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To the Graduate Council:

I am submitting herewith a dissertation written by John R. Dreyer entitled "The Use of Force Against Hegemonic Malcontents." I have examined the final electronic copy of this dissertation for form and content and recommend that it be accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, with a major in Political Science.

Bruce Tom, Major Professor

We have read this dissertation and recommend its acceptance:

David Anderson, Michael Fitzgerald, Anthony Nownes

Accepted for the Council:

Carolyn R. Hodges

Vice Provost and Dean of the Graduate School

(Original signatures are on file with official student records.)

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The Use of Force Against Hegemonic Malcontents

A Dissertation
Submitted for the
Doctor of Philosophy
Degree

The University of Tennessee, Knoxville

John R. Dreyer
August 2008

The outstanding feature of today's march is that we have seen new land to the South never seen by human eyes before great snow clad heights [which] we did not see on our journey South on the last Expedition for we were too close to the land or rather foothills and now at the great distance we are out they can plainly be seen.

-Ernest Shackleton,

"Heart of the Atlantic", 22 November 1908

Illegitimi non carborundum

-Joseph Stillwell

As an incredibly brilliant, handsome man once said; to be the man, you gotta beat the man, no matter how large the obstacles may be! Woooooooooo!

-Ric Flair

In science it often happens that scientists say, "You know that's a really good argument; my position is mistaken," and then they would actually change their minds and you never hear that old view from them again. They really do it. It doesn't happen as often as it should, because scientists are human and change is sometimes painful. But it happens every day. I cannot recall the last time something like that happened in politics or religion.

-Carl Sagan

I would like to dedicate this work to my grandmother, Lois Jeanne Bennett.
Love you Grandma.

Acknowledgements

First, and most importantly, I want to thank my wife, Adriane, without her support and love I would never, ever made it through to this stage. Second to my mom and dad, Russ and Peggy, without them I would have never have made it to this stage either. To the rest of my family and friends, both North and South, I also owe an awful lot to these people too for being there to talk and nudge me through.

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And thank you to the rest of my committee, Dr. David Anderson and Dr. Tony Nownes for patiently dealing with me as I composed this project.

I would also like to thank Dr. Neal Jesse for being an immense influence on my choice to finish my graduate work and for reading various drafts when he surely did not have to.

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Abstract

Malcontents within international relations are small states that signal the decline of the hegemonic state. While not the direct cause of a hegemonic state's downfall, the malcontent is a sign that the hegemon is becoming weaker and the more malcontents is a symbol of the dwindling power of a hegemon. This work takes combines hegemonic theory and international relations theory to form a typology of malcontents. In addition this work introduces a futures analysis methodology that helps to quantify the impact that malcontents have on the hegemonic future of the United States. This typology divides malcontents into three specific categories, revolutionary, benign, and passive aggressive according to their approach to achieving their national goals. The futures analysis exercise gives results that show how malcontents are a part of a much larger decline in general. Malcontents help to demonstrate how weak the hegemon really is, further hastening its decline. The use of force against hegemonic malcontents is often the only policy choice left and it is often the worst policy decision that can be made.

Preface

The genesis for this project came when I was working on my Master's degree at Bowling Green State University in 2002-2003. My professor and advisor there, Dr. Neal Jesse, was finishing up a project with his co-authors and moving on to another project. This new project was going to examine ~~“hegemonic chafing”~~, that is, small states that chafe under the influence of the hegemonic power. The term was switched a short time later to hegemonic malcontents. Not only was this relatively new territory but also a chance for me to undertake a project that combined both political theory and international relations, something I had been searching for. When I came to Tennessee in 2004 the project never left me and when the need for a dissertation proposal arose I went back to it. Through the examination of Marxist thought, International Relations literature, and other works I began to formulate the idea to produce a typology of malcontents, something that has both a practical purpose as well as a possible contribution to the literature.

I was fortunate to have a class with Dr. Bruce Tonn that introduced his methodology for the organization of futures analysis. This type of work appealed to me and I believed it to be quite useful in my own field, that of International Relations. The ability to predict the future has always been a coveted goal of humanity and while certainly not perfect the futures analysis methodology Tonn composed would dovetail perfectly with my malcontent project. I had theory and a tool for predicting where the malcontents would take the American hegemonic order.

This work is meant to be useful to both scholars and policy makers. Whether it will achieve that lofty goal, I do not know. But I am confident that it will provide a starting point if anyone wishes to pursue the topic further.

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Introduction

Tensions between a large power and smaller powers are a universal aspect of international relations. Rome dealt with Gaul, the Celts, the Germans and numerous other barbarian tribes. Spain had to deal with England in order to maintain her network of gold and silver ships. Great Britain sent troops to deal with any number of native rulers who stood in the way of European civilization and trade. In the early 21st century we see the United States maintaining tensions with Iran and Pakistan in a war waged against homeless terrorists who seemingly threaten the American mainland. Whatever the dominant power there will always be small powers who feels that it is “under the thumb” so to speak of the larger power and just want to be free to pursue goals that are purely national, without outside interference.

The modern age is not the first time a hegemon has had to deal with troublesome smaller powers, nor will it be the last. These smaller powers are what I call malcontents. And because they are dissatisfied with the order that exists around them they constantly seek to test and probe the power of the hegemon. Hegemony is a word that will be used frequently in this work. Essentially it is the rule of a single, dominant power by consent of the ruled. Coercion, that is the stick, will always be in the background. But the hegemonic power long ago realized that an empire by consent was far more beneficial to peace and prosperity. This is the hegemonic order that surrounds and benefits everyone within it, centering of course on the hegemon itself. To nourish and grow the hegemonic

order limits are necessarily in place on the course of action a hegemonic power can take. History shows us that no matter the method of rule, a dominant power will eventually decline. When a hegemonic power is in its golden age it finds that the need for overt military action will be low, for consent is easy when things are prosperous. But when the decline sets in there will be more and more small powers that want to set out on their own, away from the decaying mass that is the hegemonic order.

This study concentrates on the malcontents of hegemony, those small states that seek to pursue their own national policy away from the prying eyes of hegemon. Malcontents do not cause the decline and fall of a hegemonic power. However they will play a role in the decline and fall of a hegemon and will most assuredly take advantage of a weakening hegemonic power. A typical malcontent will be a small state that exists on the periphery of the hegemonic order and is unable to pursue the national goals it deems necessary because of hegemonic influence. As the hegemon become unable to fully enforce its order the malcontent will see an opening to challenge the power of the hegemon by whatever number of means. This is the point at which the hegemon and the malcontent will collide, if the hegemon chooses to try to enforce the order. Enforcing the order will be a complicated matter. If the hegemon is able to exercise soft power, that is power based on economic and political power, effectively the conflict may be minimal and the order restored. If soft power does not work, then the hegemon will very possibly resort to military power. This use of power can be a very tricky proposition within the framework of hegemonic rule.

Hegemonic rule has been explored by a multitude of scholars. However there exists a gap in the literature in regards to the hegemonic malcontent. A study of malcontents is important, especially in relation to the hegemon at the end of its life cycle. For a malcontent to break off from the hegemonic order is part of a most important signal of decline. We can take a cue from the end of the Roman Empire that malcontents will not be able to assume any sort of power within the order. The barbarian powers that brought Rome to her knees were unable to fill the void demonstrating that no one small power can take over what a hegemon has left behind.

Malcontents of hegemony exist at the limits of hegemonic power. The hegemonic state will rarely know where their power stops. Consequently the hegemonic state discovers this when it is attempting to enforce the order. The reasons for the decline of the hegemonic state are many and much of this is rooted in domestic factors. Economic decline, elite desires to remain in power, public opinion, and a desire to open new economic routes all can be counted among reasons for hegemonic decline. Malcontents come into being at the point where the hegemon loses power.

This study will proceed in three major parts. The first chapter will explore hegemony in political and social theory. The modern concept of hegemony stems from Antonio Gramsci. Gramsci saw hegemony as an interpretation of Marxism that concentrated more on power difference and dynamics that avoided the strict positivist view of history that Marx used in his economic interpretation. Gramsci sought to construct a pragmatic theory of revolution that emphasized power through the consent of the masses as a way to empower the proletariat. As such the first chapter is based on how

hegemons gather power based on consent. Power based on consent of the governed is a driving force in the construction of hegemony. Such a concept is necessary in building strong class (or international) relationships. Empires built on force last only as long as the stick can be effectively wielded towards the masses. Hegemonic orders built on consent from will last as long as the masses are willing to keep supporting the hegemonic power.

The second part of this work will plug the theoretical concepts of hegemony into the context of international relations. Hegemons are able to form because they have precisely the attributes that make other smaller powers want to follow them. Hegemonies are often able to fill a vacuum in world affairs at a particular point in history, whether the US at the end of the Second World War or Great Britain at the conclusion of the Napoleonic wars. In some cases war can result in the emergence of hegemons as one or more states have been able to build themselves into powers that can be identified as leaders- countries willing to conduct a munificent rule for the powers that support it. To illustrate how hegemons operate this section constructs a life cycle for the hegemonic power. There is no strict time line for the rise and decline of a hegemon. Perhaps the modern world has sped the process somewhat but the cycle will still persist. It is at end of this cycle when we see malcontents begin to rise. During the closing stages the hegemon begins to use force and it is this use of force that contributes to the end of the order that the hegemon has built.

The third part of this work considers the malcontent itself. Within the context of hegemony we see three roles for other powers to fill. The first is the hegemonic follower, that power that accepts the order and benefits from it. The second is the challenger; a

power that exists outside the hegemonic order and feels it is strong enough to challenge the hegemonic order and the power of the hegemonic state. The final role is that of the malcontent. Malcontents can be former followers or simply small powers that desire to break out from under the hegemonic order. Good followership is essential for a strong order. An examination of the followers of the hegemon will give the interested observer a better idea of just how effective the hegemon is. The same idea goes for the malcontents. We can see just how weak the order is by examining the malcontents. This work divides the malcontent into three types: revolutionary, passive aggressive, and benign. The ways each of these three types will respond to the hegemon are different. But no matter the type the same end exists: to distance itself from the interference of the hegemonic state.

The final part of this project is a futures analysis. Futures analysis is, appropriately enough, an analysis of the future with planning for uncertainties that exist. This analysis uses a mix of quantitative methodology and narrative to give a possible picture of the future out to 20 years. This picture of the future is based on current events through the use of leads culled from various sources including mainstream media, academic and trade journals, think tank assessments, technology based sources, internet blogs, and any other reputable source of information. These leads are then assigned an impact score and numbers reflecting the uncertainty that exists with the impact score. These numbers are aggregated into a systems model that utilizes components that represent parts of the future we are trying to see. In the end a final set of scores will be produced for the systems model. From here we can analyze the future. After the final

numbers are calculated I then take these numbers and write a narrative scenario that gives one possible future.

My hope for this work is that it is universal in conception and particular in execution. The futures analysis methodology has not been applied to the field of international relations before. I hope I have wielded it effectively, and I would like to think it could be used again as an effective predictor. Malcontents of hegemony are a little studied phenomenon in a field that concentrates on the hegemons and challengers. This work will provide some structure to the theory of malcontents within the hegemonic order and how they can hasten the decline of that order. The use of force comes into play when a hegemon decides to use the stick to put a wayward small power in its place. Such use of strength signals that the rest of the options have been exhausted; that the political and economic might of hegemony is too feeble to work effectively. The use of force against hegemonic malcontents is a signal of weakness and a sign of decline.

Chapter 1

Hegemony, Power and the State

Hegemony

The Britons watched the last of Rome's legions leave the isles around 400 C.E. This development was long in coming but nothing could prepare the Romano-British for the trepidation they certainly felt as Rome pulled back her borders. Britain had been made Roman through the force of arms but had adapted willingly to the culture and politics of the Empire. The legions provided defense against enemies outside the isles and the occasional, though rare, uprising within the isles. For all intents and purposed Britain was a full Romanized province; an integral and important part of the Empire. The Romano-British had consented to Roman rule for the benefits it brought. The legions provided security; trade was made with the rest of the Empire and the culture of Rome spread throughout the islands.

Though Rome is characterized as an Empire, the rule over Britain was hegemonic in that the British largely consented and there was little need for physical force. This is the essence of hegemony, the rule of subordinate groups through their consent. Of course the interest of the ruler is first, but in order to rule effectively it is necessary to ensure that all groups, or at least the groups with the capacity to resist effectively, within the hegemonic order are satisfied as to the direction things are taking. The power of the hegemonic order comes from below, from the support and consent of the subordinate

groups within the order. The hegemon may need to make adjustments and enforce compliance on occasion. However the way that this is carried out must rely not on force but on the ability of the hegemonic group to punish the offender through methods that utilize economic and political pressure. Force is the last resort of a hegemon. The use of force by a hegemon is a signal that other means of enforcement, namely economic, cultural and political, have not been effective. In ancient times force may have been a key element to enforcing the will of the ruling group. But in the modern world that same use of force is a hindrance to the continuation of the hegemonic order.

In this chapter I explore the idea of hegemony as power through consent. The next chapter will explore hegemony within the context of International Relations and chapter 3 will expound on the primary subject of this work; Hegemonic Malcontents. The conception of hegemony comes from the Greeks, who passed it to, eventually, Antonio Gramsci. Through Gramsci hegemony became an alternate form of Marxist thought, detached from the strictly economic realm. For my work, Gramsci's hegemony adds a dimension of the cultural as an important element of hegemonic rule. Here I demonstrate that hegemony is based within civil society and herein its strongest roots lie. Civil Society is the element of the state that is crucial to political process yet is separate from the state. Religion, civic groups, and any multitude of organizations that exist in the modern state are part of civil society; it is these elements that feed the political side of the state and thus, the state itself. It is within civil society that the forces of the hegemonic group and the native group clash; it is this battlefield where the idea of hegemonic malcontent comes from. The hegemonic malcontent, as will be expounded upon in

chapter 3, is a state or non-state group that is dissatisfied with the hegemonic order and, consequently, the hegemon. Though they take on various guises, malcontents feel that they need freedom from the hegemon to pursue national goals that satisfy the self-interest they have. Hegemony is power through consent, and I intend to demonstrate how that consent is manufactured and perpetuated. Through this we can begin to understand why malcontents arise and what their specific problems are.

Power through Consent

Power is a most important idea within the theory of hegemony. Humans accumulate power as long as they believe in their own competence to handle the business in question. When they know themselves to be incompetent these people will follow a leader¹. Of course, some men may be quite competent but the charisma and prestige of the leader may convince these people to fall in behind that leader. These men want that particular leader to show them the way, to lead them to whatever common interest they have. They invest power in a leader because they believe that leader will work in the benefit of all. Bertrand Russell makes the argument that for the law to be truly effective than it must have the support of the people². If the people support the hegemon and the law that is spawned then there is what Russell terms traditional power and what De Jourenel stresses

¹ Russell, Bertrand, *Power: The Role of Man's will to Power in the World's Economic and Political Affairs*, Norton and Company, New York, 1969. p. 19

² Russell, p. 38

as habit³. It is this form of power that is created by consent and generates obedience to a particular leader to leaders. Force can establish power but only consent in the long-term can retain it.

Consent is the crux of the concept of hegemony. Put simply hegemony is the dominance of one group over all other groups. The dominant group must persuade the subordinate groups to accept, adopt and internalize its values and norms. Hegemony implies that consent has been given, no matter how that consent is obtained. The most effective hegemonies in history are built with coercion as an implied tool, rarely used. An initial use of force to demonstrate its effectiveness is not unheard of and contributes to the implied threat. More commonly, however, other means to obtain consent are utilized including money payments, perhaps a cut of the rich economic pie, a defensive alliance, or spreading of the dominant culture to encapsulate the subordinate group.

There are two levels of hegemony employed in this work; one level is within the individual state, the other on the scale of the international. The state is composed of two major parts, political society and civil society. To achieve hegemony the dominant group must rise to power within civil society and then subsequently assume power in political society. Political society is the machine of the state, the bureaucracy, appointed offices, the budget; in short the ability to rule over the territory and people with the state. On the stage of world politics hegemony is similar. The dominant group must obtain consent from whatever means will enable long-term power to be established. Many concepts and ideas spread across both levels but on different scales.

³ Russell, p. 38 and De Jouenel, Bertrand, *On Power: It's Nature and the History of it's Growth*, The Viking Press, 1949. p. 25

The Greek Way

The Greeks were the originators of the formal, scholarly concept of hegemony. Greek authors applied hegemony to both international relations and to society at large. Plato, writing in *The Republic*, believed the state to be all encompassing with the primary function it performed being the education of the people in the highest sense of the word⁴. It is impossible, writes Plato, to cut cloth from a poorly formed pattern⁵. From poor education comes a citizenry that is bereft of justice and knowledge to be efficient members of the *polis*. Power in Plato's state was by consent of the people but rule was given to the philosophers, for only the philosophers were possessed of the knowledge and wisdom to rule in the best interests of the people. The individual was unimportant as compared to the whole. Consent was generated through keeping the whole happy through an educated, efficient, and therefore just, state⁶. Plato was the genesis of the theory that hegemony is the dominance of one group over all others but with the interest of all in mind. This ideal would be changed in later centuries, sometimes to extremes that Plato could have little thought.

Plato's student, Aristotle, wrote about two forms of rule, despotic and political. Despotic rule was servile; work is done for the master and there exists a sharp distinction between ruler and ruled⁷. Political, or constitutional, rule is just the opposite. In other

⁴ Wayper, C.L., *Political Thought*, Philosophical Library, New York, 1954. p. 22-23

⁵ Wayper, p. 24

⁶ Wayper, p. 29

⁷ Aristotle (translated with an introduction by T.A. Sinclair), *The Politics*, Penguin Books, Suffolk, 1969. p. 109.

words the ruler must first *be ruled*, only then is he fit to rule. This, in Aristotle's opinion, makes a good citizen; through this he understands the governing of free men by free men⁸. Political rule is Aristotle's version of hegemony; a leadership of equals in the interest of all⁹. Isocrates, the Greek orator, added to this with the belief that hegemony was closely interwoven with the generation and formulation of moral, cultural, intellectual, and educational ideas¹⁰. Free men, men brought up in democratic setting with a free exchange of ideas, rule hegemons. The very idea of democracy in the Greek tradition is a reflection of this.

Plato, Aristotle and Isocrates represent a view of hegemony that is designed to encourage and continue democracy within the *polis* through the free exchange of ideas and words. Thucydides and his classic study of international politics, *The Peloponnesian Wars* represent the other side. The war between Athens and Sparta can easily be classified as a war between competing hegemonic states. Athens was an upstart naval power with a democratic system and an economy to match its expansive interests. As Athens expanded it came into conflict with the interests of Sparta, the traditional leader of Greece. Sparta was a fearsome opponent, with an economy based on slave labor and the most powerful land-based military presence on the Greek peninsula. Sparta was ready to defend her interests against Athenian encroachment. The resulting war, which lasted from 431 BCE to 404 BCE saw the defeat of Athens and the destruction of the hegemony

⁸ Aristotle, p. 109-110

⁹ Fontanna, Benedetto, "Hegemony in Gramsci", in *Hegemony and Power*, Hayward and Letner, eds. 2006, p. 25

¹⁰ Fontanna, p. 25

that it had built. Sparta won but the war ultimately opened the door to Phillip the II of Macedon and his son, Alexander, to invade and conquer the Greeks.

Thucydides, in his examination of the war, believed that humans were driven by three fundamental passions, interest, pride and, above all else, fear¹¹. All three of these come into play during the Peloponnesian War; indeed, all three passions were important to starting the Peloponnesian War. Sparta was the dominant power on the peninsula; after all, they had played a major role in organizing the defense against the Persians in the year preceding the Peloponnesian War. The Persian War (490-478 BCE) had allowed Athens to catch up to Spartan dominance with leaps in military, technical and economic matters. The radically different domestic models of the two states (democracy versus despotism, naval versus land) meant that Athenian expansion would inevitably come into conflict with Spartan holdings. This conflict occurred because for Sparta to survive the ideas and culture Athens offered would have to stop from spreading to subordinate states. In short, Sparta saw a rising power that conflicted with their philosophy of rule and the base of power that made Sparta strong. The war saw both Athens and Sparta trade blows on both land and sea. It was only the ability of the Spartans to adapt to the sea and superb leadership that Athens was defeated.

The war ended the 5th century B.C.E. –golden age” of Greece as well as the power of Athens. Sparta emerged as the dominant hegemonic state on the Greek peninsula, and was able to change the basis of power that characterized Greek politics from sea power and trade to land forces and slavery. The hegemonic war, as Robert Gilpin puts it, had

¹¹ Gilpin, Robert, –The Theory of Hegemonic War”, in *Journal of Interdisciplinary History*, Vol. 18, No. 4, (Spring, 1988), pp. 591-613. p. 593

given birth to a decisive outcome¹². The Peloponnesian War illustrates what might happen when two competing and powerful hegemonies engage each other. The outcome radically restructured relations on the Greek peninsula and ended one of the most intellectually prosperous periods the world had known.

Political and Civil Society in Relation to the Modern State

Plato's all encompassing state is a utopia, not a practical means for governance in a world ruled by military force and realistic bent on the practice of politics. Instead the concept of the state is something more of an outgrowth of the community, more in the spirit of Locke's social contract¹³. With Locke the state is a machine constructed by man that takes man out his state of nature and into a situation where the consent of the community is needed to rule; otherwise the state will wither and die¹⁴. Grotius and Althusius were early advocates of the theory that power came from the community¹⁵. Grotius in particular believed that ultimate authority rested with the community. He later clarified this point by noting that this ultimate authority continues to exist even if the ruling Prince's line dies or power lost and even if, as commonly happens, another line takes its place¹⁶. However, the power of the Prince is recognized to be an outgrowth of the

¹² Gilpin, p. 597

¹³ Wayper, *Political Thought...* p. 71

¹⁴ Wayper, p. 71

¹⁵ Krabbe, H. *The Modern Idea of the State*, D. Appleton and Company, London, 1930. p. 18-20

¹⁶ Krabbe, p. 20

organization of the community. In this way Grotius saw a separation between the sovereign/state and the community¹⁷.

The exclusive use of force, that is the right to utilize violence as a tool to achieve goals, is a hallmark of the modern state and many ancient ones. This monopoly on coercion through force is used to enforce the state's desires and goals. However the use of force is a measure of last resort. The state, which is born from political society, is only one part of a modern nation-state, the other being civil society. Civil society is the foundation of society through education, religion, academia, community groups, and many others. Civil society is those organizations that have no direct ties to the state through money or other direct influence. It must not be forgotten though the organizations and people within civil society exist within the boundaries of the state and therefore often permeated by the ideals and operations of the state whether they want to be or not. Nonetheless, civil society is still regarded as a separate entity from both the political and the state and to build any hegemony a power-seeker must ideally come from the web of organizations and people that are civil society.

Gibbon noted in *The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire* that peace could not be secured without armies. This is very true. But securing peace and maintaining peace are two very different matters. Coercion often brings out the worst in how people act. If the people see a dominant group within society intervening through military measures there is a better chance that maintaining an effective and productive peace will fail as the people will want to resist such violent measures. This is how the concept of hegemony

¹⁷ Krabbe, p. 21

fully comes into play. Instead of using force to come to power the dominant group instead generates the consent of the other groups to achieve power¹⁸. Force is only a last resort, a sparingly used tool that rarely achieves the desired result. Consent from below is given spontaneously to the general direction of social life imposed by the dominant fundamental group by all other groups within society¹⁹. This spontaneous consent is given because of the prestige the dominant group enjoys within the society it inhabits²⁰. The dominant group's war for consent is an ongoing phenomenon that involves the production, reproduction and mobilization of popular consciousness towards the society that the dominant group envisions²¹.

Political society is the result of the dominant group's creation of hegemony. Political society is intertwined with the state, for all of the elements of political society are funded and cultivated by the state²². The civil service, the welfare system, and the military are examples of political society²³. Building and maintaining hegemony within political society is easy for the dominant group controls the state and can produce and maintain its culture in state funded and controlled entities. The realization of hegemony will give the state an official culture, one that is endorsed and maintained by the dominant social group and is consented to by the majority of other elements in society.

¹⁸ Joseph, Jonathan, *Hegemony: A Realist Analysis*, Routledge, New York City, 2002. p. 1

¹⁹ Lears, Jackson, "The Concept of Cultural Hegemony: Problems and Possibilities", in *The American Historical Review*, Vol. 90, No. 3. (Jun., 1985), pp. 567-593. p. 568

²⁰ Lears, p. 568

²¹ Hunt, Alan, "Rights and Social Movements: Counter-Hegemonic Strategies", in *Journal of Law and Society*, Vol. 17, No. 3. (Autumn, 1990), pp. 309-328. p. 311

²² Joseph, p. 31

²³ Bocoock, Robert, *Hegemony*, Ellis Howard Ltd., Chichester, UK, 1986. p. 33

Maintaining hegemony over political society is an easy matter; if an element strays from the official party line then the state can simply cut support from that rogue component.

Civil Society is where hegemony is realized far more fully by the dominant group. Civil society is comprised of other organizations within the social formation that are neither part of the processes of material production, meaning the labor and the economic infrastructure of society, nor part of any state funding²⁴. These are long-lasting institutions that are supported and ran by people outside of the state. The largest organizations within the civil sphere are generally religious institutions and media outlets not controlled or funded by the state. In many states there exists a close relationship between the secular and the religious, state sponsorship of religion. In this case, the church would not be part of civil society. Civil society is the space where consent is generated through the complex construction of political projects and social alliances²⁵. The hegemony of a social group over the whole national society is exercised in part through the private organizations.

Political and civil society creates structures that are connected through hegemony and the groups that realize that hegemony through the obtaining of consent from other elements in society²⁶. Hegemony is not created but realized through a dominant social group with enough prestige and consent to generate acceptance with the populace in general. Once in a position of power the dominant group must keep that consent in order to achieve whatever goals it has set. Certain projects will, of course, be less popular than

²⁴ Bocoock, p. 36

²⁵ Fontanna, Benedetto, "Hegemony in Gramsci", in *Hegemony and Power*, Hayward and Letner, eds. 2006, p. 34 and Joseph, p. 2

²⁶ Joseph, p. 39

others. In order to complete these projects the dominant social group must generate consent throughout society. Within civil society consent is made through political projects and social alliances. Other groups and individuals will be regularly co-opted into the official culture to ensure continued interpenetration between political and civil society. Without a proper relationship between the state, political society and civil society there is only one method of generating consent left to the dominant group; that of force.

Gramsci and Croce

Antonio Gramsci was a sickly, hunchbacked Italian born into a working class family in 1891 on the island of Sardinia. Swept up in the Italian Communist movement during the First World War he quickly rose to the leadership of the Italian Communist Party (PCI) in the 1920s. The Fascists tolerated the PCI and other socialists in the early 20s; this quickly changed and Gramsci was imprisoned while other communists and socialists fled or suffered a similar fate. His already fragile health was put in serious jeopardy while in Mussolini's prisons; it was during this time, however, that he wrote some of his additions to the theories of Marxism.

Gramsci took the concept of hegemony and greatly expanded it. Under Gramsci hegemony was sculpted so as to represent an alternative method of revolution for the proletariat. Karl Marx based his original ideas of socialism on economics. Relations between the working and ruling classes, to Marx, are based on who controlled the mode

of production. Economics were the base, the foundation on which everything else was built. Marx's progression of history was based entirely on the relationship of the social classes within the means and mode of production. The capitalists owned the means of production and therefore could exercise control of the working class. The class consciousness that the worker possess will, in Marx's work, lead to a revolution and the next stage of history; that of communism.

Control of the economics, that is the mode of production, would lead to control of society, whether it is socialism, capitalism or communism. The concept of hegemony as articulated by Gramsci took this into an entirely different direction. Gramsci sought to find a new sociopolitical order within a fragmented Italian and European reality²⁷. He concentrated on the power differences and power dynamics within society and how power persists and develops over time. Gramsci sought to distance himself from the positivist view of history, which is the examination of history through strict scientific method, through this examination of power²⁸. With this firmly in mind Gramsci was adding a new dimension to the Marxist base of theory instead of a strict economic relationship the idea that culture could move history along was brought in.

The effect Gramsci had on Marx's idea of ideology was five fold, the first being the shift from the intellectual plane of philosophical systems to the formation of popular

²⁷ Fontanna, Benedetto, "Hegemony in Gramsci", in *Hegemony and Power*, Hayward and Letner, eds. 2006, p, 27

²⁸ Bates, Thomas R., "Gramsci and the Theory of Hegemony", in *Journal of the History of Ideas*, Vol. 36, No. 2, (Apr.-Jun., 1975), pp. 351-366. p. 355

consciousness or common sense²⁹. Second was a de-emphasis on the Marxist idea of ideology as a coherent and integrated system. Thirdly Gramsci took the ideological struggle and began to view it as a practical engagement to bring about shifts and modifications in common sense or popular consciousness. Fourth was the concept that ideologies are an active process that organizes the masses and help create political terrain in which men can maneuver while they acquire popular consciousness and struggle to bring about change. Finally Gramsci tried to bring about a more positive view of ideology versus Marx's rather negative view of such.

The case of Benedetto Croce serves as a good example of the concept of hegemony as elaborated by Gramsci. Croce was an idealist philosopher, politician and critic and through these outlets created an intellectual hegemony that came to dominate Italian culture in the mid-20th century³⁰. Croce sought to buck what he called the "official culture", that is the culture within Italian Universities and other centers dominated by the state. He sought to build an intellectual culture on what he called the laity, the men of letters outside of the official bastions of learning. This was part of *Risorgimento*, the continuing Italian unification into the 20th century. Croce's aim was to open a cultural front in conjunction with the political and economic front. To this end Croce founded the magazine of *La Critica* which he was a major contributor to, to ensure that it would have a definite direction³¹. The magazine was a weapon of war in Croce's battle against his

²⁹ Hunt, Alan, "Rights and Social Movements: Counter-Hegemonic Strategies", in *Journal of Law and Society*, Vol. 17, No. 3. (Autumn, 1990), pp. 309-328. p. 310

³⁰ Jacobiti, Edward, "Hegemony before Gramsci: The Case of Benedetto Croce", in *Journal of Modern History*, Vol. 52, No. 1. (Mar., 1980), pp. 66-84. p. 68

³¹ Jacobiti, p. 71

primary foes, ~~n~~naturalists, free masons, and positivists”. His goal was to construct a culture that espoused his own ideas of the superiority of art over the natural sciences and his conception of history as the only conceptual and genuine form of knowledge, against the ~~f~~alse liberalism” within Italy that was based off a positivist view of the world³².

Croce was successful in his endeavor for in addition to *La Critica* he started a publishing house to further his intellectual views. No less than guiding a disoriented culture into a determinate point of view, Croce’s view that is, was Croce’s ultimate goal. And, to a large extent, he succeeded. The philosophers he sponsored and encouraged, Giambattista Vico, Francesco de Sanctis, and Silvio and Bertrando Spaventa, all became well known and indeed, these men are some of the well known idealist philosophers in Italy even well in the second half of the 20th century³³. Croce’s publishing house and *La Critica* became the voice of Southern Italy for the intellectuals. The idea of hegemony implies a certain hostility to a free marketplace of ideas. In Croce’s case there was, quite simply, no other intellectual outlet in Southern Italy with the impact and size of what he had created. This success illustrates how Croce’s viewpoint became part of the mainstream culture of the Italian intellectual community.

Croce’s idea of intellectual hegemony illustrates how a culture, with a singular viewpoint and drive, can come to dominate other cultures. Gramsci based some of his work upon Croce and was, seemingly, envious of Croce’s success. Gramsci noted in the South there exists only the publishing house of Laterza (Croce’s aforementioned publishing house) and the journal *La Critica*; there are academies and cultural groups of

³² Jacobiti, p. 72

³³ Jacobiti, p. 72

great erudition³⁴. By viewing Croce's success we can perhaps see the consequences of Gramsci's theoretical musings. However Gramsci took the concept of hegemony above and beyond what the Greeks and Croce had ever thought.

Gramsci believed that most every person, whether worker or peasant, has the capacity to be an intellectual. Some people, however, are greater organizers and possessed of a higher sense of social elaboration than others³⁵. This higher sense is what makes the average man capable of forming hegemony. There are, according to Gramsci, historically formed specialized categories for the expression of intellectual function³⁶. Croce exploited this by his diffusion of Italian philosophy and thought to the select intellectuals outside of the official culture of the time. Because of this he was able to form a powerful voice based around the ideas he wished to spread.

Gramsci and Croce represent the Italian roots of the concept of hegemony as it is currently understood. Born in a time of political turmoil following the end of the First World War, hegemony helped to describe what Gramsci saw occurring in Europe. The old rule was brought down and in its place were a thousand little groups struggling for dominance. The fascists became textbook cases of a rise to power through consent. Their power was not through gangs of toughs in colored shirts but through their ability to appeal directly to the masses and the individual suffering through the Great Depression. The power of the fascists came through the consent they obtained from the rest of the nation.

³⁴ Jacobiti, p. 84

³⁵ Gramsci, Antonio, *Selections From the Prison Notebooks*, International Publishers, New York, 2003. p. 5

³⁶ Gramsci, p. 10

Power

Marx believed that power came from an economic base or, more commonly, the means of production³⁷. As Gramsci and Croce demonstrated through theory and practice this notion was not entirely true. The desire for power and glory can be separated from commodities and economic self-interest³⁸. Power relationships are asymmetrical in that the power holder will always exercise greater control over the behavior of the power subject³⁹. The means of power is important, but the end is almost always described as the same; the common good. The submissiveness of those subject to the power of the dominant group is based on seeking out and deferring to whomever is most likely to achieve the common good⁴⁰.

Power relations can be divided into three attributes, breadth, comprehensiveness and intensity⁴¹. An extensive power relationship asks the question “how many rule how many?”. The comprehensive aspect is based on the total conduct and life activity the power holder controls in the existence of the power subject. The intensity of a power aspect is the range of effective options open to the power holder within each and every scope of life of the power subject over which power is wielded⁴². George Orwell’s *1984* provides us with an example of a society that has very extensive, comprehensive and

³⁷ Barrow, Clyde W. *Critical Theories of the State: Marxist, Neo-Marxist, Post Marxist*, University of Wisconsin Press, 1993. p. 16-17

³⁸ Russell, *Power...*, p. 12

³⁹ Wrong, Dennis H. *Power: It's Forms, Bases and Uses*, University of Chicago Press, 1988. p. 14-15

⁴⁰ De Jouenel, *On Power...*, p. 24

⁴¹ Wrong, *Power: It's Forms...*, p. 14-15

⁴² Wrong, p. 16

intense control over the power subjects by an small and unknown body of power holders. Big Brother is ever present, all seeing and in total, absolute control of Oceania. *1984* is used as an example of a totalitarian state. Civil liberties represent a roadblock to the comprehensiveness and intensity of power, a roadblock that is absent in Orwell's dystopian fantasy.

Both Russell and Wrong advance different divisions of power⁴³. Both agree on force as a major division. Force, both physical and biological, is the creation of physical obstacles that restrict the freedom of another. The actual use of force is different, however, from the threat of force. Military and police power fall in this category. Manipulation is Wrong's second category⁴⁴. Manipulation is where the power holder conceals his intent from the subject he is trying to manipulate. Wrong believes that the subject cannot resist this form of power, yet he also maintains this is the weakest of his three categories. Russell uses a similar idea: that of rewards and punishments as inducements to for one to subject themselves to the power holders wishes. However this is not conducted exclusively without the power subject's knowledge. Finally both authors categorize persuasion as a final aspect of power. Here the use of arguments, appeals and exhortations are used in conjunction with the subject's goals and values to produce a desired result⁴⁵. Persuasion relies on the subject's free acceptance and choice and thus can be limited in how extensive it can be.

⁴³ Russell, Bertrand, *Power: The Role of Man's...*, p. 26 and Wrong, *Power: It's Forms...*, p. 25-32

⁴⁴ Wrong, *Power: It's Forms...*, p. 30

⁴⁵ Russell, Bertrand, *Power: The Role of Man's...*, p. 26 and Wrong, *Power: It's Forms...*, p. 32

The rise of Hitler in the 1930s illustrates just how a power holder comes to supremacy using the three elements of power. The Nazi program generated persuasion among the general populace with inducements that gained the consent of the nation. The use of the existing party of Social Democrats under Hindenburg was a ready-made flock of sheep, according to Russell, that followed their leader towards the acceptance of Hitler⁴⁶. The victims of the concentration camps, not just Jews but also political dissidents and others deemed unrecoverable by the Nazi hierarchy, represented the use of force. Finally the manipulation of the educational system helped to generate consent for the Nazis in many other aspects of German life. Their economic situation was improved, education was regulated and any vocal opposition was removed often with the proper justification, through democratic and legal means, secured and common interest as the reason.

The Generation of Consent

Machiavelli, in his seminal work *The Prince*, emphasized the need for the ruler to remain within the good graces of his people. In particular he cites the story of Oliverotto de Fermo⁴⁷. Oliverotto de Fermo plotted and schemed to kill his uncle, then Prince of the city of Fermo in central Italy. After he had his uncle and other powerful men in Fermo

⁴⁶ Russell, Bertrand, *Power: The Role of Man's...*, p. 37

⁴⁷ Machiavelli, Niccolo, *The Prince*, translated by W.K. Marriot, J.M. Dett and Sons, London, 1958. p. 46-47.

killed, Oliverotto ruled his new domain through unspecified doses of what Machiavelli calls “*far and violence*”⁴⁸. He made sure to not only kill the chief citizens but also any and all malcontents to his rule as well as strengthening civil and military ordinances to his own benefit. Despite his use of fear through force and coercion Oliverotto was strangled to death by a group of angered citizenry almost one year to the day after he took power. The message Machiavelli sought to impart in his royal readers was that odious Princes do not stay in power long. They are not safe from threats that exist both within and without. A Prince, to be truly successful in Machiavelli’s mind, must both be loved *and* feared and take special care to avoid arousing the hatred of his people⁴⁹. Having proper justification to utilize violence and leaving the property of potential supporters untouched were, in Machiavelli’s mind, essential to maintaining power. People have a “*zone of acceptance*” that places limits how intense and how comprehensive power relationships are⁵⁰.

Dominant groups enjoy power through the generation and maintenance of consent. Here we can reinforce the notion that consent is the crux of the entire concept of hegemony. For a hegemon to exist at all a significant amount of consent must be generated from the masses. Generating consent can be difficult and depends on the popularity of the course of action that the state wants to take. An example would be the initiation of an unpopular action by the state. In advance a suitable public opinion is

⁴⁸ Machiavelli, p. 46

⁴⁹ Machiavelli, p. 93

⁵⁰ Wrong, *Power: It's Forms...*, p. 17

created and through this certain elements of civil society are brought into the unpopular action and persuaded to support it⁵¹.

Mobilizing this consent is often done through the media. When Gramsci wrote about hegemony he mentioned radio and the “yellow” press, both powerful forces in the early and mid-twentieth century⁵². This is much the same today, except that radio has been regulated to a third position behind television and the internet. The media in modern society is a force that plays an important role in the generation of consent.

As the First World War raged on in 1917 the majority of the American people were against entering what was, to them, an obviously European matter. The job of convincing Americans into throwing their lot in with the Allies fell to a man named George Creel. Creel was a publisher and head of the Committee for Public Information and in his book, *How We Advertised America*; Creel described his efforts in generating consent for the war against Germany⁵³. His success in selling the First World War to America caused considerable interest among other parties, most notably Adolph Hitler. Techniques like using phrases to create public opinion can help win the masses, for example Harry Truman’s labeling of the Korean Conflict as a “Police Action” and Hitler’s definition Russia as “The Red Menace” both fit into this category⁵⁴. The use of persuasion and propaganda is not the only method of generating consent. However it is a

⁵¹ Femia, Joseph V., *Gramsci’s Political Thought: Hegemony, Consciousness, and the Revolutionary Process*. Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1981. p. 27

⁵² Femia, p. 27

⁵³ Pratanis, Anthony and Aronson, Elliot, *Age of Propaganda: The Everyday Use and Abuse of Persuasion*, W.H. Freeman and Company, New York, 2000. p. 10

⁵⁴ Pratanis, p. 75

telling example of just how the state can generate support for action when such action is unpopular.

Pratkins and Aronson⁵⁵ use the example of Imelda Marcos's shoes as a shining example of how the news media will often employ vivid imagery versus thoughtful discussion. The racks upon racks of shoes that the wife of the deposed Philippine dictator owned entered the American consciousness as an example of the excesses of a regime that few in the general public knew anything else about. The focus upon such a visual symbol is an example of the selectivity of the news media. There must be a barrier, such as the media, between the masses and the event in order to establish some form of propaganda. This barrier filters and manipulates information as it is passed down to civil society. The news media, whether it is conscious of it or not, represents the frontline of establishing consent to a certain point of view, whether that view is of the dominant group within society or simply the editor of the paper with an agenda. If a group is actively seeking a foothold with the masses the establishment of publishing houses and other sources of news are essential. Benedetto Croce established himself as the reigning intellectual because of his publishing house and magazine. Hitler helped to establish the Third Reich because of *his* publishing houses and rewards to journalists willing to cooperate with the Nazi regime⁵⁶.

Gramsci noted that the Government can often mobilize the support of the mass media and other associated ideological instruments partly because various elites share

⁵⁵ Pratans, p. 268

⁵⁶ Pratans, p. 269

similar worldviews and life styles⁵⁷. It can be argued that the same dominant group that controls the government will also have at least a foothold in the media. However the media is an integral part of civil society and some of the most controversial media sources are often pitted against the dominant group in charge of the state. In today's highly technological world, where news is delivered quickly, the government must be adept at handling the media. As noted above, the media is very good at presenting compelling visual images. Instead of asking serious questions about the support of the Marcos regime in the Philippines and how they received support from the west, the media focused on the ostentatious wealth of the regime that helped to bring about its downfall.

Consent breeds power, as Adolph Hitler knew only too well. So did Mussolini and so does any other dictator brought to power through popular means, such as an election. In modern western democracies consent is needed to accomplish any number of tasks that the government deems necessary. The United State's involvement in the Republic of Vietnam is an example of generating and ultimately losing consent. The Vietnam conflict was supposed to be an example in Eisenhower's domino theory of communist aggression. If one small country fell to communism, the theory went, and then the region would soon fall to communism. The fall of French Indo-China in 1954 with the battle of Dien Bien Phu led to a situation where there was a split nation, the communist North Vietnam and the democratic South. The United States soon began sending advisors, then contingents of troops to the South to bolster a corrupt government

⁵⁷ Femia, *Gramsci's Political Thought*, p. 27

and a flagging military effort. By the time the United States left in 1975 very few people were convinced that any involvement had been necessary.

In the early 1960s the war in Vietnam was pitched to the American people as a needed effort to forestall communism in Asia. The Commander of MACV (Military Assistance Command, Vietnam), William Westmoreland, was confident that the conflict in Vietnam would be won in 1968. As the local New Year approached the North Vietnamese launched the “Tet Offensive” of January 1968 catching the Americans and South Vietnamese forces unprepared and off guard. The North’s offensive was a military failure, with every major objective Northern forces captured quickly taken back. The Revolutionary Forces, commonly known as the Viet Cong, were nearly destroyed. In a conventional military sense the Tet offensive proved a costly failure. But in the context of the Vietnam War it was an absolute, utter victory. Why? The American government had labored long and hard to convince the American people of the necessity of the war. Part of this convincing was the presence of hard dates for a victory and subsequent withdrawal for American forces. Tet caught the American military so off guard that it appeared obvious that any deadline for victory was arbitrary. Walter Cronkite, in his position as anchor of CBS evening news, pronounced the war as “unwinnable”. This pronouncement by the mainstream media effectively sealed the fate of the American effort. Richard Nixon’s 1968 Presidential campaign was based on “peace with honor” and American withdrawal. The power of the American effort was eroded to the point where a policy of “Vietnamization”, in other words handing responsibility over to an ill-prepared and corrupt South Vietnam, was perceived as the only way to end the war.

Separating Power from Resources

We can look at two examples to demonstrate how resources do not equate with power in hegemony. The Persians were possessed of both resources and the power to govern over states and cities that acquiesced to their rule. Xerxes had power; the power to persuade Greek city states to come under his rule without a fight, the power to rule a vast and varied empire such as Persia⁵⁸. Though the invasion of Greece was a failure the simple fact is that Xerxes still possessed enough power to both rule his kingdom and lose his war against the Greeks without any ill effects, save for prestige. In fact Xerxes ruled for 15 more years until deposed by his nobles. The American effort in Vietnam is a different example with a distinctly different outcome. Despite seemingly limitless resources and massive troop numbers the war was lost against an enemy who was far less technologically sophisticated. In the American example the fallout from the war and backlash from an angry public helped end a Presidency and hurt the morale of the US armed forces until the early 1980s.

Resources, however limitless, do not equal power to accomplish policy goals or to govern⁵⁹. Discourses other than coercion help to ensure that power is not essentially tied to military strength, or more simply, force to enable goals to be achieved. Hegemony is a concept that is dependant on the force of consent to achieve what the state wants. Both

⁵⁸ Matthews, Rupert, *The Battle of Thermopylae: A Campaign in Context*. Spellmount Books Limited, London, 2006.

⁵⁹ Haugaard, Mark, "Power and Hegemony in Social Theory", in *Hegemony and Power: Consensus and Coercion in Contemporary Politics*, Mark Haugaard and Howard Lentner, eds. p. 45-64., p. 63

economics and coercion are not the ends of the hegemony. Instead we can look at what is called a language of discourse⁶⁰. This shared discourse helps to write people into a mode of interpretation that reinforces particular relations of dominance⁶¹.

This discourse can be used to create counter hegemony against the dominant group. Society within the state is a marriage between the dominant group and the subordinate groups that share a common will and material resources. A discourse among select elements of this society will help to create certain ideas. For example discourse among a number of elements of a state may begin to ideas of nationalism and modernity. Ireland in the late 19th and 20th centuries is a good example of this. Despite Britain's ability to govern huge territories like India with surprisingly tiny numbers, the discourse of Irish nationals proved overwhelming for the colonial government. In response Britain used coercion in the form of such things like the notorious "Black and Tans" to break up any ideas of Irish nationalism. Despite the resources available the British failed and granted independence to Ireland in 1922.

The British effort to keep Ireland within the Empire proves a very important point about the nature of power and the ability to maintain hegemony. Power, that is the power to maintain hegemony, will decrease through the use of violence⁶². Power is a non-zero sum game and within this game power will wither through the use of violence. Violence is easy for a society possessed of superior physical resources. In the short-term using coercion and, consequently, violence to achieve goals is a perfectly feasible idea. In the

⁶⁰ Haugaard, p. 49

⁶¹ Haugaard, p. 49

⁶² Haugaard, p. 63 and Parsons, Talcott, "On the Concept of Political Power", *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society*, Volume 107, pp. 232-262. p. 239

long run such usage of aggression becomes dangerous. The Royal Irish Constabulary Reserve (unofficially known as the Black and Tans) mentioned above were groups of men, many former British soldiers in the First World War, who were assigned to bolster the Royal Irish Constabulary in the fight against the Irish Republican Army (IRA). Many Irish viewed the Black and Tans as an occupation force in the wake of the failed 1916 Easter Uprising. The tactics used by the RICR were harsh, including the burning and sacking of small Irish towns as reprisals for Irish Republican activities. These were tough men who used tactics ill suited to keeping public opinion high. Indeed the actions taken by the Black and Tans contributed to British concessions ultimately ending in Irish independence. Instead of coercing the Irish, the RICR's methods incited more nationals to fight the colonial forces. The tough tactics employed hardened the Irish further and ultimately helped to fuel the fires of independence from Britain.

The use of the means of violence is a hallmark of the state. Gramsci described the state as the outer defense of civil society⁶³. The means of violence is there to protect the state and all that it contained. If the state chooses to turn the means of violence inward, against civil society, then obviously there is an issue with the hegemony of the dominant class. Whatever the problem the discourse that spawned the use of coercion was a signal that the historic bloc, which is the fusing of the dominant class and subordinate classes by a common ideology, will, and material resources, is possibly at an end. The more violence is used the more gap appears and thus, the better the chance that the counter-hegemony will win.

⁶³ Gramsci, *The Prison Notebooks*, p. 235

If a power is to adequately govern a people, group or territory that is not wholly fused into the hegemon then that group must have minimal national discourse amongst itself. National discourse is the dialogue among groups of people who consider themselves united, either by religion, like Israel, or by ethnicity, like the Kurds. Nations within states, such as the Quebecois in Canada and Chechnya within Russia, are often able to find their national voice and express their discontent with the current state of the political society in their state. Chechnya and Quebec have taken two very divergent routes in their quest to break off from their respective states. Quebec is on the edge of finding their national voice yet not quite ready to take the plunge as a separate entity. The history and democratic nature of Canada seemingly ensures that if such a choice is for separation then that choice will be honored by the state. The desire for a nation within Chechnya is an altogether different matter with violence being used to squelch the desire to move away from Russia. This has had very mixed and almost entirely negative results for both Chechnya and Russia. Russia has possessed little power to actually govern Chechnya yet has been able to amass the physical resources to force them back into the Russian state. Here violence, overwhelming, devastating physical violence, has proven to be a substitute for the ability to govern.

Conclusion

Real, long term power comes through the consent of the subordinate groups within society. Hegemony is built through the dominant group's efforts to instill its wants, needs, fears and desires into the rest of the community. This enables a strong, unified state that is created through the building of an extensive trench network of civil society surrounded by the outer defenses of the state. Without the consent of civil society the lifespan of the dominant group will be, to borrow from Hobbes, short, nasty and brutish as violence is used to keep power in lieu of the consent of the rest of society. The power to govern and rule is made through consent, not the proliferation of resources and the ability to manage violence.

Hegemony is a fickle force within social theory. There is a certain inevitability to the dissolution of hegemony. The ability to rule is finite, as many kings, presidents, dictators and parliaments have discovered. Ruling through the obtaining of consent will help to guarantee a stronger and more stable rule. The need to have the support of the people without the overt and continued use of violence is essential to a prosperous and peaceful rule.

Chapter 2

Managing Hegemony

In the world of declining American hegemony the phenomenon of hegemonic malcontents is on the rise. The hegemonic malcontent is a subordinate power that has consciously decided to exercise its own national goals apart from the order of the reigning hegemon. Most often time malcontents exist under the hegemonic order with a certain degree of unwillingness. They may have been compelled into the order through military force or economic necessity. Whatever the reason the malcontent has always had the thought of breaking out from what they view as an oppressive existence. Other malcontents may be former followers of the hegemon. The followers may have experienced an internal change of government or simply may seek to find their fortune elsewhere.

Malcontents of hegemony are often among the reasons for the decline of hegemonic order. Their activity both outside the order and against the order will help to underline the developing weakness of hegemony leading other subordinate powers to begin pursuing their destiny elsewhere. Not every malcontent will succeed, of course. Many times the hegemon is able to punish the malcontent and keep the status quo within their order. Most hegemons are able to do this through political and economic means while they are at the peak of their power. As that power declines the economic and political power to keep troublesome subordinates in line is sapped. Without other means,

physical force in the form of military action can be used against the malcontent. Military action is the most effective act of keeping order, but also the most damaging to the hegemon and the order it maintains. Military force signals that a decline may be happening based on the lack of effective options in the economic and political realms. Physical force also impacts the other subordinate powers, it outrages them that such means would be used; it also demonstrates that the hegemon is willing to resort to such measures to enforce compliance.

The first chapter of this work outlined a theoretical discussion of hegemony. This chapter will build on that by talking about hegemony and hegemonic malcontents within the context of International Relations. The initial part of this chapter will build a framework of hegemony within the context of international relations. Enshrined in this framework will be three models of malcontents, which will be discussed in the following chapter. Each of these models will portray a different kind of malcontent, from the overt revolution to the subtle distancing.

Hegemonies that wish to maintain their world order effectively must be prepared to wage battle in every sense of the word. If I may slip into a more Gramscian phraseology, hegemonies must fight on both cultural and ideological fronts as well as the material and economic fronts. Incorporating other groups, nations and states into the hegemonic world order is a task that must be undertaken with determination and with an eye towards the definition of hegemony. Inevitably there will be a group that resents such intrusion into their own goals. They will seek to exercise these goals when they believe the time is right. A weakness in the center of hegemony will become the impetus for

these malcontents to exercise their particular goal. The methods that the hegemon uses to deal with them will help the rest of the world to determine how healthy and stable the hegemony is. The use of force against hegemonic malcontents is a sign of weakness and often the start of a decline.

The Social Construction of International Relations

Hegemonies are able to form precisely because they have qualities that make other groups within the system want to follow them. These traits include nearly all the dimensions of power that make following such a dominant group an easy decision for most. When a state creates hegemony it does so because it has been able to fill a vacuum in world politics. This leads to the first question that we must answer, namely how do hegemonies emerge from the great morass of nations and states? Hegemonies generally emerge in periods of unstable relations. Here the hegemon is experiencing an encroachment on the hierarchy of power by other, smaller powers due to a number of factors. This translates into the undermining of the position of the hegemonic state⁶⁴. Major wars cause dramatic shifts in economic, military and political power⁶⁵. Whether these wars come from the erosion of hegemony or from a balance of power situation the end result is usually a new set of major power(s) on the world stage.

⁶⁴ Gilpin, Robert, "The Theory of Hegemonic War" in *Journal of Interdisciplinary History*, Vol. 18, No. 4, The Origin and Prevention of Major Wars. (Spring, 1988), pp. 591-613

⁶⁵ Gilpin, Robert, *War and Change in World Politics*, Cambridge University Press, New York, 1981, p. 1-2

What kind of environment does this change take place in? Classical theories of international politics, like E.H. Carr's realism and utopianism, have been supplemented with a slew of other ideas. Hegemons do not develop in a vacuum of states randomly bumping into each other, like a demolition derby at a rural county fair. There are no systematic sets of rules that dictate world politics. To be fair we must strike a balance between these two extremes in order to explain why hegemonies rise and how they accumulate followers.

Theorists like Carr believe that international politics is a great anarchical arena, where historical cause and effect dictate how players will act⁶⁶. The primary actors are states, sovereign and free who interact with each other but on the assumption that the end result of whatever is done will be in the national interest. Non-state actors are not seen as important within the arena of states. Security and self-interest is the primary consideration of the statesman in the world of the realist. Power is the primary aspect of hegemony, power through the consent of the followers. Taking a cue from the classical realists we can say that, perhaps, the followers in a hegemonic system follow the biggest kid on the block for he can provide a measure of protection, economic stability and fair hand to settle arguments among the followers. The absence of any central political authority on the international stage can be seen as to dictate such behavior among states. After all, one must look out for themselves if they are to survive and, perhaps, prosper.

⁶⁶ Carr, E. H. *The Twenty Years Crisis, 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations*, Harper, New York, 1939. Morgenthau, Hans, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, Alfred Knopf, New York, 1948.

Revisions of this theory have taken place. Neorealism has reconfigured the anarchical stage into an anarchical system that has little sympathy for states that do not seek to help themselves⁶⁷. But some authors argue that the anarchy of realism is a creation of states within the system. The creation and perpetration of identity helps to drive willing states towards an anarchical system⁶⁸. If a state develops itself in a particular identity, say that of a crusader for democracy, then that conception of itself will help to shape its interests⁶⁹. The social context that a state or non-state actor exists in will help to define reaction to situations they will face. Interests are defined in the process of defining situations⁷⁰. If a factory worker in a Ford plant near Detroit has an interest in assembling car doors, possessing Union membership or cleaning up at the end of work day we are saying that the worker has to define certain situations as calling for certain actions. This does not mean that the worker will necessarily do so, but if they do not then they will not get promotion and perhaps lose their job⁷¹. The concept of identity is perhaps the key to Wendt's theory of politics.

In a more international relations role we can see this idea in the end of the Cold War. When the Soviet Union collapsed the United States lost the environment of threats and hostility that helped to generate the identity of a democratic nation against the forces of communism and totalitarianism. Without a situation to build an identity off of the

⁶⁷ Waltz, Kenneth, *Theory of International Politics*, McGraw Hill, New York, 1979. Waltz is one of the more important IR theorists in the last 30 years or so because of his structural based theory of realism and International Relations in general.

⁶⁸ Wendt, Alexander, "Anarchy is what States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics" in *International Organization*, Vol. 46, No. 2. (Spring, 1992), pp. 391-425.

⁶⁹ Wendt, p. 398

⁷⁰ Wendt, p. 398

⁷¹ Wendt, p. 398

United States began to become unsure of exactly how to define itself, and its interests, in a post-Cold War world. Without a situation that can help define interests the ability for a player to form an identity is hindered. The United States kept preparing for the Cold War for years after the Soviet Union was gone. The massive investment in weapons was geared towards the kind of apocalyptic conflict that was almost counted upon to occur in Europe against the forces of Communism. A new world emerged after the demise of the Soviet Union but without a concrete environment to base a new identity off of the United States was a superpower without a cause; only the events of the terrorist attack on the World Trade Center changed this. Of course this leans both ways; the start of the 21st century has seen Russia begin to construct a new identity as well, one based on resurrecting the Cold War and, presumably, the glory and achievement that the former Soviets believe surrounded it.

Institutions represent a set of structures that are relatively stable in form⁷². Combining both identities and interests, institutions often have these formalized into rules and norms. The stability of such institutions is dependant on the willingness of the people involved to participate in collective knowledge and their level of socialization. Institutions represent what the actors within them collectively “know” about the world⁷³. Institutionalization is a process whereby the actors within internalize new identities and interests. A choice thus exists for institutions viewed as such; they can be cooperative or conflictual. This idea places the concept of institutions outside of the norm in that traditionally most institutions with international relations are seen as cooperative entities.

⁷² Wendt, p. 399

⁷³ Wendt, p 399

Institutions play a crucial part in the creation of hegemony through their tying of the order together into the hegemon's political and civil society. This helps create the structure that binds the hegemonic order together.

Institutions as described here are not organizations like the United Nations or Amnesty International. Instead institutions are geared more toward concepts like the above idea of "self-help" within a primarily anarchical stage. Various structures of identity and interest exist under anarchy, the primary one being self-preservation and/or security. Within the institution of "self-help" states treat security as the responsibility of each other. Politics, and the manipulation of power, will be to satisfy self-regarding interests in such institutions. This is contrasted with cooperative institutions of collective security, where the security of each is accorded to the responsibility of all⁷⁴. The use of power depends on what type of institution is being formed. The world situation in 1939 was very much a "self-help" situation where states sought power and security as the primary motivation for action. The Russo-Finnish war of 1939-1940 was based on such a fear. Stalin was convinced that Finland was going to ally with Germany, the only power able to realistically threaten the Soviet Union at the time. The diplomatic maneuvers broke down because the Finns would not give in to any Soviet demands. Stalin saw this as suspicious and added it to an already large amount of evidence he believed he had. This prompted the invasion of Finland and after a hard fight by the Finnish army the Soviets eventually gained the upper hand and were able to dictate the terms on which the

⁷⁴ Wendt, p.400

war ended⁷⁵. Stalin knew that to preserve the Soviet Union and to ensure the best security if war did occur with Germany he had to eliminate the threat he perceived coming from the nearest potential German ally, Finland. In the atmosphere of pre-World War II Europe Stalin's actions were thoroughly grounded in the identity of the Soviet Union as a direct competitor to Germany and consequently Finland, who had flirted with fascism, was seen as a danger to Soviet interests.

Interaction is dependant on the dynamic normative interpretation of the above material world⁷⁶. The international stage is not trans-historically given to us but instead is socially constructed by humans through actions and words⁷⁷. Anarchy, which Waltz takes for granted, is just as artificial as Morgenthau's power politics. Both ideas are constructed institutions by the players within. There is an *a priori* reality within this theory that serves as base for the meaning that is generated by human actions and words. Action is only meaningful though when placed in an intersubjectively shared context⁷⁸. Words can be used either in place of or as an addition to deeds and action to help construct the social world⁷⁹.

The constructivist argument does share one trait with other theories of International Relations, namely the state-centric attitude. States are the primary movers and shakers in the arena in world politics by most accounts. However when discussing

⁷⁵ Trotter, William R. *A Frozen Hell: The Russo-Finish War of 1939-40*, Algonquin Books of Chapel Hill, Chapel Hill, NC, 1991. This account, by a well known writer on military war gaming, is an excellent account of the war and the hard fight given by the Finnish Army against overwhelming odds.

⁷⁶ Zehfuss, Maja, *Constructivism in International Relations: The Politics of Reality*, Cambridge University Press, 2002. p. 5

⁷⁷ Zehfuss, p. 14 and p. 20

⁷⁸ Zehfuss, p. 66

⁷⁹ Onuf, in Zehfuss, p. 153

hegemony and malcontents thereof we must also expand the definition of “actor” when discussing international relations. Changes in the collective identity of societal actors transform the interest of relevant collective actors that constitute the system⁸⁰. Members help to condition the group interests, with respect to the groupings within society and, especially, within the state⁸¹. The identity of individuals is partly defined by their collective identity⁸². States form a society, but the individual will only partly identify with the state. He will have other identities depending on group affiliation. In this way we see how extra-state groups arise and begin to play an important role in constructing international relations. A very good example of this is terrorist groups with a religious motivation, like Al-Qaeda. A member may partly identify with his nationality but will identify much more strongly with his religion and the norms of the group. Take some thousands of members and this group has the potential to affect world events, like Al-Qaeda has.

The Life Cycle of Hegemony

The life cycle of hegemony is an important issue when talking about malcontents. There is no set timetable to the rise and fall of hegemonic power. The modern world has, perhaps, sped up the process somewhat. The rise and fall of major powers used to take

⁸⁰ Hall, Rodney Bruce, *National Collective Identity: Social Constructs and International Systems*, Columbia University Press, New York, 1999. p. 5

⁸¹ Hall, Rodney, p. 5

⁸² Hall, Rodney, p. 34

millennia⁸³. Now the life of a hegemon can take only a few decades as evidenced by the decline of the United States in the 21st century. Hegemons do possess a discernable life cycle; they rise because of a major war, experience a stable period of expansion and plenty and then begin a decline, which can vary in the speed it occurs. For such powers economics is closely tied into the other elements of hegemonic order⁸⁴. Hegemonic states rise because of historical events (like major war) and the ability to maximize their economic base. The ability to capitalize on these is what makes hegemons hegemonic⁸⁵.

Some contend that hegemony is a revolving cycle, one hegemonic state rises, peaks, declines and leads into the next hegemonic state⁸⁶. In Paul Kennedy's theory the last two centuries are divided into four distinguishable time periods:

1. 1845-1875: Hegemonic with a world economy centered on Great Britain. The economic doctrines that were espoused were consistent with British supremacy, yet universal in form. Britain not only held the balance of power in Europe but also ruled the sea. This dominance translated into the British having the ability to enforce obedience for the rules of the market in peripheral states.

2. 1875-1945: This time period saw the above reversed with other countries challenging British supremacy. The balance of power held previously was de-stabilized. Instead of British free trade the specter of protectionism began to attain dominance in trade policies of Europe and elsewhere. The world economy began to fragment into economic blocs.

⁸³ Gilpin, p. 34

⁸⁴ Kennedy, Paul, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Power from 1500 to 2000*, Vintage Press, New York, 1989.

⁸⁵ Ibid, p. xxiv

⁸⁶ Cox, Robert, "Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations", in *Gramsci, Historical Materialism and International Relations*, Stephen Gill, editor, Cambridge University Press, 1993, p. 52

3. 1945-1965: The United States founds a hegemonic order similar to Britain's in the aftermath of the Second World War. Institutions and doctrines are kept, yet adjusted to fit a more complex world order.

4. 1965 – present: Here the American hegemonic order begins to break down as the smaller states are able to assert themselves following the recovery from the devastation of the Second World War. Economic troubles such as the oil crisis and the US going off the gold standard all take their toll on American hegemony. Essentially this is the start of a decline similar to Britain's in 1875.

Historically hegemonies have been founded by states that have undergone powerful social and economic revolutions⁸⁷. These states have ironed out the internal and domestic issues that would have otherwise prevented them from expanding out beyond their borders. Both Great Britain and the United States experienced this, as well as more ancient hegemonic powers such as Athens and Rome. These states were (and are) powerful because they were able to produce an internal equilibrium. Once this revolution is complete the opportunity is available for the state to unleash its energies to expand beyond the national borders. This can happen in several different ways. The objective of the state is the very thing that will produce change. These objectives can, according to Gilpin, be classified thusly:

-The conquest of territory: The traditional method of acquiring wealth and ensuring security is the acquisition of new territory.

⁸⁷ Cox., p. 59

- Increase influence over the behavior of other states: The use of threats, alliances and spheres of influence, among other methods, can increase influence exercised.
- Control of or exercise influence over the world economy: The creation of an international market economy in the 17th century has given states a new outlet to seek to exercise control over, of course focusing on the economic realm⁸⁸.

As the newly powerful state expands it will, more than likely, come into conflict with other powers or into conflict with the reigning hegemon, if one exists. Seeking to achieve objectives based on interests and the identity developed from them, the newly powerful state will have to weigh the consequences of implementing these objectives. The assumption is that if a state finds that the gains will outweigh the potential costs then it may seek to throw the order into a state of disequilibrium⁸⁹. The new power may have significant advantages over the old. The underlying causes of the Peloponnesian war, for example, included the open, democratic government of Athens, the powerful Athenian Navy and ideas that came along with such institutions. These prompted Sparta to take action thus causing a war that changed the face of Greece.

Gilpin calls this hegemonic war⁹⁰. Such a war is between the old order and emerging one. The conflict will widen and last long enough to encompass most other states within the order. Such wars serve as major turning points in history; old powers are

⁸⁸ Gilpin, *War and Change*, p. 23-24

⁸⁹ Gilpin, *War and Change*, p. 30

⁹⁰ Gilpin, *War and Change*, p. 186 and Gilpin, Robert, "The Theory of Hegemonic War" in *Journal of Interdisciplinary History*, Vol. 18, No. 4, The Origin and Prevention of Major Wars. (Spring, 1988), pp. 591-613

beaten down while new powers emerge. On occasion there is no one power that emerges able to bring stability to the world stage. This is seen in the aftermath of the First World War, where no one European power had enough strength, in either economic or military terms, to resume their previous position in world affairs. The power that *did* have the ability to become a leader in world affairs, the United States, retreated back to isolation⁹¹. The end of the Roman Empire serves as such an example as well. The barbarians attacked and destroyed the Roman order yet were unable to capitalize on it; no one barbarian had enough power to re-establish the empire Rome had vacated. However in more modern times hegemonic war has produced victors quite capable of taking advantage of the new world created by the total war.

Once a new power has established itself as hegemon it must choose how to enact its new international order. Hegemons, as we have established, find their power through the consent of the subordinates. Empire is established through more coercive means, the use of physical force plays a greater role. Empires represent the most extreme form of hierarchical order⁹². In this order weaker units are not full sovereign and control is ultimately based on coercive domination⁹³. Rule by force is distinct from rule by consent⁹⁴. Empires are not hegemons, as hegemons rule through consent and a universally conceived order. The new hegemony must be universally conceived so that

⁹¹ Kennedy, p. 278

⁹² Ikenberry, G. John, *After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraints and the Rebuilding of Order After Major Wars*, Princeton University Press, Princeton and Oxford, 2001.

⁹³ Ikenberry, *After Victory*, p. 28

⁹⁴ Augelli, Enrico and Murphy, Craig, "Gramsci and International Relations: A General Perspective and Example from Recent US Policy towards the Third World" in *Gramsci, Historical Materialism and International Relations*, Stephen Gill, editor, Cambridge University Press, 1993

other states within the order find it compatible with their own interests and identities. With its power established after war, the new hegemon begins to unleash an expansive effort that impacts both subordinates and peripheral states with patterns of economic and social institutions, culture and technology⁹⁵.

As the hegemon spreads out the patterns of institutions, culture and technology begin to perpetrate a civil society at a global level. Indeed, culture has been identified as an important aspect of American hegemony⁹⁶. Rome and Great Britain also counted the spread of their culture as an aspect of the power of their hegemonies. A look at governmental systems of any number of democracies quickly demonstrates the staying power of British culture within disparate societies. Reading the history of Europe into medieval times also shows the in road Roman culture made, even on the very societies that conquered the Western Empire. Another, more important function is the regulation of inter-state conflict⁹⁷. Empirical analysis of this point has demonstrated that indeed hegemonic governance exerts an influence over the outbreak of major war⁹⁸. The economic and military might of a hegemon is, as Spiezio puts it, inversely related to the phenomenon of systematic instability.

Here we come to a problem of order. Building a hegemon is one thing, but building and maintaining an order is a different proposition. Order is a major issue within

⁹⁵ Cox, p. 60

⁹⁶ Maynes, Charles William, "The Perils of (and for) an Imperial America" in *Foreign Policy*, No. 111 (Summer, 1998), pp. 36-48

⁹⁷ Cox, p. 61 and Gilpin, *War and Change*, p. 35

⁹⁸ Spiezio, K. Edward J., "British Hegemony and Major Power War, 1815-1939: An Empirical Test of Gilpin's Model of Hegemonic Governance" in *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 34, No. 2. (Jun., 1990), pp. 165-181.

international relations and especially for hegemons. Ultimately, order is established and maintained by the preponderance of power and prestige of the leading state⁹⁹. We have established power within the context of hegemony, but prestige is concept that, while closely related, is distinct and different.¹⁰⁰ Prestige is closely linked with power but is built on a more hierarchical structure. We can identify prestige as —Probability that a certain command with a certain specific content will be obeyed by a certain group of persons”¹⁰¹. A hierarchy of prestige relies, as Gilpin tells us, on primarily economic and military power. The key point with prestige is that if your strength is recognized then you can achieve your aims without having to use it. For a state to acquire prestige it must be able to provide some sort of public good that invites other states to follow. Security, economic benefits, cultural identification and the political integration of elites will all contribute to the prestige of the hegemon. The ideological appeal and prestige of the hegemon are relevant to its ability to form a stable order¹⁰².

Once the hegemon is in power and apparently stable what exactly is it doing? Institutions and rules are first created that express the interests and identity of the hegemon and encourage subordinate groups to follow suite. The creation of institutions like the International Monetary Fund and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade both represent organizations that benefit a hegemon while still appealing to subordinate powers in the order. International institutions are but one faucet of an expansive effort that takes the hegemonic interests of economics, social institutions, political models,

⁹⁹ Ikenberry, *After Victory*, p. 29

¹⁰⁰ Gilpin, *War and Change*, p. 30

¹⁰¹ Gilpin, *War and Change*, p. 30

¹⁰² Ikenberry, *After Victory*, p. 29

culture and technology, as noted above, and enables their adaptation by peripheral states and groups¹⁰³. International organizations are an important tool in expanding the hegemonic order and reproducing the norms of the hegemon. The most important functions of international organizations include ideologically legitimating the norms of the hegemonic order, absorbing counter-hegemonic ideas and co-opting elites within the peripheral states to further hegemonic ideals¹⁰⁴.

The absorption of counter-hegemony is an important task of hegemonic order. Counter-hegemony is exactly what it sounds like; a challenge to the order established and maintained by the hegemon. Most counter-hegemony during the birth and stable life of the hegemon tend to fail. After all, why upset a stable system? This is the very picture of counter-hegemony¹⁰⁵. True hegemons will incorporate some aspects of the aspirations, interests and ideologies of subordinate groups. Counter-hegemonies will identify aspects already in existence, renovate them, make them critical and apply them to their own interests and identity¹⁰⁶. On the scale of the international counter-hegemony will be a primary force behind the disequilibrium of the order. They would have weighed the gains versus the cost and decided that the profit was worth the expense. However, institutions like international organizations exist partly to mute such calls against the order.

Institutions are only part of the bargain, however. If subordinates within the order do not feel as if they are able to share the fortune of the stable world order the idea of

¹⁰³ Cox, p. 61

¹⁰⁴ Cox, p. 61-62

¹⁰⁵ Hunt, Alan, "Rights and Social Movements: Counter-Hegemonic Strategies", in *Journal of Law and Society*, Vol. 17, No. 3. (Autumn, 1990), pp. 309-328.

¹⁰⁶ Hunt, p. 313

power through consent is lost. Thus the idea of collective goods becomes a relevant idea. A collective good in this context is —one which all enjoy in common in the sense that each individual's consumption of such a good leads to no subtraction from any other individual's consumption of that good¹⁰⁷. Hegemons provide a number of collective goods through their prestige and power within their order. Security, economic benefits, cultural exchanges, technological innovations and many other benefits often are made available to subordinates within the order. The dissemination of collective goods from hegemonic rule provides a serious indictment for followers to follow.

The provision of security and economic benefits are collective goods as hegemons will provide these to ensure that the order is maintained. However, can we consider culture a collective good? Security brings peace and economics will bring prosperity to the order, but what does culture bring? First culture brings a measure of the hegemon to the civil society of the subordinate states, mixing into and sometimes eclipsing the domestic culture. The spread of British culture around the globe is perhaps a far more lasting attribute of hegemony than the economic and military benefits Britain invested in. The spread of liberal trading regimes, the parliamentary system of government and any number of cultural quirks the world over is proof that hegemonic culture does indeed penetrate into the civil society of subordinate nations. Ferguson makes the argument that the liberal trading regime of the British was indeed a major benefit of their hegemonic status¹⁰⁸. Much of the world was provided (or forced) into accepting the British liberal trade regime and the arguments is the states with alternate systems, notably the Soviet

¹⁰⁷ Gilpin, *War and Change*, p. 16

¹⁰⁸ Ferguson, *Empire*

Union and China, have paid the price for such mistakes and are only now correcting it. Infusing the order with the culture of the hegemonic state is a collective good. Culture has the advantage of making the civil society of both the order and the individual states more able to identify positively with the hegemon. This in turn gives the hegemon greater compliance in certain areas, especially for a hegemon that rules through consensual and reciprocal relationships.

Culture is merely one of the thrusts that the hegemonic order has into the societies and governments of subordinate states. Elites within subordinate states are co-opted into the hegemonic order. This can occur several different ways; money is perhaps the most common in the form of aid to the state, direct payments to the elites (like gifts of cars, planes, etc.) and benefits within the order itself. Also elites can be co-opted into international institutions that are supported by the hegemon. Some elites may have a goal of working within to change the order. However these goals are quickly sidelined as the structure is designed against the idea of passive revolution many of these idealists entertain¹⁰⁹. The experience of many Latin American countries under the order of the United States tends to validate this argument. The elites were co-opted through support of US government agencies and military assistance. The same elites often bring in institutions to the country to solidify a shaky military/political/economic/cultural situation. These same institutions are inexorably linked to the hegemonic order and will bring the power of the order with them.

¹⁰⁹ Cox, p. 63

Institutions provide a link between the state and civil society, and in this case between the hegemon and the order that it creates¹¹⁰. Through the creation of links between the state and civil society the hegemon is striving to become what Gramsci termed an historic bloc, that is a force composed of material forces, institutions and ideologies that build and ensure the link between the hegemon and the order. The hegemon ensures that the range of power that is available preserves the order; economic, political, military and cultural methods all enforce compliance and participation¹¹¹.

Hegemons will decline. Gilpin's theories on power transition provide a good starting point to discuss the decline and fall of hegemonic order. Eventually the hegemon will find the continued cost of expansion too great; indeed the continued cost of simply maintaining what it already has may be too much. The collective goods it provides may be less attractive than the ability to simply keep a stable system. The ability to quash counter-hegemony will also be muted as fewer followers find reasons to toe the hegemonic party line. The interests of the hegemon mutate from expansion, growth and power to retrenchment and keeping what it has. The decline and fall of the Roman Empire provides a stark reminder of the reality of international politics. The Roman world, so imbued with Roman values, culture and economics began to disintegrate as the resources to maintain the Empire evaporated along with, most importantly, the will to defend it¹¹². The collective goods that the Empire provided, chief among them security,

¹¹⁰ Gill, Stephen and David Law, "Global Hegemony and the Structural Power of Capital" in *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 33, No. 4 (Dec., 1989), pp. 475-499. p. 476

¹¹¹ Ikenberry, p. 28

¹¹² Gibbon, Edward, *Decline and Fall of The Roman Empire, Volume IV*, Methuenand Company, London, 1901.

were pulled from the farthest provinces, like Britain, to defend the core of the Empire. Internal and external forces combined to put undue pressure on the faltering defenses of the Empire. Gibbon notes that three things spelled the death of Rome: the inability to defend itself, the inevitable effects of immoderate greatness that had plagued the Empire and the rise of Christianity, which served to sap the military spirit that had so defended the Empire in the past.

Rome did not fall in a day. The causes of the end of Roman order were spread out for hundreds of years. Not so in more modern times. However the symptoms are much the same. The increased costs of keeping the Empire in equilibrium, not to mention expansion, became too much for Rome¹¹³. This is a generalized symptom of hegemonic order in general, the rising costs to simply keep what is here now overpowers the declining fortunes of the order. The steady but yet inevitable shifts in the distribution of power will give rise to challenger states and malcontents. Challenger states will actively oppose the hegemon for more power, they will in this respect give rise to counter-hegemony. These challenger states will up the ante, so to speak, and eventually such a challenge will result in hegemonic war¹¹⁴.

As other countries challenge the supremacy of the hegemon the balance of power that the hegemonic power holds both within and without the order will be upset. The hegemon will find itself increasingly unable to enforce compliance and participation. If free trade was a trademark of the hegemon then protectionism will begin to creep in as other states begin to fortify their trading regimes. A world economy that once existed will

¹¹³ Gilpin, *War and Change*, p. 168

¹¹⁴ Ikenberry, p. 26

begin to fragment into economic blocs. This is the situation Britain faced on the eve of the First World War¹¹⁵. The decline would continue past the First World War, into the Second and finally end after the Suez crisis in 1959. The First World War was the trigger that brought the final downfall of British hegemony¹¹⁶. The war had bled the British dry and the nation was unable to maintain the order that the 19th century had seen prosper. As Britain declined there really was no other hegemon able or willing to take her place. The hegemonic war that was the First World War (and the Second) had seen a victory for Britain and her allies but that victory had left them weak.

It is precisely at this juncture that the question of hegemonic stability arises. Hegemonic stability theory was first advocated by Kindleberger and essentially states that a hegemon must exist for a stable international economy to do so¹¹⁷. His argument is based on the Great Depression in the years following the First World War. As the international monetary system began to experience a bout of instability the usual method, which was for Great Britain to stabilize it, would not work, as Britain was far too weak to undertake such a feat. The depression was so wide and so deep, argues Kindleberger, that Britain was simply unable to bear the burden like she had in the past. Instead the buck was supposed to pass to the United States, still fresh from the First World War and apparently ready to assume leadership. Instead the isolationist sentiment prevalent in the country at the time squashed any such move. The system was left in the lurch and the

¹¹⁵ Cox, p. 60

¹¹⁶ Ferguson, *Empire*

¹¹⁷ Kindleberger, Charles, *The World in Depression, 1929-1939*, University of California Press, Los Angeles, 1979.

depression that followed was a direct result of the inability of the British and the unwillingness of the Americans.

Of course this depiction has always been rendered as too simplistic. As one author puts it, the presence of a single, strongly dominant actor in international politics lead to collectively desirable outcomes for all states in the current international system¹¹⁸. Some have challenged Kindleberger's ideas, including the thought that collective action is impossible without a dominant actor and that a declining hegemon will see a decline in cooperation; a claim that is refuted by some¹¹⁹. Snidal tests just how far hegemonic stability theory can possibly go¹²⁰. Here Kindleberger's theory is described as far more varied and dependent on the type of power hegemony uses, i.e. coercion or consent. Snidal talks about the public goods benefit of stability theory. The British provided stability as a public good, maintaining the international economy for free trade to benefit Britain¹²¹. As a result the rest of the world benefited too from this attitude. Snidal makes the point that America is currently playing the game differently in that instead of a public good there seems to be an attitude of control and a "private club" atmosphere¹²². Snidal brings the assumption that the goods provided by the hegemon are public under question. The interests of the hegemon will dictate the amount of international cooperation, a correlation between interest in such and the capability for maintaining such¹²³.

¹¹⁸ Snidal, Duncan, "The Limits of Hegemonic Stability Theory" in *International Organization*, Vol. 39, No. 4. (Autumn, 1985), pp. 579-614. p. 579

¹¹⁹ Snidal, p. 580

¹²⁰ Snidal, p. 580

¹²¹ Kindleberger, p. 294

¹²² Snidal, p. 613

¹²³ Snidal, p. 613

Keohane argued actively against Kindleberger's theory; he maintains that neither hegemon nor hegemonic order is needed at all. In a world where the hegemon is in decline the possibility for international cooperation and the maintenance of international regimes of trade is not impossible¹²⁴. Indeed these regimes may just be able to flourish with appropriate cooperation on an international level. International intuitions and regimes help independent states in a hegemon-less world identify common interests and goals. A shared, common identity is a first step in maintaining a common interest. However, Keohane emphasized the need to start with Realism, which explains that each state is motivated through its economic and military power rather than ideals or ethics, as Realism provides us with a barrier against wishful thinking and pipe dreams in world politics¹²⁵.

We can see here how some subordinate states can envision a world free of what they could deem as hegemonic interference. The hegemon may provide a measure of stability but world politics will go on without it in some way or another. There will always be a great power or powers, either in the making or in decline¹²⁶. There will always be a malcontent to chafe against the great power. The stage at which the malcontent arises will determine whether it can afford to stand up against the hegemonic order.

¹²⁴ Keohane, Robert, *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1981. p. 51

¹²⁵ Keohane, p. 245

¹²⁶ Kennedy, p. 538

Hegemonic Use of Force

The use of force is a hallmark of the state¹²⁷. Force is also, for a hegemonic power in the modern world, a last resort. Power comes through consent and if civil society does not support an act by the state then the state is in danger of losing that sanction. The non-military dimensions of power, which are the economic, political and cultural, are often far more effective in holding the hegemonic order together. The prestige of the hegemon is an important factor in the enforcement of compliance. A stable order is based on the prestige that the hegemon has built¹²⁸. As this prestige declines because of economic troubles, political in fighting and numerous other reasons the ability of the hegemon to maintain compliance is put into decline. A thread that runs through Kennedy is one of internal decay rather than external problems being the cause of decline¹²⁹. As the means of enforcement decline the element of power that remains strong is that of physical force. Even as the hegemon becomes thinly stretched in its obligations the military will often remain the one element of power that retains its capability to enforce the order.

Force dominates other means of power *if* there are no constraints on the choice of one's instruments¹³⁰. Military power is an important component of hegemonic power¹³¹. The large economic base and resource pool that a hegemon possesses allows it to build a

¹²⁷ Gramsci, p. 235

¹²⁸ Ikenberry, *After Victory*, p. 29

¹²⁹ Kennedy, p. 13

¹³⁰ Keohane, Robert and Nye, Joseph, "Power and Interdependence" in *Conflict after the Cold War: Arguments on the Causes of War and Peace*, Richard Betts, editor, Macmillan and Company, New York, 1994. p. 151

¹³¹ Keohane and Nye, p. 151

military that is state of the art. It is tempting to use force to enforce compliance within the order. However force is far more costly and more uncertain than other means. The use of force is not the most efficient method of achieving goals rooted in economics, ecological welfare, and human rights, among many others¹³². Major war has been deemed obsolete by some scholars, and for good reason¹³³. Peace is seen as a far more preferable alternative than war and since the Second World War, the use of war as policy in world politics has become riskier¹³⁴. The advent of nuclear weapons and the high costs of conflict in a modern age have helped to discourage conflict. We will, in all likelihood, never see another Second World War. The constraints on the use of force also can come from within the hegemonic order itself. With the threat of major war no longer hanging over the heads of the world, at least for the moment, the reasons to use force must be valid in the eyes of the order.

When does hegemony resort to force? In order to use force a hegemon must have issues that can be resolved by force. Gaining of territory, expanding trade, coercing an opponent, preventing secession, proving superiority, settling old scores, resolving disagreements and many others all fit into this category¹³⁵. These situations are, for the most part, resolvable by means other than force, either by politics, economics or cultural solutions. The use of force signifies that the other means to resolution have failed. Why have these failed? The hegemonic order may not simply have the reach to impose its will

¹³² Keohane and Nye, p. 151

¹³³ Mueller, Jack, "The Obsolescence of Major War", in *The Use of Force: Military Power and International Politics*, Robert J. Art and Kenneth Waltz, editors, Rowman and Littlefield, New York, 1999. p. 428

¹³⁴ Mueller, p. 428

¹³⁵ Mueller, p. 428

on the problem. Also, the hegemon may be in the throes of decline. As decline occurs the things that made a hegemonic presence so attractive, things like trade and political assistance are not so valuable anymore. In fact such things may indeed be part of the problem. At this point the hegemon has a choice; failure to resolve the problem to satisfaction or escalation. A failure to resolve the situation is a negative to the order and will hasten the decline of the hegemonic state. If the hegemon cannot at least make a compromise under peaceful conditions than the loss of face can be damaging to the ability of the hegemon to maintain its order effectively.

Escalation is the other option, and this is the use of force comes into play. The military of the hegemon is going to possess the elements that make it prestigious, technology, manpower, superior training and tactics and, of course, superior logistics. Appearing almost overwhelming to the opposition, the use or threat of force by a hegemon will stand a far better chance of solving the problem than the non-force methods described above. The modern United States and many of its allies employ what has been termed the “~~R~~evolution in Military Affairs” or RMA¹³⁶. The RMA in today’s world describes the importance of changes in military organization, strategy and technology. The revolution and advancements in information and military technology that began in the late 1980s has taken a dramatic hold upon the use of force¹³⁷. Computers, stealth technology, satellite information systems, and night vision are all part of the on going ability of the US to bring force down upon a problem effectively.

¹³⁶ Orme, John, “The Utility of Force in a World of Scarcity” in *The Use of Force: Military Power and International Politics*, Robert J. Art and Kenneth Waltz, editors, Rowman and Littlefield, New York, 1999, p. 460

¹³⁷ Orme, p, 460

Even with the revolutionary aspect of the application of force, are the costs going to be significantly lowered? The British involvement in Africa in the later 19th century, as outlined in several books about the Anglo-Zulu War, is an example of technology as applied by a hegemonic power. The British forces involved in the Anglo-Zulu conflict were superior in both firepower and technology. The Martini-Henry rifle was described as being “never a better weapon for close-quarters fighting” with its 22 inch bayonet and two foot length was the pinnacle of single-shot battle weapons, was standard issue to the British Army at this time¹³⁸. The logistics train was troublesome but the Army in South Africa in 1879 rarely lacked for much. The Army had artillery, mounted infantry and rocket batteries readily at hand. The first major battle, however, at Isandhlwana, was an unprecedented disaster for the British. What was supposed to be an easy war against an African kingdom quickly turned into a debacle of the highest order. The war was carried on, mostly as revenge for Isandhlwana. On a tactical scale the Army held its own and once the shock of defeat wore off the war was as good as won. The Zulus held no modern weapons, the only firearms being of 18th century vintage, no artillery, and little beside superb training and determination to defend their homeland. The British had started the war to acquire territory for Natal colony not to mention ridding themselves of a powerful neighbor that *might* cause trouble later on. What they got was costs that far exceeded the gain. The Army suffered the loss of a complete battalion (1st/24th, later known as the South Wales Borders) as well as the expense of shipping extensive reinforcements to impose a final defeat on the Zulus. As well, with the demise of the Zulu Kingdom the

¹³⁸ Snook, Mike, *Like Wolves in the Fold: The Defence of Rorke's Drift*, Greenhill Books, London, 2006. p. 65

British were left with an unorganized collection of small tribal units that revolted and warred with each other into the 20th century.

For all the advantages the British possessed the Zulu war was far more trouble than it was ultimately worth. The technological advantages provided by the “civilized” British Army helped to breed a culture of superiority that resulted in the death of over 1500 troops, both regular and colonial. Was the war a victory? Yes, it gained the objectives that the British had set out to acquire. Was the use of force successful? No, the costs of the war far exceeded the gain. The stability of the region was negatively affected by the absence of the Zulu King and the expenditure to win the conflict had been immense, over 5 million pounds in 1879 (nearly 415 million pounds in 2005 terms)¹³⁹. There was little international outcry at that time for a war waged against native populations. The media at the time helpfully spread enough falsehoods to encourage consent to such a conflict. The Zulu wars were, and remain, a romantic excursion of victory and defeat by the British Soldier dressed in his red uniform valiantly patrolling the edges of Empire.

The British repeated this same performance at different locations with the same results in the 19th century. Invade a territory, experience defeat, re-group and re-enforce and then proceed to secure victory. The use of force would entail a high cost but the British possessed the resources to overcome any setbacks they would encounter. This is the essence of a hegemon. The use of force may prove inefficient but the superior

¹³⁹ House of Commons Research Library paper 06/09, 13 February, 2006, “Inflation: The Value of the Pound, 1750 to 2005” at <http://www.parliament.uk/commons/lib/research/rp2006/rp06-009.pdf>
Zulu War expenditure from *The New York Times*, August 8th, 1879 at <http://www.parliament.uk/commons/lib/research/rp2006/rp06-009.pdf>

resources available ensure that a determined conflict will be ultimately won. There are exceptions to this, and these occur not because of superior resources but to the public consent needed for support. The Boer war is an example of public outcry against British action, both internal and external. Like Afghanistan and the Zulu Wars, the Boer war was the result of British economic and strategic considerations¹⁴⁰. The tactics employed by the British included a scorched earth policy and concentration camps to house the Boer population¹⁴¹. These were unpopular at home and abroad; media exposure certainly helped to turn the tide of public opinion. The Boer war was costly in material and men but, like Afghanistan in 1881 and the Zulus in 1879, it was a victory. Of course, in order to rule the British had to rebuild what they had destroyed. This is perhaps the ultimate irony of the British Empire and hegemony. In order to enforce their rule they used physical force. But in order to build consent and hegemony they needed to re-build what they had destroyed, thus doubling the costs.

The use of force is a double-edged sword for a hegemonic power. As evidenced by the British, physical force was a sure way to achieving compliance to the ways of the hegemon. But that compliance comes at a cost that may be disproportionate to the gains made. The British used force primarily against powers that were equivalent to the North South relationship enjoyed by the United States over Latin America before the Second World War. The native regimes and non-European powers were susceptible to British force; they had little recourse. But against other powers in Europe, Britain was not able to use force with such abandon. The naval build up by German in the years prior to the First

¹⁴⁰ Ferguson, *Empire*, p. 227

¹⁴¹ Pakenham, Thomas, *The Boer War*, Avon Books, New York, 1979. p. 525

World War was a good indicator that the ambition exercised in Africa and Asia would not translate well to Europe¹⁴². Force was, as Keohane and Nye suggest, a minor aspect of policy. It was the race to use the resources of hegemony to demonstrate the ability to use force, much like a peacock showing its feathers that was far more important than force itself. It was thought that by building a bigger navy, and more battleships, potential contenders could be deterred from attacking.

The Decline of Hegemony

An increased use of force is an element that often identifies a declining hegemon. Amid the loss of political and economic power a hegemon will find itself searching for a preferred grand strategy¹⁴³. Grand strategy incorporates several components: the use of military as well as fiscal and political power, balancing both the ends and means in peace and wartime and long term planning¹⁴⁴. The environment in which a hegemon finds itself will often dictate that strategy and the domestic forces behind it will be decided by what Lobell calls the commercial orientation of its contenders. By this it is meant that if a contender is liberal, than the strategy of the declining hegemon will follow suit, the same

¹⁴² Ferguson, *Empire*, p. 242

¹⁴³ Lobell, Steven, *The Challenge of Hegemony: Grand Strategy, Trade and Domestic Politics*, University of Michigan Press, 2006.

¹⁴⁴ Lobell, p. 3

idea goes for an imperial contender¹⁴⁵. Lobell argues that declining hegemons follow an identifiable pattern of what puzzles they must solve:

-Which states to punish?

-Where to cooperate?

-How to allocate national resources between productive capacity and military security?¹⁴⁶

The goal through the answers to these questions is to balance commitments without compromising economic staying power. Every hegemon will produce different answers to these questions. We cannot find a set cycle of a hegemonic cycle. Instead we see the pattern of questions that Lobell identifies as deciding a declining hegemon's grand strategy.

A declining hegemon is faced with an ever increasing cost/benefit problem. Returns on the economy dwindle while the needs for consumption increase¹⁴⁷. The consent that once provided the hegemon with the power it needed to run the order has been reduced in light of unpopular actions. Instability within the order is increasing. The hegemon has to try harder to produce the same results and eventually will be entirely unsuccessful at it. It is precisely at this point that the order will begin to fall apart, gently at first with some subordinate states not following the hegemonic lead. It will be more and more common to avoid compliance within the order. States and groups that have felt

¹⁴⁵ Lobell, p. 1

¹⁴⁶ Lobell, p. 3

¹⁴⁷ Gilpin, *War and Change*, p. 185

the hegemonic order begin to realize that they can perhaps break out from the order and pursue their own national goals. Thus begins the period where the malcontents of hegemony can arise successfully.

Conclusion

The life cycle of a hegemon is, like Gilpin noted, a fairly set process. However every hegemon will manage itself differently according to the environment it finds itself in, as well as based on the identity it manufactures for itself in this environment. Each hegemon will respond differently when maintaining the order it has created. The management of hegemonic decline is important when dealing with malcontents. In the modern era after the Second World War force has lapsed into a minor role. The use of force is often the last resort of a hegemon that has exhausted its economic and political options for enforcing compliance. The use of force within the hegemonic life cycle is dependant on the very environment which the hegemon finds itself in. That environment may be self-created, as the hegemon pictures itself as embarking on a great crusade when in reality it is risking the consent within the order it had so enjoyed in the past

Chapter 3

Hegemonic Malcontents

The 2002 *National Security Strategy of the United States of America* presented a plan for the United States in the wake of 9/11. The idea of deterrence, which had directed American policy for so long, was replaced by a strategy of preemption. Written in light of the perception of the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), the 2002 *National Security Strategy* was designed to show that the United States would strike before the enemy could, all the while building democracy along with a coalition of willing states. In short, the US was reaffirming its status as a hegemonic power while simultaneously adjusting itself to what was domestically considered a new world situation. The new strategy was highlighted by the 2003 Iraq war and the subsequent occupation and “nation-building” that has engendered so much debate and controversy.

The United States had drawn the proverbial “line in the sand.” President George Bush told other nations in late September 2001 “either you are with the US or you are with the terrorists,” thus demonstrating a “black and white world” mentality. The sane, safe order that had seemingly existed throughout the post-Soviet era had come to an end. The hegemonic order that was centered on the United States had begun to change. Instead of multilateral action, like that characterized by the First Gulf War, the Americans had made it clear that they would strike first and, if absolutely necessary, strike alone. The

ability of hegemonic America to act preemptively and decisively is not in question; the United States possesses the most powerful military in the modern world and the resources to ensure that wherever this force is deployed and whatever it is to do it stands a better than average chance of success in most conventional conflict.

As I have noted in previous chapters hegemony is based on consent, not coercion. The most powerful tool in the American arsenal is arguably not the military but the ability to form a coalition of democracies to tackle issues at the international level. The preemptive strike doctrine (known as the Bush Doctrine in some circles) introduced after 2002 swept the need for a coalition away as a primary concern. The war against terrorism and the “axis of evil” had replaced the cold war. And while the world was not so black and white anymore, American policy strived to present it in such a light.

The new strategy of preemption developed by the Bush Administration helped to crystallize the way opposition developed to American policy decisions. There are three categories of malcontents that began to develop in the time prior to the 2003 Iraq war; all were dissatisfied with the approach the United States took to fighting the war on terror and all three malcontent types expressed this in different ways. These are called malcontents of hegemony. Unlike a counter-hegemony, where there is direct competition with the reigning hegemon, malcontents are dissatisfied with the current hegemonic order and find that the ideals of the hegemon run counter to the national (or state) goals that the malcontented states and non-state groups wish to pursue

This chapter deals with the theory of hegemonic malcontents. Specifically, it examines why they exist and how they respond to the hegemonic international order. The

Bush Administration's reaction to the 2001 attacks and the Iraq invasion helped to polarize reaction within the American hegemonic order. With a strategy of preemption firmly in place it was perhaps inevitable that world powers took different approaches to the way America was dealing with the threats it believed were facing it. Here I hope to establish a theory that explains not just the reaction to the American strategy but also the reactions of smaller powers to hegemons throughout history. What follows is a discussion on how states become hegemonic malcontents, a subject that has little prior evaluation in the literature on hegemony. Hegemonies are an important feature of the international stage. Malcontents play an essential role in the way a hegemon rules, especially as the hegemony declines and falls. Here I illustrate the characteristics that contribute to the rise of a malcontent. Next I describe the three types of malcontents--benign, passive aggressive, and revolutionary. Finally, I explain how the rise of malcontents will signal the end of hegemony

From Deterrence to Preemption

In response to 9/11, the United States attacked the only physical target associated with Al-Qaeda--Afghanistan. According to the Bush Administration, Afghanistan was but the first in a series of targets that housed or aided terrorists.¹⁴⁸ Allies within the US hegemonic sphere roundly supported the attack on Afghanistan. The regime in

¹⁴⁸ Pauly, Robert J. and Lansford, Tom, *Strategic Preemption: US Foreign Policy and the Second Iraq War*, Ashgate, Burlington, VT, 2005. p. 71

Afghanistan was a routine violator of human rights as well as an active supporter of terrorist activity. The invasion and subsequent takeover of Afghanistan was easy for US allies to support.

The next target was Iraq. Saddam Hussein had been a thorn in the side of American foreign policy makers since the First Gulf War. President Bush in the 2002 State of the Union address identified Iraq as part of the “axis of evil.” Suddenly Hussein’s regime became the next objective in the American strategy of preemption¹⁴⁹. The consent that had characterized the Afghanistan conflict unraveled as Bush made it clear that Iraq would not only be the next goal but would also be eligible for the use of force if the situation was irresolvable diplomatically. The Bush Administration launched an effort to manufacture consent both domestically and internationally. At first the international effort at developing consent focused on the United Nations. Bush noted that Iraq routinely violated human rights accords and thwarted UN weapons inspections. The “coalition of the willing” was built using these arguments. Allies that the US had traditionally counted on, such as Great Britain and Australia, involved themselves in this coalition as did some Eastern European countries such as Poland. However, even as US determination to use force against Iraq picked up support, many states, including many European allies of the US, began to speak loudly and openly against the coercion option. The slow switch from a multilateral coalition--a traditional US bastion of its hegemonic order--to a bilateral coalition played a major role in the international opposition to the war as well as reactions from various states.

¹⁴⁹ Hermann, Denise von, “Presidential Decision Making: Three Models and the Road to War with Iraq” in *Presidential Policies and the Road to the Second Iraq War*, John Davis, editor, Ashgate, 2006. p. 23

France and Germany offered opposition to the Iraq policies of the Bush Administration both within and outside the UN. Not only did both states put forward fiery anti-war rhetoric, they also successfully pressured Greece (acting European Union President) into withdrawing invitations to prospective EU members who had sided with the US to a summit on Iraq.¹⁵⁰ This rhetoric, however, caused a backlash in the US domestically, as members of Congress presented bills to restrict importations of French and German foodstuffs (particularly wine), and members renamed “french fries” “freedom fries.”. Eventually, France and Germany were joined by Russia in exercising willingness to impede the coalition through whatever diplomatic means available¹⁵¹.

Other states including Turkey and Saudi Arabia did not actively oppose the war to the same extent, but adopted policies that forbade or restricted U.S. military use of territory and over flight privileges. In the case of Turkey this was especially problematic¹⁵². The denial of Turkish support of any kind, including flyover and basing rights for the imminent invasion of Iraq was another blow against American strategy in Iraq.

Outside the American sphere of influence, other countries also actively opposed the U.S. Iran, for example, opposed any sort of US attack seeing it, quite rightly, as a possible next target in the preemption strategy. Iran had been at odds with the US since the revolution in 1981, and Bush’s inclusion of Iran in the “axis of evil” further

¹⁵⁰ Pauly and Lansford, p. 94 and 98

¹⁵¹ Lansford, Tom, “Coalition Diplomacy and Iraq” in *Presidential Policies and the Road to the Second Iraq War*, John Davis, editor, Ashgate, 2006. p. 146

¹⁵² Pauly and Lansford, p. 97

exacerbated tensions. In the midst of U.S. threats, the reformist policies of Mohammad Khatami were replaced by the conservative Ahmadinejad regime.

I include the 2003 Iraq conflict to paint a picture of what the U.S. was going to face as it embarked upon a strategy that departed from the consensus-based policies of the Cold War. Rather than deterrence, which encouraged consent from states and groups within America's hegemonic sphere, a policy of preemption against the perceived threat of terrorist attack helped to polarize the states within the order. While many states did join the "coalition of the willing," some did not and others took active steps to oppose it.

The opposition that arose against U.S. action came from malcontents. Malcontents of hegemony do not seek counter-hegemony. Rather, they seek to work within the current order and pursue goals that differ from the ones set forth by the hegemon. The malcontents against the U.S. can be divided into three categories: benign, passive aggressive, and revolutionary. In this case, benign malcontents are states including France and Germany. While the opposition of states is quite heated, it manifests within acceptable institutions and within the rules of diplomacy, broadly speaking. In general, benign malcontents act against the hegemon but within the order created by the hegemon. Passive aggressive malcontents such as Pakistan do not offer open opposition within the order but are obedient because of the fear of a greater use of the carrot, or the stick, by the hegemonic power. Finally, revolutionary malcontents such as Iran oppose the hegemon on a number of levels, not all of them within the boundaries of the order. These malcontents are the greatest danger because they are willing to use violence and other means outside the established order to attain their national goals.

I believe that these three types of malcontents have existed within all previous hegemonic orders. Moreover, this typology can greatly improve our understanding of international politics. I will explore this further in the sections that follow. First, I will describe how a country becomes a malcontent. Next I will describe the different malcontents in far greater detail, providing examples along the way. Finally, I will examine the impact of malcontents on the hegemonic order. The importance of a malcontent cannot be understated in the context of hegemonic order. Left to its own devices a malcontent will not bring down a hegemonic power. However, as more and more malcontents cease to follow the leader the hegemon will soon lose the attribute that makes a hegemon: consent to rule

What is a Malcontent?

Attaining hegemony occurs when the interests of the dominant power--the hegemon--transcend the limits of the purely economic class and these interests become the interests of lesser powers that follow the hegemon, either willingly or unwillingly¹⁵³. There is an extensive body of literature on hegemony and hegemonic order. There is a far more limited body of work on other nations within the order--the followers and the malcontents. We can examine hegemony extensively, but such study will tell us little about the smaller powers within the international order. An examination of the First Gulf

¹⁵³ Hunt, p. 313

War by Cooper puts forth the idea that followers make hegemony work¹⁵⁴. The thesis here is that the First Gulf War was, from a renewalist perspective, a boon to American hegemony. In the heyday of talk about a “new world order” in the wake of the demise of the Soviet Union optimists in the US Government believed that the unity shown by the coalition, and the leadership by the US, was the start of a new era of American power. Cooper examines the First Gulf War from a follower’s point of view. As I have discussed previously, consent is a far better tool to motivate than coercion. As the actions leading up to the ground war occurred, the US found itself having a difficult time persuading many states that the big idea was also the right idea¹⁵⁵.

Why is the concept important?

The identification and explanation of hegemonic malcontents is a task that contributes to the field of International Relations and the practice of policy and history. A pragmatic view of hegemony dictates that there will always be threats to the order. Classifying these threats will, hopefully, help to dictate the use of the finite resources of the hegemonic state. States such as Germany may be malcontented, but the threat level is far lower than a malcontent such as Iran. We are able to identify followers of hegemony and challengers

¹⁵⁴ Cooper, Andrew Fenton, Richard Higgott, Kim Richard Nossal, “Bound to Follow? Leadership and Followership in the Gulf Conflict” in *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 106, No. 3. (Autumn, 1991), pp. 391-410.

¹⁵⁵ Cooper, et., al, p. 405

to hegemony. The malcontents represent a middle ground, not necessarily followers and certainly not challengers.

My classification is a tool that will help to identify the strengths and weaknesses of hegemony, as well as the impact that the malcontents will have on those strengths and weaknesses. Theoretically I hope that this typology will enable a dialogue focused on the specific reasons states and non-state groups within the order choose to pursue goals at conflict with the hegemonic state. Practically this typology could be a tool to identify gaps in the hegemonic order and places where the hegemonic state could best utilize its power. Whatever the usage, I hope for this work to provide a basis for further research in the social sciences.

Hegemony and the First Gulf War

The coalition in the First Gulf War is widely viewed as an example of followership under a hegemonic lead¹⁵⁶. Cooper and his colleagues argue that hegemony is only as good as the leadership it provides. Without followers, there is no hegemony. By examining the followers rather than the hegemonic power, the idea of successful leadership has been redefined. To be an effective hegemonic leader a nation must have followers accept a broad vision of collective goals articulated by a leader in whom both legitimacy and trust

¹⁵⁶ Cooper, et, al.

are placed¹⁵⁷. The George H.W. Bush Administration shifted from a diplomatic solution to a military solution too fast and with far too few reasons for some of the followers to spill their blood on a military operation. Simply put, the US was in a good situation, because despite issues with moving to a military solution too quickly, the costs for defection from the coalition would be even higher. By defecting from the coalition and the stated goals of the US, a country took the risk of looking weak in face of Iraqi aggression as well as losing aid and support from Washington. In simple terms of game theory, the cost to defect overshadowed the misgivings about participation in the war. While many followers accordingly sent military aid, much of this aid was relatively minimal.

We cannot expect hegemons who possess a preponderance of power in economic, military, and political spheres to also possess the ability to lead. The United States during the First Gulf War provided leadership to a disparate coalition that counted its primary goal as defeating Iraqi aggression. What the First Gulf War demonstrated is that followership is just as important as leadership. The power and influence a hegemon possesses is dependant on the policies of other states within the system¹⁵⁸. The hard balancing of the Cold War, that is, the formation of alliances to increase military capabilities, has given way to what is called soft balancing—the use of diplomacy, economic statecraft, international institutions, and international law to balance against

¹⁵⁷ Cooper, et.al, p. 408

¹⁵⁸ Jesse, Neal and Kristen Williams, “The Leader can’t Lead when the Followers Don’t Follow: The Limitations of Hegemony” Paper presented at the 2007 Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, February 28th-March 3rd, Chicago., Ill.

threats¹⁵⁹. In this light, the Second Gulf War can be seen as soft balancing against the actions of the US¹⁶⁰. Nonetheless, the lack of followership and balancing attempts are testing the limitation of hegemony in the years after 9/11.

A malcontent is not a follower. A follower is one that is led effectively because it accepts what the leader seeks. During the post-9/11 attack on Afghanistan followers were indeed led by a hegemon whose goals they supported. The subsequent attack on Iraq in 2003 was not in the best interests of the group who willingly followed the American lead into middle Asia. While the US had few problems with a preemptive attack on Iraq, many of the coalition of the willing had interests that stretched into the Middle East and Iraq itself. An approach that concentrated on soft balancing techniques and UN inspired inspections was far more likely to encourage a positive response from the coalition. Such attempts at soft balancing had been used for most of the 1990s to, in the eyes of the Bush Administration, little effect. The US stressed that immediate action was necessary against Hussein and his weapons of mass destruction and that a continuation of the soft balancing would fail to possibly disastrous results. These US policy decision saw followers not only ceasing to follow but some began to transform into malcontents—countries that were dissatisfied with American actions and policies. These malcontents have the potential to affect the entire international system. The actions taken by many of these malcontents reflected the trend toward soft balancing of the post-cold war era. Many small European states took up the U.S. cause, riding a bandwagon as an attempt to balance against the Western European states who dominate the European Union.

¹⁵⁹ Jesse and Williams, p. 10

¹⁶⁰ Jesse and Williams, p. 11

Choose You Poison: Options for the Malcontent

Malcontents have several specific paths of action they can take against the hegemon. Challenging hegemonic power by convincing others within the system that such power will cause more harm than good is one option¹⁶¹. Blackmail through what is called “undesirable consequences” can work for both ally and adversary¹⁶². This sort of action includes such threats as the continued spreading of nuclear weapons. Outright refusing or ignoring of the hegemon’s demands is another strategy, as the hegemon cannot force every state to do its bidding.¹⁶³ The more states that refuse, the easier it becomes for other states in the order to follow suit. Other methods of dealing with hegemonic power, like institutional membership and neutrality, also exist as options for dissatisfied states¹⁶⁴.

Simply choosing not to follow the lead of a hegemon is a rather easy way to opt out of the order. States such as those located in Western Europe will use paths of action such as these to avoid the policy the hegemon has chosen. Other malcontents were never followers of the hegemon in the first place. These malcontents may pursue strategies that are more reactionary in nature in an effort to be “left alone.” Drawing from revolutionary theory we see reactionary malcontents angered over a perceived meddling by the hegemon in their internal and regional affairs. Many revolutionary states are externalizing internal conflict through attacks on what they perceive as detrimental to the revolution

¹⁶¹ Jesse and Williams, p. 11

¹⁶² Jesse and Williams, p. 11

¹⁶³ Jesse and Williams, p. 12

¹⁶⁴ Jesse and Williams, p. 13

like, for example, Iran after the overthrow of the Shah in 1979¹⁶⁵. Revolutions become successful only when the administrative and coercive capacities of the states have been weakened by a combination of external and internal challenges¹⁶⁶. Consequently, some malcontents are more reactionary when a perceived weakness appears in hegemonic power within the region.

Somewhere between ceasing to follow a hegemon and reacting more strongly is an approach that allows the subordinate state to stay under the hegemonic order yet exercise its own power when it feels that the hegemon is overstepping its bounds. The case of Brazil during the Second World War is an example of this behavior. Brazil was the only Latin American state to contribute to the Allied war effort. It cooperated fully with the U.S. in assisting in the defense of the Northeastern South American coastline¹⁶⁷. Yet even given this activity Brazil did not support the U.S. in its call for all South American countries to halt relations with the Axis powers. In addition to Brazil, two more South American states, Chile and Argentina, did not do this (though Chile eventually relented and ceased all contact with the Axis powers). Further, the U.S. tried to convince all Latin America countries not to recognize the post-coup Argentinean government in 1943, and again Brazil did not go along. Eventually the entire effort fell apart¹⁶⁸. In large part, Brazil stayed a loyal subordinate state to U.S. hegemony in the region. But the

¹⁶⁵ Walt, Stephen, —“Theory of Revolution and War” in *Revolution: International Dimensions*, Marc N. Katz, editor, CQ Press, 2001, pp. 41

¹⁶⁶ Walt, —“Theory of Revolution..” p. 35

¹⁶⁷ Mares, David R. —“Middle Powers under Regional Hegemony: To Challenge or Acquiesce in Hegemonic Enforcement” in *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 32, No. 4 (Dec., 1988), pp. 453-471

¹⁶⁸ Mares, p. 467

actions it took in relation to Argentina demonstrate that its leaders were willing to check US power in the region through diplomatic means.

In the end, a malcontent is a state that has the desire to exercise national policy that allows for freedom of action without interference from external powers. The very nature of hegemony requires a carrot and stick approach to the maintenance of the order. It must not be forgotten that while the order is designed so everybody can benefit, the ultimate beneficiary is the hegemonic state. A strong hegemon will be able effectively to use a combination of consent and coercion to drag subordinate powers along. As decline sets in subordinate states will be able to disagree with the actions of the hegemon more freely. States that are subject to hegemonic influence will sense they have the ability to break out from under the thumb of the hegemonic state. They are all malcontents, but the ways in which they respond are different.

The Limitations of Hegemony

The desire of the malcontent to exercise purely national goals within the hegemonic order tests the limits of hegemony. A hegemon will have an identity that will influence what interests it has, and these interests are imposed upon the order as a whole. The British promotion of free trade in the 19th century was based on the identity of Britain as industrial powerhouse and colonial Empire. Free trade was an essential element of British success; the order benefited both Britain and the rest of the world, at least according to

the British worldview. Britain's hegemony was concerned with the maintenance of empire on one hand and the free and open trade of British goods on the other. Inevitably hegemonic interests will collide with the goals and interests of the subordinate states. The Venezuelan incident of 1902 in which the country defaulted on loans from Germany and Britain is an example of this collision. Britain and Germany sent naval forces to force payment, while Theodore Roosevelt began to exercise the Monroe Doctrine against European intervention¹⁶⁹. Neither Germany nor Britain had the clout to force the issue; instead the U.S. played the role of arbitrator between the two sides. Britain recognized who exactly was the dominant power in the region, while Roosevelt refrained from a show of force¹⁷⁰. Britain was already in decline as a hegemonic power. The inability to enforce the order in the Americas demonstrates the limitations of hegemony.

In 1902 the U.S. was a power on the ascendance, while Britain was in a slow but steady decline. The U.S. was establishing an identity as an imperial power in its own right. Traditionally the Americas were seen as the backyard of the US, an area that was to be free of European influence. In 1902 the expulsion of the Spanish from Cuba left the U.S. as the sole imperial power in the region, a status that Roosevelt was eager to preserve and nurture.

Hegemons are rarely able to make informed decisions about the limitations of their power. Instead they often find out while attempting to enforce the order. Jesse and

¹⁶⁹ Zimmerman, Warren, *The First Great Triumph: How Five Americans Made Their Country A World Power*, FSG, New York, p. 438.

¹⁷⁰ Zimmerman, p. 439

Williams¹⁷¹ theorize that states are affected by domestic factors, such as regime type, political parties; elite desire to remain in power, public opinion, and the influence of interest groups, when challenging the hegemonic power¹⁷². Therefore, instead of a response to hegemony, a malcontent will be exercising goals that relate to domestic factors. This can make it difficult for hegemons to know when to stop. In the case of Venezuela and the U.S. in 1902, the British realized exactly where they needed to stop without the U.S. taking overt steps to assert its power in the region through a show of force.

Because hegemons rely on a mix of consent and coercion there must be a point at which the use of force comes into play. If a hegemon is unable to obtain what it wants through political or economic means, it may ask: Should force be employed? The use of force is a stopping point that the hegemon must thoroughly examine. A number of factors, including the possible gains from a use of force, the reaction from the external international order and the internal domestic community, the cost to the rest of the hegemon's projects, and the danger of upsetting the stability of order, all may be taken into account. However, as noted above, the hegemon rarely has the luxury of foresight. Often what appears to be a quick enforcement of the order can become a bog in which the power of the hegemonic state is threatened. The Boer War for Great Britain helped to bookend the 19th century as well as the decline of British hegemony. The Vietnam War in the 1960s and 1970s served as a quagmire that haunted US domestic and foreign politics for the next 35 years. War is where hegemons are both born and die. A prolonged war

¹⁷¹ Jesse and Williams, p. 16

¹⁷² Jesse and Williams, p. 17

resulting from a simple use of force is perhaps the greatest risk that a hegemon takes when it embarks on the use of force. Even a victory may leave the hegemonic state so drained as to hasten its decline.

Walt notes that many post-9/11 U.S. policies graphically demonstrate the limitations of hegemony. First, massive spending shows that U.S. foreign policy is not cost-free¹⁷³. The freedom of action and the lack of sacrifices gave the U.S. a fairly free hand in acting out foreign policy immediately after the end of the Cold War. The low casualty to success ratio of the First Gulf War combined with the low number of soldiers killed in Panama, Haiti, Somalia, Bosnia, and Kosovo gave the US a sense of hubris¹⁷⁴. The attacks on New York graphically portrayed the price for the global engagement of American forces. The economic growth, successful humanitarian and military intervention, and status as the sole superpower meant little in the long run; al-Qaeda had proven that American soil was indeed vulnerable. Walt's first lesson is that America can no longer assume that it can wield global influence at little or no cost to itself¹⁷⁵. He also notes that we must discard the notion popular in the U.S. that America represents a "shining city on the hill" that other societies admire. Indeed, the September 11th attacks showed that much of the world views the U.S. with ambivalence. International support for the U.S. was widespread in the wake of the attacks, but not unanimous. As the invasion of Iraq demonstrates, there is a limit on the amount of sympathy for the

¹⁷³ Walt, Stephen, "Beyond bin Laden: Reshaping US Foreign Policy" in *International Security*, Vol. 26, No.3. (Winter, 2001-2002), pp. 56-78.

¹⁷⁴ Walt, "Beyond bin Laden...", p. 58-59

¹⁷⁵ Walt, "Beyond bin Laden...", p. 59

American cause¹⁷⁶. The second lesson is that America must be prepared to listen to its allies and pay close attention to who really is the enemy. Not every state is willing to follow the “shining city on the hill.” Finally, Walt argues that the United States cannot “go it alone”¹⁷⁷. The amount of international support needed in the aftermath of September 11th was enormous, including access to foreign territory, use of foreign airspace: enduring and extensive support of other countries (especially to attack far flung terrorist networks) is needed¹⁷⁸. The hegemon alone cannot succeed. Instead, the entire order needs to be co-opted into the effort. The danger is that the effort will drag on for too long, thus jeopardizing international support. As the seventh year from the attacks on New York is entered this lesson is playing out dramatically over the Iraqi conflict and the prolonged fighting in Afghanistan.

As a hegemon reaches the limits of its power, the malcontent subordinate states begin to arise. Either the hegemon (the US) is unable to make followers of the subordinate states, as in the case of France and Germany, or the national goals of the subordinates‘ conflict directly with those of the hegemon (e.g., in a current case, Iran and its bid to build a nuclear reactor). A malcontent will seek to test the limitations of the hegemon. In many cases this will fail as the malcontent underestimates the hegemon and/or overestimates its own power. In some cases the order will be enforced and hegemony maintained. If the malcontent succeeds in its exercise the hegemon will be forced to respond in order to maintain its power. If power is not restored than the

¹⁷⁶ Walt, “Beyond bin Laden...”, p. 61

¹⁷⁷ Walt, “Beyond bin Laden...”, p. 63

¹⁷⁸ Walt, “Beyond bin Laden...” p. 63

weakness of the hegemonic state has been demonstrated and the inevitable decline has set in.

Three Types of Malcontent

The three following types of malcontent, benign, revolutionary, and passive-aggressive, have been noted previously but in this section they will be discussed about in far greater detail. Categorizing the malcontent will help to demonstrate the crossroads that mark the limitation of the hegemonic order. Malcontents will arise at all the stages of the life cycle of hegemony. Only when the hegemon is weak will the malcontent succeed in the goal they have embarked on. These goals differ drastically, from merely opting out of a policy they consider ruinous to foreign policy endeavors to ambitions of regional power and the acquisition of nuclear weapons. Each type of malcontent will have an established framework for which to evaluate it. Some of this framework will be similar from type to type. Other points of the framework will differ to highlight the differing paths each type will follow. For each model of malcontent I have outlined several points to help frame the malcontent's methods and reasons for going against the order. Each framework is followed by a relevant example of malcontent to illustrate in reality how the theory works.

The state has always been a primary focus within international relations theory. While the state is the primary focus of the three types of malcontents the non-state

groups, like terrorist organizations and nationalist movements, are just as important. Nationalism is the conviction that the national and political unit should be congruent¹⁷⁹. Terrorist organizations aim to spread murder, assassination, sabotage and subversion, the destruction of public records, the spreading of rumor, the closing of churches and other actions which contribute to a common end; the propagation of fear¹⁸⁰. Groups that can be defined by the above represent malcontents that can fit into the typology below. Terrorist organizations like al-Qaeda are not malcontents; instead they seek to overthrow the hegemon completely. We can look to groups dedicated to terrorism such as the Black Hand, which played a part in the start of the First World War with the assassination to Archduke Franz Ferdinand for an example of a non-state malcontent, albeit one pre-disposed to methods of violence to achieve its aim of throwing off Austrian rule. The wave of nationalism during the Yugoslav civil war is another example of malcontents trying to rid themselves of outside hegemonic influence, in this case the Serbs against America and Europe. After 9/11 there was a fresh recognition of non-state groups and the potential they have to throw off the rule of the hegemon. While such problems had existed since the start of the previous century the attack on the American mainland highlighted the existence of such threats to the hegemonic order. Even if a terrorist organization or national group seeks only to rid itself of hegemonic influence the methods they utilize will place them uncomfortable next to organizations like al-Qaeda.

¹⁷⁹ Gellner, Ernest, "Nations and Nationalism" in Betts, Richard, editor, *Conflict after the Cold War: Arguments on Causes of War and Peace*, Macmillan, New York, 1994, pp. 280-292.

¹⁸⁰ Jenkins, Brian, "International Terrorism" in Art, Robert and Waltz, Kenneth, editors, *The Use of Force: Military Power and International Politics*, Rowman and Littlefield, New York, 1999, pp. 70-77.

Such placement will negatively affect the outcome of any organization or group, no matter the goal.

There are three types of malcontents: benign, revolutionary, and passive-aggressive. Each is unique in the way they approach the objective of pursuing purely national goals free of hegemonic interference. The benign uses the soft-balancing tactics of diplomacy, economic means, and institutional paths (like the United Nations). The revolutionary will employ means that verge on violence and hostile negotiations. The passive-aggressive will appear to accept the hegemon but will also undertake its own agenda when it feels it can get away with it. The next section deals with the three types of malcontents, each laid out around a framework to better understand their motives and means to act away from the hegemon.

Ceasing to Follow: The Benign Malcontent

Benign malcontents employ methods against the hegemon that generally rely on soft balancing techniques including diplomacy and action through international institutions. Most often cast in the role of follower the benign type supports the hegemon, as the order is beneficial to the politics, economics and security of the nation or state. During the peak of hegemony the subordinate states follow because they have an investment in the order they are part of. Do not take this to mean that this type will blindly follow the hegemon on expeditions that are potentially ruinous. This is precisely the point where the benign

malcontent is born. There comes an intersection where the demands of working with the hegemon will conflict with the self-interest of the individual state. As the hegemon embarks on endeavors that promise little and entail high risk, the benign malcontent will begin their attempts at restraining the hegemonic state's actions. They do not want to destroy the order but seek to bring the order back the equilibrium that benefits all, not just one.

Benign malcontents cease to follow the hegemon but not the order it exists in. The hegemonic order provides benefit and the benign states see the hegemon as threatening the stability of the order and their own national goals. These malcontents are bound to the hegemon in such a way that soft balancing will be seen as the only option. The war of words and diplomatic maneuvers can and will become heated, but there is little or no risk of actual military power or even the tactics of hard balancing. The benign malcontent is a self-interested state; its identity is closely tied to the order in which it participates, even if that order is going in a direction that the malcontent disagrees with.

In order to analyze the benign malcontent we must first establish a framework. This framework must take into account the means by which benign malcontents work against the wishes of the hegemonic state while still maintaining the order itself. Benign malcontents are often hegemonic followers who have chosen to not follow the leader in an effort to not only preserve the order in which they exist but also to exercise a purely national goal they may have.

1. Soft balancing as a means to restrain the hegemon

Benign malcontents do not seek to utilize hard balancing methods against the hegemonic state. Through diplomacy, no matter the tone, and the use of international institutions the benign malcontent will try to restore the balance of the hegemonic order. The benign malcontent sees the hegemonic order going in a direction that will hurt their national goals. The exchange is decidedly asymmetrical in that the benign malcontent, while regionally powerful, is often not able to muster enough strength to convince the hegemon to heel to the order wide vision.

2. A decline of state resources relative to the state's expenses and commitments.

As the resources of the hegemon decline the benign malcontent will begin to pick up a greater part of the expense and commitment. As the closest type of malcontent to the hegemonic state the benign malcontent will have not only bear a greater part of the burden but also a larger stake in the well being of the order. Along with such obligations comes a greater sense of entitlement, not necessarily a sharing of power but a greater piece of the hegemonic pie. This includes a certain freedom of action that may not be in the best interests of the hegemonic state.

3. Hegemonic alienation that sees the closest of allies begin to drift apart in the goals they seek for their participation in the order.

The vision that the hegemon has for the order and the vision that the benign malcontent has may be two very different things. A change in strategic goals, economic

problems and recognition of new political realities may see a divide between the hegemon and its most powerful allies within the order. The benign malcontent is not able to increase their influence over the hegemon and consequently is unable to affect its behavior. The prestige that the hegemon enjoyed is waning, but the prestige for the benign malcontent is also not increasing, keeping the relationship asymmetrical. The system as it stands, however, is stable. Thus the benign malcontent seeks to keep it stable, even if this means going against the hegemon itself.

4. Alienation will not go so far as to see a break between malcontent and hegemon

This point is important for the benign malcontent. While they may feel alienated and disgruntled the benign malcontent will not seek to totally break from the order they are a part of. The benign malcontent has too much invested and derives positive benefit from their participation. Being involved in a network of trade agreements, defensive alliances, and other beneficial arrangements, the benign malcontent wants to ensure that the order survives. Consequently they seek to balance out the actions they perceive as harmful.

5. Elites within the order share experiences

The political elites still share the similar vision that convinced them to buy into the hegemony in the first place. Whether this vision is of democracy, capitalism or free trade matters not, the fact is that they are still invested in the order. The idea of culture as a collective good plays an important aspect in this regards. The culture of the hegemon

imparts a bit of civil society into the order. Culture is an element that makes states identify positively with the hegemon. Benign malcontents are more deeply ensconced with this culture, in some cases they share multiple aspects of it, thus making it more difficult to fully break with the hegemonic order. Political elites not only buy into the culture but also are co-opted by institutions, money and a shared vision. Even in benign malcontents the vision is similar but the paths to attain it are radically different.

The states of Western Europe, post Second World War, provide an example of the benign malcontent and how they oppose the hegemon. Not all comparable states are in agreement with the benign malcontent. In Western Europe's case many new prospective entrants since 2000 into the European Union were Eastern European states who fully supported what the US was doing in regards to actions like the Iraq war of 2003. This had the potential to create problems in the region. The institutions that the benign malcontents and the followers of the order built have created a link that is incredibly difficult to break.

Will a benign malcontent seek to overthrow the hegemonic state and assume the lead? Perhaps, but the most important question is if their power potential match the goals they have set for themselves¹⁸¹. Neither France nor Germany possesses the ability to achieve such a thing, even if they had any sort of goal to ascend to such a role.

Hypothetically the European Union could become a hegemonic power. The United States would have to admit that its power had declined to such a point that a symmetrical power

¹⁸¹ Keohane, p. 31

relationship with its European partners would be the only way to maintain the order. Such questions on the nature of the future are reserved for chapter four.

The Cold War in Europe: How Europe Became Malcontented

The United States never really wanted to become the dominant force in Europe in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War. The Atlantic Charter represents what the Roosevelt administration was aiming for after the war, namely self-determination, economic multilateralism, and collective security in the face of a possibility of a return to isolationism¹⁸². However by 1947 it was obvious that Great Britain was no longer the Empire it had been in previous decades. Two world wars had drained Britain of first the ability and finally the will to enforce the hegemonic order it had once possessed. Instead of a partnership of Anglo-Americans stretching across the Atlantic, as Churchill had hoped for, the stark reality was one of America reaching out to a war-torn and bankrupt Europe. With Britain withdrawing from her commitments in the Eastern Mediterranean there was little doubt that if the Soviet Union was to be kept in check the US would have to step in and take over where Britain had left off¹⁸³.

By 1946 there were rumblings among many foreign policy specialists about the inevitable division in Europe between the Soviets and the West, led by the United States.

¹⁸² Gaddis, John, "The United States and Europe, 1945-1952" in *The Cold War in Europe: Era of a Divided Continent*, Charles S. Maier, editor, pp. 107-142. p. 112

¹⁸³ Reynolds, David, *One World Divisible: A Global History Since 1945*, W.W. Norton and Company, New York, 2000. p. 28

There was still hope that the situation could be resolved, but the Soviets would have to be convinced that indeed, two systems could co-exist peacefully in Europe¹⁸⁴. The Americans had tried to hold off forming a sphere of influence and tried to get the USSR to do the same. This failed, and the involvement that the US had begun in the Mediterranean began to solidify into something else, something far grander than any isolationist could have predicted before the war. Two major American initiatives began to take shape in 1947: the Truman doctrine and the Marshall plan. Both were at the forefront of American involvement in Europe.

The Truman doctrine took a cue from Churchill; essentially that the world was divided into black and white, democracy versus totalitarianism¹⁸⁵. The United States did not want to risk open war with the Soviets. Instead the Americans bet that the Soviets would not go to war again and embarked on what can best be described as the very essence of a hegemon; the economic revitalization of Western Europe through the Marshall Plan¹⁸⁶. The US could not hope to maintain any sort of balance of power scenario with the Soviets on its own. The de-mobilization of US forces following the Second World War Europe as well as extensive commitments around the world helped to limit the strength of the US in Europe. Rebuilding Western Europe was seen as an important strategy in keeping the Soviets at bay. Europe was a primary focus of this and consequently seen as the best use of limited resources. American planners saw economic

¹⁸⁴ Gaddis, p. 113

¹⁸⁵ Reynolds, p. 28

¹⁸⁶ Reynolds, p. 28

means as not only a quick method, but also the most effective method of strengthening Europe¹⁸⁷.

There would be no American Empire in Europe. Instead the emphasis was placed on the creation of an independent center of power on the continent capable of maintaining equilibrium without American intervention¹⁸⁸. However, the presence of the Americans was very much welcomed by their hosts, they had been essentially invited into Europe and the Near East and most states were quite happy they were there. Secretary of State George Marshall called this American attitude “enlightened self-interest”¹⁸⁹. In some ways the creation of a hegemonic order in Europe came from the bottom; people who welcomed the support of the United States. The seeds for European integration were also being sown with France and Germany as the center for a United Europe that could stand equal with America against the Soviet threat. However such intentions would remain just that for sometime, as such visions were overwhelmed by policy influenced by reality.

The year 1949 saw America deepen its involvement in Europe. The Berlin airlift prompted a renewed commitment to American participation in European security. The birth of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO, stems directly from the crisis that perpetrated the Berlin airlift and the need for not only an effective deterrence against the Soviet threat but also interests against renewed German aggression and American guarantees to France that military assistance would be forthcoming¹⁹⁰. The choice to resurrect Germany was a controversial one. There was little desire to see Germany

¹⁸⁷ Gaddis, p. 117

¹⁸⁸ Gaddis, p. 118

¹⁸⁹ Gaddis, p. 118

¹⁹⁰ Reynolds, p. 33

dominate any sort of unified Europe, but the idea to balance Germany with Great Britain died as the extent of British weaknesses at home and abroad began to play out¹⁹¹. The special relationship between Britain and the United States combined with British reluctance to take part in European affairs helped to separate them from the rest of Europe early on.

The early history of American involvement in Europe helps to paint a picture as to the extent of cooperation between the Atlantic. While America at first eschewed any sort of “sphere of interest” this changed as the extent of Soviet policy became clear. The important part of this is the invitation that Western Europe extended to the United States to participate in the security of the continent¹⁹². The US wanted to build Europe so as to provide equilibrium in the balance of power. Europe wanted increased American military participation in addition to extensive economic aid. The use of material incentives combined with the projection of norms that emphasized economic multilateralism through both external inducement and internal reconstruction helped to entrench the US in the affairs of Europe in the immediate postwar years¹⁹³.

Western Europe’s weakness at the end of the Second World War helped to ease the adaptation of the norms that flowed in along with the money of the Marshall Plan. The right and left wing parties within Britain, France and Italy were weakened by the economic recovery that took place. Instead strong centrist coalitions helped to make for

¹⁹¹ Gaddis, p. 129

¹⁹² Lundestad, Geir, “Empire by Invitation? The United States and Western Europe, 1945-1952” in *The Cold War in Europe: Era of a Divided Continent*, Charles S. Maier, editor, pp. 143-165

¹⁹³ Ikenberry, G. John and Charles Kupchan, “Socialization and Hegemonic Power” in *International Organization*, Vol. 44, No. 3. (Summer, 1990), pp. 283-315.

what Ikenberry calls the normative consensus about the terms of the postwar order¹⁹⁴. Much of the power that the US wielded in post-war Europe was based on this social distribution of norms. The aftermath of the Second World War saw America articulate a set of norms and political conditions that were closely tied to the economic rebuilding and coalition formation within Western Europe¹⁹⁵.

The “enlightened self interest” that the United States displayed in Western Europe came about because of the Soviet threat. Without the need to balance against the Soviet Union the United States would have, most likely, taken a far less important role in European politics after the war. With strong isolationist elements in Congress as well as Truman’s desire to stay out of Europe initially, without the Soviets the postwar reconstruction may have gone very differently, perhaps the same way the Wilsonian project after the First World War failed with the defeat of the League of Nations in the US Senate. This leads to the era after the Cold War, when the need to balance in Europe disappeared along with the Soviet threat in the early 1990s. The order that the US had established and nurtured was missing the Soviet threat, the same threat that had helped, in part, to drive the US participation in European politics.

The Soviet Union and the cold war were the glue that bonded the allies on both sides of the Atlantic together¹⁹⁶. Three unifying elements held the US and Europe together, (1) the Soviet threat, (2) the American stake in the European economy, and (3)

¹⁹⁴ Ikenberry, —Socialization and Hegemonic Power...” p. 303

¹⁹⁵ Ikenberry, —Socialization and Hegemonic Power...” p. 314

¹⁹⁶ Beeson, Mark, —Resisting Hegemony: The Sources of Anti-Americanism in Southeast Asia”, Paper for *The workshop on Globalization, Conflict and Political Regimes in East and Southeast Asia*, August 15th-16th, 2003, Freemantle Washington.

the generation of political elites that had developed the habit of working together in a common endeavor¹⁹⁷. These elements were experiencing a change in the aftermath of the Cold War and this would change the way that the US and Europe behaved towards each other. In the absence of a common enemy many scholars began to talk about a divorce of sorts between Continental Europe and the United States¹⁹⁸. Some talked further about a return to a multipolar environment where the individual European states would play the old style game of geopolitics¹⁹⁹. The idea of a united Europe seemed like a possibility that could very well come to fruition in the aftermath of the cold war²⁰⁰. However the inability of the Europeans to define security and defense hurt the attempts to solve the Yugoslavian crisis in 1991-92 and led to a greater sense that Europe was not ready to look after its own problems. There was still a gulf between national interests and collective interests and this led to an open role that the United States could still fill, even in a reduced capacity, as it seemed in the 1990s. The Europeans were still followers to a lead taken by the hegemonic US; defense spending from the latter equaled twice the total of the European allies combined in 1992²⁰¹. By 2000 the differences in defense spending had scarcely improved with Europe supplying only one-third of NATO's equipment and

¹⁹⁷ Walt, Stephen, "The Ties that Fray" in *The National Interest*, Vol. 54, (Winter 1998-1999).

¹⁹⁸ Daalder, Ivo, "Are the United States and Europe Heading for Divorce?" in *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-)*, Vol. 77, No. 3, Changing Patterns of European Security and Defence. (Jul., Heisburg, Francois, "The European-US Alliance: Valedictory Reflections on Continental Drift in the Post Cold-War Era" in *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-)*, Vol. 68, No. 4. (Oct., 1992), pp. 665-678; Nye, Joseph S., "The US and Europe: Continental Drift?" in *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-)*, Vol. 76, No. 1. (Jan., 2000), pp. 51-59.

¹⁹⁹ Mearshiner, John J., "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War" in *International Security*, Vol. 15, No. 1. (Summer, 1990), pp. 5-56.

²⁰⁰ Daalder, p. 666

²⁰¹ Daalder, p. 672.

only one-sixth of its military research and development²⁰². Even with increased European unity the Americans would play an important role in security and defense for many years simply because of the material it was able to bring to any coalition arrangement.

As viewed at the turn of the millennium the relationship that stretched across the Atlantic was still trying to define itself against the post-Cold War world. Several difficulties were set to cause problems in US-European relations, among them an increasing occupation with domestic issues, economic friction, cultural differences in US/European thinking (among them capitalism versus social welfare), confusion in the creation and execution of foreign policy because of systematic differences, and the danger of US unilateralism that sought to introduce policy with extraterritorial effects that paid less attention to concerns among allied nations²⁰³. These problems could be worked through though in most respects. It is not to say that Europe would automatically follow America's lead but as long as the model of leadership and followership were kept the possibility of continued cooperation was certain²⁰⁴. The prestige that the United States had once enjoyed in Western Europe was wearing off and to keep the allies on board required a good bit more work than during the Cold War.

Then September 11th, 2001 dawned and while the United States cleaned up the disaster domestically it began to assemble a coalition that would hunt down the perpetrators of the attacks and any states that would harbor them. The honeymoon period of coalition warfare began to wear off as the United States began to repeat the Truman

²⁰² Nye, *The US and Europe: Continental Drift?*, p. 57

²⁰³ Nye, *The US and Europe: Continental Drift?*, p. 57

²⁰⁴ Jesse, Neal and Kristen Williams, "The Leader can't Lead when the Followers Don't Follow: The Limitations of Hegemony"...

Doctrine in defining the world in black and white, the terrorists (and those who harbor them) versus the free peoples of the world. Under the Bush Administration the United States would push the idea of unilateral action even further than the Clinton Presidency had pushed the concept with Kosovo, Somalia and other interventions. While the honeymoon period in the immediate aftermath of the September 11th attacks saw unprecedented cooperation between Europe and the US the calls for a coalition to enforce the preemption strategy began an alienation of Europe from America.

Some have argued that the United States does not need Europe at all in the waging of a war against terrorists and associated states²⁰⁵. The differences between the two cultures have opened up into a wider gulf than ever before. The United States had turned to states branded as “evil” as replacements for hard to catch terrorists²⁰⁶. This assertion may be controversial but proves a point: that there is a fundamental disconnect between the hegemonic US and the allies in Europe who were once regarded as indispensable. Europe will not realize itself as counter-hegemony against America²⁰⁷. Instead the nation-states of Europe have remained allies of the US while attempting to balance policies and strategies they see as dangerous to the international order that they have a stake in.

As benign malcontents the states of Western Europe, most notably France and Germany, conducted soft balancing against the US invasion of Iraq. France, under

²⁰⁵ Kagan, Robert, *Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order*, Vintage Books, New York, 2004.

²⁰⁶ Barber, Benjamin, *Fear's Empire: War, Terrorism, and Democracy*, W.W. Norton and Company, New York, 2004.

²⁰⁷ Ferguson, *Colossus...*

Jacques Chirac, embarked on a campaign against the US effort to assemble an anti-Iraq coalition while Germany, who held the United Nations Security Council rotating chair, engaged in an effort to block the Anglo-Spanish-US resolution against Iraq²⁰⁸. The warfare between Germany and the US were merely rhetoric, including Donald Rumsfeld's comparison of Germany to Cuba and Libya²⁰⁹. Several European states, including the "NATO eight" (Britain, Italy, the Czech Republic, Hungary, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, and Spain) and later a group of ten aspiring NATO members all located in Eastern Europe supported the resolution and the US effort. France and Germany would not use violence or threats of violence. Indeed, they possessed a stake in the international order, an order they were trying to balance out. Economically and politically both states possessed a measure of power that could realistically provide a balance to the preemptive aspirations of the United States in regards to Iraq.

While France and Germany may not be able to openly challenge the United States' hegemonic status they can certainly provide a balance that may encourage the US to soften its approach to the war on terror. The radical switch in the United States' strategy from deterrence to preemption has caused a crisis of direction for many long-term allies of the US. Under the Bush Presidency the US is quite prepared to use its overwhelming strategic superiority in an attempt to impose its preferred vision of the world²¹⁰. The vision that both the US and Europe share of getting rid of militarist terrorists still exists. The Europeans and the US must realize that to maintain the desired

²⁰⁸ Pauly and Lansford, *Strategic Preemption...*, p. 99

²⁰⁹ Pauly and Lansford, *Strategic Preemption...*p. 99

²¹⁰ Beeson, p. 4

outcome it is necessary to keep a compatible international system where these goals can be pursued²¹¹. Both sides need to understand the realities of the situation; the international community needs American support so as to not be rendered impotent and American needs to realize that going it alone will open up US property and citizens as primary targets of terrorists²¹². Here the framework on benign malcontents to applied to the European benign example:

1. Soft balancing as a means to restrain the hegemon

For Europe this has become a primary means by which to restrict the United States. The use of diplomacy, economic sanctions, and institutional methods (like NATO and the UN) are all examples of how Europe tries to restrict the actions of the hegemon. There is little other choice, Western Europe and American are still closely tied together and pursuing balancing through means other than force is the norm.

2. A decline of state resources relative to the state's expenses and commitments.

The decline of American hegemony has seen the states of Western Europe pick up more responsibility. The strong European commitment to Afghanistan is perhaps one of the best examples of European penetration in areas that would not have seen such involvement two decades ago. As other commitments and expenses take their toll on American hegemony, notably Iraq, Europe will have to step in to fill the gap.

²¹¹ Russett, Bruce, "The Mysterious Case of Vanishing Hegemony; or, is Mark Twain really Dead?" in *International Organization*, Vol. 39, No. 2, (Spring, 1985), pp. 207-231.

²¹² Dhanrajgir, Nikhil and Fortman, Bas de Gaay, "From Dissociated Hegemony towards Embedded Hegemony" in *ISYP Journal on Science and World Affairs*, Vol. 1, No. 2, 2005, pp. 123-131. p. 130

3. Hegemonic alienation that sees the closest of allies start to drift apart in the goals they seek for their participation in the order.

With the Soviet threat to Europe gone the unitary vision that the US and Europe possessed has changed. Europe seeks to work with much of the third world and while the commitment to the war on terror is no less vocal than the United States the means to accomplish it has caused a rift. This rift is indicative of many aspects of Europe-American policy disagreements. No longer is Western Europe dependant on the US for military and economic support. The equal status that the partners now have has led to diverging approaches to the structure of the international order.

4. Alienation will not go so far as to see a break between malcontent and hegemon

While America and Western Europe may experience alienation from each other over a multitude of issues the fact remains that economically and politically the ties remain very close.

5. Elites within the order share experiences

Differences such as the socialist leanings of many Western European Governments and the United States have done little to alienate the elites. For all the apparent differences in government, at heart both Europe and the US are capitalist democracies with common elements in culture that allow elites within the system to engage in a dialogue that will make any break far harder to engineer.

Fighting Against Oppression: The Revolutionary Malcontent

The term —sham independence” originates from Kwame Nkrumah’s work *Handbook of Revolutionary Warfare* and describes what he believes:

A state can said to be a neo-colonialist or client state if it is independent de jure and dependant de facto. It is a state where political power lies in the conservative forces of the former colony and where economic power remains under control of international financial capital²¹³.

Nkrumah espouses the same ideas revolutionaries across time have, that of exploitation of smaller groups by their larger neighbors. Lenin’s concept of Imperialism represents the early application of such revolutionary belief. Lenin wrote of capitalists reaching beyond their own borders to exploit the workers and peasants in less developed states²¹⁴. For the average revolutionary, however, the enemy is the political elite and the foreigners who are seen as exploitive and gluttonous in the face of poverty and oppression. Nkrumah’s particular brand of revolution was directed at Africa and the neo-colonialism that he saw taking place in the 1960s. On the face of it Africa was independent but, as put by Nkrumah, was tied to a —sham-independence” that was just another method of control by European Colonial powers.

Even though hegemony is based on consent, such a concept is rarely accepted universally on the international stage. There will always be states, or non-state groups,

²¹³ Nkrumah, Kwame, *Handbook of Revolutionary Warfare: A Guide to the Armed Phase of the African Revolution*, International Publishers, New York, 1969. p.8

²¹⁴ Pollitt, Harry, editor, *Lenin on Britain: A Compilation*, Lawrence and Wishart, London, 1941. p. 23

who do not wish to offer their consent to the order but inevitably must bow to it. They do not have the strength to break out from beyond the reach of the hegemon to exercise their own national goals. The hegemonic state perhaps considers these malcontents important to the order in some way, as a holder of an important resource or a strategic position that must be maintained and defended. A revolutionary malcontent wants to break out from under the thumb of the hegemon and is willing to utilize whatever means necessary to do it, including violence.

Taking a cue from revolutionary theory we can outline a general theory of how these malcontents seek to pursue their goals against the hegemonic order. Revolutionary malcontents exist throughout the time of a hegemon but will begin to see the fruit of their labor pay off best as the hegemon enters into a decline. Goldstone has established an analytical framework for revolutions that will help to establish the same for revolutionary malcontents²¹⁵. I have used Goldstone to construct a framework for the revolutionary malcontent type. The following numbered paragraphs are adapted from Goldstone's analytical framework.

1. A decline of state resources relative to the state's expenses and commitments.

During the peak of hegemony it is easier to enforce the order. Through political and economic pressure the hegemon can impose the order it has created. Sanctions on the malcontent's exports, restrictions on needed imports and monetary aid can be used as both carrot and stick to entice the malcontent to the party line. As the fortunes of the

²¹⁵ Jack Goldstone, —An Analytical Framework” in *Revolution: International Dimensions*, Mark N. Katz, editor, CQ Press, New York, 2001, pp. 9-30.

hegemonic state decline it may find itself unable influence malcontented states with promises of economic sanctions and military aid.

2. Hegemonic Alienation: Alienation from the hegemonic state creates resistance to the need for new state revenues and institutional reforms, thus blocking recovery of the order.

The goals of the hegemon and malcontent differ precisely because the hegemon is concerned about not only the good of the order but also the success of the hegemonic state. The hegemon is alienated from the needs and problems of the revolutionary malcontent, thus creating an atmosphere where any varied means of resistance will be used to exercise the national regional goals of the malcontented state.

3. Popular mass mobilization potential: States and non-state groups with grievances stemming from economic and political issues will mobilize into a bloc against the hegemonic state and possibly the entire order.

If one malcontent exists, the possibility of another coming to light is high. These malcontents will be able to perhaps form a friendship based on their mutual dislike of the hegemonic order. Cuba, for example, sent support in the form of men, aid and material (supplied by the Soviets) to revolutionary Africa in the 1970s, helping to propagate a communist revolution. During the early 21st century several states, among them Venezuela, Cuba and Iran, formed friendships based on their malcontent status, mobilizing into a loose coalition that the United States was forced to contend with.

4. States undergoing internal revolution will often externalize it²¹⁶.

Throughout history states undergoing internal revolutions will externalize against threats or perceived threats. The Iranian hostage crisis was a strike against the United States after the 1979 overthrow of the Shah, for example. The Chinese entry into the Korean conflict in 1951 was prompted by a perceived threat to their border from forces of the United Nations and South Korea. Revolutionary malcontents are most dangerous when they undergo internal revolution. As the bonds of the former government are thrown off the possibility is there that the newly revolutionary state will seek to exercise foreign policy free of the supposed oppressive international regime as well.

5. Revolutionary malcontents are often the most politically marginalized and excluded groups or states within the order.

The states that can be defined as malcontents, like Iran after 1979, Cuba after 1959, the Boer republics in the later 19th century and North Korea after 1945 all had been marginalized by the order they existed under. Marginalization leads to actions like internal revolution and exercise of options best in the national interest versus hegemonic interest that prompted a response by the hegemon to restore the order to the malcontent. In some cases force was used (Boer war, the Korean conflict) in other cases economic and political strength was used to attempt to resolve the situation (Iran and Cuba). None

²¹⁶ Walt, —“Theory of Revolution...”, p. 41 and Snyder, Robert S., —“The U.S. and Third World Revolutionary States: Understanding the Breakdown in Relations” in *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 43, No. 2. (Jun., 1999), pp. 265-290, p. 269

of the examples used ended in a clean win for the order and indeed three of the four still represent current issues for the United States.

6. The pursuit of goals thought essential to the national self-interest are denied by the hegemonic order.

As a self-interested state with few ties to the hegemonic order, the revolutionary malcontent will seek to pursue goals that satisfy that interest. These goals do not sync with the good of the order, like the acquisition of nuclear weapons, for example, by a state such as Iran. If the state fits within the above framework then it is willing to test the hegemon over the issue. The hegemon's response is essential in the determination of the future of the order.

Revolutionary malcontents can exist even at the height of a hegemon's strength. Cuba, for example, succeeded in its internal revolution and began to externalize against the US as objections were raised concerning the nationalizing of American owned assets. The Bay of Pigs invasion marked a failure of the hegemon to restore the order and consequently the US had to contend with a malcontent that not only would not heel to the demands of the hegemonic state but was also aided by a counter-hegemonic force, in Cuba's case the Soviet Union who saw Cuba as a forward base of operations. This frame of mind led directly to the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1963. As Cuba demonstrates there is no set method of dealing with revolutionary malcontents. If the carrot and stick method fails the next logical step will be to utilize physical force.

The revolutionary malcontent rejects the civil society of the hegemon, the same civil society that ties the benign malcontent so tightly to the hegemonic state. Today we see a distinct entity in the democratic west. While cultural differences do manifest themselves Western Europe, the United States, and Canada all share a similar civil society. This civil society has been adapted in bits and pieces, and some whole parts, by other regions of the world as well, like Eastern Europe. However revolutionary malcontents like Iran actively seek to distance themselves from what they regard as a suffocating environment. Internal revolutions bring a nationalist ideal and when internal revolutions externalize this nationalism will revolt against the civil society of the hegemonic order.

Many states that will fit the revolutionary malcontent classification were established by Western powers and saw their culture and civil society highly penetrated by them as well²¹⁷. Robert Snyder makes a hypothesis that perhaps helps us to understand the revolutionary malcontent a little better. He theorizes that revolutionary states take defensive steps after a hegemon (in this particular case, the US) initiates an action that is perceived as potentially threatening or in anticipation of aggression in the near future²¹⁸. The foreign policy of the revolutionary malcontent is concerned with purging the influence of the hegemonic power as well as engaging in state building by externalizing the internal conflict. The hegemon is seen as a looming threat and anything the malcontent can do to shore up against this threat will be undertaken.

²¹⁷ Snyder, p. 270

²¹⁸ Snyder, p. 269

Since the Second World War the US has seemingly resisted responding immediately to the hostility shown by revolutionary states, like Cuba and Iran. Instead it was only a move that directly affect US interests, like the taking of the US embassy in Iran or the Cuban missile crisis that prompted an American reaction²¹⁹. Great Britain acted much the same in the months previous to the Second Boer War, preferring private intrigue to official sanction. The Boer republics did everything in their power to sidestep the British presence in South Africa; this ultimately led to open war, a war that highlighted the beginning of the end for the British Empire.

The Second Boer War

The Boers had originally come to South Africa from The Netherlands and as descendants of the original Dutch they maintained an enthusiastic independence that Britain, who had taken over governance of South Africa in 1806, found hard to reconcile. Attempts by the British to impose their rule on the Boers (especially the emancipation of slaves) led to what the Boers called –“The Great Trek” which took them North and saw the establishment of two Republics, The Transvaal and The Orange Free State. Despite a nominal independence granted by the British the two Boer states would be subjected to ever greater scrutiny by the British Colonial Government, culminating in the attempt to annex the Transvaal in 1880. The First Boer War was a failure for the British and the two

²¹⁹ Snyder, p. 273

Boer Republics regained their nominal independence. The discovery of gold and diamonds led to a wave of British colonization north of the two Boer states; the Boers also benefited from the discovery of gold. The Boers began to receive more and more attention, first from British colonists who were swept northward in the gold rush but also British officials who began to covet the rich lands occupied by the Boers. Men like Cecil Rhodes and his contemporaries saw the Boer republics as barriers to furthering their own wealth and power. The non-Boers in the Republics were deprived of rights, yet subject to taxes and conscription. The British government saw the same republics as a thorn in the side of the colony in South Africa, a thorn that grew larger each day as the wealthy republics flaunted their independence more and more. As well the British wanted to secure just and fair treatment for the British gold hunters. Clearly the situation would not stand for long and hence the underpinnings of the Second Boer War were laid.

The Second Boer War is a case of a hegemon asserting its control over a territory that has been deemed desirable but controlled by a small state. The small state in this case was surrounded by British territory and enjoyed the support of European countries that would like to see Britain's power checked, in the case of the Boers, Germany was a primary benefactor. The Boers called the British and other nationalities that attempted to make their fortune Uitlanders and it was the friction stemming from the gold-seeking Uitlanders and the independent Boers that brought the British government in. The Transvaal Republic was militarily the most powerful state in South Africa and the most troublesome for Cecil Rhodes and other British capitalists trying to cash in on the gold rush. It was with Rhodes that the Second Boer War would ultimately start. Though other

factors would come into play, most historians regard the Jameson Raid as the catalyst for the war, leading to the Transvaal's preemptive attack²²⁰.

The Jameson Raid was supposed to coincide with an uprising in the Transvaal by the Uitlanders and the two armed parties would bring to a boil the tensions in the Boer Republic, freeing the Uitlanders to exploit the gold and diamonds without the interference of the Boers. The plan was for Jameson and his men to meet the Uitlanders on the road to Johannesburg and together they would overthrow the Kruger regime and install a government that would grant more rights to the outside interests in the small country. Rhodes and other prominent British businessmen in the Transvaal felt that this way was the only way to be left to make money in peace. The Colonial Secretary, Joseph Chamberlain, was supposedly in the know as well, providing a wink and a nod to the scheme²²¹. The Jameson Raid was built around the majority of Rhodesian Mounted Police and was reasonably well armed with cannon, Maxim machine guns and other armament. What it lacked, however, was knowledge of what was happening in the capital of the Transvaal, Johannesburg. The president of the Transvaal, Paul Kruger, had made peace with the Uitlanders, a peace that restored stability to the Republic and his regime. Jameson would be riding into oblivion; there would be no uprising to greet him and no message to turn back. In his secrecy he had cut the telegraph wires, nobody, not even the

²²⁰ Blainey, G. —“The Causes of the Jameson Raid” in *The Economic History Review*, New Series, Vol. 18, No. 2. (1965), pp. 350-366; Buxton, Earl, —“The Jameson Raid”, *Journal of the Royal African Society*, Vol. 30, No. 119. (Apr., 1931), pp. 113-118; Makhura, Tlou John, —“Another Road to the Raid: The Neglected Role of the Boer-Bagananwa War As a Factor in the Coming of the Jameson Raid, 1894-1895”, *Journal of Southern African Studies*, Vol. 21, No.22 (Jun., 1995), pp. 257-267; Pakenham, Thomas, *The Boer War*, Avon Books, New York, 1979.

²²¹ Pakenham, p. xxvii; later research has shown that indeed Chamberlain was aware of what was going on, whether he approved of it is a bit cloudier.

one man Jameson answered to, Rhodes, would be able to rein him in. Five days later Jameson was in the gaol in Johannesburg and his dreams of success, or at least a heroic last stand, had been shattered by politics and the Boer commandoes.

Kruger was in a position to once more stand up to the British. He wanted full independence for his people and his Republic. Even the Orange Free State, the neighboring Boers, who had been friendly with the British, were put off by the raid and allied themselves closer with the Transvaal and Kruger. Paul Kruger was an old man but an old man that made it his life to maintain the independence of his people, first in 1881 when the British invaded and now in the face of a failed military raid and the subsequent pressure by the British to give rights to the Uitlanders. Britain was not exactly unanimous in support of the Uitlanders. Many regarded the whole deal as smacking of Imperialism and the gold-powered likes of Rhodes and his associates had helped to hang a brace of money-bags on the whole spectacle²²². The problems all fell into place though when Paul Kruger took the first step by issuing an ultimatum that demanded of Britain that it:

1. Agree to arbitration on ~~all~~ points of mutual difference”
2. The British troops on the borders of the Republic shall be instantly withdrawn
3. That all British reinforcements sent after 1 June 1898 be withdrawn
4. That Her Majesty’s Troops on the high seas not be landed at any South African Port.

²²² Parkenham, p. 113

The ultimatum would expire in 48 hours and if no compliance were to be had the Transvaal would regard such as a declaration of war and would take appropriate action²²³. In many ways David had just rather foolishly flung the first stone at Goliath.

The Boer Republics represent a revolutionary malcontent that took a preemptive step against the hegemon; probably not the best of ideas but something that was felt necessary. Having not suffered a defeat since 1848 the Boer Commandos, which were all male Boers of fighting age, went to war confident they could repeat the victory of 1881 where the Transvaal had originally secured its independence after a British invasion. The Boers had lost one man compared to the British losses of 92 at the final battle of the 1881 war. The ultimate British victory in 1902 came at a heavy cost amid both domestic and international outrage at the tactics employed, including the use of concentration camps to separate the commandoes from their base of support. By the end of the war the British had invested considerable resources to win the war including three thousand miles of blockhouses to protect lines of communications, heavy garrisons throughout South Africa, and nearly 250,000 troops²²⁴. Losses amongst both parties had been high, the British had suffered somewhere in realm of one hundred thousand casualties of which twenty-two thousand had died, while the Boer Commandoes had taken around 7,000 deaths²²⁵. These military figures do not take into account the thousands of Boer civilians who had died in British concentration camps, somewhere between 18,000 and 28,000.

²²³ Pakenham, p. 104

²²⁴ Pakenham, p. 596

²²⁵ Pakenham, p. 607

The war was a series of political mistakes on both sides. Rhodes and his fellow Uitlanders wanted freedom within the Transvaal to accumulate their profit. The British tried to drum up support through dubious claims of wrongs on the Uitlanders by the Boers. Jameson proved to be the ultimate mistake by the British as it hardened the resolve of Paul Kruger and kept him in power at a time when his political hand may have been overplayed. The British turned down chances to negotiate even when Kruger relented and offered a Reform Bill that would have averted the war²²⁶. Kruger, for his part, solved all the political problems the British may have had in going to war with his 48 hour ultimatum. Boer confidence and British obstinance ultimately brought the war on.

1. A decline of state resources relative to the state's expenses and commitments.

In the years prior to the Second Boer War little was spent on running the British Empire from an administrative standpoint. Indeed, Chamberlain's Colonial Office had around £600,000 to budget on the entire Empire²²⁷. The British had a history of sending too little to deal with a problem, suffering defeat then sending in the necessary resources to win. While the Empire as a whole was not on the decline not much attention was paid to it before the war. The Boers saw this and reasoned, reinforced by their previous successes, that they could win a true independence from British influence. Locally there was little in the way of state resources and the ability to present an effective "carrot and stick" approach was limited. The Boers had an advantage and they knew it.

²²⁶ Pakenham, p. 63

²²⁷ Pakenham, p. 610

2. Hegemonic Alienation: Alienation from the hegemonic state creates resistance to the need for new state revenues and institutional reforms, thus blocking recovery of the order.

The Boers had tried to extract themselves from the reach of British influence since the first great trek in the 1840s. The establishment of the Transvaal and Orange Free State as Boer Republics created a line, a line that the British disliked intensely. Uitlanders such as Cecil Rhodes wanted to exploit the wealth in the area free of outside influence. Boer treatment of the Uitlanders within their republics helped to strengthen the British case. The Jameson Raid was a direct result of the Boer retarding of British profits from the gold mine²²⁸. The Boers were well alienated from the British mainstream, men like Paul Kruger preferred to keep it like that and he had the support necessary within the Republic to uphold it. Policies like the dynamite monopoly gave revenue to French and German businesses and in turn provided the Transvaal with a willing source of support when war appeared to be on the horizon. The Boer Republics alienated themselves from the British and the British did likewise to the Boers.

3. Popular mass mobilization potential: States and non-state groups with grievances stemming from economic and political issues will mobilize into a bloc against the hegemonic state and possibly the entire order.

The Boers were not alone in their grievances against Britain. The support that Kruger received from Germany and France played a major part in allowing the Boers to

²²⁸ Blainey, p. 362

strengthen themselves for war²²⁹. While not a bloc of resistance against the British the international support the Boers received was instrumental in giving them the resources to fight.

4. States undergoing internal revolution will often externalize it²³⁰.

While the Boer Republics were not going through what many would call a revolution, Kruger was trying to keep a conservative grip on his state by denying the British any influence whatsoever in the running of the Transvaal. This nearly cost him the presidency until the Jameson Raid provided Kruger a new lease on life. The Second Boer War was not so much a case of externalizing of internal revolution but the externalizing of a conservative desire to remain independent.

5. Revolutionary malcontents are often the most politically marginalized and excluded groups or states within the order.

The Boers were politically marginalized, they had undertaken their Great Trek to rid themselves of British control and they had defended their independence in 1881 successfully. The Boers had little recourse, one of Kruger's points in his Ultimatum demanded arbitration by a third party. The British excluded the Boers from the order but the Boers also voluntarily excluded themselves by dealing with Germany and France as

²²⁹ Penner, C.D., "Germany and the Transvaal before 1896" in *The Journal of Modern History*, Vol. 12, No. 1. (Mar., 1940). Pp. 31-58.

²³⁰ Walt, "A Theory of Revolution...", p. 41 and Snyder, Robert S., "The U.S. and Third World Revolutionary States: Understanding the Breakdown in Relations" in *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 43, No. 2. (Jun., 1999), pp. 265-290, p. 269

outside investors. This appealed to the Boer love of independence as well as strengthening the position of the Transvaal through European support.

6. The pursuit of goals thought essential to the national self-interest are denied by the hegemonic order.

The goal of the Boer Republics was independence, pure and simple. That they existed at all is a testament to this ideal. Independence was a national goal that was not permissible in the British quest to control the Cape of South Africa. The Boers were rich in gold and this paid off in increased power for the fledgling Republics. While being described as unorganized the Republics would not fit that description forever. The last thing the British needed on the Cape was a powerful, independent nation of capable and potentially hostile Europeans. British diplomacy reflected this policy in the final months before the war.

In sum, the Boer war reflects the framing theory that describes a revolutionary malcontent. While not revolutionary in the contemporary sense the Boers sought to do what revolutionary malcontented states do; break away from the hegemonic influence in the area. The Kruger regime upheld the conservative ideals that had led to the Great Trek in the first place, until British interference this was to be replaced with a strong reform faction in the Transvaal Government. The overconfidence the Boers held plus the perceived weakness of the British on the Cape strengthened the belief that they could

start and successfully win a war to solidify their independence. The Transvaal exhibits characteristics that define revolutionary malcontents. This led to a war that destroyed any dreams of independence.

Toeing the Line: The Passive-Aggressive Malcontent

The benign malcontent seeks to balance the hegemonic state and remain close to the order. The revolutionary malcontent seeks to break away from the order to pursue its own self-interested goals. The passive-aggressive malcontent is a bridge between these two types. Being caught in the middle has never been an attractive proposition to anybody, especially for a small state on the international stage. Passive-aggressive malcontents must seek a balance between the forces of the hegemon and other forces pushing for different goals. Most often these come in the form of foreign/domestic pressure points. Domestically there exists pressure to go against the precepts of the hegemonic state; religious demands, national groups, and elements within both state and civil society can all contribute. The domestic demands collide with international goals such as a war against the same groups that exist within the state and goals that conflict directly with both civil and state society.

The leaders of the passive-aggressive malcontent are in a hard place. In order to reap the benefits and stay within the good graces of the hegemon they must accede to its

demands. But if the same leaders do so with too much totality the forces within their state will overthrow them, or at the very least make life more difficult. In essence the passive-aggressive malcontent is forced to toe the hegemonic line and seek to assuage both sides that results in neither being totally satisfied with the effort put forth.

Passive-aggressive malcontents are states that have a population divided along religious or national lines. In states with a strong Muslim population, like Saudi Arabia or Turkey, the divide is amongst the secular and the religious and one usually dominates the other in government yet not so much as to give complete freedom of action. The secular world that was largely founded in many Islamic countries is at odds with a growing dissatisfaction among the poor and disenfranchised. The civil society that many passive-aggressive malcontents inherited from the Western Democracies has never been fully developed. Instead of a civil society that translates to a state, people find association along ethnic and religious lines. This translates into opposition as the religious and national organizations see the hegemonic order as trying to supersede what they have formed.

The elites within passive-aggressive malcontents are positioned between two worlds, neither of which fully accepts them. On one hand to stay in power they must pander to a population that is not fully in step with the demands placed on the elites by their presence on the international stage. On the opposite side is the hegemonic order itself and the desire of the hegemon to see that its interests are covered. The elites themselves are self-interested and will try to pander to both sides to keep power. Maneuvering in tight political quarters is a tricky business and some of these elites will

lose their position (and quite possibly their head). What was a passive-aggressive malcontent will be at risk to become a full-blown revolutionary malcontent that is not willing to compromise with the hegemon.

Passive-aggressive malcontents are subjected to numerous inducements by the hegemon. These inducements are a mix of threats and promises that tend to alter the preferences of leaders in secondary states²³¹. The leadership/elite of the malcontent knows that if they do not consent to the hegemon the stick will be used on his state and this leads to the loss of power, a situation that is best avoided. Hegemonic pressure adds to the fine line that the leaders of these malcontents must tread. As with the two previous types of malcontents a framework will be useful in identifying and examining the passive-aggressive category.

1. Passive-Aggressive Malcontents have cleavage in their society:

Most often this cleavage is between secular society and religion. Other times the cleavage is between ethnic or national groups. Most important, this cleavage is nearly a balance; neither side can overtake the other to gain power in the government. Both sides will exert influence on both domestic and foreign policy. Political identity plays a role in how this cleavage manifests itself in how the government operates. Deep differences separate identity in social life from political life. These differences allow a government to function insofar as all the pressures are applied equally.

²³¹ Ikenberry, G. John and Charles Kupchan, "Socialization and Hegemonic Power", *International Organization*, Vol. 44, No. 3. (Summer, 1990), pp. 283-315.

2. Hegemonic Alienation is not as pronounced as in revolutionary malcontents:

While revolutionary malcontents are often alienated from the hegemonic order because of any number of reasons (see Iran and Cuba), passive-aggressive malcontents are not as alienated. Some passive-aggressive states, such as Turkey and Pakistan, maintain a secular government and have made efforts at keeping Islamists, which is the political ideology of Islam, out of the government. This gives the passive-aggressive malcontent a stake within the order and for a hegemon bent on imposing its will on the international system there will be an interest in keeping the secular government afloat and within the order.

The nature of hegemonic alienation will depend on the value of the passive-aggressive malcontent's position within the order. Ireland, previous to the Second World War, struggled to become an independent state, free of British influence²³². With the coming of war Ireland increased in importance to Britain and the Allies because of its strategic position and the continued desire to pursue an independent foreign policy. For Ireland, this was ensconced in a policy of neutrality. Irish independence remained benevolent towards Britain but continued to pursue policies that reminded the Allies that Ireland was a free state; such policy included continued relations with Germany²³³. Britain could not simply alienate Ireland; the island's position was crucial for the war effort and such alienation could produce a German advantage when such things could be ill afforded. Ireland maintained a line between neutrality and cooperation with Britain.

²³² Jesse and Williams, p. 22

²³³ Jesse and Williams, p. 23

3. Passive-Aggressive Malcontents have a Civil Society:

The interplay of civil and political society helps to construct the state. One cannot overshadow the other; they must remain in balance to have a healthy state. Passive-aggressive malcontents have a civil society that is weak, sometimes inherited from a colonial past, other times it just has never had the chance to mature. Benign malcontents have a fully developed civil society while revolutionary malcontents have a very weak or non-existent civil society. Passive-aggressive malcontents do not have a fully realized civil society but what they do have is enough to give a boost to both political society and the state.

4. Passive-Aggressive Malcontents have regional interests that are different from the hegemon:

Regionally the passive-aggressive malcontent will have goals that differ from the hegemon. Brazil during the Second World War recognized the importance of US aid but worked to keep pressure off Argentina and Chile, rejecting American attempts to unite Latin America as well as breaking relations with South American states who maintained relations with the Axis powers²³⁴. US efforts to exclude Argentine were blocked several times by Brazil. Brazil was a friendly nation, even sending troops to the European theater and fully cooperated with the US during the war. But in matters of regional importance Brazil tried to minimize US participation.

²³⁴ Mares, p. 467

Pakistan and the War on Terror

After the attacks of September 11th Pakistan assumed an importance to the American hegemonic order. Previously Pakistan had had been on rather poor terms with the United States because of disagreements with India, refusal to sign the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, and continued support of the Taliban in neighboring Afghanistan²³⁵. Much of bad blood stemmed from Pervez Musharraf's military takeover of the Government in 1999. Though Musharraf did not institute martial law and struggled to keep business as usual in both the foreign and domestic realms his takeover did little to calm fears within India and the United States²³⁶.

Pakistan had for years supported the Taliban through the Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence, or ISI. The ISI had penetrated deep into Afghanistan through support of the militant Islamists, who were later to become the Taliban in the mid-1990s²³⁷. Pakistan, through the ISI, provided the support that swept the Taliban into power and kept them there, despite widespread Afghani disapproval²³⁸. For Pakistan, a Taliban controlled Afghanistan provided another anchor for the continued strategy to wrest control of the province of Kashmir from India. Afghanistan would also be friendly to the Pakistani government, thereby safeguarding an important border area and allowing all that more pressure to be placed on India. In effect the Taliban was a proxy in the

²³⁵ Ziring, Lawrence, *Pakistan: At the Crosscurrent of History*, Oxford, 2003. p. 268

²³⁶ Ziring, p. 266-267

²³⁷ Hussain, Rizwan, *Pakistan and the Emergence of Islamic Militancy in Afghanistan*, Ashgate, Burlington, VT, 2005. p. 220

²³⁸ Hussain, p. 225

tensions with India²³⁹. US concerns about Osama bin Laden and continued pressure to capture him in the late 1990s was of secondary concern to Musharraf once he took power. The support for the Islamists in Afghanistan and within Pakistan itself was widespread in both the population at large, especially among the poor and dispossessed, and the army, which included some officers at the highest levels of command²⁴⁰.

September 11th and the attacks on the United States changed the importance of Pakistan in the American hegemonic order. Suddenly a troublesome, backwater, Islamic state became the frontline on a war to not only get revenge but to extinguish the terrorists once and for all. The demands placed on Musharraf from the Americans came swiftly and were spelled out in very clear terms: cooperate with us and benefit or face the consequences. In the face of the black and white world the Bush administration created there was no shades of grey; Musharraf made the only choice he could, stand with the Americans and destroy the nation he and his military had helped create²⁴¹. The stark truth was that any hedging with the American demands would also give India an edge on the numerous disputes between the two countries, something that could ill-afford to happen²⁴². Musharraf tried to cling to a belief that the Islamists that he had supported for so long and the terrorists were not one in the same. By acting as a bridge he thought he might be able to preserve the legitimacy of the Taliban while appeasing the US. However the declaration by the head of the Taliban, Mullah Omar, that bin Laden was a guest of

²³⁹ Ziring, p. 339

²⁴⁰ Ziring, p. 271

²⁴¹ Hussain, p. 306

²⁴² Abbas, Hassan, *Pakistan's Drift into Extremeism: Allah, the Army, and America's War on Terror*, M.E. Sharpe, New York, 2005. p. 220

Afghanistan and that he would be sheltered there wiped away any notion of preserving the status quo²⁴³. Association with *anybody* associated with terrorism suddenly became a bad idea and to preserve himself and his regime Musharraf moved ever closer to the American led coalition.

As Musharraf made his bed with the Americans elements within both the military and society at large began to side more closely with the Islamists. Militant Islam was on the rise and placed the blame for their situation on American oppression. An indication of this was in July of 2003 when General Aziz Khan publicly stated that the number one enemy of the Muslim world was the US due to its identification of Islam as a threat²⁴⁴. Khan echoed what many Pakistanis were already feeling and what a large number of them had already acted on by joining organizations and schools that bred a type of militant Islam bent on the destruction of the West. Trying to reign in the explosion of militant Islam, Musharraf began to tightly regulate the existing mudrassahs while not allowing new ones, he also limited foreigners coming into Pakistan as well as expelling foreigners who were seen as joining the militant Islamists²⁴⁵.

Musharraf found himself between two rocks, the Americans and the vocal Islamists in his own country. To appease the Americans Musharraf had not only cut all ties with the Taliban (and al-Qaeda, by default), he also struggled to distance himself from anything that could be considered “terrorist”. Musharraf has not gone all out against the religious extremists though. The ISI, with extensive contacts in the tribes in

²⁴³ Ziring, p. 305

²⁴⁴ Hussian, p. 233

²⁴⁵ Ziring, p. 324-327

Afghanistan and the border regions of Pakistan have provided discreet support for pro-Taliban elements in the area²⁴⁶. An example of this support from the ISI is seen when two former Taliban Deputy Ministers were allowed to attend a tribal social function and subsequently disappeared into the mountains²⁴⁷. Further, US forces were restricted in striking terrorist camps on the Pakistani side of the frontier²⁴⁸.

Pakistan is seen as a linchpin in the war on terror, at least insofar as it is conducted in Afghanistan. Even with a diversion of attention on that part of the Americans to Iraq, Pakistan is still important and Musharraf could not abandon his commitments without a backlash. The diversion of attention to Iraq could play a crucial part in years to come, especially with the continuing rise in militant Islam and the Pakistani Governments seeming inability to eliminate it. The deep links forged between elements of the Pakistani military and the Taliban are still there despite the official termination of support after 9/11. Musharraf must walk a delicate balance; he already has had at least three assassination attempts by militants who decry his cooperation with the US. On the other side is the lawyer's strike in March of 2007, which occurred after Musharraf's suspension of the Pakistani Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. The declaration of martial law in late 2007 is a result of Musharraf's tenuous hold on power in the face of the upcoming elections (which he won when they were held in February of

²⁴⁶ Abbas, p. 232

²⁴⁷ Ziring, p. 341-342

²⁴⁸ Ziring, p. 341

2008²⁴⁹). Stuck between the rule of law on one side and militant Islamists on the other Musharraf is reaping the results of Pakistan's position with both the American war on terror and the internal discord in his country.

Why is Pakistan a passive-aggressive malcontent and not a revolutionary malcontent? First, and most importantly, is Pakistan's civil society. Inherited from the British and nurtured by the founder of Pakistan, Mohammad Ali-Jinnah. Jinnah was invested in the rule of law in a secular state²⁵⁰. It was understood that independence was the ultimate goal, but to make that work Jinnah believed that much was to be learned from the British colonial rule. This put him at odds with Gandhi and was an important element in the formation of Pakistan as a separate state²⁵¹. Jinnah encountered the same problems that Musharraf has; Muslim clerics, in the form of an organization called The Congress uloma, who wanted Pakistan to take a more Islamic flavor. To his credit Jinnah kept his vision of a secular state intact and, despite military coups, corrupt bureaucrats and politicians, and the continuing strain of a strong Islamic community, Pakistan has managed to keep a semblance of secular rule.

The issues Musharraf has been experiencing with the growing Islamic militant factions and civil society itself is an indication of the disconnection between civil society, political society and the state. The state has accumulated too much power at the expense

²⁴⁹ This was later reversed and the All Parties Democratic Movement (PPP) and Pakistan Muslim League (N), both anti-Musharraf, formed a coalition government in March of 2008. This has immediately led to more severe questioning of support for US activities.

²⁵⁰ Ziring, p. 14

²⁵¹ Ziring, p. 14

of the civil and political societies²⁵². This imbalance has taken away the development of civil society thus leading to the explosion of institutions that support and breed Islamic militancy. Actions such as the lawyer's strike in early 2007 confirm that civil society is still in existence in Pakistan and willing to take action against unjust grabs of power.

The clash between the civil society and the religious militants is part and parcel of the State's position. The interplay between civil society and religion is an integral part of the balancing act that Musharraf must maintain. Without this balance Pakistan would perhaps go the way of Iran, with Islamic revolution and the subsequent classification as a revolutionary malcontent, yet another state that actively opposes the ruling hegemon. However with this balance Pakistan, and Musharraf, must somehow appease the people while toeing the line with American demands and requests. It remains to be seen as of this writing if favor will tip in favor of the religious extremists, Musharraf's government, or the nascent civil society.

Pakistan is considered passive-aggressive precisely because it has not entirely bent its policy to match what the United States demands of it. Before 9/11 Pakistan was actively supporting (and played a hand in building) the Taliban. This was considered an important foreign policy in the continuing disputes with India. Musharraf was trapped, if he did not agree to American demands sanctions would be forthcoming, as well as inclusion on the list of countries that harbor terrorists²⁵³. This would not only result in Pakistan becoming an outcast but also benefit India in future relations; a situation that was unacceptable for Musharraf and Pakistan as a whole. Musharraf needs to be part of

²⁵² Malik, Iftikhar H., *State and Civil Society in Pakistan*, St. Martin's Press, New York, 1997. p. 3

²⁵³ Abbas, p. 220

the American hegemonic order, or at least on good terms with it. He cannot, however, ignore the Islamists both in and out of his government. To overtly support Islamic militants would not only be invitation to trouble with America but also undermine Musharraf's regime. Instead Musharraf needs to provide what American wants while carefully choosing situations that will not put the balance of power into the hands of the Islamic militants. Closing off certain areas of the frontier to American activity, keeping the ISI in Afghanistan among the tribes, and doing business with North Korea and Iran with nuclear technology are actions that go against American policy²⁵⁴.

With its position as a not-entirely reliable ally of America, despite official statements to the contrary, Pakistan has little room to change policy. Even with American attention diverted to Iraq any failure on the part Musharraf and his government to at least pay lip service to anti-terrorist policy will result in sanctions that can be ill afforded. In Pakistan's case the hegemon is the reason it has undertaken policies that match the rest of the order. Without the Americans offering the carrot and stick Pakistan would not have acted against the Taliban. Relations before 9/11 demonstrates that Pakistan's importance was limited and therefore could pursue a pro-Islamist policy without any ill effects from the international community in general and American in particular.

²⁵⁴ Abbas, p. 230

1. Passive-Aggressive Malcontents have cleavage in their society:

Pakistan was created as a Muslim state. The cleavage within Pakistan is between the Islamists, who want a state based on the precepts of that religion, and the secular society within Pakistan. Not all Muslims in Pakistan support the Islamists, and many participate in the civil society that, though weak, is still active.

2. Hegemonic Alienation is not as pronounced as in revolutionary malcontents:

Pakistan was considered a strategic though not an important area to the United States in the days before 9/11. Relations were bad; Musharraf's military coup, inability to squelch bin Laden and bad relations with India all contributed to this. After 9/11 Pakistan assumed a new, and overwhelming, importance to the strategic vision of the US. Musharraf quickly was given a stark choice; join the effort willingly and consequently reap the benefits or Pakistan would be ostracized as a terrorist supporting state. In this case the alienation was dependant on Pakistan's position within the hegemonic order.

3. Passive-Aggressive Malcontents have a civil society:

The presence of civil society gives society an outlet that is not nationalistic or religious in nature. In Pakistan the civil society was inherited from the British and is unbalanced because of the power given to the state. But, actions such as the lawyers strike in March 2007 and the March 2008 election of a new Prime Minister show that civil society is still in effect in Pakistan and plays a role in keeping the Islamists at bay. It is in part the

presence of civil society that keeps Pakistan a secular state, no matter how tenuous that seems at times.

4. Passive-Aggressive Malcontents have regional interests that are different from the hegemon:

Pakistan has different interests than the US in Central Asia. Before 9/11 Pakistan had helped to bring the Taliban into being and to the governance of Afghanistan. This was part of a plan to use Afghanistan as a proxy in the dispute with India, primarily over the province of Kashmir. After 9/11 Pakistan disavowed the Taliban and any support for Islamists in Afghanistan, even giving use of territory to the US for the purpose of hunting down terrorists. Without hegemonic interest, Pakistan would not have totally abandoned its efforts in Afghanistan.

Conclusion

Hegemony is a fickle concept. Hegemonic states strive to build an order based on consent, which is the only way to ensure success in the long-term. As hegemons mature and begin to enter decline the malcontents start to go against the order. In *The Old Regime and Revolution*, de Tocqueville said “Evils which are patiently endured when they seem inevitable become intolerable once the idea of escape has been suggested”. While the hegemon may not have perpetrated any evils there will always be states that

feel like they are being held down. As other states within the order accumulate economic and military power they will want more equal treatment and a bigger say within the order. Other states will see an opportunity to exercise their own goals both within and without their state and region. Make no mistake though; it takes a long slow decline or a major war to make the hegemon a doddering old man within international relations. This means that the malcontents must exercise caution in how they deal with the hegemon.

As a famous professional athlete once said, —“Be the man, you gotta beat the man”²⁵⁵. Nowhere is this more true than within the hegemonic order. Malcontents are important phenomena, as they are not directly challenging the hegemonic state for leadership. Instead they want to be able function as independent states, with minimal outside influence. The reasons for this are many but all lead to the same end; freedom from hegemonic interference. In Western Europe’s case this stems from a realization that in many ways Europe is quickly becoming the equal of the United States in the economic and political realm. For the Boers it was a conservative desire to keep things at the status quo and to exploit their wealth in peace. For Pakistan it was the desire of Pervez Musharraf to remain in power and work toward his own goals for his state. Whatever the reason the more power the malcontents assume, the weaker the hegemon will become. The ability to offer the carrot and threaten the stick will diminish and along with it the capacity of the hegemon to accomplish its own goals and maintain the order. The hegemon may very be “the man” but its power will be compromised as the malcontents usurp more and more.

²⁵⁵ Flair, Ric, *To Be the Man*, Pocket Books, New York, 2004

In lieu of major war, the decline of a hegemon is rarely quick and rarely clean. Malcontents are a sign of decline; more malcontents equal a weaker hegemon. As more malcontents rise the ability to hegemon to bring them back into the order diminishes. The order begins to weaken and, eventually, the hegemon will lose its power, leaving a world that is more anarchical and multi-polar. In the aftermath of the First World War, no clear winner emerged and the Allies quickly broke up, the US withdrawing to the Americas, Britain too weak to exert its former hegemonic strength and the rest of the Allies unable to emerge from a war-torn Europe to form a new order. Even if a post-hegemonic world does not resemble a post World War One scenario there can be little doubt that no clear power will emerge. Establishment of a theory of malcontents will help to identify future areas of conflict, be it based on economic or military strength. No one malcontent will spell the end of hegemony. Instead, many malcontents will spell the end of hegemony.

Chapter 4

An Application of Environmental Scanning to International Relations

This section will lay out step by step how to study the future through the application of the Tonn methodology to futures analysis. This is a tool that incorporates the scanning of leads and translates these leads into numbers that are organized into results that point to a particular result or set of results. Developed originally by the private sector, environmental scanning encompasses the review of a disparate number of sources, which include but not limited too science and technology journals and databases, gray literature reports, industry publications, technology developers, and major government agencies²⁵⁶. Tonn's methodology takes the idea of environmental scanning and incorporates it into a larger scheme that develops a systems model to organize the scanning while quantifying the impacts that particular leads will have on the various components of the systems model. Different leads will have different impacts and some systems model components will be impacted with multiple and possibly conflicted leads²⁵⁷. Here the methodology will be outlined, step-by-step, in what I hope is an easy to follow manner.

²⁵⁶ Tonn, Bruce E., —A methodology for organizing and quantifying the results of environmental scanning exercises” in *Technological Forecasting and Social Change: An International Journal*, 75 (2008) pp. 595-609.

²⁵⁷ Tonn, p. 596

Step One: Development of the Systems Model

A systems model is used to organize our study of the future. The model is built from components, each of which represents a piece of the overall environment. Components are influenced by other components. For example in my model, hegemonic economic, military and cultural power all directly influences the hegemonic political power component, which in turn influences the international hegemonic order. Sometimes components will exist, yet do not directly influence anything else, and yet are important parts of the model. My model does not have any of these “free floaters”. The illustration below (Figure 1) is the systems model developed for this futures exercise. The model is designed to represent the current international hegemonic order centered on the United States. After the illustration I go into detail about each of the components and the reasoning behind them.

The primary component, that is the component that is impacted by everything, is E1: International Hegemonic Order. The order is built around the United States and is affected by two US based components, D1: Hegemonic Political Power and C2: Hegemonic Military Power. Political power is an amalgamation of economic and cultural strength, in other words the ability to get things done without the use of hard power. Military power is exactly that and its function is to influence the hegemonic order through the use of the stick. On the opposite side of the systems model F1 through F3 represent states under or affiliated with the hegemonic order. F1: Hegemonic Followers generally support the hegemonic order and, most likely, the hegemon. F2: Hegemonic




Figure 1: Systems Model

C1: Hegemonic Economic Power: This is the power of the hegemon’s economy, in this case, America. Any leads that may affect the economic power of the US would have an impact here; the sliding US dollar and advent of a possible bullet train in California are both examples of leads that would affect the US economy.

C2: Hegemonic Military Power: Military power is often a primary source of power for the hegemon and this component catalogs all the leads that have potential to impact it.

C3: Hegemonic Cultural Power: This component is reflective of the particular set of institutions that America spreads throughout the world, namely free markets, democracy and American exceptionalism.

Figure 1, cont.

D1: Hegemonic Political Power: The above three components form to impact the political power of the hegemon. Political power represents the ability to use the carrot and stick of raw economic and military power to accomplish goals without actually using said power.

E1: International Hegemonic Order: The International Hegemonic Order represents the sphere of influence that surrounds the United States. This systems component is the end point for all other components; in other words the other components will all impact this one

F1: Hegemonic Followers: Hegemonic Followers are states that are willing to follow the United State's lead on various issues. States such as Britain, Poland and Romania are representative of this category.

F2: Hegemonic Malcontents: Malcontents are states that are too small to actively oppose the hegemon yet seek to do whatever in their power to escape from the influence of the hegemon. States such as Venezuela and Iran fall into this category.

F3: Hegemonic Challengers: Challengers are states that are on the cusp of being able to rival the United States in the exercise of regional or world power and are willing to do so. States such as Russia and China are states that fall into this position.

Malcontents seek to break out from under the order to pursue their own goals thus weakening the order by not being in it. F3: Hegemonic Challengers are states that seek to upstage the hegemon and, perhaps, the order to carve out their own order.

Step Two: The Acquisition of Leads

Once the systems model has been designed the next step is the scanning exercise. Scanning is undertaken to acquire leads; that is relevant and timely sources that influence each of the components. Leads are a factor or factors that could change any component within the systems framework²⁵⁸ Leads are culled from a wide variety of sources which include and are certainly not limited too: journals, mainstream media, internet blogs, trade journals, think tank reports, and any other source that provides relatively reliable information that matches the above criteria. For this work the leads were drawn from a wide variety of sources that included journals like *Foreign Affairs*, *Foreign Policy*, *Far Eastern Economic Review*, *Comparative Strategy*, *Aviation Week*. Other sources included publications such as *The Economist*, *The Christian Science Monitor*, *Financial Times*, *Kiplinger's*, and *The New Yorker*. Websites of organizations like The Brookings Institute, Jane's Information Group, World Security Network, The Center for International and Strategic Studies, The Belfer Center for International Affairs at Harvard, and Global Security.

²⁵⁸ Tonn, p. 597

The selection process was based on the subjectivity of the researcher. For this exercise the acquisition of leads was a three-fold process. First was the identification of a lead that looked to be relevant to the topic of malcontents and hegemonic decline and came from a reliable source. Reliable sources, like the ones noted above, were again up to the subjectivity of the researcher but based on the knowledge and experience of the same. Second the lead was matched with an appropriate component, for example, lead number 18, The US Military Index for March/April 2008, would be matched with the C2: Hegemonic Military Power. Lead number 33, Only in America: Will America's Particularities Survive George Bush?, were matched with C3: Hegemonic Cultural Power because of the articles topic about American exceptionalism and its impact on world affairs. After this has been done the lead is then put into abstract form and then scored for its potential impact, as detailed in the next step.

The leads themselves are contained in Appendix 1: Sources and Data for the Futures Analysis of the American Hegemonic Order. The following leads are representative of the Appendix and will give the reader an example of the format.

2: C1: Hegemonic Economic Power: Sliding US dollar rates hit JSF program

The sliding dollar has caused the Joint Strike Fighter program to skyrocket in cost because of overseas contracts. The JSF was conceived as an international cooperative program and much of the success hinges on the US-UK partnership in the deal. Future cost increases are expected as the USD continues to fall. This lead demonstrates the impact of the troubled US dollar on other aspects of American hegemonic power.

Source: http://www.janes.com/news/defence/jdw/jdw080320_1_n.shtml

5: E1: International Hegemonic Order: British Face Rising Cost of Living, Credit Crunch

British citizens have faced a rise in the cost of living that sees cheap credit disappearing and bankruptcy on the rise. Here the troubles of the hegemon affecting the economic health of many states within the hegemonic order.

Source: <http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=89195093&ft=1&f=1001>

6: F2: Hegemonic Malcontents: Pakistani PM vows to fight terror

Yusuf Raza Gillani, the Pakistani Prime Minister, claims the first priority for his country is to find peace and fight militants. Among other actions the ban on student and trade unions has been lifted and steps toward integrating the lawless tribal areas into the rest of the country, along with full rights for the inhabitants, have been discussed and enacted. Pakistan has now elected a government that feels that it does not have to maintain the same levels of cooperation with the US as the Musharaff administration did. While not overt, this decrease in cooperation will no doubt harm US policy against terrorists in Afghanistan and the region.

Source: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/7320065.stm

Each of these leads came from three different sources, the BBC, Jane's Information Group and National Public Radio. The number of the lead is first and the component next. Each of the above examples is attached to a different component; this is a subjective decision by the research as well. Each lead is attached to the component that best fits it. For example lead 6, F2: Hegemonic Malcontents: Pakistani PM vows to fight terror is associated with the F2: Hegemonic Malcontents component because it deals with a passive aggressive malcontent and the way they plan to pursue a policy issue. Other components will be judged in a similar manner.

The total number of leads in this analysis is totaled at 60. This number was, like other aspects of this study, chosen subjectively by the author. To achieve 60 up to 200 sources were scanned. Some sources, like a more in-depth study of academic journals and technology sources were not scanned as closely as sources that concentrated on world affairs and thus represent a source that could be used in a repeat of this study in the

future. The chosen leads were deemed relevant to the components within the systems model. The methodology can be used with as many or as few leads (within reason) as the researcher deems necessary. However too few leads will give a poor picture of the future and while the more leads may certainly equal better too many may make the study ponderous. The leads for this particular analysis were chosen from contemporary sources, none older than a month or two from March/April of 2008. The concept was to provide a picture of the future based on current information from the sources named above.

Step Three: The Coding of Leads

Once the leads have been gathered and put into their respective components they then must be coded for their potential impact on the systems component. This impact is influenced by uncertainty. The uncertainty is represented by the upper and lower numbers in each box. Why uncertainty? We could code leads all day, happily assigning numbers at will. However in a study such as this the future is never known for certain. Further with the strong subjective streak of the exercise the uncertainty is present to remind us that nothing is guaranteed to come to pass. The upper and lower scores represent this uncertainty using the knowledge and intuition of the researcher. Coding is done for a set period of years, in this case 5, 10, and 20 years into the future. This coding is the linchpin in what makes this exercise an effective tool.

Assigning impact score is done on a scale of -10 to $+10$, where -10 represents a complete reduction or negative change in the model component (e.g., in the emission of a

pollutant) and +10 represents an extremely massive increase or positive change in the component²⁵⁹. Table 1 is the Chart for Assigning Impact scores and shows that as the impact score increases, the change in the component increases quickly at first and then levels off asymptotically to either -1.0 or 1.0.

Imprecise probabilities, also known as upper and lower probabilities represent the areas of uncertainty that are encountered in the study of the future. Here is a brief introduction to imprecise probabilities. Let $\underline{P}(A)$ be the lower probability of an event A occurring and let $P^-(A)$ be the upper probability. Then, $0 \leq \underline{P}(A) \leq P^-(A) \leq 1.0$. If one is certain that event A will occur, then $\underline{P}(A) = P^-(A) = 1.0$. If one is certain that event A will not occur, then $\underline{P}(A) = P^-(A) = 0.0$. If one has no knowledge about the occurrence of event A, then this is expressed as $\underline{P}(A) = 0.0$ and $P^-(A) = 1.0$. With precise probabilities, this situation is expressed as $P(A) = 0.5$. Let's say that some knowledge is gained about A (for example, let's assume that A is the percent of red balls in a clear glass urn filled with a total of one hundred red and blue balls and a cloth covering the urn has been removed so that one can now count the balls visible from the outside), then the lower and upper probabilities can be adjusted, say to $\underline{P}(A) = 0.4$ and $P^-(A) = 0.6$. In the precise probability case, the addition of new knowledge leaves the $P(A)$ unchanged at 0.5. The ability to represent a wide range of knowledge and changes in knowledge make imprecise probabilities very attractive for the methodology²⁶⁰.

²⁵⁹ Tonn, p. 598

²⁶⁰ Tonn, p. 600

Table 1
Chart for Assigning Impact Scores

Qualitative Change in Component	Change in component score (y-axis)	Impact score (x-axis)
Extremely massive increase	.99999	10
Extreme increase	.986	5
	.90	3
Substantial increase	.46	1
	.38	.8
	.29	.6
~ 20% increase	.2	.4
~ 10% increase	.1	.2
	.05	.1
	.005	.01
~ 1 in a million increase	.0005	.001
	.00005	.0001
~ 1 in one hundred million increase	.000005	.00001
	.0000005	.000001
No Change	0	0
	-.0000005	-.000001
~ 1 in one hundred million decrease	-.000005	-.00001
	-.00005	-.0001
~ 1 in a million decrease	-.0005	-.001
	-.005	-.01
	-.05	-.1
~10% decrease	-.1	-.2
~20% decrease	-.2	-.4
	-.29	-.6
	-.38	-.8
Substantial decrease	-.46	-1
	-.90	-3
Extreme reduction	-.986	-5
Reduction to very close to zero	-.99999	10

Let $\underline{P}_{i,t}(L_j)$ represent the lower probability that the lead j will have the estimated impact on component i in year t and let $\overline{P}_{i,t}(L_j)$ represent the upper probability. The lower expected impact of lead j on component i in time period t is then $\underline{E}_{i,t}(L_i) = I_{i,t}(L_j) * \underline{P}_{i,t}(L_j)$ and the upper expected impact is $\overline{E}_{i,t}(L_i) = I_{i,t}(L_j) * \overline{P}_{i,t}(L_j)$. As suggested, lower and upper expected values are calculated in approximately the same fashion as normal expected values. To put these formulas in context an example of three leads are illustrated below and assigned impact scores as well as upper and lower probabilities.

2: C1: Hegemonic Economic Power: Sliding US dollar rates hit JSF program

The sliding dollar has caused the Joint Strike Fighter program to skyrocket in cost because of overseas contracts. The JSF was conceived as an international cooperative program and much of the success hinges on the US-UK partnership in the deal. Future cost increases are expected as the USD continues to fall. This lead demonstrates the impact of the troubled US dollar on other aspects of American hegemonic power

	5 Years	10 Years	20 Years
Impact	-.0006	-.005	-.0045
Upper	0.75	0.85	0.8
Lower	0.65	0.75	0.75

Using Figure 1: Chart for Assigning Impact Scores, we can examine this lead within the context of systems component C1: Hegemonic Economic Power. The sliding US dollar is beginning to affect defense projects, so the impact will be rather large and it will be

negative because such with both the loss of economic strength and the potential impact on military strength this lead will have a 1 in one hundred thousand decrease; not substantial but not terribly small either. The upper and lower improbabilities for this lead are not particularly large because the military budget will be the last to be touched and other ways to make up the shortfall will most likely be found.

Another example of lead coding is number 5, E1: International Hegemonic Order.

5: E1: International Hegemonic Order: British Face Rising Cost of Living, Credit Crunch

British citizens have faced a rise in the cost of living that sees cheap credit disappearing and bankruptcy on the rise.

	5 Years	10 Years	20 Years
Impact	-.00003	-.000035	-.000037
Upper	0.8	0.7	0.85
Lower	0.75	0.65	0.8

Again, using Figure 1: Chart for Assigning Impact Scores, we can see how this lead may potentially impact the component of E1: International Hegemonic Order. The credit crunch has become a global phenomenon in this lead and the impact within five years is a one in ten million decrease in the order as a whole. Britain is only one part of a larger order and while the crunch is certainly hurting the average Briton, the impact will not be great individually. However, if multiple states within the order are feeling this, the impact will increase; this is covered in step four. The impact and the improbabilities are smaller still as with ten and twenty years the economy of the states within the order begins to stabilize as the economic cycle continues.

A final example of the coding of leads is number 15, F2: Hegemonic Malcontents.

15: **F2: Hegemonic Malcontents:** A Balancing Act in Pakistan

Pakistan's new government has made it clear that the cooperation enjoyed with Musharraf is going to end. The new PM and government will begin to undertake strategies that limit US freedom for military operations, negotiations with militants as a counter strategy and serious concerns about civilian deaths in the war against extremists.

Basically the US will have to balance diplomacy and negotiation with a government that is not so eager to lay down to the US effort against Islamic militants.

Type: Passive-Aggressive

	5 Years	10 Years	20 Years
Impact	-.009	-.0002	-.0003
Upper	.45	.25	.35
Lower	.35	.2	.29

The impact here in five years starts at a one in one hundred thousand decrease.

This number reflects the fact that Pakistan is not actively resisting the US in the region, but is stating that the agreement that was previously enjoyed will not be necessarily repeated. At the ten and twenty year mark the impact is lessened as US involvement in the region may very well wind down as well as possible governmental changes in Pakistan itself.

Step Four: Aggregating the Leads

Once the individual leads have been coded and assigned to a systems component they must be combined. Having multiple and often conflicting leads means that an effective means of aggregating them must be found. The following equations can be interpreted as calculating the expected changes in the systems model components estimated from the

impacts of the leads on the components. Tonn uses the following formulas to model the impact of all the leads attached to a component on the component itself.

Let $\underline{E}(\Delta(C_{i,t}))$ and $\bar{E}(\Delta(C_i))$ define the lower and upper expected values, respectively, of the change in component C_i in time period t . Let $\underline{I}(C_{i,t})$ and $\bar{I}(C_{i,t})$ define the lower and upper expected values of the aggregated impacts of leads (L_i 's) on component C_i in t years. Then, the lower expected value of aggregated impacts of leads (L_i 's) on component C_i in t years is calculated by equation (1) and the upper expected value are calculated by equation (2):

$$(1) \quad \underline{E}(\Delta(C_{i,t})) = (1 - e^{-\underline{I}(C_{i,t})}) / (1 + e^{-\underline{I}(C_{i,t})}) \text{ where}$$

$$\underline{I}(C_{i,t}) = \underline{P}_{i,t}(L_1) * I_{i,t}(L_1) + \underline{P}_{i,t}(L_2) * I_{i,t}(L_2) + \dots + \underline{P}_{i,t}(L_N) * I_{i,t}(L_N)$$

$$(2) \quad \bar{E}(\Delta(C_i)) = (1 - e^{-\bar{I}(C_{i,t})}) / (1 + e^{-\bar{I}(C_{i,t})}) \text{ where}$$

$$\bar{I}(C_{i,t}) = \bar{P}_{i,t}^-(L_1) * I_{i,t}(L_1) + \bar{P}_{i,t}^-(L_2) * I_{i,t}(L_2) + \dots + \bar{P}_{i,t}^-(L_N) * I_{i,t}(L_N)$$

These equations can also be interpreted as calculating the expected changes in the model components estimated from the impacts of the leads on the components²⁶¹. The total impact of all the leads within a systems component is then calculated and the total number can be tracked through the systems model itself, leading thusly to step five. An example of this can be seen by component by F2: Hegemonic Malcontents (Table 2).

²⁶¹ Tonn, p. 601

Table 2
F2: Hegemonic Malcontents

Lead #	5 years				
	Impact	Low Prob.	Up Prob.	LEI	UEI
6	0.0001	0.3	0.35	0.00003	0.000035
11	0.00008	0.6	0.65	0.000048	0.000052
12	0.00001	0.002	0.004	2E-08	4E-08
15	-0.009	0.35	0.45	-0.00315	-0.00405
16	-0.00005	0.5	0.75	-2.5E-05	-3.8E-05
23	-0.0009	0.8	0.9	-0.00072	-0.00081
39	-0.00004	0.3	0.5	-1.2E-05	-0.00002
45	-0.06	0.4	0.9	-0.024	-0.054
53	0.005	0.2	0.4	0.001	0.002

Lead #	10 years				
	Impact	Low Prob.	Up Prob.	LEI	UEI
6	0.0005	0.35	0.39	0.000175	0.000195
11	0.00015	0.65	0.7	9.75E-05	0.000105
12	0.00009	0.02	0.12	1.8E-06	1.08E-05
15	-0.0002	0.2	0.25	-0.00004	-0.00005
16	-0.00002	0.8	0.85	-1.6E-05	-1.7E-05
23	-0.0012	0.85	0.9	-0.00102	-0.00108
39	-0.0003	0.2	0.4	-0.00006	-0.00012
45	-0.0005	0.3	0.6	-0.00015	-0.0003
53	0.7	0.7	0.9	0.49	0.63

Lead #	20 years				
	Impact	Low Prob.	Up Prob.	LEI	UEI
6	0.0008	0.39	0.4	0.000312	0.00032
11	0.0003	0.5	0.6	0.00015	0.00018
12	0.0003	0.8	0.9	0.00024	0.00027
15	-0.0003	0.29	0.35	-8.7E-05	-0.00011
16	-0.000009	0.7	0.75	-6.3E-06	-6.8E-06
23	-0.0009	0.85	0.9	-0.00077	-0.00081
39	-0.002	0.7	0.9	-0.0014	-0.0018
45	-0.0003	0.2	0.4	-0.00006	-0.00012
53	0.1	0.2	0.6	0.02	0.06

Once the impacts have been figured we can use equations (1) and (2) to calculate the leads into the expected changes in the model component into overall lower and upper expected changes, based on table 1:

Lower Expected Change	-0.0116	0.2695812	0.569638
Upper Expected Change	-0.02635	0.337071	0.607052
	5 yrs	10 yrs	20 yrs

Here the lower and upper expected change for the hegemonic malcontents component are illustrated in five, ten, and twenty year increments. The changes start out small, only about a one in one-hundred increase within five years. However, as we hit ten and twenty years the numbers from the leads indicate a far greater increase in the component score, in the case of the twenty year upper probability, an extreme increase in power. These upper and lower changes are derived from the leads within the F2 component. These numbers come from the following leads:

Step Five: Tracking Component Changes through the Systems Model

Systems model components will have impacts on each other. In this model's case these impact are numerous as seen in the above chart. Hegemonic economic, military, and cultural power will directly affect hegemonic political power that in turn affects the hegemonic order and so on. Estimating the impact of components on one another is done exactly like the assignment of impact scores to leads. First the leads must be aggregated within the component, and then the over all score is taken into account. The impact score

assigned to component impacts are separate from the aggregated leads impact score. The model will assume that the systems components impact each other in a sequential manner.

In this systems model components such as C1, C2, and C3 have been modeled to have an impact on D1, for example. In this methodology, it is proposed that the impact of one component upon another be treated mathematically as another lead. Let $\underline{P}_{i,t}(C_j)*I_{i,t}(C_j)$ and $P^-_{i,t}(C_j)*I_{i,t}(C_j)$ define the lower and upper expected impacts of Component C_j on Component C_i. Then, to incorporate the impacts of components upon each other, equations (1) and (2) are modified into equations (3) and (4), respectively:

$$(3) \quad \underline{E}(\Delta(C_{i,t})) = (1 - e^{-\underline{I}(C_{i,t})}) / (1 + e^{-\underline{I}(C_{i,t})}) \text{ where}$$

$$\underline{I}(C_{i,t}) = \underline{P}_{i,t}(L_1)*I_{i,t}(L_1) + \underline{P}_{i,t}(L_2)*I_{i,t}(L_2) + \dots + \underline{P}_{i,t}(L_N)*I_{i,t}(L_N) + \underline{P}_{i,t}(C_1)*I_{i,t}(C_1) + \underline{P}_{i,t}(C_2)*I_{i,t}(C_2) + \dots + \underline{P}_{i,t}(C_M)*I_{i,t}(C_M)$$

$$(4) \quad \bar{E}(\Delta(C_{i,t})) = (1 - e^{-\bar{I}(C_{i,t})}) / (1 + e^{-\bar{I}(C_{i,t})}) \text{ where}$$

$$\bar{I}(C_{i,t}) = P^-_{i,t}(L_1)*I_{i,t}(L_1) + P^-_{i,t}(L_2)*I_{i,t}(L_2) + \dots + P^-_{i,t}(L_N)*I_{i,t}(L_N) + P^-_{i,t}(C_1)*I_{i,t}(C_1) + P^-_{i,t}(C_2)*I_{i,t}(C_2) + \dots + P^-_{i,t}(C_N)*I_{i,t}(C_N)$$

The impact of one component upon another should be estimated exactly like the impact of a lead upon a component, although these scores should, on average, be much higher than scores for single leads. Instead of taking a lead and interpreting its impact score, one would review the estimated change in a component, as calculated by equations (3) and (4), and then estimate the impact score of that component on the next component. Please note that that the estimated change in the first component is NOT the same as its impact score upon another component. Thus, one cannot simply push component change scores through the model (e.g., by using spreadsheet formulas). Analysts will have to

review component changes and estimate component impacts upon other components at every stage of the model. To make this process easier, the model assumes that components impact each other in a sequential manner, much like the structure of a neural network. Impact recursion is not built into this methodology. This assumption seems reasonable since this is supposed to be an easily applied environmental scanning and screening tool, not a complicated simulation model²⁶².

This methodology allows a great deal of flexibility in regards to how the analysis is constructed. The method can be used with all leads impacting all components that are relevant. As an alternate all the calculations can be done with as little as one lead that impacts multiple components (Tonn suggests a lead that emphasizes climate change as such a lead would have rather far ranging impacts on many components. Also this methodology can assess the impact of leads from across the model on one particular component, like, for example, all leads dealing with oil impacting C2: Hegemonic Military Power.

An example of this is the impact of F2: Hegemonic Malcontents on the end component of E1: International Hegemonic Order. The following is the impact and probabilities of the above:

Impact of	F2: Hegemonic Malcontents	-0.09	-0.09	-0.1
Lower				
Probability		0.7	0.8	0.85
Upper				
Probability		0.85	0.9	0.95

²⁶² Tonn, p. 601

The impact of F2: Hegemonic Malcontents on E1: International Hegemonic Order is coded exactly like the leads. While the impact of F2 is a subjective number as estimated by the researcher, the upper and lower probabilities from the aggregated leads within the F2 component play a part in this subjective number. The upper and lower probabilities are then aggregated into the other impact numbers within the E1 component.

Step Six: Adding it all Up

When completed the overall component changes should tell a story about the future in a scientific and methodical way. The numbers that the methodology produces can be used in a variety of ways. In this work the numbers will be interpreted in Chapter 5.

Environmental scanning is just one tool that futurists can use to study potential futures. Another method is the narrative scenario, which is employed along with the results of the scanning exercise in the next chapter.

Chapter 5

A Futures Analysis of the American Hegemonic Order and the role of the Malcontent

The world that the US dominated during the Cold War is history. Black and white politics between “good” and “bad” are no longer as clear-cut as they may have been in the past. A simple case of with us or against us will not work in the complicated world born by the 21st century. The lack of a Communist Soviet Union or a Fascist Germany ensures that the opportunity to divide the world into “cowboys” and “Indians” has past. Instead we have entered a period the enemy is defined by the highly subjective word terrorist and appears to be homeless. The “war on terror” that demands so much attention has proven a central element in questions that have risen concerning the dominance of the United States. Samuel Huntington calls the international arena a uni-multipolar, a situation that sees a dominant US surrounded by other major powers. This situation sees the hegemony that the US enjoyed is fading slowly as a result of the rise of other international powers, such as China and India, as well as economic and political pressures that no longer favor the US. This has had a negative impact on the domestic finances and politics of the hegemonic US.

The malcontent’s role in the decline of the US hegemonic order is centered on the fact they are beginning to realize that they may have a chance to achieve their national goals in the face of a disapproving US. Many malcontented powers receive some sort of assistance and

recognition from hegemonic challengers, as a malcontent will help in a balance of power situation against the hegemon. Each of the types of malcontent, benign, revolutionary, and passive-aggressive, plays a role in the world arena. Some overtly subvert the hegemon's rule while others want to quietly cast off the troublesome tenants of hegemonic policy.

The purpose of this chapter is to explain the results of the futures analysis exercise. First this chapter will explain how the futures analysis methodology examines sources to present a picture of the future. Second I will present an analysis that puts the leads, numbers and figures into a narrative that explains what the status of US hegemony is. More importantly I will concentrate on the hegemonic malcontents that are part and parcel of the international arena. By presenting this I hope to demonstrate the validity of the futures analysis methodology in the field of international relations. Further, this methodology will allow me to put a practical face on the theory I have advanced in previous chapters.

The Results of the Acquisition of Leads

The leads by themselves tell a story, they help to set in motion the future as we will, perhaps, see it. In this section I will talk about the leads and what direction they take both the individual components and the entire model. The leads are contained in appendix 1 and are divided by systems component, then number. In this model sixty leads were identified and subsequently associated with a systems component. Here I will discuss the results of the scanning exercise and what kind of picture the leads paint for each systems component. Table 3 below is for the total, overall component changes:

Table 3: Component changes

Component	Five Years	Ten Years	Twenty Years
C1: Hegemonic Economic Power			
Lower Expected Change	-0.03248	-0.06427	-0.14882
Upper Expected Change	-0.03909	-0.07248	-0.17397
C2: Hegemonic Military Power			
Lower Expected Change	-0.0042085	-0.003123	-0.00132
Upper Expected Change	-0.0044567	-0.003305	-0.0014
C3: Hegemonic Cultural Power			
Lower Expected Change	9.34E-05	0.00019	0.000356
Upper Expected Change	0.000101	0.000207	0.000379
D1: Hegemonic Political Power			
Lower Expected Change	0.232715	-0.0100764	-0.0232
Upper Expected Change	0.247012	-0.0105063	-0.02468
E1: International Hegemonic Order			
Lower Expected Change	-0.01058	-0.31473	-0.56713
Upper Expected Change	-0.02368	-0.33794	-0.61927
F1: Hegemonic Followers			
Lower Expected Change	-0.03093	0.004389	0.225356
Upper Expected Change	-0.0376	0.005477	0.253865
F2: Hegemonic Malcontents			
Lower Expected Change	-0.0116	0.2695812	0.569638
Upper Expected Change	-0.02635	0.337071	0.607052
F3: Hegemonic Challengers			
Lower Expected Change	0.2400955	0.525074	0.826016
Upper Expected Change	0.4392015	0.605416	0.854397

C1: Hegemonic Economic Power: The leads in component C1 paint a picture of a hegemon in economic distress. The US dollar is rapidly sliding in comparison to other currencies, to the point that it may be replaced by the euro when trading for certain commodities. The economic calamities of the US may not be a temporary problem either, they may, in fact, be the leading edge of something worse. As economic power declines the ability of the US to use it to affect political outcomes will decline as well. The US is staying the same in a world that is rapidly changing.

Here the leads give an overall component change that ranges from a negative three percent decrease in hegemonic economic power in five years to a 14 to 17 percent decrease at twenty years. With so many changes occurring so rapidly in the last year the leads have given insight into a longer term change, namely that of the US losing much of its economic clout within world markets. Lead no. 52 discusses what will happen after the dollar and is representative of many that believe that the dollar is no longer the hegemonic force it once was. The rise of euro has given many an alternative, an alternative they will no doubt exercise. Further lead no. 31 is indicative of the reliance on oil that US economy has and that such a continued need will necessarily be negative as oil becomes more expensive and less prolific.

C2: Hegemonic Military Power: While the economy of the US has affected the military power slightly, in reality the US has maintained its strength and shows great promise for the future. Currently the US is stretched out over two conflicts and this has hurt the power of the hegemon. However the number of advanced projects in the works will help

to make the US military, to excuse the phrase, leaner and meaner in the way it conducts operations. Many of the leads see automated tools such as robots and drones in development to become incorporated within the forces in the next five years or so. Essentially the leads demonstrate that the US is as powerful as it ever was militarily and will continue to be so for the foreseeable future.

For this component the leads give very small levels of negative impact scores, ranging in the 1 in one hundred million decrease. Even at twenty years the level of decrease is quite small. The US military will indeed be hit by the shrinking economy but with the level of research and design that the military has, as indicated by leads 22, 26, 27, 28, and 35, the negative impacts by leads like 4, 18, 21, and 59 will be largely canceled out. The leads indicate a switch to a force that is slowly becoming more capable while shrinking because of force multipliers, like robots. The US has such a lead in military technology and logistical capability that even with a reduced budget it is possible to foresee only minor losses in force capability.

C3: Hegemonic Cultural Power: The values that help define American, democracy, free trade and civil liberties, among others, are still alive and strong and spreading. The values that American has long stood for still seem to be popular and while other aspects of American power may decline the culture it has propagated will continue. Culture is, unlike other aspects of hegemonic power, more nebulous and more difficult to judge. The leads have been selected on the basis of how they relate to the above attributes that seem uniquely “American”.

The leads here see an increase that begins quite small (in the 1 in one hundred million range) and ends up being a bit more significant in twenty years time, around 1 in a million increase. The leads here indicate that democracy, which America has traditionally pushed hard, is still being adapted by many states around the world. This growth is tempered the fact that America is slowly losing the exceptionalism that has defined so much of the post-Cold War world view. America is in danger of becoming more and more isolationist in a world that has ceased to appreciate the American spirit and this will hurt the spread of those American values that are beneficial to the rest of the world.

D1: Hegemonic Political Power: American's political power is still fairly consistent. Despite a poorer economic situation American is still seen as a primary aid provider, especially in these times of high food and energy prices. Further, military assistance is still readily given to allied states. Despite economic woes, America is still able to convince companies like Shell that assistance to Iran is not in their best interests. The leads suggest a relatively high amount of American political power.

The political power of the hegemon will experience a steep drop, beginning in the five year range as a 23-24 percent decrease and getting markedly smaller, but still negative, as we wind up in the twenty year period at a two percent decrease. The leads (no.7) indicate that despite a change in presidents, American will still stay on roughly the same foreign policy path and that Iraq will remain a troublesome burden on the exercise of political power. In the longer term such things will still present echoes in how

American deals and is dealt with. On the upside, America is still able to exercise some pull as leads 51 and 58 indicate. The fact is, and will most likely remain for some time, that American stands as an important giver of aid, readily supplying logistical support for international disasters.

E1: International Hegemonic Order: The old saying of “So goes GM, so goes the nation” is applicable here. The order is suffering from roughly the same maladies as the hegemon, namely the global credit crunch and other economic woes. A primary institution of the order, NATO, is in need of a restoration of credibility. Some states within the order, Argentina is pointed out, are suffering economic meltdowns which are blamed on the IMF and the primary backer of such, the US. Plagued by rising food and energy prices the international hegemonic order is suffering and many states are looking elsewhere for their support.

The decline of the order is steep and the decline is steady over the twenty year timeline. Starting at between a one and two percent increase at five years and ending up at between a negative 56 to 61 decrease at twenty years, this loss of power can be ascribed to a number of factors. Leads 1, 5, 41, and 44 all demonstrate how the economies of even stable members of the order, like Iceland, are being hit by the global economic problems. Other leads, like 40 and 41, are representative of issues that will help to sap the strength of the order. The rapidly rising price of food has begun to hit the hegemonic order; a sure sign of something serious. The ability to function off inexpensive food and energy is disappearing and this will hurt the order, especially in the

long term as economic troubles conspire to take away the ability to maintain the standard of living that the order has become accustomed to.

F1: Hegemonic Followers: The hegemonic followers are not as rigid as they once were. Some, like Canada, are beginning to strike out on their own to select regions, such as the Caribbean. Many NATO states are beginning to expand and lean away from the picture of the US as a senior partner. In many ways the US has nurtured this by bypassing NATO in the new strategy of preemption. The followership of the states behind the hegemon is weaker than it has been in many years, perhaps weakest since the founding of the order in the post-Second World War period.

The initial decrease in hegemonic followers (being small, one in a hundred thousand decrease) is a result of the backlash from the hegemonic economic crunch. The following two time periods, ten and twenty years, show increases which are dramatic, ending at a roughly 20 to 25 percent increase. Leads such as no. 8 and 19 demonstrate that followers like Canada are starting to break into new territories without the assistance of the hegemon. NATO, an important institution for followers of the order, is starting to take on a life of its own. Such success in Europe and engagement abroad make NATO a force to be reckoned with, even without the full support of the United States.

F2: Hegemonic Malcontents: The malcontents are beginning to turn against the power of the hegemon. Pakistan, for example, has elected a new government, democratically, that is determined to do things without the overt interference of the US, like talking to the

Islamists within the state. Other malcontents, like Venezuela, are seeking to spread its oil capacity to areas that exist under nominally tight US control, such as the Caribbean. European malcontents, like Germany, are beginning to evolve their foreign policy to approach issues without the US in the picture. The weakness of the order and the hegemon has allowed the malcontents the ability to exercise their national goals, at least to a point.

The malcontents suffer a slight loss in the five year period, between a -.01 and a -.02 decrease. After that the malcontents begin a rapid rise in their impact scores, ending in the twenty year period between 57 and 61 percent. Why so much? First the small decrease is brought about by questions regarding gaps in Chavez's rule (lead 11) and problems regarding the infrastructure on Iran's oil fields (lead 53). However these will be balanced by leads such as 6, which is part of the Pakistani effort to fight terrorism their way, which includes lead 15, and the end of the full cooperation given by the government to the US effort. Leads indicate that Iran and Germany will continue their increase in power, with Germany dabbling with the idea of a more active foreign policy and Iran continuing to pursue its vested interest in Iraq's fate. Venezuela is working towards providing an alternative to US involvement in the Caribbean (lead 45). The thing that makes this lead important is Venezuela's oil and the means that Chavez uses to exploit that resource as a base to build a following in the American backyard.

F3: Hegemonic Challengers: Challengers are beginning to rise and, based on the leads here, becoming stronger. China and India are beginning to make inroads with both Africa

and the EU in regards to trade agreements and aid. China has stumbled as of late economically, leading to questions that revolve around its ability to sustain the tremendous economic growth. Meanwhile the EU is beginning spread its wings in Europe, slowly building an independent economic and political life away from the US. Many states have begun to build around the US, changing how business is done on a day to day scale.

Hegemonic challengers, like the malcontents, have very large increases that start at the five year mark as between 24 and 43 percent and range to 82 and 85 percent at the twenty year mark. The large increase is due to leads such as 13, 32 and 34 which detail the rise of China as a power to contend with. Lead 13 is very interesting as it demonstrates that both India and China are beginning to make inroads in places they have never really been before and Africa is ripe for development by potentially major powers like India and China. These states will experience an economic slow down, as evidenced by leads 25 and 30 but I believe in the twenty year run this will do little to truly put a muzzle on the growth of the hegemonic challengers as major contenders for power on the international scene. Lead 49 is perhaps one of the more important leads. By having France come back in as a full member the two benign malcontents that were against the 2003 Iraq conflict will be able to exercise influence on the most important defense alliance in the western world. This will have major implications for both the power of the US as well as the European Union. NATO may very well be on its way to becoming the defense pillar of the EU.

A Narrative Scenario of the Future

The numbers for the futures methodology exercise are divided into five, ten, and twenty year forecasts. Consequently, I will divide my scenario section about them in a similar manner and discuss the state of the American hegemonic order at each stage. Scenario building is an important part of futures analysis. Scenarios are tools for taking a long view in a world of great uncertainty.²⁶³ The scenario that follows is merely one possible future. While based off the leads and the results of the exercise, the scenario is speculation based on the researcher's own knowledge. I have divided the narrative into five, ten, and twenty year increments to coincide with the rest of the methodology. This scenario is derived from the futures analysis exercise and is, of course, merely one possible future; one man's idea of a possibility based on subjectivity as well as the hard data found from the exercise.

Five Years

Within five years the component where everything meets, E1: International Hegemonic Order, continues a slow, yet steady decline. With a spread between -.008 and -.015 the initial loss is under 2 percent. Yet these two percentage points represent many things. First institutions within the order have lost credibility in the eyes of the world. NATO, WTO and other organizations that represent the order are not as powerful as they once were. NATO has lost some of the status that made it an integral part of the defense

²⁶³ Schwartz, Peter, *The Art of the Long View: Planning for the Future in an Uncertain World*, Currency-Doubleday, New York, 1991.

of Europe. The International Monetary Fund and its primary supporter, the United States, are seen by many South Americans as a primary cause for Argentina's meltdown. On another front, the economic crisis centered on a global credit crunch has begun to hit states not only such as Britain, but also smaller, more stable states such as Iceland who depend on foreign investment. Finally it seems as if a democratic recession has started, rolling back the wave of democracy that influenced many small states in the late 1990s and early 2000s. While not really Islamic in nature, this democratic rollback will have serious repercussions for the stability of the order if it continues. These democratic rollbacks could stick because of the rising prices in food and energy and the inability of many to cope with the increased prices.

The center of the International Order, the United States, is an important cause of the slow decline. The economic power of the US is very much in doubt. The rapidly declining dollar, coupled with rising energy and food prices, hurt the economic health of the US, perhaps past the point of recovery. The initial number stands at between three and nine percent, both negative. This negative number is more damaging than it first appears as the US is the driving force behind many international institutions, as well as the basis for much trade in foreign markets because of the use of the dollar. Many are starting to ask themselves —“what next after the dollar?” and looking for other currency to use in markets. In this environment, NAFTA may assume an increased importance in the economy of the US. While the economy may be in the beginning stages of a bad flu, the military power of the US is still high, with almost negative miniscule changes, mostly brought upon by the war and pull out from Iraq. The military is still the strongest element

of American foreign policy, either as by threat or by use. The continuing research and design into tools such as robot soldiers, airborne drones and other advanced weapon systems and force multipliers help US military strength. The military will shrink numerically yet stay or increase in the ability to project force.

States that represent challengers and followers of the order are a mixed lot. Hegemonic followers of the order, which include states such as Canada and Australia, experience a small decline of between negative two and three percent. These states are going through the same shocks as the rest of the order but are also able to stabilize their currency better, resulting in rising local values against the US dollar. States such as Canada are slowly realizing their potential at the international level, and are seeking to expand their economic ventures into unexplored areas, such as the Caribbean. Hegemonic challengers, however, are predicted to realize big gains in the next five year growth between 8 and 30 percent. The large spread can be attributed the challenger states' (such as India, Russia, China and the European Union) rise in power and the decline of the US. While militarily no power can match the US, economically these challenger states represent a serious force in world markets. Even more important they are starting to discuss trade pacts with each other, such as the EU and China.

The first five years represents a period in which the US and the order surrounding it are suffering economic decline among a rapidly changing world. While many followers of the US adjust to these changes, the US does not. This will hurt it later on. Make no mistake; the military power of the US is second to none. While China and other states appear to be powerful they lack the ability to project force the way the US can. In five

years the United States will remain a superpower and the center of the hegemonic order. But the order will weaken with it, as the global financial crisis (centered on the credit crunch and rising food and energy prices) spreads.

Ten Years

Five to ten years out the International Hegemonic Order is still on its long, slow decline. Now the numbers stand at between a 1 and 2 percent decline within the hegemonic order. The economic meltdown has been stabilized to a point, but the wealth that once existed has never come back. The international institutions that helped make the order a reality are weaker. Moreover, hegemonic challengers are making it possible for smaller states to avoid having to conform to the draconian economic standards of the IMF. The credit crunch has eased, making it possible for the middle classes of Britain and the US (among many others) to stabilize the economy. The bubble that fed the extreme rise in energy and food prices has long since burst, making it possible for many small states to get back on their feet and solidifying many democracies that were in danger of collapsing. The order has, in large part, stabilized itself economically and many of the smaller states, such as those in Eastern Europe and former Commonwealth states, are playing an increased role in how the order is managed.

The reduced economic strength of the US makes the increased participation of other order member states important. For the ten year mark we see a further decrease in economic power in the range of between two to five percent. Again, this may seem small. But as the economic strength of the US declines other states will take up the slack and a

corresponding decrease in the successful use of political power will occur. By this point many international markets have gone off the dollar as the standard currency, many using the euro as a more stable alternative. The drop in energy and food prices has allowed the US to slow its decline to some extent and even experience resurgence in the domestic economy. Compared to challengers, however, this resurgence is too little too late. The economic power of the hegemon has slipped.

In contrast, the military power of hegemon has not slipped. While the decline still exists, it is small. The end of the Iraq war allowed the US military to reorganize and integrate new technology ago. Capable robots controlled by humans now perform many dangerous tasks. Drones have taken over many reconnaissance and ground attack duties, leaving high technology projects like the Joint Strike Fighter for air superiority. On the ground a highly integrated web of command and control equipment supports the individual soldier, enabling smaller units to perform bigger tasks more efficiently. Research and design has slowed because of the smaller economy, but many tools are still in development. What appears is a smaller, more capable force that effectively accomplishes many tasks remotely, with minimal loss of life. The ability to project force is undiminished; the nuclear carrier force has entirely replaced the remaining conventional CVs, for example. The modern American miracle of large scale logistical deployment and support are still in place, thanks to the smaller, more capable force make-up. The military has become a tool that takes the place of political pressure. If a small, Middle Eastern state is giving American interests in the area trouble, a battle group of some sort is likely to be sent. Diplomatic pressure is forgone. Coalition forming is still

important, but the legacy of Iraq often shines through and more likely than not the US approaches a military situation alone, with minimal coalition support

The hegemonic followers are still behind the US, and they lend their support on occasion. But they have also begun to strike out on their own more. Canada is developing economic ties with South America and the Caribbean. Australia is in talks with several of its neighbors in the South Pacific. Great Britain has started investigating the use of the euro. Eastern Europe is forming increasingly stronger economic and cultural ties with the Western European states. The numbers for hegemonic followers show a slight increase and this is reflective of the success many of these states have had in improving their own situations without overt US activity. These states still support the US, but this support is increasingly more in spirit than in actual military support. In addition, the followers are more active in aiding the states of the third world, preferring to send money rather than military aid to young democratic states.

The hegemonic challengers to the US and the order are experiencing a renaissance with gains between 40 and 90 percent. China is continuing its trend as an economic powerhouse. Between servicing the debt of the US and new trade pacts with the EU, China booms. This boom period has also hit the military and the People's Liberation Army is continuing the move away from huge masses of troops to a more streamlined, technological force, something that the money flowing into the country is helping with. Prudent minds in Beijing have decided that the Taiwan problem is best serviced by economic means. Taiwan is seen increasingly as a partner in Chinese economic growth. China stumbles, but only slightly and the tiger that is China continues to grow. Russia has

profited from Putin's strategy of switching to economic means rather than military means of deterrence. The country is a powerhouse of natural energy and is ready and willing to cut off the taps to get its political way with Europe. The nuclear arsenal is still Putin's way of dealing with any potential state-based threats while the conventional Russian forces are benefiting from energy revenue. Russia is not above flexing its increased military muscle when needed, but it prefers to bargain with its energy reserves.

Twenty Years

By 2028 we will see significant changes in the way the US and the order that surrounds it must operate. While the order has resisted change, its power has dropped between 15 and 25 percent, which is a decrease produced by a changing world and an order that cannot seemingly adapt. NATO is still around and remains an important pillar of the European Union Defense community and is not necessarily controlled or dominated by the US. After the rebuilding of Afghanistan a major push by Great Britain and other member states sought to restore NATO's credibility as a military alliance. Because of its European make-up NATO was seen a natural transition to become the security arm of the EU. This decision saw the influence of the US reduced drastically, even though the force projection capability of the US was still an integral part of NATO operations. Other institutions, like the IMF, are also still around, though they lack the support they did twenty years ago. Many within the International Order felt that the IMF was a negative in relations with third world states. Concerned EU members will have put alternatives to the draconian policies of the past in place. Elsewhere the order has

weakened considerably in its influence due to the growth of challenger states. South America, for example, has established more extensive ties with China, the EU and Russia. This has allowed South America to resist political pressure from the US because of the reduction in trade.

The US has, in the last twenty years, seen a precipitous drop in its economic strength. This is somewhere in the order of 46 and 69 percent, a massive drop in power. The globalization of the new millennium has continued, leaving the US behind in many ways. The dollar, once the benchmark for world markets, has been partially replaced by the euro. Each currency is used about equally on world markets, especially in energy trading. Russia, in particular, has used the euro exclusively for all of its energy transactions. The domestic economy has stabilized and this has paid off well for the NAFTA agreements, which have morphed into a far closer economic arrangement than the original signers would have thought possible. In many ways Mexico and Canada represent a significant part of the perceived economic strength of the US. Without these two states, the US would have an economic strength similar to that of Britain or Germany.

Military strength is the most important component of US power left. With a leaner, meaner military than twenty years previously, the US is still the most powerful conventional force in the world. Robots and drones have given US forces the ability to strike anywhere with relative impunity, and with lower domestic political costs. Force projection is still the most powerful tool in the arsenal and the legendary logistical capability of the US military has lost little. The smaller force profiles have allowed for an

efficient reduction in numbers. In essence, when NATO needs a lift the US is still the one called. This superiority in military strength has also led to increased use when political or economic muscle will not work. Without the capacity to present an effective “carrot” to potential troublemakers the US has resorted, in recent years, to deploying more and more military solutions that would normally have resulted in political and economic pressure ten years previous. The ability to deploy without coalition or alliance partners is the crest of sea change in American foreign policy that began ten years before. Rather than spending months trying to use soft power to resolve issues and then forming a bickering array of partners, the US now simply deploys a Carrier Battle Group and a Rapid Deployment Force to deal with an issue. Politically these have garnered the US negative reactions from around the world. Further, challengers such as China and Russia are increasingly concerned at such behavior. This has led them to investigate the best methods to match force capabilities with the US so as to counter any move against their interests. In essence a new Cold War has begun, though the participants don’t quite realize it quite yet.

The hegemonic followers of the United States are now seeing increases that range between 8 and 20 percent. This means that the followers are more and more like equal partners in the running of the order. Canada has deep ties in the US thanks to NAFTA, and Australia now has a significant stake in the economy of the South Pacific as well as ties with India. Great Britain has largely integrated itself into the EU, even though the pound has still not been replaced by the euro. Eastern Europe still supports the US and the order but has forged ever stronger ties with Europe and NATO as a precaution

against Russia. While many followers still follow, they have also begun to make ties elsewhere. The foreign policy of the US also worries them, and the possibility of using their newfound political and economic power to force a change has been discussed.

Hegemonic challengers represent the greatest external threat to the current hegemonic order. With numbers that represent an increase on the order of between 86 and 90 percent, the hegemonic challenger states, including India, China and Russia, will be serious competitors in the economic, political, and military arenas. Economically these states have most likely overtaken the US and the order. Russia is using its massive energy reserves as a source of cash and influence in Europe and around the world, possibly forming partnerships with South American states. Europe and Russia are only friends when it comes to dealing in the energy market; Russia has a product Europe needs and Europe has money that Russia wants. Putin's game of using his natural resources as a political tool is paying off handsomely. India has become a major player in Asia, and while tensions still exist with Pakistan these tensions are far higher with China and its growing military and economic reach. Both China and India have poured massive amounts of economic aid into Africa, and both have entered into trade agreements with African states. Because of this Africa is experiencing a renaissance. Essentially the hegemonic challengers are not so much directly challenging the US as they are creating a new, multi-polar world. The US centered hegemonic order is another player in a new international scene.

The Impact of Hegemonic Malcontents

Within my futures analysis hegemonic malcontents represent a force that chips away at hegemonic power while perhaps courting the challengers and each other. Like the above analysis, the hegemon and the order are not really changing, while the world around it *is* changing, and changing dramatically at that. The hegemonic malcontents will experience an increase in their power as the order begins to weaken and the challengers become stronger. Many of the malcontents have resources, such as oil, that are essential to the growth of industry and, consequently, economic strength..

Five Years

The malcontents at five years, based on F2: Hegemonic Malcontents, experience a small decline of between one and two percent. Many of the malcontents that were included in the scanning, including Pakistan (as a benign malcontent), Iran (as a revolutionary malcontent) and Venezuela (also as a revolutionary malcontent), are unstable politically. This instability will hamper any growth that these states may see, even with a weakening hegemonic order. In five years time Iran will be experiencing a severe infrastructure problem that sees its aging drilling and refining plants begin to fail. The US has managed to prevent any major western firms from stepping in and rebuilding these facilities. The oil fields are still operating but a cascade of failures has reduced capacity, causing concern among many states that consume Iranian oil. Iran was able to avoid any sort of armed conflict with the US after 2008, but tensions remain very high. Venezuela has seen its fortunes begin to decline as the management of the current regime

begins to fail, even while the demand for Venezuelan oil holds steady. Chavez is barely holding on to power, as the good things he has done have given way to lavish spending and a stagnant economy. Pakistan, meanwhile, has managed to stabilize its democratic government and has made a tenuous peace with the Islamic militants. While this has caused problems with the US and India it has gone a very long way in giving Pakistan a measure of political stability. Germany has continued its distancing from American foreign policy by throwing itself deeper into the planning of the EU. Germany's goal is to enable the EU to become a fully independent entity, which it already is for the most part. But these plans include increased military power as well.

Ten Years

Ten years hence marks an exciting time for the hegemonic malcontents of the order. Their growth is very high, with changes between 26 and 33 percent. These extreme increases demonstrate that the power of the hegemonic order is declining in relation to the rest of the world and that the malcontents are capitalizing on their newfound freedom. Iran's oil infrastructure has been rebuilt, or is in the process of rebuilding, with assistance from Russia, China and the EU. Iran has ceased to throw around its brand of Islamic militantism because of increased profits flowing into the country. Make no mistake; the Islamic clerics still hold power. But they have toned down their message, as the US is no longer seen as the threat it was ten years ago.

Venezuela has become more of a threat to US and Canadian interests in the Caribbean. By building an oil infrastructure ten years previously, Venezuela has captured

a surprisingly large share of the Caribbean market. And by the use of well written trade agreements, Venezuela has made quite a few friends. The US, however, sees this as a threat to the one area of the world that is US-dominated. Eventually Venezuela imposes a oil embargo on the US, thus driving energy prices beyond 2008 levels while overtly working to unite South America. The US decides that the best way to handle this threat is to send a military response and the resulting situation sees Venezuela bowing down to US demands to stop sanctions amid the destruction of several refinery complexes. Venezuela is devastated economically and the US is condemned around the world for such an outright act of war.

Pakistan and India have forged a more-or-less permanent truce and Afghanistan is being supported actively by both states. Of course tensions will always exist. But India's rise to power has convinced the democratic Pakistani Government to work with it. Islamic militants are in the Pakistani Parliament but have a small voice in the way things are run. The winding down of the war on terror has made Pakistan just another country to the US, a status that Pakistan likes. For the first time in many years central Asia is quiet and free of an American presence.

Twenty Years

At twenty years North Korea has collapsed. The death of Kim Il-Jung spelled the end of a corrupt regime, and talks of union began with the South. Within six months an agreement had been reached, mostly for aid as the South was reluctant to jeopardize its own economy by incorporating the destitute North so quickly. States including China and

Russia took an interest in the North and begin to render aid as well. The massive military machine of the People's Republic causes concern as their intentions are unknown. The US sends a military presence as insurance; this is unwelcome by all parties. The rehabilitation of North Korea will be a massive undertaking and will help to unite Japan, China and South Korea, something few other things have done.

Iran has grown exponentially in the past ten years due to increased demand for oil from China and India. The attack on Venezuela by the US prompted Iran to take a hard-line economically by setting sanctions against the US. A military task force sent to Iraq did little to quell Iranian outrage. An attack caused by a few drone guided missiles from a US carrier group caused an international outcry so loud that action was suspended and reparations were made. Relations stabilized, to a point, but the power of the US in the Persian Gulf region was reduced to the point of nullification.

Pakistan has made significant economic inroads, mostly from pacts with both India and China. Afghanistan is, for the first time, a viable trading partner with Pakistan. Venezuela has recovered from the US attack ten years ago and has calmed down in its anti-American actions and rhetoric. Besides having renewed economic ties with the US, Venezuela has also been one of the South American countries to enter an expanded NAFTA, a move spearheaded by Canada. The malcontents at the twenty year point are not so much malcontents anymore. The US does not have the economic power to force any sort of policy on them, while the malcontents have gained power, along the lines of 69 to 92 percent. In other words the influence of the US on these states at the twenty year mark is minimal.

Conclusion

Hegemonic malcontents are not a primary reason for the decline of American hegemony. Instead they represent a piece of a larger picture. First and foremost the numbers indicate that the world around the US and the order it has built is changing. Challengers are become stronger and followers are beginning to look elsewhere. The US is “~~staying~~ the course” and not really adapting to a rapidly changing world. The reliance on military power will become a larger part of American foreign policy as other fortunes, mainly economic and political, decline. The ability of the US to project military power will remain high. This ability, however, may very well be viewed as an acceptable substitute for soft power methods of enforcing policy. As challengers such as Russia and China become more powerful the world will become more multi-polar. The US and the order that it has built will be but one among equals.

This exercise concentrated on the international hegemonic order as a whole while the rest of this work focuses more on malcontents. The reasoning behind this is based on the fact that in order to demonstrate that malcontents will not be a major cause of hegemonic downfall but rather an element that will hasten a hegemon already in decline. As a source of challenges for the already stretched hegemon, malcontents will test the ability of the hegemonic state to enforce the order. This is the role they play; if the hegemon lets the malcontented state pursue policy then it is obvious that the hegemon is on the decline. If the hegemon enforces the order and the use of the carrot fails, the use of force will provoke an outcry from both within and outside the order.

Conclusion

So where does all of this lead us? Hegemony is a universal concept, something that is able to transverse history with great ease. Malcontents within hegemony will always exist in one form or another. Knowing how hegemony functions will enable us to see how malcontents form and, subsequently, we can see how these malcontents contribute to the decline of a hegemonic state. Power will lead nowhere if it is not used correctly. We have seen leaders who can wield power without consent, men like Idi Amin, late President of Uganda, and other dictators who are soon deposed the first time their power is seen as lacking. Hegemons are able to function because they possess a unique mix of power and consent. This enables them work even as their economic and military power declines. The consent of the hegemonic order serves as their basis of power; without it they would wither.

The symptoms of hegemonic decline are all present in the United States at the start of the 21st century. The consent that was once so easy to generate is more difficult now in the face of unpopular foreign policy decisions. Economic power which the US once possessed in spades has begun to dissipate around the world, making other powers, such as China, contenders on world markets. The European Union, once a collection of ragged, war torn states has slowly evolved into a force that rivals the US for economic influence. Much like Britain in the 20th century the US is experiencing a decline in influence, first economic, then political. With no real empire to partition off the US is

faced with a far starker reality; that of loss of influence in a world that once was willing to do what it wanted with minimal convincing. The heady days of post 9/11 are long gone as the war in Iraq seemingly drags on indefinitely and changes on the outside of the US affect the domestic situation with rising food and energy prices and a war against the dollar.

Where does the malcontent stand in all this? Malcontents, no matter their type, act as an additional drain on the hegemon. They want to be left alone to pursue national goals. But these national goals can be quite varied in their ultimate aim. No matter if it is to build a nuclear power plant, expand oil refining capacity into the Caribbean or simply to be left alone to mine gold on the veld in peace the malcontent will help hasten the decline of the hegemonic state. The malcontent will believe that the greatest chance of success will occur when the hegemon demonstrates a weakness, a gap in its power. This is when it will begin to defy the hegemon and it is here that the hegemon must respond. If the response is through soft power the political strength of the hegemon must be up to the challenge. If the hegemon chooses force then the all important question arises; will the order approve?

This is where the typology comes into play. Using force against a benign malcontent like Germany would be nearly unthinkable into today's world. We can take parable of Oliverotto de Fermo on page 26 as an example of how not to act in dealing with those who are ruled. The message here is that the odious, the violent and the repulsive do not stay in power for long. Use of force against a malcontent such as Iran, which would be classified as revolutionary, is something that, perhaps, the hegemonic

state could justify to the rest of the order. The typology can play an important part in the allocation of hegemonic resources and how best to deal with threats to the stability of the order. The lack of soft power in pursuit of a Germany or a France may also function as an indicator of loss of power in that particular region. The US has suffered a loss of clout in recent years with its European allies, a loss that is readily apparent when the actions of Germany and France are examined in 2003. Using the typology we can identify where this might happen next and, possibly, identify the states that will be a part of it.

Hegemonic states and the order which they form are betting against history to see how long they can stay successful on the troublesome and unpredictable international stage. Some hegemonies realize their time is waning as budgets and the will to rule shrink, as the British experienced in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War. Some hegemonies are like a cosmic red dwarf, puffing out to their maximum size just before their total, inevitable collapse. Military power is the last resort of a declining hegemon and is often the only powerful tool left in its arsenal. But the overt use of force in today's world is a negative; something that will bring derision from challengers and followers alike.

The malcontent is betting too, only against the reactions the hegemon will take. Odds are that the malcontent will decrease as the hegemon drags its actions out, either because they do not work or because they are not working strongly enough. Each type of malcontent will respond differently and each will prompt a differing reaction. The lengths that the hegemon is willing to go to bring the malcontent back into the order will state quite loud and quite clear where the hegemonic state is in regards to the use of force and the use of soft power.

Hegemons are generally quite liberal in how they see themselves and their order. Dealing with malcontents creates a tension between that liberal creed and the practical reality of running affairs on the international stage. The dangers to security will vary immensely during the life cycle of a hegemon. Malcontented states are generally going to be placed lower than challenger states and other groups that directly threaten that security. Underestimating a malcontent is a dangerous move and one that will only serve to hasten the downfall of a hegemonic state. The use of force can be deemed a necessary tool against the outliers of the hegemonic order. But force is often a very poor tool for restoring the order. It is hard to generate consent from nations, states, and groups that have been squashed by military action. It is even harder to placate followers and supporters within the order after an overt use of force that many see as unnecessary. Hegemons must bear in mind that their rule is based on the consent of the order, without that consent their power is limited.

Implications

The identification of malcontents will point to gaps in the hegemonic order; the areas where the hegemon is most vulnerable. Pragmatically the ability to see how the malcontent typology affects the decline of a hegemon can provide a new dimension to policy formation and execution. While many states that are labeled as malcontent are constantly in the media, a means to categorize them and apply that to the level of threat

they present will help to allocate the scarcer resources in a time of decline. A systematic identification of malcontents would also assist policy makers in formulating timely and appropriate responses.

This work is a timid beginning to fill a gap in the literature. While much has been written on small states, hegemonic followers and hegemony itself I have found little that grouped everything together into a coherent work on malcontented states, nations and other assorted groups. In this age of terror, where homeless groups are just as dangerous as conventional armies, an opportunity for further research would exist using the malcontent typology as applied to non-state groups.

The futures analysis section of this work is the practical application of my theory presented previously. Futures study is a field that has seen a great growth in the last 30 years and presents an organized, scientific means to examine possible scenarios for the future. This work has incorporated a methodology that was originally conceived to examine environmental issues. I believe it speaks volumes about the usefulness and versatility of this methodology that it is so easily adapted to the material this work explores. A positivist method of examining and analyzing the future can provide important insight for both policymakers and political scientists. In this work the future is bleak for the United States and the order that it has built. Essentially it is not the US declining so much as it is the rest of the world shifting away from the reality that the US has known since the Second World War. Malcontents play an important role in this as they find there is more and more freedom to operate. While this is but one possible future based on available data today it is nonetheless important. The results of this study are

subjective and based on the researcher's own knowledge and intuition. Not surprisingly the prospects for further research using the same methodology are nearly boundless. I believe strongly that this methodology is an effective tool for presenting possible outcomes to policy makers and to formulate alternative plans of action.

Appendices

Appendix 1: Sources and Data for the Futures Analysis of the American Hegemonic Order

C1: Hegemonic Economic Power

2: C1: Hegemonic Economic Power: Sliding US dollar rates hit JSF program

Date: 3/20/08

The sliding dollar has caused the Joint Strike Fighter program to skyrocket in cost because of overseas contracts. The JSF was conceived as an international cooperative program and much of the success hinges on the US-UK partnership in the deal. Future cost increases are expected as the USD continues to fall. The sliding dollar is now beginning to impact other aspects of power; this lead concentrates on military power.

Source: http://www.janes.com/news/defence/jdw/jdw080320_1_n.shtml

	5 Years	10 Years	20 Years
Impact	-.0006	-.005	-.0045
Upper	0.75	0.85	0.8
Lower	0.65	0.75	0.75

17: C1: Hegemonic Economic Power: The Coming Financial Pandemic

For months, economists have debated whether the United States is headed toward a recession. President George W. Bush can tout his \$150 billion economic stimulus package, and the Federal Reserve can continue to cut short-term interest rates in an effort to goose consumer spending. But those moves are unlikely to stop the economy's slide. The severe liquidity and credit crunch from the sub prime mortgage bust is now spreading to broader credit markets, \$100 barrels of oil are squeezing consumers, and unemployment continues to climb. And with the housing market melting down, empty pocketed Americans can no longer use their homes as ATMs to fund their shopping sprees. It's time to face the truth—the U.S. economy is no longer merely battling a touch of the flu; it's now in the early stages of a painful and persistent bout of pneumonia.

Predicting a long-term financial pandemic, this lead shows how long-term the economic difficulties may be for the US.

Source:

http://www.foreignpolicy.com/users/login.php?story_id=4169&URL=http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=4169

	5 Years	10 Years	20 Years
Impact	-.009	-.005	-.00009
Upper	.2	.3	.3
Lower	.15	.25	.25

24: C1: Hegemonic Economic Power: **An End to Currency Manipulation**

As the value of the dollar drops, currency stability all over the world is affected. The main point here is that the dollar needs to be made stable again to counter the hyperflexibility of global markets. An unstable dollar affects the currencies tied to it, such as China and Vietnam, while other states have unpegged their currency from the dollar in light of the rapid drop. The author believes that a strong dollar, as the responsibility of the Federal Reserve, is needed in order to stabilize world markets. With the dollar losing its primacy the effect on hegemonic power if the dollar is replaced, even partially replaced, with the euro will be great.

Source: <http://www.feer.com/shroff/2008/march/end-to-currency-manipulation>

	5 Years	10 Years	20 Years
Impact	-.014	-.009	-.009
Upper	0.6	0.65	0.75
Lower	0.3	0.35	0.6

31: C1: Hegemonic Economic Power: **Why Oil Wealth Fuels Conflict**

The world has grown much more peaceful over the past 15 years -- except for oil-rich countries. Oil wealth often wreaks havoc on a country's economy and politics, helps fund

insurgents, and aggravates ethnic grievances. And with oil ever more in demand, the problems it spawns are likely to spread further. Oil is important to US economic power and its rise in price will continue to affect the economy. Further malcontents who possess oil wealth will be targets of economic policy more so than they normally would be.

Source: <http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20080501faessay87301/michael-i-ross/blood-barrels.html>

	5 Years	10 Years	20 Years
Impact	-0.0012	-0.0014	-0.0016
Upper	0.55	0.6	0.85
Lower	0.5	0.55	0.8

37: C1: Hegemonic Economic Power: Toward an Economic Strategy against Iran

In the evolving American debate over strategy toward the Islamic Republic of Iran, the idea of economic warfare - the coordinated application of punitive trade/inflationary/socioeconomic pressures - has received comparatively little attention. This is somewhat surprising, given the intrinsic vulnerabilities, ranging from a heavy dependence on foreign refined petroleum to a centralized economic hierarchy, now visible within the Iranian economy. This article outlines these "points of entry," and details the economic approaches that U.S. policymakers can employ in order to convince the Iranian regime that the real costs of its nuclear program are likely to outweigh the potential benefits of atomic acquisition. Using economic power against Iran will be an important test of hegemonic economic power; the more it succeeds, the better for it.

Source: [Comparative Strategy](#), Volume [27](#), Issue [1](#) January 2008 , pages 20 - 26

	5 Years	10 Years	20 Years
Impact	.0005	.00009	.00007
Upper	0.85	0.75	0.8
Lower	0.8	0.6	0.75

43: C1: Hegemonic Economic Power: **Bullet train coming to California ballots**

California will put a 10 million bond to finance the 42 billion dollar bullet train proposal to link North and South. Such a proposal is important in that it would help to provide an alternate form of cheap, efficient and fast transportation in an era where the car is less and less feasible for long, daily commutes. Such a proposal is, hopefully, a sea change in how the American Economy is built. Projects like the bullet train are indicative of a switch in the US to alternative means of transport. If these initiatives are successful it will help in maintaining the economic power of the hegemon.

Source: *Christian Science Monitor*: <http://www.csmonitor.com/2008/0409/p02s03-usgn.html>

	5 Years	10 Years	20 Years
Impact	.000002	.000005	.4
Upper	0.95	0.95	0.95
Lower	0.9	0.9	0.9

52: C1: Hegemonic Economic Power: [After the dollar](#)

As the US dollar keeps sliding in value, the question of what will be the next reserve currency for the international economy be? These kinds of questions are important for primarily because of the dollar slide people are examining alternatives to the dollar. The author sees the euro as a possibility and nothing as a backup; the speed of currency calculation in may ways forestalls the need for reserve currency. As in lead 24, this lead discusses the end of the dollar as a primary component of international trade. For the economic power of the US, this is a negative.

Source: <http://johnquiggin.com/index.php/archives/2008/05/10/after-the-dollar/#more-3977>

	5 Years	10 Years	20 Years
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Impact	-0.2	-0.3	-2
Upper	0.45	0.55	0.6
Lower	0.4	0.5	0.55

55: C1: Hegemonic Economic Power: Democrats Threaten NAFTA, but Pact Is Here to Stay.

While some politicians talk tough about reopening NAFTA, in reality there is very little any President could do. Checks within the system, consisting of Congress and NAFTA partners, would help to stop any reopening of the treaty. According to this, no matter anyway if NAFTA were reopened, it would not help the people most affect by the loss of manufacturing jobs anyway. A slowdown of NAFTA, perhaps, but not a rollback, thwarting the protectionist attitude. NAFTA is an important aspect of the US economy. An expansion of NAFTA and the avoidance of protectionist attitudes will help increase the economies of all states involved, including the US. Embracing NAFTA, I believe, will help keep the US economy competitive.

Source:

http://www.kiplinger.com/businessresource/forecast/archive/nafta_and_political_candidates_080403.html

	5 Years	10 Years	20 Years
Impact	0.03	0.04	0.6
Upper	0.76	0.8	0.8
Lower	0.7	0.75	0.75

56: C1: Hegemonic Economic Power: The Yin and Yang of US Debt: Growing American debt has consequences for both lenders and borrowers

The flow of foreign credit and investment fueled tremendous economic expansion in the US in recent years, but it also contributed to lower interest rates that helped to create the housing bubble. Financing – with the purchase of US Treasury, Agency and mortgage-

backed securities – by foreign investors has created a glut of funds allowing US consumers to spend more money than they actually have. Americans grew accustomed to living beyond their means. If foreign financiers took their money elsewhere, US citizens would struggle to sustain their current standard of living and the government would have difficulty maintaining its current level of spending. Ashok Bardhan and Dwight Jaffee, economists based at the University of California, Berkeley, offer insights into which countries hold US debt – and why the investors might find it difficult to diversify into new investments. The supply of creditworthy debt instruments does not meet the demand from global savers looking to invest. So, Bardhan and Jaffee predict that, for better or worse, any abrupt change in current investment patterns is unlikely

Source: <http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/display.article?id=10607>

	5 Years	10 Years	20 Years
Impact	0.0002	0.0002	0.0002
Upper	0.8	0.8	0.85
Lower	0.75	0.75	0.8

C2: Hegemonic Military Power

4: C2: Hegemonic Military Power: US budget request for increased defence spending masks squeeze on procurement and R&D

The US Budget request for defense has gone up, but Research and Design has been squeezed. However, overall there will be additions to the force, seven new Navy vessels and additional support for ground forces. Several high-end weapons programs have been scaled back or cut altogether. The military power of the US is seeing the economic effects first-hand. Many projects will keep rolling, however.

Source: http://www.janes.com/news/defence/triservice/jdi/jdi070208_1_n.shtml
Date: 2/8/07

	5 Years	10 Years	20 Years
Impact	-.00002	-.0001	-.00025
Upper	0.95	0.95	0.9
Lower	0.9	0.9	0.85

18: C2: Hegemonic Military Power: The U.S. Military Index for March/April, 2008

The Military index put together by *Foreign Policy* rates the health of the US Military. This particular one puts the US Military as an organization that is stretched thin, which in turn affects the readiness of the forces that, in turn, places strain on war fighting operations. Without a clear victory in sight for either Afghanistan or Iraq, the US is stretched to its breaking point. An increase in ground forces in general and Special Forces in particular is needed to help rejuvenate the military. As we see a draw-down in Iraq (in the next five years) I believe that the status of the US military will change for the positive in the next five years.

Source: http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=4198
Date: March/April, 2008

	5 Years	10 Years	20 Years
Impact	-.0009	-.00011	-.00015
Upper	0.85	0.95	0.9
Lower	0.8	0.9	0.85

21: C2: Hegemonic Military Power: U.S. Land Forces Draw Concern

Both the US Army and the USMC are concerned about the ability of the forces to maintain an acceptable level of readiness. The over emphasis on counter-insurgency training had decreased the ability of certain types of units, namely non-infantry units such as Artillery and Air Defense, to pursue their primary mission as they are diverted to —in lieu-of” missions that support counter-insurgency operations. Iraq is both cited and denied as a cause of this problem, many within the forces believe that Iraq is only a minimal factor at best. Within five years the concerns stated in the article are valid. Like

Vietnam however the military will be forced to evaluate and re-organizes; an activity that will make it more suited to modern force projection missions.

Source:

<http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/generic/story.jsp?id=news/LAND041508.xml&headline=U.S.%20Land%20Forces%20Draw%20Concern&channel=defense>

	5 Years	10 Years	20 Years
Impact	-0.009	-0.006	-0.0009
Upper	0.9	0.9	0.85
Lower	0.85	0.85	0.8

22: C2: Hegemonic Military Power: Joint Strike Fighter Program Still Improving; Still in Crosshairs.

The JSF program aims to build a high-tech, versatile fighter that can be spread across not only US forces but available for purchase to select US allies, such as Australia. This program has become not only increasingly expensive but subject to inter-service rivalry and squabbling. Even so, foreign interest and US interest remains high, but this will be subject to debate as the imposed costs on the project, partly from economic measures and partly from increased service demand, diminish the advantages that make the JSF such an attractive package. Institutional momentum will most likely keep the JSF going and this lead shows that even with economic difficulties many advanced weapons programs will keep going.

Source:

<http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/generic/story.jsp?id=news/F35041508.xml&headline=JSF%20Program%20Improving,%20Still%20In%20Crosshairs&channel=defense>

	5 Years	10 Years	20 Years
Impact	.00005	.00009	.00012
Upper	0.9	0.85	0.85
Lower	0.85	0.8	0.8

26: C2: Hegemonic Military Power: Is Our Robot Army Ready for Combat?

The goal for the land forces of the US Army is to have robots, combat deployable robots, to supplement the men on the ground. Ideally the robots will serve as “pint man” for combat patrols, especially in urban areas. While a robot army is still science fiction, robot supplements will improve the combat capability of the US forces. The use of robots will be important for both force projection and political goodwill. A more extensive use of robots could make military action easier as humans are taken out of harms way.

Source: <http://www.military.com/features/0,15240,165973,00.html?wh=news>

	5 Years	10 Years	20 Years
Impact	.00009	.00012	.00015
Upper	0.75	0.8	0.8
Lower	0.7	0.75	0.75

27: C2: Hegemonic Military Power (And F1: Hegemonic Followers): Raytheon Wins Big Bucks for Missile Radar Move

Raytheon has received a contract to move a missile defense site from the Marshall Islands to the Czech Republic. The primary purpose for this site is to work in conjunction with a similar site in Poland to defend Europe against potential attacks from Iran. Another lead that emphasizes that the military power of the hegemon is still growing and expanding.

Source: <http://www.defensetech.org/archives/004125.html>

	5 Years	10 Years	20 Years
Impact	.00009	.00009	.00009
Upper	0.95	0.95	0.85
Lower	0.9	0.9	0.8

28: C2: Hegemonic Military Power: Counter-Sniper Program (C-Sniper)

The Counter-Sniper (C-Sniper) program's goal is to detect and neutralize enemy snipers before they can engage U.S. Forces. An objective of the program is to deliver a field testable prototype system suitable for operational experimentation as an integrated part of the DARPA Crosshairs system, already under development. The purpose of the Crosshairs system is to detect enemy bullets, RPGs, and mortars fired at U.S. military vehicles and to prevent them from striking the vehicle. The C-Sniper system will enhance this capability by identifying threats before they can fire.

Note: I have mainly used this as an example of some of the research that DARPA is doing that will, in my work at least, directly affect the way the US forces handle operations in the near future.

Source: <http://www.darpa.mil/sto/smallunitops/csniper.html>

	5 Years	10 Years	20 Years
Impact	.000009	.000019	.00003
Upper	0.95	0.95	0.95
Lower	0.9	0.9	0.9

35: C2: Hegemonic Military Power: FCS Launch System Tested at White Sands

The Future Combat System is a non-line of sight artillery and missile delivery system that represents a portion of the Army's next generation of war fighting. NLOS-LS consists of a highly deployable, platform-independent weapon system that provides networked, extended range, precision strike capability for combat commanders. The NLOS-LS is capable of unattended/unmanned operations under all weather conditions. Armed with 15 Precision Attack Missiles, the NLOS-LS is capable of engaging a host of varied targets on the modern and future battlefield. The development of the FCS is another feather in the hat for an advanced US military. Again, the more advanced and automated the less humans in harms way and, maybe, an easier time going to war.

Source: <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2008/04/mil-080425-arnews01.htm>

	5 Years	10 Years	20 Years
Impact	.00009	.00012	.00015
Upper	0.8	0.85	0.95
Lower	0.75	0.8	0.9

42: C2: Hegemonic Military Power: In push for drones, Gates labors to change Pentagon

The US Forces see the Unmanned Drones as “force multipliers” to increase recon and surveillance functions. The Secretary of Defense is trying to build bureaucratic momentum on the use of drones in combat zones, such as Iraq. This article stresses that the Pentagon is concerned with getting UAVs to the troops as part of an overall increase in technology. This is seen as integral to keeping the US military at the top of the war fighting pile.

Source: *Christian Science Monitor*: <http://www.csmonitor.com/2008/0428/p03s03-usmi.html>

	5 Years	10 Years	20 Years
Impact	.00008	.00009	.00012
Upper	0.9	0.95	0.95
Lower	0.86	0.9	0.9

57: C2: Hegemonic Military Power: May 10 airpower summary for Coalition Airpower in SW Asia.

I use this article as an example of the military might, particularly airpower, of US forces in SW Asia. Combined with Coalition numbers, these present an impressive summary of the combat capabilities of the hegemonic order.

Source: <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2008/05/mil-080511-afpn01.htm>

	5 Years	10 Years	20 Years
Impact	0.0005	0.0007	0.0007
Upper	0.95	0.85	0.85
Lower	0.9	0.8	0.8

59: C2: Hegemonic Military Power: Poisoned Chalice? The Crisis in National Security Planning, Programming, and Budgeting.

The crisis in US national security planning, programming, and budgeting is not the fault of any one Administration, and has often been shaped by the mistakes of the US congress and key military commanders. It has accelerated sharply over the last eight years, however, and will be a major burden for the next President. The real cost of national security spending is likely to be 20-30% higher that is estimated in current baseline budget requests. There is no clear or coherent plan, program, or budget that reflects the fact the nation is at war and no credible mix of force plans, modernization plans, and procurement plans for the future. The future may look bright for combat capabilities, but the administration is in trouble. Like the planning after Vietnam I believe that it will take some time to recover and re-organize national security planning.

Source:

http://www.csis.org/component/option,com_csis_pubs/task,view/id,4460/type,1/

	5 Years	10 Years	20 Years
Impact	-0.0004	-0.0003	-0.0002
Upper	0.95	0.9	0.8
Lower	0.9	0.85	0.75

C3: Hegemonic Cultural Power

33: C3: Hegemonic Cultural Power: Only in America: America's particularities will survive George Bush

Even in an age of retreat, American still emphasizes the exceptionalism that defined the 20th century. Several think tanks have authored reports confirming that, indeed, America is special. The big change coming is not the end of American exceptionalism but the end of American triumphalism. Winning the cold war left many Americans intoxicated with

power. Even Bill Clinton boasted about America as the “indispensable nation”—a country that stood taller and saw farther than its rivals. The mood is very different today. The main challenge facing the next president will not be to blunt American exceptionalism, but to make sure that American triumphalism is not replaced by a grumpy and irresponsible isolationism.

Source: http://www.economist.com/world/na/displaystory.cfm?story_id=11089896

	5 Years	10 Years	20 Years
Impact	.000009	.000009	.000009
Upper	0.75	0.8	0.85
Lower	0.6	0.75	0.75

47: C3: Hegemonic Cultural Power: South Asia, A New Center of Democracy?

This article talks about the recent growth spurt of Democracy in South Asia, a spurt that has been successful, especially in Pakistan, initially at least. The long term may prove to be something different and this success needs US support to stay afloat. Despite the bleak outlook, we must not dismiss the others. If these new democracies do not hold, then in many cases the consequences could be devastating, returning their citizens to the longstanding conflicts from which they have only recently emerged. Instead, the West should take hope that in Pakistan, over 40 percent of the population came out to vote. And, in Nepal, 60 percent. And this, despite the insecurity and/or illegitimacy of the elections. It is this section of the population — those interested in building democracy — the West should engage. Democracy is spreading even further; the primary cultural export of America. The more democracy, the better for the hegemonic order.

Source: Belfer Center for International Affairs

http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/18251/south_asia_a_new_center_of_democracy.html

	5 Years	10 Years	20 Years
Impact	0.0002	0.0004	0.0006
Upper	0.8	0.85	0.85
Lower	0.75	0.8	0.8

54: C3: Hegemonic Cultural Power: **Can democracy save the planet?**

This article arose from a conference in London, asking the question –does democracy enable sustainable development, or get in the way?”. While problems do exist for democracy, the coupling of market interests to politics among them, overall democracy is crucial and necessary for decent and equitable sustainable development, but is currently coupled tightly to the established "growth model" - to a degree that raises deep questions about whether it can deal with the risks stemming from the excesses of that model.

Source: http://www.opendemocracy.net/article/can_democracy_save_the_planet
Open Democracy

	5 Years	10 Years	20 Years
Impact	0.00007	0.00009	0.0003
Upper	0.5	0.75	0.8
Lower	0.45	0.6	0.75

D1: Hegemonic Political Power

7: D1: Hegemonic Political Power: Whether it is Clinton, McCain or Obama, the world will still quarrel with America's foreign policy.

A Bush-less American foreign policy is expected to get an immediate pop from the international community, thus improving America’s standing and hegemonic credentials. However, there is little that can be done that will have a major impact. The legacy of the Bush years will persist for some time after he leaves office and it will take much work to turn around opinion on American foreign policy; that is, if the next administration WILL turn it around.

Source:
http://www.economist.com/opinion/displaystory.cfm?story_id=10924123&fsrc=RSS

	5 Years	10 Years	20 Years
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Impact	.0006	.0000001	.00000001
Upper	0.9	0.9	0.8
Lower	0.7	0.85	0.9

9: D1: Hegemonic Political Power: Us and Them: The Enduring Power of Ethnic Nationalism

Americans generally belittle the role of ethnic nationalism in politics. But in fact, it corresponds to some enduring propensities of the human spirit, it is galvanized by modernization, and in one form or another, it will drive global politics for generations to come. Once ethnic nationalism has captured the imagination of groups in a multiethnic society, ethnic disaggregation or partition is often the least bad answer. Ethnic nationalism is a roadblock to hegemonic policy. No matter what America does in certain areas of the world, political cooperation will be short because of ethnic tensions.

Source: <http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20080301faessay87203/jerry-z-muller/us-and-them.html>

	5 Years	10 Years	20 Years
Impact	-.00005	-.00003	-.00002
Upper	0.75	0.8	0.85
Lower	0.65	0.75	0.75

29: D1: Hegemonic Political Power: A Battalion’s Worth of Good Ideas

The author argues that a separate branch of US military advisors that can offer up assistance to allies in not only the current war on terror but any future conflicts where a US presence may be desirable but not in the form of operational combat forces. Nagl believes that such a boost in advisory capacity will effectively learn from previous successful advisory experiences, namely that local forces will ultimately win the war. Such a strategy will prove not only effective in achieving US aims, but also cost effective

as well. Political power derives from military power and US advisors have been a staple of foreign policy since the Second World War. This is no different.

Source: http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/02/opinion/02nagl.html?_r=1&oref=slogin

	5 Years	10 Years	20 Years
Impact	.0007	.0009	.0012
Upper	0.9	0.9	0.9
Lower	0.6	0.75	0.85

58: D1: Hegemonic Political Power: Is the U.S. doing enough to alleviate the world food crisis?

The question posed by the title of this piece is a mixed result. While the 1 billion in aid promised by the Bush administration will be welcomed world-wide it will not be until 2009 that the money and aid will begin to flow, and even that could be stopped by changes in US domestic agricultural policy. Whatever the point, this demonstrates that US political power is still great, especially when it comes to aid.

Source: <http://www.csmonitor.com/2008/0507/p02s02-usec.html>

	5 Years	10 Years	20 Years
Impact	0.9	0.03	0.009
Upper	0.65	0.75	0.85
Lower	0.6	0.7	0.8

51: D1: Hegemonic Political Power: Shell pulls out of Iran gas deal

Shell pulled out of a deal that partnered with Iran on a planned gas project due to US influence and US concern for Iran’s nuclear program. Possible replacement partners include Russian and Chinese companies, however neither have the same experience with this particular type of project that Shell has. US influence made policy occur in the political push against Iran.

Source: <http://www.iranfocus.com/en/iran-general-/shell-pulls-out-of-iran-gas-deal.html>

	5 Years	10 Years	20 Years
Impact	0.00007	0.00003	0.00001
Upper	0.9	0.85	0.75
Lower	0.85	0.8	0.7

50: D1: Hegemonic Political Power: Frustrated Senators See No Exit Signs

General David Petraeus, commander of forces in Iraq went before a Senate panel hearing on withdrawal dates from Iraq. He had none, and danced around the question for hours. What does this mean? It means that either no plan exists (unlikely) or that the situation is simply too fluid to put any existing plan into place. Whatever the point, the US is most likely to stay in Iraq for sometime, at least if the willingness still exists.

Source: http://www.worldsecuritynetwork.com/showArticle3.cfm?article_id=15737&topicID=53

	5 Years	10 Years	20 Years
Impact	-0.09	-0.0008	-0.0006
Upper	0.75	0.85	0.85
Lower	0.6	0.8	0.8

E1: International Hegemonic Order

1: E1: International Hegemonic Order: UK report urges action to restore NATO's credibility

The UK urges action to restore the credibility of NATO as an “indispensable alliance” that is a central pillar of European and UK defense policy. In order to not decline and become irrelevant NATO needs to define its role and purpose far more clearly and should agree a new Strategic Concept explaining that role as a matter of priority. Success in Afghanistan should be at the top of the NATO agenda. NATO is a linchpin of the hegemonic order and an action to restore credibility is important, especially coming from a more senior partner like Great Britain.

Source: http://www.janes.com/news/defence/jdw/jdw080325_1_n.shtml

	5 Years	10 Years	20 Years
Impact	.0005	.00045	.00035
Upper	0.75	0.8	0.8
Lower	0.6	0.75	0.75

5: E1: International Hegemonic Order: British Face Rising Cost of Living, Credit Crunch

British citizens have faced a rise in the cost of living that sees cheap credit disappearing and bankruptcy on the rise. This article is an example of how domestic American economic woes are spreading throughout the order is occurring. More importantly, will there be a breaking point with other followers if the spread is too deep?

Source: <http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=89195093&ft=1&f=1001>

	5 Years	10 Years	20 Years
Impact	-0.00003	-0.000035	-0.000037
Upper	0.8	0.7	0.85
Lower	0.75	0.65	0.8

10: E1: International Hegemonic Order: The Democratic Rollback: The Resurgence of the Predatory State

After decades of historic gains, the world has slipped into a democratic recession. Predatory states are on the rise, threatening both nascent and established democracies throughout the world. But this trend can be reversed with the development of good governance and strict accountability and the help of conditional aid from the West. The order will be affected by a loss of states that slip back from democracy. However, as globalization continues this trend will lapse.

Source: <http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20080301faessay87204/larry-diamond/the-democratic-rollback.html>

	5 Years	10 Years	20 Years
Impact	-0.0008	-0.0005	-0.0001
Upper	0.5	0.55	0.55
Lower	0.45	0.5	0.5

20: E1: International Hegemonic Order: Argentina’s Political and Commercial Relationship with America.

Argentina is a state with serious issues, both economic and political. Many Argentines believe that a combination of the IMF and the US caused the economic meltdown that resonates throughout the country. While Argentina is not quite a malcontent, they are also

no friends of the US. Rapprochement with Chavez and a decided progressive trend in Government has set Argentina apart from the American sphere. While Brazil may be considered the closest partner of Argentina, Brazil's rise in the international arena has unbalanced this relationship. Essentially, Argentina is suffering domestic crises associated with the lack of value of the most important exports, namely foodstuffs. Without sufficient demand the economy has suffered, a blow to an already devastated financial landscape. Argentina needs to invest in manufacturing and the associated education and infrastructure. The important point is that recovery is rooted in domestic issues rather than international. This lead is an example of the problems some hegemonic followers have with the hegemon and the order that leads them to become malcontents. Argentina is a prime example of a state that blames many of its problems on America.

Source:

http://www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/item/2008/0103/bald/baldinelli_relaciones.html#translation

	5 Years	10 Years	20 Years
Impact	-.00005	.00002	.00008
Upper	.9	.9	.85
Lower	.85	.85	.8

38: E1: International Hegemonic Order: Why Islamists Don't Win Elections

This article outlines the fact that when election time comes in Islamic countries the promise to —make an Islamic state” seems to turn voters off. From Asia to the Middle East, including Iran, the platforms that include Islamic law and principles are being defeated for secular parties. Why do Islamists fail to do better in elections in Muslim countries? There are many answers. The one I prefer comes from Turkish President Abdullah Gül: —Most Muslims like to live in an Islamic society with a secular state.”

Source: <http://www.feer.com/features/2008/april/why-islamists-dont-win-elections>

	5 Years	10 Years	20 Years
Impact	.0002	.00004	.00006
Upper	0.65	0.7	0.7
Lower	0.55	0.65	0.65

40: E1: International Hegemonic Order: The Debate on Biofuels: Between Food Security and the Price of Oil

According to this piece, the spike in food prices is caused by a combination of factors, among them: the 58 percent rise of fertilizer prices in the last year, the high cost of oil, and the actions of “speculators” looking for “opportunities” in markets of raw materials. Latin American, where this piece is based on, has 30 percent more food than it needs to feed its populace. The problem is also about how this is organized and who controls production and the distribution of the profits. According to this piece, it’s likely that the huge demand for biofuels shares responsibility for the rise in food prices. But it’s not true that biofuels are wholly responsible for an entire fifth of the world’s population is going hungry.

Source: *North American Congress on Latin American:*
<http://www.nacla.org/node/4591>

	5 Years	10 Years	20 Years
Impact	-0.003	-0.0004	-0.0002
Upper	0.85	0.85	0.9
Lower	0.8	0.8	0.85

41: E1: International Hegemonic Order: Price shock in global food: Riots over grain prices call for a rethink of global stability based on better farming.

The food shortage is real, while some media hype is not. In reality, the food shortages are starting to affect the rich West: a sure sign that it is deeper than thought. The rush to Government control and the putting up of trade barriers will hurt, rather than help, in the long run. Food riots signal the need to rethink global stability and the critical role of those who till the land and feed us all. The prosperity that built the post-Second World War order is slipping. This will ease as alternative are found, but in the short term the order will be weakened.

Source: *The Christian Science Monitor*: <http://www.csmonitor.com/2008/0407/p08s01-comv.html>

	5 Years	10 Years	20 Years
Impact	-0.09	-0.008	-0.0002
Upper	0.95	0.9	0.85
Lower	0.9	0.85	0.75

44: E1: International Hegemonic Order: Iceland's Deep Freeze

Iceland is a victim of the global credit crunch for a simple reason: it depended on foreign investment and capital to fuel its astounding growth spurt in the last decade (4% annually). Iceland, a seemingly insignificant player, is an example of just how connected the international markets are and despite the fact they were successful, the global situation has made a dramatic impact on a local economy. Again, this lead is representative of how the order is affected by the poor economic situation, even a small state that had little to do with the problem.

Source: http://www.newyorker.com/talk/financial/2008/04/21/080421ta_talk_surowiecki
The New Yorker, May 12th, 2008

	5 Years	10 Years	20 Years
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Impact	-0.002	-0.0002	-0.00002
Upper	0.85	0.85	0.9
Lower	0.8	0.8	0.85

48: E1: International Hegemonic Order: Europe's unlikely attempt to renew a "partnership" with Russia.

Even as Russia violates Icelandic airspace with routine bomber missions the EU has reopened talks for a long dormant partnership. This idea is tied to Russia's energy bullying of smaller East European EU members, as well as Poland. Russia ties political demands to energy deliveries, a sort of partnership may relieve such tensions, but this is doubtful with Putin still continuing to play a significant role in Government, despite his position change. Of course, there is no New Cold War, and that is fine. The problem is that what has replaced it, while no replica, feels familiar.

Source:

http://www.worldsecuritynetwork.com/showArticle3.cfm?article_id=15779&topicID=53

	5 Years	10 Years	20 Years
Impact	-0.0002	-0.0005	-0.0007
Upper	0.8	0.85	0.8
Lower	0.75	0.8	0.75

F1: Hegemonic Followers

3: F1: Hegemonic Followers: NATO expected to further Balkan enlargement

NATO has sent signals that it will invite Albania, Croatia and Macedonia into the alliance. These three states have done enough to merit an invite, according to a senior European diplomat. This lead demonstrates that the followers of the hegemon and order are still following, at least by joining the institutions created by the order.

Source: http://www.janes.com/news/defence/triservice/jdw/jdw080305_2_n.shtml
Date: 3/5/08

	5 Years	10 Years	20 Years
Impact	.0009	.005	.008
Upper	0.6	0.65	0.9
Lower	0.5	0.55	0.8

8: F1: Hegemonic Followers: The Canadian Connection in the Caribbean

Canada is exploiting and increasing its presence in the Caribbean, from finance to business to policeman to reorganize chaotic local departments. While the Canadian presence is not large, the simple fact is that it is increasing. Canada is beginning to expand outward, but how far will it expand is the question. Canada is an important member of the hegemonic order. This lead demonstrates that they are trying to break out on their own. while avoiding direct competition with the hegemon.

Source:
http://www.economist.com/world/la/displaystory.cfm?story_id=10925797&fsrc=RSS

	5 Years	10 Years	20 Years
Impact	.0003	.0004	.0005
Upper	0.85	0.75	0.7
Lower	0.8	0.7	0.69

14: F1: Hegemonic Followers: **The NATO Alliance at War**

While some cite the lack of full participation of some NATO members, the organization was always a multilayered partnership. NATO is still hugely relevant and is involved in many places, Afghanistan, Kosovo, etc. Basically, NATO is not going away, nor losing its place in the world anytime soon.

Source:

http://www.cfr.org/publication/15902/nato_alliance_at_war.html?breadcrumb=%2F

	5 Years	10 Years	20 Years
Impact	.0001	.0002	.0003
Upper	0.95	0.95	0.85
Lower	0.9	0.9	0.8

19: F1: Hegemonic Followers: **Canada, 2008: Winter of (Mild) Discontent**

Canada has strong ties to the US and a weakening US leads to a possible stronger Canada, especially in regards to international affairs. Domestically the Canadians have a minority government, something that is not granted to stay around. With the departure of the minority government comes the possible withdrawal from Afghanistan and other NATO operations that Canadians see as superfluous to their interests. The Canadians have a rather chilly political climate, something their Southern neighbors are lacking. However, they run the risk of asking for something, then getting it.

Source: http://www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/item/2008/0103/jone/jones_mild.html

	5 Years	10 Years	20 Years
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Impact	.0002	.0005	.0009
Upper	0.75	0.9	0.95
Lower	0.7	0.85	0.9

36: F1: Hegemonic Followers: Out of Area and Very Much in Business? NATO, the U.S., and the Post-9/11 International Security Environment

This paper seeks to determine why the United States chose to bypass NATO after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks and the relative strengths and weaknesses of alliance and coalition operations, through an examination of NATO's missions in Bosnia and Kosovo and U.S.-led coalition operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. While the United States emerged from NATO's two Balkans missions with a belief that its operational freedom and flexibility had been hampered by operating within alliance constraints, coalition operations in Afghanistan and Iraq raised key questions about whether ad hoc coalitions are the most appropriate mechanisms for conducting such operations. NATO's contributions to post combat reconstruction and stabilization also highlighted some of the core advantages to be derived from working through the alliance. If NATO can follow through on the transformation agenda it has undertaken since the 2002 Prague Summit, the indications are that the United States is more likely to turn to NATO for future operations and that NATO's days as a "toolbox" may well be numbered. NATO may be playing a far stronger role in the hegemonic order than anytime in its past if Prague is adhered to.

Source: [Comparative Strategy](#), Volume [27](#), Issue [1](#) January 2008 , pages 65 - 78

	5 Years	10 Years	20 Years
Impact	.0002	.0004	.0005
Upper	0.9	0.8	0.75
Lower	0.85	0.75	0.7

60: F1: Hegemonic Followers: U.S.-Australia Alliance Goes Back to Business First with Kevin Rudd

The new Australian PM has taken John Howard's support for the US and reinforced it, emphasizing the Australia/China/US strategic triangle and making Australia an active ally and busy partner of the US.

Source: http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2008/0404_australia_fullilove.aspx

	5 Years	10 Years	20 Years
Impact	.00004	.00005	.00005
Upper	0.95	0.9	0.9
Lower	0.9	0.85	0.75

F2: Hegemonic Malcontents

6: F2: Hegemonic Malcontents: **Pakistani PM vows to fight terror**

Yusuf Raza Gillani, the Pakistani Prime Minister, claims the first priority for his country is to find peace and fight militants. Among other actions the ban on student and trade unions has been lifted and steps toward integrating the lawless tribal areas into the rest of the country, along with full rights for the inhabitants, have been discussed and enacted. Pakistan is beginning to fight their war on terror their way, through positive steps that will perhaps bring the country together.

Source: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/7320065.stm

Type: Passive-Aggressive

	5 Years	10 Years	20 Years
Impact	.0001	.0005	.0008
Upper	0.35	0.39	0.45
Lower	0.30	0.35	0.40

11: F2: Hegemonic Malcontents: An Empty Revolution: The Unfulfilled Promises of Hugo Chávez.

Even critics of Hugo Chávez tend to concede that he has made helping the poor his top priority. But in fact, Chávez's government has not done any more to fight poverty than past Venezuelan governments, and his much-heralded social programs have had little effect. A close look at the evidence reveals just how much Chávez's "revolution" has hurt Venezuela's economy -- and that the poor are hurting most of all.

Source: <http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20080301faessay87205/francisco-rodriguez/an-empty-revolution.html>

Type: Revolutionary

	5 Years	10 Years	20 Years
Impact	.00008	.00015	.00030
Upper	0.65	0.7	0.6
Lower	0.6	0.65	0.5

12: F2: Hegemonic Malcontents: Staying Alive: Why North Korea Will Not Change

Despite international calls for reform, the North Korean government is doing its best to maintain the domestic status quo -- and with good reason, at least from its perspective. Still, change is coming in very slow motion thanks to international aid and illegal exchanges with the outside world, which are eroding Pyongyang's legitimacy. North Korea is determined to keep its status as an enemy of the US. The need for assistance will damage this picture of a revolutionary malcontent against the order.

Source: <http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20080301faessay87202/andrei-lankov/staying-alive.html>

Type: Revolutionary

	5 Years	10 Years	20 Years
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Impact	.00001	.00009	.0003
Upper	.004	.012	0.9
Lower	.002	.002	0.8

15: F2: Hegemonic Malcontents: **A Balancing Act in Pakistan**

Pakistan’s new government has made it clear that the cooperation enjoyed with Musharraf is going to end. The new PM and government will begin to undertake strategies that limit US freedom for military operations, negotiations with militants as a counter strategy and serious concerns about civilian deaths in the war against extremists. Basically the US will have to balance diplomacy and negotiation with a government that is not so eager to lay down to the US effort against Islamic militants.

Source:

http://www.cfr.org/publication/15862/balancing_act_in_pakistan.html?breadcrumb=%2F

Type: Passive-Aggressive

	5 Years	10 Years	20 Years
Impact	-.009	-.0002	-.0003
Upper	.45	.25	.35
Lower	.35	.2	.29

16: F2: Hegemonic Malcontents: **Seeing Iran’s Shadow in Iraq Unrest**

There is no doubt Iran has vested interests in Iraq. From economic to political ties, Iran is involved in many aspects of Iraq. The most concern for the US is how deep Iranian influence is in relation to the insurgency. Not only that, but the question of exactly why Iran is so involved is also unresolved. Keeping the Sunnis out of power, inspiring a sort of managed chaos in Iraq to suit Iran’s needs; all could be motives. What it all leads back to is Iran’s continued undermining of both US and Iraqi efforts at stabilizing and re-building.

Source:

http://www.cfr.org/publication/15858/irans_shadow_in_iraq.html?breadcrumb=%2F

Type: Revolutionary

	5 Years	10 Years	20 Years
Impact	-.00005	-.00002	-.000009
Upper	0.75	0.85	0.75
Lower	0.5	0.8	0.7

23: F2: Hegemonic Malcontents: Hearts and Minds in Pakistan

The new Pakistani Government is aiming for a truce with the Islamic militants who stage attacks and suicide bombings all over Pakistan. While a dialogue will hopefully help curb the attacks and save Pakistani lives, American policy makers are nervous at what a truce could do to the hunt for terrorists, which has been intensifying as of late. The author concludes that the united Pakistani-US front, no matter how superficial, is ending without Musharraf in power. The face of the war on terror in Asia will certainly change.

Source: <http://www.feer.com/features/2008/april/Hearts-and-Minds-in-Pakistan>

Type: Passive-Aggressive

	5 Years	10 Years	20 Years
Impact	-.0009	-.0012	-.0009
Upper	0.9	0.9	0.9
Lower	0.8	0.85	0.85

39: F2: Hegemonic Malcontents: All the way? The evolution of German military power

German strategic decision-makers have to reconsider their approach to the use of force. In Afghanistan, the Bundeswehr is faced with the challenge of a growing insurgency. This situation requires a willingness to provide combat forces for the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force. Hence, the conviction in German domestic

politics that the Bundeswehr should only be employed for the purposes of stabilization and reconstruction is increasingly challenged by a changing operational reality in Afghanistan, and allies' reluctance to continue to accept German policy. In essence, the issue is about German participation in counterinsurgency operations. This article argues that while military force in recent years has become an integral part of German foreign policy to pursue national interests, political decision-makers in Berlin and the broader German public will still have to come to terms with the reality of a new security environment in Afghanistan. For the German government the 'small war' in northern Afghanistan is a very politically exhausting undertaking. Both politically and militarily Germany seems ill prepared to sustain such an operation. Its political and strategic culture still promotes an aversion to involvement in war fighting. Still, there are indicators that the changing operational reality in Afghanistan might lead to a significant evolution of the German approach to the use of force.

Source: International Affairs: Volume 84 Issue 2 Page 211-221, March 2008

Type: Benign

	5 Years	10 Years	20 Years
Impact	-.00004	-.0003	-.002
Upper	0.85	0.85	0.9
Lower	0.8	0.8	0.7

45: F2: Hegemonic Malcontents: Trouble in paradise: Venezuela spreads oil on tropical waters.

Venezuela is attempting to outflank the US in the Caribbean, which includes a Venezuelan run oil refinery in the Dominican Republic. Pending environmental impact studies this has been committed to. This is a part of the alternative trade pact inspired by Chavez, the Alternative for the Americas. With this Chavez hopes to nick some of the influence of the US away from it in the Caribbean region. Environmentally the refinery could be a disaster but the economic impact may trump this.

Source:

<http://www.newint.org/columns/currents/2008/04/01/oil/>

Type: Revolutionary

	5 Years	10 Years	20 Years
Impact	-0.06	-0.0005	-0.0003
Upper	0.9	0.6	0.4
Lower	0.4	0.3	0.2

53: F2: Hegemonic Malcontents: Iran's Oil Industry: A House of Cards?

On paper Iran has the potential to be an energy super power, but in reality the infrastructure that drives that potential is described as a house of cards, crumbling and in poor shape. Oil may be Iran's greatest strength, but it is also Iran's greatest weakness. As such, the debate in the West on how to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons should focus less on the risky military option, or the seemingly ineffective diplomatic option, and more on a comprehensive economic warfare strategy that targets Iran's energy sector. With oil exports accounting for half the government's budget and around 80 to 90 percent of total export earnings, the surest strategy to bring down Tehran's Islamic regime is to break its economic backbone.

Source: <http://www.iags.org/n050707.htm>

Type: **Revolutionary**

	5 Years	10 Years	20 Years
Impact	0.5	0.7	1
Upper	0.4	0.9	0.6
Lower	0.2	0.7	0.2

F3: Hegemonic Challengers

13: F3: Hegemonic Challengers: China and India Go to Africa: New Deals in the Developing World

Economic activity between Africa and Asia, especially China and India, is booming like never before. If the problems and imbalances this sometimes creates are managed well, this expanding engagement could be an unprecedented opportunity for Africa's growth and for its integration into the global economy.

Source: <http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20080301faessay87208/harry-g-broadman/china-and-india-go-to-africa.html>

	5 Years	10 Years	20 Years
Impact	-.0005	-.0009	-.002
Upper	0.9	0.9	0.9
Lower	0.6	0.7	0.8

25: F3: Hegemonic Challengers: Asia's 'Rising Elephant' Stumbles

India, which has been sustained with a booming economy, has experienced a slow down, to around 5.3 percent. The rupee has begun to fall against the dollar again, and the stock market has taken a few good hits. While India will not stop, it will slow down to a crawl.

The Government is taking measures such as improvement of infrastructure, improvement in education and tax measures. It is hoped that these efforts will jump start the flagging growth in India's economy.

Source: <http://www.feer.com/economics/2008/march/Asias-Rising-Elephant-Stumbles>

	5 Years	10 Years	20 Years
Impact	.0002	-.0001	-.0003
Upper	0.8	0.85	0.85
Lower	0.75	0.8	0.8

30: F3: Hegemonic Challengers: China's inflation worries: High prices for food, fuel and other goods are troubling.

Inflation in China had led to decreased consumer spending, stricter price controls by the government, and a strengthening currency against the dollar. Despite the headlines Chinese inflation is currently attracting, the Economist Intelligence Unit expects the year-on-year rate of inflation to fall rapidly in the second half of 2008. The key factor will be a cyclical fall in pork prices from the high base in 2007, helped by a restocking of China's pig herds. However, surging global food prices are likely to mean that the deceleration in inflation will not be as swift or deep as we previously expected. We have consequently increased our inflation forecast for 2008 to 5.9% (from 5% previously).

Short-term grain price inflation remains to a large extent dependent on the weather, and there is a risk that a major drought in China could cause price growth to accelerate rapidly. In the longer term, a falling supply of agricultural land, water shortages, and rising fuel and fertilizer costs will put upward pressure on food prices. However, inflation in the cost of manufactures will remain low, owing to intense competition and massive investment. Inflation should slow further in 2009, averaging 3.6%, owing to improving agricultural supply.

Source: http://www.economist.com/daily/news/displaystory.cfm?story_id=11114381

	5 Years	10 Years	20 Years
Impact	.0008	.0005	.0002
Upper	.9	.8	.9
Lower	.5	.2	.85

32: F3: Hegemonic Challengers: China and EU address trade issues.

China is taking its trading relationship with the EU more seriously than at anytime in the past. This is the EU response to continued Sino-American dialogue and China's realization of the power of the EU in trade matters.

Source: http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/dd0543e0-12a3-11dd-8d91-0000779fd2ac.html?nclick_check=1

	5 Years	10 Years	20 Years
Impact	-.005	-.009	-.10
Upper	0.75	0.8	0.95
Lower	0.7	0.75	0.9

34: F3: Hegemonic Challengers: Military Power of the People's Republic of China

This is a Department of Defense report on the status of the Chinese military. While the US welcomes a stable, prosperous partner the future of the People's Liberation Army is uncertain. The Chinese have increased their technology with foreign purchases and combined with the size of the forces it is evident that the balance of power will change in Asia. Further, the PLA is slowly increasing its capability to project its power farther and farther away; this also contributes to the significant change in the balance of power. Limited knowledge combined with increased capacity makes China a potential enemy of a good friend.

Source: <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/2008/2008-prc-military-power.htm>

	5 Years	10 Years	20 Years
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Impact	-.006	-.010	-.19
Upper	0.7	0.7	0.75
Lower	0.5	0.6	0.7

46: F3: Hegemonic Challengers: It Is Time for the Pentagon’s PLA Report to Grow Up

Essentially calling for a revision of the China Military power report, this article details the need for greater transparency of China in its military capabilities. Such concealment is in response to Chinese perceptions of opposition to military goals. This article advocates a more detailed report, designed to convince the Chinese to be more open about their capabilities in the name of cooperation. It also stresses that the report needs to be more like the 1980s Soviet Military power reports.

Source: http://www.strategycenter.net/research/pubID.182/pub_detail.asp

	5 Years	10 Years	20 Years
Impact	0.00001	.000001	.000009
Upper	0.2	0.2	0.3
Lower	0.09	0.09	0.07

49: F3: Hegemonic Challengers: NATO Summit In Bucharest: A Glass Half-Empty Or Half-Full?

Three themes seem to prevail within NATO after Bucharest, the continued Russian obstinance against NATO and the encroachment the organization is undertaking right to Russia’s doorstep, a possible return of France to NATO as the organization plays an ever

greater role as the defense arm of the EU, and the increased commitment of member states to Afghanistan. The return of France may very well signal a major change in the orientation of NATO and the organization's relationship with the EU.

Source:

http://www.worldsecuritynetwork.com/showArticle3.cfm?article_id=15731&topicID=31

	5 Years	10 Years	20 Years
Impact	0.4	0.8	2
Upper	0.8	0.85	0.85
Lower	0.79	0.8	0.8

Appendix 2: The Results of the Futures Analysis Exercise

C1: Hegemonic Economic Power

Lead #	5 years					
	Impact	Low Prob.	Up Prob.	LEI	UEI	
2	-0.0006	0.65	0.75	-0.00039	-0.00045	
17	-0.009	0.15	0.2	-0.00135	-0.0018	
24	-0.014	0.3	0.6	-0.0042	-0.0084	
31	-0.0012	0.5	0.55	-0.0006	-0.00066	
37	0.0005	0.8	0.85	0.0004	0.000425	
43	0.000002	0.9	0.95	1.8E-06	1.9E-06	
52	-0.2	0.4	0.45	-0.08	-0.09	
55	0.03	0.7	0.75	0.021	0.0225	

Lead #	10 years					
	Impact	Low Prob.	Up Prob.	LEI	UEI	
2	-0.005	0.75	0.85	-0.00375	-0.00425	
17	-0.005	0.25	0.3	-0.00125	-0.0015	
24	-0.009	0.35	0.65	-0.00315	-0.00585	
31	-0.0014	0.55	0.6	-0.00077	-0.00084	
37	0.00009	0.6	0.75	0.000054	6.75E-05	
43	0.000005	0.9	0.95	4.5E-06	4.75E-06	
52	-0.3	0.5	0.55	-0.15	-0.165	
55	0.04	0.75	0.8	0.03	0.032	

Lead #	20 years					
	Impact	Low Prob.	Up Prob.	LEI	UEI	
2	-0.0045	0.75	0.8	-0.00338	-0.0036	
17	-0.00009	0.25	0.3	-2.3E-05	-2.7E-05	
24	-0.009	0.6	0.75	-0.0054	-0.00675	
31	-0.0016	0.8	0.85	-0.00128	-0.00136	
37	0.00007	0.75	0.8	5.25E-05	0.000056	
43	0.4	0.9	0.95	0.36	0.38	
52	-2	0.55	0.6	-1.1	-1.2	
55	0.6	0.75	0.8	0.45	0.48	

C2: Hegemonic Military Power

Lead #	5 years				
	Impact	Low Prob.	Up Prob.	LEI	UEI
4	-0.00002	0.9	0.95	-1.8E-05	-1.9E-05
18	-0.0009	0.8	0.85	-0.00072	-0.00077
21	-0.009	0.85	0.9	-0.00765	-0.0081
22	0.00005	0.85	0.9	4.25E-05	0.000045
26	0.00009	0.7	0.75	0.000063	6.75E-05
27	0.00009	0.9	0.95	0.000081	8.55E-05
28	0.000009	0.9	0.95	8.1E-06	8.55E-06
35	0.00009	0.75	0.8	6.75E-05	0.000072
42	0.00008	0.86	0.9	6.88E-05	0.000072

Lead #	10 years				
	Impact	Low Prob.	Up Prob.	LEI	UEI
4	-0.0001	0.9	0.95	-0.00009	-9.5E-05
18	-0.00011	0.9	0.95	-9.9E-05	-0.0001
21	-0.006	0.85	0.9	-0.0051	-0.0054
22	0.00009	0.8	0.85	0.000072	7.65E-05
26	0.00012	0.75	0.8	0.00009	0.000096
27	0.00009	0.9	0.95	0.000081	8.55E-05
28	0.000019	0.9	0.95	1.71E-05	1.81E-05
35	0.00012	0.8	0.85	0.000096	0.000102
42	0.00009	0.9	0.95	0.000081	8.55E-05

Lead #	20 years				
	Impact	Low Prob.	Up Prob.	LEI	UEI
4	-0.00025	0.85	0.9	-0.00021	-0.00023
18	-0.00015	0.85	0.9	-0.00013	-0.00014
21	-0.0009	0.8	0.85	-0.00072	-0.00077
22	0.00012	0.8	0.85	0.000096	0.000102
26	0.00015	0.75	0.8	0.000113	0.00012
27	0.00009	0.8	0.85	0.000072	7.65E-05
28	0.00003	0.9	0.95	0.000027	2.85E-05
35	0.00015	0.9	0.95	0.000135	0.000143
42	0.00012	0.9	0.95	0.000108	0.000114

C3: Hegemonic Cultural Power

Lead #	5 years					
	Impact	Low Prob.	Up Prob.	LEI	UEI	
33	0.000009	0.6	0.75	5.4E-06	6.75E-06	
47	0.0002	0.75	0.8	0.00015	0.00016	
54	0.00007	0.45	0.5	3.15E-05	0.000035	

Lead #	10 years					
	Impact	Low Prob.	Up Prob.	LEI	UEI	
33	0.000009	0.75	0.8	6.75E-06	7.2E-06	
47	0.0004	0.8	0.85	0.00032	0.00034	
54	0.00009	0.6	0.75	0.000054	6.75E-05	

Lead #	20 years					
	Impact	Low Prob.	Up Prob.	LEI	UEI	
33	0.000009	0.75	0.85	6.75E-06	7.65E-06	
47	0.0006	0.8	0.85	0.00048	0.00051	
54	0.0003	0.75	0.8	0.000225	0.00024	

D1: Hegemonic Political Power

Lead #	5 years					
	Impact	Low Prob.	Up Prob.	LEI	UEI	
7	0.0006	0.75	0.9	0.00045	0.00054	
9	-0.00005	0.65	0.75	-3.3E-05	-3.8E-05	
29	0.0007	0.6	0.9	0.00042	0.00063	
50	-0.09	0.6	0.75	-0.054	-0.0675	
51	0.00007	0.85	0.9	5.95E-05	0.000063	
58	0.9	0.6	0.65	0.54	0.585	

Lead #	10 years					
	Impact	Low Prob.	Up Prob.	LEI	UEI	
7	0.0000001	0.85	0.9	8.5E-08	9E-08	
9	-0.00003	0.75	0.8	-2.3E-05	-2.4E-05	
29	0.0009	0.75	0.9	0.000675	0.00081	
50	-0.0008	0.8	0.85	-0.00064	-0.00068	
51	0.00003	0.8	0.85	0.000024	2.55E-05	
58	0.03	0.7	0.75	0.021	0.0225	

Lead #	20 years					
	Impact	Low Prob.	Up Prob.	LEI	UEI	
7	0.00000001	0.8	0.9	8E-09	9E-09	
9	-0.00002	0.75	0.85	-1.5E-05	-1.7E-05	
29	0.0012	0.85	0.9	0.00102	0.00108	
50	-0.0006	0.8	0.85	-0.00048	-0.00051	
51	0.00001	0.7	0.75	0.000007	7.5E-06	
58	0.009	0.8	0.85	0.0072	0.00765	

E1: International Hegemonic Order

Lead #	5 years				
	Impact	Low Prob.	Up Prob.	LEI	UEI
1	0.0005	0.6	0.75	0.0003	0.000375
5	-0.00003	0.75	0.8	-2.3E-05	-2.4E-05
10	-0.0008	0.45	0.5	-0.00036	-0.0004
20	-0.00005	0.85	0.9	-4.3E-05	-4.5E-05
38	0.0002	0.55	0.65	0.00011	0.00013
40	-0.003	0.8	0.85	-0.0024	-0.00255
41	-0.09	0.9	0.95	-0.081	-0.0855
44	-0.002	0.8	0.85	-0.0016	-0.0017
48	-0.0002	0.75	0.8	-0.00015	-0.00016

Lead #	10 years				
	Impact	Low Prob.	Up Prob.	LEI	UEI
1	0.00045	0.75	0.8	0.000338	0.00036
5	-0.000035	0.65	0.7	-2.3E-05	-2.5E-05
10	-0.0005	0.5	0.55	-0.00025	-0.00028
20	0.00002	0.85	0.9	0.000017	0.000018
38	0.00004	0.65	0.7	0.000026	0.000028
40	-0.0004	0.8	0.85	-0.00032	-0.00034
41	-0.008	0.85	0.9	-0.0068	-0.0072
44	-0.0002	0.8	0.85	-0.00016	-0.00017
48	-0.0005	0.8	0.85	-0.0004	-0.00043

Lead #	20 years				
	Impact	Low Prob.	Up Prob.	LEI	UEI
1	0.00035	0.75	0.8	0.000263	0.00028
5	-0.000037	0.8	0.85	-3E-05	-3.1E-05
10	-0.0001	0.5	0.55	-0.00005	-5.5E-05
20	0.00008	0.8	0.85	0.000064	0.000068
38	0.00006	0.65	0.7	0.000039	0.000042
40	-0.0002	0.85	0.9	-0.00017	-0.00018
41	-0.0002	0.75	0.85	-0.00015	-0.00017
44	-0.00002	0.85	0.9	-1.7E-05	-1.8E-05
48	-0.0007	0.75	0.8	-0.00053	-0.00056

F1: Hegemonic Followers

Lead #	5 years				
	Impact	Low Prob.	Up Prob.	LEI	UEI
3	0.0009	0.5	0.6	0.00045	0.00054
8	0.0003	0.8	0.85	0.00024	0.000255
14	0.0001	0.9	0.95	0.00009	0.000095
19	0.0002	0.7	0.75	0.00014	0.00015
36	0.0002	0.85	0.9	0.00017	0.00018
60	0.00004	0.9	0.95	0.000036	0.000038

Lead #	10 years				
	Impact	Low Prob.	Up Prob.	LEI	UEI
3	0.005	0.55	0.65	0.00275	0.00325
8	0.0004	0.7	0.75	0.00028	0.0003
14	0.0002	0.9	0.95	0.00018	0.00019
19	0.0005	0.85	0.9	0.000425	0.00045
36	0.0004	0.75	0.8	0.0003	0.00032
60	0.00005	0.85	0.9	4.25E-05	0.000045

Lead #	20 years				
	Impact	Low Prob.	Up Prob.	LEI	UEI
3	0.008	0.85	0.9	0.0068	0.0072
8	0.0005	0.69	0.7	0.000345	0.00035
14	0.0003	0.8	0.85	0.00024	0.000255
19	0.0009	0.9	0.95	0.00081	0.000855
36	0.0005	0.7	0.75	0.00035	0.000375
60	0.00005	0.75	0.9	3.75E-05	0.000045

F2: Hegemonic Malcontents

Lead #	5 years				
	Impact	Low Prob.	Up Prob.	LEI	UEI
6	0.0001	0.3	0.35	0.00003	0.000035
11	0.00008	0.6	0.65	0.000048	0.000052
12	0.00001	0.002	0.004	2E-08	4E-08
15	-0.009	0.35	0.45	-0.00315	-0.00405
16	-0.00005	0.5	0.75	-2.5E-05	-3.8E-05
23	-0.0009	0.8	0.9	-0.00072	-0.00081
39	-0.00004	0.3	0.5	-1.2E-05	-0.00002
45	-0.06	0.4	0.9	-0.024	-0.054
53	0.005	0.2	0.4	0.001	0.002

Lead #	10 years				
	Impact	Low Prob.	Up Prob.	LEI	UEI
6	0.0005	0.35	0.39	0.000175	0.000195
11	0.00015	0.65	0.7	9.75E-05	0.000105
12	0.00009	0.02	0.12	1.8E-06	1.08E-05
15	-0.0002	0.2	0.25	-0.00004	-0.00005
16	-0.00002	0.8	0.85	-1.6E-05	-1.7E-05
23	-0.0012	0.85	0.9	-0.00102	-0.00108
39	-0.0003	0.2	0.4	-0.00006	-0.00012
45	-0.0005	0.3	0.6	-0.00015	-0.0003
53	0.7	0.7	0.9	0.49	0.63

Lead #	20 years				
	Impact	Low Prob.	Up Prob.	LEI	UEI
6	0.0008	0.39	0.4	0.000312	0.00032
11	0.0003	0.5	0.6	0.00015	0.00018
12	0.0003	0.8	0.9	0.00024	0.00027
15	-0.0003	0.29	0.35	-8.7E-05	-0.00011
16	-0.000009	0.7	0.75	-6.3E-06	-6.8E-06
23	-0.0009	0.85	0.9	-0.00077	-0.00081
39	-0.002	0.7	0.9	-0.0014	-0.0018
45	-0.0003	0.2	0.4	-0.00006	-0.00012
53	0.1	0.2	0.6	0.02	0.06

F3: Hegemonic Challengers

Lead #	5 years					
	Impact	Low Prob.	Up Prob.	LEI	UEI	
13	-0.0005	0.6	0.9	-0.0003	-0.00045	
25	0.0002	0.75	0.8	0.00015	0.00016	
30	0.0008	0.5	0.9	0.0004	0.00072	
32	-0.005	0.7	0.75	-0.0035	-0.00375	
34	-0.006	0.5	0.7	-0.003	-0.0042	
46	0.00001	0.09	0.2	9E-07	0.000002	
49	0.4	0.79	0.8	0.316	0.32	

Lead #	10 years					
	Impact	Low Prob.	Up Prob.	LEI	UEI	
13	-0.0009	0.7	0.9	-0.00063	-0.00081	
25	-0.0001	0.8	0.85	-0.00008	-8.5E-05	
30	0.0005	0.2	0.8	0.0001	0.0004	
32	-0.009	0.75	0.8	-0.00675	-0.0072	
34	-0.01	0.6	0.7	-0.006	-0.007	
46	0.000001	0.09	0.2	9E-08	2E-07	
49	0.8	0.8	0.85	0.64	0.68	

Lead #	20 years					
	Impact	Low Prob.	Up Prob.	LEI	UEI	
13	-0.02	0.8	0.9	-0.016	-0.018	
25	-0.0003	0.8	0.85	-0.00024	-0.00026	
30	0.0002	0.85	0.9	0.00017	0.00018	
32	-0.1	0.9	0.95	-0.09	-0.095	
34	-0.19	0.7	0.75	-0.133	-0.1425	
46	0.000009	0.07	0.3	6.3E-07	2.7E-06	
49	2	0.8	0.85	1.6	1.7	

Vita

John began university at Bowling Green State University in 1995, graduating with a Bachelor of Arts in Political Science and History. Continuing with his education at BGSU, he earned a Master's of Public Administration in 2003 while working as a Teaching Assistant to Dr. Neal Jesse. After a stint teaching at a Community College in Toledo, John decided that it was time to finish with his terminal degree and applied, and was accepted, to the University of Tennessee in 2004. While pursuing his degree he has had the good fortune to continue working with Dr. Jesse on several projects. Further is assistantship with the Arts and Sciences Advising Services has helped him learn the nooks and crags of the Administration process within a University setting, as well as extensive contact with a wide variety of students. In addition to a perverse joy in Political Theory, particularly Marxism, and Dark Ages Britain, John enjoys historical reenactment, collecting British militaria and watching *Battlestar Galactica*.