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Genocide and Genocide Prevention: Outlines Illustrated with the Tragedy in Rwanda 1994

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I am submitting herewith a thesis written by Ginger L. Denton entitled "Genocide and Genocide Prevention: Outlines Illustrated with the Tragedy in Rwanda 1994." I have examined the final electronic copy of this thesis for form and content and recommend that it be accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts, with a major in Political Science.

Robert Gorman, Major Professor

We have read this thesis and recommend its acceptance:

April Morgan, Mary Caprioli

Accepted for the Council:


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
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Dr. Robert Gorman, Major Professor

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Dr. April Morgan


Dr. Mary Caprioli

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**GENOCIDE AND GENOCIDE PREVENTION:
OUTLINES ILLUSTRATED WITH THE TRAGEDY IN RWANDA 1994**

**A Thesis
Presented for the
Master of Arts Degree
The University of Tennessee, Knoxville**

**Ginger L. Denton
August 2004**

Abstract

The purpose of this study was to contribute to comparative research towards a theory of modern genocide and ways to prevent mass murder. Definitions, typologies, key elements, patterns, a comparison of the Holocaust with the Rwandan genocide, and preventive measures are included in the study.

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Abbreviations

CDR	Coalition for the Defense of the Republic
CNN	Cable News Network
FAR	Forces Armees Rwandises
FRODEBU	Front for Democracy in Burundi
FSU	Former Soviet Union
Gestapo	Geheime Staatspolizei (German: "Secret State Police")
ICC	International Criminal Court
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
ICTR	International Criminal Tribunal on Rwanda
IGO	International Governmental Organization
ILO	International Labor Office
INGO	International Non-Governmental Organization
MRND	National Revolutionary Movement for Development
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NSDAP	National Socialist German Workers Party
OAU	Organization of African Unity
POW	Prisoner of War
RPA	Rwandese Patriotic Army
RPF	Rwandese Patriotic Front
RTL	Radio Television des Milles Collines
SA	Sturmabteilung (German: "Storm Troopers")
SS	Schutzstaffel (German: "Protection Squad")
TNC	Transnational Corporation
UN	United Nations
UNAMIR	United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda
USA	United States of America
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Chapter 1: Introduction

Mass violence has riddled the twentieth century. The genocide in Rwanda marks the most extreme case. Violent conflict is not going on between East and West, or between North and South, but is being suffered in this very moment inside more than fifty states. The regional distribution of contemporary mass violence shows a clear global trend: violent conflict is infrequent in the North and West but part of normality in the South and some areas of the East. Much of the violence in the South would not have occurred and acts of genocide would not have been committed without involvement of the North. Northern complicity with state crimes in the South has not at all been an exception.

Since 1945 there have been more than 250 violent conflicts occurring worldwide – until the late 1980s nearly exclusively in the Third World. Assertions of new states regarding their own citizen and substate collectivities were put forth in an increasingly aggressive way. The victims were mainly among minority nationalities, nondominant ethnic groups, and indigenous peoples. Ethnicity and ethnic violence became the single most dangerous source for violence. It produced new types of non-Clausewitzian warfare and modern genocide in the world. In two out of three cases of mass violence we find an ethnic component. That means the ethnic factor (ethnicity) is a dominant or influential component.

High frequency and huge potential of forgotten wars and forgotten massacres became decisive regarding the lack of possibilities for structural prevention of violence, conflict management and transformation, as well as regarding the role of multilateralism in preventing mass violence. The first question “What to do in a particular situation?” is

linked to the particular type of conflict we are dealing with. The second question “When to do what?” underlines the importance of timing in response to conflict.

Today gross human rights violations, genocidal atrocities, and in some cases outright genocide cause havoc in many regions of the world and result in whole populations being petrified in fear and mass traumatization. Violence not only kills humans but also kills life chances for those surviving. Today mass violence is intrinsically linked with ethnicization from above and the contemporary wave of ethnic nationalism from below. Unlike most new types of warfare, genocide is always a state organized crime. If attempts to prevent mass violence and genocide are to be successful then the quest of understanding has to concentrate on the following interlinked areas.

First, the secrets of ethnicity and the process of ethnicization have to be uncovered. We are dealing with a powerful source of deep-rooted conflict, often nourished by destructive interaction in the past.¹ If ethnicity is combined with domination then things become dangerous. Ethnicity becomes a resource for political manipulation and vested interests.

Second, the phenomenon of weak or failed states became more salient in the 1990s. Awareness is growing that failed states are the most dangerous states. The well being, security, and sometimes the very survival of nondominant groups are put at the disposition of states. Failed states threaten to become genocidal states.

Third, meaningful prevention of violent conflict has a very strong structural component. Such structural prevention aims at safeguarding inter-ethnic balance and an

¹ Charles Tajfel, “Experiments in Intergroup Discrimination,” *Science* 223 (11): 96-102.

accommodation of just demands on a sustainable base, providing protection and space for nondominant and vulnerable groups.

Fourth, the timing of conflict management is crucial. If conflicts break out violently then it is already too late for most peaceful solutions. Successful prevention of violent conflict cannot be reactive, as a response to crisis and violent conflict, but has to be anticipatory.

Fifth, the best prevention is preclusive promotion and institutionalization of constructive relationships between different groups.² Often the combination of different methods such as minority protection, power sharing, internal self-determination, e.g. self-governance and forms of autonomy, is successful.³ There is no simple cure-all.

Several publications including Samantha Power's book, quest for an explanation of how and why US governments steer clear of genocidal violence.⁴ Her book raises the question to a wide spectrum of respondents, but, in the end, fails to find an all-encompassing answer. She is forced to remain content with the theory of avoiding a quagmire. I found her book and others very informative but sensed that the authors got lost in the wealth of information and came out short on analysis.

The problem is that today there are only a few research projects operating on a larger scale with the attempt to relate the development of theoretical findings with empirical studies and vice-versa; not talking about the step beyond into practical action of

² Morton Deutsch, *The Resolution of Conflict* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1973).

³ Donald Horowitz, "Making Moderation Pay," in *Conflict and Peacemaking in Multiethnic Societies*, edited by Joseph Montville (Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath, 1990) pp. 451-476.

⁴ Samantha Power, *"A Problem from Hell": America and the Age of Genocide* (New York, NY: Basic Books, 2002).

early warning and genocide prevention and peace building. This thesis seeks to fill that gap.

Chapter 2: Defining Genocide and Mass Murder

The worst kind of destructive interaction of different ethnic or national groups (one of them in possession of the state) is mass murder and genocide.⁵ Genocide is the most barbaric crime and has long-term effects. Cold-blooded state-organized mass murder is not an exceptional crime. The death toll of wars in this century is equaled by the death toll of genocide.⁶ Genocide is the most severe type of violent conflict; its victims are civilians including old people, children, and even babies. Article III of the Convention on the Prevention of Punishment of the Crime of Genocide defines the crime as:

Any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial, or religious group, as such:

- (a) Killing members of the group;
- (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
- (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
- (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
- (e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.⁷

One of the most important observations is that genocide and colonization were always closely linked. The largest ever genocide in modern history was committed by half a dozen European states in what was later called the Third World. Large-scale genocide was committed against American Indians, Africans and Afro-Americans, and subjugated people in European colonies.

⁵ Julian Burger, *Report from the Frontier: The State of the World's Indigenous Peoples* (London: Zed Books, 1987) pp. 83-84. Stephen Ryan, *Ethnic Conflict and International Relations* (Brookfield, VT: Dartmouth, 1995) pp.11-12.

⁶ Ibid..

⁷ Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Article 2, United Nations Treaty Series, 78: 277. The convention was adopted by UN General Assembly (Resolution 260 (III) A) on 9 Dec. 1948.

European colonial expansion and genocide since 1500

According to Darcy Ribeiro the Indians of the Americas were reduced by the Spaniards in the South and European settlers in the North from 80 million in 1492 to 3.5 million 1750.⁸ Genocide against Indians has continued until today, e.g. in Paraguay, Guatemala, and Brazil. From 1500 onwards Africa lost one hundred million people to European slavery. Most enslaved Africans died under terrible conditions during mass transport from Africa to Americas. Genocide against Africans was continued by infamous lynching campaigns in the southern US.⁹

It is important to understand that genocide was an inherent part of general practice employed by virtually all European powers throughout the colonial period, with Germany and Britain ranking second to Spain. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries the German colonial genocide against the Herero and Nama in German Southwest Africa and the diverse people of Southern Tanganyika constituted preparatory stages for modern genocide.¹⁰

Definitions and cases

Genocide is a phenomenon known since ancient times; it means actions carried out by a state or ruler with the intent to systematically kill a particular community of people or social collectivity, resulting in destroying the targeted group in whole or in part. Modern genocide is state-organized mass murder and crimes against humanity characterized by the intention of the rulers to exterminate individuals because of

⁸ Darcy Ribeiro, *The Americas and Civilization* (New York: Dutton, 1971) p. 356.

⁹ Roger Smith, "Exploring the United States' Thirty-Five-Year Reluctance to Ratify the Genocide Convention," *Harvard Human Rights Journal* 5 (Spring): pp. 227-233.

¹⁰ John Iliffe, *Tanganyika under German Rule, 1905-1912* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1969) p. 172.

belonging to a particular national, ethnic, religious, or racial group. Victims belonging to a particular cultural group (ethnocide), to a particular political group (politicide) or to a particular social group (democide) are not equally well protected by the UN Anti-Genocide Convention of 1948.¹¹ Genocide is a premeditated mass crime that has been systematically planned, prepared, and executed.

Massacres are genocidal acts committed by different types of perpetrators such as state agents or entire agencies, political extremists and interest groups against vulnerable groups, which have been excluded from mainstream society. Total genocide means that the perpetrators aimed at the complete extermination and destruction in whole of a particular community or group of people, with the intent to destroy its reproduction (as a group) as well as its culture and institutions.

Typology of genocide

The distinction of scale must be introduced. The wording of the Anti-Genocide Convention of 1948 suggests genocide in whole and genocide in part, thus total or full-scale genocide and partial or large-scale genocide. Robert Melson combined this distinction of scale (total/partial) with the equally obvious distinction of place (domestic/foreign).¹²

This also calls in the type of victims targeted. Modern full-scale genocide in this century, such as the ones committed by the Young Turks, the Nazis and their allies, the Khmer Rouge, and the Hutu power regime in Rwanda, were all directed against a

¹¹ Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Article 2, United Nations Treaty Series, 78: 277.

¹² Melson, *Revolution and Genocide: On the Origins of the Armenian Genocide and the Holocaust* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992).

domestic component of the respective societies or against several components at once. In all four cases the state machinery was used extensively.

The type of perpetrator, being state and non-state actors would therefore define an obvious distinction and third dimension of the crime of genocide. In order to broaden the picture I include other types of mass murder, such as massacres, to be distinguished from total genocide. It becomes more illustrative with reference to structural situations in which I will explain below. In Table 1 this typology of genocide is illustrated with a series of cases.

The extreme worst case of genocide is when the perpetrators are domestic/state actors. This results in the total extermination of a minority, planned and executed by the state. Carried out by the same perpetrators, mass murder would include massacres against a minority organized by state agents/agencies.

Next domestic/non-state actors resulting in full-scale genocide include European adventurers and invaders against indigenous groups in settler colonies of the Americas and Australia. Mass murder or massacres include genocidal atrocities directed against a minority committed by extremists/interest groups.

Full-scale genocide occurs under foreign/state actors with colonial genocides committed by European powers against indigenous people (mainly Spain, Britain, Portugal, and Germany). The same actors result in mass murder when committed by invaders against civilian populations and rebellious or resisting groups.

Finally, there is no evidence found of a full-scale genocide when foreign/non-state actors are the perpetrators but mass murder results when acts are committed by invading settlers against local populations and resisting groups.

Table 1: Typology of Genocide: Cases in the 10-Types Outline

20th century genocide and mass murder	full-scale genocide	mass murder (massacres)
domestic / state actors (before 1945)	19 th century internal colonial genocide of the USA against the Indians extending into 20 th century; large-scale genocides during WWI & WWII; Germans in FSU, Balkans & Greece; Serbs vs. Albanians 1912; Jews 1942	Hundreds of cases worst mass murder: Stalin's massacres against Caucasians 1943-57, the Gulags, mass murder in Ukraine, etc.; massacres of USA against Indians
domestic / state actors (after 1945)	four cases of total full-scale genocide in this century: Aghet, Shoah, Pol Pot's Cambodia 1975-79, Rwanda 1994 large scale genocide cases: Hima-Tutsi army in Burundi (1972) vs. Hutu elites & Tutsi-Banyaruguru opposition; military regimes vs. Guatemala's indigenous Mayan majority 1980s	since 1945 (Gurr & Harff compiled 44 large cases); Burma's military vs. minorities since 1948; Burma vs. students in 1988; pogroms against Palestinians since 1948, later in Shatila / Sabra near Beirut; pogroms against Chinese and mass murder of alleged communists in Indonesia; Apartheid crimes in South Africa; several hundred other cases, e.g. China's Tiananmen massacre
domestic / non-state perpetrators	by European settlers vs. Amerindians; landless peasants vs. low land Indian peoples in the Amazon	several hundred cases; worst pogroms against Jews and Roma in several states of Eastern and Western Europe; lynching of Blacks in USA
foreign genocide / state actors	colonial genocide of the Germans vs. Herero and Nama	USA in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia by indiscriminate bombing, killing and spraying of civilians in the 1970s; USSR dirty war against Afghani civilians
foreign genocide/ non-state actors	no case	Mercenaries in Third world conflicts; TNCs against marginal groups

Who is who: Perpetrators and victims

There is some agreement in the question of defining the victim group largely following Raphael Lemkin's definition of genocide and the wording of the Anti-Genocide Convention of 1948.¹³ However, the convention would partly go further than the present minimal consensus, especially concerning the gray area of indirect genocidal practices and measures.

Particular national, ethnic, or political groups rule a state in crisis, often as ethnocracy. Such dominant groups, no matter if they are demographically in a majority or minority position, were under particular historic circumstances able to bring the new state into their own, often as a consequence of colonial legacies, wars or crisis. Dominant groups got into position of command over the so-called monopoly of violence; they exercise firm control (total state). Assertive relationships towards minority groups, the political opposition, religious communities, and ethnically distinct nationalities (nations without own state) became a dangerous source of violent conflict long ago in the South and increasingly so with each cycle of decolonization since 1945. Exclusion of minorities and their persecution by dominant groups commanding the states' monopolies of violence became the most dangerous source of destructive violence in modern times. In situations of exclusion there is a risk of genocide.

¹³ "Genocide means ... acts committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group as such" (Article 2). Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Article 2, United Nations Treaty Series, 78: 277. Raphael Lemkin, *Axis Rule in Occupied Europe; Laws of Occupation, Analysis of Government, Proposals for Redress* (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Division of International Law, 1944).

Four cases of full-scale genocide in the twentieth century

Full-scale total genocide means that the perpetrators were aiming at the total destruction of a particular community of peoples (genocide in whole, not in part) and the result varied accordingly. There were only very few cases of total genocide before the twentieth century, namely the largest ever genocide committed 1492-1750 by the Iberians against the American Indians and the genocide against North American Indians by European powers and settlers.¹⁴ In the twentieth century alone there were four cases of full-scale genocide, causing more victims than in any previous period.

1. the Aghet: Turkish genocide 1914-23 against the Armenians¹⁵
2. the Holocaust: genocides committed 1933-45 by the fascist German state and its allies against the European Jews, Roma, Russians, other Slavic peoples, POWs, slave workers, and the political opposition¹⁶
3. the Khmer Rouge genocide in Kampuchea 1975-79 against the Vietnamese, Cham Muslim and Chinese minorities as well as against the Khmer urban classes¹⁷
4. the Hutu-power genocide in Rwanda 1994 committed by the akazu elite, their state machinery, Hutu-power factions of all political parties and a huge number of common people against the Tutsi branch of the Banyarwanda and against Hutu opponents.¹⁸

The most deadly regimes in the twentieth century have all committed genocide against domestic groups, mainly the barbarian attempt to exterminate specific minorities.

¹⁴ Ward Churchill, *Struggle for the Land: Native North American Resistance to Genocide, Ecocide, and Colonization* (San Francisco: City Lights Books, 2002) pp. 53-55.

¹⁵ Vahakn N. Dadrian, *Warrant for Genocide: Key Elements of Turko-Armenian Conflict* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 1999).

¹⁶ Doris. L. Bergen, *War and Genocide: A Concise History of the Holocaust* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003).

¹⁷ Ben Kiernan, *The Pol Pot Regime: Race, Power, and Genocide in Cambodia under the Khmer Rouge, 1975-79* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996).

¹⁸ Gerard Prunier, *The Rwanda Crisis, 1959-1994: History of a Genocide* (London: Hurst, 1995).

Chapter 3: Genocide in the Twentieth Century

The most infamous cases of state organized crimes in modern Europe are large-scale genocide committed during both World Wars. The executioners of the Holocaust were not only Germans but also local collaborators among different nations in occupied countries all over Europe; the executioners of the Armenian genocide were also recruited among non-Turkish people of the Ottoman Empire.¹⁹ Both large-scale genocides were committed under the cover of warfare. However, the genocidal agenda of the perpetrators was known, e.g. in the case of German fascism openly announced by Hitler well in advance.

War as a smoke screen for slaughter

War provided a smoke screen for the slaughter of millions of civilian victims. After reaching the height of power in the declining empire in 1914, the Young Turk military elite began with systematic preparations for the genocide against the Armenians. On August 2, 1914, a secret German-Turkish agreement on the entry of Turkey at the side of Germany into World War I was signed.²⁰ The situation was similar concerning the fascist genocides. Since 1939 Germany was in war with its neighbors, starting with Poland where in the following years alone 4.4 million civilians perished. Genocide was one of the means totalitarian regimes in Europe used against national, ethnic, or religious minorities, which played leading roles in the economy and culture of their respective countries.²¹

¹⁹ Robert Melson, *Revolution and Genocide: On the Origins of the Armenian Genocide and the Holocaust*.

²⁰ Dadrian, *Warrant for Genocide: Key Elements of Turko-Armenian Conflict*, p. 129.

²¹ Helen Fein, "A Formula for Genocide: Comparison of the Turkish genocide (1915) and the German Holocaust (1939-1945)," *Comparative Studies in Sociology*, 1 (1978); Robert Melson, *Revolution and Genocide: On the Origins of Armenian Genocide and the Holocaust*.

The Holocaust as model genocide: Totalitarianism and superior race in Germany

Genocidal atrocities started with politicicide. Violence was first directed against communists, trade unionists, and socialists. Mass executions and slaughter by special task forces such as the SA and later the SS, as the main instrument of fascist terror policy under the command of the Führer, the Nazi power elite and the establishment of the National Socialist German Workers Party (NSDAP).²² When World War II was started with Hitler's Blitzkrieg against Poland, mass executions began in 1939. Following the occupation of large parts of Eastern Europe, mass murder against the European Jews, Roma, Russians, and other people was ordered immediately and took the form of full-scale genocide. Units of the German army and special battalions executed the mass murder. The infamous Einsatzgruppen A-D partly consisted of police reserve battalions of normal Germans.²³ Finally the civilian population and prisoners of war from the USSR were targeted.²⁴ The overkill of prisoners and millions of slave workers through hard labor and inhumane conditions in the concentration camps was organized similar to the killings in war zones. The Nazi terror reign was culminating in industrial genocide in places like Auschwitz, Dachau, and in other extermination factories, especially constructed for the execution of the Final Solution, by cremating millions, separated in different categories of victim, throughout the years 1942-1945.²⁵

More than eighteen million people became victims of the Nazi genocide and the total war fascist Germany brought over Eastern Europe; this excludes the victims in

²² Kressel, *Mass Hate: The Global Rise of Genocide and Terror* (Westview Press, 2002) pp. 139-140.

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 138.

²⁴ Melson, *Revolution and Genocide: On the Origins of the Armenian Genocide and the Holocaust*.

²⁵ Kressel, *Mass Hate: The Global Rise of Genocide and Terror*, pp. 102-108.

southeastern Europe and Northern Africa.²⁶ German fascism murdered six million Jews, 3.3 million Soviet POWs, two million Romani, almost one million Serbs, and millions of others.²⁷ The indirect death toll among the civilian populations (democide) was enormous. Seven million people died of hunger during the German extermination war in the hinterlands of the former Soviet Union only.²⁸ These were cases of intentional mass murder. In both cases (Germany 1940s and Turkey 1910s) the exterminatory ideologies used were an inherent part of premodern ethnist or racist theories.

Modern genocide in the South: Ongoing legacies of colonialism

Examples of fifty years of modern post-colonial genocide, 1948 to 1998, are manifold.²⁹ Legacies of colonialism led to genocide or genocidal atrocities in different parts of the world since the Second World War. Other destructive forms of interaction between states and nations/nationalities are to be considered. Destructive interaction took the form of forced assimilation of non-dominant groups; territorial invasion of minority areas by state actors; settlement policy in indigenous territories, infiltration of homelands of minorities or indigenous groups; forced massive transfer of populations, forced resettlement, ethnic cleansing, expulsion, and deportation.³⁰ In many cases genocide was

²⁶ Bergen, *War and Genocide: A Concise History of the Holocaust*.

²⁷ John G. Heidenrich, *How to Prevent Genocide: A Guide for Policymakers, Scholars, and the Concerned Citizen* (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 2001) p. 6.

²⁸ Ibid..

²⁹ Burma since 1948, Southern and Central Sudan since 1960, Rwanda since 1959 and Burundi since 1964, Timor from 1974, Pol Pot's Cambodia in the 1970s, Burundi's selective genocide in 1972, Genocide against American Indians: continued in the 1970s against the Ache in Paraguay, in the 1980s against Guatemala's indigenous Mayan majority, in the 1990s against the Yanomami and other low land Indian people in the Brazilian Amazon region, Burundi's second partial genocide in 1993, in Congo-Zaire since the 1970s, Rwanda 1994.

³⁰ Examples for massive population transfer: Soviet Union in the Baltic states since 1945, China in Tibet and Eastern Turkestan since the 1950s, Indonesia with its policy of transmigration in West Papua, Moluccas, and Aceh, Bangla Desh in the Chittagong Hill Tracts since 1979, Ethiopia under Mengistu in Oromia, in Gambella lowlands and the inter lake area (until 1990), Iraq and Iran in Kurdistan.

committed in a situation of crisis, internal turmoil, or civil war, as for instance in Burma, Indochina, Sudan, and Central Africa.³¹ The Rwandan genocide is only the most extreme case. Defenselessness of the victims or lack of formal power, as witnessed in Rwanda, has been analyzed as contributing to the likelihood of genocide.³² The Hutu extremists killed an estimated 900,000 to 1.2 million. This represents three times more victims than in all violent conflicts of the 1990s in the former USSR and in Yugoslavia together.

³¹ Frank Chalk and Kurt Johassohn, *The History and Sociology of Genocide: Analyses and Case Studies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990).

³² Helen Fein, "Genocide: A Sociological Perspective," *Current Sociology* 38, 1 (1990).

Chapter 4: Patterns of Total Genocide

The elaboration of a comprehensive typology of genocides, based on the definition of clear-cut criteria, is a demanding task. Identification of key elements of comparison and of general patterns of genocides may help to reduce the voids of comparative genocide research. This would contribute to the key objective of such research, the prevention of future genocide and mass violence. Barbara Harff and Robert Melson have both identified a number of common patterns of modern genocides.³³ Melson saw “four tidal waves of ethno-national conflict and genocide in the wake of crushing or crumbling states and empires”.³⁴

The progressive disintegration of the Ottoman Empire produced the first of the four total domestic genocides in this century, the Aghet, the destruction of the Armenians in Anatolia by the regime of the Young Turks. The collapse of the German and Austro-Hungarian empires in WWI produced instability and the growth of fascism in Germany since the 1920. Under the cover of WWII the Nazis and their willing local supporters committed large-scale genocide at home and in the occupied countries. By 1945 this had resulted in the intended total extermination of the European Jews and the Roma. Partial genocide was committed against a large number of Slavic people. Large-scale genocide was committed against millions of slave workers and POWs.³⁵

The decolonization period consisted of artificial and weak states searching for ways of nation building, which was often violently directed against minorities and the

³³ Barbara Harff, “The Ethiology of Genocides,” in Isidor Wallimann and Michael N. Dobkowski, *Genocide in the Modern Age: Ethiology and Case Studies of Mass Death* (New York: Greenwood Press 1987), pp. 41-60.

³⁴ Melson, *Revolution and Genocide: On the Origins of the Armenian Genocide and the Holocaust*.

³⁵ Bergen, *War and Genocide: A Concise History of the Holocaust*.

political opposition. Endless ethnic civil wars, liberation wars, secessions, and slaughter of populations began soon after WWII in the Africa-Asian space. In Former British India the separation of India and Pakistan ended in large-scale communal violence and horrible bloodshed. Internal wars in Burma since 1948, the secession of Eastern Pakistan, and the civil war in Sri Lanka crippled South Asia, followed by mass violence in Sudan, Algeria, Indochina, Nigeria/Biafra, Indonesia, Uganda, Rwanda-Burundi, Former Portuguese Africa, and the Horn of Africa.³⁶

The collapse of the federations of the USSR and Yugoslavia led to comparatively less violent wave of wars, ethnic cleansing, and communal violence. In this period falls the last and most rapid genocide of this century in Rwanda 1994, which was partly a result of the end of the Cold War. The Rwandan genocide resulted in more destruction in terms of loss of human lives than the ongoing instability, crisis, and warfare in parts of the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. Rwanda was the first genocide in modern history characterized by a massive participation of common people.

Common elements and patterns of genocidal processes

Analyzing and comparing the four total modern genocides of the twentieth century produces a set of common elements and patterns of genocidal processes. Patterns can be found by looking at the perpetrators and their environments. We identify and explore

- the role of the elite, the core organizers, legitimizers and perpetrators of genocide, and their relations to the mass of willing executioners,
- the internal and external conditions they find and create,
- the context in which they act,

³⁶ John G. Heidenrich, *How to Prevent Genocide: A Guide for Policymakers, Scholars, and the Concerned Citizen* (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 2001) pp. 13, 99, 114, 260.

- the political environment in which they take the decision to destroy,
- the way genocidal extremists gain the state power and transform it,
- the type of victims they chose,
- the exterminatory ideology they use, and
- the systematic way they plan, prepare and execute the crime of genocide.

Elites, perpetrators, objectives and the context of the crime

First we would look at the perpetrators, their ideology, the process of victimization, and the way they executed the crime of genocide. An organized and vicious elite is more likely to gain state power in situations of deep historic changes. Under certain internal and external conditions they succeed in imposing their genocidal and destructive aims. The agendas of such leaders are to destroy specific domestic groups, which are as a rule always in a non-dominant and minority position.³⁷

Genocidal elites try to penetrate and dominate the state. Their objective is to impose their aims on the state machinery they have conquered and on the majority people of their respective societies. The modern nation state is the “predominant culprit in genocides”.³⁸ Evidently the likelihood to realize such aims is much higher in a totalitarian system than in a democratic one. However, periods of imposed democratization can be conducive to genocide, as the case of Rwanda exhibits in the most drastic way.

The context is characterized by rapid political, social, and structural changes which were described by the context of “national upheaval”³⁹, separatist conflict, internal

³⁷ Neil J. Kressel, *Mass Hate: The Global Rise of Genocide and Terror* (Cambridge, MA: Westview Press, 2002) p. 187.

³⁸ Harff, *Ethnic Conflict in World Politics*.

³⁹ Ibid..

strife, rebellion or “revolution”⁴⁰. What is meant are rapid or abrupt historic changes following an extended period of crisis. The aim of genocide is part of a larger project of the nation-state (re)formation or its revision. This includes all the different processes of changing regimes, moving of boundaries or loss of territory, warfare or security threats resulting from (or perceived as) challenges to the dominant groups identity and to the identity of the national political community.

Narrow nationalism, exterminatory ideology, and victimization

The redefinition or confusion of national identity by the power elites is a central point. The perceived struggle for national survival, against internal and external enemies, has to become somewhat plausible for the majority group. The foreign minorities will function as scapegoats. The nation needs to be purified. The elimination of so-called “foreign elements from within”⁴¹ is one of the common denominators of total modern genocide. In reality all total domestic genocides were preceded not so much by real challenges to national identity rather than by challenges to the dominant power strata, having won, consolidated or maintained its power by use of force in an outright unstable situation.

The intentions of the killers are expressed in their exterminatory ideology. This ideology will always take up older stereotypes. The aim of the power elite is to single out and exclude a group as the enemy of state and society. Extremist regimes are essentially combining militarism, ethno-chauvinism, and ultra-nationalism with promises for their population’s bright future. They try to restore the allegedly threatened identity of their

⁴⁰ Melson, *Revolution and Genocide: On the Origins of the Armenian Genocide and the Holocaust*.

⁴¹ Harff, *Ethnic Conflict in World Politics*.

political constituency on a narrow hybrid base. The result is the ethnicization of the nation. If any of its key elements came under heavy internal or external pressure for change then the reaction was fierce and in the end self-destructive.

Support for genocide by a minority, and more important the indifference of the majority, can ultimately be won if victimized groups are presented as racially, ethnically, religiously, or morally different from the dominant group. Harff wrote of the “most different groups” to become scapegoats for losses and “national frustrations” and the targets of destruction.⁴² Most successful, this proved the construction of close links between domestic enemies and external aggressors by the genocidal elites. Individual victims may often not be easily identifiable, and there is usually a large gray area calling for arbitrary solutions. As a result the target group becomes visible and easily identifiable, as an imagined entity of domestic enemies seen as foreigners.

Extremist power-elites, willing executioners and lack of external constraints

Decisive elements are the exacerbation of existing internal cleavages, the lack of external constraints in implementing so-called final solutions or/and foreign support for it, and the control of the state by the power elites to allow for a genocidal state. Such a state needs willing executioners. Of further importance is a subservient state bureaucracy and obedient or extremist sections of armed forces or special troops. Conducive to the genocidal aim are the great fear and confusion among the national population, the well-organized massive support by their core political constituencies, and the at least lukewarm support among larger sections of grassroots. Describing the genocidal elites as simply power-mad is not sufficient. There are structural reasons for their drive to state-

⁴² Harff, *Ethnic Conflict in World Politics*.

centrism and extreme centralization of power, often symbolically in one person with a single party platform. Obviously such a plan is bound to end in totalitarianism and self-destruction. Often there is little or no external pressure to prevent the worst.

Chapter 5: The State-Organized Genocide in Rwanda 1994: A Crime of Obedience

The genocide in Rwanda in 1994 was a well-advertised and well-prepared attempt to obliterate a minority. The whole state apparatus was mobilized for the purposes of exterminating the Tutsi group. Over a period of months, public and private media called upon loyal citizens to do their duty and dispatch their neighbors. The Catholic Church and other churches (except the Muslims) failed disgracefully and, as institutions, kept up a stubborn silence.⁴³ Donor countries were struck with blindness. Rationale for such behavior includes the United States' thinning patience for peacekeeping. The Clinton administration had taken office better disposed toward peacekeeping than any other administration in US history. But Congress owed half a billion dollars in UN dues and peacekeeping costs. It had tired of its obligation to foot one-third of the bill for what had come to feel like an insatiable global appetite for mischief and an equally insatiable UN appetite for missions. The Clinton White House agreed that the Department of Peacekeeping Operations needed fixing and insisted that the UN "learn to say no" to chancy or costly missions. Rwanda was extremely low on the list of American priorities.

The media prepared the ground for the final solution, especially the radio stations. The citizens were encouraged to hate the Tutsi and their accomplices. From April 6, 1994 they were ordered to kill their fellow citizens.⁴⁴ Mass participation in genocidal atrocities involved a huge number of the male Hutu population. The genocide has to be analyzed as a crime of obedience. Extermination was facilitated by a totalitarian administrative system on five levels.

⁴³ Peter Ronayne, *Never Again? The United States and the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide since the Holocaust* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2001) p. 159.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 156-167.

The population played a direct, active, and massive part in a state ordered act of genocide to which practically the whole minority of Tutsis who had remained in the country fell victim.⁴⁵ The genocide in Rwanda was an enormous crime of subordination and submission to the murderous command of a state. Only half the population remained in the country; the other half either fled or was murdered. The evacuation produced the greatest and most ambivalent refugee crisis of modern times.

It will be many years before one can mention Rwanda without evoking the horror of mutilated bodies and severed limbs floating down the Kagera River. Yet very few Americans, even well informed ones, possess even the most rudimentary background needed to understand what happened there. Even people who know a great deal about Africa typically know very little about Rwanda; after all, dozens of countries crowd the continent, and Rwanda has had relatively little political, economic, or cultural impact beyond east-central Africa. The few Americans who knew anything at all about Rwanda prior to the massacres knew it as one of the centers of Africa's uncontrollable AIDS epidemic.

At first, a mass confusion surrounded the events of the spring of 1994, starting with the apparent precipitating factor- the fatal downing of April 6 of a plane carrying the Hutu president of Rwanda, Juvenal Habyarima, and his counterpart from Burundi, also a Hutu, Cyprien Ntaryamira.⁴⁶ Months after the massacres became headline news, Jean Kambanda, prime minister of the Rwandan (Hutu) government-in-exile, protested that the

⁴⁵ Josias Semujanga, *Origins of Rwandan Genocide* (Amherst, NY: Humanity Books, 2003).

⁴⁶ Samantha Power, *"A Problem from Hell" America and the Age of Genocide* (New York, NY: Basic Books, 2002) p. 329.

Tutsis had been the ones guilty of genocide against the Hutus.⁴⁷ Kajuga, Kambanda, and other Hutu extremists denied the existence of an organized massacre; instead, they painted a picture of civil war, in which their side, the “patriotic” Hutus, engaged primarily in self-defense, though some regrettable atrocities occurred.⁴⁸

The crime of genocide and the United Nations

The source of one of Central Africa’s recent turmoil was Rwanda. The politics of genocide have been a planned, conscious strategy applied from 1990 onwards. The clique of powerful people around dictator Habyarimana (Akazu) superimposed a pathological plan to murder all Tutsi and the political opposition among the Hutu in order not to implement the plan of power sharing agreed in the Arusha Accords 1993.⁴⁹

I analyze three phases of escalation from fall 1990. The first phase of escalation began with the Uganda based invasion by the RPF rebels; it ended with Habyarimana’s MRND regime apparently giving way on the major points of contention in March 1992. At the same time, the extreme political polarization began, and the organizational preparations for the genocide were expedited. The second phase of escalation was triggered by the regime’s concessions and ended with the signature of the Arusha peace agreement in August 1993. Against the background of the successful peace negotiations of 1992–93, this phase led to a hardening of the attitude of rejection and was characterized by a continuation of preparations for the final solution, an intensive racist propaganda campaign, and a perverting of the notion of democratization. The third phase of escalation, from fall 1993 until the start of the genocide in April 1994, resulted in the

⁴⁷ Raymond Bonner, “Rwanda Now Faces Painful Ordeal of Rebirth,” *New York Times*, 29 Dec. 1994, A1.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*.

⁴⁹ Semujanga, *Origins of Rwandan Genocide*, pp. 25, 44, 205.

whole state being taken over by the extremists and to the launch of a massive hate campaign. During this phase, the failure of the United Nations to underpin and enforce the Arusha peace became evident.

Getting the option of force established as part of government policy

From the time of the RPA invasion in October 1990, a terrible polarization began to take place in society; there was an increase in right wing extremism and fascism, and the option of force began to be established as part of government policy (Phase 1). Alongside these destructive political developments, the organizational preconditions for the genocide began to be systematically put in place on the orders of the Akazu power elite. At the end of 1991 and beginning of 1992, various state bodies began to push ahead with the relevant preparations on a comprehensive basis and with great criminal gusto. The society was militarized by means of mass recruitment to the army and presidential guard based on the threat posed to the regime by the military invasion by RPA rebels (October 1, 1990). The guerrilla war was confined to parts of the northern hill country; therefore, the buildup of the militias had nothing to do with the fight against the RPA.⁵⁰

The extremist, eliminatory ideology was not confined to a handful of misguided individuals; it was developed and disseminated by paid Hutu extremists as an official ideology. The destructiveness and pathological nature of Hutu extremism were revealed already in 1991 in the genocide perpetrated on the small Bagogwe group in northwestern Rwanda in January/February 1991. The ideological propaganda and relentless agitation

⁵⁰ Semujanga, *Origins of Rwandan Genocide*, p. 195.

of the Hutu population were intended to stimulate social envy. The extremists exploited the inferiority complexes that had been implanted in colonial times in regard to the Tutsi as alleged born rulers. This was even despite the fact that the Tutsi had, in reality, been oppressed and persecuted since 1959.⁵¹ The media campaign to create fears about threats to the overwhelming majority from the minority acquired plausibility as a result of the lingering civil war under way in Burundi since the murder of the moderate FRODEBU president Melchior Ndadaye (Burundi's first Hutu head of state) in October 1993.⁵²

The force option was given an enormous legitimacy boost as a result of the traditional moral authorities being taken into state ownership and as a result of the silence of all the Christian churches. The increased involvement of the leadership and many secular followers of the powerful Catholic Church became obvious. The negligence of the Catholic Church was not simply a faux pas on the part of individual bishops, missionaries, priests, or lay people. The church structures themselves were mobilized by the clergy, most of whom were of an extremist bent, and by the mass of church-going supporters and accomplices of the extremists.⁵³

Democratization and the preparations for the genocide

In March 1992, when Habyarimana gave in on the refugee question and declared his willingness to enter into peace talks with the RPF, the destructive dynamic seemed to have been halted. However, the formation of a coalition government in April 1992 soon had a boomerang effect. Against the background of the successful peace negotiations in

⁵¹ Kressel, *Mass Hate: The Global Rise of Genocide and Terror*, pp. 82-84.

⁵² *Ibid.*, p. 88.

⁵³ Ronayne, *Never Again? The United States and the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide since the Holocaust*, pp. 158-159.

Arusha in 1992–93, the extremists took these concessions as a ground for intensifying the campaigning.⁵⁴ This negative dynamic grew stronger with the first Arusha protocol in August 1992, making the option of the use of force more acute within government policy.

The top-down perversion of democratization, following its introduction in March 1992, under external pressure and in conditions of permanent emergency, led to the opposite of what was originally intended. The freedom to organize (foundation of political parties) and freedom of the press were exploited without interference by the Hutu extremists (to launch a massive campaign). The negotiations in Arusha were obstructed by the regime and eventually failed on the question of the division of power with opposition forces, notably the RPF (Arusha agreement of January 1993).⁵⁵ The failure of the UN to react appropriately to repeated verifiable warnings of genocide is inexcusable; an arms-embargo should have been declared in 1991; hardly any criticism was voiced of France's criminal policy in Rwanda.⁵⁶

State bodies coordinated the preparations for the genocide. The challenge presented to the state and its monopoly on force by the countrywide build-up of the militias belonging to the MRND (Interahamwe) and CDR (Impuzi) was only apparent; in reality, the aim was to strengthen the state and ethnic monopoly on force.⁵⁷ The Hutu nationalists secured a position of predominance; they got rid of the remaining moderates by threats and political assassinations, put their own adherents into decision-making positions, and worked constantly on public opinion. The general climate of brutalization

⁵⁴ Kressel, *Mass Hate: The Global Rise of Genocide and Terror*, p. 91.

⁵⁵ Semujanga, *Origins of Rwandan Genocide*, p. 44.

⁵⁶ Hirsch, *Anti-Genocide: Building an American Movement to Prevent Genocide* (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 2002) p. 91.

⁵⁷ Ronayne, *Never Again? The United States and the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide since the Holocaust*, p. 158.

was reinforced by the three pogroms against the ethnic minorities of the Bagogwe, Bahima, and Bugesera-Tutsi perpetrated by Hutu extremists with official support between 1991 and 1993. The victimization and dehumanization of all Tutsi was deliberately escalated from the time of the Bugesera pogrom in 1992.

The failure of the UN: extremists gain control of the state apparatus

Most grave and unforgivable was the miscalculation of the situation by the UN at the end of 1993. This happened despite the fact that accurate information was available after the Milobs had presented UNAMIR force commander Roméo Dallaire with alarming detailed reports, which Dallaire had faxed to the chief of UN peace operations.⁵⁸

The decisive development of Phase 3 is the seizure of the state's monopoly of force by the extremists. It was not the loss of the monopoly on force that cleared the way for the strategy of genocide in Rwanda, as some experts believed, overlooking the fact that the monopoly on force had long since been captured. One cannot talk of a loss, given that at no time was there a change in command and that the party militias were an integral element in the Akazu's monopoly on force. The societal element, and also a degree of social control, was undoubtedly present, but it was too weak compared with the strong state.

The problem began when the monopoly on force was altered. Phase 3 was marked by the take over of all state apparatuses by extremists, a massive hate campaign,

⁵⁸ Ronayne, *Never Again? The United States and the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide since the Holocaust*, pp. 155-156.

The fax of January 1, 1994 contained the complete plans for the genocide. UNAMIR security experts had analyzed the structure of the military, the location of the arms-depots was known, as were the operational plans, and yet the UN remained paralyzed. The Belgian secret services were aware of secret arms collections, and on February 2, 1994 they issued an urgent warning. On January 11, 1994, Gen. Dallaire alerted the UN.

and the broad dissemination of the pathological idea of obliteration among the population characterized the situation from the time of the signature of the Arusha agreement in August 1993, on the eve of the genocide. The escalation of this process of violence over the last phase of approximately seven months, up to the start of the genocide on April 6, 1994, might still have been halted by outside intervention. Among the elements were: The failure of the UN to back up the Arusha settlement, negotiated through the intermediary of Tanzania and the OAU from June 1992 to August 1993, to ensure it was implemented, and to make worst case preparations. The failure of the international community was characterized by total absence of a coherent policy of conflict mitigation. The six most important donor countries of the Habyarimana regime 1991-1993, Belgium, Germany, France, USA, Switzerland, and Canada failed to suspend the aid flows.⁵⁹ Their failure to use comprehensive conditionality was a crucial factor, which gave signals of sympathy and support to the regime. Under the Anti-Genocide Convention of 1948 the international community was obligated to intervene once early warnings had clearly revealed the intention to destroy the Tutsi minority and the Hutu opposition.

The complete confusion caused among the Rwandan population by the campaigns against alleged collaboration with the RPF and by the hate campaign conducted by the private radio station, RTLM, was an important element. All the opposition parties in Rwanda split into genocidal factions under pressure from the increasingly influential Hutu extremists of the MRND and CDR. Violence against the Tutsi, against smaller

⁵⁹ Tor Sellstrom and Lennart Wohlgemuth, "Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda: Historical Perspective, Some Explanatory Factors," Online, 29 Aug. 2003.

<http://www.ess.uwe.ac.uk/Rwanda/Rwanda4c.htm>

Linda de Hoyos, "The Hoax Embedded in the UN Inquiry Report on the Rwanda Genocide," 1 Feb. 2000, Online, 30 Aug. 2003. <http://www.inshuti.org/hoyos2.htm>

minorities, and against the political opposition became normal. Violence was encouraged by the absence of punishment for acts of terror against excluded minorities and dissidents.

According to expert reports, public accusations by opposition politicians and statements by the perpetrators themselves aimed to utilize the state to further prosecute their genocidal campaign. Their declared aims were the extermination of the Tutsi and the removal of the Hutu opposition. The extremists assumed control of almost all state apparatuses having first acquired a greater following through state support; moderate opposition members were reduced to just a handful in the state administration.

Several foreign secret services monitored the militias but Western governments refrained from any pressures and did not intervene. The donors never conditioned the large aid flows. Aid flows even increased by fifty percent since 1990: this was seen as a clear signal of support by the akazu and the Hutu power extremists.⁶⁰ On the eve of the genocide, the militarists and fascist extremists were in command of the state monopoly on force and were waiting for the signal to strike.

The shooting down of the dictator's aircraft by two ground-to-air missiles as it came in to land at Kigali was taken by certain sections of the army and presidential guard as an opportunity for the armed gangs to launch a strike against the opposition gangs. The deliberate shooting down of the aircraft cannot be reinterpreted as a start to an unplanned wave of bloodlust.

⁶⁰ Sellstrom and Wohlgemuth, "Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda: Historical Perspective, Some Explanatory Factors," <http://www.ess.uwe.ac.uk/Rwanda/Rwanda4c.htm>

The threat of a loss of power is crucial. The Akazu elite gave the order for the mass murder when it saw its position of power jeopardized by Habyarimana's promise that the Arusha agreement would finally be implemented.⁶¹ In the interests of preserving its power, the Akazu elite made use of a racist ideology whose pathological consequence was the annihilation of the minority and the molding of the majority into a nation of murderers.

The perpetrators: organizers and executioners

The main bodies and organizations that carried out the genocide were the presidential guard, two paramilitary youth organizations (the MRND Interahamwe and the CDR Impuza Mugambi killer troops)⁶², the army; and almost the entire state's administrative apparatus. These bodies were the main perpetrators of the genocide, in their capacity as executing authorities. Members of the higher professional groups and a large proportion of church leaders and religious functionaries (not including the Muslims) also played a major part as agitators and executive organs. The Christian churches, including the Catholic Church, which, until very shortly before this, had claimed a monopoly on public morality, remained tight lipped through it all. The ethnicist ideologies preached by the missionaries and colonialists were immoral and abhorrent. The apocalyptic end result of ideologies of exclusion is illustrated in the most horrific way in Rwanda.

⁶¹ The *Akazu* power elite was the clique around Agathe Habyarimana, the "true ruler of Rwanda", and also included financiers and military leaders who enjoyed the protection of the state.

⁶² The Interahamwe ("those who stand together") was set up by the regime in 1990 as a youth wing of the MRND. Its leaders belonged to the Habyarimana clique. It was described by some observers as extreme right wing and by others as fascist. In April 1994, together with the CDR Impuzi Mugambi ("those of single purpose"), they made a total of about 60,000 killers.

One of the aims of the Akazu power elite around the wife of the dictator Habyarimana was to mobilize the mass of the people as volunteers, under orders, or under constraint. It was intended that every Rwandan Hutu should participate in the genocide. To ensure that the order was obeyed, a few hundred suitable party soldiers were chosen from each community and trained as killers. Alongside the army, the Interahamwe was the largest and most brutal killing organization. The policy of genocide was the Akazu's ultimate strategy of power retention. This clique of powerful individuals around the dictator and his wife recruited not only the entire state apparatus as an instrument of genocide, but the entire majority population of the Hutu, whom it called upon and in some cases forced to destroy the national minorities and the opposition.⁶³

The Hutu extremists assumed complete control over all the organs of the state and the media. The medium most used by the extremists was the radio, the state-run Radio Rwanda and the private Radio Television des Milles Collines (RTL).⁶⁴ These two stations waged a racist and chauvinist campaign of encouragement against the Tutsi minority and the political opposition waged over a period of months. On April 6, 1994 at 6 p.m., RTL gave the starting signal for the massacre.⁶⁵ Every day after this, Rwanda's citizens were openly called upon to go out and do their job, in other words, murder all Tutsis in the neighborhood.

⁶³ Semujanga, *Origins of Rwandan Genocide*. pp. 31, 193.

⁶⁴ Ronayne, *Never Again? The United States and the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide since the Holocaust*, p. 157.

⁶⁵ Ibid..

Watching genocide on TV

World public opinion reacted with outrage when CNN broadcast amateur videos of people being hunted down, butchered, and savagely executed on the streets of the capital, Kigali. One video in the ICRC archives, filmed from the Milles Collines hotel (to which many foreigners had fled), showed victims being insulted and beaten. Rigid with fear, the victims were made to kneel down in a row in the street and then, one after the other, had their heads chopped off. Images of indescribable cruelty such as these dominated international news coverage for no more than a few days. The reason is a simple one. During the first week of the genocide, missionaries and development workers provided the foreign media with some of their most reliable information; but because all whites except a few missionaries and nuns then fled the country, this source of information soon dried up. The reports then concentrated either on military activities, on the UN's indecision and futile gestures, or on the thousands of bodies of murdered Tutsi washed ashore in Lake Victoria. Days later CNN and all the other television stations began to focus on the streams of refugees. Exactly why the people were fleeing was left unclear in many reports.⁶⁶

How the administration was exploited

Rwanda had a system of totalitarian control that was probably unique in Africa. The central government was able to exert direct influence on events in the ten prefectures, 147 local communities, and thousands of sectors and cells, right down to the nyakumi (units of ten families). The cells and nyakumi were creations of the MRND

⁶⁶Ronayne, *Never Again? The United States and the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide since the Holocaust*, pp. 160-161.

party of unity and were introduced in the 1970s; they are grassroots units.⁶⁷ They are alleged to have been introduced as a result of Habyarimana's admiration for the Stalinist system of repression, but they are also reminiscent of the block warden system operated by the Nazis in Germany. (Similarities with fascist models are to be found in every organizational aspect of the genocide.) As a result of all this, the order to hunt down and kill the Tutsi was carried out within a few days in almost every part of the country. Thanks to the totalitarian administrative apparatus perfected over a period of thirty-five years, the authoritarian state's racist manipulation was comprehensive in its effect. The utilization of the totalitarian administrative apparatus, with its five hierarchical levels, the mobilization of all branches of the machinery of repression, the enforced recruitment of civilians, a long-term organized campaign by the media—these were the elements that helped ensure the devastating efficiency of the genocide. The regime's aim of securing mass participation in the genocide through propaganda and force, equaled the creation of a single people under a single leader. The guiding notion was not that of a single nation embracing all Rwandans but that of an ethnically cleansed community of murderers permanently bound together by a horrific bloody deed.

For the first time in modern history, a state succeeded in transforming the mass of its population into murderers. To begin with, the presidential guard and the armed gangs went around with long computer printouts listing the names of dissidents; these individuals were hunted down and killed throughout the country from the very first murderous night. The death squads and the presidential guard started on the planned

⁶⁷ Prunier, *The Rwanda Crisis, 1959-1994: History of a Genocide*, p. 76.

bloodbath right from April 6, 1994, and hundreds of thousands of Rwandans subsequently fell victim to it.⁶⁸

The arrest of the popular prime minister, Agathe Uwilingiyimana (the leader of the moderate wing of the Hutu-dominated MDR denounced as a traitress by the extremists) and her murder along with her bodyguards, carried out in the most inhuman way by the presidential guard was meant to spread fear and horror.⁶⁹ Executions, public torturing, and the sadistic publicized elimination of dissidents formed the prelude to the countrywide mass murder.

The role of the local authorities

The most important link in the chain was the civilian authorities. The great majority of them proved willing instruments of the Akazu power elite's genocidal policy when it came to organizing massacres in small towns, villages, and the hill country. The officials not only passed on orders to kill Tutsi civilians; they facilitated the mass slaughter by arranging the distribution of weapons and the transport of army troops and death squads, by co-coordinating the deployment of professional killers, by organizing the distribution of the possessions of those who had been murdered, and so on. The mayors (bourgmestres) played a crucial role; they passed on the orders to kill to the heads of sectors. Many obeyed out of subservience. The heads of sectors in their turn passed the orders to the cell leaders.

⁶⁸ Prunier, *The Rwanda Crisis, 1959-1994: History of a Genocide*, pp. 219-224.

⁶⁹ The 440 Belgian UN soldiers were the backbone of the 2,500-strong UNAMIR. Nine days after the death of the prime minister and her bodyguard, the Belgian government decided to withdraw the contingent. Prior to this, all 1,500 Belgian citizens had been flown out.

Not only did officials play a basic organizational part in ensuring that the genocide was carried out countrywide; they often went beyond what was required of them. Mayors summoned the local population to meetings at which agitators provoked them to kill the resident Tutsis. All the possessions of the dead became the property of the killers. Everyone was officially permitted to burn down houses belonging to Tutsis and to slaughter and eat their cows. Minor officials were in charge of organizing the production. These tasks had to be performed by officials in all the local communities otherwise they themselves were killed by members of the presidential guard. Because prefects, assistant prefects, and mayors were personally appointed by Habyarimana, they were usually members of the MRND. After 1990, some of them joined the genocidal pawa (power) wing of the opposition parties. Many high-ranking officials were themselves murderers. Most of them appear to have been in the habit of carrying a weapon (usually an AK47), for quite a long time before this, ostensibly for security reasons, and they made liberal use of these against Tutsi civilians during the genocide. Only a handful of officials belonged to the opposition; they were among the first to be killed.

According to concurring statements by survivors and eyewitnesses, in many places (for example, in Nyakizu, Kigembe, and Kibayi, along the border with Burundi), senior officials plotted the massacre of Tutsi refugees from inland who were making their way in large groups to the borders. They demanded that the refugees register before crossing the border, guaranteeing them a safe house in the local administrative buildings or in buildings belonging to the parishes—only to use the time gained to organize the deployment of the professional murderers, the militias and gendarmes, and, in some

cases, the army. Community centers and schools became the setting for mass murders all over the country, particularly along the borders.

Even in the smallest settlements, at the instigation of bureaucracy, the male Hutu population was urged to arm themselves with pangas (long knives), axes, and clubs, and go out and kill. Obedience to the orders of the authorities was something that had been taught. In Rwanda, the authorities comprise not only the powerful mayors, but also the sector and cell heads, the gendarmes, teachers, and the Catholic Church as represented by parish priests, curates, and nuns. All the named local authorities were involved in the genocide at the highest levels as organizers, encouragers, or role models.

The role of NGOs and the export of the politics of genocide

The effects of the African Holocaust in Rwanda were devastating: In the middle of 1994 half of Rwanda's population was either killed or had fled the country. After the genocide seventy percent of the population was women, many were ill treated and raped.⁷⁰ Thousands of children are traumatized. The morale was broken, the social fabric disintegrated, the economy shattered, the state administration was out of order.

Crucial for the regime was the non-reaction of the United Nations. Despite earlier warnings, the UN remained disunited, paralyzed, and inactive in the case of Rwanda. The weeks of inactivity by the UN, in the face of the horrific organized massacre of Tutsi civilians by militia forces, the police and the army, seem incomprehensible to many. With that being said, investigation of the genocide and prosecution of the perpetrators had since been very slow getting off the ground. The International Criminal Tribunal on

⁷⁰ Ronayne, *Never Again? The United States and the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide since the Holocaust*, p. 159.

Rwanda (ICTR) was struggling with budget problems and had too few people investigating and too many administrating. In dealing with the genocide, the UN seemed to be acting without any kind of plan.

The challenges of a complex emergency were too great for the international community. The giant disaster relief went into the trap. Humanitarianism wanted to fill a political vacuum. Nobody was talking about justice, but all NGOs and UN agencies were talking about aid. The separation of killers and refugees never took place. A chain of huge refugee camps in the border areas consequently became military camps. Aid contributed to lengthening a deadly conflict. Humanitarian NGOs lost their innocence when it became clear that they were feeding perpetrators of genocide and prolonging a deadly conflict. Infiltration of genocidal FAR and Interahamwe elements to Rwanda went on throughout 1995 and 1996. Only the revolt of the Banyamulenge rebels in Kivu in fall of 1996 and the military defeat of the perpetrators of genocide in the camps brought dramatic change. The return of 800,000 refugees from Congo-Zaire in November 1996 was followed by as many from camps in Tanzania. The mass return was a new challenge for a ravaged country and had serious destabilizing effects in Rwanda throughout 1997 and 1998.

The American position

The United States sounded a particularly strident voice of caution over the issue of an expanded UN presence in Rwanda. As events unfolded in Rwanda, American policy makers faced the specter of the Somalia disaster as they deliberated possible options. In December 1992, American forces entered Somalia as part of a UN mission to

feed starving people in a nation wracked by internal chaos. With the CNN broadcasting images of the soldiers coming ashore to rescue the at-risk population, this gesture of international goodwill seemed destined for success.⁷¹

Over the next year, the mission expanded from humanitarian relief to include elements of nation building, helping Somalia establish some sort of workable, democratic polity. As a result of this so-called mission creep, American forces found themselves at odds with local Mogadishu warlords. This conflict culminated on October 3, 1993, with a firefight between American Rangers, members of the Army's elite Delta Force, and forces loyal to Mohammed Aideed. After hours of intense fighting, eighteen Americans lay dead and seventy-three wounded.⁷²

Any loss of life is difficult enough, but Somalia earned its lasting legacy when triumphant Somalis dragged the body of a perished American helicopter pilot through the streets of Mogadishu. Covered in the news complete with video footage, the episode seared powerful images into the memories of Americans. Somalia became a sobering and formative experience for US policy.

In the military establishment, an angry belief that the Clinton administration had failed to provide requested equipment and irritation at its subsequent hasty withdrawal from Somalia following the Battle of Mogadishu contributed to a reluctance to commit American forces to another UN mission, especially one in Africa. At the same time, the dictates of domestic politics suggested few if any influential constituencies for American involvement in Africa following the Somalia debacle. To put it simply, the president

⁷¹ Thomas Keenan, "Live from... / En direct de...", *Back to the Front: Tourisms of War*, (Caen: FRAC, Basse-Normandie, 1994) pp. 130-163.

⁷² Mark Bowden, *Black Hawk Down: A Story of Modern War* (New York: Penguin USA, 2000).

feared losing more votes and opinion poll percentage points than he would gain over any African intervention.

The Pentagon based much of its position on a Somalia analogy, arguing that an all-too-fine line existed between sending in UN forces and eventually having to follow up with American soldiers. Pentagon officials were quite wary of having to bail out a floundering UNAMIR and, therefore, opposed multilateral involvement at any level. This was an understandable concern but one born of selective memory- the costly Battle of Mogadishu had been an American not a UN operation.⁷³

It appears the United States operated under a significantly flawed understanding and interpretation of events. In large part, the Clinton administration first mistakenly identified and therefore discussed the Rwanda issue as a peacekeeping matter, as a more or less traditional conflict between two armed forces. Therefore, any proposed action to alleviate the situation in Rwanda fell under the rubric of peacekeeping and was far more likely to fall victim to flawed analogies from the Somalia experience. It also make more likely- and perhaps more understandable and defensible- extreme caution and trepidation at the thought of interposing any foreign force between the warring parties no matter what the reported loss of life.

⁷³ Power, *"A Problem from Hell" America and the Age of Genocide*, pp. 370-373.

Chapter 6: The Rwandan Genocide in a Comparative Perspective

Interdisciplinary comparative genocide research is needed for effective prevention of the crime of genocide. The comparative approach initially met difficulties. Fears of a particular genocide being banalized and the radical claim of singularity for a particular community of victims have to be taken seriously. However, the singularity of genocide cannot be an obstacle for comparative research. The task is to explore accepted categories for comparing genocidal processes. So far there is a minimal consensus among the research community only about a few basic elements of genocide analysis such as perpetrators, victims, motive, planning, preparation, execution, and result.

The singularity of the Rwandan genocide

Wanton brutality and inhumanity are not a peculiarly Rwandan, German, Turkish, or Cambodian characteristic; they are a trait of all forms of totalitarian rule. The question of how the genocide could have come about, of whether it was a case of a loss of social controls or of the systematic planning and execution of mass murder by the state, is one that has been posed by Dieter Neubert.⁷⁴ In fact, only a combination of the two factors can explain it: the systematic nature and dynamic of the official genocide eroded, and ultimately completely dissolved, social controls. The thesis, that it was only possible for the preplanned genocide to be realized because there was an escalation of violence, during which more and more people were caught up in the undertow of this process, runs counter to my own thoughts. The thesis is based on the pattern seen in other genocides

⁷⁴ Dieter Neubert, *The Dynamics of Violence – Processes of Escalation and De-escalation in Violent Group Conflicts* (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1999).

and assumes the same for Rwanda. The uniqueness of the Rwandan genocide can be seen in two related factors:

1. Rwanda 1994 was the first genocide in modern history, which was based on mass participation of the common population. The most massive scale of slaughter ever seen in human history would have been impossible without hundred of thousands of willing executioners. Mass participation during a short period of time (99 days) resulted in murderous efficiency.
2. The intensity of the slaughter was overwhelming from the very first day, from the night of April 6-7, and it escalated into generalized butchery within hours. Organized mass murder was committed across the whole country over the next days, weeks, and months.

This is not to say that there was no process of escalation leading to the generalization of massacres. This process had been started three and a half years earlier, on October 1, 1990. Measured in terms of the number of people killed (rather than by the way in which the killing was done) there was not an increase but a gradual decrease in the slaughter. In some areas such as the Butare prefecture, generalized massacres took place with a time lag compared to the rest of the country.⁷⁵

In parts of the hill country, there was renewed killing weeks after the first massacres had taken place. Many of the victims had previously been spared, often because their classification (Hutu/Tutsi) had been unclear or because someone had offered them protection. Many spent weeks in hiding, only to be discovered later. The

⁷⁵ Howard Adelman and Astri Suhrke, *The Path of Genocide: The Rwanda Crisis from Uganda to Zaire* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1999).

picture of people being caught up in the undertow is also a bad image in so far as the process of escalation began months or years before the actual outbreak of violence, triggered by the final order from high up that all Tutsi should be killed. The tendency of violence needed for this had been worked up during the thirty-five years of ethnicized rule and racial dictatorship.

An African holocaust

An eruption of violence like that which occurred in Rwanda in 1994, with the capacity to unleash such a monstrous degree of inhumanity, can only happen within the extreme framework conditions of totalitarianism, state terror, and organized barbarity. Rwanda is a case of total full-scale genocide. In the twentieth century there were four cases of total genocide. All key elements of a total genocide have been developed over long periods of time. An aggressive ideology that aims at eradication is always based on the culmination of pre-existing racist views, doctrines, and attitudes within a society. A long period of dehumanization of the victims, and an ever-present fear among the little people are present as well. Mass participation also needs incentives. An assurance of immunity, reward, or illicit gain is required to bring people to a position where they will act as instruments and willing agents of those in power, and in a way that contradicts all notion of human dignity.⁷⁶

An analysis of the total genocides committed during the twentieth century shows that there are common patterns. The most deadly regimes of this century (measured by

⁷⁶ This was the conclusion arrived at, from a different perspective, by the genocide researcher, Rummel. R.J. Rummel, *Death by Government* (New Brunswick: Transactions Publishers, 1994).

yearly death rate) were responsible for barbaric attempts to annihilate their minorities.⁷⁷

Usually a situation of war or internal troubles provides the best cover for genocide. A situation of confusion and jeopardy, in which uncertainty and fear thrive, is one of the framework conditions for genocide. Rumors are deliberately fabricated from above, in order to enhance the uncertainty. In the history of Rwanda since 1959, deliberate rumors have played a key role in triggering violence. An atmosphere was created which produced a kill or be killed psychosis in individuals.

The history of genocide since classical times yields a range of illustrative material showing that as a rule, 1) genocides are carried out before, during, or after wars, mostly in conditions of war, and that 2) ideological components play an important part in concealing barbarity, in encouraging the population, and in providing a pretext or overall racist construction to legitimize events. These elements are clearly displayed in the first genocide of this century, against the Armenians in Turkey in 1915, decreed by the Committee for Unity and Progress (the Young Turk elite that ruled after the fall of the Ottoman Empire), and also in the destruction of the Roma in Europe in 1935–45 and the Holocaust, the final solution to the Jewish problem in 1939–45, both decreed by the Nazi leadership under Hitler.

The Young Turks justified their genocide by reference to the alleged danger of Armenian collaboration with their archenemy Russia. Hitler excluded the Roma on the

⁷⁷ These mass murders of civilians took place in the context of war: Pol Pot's Cambodia (1975–9) claimed 2 million victims, with genocide being perpetrated against Chinese, Muslim (Cham), and Vietnamese minorities; Young Turk Turkey (1909–23) produced 1.4 million victims in the genocide of the Armenians in 1915–18, plus half a million other victims from 1915–23; the Ustacha regime in Croatia (1941–4) was responsible for a genocide of 650,000 Serbs, Jews, and Roma; the Islamic fundamentalist NIF regime in Sudan (1989–94) carried out the genocide of 1.5 million Nuba, Dinka, and other people of southern and central Sudan.

grounds that they were inferior, and placed the blame for the Second World War both on international Jewish finance and Jewish Bolshevism. The Akazu power elite initially justified its genocide by claiming that the Tutsis, having killed the president, were out to kill all Hutus. For the extremists of Hutu Power, the aim was to complete the revolution begun in 1959. However senseless, irrational, and pathological such explanations are, they are still a crucial part of the overall picture.⁷⁸

Violence and destruction to the point of self-ruination

Irrational traits figure prominently in Nazi and in Hutu-Power barbarity. In both cases, violent processes were taught and planned like a military operation but ultimately became uncontrollable. This meant that interests from the beginning, and military, power-political, and economic considerations became obsolete as these violent processes ran their course. The exterminism of the Nazis and of the Hutu extremists turned into self-destruction.

All the prerequisites and deliberate, strategic measures that constitute the conditions for totalitarianism, state terror, and organized barbarity were present in Rwanda in over determined form. I demonstrate this by reference to the elements, which I mentioned earlier as being necessary for social controls to be eroded and genocide to be carried out. Among the most important of these is an aggressive ideology that aims at extermination, the dehumanization of the victims, other mechanisms for provoking the perpetrators, generalized fear, and war as a cover. Finally, there is the molding of the perpetrators, the loyal subjects, without whose delusional obedience and excessive trust

⁷⁸ Chalk and Johassohn, *The History and Sociology of Genocide: Analyses and Case Studies*.

in authority no genocide could take place. In the course of my demonstration, I will make a step-by-step comparison of Rwandan Tutsi genocide and the Holocaust.

Ethnicization, exterminatory ideology, and dehumanization

Unless we can explain the inexplicable, we will not find any answers to the question of what can be done in Rwanda to deal with the consequences of the genocide and to ensure that what has happened can never be repeated. I am aware that my attempt at an explanation is neither complete nor conclusive. It does not begin at zero and is not essentially concerned with understanding a foreign culture. Over the last one hundred years, the influence of large numbers of missionaries, colonial officials, experts, and development workers in Rwanda-Burundi has led to a marked erosion of indigenous culture.

Alongside South Africa, Rwanda is the most Europeanized country in Africa. It was not only a country that was colonized; so were the minds of the people. What I talk about in the following pages is a barbarity that touches us all and with which all of us are familiar. The very same murderous ideology, rooted in nineteenth-century Germany, manifested itself in German fascism and in Hutu extremism. This racist ideology, the blatant inhumanity of claims about differing worth within the human species, was translated into physical violence in just the same way in the Holocaust and in the genocide against the Tutsi.

The aggressive ideology of ethnicization (extremist Hutuism) came into being during the 1950s in the path of the church, notably in the seminaries. It is a misdirected, opportunistic reaction by the new Hutu elite to the splitting of the Rwandan nation for the purposes of indirect rule and to the related creation of a social order, characterized by

scandalous inequality and the vile degradation of the Hutu majority. The influence of the missionaries, colonial officials, and Catholic Church had played a decisive part in bringing about the desperate plight of the oppressed and slighted. The elite abused the justified rage of the masses to advance its own struggle for power. The misdirected ethnicist Hutuism of the new elites was targeted not at those responsible for the situation (the colonial states and the church), but at their tools, the Tutsi. In its capacity as an ethnicized social group, the Tutsi aristocracy had been utilized as part of the colonial plan, as a means of securing indirect rule, and this entailed an extensive reorganization of the pre-colonial system of rule.

In Rwanda, eliminatory extremism was something that came from above. As in Nazi Germany, the highest-ranking representatives of the state were quite brazen in their support of it. As mentioned before, over thirty years ago, President Kayibanda, a person of the Swiss archbishop Parraudin, had threatened the extinction of the Tutsi as a race.⁷⁹ Hitler was already writing about the Final Solution in the 1920s and gave notice of the “destruction of the Jewish race in Europe”⁸⁰ in the Reichstag at the start of 1939. The Jews, of course, like the Rwandan Tutsi, are not a race but a religious community and/or social group. Their exclusion as a race was based on the general racism in the Europe of the nineteenth century and its infamous theory of the races. Racism permeated not only the racial teachings of Count Gobineau, classical German philosophy, and the science of ethnology, but also religious ideologies, as in the case of the newly strong age-old anti-Semitism of the Catholic Church and other Christian churches. Racial ideologies shaped

⁷⁹ Semujanga, *Origins of Rwandan Genocide*, p. 155.

⁸⁰ Hitler's speech to the Reichstag, 30 Jan. 1939, *The History Place*, Online, 17 Oct. 2003. <<http://www.historyplace.com/worldwar2/holocaust/h-threat.htm>>

the thinking of the Germans and other colonizers about the people they subjugated. They also had a destructive impact on the thinking of those who were colonized.

The dehumanization of the Jews by German fascism is a criminal form of scapegoat ideology, just like the dehumanization of the Tutsi as cockroaches and broods of vipers. It is no coincidence that a German missionary should have been asked to translate Hitler's inflammatory text, *Mein Kampf*, into Kinyarwanda. The policy of Tutsi dehumanization is as old as Hutu domination and has produced its own symbols and language, familiar to every child in Rwanda.

Broadcasting of the inflammatory propaganda

Fear is a dominant element in all rigid, hierarchical societies. In the case of Rwanda, the tyranny of earlier centuries has helped bring about a situation in which the population's fear is almost a natural state. An assurance of impunity for the perpetrators is therefore a key element. The appeal to fear and primitive instincts provided an effective catalyst for the genocidal policy.

The radio was the main instrument of indoctrination both in Nazi Germany and in Rwanda. The RTL M radio station was set up in 1993 by the black Nazi Nahimana, with the aid of the Christian Democrat Internationale and equipment from Bavaria.⁸¹ The relentless primitive campaigning eroded resistance and sought to give the racist creation an appearance of normality in the eyes of the masses. The spreading of the inflammatory propaganda was achieved via the major private and public media. This obvious abuse of press freedom was also a result of the combination of the external top-down

⁸¹ Semujanga, *Origins of Rwandan Genocide*, pp. 25, 223.
Prunier, *The Rwanda Crisis, 1959-1994: History of a Genocide*, p. 129.

democratization that had been going on since mid-1990 and the stop-start process of war, cease-fires, and the Arusha talks.⁸²

⁸² Ronayne, *Never Again? The United States and the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide since the Holocaust*, pp. 160-161. Prunier, *The Rwanda Crisis 1959-1995: History of a Genocide*, pp. 133-135. Frank Chalk, "Hate Radio in Rwanda," in Adelman and Suhrke, *The Path of Genocide: The Rwanda Crisis from Uganda to Zaire*.

Chapter 7: A Comparison of Perpetrators: The Executioners of the Final Solution

Debates among Holocaust scholars can be instructive for those attempting to analyze the Rwandan genocide of 1994. Such discussions help to highlight important questions to be explored and relevant issues that demand attention. One thing that should be noted here is that the war, in the sense of armed hostilities between the FAR and RPA, was only happening in a concrete sense in a limited area in the northern mountains, but had been turned inward as a permanent state of emergency. War and genocide were entwined with one another not at a substantial level, but solely at the level of the propaganda put out by a suffering regime and as a perfect cover for the preparations for the planned final solution that were now in full swing.

Among fruitful areas of comparison, the role of the state in sanctioning, mobilizing, and organizing genocide is critical. In the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, as in Germany during the Holocaust, a modern bureaucratic state organized the forces of violence, mobilized its citizens, and directed them to kill people of a particular category.⁸³

In Germany there was a principal target- Jews- and several secondary targets. So too in Rwanda, the principal target was people of the Tutsi ethnic category, but Hutu political dissenters and opponents to the government were also targeted. In both cases the role of the state was important in the use of propaganda as a tool of the perpetrators.

Drawing on models from elsewhere, especially southeastern Europe and Somalia, early reports in the international media cast the violence in Rwanda as a result of state

⁸³ Alison Des Forges, *"Leave None to Tell the Story": Genocide in Rwanda* (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1999).

collapse, which released ethnic tensions and primitive violence. But in Rwanda, as in Germany, this was not a case of the implosion of the state; rather, the violence involved use of the state apparatus to carry out the conscious policy of a faction within the government. Massive killing on the scale of what occurred during the Holocaust and in Rwanda is a modern phenomenon, enabled by modern technology.⁸⁴ In Germany the centralized death camps and mass killings made the state presence evident throughout. In Rwanda, too, although much killing was done by machete, the power of the state was a prevalent presence: guns and grenades were used to kill people gathered in churches and stadiums; members of the Interahamwe militias were often former policemen or soldiers trained in the use of modern weapons; and political leaders broadcast hate messages on the radio.

Soldiers, police officers, and officials blindly operate on orders under totalitarian regimes. Fanatics motivated by political or moral convictions do more than merely carry out orders; most importantly, they do it with deliberation and in full conscience without inhibition. Nazi Germany and the Habyarimana regime could both count on the latent readiness of broad sections of the population to resort to violence. In Rwanda there was an especially large number of perpetrators of this kind, probably between several hundred thousand and a million farmers and youths. They were afforded the opportunity to torture and kill by hand. In contrast, the Holocaust of the Jews and the porajmos (destruction of the Roma), first implemented by mass executions, later became industrial in nature and could be carried out with much less directly involved manpower.

⁸⁴ Frank Chalk and Kurt Jonassohn, "Introduction," in Frank Chalk and Kurt Jonassohn, eds, *The History and Sociology of Genocide: Analyses and Case Studies* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1990) p. 26.

Why did men who were apparently normal citizens engage in murder?

Another useful area of comparison with the Holocaust is found in questions about who participated in the violence. As in the case of the Holocaust, the conduct of perpetrators and their followers in Rwanda requires careful analysis. Reference to the experiments of Milgram, to intensive indoctrination, and to the conditions prevailing in a dictatorship still do not suffice to answer the question of why normal citizens engaged in murder.⁸⁵ A new historians dispute broke out in 1996, prompted by Daniel Goldhagen's broad-based investigation into exterminatory anti-Semitism. Goldhagen focused not only on the fascist ideologues and behind-the-scenes masterminds of the Third Reich, but on the actual executioners and agents of the so-called final solution.⁸⁶ In Auschwitz, seven thousand SS criminals managed the industrial-style annihilation of more than a million Jews. The systematic mass shootings that were carried out in Eastern Europe involved four special taskforces containing thirty-eight police battalions made up of sixteen thousand German police officers.⁸⁷

The spearhead of the executioner-force

In Rwanda, the most criminal of the forces, the presidential guard, comprised a troop comparable to the SS, officially numbering between six and eight hundred, but probably fifteen hundred strong, trained under the supervision of French riot-control experts. The total manpower of the fanaticized professional force of the Interahamwe (originally hit men of the MRND party), a kind of Rwandan SA, rose to about five

⁸⁵ Christopher Browning, *Ordinary Men: Reserve Police Battalion 101 and the Final Solution in Poland* (New York: Harper Perennial, 1992); Ronayne, *Never Again? The United States and the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide since the Holocaust*, pp. 157-170.

⁸⁶ Daniel Goldhagen, *Hitler's Willing Executioners: Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust* (New York: Knopf, 1996).

⁸⁷ Browning, *Ordinary Men: Reserve Police Battalion 101 and the Final Solution in Poland*.

thousand in 1993-94, with a further 60,000 – 100,000 killers in reserve. In each local community (Rwanda's 147 communes) there were several hundred trained and armed militiamen.⁸⁸

The most horrific murder organization in history, the German SS, was merely the leaders of a multinational executioner force, to which were added, in each region, thousands of native fascists and extremists (Austrians, Latvians, Estonians, Lithuanians, Western Ukrainians, Hungarians, etc.) who were directly involved as perpetrators, plus hundreds of thousands of police in all the occupied countries, along with soldiers, officials, drivers, and other groups of workers, who provided backup for the mass murder.⁸⁹

In Rwanda, along with the army (35,000-40,000), the gendarmes (5,000), and the local police, about 100,000 soldiers, functionaries, and volunteers, all armed with the latest weaponry, took part in the killing.⁹⁰ In the south of the country, Burundian Hutu refugees made up a particularly large proportion of those involved in the slaughter of the Rwandan Tutsi.

Wholesale collective guilt: willing agents?

In the case of the Holocaust, at least half a million Germans were actively involved as direct perpetrators or accessories; millions more, while not getting their own hands dirty, rendered themselves guilty of involvement as agitators, informants, or bystander. This means that perhaps one percent of the eighty million Germans of the time were willing agents of the Holocaust.

⁸⁸ Semujanga, *Origins of Rwandan Genocide*, p. 230. Prunier, *The Rwanda Crisis 1959-1994: History of a Genocide*, pp. 165, 231,

⁸⁹ Bergen, *War and Genocide: A Concise History of the Holocaust*.

⁹⁰ Prunier, *The Rwanda Crisis 1959-1994: History of a Genocide*, p. 246.

One willing group not involved in the killing but directly responsible politically was the membership of the National Socialist party (NSDAP). One in eight adult Germans was a member of this criminal organization. In a certain sense, one in three Germans (the number that voted for the NSDAP in free and secret elections in 1932) shared in the political responsibility and the guilt. The bourgeois political class and the military-industrial complex, which had made Hitler chancellor and brought Nazi fascism to power, rendered themselves guilty. Anyone who wanted to find out what sort of people he or she was voting for could do so. Hitler had given clear advance notice of the Holocaust ten years previously (in *Mein Kampf*). Kayibanda had threatened the Tutsis with extinction thirty years previously.

Why was there only feeble resistance?

Anyone looking for collective guilt of a verifiable kind will have no trouble finding it in Rwanda. Estimates put the rate of participation amongst the mass of male Hutu farmers at 40–66%;⁹¹ among the higher professions, the percentage was significantly more— 60–80%.⁹² Measured in terms of the sheer numbers of victims and the speed of the mass murder, the tragedy in Rwanda (in April and May 1994) attained the same level as, and surpassed, the destruction brought down on the Jews and Roma by the Holocaust. In Rwanda too, there was almost no open Hutu opposition to the carrying out of genocide; and though there was probably broad passive resistance, this became more and more weak as the killing went on. Every fourth person in Rwanda's Hutu population was probably directly involved in the genocide, and millions rendered

⁹¹ Chalk, "Hate Radio in Rwanda."

⁹² Ibid..

themselves indirectly responsible. Despite huge pressure, many Hutus did not participate in the killing, not even as accessories. Consequently, they also refused to leave the country along with the killers.

It may be argued that the active organized resistance to the Nazi dictatorship was quickly smashed. But it was only after the havoc wreaked by the Gestapo on the internal enemy on the left, and after the state organized mass murders of the left-wing opposition, the communists, social-democrats, and other antifascists (the true resistance fighters and first occupants of the concentration camps and death camps) that the militant resistance diminished virtually to none. The assertion that there were no identifiable forces fighting fascism, war, and genocide in Germany is therefore entirely untrue. In official Federal German historiography, the old established German political elite were recast in the mold of militant resistance fighters, and the allegedly relevant parts of the churches (which for centuries had been a safeguard of anti-Semitism and had collaborated closely with the Nazi regime) were transformed into an opposition. Such inventions are part of the myths that have repeatedly been told in recent German history. Similar myths about resistance are being invented on an individual basis in Rwanda; mostly they originate from politicians who retrospectively had nothing to do with it all, did not know anything about the preparations, and could do nothing about the killing.⁹³

Well known threats of destruction became grisly realities

The majority of Germans must have known about the genocide perpetrated on the Jews and Roma. Several hundreds of thousands of Jews living in Germany were taken away. Synagogues were burnt down in November 1938. Like the Tutsi in Rwanda,

⁹³ Prunier, *The Rwanda Crisis, 1959-1994: History of a Genocide*.

Jewish Germans were beaten up and killed on the streets before the organized eradication began. In January 1939, Hitler threatened the Jews with extinction, just as Léon Mugesera (vice-president of the MRND) threatened that all Tutsis would be sent back to Ethiopia by the shortest route, meaning as corpses via the Nyabarango River. In both cases, these threats of destruction became grisly realities—in the case of Rwanda about eighteen months later.

The latest historians' dispute of 1996, was concerned with the perpetrators, with the readiness of ordinary citizens to use violence at the time of fascist totalitarian rule, and with the question "Why?" The huge historiographical gap in knowledge about the categories of people who acted as agents has finally begun to be closed—decades after the German genocide. For some, the question "Why?" inevitably raises the question of the specifically German national character. Others point to the centuries old Western Christian problem of anti-Semitism, make reference to the incredible racism of the nineteenth century and explore the links these two elements have with fascism and militarism. No one talks of a Rwandan national character, because, since the introduction of German racial theories in about 1900, the Rwandan nation has been viewed only as disconnected individual components.

Despite apparently very different complex backgrounds, examination of the ideological, structural, and material framework conditions governing the Holocaust and the Rwandan disaster brings a host of similarities and shared features to light. No highly developed metropolitan state and no industrial style extermination in gas chambers and ovens is required for racist European ideologies to be translated into reality. The

structures of a dictatorial Third World state and destruction by hand, with grenades, rifles, and long knives, will do the job in peripheral areas of the world.

Collective moral responsibility

Any idea of wholesale collective guilt on the part of the Germans or the Rwandan Hutus cannot be proven rationally. In the case of Rwanda, organized internal opposition to the dictatorship was weak. The church leaders, particularly the Catholic ones, collaborated closely with the regime. There was little opportunity for an independent civil society to express itself. Many critics of the regime fell victim to assassination attempts by the death squads. The opposition that emerged as a result of the democratization introduced by donor countries was very weak.

Known members of the opposition were the first to be hunted down and murdered that April; but the majority of the political class either maintained a fearful silence or collaborated openly with the extremists and the genocidal regime. The idea of collective guilt is not plausible; the idea of collective moral responsibility, on the other hand, may well be. All Rwandans have a collective responsibility to fight racism and fascism so that totalitarianism and genocide are never again allowed to occur.

More comparisons to the Holocaust

Comparing the genocide in Rwanda to the Holocaust is useful in delineating the legal definition of genocide and the importance of honoring international conventions relating to it. As is well known, the original catalyst for the UN convention on genocide was a commitment in the international community after WWII not to allow such violence again. When genocidal killing engulfed Rwanda in April 1994 signatories to the convention on genocide had an obligation to take action; as human rights organizations,

NGOs, and individual scholar-activists pointed out at the time, this clearly was a case of genocide. And like the Holocaust, this type of killing, with the power of the state behind it, was not something that ordinary unarmed individuals could stop alone- only organized force with command of modern weapons could do that.

Holocaust denial is yet another area where comparisons can be helpful. As with those who have tried to deny the existence of the Nazi gas chambers used to exterminate the Jews of Europe, some Rwandans associated with the pre-genocide government of the ex-FAR deny there was a genocide in Rwanda. Yet all the evidence contradicts that position.⁹⁴

Finally, literature on the Holocaust can help to conceptualize the profound effects of this tragedy in shattering Rwandan society and traumatizing its people. As Rwandans have attempted to rebuild their lives in the aftermath of the genocide, they are aware that things will never be the same as before. Efforts to preserve the memory of what happened and honor victims of the violence serve both to shape collective group consciousness and to transmit the hurt to the next generation.

The imperative of justice

In a post genocide situation the imperative is justice. The base for integration and reconciliation in Rwanda is the application of justice and the rule of law. The new law from August 1996 introduced new legal procedures to deal with the perpetrators of genocide. Four years after the beginning of the worst genocide since the Holocaust not much justice had been done. Rwandese criminal courts had the first 304 trials in 1997

⁹⁴ De Forges, *"Leave None to Tell the Story": Genocide in Rwanda.*

and 864 in 1998, with 130,000 waiting in overcrowded jails.⁹⁵ The much better funded UN Tribunal remained until 1998 in the phase of preparation. In Arusha only a few of the now thirty-five detained perpetrators of genocide are among the authors of the genocide.

The international community is asking itself what can be done. Without some measure of justice, there can be no thought of reconciliation in Rwanda. The sheer number of murderers and criminals is enough to overburden any judicial system; alternative modes of proceeding are therefore required. Nuremberg-style tribunals would have to take place on every one of the thousands of hills in Rwanda and Burundi in order to have a healing and preventive effect. Nationwide truth commissions operating both from below and from above are needed. In many communities, traditional arbitration bodies (*gachacha*) have spontaneously been reactivated. Following the return of two million refugees in 1996 and 1997, it is urgent that such efforts are supported.⁹⁶ The spontaneous reactivation of a grassroots plan for arbitration, known as *Gachacha*, in many municipalities gives rise to hopes.

⁹⁵ PBS, *The Triumph of Evil: Justice in Rwanda*, Online, 13 Nov. 2003, <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/evil/readings/justice.html>
Amnesty International, *AI Report 1998: Rwanda*, Online, 6 Feb. 2004, <http://www.amnesty.org/ailib/aireport/ar98/afr47.htm>

⁹⁶ World Wide Refugee Information, *Country Report: Rwanda*, Online, 17 Oct. 2003, <http://www.refugees.org/world/countryrpt/africa/rwanda.htm>

Chapter 8: Contribution of Comparative Research to Genocide Prevention

Interdisciplinary comparative genocide research is an outcome for effective prevention of the crime of genocide. The comparative approach initially met difficulties. Fears of a particular genocide being banalized and the radical claim of singularity for a particular community of victims have to be taken serious. However, the horror of genocide cannot be an obstacle for comparative research. The task is to explore accepted categories for comparing genocidal processes. So far there is a minimal consensus among the research community only about a few basic elements of genocide analysis such as perpetrators, victims, motive, planning, preparation, execution, and result. Consensus is the distinction between oppression and systematic extermination.

Policy deficits cause destabilization

Mass murder of members of minority groups (with states proving impunity to the killers) is the worst form of destructive interaction between states and nations / nationalities. Especially state organized mass murder and crimes against humanity such as ethnocide, democide, politicide, and genocide are a matter of great impact on international relations. They cause enormous human suffering and affect the stability of entire world regions, as recent cases in Southeast Asia, the Horn of Africa, and Central Africa have exhibited in the most drastic way. There is no systematic research going on nor is there an accountable and comprehensive policy of the international community to prevent all out mass violence against non-dominant groups.

Indicators for genocide prevention

A dozen broad categories cover in my view the main aspects of genocidal processes. A comparative approach would look at the genocidal society in general and

the perpetrators in particular, the development of a exterminatory ideology, the victims as constructed by the perpetrators, motivations, the process of victimization, the central role of the state and its transformation, process characteristics and dynamics, external framework, historic context, the consequences of the crime, the reactions, and the post-genocidal cover up.

The process of escalation is being characterized in order to combat and prevent the crime of genocide (see Table 2). The purpose is to picture the situation of continuous aggravated crisis within each broad category, finally leading to the execution of the crime of genocide.

Table 2: Early Warning and Genocide Prevention Indicator Box
95 indicators of successive escalation within ten broad categories

<p style="text-align: center;">Genocidal society (1)</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Characteristics and manipulation of the perpetrator society 2. Mobilization of past negative experiences 3. Construction of the “problem” 4. Reinforcement and manipulation of old stereotypes 5. Reinforcement of prejudice, intolerance and antipathies 6. Encouraging disposition and readiness for use of violence against the victims 7. Construction of threats 8. Building a solid base of confusion and insecurity 	<p style="text-align: center;">Development of an exterminatory ideology by the perpetrators (2)</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 9. Replacing unitary and emancipatory categories of nationhood 10. Categories of order in “nation building” 11. Purified exclusive “national idea” 12. Futility, “falseness” and “danger” of <i>aliens</i> being assimilated into the nation 13. Primitivization of alleged “utopian conceptions”, borrowed from ethno-centric philosophy & nationalist ideology 14. “Purposeful rationality” vs. psychopathological aspects 15. Anti-individualistic bias in the construction of dichotic collectivities: us / them; nationals / vermin; perpetrators / victims
<p style="text-align: center;">Construction of the victim group by the perpetrators (3)</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 16. Identifying victims 17. Defining the gray zone of mixed elements 18. Signifying victims 19. Deluding vigilance among the victims 20. Ensuring and reinforcing the defenselessness of the victims 21. Destroying unity, solidarity and resistance among the victims by all means 	<p style="text-align: center;">The process of victimization (4)</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 22. Excluding victims from the scope of normal procedures 23. Systematic spreading of gossip 24. Heinous rumors about the victims 25. Public humiliation and harassment of victims by extremists in daily life 26. Impunity for crimes against the victims 27. Associating victims with all evils 28. Unsanctioned hate propaganda 29. Dehumanizing victims 30. Demonizing victims
<p style="text-align: center;">The making of a genocidal state (5)</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 31. Infiltration the state machinery / silencing moderate leaders 32. Deepening the general situation of political crisis and disorientation 33. Creation of more confusion and fear 34. Division of roles/labor between authors-ideologists and the state apparatus 35. Free hand for planers of crime of genocide 36. Free hand for propagandists 37. Extremists take over media 38. Coercion of the state bureaucracy for “purification” (campaign of fear) 39. Exclusive ideologies in schools and public places 	<p style="text-align: center;">Negative dynamics of totalitarianism (6)</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 40. Establishing lines of command for the “final solution” of the “problem” 41. Mobilization of the state bureaucracy for planning / organizing genocide 42. Coercive mobilization of civil servants 43. Secret systematic preparation of the final solution 44. Organization of special troops, militias and/or gangs 45. Training of the executioners 46. Spreading of mass hatred 47. Creating of the “ripe moment” 48. Ruthless execution of the crime by all means

Table 2: Continued

Development of a conductive social-political environment (7)	Development of a genocidal environment (8)
49. Propagandist onslaught to win over the national population 50. Supply of ambiguous identification possibilities 51. Normalcy and necessity of escalation 52. Undermining social solidarity with victims amongst the perpetrator society 53. Diffusion of normalcy 54. Normality of "special procedures" 55. Appeals to complicity (supply of more privileges)	56. Brainwashing in schools / public places 57. Permanent hate propaganda in the state controlled media: lies, falsifications, fabrications, gossip 58. Compulsory use of derogatory expressions for victims 59. Humiliating expressions for alleged accomplices of the victims 60. Attempt for breaking down the (traditional) moral order 61. Public chasing and beating of victims
Building of a totalitarian state and establishing of total state control (9)	Preference for the option of outright violence and extermination (10)
62. Decapitation of opposition 63. Liquidation of the political opposition 64. Liquidation of all dissent 65. Public humiliation of neutral personalities 66. Showing resolute ruthless leadership 67. Open criminal agitation 68. Intentions of the killers become known 69. Appeal to the most primitive instincts 70. Arbitrary arrest of doubtful nationals 71. Exhibiting final determination of the top leader(s) and his/their ring leaders 72. Public acts of violence against last rest of former opposition 73. Open violence against victim group 74. Spreading and generalizing fear	75. Construction of the "problem" 76. Reinforcing its plausibility 77. Breaking resistance among the "national" population 78. Supplying a problem-solving model 79. Invitations for fatalist acceptance of state terror 80. Creating the full atmosphere for extermination 81. Executing the problem-solving model
Conductive context for genocide: War or crisis as smoke screen (11)	Misinformation and denial (12)
82. Skilful interpretation of contradictions in top leaders' policy 83. Skilful use of framework of war and crisis 84. Delusion of the international community 85. Use of emergency situation to cut access to information 86. Play of diplomatic dementia 87. Tricking international media 88. Use of the ripe moment 89. Presentation of an all-out operation as singular acts for foreign consumption	90. Misinformation campaign claiming punitive acts and preventive action 91. Launching well-prepared cover-up operations by the perpetrators 92. Banalizing the crime of genocide claiming isolated events, unfortunate incidents, individual cases of wrongdoers, etc. 93. Threatening or silencing witnesses 94. Destruction of evidence (especially official documents) 95. Outright denial of genocide

Chapter 9: Perspectives for Genocide Prevention

Comparative genocide research might well contribute to the development of a global early warning system (e.g. by working on reliable indicators) and to establish effective structural prevention of genocide. Quantitative indicators to measure economic and political discrimination of ethnic groups by state governments and indicators to measure the use of violence by governments have been developed by Gurr and Harff.⁹⁷ The idea is to develop qualitative indicators for minorities at risk of genocide without excluding possible quantitative aspects.

Searching for signs of eminent danger and identifying indicators for alert

Global data collections showing low and high scales of discrimination of minorities are of special interest since discrimination as an essential aspect of the victimization process characterizing every genocide.⁹⁸ Danger is eminent in the category of highest discrimination. The measures applied by states are similar to those of genocidal processes, such as formal and deliberate exclusion and/or recurring repression.

According to the findings of the Minorities-at-risk Project nearly a fifth of all minorities at risk suffer deliberate exclusion and repression by state actors, with a disproportionate concentration of minorities at high risk in Middle East and Africa.⁹⁹ The severity of discrimination is greatest in the Middle East and among ethno-classes.¹⁰⁰ The latter category is particular prominent in the Central African region of the Great Lakes.

⁹⁷ Harff and Gurr, *Ethnic Conflict in World Politics* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994) pp. 87-92.

⁹⁸ Ted R. Gurr, *Minorities at Risk: A Global View of Ethnopolitical Conflict*, Washington: US-Institute of Peace, 1993, p.44.

⁹⁹ Minorities at Risk, Online, 20 Sept. 2003, <<http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/mar/about/definition.htm>>

¹⁰⁰ Gurr, *Minorities at Risk: A Global View of Ethnopolitical Conflict*, pp. 45-48.

Genocide prevention includes the abolition of impunity for gross human rights violation and gives a clear signal to potential perpetrators. The base for reconciliation is justice.

Development of indicators for a system of effective early warning

Indicators warning of serious risk of genocide or mass violence against vulnerable groups can be deduced from the escalation patterns explored within the previously mentioned ten comparative categories. In order to remove indicators of alert for the purpose of on-the-spot-monitoring of human rights violations and early warning it would be necessary to assemble the identified elements of genocidal processes according to stages of urgency and significance. Indicators would be deduced as signifiers for high alert.

The challenge of genocide prevention is chiefly the identification of aspects of significant aggressiveness, the timely reading of signs for growing determination of the perpetrators in the genocidal process, and the identification of triggers of rapid escalation. Table 3 gives an overview of the tasks, precedures, institutions, and voids of genocide prevention. I focus on areas of activities, which are essential to combat and eliminate genocide: Early Warning, Early Action, Persecution and Deterrence, Enforcement of International Law, Pressure, Vigilance and Protection, and, Lessons Learned.

Table 3: Systematic Overview on the Tasks, Precedures, Institutions and Voids of Genocide Prevention: Critical Areas of Activities

<p style="text-align: center;">Early Warning</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Global monitoring of gross human rights violations shall be coordinated • Clear-cut indicators for early warning about serious risk of genocide • Development of an integrated early warning and early response system • Special UN task force for processing data on minorities-at-risk and development of behavior of dangerous gangster regimes • Permanent information of UN Security Council and key decision makers about high-risk situations (minorities at risk) 	<p style="text-align: center;">Early Action</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • High level diplomacy in cases of alert • Development of new mechanisms of rapid reaction in cases of red alert • Organizing political will for averting genocide • Organizing political will for mandatory military intervention of UN and protection of the victims in case of genocide
<p style="text-align: center;">Persecution and Deterrence</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Mandatory persecution for perpetrators of genocide in anyone state • Establishment of special persecution institutions / ending impunity • A permanent international tribunal for the crime of genocide shall be institutionalized as integral part of the UN system • ICC established and adhered to • International criminal law has to be developed in order for the rule of law to be respected by all states and political actors 	<p style="text-align: center;">Enforcing International Law:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • by comprehensive review processes and checks-and-control, as in the case of the European Convention on Human Rights or in the case of the ILO convention 169 • by institution building, as in the case of OSCE (e.g. High Commissioner for Minorities), or the ICC, in order to outlaw gross human rights violations such as genocide and crimes against humanity (ICC is still meeting strong resistance by large states such as USA and France) • by refining an arsenal of sanctions, which shall hurt the regimes not the people
<p style="text-align: center;">Pressure, Vigilance and Protection</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • UN, regional organizations and donor states shall impose conditions or disincentives on development aid in case of abuse, violations, threats, state criminality • Incentives shall promote democratization, respect for basic human rights and minority rights, rule of law, good governance • Monitoring risk areas and minorities at risk (by INGOs, local NGOs, IGOs, etc.) • Averting genocide / breaking escalation through presence and media coverage • Rapid and broad system of protection of possible victims 	<p style="text-align: center;">Lessons Learned</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Learning from experience of genocide-free regions of the world • Fighting powerlessness and passive response on genocide • Development of concepts of structural prevention of genocide • Writing genocide prevention into statutes, domestic laws, constitutions, international conventions, pacts, etc. • Standardizing prevention of genocide and mass violence internationally

Conclusions

Despite impressive growth in international law outlawing crimes against humanity and even with war crimes tribunals, the world has failed to deter genocide and large-scale ethnic violence and to prosecute offenders. Meanwhile, billions of dollars have been provided for humanitarian relief, tens of thousands of peacekeepers have been deployed, hundreds of commissions have written thousands of reports, and a library of scholarly research and writing has been published. But can we not do better?

The Geneva War Conventions protect the rights of civilians in warfare, prohibit hostage taking and reprisals, excessive military actions, torture, summary executions, and hold states and armies accountable for compliance. Recently, some of these provisions have been extended to internal wars, not just wars between states. Most of these prohibitions and others not listed here have been violated on a massive scale in Rwanda, Yugoslavia, and elsewhere. Why?

International law itself is contradictory. A cornerstone of the international order is the political sovereignty and territorial integrity of states. According to the legalist paradigm in international relations, the international system establishes for states the rights of territorial integrity and political sovereignty. The use of force by one state against the territorial integrity and political sovereignty of another constitutes aggression and is a criminal act. The moral argument for intervention by outsiders is justified when a state continually uses violence, terror, and genocide against its people. The legalist and moral principles are contradictory. The United Nations as an institution was not designed to deal with aggression of a state against its own citizens. The notion of a just war, of

humanitarian intervention to stop a government that commits crimes against humanity on its own citizens, seldom supplants the principle of state sovereignty. The permanent members of the Security Council and their close allies have partisan interests in ethnic conflicts that override humanitarian intervention, unless it is a precedent against their own and their allies' ethnic problems. The permanent members can veto UN action, and the UN needs their military, logistic, and financial support for effective prevention of genocide. Endless diplomacy can be a cover and excuse for avoiding effective intervention. Domestic public opinion is difficult to mobilize before massacres occur, and is sensitive to casualties from peacekeeping in distant places. Economic sanctions imposed after genocides are evaded. War crimes tribunals have not deterred. The chances are small that the war criminals and perpetrators of genocide will be brought to justice. Current modes of international intervention in ethnic conflict and current enforcement of international law on crimes against humanity have not prevented genocide. Our best bet is crisis intervention with military force, in the short run, and a democratic constitution and regime tailored for societies divided on ethnicity,¹⁰¹ and the institutions that sustain democracy, in the long run.

I have compiled a list of my findings and those from previous scholarship about genocide. Would these indicators have provided early warning in Yugoslavia and Rwanda? The answer is a resounding yes. Rwanda had a previous genocide in 1962; it was an ethnically stratified society; it had a non-democratic military regime; France was a powerful protector; the descendants of the Tutsi victims formed the Rwanda Patriotic Front and had invaded with a military force; the Rwanda government was losing the war;

¹⁰¹ Horowitz, "Making Moderation Pay," pp. 451-476.

the regime was forced into a negotiated settlement of power sharing with the RPF and the return of half a million Tutsi refugees. With state support, the extremist anti-Tutsi party, the Coalition for the Defense of the Republic, and top people close to the president mounted a radio and leaflet campaign of hatred and incitement to kill, specifically targeting moderate Hutus and Tutsi leaders by name. Meanwhile militias were recruited openly in the streets and sent in groups of hundreds to military camps for weapons training and indoctrination, and were organized for the genocide. These preparations were supplemented with the distribution of guns to government supporters and with ethnic mobilization. The preparations for genocide and the already ongoing ethnic violence were observed by the diplomatic corps, human rights and other NGOs, UN agencies, and religious organizations.

Illuminated by early warning indicators, the Yugoslav wars and genocides tell a similar tale: non-democratic state, ethnic power relations threatened by constitutional changes and secessions, prior history of genocide, powerful outside states supporting different groups, massive hate and fear propaganda in the media, ethnic rebellions that challenge the authorities, paramilitary militias for genocide sponsored by governments and the army. As for genocide itself, there were ample trial runs on a smaller scale: the siege and shelling of Dubrovnik; the leveling of Vukovar and the massacre of the male survivors after it fell.¹⁰² The Bosnian war started with a massacre and war crimes at Zvornik, witnessed by a high UN official who happened to be driving through.¹⁰³

¹⁰² V.P. Gagnon, Jr., "Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict: The Case of Serbia," *International Security* 19(3) pp. 133.

¹⁰³ Kressel, *Mass Hate: The Global Rise of Genocide and Terror*, p. 19.

Eventually UN peacekeepers were deployed; they spent much effort on recording violations of cease fires, trying to figure out who was responsible for an unending stream of war crimes and atrocities, and how to prevent humanitarian relief workers, equipment, and shipments from falling into the hands of combatants. UN peacekeeping was unable to lift the siege of Sarajevo and stop ethnic cleansing and war crimes. After the creation of UN protected zones, Dutch peacekeepers in Srebrenica were forced to surrender to civilians under their protection to General Mladic's executioners, knowing full well the outcome.

In contrast to these international peacekeeping disasters, some observers believe that the deployment of an international military force at the very start of these countries showing genocidal signs would have deterred the genocide. General Dallaire estimated 5,000 soldiers in Rwanda would have prevented the genocide while about 10,000 was estimated by Radovan Karadzic for Bosnia-Serbia.¹⁰⁴

I believe the task of genocide prevention is a humanitarian imperative at the end of a century marked by the most disturbing negative dialectics of modernity and barbarism. On the fifty years anniversary of the Anti-Genocide Convention in December 1998, the UN was called upon to amend the Convention comprehensively. Genocide prevention has to be standardized internationally. Mass murder as a possible option for failed states to deal with minorities has to stop once and for all.

¹⁰⁴ Power, *"A Problem from Hell": America and the Age of Genocide*, pp. 284, 340.

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