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Public Support for Social Welfare Policies: A Cross-National Examination

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I am submitting herewith a dissertation written by Andrew Lee Morelock entitled "Public Support for Social Welfare Policies: A Cross-National Examination." I have examined the final electronic copy of this dissertation for form and content and recommend that it be accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, with a major in Political Science.

David J. Houston, Major Professor

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Public Support for Social Welfare Policies:
A Cross-National Examination

A Dissertation Presented for the
Doctor of Philosophy
Degree
The University of Tennessee, Knoxville

Andrew Lee Morelock
August 2016

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DEDICATION

To my dear mother, Kimberley Morelock, and kind father, Daniel Morelock, who have always loved, supported, and kept faith in me.

Additionally, this dissertation is written on behalf of all members of the civil service whose efforts to serve the public echo across both time and place, perhaps more so than they know.

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ABSTRACT

What explains public support for social welfare policies? The extant literature on this topic suggests that people's attitudes are mainly a reflection of their political ideology and economic self-interest. However, this explanation fails to recognize the role that the public sector plays in influencing individuals' social welfare policy preferences. The literature, with few exceptions, also does not thoroughly acknowledge how national context alters people's attitudes. Data from 23 national samples in Europe, North America, Eastern Asia, and Oceania taken from the 2006 ISSP are examined using multilevel regression. The dependent variable is a measure of individual's views of governmental responsibility, reflecting eight different types of social welfare policies.

The analysis reveals that public attitudes about social welfare policies vary both within countries and between countries. Variation within countries is a function of socio-demographic attributes, socio-psychological attitudes, and views toward the public sector. Across-country variation is largely a function of the quality of government institutions, income inequality, and, to a lesser extent, economic conditions. These results suggest that how people come to judge public sector actors, as well as the quality of the work they perform, directly influences their level of support for social welfare policies. Similarly, the findings also imply that levels of government effectiveness measured at the country-level matter, as well.

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CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION AND GENERAL INFORMATION

Section 1.1: Research topic

What role should government play in the lives of its people? This question, perhaps more so than any other, lies at the heart of debate over contemporary public policies. Without a doubt, the reach of the state has grown substantially over the course of the past century. Kettl (1999) claims that “Government in the United States and around the world, hinges more centrally on administration than ever before” (127). Nowhere is this perhaps more true than in the realm of social welfare policies.

The modern welfare state is premised on the notion that government has an outright responsibility to provide public services in order to meet its people’s basic needs for income, health, education, and housing (Gangl 2007, Gërkhani and Koster 2012). Over time, the size of government has grown in response to the challenges posed by an increasingly interdependent society (Mason 1960; Tanzi and Schunknecht 1997), with the ultimate purpose being to protect society’s most vulnerable against the “vicissitudes of modern life” (Dong and Cui 2010: 244).

Section 1.2: Status of the research literature

Despite the fact that the rise of the welfare state has permanently altered the relationship between people and their government, comparatively little scholarly attention has been paid by political scientists to examining public attitudes toward social welfare policies. Indeed, much is still unknown about the determinants of social welfare policy support (Breznau 2010; Gërkhani and Koster 2012). What is known comes mainly from the political sociology literature where two main explanations dominate: (1) People will

support (or oppose) social welfare policies in accordance with their ideological beliefs, and (2) People are self-interested and will support social welfare policies when it is in their economic best interest to do so (Calzada, Gómez-Garido, Moreno, and Moreno-Fuentes 2014; Hasenfeld and Rafferty 1989; Voicu and Voicu 2011).

Even though this bifurcated explanation is quite parsimonious, it may also be far too simplistic. The most glaring omission from this account is that it fails to take into consideration people's views towards the public sector itself – in particular their level of trust in public sector actors and their evaluations of government performance. Likewise, with few exceptions (e.g., Blekesaune and Quadagno 2003; Gërkhani and Koster 2012; Voicu and Voicu 2011), much of the extant research fails to acknowledge the role that national context plays in shaping social welfare policy attitudes. While comparative studies do exist (e.g., Andreß and Heien 2001; Breznau 2010; Lipsmeyer and Nordstrom 2003; Salmina 2014; Svallfors 2004), few inquiries make use of multilevel statistical techniques. Those that do focus mainly on only one primary variable of interest – the institutional structure of the welfare state (e.g., Arts and Gelissen 2001; Edlund 1999; Svallfors 1997).

Section 1.3: Research questions

This dissertation seeks to contribute a much more complete understanding of what factors influence public support for social welfare policies. The research will address the following questions: First, across countries, what levels of support do people hold for social welfare policies? Second, what individual-level attributes and attitudes correlate with these levels of support? Third, does national context account for variation across countries in terms of the level of support? Finally, does the public sector play a role in

determining levels of social welfare policy support at either the individual or country-level?

Section 1.4: Research approach

The data used in this study comes primarily from the International Social Survey Programme's (ISSP) 2006 "Role of Government IV" module (ISSP Research Group 2008), which contains data from surveys administered across countries worldwide. National samples were drawn from the adult population in each participating country using multi-stage stratified sampling designs. A variety of methods were used to collect the data, including face-to-face interviews, self-completion surveys with interviewer assistance, and by mail. To ensure data quality, ISSP methodological groups study the sampling and administration of the annual surveys. For this research, I specifically examine data for 23 countries located in Europe, North America, Eastern Asia, and Oceania.

The analysis for this dissertation will be conducted in three distinct stages. First, descriptive statistics are examined in order to identify variation in public support for social welfare policies across countries. Second, ordinary least squares (OLS) regression models are estimated for each country in order to determine whether social welfare policy support is influenced by similar individual-level attributes across countries. Third, in addition to the demographic and attitudinal variables included in the country-specific models, country-level correlates are also considered. In order to explain variation between countries, multilevel regression models are estimated by pooling together all of the national samples.

Section 1.5: Contribution to the literature

The intent of this study is not only to identify the extent to which individuals see a governmental responsibility for the activities identified above, but also to explain these attitudes. There is reason to believe that developing a fuller understanding of these views is quite important. Jacobs (1992) suggests that the general public is able to exert a powerful influence on policymaking. Even when one takes into consideration the influence of political elites and organized factions, public opinion can still have a considerable impact on the policies that are enacted (Burnstein 2003). Scholars have found that shifts in the support for redistribution can indeed lead to policy change (Manza, Cook, and Page 2002; Stimson, MacKuen, and Erikson 1995). According to Page and Shapiro (1983), "... there is a great deal of congruence between changes in policy and changes in opinion during the last half century" (177). In fact, research by Brooks and Manza (2007) indicates that higher levels of public support for social welfare policies correlate with the generosity of welfare provision in developed countries.

Political elites are known to pay close attention to public opinion (Hasenfeld and Rafferty 1989). To the extent that policy change occurs when the orientations of political elites and the mass public converge, as suggested by Kingdon (2011), policy entrepreneurs may manipulate images to influence the public's understanding of a particular issue (Baumgartner and Jones 2009; Ginsberg 1986). By examining public support for social welfare policies, we are better positioned to understand the determinants of change in this area of public policy. Without this information, we are left with an incomplete account of the process by which policies are fashioned.

In addition, this dissertation specifically considers the relationship between public views toward the public sector and their public policy preferences. This is an area of scholarship that has been commonly ignored in academia. Much of the literature treats political trust (e.g., Christensen and Laegreid 2005; Marlowe 2004; Mischler and Rose 1997; Van Ryzin 2011; Vigoda-Gadot and Yuval 2003) and government performance (e.g., Ariely 2011, 2013; Van de Walle 2007; Vigoda-Gadot, Shoham, and Vashdi 2010) as dependent variables. However, this is short-sighted, as it overlooks a logical consequence of these phenomena – the shaping of public opinions about the proper role of government.

While it is commonly acknowledged that contemporary public opinion generally favors the provision of many forms of social welfare, much less is known in terms of how and why people formulate their views about these aspects of public policy (Breznau 2010). In addition to the explanations offered at the individual-level, this dissertation advances the view that social welfare policy support is conditioned by national context. Thus, for this research a comparative method is adopted which stresses how variation in conditions measured at the country-level sway people’s policy preferences.

By comparing attitudes in differing contextual settings, one is able to illuminate possible causal relationships that underlie attitudinal patterns (Svallfors 2010). This line of inquiry is sorely needed in the field. Even though there exists a sizable literature which focuses on the development of the welfare state, much less is known about why people support or oppose it as a matter of policy. According to Svallfors (2007b), “In spite of considerable progress over the last few years, comparative research on

orientations, values, and attitudes has still not reached the status of a mature research field” (2).

Finally, it is worth noting that in recent years people have become more fickle in their preferences for public services. As Pollitt and Bouckaert (2011) assert, “Publics tend to be vigilant against reductions in popular and basic welfare state services (health care, education, pensions), yet more skeptical and more demanding (in terms of service standards) than in the past *and*, at the same time, more resistant to tax increases” (163). In response, governments around the world have focused on enhancing the efficiency, effectiveness, and performance of the public service (Ariely 2011; Osborne and Gaebler 1992). However, little remains known in terms of how people’s policy attitudes are shaped by their views and assessments of the public sector. One of the key contributions of this research is revealing how the outputs of public policy – either perceived or actual – influence the policies that people want.

CHAPTER II LITERATURE REVIEW

Section 2.1: Defining social welfare policies

Fundamentally, social welfare policies exist to both ensure socio-economic security and to promote equality. A useful definition of social welfare policies is offered by Andreß and Heien (2001), who suggest that they involve "... guaranteeing a basic income, providing jobs for all, supporting children from poor families to go to university, or reducing income differences" (339). Indeed, the range of public services which is commonly labeled as a form of "social welfare" is quite extensive and complex (Richan 1988). Kahn (1964) claims that "Social services appear everywhere in the modern world. They continue to exist and ever expand as productivity increases and as average standards of living are raised" (14).

However, social welfare policy includes more than just a system of laws or procedures prescribed by governmental entities for dealing with the destitute. Rather, this extensive policy area includes a particular set of activities created to cure an extensive list of societal ills (Breznau 2010; Richan 1988). According to Rochefort (1986), "The multiplicity of client groups receiving service via this system (old people, the mentally and physically ill, families with dependent children, veterans, schoolchildren, unemployed adults, disabled persons, and others) is matched only by the variety of methods used to support them ..." (1). In order to provide these public services, whether it be income assistance, healthcare, housing subsidies, education, etc., a complex organization of programs, agencies, and different levels of government are involved.

Friedlander and Apte (1974) argue that “Social welfare is a system of laws, programs, benefits, and services which strengthen or assure provisions for meeting social needs recognized as basic for the welfare of the population and for the function of the social order” (12). Overall, social welfare policies constitute a form of mutual aid, which has been a key characteristic of human society since time immemorial. Simply stated, it is a means by which people living together survive through cooperation. “Mutual aid in the modern world is more complicated than helping to rebuild a neighbor’s barn when it burns or sharing a pot of chicken soup with a sick friend, but the essence of mutual concern for others is still very much a part of authentic humanity” (Prigmore and Atherton 1986: 12).

It is constructive to emphasize the point that the formulation of social welfare policies is a response to conditions that are perceived by policymakers and the public alike as social problems (Segal 2010). As Prigmore and Atherton (1986) comment, “Like it or not, a social problem is whatever people with enough ‘clout’ say it is. Sometimes many people are in agreement. . . . Sometimes something can be defined as a social problem by relatively few people if they are powerful and well organized” (40). To this extent, it is fair to say that social welfare policies are socially constructed. Their existence is owed to set of normative expectations determined by societies themselves that evolve over time.

Kuhnle and Sander (2010) are keen to point out that poverty, for instance, has been a pervasive challenge throughout all of human history. However, poverty has not always been perceived as a “social problem.” Thus, “. . . the social welfare policy-making process and its outputs are critically related to contemporaneous attitudes, beliefs, and

perceptions that are prominent among diverse societal groups” (Rochefort 1986). Since these collective perceptions are very context-dependent, there is cause to believe that a great deal of variation exists in attitudes about social welfare policies from one country to the next (Prigmore and Atherton 1986). Indeed, different societies may maintain different expectations in terms of the role that the state should play in ameliorating difficult social conditions.

For this reason, it is necessary to compare public attitudes using a consistent standard. While it is true that social welfare can take place in many forms, in this dissertation I define social welfare policies using the framework offered by Andreß and Heien (2001) above. Ultimately, social welfare policies involve governmental action in key areas of public policy in order to secure the lives and livelihoods of a country’s people – particularly those who happen to be materially deprived. Although social welfare policies can be conceptually defined to refer to a much broader set of programs and endeavors meant to ameliorate a variety of societal ills, the more limited definition adopted here is utilized in order to facilitate the comparison of public views across a variety of national contexts.

The Development of the Social Welfare State

A country’s social welfare policy is ultimately a reflection of the manner in which “... society responds or does not respond to social need ...” (Abramovitz 2004: 19). That being said, societies’ answer to the pressing problems posed by economic insecurities over the centuries has varied substantially. Richan (1988) claims that the set of institutions that now make up the modern welfare state had their roots in the socio-economic relationship between lords and their serfs during Medieval times. In those

early days, a system of mutual aid existed in which the serf provided manual labor to his master, and in exchange, the lord provided for the families of his peasants in the event that the serf either perished or became too infirmed to work.

While certainly not free, serfs were afforded certain social rights as a matter of principle. Under this arrangement, “The serf could not leave the land, but he could not be made to leave it either. He had a right to a certain amount of land for his own use. If he died, his widow and children had certain rights to support” (Prigmore and Atherton 1986: 19). In this way, a social agreement existed between lord and serf with a clear expectation of deliverables and obligations for both parties.

In the wake of the Black Death, the manor system which had dominated Medieval Europe for so long began to wane (Richan 1988). During this time period, churches and trade guilds began to provide many of the social services that had previously been offered under the feudal model. However, by the 16th century, the demands for action by the commoners became too great. In particular, laws created in England during the reign of Henry VIII, as well as his daughter Elizabeth I, are noteworthy. Collectively known as the Tudor Poor Laws, these acts served as a national response to the problem of widespread poverty and contained many elements of the social welfare framework that currently exist today.

For example, the Act for the Relief of the Poor of 1601, also known as the Elizabethan Poor Law, created a national system of assistance for those impoverished (Kuhnle and Sander 2010). Administered by parishes locally, this policy specifically targeted destitute children, disabled people, the infirmed, and those who were unemployed. The Elizabethan Poor Law distinguished between three classifications of

those destitute, and outlined a specific policy remedy for each (Richan 1988). The “impotent poor” included older people, the mentally and physically ill, as well as the disabled. These people were sent to live in almshouses, or otherwise provided with relief in their own homes.

A second category consisted of dependent children. To provide for their care, minors were assigned to local citizens for whom the children would work to justify their maintenance. Finally, a last group labeled “sturdy beggars” comprised a cohort of able-bodied people who were poor. These people were assigned to workhouses. Overall, the Elizabethan Poor Law is significant because it provided a workable framework for providing poor relief across an entire country. Administratively based at the parish level, this form of public policy specified relatively detailed solutions to meet a pervasive social problem.

With the passage of time, social and economic developments made the need for additional social welfare policies necessary. With the increasing industrialization that took place during the 18th and 19th centuries, the problems associated with urbanization became more pressing (Kuhnle and Sandler 2010; Mason 1960). Expansion of the state in areas such as education, healthcare, public pensions, and public assistance to the needy and unemployed became the solution (Tanzi and Schuknecht 1997). According to Rimlinger (1971), two forces played a very influential role in changing attitudes with respect to the need for a social welfare state. The first was the Industrial Revolution itself. According to Prigmore and Atherton (1986), “It is apparently true that when industry moves from the cottage to the factory, from generalization to specification, from country to city, something happens to make human life different for at least a transitional

period” (23). Via the industrialization of the economy, workers came to view themselves as a single class with similar problems (Kuhnle and Sander 2010).

The second force identified by Rimlinger (1971) which altered the development of the welfare state was the acceptance by the population of new conceptions of individual rights that had been at the core of the American and French Revolutions. Combined with the solidarity shared by workers over their sometimes precarious economic situation, a new perspective was suggested in which government itself had a responsibility to protect its people from economic insecurity – that all people had a right to social protection. In the words of Kuhnle and Sander (2010), “Prior decades had seen the spread of democracy and political rights. Directly or indirectly, these now smoothed the way for social rights” (63).

The twin influences of industrialization and democratization paved the way for a new model of relations between the state and its people. According to Kaase and Newton (1995), “It is not just the scope of government which has expanded, but also the depth of its influence on the everyday lives of citizens” (65). Historically, the first social insurance program implemented on a grand scale occurred in the German Empire with the Imperial Decree of 1881. Although commonly understood today as an overt attempt by German Chancellor Otto Von Bismarck to engender support for his regime among the working class (Rimlinger 1971; Wehler 1985), the policies enacted created a national insurance program to provide benefits for the sick, the old, and those who had the misfortune of being the victim of an accident. “The new policy was radical (in several senses, but most importantly in the way that individual citizens ... were to be compulsorily insured and became entitled to social benefits as a matter of right rather

than provided with poor relief benefits on the basis of discretionary needs and means tests” (Kuhnle and Sander 2010: 64).

The policy reforms undertaken in Germany, and subsequently by other countries, in the concluding decades of the 19th century marked the first step in a process that would eventually lead to the fashioning of the modern welfare state (Flora and Alber 1981). Prior to these shifts in policy, the role of the central government was mainly constrained to (1.) protecting citizens from foreign intervention and domestic criminality, and (2.) developing national infrastructure in order to promote economic growth (Kuhnle and Sander 2010). However, with the crafting of new policies specifically designed to mediate the effects of economic insecurity, a third function of government was instituted: social protection for all on the basis of one’s social rights ensured solely by their citizenship.

While the seeds for contemporary social welfare policies may have been sown in the late 19th century, the vast majority of development of the welfare state took place during the 20th century. According to Kaase and Newton (1995), “Whatever the measure – taxes enacted, money spent, people employed, services delivered, laws passed, regulations implemented, people affected – the amount and range of state activity has grown out of all recognition in the twentieth century, especially in the latter half” (65). But, why did this revolution in governance occur when it did? Kaase and Newton (1995) point to three explanations. First, the Great Depression of the 1930s primed the public for a fundamental change in the economic system. As a result of the severe hardships and instability caused by the downturn in the economy, political officials were willing to embrace new means of social policy.

Second, the national mobilizations necessary to fight the Second World War conditioned people to unusually higher levels of governmental intervention in their personal lives (Goodin 1988; Peacock and Wiseman 1961). As a result of wartime spending and activities, a new normal was artificially created. The war also created a sense of national solidarity among citizens that lasted even after the war came to a close (Goodin and Dryzek 1995). Finally, in the aftermath of the war, pro-government feelings were engendered via the reconstruction process. These three developments set the stage for the political conditions necessary to formulate an extensive welfare state. The peace and economic growth of the postwar 1950s and 1960s only further facilitated the rapid expansion of social welfare policies (Kaase and Newton 1995).

From the end of the Second World War until the mid-1970s, the size and scope of the public sector grew hastily. During this time period, public opinion viewed an activist state as the appropriate tool for solving social and economic ills (Kaase and Newton 1995). However, it is commonly recognized that the expansion of the welfare state halted after reaching its zenith in the mid-1970s. For the first time in quite a while, the role of the state was called into question (Peters 1991). Politics at multiple levels of government became more anti-bureaucratic (Frederickson 1996). Rather than being a solution for societal problems, government was increasingly seen as a potential cause of them (Douglas 1989; Hadenius 1986). A number of possible explanations have been suggested as to why the post-war development of social welfare policies stalled, including: the 1973 Oil Crisis, the rise of globalization, the movement in many countries towards service economies rather than an industrial one, etc. (Nullmeier and Kaufman 2010).

Certainly in recent years, doubts have been raised about the efficiency and effectiveness of the public sector, spurring calls for reform. Beginning in the 1980s, governments around the world began implementing policy and bureaucratic reforms in order to enhance the efficiency, effectiveness, and performance of the public service (Ariely 2011; Osborne and Gaebler 1992). This approach embraced market mechanisms, decentralization, and government downsizing with the overall intent of making policy implementation much more efficient and quality-oriented. The primary goal of what has been labeled the New Public Management (NPM) movement has been to restore public trust in government by producing demonstrable results (Bouckaert 2012; Radin 2006; Van Ryzin 2011).

Will social welfare policies continue to provide the level of services they have traditionally offered in the past? Or will they crumble under their own weight? The modern administrative state is the product of a devastating economic depression, world wars, and a wholesale effort during the postwar period to eradicate poverty and discrimination (Van Riper 1999). But its continued existence remains uncertain. According to Nullmeier and Kaufmann (2010), “Whether social benefit levels will ultimately be stabilized in the face of shrinking contributions and tax revenues, rising debt and the related fiscal crisis of the welfare state, or whether social benefits might even be further expanded ... will greatly depend on political constellations – these, in turn, also depend on economic developments and their framing in public debates” (100).

Support For and Against Social Welfare Policies

It is commonly argued that welfare policies have been implemented as a “cushion” for the growth of inequality around the world (Dallinger 2010: 333). Esping-

Andersen (1990), for example, contends that industrialization has made the welfare state both possible and necessary. It was during the 20th century that a decided shift among the public began to take place with respect to the role that government plays in the lives of its people. For the first time, large segments of the public began to favor government intervention in matters of private life in order to aid the disadvantaged so they could overcome the drawbacks of industrial capitalism (McClosky and Zaller 1984).

Despite the many benefits of a capitalistic economy, "...this system does not cover all members of society. For those who cannot work because of health or physical limitations, for those who cannot find work, or for those who are excluded because of their race, sex, age, physical ability, or sexual orientation, there is no market exchange of salary" (Segal 2010: 10). Left to its own devices, ungoverned capitalism does not provide adequate opportunities for all people in society.

According to McClosky and Zaller (1984), every step in the development of the welfare state has generated intense controversy. Even today, the debate over the extent to which government has a responsibility to provide these particular services remains quite contentious. At the heart of this dispute lie two conflicting principles. The first is the notion that individuals should be able to live their lives in a manner consistent with prevailing social standards (Marshall 1964). The second is the view that people have a responsibility to make an effort to be as economically self-sufficient as their ability permits (Feldman and Zaller 1992).

The debate over the extent of social welfare provision follows a typical left-right ideological divide between liberals and conservatives. The debate can be framed in terms of disagreements over the values of democracy and capitalism. Liberals ask how "...can

a genuine democracy be achieved when powerful private interests dominate the society and millions of citizens lack the necessities for a decent and fulfilling life?” (McClosky and Zaller 1984: 264). The values of the democratic tradition stress equality, as well as social and economic justice. This perspective holds that if the problems confronting people are too large for one individual alone to solve, they have every right to request assistance (Feldman and Steenberger 2001). Thus, “... no one can be allowed to suffer exploitation, mistreatment, or other social and economic injustice. All are entitled to live in dignity and to enjoy a fair share of society’s benefits” (McClosky and Zaller 1984: 279).

In contrast, conservative defenders of capitalism allege that governmental intrusion into the lives of its people undermines the values of self-reliance and individual initiative. “On the right, the argument is that people ought to take care of themselves. The traditional exhortation to the poor is ‘Lift yourselves up by your own bootstraps’” (Prigmore and Atherton 1986: 9). In the tradition of Adam Smith (1776/2004), economic competition is seen as the preferred means to maximize wealth for those who are willing to work. According to President Dwight D. Eisenhower, “... what is stolen by paternalistic government is that precious compound of initiative, independence, and self-respect that distinguishes a man from an automaton, a person from a number, productive and competitive enterprise from a regimented people” (1967: 34). This disagreement over what role government should play in society continues to rage among policymakers and citizens alike in every state around the world, often with enthusiastic discourse being offered by both sides.

Section 2.2: The implications of social welfare policy support

Kraft and Furlong (2010) assert that “Public policy is what public officials within government, and by extension the citizens they represent, choose to do or not to do about public problems” (5). Social welfare policies exist in order to provide essential services to those who need them in order to ameliorate their desperate condition. In the words of Prigmore and Atherton (1986), “While many people are very critical of social welfare, there is still the expectation that society should provide for the delivery of a secure level of basic life supports (food, housing, health care, education, and various kinds of counseling and protective services) to people as a benefit of citizenry” (8). To this end, public support for social welfare policies plays a very important role in determining the creation and extent of these public services.

Perhaps the most defining attribute of a functional democracy is the linkage that exists between public policies and public opinion (Monroe 1975). Luttbeg (1981) claims that “... the most widely held conception of democracy is that government must serve its public. Somehow the policies passed by government must reflect both the preferences of the governed and, most desirably, the public’s best interest” (1). Indeed, the social welfare policy-making process and, by extension, its outputs are a product of the various attitudes, perceptions, and beliefs shared among citizens (Rochefort 1986).

The mass public exercises a great deal of clout with respect to policymaking (Jacobs 1992), particularly when the salience of a policy issue is elevated (Burnstein 2003). According to Kingdon (2011), “People in and around government believe quite firmly that something like a national mood has important policy consequences. ... A shift in climate, according to people who are actively involved in making or affecting

public policy, makes some proposals viable that would not have been viable before, and renders other proposals simply dead in the water” (144).

This is true because public opinion influences elections, the fate of political parties, and the efforts of organized interests. Along with the attitudes of public officials and other elites, public opinion can help to influence the twin processes of problem definition and agenda setting. Thus, “Public opinion can be seen in this context as one among several simultaneously, mutually supportive forces in society that impel the social welfare policy-making process in a common direction” (Rochefort 1986: 140).

The conditions that exist throughout the world, known by the label “social problems,” are defined by a socially constructed meaning. Cobb and Elder (1983) state, “Whether or not a situation is considered a public problem and what the problem is, if there is one, depends upon not just facts but upon beliefs and values – beliefs and values that determine what is taken to be fact, what facts are considered relevant, and how those facts are interpreted” (172-173). As a result of this, social problems are very subjective and context dependent (Stone 2002). Also, how problems are defined shapes the range and typology of solutions offered for confronting that particular difficulty (Kraft and Furlong 2010).

Ultimately, problem definition is a political exercise (Rochefort and Cobb 1994). According to Kingdon (2011), “For a condition to be a problem, people must become convinced that something should be done to change it” (114). Stone (1989) claims that problem definition is chiefly concerned with attributing undesirable conditions to human factors. Whether this occurs via a focusing event (Birkland 1997) or with the help of policy entrepreneurs and the media (Jones 1994), it is apparent that the attitudes held by

the masses concerning the definition of contemporaneous “social problems” play an important role in influencing policy agendas.

A number of scholars have postulated how agenda setting takes place and by what means certain social problems achieve public awareness, and possibly, governmental action (e.g., Baumgartner and Jones 2009; Downs 1972; Ingram, Schneider, and DeLeon 2007; Kingdon 2011; Schattschneider 1960). What remains consistent in all of their explanations is the influential role that the public plays in producing variations in policy. In a democracy, the people rule through the ballot box. The policies that are formulated by policymakers create politics through the distribution of benefits and burdens within the population (Lowi 1979). How people respond to the outputs of these policies in terms of their political participation, and perhaps most importantly through their vote choice, imbues the collective public with a tremendous amount of political clout.

Svallfors (2010) argues that there are three primary reasons why studying public attitudes directed toward social welfare policies is important. First, it helps researchers understand changes in public policy in this particular policy area. Public perceptions are often resistant to alteration. According to Schumpeter (1942), “...attitudes are coins that do not readily melt” (12). Those who wish to reform or otherwise change existing public policies from the status quo must contend with normative expectations among citizens that have been created by previous policies and politics (Svallfors 2010). As Kingdon (2011) clarifies, “Public opinion may sometimes direct government *to* do something, but it more often constrains government *from* doing something” (65).

The second explanation offered by Svallfors (2010) is that a careful analysis of public perceptions of social welfare policies allows researchers to distinguish between

elite opinions versus the views of the general public. Certainly, elites play a very influential role in not only influencing social welfare policies (Rocheffort 1986), but also public opinions toward them (McClosky and Zaller 1984). Where the dividing line between these two concepts falls is still in dispute. Finally, Svallfors (2010) claims that the examination of public attitudes in this particular policy sphere allows social scientists to view social welfare policies from the perspective of their normative effects – specifically how people’s value preferences are translated into meaningful policies that can be implemented into reality.

In addition to the reasons suggested above, it may also be true that a feedback loop exists in which the outputs of social welfare policies influence the inputs (Jordan 2010; Kumlin 2007). That is to say, it is not just public opinion which influences public policy, but also public policy outcomes which come to affect public opinion. As Manza, Brooks, and Sauder (2005) point out, political participation influences the political process, but the outcomes of the process in turn affect those who tend to participate and by what means. It may be that this analogy holds also in terms of support for various policies. Despite this possibility, feedback effects have not yet received a great deal of scholarly attention and remain under-theorized (Mettler and Soss 2004; Pierson 1993). Instead, much of the focus still remains input-centered (Svallfors 2007a).

Section 2.3: Influential studies of social welfare policy support

Within the broader literature that addresses the topic of public attitudes towards different types of public policies, a few studies stand out as worthy of specific mention. These investigations, perhaps more so than others, are particularly relevant to the research at hand, not only because they specifically focus on public support for different

types of social welfare policies, but also because they constitute some of the key landmark studies upon which other investigations are based. Additionally, the chronology of these studies over the last several decades illustrates how research in this area of social scientific inquiry has progressed from single-nation studies with a relatively limited list of explanatory variables to works which consider social welfare policy support cross-nationally using advanced methods. In what follows, I will discuss four studies which I consider influential to addressing the research questions presented in this dissertation.

It is perhaps not surprising, that early studies on public policy attitudes undertaken by political scientists began as an extension of research on voting behavior. In their seminal article published in the *American Political Science Review*, Sears, Lau, Tyler, and Allen (1980) consider how self-interest and symbolic attitudes influence voters' views toward government in four controversial areas of public policy in the United States including: unemployment, national health insurance, busing, and law and order policy. At issue in this research is determining which force – self-interest or ideology – is more influential in terms of predicting individuals' policy support. In the words of Sears et al. (1980), “Do people support those policies that further their private gains, or do policy preferences originate instead in political predispositions, which are largely the residue of an earlier political socialization that was ignorant of present self-interest?” (671).

It had long been assumed that voters are rational actors driven by self-interest. In the well-known words of V.O. Key (1966), “... voters are not fools” (7). Research indicates that when making their electoral choices, individuals consider the performance

of incumbents and decide to reward or punish accordingly (Fiorina 1978; Kramer 1971; Tufte 1978). Likewise, some studies suggest that utility-maximizing citizens support those candidates or parties that are closest to their views on campaign issues (Page 1977; Riker and Ordenshook 1973). In contrast with this line of reasoning, Sears et al. (1980) suggest that it is not self-interest that matters so much, but rather what they label “symbolic attitudes.” As they claim, “When confronted with new policy issues later in life, people respond to these new attitude objects on the basis of cognitive consistency. The crucial variable would be the similarity of symbols posed by the policy issue to those of long-standing predispositions” (Sears et al. 1980: 670).

Using the 1976 Center for Political Studies Presidential Election Survey, Sears et al. (1980) examine the influence of self-interest and symbolic attitudes on voters’ policy preferences in four controversial policy areas while controlling for relevant demographic variables. Surprisingly, the researchers discovered that self-interest has little effect on people’s policy preferences, while symbolic attitudes such as ideology, party identification, and measures of racial prejudice had major effects – some of which were very robust. These findings are quite revealing as they directly question self-interest assumptions apparent in much of political research. According to the authors, “What we can say with some certainty is that ... policy preferences are remarkably indifferent to the individuals’ current personal situation, even when it involves such very striking phenomena as personal unemployment, the threat of catastrophic medical expense, or having one’s own child bused to distant ghetto schools” (Sears et al. 1980: 681).

The work by Sears et al. (1980) did little to advance the self-interest argument. Instead, it suggested a world in which an individual’s political ideology was the primary

determinant of their public policy preferences. However, theirs was certainly not the last word on this matter. In response to what they saw as a shortage of studies that focused specifically on public opinion toward social welfare policies, Hasenfeld and Rafferty (1989) examined public support for welfare state programs in the United States. In their study, the authors hypothesize that those who experience a greater sense of economic security such as whites, males, upper-income earners, etc. are more likely to support the ideals of economic individualism, and thus are inclined to be less supportive of welfare state programs. In contrast, people who are economically vulnerable, including the nonwhites, women, and low income earners are more likely to subscribe to the notion of social equality and collective responsibility. As a result, they are more supportive of welfare state programs.

Hasenfeld and Rafferty's (1989) study utilized a 1983 survey of adults drawn from the Detroit Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area. Respondents were asked whether government spending should be increased, decreased, or remain the same for both means-tested (AFDC and Food Stamps) and contributory (Social Security and Unemployment Compensation) welfare state programs. Controlling for ideological variables, the researchers found that self-interest does appear to matter a great deal. As Hasenfeld and Rafferty (1989) report, "Persons who are socioeconomically vulnerable and thus more likely to benefit from the welfare state tend to be more supportive of it. ... These status characteristics expose persons to economic hardship or risk and they look to the welfare state to cushion them from major insecurities and inequalities" (1041-1042).

Additionally, the authors discovered that there was more support for contributory programs as opposed to those that were means-tested. This finding suggests that

perceptions of “deservingness” appears to play a role, and is in line with other research which shows more support for providing benefits to those who are viewed by the public as worthy of public assistance such as the disabled, the elderly, and children (Cook 1979; Ogren 1973). Overall, the results of Hasenfeld and Rafferty’s (1989) study are that support for social welfare policies is influenced not only by ideological variables, but also by self-interest. To add to this point, certain forms of social welfare policies seem to enjoy more public support than others based on how the recipients of the benefits of those policies are socially construed.

For several years, the notion of public support for social welfare policies was construed as a phenomenon that was influenced by factors at the individual level. However, in the late 1990s and early 2000s, that outlook slowly began to change. Beginning with work by Svallfors (1997) and Edlund (1999), a new perspective began to emerge. These scholars postulated that public opinion concerning social welfare might be the result of the institutional structure of the welfare state itself. In the words of Blekesaune and Quadagno (2003), “In these studies, variations across nations in the configuration of social programs are viewed as a product of the history of class coalitions, which create various regime types of welfare state” (417). That is to say, differing institutional characteristics at the national level influence people’s attitudes and opinions about social welfare programs.

In his seminal book, *The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism*, Esping-Andersen (1990) first suggested the existence of differing welfare regimes based on the degree to which social welfare benefits are provided as a right of citizenship and the level of expenditures allocated for those services. Thus, variations between countries followed a

pattern predicted by the differing arrangements construed between the state, the market, and the family (Esping-Andersen 1990: 26). According to Esping-Andersen, three typologies exist: “social democratic”, “conservative”, and “liberal” welfare regimes – each denoted by the extent and universality of social welfare programs provided by the state. Social democratic regimes tend to offer the most generous benefits, while liberal regimes provide the least.

It was not until an article by Arts and Gelissen (2001) that support for this thesis was offered using methods more appropriate for examining the hypothesis. While earlier studies by Svallfors (1997), Bean and Papadakis (1998), and Edlund (1999) were undertaken, they only comprised country comparisons for a limited number of nations. Using data from the 1996 International Social Survey Programme, Arts and Gelissen (2001) examined whether differing regime types influenced what the authors labeled “notions of solidarity” among people in 14 countries. Here “solidarity” was operationalized in terms of support for seven forms of collective protections offered by the state. Respondents were asked whether it should or should not be the government’s responsibility to provide a range of different services ranging from providing employment to the jobless to providing housing assistance for low-income people. Responses to this battery of items were used to generate factor scores.

Using multilevel modeling techniques, and controlling for a number of demographic and ideological variables at the individual level, Arts and Gelissen (2001) determined that there is evidence to suggest that welfare regime typology does influence public attitudes toward solidarity. However, the authors also point out that there were only small differences between the different regimes types examined. Thus, there still

remains some question as to how useful the welfare regime typology is as a constructive explanation for public support for social welfare policies. Nevertheless, the work by Arts and Gelissen (2001) is notable because it helped to advance the study of the topic of social welfare public policy preferences from the realm of individual-level, single-nation studies to a truly comparative examination using advanced statistical methods.

After Arts and Gelissen (2001), a number of scholarly studies continued to examine the relationship between the institutional structure of the welfare state and public attitudes towards social welfare policies (e.g., Dallinger 2010; Jaeger 2006; Jakobsen 2011; Jordan 2010; Koster and Kaminska 2012; Larsen 2008). However, to date, little effort has been made by social science researchers to examine other causal factors at the country-level that might influence the public's policy preferences. A study by Blekesaune and Quadagno (2003) serves as an exception to this trend. In their article, the authors suggest that people's attitudes toward welfare state policies are the result of situational and ideological variables at both the individual and country levels of analysis.

According to Blekesaune and Quadagno (2003), "... self-interest and ideology are two standard explanatory variables employed in studies of public attitudes toward welfare policies, but both are typically used at the individual level only. When applied at the nation level, the definition of 'self-interest' no longer refers solely to the interest of the individual but also to public interests/good" (418). The authors' argument rests on the notion that public support for social welfare policies is in part a reflection of feelings of self-interest and ideology on the part of the individual, as well as a result of contextual factors. This is to say, public attitudes are both an individual and country-level phenomena. Using data from 24 countries taken from the 1996 International Social

Survey Programme's Role of Government III Module, Blekesaune and Quadagno (2003) illustrate this effect by estimating a series of multilevel models which include both self-interest and ideology-based variables at both levels of analysis.

At the country-level, Blekesaune and Quadagno (2003) include measures for both national unemployment rates (self-interest) and egalitarian ideology (ideology). As to the former, the authors reason that a high national unemployment rate is likely to increase public empathy for the unemployed. This is made possible via a variety of means. For instance, high levels of unemployment may engender fear among the larger population. "The greater the number of people who are unemployed, the more people are confronted with the possibility that they may become unemployed themselves and thus be more supportive of welfare state policies...." (Blekesaune and Quadagno 2003: 418).

Alternatively, people who encounter the unemployed regularly or who otherwise personally know people who are unemployed may be more likely to be concerned about their economic situation (Plotnick and Winters 1985).

With regard to the latter, the authors hypothesize that countries characterized by stronger egalitarian ideology among its people will result of more positive views directed toward welfare state policies. The rationale for this notion is that "Beliefs and attitudes about the role of the (welfare) state may be organized by dominant political ideologies whose formation reflects national historical experiences and is embedded in national symbols and institutions such as the partisan political system" (Blekesaune and Quadagno 2003: 418). In other words, a country's collective political culture may influence individual policy preferences, particularly through public debate and traditions.

Blekesaune and Quadagno (2003) find that national context does appear to influence levels of public support for social welfare policies. These results suggest that yes, situational and ideological factors at the country-level of analysis can have an effect with respect to shaping individuals' public policy preferences. Specifically, two implications loom large. First, public attitudes are, at least in part, a function of societal problems – not just the personal predicaments of individuals. Second, the shared, collective ideology of a country has the potential to also influence support for social welfare policies among individuals. Overall, the work by Blekesaune and Quadagno (2003) is significant not only because it expands the cross-national research focus on social welfare policy support beyond the work of Arts and Gelissen (2001) and others, but more importantly because it creates a rationale for considering how other contextual factors found at the country-level influence individuals' attitudes and opinions about the proper role of the state in the lives of its people.

The four works outlined in this section provide a useful means for surveying the quality and extent of the research undertaken to explain public support for social welfare policies. The chronology of these studies illustrates the development of this line of inquiry over time. Initially, investigations were single-nation studies and considered two primary determinants of social welfare policy support: (1) ideology, and (2) self-interest. In the decades since, cross-national research has progressed, aided by the advent of more rigorous statistical tools. However, there is still much which has not been considered, and thus new opportunities exist for further research.

While cross-national studies have become the norm in this area of inquiry, relatively few country-level contextual variables have been considered as determinants of

support for social welfare policies. Likewise, with much of the focus in recent years being directed to variables at the national-level, there have been few attempts to move beyond ideological and self-interest based explanations of social welfare policy support at the individual-level. In order to improve on this deficit, new research is necessary which considers additional correlates of people's public policy preferences at both levels of analysis.

Section 2.4: Competing explanations for social welfare policy support

Correlates of public support for social welfare policies exist at both the individual and country-levels of analysis. To summarize the applicable literature, it is useful to think of individual-level explanations of social welfare policy support as falling into three distinct categories: socio-demographic explanations, socio-psychological explanations, and the main contribution of this dissertation – attitudes toward the public sector (see Chapter 4). While sparse, there have been a few scholarly attempts to examine country-level correlates of social welfare policy attitudes (e.g., Blekesaune and Quadagno 2003; Gërxfhani and Koster 2012; Voicu and Voicu 2011). Given the results of these studies, there is cause to believe that national context does matter, and thus, I include a number of country-level variables in the multilevel models (see Chapter 5).

Section 2.4.i.: Individual-level correlates

Socio-demographic correlates

Much of the existing research on the topic of social welfare policy attitudes points to people's political ideology and economic self-interest as the primary predictors of their level of support (Calzada et al. 2014; Hasenfeld and Rafferty 1989; Voicu and Voicu 2011). For organizational purposes, I prefer to label these types of variables as being

“socio-demographic.” Socio-demographic explanations hold that social welfare policy attitudes are the product of socialization and social experiences.

A person’s ideological orientations are expected to strongly influence their position on social welfare policies (Schneider and Jacoby 2005). One’s ideology can act as a powerful force, as “... ideology is one of the few motivating forces that can be seen to induce a person to act in terms of interests other than his own” (Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes 1960: 206). A variety of values have been suggested as possible influencers including egalitarianism (Breznau 2010; Calzada et al. 2014), humanitarianism (Feldman and Steenberger 2001), individualism, pragmatism (Feldman and Zaller 1992), multiculturalism, authoritarianism, traditionalism (Calzada et al. 2014), reciprocity (León 2012), etc. Feldman and Zaller (1992) argue that rather than making a clear choice between competing values, individuals tend to emphasize one set of values over the other.

However, when forced to choose between freedom and equality (Rokeach 1973), between capitalism and democracy (McClosky and Zaller 1984), or between achievement and equality (Lipset 1979), Feldman and Zaller contend that conservatives tend to prefer the former value, while liberals favor the latter (1992: 272). Thus, partisan leanings are expected to cue support for social welfare policies (Zagórski 1999). According to Lipsmeyer and Nordstrom (2003), “Respondents who support leftist parties will endorse more responsibility for and spending on welfare policies than their right-leaning compatriots” (343).

With regard to self-interest, those who are more economically and socially vulnerable are more likely to be supportive of social welfare programs (Andreß and

Heien 2001; Salmina 2014; Schneider and Jacoby 2007). As stated by Berinsky (2002), "... those who do not share fully in society's benefits – are the natural supporters of the welfare state" (279). According to this line of reasoning, it is the individual's regard for their own personal situation which influences their public policy preferences. Campbell et al. (1960) claim that "Political action is, in itself, a roundabout route to the fulfillment of most forms of self-interest" (204). People, looking out for their own well-being, will attempt to maximize their own utility in political matters (Downs 1957). Thus, the rational citizen "... knows her preferences or goals, can rank-order them, and when faced with a set of options to achieve those preferences will choose those expected to maximize individual benefits and minimize individual costs" (Buchanan and Tullock 1962: 195).

According to the self-interest argument, certain groups, by virtue of their status and situation within society, will be more supportive of the welfare state. People who are older in age are expected to be more supportive of social welfare policies (Cook and Barrett 1992; Edlund 2006; Iversen and Soskice 2001). Those who make up this social group are likely to be dependent upon old-age pensions, and thus may need or expect these types of social welfare programs (Andreß and Heien 2001). Individuals who are female are also expected to be more supportive of social welfare policies (Cook and Barrett 1992; Reuter, Harrison, and Neufeld 2002; Schlesinger and Heldman 2001; Voicu, Vociu, and Strapcová 2007). Schlesinger and Heldman (2001) argue that women are more likely than men to perceive that inequalities exist within society and less likely to blame social problems on existing government programs.

People who have less educational attainment are also predicted to be more supportive of social welfare policies than those with more (Jackman and Muha 1984).

One's level of education is ultimately a reflection of their socio-economic status (Hasenfeld and Rafferty 1989). Those who rely on the welfare state for economic assistance are expected to be more supportive (Andreß and Heien 2001). Similarly, those who are not currently employed (Cook and Barrett 1992; Owens and Pedulla 2014) are presumed to be more inclined to support social welfare policies.

The consistent theme among these variables is that members of groups who are poorer in economic resources, in comparison to their counterparts, have a tendency to see a need for a very active state. Generally speaking, those who experience economic strain are more likely to be supportive of public policies that promote a redistribution of resources (Blekesaune 2007; 2013). Also, it is expected that government employees are more likely to harbor positive views of welfare policies since they themselves are dependent upon the government's continued level of service provision for their own employment (Papadakis and Bean 1993). As a producer of social welfare, the careers and working conditions of those employed in the public sector are tied to the long-term prosperity of the welfare state (Andreß and Heien 2001).

Socio-psychological correlates

Socio-psychological studies explain support for social welfare policies in terms of differing personality traits. Some sociologists have suggested that interpersonal trust mediates the effect of self-interest and overall has a negative effect on attitudes toward the welfare state (Voicu and Voicu 2011). Strong interpersonal bonds provide the opportunity for individuals to rely on each other, rather than the government, in order to achieve common goals and provide mutual aid (Coleman 1990; Welch, Rivera, Conway, and Yonkoski 2005). These social relationships provide access to basic services and

benefits (Cohen, Underwood, and Gottlieb 2000). Some also claim that the frequency of social interactions is also negatively related to support for the welfare state (Voicu and Voicu 2011). Taken together, this suggests that individuals who maintain strong social networks with others may not see the need for a large, powerful state (Franzen and Hangartner 2006). In times of difficulty, these individuals prefer to rely upon each other, and thus do not believe it is the responsibility of the state to ensure their continued livelihood (Gërxhani and Koster 2012).

However, not all scholars support this argument. Taylor-Gooby (2005) indicates that trust is necessary in order to facilitate "... the running of a complex modern welfare state" (217). Similarly, Calzada et al. (2014) claim that individuals who lack interpersonal trust will be reluctant to support social welfare policies for fear of free-riding and abuse. Hooghe, Reeskens, and Stolle (2007) state that "... if many people have the feeling that most others cannot be trusted, it will be more difficult for a community to pursue collective-action efforts and to provide for collective goods" (3). Thus, there is still some question as to how interpersonal trust and the frequency of contact with others influence social welfare policy attitudes.

Political efficacy is also believed to be a correlate of support for social welfare policies. Lipsmeyer and Nordstrom (2003) argue that, "How respondents perceive the workings of democracy and their place in the process may have an effect on whether or not they want the government to be more involved in welfare activities" (343). It is known that political efficacy plays a vital role in determining how the performance of public policies are perceived (e.g., Ariely 2013; DeHoog, Lowery, and Lyons 1990). Likewise, political efficacy is thought to influence levels of political trust (Houston and

Harding 2013). Just the same, it may be that political efficacy guides citizen's public policy preferences.

Political efficacy can be thought of as being comprised of two separate components. The first, internal political efficacy, refers to an individual's belief in their ability to understand and influence the political process. The second, external political efficacy, focuses on the individual's confidence that their government is being responsive to the wishes of the citizenry. It is expected that higher levels of political efficacy will have a negative effect on support for social welfare policies. In this dissertation, I hypothesize that people who feel politically empowered are more likely to be satisfied with the status quo, feel that their needs are being met, and thus will not see a need for a more activist government. This is consistent with arguments that levels of social trust negatively influence social welfare policy support via a "crowding out" mechanism (Voicu and Voicu 2011).

Attitudes toward the public sector

The final category of correlates consists of attitudes toward the public sector. Prior studies on the topic of social welfare policy attitudes have largely ignored the role that trust in political actors and perceptions of government performance play in shaping policy preferences. With regard to political trust, Gabriel and Trüdinger (2011) claim that, "... the more people trust in political institutions and actors, the more they would be willing to approve governmental policies and policy shifts; even if they do not bear positively on their own living conditions" (286). It is the existence of trust, Gabriel and Trüinger assert, which has been one of the primary driving forces behind welfare state

reforms. Similarly, Rudolph and Evans (2005) find that opinions about welfare state expenditures are influenced by levels of political trust.

When people see their public servants as trustworthy, honest, fair, and reliable, they are more likely to be supportive of an expanded role for the state. “A population which retains faith in its system of government, and which believes it is reasonably democratic, is more likely to trust its government with a broad range of duties than a population which is alienated and distrustful” (Kaase and Newton 1995: 93). As an example of this relationship, Hetherington (2005) points to a lack of political trust as one of the chief reasons why healthcare reform in the United States failed in the early 1990s during the Clinton Administration. In this instance, there was not enough political trust available to sustain such a sweeping governmental transformation.

According to Ruscio (1999), political trust involves “... weaving together judgments of the integrity and capability of public officials with confidence in the institutional structures in which they operate” (641). Trust, in this context, is not only about making a calculative judgment as to the competence of public officials to implement public policy, but also “... having the service-user’s interests at heart” (Taylor-Gooby 2006: 19). Inherent in the concept of political trust is the willingness of individuals to believe that public institutions are working to act on behalf of the greater good (Kim 2005; Kim 2010).

In this dissertation, I argue that the level of trust that people place in civil servants influences their public policy preferences. Here, the term civil servants refers to non-elected, government administrators. Specifically, I expect that stronger levels of political trust in civil servants will result in additional support for social welfare policies. In

contrast, if trust is lacking, there should be less support for social welfare policies – a reflection of a shortage of confidence in civil servants to do their job in an effective and principled manner. Civil servants, by virtue of their positions, are very influential political actors. They serve on the frontlines of policy implementations in government offices around the world. It is reasonable to anticipate that how they are viewed by the public in terms of both their competence to complete assigned tasks, as well as their intentions to benefit the greater public good, influences the level of support people maintain for different forms of public policy they help to provide.

Perceptions of government performance may also influence support for social welfare policies. Research suggests that positive perceptions of public sector performance promote active citizenship and foster efficacious feelings toward government (Vigoda 2002). Positive perceptions of performance have been linked to changes in ideology among adults based on evaluations of incumbent governments (Kumlin 2006). Likewise, perceptions of competent public management are considered to be an indicator of a strong democracy and associated with satisfaction with public services (Vigoda-Gadot, Shoham, and Vashdi 2010).

In addition to the studies mentioned above, it bears mentioning that evaluations of government output have long been known to influence their political opinions. This is true in terms of citizens making voting decisions (Kinder and Kiewiet 1981; Lewis-Beck 1988), as well as engendering political trust in institutions (Listhaug 1995; Holmberg 1999; McAllister 1999; Huseby 2000). Negative evaluations of social policy outputs have specifically been known to translate into less support for the political party in power (Huseby 2000; Kumlin 2004). Additionally, public dissatisfaction with public policies

may encourage different forms of political participation and activism (Dalton 2002; Farah, Barnes, and Heunks 1979; Lyons and Lowery 1989).

Given these findings, there is reason to suppose that perceptions of government performance play a key role in shaping people's social welfare policy preferences. In this dissertation, I argue that positive perceptions of government performance, similar to higher levels of interpersonal trust and political efficacy, "crowd out" the desire for a more activist government. That is to say, it is expected that people who perceive government to be performing well are less likely to support social welfare policies.

This argument, although seemingly paradoxical, is not without academic support. Why would individuals who see government as performing well be more likely to view social welfare policies in a negative light? Or put another way, why would people who perceive poor performance be willing to support policies that increase the size of failing institutions? Interestingly, Calzada and del Pino (2008) find that individuals who tend to perceive public services as being ineffective are not likely to support cutting expenditures for those programs. Rather, these people appear to blame performance shortcomings on a lack of sufficient resources. This finding is consistent with literature that suggests that dissatisfaction with performance tends to increase support for more government spending (Johanssen, Nilsson, and Strömberg 2001).

The philosophical foundation for my contention is based in what has become known as "overload theory." The basic framework for overload theory was suggested by Crozier, Huntington, and Watanuki (1975) in their book, *The Crisis of Democracy*. The authors argue that the expansion of the welfare state during the postwar era was "... attributed not so much to the strength of government as to its weakness and the inability

and unwillingness of central political leaders to reject the demands made upon them by numerically and functionally important groups in their society” (Crozier et al. 1975: 164). Simply stated, as elected officials promised more and more to their constituents over the years, the size and role of government grew.

Positive experiences associated with this expansion of the welfare state led many to believe that any societal problem could be remedied via government action (Kaase and Newtown 1995). New expectations were created that government had a responsibility to its citizens to meet an ever increasing list of needs (Crozier et al. 1975). According to Kaase and Newton (1995), “... rising expectations makes today’s luxuries tomorrow’s necessities. Experience of satisfactory government services may also fuel the demand for still more services. As a result, claims on government both proliferate and escalate” (71). However, over the course of time, the new demands placed on the welfare state to solve social problems fail to keep pace with the capacity of government institutions to provide efficacious solutions (Kettl 2000). In the long run, the inability of the public sector to meet ever expanding expectations results in perceptions of poor performance.

According to Kumlin (2007), overload theory predicts that public dissatisfaction with welfare state-related performance actually increases support for social welfare programs. When poor performance becomes an issue, the masses instinctively call for additional governmental involvement. “When performance problems appear in the shape of, say, more pupils per public school teacher, longer waiting time for specialist treatment, or raised medical fees, citizens will do what they always do according to overload theory: they will demand a political solution by means of (even more) expansionist policies” (Kumlin 2007: 84). Rather than abandon the idea of public

solutions to pressing social and economic problems, those who perceive poor performance do the exact opposite. Convinced that government can remedy the issue, they call for additional government intervention.

If it is true that public perceptions of poor performance engender support for social welfare policies, it may be reasonable to expect that the converse relationship is true as well: Positive perceptions of government performance will decrease support for social welfare policies. “According to overload theory, modern society generates an ever expanding range of special groups and interests each of which urgently presses its case for benefits and services on government” (Kaase and Newton 1995). When government fails to provide satisfactory services, there are renewed calls from the public for additional governmental intervention. However, I argue that when individuals see the government as being efficient, effective, and ultimately successful, they are more likely to be satisfied with the status quo, reason that government programs have been adequately funded, and thus, see no need for additional expansionist policies which extend the role of government.

While overload theory may prove to be a useful framework for explaining public support for different forms of social welfare policy, it is important to recognize what it does not capture. Overload theory is helpful in explaining how public perceptions of policy outcomes, particularly the implementation of public programs, can influence levels of public policy support. However, it may not be as suitable a structure for predicting how the public might feel about entirely new programs – programs for which there is no track record of governmental success or failure. This is certainly a limitation of the theory. That being said, completely new programs are relatively rare, and this

dissertation is mainly concerned with investigating the link between the implementation of public programs and people's attitudes towards them.

Section 2.4.ii.: Country-level correlates

Beyond variation in attitudes within countries, there is likely to be differences in the average level of support for social welfare policies across countries. Therefore, it is reasonable to expect that social welfare attitudes are conditioned by national context.

While the extant literature suffers from a deficit of empirical studies that focus on country-level explanations, the broader literature that focuses on attitudes towards government more generally suggests a number of key variables that have particular import. For this analysis, I will focus on four categories of country-level correlates: welfare regime type, economic conditions, inequality, and the quality of governmental institutions.

Welfare Regime Type

Cross-national variation in public support for social welfare policies may be the result of dissimilarities in the institutional character of differing welfare regimes (Jakobsen 2011; Larsen 2008; Svallfors 1997). Jordan (2010) argues that once social welfare institutions are created, they "... transform political debate, generate new constituencies, and alter how individuals and interest groups interpret their preferences" (862). The term "welfare regimes" in this context reflects the compatibility of different institutions within a country in terms of how social welfare policies are organized (Svallfors 2007b). The configuration of these policies, "... influence the ways individuals understand their rights and responsibilities as members of a political community" (Mettler and Soss 2004: 61).

In *The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism*, Esping-Andersen (1990) suggests the existence of three ideal types of welfare states: social-democratic, conservative, and liberal. The primary means of demarcation between these three groups of countries is the extent of decommodification by the state. This concept refers to the degree to which welfare benefits are provided to citizens as a right of citizenship and the corresponding decrease in reliance on the private sector for essential services (Bean and Papadakis 1998: 213). Simply stated, it is a reflection of whether social welfare policies are more universal or more means-tested in nature.

Using the Esping-Andersen (1990, 1999) framework, different countries can be classified into three welfare regimes based on their level of decommodification. Social-democratic regimes are characterized by high decommodification and strong tendencies toward universalism. Countries which fall into this category are distinguished by maintaining a comprehensive system for social protection, providing generous benefits, and requiring high levels of taxation (Deeming and Hayes 2012). Scandinavian countries are classified in this typology. Alternatively, conservative regimes tend to be located in Continental Europe and are considered to be mostly decommodified. Conservative regimes tend to focus on equity rather than redistribution (Arts and Gelissen 2001). According to Jaeger (2009), “Corporatism is the organizing social principle in this regime type, and entitlement to the major social security programmes (unemployment, sickness, retirement, etc.) is based on occupational rather than on citizenship status” (726).

Finally, liberal regimes are described as having low levels of decommodification, as well as predispositions towards individualistic self-reliance values. A focus is placed on means-testing public assistance (Deeming and Hayes 2012; Jaeger 2009). Here, the

term “liberal” is a reference to classical liberalism and limited government, as opposed to the contemporary use of the word liberal. In liberal regimes, the state plays only a minor role in terms of social policy. Instead, these governments tend to look to the market for solutions to public policy problems (Jaeger 2006). In these countries, equality of opportunity and individualism is stressed, and as a result, the state is reluctant to provide benefits except for the deserving poor (Arts and Gelissen 2001). Liberal regimes generally include countries with an Anglo-Saxon heritage.

Does regime type help account for cross-national support for social welfare policies? The literature indicates mixed results. According to Arts and Gelissen (2001), “Not all welfare states have wholeheartedly and equally embraced the notion of equality that reflects a redistributive justice or collective solidarity” (285). They find that regime types do influence people’s views. However, they also caution that there are only small differences between regime types. Bean and Papadakis’ (1998) research reveals very weak support for the hypothesis. Again, they cite little differences in social welfare policy support between different regime types. That being said, Jaeger (2009) cautions that it is a mistake to dismiss the influence of welfare regimes. Rather, more attention should be paid to how countries are classified into the various ideal typologies. Using other indicators of welfare regimes, he is able to find modest support for the hypothesis (Jaeger 2006).

While the work of the aforementioned authors has done much to advance the study of public support for social welfare policies, it is still unclear as to whether differing welfare regimes make a significant difference. One of the key limitations of these studies is that they are confined only to developed countries, mostly in Western

Europe. Much remains unknown with respect to the influence of other welfare regime configurations which may exist in other parts of the world.

Castles and Obinger (2008) find evidence which suggests that an additional welfare regime typology may exist among countries in Eastern Europe. Using hierarchical cluster analysis techniques, they find that collectively the countries of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Slovenia, Poland, and Slovakia exhibit social welfare policy characteristics which are noticeably different from the more traditional welfare regime types. Specifically, this “post-communist” regime type is distinguished by comparatively low levels of governmental financial support for social welfare policies, high rates of economic growth, but also difficult social problems (Castles and Obinger 2008).

While other studies have studied public support for social welfare policies in post-communist states, most have either focused on a single country (e.g., Salmina 2014) or involve comparing a small number of post-communist countries to non-communist ones (e.g., Breznau 2010; Lipsmeyer and Nordstrom 2003). It is generally observed that people living in post-communist countries maintain higher levels of public support for social welfare policies in comparison to capitalistic countries in Western Europe – a reflection of the residual effects of the communistic institutions that once dominated their societies (Breznau 2010). However, to date, no known study has empirically tested the explanatory usefulness of a “post-communist” welfare regime type within a multilevel modeling context. For that reason, this dissertation considers such a regime type along with the more traditional welfare regime types used so popularly in the field of political sociology by other scholars.

Economic conditions

The state of a country's economy is expected to influence social welfare policy attitudes (Blekesaune 2007, 2013; Gërxfhani and Koster 2012). Poor economic conditions may reinforce self-interested behavior and spur a shift in favor of more liberal policies that seek to reduce economic insecurity (Lipset 1968). According to McClosky and Zaller (1984), the performance of capitalistic institutions plays a major role in determining support for social welfare policies. Simply put, when economic opportunities are plentiful, the conflict between capitalistic and democratic values held by the public is relatively mild. However, when "... the free enterprise system fails to deliver on the promises made by its proponents, new efforts to modify it seem inevitable" (McClosky and Zaller 1984: 301). The result is increased levels of support for governmental solutions to alleviate what might be perceived as economic injustice.

Evidence exists which supports this argument. Blekesaune and Quadagno (2003) find that the higher a country's unemployment rate, the more supportive its people are of social welfare policies. Blekesaune (2007) discovers that both lower unemployment rates and country-level measures of financial strain are correlated with support for social welfare policies. Levels of economic strain have been shown to influence support for redistributive policies (Blekesaune 2013). Dallinger (2010) also finds that public demand for a redistribution of resources decreases with economic prosperity, even when controlling for the level of social expenditures dispersed by the political system.

That being said, not all studies are consistent on this point. For example, Voicu and Voicu (2011) fail to witness a relationship between national unemployment figures and social welfare policy support. Since the question of whether or not national

economic conditions are a factor in predicting levels of public support for social welfare policies has not been definitely settled, additional research on this relationship is necessary. For that reason, a number of variables measuring national economic conditions are included in the country-level models (see Chapter 5).

Inequality

It is also believed that income inequality may condition social welfare attitudes (Voicu and Voicu 2011). Two theories exist. The first suggests that inequality positively influences support for social welfare policies. Higher levels of inequality lead to a greater demand among less affluent individuals for a redistribution of income (Meltzer and Richard 1981). Koster and Kaminska (2012) claim that one of the key values of welfare states is to promote equality. Their results reveal that greater inequality correlates with stronger preferences for income redistribution. Dallinger (2010) also finds evidence that greater levels of pre-tax income inequality correlate with more public support for redistribution.

In contrast, a second account holds that higher levels of income inequality actually reduce support for social welfare policies. Rehm, Hacker, and Schlesinger (2012) find evidence that higher levels of inequality lead to less support for social welfare policies. One possible explanation is that the worse inequality is in a country, the lower the earnings of the median voter will be (Kenworthy and McCall 2008). As a result, the median voter will be less likely to favor expenditures on welfare policies that must be financed with additional taxes. Conversely, Rothstein and Uslander (2005) argue, “When resources and opportunities are distributed more equally, people are more likely to

perceive a common stake with others and to see themselves as part of a larger social order” (52).

In the end, it may be that both explanations are not concurrent, but rather complementary (Voicu and Voicu 2011). As a result, the contrasting effects of each may cancel each other out. Just as greater levels of inequality leads to more demand for redistribution, as suggested by Meltzer and Richard (1981), it may also be that at the same time the median voter will be reluctant to pay the additional taxes necessary to sustain a social welfare system (Kenworthy and McCall 2008). While inequality may be perceived as a problem worthy of governmental intervention, people may not be inclined to pay the taxes necessary to attain the solution to the problem. Thus, inequality at the country-level may have a very low or null effect on popular support for social welfare policies.

Still yet, it bears mentioning that how social welfare policies are viewed by the public may influence levels of public support vis-à-vis the problem of inequality. Moene and Wallerstein (2001; 2003) point out that public pensions, unemployment benefits, and health insurance are more likely to be perceived by the public as a type of insurance, as opposed to a redistribution of income. This may also help to explain why inequality can have such seemingly mysterious effects on individuals’ public policy preferences. As they state, “The demand for redistribution increases when income falls, but the demand for redistributive insurance increases when incomes rise” (Moene and Wallerstein 2003: 510). This suggests that in examining this relationship, perceptions matter a great deal. Clearly, additional research on this point is warranted in order to tease out how the public responds to the inequality endemic to a particular social group.

Quality of government institutions

Political scientists have not systematically examined how institutional quality influences attitudes towards social welfare policies. However, it is commonly recognized that the outputs of a political system are linked to fluctuations in public support (Easton 1965). According to Pettersson (2007), "... we possess knowledge about the way institutions matter for various kinds of policy output, and we also know a great deal about peoples' opinions about the welfare state and welfare state output. But the connection between the two – that is, the interplay between institutional theory and public opinion studies – demands more attention" (149).

If, in fact, the central tenets of overload theory are correct that perceptions of performance influence support for social welfare policies at the individual-level, then it may also be true that the same relationship holds at the country-level. Actual levels of performance, reflected in the form of institutional quality, may influence public support for social welfare policies. As the work of Blekesaune and Quadagno (2003) has demonstrated, public opinion is subject to more than just the personal situation of individual people. Rather, it has the potential to be swayed also by collective phenomena, specifically living within a society.

To this extent, I expect national context to play a decided role in influencing public attitudes. Consistent with the implications drawn from overload theory (Crozier et al. 1975; Kaase and Newton 1995; Kumlin 2007), I argue that a well-functioning government with high quality institutions is likely to reduce support for social welfare policies. If government is functioning well, people may perceive that there is little need for social welfare policies. Thus, it is expected that individuals living in countries where

the government is rated with higher levels of institutional effectiveness will be less supportive of social welfare policies.

Summary

In summary, public support for social welfare policies is commonly explained by both socio-demographic variables and socio-psychological attributes. In addition to these correlates, I suggest the possibility that welfare attitudes are also influenced by people's views and assessments of the public sector. Furthermore, I suggest the testing of four categories of variables at the country-level: welfare regime type, economic conditions, inequality, and the quality of government institutions. Given that the extant literature fails to take into consideration the full range of explanations of public support for social welfare policies in a multilevel context, I feel this study is justified. To fill this void, this dissertation tests the individual and country-level explanations of social welfare policy attitudes using data from 23 countries in Europe, North America, Eastern Asia, and Oceania.

CHAPTER III DATA AND METHODS

Before an examination of people’s social welfare policy preferences can take place, it is necessary to consider both the data sources and the operationalization of key variables used in this research. In what follows, the primary source of information for this analysis – the 2006 International Social Survey Program’s Role of Government IV Module – will first be discussed. After that, the various countries examined in this dissertation are identified. Next, the operationalization of the dependent variable, public support for social welfare policies, is described. Likewise, the individual-level and country-level correlates used in the analysis found in Chapters 4 and 5 will be discussed, as well. In addition, the data sources for the country-level variables will be examined. (Please note that all data sources are summarized in Appendix A.) Finally, the estimation methods used in the statistical analysis, particularly multilevel modeling techniques, are described in detail.

Section 3.1: Data sources

The individual-level data used in this research comes from the International Social Survey Programme’s (ISSP) 2006 Role of Government IV Module (ISSP Research Group 2008). According to Bechert and Quandt (2010), “The *International Social Survey Programme* (ISSP) is a coordinated effort of research institutes from many countries across the world. Its annually repeated surveys are designed to cover various topics of high relevance to social science research” (13). The ISSP began in 1985 as a collaboration between researchers in Australia, the United Kingdom, Germany, and the United States. Each of these groups had been conducting national surveys for several years (i.e., the National Social Science Survey, British Social Attitudes, the Allbus

Survey, and the General Social Survey, respectively). To facilitate the comparison of collected data, it was agreed that a common module would be added to each of these national surveys for cross-national comparison purposes (Bréchon 2009). Beginning with the first ISSP survey in 1985, the “Role of Government” module focuses on the relationship that exists between governments and their people (Bechert and Quandt 2010). Subsequent “role of government” modules occurred in 1990, 1996, and 2006. By the date of the most recent, the Role of Government IV Module, the ISSP had expanded to include national research groups from 33 countries (Scholz, Faaß, Harkness, and Heller 2008).

Standardized questionnaires are constructed by ISSP members with an emphasis on topics that are relevant to the constituent countries. According to Smith (2009), “The ISSP has assisted the expansion of social-scientific knowledge by gathering data on important social topics in comparative perspective” (12). National samples are drawn from the adult population in each participating country using multi-stage stratified probability sampling designs. To ensure data quality, ISSP methodological groups consider the sampling and administration of the annual surveys in order to ensure the representativeness of the samples which are drawn (Scholtz, Faaß, Harkness, and Heller 2008).

For this analysis, data for 23 countries in Europe, North America, Eastern Asia, and Oceania are examined. The standard sample size is at least 900 respondents for each country (ISSP Research Group 2008). Standardized questionnaires were administered in these countries via face-to-face interviews or self-completion surveys with interviewer assistance (15 countries) and by mail (8 countries). Fieldwork for the survey was

conducted between 2005 and 2008, depending on the specific country (see Appendix B) (Scholtz et al. 2008).

Section 3.2: Countries included

The research undertaken in this dissertation relies on surveys considered in a cross-national perspective. According to Bouckaert, Van de Walle, and Kampen (2005), public administration scholars have largely ignored people's views, noting that "From the very beginning, the citizen has been neglected as an object of study in public administration, due to the discipline's early focus on organization studies and political-administrative relations" (232). Hopefully, this study will help to lessen this scholarly deficit given the important role that people's views play in democratic political systems. To this end, comparative public opinion research serves as a very useful tool, as it allows the researcher to distinguish between patterns which are specific to one country as opposed to those that are more universal in nature (Smith 2009).

In addition, by framing this investigation in a cross-national context, it is possible to determine the extent to which individuals' policy preferences are influenced by national context. According to Pedhazur (1997), "Social scientists, notably sociologists, social psychologists, and political scientists, have long been interested in the effects of social environments on the behavior of individuals" (687). Despite this, and with very few exceptions (e.g., Blekesaune and Quadagno 2003; Gerxhani and Koster 2012; Voicu and Voicu 2011), much of the research which focuses on social welfare policy attitudes has ignored the role that national context plays in influencing individuals' opinions. In order to overcome this shortcoming in the literature, this study examines 23 countries in Europe, North America, Eastern Asia, and Oceania for which ISSP survey data is

available (see Table 1). The countries included in the analysis vary considerably in terms of their political systems, economic development, and national culture.

Section 3.3: Individual-level variables

As mentioned above, the data source for all the individual-level variables used in this analysis is the 2006 ISSP, Role of Government IV Module. In this section, the survey items used to construct the dependent and independent variables are discussed.

Dependent variable

The dependent variable is created from responses to a battery of questions that asks: “On the whole, do you think it should or should not be the government’s responsibility to ... 1) Provide a job for everyone who wants one? 2) Keep prices under control? 3) Provide health care for the sick? 4) Provide a decent standard of living for the old? 5) Provide a decent standard of living for the unemployed? 6) Reduce income differences between the rich and the poor? 7) Give financial help to university students from low-income families? and 8) Provide decent housing for those who can’t afford it?” All eight questions have four-point Likert-type response scales. Responses include: “definitely should be,” “probably should be,” “probably should not be,” and “definitely should not be.” For each question, responses are coded so that the highest value indicates the most positive response. The response “can’t choose” is also an option.

The battery of questions used to operationalize support for social welfare policies refers to respondents’ attitudes about government’s responsibility to provide aid to those members of society who are materially deprived. This is consistent with the conceptual definition for social welfare policies offered in Chapter 2. However, it bears mentioning that this definition, as well as the metric utilized here to measure it, fails to take into

Table 1. List of countries included in the study

#	Country	Geographical region
1	Australia	Oceania
2	Canada	North America
3	Croatia	Southern Europe
4	Czech Republic	Eastern Europe
5	Denmark	Northern Europe
6	Finland	Northern Europe
7	France	Western Europe
8	Germany	Western Europe
9	Great Britain	Northern Europe
10	Hungary	Eastern Europe
11	Ireland	Northern Europe
12	Japan	Eastern Asia
13	Latvia	Northern Europe
14	Netherlands	Western Europe
15	Norway	Northern Europe
16	Poland	Eastern Europe
17	Portugal	Southern Europe
18	Russia	Eastern Europe
19	Slovenia	Southern Europe
20	Spain	Southern Europe
21	Sweden	Northern Europe
22	Switzerland	Western Europe
23	United States	North America

consideration other elements of social welfare that a more expansive definition would include. Social welfare could be construed to include more than just public aid to the poor. Particularly, it could be interpreted to include other programs that serve as remedies for a variety of conditions perceived as social ills. Unfortunately, these forms of social welfare cannot be considered using the 2006 ISSP survey.

As has been done in previous studies of social welfare attitudes (i.e., Arts and Gelissen 2001; Bean and Papadakis 1998; Iida and Matsuayashi 2010), responses from the battery of questions are used to create factor scores with values ranging from -4.10 to 1.24. Confirmatory factor analysis indicates that the responses strongly load on a single dimension, with an eigenvalue of 2.97. The factor loadings for the distinct items in the scale are provided in Table 2. The Cronbach's alpha for the index among all observations is 0.82, which is above the standard of 0.70 for inter-item reliability commonly used in social science research. Among the specific country samples, the Cronbach's alpha ranges from a low of 0.71 in Japan to a high of 0.86 in Portugal.

The decision to generate factor scores was made not only to be consistent with previous studies – which typically measure public support for social welfare policies using this method, but also to construct a metric that is both comprehensive and parsimonious. According to Rummel (1970), “To discover order, pattern, and regularity in phenomena is the *raison d'être* of science. In this sense, factor analysis is a scientific tool par excellence” (10-11). Factor analysis is a statistical method used to explain variation in a set of observed variables in terms of a set of unobserved, or latent, variables. These underlying variables are known as factors, and they are assumed to be the sources for the variables which are observable (Kim and Mueller 1978).

Table 2. Factor loadings, reliability score, mean, and standard deviation for social welfare policy support scale

Factor loadings	
<i>Government's responsibility to:</i>	
1. Provide a job for everyone who wants one	0.59
2. Keep prices under control	0.54
3. Provide health care for the sick	0.57
4. Provide a decent standard of living for the old	0.63
5. Provide a decent standard of living for the unemployed	0.62
6. Reduce income difference between the rich and the poor	0.63
7. Give financial help to university students from low-income families	0.58
8. Provide decent housing for those who can't afford it	0.71
Scale reliability score (Cronbach's alpha)	0.82
Scale mean	-5.84E-09
Standard deviation	0.91

In the social sciences, researchers may wish to measure or explain variables that are not directly observable. As Long (1983) explains, “While latent variables cannot be directly observed, information about them can be obtained indirectly by noting their effects on *observed* variables” (11). Using factor analysis, factor scores can be generated which serve as estimates for an underlying factor created by a linear combination of observed variables (Kim and Mueller 1978).

In the present research, the key variable of interest is public support for social welfare policies. The 2006 ISSP does not survey respondents specifically as to their support or opposition to social welfare policies. Instead, the survey asks respondents their opinion with regard to whether government has a responsibility to provide particular forms of social welfare to its residents (e.g., healthcare for the sick, living standards for the elderly, unemployment benefits for those out of work, housing assistance for the poor, etc.). Via factor analysis, these observed variables can be used to create a measure of the latent concept that is the subject of the research questions. By using responses to the battery of questions that gauge individuals’ preferences for governmental involvement in various activities, factor scores can be calculated which serve as an indicator of the level of support respondents possess for social welfare policies.

Independent variables

A brief description of the independent variables used in this research can be found below. A more detailed wording of the survey questions taken from the 2006 ISSP are presented in Appendix C. As indicated in Chapter 2, the literature identifies a number of different predictors of welfare policy support. These variables can be organized into

three broad categories: socio-demographic explanations, socio-psychological explanations, and attitudes toward the public sector.

Socio-demographic correlates

The following socio-demographic variables are included in the study: *Left political party affiliation*, *Right political party affiliation*, *Age*, *Female*, *Low education*, *Not employed*, and *Government employment*. To measure respondents' membership in political parties, two variables, *Left* and *Right political party affiliation*, are constructed. ISSP surveys routinely ask respondents the political party they identify with. Based on these responses, a left/right placement is derived by ISSP coders. Individuals' affiliations with political parties are classified based on the following scheme: "far left," "left, center left," "center, liberal," "right, conservative," "far right," "other," and "no party preference." *Left political party affiliation* includes individuals who identify with a political party designated as either "far left" or "left, center left," while *Right political party affiliation* includes those who identify with a party labeled as either "right, conservative" or "far right."

The variable *Age* is measured as a continuous variable. The respondents' age was determined by different means in different countries. For instance, in some countries the respondent was asked to specify the year of their birth, and their age was calculated. In other countries, the respondent was simply asked to indicate their age. The binary variable *Female* distinguishes between females and males. The process used to make this determination varies from one country to the next. In some countries, the respondent was asked to self-identify as being either male or female (or man or woman). In other countries, the question was coded by the interviewer based on their observation.

The respondent's level of education is measured by responses to questions in the various country surveys that ask about the highest education level completed. While the specific response set varies from one country to the next, the responses are coded such that there are six categories ranging from "no formal qualification, incomplete primary" to "university degree completed, graduate studies." The binary variable *Low education* is created by assigning a value of '1' to the following response categories: "no formal qualification, incomplete primary," "lowest formal qualification," and "above lowest qualification," and a value of '0' to the other three responses. In the United States, for example, *Low education* would include the categories: "less than high school, 1-5 years of education," "less than high school, 6-8 years of education," and "less than high school, 9-16 years of schooling."

The variable *Not employed* is created based on responses to survey questions that gauge the current economic status of the respondent. Categories of employment status include "employed, full-time," "employed, part-time," "employed, less than part-time," "helping family member," "unemployed," "student, school, vocational training, apprenticeship or trainee," "retired," "housewife, -man, home duties," "permanently disabled," and "other – not in labour force." In order to distinguish between those who are currently working from those who are not, the variable *Not employed* is coded to include all the categories listed above except those where the respondent is actually employed. Thus, the responses "helping family member," "unemployed," "student, school, vocational training, apprenticeship or trainee," "retired," "housewife, -man, home duties," "permanently disabled," and "other – not in labour force" are assigned a value of

'1.' The remaining responses, "employed, full-time," "employed, part-time," and "employed, less than part-time," are given a value of '0.'

The *Government employment* variable is created based on survey questions that ask the respondent to identify the sector of the economy in which they are employed. The responses are coded based on the following categories: "work for government," "public owned firm," "private firm," "self-employed," and "other, charity, voluntary sector." The binary variable *Government employment* is created by assigning a value of '1' to individuals who indicate they work for government and a value of '0' for the remaining categories.

Socio-psychological correlates

In this analysis, four socio-psychological variables are included: *Interpersonal trust*, *Contact with others*, *Internal political efficacy*, and *External political efficacy*. *Interpersonal trust* is measured with responses to two questions: "If you are not careful, other people will take advantage of you" and "There are only a few people I can trust completely." Both questions have five-point Likert-type response scales ranging from "strongly agree" to "strongly disagree." For each dimension of interpersonal trust, responses are coded so that the highest value indicates the most trusting response. As has been done in other studies (Brehm and Rahn 1997; Flavin and Keane 2012; Schyns and Koop 2010), responses to these questions are summed to create an additive index with values ranging from 2 to 10. The decision to construct an index was made in order to be consistent with the method used to measure this particular correlate in previous studies.

The Cronbach's alpha for the *Interpersonal trust* index is 0.70 for all observations, which is equal to the common standard of 0.70 for inter-item reliability.

Among the country samples individually, the highest Cronbach's alpha is observed in Denmark (0.80). The lowest is witnessed in Russia (0.38), but this is an outlier, as the next lowest value is found in Poland (0.57). The variable *Contact with others* is measured with responses to the question: "On average, about how many people do you have contact with in a typical week day, including people you live with?" This question has a five-point Likert-type response scale ranging from "0-4 persons" to "50 or more."

Responses to the following two questions are used to operationalize *Internal political efficacy*: "I feel that I have a pretty good understanding of the important political issues facing our country" and "I think most people are better informed about politics and government than I am." Both questions have five-point Likert-type response scales ranging from "strongly agree" to "strongly disagree." Responses are coded so that the highest value indicates the most efficacious response. As has been done in other studies (e.g., Asher 1974; Craig and Maggiotto 1982; Dyck and Lascher 2009; Flavin and Keane 2012; Hayes and Bean 1993), the values are summed in order to create an additive index with values ranging from 2 to 10.

This index, as well as its companion measuring external political efficacy below, was created in order to be consistent with the way this concept has been typically measured in the extant literature. The Cronbach's alpha for the *Internal political efficacy* index is 0.50. However, it bears mentioning that the Cronbach's alpha varies a great deal from one country to the next. The highest values are witnessed in Switzerland (0.65), Germany (0.64), and Ireland (0.63). The lowest are observed in Russia (0.04), France (0.05), and Japan (0.09). These values suggest that this measure may be more appropriate in some countries than others.

External political efficacy is measured by responses to the statements: “People like me don’t have any say about what the government does” and “The average citizen has considerable influence on politics.” Both questions have five-point Likert-type response scales ranging from “strongly agree” to “strongly disagree.” Responses are coded so that the highest value indicates the most efficacious response and are summed to create an additive index with values ranging from 2 to 10. The Cronbach’s alpha for the *External political efficacy* index is 0.55. Similar to the *Internal political efficacy* index, there is some variation in the country specific Cronbach’s alpha values. The highest values are seen in Canada (0.65), Finland (0.65), and Norway (0.64). The lowest are observed in France (0.13), Japan (0.25), and Russia (0.31). Again, these values are indicative of varying degrees of internal consistency for this variable from one country to the next.

Attitudes toward the public sector

The final category of individual-level correlates used in this analysis is that which reflects respondents’ attitudes toward the public sector. Two variables are specifically considered: *Trust in civil servants* and respondent *Perceptions of governmental performance*. The former is measured by responses to the survey item: “Most civil servants can be trusted to do what is best for the country.” Respondents were presented with five response options ranging from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree”. A binary variable is created with a value of ‘1’ indicating either a “strongly agree” or “agree” response and a value of ‘0’ for all other responses.

In order to gauge how individuals come to assess public sector performance, a general measure is needed which reflects perceived success in a number of policy areas.

For this reason, the variable *Perception of performance* is operationalized using responses to the question: “How successful do you think the government in [Country] is nowadays in each of the following areas: 1) Providing health care for the sick? 2) Providing a living standard for the old? 3) Dealing with threats to security? 4) Controlling crime? 5) Fighting unemployment? and 6) Protecting the environment?”

All six questions have five-point Likert-type response scales ranging from “very successful” to “very unsuccessful.” For each dimension, responses are coded so that the highest value indicates the most satisfactory response and are used to create factor scores ranging from -2.33 to 2.58. Much like the dependent variable, the decision to generate factor scores was made in order to construct a parsimonious measure that reflects the latent concept of perceived government performance. Confirmatory factor analysis indicates that the responses strongly load on a single dimension with an eigenvalue of 2.30. The factor loadings for the distinct items in the scale are provided in Table 3. The Cronbach’s alpha for the six questions in the battery is 0.79 for all observations. Among the country samples, the Cronbach’s alpha ranges from a low of 0.69 in Canada to a high of 0.86 in Russia.

Section 3.4: Country-level variables

In order to examine the influence of national context on public support for social welfare policies, several country-level variables are included in the multilevel analysis. Specifically, four categories of country-level variables are examined in this research: welfare regime type, economic performance, inequality, and the quality of government institutions. The sources of these correlates include the welfare regime typology created by Castles and Obinger (2008) in their article, “Worlds, Families, Regimes: Country

Table 3. Factor loadings, reliability score, mean, and standard deviation for perception of performance scale

Factor loadings	
<i>How successful is government in:</i>	
1. Providing health care for the sick	0.72
2. Providing living standard for old	0.76
3. Dealing with threats to security	0.67
4. Controlling crime	0.71
5. Fighting unemployment	0.70
6. Protecting the environment	0.64
Scale reliability score (Cronbach's alpha)	0.79
Scale mean	3.67E-10
Standard deviation	0.89

Clusters in European and OECD Area Public Policy,” published in the journal *West European Politics*, the World Bank, and the Standardized World Income Inequality Database (SWIID) compiled by Solt (2014). To the extent that these variables are revealed to be statistically significant in the multilevel models, a case can be made that public support for social welfare policies is not only dependent upon individual-level factors, but also on conditions that affect societies as collective entities.

Welfare Regime Type

Castles and Obinger’s (2008) classification scheme is used to identify the existence of different welfare regimes. In *The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism*, Esping-Andersen (1990) classified 18 countries located around the world into three welfare state typologies. Since its publication, other scholars have expanded the number of countries classified. Many have renamed, reclassified, or created additional regime typologies (Ebbinghaus 2012; Arts and Gelissen 2010). Castles and Obinger (2008) use a hierarchical cluster analysis of public policy outcomes in 20 OECD countries over the period 2000-2004 to distinguish between *Scandinavian* (social democratic), *Continental*, and *English-speaking* (liberal) welfare regimes.

It may also be that a fourth regime type made up of transitioning democracies in Eastern Europe also exists. Using an additional analysis of policy outcomes in 25 member states of the European Union over the period 2001-2005, Castles and Obinger (2008) suggest that indeed a *Post-communist* welfare typology exists which is statistically distinct from the more traditional welfare regime classifications. For this reason, a fourth welfare regime typology is created which includes the seven countries for which ISSP data are available that have a socio-economic history of communism. For the remainder

of this dissertation, the welfare regime typologies suggested by Castles and Obinger (2008), as well as the labels they use: *Scandinavian*, *Continental*, *English-speaking*, and *Post-communist*, will be used consistently. See Table 4.

Table 4. Countries listed by welfare regime typology

Scandinavian	Continental	English-speaking	Post-communist
Denmark	Finland	Australia	Croatia
Norway	France	Canada	Czech Republic
Sweden	Germany	Great Britain	Hungary
	Netherlands	Ireland	Latvia
	Portugal	Japan	Poland
	Spain	Switzerland	Russia
		United States	Slovenia

Economic Performance

The state of a country's economy is expected to influence social welfare policy attitudes (Gërkhani and Koster 2012; Voicu and Voicu 2011). Three measures of economic performance are used to indicate economic performance: *Gross domestic product (GDP) per capita (PPP)*, the *Unemployment rate* for each country, and the measure of *Inflation* for each country. *GDP per capita (PPP)* is used to represent the level of economic development of a country. The GDP implicit inflator is the ratio of GDP in current local currency to GDP in constant local currency (World Bank 2016). *GDP per capita (PPP)* is measured in international dollars, which has the same purchasing power as U.S. dollars. *Unemployment* refers to the share of the labor force that is without work but available for and seeking employment (World Bank 2016).

Inflation reflects the rate of price change in the economy as a whole, and it is measured by the annual growth rate of the GDP implicit deflator (World Bank 2016).

The data sources for these variables are the World Development Indicators (WDI) of the World Bank for each country for the year in which the ISSP survey was administered. Established in 1944, the World Bank was created to assist developing countries via financial and technical assistance in order to both reduce poverty and support development efforts (World Bank 2015b). In addition to providing low-interest loans and grants, the World Bank works with multiple actors including multinational institutions, private sector investors, and public sector entities on various projects in order to support development goals. This includes providing policy advice, as well as research analysis.

Inequality

The *GINI inequality index* calculated by Solt (2014) is used to measure income inequality. The *GINI index* quantifies the extent to which the distribution of income among individuals or households within a country's economy deviates from a perfectly equal distribution. The value can range from 0 (perfect equality) to 100 (perfect inequality). The *GINI index* values for each country included in the analysis are used to match the applicable year of the ISSP survey data.

Solt (2009) created the Standardized World Income Inequality Database (SWIID) as a means of overcoming the limitations prevalent in a number of other inequality indexes. Data issues created questions as to the comparability of observations when conducting cross-national research (Neckerman and Torche 2007). Specifically, two inadequacies emerged: (1) the inclusion of only a small number of countries, and (2) the

usage of different definitions of income (e.g., gross or net) and reference units (e.g., households or people) when calculating inequality indexes. Using a custom missing-data algorithm, Solt (2009) standardized the United Nations University's World Income Inequality Database (UNU-WIDER 2008) using quality benchmarks established in the Luxembourg Income Study (Luxembourg Income Study 2008). The SWIID attempts to maximize the comparability of inequality statistics for the largest possible number of countries. According to Solt (2009), "... the SWIID is better suited to broad cross-national research on income inequality than previously available sources" (231).

Quality of Government Institutions

The quality of governmental institutions is measured with the *World Bank Government Effectiveness Indicator*. The measure is one of the six broad dimensions of "governance" routinely computed by the World Bank. The Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) are "... a research dataset summarizing the views on the quality of governance provided by a large number of enterprise, citizen and expert survey respondents in industrial and developing countries" (World Bank 2015a). In recent years, scholars have come to recognize that good governance matters for sustained economic development (Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2009). WGI data offers a means of determining the status of government effectiveness in a cross-national perspective. The World Bank provides WGI measures for 215 countries over the period 1996-2014.

The *World Bank Government Effectiveness Indicator* combines several measures into a single variable that reflects the quality of public service provision, the quality of the bureaucracy, the competence of civil servants, the independence of the civil service from political pressures, and the credibility of the government's commitment to policies

(Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2010; World Bank 2015c). The measure reflects data from a number of different sources, including international organizations, think tanks, non-governmental organizations, and entities in the private sector. The *Government Effectiveness Indicator* ranges from a value of -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong). Indicator values for each country included in the analysis are used to match the appropriate year of the ISSP survey data.

Section 3.5: Estimation methods

The research for this dissertation is conducted in three stages. The first stage includes a descriptive analysis of the dependent and independent variables examined in the study. In particular, descriptive statistics are provided to report the distribution of response items in the 2006 ISSP Survey. Moreover, this inquiry illustrates the extent to which public support for social welfare policies varies from one country to the next. In the second stage, an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression model for each specific country included in the analysis is estimated in order to reveal whether attitudes toward social welfare policies are influenced by similar individual-level attributes across countries.

The OLS regression model allows the researcher to examine the effects of a particular independent variable on a continuous dependent variable while holding other factors fixed (Wooldridge 2009). When considered comparatively, this examination indicates how consistent the socio-demographic, socio-psychological, and public sector attitudinal variables are in determining levels of support for welfare policies from one country to the next. The results from the first two stages of the analysis are found in Chapter 4.

The final stage of this research considers the extent to which variation in social welfare policy support is a function of differences in country-level attributes. Specifically, national context will be considered as a potential influencer. In addition to the individual-level variables included in the country-specific models, certain country-level correlates identified in the extant literature are included, as well. For this, multilevel regression models are estimated. The results from this final stage of the study are found in Chapter 5.

Multilevel Models

Increasingly, social science researchers have come to realize that an underlying hierarchical structure exists in much of their data (Goldstein 1987). Typical examples of these arrangements include individuals nested within families, medical cases grouped within different hospitals, plots within fields, or students nested within different classrooms or schools, etc. (Longford 1995). According to Hox (2002), “The general concept is that individuals interact within the social contexts to which they belong, meaning that individual persons are influenced by the social groups or contexts to which they belong, and that the properties of these groups are in turn influenced by the individuals who make up that group” (1).

The existence of this organizational structure necessitates the need to take hierarchy into account when conducting data analysis. Thus, multilevel modeling seeks to account for the relationships between different levels of data within the framework of a single model. As stated by Courgeau (2003b), “Ignoring this relationship may lead to an incorrect analysis of individual behaviors and an equally incorrect analysis of the behaviors of the entire group. Only by recognizing these reciprocal influences can we

arrive at a more correct analysis of behaviors” (3). A multilevel approach allows the researcher to take into consideration how social phenomena are often the result of influences found at both the individual and social levels of analysis.

Known by a variety of names, including “hierarchical linear model” (Bryk and Raudenbush 1992; Raudenbush and Byrck 1986, 1988), “mixed-effects model” (Littell, Milliken, Stroup, and Wolfinger 1996), “random coefficient model” (de Leeuw and Kreft 1986; Longford 1993, 1995), or “variance component model” (Longford 1987), multilevel regression models examine a single dependent variable measured at the lowest hierarchical level using correlates at all levels. Multilevel modeling has enjoyed extensive use in certain fields of study where a hierarchal structure is common to the data being examined.

The first social science discipline to fully develop the technique was educational studies with a focus on students nested within classrooms nested within schools (Goldstein 2003). This examination resulted in a number of influential works for the field (e.g., Aitkin, Anderson, and Hinde 1981; Goldstein and Sammons 1997; Hill and Goldstein 1998; Woodhouse and Goldstein 1988). In addition to its use in education science, multilevel models have commonly been used in other fields including demography (Courgeau 2003a), epidemiology (Greenland 1998; Morgenstern 1998), and human geography (Jones 1991), among other studies.

Methodologically, multilevel models should be used when analyzing data which is believed to be hierarchically structured. This is done in order to overcome two problems – one conceptual and the other statistical (Hox 2002). Conceptually, researchers want to avoid the hazards of making cross-level inferences. According to

Pedhazur (1997), “When findings obtained from data collected on one level (e.g., individuals) are used to make inferences about another level (e.g., groups to which they belong), a cross-level inference is being made” (676). Cross-level inferences can often be misleading, and a number of early scholars have pointed out the risks involved in making them (e.g., Lindquist 1940; Thorndike 1939).

In his seminal paper on race and illiteracy, Robinson (1950) drew attention to what is now known as the ecological fallacy. An ecological fallacy refers to interpreting aggregate data at the individual level. Often, those who commit an ecological fallacy do so because aggregate data tends to be more easily available, whereas individual-level data may require collection, resulting in greater costs in terms of time and resources. Consider the aggregate measures commonly made available by various organizations, governmental and not, for differing countries, states, counties, municipalities, census tracts, election districts, etc. Similarly, another cross-level inference, the atomistic fallacy, refers to interpreting individual level data at the aggregate level. While the atomistic fallacy is not as common as its counterpart, it is still problematic. Both forms of statistical interpretation should be avoided because mismatching data to one’s selected unit of analysis can lead to dramatically differing, and potentially spurious, results.

Multilevel models can help prevent researchers from making fallacious cross-level inferences. Moreover, they actually present the investigator with a clearer illustration of how both individual and contextual variables influence the object of study. As stated by Hox (2002), “A more general way to look at multilevel data is to realize that there is not one ‘proper’ level at which the data should be analyzed. Rather, all levels present in the data are important in their own way” (4). Multilevel modeling is able to

incorporate all available information from multiple levels of data in order to more fully explain variation in a dependent variable.

The second reason why multilevel models should be used when analyzing hierarchically structured data is for statistical reasons. Standard regression methods, such as ordinary least squares regression, only allow for data analysis at a single level. In the past, it has been common practice for some researchers, albeit mistakenly, to pool hierarchically structured data into a single level. However, this is inappropriate. When individual data from multiple groups is merged and used to estimate models using standard regression techniques it is assumed that the characteristics of those groups do not matter – which is implausible (Pedhazur 1997).

Given that common regression methods assume that observations are independent of one another, this presents a distinct problem. If the independence of observations assumption is violated, the standard errors of the regression coefficients will be underestimated, resulting in a greater likelihood of committing a Type I error in which results may appear statistically significant but in truth are not (Hox 2002). According to Pedhazur (1997), “A least-squares solution ignores the fact that individuals belonging to a given group tend to be more alike than do individuals belonging to different groups” (692). Alternatively, multilevel regression analysis takes the clustered nature of hierarchical data into account and estimates standard errors which are more accurate than those generated by standard regression methods.

In summary, multilevel models are appropriate for data which are hierarchically structured, such as data on individuals collected through surveys (level-1) that are clustered (or nested) within countries (level-2) (Raudenbush and Bryk 2002). The

advantage of this estimation approach over a simple pooled regression model is that a hierarchical linear model does not assume that respondents are independent of one another, as it is more appropriate to assume that individuals within each cluster (i.e., country) have attitudes that are correlated as a function of the national context in which they reside. The multilevel estimator also more efficiently accounts for the heterogeneity across clusters (Gelman and Hill 2006).

Overall, multilevel regression "...allows specification of each variable at the conceptually appropriate level. Perhaps more important, the methods allow us to ask research questions which probably would otherwise have remained unasked" (Raudenbush and Willms 1991, xii). For this study, multilevel models are used to examine public support for social welfare policies using the statistics software HLM 7.01.

CHAPTER IV

EXPLAINING PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR SOCIAL WELFARE POLICIES: INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL CORRELATES

In order to explain the extent of public support for social welfare policies as well as its causes, this chapter examines the phenomena at the individual-level. First, a descriptive analysis of the dependent and independent variables for all of the 23 countries included in the study is offered. This descriptive analysis includes an investigation of missing data, as well as a presentation of key statistics such as the mean, standard deviation, minimum and maximum values, and sample sizes for each variable by country. The dependent variable is examined first, with the goal being to determine how levels of support for social welfare policies vary across countries. Then a descriptive analysis of the socio-demographic, socio-psychological, and government attitudinal correlates follows. After that, the focus of the chapter turns to explaining social welfare policy support at the individual-level. For that, a series of country-specific OLS regression models are estimated and analyzed.

Section 4.1: Descriptive analysis of the dependent variable

This section offers a descriptive analysis of the dependent variable, public support for social welfare policies, in 23 countries around the world. First, an inspection of missing data is conducted, followed by an examination of key measures of central tendency. Finally, an assessment is made as to how levels of public support for social welfare policies vary across the countries examined in this study.

Section 4.1.i: Valid and invalid responses

When conducting statistical analysis with respect to survey data, it is essential to be aware of the distribution of valid and invalid responses. An insufficient number of

responses may endanger the ability of the researcher to make valid claims about relationships that exist within the data. Figure 1 illustrates the percentage of missing data for the dependent variable by country. The full distribution of missing values by country is presented in Appendix D.

For the dependent variable, 5,079 or about 15.9% of the responses are missing data, indicating that the respondent either replied “can’t choose” or gave “no answer” to at least one of the eight questions that comprise the dependent variable. These missing responses decrease the sample size from 31,944 to 26,865. As indicated in Figure 1, the countries with the highest number of invalid responses include Japan (29.1%), Canada (22.8%), and Latvia (21.7%). Each of those countries has missing values in excess of 20%. Countries with the fewest invalid cases include Slovenia (6.4%), the United States (7.4%), and Hungary (8.9%).

Section 4.1.ii: Support for social welfare policies across countries

The first research question posed in this dissertation is: Across countries, what levels of support do people hold for social welfare policies? Table 5 reports the descriptive statistics for the factor scores that comprise the dependent variable. Recall from Chapter 3 that the dependent variable is created from responses to a battery of questions that asks whether it should be the responsibility of government to provide certain forms of assistance, reflecting eight different types of social welfare policies. Responses to these questions are used to generate factor scores with values ranging from -4.10 to 1.24. The overall mean for all cases is $-5.84E-9$, and the overall standard deviation is 0.91. Country averages and standard deviations indicate that there is variation in public attitudes about social welfare policies within countries, suggesting




Figure 1. Invalid responses for the dependent variable by country, %

Table 5. Descriptive statistics: Support for social welfare policies

Country	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max	N
Australia	-0.32	0.85	-4.10	1.24	2,261
Canada	-0.32	0.89	-3.56	1.24	720
Croatia	0.45	0.73	-2.75	1.24	1,007
Czech Republic	-0.45	0.94	-3.19	1.24	1,010
Denmark	-0.09	0.83	-3.43	1.24	1,139
Finland	0.00	0.83	-3.47	1.24	979
France	-0.09	0.91	-4.10	1.24	1,522
Germany	-0.37	0.89	-3.33	1.24	894
Great Britain	-0.21	0.82	-2.92	1.24	756
Hungary	0.08	0.75	-2.22	1.24	920
Ireland	0.36	0.67	-2.41	1.24	882
Japan	-0.78	1.02	-4.10	1.24	873
Latvia	-0.06	0.91	-2.83	1.24	837
Netherlands	-0.23	0.86	-2.81	1.24	794
Norway	0.17	0.74	-4.10	1.24	1,165
Poland	0.28	0.84	-4.10	1.24	1,091
Portugal	0.51	0.69	-3.52	1.24	1,654
Russia	0.44	0.73	-3.28	1.24	1,965
Slovenia	0.30	0.72	-3.11	1.24	939
Spain	0.46	0.71	-4.10	1.24	2,238
Sweden	-0.19	0.92	-3.71	1.24	973
Switzerland	-0.66	0.77	-3.74	1.24	840
United States	-0.41	1.06	-4.10	1.24	1,406
Total	-5.84E-09	0.91	-4.10	1.24	26,865

the need to examine individual-level correlates in order to understand these attitudes. Perhaps more important, these summary statistics indicate variation in public attitudes across the countries examined and highlight the need to examine national context for explaining these views (see Chapter 5).

The cross-national variation in social welfare policy support is illustrated in Figure 2, which reports the average factor score for each country ordered from lowest-to-highest. Respondents in Portugal (0.51), Spain (0.46), and Croatia (0.45) are the most supportive of social welfare policies, while people living in Japan (-0.78), Switzerland (-0.66), and the Czech Republic (-0.45) are, on average, the most critical. A cursory glance at Figure 2 reveals that Eastern and Central European countries tend to be over-represented in the bottom half of this chart. Several of these countries have only recently transitioned to democratic governments and capitalistic economies. This observation suggests that the quality of public institutions may influence respondents' opinions about social welfare policies.

Section 4.2: Descriptive analysis of the independent variables

This section summarizes the statistical characteristics of the independent variables included in the analysis at the individual-level. In addition to reporting the valid and invalid data for each correlate by country, it also provides important descriptive statistics such as range, distribution, and measures of central tendency. Specifically, the amount of variation for each variable is considered comparatively by country.

Section 4.2.i: Left political party affiliation

Appendix E reveals that there are 5,601 invalid responses for the *Left political party affiliation* variable, decreasing the pooled sample size of the data from 31,944 to




Figure 2. Mean factor score of support for social welfare policies by country

26,343, or by 17.5%. Figure 3 indicates that all countries have at least some invalid cases, ranging from 0.6% in Japan to 37.1% in Hungary. The number of invalid cases is in excess of 30.0% in four countries: Russia, Slovenia, Poland, and Hungary. However, it is less than 5.0% in seven: Japan, the United States, Ireland, Australia, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and Canada.

The *Left political party affiliation* variable is coded to include those individuals who belong to political parties identified as being either “far left” or “left, center left” by ISSP coders on an ideological left/right placement measure. Accordingly, 8,045, or 30.5%, of respondents for which valid data is available identify with a left political party. Figure 4 illustrates the percentage of respondents who are affiliated with a left political party by country. The percentage varies from a low of 2.8% of respondents in Japan to a high of 54.3% of respondents in France. Less than 15.0% of respondents are members of a left political party in Japan, Ireland, Croatia, Latvia, and Russia – using this coding scheme. Meanwhile, more than 40.0% of respondents are affiliated with left political parties in France, Hungary, Spain, Sweden, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Germany.

Section 4.2.ii: Right political party affiliation

Appendix F reveals that there are 5,601 invalid responses for the right political party affiliation variable, the same number as for the *Left political party affiliation* variable. This decreases the pooled sample size of the data from 31,944 to 26,343, or by 17.5%. Just as before with *Left political party affiliation*, Figure 5 indicates that all countries have at least some invalid cases, ranging from 0.6% in Japan to 37.1% in Hungary. The number of invalid cases is in excess of 30.0% in four countries: Russia,




Figure 3. Invalid responses for left political party affiliation by country, %




Figure 4. Percentage distribution of left political party affiliation by country, %

Slovenia, Poland, and Hungary. However, it is less than 5.0% in seven: Japan, the United States, Ireland, Australia, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and Canada.

The *Right political party affiliation* variable is coded to include those who belong to political parties identified as being either “right, conservative” or “far right” by ISSP coders on an ideological left/right placement measure. Accordingly, 6,793, or 25.8%, of respondents identify with a right political party. Figure 6 illustrates the percentage of respondents who are affiliated with a right political party by country. The percentage varies from a low of 0.6% of respondents in Ireland to a high of 46.9% of respondents in Hungary.

Less than 15.0% of respondents are members of a right political party in Ireland, Portugal, Latvia, Russia, and Spain. Meanwhile, more than 40.0% of respondents are affiliated with right political parties in Norway, Denmark, and Hungary. It bears mentioning that a total of only 6 people in Ireland belong to a right political party using this coding scheme. This number being so small may have implications on the country-specific regression model for the state of Ireland later in this chapter.

Section 4.2.iii: Age

Appendix G indicates that 149 respondents, or about 0.47%, provided no answer when asked about their age. Most of these missing cases are either in Canada (63 people) or Australia (44 people). These missing data have decreased the overall sample size from 31,944 to 31,795. Cross-nationally, the smallest number of respondents in the country samples is 870 in Canada, while the maximum is 2,737 in Australia. Table 6 provides the descriptive statistics of the *Age* variable. Respondents’ ages range from 15 to 98 years. Five countries have respondents younger than 18 in their samples, including Finland




Figure 5. Invalid responses for right political party affiliation by country, %




Figure 6. Percentage distribution of right political party affiliation by country, %

Table 6. Descriptive statistics: Age

Country	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max	N
Australia	50.51	16.65	17	97	2,737
Canada	51.57	15.64	18	97	870
Croatia	46.47	18.73	18	92	1,194
Czech Republic	49.36	17.42	18	94	1,195
Denmark	50.56	16.41	18	90	1,368
Finland	46.04	16.45	15	75	1,189
France	52.61	16.61	18	98	1,824
Germany	48.96	17.06	18	94	1,107
Great Britain	48.77	17.68	18	91	928
Hungary	48.88	18.36	18	97	1,010
Ireland	46.65	17.28	18	93	991
Japan	49.91	17.78	16	96	1,231
Latvia	44.59	16.63	18	74	1,069
Netherlands	49.64	15.84	18	92	992
Norway	46.85	15.66	18	79	1,330
Poland	48.14	18.04	18	88	1,293
Portugal	49.30	18.55	18	95	1,837
Russia	44.69	18.48	16	90	2,407
Slovenia	46.57	17.92	18	94	1,003
Spain	47.24	17.83	18	97	2,515
Sweden	48.11	16.04	17	79	1,194
Switzerland	50.51	17.77	18	96	1,003
United States	47.13	16.40	18	89	1,508
Total	48.38	17.40	15	98	31,795

(15), Japan (16), Russia (16), Australia (17), and Sweden (17). Overall, the mean age of respondents was 48.38 years, with a standard deviation of 17.40 years. Within the samples, the average age of respondents varies from a low of 44.59 years in Latvia to 52.61 years in France. Within countries, the amount of variation ranges from a minimum standard deviation of 15.64 years in Canada to a maximum of 18.73 years in Croatia.

Section 4.2.iv: Female

Appendix H reveals that 44 respondents, or about 0.47%, provided no answer when asked about their sex. Nearly all of these cases are in either Australia (27 people) or Canada (15 people). These missing data slightly reduce the overall sample size from 31,944 to 31,900. The smallest number of respondents in the country samples is 918 in Canada, while the maximum is 2,754 in Australia. Figure 7 provides the percentage distribution of the variable *Female* by country.

A closer inspection of Figure 7 indicates that there are more women than men in nearly all of the country samples. The only exceptions are in France (44.4%), the Netherlands (46.1%), and Canada (49.2%). It is noteworthy to point out that the share of women is over 55.0% in 8 countries including: Russia, Portugal, Latvia, Great Britain, Ireland, the Czech Republic, Switzerland, and Hungary.

Section 4.2.v: Low education

Appendix I shows that there are 678, or 2.1%, invalid responses for the *Low education* variable. These missing data reduce the sample size from 31,944 to 31,226. Cross-nationally, the percentage of invalid responses is less than 2.0% in each country sample with the exceptions of Denmark (6.1%), Finland (4.7%), and Sweden (2.4%). Notably, there are no missing data in Hungary, Latvia, Poland, Portugal, or Russia. With




Figure 7. Percentage distribution of those female by country, %

respect to the sample size, the figures range from 914 cases in Canada to 2,728 in Australia.

The *Low education* variable is coded to reflect the educational attainment of those who took part in the survey. Specifically, the variable includes those cases for which the respondent indicated that their highest level of education fell into one of the following three categories on a 6-point scale: (1) “no formal qualification, incomplete primary,” (2) “lowest formal qualification,” and (3) “above lowest qualification.” Overall, 13,226 respondents, or 41.9% of the pooled sample, are classified as possessing low educational attainment.

Figure 8 reveals that the percentage of respondents with low educational attainment, as it is coded here, varies a great deal across the countries considered in this analysis. Less than 25.0% of respondents are listed as having low educational attainment in eight countries: Denmark (12.1%), Canada (15.2%), the United States (16.4%), Latvia (18.1%), Russia (20.6%), Australia (20.9%), Norway (24.2%), and Japan (24.9%). In contrast, over 60.0% of respondents are categorized as having low educational attainment in four countries, including Spain (61.2%), Switzerland (69.4%), Germany (74.8%), and Portugal (82.5%). It is important to point out that educational attainment must always be considered in context, as educational systems tend to vary from one state to the next. However, ISSP coders have attempted to create categorizations of educational attainment that are comparable across different countries.

Section 4.2.vi: Not employed

There are 456, invalid cases, or 1.4% of the pooled sample, for the *Not employed* variable (see Appendix J). This decreases the overall sample size from 31,944 to 31,488.




Figure 8. Percentage distribution of low education by country, %

The percentage of invalid responses is less than 4.0% in each country sample with the exceptions of the Netherlands (6.0%) and Finland (4.4%). Incidentally, there are no missing data in Hungary, Ireland, Latvia, Poland, Russia, or Great Britain. With respect to the sample size in each country, the number of cases range from 905 in Canada to 2,701 in Australia.

The variable *Not employed* measures the economic status of the respondent vis-à-vis their employment status. To be not employed means that the respondent does not possess any employment, whether full-time or part-time. In total, 13,767 respondents, or 43.7% of the pooled sample, are classified as being not employed. Figure 9 reveals that the percentage of respondents who are not employed varies somewhat across the countries examined. Less than 35.0% of respondents are listed as being not employed in only two countries: Sweden (33.7%) and the United States (34.5%). Alternatively, over 50.0% of respondents are categorized as not working in four countries, including Croatia (58.4%), the Hungary (58.4%), Poland (51.7%), the Czech Republic (51.6%), and Germany (50.4%). It is important to remember that the *Not employed* variable excludes those who are employed in any capacity. Thus, the variable includes a number of people such as those who are unemployed, students, retired people, or the disabled, etc.

Section 4.2.vii: Government employment

Appendix K indicates that there are 3,897 invalid responses for the *Government employment* variable, which reduce the overall sample size from 31,944 to 28,047, or 12.2%. Figure 10 indicates that the number of invalid cases is highest in Japan (39.1%), Croatia (24.6%), and Spain (19.9%). It is lowest in Great Britain (3.3%), the United States (4.9%), and Switzerland (6.4%).




Figure 9. Percentage distribution of those not employed by country, %




Figure 10. Invalid responses for government employment by country, %

Overall, 6,405 respondents report that they work for government, or 22.8% of those who offered valid responses. Figure 11 illustrates the distribution of the *Government employment* variable across the countries considered in the analysis. Countries with the fewest respondents who say that they work for government include Hungary (4.6%), the Czech Republic (5.9%), and Japan (7.7%). In sharp contrast, countries with the highest number of respondents who claim to be government workers include Russia (54.4%), Denmark (37.4%), and Norway (35.6%).

Section 4.2.viii: Interpersonal trust

There are 1,250 invalid responses, or 3.9% of the pooled sample, for the variable *Interpersonal trust* (see Appendix L). This decreases the overall sample size from 31,944 to 30,694. The percentage of invalid responses is less than 5.0% in each country sample, with the exceptions of Russia (12.2%), Sweden (7.5%), France (7.0%), and Japan (5.6%). The country sample sizes range from 900 cases in both Canada and Great Britain to 2,660 in Australia. Table 7 presents the descriptive statistics for the *Interpersonal trust* variable, which is an index of responses to two questions that attempt to measure the concept (see Chapter 3). Index values range from 2 to 10. Although, it bears mentioning that in the sample for Croatia, the maximum value observed was a 9. The overall mean value for all respondents is 4.42, with a standard deviation of 1.88. This indicates that the pooled distribution of index values is somewhat positively skewed.

Cross-nationally, the average value for the index varies somewhat. The lowest *Interpersonal trust* index scores are found in Hungary (3.36), Croatia (3.82), and Poland (3.88) – all former communistic countries. Countries with the highest index values include Denmark (5.19), Switzerland (5.41), and Norway (5.19). The standard deviations




Figure 11. Percentage distribution of government employment by country, %

Table 7. Descriptive statistics: Interpersonal trust

Country	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max	N
Australia	4.38	1.86	2	10	2,660
Canada	4.55	1.81	2	10	900
Croatia	3.82	1.53	2	9	1,166
Czech Republic	4.69	1.64	2	10	1,183
Denmark	5.76	2.60	2	10	1,321
Finland	4.98	2.13	2	10	1,130
France	4.19	1.83	2	10	1,697
Germany	4.47	1.82	2	10	1,065
Great Britain	4.31	1.66	2	10	900
Hungary	3.76	1.60	2	10	1,002
Ireland	4.13	1.91	2	10	990
Japan	4.49	2.17	2	10	1,162
Latvia	4.35	1.56	2	10	1,021
Netherlands	5.18	1.98	2	10	952
Norway	5.19	1.88	2	10	1,300
Poland	3.88	1.28	2	10	1,252
Portugal	4.08	1.51	2	10	1,825
Russia	4.04	1.56	2	10	2,113
Slovenia	4.21	1.58	2	10	991
Spain	3.94	1.68	2	10	2,451
Sweden	5.02	1.99	2	10	1,105
Switzerland	5.41	2.00	2	10	999
United States	4.10	1.84	2	10	1,509
Total	4.42	1.88	2	10	30,694

of the various country samples also vary from 1.28 in Poland to 2.60 in Denmark, indicating differing degrees of variance from one country to the next.

Section 4.2.ix: Contact with others

Appendix M shows that there are 883 or 2.8%, invalid responses for the variable *Contact with others*. These missing data reduce the sample size from 31,944 to 31,061. Across countries, the percentage of invalid responses is less than 4.0% in each country sample, with the exceptions of Latvia (18.3%), Great Britain (5.3%), and Canada (4.8%). The country sample sizes range from 873 cases in Latvia to 2,684 in Australia. Table 8 offers the descriptive statistics for the *Contact with others* variable, which is an ordinal measure that summarizes the amount of interaction respondents have with others in a typical weekday. The response scale includes five categories, ranging from “0-4 persons” to “50 or more.” Thus, index values range from 1 to 5.

The overall mean value for all respondents is 2.73, with a standard deviation of 1.21. This indicates that the pooled distribution of index values is slightly negatively skewed. Across countries, the average value for the correlate varies to some extent. The lowest values for *Contact with others* are found in Hungary (2.06), Poland (2.24), and Latvia (2.37) – again, all former Eastern Bloc states. Countries with the highest values include Ireland (3.08), Australia (3.08), and the Netherlands (3.05). The standard deviations of the various country samples also vary slightly from 1.06 in Norway to 1.28 in the United States.

Section 4.2.x: Internal political efficacy

There are 2,654 invalid responses for the *Internal political efficacy* variable (see Appendix N). This decreases the total pooled sample size from 31,944 to 29,654, or by

Table 8. Descriptive statistics: Contact with others

Country	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max	N
Australia	3.08	1.23	1	5	2,684
Canada	3.02	1.28	1	5	888
Croatia	2.42	1.10	1	5	1,154
Czech Republic	2.61	1.18	1	5	1,189
Denmark	2.64	1.13	1	5	1,333
Finland	2.50	1.12	1	5	1,165
France	2.86	1.17	1	5	1,774
Germany	2.74	1.23	1	5	1,094
Great Britain	2.96	1.28	1	5	881
Hungary	2.06	1.13	1	5	1,005
Ireland	3.08	1.25	1	5	998
Japan	2.56	1.13	1	5	1,194
Latvia	2.37	1.18	1	5	873
Netherlands	3.05	1.16	1	5	961
Norway	2.64	1.06	1	5	1,305
Poland	2.24	1.18	1	5	1,267
Portugal	3.03	1.17	1	5	1,803
Russia	2.55	1.22	1	5	2,318
Slovenia	2.42	1.16	1	5	989
Spain	2.87	1.17	1	5	2,498
Sweden	2.92	1.16	1	5	1,174
Switzerland	2.69	1.17	1	5	1,000
United States	2.92	1.28	1	5	1,514
Total	2.73	1.21	1	5	31,061

8.3%. Figure 12 indicates that the number of invalid cases is highest in Russia (18.2%), Japan (17.5%), and France (14.6%). It is lowest in the United States (1.3%), Ireland (2.5%), and Spain (4.0%). The country sample sizes range from 863 observations in Great Britain to 2,640 in Australia.

Table 9 provides the descriptive statistics for the *Internal political efficacy* variable, which is an index of responses to two questions that attempt to measure the concept (see Chapter 3). Index values range from 2 to 10. The overall mean value for all respondents is 6.16, with a standard deviation of 1.78. This indicates that the pooled distribution of index values is negatively skewed. Across countries, the average value for the index varies somewhat. The lowest index values are found in Latvia (5.17), Portugal (5.43), and Russia (5.45). Countries with the highest index values include Denmark (7.37), Australia (6.94), and Norway (6.81). The standard deviations of the various country samples also vary slightly from 1.41 in Norway to 1.93 in the United States.

Section 4.2.xi: External political efficacy

Appendix O indicates that there are 1,730 invalid responses for the *External political efficacy* variable. As a result, the total pooled sample size falls from 31,944 to 30,214, or by 5.4%. Similar to *Internal political efficacy*, Figure 13 illustrates that the number of invalid cases for the *External political efficacy* variable is highest again in Russia (10.3%), Japan (9.3%), and France (9.5%). However, it is lowest in the United States (1.4%), Hungary (1.5%), and Switzerland (2.3%). The country sample sizes range from 880 cases in Great Britain to 2,653 in Australia.

The descriptive statistics for the *External political efficacy* variable are presented in Table 10. This variable is an index of responses to two questions that attempt to




Figure 12. Invalid responses for internal political efficacy by country %

Table 9. Descriptive statistics: Internal political efficacy

Country	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max	N
Australia	6.94	1.47	2	10	2,640
Canada	6.77	1.64	2	10	877
Croatia	5.77	1.87	2	10	1,097
Czech Republic	5.85	1.69	2	10	1,135
Denmark	7.37	1.73	2	10	1,265
Finland	6.14	1.69	2	10	1,034
France	5.83	1.54	2	10	1,558
Germany	6.28	1.89	2	10	1,006
Great Britain	6.63	1.47	2	10	863
Hungary	5.75	1.76	2	10	964
Ireland	6.58	1.90	2	10	976
Japan	5.80	1.58	2	10	1,016
Latvia	5.17	1.51	2	10	929
Netherlands	6.76	1.49	2	10	924
Norway	6.81	1.41	2	10	1,237
Poland	5.63	1.60	2	10	1,213
Portugal	5.43	1.81	2	10	1,754
Russia	5.45	1.54	2	10	1,968
Slovenia	5.65	1.72	2	10	930
Spain	5.76	1.88	2	10	2,416
Sweden	6.59	1.49	2	10	1,029
Switzerland	6.31	1.76	2	10	961
United States	6.57	1.93	2	10	1,498
Total	6.16	1.78	2	10	29,290

measure the concept (see Chapter 3). Just as before with *Internal political efficacy*, the index values range from 2 to 10. The overall mean value for all respondents is 5.03, with a standard deviation of 1.98. The mean for the index varies somewhat across countries. The lowest index values are found in Croatia (4.00), Hungary (4.05), and Latvia (4.14). In contrast, countries with the highest index values include Japan (6.94), France (6.47), and Switzerland (6.03). Also, the standard deviations of the various country samples vary somewhat from 1.58 in Latvia to 2.13 in the United States.

Section 4.2.xii: Trust in civil servants

There are 1,973 invalid cases for the variable *Trust in civil servants* (see Appendix P). This missing data reduces the number of valid observations from 31,944 to 29,971, or by 6.1%. Figure 14 shows that the number of invalid cases is highest in Russia (11.1%), Latvia (10.0%), and Spain (9.2%). The number is lowest in the United States (1.6%), the Czech Republic (2.1%), and Ireland (2.8%). The country sample sizes range from 867 observations in Great Britain to 2,671 in Australia.

In total, 7,816 respondents indicate that they either “agree” or “strongly agree” that “most civil servants can be trusted to do what is best for the country.” This amounts to approximately 26.1% of the total number of respondents in the pooled sample. The distribution of the *Trust in civil servants* variable across the countries considered in the analysis is illustrated in Figure 15. Countries with the fewest trusting respondents include Russia (8.6%), Japan (10.6%), and Croatia (10.8%). Alternatively, countries with the highest number of people who indicate trust in civil servants include Ireland (56.7%), Denmark (56.5%), and Switzerland (52.9%). A quick glance at the ordering of




Figure 13. Invalid responses for external political efficacy by country, %

Table 10. Descriptive statistics: External political efficacy

Country	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max	N
Australia	5.12	1.83	2	10	2,653
Canada	5.27	1.90	2	10	887
Croatia	4.00	1.71	2	10	1,128
Czech Republic	4.20	1.66	2	10	1,173
Denmark	5.82	2.08	2	10	1,298
Finland	4.71	1.94	2	10	1,128
France	6.47	1.88	2	10	1,651
Germany	4.62	1.77	2	10	1,069
Great Britain	4.98	1.64	2	10	880
Hungary	4.05	1.77	2	10	995
Ireland	5.18	1.97	2	10	978
Japan	6.94	1.96	2	10	1,116
Latvia	4.14	1.58	2	10	1,000
Netherlands	4.97	1.75	2	10	950
Norway	5.36	1.83	2	10	1,297
Poland	4.27	1.76	2	10	1,246
Portugal	5.08	1.93	2	10	1,731
Russia	4.14	1.68	2	10	2,158
Slovenia	4.24	1.60	2	10	971
Spain	5.07	1.90	2	10	2,326
Sweden	5.04	1.78	2	10	1103
Switzerland	6.03	1.72	2	10	980
United States	5.58	2.13	2	10	1,496
Total	5.03	1.98	2	10	30,214




Figure 14. Invalid responses for trust in civil servants by country, %




Figure 15. Percentage distribution of trust in civil servants by country, %

states in Figure 15 seems to suggest that trust in civil servants tends to be higher in developed countries and lower among those that are transitioning democracies.

Section 4.2.xiii: Perception of governmental performance

There are 5,340 invalid responses for the *Perception of governmental performance* variable (see Appendix Q). This decreases the total sample size from 31,944 to 26,604, or by 16.7%. Figure 16 indicates that the number of invalid cases is highest in Croatia (32.3%), Sweden (26.0%), and Poland (22.1%). The amount of missing data is lowest in the United States (7.2%), the Czech Republic (7.9%), and Switzerland (10.1%). The country sample sizes range from 812 cases in Croatia to 2,468 in Australia once the missing data is omitted.

The descriptive statistics for the *Perception of governmental performance* variable are presented in Table 11. Remember that this particular variable is created from responses to a battery of questions that asks how successful government is with respect to six areas of public policy. Responses to these questions are used to generate factor scores with values ranging from -2.33 to 2.58. The overall mean for all cases is 3.67E-9, and the overall standard deviation is 0.89. Cross-nationally, the average factor score varies from one country to the next. The lowest country means are found in Croatia (-0.65), Portugal (-0.56), and Russia (-0.56). In contrast, countries with the highest mean factor scores include Switzerland (0.84), Denmark (0.50), and Finland (0.34). The standard deviations of the various country samples vary somewhat from 0.66 in Switzerland to 0.94 in Russia.




Figure 16. Invalid responses for perception of performance by country, %

Table 11. Descriptive statistics: Perception of performance

Country	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max	N
Australia	0.32	0.76	-2.33	2.58	2,468
Canada	0.26	0.71	-2.33	2.23	766
Croatia	-0.65	0.84	-2.33	1.70	812
Czech Republic	-0.04	0.82	-2.33	2.58	1,106
Denmark	0.50	0.81	-2.33	2.58	1,150
Finland	0.34	0.78	-2.33	2.40	963
France	0.07	0.80	-2.33	2.58	1,608
Germany	0.24	0.81	-2.33	2.58	942
Great Britain	0.03	0.90	-2.33	2.58	827
Hungary	-0.15	0.75	-2.33	2.58	849
Ireland	-0.11	0.88	-2.33	2.10	867
Japan	-0.31	0.81	-2.33	2.58	961
Latvia	-0.39	0.79	-2.33	2.58	854
Netherlands	0.09	0.69	-2.33	2.58	863
Norway	0.13	0.78	-2.33	2.58	1,101
Poland	-0.21	0.84	-2.33	2.58	1,007
Portugal	-0.56	0.84	-2.33	2.58	1,491
Russia	-0.56	0.94	-2.33	2.58	1,895
Slovenia	0.09	0.66	-2.33	2.18	858
Spain	0.20	0.81	-2.33	2.58	2,021
Sweden	-0.10	0.86	-2.33	2.58	884
Switzerland	0.84	0.66	-1.55	2.58	902
United States	-0.07	0.91	-2.33	2.58	1,409
Total	3.67E-10	0.89	-2.33	2.58	26,604

Section 4.2.xiv: Summary

The preceding descriptive analysis of the dependent and independent variables reveal a number of significant and interesting findings. With respect to public support for social welfare policies, indeed there is variance both within countries, as well between countries. Based on the factor scores generated to indicate social welfare policy support, it appears that more supportive views tend to be found in states in Eastern and Southern Europe. Lower levels of support seem to be more prevalent in countries located in North America, as well as in Western Europe. People living in Northern Europe appear to be located somewhere in between, generally speaking.

In terms of the independent correlates of social welfare policy support, the descriptive statistics presented in this section indicate that there is variation, at times substantial, across the 23 countries considered in this study. The prevalence of individuals holding leftist political party affiliations is highest in France at 54.3% and lowest in Japan at 2.8%. In contrast, the number of people belonging to a right political party varies from 46.9% in Hungary to 0.6% in Ireland. Overall, the average age of respondents in the ISSP surveys is 48.4 years with a standard deviation of 17.4 years.

On average, there are more female respondents than males across countries, although there are some key exceptions. Low educational attainment varies tremendously cross-nationally with a low of 12.1% in Denmark and a high of 82.5% in Portugal. The variable not working also fluctuates from 33.7% of respondents in Sweden to 58.4% in Croatia. The number of individuals who are employed by government also varies considerably from 4.6% in Hungary to 54.4% in Russia.

With respect to the socio-psychological correlates, there is also a great deal of variation. Respondents of Hungary, Croatia, and Poland are the most interpersonally trusting, while people living in Denmark, Switzerland, and Norway are the least. Respondents who indicate they have the most contact with others tend to be located in Ireland, Australia, and the Netherlands. Meanwhile, those with the least amount of contact with others seem to be concentrated in Hungary, Poland, and Latvia. Measures of internal political efficacy appear to be highest in Denmark, Australia, and Norway. Countries with the lowest levels include Latvia, Portugal, and Russia. With respect to external political efficacy, the greatest levels are witnessed in Japan, France, and Switzerland. Alternatively, the smallest amounts appear in Croatia, Hungary, and Latvia.

Overall, 26.1% of respondents in the ISSP surveys indicated that they “agree” or “strongly agree” that civil servants can be trusted to do what is best for their country. The percentage varies from 8.6% of respondents in Russia to 56.7% of those in Ireland. Finally, the factor scores generated to measure public perceptions of governmental performance indicate that government is viewed most successfully by people in Switzerland, Denmark, and Finland and least successful in Croatia, Portugal, and Russia. Overall, it appears that perceptions of governmental performance are strongest in developed democracies and weakest in transitioning states located in Eastern Europe.

Section 4.3: Individual-level regression models

In this section, OLS regression models for each of the 23 countries for which sample data is available will be examined in order to determine the predictors of public support for social welfare policies. The primary research question that this section addresses pertains to what attributes and attitudes at the individual-level correlate with

social welfare policy support. Not only am I concerned with assessing the extent to which social welfare policy support is determined by similar variables across different countries, but, more specifically, I am also interested in determining how people's attitudes toward the public sector compare with the more traditional correlates of social welfare policy support.

Tables 12-17 report distinct OLS regression models for each of the 23 countries considered in this dissertation. The dependent variable is a measure of public support for social welfare policies created by generating factor scores from a battery of questions in the ISSP's 2006 "Role of Government IV" module. The questions in this battery specifically concern the degree to which government has a responsibility to provide differing forms of social welfare policies. The models are estimated using the statistics package Stata 12. Model diagnostics indicate that heteroskedasticity is present in 15 out of 23 country models (see Appendix R). For this reason, and in order to be consistent, all 23 country-specific models are estimated using robust standard errors. The variance inflation factors were calculated for each correlate in the various country-specific models. Multicollinearity is only problematic for the *Left* and *Right political party affiliation* variables in the model for Hungary. This is likely due to the lack of a sizable reference category for that particular country sample and may account for the variable's lack of statistical significance.

In terms of the different models, the sample size for each country varies from 404 (Latvia) to 1,778 (Australia). In most cases, the sample size for each of the models has decreased as a result of missing data attributed to the *Left* and *Right political party affiliation* variables. The F statistic for all 23 models is statistically significant. This

suggests that each of the country-specific models, respectively, fit the data statistically better than a model with no predictors. With respect to explained variance, the R^2 values are provided for each of the models. Variation in the dependent variable is best explained in France (0.3213), Latvia (0.3040), and the United States (0.2840). In contrast, the lowest R^2 values are observed in Spain (0.0491), Ireland (0.0847), and Switzerland (0.0870).

Interestingly, the analyses reveal that there are considerable differences in the efficacy of the different variables based on the particular country that is examined. In terms of socio-demographic attributes, there is reason to believe that political attitudes condition opinions on social welfare policies. On the one hand, respondents who are affiliated with left-leaning political parties are more likely to be supportive of welfare policies in 13 out of 23 countries. On the other hand, respondents who identify with right-leaning political parties are more likely to be opposed to social welfare policies in 13 countries. However, it should be noted that in both Poland and Russia, being a member of a right-leaning political party is positively associated with support for welfare policies when compared to the centrist/nonpartisan reference group. Taken together, these results suggest that one's political party affiliation does matter a great deal in determining individual's support for welfare policies, consistent with the literature (e.g., Lipsmeyer and Nordstrom 2003; Zagórski 1999).

There is also some evidence to suggest that people take their own self-interest into account with respect to their support for social welfare policies, although the results are somewhat mixed. Age is statistically significant in 6 out of 23 countries and is signed in the expected positive direction, with the exception of the United States. Being female is

an influential predictor of support for social welfare policies in 12 countries. People who report having lower levels of education are more likely to support social welfare policies in 13 out of 23 countries. Likewise, being a member of the workforce is statistically significant in 11 countries. However, it appears that being a government employee is not as powerful a predictor of support for social welfare policies cross-nationally, being statistically significant in only 4 countries (the Czech Republic, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Poland).

Overall, these results suggest that those people who are more economically vulnerable, and thus more likely to benefit from welfare policies - older respondents, females, and people with low levels of education - are more likely to be supportive of welfare policies. The same is true for those who are not currently in the labor force, albeit in a smaller subset of countries. Similarly, government employees, who are dependent on the welfare state's mission for their continued employment, are also more likely to support social welfare policies in a handful of states.

In terms of the socio-psychological correlates, as hypothesized, respondents with higher levels of interpersonal trust are less likely to support welfare policies than those with lower levels. This relationship is observed in 13 out of 23 countries. The frequency of contact a person has with others on a daily basis has a negative relationship with support for social welfare policies in 8 countries (Australia, Denmark, Finland, Hungary, Ireland, Latvia, Portugal, and the United States). Taken together, these findings lend some support to the theory that people who maintain a strong social network do not see a pressing need for expansive government (Franzen and Hangartner 2006; Gërkhani and

Koster 2012; Voicu and Voicu 2011). Rather, they are more likely to rely on each other in times of crisis (Coleman 1990; Welch et al. 2005).

It was hypothesized that people who feel more politically empowered are less likely to be supportive of social welfare policies than those who are not. Both those respondents who are confident in their knowledge about government and politics (i.e., internal political efficacy), as well as those who believe that they can influence the political system (i.e., external political efficacy) express lower levels of support for social welfare policies than those who do not. People with higher levels of political efficacy may not see the need for welfare state policies because they are satisfied with the status quo. However, it should be noted that the influence of these two variables is somewhat weak. Internal political efficacy is significant in only seven countries (Germany, Hungary, Latvia, Poland, Spain, Switzerland and the United States). External political efficacy is significant in eight countries, (Croatia, Germany, Hungary, Japan, Poland, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United States). However, it bears mentioning that in Japan the effect is positive.

The analysis reveals that respondents' attitudes toward government do in fact influence their public policy preferences. People who are trusting of civil servants are more likely to support welfare policies than those who are not as trusting. A positive relationship is found in 11 countries (Australia, Canada, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Sweden, and the United States). This finding is consistent with Gabriel and Trüdinger's (2011) assertion that trusting citizens perceive political actors to be honest and fair, and are, as a result, are more likely to approve of government policies.

In stark contrast, respondents who perceive government to be performing well are less likely to be supportive of social welfare policies than those who see it as performing poorly. In 14 out of 23 countries, a negative relationship exists. Overall, it appears that public sector performance may have a “crowding out” effect, similar to the relationship between political efficacy, as well as interpersonal trust and contact with others, and support for social welfare policies. Respondents who see government as performing well are less likely to perceive a need for social welfare policies, and thus are less likely to believe that providing aid to society’s most vulnerable is a responsibility of government, consistent with the implications of “overload theory” (Crozier et al. 1975; Kaase and Newton 1995; Kumlin 2007).

In sum, public attitudes toward social welfare policies vary both within countries and between countries. The OLS models indicate that explanations for public support for social welfare policies are often context-dependent. A cursory glance of the estimates show that certain variables tend to be more influential in some countries and less useful in others. The results also demonstrate that variation in social welfare policy preferences is not only a function of people’s personal attributes, personality traits, and political attitudes – as indicated by the literature, but also of their views towards governmental actors and the quality of the work they perform in the public sector. These results lend support to the hypotheses that people’s opinions concerning social welfare policies are influenced by both trust in the civil service and perceptions of public sector performance.

Table 12. OLS regression models: Social welfare policy support (Australia, Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic)

	Australia	Canada	Croatia	Czech Republic
<i>Socio-demographic correlates:</i>				
Left political party	0.2280*** (0.05)	0.2963*** (0.11)	0.0137 (0.11)	0.2646*** (0.09)
Right political party	-0.3700*** (0.05)	-0.2532*** (0.09)	-0.0291 (0.08)	-0.4490*** (0.08)
Age	0.0019 (0.00)	0.0023 (0.00)	0.0009 (0.00)	-0.0016 (0.00)
Female	0.1709*** (0.04)	0.1489* (0.08)	-0.0203 (0.07)	0.0119 (0.07)
Low education	0.0797 (0.05)	0.4026*** (0.12)	0.1197 (0.08)	0.1357* (0.07)
Not employed	0.1431*** (0.04)	0.0619 (0.11)	0.2156*** (0.09)	0.3614*** (0.09)
Government employment	0.0715 (0.05)	-0.0639 (0.09)	-0.0422 (0.13)	0.2549** (0.13)
<i>Socio-psychological correlates:</i>				
Interpersonal trust	-0.0231** (0.01)	-0.0334 (0.02)	-0.0369 (0.03)	-0.0753*** (0.02)
Contact with others	-0.0635*** (0.02)	-0.0534 (0.04)	-0.0027 (0.04)	-0.0274 (0.04)
Internal political efficacy	-0.0102 (0.01)	-0.0079 (0.03)	0.0179 (0.02)	-0.0318 (0.02)
External political efficacy	-0.0056 (0.01)	-0.0234 (0.02)	-0.0824*** (0.02)	0.0161 (0.02)
<i>Attitudes toward government</i>				
Trust in civil servants	0.0928** (0.04)	0.2830*** (0.09)	0.2036** (0.10)	0.3562*** (0.10)
Perception of performance	-0.1162*** (0.03)	-0.0579 (0.06)	-0.1027** (0.05)	-0.1340*** (0.04)
Constant	-0.1295 (0.13)	-0.1681 (0.28)	0.5717** (0.23)	-0.0430 (0.26)
<i>N</i>	1,778	492	407	656
<i>F</i>	30.08***	5.46***	4.48***	15.12***
<i>R</i> ²	0.1733	0.1213	0.1247	0.2344

* $p \leq 0.10$; ** $p \leq 0.05$; *** $p \leq 0.01$ (Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.)

Table 13. OLS regression models: Social welfare policy support (Denmark, Finland, France, Germany)

	Denmark	Finland	France	Germany
<i>Socio-demographic correlates:</i>				
Left political party	0.4747*** (0.08)	0.1814** (0.08)	0.7034*** (0.09)	0.3480*** (0.10)
Right political party	-0.2485*** (0.08)	-0.4424*** (0.09)	-0.0523 (0.10)	-0.0031 (0.10)
Age	0.0023 (0.00)	0.0012 (0.00)	0.0058** (0.00)	-0.0016 (0.00)
Female	0.0892 (0.06)	0.2490*** (0.07)	0.2716*** (0.06)	0.0194 (0.08)
Low education	0.0559 (0.12)	0.2134*** (0.08)	0.2723*** (0.06)	0.0513 (0.09)
Not employed	-0.0038 (0.06)	0.1836** (0.08)	0.1313* (0.08)	0.1991* (0.10)
Government employment	0.1851*** (0.06)	0.0984 (0.08)	0.0740 (0.06)	-0.0840 (0.11)
<i>Socio-psychological correlates:</i>				
Interpersonal trust	-0.0042 (0.01)	-0.0033 (0.02)	-0.0270* (0.01)	-0.0598*** (0.02)
Contact with others	-0.0561** (0.03)	-0.0901*** (0.03)	0.0182 (0.03)	0.0264 (0.04)
Internal political efficacy	0.0046 (0.02)	0.0079 (0.02)	-0.0168 (0.02)	-0.0886*** (0.02)
External political efficacy	-0.0021 (0.01)	-0.0305 (0.02)	0.0186 (0.01)	-0.0426* (0.02)
<i>Attitudes toward government</i>				
Trust in civil servants	0.1898*** (0.06)	0.0570 (0.08)	0.0894 (0.07)	0.2798*** (0.09)
Perception of performance	-0.0498 (0.04)	-0.1324*** (0.05)	-0.1900*** (0.04)	-0.0894 (0.05)
Constant	-0.3508* (0.20)	-0.0467 (0.24)	-1.0433*** (0.25)	0.2391 (0.29)
<i>N</i>	749	505	804	526
<i>F</i>	20.89***	12.74***	32.33***	6.30***
<i>R</i> ²	0.2432	0.2477	0.3213	0.1379

* $p \leq 0.10$; ** $p \leq 0.05$; *** $p \leq 0.01$ (Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.)

Table 14. OLS regression models: Social Welfare Policy Support (Great Britain, Hungary, Ireland, Japan)

	Great Britain	Hungary	Ireland	Japan
<i>Socio-demographic correlates:</i>				
Left political party	0.0425 (0.08)	0.2774 (0.22)	0.0832 (0.09)	0.2568 (0.25)
Right political party	-0.3160*** (0.09)	0.3017 (0.23)	-0.1778 (0.27)	-0.2632** (0.12)
Age	0.0047* (0.00)	-0.0010 (0.00)	0.0015 (0.00)	0.0059 (0.00)
Female	0.1944*** (0.07)	0.1291** (0.06)	0.0929* (0.05)	0.0766 (0.10)
Low education	0.1347* (0.07)	0.1502** (0.07)	0.1511** (0.06)	0.1524 (0.17)
Not employed	0.2254*** (0.08)	0.1988** (0.08)	0.0189 (0.06)	-0.0190 (0.19)
Government employment	-0.0139 (0.07)	-0.0646 (0.14)	0.0893 (0.06)	0.1521 (0.15)
<i>Socio-psychological correlates:</i>				
Interpersonal trust	-0.0223 (0.02)	-0.0669*** (0.02)	-0.0153 (0.01)	-0.0081 (0.02)
Contact with others	0.0057 (0.03)	-0.0623** (0.02)	-0.0424* (0.03)	0.0147 (0.05)
Internal political efficacy	0.0045 (0.03)	-0.0599*** (0.02)	-0.0107 (0.01)	-0.0460 (0.03)
External political efficacy	-0.0027 (0.02)	-0.0346** (0.02)	-0.0098 (0.01)	0.0539** (0.03)
<i>Attitudes toward government</i>				
Trust in civil servants	-0.0133 (0.08)	0.0515 (0.08)	-0.0033 (0.05)	-0.0465 (0.16)
Perception of performance	0.0175 (0.04)	-0.1515*** (0.04)	-0.1219*** (0.03)	-0.2979*** (0.08)
Constant	-0.5610** (0.24)	0.4528 (0.28)	0.4441** (0.18)	-1.2627*** (0.32)
<i>N</i>	584	478	683	440
<i>F</i>	4.59***	9.25***	4.89***	4.00***
<i>R</i> ²	0.1061	0.1969	0.0847	0.1087

* $p \leq 0.10$; ** $p \leq 0.05$; *** $p \leq 0.01$ (Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.)

Table 15. OLS regression models: Social welfare policy support (Latvia, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland)

	Latvia	The Netherlands	Norway	Poland
<i>Socio-demographic correlates:</i>				
Left political party	0.0500 (0.11)	0.3190*** (0.07)	0.2537*** (0.08)	0.0217 (0.10)
Right political party	-0.1009 (0.13)	-0.3053*** (0.08)	-0.1161 (0.07)	0.1659* (0.09)
Age	0.0053 (0.00)	0.0067** (0.00)	0.0061*** (0.00)	0.0001 (0.00)
Female	0.0881 (0.08)	0.1425** (0.07)	0.1699*** (0.06)	0.0132 (0.08)
Low education	0.1366 (0.12)	0.3123*** (0.07)	0.2499*** (0.07)	0.2134** (0.08)
Not employed	0.0348 (0.10)	0.1763* (0.09)	0.1692*** (0.06)	0.1260 (0.10)
Government employment	-0.0550 (0.11)	0.2358*** (0.08)	0.0749 (0.05)	0.1836* (0.10)
<i>Socio-psychological correlates:</i>				
Interpersonal trust	-0.1084*** (0.02)	-0.0426** (0.03)	-0.0039 (0.02)	-0.0645* (0.03)
Contact with others	-0.1206*** (0.04)	-0.0450 (0.03)	-0.0230 (0.03)	-0.0117 (0.04)
Internal political efficacy	-0.1193*** (0.03)	0.0036 (0.02)	-0.0278 (0.02)	-0.0916*** (0.03)
External political efficacy	-0.0295 (0.03)	0.0205 (0.02)	-0.0278 (0.02)	-0.0524** (0.02)
<i>Attitudes toward government</i>				
Trust in civil servants	-0.0339 (0.09)	0.1371* (0.07)	0.1046* (0.06)	0.2394** (0.10)
Perception of performance	-0.2733*** (0.04)	-0.0898* (0.05)	-0.0132 (0.04)	-0.1238*** (0.05)
Constant	1.0267*** (0.26)	-0.7231*** (0.24)	-0.1440 (0.23)	0.9093*** (0.32)
<i>N</i>	404	602	733	482
<i>F</i>	13.08***	19.09***	7.31***	6.08***
<i>R</i> ²	0.3040	0.2741	0.1381	0.1308

* $p \leq 0.10$; ** $p \leq 0.05$; *** $p \leq 0.01$ (Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.)

Table 16. OLS regression models: Social welfare policy support (Portugal, Russia, Slovenia, Spain)

	Portugal	Russia	Slovenia	Spain
<i>Socio-demographic correlates:</i>				
Left political party	0.0381 (0.05)	0.2281*** (0.07)	-0.0029 (0.08)	0.0591 (0.04)
Right political party	0.0228 (0.22)	0.1554* (0.08)	0.0609 (0.09)	-0.2491*** (0.08)
Age	0.0033** (0.00)	-0.0003 (0.00)	0.0025 (0.00)	0.0026 (0.00)
Female	-0.0075 (0.04)	0.0582 (0.05)	0.0842 (0.06)	0.1149*** (0.04)
Low education	-0.0250 (0.06)	0.0841 (0.07)	0.2552*** (0.07)	0.0674 (0.05)
Not employed	0.0147 (0.06)	0.1012 (0.07)	0.1571* (0.09)	0.0392 (0.06)
Government employment	-0.0273 (0.06)	0.0341 (0.05)	0.0408 (0.10)	-0.0110 (0.07)
<i>Socio-psychological correlates:</i>				
Interpersonal trust	-0.0018 (0.01)	-0.0469*** (0.02)	-0.0546** (0.02)	-0.0402*** (0.01)
Contact with others	0.0572*** (0.02)	-0.0045 (0.03)	-0.0365 (0.03)	0.0166 (0.02)
Internal political efficacy	-0.0223 (0.01)	0.0143 (0.02)	-0.0345 (0.02)	-0.0244** (0.01)
External political efficacy	-0.0169 (0.01)	0.0043 (0.02)	-0.0093 (0.02)	0.0026 (0.01)
<i>Attitudes toward government</i>				
Trust in civil servants	0.0752 (0.05)	0.0651 (0.11)	0.0865 (0.08)	0.0153 (0.05)
Perception of performance	-0.2278*** (0.03)	-0.2283*** (0.03)	-0.0630 (0.05)	-0.0018 (0.03)
Constant	0.2568 (0.16)	0.1333 (0.17)	0.5367** (0.22)	0.5033*** (0.14)
<i>N</i>	987	802	470	1,155
<i>F</i>	9.65***	6.19***	5.75***	4.76***
<i>R</i> ²	0.1019	0.1072	0.1476	0.0491

* $p \leq 0.10$; ** $p \leq 0.05$; *** $p \leq 0.01$ (Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.)

Table 17. OLS regression models: Social welfare policy support (Sweden, Switzerland, United States)

	Sweden	Switzerland	United States
<i>Socio-demographic correlates:</i>			
Left political party	0.1723** (0.08)	0.2038*** (0.07)	0.3072*** (0.06)
Right political party	-0.5554*** (0.10)	-0.1457** (0.07)	-0.4019*** (0.07)
Age	0.0034 (0.00)	-0.0034 (0.00)	-0.0144*** (0.00)
Female	0.0698 (0.08)	0.1155** (0.06)	0.2188*** (0.05)
Low education	0.2275*** (0.08)	-0.0085 (0.06)	0.5082*** (0.08)
Not employed	0.2452** (0.10)	0.0741 (0.08)	0.1810*** (0.07)
Government employment	0.1076 (0.08)	0.1027 (0.06)	0.0669 (0.07)
<i>Socio-psychological correlates:</i>			
Interpersonal trust	-0.0271 (0.02)	-0.0308** (0.01)	-0.0643*** (0.01)
Contact with others	0.0103 (0.04)	-0.0109 (0.03)	-0.0558** (0.02)
Internal political efficacy	-0.0274 (0.03)	-0.0410** (0.02)	-0.0680*** (0.01)
External political efficacy	-0.0427* (0.02)	-0.0432*** (0.02)	-0.0308** (0.01)
<i>Attitudes toward government</i>			
Trust in civil servants	0.1684* (0.10)	-0.0015 (0.06)	0.0997* (0.06)
Perception of performance	-0.0354 (0.05)	-0.0402 (0.05)	-0.2278*** (0.03)
Constant	-0.1489 (0.28)	0.1358 (0.19)	1.0139*** (0.15)
<i>N</i>	582	704	1,232
<i>F</i>	10.60***	5.43***	39.29***
<i>R</i> ²	0.2050	0.0870	0.2840

* $p \leq 0.10$; ** $p \leq 0.05$; *** $p \leq 0.01$ (Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.)

Section 4.4: Summary

This chapter has examined the phenomenon of public support for social welfare policies via both a descriptive analysis, as well as through the estimation of a series of country-specific regression models. The investigation reveals that the dependent variable varies considerably among respondents both within countries and between countries. People residing in Portugal, Spain, Croatia, and Russia are, on average, the most supportive of social welfare policies. Alternatively, individuals in Japan, Switzerland, the Czech Republic, and the United States are the least supportive. The data suggests that people living in states in Southern and Eastern Europe are likely to harbor greater levels of support, while those in Western Europe and North America are comparatively less likely to hold supportive attitudes. Individuals who live in Northern Europe, on average, have a tendency to be placed somewhere between these two extremes.

The regression analyses conducted in this chapter at the individual-level indicate that support for social welfare policies is a reflection of peoples' socio-demographic attributes, socio-psychological attitudes, and views toward the public sector. However, these results are not necessarily uniform across all countries, as certain variables are more or less influential given the national context. These findings generally confirm that both political ideology and self-interest considerably influence social welfare policy attitudes. Still, the analysis also suggests that levels of interpersonal trust, the frequency of contact with others, and both internal, as well as external, political efficacy play important roles as well. Notably, both trust in civil servants and perceptions of governmental performance also influence public support for social welfare policies, lending credence to

the key thesis of this dissertation that public attitudes toward the public sector are noticeably influential in explaining the phenomena.

Several implications can be drawn from this examination. First, the existing literature on the topic of individual's social welfare policy attitudes is largely confirmed. Second, national context does appear to matter in explaining social welfare policy preferences, as the explanatory power of the variables differs from one country to the next when considered cross-nationally. Finally, people's views toward the public sector do appear to shape how they come to assess government's level of responsibility in solving societal problems.

CHAPTER V

EXPLAINING PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR SOCIAL WELFARE POLICIES: COUNTRY-LEVEL CORRELATES AND MULTILEVEL MODELS

Whereas the previous chapter explored the individual-level correlates of support for social welfare policies, this chapter examines possible influences at the country-level. Particularly, this chapter considers the research question: Does national context account for variation across countries in terms of the level of support? In addition, the question of whether the public sector plays a role in determining social welfare policy support will also be investigated. In order to answer these questions, this chapter unfolds via a sequence of incremental steps. First, a descriptive analysis of the country-level variables included in this analysis will be given. Next, scatter plots will be provided which will help to illustrate the relationship between these correlates and the mean factor score for the dependent variable in the 23 country samples examined in this dissertation. Finally, a series of multilevel regression models will be estimated and inspected in order to assess how useful country-level predictors are in explaining support for social welfare policies in addition to variables at the individual-level.

Section 5.1: Descriptive analysis of the country-level variables

In this section, each of the country-level variables is examined via the presentation of descriptive statistics. Overall, this segment attempts to provide a better understanding of how the correlates considered vary across the countries included in the analysis. First, the classification of countries with respect to their welfare regime type will be given. Then, the economic conditions and levels of inequality for the range of countries included will be assessed. Finally, variations in the quality of government

institutions will be considered cross-nationally. In order to accomplish this, the mean, the standard deviation, as well as the minimum and maximum values for each correlate is provided. Additionally, the distribution of the country-level variables will be illustrated where appropriate.

For this dissertation, the characteristics of 23 countries in Europe, North America, Eastern Asia, and Oceania are examined (see Appendix B for a comprehensive list of countries). Table 18 gives the descriptive statistics for the country-level variables used in this analysis.

Table 18. Descriptive statistics: Country-level variables

Country-level variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max	N
Scandinavian regime	0.13	0.34	0	1	23
Continental regime	0.26	0.45	0	1	23
English-speaking regime	0.30	0.47	0	1	23
Post-communist regime	0.30	0.47	0	1	23
GDP per capita (PPP), thousand USD	32.78	10.69	16.65	54.69	23
Unemployment, %	6.35	2.18	3.40	11.10	23
Inflation, %	4.00	4.60	-1.12	20.13	23
Gini index	29.94	4.65	23.07	40.80	23
Government effectiveness	1.36	0.66	-0.38	2.24	23

Section 5.1.i: Welfare regime type

The first four country-level variables reflect the welfare regime typology into which the different countries in this study are classified. Recall from Chapter 2 that cross-national support for social welfare policies may be the result of differences in the institutional characteristics of social welfare institutions (Jakobsen 2011; Larsen 2008;

Svallfors 1997). It has been hypothesized that these institutions transform the political system, and thus may influence public opinion (Jordan 2010; Mettler and Soss 2004). The classification scheme used in this dissertation follows that which is suggested by Castles and Obinger (2008) (see chapter 3 for more information). Table 19 reflects this coding. In the multilevel models presented later in this chapter, these welfare regimes are included as dichotomous variables.

Section 5.1.ii: Economic conditions

The second set of country-level correlates – *GDP per capita (PPP)*, *Unemployment*, and *Inflation* – indicate the economic conditions present in the various countries for the year in which the ISSP survey was conducted. The first, *GDP per capita*, is a measure of a country's economic wealth. Figure 17 presents the relative levels of GDP per capita measured in thousands of U.S. dollars, ranging from lowest to highest, for the countries included. *GDP per capita* varies substantially from a low of \$16.6 thousand in Russia to \$54.7 thousand in Norway. Overall, the average GDP per capita amount is \$32.8 thousand, and the standard deviation is \$10.7 thousand. A cursory glance at Figure 17 reveals that, as expected, developing nations concentrated in Eastern and Southern Europe tend to be overrepresented in the top half of the chart, while developed democracies in Northern and Western Europe tend to be located in the bottom.

The second measure, *Unemployment*, refers to the portion of the labor force that is without work but is available for and seeking employment (World Bank 2016). The respective unemployment rates are illustrated in Figure 18. Levels of unemployment vary from a low of 3.4% in Norway to a high of 11.1% in Croatia. The unemployment rate is below 4.0% in four countries: Norway, Denmark, Switzerland, and the

Table 19. Welfare regime typology by country

Regime Classification	Country
Scandinavian	Denmark
	Norway
	Sweden
Continental	Finland
	France
	Germany
	Netherlands
	Portugal
	Spain
English-speaking	Australia
	Canada
	Great Britain
	Ireland
	Japan
	Switzerland
	United States
Post-communist	Croatia
	Czech Republic
	Hungary
	Latvia
	Poland
	Russia
	Slovenia




Figure 17. GDP per capita (PPP) by country, thousand USD




Figure 18. Unemployment rate by country, %

Netherlands. In contrast, it exceeds 8.0% in four also: Croatia, Germany, France, and Spain. Overall, the average unemployment rate for the selection of countries is 6.4%, and the standard deviation is 2.2%. The distribution is slightly negatively skewed.

The final indicator of prevailing economic conditions is the level of *Inflation*. The inflation rates provided here reflect price changes in the economy, and it is measured by the annual growth rate (or decline) of the GDP implicit deflator (World Bank 2016). Figure 19 illustrates the inflation rates across the range of countries included in the analysis, ordered from lowest to highest. It is interesting that in 2006, Japan actually experienced a negative inflation rate of 1.1%, indicating deflation in its economy. The highest inflation rate is observed in Latvia at 20.1%. Overall, five countries report inflation rates under 2.0%: Japan, Germany, the Czech Republic, Finland, and Sweden. Alternatively, five countries also have inflation rates exceeding 4.0%: Latvia, Russia, Norway, and Australia. The average inflation rate is 4.0%, and the standard deviation is 4.6%. The presence of such large inflation rates in Latvia (20.1%), Russia (13.8%), and Norway (8.8%) negatively skews the distribution.

Section 5.1.iii: Inequality

The third category of country-level correlates is the level of income inequality present in a given country. The *GINI index*, as measured by Solt (2014), quantifies the extent to which the distribution of income among individuals or households within a country's economy deviates from a perfectly equal distribution. Theoretically, the value can range from 0 (perfect equality) to 100 (perfect inequality). For the country samples, the *GINI index* ranges from a low of 23.1 in Slovenia to a high of 40.8 in Russia. Figure 20 presents the *GINI index* for each country. Four countries have *GINI index* values




Figure 19. Inflation rate by country, %




Figure 20. GINI index by country

under 25.0: Slovenia, Sweden, Denmark, and Norway. In contrast, five countries have values that exceed 35.0: Russia, the United States, Latvia, Great Britain, and Portugal. Overall, the average index value is 29.9, and the standard deviation is 4.7.

Section 5.1.iv: Quality of government institutions

The final classification of country-level correlates signals the quality of government institutions. The *Government Effectiveness Indicator* calculated by the World Bank combines several measures into a single figure that reflects the quality of public service provision, the quality of the bureaucracy, the competence of civil servants, the independence of the civil service from political pressures, and the credibility of the government's commitment to policies (Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2010; World Bank 2015c). Theoretically, the *Government Effectiveness Indicator* ranges from a value of -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong). However, in this analysis it ranges from a low of -0.38 in Russia to a high of 2.24 in Denmark. Higher scores are indicative of better quality government institutions.

Figure 21 outlines the distribution of the *Government Effectiveness Indicator* across countries. Only one country has a negative value – Russia (-0.38). Three countries have values less than 0.50, including: Russia, Poland, and Latvia. Alternatively, three countries have values exceeding 2.00, such as: Denmark, Finland, and Switzerland. Overall, the average *Government Effectiveness Indicator* score is 1.36, and it has a standard deviation of 0.66. This suggests that the distribution is somewhat positively skewed. A cursory examination of Figure 21 reveals that Eastern and Southern European countries tend to be characterized by having lower quality public institutions.




Figure 21. Government effectiveness indicator by country

Alternatively, developed countries in Northern and Western European countries appear to retain higher indicator values.

Section 5.2: Cross-country differences in the level of support for social welfare policies – scatter plots

The primary research question with which this chapter is tasked with answering is explaining what conditions present at the country-level influence levels of public support for social welfare policies. In order to make progress towards this end, this section offers a series of scatter plots which clarify the relationships that exist between the country-level correlates previously described and the mean factor score of the dependent variable for each country, respectively. This analysis is undertaken mainly for illustration purposes, and it serves as a necessary first step before moving on to the multilevel models which are estimated and analyzed later in this chapter. A trend line has been superimposed onto each scatter plot to help facilitate the interpretation of possible relationships that may exist. In this section, the strength and direction of relationships made apparent from the figures is discussed in accordance with the hypotheses offered in previous chapters.

Section 5.2.i: Welfare regime type

At the country-level, the extant literature on public support for social welfare policies indicates that the level of support is often dependent upon a country's classification into different welfare regime typologies (Arts and Gelissen 2001; Jakobsen 2011; Larsen 2008; Svallfors 1997). In this dissertation, four different types of welfare regimes are considered: (1) the *Scandinavian*, (2) the *Continental*, (3) the *English-speaking*, and the (4) *Post-communist* regime. Figures 22-25 illustrate how these

groupings of countries compare to the overall sample of countries when contrasted with respect to the mean factor score for the dependent variable.

More specifically, Figure 22 shows how countries classified as being in the *Scandinavian* welfare regime compare to the remainder of countries considered in the analysis. The *Scandinavian* regime type only comprises three countries: Denmark, Norway, and Sweden. Theory suggests that people living within countries characterized by *Scandinavian* regimes are distinguished by a willingness to maintain a comprehensive system for social protection, provide generous benefits, and require high levels of taxation (Deeming and Hayes 2012). In short, people within these countries should be among the most supportive of social welfare policies.

Consistent with this hypothesis, it does appear that the three countries that comprise the *Scandinavian* regime type are, collectively, more supportive than other countries in the sample. The average factor score for the three countries is -0.0381, whereas the overall mean for all countries is -0.0494. However, it does bear mentioning that the factor scores for both Denmark (-0.0945) and Sweden (-0.1931) are below the average mean factor score for all countries. Thus, there is some reasonable cause for skepticism that respondents of *Scandinavian* regimes are more supportive of social welfare policies than others – at least using comparative country means as the indicator.

The country mean factor scores for the dependent variable for those countries included in the *Continental* regime type are presented in Figure 23. Conceptually, individuals residing in *Continental* regimes should be less supportive than those in *Scandinavian* regimes, but more so than those in *English-speaking* regimes. These types of welfare regimes tend to focus on equity rather than redistribution (Arts and Gelissen




Figure 22. Social welfare policy support and Scandinavian welfare regime type




Figure 23. Social welfare policy support and continental welfare regime type

2001), but they also tend to be more generous with respect to the decommodification of social welfare services than *English-speaking* regimes. Accordingly, their levels of support should be somewhere towards the middle of the overall distribution. A cursory glance at Figure 23 reveals this to be somewhat true. The six countries that comprise the *Continental* regime type tend to be placed toward the middle of the distribution with respect to the indicator of social welfare policy support used here. Overall, the average of country mean factor scores for the *Continental* regimes is 0.0482, which is greater than the overall mean for all countries of -0.0494. However, it is also more than the average of the *Scandinavian* regime of 0.0467, which is inconsistent with the literature.

Figure 24 shows how countries classified as being in the *English-speaking* welfare regime compare to the remainder of countries considered in the analysis. In these types of regimes, the state plays only a minor role with respect to social policy. Rather, the governments in these countries often look to the market for solutions to public policy problems (Jaeger 2006). It is hypothesized that support for social welfare policies will be lower in countries that comprise the *English-speaking* regime type than in either the *Scandinavian* or *Continental* typologies.

Figure 24 reveals that there is a large range of country mean factor scores for the seven countries in the *English-speaking* regime type, varying from a low of -0.7841 in Japan to a high of 0.3576 in Ireland. Overall, the average country mean factor score for the subset of countries is -0.3350, which is quite a bit lower than the overall average country mean factor score of -0.0494 for all countries. Likewise, and consistent with the hypotheses offered, the average country mean factor score for countries included in the




Figure 24. Social welfare policy support and English-speaking welfare regime type

English-speaking regime is noticeably lower than for either the *Scandinavian* (-0.0381) or *Continental* (0.0482) regimes.

The final classification of the welfare regimes is the *Post-communist* typology. It is commonly understood that people living in post-communist countries maintain higher levels of support for social welfare policies in comparison to capitalistic countries in Western Europe (Breznau 2010). This is most likely the result of the residual effects of a legacy of communism. That being said, to date, no known study has empirically tested the explanatory usefulness of a *Post-communist* welfare regime type with respect to analyzing public support for social welfare policies. However, according to Castles and Obinger (2008), evidence does suggest that a *Post-communist* regime type may exist, as social welfare policies in post-communist states differs from those in other, more traditional, welfare regimes.

In order to make this determination, I include a *Post-communist* regime type alongside the previous typologies. Figure 25 reveals that there is quite a bit of variation in the country mean factor scores for the seven countries that comprise the *Post-communist* regime type. The values vary from a low of -0.4523 in the Czech Republic to a high of 0.4451 in Croatia. Overall, the average country mean factor score for the *Post-communist* countries is 0.1477, which is higher than the average country mean factor score of -0.0494 for all countries. The average country mean factor score for the countries that make up the *Post-communist* regime is noticeably higher than those in the *Scandinavian* regime (-0.0381), higher than those in the *Continental* regime (0.0482), and much higher than those in the *English-speaking* regime (-0.3353). For comparison




Figure 25. Social welfare policy support and post-communist welfare regime type

purposes, Figure 26 illustrates the country mean factor scores across all four welfare regime typologies.

The averages indicated above suggest the possible existence of a rank-ordering among the different welfare regimes. However, there are some inconsistencies with the literature. While it is true that people who reside in *Scandinavian* regimes appear to harbor more supportive views toward social welfare policies in comparison to the overall average country mean, they also appear to be less supportive than people in *Continental* regimes. Overall, the scatter plots suggest that the residents of *Post-communist* regimes are the most supportive of all welfare regime typologies, surpassing every other category. People living in *English-speaking* regimes are the least. Generally speaking, the previous series of scatter plots leave the hypothesis that welfare regime types play a role in explaining support for social welfare policies open to question.

Section 5.2.ii: Economic conditions

Economic conditions are also thought to affect social welfare policy support. Three correlates are considered in this chapter: *GDP per capita (PPP)* in thousands of U.S. dollars, the *Unemployment rate (%)*, and the *Inflation rate (%)* of the countries included in the study. Figures 27-31 illuminate the relationships that exist between these variables and the country mean factors scores used to signify support for social welfare policies. Figure 27 illustrates how *GDP per capita* and support for social welfare policies co-vary across the various countries. The Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient, also known as Pearson's r , for the two variables is -0.38, indicating a moderate negative relationship between *GDP per capita* and social welfare policy support. Generally speaking, countries with higher levels of economic wealth tend to be




Figure 26. Social welfare policy support and welfare regime type




Figure 27. Social welfare policy support and GDP per capita (PPP) (thousand USD)

less supportive of social welfare policies, on average. Conversely, countries with lower levels of wealth tend to be more supportive – using country mean factor scores of support for social welfare policies as an indicator.

This may lend some evidence to the argument that poorer economic conditions engender more supportive attitudes toward social welfare policies in response to the needs of society's most vulnerable. However, the scatter plot does reveal the appearance of some outliers which may contravene this argument. For instance, the Czech Republic is characterized by both relatively low levels of economic wealth and also a low country mean factor score for social welfare policy support. Accordingly, it is difficult to definitively say if the hypothesized relationship is present or not.

The second measure of prevailing economic conditions is the *Unemployment rate* of the country. Figure 28 reveals the relationship between the unemployment rate and support for social welfare policies. Here, Pearson's r is equal to 0.36. This indicates a moderate positive relationship. Greater levels of unemployment seem to be correlated with more support for social welfare policies, consistent with arguments made by other scholars (Blekesaune 2007; Blekesaune and Quadagno 2003). While the relationship is not incredibly strong, the correlation is signed in the hypothesized direction. Thus, the variable may still yet influence levels of support for social welfare policies.

The third and final correlate which reflects economic conditions is the *Inflation rate* for each country. Figure 29 illustrates the relationship between the inflation rate and support for social welfare policies. For this association, the Pearson's r is equal to 0.31, which is indicative of a moderate positive relationship. This suggests that greater levels of national inflation result in more support for social welfare policies. This finding is




Figure 28. Social welfare policy support and unemployment (%)




Figure 29. Social welfare policy support and inflation (%)

consistent with hypotheses that comparatively worse economic conditions prompt greater levels of public support for social welfare policies.

That being said, it is important to point out that the case of Latvia may be distorting the correlation coefficient. In this data, Latvia's extraordinarily high inflation rate of 19.0% recorded in 2007 may be an outlier. In fact, if Latvia is removed from the sample, Pearson's r jumps to 0.49, which is a much stronger relationship. For this reason, it is difficult to determine the exact relationship between the inflation rate and support for social welfare policies using scatter plots and correlation coefficients alone.

Section 5.2.iii: Inequality

Levels of income inequality present within a country are also thought to be a potential correlate of social welfare policy support. Figure 30 shows how levels of inequality, measured by the *GINI index*, and support for social welfare policies co-vary across the countries in the study. Pearson's r for the two variables is 0.07, indicating a very weak positive relationship between the *GINI index* and social welfare policy support. Generally speaking, countries with higher levels of income inequality tend to be more supportive of social welfare policies. Alternatively, countries with lower levels of income inequality tend to be less supportive, on average.

Recall from Chapter 2, that there have been mixed findings with respect to the influence of inequality on public support for social welfare policies (see Chapter 2). Whereas some researchers find a positive effect (e.g., Dallinger 2010; Koster and Kaminska 2012; Meltzer and Richard 1981), others note a negative one (e.g., Rehm, Hacker, and Schlesinger 2012). Still yet, others contend that the end result of conflicting




Figure 30. Social welfare policy support and inequality

mechanisms may lead to no apparent effect at all (Voicu and Voicu 2011). The results presented here in this particular section do little to diminish this ambiguity.

Section 5.2.iv: Quality of government institutions

The final correlate of public support for social welfare policies considered in this study is the quality of government institutions. In this dissertation, I have argued that the existence of well-functioning governments distinguished by high quality institutions is likely to reduce support for social welfare policies. Figure 31 shows how levels of institutional quality, measured by the World Bank's *Government Effectiveness Indicator*, and support for social welfare policies co-vary across the countries in the study. Pearson's r for the two variables is -0.57 , indicating a moderate negative relationship between the *Government Effectiveness Indicator* and social welfare policy support.

On average, people who live in countries whose governments are characterized as having higher levels of institutional quality tend to be less supportive of social welfare policies than those with lower levels. This finding provides some support to my contention that levels of performance, in this case manifested in terms of better institutional quality, has the capacity to influence public opinion – specifically with respect to the level of social welfare provision desired by the public. Likewise, this result seems to suggest that the implications of overload theory (Crozier et al. 1975; Kaase and Newton 1995; Kumlin 2007) may be used as a viable framework for explaining different forms of contemporary public opinion.

Section 5.2.v: Summary

This section considers the possible relationships that may exist between public support for social welfare policies, expressed in terms of country mean factor scores, and




Figure 31. Social welfare policy support and government effectiveness

a series of country-level correlates. Among the variables that have been analyzed include those that classify the 23 countries of this study into four distinct welfare regime types, those that measure prevailing economic conditions, as well as indicators of national income inequality and the quality of government institutions. The scatter plots reveal that some of these relationships appear to be stronger than others.

With respect to differing welfare regime types, a rank-ordering of regimes appears to be possible, although the specific ordering observed in this analysis is somewhat inconsistent with what others scholars have suggested. Overall, higher levels of support are reported in *Post-communist*, *Continental*, and *Scandinavian* regimes. Less support is offered in *English-speaking* regimes. In terms of economic conditions, a moderate positive relationship was discovered between GDP per capita and support for social welfare policies, while a slightly weaker association was found between unemployment levels and social welfare policy support.

Interestingly, a moderate positive relationship exists between national inflation rates and social welfare policy support. However, if an outlier is omitted from the analysis, the relationship becomes much stronger, which is more consistent with the hypotheses generated in Chapter 2. A weak positive relationship is also witnessed between levels of inequality and social welfare policy support. Unfortunately, this finding does little to resolve the debate with respect to the direction of the impact of income inequality on levels of the dependent variable.

Finally, a moderate negative relationship appears to exist between the quality of government institutions and levels of support for social welfare policies. This last finding is particularly meaningful as it provides some support for one of the main arguments of

this dissertation that the performance of the public sector plays a role in influencing public opinion in the realm of public policy. In the following section, both the individual and country-level correlates of support for social welfare policies are examined using multilevel modeling techniques.

Section 5.3: Multilevel models of support for social welfare policies

To explain public support for social welfare policies, a series of multilevel models are estimated and presented in Tables 21-23. Multilevel models are used here because of the hierarchical nature of the data. For this analysis, my primary goal is to explain individual attitudes. However, those individuals are nested within different countries around the world. It is likely that the views of people within the same country correlate with one another as a result of the national context in which they find themselves. As a result, it is methodologically appropriate to control for this occurrence. Additionally, multilevel modeling affords researchers the opportunity to examine hypotheses about various phenomena at both the individual and country-levels simultaneously.

The dependent variable in this chapter remains the factor scores generated from a battery of questions in the ISSP survey which measure public support for social welfare policies (see Chapter 3). Given the structured nature of the data, a two-level model is appropriate for this research. Accordingly, the level-1 model considers the relationships that exist between the individual-level correlates previously discussed in Chapter 4, and the level-2 model reflects the influence of the country-level variables that have been described in this chapter. Written more formally (see Hox 2002: 12), there are

$i = 1, \dots, n_j$ level-1 units (i.e., individuals) nested within

$j = 1, \dots, J$ level-2 units (i.e., $J = 23$ countries).

The Null Model and Interclass Correlation

Prior to conducting multilevel analysis, it is first necessary to measure whether there is sufficient variation between countries to justify the inclusion of country-level effects (Raudenbush and Bryk 2002). In order to make this determination, a null model is estimated that excludes any individual-level or country-level variables.

The level-1 model is written as:

$$(Social\ welfare\ policy\ support)_{ij} = \beta_{0j} + r_{ij}$$

The level-2 model is written as:

$$\beta_{0j} = \gamma_{00} + u_{0j}$$

In this instance, the estimated null model has an intercept variance component of 0.1386 that is statistically significant, which means that the intercept of the outcome variable (i.e., support for social welfare policies) is significantly affected by its predictors, which in this case are the country-level attributes. The country effect is smaller than the residual variance component of 0.6868, suggesting that there is still considerable residual variation in the dependent variable yet to be explained and that a model with additional predictors may be needed.

The intraclass correlation coefficient (ICC) indicates the proportion of variation in the dependent variable explained by the structured nature of the data (Hox 2002).

$$ICC = \frac{\text{intercept variance component}}{\text{total variance components}} = \frac{0.1386}{0.1386 + 0.6868} = 0.2018$$

The intraclass correlation coefficient for the null model is 0.2018, which can be interpreted to mean that 20.18% of the variation in the dependent variable is attributable to country-level characteristics. This number demonstrates that there is a significant

country-level effect on public support for social welfare policies, and justifies not only the estimation of multilevel models, but also the examination of country-level correlates.

Fixed and Random Coefficients in Multilevel Regression

When using multilevel regression, it is assumed that the predictors at both level-1 and level-2 are fixed (Snijders and Bosker 2012). That being said, both the intercept and the slope coefficients at level-1 could be specified as either fixed or random. When the intercept and the slope coefficients are assumed to vary across classes, a random coefficients model is appropriate (Hox 2002). However, the researcher is left to decide when coefficients should be fixed and when they should be allowed to vary. In order to make this determination, the model development strategy outlined by Snijders and Bosker (2012) is employed. First, a multilevel model including all of the individual-level variables is estimated with random intercepts and slopes (see Table 20).

Table 20 indicates that the variance components for the *Not working* and *Government employment* variables are not statistically significant. This suggests that there is no between-country variability in the slopes for these particular correlates. Accordingly, these variables should be specified as having fixed coefficients. Since the variance components for the remainder of the individual-level variables and the intercept are statistically significant, these slopes should be allowed to vary.

The model described above was estimated once again after removing random effects for the *Not working* and *Government employment* variables. The between-country variability remains at a statistically significant level for the other eleven individual-level correlates. As such, random effects are included for the estimation of the multilevel models for the intercept, as well as for the following individual-level variables: *Left*

Table 20. Variance components for multilevel random coefficient model (all slopes random)

Random Effect	Standard Deviation	Variance Component	df	χ^2	P-value
Intercept, u_0	0.37685	0.14202	22	606.46	<0.001
Left political party slope, u_1	0.16679	0.02782	22	89.18	<0.001
Right political party slope, u_2	0.20042	0.04017	22	135.77	<0.001
Age slope, u_3	0.00410	0.00002	22	132.05	<0.001
Female slope, u_4	0.06146	0.00378	22	38.52	0.016
Low education slope, u_5	0.10436	0.01089	22	67.36	<0.001
Not working slope, u_6	0.06049	0.00366	22	29.39	0.134
Government employment slope, u_7	0.04575	0.00209	22	24.27	0.333
Interpersonal trust slope, u_8	0.02138	0.00046	22	52.87	<0.001
Contact with others slope, u_9	0.03077	0.00095	22	46.26	0.002
Internal political efficacy slope, u_{10}	0.02833	0.00080	22	64.07	<0.001
External political efficacy slope, u_{11}	0.02138	0.00046	22	51.18	<0.001
Trust in civil servants slope, u_{12}	0.08079	0.00653	22	39.00	0.014
Perception of performance slope, u_{13}	0.08467	0.00717	22	124.49	<0.001

political party affiliation, Right political party affiliation, Age, Female, Low education, Interpersonal trust, Contact with others, Internal political efficacy, External political efficacy, Trust in civil servants, and Perception of performance. It should be noted, that the variance components for these variables are also reported in Tables 21-23 alongside each of the multilevel models estimated.

Multilevel Models

The multilevel models analyzed in this chapter are estimated using the statistics software package HLM 7.01. As is the norm, continuous predictors at the individual and country-level are grand-mean centered. Intercepts in any type of multiple regression analysis are interpreted when all of the independent variables take on a value of zero. Since zero is not a possible value for many variables, this transformation is appropriate (Hox 2002). Thus, the following individual-level variables are grand-mean centered: *Age, Interpersonal trust, Contact with others, Internal political efficacy, External political efficacy, and Perception of performance.* Likewise, the country-level variables *GDP per capita, Unemployment rate, Inflation rate, GINI index, and Government effectiveness* are also grand-mean centered. These particular correlates are denoted in boldface below in the following equations.

Written in mathematical notation, the two-level models examined in this dissertation are:

Level-1 model

$$\begin{aligned}
 (\textit{Social welfare policy support})_{ij} = & \beta_{0j} + \beta_{1j}(\textit{Left political party})_{ij} + \beta_{2j}(\textit{Right political} \\
 & \textit{party})_{ij} + \beta_{3j}(\mathbf{Age})_{ij} + \beta_{4j}(\mathbf{Female})_{ij} + \beta_{5j}(\mathbf{Low education})_{ij} + \beta_{6j}(\mathbf{Not working})_{ij} + \\
 & \beta_{7j}(\mathbf{Government employment})_{ij} + \beta_{8j}(\mathbf{Interpersonal trust})_{ij} + \beta_{9j}(\mathbf{Contact with}
 \end{aligned}$$

$$\text{others})_{ij} + \beta_{10j}(\mathbf{Internal\ political\ efficacy})_{ij} + \beta_{11j}(\mathbf{External\ political\ efficacy})_{ij} + \beta_{12j}(\mathbf{Trust\ in\ civil\ servants})_{ij} + \beta_{13j}(\mathbf{Perception\ of\ performance})_{ij} + r_{ij}$$

Level-2 models

For the Scandinavian welfare regime model:

$$\beta_{0j} = \gamma_{00} + \gamma_{01}(\mathbf{Scandinavian\ welfare\ regime})_j + u_{0j}$$

For the continental welfare regime model:

$$\beta_{0j} = \gamma_{00} + \gamma_{01}(\mathbf{Continental\ welfare\ regime})_j + u_{0j}$$

For the English-speaking welfare regime model:

$$\beta_{0j} = \gamma_{00} + \gamma_{01}(\mathbf{English-speaking\ welfare\ regime})_j + u_{0j}$$

For the post-communist welfare regime model:

$$\beta_{0j} = \gamma_{00} + \gamma_{01}(\mathbf{Post-communist\ welfare\ regime})_j + u_{0j}$$

For the composite welfare regime types model:

$$\beta_{0j} = \gamma_{00} + \gamma_{01}(\mathbf{Scandinavian\ welfare\ regime})_j + \gamma_{02}(\mathbf{Continental\ welfare\ regime})_j + \gamma_{03}(\mathbf{Post-communist\ welfare\ regime})_j + u_{0j}$$

For the economic conditions model:

$$\beta_{0j} = \gamma_{00} + \gamma_{01}(\mathbf{GDP\ per\ capita})_j + \gamma_{02}(\mathbf{Unemployment\ rate})_j + \gamma_{03}(\mathbf{Inflation\ rate})_j + u_{0j}$$

For the inequality model:

$$\beta_{0j} = \gamma_{00} + \gamma_{01}(\mathbf{GINI\ index})_j + u_{0j}$$

For the governmental institutional quality model:

$$\beta_{0j} = \gamma_{00} + \gamma_{01}(\mathbf{Government\ effectiveness})_j + u_{0j}$$

For the composite non-welfare regimes model:

$$\beta_{0j} = \gamma_{00} + \gamma_{01}(\mathbf{Inflation\ rate})_j + \gamma_{02}(\mathbf{GINI\ index})_j + \gamma_{03}(\mathbf{Government\ effectiveness})_j + u_{0j}$$

$$\text{effectiveness})_j + u_{0j}$$

For the composite model:

$$\begin{aligned} \beta_{0j} = & \gamma_{00} + \gamma_{01}(\text{Scandinavian welfare regime})_j + \gamma_{02}(\text{Continental welfare regime})_j \\ & + \gamma_{03}(\text{Post-communist welfare regime})_j + \gamma_{04}(\text{Inflation rate})_j + \gamma_{05}(\text{GINI} \\ & \text{index})_j + \gamma_{06}(\text{Government effectiveness})_j + u_{0j} \end{aligned}$$

For all models:

$$\beta_{1j} = \gamma_{10} + u_{1j}$$

$$\beta_{2j} = \gamma_{20} + u_{2j}$$

$$\beta_{3j} = \gamma_{30} + u_{3j}$$

$$\beta_{4j} = \gamma_{40} + u_{4j}$$

$$\beta_{5j} = \gamma_{50} + u_{5j}$$

$$\beta_{6j} = \gamma_{60}$$

$$\beta_{7j} = \gamma_{70}$$

$$\beta_{8j} = \gamma_{80} + u_{8j}$$

$$\beta_{9j} = \gamma_{90} + u_{9j}$$

$$\beta_{10j} = \gamma_{100} + u_{10j}$$

$$\beta_{11j} = \gamma_{110} + u_{11j}$$

$$\beta_{12j} = \gamma_{12} + u_{12j}$$

$$\beta_{13j} = \gamma_{13} + u_{13j}$$

Section 5.4: Empirical findings

The multilevel regression models reported in Tables 21-23 consider the correlates of public support for social welfare policies at both the individual and country-levels of analysis. Model diagnostics indicate that heteroskedasticity is present in all of the

multilevel models (see Appendix S). For this reason, all of the models are estimated using robust standard errors. Additionally, the variance inflation factors (VIFs) were calculated for each of the variables in the country-level models. These values are reported in Appendix T. Multicollinearity is an issue in only two variables found in Model 7, which is discussed later in the chapter.

The basic (individual-level correlates only) model is the first model reported in Table 21. It is notable that the individual-level variables perform similarly across each of the models, indicating the robustness of these findings. In terms of the socio-demographic attributes, there is evidence which suggests that political attitudes play a crucial role in shaping public opinion on social welfare policies. The results indicate that respondents who are affiliated with left-leaning political parties are more likely to be supportive of social welfare policies, while respondents who identify with right-leaning political parties are more likely to be less supportive of social welfare policies. This suggests that one's membership in an ideologically-based political party is a principal influencer of public social welfare policy preferences – in line with the literature on this topic (e.g., Lipsmeyer and Nordstrom 2003; Zagórski 1999).

The results also indicate that people take their own self-interest into account vis-à-vis their support of social welfare policies. Those who belong to classes of society that tend to be more economically vulnerable, and therefore more likely to benefit from social welfare policies - females, individuals with low levels of education, and those who are not currently in the workforce - are also more likely to be supportive of social welfare policies. However, it should be noted that the respondent's age does not appear to be a useful predictor of social welfare policy preferences. Model 1 reveals that government

employees are more likely to support social welfare policies in comparison to those who are not. These people's livelihoods are tied to the continued delivery of public services (Andreß and Heien 2001; Papadakis and Bean 1993). Therefore, it is sensible that they would be supportive of government playing a more expansive role in this area of public policy.

With respect to the socio-psychological correlates, as hypothesized, people with higher levels of interpersonal trust are less likely to support social welfare policies than those with lower levels. Likewise, the amount of contact a person has with others on a daily basis negatively influences levels of support for social welfare policies. These findings give further credence to the theory that those who maintain strong social networks may not see as great a need for governmental intervention in their lives (Franzen and Hangartner 2006; Gërxhani and Koster 2012; Voicu and Voicu 2011).

Model 1 also suggests that people who feel more politically empowered are less supportive of social welfare policies than those who do not. Respondents who are confident in their knowledge about government and politics (i.e., internal political efficacy), as well as those who believe that they can influence the political system (i.e., external political efficacy), indicate lower levels of support for social welfare policies than those who do not. Those who express higher levels of political efficacy may be satisfied with the status quo and thus do not desire expansive governmental programs.

The findings show that people's attitudes toward political actors appear to influence their social welfare policy preferences, echoing the results discussed in Chapter 4. Those who express trusting attitudes towards civil servants are more likely to support social welfare policies than those who do not. This result is consistent with literature that

argues that trusting citizens are more likely to approve of governmental policies because they maintain faith in those performing the duties involved in governing (Kaase and Newton 1995; Gabriel and Trüdinger 2011).

Alternatively, people who perceive higher levels of governmental performance are less supportive of social welfare policies than those who see government as operating poorly. This suggests that a “crowding out” effect may be at work. People who perceive government as being more successful in terms of public policy outcomes are less likely to be supportive of social welfare policies because they may be satisfied with the status quo. This finding is consistent with the results discovered in Chapter 4, and it is in accordance with the implications drawn from “overload theory” (Crozier et al. 1975; Kaase and Newton 1995; Kumlin 2007). When poor performance is encountered, people tend to instinctively call for a governmental solution to ameliorate the problem. However, when performance is perceived as suitable, people may not recognize an apparent need for additional governmental programs, resulting in lower levels of support for them.

Beyond the individual-level correlates, the multilevel models included in this analysis consider the influence that national context has on public attitudes. A total of six models are presented in addition to the basic model which examine separate explanations for the differing opinions about social welfare policies between countries. A final composite model, Model 7, is included which combines the statistically significant country-level indicators from the previous models.

In order to test the theory that cross-national variation in support of social welfare policies is attributable to dissimilarities in the institutional character of differing welfare regimes, Model 2 considers the effects of the various welfare regimes side-by-side.

Consistent with Arts and Gelissen's (2001) work, the *English-speaking* welfare regime type was chosen as the reference category. The results reveal that all three categories, the *Scandinavian*, the *Continental*, and the *Post-communist*, are all statistically significant with respect to public support for social welfare policies when compared to the reference of the *English-speaking* welfare regime. An examination of the size of the coefficients appears to reveal a rank-ordering of welfare regimes. People who live in *Scandinavian* welfare regimes appear to be the most supportive of social welfare policies. They are followed by those located in *Continental* welfare regimes. People who reside in *Post-communist* countries are ranked next. Finally, the respondents of countries in the reference category, the *English-speaking* welfare regime tend to be the least supportive of social welfare policies.

These findings seem, at first glance, to reveal some support to the thesis that different welfare regime typologies are capable of explaining support for social welfare policies, in accordance with the literature (e.g., Arts and Gelissen 2001; Jakobsen 2011; Larsen 2008; Svallfors 1997). However, little has been done to move beyond these correlates and to consider the explanatory power of other types of country-level variables. For that reason, this study also considers additional multilevel models which examine the influence that prevailing economic conditions, levels of income inequality, and the quality of government institutions have on levels of public support for social welfare policies.

Model 3 examines the impact of economic conditions on the dependent variable. Of the three indicators of economic performance, only the *Inflation rate* is significantly related to public support for social welfare policies. As hypothesized, the higher the level

of inflation in a country, the more support there is for social welfare policies. This may lend some support to the notion that people are self-interested beings who are capable of shifting their policy positions based on changing economic circumstances (Lipset 1968; McClosky and Zaller 1984). However, it should be pointed out that the substantive size of the effect is fairly low when one considers the typical range of inflation rates that characterize the 23 countries examined in this analysis.

Model 4 in Table 22 examines the effect of income inequality on people's social welfare policy attitudes. The *GINI index* indicator is statistically significant and shows the existence of a negative relationship. This finding leaves open the possibility that the more unequal the distribution of wealth there is in a country, the less likely people will be supportive of social welfare policies, consistent with the findings of Rehm, Hacker, and Schlesinger (2012). This result may also lend some support to the arguments of Kenworthy and McCall (2008) who claim that this negative association exists because the median voter in those countries characterized by higher levels of income inequality is more reluctant to pay the additional tax money necessary to sustain a social welfare system than those in countries where income inequality is not so high.

The second model in Table 22, Model 5, considers the effect of institutional quality on respondents' social welfare policy positions. The World Bank's *Government Effectiveness Indicator* is statistically significant and reveals a negative relationship between institutional quality and the dependent variable. That is to say, people who reside in countries characterized by better quality public institutions are less likely to be supportive of social welfare policies than those in countries with poorer quality public

institutions. Indeed, the outputs of a political system appear to be linked to fluctuations in public support, in agreement with the arguments of Easton (1965).

This finding at the country-level dovetails very nicely with the findings at the individual-level vis-à-vis perceptions of government performance and reinforces the argument that public sector performance matters – whether perceived or actual. Likewise, it leaves open the possibility that the implications of “overload theory” are not only confined to the individual-level. As the results demonstrate, the work of Crozier et al. (1975) can be utilized as a useful framework for considering how performance, or its lack thereof, at the country-level influences public support for social welfare policies.

A composite model, Model 6, which considers all of the correlates from Models 3, 4, and 5 that emerge as statistically significant, is reported in Table 23. This model permits testing the utility of each country-level explanation of public support for social welfare policies, excluding the welfare regime variables, while also controlling for the other country-level variables. The coefficients for all of the country-level variables retain their signs from the previous models. Likewise, the *Inflation rate*, the *GINI index*, and the *Government Effectiveness Indicator* all remain statistically significant.

Another composite model, Model 7, which includes all of the correlates that arise as being statistically significant from all of the models, including those that estimate the influence of differing welfare regime typologies, is also presented in Table 23. In this final composite model, the *Inflation rate* remains a statistically significant predictor, as does the *GINI index* variable. Both retain their signs from the previous models. The World Bank *Government Effectiveness Indicator* not only remains statistically significant, but the size of its effect more than doubles in comparison to its impact in

Model 5 or Model 6. Again, a negative relationship is observed between the quality of public sector institutions and support for social welfare policies. Interestingly, none of the welfare regime typologies are statistically significant in Model 7 when controlling for the inflation rate, income inequality, or measures of government effectiveness with one important exception.

The *Post-communist* welfare regime type is statistically significant, but it now carries a negative sign. Using *English-speaking* welfare regimes as the reference category, this finding reveals that the residents of post-communist countries are actually less supportive of social welfare policies when the variables included in Model 7 are controlled. Bear in mind that Model 2, reported in Table 21, seemed to imply that people residing in post-communist countries were statistically more likely to be supportive of social welfare policies than people living in *English-speaking* countries. This result seems to cast some doubt on the use of welfare regime typologies as a useful means for explaining public support for social welfare policies.

Appendix T indicates that multicollinearity may be an issue for both the *Post-communist* and *Government effectiveness* variables in Model 7. However, even with multicollinearity present, both variables remain statistically significant. This does much to indicate the robustness of these findings. When controlling for other variables, notably measures reflecting national economic conditions, levels of income inequality, or the quality of government institutions, much of explanatory power of the welfare regime typologies as a class of predictors is either lost or distorted.

Table 21. Multilevel regression models: Social welfare policy support (Basic Model, Welfare Regime Type Model, Economic Conditions Model)

	(1) Basic Model	(2) Welfare Regime Type	(3) Economic Conditions
<i>Fixed Effects</i>			
<i>Individual-level variables</i>			
Intercept	-0.3281*** (0.08)	-0.5141*** (0.10)	-0.3289*** (0.07)
Left political party	0.2075*** (0.04)	0.2032*** (0.04)	0.2041*** (0.04)
Right political party	-0.1716*** (0.04)	-0.1723*** (0.04)	-0.1723*** (0.04)
Age	0.0013 (0.00)	0.0013 (0.00)	0.0013 (0.00)
Female	0.1116*** (0.02)	0.1102*** (0.02)	0.1111*** (0.02)
Low education	0.1725*** (0.03)	0.1708*** (0.03)	0.1725*** (0.03)
Not working	0.1355*** (0.02)	0.1354*** (0.02)	0.1357*** (0.02)
Government employment	0.0711*** (0.01)	0.0705*** (0.01)	0.0709*** (0.01)
Interpersonal trust	-0.0371*** (0.01)	-0.0372*** (0.01)	-0.0374*** (0.01)
Contact with others	-0.0270*** (0.01)	-0.0266*** (0.01)	-0.0269*** (0.01)
Internal political efficacy	-0.0301*** (0.01)	-0.0304*** (0.01)	-0.0298*** (0.01)
External political efficacy	-0.0144** (0.01)	-0.0143** (0.01)	-0.0143** (0.01)
Trust in civil servants	0.1104*** (0.02)	0.1110*** (0.02)	0.1113*** (0.02)
Perception of performance	-0.1199*** (0.02)	-0.1202*** (0.02)	-0.1201*** (0.02)
<i>Country-level variables</i>			
Scandinavian welfare regime	--	0.3381*** (0.09)	--
Continental welfare regime	--	0.2884*** (0.09)	--
Post-communist welfare regime	--	0.2226** (0.08)	--
GDP in thousand \$s per capita	--	--	-0.0046 (0.00)
Unemployment rate	--	--	0.0297 (0.02)
Inflation rate	--	--	0.0211*** (0.01)

* $p \leq 0.10$; ** $p \leq 0.05$; *** $p \leq 0.01$ (Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.)

Table 21 (continued). Multilevel regression models: Social welfare policy support (Basic Model, Welfare Regime Type Model, Economic Conditions Model)

	(1) Basic Model	(2) Welfare Regime Types	(3) Economic Conditions
<i>Random Effects</i> (Variance Components)			
Intercept (level-2 variance)	0.13023***	0.12450***	0.12360***
Left political party	0.02749***	0.02577***	0.02499***
Right political party	0.04031***	0.04049***	0.04034***
Age	0.00002***	0.00002***	0.00002***
Female	0.00394**	0.00386**	0.00389**
Low education	0.01070***	0.01078***	0.01091***
Interpersonal trust	0.00048***	0.00047***	0.00048***
Contact with others	0.00119***	0.00119***	0.00118***
Internal political efficacy	0.00082***	0.00084***	0.00079***
External political efficacy	0.00046***	0.00047***	0.00044***
Trust in civil servants	0.00622**	0.00601**	0.00608**
Perception of performance	0.00732***	0.00736***	0.00729***
Level-1 <i>N</i>	16,255	16,255	16,255
Level-2 <i>N</i>	23	23	23
Log likelihood function	-18,803.77	-18,805.15	-18,813.21

* $p \leq 0.10$; ** $p \leq 0.05$; *** $p \leq 0.01$

Table 22. Multilevel regression models: Social welfare policy support (Inequality Model, Institutional Quality Model)

	(4) Inequality	(5) Institutional Quality
<i>Fixed Effects</i>		
<i>Individual-level variables</i>		
Intercept	-0.3282*** (0.08)	-0.3291*** (0.07)
Left political party	0.2078*** (0.04)	0.2070*** (0.04)
Right political party	-0.1715*** (0.04)	-0.1735*** (0.04)
Age	0.0013 (0.00)	0.0013 (0.00)
Female	0.1112*** (0.02)	0.1110*** (0.02)
Low education	0.1722*** (0.03)	0.1732*** (0.03)
Not working	0.1356*** (0.02)	0.1357*** (0.02)
Government employment	0.0713*** (0.01)	0.0712*** (0.01)
Interpersonal trust	-0.0371*** (0.01)	-0.0376*** (0.01)
Contact with others	-0.0271*** (0.01)	-0.0270*** (0.01)
Internal political efficacy	-0.0301*** (0.01)	-0.0300*** (0.01)
External political efficacy	-0.0145** (0.01)	-0.0139** (0.01)
Trust in civil servants	0.1107*** (0.02)	0.1117*** (0.02)
Perception of performance	-0.1198*** (0.02)	-0.1202*** (0.02)
<i>Country-level variables</i>		
Gini index	-0.0138** (0.01)	--
Government effectiveness	--	-0.1966*** (0.05)

* $p \leq 0.10$; ** $p \leq 0.05$; *** $p \leq 0.01$ (Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.)

Table 22 (continued). Multilevel regression models: Social welfare policy support (Inequality Model, Institutional Quality Model)

	(4) Inequality	(5) Institutional Quality
<i>Random Effects</i> (Variance Components)		
Intercept (level-2 variance)	0.13883***	0.10801***
Left political party	0.02731***	0.02636***
Right political party	0.04058***	0.04013***
Age	0.00002***	0.00002***
Female	0.00394**	0.00390**
Low education	0.01074***	0.01048***
Interpersonal trust	0.00048***	0.00047***
Contact with others	0.00119***	0.00119***
Internal political efficacy	0.00083***	0.00078***
External political efficacy	0.00046***	0.00043***
Trust in civil servants	0.00616**	0.00610***
Perception of performance	0.00740***	0.00718***
Level-1 <i>N</i>	16,255	16,255
Level-2 <i>N</i>	23	23
Log likelihood function	-18,807.96	-18,805.66

* $p \leq 0.10$; ** $p \leq 0.05$; *** $p \leq 0.01$

Table 23. Multilevel regression models: Social welfare policy support (Composite Non-Welfare Regime Model, Composite Model)

	(6) Composite Non-Welfare Regime Variables	(7) Composite Model
<i>Fixed Effects</i>		
<i>Individual-level variables</i>		
Intercept	-0.3301*** (0.07)	-0.1712 (0.15)
Left political party	0.2071*** (0.04)	0.2078*** (0.04)
Right political party	-0.1746*** (0.04)	-0.1715*** (0.04)
Age	0.0013 (0.00)	0.0013 (0.00)
Female	0.1105*** (0.02)	0.1112*** (0.02)
Low education	0.1728*** (0.03)	0.1722*** (0.03)
Not working	0.1359*** (0.02)	0.1356*** (0.02)
Government employment	0.0710*** (0.01)	0.0713*** (0.01)
Interpersonal trust	-0.0374*** (0.01)	-0.0371*** (0.01)
Contact with others	-0.0273*** (0.01)	-0.0271*** (0.01)
Internal political efficacy	-0.0300*** (0.01)	-0.0301*** (0.01)
External political efficacy	-0.0140** (0.01)	-0.0145** (0.01)
Trust in civil servants	0.1122*** (0.02)	0.1107*** (0.02)
Perception of performance	-0.1199*** (0.02)	-0.1198*** (0.02)
<i>Country-level variables</i>		
Scandinavian welfare regime	--	-0.1048 (0.16)
Continental welfare regime	--	0.0403 (0.12)
Post-communist welfare regime	--	-0.5063** (0.22)
Inflation rate	0.02360*** (0.01)	0.0326*** (0.01)
Gini index	-0.0289*** (0.01)	-0.0539*** (0.01)
Government effectiveness	-0.1683*** (0.05)	-0.4679*** (0.13)

* $p \leq 0.10$; ** $p \leq 0.05$; *** $p \leq 0.01$ (Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.)

Table 23 (continued). Multilevel regression models: Social welfare policy support (Composite Non-Welfare Regime Model, Composite Model)

	(6) Composite Non-Welfare Regime Variables	(7) Composite Model
<i>Random Effects</i> (Variance Components)		
Intercept (level-2 variance)	0.11490***	0.10498***
Left political party	0.02537***	0.02554***
Right political party	0.04002***	0.04009***
Age	0.00002***	0.00002***
Female	0.00388**	0.00393**
Low education	0.01072***	0.01068***
Interpersonal trust	0.00048***	0.00048***
Contact with others	0.00123***	0.00119***
Internal political efficacy	0.00080***	0.00086***
External political efficacy	0.00044***	0.00044***
Trust in civil servants	0.00594***	0.00723**
Perception of performance	0.00726***	0.00740***
Level-1 <i>N</i>	16,255	16,255
Level-2 <i>N</i>	23	23
Log likelihood function	-18,810.24	-18,809.30

* $p \leq 0.10$; ** $p \leq 0.05$; *** $p \leq 0.01$

Section 5.5: Summary

In summary, public attitudes toward social welfare policies vary both within countries, as well as between countries. The multilevel models indicate that variation in social welfare policy preferences is not only a function of individuals' personal attributes, personality traits, and political attitudes – as indicated by the literature, but also of their perceptions of governmental actors and the quality of the work they perform in the public sector. Across-country variation is largely a function of public sector institutional quality, and, to a lesser extent, levels of inflation and inequality. While differences with respect to welfare regime types do appear to exist, once the preceding variables are introduced to the analysis alongside them, their influence diminishes.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUDING REMARKS: A CROSS-NATIONAL EXAMINATION OF PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR SOCIAL WELFARE POLICIES

Section 6.1: Overview

Van Riper (1999) observes that "... when in desperation we turn to the government, not to the marketplace. The marketplace is for you or me. Our government is for us" (369). Over the course of the last century, people around the world have become more reliant upon government to solve societal problems. In particular, we have fashioned policies which promote equality and guard against economic risk. Rochefort (1986) observes that "Every level of government is significantly involved in this effort to identify, treat, and prevent social ills" (1). Undeniably, the size and reach of the state has grown in recent decades. However, while volumes have been written describing the rise of the welfare state, far less scholarly attention has been paid to explaining why people support or oppose the subset of laws, programs, and initiatives collectively known as social welfare policies. It is for this reason why this dissertation was written.

Social welfare policies exist in order for governments to meet their residents' most basic needs for income, health, education, and housing (Gangl 2007; Gërkhani and Koster 2012). It is commonly acknowledged that social welfare policies are designed to offer opportunities to the disadvantaged. However, these programs are fashioned not only to care for the destitute, but also to provide a "safety net" for all people living in society (Segal 2010). According to Hasenfeld and Rafferty (1989), "The principle of social equality and collective responsibility implies ... that government has a major role in providing equal economic opportunities to all its people, and has an obligation to ensure that each resident enjoys a minimally acceptable standard of living" (1030).

The rationale behind the development of the welfare state is clear: government has a responsibility to its people to provide public services to those who need them. What remains to be answered is why people either support or oppose this expansive view of governmental intervention to bring about desired social ends. The research literature strongly implies that there is scholarly import to knowing why these views vary. Public opinion can have a dramatic influence on the public policies that are enacted by governments (Burnstein 2003; Jacobs 1992). Specifically, alterations in the level of public support for redistribution have been found to precede policy change (Manza et al. 2002; Stimson et al. 1995). Work by Kingdon (2011) also suggests that public opinion has the ability to constrain the range of possible actions taken by government. Thus, it is imperative that researchers study the views of the public in order to gain a better understanding of the policy process.

While it is true that a number of social scientists have addressed the topic of social welfare policy support, it is important to acknowledge how much was previously unknown. The political sociology literature indicates that support for social welfare policies is mainly a function of either ideological preferences or personal self-interest (Calzada, Gómez-Garido, Moreno, and Moreno-Fuentes 2014; Hasenfeld and Rafferty 1989; Voicu and Voicu 2011). Additionally, the extant literature on this topic largely fails to take national context into consideration as a possible influencer of social welfare policy support. With the exception of those studies that focus on differing welfare regime types (e.g., Arts and Gelissen 2001; Edlund 1999; Svallfors 1997), little has been done to examine how varying conditions cross-nationally influence levels of support for social welfare policies.

Finally, the most blatant omission from the scholarly record with respect to this line of research is the conspicuous lack of attention given to the role that the public sector plays in either promoting or inhibiting public support for social welfare policies. In the modern world, governments, and by extension public administrators, exercise a great deal of influence. According to Kettl (1999), “Wherever one looks, administrative agencies determine who gets what from government – and how well government works” (127).

It is only reasonable to suggest that how people come to view public administrators and assess the quality of the work that they perform has an impact on the level of support that various public policies enjoy. My argument throughout this work has consistently been that support for social welfare policies is dependent not only upon one’s ideology or personal self-interest, but also on a number of other factors at the individual and country-levels. Chief among them is both the attitudes people hold towards the public sector and the quality of governmental institutions, cross-nationally.

Throughout the preceding chapters of this study, four primary research questions have been addressed: First, across countries, what levels of support do people hold for social welfare policies? Second, what individual-level attributes and attitudes correlate with these levels of support? Third, does national context account for variation across countries in terms of the level of support? Finally, does the public sector play a part in determining levels of social welfare policy support at either the individual or country-level? The research presented in this dissertation specifically answers each of these questions by comparing and analyzing variations in social welfare policy support across 23 countries in Europe, North America, Eastern Asia, and Oceania. In the following section, a summary of the results of the statistical analysis is presented.

Section 6.2: Summary

It was found that variation in the level of support for social welfare policies does take place both among people within countries, as well as between countries. People living in Portugal, Spain, Croatia, and Russia are, on average, the most supportive of social welfare policies. In contrast, the residents of Japan, Switzerland, the Czech Republic, and the United States are the least supportive. Overall, it appears that a rank-ordering of countries with respect to their levels of support can be arranged. Generally speaking, people living in countries located within Southern and Eastern Europe tend to be more supportive of social welfare policies, while people in Western Europe and North America are comparatively less likely to hold supportive attitudes. Those who live in Northern European countries, on average, appear to have levels that are somewhere between these two limits.

A series of country-specific OLS models were estimated and analyzed in Chapter 4. These models provide some evidence that support for social welfare policies is in fact a result of people's socio-demographic attributes, socio-psychological attitudes, and views toward the public sector. However, these results are not necessarily uniform across all countries. Certain correlates are more or less useful from one country to the next. Overall, both ideology-based political party affiliation and economic self-interest appear to considerably affect social welfare policy attitudes, consistent with the prevailing literature on this topic (e.g., Calzada et al. 2014; Lipsmeyer and Nordstrom 2003; Hasenfeld and Rafferty 1989; Voicu and Voicu 2011; Zagórski 1999).

That being said, the models also imply that levels of interpersonal trust, the frequency of contact with others, and both internal, as well as external, political efficacy

play important roles as well, reaffirming the work of other scholars (e.g., Coleman 1990; Franzen and Hangartner 2006; Lipsmeyer and Nordstrom 2003; Gërxhani and Koster 2012; Voicu and Voicu 2011; Welch et al. 2005). Likewise, both trust in civil servants and perceptions of governmental performance also influence public support for social welfare policies, offering some evidence that social welfare policy support is swayed by people's views of the public sector.

A close examination of the dependent variable indicates that there is substantial variation in levels of support for social welfare policies cross-nationally. The computation of the intraclass correlation coefficient (ICC) in Chapter 5 demonstrates that approximately 20% of variation in social welfare policy support is attributable to variation at the country-level of analysis. This being the case, a number of multilevel models were estimated in order to determine possible predictors that reflect differing national contexts.

The multilevel analysis echoes the results discovered in Chapter 4 with respect to the individual-level correlates. In fact, all of the variables that measure respondents' socio-demographic attributes, socio-psychological attitudes, and views toward the public sector are statistically significant and signed in the hypothesized direction. The only exception to this pattern is the variable age, which does not appear to influence social welfare attitudes. The strong performance of the individual-level variables in Chapter 5 is perhaps due to the large sample size used when estimating the multilevel models. As the sample size rises, there is a corresponding increase in the power of a statistical test, making it easier to illuminate the existence of key differences in the data.

Beyond variables at the individual-level, multilevel models allow the researcher to simultaneously consider the effect that country-level correlates may have on social welfare attitudes. Four categories of country-level variables were analyzed: welfare regime typology, economic conditions, income inequality, and the quality of government institutions. The results strongly indicate that there is utility in considering differing national contexts as an explanatory factor with respect to the levels of support for social welfare policies. With few exceptions (e.g., Blekesaune and Quadagno 2003; Gërkhani and Koster 2012; Voicu and Voicu 2011), the vast majority of the literature has concentrated on employing differing welfare regime typologies to make sense of the public's social welfare attitudes. Since this study considers both welfare regime typologies alongside other categories of country-level correlates, it offers an opportunity to consider the comparative usefulness of each category of variables.

With respect to the welfare regime typologies, the findings presented in Chapter 5 suggest mixed results. It is true that when considered alone as a single category of correlates, differing welfare regime types appear to explain variation in social welfare policy support across countries. In fact, the models even imply the existence of a rank-ordering of countries vis-à-vis their respective level of support. The residents of *Scandinavian* regimes appear to be the most supportive of social welfare policies. People living in *English-speaking* regimes seem to be the least supportive, comparatively. Individuals residing in *Continental* and *Post-communist* regimes tend to fall somewhere in between these two extremes.

However, it is vital to point out that when considered in conjunction with other correlates, the usefulness of the welfare regime types is seriously called into question.

Model 7 of Chapter 5 illustrates the performance of the differing welfare regime typologies, controlling for the effects of national inflation rates, levels of income inequality, and the quality of public institutions. It is notable that all three of the aforementioned variables are statistically significant, while only the *Post-communist* welfare regime type is.

Also, consider that the sign for this particular welfare regime type flips its sign, indicating the possibility that the residents of *Post-communist* countries are hold less supportive social welfare attitudes than people living in the reference category, *English-speaking* regimes, once the researcher controls for other variables. This, of course, is contrary to the results of the earlier models. For this reason, there is cause to be somewhat skeptical of the efficacy of welfare regime typologies to give a clear account of why levels of support for social welfare policies tend to vary across countries when considered in the light of other country-level factors.

As indicated above, correlates in addition to the welfare regime types were investigated in this dissertation. The analysis reveals that certain economic conditions may influence social welfare policy attitudes. Specifically, the national inflation rate was found to be a statistically significant correlate in several models. However, it bears noting that the substantive effects of fluctuations of the inflation rate are somewhat small when one considers the typical range of this measure across countries. Evidence was also discovered that levels of income inequality may have an impact on levels of support for social welfare policies. Multilevel models point to the existence of a negative relationship, which is consistent with the hypotheses of other scholars (e.g., Kenworthy and McCall 2008; Rehm, Hacker, and Schlesinger 2012).

Finally, the multilevel analysis indicates that the quality of government institutions influences public support for social welfare policies. The findings demonstrate that the residents of countries characterized by having higher levels of government effectiveness are less supportive of social welfare policies than those residing in countries with lower levels. This seems to imply that actual levels of performance measured at the country-level influence public opinion.

The relationship observed is very similar to that witnessed with respect to the perceptions of performance residents hold at the individual level. Better performance – either perceived or actual – appears to result in less social welfare policy support. Poorer performance leads to more. The results of Chapter 5 appear to give further credence to “overload theory” (Crozier et al. 1975; Kaase and Newton 1995; Kumlin 2007) and suggest that it may be a useful framework for explaining support for social welfare policies in the modern era.

Section 6.3: Implications

The purpose of this study was not to craft a compelling case either for or against the development of social welfare policies – that is a task best left to political theorists, to politicians, and to the public itself. The primary objective of this dissertation has been to offer a more complete explanation as to why some individuals express support for social welfare policies and other do not. There is reason to believe this is an important concern, as changes in public policy are often paralleled in time by fluctuations in public opinion. The preceding chapters have provided a comprehensive study of social welfare policy attitudes and have attempted to determine useful correlates of support at both the

individual and country-levels of analysis. Several implications can be drawn from the results presented in this study.

One of the central claims of this work is that a number of different factors affect people's social welfare policy preferences – not just one's ideological-based partisan orientations or personal self-interest. In fact, the explanation is far more complex and multifaceted than much of the existing literature seems to indicate. The findings suggest that many socio-psychological variables play a role, particularly levels of interpersonal trust, the amount of contact people have with others, as well as the extent of political empowerment people feel with respect to their role in the political system. Additionally, people's views toward the public sector also appear to influence public opinion. Two variables were considered: whether or not people trust civil servants and how individuals rate the performance of government. Both correlates were found to affect levels of social welfare policy support.

In addition to suggesting new correlates at the individual-level, this study has also tested a number of competing explanations at the country-level, many of which had only been used only sparsely before – economic conditions and income inequality, and one that had never before been examined – the quality of government institutions. The results imply that these correlates of social welfare policy support perform just as well, if not better, than those used in previous research. Not only that, but the results of Chapter 5 cast some doubt on the efficacy of using welfare regime typologies as a means for explaining public support for social welfare policies. Overall, these findings highlight the usefulness of cross-national research and the ability of multilevel modeling techniques to reveal important relationships previously hidden.

The results suggest that national economic conditions may influence social welfare policy preferences. Specifically, the inflation rate emerges as a significant predictor. As hypothesized, persons living in countries experiencing higher levels of inflation are more supportive of social welfare policies. This finding implies that levels of social welfare policy support are not just affected by economic insecurity experienced on a person-to-person basis, but also at a societal level. Simply put, social welfare policy support appears, at least in part, to be a collectivist response to economic strain.

The same can be said with respect to levels of income inequality across countries. What is perplexing is that the findings of this analysis indicate that people living in countries characterized by greater levels of income inequality are actually less supportive of social welfare policies than those with less inequality. An implication of this relationship is that there appears to be less support for social welfare policies precisely in those countries where more people need them. This is indeed a paradox that deserves further examination.

Throughout this study, I have also argued that the public sector plays a role in shaping the policy preferences of the people they serve. The results certainly provide additional support for this assertion. At the individual-level, it was found that people who are more trusting of civil servants express higher levels of support for social welfare policies in comparison to those who are less trusting. This implies that the engendering of trust between people and public servants has the capacity to alter the public's views, with respect to the welfare state. If greater levels of trust among residents can be successfully promoted, the result may be an unintentional, yet corresponding, increase in support for social welfare policies.

Alternatively, the findings also reveal that people who perceive higher levels of governmental performance express less support for social welfare policies, while those who sense lower levels of performance indicate more. These results seem to question the role of good governance in the modern era with respect to the continued existence of the welfare state. “Overload theory” predicts that public dissatisfaction with public sector performance actually increases support for more government (Kumlin 2007). When poor performance becomes a problem, people instinctively call for additional governmental intervention to remedy the situation. In this way, more government becomes the antidote for all social ills – even if government itself proves unsuccessful in ameliorating them.

The implications of this phenomenon are very interesting. Satisfactory performance, as interpreted by residents, results in either an acceptance of the status quo or possibly even calls for less government. In contrast, poor performance, as perceived by residents has the potential to generate public demands for an ever-increasing state in both size and scale. The ultimate result of this predicament may hinge on whether expansionary policies ever lead to perceptions of governmental success. If ever judged to be effective, government would eventually stop growing as a result of satisfaction with current levels of performance. However, if perceptions of performance remain consistently poor, then there may always be calls for more governmental intervention. These are all possible scenarios that could become reality.

The country-level findings mirror the results at the individual-level. The people of countries characterized by high quality government institutions are significantly less likely to support social welfare policies than those where institutional quality is low. This offers substantial support to the argument that government performance – either

actual at the country-level or perceived at the individual-level – alters public opinion. More specifically, it influences individuals' views with respect to social welfare policy attitudes.

Another interesting puzzle that I will briefly comment on pertains to the interplay between performance and trust. In recent years, governments around the world have attempted to increase government performance by enhancing the efficiency and effectiveness of the public sector (Ariely 2011; Osborne and Gaebler 1992). One of the ultimate goals of this endeavor has been to restore levels of trust in government (Bouckaert 2008; Radin 2006; Van Ryzin 2011). While a number of different empirical analyses support the hypothesis that positive evaluations of public sector performance leads to more trust in government (e.g., Christensen and Laegreid 2005; Marlowe 2004; Mischler and Rose 1997; Van Ryzin 2011; Vigoda-Gadot and Yuval 2003), much less is known about the impact of these efforts with respect to public policy attitudes.

As the results demonstrate, trust in civil servants positively influences support for social welfare policies. However, positive perceptions of governmental performance at the individual-level, as well as residing in countries characterized by better quality institutions at the country-level, has the opposite effect – it reduces support for social welfare policies. Interestingly enough, it appears that if bureaucratic reforms are successful in achieving their goals, the positive effect on social welfare policy attitudes which results from increasing trust in government may be offset by the negative effect that comes with better evaluations of governmental performance. Clearly, future research which examines this fascinating, but apparent, dynamic is warranted.

Overall, the notion that the public sector plays a role in crafting the public's policy attitudes should not be terribly surprising. After all, in many ways people are consumers of public goods. Ultimately, public administrators are those who implement public policy. Therefore, it is only sensible that people would care if those with whom they rely on are judged to be trustworthy, honest, fair, or reliable. Likewise, as recipients of goods and services, it is only natural that people make evaluative assessments which influence their policy preferences.

In the end, this study has advanced an argument, which is supported by evidence that a feedback loop exists within the policy process that connects the outputs of public policy to its inputs – in accordance with other scholars (e.g., Jordan 2010; Kumlin 2007). Namely, the trust that people feel, the perceptions that they hold, and the levels of performance that exist all affect individuals' social welfare attitudes. These views have the ability to sway public officials, and in turn, create new public policies (Kingdon 2011; Rochefort 1986).

Section 6.4: Limitations and future research

When considering the findings and implications of this research, it is important to be cognizant of its limitations. While this examination is one of the most comprehensive studies of public support for social welfare policies to date, the results are based on an analysis of samples from only 23 countries throughout the world. The ISSP Role of Government IV Module does include data for additional countries, however the subset of those analyzed in this study was limited by using a welfare regime typology classification scheme that was constrained to include only the countries used (see Chapter 3 for more information). Admittedly, most of these countries are economically developed

democracies located mainly in Europe. Even though a number of transitioning countries from Eastern Europe are included, this hardly mitigates the potential for bias. Thus, it is difficult to generalize the findings of this study to other countries that are either less developed or non-European.

Also, the relatively low number of country samples analyzed creates another potential problem. The multilevel models reported in Chapter 5 are estimated using a sample size of only 23. The lack of statistical power in these models could possibly result in a “false negative” decision in which a true hypothesis is rejected as incorrect. A broader range of countries would increase the amount of variation in both the dependent and country-level variables, permitting a more trustworthy test. While this is definitely a hindrance, it should be pointed out that previous studies of social welfare policy support that employ country-level correlates have estimated multilevel models with even fewer observations than those used in this analysis.

Another limitation of this study, broadly speaking, is that the focus is only limited to public support for one particular type of public policy. Only public attitudes toward social welfare policies have been examined. Thus, it may be inappropriate to over-generalize the relationship between the specifically tailored dependent variable used in this research and its respective correlates to all forms of public policy. Indeed, support for one form of public policy versus another may be context-dependent.

A somewhat related concern is that the models estimated in both Chapters 4 and 5 fail to take into consideration certain country-specific variables that have been found to influence social welfare attitudes. For example, in the United States, racial attitudes are known to be a powerful source of opposition to particular forms of social welfare policies

(Frederico 2005; Gilens 1995). In order to account for this, customized models of social welfare policy support would need to be developed for each country sample that reflect the idiosyncrasies that characterize the attitudinal viewpoints of people within their particular political system.

With respect to the survey, its content, and its timing, there are additional limitations that should be highlighted. First, it bears mentioning that it is not possible to know exactly what respondents are thinking when they indicate that it is (or is not) the government's responsibility to remedy a particular social problem. While the battery of questions in the ISSP survey that are used to construct the dependent variable are clearly written to elicit a very general response, it may be that they are too general. For example, nothing is mentioned as to how government is to provide the various social welfare policies listed. Indeed, there are a number of different means to provide public services. Also, no mention is made as to how government should pay for them. All that is asked is whether government has a responsibility to provide certain forms of assistance. Thus, there may be some concern as to whether the respondents offered well-reasoned decisions that reflect their true feelings on the matter.

The same can be said for some of the independent variables. For instance, the variable *Trust in civil servants* is measured using a question in the 2006 ISSP survey that ask respondents whether they believe civil servants can be trusted to act in the country's best interest. While the ISSP does give some guidance as to how the phrase "civil servants" should be interpreted (see Chapter 3), the question remains as to how encompassing respondents construe the term when completing a survey. Likewise, the correlate *Perception of performance* consists of factor scores generated from a battery of

questions that ask how successful government is in providing different forms of public policy. This analysis has treated this series of questions as a measure representing an assessment of policy implementation. However, it is possible that respondents' answers are more a reflection of their political beliefs rather than an evaluation of public service provision.

Indeed, question wording is an issue – one which is even more pronounced in cross-national research. Since the same basic survey is administered in different countries around the world, its content had to be translated into several languages. This presents a challenge with respect to the comparability of responses as different words and phrases are used to represent similar constructs across vastly different contexts. A similar limitation is that the method used for data collection varies from one country to the next. In some countries, the survey is administered via face-to-face interviews, self-completion with interviewer assistance, or mail. The means used to collect survey data may influence the answers given by respondents. This also presents an issue in terms of the comparability of responses.

Also, it is important to point out that many of the variables used in this analysis at the individual-level are composite measures that are generated using a variety of data items. For instance, the dependent variable itself consists of factor scores which quantify public support for social welfare policies based on responses to a battery of questions. The same is true of the variable *Perception of performance*. Many of the socio-psychological correlates are indexes, reflecting responses to different questions in the 2006 ISSP survey. While there are advantages to using composite measures, there are also some drawbacks. Whenever composite variables are generated, a certain amount of

information is lost, and a certain amount of measurement error is introduced. This being the case, it is appropriate to disclose that the size of the effect of these variables may be influenced by the act of generating composite measures.

Another potential issue is what is known as common-source bias. According to Meier and O'Toole (2013), "Common source bias exists when some of the common variation of two concepts is a function of common measurement and/or source used to gather the data" (431). All of the individual-level variables in the analysis are taken from the same basic survey – the 2006 ISSP Role of Government IV Module. As a result of this, it is possible that the relationships that appear to exist between public views on social welfare policies and other concepts measured using questions from the ISSP survey may be biased as a result of both items originating from the same source. This is certainly a limitation of the analysis, and the only means to overcome this potential concern is to use other measures independent of the ISSP survey that are tied to the same respondents. To my knowledge, no such data exist.

A final limitation that should be noted is that the fieldwork for the Role of Government IV Module was completed in either the year 2006, 2007, or 2008, depending on the country. As such, the country samples provide cross-sectional data that only reflect a snapshot in time. Accordingly, it is difficult to make causal claims without information with respect to time order. Also, the respective surveys were administered prior to economic instability caused by the Great Recession. Since this event radically altered people's lives and livelihoods, it is difficult to say if the responses offered when the various surveys were completed are comparable to views held in more contemporary times. Additional research with updated data is worthwhile.

The limitations discussed above cause a moment for pause, but also suggest future avenues of research. Certainly, the analysis would benefit from adding additional country samples that are reflective of differing contexts found throughout the world. Likewise, it may prove useful to consider other types of variables measured at the individual and country-levels to determine their explanatory import. Perhaps in the future, additional measures will be available that tap other concepts previously ignored by the research literature. As of this writing, the fieldwork for the 2016 Role of Government V Module is being conducted by the ISSP, which partially replicates the 2006 survey (ISSP – News 2016). Once this data is made available, a comparison of public support for social welfare policies can be made which not only examines cross-national variation in levels of social welfare policy support, but also changes in public opinion that are made manifest over time.

Section 6.5: Final thoughts

As the foregoing analysis has shown, public support for social welfare policies varies from person to person, and from place to place. This dissertation has attempted to test competing claims as to why those differences exist. The results reveal that support for social welfare policies is explained by a number of different factors – not just one’s ideologically partisan leanings or personal self-interest. Rather, several variables come into play at both the individual and country-levels of analysis. Throughout this work I have advocated that both public views toward the public sector and the quality of government institutions influence these levels of support. Those arguments are supported by the findings of this study.

The examination of public views with respect to social welfare policies is an important endeavor. The key defining characteristic of a democracy is the notion of self-rule. For that reason, the wants and desires, the hopes and dreams, and the fears and anxieties of people matter a great deal. They are worthy of scholarly study because those attitudes and opinions are used to make decisions about the direction of one's country via the ballot box. In January of 1944, President Franklin Roosevelt proposed what has become known as "An Economic Bill of Rights" for the American people – a set of sweeping reforms that promoted the tenets of social welfare. In a speech, he said, "We have come to a clear realization of fact that true individual freedom cannot exist without economic security and independence. 'Necessitous men are not free men.' People who are hungry and out of a job are the stuff of which dictatorships are made" (Roosevelt 2010: 466).

Less than forty years later in his First Inaugural Address, President Ronald Reagan enthusiastically declared, "In this present crisis, government is not the solution to our problem; government is the problem" (Reagan 2010: 542). While the debate over the efficiency, or the effectiveness, or even the appropriateness of the modern welfare state continues to rage, what is clear is that the will of the public influences policy outcomes. Regardless of whether social welfare policies should be either adopted or rescinded as a matter of governing philosophy, their establishment and continued existence is tied to the support that the public gives them.

This dissertation began with a simple question: What role should government play in the lives of its people? Nowhere are the differences between liberals and conservatives on this question perhaps more pronounced than in the realm of social welfare policies. It

remains as one of the key points of disagreement which divides our society into competing factions – those who favor expansive government and those who oppose it. Ultimately, it is a question that each person must answer for themselves. However, as this study suggests, certain factors may lead individuals to answer the query one way and others another.

In spite of the limitations noted above in the preceding section, several implications can be drawn from this examination of support for social welfare policies. First, there appears to be substantial variation in levels of public support for social welfare policy cross-nationally. The greatest levels of support are found within Southern and Eastern Europe countries. In contrast, people who live in Western Europe and North America are comparatively less supportive. Second, the existing literature on the topic of the public's social welfare attitudes is largely confirmed. However, it should be noted that a number of different factors appear to influence social welfare policy support – not just one's ideologically-based political party affiliation or personal self-interest.

Third, national context appears to matter in explaining social welfare policy preferences. A country's inflation rate, its level of income inequality, and the quality of its public institutions all seem to sway people's attitudes. In contrast, welfare regime typologies do not emerge as a significant predictor of social welfare policy support when controlling for other factors. Finally, it appears that the public sector plays a decided role in influencing how people come to assess government's level of responsibility in solving societal problems – thus confirming Frederickson's (1996) assertion that “Any serious student of government or public administration would likely argue that it is difficult if not impossible to unbundle politics from governance” (267).

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APPENDICES

Appendix A. Variable sources and descriptions

Variable name	Description	Source
Individual-level variables	See Appendix C	International Social Survey Programme 2006 (Role of Government IV) http://www.gesis.org/issp/modules/issp-modules-bytopic/role-of-government/2006/
Welfare regime type	Classification of countries with respect to differing social welfare policy outcomes	Coding scheme based on work of Castles and Obinger (2008)
GDP per capita, thousand USD	Gross domestic product per capita adjusted for purchasing power parity	World Bank http://data.worldbank.org/
Unemployment rate, %	Share of the labor force that is without work but available for and seeking employment	World Bank http://data.worldbank.org/
Inflation rate, %	Annual growth rate of the GDP implicit deflator	World Bank http://data.worldbank.org/
GINI index	Indicator of income inequality	Solt (2014) http://fsolt.org/swiid/
Government effectiveness indicator	Indicator of the quality of public institutions	World Bank - Worldwide Governance Indicators Project http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#home

Appendix B. Countries included and year of survey

#	Country	Geographical region	<i>N</i>	Year of survey
1	Australia	Oceania	2,781	2007
2	Canada	North America	933	2006
3	Croatia	Southern Europe	1,200	2006
4	Czech Republic	Eastern Europe	1,201	2006
5	Denmark	Northern Europe	1,368	2008
6	Finland	Northern Europe	1,189	2006
7	France	Western Europe	1,824	2006
8	Germany	Western Europe	1,112	2006
9	Great Britain	Northern Europe	930	2006
10	Hungary	Eastern Europe	1,010	2006
11	Ireland	Northern Europe	1,001	2006
12	Japan	Eastern Asia	1,231	2007
13	Latvia	Northern Europe	1,069	2006
14	Netherlands	Western Europe	993	2006
15	Norway	Northern Europe	1,330	2008
16	Poland	Eastern Europe	1,293	2007
17	Portugal	Southern Europe	1,837	2007
18	Russia	Eastern Europe	2,407	2006
19	Slovenia	Southern Europe	1,003	2007
20	Spain	Southern Europe	2,517	2006
21	Sweden	Northern Europe	1,194	2007
22	Switzerland	Western Europe	1,003	2006
23	United States	North America	1,518	2006
	Total		31,944	

Appendix C. International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) survey wording

Variable name	Question wording
<i>Dependent variable</i>	
Support for social welfare policies	<p>On the whole, do you think it should or should not be the government's responsibility to ...</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1.) Provide a job for everyone who wants one, 2.) Keep prices under control, 3.) Provide health care for the sick, 4.) Provide a decent standard of living for the old, 5.) Provide living standard for the unemployed, 6.) Reduce income differences between the rich and the poor, 7.) Give financial help to university students from low-income families, 8.) Provide decent housing for those who can't afford it. <p>Coding:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Definitely should be 2. Probably should be 3. Probably should not be 4. Definitely should not be 8. Can't choose 9. No answer
<i>Independent variables</i>	
Left political party	<p>Political party affiliation left/right placement is derived based on country specific inquiries about party identification.</p> <p>Coding:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 0. Not applicable, did not vote, not eligible 1. Far left, etc. 2. Left, center left 3. Center, liberal 4. Right, conservative 5. Far right, etc. 6. Other, no specification 7. No party preference 8. Don't know 9. No answer, refused

Variable name	Question wording
Right political party	<p>Political party affiliation left/right placement is derived based on country-specific inquiries about party identification.</p> <p>Coding: 0. Not applicable, did not vote, not eligible 1. Far left, etc. 2. Left, center left 3. Center, liberal 4. Right, conservative 5. Far right, etc. 6. Other, no specification 7. No party preference 8. Don't know 9. No answer, refused</p>
Age	<p>Respondents were asked either the year of their birth or how old they are (dependent on country).</p> <p>Coding: 15-98. (Age is derived from response.) 99. No answer, refused</p>
Female	<p>Respondents were either asked their sex or it was coded by the interviewer (dependent on country).</p> <p>Coding: 1. Male 2. Female 9. No answer, refused</p>
Low education	<p>Different questions are asked in with respect to the respondent's highest level of educational attainment in each country. However, responses are coded consistently using the following scheme.</p> <p>Coding: 0. No formal qualification, incomplete primary 1. Lowest formal qualification attainable 2. Above lowest qualification 3. Higher secondary completed 4. Above higher secondary level 5. University degree completed, graduate studies 8. Don't know 9. No answer</p>

Variable name	Question wording
Not working	<p>Different questions are asked in with respect to the respondent's current employment status in each country. However, responses are coded consistently using the following scheme.</p> <p>Coding:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Employed, full-time, main job 2. Employed, part-time, main job 3. Employed, less than part-time, temporarily out of work 4. Helping family member 5. Unemployed 6. Student, school, vocational training, apprenticeship or trainee 7. Retired 8. Housewife, -man, home duties 9. Permanently disabled 10. Other, not in labour force 97. Refused 98. Don't know 99. No answer
Government employment	<p>Different questions are asked in with respect to the respondent's employment sector in each country. However, responses are coded consistently using the following scheme.</p> <p>Coding:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 0. Not applicable, never had a job 1. Work for government 2. Work for publicly owned firm, state owned firm, nationalised industry 3. Work for private firm or company, others 4. Self employed 9. No answer, don't know

Variable name	Question wording
Interpersonal trust	<p>1.) If you are not careful, other people will take advantage of you.</p> <p>2.) There are only a few people I can trust completely.</p> <p>Coding:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Strongly agree 2. Agree 3. Neither agree nor disagree 4. Disagree 5. Strongly disagree 8. Can't choose 9. No answer
Contact with others	<p>On average, about how many people do you have contact with in a typical week day, including people you live with. We are interested in contact on a one-to-one basis, including everyone with whom you chat, talk, or discuss matters. This can be face-to-face, by telephone, by mail, or on the internet. Please include only people you know.</p> <p>Coding:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. 0-4 persons 2. 5-9 persons 3. 10-19 persons 4. 20-49 persons 5. 50 or more persons 8. Can't choose 9. No answer
Internal political efficacy	<p>1.) I feel I have a pretty good understanding of the important political issues facing our country.</p> <p>2.) I think most people are better informed about politics and government than I am.</p> <p>Coding:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Strongly agree 2. Agree 3. Neither agree nor disagree 4. Disagree 5. Strongly disagree 8. Can't choose 9. No answer

Variable name	Question wording
External political efficacy	<p>1.) People like me have don't have any say about what government does.</p> <p>2.) The average citizen has considerable influence on politics.</p> <p>Coding:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Strongly agree 2. Agree 3. Neither agree nor disagree 4. Disagree 5. Strongly disagree 8. Can't choose 9. No answer
Trust in civil servants	<p>Most civil servants can be trusted to do what is best for the country.</p> <p>Coding:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Strongly agree 2. Agree 3. Neither agree nor disagree 4. Disagree 5. Strongly disagree 8. Can't choose 9. No answer
Perception of performance	<p>How successful do you think the government in [Country] is nowadays in each of the following areas?</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1.) Providing heal care for the sick? 2.) Providing a decent standard of living for the old? 3.) Dealing with threats to [Country's] security? 4.) Controlling crime? 5.) Fighting unemployment? 6.) Protecting the environment? <p>Coding:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Very successful 2. Quite successful 3. Neither successful nor unsuccessful 4. Quite unsuccessful 5. Very unsuccessful 8. Can't choose 9. No answer

Appendix D. Valid and invalid responses: Dependent variable – social welfare policy support

Country	Invalid responses, % (1)	Total invalid responses (2)	Total valid responses (3)	Total responses (4=2+3)
Australia	18.7	520	2,261	2,781
Canada	22.8	213	720	933
Croatia	16.1	193	1,007	1,200
Czech Republic	15.9	191	1,010	1,201
Denmark	16.7	229	1,139	1,368
Finland	17.7	210	979	1,189
France	16.6	302	1,522	1,824
Germany	19.6	218	894	1,112
Great Britain	18.7	174	756	930
Hungary	8.9	90	920	1,010
Ireland	11.9	119	882	1,001
Japan	29.1	358	873	1,231
Latvia	21.7	232	837	1,069
Netherlands	20.0	199	794	993
Norway	12.4	165	1,165	1,330
Poland	15.6	202	1,091	1,293
Portugal	10.0	183	1,654	1,837
Russia	18.4	442	1,965	2,407
Slovenia	6.4	64	939	1,003
Spain	11.1	279	2,238	2,517
Sweden	18.5	221	973	1,194
Switzerland	16.3	163	840	1,003
United States	7.4	112	1,406	1,518
Total	15.9	5,079	26,865	31,944

Appendix E. Valid and invalid responses: Left political party affiliation

Country	Invalid responses, % (1)	Total invalid responses (2)	Total valid responses (3)	Total responses (4=2+3)
Australia	3.3	91	2,690	2,781
Canada	4.4	41	892	933
Croatia	15.7	188	1,012	1,200
Czech Republic	24.0	288	913	1,201
Denmark	10.8	148	1,220	1,368
Finland	28.5	339	850	1,189
France	29.4	537	1,287	1,824
Germany	21.6	240	872	1,112
Great Britain	6.0	56	874	930
Hungary	37.1	375	635	1,010
Ireland	1.2	12	989	1,001
Japan	0.6	8	1,223	1,231
Latvia	28.6	306	763	1,069
Netherlands	4.2	42	951	993
Norway	18.3	243	1,087	1,330
Poland	36.8	476	817	1,293
Portugal	14.6	268	1,569	1,837
Russia	34.0	819	1,588	2,407
Slovenia	34.3	344	659	1,003
Spain	25.4	640	1,877	2,517
Sweden	7.0	84	1,110	1,194
Switzerland	4.4	44	959	1,003
United States	0.8	12	1,506	1,518
Total	17.5	5,601	26,343	31,944

Appendix F. Valid and invalid responses: Right political party affiliation

Country	Invalid responses, % (1)	Total invalid responses (2)	Total valid responses (3)	Total responses (4=2+3)
Australia	3.3	91	2,690	2,781
Canada	4.4	41	892	933
Croatia	15.7	188	1,012	1,200
Czech Republic	24.0	288	913	1,201
Denmark	10.8	148	1,220	1,368
Finland	28.5	339	850	1,189
France	29.4	537	1,287	1,824
Germany	21.6	240	872	1,112
Great Britain	6.0	56	874	930
Hungary	37.1	375	635	1,010
Ireland	1.2	12	989	1,001
Japan	0.6	8	1,223	1,231
Latvia	28.6	306	763	1,069
Netherlands	4.2	42	951	993
Norway	18.3	243	1,087	1,330
Poland	36.8	476	817	1,293
Portugal	14.6	268	1,569	1,837
Russia	34.0	819	1,588	2,407
Slovenia	34.3	344	659	1,003
Spain	25.4	640	1,877	2,517
Sweden	7.0	84	1,110	1,194
Switzerland	4.4	44	959	1,003
United States	0.8	12	1,506	1,518
Total	17.5	5,601	26,343	31,944

Appendix G. Valid and invalid responses: Age

Country	Invalid responses, % (1)	Total invalid responses (2)	Total valid responses (3)	Total responses (4=2+3)
Australia	1.6	44	2,737	2,781
Canada	6.8	63	870	933
Croatia	0.5	6	1,194	1,200
Czech Republic	0.5	6	1,195	1,201
Denmark	0.0	0	1,368	1,368
Finland	0.0	0	1,189	1,189
France	0.0	0	1,824	1,824
Germany	0.4	5	1,107	1,112
Great Britain	0.2	2	928	930
Hungary	0.0	0	1,010	1,010
Ireland	1.0	10	991	1,001
Japan	0.0	0	1,231	1,231
Latvia	0.0	0	1,069	1,069
Netherlands	0.1	1	992	993
Norway	0.0	0	1,330	1,330
Poland	0.0	0	1,293	1,293
Portugal	0.0	0	1,837	1,837
Russia	0.0	0	2,407	2,407
Slovenia	0.0	0	1,003	1,003
Spain	0.1	2	2,515	2,517
Sweden	0.0	0	1,194	1,194
Switzerland	0.0	0	1,003	1,003
United States	0.7	10	1,508	1,518
Total	0.5	149	31,795	31,944

Appendix H. Valid and invalid responses: Female

Country	Invalid responses, % (1)	Total invalid responses (2)	Total valid responses (3)	Total responses (4=2+3)
Australia	1.0	27	2,754	2,781
Canada	1.6	15	918	933
Croatia	0.0	0	1,200	1,200
Czech Republic	0.0	0	1,201	1,201
Denmark	0.0	0	1,368	1,368
Finland	0.0	0	1,189	1,189
France	0.0	0	1,824	1,824
Germany	0.0	0	1,112	1,112
Great Britain	0.0	0	930	930
Hungary	0.0	0	1,010	1,010
Ireland	0.2	2	999	1,001
Japan	0.0	0	1,231	1,231
Latvia	0.0	0	1,069	1,069
Netherlands	0.0	0	993	993
Norway	0.0	0	1,330	1,330
Poland	0.0	0	1,293	1,293
Portugal	0.0	0	1,837	1,837
Russia	0.0	0	2,407	2,407
Slovenia	0.0	0	1,003	1,003
Spain	0.0	0	2,517	2,517
Sweden	0.0	0	1,194	1,194
Switzerland	0.0	0	1,003	1,003
United States	0.0	0	1,518	1,518
Total	0.1	44	31,900	31,944

Appendix I. Valid and invalid responses: Low education

Country	Invalid responses, % (1)	Total invalid responses (2)	Total valid responses (3)	Total responses (4=2+3)
Australia	1.9	53	2,728	2,781
Canada	2.0	19	914	933
Croatia	0.1	1	1,199	1,200
Czech Republic	0.8	10	1,191	1,201
Denmark	6.1	84	1,284	1,368
Finland	4.7	56	1,133	1,189
France	0.5	10	1,814	1,824
Germany	0.2	2	1,110	1,112
Great Britain	0.1	1	929	930
Hungary	0.0	0	1,010	1,010
Ireland	0.2	2	999	1,001
Japan	0.9	11	1,220	1,231
Latvia	0.0	0	1,069	1,069
Netherlands	1.6	16	977	993
Norway	0.8	11	1,319	1,330
Poland	0.0	0	1,293	1,293
Portugal	0.0	0	1,837	1,837
Russia	0.0	0	2,407	2,407
Slovenia	1.5	15	988	1,003
Spain	0.5	13	2,504	2,517
Sweden	2.4	29	1,165	1,194
Switzerland	0.7	7	996	1,003
United States	0.5	8	1,510	1,518
Total	1.1	348	31,596	31,944

Appendix J. Valid and invalid responses: Not working

Country	Invalid responses, % (1)	Total invalid responses (2)	Total valid responses (3)	Total responses (4=2+3)
Australia	2.9	80	2,701	2,781
Canada	3.0	28	905	933
Croatia	0.2	2	1,198	1,200
Czech Republic	0.8	10	1,191	1,201
Denmark	3.1	43	1,325	1,368
Finland	4.4	52	1,137	1,189
France	0.4	7	1,817	1,824
Germany	0.2	2	1,110	1,112
Great Britain	0.0	0	930	930
Hungary	0.0	0	1,010	1,010
Ireland	0.0	0	1,001	1,001
Japan	3.9	48	1,183	1,231
Latvia	0.0	0	1,069	1,069
Netherlands	6.0	60	933	993
Norway	2.9	39	1,291	1,330
Poland	0.0	0	1,293	1,293
Portugal	0.2	3	1,834	1,837
Russia	0.0	0	2,407	2,407
Slovenia	1.0	10	993	1,003
Spain	1.1	27	2,490	2,517
Sweden	3.3	39	1,155	1,194
Switzerland	0.4	4	999	1,003
United States	0.1	2	1,516	1,518
Total	1.4	456	31,488	31,944

Appendix K. Valid and invalid responses: Government employment

Country	Invalid responses, % (1)	Total invalid responses (2)	Total valid responses (3)	Total responses (4=2+3)
Australia	7.7	214	2,567	2,781
Canada	15.5	145	788	933
Croatia	24.6	295	905	1,200
Czech Republic	7.4	89	1,112	1,201
Denmark	9.4	129	1,239	1,368
Finland	15.2	181	1,008	1,189
France	11.4	208	1,616	1,824
Germany	11.0	122	990	1,112
Great Britain	3.3	31	899	930
Hungary	9.1	92	918	1,010
Ireland	6.4	64	937	1,001
Japan	39.1	481	750	1,231
Latvia	10.3	110	959	1,069
Netherlands	8.0	79	914	993
Norway	7.2	96	1,234	1,330
Poland	14.2	184	1,109	1,293
Portugal	12.6	231	1,606	1,837
Russia	9.8	237	2,170	2,407
Slovenia	18.0	181	822	1,003
Spain	19.9	502	2,015	2,517
Sweden	7.3	87	1,107	1,194
Switzerland	6.4	64	939	1,003
United States	4.9	75	1,443	1,518
Total	12.2	3,897	28,047	31,944

Appendix L. Valid and invalid responses: Interpersonal trust

Country	Invalid responses, % (1)	Total invalid responses (2)	Total valid responses (3)	Total responses (4=2+3)
Australia	4.4	121	2,660	2,781
Canada	3.5	33	900	933
Croatia	2.8	34	1,166	1,200
Czech Republic	1.5	18	1,183	1,201
Denmark	3.4	47	1,321	1,368
Finland	5.0	59	1,130	1,189
France	7.0	127	1,697	1,824
Germany	4.2	47	1,065	1,112
Great Britain	3.2	30	900	930
Hungary	0.8	8	1,002	1,010
Ireland	1.1	11	990	1,001
Japan	5.6	69	1,162	1,231
Latvia	4.5	48	1,021	1,069
Netherlands	4.1	41	952	993
Norway	2.3	30	1,300	1,330
Poland	3.2	41	1,252	1,293
Portugal	0.7	12	1,825	1,837
Russia	12.2	294	2,113	2,407
Slovenia	1.2	12	991	1,003
Spain	2.6	66	2,451	2,517
Sweden	7.5	89	1,105	1,194
Switzerland	0.4	4	999	1,003
United States	0.6	9	1,509	1,518
Total	3.9	1,250	30,694	31,944

Appendix M. Valid and invalid responses: Contact with others

Country	Invalid responses, % (1)	Total invalid responses (2)	Total valid responses (3)	Total responses (4=2+3)
Australia	3.5	97	2,684	2,781
Canada	4.8	45	888	933
Croatia	3.8	46	1,154	1,200
Czech Republic	1.0	12	1,189	1,201
Denmark	2.6	35	1,333	1,368
Finland	2.0	24	1,165	1,189
France	2.7	50	1,774	1,824
Germany	1.6	18	1,094	1,112
Great Britain	5.3	49	881	930
Hungary	0.5	5	1,005	1,010
Ireland	0.3	3	998	1,001
Japan	3.0	37	1,194	1,231
Latvia	18.3	196	873	1,069
Netherlands	3.2	32	961	993
Norway	1.9	25	1,305	1,330
Poland	2.0	26	1,267	1,293
Portugal	1.9	34	1,803	1,837
Russia	3.7	89	2,318	2,407
Slovenia	1.4	14	989	1,003
Spain	0.8	19	2,498	2,517
Sweden	1.7	20	1,174	1,194
Switzerland	0.3	3	1,000	1,003
United States	0.3	4	1,514	1,518
Total	2.8	883	31,061	31,944

Appendix N. Valid and invalid responses: Internal political efficacy

Country	Invalid responses, % (1)	Total invalid responses (2)	Total valid responses (3)	Total responses (4=2+3)
Australia	5.1	141	2,640	2,781
Canada	6.0	56	877	933
Croatia	8.6	103	1,097	1,200
Czech Republic	5.5	66	1,135	1,201
Denmark	7.5	103	1,265	1,368
Finland	13.0	155	1,034	1,189
France	14.6	266	1,558	1,824
Germany	9.5	106	1,006	1,112
Great Britain	7.2	67	863	930
Hungary	4.6	46	964	1,010
Ireland	2.5	25	976	1,001
Japan	17.5	215	1,016	1,231
Latvia	13.1	140	929	1,069
Netherlands	6.9	69	924	993
Norway	7.0	93	1,237	1,330
Poland	6.2	80	1,213	1,293
Portugal	4.5	83	1,754	1,837
Russia	18.2	439	1,968	2,407
Slovenia	7.3	73	930	1,003
Spain	4.0	101	2,416	2,517
Sweden	13.8	165	1,029	1,194
Switzerland	4.2	42	961	1,003
United States	1.3	20	1,498	1,518
Total	8.3	2,654	29,290	31,944

Appendix O. Valid and invalid responses: External political efficacy

Country	Invalid responses, % (1)	Total invalid responses (2)	Total valid responses (3)	Total responses (4=2+3)
Australia	4.6	128	2,653	2,781
Canada	4.9	46	887	933
Croatia	6.0	72	1,128	1,200
Czech Republic	2.3	28	1,173	1,201
Denmark	5.1	70	1,298	1,368
Finland	5.1	61	1,128	1,189
France	9.5	173	1,651	1,824
Germany	3.9	43	1,069	1,112
Great Britain	5.4	50	880	930
Hungary	1.5	15	995	1,010
Ireland	2.3	23	978	1,001
Japan	9.3	115	1,116	1,231
Latvia	6.5	69	1,000	1,069
Netherlands	4.3	43	950	993
Norway	2.5	33	1,297	1,330
Poland	3.6	47	1,246	1,293
Portugal	5.8	106	1,731	1,837
Russia	10.3	249	2,158	2,407
Slovenia	3.2	32	971	1,003
Spain	7.6	191	2,326	2,517
Sweden	7.6	91	1,103	1,194
Switzerland	2.3	23	980	1,003
United States	1.4	22	1,496	1,518
Total	5.4	1,730	30,214	31,944

Appendix P. Valid and invalid responses: Trust in civil servants

Country	Invalid responses, % (1)	Total invalid responses (2)	Total valid responses (3)	Total responses (4=2+3)
Australia	4.0	110	2,671	2,781
Canada	4.0	37	896	933
Croatia	8.4	101	1,099	1,200
Czech Republic	2.1	25	1,176	1,201
Denmark	5.2	71	1,297	1,368
Finland	5.7	68	1,121	1,189
France	6.7	123	1,701	1,824
Germany	6.8	76	1,036	1,112
Great Britain	6.8	63	867	930
Hungary	7.2	73	937	1,010
Ireland	2.8	28	973	1,001
Japan	7.4	91	1,140	1,231
Latvia	10.0	107	962	1,069
Netherlands	5.0	50	943	993
Norway	3.2	42	1,288	1,330
Poland	7.7	99	1,194	1,293
Portugal	6.6	122	1,715	1,837
Russia	11.1	267	2,140	2,407
Slovenia	4.3	43	960	1,003
Spain	9.2	231	2,286	2,517
Sweden	6.9	82	1,112	1,194
Switzerland	4.0	40	963	1,003
United States	1.6	24	1,494	1,518
Total	6.2	1,973	29,971	31,944

Appendix Q. Valid and invalid responses: Perception of performance

Country	Invalid responses, % (1)	Total invalid responses (2)	Total valid responses (3)	Total responses (4=2+3)
Australia	11.3	313	2,468	2,781
Canada	17.9	167	766	933
Croatia	32.3	388	812	1,200
Czech Republic	7.9	95	1,106	1,201
Denmark	15.9	218	1,150	1,368
Finland	19.0	226	963	1,189
France	11.8	216	1,608	1,824
Germany	15.3	170	942	1,112
Great Britain	11.1	103	827	930
Hungary	15.9	161	849	1,010
Ireland	13.4	134	867	1,001
Japan	21.9	270	961	1,231
Latvia	20.1	215	854	1,069
Netherlands	13.1	130	863	993
Norway	17.2	229	1,101	1,330
Poland	22.1	286	1,007	1,293
Portugal	18.8	346	1,491	1,837
Russia	21.3	512	1,895	2,407
Slovenia	14.5	145	858	1,003
Spain	19.7	496	2,021	2,517
Sweden	26.0	310	884	1,194
Switzerland	10.1	101	902	1,003
United States	7.2	109	1,409	1,518
Total	16.7	5,340	26,604	31,944

Appendix R. Tests of heteroskedasticity for country-specific models

Model	χ^2	P-value	Degrees of freedom
Australia	3.92	0.0478	1,777
Canada	0.00	0.9645	491
Croatia	21.91	0.0000	406
Czech Republic	0.06	0.8117	655
Denmark	13.53	0.0002	748
Finland	5.61	0.0179	504
France	31.73	0.0000	803
Germany	0.29	0.5875	525
Great Britain	2.05	0.1527	583
Hungary	7.24	0.0071	477
Ireland	17.14	0.0000	682
Japan	3.90	0.0484	439
Latvia	3.21	0.0730	403
Netherlands	4.97	0.0258	601
Norway	0.07	0.7886	732
Poland	13.51	0.0002	481
Portugal	30.70	0.0000	986
Russia	36.38	0.0000	801
Slovenia	1.58	0.2086	469
Spain	5.99	0.0144	1,154
Sweden	5.13	0.0235	581
Switzerland	0.65	0.4209	703
United States	22.80	0.0000	1,231

Appendix S. Tests of heteroskedasticity for multilevel models

Model	χ^2	P-value	Degrees of freedom
Basic	351.62	0.000	22
Welfare regime type	351.64	0.000	22
Economic conditions	351.61	0.000	22
Inequality	351.61	0.000	22
Institutional quality	351.61	0.000	22
Composite non-welfare regime	351.60	0.000	22
Composite	351.62	0.000	22

Appendix T. Variance inflation factors (VIFs) for country-level correlates

Model	Variable	VIF	1/VIF
Welfare Regime Type	Scandinavian welfare regime	1.24	0.8050
	Continental welfare regime	1.37	0.7285
	Post-communist welfare regime	1.39	0.7188
Economic Conditions	GDP in thousand \$s per capita	1.85	0.5415
	Unemployment rate	1.70	0.5883
	Inflation rate	1.17	0.8524
Inequality	Gini index	1.00	1.0000
Institutional Quality	Government effectiveness	1.00	1.0000
Composite Non-Welfare Regime Variables	Inflation rate	1.49	0.6700
	Gini index	1.37	0.7278
	Government effectiveness	1.47	0.6802
Composite	Scandinavian welfare regime	3.69	0.2713
	Continental welfare regime	3.09	0.3238
	Post-communist welfare regime	13.93	0.0718
	Inflation rate	2.80	0.3574
	Gini index	7.12	0.1404
	Government effectiveness	10.18	0.0982

VITA

Andrew Lee Morelock was born in Kingsport, TN, the son of Daniel and Kimberley Morelock. He attended the University of Tennessee, majoring in political science. After graduating with a bachelor's degree with honors in 2010, he enrolled in the University of Tennessee's Master of Public Administration Program. While pursuing his MPA, Andrew served as an intern at the Community and Regional Resilience Institute (CARRI) located at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL). He also participated in the Tennessee Public Service Internship Program administered by the County Technical Assistance Service (CTAS) within the University of Tennessee's Institute for Public Service. Upon graduation in 2011, Andrew continued his graduate studies in UT's PhD program, focusing in political science.

While a graduate student, Andrew has taught a number of different courses in the Department of Political Science including: Public Budgeting, Contemporary Issues in American Public Policy, and Introduction to Political Science. Andrew is certified by the State of Tennessee Comptroller's Office as a Certified Municipal Finance Officer (CMFO). He has also served as two terms as the president of the East Tennessee Chapter of the American Society for Public Administration (ASPA). To date, Andrew has one refereed co-authored publication accepted in the *International Journal of Public Administration*, one "revise and resubmit" co-authored manuscript at *Public Performance & Management Review*, and several other papers ongoing. Along with his colleague, Dr. Nurgul Aitalieva, he received the *Best Paper Award* at the 2015 Midwest Public Affairs Conference (MPAC) in Milwaukee, WI. Beginning in the fall of 2016, he will join the faculty of Murray State University as an assistant professor.