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Doing Crime: An Analysis of Repetitive Property Offenders' Decision-Making

Kenneth D. Tunnell

University of Tennessee - Knoxville

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We have read this dissertation and recommend its acceptance:

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
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


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
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DOING CRIME: AN ANALYSIS OF
REPETITIVE PROPERTY OFFENDERS' DECISION-MAKING

A Dissertation
Presented for the
Doctor of Philosophy
Degree
The University of Tennessee, Knoxville

Kenneth D. Tunnell

December 1988

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While collecting the data for this research, I worked as a research assistant to Professor Neal Shover, who I thank for the opportunity and for constructive guidance. Professor James Black willingly agreed to serve as my committee chairman mid-way through the dissertation process. To him I owe tremendous gratitude for his guidance and constructive criticisms. Thanks also goes to committee members Don Clelland, Mike Benson and Bill Lyons for their constructive and supportive comments on earlier drafts of this dissertation. Thanks to the sociology department for its support facilities during the writing of this dissertation. Thanks to Sandy Maples for transcribing the interview audio tapes and to the secretaries in the sociology department for their continual support and assistance. To all those who had a hand in this work, a heartfelt thank you.

ABSTRACT

Over the past two decades social theory and research have focused increasingly on issues of criminal decision-making and deterrence. This interdisciplinary movement draws from criminology, economics, and psychology, which share common assumptions that point toward a model of rational decision-making. Each body of thought considers criminal decision-making as being no different than non-criminal decision-making. Deciding whether to commit a crime is considered a "decision problem", a unique one no less, but a decision that is resolved similarly to other decision problems.

The central objective of my research is to enhance our understanding of decision-making, specifically individual career criminal decision-making about whether or not to commit a crime, various alternatives considered in the decision problem, and influences on the decision processes.

This dissertation reviews literature on decision-making processes as explicated by perceptual deterrence, economic, and cognitive decision-making theories. They serve as theoretical guidance for this research. I then review previous research on perceptual deterrence and criminal decision-making processes and suggest that both the merits of rational decision-making theory and proposed modifications of it are debated with little

empirical guidance.

A purposive sample of 60 adult male repetitive offenders incarcerated in the Tennessee Department of Corrections was selected and interviewed at two different points in time. The interviews focused on each subject's criminal calculus, i.e., their decision-making processes. The findings provide a description of criminal decision-making from which typologies of decision-making were constructed. Offenders were separated into Type I and Type II lambda categories, based on offense frequency, resulting in the following typological constructs: (1) the Type I lambda offender; (2) the non-drug-addicted Type II lambda offender; (3) the drug-addicted Type II lambda offender; (4) the hustling Type II lambda offender.

The major conclusion of the study is that criminals do not engage in rational decision-making. They especially do not weigh the possible legal consequences of their actions. Negative consequences are far less influential than positive consequences. This conclusion has implications for deterrence and decision-making theories in that they may not explain adequately the decisions made by repetitive property criminals. The research also addresses the question of offense specialization. My findings are at odds with those who

argue for a "generalist" position suggesting that specialization does occur when criminal activities are viewed over time. Theoretical and methodological suggestions for future research of this nature are offered.

PREFACE

The research for this dissertation is part of a larger research project entitled "Perceptual Deterrence and Desistance from Crime: A Study of Serious, Repetitive Property Offenders." The research project was directed by Professor Neal Shover and was funded by a National Institute of Justice research grant, Number 861-CCT-15. Without this funding this dissertation would not have been possible.

The larger research project was a longitudinal study of adult males imprisoned twice or more for property crimes such as armed robbery and burglary. A purposive sample of 60 offenders incarcerated in the Tennessee Department of Corrections was selected. Each offender was paid \$150 for participating in the research. Confidential, tape recorded interviews were conducted with each subject, in two-waves within a 12-month period. The interviews were conducted by research assistant David Honaker and myself. The first interview was conducted within four months of each subject's release from prison and the second interview within nine months after release. Informed by deterrence theory, the interviews focused on each subject's criminal calculus, i.e., their expectations of the likely gains and losses of further criminal behavior. Both official

records and self-reports of involvement in crime were used to measure the dependent variables: the extent and nature of involvement in criminal behavior during the follow-up period. Data analysis consisted of internal comparisons of subgroups of participants whose criminal calculus showed distinct variation.

Data analyses and interpretation for this dissertation are the sole responsibilities of the author and do not represent those of the principal investigator or the National Institute of Justice.

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CHAPTER I

THEORETICAL CONTEXT AND LITERATURE REVIEW

INTRODUCTION

The central objective of this study is to enhance our understanding of criminal decision-making by describing decision-making processes among repetitive property offenders. It is guided by prescriptive decision-making theories and has implications for those theories and their applicability to repetitive property criminals.

The decision-making processes include the resolution of a decision-problem of whether or not to commit a crime, various alternatives considered within the decision problem, and influences on the decision processes. From self-reported accounts of these processes obtained in interviews conducted at two points in time, typologies of decision-making are constructed and implications of the findings for future research are explored.

PERCEPTUAL DETERRENCE THEORY

Criminologists historically have shown continued and diverse interest in deterrence theory and research. Although conceptual differences pervade the theoretical

literature, a core hypothesis has emerged: namely, law violation is inversely related to the threat of legal punishment (Grasmick and Milligan, 1976). The deterrence doctrine has been defined thusly: "an increase in the probability or severity of punishment for a particular type of crime, or both, will reduce the rate at which that crime is committed, other things being equal" (Cook, 1980:216).

The foundational premise of the deterrence doctrine is that individual behavior is the product of rational deliberation about the expected risks and benefits of a particular course of action. According to deterrence theory, law abiding individuals seek the benefits of conformity (e.g., network acceptance, social standing) and avoid the costs of deviance (e.g., network ostracism, self embarrassment, legal penalties, loss of social standing). The expectation of both social approval for conformity and punishment for deviance are important variables in explaining conformity. Deterrence theory, however, emphasizes the fear of punishment, shaped by external and internal controls, as the variable that best explains conformity to state-created law (Hirschi, 1969). For deterrence theorists then, legal punishment is designed not as retributive in nature but as social control (Meier and Johnson, 1977; Gibbs, 1981). For, it allegedly affects the future

behavior of the punished individual specifically and society generally.

In recent years, deterrence theorists have emphasized the importance of the psychological processes of individuals' decision-making. Perceptual deterrence, a rational-choice model of criminal decision-making, highlights the importance of the actor's assessment of the potential costs and benefits of various behavior options. The actual deterrent effect of sanctions is mediated through and is a product of individuals' perceptions of sanction threats. In this way, the certainty and severity of punishment becomes a "mechanism for information transmission rather than simply . . . a sanctioning system" (Geerken and Gove, 1975: 498). Deterrence theory, therefore, has made a transition to perceptual deterrence theory. Perceptual deterrence processes focus on human decision-making which entails individuals' estimations (i.e., perceptions) of the risks and rewards of crime commission and the certainty and severity of punishment. This explains the growing interest in perceptual deterrence.

Human decision-making consistently has been a topic of intrigue for social scientists. Various theories have been suggested, each purporting to explain how individuals make decisions, that is, make choices

between alternatives. Understanding this process is especially troublesome since choices usually must be made "in the absence of certain knowledge of their consequences" (Sills, 1968: 34). From this quest for theoretical explanations, two branches of thought--economic and cognitive--remain unsurpassed in their contributions to our understanding of decision-making. Like perceptual deterrence theory, economic and cognitive decision-making theories explain how individuals behave when confronted with decision problems (i.e., perceptions of choices among acts, perceptions of the consequences of a given act, and perceptions of the contingencies relating consequences to acts).

ECONOMIC DECISION-MAKING THEORY

Decision-making theory was first developed by mathematicians and economists (Lee, 1971). Over the past two decades economists have proposed various propositions and causal models to explain rational decision-making. Although an overwhelming majority of the research on law and individual behavior has focused on judicial discretion, risk/benefit analyses proposed by economists have been applied increasingly to the decision-making processes of criminals (e.g., Becker, 1968; Firey, 1969; Palmer, 1977).

Economists purport that criminals are normal individuals who are not in need of rehabilitation but who act rationally (Becker, 1968; Sullivan, 1973). "Crime is assumed a priori to involve rational calculation and is viewed essentially as an economic transaction" (Clarke and Cornish, 1985: 156). The economic model suggests that decision making is a processual culmination of progressive steps (Becker, 1976; Hill, et al., 1979). These steps are not mutually exclusive and some overlap does occur (for simplicity, I have collapsed some of these steps and present them here in modified form). The first step is to define the problem (e.g., to burglarize or not to burglarize). To accomplish this, one must gather information by such methods as talking with others who may have confronted similar problems, observing other's behavior, reading, and watching television and films. Second, decision alternatives must be identified and considered. This step implicitly involves assessing the benefits that one hopes to attain. Failing to do so, may result in a less-than-optimal decision. Then third, one must determine if the same or more rewarding benefits could be derived from another action. This evaluation usually is determined by the individual's short or long-term plans, perceptions of the costs and rewards, and personal preferences. Those alternatives not pertinent

or feasible by the decision-maker can be eliminated. Optimal criminal decision-making, just as non-criminal decision-making, according to the economic camp, takes place through a rational progression of these steps. "Economists accept as an article of faith, and assert as a revealed truth, the proposition that man is rational, that he is free to choose among alternative behaviors, and that his choice is governed by a desire to maximize his own well being" (Orsagh, 1983: 392). This article of faith holds that humans calculate. The concept of rational criminal decision-making is founded on two distinct but related ideas. Firstly, the economic approach to decision-making proposes that individuals are rational in their decisions to commit crimes. This approach rests on two basic assumptions about criminal decision-making. The first is that individuals have a realistic perception of the probabilities of being sanctioned and of the severity of the sanction (i.e., risk). Research, however, shows that the general public has incorrect perceptions of the probability and severity of sanction (Jacob, 1979). In fact, research shows that law abiding individuals over-estimate the probability and severity of legal sanction while criminals estimate more realistically (Meier, 1978; Parker and Grasmick, 1979). Some economists define "loss" due to sanction very narrowly (e.g., lost income

while imprisoned). Most theorists, however, agree that "loss" involves pecuniary and non-pecuniary components (e.g., Brown and Reynolds, 1973). Research shows too that offenders consider the expected benefits more than the expected risks in making a decision to commit a crime (Carroll, 1978). And it has been recommended that future research closely examine perceived benefits (Peterson, et al., 1980).

The second assumption is that criminals act after rational calculation rather than impulsively. A rational act is purposive and conscious to obtain an objective. "To act rationally is to employ one's reason to select the most appropriate means for the attainment of one's empirical ends" (Nettler, 1984: 166). One acts rationally if "given a choice between various alternatives he selects what appears to be the most desirable" (Palmer, 1977: 5). Research shows, however, that many criminals live hedonistic lifestyles that demand more income than their legitimate jobs afford (Petersilia, et al., 1978; Jacob, 1979). And this demand for more money often results in impulsive opportunistic behavior rather than rationally calculated behavior. Economists consider this impulsive behavior as "irrational" (Sullivan, 1973).

An economic approach secondly suggests that the selection of an illegitimate occupation (e.g., burglary)

is a rational, calculated decision (Letkemann, 1973; Holzman, 1982; Nettler, 1984; Luckenbill, 1985), or simply put, "a question of occupational choice" (Clarke and Cornish, 1985: 156). Individuals involved in conventional criminal behavior often begin their crime commission at an early age and often within a group setting whose norms support the deviant lifestyle of theft for profit (see, e.g., Luckenbill, 1985). An economic approach suggests that one generally continues this behavior if the "result . . . is generally positive" (Clarke and Cornish, 1985: 170). These individuals demonstrate a partial commitment to criminal behavior as a way of life (Clinard and Quinney, 1967). Career property criminals report that they take pride in their craft which relies on nerve, coolness, and network connections. They enjoy leisure between jobs, autonomy, and non-routinized lifestyles. They contrast their lives to the alternate drab "square-john" lifestyle (Akerstrom, 1985). "Given the low risk of penalty and the high probability of reward and given the absence of pangs of guilt and the presence of hedonistic preferences, crime is a rational occupational choice" for some individuals (Nettler, 1984: 178). Even after being arrested several times, these career criminals may think their career choice is more rational than the alternatives available to them.

COGNITIVE DECISION-MAKING THEORY

Although economists first developed decision-making theory, psychologists soon followed suit. Cognitive decision-making theory is the product of debate among, on one hand, economists who support rational decision-making and, on the other hand, psychologists who support a less-than-rational approach to human decision-making. Psychologists have focused increasingly on deviant behavior and the methods used by individuals when confronted with the decision to commit a crime (e.g., Konecni, et al., 1976; Carrol, 1978; 1982; Konecni and Ebbesen, 1979; Cook, 1980). Until recently, criminologists largely have ignored cognitive psychology and individual's decision-making (Clarke and Cornish, 1985). Three developments have renewed interest in individual criminal decision-making: the Chicago School's interest in "his world"; the failure and rejection of the rehabilitative ideal (Morris, 1974); and the introduction of new means of crime control (e.g., selective incapacitation) (Clarke and Cornish, 1985).

Cognitive psychology treats the decision-maker as a "limited information processor who has many different simplifying strategies for making choices" (Johnson and Payne, 1986: 180). When individuals are faced with a decision, they frame it as a decision-problem. This

problem is defined by "the acts or options among which one must choose, the possible outcomes or consequences of these acts, and the contingencies or conditional probabilities that relate outcomes to acts" (Tversky and Kahneman, 1981: 453). For example, a potential property offender is faced with a decision--whether to commit a particular property crime. He cognitively frames a "decision-problem" and uses his own psychological perceptions to evaluate the choices of crime commission or non-commission. In evaluating his choices, he may also evaluate the perceived consequences of each choice or act and the probability of an outcome to a particular act.

When making choices about gains and losses, the imperfections of individuals' perceptions and consequent decisions may cloud the possible outcomes and contingencies of their decisions. Thus, psychologists argue that although acting rationally based on their perceptions, individuals often do not act optimally (Goldberg, 1970; Gardner, 1985) and may fail to "make decisions that [are] objectively the best" (Clarke and Cornish, 1985: 159). Rather, two different people can select two different behaviors -- both of which are rational to them, but formed by their individual subjective perceptions (Palmer, 1977). The cognitive model clearly supports this subjectivity in criminal

decision-making. The belief is that individuals do not "conceptualize the possible sanctions they face and therefore cannot be easily deterred from crime" (Carroll, 1982: 57). Decision makers, including those involved in criminal decision-making, almost "invariably choose a course of action without knowing for certain what its consequences will be" (Hill, et al., 1979). Also the "riskiness of an individual's decisions may vary according to whether the decision is made alone or as a group member" (Clarke and Cornish, 1985: 160). Hence the concept risky shift. Other variables that may account for this less-than-optimal decision-making are the individual's personality, ethical norms, psychological considerations, and the individual's own subjective utilities (Hill, et al., 1979). Thus, psychologists argue, economic decision-making theory fails to explain empirical decision-making.

Briefly, then, economic decision-making theory views human beings as rational utility maximizers, who make rational decisions after careful deliberation about the possible acts and outcomes of those acts. The economic approach is in accord with the classical school of criminology. Both postulate that crime is a rational choice aimed at maximizing pleasure (Becker and Landes, 1974; Carroll, 1978). The economic model has received criticism for its failure to predict individual choices

accurately. These failures usually are due to an individual's "cognitive limitations, short-cut decision-making, and processing heuristics" (Lattimore and Witte, 1986: 133). Cognitive decision-making theory views human decision-making as less-than-rational where individuals make simple examinations of their opportunities and make decisions that can be far short of optimal.

To understand decision-making processes, we therefore, should consider the subjectivity of profit and pain as well as individual differences in objective circumstances. By suggesting that criminals are rational actors, the implication is that they have a realistic perception of the potential certainty and severity of punishment and that they act after rational calculation. They may act, however, with limited rationality rather than full rationality.

The rational choice perspective on crime assumes that offenders seek to benefit themselves by their criminal behavior; that this involves the making of decisions and choices, however rudimentary on occasions these choices might be; and that these processes, constrained as they are by time, the offender's cognitive abilities, and by the availability of relevant information, exhibit limited rather than normative rationality (Cornish and Clarke, 1987: 933).

Limited rationality considers the limitations of individual's capacity to acquire and process information. Individuals allegedly make a few simple and concrete examinations of their opportunities and

make decisions that can be far short of optimal (Cook, 1980). It may well be, as Bentham said, that "all men calculate," but unlimited calculation may not represent adequately descriptive decision-making. Since individuals differ in their perceptions and subsequently in their decisions, the perceptions of individuals and the formation of these perceptions are the integral components of decision-making. Three related but divergent bodies of thought about decision-making-- economic, cognitive, perceptual deterrence -- serve as theoretical guides for my research. Next, I examine relevant empirical studies.

A CRITIQUE OF DECISION-MAKING RESEARCH

Deterrence investigators have examined the relationships between aggregate crime rates and various operationalizations of the certainty and severity of punishment (e.g., Gibbs, 1968; Tittle, 1969; Jensen, 1969; Chiricos and Waldo, 1970; Bailey and Smith, 1972; Bailey, 1975; Ehrlich, 1975; Blumstein, et al., 1978). The conclusions from these aggregate-based studies support a deterrent effect for the certainty but not for the severity of legal punishment (Chambliss, 1966; Gibbs, 1968; Jensen, 1969; Tittle, 1969, 1980; Chiricos and Waldo, 1970; Waldo and Chiricos, 1972; Tittle and Rowe, 1974). Since these studies rely on aggregate

data, they share a common fundamental weakness --they tell us little about the processes of individual decision-making and calculus. By contrast, perceptual deterrence researchers focus specifically on individual's assessments of the probability of sanction.

Samples used in perceptual deterrence research have met criticism. Three groups of subjects have been used exclusively by perceptual deterrence researchers-- students, marginally criminal adults, and incarcerated offenders. High school students have been used in some deterrence research (e.g., Erickson et al., 1977; Jensen et al., 1978; Jensen and Stitt, 1982; Rankin and Wells, 1983). Samples of college students, chosen primarily for their accessibility to academics, also have been used (e.g., Waldo and Chiricos, 1972; Silberman, 1976; Paternoster et al., 1982a, 1982b, 1983). Researchers of marginally criminal adults examined perceptions of sanction threats among individuals who commit at worst minor crimes that are not met with grave social disapproval or legal punishment (e.g., Grasmick and Milligan, 1976; Meier and Johnson, 1977; Grasmick and Bryjak, 1980; Grasmick, 1985; Green, 1985). Samples of incarcerated offenders offer more insight into the perceptions of individuals involved in serious crimes (Petersilia, 1980). Like students, these samples were chosen primarily for

accessibility (e.g., Petersilia et al., 1978; Peterson et al., 1980). Recently researchers have suggested moving beyond these pioneering samples to those of problem populations, namely, career property offenders (Paternoster et al., 1982a; Glassner and Carpenter 1985; Piliavin, et al., 1986).

In most perceptual deterrence research, subjects are asked to self-disclose such items as previous criminal behavior, perceptions of sanction threats, and their expectations for future criminality (e.g., Grasmick and Milligan, 1976; Erickson et al., 1977; Jensen et al., 1978; Grasmick and Bryjak, 1980; Paternoster et al., 1982, 1983; Grasmick, 1985). Generally, self-report data are collected cross-sectionally via anonymous forced-choice questionnaires (e.g., Grasmick and Milligan, 1976; Erickson et al., 1977; Grasmick and Bryjak, 1980; Grasmick, 1985). Since these surveys rely on anonymity, they disallow comparisons to official criminal records (e.g., Peterson et al., 1980).

Cross-sectional data collection may confuse the temporal order of perceptions and behavior (e.g., Grasmick and Bryjak, 1980; Jensen and Stitt, 1982; Saltzman et al., 1982; Minor and Harry, 1982; Paternoster et al., 1983; Rankin and Wells, 1983; Paternoster et al., 1985; Piliavin et al., 1986;

Paternoster, 1987). Since cross-sectional data collection relies on the participants' retrospective accounts, critics contend that little can be learned about perceptions that precede behavior. These studies have been criticized for failing to measure a deterrent effect (i.e., behavior preceded by perceptions) and allegedly have measured an experiential effect (i.e., perceptions preceded by behavior). To overcome this methodological weakness, researchers recently have called for greater use of longitudinal studies (e.g., Farrington, 1979; Paternoster et al., 1983; 1985). It has been suggested that longitudinal studies afford the opportunity to detect changes in individuals perceptions of their circumstances and allow for prospective predictions by the respondents (Farrington, 1979). It has been suggested that future research focus on "future deviance rather than . . . past deviance" (Tittle, 1977: 586).

Still other researchers inform us that cross-sectional measurements can be as reliable as longitudinal if the researcher is sensitive to causal ordering (Lundman, 1986). To this end, researchers suggest that the temporal sequence of events clearly should be elaborated by the researcher to guarantee the respondent is aware of such order. Thus, in an interview, a researcher may ask the individual about

thoughts and perceptions prior to the act to establish such causal ordering.

Self-report measures in studies of perceptual deterrence often are criticized as unreliable (Jensen and Stitt, 1982). These measures, it is charged, implicitly contain bias due to individuals' inability to recall or unwillingness to report previous criminal behavior (Tittle, 1980). Thus, the reliability of self-report studies is at the mercy of the subjects' memories and honesty (Farrington, 1983). To rectify this weakness, critics suggest using both self-report data from in-depth interviews, and official measures of previous criminal behavior (Petersilia, 1980).

Previous research has been criticized for methodological weaknesses and also for ignoring components of the criminal calculus. Critics contend that deterrence theory and research over-emphasize the threat of punishment as conformity-inducive and ignore the perceived benefits of crime commission (e.g., Clinard and Quinney 1967; Petersilia, et al., 1978; Grasmick and Bryjak, 1980). Some research shows that those engaged in criminal decision-making are rational actors and consider the perceived benefits of crime as important as the perceived risks (Bennett and Wright, 1984; Nettler, 1984). Other research does not substantiate criminal activity as rational decision-

making but rather opportunistic (Petersilia et al., 1978; Carroll, 1978; 1982).

Critics of previous deterrence research contend that if we posit theories at the micro level, we need micro data (e.g., Jacob, 1979). Thus, interviews increasingly have been used to measure deterrent effects. These interviews produce qualitative data about individuals' risk perceptions and previous and subsequent behavior (e.g., Petersilia et al., 1978; Richards and Tittle, 1982; Rankin and Wells, 1983; Shover, 1985). These studies endeavor to "get inside people's heads" to understand their individual perceptions of rewards and sanction threats -- the major control mechanism posited by deterrence theory (Gibbons, 1979:122).

The study of individual criminal behavior has received little attention from decision-making researchers. Often the research samples suffer similar weaknesses as those in deterrence research -- namely their weak generalizability to empirical problem populations (i.e., individuals involved in actual criminal decision-making).

Studies of criminal decision-making typically focus on minor criminal offenses such as traffic offenses, shoplifting, and income tax evasion (e.g., Brown, 1981; Buckle and Farrington, 1984). Although these studies

use different methods (surveys and observations) the findings are very similar and make common sense: young males tend to engage more in "risky" decision-making than females and the elderly. These studies also fail to "get inside peoples' heads," meaning, their focus typically is elsewhere than individual's perceptions of the decision-problem and the alternative actions available to them.

The economic and psychological decision-making research to date rely on both aggregate and individual data (e.g., Rettig, 1963; Sjoquist, 1973; McPheters, 1976; Carroll, 1978; 1982). A study whose findings support rational decision-making examines average gains from three index crimes (viz., robbery, burglary and larceny over \$50). The significant finding from this research is that an increase in the probability of arrest and conviction and an increase in the punishment result in a decrease in the number of major property crimes, thus bolstering the deterrence doctrine (Sjoquist, 1973).

But critics contend that too much attention and weight are given to the threat of legal sanction. Legal threat does not operate in a vacuum and may not be as important in the calculus process as extra-legal threat (Meier, 1978). Researchers traditionally have ignored

extra-legal sanction threats and stigma (Jensen and Erickson, 1978).

McPheters (1976) found that as the expected gains decrease, the number of crimes increase. Again, this research uses aggregate data for the average real gains from robbery, the frequency of robberies, and the probability of arrest and conviction. The results from this research suggest that in the face of decreasing gains from robbery, the number of crimes that individuals commit increases. One explanation offered for this is perhaps individuals act as satisficers rather than maximizers (Simon, 1976). This explanation recognizes the complexities of the calculations involved in decision options. Possibly individuals opt for stable satisficing rather than optimal maximization. A second explanation is that the probability and perceptions of arrest and conviction are declining. With this decrease in risk, marginal criminals enter into robbery which may increase the number of robberies while at the same time decrease the average gains from robberies. Thus, amateurs may account for the increase in crimes accompanied by a decrease in gains (Zimring and Hawkins, 1968; McPheters, 1976).

A significant finding from a study using 59 offenders is that the decision to commit a crime is based on a simple, additive, and unidimensional analysis

of crime opportunities (Carroll, 1978). This finding is in opposition to the economic approach where criminal decision-making is a complex multiplicative weighing of benefits and risks. The sample appeared more responsive to the positive gains from crime than the risk probabilities and changes in penalties (Carroll, 1978). A follow-up study supports the use of limited rationality since complex situations rely, in part, on limited comparisons and judgments. Thus, compared to optimal responses, human responses appear non-optimal.

The facts that people do not always make the most rational decisions, that they may pay undue attention to less important information, that they employ shortcuts in the processing of information, and that group decisions may be different from individual ones are all clearly relevant to an understanding of criminal decision making (Clarke and Cornish, 1985: 160).

It may well be that salient features of the situation (i.e., the decision-problem) may dominate the decision-making (Carroll, 1982).

Previous case studies of individual offenders illuminate the logistics of crime, criminal networks and criminal ideologies about legitimate work, the lure of crime, and the autonomy it affords (Sutherland, 1937; Chambliss, 1972; Inciardi, 1977). Much has also been written about the organization and structure of criminal careers and networks (Shover, 1972; 1973; Best and Luckenbill, 1982).

Studies of perceptual deterrence and individuals engaged in decision-making tend to evaluate only target selection for various crimes rather than the decision-making process that precedes target selection and the criminal act (e.g., Maguire, 1980; Maguire and Bennett, 1982; Bennett and Wright, 1984a; 1984b; Akerstrom, 1985; Rengert and Wasilchick, 1985). Since these studies focus on target selection, they purposely ignore the individual's decision to commit or not commit crimes. Doubtless, these decisions are inter-related, but, they involve different assessments of different decision problems. In the target selection decision-making research, individuals describe the properties of particular targets that are appealing or frightening. These studies use a variety of research methods and some of which are innovative. For example, burglars were walked through a neighborhood and asked to identify those characteristics of various targets that were appealing or unappealing to them as burglars. But these research projects simply illustrate the methods used by property offenders in making a decision about whether to rob or burglarize a particular house or business (e.g., Best and Luckenbill, 1982; Bennett and Wright, 1984a; 1984b). Target selection research shows the decision to commit or not commit a particular crime generally precedes target selection (Maguire, 1980; Maguire and

Bennett, 1982; Bennett and Wright, 1984b). This decision problem presently remains unexplored.

In sum, studies of perceptual deterrence and individual decision-making have increased our understanding of the deterrence/decision-making processes. Nonetheless, findings from studies which use samples of students, non-criminal adults, and incarcerated offenders have limited external validity (Paternoster et al., 1982a). For example, we cannot generalize those findings to the population of unincarcerated adults engaged in criminal decision-making until we study samples drawn from this population (Piliavin et al., 1986). Nor can we generalize these findings to individuals who have demonstrated careers in property or garden-variety crimes, nor to non-criminal decision-making (Glassner and Carpenter, 1985).

Investigators have neglected to examine respondents' explanations and elaborations of their perceptions, decision-making processes, and the issue of deterrence. This weakness remains despite the recognized need for studies which employ personal and qualitative measures of deterrent effects and the offender's perspective (Jensen et al., 1978; Jacob, 1979; Paternoster et al., 1982a; Glassner and Carpenter, 1985; Clarke and Cornish, 1985; Piliavin et al., 1986;

Tuck and Riley, 1986). Paternoster (1987) has drawn the following conclusion about the state of the field:

In many ways, perceptual deterrence research has advanced about as far as is possible in its present form. It has moved from simple bivariate measures of association between perceived sanction threats and self-reported behavior to the estimation of complex two and three-wave multivariate causal models. Additional studies in the same mold with the simple addition of waves or variables would not contribute substantially to our understanding of the deterrence process. Unfortunately, even in spite of past efforts, all we know in general is that perceptions of the certainty and severity of punishment do not seem to deter the trivial and infrequent behaviors of high school and university students. With only a few and isolated exceptions, perceptual deterrence research has not gone beyond the science of sophomores described by Jensen et al. (1978). Therefore, perceptual deterrence researchers must conduct survey research of high-criminality adult samples. Only this next progression can determine whether perceived sanction threats play a role in inhibiting more serious and more frequently occurring criminal conduct (Paternoster, 1987:213-214).

Paternoster's advice is well-taken and serves as guidance in the development of my research objectives. The central objective of my research is to enhance our understanding of decision-making, specifically individual career criminal decision-making about whether or not to commit a crime, various alternatives considered in the decision problem, and influences on those decision processes.

CONTEXTUAL SETTING

We know that a relatively small proportion of offenders is responsible for a substantial percentage of

index crimes (Blumstein, 1986). These individuals are often called "career criminals." One study found that 25 percent of a sample of 624 California inmates were career criminals. They were responsible for 60 percent of armed robberies and burglaries committed by the entire sample (Peterson et al., 1980). This group has been labeled a problem population because during their careers in crime, they are responsible for the majority of thefts, burglaries, armed robberies, forgeries and buying and selling stolen goods. Thus to understand the process of and influences on the decision-making of those offenders who establish careers in crimes, the obvious "problem population" is that of the career criminal, rather than samples used previously.

The selection of a criminal career is considered by some researchers as a rational selection, given the individual's alternatives (Holzman, 1982). Case studies of entry into the criminal lifestyle report that individuals enter this alternate lifestyle early in life and learn the trade in the same manner as others who learn a legitimate occupation (Sutherland, 1937; Irwin, 1970; Chambliss, 1972; Inciardi, 1977; Luckenbill, 1985). To establish a criminal career, one must first have the opportunity. Therefore, one must be introduced to senior people in the field, establish networks among individuals, learn the language of the profession, and

learn the rudiments of business transactions. These career necessities must be met in illegitimate occupations similar to legitimate occupations (Letkemann, 1973). Research shows that one learns the trade by meeting, observing and talking with senior people in the field (Farrington, 1979). "Background conditions can predispose individuals to deviance by means of shaping their circumstances and orientations. But . . . contextual conditions channel individuals' predispositions toward concrete activities" (Luckenbill, 1985: 151).

Although these "career" criminals generally are sanctioned at some point in their lives, their careers continue even after experiencing sanction. They may be arrested, jailed or imprisoned numerous times but their criminal activities often are not offset by the sanctioning experience. Since after their release, 49 percent of former prisoners will return to prison again, they apparently are persuaded little, by legal sanction, to desist from crime (Beck and Shipley, 1987). A recent Bureau of Justice Report states that at least "80 percent of the men and women held in local jails in 1983 had a prior criminal conviction. About two-thirds had served time before in a jail or prison, and about a third had served a prior sentence at least twice" (BJS, 1986: 49).

These career criminals begin their careers at a young age and often terminate them only with impending old age (e.g., Irwin, 1970; Meisenhelder, 1975; 1977; Frazier, 1976; Greenberg, 1983; Hirschi and Gottfredson, 1983; Shover, 1985). Still, little is known about the nature and incidence of offending due to the methods used in previous studies (Buckle and Farrington, 1984). "The question has not properly been considered whether those individuals who habitually make criminal decisions think in different ways from other people" (Clarke and Cornish, 1985:161). These repetitive offenders, it has been observed, steal habitually and constantly are alert to opportunities for personal gain to the point that this "attitude becomes second nature" (Irwin, 1985: 88).

CHAPTER II

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND DATA COLLECTION

This research is ethnographic and inductive. The theories and research of rational decision-making serve as guides in shaping this research, its objectives, methodologies, research questions and ontological inquisitiveness. This research, however, is inductive and offers explanations based on observation rather than theory testing. Thus, this research and its findings are discussed in relation to existing theories but not limited by them (e.g., Glaser, 1967).

Weaknesses typically found in decision-making and deterrence research may be overcome by an inductive, ethnographic research methodology and by utilizing a multiplicity of data sources and data collection techniques. To this end, I used both official records of the samples' criminal involvement/incarceration and self-report data. I collected self-report data by using both personal ethnographic interviews and structured questionnaires. These data are not anonymous and therefore readily comparable to official records.

The processes of the risk-benefit calculus were explored to determine how career property criminals make decisions about whether to commit or not to commit crime. To arrive at such an understanding, I had each

participant focus on how the decision to commit a crime was arrived at, various alternatives considered in the context of the decision problem, perceptions of the likelihood of various outcomes, and the effect of those perceptions on decisions. Critics suggest when an individual is prevented or deterred from committing a particular crime, he is simply displaced to other criminal activity. Researchers inform us that "additional ways of investigating displacement are needed, and in particular, studies which focus upon the offender's own explanations for his decisions and choices (Cornish and Clarke, 1987: 935). When discussing alternatives, each respondent focused on both legitimate and illegitimate alternatives. Thus, this research enlightens us on the types of alternatives considered during the decision-making process and also when criminal action is displaced. This analysis of individual decision-making processes is unique to criminological research and addresses those issues that critics recently have called for.

My position and those of others is that "parsimonious accounts of criminal behavior . . . do not have to be complete explanations . . . but only ones good enough to accommodate existing research and to suggest new directions" (Clarke and Cornish, 1985: 149).

As mentioned earlier, decision-making investigators have called for ethnographic researchers to explore the dynamics of individual decision-making. These recently suggested directions support the research methodology for my research. The research methodology for this dissertation is described in the following chapter.

SAMPLE SELECTION

This research used a sample with greater generalizability to an important criminal population than those used previously. The sample provided empirical data about retrospective and present-day decision-making among "ordinary" career criminals.

With the cooperation of the Tennessee Board of Paroles, a sample of 60 male career property offenders nearing release from Tennessee prisons was selected. This particular sample was used to enhance our understanding of empirical decision-making among an actual chronic problem population. For purposes of this research, "career criminal" was operationalized by the following criteria: (1) he must be serving at least his second prison incarceration for felony property crimes; and (2) one of his incarcerations must have been for either burglary or armed robbery. Researchers recently have insisted that studies of criminal decision-making be crime-specific for the "deterrence processes and the

factors taken into account are likely to vary greatly . . . among different crimes" (Clarke and Cornish, 1985: 167). Since burglary and armed robbery account for the majority of property crimes reported yearly (other than petty theft), they are the logical choices for this research (Uniform Crime Reports, 1985). Thus, to ensure inclusion of those typical rather than atypical property offenders in the sample, and to be crime-specific, those selected must have been incarcerated for one of the two most common property crimes.

Two other criteria were used in selecting the sample. First, those selected must have been approved for parole and have a release date not to exceed four months after the initial first-wave interview. This ensured that the sample was released from prison nine months prior to the second interview. Research in criminal recidivism shows that most recidivists are re-incarcerated within six to nine months after their prison release (Beck and Shipley, 1987). The logic was that those in the sample who would be re-incarcerated were more likely to be prior to the second interview. Second, the participants must have been at least 25 years of age. This minimum age criterion was to increase the likelihood of obtaining information from the participants that showed reflection on their lives that often eludes young adults. Also, since sample

members had to be serving their second prison incarceration, they more than likely could not have established long-lasting careers in crime at a young age of less than 25 years.

The sample was limited to males since they better represent career property offenders than females. Research shows that males account for the great majority of all property crimes and that females traditionally have not been actively involved in property crimes (Mann, 1984; Morris, 1987). Therefore, to better understand the decision-making processes of individuals establishing long-lasting careers in property crime, males are the logical choice.

To obtain the names of the population from which the sample was drawn, I visited the Tennessee Board of Paroles in Nashville and reviewed prospective parolees' Pre-Release Plans. These informed me who had been granted parole, from which Tennessee institution, the offense for which they were incarcerated, and the anticipated date of their release. Federal Bureau of Investigation "rap sheets" were then reviewed to obtain individual's incarceration histories. These "rap sheets" are part of the Parole Board's central files and therefore were readily accessible.

This research is part of a larger research project funded by the National Institute of Justice. The larger

project's principal investigator contacted, by letter, those individuals who met the sample criteria. The letter described briefly the purpose of the research, methods of sample selection, and monetary compensation for participating. Shortly thereafter, the other graduate assistant and I visited them where they were incarcerated and explained further the research to them. After a thorough explanation of the research and informed consent procedures, the individuals were asked to participate. They were informed that the decision to participate was entirely theirs' and that they would not be penalized for refusing to participate (see Appendix A for informed consent form and Appendix B, Figure 1 for sample demographics). All information divulged by the participants is confidential and accessible only to the research staff. The sensitivity of this type of research demands ethics of sensitivity and guaranteed confidentiality (e.g., Ellen, 1984).

Respondents were paid \$50 after the first interview (i.e., the interview conducted in prison) and \$100 after the second interview (i.e., the interview conducted nine months after their release from prison). Payments were made through the Treasurer's Office at the University of Tennessee. These payments were subsidized by federal research grant monies from the National Institute of Justice.

DATA COLLECTION

Although this research relied on decision-making theories as its guide, it was not restricted by the limitations of those theories. Rather, this research describes empirical decision-making among this sample of property offenders.

Three methods of data collection were used in this research: analysis of official arrest and incarceration records; ethnographic semi-structured personal interviews which were audio taped and later transcribed; and structured questionnaires (see Appendix A for interview guides and questionnaires). The use of multiple data sources (i.e., triangulation), yielded several accounts of a single event which provided an internal validity check (Burgess, 1982).

Official records were reviewed prior to the first interviews to compare them to the participants' retrospective accounts of their arrest and incarceration histories. Some information was available via computer at the Board of Paroles and some was available only in file folders. Without the use of official records and the individuals' self-reporting, there would not have been a method for cross-checking the incarceration histories. This way, if any contradictions did arise, they were resolved either during the interview or soon

afterwards to obtain an accurate history of arrests and incarcerations.

The interviews were conducted and the survey questionnaires administered at both measurements. The surveys included questions about the participants' perceptions of the risks and rewards of crime commission and how these contributed to their decision-making. During the ethnographic interviews (which provided the most important data for this research), I focused specifically on the participant's criminal calculus and how criminal decision-problems were framed and resolved. This was accomplished by having the participant, at both interviews, describe how the decision to commit a specific crime was arrived at, his method of assessing the perceived risks and rewards of the crime and various alternatives to crime (i.e., his criminal-calculus). In this way, actual career criminals' decision-making processes are explained within a theoretical decision-making context guided by deterrence and decision-making theories and by using an ethnographic methodology. The probing revealed those independent variables that best explain the dynamics of the criminal calculus. Various explanatory factors were discussed with the participant to tap those variables that best explain the dynamics of his criminal calculus. The variables that were explored include aging, the threat of legal sanction, the

individual's self-image, and familial attachment/commitment. Other variables were discovered and modified as this ethnographic research process developed and as some sense was made of the qualitative data.

The intensive interviews were semi-structured to elicit from the informant detailed accounts of decision-making. Most social research relationships are asymmetrical. In this ethnographic research, participants were treated as key informants possessing knowledge unknown to those outside their reference group or profession (Hammersley and Atkinson, 1983). This research, which relied heavily on establishing rapport, operated on the assumption that human relationships form when two people meet and talk, especially about sensitive information (Agar, 1977). The use of these multiple key informants ensured greater data reliability (Lofland and Lofland, 1984). Using this approach, the interviewer could better assure reliability by letting the participant know, if need be, that he was "conwise" when certain information appeared dubious (Frazier, 1978).

Self-report data collection problems are not insurmountable. Careful planning and execution of the research with the support of a well designed interview schedule, believable assurances of confidentiality, and

skilled interviewing contribute to successful self-report data collection (e.g., Minor, 1978). Establishing rapport in any qualitative research project is of the utmost importance and can be difficult especially with suspicious individuals who, for good reason, do not trust outsiders. Generally accepted guidelines for establishing rapport and trust were adhered to in this research (e.g., Beck and Adams, 1970). "Intensive interviewing . . . is a guided conversation whose goal is to elicit from the interviewee rich, detailed materials that can be used in qualitative analysis. It is to discover the informant's experience of a particular topic or situation. Many social situations can be directly apprehended only through intensive interviewing" (Lofland and Lofland, 1984: 12, 13). "The interviewer must be an active listener, he or she must listen to what is being said in order to assess how it relates to the research focus" (Hammersley and Atkinson, 1983: 114).

The participants were asked a host of questions guided by models of decision-making about their own individual decision-making. They were questioned about the way they defined and gathered information about the problem prior to their deciding to commit or not commit a crime. They were questioned about the various alternatives considered in the decision-problem, the

manner of evaluating alternatives, and their perceptions of the costs and rewards of choosing one alternative over another.

DATA ANALYSIS

The data from the questionnaires were used for simple percentages (found in chapters 3 and 4) and bivariate statistical analyses (e.g., cross-tabulation). After having cross-tabulated the key decision-making variables, to discover they revealed no significant relationship, some were collapsed, re-coded, and cross-tabulated again. The cross-tabulations showed nothing significant, other than an internal validity check (these data are available but not included in this text). Data analyses focused specifically on those variables that shape and reflect decision-making processes and the individual's subjective perceptions of the benefits and risks of crime commission (e.g., knowledge and perceptions of legal and extra-legal sanction threats; their economic situational setting; network support systems).

The interviews were audio taped and transcribed. I then read the transcripts and searched for information pertinent to the research objectives. Those dialogues that pertained were highlighted in various colors that were coded to specific objectives (e.g., orange was

coded to perceptions of rewards of crime commission). Later the 60 transcripts were analyzed by each color-highlighted dialogue. The interviews yielded empirical data about individuals in specific situations (Spradley, 1979). Those dialogues were then subjected to standard qualitative data analyses to better understand criminal decision-making and its changing character.

Throughout the course of the research, data were gathered and kept in the form of field notes (e.g., Patton, 1987). These notes were used to make analytic "sense" of the career criminal's calculus. This inflow of data produced a "sparking of ideas" which were written, filed, organized, and used in the ethnographic analyses (Glaser, 1978; Lofland and Lofland, 1984; 149).

These are not fully developed working papers but periodic written notes whereby progress is assessed, emergent ideas are identified, research strategy is sketched out, and so on. The construction of such notes therefore constitutes precisely that sort of internal dialogue, or thinking aloud, that is the essence of reflexive ethnography. Such an activity should help one avoid lapsing into the natural attitude and thinking as usual in the field. One is forced to question what one knows, how such knowledge has been acquired, the degree of certainty of such knowledge, and what further lines of enquiry are implied (Hammersley and Atkinson, 1983: 164-165).

From these field notes, typologies of decision-making were constructed. During the course of this research, such typologies were created and revised with different characteristics, names, and labels. I eventually opted to use typologies with quantitatively

distinguishing lines of demarcation rather than typologies in previous research, namely Type I and Type II Lambda decision-makers. These typologies are explicated in the fourth chapter. Briefly, the Type II Lambda decision-maker is one who has committed a great number of felonies (at least 100 during his lifetime) and a Type I Lambda decision-maker is one who has committed less than 100 felonies across his lifetime. These Lambdas represent quantitative differences in decision-making types, with real empirical qualitative differences associated with each. These differences are explicated in chapter four.

Also, typologies were constructed of those variables that were identified as impeding rational decision-making. Typology construction and other ways of making sense of qualitative data, took place during the research process and data collection.

In ethnography the analysis of data is not a distinct stage of the research. Formally, it starts to take shape in analytic notes and memoranda; informally it is embodied in the ethnographer's ideas, hunches, and emergent concepts. In this way the analysis of data feeds into the process of research design. This is the core idea of grounded theorizing: the collection of data is guided strategically by the developing theory. Theory building and data collection are dialectically linked (Hammersley and Atkinson, 1983: 174).

As these data were analyzed along the course of the research, they called for revisions of the interview guide. Topics were revised, deleted, and added to the

guide over the course of the year and a half. An important advantage of ethnographic research is its flexibility. "The strategy and even direction of the research can be changed relatively easily, in line with changing assessments of what is required by the process of theory construction. As a result, ideas can be quickly tried out and, if promising, followed up" (Hammersley and Atkinson, 1983: 24).

A LOOK AHEAD

The following chapter provides qualitative data on three specific issues. First, the chapter describes the respondents' accounts of their own motivations, the alternatives available to them and considered by them, and the mechanism that facilitated their decision-making. These variables are components of, but precede the actual decision. Therefore, those components of theoretical decision-problem resolution are related to empirical data from this sample of repetitive offenders. Second, chapter three describes generally, from the interview data, the decision to commit a crime. This description explicates the calculus, motives, alternatives, and mechanisms typically found among this sample. Third, the following chapter describes generally, from the interview data, the decision to not commit a crime. This description explicated the

calculus typically used among this sample and compared it to the calculus used when the decision was made to commit a crime. Thus, the three primary issues of the following chapter, provide an account of decision-problem resolution related to those variables of decision-making theories and to decisions to commit and not to commit specific crimes.

After these general findings are discussed in chapter three, they are related to specific decision-making typologies constructed from this sample. These decision-making typologies along with some simple percentages are found in chapter four. The chapter also contains a case-study of each typology for illustrative purposes. The fifth and final chapter relates the data findings and analysis to the theories that guided this research and offers some implications for those theories.

CHAPTER III

AN ANALYSIS OF OFFENDER DECISION-MAKING

As discussed in chapters one and two, proponents of prescriptive decision-making assume that the individual decision-maker analytically resolves a decision-problem through a logically calculated series of steps culminating in a "rational decision." This research uses those social-psychological variables that are indicative of decision-problem resolution theories and research as lines of inquiry. A wealth of information was elicited from each participant. Most important for this research was the individual's reconstructing of two specific criminal decision-problems and their resolution. Each participant was asked to recall the most recent crime that he had committed and could remember clearly. At that point, all daily events, conversations, and thoughts during the decision to commit the crime were reconstructed and probed. In this way, 60 crime-specific criminal decision-problems, their framing and resolving were obtained.

Likewise, each was asked to think about the most recent occasion when they decided not to commit a specific crime for reasons other than being frightened off by the police or a would-be witness or victim. Again, all daily events, conversations, and thoughts

during the decision to not commit a crime were reconstructed. Thus, a crime-specific decision to not commit the crime was obtained from those offenders who could recall a specific time.

MOTIVATIONS: FRAMING THE DECISION-PROBLEM

Social psychologists inform us that motivation is intrinsically wedded to goal attainment. Researchers studying motivation focus primarily on the various factors that determine what psychologists call "goal-directed behavior." Goal directedness is of central importance in understanding motivated behavior. "Motivated behavior can perhaps best be described by its purposefulness and persistence until the goal is reached" (Van Doren, 1972: 369). That behavior usually will continue if the result is beneficial or positive. Goal attainment generally is preceded by perceptions of expected benefits from a particular act which become motives for engaging in a particular act.

To analytically understand motive is difficult for motive cannot be observed directly but rather must be inferred from behavior or the individual's self-reporting about the pre-behavioral thoughts and perceptions.

Motive is an essential component of criminality for jurists and investigators of decision-making. Jurists

are interested in motivation since it is an integral part of intent or "mens rea." Decision-making researchers are interested in motivation for it is part of the decision-problem, part of the expected benefits produced by engaging in a particular act, and part of the calculable results perceived by the problem-solver.

The most common motivating force among these offenders was the "quick, easy money" they believed that would obtain from committing crimes. Fifty-three of 60 gave "money" as their major motivator for committing crimes.

Q. Why do you think you did the armed robbery?

A. For the money.

Q. Any other reason?

A. I just wanted money. (#1)

The financial attractiveness coupled with the perceptions that legal sanction threats are next to nil (to be elaborated in this chapter) explain a great deal of the decision-problem framing among many of these, especially the high frequency offenders (these offenders are discussed in chapter four).

Q. What about crime is attractive to you or appealing?

A. It doesn't take very long, the profit is quick. If I worked construction I would make a week when I could make that much in 15 minutes. It's pretty much why its appealing. (#007)

Q. Why did you do it, for the money, or excitement, or --

A. Oh, for the money and no, I don't think it was excitement, it was just for the money. (#14)

Q. Why did you do that, why did you decide to break and enter?

A. For the money, to get drugs to get high on, you know. (#6)

Q. Why did you do it, or why did you do a burglary?

A. Broke and needed money and wasn't working, you know, and just needed money to drink and party, it wasn't for bills. (#14)

A less often stated motivation (3 of 60) for committing crimes was for the sense of accomplishment.

Q. Why would you do it?

A. Because I enjoyed it and the people with me enjoyed it. I'm the type of person man if I could steal something from way in the back row or if the store manager is standing here and I could take something right under his nose, that's what I'd get.

Q. Why would you prefer that?

A. Because it was more of an accomplishment. (#7)

This motivation typically was coupled with the desire for easily obtainable money or a sense of enjoyment.

Q. What do you think the major motivations were to commit shoplifting?

A. Because it's easy money, it's exciting to do it, it ain't never hard to sell the stuff. But wanting to do it man, wanting to do it. Love to do it. Love to do it would be the word. (#7)

Two individuals reported in vivid detail a motivation for their crimes unlike that of others. Both are high frequency burglars who considered crime a very fun and exciting game. The game-like rewards served as motivation-enough for their willingness to commit crimes. The easy money, which was motivating, paled in significance to beating the opponent of the game and getting over on the law.

Q. Why did you do it?

A. If I had to write a damn paper on the reason I steal they would be one sentence -- It was for the game. It's a high, now, I mean it's exhilarating. I mean, some people like racquet ball and some people like tennis and I get off going through doors. (#42)

Successfully completing the game provided a sense of accomplishment, a positive feeling, and reinforced their belief that they had won the game. They functioned with the knowledge that in this game, like others, there emerges a winner and a loser. And when they were arrested and convicted, they simply admitted that they had lost the game, at least temporarily.

Q. What do you mean when you say "I lost for now."

A. It got to be a game. I've been locked up since I was 16. I've wasted the best years of my life, I can never get them back because I've played this game of "I'm going to beat them" you know and then you get to the stage of you wonder who in the hell is it I'm trying to beat. But it got to be a game. I played the game and lost. You got me. Let's go ahead and run it and start it over, you know.

- Q. Did you feel like you were winning the game?
- A. Well it starts, it's just like the trumpets at a horse race. I mean that sounds a silly way to sum up, but now, that's the damn, that's just about it. It's like a starting gun at a swim meet, you just, that starts the game. And it's not ended until you stand before that judge, you know, or you beat it. It's just like a chess game. I'm trying to stay a step ahead. I mean, fuck, it's a challenge. I mean, by God, it gets down to where it's just me against them and that's the way it is. To me, getting over on him or beating him at this game is 90 percent of it. The fucking money ain't nothing. Getting over on them is what it is. It got to where I just liked it.
- Q. What did you like about it?
- A. The excitement and the feeling of, you know, I fucked them, I mean, I had got over on them. They put their best investigators and I fucked them man. I sit back and laugh thinking. Really basically, and you know yourself, it's a sorry mother-fucking thing, but I mean it's just, it provides that damn challenge. Crime was a game . . . with a whole lot of reality to it. (#42)

Another lesser used motivation, and used only by two armed robbers, was retaliation founded on vengeful motives. These armed robbers claimed to have suffered severely due to official governmental decision-making, or lack of. Both lost legitimate earnings, both believed the government had done them an injustice, and one was homeless at the time of his most serious crimes. They acted criminally for revenge, striking out at a generalized other or striking out at legitimacy as a representation of government. Their crimes were

expressive acts and they believed they were getting even with the status quo or the State.

One armed robber's motivation clearly was shaped by his "definition of his situation." He believed that some of his legal earnings from early in his life were wrongfully collected from him by the Internal Revenue Service. He claimed to have lost nearly all of his legally earned capital. It was then that he decided to enter crime as a way of retaliating against the system or legitimate society. Also it was a matter of principle to him since he later defined work as vanity where individual workers end up with little to show for their labor.

Q. Did you try and find a job?

A. I was determined then that I wasn't going to work and make a living. I wasn't going to go out and work all day and week after week and pay the government for working. I mean this is the way I felt then. I felt that if I went out and got a job, which I did, and I was making \$60 to \$70 a week. They took federal tax out, they took state tax out, they took medicare out, they took Social Security out and by the time I got my check they had already taken out \$30 or \$40. So why would I work to pay the government for working, you know. That's the way I felt. (#37)

The other armed robber expressed similar rebellion against a government that he believed had done him an injustice and refused to assist him in solving his problems.

A. The government did this somewhat to me too, you know, by denying me benefits.

Q. Your Social Security?

A. Yeah. I mean I was desperate. I didn't know what the hell I was going to do because I couldn't even keep the roof over my head. I moved into my car and I didn't have much of a car, but I slept in my car for a long time. I've had three back surgeries and now I've got heart trouble on top of the back surgery so how in the hell am I going to get a job? My wife took me to _____ Mental Hospital because I did have an alcoholic problem and drugs and I asked her to take me there and she did and I got turned away from over there, saying they didn't have the funds or money to help me and there was no room for me. No place for me there.

Q. And you had gotten turned down for Social Security before that?

A. Right. I had many problems, you know, mental problems. It got to the point where I knew I needed help and I couldn't get it. And that whole chain of events got me right to prison. I was on my Social Security, you know, and they cut it out and when they cut it out it like to cut my life off. I lost my Social Security, I lost my truck, you know, and I didn't know what the hell I was going to do. I done it out of desperation and frustrated at life, no help, no money, living in a car. I couldn't even take a bath, you know, nowhere to take a bath. I felt less than worthless.
(#20)

Those who committed crimes out of vengeance calculated their crimes emotionally rather than logically, as the following participant's comment illustrates.

A. When you're mad like that and a person did something to you, you be in a mental state of mind, you know, you don't give a damn about no police or being locked up or a judge or no damn nobody else. (#37)

Motivation, though, typically is composed of several of these inter-related perceived benefits rather than

simply one. Although most participants reported one primary motivation, many reported lesser motivations or latent benefits.

Attention now is given to the next analytical component of decision-making -- the alternatives considered while resolving a decision-problem.

ALTERNATIVES

Recent literature indicates that decision-making investigators should examine closely an important theoretical component of prescriptive decision-making processes -- namely, the alternatives considered by the decision-maker while resolving a decision-problem. Investigators of criminal decision-making recently have pointed to the need for specific information about the offender's mental calculus to determine his perceptions of his legitimate opportunities for getting money (e.g., Feeney, 1986). Investigators interested in crime displacement are also intrigued by the offender's calculus since displacement may not result in legitimate actions but more typically illegitimate ones. Feeney (1986), for example, reports that his sample of armed robbers usually considered another illegal alternative, rather than a legal alternative, to armed robbery.

Akerstrom (1985) analyzed crime as work, much the same as Holzman (1979). Akerstrom found that criminals

often have legitimate jobs. But crime, as a job, provided rewards that their legitimate jobs did not provide, e.g., quick easy money and psychological fulfillment or usefulness. Holzman (1983), using LEAA data of 1974, found that 95 percent of his sample of criminals had full-time jobs at the time of their arrests. But they "moonlighted" in illegal occupations and saw themselves as entrepreneurs who would someday own their own businesses.

Two points from these studies are compared to my research sample. First, many in this sample also dream of one day owning their own businesses and envision themselves as entrepreneurs, innovative ones too be sure, but entrepreneurs nonetheless. Their dreams of owning a business give them some hope of earning a legitimate wage while exercising their nerve in making the plunge into their own business, enjoying autonomy, being their own boss, and creating and revising rules guiding their own work behavior. They have a desire to apply their skills (e.g., coolness and nerve) to a legitimate autonomous job, as the following typical comment illustrates.

- A. I'm going to live out my fantasy or whatever it is, you know, about getting this house and building me a business of my own, you know, I want to be the boss. (#20)

- Q. Do you think being locked up will have a negative impact on your trying to find a job?

- A. Probably not because I'm going to be self-employed. I'll probably get a grocery store with a little gas station hooked to it and sell beer. And with a little luck a Stop and Go or something. I have a good business mind.
(#8)

These projections are representative of their distorted perceptions of their legitimate options.

Second, nearly all of those in my sample were not employed full time at the time of their arrest and most were unemployed. Nearly all of the 60 could be located in one of two economic categories: unemployed and underemployed. This dichotomy is important for understanding alternatives available to and considered by them while resolving criminal decision-problems. Rather than focus on individual differences between Holzman's 1974 sample and mine, a place to focus with more explanatory power may be on structural changes that have occurred within the domestic labor market. Market demands have changed to the point that employers now demand from employees more education, specialization, computer skills, and stable work experience than ever before. It has become a buyer's market, so to speak. Just as 15th century peasants were "marginalized" by a macro change in production, these individuals with little job skills increasingly have been displaced and increasingly have lost what little stake in conformity they had.

Q. Did you see any alternatives at all, like did you think you had a chance at a job?

A. Yeah, but at that time jobs were hard to find especially for a young man that didn't have no education and been in trouble, you know. (#10)

Q. Did you see any alternatives to committing robbery?

A. I tried [to find a job]. The moment you said you was put in jail or a reference or something like that, you was out. (#11)

Drug use and dependency have increased since 1974 and the population using these drugs has broadened. A recent Bureau of Justice report based on survey research of a large sample (27,000) reveals that one-half of state inmates sentenced to prison for property crimes were daily drug users (Innes, 1988). Many in this sample were severely addicted to drugs to the point that they could not maintain a regular full time job.

Q. Before you got locked up this time did you think crime was morally wrong?

A. Yeah, I knew it was wrong, but like I say, man it was wrong in the eyes of the beholder, you know. I mean, I'm needing a shot of dope, it's not wrong for me to go get it, you know. I have to get it, however I can. To me it wasn't wrong. I had to have it and I had to get it from somewhere. (#57)

Also, a legitimate job with a salary that they realistically could have expected to earn would have offered them less money than they needed to support their serious habits.

- A. I tried to stay away from crime other than selling cocaine. I was determined not to rob any more and when my cocaine sales did not contribute enough to my cocaine consumption, then it became necessary that I rob. Nobody would hire me. I was an ex-con and I tried, I really tried to get gainful employment. There was nobody looking to hire me with my record. I went in as a juvenile and came out as an adult and didn't have any legitimate employment resume to submit. Employment was impossible. So, I started robbing. (#3)

Legitimate Alternatives

During their in-depth description of resolving a criminal decision-problem, each was asked about alternative actions they may have considered at that time. The question was left open-ended, leaving them free to offer accounts of legal or illegal alternatives that they may have considered. A few reported pursuing legal alternatives prior to illegal ones. The most common legal alternative considered was an attempt to borrow money from relatives or friends. Of the 60, three attempted borrowing money prior to deciding to commit the crime that they recounted in detail. This legitimate alternative is one that requires minimal initiative and investment of time and is certainly in line with a thief's normal attempts at obtaining money -- with little initiative and investment of time.

- Q. Did you consider doing anything else for money, at that time?

- A. I went to the bank four different times, I went to four or five different loan companies,

you know, the ones that say come on in and borrow money on your word and all this. That's a crock of shit. They ain't nobody going to lend you nothing. I mean, you know, it's there for the taking, but it ain't there for the loaning. (#43)

Some related that they had successfully borrowed money before, but realized they could not rely continually on that option.

Q. Did you think of anything else that you could do to get money, like borrow it?

A. No, I'd done run that in the ground, see. You burn that up, that's burned up right there, borrowing. (#24)

For some who previously had relied on borrowing money, the well had run dry, so to speak, and they were unable to borrow more.

Q. You said you tried other ways to get money. Like what?

A. I had went to my sister's house to get some money, you know, I went to ask her to let me have some money and she said at that particular time she couldn't. I asked my sister . . . but I couldn't convince her to let me have the money. (#4)

Working for money certainly was considered an alternative at some point in these individuals' lives.

Q. At that time you said you were out of work and you took this [gun] running job. Did you see any other alternatives that you could have chosen?

A. Not there unless I wanted to go to work in the coal mines with my wife's cousins. I couldn't see myself coming out of a coal mine at four o'clock in the afternoon, black sooted face. (#8)

Q. Did you see any other way to get those things?

A. Well yeah. I had seen the way my father was getting the things that he had, you know in life. But, I just wanted things then and there. Like a new car, I couldn't see myself working for two years saving money and then going out and putting it on a car. I wanted my car then and there. (#48)

They did not consciously think of working each time they confronted a decision-problem of committing a crime. In fact, only two offenders reported searching for legitimate work while resolving the criminal decision-problem. Another two reported they had previously sought legitimate work while committing crimes, but to no avail. The majority previously had appraised working for a wage and had rejected that option due to: (1) their inability to secure employment; (2) the limitations in working for a living; or (3) their refusal to work for a living.

Q. When you all were talking about robbing this man over in _____ did you think "I could go out and work" or did you think of doing other things for money?

A. I figured shoot, why go out and work when a man can go out here and do this right here and make a whole lot of money just in a little bit. (#12)

Work provided them with less-than-fulfilling wages and psychological rewards. Based on their experience in the legitimate work world, they were conscious that legitimate work offered subsistence wages. Also, in a restrictive controlled work place, they were not free to

use their individual skills (e.g., cool, nerve, and network connections). They typically believed that legitimate work failed to offer autonomy and satisfaction.

Q. Does work bore you, legitimate work?

A. Yeah. If I can't get something that keeps my mind working and keeps me going I can't . . . I ain't got that good a damn mind, but I mean I've got to keep busy.

Q. And burglary does that for you?

A. Oh, hell yeah. I was having too good a time. I thought this is fun. Hell, the whole town is mine. (#42)

Q. Did you ever see any alternatives that you could have taken instead of breaking into houses and stealing boats and tractors?

A. This lady I was living with, she had a girl friend. . . [who] owned a big old trailer park and she offered. . . she told me "I'll give you \$500 a week to come up here and run it for me, to keep the maintenance up." But, shit, I was done into burglaries so bad man that I wasn't about to give up an easy damn job like that for, you know, to go out and actually work. (#33)

Q. Did you, at that time, think of any alternative to doing the armed robbery?

A. At the time I really didn't like working, you know, because the life I was living, you know, the money that I was getting was way more easy than you know, going out and working for it. (#16)

Q. Did you think of anything else you could do for money, at that time?

A. Well, it's not every day you can go out in an hour's time and make \$500 to \$1000, you know.

There's just no job in the world that pays that and even if you didn't make but \$200 or \$300 that's more than you could make in a week. And say for an hour's work, you take off all week and not worry about working no more. (#21)

Work was not a viable option for some of these individuals. Many admitted that the benefits derived from illegal adventures dwarfed those derived from working.

Q. Why did you do the forgery . . . at that time?

A. I didn't want to work and I didn't want to do no armed robberies. I didn't want to break in some place and a forgery was pretty much the easiest thing.

Q. So it sounds like you're saying that the money you've made illegally far outweighs the money you can make--

A. Far outweighs. I don't mind working but it's hard work all day and kill yourself for really nothing. (#007)

A few high frequency participants (discussed in chapter four) made a conscious decision to not work a legitimate job and instead to support themselves with illegal earnings. These individuals typically had few expenses and shunned investing in a legitimate lifestyle.

Q. You didn't used to work did you?

A. Not at all. I wouldn't work if you asked me to work. I thought it was other ways to do things besides working. I thought you were a fool to work, you know. Why should you work you fool. You ain't never going to have nothing. That's what I used to say.

Q. How about picking up an odd job for half a day?

- A. No, I thought I was too cool, too cool man. I thought I was too good. That would have been against my dignity to try to work. I wouldn't want nobody to know that I was doing that. (#24)

The majority of these individual's legitimate opportunities to earn a decent wage were institutionally limited. They were aware of that, at least intuitively, and often opted for illegitimate means to obtain immediate success goals (e.g., Merton, 1968). The majority had "everything going against them." That is, most either had dropped out of school or were dismissed at a young age and were unable to develop marketable job skills. Thus, when they did work they nearly always relied on menial jobs and moved from one job to another. All had been in prison at least one time before so after their first incarceration they also found themselves labeled and stigmatized as "ex-cons." They then experienced those well-known difficulties associated with being an ex-con.

- Q. Did you see any other alternatives to committing robbery like a job, did you think you could find a job?

- A. I tried. Back there in them days it wasn't, uh, the moment you said you was put in jail or something like that, you was out. When you commit the crime, you commit it and you get sentenced to pay a debt to society. But that debt's never paid. You cannot pay that debt. You're screwed the rest of your life. (#10)

Doubtless, education, job skills, work experience and a "clean record" provide individuals with legitimate

institutional opportunities (i.e., they provide social status, mobility, and economic stability). Lacking these particular assets in their lives, many of these individuals became innovators. They innovated by replacing legitimate means with illegitimate. A recent Bureau of Justice survey points to similar patterns. The Justice research reports that "social conditions . . . may limit opportunity and reduce an individual's investment in society, leading to both drug abuse and criminal behavior" (Innes, 1988: 2).

The majority of these 60 had less than a high-school education, had developed no job skills, had not established a stable and durable record of employment, had a criminal record, and a great majority were addicted severely to drugs or alcohol. On one hand, then, since numerous alternatives were not evaluated during the decision-problem resolution, it appears that a step of "rational decision-making" was not fully exhausted, making their decision-making less-than-rational. But, on the other hand, given their backgrounds and circumstances, their decision-making appears logical, if the decision-making process is placed within the psychology of "situational rationality" where the individual's own subjective appraisal and objective needs and ways of meeting those needs are limited and hence evaluated situationally (cf

Gordon, 1973). Given the demands of their needs and the limitations of obtaining them, their actions, including ignoring other alternatives, appear somewhat logical, especially given the fact that the majority thought they would not get caught and they believed if they were caught the punishment was defined as no great threat.

Illegitimate Alternatives

A recent Bureau of Justice survey of 27,000 state prisoners reports that 40 percent of state prisoners sentenced for property crimes were under the influence of a drug when they committed the crimes (Innes, 1988). This figure would include those individuals who were addicted to a drug and those individuals who used drugs as a mechanism to commit the risky decision and action.

Many of my respondents reported they committed crimes to purchase drugs to which they were addicted.

Q. Why did you do it, at that time?

A. You're out there living that kind of life, you're just taking chances and plus I was doing drugs real heavy, powerful drugs, and I liked it and by me liking that I took them chances. I really didn't think about the risk period then hardly. All I thought about was just getting dope and I'd go to any lengths to get it. The urge for that dope is stronger than getting caught so I'd go ahead and do it. I was doing it just to get money and it was for that damn dope. I didn't really, you know, think about all the trouble, you know, I'd end up in or anything. I was just wanting to get the money for dope. (#2)

- Q. How did your drug use contribute to committing crimes?
- A. But whenever you get hooked on cocaine, man, you'll do anything in the world for it, whatever you need to do it what you'll do. (#3)
- Q. Why did you commit forgeries at that time?
- A. That's the reason I was doing the forgeries, you know to get money to buy the drugs with.
- Q. That was the main reason?
- A. That was the only reason. (#2)
- Q. What reason did you do those crimes for?
- A. In order to obtain money to purchase narcotics, drugs, shooting drugs.
- Q. Did you use a lot of drugs?
- A. Constantly. It was money for drugs. Now I know if I didn't have that drug habit I wouldn't be in this prison. It had got to the point that, you know, I really wasn't out there for nothing but just to do drugs. (#16)

The interviewees knew that crime would be monetarily rewarding and a rational way to obtain what they needed. Using Merton's modes of adaptation (1949) and Gordon's (1973) analysis of the rationality of property crimes, it is apparent how these addicts defined the situation as such that it became necessary to pursue illegitimate means to obtain physical necessities -- physically addicting drugs.

- Q. Did you ever see another way to get money other than crime?
- A. Well working, no. There was no other way to support a drug habit and the best way, the

fastest way was stealing. I mean, it was always something to steal. All I had to do was look for it and it was always something to steal somewhere. (#45)

A. A person as a drunk and an alcoholic I found out now, I know now, there's no rational thinking of any sort. What you might feel is normal is totally abnormal. It was like some reality to everything, you know, you're really running in a twilight zone. There's no rational thinking you know. (#24)

Q. Did you think of getting money elsewhere?

A. With drugs you don't rationalize. It's just a decision you make. You don't weigh the consequences, the pros, the cons. You just do it. (#10)

While examining alternatives considered within criminal decision-making, Cornish and Clarke (1987) suggested that criminals typically think only of illegal alternatives before committing a crime. Of those in my sample who actually considered an alternative to the crime that they eventually committed, the majority reported likewise.

Q. Did you think of other ways of making money?

A. Well every now and then I might run across something that I could get right spur-of-the-moment. But mainly I stayed with robbery.

Q. Are you talking about legal or illegal?

A. Illegal. (#16)

But, when considering another illegal act, almost all did not want to change their MO or "specialty" at that particular juncture in their careers. Most reported

considering another crime of the same type that they were thinking of committing.

Q. Did you consider doing anything else?

A. I mostly did armed robbery. Reason why because that was the quick and easiest way of getting money cause if you do a burglary then whatever you get you have to sell it or you've got to find somebody to buy, but if you do armed robbery it's money right there. (#7)

Q. At that time, did you consider doing anything else besides the robbery?

A. I'm thinking, well in a burglary, if I go break in something I've got to turn around and sell it, whereas if I rob these people I've got the money right then. (#1)

While resolving the decision-problem of committing or not committing a crime, the majority considered only the type of crime they were committing regularly at that particular period of their career and most had a specific target in mind. The decision, then, was not one that involved in-depth calculations of their specialty and a criminal alternative and the perceived benefits from each. Some general ideas about the alternatives available to them were known but never considered viable due to the individual's limited knowledge about the alternatives and his willingness to participate in such alternatives. Some quickly compared their MO to another crime, but most plodded right along and committed the criminal act with no thoughts of doing anything other than that particular criminal act.

The majority (43 of the 60) reported that they did not consider any alternative to the crime that they committed.

Q. Did you ever talk about doing anything else to get the money or did that ever enter the conversation?

A. No, that never came up . . . we never did talk about, you know, going and looking at this, finding a job. It was always, you know, taking something, you know, and it never crossed our mind, you know, why don't we go and check out this job, you know, this and that. That wasn't even --well, it wasn't on my mind, you know, and didn't none of the rest of them ever bring up the conversation. (#16)

Q. Did you see any alternatives to the shoplifting that you were doing at that time?

A. Never looked for none because there wasn't anything that I enjoyed more than shoplifting. (#7)

Q. Did you think about any alternatives to make money that day [the day of the burglary]?

A. Oh, besides breaking in there?

Q. Yeah.

A. No, that's the only one I, that's all I knew of at the time. (#14)

This heuristic device of not contemplating alternative actions could be in line with the principle of immediate utility, which states that a "course of conduct is the right one for an agent if and only if it is the best alternative under the circumstances; and the best alternative is the one that has the best overall consequences" (Hill, et al., 1979: 48). Given their

circumstances, many of these offenders, especially the severely drug addicted, may be choosing the best alternative generally since crime often nets them their immediate needs or desires.

Q. Did you ever think about doing anything legal for money?

A. No. I was doing drugs real heavy and, you know, work was out. At that time all I considered was crime. (#16)

The point is, even though they still may be acting in a utilitarian fashion, they do not consciously think of alternatives to a specific crime.

Crime appears to have been a "rational response" for most of these criminals -- a rational response to success goals offered as obtainable by this society; goals that legitimate-living individuals often desire and affordably can obtain. They believed there was no better method of obtaining money and possessions than illegally. But, shortly after their criminal actions they usually had little money or goods to show for their efforts. They typically blew the money on drugs and easily consumable commodities. The "easy money" most report, was also easy to spend. All participants report that illegally obtained money "spent faster" than legally obtained, and that for them, the old adage, easy come, easy go, has a ring of truth to it. So they had little to show for their risky venture and labor.

It became clear while interviewing the sample members that they have less-than-optimal knowledge about legitimate alternatives. Although some considered legitimate alternatives, those who did had little information and knowledge about them. The decision-problem resolution clearly was reduced to the individual's subjective information evaluation. Their lack of knowledge about earning a legitimate living became obvious during the interviews. Most had lived on legitimate earnings very infrequently during their lives. But, after having served two or more incarcerations, and nearing their release, they believed they would be able to survive and be somewhat content on legitimate earnings. They usually had no idea that they may be destined to reap subsistence wages. Some believed that evidence to support their ability to live on legitimate earnings was the fact that they lived comfortably in prison on their prison earnings and that they certainly can live as well in the free-world. They failed to consider that they had almost no living expenses while incarcerated.

- A. I see if I can work in here [prison] making \$50 or \$40 a month and can survive and live off of that, then I won't have no problem going out in society working if it's nothing but minimum wages. (#16)

MECHANISMS THAT FACILITATE CRIMINAL DECISION-MAKING

During the course of this research it became clear that many individual's decision-making was facilitated by a mechanism that enabled them to participate in a risky act even in the face of very real and severe consequences. The mechanism functioned as a rationality depressant that enabled the individual to decide in a seemingly less rational manner than he would have otherwise. Some of these mechanisms were used consciously by the offender to enable him to complete the risky decision/action that he desired to do while other mechanisms were used unconsciously and typically unbeknownst to the offender.

The first mechanism is also the most commonly used -- drugs and alcohol. For many, risk typically was a feeling similar to "butterflies" rather than a perception of real possible consequences of their actions. The use of this mechanism alleviated "butterflies" during the decision-making process and during the crime. This mechanism (the use of alcohol and drugs) allowed them to overcome nervousness and engage in a risky decision and event which they reportedly could not have done otherwise, as the following dialogue illustrates.

- A. So I was always kind of nervous unless I had done drunk a few beers or smoked some weed to build my nerves up.

Q. Drinking and smoking. Is that something that you typically did before pulling off a robbery?

A. Yeah. I needed something to build my nerves up, to relax me, you know, stop me from shaking. If I'm a little intoxicated I'm ready for it, whatever goes down. (#16)

Many had some idea that they wanted to commit a crime before they began indulging in alcohol or drugs. They often first rudimentarily decided to commit the crime and then drank or drugged for courage to complete the risky act.

Q. Was the booze to get your courage up?

A. Yes, yes, yes, yes. See, I wanted to do that [burglary] anyway before I started drinking, but I didn't have no help. So, what I'd do is I'd get me some help. I called it false courage. Because that's the courage that I need and I've never been the one to do anything without false courage. (#24)

Q. What happens to your courage when you start drinking?

A. Alcohol gives me more strength to do stuff like that. I would always be a drinking when I would do that stuff. It would always kind of boost me up and build my hopes up that I could do it. That alcohol and stuff where I was drinking that partly, made me just go ahead and do it. Because when you get to drinking you drink so much and you get so drunk or something or another like that you'll do anything. (#12)

Many claimed to always need "a buzz" before committing their crimes. The potential risk of their actions was deadened by the "buzz." One armed robber explained it this way:

- A. I would get kind of buzzy before I would do it because you get ready to do something and you're straight man you'll be having butterflies. If you're up there buzzing you're going to have a little butterfly but after you get in there and get situated well then it's a piece of cake. You're ruling everything. (#16)

And another robber explained it similarly.

- A. I can't sit here and think of a crime that I went in and pulled an armed robbery when I was straight. Maybe I'd smoke a joint or something and sometimes I was drunk, but I always had a little buzz when I went in. (#1)

Also the following dialogue with a burglar illustrates how a "buzz" acted as a mechanism that enabled him to indulge in the risky decision and venture. He described traveling with his cohorts to the house they had planned to burgle.

- Q. Usually are you straight or high when you break into a place?

- A. I like to have a buzz. It calms you down a little bit, to build the courage up, I guess.

- Q. Were you smoking and drinking on the road?

- A. Oh yeah. Always have you a cold beer before you go out.

- Q. Why would you?

- A. To build your, to give you the courage not just to build your courage up. Just to give it to you, give you that, knock the edge off. (#14)

A second mechanism used was the offender's unrealistic or erroneous perceptions of the punishment severity for the crime he contemplated committing. Each participant reported that they knew their actions were

wrong and illegal and therefore did their best to avoid capture. But, a great number of them did not know the severity of the punishment for that particular act until after their arrest. Most learned the "going rate" for certain crimes after their arrest, rather than before (Walker, 1985). Their perceptions of the severity of legal sanction were unrealistic. Therefore, risk was weighed with less weight than it ideally should have been. One armed robber thought, for example, that his first armed robbery conviction would yield a probationary sentence rather than a lengthy prison sentence. He never considered his chances of going to prison for a lengthy sentence.

Q. So before you learned the penalty for armed robbery, did you know that you could go to the penitentiary for it?

A. Well, I thought that, you know, I hadn't never got caught for robbery or nothing. I thought I'd go to jail and they'd put me on probation or something the first two times. So I really didn't pay too much attention to the penalty because I knew if I got caught that first time I might spend a few days in jail and I knew that my first time . . . I could get probation since it was my first offense. After my first conviction, five years for robbery, I really found out the penalty, you know. (#16)

Some burglars reported they thought burglary carried a three year sentence rather than a 10 year sentence. The rationality of their decisions can be questioned since they did not consider realistically the possible outcomes of their actions. They were predisposed to

calculate erroneously since they viewed punishment unrealistically. They therefore, resolved criminal decision-problems with less-than-full knowledge about the real possible outcomes of various decision and actions.

Q. Did you know you could get some time as a juvenile for burglary?

A. Everybody told me, said "Hey," said you know, "they ain't-all they're going to do is give you probation." (#42)

Q. Did you have knowledge of the potential penalty for doing [strong-armed robbery]?

A. In the state of Tennessee, absolutely not. This class X crime penalty that's supposed to be a deterrent . . . I wasn't aware of any class X, I wasn't aware of any penalties whatsoever. (#10)

A third mechanism was the use of conversations with cohorts as part of the decision-making process. Social psychologists inform us that one way to reduce fear or anxiety prior to engaging in a risky decision or event, is to become engrossed in an absorbing activity, such as conversation with others or with oneself. Thus, by using an absorbing activity, the fear sometimes can be escaped which reinforces the behavior until the risky decision/action has been completed. This is a fear-avoidance mechanism. Conversation not only allowed cohorts to discuss the logistics of the crime but acted as a means of encouraging each other through the decision-making process and the crime commission.

Cohorts often recounted previous successful crimes as a means of encouraging each other. This mechanism is similar to that used in organized athletics, where, members of a team recount past victories prior to meeting an opponent as a way of "psyching" each other up or encouraging each other to believe they will be successful in the event facing them.

Q. So did you all talk about other things besides the specific plan to encourage each other?

A. Probably, old burglaries, you know, like "remember the one at so and so we did last week," you know or something like that. (#14)

Conversation among these participants, however, was usually one-sided where the individuals discussed only the anticipated benefits of their actions, rather than weighing the anticipated benefits against the possible risks. This mechanism, in-part, impeded a rational calculation.

Q. Well as you all rode around and drank and smoked that day thinking about doing the crime what kinds of things did you all talk about?

A. We talked about when we got all that money that they said that man had, we talked about, oh we would do this and do that with that money, we was going to go and buy some nice cars and make us some hot rods and stuff out of them and build them up and make them mean and stuff. (#12)

Q. Tell me what kinds of things were talked about or what kinds of things you thought about.

A. Thought it would be easy. And what we'd make, how much money we'd make and what we'd get, how much we'd make off of it.

Q. What kinds of things were you thinking in your own mind, that maybe you all didn't talk about?

A. I was thinking about the big lick. (#41)

A fourth mechanism identified during the course of this research was the influence of older individuals in these men's lives. Most respondents reported they started committing crimes at a young age and were strongly encouraged or influenced to do so by an older individual who already was involved in crime and who therefore, was viewed as more knowledgeable about the risky decision/action. This finding is not in line with prescriptive decision-making. Individuals ideally should conceptualize their preferences independently of other individuals.

A. I always wanted to hang around the older guys and when I did, you know, I run into, you know, the guys that I hung around with that was older, you know, they was into drugs. In order for me to be in with the crowd, I always like to hang around older people.

Q. Were they into burglaries too?

A. Yeah, they was into some of everything. The things that I seen them do, you know, I liked it and I wanted to do it myself because I thought it was a big thing, you know, if you did that you was cool and all that. (#16)

The older individual would point out that he had successfully committed crimes and they, with his assistance and expertise, could do likewise.

Q. Tell me about that conversation that you all had, what kinds of things were said and what kinds of things went through your mind.

A. I was scared. I said, "I'll tell you what." I said, "we may get in trouble or we might end up getting killed by doing this," because I hadn't never did nothing like that. But he said, "No," said "everything will be alright." Said, "you ain't got nothing to worry about." So, I kindly figured to myself well I guess maybe it will be alright.

Q. So, why did you think it would be?

A. Because he had got out of a lot of stuff and he had did a lot of stuff and had never got caught at it. I figured well if he can get by with all them things I know we can get by with this just one thing. (#12)

Those reporting the use of this mechanisms believed that the older/wiser person already had considered the potential risks and benefits of crime and had calculated correctly. They relied on the older criminal to do the thinking and they, then, did not have to consider the rationality of their actions.

A. We always had a handgun on every burglary that we done.

Q. You carried a gun?

A. I never did carry one but mostly the oldest person in the group always had the gun, you know, and he would be the one that, you know, looked out, you know make sure everything was ok. (#16)

This influence of the older/wiser and more experienced individual facilitated decisions to commit crimes, especially early ones. Nearly every participant had his decision-making influenced by an older/wiser individual early in life; those who committed the fewest number of

crimes across their lives continually relied on the expertise of the older/wiser individual.

The respondents reported they also felt a certain amount of peer pressure from older associates which affected the decision-problem resolution.

Q. What good did you see coming to you from doing these burglaries besides the money to buy thing with. Anything else?

A. My friends . . . they was all older than I was . . . it made me feel that you know I was ok. I was, you know, cool and I could hang with them. (#16)

A fifth mechanism was the ability to put thoughts of possible negative consequences out of mind.

Q. So what negative things did you think about?

A. At the time you block out all those thoughts . . . you've got to have the money and when you get the money then you'll worry after that.

Q. You block out the thoughts. That's something I've heard other people say. Can you elaborate on that?

A. No, I can't, no I couldn't really explain. I couldn't make it any clearer really. It's just something you know you do. You block it all out because, you know, well some people maybe not, but you know it's wrong. It eat me a lot of times.

Q. Did it that day?

A. No, at the time you don't think about nobody but yourself, Mr. Greed, you know.

Q. I might have misunderstood you. On the ride up there to do this thing [burglary] you were thinking about some of these negative things but you managed to somehow block them out of your mind.

A. Oh, you just block them for now, you know.

Q. I guess I'm having a hard time understanding how if you're thinking about [negative consequences] how you could actually remove that from your mind or block it out of your mind.

A. Well you don't, you know. It's just a temporary block. (#45)

They claimed to have worried only minimally about risks prior to doing the crime. But when they actually were doing the crime, they managed to put those concerns and worries of the risks out of their minds, as the following dialogue illustrates.

A. When I walked in the place I really didn't think nothing. I mean it was just like my mind was blank when I walked in. I knowed what I was in there for. (#1)

Q. How worried were you that you'd get caught and sent back to prison?

A. I tried not to think about getting caught as I was doing it. That's something you really just kind of keep on the back burner until it actually happens and then you start worrying. (#57)

Not only was thinking of risks a distraction to concentrating on the logistics of the crime, but it also was viewed as unlucky or "negative producing." Most of the people who used this mechanism stated that they typically attempted to think positively to produce positive results rather than think about the potential negative consequences. By not thinking about them, they believed they could somehow prevent them from coming to pass.

Q. How worried were you when you all did these burglaries that you'd get caught for it?

A. Well, personally, you try not to think about it while you're doing it because if you start thinking about it really bad before you do it it's going to make you nervous and more apt to make mistakes, so you try not to worry about it. (#21)

A mechanism is that which facilitates action, that is, a decision. That decision or action is then followed by an action, that is, a crime. Both of these actions typically are related to one or more mechanisms. Nearly all 60 of the respondents relied on the use of mechanisms.

Given the use of these mechanisms, it is obvious that criminal decision-problems typically are resolved in a less-than-rational fashion. Criminal decision-making departs from models of prescriptive decision-making.

DECIDING TO COMMIT A CRIME

Cornish and Clarke (1985) address the issue of crime specificity in decision-making research. In the research at hand, where the central objective is to understand the resolution of a criminal decision-problem, much of the interview focused on one specific crime, the events leading up to that crime, and most important, the individual's thoughts and conversations during the actual decision-making. The crime itself and

the target were only of peripheral interest. Each respondent was asked to recall the most recent crime he had committed and could remember clearly. At that point we then reconstructed all events in temporal order preceding the crime and then through the crime itself. The emphasis, however, was on the decision about whether to commit the crime. Attention was given to those variables of central importance in prescriptive decision-making processes, namely, the individual's knowledge and perceptions of the likely positive and negative consequences of his actions, the alternatives considered in resolving the decision problem and the mechanism (if applicable) that facilitated the individual's decision to participate in the risky decision/event.

Legal Risk Perceptions

During the crime, thinking of risks was distracting and interfered with performing well in the task they had chosen.

- A. I never really thought about getting caught until, pow, you're in jail, you know, you're in juvenile or something. That's when you go to think about it. (#17)

- A. I never cared about the risks. I don't think any man can care about the risk or he wouldn't do it. I would never let anything stop me from doing something because of the danger or the risk. (#37)

Q. So how much do you think you feared getting caught?

A. I didn't. I never did think about it really. Not to a point that it would make me undecided or anything like that, you know. I knowed I wasn't supposed to get caught. I just figured every time I wouldn't get caught. I never thought that I would get caught for nothing that I did. (#23)

Even those who knew full well the possible consequences of their actions functioned with the belief that they would not be apprehended or suffer negatively.

Q. So, it sounds like as you were approaching an armed robbery you thought about going to prison.

A. Yeah.

Q. And you also knew that your mama knew what you were into and you said that bothered you.

A. Yeah.

Q. And you also just now said you were worried about getting killed or killing somebody. So knowing all those things . . . how did you manage to go ahead and do the armed robberies?

A. I was doing it just to get money. I didn't really, you know, think about all the trouble, you know, I'd end up in or anything. (#16)

Q. These burglaries you committed, did you worry much about getting caught while you were doing it?

A. No.

Q. What about afterwards?

A. Noooo. I didn't give a damn. And the police couldn't catch a damn cold if it wasn't for the snitches. (#6)

Others described being "torn" between whether or whether not to commit the crime. Their indecisiveness was exasperating to them. They were not all that clear about why and how they chose that particular course of action. It is not that they were all that committed to their decision but rather they were committed to making some decision. Action stemming from indecisiveness is not unique to criminal decision-problems. Law-abiding individuals daily resolve legitimate non-criminal problems in much the same way. They decide by "throwing up their hands", so to speak, in exasperation. This type of "decision" reflects their inability to fully evaluate alternatives and their possible outcomes within the decision-problem.

Q. I've heard some of the other fellows I've talked to mention an expression similar to what you used then when you said "Fuck it, I'll just go ahead and do it." Can you explain that to me? What did it mean to you when you just said that to yourself at that time?

A. When you say "Fuck it" you don't want to deal with it you just whatever is up you're going for it, you know. When you say "Fuck it," you know, you're saying "Fuck it, I ain't going to worry about this no more." You ain't going to worry about nothing, you're fixing to go out there and just do whatever it is to do to get it. It's a problem that's up now that you don't want to deal with so you're running from the problem. (#10)

One armed robber described this mode of resolving the decision-problem as he waited on his would-be

victims. He described being undecided but then made a frustration-laden decision.

Q. So you stood around for about 45 minutes waiting on them?

A. Right.

Q. What kinds of things did you think about?

A. I'm thinking must I do this here or must I not? I said I don't need to do this here. And I just said I'm going to do it, I'm going to just do it, I'm going to do it. (#4)

Nearly all claimed to have rarely thought of the potential legal consequences of criminality.

Q. As you did burglaries, what came first -- the crime or thinking about getting caught for the crime?

A. The crime comes first because it's enough to worry about doing the actual crime itself without worrying about what's going to happen if you get caught. (#21)

Two common themes dominated their decisions to commit crimes. First, they believed they would not get caught and second, they believed if they were caught, the prison sentence would not be lengthy or difficult to complete.

Q. Prison must not be much of threat to you.

A. It's not. Prison wasn't what I thought it was, you know.

Q. What do you mean by that?

A. When I went in it was, well at that point in time it was kind of an awful thing to go to prison. That's what I had always heard, but when I got there and then found out the "Well hell, look who is here," you know. "I didn't know he was here or they was here," you know.

And then I seen that I'm a man just like they are and I can make it and I went and come back so quick. (#007)

These individuals know the "ins and outs" of the correctional system, e.g., points for "good and honor time" and how much time will be deducted from their sentence. Therefore, they could rationalize their sentence easier knowing that they actually would not serve their full sentence. While committing crimes they were aware of the ropes of the system and, therefore, a prison sentence was not as weighty a threat as it may have been if (1) they had not known the ropes of the system or (2) if there was not a reduction in time served for a prison sentence.

Q. When I asked you how much time you did, you said "nothing, 18 months." Did that not seem like much time to you?

A. I always thought it wasn't nothing because I went and did it and come on back here. But it really wasn't 18 months, it was 13 months and something. See they give me 18 months, see they give me so much off for good behavior. Just like this time I'm doing now. To you 15 years would be a lot of time because you don't quite understand it, but after you get into the system here then they give you so many points for this and so many points for that, you know, and when you get through looking at that you really don't have to stay as long as you, you know. (#24)

One easily can see the threat of incarceration, the most severe form of punishment the State can levy for property crimes, was no threat to many of these individuals. Again, they typically did not think about

the legal sanction when deciding to commit crimes. Even those few who did think about punishment and those who previously had encountered legal sanction, perceived it as no great punishment threat.

Frazier and Meisenhelder (1985) report from interviews with 95 male property offenders some insights on decision-making. Their participants did not desire punishment, as some theorists have suggested, and they did not feel guilty for their actions. These findings are similar to mine. The great majority of these 60 never thought of punishment or capture and they did not feel guilty about what they had done. This is not to imply that they are amoral. Both Frazier and Meisenhelder and my findings support the offenders as moral and feeling guilty at some points in their careers. Even while engaging in criminal actions they knew their actions were wrong. But, they were able to rationalize them due to desire or necessity, or they were able to put the wrongfulness of their actions out of their minds and not dwell on them.

Extra-Legal Risk Perceptions

Extra-legal risks are those risks beyond the parameters of the legal system. They typically include fear of sanction by parents, employers, or peers. Extra-legal sanctions, however, are more than fear of

sanction. They also include the fear of disappointing significant others, such as family or employers, losing a job, or having difficulty securing employment.

The interviewees reported that they rarely worried about their family discovering they were committing crimes. When the participants were asked about thinking of their parents while deciding to commit a crime, almost all reported they had no worries. This is surprising since most reported that their parents are the most significant other in their lives. They did not think about the possible hardships imposed on their family as a result of their arrest or incarceration. When they finally witnessed first-hand the difficulties their family endured they, often for the first time in their lives, realized the results of their criminal actions. One individual who had committed some forgeries offered an enlightening example.

- A. Well when we got over there, the dude looked at me, and said, "is this your son?" And she said "yeah, do you have the picture? "Would you let me see the picture?" He showed her the picture and sure enough it was a picture of me standing up there signing the check to get it cashed, you know, so no way out. And my mom looked at me, man, and I seen that hurt in her eyes, you know, and I just didn't know what to say. But then it hurt me just that much more because my girlfriend was standing behind me and she saw it too and it just, you know, it was like I just shattered two lives right there man. At that very moment I felt remorse. I felt bad about it. (#58)

And a burglar similarly expressed himself.

Q. What were the worst things about doing time?

A. Well one of the worst is like when your family comes to visit you and you see them leave and see a lot of pain and a lot of hurt in their eyes. You know yourself that you're doing alright, but it hurts them a lot worse than it does you. You can see that. It's plain.
(#45)

Many now claim they do not want to cause their family similar hardships in the future. Those 33 participants who have successfully desisted claim now that if they were faced with a criminal decision-problem, they would consider the effects of their criminal actions on their parents.

Fear of extra-legal sanction threat from their friends discovering they were committing crimes, or their disappointment over their incarceration was nearly non-existent. The friends of most of these individuals are also thieves. Their behavior among their associates and friends was not viewed as all that deviant but rather as normal acceptable behavior. The following dialogue illustrates this point as the participant "turned the tables" and interviewed the researcher.

Q. Okay, let me ask this here. Didn't the people that you grew up with always do crimes and stuff?

A. There were some people that I knew that were always into crimes, you know, everybody's shoplifted. But as far as people I hung around with into more serious things--

Q. Such as?

- A. Burglary or armed robbery . . . breaking and entering, vandalizing.
- Q. Would you believe that I don't have nothing personal against your crowd, but I never remember going to school with them. It seemed like everybody that I knew was damn near into the same way that I was or they was wanting to be or claiming to be or something.
- A. That's surprising.
- Q. Well, your story is also surprising. (#7)

Benefit Perceptions

The perceived benefits from criminal activities are those positive expectations that motivate individuals to engage in a risky decision and action. Motivations are discussed generally earlier in this chapter. However, it is important to discuss these anticipated benefits again within the context of the actual decision commit a crime. The risk-benefit calculus is misleading for understanding criminal decision-making. The decision-making process appears to not be one of rational evaluation or calculation between benefits and risks that these criminals perceive could occur. Rather, the decision is one where the benefits only are considered and risks are (1) rarely thought about or (2) minimally considered but are put out of their minds. Risk was a distraction to those individuals who were able to eventually rid themselves of it. The decision was one of how to cope with the crime. That is, the decision to

commit a crime was a decision predicated on the anticipated benefits and not the calculated expected product of the benefits versus the risks. The decision was one of coping with the action, not necessarily the logistics of putting the possible negative consequences out of the mind -- perceptions of consequences that distracted from the act itself. A few reported that they could not commit a crime if the negative thoughts lingered in their minds. If they were unable to rid themselves of the perceptions of the possible negative consequences, they would not go through with the act that they otherwise previously have decided to do. So risk is not a variable that appears in every calculus for every crime. When risk surfaces, it is evaluated (e.g., the individual asks if it is instinct or real) and acted upon. It typically is cast aside as a nuisance from the task at hand.

As addressed earlier when discussing motivations, the single most popular motivation and perceived benefit from criminal activity was money.

- Q. So, when you were doing these burglaries then, what benefits did you see coming from them?
- A. The money to make it from day to day, to pay, you know, to pay me gas, pot, party money, to have a good time.
- Q. Some people say they break into places for the thrill of it or the excitement or the accomplishment of it.

A. It never give me no thrill and I really wasn't accomplishing nothing but putting money in my pocket so I didn't get no thrill because of it. (#14)

Q. So it sounds like you're saying that the money you've made illegally far outweighs the money you can make--

A. Far outweighs. I don't mind working, but it's hard to work all day and kill yourself for really nothing. (#007)

The attractive qualities that criminality offers are well illustrated from the above quote. The financial attractiveness coupled with the next to nil perceptions of legal sanction threat illustrate a great deal of the decision-making processes found among many of these respondents, particularly the high frequency or Type II lambda respondents.

Q. What benefit did you see coming from shoplifting and committing other crimes?

A. Just getting money to run around on the weekends with and buy some beer and whiskey and shit like that. (#5)

Benefits identified other than money were excitement, getting over on the powers that be, respect from peers, and control. These anticipated benefits, however, should be considered latent benefits and not the prime objective considered when they resolved a criminal decision-problem.

Q. What was the reason you did the burglary?

A. Well for the money, for the money. That's the only reason I did any burglaries. Really any crime at all would be for the money. And the

excitement, you know, it was always there, but it was for the money, more or less.

Q. Did you see any other benefits coming from doing burglaries or was it just the money?

A. Just the money.

Q. You didn't do it because it was exciting or -

A. It was fun, you know, I guess it was kind of exciting in a way. (#14)

Exerting power and controlling victims and the crime situation were particularly important latent benefits to armed robbers.

Q. Is that a pretty scary experience when you walk in with a gun pulled asking for money?

A. No, it's not really scary because you know you've got control of the situation, you know, it's a surprise, you know element of surprise. You go in and you throw a gun on the table and everybody flips out. But it never did scare me because I always just put myself in their position. But it's just that getting in that door, you know, after you get through that door it ain't nothing, it's like you're running, like you own that place.

Q. You said like you own the place?

A. Yeah, you are ruling everything, you know, because everybody, whoever is in there is going to pay attention to you. I didn't want to hurt nobody the only thing I wanted was the money. If you go in there you've got to play that act all the way out whether you get hurt or not.

Q. I think you're saying you were also prepared to do whatever to get the money?

A. Right. It wouldn't be that they'd try to harm me it would be that they wouldn't give up the money. Because you see if you go in there and then let them tell you what to do then there ain't no sense in you going it there at all. (#16)

Frazier and Meisenhelder (1985) report that many of their 95 property offenders found crime to be exciting and believed they were getting over on someone or away with something. Many in my sample report the same. In fact, nearly all 60 found it exciting. But, excitement was a latent benefit neither primarily nor objectively sought after. Very few respondents reported excitement as a reason for committing crime. Rather, quick, easy money was the most common reason for doing crime. If committing crime was also exciting, then that added more pleasure to a financially rewarding activity. But, few entered crime motivated primarily by a desire for excitement.

Repetto (1974) interviewed 97 burglars and found money to be their primary motivator. Excitement was mentioned most often among the young and least often among the old. This age-related difference is similar for the 60 men of this research. Motivation responses were measured across three different age periods of these men's lives. These data show that excitement was often a primary motivator among the young, but its importance lessened with age until it typically became, at most, a latent benefit and motivating force.

DECIDING NOT TO COMMIT A CRIME

During the interviews, each was asked to describe the most recent time that they could remember clearly when they made a conscious decision to not commit a crime. When this question was asked, every participant related a specific time when they were displaced (i.e., their mission was aborted) due to a police officer or a would-be witness. When this consistent pattern emerged, the question was then qualified by limiting their reconstruction to a specific time when they were displaced for other reasons. When the participant recalled the most recent incident, the interview then focused on the same variables as those within the decision to commit a crime. A concentrated effort was made to reconstruct events and conversations preceding and during the decision itself. Conversations with others and the actual thoughts of the individual were probed to understand the way that the decision-problem was framed to determine how the decision to not commit a specific crime was made. Of those who could recall a specific time when they decided not to commit a crime, all described a time when things did not "feel right."

- Q. Did you ever have a chance to commit a crime such as one of these burglaries or robberies and then decide not to for some reason?
- A. Yeah. I know of one incident. It was just my inner feelings told me that something wasn't right. (#56)

They described times when their intuition led them to believe that there was some kind of risk, although they may not visually have seen anything wrong with the particular crime or target they were contemplating. It is not that they saw something that did not look right. Rather they felt that something was amiss. They described this feeling as "butterflies," a "gut feeling," or "instinct."

Q. Did you ever decide not to commit a shoplifting for some reason?

A. Sure. If I had bad feelings about it I wouldn't do it. You just have to go on your feelings, you know, when you're doing something like that because you've got no other way of knowing what's happening.

Q. Is that like a gut-level feeling?

A. It was a sick feeling like disaster was in front of you. (#42)

Q. Of the times that you didn't go through with a crime, what percentage of those times do you think because you thought you could go to prison?

A. Twenty to twenty-five percent.

Q. What percentage were because of this intuition feeling you're talking about?

A. Seventy-five percent. (#57)

A. I've had places planned to rob and got a bad feeling about it, you know, and not done it. That robbery would be on my mind and I just took it as something telling me that ain't going to work, don't do it, so I didn't do it. I never went against my feelings. (#45)

Four individuals were able to relate their experiences of deciding not to commit a crime to similar intuitive feelings about risky legitimate experiences.

Q. Can you relate that to any, to any gut-level feeling you've had about other things in your life, besides criminal things?

A. Well, it'd be like, if you was going to buy a car and you didn't feel like the guy was shooting straight with you, you know. You just had a feeling I don't feel like he's telling me the truth, or you know, I feel like if I buy this car and get down the road the motor is going to fall out of it. It'd be about the same deal. I feel like, if I get these [Corvette] tops, there's going to be more involved in it than what I anticipate, you know. (#56)

Q. Had you backed out of crimes before because they just didn't feel right?

A. Yeah.

Q. Is that kind of like intuition?

A. I'm not sure what you'd call that, it's just like you going down here to this river and finding a place to jump in but changing your mind and going to another place to jump in. It's just something that didn't strike you right about that one place so you backed out of it. I don't know what causes it. (#007)

Some individuals were able to decide and act even with the nervous feelings that are common among these respondents. The following dialogue illustrates how an armed robber related his decision to complete the act to a legitimate act.

Q. Some people have told me about, when I asked them this kind of thing, a lot of people talked about some gut-level feeling of what

they called instinct or sixth sense. They just sensed something isn't right.

A. Well I always get that. You're going to get that before every armed robbery and I'll tell you why, because you was brought up not to do them. It's the same damn way man if you're out on the street and you get you a prostitute and you're taking her to this motel, you've got the same feeling.

Q. Have you ever decided not to go through with one because of that feeling [instinct]?

A. Not that I recall. I know that I'm doing wrong and I'm taking a chance and I just go on with a positive attitude. It's the same way that you got in your car and you started down here, right, okay. What would have happened if you started thinking, well look here, I could have a car wreck around this next corner here. Are you going to just turn around and go back? It's your job to get here and do that, right? It's the same thing. It's a job to me so I do my best at it.

Q. What does it feel like, is it a gut-level feeling?

A. It's a scared feeling, it's a do wrong feeling. It's a small feeling of being in school and I do wrong and here I'm sitting in the principal's office, you know, it's a scary feeling. I do get them, yeah, sure. I think everybody does.

Q. When do those butterflies leave you?

A. Right after I've got the money. (#7)

The majority, however, considered themselves intuitive and took pride in following the lead of their intuition. When confronted with the intuitive nervousness or "butterflies," they typically decided to not commit the crime due to that intuition. They could not point to a concrete factor that led to their decision to not commit

the crime. In fact, during the reconstruction of the daily events, conversations, and thoughts leading to the decision-making, no differences were discernable between those occasions when the decision was made to commit a crime and those where the decision was made not to commit a crime.

CONCLUSION

This chapter provides data on empirical decision-making among the sample of 60 repetitive property criminals. Data collection was guided by, and therefore addresses, components or variables of rational decision-making.

The data show that individuals are motivated by that which they perceive they will obtain. Fifty-three of the 60 respondents reported they were motivated by the desire for money. This perceived benefit, it was discovered, was calculated with more weight than any perceived risk. Risk, the other significant variable in the calculus, rarely was considered. Nearly all respondents reported they rarely considered the threat of capture, arrest, and imprisonment. Nearly all reported that risk was considered a nuisance rather than a real tangible threat. Risk-related negative thoughts were viewed as distractions from their prime objective-

- committing a crime. Thus, many were able to simply not think about the risk, to put it out of their minds.

These findings are in opposition to those that rational decision-making predicts. In prescriptive decisions, both the perceived benefits and perceived risks are calculated more carefully than that found among this sample. Even risky legitimate decisions, most would attest, are calculated with more care and finesse than found among these interviewees.

Another component of rational decision-making is the alternative action evaluated by the decision-problem-solver. The individual theoretically evaluates alternative actions and determines which among them is the best course of action. But, as the data in this chapter illustrate, alternative actions rarely were considered within the context of the decision-problem. And on those rare occasions when they were, they typically were illegal alternatives. But, nearly always, alternative actions were not considered or evaluated.

The data also point to a significant pattern that emerged during this research. Nearly all respondents reported that their decision-making was facilitated by a mechanism that propelled them or enabled them to decide and also to act. These mechanisms clearly interfered with rational calculation and action. This finding is

yet another departure from rational decision-making. Thus, the actual decision to commit a crime hardly resembles a prescriptive decision-problem resolution.

From the onset of this research, one objective has been to create typologies of decision-making from among this sample. As the previously discussed components of decision-making were used in the interviews, patterns emerged in the form of different types of offenders and decision-makers. In the next chapter these broader components of decision-making are situated within typologies that were constructed during this research. These components are made clearer when discussed in relation to specific crime types and specific modes of decision-making. Following the typologies are brief case studies to illustrate further the similarities and differences (i.e., the patterns) found among different types of decision-makers.

CHAPTER IV

TYPOLOGIES OF CRIMINAL DECISION-MAKING

To offer only general accounts of decision-problem resolution would fail to address crime-specificity and those components of rational decision-making within typologies of criminal decision-problem solving. Therefore, distinctly different types of decision-problem-solvers were identified. Each had a unique way of deciding to commit a specific crime. Each type reported slightly different methods of resolving the problem.

Criminal offender typologies have been constructed throughout the history of crime-related research. Criminological research on repeat criminals has produced such vague offender types as "chronic criminal," "career criminal," "habitual criminal," "hard-core criminal," "successful," "unsuccessful," and recently "intensive" and "intermittent." These typologies have illustrated similarities and dissimilarities among criminals. But they lack precision and therefore are applied to individuals with less confidence than those with clearer lines of demarcation and with greater explanatory power.

Definitional/operational debates seemingly have done little to illuminate the central issue for deterrence-minded policy makers, namely to explain the

variance in perceptions of sanction threats among those who commit many and those who commit few crimes. Researchers recently have relied on the frequency of crime commission as guidance in constructing typologies. Lambda has been defined as the "magnitude as measured by the number of crimes an active offender commits in a unit of time" (Blumstein, et al., 1988b: 58). This frequency of offending is referred to as an individual crime rate, which distinguishes it from aggregate data (Blumstein, et al., 1988a).

It became clear in the analysis of the survey and interview data that a portion of this sample committed far more crimes than others in the sample (see Appendix B, Figure 2, for total crimes committed by lambda types). That is, some have a higher lambda than others. During the analysis a question emerged inspired by recent debates among researchers -- namely, are there clear distinctions between the low lambda and high lambda property offenders and their criminal decision-making processes? To answer this question the survey and interview data were used to compile the individual's lambda across their lives. The individual lambda is "expressed as a fraction: the number of crimes committed divided by the number of years of street time" (Visher, 1986: 172).

TYPE I AND TYPE II LAMBDA TYPOLOGIES

To differentiate between high and low lambda offenders, an arbitrary cut-off point was used. Those individuals who committed over 100 felony crimes across their years of street time were considered high lambda and those who committed less than 100 were considered low lambda offenders. This cut-off point was considerably higher than that used in previous research. Visher (1986) and Chaiken and Chaiken (1982), for example operationalized a high lambda offender as one who committed 11 or more crimes during the individual's years of "street time." Among this sample of 60 repetitive offenders, only one reported committing fewer than 11 felonies. And the great majority of these "low lambda offenders" committed far more than 11 crimes during the time they lived in the "free world." Since a 100-crime differentiation is a rather high number, lessor value-laden concepts for high and low lambda are used in the remainder of this work. Those individuals who have a low lambda will be considered Type I lambda and those who have a high lambda will be considered Type II lambda.

From my sample of incarcerated men, it is clear that Type II lambda offenders are more successful criminals than Type I. The Type II lambda offenders have been punished for fewer crimes than the Type I

lambda offenders. For example, a Type I lambda offender may have committed 20 property crimes during his criminal career. He may be incarcerated twice (meeting a sample criterion) for two felonies (one per incarceration). Thus, he was punished for 10 percent of the crimes that he committed and successfully avoided punishment for 90 percent of his crimes. On the other hand, a Type II lambda offender may have committed 200 crimes during his criminal career and may be incarcerated twice for a minimum of two felonies. Thus he was punished for one percent of his crimes and was 99 percent successful at avoiding punishment.

The characteristics of each type of decision-making are similar to the intensive and intermittent typologies developed by Petersilia et al. (1978). The intensive criminal offender is similar to the Type II lambda offender identified in this research. The intensive offender is one that is criminally active over a long period of time, sees himself somewhat as a professional, and concentrates on planning more than the intermittent. The intermittent criminal offender, which is similar to the Type I lambda offender identified in this research, commits crimes infrequently and often opportunistically. This type is uncommitted to a criminal lifestyle and has a lower "success" record (i.e., they have been punished

for a greater percentage of their crimes than the intensive or Type II lambda offender).

Unlike some previous research findings, an association between lambda and the offender's decision-making processes was detected in this study (e.g., Visher, 1986: 184). Thirty-four individuals or 56.6 percent of the sample were Type II lambda offenders. Twenty-six individuals or 43.4 percent of the sample were Type I lambda offenders. Forty-four percent of the Type II lambda offenders had a severe drug addiction--compared to only 7.7 percent of the Type I lambda offenders -- an addiction that demanded daily attention (see Figure 3, Appendix B). These drug-dependent individuals were also dependent on accessible cash to make their needed purchases. Only one Type II lambda offender was employed legitimately and the rest defined their situation as one where they had no alternatives available to them for accessible cash. They functioned with the knowledge and mind set that they had to steal to meet their needs, however illegitimate, to survive.

Whenever the Type II lambda offenders were faced with the decision to commit or not commit a crime, it was less of a "decision-problem" or dilemma than it was for the Type I lambda offenders. The Type II lambda offenders daily functioned with the predisposition to commit crimes -- the decision was not one that required

a great deal of pondering. It was a given for them that they would commit crimes to meet their needs. Most had no other and sought no other alternatives to crime (see Figure 4, Appendix B). The decisions they had defined that required careful thought and pondering were logistical (e.g., planning, target selection, and time of day). They knew that theft offered "quick, easy money" unlike a legitimate "square-john" job. They also knew that in their drug-addicted condition they would not be able to obtain and maintain legitimate employment. Thus, the decision to commit a crime for these Type II lambda offenders was not a decision of "should" or "shouldn't" or calculation, as the following quote illustrates.

- A. With drugs you don't rationalize. It's just a decision you make. You don't weigh the consequences, the pros the cons. You just do it. (#10)

An interesting comparison to this finding of drug addiction is the use of alcohol by these two offender types. Twenty-three percent of the Type II lambda offenders either had an alcohol problem or the crimes were induced by alcohol compared to 38.4 of the Type I lambda offenders (see Appendix B, Figure 3). The Type I lambda offenders often needed encouragement to complete the risky decision -- encouragement from others or from alcohol. They first decided that they were going to do some kind of criminal act and then began drinking to

gain encouragement enough to participate in the risky venture. In retrospect they often blamed their criminal actions on the alcohol rather than the decision they had made prior to consuming the alcohol. In chapter three, mechanisms that facilitated action by these individuals when encountering a risky decision-problem are discussed. Alcohol certainly is one such mechanism but more so for the Type I lambda offenders, as the following illustrates.

- A. Drinking was the whole problem. That drinking will pump you right up. (#17)
- A. That alcohol partly made me just go ahead and do it. (#12)
- A. I believe if I never started drinking wine I'd never done it. (#26)

Forty-four percent of the Type II lambda offenders planned their crimes compared to 11.5 percent of the Type I lambda offenders. Also 47 percent of the Type II lambda offenders committed their crimes alone compared to 30.7 percent of the Type I lambda offenders (see Figure 3, Appendix B). These phenomena indicate that the Type II lambda offenders approached their planned actions with more knowledge about the decision-problem and with better logistical information for solving that problem. They also were prepared to act criminally nearly every day. They did not have to rely on encouragement or the "psyching-up" process indicative of Type I lambda offenders. Those Type I lambda offenders

who stole with other people often relied on psychological encouragement to complete the act. The encouragement, however, was minimal, where previous successful crimes were recalled with pride to illustrate that they could succeed in the crime facing them. Much like an athletic team that recounts past victories before entering a similar risky experience (i.e., meeting an opponent) these cohorts in crime often did likewise.

The Type II lambda offenders are those who were more deliberate, calculative, better planners and considered crime more of a career than Type I lambda offenders. The Type II lambda offenders considered crime their occupation to the point that when they talked of "going to work" or "making some money" they referred to only illegal acts. They approached crime more professionally and viewed it as more than a short-term venture.

- Q. What kinds of things did you suggest?
- A. You know, I just wanted somewhere where we could go rob something.
- Q. So you suggested you all go somewhere and rob?
- A. Yeah, make some, well we call it making money.
- Q. So whenever you all said "making money" that's what it meant?
- A. Right. (#16)

The Type I lambda offenders, on the other hand, decided to commit crimes more opportunistically and spur-of-the-moment than the Type II lambda offenders.

Q. Tell me about that conversation you all had?

A. I said I know a place I think we can get . . . I asked him if he wanted to do it . . . I knowed the answer was going to be yeah. It wasn't no big discussion about nothing like that, you know. We just did it. (#18)

In the remainder of this chapter, types of decision-making are described. These types became evident during the course of this research and data analysis. To illustrate each type, a case study of one individual for each type of decision-making is offered. The individuals chosen for these case studies were selected for two important reasons: (1) each is representative of the type for which he was selected; and (2) each was selected because of his insightfulness, reflectivity, and his apparent honesty and candor. Not every participant was able to reconstruct and articulate a specific crime and the events, conversations, thoughts and decision-making that occurred prior to that crime; essential information for understanding the resolution of a specific criminal decision-problem.

Clarke and Cornish (1985) have emphasized the need to be crime specific in future decision-making research to detect differences among types of crime and criminals. This necessity for crime specificity served

as a guide in this research. A great deal of the interviews and hence case studies focus on the decision-making for one specific crime -- the most recent typical crime that they committed and that they can remember clearly. By focusing on a specific crime, each participant was able to respond in a much more detailed and methodical manner about his decision-making processes and actions than would have been possible had the focus been on crimes generally.

During the interviews, each participant was asked to also describe the most recent occasion that they could remember clearly when they decided not to commit a crime. They were to describe a crime type that they typically committed and a time when the decision was made for reasons other than when they saw the police, or another party that might have interrupted or witnessed the action. As mentioned previously, given these conditions, the majority of participants was unable to recall a specific time when they decided not to commit a crime. Attention now is given to the case studies as a means of illustrating the decision-making typologies.

Floyd: A Type II Lambda Offender

This case study is of one Type II lambda offender in the sample. Although he is a unique individual, he is representative of the Type II lambda offender type.

His biography is typical of most Type II lambda offenders with the exception of two other forms of Type II lambda offender -- the drug-addicted and the Type II lambda hustler. The discussion of these types follow this case study.

Floyd, who is from a broken home, lived with his mother, step-father, and several siblings in a rather large urban area. He considered his family's social class at the time that he was growing up to have been lower working class. He began disliking school at an early age and dropped out after completing the seventh grade.

Q. Why did you hate school?

A. I think it was authority more or less. In fact, to this day, I've got a worse hate for school than I do the penitentiary system.

This disdain for authority and authority figures is evident in much of his criminal activity and his decision-making about risk of an authority figure apprehending him and his attitudes about victims.

Floyd's earliest criminal involvement was in shoplifting (his earliest criminal area of concentration) and burglary..

Q. So was shoplifting the crime you started with?

A. That was my main specialty.

Floyd, like many of the Type II lambda offenders, concentrated or "specialized" typically in one crime for

a period of time and then "graduated" to another specialty area. This temporal-specialty phenomenon supports the idea of specialization among those involved in rather lengthy criminal careers.

He claimed as a juvenile, when he first began committing crimes, that he committed between 500 and 600 shopliftings.

Q. So you committed them pretty frequently then?

A. Anytime I could. Anytime that I only stood a 50 percent chance of making it. Sometimes if I only stood a 25 percent chance of doing it, I would do it, because I enjoyed it. I'm the type of person, man, if I could steal something from way in the back row or if the store manager is standing here and I could take something right under his nose, that's what I'd get.

Q. Why would you prefer that?

A. Because it's more of an accomplishment.

He soon developed a liking to shoplifting and the pecuniary and non-pecuniary rewards it offered.

Q. What were your motivations to shoplift then?

A. Because it's easy money [and] it's exciting. But wanting to do it man, wanting to do it. Love to do it. Love to do it would be the word.

He normally committed these early crimes with someone else and with almost no planning or conversation about the risky decision/act. He and his accomplice simply would frequent different stores together with full intentions of stealing whatever and whenever they

could. Shoplifting was an adventure that they both found enjoyable and financially rewarding.

Floyd, as most Type II lambda offenders, committed crimes at a very high rate and nearly always motivated by the benefits he perceived and usually obtained-- "easy money" and excitement. Floyd, however, emphasized the excitement variable among his decision to commit crimes more than most Type II lambda offenders. Most Type II lambda offenders reported that committing crime provided a latent benefit of excitement. But excitement, a psychological benefit, certainly was not a major motivating factor in their decision-making. Thus, the benefits from criminal participation, perceived within the criminal calculus, were "easy money" and excitement.

These non-drug-addicted Type II lambda offenders, typically reported using drugs and alcohol, but not to the extent of becoming addicted and not as a mechanism to enable them to complete the risky decision/action. Alcohol and drug use were primarily social and not crime-related.

Q. Were you using alcohol or drugs during the period you shoplifted?

A. Yeah.

Q. Did you use them to build your courage up to shoplift?

- A. No, no, in fact, I could not even blame my shoplifting or whatever I done wrong on drugs and alcohol. I'm sure to a certain extent it did pump you up some, but I would definitely done what I was doing if I didn't have it.

When asked about alternatives he considered while resolving the criminal decision-problem, Floyd responded in a typical way for Type II lambda offenders.

- Q. Did you see any alternatives at all?

- A. Never looked for none because there wasn't anything that I enjoyed more than shoplifting.

When asked about the potential legal and extra legal risks, Floyd admitted that he was aware of some. He, like most, had a minimal understanding of the penalty for the crime that he was committing. He knew enough about the risks to do what he perceived as necessary to avoid capture and he believed that he could continually do what was necessary to avoid it. He fully believed that he was skillful and clever enough to avoid capture. The only worry he had was extra-legal punishment from his parents. His perceptions of risk are typical of these non-drug-addicted Type II lambda offenders.

- Q. Did you know the penalty for shoplifting at that time?

- A. I knew one thing. If you got caught you got in trouble, period. As far as ever thinking about being locked up, no, I never really thought about that. If I was to worry about anything it would be my parents catching me.

- Q. That was your biggest worry?

A. It was my only worry then. They'd tear my ass up.

Floyd soon abandoned his career in shoplifting and delved into burglary for a short period of time before he reached the age of 18. Although he was never committed to burglary as a "specialty," he claims to have committed between 20 and 30. Rather than taking the initiative in burglary, as he had done with shoplifting and later with armed robbery, Floyd was led into most burglaries by associates.

A. I was always with someone else. Usually because they wanted to do it. I never was much into burglaries. I have never had a desire for burglaries.

More than likely, because he never exercised his leadership abilities, he was uncommitted to burglary.

Q. Think of things that might have influenced you to commit burglaries.

A. All the other people, man. I did a burglary because the person next to me or persons next to me wanted to go in that house and do a burglary. So what am I going to do, sit down here until they come back? So, to hell with it, "let's do a burglary."

It became evident that his desire to be accepted by significant others clearly propelled Floyd into committing a type of crime that he had little desire for. Perhaps too, since another person or persons suggested the crime and the target, those individuals allowed little opportunity for Floyd to exert his leadership. This may have contributed to his dislike

for burglary. Floyd also thought there were too many uncontrolled variables involved in burglary. Regardless, his perceptions of risk were similar to those he held for shoplifting -- next to nil.

It became evident during the interview that Floyd was willing to try nearly any type of crime to determine if he might like it. After his encounter with burglary, Floyd graduated to armed robbery -- his first area of "specialization."

A. Believe me, as soon as I first thought about armed robbery I did it. I never did armed robbery prior to that because I never considered them. Never thought about them, you know. I got into armed robbery and I loved that. That was a real weakness to me there, right there, armed robbery.

Q. What did you love about it?

A. A lot of money.

Again, he considered the risks of getting caught next to nil, until, like nearly all criminals, he was sentenced to prison his first time.

A. Never in my life, until I got locked up for that 15 years, did I ever consider being locked up. Never in my life.

Q. Did you know the penalty for armed robbery at that time?

A. No, never thought about it.

Q. How worried were you that you'd get arrested?

A. Never thought about it.

Although the harsh realities of a prison sentence educated Floyd to the real possibilities of

imprisonment, he continued to believe that his skill would enable him to successfully commit crime without further legal sanction.

A. From the age of 18 until I got locked up, until I walked out of the penitentiary, until I got locked up this time, while I was out last time, the same thing. The same feeling, everything was as if it never changed.

Q. So, you continued to think you wouldn't get caught and that you wouldn't be arrested?

A. Most definitely.

Prior to his first prison incarceration, at age 18, Floyd had planned only minimally to commit an armed robbery. His continued reliance on his own skill was reinforced by increased planning prior to armed robberies. He typically would watch the place for a few hours. He reported the following about the way he decided to commit armed robbery.

A. The more I would think about it the more I knew that I wouldn't be caught for it.

Q. You weren't worried about getting caught?

A. No, not at all. Like I mentioned on that [questionnaire], my chances of being caught I felt was zero to one (on a ten-point scale).

Q. What do you think accounts for that?

A. Confidence and just doing it before.

Q. Think of the way you weighed the possibility of getting caught against the benefits--

A. I only thought of the benefits.

We see from the above that Floyd's confidence in his ability supported by his previous success in armed

robbery enabled him to confidently decide with self-assurance. This confidence, coupled with his one-sided calculus, enabled Floyd to resolve an otherwise troublesome decision-problem but in a non-problematic manner.

During the interviews, Floyd was asked to describe the most recent crime he had committed that he could remember clearly. He described in vivid detail a recent armed robbery of a store manager who had brought the store deposits to the bank to place in the overnight deposit. Floyd's description of his decision-making was articulate, especially compared to the difficulty a great number of individuals had with explaining their decisions and the calculus behind them.

Q. Tell me what kind of conversation you had with yourself about whether you should or you shouldn't.

A. I knew I should. And I was going to and it was going to be okay. The easiest money is armed robbery.

Q. Did you, at that time, think "I could go to prison?"

A. No. You think about coming to prison about like you think about dying. Did I think about prison? No. I did not have no doubt in my mind I was good enough to do it and make it. It's the same way that you got in your car and you started down here. What would have happened if you started thinking "well look here. I could have a car wreck around this next corner here." Are you just going to turn around and go back? It's your job to get here and do that, right? So the same to me. It's a job to me so I do my best at it.

Again this illustrates how these non-addicted Type II lambda offenders consider crime an occupation or profession. They consider themselves skillful and resourceful enough to successfully complete the task of their profession.

We went on to talk about risk perceptions and negative variables that he may have thought of during the decision to commit the armed robbery and during his wait for the victim.

Q. Well, did bad thoughts actually enter your mind and then you put the thoughts out or did the thoughts not enter your mind?

A. No, they don't. They don't enter my mind, man.

Floyd and these non-addicted Type II lambda offenders rely heavily on their skill and past experiences. Thus, when they are faced with a decision to commit a crime, after having successfully committed a number of crimes, after arriving at the opinion that they are good at their job, the decision is easily made. Their attention, their mental conversation, and conversation with others (when others are included in the crime) focus on the logistics of the crime rather than other calculable factors. They did not deliberate over whether to commit it or negative consequences of their actions. Those components of resolving the decision-problem were resolved, a priori.

DRUG-ADDICTION AND THE TYPE II LAMBDA OFFENDER

In The Felon, Irwin (1970) typologizes various individuals involved in the commission of felonies and calls them criminal identities. These identities are useful for supporting the decision-making typologies of my research. One such identity is the Dope Fiend, which will be referred to as the "drug addict."

Irwin (1970) informs us that the dope fiend is one who has a severe drug addiction for an extended period of time.

The use of drugs is the dominating aspect of his life. Irrespective of former history, former subcultural identities, once hooked, the physiological effects and other exigencies of drug use take over and certain patterns emerge (Irwin, 1970: 16).

From my research, it has become very clear that one such "pattern" is the manner in which criminal decision-problems are framed and resolved by those severely addicted to drugs.

Irwin elaborates on five major themes of the dope fiend world which are "derived from the one dominant dimension -- drug use" (1970: 16). The most important theme identified for this research is stealing to obtain drugs. But Irwin suggests that "what distinguishes their theft from that of other thieves is that the dope fiend tends to be pettier, less ambitious, less polished, more desperate, and more impulsive"

(Irwin, 1970: 17). The extreme monetary cost of using large and regular amounts of expensive drugs and the physically debilitating effects of drugs, make it nearly impossible for the drug addict to support his habit from legal earnings.

As pointed out earlier in this chapter, those individuals in this sample who committed the largest numbers of crimes (i.e., the Type II lambda offenders) are those who were severely addicted to drugs. Their daily needs predisposed them to steal to feed their addictions. The decision was not one of "should" or "shouldn't," but became one of must.

- A. I was off into drugs and I just didn't care. That's the kind of life I was living, so I was just out there and I was dealing with it, you know, survival or whatever.

They had to have drugs to function during the day.

- A. My mind kept saying, "well you know, you've got to do this to get these drugs" and it would, you know. If I didn't get the drugs it'd make me sick, you know, but when I get the drugs in me I'm okay, you know, a normal person.

Stealing for most of these addicts was an act of desperation, and an act that required nearly no decision-problem resolution at all. To simplify it, given their addictions, they did what they defined as necessary. Their situation was one that predisposed them to decide to commit crimes defining their situation as such and therefore deciding in a situationally-

bounded way. It was a daily act and one that became so repetitive that the decision was no longer a real deliberative decision but merely part of the near-daily routine. The decision is, in a sense, made for them, by the very nature of their addictions.

- A. A person as a drunk and an alcoholic I found out now, I know now, there's no rational thinking of any sort. What you might feel is normal is totally abnormal. There's no rational thinking, you know.
- A. With drugs you don't rationalize. It's just a decision you make. You don't weigh the consequences, the pros, the cons. You just do it.

Of the Type II lambda offenders in this sample, 44 percent were addicted severely to drugs or alcohol. Since the percentage of these addicts among this offender type is as large as it is, it has proven worthwhile, during the course of this research, to distinguish characteristics of this particular offender type from those of the non-addicted Type II lambda offenders. Non-addicts are driven by factors and make decisions differently than drug/alcohol addicts. Our attention will turn now to the drug-addicted Type II lambda offender. It will become clear by comparing this biography to the biography of Floyd, the non-addicted Type II lambda offender that the offender characteristics and decision-making processes are unique to each particular type.

Hank: A Drug-Addicted Type II Lambda Offender

Hank completed his high school education and never married. His father now owns his own small business after having worked as a county government official and his mother works as a manager for a State agency. His parents divorced when he was in his mid-teens. When asked about their social class while he was growing up he reported that they "never went without" and were clearly middle class.

Hank was 20 years old the first time he was sentenced to prison. He was not incarcerated at any time prior to that and he also claims he committed no crimes before the age of 18.

While in his late teens, he became involved in a "chop shop" operation, that is, stealing cars, stripping the original parts, replacing them with others, then reselling the cars. He claimed that he had always been exposed to this type of criminal operation and to the older people involved in it. As he associated with these older people he began, little by little, to get more involved in the operation until he reached the point of paying people to steal for him. He frequently was involved in auto thefts prior to his first incarceration.

- Q. Then in that period from 1980 when you first came to the penitentiary, were you into crimes besides stealing cars?

A. Well, that's basically all it was.

Q. So how many cars do you think you were involved in stealing? How many cars and trucks?

A. Hundreds, because when you say every night and sometimes three in one night, you know, it don't take, you'd think that sounds like a big amount but it's not really when you do at it on a steady basis.

We can see from the above dialogue that Hank was a frequent and repetitive offender who also "specialized" at that particular period in his life in one particular crime -- stealing and reselling cars. Again support is evident for "specialization" in a particular crime for a specific period of time. In other words Hank, like most Type II lambda offenders, went through specialty changes or career changes in their larger criminal careers.

Once again, the major motivating force for this crime and the major benefit from this crime, was money - quick easy money.

Q. Why do you think you stole cars at that time?

A. Well it was for the money.

When asked about alternatives that he considered during the decision-problem resolution, Hank reported that at that time in his life, before he became addicted to drugs, he pursued legitimate alternatives, but soon opted for illegitimate.

Q. At that time did you see any alternatives that you could have done besides stealing cars?

A. I had had these summer jobs at night, you know. I'd made my mind up at the time that I would just soon as have that easy money.

When asked about risks for this early criminal "specialty," he reported that he assumed, if he was caught that the penalty would be pretty lenient.

Later, through associating with these friends in the chop-shop business, he formed the same type of habits they had -- a drug addiction.

A. What got me in so much trouble . . . has been dilaudid.

When asked about how he managed to actually make the decision to commit a crime, he responded typically to other drug-addicted Type II lambda offenders.

Q. How did you manage to cope, how did you manage to-

A. You know you're wrong, no matter . . . so you try not to think about it, you shake it off.

Hank, like most drug-addicted Type II lambda offenders, became only marginally involved in crime until his drug use increased to the point of addiction. Parallel to his worsening addiction, his criminal involvement increased. After he became addicted to dilaudid he began spending more money for drugs than he made. He associated with people who committed burglaries and soon found himself for the first time in his life, doing likewise.

Q. Why do you think you did that?

- A. Simply for the drug money. I drifted with that crowd and they either shoplifted or did home burglaries or some kind of violation of the law every day, whatever it is, and you violate the law every single day on end.

He claims that he knew he would eventually get caught, although he continued to participate in risky decisions and events. His drug addiction motivated and necessitated him to continue engaging in criminal decision-making and participation.

- A. You know you pretty well know you're doomed, you're destined. It's just a matter of time until the law enforcement stops you. I worried about it. You can't violate the law every day, two or three different ways a day and survive and get away with it. Eventually you'll stumble.

- Q. How did you handle that mentally thinking that you were going to get popped?

- A. The drugs led the way. They made me think I could walk on water. I didn't judge anything at all. If I had just thought for a split second, but there wasn't no looking back, there wasn't no worries at the time. I decided to do it and didn't think about it till it was over. I wasn't raised up to steal, I wasn't raised up around people that stole.

- Q. Before you had the drug problem had you ever thought about breaking into somebody's house?

- A. No. I didn't have any desire to do that at all.

Hank was asked to describe the most recent crime that he had committed and could remember clearly. He described a house burglary that he committed with "another junkie". He knew the morning of the burglary

that he would have to commit a crime that day to survive (i.e., to purchase drugs).

- A. In the mornings you have to have [a fix] just to function as a normal person.

He, like every respondent, was questioned about his mood that day. Almost every participant, when asked this question, reported that they were in no particular mood, no different from any other day. Mood appears to have been fairly insignificant in their decision-making processes. The drug addicted, however, typically reported they were feeling "bad," "depressed," "desperate," and "anxious about the next fix".

- A. I was in a bad mood, I felt bad. I hadn't done any dilauded that day and like I said you have to have it to function, period.

- Q. Typically, when you burglarized, were you in a bad mood?

- A. Normally in a bad mood or felt bad or I wouldn't have been doing it. It was a have-to situation. You really had to have them physically.

Hank knew he would have to steal for his addiction because he was earning no legitimate money and he relied on "quick, easy money." He searched for a target on his own and then connected with the other person who he had committed burglaries with before. Their typical modus operandi was to drive around looking for suitable targets, or, as Hank said, "to make their opportunity."

When asked about the types of positive or negative factors he thought about or they talked about, he

reported thinking about making "easy money." They talked only of logistics and the division of labor, for that particular criminal act, and not about previous successes or any risk-benefit analysis.

Q. Did you all talk about any negative things that you thought could happen to you?

A. Well, no, you wouldn't talk about getting caught because the main thing is because you didn't want to get caught so, you know, you more or less didn't want to talk about it or think about it.

He claims that he thought about negative consequences, such as arrest, imprisonment, and victim confrontation, but managed to temporarily "block" those worries from his mind.

A. You block out all those thoughts . . . you know it's wrong . . . you don't think about nobody but yourself, Mr. Greed . . . you just block them out for now . . . it's just a temporary block . . . you'll probably never be hooked on those type of drugs but if you ever was you could see it clearly.

The only alternative he had in mind was what he thought was fundamentally necessary for ending his criminal involvement.

A. I thought the only way to end my crime was to end the drug problem. See, the drug problem was the root of it all. That was the only alternative I had was to check myself in somewhere or leave town and get away from the drugs, period. But you go to a drug clinic and get out and you come back, well, you're right back in the middle of it. Now how are you going to deal with it?

Q. Did you think about any alternatives to make money that day?

A. No, that's the only way I knew at the time.

When Hank was asked to describe a particular time when he decided to not commit a crime, he was unable to recall a specific incident. But, he, like others who were unable to remember one specific incident, did describe the most typical response given for deciding not to commit crime in general -- instinct. He also referred to those feelings as "butterflies." He had reported earlier in the interview that he races cars on a dirt track. He was asked to analogize those crime-related "butterflies" to general nervousness that he may have before races -- a legitimate risky decision/action.

Q. Do you get butterflies before a race?

A. Oh, I get nervous every time. I get nervous, deadly nervous.

Q. Do those butterflies feel something like that intuition feeling you're talking about?

A. Well, in a way. But, they go away at the beginning of the race. They'll go away and you'll settle down, but the other, it'll stay with you, it'll stay with you, you know.

Q. So, it's not something you can point to?

A. It's just something that, you know, comes to you, just something you feel yourself.

The drug-addicted Type II lambda offenders typically are those driven by their addictions. The majority, unlike the non-addicted Type II lambda offenders, do not consider crime an occupation or profession. Rather, they view crime as an expedient way

to fulfill their need -- a need that most hope is temporary. Driven by their needs, they commit types of crimes that they would not have considered otherwise. Also, their modus operandi is desperate and more impulsive with little planning and one where they constantly "make their opportunities."

THE HUSTLING TYPE II LAMBDA OFFENDER

Irwin identifies the hustler among his typologies in The Felon (1970). Again, his analysis is useful in typologizing decision-making among these 60 respondents. A major theme of the hustler identified by Irwin is "sharpness" of appearance and language. "The language-intellectual skills component is the ability to dupe, to outwit through conversation" (1970: 12). The hustlers were those who were very well guarded during the course of the interviews. They were the most cautious, distrusting participants who played their cards "close to their chests", so to speak. The majority of the Type II lambda offenders, unlike the hustler, were quite willing to talk of their exploits, their past accomplishments, and their lives. They were happy to volunteer information and rarely seemed guarded during the interviews.

The hustler of the following biography, Archie, was without a doubt the most guarded respondent of the 60.

Irwin informs us that the absence of trust is an important theme of the hustler. This was reinforced during the interviews with the hustlers and especially with Archie.

Irwin (1970) informs us that the hustler has a dichotomous view of others -- those who take and those who are taken, and suggests that "the sensible course . . . is to be one of those who take" (1970: 15). The hustler's lack of indecisiveness about committing crimes is evident in his belief about the social world.

The hustler is a form of Type II lambda offender and one whose mindset is to commit crimes on a regular basis -- nearly daily. The decision problem has become routinized as part of his daily activities, as has committing crimes, and is really no problem at all. Resolving the decision-problem rarely follows the processes of prescriptive decision-making. Hustling is second nature to the hustler just as using drugs is to the drug addict.

Archie: A Type II Lambda Hustling Offender

Archie, who was raised in an inner-city environment, is 39 years old, single, and the father of three children. He completed the seventh grade of school and has never attempted to obtain his GED. He has four siblings, none of which has been in legal

trouble. His father worked as a custodian and his mother spent some time, periodically, in hospitals for nerve-related problems.

His most stable period of employment was as a presser for a dry-cleaning business. When asked about his impression of performing that type of work he replied:

- A. Well, I seen nothing wrong with it, as long as I could make enough money to keep up with the cost of living to my standard of living, you know. It wasn't nothing wrong with it.

Archie became involved in crime at the age of 12 or 13 when he and friends began shoplifting minor items (e.g., candy bars, pop bottles). They then progressed to breaking into businesses. He soon adopted this lifestyle and the mindset of stealing to support his "standard of living." He volunteered the following:

- A. As you get older and see these same opportunities I guess your desire for the taste of candy is going away, but you know this holds a value.

Q. So when did it become bigger stuff?

- A. When I started liking girls more or less, you know dating and cared about my appearance and the clothes that I wore.

Archie was sent to a juvenile reformatory twice between the ages of 13 and 15. He was 19 when he first was sentenced to prison for burglary, for which he served one year. The next time he was incarcerated was when he was 29 years old, again for burglary. When

relating his age at his first two incarcerations, he was asked about his criminal activity during the ten years between prison sentences. The following dialogue illustrates how cautious the hustler is when asked to divulge sensitive information.

Q. Did you burglarize during that ten year period?

A. During that ten year period, is that what you're saying? Did I burglarize in between that ten year period?

Q. Yeah, in that ten year period.

A. Did I?

Q. Yeah.

A. Your asking me that question? And you expect me to give you a straight answer?

Q. You don't have to answer it if you don't want to. It's just odd that if somebody was into burglaries a lot that there would be this ten year gap where they managed to get away with it, you know.

A. Well, no, it's not necessarily . . . it's a number of other things that you can do that work for you for a certain length of time and then when that particular thing is not working you go into this thing that you rely in, maybe a thing that you might feel that you're more experienced at.

Q. Did you do very many before you were caught?

A. Did I do very many? Now that's one question that I find it hard to come out of my mouth to even say that. You see what I'm saying?

Archie claimed that he occasionally relied on hustling in a different way -- by gambling and selling marijuana. The hustler is able to move easily from one hustle or

"specialty" to another. The hustler is street-wise and always is alert for new opportunities in a variety of hustles.

After serving one year for his second burglary conviction, Archie was reincarcerated seven years later again for burglary. He received a four year prison sentence, during which he was interviewed for this research.

When Archie was interviewed during the second wave, after his release from prison, he continued to play his cards as close to his chest as he had during the first interview and responded very cautiously to sensitive questions, but typical to hustlers. He was questioned about the period since his release from prison and if he had thought about committing any crimes.

Q. How long were you out before you thought about doing something wrong?

A. How long was I out before I thought of doing something? What do you mean wrong? Wrong in what way?

Q. You know, illegal.

A. Thought about it? What kind of question is that?

Q. It's a good straight-forward question.

A. (Laughs) This ain't funny, not much. It's just you're asking me and the things that I know that I could be telling you.

During the interviews Archie was asked about the

decision-making of those early shoplifting/petit theft
sprees.

- A. We didn't ever decide. We'd just take off to walking, you know, it was a thing of kids just going to town all the time, you know, you go to town and wander around downtown and whatever you run into in between town and back home, it was, "come on, let's do this and do that," and then, you know, you're doing it. It wasn't no diabolical plot, just spur-of-the-moment.

He reports that about age 17, the way that he approached burglaries and the way that he made the decision changed. He began hustling as a livelihood.

- A. I would say it changed to the fact that I would go at more at the professional level. It was a serious thing now to me.

Q. If you had to say, "this is the reason I broke into places," what would it be?

- A. I basically needed the money to keep up my standards of living. When I seen my standard of living falling, you know, I had to reinforce it with some currency.

Archie was asked to describe the most recent crime he had committed and could remember clearly. He related one specific burglary that he committed and his decision-making prior to it. He was asked about the amount of time he had contemplated doing the crime.

Q. You had been thinking about that for awhile, then?

- A. No, it's not like that. If you do things like that it's not a matter of thinking about doing it. You see valuable things as you go along day by day. It might be something that you can knock off when you might need some money. You spot things like that day by day as you go.

Q. How worried were you that you would get caught?

A. Not at all. I was rather bold. I didn't think about that much. [The worry] comes but you can wipe it away.

Q. How do you wipe it away?

A. You just blank it out.

Archie was also questioned about a specific time when he decided not to commit a crime. He, like many, was unable to remember one specific time, but remembered generally. He attributes those decisions not to commit a crime to instinct.

Q. What percentage of the burglaries that you thought about doing would you say that you didn't go through with, that you decided not to do?

A. I'd say 10 percent.

Q. For reasons like you're describing to me now?

A. Yeah, just bad feelings.

Archie, like most hustlers, knows the system and its ins and outs. Prison represents little threat to him for he knows through experience that he can do time and that it is a relatively easy experience for him. Hustlers do not enjoy being incarcerated, but when that is the result of their decisions and actions, they accept it. Prison and the threat of prison, are not fears that are part of their calculus and decision-making before committing crimes.

The hustler is a criminal who calculates more carefully than the drug-addict and the Type I lambda offender. The hustler thinks little in advance about the logistics of doing the crime and certainly does not use a prescriptive weighing of the expected costs and benefits of completing the act. The hustler decides first to do a crime and then searches for an amenable target. He searches for opportunities and targets rather than jumping at the first opportunity that presents itself. This is not to say that he does not take advantage of opportunities, but his typical modus operandi is to decide first and then selectively choose a target.

Abel: A Type I Lambda Offender

As mentioned earlier in this chapter, the research participants are typologized as Type I and Type II lambda offenders. The various forms of Type II lambda offenders do not apply to the Type I lambda offender type. The Type I lambda offender is one who has committed fewer than 100 crimes during his life of "street time." Differences in decision-making emerged as the typologies were constructed along the course of this research. These differences are apparent when the Type I lambda offender biography is compared to the Type II lambda offender biographies.

Abel attended school until age 17 at which time he had completed nine grades, a few of which were in special education. While he was growing up his father and mother were disabled and he claims that they certainly were lower social class. Abel has 10 siblings, two of which have been involved in legal trouble. He has worked only menial jobs, typically as a laborer. He and his wife have been married seven years and are expecting their first child.

The first serious crime Abel committed was a home burglary at the age of 17 with his older brother. He continued dabbling in burglaries with his brother, who strongly encouraged and pressured him to commit nearly every crime that he was involved in.

A. My brother and them they'd get with me and stuff and they'd maybe say, "yeah we know where so and so place is and we can go and get some money and make a little money off of this." My brother . . . he's really the reason I'm in here today. He would always kind of encourage me.

He claims to have committed 10 to 15 burglaries across his lifetime. They occurred infrequently and were distributed across the 10 years of his life that he was involved in crime.

Abel was 19 years old when he was first incarcerated. He served three years for accessory to murder that originally was intended as an armed robbery. After his release from prison he spent seven to eight

years in the "free world" before he was reincarcerated for burglary. At the time of the first interview, he was serving his second prison incarceration.

When Abel was asked about the decision to commit crimes he spoke of his perceptions of both the risks and benefits. His wife, the most significant other in his life, was also the most significant extra-legal risk he thought of prior to committing crimes. He claimed to have thought about her and their marriage prior to committing most crimes.

A. [I] knowed I was going to get in trouble and I didn't want to be away from my wife. Just like I've, hey, I've laid a many a night and cried because I knowed that I had hurt my wife and she even cries every time. Every week I get two or three letters from her and she writes stuff in there that makes me cry.

He claimed that she, in a caring and not nagging way, encouraged him to cease his criminal activities.

A. My wife, she told me, she said, "you're going to get locked up away from me," and said, "you're going to be gone for hard to tell how many years," and said, "you might liable end up getting killed sitting down there in them prisons," said, "because," said, "they's a lot of that, a lot of that goes on."

He claimed to also have thought about the legal risks prior to committing a burglary.

Q. How worried were you that you would get arrested or sent to prison when you were doing those burglaries? Is it something that you thought very much about?

A. I thought about it very, very much.

Q. When did you usually think about it?

A. After.

Q. So how long after the burglary would pass until you would stop worrying about getting caught?

A. Sometimes it'd be about a month. I would lay in bed and think about it, think to myself, I'd lay on the bed with my eyes closed and just imagine a lot of times that the police was going to walk up any time and arrest me for doing so and so thing and take me and lock me up away from my wife.

The perceived benefits that he thought he would derive from burglary were typical benefits found among nearly all offender types, namely, money, excitement, and enjoyment.

Q. When you thought about doing the burglaries . . . what were the benefits that you saw coming out of doing burglaries?

A. Well, when I was doing them I thought I was having fun and I thought I was making money for me and my family.

Abel, as did most Type I lambda offenders, relied on alcohol or drugs as a mechanism which enabled him to participate in the risky decision/action.

A. I would always be a drinking when I would do that stuff. It would always kind of boost me up and build my hopes up that I could do it. That booze and stuff, just like if you drink one can of beer you're going to want a second. You get that drunk you're going to want another one and it's going to keep on and keep on until it leads you on and on and then you're going to be out here doing this and that and then end up you're going to be sitting up here behind bars.

A second and very powerful mechanism in Abel's decision-making process was his older brother who also

committed the murder during the armed robbery. This mechanism was used almost exclusively by the Type I lambda offenders. Abel attributes most of his criminal involvement and legal trouble to this very important mechanism in his criminal decision-making.

Q. Was [your brother] the one that initiated the stealing?

A. Oh, yes. He's really the reason I'm in here today. He would always kind of encourage me for to go. He's say, "come on, let's go." Go over there where so and so is and we might make so much money and we'd half it. My brother, he would come by one day and he would talk to me. I'd a lot of times I'd tell him I'd say, "No, I don't want to do this." And then, maybe the next day, he would come by and we'd sit around and talk about it and stuff and then we'd get out maybe a little drinking and something another and then's when we'd go do it.

Abel, when describing the most recent crime that he committed and could remember clearly, described the robbery/ murder that he, his brother, and another accomplice committed. That was the only armed robbery that he participated in. He was convinced, again, by his brother.

Q. Just briefly tell me the circumstances of that murder.

A. Well my brother, he talked me into that. He said, "I know this man," said, "he's got all kinds of money," said, "come on," said, "we'll go over there and do this," said, "they ain't going to be nothing happen."

His brother had committed armed robberies before and

Abel relied on the expertise of this older, more experienced individual.

Q. Had he armed robbed before?

A. Yeah he had did that a lot.

Q. So you never had. What was your reaction when all of a sudden this guy said, "hey, why don't we go over here and stick this guy up?" I mean, you'd never done an armed robbery before.

A. Well, it was, it was kind of a shock to me and I asked, I asked him, I said, I said, "is anybody going to get hurt doing this," and they said, "no." Said, "all we'll do is just go over there," and said, "draw the gun on the man," and said, "tell him to set the money out," and said, "he'll set it out."

Abel, relying on his brother's expertise and his previous criminal accomplishments, was able to make the leap in seriousness from committing burglaries to armed robbery.

Q. Tell me about the conversation that you all had, you know, what kinds of things were said, what kinds of things went through your mind.

A. I was scared. I said, "Ronnie, I'll tell you what," I said, "we may get in trouble or we might end up getting killed by doing this," because I hadn't never did nothing like that. But he had and he said, "no," said, "everything will be alright," said, "you ain't got nothing to worry about."

Q. Did that convince you everything would be okay?

A. So I kindly figured to myself well I guess maybe it will be alright.

Q. So why did you think it would be?

A. Because he had got out, got out of a lot of stuff and he had did a lot of stuff and had never got caught at it. I figured well if he

can get by with all them things I know we can get by with just this one thing.

The calculus in this case, unlike the calculus among other types discussed in this chapter, was not one-sided. The expected benefits certainly were discussed and counted on similarly to other criminal decision-makers.

A. Well we talked about when we got all that money . . . we was going to do this and do that with the money. We was going to go and buy some nice, nice cars and make us some hot rods and stuff out of them and build them up and make them mean and stuff.

But, Abel, as other Type I lambda offenders, typically thought about possible legal and extra-legal consequences of his decisions/actions.

Q. Were there other things you were worried about?

A. Well, I was thinking, I was thinking about my wife too. And I thought that I'd get this money. Shoot, I'm going to, I'll think I'm rich. I'll have plenty of money. I figured [my wife] would just up and leave me and I would never, I would never be back with her any more.

Q. You thought about that too?

A. Yeah.

He attributes his ability to make the decision to take part in the armed robbery on the mechanism alcohol.

Q. How did you manage to, thinking about all those things, how did you manage to do that crime?

A. Well, one thing, well that alcohol and stuff where I was drinking that partly, that partly made me just go ahead and do it. Because when you get to drinking and you drink so much and

you get so drunk or something or another like that you'll do anything.

Abel, as most Type I lambda offenders, felt guilty for committing crimes even at the time of commission. Type I lambda offenders are unable to rationalize away the moral and ethical dilemmas that they face when resolving a criminal decision-problem and those they face afterwards. Not only did the Type I lambda offenders feel guilty but they also realized the extra-legal sanction threats from neighbors and friends and how their criminal actions would reflect badly on their families.

- A. I felt bad about doing that stuff. I felt bad about myself because I knowed people are looking, looking down on me saying, "well there's nothing to him. Why he ain't good for nothing."

HABITUAL THEFT

Irwin (1985) reports from his study of the jail, that many criminals he observed are highly impulsive in their behavior, both in and out of jail. They steal habitually without any forethought and believe that items belong to no one, but are "up for grabs." They constantly are alert to opportunities for personal gain. "This attitude becomes second nature, and the impulse to appropriate anything that is not carefully guarded carries over to life on the outside" (Irwin, : 88).

Several of these participants reported that many of their criminal actions took place with little or no forethought about the acts themselves, as opposed to forethought about perceived consequences, benefits, motives, and alternatives. Much of the minor crimes were committed habitually. These minor offenses had been committed so often that they became a normal inconsequential action by some of these offenders. For example, a common comment among these respondents was "I never pay for cigarettes."

- A. Used to, when I'd go in a store and I had money in my pocket, it was just, used to when I'd go in a store if I was going to get cigarettes I wasn't going to pay for them. I would just steal them. (#1)

They developed a pattern of stealing cigarettes and other petty items to such an extent that it became a nonchalant, habitual act, absent of forethought about the act or possible negative consequences.

According to their descriptions, which are short on detail, the act itself is a rather simple one. It involves a quick visual appraisal of the setting, "lifting the items" and successfully concealing them until away from the premises. Even this description, as simple as it sounds, makes the action seem more complex than it actually is. The decision about habitual, petty theft is much simpler than the decision-making process and action of shoplifting, as described by those who

shoplifted. Shoplifters typically would go to the place of business with full intentions to shoplift. Such is not the case with the habitual thief.

One individual when asked about habitual minor theft responded in the following manner.

A. Hell, sometimes I couldn't walk in a store without stealing something. You know, just to see if I could do it. It wasn't something I needed, it's just, I just felt I needed to steal something.

Q. The way that you approached that habitual stealing, was that the same way that you approached burglaries?

A. No, it was impulsive. (#41)

This type of decision-making is the least calculative of the types identified in this work. As often as not, the offender arrives at the crime scene with no forethought of stealing. But, after having habitually stolen petty items, when presented with another opportunity, the habitual thief engages in the risky action with little or no forethought about the action or consequences thereof.

CONCLUSION

These typologies, accompanied with a case study of each, are useful in understanding patterns and processes of decision-making found among repetitive property criminals. Each decision-making type is unique in its framing and resolving criminal decision-problems. The

interviews revealed that each viewed crime commission and committed crimes distinctly different from the other types. Those components of rational decision-making (viz., alternatives, risk/benefit perceptions, mechanisms) are also unique to each decision-making type.

Early in this research, I began to question my confidence in the interviewees' accounts of their decision-making, particularly in its simplicity. Two possible explanations for this apparent simplicity surfaced. Each, in turn, was evaluated. First, the operationalization of decision-making variables was questioned since it was possible those theoretical properties of rational decision-making were not being "tapped." A second explanation was arrived at, that when evaluated makes more analytic sense than the former. Each participant showed difficulty articulating the atomistic steps and processes that they were pressed for. They had difficulty in analytically separating components of their decisions and had difficulty reconstructing thought processes during the decision. This explanation makes more analytic sense when we consider their difficulty in reconstructing illegitimate decisions compared to the difficulty of legitimate decision-makers' to reconstruct their decision-problem resolution. Like criminal decision-

problems, many legitimate decisions also are risky (e.g., those involving purchases of substantial monetary size, elective surgeries, organized athletics, international travel). From personal experience, those who resolve legitimate risky decision-problems also experience difficulty in recalling specifics about their decisions to act. They are unable to provide accounts of alternatives to the decision and many legitimate decisions are made with the facilitative aid of a mechanism (e.g., drinking and conversation). Also, many legitimate decisions are made without knowledge of the possible outcomes and without calculation between perceived benefits and risks. Therefore, the difficulty in reconstructing criminal decision-problem resolution may be typical of reconstructing all types of decisions. It may well be that these cognitive human processes elude precise social science measurement.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

This research describes an important and, until now, overlooked component of criminal activity, particularly among a problem population of repetitive criminals. It offers a descriptive analytical look at criminal decision-making and how it departs from decision-making as described in theoretical literature.

During the research, three important topics emerged that are important for the future of research guided by decision-making theories. First, criminal decision-problems typically are resolved with the aid of a mechanism that facilitates both the decision to commit a crime and the actual commission of the crime. As shown in Figure 3, Appendix B, many of the criminals in this study decided to commit crimes while they were under the influence or addicted to drugs and alcohol. This single mechanism was used in the majority of the crimes they described. This is not to imply a causal relationship, but merely a significant factor in explaining criminal decision-problem resolution.

Second, while resolving a criminal decision-problem, that is calculating between the perceived positive and negative outcomes, very few reported considering possible negative consequences of their

actions. This failure to calculate negative outcomes, even simplistically, does not support empirically prescriptive decision-making theories.

Third, this research fulfilled an important objective by constructing decision-making typologies. As various patterns of decision-making emerged, along with various motivations, and mechanisms, typologies of decision-making were constructed, guided by previous distinctions of offending.

These research findings, and those detailed in previous chapters, have important implications for current debates in the literature. One such debate is over whether career criminals specialize or generalize in types of crimes during their careers. Another debate has to do with the relevance of deterrence and decision-making theories and future research guided by such theories.

SPECIALIST/GENERALIST DEBATE

Previous research on repetitive criminals has examined, among other things, the issue of specialization among the chronic career offenders. Debate has focused on whether the repeat offenders are specialists in a given area of criminality or whether they are generalists who commit a variety of types of crimes.

An early study of criminal careers found that generalization is common among young criminals who reported they committed three or more types of crime. As they grew older, they committed fewer types of crimes, but committed them opportunistically and as generalists (Petersilia et al, 1978; Petersilia, 1980). In a similar study, Walsh (1986) interviewed 122 British robbers and found that the participants were generalists who did not distinguish between robbery and burglary. His robbers reported that they associated with all types of criminals. He also reported that his robbers were able to shift easily from committing robbery to committing burglary and then back to robbery.

These findings are dissimilar to my research findings. Although the majority of the 60 offenders in my study could not be considered specialists in the sophisticated use of the word, they typically "specialized" in one type of crime for a period of time, then moved on to another type of crime or "specialty area." Individuals usually began their careers with one crime type and then "graduated" to another type. Sometimes they returned to the original crime type but typically did not.

A. When I became an adult . . . I didn't really do too much burglaries because . . . I graduated from that, you know, to armed robbery.

Q. So you graduated, you said graduated?

- A. When I first started hanging out I was doing shoplifting and then I went from shoplifting to burglarizing and then I went from that to armed robbery so, you know, each step you go further and further. (#16)

Other individuals reported they could adapt to long-range career changes by changing their "specialties."

- A. It's a number of other things that you can do that work for you for a certain length of time and then when that particular thing is not working you go into this thing that you rely in, maybe a thing that you might feel that you're more experienced at. (#57)

Few reported shifting from one crime to another with the ease that Walsh found among his sample. My findings are closer to those of Feeney (1986) who interviewed armed robbers. He discovered that many thought that committing burglary was too risky and unpredictable just as I found with many in my sample.

Those individuals who specialized in burglary generally reported an aversion to armed robbery for like reasons. The most common reasons given were that: (1) they desired to avoid confronting the victim; (2) armed robbery was too dangerous; and (3) armed robbery carried too much prison time. Likewise, "specialists" in robbery reported they did not commit burglary for similar reasons. With burglary they reported there was: (1) a lack of control of the situation; (2) fear of being attacked by a home or business owner; (3) dislike for the physical work of transporting the spoils; and

(4) disdain for the trouble and time involved in fencing the goods.

Some individuals reported changing their "specialty" to avoid further arrest or a severe punishment for the same crime type for which they had been previously incarcerated.

A. I changed crimes.

Q. Why did you change?

A. I was told, you know, if you come back on the same MO that, you know, they'd lock me up longer if I was caught for burglary, which there was a lot of charges like that on my records, burglary. So, if I was going to do anything I need to change. (#23)

In sum, my findings suggest that over time, offenders tend toward specialization. There clearly is a need for more systematic research on the topic of specialization. Longitudinal designs should be utilized in these investigations.

IMPLICATIONS FOR DETERRENCE AND DECISION-MAKING THEORIES

Perceptual deterrence and decision-making theories inform us that individuals, prior to acting, think about the potential positive and negative consequences of their actions. The decision of whether to engage in those actions is a product of some rational calculation of the perceived benefits and risks associated with each act. The theories' logic, then, informs us that if the action is believed to produce greater positive than

negative results, the actor more than likely, will proceed with the act. In this case the rewards are perceived as "outweighing" the risks. On the other hand, if the actor believes the act will produce greater negative than positive consequences the actor, more than likely, will not engage in the act. In this case, the risks are perceived as "outweighing" the benefits. Perceptual deterrence and decision-making theories emphasize the ability of the actor to relate action to consequence, which is of utmost importance in understanding risky decision-problem resolution and risky actions. These theories also emphasize that the actors' perceptions of the likely outcome of actions propel them to act one way or another.

My research findings, however, do not support the theoretical presuppositions of deterrence and prescriptive decision-making theories. For the respondents in this research claimed that they and nearly every thief they have known simply do not think about the possible legal consequences of their criminal actions prior to committing crimes. This is especially true for those criminals of grave concern to deterrence-minded policy makers -- the drug-addicted and the non-addicted Type II lambda offenders. Rather than thinking of the negative consequences of their actions, the Type II lambda offenders claimed to have thought primarily of

the perceived positive consequences of their actions.

Deterrence and decision-making theories inform us that "risk" ideally is conceptualized and evaluated prior to acting. But, again, contrary to decision-making theories, those few participants who reported considering the possible negative consequences of their actions when deciding to commit a crime also managed to put those thoughts out of their minds to complete the crime. This certainly is supportive of the social psychological domain assumption that fear "can be escaped by turning away from signs of danger [which] is one of the weaknesses of trying to use fear to influence behavior" (McCarroll, 1972: 363). Deterrence theory's presupposition that the threat of legal sanction is a fear-inducing control, may not hold water, especially among very high frequency repetitive offenders.

Up to this point in their lives, these repeat offenders certainly have been undeterred by the threat of legal sanction. Only now, after having served at least two prison incarcerations and after suffering mammoth extra-legal consequences do the majority claim they will desist from committing property crimes. They possibly may be deterred now, but only after having committed numerous property crimes and after having served two or more prison terms. The question of importance for deterrence theory, theorists, and policy

makers, is -- why were they not deterred before now? The most common threads among their responses that explain this absence of deterrent effects on their actions are that they (1) thought they would not get caught, (2) thought if they were caught they would be incapacitated for a relatively short time, and (3) considered prison a non-threatening environment.

These first two points are addressed in chapters three and four of this work. In those chapters the decision-making and the individual's perceptions of the consequences of their actions are elaborated. The third point deserves further elaboration. When the participants actually thought about the prison environment prior to their first incarceration, they thought of the same types of threats as most individuals. Then, when they were incarcerated the first time, they concluded that the State's punishment for committing property crimes was not that severe. In other words, the worst punishment that the State could invoke on property offenders, they discovered, could be endured relatively easily and hence was no great threat. Even more important, they rarely thought of the prison environment or their being incarcerated there. They simply believed they would not get caught and refused to think beyond that.

While in prison many of these offenders experienced a typical education about prison sentences and the "going rate" for various crimes. With this new knowledge and after experiencing the realities of prison, some offenders desisted from crime for a time. Those who desisted attribute their decision to the realization of legal punishment and extra-legal factors in their lives (e.g., new-found family commitments, abstinence from drugs and alcohol, legitimate employment). During this period, some claimed to have considered and pursued alternatives to their illegitimate occupations for the first time since they began.

Those who continued committing crimes changed their decision-making approach to crimes in one of two ways. Some thought about the possibility of legal sanction much more than they ever had before. This often led to, at best, a minimal increase in planning. Others claimed that they simply chose not to think about the legal sanction threats. Choosing not to think about the consequences of their actions was one of a number of mechanisms used by the participants to enable them to make the decision to commit a crime in the face of very real consequences (these mechanisms are discussed in the preceding two chapters). Some consciously chose to put thoughts of legal sanction out of their minds. This

failure to evaluate the legal consequences of their actions does not support prescriptive rational criminal decision-making although it does support utilitarianism. All of these individuals considered themselves immune from arrest and incarceration, although they believed that eventually every person who habitually commits crime will be arrested. Their perceptions about immunity disallowed adequate consideration of the legal consequences.

Clarke and Cornish (1985: 173) recently reported that desistance "is not necessarily permanent and may simply be part of a continuing process of lulls in the offending of persistent criminals." A great majority of these 60 persistent offenders reported periods in their lives when they were not actively committing crimes. They reported going through phases of desistance which were not related to the threat of legal sanction. Rather, the phases were related to periods when conditions other than legal, were positive or rewarding (i.e., when they could say, "My life is good"). These offenders could be labeled cyclical or temporary desisters. Still, the most significant point, for deterrence theory and deterrence-guided policy, is that they temporarily desisted for reasons other than being deterred by the threat of legal sanction.

A recent review of previous deterrence-guided research by a recognized deterrence scholar, yields an insightful and sobering conclusion about the utility of deterrence theory and deterrence-guided policies. And his comments well serve as a conclusion to this dissertation.

Perceptual deterrence researchers and proponents of the deterrence doctrine should also begin to prepare themselves for possible bad news. No matter how sophisticated the study or how valiant the effort, very little relationship may exist between people's estimates of the certainty and severity of punishment and their behavior. Deterrence theory assumes that even if people do not perceive accurately the objective certainty and severity of punishment, at least they are motivated rationally by their perceptions of those risks. Perhaps not; it may not be in the nature of the beast to be so rational. Thus, however much we pride ourselves on being intelligent, rational creatures, the truth may be that we are tempered somewhat with humanity (Paternoster, 1987: 213-15).

Perhaps these uniquely human characteristics, thought processes, evaluations, and actions are beyond the realm of scientific measurement. And perhaps the theoretical propositions are not indicative of human behavior. Research such as this illuminates the utility of theory and theoretical assumptions. This illumination also has policy implications that logically follow the direction of the research findings.

Although these participants have served several cumulative years in prison, few have served many years in one prison term. Now, with their habitual records and being several years older, they are faced with the

threat of being incarcerated as a habitual criminal should they be convicted of further property crimes. Approximately 55 percent of the sample claimed to have been threatened with being tried as a habitual criminal. Under Tennessee law, a habitual criminal conviction carries a life sentence. All of these individuals claimed that the punishment severity was too great a risk to justify continued property crime commission. All also indicated that their chances of re-arrest are greater now than at any point in their lives and all believed that re-arrest certainly would result in another prison sentence. This very severe penalty appears to act as a deterrent on these repetitive property offenders who, have already served several years in prison and perceive the habitual criminal law as a threat.

Policy makers could interpret this as evidence that very long prison sentences act as a deterrent. This research suggests this interpretation, but only among those individuals who have been incarcerated twice previously for felonies. Most of these men served a very short prison sentence when they were first incarcerated, and they subsequently were undeterred by the threat of prison. Some policy makers could endorse and work toward the implementation of severely long prison sentences for first-time property offenders.

This policy would selectively incapacitate "risky offenders," and would send out a threatening message to would-be property offenders who would be forced to recalculate the going rate for various crimes. However, this "deterrent effect" among this sample, can only be generalized to populations of "two-time losers," that is to those who have been incarcerated twice or more and who face the threat of being tried as a habitual criminal. Generalizations from this research cannot be unilaterally applied to other criminal populations for there is no scientific evidence to support such applications.

Given that previous research has examined changes in the severity of punishment and found very little impact on individual's perceptions, deterrence-guided policy may indeed be misguided and one that operates on false premises. Deterrence theory, likewise, seems incapable of predicting behavior since it is unable to account for individuals' perceptions and decision-problem resolution, no matter how rational.

IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

Since this research illuminates some serious questions about deterrence and decision-making theories, perhaps another theory should be used for this type of research in the future. This type of qualitative

research design and data analysis calls for a qualitative theory that both explicitly and implicitly embraces the idea of "getting inside" peoples' heads. Phenomenological sociology may prove useful in understanding criminal decision-making not only for future research but also in reanalyzing the data from this research project.

Phenomenology, more than any other social theory, is concerned with how individuals think and, for research such as this, how they frame decision-problems. Part of decision-problem resolution is assembling and processing information of various kinds, drawing comparisons and acting on what is considered best for the actor. Phenomenology's major focus is on how individuals use such procedures to make their lives coherent and consistent. Phenomenology does not take for granted that people can decide "what is going on." Rather, it questions how people reach conclusions about what is "going on" (Freeman, 1980: 139). Phenomenology is concerned with the ways in which individuals "construct in their own consciousness the meanings of things" (Douglas, 1980: 17). This "practical reasoning" may be the most important component of phenomenology since it entails the processes that individuals use to make sense of objects and events.

Phenomenology clearly takes into account the subjectivity of decision-problem resolution and the various perceptions that individuals use in their decision-making. Future research may opt to pay less attention to rational choice and deterrence theories and more attention to phenomenology to understand decision-making among repetitive property criminals. This new theoretical approach may provide much clearer explanations of decision-making and explanations firmly situated in and supported by sociological theory.

This research, its design, and its findings benefitted from previous research endeavors. Much was learned from previous research about sampling, measurement, data analysis, and the kinds of data needed at this point in the development of this research tradition. Likewise, this research suggests some important lines of pursuit for future research that is designed to "get inside" criminals' heads.

One such line of pursuit, not only for these data but also for similar data collected in the future, is to analyze them along the lines suggested by Wilson and Herrnstein (1985). Their concern is with those offenders of concern to policy makers -- the high rate offenders, or identified in my research as Type II lambda offenders. In their seminal work, Wilson and Herrnstein repeatedly ask why these particular criminals

commit high rates of crime while others do not. They suggest that alcohol and drug addictions may indeed explain some of this variance. My research certainly supports this linkage. To explain this variance in lambda offender types, future research designs should take into account those variables that Wilson and Herrnstein refer to as "constitutional factors."

One constitutional factor is intelligence which can be operationalized as IQ or psychological evaluations. Such data are available in the form of psychological evaluations found in the offender's official state records. The evaluations typically are performed immediately after incarceration as part of the classification process. Thus, such information should be readily available.

Personality is another constitutional factor of Wilson and Herrnstein's that can be operationalized and obtained in the form of personality evaluation scores found in the official records.

Last, "developmental factors" such as family backgrounds are important lines of inquiry for future research. Such information as family stability, geographical region during the developmental years, criminal behavior among parents, grandparents, uncles, aunts and siblings are variables that may explain some of the variance in Type I and Type II lambdas. This

information, however, may be obtained only by the participants' self-reporting since family genealogies are somewhat difficult, time-consuming, and costly to reconstruct.

Wilson and Herrnstein are concerned with decision-making and those variables of "human nature" that may shape decision-making processes among property criminals. Thus, these constitutional and developmental factors should be evaluated among a sample of Type I and Type II lambda criminals to determine if they explain variance in their frequency of crime commission.

Future research may benefit from using both a phenomenological approach and measuring those constitutional and developmental variables suggested by Wilson and Herrnstein (1985). This new direction in criminal-decision making would almost certainly yield better results if placed within a longitudinal research design. Thus, the research could examine personal and background variables, "get inside" peoples' heads, and compare responses across time. In this way, both retrospective and prospective accounts of criminal decision-making could be obtained to understand further the dynamics of the criminal calculus and account for some of the variance in lambda offender types.

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APPENDIXES

APPENDIX A

Informed Consent Form

I, _____, affirm that the details of the research project "Doing Crime: A Study of Criminal Decision-Making" has been explained to me by a member of the research staff. I understand that I have the right to refuse to participate in the research. I also understand that if I consent to participate I may refuse to answer any questions and to discontinue participation at any time without penalty for doing so. I understand that my responses to the questions are confidential and that no one except the members of the research staff will have access to them. I understand that if I participate in the research I will receive \$50.00 after the first interview and \$100.00 after the second interview. I understand that if I have any further questions about the research or about my rights as a participant I can call the project director, Dr. Neal Shover, at (615) 974-0931.

The research has been explained to me and I agree to participate in the project.

Participant

Date

Researcher

Date

Witness

Date

In the future, if you would like additional information about the research project you may contact Dr. Shover, Kenneth Tunnell, or David Honaker at: The University of Tennessee

905 McClung Tower

Knoxville, TN (615)974-0931

TOPICAL INTERVIEW GUIDE

I. Demographics

1. Age
2. Marital status (how many times married/divorced?)
3. Children
4. Education (school experiences?)
5. Parents' occupation and income
6. Siblings
7. Type of area where born and reared
8. Last place of residence

II. Employment History

1. Types of legitimate employment
2. Longest period of employment. When?
3. Most recent free-world job and salary. When?
4. Experiences from working
5. Expectations about working

III. Incarceration History

1. For each incarceration including juvenile
 - a. Age
 - b. Crime
 - c. Location
 - d. When
 - e. Sentence
 - f. Calendar years served
 - g. When released

IV. Exploring Variation in Past Criminal Behavior

- A. Describe the first period of sustained criminality. (For each discernable period, probe for the following)
1. Describe the first period
 2. How did you get started?
 3. Number
 4. Motivations
 5. Did alcohol or drug use precede decision?
 6. Typical social context of the decision to become involved? Probe for:
 - a. Were there interactional or interpersonal influences on the decision? What were they? Time frame . . . single instance . . . during a day . . . over the course of a week?
 - b. Specific events or focal points which influenced decision . . . time frame
 - c. Alternatives to the course of action you chose? Why?
 7. Knowledge of penalty?
 8. Fears of legal sanction during preparation, during crime, after crime (Probe for perceptions of capture, arrest, conviction, incarceration)
 - a. Were you sanctioned? Penalty?
 - b. Effect on criminal calculus? (Probe for how, when, why it changed; Age-related? Sanction related? Extra-legal related?)
 9. Perceptions of the likelihood of personal loss (Probe for extra-legal sanction fears)
 - a. Personal losses or sanctions

10. Perceived benefits
 11. Describe your mental weighing processes of potential risks vs. benefits for a typical situation
 12. Average take . . . other benefits
 13. Decision not to commit this type crime ever made? (Probe for general social context; deterred by legal and/or extra-legal factors?)
 14. Typical decision-making practices to avoid detection
- B. Did this calculus change? How did you neutralize fears?

V. Criminal Decision-making in the Future

- A. Hopes and plans for the future
 1. Anticipated future crimes (if none have them suppose)
 2. Social context in which return to crime would occur
 3. Circumstances that would most account for return or desistance
 - a. Threatened with bitch? Effect?
 4. Types (Probe for serious or less serious types)
 - a. Types you may and may not commit
 5. What size "take" would motivate criminal re-involvement?
- B. Perceptions of likely legal sanction (Probe for perceptions of the likelihood of arrest, incarceration)
- C. Perceptions of extra-legal sanctions (e.g., family, friends, co-workers, employment difficulties)
- D. Crime worthwhile? What type(s)?

INTERVIEW GUIDE: POST-RELEASE PERIOD

I. Post-Release Behavior

A. Problems? Arrests? Outcomes?

B. Crimes Considered

1. Why? Types? How often?
2. How did you decide? (Probe for rich detail about perceptions of: risks; rewards; sanctions)
3. Social relationships (Probe for detail about settings or situations; influence of others; effect on perceptions of consequences)
4. Alternatives (Probe for kinds; knowledge about them; perceived consequences of each)
5. Describe typical setting and all daily events during the decision-making (Probe for conversation with self)

C. Crimes Planned

1. Why?
2. Carefulness of planning -- detection avoidance
3. Social relationships (Probe for detail about influence; effect on planning; perceived consequences)
4. Describe typical setting and all events during the planning (Probe for time lapse; booze or drugs)

D. Crimes Committed

1. RANDOMIZE: If you have done X, or if you get a yellow marble, answer YES; 2 times or less or if you get a yellow marble, answer YES; 3 times or more or if you get a yellow marble, answer YES.

- a. armed robbery
 - b. strong armed robbery
 - c. home burglary
 - d. business burglary
 - e. auto theft
 - f. forgery
 - g. shoplifting
 - h. credit card fraud
 - i. grand theft
 - j. dealing hot goods
2. Describe first serious crime that you remember clearly. Probe for changes in decision-making
3. Describe the most recent crime you committed that you can recall clearly and in detail -- Probe for:
- a. age category (viz., juvenile; 18-26; over 27)
 - b. type
 - c. mood/motivations
 - d. daily activities
 - e. social setting and relationships
 - f. influence and effect of these relationships
 - g. alcohol or drug use before/during?
 - h. perceived worries or fears (Probe for perceived legal/extra-legal consequences)
 - i. how you rationalized those perceptions
 - j. how you made decision (i.e., how you moved from worry or fear to the crime commission; Probe for conversation with self)
 - k. alternatives (Probe for kinds; knowledge about them; perceived consequences of each)
 - l. relate to legitimate experience
4. Habitual theft? Decision-making different?
5. Describe most recent occasion when decision not to commit a crime was made (Probe for more depth than when they saw the man and for:)
- a. age category (viz., juvenile; 18-26; over 27)
 - b. type
 - c. mood/motivations
 - d. daily activities
 - e. social setting and relationships

- f. influence and effect of these relationships
- g. alcohol or drug use?
- h. perceived worries or fears (Probe for perceived legal/extra-legal consequences)
- i. why you decided not to
- j. how you made the decision (Probe for conversation with self)
- k. relate to legitimate experience

II. Future Behavior/Expectations

A. Anticipate Future Crimes?

- 1. Why? Under what circumstances? Types? Context?
- 2. Legal/extra-legal worries?
- 3. How would decision-making change? What explains it?

B. Self concept--Compare current self concept with past conceptions

DOING CRIME: A STUDY OF POST-PRISON DECISION-MAKING

Professor Neal Shover, Principal Investigator

and

Kenneth Tunnell and David Honaker, Research Assistants

**Department of Sociology
The University of Tennessee
Knoxville 37996-0490**

Phone: (615) 974-0931

Instructions

Thank you for participating in our study. This questionnaire is similar to the one you completed during the first interview while you were in prison. This one deals with your life since your release from prison.

You may refuse to answer any question without penalty at any time. You also have the right to end your participation without penalty. Your responses on this questionnaire are completely confidential. After you complete the questionnaire, we will keep it under lock and key until it is destroyed. Only the research staff will have access to the information you provide.

The majority of the questionnaire is divided into three sections. One set of questions asks about crimes that you may have thought about committing since your release from prison. Another set of questions asks about crimes that you may have planned since your release from prison. The third set of questions asks about crimes that you may have committed since your release from prison. It is important for you to read the instructions carefully and answer the questions to the best of your knowledge.

The questionnaire also contains several types of questions. Some questions require that you answer by filling in a blank while others ask you to circle the best answer. Other questions require you to rank the answers that are provided. Therefore, you will need to pay close attention as you go through the questionnaire. Unless a question asks you to choose more than one answer, be certain to mark only one.

Again, thank you for helping us in with this research. If you have any questions, feel free to ask.

1. What date were you released from prison? (Write in the month, day, and year)

2. Altogether, how many months have you worked for pay since your release from prison? (Specify the number of months in the blank)

_____ MONTHS

3. Since your release from prison, what has been your average weekly take-home pay from working?

\$ _____ TAKE-HOME PAY PER WEEK

4. Since your release from prison, where have you lived the majority of the time?

- 1 WITH MY PARENT(S)
- 2 WITH RELATIVES OTHER THAN MY PARENTS OR WIFE
- 3 WITH MY WIFE OR GIRLFRIEND
- 4 WITH FRIENDS
- 5 BY MYSELF
- 6 OTHER (Specify) _____

The following series of questions asks about crimes that you have thought about committing since your release from prison. When answering these next few questions, think only about whether you have thought seriously about committing crimes. For now, do not think about planning or committing crimes.

5. Have you thought about committing any crimes since your release?

- 1 NO
- 2 YES

6. How often do you think about committing crimes?

- 1 NEVER
- 2 SOMETIMES
- 3 OFTEN
- 4 NEARLY ALWAYS

7. When the possibility of committing a crime crosses your mind, how much time do you usually spend thinking about it?
- 1 NONE (Go to Question 14)
 - 2 ONE HOUR
 - 3 A FEW HOURS
 - 4 ONE DAY
 - 5 A FEW DAYS
 - 6 ONE WEEK OR MORE
8. Usually, where are you when you think about committing crimes?
- 1 RIDING AROUND IN AN AUTOMOBILE
 - 2 IN A BAR
 - 3 HANGING OUT WITH FRIENDS
 - 4 AT WORK
 - 5 AT HOME
 - 6 OTHER (Specify) _____
9. Are you usually alone or with others when you think about committing crimes?
- 1 ALONE
 - 2 WITH OTHERS
10. Since your release, are you usually drinking when you think about committing crimes?
- 1 NO
 - 2 YES
11. Are you usually using drugs when you think about committing crimes?
- 1 NO
 - 2 YES
12. How carefully do you think about your family's reactions when you think about committing crimes?
- 1 NOT CAREFULLY
 - 2 SOMEWHAT CAREFULLY
 - 3 CAREFULLY
 - 4 VERY CAREFULLY

13. How carefully do you think about the possibility of being arrested and incarcerated when you think about committing crimes?

- 1 NOT CAREFULLY
- 2 SOMEWHAT CAREFULLY
- 3 CAREFULLY
- 4 VERY CAREFULLY

Instructions: The next few questions ask about crimes you may have planned since your release from prison. When answering these next few questions, think only about whether you have planned any crimes since your release from prison. For now, do not think about committing crimes.

14. Have you planned any crimes since your release?

- 1 NO (Go to Question 21)
- 2 YES

15. How often do you plan crimes?

- 1 NEVER
- 2 SOMETIMES
- 3 OFTEN
- 4 NEARLY ALWAYS

16. When you plan a crime, usually how much time do you spend?

- 1 NONE
- 2 AN HOUR
- 3 A FEW HOURS
- 4 ONE DAY
- 5 A FEW DAYS
- 6 ONE WEEK OR MORE

17. Where do you usually plan crimes?

- 1 RIDING AROUND IN AN AUTOMOBILE
- 2 IN A BAR
- 3 HANGING OUT WITH FRIENDS
- 4 AT WORK
- 5 AT HOME
- 6 OTHER (Specify) _____

18. Are you usually alone or with others when you plan crimes?

- 1 ALONE
- 2 WITH OTHERS

19. Are you usually drinking when you plan crimes?

- 1 YES
- 2 NO

20. Are you usually using drugs when you plan crimes?

- 1 YES
- 2 NO

21. Since your release from prison, what has been your main source of income?

- 1 EMPLOYMENT
- 2 FAMILY AND FRIENDS
- 3 ILLEGAL ACTIVITIES
- 4 SOCIAL SECURITY OR WELFARE
- 5 I HAVE HAD NO INCOME
- 6 OTHER (Specify) _____

Instructions: The next series of questions asks about crimes that you may have committed since your release from prison. When answering these questions, think only about crimes that you have committed since your release.

22. Since your release from prison, have you committed any misdemeanors?

- 1 NO
- 2 YES

23. Since your release from prison, have you committed any felonies?

- 1 NO
- 2 YES

Instructions: If you answered YES to Questions 22 or 23, you may skip the next three questions and go directly to Question 26.

24. Since your release from prison, how important has the Habitual Criminal Act been in your decision not to commit crimes?

- 1 NOT IMPORTANT
- 2 SOMEWHAT IMPORTANT
- 3 IMPORTANT
- 4 VERY IMPORTANT

25. Now we want to know why you think you have been successful in staying away from crime, since your release from prison. Look over the following list of reasons and rank the four most important reasons that you have managed to not return to crime. Place a 1 beside the most important reason that you have not returned to crime, a 2 beside the second most important reason, etc.

- _____ I DO NOT WANT TO BE SENTENCED TO PRISON
- _____ AS I HAVE GOTTEN OLDER, DOING TIME IS HARDER
- _____ I DO NOT WANT MY PAROLE REVOKED
- _____ I DO NOT WANT TO BE TRIED AS A HABITUAL CRIMINAL
- _____ I NOW HAVE MORE SELF-RESPECT THAN IN THE PAST
- _____ I NO LONGER WANT TO CAUSE MY FAMILY ANY HARDSHIP
- _____ MY DRINKING IS NOW UNDER CONTROL
- _____ I NOW USE LITTLE OR NO DRUGS
- _____ I NO LONGER KEEP BAD COMPANY
- _____ I NOW HAVE A JOB
- _____ I NOW CONSIDER THE CONSEQUENCES OF CRIMES MORE CAREFULLY
- _____ I NOW WANT TO DO THE RIGHT THING
- _____ I NOW HAVE MORE RESPECT FOR THE POLICE AND COURTS
- _____ MY FRIENDS WOULD THINK BADLY OF ME

Instructions: Go directly to Question 37.

26. Since your release from prison, have you usually committed crimes alone or with others?

- 1 ALONE
- 2 WITH OTHERS (Go to Question 28)

27. Now we would like to know why you have committed these crimes alone instead of with others, since your release. Look over the following list and rank those reasons that apply to you. Place a 1 beside the most important reason that you chose to do crimes alone, a 2 beside the second most important reason, etc.

- _____ CRIMES ARE EASIER DONE ALONE
- _____ CRIMES ARE MORE EXCITING DONE ALONE
- _____ THERE IS LESS RISK OF GETTING CAUGHT AND PUNISHED WHEN CRIMES ARE COMMITTED ALONE
- _____ I DO NOT WORRY AS MUCH ABOUT MY PERSONAL SAFETY WHEN COMMITTING CRIMES ALONE
- _____ I CAN MAKE MORE MONEY WHEN COMMITTING CRIMES ALONE
- _____ I DO NOT WORRY AS MUCH ABOUT BEING ARRESTED WHEN COMMITTING CRIMES ALONE
- _____ OTHER (Specify) _____

Instructions: If you answered Question 27, skip the next question and go directly to Question 29.

31. Please look over the following list and think if you have experienced any of these circumstances since your release from prison. Think about how important these circumstances have been to you as you have committed crimes since your release. Then rank the circumstances that apply to you by placing a 1 next to the most important, a 2 next to the second most important, etc.

- _____ I HAVE HAD PROBLEMS WITH MY FAMILY, MY WIFE, OR MY GIRLFRIEND SINCE MY RELEASE
- _____ I HAVE BEEN OUT OF WORK SINCE MY RELEASE
- _____ I HAVE BEEN KEEPING BAD COMPANY SINCE MY RELEASE
- _____ I HAVE BEEN DRINKING HEAVILY SINCE MY RELEASE
- _____ I HAVE BEEN USING DRUGS SINCE MY RELEASE
- _____ I HAVE HAD PROBLEMS WITH MY PAROLE OFFICER SINCE MY RELEASE
- _____ OTHER (Specify) _____
- _____ THERE HAS BEEN NOTHING UNUSUAL ABOUT THE TIMES WHEN I COMMITTED CRIMES SINCE MY RELEASE

32. Listed below are reasons that people sometimes give for committing crimes. Look over the list and think about how important these reasons are to you when committing crimes since your release from prison. Then rank the four most important reasons. Place a 1 in the blank next to the most important reason you commit crimes, a 2 in the blank next to the second most important reason, etc.

I want money for the necessities of life . . . _____

I want money for high living _____

I enjoy being my own boss _____

I enjoy the excitement of doing crime . . . _____

Doing crime gives me a sense
of accomplishment _____

Doing crime makes my friends look up to me
and respect me _____

Doing crime is easy money _____

I want money for drugs _____

I enjoy it more than working _____

It is satisfying to outsmart the police . . _____

33. Many people who commit crimes say that while committing them they are concerned about some of the things that could happen to them. Please think about the period since your release from prison and the things that you have been concerned about when committing crimes. Then look over the following list and indicate how often you have been concerned about each item when committing crimes since your release. Answer by circling one of the numbers next to each item.

While committing crimes since my release, I have been concerned:

	<u>Never</u>	<u>Occasionally</u>	<u>Often</u>
That I would be arrested . 1		2	3
That I would be "roughed up" by the police 1		2	3
That I would be convicted. 1		2	3
That I would be put in jail 1		2	3
That my parole would be revoked 1		2	3
That I would be charged and and convicted as a habitual criminal 1		2	3
That I would lose my job . 1		2	3
That I would feel guilty or be disappointed with myself. 1		2	3
That it would harm my relationship with my family 1		2	3
That it would harm my relationship with my wife or girlfriend 1		2	3
That my friends would think badly of me 1		2	3
That my neighbors would think badly of me 1		2	3

That I would have trouble
finding a job 1 2 3

34. Since your release from prison, how carefully have you thought about the possible consequences before committing crimes?

- 1 NOT CAREFULLY
- 2 SOMEWHAT CAREFULLY
- 3 CAREFULLY
- 4 VERY CAREFULLY

35. Before committing a typical crime since your release, which have you usually considered more important --the possible rewards or the possible risks from committing crimes?

- 1 THE REWARDS
- 2 THE RISKS

36. Think about the rewards that you have obtained from the crimes you have committed since your release. Did you usually obtain the kind and amount of rewards that you thought you would when you planned the crimes?

- 1 NO
- 2 YES

37. We would like to know whether getting older has had any effect on your decision to commit or not commit crimes. Look over the following list. Please rank the four most important statements that best apply to you. Simply place a 1 in the blank beside the statement that most applies to you, a 2 in the blank beside the second most important, etc.

- _____ GETTING OLDER HAS HAD NO EFFECT ON MY DECISIONS TO COMMIT OR NOT COMMIT CRIMES
- _____ GETTING OLDER HAS MADE ME REALIZE THAT CRIME PAYS
- _____ GETTING OLDER HAS MADE ME MORE CAREFUL
- _____ GETTING OLDER HAS MADE ME REALIZE I HAVE NOTHING TO LOSE
- _____ GETTING OLDER HAS MADE ME THINK MORE CAREFULLY ABOUT THE CONSEQUENCES OF CRIMES
- _____ I CONSIDER MY FAMILY'S FEELINGS MORE THAN I DID WHEN I WAS YOUNGER
- _____ I HAVE MORE RESPECT FOR THE LAW NOW THAN WHEN I WAS YOUNGER
- _____ I NOW THINK DOING CRIME IS A WASTE OF TIME
- _____ TIME NOW MEANS MORE TO ME THAN WHEN I WAS YOUNGER
- _____ I NO LONGER HAVE THE ENERGY FOR CRIME
- _____ WORKING FOR A LIVING IS NOW MORE SATISFYING THAN WHEN I WAS YOUNGER
- _____ OTHER (Specify) _____

Instructions: Now we are interested in knowing what kinds of crimes you have been willing to commit since your release from prison. The next series of questions asks about specific crimes. Even if you have not committed these offenses, we would like to know if you have been willing to commit them if you had an opportunity to do so. For each crime listed, check either YES or NO and then check the one reason that you would or would not have been willing to commit that particular crime.

38. Today, would you be willing to commit armed robbery?

_____ YES, because

_____ I THINK I CAN GET AWAY WITH IT
_____ IT IS EXCITING
_____ I WANT TO BE PART OF THE CROWD
_____ I KNOW HOW TO DO IT
_____ OTHER (Specify) _____

_____ NO, because

_____ I AM AFRAID I WOULD BE ARRESTED AND
_____ RECEIVE A LONG PRISON SENTENCE
_____ I AM AFRAID MY PAROLE WOULD BE REVOKED
_____ I AM AFRAID MY PARENTS, WIFE, CHILDREN
_____ OR GIRLFRIEND WOULD BE DISAPPOINTED
_____ WITH ME
_____ I AM AFRAID I WOULD BE DISAPPOINTED
_____ WITH MYSELF
_____ I DON'T KNOW HOW TO DO IT
_____ OTHER (Specify) _____

39. Today, would you be willing to commit burglary?

_____ YES, because

_____ I THINK I CAN GET AWAY WITH IT
_____ IT IS EXCITING
_____ I WANT TO BE PART OF THE CROWD
_____ I KNOW HOW TO DO IT
_____ OTHER (Specify) _____

_____ NO, because

_____ I AM AFRAID I WOULD BE ARRESTED AND
_____ RECEIVE A LONG PRISON SENTENCE
_____ I AM AFRAID MY PAROLE WOULD BE REVOKED
_____ I AM AFRAID MY PARENTS, WIFE, CHILDREN
_____ OR GIRLFRIEND WOULD BE DISAPPOINTED
_____ WITH ME
_____ I AM AFRAID I WOULD BE DISAPPOINTED
_____ WITH MYSELF
_____ I DON'T KNOW HOW TO DO IT
_____ OTHER (Specify) _____

40. Today, would you be willing to commit auto theft?

_____ YES, because
_____ I THINK I CAN GET AWAY WITH IT
_____ IT IS EXCITING
_____ I WANT TO BE PART OF THE CROWD
_____ I KNOW HOW TO DO IT
_____ OTHER (Specify) _____

_____ NO, because
_____ I AM AFRAID I WOULD BE ARRESTED AND
RECEIVE A LONG PRISON SENTENCE
_____ I AM AFRAID MY PAROLE WOULD BE REVOKED
_____ I AM AFRAID MY PARENTS, WIFE, CHILDREN
OR GIRLFRIEND WOULD BE DISAPPOINTED
WITH ME
_____ I AM AFRAID I WOULD BE DISAPPOINTED
WITH MYSELF
_____ I DON'T KNOW HOW TO DO IT
_____ OTHER (Specify) _____

41. Today, would you be willing to forge checks?

_____ YES, because
_____ I THINK I CAN GET AWAY WITH IT
_____ IT IS EXCITING
_____ I WANT TO BE PART OF THE CROWD
_____ I KNOW HOW TO DO IT
_____ OTHER (Specify) _____

_____ NO, because
_____ I AM AFRAID I WOULD BE ARRESTED AND
RECEIVE A LONG PRISON SENTENCE
_____ I AM AFRAID MY PAROLE WOULD BE REVOKED
_____ I AM AFRAID MY PARENTS, WIFE, CHILDREN
OR GIRLFRIEND WOULD BE DISAPPOINTED
WITH ME
_____ I AM AFRAID I WOULD BE DISAPPOINTED
WITH MYSELF
_____ I DON'T KNOW HOW TO DO IT
_____ OTHER (Specify) _____

42. Today, would you be willing to shoplift?

_____ YES, because
_____ I THINK I CAN GET AWAY WITH IT
_____ IT IS EXCITING
_____ I WANT TO BE PART OF THE CROWD
_____ I KNOW HOW TO DO IT
_____ OTHER (Specify) _____

_____ NO, because
_____ I AM AFRAID I WOULD BE ARRESTED AND
RECEIVE A LONG PRISON SENTENCE
_____ I AM AFRAID MY PAROLE WOULD BE REVOKED
_____ I AM AFRAID MY PARENTS, WIFE, CHILDREN
OR GIRLFRIEND WOULD BE DISAPPOINTED
WITH ME
_____ I AM AFRAID I WOULD BE DISAPPOINTED
WITH MYSELF
_____ I DON'T KNOW HOW TO DO IT
_____ OTHER (Specify) _____

43. Today, would you be willing to buy or sell stolen goods?

_____ YES, because
_____ I THINK I CAN GET AWAY WITH IT
_____ IT IS EXCITING
_____ I WANT TO BE PART OF THE CROWD
_____ I KNOW HOW TO DO IT
_____ OTHER (Specify) _____

_____ NO, because
_____ I AM AFRAID I WOULD BE ARRESTED AND
RECEIVE A LONG PRISON SENTENCE
_____ I AM AFRAID MY PAROLE WOULD BE REVOKED
_____ I AM AFRAID MY PARENTS, WIFE, CHILDREN
OR GIRLFRIEND WOULD BE DISAPPOINTED
WITH ME
_____ I AM AFRAID I WOULD BE DISAPPOINTED
WITH MYSELF
_____ I DON'T KNOW HOW TO DO IT
_____ OTHER (Specify) _____

Instructions: The next four questions asks about crimes that you may commit in the future. The questions ask that you assume or suppose that you are faced with an opportunity to steal a sum of money. Please mark the answers that best represent your opinion to each situation.

44. Assume that in the future you commit property crimes. Do you think your chances of being arrested are LESS THAN, ABOUT THE SAME, or GREATER THAN other men who commit similar crimes?

- 1 LESS THAN OTHERS
- 2 ABOUT THE SAME AS OTHERS
- 3 GREATER THAN OTHERS

45. Assume that in the future you have an opportunity to steal a sum of money. Look over all the items in the following list. While deciding whether to steal the money, which of the following would you worry about? Please rank the four things that would cause you the most worry. Place a 1 beside the most important, a 2 beside the next most important, etc.

While deciding to steal a sum of money, I would worry:

- _____ THAT I WOULD BE "ROUGHED UP" BY THE POLICE
- _____ THAT MY PAROLE WOULD BE REVOKED
- _____ THAT I WOULD SERVE TIME IN PRISON AGAIN
- _____ THAT MY PARENTS, WIFE, CHILDREN, OR GIRLFRIEND WOULD BE DISAPPOINTED WITH ME
- _____ THAT MY CLOSE FRIENDS WOULD BE DISAPPOINTED WITH ME
- _____ THAT MY CO-WORKERS WOULD BE DISAPPOINTED WITH ME
- _____ THAT I WOULD BE DISAPPOINTED WITH MYSELF
- _____ THAT I WOULD HAVE TROUBLE GETTING OR KEEPING A JOB
- _____ THAT I WOULD BE CHARGED AS A HABITUAL CRIMINAL
- _____ OTHER (Specify) _____

46. Again, assume that in the future you have an opportunity to steal a sum of money. Please look over the following list. Other than the fear of being arrested and sentenced to prison, which of the following would you worry about while deciding to steal the money? Please rank the four most important items that you would worry about. Place a 1 beside the most important item, a 2 beside the second most important, etc.

While deciding to steal a sum of money, other than worrying about being arrested, I would worry:

- _____ THAT MY PARENTS, WIFE, CHILDREN, OR
GIRLFRIEND WOULD BE DISAPPOINTED WITH ME
_____ THAT MY FRIENDS WOULD BE DISAPPOINTED
WITH ME
_____ THAT MY CO-WORKERS WOULD BE DISAPPOINTED
WITH ME
_____ THAT I WOULD BE DISAPPOINTED WITH MYSELF
_____ THAT I WOULD HAVE TROUBLE FINDING A JOB
_____ THAT I WOULD LOSE MY JOB
_____ OTHER (Specify) _____

47. Assume that in the future you decide to steal a sum of money. Look over the following list of reasons for committing crimes. Then, place a 1 next to the most important reason for committing the crime and a 2 next to the second most important reason.

- _____ FOR THE EASY MONEY
_____ FOR THE EXCITEMENT
_____ FOR THE SATISFACTION OF OUT-SMARTING
THE POLICE
_____ FOR MY FRIENDS' RESPECT OR ADMIRATION
_____ FOR THE SENSE OF ACCOMPLISHMENT
_____ OTHER (Specify) _____

APPENDIX B

Mean Age

34

Mean Years Of Education

10

Mean Age At First Arrest

11

Race Composition By Percent

White=63%

Black=37%

FIGURE 1

SAMPLE DEMOGRAPHICS

<u>CRIME TYPE</u>	<u>TYPE II LAMBDA</u>	<u>TYPE I LAMBDA</u>
Armed Robbery	935	145
Strong Armed Robbery	887	20
Home Burglary	4894	117
Business Burglary	2367	74
Auto Theft	3327	73
Forgery	6401	40
Shoplifting	3926	114
Credit Card Fraud	7918	5
Grand Theft	7528	53
Petit Theft	3772	107
Dealing Stolen Goods	13843	103

Type II Lambda N = 34 Offenders
Type I Lambda N = 26 Offenders
Total N = 60 Offenders

FIGURE 2
TOTAL NUMBER OF CRIMES COMMITTED
BY DECISION-MAKING TYPE




FIGURE 3. PERCENTAGES OF TYPE I AND TYPE II LAMBDA GROUPS FOR PLANNING ALONE, ALCOHOL USE, AND DRUG ADDICTION




FIGURE 4. PERCENTAGES OF TYPE I AND TYPE II LAMBDA GROUPS AND THE ALTERNATIVES CONSIDERED DURING DECISION-MAKING

VITA

Kenneth D. Tunnell was born in Kingsport, Tennessee on January 4, 1956. He attended elementary schools in Sullivan County and was graduated from Sullivan Central High School in June 1974. The following September he entered Anderson College in Indiana and, a year later, entered East Tennessee State University where he received a Bachelor of Science Degree in June 1978.

After a two year absence from academics, he began study toward a Master's Degree in Criminal Justice at Middle Tennessee State University, in September 1980. This degree was awarded in December 1983.

The following Fall he accepted a teaching assistantship at The University of Tennessee and began study toward the Doctor of Philosophy in Sociology. This degree was awarded in December 1988.

The author is an active member in the American Society of Criminology and the Southern Sociological Society.