,1727327">https://politica.estadao.com.br/noticias/geral,cunha-cira-cpi-do-bndes-apos-romper-com-governo,1727327</a>	E17/7 2015	Estado	Petrobras	Eduardo Cunha Daniel Carvalho, Victor Martins
19/7 2015 <a href="https://politica.estadao.com.br/noticias/geral,revés-de-cunha-muda-rumo-da-oposicao,1727909">https://politica.estadao.com.br/noticias/geral,revés-de-cunha-muda-rumo-da-oposicao,1727909</a>	E19/7 2015	Estado	Eduardo Cunha	Julio Camargo Alberto Bombig
20/7 2015 <a href="https://epoca.globo.com/tempo/noticia/2015/07/acoes-da-policia-terao-consequencias-politicas.html">https://epoca.globo.com/tempo/noticia/2015/07/acoes-da-policia-terao-consequencias-politicas.html</a>	E#893	Época	Eduardo Cunha	Julio Camargo F. Tavares, A. Ribeiro, P. M. de Moura
22/7 2015 <a href="http://en.calameo.com/read/001238206a72704b8f69e">http://en.calameo.com/read/001238206a72704b8f69e</a>	V#2435	Veja	Eduardo Cunha	Julio Camargo Daniel Pereira
22/7 2015 <a href="http://en.calameo.com/read/001238206a72704b8f69e">http://en.calameo.com/read/001238206a72704b8f69e</a>	V#2435	Veja	Lula	Leo Pinheiro Rodrigo Rangel, Robson Bonin
3/8 2015 <a href="http://politica.estadao.com.br/noticias/geral,parecer-sera-nossa-bala-de-prata--diz-lider-do-psdb-na-camara,1736834">http://politica.estadao.com.br/noticias/geral,parecer-sera-nossa-bala-de-prata--diz-lider-do-psdb-na-camara,1736834</a>	E3/8 2015	Estado	Impeachment	Pedaladas Pedro Venceslau
19/10 2015 No link available	E#906	Época	Impeachment	Eduardo Cunha Talita Fernandes

<i>Date</i>	<i>Code - Media Outlet</i>	<i>Subject 1</i>	<i>Subject 2</i>	<i>Author(s)</i>	
19/10 2015	E19/10 2015	Estado	Impeachment	Eduardo Cunha	Igor Gadelha
<a href="https://politica.estadao.com.br/noticias/geral,lamento-que-seja-com-um-governo-brasileiro-o-maior-escandalo-de-corrupcao-do-mundo--diz-cunha,1782426">https://politica.estadao.com.br/noticias/geral,lamento-que-seja-com-um-governo-brasileiro-o-maior-escandalo-de-corrupcao-do-mundo--diz-cunha,1782426</a>					
21/10 2015	F21/10 2015	Folha	Impeachment	Eduardo Cunha	Débora Alvares, Ranier Bragon
<a href="https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2015/10/1696548-suspeito-de-corrupcao-cunha-recebe-pedido-de-impeachment-de-dilma.shtml">https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2015/10/1696548-suspeito-de-corrupcao-cunha-recebe-pedido-de-impeachment-de-dilma.shtml</a>					
23/10 2015	E23/10 2015	Estado	Rodrigo Janot	Eduardo Cunha	Lorenna Rodrigues
<a href="http://politica.estadao.com.br/noticias/geral,janot-manda-indireta-e-diz-que-nao-adianta-esconder-bens-fora-do-brasil,1000000582">http://politica.estadao.com.br/noticias/geral,janot-manda-indireta-e-diz-que-nao-adianta-esconder-bens-fora-do-brasil,1000000582</a>					
29/10 2015	G1-29/10 2015	G1 (Globo)	Lula	Fiscal crisis	Nathalia Passarinho, Filipe Matoso
<a href="http://g1.globo.com/politica/noticia/2015/10/lula-diz-que-pt-vive-maior-bombardeio-na-historia-do-pais.html">http://g1.globo.com/politica/noticia/2015/10/lula-diz-que-pt-vive-maior-bombardeio-na-historia-do-pais.html</a>					
3/11 2015	G1-3/11 2015	G1 (Globo)	Eduardo Cunha	Ethics Committee	Fernanda Calgaro
<a href="http://g1.globo.com/politica/noticia/2015/11/eduardo-cunha-diz-que-provara-ao-conselho-de-etica-que-falou-verdade.html">http://g1.globo.com/politica/noticia/2015/11/eduardo-cunha-diz-que-provara-ao-conselho-de-etica-que-falou-verdade.html</a>					
20/11 2015	E20/11 2015	Estado	Eduardo Cunha	Ethics Committee	D. Carvalho, D. Cardoso, Igor Gadelha
<a href="https://politica.estadao.com.br/noticias/geral,aliados-de-cunha-impedem-leitura-de-relatorio-que-pede-processo-contra-ele,10000002520">https://politica.estadao.com.br/noticias/geral,aliados-de-cunha-impedem-leitura-de-relatorio-que-pede-processo-contra-ele,10000002520</a>					
24/11 2015	F24/11 2015	Folha	Sergio Moro	anti-corruption	(front page editor)
24/11 2015	G24/11 2015	O Globo	Sergio Moro	anti-corruption	(front page editor)
24/11 2015	E24/11 2015	Estado	Sergio Moro	anti-corruption	(front page editor)
No links available					
25/11 2015	G1-25/11 2015	G1 (Globo)	José Carlos Bumlai	Celso Daniel	Hélio Gurovitz
<a href="http://g1.globo.com/mundo/blog/helio-gurovitz/post/o-novo-elo-entre-mensalao-e-petrolao.html">http://g1.globo.com/mundo/blog/helio-gurovitz/post/o-novo-elo-entre-mensalao-e-petrolao.html</a>					
2/12 2015	F2/12a 2015	Folha	Impeachment	Eduardo Cunha	Ranier Braigon, Gustavo Uribe
<a href="https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2015/12/1713918-bancada-petista-decide-votar-contra-cunha-no-conselho-de-etica-da-camara.shtml">https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2015/12/1713918-bancada-petista-decide-votar-contra-cunha-no-conselho-de-etica-da-camara.shtml</a>					
2/12 2015	F2/12b 2015	Folha	Impeachment	Eduardo Cunha	Gustavo Uribe, Ranier Braigon
<a href="http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2015/12/1714133-cunha-deflora-processo-de-impeachment-contra-dilma.shtml">http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2015/12/1714133-cunha-deflora-processo-de-impeachment-contra-dilma.shtml</a>					
2/12 2015	V-2/12 2015	Veja	Impeachment	Eduardo Cunha	Marcela Mattos
<a href="http://veja.abril.com.br/noticia/brasil/o-fator-janot-na-decisao-de-cunha-sobre-o-impeachment">http://veja.abril.com.br/noticia/brasil/o-fator-janot-na-decisao-de-cunha-sobre-o-impeachment</a>					
2/12 2015	JN 2/12 2015	Jornal Nacional	Impeachment	Dilma Rousseff	Jornal Nacional newsroom
<a href="http://g1.globo.com/politica/noticia/2015/12/dilma-diz-que-recebeu-com-indignacao-abertura-de-impeachment.html">http://g1.globo.com/politica/noticia/2015/12/dilma-diz-que-recebeu-com-indignacao-abertura-de-impeachment.html</a>					
3/12 2015	E3/12a 2015	Estado	Impeachment	Eduardo Cunha	Beatriz Bulla
<a href="http://politica.estadao.com.br/noticias/geral,pt-desiste-de-recurso-no-stf-apos-gilmar-se-tornar-relator,10000003791">http://politica.estadao.com.br/noticias/geral,pt-desiste-de-recurso-no-stf-apos-gilmar-se-tornar-relator,10000003791</a>					
3/12 2015	E3/12b 2015	Estado	Impeachment	Eduardo Cunha	Marco Aurélio Nogueira
<a href="http://politica.estadao.com.br/blogs/marco-aurelio-nogueira/impeachment-e-um-risco-mas-pode-trazer-ganhos-para-o-debate-democratico/">http://politica.estadao.com.br/blogs/marco-aurelio-nogueira/impeachment-e-um-risco-mas-pode-trazer-ganhos-para-o-debate-democratico/</a>					
3/12 2015	E3/12c 2015	Estado	Impeachment	Eduardo Cunha	E. Machado, D. Dimoulis, R. Dias
<a href="http://politica.estadao.com.br/blogs/supremo-em-pauta/impeachment-supremo-tera-papel-decisivo-para-preservar-legalidade/">http://politica.estadao.com.br/blogs/supremo-em-pauta/impeachment-supremo-tera-papel-decisivo-para-preservar-legalidade/</a>					
5/12 2015	E5/12 2015	Estado	Impeachment	Eduardo Cunha	Economist editorial
<a href="http://politica.estadao.com.br/noticias/geral,o-roto-e-a-esfarrapada-se-estranham--imp-,1807179">http://politica.estadao.com.br/noticias/geral,o-roto-e-a-esfarrapada-se-estranham--imp-,1807179</a>					
8/12 2015	E8/12 2015	Estado	Impeachment	Eduardo Cunha	Fernando Dantas
<a href="http://economia.estadao.com.br/blogs/fernando-dantas/as-razoes-de-temer/">http://economia.estadao.com.br/blogs/fernando-dantas/as-razoes-de-temer/</a>					

## News texts and broadcast news from 2016

18/1 2016	E18/1 2016	Estado	Impeachment	Eduardo Cunha	Editorial
<a href="http://opinioao.estadao.com.br/noticias/geral,a-verdade-do-impeachment,10000007338">http://opinioao.estadao.com.br/noticias/geral,a-verdade-do-impeachment,10000007338</a>					
19/1 2016	E19/1 2016	Estadão	Sergio Moro	Manifesto against LJ	Fausto Macedo, Julia Affonso
<a href="http://politica.estadao.com.br/blogs/fausto-macedo/promotores-paulistas-repudiam-manifesto-dos-advogados-contra-a-lava-jato/">http://politica.estadao.com.br/blogs/fausto-macedo/promotores-paulistas-repudiam-manifesto-dos-advogados-contra-a-lava-jato/</a>					
22/1 2016	V#2462	Veja	Lula	OAS	Veja newsroom
<a href="https://veja.abril.com.br/brasil/ministerio-publico-vai-denunciar-lula-por-ocultacao-de-propriedade/">https://veja.abril.com.br/brasil/ministerio-publico-vai-denunciar-lula-por-ocultacao-de-propriedade/</a>					

<i>Date</i>	<i>Code - Media Outlet</i>	<i>Subject 1</i>	<i>Subject 2</i>	<i>Author(s)</i>	
29/1 2016 <a href="https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2016/01/1734827-odebrecht-fez-obra-em-sitio-ligado-a-lula-diz-fornecedora.shtml">https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2016/01/1734827-odebrecht-fez-obra-em-sitio-ligado-a-lula-diz-fornecedora.shtml</a>	F29/1 2016	Folha	Lula	Odebrecht	Flávio Ferreira
3/2 2016 No link available	V#2463	Veja	Lula	OAS	D. Pereira, R. Rangel, R. Bonin
		G1			
8/2 2016 <a href="http://g1.globo.com/mundo/blog/helio-gurovitz/post/quadrilha-do-petrolao-e-uma-so.html">http://g1.globo.com/mundo/blog/helio-gurovitz/post/quadrilha-do-petrolao-e-uma-so.html</a>	G1-8/2 2016	(Globo)	Mensalção	Petrobras	Hélio Gurovitz
22/2 2016 <a href="http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2016/02/1741820-apos-dez-anos-publicitario-estrela-volta-a-ameacar-governo-petista.shtml">http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2016/02/1741820-apos-dez-anos-publicitario-estrela-volta-a-ameacar-governo-petista.shtml</a>	F22/2 2016	Folha	Impeachment	João Santana	Fabio Zanini
23/2 2016 <a href="http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2016/02/1742320-oposicao-decide-ir-ao-stf-pedir-que-impeachment-seja-destravado.shtml">http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2016/02/1742320-oposicao-decide-ir-ao-stf-pedir-que-impeachment-seja-destravado.shtml</a>	F23/2 2016	Folha	Impeachment	João Santana	Ranier Bragon
26/2 2016 <a href="http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2016/02/1743480-pmdb-volta-a-considerar-impeachment-apos-prisao-de-santana.shtml">http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2016/02/1743480-pmdb-volta-a-considerar-impeachment-apos-prisao-de-santana.shtml</a>	F26/2 2016	Folha	Impeachment	João Santana	Daniele Lima
4/3 2016 <a href="http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2016/03/1746176-delacao-de-delcidio-reforca-pessao-por-impeachment-avalia-pmdb.shtml">http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2016/03/1746176-delacao-de-delcidio-reforca-pessao-por-impeachment-avalia-pmdb.shtml</a>	F4/3 2016	Folha	Impeachment	Delcídio do Amaral	Daniele Lima
		Jornal			
4/3 2016 <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4ldpBPW8Bs">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4ldpBPW8Bs</a>	JN4/3 2016	Nacional	Lula	OAS	JN newsroom
8/3 2016 <a href="https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2016/03/1747462-responsavel-por-planilha-da-odebrecht-negocia-delacao.shtml">https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2016/03/1747462-responsavel-por-planilha-da-odebrecht-negocia-delacao.shtml</a>	F8/3 2016	Folha	Odebrecht	Maria Lúcia Tavares	Graciliano Rocha, Bela Megale
9/3 2016 <a href="http://politica.estadao.com.br/noticias/geral,sob-vara,10000020255">http://politica.estadao.com.br/noticias/geral,sob-vara,10000020255</a>	E9/3 2016	Estado	Lula	Sérgio Moro	Eliane Cantanhêde
10/3 2016 <a href="http://politica.estadao.com.br/noticias/geral,nomeacao-so-pode-ser-ideia-de-inimigo,10000020477">http://politica.estadao.com.br/noticias/geral,nomeacao-so-pode-ser-ideia-de-inimigo,10000020477</a>	E10/3 2016	Estado	Lula	Obstruction of Justice	Dora Kramer
10/3 2016 <a href="http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/colunas/monicabergamo/2016/03/1748472-planalto-teme-acao-no-stf-se-lula- virar-ministro-da-casa-civil.shtml">http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/colunas/monicabergamo/2016/03/1748472-planalto-teme-acao-no-stf-se-lula- virar-ministro-da-casa-civil.shtml</a>	F10/3 2016	Folha	Lula	Obstruction of Justice	Mônica Bergamo
11/3 2016 <a href="http://opinioao.estadao.com.br/noticias/geral,de-paz-e-amor-a-jararaca,10000020610">http://opinioao.estadao.com.br/noticias/geral,de-paz-e-amor-a-jararaca,10000020610</a>	E11/3 2016	Estado	Lula	Presidential candidate	Fernando Gabeira
14/3 2016 No link available	V#2469	Veja	Marcelo Odebrecht	Petrobras	Ulisses Campbell
14/3 2016 <a href="http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/colunas/monicabergamo/2016/03/1749879-lula-deve-aceitar-convite-de-dilma-para-ser-ministro.shtml">http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/colunas/monicabergamo/2016/03/1749879-lula-deve-aceitar-convite-de-dilma-para-ser-ministro.shtml</a>	F14/3 2016	Folha	Lula	Obstruction of Justice	Mônica Bergamo
15/3 2016 <a href="http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2016/03/1750090-oposicao-vai-acionar-justica-se-lula-assumir-ministerio-de-dilma.shtml">http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2016/03/1750090-oposicao-vai-acionar-justica-se-lula-assumir-ministerio-de-dilma.shtml</a>	F15/3 2016	Folha	Lula	Obstruction of Justice	D. Álvares, R. Bragon, P. Reverbel
16/3 2016 <a href="https://veja.abril.com.br/blog/felipe-moura-brasil/o-desespero-da-jararaca/">https://veja.abril.com.br/blog/felipe-moura-brasil/o-desespero-da-jararaca/</a>	V#2469	Veja	Lula	Petrobras	(Veja frontpage designer)
		Jornal			
16/3 2016 <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WKCS0Ej3z_k">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WKCS0Ej3z_k</a>	JN16/3 2016	Nacional	Lula	Obstruction of Justice	Jornal Nacional newsroom
			Marcelo		P. Venceslau, R. Brandt, V. Hupsel Filho,
22/3 2016 <a href="http://politica.estadao.com.br/blogs/fausto-macedo/marcelo-odebrecht-decide-fazer-delacao-premiada-na-lava-jato/">http://politica.estadao.com.br/blogs/fausto-macedo/marcelo-odebrecht-decide-fazer-delacao-premiada-na-lava-jato/</a>	E22/3 2016	Estado	Odebrecht	Impeachment	F. Macedo
22/3 2016 <a href="http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2016/03/1752993-executivos-da-odebrecht-decidem-fazer-acordo-de-delacao.shtml">http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2016/03/1752993-executivos-da-odebrecht-decidem-fazer-acordo-de-delacao.shtml</a>	F22/3a 2016	Folha	Odebrecht	Plea bargain	Mario Cesar Carvalho
22/3 2016 <a href="http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2016/03/1752707-odebrecht-tinha-departamento-de-propina-no-pais-diz-lava-jato.shtml">http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2016/03/1752707-odebrecht-tinha-departamento-de-propina-no-pais-diz-lava-jato.shtml</a>	F22/3b 2016	Folha	Odebrecht	Planilha	Graciliano Rocha
23/3 2016 <a href="http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2016/03/1753135-a-delacao-do-fim-do-mundo.shtml">http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2016/03/1753135-a-delacao-do-fim-do-mundo.shtml</a>	F23/3	Folha	Odebrecht	Planilha	Clovis Rossi
25/3 2016 <a href="https://blogs.oglobo.globo.com/merval-pereira/post/tentativa-de-sabotagem.html">https://blogs.oglobo.globo.com/merval-pereira/post/tentativa-de-sabotagem.html</a>	G25/3 2016	O Globo	Odebrecht	Planilha	Merval Pereira



<i>Date</i>	<i>Code - Media Outlet</i>	<i>Subject 1</i>	<i>Subject 2</i>	<i>Author(s)</i>	
25/3 2016	F25/3 2016	Folha	Odebrecht	Planilha	Editorial
<a href="https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/opiniaio/2016/03/1753954-lista-explosiva.shtml">https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/opiniaio/2016/03/1753954-lista-explosiva.shtml</a>					
11/4 2016	F11/4 2016	Folha	Partido da República	Government rupture	Débora Álvares
<a href="http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2016/04/1759860-favoravel-ao-impeachment-lider-do-pr-na-camara-entrega-cargo.shtml">http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2016/04/1759860-favoravel-ao-impeachment-lider-do-pr-na-camara-entrega-cargo.shtml</a>					
14/4 2016	F14/4 2016	Folha	Impeachment	Dilma Rousseff	Jose Henrique Mariante
<a href="https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/colunas/josehenriquemariante/2016/04/1760726-revisao-inconsequente.shtml">https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/colunas/josehenriquemariante/2016/04/1760726-revisao-inconsequente.shtml</a>					
27/4 2016	F27/4a 2016	Folha	Impeachment	Eduardo Cunha	Marina Dias
<a href="https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2016/04/1765414-dilma-acusa-cunha-de-ser-pecado-original-do-impeachment.shtml">https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2016/04/1765414-dilma-acusa-cunha-de-ser-pecado-original-do-impeachment.shtml</a>					
27/4 2016	F27/4b 2016	Folha	Impeachment	Dilma Rousseff	Marina Dias, Gustavo Uribe, Valdo Cruz
<a href="http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2016/04/1765178-dilma-admite-que-afastamento-da-presidencia-se-tornou-inevitavel.shtml">http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2016/04/1765178-dilma-admite-que-afastamento-da-presidencia-se-tornou-inevitavel.shtml</a>					
3/5 2016	E3/5 2016	Estado	Impeachment	Dilma Rousseff	Victor Martins, Carla Araújo
<a href="http://politica.estadao.com.br/noticias/geral,e-confortavel-para-os-golpistas-que-a-vitima-desapareca--diz-dilma-sobre-pessao-para-renuncia,10000048880">http://politica.estadao.com.br/noticias/geral,e-confortavel-para-os-golpistas-que-a-vitima-desapareca--diz-dilma-sobre-pessao-para-renuncia,10000048880</a>					
5/5 2016	F5/5 2016	Folha	Impeachment	Dilma Rousseff	L. Colon, M. Haubert, D. Álvares
<a href="http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2016/05/1768027-afastamento-de-cunha-confirma-tese-para-anular-impeachment-diz-cardozo.shtml">http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2016/05/1768027-afastamento-de-cunha-confirma-tese-para-anular-impeachment-diz-cardozo.shtml</a>					
23/5 2016	F23/5 2016	Folha	Sergio Machado	Romero Jucá	Rubens Valente
<a href="https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2016/05/1774018-em-dialogos-gravados-juca-fala-em-pacto-para-deter-avanco-da-lava-jato.shtml">https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2016/05/1774018-em-dialogos-gravados-juca-fala-em-pacto-para-deter-avanco-da-lava-jato.shtml</a>					
26/5 2016	F26/5 2016	Folha	Sergio Machado	Romero Jucá	Bernardo Mello Franco
<a href="https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/colunas/bernardomellofranco/2016/05/1775184-o-novo-homem-bomba.shtml">https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/colunas/bernardomellofranco/2016/05/1775184-o-novo-homem-bomba.shtml</a>					
8/6 2016	V#2481	Veja	Sergio Machado		Rodrigo Rangel
No link available					
6/8 2016	F6/8 2016	Folha	Odebrecht	Michel Temer	Folha Newsroom São Paulo
<a href="http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2016/08/1799749-odebrecht-delatara-pedido-de-apoio-financeiro-de-temer-afirma-revista.shtml">http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2016/08/1799749-odebrecht-delatara-pedido-de-apoio-financeiro-de-temer-afirma-revista.shtml</a>					
7/8 2016	F7/8 2016	Folha	Odebrecht	José Serra	Bela Megale
<a href="http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2016/08/1799887-jose-serra-recebeu-r-23-mi-via-caixa-2-afirma-odebrecht.shtml">http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2016/08/1799887-jose-serra-recebeu-r-23-mi-via-caixa-2-afirma-odebrecht.shtml</a>					
8/8 2016	V#2490	Veja	Odebrecht	Michel Temer	Daniel Pereira
<a href="https://veja.abril.com.br/brasil/odebrecht-cita-temer-em-negociacao-de-delacao-premiada/">https://veja.abril.com.br/brasil/odebrecht-cita-temer-em-negociacao-de-delacao-premiada/</a>					
8/10 2016	E8/10 2016	Estado	Odebrecht	Plea bargain	Beatriz Bulla
<a href="http://politica.estadao.com.br/noticias/geral,hotel-de-brasilia-vira-qg-de-delacao-da-odebrecht,10000081003">http://politica.estadao.com.br/noticias/geral,hotel-de-brasilia-vira-qg-de-delacao-da-odebrecht,10000081003</a>					
28/10 2016	F28/10 2016	Folha	Odebrecht	José Serra	Bela Megale
<a href="http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2016/10/1827058-odebrecht-diz-que-caixa-2-a-serra-foi-pago-em-conta-suica.shtml">http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2016/10/1827058-odebrecht-diz-que-caixa-2-a-serra-foi-pago-em-conta-suica.shtml</a>					
2/11 2016	V#2502	Veja	Odebrecht	Sergio Moro	(Veja frontpage designer)
<a href="https://veja.abril.com.br/brasil/lava-jato-a-delacao-do-fim-do-mundo/">https://veja.abril.com.br/brasil/lava-jato-a-delacao-do-fim-do-mundo/</a>					

## News texts from 2017-18

17/5 2017	E17/5 2017	Estado	JBS	Michel Temer	Alexandre Hisayasu, Fausto Macedo
<a href="https://politica.estadao.com.br/blogs/fausto-macedo/se-a-jbs-delatar-sera-o-fim-da-republica-diz-eduardo-cunha/">https://politica.estadao.com.br/blogs/fausto-macedo/se-a-jbs-delatar-sera-o-fim-da-republica-diz-eduardo-cunha/</a>					
28/5 2018	F28/5 2018	Folha	Jair Bolsonaro	Elections	Celso Rocha de Barros
<a href="https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/colunas/celso-rocha-de-barros/2018/05/bolsonaro-te-acha-otario.shtml">https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/colunas/celso-rocha-de-barros/2018/05/bolsonaro-te-acha-otario.shtml</a>					
6/4 2018	F6/4 2018	Folha	Lula	Elections	Mauro Paulino, Alessandro Janoni
<a href="https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2018/04/lula-deixa-herdeiros-mas-centro-tem-potencial.shtml">https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2018/04/lula-deixa-herdeiros-mas-centro-tem-potencial.shtml</a>					

# Appendix A

## Visual Representations of the Lava-Jato Scandal and Impeachment

Front pages of weekly magazines and newspapers, collages, and graphic details of print and online news



Figure A.1, A.2, and A.3: Businessmen on the front pages of *Veja* and *O Globo*. See section 5.1 and 4.1.1. Notice the super-header “Escândalos em série”, “Serial scandals”, on *O Globo* front page.



Figure A.4: “They knew everything”, *Veja*, revealed online and on TV on October 23, 2014, published on October 26 (V#2397). See section 4.1.

Figure A.5: “He threatens to overthrow the Republic”, *Época*, June 22, 2015 (E#889). See section 4.1.2. Compare the similarities in design and hue with figure A.4.



Figure A.5: “Nothing can stop him”, *Época*, July 6, 2015 (E#891). See section 4.2.

Figure A.6: “Janot, ur the hope of Brazil!” Photo recycled on social media, March 8, 2015. See section 4.2.1.







Figure A.13 and A.14: Score board element of newspaper front pages (*Estado*, April 17, and *O Globo* April 12, 2016). See section 4.5.4.

Figure A.15 and A.16: *Estado* front page photos. Rousseff burnt in-implicit-effigy on the front-page of *Estado* (E4/5 2016) (figuratively speaking) and symbolically decapitated (E14/4 2016).




Figure A.17 and A.18: Festive front pages celebrating the Câmara's vote in favor of impeachment. *O Globo* and *Estado*, April 18, 2016.

**O GLOBO**

BATALHA NO CONGRESSO

**Por 367 votos, 25 a mais que o necessário, Câmara aprova autorização para processo de impeachment da presidente Dilma**

**PERTO DO FIM**

Dilma Rousseff começou ontem a se despedir da cadeira de presidente do Brasil. Pouco mais de um ano depois de reeleita e de 13 anos de PT no poder, a Câmara autorizou o processo de impeachment da petista por crime de responsabilidade. Isolada, sem apoio da grande maioria dos partidos de sua ampla coalizão eleitoral, Dilma dificilmente terá forças para impedir que o Senado abra o processo e a afaste do cargo, numa votação por maioria simples, nas próximas semanas. Em guerra declarada com o PMDB de seu vice Michel Temer, maior partido do Congresso, a presidente teve menos votos do que esperava o Planalto. Foi o que se viu também nas ruas por todo o país, onde as manifestações pró-impeachment reuniram mais público do que as de apoio ao governo. Não surtiu efeito sequer o esforço do ex-presidente Lula, cuja nomeação como ministro para escapar do juiz Sérgio Moro, da Lava-Jato, ajudou a agravar a crise. Temer assumirá por 180 dias assim que o Senado abrir o processo. **PÁGINA 2-21**

**EDITORIAL**  
**"Um passo para o impeachment"**  
Falta o julgamento propriamente dito, no Senado, e Temer precisa agir. **PÁGINA 18**

**Comemorativa.** O deputado Bruno Araújo (PSB-PE), que deu o voto 342, é festejado por colegas da oposição plenária. Pôde seguir vice-deputado e reformar-se, a Câmara autoriza o impeachment de um presidente da República.

**LAURO PEREIRA**  
Resta tentar o resgate.  
**PÁGINA 23**

**ELIO JARDIM**  
Os inimigos da esquerda.  
**PÁGINA 25**

**ELIO GASPARINI**  
Uma derrota da esquerda.  
**PÁGINA 23**

**ANCELMO DOS SANTOS**  
Prevalença a Lei de Imunidade.  
**PÁGINA 24**

**MIRIAM LESTER**  
Caminho será árduo.  
**PÁGINA 23**

**NELSON MOTTA**  
Não dá para ter pena.  
**PÁGINA 24**

**ZUENIR VENTURA**  
Com quem Temer conta?  
**PÁGINA 27**

**RICARDO WOLFF**  
Temer não terá direito de errar.  
**PÁGINA 2**

**LUÍZA ANTÔNIO NOVAES**  
O caso do Lulá de Imunidade.  
**PÁGINA 22**

**SÉRGIO FALDUT**  
Impeachment começou no PT.  
**PÁGINA 25**

**MARCUS FAUSTINI**  
O início do processo.  
**PÁGINA 25**

**PAULO CELSO PEREIRA**  
Faltou o ritual da votação.  
**PÁGINA 27**

**CHICO**  
**JOSÉ CASARDO**  
Um presidente no limbo.  
**PÁGINA 26**

**ELMAR FRANCO**  
O quarto turno de Temer.  
**PÁGINA 27**

**JOSÉ PADILHA**  
Tudo depende da cabeça de Lula.  
**PÁGINA 27**

**CORA BOMAI**  
O governo não foi para todos.  
**PÁGINA 25**

**VERISSIMO**  
É bom manter o Temer vivo.  
**PÁGINA 27**

**FLÁVIA OLIVEIRA**  
Uma fratura suposta.  
**PÁGINA 26**

**ARTHUR DAPIVEY**  
Pode haver retrocesso sério.  
**PÁGINA 27**

**DIÉGO MAGNOLI**  
Ser Temer ou ser Itamar.  
**PÁGINA 26**

**ANA CRISTINA REIS**  
Saudades de Rui Barbosa.  
**PÁGINA 25**

**ALAN GRIPP**  
Caso está longe do fim.  
**PÁGINA 26**

**PAULO CESAR CALUZZI**  
Temos que rebotar o país.  
**PÁGINA 22**

**Temer já prepara governo**  
Em clima de festa, Temer fez planos de governo no Jaburu.  
**PÁGINA 4**

**Dilma se diz indignada**  
A presidente reagiu com indignação, segundo Cardoso, da ACIL.  
**PÁGINA 5**

**367 deputados votaram a favor e 146, contra** ■ Dilma promete "lutar até o fim", mas Planalto vê situação dramática ■ Oposição tenta antecipar decisão do Senado, prevista para dia 11 ■ Milhares vieram às ruas em 23 Estados do País

2ª Edição - Preço de venda no Estado de São Paulo: R\$ 4,00 - Circula com esta edição: Segundo Quilombo e caderno Esporas.

**O ESTADO DE S. PAULO**

EDIÇÃO ESPECIAL

**IMPEACHMENT AVANÇA**

**Um passo para o impeachment**

Falta o julgamento propriamente dito, no Senado, e Temer precisa agir. **PÁGINA 18**

**367 deputados votaram a favor e 146, contra** ■ Dilma promete "lutar até o fim", mas Planalto vê situação dramática ■ Oposição tenta antecipar decisão do Senado, prevista para dia 11 ■ Milhares vieram às ruas em 23 Estados do País

Figure A.19: “The Final Judgement”. *IstoÉ*, March 14, 2017 (I#2465). See section 4.6.





Figure A.20, A.21, A.22 and A.23: Front pages with photos of protests on March 13 (F14/3, E14/3 2016) and March 31 (F1/4 and E1/4 2016, bottom). Notice size differences in layout of photos. See section 5.4.







Figure A.24, A.25 and A.26: A visual demonology of presidents and ex-presidents in *Veja*, March 11, 2016 (V#2469) and March 8, 2017 (V#2520) plus Claudio Lessa's montage "The Devil's Advocate". See section 6.4.



(Compare with A.15, *Estado's* impeachment photo of Rousseff and the Olympic torch, E4/5 2016)



## Appendix B

### Phases of the Lava-Jato Investigation

This appendix provides a timeline with the names, dates, and principal targets (of arrests or interrogations) relating to each of the investigative phases. The numbering of the phases, in 2016 and 2017, became erratic, as some phases spawned one or more sub-operations.

1. Lava Jato (17-3-14) Alberto Youssef, Habib Chater
2. Bidone (20-3-14) Paulo Roberto Costa
3. Dolce Vita (11-4-14) Ecoglobal Ltda., Nelma Kodama
4. Casablanca (11-6-14) Paulo Roberto Costa
5. Bidone II (1-7-14) João Procópio Junqueira Pacheco de Almeida Prado
6. Bidone III (22-8-14) Individuals linked to Paulo Roberto Costa
7. Juízo Final (14-11-14) Nestor Cerveró (ex-director of Petrobras), Ricardo Pessoa (UTC), CEOs, presidents of OAS, Camargo Corrêa, Mendes Júnior, amongst others (see section 4.1)
8. (unnamed operation) (14-1-15) Arrest of N. Cerveró, as he was trying to escape Brazil
9. My Way (5-2-15) BR Distribuidora, Zwi Skornicki
10. Que País é Esse? (16-3-15) Named for Renato Duque's response to his arrest warrant in phase 7; arrests of Queiroz Galvão executives
11. A Origem (10-4-15) André Vargas, Luiz Argolo, Pedro Corrêa (PP)
12. (unnamed operation) (15-4-15) João Vaccari Neto arrested
13. (unnamed operation) (21-5-15) Milton Pascowitch arrested
14. Erga Omnes (19-6-15) Odebrecht group, arrest of Marcelo Odebrecht and Otávio Azevedo, president of Andrade Gutierrez.
15. Conexão Monaco (2-6-15) Jorge Zelada
  - a. Politeia (14-7-15) Search warrants in offices and houses of Fernando Collor de Mello, investigating BR Distribuidora, and PP politicians Mario Negromonte, Dudu da Fonte, Ciro Nogueira and Fernando Bezzera Coelho (then PSB)
16. Radioatividade (28-7-15) Othon Pinheiro and state nuclear company Eletronuclear
17. Pixuleco (2-8-15) José Dirceu
18. Pixuleco II (13-8-15) Alexandre Romano
19. Nessun Dorma (21-9-15) Engevix executive José Antunes Sobrinho
20. Corrosão (16-11-15) Roberto Gonçalves, former Petrobras manager
21. Passe Livre (24-11-15) Jose Carlos Bumlai
  - a. Catilinárias (15-12-15) PMDB politicians Eduardo Cunha, Henrique Alves, Celso Pansera, Edson Lobão, Aníbal Gomes
22. Triplo X (27-1-16) Bancoop/OAS scheme, involving the owners of the triplex attributed to Lula as well as the Panama law firm Mossack Fonseca
23. Operação Acarajé (22-2-16) João Santana, marketing expert working for PT
24. Aletheia (4-3-16) Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva and his family
25. Polimento (21-3-16) Operation in Lisboa, against Raul Felipe Schmidt
26. Xepa (22-3-16) based in the operation Acarajé, investigating the construction contracts of the Corinthians stadium in São Paulo
27. Carbono 14 (1-4-16) PT ex-secretary Silvio Pereira, linked to Celso Daniel and the Mensalão case

28. Vitória de Pirro (12-4-16) Gim Argello (PTB) for manipulating CPI de Petrobras in 2014
29. Repescagem (23-5-16) PP politicians and Jose Claudio Genu, ex-treasurer of PP
30. Vício (24-5-16) more investigation against Dirceu
  - a. Custo Brasil (23-6-16) Ex-minister Paulo Bernardo (PT)
  - b. Sepsis (1-7-16) Lúcio Funaro
31. Abismo (4-7-16) PT ex-treasurer Paulo Adalberto Alves Ferreira
32. Caça-Fantasmas (7-7-16), revisiting the Mossack Fonseca organization and the Panama bank FPB
33. Resta Um (2-8-16), arresting Quieroz Galvão bosses Colares og Zanoides, and investigating the deceased PSDB national president Sergio Guerra
  - a. Operacao Irmandade (10-8-2016) Samir Assid, brother of Adir Assad
34. Arquivo X (22-9-16) Guido Mantega
35. Omertà (26-09-16) Palocci and Brani Kontic (Palocci aide)
36. Dragão (10-11-16) - Adir Assad, Tacla Duran – UTC and Mendes Junior
37. Calicute (17-11-16) Ex-governor of Rio de Janeiro, Sergio Cabral (PMDB)
  - a. Deflexão (4-12-16) TCU judge Vital do Rego, Marco Maia (PT), based on Delcidio plea bargain and OAS?
  - b. Eficiência (26-1-17) Eike Batista apprehended
  - c. Levitã (16-2-2017) referring to Hobbes’ work and his phrase “homo homini lupus”, implicit reference to the target, Edison Lobão Filho, involved in the Belo Monte graft
38. Blackout (23-2-17) – A father/son couple apprehended (both with the name Luz)
  - a. Tolypeutes (14-3-17) – RioTrilhos (linha 4 de Metrô no RJ) and sub-secretaries of the Sergio Cabral administration
  - b. Satelites (21-3-17) – Senators Humberto Costa (PT), Renan Calheiros and Eunício Oliveira (of PMDB) (plus Oliveira’s security firm Confederal, used by the state) and the company Corpvs
39. Paralelo (28-3-17) – Petrobras ex-director (after Barusco) Roberto Gonçalves again
  - a. Quinta de Ouro – (29-3-17) TCE RJ – Jorge Picciani and judges of TCE-Rio arrested or interrogated
  - b. Satelites 2 (28-4-17) search warrants against Bruno Mendes, Senators Renan Calheiros and Romero Jucá and ex-president José Sarney (all PMDB) plus the chemical company Triunfo Caio Gorentzvaig
40. Asfixia (4-5-17)
  - a. Patmos (18-5-17) search warrants in Senator Aecio Neves’ (PSDB) house and offices, arrest of his sister Andrea Neves, search warrants for individuals linked to Michel Temer, including colonel João B. Lima Filho and congressman Rocha Loures (PMDB)
41. Ratatouille (1-6-17) search warrants for Cabral assessor Marco Antonio de Luca
  - a. Manus (6-6-17) Henrique Alves (PMDB) arrested for Arena das Dunas graft
  - b. Tendão de Aquiles (9-6-17) Grupo JBS for insider trading prior to operation Patmos
  - c. Ponto Final (3-7-17) – public transportation contracts in Rio, Rogerio Onofre and Jacob Barata Filho arrested, as well as Fetranspor president and board members
42. Cobra (27-7-17) – Aldemir Bendine, ex-president of Petrobras arrested
  - a. Rio 40 Graus (3-8-17) – Alexander Pinto (assessor of Rio ex-mayor Paes) arrested

- b. Gotham City (9-8-17) – arrest warrants for two construction firm bosses, linked to Rogerio Onofre
  - c. Ponto Final II (15-8-17) Roberto Bethlem (Fetranspor) arrested in Rio
  - d. Étimo (16-8-17) Interrogations expanding on the phase Xepa (in Rio Grande do Sul and Porto Alegre)
43. Sem Fronteiras (18-8-17) Honorary consul to Greece Konstantinos Georgios Kotronakis
  44. Abate (18-8-17) Candido Vaccarezza (PT) arrested, linked to Sargeant Marine contracts with Petrobras
  45. Abate II – Tiago Cedraz (son of TCU minister Aroldo Cedraz) forced to testify, implicated by Jorge Luz
    - a. Tendão de Aquiles II (13-9-17) - Wesley Batista, ex-leader of Grupo JBS, arrested
  46. (unnamed operation) (20-10-17) Petroquisa and the probe-ship Vitoria 10.000
    - a. Cadeia Velha (14-11-17) Jorge Picciani (PMDB), Felipe Picciani, Jacob Barata Filho again
  47. Sothis (21-11-17) Transpetro director José Antonio de Jesus and possible financing of PT
  48. Integração (22-2-18) public transport in Paraná
  49. Buono Fortuna (9-3-18) Ex-minister Delfim Netto and his nephew, involved in Belo Monte graft
    - a. Pão Nosso (13-3-18) investigation of the Rio prison food system, arrest of secretary in the Cabral administration of Rio, and Cesar Rubens Monteiro
  50. Sothis II (23-3-18) Sergio Machado, Transpetro corruption
    - a. Skala (29-3-18) Wagner Rossi, Coronel Lima Filho, Michel Temer aides arrested
    - b. Tira-Teima (10-4-18) Hypermarca investigated, related to Eunício Oliveira (PMDB)
    - c. Rizoma (12-4-18) Milton Lyra, Marcelo Sereno (related to non-LJ operations called Operação Eficiencia and Operação Unfair Play)
    - d. Cambio, Desligo (3-5-18) Dario Messer and 45 *doleiros*
  51. Déjà vu (8-5-18) Odebrecht again
  52. Greenwich (21-6-2018) Odebrecht contracts with Petrobras Química investigated


*Brief considerations about naming:*

- Many names simply refer, more or less obliquely, to the targets of the operations (this is the case in phase 16, 22, 38, 47, and 49, or the operations Corrosão, Tolypeutes and Levitã, for instance).
- Some names are direct quotes of the apprehended persons (e.g. phases 9, 10, and 17)
- A number of phases are named for specific synonyms for “bribes”, such as Pixuleco, Acarajé, and Custo Brasil.
- Several names are tributes to other probes – such as Nessun Durma and Omertá
- Some names are given to an operation because of the sequential relation to other operations: Déjà vu, Repescagem, Paralelo, and Satelites are examples of this.
- Some are pop-cultural references – X-files, Casablanca, and Dolce Vita, for instance.
- Many names refer to classical literature and mythology, including Patmos, Vitoria de Pyrrho, and Catilinárias.

## Appendix C

### Corruption cases reported in the newspapers

**Figure C.1.** Count of news items in *Folha* and *Estado de S. Paulo* (web and print) reporting on the most-covered corruption topics from October 2015 till May 2016.



Sum of Number of Records for each Date of Web publish Week. Color shows details about Corruption topic. The view is filtered on Corruption topic, which has multiple members selected.



**Table C.1.** Summed frequency of front-page news items concerning corruption cases in *Folha*, *Estado*, and *O Globo*, October 17, 2015 till April 17, 2016.

327	61	33	261	206	160	48	43	22	15
<b>Impeachment</b>	<b>Dilma</b>	<b>Pedaladas</b>	<b>Lula</b>	<b>Petrobras</b>	<b>Cunha</b>	<b>Odebrecht</b>	<b>Delcídio</b>	<b>Calheiros</b>	<b>Neves</b>

Source: Author's database.

## Remarks on sampling methodology

“I sample all front pages from *Folha*, *Estado*, and *O Globo*—the three main national papers of Brazil—and, furthermore, sample all printed and web-published articles in *Folha* and *Estado* dealing with news on national corruption and the impeachment proceedings (this leaves out stories on corruption abroad, e.g. the Panama Papers, as well as corruption in the international soccer association FIFA). The sample period contains the six months of front-page items up until the Lower House of Congress voted on the impeachment (on April 17, 2016), while the article sample comprised the period October 2015 to May 12, 2016, when the Senate ratified the vote of the Lower House. The total sample includes 8,800 news items, and more than 1,300 front page items, all dealing with news on political transgression and corruption.” (Damgaard 2018a:119)

“The headline samples provide an index of the salience of each corruption case on the national media agenda on a daily basis. If a corruption case is mentioned on one or more front page, there is a chance that it may also reach the news broadcasts. The article sampling, meanwhile, took both printed and web-publicized news items and opinion pieces from *Estado* and *Folha*, leaving out *O Globo* in order to avoid excess data redundancy. This second sample provides an index of how attention to all cases of corruption was distributed by including the cases that did not make it to the front pages. The front-page count is inherently weighted, since only so many headlines can fit in a front page, while a sampling of all published articles of print and web face fewer restrictions. The print versions of quality newspapers, as pointed out above, normally have many pages dedicated to the coverage of politics, while their online versions face no restrictions inherent in the format. Thus, these kinds of media give a measure of the resources and attention given to scandals and investigations independent of other news of national or international importance. The sample of articles includes articles published on the newspapers’ online editions... I opted to collect both web and print versions of news items on corruption from *Estado* and *Folha* in a single SQL database structure with various metadata and a coding of the issues being reported.” (Damgaard 2018b:157)

“In general, I included all articles covering political corruption or corruption in state companies (since these have politically appointed executive officers), as well as all articles treating or discussing alleged improper economic or political conduct of the President, ex-presidents, ministers or ex-ministers, since these articles are partly overlapping thematically... This means that the articles concerning impeachment petitions were included, though they in many cases do not deal with corruption per se, but certainly deal with perceived illicit political actions. This inclusion was fortunate, because it allows for comparisons between the most visible political topics of the sampled period – impeachment and the Lava-Jato case. However, I excluded articles about corruption in national and international football associations, as well as articles about the train cartel of São Paulo, as that case was running out of steam and went on to disappear totally from the media agenda. Articles about ex-president Fernando Henrique Cardoso’s mistress were also excluded, as the framing in most of these articles (whatever the population in general may think) did not cast the Cardoso case as corruption, but as extra-marital activity, making it scandalous for sexual-moral reasons rather than for public-office moral reasons. Leaving aside those caveats, I have deployed the definition given and kept track of the various corruption cases and their spin-off probes, identifying news items related to these cases and the politicians under scrutiny.” (Damgaard 2018b:159)


The database and the tally of headlines and topics are available online, at the time of writing, at the University of Copenhagen’s Centre for Latin American Studies site ([www.clas.hum.ku.dk/research](http://www.clas.hum.ku.dk/research)).

## Corruption cases involving Temer in the newspapers

**Table C.2.** Headlines implicating Temer in *Estado de S. Paulo* (E), *Folha de S. Paulo* (F), and *O Globo*:

	E	F	G
2016-04-06	STF manda Câmara abrir impeachment de Temer; Cunha reage	Marco Aurélio decide iniciar impeachment de Temer	Ministro manda acolher processo contra Temer
2016-04-03		Nem Dilma nem Temer	
2016-04-02	STF divulga parecer contra Michel Temer		
2016-04-01	Temer nega que vá interferir na Lava Jato		Temer e FH falam em blindar Lava-Jato
2016-03-16	Temer é citado no caso Petrobras	Senador implica também Temer, Renan e Esteves	Janot vai pedir investigação de Lula, Temer, Merca
2016-03-11		Ex-diretor preso foi indicado por Temer, afirma Delcídio	
2016-03-01	Emenda de Cunha à Lei dos Portos ajuda doador de Temer		
2016-02-12	Ao TSE, Temer acusa oposição de 'demonizar' doação eleitoral		
2016-01-12	Lava Jato faz Temer se unir a Dilma em defesa no TSE		
2015-12-19		Em mensagem, empreiteira cita repasse a Temer de R\$5 milhões	

**Figure C.2.** Number of news items in *Folha* and *Estado* concerning five cases involving Temer:



Sum of Number of Records for each Date of Web publish Week. Color shows details about Corruption topic. The data is filtered on Date of Web publish, which ranges from 17/10/2015 to 12/05/2016 and keeps Null values. The view is filtered on Corruption topic, which keeps Temer and Argeplan scheme, Temer impeachment petition, Temer in Ficha Limpa violation, Temer in Petrobras graft and Temer sponsored by port company.

- Corruption topic**
- Temer and Argeplan scheme
  - Temer impeachment petition
  - Temer in Ficha Limpa violation
  - Temer in Petrobras graft
  - Temer sponsored by port company



## Appendix D

### Transcript of news broadcasts

Jornal Nacional, broadcast on TV Globo, 20:30 on March 4, 2016 – see section 4.4.1  
Retrieved from <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4ldpIBPW8Bs>

[WB = William Bonner; RV = Renata Vasconcellos]

[music, zoom in on anchors in Globo studio]

**WB:** Boa noite

**RV:** Boa noite

**WB:** A operação Lava Jato chega ao ex-presidente

[head shot of RV]

**RV:** Policiais federais obrigam

[footage from Lula's house, agents leading Lula out of the garage and into black car]

Lula prestar depoimento numa sala no aeroporto de Congonhas

[studio, head shot of WB]

**WB:** A ação policial atrai manifestantes pro e contra ao ex-presidente

[footage of police and protesters in half melee in front of Lula's house]

e as provocações de lado a lado terminam em violência

[studio, head shot of RV]

**RV:** procuradores investigam contas de instituto Lula e a empresa de palestras dele

[head shot of WB]

e afirmam que o instituto e a empresa receberam pagamentos e doações das cinco empreiteiras mais envolvidas no desvio de dinheiro da Petrobras

[head shot of RV]

**RV:** os investigadores querem saber porque empresas dos filhos do ex-presidente receberam dinheiro do instituto Lula e da empresa de palestras

[head shot of WB]

**WB:** Agentes também fizeram buscas na casa de Lula em São Bernardo do Campo

[footage of beach side apartment and ranch]

e no tríplice em Guarujá e no sítio em Atibaia

[head shot of RV]

**RV:** A força-tarefa da Lava Jato investiga se a OAS bancou armazenamento de objetos de Lula depois que ele deixou a Presidência

[head shot of WB]

**WB:** isios e reformas no sítio e no apartamento foram pagamento de vantagem indevida ao ex-presidente

[footage from police press conference, half-shot of PGR Carlos Fernando dos Santos Lima]

**Lima:** este é o momento de sermos republicanos

Não há ninguém isento de investigação no país

[studio, head shot of RV]

**RV:** O ex-presidente repudia as acusações

[head shot of WB]

**WB:** critica a condução coercitiva

[head shot of RV]

**RV:** e diz que teria prestar do esclarecimento se tivesse sido convidado a depor

[footage of Lula at press conference]

**Lula:** então era só ter comunicar [not intelligible] diremos lá

Lamentavelmente, eles preferiram a utilizar a prepotência.

A arrogância.

Num show e num espetáculo e pirotécnica

[studio, head shot of WB]

**WB:** A presidente Dilma Rousseff manifesta

[footage of Dilma at press conference]

**WB:** solidariedade ao ex-presidente Lula

[head shot of RV]

**RV:** e rebate afirmações do acordo de delação premiada do senador Delcídio do Amaral

[head shot of WB]

**WB:** nossos repórteres mostram a repercussão da 24<sup>o</sup> fase da Lava Jato no Congresso e no mercado financeiro

[head shot of RV]

**RV:** e a nova denúncia de Procuradoria-Geral da República contra o deputado Eduardo Cunha

[full studio shot from above]

**WB:** o Jornal Nacional está começando

[graphic with logotype; music]

[2:00 - full studio shot, zooming in]

**WB:** Policiais federais levaram o ex-presidente Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva para depor a investigadores da operação Lava Jato hoje da manha numa sala do aeroporto de Congonhas em São Paulo. Ele foi o alvo central da 24<sup>o</sup> fase da operação, que recebeu o nome de “Aletheia”.

[shot from left, zooming in again on WB]

**WB:** Em grego, essa... palavra significa “a busca da verdade”.

[footage from helicopter, above São Bernardo do Campo and Lula’s apartment]

**Reporter VO [José Roberto Burnier]:** Eram 6 da manha quando policia federal bateu a porta do apartamento do ex-presidente Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva em São Bernardo do Campo onde ele mora De acordo com os procuradores da operação Lava Jato, Lula recebeu os policiais com tranquilidade. Para não chamar atenção, Lula saiu num carro sem o logotipo da PF, por volta da 7 de manha.

Mas ele não foi para a sede da policia federal na zona oeste de São Paulo, para onde os intimados costumam ser levados.

Ele percorreu cerca de 25 quilómetros, entre São Bernardo do Campo e a zona sul de São Paulo onde fica o aeroporto de Congonhas.

[repórter on-site, half-shot]

**Burnier:** Por questões de segurança o ex-presidente Lula foi trazido aqui para ala de autoridades de aeroporto de Congonhas.

É uma área militar; mais protegida. Durante mais de três horas, Lula prestou depoimento numa sala que normalmente é usada pela Presidência da República

[head-shot of police delegate Igor Romário de Paula]

**Romário de Paula:** o acompanhamento nas últimas semanas detetou a movimentação de pessoas ligadas de uma forma ao ex-presidente e sua família, no sentido de mobilizar pessoas para tentar prejudicar a diligência de hoje.

Então a por isso o local do depoimento dele foi mudado, por isso as equipes hoje são acompanhadas das equipes estáticas para isolar áreas necessárias, e feito na forma mais ágil possível, no, foi uma mudança de procedimento por ser o ex-presidente da República. Foi uma questão só de segurança mesmo.

[footage from press conference, in Curitiba presumably, with judge Sergio Moro]

**Reporter VO:** No total, o juiz Sérgio Moro expediu 11 mandados

[footage from the front of Lula's house]

de condução coercitiva, que é quando o suspeito ou investigado tem que se apresentar a uma autoridade policial, ainda que fique calado.

[footage of Congonhas from helicopter, shots of police cars coming down a street]

Moro também expediu 33 mandados de busca e apreensão, cumpridos nos estados de São Paulo, Rio e Bahia.

[footage from the front of Lula's house]

200 policiais e 30 auditores da Receita Federal

[footage of Tax Authority car opening door]

participaram na operação.

[Animated graphic of “propinoduto” – showing tubes, supposedly at a Petrobras refinery, dripping bundles of money. A document hovers in from left, depicting the court order quoted below]

As buscas foram autorizadas dia 24 de fevereiro. A justificativa do Ministério Público para a condução coercitiva do ex-presidente é que

[quote, graphic highlights of that text section]

a medida é necessária para evitar tumultos políticos, como ocorrido no Fórum criminal da Barra Funda em fevereiro, quando pessoas ficaram feridas.

[footage from the front of Lula's house]

Assim que a notícia foi divulgada, manifestantes começaram a se aglomerar em frente ao apartamento de Lula.

[footage shows 2 seconds of protesters singing “Olé, olé oh la, Lula, Lula”]

Não demorou muito e começou uma confusão. Polícia militar tentou manter os grupos a favor e contra em lados separados.

[footage of in-fighting between protesters]

Teve socos, chutes, gente machucada, e muita briga

[footage of more fighting at airport, by busses and behind barriers]

A cena se repetiu em frente ao aeroporto de Congonhas. Manifestantes a favor e contra o ex-presidente entraram em confronto.

Sobrou provocação para todo lado;

[footage of people protesting inside Congonhas terminal]

E em frente a sala onde Lula estava depondo.

No saguão, muita gente, e mais discussão

Teve protestos contrários

[people chanting “a nossa bandeira jamais será vermelha”]

e favoráveis ao ex-presidente Lula

[people chanting “não vai ter golpe”]

[close-up of Luiz Carlos da Silva in front of the airport office of the federal police]

Professor Luizinho, um dos fundadores do Partido dos Trabalhadores, estava no aeroporto. Ele chegou a ser investigado no esquema de Mensalão e foi absolvido. Ele discutiu com uma passageira; mostrou uma cueca, e fez com a mão a letra “I”, de Lula.

[footage of airport front road, on the ground and from helicopter]

Do lado de fora, um pequeno grupo de manifestantes soltou fogos no canteiro central de avenida que fica em frente ao aeroporto. O trânsito parou nos dois sentidos.

[footage of Paulo Teixeira in front of airport]

O deputado federal do PT Paulo Teixeira que acompanhou o depoimento do ex-presidente diz:

[footage of Atibaia ranch from helicopter, while quoting Teixeira]

“Lula afirmou que os donos do sítio em Atibaia são Jonas Suassuna e Fernando Bittar.”

[footage of beach side apartment complex]

O ex-presidente explicou que teve uma quota do triplex na Guarujá, mas que não exerceu a opção de compra de apartamento. Lula confirmou que visitou o imóvel

[footage of Atibaia ranch from helicopter]

já de acordo com o deputado, Lula se irritou quando foi perguntado sobre os pedalinhos com os nomes dos netos e que estão no sítio de Atibaia

[footage of Paulo Teixeira in front of airport]

**Paulo Teixeira:** Ele ficou indignado e falou que acha essa pergunta na tal altura nem é da policia federal e nem do Ministério Público Federal e não dar ... a minha altura

[low-resolution photo of Lula on the phone at the airport hall, zooming out and revealing the propinoduto graphic again, substituted for another photo of Lula in the hall]

**Reporter VO:** Depois de responder às perguntas dos delegados da Polícia Federal, o ex-presidente saiu pouco

[footage of garage entrance of the Congonhas presidential hall section, circled by a yellow ring] depois do meio dia por trás do aeroporto.

[studio, torso-and-desk shot of RV]

**RV:** Os investigadores disseram que as suspeitas contra o ex-presidente Lula são baseadas em provas e depoimentos.

O Ministério Público e a Polícia Federal investigam o papel dele no esquema criminoso [RV nods] da Petrobras

[footage from police press conference, half-shot of PGR Carlos Fernando dos Santos Lima]

**Lima:** Há motivos para investigar o, o senhor Luiz Inácio. Neste momento, o motivo é verificar se esses pagamentos, feitos a ele, são um, um “quid pro quo”, como diz os americanos, do, do, dos benefícios alcançados pro favores no governo.

[torso-and-desk shot of WB]

**WB:** Agora Você vai conhecer os detalhes dos motivos dessa condução de Lula, apresentados pelos investigadores.

Esses motivos foram divulgados numa entrevista junto com um documento, e o repórter Marcelo Rocha mostra na reportagem:

**Reporter VO, Marcelo Rocha** [Reading from document presented in graphic of a desk]: Estão sendo cumpridos

[in this case and the following, the graphic shows quotes from document, with lines of text swooping closer to the spectator]

nesta data, mandados de busca e apreensão e de condução coercitiva para aprofundar a investigação de possíveis crimes de corrupção e lavagem de dinheiro oriundo de desvios da Petrobras, praticados por meio de pagamentos dissimulados por José Carlos Bumlai e pelas construtoras OAS e Odebrecht ao ex-presidente da República, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, e pessoas associadas.

[footage from police press conference, half-shot of PGR Carlos Fernando dos Santos Lima]

**Lima:** Nesse caso estamos falando de uma... organização criminosa infiltrada dentro do governo federal que se utilizava da Petrobras e das outras empresas para o financiamento político e também para apropriação pessoal. Essa organização criminosa certamente possui uma, um comando. Foi verificado, e nós aí fizemos a acusação, que o ex-ministro Zé Dirceu fazia parte deste comando junto com ex-tesoureiro José Vaccari entre outros.

[break in footage to other part of conference, still Lima talking]

Nós precisamos, e fazemos uma investigação, da continuidade dessa cadeia de comando. Hoje, nós estamos analisando evidências de que... o ex-presidente e sua família receberam vantagens para ... eventualmente ... a ... consecução de atos dentro do governo

**Reporter VO, Marcelo Rocha** [quoting again from document presented in graphic of a desk]:

Esse grande esquema era coordenado a partir das cúpulas e lideranças dos partidos políticos que compunham a base do governo federal, especialmente o Partido dos Trabalhadores, o Partido Progressista e o Partido do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro.

[footage from police press conference, half-shot of PGR Carlos Fernando dos Santos Lima]

**Lima:** Esse é um esquema de compra de apoio político partidário, entretanto:

[10:00] Se ele conhecia as vantagens indevidas pagas, e se ele recebeu vantagens indevidas, nós estamos ainda em investigação.

[footage from other angle, showing more desk and still focus on Lima]

As investigações são exatamente

[footage from first angle, head-on – possible hiding a break in the footage]

no sentido de comprovar – ou não – a participação do ex-presidente nas decisões de beneficiamento dos partidos políticos da base aliada. Nesse aspecto, as investigações já vêm acumulando evidências do principal, eeh, beneficiário disso, era o governo do PT; que foi... cujo titular foi o ex-presidente. Então, fica claro que o benefício político recebido foi basicamente do ex-presidente Lula, e atualmente da atual presidente.

**Reporter VO, Marcelo Rocha** [quoting again from document presented in graphic of a desk]:

O ex-presidente Lula, além de líder partidário, era o responsável final pela decisão de quem seriam [11:00] os diretores da Petrobras e foi um dos principais beneficiários dos delitos. De fato, surgiram evidências de que os crimes o enriqueceram e financiaram campanhas eleitorais e o caixa de sua agremiação política.

[footage from police press conference, half-shot of PGR Carlos Fernando dos Santos Lima]

**Lima:** Está sob análise todo os atos de nomeação de diretorias da empresa Petrobras - e de outros casos envolvendo outras empresas ou órgãos estatais - e verificando se este aparelhamento da Petrobras e deu-se por orientação do governo. Nós sabemos que José Dirceu estava realmente aparelhando a Petrobras para desvio de recursos. Nós vamos verificar agora se esses desvios de recursos eram de reconhecimento do ex-presidente.

**Reporter VO, Marcelo Rocha** [quoting again from document presented in graphic of a desk]:

A suspeita, aqui novamente, é que os valores com que o ex--presidente foi agraciado constituem propinas pagas a título de contraprestação pelos favores ilícitos obtidos no esquema Petrobrás.

[footage from police press conference, half-shot of PGR Carlos Fernando dos Santos Lima]

**Lima:** A vantagem não precisa ser dinheiro, não preciso estar diretamente ligada ao ato; nós podemos verificar que mesmo após... o exercício da Presidência pode estar sendo pagos ainda vantagens ao ex-presidente

**Reporter VO, Marcelo Rocha** [quoting again from document presented in graphic of a desk]:

Todos esses fatos estão sendo investigados no âmbito da Lava Jato porque eles se relacionam com o destino de verbas desviadas da Petrobras por empresas e pessoas participantes do mega-esquema criminoso. Os fatos são de competência federal não só por se relacionarem com crimes financeiros e de lavagem de dinheiro transnacional, mas também por haver fatos praticados quando o ex-presidente estava no exercício de mandato no âmbito da União Federal, onde possivelmente sua influência foi usada, antes e depois do mandato – o que é objeto de investigação – para que o esquema existisse e se perpetuasse.

[footage from police press conference, head-shot of PGR Carlos Fernando dos Santos Lima, this time in the midst of scores of reporters holding microphones]

**Lima:** Certamente o governo dele foi um

[credit texts appear in the bottom of the screen]

dos grandes beneficiários da compra desse apoio político partidário, eeh, nós estamos investigando se houve algum vantagem ao senhor Luiz Inácio.

**Reporter VO, Marcelo Rocha** [quoting again from document presented in graphic of a desk]:

A investigação sobre o ex-Presidente não constitui juízo de valor sobre quem ele é ou sobre o significado histórico dessa personalidade, mas sim um juízo de investigação sobre fatos e atos determinados, que estão sob suspeita. Dentro de uma república, mesmo pessoas ilustres e poderosas devem estar sujeitas ao escrutínio judicial quando houver fundada suspeita de atividade criminosa.

[repeating the footage of the *escalada* from police press conference, half-shot of PGR Carlos Fernando dos Santos Lima]

**Lima:** Este é um momento de sermos republicanos;

Não há ninguém isento de investigação no país.

[repórter on-site in Curitiba, outside of the PF offices]

**Marcelo Rocha:** Foram estes os argumentos apresentados pelos procuradores ao juiz Sérgio Moro para pedir a condução coercitiva do ex-presidente Lula. O juiz concordou que não dava para marcar uma data, já que isso pode causar tumultos como o que ocorreu em São Paulo no mês passado quando Lula seria ouvido numa investigação conduzidas por promotores paulistas. O juiz destacou que a condução coercitiva do ex-presidente não significa antecipação de responsabilidade criminal, e nem tem por objetivo cessar os direitos de Lula ou colocá-lo em situação vexatória.

Sérgio Moro estabeleceu como condição para o cumprimento do mandado que os policiais não utilizassem algemas e em hipótese alguma permitissem a filmagem do deslocamento e interrogatória do ex-presidente.

[studio, head shot of RV]

**RV:** Os partidos citados, PP e PMDB, negam (RV shakes her head) qualquer envolvimento em irregularidade. O Ministério Público Federal também tinha pedido a condução coercitiva da ex-primeira-dama, Marisa Letícia, mas o juiz Sérgio Moro indeferiu o pedido. O juiz alegou que no caso de Marisa Letícia é possível agendar um depoimento sem que se implique um maior risco à ordem pública.

[torso-and-desk-shot of WB]

**WB:** Uns dos principais focos dessa fase da operação Lava Jato são os pagamentos ao Instituto Lula e ao LILS, a empresa de palestras do ex-presidente.

**RV:** As... [interrupted by WB]

[close-up head-shot of WB, angled from the left of the desk]

**WB:** As investigações mostram que empreiteiras que mais desviaram dinheiro da Petrobras são as maiores financiadores das duas instituições.

[footage from older interview with Lula]

**Reporter, Malu Mazza, VO:** Assim que deixou a Presidência em 2011, Lula criou a LILS, empresa que promove principalmente palestras do ex-presidente.

[helicopter footage of Instituto Lula]

No mesmo ano, ele também criou o Instituto Lula, que funciona sem fins lucrativos

[propinoduto graphic again, this time from another angle, with the BR logo prominent (the well-known gas station, a sub-company of Petrobras) – again ending in money bundles and a document swooping in from the left, this time illustrating Institute Lula’s web page]

De acordo com seu site na Internet, o instituto tem com missão principal a cooperação do Brasil com a África e a América Latina

[helicopter footage of Instituto Lula]

A LILS e o Instituto Lula estão na mira da Polícia Federal e do Ministério Público Federal

[footage of the press conference, desk with four delegates/prosecutors; credit subtitle at the bottom of the picture]

Os investigadores da Lava Jato querem saber se há relação entre dinheiro desviado da Petrobras pelas empreiteiras e os pagamentos e doações feitas a LILS e ao Instituto.

[footage of tax auditor Leonel at press conference, torso, and the Paraná police department’s flag, the state’s flag, and other banners in the background]

**Roberto Leonel:** Nós seremos aí a verificação de que – que a coincidência há - que as cinco maiores empresas que pagaram palestras para a LILS Palestras de 2011 a 2014 – são as mesmas empresas que doaram os maiores valores para o Instituto Lula.

[break in footage, resuming instantly in same shot]

Esse é umas das considerações em relação às origens dos recursos.

[propinoduto graphic again – again with the BR logo]

**Reporter, Malu Mazza, VO:** os procuradores já identificaram que entre 2011 e 2014, o Instituto Lula recebeu mais de 20 milhões de reais em doações - perto de 60% da receita - dinheiro das construtoras Camargo Correa, Odebrecht, Queiroz Galvão, OAS e Andrade Gutierrez.

No mesmo período, essas empreiteiras e mais a UTC fizeram pagamentos a LILS para palestras do ex-presidente Lula, no total de quase 10 milhões reais, 47% do faturamento da empresa.

[footage of the press conference, desk with four delegates/prosecutors seen from right]

Todas essas empreiteiras que fizessem os pagamentos e doações são investigados na Lava Jato e parte delas já teve executivos condenados.

[footage from police press conference, half-shot of PGR Carlos Fernando dos Santos Lima]

**Lima:** Caracterizavam núcleo duro do cartel que delapidou patrimônio da Petrobras

[break in footage, resumed instantly]

Isto é um valor significativo. É claro que doações pode serem realizados por diversos motivos, mas nós precisamos analisar claramente se isso tem alguma vinculação com as obras ... eeh... fraudadas, e com a Petrobras e outras órgãos.

[new propinoduto graphic – zooming in on a sombre landscape with a lone refinery]

**Reporter, Malu Mazza, VO:** No despacho que autorizou a operação de hoje, o juiz Sérgio Moro afirmou que

[half-quoting text]

não se pode concluir pela ilicitude das transferências às empresas do ex-presidente, mas é forçoso reconhecer que tratam-se de valores altos para doações e palestras, o que no contexto do esquema criminoso da Petrobras gera dúvidas sobre a generosidade das empresas.

[footage from police press conference, half-shot of PGR Carlos Fernando dos Santos Lima]

**Reporter, Malu Mazza, VO:** Os procuradores também querem investigar se as palestras feitas [footage of the press conference, desk with four delegates/prosecutors]

pelo ex-presidente Lula e pagas pelas empreiteiras foram realmente realizadas

[footage from police press conference, head-shot of PGR Carlos Fernando dos Santos Lima, this time in the midst of scores of reporters holding microphones]

**Lima:** Nós queremos verificar-se circunstâncias em que as ocorreram, os locais em que as ocorreram, e se houve um ato do governo que possa ser vinculados a essas empreiteiras que pagaram essas palestras e aos governos que onde essas palestras ocorreram

[footage of the press conference, desk with four delegates/prosecutors]

**Reporter, Malu Mazza, VO:** Outro ponto da investigação é saber se houve favorecimento das empresas ligadas a filhos do ex-presidente através de pagamentos

[helicopter footage of Instituto Lula]

do Instituto Lula e da LILS Palestras.

[propinoduto graphic of a sombre landscape with a lone refinery again; again, document swoops in from left ]

O Instituto Lula pagou G4 Entretenimento e Tecnologia Digital, que tem como sócios Fabio Luiz, filho de Lula, e Fernando Bittar, e Kalil Bittar. Entre 2012 e 2014, a empresa recebeu mais de 1,3 milhão reais. Fernando Bittar é um dos donos oficiais do sítio de Atibaia.

O Instituto também pagou a FlexBR tecnologia que tem sede no mesmo endereço da G4 e tem como sócios os filhos de Lula, Marcos Claudio e Sandro Luís, além de Marlene Araújo Lula da Silva, nora do ex-presidente. A Flex recebeu 114.000 reais em 2014.

A LILS também pagou a FlexBR mais de 72 mil reais entre 2013 e 2014 e fez pagamentos ainda a outro filho de Lula – Luís Claudio – mais de 227 mil reais entre 2011 e 2013.

[footage from police press conference, half-shot of PGR Carlos Fernando dos Santos Lima]

**Lima:** Como nós não vemos nenhuma motivação econômica na contratação por parte do Instituto Lula de empresas dos familiares do ex-presidente, eeh, nós estamos investigando se esses valores correspondem aos serviços prestados ou não. Se não corresponderem, certamente há um benefício aos familiares

[break in footage, instantly continuing]

Como Instituto Lula recebe das cinco maiores empreiteiras, nós estamos verificando se isso não é apenas uma triangulação de um benefício final da família do senhor Luiz Inácio

[repórter on-site, night-time]

**Malu Mazza:** A Receita apontou outra possível irregularidade: Por não ter fins lucrativos e ser isentos de impostos, os recursos que entram no Instituto Lula só podem ser usados dentro da função principal da entidade. Já a LILS Palestras é uma empresa comum com fins lucrativos, mas na prática a Receita Federal e os investigadores afirmaram que o Instituto e a LILS têm os mesmos funcionários. A coincidência, segundo eles, se repete com doadores e clientes.



[footage of the press conference, desk with four delegates/prosecutors]

**Reporter, Malu Mazza, VO:** Para os investigadores, isso leva a uma mistura na movimentação financeira do Instituto e da LILS. Essa confusão precisa ser investigada.

[Torso shot of tax authority auditor]

**Roberto Leonel:** A empresa LILS não possui nenhum empregado; exceção é que, há alguns anos, tinha um só empregado que era um dos filhos, eeh, e toda, e a sede dela na sss... na casa, na residência do ex-presidente. Tá. Então toda atividade de contatos, eeh, eeh, eeh, com empresas que vão contratar para fazer as palestras, as questões financeiras, as questões de análise de documentos, et cetera, tudo é feito no instituto, que não tem esse objetivo.

[studio, head shot of RV]

**RV:** A 24ª fase da Lava Jato teve operação de busca e apreensão no sítio de Atibaia que a família do ex-presidente Lula costuma a frequentar no interior de São Paulo,

[shot of studio from the right of RV zooming in]

e surgiram novas informações sobre esse imóvel.

[footage from helicopter of Atibaia ranch]

**Reporter, Bruno Tavares VO:** Os investigadores da força-tarefa da Lava Jato não têm dúvidas: O ex-presidente Lula é o verdadeiro dono do sítio em Atibaia.

[graphics of table with documents]

Eles chegaram a essa conclusão depois de constatar que parte considerável dos itens pessoais do ex-presidente foi transportada de Brasília para o sítio quando Lula deixou o Planalto no fim de 2010.

[footage from police press conference, half-shot of PGR Carlos Fernando dos Santos Lima]

**Lima:** As despesas de armazenamento nós temos comprovação que foram pagas pela empresa OAS.

[graphics of table with documents, voice-over quoting document]

**Reporter, Bruno Tavares VO:** Segundo investigação, os pertencias do ex-presidente foram transportados por duas empresas: Mudanças 5 Estrelas Limitada e Três Poderes Mudanças e Transporte Limitada, a Granero – as duas contratadas pela União. Coube a Granero a realização do transporte das roupas que foram para apartamento de São Bernardo de Campo e parte da adega que foi entrega no sítio de Atibaia. Segundo documento, o acervo audiovisual do ex-presidente se encontra atualmente armazenado na Granero.

[still photos of archive and items on shelves]

É o que mostram essas fotos feitas pela Polícia Federal no campão da transportadora. Duas delas mostra uma caixa e um pacote em que está inscrito: caixa madeira sítio. A 5 Estrelas também transportou parte dos bens para o sítio de Atibaia e para o depósito de Granero com custos pagos pela OAS, segundo a Receita Federal. Em dezembro de 2010, o presidente do Instituto Lula, Paulo Okamoto, autorizou a Granero a prestar esses serviços. Já de acordo com o documento, três dias depois, a construtora OAS assinou um contrato de armazenagem com a Granero no valor de 21.536 reais e 84 centavos - em benefício do ex-presidente Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva.

Segundo a investigação, a OAS indicou que o contrato tinha pro objetivo armazenagem de materiais de escritório e mobiliário corporativa de propriedade da OAS. O serviço foi prestado entre janeiro de 2011 e janeiro deste ano, no valor total de quase um milhão e 300 mil reais.

O relatório conclui que há evidências de que o ex-presidente Lula recebeu vantagens indevidas da OAS nesse valor com adoção de práticas de lavagem de dinheiro, com ocultação e dissimulação de origem, natureza e propriedade de bens e recursos.

[footage of police car in Atibaia woods, credit text at the bottom of the picture]

A polícia federal esteve hoje no sítio para cumprir mandado de busca e apreensão.

[helicopter footage of the ranch área]

Em 2010 o local passou por uma grande reforma e a suspeita é de que as obras

[graphic, Google Earth-style, of the ranch area, overlaid with two logos and the Picture of Bumlai]

têm sido bancadas pelas empreiteiras OAS e Odebrecht, investigadas pela Lava Jato, e também pela pecuarista José Carlos Bumlai, preso em Curitiba e réu no esquema de corrupção da Petrobras.

[helicopter footage of the ranch área]

Lula nega ser o verdadeiro proprietário e diz que apenas frequentava o local em dias de descanso.

[graphic, Google Earth-style, of the ranch area, overlaid with pictures of documents, Jonas Suassuna, Fabio Lula da Silva, and a emblem of a man substituting for a Picture of Bittar]

A propriedade está registrada nos nomes do Fernando Bittar e Jonas Suassuna, sócios de um dos filhos do ex-presidente.

[new overlays, this time of three checks, showing numbers R\$ 1 milhão, R\$ 400 mil and R\$100 mil]

O Jornal Nacional teve acesso a cópias dos cheques usados na compra do sítio que foram entregas pela defesa do Lula ao Ministério Público.

Todos os cheques são assinados por Jonas Suassuna no total de 1 milhão e meio de reais.

[graphics of table with documents]

Numa petição em que pedia ao Supremo Tribunal Federal a suspensão das investigações sobre o sítio, a defesa do ex-presidente afirmou que foi Jacó Bittar, pai de Fernando Bittar e amigo de Lula, que procurou o sítio para que as famílias pudessem conviver.

[Reporter, on-site at the ranch gates]

**Bruno Tavares:** Os procuradores da Lava Jato receberam mais uma prova de que pessoas muito próximas do ex-presidente cuidaram pessoalmente da reforma aqui no sítio. O empreiteiro é o que forneceu a mão-de-obra, e os equipamentos por a obra diz que quem pagou a obra foi um ex-assessor especial de Lula.

[new graphics of table with documents, blue and yellow hues]

**Reporter, Bruno Tavares VO:** Na defesa que apresentou ontem na Lava Jato, o empreiteiro Carlos Rodrigues do Prato disse que o pagamento era feito semanalmente e em espécie, por Rogério Aurélio Pimentel, totalizando 167.500 reais.

[graphic, Google Earth-style, of the ranch area, overlaid with photo of Rogerio and Lula]

Rogerio Aurélio Pimentel foi assessor especial de Lula.

[photo substituted by mug-shot style photo of Rogerio]

Ele deixou o governo quando Dilma assumiu a Presidência.

O nome do Aurélio já tinha aparecido no escândalo dos Alopados em 2006.

[footage of Aurélio in car prior to his interrogation the same morning in São Paulo]

Aurélio foi levado para prestar depoimento hoje cedo na sede da Polícia Federal em São Paulo.

[footage of interview on a road, repórter showing an iPad to interviewee, interviewee looking down and camera angle over her shoulder and cheek]

Mostramos a foto dele para Patrícia Nunes que era dona de um depósito em Atibaia e vende materiais de construção para obra no sítio.

**Nunes, almost off-screen:** Já passou cinco anos, né... a descrição dele seria essa: **vaibam**, branca, cabelo branco, meio gordinho, que algo que me lembrava dele.

[break in footage]

É muito parecido com o que me lembro... mas não consigo de certeza, viu?

**Reporter, Bruno Tavares VO:** Em depoimento a Lava Jato, o engenheiro da Odebrecht, Frederico Barbosa, disse que em dezembro de 2010, o diretor da construtora Emyr Costa Junior, solicitou que fosse analisado uma obra de um sítio em Atibaia.

Ele foi, na ocasião, disse que foi recebido por uma pessoa de nome Aurélio. O engenheiro informou ainda que Aurélio era responsável por lhe passar decisões sobre o acabamento da obra; e que os trabalhadores foram pagos pela Odebrecht, mas não era uma obra de Odebrecht.

[helicopter footage of police agents and cars on parking lot]

Depois que ficarem mais de sete horas no sítio, policiais federais foram até uma propriedade perto da ali.

[footage of cellular antenna site, zoom out and move towards repórter on-site]

**Bruno Tavares:** essa antena de telefonia celular também é alvo dos investigadores da operação Lava Jato

Eles querem entender porque que essa antena foi colocada ao menos de 100 metros do sítio Santa Barbara.

[footage of the top of the antenna]

Ela foi instalada pela operadora Oi.

[interview, police delegate sitting in car and pointing up]

**Eduardo Mauat:** O que nos achamos interessante é o seguinte: geralmente antena se põem na cima do morro... na, se tá em baixo. Então se as pessoas saem dessa racha não [...] antena

**Female interviewer, off-screen:** Seria para quem mora que bem **por no s.. sofrido** sinal

**Eduardo Mauat:** Exatamente.

[more footage of the antenna, credit text at the bottom]

**Reporter, Bruno Tavares VO:** Os investigadores apuram se a instalação da antena teria sido mais um benefício concedido irregularmente pro uma empresa ao ex-presidente.

[studio, torso-and-desk shot of RV]

**RV:** O Instituto Lula declarou que é absolutamente falsa a afirmação de que a mudança do ex-presidente de Brasília pra São Paulo tem há sido pago por uma empresa.

**WB:** O Instituto afirmou que a mudança, como ocorre com todos os ex-presidentes, foi providenciada pela Presidência da República. Segundo instituto, parte dos objetos foi levada para apartamento em São Bernardo, e parte para o sítio Santa Barbara, com o conhecimento dos proprietários.

**RV:** O instituto afirmou ainda que no fim do governo Lula, a Presidência da República providenciou triagem e entrega do acervo documental privado do ex-presidente da mesma forma como procedeu com os anteced – com os antecessores.

**WB:** A Granero declarou que fez parte da mudança do ex-presidente Lula de Brasília para São Paulo, e que o acervo audiovisual continua armazenado, e que o acervo museológico foi retirado por outra transportadora contratado por Paulo Okamoto.

**RV:** A defesa de Fernando Bittar e Jonas Suassuna afirmou que o sítio em Atibaia pertence a eles. A defesa de Suassuna diz ainda que todas as despesas de sítio foram pagas por ele.

[end of transcript at 28.55]

Jornal Nacional, broadcast on TV Globo, 20:30 on March 16, 2016 – see section 4.4.3

Retrieved from [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WKCS0Ej3z\\_k](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WKCS0Ej3z_k)

[WB = William Bonner; RV = Renata Vasconcellos]

[music, zoom in on anchors in Globo studio]

**WB:** Boa noite

**RV:** Boa noite

**WB:** A crise do governo Dilma Rousseff atinge o ponto mais alto.

[graphic of document on desk]

**RV VO:** Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva é nomeado Ministro-Chefe da Casa Civil

[torso-shot of WB]

**WB:** Ele sai do alcance de

[footage of Sergio Moro speaking publicly]

Sérgio Moro, o juiz federal do Paraná responsável pela Lava Jato,

[torso-shot of RV]

**RV:** e passa a ter o chamado foro privilegiado no Supremo Tribunal Federal.

[torso-shot of WB]

**WB:** O juiz Moro suspende o sigilo

[torso-shot of RV]

**RV:** e a Justiça Federal torna publicos os grampos telefônicos do ex-presidente,

[torso-shot of WB]

**WB:** um deles de hoje a tarde.

[torso-shot of RV]

**RV:** Lula recebeu ligação da presidente Dilma

[graphic of a futuristic sound-scanner instrument, dividing the screen in two, with a picture of Dilma and a picture of Lula – the sound of their recorded dialogue is accompanied by text in the middle of each instrument section]

- Dilma: Alô

- Lula: Alô

- Dilma: Lula, deixa eu te falar uma coisa.

- Lula: Fala, querida. Ahn

- Dilma: Seguinte, eu tô mandando o 'Bessias' junto com o papel pra gente ter ele, e só usa em caso de necessidade, que é o termo de posse, tá?!

- Lula: Uhum. Tá bom, tá bom.

- Dilma: Só isso, você espera aí que ele tá indo aí.

- Lula: Tá bom, eu tô aqui, fico aguardando.

- Dilma: Tá?!

- Lula: Tá bom.

- Dilma: Tchau.

- Lula: Tchau, querida.

[1:00 - torso-shot of WB]

**WB:** Os grampos têm indícios fortes de que o objetivo da ida de Lula para ministério foi mesmo tirá-lo do alcance do juiz Moro,

[torso-shot of RV]

**RV:** e indicam que o ex-presidente tentou influenciar várias autoridades para se proteger.

[torso-shot of WB]

**WB:** Uma edição extra do Diário Oficial publica a nomeação do agora ministro Lula.

[torso-shot of RV]

**RV:** Quarta-feira, 17 de março:

[full studio shot from above]

**WB:** O Jornal Nacional está começando

[graphic with logotype; music]

[full studio shot, zooming in slowly on WB until torso-and-desk shot]

**WB:** Nesta quarta-feira crise que envolve governo Dilma Rousseff atingiu ponto mais alto desde o início.

Antes que o Diário Oficial efetivasse

[WB turns halfway towards RV and RV then turns towards WB, before WB breaks eye-contact again and looks towards camera; RV remains turned towards WB]

a nomeação de Lula como ministro, o juiz Sérgio Moro retirou o sigilo de toda a investigação sobre o ex-presidente, e com isso tornaram-se públicas no fim da tarde conversas telefônicas de Lula.

Os integrantes da Lava Jato afirmam que há indícios de uma ação para

[WB stresses each syllable]

a-tra-pal-har as investigações.

Ainda nesta edição Jornal Nacional vai mostrar o conteúdo desses grampos e as reações que eles provocaram.

[2:00 - WB looks to the left, câmera shifts to torso-shot]

**WB:** A nomeação de Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva como novo Ministro-Chefe da Casa Civil, seis dias depois de promotores estaduais de São Paulo terem pedido a prisão dele, foi anunciada no início da tarde. Mas começou a se concretizar na noite de terça-feira numa reunião no Palácio da Alvorada.

[footage of the Alvorada in the distance at night-time]

**Reporter VO Delis Ortiz:** Foi uma decisão demorada mais de quatro horas na Alvorada.

[grainy zoomed-in footage of a staircase in the palace, visible from the outside, of Dilma and Lula walking down]

Os principais ministros do Planalto, Dilma, e o ex-presidente Lula saíram tarde da noite, despistando a imprensa, ainda sem nenhuma certeza - em jogo, segundo governistas

[footage of the palace gates, Alvorada visible behind the bars of the gate, gates slowly opening and letting a car out]

os questionamentos do Lula sobre os poderes que passariam ter como alcance de condução da economia,

[close-up footage of the car front window, Lula visible in the back]

e se a presença dele no governo recuperaria de fato a duvidosa fidelidade de base aliado no Congresso,

[car on the road outside of the Palace]

a do PMDB principalmente.

[footage of the entrance of the Royal Tulip hotel, neighbour of the Alvorada palace, and close-ups of supposedly Carvalho talking to the porter]

As tratativas seguiram madrugada dentro os velhos conselheiros do ex-presidente, como ex-ministro Gilberto Carvalho, madrugaram no hotel onde ele estava hospedado.

[3:00 - footage of the Alvorada in daylight, and cars on the road leading inside the palace gates]

Dilma nem pedalou, como de costume, retomou a conversa com Lula no café da manhã com ministros.

Ainda precisaram de quase três horas de conversa para chegar finalmente a um termo.

[graphic of a workstation with a computer screen, zooming in, on a twitter-like feed in red, indicating PT leaders' feeds, quoting "Lula novo ministro da pasta!"]

Mal acabou a reunião, e líderes do PT no Congresso já anunciavam a decisão pela internet.

[footage of Lula going into a car in front of Alvorada]

Lula voltou pra São Paulo;

[footage of Wagner at press conference, torso-shot]

Jacques Wagner viajou pra Bahia;

[footage of the entrance ramp to the Planalto palace, shot towards the Congress]

Houve um entra-e-sai de petistas e ministros no Planalto.

No início da tarde veio o anúncio discreto:

[graphic of a desktop with document on top]

Uma nota de treze linhas oficializou Lula para Ministro-Chefe de Casa Civil

Jacques Wagner, Chefe de Gabinete de Dilma,

e Mauro Lopes de PMDB para Secretaria de Avião Civil

**Reporter Delis Ortiz, on-site:** O governo tenta convencer que a nomeação do ex-presidente tem caráter estrutural de reforço para alterar os rumos de economia e de ânimo para relação com o Congresso. Argumentos à parte, fato é que Lula no ministério implica o direito ao foro privilegiado, ou seja,

[4:00]

ele escapa das mãos do juiz Sérgio Moro em Curitiba, porque a investigação contra ele passará para o Procurador-Geral da República, Rodrigo Janot, e o juiz do caso será o ministro Teori Zavascki do Supremo Tribunal Federal.

[footage of delegate Igor Romario de Paula]

**Igor Romario de Paula:** Os autos são, são, encerrados no estado em que se encontram, e entregados ao juízo da 13<sup>o</sup> Vara, que automaticamente encaminha isso tudo pro Supremo para apreciar.

[footage of Renan Calheiros, Rose de Freitas and other PMDB bosses, together with Lula, exiting the house of Renan]

**Reporter VO Deliz Ortiz:** Lula seguirá trabalhando na sedução dos caciques do PMDB. Já recebeu do Presidente do Senado, Renan Calheiros, o aceno de que pode ir frente. Eles ainda terão um encontro.

O vice, Michel Temer, também é alvo da investida de Lula nessa articulação.

[studio, RV in desk-and-torso shot]

**RV:** O presidente Lula já estava em São Paulo quando, no fim do dia, o Palácio do Planalto publicou uma edição extra do Diário Oficial.

[footage of Diário Oficial document, parts highlighted in the document swoops closer to the spectator]

**RV VO:** O documento é o que garante a posse do ex-presidente no cargo de ministro. A edição extra, no mesmo dia do anúncio da nomeação, não é usual.

[5:00]

Normalmente, a presidente Dilma assina o termo de posse na cerimônia de posse, e só depois o documento é publicado no Diário Oficial.

[studio, WB in desk-and-torso shot]]

**WB:** A entrada de Lula no governo repercutiu no Supremo Tribunal Federal e no Congresso.

[footage of impromptu press meeting with Afonso Florence in Congress antehall]

**Reporter, VO, Zileida Silva:** No Congresso foi o líder do PT na Câmara que deu a notícia. Lula pediu para que antes do anúncio formal, todos líderes dos partidos que apoiam o presidente fossem informados da nomeação.

**Reporter on-site, Zileida Silva:** Lula avisou que quer se reunir com os líderes na semana que vem, após a posse. Quem conversou com o ex-presidente diz que deixou claro que quer mudar a relação com a base aqui no Congresso, e para alguns parlamentares, a presidente Dilma não tinha a mesma outra saída - que o governo dela precisa ser reinventado.

[interview in Camara with deputado José Guimares (PT)]

**Guimares:** Vai ser um braço forte, junto a presidenta Dilma, para agilizar e tomar as medidas que foram necessárias para retomar do crescimento e, principalmente, do emprego.

[footage of senador Humberto Costa in corridor at the Congress]

**Reporter on-site, Zileida Silva:** Governistas negaram que o ex-presidente tem aceitado

[6:00, close-up of Costa] ser ministro para ter foro privilegiado

**Humberto Costa:** Vindo para o ministério ele estará sujeito a responder qualquer inquérito e investigação no Supremo Tribunal Federal.

[cut in footage]

É até um desrespeito ao Supremo esse tipo de argumentação.

[footage of impromptu press meeting with Pauderny Avelino of DEM in Camara antehall]

**Reporter on-site, Zileida Silva:** Mas a oposição vai insistir, e entrou com um série de ações populares na Justiça Federal para tentar impedir a posse do ex-presidente.

**Avelino:** A presidente Dilma Rousseff está se utilizando de um ato lícito para promover um ato ilícito que é nomear uma pessoa que está denunciado na justiça, e uma pessoa que pode se transformar em réu de momento para outro para um cargo apenas

[cut]

para blindar-lo junto a Justiça Federal

[footage of Aécio and ? in a crowded room]

**Reporter on-site, Zileida Silva:** O senador Aécio Neves, presidente do PSDB, diz que na prática está abdicando do seu mandato, e que é absolutamente condenável a nomeação do ex-presidente Lula para Casa Civil.

[7:00, head-shot of Neves in the midst of interview]

**Neves:** A razão da posse do presidente Lula no ministério tem um sentido que supera todos os outros:

[cut in footage]

É impedir o bom andamento das investigações, seja no Operação Lava Jato, daquelas conduzidas pelo Ministério Público, eh, de São Paulo.

[footage of Camara floor, few persons in the room]

**Reporter on-site, Zileida Silva:** No início da noite, o PRB, que tem 21 deputados, um senador, e o Ministro do Esporte, George Hilton, anunciou que vai deixar a base aliada.

[footage of Camara central panel]

[footage outside of STF]

A nomeação de Lula também repercutiu no Supremo Tribunal Federal:

[footage of STF session, Supreme Justice Gilmar Mendes at his desk in the plenary]

**Mendes:** A crise só piorou. Só se agravou, a ponto de agora a presidente busca inclusive um tutor para, -- colocar, no, no, no seu lugar de presidente, e ela assumiu um outro papel.

[cut in footage]

...e um tutor que vem com problemas criminais muito sérios, mudando inclusive a competência do, eh, Supremo Tribunal Federal – tema que nos vamos ter aqui discutir - mudando inclusive a competência da justiça federal.

[8:00, footage of interview with Supreme Justice Marco Aurélio Mello]

**MAM:** Eu não vejo como alguém aceitaria um cargo depois ter sido presidente da República apenas para buscar a prerrogativa se é que a prerrogativa de ser julgado pelo Supremo

[cut in footage]

Eu vejo essa saída do presidente como uma tentativa de sairmos do impasse nacional.

[studio, both anchors at the desk, slowly zooming in and panning right, RV gets up from the chair and walks towards screen on the right]

**RV:** Vamos agora ao vivo à Brasília porque o repórter Fernando Rego Barros tem informações deste momento – olá Fernando, boa noite, manifestantes protestam agora em frente ao Palácio do Planalto?

**Reporter on-site, Fernando Rego:** Boa noite Renata, boa noite a todos. Os manifestantes começaram a chegar aqui ao Palácio do Planalto por volta das cinco horas da tarde, bem antes até da divulgação da gravação entre a presidente Dilma e

[helicopter footage of protests in front of Planalto]

**Reporter on-site, Fernando Rego VO:** o ex-presidente Lula, que foi divulgada um pouco depois. Esses manifestantes vieram aqui para protestar contra nomeação pela presidente Dilma do ex-presidente Lula como Ministro-Chefe da Casa Civil. A gente vê essas imagens aéreas aí [explosions of fireworks] nesse momento aqui em frente ao Palácio do Planalto.

[9:00]

Segundo Polícia Militar, cerca de duas mil e 500 pessoas – esse numero até foi atualizado agora há pouco - para cinco mil pessoas postadas aqui em frente ao Palácio do Planalto.

A presidente Dilma Rousseff saiu daqui do Planalto por volta da 6 e 35 da noite e foi para Palácio da Alvorada, mas as manifestantes continuam aqui. Eles não aceitam a nomeação do ex-presidente Lula como Ministro-Chefe da Casa Civil. Os protestos são pacíficos e em nenhum momento houve violência, nem por parte da Polícia Militar, nem por parte dos manifestantes. Os manifestantes só não podem... a, a, a Guarda Presidencial está postada logo depois da mureta de proteção para evitar qualquer invasão – mas não houve essa invasão.

Um grupo de deputados da oposição chegou aqui logo depois do início do protesto, mas demorou pouco foi, m, foi logo embora;

E houve alguns deputados, bem que chegaram, foram expulsos pelos manifestantes

[10:00]

que não queriam a presença de, de alguns deputados protestando aqui junto com eles.

**Reporter on-site, Fernando Rego:** A gente tá acompanhando aqui esse movimentação ainda em frente aqui ao Palácio do Planalto. Bonner, Renata...

[Studio, RV still standing in front of screen]



**RV:** Fernando Rego Barros mostrando cerca de 5000 pessoas protestando nesse momento em frente do Palácio do Planalto; e de Brasília, a gente vai agora a São Paulo;  
[RV turns halfway looking out to the right, standing in profile; while the screen behind her changes to helicopter footage of Avenida Paulista and people walking on the street]

Repórter Tiago Elz, também tem informações para gente – Thiago que é que Você ver nesse momento?

[helicopter footage continued in full-screen; 7 seconds of traffic noise]

**Reporter VO, Tiago Elz:** Há um grande protesto já na Avenida Paulista nesse momento. Vale lembrar que começou antes do anúncio da divulgação do grampo da ligação entre o ex-presidente Lula e a presidente Dilma. Varias pessoas já se dirigiram aqui para Avenida Paulista para protestar contra a nomeação do ex-presidente; essa manifestação começou a ganhar mais corpo –

[11:00]

agora noite depois da divulgação desse áudio - depois da divulgação do grampo. Às 8 horas, por volta das 8 horas da noite a Avenida Paulista foi fechada, e ela segue fechada e com manifestantes ocupando os dois lados da Avenida aí em frente a FIESP, que Você vê aí com essa bandeira com a faixa preta.

Renata, Bonner; -

[Studio, RV still standing in front of screen]

**RV:** Tiago Elz, mostrando ao vivo da Avenida Paulista, um protesto em frente da Federação das indústrias de São Paulo,

[RV turns and câmera changes, torso shot with the News room in the background]

e ainda nesta edição: A crise política no auge em Brasília.

[desk-and-torso shot of WB, slow zoom]

**WB:** A justiça torna publica um diálogo entre Lula e a presidente Dilma Rousseff

[RV standing, torso-shot]

RV: A polícia federal afirma ver indícios de ações para atrapalhar as investigações da Lava Jato

[desk-and-torso shot of WB, slow zoom]

**WB:** E a seguir, você vai o que diz a presidente Dilma sobre nomeação de Lula para o cargo de ministro.

[Graphics of G1 / JN url, JN jingle music]

**WB:** A nomeação do ex-presidente Lula para ministério foi feito de uma maneira muito discreta, numa nota de 13 linhas – e depois disso veio silêncio.

[12:00]

Silêncio isso que só foi quebrado no meio da tarde.

A presidente Dilma deu uma entrevista no Palácio Planalto, e logo no início, a presidente foi questionada se, com essa nomeação, Lula teria a virar uma espécie de super-ministro e ela iria perder poder.

[footage of interview with Dilma in Planalto]

**Dilma:** Eu vou ter a riso porque, tem quatro anos de governo mais um cinco; estou entrando no sexto. Tem seis anos que Vocês tentam [porque] tentam me separar de Lula. A minha relação com Lula não é uma relação de poderes ou super-poderes – a minha relação com Lula e uma sórdida relação de quem constrói um projeto junto. Então, o presidente Lula, no meu governo, terá os poderes necessários para nós ajudar – para ajudar o Brasil, sobretudo Brasil. Tudo que ele pode fazer pra ajudar o Brasil será feito.

[13:00]

Punto!

[studio, RV desk-and-torso shot]

**RV:** A presidente Dilma também foi questionada sobre as negociações para que Lula aceitar seu cargo. Junto com os rumores de que ele seria nomeado, surgiram informações de que Lula estaria fazendo exigências para aceitar o cargo. A presidente negou.

[footage of interview with Dilma in Planalto]

**Dilma:** Eu digo para Vocês que isso não é do perfil do presidente Lula. Presidente Lula não age dessa forma.

[cut in footage]

Porque o presidente Lula tinha dúvidas se ele deveria ou não assumir o cargo. Dúvidas essas - mais ligadas a situação, eh, do, do confronto que a oposição poderia fazer sobre as suas razões do que sobre esse tipo de questão.

[cut in footage]

E acho que essas, essas dúvidas, foram integralmente, eh, superadas, e nós, já ontem, já ontem! - tínhamos a decisão. Mas nós aprofundamos hoje porque [indecipherable] tentamos de vários assuntos...

[14:00; repórter interrupts]

**Reporter off-screen:** Presidente...

**Dilma:** Mais práticos.

[Studio, desk-and-torso shot of WB]

**WB:** Quando o repórter perguntou se o fato de Lula está sendo investigado na Operação Lava Jato causaria algum constrangimento, a presidente voltou a defendê-lo e disse que estranha a forma como as investigações sobre o Lula têm sido conduzidas.

[footage of interview with Dilma in Planalto]

**Dilma:** os critérios de investigação são extremamente estranhos em relação ao presidente Lula. Muito estranhos. Por quê? Porque o presidente Lula nega que tem o tríplice, nega que tem o sítio, e deu explicações suficientes; não se recusa dar explicações – sempre foi chamado, foi, foi... informou, e acho estranho – já, já manifestei isso – que ele tinha lev- se que - seja levado coercitivamente ou que seja pedida preventiva dele, sem base num fato que caracteriza isso. Não só eu, mas, um opção de juristas falaram isso.

[15:00 - cut in footage]

Acho que não está certo isso – mostra minha confiança na trajetória dele, na biografia dele, no compromisso dele – que eu conheço ele – um compromisso com todas as praticas corretas e idôneas.

[Studio, desk-and-torso shot of RV]

**RV:** Uma das criticas da oposição sobre a nomeação de Lula é que como ministro, ele ganha foro privilegiado, ou seja, deixe de ser investigado em Curitiba pelo juiz Sérgio Moro e passa a ser investigado em Brasília pelo Supremo Tribunal Federal. A presidente Dilma rebateu esse argumento.

[footage of interview with Dilma in Planalto]

**Dilma:** Prerrogativa de foro não é impedir investigação. É fazê-la em determinada instância e não em outra. E, a, o tropo de que eu vou achar de investigação do, do, juiz Sérgio Moro é melhor do que a, a investigação do Supremo, essa é uma- , é uma inversão da hierarquia, me desculpa, eu não posso acrescentar mais nada uma resposta dessas

[16:00 – cut in footage]

Então, eu não entendo porque, quando chega na ca-, no, no nesse caso, criam essa hipótese; a minha desculpa, mas eu acho que se essa hipótese - ele é apenas uma, uma sombrinha; uma proteção ao fato de que - vou falar a verdade - a vinda do Lula, pro meu governo – fortaleça o meu governo. Tem gente que não quer que ele seja fortalecido – o que que eu possa fazer?

[many interruptions of reporters off-screen]

[Studio, desk-and-torso shot of WB]

**WB:** A presidente Dilma também falou sobre crise econômica. Ela negou que o governo vá usar reservas internacionais – uma espécie de poupança que Brasil tem no exterior, para incentivar o crescimento da economia ou a queda da inflação.

[footage of interview with Dilma in Planalto]

**Dilma:** Nós jamais teremos uma pauta de uso dessas reservas para alvo que não seja proteção do país, contra flutuações internacionais. E essas reservas também, elas podem, eh,

[17:00]

dê um papel em relação à dívida. Mas elas não são a forma adequada de se solucionar questões de investimento; portanto, as especulações que existem quando esse fato do uso das reservas são isso: Especulações. E elas, infelizmente, só beneficiam os poucos que lu-, que lucram com ela. Que lucre, que tentam um, um, uma, uma – eu acho criar uma situação de especulação.

[cut in footage]

Nós temos de fazer buscar estabilidade fiscal – Por quê é que se acham que eu falei do compromisso do Lula com estabilidade fiscal? Porque ele é real! Se sabem disso. Olha retrospectiva do presidente. Que historia esse do presidente não mantém compromisso com estabilidade fiscal. Que historia é esse que ele não mantém compromisso com controle da inflação? Eu acho que é demissível – tudo é demissível – mas tem coisas que passa

[18:00]

eu diria se que tal por **kima** cima do noticiário especulativo.

[Studio, desk-and-torso shot of RV]

**RV:** A presidente Dilma também assegurou que não haverá mudanças na equipe econômica.

[footage of interview with Dilma in Planalto]

**Dilma:** Não se demite, porque cria turbulência na economia; me desculpe, isso tem um sentido especulativo. Nem o Ministro Nelson Barbosa, nem o Ministro Tombini estão com alguma, alguma, ouve, alguma ou alguém ou qualquer coisa que levantou a possibilidade de sair do governo. Pelo contrário, eles estão mais dentro do que há nunca.

[Studio, shot of both anchors at desk]

**WB:** A seguir, a crise política no auge em Brasília:

**RV:** A Justiça torna público um diálogo entre Lula e a presidente Dilma Rousseff

**WB:** e a Polícia Federal afirma ver indícios de ações para atrapalhar as investigações da Lava Jato

[cut for commercials; Graphics of G1 / JN url, JN jingle music]

**WB:** O Supremo Tribunal Federal manteve as regras estabelecidas ao fim do ano passado para tramitação de pedido da abertura de processo do impeachment no Congresso contra a presidente Dilma Rousseff.

[19:00]

[TV Justiça footage of STF, Supreme Justice Luís Roberto Barroso speaking at his desk next to Rosa Weber, camera slowly zooming out and panning towards rest of plenary]

**Reporter VO Marcos Losekann:** O Ministro relator Luís Roberto Barroso manteve o voto de dezembro. Rejeitou os recursos da Câmara dos Deputados contra o rito do impeachment

[Shot from opposite angle, Barroso reading his verdict]

**Barroso:** Cabe às instâncias políticas deliberar sobre a permanência ou afastamento do Chefe de Estado. O Supremo Tribunal Federal toca tal somente zela pelo cumprimento da Constituição e das demais normas aplicáveis.

[shot of the whole STF plenary]

**Reporter VO Marcos Losekann:** Oito ministros seguiram o relator. Entenderam que não houve omissão, nem contradição nas decisões do tribunal e que o recurso da Câmara não poderia ser usado pra julgar tudo de novo.

[footage of Supreme Justice Teori Zavascki at desk in the plenary]

**Teori:** Fato simplesmente não aceito do agrado da parte que não viu atendido se o interesse não se justifica, por si só provocará um novo julgamento a causa –

[20:00]

a causa está julgado.

[footage of Supreme Justice Luiz Fux at desk in the plenary]

**Fux:** O que a corte fez foi manter a integridade e a interessa das [indecipherable] jurisprudência já sedimentada após a Constituição de 1988.

[footage of other Justices and the plenary seen from above]

**Reporter VO:** Gilmar Mendes e Dias Toffoli foram os únicos a discordar. Toffoli disse que há contradição, porque com a indicação das integrantes da comissão do impeachment pelos líderes partidários, e sem chapa avulsa, não há eleição

[footage of Supreme Justice Dias Toffoli at his desk in the plenary]

**Toffoli:** Nós estamos trocando a representação de 513 por 28 líderes partidários. Ou menos, porque há os blocos, e aí nos blocos quem indicam são os líderes dos respectivos blocos.

[Reporter on-site at the Planalto, looking towards the Camara]

**Reporter Marcos Losekann:** Essa posição final no Supremo é na prática um sinal verde para Câmara. Os deputados poderão retomar o processo de impeachment da presidente Dilma Rousseff, desde que as regras determinadas pelo STF sejam obedecidas.

[21:00]

E se surgirem divergências, acorde por ser acionada de novo.

[footage of the Eixo Monumental in Brasília, centred on the Congress, with graphic overlay, morphing into next shot]

**Reporter Marcos Losekann VO:** Como a rejeição do recurso a Comissão Especial na Câmara que analisa a pedido de abertura do processo deve ser

[footage of empty commission meeting room in Câmara]

eleita com voto aberto.

[letters spelling “voto aberto” appears levitating on desk in the empty meeting room]

Os nomes serão indicados pelos líderes dos partidos,

[letters spelling “indicados pelos líderes” appears, followed by “sem chapa alternativa”]

e não poderão haver chapa alternativa

[the meeting room diminishes into a window, and the Eixo appears again as background of graphics of a pie chart showing impeachment process voting requirements]

Se dois terços da Câmara aceitarem abertura do processo, o Senado poderá decidir por maioria simples, pelo arquivamento ou pela continuidade.

[letters spelling “O afastamento da presidente somente após Senado abrir processo” appears on the background of the Eixo Monumental in Brasília]

O afastamento da Presidente Dilma Rousseff do cargo ocorrerá somente depois do plenário do senado decidir pela abertura do processo de impeachment por maioria simples.

[studio, desk-and-torso shot of RV]

**RV:** Nesta quarta-feira crise político atingiu ponto mais alto. O juiz Sérgio Moro suspendeu, no fim da tarde, o sigilo da 24<sup>o</sup> fase da Operação Lava Jato, e com isso, conversas com ex-presidente Lula se tornaram públicas

[22:00, RV turns to another angle and camera shifts to a head shot of RV]

Integrantes da operação Lava Jato afirmaram que há indícios de uma ação para atrapalhar as investigações.

[footage from various angles of Paraná PF station]

**Reporter VO:** As interceptações telefônicas foram feitas com autorização da justiça, começaram no dia 19 de fevereiro e continuavam até hoje. Numa conversa gravada em 27 de fevereiro, dias antes da condução coercitiva de Lula em 4 de março,

[footage of Lula exiting car in the midst of many people, one of them supposedly Falcão]

o ex-presidente conversa com Rui Falcão, presidente do PT.

[graphic of refinery tubes, with the BR logo visible in the background. In the foreground, a document with federal police stamps at the top is overlaid, while Money bundles well out from the oil line. Highlighted parts of the document appear in yellow]

Lula disse: É, eu tô esperando segunda-feira. Eu tô esperando segunda-feira a Operação de busca e apreensão na minha casa, do meu filho Marcos, do meu filho Fábio, do meu filho Sandro, do meu filho Claudio. E Rui Falcão respondeu: É, eu vi esse noticiário aqui.

**Reporter on-site Vladimir Netto:** Investigadores dizem que essa conversa e outros que foram interceptadas indicam que Lula podem fica sabendo contra ele e tentava atrapalhar os trabalhos da Lava Jato. Lula teria inclusive buscado influenciar ou conseguir ajuda de autoridades do Ministério Público Federal e até de ministros do Supremo Tribunal Federal.

[23:00 - footage of Lula, standing at a pulpit, reading from documents at a press conference]

**Reporter VO Vladimir Netto:** Numa conversa gravada no dia 27 de fevereiro, o ex-presidente fala com Paula de Tarso Vannuchi,

[footage of Lula in armchair during interview]

ex-Ministro da Secretaria de direitos humanos no governo Lula

[footage of police station]

De acordo com a Polícia Federal há indícios de que no diálogo, Lula esteja se referindo ao Ministro indicado da Justiça Eugenio Aragão que também é sub-Procurador-Geral de República

[graphic of refinery tubes again]

Lula disse: “O problema é o seguinte, Paulinho, nós temos que comprar essa briga, eu sei que é difícil, sabe?! Eu as vezes fico pensando até que o Aragão deveria cumprir um papel de homem, porque o Aragão parece nosso amigo, parece, parece, mas tá sempre dizendo ‘olha...’”

[helicopter footage of parking lot in front of Congonhas airport of SP]

Logo depois de saído de depoimento de Polícia Federal no dia de operação “Aletheia” em 4 de março,

[footage of Dilma standing in TV show, being instructed before broadcast]

Lula falou com Dilma sobre um pedido dos advogados dele

[Footage shot in front of STF sign]

que estava no Supremo Tribunal Federal

[Footage shot in front of STF]

Questionando quem deveria investigá-lo

[Footage, shot from the ground up, in front of justice statue in Praça dos Tres Poderes ]

se o Ministério Público de São Paulo ou a força-tarefa da Lava Jato em Curitiba

[new graphic of refinery tubes, still Money bundles flowing and BR sign visible; document again highlighting text]

Lula falou: Eu acho que eles queriam antecipar o pedido nosso que tá na Suprema Corte, que tá na mão da Rosa Weber

[24:00 - footage of police station in Paraná]

Após a conversa com Dilma, Lula conversa com então ministro-chefe da Casa Civil Jacques Wagner e solicita que ele converse com Dilma a respeito do negócio com Rosa Weber

[graphic of the inside of a oil tube with smudgy Money bills, document text again swooping towards spectator:]

Lula falou: “Mas viu, querido, ela tá falando dessa reunião, ô Wagner, que queria que você visse agora, falar com ela, já que ela tá aí, falar o negócio da Rosa Weber, que tá na mão dela pra decidir. Se homem não tem saco, que sabe uma mulher corajosa possa fazer o que os homens não fizeram.”

[helicopter footage of police station in Paraná]

A ministra Rosa Weber negou o pedido da defesa de Lula porque entendeu que não houve ilegalidade nas duas investigações.

[footage of police station in Paraná]

Em outro telefonema, o homem identificado como Roberto Carlos deixa claro que o ministério serve de foro privilegiado para Lula.

Roberto Carlos fala: “Eu acho, tá, tem uma coisa que tá na mão de vocês. É ministério, acabou.”

Roberto Carlos continua: “Agora você tem uma coisa na tua mão, você, o PT, a Dilma... Vai ter porrada? Vão criticar? E daí? Numa boa, você resolve outro problema, que é o problema da governabilidade.”

[24:00 - Studio, desk-and-torso shot of WB]

**WB:** Numa conversa gravada na 27 de fevereiro o ex-presidente Lula fala com fala com Paula de Tarso Vannuchi, ex-Ministro da Secretaria de Direitos Humanos no governo Lula. De acordo com a polícia federal, há indícios de que no dialogo, Lula esteja se referindo ao novo Ministro da Justiça, Eugênio Aragão que também é sub-Procurador-Geral de República.

Lula disse assim abre aspas: Lula disse: O problema é o seguinte, Paulinho, nós temos que comprar essa briga, eu sei que é difícil, sabe?! Eu as vezes fico pensando até que o Aragão deveria cumprir um papel de homem naquela...” - e o presidente disse um palavrão - “...porque o Aragão parece nosso amigo, parece, parece, mas tá sempre dizendo ‘olha...’” fecha aspas.

[RV in desk-and-torso shot]

**RV:** Na introdução da de gravação de uma conversa entre Lula e o advogado Luiz Carlos Sigmaringa Seixas, ocorrida no dia 7 de março, os investigadores dizem que nesse trecho, Lula diz que

[26:00]

o PGR recusou 4 pedidos de investigação do Aécio, de Aécio Neves, e aceitou o único pedido da investigação da LILS. Ele fala que essa é a gratidão do PGR por ser nomeado Procurador. Sigmaringa que vai fazer uma petição formal e jogar pra imprensa pra constranger o PGR:

[graphic of a futuristic sound-scanner instrument, divided into two, with a picture of Dilma and a picture of Lula – the sound of their recorded dialogue is muted, but still accompanied by text in the middle of each instrument section]

**RV voice-over:** Lula diz abre aspas: “Eu não sei o quê que eu pedi pra você de manhã. Mas era uma coisa simples que não precisava de formalidade.”

[RV in studio, desk-and-torso]

**RV:** Sigmaringa Seixas pergunta: “Não. Mas simples ele vai dizer não. Ele não vai receber. Eu conversei com gente só.”

Lula diz: “É porque ele recusou quatro pedidos de investigação ao Aécio e aceitou a primeira de um bandido do Acre contra mim.”

Sigmaringa responde:

[27:00]

“Pois é... mas se fizer uma petição...” Lula diz: “Essa é a gratidão...Essa é a gratidão dele por ele ser Procurador.” Sigmaringa responde: “Pois é. Mas ele se tiver... se a gente formalizar, inclusive, jogando pra imprensa, ele vai ficar constrangido. Se for lá conversar com ele diz não e pronto. Ou não diz né.” Lula diz a Sigmaringa: “Então conversa com o Cristiano.”

[WB headshot]

**WB:** No dia 7 do março a policia federal interceptou entre o ex-presidente Lula e o prefeito do Rio Eduardo Paes. O prefeito diz que está sofrendo e Lula rebate, dizendo que ele é abençoado por Deus por causa das Olimpíadas. O prefeito Eduardo Paes afirma então que fazendo Olimpíada com Lula e com Sergio Cabral é uma coisa, mas segurar com aquele bon-mot da Dilma e do Pezão - Lula comenta: “Não é fácil, querida.” A conversa seque e o prefeito do Rio afirma: “Agora, da próxima vez o senhor me para com essa vida de pobre, com essa tua alma de pobre comprando” esses barco de M –

[28:00]

ele usou o palavra que eu não preciso repetir aqui - “sitiozinho vagabundo”, e aí diz um palavrão. Isso a palavra do prefeito do Rio Eduardo Paes. Ai o ex-pref, o ex-presidente Lula ri e Eduardo Paes continua: “O senhor é uma alma de pobre. Eu, todo mundo que fala aqui no meio, eu falo o seguinte: imagina se fosse aqui no Rio esse sítio dele, não é em Petrópolis, não é em Itaipava. É como se fosse em Maricá.” E o prefeito diz alguns palavrões. E Lula, mais uma vez, ri.

[headshot of RV]

**RV:** Em uma das ligações interceptadas pela polícia federal o ex-presidente Lula fala para o ministro da Fazenda Nelson Barbosa acompanhar o que a Receita Federal está fazendo junto com a Polícia Federal. No diálogo, Lula fala o seguinte: abre aspas “O Nels-, O Nelson, vou te falar uma coisa por telefone, isso daqui. O importante é que a Polícia Federal esteja gravando. É preciso acompanhar o que a receita tá fazendo junto com a Polícia Federal, bicho!”

[29:00]

Nelson Barbosa responde: “Não, é... Gagueja um pouco e depois prossegue. Eles fazem parte.”

Lula retruque: “É, mas você precisa se inteirar do que eles estão fazendo no instituto. Se eles fizessem isso com meia dúzia de grandes empresas, resolvia o problema de arrecadação do Estado.” Nelson Barbosa responde: “Uhum, sei.” Lula continua: “Sabe? Eu acho que está faz- eu acho que eles estão sendo” – e fala um palavrão. Nelson Barbosa responde: “Tá.” Lula

complementa: “Tão procurando pelo em ovo. Eu acho... eu vou pedir pro Paulo Okamoto botar tudo no papel, porque era preciso você chamar o responsável e falar” ele fala um palavrão “Vocês

estão fazendo o mesmo com a Globo, com Instituto Fernando Henrique Cardoso, o mesmo com Gerdau, o mesmo com o SBT, o mesmo com a Record?! Ou só com Lula?”, e o ex-presidente fala um palavrão; e logo em seguida outro palavrão.

[30:00]

E Nelson Barbosa responde: “Tá, pede pro Paulo colocar”.

[*end of transcript at 30:05*]