



## **Implementation of the habitats directive in denmark chapter 3.4**

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## List of Acronyms for GoFOR Cases

Case title	Acronym	Country
Austrian Implementation Strategy for the Convention on Biological Diversity	AT-BS	Austria
Austrian Forest Dialogue	AT-AFD	Austria
Implementation of the Habitats Directive in Denmark	DEN-HD	Denmark
National Park Pilot Projects in Denmark	DEN-NPP	Denmark
Territorial Forest Charters in France	FR-CFT	France
Relief Plan for Forests in France	FR-RPF	France
Integrated Rural Development	GER-IRD	Germany
GAK - Joint Task "Improvement of Agricultural Structures and Coastal Protection"	GER-GAK	Germany
LEADER+ – EU pilot programme for the advancement of rural development	GER-L+	Germany
REGIONEN AKTIV – National pilot programme for the advancement of rural development	GER-RA	Germany
New modes of governance for protected areas through Management Agencies in Greece	GR-MA	Greece
National Forest Programme Hungary	HUN-NFP	Hungary
The Living Forests Project	NOR-LF	Norway
Groene Woud	NL-GW	The Netherlands
Nature for People, People for Nature	NL-NPPN	The Netherlands
Utrechtse Heuvelrug	NL-UH	The Netherlands
Anti-corruption policies in Romania	ROM-ACP	Romania
Implementation of Acquis Communautaire in Nature Protection Policies in Romania	ROM-NAT	Romania
Forest Policy General Plan of Catalonia	ESP-FPGP	Spain

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# 1 General introduction: concept of governance

*Hogl, K., R. Nordbeck, E. Nußbauer and M. Pregernig*

The term governance<sup>1</sup> appeared in political science about 10 years ago, connected to the claim that the traditional model of the nation state did not adequately represent political reality anymore, and has since then, evolved into a central concept of the political science discourse. Governance has been used in different arenas within political science, such as policy analysis, European Union research or international theory, on different levels of research- e.g. global, European, national, regional or corporate, and connected to normative claims as in “good governance”. (Benz et al. 2006 1; Schuppert 2005)

Governance is usually interpreted as consequence of changes in society that challenge the modern state, being: deregulation of financial markets that question the abilities of governments to steer their economy; rising assertiveness of regions and cities; and cohesive policy networks that challenge the ability of the state to govern hierarchically and impose its will on society (Pierre 2000, 1)

A large number of definitions are to be found in the literature, Rhodes (1996, 652-3) e.g. defines governance as “a change in the meaning of government, referring to a new process of governing; or a changed condition of ordered rule; or the new method by which society is governed”, Kooiman (1993, 2) writes about “the patterns that emerge from governing activities of social, political and administrative actors” and Yee (2004, 477) calls all “new governing activities that do not occur solely through governments” new modes of governance.

Within the governance debate, two strands can be traced back. A more state centred one which is rooted in the older concept of “steering” and a wider one, that basically refers to sustaining co-ordination among a wide variety of actors with different purposes and objectives such as political actors and institutions, civil society, corporate interest and trans-national organizations (Pierre 2000, 3).

The main question in the first strand is about the capacities of central government to solve collective problems under the condition of major changes in its environment. Peters labels it the “old governance” approach. The normative assumptions here are that the state is the only legitimate locus to solve societal problems, and that the society is incapable of going beyond self-interested outcomes and thus the state is necessary to defend the public interest. “The basic argument, therefore, is that the state and old governance are necessary to produce better outcomes from social and political activity than would otherwise be possible (Peters 2000, 40). Thus, the main analytical question in this first approach is to what extent the state still has the political and institutional capacities to steer and how the role of the state relates to other influential actors (Pierre 2000, 3). In general, this approach suffers from an implicit assumption that politics is basically about collective problem-solving (“*Problemlösungsbias*”), but not about power (Mayntz 2005).

The second approach, often called “modern governance” or “new governance”, takes a more society-centred perspective and poses questions about how the centre of government interacts with society to reach mutually acceptable decisions. The focus

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<sup>1</sup> Governance is a common term in the English language. End of the 1990s a certain meaning was ascribed to it in the field of science though which also lead to the transfer of the term into other languages.

is on different forms of co-ordination and self-governance as such. According to this, Rhodes (1997: 53) defines governance as a form of coordination other than hierarchical steering, but especially refers to self-organizing, inter-organisation networks. Similarly, Héritier (2002: 3) states that “governance implies that private actors are involved in decision-making in order to provide common goods and that non-hierarchical means of guidance are employed”. The common denominator in the various definitions of governance under this approach is that it refers to the process through which public and private actions and resources are coordinated to solve collective problems. Societal actors and their resources manifesting in networks, communities or other form of interest organization are regarded as an asset for governance contributing to the formulation and implementation of policies (Peters 2001: 41). The normative element in this approach is that society is able to manage its own affairs and solve collective problems without much guidance from the state. Accordingly, social capital as it has been defined by Putnam (2000) is argued to be necessary for good and democratic governance.

To summarize, the literature on (new) governance is about *shifting* roles of government as a reaction to fundamental changes in its economic, political, and societal environment, not just about *shrinking* roles of government (Kooiman 2001: 139). The analytical perspective has shifted from steering capacities of the government to modes of interaction between state and society. And furthermore, the reasoning on collective problem-solving has been extended with questions about the legitimacy of governance processes. What has been previously regarded as roles and tasks for the government are in the governance debate interpreted as more common, societal problems that can be solved by political actors and institutions, but also by other actors.

As regards content, Benz and Papadopoulos (2006, 2-3) describe six points that picture the main components of governance regarding structures, actors and modes of policy making:

- Governance implies a **plurality of decision centres**, between which no clear hierarchy can be detected. Governance structures can be embedded in formal hierarchy; conflicts between social groups, organizations and individuals are expected to be regulated in networks though, which consist of relatively stable relationships between autonomous organizations and actors.
- **Boundaries** are defined in more functional and less territorial terms; they are also fluid concerning inclusion of actors and effects of decisions.
- **Actors** are experts, public actors (government officials and state administrators) and representatives of private interests; elected officials are less important.
- The issues and preferences are defined by **collective actors** who are represented by individual actors in the decision-making processes and networks. Corporate actors play an important role in governance.
- Governance includes a mixture of different modes of control and coordination. Mutual adjustment in **processes of negotiation** predominate, although unilateral decisions can happen; While organizations and collective actors interact by competition and cooperation, they are at the same time, when

being a member of a network, expected to demonstrate an inclination to compromise and possibly also a will to learn from each other.

- Usually governance leads to **less formal decision making**, within structures that are not part of the official institutions of representative democracy and that are mostly opaque to the public.

Although governance is sometimes referred to as “governance without government”, Benz and Papadoupoulos point out that political institutions are still relevant for understanding governance, since the institutional framework often shapes power relations, defines who is included and who not and guides interactions of actors. Furthermore institutional rules of collective entities restrain their representatives in networks and the dynamics of governance is rooted in the interplay between formal and informal processes. (Benz et al. 2006, 3)

The extensive theoretical discussions connected to “governance” have not entirely clarified its meaning. (see Jordan et al. 2005, 477) Nevertheless, governance calls attention to specific changes of the state and of society, which no other term grasps. In GoFOR, the definition of “new modes of governance” was rather left open; following Benz et al. (2007, 15-16), governance was basically understood as concept that allows a certain point of view on modes of coordination between interdependent societal actors.

The GoFOR project is to be seen as contribution to the empirical testing of “new modes of governance” which is called for by several scientists. (see e.g. Jordan et al. 2005, 477) The analyses were carried out along several elements of governance that were derived from previous work in the field of nature policy. They provided the basic guideline for the empirical work and also for theoretical thoughts and conclusions.

## 2 GoFOR approach: conceptual framework and methodology

Hogl, K., R. Nordbeck, E. Nußbauer and M. Pregernig

### 2.1.1 Introduction to the conceptual framework and methodology

The main goal of GoFOR was **to assess evolving practices of new modes of governance in Europe**. Considering this, the nature and preconditions of the research field, a multi-case study approach was chosen<sup>2</sup>; According to Yin (1994), a case study approach is advisable when “how” or “why” questions are posed, when the investigator has little control over events and when the research focus is on contemporary phenomena within some real-life context” (Yin 1994,13). Since the GoFOR project perfectly meets these criteria the design of the GoFOR project, as multi case study research project with governance processes as “units of analysis”, seemed appropriate.

This basic methodological decision was supplemented with a **conceptual framework** which was developed in the initial phase of the project. A first and foremost challenge was thereby to operationalise the concept of “governance”. As discussed in the previous chapter, governance and new modes of governance have become a catchword in both politics and science over the past years. Nevertheless, the concept of governance is still evolving; and in forest policy and adjacent fields, the issue and the main policy actors’ assumptions, preferences and policy positions concerning new modes of governance have only been poorly explored so far. In order to grasp the multi-actor and multi-level negotiation processes that revolve around governance processes in forestry politics, the terms need to be clarified. The problems lie thereby on two levels, the lack of a uniform theory of governance and the lack of clear definitions of governance. The issue of “governance theory” was already addressed in chapter one. The way the project handled the lack of clear definitions and operationalised “governance” is, amongst others, subject of this chapter.

The conceptual framework aims at operationalising “governance” by focusing on certain aspects which are usually associated with the overall concept. Some basis for this operationalisation was provided by the COST-Action E19 “*National Forest Programmes in a European Context*”, in which a first attempt to conceptualise the main elements of modern governance in the field of forest policy was undertaken: e.g. participatory approaches (Appelstrand 2002), inter-sectoral co-ordination (Hogl 2002a and 2002b) and adaptive-iterative approaches (Barstad 2002). However, as COST-Action E19 was not a research programme which allowed comprehensive research work, the empirical input was rather limited to theory-based contributions, conceptual clarification and narrative data. A broad conceptual framework for assessing new modes of governance was still lacking.

Nevertheless, building on the foundations laid by the work of COST-Action E19 (cf. Schmithüsen and Zimmermann 2002, Glück and Humphreys 2002) the GoFOR project developed a conceptual framework to assess existing and evolving practices of new modes of governance which was subsequently applied to cases of

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<sup>2</sup> For an extensive discussion on how to define a case see Ragin/Becker (1992)

governance process from the fields of forest policy, nature protection policy, and regional developments policy in 10 European countries.

The complexity of multi-actors and multi-levels governance processes (iii) was taken into account by assessing “governance processes” in a case study research design. The GoFOR case studies are therefore not country or sector reports, but examples of concrete policy processes, in which “new modes of governance” or certain elements thereof were applied or meant to be applied. Hence, the GoFOR project itself can also be seen as an attempt to further clarify the manifestation of “governance” practices as found in forest policy and the adjacent policy domains.

Empirically the research basically followed three lines of inquiry (cf. Eberlein and Kerwer 2002, Sanderson 2002):

### *I. Analysis of programmatic policy statements*

The first line of inquiry sought to assess the salience of new modes of governance and its constituting elements on the basis of the strategic and programmatic role they play in the repertoire of political institutions and policy actors. Empirically these roles were determined by investigating programmatic policy statements such as White Papers and other strategy documents, position papers, general procedural guidelines for governance processes (such as NFPs), but also the more programmatic parts of legislative texts, subsidy schemes and the like. Programmatic policy statements were seen as promising to be useful by providing a straightforward image of the current political compromises on the meaning and specific materialization of new modes of governance and its constituting elements in a given policy arena.

### *II. Analysis of practices of governance*

GoFOR did not only look at the rhetoric about governance but also and primarily at current and evolving practices of governance. The term “practice” refers, on the one hand, to *policy processes* (e.g., the formulation of an NFP, the planning of a national park, the formulation and implementation of anti-corruption policies), but also to the *policy outputs* (such as new policy programmes or procedural and institutional reforms) and, to some extent, also to *policy impacts and outcomes*. However, the focus of our empirical work was on the two first-mentioned categories of “effects”, simply because most of the governance policy processes which were analysed are not yet advanced enough to allow drawing empirically-based conclusions as regards to their effects in the bio-physical world, e.g. “in the forests”.

### *III. Assessment of theoretical approaches*


The clarification and operationalisation of new modes of governance and its constituting elements was not only build on empirical evidence (i.e., programmatic statements and practices of policy makers) but the potential of new governance was also assessed in the light of *theoretical approaches and concepts*. Given the variety of procedural elements of governance the development of a conceptual framework had to rely on a multi-theory approach. Actually the elaboration of theory oriented, conceptual input papers by the lead and co-lead teams served to integrate the theoretical lenses into the case study research.

For clarifying the necessary work-steps, the main objective of the GoFOR project, i.e. **to assess evolving practices of new modes of governance as a basis for policy relevant conclusions**, was broken down to the following sub-objectives:

1. development of a sound conceptual framework and methodologies for the evaluation of evolving practices of new modes of governance in forest policy
2. elaboration of an enlarged set of criteria that operationalise the concept of “new modes of governance” and its constituting elements in European forest policy
3. exploration of the main policy actors’ assumptions, preferences and policy positions with regard to new modes of governance and of the contextual factors (socio-economic, political, ecological) that mediate the practices of new modes of governance and their effectiveness
4. overview of existing practices of new governance, identification of successful models, and critical evaluation of the transferability of such models to other political contexts
5. deduction of policy relevant conclusions and recommendations with regard to procedural and institutional approaches for the implementation of new modes of governance to promote sustainable forest management in Europe.

Figure 1 depicts the overall conceptual framework of the GoFOR project, presents the main concepts which were subject to the cases studies, and describes three analytical steps that had to be taken, in order to tackle the sub-objectives as described above.

**Figure 1: The general conceptual framework**




Actually, the overall approach comprised 5 steps (for 1-3 see also Figure 1):

1. Clarification and operationalisation of new modes of governance
2. Exploration of the broader political context
3. Assessment of the scope and effectiveness of new modes of governance
4. Cross-national and cross-sectoral comparisons
5. Overall synthesis

These steps are not neatly separated entities which have to be taken in a chronological sequence. Rather they were seen as underlying guidelines. Steps 1-3 e.g., were actually run through several times along the research process. As relates to the content and the actual time line, the research process can be described as one of recurring adaptation, interrelation and evolution of three parallel strands. The first being the general theory on governance, the second the development of a common methodological basis and a common research frame for GoFOR (Input Papers, Terms of Reference, Comparative Frame), and the third strand as having been the actual process of carrying out the case studies, from starting with detecting possible cases up to the final reports on 19 fully fledged case studies (see Figure 2).

**Figure 2: GoFOR Work packages: Sequence and interrelation of steps along the research design**





## **1<sup>st</sup> Step: Clarification and operationalisation of new modes of governance (cf. Figure 1)**

At the beginning of the process it was quite obvious, that it was necessary to clarify the definition of governance and its constituting elements in order to have a common ground from which the next steps could be taken, and to finally allow comparing and synthesizing findings from different case studies as far as possible. At the same time the research design emphasized that the conceptual framework should not be too rigid or too narrowly defined in order to stay open not only towards changes in the still evolving concept of governance but also to differences in context of the various national case studies to be done. In any case, one of the major challenges throughout the project was to search for an appropriate balance between conceptual openness and a sufficiently defined common basis that also promises to allow the appliance of a comparative perspective and a synthesis across cases.

The elements of new modes of governance which were meant to be focused on in the GoFOR project – i.e. participatory approaches, inter-sectoral and multi-level coordination, adaptive and iterative policy-making and the role of accountable expertise – were generally acknowledged, both in the political arena (cf. EC White Paper on European Governance; MCPFE Approach to National Forest Programmes in Europe) and in the scientific realm (Powell 1996, Glück et al. 2003); Nevertheless they were interpreted quite differently in various contexts in practice.

From the very start of the project, country teams (lead- and co-lead partners) were assigned to lead the conceptual work on one of the governance elements, as defined in the research framework: Participation, Multi-Level Coordination, Inter-Sectoral Coordination, Accountable Expertise and Adaptive and Iterative approaches. The “lead teams” started by elaborating conceptual input papers on the respective element. These input papers were broadly discussed among all partners within the consortium, both online (Bulletin Board) as well as in workshops, and further refined and elaborated by the respective lead teams, and served as the conceptual basis for drawing up terms of reference for the pre-assessment of potential cases later on.

## **2<sup>nd</sup> Step: Exploration of the broader political context (cf. Figure 1)**

Both programmatic policy statements and the evolving practices of new modes of governance cannot be appropriately described and understood if the analysis is not focussed on the broader political environment. A comprehensive analytical framework must not only take into consideration (a) the main policy actors, their interests, resources, strategies and actions, but also (b) the wider political context in which a respective governance process takes place. (see the dotted arrows in Figure 1)

It goes without saying, that the policy actors in the relevant fields significantly determine the practices of governance. Therefore the assumptions, preferences and policy positions of the **main policy actors** were systematically analysed in order to learn about their expectations concerning as to how and why the various practices of governance work.

Furthermore, new modes of governance are not only determined by the assumptions, preferences and activities of the actors which are directly involved, but also by **contextual and environmental factors** that mediate the evolvement and effectiveness of different practices of governance (Rowe and Frewer 2000). Thus, the influence of ecological, socio-economic and political factors such as, for example,

different systems of interest representation, needed to be taken into account as well when evaluating practices of new modes of governance.

The first two steps of analysis lead to an **enlarged set of criteria** that operationalised the concept of new modes of governance for the GoFOR project. Practically, these criteria were reflected in form of the Terms of Reference for the empirical assessments

In the course of conceptual clarifications it was pointed out that the five constituting elements of governance, as defined in the research proposal, have to be regarded as a minimum set of elements of governance, as a common starting point which should, however, be open for additional elements. In addition, it became quite clear that the five elements can not be seen and analysed separately, but have to be seen and analysed as aspects of overall governance arrangements, since they are strongly interlinked in practice. Furthermore, in the course of the project the issue of “effects” of the governance processes turned out to be another major focus for empirical analysis, and was addressed further focused on, both conceptually (for providing common ground) and empirically in the empirical assessments.

Finally, it should be emphasised that the first two steps of the GoFOR research design – as assumed from the very beginning – further evolved in parallel to the other work steps, largely parallel throughout the whole project, up to the formulation of a comparative framework by mid 2007. That is, both the conceptual work as well as the empirical analysis done by individual GoFOR partners was cross-fertilized by research work of the overall project consortium almost throughout the project duration.

### **3<sup>rd</sup> Step: Assessment of the scope and effectiveness of new modes of governance (cf. Figure 1)**

Based on the amended set of criteria (ToR for Main Assessment) and the improved understanding about the contextual factors that shape practices of governance, the project turned to the case study research. The case studies were conducted in order to **assess** the actual manifestation, the characteristics and effects of governance processes, with a focus on the aspects depicted above (see Figure 1). The case study research was conducted in a two-step approach (see Figure 2).

#### Selection of potential cases for pre-assessment

As a first step, potential cases had to be detected. At the kick off meeting in Vienna (February 2005) the partners were asked to bring forward proposals for possible case studies and to portray these case proposals along the following **criteria for the selection of case studies**:

- *Policy fields*: According to the research contract a number of case studies had to be done in the field of forest policy, in particular the concept of “National Forest Programmes” had to receive attention. Anyhow, the project contract also asked for looked at “adjacent” sectors in order to draw lessons from policy-making processes, which apply similar governance principles and approaches.

- *Scope of policy issue:* The policy issues to be selected should be issues lasting at least a few years in order to promise rich empirical materials for analysis. It was stressed that selecting cases with a longer time scope would usually be more favourable for analyses than processes having only little “historical background” and development and/or probable changes in characteristics.
- *Level of government:* The GoFOR project was mainly aimed at analyzing national level policy making (as opposed to local or international). However, sub-national processes were also considered as providing analytically fruitful cases, in particular if they were expected to provide process links to national level policy making. Since GoFOR was also interested in the implementation of policies, quite a lot of document analyses and interviews had to be done also on regional and even on local level processes.
- *Stage of implementation:* Governance processes could still be in the stage of formulation or already in the stage of implementation or even evaluation. Both types of processes were considered relevant. However, the selection of case studies was aimed at achieving a picture as comprehensive as possible, in terms of the stages of the policy cycle.
- *Analytical contributions to all or at least some of the constituting elements:* This criterion addresses the question on in how far a specific policy process contributes to the understanding of a specific constituting element? (e.g., processes with and without multi-level governance; processes with different forms of participation etc.). The goal was that the overall set of cases to be finally selected for the main assessment promises to provide sufficient empirical insights on all the governance elements as defined in the conceptual framework (see Figure 1).
- *Available research:* For some governance processes previous research (done by GoFOR team members themselves or by other researchers) was available. The assumed advantage of choosing such “well-researched” processes was that existing research might provide a good basis to start from.
- *Process change:* Cases which provide evidence of significant changes in processes were seen as particularly promising from an analytical point of view. Analysing changes over time in terms of the use/presence of new modes of governance should allow to formulate hypotheses or even to draw conclusions as regards triggers, barriers, effects, etc., i.e. as regards cause-and-effect relationships inherent in the governance processes analysed.
- *Policy change:* From a similar analytical perspective, cases that promised to show some change in policies were also considered “potentially rich cases”, since they promise to allow for analysing “how and why dominant policy patterns might have changed”.
- *Not just Strategy processes:* In particular in forest policy science, scholars had until then very much concentrated their research on “new modes of governance” on “strategy processes” (e.g. national forest programmes). It was assumed though, that strategy processes are just one category of governance processes and that GoFOR should deliberately avoid taking a too narrow analytical focus by emphasising this type of processes.

The goal was to elaborate a list of cases for the pre-assessment which promises to detect governance processes that (i) allow to derive rich empirical data as regards the leading research questions, (ii) sets some focus on cases from the field of forest policy while (iii) at the same time promises to allow drawing lessons from adjacent policy fields.

Based on the above mentioned criteria possible cases were discussed in depth and selected to be researched in the run-up to the pre-assessment. In a first exploratory round, this broader range of possible cases was probed, on the basis of a few exploratory interviews with key actors, e.g. within the national GoFOR project advisory groups, and exploratory document analysis and research reports (Halfman & Hoppe 2004: 16). Additionally the case selection was coordinated across the partner countries in order to get a well-balanced, analytically fruitful set of case studies.

Based on the result from this exploratory phase the following list of 24 cases were selected for the pre-assessment, which aimed at gaining deeper insight into the cases as a basis for the final selection of the “sample” of cases. This Table 1 also provides an overview on the case characteristics along the above mentioned criteria.

**Table 1: List of cases for pre-assessment and summary of pre-assessment findings relating to criteria for the selection of cases**

Country	Case Title	Policy field	Level of government	Stage of implementation	Research available	Participation	Inter-sectoral	Multi-Level Co-ordination	Long-term iterative	Accountable expertise	Effects	
											Process changes	Policy changes
AUT	Forest Dialogue	Forest	National	NFP adopted Dec 2005	Limited	++	+	+	0	+	Yes	No
	Biodiversity Strategy	Nature Conservation	National	Implem. since 1998	Limited	0	+	+/0	0	+	Minor	No
	Sustainability Strategy	Sustainable Development	National	Implem. since 2002	Several studies	++	+	++	++	+	Yes	Yes
DK	National Park Pilot Projects	Nature Conservation	National	Implem. since 2003	Broad range of studies	++	+	+	0	+		
	Natura 2000	Nature Conservation	EU + National + Regional	Implem. since 1994	Limited	+	+	++	0	++		
ESP	Regional Forest Plan Catalonia	Forest	Regional + National	Approval of RFP planned end of 2005	Own research	++	+	+	+	+	N/A	Yes
	Natura 2000 in Catalonia	Nature Conservation	EU + National + Regional	Implem. since 1994	Very limited	+	+	++	0	++		
FRA	Territorial Forestry Charters	Forest	National + Regional	Implem. since 2001	Own research	+	+/0	+	+	+	Yes	Yes
	Relief Plan Vosges	Forest	National + Regional	Implem. since 2000	N/A	+	0	++	0	+		
GER	Integrated Rural Development	Rural Development + Forest	EU + National + Provincial	(Implem.)	Own research	+	++	0	+	+	Yes	Yes
	Leader+	Rural Development	EU + National + Provincial	Implem. since 2001	Own research	++	++	++	+	++	Yes	Yes

Country	Case Title	Policy field	Level of government	Stage of implementation	Research available	Participation	Inter-sectoral	Multi-Level Co-ordination	Long-term iterative	Accountable Expertise	Effects	Policy changes
											Process changes	Policy changes
GER	Regionen Aktiv	Rural Development	National + Provincial	Implem. since 2002	Own research	++	++	++	++	++		
	GAK	Rural Development + Agriculture	National + Provincial	Implem. since 2004	-	0	0	+	0	0		
GRE	National Park Reserve Policy	Nature Conservation + Forest	National	Implem. since 1992	Own research	+	+	+	0/+	+	Yes	Yes
	Forest Fire Management	Forest	National	Implem. since 1998	Limited	0	+	+	0	+	No	Yes
HUN	NFP	Forest	National	Plan adopted 2004, Impl. 2006	Own research	++	+	0/+	+	++	Minor	Yes
	National Rural Development Plan	Rural Development + (Forest)	National	Implem. since 2004	-	0/+	0/+	+	+	+	N/A	Yes
NL	Nature for People	Nature Conservation + Forest	National	Implem. since 2000	Own research	+	++	+	+	+	Partial	N/A
	Groene Woud	Nature Conservation	Provincial + National	Implem. since 1995	-	++	+	++	+	+		
	Utrechtse Heuvelrug	Nature Conservation	Provincial + National	Implem. since 1993	-	++	+	+	0/+	+		Yes
NOR	"Shadow" NFP	Forest	National	Implem. since 1999	Studies + Own research	++	0/+	++	+	+	Yes	Yes
	Living Forests Project	Forest	National	Finnished 1995-1998	Various studies	+	+	+	0/+	0		
ROM	Sustainability of Private Forestry	Forest	National	Implem. since 2004	Limited	0	++	0/+	0/+	0	Yes	Yes
	Policy against Corruption in Forestry	Forest + General	National + Local	Implem. since 2003	Limited	0/+	+	+	0	0	Yes	Yes

Legend: ++ ... plays an important role; + ... plays a role; 0 ... plays a minor/no role

### Development of Terms of Reference for Pre-assessment

Alongside the process of the case selection, the lead teams elaborated conceptual input papers on their respective governance elements (see above). These papers served as a basis for developing the Terms of Reference for the pre-assessment studies in a common effort of the consortium.

The **ToR** guided the empirical work carried out in the pre-assessment phase. The ToR outlined basic methodological questions such as the appropriate depth of pre-assessments and survey methodologies, how results had to be synthesised and reported, and, at its core, the ToR described the research questions to be addressed in terms of the criteria that describe the manifestation of the governance processes to be studied.

The resultant pre-assessment reports were presented and discussed at the third workshop meeting in Hurdal/Norway in February 2006. Based on the criteria described above and on the insights gained from the pre-assessment the following 19 cases were finally selected for the main assessment (see Table 2).

**Table 2: List of cases for the Main assessment arranged in thematic clusters**

<b>Thematic cluster</b>	<b>Case title</b>	<b>Acronym</b>	<b>Country</b>
<b>Forest policy</b> (incl. National Forest Programmes, NFPs)	Territorial Forest Charters in France	FR-CFT	France
	Relief Plan for Forests in France	FR-RPF	France
	Anti-corruption policies in Romania	ROM-ACP	Romania
	The Living Forests Project	NOR-LF	Norway
	Austrian Forest Dialogue	AT-AFD	Austria
	National Forest Programme Hungary	HUN-NFP	Hungary
	Forest Policy General Plan of Catalonia	ESP-FPGP	Spain
<b>Biodiversity and nature conservation</b>	Austrian Implementation Strategy for the Convention on Biological Diversity	AT-BS	Austria
	Implementation of the Habitats Directive in Denmark	DEN-HD	Denmark
	National Park Pilot Projects in Denmark	DEN-NPP	Denmark
	Implementation of Acquis Communautaire in Nature Protection Policies in Romania	ROM-NAT	Romania
	New modes of governance for protected areas through Management Agencies in Greece	GR-MA	Greece
	Utrechtse Heuvelrug	NL-UH	The Netherlands
	Groene Woud	NL-GW	The Netherlands
	Nature for People, People for Nature	NL-NPPN	The Netherlands
<b>Rural development policies</b>	Integrated Rural Development Policy in Germany	GER-IRD	Germany
	GAK - Joint Task "Improvement of Agricultural Structures and Coastal Protection"	GER-GAK	Germany
	LEADER+ – EU pilot programme for the advancement of rural development	GER-L+	Germany
	REGIONEN AKTIV – National pilot programme for the advancement of rural development	GER-RA	Germany

### Terms of Reference for the Main Assessment

Building on the experiences gained in the course of the pre-assessments as regards the strength and weaknesses of the ToR, they were refined and amended for guiding the subsequent main assessment on the selected case studies.

Furthermore, a workshop meeting in summer 2006 was dedicated mainly to the discussion of the ongoing research in terms of experiences with the methodology and the research question as described by the common ToR. The aim of this interim step was to co-ordinate on corrective measures, where necessary. This eventually led to another revision of the Terms of Reference.

Half a year later, at the workshop meeting in Budapest, 19 draft main assessment reports were presented and examined thoroughly. Insights and open questions to the case study authors were subsequently taken up and incorporated in the main assessment reports, which were finally delivered in summer 2007. These comprehensive main assessment reports provided the basis for the next step along the overall research design:

### **4<sup>th</sup> Step: Cross-national and cross-sectoral comparisons**

Finally, the main results of the main assessments should be synthesised and described from a comparative perspective. This report, in particular chapter 4, constitutes the outcome of this effort.

### Comparative Framework

In order to prepare the comparisons methodologically a Comparative Framework (CF) had to be elaborated. This was done in a three-step approach:

First, the lead and co-lead teams examined the main case study reports with a focus on their respective governance elements, to derive the research questions for the comparative phase of GoFOR, that is:

- (i) *overarching* analytical questions and
- (ii) interesting “*partial*” analytical questions that only apply to a subset of GoFOR case studies.

These analytical questions for the CF had to fulfil the following two prerequisites:

- (a) There must be substantial evidence available to answer those questions in all or at least a number of GoFOR case studies
- (b) Research questions have to be scientifically interesting and “bold”. The Criteria for “boldness” has been whether an analytical question could be apt to make the core of a scientific publication (journal publication or book chapter).

In order to demonstrate that an analytical question can be addressed in at least some GoFOR case studies, lead teams not only had to formulate research *questions* for the CF but had to provide the *examples* of how and which cases might be relevant to address these questions.

In a second step, a draft CF was elaborate by the co-ordinators On the basis of this input of the lead teams. This draft CF was then sent to all cases study authors. In a third step, case study authors had to verify, correct and amend the lead-teams’ interpretation of their respective case reports, and to report back on the research



questions raised in the draft CF. The feedback by case authors was summarised by the lead teams and finally presented and discussed in-depth at the final workshop meeting in August 2007.

This overall approach provided a sound and cross-verified empirical basis for the final CF which subsequently served the lead teams to elaborate the comparative chapters as outlined in this deliverable (D12).

### **Step 5: Overall synthesis**

The extensive characterization and theory-based evaluation of alternative governance approaches allowed to judge as to whether successful models in one country ("*best practices*") can be applied in other countries as well, whether country-specific conditions impede the simple transfer of a specific model, and what modifications would be necessary to take into account cultural peculiarities. Eventually, it was possible to provide an overall view of the existing models and to explain in what circumstances a specific model is adequate and where its limits of application are.

So finally, the knowledge gained in the conceptual clarifications, the exploration of political influences, the empirical and theoretical evaluations, and the cross-comparisons were drawn together to come up with ***policy relevant conclusions and recommendations*** with regard to procedural and institutional approaches for the implementation of new modes of governance to promote sustainable forest management in Europe.

### **2.1.2 Methods applied in case study research**

As regards methods, both quantitative and qualitative techniques were applied. However, the main emphasis was on qualitative analyses of documents and transcripts of qualitative interviews.

In some of case studies, further methods were successfully applied to collect complementary data such as participatory observations (Hungarian NFP process, Austrian Forest Dialogue), postal surveys (Norwegian case) and telephone interviews (Greek case).

#### **Document analysis**

For a content analysis of documents, three main groups of different sources were used in the case study research:

- General documents about the field at hand
- Documents out of the respective policy process (minutes, reports, official documents, speeches, stakeholder statement and position papers, e.g.)
- Documents about the respective policy process prepared by someone external to the process (evaluations, research reports, etc.)

Basically, a large amount of documents was accessible in all cases, providing a fruitful empirical basis and background materials to e.g. complement and validate interview results or data collected in the course of participatory observation. In general, the attitudes of organisations, persons and administrations towards the project were quite positive. Most of the interviewees showed a high interest in the

study subject and in the expected results. (e.g. Austria, France, Germany, Netherlands, Romania) Accordingly, most of the actors that were contacted in the course of the empirical research were willingly providing relevant documents.

Document analysis was not only used to describe and analyse the process, but also to prepare for the second main source of the case studies: the interviews.

As regards the analysis of documents the case study authors applied different approaches, also depending on the “nature” of the documents. On the one hand, documents were often used as “background materials”, providing introduction to the research field, the actors involved etc., and as a source of validating materials from other sources. On the other hand documents were partly analysed in just as systematically as the interview transcripts (see below), in particular when the documents had to be as policy statements of actors in the governance processes which had been the subject of research.

## Interviews

In all of the case studies qualitative interviews were carried out with a variety of stakeholders, administrative personnel, politicians and other involved persons.<sup>3</sup>

Methodologically the researchers followed the principles of interviewing and analysis as outlined in the common Terms of Reference:

- The interviews were done in a semi structured format using interview guidelines that were elaborated based on the questions as formulated in the ToR and pre-information derived from document analyses. Interviewers were free to adapt the order and focus of questions to the context of the respective case and interviewees. The basic idea was to create a positive, open atmosphere so that the interviewee would speak as freely as possible about his experiences, perceptions, judgements etc.
- Most interviews were tape recorded and transcribed afterwards. Only a few interview partners opposed to tape record their statements Three partners (France, Hungary, Romania) have chosen not to tape record the interviews because in their experience this would have compromised the goal of developing an open and trustful interview atmosphere. The Greek team consciously turned off the tape recorder at the end of the “official” part of the interviews for allowing some time to speak more freely about more sensitive topics. Also in Spain some important information was provided “off the record” only. Such “additional” information turned out to be helpful for understanding certain aspects of a given case, even though – by definition – off record information can not be used for formal analysis procedures and reports.
- It has proven worthwhile to carry out interviews by teams of two. By doing so one researcher was able to concentrate on the conversation while the other could concentrate on taking notes and to “check off” questions of the interview guide. Apart from that, the experience was that contribution of two interviewers to the conversation as well as cross check of interview notes helped to increase the amount and the quality of information that was derived from the interviews.

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<sup>3</sup> The appropriate mode of selecting interview partners is a case specific issue. It is described in more detail in the respective main assessment reports (see D10). In average, 17 persons were interviewed per case study (see Table 3).

- Interviews were conducted by the researchers themselves. Since the interviewers had to be very familiar both with the GoFOR research design (ToR) and the governance processes under study, it was not advisable to employ external personnel. This also allowed using the interview guidelines as real “guideline” but not in terms of rigid frames, which is a precondition for successful qualitative interviewing of experts.
- Researchers conducted pre-assessment interviews and redrafted their interview guide according to the experiences gained from that. In some cases (e.g. the research on the Austrian Biodiversity Strategy) additional interviews were carried out at a very late stage of the research process, in order to clarify open questions which emerged from the analyses.

For transcribing and coding the data some partners used software, such as Express Scribe and MAXqda®, i.e. tools specifically designed for the systematic analysis of text materials. Other partners used standard office tools to organize and assess their materials systematically. The choice of software tools was left to the partners.

Table 3 provides an overview about the methods of data collection as applied in the case studies:

**Table 3: Methods of data collection and data analyses**

Cou ntry	number of interviews	interviewees	other sources	recording	transcription	software	filing	interpretation
AT	41 (22 AFD + 19 BD)	public administration NGOs Science at national and regional level	Attendance of team members in process meetings (Expert Modules, Round Tables), Official documents, Internal documents, Research reports, Written comments by stakeholders	Yes	Yes	Express Scribe, MAXqda®	CD and hard disks	
DK	23	public administration NGOs science	conference (with MP, administration, NGOs, media), newspaper articles, parliamentary documents, research reports	yes	yes		on PC	probably sometimes sensitive to wording, sometimes not
ESP	25	Public Administration Forest owners Industry NGOs Research & Universities	Documentation (Intermediate Reports, Meeting Reports, Forest Laws, Evaluations), Direct observation in workshops	Yes, in 2 cases remarks were given off the record	Yes, partly	Digital Voice Editor 2	Hard Disk	Using a four column table
FR	66	public administration NGOs Science at national, regional (3 representative regions) and local levels	scientific reports and progress reports, legal texts, publications in mass media	no, to keep atmosphere of trust & confidentiality	comprehensive and systematic note taking with questionnaire as kind of "form"	no	minutes in hard copy analytical tables on PC	classification per research question, per frequency and similarity/difference of the opinions

Cou ntry	number of interviews	interviewees	other sources	recording	transcription	software	filing	interpretation
GE	35	public administration NGOs science at national and regional level (selected regions)	internet, participatory observation during conferences	yes (digital)	partial (esp. key information and key expressions)	MaxQDA	audio and text files on PC	interpretative case study approach
GR	31 (+ 12 completed questionnaires)	management authorities Ministries regional administrators science local society	legal texts, official policy documents, formal policy positions, relevant publications and reports issued by relevant policy actors, research reports	yes, off-record discussion at the end (10-30 min)	yes	no	on PC	content analysis of each individual interview
HU	8	associations of forest owners the woodworking industry professional foresters	participatory observations, documentation	no	detailed notes	no	on PC	content analysis
NL	33 (5 NPPN + 14 UH + 14 GW)	provincial authorities national authorities NGOs local activists / experts science	formal policy documents, leaflets, brochures, minutes of project teams, advisory and steering committees, news paper articles, research studies	yes (digital), off-the-records notes only rarely used	yes (full), some transcripts sent back to interviewees	no, but colour coding in text along 4 dimensions of PAA plus keywords	on PC and CD	along dimensions of PAA
NOR	28	National Ministries Regional Administration Interest groups NGOs Consultants	written information, reports, newspapers and other media, evaluations, websites	Yes	Partially (key aspects)	NUDIST	Hard Disk, filing also thematically	Content analysis, focus on themes or arguments made

<b>Cou ntry</b>	<b>number of interviews</b>	<b>interviewees</b>	<b>other sources</b>	<b>recording</b>	<b>transcription</b>	<b>software</b>	<b>filing</b>	<b>interpretation</b>
RO	23	public administration NGOs science	newspapers, brochures, internet, official policy documents, position papers, press briefings, evaluation studies, participation in meetings	yes (digital) or paper notes (last more appropriate for corruption case); not even notes in 1 interview	yes (except “context conversation” ) with transcripts sent back to interviewees	no	on PC	interpretation of discourse in context; search for common features in interviews; interpretation only in early phase

### 3 GoFOR case studies

The empirical evidence for this synthesis is based on the main assessment cases study reports which relate to three broad and rich thematic fields: first, biodiversity and nature conservation, including all processes engaged in the implementation of the habitat directive (92/43/EEC) and generally the operationalisation of nature conservation policies. Second, forest policy, including a number of case study reports that operate within the forestry field and thirdly, rural development policies, including a range of studies that aim at integrating development policies in the rural realm (Table 4).

**Table 4: Classification of governance case studies by policy field**

<b>Policy field</b>	<b>Case study</b>
Nature conservation	AT-BS, DK-HD, DK-NPP, GR-MA, NL-NfP, ROM-NAT
Forest policy	FR-CFT, FR-RPF, AT-AFD, HU-NFP, NOR-LF, SP-NFP, ROM-COR
Rural development	GER-IRD, GER-RA, GER-L+, GER-GAK, NL-GW, NL-UH,

Chapter 3 briefly describes the governance processes that have been analysed in GoFOR, case by case. These case descriptions do not go into the details but emphasise the cases' main characteristics to provide the basis for the comparative analysis along the elements of governance, which is provided in Chapter 4.

The following Table provides brief characterizations of the case studies.

<b>Case title</b>	<b>Brief characterization</b>
Austrian Implementation Strategy for the Convention on Biological Diversity	national strategy process mainly driven by international obligations
Austrian Forest Dialogue	participatory and sector-integrated national strategy process
Implementation of the Habitats Directive in Denmark	national implementation of EU policy
National Park Pilot Projects in Denmark	participatory planning processes at regional level as non-binding input to policy formulation at national level
Territorial Forest Charters in France	participatory and sector-integrated strategic planning approach at the regional level
Relief Plan for Forests in France	<i>ad hoc</i> governmental assistance programme in the aftermath of devastating storms
Integrated Rural Development policies in Germany (with three embedded sub-cases): – LEADER+ – REGIONEN AKTIV – Joint Task “Improvement of Agricultural Structures and Coastal Protection” (GAK)	integration of new policy approach (regional governance) in three programs: – EU pilot programme for sustainable rural development – national pilot programme for sustainable rural development – mainstream funding instrument of agricultural policy
Restructuration of management agencies for protected areas in Greece	reorganization of administration and management of protected areas mainly driven by EU policies
National Forest Programme Hungary	participatory and sector-integrated national strategy process
Norwegian Living Forests Project	participatory and sector-integrated strategy process initiated and promoted by private actors
“Nature for People, People for Nature” program in the Netherland	formulation and implementation of strategic policy document
Nature policy in the Groene Woud area, NL	long-term policy development around nature conservation
Nature policy in the Utrechtse Heuvelrug area, NL	same as above
Anti-corruption policies in Romania	policy formulation and implementation driven by international obligations and pressures
Implementation of <i>Acquis Communautaire</i> in Nature Protection Policies in Romania	national implementation of EU policy
Forest Policy General Plan of Catalonia, Spain	participatory and sector-integrated regional strategy process

**Table 5:** Brief characterization of GoFOR case studies



## 3.1 Austrian Biodiversity Strategy

*Nordbeck, R. and M. Pregernig*

### 3.1.1 Introduction

The Austrian Biodiversity Strategy (BS) constitutes an example for a national strategic planning approach in the broader field of sustainability. The Austrian Biodiversity Strategy process has a history of more than ten years now. Following a year-long dialogue and negotiation process, the first biodiversity strategy was adopted by the Austrian Council of Ministers in 1998. The strategy was evaluated in a two-step procedure in 2001 and 2003. Based on that evaluation the strategy was revised and updated with the “Advanced Biodiversity Strategy” being adopted in 2005.

The Austrian BS process was mainly chosen to provide a contrasting governance case to the Austrian Forest Dialogue (see Chapter 3.2). The set of two processes was thought to give valuable insights into the conditions of success (or failure) of national strategies for sustainability in Austria and beyond.

### 3.1.2 Main characteristics of governance case

The main driving force for the initiation of the Austrian BS process stemmed from the international level with the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) requiring each country to develop a national biodiversity strategy.

Recognizing the divided formal responsibilities for biodiversity, with many key competencies, like e.g. nature conservation, lying not with the federal state but with the provinces, a *National Biodiversity Commission* (NBC) was set up as a policy coordination mechanism in 1996. The NBC is a multi-stakeholder body, including representatives of administrative departments (both federal ministries and provincial authorities), public and private interest groups, science, and NGOs. It is a predominantly informational body which has no authority to make politically binding decisions.

The formulation process for the first biodiversity strategy proceeded in several steps with drafts being sent out for comments by relevant stakeholders and new draft versions being prepared based on the comments received. The process provided rather limited opportunities for participation of interest groups and NGOs. Inter-ministerial coordination was also limited because Ministries other than those for environment and agriculture had little interest in being involved with the strategy. Furthermore, the process struggled with the complex allocation of competences within and across territorial levels.

The first strategy sets out general policy directions and guidance for the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity, combined with broad lines of action for specific problem areas. It is written mostly in a general, non-committal language including good, but rather unspecific intentions and objectives, with only few details about what should be achieved at what time. The strategy also states no responsibilities and makes no resources available for its implementation.

Soon after its adoption, the strategy was evaluated in a two-step procedure. The first evaluation study assessed to what degree the measures formulated in the strategy had already been implemented and by whom. The second evaluation study assessed

the strategy document itself. Based on the two evaluations, the Austrian BS was revised and updated. In this revision phase, the process has become more expert-driven. Both the updating of the strategy document as well as the formulation of an Action Plan on invasive alien species were commissioned to experts at the Federal Environmental Agency. After almost two years of discussions and negotiations, the “Advanced Biodiversity Strategy” was adopted by the NBC in July 2005.

In the second strategy, some of the most severe flaws of the first strategy could be cured. The revised strategy has a coherent structure and the individual chapters follow the same logic and do not differ substantially in style and length. Still, very few of the formulated goals and measures have been operationalised in measurable qualitative or quantitative terms. With that, it is still very hard to analyse the implementation of the strategy and to measure its effectiveness.

### 3.1.3 Major insights and conclusions

Without any doubt, the Austrian BS falls far behind an ideal-type strategic planning approach. Some of the problems faced are directly linked to the strategy process and the work of the NBC in general, whereas others are more structural problems the solution of which lies beyond the limited capacities of the NBC.

As regards *process*, the biodiversity strategy suffers from various problems, including limited public participation and outreach, the incapacity to integrate relevant economic sectors as well as barely effective procedures of coordination across multiple hierarchical levels. Positive aspects of the Austrian BS can be found more on the *informal* side. The NBC fulfilled important networking functions for its members, e.g. by providing scientists and representatives of interest groups with direct and easy access to ministerial officials. Furthermore, the biodiversity strategy played an agenda setting role with regard to topics related with the CBD and the biodiversity 2010 target. Last but not least, the biodiversity strategy and its targets have been used by environmental NGOs but also by public authorities as an argument to legitimise their actions and demands.

The underlying *structural* problems that the Austrian BS process is struggling with are manifold. The loss of biodiversity has not been perceived as an urgent policy problem in Austria and the strategy process didn't manage to improve the visibility of biodiversity concerns in any notable way. Both the NBC and the biodiversity strategy have low political weight. This situation is aggravated by the complex allocation of competencies between various federal ministries as well as between the federal state and the provinces creating an ample network of actors when it comes to the implementation of biodiversity-related policies in Austria, including a high number of possible veto players.

Altogether, the Austrian Biodiversity Strategy, up to now, can be viewed as not much more than a “work-to-rule exercise” initiated and driven mainly by international reporting obligations. The whole strategy process would have certainly benefited from a greater transparency, more actor involvement, and the possibility for real dialogue.

## **3.2 Austrian Forest Dialogue**

*Hogl, K. and E. Kvarda*

### **3.2.1 Introduction**

This case study deals with the elaboration of a 'National Forest Programme' (NFP) by means of the so-called 'Austrian Forest Dialogue' (AFD), an ongoing governance process at the national level. The Federal Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, Environment and Water Management (FMAFEW) launched the AFD in April 2003 taking into account basic procedural principles for the elaboration of a NFP as agreed in international commitments: e.g. stakeholder participation, and efforts towards inter-sectoral as well as multi-level coordination.

The case analysis covers the time span from the run-up phase to the AFD up to a first period of implementation (Summer 2007).

This case was chosen for analysis for three reasons: Firstly, the field of forest policy stands central in GoFOR and the AFD is currently the most prominent governance process in Austrian forest policy. Secondly, with its traditionally rather introverted policy style the Austrian forest policy sector, was seen as challenging "test case" as regards the effects of governance principles which call for broad process of deliberation and participation. Last but not least, the AFD was chosen for comparative analysis with the Austrian Biodiversity Strategy process, which partly took place in parallel to the AFD under the auspices of the very same ministry.

### **3.2.2 Main characteristics of governance case**

The main motivations for initiating the AFD have been i) external pressures induced by international commitments on NFPs and EU regulations, ii) political will to measure up to ongoing NFP processes in other European countries, iii) the hope for achieving more effective problem solving and implementation based on broad stakeholder consensus as well as iv) the aim to raise awareness and support for forest policy issues beyond the forest sector in a narrow sense. Ultimately, from 2002 onwards the NFP approach found growing support within the Forestry Department of the FMAFEW and growing acceptance among other key actors.

The key actor responsible for the procedural management and administration of the AFD was and is the FMAFEW. Two types of discussion and decision-making panels were established in the first formulation phase: a Round Table and Working Groups (WGs). The Round Table, chaired by the Minister (FMAFEW) acted as the main political decision-making body. About 40 representatives of forestry, economic, social and environmental interest groups, both governmental as well as non-state actors, participated in this body. Three thematically oriented WGs served as forums for expert discussion, for the search for common denominators and divergent positions and a balance of interests on more detailed topics. The WGs were focused on elaborating the textual content of the Forest Programme and the related Work Programme. Participants of WGs were invited both as experts and representatives of about 80 groups and organisations, ranging from public administrations, universities to all sorts of interest groups that have a stake in forest matters. Hence the process was characterised by participation of quite a broad range of organisations. However, beyond these collective actors, public awareness of the AFD process has been rather low, e.g. in terms of media coverage.

After about three years, the first 'Austrian Forest Programme' and a related 'Work Programme' were adopted by the Round Table in 2005. As a non-binding strategy document the Forest Programme shall provide guidance for decision-makers in forest policy. It describes the actual state of forest and forestry affairs (including trends, problems and challenges), it comprises guiding principles and forest policy goals and it sets of measures and defines indicators for measuring goal achievement.

The related Work Programme shall serve as the main implementation-tool. It lists 84 measures - primarily rather 'soft', informational ones - and also defines time frames for implementation as well as the actors who voluntarily took over responsibility for implementation. This Work Programme is not a static one, but is defined as a 'living document' to be revised and amended continuously, just as the related indicators. Further elaboration and monitoring of the Work Programme's implementation shall be done by a newly established institution, the so-called 'Forest Forum', which comprises the participants of the previous three thematic WGs.

As regards content the Work Programme mirrors the AFD-discussions: the measures cover a broad range of topic areas as regards economic, ecological and social interests on forests. However, core forest policy programmes have not specifically been subject to the AFD agenda as such, but have been decided upon beforehand (the forest law) or in parallel procedures (forestry subsidy scheme), mainly because of the traditional forest policy actors' preference to basically retain status quo.

In terms of 'effects', besides the outputs depicted above, some change in the key actors' behaviour has been observed in the course of the process, i.e. a significantly enhancement of the climate for dialogue between traditionally antagonistic groups. However, for the time being a number of new rather detailed initiatives have been taken, but no significant policy changes that are directly linked to the AFD process have been observed.

### **3.2.3 Major insights and conclusions**

This kind of participatory and inter-sectoral process was kind of new to the Austrian forest policy sector, traditionally characterised by close cooperation between forest owners' interest groups and the forest authorities. However, the AFD as a new mode of governance, basically turned out successful in its institutionalised effort for allowing a broader range of actors to become more effectively engaged in forest policy. As a result, the legitimacy of the process and its output rests on its participatory nature. A broad range of actors find their issues, contributions and positions represented in the output documents.

However, so far the AFD was less effective in terms of inter-sectoral and multi-level co-ordination, even though some achievements have been made on issues which cross sectoral and/or as territorial boundaries. Strategic behaviours of a number of actors, e.g. of the hunting and tourism associations as well as of some ministries/ministerial departments (in the fields of tourism and energy policy, e.g.), for preventing interference with their respective interest domains turned out as main barriers against more effective co-ordination. In some highly relevant subject areas, like nature conservation, landscape planning and hunting, also the distribution of legislative competencies between the federal and the *Länder* level remained a significant challenge for more effective coordination in this national level strategy process.

Altogether, for the time period analysed the ongoing AFD can be characterised as “process-oriented”, the main “innovation” lies in the nature of the strategy process itself which took up governance principles as predefined in international deliberations. As regards output, there was no major policy change induced, even though some of the measures which were adopted are new to the sector.

### 3.3 Danish National Park Process

*Boon, T.E., D.H. Lund and I. Nathan*

#### 3.3.1 Introduction

The National Park Pilot Process (NPP) was intended to identify options for establishing national parks in Denmark. The expected output was a non-binding input to policy formulation.

In 2003, the Minister of Environment (MoE) enquired counties and municipalities of six areas whether they were interested in hosting a pilot project. The Outdoor Council, an umbrella NGO for outdoor and environmental NGOs, entered the political arena, adding 2 ½ mio Euro to the project and entered into an agreement with the Minister of Environment regarding how to implement the pilot projects, and it was decided to support pilot projects in seven areas.

In the following phase (2003-2005), the MoE initiated the process by sketching out rough guidelines for the organisation of the pilot projects to the counties and municipalities. The pilot projects were to elaborate a report with recommendations on how to organise a prospective National park. Locally, the pilot projects were led by steering committees headed by (in most cases) mayors from the municipality assisted by the local state forest districts and with representatives from a broad range of organisations. At the national level a national advisory group was set up with members representing different Ministries, NGOs and the chairmen of the seven steering committees. The purpose of this committee was to assist in carrying out relevant investigations and to compile the reports from the seven pilot projects elaborating one final report to be submitted to the MoE. So far the process has resulted in the elaboration of a draft proposal for a National Park Act.

From the initiation and onwards, the Government rhetoric was dominated by wanting a voluntary approach, extensive participation by landowners and other local stakeholders, and an inter-sectoral solution. Along with a participatory approach, expert knowledge was attributed a significant role.

#### 3.3.2 Main characteristics of governance case

The NPP can be seen as rather **participatory** while at the same it was initiated and framed ‘from above’; altogether, it can best be characterised as a governance process induced and embraced by Government. The identification and appointment of the pilot project areas was a bilateral communication between the Minister of Environment and the mayors of the municipalities. If a municipality did not want to join, that area was omitted. From a local perspective this may be fair insofar as the mayors are elected representatives of the local population. But it also meant that possible areas of *national* interests were omitted without national stakeholders having a say in it.

Within this government induced process, the pilot projects took a bottom-up approach. In pilot project 'Kongernes Nordsjælland' the steering committee initiated the establishing of thematic groups which prepared a number of proposals which were brought up at a citizen summit for (what was intended as a socio-demographically representative) deliberating dialogue and voting procedure. There was a high degree of transparency and information, tending towards information overflow in the pilot projects.

The process managed to involve new stakeholders, notably the local mayors, who traditionally have not been involved in nature policy, since nature and agriculture was beyond the jurisdiction of the municipalities, until the Structural Reform in 2007. But the organisers of the process, the Forest and Nature Agency, found it difficult to mobilise the 'ordinary citizens' despite active efforts.

Experiences from pilot project 'Kongernes Nordsjælland' indicated that the NPP had problems dealing with minority viewpoints: The one main conflict was that agriculture wanted to restrict the national park area to already publicly owned areas, whereas the proposal that evolved from the steering committee included corridors on privately owned land. Agricultural stakeholders played a hesitant role in the process and left, at the end, proposing its own suggestion for demarcation.

There is tradition for involving interest groups from **different sectors** in decision-making in Denmark, yet the ISC was more formalised and deliberately emphasised in this process than formerly, and as a new thing, the local level was involved. Prior to the Structural Reform 2007, nature policies related to the national (MoE) and county level, and agricultural policies entirely to EU and the national level. By establishing a discussion at local level too, the 'column-like' character of the nature and agricultural sectors was partly dissolved. The monopoly of agriculture to determine how the country side should be managed was broken.

The degree of **multi-level governance** varies with the phase one looks at. Seen as a whole, the NPP was a top-down governed process. The pilot project phase was bottom-up with active involvement of local levels, but the pilot projects were evaluated by the national advisory group, and the parliamentary statement and draft Act on National parks was prepared by the National Forest and Nature Agency for the Minister of Environment. It appears that the decision-making power lies with the MoE, the National Forest and Nature Agency and the Outdoor Council.

There was a focus on the need to investigate specified topics, defined by the MoE/NFNA. Many **experts** participated from various research institutions, consultancy firms, counties and NFNA. In principle there was rich opportunity for contesting viewpoints. In practice, it was division of work within strictly limited time. The final expert reports were not included in the discussions for time reasons. Still, the new thing was that experts got closer to the public, i.e. experts were asked to report on their methods towards the broad public, possibly strengthening accountability.

A report about biodiversity came up in the middle of the process, showing that the chosen pilot projects were not optimal from a (insect) biodiversity perspective. This information was deliberately set aside by most stakeholders, even the Danish Nature Conservation Association.

The aim of the process was to decide if and how National parks should be established. So in that sense the process was part of an **adaptive, iterative planning process** (AIP), because this question was addressed at national, local and then again national level. There was a great degree of complexity and uncertainty, as

during the pilot project phase it was uncertain if pilot projects would ever be implemented. Fundamentally, though, the concept 'AIP' does not contribute much to our understanding of the process as it is not central to the case.

### 3.3.3 Major insights and conclusions

The NPP was initiated and framed 'from above', and can best be characterised as a governance process induced and meta-governed by Government. The process managed to involve new stakeholders, notably the local mayors, who traditionally have not been involved in nature policy, whereas the organisers of the process found it difficult to mobilise the 'ordinary citizens' despite active efforts. ISC was more formalised and deliberately emphasised in this process than formerly, and by establishing a discussion at local level too, the 'column-like' character of the nature and agricultural sectors was partly dissolved. Expertise was rhetorically considered important in the decision process, but apparently the expert reports did not have any significant impacts on the process.

## 3.4 Implementation of the Habitats Directive in Denmark

*Boon, T.E., D.H. Lund and I. Nathan*

### 3.4.1 Introduction

The Habitat Directive (HD) was adopted in the EEC (now EU) in 1992. It has subsequently been in the process of implementation, encompassing the following phases:

- 1992-2001, 2005: Designation of Special Areas of Conservation (SACs) by the Danish government
- 2003-2005: Implementation in legislation: Revision of Acts (incl. Act on Environmental Objectives)
- 2005-2007: Technical specification of the HD in a Danish context: identify nature types, quantitative interpretation of 'favourable conservation status' for each nature type mapping and conduct basis analysis
- 2007-2009: Elaboration of Natura 2000 plans and Natura 2000 action plans

This case study follows the implementation of the HD in Denmark, beginning with the designation of SAC sites in 1995 and ending with the basis analysis in 2006.

The HD was chosen to contrast the NPP case (see chapter 3.3) rather than for being an example of new modes of governance. The HD case has major financial and political significance and is characterised by a multilevel decision structure. In contrast to the NPP, the HD case was deliberately strongly sector specific, expertise driven, and not participatory.

### 3.4.2 Main characteristics of governance case

**Participation** was restricted to public hearings of sector related NGOs, agriculture and public authorities, whereas ordinary citizens were not a target for participation. In the first designation of SAC sites, the affected landowners were not directly consulted. This gave rise to critics, and in the subsequent revised designation of SACs landowners were consulted on an individual basis. Complaints over insufficient designation of SAC sites and insufficient implementation of the HD in the Danish legislation caused the EU to require the Danish Government to follow up on this. Indirectly, the right to lodge a complaint is used by NGOs to strengthen their position of influence towards the environmental, public authorities in general and maybe the most effective mean of influence.

At the outset, the general impression in the public administration was that the HD would have little practical influence on land management. It was assumed that the existing legislation was sufficient to conserve biodiversity corresponding to the requirements of the HD. In 1995, the MoE at the time explicitly stated that the HD would have minor significance to private landowners. This was also the excuse for not consulting landowners in advance of designating SAC sites in 1995. Subsequent cases at the European Court of Justice showed that implementation of HD would require changes of management. These fundamental changes of preconditions caused a serious loss of trust among landowners towards the environmental authorities.

The HD overrules all other regulations, except for pressing societal matters. The **intersectoral coordination** in the HD case took place as forced coordination rather than cooperation. This mode of policy implementation clashes with the administration culture in Denmark: Danish environmental legislation is based on decentralisation and framework legislation providing discretionary powers to the local public authorities to balance economic, social and ecological interests in the specific context. In contrast, the HD has to be implemented according to specific, uniform standards, with limited room for interpretation. As such, the implementation of the HD is a move away from more soft modes of governance towards hierarchic top-down rule based government.

The HD case is clearly **multileveled**, involving EU, national, county and municipal levels, even landowners. Decisions made at the Environmental Court of Justice apply to all EU countries, even if the case is raised regarding one country only. This means that the scope of influence for NGOs etc. has widened to encompass activities and authorities throughout Europe. This relatively strengthens EU aware NGOs like BirdLife.

The HD has a strongly technical and scientific character. The HD specifically calls for **scientific expertise** in its implementation and there was extensive use of experts from the sector research institutions of the Ministry of the Environment (DMU, S&L, GEUS) and staff from NFNA to specify and interpret the different elements of the HD. From the perspective of the NFNA, all known experts were involved. There were discussions and different viewpoints among experts about what the correct interpretation of the HD is. It was not a transparent process. Documents have been both physically and linguistically difficult to access, because of the technical-scientific language applied.

The HD was a forced **iterative** process. Built-in mechanisms to induce iterativity were: (i) six-yearly reporting to the EU, (ii) possibility for citizens to lodge a complaint to the EU Commission, (iii) monitoring of habitats, (iv) possibility of supplementary



designation of SACs, (v) lack of legal implementation leading to infringement proceedings from EU Commission and revised legal implementation in Denmark. The weakness of the process is that it is designed as a one-way learning process, with little scope for revising the foundation: the EU policy design. This may be critical, e.g. in a period where climate changes forces a new and more dynamic approach to nature conservation than the HD allows for.

### **3.4.3 Major insights and conclusions**

The HD has altered the Danish tradition for balancing economic and ecological interests and possibly giving exemptions from legislation. In contrast, EU and ECJ require a strict interpretation of the HD, and not only measured on actions and intentions, but on the actual conservation status of the habitats and species. This can be considered a strengthening of the 'rule of law' (citizen rights).

The HD is far less participatory than the NPP case. But as the two cases shows, the participation process in the NPP was less suited at managing conflicts of interests, as that of a powerful minority group (agriculture) against a majority. In contrast, The HD, based on legislation and the court, is able to deal with such conflicts.

## **3.5 Two new approaches in French forest policy**

*Buttoud, G. and I.Kouplevatskaya*

### **3.5.1 Introduction**

Two major factors could be reported as decisive for the changes in the system of governance in forestry in France. First it is the international context with the debate on sustainable forest management which had an impact on the management procedures and imposed the modality of participation. Debates on acid rains and climate change have stressed uncertainty and the need for links between politicians, technicians and scientists, thus enforcing the issue of accountable expertise. Globalisation of the market has influenced the timber market related networks and had an impact on the re-assessment of the values of the forest. A second major factor is the internal context in France with economic changes caused by the modifications in the system of the timber market; social development with the increased role of the local governments and ongoing decentralisation and transfer of power to the territorial levels. These general trends have been still more re-enforced by the dramatic consequences of the storms in 1999, which have triggered the re-assessment of visions and approaches to the traditional forest management. Certain initiatives taken at the National level in France (National Forest Strategy, Strategy for Biodiversity; Forest Law; National Forest Programme; Programme for the Endorsement of Forest Certification Schemes (PEFC) etc.) have also contributed to the promotion of governance in forestry.

Nevertheless, the relations between the state and the other actors and stakeholders are still unclear as regards to the forest policy issues. While the state is retrieving, giving more space for governance, the lack of clear mechanisms and modalities for the transfer of power and responsibilities at different levels results in poor articulation between the different elements of governance. In general, the adaptation of

traditional procedures to the new modes of governance in France is basically reactive to the international forestry dialogue, global changes in the society and procedures imposed by the European Union. The process is still rather slow, with no clear signs of a great capacity for anticipation. Two case studies were selected for the analysis of the situation with governance in the forest sector in France: the new instrument of Territorial Forestry Charters (CFT) and the Relief Plan for the Reconstitution of the Forests (RPF) after the storms of December 1999.

### **3.5.2 Case study 1: Territorial Forestry Charters (CFT)**

The Territorial Forest Charters (CFT) are development projects at the local level aiming at the increased role of forestry in regional development, multifunctional resource management, re-groupment of public and private owners and re-enforcement of wood chain competitiveness. CFTs are elaborated based on willingness and initiative of local actors including stakeholders and local politicians who are joining the project with formerly established duties, engagements and responsibilities. They are generally considered as a basic element for the new strategy for forestry development and one of the major instruments, used by the State to promote consensus on forestry development at the local level.

CFTs have institutionalised local forums for decision-making; have introduced participatory processes for discussions; and thus have promoted changes in the distribution of competencies. The main driving force for such an important change was a change from a sectoral to territorial policy making. The national Programme for CFTs has been set up in order to give some content to a decentralisation process which was new in France, where traditionally the top down centralised conventional style of decision making is prevailing. This new system, when introduced, did not formally take into consideration the five constituting elements of governance, as defined in the GOFOR project, except for participation, and somehow adaptive policy making.

At the same time, the introduction of CFTs has concretised two important changes in the French forest policy. From the sectoral scale, the forest policy measures has got basically a territorial character, when the activities aimed to forestry development are defined locally by the main stakeholders and presented as project proposals for funding. This represents a change from the previous conventional practice of centralised administration but also means a switch from the cash-desk logic in the support to the forest development activities with systematic funding of the actors, corresponding to the national norms imposed through a top down decision making process. Although the system does not work perfectly yet; the introduction of CFTs has brought a huge psychological change in the way the forestry actors are involved in the process of forest policy formulation. This change has also produced an intersectoral view on forest development, bringing up the priorities of the territorial approach, thus providing a concerted framework for integrating social and environmental values in forest economy around a local project. Currently, the main focus of CFTs is on the promotion of income generation and employment at the local level. Lack of the clear reference to environmental services in the National Programme for CFTs restricts the dimension of intersectorality. Nevertheless, even if the co-ordination between the sectors is still to be reached, the involvement of different actors and the responsibility of local politicians, promote the opening of the process to issues outside of the forest sector.

The CFT process has also brought many results in terms of involvement of the local actors. The CFTs have promoted the development of common discussions among stakeholders at the local level. The local politicians have clearly become the leaders of common actions towards forestry development of territories. They are viewed and legitimated by all the stakeholders as the co-ordinators and promoters of links between the forestry field and the other dimensions of the development. This situation has been favoured by both the decentralisation scheme in France and by the recent development of inter-communal associations. Certainly, participation is more or less restricted to the representatives of the productivists' interests, while the environmental and social aspects are still weak in the CFT process, but even with such restriction, participation at the local level is a real new phenomenon. From this point of view, the CFTs have brought a huge impact on the mentality and on the principles for forest policy formulation and implementation. At the same time, this usual restriction of the process mainly to the local sectoral groups representing productive interests has resulted in the fact that the forestry debate in CFTs still remains linked basically to timber production, even if there would be a need for a priority address of land use and environmental issues. The disbalanced representation of the various interests could be also accounted for by the lack of clear procedures and rules defining organisation of participation. Still, the contribution of the CFTs to the establishment of the local networking and need for emerging dialogue between different stakeholders is quite considerable.

The issue of expertise as such has not been raised in the CFT related documents, still several types of expertise have been mobilised: (i) expertise of local politicians in representing social demands, which is highly accountable in a representative democracy system; and (ii) traditional management expertise, which provides a basic technical knowledge and which is highly valorised by society. Seeing the risk of losing the power in decision making, representatives of this type of expertise showed a capacity of adaptation to the changed process which in some cases has led to a better balance between these two types of expertise, although the priority position of the technical expertise is still prevailing. Such a context maintains the role of institutions traditionally in charge of providing expertise on technical fields, although their expertise becomes accountable through the exposure to the transparent participatory CFT process.

In relation to multilevel governance, the lack of co-ordination between the local decision making level and other (departmental, regional or national) levels is still remaining an issue with the consequent incidence on the efficient use of the limited financial resources and concrete results.

The introduction of CFTs has certainly provoked a change in the behaviour of public and private forest owners and national agencies: the CFTs have built up a system of local networks for solving conflicts and generating consensus and partnership (at least for productivists topics). It gave a new possibility for allocation of resources, as a replacement of the Forestry National Fund, which had been cancelled in 1999. The existence of CFTs is supposed to define conditions and priority in attributing grants from the State.

CFTs were initially conceived as new mechanisms for funding the forestry development. But due to the contextual factors (CAP reform) this objective has not been achieved yet and there is still some uncertainty in the potential funding of the CFT projects during the coming years. Due to that, most of the CFT processes have currently resulted in nice projects on paper without being followed up by clear concrete actions, unless they are funded directly by the actors.

### 3.5.3 Case study 2: Relief Plan for the Reconstitution of the Forests (RPF)

The “Relief Plan for Forests” (RPF) was established as a response of the French government, as a major assistance programme aimed at supporting the forest sector after the devastating storms in December 1999. The context of the RPF designing and implementation is clearly a context of crisis which has an unpredictable character, leading to the situation of high uncertainty and a pressing need for emergency solutions of the main problems. Such reaction is not easy to be considered through conventional forest policy means as they work in the usual French forest policy situations, with clearly defined long term objectives to be achieved through stable fixed means. The occurrence of this crisis has created the necessity for a rapid adaptation which could go until some important conceptual changes in forest management.

The development of the new modes of governance in the RPF process has been studied through two clear phases with different objectives, beneficiaries and time scales: the first stage dealing with the immediate consequences of the storm; and the second stage (ongoing) aiming at re-building and improving of all the components of forest ecosystems (ecological, economic and social). Basically the RPF has provided incentives for the restoration of the damaged stands (through natural or man made regeneration); for the restructuring of the economic background (infrastructure and land tenure); and for the re-enforcement of forest organisations.

Due to the emergency of the situation and the necessity to react to the crisis in a very short time span, the State has overtaken an important role in the process with a parallel development of elements leading to the new modes of governance. Thus, spontaneous broad participation and inter-sectoral coordination were immediate reactions to the emergency situation. The psychological shock caused by the storms easily led to a consensus among the various stakeholders about a common view on the immediate concerted actions and measures to be taken after the storms. This consensus was built through a complete process of participation, which was particularly new for France. All measures of the RPF were completed with the additional means established at different levels of governance (European, national, provincial and local). In the implementation phase of RPF the State was confronted with the need of assuring coherence with the other measures and defining its own role in terms of complementarity. In such a situation, the accountability of expertise had acquired a new meaning, as at the beginning there was no exact knowledge available and the process itself was conceived as learning by doing. For this reason the implementation of the RPF has foreseen some flexibility and has not been conceived as a rigid executive framework. At the same time, regardless of the actual active presence of the different elements of the new modes of governance in the RPF process, the state has played a central role, constituting the basic decision maker.

RPF as a policy tool has proved to be adaptable to the crisis situation with a capacity to evolve through time and the changing requirements of different actors. From this view point, RPF is a very iterative instrument, but mainly because it was an emergency tool designed for an extraordinary crisis situation. RPF was the first (at such a scale) experiment in France of the new elements of governance, especially: flexible participation, complementarity between various multi-governance levels, systematic call for scientific expertise, as well as institutionalisation of adaptability and iterativity. Although the RPF itself does not constitute a fixed strategy, it brought some consistency and applicability to the 2001 forestry law. It also gave mechanisms

for a permanent set of tools more or less adaptable to the solution of the problems created by the storms.

Two types of effects of the governance process may be identified as resulting from the RPF process in France after six years of implementation: (i) For the first time in France there has been a clear consciousness that the local actors can play a role in the formulation of concrete measures in the forestry sector. The spontaneous system of a common debate on forest policy, gave to the local actors the feeling that their opinion could be (and was) taken into consideration. In a way, one of the bigger changes was this shift from consultation to concertation in the framework of RPF. (ii) The second effect is that for the first time since the reform of the French forest policy in the second half of the 1990s, stakeholders and the state administration have built up together a framework for action. During many years corresponding to the collapse of the national forestry fund, in the French debate on the forest policy, there were no clear ideas about the redefinition of objectives and means of organisation for forestry development. Due to this extra-ordinary event, all the interested people were obliged in a very short period (of a few months) to elaborate a framework in which the forest policy measures would have to be implemented. The RPF process has created a method that did not exist before, without any normative guidelines or requirements, just through the establishment of mechanisms of governance. And this is a really big change in France.

The RPF process has led to certain institutional changes: a spectacular come back of the central state into the design of the French forest policy. Correlatively to this increase of the role of the State, the Ministry of Agriculture in charge of the forest policy has gained a lot of legitimacy and credibility, which in turn, has led to an almost complete exclusion of the Ministry of Environment from the forestry issues. The RPF process has also resulted in a spectacular come back to the subsidies as instruments of National forest policy.

### **3.5.4 Major insights and conclusions**

A first conclusion from the analysis of two forest policy case studies, the CFTs and the RPF in France, shows that both processes correspond to the introduction of new modes of governance. Both processes have led to the consolidation of power of local politicians on the one hand and administrative bodies at the national regional and departmental levels on the other hand. With the storms of 1999, and the importance of land use management through decentralisation, forest is now considered as part of the territory and not as a specific sector. This is a big change in France where forest policy was usually considered as a purely sectoral one.

A second conclusion is related to the understanding of the new modes of governance as being based on mechanisms, rather than on normative directives, as well as on participation more than on a rationalist decision making system. Although, that does not necessarily lead to the diminishing of the roles of the state, and to a better importance of markets in forest policy, even, if only productivist measures are concerned. The French cases clearly show that the five elements from the definition of governance in GoFOR are not necessarily all met together in the new modes. The case of RPF, for instance, shows that participation, intersectorality and iterativity may lead to a consolidation of the conventional technical expertise. This re-concentrates expertise and decision making at the top national level. The same is valid for the case of CFTs, where the openness of the process at the local level and its intersectoral nature have directly resulted in the exclusion of the other sectors,

especially in the evacuation of the environmentalists interests. Thus, in the same country, with the same legal context, during the same period, two different tools can have different approaches to the importance of several elements constituting governance. The CFT and RPF cases have both followed the principle of governance, although not respecting all the constitutive elements in the same way. The cases of the CFTs and RPF in France show that it is often unclear how different elements may be assessed in a linear way. In some forest policy processes different simultaneous aspects may be traced with separately positive or negative impacts on the constitutive elements of governance. This brings complexity to the assessment of how those forest policy processes fit into a re-condition which is supposed to be defining a governance system.

## 3.6 “Integrated Rural Development” policies in Germany

*Giessen, L. and M. Böcher*

### 3.6.1 Introduction

Rural development policies show a gradual but distinct shift in paradigm concerning the governance of rural areas. Traditional rather sector-oriented policies are recently being complemented by more integrated and area-based strategies. One policy approach discussed in this context is ‘integrated rural development’ (IRD). This normative concept largely aims at facilitating decentralised negotiated spatial planning processes among a variety of public, private and civil society actors. In this it takes an integrated, cross-sectoral approach to area-based development of rural regions.<sup>4</sup> In a German context this concept is being reflected in recent rural development funding programmes. On the one hand the approach is taken up by two pilot programmes, aiming to test and demonstrate the approach. First, the EU’s LEADER+ initiative has been implemented from 2000-2006, building on experiences made by forerunner programmes since 1991. Second, *Regionen Aktiv* was launched by the Federal Ministry of Agriculture as a national demonstration project and is being implemented since 2002 to date. The programme largely builds on the LEADER experiences and elements, but also made an attempt to even develop them further. On the other hand, IRD elements also have been taken up by a national mainstream funding instrument of agricultural policy - the ‘Joint Task Improvement of Agricultural Structures and Coastal Protection’. All three programmes, in one way or another, entail competitive elements, i.e. they are not applied all over the country.

The three different funding programmes are being delivered by different entities, but have in common the beneficiaries or addressees, which are local and regional partnerships, negotiating, formulating and jointly implementing endogenous development strategies. Thus, programme formulation at EU or national level is contrasted with implementation at regional level. This case study analyses both territorial levels. It aims at reflecting in how far governance elements have emerged and evolved in IRD-programmes and whether or not they actually affected rural development policy in a wider sense.

IRD was selected as a case study because it addresses various actors from different sectors in rural areas. This trend towards more integrated policy approaches was

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<sup>4</sup> Regions in our understanding comprise more than one municipality but still are smaller than one of the Federal States of Germany.

found to be interesting for forest policy as well. In this design, the three programmes mentioned above serve as contributing case studies reflecting some sort of policy continuum from the pilot stage of testing an approach (LEADER+) to further improving (Regionen Aktiv) and finally to mainstreaming it (Joint Task). Thus, all three case studies may be viewed as being embedded into an overarching 'case' on the impact of IRD as a concept on rural development policy. This comparative design allows to analyse the approach before the background of different programmatic, institutional and interest settings and to draw conclusions on different degrees of appearance and acceptance of new modes of governance.

### 3.6.2 Main characteristics of governance cases

The **context** out of which IRD evolved is characterised by changing demands on rural development policy. The decreasing role of agriculture as a main source of income in rural areas as well as international trends of trade liberalisation and subsequent changes in the EU's CAP paved the way for new approaches of supporting rural regions. The crisis in agriculture caused by 'mad-cow' or 'foot-and-mouth disease' in a German context led to a process referred to as 'Agrarwende' (translates into 'agrarian turnaround'), which was driven by a change of the Federal Government in 1998 and the first 'Green' Minister for agriculture in 2001. This finally caused an increased application of integrated approaches to rural development policy.

All three programmes show a relatively clear divide between the formulation of programmes at a central level and its implementation in regional settings. Formulation to a vast degree remains in the hands of public **actors** such as Federal and *Länder* ministries or the EU Commission. The latter as well as the Federal Ministry of Agriculture have been central actors in the IRD discourse, but also private actors were observed playing an increasing role here. Especially under the pilot programmes one has observed an opening of public administration for the ideas of private actors regarding the design of IRD-programmes.

From a governance perspective the implementation process bears fruitful aspects. Here certain IRD-specific **instruments** are being employed, empowering regional actors and triggering processes of collective action. Regional public-private-partnerships are the central decision-making body during programme implementation. They negotiate and jointly formulate so called 'regional development concepts' which serve as a basis for the following process. In addition, the partnerships also decide on project proposals and on a regional budget dedicated to each participant region and hence, also accompany the implementation of the regional strategy. Finally, a regional management facility runs the multi-annual development process, facilitates networking among the various actors and coordinates the diverse interests.

The **effects** of IRD as a governance case mostly are associated with the different funding programmes. The two **pilot** programmes were observed to inspire policy makers at EU, national and sub-national level to adopt the IRD approach. They created several self-sustained projects and increased social capital in the regions. Such soft effects have been the base for more significant changes in funding policy for rural areas. The pilots caused attitudinal and culture changes among regional actors and policy makers and resulted in the introduction of new funding instruments under the 'Joint Task' programme which now are available for country-wide application. Moreover, based on the LEADER+ experiences the approach has been

mainstreamed in the EU's rural development policy, which now states that at least 5% of co-funded expenditure is reserved for funding through the LEADER approach. On the contrary, the introduction of new modes of governance into **mainstream** policy led to very limited effects. This was mainly due to the rather narrow application of the IRD approach within the agricultural mainstream programme.

### 3.6.3 Major insights and conclusions

One of the **main** case **characteristics** is the delegation of responsibilities and competencies from Federal State to the regional level. Such regions have not necessarily been defined as a level of political coordination prior to the IRD-intervention. Governance elements are employed mainly in the implementation of rural development programmes at this regional level. Here, participatory and inter-sectoral processes of collective action are triggered and supported through public funding.

The case study gives valuable **insights** as to how governance elements may function in IRD programmes. It shows a clear divide regarding the application of governance elements at different stages of the policy cycle, suggesting that such ideas mostly play a role in improving programme implementation. Here however, lies the strength of these elements, as in regional settings they can facilitate successful cooperation among various actors. In the literature such processes are described as 'regional governance arrangements', highlighting regionalisation tendencies and the increasing importance of regions as a level of political coordination. We also observed deliberative and reflexive elements during programme formulation, which again has been limited to the pilot programmes. This leads to the question, whether governance features are merely capable of improving programme implementation, or if they may lead to better formulation and design as well?

Finally, the use of such elements has been observed to be more advanced in pilot than in mainstream programmes. While under LEADER+ and its predecessors IRD as a governance-like approach has evolved, Regionen Aktiv even developed it further. During this 'trial phase' governance elements showed many positive effects, most of which were of a rather soft nature. After this era of testing, the approach has been mainstreamed. Consequently it now is struggling with the conserving forces of traditional funding systems (such as the CAP and the Joint Task regime) and well established sectoral boundaries. The question remains, whether governance ideas serve as a toy in small arenas only, or if they cause significant change in the tradition of policy making?

## 3.7 National Forest Programme Hungary

*Mészáros, K., E. Schiberna, G. Beltos and A. Lengyel*

### 3.7.1 Introduction

The National Forest Programme Hungary (NFPH) is the national level development programme of forest management related activities and it relates in general to the future role of forests and covers almost all thematic areas of the development of the forestry sector. It also includes strategic principles on sustainable forest management (SFM), but its main task is to be the basis of programme implementation.



It is a mid-term programme with a 10 years period of implementation scheduled from 2006 to 2015. The NFPH is set up of 10 sub-programmes with concrete objectives to be achieved in this time frame.<sup>5</sup> One of its major characteristics is that it got elaborated in partnership and open participation of many different stakeholders and interested parties in forestry and forests, meaning governmental and non-governmental organisations and other actors in society.<sup>6</sup>

Its overall aim is the promotion of sustainable forest management (SFM) at the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century in Hungary. Hereby the provision of answers to conflicts and problems originating in general from the new conditions and structure changes of the political-economical system transition since 1989 including the 2004 EU-accession of the country plays a central role. It is a framework or policy process integrating different interests on thematic issues and in general.

The Programme can be divided into three main phases: (i) programming, 2001-2003, (ii) decision making, 2004-2005, and (iii) implementation, 2006-2015.

The process started 2001 under the title of “*National Forest Programme and Strategy*”. The Forestry Department of the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development was the government agency in charge for its programming as programme “owner”. In autumn 2004, the Programme got adopted by the Government by the passing of the Government Resolution Nr. 1110/2004 on the NFP Hungary.

Its implementation should be by far the highest priority task in current Hungarian forest policy, however through financing and institutional difficulties this is endangered to a large extent or it is sub-ordinated to financial options of other programmes, such as e.g. the National Rural Development Programme or thematic projects.

### **3.7.2 Main characteristics of governance case**

In Hungary, the participatory approach got introduced in the last 10 years in policy preparation supported by pro-forma legal requirements and societal changes demanding for more transparency and participation in general. However, its implementation is still far from being satisfactory. Top-down approaches are still practiced or the influence of the central administration is decisive in policy setting. This gets obvious when it comes to decision making and finances. The NFP Hungary process affirms these observations. In the case study the features of process participation got analysed and a number of supporting and impeding factors could be identified. The most important supporting factors are the existence of an independent coordination unit, process transparency in the programming phase or the use of a partnership approach. The most severe impeding factors are lack of information in the decision making phase, the limited international experiences of stakeholders, no compromising ability or no institutional set up for implementation.

The NFP public discussion forums (2002-2003) provided good opportunities for a wide and free participation of interested organisations or private persons, although

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<sup>5</sup> Operative Programs of 1) State Forest Management Development, 2) Private Forest Management Development, 3) Rural Development, Afforestation and Tree Planting, 4) Nature Protection in Forests, 5) Modern Forest Protection, 6) Sustainable Game Management, 7) Rational Wood Utilization, 8) Duties of the State Forest Service, 9) Innovation and Research Development 10) Effective Communication about Forests to Improve the Man-Forest Relation (GR Nr 1110/2004).

<sup>6</sup> For more information see: [www.erdostrategia.hu](http://www.erdostrategia.hu)

these forums were not particularly institutionalised. One of the major merits of the discussion forums was that they secured open access to the process and its stakeholders in a transparent way. They provided a platform for free exchange between different stakeholders compared to previously used negotiation forms in forest policy. New actors could enter this policy domain as well, like hikers, students, teachers and a wide range of NGOs of different territorial levels. Fundamental differences between parties got not necessarily resolved, but prejudices could be eliminated in some cases. This was clearly to be recognised at the final expert level meeting, where compromises and consensus on a number of issues could be achieved. However, many differences occurred concerning follow up and implementation. These differences existed basically between the Governmental officials and the other stakeholders. These neither could be resolved entirely but resulted in some important modification of the proposal mainly done by government officials of the Forestry Department in MARD. However, learning in the process took certainly place as almost all parties are stating this.

On inter-sectoral coordination (ISC) the NFP Hungary states some aspects explicitly but the analysis also shows that between responsible governmental organisations this aspect is still largely absent in practice. The NFPH document states the importance of ISC in principle, but the implementation has not paid sufficient attention to the inter-sectoral approach. This is not purely a government failure, as neither civil society nor the public discussion phase of the NFP have paid enough attention to it. Actor behaviour rather was focused on the own, often short-time interests and was not aiming for general solutions or a classified problem analysis including many sectors. In this respect similarities can be found to multi-level governance (MLG) concerning the intentions and some successes in the programming, but no success in decision making or implementation so far.

In the NFPH, policy statements called for a wide social and professional representation of stakeholders providing their expertise legitimated by open participation. Following this, in programme development and coordination, science and specialists of thematic fields played an outstanding role, such as also in the process phases of the programming and decision making. The direct influence of expert advice during the programming is rather obvious as the working group and expert sessions developed both, the White Book (as the public debate's basic information document) and also the final expert proposal on the NFPH. On structure, priorities, and content apparently experts had a decisive role. An increase of the role of experts in the forest policy domain can be therefore made out.

Aspects of adaptive and iterative programming can be clearly recognised in the drafting phase, but evaluation and monitoring got not set up further in the process. The main shortcoming, however, is the failure in setting up an institutionalised programme implementation structure with own resources, which could have secured continuity into the implementation phase and which could have kept up the process, which got practically stuck in 2006/2007.

### **3.7.3 Major insights and conclusions**

The Hungarian National Forest Program in its current form and programming closely adheres to the standpoint of the resolution about the national forest programs of the Ministerial Conference on the Protection of the Forests of Europe (MCPFE V1 A1). It must be pointed out that for the first time ever such a process was initiated in forest policy in Hungary. It is therefore an accomplishment that international forest policy

commitments arrived into Hungarian forest policy practice. It was viewed as an important contribution to the country's EU accession in the programming phase by many process stakeholders.

Another aspect to be stressed is that with the NFPH process Hungary's forest policy stepped out from the historical tradition of forest policy making driven by mere law-setting. Further, it must be stated that with the passing the NFPH society and its representatives expressed their long run commitment for forests and forest management. However, in spite of wide participation in the programming phase, the absence of the direct interests of politicians at all levels, including the Parliament, as well as the presence of conflicting interests of the state administration of different policy areas concerned (environment vs. agriculture, agriculture vs. forestry etc.) led to the situation that, so far, no organisational and financial means for programme implementation have been provided. This situation has put at danger the positive effects of the process to a large extent.

It must be concluded that without the implementation of the NFPH forest policy will not gain real structure or form and a consensus based overall development will be very difficult. Separated thematic issue development will be possible, of course, but tends certainly to lose the process' achievements in general and especially as regards intersectoral coordination and iterativity. The danger will increase that this policy field at national level will be simply sub-ordinated to other ones, such as rural development or environmental policy. Without implementation Hungary could neither claim for practical contribution to the further improvement of the sustainable forest management highlighted e.g. in the MCPFE process or the EU Forestry Strategy.

### **3.8 Management of protected areas through management agencies in Greece**

*Kassioumis, K., K. Papageorgiou and M. Vakkas*

#### **3.8.1 Introduction**

An appraisal of the progress of nature conservation policy has been undertaken in the Greek case study, specifically addressing the administration and management of protected areas and concentrating mainly in the recent developments in this field, especially after the creation of the ministry of Environment, Planning and Public Works until today. The main focus was to provide an evaluation of how new governance and its constituting elements have influenced policy outcomes.

A stronger set of policy elements, institutional reforms and increased state declarations has evolved in the national park arena over time in the country. National park administration and management in Greece is now, not to be understood as a process aimed simply at identifying and selecting the most suitable and biologically rich wilderness sites to be preserved, but as a continuous way of managing national parks by describing the breadth of the political and societal basis engaged in national park administration, focusing on the degree and empowerment of participation of various stakeholders and the increased mobilization of decentralized societal capacities. In this respect, the encompassing case study policy process macroscopically offered a generic and evolving practice of governance in the highly prioritized field of nature conservation. The value of this governance process is more meaningful in a nation-wide level of analysis, where country-specific weaknesses,

strengths, inherent deficiencies as well as social, political and natural area dependencies, can provide an overarching overview on the state of administration and management of national parks, beyond the traditional direct management by a governmental actor.

The characteristics discussed in this case study are still the subject of on-going developments, which have started being placed more systematically into the core of the political agenda in the mid 1980s, but have revealed their higher integrative and democratic dynamics features after the initiation of the habitat directive in the early 1990s. The operationalisation of what can be described as new governance operates in a national environment where the reality of greater participation of interest groups in decision-making is gaining weight in a national policy setting that is becoming increasingly transparent and decentralized.

### **3.8.2 Main characteristics of governance case**

The recent revision of environmental legislation, induced by the EU framework, led to the reorientation of Greece's existing conservation policy introducing a number of changes in the nature reserve administration system aiming at a more efficient pursuit of the desired objectives. Notably, the new legislation provided *inter alia* for the establishment of autonomous Management Agencies or Boards, legally entitled to take over responsibilities concerning the national parks' and other protected areas' organisation and functioning from the formal coercive powers and direct state control of forest service and the ministry of EPPW.

Before the background of these institutional changes the central question is whether the introduced policy processes for broader stakeholder participation, greater coordination between state and non-state actors, increased multilevel coordination, enhanced possibilities for adaptive and iterative planning and higher issues of accountability and legitimacy are adequate for planning an integrative and sustainable conservation outcome.

The analysis has shown that the recent administrative and legal changes laid the ground for more actors involved in protected area planning and management. The new governance process instituted a framework which has shifted participation from a pure informative and communicative approach towards a more participatory by granting possibilities to the public for negotiation, deliberation and reaction to proposals. However, field experience has shown that the legal recommendations of participation remain often merely rhetorical; there are problems affecting the use of participation in decision-making which could be regarded as generic and inherent to the prevailing political attitude style of administration. Moreover, the involvement of many different interest groups and stakeholders in the decision-making has raised a private (economic) vs. collective (environmental) dichotomy. Inter-sectoral conflicts on the competencies of the various ministries and institutions more or less reflect the historically developed dominant political culture of public authorities that favour sectoral isolationism. Classical arguments resisting change in behaviour of policy actors in various levels may be those providing continuity and security. A tendency for increased engagement of scientific knowledge in the policy process was apparent in this case study.

### **3.8.3 Major insights and conclusions**

The new governance process in national park administration was found to be still ambiguous as an approach to ensuring sustainable management and conservation of national parks in Greece. Nevertheless, the analysis has shown that national park issues that have most commonly been the domain of professional state bureaucracies at national levels are increasingly subjected to involvement from institutions at sub-national level following patterns of negotiations between state and non-state actors. The new approach that brings participatory approaches in the management and planning of protected areas to the forefront of practice, has been a significant change in the direction for a more participatory and democratic decision-making in an increasingly cooperative national policy environment. The research identified the above elements as wielding influence in the outcome of conservation processes since they have ensured the involvement of several actors and the interconnection of a policy network.

Besides the positive aspects, long-established organizational problems, deeper institutional weaknesses such as the national policy style of administration, low political commitment of the political actors and most essentially a reality that most management actions have not been pursued and completed, constitute an impeding factor and are inconsistent with the new patterns of politics geared towards open decision-making. Likewise, the research disclosed attitudes, perceptions and behaviours of some respondents that are not compliant with the new governance process but are rather rooted to a more reactive form of governing that used to be dominant in the past. Similar behaviour was identified among the lay public especially in areas regarding public participation in open forums and negotiations. Interest groups and the public need to be trained and raise their experience to interactions as laid out by the new governance process.

## **3.9 Dutch “Nature for People, People for Nature” Process**

*Turnhout, E., R. Arnouts, and M. Van der Zouwen*

### **3.9.1 Introduction**

It was the prominent presence of governance discourses in recent Dutch nature conservation policy, that triggered us to look closer into this neglected aspect in the governance debate. Where did these discourses come from and how could such a discourse develop and institutionalize? The development process of the Dutch nature policy plan “Nature for People – People for Nature” (NfP) which was adopted by Dutch parliament in 2000 served as a case study to answer this question.

### **3.9.2 Main characteristics of governance case**

The NfP policy plan strives to shed a broader view on nature policy. The policy document is characterized by three governance discourses: about the importance to include people’s perceptions, wishes and knowledge in nature policy, about the importance of citizen participation in, involvement in and responsibility for nature policy and about the importance of an integrated perspective in nature policy. These discourses were present already in the first drafts of the plan. Also the development process started out as a governance process in terms of actors involved, the

distribution of power and resources, the type of interactions, interaction rules and places where interactions were situated as well as the content of discussions. After the first stage, the process increasingly appeared to be a government practice regarding the actors involved, the way the power game was played and the interaction rules and loci which were important.

Participation and intersectoral coordination were stressed as important in all the drafts of the plan. Intersectoral coordination is clear in the sense that the plan integrates hitherto separate policy plans on nature conservation, forestry and landscape. In the process, broad participation and intersectoral coordination characterised the beginning. After that both were ended for a period of time in which further development took place in a closed shop context. After that, the process shows selective forms of participation about particular issues and ISC in the sense of interministerial coordination about financial and spatial issues. Accountable expertise was stressed as important in all the drafts of the plan in the sense that social science knowledge and the input of citizens was viewed important in addition to ecological science knowledge. In the process no special attention was paid to this, although the participation and intersectoral coordination meetings, of course, implied that the participants could speak up and share their knowledge and perspectives. Interactive and iterative planning and multilevel governance do not play an important role in this case study.

### **3.9.3 Main insights and conclusions**

Although the governance discourses on policy integration, societal responsibility and people's perceptions have been reproduced throughout the entire process in the drafts of the plan, the process shows dynamics in terms of governance. Broad participation and intersectoral coordination was discontinued and replaced by selective ad hoc participation and interministerial coordination. This leads us to the conclusion that the governance discourses in the final policy document do not go hand-in-hand with a governance process.

## **3.10 Nature policy in the Groene Woud area (The Netherlands)**

*Arnouts, R., M. Van der Zouwen and E. Turnhout*

### **3.10.1 Introduction**

The "Groene Woud" area, also called "Meierij" or "Midden Brabant", basically consists of a core of several large natural areas surrounded by agricultural land, in between the Dutch cities of Den Bosch, Eindhoven and Tilburg. The area is situated in the province of Noord-Brabant in the south of the Netherlands. This study area was chosen because of the rapid development in policy processes over the last decades and because of the tension between different interests that comes to the fore over time (mainly between nature and agriculture). To be able to focus on a more long-term perspective, the case has been divided into three periods, each of them characterized by specific events and governance processes.

### 3.10.2 Main characteristics of governance case

The first period is characterized by rebuilding the regional economy after the Second World War. This is mainly visible in two large scale agricultural reallocation processes. The first one, Oirschot – Best, is implemented without much resistance. Landscape and nature conservationists try to keep natural areas out of the reallocation by buying them, which is sometimes successful. From the mid-seventies, because of societal unease with unbridled reallocation, policy initiatives are emerging that support landscape and nature conservation. The second reallocation process, which commences from the mid-seventies, has to take into account non-agrarian interests, but still is dominated by agrarians. However, the implementation of this process is not going very smoothly.

From a governance perspective, the first period is already quite interesting. The reallocation processes are quite participative due to their corporatist character, but are dominated by agricultural actors. Towards the end of the period, some attention is being paid to non-agrarian sectors, but this does not change the dominant agrarian position. Furthermore, technical agricultural expertise is dominant in this period, although later on, ecological and environmental expertise is used to challenge the dominant agricultural position. Iterativity and adaptiveness is mainly found in the Sint-Oedenrode reallocation, which takes into account multiple interests. From a multi-level perspective, there are no signs of exceptional multi-level coordination.

The second period commences with the introduction of the Nature Policy Plan in 1992. It aims at the creation of a network of natural areas which is being demarcated by the province, supported by nature conservationists, but resisted by agrarians. This latter sector gradually loses its dominant position. Furthermore, the WCL policy (“Waardevolle Cultuurlandschappen”, Valuable Cultural Landscapes) is created, which focuses on several functions of the rural area. However, this initiative is not very successful, because of a lack of public support and private commitment. In the shadow of these two initiatives, the Groene Woud ideals are conceived, which aim at the creation of a large natural park in Midden Brabant. At the end of the period they are being put under the footlights.

From a governance perspective, mainly the demarcation of the EHS (Ecological Main Structure), the development of the WCL policy and the conception and launch of the Groene Woud ideals are interesting. All these initiatives are carried out in a participative fashion, though with changing success. ISC mainly comes to the fore in the WCL policy and EHS demarcation, where actors from different sectors meet each other. The difference in success between the EHS demarcation and the WCL policy can be partially explained from a multi-level perspective because in the former, there is a good connection between the provincial and local level, which is missing in the latter. As a result of the EHS policy, ecological expertise gains in importance. Moreover, social types of expertise come to the fore. The general way in which policies are conceived in this period is more adaptive and iterative.

The third period begins with the incorporation of the Groene Woud in provincial policies and in the municipality of Boxtel. Meanwhile, the WCL policy is being transformed into a new initiative, the IDM (“Innovatieplatform Duurzame Meierij”, Innovation Platform Sustainable Meierij), whose participants enthusiastically support the Groene Woud developments. Along the way, ideas are conceived to create a spin-off effect, which broadens the Groene Woud ideals, involving more and more actors, including agrarians, who start working together with nature and landscape conservationists. Another important process in this period is the Reconstruction,

which aims at the creation of an all-encompassing policy for the Midden-Brabant area, with a main focus on strengthening the regional economy. However, implementation of the Reconstruction plans has not commenced yet due to massive delays. This leaves the Midden-Brabant area with two integral policy initiatives.

Governance practices mainly come to the fore in the Groene Woud developments, but as well in the IDM activities and in the new Reconstruction policy. In all three examples, participation is clearly visible. In the Reconstruction, it is most formalized, whereas the Groene Woud and IDM have a more informal character. ISC is visible in the broadening of the Groene Woud ideals, in which agrarians and nature conservationists cooperate, and in the Reconstruction and IDM. From a multi-level perspective, the uneasy relationship between the Ministry of LNV (agriculture) and the province of Noord-Brabant, the involvement of the municipality of Boxtel and connections between the local and provincial level (and the lack thereof) are interesting. Furthermore, the attention for more integral policies implies an integration of all types of expertise, while policy process in general get more adaptive and iterative, mainly visible in the approach of the province of Noord-Brabant.

### **3.10.3 Major insights and conclusions**

From the historiography of nature policy in the Groene Woud area it can be concluded that participation is not new, it already was visible in the first period. Throughout time, though, it becomes more common, involving more sectors. Moreover, one witnesses an intersectoral trend which is clearly visible in the relationship between the agricultural sector and nature and landscape conservationists. Several intersectoral initiatives appear over time, and the Groene Woud seems to be successful. However, with the start of the Reconstruction, there now are two integral policy plans for Midden Brabant, with no clear relationship between them. From a multi-level perspective, what is most striking is that regional commitment is needed, both from local and provincial actors, in order to create a successful policy plan for Midden Brabant. As well, the province of Noord-Brabant seems to become more headstrong, positioning itself more clearly at the expense of the Ministry of LNV. From an expertise perspective, social kinds of expertise seem to become more important over time, whereas agricultural expertise loses its dominant position to more ecological kinds of expertise. Finally, over time policy processes become more adaptive and iterative. In dealing with the Groene Woud, the province of Noord-Brabant is especially iterative and adaptive.

## **3.11 Nature policy in the Utrechtse Heuvelrug area (The Netherlands)**

*Arnouts, R., M. Van der Zouwen and E. Turnhout*

### **3.11.1 Introduction**

The 'Utrechtse Heuvelrug' is a large and mainly forested natural area in the centre of the Netherlands, divided over the provinces of Utrecht (for two-thirds) and Noord-Holland (for one-third). It can roughly be divided into three parts, i.e. the southern, central and northern Utrechtse Heuvelrug. Because it is situated close to the highly urbanized west of the country, it has always been subjected to strong urbanization influences, which have left the area in a quite fragmented state. Therefore, it is



interesting how nature policies have been developed over time. To achieve a comparative overview, the case has been divided into three periods, each of them characterized by specific events and governance processes.

### **3.11.2 Main characteristics of governance case**

The first period, which begins after the Second World War, is characterized by the “flowerpot model”, meaning that actors mainly focus on their own affairs. Large scale expansions of villages, military terrains, (recreational) businesses and infrastructure occur, supported by the province of Utrecht. Such activities are allowed to flourish, ownership of the land is an important resource. The area is mainly owned by the Ministry of Defense, large health care institutions, private landowners, the State Forest Agency and large nature conservation organizations. From the mid seventies, societal unease with the unbridled expansions begin to occur, leading to some more political attention for nature- and landscape conservation and some first initiatives to put a halt to unbridled urbanization, although without much effect.

In this context, virtually no governance practices are visible. Participation is restricted to an insignificant provincial policy plan. Intersectoral coordination only happens on a small scale within the provincial organization. Multi-level characteristics do not go beyond the Dutch constitutional relationships. Expertise is mainly technical and focused on spatial planning, although this is complemented with ecological expertise. Provincial and municipal policy plans are only adaptive because they allow for formal consultation, which in practice seldom occurs. Most actors see no need to get involved because they focus on their own activities.

In the second period (starting in 1992), the Ecological Main Structure, or EHS (Dutch abbreviation), is introduced. The entire Utrechtse Heuvelrug is demarcated as natural core area. Moreover, a new provincial spatial plan is formulated in 1994, which aims at the creation of red and green contours on the Utrechtse Heuvelrug. As well, the ministry of LNV issues a decentralization impulse, giving the provinces and municipalities new responsibilities. The most important development in this period is the installation of a National Park in the South of the area. After the national committee has failed, a group of regional actors takes over and eventually launches a preliminary National Park. Furthermore, several private actors create a vision in which the Utrechtse Heuvelrug is seen as a whole, instead of focusing on just parts of it.

From a governance perspective, the second period shows the demarcation of the EHS in a participative fashion, with the help of ecological expertise from involved nature conservationists. Moreover, the new provincial spatial plan of 1994 shows explicit signs of intersectoral coordination. The decentralization impulse causes some multi-level related problems. To cap all that, however, the National Park initiative harbors several governance characteristics. The first attempt partly fails because of a multi-level related dispute between the regional actors and the national committee. However, private actors start a new and bottom up attempt to install a National Park on their own terms. This attempt is eventually supported by the committee and the province, making the process quite adaptive and iterative. Another participative process concerns the “Heel de Heuvelrug” initiative, launched to put the Utrechtse Heuvelrug as a whole on the political agenda.

The third period (from 1998) shows waning attention for the “Heel de Heuvelrug” idea. After initial enthusiasm, it is not really taken up. Meanwhile, the National Park is formally installed, so the second attempt has been successful. A formal body of

consultation and a management plan are established. However, cooperation within this body is not easy because of the voluntary character of participation and the tough attitude of the private owners. Most important in this period is the “Hart van de Heuvelrug” project, which focuses on the middle of the area. The province aims at solving the deadlock between green and red interests, arisen because of a new provincial spatial plan which has significantly strengthened the EHS. In this project, patches of land are being exchanged and given another function. It is enthusiastically taken up, but there is a lot of critique as well, because it is feared that “red” interests will dominate, which will lead to further deterioration of the area.

In this period, governance processes from the second period keep on developing, while new processes are occurring. An exception is the “Heel de Heuvelrug” initiative, characterized by participation and a multi-level approach, which after initial enthusiasm wanes away. In the National Park, a participative, adaptive and iterative approach is followed, which gradually results in some trust, but participation is uneasy. The most important governance processes in this period is the “Hart van de Heuvelrug” project. It bears signs of participation, intersectoral coordination, multi-level coordination, different uses of expertise by governmental and non-governmental actors and an iterative and adaptive approach. However, there is some scepticism towards the project as well.

### **3.11.3 Major insights and conclusions**

All in all, one can conclude from the Utrechtse Heuvelrug case that over time more and stronger governance practices are occurring. However, the difference between the second and third period is not that significant, i.e. in the second period there are some pretty interesting governance patterns already. Important examples of governance practices are the processes around the National Park and the “Hart van de Heuvelrug” project, but for example also the “Heel de Heuvelrug” ideal, the continuous update of provincial spatial plans, the decentralization impulse and the issuing, demarcation and implementation of the EHS. Important actors are the province of Utrecht, which is adopting a truly iterative and adaptive approach throughout the three periods, the private owners, especially concerning the National Park, and Utrechts Landschap, a non-governmental actor that plays an important facilitating and mediating role. Mainly in the “Hart van de Heuvelrug” project, all governance characteristics are visible. Furthermore, the case of the National Park shows that more governance (in this case participation) does not always lead to better, i.e. more effective policy processes.

## **3.12 Norwegian Living Forests process**

*Moen Ouff, S., E.R. Yttredal and L.J. Halvorsen*

### **3.12.1 Introduction**

Norwegian forestry is overall characterized by relatively small forest properties and a large amount of forest owners. Today it has remained the third largest export industry in the country. The Living Forests (LF) Process is a new mode of governance in Norwegian forestry, and was initiated in order to secure sustainable forestry in economic, social and ecological terms. The process had a modest start between the forest owners, the forest industry and the government in 1995, growing over the next

year into a large scale process of face-to-face negotiations on standards for sustainable forestry also with NGO's on environment and social issues. The analysis deals with the process from the beginning in 1995, until a major shift is made late 2006, transforming the project-organisation into a permanent Living Forests Council.

Governance as such is a growing phenomenon in the Norwegian policy context. However, in forestry this is the very first example of this kind of process, and of this scale. Also, the Living Forests Standards is included as one of several documents to make up the Norwegian NFP. For these reasons, it was decided to analyse the Living Forests Process in the set of GoFOR case studies. Being the only non-governmental part of the NFP, it was interesting to find out what it consisted in, in order to achieve this status, and how the parties carried out the cooperation in order to obtain the objectives of their efforts.

### **3.12.2 Main characteristics of governance case**

Living Forests 1995-2006 is an inter-sectoral co-operation process taking place between stakeholders from forestry, environmental and outdoor recreational organisations, trade unions, consumers' organisations and the government. The main objective of the process is to achieve and document sustainable forestry in Norway. This is handled by providing new knowledge on forest conditions, forestry's impact on forest conditions and by forming this knowledge into standards for sustainable forestry. Later, certification schemes have also been worked out. In the Ministry of Agriculture's opinion the government should not be directly involved in this kind of regulation in industry and commerce. The requirements in LF Standards 1998/2006 are thus imposed onto private forest management by themselves.

The Living Forests process would most likely not have been formed had it not been for the international market demands forced upon the forest sector. The process of certification has therefore become one of self interest for the forest owners and for the industry. In 1994, this was a project merely within the timber industry. However, this was changed in 1995 and Living Forests was established as a three-year project, financed partially by governmental bodies, and inviting other stakeholders to take part as well. An agreement was signed in 1998. After signing the agreement, the cooperation came to a halt, as there was alleged malpractice of the agreement among the forest owners. This led in the end to one major ENGO's leaving the cooperation prior to the revision of the standards in 2004-2006. In replacement, another umbrella ENGO was invited in. After evaluations and revision of the standards and their impact on the actual forestry performed, the parties decided to institutionalise the co-operation in the Living Forests Council in late 2006. This council was constituted on Dec. 1<sup>st</sup> 2006, and is now a permanent cooperation between the parties.

The most extraordinary feature of the process was the amount of people let into this kind of policy making process in forestry. At its most the process involved more than 150 people in the advisory committee and hearings. Still, there were restrictions as to who was invited into the decision-making committees and working groups. The down-side of negotiations is pointed out to be the time-consuming aspects of the partnership and the fact that not all organisations hold the same finances needed to take part.

The main outputs from LF 1995-2006 are the foundation and continuing renewal of environmental standards for Norwegian forestry, the appointment of the Living Forests Council and the fact that LF is being incorporated in public policies. However,

the cause and effect relationship in environmental issues like this are complex and hard to detect.

There are two main impacts that can be found in the case study: (i) A change in actors' attitudes towards each other, and then mainly a shift in attitude towards ENGOs from the forest owner and industry side. Included and a part of this is also training schemes and courses in sustainable forestry, developed parallel and as a result of the Living Forests process. (ii) A change in attitude towards regimes in governmental forestry administration. The first has led to a shift from focus on documentation to focus on actual environmental sustainability in forestry. The latter has led to policy making outside the political sphere and the question still remains to be answered whether this stands for a democratic turn or not.

The Living Forests Standards have only been in use for ten years, and it is still early to look for the actual outcomes on property level. Still, some changes have already been observed. The two main improvements are the amount of old growth trees left behind when logging, and in relation to the border areas. One area which needs greater improvement is among other things an increased use of closed stand felling.

### **3.12.3 Major insights and conclusions**

The actual outcomes on property level is far from visible yet, expect some early-stage conclusions on the improvement of the amount of old growth trees and the border areas. The more obvious impact the process has made, is on actors' attitude towards each other, which constitutes a major change between these actors. This turn is probably for a large part due to the extensive time span of the process, and also a strong will among the actors to find acceptable solutions for all. International market demands and pressure from global-wide ENGOs, contributes for a large part to this will. The broad participation and inter-sectorial manner of the process also gave without doubt grounds for success. Still, the major output, in the shape of the Living Forests Council, and the Living Forests Standards being implemented in the NFP, is the most extra-ordinary product of the efforts.

## **3.13 Policies to fight corruption in Romania**

*Bouriaud, L.*

### **3.13.1 Introduction**

In Romania, policies to prevent and fight corruption are issued in a governance process developed at the scale of the whole society. It is a process dealing at the national level with economic, policy, and cultural issues. The process is elaborated and controlled from the central level, the sub-national levels having a role limited to execution or implementation. Combating corruption was set as a "national priority" because Romania's integration to NATO and the EU was pending on it. Policies to fight corruption were asked in the frame of critics received from the World Bank, the European Union, Transparency International etc., particularly starting at the mid of the 1990s, and under the pressure of civil society. As a consequence, highest levels of State authorities (President, Parliament, and Premier Minister) were directly involved in the formulation of policies to prevent and fight corruption.

Corruption is also a relevant topic in the forest sector. Studying the forest sector allows insights on how a general, transversal policy is perceived and implemented (transposed, enforced, applied) in a particular sector.

### 3.13.2 Main characteristics of the governance case

The main policy issue addressed by the governance process is how to cope with the corruption phenomenon in the Romanian society. Modifications of legislation were undertaken constantly since 2000, to include the *acquis communautaire* and “good practices” at the European level. The Romanian accession to the EU was a strong reason for close monitoring of policy implementation by European officials. In the process, partnership with NGOs and co-operation with the mass media were developed.

The forestry sector was not nominated in the programmatic documents as a sensitive sector; therefore an action plan against corruption in the sector is not yet adopted. Instead an action plan to fight illegal logging is under progress. Elements of new modes of governance are present, yet the process is not advanced enough to conclude on its effects.

It has to be noticed that the process is still recent, as far as most measures taken since 2000 were not implemented properly until 2004. In the forest sector, the implementation of anticorruption measures is in an incipient stage, and one cannot speak yet about effects.

The outputs produced by the process were in form of laws, institutions, public campaigns, private-public partnership, coalitions, programmes, strategies, institutionalisation of actor forums, demission of officials, and incrimination of some high-situated people involved in corruption.

The impact of the process results from the fact that it succeeded to put corruption issues in the national debate; to increase the transparency of the political decision making process; to develop actor networks; to increase the credibility of the state in fighting corruption towards the citizens and the EU; to increase the capacity of the Department Anticorruption to investigate high-level corruption; to strengthen the law for corruption-related offences; to improve the procedures for investigating corruption; to increase mass-media freedom; to succeed in the EU integration process (knowing that in December 2004 the country had two “red flags” on justice and on corruption that could have delayed the integration after 2007).

In terms of outcomes, one could notice that the interest and skills of NGOs have risen, they were able to monitor the process. The foreign investors have become more confident in the actual government. The Transparency International annual index on corruption has improved (to a little extent, however). The EU Commission appreciated the “significant positive efforts” in policies to cope with corruption. The Romanian president is still very popular amongst citizens while the Prime Minister’s popularity decreased rapidly when the press published about a possible cooperation with a corrupted person. That means that the electorate has become more concerned by the corruption accusation brought by the press against the officials. The magistrates declared to feel more independent, yet the mass media is putting pressure in their decisions. Finally, the percentage of those declaring that they paid bribes to officials decreased by 4% in the latest two years.

### 3.13.3 Major insights and conclusions

Participation, monitoring and evaluation are the main factors explaining the obtained outcomes. The process developed in a continuous evaluation from external observers (e.g. EU, NATO), or internal structures (NGOs, self-evaluation of the institutions involved in fighting corruption). The participation element is explaining most of the effects, if considering also the “participation” of EU commissioners who supported always the reform of Ministry of Justice and the justice system in general. However, the “leadership” element role is salient: any progress in the process could not be done without the strong personal commitment of the Minister Monica Macovei in the period 2004 – 2007.

Compared with the global process, the fight against corruption in the forestry sector contains less new elements of governance. Actually, up to date (end 2007), the corruption and illegal logging affairs in the forest sector were addressed through the same mechanisms that failed in the first place, e.g. regulatory intervention. However, it is expected that the role of civil society increases in the next years.

## 3.14 Implementation of the *acquis communautaire* in nature protection policies in Romania

*Bancu, D.*

### 3.14.1 Introduction

Romanian nature protection policies between 1928 and 2000 were limited to merely declaring protected areas without having a proper administration system for the protected areas. The process of accession to the European Union which started in 2000 brought another perspective towards nature protection. It led to changes in the environmental field, because of the requirement to adapt the national legislation to the European legislation.

The focus of this case study is on the governance process related to the implementation of European legislation in the field of nature protection, notably the establishment of the European Natura 2000 network.

### 3.14.2 Main characteristics of the governance case

The governance process takes place at the national level and is generated by the need to fulfil the requirements for accession to the European Union. The timeframe considered in the case study was 2000 – 2007. The main policy issues dealt with are the process of transposing the EU legal provisions, the process of site designation, and the process of establishing administration structures for protected areas.

Starting from 2000 up to the present, substantially changes were introduced in the nature protection policies under the pressure factor represented by the need to fulfil the requirements for EU accession. The outcome of these changes consists in:

- a new legislative framework, e.g. Environmental Law 265/2006, Protected Areas Law 345/2006;

- new as well as restructured organizations involved in nature protection policies, e.g. the new Ministry of Environment and Sustainable Development, Agencies for Environmental Protection, Inter-Ministerial Committees;
- new “rules of the game”: new modes of interaction and linkage between state actors and NGOs, an increased degree of the involvement of non-state actors in the process.

### **3.14.3 Major insights and conclusions**

The constant effort to ensure an adequate framework for nature protection in line with the European provisions resulted in the adoption of a series of legal acts and the development of plans and programmes. Furthermore, the ongoing process employed in the implementation of Natura 2000 determined gradual changes in the behaviour of state actors and NGOs.

All the procedural elements of the governance process identified in the conceptual framework of the GoFOR project contributed to explaining and understanding the above mentioned effects of the governance process. The difference among them stem from the degree of their involvement in the explaining and understanding the effects.

The most significant contribution to understand the effects of the process is that it had strong “participation”. The changes in the behaviour of different actors favoured most of the effects presented above. A second important element is the role of “accountable expertise”. In this governance process, the interest is in a specific type of expertise, namely scientific information necessary for site designation. From this perspective, the presence or absence of this data might explain some effects of the governance process. Thirdly, the coordination between different levels might explain some effects.

In the process alongside with state actors is acknowledged the presence of non-state actors, as well. An important aspect to consider is the new ways NGOs developed to interact with state actors at different levels (e.g. contacting directly the European level, mediating, launching a petition with the aim to put nature protection back on the agenda etc.). The coordination between different sectors is requested and necessary. Unfortunately, there is still much to do in this respect, beyond the mere inclusion in different programmatic documents of the need for inter-sectoral coordination.

## **3.15 General Plan of Forest Policy of Catalonia (Spain)**

Pecurul, M., G. Dominguez, J. Tena

### **3.15.1 Introduction**

Meeting legal requirements of the Catalan forest act (law 6/88 forestal de Catalunya) was the main driving force for the formulation and implementation of the General Plan of Forest Policy (Pla General de Política Forestal, *PGPF*). The forest act also states that the administration responsible for forest competences is in charge of this task. Thus, the sub-General Directorate of Forests and Biodiversity in the Environment and Housing Department (Departament de Medi Ambient i Habitatge, DMAH) was directly in charge of developing the *PGPF*.

The formulation of the new Forest Plan was seen for the editor board to implement a new policy style, considering participation as a main tool to involve the largest possible range of social, technical and scientific actors related to the Catalan forestry. The sub-General Directorate of Forests and Biodiversity in the DMAH took this opportunity to reinforce the traditionally weak power of the forest administration in relation with other administrations.

### **3.15.2 Main characteristics of the governance case**

The process of formulation of the Forest Plan of Catalonia lasted four years and so far has not been approved. During this period participation has been observed in all the stages of the policy process: Diagnosis of the Catalan Forest Sector (April-June 2003), Definition of Objectives (July-October 2004), Definition of Strategies (December 2004-February 2005), Definition of Action (March-April 2005) and Presentation (June-October 2005). Three main limitations to the process detected during the analysis are the following:

1. The process lasted beyond two legislatures and the political instability was a limitation for the approval. Even one year after the project had been finished, the document has not been approved yet.
2. The forest administration had little weight in the government (the forest sector is not very important in economic terms and the forest department was managed by the smallest party of the coalition), therefore it was difficult for them to negotiate the economical support to the plan in the government.
3. Internal and old fights in the Environment Ministry among foresters and biologists running different under-secretaries have influenced the limits of the PGPF and also the attitude of some actors towards the new PGPF.

The team in charge of the document was an editorial board, including people from the forest administration and researchers from a research institute. In order to include more points of view and contribution in the document, four different groups of people were considered, and also four different specific strategies of participation were designed.

1. A panel of experts elaborated the Diagnosis of the Catalan Forest Sector (SWOT analysis) and facilitated the establishment of a working dynamic and a dialogue between those entities and associations.
2. Associations and entities in the sector participated in the Definition of Strategies. Forest owners, industry but also nature conservation entities, and forest users' entities (e.g. excursionists) attended workshops.
3. A mandatory process of public information also was organized to include the opinion of citizens not included in any association.
4. Finally, 25 thematic groups within the forest administration were organized. They transformed the result of the participatory workshop in some actions "do-able" for the forest administration and they assigned a preliminary budget for those actions.

A broad participatory process was carried out, with the involvement of 70 associations, with some actors joining the process only once it had already begun (e.g. Greenpeace or the Motor Vehicle Association). Access to the information was considered good by the participants. Different layouts and media were displayed to



reach a major number of groups and people (web pages, different versions of the same document, etc.). However, the process had a low impact on the media.

The main motivation for actors to participate was their will to influence the content of the NFP. New actors took the process as an opportunity to be known by the traditional sector.

### **3.15.3 Major insights and conclusions**

Overall, the participatory process has been assessed as satisfactory and only inconstant feedback on the information has been pointed out as a problem, especially at the end of the process. Although in general, the opening of the process to other actors has been seen as positive; the traditional sector (forest ownership and industry) was afraid to loss their direct influence and complained about it in certain moments.

Intersectoral coordination has been conducted mainly through bilateral private meetings between departments in the administration. The 25% of the actions contained in the document are coordination and planning actions. However, only 44 of the 96 actions specify the actors that should be coordinated. More than half of them (56%) claimed for coordination between departments and undersecretaries within the Department of Environment and Housing.

Regarding multilevel coordination, deficiency or absence of coordination between the regional and the national forests administrations have been observed. There are no channels that foster this communication like in other policy fields (e.g. natural protected areas) where there are some commissions. However, in practical terms, this multilevel coordination was not compulsory as the responsibilities are clearly split between the different levels. The local level was poorly involved in the process. Lack of resources and different interests from the strategic scope of the FPC were some impeding factors for local administrations to participate. In fact, this process established the basis for a new tactical forest planning figure. This figure should cover the gap between the regional and local forest planning, fostering the coordination between local and regional actors.

In general, the majority of interviewed people expressed the opinion that the outcome of the panel of experts had been more technical than political. The panel of experts was formed by sixteen people that were selected by the Editor Board. They had varied training, field of work and geographic origin. Furthermore, they had some common characteristics: they are all good experts in the Catalan forest field, both in a practical way and theoretical, they are members of more than one forest organization and good communicators and with a real involvement in the forest sector. Despite of the partial selection of the experts, and their membership to different organizations makes it difficult to distinguish them from a stakeholder, all the interviewed agreed on the experts' accountancy and legitimacy. This credibility is based on the belief of their professionalism and on their own responsibility as well-know agents in the forest sector

A system of periodical meetings for planning next steps was established in order to do not lose track of the process and feed it continuously: Previous outputs for the process were taken into account when defining the next steps of the process and measures for monitoring and assessing the implementation have been established, with a revision of the actions (but not of the objectives and the strategic lines, that

were defined for the long term) every 5 years. However, the implementation has not started as the plan has not been approved yet.

The main output of the program was the Action Proposal with 391 actions in 5 thematic programs. Other outputs are a new normative associated to new land-use planning figures range and a new tactical forest management plans (ot approved yet). On the other hand the most important impact of the process has been the improvement of the communication among actors and the inclusion of new actors (mainly users) in the forest policy outcomes.

## 4 Analysis along procedural elements

### 4.1 Participation

*Boon, T.E., I. Nathan, D.H. Lund, G. Buttoud, and I. Kouplevatskaya*

The aim of this chapter is to analyse the role of participation in each of the 19 cases within the GoFOR project, covering 10 European countries. The overriding question is: what is the anticipated role/aim of participation and how does it work out in practice?

The chapter is introduced with a conceptual framework for analysing participation (Chapter 4.1.1), followed by analysis of the case studies (Chapter 4.1.2) and conclusions (Chapter 4.1.3).

#### 4.1.1 Conceptual approach

A political ambition to strengthen public participation in forest and natural resources decision-making has grown during the past twenty years throughout the European countries. It is reflected in the international forest policy agreements, from Rio to the Lisbon Resolutions on people and forests, and indeed, with the Aarhus convention on access to information, participation and rights to appeal environmental decisions (Boon 2002). But to this date, it appears that public authorities initiate participation processes as an end in itself, without a clear idea of the scope, form and consequences of conducting such a process.

From a citizen viewpoint, participation can be defined as “activities that affect formulation, adoption and implementation of public policies and/or that affect the formation of political communities in relation to issues or institutions of public interest” (Andersen et al. 1993:32). Such activities can be membership of associations, signing or initiating petitions, lobbying, civil disobedience, forest policy discussions, participation in advisory boards and hearings, use of public appeal rights, or buying forest products according to political convictions, i.e. be a political consumer (Boon 2002).

From a public administration viewpoint, participation can be defined as, e.g. for forestry: “The effort of forest management or the planning team (1) to actively and continually provide the public with a wide range of opportunities to influence forest planning and management, and (2) to systematically analyse, evaluate and subsequently incorporate - to the extent possible - the resulting public input in the forest plans” (Gernow 1995:22). This form of participation may be labelled ‘public involvement’. Such efforts are often characterised by the degree of power sharing with the public, ranging from restricted two-way communication (e.g. surveys, public excursions), to consultation (hearings, advisory boards) and co-operation (e.g. task forces) to partnership and citizen control (e.g. self-governing land owner groups, Agenda 21 or NGO initiatives) (Boon 2002).

A third definition is suggested by FAO/ECE/ILO (2000):

“Participation – public participation is a *voluntary process* whereby people, individually or through organized groups, can *exchange information, express*

*opinions and articulate interests*, and have the potential to influence decisions or the outcome of the matter at hand. The aim is to generate a widely acceptable management plan; increasing reliance on market forces as alternatives to state governance” (FAO/ECE/ILO 2000). Notice, that this definition deliberately includes the aim to move from state governance (government) towards market forces.

The essence of all three definitions is that participation is about citizens being given or themselves taking opportunities to influence decision processes of public interest. In continuation of this, Arnstein (1969) formulated participation as “... the redistribution of power that enables the have-not citizens, presently excluded from the political and economic processes, to be deliberately included in the future”, and distinguished between forms of participation according to the degree to which they actually enable the redistribution of power.

### **Why participation?**

There are many, possible purposes of participation, as stated in policy documents as well as theoretical papers on participation (summarised in, e.g. Boon 2000, 2002, Kouplevatskaya 2006):

- Giving citizens opportunity to influence decision processes of public interest
- A more effective natural resources management, e.g. by adapting the services and products to consumer/user demands, by using local knowledge to improve management, or to co-operate with key stakeholders on joint problem-solving, hereby mitigating adverse conflicts.
- A legitimate, public natural resources management, adapted to the shifting expectations of society.
- Enhance shared understanding of a given decision process and the related interests and viewpoints of the various stakeholders.
- Social capital: create local networks, build mutual trust, generate ideas, commitment and resources
- Empower citizens to take part in environmental decision-making
- Increase environmental awareness among the public
- Mobilise citizens to voluntary environmental work, either independently, or as part of public management.
- Democratisation of political-administrative systems.

To use each of these objectives as yardsticks for evaluating a given participation process would be unfair. Each process should be measured up against the objectives stated for that particular process. But the list serves to illustrate the many expectations there may be to a participation process, irrespective of stated objectives.

### **What is an appropriate degree of participation?**

There is a standing disagreement as to how extensive participation in public decision-making should be. Some would argue that participation should be limited to the periodical public election of representatives (i.e. the politicians in Parliament, municipalities, etc.). And further, that public decision-making should be left entirely to the politicians in between elections, as that is the best way to ensure a just and equal treatment of all citizens, with no citizens having better opportunities than others to affect decision-making according to their own interests. A main philosophy is that

citizens should be protected *from* the state and a criterion of success is an optimal distribution of scarce resources among citizens. Democracy is a procedure to ensure this. Participation should either be based on representation (e.g. socio-demographic sample as used for e.g. surveys and citizen summits), or they should be limited in relation to topic and influence, e.g. consultations to adapt public services to user demands.

Others would argue opposite - that citizens should be ensured access to take part in decision-making, *being part of* the state. Because individual interests are not fixed, and through dialogue, it is possible that new and shared understandings and interests may emerge. A criterion of success is that citizens can see themselves as an included part in decision-making. Hereby, it becomes essential that citizens have access to decision-making also between elections. In this perspective, democracy becomes a way of life, rather than merely a procedure. Participation based on deliberating dialogue is an integral part of this.

Participation processes can be evaluated with regard to representation and the extent to which they allow for deliberating dialogue, respectively. The importance attached to these two factors varies with the democracy perspective.

### **Different forms of participation**

The different forms of public participation can be categorised according to their potential degree of power sharing between decision-makers and participants, see Table 6. With the criterion that participation should allow affected parties to influence decision-making, then information dispersal and exchange of information (e.g. excursions and surveys) cannot be labelled participation, but they may be useful part of an overall involvement strategy. Public consultation is where the decision-maker invites affected parties for public input with the aim to take it into account in decision-making, but still without delegating or sharing decision authority. Consultation then potentially allows affected parties to influence decision-making. But Arnstein (1969) argues that participation is only genuine when it comes to actual co-operation with shared decision-power, whereas consultation is nothing more than tokenism as long as decision-makers are only obliged to consult the public, not necessarily to take the resulting input into account in decision-making.

Consultation methods vary, from simply public meetings or allowing for written feedback on e.g. draft acts or plans, and on to facilitated series of workshops, seminars and conferences structured with the aim to stimulate dialogue among participants and eventually come to conclusions on recommended future action, whether based on majority vote or consensus. Examples are scenario workshops, consensus conference (Andersen & Jæger 1999), and constructive confrontation method (Buttoud 1999). Some methods further include a structured combination of expert and laymen input, as e.g. with citizen panels. Other methods combine deliberation and representation, as e.g. deliberative polls (Hansen 2000, Price and Neijens 1998) and citizen summit (Smith 2005), where a socio-demographically representative sample of citizens is invited to discuss a set of topics and subsequently vote among a set of options for each topic, based on informed dialogue. Obviously, the potential degree of influence depends on the applied method. An overview of methods can be found in, e.g. Smith (2005).

**Table 6: Categories of participation**

Participation method	
Info dispersal	Pamphlets, newsletters, bulletin boards, press releases, newspaper articles, radio & tv programmes, advertising, readers' letters, home pages, exhibitions, excursions, nature schools
Info feedback	Public meetings, open house, excursions, hot line, telephone calls, feedback mailings, daily employee-stakeholder interactions, surveys, environmental impact assessment (EIA), social impact assessment (SIA), focus groups, interviews
Consultation & collaborative learning	Public hearing, expert advisory boards, collaborative learning, transactive planning, workshops, mutual gains method, community of interests, environmental mediation, 4R method, constructive confrontation, informed consensus approach, citizen panels, landcare groups, search conferencing, planning cells, citizen juries, consensus conferences.
Co-operation	Method involving shared decision-power, whether it be standing committees, project groups or one of the consultation methods mentioned above
Public control	Activities where citizens hold the initiative and decision-power, e.g. Agenda 21 activities, local action groups
<i>Appeal decisions</i>	<i>Rights of affected stakeholders to appeal decisions made according to particular acts.</i>

based on Boon (2000)

### Analytical framework based on input-output legitimacy

The Gofor cases were selected to examine new modes of governance in Europe including the significance of participation. The aim was to compare the case studies with regard to the significance of participation in relation to effectiveness and procedural legitimacy.

The terms democratic legitimacy and effectiveness draw on two identified core concepts of legitimacy: input and output legitimacy (Scharpf 1999). *Input legitimacy* refers to legitimisation through participation (inclusion) and balanced representation of relevant stakeholders. Input legitimacy is defined as follows: “political choices are legitimate if and because they reflect the will of the people, that is, if they can be derived from the authentic preferences of the members of a community. Input oriented arguments often rely simultaneously on rhetoric of participation and consensus (Scharpf 1999). *Output legitimacy* refers to legitimisation through problem solving (“effectiveness”).

Participation is sometimes considered as an aim in it self, sometimes as a means to improve problem solving (“effectiveness”). In this sense, the role of participation in relation to normative criteria of legitimacy can be interpreted both in terms of democratic/input legitimacy and in terms of effectiveness/output legitimacy.

In the analysis we look at

1. Rhetoric: The extent to which the different cases are designed as participatory processes, what are the rationales for designing them as such (input or output legitimacy?)
2. Process: What forms of participation characterise the processes, and whether participation can be said to have been a basic feature of the process or rather just a corner of it, factors having supported or constrained participatory processes,

3. Effect: The extent to which the participatory elements have actually created momentum for new stakeholders to influence the processes including (a) the extent to which the processes have been inclusive or exclusive (input) (b) the extent to which participation has actually made a difference (output) (c) or rather has been a show off for decision makers to legitimise their decisions

#### 4.1.2 Participation in comparative analysis

All GoFOR cases were selected partly for featuring some form of public participation as this element is a prominent characteristic of new modes of governance. Therefore all 19 case studies provide empirical examples of various formalised forms of public participation, reasons for including participatory procedures in policy processes as well as experiences of how they worked out in practice.

The vast majority of selected cases are government initiated and therefore the participatory procedures were induced, designed and to differing extents controlled by public officials. The only exceptions are the second national park initiative of the Dutch Utrechtse Heuvelrug and to some extent the Groene Woud cases and the Norwegian living forest project which were partly considered non-governmental processes, but even here the public administrators still played an influential role. The GoFOR project therefore focuses on government initiated participatory processes, *not* on pure bottom-up, non-governmental processes.

This chapter is concerned with how the chosen modes of participation match the stated aims and reasons for having participatory procedures. The overriding question is: what is the anticipated role/aim of participation and how does it work out in practice?

##### 4.1.2.1 Importance of participation in the case studies

Table 7 shows to what degree 'participation' can be considered a characteristic element of the case and to what degree it may explain success or failure of the policy process, according to the overall judgement of the case study authors (GoFor Comparative Frames, country reports August 2007). For both dimensions, an ordinal scale has been applied, with three categories being: 'rather unimportant', 'important', 'very important'.

In 15 of the 19 GoFor cases participation has been ranked as an important (4) or even very important (11) element to characterise the governance process.

In 16 of the 19 cases, participation was also considered either important (6) or very important (10) to explain the overall successes/failures of the governance process.

Participation was considered important to specify the overall character of the governance process for various reasons: In some cases participation was considered particularly important because of former lack of participation in policy making (GR-MA, ROM-ACP, ROM-NAT, HUN-NFP), whereas in other cases participation was visible already at an early stage (NL-NfP, NL-GW). In some cases participation was considered important because it dominated the Ministry's rhetoric regarding the process (AT-AFD, DK-NPP), and in others because participation enabled participants to actively shape and influence the process (FR-CFT, F-RP, ROM-ACP, NOR-LF).

Participation was considered important to explain the overall successes/failures of the governance process for various reasons, acknowledging that the rated importance depends on what it understood by success/failure). In case of the AT-AFD, DK-NPP and NOR-LF, participation added democratic legitimacy to the process, whereas e.g. the limited participation in the AT-BS also limited the political standing of the Austrian BS, as struggling opposing actor coalitions led to a weak strategy. In F-RP and NOR-LF participation was essential in shaping the output and the continued implementation, and in the DK-HD complaints from ENGOs and landowners also actively shaped policy implementation, in spite of limited emphasis on public participation in the policy design. In some cases, the participation led to an increase in the diversity of stakeholders being involved (GR-MA, DK-NPP, NL-NfP).

**Table 7: Importance of Participation in the GoFor case studies**

		Participation as characteristic element of the governance case		
Importance of participation for success or failure		Rather unimportant	Important	Very important
	Rather unimportant	GER-GAK		
	Important	DK-HD	AT-BS ROM-NAT ROM-ACP	GER-RA GER-L+
	Very important		FR-CFT	AT-AFD DK-NPP F-RP GR-MA HUN-NFP NL-NfP NL-UH NL-GW NOR-LF

Source: GoFor Comparative Frames, country reports August 2007

#### *4.1.2.2 The role of participation in the rhetoric of the studied policy processes and why the processes are participatory*

In the following, we describe what role participation plays in the rhetoric of the studied policy processes, and what are the main rationales given for designing participatory processes.

The following Table gives a descriptive overview of the rationales and aims of having participatory procedures in the 19 case studies as they were stated by the initiators of the processes.



**Table 8: Stated aims of participation in the cases**

Austria AFD 2003–2005	<p>The process should be an open, ongoing dialogue to formulate and document interests and mutual expectations in forests and forestry among national governmental and non-governmental organisations in a first Forest Programme. There should be active participation; openness and transparency in the process; an inter-disciplinary, holistic approach was pursued; and the highest degree of consensus and mutual accommodation was sought through deliberation.</p> <p>The forest dialogue should be a “Cornerstone for new forms of cooperation for cross-linkage of ecological, economic and social concerns” (yet within the limitations of existing rules and regulations i.e. e.g. existing subsidy programmes were excluded from deliberations)</p>
Austria BDS 1996-2007	<p>The purpose of participation in the Biodiversity Commission was to ensure Information exchange regarding biodiversity, facilitate coordination and cooperation between different activities and programmes in the field of biodiversity. Decision-making should be consensus-based, but the commission had no authority for politically binding decisions. Participation in the revision process was to ensure awareness rising of 2010 goals, the collection of suggestions of necessary activities, and to derive objectives and measures to include in the BS.</p>
Denmark HD 1992-2007	<p>From the onset participation was not considered an issue as the process was perceived to be a technical procedure without actual consequences for others than public authorities. It was not until late in the process when the procedures regarding the Natura 2000 plans were disclosed that there were any statements regarding participation: citizens and organisations were to have the possibility to bring in their ideas in a 6 month hearing phase.</p>
Denmark NPP 2001-2007	<p>The rhetoric of the Minister of Environment when initiating the process was dominated by the need to bring in local values and norms in the determination of the content of a prospective national park, ensure openness and direct involvement of citizens in addition to the involvement of interest organisations in boards, and in cooperation with local and national authorities as well as businesses. Active participation was to ensure local anchorage and co-ownership of the prospective national parks among the citizens.</p>
France CFT 2001-2007	<p>Participation as such is a goal and promoted by a clear legal requirement. The forest charters are to enable mutual decisions between public and private forest owners providing services and the users and stakeholders interested in those services. Stakeholders should bring their contribution to the restructuring of French forests. In the processes the participants should strive for consensus or at least recognised compromise. All potential interests should be heard and decision-making take place in and by networks of actors and as a continuous process.</p>
France RPF 1999 – 2007 (ongoing until 2009)	<p>There was no a priori rhetoric. Participation occurred as a necessity to address the crisis created by the 1999 storm. In the relief plan participation was considered the key to ensure common action and transparency regarding how various measures were implemented. Lessons learned in one place should be available for others to learn from.</p>
Germany IRD, LEADER+, Regionen Aktiv, GAK 2000-2007	<p>“Regional development builds primarily upon the existing potentials and the expertise of a region's population.” and that “the heart of integrated rural development is the partnership between policymakers and administration, the citizens, economic operators and science”. And: “With all due respect to the elected local structures, the development initiative must maintain its creative independence, while policy-makers and administration contribute their administrative professionalism and support to the process” (BMELV 2005: 11).</p> <p>Both the interested and proactive as well as the more reluctant citizens should be involved. Citizens should rediscover forms of civic engagement within their communities. Transparent structures and clear rules for all actors involved are recommended.</p>
Greece NP End 90s- 2007	<p>From legal texts can be deduced that participatory procedures aim to establish public dialogue, raise environmental awareness and give interest groups and affected stakeholders possibility and right to deliberate with the public authorities. Landowners directly affected by conservation measures are entitled to negotiate compensation measures with the state authorities. Participation should furthermore lead to more transparent and democratic decision-making.</p>
Hungary NFP 2001-2007 (2015)	<p>Participation was to give institutions, organisations and individuals concerned with forestry the chance to respond to the challenges in coordinated and active manner in order to achieve a common programme and develop the social utilization of forests. Consensus seeking for further social development of the forest. There was a specific aim to open up for others than the usual suspects</p>

Netherlands GW 1945-2007	There are different discourses over the years, and the case study covers a wide variety of processes that individual aims are difficult to discern. Landowners are from the beginning important to involve in participatory procedures in order to implement coherent plans. Gaining knowledge of the area is also a reason for participation. Furthermore local commitment is deemed as a prerequisite for successful projects.
Netherlands NfP 1999-2000	Nature should meet the demands of society, the government wished to introduce policies which integrate multiple objectives, the people should embrace their responsibility for nature and the approach should ensure a better implementation on the ground.
Netherlands UH 1945-2007	Participation is necessary to make the various projects successful, as the different landowners need to be involved. Regarding the ecological main structure knowledge of the local conditions is needed.
Norway LF 1995-2006	The process aims to improve the reputation of Norwegian forestry in terms of sustainability. As public awareness on environmental issues is growing, the government finds it wise to incorporate a wider range of actors in the policy making, also to legitimise the process towards international markets.
Romania Anti- Corruption 2000-2007	To ensure transparency and openness to decisions in the public administration. Control of agency regarding the spending of public funds. Informing, involving and educating the public and establish partnerships with NGOs.
Romania Natura 2000	To ensure transparency and openness to decisions in the public administration. Control of agency regarding the spending of public funds. A rationale for involving the public is to raise awareness of the negative consequences and costs of corruption, and hereby changing the public culture to strengthen democracy.
Spain RFP	Broad public involvement in order to strengthen the forest sector. "to promote the public participation, to improve the social perception and to motivate the communication of the forest sector" (p. 8). "It is expected that the process stimulates capacity-building and favours the development of beliefs and preferences for public participation and democratic institutions" (p. 43). All actors should contribute their knowledge. Participation is defined as a wide array of processes and mechanisms that allows taking part in decision-making.

Source: GoFor Main assessment reports, comments to CF draft, Göttingen meeting 2007

It was expected that (in the government-initiated cases<sup>7</sup>) participatory processes have been initiated with reference to requirements of international treaties and national legal frameworks, particularly in those cases where participation has not traditionally been considered part of the political culture.

The Austrian Forest Dialogue (AFD). The process was initiated by government, who from the beginning declared participation one of the main basic principles of the process. The motivating elements first and foremost included 'the international discourse on participatory processes and international commitments', e.g. EU legislation, the Proposals for Action of the IPF and IFF, the MCPFE Vienna Resolution. Ongoing NFP processes in other EU countries and ongoing participatory strategy processes in Austria including the Austrian Strategy for Sustainable Development inspired the process. Rhetorically, the initiators and coordinators of the process emphasised openness and transparency, and the aim of reaching consensus. The rationales for having a participatory process thus, first and foremost,

<sup>7</sup> For the government initiated cases, it obviously makes sense to look at the governments' stated reasons for introducing participation. In the NOR-LF and in cases where participation has rather spontaneously emerged, like the Dutch cases, it cannot be understood in the light of rhetoric.

relate to international and national legal frameworks and are stated mainly in terms of input legitimacy.

Austria's biodiversity strategy is also a process initiated by the government. In its rhetoric, the government makes no explicit reference to the importance of participation, but the issue is brought forward in other formal documents closely related to the national biodiversity strategy. These include (1) the Convention on Biological Diversity, which encourages the co-operation between governmental authorities and private actors in developing methods for sustainable use of biological resources, and (2) the Pan-European Strategy on Biological and Landscape Diversity seeks to ensure that "full public involvement in conservation ... is assured". Hence, for the specific case, participation is not a declared aim, but it does play a role in the process, the rationale includes references to international treaties and national frameworks. Moreover, the rationale tends to fall into the category of output legitimacy, as participation is closely tied up with sustainability and conservation, but this link is not very clear from the case.

In the implementation of the Habitat directive/Natura 2000 by the Danish Government, participation was not considered an issue in the beginning of the process apart from having limited consultative processes with regard to ensuring good technical quality of the decisions. The reasons given were that Natura 2000 would only rarely affect private citizens and that nature types and habitats would be conserved sufficiently through voluntary agreements and preservation. Gradually, rhetoric changed towards actually having public involvement. This happened mainly with reference to a wish of making the process efficient/effective through dialogue with affected landowners, and by having the public contributing with proposals, ideas, and comments. Hence, the major rationale was to ensure efficiency/effectiveness by creating support from the public was a major element in the rhetoric of the Danish government. Here, again the distinction between input and output legitimacy is blurred because the argument links participation with effectiveness, but as the main objective is effectiveness, the argument tends to approach output legitimacy.

Like Natura 2000, the Danish National Park Pilot Project was designed by the government. Contrary to Natura 2000 it was designed as a participatory process from the very beginning. The process was initiated as a response to OECD's recommendations of introducing national parks in Denmark and of having participatory processes leading to the selection of these national parks. The first nature commission (national) explicitly referred to these recommendations and to international treaties such as Rio and the Aarhus convention. Later on during implementation, there was hardly any reference to the international level. Here, rhetoric focused on issues such as creating a sense of local ownership, basing policies on voluntary action and dialogue, finding new models for co-operation, and to ensure clarity, transparency, and rule of the law. Hence, in the very beginning, reference to the international level was a major issue, while during implementation input legitimacy in terms of creating support from the public was a major element in the rhetoric of the Danish government.

The CFT case in France is a government designed legal framework opening up for initiatives from below. As a framework, it was initiated by the government with clear reference to the Forestry law 2001 which requires participatory processes. The

Forestry Law refers to the Rio declaration and considers participatory processes as a new modality for public and local management as a whole. One of the purposes of the CFT process was to ensure that forest decisions were based on consensus or at least on recognised compromises between clearly expressed positions of stakeholders, and to involve actors even in direct funding of policies. With regard to the rationales explicitly given for participation, the CFT case thus tends to fall into the category of input legitimacy, and the process indirectly refers to international and national requirements as well.

In the French Relief Plan for Forest, participation was spontaneously promoted in a situation of crisis. All stakeholders acknowledged that participation was needed because the local administration was not sufficiently equipped to face the emergency. In the initial project document, participation was mentioned as a key word and it was justified from two view points: The need to structure a common reaction to the crisis, and the need for transparent processes and learning. Hence, this case is based on input as well as output legitimacy but does not refer to international treaties etc.

In Germany, LEADER+ is an EU programme, and as such has to follow the LEADER+ rules. Here, EU states that LEADER is a new approach to rural development policy which is participative. One of the rationales is to ensure “a broad and well organised participation of individuals and local groups” and thus, participation is seen as an aim in its own right. Another rationale is to address problems in partnership in a more effective and efficient manner, and to ensure “acceptance” for policy measures by involving actors concerned. A third rationale was to ensure labour free of charge resulting from voluntary work and contributions from different stakeholders. Participatory processes are what “Regionen Aktiv” is all about. Following arguments in favour of participation could be identified: achievement of regional specific solutions, providing decision making processes with democratic legitimacy, mobilisation of people as a goal in itself, to create synergies between people within the regions, to mobilise ideas, activities and resources contributed by regional actors. GAK Participation is important for re-allocation of tasks among citizens and the state. Hence, in the German cases, participatory processes are initiated on the basis of all three categories of rationales.

The Government-led Greek National Park Administration case is, as other initiatives in Greece, based on legal reforms influenced by the Rio conference and Agenda 21, and the effort of the state to harmonise EU environmental law and Directives into the national law. Based on this, many programmatic statements and legal texts since 1992 include provisions to encourage greater degree of direct public influence in the management of protected areas by putting more emphasis on the deliberative role of the society in formulating management plans, to inform the public about environmental issues, and to initiate a dialogue between local interest groups and the authorities. A major stated objective of having participatory processes is to reach consensus between the different interest groups. In the specific case, there is not much rhetoric in relation to participation. The only documented argument in favour of participatory processes was that it leads to more democratic and transparent decisions. The expectations of regional authorities were to ensure that the biological resources are adequately protected on the ground. Hence, with regard to rationales, the Greek case is not strong in relation to participation. In general, it appears that the Greek government tends to justify participatory processes by referring to international

and national legal frameworks and by input legitimacy while the regional authorities in the specific case refer to output legitimacy.

The Hungarian government explicitly recognises the participation principle in relation to the national forest programme case. The main reason for this is that this principle is stated in international forest policy documents such as the FAO NFP guidelines and MCPFE resolutions. EU accession supports governance in the sense that it provides for additional motivation through political commitments at the national level from outside the forestry sector. Some reference is made internally to the development and reform needs of the Hungarian forest sector. Moreover, there is some mentioning of the added value of participation in terms of enhancing the implementation process. In this light, the Hungarian case falls into the category of input legitimacy.

The Dutch cases are examples of participatory processes which have not been initiated by government, but which have grown out of initiatives by different actors having changed over time. Hence, it does not make sense to analyse rhetoric in relation to these processes.

The Norwegian Living Forests process (1995-2006) is another example of a process which is not formally initiated by the government. It is an inter-sectorial co-operation project between governmental and non-governmental stakeholders. The main objective of the process is to achieve and document sustainable forestry in Norway. These objectives have not changed over time. Hence, participation does not play any significant role in the rhetoric surrounding the Living Forests process, but participation does play a significant role in that it is an integrated part of the process.

In the two Romanian cases (fighting corruption in the forest sector and implementation of the EU *acquis communautaire*) there are no programmatic statements about participation of the public. The processes are, however, submitted to different laws, which do call for participation in this and similar processes. These laws refer to participation and democracy as an aim in itself: democracy needs to be strengthened through increased options for participation. Moreover, the laws refer to participation as a means to increase efficiency/effectiveness through increased openness and transparency in the process and providing the public with information (both cases), and by creating greater public awareness about environmental protection, and taking into consideration the interests of the local communities (*acquis communautaire*). International conventions such as the Aarhus Convention has been transferred to Romanian environmental law ensuring public access to information, the right to address the authorities with environmental problem and to be consulted regards environmental policies. Hence, the rationales of the two Romanian cases fall within all the three categories of international level, input and output legitimacy.

In the Spanish FGP case, participation is characterised as “an inspiring principle”. The purpose is for all sectors and social groups to contribute with knowledge and proposals, to improve communication in the forest sector, to improve the social perception, to increase the forest sector cohesion and confidence, political commitment of the results, to increase transparency in the process and to ensure access to information. It is expected that the process stimulates capacity-building and favours the development of beliefs and preferences for public participation and

democratic institutions. In the end, the main objective of having participation is “to improve the success of the implementation”. In this sense, the Spanish case tends to fall mainly within the category of input legitimacy although it is difficult to separate the two categories, as participation is seen both as an end and as a means.

Table 9 below lists the conclusions for easy comparison.

**Table 9: Comparing government rhetoric in the different cases**

	Justify participation by referring to international treaties and legal frameworks	Justify participation / democracy as a goal in itself (input legitimacy)	Justify participation as a means to increase effectiveness (output legitimacy)	Specific rationales classified as input/output legitimacy
Austrian Forest Dialogue	+	+	-	Openness; Transparency; Consensus
Austria's Biodiversity Strategy	+	(-)	(+)	Ensure public involvement; Sustainability; Conservation
Danish Natura 2000 Process	-	(+)	+	Dialogue with landowners; The public contribute with proposals, ideas, comments; Creating support from the public; Efficiency/effectiveness
Danish National Park Pilot Project	(-)	+	-	Local ownership; Voluntary action; Dialogue; New models for co-operation; Clarity, transparency, rule of the law
CFT case in France	+	+	(-)	Consensus/recognised compromises; Involve actors
French Relief Plan for Forest	-	+	+	Participation needed to solve crisis/problem solving; Transparent processes and Learning
German IRDP (Leader + , Regionen Aktiv, GAK)	+	+	+	Ensure broad participation; Ensure stakeholders' acceptance; Provide decision making with democratic legitimacy; Mobilise people; Create synergies between people within the regions; Mobilise ideas and resources; Address problems in a more effective and efficient manner; Ensure contributions from stakeholders; Achievement of regional specific solutions
Greek National Park Administration case	+	+	(+)	General: Encourage direct public influence; Inform the public; Dialogue; Create consensus Specific: Democratic and transparent decisions; Local: Adequately protection of natural resources
Hungarian NFP process	+	(-)	(+)	Enhance the implementation process
Dutch cases	/	/	/	Analysis of rhetoric not relevant
Norwegian Living Forest	/	/	/	Analysis of rhetoric not relevant
Romania Anti-Corruption	(+)	+	+	Strengthen democracy; Openness and transparency; Information to the public; Increase efficiency/ effectiveness
Romania Natura 2000	+	+	+	Strengthen democracy; Openness and transparency; Information to the public; Create awareness; Increase efficiency/ effectiveness
Spain - Catalonia	-	+	(-)	Participation/democracy; Knowledge; Proposals; Communication; Confidence; Political Commitment; Transparency; Information; Capacity building; Success of implementation

It seems that reasons for referring to output/input as source of legitimacy depends on the nature of the process, i.e. whether it is focused on preparing a plan/policy document or whether it is centred around action.

In a few cases there was a deliberate aim to include a broader set of stakeholders than formerly, as in the NOR-LF mentioned above, the HUN-NFP, and in the DEN-NPP where the focus was both on the organised interests (business, NGOs, local politicians), and also on direct involvement of citizens. In other cases, the main focus was on involving the stakeholders considered crucial for implementation of the decision at hand, typically landowners. This was the case at the outset of the NL-GW and NL-UH from 1945 and onwards.

#### *4.1.2.3 What were the different formalised forms of participation? (and can they be considered a basic feature of the process or rather just a corner of it?)*

All cases were characterised by not only one but a number of formalised forms of participation. An overview of the different forms of participation and stakeholders involved can be found in Table 10.

The cases where the aimed output was a policy document (AT-BS, AT-NFP, HUN-NFP, ROM-ACP, DK-NPP etc.), or a similar specific task (e.g. FR-RPF to prepare relief plan, and GR-MA to manage national parks, GER-rural development cases) had a project organisation with steering committee/board/advisory group, either with intra-ministerial representation (AT-BS) and/or comprised by representatives from main NGOs and business interests, and assisted by a ministerial secretariat (except in the case of NOR-LF where the process was governed by the forest owner organisation).

During a series of meetings the steering committee would then draft the document in question, and the draft document would be circulated for public comment before further refinement and, eventually, be the focus of a public workshop/conference, before final drafting and submission.

In all cases, the steering committee or the assisting secretariat arranged supplementary forms of participation along the process to get input from a broader range of participants. This broader involvement could take the form of:

1. Additional advisory groups that were nominated to assist the steering committee with specialised input, e.g. expert/scientific advisory groups (HUN-NFP, NOR-LF, ESP-FPGP), thematic working groups (AT-BS, DK-NPP) and certification committee (NOR-LF).
2. One-time participation events to involve a broader range of interest groups or citizens at broad include (café) meetings, seminars, (scenario) workshops, citizen summit (DK-NPP), conferences, public hearings through roundtables and public discussions.
3. Multilayered structures. The German rural development cases and the DK-NPP case had a multilayered structure, with a ministerial, (GER also regional)



and a local level, each level with its own participatory structures. At the local level, the process was organised and steered by a (GER: self-nominated) local action group. In the German case this was done according to EU guidelines required to obtain financial support, and in DK-NPP the local steering committees were set down according to some few guidelines laid down by the Minister of Environment, and facilitated by the Ministry of Environment.

4. A range of information activities and informal participation have been carried out in all cases, from press releases and press conferences, internet discussion platforms (HUN-NFP), bilateral conversations, to public-private partnerships between key actors, e.g. between the Romanian Ministry of Justice and the League for human rights (ROM-ACP).
5. Participatory monitoring: In ROM-NAT case, the ministry introduced a participatory nature monitoring system – ‘the Informational System for Natura 2000’, where everyone was invited to upload information about habitats and species in Romania. Another interesting initiative in this case was that the NGOs took on an awareness raising role towards fellow NGOs by conducting ‘train the trainers workshops on NGOs role in securing implementation of the Bird and Habitats directive’.

### **Top-down versus bottom-up initiated**

A ‘bottom-up process’ has positive connotations – ‘the People itself taking the initiative and being active to change the world they live in to the better’. But what if the bottom-up approach involves only some and marginalises other interests? And how can grassroots be held accountable when they are not responsible to anyone but themselves, eventually their organisation? In contrast, a top down approach may be less well-suited at creating local commitment and sense of ownership. But a well-managed top-down approach might be better equipped to ensure representativity and accountability of the process, as ultimately the politicians are accountable to their constituents through the elections.

With one exception, the participation processes were in all cases government initiated, aimed at public input to formulate acts, policies or plans (AT-BS, AT-AFD, DEN-HD, DEN-NPP, FR-CFT, FR-RPF, GR-MA, HUN-NFP, NL-GW, NL-NPPN, NL-UH, ROM-ACP, ROM-NAT, GER-GAK, GER-L+, GER-RA)<sup>8</sup>.

The Norwegian case, the Living Forest Project (N-LF) is unique among the 19 cases as it is the only process that was initiated ‘bottom-up’. The initiator was the private forest owners’ organisation realising the need to strengthen the environmental brand of Norwegian forestry.

In the case of Leader+ in Germany, the public authorities were the initiators, but with the aim to stimulate bottom-up participation, similar to the intention of the Agenda 21.

In a few cases, the public processes were initiated as a response to pressure from NGOs, e.g.

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<sup>8</sup> For instance, in Spain, the General Plan of Forest Policy of Catalonia (ESP-FPGP) was developed through a participatory process, with an expert panel as the core to draft the plan, and inclusion of a broad range of stakeholders through hearings and a public workshop, to give input and comment upon the draft plan.

- In Romania it was pressure from NGO (Transparency International Romania) and the media that led to the initiation of anti-corruption policies.
- The HD implementation in Denmark as well as Romania was furthered by NGO pressure (Birdlife International DK/Romania)

### **What was the role of the public administration in facilitating the process?**

In the cases where the Government/public administration was the initiator, it also governed the process more or less directly.

A few cases aimed at stimulating bottom-up participation, including Leader+ in Germany and DK-NPP. In these processes, the public authorities set the frames and provided funding, but the process itself was to be conducted by participatory committees established for the purpose. Here, the public administration played the role as meta-governors, i.e. indirectly governing the process through e.g. framing and boundary setting.

In the AT-AFD case there were diverging opinions within the Forest Administration (FA) as to how the participation process should be conducted. One group aimed at a participatory set-up with open, flat and transparent, discussion-oriented decision process. Another group favoured a top-down approach in order to be able to control and conduct the process effectively, e.g. the right to decide which thematic topics to include/exclude in the process, something the participating NGOs refused to accept, however.

In the DK-NPP case the Minister of Environment deliberately refrained from imposing detailed guidelines onto the seven national park pilot project groups. All they got was a letter of introduction and a budget. This 'blank paper' approach caused some uncertainty, both among the participants and as to the appropriate roles of the public servants involved. For instance, the public servants associated with the local working groups were to assist with expert input if requested but not to impose proposals.

### **What was the intended output of the processes?**

In half of the cases, the aimed output of the process was a non-binding policy document: A national forest programme/action programme for sustainable forest management (AFD, NOR-LF, ESP-FPGP, HUN-NFP), a biodiversity strategy (ABD), anti-corruption policy statement (ROM-ACP), forest policy charter (FR-CFT) and a national park proposal (DK-NPP). In the rest of the cases, participation was either linked to project implementation, (GER-cases), management of an area (NL-cases, GR-MA, FR-RPF) or implementation of legally binding policies (ROM-NAT, DK-HD).

### **Who participated and who was key participant?**

Regarding participation we distinguish between organised (representatives of interest groups) and non-organised participants ('ordinary citizens').

As Table 10 shows, the forms of participation in the cases focused on ensuring representation of the affected interests through participation by well-defined interest

groups that were considered legitimate representatives<sup>9</sup> of the interests. Another main focus seems to have been on including the participants that were considered crucial for process success.

In 11 of the cases, the national government held the *agenda setting power*, in five cases it was shared with (DKK-NPP, GER-GAK) or entirely held by the federal/local government (GER-RA, GR-MA, NL-GW), and in four cases, the national government shared the agenda setting power with NGOs (FR-RPF, GER-L+, GER-RA, NL-UH), see also Table 10.

The national government, represented by its public officials, was a *key participant* in all but three cases (GER-RA, NL-GW, NL-UH). And in 11 cases, the federal/local government was a key participant (too). Other typical key participants were environmental and recreation NGOs, NGOs representing landowners/farmers/forest owners, and NGOs related to the specific topic at hand (rural development, anti-corruption) as well as representatives from industry (forestry, rural development consultants) and research. In the case of DK-NPP the local steering committee was comprised by a mix of NGO representatives and local mayors, hereby lending legitimacy from the publicly elected politicians. In contrast, the local action groups in the GER-L+ case did *not* have local politicians seated, and the local politicians were hesitant to accept the role of these action groups.

*Involvement of ordinary citizens* was limited to information campaigns and (passive) access to participate in public hearings. As an exception, the DK-NPP process was deliberately structured to combine interest representation with a socio-demographic representation of 'ordinary citizens' through a citizen summit.

### **Who did not participate - was anyone excluded?**

In some cases, actors were reluctant to participate because they didn't see the benefit in it. This was the case for the farmers in relation to GER-L+, as they mainly perceived it as a restraining factor. In other cases actors felt excluded from the process, e.g. in the GR-MA, local farming groups, residents associations and hotel associations felt excluded, in the NL-NPPN the regional and local actors were excluded, and in the NOR-LF, environmental NGOs and representatives of the sami people felt excluded and without influence on the decision-making, as they were not represented in the core steering committee. More subtle, the AT-BS case reported on exclusion of those with less resources to participate and without good ministerial connections. And in the HUN-NFP the process was inclusive at the beginning, but excluding when it came to the decision-making phase.

A review of the cases gives the impression that on the one hand, public authorities as well as actors who had hitherto had a privileged position with the public authorities in terms of gaining influence on policies (corporate involvement of typically landowners and industry) could be reluctant to open up for a broader range of stakeholders because they feared diminished influence and having additional restrictions imposed on their management. But on the other hand were public authorities as well as e.g. forest owners organisations facing changing market conditions, where it was no longer sufficient to produce the optimal output, but rather, the *right* output – that is, - what the public demands, eventually mediated through opinion makers, like

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<sup>9</sup> Legitimacy is typically obtained by having many members, being an organisation with elected representatives, having seats in other fora as well, taking actively part in the public debate and as such exposing its viewpoints for public comment

environmental NGOs. So, there emerged a need to involve other stakeholders both to identify what the *right* output would be, but also because participation was a way to develop legitimacy of the process and, hence, the output. So in many cases the process design would likely be so as to invite for participation to ensure legitimacy of the process and the sector as such, but to retain the decision power with a restricted range of stakeholders, eventually the public authorities.

As an example, in the case of NOR-LF, the forest owners and the industry recognised the call for sustainable forest management and they recognised that it would take both a change of practices *and* a communicative effort to establish an image of Norwegian private forestry as being sustainable and this led to the creation of the NOR-LF where also environmental NGOs were invited to participate. But as we can see from the case, the decision power was still retained with the forest owners, industry and ministerial representatives.

#### *4.1.2.4 How do the forms of participation appear to work in practice in terms of achieving the stated aims?*

In all cases, it was through interest based representation that the processes gained democratic legitimacy. This works to the extent that all affected interests *are* actually represented (inclusiveness) and to the extent that the participating representatives are considered legitimate by and accountable to their support base. And it also requires that the process is transparent and with sufficient information for any potentially affected stakeholder to be able to follow the process.

In the AT-AFD there was an overrepresentation of public officials and forestry sector people, and the AT-BS was too focused on expert input. The DK-HD case too was mainly based on expert input, the selection of experts as well as the whole process was in-transparent, and the directly affected landowners were not consulted in the first designation of habitat areas. So basically, it was a non-participatory process in its very design. In spite of this, NGOs managed to significantly influence the decision process. They did so by using the right to complain to EU over improper implementation of EU directives at national level.

In contrast, the DK-NPP process was designed as a multilayered participatory process. At the local level it was even deliberately designed to ensure not only interest based representation but socio-demographic representation as well: The local steering group invited all citizens in the region for two public meetings. At the second meeting a number of thematic groups were formed by those interested to participate. These groups developed close to 300 proposals for the possible contents of a national park. Ten of these proposals were selected for discussion and voting at a citizen summit where people were invited based on a socio-demographically stratified sampling of the population in the region. The voting results were therefore given much weight by the local steering group in the final policy recommendations. With this case as the exception, all cases had very limited involvement of 'ordinary citizens'. Mostly, they were approached in a passive way, e.g. providing access to internet fora, public hearings or being the target of information campaigns. But in all cases, including the DK-NPP it is experienced that 'ordinary citizens' are difficult to mobilise.

The FR-CFT process was unbalanced in the sense that environmental and social interests were being excluded due to lack of guidelines to ensure this, and the image of forestry as mainly timber producing furthermore limited public interest to

participate. But those who participated experienced that communication improved as a result of the process.

The FR-RPF process all failed to include environmental interests, partly because of its initial focus on economic aspects and partly because of lack of resources to conduct a broad process. But the process managed to alleviate the crisis and ensure financial compensation for the affected forest owners, hereby gaining output legitimacy for its problem solving capacity.

The GER-L+ also was a success in terms of problem solving capacity (output legitimacy) – as it led to increasing visibility of EU rural development programmes, it changed the attitudes and norms, created new networks, and improved local cooperation towards rural development. In terms of input legitimacy, the process suffered from landowners being hesitant to participate, elected politicians being skeptical towards the initiative, and the process itself was administratively very demanding.

The GER-RA similarly was successful in empowering regional actors to decide on the use of public funds, and to include new interests in the partnership, although the selection of the Jury was rather in-transparent.

In the GR-MA case a more participatory culture gradually developed and informal networking was stimulated. Still, some interest groups felt excluded and some partly because they simply hadn't been informed of the possibility to participate.

In the case of HUN-NFP, participants also felt they had influence and the information flow was good. There was a broad representation at the first phases of the process, whereas at the final and decisive phases, the decision-making was held exclusively within the Ministry.

The NL-GW case evolved over several years from a narrow agricultural towards a more broadly participatory, inclusive initiative.

The NL-NPPN was appreciated for being an inclusive and very open process although the process became more excluding at the end (input legitimacy). Overall the process had the result that societal values are now being better recognised in nature policy (output legitimacy).

In the NL-UH case the participatory process increased over the years and resulted in building of trust, mutual understanding and in the establishing of a national park (output legitimacy), although not without power struggles between landowners and the other actors over right of land use and access to decision-making (input legitimacy).

The NOR-LF gained much (output) legitimacy in managing to develop a programme for sustainable forest management, including outreach/extension to forest owners. In terms of input legitimacy, various NGOs felt excluded from important decision bodies and, e.g. women were underrepresented. Still, the case authors report that over time the process became more inclusive and they report that most informants felt that all stakeholders were incorporated in the dialogue and that the process was conducted by democratic rules of the game.

In the ROM-AC case the process was in-transparent and some stakeholders felt they were only invited to enable the initiators to apply for funding (i.e. weak input legitimacy). Still, the process stimulated a more participatory political culture.

The ROM-NAT was open for broad and active participation but suffered from shortage of resources and sometimes late information (input legitimacy). The NGOs

even took on a training the trainers role and the Ministry actively supported this by providing venues for its involvement.

In the case of ESP-FPGP, participants felt they had influence: the process was perceived open to anyone who wanted to participate, there was good access to information, internet communication helped to ensure a geographical balance, and the editor board has a neutral and professional approach.

**Table 10: Formalised participation in the cases**

<p>Austria AFD 2003 – 2005</p>	<p><i>Formalised forms:</i> Start-up meeting, 20 days of working group sessions, 4 round tables, 5 one-day work shops for the elaboration of the forest programme and the work programme (216 hours of meetings). The Forest Forum succeeded (after 2005) the working groups for ongoing dialogue among stakeholders.</p> <p><i>Main actors:</i> The Forest Department (two groups with differing view points: as open and flatly structured as possible&gt;&lt; top-down steered – fear of ineffectiveness and loss of control) was the main process coordinators; set up the thematic structure of the working groups. Management and process coordination group consisted mainly of members from the Forestry Department. The most active participants were Austrian Chamber of Agriculture, national federation of Agricultural and Forest Enterprises, Forestry Department of the FMAFEW, WWF, and Green Party.</p> <p><i>Inclusion of stakeholders:</i> Interest groups organised at the national level and invited actors. Broad range of actors was invited (81 organisations). Actively participating: environment, nature conservation, sports, forestry, (agriculture), wood and paper industries, employees and consumer protection, (hunting), the church, development cooperation, youth, science, education, energy, federal provinces, public administration.</p> <p>Implementation of working programme: responsibility remains with the ‘inner core’ of the traditional forest policy actor network.</p> <p><i>The general public:</i> informed through internet and newsletters (only marginal involvement).</p> <p><i>Perceived problems:</i> lack of capacity relating to time and personnel resources, huge amount of papers to read and comment, confusing linkages between drafts, for some lack of expertise. Overrepresentation of public officials (2/3) and forestry sector, mix-up of roles as WG leader AND representative of FMAFEW</p> <p><i>Perceived benefits:</i> good atmosphere for discussions evolved, tensions eased, better understanding of the rationale of the ‘adversaries’, more open ways of thinking. Differing opinion regarding the output – the forest programme and the working programme, dependent on a priori expectations of participants. In general it makes sense, yet for some only a first step.</p>
<p>Austria BDS 1996-2007</p>	<p><i>Formalised forms:</i> The National Biodiversity Commission (NBC) held 42 meetings until 2007, higher frequency before 1999 of 6-7 meetings per year, later only twice a year (advise and inform, evaluate the first BDS), participating in the editorial group established December 1997, commenting on the four strategy drafts. Additional venues for the revision of the strategy: Workshops, working groups on 4 thematic issues. 2 further strategy drafts for commenting.</p> <p><i>Main actors:</i> Public authorities drafting the strategy. Two actor coalitions: Those with strong economic interests in the use of natural resources (Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, Presidents’ Conference of Chambers of Agriculture, Chamber of Commerce) and those motivated by an interest in nature conservation (Ministry of Environment, WWF, ÖGNU). The first coalition was the most powerful. The revision process: Provincial representatives, stakeholders from the economic coalition were the most active and influential actors.</p>

	<p><i>Inclusion of stakeholders:</i> The NBC: representatives of all relevant organisations (Landowner associations, Chamber of Commerce, ENGOs), public authorities (federal and provincial administrative departments) and science (Universities, Austrian Academy of Science, Natural History Museum).</p> <p>The editorial Group: seven members representing different ministries, federal provinces, the Presidents' Conference of Chambers of Agriculture and the Federation of Environmental Organisations (writing the draft strategies). Supported by working groups in most cases led by public officials</p> <p><i>The general public:</i> website established to inform the public. It was not actively used.</p> <p><i>Perceived problems:</i> The NBC only had an informative role, no binding decisions, and hence impact. Declining interest to participate over time from a number of stakeholders. The revision process: Not sufficiently open for discussion, unbalanced – too focussed on scientific experts. Comments to drafts communicated bilaterally – only the Chair of the NBC and the person in charge of the up-dating process at the Federal Environmental Agency knew all the comments = insufficient transparency and opportunity for real dialogue. State driven, the process favours the resourceful with good ministerial connections.</p> <p><i>Perceived benefits:</i> Networking perceived as important by in particular NGOs and science representatives, access to information</p>
Denmark HD 1992-2007	<p><i>Formalised forms:</i> Formal hearings of acts and Natura2000 plans, consultation of the forest council regarding the revision of the forest act. Interview survey with 148 forest owners. Group of experts from NERI and Forest &amp; Landscape regarding the technical implementation. Bilateral consultation of affected landowners. Statements from legal experts.</p> <p><i>Main actors:</i> Ministry of Environment (Minister and National Forest and Nature Agency) and the Counties in charge of the process and its implementation. BirdLife Denmark, The Nature Council, Professor of Law, Peter Pagh for forcing the revised perception of the scope of the directive.</p> <p><i>Inclusion of stakeholders:</i> BirdLife Denmark complained to the EU of insufficient implementation. Landowners (Danish Agriculture, Danish Forest Society) regarding the new and revised acts, NGOs commented on drafts acts. Experts regarding the technical implementation, the Nature Council consisting of Scientific experts from Universities, held conferences, published a book on the status of the implementation</p> <p><i>The general public:</i> Hardly informed, not involved.</p> <p><i>Perceived problems:</i> Closed, expert-driven, undemocratic process. Prioritised list of species and habitats are defined at EU level and does not necessarily match the Danish context. Inflexible. Difficult for smaller NGOs to gain access to EU processes.</p> <p><i>Perceived benefits:</i> For ENGOs the binding nature of the EU directives and the possibility to lodge complaints to the EU Commission on insufficient implementation, give them new power to ensure minimum standards in nature protection.</p>
Denmark NPP 2001 - 2007	<p><i>Formalised forms:</i> Organised interests and local mayors participated in local steering committees and scenario workshops and the national advisory group. Seminars and conferences. Citizens in local working groups, seminars, café-meeting, citizen summit with voting for/against ten controversial proposals.</p> <p><i>Main actors:</i> Minister of Environment taking the initiative, The National Forest and Nature Agency as secretariat for the steering committees and the national advisory group, writing guidelines for the investigations to be undertaken. The Outdoor Council, providing half the funds, proposing the areas for the pilot process.</p>

	<p><i>Inclusion of stakeholders:</i> Main organised stakeholders (landowners, environmental organisations, recreational interests, tourism) included through the steering committees (local organisations) and the national advisory group (national organisations).</p> <p><i>The general public:</i> included mainly through working groups and also public meetings. They could furthermore inform themselves by means of the webpage created for the process.</p> <p><i>Perceived problems:</i> Landowners felt as a minority who were to bear all the costs. Some citizens felt the work from the working groups being diluted on its way up through steering committees and the advisory group and that the National Forest and Nature Agency had too much influence. Difficult to mobilise the 'ordinary' citizens.</p> <p><i>Perceived benefits:</i> The process was considered unusually open and transparent, increased understanding of the viewpoints of the 'adversaries'. Strong commitment from the participating mayors lifted the process. For many: the fact that national parks would become a reality.</p>
<p>France CFT 2001 - 2007</p>	<p><i>Formalised forms:</i> Concrete contractually defined public-private partnerships based on permanent participation of all stakeholders in the management decisions and activities. Participation was organised on an informal basis without specifically allocating resources for it. The practical organisation of the forest charters are mainly taken care of by the public officials.</p> <p><i>Main actors:</i> The local communities which in almost all cases initiated the process in order to advocate a better involvement of the politicians in local decisions. The national federation of forestry communes as it managed to change the perceptions of forests in the minds of the local decision-makers by means of the communal forest charters. Local public foresters taking over the practical organisation of the forest charters.</p> <p><i>Inclusion of stakeholders:</i> In the beginning of the processes local administrative and institutional actors were systematically invited. Recreationist's associations were usually informed but not clearly invited to the constituting meetings; environmental NGOs were rarely informed. Hence partnerships were mainly between the local administration and the producer-interests. Tourism organisations were often invited but seldom took part.</p> <p><i>The general public:</i> Civil society is rarely represented as such.</p> <p><i>Perceived problems:</i> Unbalanced processes where environmental and social interests are being excluded, due to insufficient guidelines and obligations as for whom the project bearers should invite. This has led to a lack of trust in participation for those excluded. The traditional perception of forests as being mainly a timber resource is limiting the interest of the general public to take part in the decision-making process. Some private forest owners feel ruled out by the public foresters.</p> <p><i>Perceived benefits:</i> Meeting and confronting views give an added value and a better communication between public and private actors in the wood chain.</p>
<p>France RPF 1999 – 2007 the process is ongoing until 2009</p>	<p><i>Formalised forms:</i> Participation was spontaneously promoted by the shock of the crisis which urgently needed to be addressed and therefore informal. At the national level: Emergency Commission with representatives from the Ministry of Agriculture and professional stakeholder organisations</p> <p><i>Main actors:</i> The State (Ministry of Agriculture) providing substantial funds for alleviating the crisis and consolidated its powerful position. The national federation of forestry communes established contacts with and between all the municipalities. The National Forest Service organised seminars and prepared guidelines for the reconstitution of the forests.</p>



	<p><i>Inclusion of stakeholders:</i> The crisis situation initially led to an open process where all stakeholders felt they could influence the process, which is unusual in a French context. Furthermore there was financial incentive to participate, which was a driving force. The following reconstitution plans rapidly became a non-inclusive technical matter led by the National Forest Service. However; WWF informally affected the reconstitution by editing leaflets regarding environmental consideration when reforesting and some of their advice was headed by the National Forest Service. Recreational interest organisations were not consulted during the process.</p> <p><i>The general public:</i> Outside of the forestry sector no involvement (not specifically dealt with in the case)</p> <p><i>Perceived problems:</i> Since the economic aspects were prominent from the beginning, and the economically affected actors participating in the first phase simply continued to the second phase, environmental interests have been excluded from the process. There was furthermore a lack of institutional capacities at the regional level to include a broad array of stakeholders.</p> <p><i>Perceived benefits:</i> Alleviation of the immediate crisis, financial compensation for the incurred losses. Local politicians are now taking more active part in the management of forests. The national federation of forestry communes has better possibilities of selling its timber.</p>
Germany IRD (The tree programmes under the IRD philosophy are interconnected)	<p>LEADER + 2000-2006</p> <p><i>Formalised forms:</i> Many forms of participation formalised through EU guidelines and programmatic prescriptions</p> <p><i>Main actors:</i> Local Action Groups as the drivers and decision-makers of the regionally based processes, the European Commission since LEADER+ is an EU initiative. The Minister for Food, Agriculture and Consumer Protection wanted to put the IRD approach on the political agenda.</p> <p><i>Inclusion of stakeholders:</i> Local action groups are to represent all relevant regional actors and their interests, non-governmental actors should constitute at least 50% of the participants. It was mainly organised actors who participated. In many cases project initiation and agenda setting took place within a small group of actors, followed by a phase of broader participation whereas implementation again rests on a more narrow set of actors.</p> <p><i>The general public:</i> The process was in principle open for non-organised citizens, but practically mainly organisational representatives took part.</p> <p><i>Perceived problems:</i> Private and corporate are perceived to be less represented. In particular farmers were reluctant to join the LEADER+ process and when they did merely played a restraining role. Farmers and forestry actors did not a priori see sufficient benefits from participating. Elected politicians feared a loss of decision-making power to the, in their view, not democratically legitimate local action groups. Excessive demands on a few honorary actors from the requirements affiliated with the action groups combined with demands from other regional policy initiatives. Enormous administrative effort at the provincial administrations.</p> <p><i>Perceived benefits:</i> Increased visibility of EU rural development programmes. LEADER+ caused changes in attitude and thereby improved local cooperation. Actor networks evolved and increased social capital. Various local stakeholders got the possibility to influence the rural development of the area and actually had decision-making power.</p>
	<p>Regionen Aktiv 2001-2007</p> <p><i>Formalised forms:</i> A Jury was convened to assist the Ministry in the selection of applicant regions for the programme, but did not have decision-making power. A Council with seven members emerged from the Jury to assess the progress in the selected regions, grant performance dependent extra funds decide on changes in regional integrated development strategies and give advice to the Ministry. The Council was expanded to 13 participants in 2005. At the regional level: Public private partnerships.</p>

	<p><i>Main actors:</i> The Ministry (BMVEL) was a central actor and initiator of participation but conducted an active management of the project environment (e.g. excluding the federal states initially p.66). At the federal level a coalition of actors from the organic farming movement, the federal agency for nature conservation, department 525 of the Ministry of Agriculture, the German land care association, the ENGO NABU and a private consultant for rural development issues, discussed the initial idea of setting up an integrated federal rural development programme as well as certain fundamental decisions.</p> <p><i>Inclusion of stakeholders:</i> The Jury consisted of a wide range of actors who in a broad sense were concerned with sustainable rural development. The partnerships were open to all relevant and willing regional public (&lt;50%) and private actors</p> <p><i>The general public:</i> could be involved in the regional partnerships, but there was a weak mobilisation of private (organised and non-organised) actors.</p> <p><i>Perceived problems:</i> Not transparent how the Jury was composed. The federal states as constitutional stakeholders were neither invited to the Jury, nor the first Council much to the indignation of many federal states. Private and corporate are under-represented in the partnerships.</p> <p><i>Perceived benefits:</i> For the first time actors in the region were empowered to actually decide on the use of public funds. Inclusion of traditionally rather weak interests in the partnerships and the possibility for mutual learning regarding interests and concerns. New networks for cooperation formed. The creation of regional identities.</p>
GAK 2004-2006	<p><i>Formalised forms:</i> NGOs may address their concerns to members of The planning committee for agricultural structures and coastal protection (PLANAK) (see below) or informally the relevant public administrators. Formal hearings of concerned associations.</p> <p><i>Main actors:</i> Members of PLANAK. For implementation: the communes as beneficiaries for regional management and development concepts they are required to be involved in order to have rural development strategies funded (?)</p> <p><i>Inclusion of stakeholders:</i> PLANAK: only ministers (or their representatives) from the federal states and federal government representatives (Ministry of Agriculture and Ministry of Finance) are participating.</p> <p><i>The general public:</i> Not involved</p> <p><i>Perceived problems:</i> There was very limited scope for participation, i.e. in this sense the adaptations of the GAK towards the IRD philosophy have been more rhetoric than practise. GAK is a planning system reluctant of including new actors</p> <p><i>Perceived benefits:</i> none</p>
Greece End 90s-2007	<p><i>Formalised forms:</i> Park boards composed of 7-11 members. Open discussions organised by private planning bodies who undertake to conduct Special Environmental Studies for establishing new, protected areas. Public hearings and the possibility to give feedback to the Special Environmental Studies</p> <p><i>Main actors:</i> Park board members, including a representative of the provincial governor, a political entity, which can act as a general authority to approve and decide upon all region-related management policies and decisions. (This authority was given recently and represents a power-redistribution from the state to the provincial level, which is what has given better opportunities for participation in the first place). The Ministry of Environment, Planning and Public Works appoints the President of the Boards.</p> <p><i>Inclusion of stakeholders:</i> The boards are comprised of a variety of sectoral organisations, environmental organisations and private interest groups. Some interest groups feel excluded (local farming groups, residents associations and</p>

	<p>hotel associations). Certain interest groups have not participated because they have not been informed about the possibility.</p> <p><i>The general public:</i> can participate in the open discussions organised by the park board and in hearings, but unless there is a strong interest, it is difficult to mobilise non-organised citizens.</p> <p><i>Perceived problems:</i> The boards have been criticised for excluding other interests and being elitist, however; in most cases the board compositions are considered satisfactorily balanced in particular regarding local versus national interests. There is not yet a mature culture of participation in Greece which is an impeding factor. In some cases the local authorities have resented the Boards, as they meant handing over some power, and some of the local interest groups and sectoral organisations participate defensively the keep status quo.</p> <p><i>Perceived benefits:</i> A more participatory culture is developing. Board members have found their ability to participate a very positive experience, which has also stimulated informal networking.</p>
<p>Hungary 2001-2007 (2015)</p>	<p><i>Formalised forms:</i> Expert level working groups, conferences and workshops, 40-50 public roundtables, internet discussion platform, information events, press conferences.</p> <p><i>Main actors:</i> Programme owner was the Forestry Department of the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development which funded the process. Coordinator was the Institute of Forest Policy and Forest Management at the University of West Hungary which organised almost all events.</p> <p><i>Inclusion of stakeholders:</i> Differed in the various phases. Experts from research organisations took part for the initial analyses and drafting of the programme along with civil servants. Interest organisations (directly forestry related public and private organisations, forest research organisation, forest industry, ENGOs, workers unions, local/regional politicians, recreational interest groups) took part during a phase of public discussion as well as through public hearings in the Parliament sub-committees.</p> <p><i>The general public:</i> Informed through the media, broadcast and print.</p> <p><i>Perceived problems:</i> The decision making phase was of an excluding character and took place within the Ministry, where the previously informed stakeholders did not have neither sufficient access nor information. There was no actual power redistribution.</p> <p><i>Perceived benefits:</i> In the programming phase the access to information and general information flow was very good and the level of actor satisfaction was high. There were many organisations involved which gave the phase a high legitimacy. The process was much more open to stakeholders than previously in forest policy in Hungary. Mutual learning took place.</p>
<p>Netherlands Groene Woud 1945-2007</p>	<p><i>Formalised forms:</i> First period: The reallocation committee (Oirschot-Best) solely for actors with agricultural interests, consultation of the Staatbosbeheer. Reallocation Sint-Oedenrode: local committee with agricultural (dominant), recreational and nature conservation interests represented. Second period: Working group for the Ecological Main Structure established in the province Noord-Brabant by means of a covenant between the province and the provincial landscape and nature conservation interest groups and agriculture. Deliberation boards at the local level for making proposals for the Ecological Main Structure demarcations. The Valuable Cultural Landscapes project: Committee with broad organisational representation. This committee is later reorganised into Innovation Platform Sustainable Meierij, again with broad regional representation, but participants oblige themselves to a minimum effort and are better locally anchored. Groene woud: Management platform: municipalities, nature, agricultural and recreational interests are represented. The province creates reconstruction committees with formal responsibility of preparing and implementing the</p>

	<p>reconstruction process and with representatives from the municipalities, the Chamber of Commerce, agricultural, nature and recreational interest organisations. Furthermore deliberation boards are installed consisting of local representatives and a social-economical platform where knowledge institutes are added to the municipal and interest organisation representatives.</p> <p><i>Main actors:</i> Initially the agricultural organisations (in particular NCB – North-Brabant Christian Agricultural League, which however due to agricultural reorganisation is later merged into a new organisation) and farmers who are to ensure food production and the rural economy. Brabants Landschap and Natuurmonumenten, who both aim at the preservation of natural values by buying up nature areas. Later during the demarcations for the Ecological Main Structure they are able to play an influential role because of their ecological knowledge. Brabants Landschap furthermore is behind the original Groene Woud plan in cooperation with public officials. Staatsbosbeheer (semi-private state forest agency) is an important landowner and becomes a part of the coalition with Brabants Landschap and Natuurmonumenten. The province initiating and facilitating many of the processes.</p> <p><i>Inclusion of stakeholders:</i> Initially corporative involvement of the agricultural interests. Increasing influence to nature and landscape conservation organisations. The Valuable Cultural Landscapes Committee: broad representation of interest groups and public officials from the province and municipalities. The Groene Woud project: broad participation and much local enthusiasm for the process.</p> <p><i>The general public:</i> agrarians and nature- and landscape conservationists assisted by their organisations participate in the demarcation of the Ecological Main Structure. A Groene Woud festival takes place where the regional entrepreneurs present themselves to the public. Two Groene Woud symposiums (not clear what they are and for whom)</p> <p><i>Perceived problems:</i> Antagonism between agricultural interest and nature and landscape conservation interests causes toilsome negotiations. Valuable Cultural Landscapes: limited commitment from the committee participants as they are not really locally anchored. Local actors do not see any benefits and are hence not committed either. The reconstruction process is problematic and the agricultural organisation and the environmental federation steps out of the process. Some find the lack of steering and structure in the Groene Woud process problematic.</p> <p><i>Perceived benefits:</i> Because the demarcation of the Ecological Main Structure discussion took place at the local level there was no need to argue at the provincial level. As the Groene Woud ideals are strengthened cooperation begins to occur between the farmers' organisation and Brabants Landschap – the animosity of old begins to wane. The Groene Woud process flourishes – some say because it is flexible and without one single head steering the process. This generates initiative and many bottom-up projects. Participation becomes broader and more inclusive over time.</p>
<p>Netherlands Nature for People, People for Nature  1999 - 2000</p>	<p><i>Formalised forms:</i> Open general workshops in the initial phase, thematic workshops on five themes constituted by about 15- 20 governmental and societal actors. Bilateral conversations/contacts between the Ministry and selected participants. Public presentations of draft papers. (Project team: Public officials from different sectors, province representatives. The team was later reduced in size to consist of five members from the nature department. The steering group with representatives from different ministries and regional authorities – but was later reformed into an inter-ministerial advisory group.)</p> <p><i>Main actors:</i> Ministry of LVN initiated the process, defined themes to be discussed, in the later stages of the process defined which stakeholders should be further included, The project team writing the drafts and in particular the nature department representatives.</p> <p><i>Inclusion of stakeholders:</i> Initially a very broad inclusion. New actors such as a cooperative bank, the general building association, the National Agriculture Union,</p>

	<p>and the Federation of Private Landowners were explicitly involved by the Ministry in addition to the 'usual suspects', but restricted to national level actors. Later in the process participation was limited to bilateral contacts with selected stakeholders.</p> <p><i>The general public:</i> Not specifically addressed in the case report</p> <p><i>Perceived problems:</i> After the first draft after the participatory phase there were inter-ministerial concerns, where some public officials were concerned that their areas of expertise were not sufficiently covered. After the initial open phase the process became increasingly exclusive to others than the Ministry.</p> <p><i>Perceived benefits:</i> The willingness of the Ministry to include new actors at an early stage and the openness of the process was highly appreciated. The societal values are being better recognised in nature policy. New non-governmental actors were included.</p>
<p>Netherlands Utrechtse Heuvelrug 1945-2007</p>	<p><i>Formalised forms:</i> The Ecological Main Structure: The province involves nature and landscape organisations (how?), and the private owners are consulted. The national park initiative: First the VCNP makes a public hearing for an assembly of regional actors to comment on their national park study. Private landowners participate by blocking the plan of the VCNP and initiating bottom-up participatory procedures with the other landowners (Utrechts Landschap, Natuurmonumenten, Staatsbosbeheer). Supported by the the Province of Utrecht a formal deliberation board is set up. The Hart van the Heuvelrug Platform with representatives of red (urban development) and green interests (nature) as well as ministerial representatives. Referendum regarding the creation of an ecoduct over A28 (road), however; too few people vote for the referendum to be considered</p> <p><i>Main actors:</i> In the beginning Natuurmonumenten and Utrechts Landschap buying land for conservation. The latter remains a key actor later mediating between the private landowners and the other involved actors and initiating the holistic approach to "Heel de Heuvelrug". The coalition of landowners who initiates the national park after the failed attempt of the VCNP.</p> <p><i>Inclusion of stakeholders:</i> Private owners, Nature conservation interests (Utrechts Landschap, Natuurmonumenten), the semi-private state forest agency Staatsbosbeheer, recreational entrepreneurs, municipal and provincial representatives, agricultural interest organisation.</p> <p><i>The general public:</i> Apart from the landowners, not dealt with in the MA-report</p> <p><i>Perceived problems:</i> The demarcation of the Ecological main structure: recreational entrepreneurs were late in realising the consequences of the demarcation, and hence were unable to influence the process. The first national park initiative: The members of the VCNP were locally considered as 'intruders' who did not listen to the local concerns in their Utrecht National Park study. Private landowners therefore blocked the plan. Negotiations are tough due to the voluntary character of the process as the private landowners are headstrong and continuously threaten to stop cooperation if they do not get things their way. Local interest organisations and recreational entrepreneurs feel excluded from the Hart van de Heuvelrug project.</p> <p><i>Perceived benefits:</i> A national park is established. Stakeholders begin to think beyond their own borders. Trust is gradually built among the stakeholders. Definitive increase in participatory processes over the years.</p>
<p>Norway LF 1995-2006</p>	<p><i>Formalised forms:</i> The steering committee with forest owner representatives, forest industry representatives and representatives from the ministries of agriculture and environment. Four working groups with representatives of the forest production interest groups. The Certification Committee where ecological, economic and social interests were equally represented. The Scientific Committee comprised of ten researchers. The Advisory Committee where more than 200 organisations were invited to open hearings and plenary discussions as well as working groups. An Evaluative Steering Committee with six members covering economic, ecological and social interests. Public hearing of the draft for revisions of the Living Forest</p>

	<p>Standards with a consultation round for all organisations. The permanent Living Forest Council with broad representation.</p> <p><i>Main actors:</i> The Forest Owners' Federation was the driving force behind the project and together with the forest industry and the government defined the framework and objectives for the project; the government representatives did not have formal right to vote. The Forest Owners Federation was moreover in charge of the Living Forest secretariat. Environmental organisations had some power as they were needed for legitimising the process.</p> <p><i>Inclusion of stakeholders:</i> In the working groups and the steering committee there were only representatives of the economically focussed interest organisations: forest owners, the forest industry as well as observers from the Ministry. There was a broader representation in the certification committee, and in particular in the Advisory Committee and the Living Forest Council. Furthermore during the consultation phase regarding the revision of the standards everyone could comment.</p> <p><i>The general public:</i> Could respond to during the public hearing of the revision of the Living Forest standards</p> <p><i>Perceived problems:</i> ENGOs and recreational interest organisations felt excluded from the important decision-making bodies. The ENGOs felt that there were insufficient assurances that the certification criteria were complied with. Some of the conflicting issues were defined out of the project, e.g. natural forests which made one ENGO leave the process. The sámediggi was unable to participate due to insufficient resources, but did respond to the public hearing. No stakeholders regarding cultural heritage were present, neither was the tourism sector. Women are underrepresented. The industry is generally more resourceful i.e. powerful than the other interest groups.</p> <p><i>Perceived benefits:</i> Over time the process became more inclusive and most informants feel that all stakeholders have been incorporated in the dialogue and democratic principles and consensus seeking have become rules of the game.</p>
<p>Romania Anti-Corruption 2000-2007</p>	<p><i>Formalised forms:</i> Consultation through roundtables and conferences of NGOs regarding the formation of new legislation. The central group for analysis and coordination of preventing corruption actions had representation of five NGOs, the Strategic Committee for Evaluation and Control of Anti-corruption activities had 3 NGOs represented appointed by an NGO coalition. This anticorruption coalition had a working group and a business association which partnered with the Ministry of Justice and held monthly decentralised meetings. Public private partnership between the Ministry of Justice and the League for human rights. In the forest sector: Commission for Social Dialogue with representatives from producers associations and trade unions.</p> <p><i>Main actors:</i> The Ministry of Justice, active NGOs (8 are mentioned as being the most active, most of them are specifically concerned with fighting corruption, others with human rights, sustainable development and reforming the justice system) and the media proving corruption and therefore the need to fight it. The media took part in a campaign to raise awareness</p> <p><i>Inclusion of stakeholders:</i> Many coalitions were formed among NGOs, some entered into partnerships with government, others specialised in raising public awareness.</p> <p><i>The general public:</i> Informed through campaigns</p> <p><i>Perceived problems:</i> The creation of various commissions for law preparation is not transparent. Some stakeholders at the local level felt that they were only asked to participate in order for the local administration to obtain funding from different donors</p> <p><i>Perceived benefits:</i> At times participation has been well functioning and stakeholders felt they had genuine influence. The anticorruption policies have</p>

	stimulated a culture of participation inspired also by the models of other countries and international NGOs
Romania Natura 2000  1999-2006	<p><i>Formalised forms:</i> Meetings and public debates with invited interest organisations before area designation</p> <p>. The Access project initiated by the Deputy Chamber to support NGOs in the legislative process where 80 organisations were contacted. The College for Consultation which is a common forum for consultation with the civil society facilitating communication. The Informational System for Natura 2000 was an online system for data gathering and information exchange. Seminar organised by WWF and the Romanian Partnership Foundation led to the formation of the NGOs Coalition Natura 2000. They furthermore arranged “train the trainers” workshop for NGOs on their role in securing the Birds and Habitats Directives implementation. This was followed by a series of training and awareness raising activities for NGOs. NGOs produced a “shadow list” of site proposals for the Commission</p> <p><i>Main actors:</i> Ministry for Environment and Water Management being responsible for implementation, BirdLife Romania which signed a partnership agreement with the Ministry. WWF arranging seminar and workshops.</p> <p><i>Inclusion of stakeholders:</i> BirdLife Romania, WWF, Romanian Partnership Foundation, SOR, NGOs Coalition Natura 2000, The Resource Centre for public participation, municipality representatives, public officials from the national, regional and local level and landowners.</p> <p><i>The general public:</i> Information campaigns, NGOs organised meetings to inform, educate and increase awareness of nature protection</p> <p><i>Perceived problems:</i> Difficult to verify the data put into the Informational System for Natura 2000. Lack of funds for participation was initially a constraining factor. Sometimes late announcements of meetings by the Ministry, shortage in human resources.</p> <p><i>Perceived benefits:</i> NGOs were active and organised a number of activities and training sessions and the Ministry changed attitude towards NGO involvement and actively organised venues for this involvement.</p>
Spain  2003-2005	<p><i>Formalised forms:</i> Workshop, meetings for draft presentations, two expert groups.</p> <p><i>Main actors:</i> The Undersecretary of Forests and Biodiversity Management which initiated and coordinated the process</p> <p><i>Inclusion of stakeholders:</i> Expert groups: SWOT analysis done by 14 experts from the traditional forest sector, after which 80 organisations were invited to make contributions. Those were forest owner, forest industry, environmental, recreationist and consumer organisations. Only those who made contributions were invited to the workshop. The administration transformed suggestions into budgeted action plans in 25 thematic groups of 3-7 public administrators.</p> <p><i>The general public:</i> was encouraged to make contributions</p> <p><i>Perceived problems:</i> Time pressure for the public officials making action plans. All the participants from the private sector were constrained by lacking resources in terms of financial and human resources. Time gaps between events may have injured the process.</p> <p><i>Perceived benefits:</i> The process was perceived as open to anyone who wanted to participate, good access to information, and internet communication has been favourable in terms of geographical balance. A neutral and professional approach in the editor board. Participants felt they had influence.</p>

Source: Main assessment reports, comments for CF draft, Göttingen meeting.

### 4.1.3 Main conclusions on participation

In almost all GoFor cases, participation was considered an important element to characterise the process. As such, they can be considered critical cases, i.e. if participation does not work according to stated objectives in these cases, it is expected to work even less in other cases.

In current natural resources policy, the *dominating rhetoric* is that more participation is better participation. This is also reflected in the majority of GoFor cases. First of all, there is an increasingly recognised need for participation. Although more hesitant in biodiversity politics (AT-ABD, DK-HD) than in other processes, partly because of its sector nature. The calls for participatory approaches can partly be explained by the increased international focus on the topic from the 1990s and onwards, but partly also from a recognition among decision-makers that problem solving is not possible without the participation of stakeholders that can affect or are affected by the decision.

In the GoFor cases *several forms of participation* were used. The dominating form was however still to consult main interest organisations in various forums for discussion.

The rhetoric showed a concern for *who should participate (representation)*, calling for broad participation (GER-cases), involving actors (FR-CFT), local ownership (DK-NPP). And all cases reported on a tendency towards broader participation over time, although in several cases, some stakeholders were excluded from parts or all of the process (e.g. AT-BS, HUN-NFP, NOR-LF, FR-RPF). The involvement efforts remain focused on interest based representation via the organised stakeholders. The non-organised citizens are mainly addressed in terms of information campaigns, and where they are invited for actual (consultative) participation, they are difficult to mobilise. The lack of 'ordinary citizen' participation may worry the public authority that has it as a sub-objective, e.g. in the case of the DK-NPP. But it can be questioned if it is always relevant to invite for citizen involvement considering the topic and the scope for influence: citizens do not always have an interest in getting involved: it may take too much time from other activities, the topic is perceived too distant to their everyday lives and/or they may trust other parties to manage the policy area with due concern for the various, affected interests. Or they may (true or not) perceive that their opportunities to influence the process is very limited.

Arnstein (1969) argues that participation is about redistributing power from those who have power to those who do not have power. So it would be natural to assume that an aim for broader participation is to include the 'have not's' in decision-making. In most of the cases it appeared, however, that the aim of broadening the participation and involve new actors was to mobilise networks and resources that could further the implementation of already identified policy objectives. Because nature politics depends on other policy areas for its implementation, both because it has inter-sectoral implications in practice, and because the decision power and related funds are mostly located elsewhere (in the 'producing'/business sectors, .e.g agriculture, tourism). Examples can be found in the cases dealing with national forest programmes, where part of the task is to redefine the role of forests in society and maintain and rebuild legitimacy of the forest sector (AT-NFP, ESP-FPGP, HUN-NFP, NOR-LF). Having this scope for broader participation is not a problem in itself. It only becomes a problem insofar as there are actually 'have not-minorities' who are affected by the decisions but are excluded. This was the case in the NOR-LF where the sami people were excluded, partly also because they didn't have the necessary



resources to participate. This was also the case in the NOR-LF and the NPP-DK case where women were underrepresented in the participatory processes. Gender and other biases may have characterised all the processes to a larger extent than appears from the case descriptions: it was not a common goal to study such particular biases.

From the rhetoric there appears to be focus on the *quality of interaction/input legitimacy* in at least some cases: the processes need to be transparent and provide information (ESP-FPGP, AT-AFD, DK-HD, FR-RPF, GR-MA, ROM-AC, ROM-NAT). Some process aims are to achieve dialogue, create consensus, inform the public, create awareness, capacity building, mobilise people and create political commitment (various cases). And some cases refer to output legitimacy aiming to address problems in a more effective and efficient manner to achieve regional specific solutions (GER-cases), successful implementation (ESP-FPGP), or protection of natural resources (GR-MA, AT-BS).

Judged from the case study reports, some cases actually did manage to conduct a transparent process with sufficient information whereas in other cases, potentially relevant participants were not aware of the process going on (GR-MA), or there were insufficient capacity and resources to ensure information and access opportunities to all relevant stakeholders (FR-RPF, ROM-NAT).

Common to almost all the cases with invited participation is that the initiators have followed rather 'traditional' processes, inviting organised participants who are easy to reach, and who are already known to the decision makers. Moreover, most of the processes were based on traditional forms of participation such as inviting important actors for consultation and meetings, while there have been few experiments with new modes of participation. Decision makers have only to a limited extent reflected on how the participatory processes could contribute to inclusion of "new" actors, how they could lead to "new" forms of dialogue and interaction, for instance between experts and common people, and how they could lead to genuine learning processes e.g. through active facilitation of each meeting. DK-NPP may constitute an exception.

Finally, it can be asked whether the participatory procedures in the various cases improved the access of affected stakeholders to participate. Did the participation processes lead to power redistribution or did it mainly consolidate the power of the already powerful?

A short answer across the cases could be that participatory procedures have changed the political landscape, but the extent of genuine power redistribution still appears to be limited on the short term:

Some processes were tightly administered by the ministry in charge and eventually only invited a limited range of stakeholders (e.g. AT-BS). Other processes were apparently network based, whereas in practice they were meta-governed by the government, e.g. DK-NPP, GER-GAK. The NOR-LF was different in that it was a bottom-up process. Nevertheless, also in this context, environmental NGOs felt left out of significant influence as they were not included in the steering committee. The difference to the other cases then was that the power struggle was less between government and NGOs, but more between forest owners/industry and environmental NGOs.

For all cases it seems that when looking at the long-term, the overall policy culture is likely to become more participatory, providing more opportunities to participate and providing a broader range of stakeholders legitimate access to influence decision-making within the given policy field. So even if the power redistribution within the

+individual cases was limited, then the participatory processes have still stimulated the establishing of new networks, a first step towards legitimate demands for influence among new stakeholders, and- hopefully -increasing understanding among all stakeholders of the value of broad and inclusive decision-making to not only input but also output legitimacy.

## 4.2 Multi-level coordination

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Multi-level coordination describes the dispersion of authoritative decision-making across multiple territorial levels (Hooghe and Marks 2001). In all democracies power is necessarily divided to some extent between different political institutions. The dispersion of power can be based on a functional logic or between territorial units. Federalism, as an example of the territorial logic, can be regarded as the most typical and drastic method of dividing power as it divides between entire levels of government (Lijphart 1999: 185). Multi-level systems have two important functions: (1) the division of power among territorial units (levels), and (2) the allocation of competences and task among these levels.

New forms of governance and dispersion of decision-making away from central states have gained attention from a growing number of scholars in the recent years. Many of them argue that modern governance is and should be dispersed across multiple centers of authority, and that decisions are made at different territorial scales. The diffusion of decision-making away from the central states raises fundamental questions of design and coordination in multi-level systems.

The main purpose of this chapter is to provide an analytical framework for the participation and involvement of territorial units ("levels") in governance processes and to deliver empirical results from selected GoFOR case studies. Our findings are based on 19 policy case studies across ten countries (ranging from 1 to 3 in the ten countries). These countries include two federal states, two semi-federal systems (countries that do not describe themselves as federations but have many federal-like constitutional provisions), and six unitary countries, with three of them being more decentralized.

In a nutshell, our policy case studies suggest that multilevel or networked governance of varying kinds is becoming widespread if not pervasive, with complex intergovernmental relationships involving international, national, regional, and municipal governments increasingly the norm. We also found, however, that this complex web of relationships among different levels of government is by no means a partnership of equals and that the role of non-governmental actors may be more modest than some of the academic literature presumes (e.g., Marks and Hooghe 2004). Many of the case studies point time and again on the hierarchical nature of the power relationships. Thus, we end up postulating a gap between the normative argument for multilevel and networked governance and the observed reality.

### 4.2.1 Conceptual frame

Scholars in political science have responded in two different ways to the unravelling of the central state (Hooghe and Marks 2003: 234). One intellectual response has been to stretch existing concepts over the new phenomena. Issues and problems of multi-level coordination have been discussed extensively in the literature on federalism and intergovernmental relations. Studies in this tradition have still stressed

the importance of formal rules between different tiers of government (e.g. unitary vs. federal political systems). An extensive literature on federalism examines the optimal allocation of authority across multiple tiers of government and how governments at different levels interact. Another intellectual response was to create new concepts to catch up with changing realities, such as multi-level governance (Benz 2003, Hooghe and Marks 2003) or network governance (Eising and Kohler-Koch 1999). These new concepts regard the connection between different tiers as much more fluid and the range of actors involved as much larger, involving not only state actors but also non-state actors.

The various theoretical strands in the discussion of multi-level coordination have generated quite different terms to analyse empirical realities in multi-level systems. Hooghe and Marks (2003: 234) described these different theoretical strands as “islands”, because the density of communication within them is much higher than that among them. These differences can be partly explained by their divergent research focus. One main theoretical strand in the literature is particularly interested in the effects of internationalization and Europeanisation on national decision-making. For instance, in the research on EU policy-making, the concept of multi-level governance to characterize the particularities of the European structures and processes of policy making has made an astonishing career in the last decade. Another main strand of literature is interested in processes of regionalisation, thereby focussing on changes at the sub-national and local levels. Furthermore, these different theoretical approaches often do not ask the same questions. Some are mainly interested in coordination problems in the stage of policy formulation, whereas others focus on implementation deficits well known in hierarchical policy-making.

This chapter will outline the most important issues discussed in the theoretical approaches with respect to multi-level coordination.

In the following sub-chapters we will describe the main characteristics of multi-level governance in greater detail. Beginning with a descriptive typology of types of multi-level systems and problems of multi-level coordination, followed by an outline of the different mechanisms of coordination available in multi-level systems, we will conclude the conceptual frame with some remarks on the possible strategies to solve coordination problems in multi-level systems. We will then continue with a comparative analysis of multi-level coordination in the GoFOR case studies (chapter 4.2.2) before we present the findings from six selected case studies (chapter 4.2.3). Finally, we draw some major conclusions on multi-level coordination based on our empirical analyses and findings (chapter 4.2.4).

#### *4.2.1.1 Scaling-up or scaling down? Multi-level coordination between Europeanization and Decentralization*

Thinking about the vertical dispersion of authority away from central governments leads automatically to the question to which territorial levels authority has been transferred. Obviously there are two possibilities: authority can either be transferred to upper levels, a process which implies the scaling-up of policies; or it can be transferred to lower levels, a process in which policies are scaled down. Both processes are discussed at length in the literature. The processes of scaling up are discussed in the literature on internationalization and Europeanization of domestic politics, while processes of scaling down are discussed in the literature on regionalisation.

### a) Defining Decentralisation

Decentralisation can be defined as the transfer of responsibility for planning, management and resource raising and allocation from the central government and its agencies to the lower levels of government. Decentralisation is closely linked to the concept of subsidiarity, which proposes that functions or tasks be devolved to the lowest level of social order that is capable of completing them. As the UNDP (2004) states: "Decentralizing governance is the restructuring of authority so that there is a system of co-responsibility between institutions of governance at the central, regional and local levels according to the principle of subsidiarity, thus increasing the overall quality and effectiveness of the system of governance, while increasing the authority and capabilities of sub-national levels."

Generally speaking, the factors which influence the intergovernmental processes of decentralization in a given state are various and cover a wide range of elements, including legal tradition, major institutional solutions within a constitutional system, political set-up and economic background. The extent to which a given unitary state is centralized or decentralized depends, on two crucial elements of a given institutional design (Basta 1998: 32):

- on how the allocation of powers between the central and local governmental levels has been legally operationalized, as well as
- on the division of powers among major central authorities (system of powers).

#### Forms of decentralization

There are three broad types of decentralisation: political, administrative and fiscal and three major forms of decentralisation: devolution, delegation, and deconcentration (Work 2002: 6, UNDP 2004).

*Political decentralisation* normally refers to situations where political power and authority has been transferred to sub-national levels of government. The most obvious manifestations of this type of decentralisation are elected and empowered sub-national forms of government ranging from village councils to state level bodies. *Devolution* is considered a form of political decentralisation. It refers to the full transfer of responsibility, decision-making, resources and revenue generation to a local level public authority that is autonomous and fully independent of the devolving authority. Political decentralisation requires a constitutional, legal and regulatory framework to ensure accountability and transparency. It also necessitates the restructuring of institutions and developing linkages with civil society and the private sector.

*Administrative decentralisation* aims at transferring decision-making authority, resources and responsibilities for the delivery of select number of public services from the central government to other levels of government, agencies, and field offices of central government line agencies. Administrative decentralisation often comes along simultaneously with civil service reform. There are two major forms of administrative decentralisation: *deconcentration* and *delegation*. Deconcentration refers to the transfer of authority and responsibility from one level of the central government to another while maintaining the same hierarchical level of accountability from the local units to the central government ministry or agency, which has been decentralised. Delegation redistributes authority and responsibility to sub-national

and local units of government or agencies that are not always necessarily branches or local offices of the delegating authority.

*Fiscal decentralisation* is the most comprehensive and possibly traceable degree of decentralisation since it is directly linked to budgetary practices. Fiscal decentralisation refers to the resource reallocation to sub-national levels of government. Arrangements for resource allocation are often negotiated between the central and local authorities based on several factors including interregional equity, availability of resources at all levels of government and local fiscal management capacity.

### Rationale and limitations

Economists justify decentralisation on the grounds of ‘allocative efficiency’, enhancing the responsiveness of policy-making and the effectiveness of poverty reduction. Decisions taken closest to a local constituency are expected to better reflect the preferences of citizens, especially the poor. As a result, local governments are more likely to implement policies through community participation and social inclusion. The challenge is to maintain a policy focus at central and local levels, especially given the risks of local governments being captured by local elites and interest-groups.

Decentralisation is not a panacea. Clearly, there are limits to what it can achieve. Not all government functions can or should be decentralised. Decentralising weak states may compound the problems. An appropriate balance of centralisation and decentralisation is essential, and there needs to be complementary attention to central government. Decentralisation requires a strong central entity to regulate, to provide an overall framework to manage the re-allocation of responsibilities and resources in a predictable and transparent way, and to assist local governments build capacity in the early stages. Decentralization is not an alternative to centralization. Both are needed. The complementary roles of national and sub-national actors should be determined by analyzing the most effective ways and means of achieving a desired objective. And decentralization is much more than public sector, civil service and administrative reform. It involves the roles and relationships of all societal actors, whether governmental, private sector or civil society.

### **b) Defining Multi-level Governance**

The term “multilevel governance” was pioneered in the context of the European Union, where it was initially meant to capture the “scaling-up” of the national state to the level of the European Union, that is, the voluntary abdication by member states of certain responsibilities to the emerging supranational structures of the European Union. Multilevel governance relates to the condition of power and authority that is shared in institutional relationships in which the scope of public policy and the mechanisms of policymaking extend by necessity beyond the jurisdiction of a single government. Multi-level governance was initially described as a “system of continuous negotiation among nested governments at several territorial tiers—supranational, national, regional and local” that was distinctive of European Union structural policy (Marks 1993: 392), but the term is now applied to the European Union more generally as a result of the broad process of institutional creation and decisional reallocation that has pulled some previously centralized functions of the

state up to the supranational level and some down to the local/regional level (Bache and Flinders 2004; Grande 2000; Hooghe and Marks 2001).

Multi-level governance is a complex concept that embodies different aspects. It is essential to notice the dual character of the concept. MLG is composed of a multi-level aspect and a governance aspect. Kohler-Koch speaks about levels of government and systems of governance (Kohler-Koch 1996). Levels of government emphasize the different layers of policymaking and the dynamic partition of competences and power between these layers. On the other hand systems of governance zoom in on the specific ways of governance within and between these different policy levels. Relationships among institutions at different tiers of government in this perspective are believed to be fluid, negotiated and contextually defined. Previously hierarchical models of institutional "layering", for example formal treatments of federalism, are being replaced by a more complex image of intergovernmental relations in which subnational authorities engage in direct exchange with supranational or global institutions and vice versa (Peters and Pierre 2001: 1).

In short, the MLG concept points at a political system composed of different but entangled policy levels and governed by non-hierarchical networks of interacting public and private actors. Since both the governance concept (except for the regulatory aspect) and the multi-level aspect are utterances of modern governance, they are not only applicable on the European Union but also on other policy systems. And while some conceive multi-level governance as an alternative to hierarchical government (Rhodes 2000), others view policy networks as nested in formal government institutions (Peters and Pierre 2000).

In a more recent article Arthur Benz (2004) made an effort to further refine the concept of multi-level governance. For him MLG is defined by three main characteristics: first that "levels" are territorial divided political units, secondly that MLG is concerned with political structures and processes connecting these levels, and thirdly that interrelationships exist between inter- and intragovernmental rules. According to Benz, the course of action and the results of multi-level coordination depend very much on interaction patterns regulating the policy process. Policy coordination is possible through four different forms of interaction: reciprocal adaptation, competition, hierarchical steering or negotiation (Scharpf 2000). Decisive for the logic of policy-making in multi-level governance is not the institutional context as such, but to what extent actors' behavior is determined by the specific rule systems (Lehmbruch 2000). To summarize, governance in multi-level systems can be described through the following characteristics (Benz 2004: 135):

- (1) Interdependencies between different levels resulting from external effects or distribution conflicts;
- (2) Interaction rules between the involved levels, which will mainly be based on negotiation, but can also include elements of hierarchical steering and competition;
- (3) Institutionalised intra-level rules steering the behaviour of the actors (Veto rights, Party competition, Negotiations, Exit-opportunities);
- (4) The type of coupling (strong or loose) between the internal and external rule systems, deciding to what extent the actors are bound by these rules.
- (5) The collaboration between public and private actors (Governments, Administrations, Interest groups and NGOs, Experts).

#### 4.2.1.2 *Problems of Coordination in Multi-level Systems*

Economists and political scientists have often argued that even simple forms of multi-level coordination may lead to severe problems, reasoning that there is often a trade off between the scope of coordination and the problem-solving capacity (Scharpf 1976, 1997). There are two problems with regard to multi-level decision-making: first the costs of multi-level negotiations increase both in terms of complexity of decision and in terms of time required for exchanging positions and argument; and secondly, even more serious than the costs of decision-making are the ramifications of interdependent decision-making. The greater the number of actors involved the greater the difficulties: "As the number of affected parties increases [...] negotiated solutions incur exponentially rising and eventually prohibitive transaction costs" (Scharpf 1997: 70). Additionally, in case of strong opposition due to divergent interests, common agreement is likely to be blocked and negotiations may end in deadlock. The problem with interdependent decision-making is that agreements on one level may reduce the chances for consent on the other level, because actors are committed to previous decisions. It is often very difficult to coordinate interdependent negotiations at different levels and not having the actors caught in double-binds. Furthermore, intergovernmental negotiation is mostly linked to forms of intra-governmental cooperation. Region or local programs, which have to be coordinated with central policies, are to be coordinated between different public administrations and have to be elaborated in public-private partnerships on the regional or local level. Again, effective negotiations at one level might reduce space for manoeuvring at other levels, because participants are bound to agreements.

The horizontal and vertical dispersion of power does not necessarily affect the process of decision-making negatively as long as the separate units are able to act independently. Political tasks and problems which can be limited in their functional and spatial appearance are best solved by a decentralized approach at the appropriate level of administration or by functionally specialised units ("principle of subsidiarity"). However, in many cases political problems are not conforming to the horizontal and vertical boundaries of the politico-administrative system. The more political competences and tasks in a democratic political system are divided between territorially levels, the higher is its vulnerability to increasing economic, technical, ecological and communicative interdependence among territorial units. Under such conditions, choices within a given unit will create, and suffer from, external effects (Scharpf 2000). To the extent that policies of one jurisdiction have spillovers for other jurisdictions, either positive or negative externalities, a "management of interdependencies" (Mayntz 1997: 272) is necessary to avoid socially perverse outcomes. The larger the externalities are, the greater the potential harm (Hooghe and Marks 2001: 23).


Joint decision-making in multi-level systems is thus confronted with three typical problems (Mayntz 1997, 275):

- Possible blockades in decision-making;
- The danger of suboptimal compromises; and
- The danger of implementation deficits due to poor binding effects of the decisions made.



These ideal-type coordination problems can be ascribed to the combination of processes within the levels ("intragouvernemental") and between them ("intergouvernemental"): Stable blockades are created if no decisions altering the status quo come about in multi-level coordination and if this is accepted within the levels. Suboptimal compromises also emerges from negotiated solutions with a low degree of innovation, which is partially accepted within the levels, partially however it is rejected. Implementation deficits are often interrelated with decisions made that include a high degree of policy change, but which are not accepted within the levels. If these events happen, a political system either is blocked, the political steering becomes ineffective or plagued with unintended results and undesirable consequences, or the political programme does not receive any approval from those, which must execute it (implementation deficit). Successful coordination in a multi-level system requires both effective negotiation of solutions and their acceptance within the levels (Benz 2000, 99).

**Figure 3: Problems of Coordination in Multi-level Systems**



An elaborate theory of the first two of these three problems of joint decision-making was presented by Fritz Scharpf (1976, 1988), conceptualised by its well known "joint decision trap". The central hypothesis of the joint-decision theorem is that fragmented multi-level systems like German federalism or the EU are likely to produce inappropriate policy outputs and that they are, at the same time, unable to change the institutional conditions responsible for the deficiencies. In order to avoid these deadlocks and stalemates, actors in intergovernmental relations are searching for conflict avoiding strategies. Therefore, governments and administrations develop pragmatic strategies to cope with problems of intergovernmental coordination and cooperation. For instance, agreements are reached on regulations or political programs by formulating goals as "soft norms" catching all relevant interests without too much interference; financial resources are allocated in such a way that all involved governments profit from it; and compromises are found by solutions which only marginally alter the status quo.

### 4.2.1.3 Modes of Coordination

To analyse multi-level coordination we look at collective action that is influenced by institutionalized structures. These structures determine the distribution of power and the stability of the interaction as well as the possibilities and costs of exit strategies. The coordination of action can take two distinct major forms (Schimank 2007): mutual adjustment without direct interaction, but on the basis of observation, or mutual influence upon direct interaction of the involved protagonists (see Table 11).

To adapt their behaviour, actors are either influenced through restrictions (force) or through attractive options (chances). Influence is practiced by conviction (information, arguments) and/or incentives (exchange of resources), and coordination of action through influence can either be based on trust among the actors or must be agreed explicitly in negotiations. This differentiation of *elementary mechanisms* of coordination of action helps to understand the functionality of typical modes of governance in multi-level systems. In *hierarchies*, the coordination takes place through reciprocal adaptation under the condition of unequal distribution of power, that is established formally, and high exit costs. The distribution of power emerges on that occasion as well as from the formal establishing of authority and duties of implementation also as from the asymmetrical distribution of information. Under the mode of *competition* we see equal actors who take part voluntarily in the procedure, adjust their behaviour on the basis of comparisons and the outlook on relative advantages to the most successful market protagonists. *Networks* and also communities as modes of coordination are not formalized; nevertheless they normally show asymmetrical distributions of power between central and peripheral actors. Coordination of action takes place through established norms as well as through trust that is destroyed if actors leave the network and causes therefore high exit costs. In difference to this, reciprocal influence takes place in *negotiations* between formally equal actors who all have veto-power at their disposal. Agreements are gained by direct communication, but participants being able to leave the negotiation table at any time with low exit costs.

**Table 11: Basic Modes of Governance**

Mechanism of coordination		Mutual adjustment		Mutual influence	
		Constraints	Opportunities	Trust	Agreement
Structure	Power	Asymmetric	Symmetric	Asymmetric	Symmetric
	Exit costs	High	Low	High	Low
Governance mode		"Hierarchy"	"Competition"	"Network"	"Negotiation"
Source: Benz 2006					

Most of the governance types discussed in the literature can be assigned to the four modes of coordination suggested above. Markets for example let themselves

describe as complex structure of competition, the state is equated in the economic literature with hierarchy, clans and communities are based on networks, and deliberation is to be classified as variation of negotiations. However, this doesn't exclude that other divisions are held for more suitable. In the end, typologies are to be produced for areas and objects of research and with consideration on questions of the respective examination. However, it is crucial on that occasion that the mechanisms and the structures are identified, in which coordination actually takes place.

The combination of modes of coordination has effects on the operational mode of collective action. If different modes have an influence on the behaviour of actors at the same time, disturbances of the coordination can be caused by it. Hierarchical control can fail if the actors, who should follow instructions, bind themselves in networks or negotiations or reinforce the asymmetric distribution of information in the hierarchy through their own relationships of communication. Competition mechanisms are to be pushed through heavily against actors in stable networks and can be evaded by negotiations. For disturbances especially susceptible are negotiations and networks, if they include actors that are indebted as representatives of organizations on specific interests and are induced by it to competitive actions. However the probability of failure of governance does not rise with the complexity of the modes of coordination, it rather depends on the type of the combination of modes of coordination (Benz 2007). Furthermore, combinations do not cause blockades necessarily; rather they cause dynamics when actors seek to avoid possible blockades by changing the combination of modes of coordination. The analysis of governance therefore should heed both the potential of coordination failures and the reactions of the actors and the modifications of the modes of coordination resulting from it.

#### *4.2.1.4 Possible strategies to solve multi-level coordination problems*

Effective decision-making in multi-level structures might be impaired by the problem of complexity, resulting from a high number of participants and arenas of policy-making to be co-ordinated. Rising transaction costs and complications in procedures make an unlimited extension of the number of actors participating in intergovernmental negotiations impossible. This dilemma is aggravated by the problem of institutional diversity, i.e. the fact that actors and arenas to be co-ordinated follow different decision rules which often create incompatible orientations. This institutional challenge is particularly pressing in the case of the EU which is composed of several differently organized intergovernmental negotiating arenas across more than two levels (Benz and Eberlein 1999: 332).

While many observers expect that 'vertical activities' in multi-level systems increase the degree of interlacing and interlocking politics accordingly (e.g. Scharpf 1998), empirical studies on multi-level governance suggest that many of these systems work in a reasonably satisfactory way. The main reason for this dynamic may be that inherent tensions arising from the threat of overcomplexity and from conflicting operating logics of different arenas and levels trigger and drive restructuring processes, which have the potential to bring about successful adjustments to new requirements (Benz and Eberlein 1999: 332).

The structural limits to the coupling of multiple arenas caused by the problems of complexity and institutional diversity are recognized by actors. They are able to learn

from problematic situations and develop 'heuristics that approach best-response strategies' (Ostrom 1998: 9). Based on practical experience, they react to problems created by the dynamics of multi-level politics in a pragmatic way. Concerning the internal architecture of existing vertical and horizontal structures of policy-making, we can expect ongoing efforts to improve effectiveness of co-ordination. This is best achieved by limiting the access of new parties from external levels or arenas. At the same time, pressure for participation exercised by 'externalized' third parties might destabilize established patterns of decision-making and be a force of change.

The literature on interorganizational and international negotiations indicates three alternative solutions to the dilemma of exclusion and inclusion (Benz and Eberlein 1999: 333, Benz 2000: 107):

- The first one consists of a hierarchical-sequential ordering of arenas of policy-making, whereby upper-level decisions work as binding corridors for lower-level decision-making. However, this can only work if tasks can be subdivided, and if higher-level decisions leave some room for autonomous decision-making on the lower levels (Simon 1962). Otherwise, centralization with all its negative consequences prevails.
- The second solution involves a flexible dissociation or decoupling of external relations from the intraorganizational arena during the policy-making process. 'Decoupling' has, however, the disadvantage of reducing participation and coordination, allowing at best incremental mutual adjustment of policy-making at different levels.
- Thirdly, actors may be able to act in and link up multiple arenas by patterns of 'loose coupling' (Weick 1985), which perform interorganizational linkages and co-ordination between simultaneously operating arenas of negotiation. Instead of resorting to binding mandates or externally defined bargaining positions, they mediate between institutionally separated arenas and foster the exchange of information and informal contacts.

These modes of informal mediation and co-ordination exhibit several crucial advantages (Benz and Eberlein 1999: 333): they enable actors to circumvent rigidities of formal decision-making by informally linking arenas and problems; they can mobilize the power of policy ideas; they can give expertise-based policy entrepreneurs a better chance of overcoming conflicts; and finally, they allow the introduction of competition between arenas as a way of encouraging innovation. Given their advantages, these modes are likely to prevail in adjustment processes of multi-level structures, unless they are impeded by existing institutional structures.

As a result of these adjustments, we can expect multi-level systems to consist of separated, but loosely coupled, arenas. They are linked primarily by communication, and not by resource dependencies or control. Actors avoid using power to control their agent's behaviour, even if they are able to do so. Instead, they seek to influence their representatives by way of negotiation and to advance their interests by forming advocacy coalitions or informal networks, which often cut across the boundaries of institutionalized arenas.

On the basis of these theoretical considerations, we assume that processes of multi-level coordination constitute a dynamic, three-fold process of structuring (Benz and Eberlein 1999: 333): they create independent arenas of negotiation, they intensify communication and they stimulate learning. All three elements are essential for making co-operation and problem-solving effective. Differentiation of arenas reduces the problem of complexity. At the same time, it makes sure that actors are not bound

to fixed positions in their negotiations and enjoy sufficient flexibility to find agreements. Communication helps to improve the information base of negotiations and makes intergovernmental decisions acceptable to members of regional parliaments, citizens and associations. Learning leads to innovation and flexibility, which favours adjustment of existing structures.

**4.2.2 Multi-level coordination in GOFOR case studies in comparative analysis**

*4.2.2.1 Degree of federalism and decentralization*

Table 12 shows the degree of federalism and decentralization of the 10 countries in which case studies have been conducted in GoFOR. The primary federal characteristics of non-centralization and decentralization are the building blocks for the construction of the fivefold classification. The first criterion is whether the countries have formally federal constitutions. This criterion yields an initial distinction between federal and unitary countries. Each of the resulting five categories can then be divided into centralized and decentralized subclasses. Finally, an intermediate category of semi-federal systems is needed for some countries that cannot be classified as either federal or unitary.

**Table 12: Degree of federalism and decentralization**

<b>Federal and decentralized</b>	Germany
<b>Federal and centralized</b>	Austria
<b>Semi-federal</b>	Netherlands Spain
<b>Unitary and decentralized</b>	Denmark Norway
<b>Unitary and centralized</b>	France Greece Hungary Romania

Source: Lijphart 1999

The ten countries from which case studies are included in the GoFOR project cover all five categories. GoFOR includes case studies conducted in countries ranging from federal and decentralized (Germany) over semifederal (Netherlands and Spain) to unitary and centralized (France, Greece, Hungary and Romania).

*4.2.2.2 The importance of multi-level coordination in the GoFOR case studies*

Connected with the empirical findings from our case reports, we were also interested to analyse in greater detail how important the different governance elements (i.e. participation, intersectoral coordination, multi-level coordination, evaluation &

monitoring as well as the role of expertise) have been in our case studies (i) to specify the overall character of the governance processes and (ii) to explain the overall success or failure of the governance processes.

Table 13 shows how important the element “multi-level coordination” has been to describe the case and to explain the outputs and impacts of the policy process according to the overall judgement of the case studies authors. The importance of multi-level coordination is defined by two dimensions: First, how much multi-level coordination contributes to the general characterization of the governance process analysed in the case study, and secondly, how relevant multi-level coordination has been as a factor to explain the overall success or failure of the governance processes in terms of policy output and impact. For both dimensions a three-point judgement scale has been applied (very important, important, and rather unimportant).

**Table 13: Importance of Multi-level Coordination in the GoFOR case studies**

		MLC as characteristic element of the governance case		
		Rather Unimportant	Important	Very Important
Importance of MLC for success and failure	Rather Unimportant	HU-NFO NL-GW NL-UH	AT-AFD DK-NPP FR-CFT GR-MA ROM-NAT	
	Important	NL-NfP	FR-RPF NOR-LF	GER-RA
	Very Important			AT-BS DK-HD GER-L+ GER-GAK

It has to be mentioned, that this categorisation is meant to draw a rough picture as regards the significance of multi-level co-ordination among the GoFOR cases study processes only.

However, it stands out that for 12 GoFOR case studies multi-level coordination has been ranked as a very important or important element of the governance process. Only in four cases multi-level coordination was judged as rather unimportant to characterize the governance process. A slightly different picture emerges when it comes to the importance of multi-level coordination for explaining the overall success and failure of the governance process. In this dimension, multi-level coordination was viewed as very important or important for only eight cases.

Based on the results shown in Table 13 we can distinguish three groups of cases in our set of GoFOR case studies with regard to multi-level coordination. The first group, located in the bottom right corner, is defined by a high relevance of multi-level coordination on both dimensions. This group includes four case studies, three of them from federal countries (Austria and Germany), and the last case being from a unitary but decentralized country (Denmark). On the contrary, the upper left corner, we have three cases defined by a low importance of multi-level coordination on both dimensions. Here we find the Hungarian case study, a unitary and centralized state,

but also two of the Dutch cases. The latter dealing with governance processes on the regional level paying not much attention to coordination with upper territorial levels. The middle group in the first row is defined by a large set of cases in which multi-level coordination has been viewed as important element, but still as not having much importance for the explanation of the final results. It comprises different countries, ranging from unitary countries (France, Greece, and Romania) to semi-federal (Denmark) and federal systems (Austria). However, the majority in this group are case studies in unitary countries analysing decentralization approaches.

At a very general level Table 13 suggests a basic relation: the more important multi-level co-ordination was judged for characterising the processes that were studied, the more important it was for explaining the overall processes' success or failure in terms of policy outputs and impacts, and vice versa.

#### *4.2.2.3 The involvement of territorial levels in the case studies*

To conduct an analysis of the role of multi-level coordination in the 19 case studies analysed in the GoFOR project we first need to know which territorial levels are involved in our case studies. Table 14 provides an overview on the involvement and relevance of territorial levels for each of the GoFOR case studies

Almost all case studies in GoFOR deal with governance processes which heavily involved the national level. There are two exemptions from this rule: the Spanish case study analysing the General Forest Plan in the autonomous region of Catalonia, and the German case study on the implementation of LEADER+. In all other 16 cases under scrutiny the national level (and the central government) played an important role.

In seven case studies impact from the **international level** was mentioned, i.e. included in the analysis, but in five out of these seven cases the internationalization is either related to legally non-binding instrument or an indirect influence. E.g. the three cases dealing with Forest Programmes (Austria, Hungary, and Spain) refer to the role of MCPFE resolution on NFPs and their indicators for SFM, and the Danish and Norwegian cases refer to the general background of international conventions for biodiversity and nature conservation. However, only two cases analyze the domestic implementation of international legally binding conventions (Austria-BS, Romania-ACP).

Eleven cases mention an impact of the **EU level**, which are almost two-thirds of all GoFOR cases. However, in five of these cases the impact of the Community level is rather indirect (both AT, ESP-FPGP, FR-CFT, HU), i.e. the case studies refer to non-binding EU decisions or political documents (e.g. the EU Forest Strategy), mention the EU accession as an important overall background or regard the EU as an important source of possible future funding opportunities. In six case studies the influence of the EU level is more direct. Three of them analyze either directly the implementation of EU law or EU law plays an important role (Habitat Directive in DK+ROM, Anti-corruption policies in ROM). In three cases the impact of the EU level is connected to the provision of a significant amount of financial means (FR-RPF, GER-L+, GR-MA). In total our case studies show a fair amount of internationalization and Europeanization.

The **sub-national level** plays an important role in the four GoFOR countries with federal or semi-federal political systems (AT, ESP-FPGP, GER, NL). In total, seven

case studies mention an important influence of the sub-national level in their governance processes.

The **regional and/or local level** is mentioned as important in 14 case studies. However, many case studies also stated that the actual level of influence of the regional/local level in the governance processes has been limited, in some cases very limited.



**Table 14: Involvement of territorial levels in the 19 case studies analyzed in GoFOR**

Country Level	AT-BS	AT-AFD	DK-HD	DK-NPP	ESP-FPGP	FR-CFT	FR-RPF	GER-LEADER	GER-RA	GER-GAK	GR-MA	HUN-NFP	NL-GW	NL-NFP	NL-UH	NOR-LF	ROM-ACP.	ROM-NAT
International	X	Xa		Xa	Xa							Xa				Xa	X	
EU	(X)	(X)	X			(X)	X	X		(X)	X	(X)					X	X
National	X	X	X	X		X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Sub-national	X	X			X			X		X			X	X				
Regional/ Local			X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	(X)		X

X = directly involved (X) = indirect influence or reference to legally non-binding commitments

Summary (19 cases):

**International** (UN, OECD, MCPFE): in total 7 cases, five of them only indirect

**EU:** in total 11 cases, five cases only indirect

**National level:** in total 16 cases, only the Catalonian Forest Plan and LEADER+ in Germany are focussed mainly on the sub-national level

**Sub-national level** (Federal states, Autonomous regions, Provinces): in total 7 (5) cases, of course only in the federal and semi-federal countries

**Regional and local level:** in total 14 cases

#### 4.2.2.4 *Interdependency among levels*

The question about “interdependency” refers to the question about “why” and in “which way” territorial levels are interconnected: i.e. which problems have to be solved (because of external effects or distributional conflicts), which goals should be reached, and which tasks have to be fulfilled by multi-level coordination.

As Table 15 shows, empirically we found **four categories of major reasons** why territorial levels in the GoFOR case studies are interconnected: the need for legal compliance, the division of formal competencies, financial issues, and the need or ambition to improve policy effectiveness.

**Legal compliance** was found as a major reason in nine cases. Here, multi-level coordination occurred because international commitments or Community and national requirements have to be fulfilled. In the majority of cases these commitments and requirements are legally-binding. The legal obligations might originate from the international level as in the case of the implementation of the CBD in Austria or the anti-corruption policies in Romania. In other cases, such as the implementation of the Habitat Directive in Denmark and Romania, the need for compliance was triggered by EU law.

In other cases international and European legally non-binding obligations were important for the interconnection of territorial levels. This was especially important for the three cases which analysed National Forest Programmes (Austria, Hungary, and Spain), where the international level played an important role as an explicit authority for the initiative of the process, particularly as regards the obligations by the Ministerial Conference on the Protection of Forests in Europe (MCPFE) for obligatory process principles and elements. The international background served as source of legitimacy and of initiative. However, its influence is rather political, as the EU Forestry Strategy and the self-commitment status of signed MCPFE resolutions have no further legal means for implementation of the NFP approach at national level. However, in all three cases the National Forest Programmes were developed applying the MCPFE approach towards NFPs, in particular by using the MCPFE criteria and indicators for sustainable forest management.

The second main trigger is the **division of power and responsibilities** among different territorial levels. This has caused the need for multi-level coordination in ten cases. The big majority of these cases are found in countries with federal or semi-federal political systems. Austria, Germany, Netherlands, and Spain alone comprise eight cases where divided responsibilities are associated with the appearance of multi-level coordination. For instance, in both Austrian cases the division of legislative powers between the federal state and the provinces and the coexistence of national (i.e. forestry) and provincial law (e.g. nature conservation) to the very same object, the forests, has occasionally lead to problems of coordination. The same situation prevailed in two of the German cases, where the coordination among different levels under REGIONEN AKTIV is characterised by a high degree of devolution of responsibilities into regions, and where the responsible ministry actively tried to admit a maximum degree of freedom for the regional level while cutting back responsibilities of intermediate territorial levels. Also in the case of the “Joint Task for Agriculture and Coastal Management (GAK)” led the distribution of decision-making powers to certain interdependence among the two levels and all actors involved, as alliances for decisions are needed. The third German case refers to another multi-

level system of policy-making. Here, the system of EU framework legislation implies certain legal competencies, procedures and interdependencies among all levels involved (GER-L+). Furthermore, the distribution of responsibilities also triggered multi-level coordination in unitary and centralized countries. For instance, in the Greek case on national park management, power distribution and legal provisions were impetuses for coordination across levels, and the provincial governor coming in between having the assigned power to coordinate between the national and the local level.

The third main trigger for coordination between territorial levels was the **provision of financial means**. This was an important factor for MLC in seven GoFOR cases. In three cases funding came primarily from EU budgets as for instance in the case of LEADER+, where *“the principle of EU co-financing of eligible measures under LEADER+ also illustrates the distribution of rules and competencies among levels. All projects to be supported by the EU need to be co-financed by national or regional governments. EU regional policy can be characterized as a system of joint finance, linking budgetary policies of different levels of government”* (Giessen and Böcher 2007, LEADER+). Also in the case of the implementation of the Habitat Directive in Romania it was mentioned that *“at this stage in the process, the national level is dependent on EU financial resources and guidance”* (Bancu 2007). In the French case study on the Forestry Relief Plan the EU gave *“an indirect financial support through the inclusion of storm measures (roads, clearing and reconstitution of damaged stands) within the French Plan de Développement Rural National”* (Buttoud and Kouplevatskaya 2007, RPF). In one case EU funding was combined with other sources of funding to provide for functioning Territorial Forestry Charters, where *“the EU, the State, the Region and the Department granted funds for specific actions”* (Buttoud and Kouplevatskaya 2007, CFT).

In the other cases the main source for funding was the central government. For instance in Germany, where *“REGIONEN AKTIV is a funding programme of the Federal Ministry and interdependencies result from the need of BMVEL to inform beneficiaries about programme requirements and details”* (Giessen and Böcher 2007, RA). In the Greek case *“financing is a key issue that keeps the negotiation process in close contact between levels. There is a strong interdependence between local actors, the state and the EU as regards funding.”* In the case of the French Forestry Relief Plan, *“the major funding from the state basically concerned subsidies to support the transportation of timber fallen by the storms; the subsidies to the ONF for the restoration of its financial balance; the subsidies to forest communes, and measures supporting employment and education”* (Buttoud and Kouplevatskaya 2007, RPF).

The fourth trigger for multi-level coordination was found in the concern for **effective implementation** of the respective policies, and thus the effort to involve actors from the regional and local level where implementation had to take place. In this sense, *“to coordinate with sub-national actors is therefore a precondition for successful implementation”* (Nordbeck and Pregernig 2007) or as one of the Danish case studies put it: *“Since the case deals with a transfer of an EU directive to the national level, multilevel coordination is a prerequisite for success”* (Boon, Lund and Nathan 2007, HD). In some cases the role of the local level in the process was very much highlighted. This important role was most prominently stated in one of the French cases: *“During the process itself, the local communities are supposed to take all initiatives for the agenda setting, implementation, monitoring and evaluation in the context and under the umbrella of the state regulation”* (Buttoud and Kouplevatskaya 2007, CFT). The idea of regionalisation was also very prominent in the German

cases, where the need for “regionalisation” especially of decision-making competences has been articulated as a key element in rural development policies (Giessen and Böcher 2007). And “*Leader+ is supposed to improve vertical intergovernmental co-ordination and partnership with regional actors*” (Giessen and Giessen 2007, LEADER+).

In other cases, the “*coordination between different territorial levels was not mentioned in any of the examined policy statements. There was, however, much concern about how to ensure involvement and representation of local interests and local authorities in the process*” (Boon, Lund and Nathan 2007, NPP). And also the Greek case study concluded, that “*the empirical research compared to the previous administrative park regime, found that the most profound influence comes more from the involvement of several local interest groups, NGOs and all other bodies that care locally*” (Kassioumis, Papageorgiu and Vakkas 2007).

Additional to the four main reasons for multi-level coordination outlined above two more triggers were mentioned in the case studies: the actual **problems at hand** and the ambitions for **policy learning**. The former was mentioned in one of the Danish cases: “*Furthermore the “problem at hand”, i.e. declining biodiversity which led to the HD in the first place, must be addressed at all levels to be solved*” (Boon, Lund and Nathan 2007, HD). The issue of policy learning was mentioned in one of the French cases: “*All the possible levels were mobilised and each of them might have evolved through learning from the experience form the other ones, even if it has not been the initial expectation from the process*” (Buttoud and Kouplevatskaya 2007, RPF).



#### 4.2.2.5 Interaction patterns

In the background paper we stated that the course of action and the results of multi-level coordination depend very much on the interaction patterns regulating the policy process (Nordbeck, Bouriaud and Bancu 2005). Policy coordination is possible through different modes of coordination: hierarchical steering, competition, negotiation or mutual adjustment. Decisive for the logic of policy-making in multilevel systems is not the institutional context as such, but to what extent actors' behaviour is determined by specific rule systems.

In Table 16 we provide an overview on the modes of coordination used to coordinate territorial levels in the 19 cases of GoFOR.

There are four governance processes in which a single mode of coordination seems to have prevailed: the Danish case study on the implementation of the Habitat Directive, the Dutch case study on the Nature for People Plan, the French case study on Territorial Forestry Charters, and the Romanian case study on the implementation of Natura 2000. In the majority of cases a combination of modes of coordination has been applied.

However, overall it seems that **hierarchical steering** is still the prevailing mode of coordination between territorial levels. At least, hierarchy was mentioned as an important factor to explain and understand multi-level coordination in 13 out of the 19 GoFOR cases. Interestingly, hierarchy as a mode of coordination appears in different forms. The classical case has been described in one of the Danish cases: *“Coordination is clearly triggered by legal provisions and the mode of coordination was hierarchy through all levels with little room for negotiations”* (Boon, Lund and Nathan 2007, HD). And also in the Romanian case on the implementation of Natura 2000: *“The interaction between the levels within the country follows a hierarchical logic”* (Bancu 2007). Also one of the two French case studies provide an example of a multi-level system where despite the high degree of involvement of regional and local actors *“the final decisions always remained in the hands of the State. There was no real decentralisation of the decision-making. [...] The organization remains centralised”* (Buttoud and Kouplevatskaya 2007, RPF). In some cases, hierarchy refers only to parts of the political decision-making process such as the setting of general policies objectives. This was mentioned in the German case on Regionen Aktiv: *„The objectives at the programming level have been set hierarchically by BMVEL“* (Giessen and Böcher 2007, RA).

In other cases hierarchy seems to be based not so much on legal power, but on the distribution of resources. For instance, in the Greek case study it was stated that *“the dominant attitude in the Ministry of Environment, Planning and Public Works (MEPPW) acting as a central nature conservation actor is one of a body that controls the policy by regulating financial resources and places a boundary around the cooperation with the forestry department”* (Kassioumis, Papageorgiu and Vakkas 2007).

In ten cases **hierarchy was combined with other modes of coordination**, mostly with negotiation, and sometimes with market incentives (France, Greece and Germany), and sometimes with mutual adjustment (Denmark-NPP and Spain). The mix of coordination modes seems to provide for greater flexibility in decision-making in multi-level systems. As it was stated in the German cases: *„The mode of interaction between the different levels concerned varies between hierarchy and*

*competition*“ (Giessen and Böcher 2007, LEADER+). „*However, if consensus can not be reached, negotiations are complemented with hierarchical modes*“ (Giessen and Böcher 2007, RA).

Furthermore, in some cases the mode of coordination changed over time as mentioned in one of the Dutch case studies: *“The relation between the ministry of LNV and the regional authorities changed from negotiation in the first stage to one of hierarchy in the second stage”* (Arnouts, van der Zouwen and Turnhout 2007, NfP/PfN).

The second most common mode of multi-level coordination found in our case studies is **negotiation**. It was important in eight cases. This mode of coordination is of special importance for multi-level systems in which legal competences are distributed among different territorial levels. As one of the Austrian case studies states: *“Veto players always referred to the distinct allocation of competencies between the federal and the province level”* (Hogl and Kvarda 2007). Negotiation was also very important in the German cases, where „the logic of interaction within the work of the National Network Unit (NNU) and the Observatory can be assumed to be based on negotiations“ (Giessen and Böcher 2007, LEADER+). And in another case *„negotiation is the prime logic of interaction between the two levels“* (Giessen and Böcher 2007, GAK). Sub-national governments may use different mechanism to coordinate as mentioned in the second Austrian case study: *„The provinces use three mechanisms to coordinate with the federal level: a common representative for nature conservation of all nine provinces, a representative for the CBD, and institutionalised liaison body (Verbindungsstelle der Länder)“* (Nordbeck and Pregernig 2007). However, negotiation has also been used in other cases as an informal mode of coordination as shown by the Hungarian case study: *„An informal rule of the planning phase was that regional and local actors are to be involved as far as possible into the process. The mode of interaction between participants was clearly dominated in the programming phase by negotiation and discussion“* (Meszaros et al 2007).

The third form of coordination found in our cases is **competition** induced by economic incentives. Competition has been an important factor in six cases, often induced by available EU funding. The competition of regional actors for financial means either from the European and/or the national level introduces market incentives as an important element in the implementation of political decisions. Funds are allocated among regions within the financial framework based on expressed needs: *“The needs expressed at the local level go up to the state level and are more or less taken into consideration during the assessment of the distribution of necessary funds. The Ministry of Agriculture [...] distributes the funds between regions depending on the expressed needs”* (Buttoud and Kouplevatskaya 2007, RPF). The procedure of running the financial programmes is in principal the same in the three German cases studies, i.e. *„competition triggers the LEADER+ process in the respective federal states“* (Giessen and Böcher 2007, LEADER+). Market forces are also employed in the case of Regionen Aktiv. In the Greek case study financing was also a key issue *“that keeps the negotiation process in close contact between levels“*.

The last mode of coordination that has been of importance in the 19 GoFOR case studies is **mutual adjustment**. Here, national (sub-national) governments continue to adopt their own policies in response to, or anticipation of the policy choices of other territorial levels. This mode of coordination has been found in six cases. It mainly refers to coordination with the international level (UN, MCPFE). For instance, the

case study on the AFD stated that “the Austrian Forest Dialogue is based on the elements and principles defined by the Intergovernmental Panel on Forests (IPF) of the United Nations and the pan-European Ministerial Conference for the Protection of Forests in Europe” (Hogl and Kvarda 2007). And the same influence has been mentioned in the Spanish case on the Regional Forest Programme of Catalonia: „The PGPF has been developed applying the MCPFE approach [...] In addition, the strategic Spanish documents and state action plans that influence directly forest management have been taken into account“ (Pecurul, Dominguez and Tena 2007). The Romanian case study on anti-corruption policies also referred to the UN and EU level: “However, following the GRECO and EU recommendations, the mode of interaction is rather mutual adaptation – mutual policy learning” (Bouriaud 2007). However, the Danish case study on National Parks mentioned this mode of coordination also in the national context: “At the same time, there was some mutual adaptation between the territorial levels, in that the local levels had the option to abstain from joining the process” (Boon, Lund and Nathan 2007, NPP).

In a nutshell, at least at a first glance, hierarchy modes of multi-level co-ordination seem to stand central within the group of GoFOR case studies. However, each of the four basic modes of multi-level co-ordination was found as empirical phenomena that significantly contributed to describe the processes of co-ordination.



**Table 16: Forms of coordination between the territorial levels in the 19 case studies**

Country \ Form	AT-BS	AT-AFD	DK-HD	DK-NPP	ESP-FPGP	FR-CFT	FR-RPF	GER-LEADER	GER-RA	GER-GAK	GR-MA	HUN-NFP	NL-GW	NL-NFP	NL-UH	NOR-LF	ROM-ACP	ROM-NAT	
Hierarchy			X	X	Xa		X	X	X	(X)	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Negotiation	X	X						X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X?		
Competition/Market Incentives						X	X	X	X	X	X								
Mutual Adaptation	X	X		X	X	X						X					X		

Xa = Hierarchy in this case refer to the coordination between sub-national and local level

#### 4.2.2.6 *New Actors and Institutions*

In the set of case studies we furthermore attempted to identify common patterns as regards the involvement of new actors and institutions which came into play due to the interconnection of multiple levels. The term institution includes new organisations as well as any change of rules regarding multi-level coordination. Table 17 provides an overview on the involvement of new actors and the establishment of new institutions for multi-level coordination in the 19 GoFOR case studies.

In almost all cases new institutions were set up to provide for some form of multi-level coordination. Some of them were established only temporarily in the course of the decision-making process and were then either abandoned or transferred into other forms of organisation. Their time of existence varied from rather short durations to longer periods, e.g. one to two years, as in the case of coordination committees and working groups to formulate National or Regional Forest Programmes in Austria, Hungary and Spain, and six years as in the case of the coordination committee established for the Relief Plan after the Storms in France (2000-2006). In most cases the level of coordination induced by these institutions has been rather low, i.e. representatives from sub-national or regional levels participated in meetings and were informed about the progress of the decision-making process. In only a few cases a higher level of coordination has been observed, such as negotiations between the representatives of different levels of government. This was found mainly in connection with the implementation of EU or national funding programmes. In other cases new institutions were set up as permanent, such as the Territorial Forest Charters in France or the National Network Unit (NNU) and Local Action Groups (LAG) in the case of regional policy in Germany. Typically these permanent institutions are responsible for the implementation of political decisions. They have been set up in a later stage of the political process and fulfil a different function. As described in the Greek case study this had direct implication for the issues of multi-level coordination: *“Park boards work in close contact with the National Centre for Biotopes and Wetlands and the ministerial departments, but this process is more in seeking assistance rather than part of a multi-level decision making process”* (Kassioumis, Papageorgiu and Vakkas 2007). In some cases processes of multi-level coordination also took place outside the formal political arena, i.e. the national and local committees and thematic working groups, and different organisations entered into alliances both at the national and at the local levels conducting preparatory meetings (Denmark, National park processes) e.g.

With regard to the actor configurations we have observed different models in our case studies. In some cases the focus was on developing new rules of interaction between established actors, whereas in other cases new actors entered the policy arena to cope with the situation posed by the specific multi-level governance processes. One model that can be derived from our case studies is the “classical model”, in which state actors in particular from the executive (ministries and agencies) are dominating the process of multi-level coordination. The description given in the German case study on Regionen Aktiv provides a typical example of this model: *“All institutions established under REGIONEN AKTIV are actively involved in the MLC with the administrative office having an outstanding role in facilitating MLC”*. In other cases, such as the Danish and Romanian case studies on the implementation of the EU Habitat Directive, non-state actors were of particular importance for multi-level coordination: *“The institutional set-up and hierarchy of multilevel coordination in the HD implementation process has furthermore given*

*NGOs with an interest in a strict interpretation of the Directive more comparative power towards the Government as they have the possibility to complain to the EU. BirdLife Denmark used legal proceedings to gain influence on the process along with other NGOs interested in the outcome of the implementation” (Boon, Lund and Nathan 2007, HD).*

Other case studies found that the network of actors has not changed on all territorial levels but only on some of them, and mainly this has happened at local levels as for instance observed in the French, German and Spanish case studies.

**Table 17: New actors and institutions**

Country Change	AT- BS	AT- AFD	DK- HD	DK- NPP	ESP- FPGP	FR- CFT	FR- RPF	GER- LEADER	GER- RA	GER- GAK	GR- MA	HUN- NFP	NL- GW	NL- NFP	NL- UH	NOR- LF	ROM- ACP	ROM- NAT
New Institutions	Yes	X	X	(X)	X		X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X		X	X
	No																	
New Actors	Yes			X		(X)		X	X		X	X	X			X	X	X
	No	X	X	X			X			X				X	X			

### 4.2.3 Multi-level coordination between internationalization and decentralization – analyses and findings from selected GoFOR case studies

#### 4.2.3.1 Multi-level governance in EU policy-making

##### **Case study 1: LEADER+ - EU Community Initiative for rural development and its implementation in Germany (Lukas Giessen and Michael Böcher)<sup>10</sup>**

Since 1991 the European Union (EU) has been implementing new territorial approaches to rural development in a pilot program called LEADER. Being well established as a European Community Initiative the LEADER+ approach aims at developing locally managed, so-called ‘bottom-up’ rural development projects across the EU. LEADER+ projects have developed across the EU in a variety of well-defined local areas. Currently there exist 893 LEADER+-Regions in 15 European countries. The approach is characterised by high levels of local stakeholder and community involvement, by partnership and cooperation, and by the encouragement of innovative approaches to rural development.

In the programming period from 2000-2006 LEADER+ was financed with Euro 2000 million, of which approx. Euro 250 million have been transferred to Germany.<sup>11</sup> The EU initiative has been supporting local project groups in 148 rural regions in Germany, aiming to realise innovative pilot strategies for sustainable regional development. However, LEADER+ has neither been designed as an instrument for replacing investments in agriculture, nor to achieve policy goals by the allocation of enormous financial resources. Actually, the financial means of LEADER+ have just amounted to approximately 1% of the total European Union’s structural funds in this funding period. Hence, LEADER+ must rather be seen as a pilot program aiming at the development and demonstration of innovative approaches to rural development which subsequently might become part of the mainstream rural development policies.

The reform of the EU structural funds policy in 1999 introduced a complicated system of multi-level-governance which for Benz and Eberlein (1999, 335) is characterized by 4 central attributes:

“(a) It aims at implementing an *integrative approach* to policy-making by improving co-ordination of different Structural Funds.

(b) It is supposed to improve *vertical intergovernmental co-ordination* and partnership with regional actors. Grants to selected regions are allocated on the basis of development plans and operational programmes, which are to be elaborated on the national and regional levels and have to be integrated into the Commission’s Community Support Framework.

(c) All projects to be supported by the EU need to be co-financed by national or regional governments. EU regional policy can be characterized as a system of *joint finance* linking budgetary policies of different levels of government.

<sup>10</sup> Based on Lukas Giessen and Michael Böcher (2007), *New Modes of Governance in Integrated Rural Development Policies*, GoFOR Main Assessment Report, July 2007, University of Göttingen, pp. 27-58.

<sup>11</sup> Deutsche Vernetzungsstelle LEADER+ (1999)

(d) Finally, regional administrations are requested to include *public and private actors* in the decision-making process in order to achieve broad support for policy goals and comprehensive information on development potential.”

The EU Commission in its guidelines on LEADER+ articulates the need for and rationale of multi-level coordination as follows: For rural areas “developing their specific resources in an integrated approach that forms part of a territorial strategy which is tailored to the local context seems increasingly to be the route that will have to be taken if rural areas are to create and maintain competitive and sustainable products and services. [...] Such an approach will become more effective, however, if it forms part of a Community policy and national and regional policies which are able to provide the framework, tools and impetus necessary for ensuring that the rural areas, and the people who live in them, are in a position to grasp development opportunities and translate them into practice using appropriate resources and arrangements.”<sup>12</sup>

The assumption inherent in this EU programme that the involvement of EU, national and regional policies are most effective in terms of rural development can be seen as the central argument for an active approach towards multi-level coordination.

**Levels involved:** The levels referred to under LEADER+ are Community, national, sub-national and regional, with the latter being defined by the regional actors themselves after a constituting process within Local Action Groups (LAGs; see Figure 1). All territorial levels are actively involved in the process which corresponds to the general partnership principle of the EU structural funds policy. While the EU Commission sets out framework standards in its guidelines, these standards shall be further elaborated in so-called operational programmes, which in Germany have been elaborated by 13 federal states. These programmes define an administrative structure and appoint authorisation agencies at the appropriate level (e.g. at federal state or district level), which shall guarantee the alignment of LEADER+ measures with EU and other relevant regulations. Based on the operational programmes LAGs were supposed to apply for funding. The funding programme through its guidelines establishes a thorough governance system comprising all territorial levels.

At the EU level the Commission provides for funding and framework regulation. An European Observatory facilitates cross-national cooperation and networking activities between all involved 15 countries. The LEADER+ Observatory serves as facilitating organisation regarding coordination, networking and provision of.

At the national level the LEADER+ guidelines establish so-called National Network Units (NNU). They play a crucial role in addressing MLC. NNUs shall coordinate between the different regions and facilitate the exchange of experiences across regions and federal states' borders. They furthermore serve as a training institution and as a provider for information and services related to LEADER+. <sup>13</sup> Inter-territorial exchange of experiences, transfer of know-how and information exchange and dissemination from national levels to the LAGs are considered vital in replacing central steering bodies and detailed procedural rules. Hence, the NNU plays an active role for multi-level coordination under LEADER+. <sup>14</sup> The national government, however, plays a less important role than e.g. the federal states' level. It merely

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
<sup>12</sup> EU Commission (2000: 6)

<sup>13</sup> Interview (6a)

<sup>14</sup> EU Commission (2000: 9); EU Commission (2003: 15)

represents the federal states' positions and interests at the EU level and supervises the NNU<sup>15</sup>.

**Figure 4: Multi-level coordination under the EU Community Initiative LEADER+**



Own depiction.

At the sub-national level operational programmes are supposed to substantiate goals and measures within the guidelines provided by the framework regulation. In the German context the federal states (Länder) are supposed to elaborate Operational Programmes based on the Commission guidelines, further elaborating the Leader approach under the specific federal states' conditions. LEADER+ coordinators may also be funded at the provincial level for facilitating cooperation, networking, and exchange with the regions. In this case they also serve as mediator between the LAGs and the provincial authorities in some federal states.<sup>16</sup>

At regional level LEADER+ builds upon Local Action Groups (LAGs). Within the overall framework LAGs are the central feature of LEADER+. In the regions these public private partnerships can be seen as the central decision-making body concerning all LEADER+-related decisions. LAGs are to be established at the regional level with a minimum of 10.000 and not more than 100.000 inhabitants per region (on average: about 70.000).<sup>17</sup> The LEADER programme aims at promoting collective action at this very level.

According to the EU Commission's LEADER+ guidelines LAGs are supposed to represent all relevant regional actors and their interests. These groups should be open to all citizens and representatives of different organised interest groups (farmers, Nature conservationists, Tourism, Handicraft, enterprises, social groups, etc.). Actors representing the regional or local government and administration may make up max. 50% of the LAG members.

A wide range of competencies has been attributed to the LAGs. For example, they are supposed to formulate a coherent regional development strategy (so-called

<sup>15</sup> Interview 6a (2006),

<sup>16</sup> EU Commission (2000: 11); Interview 4a (2006),

<sup>17</sup> Interview 5a (2006),; Interview 1a (2006a),

Regional Development Concept). According to the guidelines of such a genuine regional development strategy, LAGs shall develop and select regional development projects for EU funding.<sup>18</sup> In addition to the LAGs LEADER+ also provides for “regional management”. So-called regional management facilities (Leader-Managers) are the organisational core assisting LAGs and facilitating their work.

Overall, the Leader+ programme is very much based on modern concepts of endogenous rural development which emphasise a combination of network steering, the guideline functions of regional development concepts and the work of a regional management as steering actor.<sup>19</sup>

### **Interdependencies among territorial levels**

The EU’s approach for LEADER+ of providing a framework legislation which focuses on minimum requirements and core topics is a central feature of MLC in the context of LEADER+. It aims at ensuring a maximum of partnership, subsidiary and local adaptation of the initiative.

Formally, the distribution of competencies among the different levels involved in LEADER+ is characterised by subsidiarity. The EU lines out a framework legislation leaving as many competencies to the regional level as possible, whilst setting central minimum requirements. Reducing the role of intermediate authorities (here the national level) can be seen as an innovation of the LEADER approach. Even though overlaps can be identified, a more or less clear distinction can be made with regard to different levels’ competencies at different stages of the policy cycle. Whilst the EU-level is more involved in the overall design phase, the federal states’ level is important to further elaborate and formulate the programme and reflecting the specific situation of the respective state. Regional actors are put in charge for the implementation. Monitoring and evaluation have been required by the framework regulation too. It has to be addressed at the regional level and to be organised and commissioned by the federal states. The principle of EU co-financing of eligible measures under LEADER+ also illustrates the rules and competencies among levels. As mentioned above, EU through structural funds’ resources finances up to 50% of eligible measures in Western and up to 75% in Eastern federal states (Objective 1 areas). The co-financing shares of 50% and 25% respectively have to be covered either by the federal states, the districts or the municipalities.<sup>20</sup>

The EU plays a prominent role in promoting, supporting and requiring networking activities among different levels. The actual work associated with multi-level coordination remains a task of the NNUs and the Observatory. The system of EU framework legislation implies certain legal competencies, procedures and interdependencies among all levels involved. However, LEADER+ aims at reaching the regional level more or less directly from the EU level, with as little interference at intermediate levels as possible. Direct interdependence only occurs between the EU level and the federal states, and between the federal states and the regions (LAGs) respectively. The national level, as regards formal interdependencies, does not play a major role. Except for the LAGs all actors playing a central role in MLC, namely the NNU, the European Observatory, EU Commission, the Federal Ministry of Agriculture and the responsible Federal states ministries can be characterised as state actors or

<sup>18</sup> EU Commission (2000); Böcher (2005:11)

<sup>19</sup> see Benz/Fürst/Kilper/Rehfeld (2000)

<sup>20</sup> Deutsche Vernetzungsstelle LEADER+ (1999b)



at least as 'closely related' to public authorities. For LAGs no such general statement can be made. No deductions can be made with regard to informal roles and interests of MLC.

### **Modes of MLC**

The primary mode of interaction between the different levels concerned varies between hierarchy, negotiation and competition, depending on the levels concerned. Certainly among the EU and national and sub-national level hierarchical modes and their implications prevail. This manifests in the LEADER+ guidelines as well as the operational programmes. However, the LEADER+ approach employs a competitive mode when it comes to the selection of single LAGs for LEADER+ funding, where the operational programmes shall elaborate selection criteria for funding the most promising strategies.<sup>21</sup> Hence, competition triggers the LEADER+ process in the respective federal states. The logic of interaction within the work of the NNU and the Observatory can be assumed to be based on negotiation.

### **Actors of MLC**

The LEADER+ approach led to an increase of the number of actors concerned with multi-level coordination. First, the establishment of the Observatory with about 40 employees under LEADER II at EU level put a strong emphasis on the issue. Actually about 7-8 staff members work on aforementioned MLC issues.<sup>22</sup> Secondly, NNUs present 'new' actors concerned with MLC. Their work is currently highly valued and in Germany the mandate of the NNU will be expanded for coordinating all rural development processes in the future.<sup>23</sup> Thirdly, some federal states employ so-called LEADER+ coordinators at the provincial level as an intermediate level between the NNU and the LAGs, which also facilitate MLC. A fourth component illustrating the increasing range of actors can be seen in the involvement of the regional level (LAGs) in inter-level networking and learning. The institutions of NNUs, provincial LEADER+ coordinators and the European Observatory are direct results of the LEADER+ initiative and have been established to support inter alia MLC.

### **Problems of MLC**

By applying the mode of competition to the funding policy the EU with the LEADER+ programme introduced a completely new paradigm into German rural development policy. Our empirical results suggest that this approach has caused problems too. First of all, the EU framework guidelines in some instances may have been too strict or too concrete for adequate implementation. For instance the maximum number of 100.000 inhabitants per 'region' as stated in the LEADER+ guidelines, led to problems in the designation of regions. It was observed that during the formation phase certain areas, communes or the like, have been actively kept out of the process in order to comply with the maximum numbers. Even if for historical of geographic reasons certain areas were perceived as integral parts of a region,

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<sup>21</sup> EU Commission (2000, 10)

<sup>22</sup> Interview 6a (2006),

<sup>23</sup> BMELV (2006)

people stated 'we can not take them on-board – we will not get funding if we do not comply'.<sup>24</sup>

Furthermore, the diversity of operational programmes and respective experiences in the 13 federal states under LEADER+ in Germany may have constrained effective vertical as well as the horizontal exchange and learning.

Although the decision over the eligibility of projects lies formally within the competencies of the LAG, provincial authorities have often the last say in whether financial resources are being allocated for respective projects.<sup>25</sup> The MLC design of involving and even empowering regions shows deficits in the design of operational programmes and may obstruct innovations as well as the bottom-up approach.

Another shortcoming of some operational programmes seems to be a focus on more traditional rural development measures. Some regulations seem to narrow the range of eligible measures under the programme to the standard EU mainstream measures.<sup>26</sup>

### **Case Study 2: Implementation of the EU Habitats Directive in Denmark (Tove Boon, Dorthe Lund, and Iben Nathan)<sup>27</sup>**

The EU Habitat Directive (HD) was adopted in 1992 and has to be implemented through the designation of an European ecological network of special areas of conservation (SACs) on land, and at sea and by promoting sustainable management of the wider land and seascapes. Each member state is obligated to propose an exhaustive list of sites from which the Commission selects a number of sites of Community importance in agreement with the Member States. The Member States must then designate these sites as SACs. Furthermore, the HD must be implemented through appropriate national legislation (EU 2006). The HD is concerned with the protection of nature which is endangered or important from a European point of view and hence does not necessarily protect all the endangered species and nature types from a national point of view (Agger et al 2005). The 1979 Wild Birds Directive entails the designation of special protected areas (SPAs) (EC 1979). Together, the SACs and SPAs form the Natura 2000 network. Furthermore, the establishment of this network of nature conservation sites is also seen to fulfil the Community's obligation according to the UN Convention on Biological Diversity (European Commission 2002).

The main requirement of the HD is to ensure a favourable conservation status of habitat types and species. This must be done according to article 6 of the HD and involves an active management (Agger et al 2005). It is not enough that the Member States stop further deterioration of the SACs, they must actively establish measures that conserve, improve or even restore a favourable conservation status; the States are obliged to obtain a specific result (European Community 2000). Article 6 furthermore obligates the Member States to prevent any deterioration of a designated

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<sup>24</sup> Interview 5a (2006); Interview 1a (2006),

<sup>25</sup> Interview 2a (2006); Interview 5a (2006), see also Böcher (2007)

<sup>26</sup> Interview 2a (2006); Interview 3a (2006),

<sup>27</sup> Based on Tove, Boon, Dorthe Lund and Iben Nathan (2007): Implementation of the Habitats Directive in a Governance Perspective. GoFOR Main Assessment Report Denmark, July 2007, University of Copenhagen.

site, which also includes terminating ongoing activities which may previously have been allowed; for example agricultural activities. It is not acceptable to wait and see if deterioration occurs, precautionary measures must be taken (European Community 2000). Plans or project which have a negative effect on the conservation status of the site can only be approved if there are imperative reasons of public interests. The Member State is obliged to take compensatory measures ensuring the overall coherence of the Natura 2000 network. Furthermore the Commission must be informed of the measures taken (European Council 1992).

In Denmark, the HD has been in the process of implementation, encompassing the following phases:

- 1992-2001, 2005: Designation of SAC sites;
- 2003-2005: Implementation in national legislation: Act on Environmental Objectives and revision of existing acts;
- 2005-2007: Technical specification of the HD in a Danish context: identifying nature types, quantitative interpretation of 'favourable conservation status' for each nature type, mapping and conducting base analyses;
- 2007-2009: development of Natura 2000 plans and Natura 2000 action plans.

This case study follows the implementation of the HD in Denmark, beginning with the designation of SAC sites in 1993 and ending with the base analysis in 2006. The HD implementation was chosen as a case study, because this policy has major financial and political significance, but also because it is characterised by multilevel decision making structures. However, in contrast to other cases that have been analysed, the HD case is deliberately very much sector specific, expertise driven, and non-participatory in nature.

### **The implementation of the EU Habitats Directive in Denmark**

The Danish government started the process of designating special areas of conservation in 1993 and sent the first list of site-proposals to the European Commission in 1995. At that time the process had low priority at the National Forest and Nature Agency (NFNA), the scope and impact of the HD was played down as existing Danish regulations were claimed to be good enough to comply to the HD. This perception subsequently contributed to the slow and insufficient implementation of the directive. The Ministry of Environment apparently had neither recognised the scope of the HD nor realised that existing laws and regulations were not sufficient to comply with the directive. The EU Commission found the first list SACs proposed by Denmark insufficient. In July 1997 Denmark was issued a letter of formal notice threatening to pursue the matter at the European Court of Justice. As a consequence, Denmark made some additional site-proposals in 1998 but the Commission did not find the new list exhaustive either and consequently did not approve the enlarged list (Stecher 2004).

Now the Danish government and the NFNA were forced to take the HD more seriously since a number of court orders made Member States - including Denmark - realize that the HD entailed more far-reaching consequences than had been presumed so far. The NFNA made a catalogue describing the different nature types to be protected building on a manual from the Commission on nature types in the HD. Using this catalogue the NFNA started to map the nature types in Denmark. In 2001 the NFNA presented an extended list of site proposals to the Commission with

56 new sites. The total area of proposed Natura 2000 sites was now 16,638 km<sup>2</sup>, of which 21.6 % (3591 km<sup>2</sup>) is terrestrial, amounting to 8.4 % of the total land area of Denmark (Stecher 2004).

Furthermore, an investigation of the transposition into Danish law was ordered by the NFNA in 2002. The resulting report came to the conclusion that the Member States were obliged to have a precise and binding legislative frame for the management of Natura 2000 areas and that the demands concerning precautionary measures for avoiding disturbances and deterioration of habitats and species were to be understood much stricter than what had been done so far (Kammeradvokaten 2002). As a result of the report, the NFNA realised that new legislation had to be made, and a new Act on Environmental Objectives dealing with the frames for management planning within internationally protected areas was formulated. The regulatory rules within the frames were addressed by changing the acts on forests and nature protection. Also a few more sites were proposed as SACs and a new departmental order on the demarcation and administration of international nature reserves was issued (Stecher 2004).

### **Territorial levels involved in MLC**

The HD is entirely a document of multilevel coordination as it intends to coordinate nature protection efforts across the EU, between the EU level, the national levels as well as the level of implementation. The directive was issued by the European Commission, and is required to be implemented in national law in the Member States. The HD outlines a timeframe for national implementation: a draft list of sites to be transmitted within three years of notification of the HD; within six years the designation and establishment of the final SACs has to be achieved, and if the designation is deemed insufficient bilateral negotiations are intended to resolve open questions within six months (European Council 1992). Failure to comply with a directive may lead to legal sanctions through the ECJ.

Since the transposition of EU law in national legislation invariably causes revision and/or new legislation the national level is inevitably included in the process. The Danish case was no exception. As the national implementation process was steered by the national level, i.e. by the NFNA, it played the central role in this case.

Initially in the implementation process the main national level actors, i.e. the Ministry of Environment represented by the Minister and the NFNA, misinterpreted the scope of the HD, and consequently also the necessary efforts for coordination with the lower levels to implement the directive appropriately. Therefore, initially practically no coordination among these levels took place. This caused problems with local landowners feeling deceived as well as with the EU level in the form of warnings of legal procedures (opening statements). As the Ministry's misperceptions became apparent additional resources were allocated to the process and the new Act on Environmental Objectives was decreed as well as revisions of existing legislation. These legislative reforms involved the regional level as well as individual landowners, as the counties had to contribute to the base analysis of the designated sites and to administrate the upcoming Natura 2000 plans. Landowners were involved in the creation of the Natura 2000 plans which affect their land use.

The new legislation was the most significant contribution from the national level, prepared by the NFNA and adopted by a majority of the Danish Parliament. Legislation was submitted to a public hearing giving individuals, institutions and organisations from all levels an opportunity to make their opinions heard, hence

possibly contributing to coordination. However; only minor changes to the first proposal by the NFNA were made. I.e. the national level remained the most influential level in the legislative process and the NFNA can be seen as the most important actor.

Due to the municipal reform in 2007 amendments of legislation were made which reallocated responsibilities between levels regarding the further tasks in the implementation of the HD. The amended Act on Environmental Objectives gives the Minister of Environment the authority to designate international nature reserves such as SACs, and when an area is designated all relevant authorities are obliged by the designation made for the area resulting from this act. Natura 2000 plans are made by the Minister of Environment; the municipal councils have to develop action plans for the specific habitats.

In the course of the process the regional level – i.e. the counties – had a role in designation SACs outside of forest areas. The counties were already responsible for the administration of the Act on Nature Conservation, and hence also became responsible of the HD implementation. Furthermore the counties, due to their administrative responsibilities, were in possession of expertise and information regarding the areas to be designated as SACs and therefore they had the task of contributing to the designation outside of forested areas. Moreover the counties played a part in the development of criteria for determining the conservation status of the SACs as well as in the base analysis laying the ground for the upcoming Natura 2000 plans.

The municipal reform of January 2007 changed the allocation of influence among territorial levels. Before the reform the regional level was given a significant role in the future implementation process, as the counties were given the task of making and implementing the upcoming Natura 2000 plans. Hence the counties were responsible of carrying the new and revised legislation into action. However; the reform divided the task between the national level and the municipalities. The State is to elaborate the overall Natura 2000 plans and municipalities are to administer the implementations of these plans by elaborating and implementing concrete action plans. Hence the municipal reform gave the municipalities more influence on the implementation and introduced an additional level to coordinate efforts.

As mentioned above, the State (NFNA) remains in charge of the further HD implementation in forest areas.

### **Interdependencies among territorial levels**

The establishment of Natura 2000 happened as a response to the recognition of threats to a number of habitats and species which had declined or become extinct. The development in tourism and urban infrastructure and the intensification of agriculture and forestry had left an imprint on natural areas, for instance causing a 60 percent reduction of wetlands in north and west Europe thereby endangering a number of species. Acknowledging that the pressure on nature would continue regulations were necessary in order to preserve the natural heritage of Europe.

First and most obvious, the levels involved are interdependent by legal provisions. Furthermore, according to the philosophy of the HD the “problem at hand”, i.e. declining biodiversity described above, must be addressed at all levels to allow effective solutions: the problem transcends national borders and should thus be addressed at a supranational level, yet implementation of measures is bound to take

place at the local level and the national level is unavoidably involved since existing national legislation had to be revised to comply with EU framework legislation.

### **Actors of MLC**

At all levels first and foremost state actors/public officials were formally involved, yet interest organisations also played an important part in the process by insisting that the HD had not been sufficiently implemented and thereby causing the European Commission to react. Participation was restricted to public hearings of sector-related NGOs and public authorities, whereas ordinary citizens were not a target group. In the course of the first designation of SAC sites the affected landowners were not directly consulted. This gave rise to criticism. As a consequence the landowners were consulted on an individual basis in the subsequent revisions of the SAC designation. Complaints over insufficient designation of SACs and insufficient implementation of the HD in the Danish legislation caused the EU to require the Danish Government to follow up on this. Indirectly, the right to lodge a complaint was used by NGOs to strengthen their positions vis-à-vis the environmental authorities. This was probably the NGO's most effective means to exert influence.

The European Commission (DG Environment and DG Agriculture) was the driving force by initiating the process, by issuing the directive, and by having the formal authority to institute legal procedures, which is hence the mode of steering (through first and second warnings, i.e. 'opening statement' and 'explanatory statement'), followed by legal case if a member state do not follow the warnings. The ECJ in the effort to coordinate between Member States has to make final judgements as regards how HD articles are to be interpreted. The various judgements and the precedent created by them functioned as a leverage for those arguing that the HD had not been implemented sufficiently giving substance to the threat of complaining to the EU. Hence the ECJ played an outstanding role in this sense. Even if the Court is neutral in terms of interests, its results are important in terms of serving the interests.

The biogeographical committees served also provided forums for coordination among member states and for interpreting the HD. However; they had little influence on multilevel coordination within Denmark.

The EU working groups dealing with individual articles which were disputed can also be considered new actors which entered the arena as a consequence of the difficulties in multilevel coordination. Yet the working groups' members were hardly new actors to the arena (mainly public officials). Hence the variety of actors did not increase. The working groups did play a role in facilitating coordination between the EU level and the member states in the sense of providing information to the national level process.

The Ministry of Environment (i.e. the NFNA) steered the process at the national level and played an outstanding role in national coordination among levels: In its first attempts to designate SACs the NFNA (inadvertently) hindered coordination because of misinterpreting the necessary measures to comply with the HD. Here the interest of the Ministry may have been to avoid costly compensation schemes and to keep things simple.

Later in the process the NFNA was significant regarding the formal coordination among levels as the Agency has written the drafts for the new and revised legislation. The NFNA works according to the wishes of the respective Minister, its influence is restricted to this frame. Formally, it is the Danish Parliament that has to adopt

legislation. But as mentioned above, the Government at the time, and hence the Minister, had a solid parliamentary majority supporting its/his policy. In so far the role of Parliament was practically a limited one.

The NFNA has significant interests at stake as regards coordination as well as regards the distribution of influence and responsibility among levels. The further implementation of the HD is deemed to be very costly and it is to be assumed that responsibility for specific tasks will be accompanied by funds and jobs, which naturally are in the interest of the organisation. Furthermore, if most of the tasks are undertaken and therefore controlled by the NFNA, this would make reporting to the Commission an easier exercise.

NGOs like BirdLife Denmark (DOF), and the Nature Council have repeatedly stressed that the implementation of the Birds Directive as well as the HD was insufficient as compared to the legal requirements (Agger et al. 2005; DOF 2003; Hansen 2003; Pagh 1999, 2001, 2002). BirdLife Denmark used legal proceedings to gain influence on the process and, along with other NGOs, BirdLife Denmark is interested in the outcome of the implementation. This NGO was a key actor in the sense that it was a pioneer in this form of influence seeking. The outcome of the insisting attempts to point to the insufficient implementation affected the re-interpretation of the Ministry as regards the consequences of the HD. However; the legal statements and judgements from the EU and from the national level respectively have been the main triggers inducing the change of perceptions.

### **Modes of MLC**

Coordination was clearly triggered by the legal provisions and the dominant mode of coordination was hierarchy through all levels leaving little room for negotiations. Coordination was institutionalised within the usual governing institutions: the European Commission and ECJ, the Danish Government, Parliament and attached bureaucratic system. No new institutions were established.

The EU commission steers the implementation of the Natura 2000 through framework legislation and legal procedures, through first and second warnings ('opening statement' and 'explanatory statement'), followed by legal cases if a Member State does not follow the warnings. Choosing this approach to steer the implementation makes the EU Commission dependent on actors (e.g. national level NGOs) to report deficits in fulfilling the requirements of the HD. The EU Commission itself does not have the resources to monitor the habitats. Complaints as regards insufficient compliance leading to legal repercussions can be reported by every citizen and organisation. Hence, citizens and organisations constitute an information link between the EU and the national level.

The main venue of formal coordination is nonetheless direct communication between national governments and the EU Commission in the form of 6 yearly reporting from the national level to the EU and conversely in the form of reports of the Commission on the progress to the Member States. Biogeographical groups and the different working groups can be mentioned as further venues of coordination, mainly comprising public officials who negotiate how various articles of the HD are to be interpreted. Moreover multilevel coordination takes place through negotiations in the Council of Ministers, the European Commission, and in the European Parliament.

At the national level the HD had a significant effect for Danish nature policy. Not only in terms of significant financial resources needed for its implementation. The

difficulties in the implementation have also pointed to a “clash of cultures of policy-making” between traditional corporative consensus seeking and hierarchical rule of law. Danish environmental legislation is traditionally done in the form of framework laws, granting authorities wide discretion both to set and enforce environmental standards. The provision of discretion authorities also allows them to assess and balance economic and environmental benefits. In contrast, EU environmental legislation is based on legally binding standards, and, e.g. habitat protection cannot be set aside for economic reasons, as decisions of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) have shown. Furthermore, Danish environmental legislation is based on a decentralised structure, leaving municipalities and counties the power to set standards and to decide how to enforce them.

## Conclusion

Decision-making in the case of HD implementation has first and foremost taken place at the EU level since the annexes defining species and habitats were formed at the EU level; the list of appointed sites had to be approved at the EU level and the measures taken to improve the conservation status must be reported and can be deemed insufficient by the EU level. The ECJ was particularly important in determining how the Directive was to be interpreted. Within this frame the national Government was decisive in terms of designing the national implementation through new and revised legislation as well by allocating financial resources. Since the Government together with the support party DF, had majority the remaining Parliament had little influence on the further process. The experts involved in the process had significant influence at the national level determining the criteria by which to evaluate the conservation status of the SACs as well as the monitoring efforts to be employed hence determining the future efforts to reach or maintain a favourable conservation status of the SACs.

There were a number of problems regarding MLC, in particular between the national and the EU level as the Danish government had clearly misinterpreted the scope and consequences of the HD. This can be ascribed to a lack of informational resources devoted to vertical coordination, as this misinterpretation was prevalent in all of the member countries. The misinterpretation caused the allocation of inadequate resources in terms of staff to make the first list of SAC designations which was consequently not approved by the Commission. The misinterpretation at the national level furthermore led to coordination problems between the local and national level as the landowners were misinformed by the Minister of Environment and the NFNA at the start of the process.

Pagh (1999) points to a clash between a traditional mode of governing and the implementation of the HD in Denmark, also as regards MLC. The traditional mode is based on flexible and decentralised framework legislation with possibilities to weigh interests and use exemption paragraphs to do so. The strict judicial mode of governing represented by the EU in contrast, very much builds hierarchical steering and legally binding standards. Danish environmental law has no tradition of legally binding standards. Furthermore the difficulties in the implementation process changed the NFNA's perception: Before NFNA perceived Danish environmental standards, including nature protection, to be among the best and strictest in the world, but it realised that this is not the case. The NGOs were under a similar delusion and did not pay too much attention to EU legislation, but they more and more recognised the scope of e.g. the HD.



The process itself and the initial misinterpretations led to a certain level of mistrust among landowners to the promises of the public officials from the NFNA, who early in the implementation process denied that the HD would have much influence on private lands and afterwards designated a number of private lands as habitats. For national environmental NGOs the institutional set-up for the implementation of the HD, which is basically a hierarchical one, provided additional routes to take influence by raising their complaints directly at the EU level, by-passing the national government. This was successfully done e.g. by BirdLife Denmark.

#### 4.2.3.2 Multi-level coordination in federal systems


### Case study 3: Between internationalization and sub-national blockade – a case study of the Austrian Biodiversity Strategy: (Ralf Nordbeck and Michael Pregernig)<sup>28</sup>

The Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) is one of three Conventions under international law which were displayed for signing at the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNED) in Rio de Janeiro in 1992. The Convention entered into force under international law in December 1993 and has three main objectives:

- the conservation of biological diversity,
- a sustainable use of its components, and
- the fair and equitable sharing of the benefits arising out of the utilisation of genetic resources.

Article 6 of the Convention on Biological Diversity requires each Party to develop or adapt national strategies, plans, or programmes for the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity and to integrate, as far as possible and as appropriate, the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity into relevant sectoral or cross-sectoral plans, programmes and policies. This Article creates an obligation for national biodiversity planning, and in its Decisions VI/26 and VI/27 the Conference of the Parties of the Convention stressed that the development and adoption of a national biodiversity strategy constitutes a cornerstone of national implementation of the Convention. A national strategy will thus reflect how the country intends to fulfil the objectives of the Convention in light of specific national circumstances, and the related action plans shall constitute the sequence of steps to be taken to meet the goals (Figure 5).

**Figure 5: Implementation of the CBD at the national level**



<sup>28</sup> Based on Ralf Nordbeck and Michael Pregernig (2007): The Austrian Biodiversity Strategy – A Failed Governance Process? GoFOR Main Assessment Report Austria, August 2007, BOKU, Vienna.

Source: Bundesministerium für Land- und Forstwirtschaft, Umwelt und Wasserwirtschaft, 2005:6

The conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity as targeted by the Convention of Biological Diversity is a cross-sectoral political issue. Its implementation touches upon many different competences across the federal political system in Austria. In many important areas the federal government has no or little legal competences; for example, nature protection, hunting, and land use planning are in the competences of the Länder. This creates a complex network of actors when it comes to the implementation of the CBD in Austria, comprising a high number of possible veto players. The Austrian biodiversity strategy is thus embedded in a multi-level system of coordination.

### **The implementation of the CBD in Austria**

Austria has ratified the Convention on Biological Diversity in 1995 and has since then developed national measures and objectives for the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity to ensure the implementation of the CBD. Recognizing the diversity of relevant legislation and the divided responsibilities for biodiversity in Austria a “National Commission on Biodiversity” was entrusted by the former Federal Ministry of Environment, Youth and Family soon after the ratification in 1995. The Biodiversity Commission was set up as a policy coordination mechanism. It should fulfil three functions: (1) guide efforts on implementing the CBD; (2) facilitate coordination and cooperation between different activities and programs in the field of biodiversity; and (3) play an important platform for information exchange on various issues related to biodiversity. The Biodiversity Commission is composed of various actors, including representatives of administrative departments (Federal Ministries and Provincial Authorities), public and private interest groups (Landowner Associations, Chamber of Commerce), science (Universities, Austrian Academy of Science, Natural History Museum), and NGOs (WWF, Naturschutzbund, Arche Noah).

The first Austrian Biodiversity Strategy is the final output of a dialogue process involving various stakeholders. The formulation process lasted for almost a year from June 1997 to April 1998. During this time period four different drafts of the strategy document were elaborated. The final draft dating from April 1998 was then adopted by the Council of Ministers in August 1998. This national biodiversity strategy was meant to serve as the basis for the coordination and implementation of measures for the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity in Austria.

The first strategy has been evaluated in a two-step approach in 2001 and 2003 (Götz, 2001, Röhrich, 2003a). Based on this evaluation it was revised and updated after 2003. The resulting second biodiversity strategy, the so-called “Advanced Austrian Implementation Strategy for the Convention of Biological Diversity” published in October 2005, shall form a long-term framework for the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity in Austria. It seeks for a compromise between necessary long-term goals and the financial and political opportunities.

## **Territorial levels involved in MLC and their interdependencies**

The international level has been very important for the Austrian biodiversity strategy, as regards the principle obligation to develop such a national strategy, but also content-wise: many of its themes as well as procedural and instrumental recommendations that were taken up nationally stem from the international level documents. The biodiversity strategy itself is regarded a part of the implementation of the CBD as indicated by the full title of the strategy, and its chapters closely mirror the relevant articles of the CBD. Another important source of influence was the EU level, with its upcoming EU Biodiversity Strategy. The Biodiversity Commission used the draft of the EU biodiversity strategy in its work. It is easy to recognise that the idea for the sectoral chapters in the Austrian biodiversity strategy have been borrowed from that source.

Additionally, the involvement of sub-national actors is also very important for the biodiversity strategy in Austria. In accordance with Article 15 of the Constitutional Law all competences for nature conservation are held by the provincial level. There is no federal framework law on nature protection in Austria. To coordinate with sub-national actors is therefore a precondition for successful implementation of the Austrian biodiversity strategy.

The interdependencies between the territorial levels are primarily based on the need of legal compliance and characterised by the distribution of legal competencies in the federal system of Austria:

- the international level as source of the obligation to elaborate a national biodiversity strategy;
- the central government, which is responsible for the implementation of the CBD and accordingly set up the National Biodiversity Commission (NBC), chairs the NBC, and furthermore has the responsibility in relevant policy fields such as forestry and water management; and
- the federal provinces which hold the legislative competencies in the field of nature protection, but also for fishery, hunting, and spatial planning.

The exclusive right of the federal provinces regarding legislation and enforcement in the field of nature protection creates a need for coordination among the central government and the federal states, but also among the nine provinces. Obviously, the distribution of competences among the federal and the sub-national level has created significant challenges for the work of the Biodiversity Commission and the elaboration of the biodiversity strategy, as reported by a number of interviewees: „Because many issues immediately touch upon the competencies of the federal provinces it becomes more difficult through it.“ (Interview 09: 42) “The difficulties were that the responsibilities for the federal provinces really don't ease to work together.” (Interview 05: 39) Not surprisingly, it was very important for both levels, the central government and the federal provinces, to have a clear statement on the distribution of competencies right in the introduction of the biodiversity strategy. (Interview 06: 181)

## **Modes of MLC**

The mode of coordination that predominantly has been used between the central government and the federal states is networking, rather seldom are negotiations necessary. The federal provinces have used two different mechanisms for coordinating with the national level: a common representative and a liaison body. The common representative speaks for all nine provinces in the Biodiversity Commission

and thus represents agreed positions of the federal provinces regarding the respective issues at hand. Additionally, the coordination between the nine provinces and between the federal and provincial level has been facilitated by an institutionalised liaison body (Verbindungsstelle der Länder). However, this liaison body only acts as an information-turntable (“mailbox”) between the federal provinces. Its main functions are to deliver information and make appointments. The liaison body conveys information between the provinces and if necessary between the federal government and the provinces, but does not coordinate different the provinces’ positions.

The involvement of representatives from provincial administrations in the strategy formulation process was regarded as an active one, sometimes even as very active by other members of the NBC. Representatives from two provinces (Salzburg, Upper Austria) attended the meetings regularly, and the provinces were also involved in the editorial group drafting the biodiversity strategy. The chapters on species and landscape protection were mainly drafted by the representative of the province of Salzburg.

However, leaving aside the active and personal engagement of individual official representatives, it must be concluded that the coordination between the federal level and the provinces during the elaboration of the biodiversity strategy remained insufficient, and the connection between the nature conservation policies at provincial level and the federal biodiversity strategy could have been strengthened much more. Accordingly, the role of the federal provinces has received much criticism from several interviewees, e.g.: “The provinces of course joined in, and wrote the chapters on nature conservation in the biodiversity strategy, but [these chapters describe] mainly what happens anyway. It is not strategically deliberate.” (Interview 12: 98) “It was difficult to include any measures which would have to be implemented by the federal provinces.” (Interview 09: 68) “Any issue that was related to changes of nature conservation laws has met with opposition from the federal provinces.” (Interview)

Members of the NBC that have followed the discussions during the last ten years stated that in their opinion the federal provinces have become more and more rigid in defending their interest positions over time (Interview 19: 36). It was also reported that federal provinces would refuse to cooperate even in cases where financial means are available from the central government because they regard any national level planning as an outside interference (Interview 07: 65). Furthermore, the impression was reported that the federal provinces are pretty happy with the current situation and a weak biodiversity strategy (Interview 07: 28).

To conclude, the federal provinces have taken a rather tough stance to defend their interest positions and showed no interest in any form of more effective multi-level coordination during the elaboration of the Austrian biodiversity strategies. This strong defence position has clearly added to the general problems of multi-level coordination in the federal system.

### **Conclusions: Little multi-level coordination and a weak biodiversity strategy**

The domestic implementation of the objectives of the CBD cannot be realised by the mere introduction of single measures. Rather it has to be done in a continuous process, which is to finally result in a change of perspectives in all sectors and at all levels. Within such a process the National Commission on Biodiversity should have a central position as an information pool and by linking-up activities at different levels.

The Austrian biodiversity strategy should be a central factor in drawing up and building a consensus on these activities (Umweltbundesamt 2004: 19).

While formally MLC has been of special importance for the National Biodiversity Commission, it was not given much weight in the strategy process. The Biodiversity Commission has not fulfilled its potential as a central institution that links the activities of different levels. As a consequence, the biodiversity strategy has failed to effectively link the objectives of the CBD with policies at the national and provincial level in a convincing manner. Furthermore, the exclusive formal rights of the provinces for legislation and enforcement in the field of nature protection create additional difficulties for the implementation of the biodiversity strategy as a federal government programme. A Federal Framework Law on Nature Protection might provide a better basis for MLC. However, given the current political constellation such a change in the distribution of competences is not in sight..

The majority of interviewed stakeholders regarded the degree of multi-level coordination in biodiversity-related matters as insufficient. Some see the lack of vertical coordination as the main explanatory factor for the shortcomings of the Austrian Biodiversity Strategy. It seems that internationalization in the field of nature conservation has led to a passive and defensive behaviour on the side of the federal provinces. Since most of the measures included in the Biodiversity Strategy cannot be implemented by the central government, and since most of the measures are ill-defined, the Strategy remains weak. Furthermore, there are no specific budgets allocated for the implementation of the strategy, only some indirect financing by means of other programmes.

One of our interviewees has labelled this general approach towards the elaboration of the Austrian biodiversity strategy as administrative behaviour in terms of compliance, instead of a problem-oriented strategic perspective (Interview 09: 125-127). Indeed, the biodiversity strategy rather seems to be a product induced by international obligations than by national problem pressure. More than once members of the Biodiversity Commission pointed out that the biodiversity strategy has to be internationally presentable. In this sense the biodiversity strategy document resembles very much the focus of work of the NBC, with much more orientation towards international than national issues.

#### **CASE STUDY 4: REGIONEN AKTIV – Federal Model and Demonstration Project (Lukas Giessen and Michael Böcher)<sup>29</sup>**

REGIONEN AKTIV – Land gestaltet Zukunft ('Active Regions – Shaping rural futures') is a pilot programme initiated by the Federal Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Consumer Protection of Germany (BMVEL). It aims at contributing to an efficient and goal oriented development of rural areas, based on cooperative problem-solving and the regional distribution of decisions and responsibilities. To a certain degree the programme shall serve as a model for future improvements of the national agriculture policy as well as the EU Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), more specifically the EU rural development policy.

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<sup>29</sup> Based on Lukas Giessen and Michael Böcher (2007), *New Modes of Governance in Integrated Rural Development Policies*, GoFOR Main Assessment Report July 2007, University of Göttingen, pp. 59-97.

In 2001 a nation-wide competition took place in which 206 German regions applied for REGIONEN AKTIV funding. 33 regions were invited to prepare regional development concepts (RDC). Finally, in March 2002 18 regions were selected for funding. Until December 2005 45 million Euro have been spent on regional management and regional development projects within REGIONEN AKTIV. In 2005 the BMVEL decided to prolongate the programme with some changes until 2007 ('Phase II') – in this current second phase especially the building of regional value chains is in the centre of the BMELV's interest.

The model project builds upon the following principles:

- Competition (among different regions and within a region for funding)
- Regionalisation (decision-making powers as well as financial accountability are shifted to the local actors)
- Integration (of different interests and different sectoral perspectives)
- Partnership (on the regional horizontal level between all relevant actors, on the vertical level between the BMVEL and the regions)
- Know-how and its transfer (continuous mutual learning of actors; learning in policy process through different forms of evaluations and incentives)
- New approach to governance (integration of hierarchical steering, market based incentives and negotiated rules)

### **Simplifying MLC by devolution**

REGIONEN AKTIV aims at a low degree of interdependencies among levels. The coordination among different levels under REGIONEN AKTIV is characterised by a high degree of devolution of responsibilities into the regions<sup>30</sup>, which explicitly are smaller than a federal state but larger than just a commune or a small group of communes. The need for "regionalisation", especially of decision-making competences, is articulated as a key element in rural development policies.<sup>31</sup> With REGIONEN AKTIV the federal ministry puts an emphasis on enabling people to help themselves, which implies a re-distribution of competencies to the regional level. This empowering approach is represented by four 'anchors of regional responsibility':<sup>32</sup>

- content responsibility - regional selection of projects
- procedural responsibility - regional partnership in combination with the professional regional management
- financial responsibility - regional budgeting for funding projects in the regions
- administrative responsibility - handling of funds by regional authorities

The devolutionary approach is also reflected in the legal base of REGIONEN AKTIV, the notification text, which roughly replaces more detailed guidelines. Elbe (2006) finds that such guidelines would have made much more detailed specifications on measures etc. necessary than the mere notification did.<sup>33</sup> As a consequence of

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<sup>30</sup> Interview 4b (2006)

<sup>31</sup> BMVEL (2004A: 8)

<sup>32</sup> Elbe (2006: 20)


<sup>33</sup> Elbe (2006:51)

shifting decision-making competencies to the regions, such competencies need to be withdrawn from elsewhere. In the case of REGIONEN AKTIV elsewhere refers to the federal states.<sup>34</sup> Hence, BMVEL actively tried to admit a maximum degree of freedom for the regional level while cutting back responsibilities of intermediate territorial levels.

### Two levels having distinct competencies

Before this background and having in mind that BMVEL to a large extent ignored the federal state level in the institutional set-up, it becomes obvious that only two levels play a meaningful role under REGIONEN AKTIV. Programme documents refer to the 'programming level' (national) and to the 'implementation level' (regional), the first being in charge of the so called 'framework steering', while the later is supposed to execute 'detail steering' (Figure 6). Thus, active coordination across a minimum of two territorial levels is being pursued. In this context of devolution, the term "framework steering" may be re-phrased as "management by objectives" being relatively open as regards the choice of ends. In particular it refers to fundamental programming tasks of the BMVEL, to the selection of regions by the Jury and accompanying advice by the Council. Detail steering includes proposing projects, deciding on proposals by Regional Partnerships (RPs), the employment of external advisors, control of legal alignment by managing authorities as well as the actual handling of public funds and networking by the regional management units.<sup>35</sup>

**Figure 6: Governance system established under REGIONEN AKTIV**



Source: Peter and Knickel (2006: 18)

Figure 6 distinguishes between framework steering at the national (upper) and detail steering at the regional level (lower part).

The two levels are interconnected through the regional development strategy document, which serves as contractual base between BMVEL and the regions.<sup>36</sup> As regards communication and the flow of information the two levels are also connected

<sup>34</sup> Interview 4b (2006)

<sup>35</sup> BMVEL (2004: 14f; 26); Interview 1b (2006); Interview 4b (2006),

<sup>36</sup> see Elbe (2006: 61)



by the GS, which in a literal sense must be assigned to the programming level.<sup>37</sup> Thus, all institutions established under REGIONEN AKTIV are actively involved in MLC with the Administrative office having an outstanding role in facilitating MLC. The Administrative office serves as a mediator between the regions and the ministry, having the role of a secretariat for managing the day-to-day work of the programme and at the same time functioning as an expert consultancy. In the regions, however, the Administrative office has been perceived as ‘the right hand’ of BMVEL. The number of actors integrated into MLC hence increased significantly. The majority of new actors in MLC now is stemming from the regional level, which formerly either has not been institutionalised or did not have far reaching decision and implementation responsibilities.

#### Modes of MLC and interdependencies among territorial levels

The modes of interaction and interdependencies between the two levels vary to a certain degree. Bearing in mind that REGIONEN AKTIV is a funding programme, where a central authority provides public funds for beneficiaries, who in turn have to comply with the programme objectives and requirements and have to enter into competition with other regions, it becomes clear that competition between regions is employed as a mode of co-ordination. That is, competition for funding serves as a means to trigger close compliance to the requirements. The objectives and requirements however have been set hierarchically at the programming level by BMVEL.<sup>38</sup> Furthermore, the concrete goals to be defined at the regional level were supposed to be the result of negotiation processes among regional actors. Thus, this case shows a combination of three modes of MLC.<sup>39</sup>

Interdependencies result from the serious need of BMVEL to inform potential beneficiaries about the programme requirements and details. This must be seen as a significant dependency, since REGIONEN AKTIV is not to be seen as a standard programme, under which every single detail has been laid down in specific guidelines. Many issues of programme governance, such as the 2-stage process of region selection, the performance-dependent extra funds, and the requirements for evaluation had to emerge in an iterative and adaptive manner and had to be communicated effectively. Likewise, funds are being transferred downstream. On the other hand BMVEL declared to count on (not to rely on) the knowledge and lessons generated in the regions (being a learning programme). Thus, BMVEL to a certain extent depends on an upstream flow of information through regional focus groups as well as on evaluation and reporting mechanisms.

#### Complicating MLC through simplification

Problems with MLC occurred at the national level, where the federal states have been actively ignored by the programme provider, even though they have the constitutional responsibilities concerning rural development issues. This approach led to ‘diplomatic irritations’ and was perceived as politically not being correct, but reasonable and understandable.<sup>40</sup> The BMVEL was definitely able to overcome “normal” federal structures by one strong power resource: financial means helped to weaken the resistance of the federal states. The later inclusion of federal states marked a ‘considerable change in the multi-level approach taken by REGIONEN

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<sup>37</sup> Interview 6b (2006); Interview 1b (2006),

<sup>38</sup> Interview 6b (2006); BMVEL (2004a:13)

<sup>39</sup> BMVEL (2004: 13)

<sup>40</sup> Interview 9b (2006); similar Interview 2b (2006); Interview 4b (2006)

AKTIV,<sup>41</sup> and finally benefited BMVEL the most. It helped to overcome the implementation dilemma which BMVEL was facing, i.e. that implementation of the progressive ideas under the pilot scheme probably had been impossible with the states, while the transfer of results (implementation into mainstream policy for rural development) without the federal states de facto is unattainable.<sup>42</sup> The approach taken by BMVEL consequently allowed the national level to intervene at regional level<sup>43</sup>, while at the same time demonstrating and testing the new approach to rural development policy for improving mainstream policy.

The procedure of how BMVEL intervened, when it became clear that in many regions the composition of the decision-making bodies (RPs) was heavily biased towards public actors whereas private sector actors were underrepresented may serve as an illustrative example for MLC in REGIONEN AKTIV. The ministry through the intermediate institution of the Administrative office urged regions to improve the balance by including further actor groups into the development strategies which were to be handed in for the application for phase II. This soft and flexible way of management by objectives can be seen as one way for MLC under REGIONEN AKTIV. However, also harder and more hierarchical modes could be identified. The thorough system of reporting and sometimes 'excessive evaluation obligations'<sup>44</sup> established under the funding scheme shows that management by objectives also was applied in a more rigid way, necessitating e.g. certain reports from the regions to obtain further funds.<sup>45</sup>

Furthermore, REGIONEN AKTIV in some cases led to parallel regional governance structures resulting from various regional initiatives.<sup>46</sup> This may serve as an indicator for problems at the national level, showing a lack of coordination between different ministries or departments.<sup>47</sup>

### Only two levels in a federal country – Does it work?

From the above descriptions we conclude that in a federal context with the states having a constitutional stake in rural development issues, the federal ministry by made a provocative move delivering REGIONEN AKTIV. It did so because including the level of the federal states might have caused the approach taken under REGIONEN AKTIV to fail for different reasons. The example of LEADER+ with its existing variety of quite different implementation structures and operational programmes in different federal states shows that negotiations with the federal states upon REGIONEN AKTIV would not have been very easy and could have led to a diminishment of the BMVEL's aims as well as to a serious delay of its implementation. Given the fact that the programme was designed as a temporary pilot project for testing a new approach, the federal states can accept (reluctant or in favour of the approach) this solo run of BMVEL. However, as soon as it comes to mainstream rural development policy the federal states will not accept the federal government to intervene in this manner. Moreover, it remains to be seen whether the

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<sup>41</sup> Interview 4b (2006)

<sup>42</sup> Interviews 2b, 4b, 6b, and 9b (2006),

<sup>43</sup> Interview 8b (2006)

<sup>44</sup> Interview 7b (2006)

<sup>45</sup> Interview 1b (2006)

<sup>46</sup> Interview 3b and 8b (2006)

<sup>47</sup> Interview 5b (2006)

'diplomatic irritations' will be offset by a success of the pilot programme or if, at least with some federal states, these irritations will negatively affect their relations to the federal ministry in the future.

#### 4.2.3.3 Making decentralization approaches work

##### **Case study 5: Territorial Forestry Charters in France (Gérard Buttoud and Irina Kouplevatskaya)<sup>48</sup>**

In February 2001, in France an internal order of the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries has introduced so-called “Territorial Forest Charters”, at first on an experimental basis, as an instrument of sustainable development of rural territories with a special focus on sustainable management and multifunctionality of the forest. A few months later, the Territorial Forest Charters (CFT) have been legally institutionalised by the Law on the Forest of July 2001, stating that «on a territory, corresponding to specific defined objectives, a territorial forest charter may be established for the implementation of a long-term programme of actions, integrating multifunctionality of the local forests» (Lequette, 2005). This legal provision has concretised the international engagements of France in the world dialogue on forests, and directly responded to the expectations of the society in relation to management and sustainable development of the forests.

According to this innovation in forest policy, it is planned that those charters should be elaborated based on willingness and initiative of local actors including stakeholders and local politicians (mayors of rural communes, other elected responsible persons). This contractual approach aims at promotion of mutual decisions between public and private forest owners offering forest related services (timber and non-timber products, recreation services etc), as well as between users and stakeholders who are interested in those services and in the way the services are provided as well. A Territorial Forest Charter in this sense is a development project at the local level, aimed at the achievement of specific goals related to the increased role of the forestry activities in the economic and social development of a small region. A CFT unites different stakeholders and actors which are joining the project with defined established duties, engagements and responsibilities. According to the Forest Code of 2002, the Forest Territory Charters are aiming at four basic goals:

- guaranteeing the satisfaction of the environmental and social domains, concerning the management of natural resources and forests;
- contributing to employment and rural development especially through the re-enforcement of links between urban citizens and forest massifs;
- favouring the re-grouping of public and private forest owners both for technical and economic matters through the land and management restructurization at the scale of the forest massif;
- re-enforcing the overall competitiveness of the wood chain.

CFTs are basically local instruments for managing forest development projects. The basic level of decision-making is a pure communal one as participation of local actors is specifically required as a mechanism for CFTs. The main decisions have to be taken at the local level. The main issue concerning MLC results from the need for the coherence with the key directives and orientations as defined at the national level.

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<sup>48</sup> Based on Gérard Buttoud and Irina Kouplevatskaya (2007): Case Study 1: Territorial Forestry Charters (CFT). GoFOR Main Assessment Report France, July 2007, Nancy, ENGREF, pp. 25-61.

### **Territorial levels involved in MLC**

The forestry law of 2001 which introduced the concept of CFTs, states that there are local initiatives borne by the local actors, and lead by local politicians if possible. The law specifies that the area of CFTs has to be validated by the departmental or regional Prefect (representative of the government) and that it has to be compatible with other officially approved documents related to the territory. Apart from this, no coordination between the CFT level and other decision-making levels is formerly required.

The National Programme for CFT is basically established at the national level with the rationale of having the forestry decisions participatory defined at the local level. In the framework of the Programme the following levels of governance are mentioned:

- (1) The international level, because de-sectorisation of forest policy is presented as a way for complying with the international engagements of France.
- (2) The EU level, because of the territorial consistency of the EU policy, especially for the disadvantaged regions;
- (3) The National level because CFT is provisioned in national law.
- (4) The provincial level, because each CFT should be established in coherence with the provincial programme to be established,
- (5) The local level, evidently because of the location of the CFT activities.

Nevertheless, none of these governance levels is mentioned clearly in the guidelines and related policy papers. In the official documents on CFTs only the local level is formally mentioned, which is new as compared to the traditionally centralised national based policies in France.

Thus, except for the local level, the other levels of governance have only an indirect influence on CFT process. The most important in this regard is the European level which was presented as a possible source of future funding under the condition of CFT organisation. The EU is used from this view point as an argument for incentives and promotion of CFT.

CFTs have been established by the national forest law, but the chapter on CFTs only provides a general direction and rough guidelines for forestry activities connected with CFTs. This means that projects developed by the CFTs do not necessarily fully comply with the objectives of the Forest Law, especially considering the rights and duties of any actor to promote sustainable forest management. But there are no legal provisions to formally control this coherence. As it has worked so far, the establishment of CFTs is basically supported by the state fundings. Although there are no specific criteria and indicators for validating the financial support, some technical norms mentioned in technical documents exist.

As a consequence, in all CFTs, the local level is the most important level under the leadership of local politicians and with the technical expertise of public institutions at the departmental level. Of course, other levels of decision making also influence the content of CFTs. The design and organization of CFTs have been basically funded by the state organizations (Ministry of Agriculture, DATAR), because CFTs were part of their strategic priorities.

As for the functioning of the CFTs the EU, the State, the Region and the Department provide funds granted for specific actions. Sometimes, they can guarantee some additional financing when actions are managed in the context of a CFT. For instance,

some Departmental Council only funds forest actions within CFTs or increase substantially the level of financial subsidies to CFT projects bearers.

Urbanism documents or, more generally, land management documents such as Land Charters or Natural Regional Park Charters also influence the content of CFTs which have to follow the same guidelines. The Regional or Departmental Prefecture is responsible for the official validation of the CFTs area. With that, they also influence the formulation process of the document.

But the national level remains essential through the definition of the French forest policy. The State thus orients the measures which are to be taken locally.

Finally, the international policy has also an impact. After the Rio Summit, the importance of considering ecological and social functions has been put forward and has induced a relatively slow but growing awareness of the importance of a sustainable management of forests. The French state replied to this with the promulgation of the 2001 law and the creation of integrated management tools such as CFTs.

### **Modes of MLC**

When creating the CFTs, the national forest administration had the idea to change the rules of the game for funding forestry activities through developing projects established by local actors and not continuing the funding mechanism that existed. Instead of the forest fund which was financing national activities, the CFT was supposed to become a mechanism for creating a funding for local projects, particularly by the state and, if the procedures were well established, also by co-financing through the European Union. But this system does not work yet because of the continuing CAP reform so that the control exerted by the state and EU in the attribution of funds, is actually not effective at all.

Since there is no formal mechanism for CFT, there is also no formal distribution for competencies among the levels involved. But evidently, through providing financial incentives, the State is taking an important role in promoting the process. During the process itself, the local communities are supposed to take initiatives for the agenda setting, implementation, monitoring and evaluation under the umbrella of the state regulation.

The National State Forest Agency (ONF) officers play a direct role in co-ordination between national, provincial and local levels and exert the role of key actors in the definition of the content of the activities to be carried out. It can even be wondered whether the ONF personnel is aiming at getting such a co-ordination as a priority. Less evident is the role of Regional Centres for Private Forests (CRPF) in the co-ordination with provincial programmes. The other actors, including the mayors of forest communes and the NGOs, seem to play a more restricted role as they are mainly focused on the local aspects of the issues.

However, there are presently no organized links between the different levels of influence. Each CFT-bearer is free to choose the interlocutors that can be particularly interesting for him/her, depending on the actions that he seeks to implement. After the validation of the area by the Prefecture, there is neither any requirement nor an obligation to inform the Region or the Department about the decisions taken. But in almost all cases, these interlocutors are integrated into the processes due to their funding role.

This lack of functional MLC, as well as the multiplication of land and forest management tools at different levels with no apparent dialogue among them are frequently criticised by the actors involved in CFTs.

The main rationale for these critics is that most of the projects in order to be implemented need some complementary funds which were not initially foreseen in the budget of the Ministry of Agriculture. As a stable system for funding forestry activities is not established yet in France, this lack of coordination is analyzed as a de-responsibilisation of the administrative structure at national and regional levels which are also promoting the CFT solutions.

The National Federation of Forest Communes (FNCoFor) has constituted a national network of CFTs for being better informed about local initiatives and to ensure a dialogue between the Charters. Over time, this network may allow an increased understanding of Charters and, consequently, a better follow-up and coordination of actions at the departmental, regional or even national level. To achieve this, the State, responding to a demand expressed by the FNCOFOR, has also created a new tool which is not binding: the Forest Massif Strategic Scheme. Presently, two pilot zones have been defined: the Alps and the Central Massif, both of them are established under the leadership and expertise of FNCOFOR. In the future, this tool is supposed to provide a regional framework for the local forest policy formulation. Obviously, it will provide guidelines and directions for the formulation of the new CFTs. This strong presence of FNCOFOR at the strategic level of defining MLC related to CFTs generates critics from other stakeholders, especially from private forest owners.

### **Effects and perspectives**

France is traditionally characterized by a centralized top down decision making system in the forestry field. That is why the CFTs represent a spectacular change by its aim of basing forest policy on the locally expressed needs.

The national Programme for CFTs has been set up in order to give some content to a decentralisation process. The main driving force was a change from sectoral to territorial policy-making. This was not easy to be established in a conceptual way in a sole policy document; it had to be framed into a new governance system at different levels with concrete implications for the decision making system.

The main impacts of the Programme for CFT are:

- Certainly, a change in the behaviour of public and private forest owners and national agencies: the CFTs have built up a system of local networks for solving conflicts and generating consensus and partnership (at least for productivists topics).
- Possibly, a new allocation of resources: after cancelling the Forestry national Fund in 1999 and the decrease of the State budget in 2003, after the end of the Relief Plan for the reconstitution of the forest after the storms of December 1999, the existence of a CFT is supposed to define conditions or priority in attributing state grants. This is not clearly stated yet, but in most cases this argument was prominent as regards the involvement of actors.

At the same time, the CFTs have concretised two important changes in the French forest policy:

1) From the sectoral scale, the forest policy measures become basically territorial. The activities to be carried out for forestry development is not any more defined from

the top centralised administration as it was the case in the conventional way. Previously the support to the forest development activities was based on the cash desk logic, bringing systematic funding to those actors which were following the respective norms. In contrast to this, in the CFT approach, local actors are defining their project proposals to be proposed for funding afterwards. Although the system does not work fully up to now, CFTs have introduced a huge psychological change in the way the forestry actors are involved in the process of forest policy formation. This change has brought also an intersectoral view on forest development. Forest development activities are built up with the participation of local stakeholders, defining their projects. As the basis for projects is adaptable locally, they may induce a bottom up system of decision making.

2) The CFT process has also brought many results in terms of involvement of the local actors. Local politicians have clearly become leaders of common actions towards forestry development of territories. They are viewed and legitimated by all the stakeholders as the coordinators and promoters of links between the forestry field and the other dimensions of development. This prominent position of local politicians has been strongly promoted by the FNCOFOR strategy as far as the increase of the role of the forests in the rural development is a major objective of the forest communes. This situation has been favoured by both the decentralisation scheme in France as well as by the recent development of intercommunal associations. Prior to CFTs, the mayors did not play any role in the design and promotion of forestry measures.

The CFTs have also brought the development of common discussions among stakeholders at the local level. Certainly, the participation is more or less restricted to productivist interests representatives, environmental and social aspects are still weakly represented in the CFT process. But even if restricted to the productivist sphere, participation at the local level is a new phenomenon. Before CFTs, the participatory process was concerning representatives of productivist groups mainly at national and partly at the regional level, but not at the local level.

The main benefit of de-centralization of forest policies certainly lies in the involvement of local politicians and the integration of forest within local development policies. The links between local elected people, forest institutions and associations are consequently reinforced. But a flagrant lack of general co-ordination remains problematic. There is a real lack of co-ordination between the CFTs as well as between the local decision making level and other levels of decisions making, and this lack of co-ordination can become a source of contradictions. For instance, two neighbouring Charters could perfectly consider contradictory actions: one aimed at the tourism development, while the other one promoting fuel wood collection. The case of several Charters and departmental actions undertaken on the same territory regarding the development of wood as a source of energy has also been observed. A departmental/regional co-ordination would be deemed necessary to optimise the use of resources, the funding and the concretization of actions.

FNCOFOR has decided to assume a co-ordination role, but its role is restricted to the co-ordination among the various CFTs, i.e. to horizontal co-ordination but not comprising the vertical one. Up to now, vertical coordination is highly deficient. It is supposed to be established when the next CAP will be stated, in case CFTs may remain as an element of EU policy.

The present lack of coordination between the local and departmental, regional or national forest policies is a problem that CFT bearers must deal with. This lack often



results in an insufficient funding, consequently hampering the animation and coordination of CFTs.

At the national level, the forestry regulations and directives pretend to promote a multifunctional and participatory management. The CFTs are the local relay of this national will. But as it works now, CFTs are in no way forced to respect a balance between the different aspects of the forest sustainability. Concretely, the Charter bearers, at the local level, are free to consider the actions they want to carry out without any control.

From the interviews it appeared that for most of the local actors, the involvement of stakeholders at the local level is considered as very important. However, in order to be supported by the regional or national policies, they have to follow general directives or at least respect some criteria and indicators which have not been defined by the participants of the CFTs locally, but, instead, at the regional or national levels. This lack of co-ordination directly explains the exclusion of some important topics (e.g. nature conservation, by some CFTs bearers). This results in an inconsistency of the national forest policy. It would therefore be necessary to improve the coordination between the work of CFTs at the local level and their good involvement of stakeholders, and the traditional funding programmes of forest policy at the regional and national level.

More than 5 years after the introduction of CFTs, a mutual adaptation of those two systems, which are working simultaneously and concurrently, has not been done yet. This situation results in a lack of means (funding, personnel) for the work of CFTs and in a certain disaffection and reluctance of most of the stakeholders in the process, except for the forest communes.

## **Case study 6: National Park Administration in Greece (Kostas Kassioumis, Kostas Papageorgiou, and Michael Vakkas)<sup>49</sup>**

### **Territorial Levels of MLC - Attributes of the multi-level system**

Greece is a centralised country though a degree of decentralised administration has taken place (Papageorgiou and Kassioumis, 2005; Chaintarlis et al, 2004). There are three levels of administration clearly recognised in Greece that influence protected area policy planning: the EU, the central government and the provincial authorities (also including municipal authorities). It is a fact that the EU is one level of governance that has wield strong direct influence in the protected areas agenda by providing additional instruments such as framework regulations and funding to promote sustainable management. At the national level, most of the planning and management of protected areas fell under the Ministry of Environment, Planning and Public Works (MEPPW). More specifically, administration and management lie within the competencies of the protected area directorate at the MEPPW and receive all funding from central government and EU sources. The regional/local level appears to be the most critical one concerning the implementation of policy and planning in the locality. The weight lies within park boards that are in charge of taking decisions and working along with all involved sectors in the region. These Boards receive all funding and support from the MEPPW. All the above levels are active in the process that is examined in this case study, with a varied degree of influence. There is a great institutional influence coming from the EU in the form of directives and law as well as the EU funds devoted to environmental management.

There has been a change, occurred in 1997, of the administrative structure to facilitate political and administrative decentralization. It denotes a process of transfer of authority from central government to an intermediate organisation. While the changing institutional architecture of the state in the recent past has been a significant input in national governing, there is little theoretically informed analysis of relations between institutions acting at different governmental levels in the area of protected areas' management. Moreover, the analysis of policy documentation and field experience is important to understand the development and implementation of public policy on protected areas in the locality.

The decentralised administration has introduced and empowered the provincial governo, to act as a general authority deciding and approving all projects, including environmental ones, and management decisions (Papageorgiou and Vogiatzakis, 2005). This development caused some significant changes in environmental planning and in the administration of parks in particular, with most decision-making process shifting from central to the regional and local bodies. While the devolving development signals an improvement in the direct involvement of the provincial authority in decision-making, the legal statements and policy texts seek some kind of MLC between the national level and the park boards as regards the protected area network functioning and management. However, it is regarded as less of coordination between levels and more of a transfer of authority from the national to local level.

The decentralisation process described above has been influential in dealing with coordination issues between national and sub-national levels but the empirical

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<sup>49</sup> Based on Kostas Kassioumis, Kostas Papageorgiou and Michael Vakkas (2007), National Park Management in Greece, GoFOR Main Assessment Report Greece, NAGREF, Ioannina, July 2007.

research showed that this is not enough. The provincial governor acts as a mediator between levels but in most cases acts within the framework of political rationality in an effort to balance all social interest. It has coordinating powers, especially can act as a mediator between the ministry and local actors. But the experience has shown that in the past it has not made a full use of its powers especially on national park management issues. The reasons for this has been difficult to establish; some respondents argued that nature conservation was not a priority issue to the provincial administration, others interviewees denied the above assertion and claimed that provincial authorities have made the best use of their powers to coordinate. Others attribute to provincial authorities both limited experience and low expert knowledge on park management matters. Locally, park boards expect a great deal of assistance from the ministerial departments which in return, are unable to solve problems and local demands due to claimed increased workload and the distance from local problems.

Our field research identified such a lack of coordination between local and national levels. Some respondents believe that these problems are due to a transitory decentralised administration process which is undergone in the country since 1997 but, according to them, has not yet been completed. They argue that empowering regional governors with greater roles could alleviate MLC problems in the future. At the moment, park boards are straggling through formal procedures to get organised and to carry out their duties (such as conducting management plans, setting up monitoring schemes, evaluating outcome, setting up information centres) while they get only limited technical assistance and advice from the MEPPW.

### **Actors of MLC**

Park boards with all interested groups, actors and organisations represented in the schema including provincial state authorities, are the main actors at the regional/local level. At the national level there are two state actors involved in the process. Principally the MEPPW through its General Directorate of Environment takes the lead in all issues regarding financing, long term planning, evaluation of monitoring schemes, etc.

Furthermore, an independent committee, the Natura 2000 Scientific Committee was created in 1992 to help organise the set up of the Natura 2000 network of reserves in the country, to evaluate their ecosystems and revise the list of proposed sites that was initially proposed in 1992 (MD, 2002). The Committee has been inactive since 2004 and no action has been taken by the ministry ever since to set up a new one. Instead, the National Centre for Biotopes and Wetlands (NCBW) was commissioned by the ministry to provide assistance to all park boards mainly on organisational matters but not on managerial issues or scientific advice. It was regarded by the ministerial interviewees as a substitute to the Natura 2000 committee. In their respondents the members of the Park board recognised NCWB's value and assistance. The scientific community however, questioned its role as a consultant body that could put planning and management issues in perspective. The NCBW has experience in reserve management, was assigned no coordinating task and can only serve as a consultant body to the MEPPW on request.

The ministry and the General secretariat of environment in particular, have a lot of administrative powers and key coordinating and communicative roles. It organised seminars for all park board chairmen and provided assistance and help, but it did so only on administrative and organisational matters.

At the regional level there is a variety of both state and non state actors involved in the process of National Park administration, representing various interests groups or provincial policy sectors. While the devolving development signals an improvement in the direct involvement of the provincial authority in decision-making in any public policy in general, the law does not extent its powers to seek for coordination between the national level and the park boards as regards the protected area network functioning and management. As explained in previous sections, boards have the key coordinating role which was assigned to them by the founding law 2742. Coordination occurs at the regional level and only on those actors participating in the park board. Park boards work in close with the NCBW and the ministerial departments, but this process is more one of seeking assistance rather than a part of a multi-level decision making process. All bodies involved in MLC, including park boards, ministerial departments, and provincial authorities are permanent organisations, except the National Centre for Biotopes and Wetland.

Decentralisation enabled more provincial state authorities, such as the provincial forest service, the provincial agricultural directorate etc. to engage in negotiations and deliberations. It increased the number of state organisations but had no effect in the involvement of non-state actors. Following the initiation of the EU Habitat Directive, most of the national and regional/local policy structures dealing with planning and management of protected areas, fell under the MEPPW. The various ministerial directorates certainly comprise new actors in the negotiation arena. Yet, the influence of the Natura 2000 committee as well as the roles of the NCBW, have had an influence at the decision making process especially for issues that are dealt centrally. However, the empirical research, when compared to the previous administrative park regime, found that the most profound influence comes more from the involvement of several local interest groups, NGOs and all other bodies that care locally, but less from the involvement of actors at higher levels.

The field research highlighted that there is no single actor having an outstanding role to drive coordination across levels. In fact, the lack of central guidance and the absence of a central coordinating body either state or non-state, were repeated comments in the interviews with park board members. Interviews with ministerial administrators on the other hand, do accept that so far, efforts have not been very satisfactory in this respect.

### **Interdependencies and modes of MLC**

Reality has shown that several problems have occurred between national and regional coordination processes which are partly linked to inherent weaknesses of the national style of policy administration in general and are partly connected to different views of the roles that each actor holds in the process. For example, boards expect some coordination, support and assistance from the ministry; there is a widespread feeling across respondents that boards are left alone. Using the words of an interviewee: “the ministry expects us to do all the dirty job they ought to have done”(Interview 2006). On the other hand, the ministry claims that it has granted greater self-determination to park boards (boards, by law, are set up as autonomous and independent bodies) exactly as a remedy to these difficulties. But the field research showed that this has hardly been the case and none of the park boards was able to speed up and facilitate the process.

National park management resembles a situation of good intentions expressed by all involved parties but with an inability to set the system work. The role of the National

Centre for Biotopes and Wetlands acting as a technical support intermediate is seen as a step forward but not as enough, as argued by the respondents. It should also be noted that the ministerial departments work under pressure and are bound on state commitments towards EU policy processes.

There is a variety of reasons for negotiations among various levels, mainly between the central and the local level, such as policy formulation, allocation of funds and power distribution. Financing is a key issue that keeps the negotiation process in close contact between levels. Financial resources are found to be instrumental in the MEPPW's efforts to achieve the protected area policy goals. But the analysis has shown that they remain insufficient for a long-term integrated national conservation strategy. Undoubtedly, a substantial amount of funding has been derived from the EU to aid the implementation of the Habitat Directive. The experience has shown that it is the size and availability of EU resources that drive the implementation of protected area policy rather than vice-versa. Thus, there is a strong interdependence between local actors, the state and the EU as regards funding.

Power distribution and legal provisions are another impetus for coordination across levels. For example the provincial governor has the power to act in between the national and the local level. However, vertical coordination is limited, whenever it appears it takes the form of a negotiation between actors and less of a hierarchy. This has been a major step forward as compared to the past. In the past planning for national parks has been based on a deductive chain of decisions taken centrally by a close circle of foresters within the forestry department (Papageorgiou and Vogiatzakis, 2005). This supported a highly hierarchical model of administration between the forestry department and forest district offices. The initiation of the Habitat Directive and the creation of management boards, operate in a less hierarchical environment and have adopted interaction process that are closely resemble negotiations and mutual adaptation as modes of coordination. This is explainable on account of the history and the conditions that prevailed before the initiation of the Habitat Directive. In brief, the Ministry of EPPW had a short history in nature conservation; shifting the responsibility of managing parks from the forest department to MEPPW was a political decision. Over the years, the MEPPW secured funding options, created park boards and made necessary institutional changes to enhance the efficiency of national park management. Historically, we are still at the initial stage of a new planning process and that is why the ministry and park boards as well as all other involved groups and organisations are working in close contact in synergetic rather competitive terms.

### **Conclusions: Problems and significance of MLC**

Our analysis provided some insight in the attempt to identify problems in MLCs. From a broad perspective, the reasons for lacking coordination results from the inability of the state to create a vertical organisation, similar to that of the forestry department that once managed national parks. Classical arguments resisting change in behaviour of policy actors in various levels may be those providing continuity and security. Moreover, the conflicts on the competencies of the various ministries and institutions more or less reflect the historically developed, the dominant political culture of public authorities that favour sectoral isolationism. The analysis of interviews also revealed a lack of cooperation and coordination between the MEPPW and the ministry of Rural Development and Foods (RDF), especially in the past, due to the vagueness of responsibilities and in some cases also due to opposing attitudes and ideologies. The dominant attitude in the MEPPW, acting as a central

conservation actor, is one of a body that controls the policy by regulating financial resources and placing a boundary, especially at the policy level, around the cooperation with the forestry department. The distance between the ministerial departments and the boards is large and creates what some respondents call 'administration gap'. A direct effect of that are major implementation problems in practice and reduced overall coordination efficiency. As noted above, the provincial governor comes in between. It was assigned with coordinating powers but in practice it was not able to make the best use out of it. A lack of experience in national park matters, and perhaps a resistance against becoming involved into negotiations between the ministry and local authorities, simply because additional problems are anticipated, can be invoked as plausible explanations. However, our empirical evidence is weak in this respect. Certainly, there is a political dimension to the problem. The ministry has not institutionalised structures at the provincial level that could enhance powers to the provincial authorities in order to deal with such issues or to put nature conservation matters higher on the provincial political agenda.

#### 4.2.4 Major conclusions on multi-level coordination

In the theoretical chapter we have outlined our conceptual frame elaborating four issues related to multi-level coordination: (i) the question of scaling up or scaling down, (ii) problems of coordination, (iii) modes of coordination, and (iv) possible strategies to circumvent deadlocks in multi-level decision-making.

On the basis of the theoretical considerations we assumed that processes of multi-level decision-making are constituted by three elements: differentiation of negotiation arenas to reduce complexity, intensified communication to improve the information base to make decisions, and learning as a mean towards innovation and flexibility.

In chapter 4.2.2 we provided an overview on issues of multi-level coordination in the 19 GoFOR case studies based on six criteria: (i) the degree of federalism and decentralization, (ii) the territorial levels involved, (iii) the interdependency among levels, (iv) the interaction patterns and modes of coordination, and (v) new actors and institutions. This overview closed with an overall assessment about the importance of multi-level coordination in the individual GoFOR case studies. The summarizing table showed remarkable differences among the case studies regard the importance of multi-level coordination as characteristic element of the case study and as an important explanatory factor for success and failure of the policy process under study.

Based on these findings in chapter 4.2.2 we then selected six GoFOR case studies to be presented in greater detail in chapter 4.2.3. The six case studies were sought to represent three different kinds of multi-level systems, with each of them illustrating different characteristics and problems of multi-level systems in terms of political decision-making and policy implementation: European Union multi-level governance, multi-level coordination in federal systems, and decentralisation approaches in unitary systems.

This provided us with a rich empirical base to describe and analyse coordination issues in different multi-level systems, and furthermore gave us a good basis to search for patterns of multi-level coordination among the diverse case studies. The six case studies have shown that the processes of Europeanization and regionalization entailed some novel elements of interlacing and interlocking politics. They raise the challenge of including actors from various territorial levels in a multi-level system without impairing effective decision-making, which tends to suffer if too large a number of actors and arenas need to be co-ordinated in the decision-making process. From our analysis we see patterns of multi-level coordination emerging around three main issues: functional and territorial differentiation, institutional continuity and innovative forms of linkages between territorial levels, and the issue of mixed or combined modes of coordination.

First of all, the case studies have shown that the necessity of multi-level coordination under the conditions of Europeanization and regionalization triggered processes of differentiation of intergovernmental decision-making structures.

On the one hand, we observe a specific **differentiation related to functions**. Here, problems are divided into partial tasks to be dealt with by separate arenas, as it was shown in the Germany case study on LEADER+ and the Danish case study on the implementation of the Habitat Directive. On the EU level, decisions are made in both of these cases on the overall concept and the general policy goals, and additionally on the principles for the allocation of grants to regions in the case of LEADER+. The

substantial policy goals are formulated in both cases at the national and/or sub-national level through operational programmes respectively Natura 2000 plans, and finally executed at the regional and local level for each regional partnership or Natura 2000 site through individual projects and specific Natura 2000 action plans. Also in the German case study on Regionen Aktiv and the French and Greek case studies we see a functional differentiation between the decision-making at the national level, i.e. formulating the overall policy goals and adopt them as laws or programs (“framework steering” as it was called in the German case study), and the decision-making at the regional level related to the establishment of regional partnerships, CFTs, and park management boards as well as the implementation of concrete projects (“detail steering”). In particular in the French and Greek case studies on decentralization we can observe this form of “decoupling” of levels of government. Interestingly, both case studies point to the benefits of decentralization as well as to negative effects. The lower levels of government face several challenges including the lack of financial capacities, the necessity of legal and scientific advice, and often they are cut off from information exchange with higher levels. This points out that reasonable decoupling presupposes the availability of the capacities that are needed at the level of the decoupled arenas (levels) to effectively fulfil their tasks within overall multi-level policy structures.

On the other hand, the complexity of processes is simplified by **territorial differentiation** in intergovernmental relations. Here, multi-level coordination is limited to particular nations or regions. In contrast to systems of joint decision-making, including all decentralized governments, the dominant mode of decision-making under conditions of territorial differentiation is bilateral instead of multilateral. In this way, multi-level coordination can be adjusted to different institutional settings of lower-level governments. This form of differentiation is particularly evident in both German cases on regional policy, where individual regions apply for funding either from the EU or the federal government. The federal and/or sub-national ministries operating the funding programmes negotiate individually with each region, based on the general policy framework. In the French case, a similar mode is used for coordination, i.e. each regional Forest Charter is trying to collect funding for their projects bilaterally from different sources at the national, regional or department level. The same can be said about the vertical coordination with regard to specific Natura 2000 sites in Denmark or the management boards of national parks in Greece.

Regarding the institutional forms of linkages between territorial levels it can be said that the challenges of Europeanization and regionalization favour the rise of new, **innovative forms of linkages between levels** and, more generally, a new mixture of modes of governance. All of our six case studies describe and analyse some kind of institutional innovations. This is most obvious in the French and Greek cases where competences and decision-making processes have been administratively decentralized to regional and local levels. The German case studies show two different innovative forms of linking levels to empower regional actors: The case of LEADER+ provides us with an example of EU multi-level governance that is based on the idea of lesser influence of the central government compared to the sub-national levels, whereas the case of Regionen Aktiv is an interesting example where the central government tries to circumvent the federal states and their constitutional rights by negotiating more directly with regional actors. In the majority of cases, institutional change and innovation takes place most obviously on the regional and local levels, whereas on the national-institutional level we have observed many elements of institutional continuity, with traditional patterns of level linkages and joint decision-making are largely being preserved.



Another important element of innovation are new patterns of 'loose coupling' of arenas and levels of government. The term 'loose coupling' means that decisions in one arena do not completely determine decisions in other arenas but only influence parts of the decision premises. Such a loosely coupled multi-level system is not structured in the form of 'connected games', in which actors' strategies depend on outcomes of other games, but as 'embedded games', in which policy-making in one arena sets the context for negotiations in other arenas (Benz/Eberlein 1999). This context-setting is achieved by a shift in the mode of interaction from power and control to information exchange, communication and persuasion. Moreover, in the differentiated systems of governance, actors at the interface of arenas play the role of mediators and promoters. Good examples are the National Network Unit for LEADER+ in the German case study and the regional governors in the French and Greek cases. As a rule, in a loosely coupled structure state actors play less of a monopoly role of control and decision-making, but rather a mediation role. However, the more they can operate in the 'shadow of hierarchy', the better they can perform the softer role of mediation.

This last point reminds us that effective vertical coordination in multi-level systems is often not delivered by one single form but rather by a balanced **mixture of different modes of governance** which helps to manage the tensions produced by the multi-level framework. Co-operative networks and mediation are not the only modes of governance. As a matter of fact, the need for cooperation and consensus-building, which gives rise to patterns of 'loose coupling', can be successfully managed, as Benz and Eberlein argue (1999: 343), precisely because these modes of social coordination are complemented by alternative modes, namely competition and hierarchy. Of course, and as our case studies prove, the specific mixture of modes of governance varies with the given institutional and policy context. In all case studies, except the Danish HD case, different modes of coordination are combined, in some cases up to three different modes. Good cases in point are the German case studies on regional policy. Both cases present a mixture of three different modes of coordination, namely hierarchy, negotiation, and competition. In these cases the different modes are not used simultaneously, but rather subsequently, i.e. at different levels and at different stages of the policy process. As the results of the German case studies suggest, the provision of greater flexibility by applying different modes of coordination can lead to effective decision-making in quite complex multi-level systems. However, some (minor) problems of MLC have been reported for these two cases too.

Other combinations of ideal-type modes of governance have been less successful. For instance, the combination of negotiation and networking as coordinating principles in the functionally differentiated multi-level system described for the case of the Austrian Biodiversity Strategy. The process analysed here led to weak MLC, ineffective decision-making and finally to rather modest outputs. Furthermore, the French and Greek case studies reported problems with horizontal competition among regional units in an otherwise hierarchically structured multi-level system.

A case of its own in this sense seems to be the implementation of the EU Habitat Directive in Denmark. The former predominantly cooperative approach has been overridden by a hierarchical form of coordination. This resulted in quite a lot of mistrust among the affected target groups. However, it is too early to draw conclusions on how this finally will affect the whole decision-making, the implementation process and its outcomes in Denmark.

In conclusion, it seems useful to analyse the specific mixture of the different modes of governance which emerge, in order to manage the adaptation pressures and tensions arising from the processes of Europeanization and regionalization. Whether viable institutional solutions and devices can be found in every single case remains an open question which requires further research.

## 4.3 Inter-sectoral coordination

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### 4.3.1 Introduction and conceptual issues

This chapter analyses different intentions, processes, outputs and outcomes of Intersectoral Coordination (ISC) from a comparative perspective. Before presenting the comparative analysis of ISC in the different case studies and the conclusions, the following sections provide an overview, a further conceptualization and a specific elaboration of ISC in a governance context.

#### 4.3.1.1 *The call for Intersectoral coordination*

ISC is part of political discussions and called for on various levels and in a number of policy documents. The concept of Intersectoral Coordination, in terms of coordination among e.g. different administrative units or policy sectors, has increasingly gained attention in studies on environmental and natural resource policy in the last decades. It became particularly prominent in international and national forest policy processes. The rise of the concept in the global forest policy arena was very much linked to the recognition of the importance of cross-sectoral linkages between forest policy and other public policy sectors for sustainable forest management. As Liss (1999) indicated, it has early been acknowledged that “the destruction and degradation of forests could not only be stopped by action within the forestry sector”. Authors like De Montalbert (1995) and Schmithüsen (2001) problematized these cross-sectoral relations for forest policy from the 1990s onwards. Besides the recognition of the importance of cross-sectoral linkages, various international governmental organisations called for intersectoral coordination to realise sustainable forestry. The issue has been present on the global forest political and policy agenda since the 1980s. In a survey on the implementation of National Forest Programmes for instance, the FAO (1999) called for “adequate intersectoral coordination mechanisms”. Other examples are the debates within the UN arenas of the Intergovernmental Panel on Forests (IPF), the Intergovernmental Forum on Forests (IFF) and the United Nations Forum on Forests (UNFF) respectively. Here, intersectoral coordination was seen as an important issue for the development of so-called National Forest Programmes (NFPs).

The call for intersectoral coordination has also entered the political and policy agenda in the Pan-European and EU forest arena. The Ministerial Conference on the Protection of Forests in Europe (MCPFE) explicitly paid attention to the concept in the Vienna Resolution on NFPs and intersectoral coordination (1/2003). At the EU level, the EU Council adopted the ‘Resolution on a forestry strategy for the European Union’ in 1999 (1999/C56/01). The European Commission recently called for the strategy’s implementation (COM 2005, 84 final). Next to the global, Pan-European and EU level, intersectoral coordination has found its place at the national level in several European countries. As part of the development of NFPs, countries explicitly addressed the concept. Debates and statements in the abovementioned examples emphasised the need for more cooperation between traditional policy sectors (like forest policy, nature policy, agriculture policy, etc) in order to contribute to sustainable

forestry. As such, enhanced intersectoral coordination was interpreted as a solution for forest policy problems.

Parallel to the increasing prominence of “intersectoral coordination” in the political realm, the concept has also become increasingly debated among forest policy scientists. The COST E19 action on ‘National Forest Programmes in a European Context’ and the 2002 International Conference on ‘Cross-Sectoral Policy Impacts on Forests’ in Savonlinna (Finland) are examples of joint initiatives that have put a focus on ISC (Tikkanen et al. 2002).

In spite of this increasing acknowledgement of the need for ISC in national and international forums, a recent joint report by MCPFE, UNECE and FAO (2007) pointed out that the achievements in ISC within the framework of national forest program processes have been rather modest.

#### *4.3.1.2 Intersectoral coordination in the scientific literature*

Before elaborating on the concept of “sector” and “intersectoral coordination”, it is reasonable to provide an understanding and definition of what is meant when “coordination” is used in this study: A helpful definition of “co-ordination” among organisations, with a focus upon decision making, was provided by Warren et al. They define co-ordination as a “structure or process of concerted decision making or action wherein the decisions or action of two or more organisations are made simultaneously in part or in whole with some deliberate degree of adjustment to each other” (Warren et al. 1974, cited in Verbij and Schanz 2002, 94).

In the scientific literature, different terminologies related to ISC are found in different strands of literature, e.g. policy integration (Jänicke/Jörgens 2004), joined-up government (6 2003, Pollit 2003), horizontal coordination (Peters 1998) or networks. The terminologies, although they differ in terms of scope or emphasis generally point to the aspect of horizontal co-ordination as contrasted with vertical/multi-level coordination.

There are various definitions of the concept a sector, which differ according to research interest and methodological approach. Hogl (2002), for example, discusses two definitions. The first one encompasses the policy dimension and relates to “policies and programmes affecting certain subject areas”. A second definition approach addresses the polity dimension and relates to “actors, networks bureaucratic structures, etc.”. This definition points at sectors as more or less stable interaction and decision making structures in which a variety of state as well as non-state actors interact. Sectors can be seen as networks (stable policy communities rather than ad hoc or temporary issue networks (Rhodes 1997) or subsystems (Sabatier 1993), which comprise governmental actors and private actors (e.g. interest groups, journalists, scientists)). The two definitions show that both substantial and organisational aspects are involved in sectors.

Sectoral boundaries are not fixed. They may be interpreted differently by different actors, may be established, re-defined, modified and challenged altogether by factors and actors from within as well as from outside a sector. Furthermore, aspects that potentially contribute to the definition of sectors, i.e. to their boundaries and the boundaries of other sectors are manifold. Which factors add to establish sectoral boundaries and whether and how sectoral boundaries are perceived by policy actors remains an empirical question from this perspective. A common language, a common knowledge-base, related views of problems as well as shared goals, beliefs and

perceptions of causal mechanisms in the respective field may add to the establishment of sectoral boundaries. However, the most obvious factor that might establish sectoral boundaries seem to be administrative structures, which traditionally separate organisational units by allocating well-defined areas of responsibilities.

Also Verbij and Schanz (2002) argue that taking into account the different context dependent perceptions of actors regarding the sector and its boundaries is key "in understanding intersectoral coordination" (Verbij & Schanz 2003). The character of sector boundaries and boundary setting and resetting processes are central for analysing ISC. Sectors are delineated from other sectors through the interaction of their actors and the way they set and challenge their boundaries. Accordingly, intersectoral co-ordination can only be analysed relative to these boundaries. "Understanding actor's boundary setting is a basic requirement for the analysis of intersectoral co-ordination" (ibid.). A comparative analysis about meanings and frames of the forestry sector in Austria and the Netherlands provided further substantiation of the importance of focussing on perceptions of sector boundaries and boundary setting processes, as it showed definitions and meanings of the forestry sector to change over time and differ between different actors and countries (Verbij et al. 2007).

To be able to do justice to this potential variety in empirical research, the GoFOR project has refrained from giving a strict theoretical definition of ISC. Instead, the character of ISC is seen as one of the results of empirical research. Accordingly, the Terms of Reference for ISC started by asking to examine what is seen as a sector or as sectoral by the actors of the respective case processes in their respective contexts and also tried to explore the boundary defining aspects.

#### *4.3.1.3 Intersectoral Coordination in a governance context*

In the GoFOR project we considered ISC one of the five interdependent constituting elements of the umbrella concept of 'governance'. Hence it was one among a number of "indicators" of what we might find in practices in terms of governance in empirical reality.

We conclude that despite the countless number of conceptions of the term governance, theorists in governance literature seem to agree that there is a development towards an increasing involvement of non-governmental actors in policy-making, that the boundaries between state, market and civil society become increasingly blurred, that policy processes are increasingly situated outside the classical institutions of the nation state and that decision making is increasingly done in network structures comprising both public and private actors (a.o. Van der Zouwen 2006; Wageningen and BOKU team 2006). 'Governance' – if defined as a counter-term to "government" in terms of top-down steering by hierarchy –, can thus be perceived as manifesting itself in contemporary policy processes through:

- blurring boundaries between state, market and civil society,
- an increasing interconnectedness between EU, national, regional and local levels of policy making;
- shifts in the loci of policy making towards more informal practices;
- the emergence of network like structures in which public as well as private actors from different territorial levels interact.

When considering these characteristics specifically related to ISC we can expect ISC in governance processes to manifest itself in:

- blurring boundaries between sectors and increasing interconnectedness of sectors;
- increasingly informal processes of ISC;
- increasing occurrence of practices in which different sectors, actors and levels participate (combination of participation, multilevel coordination and ISC).

The following chapter will provide the comparative analysis that will serve as empirical basis for the final assessment of these three expectations.

For the GoFOR project, we were interested in the question to what extent and most importantly how we encountered governance, and intersectoral coordination as one of its constituting elements, in policy practices. We did not primarily focus on intersectoral coordination as a necessity to solve policy problems. Rather, we considered intersectoral coordination as a characteristic part of governance arrangements and processes which we tried to explore and understand by doing in depth case studies.

The following chapter documents the different shapes and forms in which ISC has been observed. Most importantly, it makes clear that ISC implicated both substantive as well as procedural aspects of the policy processes under study. The concept of ISC was used to refer to (often site specific) processes which aimed for the integration of different interests, functions and uses of areas. In addition, it was used to refer to the coordination between different sectoral ministerial departments and policy networks. These meanings make sense as often calls for ISC are based on the perceived need for an integrated perspective, especially in forestry, nature conservation and environmental issues (e.g. Turnhout 2003; Turnhout et al. 2007); And oriented towards achieving the interactions between state as well as non state actors, from different sectors, which are seen necessary to formulate more integrated policies.

#### **4.3.2 Intersectoral Coordination in a comparative perspective**

This section presents the results regarding ISC of all GoFOR case studies in a comparative perspective. It is divided in four subsections. First the perceptions and actor definitions of sectors are reported. Then the main findings as regards the intentions for and of ISC are presented. This is followed by a comparison of the actual ISC processes and the outputs and outcomes. The final subsection deals with some tentative explanations of the ISC practices as documented in the first four subsections.

The analysis is based on the case reports (Deliverable 10) and on the comparative frame (Deliverable 11). Since the cases were chosen to provide empirical evidence for a rather broad range of aspects – but not just on questions as regards ISC - they differ quite a lot with respect to their focus, scope and level of detail in the analysis of ISC. It goes without saying that this has affected the comparative analysis. Consequently, we do not aim at integrating the empirical results of all cases into each

sub-chapter, but rather focus only those results which contribute to our research questions.

#### *4.3.2.1 Perceptions and definitions of sectors*

In general, with a few exceptions, the cases refer to sectors in the form of “policy fields” like agriculture, industry, tourism, environment, etc. Most often these definitions correlate closely with the respective administrative structures, e.g. with jurisdictions of ministries or ministerial departments. This applies for example to the AT-AFD, the GE-GAK and the HUN-NFP case, in which sectors were recognised along formal lines of competencies (state administrative structures) and flows of powers. This kind of perception is also found in the cases GE-RA in which on the other hand also the development of a “regional development community..., whose members were sharing common beliefs” is reported, where the highly specialised and institutionalised administrations do not prevail as they do at EU, national and sub-national levels.

Sector definitions within the case studies done in the Netherlands (NL-NPPN, NL-UH, NL-GW) also have these “administrative elements”. In addition the NL-UH and GW consider sectors also as policy issues which have institutionalized over time, around which several actors are usually involved (e.g. agriculture, water, spatial planning, nature, forest, landscape and urban area policy).

The Norwegian case study refers to interests instead of sectors: economic, social, and environmental interests.

In two case studies governance processes prescribe definitions of sectors. In the example of the AT-BS, the sector definitions were introduced by the EU Biodiversity Strategy which was adopted a year before the national process started. Accordingly the AT-BS mentions nine sectors: Agriculture, Fishery, Forestry, Hunting, Tourism, Mining, Industry, Energy, and Transportation. However, this closely correlates with Austrian administrative state structures and with the actors’ traditional perceptions of sectors. In the DEN-NPP case the areas of interest were defined by the Minister in charge. He constituted the sector definition by specifying the stakeholders to be involved. Hence in this case sectors are defined in terms of actors and interests rather than by thematic policy areas.

Finally the cases also point out that there are of course quite different, subjective perceptions of sectors among the actors within specific policy processes. The GE-GAK case provides an excellent example: policy administrators at national and regional level identified sectors as vertical fields of policy-flow having a common administrative structure, a sense of common understanding of issues and explicit legislative responsibilities assigned to each level. On the other hand, the scientific community and park board members did not define sectors following these strict departmental structures, but perceived sectors as processes of actors characterised by common objectives.

#### *4.3.2.2 Intentions*

Most cases show intentions for coordination among different sectors. But the character and the aims of these intentions differ between the cases. Seven issues regarding the intentions for ISC stand out:

1. ISC as an implicit or an explicit intention;
2. ISC as a means to different ends;
3. the question of why ISC was on the agenda;
4. ISC as part of existing rules;
5. ISC as a strategy to solve cross-sectoral problems;
6. ISC as driven by economic incentives;
7. ISC as triggered by regionalization.

### **Implicit and explicit intentions**

In some cases ISC was explicitly aimed for. Both Austrian cases are good examples of such explicit intentions. Also the French cases, the German cases, the NOR-LF case, the Romanian cases and the ESP-FPGP case show more or less explicit intentions for ISC.

Although there are no explicit aims for ISC, implicit intentions can be recognized in the DEN-NPP case and the Dutch cases. The DEN-HD case stands out in this respect because in fact, the case shows quite explicit non ISC intentions in the sense that the implementation of the Habitats Directive was explicitly considered to be a sectoral nature conservation issue.

However, a closer look at the case studies shows that in fact the DEN-HD case is not so unique. For example, the AT-AFD case explicitly restricted ISC in the sense that at the start of the strategy process some topics were explicitly excluded from the debates and because it was decided that results were not allowed to compete with existing policies and instruments. Also in the FR-RPF case ISC was restricted and referred mainly to coordination with the transport sector to remove the damaged trees from the forests.

In the German cases the explicit intentions for ISC on regional level in the rhetoric turn out to be a consequence of more implicit settings - namely the Länder, national and EU level. Since they are not capable of doing ISC within their highly specialised administration this aim is handed down to the regional level. The inabilities of the higher levels not only lead to, but also interfere with the realisation of ISC on regional level.

Several cases note, that although ISC was called for, further specifications of how it should be organized and who should take the lead were lacking. Examples are the ESP-FPGP case, the FR-CFT case and the GR-MA case.

The empirical data shows that one of the central mechanisms to comply with intersectoral coordination aspirations is to install an intersectoral committee or body (see below).

### **A means to different ends**

In general, coordination between different sectoral actors with different sectoral interests is considered important, however, not as an end in itself but as a means for other ends.

The AT-AFD case claims that ISC was important to achieve policy coherence and for making implementation more effective. Also the HUN-NFP shows that ISC was considered important to ensure harmony between forestry policies and other sectoral



policies. The GR-MA case refers to the importance of ISC to smoothen implementation as well.

In many cases, ISC is related to balancing of interests or functions or areas. For example, the DEN-NPP case, the NOR-LF case, the German cases and the NL-UH and GW cases, mention this as the goal of ISC efforts. As regards functions and interests, in general a distinction is made between ecological or environmental functions and interests on the one hand and economic functions and interests on the other. The NL-UH and GW cases refer to the same distinction but use the terms green and red instead of ecological/environmental and economic respectively. The AT-AFD case also involves the goal of balancing between forestry and environmental interests. The DEN-NPP case refers to balancing conservation and (agricultural) use. The NOR-LF case mentions economic, environmental and social interests.

Another important goal of ISC, which is referred to in several case studies, is related to achieving policy integration. In the AT-BS case, the ROM-NAT case, and the FR-CFT case, the intention was to get biodiversity, nature conservation and forestry respectively integrated in other policies. Some cases aimed explicitly at achieving new integrated policies. The NOR-LF case, the ESP-FPGP case and the NL-NPPN case for example, aimed at achieving new, integrated, national level policies. The German cases and the NL-UH and GW cases show the importance of ISC to achieve local level site specific integrated policies.

Also the GR-MA case, the Ro-ACP case the FR-RPF case aimed to achieve policy integration in the sense of common problem solving. Reference is made to the importance of taking actions in all ministerial departments to achieve biodiversity and nature conservation objectives in the GR-MA case, to solve the problems caused by the storm in the FR-FRP case and to solve the problem of corruption in the ROM-ACP case.

### **Why was ISC on the agenda?**

Another perspective, as regards motives, examines those factors which actually contributed to put ISC on the governance agenda, also in cases where quite some resistance against ISC was observed.

We found a number of different motivations for actually putting ISC on the agenda. In most cases more than one cause can be observed, usually a couple of different main motives of actors are reported. Some factors stand out.

Unsurprisingly in some cases concrete cross-sectoral policy problems were the main starting point for ISC efforts. However, in a number of cases ISC was introduced primarily because it was part of the rules: ISC may be prescribed e.g. by law, by non-legally binding agreements (e.g. by international forest policy agreements), enforced by governmental bodies, it may be a principle inherent in a framework or strategy, etc.

In some other cases, driving factors were economic incentives which motivated actors to coordinate, either market forces which made ISC necessary (NOR-LF), or incentives set by higher level programmes like EU subsidy framework programmes which prescribed certain procedures including ISC (see above). In the latter case competition for economic incentives can be seen as a significant mechanism facilitating ISC.

Last but not least, in a couple of cases ISC resulted from new, region-oriented or local approaches in policy making, that is “ISC in the wake of a change to territorially-oriented policy-making approaches”.

### **ISC as part of the rules**

In the cases related to National Forest Programmes (NFP) (AT-AFD, HUN-NFP NFP, ESP-FPGP), ISC is defined as a procedural principle. ISC is inherent to the NFP approach as it was defined in various documents in International and European forest dialogues. The same principle applies to the AT-BS: the integration of conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity into other sectoral policies was one of the main objectives of the CBD and accordingly the Austrian Biodiversity Strategy.

Also the concept of Integrated Rural Development, which became a new funding principle with the GAK “reform” in 2003 calls for ISC (GER-IRD, GER-GAK), just as it was prescribed as a normative principle in Leader Programme (GER-L+) and as a programme requirement in the case of GER-RA. In case of FR-CFT the establishment of the forest charters also required ISC.

### **Concrete cross-sectoral problems**

In some of our cases, a main motivation for new efforts in ISC, were pending, cross-sectoral policy problems. The most straight forward example is provided by the FR-RPF case, in which strong cross-sectoral interdependencies in times of crisis after the catastrophic windfall actually made intersectoral cooperation a must. In the situation of crisis, the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry coordinated with all other relevant administrations. Actually, in this case the issue was not addressed in terms of intersectoral co-ordination but in terms of dependence on other sectors to solve problems.

Concrete policy problems are also observed and framed as problems of policy fragmentation and as implementation problems (NL-NPPN, GR-MA). In case of the NL-NPPN case, the reasons for intersectoral coordination originated from the problematization of a high degree of policy fragmentation, from observed implementation deficits and lack of support and from the recognition of the societal value of nature.

In the NOR-LF case it was not so much a pending concrete policy problem as such, but it was widely recognised among the stakeholders that intersectoral coordination was crucial for efficient forest management.

### **Economic incentives**

In a couple of cases economic incentives play a decisive role in formulating ISC intentions. In these cases, ISC was a pre-condition in the development of projects applying for funds.

For the GR-MA case it is reported that significant incentives for striving to enhance ISC were related to securing EU funding and to the legal obligation to implement ISC. However, in this particular case, overcoming cross-sectoral policy problems was the main argument for ISC in policy documents as well as in actors’ perceptions.

In France the Forest Charters (FR-CFT) were developed rapidly also because of financial support that was offered from the national level. The Forest Charters were

initially conceived as an approach aiming for funding in forestry development from national and EU levels.

Financial incentives were also main triggers in the Romanian, Hungarian, Austrian and German cases. Ministries started to cooperate to be able to access EU funds (ROM-NAT), regional sectoral actors cooperated for accessing EU and national integrated rural development funds (GER) and processes were legitimised against resistance of powerful actors with intersectoral program formulation as a potential precondition for applying to EU rural development funds (AT-AFD). In Hungary (HUN-NFP) the National Forest Program was, besides other motives, designed and initiated with the goal to secure the mid-term financing of reforms relating to forest land use. In competition with other sectors for scarce resources, ISC was perceived as a need for the forestry sector.

The GER-IRD case provides also an example of the effect of financial incentives to sectors on ISC: since funding for rural development was meant to be taken from agricultural, forestry- and fishery-funds, these sectors were reluctant towards increasing the scope of ISC, while actors from other policy domains, who were potential winners from budget transfers (e.g. WWF), were in favour of broader ISC processes.

Finally, not only funding as source of direct economic incentive to enhance ISC was observed. In the NOR-LF case the overall governance process was basically started because of market pressures: the process itself would not have taken place had it not been for the fact that the forest sector was forced to take measures by international market demands.

### **ISC in relation to regionalization**

A group of cases points to ISC taking place in the wake of changes towards region-oriented or local policy making approaches. Interestingly, in some cases ISC was in fact strengthened or even introduced only in relation to such territorial approaches.

In the German cases on regional development policy, ISC is reported as a result of new territorial approaches for rural development which had been discussed for some time and were a reaction to identified weaknesses of “more traditional”, sectoral forms of supporting rural regions. In these cases, the basic idea was that rural development could not be achieved anymore by sectoral approaches but had to be facilitated by intersectoral development strategies. Hence, ISC in the German cases was a problem-solving strategy which was a consequence of the increased emphasis on regional planning. In the GER-GAK case a previous ‘sectoral approach’ of measures was supplemented by ‘a more spatial approach’. In both, the GER-L+ as well as in the GER-RA cases, ISC was observed as the result of new territorial approaches for rural development.

In France, in the case of the Forest Charters (FR-CFT) the main driving force for change was the shift from sectoral to territorial policy making. The goal was to integrate forests and forestry into the development and management of territories by applying a regional approach to ISC.

Last but not least, also the Dutch cases NL-UH and NL-GW are reported as region-oriented approaches which have particularly striven for integrative, intersectoral perspectives.

### 4.3.2.3 *The process*

Many different processes of ISC are documented in the case studies. Apparently, relatively clear intentions as regards ISC materialize in a wide variety of processes which differed with respect to five issues:

1. participating sectors;
2. the installation of specific committees;
3. the territorial levels where ISC actually took place and the types of actors that were included;
4. power imbalances;
5. ISC dynamics.

#### **Participating sectors**

It turns out that the amount and diversity of involved sectors differs widely between the cases due to diverging reasons.

Some processes were designed to integrate a broad range of sectors and interests, such as the NOR-LF, the Danish NPP or the Austrian FD case. Most of those cases actually turned out as including a great number of sectors and interests, some cases even report that new actors (ESP-FPGP) or actors “beyond the usual suspects” (NL-NPPN) took part. In the Austrian FD case some sectors did not engage, though, due to a lack of interest and also in the second Austrian case (AT-BS) it is stated that the overall involvement of some ministries was not satisfying.

The French RPF case was not actually designed to include many stakeholders, as it was a reaction to an unforeseen catastrophe; nevertheless, all the sectors affected were associated to the process.

On the other hand, initiatives, in which certain sectors that would have been interested to participate were deliberately kept out, were also detected, the most extreme being the Danish HD case, where all stakeholders were left aside except the ones that were directly affected by the habitat designations by owning land. Nevertheless, some stakeholders managed to force their way into influence during the process and the now ongoing Natura 2000 process takes a more open approach. A less extreme example is the FR-CFT case where any link with the environmental sector was considered as creating difficulties and was therefore avoided.

The NL-NPPN case shows a much more selective and ad hoc way of ISC. In the second phase of the process, coordination between different ministerial departments took place only when necessary to resolve specific issues. This was also observed in the AT-BS case where broad ISC changed into coordination on a national level to resolve inter-ministerial wrangles.

Despite the acknowledgement of the importance of ISC (FR-CFT) or joint problem solving (FR-RFP), the French cases show that issues were quickly defined in mono-sectoral and in technical terms and that, in practice, mostly forestry related actors were invited and represented. In a similar vein, the GER-RA case, although in principle open to all sectors, especially appealed to the organic and sustainable agriculture sector.

The DEN-HD case and the GER-IRD cases stand out in this respect because it was specifically documented that ISC practices did not take place in these cases.

## ISC institutions

As just elaborated, most case studies refer to processes in which different sectors were invited and actually at the table. To achieve this, most processes applied/developed integrated strategies, plans or programmes. A central instrument in most of these processes was, as mentioned before, a committee or similar initiative. Such ISC bodies can be found in both Austrian, one Danish (DEN-NPP) and all three Dutch cases, in the GER-RA, the GER-GAK and the GR-MA case as well as both Romanian cases and the ESP-FPGP case. The Norwegian case not only developed around an ISC-structured body, but also, lead to a permanent council with different interests represented by stakeholders.

The constitution of the committees varies from case to case, basically they consisted of actors of the sectors described in previous and upcoming chapters.

As to decision making rules, a large part of these committees (AT-BS, FR-RPF) strived for consensus. The French RPF case reports documented high pressure for consensus, the Danish NP case states that “to reach agreement” and to “avoid significant opposition” was important, the Greek case, although majority voting was required by law, emphasises “significant effort devoted to achieve consensus” and the Austrian FD states that a maximum of consensus should be reached. In the NOR-LF case simple majority vote was applied. It is important to keep in mind however, that not necessarily the most important questions were debated in these committees. The NL-NPPN case for example reports that the most crucial issues were dealt with outside the especially created advisory group.

## Levels and actors

Some of the documented ISC practices were restricted to the national or subnational level. Examples are the NL-NPPN case, the Austrian cases, the GR-MA case, the HUN-NFP case, the NOR-LF case, and the ESP-FPGP case. Other cases also refer explicitly to the local level. Examples are the DEN-NPP case, the GR-MA where coordination among sectors was organized ad hoc by management boards and partially also the Fr FC case. The NL-UH case and the NL-GW case are unique in the sense that the ISC was located on a level between local and regional.

When taking the German cases together, an interesting relation emerged between the national or subnational and the local/regional level. The national and subnational levels prescribed rules in terms of ISC (which were not necessarily the result of national level ISC processes) that the local/regional level was encouraged to conform with. In the GER-L+ case, the inability to achieve effective ISC on EU, national and Länder level lead to the delegation of ISC expectations/efforts to local and regional levels. Within the GAK, national level actors, mainly ministries, called for a more ISC-oriented approach, which was not or only very limitedly realised at the national or Länder level, but moved to the regional level by means of rural development strategies in the course of implementation. For the Ge IRD in general it turned out that despite a lot of ISC intentions on national level, the coordination and integration of ISC on national level was difficult and was therefore rhetorically and also acutally passed on to the local/regional level .

In the Romanian cases, ISC was restricted to state actors in the sense that the case reports refer to specific interministerial institutions and in the ROM-ACP case ISC at the local level involved state actors solely; also the GER-GAK case included just

state actors. In the other cases non state and state actors from different sectors were involved.

### **Power imbalances**

Although in many cases different sectors were in fact at the table, usually not all were equally strong. Also the attitudes towards cooperation among sectors differed quite a lot.

In the AT-AFD case the forestry sector which was not in favour of a broad intersectoral process in the run-up period to the strategy process, mostly focused on defending their interests. The forestry sector was powerful enough to formally restrict the potential scope of ISC, at least at the start of the process. The environmental sector, on the other hand, wanting to promote changes, was less able to influence the process in the run-up and in the starting phase. However, this case is interesting, since over time the process developed self-momentum enough to re-balance powers between these sectors, so that finally, no topics could be kept from the agenda completely. Also in the French cases, the forestry sector dominated and was able to define issues in mono-sectoral and rather technical terms. In the HUN-NFP case, the forestry sector also dominated, but primarily because other sectors were not too much interested to participate in the process.

In contrast, the forestry sector was weak in the GER-RA case, in which mostly organic farmers, tourism actors, renewable energy and trade were represented.

In the AT-BS case economic sectors are seen to dominate over environmental sectors. In a similar vein, the ISC initiative Hart van de Heuvelrug in the NL-UH case shows that the environmental and nature conservation 'green' sector, who initiated the project, felt that the economic 'red' sector was too dominant. Perceived power imbalances triggered ISC efforts to emerge.

### **Dynamics in intersectoral processes**

Basically ISC can be seen more often and more intense at the earlier phases of the processes than at later stages (for example in the AT-BS case, the HUN-NFP case and the FR-RPF case). Nevertheless, there are also cases where ISC efforts can be detected especially at later stages (for example the FR-CFT case and the GR-MA case) or cases where ISC processes remained constant in intensity (for example the NOR-LF case). This brings us to the dynamics of ISC in the governance processes studied. Some of the cases report developments in ISC over time. In some cases broad ISC processes changed into limited ISC or ISC even disappeared altogether when concrete political decisions had to be made. Other cases report an increase of ISC along the time, sometimes connected to a shift in level.

The AT-BS case reported that ISC changed from broad settings with state and non state actors from different sectors to much more closed coordination between ministerial departments. The NL-NPPN case showed similar dynamics. At a certain point, political choices needed to be made and broad ISC settings changed into closed interministerial coordination about specific topics. Also the German cases, when considered in comparative perspective, show this trend. The GER-GAK case shows that in the reform of the GAK policies (as a result of previous Integrated Rural Development initiatives documented in the other German cases) ISC was dealt with on the national level without interference of non state actors. The HUN-NFP also

shows that when decisions had to be made and budgets were discussed, broad ISC settings with state and non state actors changed into interministerial discussions.

Also in other ways, ISC processes show dynamics. The GER-RA case points out that during the ISC process, the increasing focus on a value chain approach and economic effects introduced limitations to the diversity of perspectives that could legitimately and effectively be included in the process. The FR-CFT case shows that ISC did take place in the first phase. ISC was addressed, but there were no concrete actions that integrated environmental, social and economic aspects. In the FR-RPF case, quickly after the first broad ISC and participatory initiatives were taken, the problems were addressed with a mono-sectoral and technical forestry perspective. This case is exceptional though, since it depicts mainly a reaction to an emergency and the ISC decreased along with the emergency.

In the NL-GW and UH cases, an increase of ISC over time was detected. It has to be noted however, that the long historical time perspectives of these cases enabled this observation. An increase of ISC is also described in the NOR-LF case and in the AT-AFD case, where readiness of central actors for ISC increased over time. Since the Norwegian Living Forest programme included totally new actors into forest decisions, this is interpreted as paradigm shift by the case authors.

Also the GR-MA case is interesting in this respect. This case shows a shift of ISC activities from a higher to a lower level in the course of the process. This change resulted in a more democratic intersectoral model at the local level, which also included non-state actors. The development of a spatial policy-making approach which replaced the sectoral approach is described in the German GAK case.

#### *4.3.2.4 Outputs and outcomes*

Given the variety in intentions and aims of ISC and the variety of ISC processes that took place, the important questions to address are: what happened? Did sectors coordinate, were integrated policies formulated, were interests balanced and with what results?

### **Coordination and cooperation**

The observation that different sectors were at a table in a specific governance process does, of course, not necessarily mean that actual coordination or cooperation was achieved.

Sometimes cooperation was ad hoc and temporary. In the FR-RPF case there was some cooperation with the transport sector but after this issue was resolved, ISC stopped. Also in the third phase of the NL-NPPN case, coordination between ministers took place only when necessary to deal with specific issues.

Long lasting cooperation was established in the NOR-LF case. Although defending interests was important throughout the process, this did not hamper actual coordination and cooperation. In the end, a permanent council with equal representation of economic, environmental and social interests was installed.

Some cases show that defending interests stood in the way of real cooperation and that actors lacked a cooperative attitude. In the AT-AFD case, not all sectors had a cooperative attitude and coordination was often limited by actors who defended mono-sectoral interests. The AT-BS case is similar in that respect. Not all actors were active or cooperative and the strategy document that was produced proved to

be little more than a stapled collection of different sectoral chapters, without an integrated, overarching logic.

Also in the ESP-FCGP case, the actual achievements of ISC in terms of cooperation and coordination were rather limited. On the sub national level, sectors were not really committed to working together.

In the NL-UH case, actual cooperation was achieved in the establishment of the national park but only to a limited extent because actors were mostly active in defending their interests, for example by continuing to try building houses. The Utrechts Landschap (a nature conservation organisation) played an active role by trying to mediate between different landowners and other interests. In the project Hart van de Heuvelrug of the NL-UH case, actual coordination is reported. The NL-GW shows similar characteristics. While in the beginning, ISC was restricted by actors primarily oriented towards defending their interests, actual cooperation started within the innovation platform “Sustainable Meierij”, the broadened Groene Woud coalition and in the Reconstruction process.

The GER-IRD, the GER-L+ and the GER-RA cases report that on a national and sub-national level no coordination or cooperation was achieved, in the Leader+ case because of a lack of active participation of certain sectors and a general reluctance to change, while on the regional/local level cooperation was achieved.

Local level coordination was also observed in the GR-MA case study which reports greater engagement of local actors and increasing coordination. Also the ROM-ACP case study reports the achievement of local level cooperation

### **Balancing of interests**

The DEN-NPP case shows that nature conservation and agricultural interests were balanced in the process. Balancing of interests was also very important in the NL-UH case and the NL-GW case. In the Hart van de Heuvelrug project of the NL-UH case, it was clear that balancing was also achieved, although some criticized the dominance of the red sector. Still, defending interests remains a very important strategy in these two cases. Also in the NOR-LF case, balancing interests is emphasized as important.

### **Strengthening a single sector**

The DEN-NPP process included ISC in the sense of balancing and integrating different interests (most notably agriculture and nature conservation). What was achieved in this process was not only a more equal balance between the two interests but as a result also the weakening of the agricultural sector and the strengthening and establishment of nature policy as a separate policy sector. Also in the first and second phases of the NL-UH case, this can be observed. Nature policy was not a strong policy sector and needed to establish itself before further ISC could take place.

In the FR-RPF the ministry of Agriculture was strengthened as the leader of forest issues. After ISC stopped, the ministry of Agriculture took over at the expense of the ministry of Environment. The media attention related to the storms lead to increased recognition of the importance of forestry and arguably to increased financial support to the sector.



## **Integrated policies**

In some cases integrated policies were formulated. Despite critical attitudes of actors regarding ISC, the AT-AFD case documents numerous integrated measures that were developed. Also in the NL-NPPN case, integration was achieved in the sense that a policy document was produced that integrated hitherto separate policy fields of landscape, nature conservation and forest policy.

Some cases explicitly reported failed integration attempts. In the AT-BS case integration failed in the sense, that the produced strategy did not contain an integrated vision and because concrete goals and targets were largely lacking. Also the FR-CFT reported that there were no examples of improved links between environmental protection and conservation and timber production and economy or agricultural and forestry activities at the local level.

In the NL-UH case a spatial plan was produced with some indications of policy integration, but this plan was not developed in an ISC setting. The same holds for the WCL plan in the second phase of the NL-GW case. Stronger signs of integrated policies can be found in the third phase of both cases: in the NL-UH case in the Hart van de Heuvelrug project, because actual areas are being exchanged between green and red owners; in the NL-GW case because several integrated visions and policies were produced. Still, in both cases defending interests has remained important.

## **Changes in attitude**

Several cases showed changes in attitude of the sectoral actors over time as a result of ISC processes. The DEN-NPP case reported that ISC has lead to better understanding of different perspectives and interests. The GR-MA case noted behavioural change and increasing cooperation spirit. The NOR-LF case reported that several actors have gained faith in the benefits of ISC. Significant changes in attitude were also reported for the AT-AFD case.

The AT-BS case reported explicitly that, despite the fact that several ISC measures were formulated, changes in attitude of the actors did not occur. Also the NL-UH case reported scepticism in that respect. Although quite some achievements of ISC were reported in the NL-UH case, it was speculated that actual long lasting changes in attitude did not take place. Although actors accepted their interdependencies, the argument was made that segregation of sectors would start again after stopping ISC attempts.

## **No achievements?**

For the HUN-NFP case, the ROM-NAT case, the DEN-HD case and the GER-GAK case, no achievements of ISC or explicit references to the absence of achievements could be found. From the comparative analysis on these cases so far, it can be concluded that this was the case because in fact there were few such achievements. For the GER-GAK it can be stated that it was actually the intention to have only a symbolic ISC at national level.

### *4.3.2.5 Understanding Intersectoral Coordination*

The cases reported several reasons that explained why things happened as they did. Apart from few exceptions, most cases presented reasons that account for limitations or restrictions in ISC processes and outcomes, rather than reasons that account for

ISC achievements. This makes sense as the relation and differences between actors' intentions and the actual processes and outcomes were the main focus of study. This resulted in deviations or gaps between these intentions, processes and outcomes being explicitly explained, while achievements were implicitly assumed.

### **Strong sectoral tradition and organisation**

The strict sectoral organisation of ministerial departments on a national level was mentioned in many cases as an important factor to explain limitations in ISC processes. No interministerial or national level ISC preceded the AT-AFD and therefore, the project was not well embedded in the national level ministerial departments. A similar observation was made in the German cases. This had two effects: firstly the rhetoric of ISC was still held up high which made it necessary to achieve ISC at regional level and increased the expectations towards this end. Secondly, it at the same time limited the potential for local level ISC and policy integration. Also in the Spanish FPC case, this was observed in the sense that people mentioned that it was very difficult to break habits in the administration.

### **Lack of specifications and instruments for ISC**

The fact that ISC was called for without further specifications of how it should be organized and who should take the lead is an explanation for ISC limitations in the Sp FPC case and the GR-MA case.

### **Lack of cooperative attitude**

Many cases documented a lacking cooperative attitude of participating sectors to explain limited ISC achievements. These cases generally referred to the fact that actors were mostly defending fixed interests and positions instead of really working together. Both Austrian cases, the SP FPC case, the NL-UH case, the GER-L+ case, the DEN-HD case, the NOR-LF case are examples of this. Some cases specifically explain (temporary) ISC limitations by referring to the powerful positions of ministries who hinder ISC efforts. Strategies to slow down the process by state actors in order to maintain control have been reported in the cases GER-L+, Fr FC and AT-BS. In the NOR-LF case ministries did not coordinate well across sector boundaries but eventually left way for the partners to find the specific solutions by withdrawing from hands-on management.

### **Lack of resources and time restrictions**

Quite a few case studies noted that a lack of resources and time available stood in the way of actual cooperation and involvement in ISC processes. It would just take too much time, effort and or knowledge to be able to contribute meaningfully. This was reported in the AT-AFD case, the NOR-LF case, the DEN-NPP case and the GR-MA case.

### **Low political importance**

In some cases, limited ISC processes and outcomes were explained by referring to the low political weight of the issue involved. Sectors just did not find it worthwhile to invest time and effort in these processes and the processes resulted mostly in soft goals and measures.

In the HUN-NFP case, actors outside the forestry sector did not find the topic of forestry very important and therefore, their involvement in ISC processes was limited. Also in the AT-BS case, low political weight was used to explain limited ISC achievements. In this process, it was not possible to formulate strict sanctions or incentives and therefore, the process was not so relevant for many sectors. Furthermore, the goals and measures of the updated strategy did not address responsibilities or target groups. Arguably, something similar was the case in the AT-AFD case. From the start, the forestry dialogue was to contain no new policies and measures and the many intersectoral measures that were observed were all considered to be 'soft' policies. Given the predetermined low political status of the outcome of the process, it is not surprising that only measures with equally low status were formulated.

Interestingly, in the AT-BS case, the low political weight of the process was also used to explain the fact that the strategy does contain (potentially) ambitious targets and measures. Although these measures in principle could have far reaching effects, the participating sectors could agree on them, because they had no formal policy status.

### **Urgency, concreteness or political character of the issue**

In several cases it was observed that when urgent, concrete or political choices needed to be made, ISC processes were either stopped or restricted to national level state actors. The urgency of the problem that had to be solved was an important factor in the FR-RPF to understand why the issues were so quickly defined by the forestry sector in mono-sectoral and technical terms. The importance of a quick solution triggered the definition of an uncomplicated and well structured problem. Related to this are the observations done in the NL-NPPN case where it was stated that because concrete political decisions had to be made about financial and spatial issues, ISC became much more ad hoc, selective and a national interministerial issue. Also in the GER-GAK case this was observed. Non-state actors were excluded because decision making was about political trade offs. In the HUN-NFP case, decision making about budgeting took place in interministerial settings.

### **Other, more important arenas for ISC**

The AT-AFD reported the existence of alternative venues for ISC as an important barrier for ISC. ISC was dealt with in smaller circles in the Austrian system. This made the Forest Dialogue less necessary as a location for ISC.

### **4.3.3 Conclusions**

The previous sections presented a comparative perspective on the intentions of ISC, on the ISC process, on ISC outputs and outcomes and on explanations for (barriers in achieving) ISC.

In the chapter on ISC in a governance context we came up with three expectations on how ISC would be manifesting itself in policy practices, which is in:

- blurring boundaries between sectors and increasing interconnectedness of sectors;
- increasingly informal processes of ISC;

- increasing occurrence of practices in which different sectors, actors and levels participate (combination of participation, multilevel coordination and ISC).

Many cases do indeed show blurring boundaries between sectors and increasing interconnectedness. Based on the case reports and the comparative perspective we can be more nuanced. The majority of cases show these blurring boundaries in terms of ISC intentions of actors in governance processes. These intentions are expressed by actors involved as well as in drafts, plans or paper strategies in which it is stated that cooperation between sectors is a necessity, is of importance, etc.. But it is not only in intentions that ISC is occurring. Also many cases present an interconnectedness of actors from different sectors in governance processes. This especially goes for early stages. In many cases the actors are interacting in committees or commissions which are specifically created for ISC efforts. This leads to the conclusion that ISC characteristics are emerging both in terms of content (actors' ideas, plans or strategies) and organisation (actors from different sectors, organisational structures). At the same time, the cases also show that only in a few cases ISC efforts are institutionalized. Though the project focused on hindrances and barriers far more than on ISC achievements, it can be concluded that ISC practices seldom go beyond intentions and actor involvement. Factors accounting for ISC not to materialize are manifold. We have pointed at the following factors: the presence of strong sectoral traditions, the controlling behaviour of sectorally organized ministries, a lack of ISC specifications and instruments, a lack of cooperative attitude, a lack of resources and time, low political importance of ISC, the urgency, concreteness and political character of an issue, and finally, the presence of other, more important arenas for ISC.

Our second expectation on the increase of informal processes is more difficult to assess. Most cases do not allow for drawing conclusions concerning this topic. There are some clues though, that in some cases interactions taking place outside the traditional, longer existing structures have been important in ISC efforts. Furthermore, some governance processes have seen specific ISC committees or commissions in which rules such as consensus building and the agreement that the outcomes of the process would not be considered as formal policy were important.

Our third expectation stated that increasingly we would witness the occurrence of practices in which different sectors, actors and levels participate. This is to say that ISC is related to participation and multi-level coordination. Many cases do show the emergence of ISC and participation at the same time. The intention to strive for ISC goes hand in hand with the participation of both state and non state actors from different sectors. This is especially the case for early stages of governance processes. In the course of time some ISC processes in which both state and non state actors participated turned out to be the exclusive domain of state actors. Often ISC became an interministerial affair, excluding non state actors. Only in a few cases ISC was a multi-level issue at the same time.

Thus, the expectations have only been met partly. This points to the conclusion that ISC practices are not self evident features of contemporary policy processes. ISC is present to some extent, mostly in terms of actors, in the form of specially created and often temporary structures and foremost in terms of rethorics and intentions.

## 4.4 Democratic and accountable expertise

*Pregernig, M. and M. Böcher*

Science and expertise have long been a political factor in society. Recently, however, the interactions between science and politics have developed new qualities and unprecedented levels of intensity. Especially in a governance context, it can be expected that science and expertise play distinct, new roles that go beyond the mere content-wise input of scientific knowledge in political decision-making processes.

The intense interaction between science and politics evolves from and brings about various social dynamics and challenges which are currently discussed under some of the following headings:

- *Scientification of politics*: As policy issues are becoming more and more complex, science has come to play an increasingly influential role in its contribution to the formulation of policy and regulatory decisions (Mentzel, 1999, Banthien *et al.*, 2003). The demand for scientific expertise is especially strong in questions of environmental and natural resource policy, not least because of the high complexity and long-term character of many environmental problems (Fischer, 2001). As a result of the growing pervasiveness of science-related issues there has been a corresponding increase in the use of expert scientific advice to inform decision-making at all levels of policy-making (Glynn *et al.*, 2003).
- *Politicisation of science*: The increased coupling of knowledge with politics concurrently drives the politicisation of science. Peter Weingart notes that knowledge, as it enters the public arena, is inevitably judged and valued by society. Advisors are selected not only for their knowledge but also for the legitimation that they provide for policies as well as for policy makers and interest groups involved in policy processes. *“The assumption that science is always disinterested and transmits only objective knowledge is obviously a myth. Science has become one of the actors to support [policy makers’] specific interests.”* (Weingart, 2002b: p. 704)
- *Legitimacy crisis of science*: As the use of scientific advice to policy making has increased, so too has the concern over its utility and validity. We witness the paradox of expertise being a resource that is increasingly sought for policy making and for social choice, but one that is also increasingly contested (EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 2001). Science that has traditionally drawn strength from its socially detached position has become too frail to meet the pressures placed upon it by contemporary societies (Jasanoff, 2003). The public discussion and confrontation between experts and counter-experts over the interpretation of scientific knowledge and its consequences are signs of a lack of social and political trust in scientific knowledge (Frederiksen *et al.*, 2001).
- *Call for more “accountable” and “democratic” forms of expertise*: Before the background of the phenomena described above, both scientific scholars and policy makers are asking the question of which role science and expertise should play in democratic decision-making processes. When political norms are replaced by seemingly inherent necessities, politics threaten to be technocratically “regulated away” (Schelsky, 1965, Habermas, 1968). With the erosion of the legitimating function of science in modern societies, reinforced by a general trend towards

making public decisions more accountable and democratic, such technocratic forms of decision-making are commonly dismissed as insufficient. At the moment, however, the proper place of scientific expertise in democratic decision-making is still under – partly contentious – social negotiation.

In resistance to the perceived scientification of politics and the ensuing erosion of the authority and legitimacy of both science and politics, policy-makers at all levels have been calling for more transparent, accountable and democratic forms of scientific expert advice (Bäckstrand, 2004). Especially the European Commission has put great efforts into the “democratisation of expertise.” The “*White Paper on European Governance*” (EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 2001), which is the key document in this reform process, aims “to open up policy-making to make it more inclusive and accountable. A better use of powers should connect the EU more closely to its citizens and lead to more effective policies” (ibid., p. 8). In the White Paper, the European Commission considers the relation between science and society as a crucial area for European governance and it acknowledges the need for more confidence, transparency, and accountability in the use of expertise in policy-making. With the “*Science and Society Action Plan*” (EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 2002) the Commission further intensified its strategy to involve science and scientists in governance processes and to make science more accessible to European citizens. The call for more “accountable expertise” in policy making has also opened up the question of what can be judged as “good practice”. Responding to a commitment made in the White Paper the Commission elaborated a set of “*Principles and Guidelines on the collection and use of expertise by the Commission*” (EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 2003). The declared objectives of these principles and guidelines are to help Commission’s departments at all stages of policy making, to “mobilise and exploit the most appropriate expertise for better policies” and to make “the process of collecting and using expert advice credible” (ibid., p. 2).

The question of how to organise the relationship between science and society in a more democratic way has not only been addressed in the political but also in the scientific realm. In the scholarly literature, the ascendancy of a “participatory paradigm” (Bäckstrand, 2004) has come under various catchwords such as *civic science* (O’Riordan, 1996, Shannon and Antypas, 1996), *citizen science* (Irwin, 1995), *participatory science* (Foltz, 1999), or *democratic science* (Charnley, 2000, Lee and Roth, 2001). In all of those concepts, one of the key criteria is the *democratic legitimation* of science-laden political decisions. The question of democratic legitimation of science influencing the political process is especially discussed against the background of the increasing dependence of political decisions on scientific knowledge: If science is more and more influencing political decision-making then this may result in political decisions lacking democratic legitimacy. So the main question is how to secure democratic procedures even in settings in which the scientification of public policy-making seems to be necessary (Fischer, 2000).

Before the background of the above-mentioned social dynamics and challenges that characterise the interaction between science and politics, the focus of analysis in this chapter will be aligned along two overarching questions:

- (i) What are the roles and functions of (different types of) experts and expertise in the GoFOR governance processes?
- (ii) To what extent does the involvement of experts and expertise in the GoFOR governance cases live up to the normative expectations regarding the “democratisation of expertise” propagated, e.g., in EU policy documents?

As the empirical insights from the GoFOR case studies shall be linked with the general science-policy literature, we will first introduce selected conceptual approaches (in sub-chapter 4.4.1) before coming to the results of the comparative analysis (in sub-chapter 4.4.2). The final sub-chapter (4.4.3) will provide some general conclusions on the role of expertise in governance processes.

#### 4.4.1 Conceptual approaches

The interaction between science and politics can be conceptualised theoretically in a number of ways. In the following, we give a brief overview of the relevant theoretical strands, theories, and models. This overview is not intended to provide a complete list of theories but rather a well-chosen selection. To a certain extent, this review of conceptual models traces the historic development of the field. Therefore, we not only introduce state-of-the-art concepts but also critically evaluate the validity of “older” approaches.

We do not intend to come up with a single comprehensive model of science-policy interaction, which probably is not possible or at least not feasible here. Each of the models introduced below only gives a partial description of the science-policy interface, but by focussing on specific aspects these partial models promise to be more instructive and to be more fruitful in producing substantive research perspectives than a “catch-all” theory. Each of these models should be able to describe some important aspects or phenomena of the relationship between science and natural resources policy we have identified empirically in GoFOR.

##### 4.4.1.1 Knowledge transfer model: Speaking truth to power

The discussion on the role of science and expertise in policy-making, which has been surfacing in waves of varying intensity since the 1960s, was initially dominated by “socio-technological” and technocratic ideas and ideals. One of the classical models built upon this tradition is the so-called “knowledge transfer model.”<sup>50</sup> Under this model expectations for the usefulness of advisory knowledge are high. Scientific expert advice is believed to make a direct contribution to the increased effectiveness and rationalisation of political action (Schuster, 1990, Bröchler, 1999).

The knowledge transfer model is an *ideal type*, both as regards its conceptualisation of how public policies are formulated and how science provides input into policy processes (Stone, 2001). The linear model, as pioneered by Lasswell in the 1950s, depicts policy-making as a problem-solving process that is rational, balanced, objective and analytical. The policy-making process is seen as a series of sequential phases (starting with the identification of a problem or issue, and ending with a series of activities to solve or deal with the problem) during which information is rationally considered by policy-makers (Sutton, 1999, Crewe and Young, 2002).

With policy-making being construed as “problem-solving,” expert participation is seen as essential. Experts are brought into policy processes to impart their unique knowledge and wisdom to policy-makers. Science and politics are linked in a way that could be best described with the phrase “*speaking truth to power*” (Price, 1981).

The knowledge transfer model is built on a number of specific assumptions. First, it is associated with a picture of *spatial separation* between a place of knowledge

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<sup>50</sup> This model is also referred to as the “linear model” (Neilson, 2001, Pielke, 2004) or the “modern model” (Liberatore and Funtowicz, 2003).

production, science, and a place of knowledge use, politics (Nowotny, 1994, Jäger, 1998). Decision-makers and stakeholders are expected to have questions or demands, and scientists are expected to answer these questions or to meet these demands by providing policy-relevant solutions.

Under the transfer model, scientific advice is also conceptualised as the *simple transmission* of ready-made scientific results (Freyend and Haß, 1990, Kuttruff, 1994, critically: Weingart, 1999). First, there is knowledge closure on the side of science, meaning that scientific questions are completely resolved and a finished product is handed over to policy-makers; after that, policies are formulated (“*get-the-facts-then-act model*”) (Pielke, 2004: p. 406).

According to the transfer model, *facts* can (and must) be separated from *values*. Scientists’ role in the collaboration with policy-makers is to present scientific information in the areas of their expertise. The transfer model is based on the assumption that those parts of decision-making requiring specialised knowledge should be depoliticised and left to experts (Wildavsky, 1987, critically: Ezrahi, 1980, Fischer, 2000).

In the light of recent scholarship, the naïve hopes of the cascade-like “*scientification of the non-scientific world*” (Beck and Bonß, 1984: p. 382) turned out to be untenable, both in a theoretical and an empirical perspective. Scientists can no longer – and probably never could – simply do the science and hope that someone else uses the information to make “good policies” (Cortner *et al.*, 1999).

Although the value of the knowledge transfer model as a correct depiction of empirical reality was already questioned at an early stage (e.g. Habermas, 1968), this unilinear approach of science in policy-making to some extent still dominates perceptions among policy-makers and scientists alike (Weingart, 1999, Beck and Bonß, 1995).

#### 4.4.1.2 *Group politics models: Expertise as a power resource for political actors*

While the knowledge transfer model takes a rather “apolitical” look at the role of science and expertise in social and political processes, another set of models, commonly termed “group politics models”, put the focus on the more “political” aspects of the interaction between expertise and politics. In group politics models which are based on public choice theory, policy making is seen as a process of permanent conflict and compromise among different actor groups. Martin and Richards (1995) use the group politics model to describe the role that scientific knowledge plays for political actors and their interests in the policy process. Here, generally, scientific knowledge is just seen as a resource of power for different actors without having an epistemic function. Political actors *use* or even *mis-use* (Krott 2007) scientific knowledge just as an additional power resource for achieving their political goals.

Group politics models follow the classic idea of liberal democracy in which different groups mutually interact in a kind of “political marketplace” in order to influence political decisions (Martin and Richards, 1995). Theories of this group, *inter alia*, focus on how different groups are able to mobilise and use a range of “resources”, including money, political power, supporters, and scientific authority (Renn, 1992) or they analyse the different potentials of special interest groups to organise collective action (Olson 1965).



In group politics approaches, contending groups use scientific knowledge simply as an additional resource to increase their authority or legitimation. The traditional analysis of power accords only an advocacy role to knowledge, or even no role at all. Or, as Claudio Radaelli puts it, knowledge is nothing but a “hook” on which interests hang their case (Radaelli, 1995: p. 173).

In political conflicts, science is often used in a selective way. Competing parties choose advice that supports their own policy choices and overlook advice which does not. Experts are not necessarily neutral and apolitical but are often forced to come to an “arrangement” with those groups that financially support them (Fischer, 1990, Krott, 1989). Decision makers try to use expertise for legitimating their interests and political programmes (Krott, 1999) and, thus, support those scientists which deliver the scientific results which conform to their expectations and beliefs (Schneider, 1989). Political decisions are legitimated *ex post* by making them appear as if they are without a political alternative due to scientific “inherent necessity” (Schneider, 1989).

A very “radical” version of the group politics approach was formulated by David Collingridge and Colin Reeve who posit that the impact of science on policy is negligible because science either encounters an under-critical or an over-critical environment when it is linked to policy: In the *under-critical* model, policy actors are already in agreement with respect to policy goals, thus scientific claims will uncritically be accepted as supporting the pre-existing consensus. In the *over-critical* model, political adversaries are sharply divided and scientific claims are subjected to heightened scrutiny by experts from rival camps, resulting in endless technical debates (Collingridge and Reeve, 1986). In neither case does science play a productive role in decision making. “*All truths are in service to political consensus or disagreement.*” (Guston, 2001b: p. 102)

Other authors conceptualise the interaction between science and politics in a more nuanced way. Sonja Boehmer-Christiansen, for example, outlines a number of different *functions* which scientific knowledge can fulfil in the policy process. Scientific expertise can, *inter alia*, serve as:

- a source of authority and hence *legitimacy* for official actors;
- *justification* for unpopular policies (“greenwash”);
- an instruments of *persuasion* in debates and negotiations (with the parties tending to select the advice that best fits their own interests);
- a mechanism for *delaying* or avoiding action or substituting for action (as conducting more research gains time and passes responsibility to somebody else);
- cover-up for policy change and *scapegoat* (as science may be used to allow politicians to change their minds without losing face or having to admit error) (Boehmer–Christiansen, 1995).

Group politics approaches seem to be of high analytical value in cases where there are different scientific interpretations of what might be the right things to do (Martin and Richards, 1995). In various European countries one can, for example, observe a scientific controversy about the right instruments to stimulate economic growth and to decrease unemployment: One strand of economists suggest reducing taxes for companies and to lower standards in the social security system while another strand of economists ask for higher wages to stimulate overall economic demand. This

scientific debate can be “exploited” by industrial associations as well as by trade unions: Every group uses the scientific knowledge which seems to be most suitable for their goals. The different scientific arguments become a legitimating resource for the different interest groups participating in the policy process (Weingart, 2003).

#### 4.4.1.3 *Boundary models: Contingent demarcation of science from politics*

Although the knowledge transfer model and the group politics model ascribe different roles to science and politics, they still have one thing in common: they largely follow an essentialist tradition distinguishing, in an *a priori* fashion, between politics and science. In both models the question of where the boundary between science and politics is located, of where science ends and where politics begin, is rather unproblematic. The social systems of science and politics are seen as two completely separate, self-referential entities.

In contrast to that, *constructivist* approaches are more sensitive to the difficulties of making analytical distinctions between politics and science. Constructivism argues that what demarcates science from non-science is not some set of essential or transcendent characteristics but rather an array of contingent circumstances and strategic behaviour (Gieryn, 1995, Jasanoff, 1996).

In recent years, there has been a growing body of work dedicated to the analysis of “boundaries” in knowledge-action systems (Gieryn, 1983, Jasanoff, 1987a, 1990b, Guston, 2001a). The theoretical preoccupation with boundaries in knowledge-action systems started out with Thomas Gieryn’s concept of “boundary work”. Boundary work stands for a form of political management of symbolic boundaries between science and non-science, “good” and “bad” science, and “facts” and “opinion.” Gieryn defines boundary work as “*the attribution of selected characteristics to the institution of science (i.e., to its practitioners, methods, stock of knowledge, values and work organization) for purposes of constructing a social boundary that distinguishes some intellectual activity as non-science.*” (Gieryn, 1983: p. 782)

Although initially introduced as a predominantly descriptive concept used to critically analyse the symbolic positioning of science and scientists (Gieryn, 1983, 1995, 1999), boundary work has also found policy-relevant applications, for example, in evaluating different forms of science-policy advice processes (Jasanoff, 1987a, 1990b, Cash and Clark, 2001, Pregernig, 2005, 2007). Those policy-oriented studies show that in the interaction between science and politics, boundaries serve a variety of – sometimes seemingly contradictory – functions. Clearly discernable and undisputed lines of demarcation can protect science from the biasing influence of politics or help to organise and allocate authority. But boundaries can also act as obstacles to communication, collaboration, and integrated action. With boundaries being both a safeguard and barrier their targeted “management” promises to be an effective leverage in linking knowledge to action (Cash *et al.*, 2002).

One of the crucial problems in science-policy advice is how to find the “right” social distance between science and politics (Weingart, 2002a). In the context of knowledge use the cultural spaces of science and politics move close together. So the challenge for scientists and policy-makers is – to use a cartographic picture – to bring science near enough to politics without risking a spillover of one space into the other or creating ambiguity about where the line between science and politics should fall. Gieryn summarises this distance problem by saying that “[o]nly good fences keep politics and science good neighbors.” (Gieryn, 1995: p. 436) Empirical studies show that science-policy advice processes should not go so far as to make the boundary

between science and policy completely arbitrary or even non-existent. This would neither be in the interest of science or politics. The creation of boundaries seems crucial to the political acceptability of advice (Jasanoff, 1990b, Farrell *et al.*, 2001).

Also growing out of the policy-related work on boundaries between science and politics is the identification of *institutions* that facilitate the communication and provide mediating functions across boundaries. David Guston coined the term “*boundary organisations*” for this type of institutions (Guston, 1999). Boundary organisations are hypothesised to perform a variety of functions that facilitate bridging science and policy across levels. Boundary organisations involve the participation of actors from both sides of the boundary, as well as professionals who serve a mediating role. They exist at the frontier of the two relatively different social worlds of politics and science, but they have distinct lines of accountability to each. Boundary organisations draw their stability not from isolating themselves from external political authority but precisely by being accountable and responsive to opposing, external authorities (Guston, 2001a, Cash and Clark, 2001).

Statements on the appropriateness of specific institutional forms of scientific expert advice can, of course, not be generalised to any politico-historical context. The national political culture of a country, its political, legal, and scientific traditions of decision-making, influence the mechanisms and institutions for integrating expertise in the policy arenas (Brickman *et al.*, 1985, O’Riordan and Wynne, 1987, Jasanoff, 1990a, Renn, 1995, Pregernig, 2005). In this context it is interesting to see what “cultural traces” the distinct political patterns of a country leave behind in specific practices of science-policy consultation: What counts as legitimate expertise? Who counts as an expert and how much influence and authority does science hold and how much accrues to other modes of knowing and deciding? How are the contributions of scientists and policy-makers integrated (in a political as well as an cognitive way)? Which roles do non-scientific actors and the public play?

#### 4.4.1.4 *Science and democracy: Towards the accountability of expert knowledge*

A last conceptual perspective on the science-policy interface is not so much driven by a common theoretical approach than rather by a shared political concern that could be paraphrased with the notion of “democratising expertise”. Seen from a normative point of view, the inherent tension between an increasing demand of scientific knowledge for political decision-making, on the one hand, and the urge for securing democratic norms, on the other hand, can be deemed to be critical. If scientific experts and their expertise become too powerful in policy processes then the political decisions might suffer from a lack of democratic legitimacy, because scientific knowledge can “pre-decide” society’s decisions without becoming objects of public deliberation and discourses (Böcher 2008). Therefore many scholars argue that an increase in the influence of expertise on public policy making may result in a loss of democracy.

In the classic *technocratic model* of the science-policy interface, which has been elaborated by the German sociologist Helmut Schelsky, a *scientific* solution can be applied to every political problem, and politics (or ideologies) can be overcome by scientific rationality (Schelsky, 1965): Scientific rationality ultimately replaces democracy. Several of these technocratic models describe a replacement of politics by a scientifically rational administration (Weingart, 2003: p. 60).

In reaction to the technocratic approach, Jürgen Habermas argued that there cannot be a distinct separation between the spheres of scientific experts and political actors

as well as there cannot be a replacement of politics by science (Habermas, 1968). He therefore suggests an understanding of the science-policy interface as a mutually critical relationship in which communication between science and politics becomes the most important aspect. In Habermas' normative pragmatist model, the democratic organization of a public discourse between science and public policy should constitute a society's insurance against the dangers of technocracy. On the one hand, the development of new scientific knowledge would then always be reflected against the background of existing values. On the other hand, political interests would always be examined against the background of the available scientific means and knowledge (Weingart, 2003: p. 61).

In a further step, Habermas developed his model of *deliberative democracy* in which rational discourse forms the basic principle of a democratic society. The possibility of free discourse and mutual communication between scientists, politicians, and citizens has the potential for legitimising democratic rules and institutions. In his later works, Habermas (1996) indeed expressed scepticism vis-à-vis the possibility of citizen participation in all realms of decision making due to the problem of the high complexity of modern societies. Nevertheless, Habermas' model "*best describes the repeated process of problem definition, translating the problem into research projects, and their redefinition against the background of existing knowledge, with the translation of new findings into political decisions*" (Weingart, 2003: p. 61).

For Peter Weingart, the science-policy interface should be understood as a non-linear, recursive communication process in which scientific experts communicate scientific issues and problems to political actors: science helps to define policy problems and contributes to the agenda-setting process, often in collaboration with the media, with politicians asking scientists for advice in finding solutions to these problems (Weingart, 2003). This recursive communication process fulfils the requirements of democratic legitimation due to its embeddedness in public discourses between citizens, experts, and the political actors.

However, even if we understand the relationship of science and public policy as a to a certain degree normatively conceptualised recursive communication process, empirically the tension between the role of professional expertise and the democratic legitimacy of political decisions remains a problem: In Germany for example, there appears to be a tendency to delegate important policy issues to external expert bodies with the aim of deliberating upon critical issues which can lead to a pre-structuring and preliminary decision-making of political debates outside the traditional institutions of democratic policy-making (Blumenthal 2003).

Today, Frank Fischer, whose work is highly inspired by Habermas' thoughts, still claims that "*the tension between professional expertise and democratic governance is an important political dimension of our time*" (Fischer, 2000: p. IX). According to Fischer, a way of organising the transfer of scientific knowledge without running the risk of contributing to a loss of democratic legitimacy must be found. From such a point of view, the role expertise plays in the policy process must always be assessed against the background of existing democratic procedures and rules. In the light of this normative discussion, scientific knowledge transfer should not be organised in a linear technocratic way but the in a way that secures the accountability of expert knowledge against the background of standards of democratic legitimacy.

To reach democratic accountability of expert involvement, for Frank Fischer – despite an increasing demand for scientific knowledge in an "Age of Expertise" – citizen participation is a corner stone of democracy (Fischer, 2000). Focusing on the idea of a democratic foundation (or legitimisation) of expertise, he claims from the view of

post-positivist political science that it is no longer sufficient for experts to deliver technical information for political problem-solving (as expected within the technocratic model). The experts should also combine their privileged knowledge with knowledge about facilitating public deliberation and learning (Fischer 2004: 21). In a programmatic statement Fischer (2004: 21) wrote: “*If experts, acting as teachers and interpreters, could decipher the technological world for citizens in ways that would enable them to make intelligent political judgments, the constitutional provisions designed to advance public over selfish interests could function as originally conceived*”. This type of model calls for regular exchanges between citizens and experts. The instruments of consensus conferences or mediation, for example, which establish a discourse between politicians, experts, and citizens to find political solutions, are a result of these ideas. Although Fischer’s perspective may look “radical” – at least when compared with the traditional image of science in society –, it nevertheless provides interesting insights into actual discussions about the role of science in the modern democratic state. In a way, Fischer tries to dissolve the “paradoxes of science in politics”.

#### **4.4.2 Democratic and accountable expertise in comparative analysis**

After having sketchily depicted various conceptual perspectives on the role of science and expertise in governance processes, this chapter will put an empirical focus on the roles and functions of experts and expertise in the GoFOR governance cases. The analysis will first try to unearth the overall character of expert involvement in the GoFOR cases (sub-chapter 4.4.2.1), and then go in more depth into the questions of what types of experts and expertise are typically involved in governance cases (4.4.2.2), what political functions they fulfil (4.4.2.3), and what makes science and expertise in governance processes accountable and legitimate (4.4.2.4). Finally, the analysis will focus on the question of whether there are discernable temporal trends in the use of expert advice (4.4.2.5).

##### *4.4.2.1 Overall character of expert involvement*

Before coming to the more specific questions of what roles (different types of) experts and expertise have played in the GoFOR governance processes and to what extent the involvement of expertise can be denominated as “accountable” or “democratic”, the involvement of experts in the set of 19 governance cases shall first be characterised on a more general level. In this respect three questions shall be addressed: First, what is the relative weight of experts and expertise in governance processes, i.e. are those processes rather driven by expertise or by politics? Second, how are expertise and politics linked in the course of political decision-making processes, i.e. does politics build on expertise or vice versa? And third, how are expertise and politics institutionally integrated, i.e. are experts part of political bodies or are expert bodies and political bodies strictly separated?

##### **Relative weight of experts and expertise**

In principle, political processes can be located on a theoretical continuum between purely *expert-driven* processes on the one extreme and purely *politics-driven* processes on the other extreme. The GoFOR governance cases fall – as most real-world processes – somewhere in between those two extremes. Most GoFOR cases tend towards the politics rather than the expertise end of the spectrum. None of the cases can be characterized as a purely or even predominantly expert-centred process. But at the same time, experts and expertise played some sort of role in all

the cases. For example, the Norwegian Living Forests process can be seen as a paragon in the use of expertise. Experts of different backgrounds have been involved at different levels throughout the process. Nevertheless, it cannot be called an expert-driven process as it clearly has been a political process with a tug-of-war especially between environmental and economic interests. In this context, experts and expertise have been mobilized for different purposes.

Only few GoFOR cases were explicitly framed as “technical” processes or were otherwise dominated by scientific reasoning. One of the main inspiring principles of the Catalanian General Plan of Forest Policy (FPGP), for example, is that it should be “technical”, what means that it should be based on the best scientific knowledge and the most comprehensive experience available. It was especially the Editor Board which paid attention to ensure technical rigor and coherence over the whole process. At the same time, the elaboration of the General Plan was supported by broad participation of stakeholders (Pecurul *et al.*, 2007).

Regarding its overall character, the formulation and implementation of the Austrian Biodiversity Strategy was also very much influenced by experts and expertise; however, it is fair to say that the whole process was not only expert-driven but was just as well influenced by political factors. While scientists have been well represented in the National Biodiversity Commission (NBC) and the formulation of draft versions of strategy papers was mostly delegated to experts in the National Environmental Agency, discussions in the NBC still have taken more the form of “negotiations” than purely technical exchange of arguments (Nordbeck and Pregernig, 2007).

National Park management in Greece as well as the implementation of the EU Habitats Directive in Denmark and in Romania are also rather expert-centred policy processes. Management and administration of the Greek protected area network is firmly in the hands of public administration with numerous scientific committees and individual experts giving input on science-laden questions (Kassioumis *et al.*, 2007). The great degree of expert involvement in the implementation of the Habitats Directive is mainly attributable to the highly “technical” character of this EU directive (Julien *et al.*, 2000, Alphandery and Fortier, 2001). The main requirement of the directive which is to ensure a favourable conservation status for selected habitats and species obviously cannot be fulfilled without expert involvement. Implementation of the directive not only requires experts on the ecological requirements of species, but also experts regarding legal and administrative issues in order to ensure that measures are appropriate. Therefore the implementation of the Habitats Directive in Denmark and Romania, as in many other European countries, is characterised by extensive use of expertise in the policy process (Boon *et al.*, 2007a; Bancu, 2007).

The majority of GoFOR governance cases can be classified as “*political*” processes where expertise only played a minor role. In the elaboration of the Dutch nature policy plan “Nature for People, People for Nature”, for example, expert input mainly came from within the Dutch Ministry of Agriculture, Nature and Fisheries (LNV) (Turnhout, 2007). In the Danish National Park Pilot Process as well as in Romanian anti-corruption policies formal expertise hasn’t played a significant role, and expert input has been brought in mainly in the form of commissioned studies dealing with rather specific, technical questions (Boon *et al.*, 2007a; Bouriaud, 2007). In the main working bodies of the Austrian and the Hungarian NFP processes also scientists and other experts were represented, but the processes as such were still operating more or less in a *modus operandi* that can be characterized as political deliberation or negotiation. Similarly, also in the two French forest policy cases and in the processes

related to Integrated Rural Development in Germany science and other types of formal expertise played only a rather marginal role.

### ***Linking of expertise and politics in the course of policy processes***

Having seen that in none of the GoFOR governance cases experts and expertise played an outstanding and dominant role but that, on the other hand, all 19 cases left some room for expert involvement, it is interesting to ask how expertise and politics are *sequentially linked* in the course of political decision-making processes. For that, we will draw on a typology by Millstone (2007) who distinguishes a number of ideal-type models of science-policy interaction.<sup>51</sup>

The first model, which came to be known as the “decisionist” model, goes back to the sociologist Max Weber who argued that *“the deliberations and judgments of bureaucrats (and by extension expert advisors) should always be framed by the policy goals and objectives that should be set by politically accountable representatives, rather than by unaccountable officials.”* (Millstone, 2007: p. 486) Here, politicians have the ultimate authority in defining policy whereas experts are confined to selecting the most appropriate means by which the politicians’ goals could be attained, and for their efficient implementation (*“science on tap”*).

In the set of GoFOR case studies a number of processes correspond to a large degree to the classical Weberian decisionist model with policy makers setting political goals and implementation being left to public administrations and their advisory bodies. The implementation of the EU Habitats Directive, which is addressed in three GoFOR cases, is almost by definition following a decisionist model logic. The designation of Natura 2000 sites in Denmark and Romania and the revamping of the Greek national park management structure were clearly driven by politics, to be specific, by EU obligations to implement the Natura 2000 regime at national levels. As an implementation of this obligation, there have been expert bodies created in all three countries to rigorously pursue the objectives.

The Danish National Park Pilot Process, which aimed at identifying options for establishing national parks in Denmark, is another example for a decisionist setup. The process was initiated by the Minister of Environment who sketched out rough guidelines for the organisation of the pilot projects to the counties and municipalities. The subsequent local processes were marked by extensive participation of landowners and other local stakeholders, but also expert knowledge was attributed a significant role (Boon *et al.*, 2007b).

Finally, the process around the French Territorial Forestry Charters (CFTs) can be seen as a special kind of role model for decisionism as here state actors were complemented by non-state actors to set the political guidelines for subsequent “technical” implementation. In the creation of this new policy instrument as well as in the initiation of specific CFTs, political aspects have been dominant with politicians and timber producers (and their representatives) driving the processes. In the implementation phase different types of expertise were mobilized, e.g. traditional forest specialists’ expertise, local actors’ insider knowledge, and scientific expertise (both from ecological and social sciences) (Buttoud and Kouplevatskaya-Yunusova, 2007).

In the science-policy literature the decisionist model is typically contrasted with the

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<sup>51</sup> Some of the models described by Millstone (2007) will not be taken up here as they are solely applicable in a risk management context.

“technocratic” model in which scientific rationality is (or in a normative reading: should be) the guiding principle for political decisions. Responsibility for policy-making should be assigned to experts, since only they possess relevant knowledge and objectivity (Millstone, 2007). Here, politicians are the agents of the scientific community; their responsibilities are confined to recruiting the best experts, and following their advice (“*science on top*”).

At first sight, no example of a pure technocratic model can be found in the set of GoFOR case studies. This might be attributable to the fact that technocratic ideas and ideals are hardly ever called for or even explicitly spelled out in the political discourse. Millstone, however, notes that “[n]owadays, *explicit and enthusiastic endorsements are rarely articulated by policy-makers or by policy analysts, but whenever policies are represented as if based on, and only on, ‘sound science’ then technocratic assumptions are implicitly being relied upon.*” (Millstone, 2007: p. 488)

But also measured against this more differentiated perspective, GoFOR cases provide little evidence for technocracy. In some cases, like for example the implementation of Natura 2000, we see a rather strong influence of experts, but the setup is still far from genuine technocracy since experts rarely have other resources than their knowledge to convince policy makers (Boon *et al.*, 2007a) and since the problem framings of scientists are – often fiercely and successfully – contested by alternative problem framings of societal stakeholders.

While the decisionist model and the technocratic model are mainly built on normative arguments a third ideal-type model has its roots in empirical observations, namely those of the US American risk management system of the late-20<sup>th</sup> century. Millstone calls this model “inverted decisionism” as here the roles of experts and politicians are interchanged. After experts set goals, “*responsibility would pass downstream to policy-makers to decide how best to implement the advice of the scientists, taking account of non-scientific factors such as the costs of alternative courses of actions, and the ways different groups of protagonists might respond to policy signals and/or regulatory requirements.*” (Millstone, 2007: p. 493)

One GoFOR case, the Hungarian NFP process, shows some characteristics of inverted decisionism, insofar as political decision making was preceded by an expert-centred deliberation phase. This policy formulation phase was marked by an interplay of expert-level discussions (supported by commissioned expert studies) and public discussion fora. Altogether, deliberations in the formulation phase proceeded on a rather “technical” level. When the process entered the decision-making phase, political and financial issues came to the fore. This second phase also became institutionally separated from the first phase with government bodies and the Parliamentary Sub-Committee for Forestry taking the lead. In the subsequent policy implementation phase, the Forest Programme lost much of its political clout and now is partially stalled because of lack of funding. In retrospect, it can be seen that the inverted decisionist model didn’t play out successfully in this case. Expert-led deliberations achieved a broad consensus on forest policy goals, but when those goals had to be reaffirmed and financially bolstered by political bodies this technical consensus began to crumble (Mészáros *et al.*, 2007).

### **Institutional integration of expertise and politics**

A third aspect relevant to describe the overall character of expert involvement in the GoFOR governance cases is the institutional integration of expertise and politics. Basically, expert advice processes can be located on a theoretical continuum



between experts being fully part of political bodies, on the one hand side, and expert bodies and political bodies being strictly separated, on the other hand side. The first model, which could be called the “*integration model*,” builds on multipartite bodies (made up of scientists and policy-makers) that are capable, simultaneously, of negotiating differences regarding scientific and political questions. The second model, which could be named the “*separation model*,” makes great effort to divide “technical” issues from “political” ones. Here typically, “expert working groups” focus on the former while “policy groups” deal with the latter (Farrell *et al.*, 2001, Pregernig, 2004). In real-world processes often a mixture of the two models can be found.

In the set of GoFOR governance cases the integration of science and expertise into policy processes resembles more the integration model than the separation model. In most processes one finds “mixed” bodies in which policy makers, administrative officers, interest group representatives, and scientists sit side by side without a clear separation of roles.

The Austrian National Biodiversity Commission (NBC) is one example of such a mixed body. In the NBC, the role of scientists has not been exclusively restricted to providing expert inputs while also policy makers (in the widest sense) have contributed to the knowledge base on which negotiation processes could build upon. Features of the separation model can only be found in those instances where external experts were consulted on a temporary basis. Their contributions were typically more or less restricted to providing content-wise input on a specific topic and, after that, leaving the deliberations and negotiations on the actual text of the strategy to the ordinary members of the NBC (Nordbeck and Pregernig, 2007).

In Greek National Park management, one finds consultation bodies with mixed membership at the national, the regional and the local level. The National Scientific Natura 2000 Committee, which is responsible for improving the administration of the Natura 2000 network, is made up of representatives from six ministries, six academics with biological scientific backgrounds, and two representatives from NGOs. In the individual parks, Park Boards are typically composed of 7 to 11 members representing a variety of stakeholders including local interest groups, NGOs, public administrators, as well as scientists. This composition suggests a spirit of accountability both to the scientific community and the political decision-making system (Kassioumis *et al.*, 2007).

In the Catalanian General Plan of Forest Policy the main coordinating function was taken over by the Editor Board. The Board is composed of representatives from the Technological Forest Centre of Catalonia, the private Centre for Forest Property, and the Undersecretary of Forests and Biodiversity. The head of the Undersecretary coordinated the work of the team; he also tried to connect the technical work of the team with political agendas and processes (Pecurul *et al.*, 2007).

Mixed consultation bodies in which scientists and other experts cooperated “at arm’s length” with political actors can also be found in a number of other GoFOR governance cases, e.g. the French “Relief Plan for Forests”, the Dutch nature policy plan “Nature for People, People for Nature”, the Austrian Forest Dialogue, and the Hungarian National Forest Programme.

In only a few cases experts were kept in a more peripheral position. In the Danish National Park Pilot Process, for example, scientific experts were deliberately kept out of the political process and only their results, in the form of technical reports, were used as input in the pilot projects. In one instance, expert input was even deliberately

ignored: When a report about biodiversity came up in the middle of the process, showing that the chosen pilot projects were not optimal from a specific biodiversity perspective, this information was deliberately set aside by most stakeholders, including the Danish Society of Nature Conservation (Boon *et al.*, 2007b).

Similarly, in the Norwegian Living Forests process expert input and even genuine research have played an important role, but at the same time, scientists have not been part of the actual political negotiations at the table. In the first phase of the process, environmental NGOs insistently called for more intensive and more formalized input from the scientific community. With that, they probably hoped to create a kind of counter weight to forestry interests which very much controlled the Living Forests process at that time. In 1996, a Scientific Committee was actually set up. But even though the committee formally was part of the process its mandate remained vague and the resources allocated to the committee were scarce. Those two factors prevented the committee to play an independent and substantial role. The committee had a limited impact on the actual negotiations and was not set up again in the second phase of the process (Ouff *et al.*, 2007).

#### 4.4.2.2 *Types of experts and expertise*

One of the key tenets of new governance processes is that new, often non-state actors are involved in policy making. This tendency towards the pluralisation of policy networks can probably also be seen in the involvement and role of experts and expertise. Some of the theoretical approaches discussed in chapter 4.4.1 above make explicit reference to the notion of the “pluralisation of expert involvement”. This can be seen most markedly in the fact that “experts” who are involved in governance processes are not always and not only perceived to be scientists in a narrower sense. Newer approaches allow for other sources of expertise as well, i.e. one sees a kind of pluralisation of expertise that no longer is limited to *scientific* expertise alone but is also identified against the concrete background of a special political process or a public policy. For example, in boundary work models (see chapter 4.4.1.3), the question of who the experts are is also a question of political management of symbolic boundaries between science and non-science. A clear distinction between expertise and politics can hardly be made. In the more normative approaches this pluralisation of expertise is especially discussed in connection with the accountability of expert knowledge (see chapter 4.4.1.4). Frank Fischer, e.g., sees expert involvement in political processes typically as a cooperative enterprise between experts and citizens. Other scholars take this approach one step further by thematizing “new modes of knowledge production” in general. Emphasis is put on knowledge that is generated beyond traditional disciplinary and sectoral borders in heterogeneous forms and by a plurality of different actors who are not necessarily just scientists. In such approaches the production of knowledge is no longer only the result of scientific relevance but is also steered by anticipating the potential applications in (political) practice (Hirsch-Kreienstein, 2003). Such new forms of knowledge production are frequently characterized as “mode 2” knowledge (Gibbons *et al.*, 1994). In mode 2, “pure” science is no longer the only thinkable source of problem solutions; rather the consideration of potential application contexts and the involvement of the expertise of different actors and practitioners can help to find scientifically based and practically applicable problem solutions. In these concepts the production of expertise as reaction to society’s problems is a question of a good combination between scientific knowledge and practitioners’ knowledge since both sources of expertise are necessary to produce useful knowledge for societies.

In the set of GoFOR case studies, a variety of different sources of expertise have been mobilised and different types of experts have been involved. Table 18 shows the types of experts and expertise that could be found in the GoFOR governance cases.

**Table 18: Types of experts and expertise as observed in GoFOR case studies**

Types of experts and expertise
(i) expertise of university scientists
(ii) expertise of private research institutes
(iii) expertise of public research institutes
(iv) expertise of interest groups
(v) expertise of private consultants
(vi) expertise of “ordinary citizens” (local knowledge)

### **(i) Expertise of university scientists**

In many cases traditional expert input by university scientists has been identified. For example, in the Austrian Biodiversity Strategy process scientists of various Austrian universities have been involved in the work of the key body, i.e. the National Biodiversity Commission. In a similar way, in the Norwegian Living Forests process university scientists have been quite heavily involved. Another example is Germany, where in “*Regionen Aktiv*” universities have participated in the evaluation procedure of this rural development program (Giessen and Böcher, 2007). Altogether it seems that traditional scientific expertise, largely represented by scientists working in universities, is still quite relevant in new modes of governance too.

### **(ii) Expertise of private research institutes**

A second source of expertise is input by private research institutes. The Norwegian Living Forests program is once again an example for a governance process where private research institutes played a prominent role. This is also the case in the German integrated rural development program “*Regionen Aktiv*”, where two private research institutes built the national network unit and provided a lot of conceptual knowledge to the relevant ministry and the different rural regions participating in the program.

### **(iii) Expertise of public research institutes**

Public research institutes also played a certain role in a number of GoFOR cases. In the Austrian National Biodiversity Strategy process, experts from the Federal Environmental Agency (UBA) which is the expert authority of the federal government for environmental protection and environmental control were quite intensively involved in the formulation and implementation of the Biodiversity Strategy. It was, in fact, UBA experts who prepared the text drafts of the two strategy documents and the Action Plan on Alien Species on behalf of the NBC (Nordbeck and Pregernig, 2007). Public research institutes also participated in the Norwegian Living Forests program.

#### **(iv) Expertise of interest groups**

In a number of GoFOR cases also interest groups provided expert input. For example, in the Norwegian Living Forest process a large number of interest groups were involved and the persons representing those interest groups typically were highly skilled and knowledgeable in their field. In addition to that, the delegates were representing the knowledge of their entire organisations and could draw on their members' expertise (Ouff *et al.*, 2007).

In some governance cases, interest group representatives provided what could be called "counter-expertise", i.e. expertise which is contradicting and challenging the expertise supplied by "official" state bodies or administration concerning. This was the case in France, where WWF and its experts published two booklets expressing their views on the way the forest reconstitution should be carried out in order to guarantee a minimum of sustainability of the forest (e.g. deadwood, diversity of species) (Buttoud and Kouplevatskaya-Yunusova, 2007). In the Austrian NBC, especially representatives of environmental NGOs sometimes had different perspectives on biodiversity conservation than representatives from public authorities and economic interest groups.

#### **(v) Expertise of private consultants**

Another type of expert input is facilitated by the work of private consultants. In France, CEMAGREF, a research institute actively specializing on land and water management questions, was contracted by the Ministry of Agriculture to carry out an evaluation of the CFT program on a national level. In Austria, briefly after the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) had been signed, the Federal Ministry of Environment, Youth and Family Affairs commissioned an external private consultant to produce a report on the state of implementation of the CBD's goals in Austria. It was the critical results of this report which, in the end, led to the initiation of the National Biodiversity Strategy process in 1997 (Nordbeck and Pregernig, 2007).

In some governance cases, the contracting of private consultants seems to have served as a kind of link between "science" and "practice". This was, for example, the case in Germany where private consultants (which are perceived as scientifically grounded) provided for a link between scientific studies on and practical implementation of rural development policies.

Private consultancy seems to play a special role in new modes of governance due to two main reasons: First, new policy programs are frequently combined with special evaluation needs; consequently, private consultants are assigned the role of state-independent, "neutral" observers. Second, private consultants are perceived to be able to advise state actors in a more "practitioners' oriented" way than university experts are since private consultants are more familiar with the needs of the practitioners than academia (Giessen and Böcher, 2007).

#### **(vi) Expertise of "ordinary citizens" (local knowledge)**

In line with the concept of "mode 2" knowledge, depicted above, also input of expertise provided by ordinary citizens ("local knowledge") has been found in some GoFOR cases. In the Dutch Groene Woud project, local organizations which have a lot of on-site ecological expertise played an important role. In the German rural development philosophy of the Ministry for Food and Agriculture the importance of expertise from rural citizens was explicitly mentioned in the guidelines for integrated rural development. Successful rural development should be reached by a

combination of different sources of knowledge including knowledge from local people (Giessen and Böcher, 2007).

The set of GoFOR case studies, however, also provided examples to prove the opposite, i.e. the deliberate neglect of lay knowledge. While, for example, in the formulation and implementation of biodiversity policies in a number of European countries, like e.g. the United Kingdom, the expertise of local organisations (like local chapters of nature conservation associations) or lay people (e.g. so-called “amateur naturalists”) played an important role, the Austrian Biodiversity Strategy process did almost completely without lay expert input although there are quite some lay monitoring activities going on in Austria. With that, the NBC can be said to have some sort of “elite bias” (Nordbeck and Pregernig, 2007).

The examples given above strikingly indicate that in many governance processes expertise plays an important role but that expert input is far from restricted to traditional scientific expertise; expertise is rather provided by a diverse set of sources and actors. At the same time, the GoFOR case studies have given proof that there is, once again, no single model or pattern of expert involvement in policy processes. While in some processes expertise was mainly provided by state actors, in other processes civil society actors came to the fore.

#### 4.4.2.3 Political functions of experts and expertise

Science and expertise can fulfill various *functions* in governance processes. In different theoretical frameworks on the science-policy interface different functions are accentuated. In principle, one can identify three broader strands of conceptual models: linear transfer models, group politics models, and deliberative models.

- Linear knowledge transfer models (as described in chapter 4.4.1.1 above) build on the assumption that scientific expertise primarily serves to help resolve political and societal problems, i.e. expertise can and does perform a political *problem solving function*. Technocratic approaches go even one step further by assuming that increased use of expertise can more or less overcome a political tug-of-war. Here, expertise not only helps but rather *equals* political problem solving.
- Group politics models (as introduced in chapter 4.4.1.2 above) take a more “political” look at the role of science and expertise in social and political processes. From this theoretical perspective, expert input is mainly serving the interests of political actors. Expertise is nothing but a *power resource for political actors* who try to realize their interests by using appropriate – and from their perspective “useful” – expertise.
- A third strand of theories takes a middle position between the naïve hopes of linear transfer models and the to some extent cynical view of group politics models. They emphasize that scientific experts are one but not the only source of knowledge production for and in political processes. In their search for problem solutions political actors typically can choose between different sources of knowledge, be it scientific experts or be it consultants, agency staff or sometimes even lay people. In tight connection with this notion of a more “pluralistic knowledge field”, the question of how knowledge *diffuses* into society comes into focus. Knowledge utilization models point to the fact that the use of scientific findings typically does not come in the form of instrumental but rather in the form of *conceptual* use. Carol H. Weiss (1980) coined the term “knowledge creep” to describe the way in which

research findings and more often abstract concepts or ideas gradually spread, enter into use, and sometimes become the conceptual framework of entire policy debates (“percolation”). In this way, expertise fulfils a kind of *discursive* function as being part of societal deliberation processes in which social actors deliberate upon new policy ideas or new knowledge and its utilization in politics. Hence, expertise is not a source of knowledge that can be applied directly, but it plays an important role in public discourses about potential political problem solutions.

In the set of GoFOR governance case studies, all of the different types of functions of expertise addressed in the three above-mentioned strands of theory could be found. In some instances, expertise seems to have served purely as a power resource without having any epistemic function, in other instances, expertise-based knowledge could actually contribute to find better political solutions, while, eventually, expertise sometimes also played a key role in generating and propagating new policy ideas.

Building on the theoretical approaches above, the following empirically derived typology of functions of experts and expertise in governance processes can be developed:

- Experts as **(co-)producers of dominant discourses** (“schools of thought”): By introducing innovative concepts or general approaches, experts can lay the foundations for or push ahead a governance process.
- Experts as **initiators** and driving forces in the early phases of governance processes: Experts can act as kind of “policy entrepreneurs” who generate, design, and implement innovative ideas in the public domain.
- Experts as **consultants on process-related questions** or **evaluators of policies**: Experts sometimes perform special organizational or procedural tasks in governance processes, like e.g. the development of a code of conduct, the moderation of working group sessions, or the evaluation of the whole process.
- Experts as **producers of content-wise knowledge**: Experts can also fulfill the function that the classical transfer model attributes to them, i.e. giving content-wise input into policy processes.
- Experts as **builders of political consensus** that serves as basis for negotiation processes: By serving as mediators or idea and interest brokers experts’ knowledge can contribute to overcome conflicts of interest between different political actor groups leading, in the end, to consensus-oriented deliberations.
- Experts as **creators of arguments and counter arguments**: Experts can provide political actor groups with “suitable” political arguments to make their point in political deliberations.

Table 19 gives illustrative examples of where those functions could be found in the GoFOR governance case studies. The list of examples given is not exhaustive but it still should give the reader a rough picture of how broad the use of expertise in governance processes can be.

**Table 19: Functions of experts and expertise as observed in GoFOR case studies**

Functions	Empirical evidence in GoFOR cases
Experts as (co-)producers of dominant discourses	GER-IRD: experts played a key role in developing and propagating the overall discourse on “integrated rural development” as a “policy idea” AT-AFD: the general concept of “national forest programmes” (NFP) was partially stimulated by experts’ arguments
Experts as initiators and driving forces in the early phases of governance processes	DEN-NPP: an expert committee ( <i>Wilhelmudvalget</i> ) set forward recommendations for national park areas to be established, prior to the pilot project process was initiated HUN-NFP: forestry scientists played a key role in bringing the idea of developing an NFP in Hungary on the political agenda AT-BS: a series of four workshops organized by the Federal Environmental Agency and WWF Austria in 1996 appears to have initiated further activities around the CBD in Austria
Experts as consultants on process-related questions or evaluators of policies	HUN-NFP& ESP-FPGP: scientific experts were involved in the overall design of the process and acted as overall coordinators and organizers AT-AFD: experts were involved in formulating the code of conduct for the dialogue process and, later, also served as co-moderators in working group sessions DEN-NPP: consultants designed and facilitated the participation process  AT-BS, FR-RPF, GER-L+, GER-RA, & NOR-LF: experts were involved in carrying out evaluations of the setup and/or outcomes of the respective processes
Experts as producers of content-wise knowledge	all cases
Experts as builders of political consensus	NOR-LF: it seems that the main purpose of the use of expertise in the Living Forests process was to create a common and legitimate point of departure for consensus preceding the actual negotiations HUN-NFP & ESP-FPGP: a <i>status-quo</i> analysis carried out by university scientists provided the basis for process design and the identification of further steps AT-BS: a study commissioned in the forefield of the elaboration of an Action Plan facilitated the political negotiations on this Action Plan GR-MA: Special Environmental Studies which had to be elaborated for each National Park in Greece served as the basis for subsequent participation processes
Experts as creators of arguments and counter arguments	NOR-LF: expertise was also used as a tool for different interests to argue their case (esp. between forestry and nature protection interests)

When looking at the illustrative examples in Table 19 it is striking to see that part of the functions described are not unique to new governance processes but can probably also be found in “classical” political processes. So the key question is whether there are any functions that experts and expertise tend to fulfil exclusively or

at least predominantly in governance settings? Based on the set of GoFOR case studies it is hard to answer this question because the GoFOR research design didn't include contrasting "non-governance processes". A few general observations can still be made.

It is safe to say that there is not *the one* function that experts and expertise play in governance processes but (i) different types of experts fulfil a variety of cognitive, strategic and symbolic functions; and (ii) the set of functions found within one governance process varies from case to case.

One aspect that seems to be somewhat conspicuous for new governance processes is the heightened importance of process reviews in and evaluations of governance processes and the key role that experts play therein. In a number of GoFOR case studies, experts were contracted as consultants on process-related questions or evaluators of policies. A possible reason for that could be that policy makers strive to legitimate their policies by including external, "neutral" authorities, and science seems to be perfectly apt to symbolize this neutrality. Rather than supporting efficient and rational decision making, evaluations (also) serves as an important symbol of acceptability, indicating transparency and administrative willingness to learn and, thus, being central to the legitimation of state actors (Power, 2000).

What is also worth mentioning is that the "cognitive function" of expertise, i.e. experts providing relevant knowledge to policy makers, still seems to be quite relevant in new governance processes as well. In almost all case studies, experts gave content-wise input in one or the other form, be it in written reports, in hearings, or in actively participating in expert bodies. So, one can conclude that experts' function as knowledge providers is far from being replaced by other, more "politicized" functions. One rather sees a differentiation of multiple functions that become (more or less) relevant in one and the same governance process.

#### 4.4.2.4 *Accountability and legitimation of experts and expertise*

Discussions on the role of science and expertise in politics have frequently been framed along the question of how to link expert knowledge and political decision-making in the most effective way. Under the dictum of "*evidence-based policy-making*," reform-oriented political or administrative bodies (such as the European Commission, the British Labour Government, or the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, just to name a few) have recently launched a wide-range of ambitious initiatives to strengthen the use of evidence in public policy and practice (Davies *et al.*, 2000, Sanderson, 2002, Nutley *et al.*, 2003).

The call for more "evidence-based policy-making" is, however, not generally and unanimously supported. Bolstering the role of science in politics creates inherent tensions between professional expertise and democratic governance. Frank Fischer insistently notes: "*Democracy's emphasis on equality of citizenship, public opinion, and freedom of choice exists in an uneasy relationship with the scientific expert's rational, calculating spirit.*" (Fischer, 2000: p. ix) Fritz Scharpf points out that in democratic societies, "output legitimacy", i.e. acceptance due to the positive outcomes of a political decision, is increasingly linked to "input legitimacy", i.e. acceptance due to fair procedures (Scharpf, 1997, 1999). Similarly, Bernstein (2004) emphasises that "*legitimacy concerns a judgement of appropriateness determined by the values of the relevant audience, not because efficiency per se produces legitimacy.*" To be legitimate, un-elected institutions such as Supreme Courts, central banks but also scientific advisory bodies require transparent decision-making and



reasoning. Civil society appears less willing to simply allow authority to move to technical experts by default. “*No democratic society accepts the legitimacy of discarding democratic processes in favour of efficiency.*” (Bernstein, 2004: p. 7) From this perspective, “evidence-based policy-making” could even be seen as a form of “technocratisation in disguise”.

In resistance to the perceived scientification of politics and the ensuing erosion of the authority and legitimacy of science and politics, both scientific scholars and policy makers have been calling for more transparent, accountable and democratic forms of scientific expert advice. As described in the introduction to this chapter, especially the European Commission has put great efforts into the “democratisation of expertise” (EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 2001, 2002, 2003).

In the following, we will try to answer two questions: (i) how accountable and legitimate was the integration and use of expertise in the GoFOR governance case studies and (ii) what special democratic qualities made expertise accountable and legitimate? In our analysis, the democratic qualities of expert involvement in politics will be operationalised with a broad set of criteria, including the balanced representation of different types of expertise, the degree of accessibility and understandability of expert knowledge, the transparent and unbiased selection of experts, as well as the relation to state institutions.

### **Balanced representation of different types of expertise**

A first important criterion touches upon the question of whether in a political process different types of expertise are mobilized and used in a rather balanced way or whether there is a strong dominance of one type of expertise while other types of expertise are depreciated. The set of GoFOR governance cases provides evidence for both patterns: the relative domination of one type as well as the rather balanced use of different types of expertise.

The Austrian Forest Dialogue (AFD) is a good example for the first pattern. Expertise – if it was mobilized at all – was mainly called for and brought in by forest scientists or by other experts from forestry or forest industry. Other disciplinary perspectives didn’t play too prominent a role (Hogl and Kvarda, 2007). This is partly due to the fact that forest policy historically has been perceived as a rather “technical” policy field with expertise being concentrated largely within the forestry profession (Glück, 1992). This tendency has probably been amplified by a social phenomenon known as “Green Pillarization” (“*Grüne Versäulung*”). Green pillarization aims at uniting the “pillars” of the forestry sector, i.e. the forest bureaucracy, private forest owners’ associations, and forestry science, into a single bloc with conflicting interests equalised and with all forestry actors pursuing a common goal (Pleschberger, 1989, Pregernig, 1999). Expertise has always played an important integrative role in this “green” sector network. With its strong focus on forestry expertise, the Austrian Forest Dialogue, despite its numerous innovative aspects described above, more or less reproduced traditional patterns, at least as regards the mobilization of expertise.

Similar patterns can be seen in the case of anti-corruption policies in the forestry sector in Romania. When expert knowledge is called upon, policy makers principally fall back on the traditional “forestry academe”, represented especially by the Academy of Agriculture and Forest Sciences and the National Forest Research and Management Planning Institute. Their expertise is used to justify regulatory policies. The other participants in the process have not yet been able to present “counter

expertise” to attest that the solution proposed is not the only viable option (Bouriaud, 2007).

In other GoFOR case studies, expertise was brought into governance processes in a more balanced way. A good example for that is the Austrian Biodiversity Strategy process. Here, different types and sources of expertise have been used in a rather unbiased way, i.e. one sees no dominance of one type of expertise (like: ecological expertise) and the depreciation of other types. This is probably due to various factors: First, the Convention on Biological Diversity uses a rather broad notion of “conservation”, including the “sustainable use” of biodiversity. Second, the Austrian Biodiversity Commission, as the key driving force of this strategy process, has been set up as a very broad, pluralistic body. Regular NBC members, who are to be considered as important source of expertise as well, have come from a range of institutional backgrounds (like federal ministries, provincial governments, interest groups, as well as research organizations). When having to fall back on additional, external expertise the Commission typically tried to include a broad spectrum of experts. However, the spectrum of expertise typically only refers to different thematic areas or disciplines (like botany, zoology, or ecology) and not to different “schools of thought” in the sense of “expertise” and “counter-expertise” (Nordbeck and Pregernig, 2007).

Some GoFOR case studies document an interesting change in the role of different types of expertise in the course of time. In Dutch nature policy, for example, one sees three distinct phases which can be accounted for in each of the three Dutch case studies: (i) the dominance of agricultural expertise after World War II; (ii) the supremacy of ecological expertise in the 1980s and 1990s; and (iii) a pluralisation of expertise in recent years. In the first phase, technical knowledge which supports agricultural interests and positions was dominant. With growing public concern that agricultural processes are detrimental for natural and landscape values, ecological knowledge gained in importance. Although initiated by a more value laden argument, this type of knowledge had a predominantly technical character as well. Only in recent years, other types and sources of knowledge were recognized as important (Arnouts *et al.*, 2007). The policy document “Nature for people, people for nature”, for example, was heavily influenced by new ideas on nature and nature policy. The dominance of ecological science knowledge was problematised and opened up. Social scientific knowledge about the societal importance of nature and about the broad spectrum of peoples’ wishes for nature (incl. “lay knowledge”) informed policy processes from the beginning (Turnhout, 2007).

A similar picture can be seen in German agricultural and rural development policies. This policy field was dominated by expertise from the agricultural sector for a long time. Recent changes in the political environment, including a change of government from a conservative-liberal to a “red-green” government coalition, several food crises in Europe (esp. the outbreak of BSE and FMD), and the development of EU structural policies, opened up the policy field for new policy actors as well as for new kinds of expertise. Studies commissioned to “alternative” research institutes, the involvement of expertise from NGOs, and scientific expertise more or less unconnected from agrarian agendas began to play an increasingly important role in a policy field which was no longer perceived as (just) “agricultural policy” but rather framed by the concept of “Integrated Rural Development”. What is also noteworthy in this case is that, especially in the LEADER+ program, one not only sees a

diversification of expert input but also a kind of “pluralisation of the demand side”. Under LEADER+, the circle of *addressees* of expert advice has broadened with expertise not only being provided to national-level policy makers but also to local level and non-state actors. In recent years, one can identify an ensuing “pluralisation on the supply side”, where former “addressees” in the new sense (i.e. Local Action Group members or managers) now are requested to share their expertise (Giessen and Böcher, 2007).

A trend towards pluralisation can also be found in Norwegian forest policy. Forest policy in Norway was traditionally heavily dominated by “pure” forest expertise. Also in the Living Forest process forest professionals played a key role. The Living Forests secretariat, for example, was staffed by undoubtedly skilled personnel, but most of them were foresters. In the course of the process the question arose: What scientists have the most credibility? This topic was mainly addressed by environmental NGOs who pointing to the fact that few biologists were deeply involved in the process. In recent years, the use of expertise in the Norwegian forestry sector has broadened and new knowledge has entered the scene. The general impression is that the Living Forests process has added to and maybe accelerated this trend (Ouff *et al.*, 2007).

The two French GoFOR case studies deviate from the patterns described above insofar as they do not show linear developments (here: from narrow to broader expert involvement) but rather give evidence for a kind of “pendular movement”. Historically, French forest management and policy showed strong dominance of technical expertise, with the National Forest Service (ONF) having been considered as the only rationalistic basis for decisions. With the Relief Plan for the Reconstruction of the Forests (RPF) and the Territorial Forestry Charters (CFT) this situation changed, at least temporarily. In the direct aftermath of the catastrophic storms of December 1999, the problem, as well as its possible solutions, was framed in a rather comprehensive way, i.e. seeing the Relief Plan not only as a “mission for forestry” but rather as a broad societal challenge. Consequently, new types of expertise, especially those addressing economic, social, and political facets of the problem, were in dire need. At this early stage, also studies on the possible causes of the storms and on their ecosystemic effects were commissioned, mainly mobilising ecological expertise. In 2002, when the immediate crisis situation was overcome, the conventional technical forestry expertise came to the fore again and ONF could, once more, impose its technical priorities. A similar pattern can be seen in the CFT process. The introduction of the new policy instrument of CFTs brought a wider view on forest management, including ecological, economic and social aspects, and, consequently, a more comprehensive involvement of different types of expertise. In the implementation of individual Charters, traditional forestry expertise often came out on top again (Buttoud and Kouplevatskaya-Yunusova, 2007)

### **Accessibility and understandability of expert knowledge**

The degree to which expert input into political decision making processes is perceived as accountable and legitimate not only hinges on the balanced representation of different types of expertise, but also the question of how easily expert knowledge is accessible and understandable for a policy and lay audience is assumed to play an important role. In the set of GoFOR case studies, the degree of accessibility, openness and transparency of expert advice varied remarkably.

In the case of German rural development policies, all the reports of the accompanying research were freely available via internet. Some important milestones of the accompanying research (e.g. the self evaluation method) have been developed in cooperation with regional actors (*inter alia*, discussed in an internet forum). Different venues for the exchange of ideas between experts and social actors have been established to secure the “accessibility” of expertise (e.g. focus groups, workshops etc.). Beyond that, the guidelines on integrated rural development were formulated and layouted with the help of a professional PR agency in order to make its contents more accessible and easier understandable for practitioners (Giessen and Böcher, 2007).

Also in the Danish National Park Pilot Projects, documents and reports were readily accessible to the public throughout the process, as they could and can be downloaded from the internet. This openness also contributed to the transparency of procedures. In the course of the process, expert, in a way, got closer to the public as they were, for example, asked to report on their methods towards the broader public (Boon *et al.*, 2007b).

In other GoFOR governance cases, expertise moved less close to its “audience” than in the German and the Danish examples. The Austrian National Biodiversity Strategy, for instance, can be characterized as a semi-open process. The Austrian National Biodiversity Commission (NBC) has used, in principle, a rather transparent mode of operation with the Chair regularly distributing relevant documents, including relevant scientific studies and expert opinions, to all Commission members. Transparency has been more restricted when it came to the political reconciliation of positions, e.g. in the formulation or reformulation of strategy documents. Since NBC members were supposed to send their comments to the Chair only, individual comments were not accessible for all Commission members.<sup>52</sup> In addition, while adhering to at least basic requirements of transparency within the NBC itself, the work of the Commission remained quite opaque to the outside. This is, in part, attributable to the fact that “biodiversity” is *per se* a rather difficult concept. Compared to related concepts like “nature conservation” or “species conservation” biodiversity is hard to communicate to policy makers and a broader lay audience. Also the Austrian Biodiversity Strategy has been burdened with this disadvantage and the NBC has not (yet) found an appropriate way out of that problem. Key documents, like the two versions of the Strategy or the Action Plan on Alien Species, are written in very technical language. Also the length of the documents makes them difficult to penetrate. Even in the revised Strategy of 2005, the Commission could not agree on a prioritised, and with that reduced, list of targets. Only very recently, a small brochure that synthesises the key messages of the revised Biodiversity Strategy was published (Nordbeck and Pregernig, 2007).

Also in other GoFOR cases, the excessive use of technical-scientific language doubtlessly reduced the political clout and legitimacy of the governance processes. Documents related to the Natura 2000 process in Denmark have been linguistically difficult to access, mainly because of the expert-centered language applied (Boon *et al.*, 2007a). In the course of the elaboration of the Hungarian National Forest Program the special forestry language of the White Book was criticised by some stakeholders as not suitable for an open, public debate (Mészáros *et al.*, 2007).

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<sup>52</sup> This is a form of interaction which Scharpf denominated as “negative coordination” (Scharpf, 1993).

### **Transparent and unbiased selection of experts**

A third element that has an effect on the perceived accountability and legitimacy of a governance process is the way experts are selected to take part (or not) in political advice and decision making. In some GoFOR governance cases experts have been selected in a transparent way, in others selection procedures have been more opaque.

In the two Austrian strategy processes investigated, expert recruitment was, in principle, rather open and transparent. The National Biodiversity Commission was set up as an “open body” right from its start. All relevant institutions were invited to nominate representatives and still today the Commission is open for new members. In the Austrian Forest Dialogue, the right of all involved stakeholders to bring in their experts and expertise or even call for external experts to be commissioned by the competent Ministry had been set down in writing before the start of the process in a “Code of Conduct”. Nevertheless, expert mobilization in both processes showed quite some biases. It was typically expert institutions with which the organizing bodies had intensive interactions before which were commissioned to write a report or bring in expert opinion otherwise. In any case, it is difficult to understand the real motivations for expert selection and especially to tell apart cognitive reasons (“We chose them because they know better.”) and political motivations (“We chose them because they say what we expect.”).

In other GoFOR cases, the selection of experts was organized in a more opaque way. A good case in point is National Park management in Greece, where it was even impossible for the scientific investigators to find out whether there is a standard selection process or whether there are specific rules used for appointing chairmen of scientific committees. Thus, the process in this respect lacks transparency and openness. At the same time, there was no objection or questioning by the involved actors about the selection methods and the criteria used (Kassioumis *et al.*, 2007).

### **Relation to state institutions**

A last attribute to understand the legitimation of governance processes (and the involvement of experts therein) is the relation of those processes to state institutions. Most of the GoFOR governance processes have been embedded in state structures in one way or the other. Closeness to state institutions and the related perception of being somehow “official” processes seems to have given those processes also some special kind of legitimacy. The Austrian, the Hungarian, and the Spanish Forest Programs, the Danish and the Greek nature conservation processes as well as the French regional forest policy initiatives are good examples for this category of “governance in the shadow of government”.

The Norwegian Living Forest Project falls in a different separate category. The Living Forests Project is an inter-sectorial co-operation project between stakeholders from forestry, environmental and outdoor recreational organisations, trade unions, and consumers’ organizations. The Ministry of Agriculture and The Ministry of the Environment had active observing roles during the project, but no right to vote in negotiations. Thus, the process was very much driven by non-state actors. Also expertise was mainly mobilized and generated by private actors, like universities and private research institutes (Ouff *et al.*, 2007).

There is one case which stands in stark contrast to the above-mentioned processes, i.e. the case of Romanian anti-corruption policy. In Romanian anti-corruption policy,

the credibility – and with that the political clout – of scientific studies seems to increase with the distance from state institutions. Corruption issues have often been covered by audits and studies sponsored by international watchdog organizations (like Freedom House or Transparency International), international donor organizations (like World Bank) or international NGOs (like WWF). Those audits and studies develop special democratic qualities as non-state actors stand for transparent methods of evaluation and free public access to documents; NGOs are perceived to analyze the situation from a “non-governmental viewpoint”. Today, even governmental actors are aware of those special qualities. By listening to and considering the recommendations of NGOs in the policy process, they can give state policies additional credibility and legitimation. In the field of forestry, however, the situation is still quite different. When dealing with corruption in the forest sector, state institutions still play a dominant role. In addition, all types of policies in the forest sector are still affected by a severe lack of basic data on timber existing in the forests, on the volume of timber harvested and, thus, on illegal timber cutting, as well as on private forest owners and their behaviour in the cutting issue. The ongoing establishment of the National Forest Inventory will supply helpful data for policies in the forest sector. With that, the role of civil society will probably also change in the forest sector (Bouriaud, 2007).

#### 4.4.2.5 Trends in the use of expert advice

Finally, the question arises of whether there are specific temporal trends in the role of expert advice in governance processes: Do the policy fields under study show a trend towards increased (or rather decreased) use of expert advice? Do the governance processes themselves reinforce (or rather impede) this trend?

In many of the GoFOR governance case studies, one sees a trend towards the increased use of expert advice in policy making. One driving force behind this trend seems to be the European Union with its directives and funding programs. The EU Habitat Directive, with its strongly technical and scientific character, has undoubtedly reinforced the trend towards expert involvement in nature conservation policy in Denmark, Greece and Romania. In all three countries, one recognizes a marked increase in the number of experts and committees that serve to facilitate decision making at national, regional, and sometimes even local levels. In German Integrated Rural Development policies the use of expertise has been fostered especially by LEADER+, the EU funding program that aims to assist rural communities in improving the quality of life and economic prosperity in their local area.

But, also independent of EU initiatives, a trend towards the increased use of expert advice in governance processes can be found. Two good examples from the set of GoFOR case studies are the Hungarian NFP process and the Norwegian Living Forest Project. For the last-mentioned process it can even be hypothesized that it served as a kind of role model for the whole policy field, thus contributing to the increased use of expertise in Norwegian forest policy in general (Ouff *et al.*, 2007).

For some GoFOR case, no discernable trend can be identified. When, for example, looking at the involvement of scientists and other experts in the two Austrian strategy processes one sees no marked changes over time. Forest policy and nature conservation policy have always been policy fields where expertise played an important role, and this didn't change with the initiation of the two strategy processes.

None of the GoFOR governance case studies shows a trend towards the decreased use of expertise.

Besides asking for possible trends in the frequency and intensity of policy makers falling back on expert advice in a governance context, one could also ask whether there are temporal patterns discernable in the democratic quality of expert involvement. Do the policy fields under study show a trend towards more technocratic or towards more democratic forms of policy making? Do the governance processes themselves reinforce (or rather impede) this trend?

Once again, one sees no unanimous trend in the GoFOR case studies but there are still different common patterns. In some cases, a traditional technocratic approach was – if not fully strengthened so at least – reinforced over time. Here, the two French regional forest policy processes, Greek National Park management and, at least to some extent, the Austrian Biodiversity Strategy process serve as good examples.

As already described above, some cases are marked by distinct phases in the course of the process with an initial swing towards more “pluralistic” forms of expert involvement in the policy process and, then, old-established institutions and actor networks gaining momentum and narrowing down the scope of relevant forms of knowing and deciding again.

In quite a few GoFOR cases, one has seen remarkable trends towards more democratic forms of expert involvement in policy processes. The spectrum of expertise mobilized has been broadened to include new disciplinary knowledges, such as environmental expertise in forest policy in Norway, Austria, or Spain, or social science expertise in nature policy in the Netherlands. In some processes, like the German Integrated Rural Development processes or the Dutch “Nature for People, People for Nature” process, also great efforts have been put into making scientific insights more easily accessible to and understandable for a lay audience.

#### 4.4.3 Major conclusions on democratic and accountable expertise

While participation, multi-level coordination and inter-sectoral coordination are quite familiar conceptual perspectives when analysing governance processes, the conceptual focus on the *role of expertise* in governance processes is not so prevalent in the scholarly literature. In the GoFOR research design, expertise was taken up as a distinct focus of analysis based on the expectations that in a governance context science and expertise play special, new roles that go beyond the mere content-wise input of scientific knowledge in political decision-making processes, and that the tighter coupling of science and politics could lead to inherent tensions between professional expertise and democratic legitimation.

As set out in the introduction to this chapter, the science-policy literature points to various social dynamics and challenges in the interaction between expertise and politics, namely (i) the scientification of politics and (ii) the concurrent politicisation of science, (iii) an ensuing legitimacy crisis of science, and (iv) a call for more “accountable” and “democratic” forms of expertise. In our analysis, we wanted to find out to what extent and how those phenomena have played out in the GoFOR governance cases as well.

The scholarly literature indicates that, in recent years, science has come to play an increasingly influential role in policy making. Also in the set of GoFOR governance processes, science and expertise have frequently played a prominent role. At the same time, the GoFOR cases provide no indication for the “**scientification of politics**” in a narrower sense, i.e. that scientific expertise is dominating or even

replacing politics. As outlined in chapter 4.4.2.1 above, none of the cases analysed can be characterized as an expert-centred process dominated by scientific reasoning, but most cases were predominantly influenced by “political” factors. So in general, the analysis of 19 governance cases does not provide too much evidence in support of the above-mentioned thesis of the “scientification of politics” and the related danger of “technocratization”. A possible explanation for that could be that these phenomena cannot be generalized to all policy settings and that the science-policy literature hitherto has looked at another type of policy problems than the GoFOR project did. In the science-policy literature, the “scientification of politics” has typically been accounted for in a very special class of policy problems, namely problems characterized by a high degree of system uncertainties and high decision stakes (cf. the concept of “post-normal science” by Funtowicz and Ravetz, 1993). Most GoFOR cases do not fall into this category. They do, for example, not deal with the adoption and implementation of cutting-edge technologies (like biotechnology or stem-cell research) but rather with different forms of land use which are, of course, sometimes contested but the consequences of which are more or less predictable. In addition, a number of GoFOR cases has looked at a special class of political processes, namely “strategy processes”. With their long-term perspective this type of political processes is probably more detached from pressing political questions which call for immediate political action; strategy processes somehow take a more “distanced” view on policy problems. In this type of settings political and societal actors have seemingly less incentives to draw on science as a problem-solver and/or a source of political legitimacy.

The special character of the GoFOR case studies can probably also be seen in connection with the second, related phenomenon described in the science-policy literature, i.e. the “**politicisation of science**”. While in many high-tech and risk related policy fields the increased coupling of knowledge with politics has driven the politicisation of science, we see little evidence for that in the GoFOR governance cases, at least not in the sense that scientific knowledge claims have been deconstructed along the lines of conflict of the underlying political dispute. But that does not mean that in the governance processes analysed, experts and expertise have been “apolitical”.

One indication for that is that in most GoFOR cases expertise and politics have been tightly interwoven. As described in chapter 4.4.2.1, the integration of science and expertise into policy processes typically resembles more a kind of “integration model” than a “separation model”. In many GoFOR cases, science-policy advice has built on multipartite bodies made up of experts and policy-makers that are capable, simultaneously, of negotiating differences regarding scientific and political questions. In those “mixed” bodies policy makers, administrative officers, interest group representatives, and scientists sit side by side without a clear separation of roles. In only a few cases experts were kept in a more separated position. What is also interesting to see here is that neither the integration of science and politics in mixed bodies nor the organizational separation of science and politics were explicitly thematized in public discourses in any of the GoFOR case studies; the chosen organizational setups were more or less tacitly taken for granted. This stands in stark contrast with experiences especially from the United States of America. US advisory systems are usually organized in line with the “separation model” and great efforts are made to not only institutionally but also rhetorically “shield” science from politics (Jasanoff, 1987b, Renn, 1995). In a European context, this rhetorical “boundary work” does not seem to be necessary (Pregernig, 2005).



There is a second indication for the fact that also in the GoFOR cases expert involvement definitely had a “political” character as well: As described in chapter 4.4.2.3, experts and expertise fulfilled a number of different *functions*. In some instances, expertise-based knowledge could actually contribute to substantively improve policy making, sometimes by providing direct and specific pieces of advice to policy makers, sometimes by influencing the policy process in a more indirect way, e.g. by generating and propagating new policy ideas or “schools of thought”. In other instances, expertise seems to have served mainly as a political power resource without playing any epistemic role: Contending groups used scientific knowledge primarily as a means to increase their authority or legitimation. In conjunction with that, the selection of experts was heavily influenced by political considerations, i.e. policy makers chose those experts which were expected to deliver the results that conform most closely to their own expectations and beliefs.

The science-policy literature has pointed to several paradoxes of science in politics, one being the seemingly antithetic situation of expertise being a resource that is increasingly sought for policy making and for social choice, but one that is also increasingly contested (Weingart, 1999, van Eeten, 1999). Science has seemingly plunged into a kind of **legitimacy crisis**. Once again, our analyses showed that this phenomenon didn’t materialize too strongly in the set of GoFOR governance case studies. In none of the governance processes analysed, the utility and validity of scientific knowledge claim were absolutely called into question. There were some instances of confrontation between experts and counter-experts over the interpretation of scientific knowledge and its consequences but we found no signs of a complete lack of social and political trust in scientific and other types of expert knowledge.

In reaction to the discernable scientification of politics and the consequent legitimacy crisis of science and politics, both scientific scholars and policy makers have been calling for **more “accountable” and “democratic” forms of expert advice**. Especially EU bodies have put great efforts into searching for new models of how to organise the relationship between science and society in a more democratic way (EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 2001, 2002, 2003). In the set of GoFOR governance case studies, one only rarely sees explicit calls for the “democratisation of expertise” but, interestingly, quite a number of actual practices that go in this direction. In a number of case studies, expert input has been far from restricted to traditional scientific expertise. As depicted in chapter 4.4.2.2, one rather sees a kind of pluralisation of expert involvement with expertise being provided by a diverse set of sources and actors: public and private research institutes, interest groups, private consultants, and “ordinary citizens” (local knowledge). As regards the question of how balanced the representation of different types of expertise was, the set of GoFOR cases provides evidence for different patterns, both the relative domination of one type as well as the rather balanced use of different types of expertise (see chapter 4.4.2.4). Some case studies document interesting trends in the role of different types of expertise. Typically, the use of expertise has broadened and new knowledge has entered the scene in the course of time. But there are also counter-examples, in which after a period of pluralisation traditional forms of expertise came to the fore again. In a similar vein, GoFOR governance cases also show quite heterogeneous patterns as regards the accessibility and understandability of expert knowledge and as regards the degree of transparency and independence in the selection of experts. In a few cases, expert knowledge has been easily accessible and understandable for a policy and lay audience, while in others expertise moved less close to its “audience”. Especially the excessive use of technical-scientific

language reduced the political clout and legitimacy of some processes. Analogously, in some governance processes, experts have been selected in a transparent way, while in others selection procedures have been more opaque. Finally, there is also quite a large degree of heterogeneity as regards temporal patterns discernable. In some GoFOR cases, traditional technocratic approaches were – if not fully strengthened so at least – reinforced over time. In others, one sees remarkable trends towards more democratic forms of expert involvement in policy processes.

## 4.5 Adaptive and iterative processes

Lars Julius Halvorsen, L.J., S.M. Ouff, J. Barstad, and A. Lengyel

### 4.5.1 Conceptual Frame


A governance process is an undertaking, which is often characterized by significant uncertainty as well as complexity. Governance processes typically enter new “terrains”, with uncertain maps, new tools, and often with new partners. Since governance processes tend to include quite a few participants, they are also rather complex. As such governance processes compared to rational planning processes can better be described as social learning situations (Amdam 2005). Thus, the development and results from a governance process are largely dependent on the process participants’ ability to gather information, learn and adapt throughout the process.

#### Evaluations, monitoring and adaptation

One strategy to handle such uncertainty is to regularly evaluate and review the development of the process. Processes with this characteristic are often referred to as iterative. The phrase *iterative* suggests a stepwise movement towards a goal where, at intervals, the situation is evaluated and necessary measures are taken to ensure the process being “on track” towards the objective. Such steps will normally be like loops, where you go backwards in the step-line and kind of “run it through another cycle”. A highly related concept regarding process development is adaptivity. As the term indicates, an *adaptive process* is characterised by the ability to adapt to challenges during the course of the process. Adaptations can of course take place in processes that are neither monitored nor evaluated, but such adaptations will typically be accidental, and often occur when the problems have been all too evident for a while.

The figure below illustrates an iterative and adaptive process (Barstad and Lengyel 2005).

**Figure 7: Illustration of an iterative process**



One implication from the discussion above is that systems for monitoring and evaluations typically play important roles in governance processes. Further, this role will increase when the uncertainty and complexity of the governance process increases. In this situation the evaluator faces a paradox: Meanwhile increasing complexity and uncertainty creates a greater need for a more complex system of monitoring and evaluation. The challenges of monitoring and conducting evaluations also increase.

An iterative and adaptive process will typically be regularly evaluated and adjusted according to challenges occurring. This illustrates that systems for evaluations and monitoring is a necessary and integrated part of a governance process. The relationship between the use of evaluations and monitoring and the adaptivity and iterativity of the GoFOR-processes will be an important topic to be discussed in this subchapter.

Based upon theories regarding practically applied process evaluations it seems reasonable to emphasis four aspects of evaluations (Hall and Hall 2004; Argyris 2003).

6. The first aspect is the choice of evaluator. Important questions in this respect is whether the evaluator is internal or external or if he or she is biased towards the subject for evaluations or not.
7. The second aspect is the role and focus of the evaluation. Is the evaluation focussing on strategy, process, and/or output? Is the evaluation focussing on technical or environmental issues or political, financial or organizational issues?
8. The third aspect is how evaluation and monitoring is organized. In order to contribute to efficient adaptations to challenges, evaluations must be designed to discover different kinds of problems that could occur, and most importantly at an early stage when they can still be dealt with.
9. The fourth important aspect is the actual use of information gathered through evaluations and monitoring to adapt to challenges. In order to contribute to efficient adaptation, stakeholders do not only need information about the problem, but also a resolve to do something with it.

### New knowledge and learning

The last aspect is especially important. An ability to incorporate and utilise new lessons, experiences, different viewpoints, as well as new information during the governance process, seems to be a necessary condition for efficient adaptation. One plausible source of this kind of *organizational learning* is the use of systems for evaluation and monitoring as discussed above. There are also other also important sources of learning.

Another common source of learning is practice. Learning through practice is commonly referred to as learning by doing. In organization theory this strategy is often referred to as “muddling through” (Lindblom 1959). Muddling through as

learning by doing strategy is often assumed to be relatively efficient in situations with high degree of uncertainty and complexity.

A third source of learning is observed changes in external factors. During the course of a governance process changes in the process environment could occur, that makes adaptations necessary (Scott 2003). It is important to notice that such happenings do not present themselves objectively to the stakeholders. Rather, they must be interpreted and reacted upon. Both the interpretation and the reaction is partly dependent on the stakeholders original understanding of the situation (Argyris 2003).

### Uncertainty and Complexity

Two important complicating factors related to governance processes in general are the twin themes uncertainty and complexity.

*Uncertainty* regarding the outcome of different strategies is a factor that makes adaptations necessary in the first place. Without uncertainty, there would be no need for adaptations as the decision makers would know the outcome of their strategies in advance, thus making rational ex ante planning would be sufficient (Williamson 1985; Scott 2003). Thus the strategy of iterative and adaptive process management can be interpreted as a direct response to such uncertainty (Barstad and Lengyel 2005).

A highly related topic is the *complexity* of the governance processes. If the degree of complexity is low, the challenges caused by uncertainty would decrease. The reason for this is quite obvious. The problem with uncertainty arises due to human bounded rationality, in the sense of a lack of cognitive capacity to fully understand complex issues (Williamson 1985). When the complexity is reduced, the human capacity to understand the situation would increase. Translated into a governance context, a simple, straightforward process could be manageable despite a large degree of uncertainty, while a complex governance process under the same conditions could prove unmanageable (Scott 2003).

### The Role of Iterativity under Uncertain and Complex Circumstances

Even if the two concepts iterativity and adaptivity is interconnected, there is a fundamental difference between them. While adaptivity is a characteristic of a process design, iterativity can be seen as a tool to promote efficient adaptations to circumstances or new knowledge about the existing situation. As earlier mentioned, increasing uncertainty and complexity poses increasing challenges to stakeholders in a governance process. This challenge will be further increased as the time period of the process grows large. One way to deal with such situations, is to limit the time scope or partial analyses as much as possible by using an iterative, sequential approach (Barstad and Lengyel 2005).

#### 4.5.2 Empirical insights on adaptive and iterative processes (AIP)

The GoFOR-cases that provides the empirical basis vary significantly in terms of most of the aspects of the analysis. This is also the case when it comes to the AIP aspects evidently.

On basis of our empirical material of the case studies, the general statement can be made that AIP aspects in the policy documents were called upon explicitly in limited ways only (rhetorics), with some clear exceptions. Neither the wording of “adaptive nor iterative” were often used. This also indicates that this aspect formulated in a clear way is somewhat new in the policy arena.

The second statement on this however is, that many of the processes’ policy documents (if existing) called indirectly for aspects of AIP. This concerns mostly periodic monitoring or evaluation and/or prescribed repetitive stages of process design and implementation. These aspects indicate in most cases clear policy intentions to take up tasks in an adaptive and iterative way, we conclude. These aspects are rather clearly possible to be tracked in processes with the basis of some kind of policy documents (strategy papers, programme documents).

An explicit call on AIP as such mainly exist in the national forest programme processes as the set up of their features has been discussed intensively in international policy processes, such as the MCPFE or UN processes on forests. Therefore these documents comply with the international requirements by their nature and take them as basis to their core aspects. As national forest programmes are however policy frameworks, there is room for interpretation and implementation of these in the practice of course.

The other group of processes where AIP aspects are rather clear formulated at the rhetoric level are the Natura 2000 related ones. Here however, we have to do with the implementation of an EU directive at the national level and AIP aspects, such as surveillance, periodic evaluation by reviews and reporting are clear prescriptions at the EU level directives. Their implementation is therefore also a must.

In the other EU related process group of the rural development cases the same applies mainly, with the difference that not “directives” are the basis of implementation providing more room for national or regional initiatives. Here also periodic reporting and evaluation and a somewhat iterative process design is stressed as basis for AIP aspects.

For the comparative frame it makes sense at the empirical level to handle specific issues of the AIP aspects and their implementation. As concerning adaptive and iterative process features one of the underlying questions is how adaptation was brought about in the processes at hand and what role played there iterative process features and learning.

In the following sections three aspects of adaptivity and iterativity will be discussed:

- Adaptation brought about by evaluation and monitoring,

- Adaptation as result of new knowledge/information or past experience (learning) and
- The role of AIP aspects under uncertain and complex circumstances in the processes (adaptivity, iterativity).

#### *4.5.2.1 The Role of Monitoring and Evaluations*

The main purpose of this subchapter is to investigate the relationship between monitoring and evaluations on one side, and iterativity and adaptivity on the other. Knowledge on challenges and effects is an important prerequisite for adaptations during the span of a process. Systems for monitoring and evaluations are possible providers of such knowledge. Since monitoring and evaluations are a common part of processes and projects, we could expect it to play an important role as promoters of adaptations in the 19 GoFOR-processes.

This chapter will be structured in five parts. The first part will present the presence of, and motivations for establishing systems for monitoring and evaluations. The second part will investigate who initiates these systems for evaluations and monitoring and who were in charge of them in the processes. The third part will look into how the evaluations and monitoring were organized. The fourth part investigates the relationship between monitoring, evaluations and adaptations in the processes. The last part will contain a summary of the major findings concerning this issue.

### **Presence of and Motivations for Monitoring and Evaluations**

This sub section will discuss our findings regarding the presence of systems for monitoring and evaluations in the GoFOR-processes and the rationales behind establishing such systems.

Looking at the overall picture, one can conclude that monitoring and evaluation is viewed as substantially important in almost all of the GoFOR processes. As a result all the 19 cases have some kind of monitoring and evaluation system.

On the other hand, the specific rationales for planning and/or conducting monitoring and evaluations differ largely between the cases. So does the number of motives involved. In eight of the cases only one motive for monitoring and conducting evaluations is mentioned, while two or more motives can be identified in the remaining 10.<sup>53</sup> The distribution of motives between the processes is presented in the table below.

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<sup>53</sup> In only one case is three motives given.

**Table 20: Motives for conducting monitoring and evaluation**

Motives for conducting monitoring and evaluation				
Process	Legitimacy, Control and Efficiency	External requirement for funding	Promote learning	Number of motives involved
AT-AFD	X			1
GER-GAK		X		1
FR-RPF			X	1
ESP-FPGP		X		1
ROM-ACP	X			1
NL-GW	X			1
DK-NPP			X	1
NL-NFP <sup>54</sup>			X <sup>55</sup>	1
DK-HD	X	X		2
ROM-NAT	X		X	2
GER-RA	X		X	2
GER-LEADER	X	X		2
GR-MA	X	X		2
NL-UH	X		X	2
FR-CFT	X		X <sup>56</sup>	2
HUN-NFP	X	X		2
NOR-LF	X		X	2
AT-BS	X	X <sup>57</sup>	X	3
<b>Sum</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>29</b>

Below we will discuss the three motives involved; legitimacy and control, external requirements and organizational learning respectively.

### 1. Legitimacy, Control and Efficiency

Gaining legitimacy and maintaining control seems to be frequent motives for establishing systems for monitoring and evaluations. We can trace such motives for conducting evaluations in a total of 13 processes. It is important to mention that the motives within these processes also differ quite a lot. In six of the cases, challenges of legitimacy and efficient implementation are mentioned as reasons for conducting evaluations and monitoring. In the remaining seven cases, monitoring and evaluation is meant to be a tool for keeping control over the progress and/or the content of the

<sup>54</sup> Ex-ante the process. During the work, no evaluations were conducted.

<sup>55</sup> Ex-ante the process. During the work, no evaluations were conducted.

<sup>56</sup> By measuring process quality and input.

<sup>57</sup> For the 1st and 2nd evaluation respectively.



process, and thus improve the efficiency of the process. Still, we have chosen to see the two subgroups of motives in relation, because it is likely that efficiency, especially funding efficiency, contributes to legitimating the process, and can also ease the implementation of actions or measures.

It is necessary to mention that the term efficiency should be treated with a little caution in this respect. It seems that the concept relates to different kinds of efficiency in different processes. Some process partners use the concept referring to “funding efficiency”, for others it means “process efficiency”, and in some cases “efficiency of protection measures and actions”. Still, the use of the concept has a common denominator. Whether it relates to the output from spending, how well the process develops, or the environmental effects of the processes; the concept evolves around the issue of maintaining some kind of control or possibility to adapt to new knowledge.

## 2. Externally required evaluations

One of the most frequent reasons for establishing systems for monitoring and evaluations is legally binding obligations towards local, national, or international authorities. Monitoring and evaluation can be imposed upon the process management by law or other kinds of commitments, like international agreements.<sup>58</sup> In many instances systems for evaluation is a requirement for receiving funding for the processes. This kind of obligation is a motive for evaluations and monitoring in seven of the processes.

It is plausible to expect that evaluations only motivated by some kind of external requirement, will tend to be conducted in closer accordance with a minimum requirement level. This may especially be the case in three of the processes where external requirements are the only motive for conducting evaluations and monitoring. In the remaining four of these processes we see that the wish for keeping control and improve efficiency, and to promote learning goes hand in hand with mandatory evaluations.

## 3. Organizational learning

In most organisational learning theory, learning is seen as a condition for accomplishing a given organisation's objectives:

*“(...) organizational learning is a competence all organizations should develop. (...) the better the organizations are at learning the more likely it is they will detect and correct errors. Also, the more effective organizations are at learning the more likely they will be at being innovative or knowing the limits of their innovation”.*

(Argyris 2003: xiii)<sup>59</sup>

Table 20 shows that promoting learning is mentioned as a motive for conducting monitoring and evaluation in nine out of the 19 cases. In some of the processes this motive is seen in accordance with a need to maintain in control over the process. Following Argyris, this tendency could lead us to expect that evaluation and

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<sup>58</sup> Like the MCPFE and the NSNC (National Scientific Natura 2000 Committee).

<sup>59</sup> Argyris, Chris 2003 [1992]: *On organizational learning*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

monitoring has been a major contributor to adaptations in these processes. But is this really the case?

A closer investigation of the actual systems for monitoring and evaluations shows that the concept of learning is used quite superficially. No theoretical foundation seems to be applied, and the learning is kept within the single-loop, as Argyris puts it (Argyris 2003), meaning that they only address the efficiency of the actual output from the processes. I.e. technical issues have been addressed far more frequently than rules-of-the-game issues as well as issues that might imply issues of political character.

This indicates that, although learning is frequently mentioned as a reason for executing monitoring and evaluation, process management does not necessarily conduct them wholeheartedly, or does not feed them back into the process. This gap between theory and practice in the implementation of evaluations will be further discussed under the paragraph Monitoring, Evaluation and Adaptation below.

### Initiative and Execution of Monitoring and Evaluations

A common assumption in social science is that external monitoring and evaluation is regarded more unbiased and trustworthy than internal ones (Hall and Hall 2003). On the other hand, internal evaluators tend to be in a position in which they can use the result from the evaluation to influence the process (Scott 2001). The purpose of the following discussion is A) to investigate who initiated and who executed the evaluations. B) Further, and most importantly to discuss to what degree external evaluators had any impact on the processes.

We have considered institutions as external if they are not directly involved in the GoFOR-process as decision makers. I.e. research institutions, in order to be regarded as external, has to be independent from decision making institutions (ministries, companies etc). Evaluations or monitoring that has been carried out by actors (or their research institutions) within the process itself are regarded as internal.

**Table 21: Initiators of monitoring and/or evaluation**

	National authorities	EU/International authorities	Others
<b>Process</b>			
RPF	X		
CORR	X	X	
NfP-PfN	X		
LF	X		Project partners
NPA	X		Park boards
LEADER +		X	
RA	X		

	National authorities	EU/International authorities	Others
BS	X		
NPP	X		NGOs
HD		X	
CFT	X		
GAK	X	X	
N 2000		?	
FPGP	X	X	
NFPH			Coordination unit
AFD			Coordination groups

Regarding the high degree of mandatory evaluations as discussed earlier, it comes as no surprise that national and international authorities have initiated as many as 12 and six evaluations respectively.<sup>60</sup> Other partners contributed to three initiatives. In two of these three, the partners were NGOs participating in the process. The remaining initiative is an introduction of voluntary monitoring schemes by park boards in the Greek NPA process.

Another relevant topic is who conducted the evaluations in the respective processes. The distribution of this is presented in Table 22.

**Table 22: Who conducted the evaluations?**

Who conducted the evaluations	Frequency
Only external evaluators	4
Only internal evaluators	4
Both internal and external	8

In eight of the processes it was conducted both internal and external evaluations. The remaining 10 processes have been subject to either external or internal (five each). In several of the cases, external evaluation bodies are independent research institutes in different fields, in a wide range from forest management through environmental research to project management. Different bodies within the EU-system have also executed a large part of the external monitoring and evaluations.

Besides the distribution of initiatives between the processes, the existing empirical material does not allow us to identify the degree of awareness of the potentials, strengths and weaknesses of external and internal evaluations.

One indicator of such awareness could be the relation between the motives for conducting evaluations and the composition of internal and external evaluations. In the table below, the distribution of externally conducted and mixed evaluations in relation to the motive for conducting evaluations is presented.

<sup>60</sup> International authorities in this respect is largely the EU.

Table 23 indicates two tendencies. The first tendency is that in general, there seems to be no correlation between the motivation for conducting evaluations and the kind of evaluators used. The second tendency is that when it comes to the particular motive of maintaining control, the process participants tend to choose mixed kinds of evaluations. Due to low N, and insufficient instrumental congruency (Grønmo 2004), these tendencies are far too uncertain to allow any conclusion regarding whether the choice of external or internal evaluators is a result of coincidences or conscious considerations.

**Table 23: Choice of evaluator in relation to motivation**

Choice of evaluator	Motivation for evaluation			
	Secure implementation	Binding obligations	Promote learning	Maintain control
External	6	5	8	3
Mixed	6	5	9	7

### How are Monitoring and Evaluations organized?

As we have seen above, the motives, the source of the initiative, and the actual executors of the evaluations and monitoring differ quite a lot between the GoFOR-processes. It is plausible to assume that this would have had some impact on the actual organization of evaluations along the processes. This paragraph will discuss how the systems of evaluations and monitoring are organized throughout the processes.

The discussion will be organized in three parts: the first part looks into what kind of evaluations the projects underwent. The second part discusses how the mix of evaluations is distributed amongst the different GoFOR-processes. The third part takes a closer look at the role the respective evaluations did play in the processes, related to frequency and integration into the design of the GoFOR-processes.

#### 1. What kind of evaluations has been conducted?

Focusing on the role of evaluation and monitoring, it is possible to identify four main categories of evaluations conducted in relation to the GoFOR-processes. The first category refers to those evaluations conducted in order to control and enhance the efficiency of the processes. The second category is evaluations intended to produce and disseminate information about the processes. The third category includes those measures taken to evaluate the environmental and biological effects of specific projects related to the GoFOR-processes. Finally, the remaining category represents those evaluations investigating the development of the actual GoFOR-processes. Applying these typologies we are able to classify all but two processes. The latter two are the NL-UH and the NL-GW which are not so relevant in this respect, since they

are long term historical developments after the Second World War in the field of governance of natural resources in certain parts of the Dutch landscape.

The distribution of different kinds of evaluations between the remaining 16 processes related to the four categories of evaluations is presented in Table 24.

**Table 24: Aim and topic of the evaluations**

Process	Aim and topic of the evaluation			
	Control/ efficiency	Information gathering	Process development	Env/biological effects
RPF	X	X		X
PGPF	X		X	X
LF		X	X	X
NFPH	X	X		
BS	X	X		
AFD	X		X	
CORR	X		X	
CFT	X		X	
NP	X		X	
NPA	X			X
N 2000	X			X
RA		X	X	
GAK	X			
HD	X			
LEADER +	X			
NP			X	
NfP-PfN				X
<b>Sum</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>6</b>

Table 24 suggests that maintaining control and enhancing efficiency is by far the most frequently present motive in the GoFOR processes, including a total of 13 cases. On the other side, evaluations designed to produce information were only conducted in five of the processes. Eight of the cases under study have been subjected to evaluations regarding the development of the processes. The last category of evaluations, addressing environmental or biological effects from the GoFOR processes, has been conducted in six of the processes.

## 2. The scope of the evaluation system

A closely related factor is the variety of the evaluations used in each process. Even if the GoFOR-processes differ a lot regarding their degree of complexity and diversity, they can all be classified as rather complex processes. Accordingly, if systems for evaluations and monitoring are to be used to address obstacles and challenges facing the processes, the scope of the evaluations conducted should be an important factor. One indicator of the scope of the system of monitoring and evaluation is the number of different kinds of evaluations.

**Table 25: Number of different kinds of evaluations**

Different kinds of evaluations	Frequency
1	5
2	9
3	3

As the table shows, three processes were subject to as many as three different kinds of evaluation, while a majority of nine was subject to two kinds of evaluation. Four of the processes were only subject to one kind of evaluation. The different use of evaluations indicates that the potential adaptations based upon evaluation vary largely between the processes. We can expect governance processes, in which several different evaluations are conducted to be able to adapt to a wider array of challenges.

### 3. The evaluation characteristics

Besides the type and variety of the evaluations conducted, the frequency and role in the process design could also be an important factor deciding the potential to adapt to challenges. Among the 19 GoFOR-processes, a total of 18 were subject of evaluations during the process period. The latter, the Dutch *Nature for People- People for Nature-* process, was a result of an ex ante evaluation, but was not subject to any evaluations throughout the process.

As indicated in the table below, the time span of the processes, the regularity, the frequency of the evaluations and monitoring, as well as their degree of integration into the general process design differs a lot between the remaining 18 processes.

**Table 26: Monitoring and evaluation characteristics**

Process	Integration in process design	Time span	Regularity	Frequency	When in process
NL-NFP	Not integrated	2000- (2007)			Ex ante
NOR-LF	Integrated subsequently	1995-	Regularly	Every 5 years from 1995	Mid-term
FR-CFT	Integrated	2001-	Regularly	Every 5 years	Along the process
DK-HD	Integrated	2003	Regularly	Every 6 years	Along the process
GER-LEADER	Integrated	2000-2006	Regularly	Ex ante, 3 and 5 years into the programme, and no later than 3 years after completion.	Ex ante, along the process, and after the process
ROM-NAT	Integrated	2000-	Regularly	1992, 1996, 1999, then annually.	Along the process
DK-NPP	Integrated	2001- (2007)	Regularly	2003, 2005. Every 6 years when completed.	Along the process
ROM-ACP	Integrated	2000-2007	Regularly	Weekly, half yearly, yearly and at the end of strategic period.	Along the process
GR-MA	Integrated	1991-		Annually from park boards, management plans every 5 years, every six years from Ministries to EU.	Along the process

Process	Integration in process design	Time span	Regularity	Frequency	When in process
GER-GAK	Integrated	1969-	Regularly	Reviewed annually, the framework is negotiated every 4 years,	Along the process
FR-RPF	Integrated subsequently	2000-	Regularly	?	Along the process
HUN-NFP	Integrated	2001-	Regularly	annually	Ex ante and along the process
AT-AFD	Integrated	2002-	Regularly	-	Ex ante, during drafting, mid-term, end (not carried out yet).
AT-BS	Integrated	1998	Occasionally	-	Along the process
GER-RA	Integrated	2001-	Occasionally	-	Along the process
ESP-FPGP	Integrated	1994-	Occasionally	-	Along and after
NL-UH	Difficult to say	1945 –	Occasionally	-	Along the “process”
NL-GW	Difficult to say	1945-	Occasionally	-	Along the “process”

It is plausible to assume that evaluations that are integrated into the process design are more likely to induce adaptations than those being performed on a more ad hoc basis. As we can see from the table above, systems for monitoring and evaluations have with few exemptions been an integrated part of the GoFOR processes. The table also shows that the processes vary to a large degree when it comes to the question of how evaluations were integrated in the process design.

An interesting variable in this respect is the regularity of the evaluations. A system in which evaluations are performed regularly can be expected to promote a more systematic mapping of problems at an early stage. Occasional evaluations on the other hand, can be expected to look into problems at a later stage when they are clearly visible to all parties. Other research suggests that problems at the stage they are visible will tend to be more developed, thus having caused more damage to the process as well as being harder to deal with (Amdam 2005; Halvorsen 2007).

As shown in the table above, evaluations were conducted occasionally in five of the processes, while more than twice as many (twelve processes) were subject to evaluations and monitoring on a regular basis.

There are however, significant differences between the processes within the latter category, regarding the frequency of the evaluations. For the same reason as for regularity, it is plausible to assume that a system for frequent evaluations along the process will improve the ability for the process partners to address specific challenges effectively at an early stage. As the table shows, three of the processes with regular evaluations are scheduled as seldom as each fifth or sixth year, while the latter eight are conducted either annually or at least quite often.

Summing up, only six GoFOR-processes have integrated systems for evaluation and monitoring on a regular, frequent basis. The latter 12 cases either have not conducted any evaluations along the process (1 process), have only conducted evaluations occasionally (6 processes), or have a system for less frequent regular evaluations (3 processes). On this basis, it is possible to argue that generally

speaking, evaluations in the GoFOR processes were not organized in a way that maximizes the potential for efficient adaptation to challenges.

Still, we could expect that the results from the actual evaluations and monitoring have resulted in some kind of adaptations. The following subchapter investigates the relation between monitoring and evaluations on one side and actual adaptations on the other.

### Monitoring, Evaluation and Adaptation

The discussion above has shown that the organization of the monitoring and evaluations of the GoFOR-processes differs a lot between the cases. Assuming a causal relationship between monitoring and evaluation on one side and adaptation on the other, it is plausible to expect that the use of evaluations to adapt to challenges at hand also will vary between the processes. Below, the empirical evidence on this matter is presented and discussed.

The discussion is organized in three parts. The first part contains a presentation of the distribution of specific adaptations between the GoFOR-processes. The second part investigates the actual sources of the adaptations that took place. The third part uses the Living Forest process as a case to illustrate the importance of the organizations as well as the potential importance of evaluations for improving process efficiency.

#### Adaptations in the processes

One highly relevant question is whether adaptations took place during the processes. The table below gives an overview over whether we could trace significant adaptations in each of the processes, and if so how many.

**Table 27: Adaptations occurring**

Process	Significant adaptations traced	How many different adaptations?
RPF	Yes	1
PGPF	No /not known	
LF	Yes	3
NfP-PfN	No /not known	
UH/GW	No /not known	
ACÜ	No /not known	
AFD	No /not known	
CFT	Yes	2
LEADER+	Yes	4
RA	Yes	3
NFPH	Yes	1
BS	Yes	1



Process	Significant adaptations traced	How many different adaptations?
NP	No /not known	
HD	No /not known	
NPA	No /not known	
N 2000	No /not known	
GAK	No /not known	
<b>Sum</b>	<b>Yes: 7 No: 10</b>	<b>15</b>

Table 27 suggests that the processes vary to a large degree regarding whether adaptations took place. It is important to notice that this subject was hard to investigate in several of the processes. Thus, the tendencies in this material are very uncertain. In two of the processes it seems that no significant adaptation has taken place. In additional eight cases there might have been some adaptation, but a lack of details in the data, prevent us from drawing any clear conclusions on this issue. In the remaining seven GoFOR-processes we can trace a total of 15 specific adaptations to different challenges at hand.

### Sources of adaptation

Another interesting question that relates to the seven processes, in which a total of 15 adaptations took place, is what the sources of these adaptations were. We are able to distinguish five different sources of adaptations in the material. The distribution of these between the processes is presented in the table below.

**Table 28: Sources of adaptation**

Process	Sources of adaptation				
	Evaluations or monitoring	Top down decisions	Dialogue and negotiations	Experience	Expertise
RPF		X			
LF	X		X		
CFT	X				
LEADER+	X				
RA	X			X	X
NFPH		X (decision making)	X (drafting)		
BS	X				
AFD			X		

There are two major tendencies in the table above. Firstly, the sources of adaptations vary significantly. One adaptation was top-down induced by the government in the respective country. In three cases, negotiations and dialog between the process participants resulted in the adaptations. In one process a combination of experience and expertise brought about the adaptation. Secondly, evaluations and monitoring was by far, the most frequent source of adaptation in the processes, causing adaptations in five of the processes.

The latter comes as no surprise. As discussed earlier, organizational learning has been mentioned as a motive for conducting evaluations in nine of the 19 GoFOR-processes. Actually one could argue that the number of five processes adapting to evaluations is rather low in this respect. At the same time it is important to have in mind that this result is quite uncertain. The fact that we are unable to trace any adaptations does not necessarily mean that none occurred.

### Evaluations as a tool for necessary adaptations – illustrated by the Living Forest process

So far we have mapped the use of, the rationale for, and the organization of evaluations and monitoring in the GoFOR-processes. The general tendency is that, even if almost every process was subject to evaluation and monitoring, and most evaluations were integrated in the process design, the potential from evaluations is far from being utilized. This seems to be closely related to some common characteristics in the evaluations among the processes. One important finding is that evaluations in many cases have been motivated by obligations related to receiving funding. Thus, the evaluations are conducted on a minimum required level. Another important finding is that many of the processes have utilized internal or partly internal evaluators. The latter, in combination with a somewhat limited focus and scope of the evaluations has led to evaluations not being able to address all aspects of these rather complex processes.

To illustrate that evaluations can hold a greater potential, we will discuss the organization and role of evaluations in the Norwegian Living Forest process. This way of using a case study does not allow us to draw general conclusion, but it could serve as a useful example to illustrate the potential that lie in good systems for evaluations as well as for how certain aspects of the evaluations system affect this potential.

LF was established in 1994 by the Norwegian Ministry of Agriculture and leading economical actors in the forest sector as a response to international market demands for more sustainable forestry, in addition to a general growing pressure from the public opinion towards better environmental conservation. The next year environmental and recreational NGOs were invited to join. From day one, the process participants represented different worldviews and different interests. An additional complicating factor was a history of confrontations between economic interest groups and environmental organisations, which had resulted in distrust between the different parties.

This nearly led the process to a collapse twice, first in 2001 and secondly in 2003. Acknowledging the graveness of the threat, the project partners in 2003 decided to initiate three evaluations. The main purpose was to secure further cooperation by producing new knowledge that could provide a commonly shared perception of reality as well as shared goals for the process.

The three evaluations have covered as different topics as environmental concerns related to the felling patches, the development of the Norwegian forests according to

some selected standards, and the actual organization of the LF-process. All was conducted by external evaluators who were considered to be impartial and regarded as experts on their respective fields by the different participants.

The result of conducting these evaluations was the development of a more common understanding, paving the way for further cooperation between the parties. The evaluation itself was probably not a sufficient factor. Other aspects of the process, i.e. hiring an impartial project leader from 2003, as well as a greater will to cooperate on the part of the forest owners were also important factors. Still it is plausible to argue that the three evaluations conducted in 2003 were necessary for the process to continue.

## Summary

Systems for monitoring and evaluation are viewed as substantially important in almost all of the GoFOR processes. As a result 18 of the 19 cases have some kind of monitoring and evaluation system. On the other hand the motives for conducting monitoring and evaluations differ largely between the cases. Promoting learning has been frequently mentioned as a motive for conducting evaluations, but the concept is applied quite superficial. This indicates that evaluations in some of the processes are not conducted wholeheartedly.

Enhancing efficiency is by far the most frequently appearing motive for conducting evaluations, but generally speaking, evaluations in the GoFOR processes have not been organized in a way that realizes the potential for efficient adaptations to challenges.

The latter tendency also seems to affect the actual adaptations that occur. Out of the 19 processes, we are only able to trace adaptations in seven of them. On the other hand, in these seven GoFOR-processes we identified a total of 15 specific adaptations. Evaluations and monitoring was the most frequent source of adaptation in these processes, causing adaptations in five of the processes. Still, one could argue that the number of five processes adapting to findings in evaluations is rather low in this respect. Also, the adaptations made can be seen as quite limited.

The Living Forest case illustrates that monitoring and evaluations have the potential to play an important role in improving the efficiency of governance processes. The findings in general however, illustrates that this potential is far from being realized in most of the GoFOR-processes.

### *4.5.2.2 The role of new knowledge and learning towards process altering*

In this section the role of learning by new information or knowledge will be analysed in terms of the processes' changing ability (adaptation). Learning is associated in planning theory mostly with cyclical process design called here as iterative processes to get closer to desired or defined goals – therefore plays a basic role in AIP. However, the planning theory view proved to be for some research cases in the

GOFOR project too normative as process' result enhancement was not always clearly to be tracked or intended. Learning will be used in this section therefore for the analysis in a broader sense following e.g. P. Sabatier stating that learning can be interpreted as the consequence of experience and/or new information which leads to change of thought or behavioural intention.

### Presence of learning in the processes

In this sub-section will be looked at the empirical evidence of learning and its effects as found in the process descriptions. The following table gives a first overview on the existence of learning in the cases.

**Table 29: Presence of learning in the GOFOR cases**

Process	Learning by planned activities	"Learning by doing"	No learning	Change by external factors or without learning effect
AFD	X	X		X
BS			?	
GAK		X		
RPF		X		
PGPF	X	X		
ACP	X			
GW		X		
NP (DK)			X	?
NfP-PfN <sup>61</sup>	X	X		
HD			X	
N 2000 (R)			X	
RA	X	X		
LEADER+		X	X	
NPA	X			
CFT	X	?		
NFPH	X (drafting)	X (drafting)		X (decision making)
LF	X	X (process design)		
<b>Sum</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>2</b>

It is perhaps worth to ask what kind of changes in the cases were caused by learning and how these changes occurred?

In general it can be stated, that learning will be often viewed as source of process changes but primarily it occurs in cyclical designed processes.

<sup>61</sup> Ex-ante the process. During the work, no evaluations were conducted.

The case studies state in France however, that examples with linearly designed processes can also fit here: RPF case and the CFT case. In RPF "...changes were permanent" and "...adaptation became the most important issue", which is an indication for substantial and continuous/intensive learning. This was certainly, partly due to the crisis situation of the storm damages had to be resolved step by step - giving time for learning - and also actors' active decision making role adds to learning effects - giving ways for learning (actor initiated changes by exercising critics).

Periodic exchange played a crucial role in Germany in RA, where the cyclical design explicitly aimed for optimisation and adaptation and an intended knowledge transfer took place. Reporting of mandatory self-evaluations had no effects and this reporting practice got changed completely. However in a number of regions self-evaluations served as basis of learning (but the special tool of the so-called FOCUS groups, which provided feedback to the programme formulation, were the basis for enhancements through empirical analysis of the situation and process experiences. This is a classical institutionalised process learning case indeed. But here also the idea behind the model regions can be understood as part of a learning process, as the model regions' aim is to facilitate learning to other regions.

In Greece monitoring was viewed as learning facilitator, as "...those who learned more are the ones involved in the monitoring and evaluation processes" – apparently enabled by new capacities gained via learning.

In the Spanish case it was stated that among rather young organisations - as process stakeholders - learning and capacity building took place during the dialogue phase. However, there is a strong belief to be sensed also that dialogue alone was not enough to change the process, but triggered capacity building and "...the development of beliefs and preferences for public participation and democratic institutions" (values). This indicates that learning was present to a high degree in this process (PGPF) affecting rather views than actions.

In the Netherlands in case of the Groene Wound process the "Chaos model" practice proves to be relevant for learning as provides for options of different actors' influential decisions in the region. Here feedback rounds and concept negotiations were employed to achieve this. There was apparently continuous adaptation taking place according to the authors, but effectiveness of learning/adaptation however is not obvious, as stated in "...after all this time the reconstruction process still is not properly underway".

The role of new knowledge can be seen on the ecological expertise, which got more recognised and was most essential in the process. In the NfP-PfN process evaluations played the decisive role in adaptation and change and in Austria more specifically internal evaluations and discussions played the main role in the AFD process changes. However, in the AFD the ENGO pressure was a significant reason for process altering. In the corruption case study in Romania institutional learning plays a role and will be furthered by classic evaluations and monitoring accompanied by the positive role of NGOs.

There are just a few cases where learning played no role at all in process change. In these cases change was introduced by e.g. external factors or powerful actors

(NFPH- decision making). There were also cases where simple not much interest appeared towards learning but other motives dominated. The Danish cases show that the underlying motivations for evaluation might be others than learning (e.g. power execution or gaining the overview) and that as a result “...not much consequences to the process” appeared (Boon, Lund and Nathan 2007a, 2007b).

In Germany in the “LEADER +” case the technical feature of evaluation was felt to be hindering institutional learning but self-evaluations were obviously used for this purpose.

In Romania proposals of changes or studies’ results could not influence the process of the habitat directive planning as implementation was not designed.

In the NFPH no learning between policy levels took place and process altering in the decision making phase was due to influential civil servants and not by learning. In contrast to that in the NFPH learning played a crucial role in the drafting phase as source of process change, but it could not be maintained. This case is contrasted most by the PfN-NfP process in the Netherlands, where the influential civil servant (secretary of state) decided to change the process design due to feedbacks from colleagues; therefore the learning effect makes a huge difference and substantial process design changes and legitimates the act of personal intervention with authority to alter the process significantly.

The following table tries to indicate major sources/ideas or methods behind learning or causes of non-learning seen in the processes.

**Table 30: Methods or sources for learning in the processes - overview**

Process	Sources and methods of learning	No learning
AFD	Internal evaluations and discussions	ENGO pressure
GAK	EU evaluations?	
RPF	Crisis elimination needs & actor empowerment	
PGPF	Dialogue	
CORR	Evaluation	
GW	“Chaos model” – shared decision powers	
NP (DK)		Ignorance of evaluation results
NfP-PfN <sup>62</sup>	Evaluation, influential player by learning	
HD (DK)		Feedback on monitoring results not guaranteed
N 2000 (R)		Ignorance of studies
RA	Periodic exchange, self evaluation, FOCUS Groups	
LEADER +		Technical evaluation
NPA	Monitoring and evaluation	

<sup>62</sup> Ex-ante the process. During the work, no evaluations were conducted.

Process	Sources and methods of learning	No learning
CFT	Local initiatives	
NFPH	Thematic WG sessions, open dialogue (drafting)	Change by influential player with authority (decision making)
LF	Evaluation, past experiences	

## Summary

Not surprisingly, we could see from the various forms and ideas behind learning in the cases its context-, and actor-bonded feature and special relevance. Motives for the application of learning or process enhancement methods vary highly and range from extremes of crisis elimination by natural or human disasters (storm vs corruption) to rather normal governance cases of sector development processes of NFPs.

One interesting observation might be that top-down, nature conservation based processes dealt with here, such as the Natura 2000 cases tend to have less process/institutional learning. This is however surprising a bit, but shows top-down approaches' basics of not being often exercised very adaptively. Contrasting to this are the cases where the actor empowerment or grass root initiatives result in high-level learning and its potential to alter the process (RPF, GW, CFT, RA cases).

The special cases of self-evaluation are always employed to facilitate learning in contrast to external evaluations or monitoring, where the motives can be different. Dialogue and exchange-driven learning tends to remain at the stakeholder level, than being transferred to the institutional or process level (PGPF). Special instruments and methods of learning (Focus groups) can show high-level effects especially in combination with other methods (self-evaluation).

The role of evaluation and monitoring in reality is not matching their ideal typical role as in reality they are not always employed by intentions of learning or process enhancement. They might have only informative feature or remain pro-forma obligations as well without feedback to the process (see for more section 4.5.1). Their role as basis for changes/adaptation must be contested on basis of the empirical evidences. This role depends of course on decision making finally. In this respect the cases where local actors' empowerment in decision making was exercised not much role was granted to evaluations in terms of adaptation of the process and process changes. This issue remains however somewhat contradictory in our view.

As said before, learning gets interesting in terms of AIP aspects if its effects feed back to the process formulation or implementation. Increased actor capacity by learning might result in the same effect of course.

### 4.5.2.3 The role of iterativity under uncertain and complex circumstances

## **Iterativity vs. Adaptivity**

There is a fundamental difference between adaptivity and iterativity, as the latter one is a tool, and a process is iterative if it is designed so, while adaptivity is a characteristics of a process, which can be a result of iterativity among many other factors.

### Iterativity

Iterativity in this section will be viewed from two different perspectives. On one hand iterativity is a tool, which can be used for providing framework for negotiations on a large scale among high number of stakeholders. When there is a cyclical order of actions that enables the participants to reflect to or react on developments of the process that have been made since they last had chance to participate, that can facilitate interaction among large number of groups consisting of large number of members. This coordination mechanism is part of our analysis, but its focus is on how to establish and maintain an effective communication rather than focusing on the outputs of the process. Looking at iteration this way does not fit to the analysis of how aims of a process are targeted, and how it is monitored to what extent the aims are achieved.

Another perspective is to look at iterativity as a tool for monitoring the status of the process and the status of achieving aims of the process. In this sense the role of iterativity is to facilitate monitoring or evaluation as well as process changing mechanisms and restart the cyclical actions in order to better fulfil predefined aims.

Either way the tool of iterativity is closely related to complexity of problems and/or an uncertain environment. If the aims to be achieved are of high complexity, or if there are a large number of stakeholders to be coordinated, or if factors to be taken into account are interrelated in a way that makes impossible to impute them exactly, the only choice is to have more than one attempt to achieve the aims, and that requires iterative process design.

### Adaptivity

Adaptivity under this section refers to the process unless stated otherwise. Therefore, we are looking for evidences of a process being able to adapt to something, or even being unable to do so, and analysing the way it takes place. In many cases the term adaptivity or adaptation can confuse the reader when it addresses either the behaviour of participants, or the political traditions, or the reason for the existence of the process, or any other context factors. These are having of course major influence on the process, but describing them adaptive or calling them adaptation does not meant to refer to the nature of the process as such.

In order to avoid confusions, we define a model of process classification for analytical reasons. Empirical data from case studies will be compared to these classes to enable insights and conclusions..

### Model (or things to look at in the case studies)

A) Linearity with regular evaluation at checkpoints that can result in corrections



In cases, when the process has clear and simple aims that are clear and simple enough to specify them at the beginning of the process, and if the context factors are imputable, then a linear process can be designed. Linearity does not always mean a 'single line' structure, as parallel sub-processes and actions can also be organized in a linear manner. The distinctive characteristics of such processes are the straight to the point approach, without loops of actions, even though feedbacks between the actions are possible. These processes might include monitoring and evaluations that serve as checkpoints (milestones) to make sure the process is on track, and if the interim achievements do not meet the predefined aims, clear actions can be taken. The above described processes can be easily identified as projects.

#### B) Iteration based on new attempts to better meet objectives

In more complicated cases, when it is difficult to find direct links between actions and results, exact plans cannot be elaborated. The disability to predict the outcomes can be a result of many factors:

- The lack of sound data/information
- The lack of comprehensive knowledge
- The lack of resources
- Etc.


If there is no chance to find a direct way to the aims, the process needs to put possible actions to the test, and evaluate the outputs. This requires loops in the process design, in order to have more and more attempts, and to see which actions take the process closer to the objectives, and which actions do not. This means at the same time a learning process, in which new knowledge is created from experience that is being built upon in further attempts.

#### C) Adaptation to ensure changes can be responded to

Cyclical process design and iterative approach are also useful tools, when context factors - either internal or external - are likely to change within the time span of the process. These (possible) changes need to be monitored, to make sure the process can react on them. There are two major differences between a simple correction and an adaptation to changes of context factors. After a correction the process, or a part of it is not repeated again, but it continues with the scheduled actions, while adaptation to new situation assumes typically the whole (sub)process to be repeated. Another difference is that correction refers to rather technical issues, while adaptation can affect the process design itself, and can result in more fundamental changes.

Figure 8 illustrates the above deliberated model on process design and terms relating to each other in the sense of this section.

**Figure 8: Classification model of processes by process design and process characteristics**



#### Further considerations on the model

This classification is strongly influenced by the degree of complexity and uncertainty. The degree of these factors cannot be specified objectively, but the application of iteration and adaptation is not based on objective factors either, but rather results of subjective considerations like the perception of, crisis situations, the context factors as stated in some of the case studies at hand.

There is a strong linkage between iteration and adaptation, which is also reflected in the common feature of cyclical process design with periodical monitoring and evaluation. The reason for the differentiation is that we would like to emphasise the different focus of repeated actions, and we also assume, that there are distinguishable cases that have primary focus either closer to iteration, or closer to adaptation.

This close relation between iteration and adaptation means that they have common characteristics, too, and one of the most important of these similarities is that the need for being adaptive or iterative is not always evident from the beginning or at the planning stage. This emphasises the importance of evaluation and learning within the frame of the process, which is typically based on the experience of both internal and external origin gained along process execution.

### Classification of the processes based on empirical data

As a preparation for analysis case studies are classified according to characteristics of the model, namely the design of the process, sources of complexity and uncertainty if there is any. As it was mentioned above the concept of adaptivity has been narrowed down to the property of a process, and adaptation as subject of the process has been excluded, furthermore some conceptual clarification was provided, therefore the classification of cases here may differ from those of the authors.

**Table 31: Classification of case studies with reference to process design, complexity and uncertainty**

Process	1	Cyclical - iterative		2	Complexity		Uncertainty		Comments
		Iteration	Adaptation		Degree	Source	Degree	Source	
AFD	x		x		H	participants			
GAK		X							
RPF	x	X		x	H	subject	H	extreme situation	clearly not adaptive but maybe iterative
FPGP	x				H	actions			
CORR		X				subject	H	changing political environment	consecutive plannings
GW	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
NPP			x		H	participants & subject	H	unpredictable intentions of stakeholders	not applicable
NfP-PfN	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
HD			x		H	subject			was not planned but become cyclical
N 2000	X								
RA	X								loops inside
LEADER +	X				H	levels			
NPA	X								administrative, hierarchical
UH	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
CFT		X			H	subject & new instrument			linearly elaborated plan, iterative execution
NFPH		X			H	new instrument			
LF			x	x	H	subject	H	conflicts	was not planned but become cyclical
BS		X	x						two consecutive documents

Remarks:

1 - Linear – regular,

2 - Iterativity as a communication tool.

### Processes with “historical dimension”

Three of the processes in the GOFOR project represent historical developments, in which the time span, or the changes occurred during the process makes them difficult to evaluate as comprehensive processes, and also according to the authors adaptivity and iterativity are not relevant issues. Their interpretation would be no more than artificial exercise, so they are left out from this part of the analysis. (3 cases from The Netherlands)

### **Linearity**

#### Linear approach

Single line approach is only applicable, when there are definite aims, and a more or less logical way of achieving them. There are five such cases and almost all of them are related to a planning process initiated from a higher level than where it was applied, and in many cases the original initiator is the European Union.

Two cases were dealing with nature protection (*Implementation of acquis communautaire in nature protection in Romania* and the *Designation of national parks in Greece*), and they are both connected to the designation of NATURA 2000 sites. These processes have a large number of examples from other countries, and the EU as the initiator also provides protocols to the process, even though it does not cover each and every step, and not all elements are obligatory. The same applies to the elaboration of *National Forest Program for Catalonia*, which also had former examples.

There are also slightly more complicated cases to classify, as the *Regionen Aktiv* and the *LEADER+* projects in Germany are consisting of stages organized in a linear way, but their utter aim is the adapt EU or other higher level policies to regional level. This confusion originates also from the fact that the consecutive stages interlinked, and the results of evaluations between them are fed back to the next stage. This is a very important characteristic of the processes under study, that if the evaluation is focusing on the outcome of the project, and it feeds back the necessary corrections, then it is different from cases where the functioning of the project is evaluated and redesigning becomes necessary. With other words step-by-step approach is a necessary condition to talk about iterative process, but repeated actions in loops are also required.

This reasoning draws attention to another important feature of policy related processes, namely that a linearly organized process with stages built on each other can be successful, and its performance can be improved with regular evaluations and with necessary corrections. The design is a tool that provides framework for the process and not a measure of the quality of the process.

#### Linearity with iterative implementation

To further prove that linearity in itself is not necessarily a source of negative effects, we would like to draw an example of mixed experiences within one case. *Austrian Forest Dialog* is basically a linear process with well defined stages. On irregularity in

this case is that it demonstrates adaptation without being iterative. At a certain point of the process the question arose as to how far the measures being formulated should be specified, which turned out to be such a significant question that some stakeholders threatened to leave the process if this issue was not agreed on. The negotiations finally altered the process to a different way, which demonstrate that iterativity is not necessarily a prerequisite for adaptation, however, the process at this stage definitely stepped back and theoretically it can be seen as a loop.

There is a mixture of linearity and iterativity within the same process. This example beside others illustrates the combination of a linear planning phase, when steps are well designed and organized in a logical order, while the implementation of the elaborated plan is iterative in nature, and is being revised regularly and developed further as necessary.

## **Iteration**

### Iteration as means for communication and means for tackling uncertainty

There are examples in the case studies in which iterativity is manifested, but its function is not (or not exclusively) to test new attempts, but rather to coordinate communication among stakeholders. The most typical situation, where such arrangement can contribute to the organized participation of stakeholders is when there are too many of them, and it is impossible for everybody to actively take part in actions at the same time. In the *Forest Relief Plan* case from France represents an even more interesting example, in which the elaboration of the plan was carried out in an iterative manner with the involvement of actors from different levels (local and national).

### Iteration in the long run

Iteration as a tool can be observed typically in the long run processes, as the wide time span makes regular evaluation and the repetition of a process almost inevitable. Many examples support this observation and probably even more would support it, if the case studies were all covering at least mid-term processes. From this point of view the *Anti-corruption Policy* in Romania is worth being highlighted, as the overall process is divided into phases that are targeted to revise a plan, and since the country experienced sudden and turbulent changes compared to western European countries, iterative approach and evaluations in particular contributed to a developments in this field largely. But also the *Forest Relief Plan*, which was already cited in connection with the role of iterativity in communication, has demonstrated that in an unusual situation like after a heavy wind fall, when new measures need to be taken, the continuous evaluations and repeated actions to meet the needs the process is to handle is of an outstanding importance.

## **Adaptation**

Probably the most extreme occurrence of adaptation in a process is when the subject of adaptation is the design of the process itself. The *Living Forest* case study from Norway reported a major crisis, which temporarily suspended the process and required a complete restructuring. As a result, the formerly linearly organized steps

were replaced by iterative steps, so that there are more room for negotiations and interest harmonisation among stakeholders, and the uncertainty formerly originated from the conflicts within the process was mostly eliminated this way.

The *National Park* case study from Denmark represents an adaptive and iterative process, which in opposite of the case from Norway, was originally designed to be adaptive. It originates from the fact that the process had no definite aims for establishing national parks, but rather it was launched to provide a framework for negotiations. Results of the stages of the process influenced the further developments not only by feeding back experiences, but also by deciding how to continue on.

This case offers an important comparison with the process of a similar subject from Greece. While both cases were dealing with the same issue of establishing national parks, there is a major difference of process design. Looking at these processes from a different point of view one can realise that despite of the same issue, the adaptive approach was necessary to employ in the case from Denmark, so as stakeholders can get familiar with the idea, and the possible conflicts can be resolved before they actually appear, while the process in Greece had a rather technical nature.

Failure of a process plan can lead to adaptation, as this failure leads the process into a crisis situation to be resolved, as it took place in the Forest Dialog in Austria. Another example for such conversation is the Habitat Directive from Denmark. There is also a similar process to this from Romania, where again the same subject was dealt with differently. The core of the issue was to implement an EU regulation in member states, and it was planned to accomplish in a linear way in both cases. Since in Romania the successful implementation was a prerequisite of the EU accession - just like for all other new member countries – there was a very strong motivation for carrying it out successfully, while in Denmark such an important change in the rural areas needed a more careful approach, in which interests could be harmonized according to the country's political traditions.

## Summary

The case studies in the GOFOR project coming from different fields are influenced by different context factors, and cover different time span. They also represent different development stages of processes. This variety of cases prevent us from conducting rigid comparative analyses, but on the other hand, they provided wide range of examples on how process design, complexity and uncertainty are linked to each other.

Throughout the GOFOR project the term adaptivity was conceptualized at least three different ways: 'Adaptive' refers to the process itself but also to the issues dealt with and the approaches towards solving the problems.' (GOFOR, 2006). It was agreed in the GOFOR meetings to use the broader sense in the case study reporting. However, to avoid confusion in the comparative analysis adaptation had to be narrowed down to the characteristics of the processes. A conclusion to this issue is that to be very specific in using these terms, when policy makers or other parties call for adaptive and iterative processes. By this substantial misunderstandings should be sorted out on the demand side towards a process. As illustration the following

statement can be made: In the demand there is a difference to call for a process to maintain ability of being adaptive, or there is a need to launch a process that is to deliver an adaptation of policy, incentives, etc. as an outcome.

The hypothetical model of the arrangement and relationship of process design and process characteristics was traceable in the case studies, but clear demarcation of linearity, iterativity and adaptivity was not possible. On the contrary, the preliminary assumption that iterativity is a prerequisite for adaptation proved to be an incomplete statement. Case examples support that a basically linear process can adapt to new situations as well (RPF, CFT, RA). There are also more examples representing successful delivery of predefined tasks in a linearly organized process, in which monitoring and evaluation plays a significant role, and therefore linearity as a process design cannot be judged in itself.

Complexity of problems to deal with and uncertain environment were represented in the cases diversely. Sources of these interrelated factors typically were the strategic level of operation, wide time span, high number of stakeholders or levels, or the subject itself. There is no general rule of how to handle complex and uncertain situations, and as it was mentioned above even these situations can be handled with simple methods. In our view failures and successes highlighted not only the importance of applying a 'get ready for changes' attitude in those cases, but they also suggested that the broader involvement of people (stakeholders) in policy making and policy application is preferred, the more adaptive process should be expected in which iteration is one of the most important facilitator.

#### **4.5.3 Concluding remarks on AIP**

In general, the case studies show that AIP aspects were institutionalized only to a limited degree, with some clear exceptions. The specific concepts "adaptive" or "iterative" were seldom used. Still, several of the relevant policy documents called indirectly for aspects of AIP like periodic monitoring, evaluation, prescribed repetitive stages of process design and implementation. These aspects indicate policy intentions to take up tasks in an adaptive and iterative way.

A governance process is an undertaking, which is often characterized by significant uncertainty as well as complexity. Complexity in the problems to deal with and uncertain environment were diversely represented in the cases. Sources of these interrelated factors typically were the strategic level of operation, wide time span, high number of stakeholders or levels, or the subject itself. There seems to be no general rule for how to handle complex and uncertain situations, as even these situations can be handled with rather simple methods achieving clear targets or goals.

Failures and successes highlighted in the GOFOR cases evidence not only the importance of applying a 'get ready for changes' attitude in those cases, but they also suggest that the broader involvement of people (stakeholders) in policy making and

policy application is preferred, the more adaptive process should be expected in which iteration is one of the most important facilitator.

Another important aspect is the learning effect in such a complex and/or uncertain situation over time. Repeated learning along its time span is crucial towards the success or failure of a given governance process. This has posed some important challenges for the stakeholders in the GoFOR-processes. One possible strategy to promote learning could be to integrate a system for repeated monitoring and evaluations in the process design. The GoFOR-case studies show that almost every GoFOR-process have integrated some kind of system for evaluation and monitoring. On the other hand, the aim, the design, and the application of these systems have differed quite a lot between the projects.

The analysis shows that even if evaluations were the most frequent source of adaptations among the GoFOR-processes, the number of processes adapting to external challenges is rather low. There were cases which illustrate that monitoring and evaluations have the potential to play an important role in improving the efficiency of governance processes. The findings in general however, prove that this potential is far from being realized in most of the GoFOR-processes. It also means that the role of evaluation and monitoring in reality is not matching their ideal typical role as in reality they are not always employed by intentions of learning or process enhancement. They might have only informative feature or remain pro-forma obligations as well without feedback to the process.

The most frequently mentioned motive for conducting evaluations has been enhancing efficiency, followed by promoting learning and being an external requirement for receiving funding. The initiative or requirement for conducting evaluations has generally been taken by national or international authorities (EU). The choice of evaluator and the subject being evaluated also differed.

Their predefined or assumed role as the most important basis for changes/adaptation must be however contested on basis of the empirical evidences in most of our cases. Of course, finally this depends on decision making. In the cases where local actors' empowerment in decision making was exercised, not much role was granted to evaluations in terms of adaptation of the process and process changes.

Related to learning in the processes we saw that special reflective methods used as e.g. self-evaluation can highly facilitate learning at the stakeholder- and also at the institutional/process level. Somewhat contrasting is the role of external evaluations or monitoring in terms of learning effects as their application motives vary significantly in the cases. This indicates that motivation remains the basic aspect of individual or institutional learning and the mean of prescribed evaluation or monitoring application does not guarantee the process ability to adapt or change itself if needed. The need for action on basis of the evaluation and monitoring results remains as political responsibility of decision makers.

It is also worth to consider that dialogue and exchange-driven learning tends to remain at the stakeholder level, than being transferred to the institutional or process level in our empirical studies. This indicates that a continuous actor engagement over



the whole process timeline is crucial in terms of process adaptation. The analysis show that top-down processes tend to have less process/institutional learning - as illustrated here e.g. by Natura 2000 cases – as being often not exercised to have room for enough adaptation and changes in practice. Cases with actor empowerment or grass root initiatives tend to result in high-level learning and have the potential to alter the process as having more decision making/influencing potential in a governance sense.

Finally, it is to be stressed that policy makers or other parties should be very specific when calling for adaptive and iterative processes. By this distinction, substantial misunderstandings can be sorted out on the demand side towards a process. It must be noted that there is a difference in the need for a process to maintain ability of being adaptive, or there is a need to launch a process that is to deliver an adaptation of policy, incentives, etc. as an outcome. In this respect is further to be considered that analytically is not easy to identify clear roles of iteration or means of adaptation should play as they are closely interrelated to each other. But the preliminary assumption that iterative process design is a prerequisite for adaptation proved to be an incomplete statement. Case examples support that a basically linear process can adapt to new situations as well. There are also more examples representing successful delivery of predefined tasks in a linearly organized process, in which monitoring and evaluation plays a significant role, and therefore linearity as a process design cannot be judged negatively in itself.

## 5 Effects of the governance processes studied

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### 5.1 Introduction: the effects of GoFOR governance processes

This chapter strives for identifying and evaluating different types of effects of the governance processes which were studied in GoFOR. The objective of describing these effects and also evaluating these processes' performance is a quite demanding task. Ideally, determining the extent to which a process achieved its goals starts from well-specified process objectives (cf. Berk and Rossi, 1990). Hence, before proceeding with the analysis, the starting question is whether the governance processes provided such well-specified, concrete, or even quantitative targets, or whether the goals remained rather vague.

A uniform answer to this is not possible. Overall it can be stated that most of the processes lack a real concrete framework of goals, they lack well-defined strategic objectives which might serve as a yardstick to "measure" the changes induced by the processes. This is, for example, most obvious in the cases that refer to biodiversity conservation where ambiguity of the definition of biodiversity restricts straight forward evaluation. In other cases, objectives are introducing vague and generic concepts such as "sustainable development", often without providing further substantiation.

Overall the analysis of effects shows a patchwork of different categories of effects. Looking at the picture as a whole, it can be inferred that the majority of case processes delivered programmes, instruments, strategies etc. as well as some changes in the actors' behaviour. But most of them resulted much less in identifiable effects in terms of bio-physical changes, i.e. outcomes "on the ground".


This finding points to another limitation as regards the scope of this analysis, namely the "immaturity" of a number of case processes that were examined in GoFOR. Most of them are rather at the stage of policy formulation and/or in the process of implementation. It has to be noted, that this is not a result of a faulty research design, but resulted from the fact that the kind of governance processes which are subject to the GoFOR research interest are rather young to the policy domains that stand central to our research interest. However, as a consequence the full range of "effects" cannot be addressed (yet) in a number of cases. They are not yet advanced enough to allow for final conclusions about their material implications; e.g. about the outcomes "in the forests" even though they may very likely deliver tangible effects in a longer perspective.

From our analysis it furthermore appears that "time" (immaturity) cannot be the only reason for some processes not having overcoming the stage of output or impacts yet. Our analyses will provide an empirical basis to judge whether the immaturity of a process is indeed the only explanatory factor for poor or inexistent effects "on the ground" or whether other reasons may explain barriers to implementation.

The following subchapter first introduces a typology of effects. Then the case studies will be synthesised as regards the types of effects that resulted from the governance processes. The ambitious research question here is whether we can find some characteristic patterns or tendencies in these effects from a comparative perspective.

## 5.2 Categories of effects: definitions

Political scientists interested in the evaluation of public policies typically distinguish between “output”, “impact” and “outcome”. For the evaluation of effects, it has proven useful to build on this heuristic (Figure 9). We consider outputs as the programmes, strategies, plans (in a broader sense) that result from a governance process. With the term impacts we address changes in the policy actors’ behaviour. Finally, outcomes are defined as consequences in terms of biophysical changes, i.e. changes which may have materialised at the end of the causal chain from the process and its output via the impacts.



**Figure 9: Heuristic frame to operationalise “effects” of governance processes**

While our governance processes may well contribute to such changes along the chain from outputs to outcomes, establishing such direct causal relations empirically is notoriously difficult to document because of the many intervening factors, the diversity of conditions and the time lags involved (Cash & Clark, 2001). However, the effectivity of specific governance processes can not only be evaluated through its ultimate effects “on the ground”, but also by assessing the effects “upstream” along the causal chain from the immediate outputs to the impacts in the actors’ behaviour, which may finally indeed result in outcomes on the ground. From an *ad hoc* analysis of case reports, it is evident that in most case studies, effects are identifiable more in the form of outputs and in the form of impacts but to a lesser degree in terms of biophysical changes (i.e. outcomes).

Furthermore, it was our ambition to identify “effects” of the governance processes not only by differentiating these three major categories but in a more nuanced manner. Therefore, based on the synthesised empirical results from all the case studies, we inductively defined more nuanced sub-types of effects.

### Types of Outputs

Regarding outputs, some case studies, especially those referring to strategy processes, have delivered new programmes, plans, policies or strategy papers. In other cases the outputs took the form of guidelines, provincial plans and agreements or projects and technical reports.

Furthermore, in the majority of the cases, outputs have also appeared in the form of new or modified legislature, framework acts, policy recommendations or governmental decisions. Other types of outputs refer to the introduction of new or modified policy instruments such as financial means. This sub-category also includes approaches that represent a move from command and control to approaches that stressing shared responsibilities of citizens, that explore alternative funding schemes, or emphasise informational means or self-steering arrangements instead.

Another sub-category of output refers to changes in the distribution of competencies. In general, this sub-category contains all the various effects induced by a varying degree of decentralisation which influenced the traditional picture of power distribution.

The last sub-type of output refers to the institutionalisation of actor forums (in terms of working groups, partnership schemes, steering committees etc.).

### **Types of Impacts**

The typology developed to analyse impacts particularly stresses the policy actors' behavioural changes that resulted from the governance processes; stakeholders and state administrators building up frameworks of action, encouraging more open processes, changing attitudes, and becoming more cooperative and active over time etc. Changes were also found in terms of interest intermediation. New conflict resolution frameworks were designed and new coalitions between regional and state actors as well as new actor alliances have been detected.

The analysis of the case findings also revealed re-allocation of funds or the allocation of additional funds and/or personnel resources as powerful policy instruments.

Another significant type of impact that was detected is that new issues were put on the policy agendas or increased in relevance through the governance processes. E.g. some cases showed increasing consideration of social and economic aspects or have put specific processes higher on regional agendas.

Furthermore, several cases reported effects in the very nature of the debate among stakeholders, e.g. changes to a more open dialogue, increasing opportunities for mutual feedback etc. Such significant impacts include changes with a positive impact on social capital such as the development of local actor networks or the development of new actor coalitions. In other cases, such as the regional development cases, actors which had little in common before became involved into joint planning and cooperation.

Finally, a last sub-type of impact refers to the identification of knowledge gaps and the mobilization of expertise. In some cases local actors, private and administrative actors have benefited from interactive learning process, and the role of lay knowledge and local experiences increased through the processes.

### **Types of Outcomes**

The empirical identification of outcomes has been a hard task. Most of outcomes are not quantifiable. In many cases it is simply too early to judge upon outcomes. Hence, we attempted to account for outcomes not only in the form of manifest bio-physical changes on the ground but also in the form of direct influences to mainstream policies and strategies, in plans or on the site projects which originated from the governance process and are close to the implementation on the ground.

**Table 32: Types of effects (output, impact, outcomes) identified by GoFOR governance cases**

Types of outputs	Types of impacts	Types of outcomes
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ New (or revised) strategies, programmes or plans (as a “document”) New (or revised) strategies, programmes or plans (as a “document”)</li> <li>➤ New laws, reforms of existing laws, administrative acts, recommendations</li> <li>➤ Introduction of new policy instruments (e.g., new or revised guidelines for subsidy schemes) or changes in the predominant type of policy instruments (e.g. from regulatory to financial, informational or self-regulatory)</li> <li>➤ Changes in the distributions of competencies (e.g. for implementation, reformulation)</li> <li>➤ Institutionalisation of actor forums (e.g., foundation of a Forest Forum for Decision Makers and; Inner-bureaucratic working groups, platforms of interest groups)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ Changing behaviour or strategies of key actors and target groups</li> <li>➤ Changes in interest intermediation, conflicts, coalitions</li> <li>➤ (Re-)allocation of resources (budgets, personnel, e.g. in administration and interest groups)</li> <li>➤ Putting issues on the policy agenda or raising the visibility of policy issues</li> <li>➤ Changing the terms of the debate or changing ways of thinking</li> <li>➤ Developing actor networks or institutional capacities</li> <li>➤ Identifying knowledge gaps and needs</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ Initiation of follow-up projects, initiatives etc.</li> <li>➤ Influence to mainstream policies-strategies-institutions</li> <li>➤ (Bio) physical changes</li> </ul>

### 5.3 The outputs of the governance processes

A comprehensive account of the major outputs of all the case study processes classified across the typology developed in the previous section is shown in Table 33. New policy documents, strategies, plans or other programmatic texts and technical reports appear to be the most frequent outputs (except GER-L+ and GER-GAK). This seems to be related to the fact that a lot of efforts were devoted into formulating the policy framework in which, the new governance process should operate towards implementation, i.e. before operationalisation stages take place. This is particularly true for “strategy processes”, which typically produce “nice” outputs (e.g. in the form of booklets or strategy papers) but often lack concrete, substantially defined goals with clear time frames for implementation and references to the the policy tools to be applied. According to case reports, the majority of the processes have set a wide variety of somewhat general goals, without clearly defined priorities and without very concrete or even quantitative targets. For example, in the cases referring to the field of nature conservation, there are processes such as GR-MA, AT-BS, ROM-NAT, which lacked quantifiable targets and timeframes. Documents were littered with wording such as “to review”, “to consider”, “to examine” and “to study further”. In contrast, the the cases of DK-HD, DK-NPP and NL-NfP have set specific and relevant targets and especially the Danish cases studies both claim good achievement of action plans and conservation effort.

The national responses to the international demands for comprehensive strategies for sustainable forest management also provide some but a limited variety in the characteristics of their deliverables, with most processes producing new programmes that contain general statements of intent, guidelines, administrative documents, measures and action proposals (AT-AFD, HU-NFP).

**Table 33: Output types by case studies**

Types of outputs	Identifiable	Not identifiable
New (or revised) strategies, programmes or plans (as a “document”) New (or revised) strategies, programmes or plans (as a “document”)	FR-CFT, FR-RPF, AT-AFD, HU-NFP, NOR-LF, SP-NFP, ROM-ACP, <b>NL-NfP, ROM-NAT, AT-BS, DK-HD, DK-NPP, GER-IRD, GER-RA, NL-GW, NL-UH,</b>	<i>GER-L+, GER-GAK</i> <b>GR-MA</b>
New laws, reforms of existing laws, administrative acts, recommendations	FR-CFT, FR-RPF, HU-NFP, NOR-LF, ROM-ACP, <b>GR-MA, ROM-NAT, AT-BS, DK-HD, DK-NPP, GER-L+, GER-RA,</b>	<i>NL-GW, NL-UH, GER-IRD, GER-GAK, AT-AFD, SP-NFP, NL-NFP</i>
Introduction of new policy instruments (e.g., new or revised guidelines for subsidy schemes) or changes in the predominant type of policy instruments (e.g. from regulatory to financial, informational or seNOR-LF-regulatory)	<b>NL-NFP, AT-BS, NPDD, GER-RA, GER-IRD, GER-L+, FR-CFT</b>	FR-RPF, AT-AFD, HU-NFP, NOR-LF, SP-NFP, ROM-ACP, <b>GR-MA, ROM-NAT, DK-HD, GER-GAK, NL-GW, NL-UH,</b>
Changes in the distributions of competencies (e.g. for implementation, reformulation)	FR-CFT, FR-RPF, NOR-LF, ROM-ACP, <i>GER-RA, GER-L+, NL-GW, NL-UH, DK-HD, DK-NPP</i>	AT-AFD, HU-NFP, SP-NFP, <b>GR-MA, ROM-NAT, AT-BS, GER-GAK, GER-IRD</b>
Institutionalisation of actor forums (e.g., foundation of a Forest Forum for Decision Makers and; Inner-bureaucratic working groups, platforms of interest groups)	FR-CFT, FR-RPF, AT-AFD, NOR-LF, ROM-ACP, <i>GER-L+, GER-RA, GER-IRD, NL-UH, GR-MA, ROM-NAT, AT-BS</i>	<b>NL-NFP, DK-HD, DK-NPP, NL-GW, GER-GAK, HU-NFP, SP-NFP</b>

Legend: Forest related case studies

**Biodiversity and nature related case studies (bold)**

*Rural development related case studies (Italics)*

The formulation of new regulation or the revision of existing legal means also appears as a quite popular approach in many of our cases. The formulation of legal means differed significantly across case studies: on the one hand, the rural development processes, with the exception of GER-L+ and GER-RA, did not entail a reshaping of national legislations. On the other hand, the implementation of anticorruption policy in Romania is strongly dependent on large scale reforms of the justice system including a great deal of new legislation.

In many cases, the formulation of new strategies, and the creation of actor groups are vital requirements, especially for those processes in which the implementation is a binding mandate, e.g. based on EU regulations such as the Habitat Directive.

Other outputs refer to the introduction of and/or modification of existing policy means that can either include new financing schemes, also including investigations of possibilities for using subsidy schemes for financing national parks (DK-NPP), funding of projects instead of direct “base funding” (FR-CFT), more intensive use of market-based instruments, like competition for funding (GER-RA), or schemes that shift from purely regulatory features to informational or self-regulatory ones (GER-L+, NL-NPPNP). The latter kind of output is represented by the GER-RA case, the output of which comprises a mix of market-based, informational and regulatory means.

Another frequent type of output refers to changes in the distribution of competencies, occurring overall in 10 cases. It includes a variety of expressions ranging from decentralisation efforts, which gave provincial actors and governments more powers in cases such as NL-GW, NL-UH, GR-MA, FR-CFT, and to strengthening the roles of regional actors and networks (GER-L+, GER-RA). This type of effects has been apparent in more mature cases and less in those that are at the stage of policy formulation or at the initial stage of implementation. This might indicate different types of outputs that are developed over time with more institutional reform likely to occur at the outset of processes, whilst modification of regulatory means is likely to occur rather at subsequent stages. Assuming this, some of the case processes may be too “young” for going beyond the stage of the former types of output. However, others processes are already quite advanced but they still have not yet gone beyond these outputs. The Hungarian NFP and the Austrian Biodiversity Strategy process are good examples in this respect. They could have gone further for quite some time in principle, but still they got stuck at the stage of strategies and programmes.

A final type of output materialises in the institutionalisation of new actor forums. It is a significant development in many of the governance process, which often empowers the representation of broad societal interests in the decision-making process and builds up participatory capacities. Practically this is provided in a variety of forms such as steering committees or expert panels (FR-CFT, FR-RPF), working groups (AT-BS), actor forums (ROM-ACP, AT-FD), various commissions and committees (NL-GW, NL-UH), boards (GR-MA) or councils (NOR-LF).

## **5.4 The impacts of the governance processes**

An analysis of different types of impacts across the case studies is shown in Table 34.

**Table 34: Impact types produced by case studies**

Types of impacts	Identifiable	Not identifiable
Changing behaviour or strategies of key actors and target groups	FR-CFT, FR-RPF, AT-AFD, HU-NFP, NOR-LF, SP-NFP, ROM-ACP, <b>GR-MA, NL-NfP, ROM-NAT, AT-BS, DK-HD, DK-NPP</b> , <i>GER-RA, GER-L+, NL-GW, NL-UH</i> ,	<i>GER-IRD, GER-GAK</i>
Changes in interest intermediation, conflicts, coalitions	<i>GER-GAK, GER-IRD, GER-L+, GER-RA, NL-GW, NL-UH</i> , FR-CFT, NOR-LF	<b>GR-MA, NL-NfP, ROM-NAT, AT-BS, DK-HD, DK-NPP</b> , FR-RPF, AT-AFD, HU-NFP, SP-NFP, ROM-ACP
(Re-)allocation of resources (budgets, personnel, e.g. in administration and interest groups)	FR-CFT, FR-RPF, AT-AFD, NOR-LF, <b>GR-MA, AT-BS, DK-HD</b> , <i>GER-RA, GER-L+</i>	<i>GER-IRD, GER-GAK, NL-GW, NL-UH</i> , HU-NFP, SP-NFP, ROM-ACP, <b>NL-NfP, ROM-NAT, DK-NPP</b>
Putting issues on the agenda and/or raising the visibility of policy issues	FR-CFT, FR-RPF, AT-AFD, HU-NFP, <b>NL-NfP, AT-BS</b> , <i>GER-RA, GER-L+, NL-GW, NL-UH</i>	<b>GR-MA, ROM-NAT, DK-HD, DK-NPP</b> , NOR-LF, SP-NFP, ROM-ACP, <i>GER-GAK, GER-IRD</i>
Changing the terms of the debate, changing ways of thinking	<i>GER-RA, GER-IRD, GER-L+, GER-GAK, NL-GW, NL-UH</i> , FR-CFT, FR-RPF, AT-AFD, HU-NFP, NOR-LF, <b>GR-MA, DK-NPP, DK-HD</b>	SP-NFP, ROM-ACP
Developing actor networks or institutional capacities	FR-CFT, FR-RPF, NOR-LF, HU-NFP, ROM-ACP, <i>GER-RA, GER-L+, NL-GW</i> , <b>AT-BS, DK-NPP</b>	<b>GR-MA, NL-NfP, ROM-NAT, DK-HD</b> , <i>GER-IRD, GER-GAK, NL-UH</i> , AT-AFD, SP-NFP
Identifying knowledge gaps and needs	FR-CFT, FR-RPF, AT-AFD, HU-NFP, NOR-LF, <b>AT-BS, DK-NPP</b>	<i>GER-RA, GER-IRD, GER-L+, GER-GAK, NL-GW, NL-UH</i> , <b>GR-MA, NL-NfP, ROM-NAT, DK-HD</b> , SP-NFP, ROM-ACP

Legend: Forest related case studies

**Biodiversity and nature related case studies (bold)**

*Rural development related case studies (italics)*

There are two divergent tendencies observed in the table above. Firstly, by large the vast majority of case studies have reported changes of the behaviour of actors or actor coalitions. Case reports revealed that processes have empowered the actors' participatory abilities and have helped setting decision-making in a more transparent and open framework (AT-AFD, GR-MA, ROM-NAT, DK-HD). Likewise, in the course of processes the attitudes of actors have changed, in a way of becoming more cooperative, e.g. in cases such as the GER-L+, NL-UH and NL-GW, or by establishing a larger degree of trust and exhibiting a greater will for compromise



(NOR-LF). Impacts were also observed in terms of increasing transparency of the processes as a whole and in certain cases this also resulted in the dissemination of information about the process to the broader public, changes in the communication style between the involved actors, e.g. as reported in the report on the Catalan Forest Programme process.

Considering such behavioural changes of actors and organisations, it is no surprise that in a sizeable number of cases (8), new actor networks and coalitions have evolved (GER-GAK, GER-IRD, GER-L+), greater capacities were assigned which contributed to increasing social capital (GER-RA). It is noteworthy that, in contrast to processes in the fields of forestry and biodiversity conservation, all rural development-oriented processes have exhibited an increased networking and the formation of new coalitions. A plausible explanation for this could be that rural development activities have, by definition, to take integrated approaches.

On the other hand, when it comes to the (re-)distribution of new or existing financial means as well as to changes in personnel, this is the case in half of the processes (9). In most cases, the processes stimulated changes in the distribution of funds, either by creating new funding means (FR-RPF), by mobilising additional state resources (AT-BS) or by making clear from the outset that implementation costs will have to be taken by those actors who voluntarily have taken over responsibility for implementation (AT-AFD, NOR-LF). In the Greek case, the most common way for increasing funds and channelling additional resources is by using EU structural funds and development programmes. Money flow was found to result from increased political backing of the process by the government, which in return, is due to the binding nature of the Habitat Directive.

It is widely recognised that all processes examined in the GoFoR project aim at increasing participative and cooperative capacities in policy planning and decision-making as well as increasing the use of new mechanisms for political legitimisation (e.g. legitimisation by consensus and/or by scientific expertise). This has modified the policy agenda and raised new aspects of public management concepts in quite some processes (10). The impacts recorded ranged from a general acceptance of the ideal of societal responsibility and a broader perspective towards nature conservation and the use of natural resources (NL-NfP), up to administrators using processes as arguments to legitimise their actions and to reinforce their political demands (AT-BS) or to set issues of nature conservation and rural development higher on national agendas (GER-RA, GER-L+, NL-GW and NL-UH).

Furthermore, our comparative analysis points to changes in the way of actors' thinking in all rural development processes and also in most of the forestry and biodiversity related cases. Such changes included the introduction of a more participatory terminology (AT-AFD) as well as a more participatory behaviour of actor groups regionally (GR-MA, GER-RA, GER-L+) and emphasising the need for deliberation and intersectoral coordination (FR-CFT, FR-RPF). In other cases, such changes manifest as the reduction/elimination of prejudices (DK-NPP) among actors and generally to concepts of policy planning which favour more integrated approaches instead of sectorial ones (NL-GW, NL-UH).

Another type of impact refers to the involvement of networking activities between actors, organisations, interest groups and administrators. In other circumstances and in traditional models of policy planning, getting those actor groups together would have been a difficult and hard task to accomplish. Empirical evidence suggests that almost half of the case processes (10) have contributed to the development of some

broadened cooperation (DK-NPP, ROM-ACP, NO-LF) and/or to the establishment of informal coalitions (GER-RA, GER-L+, NL-GW, NL-UH).

However, the impacts of the GoFOR case processes were not only positive ones. In some cases processes also resulted in increased uncertainty as regards policy implementation. This is the case e.g. in the Danish Habitat Directive process, where the initial, profound uncertainty about the proper interpretation of the HD as regards the specification, the designation and the monitoring of conservation sites resulted in a high level of mistrust among landowners and the Nature Agency. Also the development of EU rural development programmes such as Leader Plus added another administrative chain to the pre-existing structures, which undoubtedly increased the volume of administrative bureaucracy at the provincial level.

## 5.5 The outcomes of the governance processes

As stated above, a critical factor as regards the potential to evaluate biophysical effects (i.e. outcomes in a narrow sense) is the progress of the processes. The majority of our case processes are in early stages of implementation. Consequently, long or medium-term effects in terms of such outcomes in a narrow sense can not be identified empirically. Hence, we applied a broader definition of outcomes, to also grasp effects that are close to implementation on the ground (see above).

Table 35 indicates the case studies with the most obvious types of outcome as found in the case reports. The Norwegian Living forest process is the only case for which tangible and concrete outcomes are clearly trace- and identifiable, e.g. an increase in the areas of old growth forests and dead woods, improvements in regeneration cutting regimes and increased areas of mire and swamp forests.

**Table 35: Types of outcomes found in the case studies**

Types of outcome	Identifiable	Not identifiable
Initiation of follow-up projects, initiatives etc.	FR-CFT, HU-NFP, <b>GR-MA, DK-NPP</b> , <i>GER-IRD, GER-L+</i>	FR-RPF, AT-AFD, NOR-LF, SP-NFP, ROM-ACP, <b>NL-NfP, ROM-NAT, AT-BS, DK-HD</b> , <i>GER-GAK, GER-RA</i> ,
Influence to mainstream policies-strategies-institutions	FR-RPF, NOR-LF, ROM-ACP, <b>ROM-NAT, DK-HD</b> , <i>GER-L+, GER-RA, NL-GW</i> ,	FR-CFT, AT-AFD, HU-NFP, SP-NFP, <b>GR-MA, NL-NfP, AT-BS, DK-NPP</b> , <i>GER-IRD, GER-GAK, NL-UH</i>
(Bio) physical changes	NOR-LF, ROM-ACP, <b>ROM-NAT, DK-HD</b> , NL-GW	FR-CFT, FR-RPF, AT-AFD, HU-NFP, SP-NFP, <b>GR-MA, AT-BS, NL-NfP, DK-NPP</b> , <i>GER-RA, GER-IRD, GER-L+, GER-GAK, NL-UH</i>

Legend: Forest related case studies

**Biodiversity and nature related case studies (bold)**

*Rural development related case studies (Italics)*

Furthermore it is noteworthy that some of the identified effects are resulted from causes of temporary nature, e.g. depending on external factors such as national/sectoral crisis. Such factors have influenced institutional changes in directions opposite to expectations. For example, in France, the Relief Plan for

Forests led to a spectacular comeback of the central state into the design of the forest policy. Moreover, it empowered the role of the Ministry of Agriculture and significantly weakened the role of the Ministry of Environment in forestry issues. However, the resulting high concentration of powers is expected to decrease when the crisis situation is solved. In the German processes examined in the GoFOR project, GER-L + and GER-RA the respective processes allowed a mainstreaming of rural development measures for achieving synergies.

Other outcomes were judged critical or ambivalent: E.g. in the case DEN-HD the significant increases and concentration of available funds for establishing nature conservation sites according to the EU Natura 2000 regulations was seen as limiting the availability of national funds to conserve nature outside the Natura 2000 network. Some critics have highlighted such a steering mechanism also in the GR-MA case.

### **Concluding Remarks**

The present chapter provided a comprehensive synthesis of the effects that we found in the GoFoR case studies in terms of outputs, impacts and outcomes. It became obvious that all processes resulted in a variety of outputs, impacts and outcomes. But it also has to be said that the majority of the processes that were studied are “immature” in terms of the stage of the policy cycle: Most of them are at the early stages of policy implementation. Hence, the GoFOR project was well able to assess and categorize a huge variety of outputs and also a good number of different kinds of impacts, but only a few outcomes in terms of effects in the bio-physical environment. However, the “immaturity” of cases is obviously not the only reasons for that: there were also cases where concrete plans and strategies have been decided upon quite some time ago but implementation was slow so far and/or stagnated for other reasons which are related to the processes themselves (for detailed conclusion on “effects” from see chapter 6).

## 6 Conclusions: policy-relevant findings

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### 6.1 New modes of governance: dimensions and causes

As the previous chapters have shown, governance theory offers a great potential in opening up alternative ways and perspectives to look upon political institutions, political decision-making processes, as well as policy contents and instruments. In the theoretical debate the term governance is often connected to several changes in relation to political structures, actors and modes of policy-making. The GoFOR project provided us with the opportunity to describe and analyse such changes in 19 case studies from ten European countries and across different policy fields.

Our case studies therefore constitute a rich empirical basis to analytically shed light on these new modes of governance and on the interaction of state and society in processes of collective problem-solving. The cross-case comparison draws an interesting picture of the degree to which governance arrangements are institutionalized in different empirical contexts and enriches our analytical understanding of such arrangements. Across the 19 case studies we detected innovations and changes related to the main components of governance as defined in the introductory chapter of this report.

Table 36 provides a framework for the analysis of new modes governance along the three classical dimensions of political analysis, i.e. polity, politics, and policy. Along those dimensions we will first (in the second part of this sub-chapter) deal with the **causal factors** leading to new governance arrangements. The next sub-chapter (6.2) will discuss the importance and the role of different **governance elements** in new policy arrangements and the concluding sub-chapter (6.3) will summarise the empirical reality of **governance effects** from the GoFOR case studies.

**Table 36: New Modes of Governance - Dimensions and Causal Factors**

Dimension	Cause of change	Governance elements	Expected governance effect
Structural/Institutional (Polity)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Internationalization</li> <li>• Europeanization</li> <li>• Decentralization</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Establishment of a multi-level system</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Loss of national sovereignty</li> <li>• Increase of regional/local autonomy</li> </ul>
Actor-related (Politics)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Loss of legitimation</li> <li>• Cross-sectoral coordination deficits</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Participation</li> <li>• Intersectoral coordination</li> <li>• Democratic and accountable expertise</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Enlargement of actor networks in terms of sectors and societal domains (public/private)</li> <li>• Increasing levels of co-ordination and cooperation</li> <li>• Increasing input and output legitimacy</li> <li>• New/changing roles of state actors</li> <li>• Additional resources, competences and information available</li> </ul>
Content-related (Policy)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Limits of command-and-control regulation</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Less hierarchical steering</li> <li>• Adaptive and iterative policy making</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• New instruments (e.g. strategy processes)</li> <li>• Mix of modes of coordination</li> <li>• increased flexibility, higher efficiency</li> <li>• Policy learning</li> </ul>

The discernable trend towards new modes of governance is driven by a number of causal factors stemming from the economic, political and social environment of governments. In Table 36 these factors were grouped along three political dimensions: structural and institutional changes, actor-related changes, and content-related changes. All identified causal factors can potentially lead to changes in political decision-making and result in some kind of new governance arrangements.

### **Structural/institutional dimension (polity):**

Concerning the structural and institutional dimension of new modes of governance two different issues were most relevant. First, a shift of competences, negotiation and decision-making arenas towards higher political-administrative levels through processes of **internationalization** and **Europeanization**. This factor has been very important in several GoFOR case studies, most obviously in cases which are related to domestic implementation of international and supranational obligations. The term Europeanization is used in the literature to describe two different phenomena related to the process of European integration. On the one hand, it describes the development of institutions of governance at the European level. Formal-legal institutions and a normative order based on some overarching constitutive principles, structures and practices both facilitate and constrain the ability to make and enforce binding decisions and to sanction non-compliance. On the other hand, it describes the penetration of national and sub-national systems of governance. Europeanization here involves the division of responsibilities and powers between different levels of governance. Europeanization, then, implies adapting national and sub-national systems of governance to a European political center and European-wide norms. Internationalization primarily concerns the increased activities and influence of actors, ideas and institutions from beyond state borders. The term internationalization is used to refer to when policies within domestic jurisdiction face increased scrutiny, participation, or influence from transnational actors and international institutions, and the rules and norms they embody.

The second important institutional factor has been **decentralization**. Many EU member states have implemented reforms over the last decade in order to decentralize the political institutions and decision-making (e.g. Belgium, Spain, UK). This trend can also be seen in the new EU member states (e.g. Romania). Decentralization defines a process that involves a wide range of actors in policy formulation and increasing responsibility at various levels that can be coupled with greater flexibility in implementation. Hence, this process requires not only a delegation of power but also improved coordination. Decentralization has some potential advantages and disadvantages. On one hand, it provides e.g. the advantage of more flexible and “tailor-made” formulation and implementation of policies, i.e. decentralised entities can optimise the policy output from the local and regional perspective. On the other hand, it brings with it the risk of weak administrative and/or financial capacities at sub-national levels resulting in implementation deficits. The restructuring of authority towards a multi-level system of co-responsibility between institutions of governance at the central, regional and local levels was a major reason for change in political decision-making in several of our case studies. The main rationale for decentralization has been the attempt to increase the overall quality and effectiveness of the system of governance, while increasing the authority and capabilities of sub-national levels.

**Actor-related dimension (politics):**

With regard to the politics dimension, the main causes for change are (i) the loss of legitimacy of the traditional, opaque way of political decision-making based on negotiations in closed circles between politicians, administrative officials and representatives of organized interest groups, and (ii) coordination deficits due to a compartmentalised way of policy-making by sectors and areas without interacting with other sectors or the wider society. Both critiques have contributed to the opening of actors' networks through more **participation** and **intersectoral coordination**, i.e. the appearance of non-governmental organisations or other civil society groups and the inclusion of organized interest groups from various sectors. The efforts to increase the number of actors are due to different underlying rationales. In some cases participation is regarded as a goal in itself, in other cases it is a mean to improve problem-solving. In any case, these developments have led to the establishment of broad policy networks which are able to use the resources, competences and information available from various public and private actors. The increased significance of such actor networks for policy-making and for implementing public policies is therefore expected to allow for a more flexible approach, seeking context sensitive solutions, and involving citizens, business organisations and NGOs in both the formulation and implementation of policies. Broader participation reflects the fact that more and more players wield effective power, i.e. that they are enabled to affect the future course in society. One benefit of increased participation can be wider sharing among actors of responsibility for the solution of common problems.

Another important point is that the involvement of various stakeholders has also led to greater transparency in political decision-making. The issue of transparency has also become very important with regard to the **accountability of expertise**. Relating to expertise we witness the paradox that experts are increasingly sought for and used as a source for policy making, while expertise is at the same time also increasingly contested because of the lack of transparency in the way expertise is selected and used by governments. The access to and transparency of the process of development, selection and use of expertise for policy making are thus important conditions for new modes of governance.

**Content-related dimension (policy):**

Finally, the limits of the traditional approach of command-and-control regulation have resulted in a search for **more flexible and less intrusive policy instruments**. The governance literature thus argues persistently that 'new' or what are sometimes labelled 'softer' instruments, have become much more widespread. The deployment of new policy instruments is insofar another important element to explain the emergence of new modes of governance. The new instruments are assumed to allow social actors more freedom to coordinate amongst themselves in pursuit of societal goals, with far less or even no central government involvement. At the same time, the concern for effective implementation led to a more systematic and professional approach with regard to the **evaluation and monitoring** of public policies. Retrospective evaluations are regarded as crucially important both for accountability and for learning from experience. Evaluations can also bring further benefits in the form of empowerment and involvement of all stakeholders in a policy process. However, to be useful, the monitoring and evaluation of policies should be based on a sound methodology and valid data, and their conclusion should be derived from well-justified findings.

Though all of the above-mentioned dimensions and causes related to new modes of governance are important factors, not all of these causes are present in all of our case studies at the same time; rather we find two and sometimes three of the major categories of causes – structural, actor-related and content-related causes – simultaneously at work in the governance processes analysed. Furthermore, the effects of these causal factors are not uniform across the case studies and countries analysed. Hence, the degree of change towards new governance arrangements differs extensively depending on differences in political institutions, political cultures and characteristics of the policy fields in the specific case study.

## 6.2 Role of governance elements

This chapter synthesises the main strands of our findings as regards the role of procedural governance elements, as they have been defined in the GoFOR project: participatory approaches, multi-level and inter-sectoral co-ordination, the role of democratic and accountable expertise as well as approaches to establish adaptive governance processes. More concretely, it synthesises the empirical findings from the 19 case studies on the manifestation of these elements in political rhetoric and actual practices. In doing so it also works out main findings as regards the role and significance of different kinds of policy actors: governmental actors, interest groups, different kind of experts - in particular scientists - and the general public.

### 6.2.1 Role of participation

Participation is generally acknowledged as one of the central elements of new modes of governance, both in the political arena (cf. EC White Paper on European Governance; MCPFE Approach to National Forest Programmes in Europe) and in the scientific realm (e.g. Heinelt *et al.* 2002, Benz and Papadopoulos 2005). Also in the field of forest and natural resources policy a political ambition to strengthen public participation has grown during the past twenty years throughout the European countries.

Participation is an elusive concept with many possible *definitions*. On a rather abstract level it can be seen as “a *voluntary process* whereby people, individually or through organized groups, can *exchange information, express opinions and articulate interests*, and have the potential to influence decisions or the outcome of the matter at hand.” (FAO/ECE/ILO 2000). Thus, the essence of participation is about citizens being given or themselves taking opportunities to influence decision processes of public interest.

The different forms of public participation can be categorised according to their potential degree of *power sharing* between decision-makers and participants, ranging from restricted two-way communication (e.g. surveys, public excursions), to consultation (hearings, advisory boards) and co-operation (e.g. task forces) to partnership and citizen control (e.g. self-governing land owner groups, NGO initiatives) (Boon 2002).

In our analysis of 19 governance case studies we investigated (i) participation rhetoric, i.e. the different rationales underlying participatory processes, (ii) the actual practices of participation in the governance cases, and (iii) the extent to which the

participatory elements have actually created momentum for new stakeholders to influence the processes.

Among the five constituting elements of governance studied in GoFOR, participation has on average featured most prominently in the set of GoFOR case studies. In almost all cases, participation was considered an important element to characterise the process. Similarly, in almost all cases participation was considered important to explain the overall successes or failures of the governance process.

In current natural resources policy, the *dominating rhetoric* is that more participation is better participation. This is also reflected in the majority of GoFOR cases. The calls for participatory approaches can partly be explained by the increased international focus on the topic from the 1990s and onwards, but partly also from a recognition among decision-makers that problem solving is not possible without the participation of stakeholders that can affect or are affected by the decision.

In about half the processes studied, participation was justified by referring to *international treaties* and legal frameworks, such as EU legislation, the Proposals for Action of the IPF and IFF, MCPFE resolutions, the Aarhus Convention etc. Governments tend to justify participatory processes by referring to the international level particularly in those cases where participation has not traditionally been considered part of the political culture.

Participation is sometimes considered as an aim in it self, sometimes as a means to improve problem solving. In this sense, the role of participation in relation to normative criteria of legitimacy can be interpreted both in terms of democratic quality (input legitimacy) and in terms of effectiveness (output legitimacy).

In more than half of the cases studied, participation was seen as a *goal in itself* (at least on a rhetorical level). The initiators and coordinators of the processes frequently emphasised openness and transparency, and the aim of reaching consensus. Other arguments for (more) participation were creating a sense of local ownership, basing policies on voluntary action and dialogue, finding new models for co-operation, and ensuring clarity and rule of the law.

References to *output legitimacy* were less frequently chosen. In about one third of the cases studied, participation was mainly justified as a means to increase effectiveness. Process designers, for example, hoped that the public could contribute with proposals, ideas, and comments, that participation would create support from the public and, thus, ensure “acceptance” for policy measures, and that involving new actors would help to mobilise networks and resources that could further the implementation of already identified policy objectives.

In a number of GoFOR cases, the distinction between input and output legitimacy is blurred because many arguments link participation with effectiveness. In most case two, sometimes even all three, rationales for (more) participation (i.e. international obligations, input legitimacy, effectiveness) were evoked.

The scholarly literature points to the fact that the – frequently overly positive – “rhetoric” of participation sometimes stands in stark contrast to the real-world *practices* of participation in political processes. This pattern can also be seen in the set of GoFOR case studies.

In the GoFOR cases *several forms of participation* were used with many cases being characterised by not only one but a number of formalised forms of participation. The dominating form was to consult major interest organisations in various forums for



discussion. The effective steering of those processes was frequently taken over by different types of steering committees, advisory groups or assisting secretariats.

In almost all cases, the key steering bodies arranged supplementary forms of participation along the process to get input from a broader range of participants. This broader involvement could take the form of additional advisory groups, one-time participation events to involve a broader range of interest groups or citizens, as well as a range of information activities and informal participation.

Common to almost all the cases with invited participation was that the initiators followed rather “traditional” processes, inviting organised participants who are easy to reach, and who are already known to the decision makers. There have been few experiments with new modes of participation. The non-organised citizens were mainly addressed in terms of information campaigns, and where they were invited for actual (consultative) participation, they were difficult to mobilise.

What was the *role of state actors* in the GoFOR governance processes? The GoFOR project intentionally focuses on government initiated participatory processes, *not* on pure bottom-up, non-governmental processes. In the vast majority of selected cases the participatory procedures were induced, designed and to differing extents controlled by public officials. Even in the few exceptions that can be considered non-governmental processes, the public administrators still played an influential role. The Norwegian case, the Living Forest Project (NO-LF) is unique among the 19 cases as it is the only process that was initiated “bottom-up”. The initiator was the private forest owners’ organisation realising the need to strengthen the environmental brand of Norwegian forestry. A few cases aimed at stimulating bottom-up participation. In these processes, the public authorities set the frames and provided funding, but the process itself was to be conducted by participatory committees established for the purpose. Here, the public administration played the role as “meta-governor”, i.e. indirectly governing the process through e.g. framing and boundary setting. In a few cases, the public processes were initiated as a response to pressure from NGOs.

*Who participated* in the participation processes? The forms of participation in the GoFOR cases focused on ensuring representation of the affected interests through participation by well-defined interest groups that were considered legitimate representatives of the interests. Another main focus seems to have been on including the participants that were considered crucial for process success. The national government, represented by its public officials, was a key participant in almost all cases. In more than half of the cases, the federal/local government was a key participant (too). Other typical key participants were environmental and recreation NGOs, NGOs representing landowners, and NGOs related to the specific topic at hand (rural development, anti-corruption) as well as representatives from industry (forestry, rural development consultants) and research. With one exemption, involvement of ordinary citizens was limited to information campaigns and (passive) access to participate in public hearings.

*Who did not participate?* In some cases, actors were reluctant to participate because they didn’t see the benefit in it. In other cases actors felt excluded from the process and without influence on the decision-making. A review of the cases gives the impression that on the one hand, public authorities as well as actors who had hitherto had a privileged position with the public authorities in terms of gaining influence on policies could be reluctant to open up for a broader range of stakeholders because they feared diminished influence and having additional restrictions imposed on their management. But on the other hand, there emerged a need to involve other stakeholders, with pressures coming from the international level being one driving

force for that. Participation was increasingly seen as a way to develop legitimacy of governance processes. So in many cases the process design would likely be so as to invite for participation to ensure legitimacy of the process and the sector as such, but to retain the decision power with a restricted range of stakeholders, eventually the public authorities.

When looking at the *development over time*, one sees marked changes. In most of the cases the governance processes studied were designed as participatory processes from the very beginning. In some cases participation was not considered an issue in the beginning of the process (apart from having limited consultative processes with regard to ensuring good technical quality of the decisions). Gradually, rhetoric changed towards actually having public involvement. In a few cases one sees an opposite trend, i.e. decision making becoming more closed again in the final phase of the process.

When finally comparing the rather far-reaching rhetoric of participation in the 19 governance processes studied with the actual practices or participation one gets a mixed picture. Before the background of a normative definition of participation (which sees participation as an instrument that gives citizens the opportunity to influence decision processes of public interest) the following weaknesses and strengths could be identified.

In quite a number of cases there was an overrepresentation of public officials and some “privileged” sectors (esp. forestry). Environmental and social interests were often excluded. Also NGOs felt expelled from important decision bodies and, e.g. women were underrepresented. Some processes were too focused on expert input and thus implicitly or explicitly excluded other interests and bodies of knowledge.

Our analysis showed that some of those drawbacks could not even be averted by ideal-type, benevolent state actors. First, the public often showed limited interest to actively engage in participation processes. And second, in complex policy settings participation processes are administratively very demanding. Participation in and especially the management of such processes requires substantial capacities and resources (personnel, time, expertise, financial resources) that neither state nor private actors can easily mobilize.

On the positive side, it can be said that for almost all cases it seems that when looking at the long-term, the overall policy culture is likely to become more participatory, providing more opportunities to participate and providing a broader range of stakeholders legitimate access to influence decision-making within the given policy field. So even if the power redistribution within the individual cases was limited, then the participatory processes have still stimulated the establishing of new networks, a first step towards legitimate demands for influence among new stakeholders, and increasing understanding among all stakeholders of the value of broad and inclusive decision-making to not only input but also output legitimacy.

### **6.2.2 Role of multi-level coordination**

Multi-level coordination has been ranked as a very important or important element in three quarters of the governance processes analyzed in GoFOR. Only in four cases multi-level coordination was judged as rather unimportant to characterize the governance process. A slightly different picture emerges when it comes to the importance of multi-level coordination for explaining the overall success and failure of the governance process. In this dimension, multi-level coordination was viewed as

very important or important in only eight cases. This suggested at a very general level a basic relation: the more important multi-level co-ordination was judged for characterising the processes that were studied, the more important it was for explaining the overall processes' success or failure in terms of policy outputs and impacts, and vice versa.

The six GoFOR case studies which were presented in greater detail provided us with a rich empirical base to describe and analyse coordination issues in different multi-level systems, and furthermore gave us a good basis to search for patterns of multi-level coordination among the diverse case studies. The six case studies have shown that the processes of Europeanization and regionalization entailed some novel elements of interlacing and interlocking politics. They raise the challenge of including actors from various territorial levels in a multi-level system without impairing effective decision-making, which tends to suffer if too large a number of actors and arenas need to be co-ordinated in the decision-making process. From our analysis we see patterns of multi-level coordination emerging around three main issues: functional and territorial differentiation, institutional continuity and innovative forms of linkages between territorial levels, and the issue of mixed or combined modes of coordination.

First of all, the case studies have shown that the necessity of multi-level coordination under the conditions of Europeanization and regionalization triggered processes of differentiation of intergovernmental decision-making structures.

On the one hand, we observe a specific **differentiation related to functions**. Here, problems are divided into partial tasks to be dealt with by separate arenas, as shown in the German case study on LEADER+ and the Danish case study on the implementation of the Habitat Directive. On the EU level, decisions are made in both of these cases on the overall concept and the general policy goals, and additionally on the principles for the allocation of grants to regions in the case of LEADER+. The substantial policy goals are formulated in both cases at the national and/or sub-national level through operational programmes respectively Natura 2000 plans, and finally executed at the regional and local level for each regional partnership or Natura 2000 site through individual projects and specific Natura 2000 action plans. Also in the German case study on Regionen Aktiv and the French and Greek case studies we see a functional differentiation between the decision-making at the national level, i.e. the formulation of overall policy goals and their adoption as laws or programs ("framework steering"), and the decision-making at the regional level related to the establishment of regional partnerships, CFTs, and park management boards as well as the implementation of concrete projects ("detail steering"). In particular in the French and Greek case studies on decentralization we can observe this form of "decoupling" of levels of government. Interestingly, both case studies point to the benefits of decentralization as well as to negative effects. The lower levels of government face several challenges including the lack of financial capacities, the necessity of legal and scientific advice, and often they are cut off from information exchange with higher levels. This point out that reasonable decoupling presupposes the availability of the capacities that are needed at the level of the decoupled arenas (levels) to effectively fulfil their tasks within overall multi-level policy structures.

On the other hand, the complexity of processes is simplified by **territorial differentiation** in intergovernmental relations. Here, multi-level coordination is limited to particular nations or regions. In contrast to systems of joint decision-making, including all decentralized governments, the dominant mode of decision-making under conditions of territorial differentiation is bilateral instead of multilateral. In this way, multi-level coordination can be adjusted to different institutional settings of

lower-level governments. This form of differentiation is particularly evident in both German cases on regional policy, where individual regions apply for funding either from the EU or the federal government. The federal and/or sub-national ministries operating the funding programmes negotiate individually with each region, based on the general policy framework. In the French case, a similar mode is used for coordination, i.e. each regional Forest Charter is trying to collect funding for their projects bilaterally from different sources at the national, regional or department level. The same can be said about the vertical coordination with regard to specific Natura 2000 sites in Denmark or the management boards of national parks in Greece.

Regarding the institutional forms of linkages between territorial levels it can be said that the challenges of Europeanization and regionalization favour the **rise of new, innovative forms of linkages between levels** and, more generally, a new mixture of modes of governance. All of our six case studies describe and analyse some kind of institutional innovations. This is most obvious in the French and Greek cases where competences and decision-making processes have been administratively decentralized to regional and local levels. The German case studies show two different innovative forms of linking levels to empower regional actors: The case of LEADER+ provides us with an example of EU multi-level governance that is based on the idea of lesser influence of the central government compared to the sub-national levels, whereas the case of Regionen Aktiv is an interesting example where the central government tries to circumvent the federal states and their constitutional rights by negotiating more directly with regional actors. In the majority of cases, institutional change and innovation takes place most obviously on the regional and local levels, whereas on the national-institutional level we have observed many elements of institutional continuity, with traditional patterns of level linkages and joint decision-making are largely being preserved.

Another important element of innovation are new patterns of 'loose coupling' of arenas and levels of government. The term 'loose coupling' means that decisions in one arena do not completely determine decisions in other arenas but only influence parts of the decision premises. Such a loosely coupled multi-level system is not structured in the form of 'connected games', in which actors' strategies depend on outcomes of other games, but as 'embedded games', in which policy-making in one arena sets the context for negotiations in other arenas. This context-setting is achieved by a shift in the mode of interaction from power and control to information exchange, communication and persuasion. Moreover, in the differentiated systems of governance, actors at the interface of arenas play the role of mediators and promoters. Good examples are the National Network Unit for LEADER+ in the German case study and the regional governors in the French and Greek cases. As a rule, in a loosely coupled structure state actors play less of a monopoly role of control and decision-making, but rather a mediation role. However, the more they can operate in the 'shadow of hierarchy', the better they can perform the softer role of mediation.

This last point reminds us that effective vertical coordination in multi-level systems is often not delivered by one single form but rather by a balanced **mixture of different modes of governance** which helps to manage the tensions produced by the multi-level framework. As shown by our case studies, the specific mixture of modes of governance varies with the given institutional and policy context. In all case studies, except the Danish HD case, different modes of coordination are combined, in some cases up to three different modes. Good cases in point are the German case studies on regional policy. Both cases present a mixture of three different modes of

coordination, namely hierarchy, negotiation, and competition. In these cases the different modes are not used simultaneously, but rather subsequently, i.e. at different levels and at different stages of the policy process. As the results of the German case studies suggest, the provision of greater flexibility by applying different modes of coordination can lead to effective decision-making in quite complex multi-level systems. However, some (minor) problems of MLC have been reported for these two cases too.

Other combinations of ideal-type modes of governance have been less successful. For instance, the combination of negotiation and networking as coordinating principles in the functionally differentiated multi-level system described in the case study on the Austrian Biodiversity Strategy. The process analysed here led to weak MLC, ineffective decision-making and finally to rather mediocre outputs. Furthermore, the French and Greek case studies reported problems with horizontal competition among regional units in an otherwise hierarchically structured multi-level system.

### **6.2.3 Role of intersectoral coordination**

The need of inter-sectoral coordination has increasingly gained attention in recent decades, both in practice as well as in studies on environmental and natural resource policy. This was particular the case in the context of policy processes which lean on the rhetoric and the conceptions of “new modes of governance” and aim at integrative policy making. Accordingly, GoFOR considered ISC as one of the constituting elements of the umbrella concept ‘governance’.

Based on scholarly literature we expected ISC to manifest in the form of increasing interconnectedness of sectors, increasingly blurring boundaries between sectors, and consequently in an increasing occurrence of practices in which actors, both state and non-state actors from different sectors participate in policy formulation and implementation. GoFOR was interested in to what extent and how we encountered ISC in governance arrangements, both in rhetoric and practices. For empirical research ISC was conceptualised as referring to (often site-specific) processes which aim at the integration of different interests, functions and uses of areas, but also as referring to coordination efforts between different sectoral ministerial departments and policy networks.

Perceptions and definitions of “what is a sector” vary, both in scholarly conceptions and in political practice. Sectoral boundaries are not fixed. They are interpreted differently by different policy actors; they may be established, challenged and modified. With only a few exceptions, the GoFOR case studies refer to sectors in the form of “policy fields” like agriculture, industry, tourism, etc. In general these definitions correlate closely with administrative structures, e.g. with jurisdictions of ministries or ministerial departments. By and large policy, actors recognised “sectors” as structured along formal lines of competencies and flows of formal powers.

With a view to the rhetoric, most GoFOR case processes clearly show intentions for ISC. In a number of cases it was explicitly high on the agenda, i.e. ISC standing central in the rhetoric of programmatic policy papers, process principles, etc., while in other cases the intentions for ISC were rather implicit to the processes, but recognizable to empirical research. Interestingly, even in cases in which ISC was explicitly called for, further specifications of how it should be organized, of the actual goals of ISC and about who should take the lead were usually lacking.

Furthermore, our empirical evidence has shown that the actual motives for and the aims of ISC differ a lot among governance processes. In some cases concrete cross-sectoral policy problems were the main triggers, e.g. in Dutch cases and most obvious in the case of strong inter-sectoral interdependencies in times of crisis (FR-RPF). In quite some other cases ISC was introduced primarily because it is “part of the rules”, e.g. as prescribed by binding or non-legally binding international agreements or general conceptions of a policy programme (e.g. ISC as an internationally agreed NFP principle, ISC as one of the main objectives of the CBD, ISC as part of the concept of Integrated Rural Development). Another major driving factor which was found in several cases are economic incentives, be it market forces which made ISC a necessity (NOR-LF), incentives provided by funding programmes that prescribed integrative procedures, or the simply the strive for mobilising additional funds by coordinating with other sectors (HUN-NFP).

Last but not least, and most interestingly, in a number of cases ISC was triggered by decentralization, by changes to region-oriented or local approaches in policy making (“ISC in the wake of territorially-oriented policy-making”). In some cases ISC was in fact strengthened or even introduced only in the wake of a change from a sectoral to a territorial policy approach (e.g. GER-L+, GER-RA).

Intentions for ISC materialize in quite some variety of processes which differ with respect to the range of participating sectors, the institutionalisation of ISC and the territorial levels that are involved: Some processes were deliberately designed to integrate a broad range of sectors; this is in particular the case for strategy processes (e.g. AT-AFD, AT-BS, HUN-NFP, ESP-FPGP). Other cases were more selective, e.g. processes which were directly reacting to urgent issues, like in the FR-RPF. In spite of that, urgent problems which affected a number of sectors, making inter-sectoral coordination a must, served to effectively overcome sectoral barriers, however, even if in rather selective and ad hoc way.

Most governance processes aimed at developing kind of integrated strategies, programmes, plans or projects. The most common organisational instrument was some kind of inter-sectoral committee which was often established temporarily only. As to decision making rules, these committees usually strive for consensus. Even if majority voting is the formal rule, significant efforts are usually devoted to achieve consensus, making ISC a time consuming endeavour. A critical aspect which was reported from several cases is that most crucial issues are dealt with outside such specifically established ISC committees, i.e. in other, pre-existing institutions outside the organisational structures of the processes that were studied. This indicates a potential limit for ISC in newly established institutions that are embedded in a rather sectoral-structured administrative landscape.

Another more general observation is that inter-sectoral coordination and integration turned out difficult at the national level, despite all the rhetoric and intentions. As a consequence, in a number of cases ISC was rhetorically and practically delegated to the regional and/or local level, where the respective efforts often turned out more effective.

Intentions and institutionalisation do of course not guarantee effective ISC. In fact, our evaluation of ISC efforts in terms of output and impact provides a mixed picture: Overall, the governance processes researched in GoFOR clearly show a divergence between programmatic ISC ambitions on the one hand, and a scattered picture of

successful ISC practices.<sup>63</sup> We observe cases in which long lasting inter-sectoral cooperation was indeed established (NOR-LF), or is likely to result from ongoing processes. But defending sectoral and administrative interests stood in the way of more effective cooperation in many cases. This seems particular true for national level processes, in which ISC efforts partly turned out as rather symbolic endeavours (e.g. AT-BS).

The main barriers that account for limitations or restrictions in ISC in the processes analysed are the following ones: Well-entrenched sectoral organisation of ministerial departments and their respective environment of interest groups often contributes to explain significant barriers and limitations of ISC processes. Even if ISC rhetoric is held up high, sectoral-structures often frustrate more effective ISC. Powerful sectors/actors may effectively block ISC, as long as there are no sufficient problem pressures, no effective inter-sectoral interdependencies or hierarchically induced pressures or incentives which serve to overcome sectoral logics.

Actual commitment to ISC first and foremost depends on the political weight of the policy issue concerned. In a number of cases rather limited achievements in terms of ISC can be explained by a low political relevance of the issues addressed, as perceived by sectoral actors that were meant to get involved (e.g. AT-BS, HUN-NFP). Low political relevance leads to low or even no actual engagement of actors from “outside” a respective lead sector (.e.g. NFP processes). Even if such processes do formulate inter-sectoral goals and measures, these outputs tend to be “soft policies”, unbinding, rather narrow in scope, vague or do hardly become implemented. Since ISC is to be seen as an ambitious and highly demanding undertaking, both institutionally and in terms of resources, it needs strong incentives or pressures for stimulating the necessary engagement. From the policy actors’ perspective ISC is not an end in itself. Hence, it needs careful selection and concentration on those issues and sectors that shall be dealt with and integrated to safeguard the capacities for fruitful ISC.

By referring to our theoretically lead expectations, we can indeed note a blurring of sectoral boundaries in many GoFOR case studies. Based on the rich empirical information that has been elaborated, our findings are even more nuanced: The majority of cases show these blurring boundaries in terms of intentions for ISC. Such intentions are individually expressed by the policy actors, in strategy papers, policy plans, guidelines and process principles etc. Many cases also prove an interconnectedness of actors from different sectors, in particular in the early stages of governance processes (agenda setting and policy formulation). Sector representatives are interacting in committees which are often specifically created, but often on a temporary basis only. Hence in the processes that were studied in GoFOR, ISC characteristics are indeed evident, both in terms of programmatic intentions, in content (actors’ ideas, plans or strategies) and organisationally. But at the same time, only a few cases the ISC efforts are institutionalized on a long term basis. Hence, ISC practices rarely go beyond intentions and a temporary cross-sectoral involvement.

Furthermore, as expected, many cases show that the intention and efforts for ISC go hand in hand with participatory processes involving state and non state actors from different sectors, especially in early stages of governance processes. However, in the

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<sup>63</sup> This finding has to be qualified since most of the governance processes assessed in GoFOR are rather “young” processes, whereas effective ISC seems to presuppose long term endeavours.

course of time some of the analysed processes changed into exclusive domains of state actors with ISC becoming inter-ministerial affairs only.

Thus, our basic research hypotheses as regards the manifestation of ISC in governance processes have only partly been validated by the empirical findings. They clearly show that ISC practices are not at all self-evident features of contemporary governance processes, even though we observe quite a lot of programmatic statements as regards the necessity of more integrated policy making. ISC is present to some extent, mostly in terms of a broadened range actors involved and in the form of specially created institutions. But still, ISC is most present in terms of rhetoric and intentions.

#### **6.2.4 Role of democratic and accountable expertise**

As policy issues become increasingly complex, political decisions strongly depend on insights derived from science and other sources of expertise. On the one hand, there are growing expectations for how science and politics can be linked in the most effective way. The interaction between the two social systems does not come without tensions, however. The science-policy literature points to a number of social dynamics and challenges, namely the scientification of politics and the concurrent politicisation of science, an ensuing legitimacy crisis of science, and a call for more “accountable” and “democratic” forms of expertise.

In GoFOR, we have, first, given an overview of theoretical conceptualisations of the science-policy interface and, then, drawing on empirical insights from 19 governance case studies, have put an empirical focus on the roles and functions of experts and expertise in governance processes. The GoFOR project started out with the assumption that in a governance context, science and expertise play distinct, (probably) new roles that go beyond the mere content-wise input of scientific knowledge in political decision-making processes. The normative concept of “democratic and accountable expertise” was used to address the question of how the relationship between science and society is organized in governance processes and how it could be developed in both a more effective and a more democratically legitimate way.

Especially EU bodies have put great efforts into searching for new models of how to organise the relationship between science and society in a more democratic way (EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 2001, 2002, 2003). In the set of GoFOR governance case studies, however, one only rarely sees explicit calls for the “democratisation of expertise” but, interestingly, quite a number of actual practices that go in this direction.

In its effort to singularize the overall character of expert involvement in governance processes GoFOR first looked into the *relative weight* that experts and expertise have in political processes. On a theoretical continuum between purely expert-driven processes on the one extreme and purely politics-driven processes on the other extreme most GoFOR cases tend towards the politics rather than the expertise end of the spectrum. Only few cases were explicitly framed as “technical” processes or were otherwise dominated by scientific reasoning. From the set of case studies, especially the implementation of the EU Habitats Directive, which was investigated in three countries (Denmark, Greece, and Romania), falls into this category. The great degree of expert involvement in the implementation of the Habitats Directive seems to be mainly attributable to the highly “technical” character of this EU directive (Alphandery and Fortier, 2001). The majority of GoFOR governance cases can be



classified as “*political*” processes where expertise played a minor (but nevertheless clearly identifiable) role.

Another aspect relevant to describe the overall character of expert involvement in governance cases is the *institutional integration of expertise and politics*. In the set of GoFOR governance cases the interaction between science and politics is mainly characterized by multipartite bodies (made up of scientists and policy-makers) that are capable, simultaneously, of negotiating differences regarding scientific and political questions (“integration model”). In most processes one finds “mixed” bodies in which policy makers, administrative officers, interest group representatives, and scientists have been sitting side by side without a clear separation of roles. Scientists and other experts cooperated “at arm’s length” with political actors. The role of scientists has not been exclusively restricted to providing expert inputs while also policy makers (in the widest sense) have contributed to the knowledge base on which negotiation processes could build upon. In only a few GoFOR cases experts were kept in a more peripheral position.

When looking at the role which experts and expertise play in governance processes it is safe to say that there is not *the one* function but different types of experts fulfil a variety of cognitive, strategic and symbolic *functions*; and the set of functions found within one governance process varies from situation to situation. In the set of GoFOR governance case studies, a number of different functions could be found: experts as (co-)producers of dominant discourses (“schools of thought”) who introduce innovative concepts or general approaches and, thus, lay the foundations for or push ahead a governance process; experts as initiators and driving forces in the early phases of governance processes (“policy entrepreneurs”); experts as consultants on process-related questions or evaluators of policies; experts as mediators or interest brokers who help to build political consensus that serves as basis for subsequent political negotiation processes; experts as creators of arguments (and counter arguments) who provide political actor groups with “suitable” political arguments to make their point in political deliberations; and, last but not least, experts as providers of content-wise input into policy processes.

Expert involvement in a governance context not only shows a variety of functions but also a remarkable *plurality of actor involvement*. In the set of GoFOR case studies, expert input has been far from restricted to traditional scientific expertise. Expertise was provided by a diverse set of sources and actors: public and private research institutes, interest groups, private consultants, and “ordinary citizens” (local knowledge). As regards the questions of how balanced the representation of different types of expertise was, of how transparent and independent the selection of experts was and of how accessible and open the input of expertise was, the set of GoFOR cases showed quite heterogeneous patterns. In many cases there has been an increasing plurality of experts and expertise involved and there have been some efforts taken to make expertise more accessible. In other cases, one sees relative domination of one type of expertise and rather opaque procedures. Especially the narrow definition of “relevant experts” and the excessive use of technical-scientific language reduced the political clout and legitimacy of some processes.

In summary, it can be said that in the set of GoFOR case studies, science and expertise have frequently played a prominent role. At the same time, the cases neither provide an indication for the “*scientification of politics*”, i.e. scientific expertise dominating or even replacing politics, nor for the reverse phenomenon of the “*politicisation of science*”. A possible explanation for that could be that these phenomena cannot be generalized to all policy settings and that the science-policy

literature hitherto has looked at another type of policy problems than the GoFOR project did. In the science-policy literature, the “scientification of politics” has typically been accounted for in a very special class of policy problems, namely problems characterized by a high degree of system uncertainties and high decision stakes. Most GoFOR cases do not fall into this category. They do, for example, not deal with the adoption and implementation of cutting-edge technologies (like biotechnology or stem-cell research) but rather with different forms of land use which are, of course, sometimes contested but the consequences of which are more or less predictable. In addition, a number of GoFOR cases has looked at a special class of political processes, namely “strategy processes”. With their long-term perspective this type of political processes is probably more detached from pressing political questions which call for immediate political action; strategy processes somehow take a more “distanced” view on policy problems. In this type of settings political and societal actors have seemingly less incentives to draw on science as a problem-solver and/or a source of political legitimacy.

The empirical findings of the GoFOR project reported above show that there is not the one and completely new role of science in governance processes that replaces traditional roles of science in public policy. Rather the set of 19 case studies shows that there are various roles for science in governance processes that empirically reflect different conceptions of the science-policy interface ranging from expertise fulfilling a rather apolitical, “cognitive” function in political processes (“speaking truth to power”), to the interest-driven use of science and expertise (“knowledge as a hook on which interests hang their case”), to new knowledge gradually spreading, entering into use, and sometimes becoming the conceptual framework of entire policy debates (“knowledge creep”).

Interestingly, the tension between effectiveness and democratic accountability of science is still quite relevant: In the range of GoFOR cases, we could find both a comeback of more “technocratic” forms of science-policy integration as well as remarkable practices of organising expert involvement in a more democratic and accountable way. This shows that there is not a unique new role of expertise in governance processes but a supplementing of traditional functions of expertise with new expertise-related governance practices.

### **6.2.5 Role of adaptivity and iterativity**

The case studies in the GOFOR project cover different time spans and also represent different development stages of processes. This variety of cases provided us with a wide range of examples on how process design, complexity and uncertainty are linked to each other. The preliminary assumption that iterativity is a prerequisite for adaptation proved to be an incomplete statement. Case examples support that a basically linear process can adapt to new situations as well (FR-RPF, FR-CFT, GER-RA). There are also more examples representing successful delivery of predefined tasks in a linearly organized process, in which monitoring and evaluation plays a significant role, and therefore linearity as a process design cannot be judged in itself.

In general, the case studies show that AIP aspects played only a limited role, with some exceptions. The specific concepts “adaptive” or “iterative” were seldom used. This indicates that these aspects are yet not well developed and integrated in governance processes. Still, several of the relevant policy documents called indirectly for aspects of AIP like periodic monitoring, evaluation, and prescribed repetitive

stages of process design and implementation. These aspects indicate policy intentions to take up tasks in an adaptive and iterative way.

Instruments for monitoring and evaluation are viewed as important in almost all of the GoFOR governance processes. Some kind of monitoring and evaluation systems has been used in 18 of the 19 cases analysed. However, the aim, the design, and the application of these systems in the governance processes differ quite substantially. In many cases the instruments for monitoring are not well institutionalised and evaluations have been conducted rather wholeheartedly. The most frequently mentioned motive for conducting evaluations has been enhancing efficiency, followed by promoting learning and being an external requirement for receiving funding. But generally speaking, evaluations in the GoFOR processes have not been organized in a way that realizes the potential for efficient adaptations to challenges.

Some of our cases illustrate that monitoring and evaluations have the potential to play an important role in improving the efficiency of governance processes. The findings however, prove that this potential is far from being realized in most of the GoFOR-processes. It also means that the role of evaluation and monitoring in reality is not matching their ideal typical role. In reality these instruments are not always employed by intentions of learning or process enhancement. They might have only informative feature or remain pro-forma obligations without feedback to the process. Their role as primary source for change and adaptation must be contested on basis of the empirical evidences.

This tendency also seems to affect the actual adaptations that occur. The analysis shows that even if evaluations were the most frequent source of adaptations among the GoFOR-processes, the number of processes adapting to external challenges is rather low. Out of the 19 governance processes analysed, we are only able to trace adaptations in seven of them. In these seven GoFOR-processes we identified a total of 15 specific adaptations. Evaluations and monitoring was the most frequent source of adaptation in these processes, causing adaptations in five of the processes. Still, one could argue that the number of five processes adapting to findings in evaluations is rather low in this respect. Also, the adaptations made can be seen as quite limited.

Another important aspect with regard to adaptivity and iterativity is the occurrence of learning effects in the governance processes. Various forms and ideas behind learning can be identified in the GoFOR case studies. Related to learning in the processes we can conclude that reflective methods such as self-evaluation can be used effectively to facilitate learning at the stakeholder- and also at the institutional and process level. Somewhat contrasting is the role of external evaluations and monitoring instruments in terms of learning effects as their application motives vary significantly in the cases. This indicates that the underlying motivation is a crucial factor to explain individual or institutional learning, and the means of prescribed evaluation and monitoring alone does not guarantee that the governance process will adapt or change if needed.

It is also worth to consider that in our empirical studies dialogue and exchange-driven learning tends to remain at the stakeholder level, rather than being transferred to the institutional or process level. This indicates that a continuous actor engagement over the whole process timeline is crucial in terms of process adaptation. The analysis show that top-down processes - as illustrated here e.g. by the Natura 2000 cases - tend to have less process and institutional learning. Mainly because these top-down approaches are exercised in a way that leaves little room for adaptation and changes in practice. In contrast, cases with actor empowerment or grassroots initiatives tend

to result in high-level learning and have the potential to alter the process (e.g. FR-RPF, NL-GW, FR-CFT, GER-RA).

### 6.2.6 Effects of governance processes

The empirical research in GoFOR also provided a comprehensive overview of the *effects* to be found in governance processes. For the evaluation of effects, GoFOR has fallen back on a typology from the policy literature which distinguishes between “outputs”, “impacts” and “outcomes”. From the analysis of 19 governance processes, it is evident that in most case studies, effects are identifiable more in the form of direct outputs and in the form of impacts (i.e. changes in the policy actors’ behaviour) but to a lesser degree in terms of biophysical changes (i.e. outcomes).

New policy documents, strategies, plans or other programmatic texts were found to be the most frequent *outputs*. In a number of cases, new laws, reforms of existing laws, administrative acts, or policy recommendations could be found. In some instances, we also found changes in the distribution of competences and the institutionalisation of new actor forums.

As regards *impacts*, the vast majority of case studies have shown changes of the behaviour of actors or actor coalitions: processes have empowered the actors’ participatory abilities and have helped setting decision-making in a more transparent and open framework. In the course of many of the processes the attitudes of actors have changed, in particular towards becoming more cooperative. Most of the governance processes also resulted in changes as regards the terms of the debate and in changing ways of thinking. Such changes included the introduction of a more deliberative and participatory terminology, the reduction or elimination of prejudices among actors and, more generally, the strengthening of more integrated approaches instead of sectorial ones.

In most of the examined governance processes, goal attainment in terms of *outcomes* in a narrow sense, i.e. in terms of bio-physical changes, has been indiscernible at this stage. Firstly, in fact, in a number of cases it is impossible to verify any effects as there are no clearly identifiable chains of cause and effect. This does not only restrict ex-post evaluation but also the potential for prognosis as regards future achievements. Secondly, governance processes are a rather recent approach in public policy making. Thus there is no adequate external evidence (history) which might help to evaluate these processes as regards their likely further implementation and goal attainment. The majority of the processes that were studied are immature in terms of the stage of the policy cycle: Most of them are at the early stages of policy implementation. However, there were also cases where concrete plans and strategies have been decided upon quite some time ago but implementation has been slow so far or has stagnated for other reasons which are related to the processes themselves.

## 6.3 New modes of governance or only “The Emperor’s New Clothes”?

As described in sub-chapter 6.1, the call for new modes of governance is connected with a number of – typically positive – expectations. Based on the empirical findings from 19 governance case studies, this final sub-chapter addresses the question whether and to what extent the expected effects of new modes of governance can

actually be realized in real-world governance processes. Subsequently, the following questions will be addressed:<sup>64</sup>

- To what extent (if at all) have actor networks become enlarged beyond sectoral boundaries and territorial levels?
- Do governance processes actually apply new modes of coordination, do they facilitate policy learning and greater process flexibility, and do they result in innovative policy instruments?

Therewith, we also provide answers to the major research questions of GoFOR, namely as regards:

- the impetus and motivation for new modes of governance,
- the manifestation of governance rhetoric in terms of programmatic policy statements as compared to the actual practices of governance and the forms of institutionalisation,
- the interaction of “new” and “traditional modes of governance”, i.e. whether and to what extent traditional structures and practices have lost or gained in importance or have changed as regards their functions, and
- whether the roles of different policy actors have changed through the introduction of governance processes (in particular the role of state actors) and whether the use of expertise has become more democratic and accountable.

### **The governance rhetoric**

“New modes of governance” are high on the agenda in current natural resources policy-making. The dominant rhetoric is usually a positive, optimistic one, stressing that more participation is better participation, that more integrated and co-ordinated policies are preferable, that the integration of a broad range of stakeholders increases policy effectiveness and legitimacy, that policies should be expert-based etc. This trend from the early 1990s onwards goes hand in hand with an increased international focus on the topic of “governance”, “new modes of governance” or “good governance” and it is also reflected in the majority of GoFOR cases.

In terms of rhetoric, it was especially the principle of participation that was found high on the agenda in almost all the cases studied. Sometimes participation was considered as an aim in itself; sometimes it was seen as a means to improve problem solving and/or to increase the democratic quality of decisions. Similarly we found programmatic calls and intentions for increasing cross-sectoral and multi-level co-ordination as well as calls for adaptive and iterative approaches in a number of policy documents. In contrast, explicit reference to the “democratisation of expertise” was reported only rarely in the case studies, but interestingly quite a number of actual practices were found in this respect.

### **Consequences of internationalization, Europeanization and decentralization**

In many cases this governance rhetoric was very much stimulated by and leaning on international and/or European agreements and policies. In about half the processes participation was argumentatively justified by referring to international treaties or non-legally binding agreements, to pan-European agreements or to EU legislation, in

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<sup>64</sup> See the right hand column in Table 36

particular when e.g. participation has not been customary in the respective political culture.

This also applies to inter-sectoral co-ordination to a significant extent: Certainly, in some cases concrete, national or regional cross-sectoral policy problems were the main triggers for striving towards more integrated policies. But in quite some other cases ISC was primarily introduced as “part of the rules”, rules that are often prescribed by binding or non-legally binding international agreements or European policies. Furthermore, internationalization and Europeanization also took effect in terms of economic incentives resulting from globalized markets or from European Union programmes. These incentives have been found as another major driving force. EU funding programmes, for example, prescribe participatory cross-sectoral programming procedures and formally entail the need to co-ordinate among territorial levels. Indeed, in many cases the actors’ commitment to the processes was very much “facilitated” by such policies and prescriptions. That is, international and European discourses and programs set significant incentives towards changes in governance arrangements or even prescribe specific planning and implementation procedures; e.g. as regards the implementation of the Habitats-Directive. Thus, they directly and/or indirectly affect national sovereignty.

Likewise, EU bodies have put great efforts into searching for new models of organising the relationship between science and society in a more democratic way (EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 2001, 2002, 2003). However, in contrast to the discourses on participation, inter-sectoral and multi-level coordination these efforts and discourses haven’t taken serious effect in the national level processes that we have studied.

Besides effects of internationalization and Europeanization we have witnessed consequences of **decentralization** in several GoFOR case studies. The benefits of decentralization approaches were found in the empowerment of provincial/local administrations, in increased involvement of new actors and the integration of different sectors’ interests into local/regional development processes. Local politicians became leaders of collective actions. Processes have succeeded in (re-)mobilizing societal capacities, and became less sector-focused but more integrative. Even though the traditional structures of power distribution are still visible and influential, decentralized governance processes have **increased regional/local autonomy**.

### **Institutionalisation and practices of governance**

With the international and the European impetus, among other pressures, the need to involve a broadened range of stakeholder and territorial levels into governance processes has emerged. Participation is increasingly seen as a way to increase legitimacy in policy formulation and implementation.

Accordingly, many of our processes aimed at integrating a broad set of stakeholders, sectors and territorial levels for **deploying additional resources, information and competences**, as well as to **increase input and output legitimacy**. However, the intention of major policy actors, of private stakeholders and public authorities as well, often was to retain the decision-making power within pre-dominant actor networks. Accordingly, our analysis yields a mixed overall picture: most of the governance processes that we have studied did in fact result in **enlarged sets of sectors and territorial levels involved**. But in a number of cases well entrenched administrative

structures, interests and sectoral logics significantly constrained or even marginalised the processes' outreach and effectiveness.

Furthermore, processes tend to be institutionalised on a temporary basis only, even if they are labelled as long-term, open-ended endeavours (e.g. strategy processes). Coordination efforts have been institutionalized on a long term basis in only a few cases, in a number of processes we observed rather symbolic short-term cross-sectoral involvement in which sectoral and administrative interests often hamper more effective cooperation.

We also found cases in which most crucial policy issues were dealt with outside the specifically institutionalised governance processes, i.e. in parallel, in traditional, pre-established structures. This indicates another limitation of such governance processes which have been established along-side but not integrated into the overall governmental arrangements: Well-entrenched sectoral organisation of ministerial departments and their respective interest group environments then easily manage to marginalise their effectiveness.

In compliance with the governance rhetoric, some kind of monitoring and evaluation has been conducted in practically all cases. Nevertheless, these procedures have often not been organized in a way that would have allowed realizing their potentials and have consequently played a limited role. With a few exceptions, evaluations haven't been effectively integrated into the processes. They rarely resulted in effective feedback to processes and/or were conducted pro-forma to fulfil externally prescribed obligations. These findings stand in stark contrast to the most frequently mentioned motives for conducting evaluations: "to enhance efficiency" and "to facilitate learning". **Policy learning was rarely and not too effectively induced** by monitoring and evaluation.

The GoFOR case studies have also shown that the processes of Europeanization and regionalization (see above) raise the challenge of including actors from various territorial levels in a multi-level system without impairing effective decision-making. We found different approaches that promise to meet this challenge effectively: functional and/or territorial differentiation of tasks along the chain of decision-making, patterns of loose coupling among levels of government, in which levels interact in terms information exchange, communication and persuasion but not in the form of hierarchical command and control, and effective vertical coordination by **combinations of different ideal-type modes of co-ordination** (i.e. market mechanisms, hierarchy, negotiations, and networks). These approaches promise to ease the tensions that are inherent to multi-level policy-making frameworks.

Institutional change and innovation was mainly found in the wake of decentralization, taking place most obviously at the regional and local levels, whereas we often noticed institutional continuity at the national level, with traditional patterns of decision-making being largely preserved. **Increasing levels of co-ordination and cooperation** were triggered and strengthened by decentralization processes, i.e. by changes to region-oriented or local approaches in policy making. In some cases cross-sectoral coordination was explicitly delegated to the regional or local levels and turned out more effective there.

Last but not least our case analyses definitely point to the fact that participatory, cross-sectoral and/or multi-level governance processes usually constitute complex settings that are very demanding. Facilitation and management of such processes **requires substantial expertise, capacities and resources** that often neither state nor private actors can easily mobilize.

### Enlarged networks, new actors and changing actors' roles

One key aspect within the governance discourse is the enlargement of the range of actors, interests and expertise being involved into policy processes. This discourse is usually accompanied by the question about whether the role of state actors is likely to change.

In the vast majority of the GoFOR governance cases participatory and coordination procedures were induced, designed and to a varying extent also controlled by state actors. This may be due to the selection of cases: GoFOR intentionally focuses on government-initiated processes, but *not* on pure bottom-up, non-governmental processes. However, even in the few exceptions from this selection rule, in cases that can be considered non-governmental processes, public administrators were very influential. The national and/or local government, represented by public officials, were key participants in almost all our cases. In summarizing, **pre-existing administrative structures and the governmental actors did remain central policy shaping factors**. They effectively promote or hinder new governance perspectives in various ways: by providing or withholding commitment, by changes in policy style, by establishing the institutional framework of the governance processes, and by defining process objectives, timeframes, measures etc. State actors are usually well endowed with the capacities and resource to steer or influence the processes. Hence, increased state actors' commitment goes hand in hand with increasingly effective policy formulation and implementation processes. On the other hand, this central role of the state also points to the fact that most of the processes that we have studied are highly dependent on and susceptible to changes in governmental regimes, and changes in the state actors' strategies and preferences.

Besides state actors, typical key participants were environmental and recreation **NGOs**, landowner associations, industry representatives and research bodies. The involvement of **non-organized citizens**, in contrast, was very limited in almost all our cases: citizens were mainly addressed by information campaigns. Where they were invited for actual (consultative) participation, citizens proved difficult to mobilise.

Science and expertise have frequently played a prominent role. But our cases do not at all provide an indication for a "*scientification of politics*", nor for the reverse phenomenon of the "*politicisation of science*". Even though we have detected an increasing plurality of experts and expertise involved and some **efforts to make expertise and information more accessible** in a number of cases, we did not observe the one and new role of science and expertise that would have replaced its traditional roles. As a rule, interaction between science and politics is characterized by multipartite bodies made up of scientists and policy-makers ("integration model"): Scientists and experts cooperated "at arm's length" with political actors.

Overall we summarize that the governance approaches that we have studied resulted in **enlarged sets of actors who became involved**. However a synthesised review of our cases gives the impression that public authorities as well as other hitherto privileged actors have often proved reluctant to open up major decision arenas to a broader range of stakeholders.

### Concluding remarks

Referring to the cases that we have studied, we conclude that the overall policy-making culture is likely to become more participatory, to provide more opportunities and access to a broader range of stakeholders who may gain increased and



legitimate influence on decision-making within the given policy fields. Even though the actual redistribution of power that we observed in most of our cases was quite limited, the participatory processes have still stimulated the emergence of enlarged and new actor networks.

Based on our findings we further conclude that the introduction of the governance rhetoric and practices at national, regional and local levels is often very much due to international and/or European discourses, agreements and policies. Firstly, ideas, arguments and procedural elements of new governance approaches have increasingly taken hold in national level discourses. Secondly, quite some international agreements and in particular EU policies even prescribe participatory and integrative policy-making procedures as well as monitoring and evaluation of processes and outcomes etc. Consequently we assume this trend to continue in the years to come, i.e. a further trend towards applying governance elements in the field of environmental and natural resource policy, at least in the programmatic rhetoric.

On the other hand, besides a number of strategic processes that were stipulated by international forest dialogues or conventions, we have barely found **innovations in policy instruments**. In most cases new modes and processes of governance did not replace traditional modes, structures or processes. Rather they complemented them or even proceeded in parallel, almost unconnected to the traditional decision-making procedures and arenas. This again points out that the pre-existing structures, traditional institutions, actor networks and the entrenched patterns of power distribution remain central to the explanation of governance processes', as well as these processes' policy outputs, impacts and outcomes.

New modes of governance, as defined in agreements, programmes and policy papers at the international, the European, the national and the regional levels set principles and procedures for meaningful public participation and for horizontal as well as vertical policy coordination and integration. Our research shows that effective application of these principles and procedures is highly dependent on a broad variety of context factors, in particular on the commitment of influential state and non-state actors.

Our rich empirical materials allowed pointing out some concrete, most significant factors that either facilitate or hamper effective implementation of governance processes. However, based on the available evidence we conclude that an all-encompassing, European-wide transferable "blueprint" that might instruct about how do simultaneously achieve effective participatory, inter-sectoral, multi-level and adaptive governance processes in various policy domain settings is hardly conceivable yet, due to the complex interrelations among the procedural elements and the variety of contextual conditions.

Even though "new modes of governance" have been high on the political agendas for almost two decades now, in depth comparative, empirical research is still scarce. The GoFOR project has given us the opportunity to significantly contribute to the body of knowledge by providing detailed empirical evidence, some answers have been provided, but – as always – more questions are still up to further research.

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