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The Effect of the Gorbachev Era (1985-1991) on Newsweek's Photo Coverage and Image of the Soviet Union

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To the Graduate Council:

I am submitting herewith a dissertation written by Ruth Winchester Ware entitled "The Effect of the Gorbachev Era (1985-1991) on Newsweek's Photo Coverage and Image of the Soviet Union." I have examined the final electronic copy of this dissertation for form and content and recommend that it be accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, with a major in Communication.

Paul Ashdown, Major Professor

We have read this dissertation and recommend its acceptance:

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Accepted for the Council:


Dixie L. Thompson

Vice Provost and Dean of the Graduate School

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
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Accepted for the Council:



Associate Vice Chancellor
and Dean of The Graduate School

**THE EFFECT OF THE GORBACHEV ERA (1985-1991)
ON NEWSWEEK'S PHOTO COVERAGE AND IMAGE OF THE
SOVIET UNION**

A Dissertation

Presented for the

Doctor of Philosophy

Degree

The University of Tennessee, Knoxville

Ruth Winchester Ware

May 1993

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DEDICATION

**This dissertation is dedicated to my daughter,
Judith Anne Ware, who is beginning her Ph.D. studies
just as I complete mine. May we both be successful
communicators, Judith in French and me in photography.**

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ABSTRACT

This study examined 729 photos and cutlines published in NEWSWEEK's International Section that depicted events that occurred in the Soviet Union during the Gorbachev Era (1985-91). The period saw change in Soviet domestic affairs (especially *glasnost*) and foreign relations (especially New Political Thinking or NPT) that cumulatively led to the end of the Cold War. NEWSWEEK coverage of the Gorbachev Era was compared to NEWSWEEK coverage of the Chernenko interlude (February 1984-February 1985) in order to have a base line for comparison.

NEWSWEEK increased its coverage of the Soviet Union during the Gorbachev Era. There were more editions, photos, and cutlines that depicted the era. A more diverse mix of content was covered. An increase occurred in content that prior to *glasnost* was considered taboo. NEWSWEEK depicted the Soviet Union in a more positive way in terms of Slant, Image, and Overall Image. International relations were depicted positively, Gorbachev and his spouse were depicted positively, but domestic turmoil was depicted negatively. NEWSWEEK had many gatekeepers. Photojournalists were important gatekeepers. Photos and cutlines were important conveyors of content and image. It was more difficult to measure latent content of photos than manifest content.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The Gorbachev Era (1985-91) was a time of momentous change in the Soviet Union that saw an improved relationship with the United States. At the beginning of this era President Reagan was taking a "tough" stance toward the Soviet Union ("Tough Talk on Star Wars," *NEWSWEEK*, September, 30, 1985, p. 28). At the end of the era President Bush was in favor of providing aid to the former Soviet Union. *NEWSWEEK* was an important source of information about this era. *NEWSWEEK* coverage consisted of headlines, text, news photos, and cutlines.

Purpose of the Study

The purpose of this study is to learn how *NEWSWEEK* responded to some of the changes that occurred during the Gorbachev Era. The specific purpose is to learn how *NEWSWEEK* covered this era through photos. One

question is determining just how the coverage changed during these years. The overarching question of the study is determining just how the image of the Soviet Union presented by NEWSWEEK changed.

The study is about NEWSWEEK's photo coverage of the Soviet Union during this era. News photos are to be content analyzed. NEWSWEEK's photo department is the communicator and provides the subject of the case study. Gatekeeping theories and research about the sociology of news-gathering are used to provide a framework for the study. Guy Cooper, NEWSWEEK's Picture Editor, Carroll Bogert, Moscow Bureau Chief, Viktor Yurehenko, Picture Editor of the Moscow Bureau, Wally McNamee, a NEWSWEEK photojournalist, and Peter Turnley, a NEWSWEEK contract photojournalist, are to be interviewed.

NEWSWEEK is seen as a good choice to be the subject of the case study. NEWSWEEK has been in the marketplace since 1933, and has as its slogan, "The Magazine of News Significance" (Taft, 1982, p. 69). It has a reputation for reacting faster than other news magazines (including TIME) on major news stories (p. 70). NEWSWEEK has been described in various ways, including: "NEWSWEEK is vigorous, competent, packed with information, bright with photographs in strong colors, and sharp with the comments of its columnists" (Wood, 1971, p. 231).

The decision to content analyze news magazine photos, not newspaper photos, is based on several reasons. News photos contained in bound editions are more easily used in research than those preserved on microfilm. The University

of Tennessee library contains bound editions of NEWSWEEK. News magazines have a potential to influence more people over time, since they may have multiple readers and are more durable (Wolseley, 1973, p. 30). NEWSWEEK has an audience of 20,318 (000) adults. Each copy is read by 6.55 persons. (Demographic Profile, 1992 Simmons). News magazines, since they usually can't compete with newspapers in terms of reporting the news first, seek to explain the news in-depth and to provide background. News magazines supplement and compete with newspapers by providing the reader more perspective on the news (Wolseley, 1969, p. 195). Since news magazines aren't expected to cover local news, their resources can be used to cover national and international news. A lot of these resources are used to cover international news (p. 283). News photography is an important part of this international coverage.

NEWSWEEK photos and cutlines are the **unit of analysis**.

Photojournalism is seen as the **channel**. Photos and cutlines are seen as containing the **message**. Manifest content is what is said, or printed. Latent content is what is between the lines (Tsang, 1987, p. 159). Both categories of content are to be analyzed in this study. Photos are to be content analyzed to determine manifest content (Identifying Data, Source, Locale, and Content) and latent content (Leader Depiction, Slant, Image, and Overall Image). Latent content is more difficult to measure than manifest content, but nevertheless is important in this study.

A key purpose of the study is to determine Slant, Image, and Overall Image of the Soviet Union presented by NEWSWEEK photos during the Gorbachev Era. Image consists of a mental picture, true or false, in various degrees, which is implicated in ideas, feelings, and prejudices (Strout, 1963, p. ix). An assumption is that images about other nations are received at least partially from the mass media and that these images are important in international relations. These images influence decision-makers and the public. Images of what the world is like, not the actual state of the world, determine our behavior (Boulding, 1959, p. 120-121).

The image of the Soviet Union has been studied by communication scholars for at least fifty years. Kriesberg (1946) content analyzed news stories and editorials in the NEW YORK TIMES 1917-1946. Kriesberg uses several variables including themes, reporting devices, an attention analysis (space and position) and an analysis of the editorial-news relationship. Kriesberg identifies six themes unfavorable to the Soviet Union: Soviet leaders are immoral and unethical, Soviet leaders are unjust, unreasonable, and arbitrary, the Soviet government does not represent the Russian people, the Soviet government will not succeed, the Soviet Union is a predatory state, and the Soviet leaders and people are enigmatic. He identifies three themes favorable to the Soviet Union: the Soviet Union is cooperating with the Allies against the Axis, the Russian people are resolute fighters, and the Soviet nation is enterprising and forceful. Kriesberg concludes that there was more negative news about the Soviet Union

than positive, and that news that is positive to the Soviet Union receives more attention when Soviet Union and United States interests are parallel (p. 553). Since Soviet and U.S. interests began to be more parallel during the course of the Gorbachev Era, one might expect that more positive photos about the Soviet Union were published during the time span of the study. The study is seen as an opportunity to test some of Kriesberg's ideas.

Kriesberg's study suggests a method to define slant. Assignment of slant (positive, negative, or neutral) can be based on a consideration of whether the values or ethics attributed to the Soviets are in harmony with the values or ethics to which most American adhere. One might ask whether the action taken by the Soviets is in the interest of the U.S. reader (p. 542). If the answer is yes, the slant of the message probably is positive.

Buchanan (1951) uses a public opinion poll to determine the image held by ordinary people about citizens of other nations. Buchanan states that Americans have the image of Russians as being cruel, hardworking, domineering, backward, conceited, and brave (p. 523). Boulding (1959) states that the Soviet Union has been viewed as the primary U.S. enemy. He provides several variables that can be applied to evaluating our image of the Soviet Union based on bipolar descriptors: the degree of exclusiveness of territorial occupation, hostility or friendliness, and strength or weakness (p. 120).

Dasbach (1966) content analyzed two propaganda magazines (AMERICAN ILLUSTRATED and SOVIET LIFE 1961-1963) to determine

whether content changes result following a change in Soviet Union and United States relations. Shifts as well as consistencies are found (p. 82). Ewen (1988) states that as Soviet society became more "stylishly *glasnost*" in the late 1980s, the U.S. media had to struggle with their stereotype of "the thick-fingered Russian peasant" (p. 111). This study will examine whether changed relations between the Soviet Union and the United States post-*glasnost* affected NEWSWEEK's coverage.

The U.S. media tend to present a negative image of the Soviet Union. A negative image of the Soviet Union during the Cold War was dangerous, but served a purpose. This study seeks to determine the extent to which the image presented in NEWSWEEK (whether positive, negative, or neutral) differs from the image presented during the Chernenko interlude.

Slant, Image and Overall Image are to be determined by using bipolar, adjectival word-pairs to test meaning.

Overview of the Study

The text of the dissertation consists of six chapters. Chapter I. presents the primary problem of the study, which is to determine whether the changes that occurred during the Gorbachev Era affected NEWSWEEK's news-gathering and

photo coverage. It is expected that Soviet domestic changes (especially *glasnost*) resulted in a different news-gathering environment. It is expected that Soviet foreign policy changes labelled, "New Political Thinking or NPT," contributed to improved Soviet Union and United States relations that resulted in a less fearful and hostile environment and mindset for the gatekeepers. It is expected that there was increased coverage, more diversity of content, a more positive depiction of leaders, and that the image of the Soviet Union was more positive. Chapter II. reviews literature about image studies, news photos, *glasnost*, and foreign policy changes that affected Soviet Union and United States relations. Photos provide information and influence the opinion of readers. Photos and cutlines are to be analyzed to determine the depiction of the Soviet Union. Photos and cutlines are used as the unit of analysis. Chapter III. presents information about gatekeeping theories and the sociology of news-gathering and describes how these theories are applied. Chapter IV. presents methods and procedures. Chapter V. presents the results of the study and Chapter VI. presents discussion and conclusions. An Appendix includes examples of questionnaires sent to NEWSWEEK gatekeepers, coding procedures, and other related materials.

The study is about contemporary events (the Gorbachev Era). It is exploratory in that open-ended questionnaires are used. It is descriptive in that it seeks to describe manifest and latent content of news photos and cutlines. It is explanatory in that it goes beyond describing content and seeks to understand how and why certain photos were used, not others.

CHAPTER II.

REVIEW OF LITERATURE

Images of Nations

This era saw profound changes occurring in the Soviet Union both domestically and abroad. These changes, especially those that affected the media (*glasnost*), and those that affected foreign relations (New Political Thinking or NPT), culminated in the end of the Cold War. A different type of Soviet Union and United States relationship was forged resulting in different relations between these two superpowers. Wedge (1966) states that national images are not permanently fixed, but are affected by changed relations between nations (p. 280). If Soviet and U.S. relations changed during the course of the Gorbachev Era, one might expect to find a different image of the Soviet Union depicted in NEWSWEEK.

This study is based on three assumptions: changed relations between the Soviet Union and the United States would affect NEWSWEEK's news-gathering and photo coverage environment, NEWSWEEK photos would depict the Soviet

Union with more diversity or complexity and would project a more positive image, and news photos are considered to be a powerful communication channel and source of images. Image studies are important in communications and political science research. Metaphors for image studies come from both communications and political science scholars. Isaacs (1956) suggests the phrase, "scratches on our minds" (p. 197), and Lippmann (1922) suggests, "pictures in our heads" (p. 3). Reigrotski and Anderson (1959, p. 517) propose using the two terms, "stereotypes" and "images" interchangeably. Merrill (1962) says that when images that national groups have of each other are incomplete, misleading, distorted, and out-of-focus that they are stereotypes (p. 203). However, other scholars consider stereotypes to be necessary to simplify complex reality and do not see this concept as having a negative connotation.

Klineberg (1951) defines stereotypes as the pictures in our heads of our own or of other national groups. Klineberg emphasizes the association between negative stereotypes and international relations. "Hostility can obviously be generated more easily between two nations which hold unfavorable stereotypes regarding each other" (p. 505). Klineberg says that national stereotypes change with time and are responsive to economic and political change (p. 512).

The brief seven years of the Gorbachev Era saw tremendous economic (*perestroika*), social (*glasnost*), and political (New Political Thinking or NPT) changes. The Cold War was a time of distrust and hostility between the two superpowers. It is expected that during the course of the Gorbachev Era,

NEWSWEEK photos depicted a more positive image of the Soviet Union, an image that was less hostile or threatening to U.S. interests.

Pool and Prasad (1958) say that images of foreigners are always partially negative, but that the most important thing about images is not to determine whether they are accurate or flattering, but to learn what they represent about the holders of the image (p. 293). One purpose of the study is to make informed inferences about NEWSWEEK gatekeepers and about U.S. readers. It is assumed that U.S. cultural biases will be reflected in the coverage. A comparison between photos taken during the Chernenko interlude with photos taken during the various phases of the Gorbachev Era is expected to provide insight about us, as well as about them.

Images are received, at least partially, through the mass media, including through photos, and have the potential of changing attitudes (Mehling, 1959, pp. 189-198). The media may present either a positive, negative, or neutral image. Image tends to be adjusted to policy (Lee, 1979-80, pp. 31-34). An hypothesis of the study is that as the United States foreign policy toward the Soviet Union changed in a more positive direction, the image presented of the Soviet Union, as depicted in photos, became more positive.

Crespi (1961) says that image is very important in determining international relations and considers image to be no less important than the objective political, military, and economic realities. Crespi says that the media are involved in the process of foreign affairs (p. 116).

Cohen (1965) views the media as a link between foreign affairs decision-makers and people who follow world events (p. 194). An assumption is that projecting images of other nations is one aspect of policy and that the media contribute to this process. One might expect that as U.S. foreign policy sought to end the Cold War, the Soviet image in the U.S. media would become more positive, or less threatening to U.S. interests.

Berry (1990) proposes that the U.S. media are neither a powerful force in foreign policy, nor managed by the government, but respond differently under different circumstances. Berry distinguishes between the formulation and execution stages of foreign policy (pp. 139-151). One might expect that NEWSWEEK contributed to a more positive image of the Soviet Union during the execution stage of foreign policy that sought to end the Cold War. One example of this execution stage of foreign policy occurred when a transition was being made in U.S. thinking between viewing Soviet change as only cosmetic, intended to lull the United States, versus viewing it as systemic change.

Boulding (1959) observes the importance of national images on international relations. "The 'image' then, must be thought of as the total cognitive, affective, and evaluative structure of the behavior unit, or its internal view of itself and its universe" (pp. 120-121). This definition suggests the use of word-pairs to measure the image of the Soviet Union presented in NEWSWEEK. Boulding considers two categories of images including, the image of the national leaders or decision-makers and the image of the mass of ordinary people.

Another distinction is made between the ethnic image and the national image (Willis, 1968-69, p. 187). This study seeks to determine the image presented about the Soviet Union as a geographical and political entity, not the image of discrete individuals. Boulding and Willis use this dichotomy in studying image.

Scott (1965) views national images in terms of cognitive, affective, and behavioral components. The cognitive component involves how a person understands the nation in an intellectual way. The affective component involves how the person feels about the nation (liked or disliked/approved or disapproved). The behavioral component consists of possible actions or responses to the nation. Scott (1965) and Alexander (1971) suggest bipolar word pairs that can be used to study the image of a nation. A composite of these variables is used in the study and includes the following: friendly-unfriendly, peaceful-aggressive, productive-unproductive, progressive-stagnant, stable-unstable, and open-closed.

"News coverage of one country in the mass media of another has been of perennial interest for students of mass communications" (Sahin, 1973, p. 685). Many of these studies examine national images. Sahin analyzed the NEW YORK TIMES's coverage of political news of Turkey during two four-year periods to find out whether news reporting changed in response to shifts in Turkish-American political relations. Sahin concludes that the NEW YORK TIMES's evaluative assessment of foreign political figures and institutions changed in response to shifts in American foreign policy. Sahin sees this as confirmation of the theory of

congruity (p. 689). Congruity Theory says that when the attitudes a person holds toward an object change, it is in the direction of greater congruity with prevailing frames of reference (Severin and Tankard, 1988, p. 148). If the frame of reference is toward peacemaking, the tendency to see the other nation as peaceful would be expected to exist.

Oliphant (1964) analyzed 10 issues of the PEKING REVIEW to determine themes presented about the United States. Fifteen recurring themes are identified. Oliphant refers to these themes as the picture the Chinese have of the United States and concludes that the way countries see each other determines what the relationship between them might be (pp. 416-420).

Mujahid (1970) analyzed the coverage of Pakistan in the three largest news magazines in the U.S., TIME, NEWSWEEK, and U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT. Mujahid analyzed the years between 1962-65, because they were important for Pakistan, both in domestic and foreign affairs. This study examines total words used, themes, whether or not major events were reported (using FACTS ON FILE), editorial bias, and slant. Mujahid states that meaning was found in the *Gestalt*, or over-all impressions (p. 127). The primary finding is that all three news magazines reported on Pakistan's foreign affairs more frequently than its domestic affairs, and that when domestic affairs were reported, it was because they impinged upon foreign policy (p. 165). Other studies suggest that for international news to be reported in the U.S. media, it needs to be relevant to U.S. interests. Wettig (1991) and other scholars conclude that the

domestic changes that occurred during the Gorbachev Era, had significant consequences for how the Soviet Union conducted foreign affairs, and that Soviet change in general had a great deal of significance for the U.S. and for the world at large (p. 11). One might expect that NEWSWEEK provided increased coverage of the Soviet Union during the Gorbachev Era, including more photos.

Belkaoui (1978) analyzed news magazines and the Sunday NEW YORK TIMES to examine the images presented of Arabs and Israeli. He used verbs and adverbs as indicators of image. He found shifting images both in the media and in public opinion polls. Belkaoui concludes that the media play a major role in the creation and manipulation of international images (p. 799). However, it is noted that Belkaoui did not state which occurred first, the image or public opinion. In other words, there was no attempt to conduct an agenda-setting study. Neither is this dissertation based on agenda-setting. However, informed inferences will be made about probable ways these photos affected NEWSWEEK readers.

Pratt (1980) analyzed news stories, editorials, and other articles, of three news magazines (TIME, NEWSWEEK, and U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT) and three opinion journals (THE NATION, THE NEW REPUBLIC, and the NATIONAL REVIEW) for 1976, to examine the image presented of Africa. The primary finding is that a preponderance of conflict news superseded all other categories (p. 39). Africa is presented as a conflict-ridden part of the world. Content did not reflect the complexity of Africa (p. 43). Lack of

complexity is one characteristic of stereotyping. One might expect that post-*glasnost* NEWSWEEK photos would depict a more complex Soviet Union. This expectation is suggested by the increased diversity of content published in the Soviet media (a primary source for the foreign media covering the Soviet Union), and by predicted changes in the news-gathering environment of NEWSWEEK journalists.

Merrill (1962) analyzed the image of the U.S. presented in ten Mexican dailies. His categories include the following: space (total number of pages), subject-matter, hard or soft news, gaps, themes, locale, sources, persons imaged, and slant whether positive or negative. Merrill suggests that the use of material about the U.S. in the press of Mexico told as much about Mexicans as about Americans (p. 209). This finding suggests that media reflect national and cultural biases. One might expect that U.S. national and cultural biases toward the Soviet Union differed between the years of the Cold War (the Chernenko interlude) and the years of the Gorbachev Era. One might expect that U.S. national and cultural biases toward the Soviet Union differed during the diverse phases of the Reagan and Bush presidencies.

Ramaprasad (1987) analyzed the effect of censorship in India on coverage by the NEW YORK TIMES. The expectation is that more positive news and less negative news would be found during censorship. The rationale is that censorship would create constraints on reporting negative news. During censorship the press became a government mouthpiece that released to the world government-

sanctioned positive news. A parallel can be drawn between this situation and *pre-glasnost* in the Soviet Union. However, Ramaprasad states that even under censorship, news may not be totally positive. Loopholes remain even under censorship. Foreign journalists and even domestic journalists, who may have been trained in the free system, often manage to defy censorship (p. 27).

Tadayon (1980, pp. 217-233) analyzed news reports, stories, commentaries, and letters to the editor, in *THE NEW YORK TIMES* 1971-76, to examine the image presented of Iran. Eleven subject-matter categories are identified and their frequency of mention noted. Tadayon plots the year-to-year frequency variation, as one technique of analysis. The methods used by Tadayon will be adapted to this study. The frequency of *NEWSWEEK* photos that depicted certain content categories and that depicted in a particular slant (positive, negative, or neutral) will be analyzed for each year included in the study.

Pittatore (1983) analyzed advertisements in five U.S. magazines (*VOGUE*, *NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE*, *PLAYBOY*, *GLAMOUR*, and *TIME*) to determine the image presented of Italy. An important aspect of this study is the emphasis on characteristics presented, as well as those omitted. Image can be inferred by what is absent, as well as from what is present (p. 731). For example, if no photos were published in *NEWSWEEK* post-*glasnost* that depicted the more open participation in religion, this omission would seem significant.

Zaharopoulos (1984) analyzed six U.S. newspapers to determine the quantity of coverage provided about Greece. An assumption is that quantity

alone communicates a certain image. A primary finding is that Greece, and probably other nations that are not trouble-spots, receive little coverage. Low quantity of coverage presents an image of non-importance in world affairs (p. 905). Soviet affairs have long been considered important to U.S. interests. However, one might expect that Soviet domestic and foreign affairs that occurred during the Gorbachev Era, increased the already high level of significance. This increase is expected to show in increased frequency of coverage in NEWSWEEK, including more photos.

Image is a useful concept in analyzing how the media of one nation present another nation. Just the fact of being imaged tells a lot about how important one nation is perceived to be to another. Relevancy theories suggest that some type of coverage will occur if the affairs of one nation impact on another nation. Frequency of Coverage is an important variable. Frequency is related to perceived importance. The more frequent the message, the more likely the message will be recalled. Frequency is a necessary component of attitude change. Another variable of importance is what is presented in contrast to what is omitted. Presenting only part of the picture may result in bias. Image is the overall impression presented. Image can be determined by an analysis of content and slant. Image studies can be used to examine the relationship between nations, to learn about the nation involved in imaging, to determine trends, and to predict future relationships.

News Photos

News photos are a distinct channel of mass communications. News photos provide day-to-day news stories in the mass media. Bastian and Case (1947) define news photos as providing news of the day, or in case of events at distant points, as providing the first available news (p. 266). Tsang (1984) says that news photos have been given the least attention by communications scholars and educators. For example, a content analysis of JOURNALISM QUARTERLY's first six decades (1924-1984) reveals that only 2 1/2 percent of the articles have been about news photography (p. 578). Schuneman (1974) observes that both the institutions of mass communications and scholars have been slow to recognize the importance of the still and moving image (p. 131).

News photos and other forms of visual communication play an important role in mass communications. Kenny (1992), in a recent article in NEWS PHOTOGRAPHER, says that research has established the importance of news photos, but that more research is needed to prevent the decline of resources allotted to news photos during the current economic recession. Kenny says that research has established that photos transmit information more rapidly than verbal messages, are accurate, realistic, and present more details than words, have an emotional impact on viewers, enhance credibility, motivate people to act,

increase understanding, are useful for making certain types of inferences, and are remembered more quickly than verbal messages (p. 41-42).

Schuneman (1974) reviews the history of research on photographic communication and concludes that accumulated research efforts can be given focus by relating them to Lasswell's paradigm of the communication process. Researchers who study the **WHO** are concerned with the communicator or the source of the message. Researchers who study the **WHO** usually conduct biographical or gatekeeping studies. Researchers who are concerned with the **WHAT** perform content analysis of the message. Researchers who are concerned with the **CHANNEL** use media analysis. Researchers who are concerned with the **TO WHOM** use audience analysis. Researchers who are concerned with the **WITH WHAT EFFECT** measure audience impact or effect. Schuneman's main criticism of existing research is that too much of it has described rather than analyzed (p. 145).

News photos are used to document social problems and conditions. News photos are capable of having a powerful effect on people and can influence public opinion. Doob (1935, p. 347-351) concludes that news photos aren't necessarily objective, but can be falsified, distorted, and used for intentional or unintentional propaganda. Irion (1950, p. 716) encourages public opinion researchers to study the potential of the camera to influence attitudes.

Photojournalism textbooks stress the importance of news photos. News photos are more readable than type and more frequently read (Stamm and

Jacoubovitch, 1980, p. 242). Mich and Eberman (1945, p. 15) say that reader-tests show that the photo story often gets twice the readership given to the accompanying text and that text is read twice as often when presented with photos. News photos have high attention value. Photos break up the text, people enjoy looking at them (Spaulding, 1955, pp. 35-45), and they are read more directly than abstract symbols of text. Miller (1975) concludes that news photos are among the first items to catch the reader's eyes and that a good photo may stop a reader who doesn't read the text (p. 70-75). More people will look at the pictures of a magazine than will spend time and effort reading the text (Wayne, 1956, p. 315).

News photos have a high degree of appeal (Fosdick and Shoemaker, 1982, p. 41). They are seen as the world's most universal language (Rothstein, 1979, p. 5). Whiting (1946) sees photography as a "language." Whiting considers this language to be composed of pictures, series of pictures, related facts, and the overall visual presentation (p. 6). News photos provide a sense of realism and of immediacy (Mich, 1947, p. 203). The camera allows the photojournalist to serve as an eyewitness to history (Rothstein, p. 27).

Hicks (1952) considers eyewitness reporting to be "the most graphic reporting" (p. 3). Photos may distort, but there is the assumption that they show something that exists or did exist (Sontag, 1977, pp. 5-6). Evens (1978) says that images fulfill a basic need to be present at a newsworthy event, and that this need lies half way between intellect and emotion (pp. 4-5). The second best thing to

being an eyewitness is having a surrogate. The photojournalist is a prime example of an eyewitness reporter.

Vitray, Mills, and Ellard (1939) observe that editors have gone beyond seeing news photos as mere illustrations for the news and consider news photos as, "the most precise, economical, and effective reporting of human events that there is." (p. 3). This broader concept of news photography is used to define the term "photojournalism." According to Hicks (p. 3) photojournalism involves the coming together of the verbal and visual media of communication.

Photojournalism involves photos, headlines, cutlines, and text.

More recent studies on news photos are based on research methods versus impressions. Budd (1964, pp. 39-56) analyzed news about the United States in four Australian and four New Zealand newspapers to test a prediction that the quality (what types of news?), quantity (how much news?), and slant of news treatment (positive or negative?) of the U.S. by a foreign nation depends on whether or not it was aligned with the U.S. in the East-West power struggle. Budd analyzed text, **photographs**, and editorials. Photographs were counted and compared with the total news-hole. Budd says that the composite image of the U.S. presented by the eight newspapers was positive. The study would have been stronger if Budd had compared these newspapers to others from unaligned nations.

Lent and Rao (1979-80) analyzed the NEW YORK TIMES, WASHINGTON POST, NEWSWEEK, and ABC NEWS, during the week of

September 26 through October 1, 1977, to survey all news and information (including **photographs**) concerning Asia. An interesting aspect of this study is that the AP wire was analyzed to provide the universe of available content. The study examines quantity of Asian news provided, news categories (crisis, developmental, or political-governmental) and whether or not Asian news usage seemed to be determined by U.S. policies. A primary finding is that a large percentage of the Asian news had implications for U.S. domestic and foreign policy (p. 22).

Buyck (1979) analyzed the **photographic** representation of Asian Americans in TIME and NEWSWEEK (1940, 1950, 1960, and 1970) to determine frequency of coverage (visibility), how Asian Americans were portrayed, and whether frequency of representation changed over time. Content categories include portrayal of ethnic or national group, type of activity, occupations, and whether the image was positive, negative, or neutral. An assumption of Buyck's study is that photographs create an instant image (p. 3).

Wanta (1988) says that **photo size** serves as a cue to the reader about the perceived importance or salience of the news. Editors, through their gatekeeping role, by increasing the size of a particular photo, can raise readers' salience on certain issues. Readers assume that important news is associated with large photos and less important news with smaller photos (p. 111).

Woodburn (1947) discusses readership research and concludes that photo size and subject are the most important factors that stop readers, but that other

factors (color, overlines, headlines, cutlines, and photo pages) also are important. Woodburn says that one three-column photo will stop two-thirds of the readers (p. 200-201).

Hazard (1960) identifies photo-variables such as subject-appeals (idolatry, social problems, picturesque, war, blood and violence, and sports), photo-shape, and internal composition or concentricity. He concludes that content is the main determinant of reader interest (p. 524).

Swanson (1955) uses a system for estimating readership of news-editorial-feature content of newspapers and concludes that two factors emerge as most dominant in attracting readers: visual form, including **photos**, and subject matter, including news with psychological proximity such as war and defense (pp. 414-416).

Kerrick (1959) extends her earlier study about the influence of cutlines on picture interpretation in which she used five pictures selected from the Thematic Apperception Test (1955). The more recent study uses actual **news photos** taken from a national news magazine in an experiment to determine whether photos change meanings (positive or negative) related to the message encoded in cutlines. She concludes that if the photo and cutline are similar in meaning, a more extreme judgment is given by subjects. However, if the photo and cutline are dissimilar in meaning, they compete for dominance (p. 188). Other studies conclude that in the second case, **photos are dominant**. Fedler, Counts, and Hightower (1982) say that people respond first to photos and that photo meaning

and impact are not significantly changed by words used to describe them (p. 637). Mehling (1959) concludes that a photo and cutline combination is more effective in attitude-changing than text alone (p. 189).

Research examines how different persons or groups are depicted in news photos and the nature of the resulting image. Stempel (1971) analyzed the visibility of blacks in five U.S. news magazines 1960-1970. Stempel considers news photos to be the "most clear-cut evidence of visibility or lack of it." (p. 338). Traves and Cook (1977) analyzed 16 daily U.S. papers and state that 80.7% of all people pictures published were white only, while 9.8% were black only (p. 597). Ortizano (1989) analyzed six U.S. magazines to compare the presence of black-only, white-only, and racially mixed photos. Ortizano says that despite social change, the races are still presented as segregated (p. 721). Lester and Smith (1990) analyzed photos of African-Americans in three U.S. magazines over a 51-year time-frame, and found a trend toward less stereotypical images (p. 136). Tubergen and Mahsman (1974) analyzed how people respond to unflattering or negative photos of others and conclude that the nature of a photo can influence attitudes toward the photo subject (p. 319). In short, news photo selection can bias viewers toward the photo subject. Culbertson (1974) concludes that photos can create an emotional impact on viewers and that this impact comes from both the subject matter and from the decisions made about technical aspects, including camera angle, cropping, and sharpness (pp. 82-83). Miller (1975) examined the content of news photos to determine how men and women are presented in two

U.S. newspapers. Miller says that women were not presented in the range of roles reflecting their actual lives. News photos can contribute to maintenance of old stereotypes (p. 75). Blackwood (1983) replicated Miller's study and says that despite efforts of the women's movement, news photos in two U.S. newspapers did not keep pace with advances in society (p. 714).

Lippmann (1952) says that we live in a world filled with verbal pictures gleaned from the press and other sources (p. 16). Blackwood (1983) says that it is reasonable to assume that sometimes photos are the only representation of world events to which some people are exposed. In short, photos are potentially important as conveyors of information and shapers of attitudes about the world (p. 711).

Sherer (1984) analyzed news photos in four U.S. newspapers that covered the invasion of Poland by Germany in 1939, and found that most of the photos were provided by the German press and pictured the military might of Germany in contrast to a weak Poland. Only late in the invasion did a few photos depict Polish resistance (p. 425). News photos can be used as propaganda. Sherer (1988) analyzed photos in three U.S. news magazines to compare coverage of the Korean and Vietnam Wars. Sherer concludes that the Korean War was presented in a more "sanitized" way, while the Vietnam War photos presented a more "brutal" image (p. 755). Sherer (1989) analyzed news photos in three U.S. news magazines to examine coverage of the Vietnam War. Sherer says that "as public opinion shifted over time, so too did the image of war change." (p. 394). Tsang

(1985) analyzed news photos in TIME and NEWSWEEK during three time periods and found that "international news pictures were more violent-oriented, and U.S. photos were non-violent oriented." (p. 584).

Research about news photos reflects various methods and goals. Singletary (1978) analyzed six U.S. newspapers over a period of years to determine trends in Page 1 photos. Singletary found that an 8% increase occurred over 40 years in mixed-race photos (p. 586). Recent scholars criticize this study for its omission of mug shots in the sample. Singletary says that mug shots are contentless and uninformative (p. 586). In contrast to Singletary, Lain (1987) concludes that subjects are able to evaluate mug shots as positive, negative, or neutral with a high degree of consistency and agreement (p. 47).

Christ and Johnson (1985) analyzed the Man-of-the-Year covers of TIME and found that persons appearing on these covers project an image of power and control (p. 893). Leslie (1986) analyzed photos and cutlines in four U.S. newspapers related to the coverage of the McCarthy censure. Leslie analyzed both manifest content (size, type, and cutline) and latent content (the over-all impression whether positive, negative, or neutral) (p. 851).

Previous research has established the importance of news photos in conveying news. News photos are used to attract readers, to provide information, to influence, to reinforce preexisting attitudes, and perhaps even to change attitudes. Previous research suggests that the coverage of the Gorbachev Era in NEWSWEEK should have had a high degree of readership. These events were

both recent and relevant to U.S. interests. In many cases the news photos depicted violence and social unrest. Visibility to these events was accessible to most people only through a surrogate or eyewitness. While most of these events indirectly reinforced U.S. biases and stereotypes, others contradicted these stereotypes. NEWSWEEK photos depicted the most "dramatic" and "radical" change most of us have experienced in our lifetime (Goldfarb, 1992, p. xi-xii). Subjectively, these photos had the potential to depict a different image of the Soviet Union. This study seeks to examine this image in an objective way.

Soviet Domestic Affairs

This study seeks to determine how the domestic changes that occurred during the Gorbachev Era (1985-91) affected the news-gathering and photo coverage of NEWSWEEK. This section of the dissertation presents an overview of some of these changes and suggests that domestic change (especially *glasnost*) created an atmosphere that resulted in different news-gathering and gatekeeping behaviors for the foreign media, including NEWSWEEK.

Various labels have been used to describe change that occurred within the former Soviet Union between 1985 and 1991. While Gorbachev will always be seen as the architect of these reforms, reformist ideas had been nurtured for many

years before Gorbachev made them official policy (Kaiser, 1991, p. 91).

Perestroika is the overarching descriptor of these changes. Gorbachev (1987) entitled his book PERESTROIKA: NEW THINKING FOR OUR COUNTRY AND THE WORLD. Gorbachev's book was written to explain his goals for the U.S.S.R. to the Soviet people and to the world. *Perestroika* taken literally means "reconstruction" or "reconstructing" (Smith, 1990, p. xvii). The need for *perestroika* grew out of the recognition that the Soviet Union was facing a crisis in many spheres (cultural, economic, military, political, social, and others). Smith observes that Gorbachev took a flexible approach to *perestroika* and that sometimes it was used as a slogan for "revolutionary" change, but that at other times it was used with caution. Just how far Gorbachev intended to take change, was debated during the Gorbachev Era. Gorbachev intended to modernize the system without dismantling it (Smith, p. xvii). A major question asked during the Gorbachev Era was whether the system was strong enough to withstand exposure of its deficiencies through *glasnost* (Lerner and Treadgold, 1988, p. 8). With hindsight the answer is known.

Cohen and Heuvel (1989) say that *perestroika* was based on five major reforms with *glasnost* being one of them (p. 15). *Glasnost* was intended to facilitate and speed up *perestroika*. They define *glasnost* as, "a reduction of state and party imposed bans and other forms of censorship in the mass media and in political, intellectual, and cultural life in general (p. 15). *Perestroika* was the goal; *glasnost* the method to achieve the goal. Taken literally, *glasnost* means

"openness" and "publicity" (Tarasula, 1989, p. xv). *Glasnost* was applied to a broad range of Soviet institutions, including the media, education, science, the military, and culture. *Glasnost* was formally expanded to encompass the media in 1986, during the 27th Party Congress (Miller, 1989, p. 91). The focus of this study is how *glasnost* affected the Soviet mass media and, consequently, the U.S. media, including NEWSWEEK.

To understand the significance of *glasnost*, it is necessary to have some understanding of the nature of the Soviet media prior to the Gorbachev Era. The Soviet media did not develop in a vacuum. There were similarities with the pre-Soviet or tsarist media. For example, censorship existed under the tsars. While the tsarist press was both privately and government owned, a strict censorship code controlled the media, literature, and other outlets for ideas. Aesopian language, in which ideas critical of the government are hidden by the use of euphemisms, existed in Russia since the 1830s (Markham, 1967, pp. 33-34). Oberg (1988, p. 270) concludes that in fact, "secrecy is a deep-seated Russian characteristic." Additionally, a tradition that writers and journalists either fought or served the system, but not both, existed by the Eighteenth Century (Pozner, 1990, p. 133). The Soviet media system grew out of the tsarist media system, rather than being a radical departure.

Soviet media were considered to be public utilities and were state owned and controlled. Prior to the Bolshevik revolution in 1917, the revolutionary leaders, including Lenin, were aware of the importance of the press as a powerful

tool to agitate for change, as well as serving as a cohesion-promoting organization. While a brief period of press freedom was allowed after 1917, monopolistic controls were in place by 1919 (Smith, 1988, p. 286).

Censorship that restricted the collection, dissemination, and exchange of information, opinions, and ideas, was a key feature of the media. Censorship over the media was the responsibility of *Glavit* (Main Administration of Literature and State Publishing Houses), but this control was changed post-*glasnost*. Miller (1989) says that *Glavit's* new policy was, "Whatever is not forbidden, is allowed" (p. 103). Editors were party members and were given more responsibility over the media. Self-censorship (based on socialization, training, and professional perks) was recognized as important in controlling the media prior to the Gorbachev Era. Schecter (1988) says that Gorbachev did not define *glasnost* "from the top down," but told the press to use self-censorship. The more daring press tested the limits of *glasnost* (p. 3). Pozner reveals other methods used to augment self-censorship. For example, journalists in disfavor might be refused permission to talk with foreigners or travel abroad (p. 232). Post-*glasnost* was different in the sense that reliance on ideological commitment on the part of journalists was based more on internal controls, not external. A new press law adopted in 1990, established the right of all Soviet citizens to express opinions or beliefs and to receive and disseminate information and ideas. Censorship was limited to the disclosure of state secrets and appeals for the violent overthrow of the system (White, 1991, pp. 95-96).

Prior to *glasnost* the Soviet media did not publish anything that reflected negatively on the system itself. However, there was a tradition of publishing letters sent by citizens containing complaints and requests for change (White, 1991, p. 13). Criticism that did appear in the media was directed at lower-level personnel, certainly not at the Politbureau, the topmost authority. Soviet journalists were seen as conduits for the official view and were expected to write positive stories that emphasized the gains of the system and to either make negative things look better, or to ignore them (Pozner, 1990, p. 149). The difference between official ideology and reality was vast. There occurred a loss of faith in the system. This loss of faith is considered one of the causes for the societal malaise that existed (Laqueur, 1989, p. 288).

In order to recognize how *glasnost* affected the Soviet media, and, consequently, may have affected NEWSWEEK, it is necessary to understand something about the nature of the Soviet media pre-*glasnost*. Ra'an and Lukes (1990) state that propaganda based on the Soviet ideology was the key purpose of the mass media, both for domestic and foreign distribution. Two departments, Ideology and International, were responsible for achieving this purpose (p. 128). Nove (1989) succinctly states the pre-*glasnost* purpose for the dissemination of news by the Soviet media: "Previously, news was evaluated from the standpoint of political-social usefulness" (p. 144). News that did not serve the interests of the system were taboo.

Various scholars have identified some of these taboo topics and have documented how *glasnost* affected the range of those that were formerly tabooed. Smith (1988) lists these tabooed topics: economic problems, shortages, waiting lines, price increases, salaries, inequities and special benefits for elites, crime statistics, other adverse social problems, foreign policies, details of the private lives of the leaders, activities of dissidents or religious figures, national illnesses or disasters, activities of the KGB or the military, and acknowledging that censorship even existed (p. 287). The two Soviet news agencies (*TASS* and *Novosti*) strictly followed censorship (Kruglak, 1962). Pozner states that Soviet media were divided into domestic and foreign services. Journalists in the foreign service were more informed and allowed more opportunity to openly state personal opinions than those in the domestic service (p. 228). Hollander (1972, p. 39) lists these taboo topics: feature stories, human interest, and travel or tourism (p. 39). The U.S.S.R. '88 YEARBOOK lists these taboo topics: war propaganda, advocacy of hatred or violence, military secrets, immoral behavior, slander or defamation, and agitation or propaganda undermining the government (p. 103). It is apparent that the range of tabooed topics was broader in practice than specified in this yearbook.

This study content analyzes news photos in *NEWSWEEK* to determine whether there was a post-*glasnost* change in content categories. This analysis uses three categories of content: INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, DOMESTIC AFFAIRS, and PERSONAL EVENTS. *Glasnost* affected change in all three of

these categories in the Soviet media. These changes are well-documented in the literature. An expectation is that change in the Soviet media had an affect on the news-gathering and photo coverage of NEWSWEEK.

This study defines INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS as including relations with the U.S., other foreign relations, and the coverage of international organizations. Tarasula (1989) says that while at first *glasnost* referred to publishing economic shortcomings, being more open about foreign affairs soon followed (p. xv). Lerner and Treadgold (1988) agree that during Gorbachev's first year, the focus was on economic reform, but by the second year there was recognition that political and cultural change was required (p. 8).

Bialer and Mandelbaum (1988, THE GLOBAL RIVALS) say that Gorbachev introduced several political slogans including "New Political Thinking or NPT" (p. 7). This slogan suggests a radical departure from the idea that Soviet policy was immutable. Tarasula (1989) identifies examples of debate about foreign policy occurring in the media. Debate occurred about the concepts of Reasonable Sufficiency and Military Superiority. Discussions about fear of nuclear disaster appeared in the media (Miller, 1989, pp. 105-106). There was acknowledgement that superpower status had been gained at the expense of other needs (Baruch, 1990, p. vii-viii). For example, in 1989 Gorbachev provided the first meaningful figure for Soviet defence spending, which was four times higher than the figure previously published (White, 1991, pp. 85-86). Coverage of the United States in the Soviet press became more positive (Tarasula, p. 220).

Laqueur (1989) confirms that traditional anti-Western coverage in the Soviet media became more objective and that there was more openness to learning from the Western experience (p. 228). Perhaps most important was the fact that *glasnost* was extended to Politburo differences about foreign policy. Gorbachev's keynote address in 1986, at the 27th Party Congress included a statement about developing an international atmosphere of openness (Miller, 1989, p. 160).

Post-*glasnost* saw the return of Andrei Sakharov to society. Some of Sakharov's ideas about foreign policy were embedded in Gorbachev's "New Political Thinking or NPT." Sakharov's ideas were originally expressed as a *samizdat* (underground) article. Sakharov called for a plan for the peaceful convergence of the Soviet and Western systems. (Alexeyeva and Goldberg, 1990, p. 208).

Initially there was a lack of *glasnost* about the Afghanistan War (p. 238). Nove (1989) says that the grievances of ex-soldiers who served in Afghanistan were "beyond the limits of *glasnost*" (p. 154). The Chernobyl disaster had international consequences and is seen as an early test of *glasnost*, a test the Soviets failed at first by delaying openness (Nove, p. 145). Bittman (1988) observes that for three days following Chernobyl the Soviets used their former techniques of secrecy, stonewalling, blaming individuals, not the system, and attacking the Western media for their coverage (p. 11). Oberg (1988) says that in the case of Chernobyl, satellite technology caught the Soviets red-handed and gave them no choice but to be open (p. 267). However, the Soviets learned their

lesson and Chernobyl has come to symbolize *glasnost*. Oberg reveals other disasters with international implications that were hidden pre-*glasnost*. A positive example of *glasnost* was in 1986, when the Soviets were open about an accident in the Black Sea involving the vacation liner ADMIRAL NAKHIMOV (p. 99). Oberg calls for recognition that we live in an interdependent world and there is a need for "cosmic *glasnost*" (p. 167). The myth existed that Soviet borders and airspace were inviolate. This myth was dramatically breached in 1987 when a West German plane piloted by a teenager landed in Red Square. MOSCOW NEWS, a newspaper associated with *glasnost*, revealed this incident and ran a photo of the plane. Baruch (1990) concludes that after the Red Square landing, the concept of "military-*glasnost*" became a major issue (p. 135). Cohen and Heuvel (1989) evaluate this as progress. "There are still some high-level forbidden zones, but fewer and fewer deep ones" (p. 261).

Schecter (1988) provides information about how Soviet news practices changed post-*glasnost* and how these changes affected foreign affairs. Foreign journalists use to have little access to official Soviet sources. Formerly press conferences for foreign journalists were few and far between. They were staged with little give and take. Propaganda was heavy. Post-*glasnost* saw more frequent press conferences and foreign policy was one of the topics covered. Schecter concludes that the Soviets recognized that the past method of not answering the questions of foreign journalists was counterproductive and led to negative speculation (p. 121). Occasionally foreign journalists and others (scientists) were

selected to present their views in the Soviet media. Satellite link-ups occurred (Bittman, 1988, pp. 38-39).

Other examples of how Gorbachev's NPT was implemented are numerous. Post-*glasnost* Soviet citizens who had emigrated to the West were allowed to return. Bittman (1988) sees this as an opportunity for the Soviets to stage PR media events favorable to them (p. 54). Emigration from the Soviet Union increased "drastically" post-*glasnost*, more foreigners entered the Soviet Union, and jamming of Western broadcasting ended (Katsenelinboigen, 1990, p. 73).

Glasnost was instrumental in enhancing the international prestige of Gorbachev and of the Soviet Union (Baruch, 1990, p. 277). *Glasnost* was applied to foreign affairs. *Glasnost* appeared to create an image of the Soviet Union as being more open than closed, more peaceful than aggressive. However, there was recognition that the ability to implement NPT depended on the outcome of other reforms at home (Katsenelinboigen, 1990, p. 325).

Many domestic reforms were needed. Goldman (1991) says that Gorbachev's domestic reforms consisted of a call for "more democracy, more *glasnost*, more humanity" (p. 83). DOMESTIC AFFAIRS is defined in this study as including discussion about culture, internal politics, the KGB, the military, social problems, and other internal matters. While initially *glasnost* was promoted to attack economic problems, soon it was used to attack other problems as well. The literature provides an array of issues that prior to *glasnost* were taboo in the media. In order to assess the scope of *glasnost* in the media it is necessary to

identify content categories that were absent pre-*glasnost*. Identifying content expressed in the media post-*glasnost* will be used as indicators or markers of *glasnost*. These indicators or markers will be used during the content analysis to determine whether *glasnost* affected NEWSWEEK photos. If these indicators or markers increased in the frequency that they were depicted in the NEWSWEEK photos, this would indicate an effect. Secondly, it is necessary to determine the limits of *glasnost* and how these limits changed during the seven years of the Gorbachev Era.

Glasnost was used to discuss formerly taboo topics about Soviet history. Bittman (1988) says that Soviet history has been falsified since 1917, not just since Stalin (p. 39). Throughout most of the Gorbachev Era historical taboos persisted. Examples of historical taboos include the part played by the revolutionary leaders in the assassination of the tsar and his family, the Nazi-Soviet Pact of 1939 between Stalin and Hitler, Stalin's destruction of the Soviet military elite prior to World War II, the execution of Polish officers, the purges, the dismissal of basic freedoms for victims sent to the *Gulag*, and many others. Even though in 1956 Khrushchev opened up the issue of Stalin's mistakes and crimes against the Soviet people, many other historical problems remained hidden. Tarasula (1989) says that for nearly twenty years following Khrushchev's death, his name was taboo (p. 48). Khrushchev was ousted from power in 1964, and after his death was buried in a remote cemetery distant from the Kremlin. His burial site was opened to visitors only in the late 1980s. Post-*glasnost* saw open discussion of the ills

associated with the long years under Brezhnev, seen in retrospect as years of stagnation. However, any direct criticism of Lenin, the revolution itself, the party's leading role, and its leaders individually, remained taboo until near the end of the Gorbachev Era (White, 1991, p. 92).

Revision of more recent history occurred post-*glasnost*. For example, the Soviets were very proud of their space program and the official version was that there had been no failures. Oberg (1988) referred to this as "history as pure fiction" (p. 183). Post-*glasnost* saw the Soviets become more open about their space problems. Sakharov (1991) observes a paradox of *glasnost* concerning "the continuing detention of people who had spoken out too soon for *glasnost*" (p. 5). Sinyavsky (1990) describes the important role played by these early dissidents. "Dissidence reintroduced into Soviet civilization the notion of the individual" (p. 239).

Preservation of Russian history became a positive force. *Pamyat* and other informal groups became important. One of the goals of *Pamyat* was to build monuments to Stalin's victims and to preserve other historical monuments.

Discussion of social ills was a primary indicator of *glasnost*. One of the first campaigns initiated after 1985 was against alcohol abuse. Gorbachev's mentor, Andropov, had used a campaign against alcohol abuse and poor work discipline. Post-*glasnost* there was discussion in the mass media not only about alcohol abuse, but also recognition that drug abuse existed. The official line had been that the Socialist system had created a new type of person (*homo Sovieticus*)

and that the conditions necessary for alcohol and drug abuses to exist had been eliminated. In 1986 a reform campaign against illegal actions and brutality by the police was announced in the media (Zemtsov and Farrar, 1989, p. 91). Other content discussed in the media included homosexuality, crime (for the first time crime statistics were published), hooliganism, prostitution, venereal diseases including AIDS, organized crime, special problems of women and children, marital problems, suicide, lack of public morality, the low quality of living standards, the underfunded health system, high child-mortality rates, declining life expectancy, abuses in psychiatry, lack of housing, the existence of the homeless, inequities in the educational system, corruption and abuses in the military, and other domestic problems. As early as 1987 Gorbachev announced that the armed services, along with the foreign and state (KGB) security services were no longer protected from criticism (McGwire, 1991, p. 309).

Prior to *glasnost* unpleasant occurrences (accidents and natural disasters) were not discussed in the media. Many examples of this information gap exist. Nove (1989) discusses several examples, including a train crash that killed two persons that the Ministry of Transport refused permission to the press to cover, even to prevent rumors. Chernobyl is seen as creating a change in the Soviet media being open about domestic accidents and disasters. For example, the Armenian earthquake was depicted with "harrowing" photos (p. 145).

Post-*glasnost* saw discussion of domestic politics. Democratization was one of the reforms. More minority viewpoints began to appear in the media.

Tarasula (1989) says that informal groups "led to multiparty system thoughts" (p. 130). Pre-*glasnost* saw the Communist Party presenting a unitary face to the Soviet people (*Partiinost*). Post-*glasnost* saw serious debate in the party made public for all to see. This broadening of permitted political activity was described as "socialist pluralism of opinions" (Sakwa, 1990, p. 65). Journalists were encouraged to investigate and to denounce abuses of power. Nove (1989) suggests that allowing political diversity to be seen played a key role in people questioning whether the Communist Party was really infallible (p. 158). Gorbachev is credited with introducing pluralism of opinions sometime after 1987. Gorbachev saw the media as a countercheck to the one-party system. (Nove, p. 164). Gorbachev called for multi-candidate elections and a secret ballot. Of course, multi-candidates did not mean multi-parties and "these elections did not reach up to the republic level nor to the party secretary himself" (Goldman, 1991, p. 103). The 19th Party Conference in 1988 is seen as important in that diverse opinions were broadcast on Soviet television. Openness about political differences filtered down to the grass roots level. The media covered protests, demonstrations, people signing petitions, and other examples of open expression of diverse ideas (Alexeyeva and Goldberg, 1990, p. 181). Post-*glasnost* saw more openness about human right issues, including the issue of Jewish immigration (Schecter, 1988, pp. 70-71). Post-*glasnost* saw Jewish unofficial cultural activities subject to less harassment, even though this change was not legalized (Ro'i and Beker, 1991, p. 284).

Post-*glasnost* saw discussion of economic problems. In fact Gorbachev's first speech in office included comments about the inefficient economy, low labor productivity, energy waste, and the quantity and quality of consumer goods (Pozner, 1990, p. 248). The media post-*glasnost* discussed both underlying causes and symptoms of economic problems. For example, "The black market was never analyzed in the Soviet press prior to *glasnost*" (Tarasula, 1989, p. 108). Openness about corruption, nepotism, special perks for the elites (for example special shops), waste, poor worker discipline, the poor quality and lack of consumer goods, inequities of income distribution, the difficulty that retired persons had just surviving, unhealthy work conditions, strikes, and other problems were discussed. There was questioning about the economic system itself. Discussion about the need for competition, the issue of wage and price increases, and other systematic changes were discussed. In 1990 an announcement was made that the Soviet Union would make the transition to a market economy (Wettig, 1991, p. 5). However, Gorbachev backed down (probably to placate conservatives who were a threat to reform) from approving the Shatalin/Yeltsin Plan that would have structurally changed the economic system (Goldman, 1991, pp. 220-221).

Post-*glasnost* saw discussion of social conflicts, including conflict based on nationality. The official Communist Party line was that nationality problems had been resolved (Tarasula, 1989, p. 169). "The outward picture was one of cooperation and harmony even though experts suspected that there was not much love lost between the nations of the Soviet Union, and in particular between them

and the dominant nation, the Russians" (Laqueur, 1989, p. 185). This proved to be wishful thinking, as open conflict became apparent in Alma-Ata, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, the Baltics, and other places.

Post-*glasnost* saw discussion of religious issues. The official Communist Party line had been that the need for religion had been replaced by ideology. Religious structures and symbols had been destroyed and the remaining core of the Russian Orthodox Church had been coopted. Prior to *glasnost* participation in religious activities resulted in negative consequences. Anti-Semitism had roots in tsarist Russia, but continued to exist under the Soviet system. In 1988 the Soviet Union celebrated the introduction of Christianity into Russia one thousand years ago. Shortly afterwards, the issue of full citizenship to believers was discussed. Post-*glasnost* revealed that for many Soviets, religion had not been replaced by Communist ideology. It was revealed that for many religious believers of diverse faiths (Christian, Jewish, Moslem, and others) religious customs and traditions were more significant than party membership. Tarasula (1989) suggests two motives for change in official policy toward religion: need for the support of religious believers for reform, and need to encourage religious volunteerism to solve societal problems (p. 191).

Environmental problems continued to be discussed in the media post-*glasnost*, as they had been discussed prior to 1985. Pollution of the environment was seen as a serious problem. Content about ruined land, poisoned rivers, over-cut forests, and other ecological disasters were discussed. There was openness

about the destruction of rural and urban environments through thoughtless planning. Public opinion emerged to promote protection of the environment (Laqueur, 1989, p. 213).

The third content category used in this study is **PERSONAL EVENTS**, defined as personal information about leaders or other human interest. News photos in **NEWSWEEK** will be analyzed to determine whether leaders (Chernenko, Gorbachev, and Yeltsin) were depicted differently post-*glasnost*. Graffy and Hosking (1989) observe that post-*glasnost* saw a change in Soviet news photography with more eye catching layouts, less use of photos that were posed and depicted happy workers, and more exciting content (photos showing combat in Afghanistan and drug addicts) (p. 27). Ra'anani and Lukes (1990) provide information about how leaders were depicted in news photos prior to *glasnost*. Ritual depictions were used (standing during ceremonies on top of Lenin's tomb) versus spontaneous appearances. Photo size and location in the photo in regard to other persons were important. For example, early photos of Gorbachev show he stood a long way from power (p. 151). Honchalovsky and Lipkov (1991) say that it became common during the Stalin years for political opponents to have their photos "airbrushed out" (p. 7). Post-*glasnost* saw the restoration of photos to replace persons, who had been edited out in earlier versions (White, 1990, **GORBACHEV IN POWER**, p. 75). Smith (1988) says that prior to *glasnost* the media did not reveal details of the private lives of leaders (p. 287). White (1991) says that pre-*glasnost* leaders did not discuss personal affairs with the mass media,

that the wives of pre-*glasnost* leaders played a very discreet role in public life, and, consequently, were seldom depicted in news photos (p. 16). Hollander (1972) says that prior to *glasnost* the media did not contain personal or human interest stories and did not reveal the travel plans of leaders (p. 39). News photos will be analyzed to determine whether some of these variables began to be used post-*glasnost*, and if so, how frequently.

Glasnost was a major reform associated with the Gorbachev Era. In hindsight *glasnost* was the most important reform. The era ended with Yeltsin replacing Gorbachev as the primary leader and the Soviet Union becoming known as the *former* Soviet Union or the Commonwealth of Independent States. White (1991) says that *glasnost* was intended to inform the Soviet people about their past and present in order to encourage their participation in reform (p. 71). Laqueur says that *glasnost* was never intended to be openness as a "supreme value" and a "right of the people" (1990, *THE LONG ROAD TO FREEDOM*, p. 252). Gorbachev is credited with starting a process that couldn't be turned back. Domestic reform **within** the Soviet Union had significant consequences for the **outside** world, including the United States.

Soviet Foreign Affairs

The Gorbachev Era ended in August of 1991, during a three-day attempted coup staged by former compatriots of Gorbachev. Shortly afterwards, Gorbachev discontinued his activities as Soviet President and transferred power to Yeltsin. Gorbachev was quoted by NEWSWEEK as acknowledging that we now live in a "new world" (1992, January 6, p. 12). These events concluded a 74-year chapter of troubled Soviet and United States relations. In order to comprehend the significance of these events, it is necessary to have some understanding of past Soviet and United States relations.

Shortly after the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917 there was discussion in the Soviet Union about whether to foster world revolution, or to focus on domestic change. Initially the avowed purpose was to promote communist internationalism (Lukacs, 1986-87, p. 21). However, Lenin soon recognized that the Soviet system would first have to be established in the Soviet Union. A basic principle of Soviet foreign relations grew out of Stalin's concepts of "capitalist encirclement" and "two camps of world affairs" (Smith, 1988, p. 42). The world was seen as bipolar. The Western nations also viewed the world as bipolar. In the United States this viewpoint led to McCarthyism and other ills. Stalin thought relations between these two camps had to be hostile, while his successors favored detente or a reduction of tension between nations (Hough, 1985-86, p. 45). The idea was that

socialism eventually would replace capitalism by military action. The Soviet Union was an ally (if belatedly) of the Western democracies during the Second World War. However, Laqueur (1992, p. 105) says that within one year after the end of the war, the Soviet Union accused its former allies of "aggression and expansion," and "preparing a new world war" (p. 105). The onset of the Cold War occurred. The United States attempted to contain the Soviets.

Containment was proposed in 1947 by George Kennan, director of the State Department Policy Planning Staff, and involved the application of counter-force as needed to contain Soviet political or geographical expansion. Kennan predicted that the Soviet regime would either "mellow" or "break up" (p. 113).

Bialer and Mandelbaum (1988) provide information about how containment was implemented. The West sought to prevent Soviet advancement into Western Europe by building economic (the Marshall Plan) and military strength (NATO). The West also gave economic assistance and political support to nations within the Soviet sphere of influence. (pp. 352-358). "The Gorbachev Era has been seen within the United States as the fruition of the prudent policy of containment, even though the changes within the Soviet Union were much slower to come about than Kennan anticipated" (Spring, 1991, p. 175).

The Cold War saw the superpowers engage in an arms race. However, by the mid-1950s, it was recognized that because of nuclear weapons and the combined forces of NATO, no nation could win such a showdown. In 1956 the CPSU (Communist Party of the Soviet Union) announced the principle of

Peaceful Coexistence at the Twentieth Party Congress. Burlatsky (1988), an advisor to Khrushchev and other Soviet leaders, credited the approval of the principle of Peaceful Coexistence to the fact that the nation had been shocked by the threat to humanity precipitated earlier during the Cuban Missile Crisis (p. 273). Post-1956 basic antagonism between communist ideology and capitalism continued to exist, but Peaceful Coexistence implied that the ideological struggle would be fought in forms other than covert war. Ulam (1985-86) refers to these years of coexistence as "troubled" (p. 12).

Detente and the Cold War saw military buildup on both sides, spying in order to gain military technology, an attempt by the Soviets to seclude their society from outside influences, an attempt by the Soviets to maintain buffer states around their borders, and both sides fostering national liberation or civil wars. Continuation of mutual antagonism resulted in both camps stockpiling more and more nuclear weapons. The deployment of U.S. missiles in Western Europe in the early 1980s, intensified the tensions between the Soviet Union and the United States. The Soviet image of the United States was that the United States was the linchpin in the foreign affairs of other Western powers. Gorbachev began a new approach to dealing with the United States.

The Gorbachev Era (1985-91) saw change in both domestic and foreign affairs. Pyadyshev (1991) says that when Gorbachev came to power in 1985, Soviet foreign policy was in a very difficult situation and that the new leadership opted for "a radical change in the very concept of foreign policy thinking" (p. 3).

Change in foreign relations grew out of "New Political Thinking or NPT."

Gorbachev acknowledged the interconnectedness between domestic and foreign affairs (Sakwa, 1990, p. 316). These developments within the Soviet Union had important consequences for the outside world, including the United States (Wettig, 1991, p. 11).

The Gorbachev Era began in March 1985, following the death of Chernenko, who served only 13 months as the General Secretary of the Communist Party. General Secretaries set the overall tone and policy agenda of the regime (Smith, 1988, p. 78). Chernenko was part of the "old guard of the Politburo" (Adelman and Palmieri, 1989, p. 231). However, Gorbachev was clearly the number two man in charge and played a leadership role, especially after the health of Chernenko deteriorated. For example, Gorbachev prior to 1985, was active in foreign affairs and had made a positive impression in England and in Canada (Bialer and Mandelbaum, 1988, p. 487).

Two issues related to the Chernenko interlude are important for the purposes of this study: how did the Chernenko interlude affect Soviet Union and United States relations, and how did the Chernenko interlude affect NEWSWEEK's news-gathering and photo coverage?

Chernenko was a continuation of the Brezhnev mentality, even though he succeeded Andropov, the reform-minded mentor of Gorbachev. Andropov served as General Secretary during a time when relations with the United States was based on hostility and confrontation. Key problems existed during Andropov's

term including: the invasion of Afghanistan, Soviet crushing of Poland's Solidarity movement, the Reagan administration's massive military buildup, the modernization of NATO, the shooting down of a civilian Korean airplane, President Reagan's description of the Soviet Union as an evil empire, increased anti-United States propaganda by the Soviet Union, and an impasse in negotiations to control nuclear weapons. (Bassow, 1989, p. 304). Chernenko entered office at a time when Soviet and U.S. relations were based on mutual mistrust and fear.

Chernenko was conservative in domestic politics and a firm believer in detente. He achieved some gains in relations with the United States. These gains were: an agreement to improve the hotline between the two nations, a partial lifting of sanctions against the Soviet Union imposed due to the invasion of Afghanistan, an agreement that allowed the Soviets to increase purchases of grain, and an agreement to negotiate on nuclear and space weapons. The Chernenko interlude saw some decrease in tensions between the two superpowers. However, this time also saw the Soviet Union boycott the 1984 Olympics (Adelman and Palmieri, 1989, pp. 231-232).

In spite of gains achieved during the Chernenko interlude, domestic problems and foreign affairs problems remained unsolved. The causes of these problems remained.

Bassow (1989) provides information about the environment for news-gathering by U.S. correspondents prior to the Gorbachev Era. Bassow in

describing the Soviet Union during the 18 years that Brezhnev was General Secretary used the term *semitorpor*. Andropov, like Gorbachev, understood the seriousness of the domestic problems facing the Soviet Union in the early 1980s. Consequently, Andropov instigated reform directed at economic problems. The focus was directed both at workers (low productivity, absenteeism, and corruption) and at the system (wage and bonus incentives). These reforms made covering the Soviet Union exciting again. However, domestic quietude returned during the Chernenko interlude (pp. 303-307).

Bassow (1989) provides information about how leaders were covered prior to the Gorbachev Era. Both Andropov and Chernenko were elderly and in poor health. Bassow says that during the terms of these two men "the biggest game in town had been to ferret out the state of health of the nation's principal leader, no easy task in a society where only the inner few are privy to such information" (p. 305). Both leaders presented an image of weakness, not strength, of illness, not health. *Pre-glasnost*, even the death of leaders had to be ferreted out.

Gorbachev's ascent to power affected change in Soviet domestic and foreign affairs, and how leaders were depicted. This study seeks to determine just how these changes affected NEWSWEEK's news-gathering and photo coverage.

The section on Domestic Affairs discussed how *glasnost* might have affected the news-gathering and photo coverage of NEWSWEEK. This section will discuss how foreign policy changes or NPT might have affected NEWSWEEK's news-gathering and photo coverage. Two issues related to the

Gorbachev Era are important for the purposes of this study: how did the foreign policy changes or NPT affect Soviet and U.S. relations, and how did foreign policy changes or NPT affect NEWSWEEK's news-gathering and photo coverage?

Wettig (1991) and other Soviet scholars conclude that the impetus of Gorbachev's NPT came out of the recognition that a domestic crisis existed (pp. 1-19). The Soviet system was lagging behind other developed nations economically, as well as in scientific and technological spheres. There was recognition that "the Soviet Union had already dropped almost to the level of an underdeveloped Third World country." Even in the sectors of arms production and space technology, spheres on which Soviet claims of superpower status had rested, lags existed. (p. 3). Gorbachev inherited a system in which resources allotted to foreign policy had been given priority over domestic needs. Expenditures on military weapons and supporting client states (especially in the Third World) had been given priority. Gorbachev came to the decision that it was time to reevaluate the allotment of resources and that domestic needs were critical. It was time to make cuts in the defense budget, without "impairing security and defence capability" (p. 14). It was time to rethink relations with other nations. The intention was to decrease military spending and to increase domestic spending. This was referred to as "the Soviet Peace dividend" (Allison, 1992, p. 50).

Post-1985 saw an attempt to abandon irreconcilable antagonism with Western capitalism, because it was recognized that domestic needs would benefit

by doing so. Sakwa (1990) describes the foreign affairs legacy that Gorbachev inherited as "dire" (p. 315). This assessment was based on the following conditions: the war in Afghanistan was stalled, Eastern Europe was facing similar problems and a new wave of unrest was likely, relations with the West were at their worst in thirty years, the nation saw itself as encircled by hostile nations and even its allies were restless, and the Soviet Union was facing internal decline. Sakwa says that Gorbachev "radically changed the international atmosphere and established a new context for East-West relations (p. 315).

Gorbachev did not formulate NPT in a vacuum. In fact, similar ideas had been developed as early as during the Brezhnev years by "intellectuals within the Soviet academic establishment" (Sakwa, 1990, p. 316). Gorbachev reveals some of his basic ideas about foreign relations in **PERESTROIKA: NEW THINKING FOR OUR COUNTRY AND THE WORLD** (1987). These ideas include: more openness or *glasnost* in international relations is needed, there is always an element of propaganda or seeking a positive response in international diplomacy, approval of sympathy with national liberation movements in undeveloped nations, but the belief that nations have the right to choose their own way of development, the interdependence of all nations, the suggestion that the superpowers divert resources being spent on weapons to help solve the problems of the Third World, the concept of Europe as a common homeland, that it was in the best interest of the Soviet Union and the United States to stop the arms race, that proper international relations needs to consider not just the interests of the Soviet Union

and the United States, but the interests of other nations as well, and that the Soviet intention was to improve Soviet and U.S. relations (pp. 171-214).

Sakwa (1990) provides a concise summary of the tenets in NPT: common security was the goal in an interdependent, nuclear world, global issues (ecological issues and the depletion of natural resources) should be given priority over national issues, cooperative agreements should be enforced by international agencies, and Soviet and U.S. conflicts required arms control and political accommodation. Gorbachev presented these ideas to the 27th party congress in 1986. NPT is a striking departure from past Soviet foreign policy. NPT renounced the Brezhnev Doctrine that had been used to justify interfering with the politics of other Eastern European nations (Clark and Serfaty, 1991, p. 38). Importantly, these ideas indicated a shift away from "competition" toward "cooperation." However, according to Goldfarb (1992), while Gorbachev was able to accept the loss of Eastern Europe, it was much more difficult for him to accept similar losses within Soviet borders (p. 240).

Nationality conflicts generated a conservative backlash, even for Gorbachev. Disarmament and arms control were seen as the major guarantees against war, not ever-increasing military spending (pp. 318-319). While Gorbachev's ideas about internationalism were initially anathema to President Reagan, his ideas about disarmament and making nuclear weapons obsolete, meshed with some of Reagan's ideas (p. 324).

The conclusion of this section focuses on how Gorbachev implemented NPT in foreign relations with the United States during the presidencies of Reagan and Bush. The overarching idea is that NPT contributed to improved Soviet and U.S. relations.

Laqueur (1992) says that Soviet attitudes toward the West became particularly hostile during the Reagan period. President Reagan in the early 1980s, condemned the Soviet Union in harsh language. President Reagan initially described communism as the "focus of evil in the modern world" and as a "bizarre chapter in human history." President Reagan's comment that the Soviet Union was "an evil empire" is well-known. Azrael and Sestanovich (1985-86) say that the first term of President Reagan focused on the Soviet strategic nuclear buildup and Soviet involvement in the Third World (p. 479). At the same time the Reagan administration began a military modernization that accelerated the arms race. (p. 525). In the early to mid-1980s the Soviet perception was that the Reagan administration was "embroiling" them in an arms race to ruin them economically (Wettig, 1991, p. 3).

However, by the time Gorbachev became General Secretary in 1985, there were signs that President Reagan was modifying his stance. During the re-election process Reagan's greatest vulnerability was the public perception that he was "dangerously aggressive" in his relations with the Soviet Union. The Reagan administration saw the succession of Gorbachev as an opportunity to explore new possibilities (Shultz, 1985, p. 207). This more conciliatory mood led to an

agreement in March of 1985 to resume arms control talks. (Spring, 1991, pp. 176-177). Spring (1991) says that Reagan's second term in office (1984-88) was in the role of "peacemaker" (p. 178).

A cornerstone tenet of NATO was the idea of nuclear deterrence. However, President Reagan and Gorbachev had similar ideas about the lack of wisdom in using nuclear weapons to prevent war. President Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative or Star Wars was a response to this belief.

President Reagan and Gorbachev got acquainted at their first summit in Geneva in 1985. This was the first summit between the two superpowers in almost ten years. Wettig says that U.S. public opinion was in favor of the two superpowers improving their relationship (p. 29). A second summit was held in Reykjavik, Iceland, in October of 1986. A bold discussion about the complete elimination of nuclear weapons was held between the two leaders and their ideas converged. However, they went into the summit with different agendas and Gorbachev achieved a public opinion coup by stressing that President Reagan had been unwilling to make an anti-nuclear commitment in order to pursue his SDI plans, which were seen as a threat to humankind (pp. 30-31). The Soviet viewpoint of SDI was that rather than being defensive in intent, the intention was for the U.S. to acquire a nuclear first-strike capability (Lambeth and Lewis, 1988, p. 756). The Soviets backed down in regard to requiring the demise of SDI in order to complete a treaty that would liquidate on both sides land-based INF missiles. The INF Treaty was signed in 1987, at the Washington summit. Wettig

views the Soviet response to the passing of the INF Treaty as showing the Soviets were still antagonistic to the United States, because they took all the credit (p. 33). The control of weapons continued towards a START (Strategic Arms Reduction Talks) treaty at the Moscow summit in 1988. This treaty had complex issues involving the balance between nuclear and conventional forces.

A dramatic difference existed between how President Reagan and Gorbachev saw each other and their respective nations by the end of Reagan's second term.

Spring (1991) says that with Bush's succession to the presidency in 1989, the government had an opportunity to re-appraise Soviet and U.S. relations (p. 182). There was awareness that Gorbachev's popularity and authority continued to decline because of economic and other domestic hardships and that he was vulnerable to being overthrown by his opponents. Initially, President Bush was cautious towards Gorbachev and the Soviets. After the extraordinary course of events that occurred during 1989 (dismantling of the Iron Curtain, tearing down the Berlin Wall, toppling of communist regimes across Eastern Europe, the reunification of Germany, withdrawal from Afghanistan), President Bush became convinced that the best interests of the United States would be served by supporting the changes associated with the Gorbachev Era. Legvold (1988-89) concisely states the goals of this era: "less repressive at home and less aggressive abroad" (p. 219).

Gorbachev had talked about an end to the Cold War in a speech presented to the UN General Assembly in 1988. In 1989 President Bush called for the dismantling of the Iron Curtain and for self-determination in Eastern Europe. The Soviet Union saw benefits to this call, since they had been "wasting military and political assets there" (Livonen, 1991, p. 61). Gorbachev's NPT included the recognition that every Eastern bloc country had a right to decide their own fate. This became known as the new Soviet "Sinatra Doctrine" (Banac, 1992, p. 4). In 1989 Soviet-buffer states in Eastern Europe became extinct. That same year the Cold War officially ended at the Malta Summit. Laqueur (1992) refers to this as "the postwar age " (p. v). Sakwa (1990) says that Malta set the course for a Soviet transition to a new pattern of international relations (p. 351).

This transition included the following steps: the Soviet Union withdrew from Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union withdrew from the global arms race, and the Soviet Union was reassured that the West would not destabilize the political situation or threaten their national integrity (p. 351). At Malta, Bush invited the U.S.S.R. to become an observer at the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the Soviet Union became less isolated from the Western nations. By Malta if not earlier, President Bush realized that Gorbachev's survival was in the best interests of the United States (p. 352).

Caution seemed appropriate. The Bush administration recognized that there were still differences of viewpoints in the Soviet Union between reformers and conservatives. There was recognition that Gorbachev also had rivals from the

left, as Yeltsin proved to be (Hough, 1989/90, p. 35). Nevertheless by 1989-90, there was consensus in the Bush administration and in U.S. public opinion that reform could not be turned back. By the later years of the Gorbachev Era both the Bush administration and U.S. public opinion were more positive toward the Soviet Union. Gallup Poll data reflects this shift in U.S. opinion in a more positive direction. For example in the February, 1991 edition of THE GALLUP POLL MONTHLY, 56% of the respondents answered yes to the question whether the Cold War was over (p. 39). Consequently, support of Gorbachev and his reforms were seen to be in the best interest of the United States. (Spring, 1991, pp. 185-188). Yet Gorbachev's position seemed weakened in 1990, when Yeltsin was elected as President of the Russian Republic, even though several months earlier Gorbachev had himself been elected President of the Soviet Union. In August of 1991, following the *putsch* against Gorbachev, Yeltsin "moved to the forefront" and Gorbachev "became a secondary figure" (Solovyov and Klepikova, 1992, p. 21).

With the succession of Gorbachev to General Secretary of the Communist Party in 1985, the atmosphere of Soviet and U.S. relations began to be more positive. The atmosphere was more positive in comparison with the Chernenko interlude. Optimism existed in U.S. foreign policy decision-makers that the long stalemate about discussing the control of nuclear arms might end. (Hyland, 1985, p. 800). Hyland (1987) says that the initial optimism, generated by the first two summits between President Reagan and Gorbachev at Geneva (1985) and

Reykjavik (1986), was followed by a deadlock, but that by 1987, Soviet and U.S. relations had improved (p. 8). This suggests that NEWSWEEK coverage might reflect a difference before and after 1987. By 1988-89 Mandelbaum concluded that Soviet and U.S. relations had improved, and that even more dramatic improvement was possible (p. 16).

Gorbachev inherited a system whose global image had been tarnished by domestic decline and by foreign policy errors (Bialer and Afferica, 1985-86, p. 630). Events that occurred during the course of the Gorbachev Era began to address these problems. Consequently, the global image of the Soviet Union became more positive. Domestic reform and NPT resulted in an improved image of the Soviet Union as less threatening and more cooperative (Holloway, 1988-89, p. 79). This image contrasted greatly with the image that was dominant in the early 1980s that saw the Soviet Union as an "inherently and unchangeable aggressive and totalitarian entity, with which no productive negotiations were possible" (Shulman, 1988, p. 507). Allison (1992) concludes that by 1990, even the most skeptical Western observer saw that a remarkable transformation of the Soviet image had occurred (p. xiii). The goal of this study is to determine just how NEWSWEEK's news-gathering and photo coverage were affected by these changes. It is hard to imagine that NEWSWEEK photos won't depict a difference in the Soviet image.

CHAPTER III.

GATEKEEPING THEORIES

Deciding What's News

One purpose of this study is to examine the **message source** or the **communicator**. NEWSWEEK's photojournalism unit is the source of the news photos to be content analyzed.

The case study method best meets the purposes of this study. Case studies are the preferred method when the research questions deal with **how** or **why**, when the researcher has little control over events, and when the focus is on a contemporary event. The case study is used to examine individual, organizational, social, and political phenomena. The case study can be used for three purposes: exploratory, descriptive, or explanatory. The case study is used to go beyond relying on documents and physical artifacts. The case study deals with a variety of evidence, including documents, artifacts, interviews, and observations. The fact that the case study uses many different sources of evidence is seen as one of its strengths (Yin, 1984, pp. 13-26).

The study focuses on contemporary events (the Gorbachev Era). It seeks primary information from actual gatekeepers through open-ended interviews. It seeks to describe the content of news photos. It seeks to go beyond describing the photos and attempts to understand how and why some photos were encoded and published, not others.

One purpose of the study is to determine whether NEWSWEEK's news-gathering and news-processing behaviors were affected by the momentous changes that occurred during the Gorbachev Era. Information about news judgment is pertinent. The most fertile line of research is gatekeeping theories. Tan (1985) provides a concise definition of gatekeeping. Gatekeeping is the process by which events occurring in the environment are defined as news and selected to be passed along the communication chain (pp. 347-348).

In 1947 Lewin introduced the gatekeeping concept into an analysis of food selection and group behavior. It was adapted for communication studies by White in 1950 (Bass, 1969, p. 70). Gatekeeping studies use different approaches. Earlier studies emphasize the role played by selected individuals, as for example, wire editors (Snider, 1966, pp. 419-27; White, 1950, pp. 383-90). Whitney and Becker (1982, p. 61), even though their study examines a complex of influences on gatekeepers, suggest that wire service editors often influence other editors by suggesting the mix of news categories. Studies of this type emphasize bias and intrapersonal influences. These types of studies are considered simplistic.

Less simplistic studies have a broader scope. Bailey and Lichty (1972) note the importance of peer groups, reference groups, formal training, informal socialization, and other variables, as influencing gatekeeping (p. 228). Some studies identify news factors as determining variables. Factors such as normality, significance, proximity, timeliness, and visuals are used (Buckalew, 1969, pp. 135-37). Galtung and Ruge (1965) propose 12 factors that either added together, or as complements, explain the selection of foreign news. Recency and strength of the message are two factors that are relevant to the current study (pp. 259-98). Bass (1969, p. 72) divides gatekeepers into two groups. News gatherers take "raw news" and turn it into "news items." If the photojournalist doesn't consider an event in the environment to be "raw news," it is unlikely that a photo will be shot. News processors take the "news items" and modify them into a product that is usable in the medium and deliver this product to the audience. The news bureau staff pass along the product to the editor, who is responsible for the final product.

Studies limited to single gatekeepers fall short. It is vital to locate where gatekeeping decisions are actually made. News gatherers (reporters, photojournalists, even news sources) often make significant decisions (Bass, 1969, p. 69). It is important to consider that "almost every news story printed or broadcast reflects decisions made by more than one journalist" (Dimmick, 1974, p. 24).

It is not sufficient to limit gatekeeping studies to news gatherers and news processors. A study by Bailey and Lichty (1972) about the decision of the U.S.

media to use the now-famous photo by Eddie Adams, showing the execution of an unarmed soldier in Vietnam by General Loan, concludes that in this case the gatekeeper is the entire organization (p. 221). Donohew (1967) studies the effect on gatekeeping of publisher attitude and community opinion. Breed (1955) in his study of social control in the newsroom concludes that the publisher's policy usually is followed by news personnel and that this control is reinforced through professional socialization and rewards (pp. 326-35).

Carter (1958) suggests another gatekeeping variable. He states that news sources are themselves gatekeepers at earlier points in the flow of content through the media. Carter examines characteristics of the news gathering situation, including the relationship between the news person and the news source, their frequency of interaction, goal differences, news-gathering practices, and language barriers. Carter concludes that there is a need for more studies about how different patterns of interaction between news sources and specific gatekeepers affect content (pp. 133-44).

Gieber (1956) says that news sources often alert news personnel about events occurring in the environment. Both the source and the reporter are seen as gatekeepers in the channels of communication. Gieber divides sources into two groups, professional and volunteer. Gieber identifies other variables to consider in gatekeeping studies. These variables are related to the news gathers and include work pressures, news policy, bureaucratic structure, and the emotional climate of the newsroom (pp. 199-200).

Whitney and Becker (1982, p. 60) identify constraints on gatekeepers such as time, space, money, standardized sources, organizational policy, and craft norms. More current gatekeeping studies seek to consider political, economic, cultural, and technological forces (Mowlana, 1986, p. 20).

Dimmick (1974) provides one of the best resources about gatekeeping. His analysis of gatekeeping theories suggests specific methods and questions.

Dimmick conceptualizes gatekeeping as news organizations mapping environmental events into inputs and outputs. News organizations use various indicators to reduce the uncertainty of what to accept as input. Two processes are involved. First, there is a need to sense or identify possible input or news. Gatekeepers (reporters, photojournalists, editors, publishers, news organizations) must first be aware or sense that an event has occurred. Sometimes these events might even be hidden from gatekeepers. Secondly, the output must be defined and structured into a news item.

Dimmick (1974) proposes several methods used by gatekeepers to reduce the uncertainty of what to pass along the communication channel. These methods include using opinion leaders, arriving at a group consensus, monitoring the output of a reference organization (AP wire or the NEW YORK TIMES), following policy, accepting the definition of news as suggested by the news source, or using group-related attitudes and values (p. 10).

Roshco (1975) analyzed news from a sociological perspective. Two issues are uppermost in his approach: how relationships between the press and other

institutions (decision-makers) determine what is defined as news, where news originates, and how news is presented, and how the news content of the U.S. press is shaped by dominant U.S. values (p. 3). Roshco uses the term "newsmaking" to suggest that news content is the end-product of a social process that results in some information being published, but other information being discarded (p. 4). He concludes that decision-making by journalists involves social interactions (news staff and news sources) and is not based on a single decision-maker. He emphasizes that most news is based on high-visibility events and that news sources play a vital role in calling attention to events (p. 18-19).

Berry (1990) identifies five variables that explain the behavior of journalists: their primary task of getting the story versus explaining the underlying causes, their tendency to accept the foreign policy of the establishment, a natural bias to support U.S. interests, the drive to meet deadlines and please editors, and the drive to protect sources. These variables are relevant to this study.

Theories Applied

Other studies have analyzed messages to make inferences about news-gathering and gatekeeping. However, this study seeks to include gatekeepers directly in the study. Five NEWSWEEK gatekeepers will be interviewed by using

open-ended mail questionnaires or telephone interviews. These gatekeepers will include Guy Cooper, Picture Editor, Carroll Bogert, Editor of the Moscow Bureau, Viktor Yurehenko, Picture Editor of the Moscow Bureau, Wally McNamee, a staff photojournalist during the Gorbachev Era and currently on contract, and Peter Turnley, a contract photojournalist.

A primary purpose of the study is to explore whether the momentous changes that occurred in the Soviet Union during the Gorbachev Era affected NEWSWEEK's news-gathering and photo coverage. Bassow (1989) provides information about how the climate for journalists changed after 1985. Bassow will be used to provide background information for this study. For example, Bassow, writing about the climate of covering the Soviet Union at the beginning of the Gorbachev Era, commented that the Soviet system systematically sought to maintain barriers between journalists and the Soviet people (p. 338). If the NEWSWEEK gatekeepers had more contact with the person on the street as a news source, this contact would be important.

A review of gatekeeping theories suggest that more than one NEWSWEEK gatekeeper was involved in making decisions about the coverage of the Soviet Union. The overall NEWSWEEK policy and other organizational variables are important. Availability and access to news sources is important. Their perceptions about the climate for news-gathering are important. An assumption is that the purposes of the study can best be met by seeking

information from the gatekeepers, as well as by content analyzing the messages produced by them.

CHAPTER IV.

METHOD

Overview

This chapter describes the methods used to content analyze NEWSWEEK photos that depicted events occurring during the Gorbachev Era (1985-91). A baseline is provided by analyzing photos that depicted the Chernenko interlude (February 1984-March 1985). Including a baseline is necessary to determine just what changes occurred after 1985.

This chapter is divided into three sections. The first section clarifies the main problem of the study, the purposes of the study, relevant terms, the hypotheses, and the research questions. The second section describes the research design. The third section details the procedures used to collect and evaluate the data. The third section also provides information about coder reliability and validity.

Problem Statement

The main problem of the study is to determine just how the news coverage of NEWSWEEK was affected by domestic (*glasnost*) and foreign affairs (NPT) changes that occurred in the Soviet Union during the Gorbachev Era. A key question is whether the news coverage was influenced by the nature of Soviet Union and United States relations. The overarching question is determining just how the Slant, Image, and Overall Image of the Soviet Union depicted by NEWSWEEK photos changed.

Slant is defined as whether the Soviet Union was depicted in a positive (+), negative (-), neutral or balanced (0), or undetermined (?) way. A positive Slant would be improved foreign relations, domestic stability, economic stability, social cohesion, or preservation of the cultural heritage. A negative Slant would be deteriorating or conflictual foreign relations, domestic instability, social unrest, economic problems, or degradation of the cultural heritage. Slant may be determined to be neutral or balanced, or as undetermined.

Image is determined by using bi-polar adjectives to test meaning. This approach to measuring Image is suggested by other studies (Osgood, Suci, and Tannenbaum, 1957). The adjectives used are suggested by the literature (Alexander, 1971, p. 175; Scott, 1965, pp. 71-103). Adjectives used to determine a positive (+) Image include cooperative, peaceful, stable, productive, progressive,

open, friendly, cooperative, or peaceful. Adjectives used to determine a negative (-) Image include non-cooperative, aggressive, unstable, chaotic, unproductive, stagnant, closed, unfriendly, uncooperative, or aggressive. Image may be determined to be neutral or balanced (0), or as undetermined (?).

Overall Image is defined as whether the Soviet Union was depicted as contributing to an end of the Cold War (+), promoting a continuation of the Cold War (-), or depicted in a neutral or balanced (0), or undetermined (?) way.

Leader depiction is defined as whether Chernenko, Gorbachev, and Yeltsin were shown as cooperative, friendly, open to discuss issues, contributing to a more peaceful world, or encouraging an end to the Cold War (+), non-cooperative, hostile, closed to discussing issues, aggressive, or not encouraging an end to the Cold War (-), neutral or balanced (0), or undetermined (?).

Goals of the Study

The study examines to what degree the momentous changes (domestic and foreign) that occurred in the Soviet Union during the Gorbachev Era (1985-91) affected NEWSWEEK's news-gathering and photo coverage. Four purposes are dominant:

P1 To determine whether the internal changes that occurred in the Soviet Union (especially those changes related to *glasnost*) affected NEWSWEEK coverage;

P2 To determine whether the change in the foreign policy of the Soviet Union (based on "New Political Thinking" or NPT) affected NEWSWEEK coverage;

P3 To determine whether the image of the Soviet Union depicted by NEWSWEEK changed;

P4 To determine the nature of the image presented.

Definition of Terms

The terms discussed in the text and used in the study are defined as follows:

T1 AGREEMENT: The photo and cutline unit and the text depict the same message or image, not conflicting ones.

T2 CLARITY: The photo and cutline unit communicate the main idea or message of the text and might stand alone.

T3 CONTENT: **INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS**/relations with the U.S., other foreign relations, and international organizations. **DOMESTIC Affairs**/military or defense, politics, the economy, social problems, culture/arts,

religion, science/technology/medical, Soviet history, human rights, disasters/accidents, agriculture/food distribution, KGB/police/justice system, ethnic/nationality conflicts or issues, media, education, and other. **PERSONAL EVENTS**/personal information about leaders or their wives;

T4 CUTLINES: "Briefly stated information, usually occupying no more than four short lines, which accompanies a photograph, adds to our understanding of the image, and often influences what we think of it" (Newhall, 1989, p. 136);

T5 Democratization: Increased diversity in political life such as competitive elections and political debates;

T6 ETHNIC IMAGE: An image held about a people (Willis, 1968-69, p. 187);

T7 FOREIGN NEWS: All the material that mentions a nation other than the one in which the news was published, or which mentions the nation of publication and another nation (Atwood, 1987, p. 75);

T8 GATEKEEPER: Mass media persons making decisions about what information is passed along the communication chain and how it is produced. Gatekeepers include reporters, photographers, editors, researchers, policy makers, institutions, sources, and others. (Hicks, 1952, p. 8; Severin and Tankard, 1988, p. 46-47);

T9 Glasnost: More openness/publicity in discussing domestic problems, including formerly taboo topics (Sakwa, 1990, p. 6); is produced.

T10 IMAGE: Image is a composite of impressions, themes, opinions, and attitudes that form an overall or dominant representation of a subject. (Merrill, 1962, p. 203);

T11 LEADERS: A photo of either Chernenko, Gorbachev, or Yeltsin, including their respective wives. These photos are to be classified as portraying leaders as friendly, cooperative, peaceful (+), unfriendly, uncooperative, aggressive (-), neutral or balanced (0), or as undetermined (?);

T12 MUG SHOT: Head-and-shoulder shots of persons, or broader shots of persons not containing any environmental information or cues. Not included in this study.

T13 NATION: A geographic and political entity, apart from its individual inhabitants (Willis, 1968-69, p. 188);

T14 NATIONAL IMAGE: An image held about a nation as a geographical and political entity (Willis, 1968/69, p. 187);

T5 NEW POLITICAL THINKING/NPT: Gorbachev's proposal to conduct foreign policy based on cooperation with the West and recognition of the interdependence of nations (Katsenelinboigen, 1990, p.167);

T16 NEWS: Information concerning the Soviet Union from which the reader might gain, either directly or indirectly, or through inference, some impression of what the Soviet Union is like (Budd, 1964, p. 40);

T17 NEWS MAGAZINE: NEWSWEEK is the specific news magazine referred to in the study;

T18 NEWS-GATHERING: All the processes involved in sensing, reporting, and communicating the news;

T19 NEWS PHOTO: Photos used to report news. Photos used in advertisements, illustrations, or editorials are to be excluded. NEWSWEEK cover shots are to be excluded in this study. Mug shots are to be excluded, even though it is acknowledged that this category of photos contain information. Non-photographic visuals such as drawings, paintings, charts, graphs, cartoons, and other means of visual communication are to be excluded. NEWS PHOTOS are used to report such subjects as armed conflict, social and political conflict, catastrophes, politics, government, defense, legal proceedings, economics, science, religion, culture, public health and welfare, and may cover sports, social events, people, and social events (Manangka, 1983, p. 11-13);

T20 PERESTROIKA: Social and economic restructuring (Gorbachev, 1987 p. 34);

T21 PHOTO EDITOR: Has a gatekeeping role and is responsible for ferreting out fake photos, avoiding pseudo-events, detecting distortion of content, and other responsibilities (McDougall and Hampton, 1990, p. vi);

T22 PHOTOJOURNALIST: A eyewitness reporter, who uses visual communication as the primary language of communication (Rothstein, 1979, p. 27). The photojournalist uses photos to inform, amuse or convince others (Truxel, 1958, p. 23);

T23 RELEVANT PHOTOS: All photos, with the exception of cover and mug shots, contained in NEWSWEEK's International Section between 1984 and 1991, in which the Soviet Union was the subject;

T24 SLANT: The overall impression depicted by the news photo, whether positive (+), negative (-), neutral or balanced (0), or undetermined (?).

T25 SOVIET IMAGE: The composite, or sum total, of all the information about the Soviet Union presented through NEWSWEEK photos between 1985 and 1991 (Tadayon, 1980, p. 218);

T26 STEREOTYPE: A conventional, oversimplified opinion, conception, or belief;

T27 THEME: "...an assertion about a subject matter" (Berelson, 1952, p. 18);

T28 TEXT: "Main literary statement accompanying a series of photographs, usually presenting information about the theme and its background not contained in photographs and cutlines" (Newhall, 1989, p. 136).

Questions

The study attempts to ask the following questions:

Q1 Did the recent internal changes in the Soviet Union (especially those related to *glasnost*) affect NEWSWEEK coverage of the Soviet Union?

Q2 Did improved Soviet Union and United States relations based on "New Political Thinking or NPT" affect NEWSWEEK coverage of the Soviet Union?

Q3 Was there a difference in frequency of coverage between the *pre-glasnost* and the *post-glasnost* eras?

Q4 Was there a difference in frequency of coverage between the Reagan years (1984-88) and the Bush years (1989-91)?

Q5 Was there a change in the content of photos between the *pre-glasnost* and the *post-glasnost* eras?

Q6 Was there a change in the content of photos between the Reagan and Bush years?

Q7 Was there a change in the image presented of the Soviet Union between the *pre-glasnost* and the *post-glasnost* eras?

Q8 Was there a change in the image presented of the Soviet Union between the Reagan and Bush years?

Hypotheses

H1 NEWSWEEK during the Gorbachev Era (1985-1991) increased its number of editions about the Soviet Union.

Increase is to be determined by counting the number of editions about the Soviet Union in NEWSWEEK's International Section. The number of editions is defined as each time the Soviet Union was covered in a discrete week. The number of possible editions is defined as 52 each year. The Chernenko interlude had 52 possible editions. The Gorbachev Era had 364 possible editions. Number of editions for each year will be counted and compared by percent.

H2 NEWSWEEK during the Gorbachev Era (1985-91) increased its number of photos and cutlines about the Soviet Union.

Increase is to be determined by counting the number of photos about the Soviet Union in the International Section of each edition. Cover and mug shots will not be counted. The number of photos and cutlines for each year will be counted and compared by percent.

H3 NEWSWEEK during the Gorbachev Era (1985-91) increased its number of editions about the Soviet Union in comparison to the Chernenko interlude (1984).

Increase is to be determined by counting the number of editions for each era. The number of editions that depicted the Soviet Union during the

Chernenko interlude will be compared to a possible 52 editions. The number of editions that depicted the Soviet Union during the Gorbachev Era will be compared to a possible 364 editions. The number of editions for each era will be counted and compared by percent.

H4 NEWSWEEK during the Gorbachev Era (1985-91) increased its number of photos and cutlines about the Soviet Union in comparison to the Chernenko interlude (1984).

Increase is to be determined by counting the number of photos and cutlines for both eras. Numbers will be compared by percent.

H5 NEWSWEEK increased its number of editions about the Soviet Union during the Bush years (1989-91) in comparison to the Reagan years (1984-88).

Increase is to be determined by counting the number of editions for each period. The Reagan years had 260 possible editions. The Bush years had 156 possible editions. Numbers will be compared by percent.

H6 NEWSWEEK increased its number of photos and cutlines about the Soviet Union during the Bush years (1989-91) years in comparison to the Reagan years (1984-88).

Increase is to be determined by counting the number of photos and cutlines for each period. Numbers will be compared by percent.

H7 NEWSWEEK showed a more diverse range of content during the Gorbachev Era (1985-91) in comparison to the Chernenko interlude (1984).

Increased diversity is to be determined by counting and comparing content between the two periods. There are 23 possible content categories. Content between the two periods will be compared by percent.

H8 NEWSWEEK showed a more diverse range of content during the Middle (1988-89) and Later (1990-91) years of the Gorbachev Era than in the Early (1985-87) years.

Increased diversity is to be determined by counting and comparing content among the three periods. There are 23 possible content categories. Content among the three periods will be compared by percent.

H9 NEWSWEEK showed a more positive Slant, Image, and Overall Image of the Soviet Union during the Gorbachev Era (1985-91) in comparison to the Chernenko interlude (1984).

Increased positive Slant, Image, and Overall Image is to be determined for each period. Numbers will be compared by percent and t-test.

H10 NEWSWEEK showed a more positive Slant, Image, and Overall Image of the Soviet Union during the Bush years (1989-91) in comparison to the Reagan years (1984-88).

Increased positive Slant, Image, and Overall Image is to be determined for each period. Numbers will be compared by percent and t-test.

H11 NEWSWEEK showed a more positive Slant, Image, and Overall Image of the Soviet Union in 1991 in comparison to 1985.

Increased positive Slant, Image, and Overall Image is to be determined for each year. Numbers will be compared by percent and t-test.

H12 NEWSWEEK photos attributed to photojournalist Peter Turnley did not differ from photos attributed to other U.S. and Western sources combined (Other NEWSWEEK photojournalists, AP, and UPI) in regard to Overall Image.

Whether the photos between these two groups differed is to be determined by counting direction of Overall Image. Numbers will be compared by percent and t-test.

H13 NEWSWEEK photos attributed to photojournalist Peter Turnley differed from photos attributed to Soviet sources in the Overall Image depicted of the Soviet Union.

Whether the photos between these two groups differed is to be determined by counting the direction of Overall Image. Numbers will be compared by percent and t-test.

H14 NEWSWEEK showed an increase in the frequency that locales other than Moscow or Russia were reflected in photos.

Increase in other locales is to be determined by counting whether depicted locale is Moscow/Russia or other locales. Numbers will be compared by percent.

H15 NEWSWEEK showed a difference in how the three leaders (Chernenko, Gorbachev, and Yeltsin) were depicted.

Difference in leader depiction is to be determined by counting whether leaders were shown as friendly (+), unfriendly (-), neutral (0), or undetermined (?). Numbers will be compared by percent and ANOVA.

H16 NEWSWEEK showed an increase in the frequency that Gorbachev, Yeltsin, and their spouses were depicted in personal events and human interest photos in comparison to the depiction of Chernenko or his spouse.

Increased depiction of personal events/human interest photos will be determined by counting the number of photos for each person with this type of content. Numbers will be compared by percent.

H17 NEWSWEEK presented a more positive Overall Image of the Soviet Union during the course of the Gorbachev Era. The Overall Image depicted the Soviet Union as contributing to an end of the Cold War (+), not promoting a continuation of the Cold War (-).

A positive Overall Image is to be determined by counting the number of positive and negative photos for each year of the era. Numbers will be compared by percent.

In addition to the 17 hypotheses to be tested, two research questions will be asked. NEWSWEEK photos and cutlines will be analyzed to determine whether there is **Clarity** (the photo and cutline unit might stand alone). NEWSWEEK photos, cutlines, and text will be analyzed to determine whether there is **Agreement** (photo, cutline, and text depict the same message or image, not conflicting ones). Both research questions will be compared by percent.

Content Analysis Design

Content analysis is to be used to determine Frequency of Coverage, Source, Locale, Content, Leader Depiction, Slant, Image, Overall Image, Photo and Cutline Clarity, and Photo, Cutline, and Text Agreement, of news photos published in the International Section of NEWSWEEK between 1984 and 1991. Overall change or trends are to be noted. Determining the frequency that specific content is covered is to be used to establish a Content Agenda (Riffe and Shaw, 1982, p. 619). A baseline is to be provided by including the Chernenko interlude in the study. Comparisons are to be made between the Chernenko interlude and the Gorbachev Era, and between the Reagan and Bush years.

One of the most frequent citations about content analysis states that this methodology is a "research technique for the objective, systematic, and quantitative description of the manifest content of communication" (Berelson, 1952, p. 18). The texts by Stempel and Westley (1989) and by Yu and Riffe (1989) are to be used as guides. Content analysis is to be used to examine the content (manifest and latent) of news photos.

Sampling

NEWSWEEK is purposively chosen as the subject of the case study. The study is based on an analysis of all the photos (except cover photos and mug shots) published in the International Section of NEWSWEEK about the Soviet Union between February 1984 and December 1991. This time period includes the brief Chernenko interlude through the end of the Gorbachev Era. The beginning of the Yeltsin period is the cutoff for the study. This time-frame allows some conclusions to be made about trends and changes. The December 30, 1991, edition of NEWSWEEK refers to the collapse of the Soviet Union, the collapse of Marxism-Leninism, and makes references to Yeltsin replacing Gorbachev.

The universe of photos and cutlines will be used, not a sample. A total of 55 photos will be analyzed for the Chernenko interlude (1984). A total of 674 photos will be analyzed for the Gorbachev Era. The total number of photos to be analyzed is 729, 114 of which are attributed to Peter Turnley. The number of mug shots that are not to be analyzed is 267. Photos and cutlines are to be grouped according to whether they are representative of the Chernenko interlude, or the Gorbachev Era. Additionally, photos and cutlines are to be grouped according to whether they are representative of the Reagan years (1984-88) or the Bush years (1988-91). A comparison is to be made between the photos taken by

Peter Turnley and other photo sources. A list of the photos and cutlines to be analyzed is provided in the Appendix.

Procedures

Each edition that covered the Soviet Union during the time frame of the study is included. Within each edition all news photo (except cover and mug shots) are to be content analyzed. The total number of photos is 729.

Each photo is classified according to its Edition (month, day, and year), Source, Locale, Content, Leader Depiction, Slant, Image, and Overall Image. Photo and Cutline Clarity and Photo, Cutline, and Text Agreement are analyzed. Procedures to be used are suggested by Stevenson and Shaw (1984) and Tsang (1987).

Photos are to be examined in three possible steps:

1. The photo alone is examined to determine its Frequency, Source, Locale, Content, Leader Depiction, Slant, Image, Overall Image, Photo and Cutline Clarity, and Photo, Cutline, and Text Agreement;
2. Cutlines are examined next to ask the research questions. The photo and cutline combination is considered to be a unit;
3. The text is read to answer questions 12 and 13.

Categories

Each photo is to be examined to determine its Edition, Source, Locale, Content, Leader Depiction, Slant, Image, Overall Image, Photo and Cutline Clarity, and Photo, Cutline, and Text Agreement, as follows:

1. Edition (month, day, and year);
2. Source (Peter Turnley, NEWSWEEK Photographer, Independent Photographer, AP, UPI, TASS/Soviet sources, other Wire Services, Photo Agencies, Other Media, and Undetermined);
3. Locale (Moscow, Russian Republic, other Soviet Republic, and locales outside the Soviet Union;
4. Content (International Affairs, Domestic Affairs, and Personal Events). This category is suggested by Yu and Riffe (1989);
5. Leader Depiction (encouraging an end to the Cold War (+), or promoting a continuation of the Cold War (-);
6. Slant (positive (+), negative (-), neutral (0), or undetermined (?). This category is suggested by Budd, Thorp, and Donohew (1967, p. 50-65);
7. Image (based on bipolar adjectival word-pairs);
8. Overall Image (encouraging an end to the Cold War (+), or promoting a continuation of the Cold War (-);

9. Whether the Photo and Cutline unit exhibited Clarity (could stand alone without text);
10. Whether the Photo, Cutline, Text exhibited Agreement (photos, cutlines, and text depict the same message or image, not conflicting ones).

Coder Reliability

Coder reliability is an important consideration in content analysis. Reliability can be defined as "simply consistency of classification" (Stempel and Westley, 1989, p. 133). Coder reliability can be checked by having a second coder code a sample of the photos. Laswell (1952, p. 16) considers coder agreement scores of at least 70% to 80% to be acceptable. Stempel (1989, p. 133) considers percentage of agreement to be an accepted way to report reliability. The study's second coder is a Ph.D. graduate of the University of Tennessee, Knoxville, and is currently an Assistant Professor at Middle Tennessee State University. Coding results of the two coders is based on Holsti's reliability coefficient formula. The coder agreement score was 98%. Inter-coder percentage agreement for specific categories was as follows:

- | | |
|---------------------|------|
| 1. Number of photos | 100% |
| 2. Month | 100% |

3. Date	100%
4. Year	100%
5. Source	99%
6. Locale	100%
7. Content	100%
8. Leader Depiction	93%
9. Slant	99%
10. Image	99%
11. Overall Image	99%
12. Clarity	96%
13. Agreement	99%

Validity

Validity is concerned with the degree with which an instrument actually measures what it's supposed to measure (Stempel and Westley, p. 43). Since the analysis included all the photos and cutlines (except mug and cover shots) in NEWSWEEK's International Section between 1984 and 1991, not a sample,

validity was high. Other aspects of validity will be discussed in the **DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS** chapter.

Measurement

A simple plan for making a quantitative content analysis and one used frequently, is measuring column inches. Photos can be measured based on column inches (Blackwood, 1983), or by categorizing them as either small, medium, or large (Shuey, 1953, p. 281). However, this is not the method used. The photos published in NEWSWEEK's International Section (except cover photos and mug shots) are approximately the same size. Item count and frequency are used as measures. Frequency is the primary unit of measurement.

Statistics

The study is based not on sampling but on an analysis of all the photos in the International Section of NEWSWEEK that depicted the Soviet Union

between 1984 and 1991. It is appropriate to report the results of the study based on frequency, percent, and cross-tabulation. Additional methods will be used including the t-test (comparison of two groups), and ANOVA (comparison of three groups). Findings are presented in subsequent chapters.

CHAPTER V.

RESULTS

This chapter presents results generated from the content analysis of photos and cutlines in NEWSWEEK's International Section that depicted the former Soviet Union during the Gorbachev Era (1985-91) and results generated from the open-ended interviews of five NEWSWEEK gatekeepers. This chapter is divided into three sections. The first section describes procedures used in the data analysis. The second section reports results and discusses the 17 hypotheses and two research questions based on the content analysis. The third section reports results and discusses the 17 hypotheses and two research questions based on the open-ended interviews. Tables are provided as needed.

Procedures

The procedures of content analysis began with frequency analysis for each variable involved in the study. The variables included Identifying Data, Source, Locale, Content, Leader Depiction, Slant, Image, Overall Image, Photo and Cutline Clarity, and Photo, Cutline, and Text Agreement. Frequency tables are provided in the Appendix. Analysis of the photos and cutlines was based on systematic adherence to procedures specified in the Coding Instructions. Copies of the Coding Instructions, the Coding Format, and the Coding Sheet are included in the Appendix. A total of 729 photos were analyzed. A second coder analyzed a random sample of ten percent of the photos. Coder reliability was computed by using Holsti's reliability coefficient formula: $CR = 2M/(N1+N2)$ in which M = number of agreements and N1 and N2 = number of items coded by each coder. Overall inter-coder percentage agreement between the principal and the second coder was 98%. This agreement was high and suggests that the study had high reliability.

NEWSWEEK was purposively chosen as the subject of the case study. All the photos about the Soviet Union in NEWSWEEK's International Section between 1984 and 1991 were included with the exception of cover and mug shots. The universe of photos, not a sample, was analyzed. The study was appropriate to report parameters, not statistics. Parameters are reported in cross-tabulations and

percents. This approach is acceptable. Statistical tests are used much less often in content analysis. However, nonparametric statistics are frequently used in content analysis (Stempel and Westley, p. 137). In this study the findings will be reported using several methods. Since the data was at the nominal or categorical level of measurement statistical testing included frequencies, percentages, and cross-tabulations. Additionally, some of the data measured at the interval level was tested by the t-test (comparison of two groups) and ANOVA (comparison of three groups). The SAS System was used to analyze the data.

Findings of Content Analysis

This section of Chapter V. presents and discusses results on the 17 hypotheses and two additional research questions.

H1 predicted that NEWSWEEK during the Gorbachev Era increased its number of editions about the Soviet Union. In 1985 the percent of editions was 42%. In 1991 the percent of editions was 77%. The hypothesis was supported. Results are presented in Table 5.1.

TABLE 5.1 Percentage of Editions during the Gorbachev Era (1985-91).

N = 221

Year	Percent
1985	42
1968	52
1987	58
1988	60
1989	69
1990	67
1991	77

Each year compared to 52 possible editions.

Percent of editions increased between 1985 and 1991.

Hypothesis supported.

H2 predicted that NEWSWEEK during the Gorbachev Era increased its number of photos and cutlines about the Soviet Union. In 1985 the percent of photos was 12%. In 1991 the percent of photos was 22%. The hypothesis was supported. Results are presented in **Table 5.2**.

H3 predicted that NEWSWEEK during the Gorbachev Era increased its editions about the Soviet Union in comparison to the Chernenko interlude. The percentage of editions during the Chernenko interlude was 54%. The percentage of editions during the Gorbachev Era was 60%. The hypothesis was supported. Results are presented in **Table 5.3**.

H4 predicted that NEWSWEEK increased its number of photos about the Soviet Union during the Gorbachev Era in comparison to the Chernenko interlude. The percent of photos during the Chernenko interlude was 7.5%. The percent of photos during the Gorbachev Era was 92.5%. The hypothesis was supported. The results are presented in **Table 5.4**.

H5 predicted that NEWSWEEK had more editions during the Bush years than it did during the Reagan years. Percentage of editions during the Reagan years was 52%. Percentage of editions during the Bush years was 71%. Hypothesis was supported. The results are presented in **Table 5.5**.

TABLE 5.2 Percentage of Photos during the Gorbachev Era (1985-91). N = 679

Year	Percent
1985	12
1986	7
1987	15
1988	15
1989	13
1990	16
1991	22

Percent of photos increased between 1985 and 1991.

Hypothesis supported.

TABLE 5.3 Percentage of Editions during the Gorbachev Era (1985-91) in Comparison to the Chernenko interlude (1984). N = 245

Leader	Percent
Chernenko	54
Gorbachev	60

Chernenko editions compared to 52 possible editions.

Gorbachev editions compared to 364 possible editions.

Percent of editions increased.

Hypothesis supported.

TABLE 5.4 Percentage of Photos during the Gorbachev Era (1985-91) in Comparison to the Chernenko interlude (1984). N = 729

Leader	Percent
Chernenko	7.5
Gorbachev	92.5

Percent of photos increased.

Hypothesis supported.

TABLE 5.5 Percentage of Editions during the Reagan (1984-88) and Bush (1989-91) years. N = 245

Leader	Percent
Reagan	52
Bush	71

Reagan editions compared to 260 possible editions.

Bush editions compared to 156 possible editions.

Percent of editions increased during the Bush years.

Hypothesis supported.

H6 predicted that NEWSWEEK increased its number of photos during the Bush years in comparison to the Reagan years. Percentage of photos during the Reagan years was 53%. Percentage of photos during the Bush years was 47%. However, the Reagan years averaged 67 photos each year. The Bush years averaged 114 photos each year. Hypothesis was supported. Results are presented in **Table 5.6**.

H7 predicted that NEWSWEEK showed a more diverse range of content during the Gorbachev Era than during the Chernenko interlude. Hypothesis was supported. Results are presented in **Table 5.7**.

H8 predicted that NEWSWEEK showed a more diverse range of content during the Middle (1988-89) and Later (1990-91) years of the Gorbachev Era than in the Early (1985-87) years. Hypothesis was supported. Results are presented in **Table 5.8**.

H9 predicted that NEWSWEEK showed a more positive Slant, Image, and Overall Image of the Soviet Union during the Gorbachev Era in comparison to the Chernenko interlude. Hypothesis was supported. Results are presented in **Table 5.9**.

H10 predicted that NEWSWEEK showed a more positive Slant, Image, and Overall Image of the Soviet Union during the Bush years in comparison to the Reagan years. Hypothesis was not supported. Results are presented in **Tables 5.10 and 5.11**.

TABLE 5.6 Percentage of Photos during the Reagan (1984-88) and Bush (1989-91) years. N = 729

Leader	Percent
Reagan	53
Bush	47

On average there were more photos during the Bush years.

Reagan photos compared to seven years. Bush photos compared to three years.

Hypothesis supported.

TABLE 5.7 Comparison, in percent, of Content between the Chernenko interlude (1984) and the Gorbachev Era (1985-91).

Content	Chernenko	Gorbachev
1. Bilateral Relations with U.S.	10	90
2. Bilateral Relations/Others	13	87
3. Relations with 2 or more nations	9	91
4. Military/ Defense	14	86
5. Internal Politics	12	88
6. Economy	0	100
7. Social Problems	0	100
8. Culture/Arts	7	93
9. Religion	9	91
10. Science	0	100
11. Soviet History	12	88

TABLE 5.7 (continued)

Content	Chernenko	Gorbachev
12. Human Rights	7	93
13. Disasters or Accidents	0	100
14. Agriculture	0	100
15. KGB/Police/Justice	0	100
16. Ethnic/Nationality Issues	0	100
17. Media	0	100
18. Education	50	50
19. Other	0	100
20. Chernenko	0	0
21. Chernenko's Spouse	0	100
22. Gorbachev	0	100
23. Gorbachev's Spouse	0	100

Diversity of Content increased. Hypothesis supported.

TABLE 5.8 Comparison, in percent, of Content among the Early (1985-87), Middle (1988-89), and Latter (1990-91) years of the Gorbachev Era. N = 674

Content	Early	Middle	Latter
1. Bilateral Relations with U.S.	53	27	20
2. Bilateral Relations/Others	34	54	12
3. Relations with 2 or more nations	40	10	50
4. Military/ Defense	40	18	42
5. Internal Politics	16	12	73
6. Economy	20	23	57
7. Social Problems	33	25	42
8. Culture/Arts	0	14	7
9. Religion	43	80	20
10. Science	45	29	41
11. Soviet History	18	41	0

TABLE 5.8 (continued)

Content	Early	Middle	Latter
12. Human Rights	88.5	11.5	0
13. Disasters or Accidents	45	42	13
14. Agriculture	0	17	83
15. KGB/Police/Justice	33.3	33	33.3
16. Ethnic/Nationality Issues	8	38	54
17. Media	57	0	43
18. Education	50	50	0
19. Other	0	100	0
20. Chernenko	0	0	0
21. Chernenko's Spouse	50	50	0
22. Gorbachev	100	0	0
23. Gorbachev's Spouse	79	14	7

Diversity of Content increased. Hypothesis supported.

TABLE 5.9 Comparison, in percent, of Slant, Image, and Overall Image between the Chernenko interlude (1984) and the Gorbachev Era (1984-91).

Leader	Slant	Image	Overall Image
Chernenko	+ 18	+ 13	+ 13
Gorbachev	+ 44	+ 43	+ 43

Gorbachev presented more positively than Chernenko.

Hypothesis supported.

TABLE 5.10 Comparison, in percent, of Slant between the Reagan (1984-88) and Bush (1989-91) years. N = 729

Leader	Slant
Reagan	+ 55
Bush	+ 45

Hypothesis not supported, in percent.

TABLE 5.11 Comparison, in t-test, of Slant, Image, and Overall Image between the Reagan (1984-88) and Bush (1989-91) years.

Leader	Slant Mean	Image Mean	Overall Mean
Reagan	- .11	- .17	- .17
Bush	- .18	- .18	- .18

$p < t = .967$.

There was no difference in depiction between the Reagan and Bush years.

Hypothesis not supported.

H11 predicted that NEWSWEEK showed a more positive Slant, Image, and Overall Image of the Soviet Union in 1991 than in 1985. Hypothesis was supported, in percent. In 1985 the percent of positive depiction was 42%. In 1991 the percent of positive depiction was 53%. However, the t-test did not support the hypothesis. Results are presented in Tables 5.12 and 5.13 .

H12 predicted that photos attributed to photojournalist Peter Turnley would not differ from photos attributed to other U.S. and Western sources combined in regard to Overall Image depicted of the Soviet Union. Western Overall Image, in percent, was more positive than was Turnley Overall Image, in percent. However, the t-test did not show a significant difference. Hypothesis supported as stated. Results are presented in Tables 5.14 and 5.15.

H13 predicted that photos attributed to photojournalist Peter Turnley would differ from photos attributed to Soviet sources in regard to Overall Image depicted of the Soviet Union. Soviet sources were more negative in direction than Turnley sources, however the t-test did not support a significant difference. Hypothesis not supported. Results are presented in Tables 5.16 and 5.17.

H14 predicted that NEWSWEEK increased the frequency that locales other than Moscow or Russia were depicted in photos. Hypothesis was supported. Results are presented in Table 5.18.

H15 predicted that NEWSWEEK would show a difference in how three leaders (Chernenko, Gorbachev, and Yeltsin) were depicted. Hypothesis was supported. Results are presented in Tables 5.19 and 5.20.

TABLE 5.12 Comparison, in percent, of Slant, Image, and Overall Image between 1985 and 1991. N = 729

Year	+1	-1	0
1985	42	54	4
1986	20	78	2
1987	54	44	2
1988	50	50	0
1989	41	59	0
1990	25	75	0
1991	53	47	0

Percent of positive depiction increased.

Hypothesis, in percent, supported.

TABLE 5.13 Comparison, in t-test, of Slant, Image, and Overall Image between 1985 and 1991.

Year	Slant Mean	Image Mean	Overall Mean
1985	- 0.01	- 0.10	- 0.13
1991	+ 0.06	+ 0.07	+ 0.07

There was no significant difference.

However, 1991 depiction was in a more positive direction.

$p < t = .837$.

Hypothesis not supported.

TABLE 5.14 Comparison, in percent, of Overall Image in Photos Attributed to Peter Turnley or other U.S. or Western Sources.

Source	Overall Image
Turnley	+ 46
U.S. or Western	+ 56

It appeared U.S. or Western sources were more positive than Turnley source.

Hypothesis not supported, in percent.

TABLE 5.15 Comparison, in t-test, of Overall Image in Photos Attributed to Peter Turnley or other U.S. or Western Sources.

Source	Slant Mean	Image Mean	Overall Mean
Turnley	- 0.01	- 0.07	- 0.07
U.S. or Western	+ 0.15	+ 0.11	+ 0.11

There was no difference between sources.

$p < t = .919$.

Hypothesis supported as stated.

TABLE 5.16 Comparison, in percent, of Overall Image in Photos Attributed to Peter Turnley or Soviet Sources.

Source	+	-
Turnley	46	54
Soviet	25	75

It appeared that Soviet sources were more negative than Turnley source.

Hypothesis supported, in percent.

TABLE 5.17 Comparison, in t-test, of Slant, Image, and Overall Image in Photos Attributed to Peter Turnley or Soviet Sources.

Source	Slant Mean	Image Mean	Overall Mean
Turnley	- 0.01	- 0.07	- 0.07
Soviet	- .40	- .48	-.48

Soviet sources were more negative than Turnley source.

$p < t = .4665, .2324, \text{ and } .2324.$

Hypothesis not supported.

TABLE 5.18 Comparison, in percent, of Locale.

Year	Moscow or Russia	Other
1985	61	39
1986	46	54
1987	53	47
1988	47	53
1989	36	64
1990	59	41
1991	75	25

The range of increase of Other Locales was 25% - 64%.

Hypothesis supported.

TABLE 5.19 Comparison, in percent, of Leader Depiction.

Leader	+	-	0
Chernenko	13.5	73	13.5
Gorbachev	62	35	3
Yeltsin	78	22	0

Gorbachev and Yeltsin depicted more positively than Chernenko.

Hypothesis supported.

TABLE 5.20 Comparison, in ANOVA, of Leader Depiction.

Leader	Slant	Image	Overall Image
Chernenko	- 0.47	- 0.60	- 0.60
Gorbachev	+ 0.41	+ 0.27	+ 0.27
Yeltsin	+ 0.56	+0.48	+ 0.48

$p < f = .000$.

Hypothesis supported.

H16 predicted that NEWSWEEK increased its frequency that Gorbachev, Yeltsin, and their spouses were depicted in personal events or human interest photos in comparison to the depiction of Chernenko and his spouse. Hypothesis was supported. Results are presented in **Table 5.21**.

H17 predicted that NEWSWEEK presented a more positive Overall Image of the Gorbachev Era. Hypothesis was not supported. Results are presented in **Table 5.22**.

In addition to the 17 hypotheses of the study NEWSWEEK photos and cutlines were analyzed to determine whether they exhibited **Clarity** (might stand alone without text), or whether the text was needed to provide the primary message. Secondly, photos and cutlines were compared to the text to determine whether they exhibited **Agreement** (photos and cutlines did not conflict with text).

Research Question 1. asked whether NEWSWEEK photos and cutlines were clear enough to communicate the basic message intended. Coders were instructed to read the photo first, then the cutline, and finally the text and to determine whether the photos and cutlines were clear. **Clarity** was analyzed using percent. It was found that 96% of the photo and cutlines had **Clarity**. Results are presented in **Table 5.23**.

TABLE 5.21 Comparison, in percent, of Personal or Human Interest Depictions among Leaders and Spouses.

Human Interest	Yes
Chernenko	0
Chernenko's Spouse	21
Gorbachev	5
Gorbachev's Spouse	74
Yeltsin	0
Yeltsin's Spouse	0

Human Interest Content increased.

Hypothesis supported.

TABLE 5.22 Overall Image Depicted, in percent, during the Gorbachev Era (1985-91).

Overall Image	Positive + 1	Negative - 1	Neutral 0
1985	42	54	4
1986	20	78	2
1987	54	44	2
1988	50	50	0
1989	41	59	0
1990	25	75	0
1991	53	47	0

Hypothesis not supported. The overarching image remained negative, due to domestic turmoil. However, the trend was more to depict a more positive image.

Research Question 2. asked whether the photo and cutlines agreed with the text or depicted conflicting images. **Agreement** was analyzed using percent. It was found that 97% had **Agreement**. **Table 5.24** presents results.

The results of the two research questions suggest that NEWSWEEK is presenting photos, cutlines, and text that depict a unified message. This suggests that the coverage of the Gorbachev Era had the potential of affecting attitudes.

TABLE 5.23 Photo and Cutline Clarity, in percent.

Year	Yes	No
1984	94	6
1985	92	8
1986	91	9
1987	93	7
1988	100	0
1989	100	0
1990	92	8
1991	99	1

Clarity was consistently high (96%).

TABLE 5.24 Photo, Cutline, and Text Agreement, in percent.

Year	Yes	No
1984	96	4
1985	99	1
1986	94	6
1987	96	4
1988	99	1
1989	99	1
1990	97	3
1991	96	4

Agreement was consistently high (97%).

Findings of Questionnaires

This section of Chapter V. presents and discusses results on the 17 hypotheses and two research questions based on the questionnaires. Written responses to questionnaires were received from Guy Cooper, NEWSWEEK's Picture Editor, and from Carroll Bogert, Moscow Bureau Chief. Viktor Yurehenko, Picture Editor of the Moscow Bureau, Wally McNamee, a staff photojournalist, and Peter Turnley, a contract photojournalist, were interviewed by telephone.

H1: This hypothesis analyzed whether NEWSWEEK increased its number of editions about the Soviet Union during the Gorbachev Era. Increased editions would indicate increased coverage. It was found that in 1985 the number of editions was 22 or 42% of the total. In 1991 the number of editions was 40 or 77% of the total. Number of editions did increase. Another indicator of increased frequency of coverage would be an increase in the resources allotted to covering the Soviet Union during the Gorbachev Era. Cooper says that he cannot as a matter of policy reveal the fiscal resources allotted. However, as the Soviet Union became more interesting post-Brezhnev, additional staff was added to the Moscow Bureau.

Cooper says that NEWSWEEK reacts to important news and will throw huge quantities of editorial, photographic, and technical resources when justified.

Cooper perceives the Gorbachev Era as a "slow-burner" versus "hot news" until and after the coup. This suggests that increased frequency of coverage during the Gorbachev Era peaked towards the end of the era. Hypothesis was supported.

H2: This hypothesis analyzed whether NEWSWEEK increased its number of photos and cutlines about the Soviet Union during the Gorbachev Era. Increased number of photos and cutlines would indicate increased coverage. It was found that in 1985 the number of photos was 79 or 11% of the total. In 1991 there were 146 photos or 20% of the total. Number of photos did increase during this era. Cooper says that during this era photojournalists were instructed to apply for visas. Hypothesis was supported.

H3: This hypothesis analyzed whether NEWSWEEK increased its number of editions between the Chernenko interlude and the Gorbachev Era. Cooper does not specifically address this question. He does not mention Chernenko at all, but instead refers to Brezhnev's "endless decline" after which covering the Soviet Union became "more interesting as a story." Cooper by omission assigns low importance to Chernenko. It was found that during the Chernenko interlude the number of editions was 28 or 54% of all the editions for 1984. During the Gorbachev Era the number of editions was 217 or 60% of all the editions between 1985 and 1991. The percent of editions increased between these two periods. Hypothesis was supported.

H4: This hypothesis analyzed whether NEWSWEEK increased its number of photos between the Chernenko interlude and the Gorbachev Era. It was found

that in 1984 the number of photos was 55 or 7.5% of all the total. During the Gorbachev Era the number of photos was 674 or 92.5% of the total. The percent of photos increased between these two periods. Hypothesis was supported.

H5: This hypothesis analyzed whether NEWSWEEK increased its number of editions between the Reagan and Bush years. Cooper does not differentiate between these two U.S. presidencies, except to say that until the coup the Soviet story was a "slow-burner." Yurehenko implied that the very nature of this question reflected a U.S. perspective. It was found that during the Reagan years NEWSWEEK had 134 editions or 52% of all editions between 1984 and 1988. The Bush years had 111 editions or 71% of all editions between 1989 and 1991. Based on percent the number of editions increased during the Bush years. Hypothesis was supported.

H6: This hypothesis analyzed whether NEWSWEEK increased the number of photos between the Reagan and Bush years. It was found that the Reagan years had 385 photos or 53% of the total. The Bush years had 344 photos or 47% of the total. It is important to note that the Reagan years lasted five years compared to three years for Bush. Percent did not rule out the possibility that the number of photos increased during the Bush years. On average the Reagan years had 67 photos each year. On average the Bush years had 114 photos each year. Hypothesis was supported.

H7: This hypothesis analyzed whether NEWSWEEK had a more diverse range of content during the Gorbachev Era than during the Chernenko interlude.

All five gatekeepers in the study confirm that *glasnost* affected the type of content that NEWSWEEK depicted. Cooper in a succinct way says that, "Yes, *glasnost* allowed us more freedom to shoot what we wanted and by proxy to say what we wanted about what we had shot." Cooper says that *glasnost* allowed NEWSWEEK to report and verify facts beyond the official Communist Party line, that had never been trusted anyway.

Bogert says that, "Things that we might have said in words, we could now document in pictures." Bogert says that after *glasnost* NEWSWEEK journalists were able to show people suffering, which the Soviet Union had always tried to prevent them from doing. Bogert provides other examples of these changes including being allowed into Armenia after the earthquake, and being allowed to take photos of empty stores, beggars, angry demonstrations, prison camps and formerly secret installations. Bogert refers to the availability of Soviet people being a source of news in that people were no longer afraid to have their faces in a foreign magazine.

However, McNamee says that one reason he found the Soviet Union to be "a ponderous place to work" was the "inherent suspiciousness" of the Soviet people about foreign journalists. His impression is that this attitude did not change very much during the Gorbachev Era. Another example of this suspiciousness occurred in 1987 when McNamee was in the Soviet Union as a photographer for the A DAY IN THE LIFE OF THE SOVIET UNION project. His official guide insisted he visit a war memorial and then criticized him for attempting to depict

the Soviet Union in a negative way by taking a photo with a military theme.

McNamee says that these official "arrangers" were common even throughout the Gorbachev Era.

Yurehenko says that not only did content become more interesting during the Gorbachev Era, but that formerly "closed content" began to appear.

Yurehenko says that Soviet officials released much of this content through press conferences for foreign media.

Turnley says that a change occurred in the type of access available to foreign journalists. He differentiates between access to external (street scenes) and internal (stores, homes, offices, installations, factories) sites. He says that internal sites were much more difficult to photograph. Turnley says that in 1986, when he first began to cover the Soviet Union, the Soviet bureaucracy and the general mentality of the people were constraints against "deep access into Soviet life."

Turnley says that after the Armenian earthquake in December, 1988, foreign journalists had access to social problems and natural disasters. He contrasts his experience covering the Armenian earthquake with covering Chernobyl in April, 1986. He says that he went with a NEWSWEEK correspondent to a Moscow train station to cover the arrival of Chernobyl survivors. Within moments KGB agents appeared and began "to drag" his partner out of the station. Turnley says he felt it was necessary to accompany this correspondent, and consequently, was unable to get the photos. McNamee

confirms that initially even though official sources released content, it was "tightly controlled." Hypothesis was supported.

H8: This hypothesis analyzed whether NEWSWEEK showed a more diverse range of content during the middle (1988-89) and later (1990-91) years of the Gorbachev Era than in the early (1985-87) years. While four of the gatekeepers did not comment on this hypothesis, Turnley has a strong impression that it wasn't until 1989 that the effects of *glasnost* and NPT were apparent on NEWSWEEK's coverage. Cooper suggests a trend of increased coverage and increased diversity of content by saying, "Yes we began slowly to cover the U.S.S.R. more." Hypothesis was supported.

H9: This hypothesis analyzed whether NEWSWEEK showed a more positive Slant, Image, and Overall Image of the Soviet Union during the Gorbachev Era than during the Chernenko interlude. Cooper says that during the Gorbachev Era NEWSWEEK tried to find some strands of common experience between U.S. readers and the Soviet people. Cooper says that the coverage of the opening of McDonalds Restaurant in Moscow was symbolic of this attempt to depict a commonality between these two nations and their peoples. Cooper's perception is that the Soviet or Russian people are exactly like us and, "the key to objective reporting on this or indeed any story is to avoid being judgmental at all possible cost."

Bogert provides an explanation for the fact that during the Gorbachev Era NEWSWEEK depicted the Soviet domestic image in a more negative way.

NEWSWEEK was able to show suffering and other social ills that prior to *glasnost* the Soviet leaders had tried to prevent NEWSWEEK from showing. McNamee remembers covering the early years of the Gorbachev Era during the anti-vodka campaign and taking photos of long lines of people waiting to buy vodka. Hypothesis was supported.

H10: This hypothesis analyzed whether NEWSWEEK showed a more positive Slant, Image, and Overall Image of the Soviet Union during the Bush years than during the Reagan years. Four of the gatekeepers did not address this question. However, Turnley thinks that the personal relationship between Gorbachev and Bush was warmer than the one between Gorbachev and Reagan. Turnley says that some "defreezing" occurred. In 1991 Turnley gave Gorbachev a photo album of 25 photos taken over a six year period showing Gorbachev with world leaders. Gorbachev commented that he and Bush had done some "good work together." One might expect some difference between the image depicted of the Soviet Union between these two presidencies. Hypothesis was not supported.

H11: This hypothesis analyzed whether NEWSWEEK showed more positive Slant, Image, and Overall Image of the Soviet Union in 1991 than in 1985. Yurehenko says that by the end of the Gorbachev Era the U.S. media were no longer depicting the Soviet Union or its leaders "as monsters." Turnley says that his primary "mission" during this time was "to reveal a common humanity" of the Soviet people and Soviet life versus showing "a dark and evil side." However, McNamee admitted that his own personal image of the Soviet Union "as an

oppressed nation with Big Brother watching" changed little during the Gorbachev Era. Hypothesis was not supported.

H12: This hypothesis analyzed whether NEWSWEEK photos attributed to photojournalist Peter Turnley differed from photos attributed to other U.S. and Western sources combined (Other NEWSWEEK photojournalists, AP, and UPI) in regard to Slant, Image, and Overall Image depicted of the Soviet Union. Little difference was found. This finding suggests that professional socialization, norms, and saliences are operating. Hypothesis was not supported.

H13: This hypothesis analyzed whether photos attributed to Turnley differed from those attributed to Soviet sources in regard to Slant, Image, and Overall Image. The content analysis did not indicate much difference in regard to this hypothesis and neither did the gatekeepers suggest a difference. Turnley says the during this time the Soviet press became "more adventurous." Hypothesis was not supported.

H14: This hypothesis analyzed whether NEWSWEEK showed an increase in the frequency that locales other than Moscow or Russia were reflected in the photos. Cooper says that some news items are planned and executed in advance, while others are "news-driven." This suggests that there was an attempt to go where important news was happening. Cooper says that geographic location is a primary concern as well as a big cost factor. Geographic location and deadline requirements are important deciding factors in assignment of specific

photojournalists. Yurehenko suggests that Russia remained the primary locale, because it is the biggest republic and also is the "center."

Turnley says that at the beginning of the Gorbachev Era each foreign journalist had to be accredited by the Soviet Foreign Ministry and this accreditation could be lifted for several infractions. One restriction involved travel outside Moscow. Journalists had to notify Soviet officials by telex 48 hours prior to departure. Turnley says that before 1989 there were many closed zones including sites that had internment camps, nuclear development, military industries, and others. In short, several constraints existed to discourage foreign coverage external to Moscow. While the percent for Other Locales increased, Moscow/Russia continued to be the frequent locale. Hypothesis was supported.

H15: This hypothesis analyzed whether NEWSWEEK showed a difference in how three leaders (Chernenko, Gorbachev, and Yeltsin) were depicted. Bogert says that the change in Soviet and U.S. relations made it possible for NEWSWEEK to get much closer to Soviet leaders, "than ever before." Bogert says that due to the increase in foreign trips taken by Gorbachev, it was possible to get quite close to him and to get, "some revealing shots." Bogert says that after awhile Gorbachev recognized Peter Turnley. This suggests the potential for shooting portraits of Gorbachev that were more informative than mug shots. Bogert expresses some concern that Gorbachev was depicted in a cult of personality way. However, Bogert concludes that NEWSWEEK resisted "the deification of Gorbachev" more than most other news outlets. Turnley says he

found Gorbachev to be a very attractive person to photograph. Turnley had many opportunities to observe Gorbachev both in the Soviet Union and abroad.

Turnley observed Gorbachev's "public and personal side" and perceived him as "a good man." The gatekeepers did not address how the other two leaders were depicted, except Cooper, who points out that towards the end of the era, Yeltsin was depicted as a "challenge" to Gorbachev. Hypothesis was supported.

H16: This hypothesis analyzed whether NEWSWEEK showed an increase in the frequency that Gorbachev, Yeltsin, and their spouses were depicted in personal events and human interest photos in comparison to the depiction of Chernenko and his spouse. Bogert says that the change in relations between the Soviet and U.S. governments made it possible to get much closer to Gorbachev in a geographical sense, and perhaps even in a more human sense. Bogert says that, "For the first we were able to dramatize Soviet leaders as personalities (though we overdramatized them), especially Gorbachev, Shevardnadze, and Yeltsin."

McNamee recalls during the early years of the Gorbachev Era asking permission to photograph Gorbachev in a personal way and being told by an official that this was like "asking to go to the moon." McNamee says that later during a Great October Revolution celebration Gorbachev and his family sat in bleachers in proximity to the foreign media. This proximity allowed personal photos to be taken. McNamee did not consider this "an accident." Hypothesis was supported.

H17: This hypothesis analyzed whether NEWSWEEK presented a more positive Overall Image of the Soviet Union during the course of the Gorbachev

Era. The gatekeepers confirm that in order to determine the Overall Image depicted it is necessary to differentiate between domestic and international images. The domestic image depicted a Soviet Union with many social ills and conflicts. The international image depicted a Soviet Union striving to end the Cold War. Since 63% of the photos were about domestic content, the overarching image was negative. However, International and Human Interest content were depicted more positively. Hypothesis was not supported.

In addition to the 17 hypotheses tested in the study two research questions were asked related to **Clarity** (the photo and cutline unit might stand alone without text) and **Agreement** (photo, cutline, and text depict the same message or image, not conflicting ones). The gatekeepers provide information about these two questions.

One aspect of **Clarity** is related to the photo itself. What criteria were used to choose the photos to be published in NEWSWEEK? Cooper says that the International Picture Editor assigns photographers to cover stories after consultation with the Editor-In-Chief, the Picture Editor, the Art Director, and the International Editor, to insure the photo is needed. Cooper says that the criteria as to which photos are used is based on diverse factors such as subjectivity, economy of size, a wealth of information, impact in both graphic and editorial terms, and reproductive quality (sharpness and exposure). Since the NEWSWEEK photo policy does not allow images to be altered manually or electronically, photos must provide the necessary information. Turnley says that

his photos were "seldom if ever cropped." McNamee agrees that photos are rarely cropped, but are used as shot. The preference is to avoid mug shots. Bogert says that photos with action, emotion, drama, and with something that attracts the reader's eye are used. Bogert says that freshness or timeliness are vital. For example, a photo of a Soviet leader about last week's news cannot be used to illustrate this week's news. Another aspect of **Clarity** is related to the cutline. Bogert says that words drive the story. This suggests that information provided in cutlines receives a lot of attention by gatekeepers. However, Turnley views cutlines as much less important than "the visual element." Turnley describes NEWSWEEK cutlines as, "minimal, literal, and self-explanatory."

Cooper says that NEWSWEEK is wholly produced in New York with editing, cutline writing, layout, and editing being performed there. Bogert says that while the Moscow Bureau writes basic cutlines that are sent along with photos to New York, the cutlines read in NEWSWEEK are written by writers in New York, and the Moscow Bureau does not even see them before they are printed. McNamee says that photographers package their undeveloped film and use a cutline envelope to provide a general description about each roll of film. McNamee describes NEWSWEEK's cutlines as intended to both "inform" and "entertain."

The results of the content analysis indicate that NEWSWEEK is achieving **Clarity** between photos and cutlines. Kerrick (1959, p. 188) says that when photos and cutlines depict similar versus competitive images a more powerful message is

communicated. NEWSWEEK presented powerful messages about the Soviet Union during the Gorbachev Era.

NEWSWEEK strives to achieve **Agreement** among photos, cutlines, and text. Cooper says that the final cutlines are written after the layouts are completed so that there is a flow from text to photos to cutlines and back again. Cooper says that **Agreement** is facilitated by the fact that the correspondent "on the ground" usually works closely with the photojournalist "onscene." Bogert suggests another factor that facilitates **Agreement**. Occasionally correspondents take photos to go with their own texts. Yurehenko says that photojournalists like to say that "no photos" means "no story."

Gatekeeping theories were used in the study and five gatekeepers were identified and questioned about gatekeeping practices. Cooper confirms more recent gatekeeping theories that emphasize multiple versus single gatekeepers. Cooper says, "I cannot emphasize the team effort of this process enough." In fact the physical layout of the New York photo unit facilitates multiple gatekeeping. Cooper says that, "Despite the efforts of high-priced architects we have avoided individual offices and most photo staffers work in a large bull-pen area like a newspaper. This eases communications and has given us a flexibility and informality which we favor (also it works)."

Cooper mentions diverse gatekeepers who influence which news stories and photos are chosen. Some of these gatekeepers are the Editor-In-Chief, Picture Editor, Director of Photography, Photo Editors (one for each section of

the magazine), Bureau Chiefs, and Bureau Picture Editors. Typically news stories are planned at the beginning of each week by a team effort. Photo researchers also play an important role in this initial planning. Resources are allotted to cover these stories. The Moscow Bureau and the New York office are in daily contact with each other through the use of telephones and the AP wires. Photos are sent from Moscow to New York by a special pouch using air transportation. However, planned stories may be displaced by "hot news." When this occurs a working copy of photos are transmitted to New York as a wire copy until the original can be sent.

Correspondents and photojournalists are gatekeepers. Turnley says that his gatekeeping role involves either taking the photo or not. Cooper says that about 35% of their photos are shot by NEWSWEEK photographers (either staff or contract) and the rest come from wire services, free-lancers, agencies, and other sources. Bogert says that other sources of photos include TASS, NOVOSTI, and other Soviet photo agencies, as well as Russians who work for these places but prefer to sell NEWSWEEK their film because they can get more money that way. McNamee says that the fact that the Moscow Bureau has a Soviet staff person is a result of changes that occurred since the coup.

Correspondents and photojournalists suggest story ideas. Turnley says that sometimes NEWSWEEK contacts him and other times he proposes ideas for photo essays. McNamee says that while sometimes he accompanies another journalist on a specific assignment, he sometimes goes alone and generates his

own photo ideas. According to Bogert some gatekeeping occurs at the Moscow Bureau. Bogert says, "We decide in Moscow which photos to send to New York, but we tend to send as broad a selection as possible, and let them weed it out in New York. We do no cropping or editing here."

CHAPTER VI.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

This chapter discusses results and draws conclusions. It discusses validity. It identifies some of the study's limitations. It highlights some of the impressions about the Soviet Union that emerged with some consistency. And it offers recommendations for future research.

The study had four goals: to determine whether the internal changes (*glasnost*) that occurred in the Soviet Union during the Gorbachev Era (1985-91) affected NEWSWEEK coverage, to determine whether foreign policy changes (New Political Thinking or NPT) that occurred during this era affected NEWSWEEK coverage, to identify whether the image of the Soviet Union depicted by NEWSWEEK changed, and to determine the nature of this image. The assumption was that NEWSWEEK had the potential of depicting either a positive or a negative image (Lee, 1978-79, p. 31). The nature of this image was expected to result not only from reality, but from gatekeeping processes. Gatekeeping involves selection, alignment, explanation, and subjectivity (Merrill, 1965, p. 563).

Overview of the Study

The central idea of the dissertation was that momentous changes occurred during the Gorbachev Era that affected not only the Soviet Union and the United States, but the world at large and that NEWSWEEK's coverage was most likely influenced by these domestic and foreign policy changes.

Domestically, *glasnost* (more openness about an array of internal problems) created a climate in which formerly taboo subjects began to be discussed in the Soviet media and consequently, were more openly available to NEWSWEEK gatekeepers. It was expected that *glasnost* created a different news-gathering environment for NEWSWEEK gatekeepers in which different news sources, locales, and content were available. It was expected that a content analysis of NEWSWEEK's photos and cutlines would manifest some of these changes. If *glasnost* affected NEWSWEEK's coverage there ought to be an increase in the frequency that formerly tabooed content appeared. If *glasnost* affected NEWSWEEK's news-gathering environment there ought to be more coverage that depicted locales other than Moscow and Russia. Foreign policy changes (NPT) that occurred during the Gorbachev Era were expected to affect NEWSWEEK's coverage of the Soviet Union. Scholars suggest that coverage by the media of one nation of another nation is affected by an array of variables, including political change. If foreign policy changes affected NEWSWEEK's

coverage there ought to be more depictions of leaders with a positive slant. If foreign policy changes affected NEWSWEEK's coverage there ought to be more human interest depictions of leaders. If foreign policy changes affected NEWSWEEK's coverage there ought to be a more positive depiction of the Soviet Union.

Prior to the Gorbachev Era the Soviet Union was considered as a nation with a low degree of similarities to the United States (suggesting low coverage by the U.S.). Even though the Soviet Union was considered a dissimilar nation, it received high news coverage because of its involvement in conflict events. Since the Soviet Union was the "other superpower" in the Cold War, its coverage had high relevancy to the U.S. media. (Tsang, 1987, pp. 205-208). It was expected that domestic and foreign policy changes that occurred during the Gorbachev Era affected NEWSWEEK's coverage in that its relevancy to the U.S. increased even more, that many newsworthy events occurred between the two superpowers, and that as the Gorbachev Era progressed the two superpowers became more similar in terms of having common goals. The Gorbachev Era saw a series of summits between the leaders of the two nations. This increase in personal contacts contributed to a more benign image on both sides. Tsang (1987) found that human contacts were an important variable in media coverage by one nation of another nation (p. 208).

Data Interpretation

The study analyzed 729 photos and cutlines in NEWSWEEK's International Section published between 1984 and 1991. All of the photos and cutlines that depicted the Soviet Union during these years were analyzed, except cover and mug shots. This time span encompassed the brief Chernenko interlude (1984) and the Gorbachev Era (1985-91). The goal of the study was to determine how NEWSWEEK depicted these events.

H1: predicted that NEWSWEEK during the Gorbachev Era increased its number of editions about the Soviet Union. Many newsworthy events occurred during this era with relevancy to the United States. Some of these events were conflict-oriented with the potential of affecting U.S. interests. The domestic policy of *glasnost* had the potential of making more news available to NEWSWEEK gatekeepers. Soviet foreign policy changes had the potential of creating a climate in which more Soviet and U.S. transactions occurred. The Gorbachev Era had a total of 221 editions. The percent increased from 42% in 1985 to 77% in 1991. The hypothesis was supported.

H2: predicted that NEWSWEEK during the Gorbachev Era increased its number of photos about the Soviet Union. Changes that occurred during the era had the potential of creating more photo-opportunities for photojournalists. The number of photos for each year of the era was counted. The Gorbachev Era had

a total of 674 photos. The percent increased from 79 or 12% in 1985 to 146 or 22% in 1991. NEWSWEEK did increase its coverage during this Era. An increase in number of editions and number of photos during this era suggests that the Soviet Union received more coverage. Increased coverage resulted in increased visibility. Photos are considered the most clear-cut evidence of visibility or lack of it (Stempel, 1971, pp. 338-39). The hypothesis was supported.

H3: predicted that NEWSWEEK increased its number of editions about the Soviet Union during the Gorbachev Era (1985-91) in comparison with the Chernenko interlude (1984). The Chernenko interlude was non-conflict oriented, even though this period was labelled the "Cold War." The Chernenko interlude was, at least on the surface, a benign time and few Soviet and U.S. relations occurred, since this period was based on mutual mistrust between the two superpowers. The Chernenko interlude had 28 editions or 54% of the total editions for 1984. The Gorbachev Era had 217 editions or 60% of the total editions during the era. NEWSWEEK increased its percent of editions during the Gorbachev Era. The hypothesis was supported.

H4: predicted that NEWSWEEK increased its number of photos about the Soviet Union during the Gorbachev Era (1985-91) in comparison to the Chernenko interlude (1984). The Chernenko interlude had 55 photos or 7.5% of the total. The Gorbachev Era had 674 or 92.5% of the total. On the average the Chernenko interlude had 55 photos and the Gorbachev had 96 during each year. NEWSWEEK increased the percent of photos during the Gorbachev Era.

NEWSWEEK provided visibility to its readers of the momentous changes associated with the Gorbachev Era. For most of these readers it is likely that NEWSWEEK and other U.S. media provided them their only exposure to these events (Fedler, Counts, and Hightower, 1982, p. 711). The hypothesis was supported.

H5: predicted that NEWSWEEK had more editions about the Soviet Union during the Bush (1989-91) years in comparison to the Reagan (1984-88) years. During part of the Reagan years the Soviet Union was labelled "an evil empire." The Bush years saw improvement in U.S. and Soviet relations. Additionally, many newsworthy events occurred during the Bush years. The Reagan years had 134 editions or 51.5% of possible editions. The Bush years had 111 editions or 71% of possible editions. NEWSWEEK did increase the percent of editions during the Bush years. The hypothesis was supported.

H6: predicted that NEWSWEEK had more photos about the Soviet Union during the Bush years than during the Reagan years. The Reagan years had 385 photos or 53% of the total. The Bush years had 344 or 47% of the total. However, since the Reagan years were longer than the Bush years, percent alone may not rule out the possibility that an increase in the number of photos occurred during the Bush years. The Reagan years averaged 77 photos each year. The Bush years averaged 115 photos each year. The hypothesis was supported.

H7: predicted that NEWSWEEK showed a more diverse range of content during the Gorbachev Era than during the Chernenko interlude. Fewer

constraints on the Soviet media existed during the Gorbachev Era. It was expected that NEWSWEEK had more access to news sources. Important differences were found between these two periods.

One method used to examine news content is ranking. This method provides a graphic depiction of the importance given to diverse content. A ranking of content depicted during the Chernenko interlude from the most frequent to the least frequent is provided: Internal Politics, Bilateral Relations with other Nations, Bilateral Relations with the U.S., Military/Defense, Culture/Arts and Soviet History, Science/Technology/Medical, Economy, Human Rights, Religion, Media, Education, and Personal Events. Content that was not depicted during the Chernenko interlude included: Disasters/Accidents, Agriculture/Food, KGB/Police/Justice, Ethnic/Nationality Issues, and Personal Events.

A ranking of news content depicted during the Gorbachev Era from the most frequent to the least frequent is provided: Bilateral Relations with the U.S., Internal Politics, Ethnic/Nationality Issues, Economy, Disasters or Accidents, Military/Defense, Human Rights, Agriculture/ Food, Relations with two or more Nations, Soviet History, Personal Events (Gorbachev's spouse), Social Problems and KGB/Police/Justice, Culture/Arts, Media, Science, and Education.

NEWSWEEK emphasized political news during both periods. This finding isn't surprising, as other scholars have found a similar emphasis in U.S. media coverage on international news. There was a consistent emphasis on Soviet and

U.S. news during both periods. Tsang (1987, p. 162) suggests that this emphasis on news involving events in which the U.S. and the other nation are engaged is a reflection of ethnocentricity.

A comparison of content during the Chernenko interlude and the Gorbachev Era suggests that some important differences existed in how the Soviet Union was depicted. Some of these differences are that U.S. and Soviet relations were given more emphasis during the later period. The Chernenko interlude was depicted in a more monochromatic way. The Gorbachev Era was depicted with a broaden mix of content, including formerly tabooed content such as: Disasters/Accidents, KGB/Police/Justice, Ethnic/Nationality Issues, and Personal Events. One explanation for this difference is that the Chernenko interlude really was more monochromatic or uneventful. A more realistic explanation is that domestic changes (*glasnost*) and foreign relations changes (NPT) created a different news-gathering environment for NEWSWEEK gatekeepers. The hypothesis was supported.

H8: predicted that the NEWSWEEK showed a different mix of news content during the Middle (1988-89) and Later (1990-91) years of the Gorbachev Era in comparison to the Early (1985-87) years. *Glasnost* gained ground during the Middle and Later years of the era. During the Early years NEWSWEEK emphasized Bilateral Relations with U.S. (53%), but during the Middle and Later years emphasized Soviet Internal Politics (84%), the Economy (80%), and Ethnic and Nationality Issues (92%). The most likely explanation for this finding is that

NEWSWEEK responded to the internal crises that resulted in the eventual collapse of the Soviet system by emphasizing domestic content. The hypothesis was supported.

H9: predicted that NEWSWEEK showed a more positive Slant, Image, and Overall Image of the Soviet Union during the Gorbachev Era in comparison to the Chernenko interlude. During the Gorbachev Era conditions associated with the Cold War began to decrease and contacts between the two superpowers became more conciliatory. It was expected that NEWSWEEK gatekeepers would respond to change in the U.S. and Soviet climate and that Slant, Image, and Overall Image would reflect the more positive political transactions. The Gorbachev Era was depicted with a positive Slant (44%) and with a negative Slant (55%). The Chernenko interlude was depicted with a positive Slant (18%) and with a negative Slant (80%). The t-tests used to test for Slant, Image, and Overall Image all were in a negative direction. In short, both periods were depicted with a more negative than positive Slant. Nevertheless, during the Gorbachev Era NEWSWEEK increased its coverage of the Soviet Union in a positive direction. Additionally, the Overall Image depicted during the Gorbachev Era was significantly different in comparison with the Chernenko interlude.

Several explanations have been proposed for this finding. Even though the Soviet Union generated a lot of negative news related to domestic problems, the Gorbachev Era saw improvement in U.S. and Soviet relations. Both superpowers were striving to end the Cold War and it was in the interest of the

U.S. government that the Soviet Union be depicted in a more benign way.

Scholars have suggested that the media play a role in foreign policy by seeking to influence how other nations are depicted (Lee, 1979-80, pp. 31-34, and Crespi, 1961, p. 116). The hypothesis was supported.

H10: predicted that NEWSWEEK showed a more positive Slant, Image, and Overall Image of the Soviet Union during the Bush years in comparison with the Reagan years. The Bush years saw improved U.S. and Soviet relations. During the Reagan years 172 photos (51%) were negative. During the Bush years 201 photos (58%) were negative. Slant, Image, and Overall Image were all in a negative direction. However, the t-test did not suggest that the Reagan and Bush years were statistically different. A change in the U.S. presidency did not affect Slant, Image, or Overall Image very much. The hypothesis not supported.

H11: predicted that NEWSWEEK showed a more positive Slant, Image, and Overall Image of the Soviet Union in 1991 (the end of the Gorbachev Era) in comparison to 1985 (the beginning of the Gorbachev Era). In 1985 42% of the photos were positive. In 1991 53% were positive. This difference was small. However, positive depictions varied from 20% in 1986 to 54% in 1987, while during the Chernenko interlude only 12% of the photos were positive. In general the Soviet Union was depicted in a more positive way. The hypothesis was not supported, because the t-test did not suggest a statistical difference between these two periods.

H12: predicted that NEWSWEEK photos attributed to photojournalist Peter Turnley would not differ from photos attributed to other U.S. or Western sources in regard to the Slant, Image, and Overall Image depicted. It was expected that Turnley and other Western sources were oriented toward Western values, had received a common socialization, shared professional norms, and shared common percepts of readers' saliences and preferences (Riffe and Shaw, 1982, pp. 617-18). No difference was found between Turnley and other Western sources. For example, 54% of the Turnley photos were negative, while 44% of other Western sources were negative. The hypothesis was supported.

H13: predicted that NEWSWEEK photos attributed to Turnley would differ from photos attributed to Soviet sources in regard to Slant, Image, and Overall Image. Even though 54% of Turnley photos were negative, while 75% of Soviet sources were negative, the t-test did not find a significant difference. One possible explanation for the fact that Soviet sources were more negative than Turnley was that Soviet sources had more access to negative information and that *glasnost* was even more a factor for Soviet gatekeepers than for NEWSWEEK gatekeepers. The most likely explanation for this similarity was that they used common sources. In general all the photos and cutlines were more similar than dissimilar regardless of source. Riffe and Shaw define this similarity as "consonance" or having the same judgment of what makes news (p. 625). The hypothesis not supported.

H14: predicted that NEWSWEEK showed an increase in the frequency with which locales other than Moscow and Russia would be depicted. During the Gorbachev Era many events, including conflictual ones, occurred in non-Russian republics. Newsworthy events occurred in non-Russian locales during the Gorbachev Era (especially Disasters/Accidents and Ethnic/Nationality Issues). The era saw increased summits and other international events. Domestic and foreign policy changes had the potential of decreasing prior constraints on travel to non-Russian locales for NEWSWEEK gatekeepers. It was expected that NEWSWEEK would depict a wider range of locales in its coverage. Difference existed between the two groups, but not in the expected direction. Overall 56% of the photos depicted Moscow or Russia. However, the percentage of other locales ranged from a low of 25% to a high of 64%. The depiction of other locales increased. Internal politics outweighed other events. Moscow and Russia were the locales where most of the internal politics occurred. NEWSWEEK gatekeepers mostly depicted either Moscow or Russia, but other locales were increasingly shown. The hypothesis was supported.

H15: predicted that NEWSWEEK showed a difference in how three Soviet leaders (Chernenko, Gorbachev, and Yeltsin) were depicted. Prior studies suggest there is a tendency for the media to depict a more positive image of another nation's leader when the host nation becomes more positive about that nation. Difference was found in Leader Depiction. Chernenko was depicted in a positive way 13% of the time, Gorbachev 62% of the time, and Yeltsin 78% of

the time. NEWSWEEK tended to depict Soviet leaders in a more positive direction. This trend was important since photos of a person have the ability to create an additudional set and to influence attitudes (Tubergen and Mahsman, 1974, p. 317). Since the depiction of Yeltsin was positive, one might expect that this facilitated the transfer of loyalty between U.S. leaders and Yeltsin following the August coup. The hypothesis was supported.

H16: This hypothesis predicted that NEWSWEEK showed an increase in the depiction of Personal or Human Interest photos. Studies about foreign news coverage in general have identified this category of news as receiving low emphasis (THE FLOW OF THE NEWS, p. 65). In the Soviet Union this type of depiction was unusual prior to *glasnost*. An impression was that Gorbachev's spouse Raisa was often depicted in a personal or human interest way. In general this content category had a low frequency. Chernenko's widow was depicted in four photos related to his funeral. However, Gorbachev's spouse was depicted in 14 human interest photos. The trend was in the direction of more photos depicting the personal or human interest side of Soviet leaders and their spouses. The hypothesis was supported.

H17: predicted that the Overall Image of the Soviet Union depicted by NEWSWEEK become more positive during the seven years of the Gorbachev Era. This era saw the end of the Cold War. There was a difference between these years in Overall Image. The expected direction was found. A positive depiction ranged from a low of 12% during the Chernenko interlude to a high of

54% in 1987. A negative depiction ranged from a high of 84% in 1984 to a low of 44% in 1987. However, 41% of the photos were positive, while 58% were negative. Only 1% were seen as neutral. The Overall Image depiction was negative. One explanation was that Soviet domestic turmoil resulted in a negative Overall Image in spite of a more positive Image related to foreign relations. In short, 62.5% of the photos were about Domestic Content and were in a negative direction. The hypothesis was not supported.

Research Question 1. analyzed photos and cutlines to determine **Clarity** (the primary message was conveyed by reading only the photo and cutline), or whether also reading the text was required to receive the primary message. Clarity was consistently high. Overall 96% of the photos and cutlines were determined to have Clarity. Other studies have shown that photos and cutlines are usually the first items to be read and that people often read only photos and cutlines, not the text (Stamm and Jacoubovitch, 1980, p. 234 and Wayne, 1956, p. 315). For these reasons the findings about Clarity are important.

Research Question 2. analyzed photos, cutlines, and text to determine **Agreement** (whether the photos and cutlines depicted the same image as the text, or conflicting images). Agreement was consistently high. There was Agreement 97% of the time. This finding was important since lack of Agreement would confuse readers (Kerrick, 1955, pp. 177/82).

Other Validity Issues

Validity is concerned with the degree with which an instrument actually measures what it's supposed to measure (Stempel and Westley, p. 43). Since the analysis included all the photos and cutlines (except mug and cover shots) in NEWSWEEK's International Section between 1984 and 1991, not a sample, validity was high.

In content analysis achieving internal validity is more problematic. Face validity is the most common way of assessing validity in content analysis. Face validity is achieved by careful category construction and exact adherence to coding procedures. This study was based on a well-defined category system developed from an intensive reading of related studies. The actual coding was conducted in a methodical manner and the inter-coder reliability score was high or 98%.

One method used to attain validity in content analysis is to use measurement techniques that have been used in other research versus "reinventing the wheel." This method is used to achieve concurrent validity. The literature review suggested measuring techniques that were used in the study. Belkaoui (1978) used a three point scale to measure slant based on a (+ 1 for a positive slant), a (-1 for a negative slant), and a (0 for a neutral slant). Studies that analyzed international news suggested content categories that were applicable to the study. Yu and Riffe (1989) coded content categories among three contexts:

International Affairs, Domestic Issues, and Personal Events (p. 915). Wolfe (1964) used ten categories similar to the categories used in this study. He used ranking and percent to analyze and report results (p. 80). The content categories used by Tsang (1987) were relevant and helpful. Other studies suggested statistical methods applicable to content analysis. Most studies based on content analysis use percent and chi-square statistics.

The literature about the domestic and foreign relations of the Soviet Union suggested methods to measure *glasnost* and NPT. The literature about *glasnost* suggested markers used to identify formerly taboo content.

The results of the study support other studies. For example, the study found that NEWSWEEK gave priority to depicting political news, as did 77% of previous research (Tsang, 1987, p. 214). A second example that suggests the study was valid is Tsang's finding that more positive photos about other nations tend to be about foreign politics, while domestic photos tend to depict a negative slant (p. 179). Whether different statistical tests concur or not is another way of assessing validity. In general the different statistical tests used to test specific hypotheses in this study were in agreement. However, in a few cases where there was not agreement, more powerful tests (t-test or ANOVA) were given priority.

Limitations

As with any study there were limitations. One limitation concerns generalizability. In case study methods this limitation is well-known. The study analyzed photo and cutline coverage of the Gorbachev Era by one U.S. news magazine. NEWSWEEK was purposively chosen to be the subject of the case study. The results of the study cannot be generalized to other media or even to other U.S. news magazines. However, it is likely that the results would be similar to the coverage of TIME or U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, since other studies have found more similarities than dissimilarities among these three major U.S. news magazines. Certainly the results of the study may not provide any meaningful information about news magazines published in other nations. The study was limited to how NEWSWEEK covered only one nation, the former Soviet Union. The results cannot be generalized to coverage of other nations. The study was limited to a discrete time span between 1984 and 1991. This time span was momentous and not typical of any other time period in recent memory. While the Chernenko interlude was included in the study to provide a baseline, a longer time span prior to the Gorbachev Era would have been helpful. The uniqueness of the Gorbachev Era was both an asset and a limitation of the study. This era was limited to two U.S. Republican presidential administrations in which one president had served as vice president to the other.

The study was restrained by methodological problems. An asset of the study was that all the photos and cutlines published in NEWSWEEK's International Section between 1984 and 1991 were analyzed, except photos defined as mug shots or cover shots. An analysis of this universe of photos and cutlines had an advantage over random sampling in that the actual nature of the photos and cutlines might be determined versus an estimation.

Another limitation of the study was the decision not to include mug shots and cover shots in the study. One rationale for this decision was to try to make the number of photos and cutlines manageable. However, this decision resulted in lost information, since mug shots are not contentless and cover shots by their very size suggest importance. Another limitation of the study was that only published photos and cutlines were analyzed. One can only wonder about the content and image these unpublished photos and cutlines might depict. Another limitation of the study was due to the very nature of content analysis itself. The study did not determine causality (whether *glasnost* and NPT caused NEWSWEEK to choose specific photos and cutlines). Neither did the study attempt to determine how NEWSWEEK readers were affected by these photos and cutlines. Determining the "cumulative impact" of media messages on people is important (McNelly and Izcaray, 1986, p. 547).

Image

Content analysis is used to assess the image of a particular group. Images form the basis for opinions and attitudes (Merrill, 1962, p. 203). Determining the image of the Soviet Union depicted by NEWSWEEK during the Gorbachev Era was an important goal of the study. The literature review included many studies that analyzed how the media imaged other nations. Many people in the U.S. have considered the Soviet Union and especially its leaders as "the enemy." This perception served a purpose during the Cold War, but not since the Cold War ended. The Gorbachev Era saw momentous changes in Soviet and U.S. relations. It is apparent that U.S. decision-makers and the general public view the former Soviet Union less negatively. NEWSWEEK reflected this trend.

How did NEWSWEEK view the Soviet Union during the Gorbachev Era? What were some of the impressions that emerged with some consistency?

One way of determining image is to analyze what is depicted and what is omitted. Visibility studies analyze these questions. Zaharopoulos says that amount of coverage may lead to the perception by U.S. readers that nations are either important or unimportant in world affairs (p. 905). NEWSWEEK increased its coverage or visibility of the Soviet Union during the Gorbachev Era. Visibility included an increased number of editions and photos. In 1985 NEWSWEEK depicted the Soviet Union in 22 editions and 79 photos (plus mug

and cover shots). In 1991 NEWSWEEK depicted the Soviet Union in 40 editions and 146 photos (plus mug and cover shots). This increase in visibility suggests that the Soviet Union was perceived by NEWSWEEK readers as important. One would expect that in order to increase its coverage NEWSWEEK allotted more resources to covering the Soviet Union during this Era. Guy Cooper confirms this assumption.

Another way to analyze image is to determine the content agenda that was depicted. Content agenda involves asking what's there, what's missing, and how often? The study used 22 content categories. Content was ranked from most frequent to least frequent. Comparing content between periods is used to detect image shifts. Comparing the content agenda depicted during the Chernenko interlude with the Gorbachev Era indicated that the image differed between these two periods.

The image differed in important ways. During 1984 NEWSWEEK readers received an image of the Soviet Union as a nation that was turned slightly more towards other nations than towards the United States. NEWSWEEK seldom depicted the Soviet Union's involvement in foreign affairs that did not involve the United States. McNamee provides one explanation for this finding. He says that covering a story within the Soviet Union that involved your nation was usually allowed, but that access to covering a story that involved the Soviet Union and a third nation was more difficult. Soviet relations with their allies or client states were seldom depicted. An important question was, what's missing? The image

depicted during the Chernenko interlude was of a nation in which not much that was newsworthy occurred related to the economy, culture/arts, religion, science/technology/medical, Soviet history, media, and human rights. The image was that nothing of importance occurred related to social problems, disasters/accidents, agriculture/food, KGB/police/justice, and ethnic or nationality problems. The Soviet Union was depicted as a nation in which domestic problems did not exist. The only photos that depicted the personal or human interest side of Chernenko occurred during his funeral. The image was of a nation turned inward with an emphasis on military strength. The image depicted during the Gorbachev Era showed a Soviet Union turned more towards the United States. A slight decrease occurred in emphasis given to Soviet internal politics and military strength. An important difference was that content totally missing during the Chernenko interlude was present after 1985. The Soviet Union was depicted more realistically as a nation where accidents/disasters occurred, where all ethnic and nationality problems had not been eliminated, and where leaders had personal lives.

The content category Locale was used to determine the geographic image of the Gorbachev Era depicted by NEWSWEEK. Wolfe (1964, pp. 82-83) says that the geographic image of a nation is important and that sometimes whole areas of a nation are missing from the news picture. There continues to be a lot of confusion about the differences between the Soviet Union and Russia. The study found that even though 56% of the photos depicted either Moscow or

Russia, there was a trend of increasing the depiction of other domestic locales. A rationale for this trend might be that an increase in news-worthy events occurred in other Soviet republics during the Gorbachev Era (especially disasters/accidents and ethnic/nationality problems) and that post-*glasnost* the news-gathering environment for NEWSWEEK gatekeepers changed in having access to formerly off-limit locales. Locale 4 (other nations) was depicted at 30%. Increased contacts occurred between Soviet and U.S. leaders and between Soviet leaders and U.S. allies and these contacts were depicted. The image of the Soviet Union became less of an insular power and more of a world power interacting on the world stage.

The content category Leader Depiction was used to determine how Soviet leaders were imaged. Yu and Riffle (p. 913) say that the media image of a nation's leader may signal that nation's status as friend or foe. They say that a change in relations with a nation affects how that nation's leader is depicted. The study found that Gorbachev was depicted in a more positive way at +80% than was Chernenko at +2%.

Future Research

The section on the study's limitations suggests ideas for future research. A comprehensive content analysis of NEWSWEEK's coverage of the Soviet Union might use random sampling to analyze photos and cutlines from a broader time span. An analysis of the image presented during the years associated with other leaders (Lenin, Stalin, Khrushchev, Brezhnev, and Andropov) would be expected to depict different images reflecting different domestic and foreign relations. This broader perspective would also allow a consideration of how different U.S. presidents and political parties affected coverage. For example, McNamee says he began to cover U.S. and Soviet summits in 1972. Future studies might use McNamee as a resource.

Future studies will have the opportunity to analyze NEWSWEEK's coverage of the former Soviet Union under the leadership of Yeltsin and future leaders. Gorbachev considered the events of August, 1991 that led to the end of the Gorbachev Era, not only as the beginning of a new era, but as the beginning of a new epoch (Gorbachev, 1991, p. 31). Perry (p. 443) suggests that to understand how media cover changes of government, changes of leaders, and even policy changes in other nations, is an important research goal. Klapp (1962) says that change in a nation's social, economic, and political climate results in a shift in the way that nation's leaders are depicted, regardless of whether or not the

leaders have **really** changed (p. 6). How the media cover future changes in the former Soviet Union will be important for future scholars. Future studies will have the opportunity to analyze NEWSWEEK's coverage of the former Soviet Union under the leadership of President Clinton and future U.S. presidents.

This study was limited to an analysis of NEWSWEEK, only **one** potential source of news about the Soviet Union. This did not allow generalizing results to other media. Future studies might compare diverse media to determine news-gathering and photo or visual coverage.

The study was limited to an analysis of photos and cutlines published in NEWSWEEK's International Section. Future studies might also analyze mug and cover shots. These photos are full of content and information. Future research might use an attention score to weigh cover shots (+3), regular shots (+2), and mug shots (+1) (Kriesberg (1946, p. 542). Cover shots send a strong message and are perceived as important. The stronger the message, the more the message is perceived as important (Weiss, 1974, p. 439).

Cross-cultural studies will continue to be important in a shrinking world. While this type of research seems too complex to attempt to determine causality, future research might attempt to identify factors that influence news-gathering and photo coverage across diverse settings and conditions. Agenda setting studies might attempt to determine how photos and cutlines influence attitudes. Future gatekeeping research might use different methods to analyze gatekeepers and gatekeeping. For example, Tsang (1987, p. 219) found that the perceptions

editors and foreign correspondents have toward nations may determine whether the depiction is positive or negative. While content analysis can be used to make informed inferences about the perceptions held by gatekeepers, other methods might be used to identify these perceptions and how these perceptions affect photos and cutlines. How media perceive the "New Russia" (Sobchak, 1992) and how they image it will be important for future researchers. Turnley continues to cover the "New Russia" or the Commonwealth of Independent States and says that access has "opened-up immensely." He says that access to most sites (with the exception of military sites) is gained with "little prior notice." He says that the people are very accessible to the foreign media, as they "want to be seen and heard."

Conclusions

The four general purposes of the study were (1) To determine whether the internal changes (*glasnost*) that occurred during the Gorbachev Era affected NEWSWEEK coverage, (2) To determine whether foreign policy changes (NPT) that occurred during this era affected NEWSWEEK coverage, (3) To identify whether the image of the Soviet Union depicted by NEWSWEEK changed, and (4) To determine the nature of this image. These purposes were achieved.

The content analysis and the interviews with NEWSWEEK gatekeepers suggest that Soviet change affected news-gathering and photo coverage. The study did not attempt to show causality, or to weigh the degree of change that might be attributed to either domestic or international change. The approach was to look at the overall pattern or Gestalt. Even though cause and effect could not be proven, the study did show that time-ordered change occurred. 76% of the hypotheses were supported.

A comparison of NEWSWEEK news-gathering and photo coverage between the Chernenko interlude (1984) and the Gorbachev Era (1985-91) indicate that NEWSWEEK increased its coverage of the Soviet Union both in number of editions and number of photos. NEWSWEEK increased its resources allotted to covering the Soviet Union during the Gorbachev Era. Increased coverage had the potential of exposing millions of readers to the momentous events that occurred during this era. NEWSWEEK readers exhibited high profile demographics in terms of age (65% were between 25-54), education (65% had attended or graduated from college), household income (57% had an income of \$40,000+), and occupation (31% were professional or managerial). (1992 SIMMONS). NEWSWEEK readers had the potential of being decision-makers. These millions of NEWSWEEK readers were not only in the U.S., but were world-wide. It is estimated that one in three persons are able to read English (Stevenson, 1992, p. 544). In short, increased coverage had the potential of affecting reader attitudes about the Soviet Union.

An important goal of the study was to determine the image depicted by NEWSWEEK photos and cutlines during this era. The study found that not only did NEWSWEEK increase its coverage, but its depiction of the Soviet Union changed. NEWSWEEK showed the Gorbachev Era in a much less monochromatic way than it had the Chernenko interlude. NEWSWEEK gatekeepers confirm that they had access to a more diverse mix of news sources, locales, and events than prior to the Gorbachev Era. NEWSWEEK gatekeepers confirm that they were exposed to a much more daring Soviet media during this era, a media testing the limits of *glasnost*.

Photos and cutlines were analyzed to determine the image depicted by NEWSWEEK during the Gorbachev Era. NEWSWEEK readers were exposed to 674 photos and cutlines plus cover and mug shots. These photos and cutlines exposed NEWSWEEK readers to a much different image of the Soviet Union. NEWSWEEK readers saw a Soviet Union with diverse domestic problems, with less hostility towards the U.S., and with more "human" leaders. NEWSWEEK readers saw a positive international image (that culminated in the end of the Cold War), and a negative domestic image (that culminated in the end of the Soviet Union).

The study found that NEWSWEEK as a product results from a team effort. Many individuals were involved in creating each edition. The study found that gatekeeping involves many gatekeepers, or perhaps, "one gate, but many hinges" (Caudill, 1993). NEWSWEEK gatekeepers are part of a complex organization.

The study found that team effort is required to achieve a high degree of **Clarity** and **Agreement**. The study found that photojournalists are important gatekeepers. The study found that photojournalism is a combination of the photo and the cutline. Both were needed to communicate message and image to the reader.

The study content analyzed 729 photos and cutlines that depicted the Soviet Union in NEWSWEEK's International Section between 1984 and 1991. Four uses of content analysis were met. Content was described using mutually exclusive categories. Secondly, hypotheses about content were tested. Assessing the image depicted of the Soviet Union (whether positive, negative, neutral, or undetermined) was a third use. Lastly, a starting point was provided for future studies, including studies of media effects.

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APPENDIXES

APPENDIX 1

LIST OF THE UNIVERSE FRAME

Chernenko Interlude

1984 (N is 55)
Jan. 9, 23 30
Feb. 20 27
March 5 12
April 2 16 23
May 7 21 28
June 4 11 25
July 2 9 16
August 6 13 20
Sept. 3 17 24
Oct. 1 8 29
Nov. 5 12 19 26
Dec. 3 10 24 31
Jan. 7 (85)
Feb. 4 18 25 (85)

Gorbachev Era

1985 (N is 72)
March 25
April 22
May 6 20 27
June 3
July 8 15 29
August 5 12
Sept. 9 16
Oct. 14 21 28
Nov. 11 18
Dec. 2 9 16 23 30

1986 (N is 51)

Jan. 6 27

Feb. 17 24

March 3 10 31

April 7 21 28

May 12 19 26

June 2 9 16 23 30

July 14 28

August 11 25

1987 (N is 97)

Jan. 5 12 19

Feb. 9

March 2 9 16 23

April 6 13 20 27

May 4 18

June 8 15 29

July 6 13 20 28

August 3

Sept. 14 21 28

Oct. 12 19 26

Nov. 2 9 16 23 30

Dec. 7 14 21

1988 (N is 102)

Jan. 11 18

Feb. 22 29

March 14

April 4 11 18 25

May 2 23 30

June 6 13 20 27

July 4 11 25

August 8

Sept. 5 19

Oct. 3 10 17 24

Nov. 7 28

Dec. 5 12 19 26

1989 (N is 85)

Jan. 23

Feb. 6 13 27

March 6 13 20 27

April 3 10 17 24

May 8 15 22 29

June 5 12 17

July 10 24 31

August 7 14 28

Sept. 4 11 18 25

Oct. 9 16 23 30

Nov. 6 13 20 27

Dec. 4 11 18 25

1990 (N is 109)

March 12 19 26

April 2 9 16 23 30

May 7 14 28

June 4 11 18

July 2 9 16 23 30

August 6 27

Sept. 3 10 17 24

Oct. 1 15 29

Nov. 12 19 26

Dec. 3 10 17 24 31

1991 (N is 143)

Jan. 7 14 21 28

Feb. 4 11

March 4 18

April 1 8 15 22 29

May 6 13 20 27

June 3 10 17 24

July 1 8 15 22 29

August 5 12 26

Sept. 2 9 16 23

Oct. 7 14 21 28

Nov. 11

Dec. 2 16 23 30

APPENDIX 2

CODING INSTRUCTIONS

The research deals with a content analysis of news photos about the Gorbachev Era (1985-91) in *NEWSWEEK*. Photos from the Chernenko interlude (1984) also are coded to provide a baseline. The coding procedure includes the following three steps: 1. Read the photo itself; 2. Next read the cutline; and 3. Next read the text to determine whether the photo and cutline are clear; 4. Finally compare the photo, cutline, and text to determine whether there is agreement. Use the Coding Format as a guide. Record your answers on the Coding Sheet.

Questions 1-7 are intended to answer questions about the manifest content of the photos. Manifest content deals with what is apparent. Manifest content includes identifying data, Source, Locale, and Content. Questions 8-11 are intended to answer questions about the latent content of the photos. Latent content deals with what is between the lines and requires an informed judgment on your part. Latent content includes Leader Depiction, Slant, Image, and Overall Image. Questions 12 and 13 analyze Photo and Cutline Clarity and Photo, Cutline, and Text Agreement.

Begin with the first photo labelled number 1. Using the Coding Sheet record all answers (1-13) about each photo in numerical sequence.

Question 1. Record the number of the photo. This number is recorded next to or on the photo. Read each photo in sequence.

Question 2. Record the month using 1-12.

Question 3. Record the date of the month using 1-31.

Question 4. Record the year the photo was published.

Question 5. Use the credit lines that run on the edges of most published photos to identify and record the photo Source.

Question 6. Record the Locale depicted. If necessary, use the cutline or text to determine Locale. Distinguish between Moscow and other locales within the Russian Republic, if possible. Record other Soviet Republics by name, as identified. Record locales external to the Soviet Union by name, if possible.

Question 7. Record the dominant Content depicted. Three content categories are listed. International Affairs includes bilateral relations with the U.S., bilateral relations with other nations, and international organizations or foreign relations with multi-nations. Domestic Affairs includes military, politics, economics, social problems, culture or arts, religion, science/technology/medical, Soviet history, human rights, disasters or accidents, agriculture or food distribution, KGB/police/justice system, ethnic or nationality conflicts or issues, media, education, and other miscellaneous topics. Record only the **main** content

for each photo. Personal Events includes personal information or human interest events about leaders and their spouses.

Question 8. This question deals with Leader Depiction. First determine whether Chernenko, Gorbachev, or Yeltsin is depicted. Next make an informed judgment about the Slant of this depiction (whether encouraging an end to the Cold War (+) or promoting a continuation of the Cold War (-). An example of encouraging an end to the Cold War would be a willingness to talk and discuss differences with U.S. leaders, or with U.S. allies (Britain, France, West Germany, Japan, and others). An example of promoting a continuation of the Cold War would be aggressively encouraging a dichotomous world.

Question 9. This question deals with the Slant of the photo. A positive Slant (+) would show improved foreign relations, domestic stability, economic progress, social cohesion, or preservation of the cultural heritage. A negative Slant (-) would show deteriorating or negative foreign relations, domestic instability, social unrest, economic problems, and degradation of culture. A neutral Slant (0) would reflect neither positive nor negative conditions, or would be a balanced depiction. Record as undetermined (?) only after reading the photo, the cutline, and the text, and still not being able to make an informed judgment.

Question 10. This question deals with the Image depicted or the composite or sum total of the information presented. Determine the **dominant** Image depicted and record **one** answer only based on whether the Image was

about foreign, domestic, or personal affairs. Bipolar words are provided to assist you in determining your answers.

Question 11. This question seeks to determine the Overall Image, whether the Soviet Union was depicted as encouraging an end to the Cold War or a continuation of the Cold War. If appropriate use the neutral or undetermined options. Base your answer on how the photo affects you, or would be expected to affect the typical U.S. reader. Consider whether or not overt U.S. values and interests were involved. Examples of overt U.S. values and interests include human or individual freedoms and rights, a free market, diversity of ideas, religious freedom, domestic stability, and control over nuclear weapons.

Question 12. This question seeks to determine whether or not the Photo and Cutline unit had Clarity of message and might stand alone. Ask whether or not the Photo and Cutline unit communicated the main idea or message presented by the Text.

Question 13. This question seeks to determine whether or not there was Agreement between the Photo, Cutline, and Text. An example of disagreement would be a photo of Bush and Gorbachev smiling and shaking hands and a text that emphasized conflict between the two leaders.

APPENDIX 3

CODING FORMAT

ORDER	VARIABLE	CODE
1.	Item Number	1-729
2.	Month	(Jan. to Dec.) 1-12
3.	Date	1-31
4.	Year	84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91
5.	Source	(1) Peter Turnley (2) NEWSWEEK Staff (3) Independent Photographer (4) AP (5) UPI (6) TASS/NOVOSTI/SOVFOTO/Other Soviet Sources (7) Wire Services/AFP/Reuters/ XINHUA (8) Photo Agencies/Gamma/Black Star/SIPA/Sygma/Other (9) Other Media/Government Sources/Broadcasting/ Other magazines (10) Undetermined
6.	Locale	(1) Moscow (2) Russian Republic other than Moscow, such as Leningrad (3) Other Soviet Republics, such as Baltic States, Armenia, etc. (4) Other Nation (5) Undetermined

7. Content (A) International Affairs (Such as diplomatic/political activity between states, spy activities, defections, international trade, aid, or relief).
- (1) Bilateral Relations with U.S.
 - (2) Bilateral Relations with Nation other than U.S.
 - (3) Relations with Two or More Nations/
United Nations/NATO/
Eastern Bloc
- (B) Domestic Issues (Internal Affairs).
- (4) Military/Defense (Such as depiction of weapons, military bases, exercises, or personnel).
 - (5) Politics (Such as internal politics, political demonstrations, riots, conflicts, crises, elections, campaigns, government changes, events, and government officials conducting business).
 - (6) Economy (Such as economic performance, prices, cost of living, consumer problems, and issues related to *Perestroika*).
 - (7) Social Problems (Such as alcoholism, drug

- abuse, prostitution,
or crime).
- (8) Culture/Arts (Such as music, dance, drama, cinema, fine arts, leisure time, or recreation).
 - (9) Religion (Such as depictions of churches or worship).
 - (10) Science/Technology/ Medical Problems
 - (11) Soviet History (Such as depictions of the Czarist era, and Soviet era prior to Chernenko).
 - (12) Human Rights (Depiction of treatment of political or religious dissidents).
 - (13) Disasters/Accidents (Such as earthquakes, floods, plane crashes, or Chernobyl).
 - (14) Agriculture/Food (Depiction of farming practices or shortages of food).
 - (15) KGB/Police/Justice System (Such as depictions of court and legal proceedings).
 - (16) Ethnic/Nationality (Such as depictions of conflicts between Russian and non-Russian republics).
 - (17) Media (Such as

depictions of
media/public
information).

(18) Education (Such as
depictions of public
education).

(19) Other

(C) Personal Events (Human interest, such as
visiting an art museum).

(20) Chernenko

(21) Chernenko's Spouse

(22) Gorbachev

(23) Gorbachev's Spouse

(24) Yeltsin

(25) Yeltsin's Spouse

8.

Leaders

(A) Chernenko

(1) Depicted as
cooperative,
friendly, open re.
discussion of
issues, contributing
to a more peaceful
world, or
encouraging
an end to the Cold
War era).

(2) Depicted as non-
cooperative,
hostile, closed re.
discussions of
issues, aggressive,
or promoting a
continuation of the
Cold War era).

(3) Neutral/Balanced

(4) Undetermined

(B) Gorbachev

(5) See question 8,
number (1).

- (6) See question 8,
number (2).
- (7) Neutral/Balanced
- (8) Undetermined

(C) Yeltsin

- (9) See question 8,
number (1).
- (10) See question 8,
number (2).
- (11) Neutral/Balanced
- (12) Undetermined

9. Slant

- (1) Positive (Improved
foreign relations,
domestic stability,
economic progress, social
cohesion, or preservation
of the cultural
heritage).
- (2) Negative (Deteriorating
or conflictual foreign
relations, domestic
instability, social
unrest, economic problems,
or degradation of the
cultural heritage).
- (3) Neutral/Balanced
- (4) Undetermined

10. Image:

(A) If International Affairs:

- (1) Cooperative/Peaceful
- (2) Non-Cooperative/Aggressive
- (3) Neutral/Balanced
- (4) Undetermined

(B) If Domestic Affairs:

- (5) Stable/Productive/Progressive/Open
- (6) Unstable/Unproductive/
Stagnant/Closed
- (7) Undetermined

(C) If Personal Affairs:

- (8) Friendly/Cooperative/Peaceful**
- (9) Unfriendly/Uncooperative/Aggressive**
- (10) Neutral/Balanced**
- (11) Undetermined**

11. Overall Image Depicted:

- (1) Contributing to world peace/ending the Cold War (If question 8 was either (1), (5), or (9) choose, or if question 10 was either (1), (5), or (8), choose).**
- (2) Not contributing to world peace/or promoting the continuation of the Cold War (If question 8 was either (2), (6), or (10), choose, or if question 10 was either (2), (6), or (9), choose).**
- (3) Neutral re. the U.S.**
- (4) Undetermined**

12. Photo/Cutline Clarity (Text not needed to explain):

- (1) Yes**
- (2) No**

13. Photo/Cutline and Text Agreement (Unified message):

- (1) Yes**
- (2) No**

***Adapted from Stevenson and Shaw (1984) and Tsang (1987).**

APPENDIX 4

CODING SHEET

1. Number (1-729): _____
2. Month (1-12): _____
3. Date (1-31): _____
4. Year (84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91): _____
5. Source (1-10): _____
6. Locale (1 2 3 4 5): _____

CHOOSE ONE ONLY:

7. Content: International Affairs (1-3): _____
or Domestic Affairs (4-19): _____
or Personal Affairs (20-25): _____

CHOOSE ONE ONLY UNLESS LEADERS DEPICTED TOGETHER:

8. Leaders: Chernenko (1 4): _____
or Gorbachev (5-8): _____
or Yeltsin (9-12): _____
9. Slant (1-4): _____

CHOOSE THE DOMINANT IMAGE DEPICTED:

10. If International Affairs (1-4): _____
If Domestic Affairs (5-7): _____
If Personal Affairs (8-11): _____
11. The Overall Image Depicted (1-4): _____

12. Photo/Cutline Clarity: (Y=1) or (N=2)

13. Photo/Cutline and Text Agreement: (Y=1) or (N=2)

APPENDIX 5

FREQUENCY TABLE (CLARITY)

CLARITY OF PHOTOS AND CUTLINES	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	CUMULATIVE FREQUENCY	CUMULAT- IVE PERCENT
CLEAR (1)	N = 697	95.6%	N = 697	95.6%
UNCLEAR (2)	N = 32	4.4%	N = 729	100.0%

APPENDIX 6

FREQUENCY TABLE (PHOTOS BY YEAR)

YEAR	FREQUENCY OF PHOTOS	PERCENT	CUMULATIVE FREQUENCY	CUMULAT- IVE PERCENT
1984	N = 50	6.9%	N = 50	6.9%
1985	N = 79	10.8%	N = 129	17.7%
1986	N = 54	7.4%	N = 183	25%
1987	N = 100	13.7%	N = 283	38.8%
1988	N = 104	14.3%	N = 387	53.1%
1989	N = 87	11.9%	N = 474	65.0%
1990	N = 109	15.0%	N = 583	80%
1991	N = 146	20.0%	N = 729	100%

APPENDIX 7

FREQUENCY TABLE (LOCALE)

LOCALE	FREQ- UENCY	PERCENT	CUMULATIVE FREQUENCY	CUMULAT- IVE PERCENT
1. Moscow	N = 296	40.6%	N = 296	41%
2. Russian Republic	N = 111	15%	N = 407	56%
3. Soviet Republic	N = 99	14%	N = 506	69%
4. Other Nation	N = 218	30%	N = 724	99%
5. Undeterm.	N = 5	0.7%	N = 729	100%

APPENDIX 8

FREQUENCY TABLE (OVERALL IMAGE)

OVERALL IMAGE	FREQ- UENCY	PERCENT	CUMULAT- IVE FREQ- UENCY	CUMULAT- IVE PERCENT
1. (+)	N = 297	40.7%	N = 297	41%
2. (-)	N = 424	58%	N = 721	99%
3. (0)	N = 8	1%	N = 729	100%

APPENDIX 9

FREQUENCY TABLE (AGREEMENT)

AGREEMENT PHOTO/CUTLINE WITH TEXT	YES	NO
1984	N = 48 or 96%	N = 2 or 4%
1985	N = 78 or 99%	N = 1 or 1%
1986	N = 51 or 94%	N = 3 or 6%
1987	N = 96 or 96%	N = 4 or 4%
1988	N = 103 or 99%	N = 1 or 1%
1989	N = 86 or 99%	N = 1 or 1%
1990	N = 106 or 97%	N = 3 or 3%
1991	N = 140 or 96%	N = 6 or 4%
TOTAL N = 8 YEARS	N = 708 or 97%	N = 21 or 3%

APPENDIX 10

FREQUENCY TABLE (PHOTOS)

FREQUENCY	PERCENT	CUMULATIVE FREQUENCY	CUMULATIVE PERCENT
N = 729	100%	N = 729	100%

APPENDIX 11

FREQUENCY TABLE (SOURCE)

SOURCE	FREQ- UENCY	PERC- ENT	CUMULATIVE FREQUENCY	CUM- ULATIVE PERCENT
1. Peter Turnley	N = 114	16%	N = 114	16%
2. NEWSWEEK	N = 83	11%	N = 197	27%
3. Independ.	N = 40	6%	N = 237	33%
4. AP	N = 60	8%	N = 297	41%
5. UPI	N = 9	1%	N = 306	42%
6. Soviet	N = 81	11%	N = 387	53%
7. Wires, other	N = 35	5%	N = 422	58%
8. Agencies	N = 274	38%	N = 696	95.5%
9. Other Media	N = 20	3%	N = 716	98%
10. Undeterm.	N = 13	2%	N = 729	100%

APPENDIX 12

NEWSWEEK CORRESPONDENCE

March 7, 1992

Dear Guy Cooper,

I am a Ph.D. candidate in the College of Communications at the University of Tennessee, Knoxville. My academic interests are in photojournalism and political science. I also have a special interest in the former Soviet Union based on two trips there in 1987 and 1988. I took two courses at UT about the politics of the Soviet Union and have done extensive reading about some of the changes in the Soviet Union related to *glasnost*.

I am in the process of writing my dissertation proposal entitled: **AN IMAGE OF THE U.S.S.R. PRESENTED BY NEWSWEEK PHOTOS DURING THE GORBACHEV ERA (1985-1991)**. The dissertation will be a case study of NEWSWEEK's photo coverage of the Soviet Union during these years. The goal will be to determine the image of the Soviet Union presented by NEWSWEEK through photos.

The dissertation will be based on a content analysis of a sample of the photos presented in the International Section of NEWSWEEK. One possibility would be to sample from the total population of photos and additionally to examine photos taken by one photojournalist (Péter Turnley).

The dissertation will look at gatekeeping processes. I am interested in how *glasnost* might have changed the process by which photos were taken and chosen for publication. For example, how were ideas for photo assignments generated? Did the nature of news sources change during these years? Other questions might include determining why some photos were included in NEWSWEEK and others not.

The purpose of this letter is to enquire whether you, Peter Turnley, and the Moscow bureau staff, might be available to provide information. This would involve answering some interviews or questionnaires. This information would supplement the information gotten from the content analysis. I hope to complete the dissertation during the summer, or by next fall at the latest.

I look forward to hearing from you. Please let me know if you need additional information about my project.

Thank You,

Ruth Winchester Ware

April 5, 1992

Dear Guy Cooper,

Thank you for your expressed interest in my dissertation. I am very relieved that you and your staff will be able to assist me. I have included a copy of my proposal for your attention. I thought it would be helpful for you to have an overview of my project. Additionally, I have included a list of questions for you, the Moscow staff, and for Peter Turnley that would be helpful. I would appreciate answers being typed for easy readability. I would appreciate questionnaires being returned as soon as possible.

Please address these issues:

1. I need to have some understanding about how the NEWSWEEK photo unit is organized or structured. For example, how many persons work in New York as compared to other locales? What are some of the different jobs or roles performed by the staff? For example, does most of the editing, cutline writing, and layout, occur in New York?
2. How is the International photo unit organized or structured? For example, how are different photo sources or photographers chosen and coordinated?
3. Could you share some of the official policies and procedures of your unit? What are some of the unwritten norms of your unit?

4. Could you share the amount of resources (financial and human) that were available to your unit during each of the seven years of the Gorbachev Era? I would like to be able to compare resources allotted to all news-photos to resources allotted to international versus national coverage and to be able to compare resources allotted to other nations versus those allotted to the Soviet Union (1984-1991).
5. Describe a typical decision-making process that occurred in producing a weekly edition about the Soviet Union? For example, how were ideas generated and followed through to a completed edition? Did ideas tend to come from the editorial staff or from photojournalists? Did specific editions tend to be planned in advance, or to reflect breaking news stories?
6. Describe the process by which photos were transmitted to the editing site or the New York office. Did photographers send all their shots and proof sheets, or did some initial gatekeeping occur on their part? Are photos about the former Soviet Union (both those used and those not used) kept in files? Where are these files and might they be made available for academic research?
7. How did you choose some photos to include and not others? What criteria did you base these decisions on? For example, were your decisions based on importance of the story, technical qualities of the photos, timeliness, what your readers wanted, or others? How was the layout process typically made? How was the determination made to use a Soviet Union photo for the cover-story? Was a standard number of photos or a standard photo size typically used?

8. What conception do you have about the NEWSWEEK audience, especially for the International Section? Could you share any of the research conducted by NEWSWEEK about the audience?
9. How do you, as the photo editor, interact with the management team? For example, what is your perception of NEWSWEEK policy as it affected the coverage of the Soviet Union between 1984 and 1991? Did the official policy change during this Era? Did unofficial policy or norms change?
10. Do you define your role as facilitator of national policy, a watchdog over the government, provider of information to the public, influencer of public opinion, or other roles?
11. In your opinion how did the recent changes in the Soviet Union (especially those related to *glasnost*) influence the photos, cutlines, and text of NEWSWEEK? How were photos, cutlines, and text coordinated?
12. In your opinion how did the improved Soviet Union and United States relationship influence coverage?
13. In your opinion was there a change during these years in terms of more frequent coverage, different content, or different topics? Did the news-sources (official versus unofficial) change during these years?
14. In your opinion did the image of the Soviet Union presented by NEWSWEEK change during these years, and if so, how? What image was presented?

15. Are you satisfied with how your unit responded to these changes in the Soviet Union? How could things have been done better?

Thank you for your time and attention to these questions. I hope you aren't already exhausted just thinking about answering them. It is quite possible I have failed to ask important questions. Please address anything you think I need to know. I appreciate you sending the questions to the other parties. Thank you again.

Ruth Winchester Ware

April 5, 1992

Dear Peter Turnley,

Guy Cooper gave me permission to ask you to answer some questions about your photo coverage of the former Soviet Union for the dissertation I'm writing at the University of Tennessee, Knoxville. The dissertation is titled: **AN IMAGE OF THE U.S.S.R. PRESENTED NY NEWSWEEK PHOTOS DURING THE GORBACHEV ERA (1985-1991)**. It will be a case study of NEWSWEEK and will be based on questions received from Guy Cooper, the Moscow bureau staff, and yourself. It will also be based on a content analysis of some of the actual photos in NEWSWEEK. My intentions are to sample from all the photos (not attributed to you) included in the International Section about the Soviet Union during these seven years, and to content analyze all the photos attributed to you. I am excited to find out from you answers to some of my research interests. I would appreciate it if you would type your answers for ease of readability and return them as soon as possible.

Please address the following questions:

1. First of all, please tell me something about yourself. For example, I would like to know your age, educational background, training and experience as a photojournalist, time spent covering the Soviet Union, whether or not you speak Russian, political orientation, other assignments covered, type of equipment used,

how you define your role as a photojournalist, your viewpoint or philosophy as a photojournalist, and other personal information you think would be helpful.

2. If you personally covered the Soviet Union prior to the Gorbachev Era, please tell me the differences you observed in doing your job. If you didn't begin covering the Soviet Union until after 1985, please tell me your opinion or impression about how coverage changed. For example, did your news-sources (official versus unofficial) change? What were some of the constraints you experienced in covering the Soviet Union (travel restrictions, intimidation, need for self-censorship, etc.) and did these constraints change during the seven years associated with Gorbachev and *glasnost*?

3. What can you tell me about the effect of *glasnost* on your work? Did the more open Soviet media effect the nature of the photos you took?

4. How did you decide what to cover? Did you generate photo-ideas, or did you receive specific instructions from NEWSWEEK? Did you send all your negatives to NEWSWEEK, or did you select some to send and others not? In other words did you perform gatekeeping roles as well as your editors? Were you sometimes disappointed that certain photos weren't published? If so, why did you think this occurred? Did your photos usually receive much cropping or other changes during the editing process? If so, describe some of these changes and your reaction. Did you also contribute to the writing of verbal content (cutlines, headlines, text) to be presented with your photos? How closely did you work with

other journalists in covering a subject? Describe the steps you took to turn your photos over to NEWSWEEK.

5. In your opinion how did the recent changes in the Soviet Union during this Era affect your work?

6. In your opinion how did the improved Soviet Union and United States relationship affect your work?

7. In your opinion was there a change in the frequency of your photo-taking, or a difference in the content of your photos?

8. In your opinion what was the image of the Soviet Union presented by your photos during this Era?

9. Are you satisfied about the coverage of the Soviet Union you provided during this Era? How might it have been improved?

Thank you for your time and attention. Please let me know anything you consider important that I failed to ask. I look forward to receiving your answers and of following your career as a photojournalist. I hope I will be able to interview you in person at a later time.

April 5, 1992

Dear Carroll Bogert:

Guy Cooper gave me permission to ask the Moscow bureau staff some questions for my dissertation at the University of Tennessee, Knoxville. The dissertation title is: **AN IMAGE OF THE U.S.S.R. PRESENTED BY NEWSWEEK PHOTOS DURING THE GORBACHEV ERA (1985-1991)**. The dissertation will be a case study of **NEWSWEEK** and will be based on interviews with Guy Cooper, Peter Turnley, and your bureau in Moscow. I would appreciate it if your answers would be typed for readability and returned to me as soon as possible.

Please respond to the following questions:

1. Describe how the Moscow bureau is organized or structured. For example, how many staff persons are assigned there and what roles do they play? Several years ago I visited the Moscow facilities of the AP and the UPI. Are you located in that same compound? Describe how your bureau interfaces with the New York office. Describe how you interface with various journalists that cover stories for you, for example free lance photographers?
2. Describe how story and photo ideas are generated and assigned. How often do you communicate with the New York office? How are photos sent to the

photo editor? Does any selection of photos occur at your level? In other words, does gatekeeping of photos occur at the Moscow bureau? If so, does any cropping or other editing of photos occur?

3. Describe the part you play in taking photos, writing cutlines, headlines, and text. Does your staff work closely with the photojournalists? Are any photographers assigned to the Moscow Bureau? It wasn't clear to me whether Peter Turnley is a NEWSWEEK staff photographer, or is a free lance photographer. What are some of the other sources of photos and how are these attained?

4. What is your understanding of NEWSWEEK's photo-policy and norms? What is your understanding of NEWSWEEK's purpose and goals in covering the Soviet Union between 1985 and 1991? Have you had stories or photos that weren't used, and if so, what would be some of the explanations for this?

5. In your opinion how did the change in the Soviet Union and United States relationship affect the photo-coverage?

6. In your opinion how did the photo-coverage change after 1985, in terms of access to stories, sources (official versus unofficial), and content?

7. In your opinion did the image of the Soviet Union as presented by photos change during this Era, and if so, how? What image of the Soviet Union was presented by NEWSWEEK?

8. Are you satisfied with the coverage provided by NEWSWEEK during this Era? How might coverage have been improved?

Thank you for your time and attention. Please answer any additional questions that are important. I look forward to hearing from you.

Ruth Winchester Ware

April 14, 1992

Dear Guy Cooper,

I hope you received the dissertation proposal, and the list of questions I need answered from you, the Moscow bureau, and Peter Turnley. Thanks for letting me know about the staff person from Moscow currently on leave in New York. Please ask her to answer the questions I sent. I also need to have some basic demographic information about each of you (age, educational background, professional associations, political affiliation). I like your idea about visiting NEWSWEEK during the summer to meet you in person. Thank you for suggesting this option.

Please let me know when Peter Turnley will be in New York. I will plan to visit New York, if possible.

Ruth Winchester Ware

August 11, 1992

Dear Guy Cooper,

Since you last heard from me I have completed the preliminary chapters of my dissertation about NEWSWEEK's coverage of the Gorbachev Era. I extended the scope of the study to include the Chernenko interlude through the beginning of the Yeltsin period. I have completed sections on the introduction, gatekeeping, newsphotos, domestic changes, foreign policy changes, and methods. I am in the process of content analyzing the actual photos published in the International Section of NEWSWEEK about the former Soviet Union between 1984 and 1991. When I return from Poland the weekend of August 31st, I hope to begin the analysis of the data.

I'm afraid I discouraged you and your staff from assisting me in the research by asking too much. Since I didn't hear from you this summer, I don't know whether you and your staff are planning to answer the questions I requested. I never received any information from you, Peter Turnley, or a staff person from the Moscow bureau.

I am inclosing the original questions I requested. I would appreciate it if you could try to send the answers back to me sometime in September, since I hope to complete the dissertation and receive the degree in December. Since time is short, I will need to communicate with you by mail, not in person.

The basic questions I need from you concern whether the domestic and foreign affairs changes that occurred during the Gorbachev Era affected NEWSWEEK coverage. Please send the questionnaires to Peter Turnley, someone who covered the Soviet Union during this Era, and respond yourself about gatekeeping policies. I also need to know how the resources (money and personnel) allotted to covering the Soviet Union changed during these years.

Thank you again for your assistance. I look forward to receiving information from you in the near future. Please let me know if there is a problem with you assisting me.

Sincerely,

Ruth Winchester Ware

VITA

Ruth Ernestine Winchester Ware was born in Asheville, North Carolina, on June 4, 1939. She attended Asheville public schools and graduated from high school in 1957. She attended Mars Hill College (1957-1959) and Wake Forest University (1959-1961). She received a B.A. degree from Wake Forest University with a major in Theater.

She received a M.A. degree in Theater from Trinity University in 1968. Her thesis was titled: **THOMAS WOLFE, PLAYWRIGHT**. In 1981, she received an M.S.S.W. from the University of Tennessee, Knoxville. She began working toward her Ph.D. degree in Communications at the University of Tennessee, Knoxville, in 1986.

She was employed for 15 years at Overlook Center, Inc. as a mental health therapist. Since 1991, she has been employed as a Licensed Clinical Social Worker at Child and Family Services.

She is a member of the National Press Photographers Association. She has been a member of Women in Communications, Inc. She was the Knoxville Artist of the Month in January, 1992. Her exhibit consisted of photographs. Her photos have been juried for the Mayor's Art Auction (1989-1991) and for ARTS

ESCAPE (1992). Since 1993 her photos have been exhibited at Key Antiques, Knoxville, Tennessee. Other photos are on exhibit in Knoxville at a.i.d.s. Response Knoxville, Child and Family Services Therapy Center, West Office, and the Volunteers of America Shelter.