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Trust in News Media in post-Communist Eastern Europe: The Case of Serbia

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Trust in News Media in post-Communist Eastern Europe: The Case of Serbia

A Dissertation Presented for the

Doctor of Philosophy

Degree

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DEDICATION

This dissertation is dedicated to the loving memory of my parents, my mother Slavica Radović and my father, Maksim Radović. They taught me to work hard, to live an honest live, and to be fair and just. They extremely valued good education and rooted in me the love for reading and the passion for problem solving. They spent days in teaching me how to approach math problems and evenings in reading and explaining literature classics. They encouraged me to learn foreign languages, explore novel places, and discover something new every day. They taught me to deeply respect the place I come from, but let me choose where I would like to go. They wanted me to always do what I love and never be afraid of pursuing my dreams. Because of them, I was able to find knowledge and new experiences in each place I went.

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ABSTRACT

The main purpose of this dissertation research was to examine the influences of cultural and performance factors on trust in news media in Serbia. This was done by conducting a survey on a stratified random sample of the Serbian population (*N*=544). Before testing cultural and performance theories, this dissertation explored the meanings of trust in news media and trust in other people in Serbia, in order to properly operationalize these concepts and establish their conceptual equivalence needed for their adequate measurement. This was done by 20 in-depth interviews with representatives of the Serbian population. The results of this dissertation study showed that both cultural and performance factors play a role in determining trust in news media in Serbia. However, the performance explanation, measured as assessments of news media corruption, was found to be slightly more powerful than the cultural explanation, measured as generalized trust, or trust in people that we don't know personally. In addition, the results of this dissertation study showed that more than 20 years after the fall of Communism and 13 years after the fall of Slobodan Milošević's authoritative regime, the pervasiveness of distrust remains present in Serbia. Serbians who participated in this study expressed skepticism about their news media and distrust of people they don't know personally. Conceptualizing trust in news media as well as trust in other people in the same way as their Western counterparts, Serbians thought that Western standards, necessary for trust in news media and other people to occur, such as fair selectivity of news, objectivity, neutrality, accuracy in reporting or sincerity in helping other people, were not met or applicable in their country.

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CHAPTER I:
INTRODUCTION

Trust has been considered a foundation of social order and cohesion that often determines nation's well-being and its ability to organize and compete (Fukuyama, 1995; Putnam, 1993; 2000). Frequently equated with the notions of reliance, dependence or faith (Barber, 1983), trust enables social relations to function on the basis of promise. Thus it becomes essential for stable relationships, maintenance of cooperation, and for even the most routine of everyday interactions (Misztal, 1988). Presupposing an essential confidence that people place in each other, trust reduces uncertainty about the future and the need to continually make provisions for the possibility of devious behavior among actors. The presence of trust increases the desire of people to take risks for productive social exchange and facilitates everyday life as it fosters acts of tolerance and acceptance of otherness. In this atmosphere, daily living becomes easier, happier, and more confident (Rothstein & Stolle, 2002).

A common threshold for classifying countries as democracies is that the governments do not rely on coercion but depend on voluntary acceptance of citizens to obey the law and accept the decisions of authorities. In this regard, citizens place confidence, under condition of risk, in democratic institutions and trust that the government will not misuse its power (Luhiste, 2006). New democracies, such as the countries of post-Communist Eastern Europe, have faced a difficult task of building this type of relationship. In traditional democracies, common knowledge and social representations of political phenomena are formed on the basis of past experience (Markova, 2004). In post-Communist societies, where the historical knowledge relates to the oppression by totalitarian or authoritarian regimes, distrust, uncertainty, and skepticism towards all institutions have been widespread and pervasive (Macek & Markova,

2004). Studying trust in institutions in post-Communist countries scholars have found that citizens' perceptions of all political institutions stay largely negative (e.g., Bjornskov, 2007; Mishler & Rose, 1997; Mishler & Rose, 2001).

News media are one of the important institutions in any democratic setting. They are expected to survey the world, report and interpret the ongoing events. Especially significant is the surveillance of decision makers; the public, who sees journalists as its eyes and ears, expect them to scrutinize government performance and report about it (Graber, 2010). Although a certain level of distrust towards institutions is a healthy characteristic of a democratic system, a very low level of trust could endanger news media's ability to inform citizens and monitor the work of the government (Gaziano, 1988; Muller, 2010). As Bok (1979) stated, "society whose members are unable to distinguish truthful messages from deceptive ones, would collapse" (p. 18).

In recent decades scholars have noted decreasing levels of trust in news media in Western societies. A 2011 Pew Research Center report shows that confidence in the news media in the United States has been steadily declining since 1985 and reached its all-time low in 2011, when 66% of Americans thought that news stories produced by traditional media outlets were inaccurate (Pew Research Center, 2011). In a more recent survey, credibility ratings for nine of 13 news organizations tested, including national newspapers, cable news outlets, broadcast TV networks, and National Public Radio, have fallen significantly (Pew Research Center, 2012). A world-wide survey conducted in 2006 showed that, in the United Kingdom, 64% of viewers did not consider that broadcast news media report all sides of the story (BBC, Reuters & Media Center Poll, 2006).

In Eastern Europe, news media have undergone tremendous changes since the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. They have been confronted not only with the breakdown of the old institutional methods of control, but also with the challenge of having to evolve from one stable state of the media system to another (Gross & Jakubowicz, 2013), from one in which they served the government to another in which they ought to control its power. With the process of their transformation still not over, news media in Eastern Europe are today facing the challenge of regaining public trust, devastated by their role of serving the state under real-socialism (Sztompka, 2000). Studies conducted during the 1990s and in the first decade of 2000 show that this process might be slow as the skepticism towards news media prevails among the countries in the region (e.g., Gallup Balkan Monitor, 2010; Mishler & Rose, 1997; Stompka, 2000).

Serbia is one of the post-Communist countries of Eastern Europe, where, during more than five decades of Communism (1943-1989) and a decade of authoritarian regime of Slobodan Milošević (1989-2000), the state had strong control over its citizens.[1] The one-party system assumed that Communists were in charge of political and social life and that any counter-ideologies should be eliminated, usually using the assistance of a strong secret service (Milic, 2006). During both periods, state news media played a propagandistic role, serving the interest of the state rather than citizens. As such, they had been clearly perceived by citizens as part of the state apparatus, and their messages were highly doubted or even profoundly distrusted, as was the case with Milošević's media (Glenny, 1996). After the introduction of democracy in the country in 2000 (TheMacroDataGuide, 2010)[2], media workers in Serbia had the opportunity to

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[1] Besides these examples from the recent past, it has to be noted that Serbia has been under several oppressive regimes during its history.

[2] On the Polity IV index, Serbia (then part of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia) moved from autocratic country (score -7) in mid 1990s to democratic country (score +7) in 2000, with the ousting of Slobodan Milošević and with the consolidation of the democratic government. The Polity index ranges from -10 (full autocracy) to +10 (full democracy), where -6 represents the threshold for autocracy, and +6, the threshold for democracy. More on the democracy in Serbia today can be found in Chapter II.

learn about Western-style of news media operations through various trainings in the areas of reporting, production, and management (Hoffman, 2002; Peters, 2010; The Delegation of the European Commission to the Republic of Serbia, 2009). However, the complex influence of economic crisis, its impact on the media market, low salaries, low ethical standards, self-censorship, and political and business pressures, have led to low standards in Serbian journalism (IREX, 2012). The low journalistic standards and contemporary media practices might be influencing trust in news media in Serbia. The cultural legacies of general distrust towards other people noted during Communism and authoritarianism might also be impacting news media trust. These two explanations about the origin of trust in news media are reflected in two theoretical traditions that compete as dominant perspectives about the source of trust in institutions: cultural theories, which hypothesize that trust in all institutions is exogenous, and performance theories, which hypothesize that trust is endogenous to institutions. The main purpose of this dissertation research is to examine the influences of cultural and performance factors on trust in news media in Serbia, by conducting a survey on a stratified random of the Serbian population (N=544). Before testing these theories, it was necessary to explore the meanings of trust in news media and trust in other people in Serbia, in order to properly operationalize these concepts and establish their conceptual equivalence needed for their adequate measurement. This was done by 20 in-depth interviews with representatives of the Serbian population. The rationale for conducting this study is presented below.

Dissertation Research Rationale

Due to the history of oppressive rule that destroyed social capital, the conceptualization of trust in a post-Communist country might differ from Western perspectives. In Western literature, trust has carried a positive connotation of a foundation of social order and cohesion

(e.g., Fukuyama, 1995; Putnam, 1993; 2000) necessary for the functioning of governments and institutions (Luhiste, 2006), as well as for all stable relationships (Misztal, 1988). Low levels of social trust were feared to bring instability and unproductivity (e.g., Fukuyama, 1995; Putnam, 1993; 2000), and in the domain of news media, potential inability to properly inform citizens (Gaziano, 1988; Muller, 2010). In Eastern Europe, however, the relationship towards trust has been somehow different. Due to the controlling rule of past regimes, distrust in everything and everybody that did not belong to immediate circles of family and close friends spread to the entire region and might have become part of the cultural heritage (Lovell, 2001; Paldam & Svedsen, 2001; Sztompka, 2000; Traps, 2009). During Communism, for example, Eastern Europeans perceived generalized trust as "naïve" or even "stupid" (Sztompka, 2000) and thought that news media, being part of an authoritarian state apparatus, were sources of lies and manipulations (e.g., Sztompka, 2000). Research shows that these beliefs did not disappear with the collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe, as people in the region stayed generally skeptical about trustworthiness of people that they didn't know personally, state institutions, as well as news media (e.g., Gallup Balkan Monitor, 2010; GfK Croatia, 2012; IREX, 2012; Mishler & Rose, 1997; Sztompka, 2000). Having lived in an atmosphere where fear, suspicion and intolerance dominated public life, it is not even clear whether the people in the region could differentiate trust from fear, risk, or faith (Macek & Markova, 2004). As Mishler and Rose (1997) explain, the meaning of trust is different for a Westerner than for a Pole or Ukrainian. Even if Americans say they distrust Congress, this does not mean that they endorse its abolition or even favor fundamental reforms. In post-Communist societies, Mishler and Rose (1997) note that about a quarter of all citizens favor the suspension of parliament, and even more think it could happen.

One of the goals of this dissertation is to delve into the meanings of trust in news media and trust in other people in Serbia, in order to verify whether these concepts in Serbia are conceptually equivalent with their Western operationalizations, which have been widely used as measurements of trust in news media and other people. By doing so, this dissertation research tries to discover the position of Serbians towards their news media and other people, as well the characteristics the news media should have in order to be considered trustworthy in Serbia. Trust in news media and trust in other people have been studied for a long time in Western literature (e.g., Bjornskov, 2007; Cole, 1973; Jacobson, 1969; Flanagin & Metzger, 2000; Kiousis, 2001; Mishler & Rose, 2001; Kim, 2005; Kohring & Matthes, 2007; Roper, 1985; Westley & Severin, 1964), but their meanings have not been qualitatively assessed in Eastern Europe. By exploring the meanings of trust in other people and in news media in one of the Eastern European countries, this dissertation makes the first step in properly defining the concepts in this region, which is necessary for their accurate operationalization and measurement.

The main goal of this dissertation research is to test the factors that affect trust in news media in Serbia. Throughout the 1990s and 2000s, the levels of trust in news media in Eastern Europe have been measured mostly by surveys in the scope of assessing trust in all institutions in the region (e.g., Macek & Markova, 2004; Mishler & Rose, 1997; Sztompka, 2000). While these surveys have documented levels of trust in the press, television and radio, they have not identified the variables that might affect that trust. Cultural and performance theories have opposing views of what might influence trust in institutions. Cultural theories posit that predisposition towards trust as part of cultural heritage determine people's attitude towards it (e.g., Almond & Verba, 1963; Fukuyama, 1995; Putnam, 1993; Inglehart, 1990). These theories have been supported by a number of psychological studies that have shown that attitudes towards

trust are learned during a person's childhood and formative years (Traps, 2009), have a remarkable stability over time (Bjornskov, 2007), and take decades rather than years to adjust, as well as by studies that have shown that generalized sense of trust towards other people has been positively correlated with trust in political and social institutions (Cole, 1973; Brehm & Rahn, 1997; Dowley & Silver, 2002; Mishler & Rose, 2001; Newton, 2001) and news media (Pjesivac & Imre, 2013). In contrast, performance theories view trust as endogenous to institutions and consider it a consequence of institutional functioning. These theories assume that, simply, institutions that perform well are likely to be trusted (e.g., Mishler & Rose, 2001; Newton & Norris, 2000; Rothstein & Stolle, 2002). In the domain of news media, these theories have indirectly been supported by studies that have found that sensationalized news stories (e.g., Chanley, Rudolph, & Rahn, 2000), biased reporting, serving the interests of political regimes and businesses rather than the public (e.g., Liu & Bates, 2009; Open Society Institute, 2005) can hurt the believability in news.

Following the assumptions of cultural and performance theories, this dissertation tests the assumption that both generalized trust and journalistic performance play important roles in determining trust in news media in Serbia. Although, when tested separately both factors have been shown to have effects on trust in institutions, studies that have tested cultural and performance theories together have generated ambiguous results: some researchers found that a cultural factor prevailed in people's evaluation of trust in institutions (e.g., Luhiste, 2006), whereas others have noted that a performance factor had better empirical support (e.g., Misher & Rose, 2001; Newton & Norris, 2000). Taking into account these contradictory results, this dissertation research further examines the strength of the effects of cultural and performance factors in predicting trust in news media and tests several extraneous variables that could

potentially moderate the relationship between the independent variables and the criterion variable. This dissertation also explored, due to the lack of an adequate conceptualization of news media performance in the literature, the meaning of this concept among the Serbian population. A measure of news media performance was then developed, pretested, and used in the survey portion of this dissertation study.

Understanding where trust in news media originates is important for testing the competing theories, but it also has significant implications for the consolidation of new democracies. If trust in news media, as one of the important institutions in democratic societies, is rooted in deep social norms and is culturally determined, there is little that can be done to cultivate, in the short run, trust in them in a transitional society. In other words, if the culture of trust is path dependent, it will take decades rather than years to develop trust necessary for news media to function effectively. However, if trust originates in the performance of news media, new media systems in Eastern Europe can generate increased trust by abstaining from unprofessional practices, a change that would not take generations to be implemented (Mishler & Rose, 2001). By singling out cultural factors from performance factors, this dissertation tries to distinguish between the importance of the past (culture) and the present (performance of the media) in evaluating the news media. It therefore adds to the understanding of how strong the "habits of the heart" are in a country where 55-years of communism and authoritarianism might have severely undermined the trusting disposition of citizens. In this regard, the study adds to the understanding of the social character of Eastern European peoples, a variable unfairly ignored in the studies of democratic processes in the region (Meštrović, Letica, & Goreta, 1993).

The next Chapter will present a background on news media in post-Communist countries and provide a brief history of Serbia and its news media. It will be followed by a Chapter that

delves deep into the literature on the concepts of trust and news media relevant for this study; it sets this study's theoretical framework by providing an overview of cultural and performance theories of institutional trust and outlines the study's research questions and hypotheses. Chapter 4 explains the methods that will be used for this dissertation research; Chapter 5 describes the results of this dissertation research; and Chapter 6 integrates the existing theories with the results of this study in order to discuss possible implications of this research for the literature on trust in news media in Eastern Europe.

CHAPTER II:
BACKGROUND

News Media in post-Communist Countries

       The landscape of east Europe is a mosaic of different nationalities that have their own languages, religions, and cultures. The region that spreads from the border with Russia in the east, to Czech Republic in the west and from Estonia in the north to Albania in the south, has been, through history, subordinate to empires of Europe: the Ottoman Empire in the south, the Russian Empire to the east, and the Austro-Hungarian and Prussian empires to the west. During these rules, the peoples of Eastern Europe have struggled to develop or preserve their national identities against attempts to assimilate them. Thus, when they obtained independence, most after World War I, virtually all were economically behind and politically troubled. Interwar leaders, most of whom were authoritarian, were unable to deal with old ethnic issues and new demands of development. This increased the vulnerabilities of the countries in the region and made them an easy target for German invasion that started with the occupation of Poland in 1939. World War II proved devastating for the region, with countries such as Poland, Ukraine, Yugoslavia, and the Baltic states, suffering great loss of life as well as physical destruction (Wolchik & Curry, 2011).

       Although Communist parties came with the 1917 October revolution in Russia and were briefly established in 1921 in some other Eastern European states, Communists consolidated their power following World War II, after victorious Soviet troops marched in many of these countries. The Communist rule intended to put everything under its control and direction. The one-party system was established with active mobilizations of the population into Party membership. All state institutions as well as companies were put under Communist control. Private land and other property were seized from owners, and intellectuals who had connections

with the West or who had simply criticized the new power structures were put on trials, sent to labor camps, or in worst cases executed (Wolchik & Curry, 2011).

Under Communism in Eastern Europe, it was generally accepted that news media served the state. The Communist party controlled the information that was disseminated through the news media, as knowledge distribution was vital for the survival of the ruling ideology (O'Neil, 1997). The mass media were usually conceived as gigantic institutions headed by party representatives. Journalists were considered to be public officials and censorship and self-censorship were widespread. Journalistic professionalism, in a Western sense of the word, did not exist, but journalism was expected to be carried in accordance with functional necessities and Communist party ideology. Thus journalism was considered to be a sort of community profession, serving for what was the best for the community defined by the Communist party (Gross, 2002). This model of the press was described by Siebert, Peterson, and Schramm (1956) as the Soviet-Communist model. Inspired by Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist thought, Soviet-Communist model of the press assumed that mass communication systems should be integral to the state. Conceived to have an instrumental role, news media were meant to be spokespersons of the dominant ideology. Under the tight control of the ruling elites, news media were conveying the words of the Communist party to large masses, as it was assumed that the truth was to arrive to collective deliberation only by the Party. In that context, only state media were allowed to exist (Siebert, Peterson, & Schramm, 1956). It has to be noted though that the level of state control of news media varied between countries of Eastern Europe as the system of Communism itself was different across the region. In Romania, for example, the classical model of Stalinism persisted, whereas in Poland the decay of a pure Communist system that dated back to the 1950s allowed for media diversification. In Czechoslovakia, the relaxation of control over media

culminated in the late 1960, whereas in East Germany, the Russian invasion of 1968 brought an extremely rigid and controlled media system (Sparks, 1997).

The shift from Communism to the new system represented a fast and dramatic change for the region. Within two years after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, the countries that belonged to the Communist system had to pass from "state socialism" to capitalism and liberal democracy. Political parties emerged and the fundamental legal and institutional structure of the societies started to change (Hallin & Mancini, 2013). This shift to a fundamentally different political and economic system was reflected in the changes in news media as well (Jakubowicz, 2005). In the short period of time, journalists obtained unprecedented freedom from state control, although mass media still faced the challenge of transformation from state to private ownership (Hallin & Mancini, 2013). Media systems had to face two separate but interrelated stages: transition and transformation. As Gross and Jakubowicz (2013) describe, in the transition stage, old political and media systems collapse and take with them old methods of controlling the media. For Eastern European countries, this represented a transition away from the Communist media system. During the time immediately after the transition, old systems of control, which included censors, were no longer effective, and many new newspapers and eventually, private radio and television stations appeared. It was the time when thousands of new journalists and others, who considered journalism as a tool for political advocacy, entered the profession. In the transformation stage, the evolution from one stable state of the media system to another is expected to happen. In Eastern European countries, the transformation assumed formulation of full-fledged media policies that espouse the principles of freedom of speech, conformity with Western standards, and the creation of a stable new media system, whatever its nature. In most former Communist countries, both transition and transformation were expected to ultimately

create a mass media system that would introduce and support Western type of journalism into Eastern European practice (Gross & Jakubowicz, 2013).

However, as the situation in post-Communist countries has been quite dynamic, mass media systems have, in the last twenty years, achieved different forms and stages of development in various countries in the region. In some countries, such as Bulgaria, Romania, and the former Soviet countries, the changes in media systems were mainly dictated by the ruling elites simultaneously with political and social changes. The changes were made at the top level but the majority of media professionals remained in their posts and the structures imposed by Communist regimes did not experience big disruptions. Media policy and changes were negotiated between elite groups without the participation of mass population (Sparks, 1997). In other countries, bureaucracy briefly lost control of the change due to disruptive events such as velvet revolutions[3]. In these countries, transition remained in suspension for a considerable time, and then moved forward, or even reverted to the previous situation, such as the case with Ukraine (Gross & Jakubowicz, 2013). In Serbia and Croatia, on the other hand, extreme governments took control of the mass media systems for a certain period of time (Sparks, 1997), whereas in Slovakia the new government led by Vladimir Mečiar severely attacked journalists by legal, economic and even violent pressures, which substantially slowed down the process of journalistic professionalization in the country (Johnson, 2013).The media of East Germany were absorbed into an already existing capitalist system (Sparks, 1997), whereas in Belarus, state-run and strictly controlled outlets dominated the media landscape (Manaev, Manaeva, & Yuran, 2013).

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[3] Civil and/or opposition protests against the regimes in some countries of Eastern Europe, which led to the overthrow of the ruling regimes.

The variations in post-Communism in the region have created a deficiency of a common theoretical model for studying news media in the region. Hallin and Mancini (2004) have compared media systems in capitalistic advanced democracies by grouping them into three models: the Mediterranean or Polarized Pluralist Model, the North/Central European or Democratic Corporatist Model, and the North Atlantic or Liberal Model. In a later work, the authors recognized the need for the development of a new Model which would group Eastern European media systems. They found that media systems in Eastern Europe share certain similarities with their Mediterranean or Polarized Pluralist Model, especially in the domain of state intervention in the media sector. In both regions, there is a strong role of the state in regulating and funding media as well as in defining news agendas. In both regions, there is a formidable connection between party politics and media, reflected in state intervention through politically connected private actors in media enterprises. Noting these similarities, Hallin and Mancini (2013) argue that in setting theoretical boundaries for media systems in Eastern Europe, much more attention should be paid to the role of the state in controlling the media sector, through processes of politicized privatizations, advertising and domination over public broadcasters. In addition, they recognize that foreign influences have been much more present in the development of Eastern European media systems than those in Western Europe. For example, both extensive foreign ownership and the importation of Western models of professional practice have represented major factors that affected media in Eastern Europe. Finally, Hallin and Mancini (2013) argue that a unifying media theory for the region should consider the interplay between media, civil society and political parties, taking into account that civil society is still underdeveloped in Eastern Europe and that political parties represent more authoritative institutions than a bridge between state and civil society.

Jakubowicz (2013) proposes that media systems in the region should be studied in relationship with socio-political circumstances, as they are, as the author claims, asymmetrically interdependent. To explain this association, he uses three criteria: the scope of political and administrative control over the media, specific institutional solutions, and normative attitudes of political elites. The first criterion assumes that the level of control of the media in the region depends on whether the country is democratic, semi-democratic or autocratic. Democratic countries are, according to him, those where the process of democratic consolidation and the progress of economic reforms are well advanced (e.g., the countries of Eastern Europe that have entered the European Union). Semi-democratic countries include, according to Jakubowicz's (2013) classification, the countries that have been less successful in creating a stable democratic system, which resulted in violent conflicts, creation of regimes that resemble their socialist predecessors, or creation of hybrid regimes that combined liberal tendencies with aspects of the socialist past (e.g., Georgia, Ukraine, Kyrgyzstan). Authoritarian regimes within Eastern Europe differ from Communist dictatorships in some respects but deny their citizens fundamental political rights (e.g., Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Belarus). Media freedom and independence is higher in democratic countries, where competitive politics and media pluralism prevail, and progressively lower in semi-democratic countries characterized by oligarchization, and authoritarian countries, where the author notes a return to strict censorship (Jakubowicz, 2013).

Especially important for news programs are general media orientations that Jakubowicz (2013) sees as being developed in five different directions in Eastern Europe: 1) idealistic orientation, endorsing the introduction of direct, participatory communicative democracy; 2) idealistic-mimetic, oriented toward the introduction of an idealized Western media system involving more elements of citizen participation; 3) mimetic, straight transplantation of the

Western media system; 4) materialist, promoting privatization of all media as a way of eliminating state or political control over them; and 5) atavistic, involving continuation of new forms of effective command-and-control systems, by allowing political elites to control the media. Idealistic and materialist orientations never gained support in post-Communist countries. Jakubowicz (2013) writes that democratic post-Communist countries have adopted mainly the mimetic orientation, semi-democratic ones a mixture of mimetic and atavistic orientations, and the autocratic ones primarily atavistic orientation.

In terms of specific institutional solutions, Jakubowicz (2013) explains that post-Communist countries can be categorized with regard to their particular choice of executive power structures (presidential, semi-presidential and parliamentary), legislature (single or double chamber), political parties (adversarial or consociational), and electoral system (majoritarian, mixed). The institutional choices correspond with some of the key characteristics of media systems in post-Communist countries, particularly in the broadcasting sector, where broadcasting regulatory authorities represent a direct extension of political powers. Finally, Jakubowicz (2013) notes that attitudes of political elites influence media freedom and independence in Eastern Europe. In some countries two major paradigms prevail: liberal, which favors the complete withdrawal of the state from the media, and the paradigm of service to national values, which assumes that media should be in service of the reconstruction and reinforcement of national identity and support national cultures. Despite this duality, political culture in Eastern Europe generally favors control of media by political elites, which regard media as tools of political agitation and propaganda, a means of political mobilization rather than political information (Jakubowicz, 2013).

In Jakubowicz's (2013) typology Serbia falls under the group of democratic countries that are assumed to have fairly stable democratic institutions and media systems that resemble either a mimetic one, which imitates the Western style, or a selective-atavistic one, where privately-owned print and broadcast media might be beyond the control of the ruling establishment,[4] but where the public service is still controlled by the state.

The Case of Serbia

After World War II Serbia was part of the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY), a one party socialist-communist country composed of six republics and two autonomous provinces, each representing different ethnic groups. Under the idea of "brotherhood and unity" Yugoslavia incorporated Muslims, Eastern Orthodox, and Catholics; Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, Bosniacs, Macedonians, Montenegrins, Albanians, Hungarians, Italians, Slovaks, Checks, Turks, and others. The country was ruled by Josip Broz Tito, who seized power with his Communist-led partisans during World War II and governed until his death in 1980. Tito's ruling system was characterized as a form of liberal communism with open borders and heavy international borrowing (Cox, 2002). Thanks to the implementation of liberalizing economic and political reforms, Yugoslavia had been broadly integrated into international economic, political and cultural development. Its unique international position allowed the country to adopt an open foreign policy between the two Cold War blocs and to develop special relations with newly independent countries by playing a prominent role in the movement of non-aligned countries. The country was neither a member of the Warsaw Treaty Organization nor NATO, and adopted an economic strategy that was socialist but not Soviet, espousing self-management decision making within the firms, trying to decentralize the economic decision-making, and liberalize

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[4] Other research notes, however, that political and economic influences are exercised over Serbian public as well as private media. This will be further discussed later in this chapter, as well as in Chapter III.

foreign trade and the banking system. The country's socialist regime was more open, transparent, and accepting of non-Marxist ideologies than any other country in Central and Eastern Europe. Its citizens enjoyed opportunities to travel, work, and study abroad, while the literature and culture forbidden in the east, from George Orwell's 1984 to punk rock and neoliberal economics, was prominent in the Yugoslav market (Baskin & Pickering, 2011).

Despite its relative openness, Tito's Yugoslavia kept control over its citizens. Milovan Djilas, a Communist political and theorist turned into one of the most prominent dissidents in Yugoslavia, described that the Communist bureaucrats had political control, managerial power over state enterprises and nationalized property, and exclusive right of distribution of wages and national wealth. According to him, self-management in enterprises represented an illusion of some kind of a new democracy, as workers' management did not lead to the participation in the division of profits (Djilas, 1998). Simultaneously, those who openly criticized the Communist ideology or opposed the Communist system were publically reprimanded or sent to jails, one of which was a notorious prison on the island of Goli Otok [Bare Island], where an estimated 32,000 male political prisoners were subjected to forced labor (Dedijer, 1984). The entire society was pervaded by the infamous secret police UDBA, which was in charge of spying on citizens, making lists of regime opponents, and even conducing secret executions of non-loyal citizens (Djilas, 1998; Milic, 2006).The activities of UDBA and the presence of Goli Otok scared the people to the point that even those who were brave enough to oppose the regime openly, thought of committing suicide rather than being sent to labor camps on the otherwise uninhibited island. Milovan Djilas, once a senior official in the Communist Party, who turned against the regime, described his distress, "The shadow of Goli Otok, the concentration camp (…), loomed also over

us. And with it the awful fear, ever suspected, ever dismissed, that there existed a secret, inconceivable place of torment for separatists and turncoats" (Djilas, 1998, p. 168,9).

The news media in Yugoslavia existed both on national and regional levels. Thus, for example, each unit of the Yugoslav federation had a radio-television system that functioned separately (Veljanovski, 2005), with 180 local stations supplementing the main broadcasting institutions. Broadcasters offered news programs not only in the main languages of Serbo-Croatian, Slovenian, and Macedonian, but also in minority languages such as Albanian, Hungarian, Romanian, Turkish and Slovakian (Paulu, 1974). On the federal level, the daily newspaper Borba, the news agency TANJUG, Radio Yugoslavia, and short-lived television station Yutel operated as pan-Yugoslav media outlets (Volčić, 2007). News media were, for the most part, controlled by the single party – the Communist Party. That control was less rigid than in other communist countries, and the freedom of the press was guaranteed by the Yugoslav Constitution and other laws (Pešić, 1994). In terms of freedom of expression, Paulu (1974) described Yugoslavia as "the most liberal country in the Eastern European bloc" (p. 474). Western magazines and newspapers were sold all over the country. There was no pre-censorship and bookstores sold books that were not sympathetic to the regime or to Communism in general, such as translations of the works of Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn or George F. Kennan's Memoires. Yugoslavia never jammed foreign radio broadcasters and maintained friendly relations with the BBC and Voice of America staffs (Paulu, 1974).

However, freedom of the press was limited. As Pešić (1994) describes, the name, person and work of the leader, Tito, was protected from criticism. The Constitution also stated that "no one may use these freedoms and rights (…) in order to disrupt the foundations of the socialist self-management democratic order" (Pešić, 1994, p. 12). Besides Tito's name, the basic

Communist system was also not to be criticized, the animosities of Yugoslavia's nationalities were not to be incited and foreign intervention was not to be invited by undue criticism of the Soviet Union. In addition, "hostile propaganda" was punishable by prison sentence. Thus, individuals who wrote critical pieces about the Communist systems in Yugoslavia or in the Soviet Union in foreign newspapers or domestic publications, such as academic journals, would be sent to jail or the issues carrying problematic articles would be banned (Paulu, 1974). For example, once Milovan Djilas openly started criticizing the Communist regime, and was sent to jail, he could no longer publish his political or even literary works in Yugoslavia, and had to send them to the United States for publication (Djilas, 1998).

The control over the media was maintained through government and Communist party bodies: Ministry of Information and the Federal Executive Council, and through the League of Communists with its ideological commissions. The Ministry for Information planned and supervised the development of the information network of the country and reinforced the ideological activities of the Party. For example, the Ministry carried the budget of the news agency TANJUG on its books while the Executive Committee of the government planned it. The editors of news media would come to the Ministry for "briefing sessions" on the foreign policy line and selection of government policy statements and certain sensitive stories. Although these formal controls were somewhat relaxed after the 1956, the government kept a fairly firm control of the news media. Thus it still had the right to appoint three members of the Workers Council in TANJUG and establish its larger presence through media workers' membership in the Communist Party. Chief editors and media directors were members of the League of Communists as well as the substantial number of journalists. In addition, the Party formed its "activs" within news organizations. They consisted of a party secretary and a seven-member

secretariat that "educated the membership as well as the 'collective' [people working in a particular news organization] on political and ideological matters (Robinson, 1977). As Tito said in 1973, "We Communists have the right to interfere in everything. I am chairman of the League of Communists and I have the right to interfere. We have the right to interfere to insure the correct implementation of the general policy of the party, the proper development of socialism, the proper development of social relations and brotherhood and unity, for which we shed a sea of blood" (Paulu, 1974, p. 474).

Furthermore, it was implied that journalists were supposed to serve the government. As Taylor and Kent (2000) write, "journalists were employed by the state, for the state and to serve the state" (p. 356). Yugoslavia's journalistic code of conduct integrated the "responsibility to implement the politics of the League of Communists" (Veljanovski, 2005, p. 4) and a journalist was defined as a "socio-political worker who, conscientiously adhering to the ideas of Marxism-Leninist, (…) participates in the establishment and development of socialist self-management of society" (Pešić, 1994, p. 12). Tito considered that the press could not be "independent" and "autonomous" but saw it as a mechanism for the implementation of a bigger social plan – the construction of Socialism on all levels (Paulu, 1974, p. 479). Other doctrines of the journalistic code, which did not differ that much from the doctrine of professional journalism in the West, offered the possibility for Yugoslav journalists to present their professional work to the world (Veljanovski, 2005), especially in the area of foreign news reporting. Thus, news agency TANJUG was the eight biggest world news agency and "had gained a reputation which no other Communist states' agencies could approach" (Pešić, 1994, p.13). It offered a news perspective alternative to those of news agencies of the major powers, while employing the Western journalistic practice. The agency played a pivotal role by being the first to break news of events

such as the last day in office of the first legally elected Prime Minister of the Congo, Patrice Lumumba, before his assassination in 1961; the U.S. 'Bay of Pigs' invasion of Cuba that same year; the US-aided military coup d'état against Chile's Popular Unity government and its democratically elected President, Salvador Allende, in 1973; the U.S. bombardment of Tripoli in 1986; and the overthrow of the Communist regime of Nicolae Ceau☐escu in Romania in 1989 (Vukasovich & Boyd-Barrett, 2012).

In the matter of domestic affairs, however, the Yugoslav media were state media that supported the ruling Communist party. Typical news programming included information about party leaders and governmental policies. They were never critical of the government and showed the commonalities of the Yugoslavian people rather than differences (Taylor & Kent, 2000). Any attempts for investigative journalism were thwarted by the state. Media criticism of certain events in the society could exist only if condoned by the Party. People who led the press and television were carefully chosen, using the loyalty to the Party as the paramount criterion. In that sense, Yugoslav Communism exercised strict control role over the news media (Milic, 2006). Thus, as Paulu (1974) notes, Yugoslavia might have been the most liberal of all Eastern European societies but "should not but be equated with typical Western democracies" (p. 474).

After Tito's death Yugoslavia continued to exist with rotating leadership and reforms did not work well. By 1990, Yugoslav debt to Western banks had grown to $20 billion, unemployment reached 15.9% (in the least developed region, Kosovo, it was even 38.4%), and inflation rates had substantially grown. With the rising ethnic tensions and the proclamation of independence by Slovenia and Croatia, Yugoslavia was on the edge of dissolution; bloody ethnic wars ensued leaving around 140,000 dead and millions of displaced (Baskin & Pickering, 2011; International Center for Transnational Justice, 2009).

Serbia was the biggest of the Yugoslav republics, and after the dissolution of the country, stayed in the federation with the smaller republic of Montenegro until 2006, when Montenegro declared independence. In December 1990, Slobodan Milošević, a mid-level official, won the first multi-party presidential and parliamentary elections in Serbia since World War II. His newly formed Socialist Party of Serbia, the successor of the Communist party of Serbia, won the majority of seats in the Parliament. His victory was considered to be a result of big rallies where he highlighted major nationalistic issues. By the time he became the president of Serbia he had already engineered the fall of the governments of the provinces of Vojvodina and Kosovo, put his key followers in media, and was considered to be the "boss of Serbia" (Cox, 2002; Sotirović, 2009). In literature, he has been described as a nationalistic leader who ruled the country as an authoritarian and, while allowing some opposition, brutally interfered with the elements of democracy (Cox, 2002).

During Milošević's rule news media were either under strict control of the state or were severely persecuted by the regime. Although the new laws allowed the formation of private media and formally guaranteed "freedom of the press and other forms of public dissemination of information" (Pešić, 1994, p. 16), the main media were state media: Radio-Television of Serbia, news agency TANJUG, and daily Politika. Milošević took full control of all of them. For example, at Radio-Television of Serbia (RTS) the government appointed all members of the managing board and the general manager after the 1991 law enabled the centralization of three state broadcasting centers into one (Veljanovski, 2005). The regime put its followers in key positions and selected the journalists according to criteria related to patriotism (Pešić, 1994, p.17). Those who did not obey those criteria were sent off to so-called "compulsory vacation" for an indefinite period of time. More than 1,000 staff members were forced to leave because the

regime considered them politically unsuited (Open Society Institute, 2005). Simultaneously, state media were the main source of information for impoverished people hit by the severe economic crisis. For example, RTS was the only broadcaster to cover the majority of the country (96%) with average viewership of 3.5 million for its main news program (Pešić, 1994, p.15).

Unlike in the Communist era, independent reporting in Serbia did exist during the 1990s and was reserved for private media, but they were severely persecuted by the regime. Independent journalists were arrested for supposed treason or libel and often called the "stooges" of Western powers (Cox, 2002). The 1998 Information Law banned, among other things, the "breach of reputation and honor of individuals" (Article 11) and broadcasting of foreign programs (Article 27) while Article 69 envisaged draconian punishments for breaches of the act (Information Law of Serbia, 1998). Just in the first year after its adoption, more than 20 media were punished for breaching the law – many of them were completely closed while others had to pay millions of dinars in fines (Kaljević, 1999). Besides enduring harassment from Milošević's regime, independent journalists faced low payments. During hyperinflation in 1993, a journalist's monthly salary could buy a jar of pickles or beets from the mostly empty shelves of Serbian stores. On the other hand, journalists working for news programmers of the state-controlled media were very well paid, some of them even rewarded with apartments. Their loyalty during the 1990s was to be proven by defending the nation during bloody ethnic wars, which usually consisted of glorifying tradition and Serbian historical greatness, while claiming an international conspiracy against the Serbs. The control over the news media was supported by the powerful, former Communist State Security Service (SDB), with its paid professionals or patriotic volunteers infiltrating the media as journalists or other media workers (Milic, 2006). This mix of existence of private and public media, in which the criticism of political machinery

and officials in power is severely punished, corresponds most closely to Siebert, Peterson, and Schramm's (1956) authoritarian model of the press. Originated out of the philosophy of the absolute power of the leader and his government, in which the society (i.e., the leader) keeps the right to prohibit the propagation of dangerous opinions under the pretext of preserving public peace and order, this press model assumes that the chief purpose of mass media is to support and advance the policies of the government. Thus, social control is imposed from one institution (the government) to another (the press), and censorship and licensing are considered as justifiable means for media control. In authoritarian press systems, existence of privately operated media are allowed, but various methods of establishing the restraints over them are employed: from granting special permits to selected individuals to engage in mass information dissemination and introducing a licensing system for individual printed works, through employing prosecution before the courts for violation of accepted and established rules of behavior, with treason and sedition as the basis for prosecutions of persons suspected of disseminating information inimical to authorities, to special taxation designed to limit the profit of private media (Siebert, Peterson, & Schramm, 1956).

On October 5, 2000, Milošević's regime was toppled in a massive demonstration in the capital, Belgrade. Milošević was forced to step down and recognize the results of the September 24, 2000 federal elections in which the candidate of a coalition of democratic parties won. Western countries supported the results of the elections and welcomed the country into the international community by restoring diplomatic relations, sending millions of dollars in aid and accepting the country into different international organizations (Cox, 2002). The toppling of Milošević finally opened the way for the news media to function in a non-repressive environment. However, the inherited problems, as well as the connections of new authorities

with organized crime and secret services made the job more difficult (Milic, 2006). Serbia's state

television had to be transformed to a public service broadcaster and the Broadcasting Agency of

the Republic of Serbia was formed, representing the first time in Serbia's history that an

independent regulatory body was entrusted to act as a controller of the broadcasting sector

(Veljanovski, 2005). However, the lack of media law implementation postponed the

transformation of state television, while other state media, such as the major dailies Politika and

Večernje Novosti, along with Belgrade's Studio B Television remained partially or fully owned

and controlled by the state. News agency TANJUG was still receiving government help, making

it more competitive than the two private national news agencies, Beta and Fonet (IREX, 2012;

Open Society Institute, March 28, 2006).

Today, Serbia is characterized as a democratic country by several organizations that

measure the level of freedom in the world, but their assessments of the level of country's

democratization range from almost full institutionalized democracy to flawed democracy. On

Polity IV index[5], which ranks the level of state democratization from -10 (full autocracy) to +10

(full institutionalized democracy), the country scored 8 for the period 2005-2010. This means

that Serbia obtained high scores on two elements: 1) the presence of institutions and procedures

through which citizens can express effective preferences about alternative policies and leaders;

and 2) the existence of institutionalized constraints on the exercise of power by the executive

(TheMacroDataGuide, 2010). Freedom House (2013)[6] ranked Serbia as a free country. On a

scale for political rights and civil liberties ranging from 1 (the most free) to 7 (the least free),

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[5] The latest version of the Polity Project, the Polity IV, is a continuation of a research program established by Ted
Robert Gurr in the 1970s. Originally, the aim of the project was to measure political system durability. In subsequent
years, the analytical scope was broadened to encompass the issue of regime type more generally, and today the
project's main index is a measure of the degree of democracy and autocracy.
[6] Freedom House is an American organization that measures the levels of freedom around the world considering that
freedom is possible only in democratic political environments where governments are accountable to their own
people; the rule of law prevails; and freedoms of expression, association, and belief, as well as respect for the rights
of minorities and women, are guaranteed.

Serbia obtained a freedom ranking of 2, civil liberties ranking of 2, and political rights ranking of

2. The report described the country as an electoral democracy with largely free and fair

elections, present political pluralism, generally free press, constitutionally guaranteed freedom of

religion, where citizens enjoy freedoms of assembly and association. However, the report noted

that corruption and human trafficking remained serious problems in Serbia, that judicial

independence, independence of media from political parties, and the representation of ethnic

minorities in the government had to be improved, while religiously motivated incidents

diminished. The Democracy Index 2012 (Economist, 2012)[7] considered Serbia as a flawed

democracy with the overall score of 6.33 (on a scale from 1 to 10). The report included almost all

Eastern Europe countries in this category (except the Czech Republic) noting that the countries

of the region lag behind the countries in Western Europe in political participation, political

culture, and, in case of Serbia, the functioning of the government. Taking into account the

findings of these reports, which indicated that Serbia reached satisfactory levels of electoral

process, political pluralism, and the presence of democratic institutions, but noted the problems

with the functioning of the government, political culture, and some civil liberties, this

dissertation will consider Serbia as a formal but not yet a fully developed democracy.

In terms of news media, today, Serbia has 134 registered television stations, 39 cable

televisions, 377 radio stations, and 517 print media outlets. In total, the country has 1,000 media

outlets for 7.1 million people, making most of the outlets unsustainable. Although the news

media in the country are no longer experiencing extreme government pressures, as they had

during the Communist and Milošević's eras, violations of freedom of speech are still present.

Political removals of editors and journalists, prohibitions to individual journalists to enter public

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[7] The Democracy Index is an index compiled by the *Economist* Intelligence Unit that measures the state
of democracy in 167 countries around the world.

press conferences, attacks on journalists, trumped-up court cases against journalists, as well as cases of state officials verbally attacking journalists remain common occurrences (IREX, 2012).

At the same time, professional standards in Serbian journalism have suffered due to the impact of the economic crisis on the media market, low salaries, worsening ethical standards, and heightening self-censorship. IREX's[8] panelists described situations in which the news media have often missed coverage of serious political, economic, and social problems. Journalists often base a story on a single source, and fail to do background research. Some are prone to sensationalized reporting using vulgar and other inappropriate language. According to IREX's panelists, Serbian journalists do not possess qualified knowledge to cover specialized topics such as economics, justice, or ecology, and are often prone to biased reporting (IREX, 2012; IREX, 2011). In addition, Anticorruption Council of the Government of Serbia (2011)[9] described corruption as one of the main problems of Serbian news media. Being closely aligned with specific political parties or other centers of power, Serbian editors and journalists are often inclined to publish rumors, insinuations, and half-truths (Miller, 2006-2007).

In sum, the literature on news media in post-Communist countries of Eastern Europe, although lacking a common theoretical framework, has pointed out some shared characteristics of media systems in the region. After the fall of Communism in 1989, most of the counties, albeit in different ways, went through the process of transition, during which the old systems of control became ineffective. However, the processes of news media transformation in these countries,

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[8] International Research and Exchange Board (IREX) is an international nonprofit organization, based in the United States, which works in transitional, conflict, and post-conflict environments, and uses specialized training and consulting in supporting the sustainability of news media.

[9] Anticorruption Council of the Government of Serbia is an expert, advisory body to the Serbian government, founded with the mission of discovering corruption activities, proposing measures to fighting the corruption effectively, and monitoring their implementation. The body was established by the Serbian Government on October 11, 2001, with the members appointed by the government. Its former president, Ms Verica Barać, was known as one of the biggest fighters against the corruption in Serbia, who openly defied political and economic centers of power in the country.

which by definition should include the evolution from one stable system to another, from one in which news media serve the state to one in which they serve citizens, have still not been completed (Gross & Jakubowicz, 2013; Hallin & Mancini, 2013). In Serbia, the media system transitioned in 1989 from a Communist one, in which all media were under state control, to an authoritarian one, in which one part of the news media were under the control of the ruling regime, and the other were independent but severely persecuted. Functioning in a not yet fully developed democratic society, news media in Serbia today try to imitate the Western journalistic style, but face problems with economic and political pressures, journalistic unprofessionalism, and violations of press freedoms (Anticorruption Council of the Government of Serbia, 2011; IREX, 2012).

In this complex situation, in which historical, political, and social developments tie with the transformation of media systems, it becomes hard to discern what leads people to trust news they see, hear or read. Is it the quality of contemporary news reporting or the general distrustful predisposition that has spilled over from the Communist past that determines the present relationship of Serbians towards their transitional media systems? Scholars have found that in terms of political institutions both explanations are possible in Eastern Europe (e.g., Luhiste, 2006; Mishler & Rose, 2001; Newton & Norris, 2000). What's astonishing is that the news media have attracted less scholarly attention, despite their central role in democratic systems. The goal of this dissertation study is to determine the origins of trust in news media in Serbia and thus explain deeper the relationship of Serbians with their news media.

The next Chapter will delve into the scholarly literature on trust and news media, will introduce this study's theoretical framework by providing an overview of cultural and performance theories of institutional trust, and will present its research questions and hypotheses.

CHAPTER III:
CORE CONCEPTS AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The Concept of Trust

Trust is omnipresent in social relationships and as such has been attributed with multiple

meanings. The oldest connotation of trust equates this notion with *faith* in supranatural power on

which man feels dependent. As such trust is present in all religious beliefs and represents more

of a commitment to something than a cognitive understanding. The second concept closely

connects trust to *confidence*. It assumes the confidence in or reliance on some quality or

attributes of a person or thing, or the truth of a statement (Misztal, 1988). Sociological theories

of trust in modern societies, however, have differentiated trust from confidence and hope.

Modern human societies are complex entities that have shifted from communities based

on fate to those moved by human agency. In this more dynamic context, humans, who need to

face the future more actively and constructively, deploy trust as an *active anticipation of the*

unknown future (Sztompka, 2000). For example, politicians have to trust the viability of

proposed policies, inventors have to trust the reliabilities and usefulness of new products, and

common people have to trust representatives who act on their behalf in the domain of

government, economy, judiciary, or science (Dahrendorf, 1990). In this regard, trust is always

oriented towards future actions, towards situations in which people have to deal with uncertainty

and risk. As Sztompka (2000) states, when we are almost certain about the future and have a

high degree of control over it, there is practically no need for trust. Thus trust requires believing,

even more, believing despite uncertainty. It involves an element of risk resulting from our

inability to monitor other's behavior (Misztal, 1988). As Luhamann (1994) explains, one can

choose to buy or not buy a used car risking that the car turns out to be "a lemon," or hire a

babysitter leaving her unsupervised in the apartment; unless one is ready to waive the associated

advantages, one cannot avoid taking risks in building trustworthy relationships. For Sztompka (2000) this belief represents a bet that we place on the future contingent actions of others.

This meaning of trust included in modern sociological theory, incorporates two main components: *beliefs and commitments*. When we believe, we hold specific expectations about how things will happen in the future or how another person will behave in the future. Barber (1983) has distinguished between the three kinds of expectations that people hold when they allocate trust. The most general is the expectation of the persistence and fulfillment of the natural and moral social orders. Under the first one, trust accounts for the expectations, which all humans in a society internalize, that the natural physical and biological orders, as well as the moral social order will persist and be realized. It is what people mean when they say, "I trust that heavens will not fall," or "I trust human life to survive." Second is the expectation of the technically competent role of performance, such as trusting the doctor to perform the operation well (Barber, 1983). As Fukuyama (1995) writes, "we trust a doctor not to do us deliberate injury because we expect him or her to live by the Hippocratic oath and the standards of medical profession" (p. 26). And the third expectation assumes that partners in interaction will carry out their fiduciary obligations and responsibilities. This expectation includes the belief that people will in certain situations place others' interests before their own (Barber, 1983).

Besides the contemplative consideration of future possibilities, trust involves commitment through action, a bet on someone, an expectation about the action of others which has a bearing on our own actions. According to Sztompka (2000), trusting involves three different types of commitments: anticipatory, responsive, and evocative. Anticipatory commitment assumes that people act toward others because they believe that the actions which they carry out will be favorable to their interests, needs and expectations. For example, a man

marries a particular woman because he believes that a woman will be a good mother. Responsive trust involves the act of entrusting some valuable object to somebody else and expecting responsible care. For example, this kind of commitment occurs when a person leaves a child with a baby-sitter, place parents in a nursing home, or deposit savings in the bank. The third type of commitment happens when people act on the belief that the other person will reciprocate with trust - we trust intentionally to evoke trust. This is particularly characteristic for the close, intimate relationships, among family members or friends. For example, a mother allowing her daughter to return late in the evening from a date (Sztompka, 2000).

In modern societies, trust is directed at various objects, the *targets of trust*. The most fundamental target of trust is another person. We can allocate our trust either to people in general or to a particular person. In the former case, the trustors experience generalized trust while in the latter case they experience particularized trust. Generalized trust assumes trust towards people we do not know, towards complete strangers (Uslaner, 2002), whereas particularized trust arises in face-to-face interactions and can be thought of as reputation (Bjornskov, 2007).[10] The next, more abstract target of trust is a social role. Independent of the concrete incumbents, some roles evoke more trust than others. Mother, friend, doctor of medicine, priest, judge, notary public are considered trusted social roles. Other roles, such as the bazaar merchant, used-car dealer, prostitute, secret agent, spy, imply apriori distrust. Of course, the definition of some roles as trustworthy may differ between societies, depending for example, on the social practices of cheating and corruption (Sztompka, 2000).

The final target of trust is trust in institutions. Institutional trust refers to "confidence in institutions under conditions of risk" and means that when one does not have full information

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[10] Further discussion about generalized and particularized trust will be presented later in this chapter as they are especially important for Cultural and Performance Theories of Trust.

about the intention and outcomes of governance, one will still be confident that governing

institutions will not misuse their power (Luhiste, 2006, p. 478). In this context, individuals place

trust in institutions such as the school, the university, the army, the church, the courts, the police,

the banks, the stock exchange, the government, the parliament, or the industrial enterprise

(Sztompka, 2000). The amount of trust that people vest in various institutions differ among

societies. It also undergoes changes in time, although these changes are relatively slow and

require not only modifications in the functioning of institutions but also physiological changes in

people who vest trust (Luhiste, 2006). Sztompka (2000) describes one of these changes in Polish

institutions. Due to its long history of foreign domination and oppression, the army and the

Catholic Church in Poland were considered as the embodiments of national struggle and

continuing identity and have always stood at the top of trusted institutions. But after the fall of

Communism in 1989, the author observed the advancement of new democratic institutions, such

as the Constitutional Court, the Ombudsman to high positions in the trust hierarchy, as well as

the relative demise of the Catholic Church, which was no longer so important in its unifying role.

In sum, the review of the concept of trust shows that its meaning has changed from

passive connotations of faith and confidence to a more active anticipation of the unknown future,

whose meaning implies insufficient knowledge about the outcomes of future actions, and the

awareness of risk. In such capacity, trust can be targeted towards individuals, social roles, or

institutions. Conceptualizing trust in its modern sociological meaning, this dissertation research

studies trust in news media as an institution. News media have been studied both as a social and

a political institution. In terms of as a social institution, defined as an organization that provides a

"support system for individuals as they struggle to become members of a larger social network"

(Silverblatt, 2004, p.35), news media have been looked to as guidebooks for social behavior that

convey societal norms and values (Silverblatt, 2004). The political angle has mainly related news process to the structure of the state and the economy, as well as to the economic foundation of the news organization. In this regard, news media as an institution have been studied as state-controlled organs of propaganda but also as autonomous forces in politics that, independent of political parties, affect political processes. At its best, the latter conceptualization of news media is one in which journalism is capable of standing as spokesperson of civil society and monitoring the work of the government (Schudson, 2002). This dissertation measures the institution of news media against this ideal and uses sociological theories as well as theories of modern journalism to conceptualize individual trust in news media.

Conceptualizing Trust in News Media

In consolidated democracies of Western Europe and Northern America, news media have been considered one of the key institutions necessary for the surveillance of decision makers, scrutinizing government performance, and reporting and interpreting ongoing events (Graber, 2010). Thus the study of trust in them has had a long tradition (Metzger, Flanagin, Eyal, Lemus & McCann, 2003). In over eight decades of research, Western academic literature has generated three separate, although not always clearly distinguished, lines of research about trust in news media: 1) believability of news media organizations, 2) credibility of news media, 3) and trust in news media as an institution.

1) The studies in the field of *believability in news media organizations* started in the 1930s, when the newspaper industry became concerned that an increasing number of people were turning to radio. It gained momentum again with the arrival of television in the 1950s, when Roper started asking about the believability of different media (Roper, 1985). Namely, the Roper organization began regularly asking people which

medium they would believe if they got conflicting reports of the same news from radio, television, magazines, and newspapers. At first, newspapers were judged to be more believable than television, but in 1961, television became the most-believed medium (Metzger, Flanagin, Eyal, Lemus & McCann, 2003). Having widely criticized Roper's question for bias against newspapers, scholars have moved from defining trust in news media as believability of news organizations to looking at the multidimensionality of the construct (Metzger, Flanagin, Eyal, Lemus & McCann, 2003).

2) Studies on media credibility have dealt with three types of *media credibility*: source, article, and organizational credibility. Defined as "the amount of believability" attributed to a source of information by the receivers (Bracken, 2006, p. 724), source credibility can affect attitude change. Receivers were found to be persuaded more by sources they find more credible then by those they view less positively (McCroskey, Hamilton, & Weiner, 1974; Pornpitakpan, 2004). The research in this domain mainly relied on Yale Communication Research Program and Carl I. Hovland's findings that credibility of the source is comprised of two components: expertise, "the extent to which a communicator is perceived to be a source of valid assertions," and trustworthiness, "the degree of confidence in the communicator's intent to communicate the assertions he considers most valid" (Hovland, Janis, & Kelley, 1953). Later, scholars proposed other dimensions of source credibility such as dynamism, composure, and sociability (e.g., Berlo, Lemert & Mertz, 1970; Markham, 1968; Whitehead, 1968). In television studies, Markham (1968) found that besides

trustworthiness, the entertainment factor, consisting of showmanship and dynamism is important for TV anchors to be perceived as credible.

Article credibility focuses on the message itself. Research has shown that in some cases message factors may be more important than source factors when assessing credibility (Metzger, Flanagin, Eyal, Lemus, & Mccann, 2003). For example, recipients turn to message cues when issue involvement, knowledge, and personal relevance are high (Petty & Cacioppo, 1981) or in situations in which little information is available about the source of a message (Petty & Cacioppo, 1988). In media research, characteristics of news stories are found to influence the level of credibility that the audience attributes to them. For instance, Fico, Richardson, and Edwards (2004) found that balanced or imbalanced story structure influenced the perceived bias, which further influenced perceptions of newspapers credibility. The authors explained that these results indicated that news audiences can distinguish between balanced and imbalanced stories and give the balanced one greater trust.

The credibility of news media organization refers to the extent to which a media organization has been perceived by the audience as (a) factual and accurate (believability dimension) and (b) concerned mainly about the community's interest (community affiliation dimension) (Meyer, Marchionni, & Thorson, 2010). This definition stems from Gaziano & McGrath's (1986) study, which created a 12-item scale that represented a credibility dimension. It included the perceived fairness, accuracy, bias, trustworthiness, respect for people's privacy and their interest, factuality, separation of facts from opinion, and journalistic training. Their scale was

refined by Meyer (1988), who indicated that two factors, believability and community

concern, best reflected dimensions of credibility of a medium as organization.

3) The third line of research in the area of trust in news media dealt with the concept of
trust in news media as institutions. Studies that have examined trust in news media in
this context were mainly big international public opinions polls (e.g., General Social
Survey, 1972-2006; Eurobarometer 2001-2006; World Values Survey, 2010-2012) or
academic studies based on the secondary data analysis of these polls (e.g., Mishler &
Rose, 1997; Mishler and Rose, 2001; Luhiste, 2006). In them, news media were
considered as one of the social, political, or non-profit institutions of a particular
country, and the trust in them was conceptualized as the amount of confidence people
put in press, television or/and radio.

This dissertation research treats news media as an institution of a democratic society but
moves away from conceptualizing trust in it as the amount of believability, confidence, or
credibility. The decision to do so partly stems from the fact that others have not been able to
validate past measurements of the concept. For example, West (1994) found that Meyer's (1988)
model did not fit the data well (GFI=.87 and .85); Gaziano and McGrath (1986) used only
exploratory techniques; whereas the studies that relied on the data from polling organizations
(Eurobarometer 2001-2006; Mishler & Rose, 1997; Mishler and Rose, 2001; Luhiste, 2006;
World Values Survey, 2010-2012), have used a single item in measuring trust in news media as
institutions. More importantly, the conceptualization of trust in news media was not theoretically
derived in these studies, which led to the confusion of notions of credibility and trust in the
literature (e.g., in Kiousis, 2001; Tsfalti & Capella, 2003, 2005). Drawing from the research of

Kohring and Matthes (2007), this dissertation research relies on sociological theories of trust and the theories of modern journalism and society to define trust in news media.

As discussed in the section above, the concept of trust in modern societies allows people to deal with the risk of the open future, allowing them to compensate for giving up control to someone else. In this situation, the complexity of modern societies demands from social actors to become selective of other social actors (Barber, 1983; Luhmann, 1979; Sztompka, 2000). In the act of trusting, the trusting actor does not know whether his or her trust is warranted, but has to selectively connect his or her action with a certain action of other social factors under the condition of perceived risk (Kohring, 2004, cited in Kohring and Matthes, 2007). As Kohring and Matthes (2007) note, news media are expert systems in modern societies that have their own organizational structure, specialist language, and logic of action. Not being able to control the effectiveness of these systems by themselves, individuals have to invest a certain amount of trust in news media, risking that news media will not betray their expectations. The societal function of news media consists of selecting and conveying information about the events in modern societies, thus enabling the public to fulfill their need for orientation in their social environments. In this process, journalists cannot provide all information about any possible issue, but have to inform the public selectively, which makes relying on news reporting itself a risky action (Kohring & Matthes, 2007). Following this line of reasoning, trust in news media is conceptualized as trust in news media selectivity, rather than in absolute truth. When reporting about issues, personalities, and events, news media selectively choose some information over other information, and people take the risk when trusting these specific selections (Kohring & Matthes, 2007). Thus the audience does not invest their trust in an ultimate truth of news media, but rather in their selectivity.

From this theory, Kohring and Matthes (2007) derived four dimensions of journalistic selectivity: "trust in selectivity of topics," "trust in selectivity of facts," "trust in accuracy of depictions," and "trust in journalistic assessment." Trust in selectivity of topics assumes that trust is associated with the selection of reported topics and that the recipients trust that the news media will focus on those topics and events that are relevant to them. Trust in selectivity of facts concerns the selections of facts or background information assuming that the way in which an event is contextualized is relevant to trust in news media. Trust in accuracy of depictions presupposes that recipients trust the verifiable and approvable accuracy of depicted facts. Finally, trust in journalistic assessment takes into consideration the trust that recipients put in the journalistic evaluation of an event (Kohring & Matthes, 2007).

When conceptualizing trust in news media, this dissertation research uses Kohring and Matthes's (2007) trust in journalistic selectivity. Although this conceptualization of trust in news media has been used previously in research (e.g., Holbert, 2011; Holbert, Hmielowski, & Weeks, 2011), it has not been expanded to the region of Eastern Europe, where the relationship of individuals towards trust has been somehow different.

Trust in post-Communist Countries

Even though there were obvious national varieties in the rigidity and style in which Communists ruled in different countries of Eastern Europe (e.g., Romania was not the same as Yugoslavia; Poland was not the same as Czechoslovakia), the Communist regime succeeded in creating a common cultural framework, over and above distinct national cultures. It was a unique syndrome of values, rules, norms, codes, and standards typical for the Soviet bloc as a whole, called the "bloc culture." Citizens of Communist countries of Eastern Europe shared the life under so-called "real-socialism" that has produced the unique legacy of a peculiar cultural-

civilizational syndrome (Sztompka, 1996; 2000). Besides a common institutional framework of autocratic polity and command economy, the Communists imposed a "philosophy of dependence" instead of self-reliance, collectivism and conformity instead of individualism, equality of not only opportunities but outcomes, extremism in beliefs and intolerance (Seweryn Bialer, quoted in Reisinger , Miller, Hesli, & Maher, 1994, p. 195).

One of the consequences of bloc culture was the widespread erosion of trust. Grandiose false promises of Communist regimes, the failure to deliver those promises, and oppressive rule which included the strong activities of secret services in controlling the citizenry, have produced a generalized distrust in everything that was linked to the state and its institutions (Traps, 2009). Authorities both central and local were perceived as alien and hostile; the government was seen as the arena of conspiracy, deceit, cynicism, or at least stupidity and inefficiency. Trusting the state or the ruling party was considered as naiveness or stupidity, and actively supporting the regime was seen as treason. On the other hand, citizens developed particular skills in outwitting the state. They recognized that the ability to beat the system, using all the means necessary, even evasion of laws, was a widely accepted virtue. Sociologists later coined the term "parasitic innovativeness" to describe this characteristic (Sztompka, 2000).

The erosion of trust in post-Communist countries is explained by Paldam and Svedsen's (2001) dictatorship theory. It argues that trust levels in Central and Eastern Europe deteriorated due to the oppressive behavior of the communist dictatorships. For example, Romania's dictator Nicolae Ceausescu created an internal intelligence agency known as Securitate that may have used as many as 700,000 citizens as informers. Other communist regimes had similar agencies: the Soviet KGB or East Germany's Stasi, both known worldwide for their brutal treatment of citizens merely accused of being political dissidents. In this atmosphere, it may have been

entirely rational not to trust people other than the closest family and friends (Bjornskov, 2007). The theory posits that dictatorships destroy trust by devastating social capital, which is achieved by the atomization of human relations. Communism made a fundamental division between the two spheres of life, private and public, and encouraged social atomization. Unable to trust anybody but close friends and family, individuals withdrew to the private sphere or to their inner selves (Wheaton & Kavan, 1992). Atomized individuals were distrustful, uninterested in public matters, and unwilling to spend energy on shared goals (Petrova, 2007). Paradoxically, communist dictators themselves became distrustful. As Milovan Djilas witnessed, to Stalin, the world of politics as well as the world in general was a world of enemies. "If you wanted to survive as your own master," Djilas (1998, p. 14) described his impression of the Soviet dictator's thoughts during one of their encounters in 1944, "you dared not trust a soul. Everyone but yourself was either a crook or a knave. You had to battle it out, you dared not rely on anyone's strength but your own" (p. 14). Atomization of individuals was achieved by controlling the citizens through secret services, creating fear and distrust, and abolishing all voluntary organizations. In order to attain its main goal of the creation of a new socialist person and the elimination of a capitalist person, Communist regimes brought all voluntary organizations under the leadership control of the Communist party: even the boy scouts were replaced by official party scouts (pioneers). By doing this, the party, in every realm of life, told people effectively what to do and made almost all decisions on their behalf. There was no room left for entrepreneurship, experiments and voluntary organization into social groups (Paldam & Svedsen, 2001).

The erosion of trust in Communist societies represented the opposite of what the rulers intended to produce by conducting severe control of the citizenry. Despotic, dictatorial, and

totalitarian systems attempt to directly institutionalize trust and turn it into a strongly sanctioned formal demand. In such a system, citizens are expected to trust unquestionably the monarch, dictator, or the leader. They are expected to ignore any relevant evidence about the deeds or misdeeds of the ruler and to avoid making evaluations or critiques of the ruler. One should "trust the leader unconditionally, not because of what he does, but because of who he is, just as one trusts one's father, a priori and without any proofs of trustworthiness really being needed" (Sztompka, 2000, p. 148). Citizens are expected to allocate the same levels of trust to the whole system of authority: feudal monarchy, or national socialism, or dictatorship of the proletariat. The principles of the regime should not be questioned and are to be treated as truths. In democratic regimes, in contrast, trustworthiness is primarily based on two criteria: accountability and pre-commitment. Accountability assumes that rulers are best trusted when the rule of law can be relied upon to force them to abide by their trust. Pre-commitment treats the Constitution as the guarantee of continuity. Thus, democracies institutionalize distrust by using principles of democracy, whereas autocracies institutionalize trust by demanding total and unconditional support for the rulers and the system of rule (Sztompka, 2000).

Although Communism fell in 1989, skepticism towards strangers, as well as towards institutions prevailed in Eastern Europe. Analyzing World Values Survey (WVS) data from 1995, Miheljak (2006) found that level of generalized trust, or trust in strangers, was relatively low in all the central and eastern European countries under examination. For example, only 15.3% of participants in Slovenia thought that most people could be trusted, 16.9% in Poland, 17.9% in Romania, 22.5% in Hungary, and 22.8% in Croatia. The fourth wave of the WVS, which included 21 countries from the region, showed average generalized trust at 22%, whereas the fifth WVS wave, which covered 9 countries from the region, showed average generalized

trust at 21%. For comparison, the respective value in the fourth wave was 38% for the EU 15

countries and 36% for the USA (Aasland, Grodeland & Pleines, 2012). In terms of trust in

institutions, Mishler and Rose (1997) analyzed the comparative data from New Democracy

Barometer surveys that were conducted in November 1993 and March 1994 in seven central and

eastern European Countries (Bulgaria, the Check Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Poland,

Romania, and Slovenia) and in two republics of the former Soviet Union (Belarus and Ukraine).

The main findings indicated that skepticism predominated in the region in terms of trust towards

15 institutions. In Rose's (1994) study, citizens of Russia, the Czech Republic, Slovakia,

Hungary, and Poland were asked whether they trusted or distrusted key institutions of civil

society. The respondents in all countries expressed distrust of seven out of ten institutions. The

author noted that in all these countries, levels of public trust in institutions were significantly

lower than the levels that researchers typically found in both Western Europe and the United

States.

Trust in News Media in post-Communist Countries

During the Communist period, media, as state institutions, did not enjoy the confidence of

citizens. General suspicion of everything that came from the public domain, was supported by

the discrepancy between official statistics and everyday observation, between the messages of

the media and everyday knowledge. Common wisdom, "TV lies," was shared among citizens. In

contrast to general distrust in state media, there was a naïve faith in the information coming

either from private sources or foreign media (e.g., Radio Free Europe, Voice of America,

Deutsche Welle) (Sztompka, 2000). Citizens of Tito's Yugoslavia were aware that the state

media served the interests of the state. Although they usually accepted the message, they did not

always trust the source (Glenny, 1996). Scholars note that such an ambivalent position is not

uncommon in authoritarian media systems. Halpern (1994), who explored media dependency in

Chile, found that state-controlled media suffered from low credibility, but that, in an

authoritarian political system, media dependency might have a significant impact on political

perceptions. The author explained that the media environment in an authoritarian political system

is characterized by a lack of functional alternatives for political information; state-controlled

mass media represent the main source of news. As Taylor and Kent (2000) explained, "even

though citizens mistrusted the source of the state-controlled messages, the state ideology behind

the messages was a part of their everyday existence" (p. 357).

     After the fall of Communism, mass media, although more independent, had trouble

regaining trust due to their instrumental role during real-socialism. Although citizens did

distinguish between state and independent media when attributing trust[11], in general, attitudes

towards news media remained negative. In Poland, for example, in 1993, 48% of people still did

not believe television, and 40% distrusted newspapers (Sztompka, 2000). In other Eastern

European countries, skepticism towards media prevailed too. Mishler and Rose's (1997) study

showed that people in seven eastern and central European countries and two republics of the

former Soviet Union, were generally skeptical towards their media. On a 7-point scale, the scores

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[11] During the 1990s, in Slovakia, the first private television station Markiza, formed by the American media group, Central European Media Enterprises, was highly critical of the government of Vladimir Mečiar and its main newscast was quickly rated by the viewers as the most objective and trustworthy. It was especially trusted by respondents aged 18 to 24, those with university education, residents of cities with population of more than 100,000, and by the Hungarian minority. In contrast, the viewers saw public TV as the least trustworthy (Johnson, 2013). In Serbia, radio station B92, financed mainly by foreign donations, played a major role in informing and mobilizing the citizenry during 1996-1997 student demonstrations against Slobodan Milošević's regime's attempt to fake the outcome of municipal elections (Cheterian, 2009), while at the same time dissatisfied citizens protested against the propagandistic reporting of the state television (Open Society Institute, 2005). In Georgia, even today, any association of the media with the state raises suspicion. Thus, state financial support for television company Rustavi 2 decreased public trust in the medium (Berekashvili, 2009). Ukrainian journalist Andrii Shevchenko described in 2006 that "the society had no trust, absolutely no trust, in the national state television" (Cheterian, 2009). Even in Belarus, where from 1997 to 2008 the level of trust in state media was higher than the level of trust in independent media, the state media seem to have lost people's support. In 2008, 2009, and 2011, an independent public opinion agency measured higher levels of trust in independent media than in state media, concluding that distrust for state media has grown rapidly (Manaev et al., 2013).

for trust in media institutions ranged from 3.2 in Romania to 4.0 in Slovakia (Mishler & Rose, 1997). Similar trend was detected in Croatia. For example, Baloban and Rimac's (1999) survey showed that only between 2% and 3 % of Croatians completely trusted the media; Čuvalo's (2010) analysis of the 2009 data indicated that, on average, Croatians' level of trust in media, when compared to trust in other institutions, was among the lower ones; whereas a study from 2011 conducted by an audience research agency GfK showed that only 21% of participants said they trusted news media (GfK Croatia, 2012).

In Serbia, general distrust prevails today among the general population. Gallup Balkan Monitor (2010) found that the Serbs together with Macedonians are the most pessimistic people in the Balkans, with a particular trend in diminishing trust in national institutions. Mass media together with national government and judiciary are the least trusted institutions. Only between 35% to 41% of respondents said they trusted these institutions, which represented a significant drop from their 2008 survey. The same year, another polling agency, Strategic Marketing from Belgrade, conducted a national survey of the Serbian population. The results showed that Serbians had quite low levels of trust in media in general. Almost every third respondent thought that information coming from the media was too scarce to enable the proper understanding of problems. In the survey, 73% of respondents thought that there was some form of censorship in the media, with 26% describing content control as prevalent. According to surveyed Serbians, political parties, the government, oligarchs, people involved in organized crime, as well as the international community controlled the information in Serbian media. Although the majority of them (57%) said they trusted television the most, this medium was simultaneously perceived as the one under the biggest control. Respondents rated private television B92 (44%) as the most

trusted medium, followed by the private television Pink (35%) and the public broadcaster RTS (35%) (Strategic Marketing, 2008).

Scholars have derived two major explanations about the origins of distrust in news media in post-Communist countries. Under the first explanation, distrust in news media has been understood as a spill-over from generalized distrust in other people and distrust in all other institutions. Studies that have subscribed to this explanation, found that origins of distrust in all institutions in Eastern European countries can be found in their Communist and socialist legacy that destroyed trustworthy social relationships (e.g., Aasland, Grodeland, & Pleines, 2012; Bjornskov, 2007). Other group of explanations saw distrust in news media among Eastern Europeans as a consequence of bad journalistic practice. This line of reasoning described that news reporting in post-Communist countries has been generally on a very low level, lacking proper training, objectivity, neutrality, and being under severe economic and political pressures (Gross, 2002; IREX, 2012; Johnson, 2013; Spasovska, 2010). The mixture of low journalistic standards, political activism, and representation of self-interest rather than public interests can contribute to a society's diminished trust in journalism as an independent agent (Johnson, 2013). These two major explanations about distrust in news media, coincide with two groups of theories that explain the origins of institutional trust: cultural and performance theories. This dissertation research uses these two groups of theories to examine the factors that influence trust in news media in Serbia.

Cultural and Performance Theories of Trust

Cultural theories differ from performance theories in the extent to which trust is conceived as exogenous or endogenous to social and political institutions (Mishler & Rose, 2001). According to cultural theories, the origins of trust lie outside of the institutions. They

originate from the character of the people, are deeply rooted in cultural norms and beliefs and are learned early in life (e.g., Almond & Verba, 1963; Fukuyama, 1995; Putnam, 1993; Inglehart, 1990). In contrast, performance theories view trust as endogenous to institutions and consider it a consequence of institutional functioning. They treat trust as consequence not a cause of institutional performance (e.g., Coleman, 1990; Dasgupta, 1988; Hetherington, 1998).

      Cultural theories assume that cultural heritage plays a significant role in determining the value systems of societies. Thus, as Inglehart (2006) notes, large differences exist between value systems of the historically Catholic or Protestant societies and the historically Orthodox societies in Europe. According to these theories, trust is a fundamental property engrained in the base of every society and as such is shaped by culture. Defined as "a system of attitudes, values, and knowledge that is widely shared within a society and transmitted from generation to generation" (Inglehart, 1990, p. 18), culture determines the trust norms that individuals carry within them. Virtually from birth, individuals learn first from their parents and immediate family and then from school friends, coworkers and neighbors, to trust or distrust people. They obtain this particular trusting or distrusting characteristic by experiencing how others in their culture treat them and how, in return, others react to their behavior (Mishler & Rose, 2001). This creates a particular "collective programming," which influences the processes the trustors use to decide whether and whom to trust (Triandis, 1972). Indeed, research shows that some countries are inherently more trusting than the others: people in the United States and France, and China and Japan differ on the basis of trust (Olson & Olson, 2000). In Norway, Denmark, and the Netherlands, about 60% of people believe most other people can be trusted, whereas in Brazil, the Philippines, and Turkey about 10% trust others (Rothstein & Uslaner, 2005). Fukuyama (1995) writes that the French have a tendency not to trust their superiors to make honest

evaluations of their work; Almond and Verba (1963) found that Germans and Italians rank relatively low on interpersonal trust; Huff and Kelley (2002) found that American managers show higher levels of trust than Asian managers, while Doney, Cannon and Mullen (1998) propose that various cultural dimensions, such as power distance or individualism and collectivism, may influence general trusting mechanisms of a particular population.

According to cultural theories, generalized sense of (dis)trust is learned early in life, is largely stable through the lifetime, and is not shaped by immediate experiences. Using longitudinal General Social Survey data (1972-1996) about immigrants in the United States of different ethnic backgrounds, Uslaner (2008) has shown that roots of generalized trust go back far in time. He found that people whose grandparents came to the United States from countries that have high levels of trust (Nordic and the British) tend to have higher levels of generalized trust than Italians, Latinos and African Americans. Generalized trust does not refer to faith in specific persons but reflects a more general notion that people, especially those who may be different from oneself, have a shared faith (Uslaner, 2008). Also referred to as social trust, generalized trust assumes trust towards people that we do not know, towards complete strangers. It is a belief that most people can be trusted and is largely based on moralistic values as it does not have foundations in experience (Uslaner, 2002). This kind of trust arises when "a community shares a set of moral values in such a way as to create regular expectations of regular and honest behavior" (Fukuyama, 1995, p. 153). As Rothstein and Stolle (2002) describe, trusting strangers indicates the "potential readiness of citizens to cooperate with each other and the abstract preparedness to engage in civic endeavors with each other" (p. 2). Generalized trust, as trust towards people that we do not have information about, should be distinguished from particularized trust, which arises in face-to-face interactions and can be thought of as reputation

(Bjornskov, 2007). It represents the notion that we should have faith only in the people like ourselves. Whereas generalized trust embraces the idea that most people are part of our moral community, particularized trust restricts that moral community to our own kind. Generalized trusters get the optimistic trust trait from their parents, while particularized trusters rely heavily on their experiences and stereotypes in deciding whom to trust (Uslaner, 2002). The difference between the two is clearly made in Banfield's (1958) famous study of a village in Southern Italy, in which individuals were connected by exceedingly strong bonds within families but not at all between families. The author coined the term "amoral familialism" to describe the phenomenon where no trust exists between people who do not know each other through families or kin groups.

Studies on Eastern European countries have found that explanations for generalized sense of distrust in the region can be found in their Communist and socialist legacy (Aasland, Grodeland, & Pleines, 2012). Using survey data from 1997, 1999-2001, and 2002-2003, Bjornskov (2007) discovered that the Communist past had a clear effect on perceptions of trust, as these countries were about eight percentage points less trusting than otherwise comparable countries. In-depth interviews with elite representatives of East Central Europe, South East Europe, and the Western Balkans, revealed that people in this region distinguished between "us" and "them" between "our people" and "others." Whereas the former usually enjoy their full trust, the latter are generally viewed with skepticism, a clear relic of communist past's atomization of human relations (for discussion see e.g., Petrova, 2007; Wheaton & Kavan, 1992). Besides these studies that directly assessed the influence of Communist past on the perceptions of trust in Eastern Europe, other studies indirectly supported these claims. Measuring the levels of generalized trust in the region, these studies found that people in post-Communist countries

traditionally have lower levels of generalized trust than those in established democracies (e.g,

Hankiss, 1990; Macek & Markova, 2004; Musil, 1992).

  The spill-over effect: Cultural theories further assume that a generalized sense of trust

influences the success of group actions. People who trust each other are more likely to cooperate

with each other in forming and maintaining both formal and informal institutions such as choirs,

bowling leagues, community association, even big companies. In these instances interpersonal

trust spills over into other forms of cooperation (Almond & Verba, 1963; Fukuyama, 1995;

Putnam, 1993). For Almond and Verba (1963) interpersonal trust is a prerequisite for the

formation of secondary associations, which in turn is essential for effective political participation

in any large democracy. In this regard, a generalized sense of trust allows citizen to join their

forces in social and political groups, and it enables them to come together in citizens' initiatives

more easily. This is in the heart of Robert Putnam's (1993) idea of social capital. In his study on

regional governing in Italy he defined social capital as "features of social organization, such as

trust, norms and networks that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated

actions" (p. 167). He posited that a group whose members manifest trustworthiness and place

extensive trust in each other will be able to accomplish more than a group lacking these qualities.

In the presence of trust in others, people have stronger social capital, they are able to form social

networks, participate in voluntary organizations, which leads to higher participation in politics

and ultimately greater political stability (Putnam, 2000). As Putnam (1993) put it, without norms

of reciprocity and networks of civic engagement, "amoral familialism, clientelism, lawlessness,

ineffective government, and economic stagnation, seems likelier than successful democratization

and economic development" (p. 183).

Fukuyama (1995) explained how generalized trust spills over to create a large and measurable economic value. Describing how trust influences successful functioning of firms, the author claimed that the greatest economic efficiency is not achieved by rational self-interested individuals but by a group of individuals, who, because of trustworthy relationships based in a preexisting moral community, are able to work together effectively. He found that in high-trust societies, where people trust one another, the functioning in enterprises is more productive as everybody is operating according to a common set of ethical norms. High-trust societies, as Fukuyama (1995) described, can organize their workplaces on a more flexible and more group-oriented basis, with more responsibility delegated to lower levels of organizations. On the other hand, low-trust societies must impose a series of bureaucratic rules on their workers, who in turn, find their workplace less satisfying if they are not treated like adults who can be trusted to contribute to their community. Rothstein and Stolle (2002) pointed out that high level of generalized trust lubricates harmonious functioning of organizations by eliminating friction and minimizing the need for bureaucratic structures that dictate the behavior of people who do not trust each other. Fukuyama's (1995) analysis showed that high-trust societies, such as Germany, Japan and the United States, with plentiful social capital, were able to develop large, private, hierarchically managed business organization. In contrast, economies of relatively low-trust societies, such as Taiwan, Hong Kong, France and Italy, have been traditionally populated by family businesses as the reluctance to trust non-kin has delayed or prevented the emergence of modern, professionally managed organizations. Although, one might conclude, from these studies' findings, that higher levels of trust have usually been noted in rich countries, it has to be pointed out that, in terms of general sense of trust, "what matters is not how rich a country is, but how equitable is the dispersion of income" (Uslaner, 2002, p. 181). Analyzing cross-national

survey data from 1997, 1999-2001, and 2002-2003, Bjornskov (2007), found that GDP per capita did not have a significant effect on generalized trust, and that poorer countries, such as India or Indonesia, had above-average trust levels. The author found, however, that at a country level, income inequalities, religion, form of government, and a presence of Communist past affected trust in people that one doesn't know.

General trust can also spill over to trust in institutions. Cole (1973) analyzed national survey data from 1964, 1968, and 1970 and found that trust in people had a statistically significant effect on trust in political institutions, when age, race, gender, social class, education, efficacy, and employment status were controlled for. Analyzing the General Social Survey data from 1972 to 1994, Brehm and Rahn (1997) found that the direct effect of generalized trust on confidence in government institutions was positive, and the fourth largest in the model with 14 independent variables. The authors concluded that the confidence in government requires the trust in other people too. In Newton's (2001) analysis of the relationship between social trust and confidence in parliament, 30 out of 42 nations analyzed using World Values Survey data 1991-1995, had positive correlations between the two variables. The author did find that some of the newly democratized nations (e.g., Poland, Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, Chile, and South Africa) were the exception to this trend. He explained that higher confidence in the parliament in these countries might be the expression of faith in the principles of democracy as a form of government, rather than a satisfaction with the parliament as an institution. Some other studies have also found that in new democracies and non-liberal regimes, social and institutional trust were not significantly correlated. Rohrscheider and Schmitt-Beck (2002) discovered that generalized trust had different effects on institutional trust in East and West Germany ten years after the unification. In West Germany, generalized trust was a significant predictor of

institutional trust, whereas in East Germany the coefficient had the right sign but was too small to attain statistical significance. This finding resembles the pattern found by Almond and Verba (1963) in their comparison of old and new democracies in the 1950s. The authors found that in established democracies, like Britain and the United States, generalized trust transferred to the political realm, but not in new democracies, as West Germany was back then. Kim (2005) even found that in South Korea, generalized trust and institutional trust were negatively correlated. In the analysis of data from a national survey, the author found that social trust was the most influential predictor of trust in parliament and political parties, solely explaining eight percent of the variance in political trust[12]. A newer study, however, showed a remarkably strong association between social trust and institutional trust regardless of the level of country's democratization. Analyzing data from 2010 European Social Survey, Boda and Medve-Balint (2012) found a correlation of .96 between the two variables across both Eastern and Western European countries.

Some newer studies seem to point out that generalized sense of trust has spilled over to the area of trust in news media in some countries. Analyzing the association between generalized trust and individuals' perceptions of trust in news media on a sample of Croatian youth, Pjesivac and Imre (2013) found that generalized trust had a positive and statistically significant effect on trust in news media, when the effects of age, gender, media use, religion, and political party affiliation were controlled in the regression model. Cook and Gronke (2001) analyzed General Social Survey's longitudinal data from 1973 – 1998. The authors found that the confidence in the media among American audiences was strongly predicted by a measure of generalized

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[12] It has to be noted, however, that Kim (2005) used a different measure of generalized trust than previously mentioned studies.

confidence in other institutions, but that education, age, income, partisanship, ideology, and strength of partisanship had independent effects upon confidence in the press.

Performance-based theories appeared as a reaction to society-centered and historically-determined approaches. They posit that trust in institutions depends on perceived successful functioning of institutions. In other words, the better the citizens believe the institutions function, the higher their trust in them (Luhiste, 2006). In this regard, trust and distrust are conceived as rational responses of individuals to the performance of institutions (Mishler & Rose, 2001). For Coleman (1990), for example, a potential trustor decides to place trust or revise his estimate of the trustee's trustworthiness based on information from trustee's actions. In Dasgupta's (1998) words, a person's trustworthiness is derived from their behavior which, with time, constitutes their reputation. Trust and confidence are, under these theories, not regarded as the direct products of social conditions that are associated with well-developed social capital. Instead, because all citizens are exposed to institutional actions, trust in institutions is considered to be randomly distributed among various different cultural and social types. Institutions that perform well are likely to elicit the trust of citizens; those that perform badly or ineffectively generate feelings of distrust and low confidence. The general public, the theories assume, recognizes whether government or institutions are performing well or poorly and reacts accordingly (Newton & Norris, 2000).

In the literature, the performance approach is also studied under the notion of institution-center approach (Rothstein & Stolle, 2002) or institutional theories (Mishler & Rose, 2001). The core of the new institutionalism lies in the claim that institutions matter in regards to the influence on human behavior through rules and norms and that their structure is a function of rational choice (Orren & Skowronek, 1995). According to this group of theories, social capital

does not exist independently of institutions, but institutions create, channel and influence the amount and type of social capital. The capacity of citizens to develop cooperative ties and establish social trust is, in this account, influenced by the government institutions and policies (Rothstein & Stolle, 2002). As the contributors to Lijphart and Waisman (1996)'s book showed, institutional design has real consequences for government performance and therefore for public trust in institutions.

Institutional theories emphasize two main aspects of performance that are important for a trustworthy relationship: policy and economic performance. Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub, and Limongi (1996) analyzed the survival and the death of political regimes in 135 countries between 1950 and 1990, and found that in poorer countries, economic performance is crucial for the survival of democracy. The authors showed that poorer democracies had a larger probability of dying in a year after their per capita income fell than if their income raised. In contrast, economic growth was shown to be conducive to the survival of democracy – the faster the economy grew, the more likely it was that the democracy would survive (Przeworski et al., 1996). Political outputs of institutions matter equally, especially in new democracies. Thus, in countries where individual liberties and the rule of law have been systematically repressed, citizens are likely to value institutions that succeed in reducing corruption, removing restrictions on individual liberty, and providing increased freedoms. For example, despite nearly two dozen major corruption scandals that have hit Argentina in the first part of the 1990s, no investigation has ended in trial. Polls showed that more than 80% of Argentinians did not trust their country's judicial system, and that corruption ranked second, behind low salaries, among issues that most concerned them (Diamond, 1999). Mishler and Rose (2001) write that in post-Communist countries both economic and political factors matter in institutional performance. Socialization into a state-

controlled economy has taught citizens to hold government accountable for economic conditions.
In addition, neither freedom nor the rule of law can be taken for granted in these countries,
taking into account that after the collapse of Communism new forms of corruption have appeared
including the massive transfer of wealth through the privatization of state enterprises.

Performance of institutions has been found to influence trust in them. Bouckaert et al.
(2002) identify two lines of research addressing the link: macro-performance theory and micro-
performance theory. The former refers to comparative studies that explain trust variations across
countries and over time as the result of variations in factors such as unemployment, economic
growth, inflation, and the stability of government. Thus, Anderson (1995) explained that the
German government lost public support between 1980 and 1982, as the unemployment rate rose
after the 1980 elections. The author found support for his claims in empirical findings from other
countries, as his longitudinal comparative analysis (1960-1992) demonstrated a negative
correlation between unemployment rate and trust in public institutions in five European
democracies: Great Britain, France, Germany, Denmark, and Netherlands. Newton and Norris
(2000) conducted a cross-national analysis of 1980-84 and 1990-93 World Values Survey data of
17 trilateral democracies. Having found a large proportion of respondents that replied they had
"a great deal" or "quite a lot" confidence in public institutions, such as police, legal system,
armed forces, parliament, and civil service, as well as in non-profit and private institutions, the
authors concluded that these responses were likely to be a good gauge of how well the political
system is actually performing. The micro-performance group of studies denotes the ones that link
trust to changes in the quality or the perception of institutional service delivery. Thus, DeHoog,
Lowery and Lyons's (1990) research conducted in Kentucky showed an important role for local
government efficacy and attachment to local community for citizens' satisfaction levels. Glaser

and Hildreth (1999) demonstrated, on a survey of a Midwestern American city with a population more than 300,000, that citizens classified as rating government performance high and registering a high willingness to pay increased taxes were the most positive about local government responsiveness to honor citizen values. Some scholars claim that it is precisely in the performance of institutions that we should look for the reasons for traditionally low institutional trust in Eastern Europe. Boda and Medve-Balint (2012) found that the levels of social trust, personal happiness, and religiousness demonstrated a statistically significant, positive association with institutional trust across the countries of Eastern and Western Europe, whereas other variables (such as income, age, gender, media consumption, education, type of domicile, membership in a minority group) did not have a significant effect on institutional trust in both regions. The authors concluded that the examinations for lower trust in institutions in Eastern Europe should be looked for elsewhere. The authors suggested looking at the perceived low performance of institutions, as they might be highly politicized and thus less trusted in Eastern than in Western Europe.

In the domain of news media, trust has been associated with the levels of journalistic performance. In order to be considered trustworthy, news media have to practice news reporting in accordance with set standards and ethical norms, which define journalistic professionalism (Deuze, 2008). Most of Western journalism studies equate journalism with professionalism if it meets the following criteria: its reporting is fair, objective, and well-sourced; journalists follow recognized and accepted ethical standards; journalists and editors do not practice self-censorship; journalists cover key events and issues; pay levels for journalists and other media professionals are sufficiently high to discourage corruption and retain qualified personnel within the media organization; entertainment programming does not eclipse news and information programming;

technical facilities and equipment for gathering, producing, and distributing news are modern

and efficient; and quality niche reporting and programming exist (investigative, economic,

business, local, political) (Deuze, 2008; IREX, 2013). In Eastern Europe however, although

journalists are aware of the standards of professionalism (e.g., fairness, objectivity, balance,

impartiality and independence) their daily routines prove to be different. In many countries of the

region, there have been no standards for writing news stories, using sources, and respecting the

rules for the separation of facts from opinions (Gross, 2002; Spasovska, 2010). Gross (2002)

observed that Polish journalists in 1990-1992 lacked the basic skills in objective news reporting;

Romanian journalists throughout the 1990s were more devoted to ideological and political rather

than to professional values, whereas Albanian journalists remained inclined to writing

propaganda. Johnson (2013) quoted Martin Šimčeka, a former newspaper editor, who described

that "Slovak newspapers present a highly superficial and blurred picture of the world and the

country … based on scraps of information without any attempt at analysis" (p. 159).

A great majority of new journalists who entered the profession in the 1990s in Eastern

Europe did not have any formal training. This is in contrast to Western practices where

journalistic education has been considered a keystone in the professionalization process

(Lippman, 2008) and where the majority of journalists working in the newsrooms hold

journalism qualifications (Weaver, 1998, 2007). In Eastern Europe, the Communist era merged

journalism education with political education in order to prepare journalists for their positions as

socio-political workers (Spasovska, 2010), or teachers and spiritual leaders of society (Gross,

2002). Journalism programs were often part of political science colleges as was the case with

former Yugoslavia (Spasovska, 2010). After the fall of Communism, official university programs

continued to exist and were to a certain extent modified but kept the same philosophy according

to which politics, journalism, and literature were mixed in order to create journalists as analysts, critics, and commentators rather than reporters or explainers. This conception has led journalists to consistently mix facts and opinion (Gross, 2002). At the same time, Western governments, non-governmental organizations, and private foundations have attempted to further media development in Eastern Europe by sending an influx of venture capital (Sparks, 2005) and conducting workshops and hands-on training for journalists. Media workers have learned about Western-style media operations and management, especially with regard to the news media (Hoffman, 2002; Peters, 2010). Despite these efforts, the journalistic practice has stayed in poor shape. IREX's Media Sustainability scores indicated that from 2001 to 2012, average scores for these countries, on a scale from 1 to 5, ranged from 1.52 to 1.86. These scores put all the countries in the region under the category of unsustainable mixed systems, which, under IREX's categorizations, indicates that these countries minimally meet objectives of professional reporting (IREX, 2012a).

In addition, journalists in the region are often under strong political and business pressures that damage professional standards. Influenced by a particular party or ideology, journalistic reporting became biased and incomplete (Gross, 2002). Political partisanship infiltrated publicly owned media, while politically favored media would get preferential status in access to information (IREX, 2012a). IREX (2012a) panelists from Albania, Bosnia, Moldova and Georgia said that siding with a particular party or government severely hurt news media's objective reporting. Thus one panelist from Georgia stated, "The largest television stations uncritically convey the government's ideas and projects, while opposition-leaning stations do not do enough to balance their criticism of the government" (pp. 10, 11). In Macedonia, due to heavy

political pressures, journalists have had difficulties following professional standards and often have opted for censoring themselves to protect their jobs (Spasovska, 2010).

Studies that have tested the cultural and performance theories of trust in institutions together have generated ambiguous results. Analyzing survey data from Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, Luhiste (2006) found that both cultural and performance variables influenced citizens' trust in political institutions. In other words, institutional trust depends on how much the individual trusts other people as well as on how well they believe economic and political systems function. On the other hand, in Mishler and Rose's (2001) study, performance reasoning was found to be a better explanation of the origins of political trust than cultural theories. The authors tested the data from ten post-Communist countries in Eastern and Central Europe and the former Soviet Union and found that institutional trust is substantially affected by both political and economic performance while being almost wholly unaffected by interpersonal trust or by socialization influences. Analyzing two waves of the World Value Surveys conducted in the early 1980s (1981-84) and the early 1990s (1990-93) that included 47,000 respondents in 17 trilateral democracies, Newton and Norris (2000) found that social trust is not strongly associated with measures of confidence in institutions at the individual level. Socially trusting people were not necessarily politically trusting, and vice versa. In addition, confidence in public institutions was not at all well explained by the social and economic variables usually associated with attitudes and behavior. Life satisfaction, education, income, gender, age, and membership in voluntary associations explained little of the variance in confidence in parliament, the civil service, or the police. Instead, their research provided substantial support for theories that focus on the performance of governments and political institutions to explain citizens' declining confidence in them.

Research Questions and Hypotheses

This dissertation study starts by asking about the levels of three main variables used to test cultural and performance theories. Previous studies that have measured trust in news media and generalized trust in Eastern Europe have done so either using different measures or different populations (e.g., GfK Croatia, 2012; Luhiste, 2006; Mishler & Rose, 1997; Strategic Marketing, 2008; World Values Survey 2010-2012). Moreover, perceptions of news media performance have not been measured on a developed scale in the region. This dissertation study, therefore, begins by describing the levels of trust in news media in Serbia, as well as the levels of two other main variables in this study: generalized trust and perceptions of news media performance.

RQ1: What are the levels of trust in news media, generalized trust, and perceptions of news media performance in Serbia?

Following the assumptions of cultural and performance theoretical perspectives, this dissertation hypothesizes that both generalized trust and assessments of news media performance play a role in determining trust in news media in Serbia. The cultural perspective, which posits that cultural heritage plays a significant role in determining the value systems of societies, claims that a nation can have a trusting or distrusting disposition depending on its dominant culture. This (dis)trusting disposition is reflected in the nation's generalized sense of trust towards other people. Generalized trust or social trust, according to the cultural view, represents a characteristic, engrained in the culture of certain people that is long-lasting and inheritable (e.g., Almond & Verba, 1963; Inglehart, 1990, 2006; Rothstein & Uslaner, 2005; Uslaner, 2008). The macro-cultural theories hold, that most post-Communist societies of Eastern and Central Europe have a predisposition to distrust, which is inherent in authoritarian political cultures (e.g., Bjornskov, 2007; Keenan, 1986). Previous literature found evidence that generalized trust is positively associated with trust in political and social institutions in liberal democracies (Cole,

1973; Brehm & Rahn, 1997; Newton, 2001), as well as in post-communist countries (Mishler & Rose, 2001; Dowley & Silver, 2002), although some studies found that this correlation might not be significant or can even have a negative association in new democracies (e.g., Almond & Verba, 1963; Kim, 2005; Rohrschneider & Schmitt-Beck, 2002). On the other hand, the performance perspective posits that potential trustor decides to place trust based on the information from other social actor's actions (Coleman, 1990). Conceiving trust or distrust as rational responses of individuals to successful performance of other individuals or institutions, these theories assume that trust in institutions depends on perceived successful functioning of institutions. Institutions that perform well are likely to elicit the trust of citizens, whereas those that perform badly will elicit the feelings of distrust (e.g., Mishler & Rose, 2001; Newton & Norris, 2000; Rothstein & Stolle, 2002). The empirical tests of the performance theoretical perspective have indicated that economic and political performance, as well as service delivery, influence trust in institutions (e.g., Anderson, 1995; Diamond, 1999; Glaser & Hidreth, 1999; Newton & Norris, 2000). Taking into account that these separate tests of cultural and performance factors have found support for both theories, this dissertation research applies these theoretical perspectives to news media, as one of the important institutions of any democratic society. In the area of news media, cultural and performance theories have not been tested directly, but studies have shown that sensationalism in news stories, serving the interests of political regimes and businesses rather than the public (e.g., Liu & Bates; Open Society Institute, 2005), can hurt the believability of news media. This finding could indicate that performance aspects matter in the assessment of trust in news media. Also, the cultural setting of post-Communism, as well as the positive correlation between generalized trust and trust in institutions in general and news media in particular found in post-Communist countries (e.g., Luhiste, 2006;

Pjesivac & Imre, 2013), could indicate that the cultural factor could play a significant role in determining trust in news media in Serbia. Thus this dissertation hypothesizes that both factors, cultural and performance, will have significant influences on trust in news media in Serbia.

H1a: Generalized trust will significantly influence trust in news media in Serbia.

H1b: News media performance will significantly influence trust in news media in Serbia.

In addition to separate tests of cultural and performance factors, several studies have empirically tested together the two competing explanations. These tests generated ambiguous results: while some researchers found that the cultural factor prevailed in people's evaluation of trust in institutions (e.g., Luhiste, 2006), others have noted the bigger influence of the performance factor (e.g., Misher & Rose, 2001; Newton & Norris, 2000). Since it remains unclear which factor, cultural or performance, might play a stronger role in determining the levels of trust in institutions, and taking into account the fact that the two frameworks have not been used together to examine trust in news media separately from trust in other institutions, this dissertation research asks the following question:

RQ2: Which of the two factors, cultural or performance, plays a greater role in determining trust in news media in Serbia?

Literature has identified several additional variables that might potentially moderate the relationship between our independent variables (generalized trust and news media performance) and the criterion variable (trust in news media). In two of Cole's (1973) studies, age appeared significant in the model that tested the relationship between generalized and institutional trust. In Cook and Gronke's (2011) study age had an independent effect on trust in news media. Other studies (e.g., Alesina & la Ferrara, 2000; Gleaser, Laibson, Scheinkman, & Soutter, 2000; Putnam, 2000) have found the so-called cohort effect, where older generations appeared to be

more trusting than their younger fellow citizens. On the other hand, studies on trust in Eastern Europe suggested that older generations in a post-Communist country, raised under the influence of Soviet block culture, could be particularly distrustful (e.g., Sztompka, 2000). In sum, previous literature has pointed out that age might moderate the relationship between generalized trust and trust in news media, but is not unanimous about the directionality of this effect. Thus, this dissertation hypothesizes:

H2: The relationship between generalized trust and trust in news media will be moderated by age of Serbian participants.

Literature has also found that the level of education can amplify or dampen the effects of generalized trust on trust in institutions. Thus, Cole (1973) found, in his studies from 1964 and 1970, that more educated people were more likely to trust institutions; and in Cook and Gronke's (2011) study, education had an independent effect on trust in news media. Knack and Keefer (1997) and Knack and Zach (2002) argued that trust is created in the educational system by making individuals better informed and better at interpreting perceived information. Moreover, as Bjornskov (2007) argues, schooling might have an important socialization effect that may give young people a more positive attitude toward strangers. Although these studies did not exclude the alternative causal effect, as trust might lead to better educational outcome, their results suggest that there might be an interaction effect of generalized trust and level of education in predicting trust in news media. Thus this dissertation hypothesizes that:

H3: The level of education will moderate the relationship between generalized trust and trust in news media.

Luhiste (2006) noted that people's trust in institutions could be affected by their political affiliations. The author explained that, for example, a Social Democrat living under the rule of a

right-wing coalition might display less support for institutions because he or she simply does not support the parties in power. This party preference explanation, as Luhiste (2006) observed, has been empirically confirmed by analyses that suggested that ''winners'' displayed higher trust in political institutions than ''losers''(e.g., Price & Romantan, 2004). Thus, it can be inferred that political affiliation might be another moderator of the relationship between generalized trust and trust in news media.

H4: The relationship between generalized trust and trust in news media will moderated by political party affiliation.[13]

When testing the hypotheses, this dissertation study statistically controlled for several variables in order to limit the possibility of Type I error caused by a spurious association between the dependent and independent variables (Hayes, 2005). The control variables used in this study - trust in government, personal religiosity, interpersonal discussion of news, media use, gender, and income – were all found in the literature to be related to news media or institutional trust (e.g., Bennet, Rhine, Flickinger & Benner, 1999; Chafee, 1982; Golan & Day, 2010; Jones, 2004; Lee, 2010; McLeod, Rush & Friedrcih, 1968; Kiousis, 2001; Tsfalti & Cappella, 2003; Westley & Severin, 1964).[14]

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[13] Originally, Ethnicity was also to be tested as a possible moderator. However, as the great majority (86.9%) of the participants of this study declared themselves as Serbians, enough variability could not be reached. Thus the hypothesis predicting that ethnicity could moderate the relationship between generalized trust and trust in news media was dropped.

[14] A more detailed description of control variables used in this dissertation study can be found in chapter 4.

CHAPTER IV:
METHODLOGY

In order to answer the above research question and test the hypotheses, this dissertation undertook two steps. The first step had the goal of providing a better understanding of the notion of trust in Serbia and of ensuring the proper operationalization of three main concepts used in this study: trust in news media, generalized trust, and news media performance. This was done by in-depth interviews with representatives of the Serbian population. Based on the findings of these interviews, as well as on the review of the relevant literature, a survey questionnaire was then constructed to test the impact of cultural and performance factors on trust in news media. I will first present the method for in-depth interviews, which will be followed by the survey method.

In-depth Interviews

The three main concepts used in this study are: trust in news media, generalized trust, and news media performance. The first two have been defined and operationalized in the Western literature (e.g., Bjornskov, 2007; Kohring & Matthes, 2007), whereas news media performance has not been clearly delineated in the literature. In-depth interviews were meant to establish the conceptual equivalences of trust in news media and generalized trust provided in the Western literature with their meanings among the Serbian population, as well as to discover the dominant aspect/s of news media performance among Serbians. Conceptual equivalence would allow the constructs of trust in news media and generalized trust to be applied on a new population, whereas the conceptualization of news media performance would allow for its proper operationalization.

Conceptual equivalence focuses on the presence (or absence) of meanings that individuals attach to specific concepts: the meaning of the concepts under study should be the same across cultures if the constructs and/or measures are imported from one culture to another (in this case from Western cultures to an Eastern European culture) (Gudykunst, 2002). In other words, the conceptual definitions of the constructs under study need to be constant across cultures (Levine, Park, & Kim, 2007). The constructs in question: trust in news media and generalized trust were reviewed carefully in the literature review section. It was established that generalized trust, or trust in people that we do not know, conceptualized as the belief that most other people try tried to be fair, helpful, and can be trusted, has been used on Eastern European populations (e.g., Bjornskov, 2007; European Social Survey 2002-2012/13; Luhiste, 2006; Mishler & Rose, 2001). However, the notion has been taken from previous, mainly Western research[15] without proper qualitative assessments of its meaning for Eastern Europeans. The peoples in this region, as the literature showed, due to complex historical and socio-political circumstances, might have a different relationship with trust than their Western counterparts (e.g., Mishler & Rose, 1997; Sztompka, 2000)[16]. The construct of trust in news media, defined as trust in journalistic selectivity (Kohring & Matthes, 2007), has not been used so far on Eastern European populations. Trust in news media in these countries has not been theoretically derived but just assessed in big public opinion polls[17] (e.g., Gallup Balkan Monitor, 2010; GfK Croatia, 2012; Mishler & Rose, 1997; Sztompka, 2000). Although these studies have recorded basic attitudes regarding trust in the fourth estate in the region, they have not addressed questions

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[15] The term dates back to Rosenberg's (1957) faith in people construct.

[16] During the oppressive and controlling rule of Communist regimes, when news media's role was to serve the state rather than the people, trusting other people or government institutions has been considered as a "naïve" and "stupid" character flaw, rather than a precondition for social cohesion. News media, being part of the authoritarian state apparatus, represented another source of government lies and manipulations (e.g., Sztompka, 2000).

[17] In these polls trust in news media has been assessed by one question that asked the respondents to indicate their level of trust in news media as one of the institutions.

regarding the relationship of Eastern Europeans towards their media systems or the conceptualization of trust in news media systems.

Finally, the review of the literature showed the lack of adequate conceptualization of news media performance. Studies that have tested the influence of performance on institutional trust have used both macro outputs (political and economic), and micro outputs (service delivery), as indicators of performance for political, social, and non-profit institutions. For example, the country's GDP (Przeworski et al., 1996), unemployment rate (Anderson, 1995), levels of corruption and individual liberties (Diamond, 1999), have been used as macro measures for the success of political institutions, whereas satisfaction with institutional attachment to local communities (DeHoog, Lowery & Lyons, 1990), and honor of citizens' values (Glaser & Hildreth, 1999) have been used as micro outputs for successful institutional performance. However, these outputs could not be considered as adequate indicators of news media performance, as their levels are not dependent on the work of news media. In order to clarify which performance outputs would be more suitable for conceptualizing news media performance in contemporary Serbia, this dissertation explored prevalent aspect/s of news media performance in the discourse of the Serbian population.

In order to discover whether Eastern and Western conceptualizations of trust in news media and trust in other people overlap as well as what the proper conceptualization for news media performance is, in-depth, semi-structured interviews with representatives of the Serbian population were conducted. The method enabled the researcher to access the mental world of individuals and reach for their understandings of trust in other people and in news media, as well as news media performance (McCracken, 1988). These understandings might be numerous, and

the researcher was able to unlock them only by intruding into the authors' world (Lacity &

Janson, 1994).

Participants

Twenty individuals were interviewed. Qualitative research allows for small samples, even

single cases, as its purpose is to reach for the depth rather than the breath of phenomena (Patton,

2002). The participants were selected using a purposeful, snowball method. The first participants

were the individuals known to the researcher and the rest were selected based on their

recommendation. Following Patton's (2002) recommendations, snowball sampling was used

because it allowed for location of information-rich cases from which we could learn a lot about

the issue in question. The exact number of participants was determined when the point of

redundancy was reached in data collection. In other words, when the saturation was attained and

no new information was emerging from interviews, the researchers stopped the recruiting of new

participants (Patton, 2002).

The purpose of the sampling was to identify the individuals that experienced the main

phenomena in question. In other words, the researchers tried to identify individuals who, in

various degrees, followed news media and thus were assumed to attribute levels of trust in them,

and were able to assess their performance[18]. Serbians interviewed in this study ranged from weak

news media followers, who only "watched news when their parents turned on the TV" (P11)[19], to

veracious ones, who turned on the TV even "before they got up" from bed (P14). Television was

the most popular medium among Serbian participants, with all of them watching daily news at

least once a day. The most popular TV station among our interviewees was RTS, the public

broadcaster, followed by B92, a private TV station with national coverage, Studio B, Belgrade's

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[18] It was assumed that, with regards to trust in other people, there was no need to look for information rich cases.
[19] In parenthetical form, as well as before citing a direct quote, a participant will be referred to as P, and will carry
the corresponding number. For example, here P11 represents "Participant 11."

TV station, and TV Prva, another commercial TV station with national coverage[20]. In terms of newspapers, Serbians interviewed in this study read mostly tabloid-like *Blic*, a daily newspaper owned by the Swiss company Ringier, as well as *Politika* and *Večernje Novosti*, both with unclear state ownership in them and a history of serving as state propaganda tools. Serbians interviewed in this study rarely bought newspapers, but rather read "whatever was available at work" (P4; P13) or what other family members (usually older ones) bought (P5). Interviewed Serbians also read online news on their home and work computers, or smartphones. The minority of participants listened to the radio (P16) or followed foreign news media (P5; P7; P10; P12; P15).

The purpose of the sampling in this study was also to represent different age groups, different levels of education, and different gender of participants. The number of participants per age groups was the following: 19-24 (3), 25-35 (8), 36-45 (2), and 46-63 (7). There were 13 women and 7 men in the sample. All of the participants live, work or study in Belgrade, the capital of the country, although some of them were not born in the city. The educational level ranged from high school diploma to various college degrees (Associate, Bachelor's, and Master's).

Instrument

The researcher, a native Serbian speaker, conducted interviews with all participants. The researcher worked from an interview guide that was composed of open-ended questions. The interview guide was meant to be a conversation starter, while the course of the interview was designed largely by the respondents. The interviewer was trained to probe the stream of thought of the respondents in order to capture important constructions necessary for reaching the

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[20] RTS (15 regular followers), B92 (9 regular followers), Studio B (5 regular followers), and Prva TV (1 regular follower)

meanings the participants assigned to the phenomena (Haley, 1996). The questionnaire served as a guarantee that all of the important research terrain was covered (McCracken, 1988).

All questions asked the participants to position themselves with regards to trust in news media, trust in other people, and news media performance. They were meant to explore interviewees' expectations of news media reporting, the relevance and assessment of the four trust in news media factors defined in Kohring & Matthes (2007) (trust in selectivity of topics, selectivity of facts, accuracy of depictions, and journalistic assessment), participants' expectations for trustworthy strangers, and the dominant aspect/s of news media performance. Using open-ended and situational questions, the interview guide did not contain direct inquiries but was designed to indirectly access participants' constructions. The open-ended nature of qualitative interviews allowed for exploratory, unstructured responses which were essential for reaching deep understandings of the phenomena in question (McCracken, 1988). Please see Appendix A for the complete interview guide.

Data Analysis

All interviews were conducted in person, in May 2013, in Belgrade, Serbia, in locations convenient for participants, and lasted from 35 minutes to one hour. The shorter interviews were with younger participants, who had less opinion about the topics. Interviews were taped on a digital audio recorder and transcribed in their entirety by outside, professional transcribers.

The data were analyzed using thematic analysis, a method for identifying, analyzing, and reporting patterns (themes) within data (Braun & Clarke, 2006). In conducting the thematic analysis the researcher followed six steps suggested by Braun and Clarke (2006). First, the researcher familiarized herself with the data (interview transcriptions) through immersion into the depth and the breath of the content. In order to do that, the researcher engaged in repeated readings of the data, actively searching for meanings and patterns. Then the researcher generated

initial codes, a list of ideas of what is in the data and what is interesting about them. This was

done by writing notes on interview transcriptions and using highlights and pens to indicate

potential patterns. In phase three, the researcher sorted different codes into potential themes, and

collated all the relevant coded data extracts within the identified themes. In this regard, a theme

was considered as one if it captured something important about the data in relation to the

research questions, and represented some level of patterned response or meaning within the

dataset. The prevalence of the theme was considered both on the level of the entire dataset (all

the transcribed interviews) and individual data item (individual transcribed interview) (i.e., How

many times did the theme appear across the different interviews? Did it appear anywhere in each

individual interview? Did the theme capture something important about the research questions

within the individual data item and across the dataset?). In step four, the researcher refined the

themes, determining whether there was enough data to support a particular theme, as well as

whether themes had internal homogeneity (whether data within a particular theme cohered

together meaningfully) and external heterogeneity (whether there were clear and identifiable

distinctions between themes). Finally, the researcher defined and named the themes (step 5) and

wrote the analysis (step 6).

Results of in-depth interviews

      Trust in news media. The thematic analysis of the interviews showed that the

interviewees distinguished between four factors of trust in news media. The first factor – trust in

selectivity of topics - was reflected in the theme that suggested that Serbians trusted the news

that were addressing all the people, not only privileged ones. Serbians expected news media to

select topics that are relevant for the larger community and not only for smaller, elitist, societal

groups, such as politicians or media owners (e.g., P17). In this regard, they expected journalists

not only to concentrate on "official visits of politicians" (e.g., P15; P19) in their reporting, but to

investigate the consequences of public officials' actions. In the view of interviewed Serbians, news media objectivity is reflected in the coverage of topics that have wide societal implications. Thus, they thought that newscasts and news pages should cover a "broad range of information" (P8), such as social issues (P6; P9), educational issues (P6; P9; P10), international stories (P14), human interest issues (P15), as well as cultural issues (P8; P9; P11) and avoid celebrity news and exclusive coverage of crime stories (P1).

The second factor – trust in selectivity of facts- was reflected in the theme that suggested that Serbians trusted news reporting that included diverse points of views that are important for the news story. In order to be considered as "fair" (P1), "unbiased," and "neutral" (P19) journalists should, according to interviewed Serbians, represent different opinions in their reports, should find the balance between governmental and independent sources in their reports (P1), and should be able to find "good" sources that are knowledgeable about the topic (P14; P17; P19). The facts reported in the story should be essential for the topic and not trivial, presented only to increase the ratings or circulation (e.g, P1; P6; P12).

The third factor – trust in accuracy of depictions – was reflected in the theme that suggested that in order for Serbians to trust the information presented in news stories, they have to be accurate and precise. The accuracy and precision are, according to interviewed Serbians, achieved by reporting the facts of an event in a short, clear, and concise form (P2; P3; P7; P9; P13; P14). Thus news media should not "twist" or "embellish" news stories or take a particular angle when reporting, but "just report truthfully what happened" (P2). This should be achieved by answering who, what, where and when, as four basic journalistic questions, while avoiding answering why something had happened (P4).

The expectation for refraining from a more elaborate expression of journalistic opinion in news stories led to the fourth factor – trust in journalistic assessment. It was reflected in the theme that suggested that, in Serbians' opinion, journalistic criticism in news stories is welcomed only when it's well- founded. In that context, interviewed Serbians thought that journalists should openly talk about the problems in the society and not "beat around the bushes" (P15), but, at the same time, avoid journalistic commentary when it makes the story longer (P2) and leads the readers/viewers astray from making their own conclusions (P13).

Generalized trust. The thematic analysis of the interviews showed that when talking about trusting other people, Serbians, indeed, mainly talked about others' perceived helpfulness, trustworthiness, and fairness. In this regard, the interviewees did not make a distinction between people they did not know personally and those that they did. Interviewees almost unanimously stated that to trust other people meant to be able to "rely" on them. This was reflected in the expectation that other people would be willing to provide help when needed (P4), or "during hard times" (P12). The expected help ranged from small everyday favors to moral help in dealing with serious life problems and was not to be asked but was expected. For interviewed Serbians, providing aid symbolized the expression of "respect" toward individuals in need and their families. Allocation of trust depended then on "a personal feeling" that others were sincere in their wishes to assist (P4). In contrast, people who did not choose to offer help would be considered as "selfish," the ones that "look only after their own interests" (P5); or the ones "who would sell their own mother for a personal benefit" (P12).

The second theme - trustworthiness of others - was mainly reflected in others' perceived sincerity and openness. These characteristics assumed that trustworthy persons should be very direct in conversations, that they would tell the truth "no matter what" (P6). Serbians interviewed

in this study considered revealing the complete truth in any situation as a quality, and the proof

that such a person is acting in accordance with her beliefs, no matter the consequences. In their

view, people are not expected to embellish the truth even in everyday exchange of pleasantries

and daily rituals. Telling the truth was viewed as "revealing" and "liberating" (P6), as it helps

fight "the false morals" (P6). For interviewed Serbians things could only be "black and white,

not grey" (P9) making ambiguity in relationships not welcomed (P9). If a person is not

completely open, he/she risks being characterized as "sly" (P3), "insidious", and "treacherous"

(P2). Being "smooth-spoken" (P2; P14) or flattery is not seen by a Serbian eye as a value but as a

vice, a "mask" that people put on when they want to hide something (P14).

This seemingly blatant openness did have some limitations. The third theme reflected that

interviewed Serbians expected trustworthy people to be "fair" (P1; P3), to respect others by, for

example, not invading their privacy, not insulting them, or talking behind their backs (P1; P8;

P9; P20). Although recognizing the values of these characteristics, interviewed Serbians thought

that it was almost impossible to find strangers who would be open, trustworthy, fair, and helpful.

Asked to evaluate a hypothetical person who goes openly into relationships with others, who

thinks that people are, in general, ready to help rather than to use others, and who thinks that

people, generally, tend to be fair rather than look only after their own interests, participants of

this study described such a person as "naïve" (P8; P13), "foolish" (P4; P6; P9), "gullible" (P10),

"stupid" (P4), "unrealistic" (P6), somebody who "lives in a fairy tale" (P19), "does not have

enough life experience," and "does not understand the environment she lives in" (P13).

Participants also indicated that this person would, most probably, be taken advantage of in the

Serbian society (P12; P15). They acknowledged, however, that this hypothetical person would be

considered as "normal," "nice," "right" (P2; P9) in another country but would not be able to

survive in Serbia where "conditions of living are different" (P4) and where everybody tries to "cheat on you" (P4). Almost all of the participants of this study completely trusted only family members and closest friends. Most thought that other "people would try to cheat you on every corner" (P2; P4), and that they would do so "intentionally" without "choosing means to achieve their goals" (P4). Some interviewees thought that even people who spontaneously start conversations in public places usually have other intentions, such as stealing from your purse (P10) or committing some sort of fraud (P13; P17), illustrating the prevalent thought of most participants that, "it is in the human nature to use good people" (P6).

News media performance. Serbians interviewed in this study saw the performance of news media in the context of the performance of institutions in general. Interviewees complained that institutions of public interest and their employees were inefficient and incompetent (e.g., P1; P6; P7; P13; P19). They accused employees in city and federal administration of sending people back "five times to bring a different paper" (P13), of making them pay for unnecessary paperwork (P19) and wait unreasonably long (P13), of dragging the work (P7), and of making mistakes without taking responsibility for them (P6). Participant 8 had problems with the judiciary system. Her two ongoing civil litigations have been dragging for 15 and 20 years in courts. Participant 13 complained about public schools. "Every time a judgment is about to be made in my cases," she said, "they change the judge!" "Educational system is falling apart," participant 13 stated. "Students are beating professors and professors only think of how to keep their positions so they can get their salaries. Grades are allocated randomly, A, B, C, D, F, it doesn't matter!"

The inefficiency and incompetency of institutions were attributed to one dominant reason that emerged as the overarching theme in interviews – corruption. Processes of hiring personnel,

managing and leading projects in all institutions, were perceived as corrupted. Participant 12 claimed that "five to six thousand euros" would get one a teaching job in a high school in Serbia; participant 18, that "300 to 3000 euros" would get one a passing grade in state medical school; participant 6, that she paid 200 euros to get the needed documentation from the City Planning Agency; participant 3, that his former employer, one of Belgrade's municipalities, was rigging the tenders for construction works; whereas participant 10 refused to be expert witness in a court case because she realized that the judge was "dragging the case for seven years so the lawyers could get paid more." Participants 9 and 10 described that in health care in Serbia, personal connections are key for getting adequate help and that most of the doctors in public hospitals would refer patients to their private health practices "in order to make more money" (P10). They considered that all the institutions are corrupted "from the bottom to the top" (P4), to the point that, as participant 4 explained, "in order to get anything done, one has to bribe literally everybody from doormen, through cleaning ladies, clerks to people on the top."

In this general atmosphere of perceived institutional dysfunction due to corruption, news media were perceived as being under the influence of economic and political centers of power and thus unable to professionally fulfill their job. Interviewees believed that media owners, news editors but also political parties censor the news content. Participant 17 thought that journalists publish only official information that politicians give them during press conferences and are not allowed to release any unofficial information from other sources. Other participants believed that journalists take money to publish certain stories, and that, pressured by political and economic centers of power, circulate information that they have to (P9). For example, some participants stated that political parties pay news media to create scandals before elections (P3; P7). Participant 7 gave the example of the tabloid *Kurir,* which he considered as a newspaper paid to

defame whoever it intends to (P7). Most interviewees considered corruption in journalism in Serbia so prevalent that it led them to perceive "journalism as a very bad profession" in which "very few journalists write objectively, but are ready to write whatever, if you pay them" (P13). Some of them even thought that all news media are inherently set to lie, that they have been set up as tools of falsification, a "very well designed "system of lies", fraud and manipulation that "Hitler called the most powerful weapon" (P6). Controlled by different sources of power, news media, private or state, domestic or foreign, were seen as pure instruments for the realization of their controllers' interests (e.g., P13; P6; P4).

This perception of widespread corruption in all intuitions led people not to trust the system at all. For example, participant 6 described a couple of cases of unreported domestic abuse, which, according to her, stayed undocumented mainly because the beaten women were afraid that the authorities would not be able to protect them from violent husbands. Others thought that there was a great disparity between the institutions and the citizenry and that omnipresent corruption has made it practically impossible for them to abide by the law on an everyday basis (e.g., P13).

Summary of in-depth interviews: The thematic analysis of 20 in-depth interviews with representatives of the Serbian population showed that the meanings of trust in news media and generalized trust among the Serbians are equivalent with their Western conceptualizations. It was found that interviewed Serbians perceived trust in news media as trust in journalistic selection and that they distinguished between four factors of trust in news media provided in Kohring and Matthes (2007): trust in selectivity of topics, trust in selectivity of facts, trust in accuracy of depictions and trust in journalistic assessment. In other words, interviewed Serbians expected trustworthy news reporting to select topics that are relevant for citizenry, to focus on important

facts, to be unbiased and include different points of view, to be accurate and precise in its depictions of events, and to have well-founded assessments. As far as the concept of generalized trust is concerned, in order for Serbians interviewed in this study to trust strangers, they have to be sincerely helpful, fair, open, and direct. This conceptualization overlaps with the Western notion of generalized trust or trust in people that we don't know that dates back to Rosenberg's (1957) faith in people concept and is widely used in public opinion surveying (e.g., European Social Survey, 2002-2012/13; World Values Survey 1990-2010/12). Finally, in-depth interviews discovered that the most problematic aspect of news media performance among the interviewees was perceived corruption. They thought that widespread corruption in Serbian news media, as well as in other institutions, prevent them from professionally fulfilling their jobs. This finding corresponds with the literature showing that corruption, an area of vulnerability for transitional countries, is one of the most serious problems in Serbia. A United Nation's report (UNODC, 2011) showed that Serbian citizens ranked it as one of the most serious problems facing their country and that 13.7% of Serbian citizens, age 18 to 64 had either direct of indirect exposure to a bribery experience with a public official. As the in-depth interviews found conceptual equivalences between Western and Serbian notions of trust in news media and generalized trust, and discovered that the most troubling aspect of news media performance is perceived corruption, this dissertation research proceeded with using these three constructs in a survey of the general population of Serbians in order to test the impact of cultural and performance factors on trust in news media in Serbia.

Survey

In order to test the impact of cultural and performance factors on trust in news media in Serbia and the effects of moderator variables, a survey on a stratified random sample of the

Serbian population was conducted. Survey research is ideal for asking about opinions and attitudes (Nardi, 2006); it enables us to answer how people perceive and evaluate the issues in questions, and allows us to assess not only what they think about them, but also how they differ in their perceptions (Hocking, Stacks, & McDermott, 2003). Also, providing an "efficient and accurate" means of assessing information about a targeted population (Zikmund & Babin, 2007, p. 128), surveys allow us to construct a sample of people that represent those within the population we seek to describe (Hocking, Stacks, & McDermott, 2003).

Participants and Sampling

Only men and women (*N*=544), who were at least 18 years of age and were living in Serbia, were recruited for participation in the survey using a stratified random sampling technique. This method allowed representativeness of the sample, as the number and type of sampling was sufficient, with an acceptable 5 percent error, to generalize the findings to the entire population (Hocking, Stacks, & McDermott, 2003). Also 544 participants were enough to satisfy the minimum of 5 observations for each independent variable in order for results to be generalizable (Hair, Black, Babin, & Anderson, 2010). The participants were recruited by IPSOS Strategic Marketing agency, an international company with over 15 years of experience, assisting approximately 1,000 researchers a year from the academic, governmental, and private sectors around the world with their research studies.

The participants for this study were recruited from the general population in Serbia, excluding the Kosovo region, using the stratified random sampling method. Initial strata were created by using Census 2011 population data for Serbia and considering two variables: six geo-economical regions (Vojvodina – Northern Serbia, Belgrade-the capital, West Serbia, Central Serbia, East Serbia, and South Serbia) and two types of settlements (urban and rural). The distribution of respondents to initial strata was based on proportional criterion – percentage of

respondents per stratum was proportional to its size. Thus, in this research, Vojvodina was

represented by 27.4% of total participants; Belgrade by 25.2%; West Serbia by 11%; Central

Serbia by 14.2%; East Serbia by 8.8%; and South Serbia by 13.4% of total participants.

Participants in urban areas represented 60.7% of total participants and in rural areas the

remaining 39.3%. Population strata proportions from Census 2011 were matched in order to get

the sample structure similar to population structure. The sampling frame for the study was the

total number of polling station territories in Serbia (N=8,246), where one sampling point

represented one polling station territory. Households from where the participants were surveyed

were sampled using a random route technique, starting from the given addresses and using

"every fourth house principle."[21] Within each household, the person to be surveyed was chosen

using the Kish Grid, the method that uses a pre-assigned table of random numbers.

The final sample was composed of slightly more women (53.9%) than men (46.1%). The

majority of participants (53.5%) had a high school education. Others had a Bachelor's degree

(12.1%), Associate Degree (9%), up to 8-grade education (12.8%), a vocational degree (6.6%),

Master's degree (1.1%), or Doctorate (0.6%), whereas 23 participants (4.2%) did not finish their

elementary school education. The biggest percentage of those who wanted to state their income

made 353 U.S. dollars or less per month per household (24.2%); 21.5% made between $353 and

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[21] Survey Interviews at the starting point address were not performed. First the data collector had to choose the so-called START. From the starting point, data collectors moved in the direction of increasing house numbers and took the right side of the street. They skipped three entrances (house numbers) and in the FOURTH house in a row from the starting point, they looked for the first household where they could interview one person – that was the Start. From the Start, moving on the right side of the street and in the direction of increasing ordinal numbers, they chose every FOURTH house number – that is, they entered the FOURTH ADDRESS IN A ROW, then the EIGHT ADDRESS IN a ROW etc. At every cross-road, they turned right and kept choosing every FOURTH house number. If it was an apartment building with up to four floors, the interviewers chose up to two apartments in which they tried to do interviews. If it was an apartment building with five or more floors, they were allowed to choose three apartments. In case of villages the Step was reduced to two.

$660; 13.2% between $660 and $1179; 3.7% made more than $1179 per month per household, whereas 0.7% did not have any income in the last month. The average age of the sample was 47.98 years (*SD* = 17.39), with a range from 18 to 89. The distribution of the sample per age group was the following: 18-29 (16.5%); 30-39 (20.8%); 40-49 (16.5%); 50-64 (25.9%); 65+ (20.2%).

Most of the participants (47.4%) didn't identify with any political party; 40.5% identified themselves with center-right and nationalistic parties[22]; and 10% identified with center-left parties[23]. The remaining 2.1% of participants either sided with other parties or did not want to answer the question. The great majority of participants were of Eastern Orthodox religion (84.9%). The rest were Catholics (6.1%) and Muslims (1.5%), belonged to other religions (1.3%), were not religiously committed (4.4%), or did not want to indicate their religious affiliation (1.8%). In terms of ethnicity, the great majority of participants in this study declared themselves as Serbians (86.9%). The others were Hungarians (4.2%), Bosnians (1.1%), Croats (0.9%), and Bulgarians (0.7%); 3.9% sided themselves with other ethnics groups and 2.2% refused to state their ethnicity. Finally, most Serbians interviewed in this study used television as their main source of information (67.1%). Television was followed by the Internet (16.7%), newspapers (11.2%), and radio (3.7%), whereas 1.3% of participants did not answer this question.

Procedure

Data were collected by face-to-face surveying of participants. Ninety-three professional and well-trained IPSOS Strategic Marketing data collectors were deployed to survey the sampled

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[22] 30% identified themselves with the ruling Serbian Progressive Party; 7.4% with the ruling Socialist Party of Serbia, party of the ousted ruler Slobodan Milošević; 1.8% with the Democratic Party of Serbia; 0.7% with the Serbian Radical Party; and 0.6% with Dveri.

[23] 7.7% identified themselves with the Democratic Party; 0.9% with the Liberal Democratic Party; 0.4% with the League of Social-Democrats of Vojvodina; 0.6% with the United Regions of Serbia; 0.4% with the Social-Democratic Party of Serbia; and 0.2% with the Hungarian minority party

population in the six geo-economic regions of Serbia. The participants were reached at their homes and asked to take the survey. The survey was administered in an electronic form, on tablets, portable computer devices. After the participants acknowledged their consent to participate in the study, they were asked to answer the survey questionnaire. Data collectors read each question to participants and entered their answers. That way, it was made possible for the illiterate and semi-literate to answer the questionnaire. The participants first answered questions about trust in news media, then about generalized trust, and then questions about news media performance. Blocks that measured two independent variables (generalized trust and news media performance) were separated by a block of questions about participants' socialization activities.[24] Participants then completed measures that assessed potential moderator and control variables (age, education level, political party affiliation, and ethnicity, gender, income, trust in government, personal religiosity, interpersonal discussion of news, and media use). The complete list of survey questions is provided in Appendix B.

The questionnaire was developed first in English and then translated into Serbian. In order to establish the linguistic equivalence, the questionnaire was back-translated following the suggestions of Gudykunst (2002). Two bilinguals fluent in both Serbian and English, and holding degrees in philology and translation, assisted. One of them translated the English questionnaire to Serbian and the other back-translated it. The variations in original wording were reconciled. The questionnaire was then sent to IPSOS Strategic Marketing Agency, where two researchers, with extensive background in opinion polling in Serbia, looked at all the questions.

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[24] News media performance was measured again at the end of the survey by a separate measure. This will be explained in more detail in the "Measures" section. Also note that socialization activities as well as some additional variables measured on this questionnaire (trust in other institutions, life satisfaction, personal happiness, satisfaction with democracy, cosmopolitanism, main source of information, place of birth of participants and their parents, citizenship, and religious affiliation) were not used in this study.

After IPSOS's researchers made smaller wording changes, the questions were then entered into IPSOS's software for electronic data collection and were ready for administration. The data were collected between October 12 and October 23, 2013.

Measures

      Dependent variable: *Trust in News Media* was measured by Kohring and Matthes (2007) scale. The scale consisted of 16 items that measured four latent factors: trust in "selectivity of topics," "selectivity of facts," "accuracy of depictions," and "journalistic assessment." Responses were given on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (Strongly Disagree) to 7 (Strongly Agree). Participants were asked to think about news media in Serbia in general when rating their level of agreement with statements about news media presentation of the topic of economic crisis.[25] The scale was successfully validated in Germany (Kohring & Matthes, 2007), United States, and China (Radovic & Rui, 2012). Before using it on a Serbian sample for the purposes of this dissertation, the scale was pretested on a sample from another Eastern European nation - Croatia. The fit was satisfactory: CFA: $\chi^2/df = 4.378$; CFI=0.928; GFI= 0.905; RMSEA=0.083, pclose=.000. Testing the scale on a Serbian sample for this dissertation, the fit of the trust in news media scale was found to be satisfactory: CFA: $\chi^2/df = 4.665$; CFI=0.954; GFI= 0.905; RMSEA=0.082, pclose=.000. In addition, factor loadings, the explained variance of first and second order factors, were high in both cases (for first order factors, factor loadings ranged from $\lambda=.749$ to $\lambda=.906$; for second order factors, factor loadings ranged from $\lambda=.905$ to $\lambda=.948$). Finally, the Cronbach's Alpha was highly satisfactory for the individual factors: selectivity of topics: .901; selectivity of facts: .901; accuracy of depictions: .916; and journalistic assessment: .903.

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[25] In Kohring and Matthes (2007) the topic used was "unemployment." The researcher decided to avoid unemployment in this dissertation as it is considered to be the most serious problem affecting Serbia today (UNODC, 2011) and as such could bias participants' answers.

Independent variables: *Generalized Trust* was measured by three items from the European Social Survey (2002-2012/13). The items asked the respondents to indicate whether, generally, other people can be trusted or one can't be too careful in dealing with people; whether most people would take advantage of you or would try to be fair, whether most of the time people would try to be helpful or are mostly looking out for themselves. The responses were offered on an 7-point scale ranging from 1 to 7. The items used in this scale date back to Rosenberg's (1957) faith in people scale that originally consisted of five items assessing the degree of confidence in trustworthiness, honesty, goodness, generosity, and brotherliness of people in general. These items were slightly reworded and summed into three items by the Survey Research Center (1969) – the items used in this research. Since then, the scale has been widely used to tap into the concept of generalized trust, either in its one-item format (e.g., World Values Survey, 1990-1995/6; 2005/6-2010/12), two-item format (General Social Survey, 1972-; World Values Survey, 1999-2002) or three-item format (European Social Survey, 2002-2012/13). Rosenberg's (1957) original scale used a Guttman-type scale and the Survey Research Center's (1969) scale also used a forced-choice response format. In this dissertation, the European Social Survey's (2002-2012/13) format was used as it allowed for the variable to be tested as continuous rather than dichotomous. Research has shown that the three items in the European Social Survey (ESS) are reliable and cross-culturally valid. Testing the scale in two waves of ESS, 2002 and 2004, Reeskens and Hooghe (2008) showed that the items demonstrate metric equivalence in 24 countries, indicating that the factor loadings of the generalized trust concept were equal across European countries (Reeskens & Hooghe, 2008). Sturigs and Smith (2010), however, found some problems with the two-item format of the scale. The authors found that, counter to the widespread assumption that these questions measure trust towards people in

general, a substantial number of respondents reported having thought about people who are known to them personally (Sturigs & Smith, 2010). To ensure more coherent interpretation and following the suggestions of Reeskens and Hooghe (2008) who suggested applying adequate control methods when using the generalized trust scale, for this dissertation, an additional explanation was added in the question instructions. Specifically, the instructions asked the participants to think about the people they DO NOT know when answering generalized trust questions. The 3 items of the Generalized Trust scale were subjected to principal components analysis (PCA) using SPSS 20. Prior to performing PCA, the suitability of data for factor analysis was assessed. Inspection of the correlation matrix revealed that all the coefficients were of .547 and above. The Kaiser-Meyer-Oklin value was .710, exceeding the recommended value of .6 (Kaiser 1970, 1974); Bartelett's Test of Sphericity (Bartlett, 1954) reached statistical significance, supporting the factorability of the correlation matrix. Principal components analysis with Varimax rotation revealed the presence of one component with eigenvalues exceeding 1, explaining 73.039 % of the variance. The inspection of the component matrices showed that three items loaded quite strongly on one factor (from λ=.851, λ=.877; λ=.835). Finally, the Cronbach's Alpha was highly satisfactory for the generalized trust scale: α= .815.

News Media Performance: Based on the results of in-depth interviews, which suggested that corruption might be in the core of the news media performance concept, this dissertation research measured the news media performance by two proxy corruption variables.

The first variable was *Trust in Corrupt Journalists*, for which a scale was developed. The goal was to separate the performance trust factor from a trait-oriented cultural trust factor (generalized trust). Thus the researcher concentrated on measuring the assessment of corruptive behavior of journalists. In order to do that, vignette-based questions were developed. Vignettes

have been defined as the "use of stories which represent hypothetical situations to elicit preferences, judgments, or anticipated behavior" (Wason, Polonsky, & Hyman, 2002).

Vignette-based surveys have been used for more than 30 years in behavioral sciences in such fields as marketing, environmental economics, transportation, ethics, and professional decision making to determine the forces that influence multidimensional judgments, especially when assessing the quality of professional practices (McFadden et al., 2005; Veloski, Tai, Evans & Bash, 2005). The premise in the use of this method is that individuals often make choices through the consideration of the characteristics of specific situations as they occur rather than through a systematic application of principles. They then make judgments about vignettes as a basis for inferring the principles that drive individual choices (McFadden et al., 2005). This might particularly be the case with the assessment of corruptive behavior, as the term carries negative connotation and a direct question might elicit respondents' exaggerated negative reaction. Describing hypothetical situations while humanizing their actors, might, to some extent, correct for the socially desirable answers. The analysis of in-depth interviews with Serbians showed that the apriori negative perception of institutional corruption (e.g., P10 – "They are all a bunch of liars and cheaters!") fades to some extent when they are presented with real-life situational events of corruptive processes. For example, for participant 5 it was acceptable to give presents to medical doctors, because "they have very low salaries and very responsible jobs." Participant 6 didn't mind giving or receiving gifts under the condition "that the job gets done", whereas participant 7 even found corruption in politics justifiable if it was used for greater good (e.g., improving the lives of citizenry). These justifications spilled over to corruptive news media behaviors, with participants acknowledging that the work of journalists

"is not easy" or is "very hard" (P6; P8; P10), that journalists are subject to various pressures and have even been killed if they reported objectively (P10).

Corruption was defined as the "behavior which deviates from the normal duties of a public role because of private-regarding (personal, close family, private clique) pecuniary or status gains; or violates rules against the exercise of certain types of private-regarding interest" (Nye, 2009, p. 284). As Nye (2009) describes, corruption includes such behaviors as bribery (use of a reward to pervert the judgment of a person in a position of trust); nepotism (bestowal of patronage by reason of ascriptive relationship rather than merit), and misappropriation (illegal appropriation of public resources for private-regarding uses).

Based on these definitions, the researcher developed a scale that tapped into the dimensions of nepotism and bribery (it was assessed that misappropriation was more applicable to officials who have access to public funds than to journalists). Six vignette-based situations were developed: two of them described nepotism situations and the rest described bribery situations. All the vignettes described hypothetical Serbian journalists who were involved in corruptive practices. The nepotism dimension was represented in two vignettes that described situations in which a journalist helped a cousin, a construction worker, get a job as a journalist, and another one in which a journalist focused a positive news story on his nephew rather than on somebody else who was more deserving of that news spot. The bribery dimension was represented in four vignettes that described situations in which journalists took bribes to not publish incriminating stories about politicians. Each bribery question represented a different level of story seriousness (starting from the most benign one – covering a love affair, to the most serious one – concealing politician's involvement in covering the real unemployment rates), and was matched with a different amount of bribe given to a hypothetical journalist (starting from the

lowest one for covering the love affair - return of a favor to a monetary one of 1,000 Euros – for covering the real unemployment numbers). The bribery stories were additionally based on a United Nations' report about the corruption in contemporary Serbia that indicated the most serious problems that country has been facing and the average amounts citizens pay in bribes (UNODC, 2011).[26]

After the face validity of vignettes was assessed by two other senior researchers, vignettes were pretested on a sample of the Serbian population (N=32). The pretest vignettes were entered into Qualtrics, an online survey software, and the URL was distributed to a voluntary sample of Serbian citizens (age range 27-55, M=36.33, SD=8.11; 67% female, 33% male). The respondents were asked to indicate on a scale from 1 (not at all likely) to 7 (very likely) how likely they thought that a particular hypothetical journalist would work in their best interest when fulfilling his journalistic duty. The results showed that surveyed Serbians made a difference between different levels of corruption: nepotism (M=2.94, SD=1.50)[27], bribery 1 (M=2.26, SD=1.44), bribery 2 (M=2.03, SD=1.59), bribery 3 (M=1.53, SD=1.07), and bribery 4 (M=1.50, SD=1.07). After the pretest, the vignettes were used in the survey of the general population of Serbia. In the analysis, the six vignettes were combined to form a scale of trust in

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[26] A United Nations' report (UNODC, 2011) found that Serbians considered Serbia's large unemployment rate to be the most serious problem in the country, while crime and security were in the middle of the scale. For the purposes of this dissertation, the researcher used the example of covering up the real unemployment rate to illustrate the highest level of problem seriousness, and the example of covering up a crime to illustrate the second most serious problem. The remaining two bribery vignettes illustrated the covering up of less serious problems, such as politician's involvement in political scuffles and his involvement in a love affair. These issues were taken from everyday news in Serbia and were assessed by the researcher to be of a lesser importance than unemployment and crime. The amounts of bribery cited in vignettes were also based on the UNODC (2011) report. As this report stated that the average cash bribe paid in Serbia was 165 Euros, the researcher took the round figure of 150 Euros to represent the bribe for covering up the mid-level serious problem of involvement in criminal enterprise, and the amount of 1,000 Euros to represent the covering up of the more serious issue - the unemployment rate. The report also indicated that giving drinks and food prizes and exchanging services were also present in the Serbian bribing culture, but were usually of a comparatively smaller value that the average cash bribe. Thus the example of bribes in the forms of "a bottle of Scotch and a packet of cigarettes" and "returning of the favor" were used in two vignettes to match the covering up of less serious problems such as politician's involvement in political scuffles and his involvement in a love affair.

[27] Only one nepotism question was included in the pretest.

corrupt journalists. The scale was reliable with satisfactory Cronbach's Alpha: α= .873. Confirmatory factor analysis of the two-factor news media performance concept (nepotism and bribery) showed that the model fit the data well: CFA: χ^2/df = 3.470; CFI=0.992; GFI= 0.985; RMSEA=0.067, pclose=.140. In addition, the fit of the measurement model was assessed by conducting a confirmatory factor analysis on the model that included scales for trust in news media, generalized trust, and trust in corrupted journalists. The confirmatory factor analysis showed that the fit of the measurement model was satisfactory: CFA: χ^2/df = 3.087; CFI=0.949; GFI= 0.890; RMSEA=0.062, pclose=.000.

Besides trust in corrupt journalists, this dissertation also included the measure of *Perceived News Media Corruption*. This single item asked respondents to state how widespread they thought corruption in news media was in Serbia. The responses were given on a scale from 1(not widespread at all) to 7(extremely widespread). The Perceived News Media Corruption question was put at the end of the survey (before the demographics), separated from the items assessing journalistic corruption. This item was successfully used in research that assessed perceived corruption in the public sector in 33 countries around the world – including Eastern European countries (e.g., Melgar, Rossi, & Smith, 2010). This measure is different than trust in corrupted journalists as it taps into the perception of institutional (news media) corruption rather than situational journalistic corruption. As news media performance has not been measured before using corruption proxies, and in-depth interviews suggested there might be a difference in assessment of corruption depending on how you ask the question, this dissertation wanted to measure the concept by using two measures and explore whether there would be a difference in the prediction of trust in news media.

Moderating variables: *Age* was measured by asking the participants to state their exact age; *Education* by asking the participants to state their highest level of education attained; and *Political Party Affiliation* by asking the participants to state with which political party they identify with or supported.

Control variables: *Trust in Government* was measured by a 7-point scale, which indicated the different extent (not at all 1 to very much 7) of trust in the government in Belgrade (Jones, 2004). This variable was chosen following several studies, which found that attitudes towards the media are strongly related to political trust (Bennet, Rhine, Flickinger, & Bennet, 1999; Jones, 2004; Lee, 2010). *Personal Religiosity* was measured by 4 items asking participants how much guidance religion provided in their day-to-day lives, how often they attended religious services, how important of a role religion played in their lives, and how often they prayed (Golan & Day, 2010). Frequency was measured on a scale from 0 (never) to 7 (every week) and the personal importance questions was measured on a scale from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much). Discussing the problematic interaction between religious audiences and the mainstream media, Golan and Day (2010), found that religiosity was not directly related to media credibility when it came to newspapers and magazines, but a significant relationship existed between personal religiosity and perceived credibility of online news. Interpersonal *Discussion of News* was measured on the 8-point scale, which indicated how many days per week a participant discussed news with friends/family. Studies have shown that interpersonal communication patterns may be relevant for differences in perceptions of media credibility (e.g., Chafee, 1982; McLeod, Rush & Friedercih, 1968), while others have found the negative correlation between interpersonal discussion of news and the credibility of some media (e.g., Kiousis, 2001). *Media Use* was measured by asking respondents to indicate how many days per week they read newspapers,

listen to the radio, watch television, or use the Internet. These variables were included following

Tsfalti and Cappella's (2003) findings that media skepticism is negatively associated with

mainstream news exposure but positively associated with nonmainstream news exposure.

Gender and *Income* were measured by standard questions asking the respondents to specify their

biological sex and monthly income per household. Westley and Severin (1964) found that gender

played a significant role in influencing people's perceptions of news credibility.

CHAPTER V:
RESULTS

The first research question asked about the levels of trust in news media, generalized

trust, and perceptions of news media performance in Serbia. The results obtained on Kohring and

Matthes's (2007) 7-point scale indicate that the average level of trust in news media among

Serbians is a little bit above the middle of the scale (M=3.73; SD=1.26). To facilitate the

analysis, this dissertation study followed Mishler and Rose's (1997) collapse of trust scale into

three categories. Respondents were said to trust other people or news media if they gave them a

positive score of 6 or 7 on the scale; they actively distrusted other people or news media if they

scored it 1 or 2; and they were described as skeptical if they gave other people and news media a

score of 3, 4, or 5. The cutting points for these categories were based on analyses indicating that

individuals scoring 3 or 5 on trust are more similar on a variety of political and social attributes

to those scoring 4 on the scale than to those with scores at either extreme (Mishler & Rose,

1997). Following this categorization, the results of this study show that, on average, Serbians did

not express either very low or very high trust in news media but were rather skeptical about them

(M=3.73; SD=1.26). This indicates that, the average answer was between "slightly disagree" or

"neither agree nor disagree" when it came to the questions about journalistic selection of topics,

selection of facts, accuracy of depiction, and fairness of assessment. When analyzing the latent

factors of the second-order multidimensional construct of trust in news media separately, it was

found that the skepticism category was dominant in all four factors: selectivity of topics

(M=3.85, SD=1.38), selectivity of facts (M=3.75, SD=1.35), accuracy of depiction (M=3.64,

SD=1.37), and journalistic assessment (M=3.71, SD=1.36).

In terms of generalized trust, the results show that Serbians' average score was below the middle of the 7-point scale (*M*=2.90; *SD*=1.38). This indicates that, on average, Serbians are somewhere between active distrust and skepticism when it comes to trusting people that they don't know personally. Analysis of separate items showed that the lowest score (*M*=2.57; *SD*=1.59) was for the item that asked the participants to indicate whether they thought that most people look out for themselves or would rather try to be helpful (1 = most people look out for themselves; 7 = most people try to be helpful). The results show that, on average, Serbians thought that people generally try to look out for themselves rather than to be helpful. The analysis of another item showed that Serbians, on average, thought that one cannot be too careful when dealing with people that he or she doesn't know. On a scale of 1 to 7, where 1 represented that one cannot be too careful when dealing with people and 7 that most people can be trusted, Serbians' average score was 3.05 (*SD*=1.58). The analysis of the final item showed that Serbians, on average, thought that most strangers would take advantage of them. On a scale of 1 to 7, where 1 represented that most people would try to take advantage of others if they had a chance and 7 that most people would try to be fair, Serbians scored 3.08 (*SD*=1.67).

Finally, in terms of perceptions of news media performance, overall results showed that Serbians assess corruption in news media negatively. The first measure of news media performance, labeled as "trust in corrupt journalists" and based on six vignettes which described hypothetical corrupted practices of individual Serbian journalists, measured how respondents thought that journalists who engaged in corrupt practices were likely to work in the people's best interest. The average score on this measure was 1.65 (*SD*=0.90). This indicates that Serbians generally do not have confidence in corrupt journalists, thinking that they are not likely to represent the interests of the average person. The second measure of news media performance

was the single-item perceived news media corruption measure. The results showed that Serbians

believe that corruption in news media is highly widespread in their country (M=5.26; SD=1.41).

The average levels of trust in news media, generalized trust, and news media performance are

shown in Table 1[28].

In the analysis of the following hypotheses and research question, the regression models

were first tested using the news media performance measure of trust in corrupt journalists and

then all the models were retested using the measure of perceived news media corruption. This

was done to explore how the two measures compare since the measure of corrupt journalists is

not an established one.

The first hypothesis argued that both generalized trust (H1a) and news media

performance (H1b) would significantly relate to individuals' trust in news media. In order to test

this hypothesis a hierarchical multiple regression analysis was conducted using trust in corrupt

journalists as a proxy for news media performance. This technique allowed for prediction of the

effects of the independent variables while controlling for possible effects of age, gender,

education, political party affiliation, income, trust in government, personal religiosity,

interpersonal discussion of news, and media use. Prior to conducting a hierarchical multiple

regression analysis, the relevant assumptions of this statistical analysis were tested. An

examination of correlations revealed that the independent variables, generalized trust and trust in

corrupted journalists, were not highly correlated (r=.18) (correlation matrix of independent and

dependent variables is presented in Table 10). In addition, collinearity statistics (Tolerance and

VIF) were all within the accepted limits (tolerance values for independent variables were .859

and .942, which is well above the threshold of .10 and VIF values of 1.164 and 1.062, which is

well below the cut-off of 10) . Thus it can be concluded that assumptions of multicollinearlity

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[28] All the tables are located in Appendix C.

have been met (Hair et al., 2010). Residual and scatter plots indicated assumptions of normality, linearity and homoscedasticity were all satisfied.

A two-stage hierarchical multiple regression was then conducted with trust in news media as the dependent variable. At stage one, control variables (age, gender, education, political party affiliation, income, trust in government, personal religiosity, interpersonal discussion of news, and media use) were entered. Political party affiliation was dichotomized and coded as 1: those supporting two main political parties in power (Serbian progressive Party and Socialist Party of Serbia) and 0: those supporting all other parties. Gender was coded as 1: Male 0: Female. Other variables were treated as continuous. Control variabes explained 14.8% of the variance in trust in news media (Table 2). After the entry of generalized trust and trust in corrupt journalists scales, the total variance explained by the model as a whole was 19.2%, F (11, 355)=7.68, $p<.001$. The two independent variables explained an additional 4.5% of the variance in trust in news media, R squared change=.045, F change (2,355)=9.84, $p<.001$. In the final model, both generalized trust ($b=.12$, $p=.021$) and trust in corrupted journalists ($b=.16$, $p=.001$) were statistically significant. This indicates that both independent variables have a significant positive influence on trust in news media. The more trusting an individual is towards strangers, the more he or she is likely to trust news media in Serbia; the more an individual is likely to believe that journalists in Serbia act in people's best interest, even if they are corrupt, the more he or she is likely to trust news media. Thus the first hypothesis was supported. One additional control variable was statistically significant in the model: trust in government ($b=.32$, $p<.001$). This indicates that despite the fact that trust in government made a unique statistically significant contribution to the model, two independent variables (generalized trust and trust in corrupted journalists) still were significant predictors of trust in news media. However, the effect sizes were small. Analysis of part

correlations, indicate that, controlling for all other variables, generalized trust explained 1.23% of unique variance in predicting trust in news media, whereas trust in corrupt journalists explained 2.50% of unique variance in predicting Trust in News Media.

The second research question asked which of the two independent variables, generalized trust or news media performance, played a greater role in determining trust in news media. The results of the hierarchical regression showed that news media performance, when measured as trust in corrupt journalists, had a higher beta value (*b*=.16, *p*=.001) than generalized trust (*b*=.12, *p*=.021). In addition, the effect size for trust in corrupt journalists (squared part correlation =0.025) was larger than the effect size for Generalized Trust (squared part correlation =0.012), indicating that trust in corrupt journalists plays a slightly bigger role in predicting trust in news media than generalized trust.

The second hypothesis argued that the relationship between generalized trust and trust in news media would be moderated by the age of participants of this study. In order to test this hypothesis, an interaction between age and generalized trust was entered in the third block of the hierarchical multiple regression. This hypothesis was not supported. The results show that adding the interaction between age and generalized trust did not bring any change in the model (R squared change=.000, *F* change (1,354)=0.006, *p*=.937). In the final model, interaction between age and generalized trust was not significant (*b*=.014, *p*=.937). The summary of the third step of the hierarchical regression with age as moderating variable is presented in Table 3.

The third hypothesis argued that education would moderate the relationship between generalized trust and trust in news media. In order to test this hypothesis, an interaction between level of education and generalized trust was entered in the third block of the hierarchical multiple regression. This hypothesis was not supported either. The results show that the interaction

between education and generalized trust did not bring significant change in the model (R squared change=.002, F change (1,354)=1.068, p=.302). In the final model, interaction between age and generalized trust was not significant (b=-.181, p=.302). The summary of the third step of the hierarchical regression with education as moderating variable is presented in Table 4.

The fourth hypothesis argued that political party affiliation would moderate the relationship between generalized trust and trust in news media. In order to test this hypothesis, an interaction between political party affiliation and generalized trust was entered in the third block of the hierarchical multiple regression. This hypothesis was also not supported. The results show that the interaction between political party affiliation and generalized trust did not bring significant change in the model (R squared change=.001, F change (1,354)=.279, p=.598). In the final model, interaction between political party affiliation and generalized trust was not significant (b=.061, p=.598). The summary of the third step of the hierarchical regression with political party affiliation as moderating variable is presented in Table 5.

After testing the hypotheses using trust in corrupt journalists as a proxy for news media performance, the regression models were then rerun using perceived news media corruption as a proxy variable for news media performance. An examination of correlations revealed that the independent variables, generalized trust and perceived news media corruption, were not highly correlated (r=-.090). In addition, collinearity statistics (Tolerance and VIF) were all within the accepted limits (tolerance values for independent variables were .880 and .928, which is well above the threshold of .10 and VIF values of 1.136 and 1.078 were well below the cut-off of 10). Thus it can be concluded that assumptions of multicollinearlity have been met. Residual and scatter plots, in this case too, indicated the assumptions of normality, linearity and homoscedasticity were all satisfied.

A two-stage hierarchical multiple regression was then conducted with trust in news media as the dependent variable and with perceived news media corruption as a proxy for news media performance. The control variables (age, gender, education, political party affiliation, income, trust in government, personal religiosity, interpersonal discussion of news, and media use), entered at stage one, explained 14.8% of the variance in trust in news media (Table 6). After the entry of generalized trust and perceived news media corruption, the total variance explained by the model as a whole was 23.7%, F (11, 355)=12.513, $p<.001$. The two independent variables explained an additional 8.9% of the variance in trust in news media, R squared change=.089, F change (2,355)=20.806, $p<.001$. In the final model, both generalized trust ($b=.12$, $p=.013$) and perceived news media corruption ($b=-.27$, $p<.001$) were statistically significant. This indicates that both independent variables significantly influenced perceptions of trust in news media. The more trusting an individual is towards strangers, the more he or she is likely to trust news media in Serbia, and the more an individual believes news media in Serbia are corrupt the less likely he or she is to trust news media. Trust in government was again the only control variable significant in the model ($b=.30$, $p<.001$), indicating that that despite the fact that it made a unique statistically significant contribution to the model, the two independent variables (generalized trust and perceived news media corruption) still were significant predictors of trust in news media. However, analysis of part correlations, indicate that effect sizes were small. Controlling for all other variables, generalized trust explained 1.35% of variance in predicting trust in news media, whereas perceived news media corruption explained 6.97% of variance in predicting trust in news media.

The first research question asked which of the two independent variables, generalized trust or news media performance, played a greater role in determining trust in news media. The

results of the hierarchical regression showed that when measured as perceived news media corruption, news media performance had a higher beta value ($b=.30$, $p<.001$) than generalized trust ($b=.12$, $p=.013$). In addition, the effect size for perceived news media corruption (squared part correlation $=0.069$) was larger than the effect size for generalized trust (squared part correlation $=0.013$), indicating that perceived news media corruption plays a bigger role in predicting trust in news media than generalized trust.

Although these effect sizes can be considered small (effect size for perceived news media corruption: squared part correlation $=0.069$, and for generalized trust: squared part correlation $=0.013$), comparison with the regression model in which news media performance was measured with a proxy of trust in corrupt journalists (effect size for trust in corrupt journalists: squared part correlation $=0.025$, and for generalized trust: squared part correlation $=0.012$) shows that the effect size for news media performance in the second model was larger than in the first model. When news media performance was measured by a proxy of perceived news media corruption, it explained 6.97% of unique variance in predicting trust in news media. When it was measured by a proxy of trust in corrupt journalists, it explained 2.50% of unique variance in predicting trust in news media. This represents a difference of 4.47%. Thus it can be concluded that the measure of perceived news media corruption has a bigger predictive power in explaining trust in news media than a measure of trust in corrupt journalists.

The hypotheses that predicted moderation effects of age, education, and political party affiliation were retested using perceived news media corruption as a proxy for news media performance. Three hierarchical multiple regression models were run. In each model, the interaction between generalized trust and one of the predicted moderators was entered in Step 3. The results show that none of the three variables moderated the relationship between generalized

trust and trust in news media: Age (R squared change=.000, F change $(1,354)=.120$, $p=.729$; $b=-.059$, $p=.729$) (Table 7); education (R squared change=.002, F change $(1,354)=.725$, $p=.395$; $b=-.145$, $p=.395$) (Table 8); or political party affiliation (R squared change=.000, F change $(1,354)=.053$, $p=.818$; $b=.026$, $p=.818$) (Table 9).

Post-hoc tests

As the effects of age and education were not found in the moderation analysis, post-hoc tests were conducted to probe whether different age and educational groups could moderate the relationship between generalized trust and trust in news media[29]. For this purpose, Age was split in two categories: people who are younger than 42 and people 42 and older. The goal was to separate people who were fully socialized in Communism from those that were not. It was assumed that those who were 18 when the Communism in Eastern Europe collapsed in 1989 could have been fully socialized during the Communist period, whereas the younger ones were assumed to have had socializing experiences in other regimes too. Based on the literature review, it was assumed that socialization during Communism could have negative effects on trust. In terms of the level of education, participants were also split in two groups: those who had up to a high school degree and those who had more education. Based on the literature review, it was assumed that those who had at least some college experience, would have been more incorporated into the educational system and thus more trustful of institutions systems (including news media) than those who completed only high school, elementary school or did not have any formal education. The interactions of age group and education group were entered separately in Steps 3 of the hierarchical regression analyses. All other variables remained the same. An analysis was first done using trust in corrupt journalists as a proxy for news media performance. Results show that neither age group nor education group moderated the relationship between

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[29] Political Party Affiliation had been dummy coded from the start.

generalized trust and trust in news media. The interaction between age group and generalized trust did not bring significant change in the model (R squared change=.000, *F* change (1,354)=.153, *p*=.696). In the final model, interaction between age group and generalized trust was not significant (*b*=.049, *p*=.696). The interaction between education group and generalized trust did not bring significant change in the model either (R squared change=.000, *F* change (1,354)=.138, *p*=.710). In the final model, interaction between age group and generalized trust was not significant (*b*=-.048, *p*=.710). A similar analysis was then conducted using perceived corruption as a proxy for news media performance. Neither variable was shown to moderate the relationship between generalized trust and trust in news media: age group (R squared change=.000, *F* change (1,354)=.049, *p*=.825; *b*=-.027, *p*=.825) and education group (R squared change=.000, *F* change (1,354)=.000, *p*=.989; *b*=.002, *p*=.989).

CHAPTER VI:
DISCUSSION

Popular trust in institutions is vital for democracy, but in post-Communist countries skepticism and distrust in all institutions, including news media, have been pervasive (e.g., Bjornskov, 2007; Mishler & Rose, 1997; Mishler & Rose, 2001). So too has been the case with interpersonal trust. Citizens of post-Communist countries either fundamentally distrust both intuitions and their fellow citizens or at least are deeply skeptical of them. Only smaller groups of individuals across post-Communist countries have been found in previous research to trust institutions and people, yet only superficially (Mishler & Rose, 1997). In the preface of their edited volume on social trust in post-socialist countries, Kornai and Rose-Ackerman describe dishonesty and distrust as "ubiquitous" in Eastern Europe (Kornai & Rose-Ackerman, 2004, p. xiv). The authors note that the topics of deception, lying, corruption, and abuse of trust have been concealed and forbidden to talk about for decades in the region. They warn that it is precisely during periods of transition, when Eastern European societies come to open up more, that those topics became visible during everyday conversations among friends, at home, at work, or in daily press and television.

The main purpose of this dissertation research was to examine the origins of trust in news media in Serbia, one of the countries of post-Communist Eastern Europe. It was done by testing cultural and performance factors as possible determinants of trust in news media, through a survey of the general population in Serbia (*N*=544). In order to give a more complete picture of trust in a post-Communist society, this dissertation study also explored the meanings of trust in

news media and trust in other people in Serbia, through 20 in-depth interviews with representatives of the Serbian population.

The results of this dissertation study show that more than 20 years after the fall of Communism and 13 years after the fall of Slobodan Milošević's authoritative regime, the pervasiveness of distrust remains present. Serbians who participated in this study expressed skepticism about their news media and distrust of people they don't know personally. Conceptualizing trust in news media as well as trust in other people in the same way as their Western counterparts, Serbians thought that Western standards, necessary for trust in news media and other people to occur, such as fair selectivity of news, objectivity, neutrality, accuracy in reporting or sincerity in helping other people, were not met or applicable in their country. Looking further at the origins of this distrust, this dissertation tested the influences of two contrasting explanations, cultural and performance, on trust in news media in Serbia. The results supported the explanation that both factors play a role in determining trust in news media. However, the performance explanation, measured as assessments of news media corruption, was found to be slightly more powerful than the cultural explanation, measured as generalized trust, or trust in people that we don't know personally.

The results of this study point out that the relationship of Serbians towards their news media is a distrustful one, based both on cultural beliefs and more rational assessments of performance of media institutions. As such, this relationship appears to involve a dense permeation of social, economic, and historical contexts and demands a holistic interpretation. In order to do this, this chapter will discuss the combined results of the in-depth interviews and survey, conducted in May 2013 and October 2013 for this dissertation study. It will interpret the qualitative and quantitative results in light of existing literature on trust and trust in news media

in post-Communist countries. This approach should provide a more complete picture of trust in general and trust in news media in particular in this transitional country, and allow interpretation in a larger context. The discussion points will be presented as three overall inferences based on the holistic consideration of the results of this study.

The first overall inference suggests that Serbians conceptualize trust in news media according to Western normative standards, but believe that these standards cannot be applicable to their local conditions. The thematic analysis of 20 in-depth interviews with representatives of the Serbian population showed that the meaning of trust in news media among the Serbians is equivalent with its Western conceptualization. The interviewed Serbians perceived trust in news media as trust in journalistic selection of topics, facts, depictions, and assessments. In other words, interviewed Serbians expected trustworthy news reporting to select topics that are relevant for citizenry, to focus on important facts, to be unbiased, fair and include different points of view, to be accurate and precise in its depictions of events, and to have well-founded assessments. These factors are also reflected in Kohring and Matthes's (2007) construct of trust in news media. The findings of this dissertation study show that Serbians, as Westerners, recognize that news media selectively choose some information over other, and that audiences are taking a risk when allocating trust to these specific selections. From the participants' long descriptions of the need to have a bigger variety of topics covered in Serbian media, as well as different points of views included in news reports, it was clear that the Serbians interviewed for this study recognized the process of journalistic selection of information. In addition, the expectations by which Serbians judged the trustworthiness of this selection overlapped with the items used to measure the trust in news media construct in Kohring and Matthes's (2007) scale: fairness, neutrality, objectivity, independence, inclusion of different points of view in a news

reports, use of reliable and knowledgeable sources in news reports, or selection of topics relevant for all citizens.

These expectations represent the same normative standards used by audiences in countries with long democratic traditions when judging their press and they overlap largely with the perceptions of news media social roles in democratic societies. Although several books have been written about press systems and models across the world (e.g., Christians, 2009; Hallin & Manicini, 2004; Siebert, Peterson, & Schramn, 1963), a social responsibility type of model has been widely accepted as an unwritten contract in Western countries. In this type of model, the state waives most of its control over the media, while media accept social commitments toward society and restrain themselves accordingly (Himelboim & Limor, 2010). Journalists pursue objectivity in two different ways: they either try to stay unbiased in their work as gatekeepers or they try to advance a social cause as advocates (Janowitcz, 1975); they either try to disseminate information in a neutral way or they try to have a more adversary role towards loci of power (Johnstone, Slawski & Bowman, 1972; Weaver et al., 2007). In the pursuit of either of these paths, Western journalistic practices demand dedication to a common set of values, such as accuracy, balance, relevance (Elliott, 1988), fairness, justice, responsibility, or civic-mindness (Plaisance & Skewes, 2003). These values are also in the core of the measurement of the trust in media construct provided by Kohring and Matthes (2007).

Serbians interviewed in this study showed the ability to perceive the democratic ideals of journalistic values exercised in the scope of the socially responsible model of the press. In fact, these principles have been circulating in discourse pertaining to Serbian journalism for a long time. Even during Communism, when the media were fully under state control, the fourth estate was nevertheless seen as a "public forum" that was supposed to be a "mirror of events" but also

an "interpreter" of social realities. In fulfilling their "socially responsible reporting" role,

journalists in the Communist Yugoslavia were supposed, at least declaratively, to "provide

independent and nonpartisan sources of comment and criticism" (Robinson, 1977, pp. 119, 120).

The Constitution itself stated that the press, radio, and television were expected to "truthfully "

and "objectively" inform the public (Paulu, 1974, p. 467), as well as include a broad range of

topics "of public interest" and integrate diverse opinions (Paulu, 1974, p. 469). Although the

question of what information was considered "truthful" and "objective" might have been left

open, and the definitions of "socially responsible reporting" and other related terms were left

afloat, it has to be noted that these principles were present in the discourse about Yugoslav

journalistic practices. Even during years of Milošević's authoritarian regime in the 1990s, these

principles kept their place. Independent journalists, who had left state media and formed private

newspapers, had made their decisions to leave based on a desire to protect the values of

journalistic objectivity and fairness against state propagandistic media system. At the same time,

scholars were warning about the bias of state media and their use of one-sided news reporting,

contra posing these practices with Western standards of neutrality and fairness (e.g., Thompson,

1994). Since the fall of the Milošević's regime in 2000, the principles of Western journalism

have become even more prominent in Serbia. Numerous reporters, producers and news directors

have gone through Western media training, during which they have learned about Western-style

media operations and management as well as about the values of Western-style news reporting

(e.g., Hoffman, 2002; Peters, 2010). The big projects, such as the transformation of state

television into a public service broadcaster, have been set up with the goal of establishing

politically, economically, culturally and ethnically unbiased radio-television entities

(Veljanovski, 2005). The principle of objectivity, neutrality, or independence from political and

economic interests, have been also clearly cited in the Code of Ethics of Serbian Journalists, a common document adopted by two competing associations of Serbian journalists in 2006.

In this atmosphere, it is not surprising that participants of this dissertation study well recognized as their own, the values that had been known as Western values or standard norms for good journalistic practices and identified them as necessary components of trust in news media. In fact, there are indications that these standards are now recognized as normative in most countries around the world as journalistic codes of ethics have become strikingly similar. A recent study of 242 codes of ethics in 94 countries indicated a rather consensual perception of a neutral journalistic role across the world with the duties of "distributing information" and "commitment to social interest" as prevalent. The study also showed that Eastern Europeans expected even more from their journalists: to be more involved and stand up for the protection of values recognizable in Western democratic practices, such as protection of peace, democracy, and human rights (Himelboim & Limor, 2010).

The results of in-depth interviews thus point out that Serbians conceptualize trust in news media using Western standards of journalistic practices as guidelines. Whether they think that these norms can be achieved in real life, is a different question. The results of the survey conducted in the scope of this dissertation (N=544) show that Serbians are skeptical about this. Scoring the average of 3.73 (SD=1.26) on a 7-point trust in news media scale, the participants of this study showed that they were not confident that their news media select topics and facts that are relevant for society, report facts and describe events accurately and neutrally, and express criticism adequately. The average score was just a hair above the midpoint of the scale. On Mishler and Rose's (1997) collapse of the trust scale, this score qualifies as skepticism.

In mass communication literature, media skepticism has been studied largely by Tsfati and his colleagues (e.g., Tsfati, 2003; Tsfati & Cappella, 2003; Tsfati & Cappella, 2005). In their work, media skepticism has been defined as a "subjective feeling of alienation and mistrust toward the mainstream news media" (Tsfati, 2003, p. 160). In this context, journalists are not viewed as fair or objective in their reports about society and not always telling the whole story. It also means individuals believe mainstream media would sacrifice accuracy and precision for personal and commercial gains, and audiences cannot believe what they read in newspapers or watch on television. In other words, Tsfati's definition of media skepticism applies the notion of mistrust not only to how mass media report but how they function in the society too. In this dissertation, skepticism towards news media represents a medium stage (scores of 3,4, and 5) on a trust scale, falling between active distrust (scores 1 and 2) and trust (scores 5 and 6). As the trust scale used in this study taps into the notion of trust in journalistic selectivity, it can be inferred that skepticism in this context assumes skepticism towards journalistic selectivity. Serbians who participated in the survey portion of this dissertation study were skeptical about journalistic selectivity and didn't have confidence that their news media select topics, facts and express their criticism fairly, accurately, and neutrally.

For comparison purposes, it has to be noted that skepticism towards news media does not exclusively pertain to Serbians. In her previous surveys in America and China, the author of this dissertation found, using the same scale for trust in news media, that young people in these countries also didn't score very high on their trust in news media assessments. Although, young Americans had higher levels of trust in news media than Serbians surveyed in this study (M=4.42; SD=0.85; N=322), as well as young Chinese (M=4.28; SD=0.82; N=298), their scores were still in the domain of skepticism (Radovic & Rui, 2012). Using different scales or single

items to assess trust in news media, other studies also noted lower levels of trust in news media in Western societies. Pew Research Center reported in 2011 that 66% of Americans thought that news stories produced by traditional media outlets were inaccurate (Pew Research Center, 2011), whereas a world-wide survey conducted in 2006 showed that, in the United Kingdom, 64% of viewers did not consider that broadcast news media report all sides of the story (BBC, Reuters & Media Center Poll, 2006).

Skepticism towards mass media does not have to be inherently bad. Some level of skepticism can be healthy for the development of democratic institutions. Some evidence suggest that media skeptics are more likely to be knowledgeable about politics or participate in the political process and thus, as Tsfati (2003) argues, less likely to slide into apathy. Mishler and Rose (1997) claimed that "healthy skepticism" can facilitate democratic process more than blind trust. However, the problem with Eastern European countries is not one of healthy skepticism but of severe skepticism that borders on outright distrust in institutions (Mishler & Rose, 1997). This dissertation showed that in Serbia too, skepticism towards news media can be interpreted as rather strong than healthy. The score (*M*=3.73; *SD*=1.26) is closer to the upper bordering value for active distrust (2) than to the lower bordering value for trust (6). Falling between the scale points of "slightly disagree" and "neither agree nor disagree" with the questions about trust in news media, this average score might indicate that the skepticism among Serbians corresponds more to a certain degree of mistrust toward mainstream news media than to a positive suspicion in news media reporting.

The results of in-depth interviews additionally inform this inference. For most of interviewed Serbians, the values of fairness, neutrality, objectivity, and independence are impossible to attain. They thought that the influences of political and economic sources of power

are so strong in Serbia that they prevent journalists from performing their jobs professionally. Serbians interviewed in this study thought that politicians and media owners, not the journalists, are the ones who select news topics to cover, or angles to take. In this regard, the participants were not sure how much journalists in Serbia can report objectively, cover all sides of the story, or work in the interest of citizens of Serbia. They rather thought that news media became instruments for the realization of their controllers' interests, tools of falsification, "systems of lies," fraud and manipulation. Willing to take bribes in exchange for covering up important stories or creating scandals, journalists were seen more as professional deceivers than as disseminators of relevant information (e.g., P2; P3; P7; P9; P13; P17).

The second inference suggests that skepticism towards news media comes more from the negative assessment of news media performance than from a cultural predisposition to distrust. After finding the low levels of trust of Serbians in their news media, as well as discovering their conceptualization of trust in news media, this dissertation study shifted focus to examining the sources of news media skepticism in this country. The regression analysis of survey data collected for this study showed that regardless whether it was measured as trust in corrupt journalism or perceptions of news media corruption, news media performance played a larger role in determining trust in news media than the cultural factor of generalized trust. The beta weight of news media performance factor, either measured as trust in corrupt journalists (b=.16, p=.001) or as perceived corruption of news media (b=-.27, p<.001), was larger and more significant than the beta weight for generalized trust (b=.12, p=.021). Consequentially, news media performance had a larger amount of unique variance in explaining trust in news media than generalized trust did. Measured as trust in corrupt journalists, news media performance explained 2.5% of variance in trust in news media, and measured as perceived news media

corruption, it explained 6.97% of unique variance in trust in news media. On the other hand, generalized trust explained 1.23% of unique variance in trust in news media.

This suggests that the performance explanation is superior to the cultural explanation when it comes to explaining trust in news media among the participants of this study. Serbians viewed trust as endogenous to news media functioning rather than as an exogenous trait rooted in the character of the people. Performance theories conceive trust or distrust as rational responses of individuals to the performance of institutions. The potential trustor decides to place trust based on the information from trustee's actions: if the trustee performs well, the trustor will trust him or her (e.g., Coleman, 1990; Dasgupta, 1998; Rothstein & Stolle, 2002). Thus institutions that perform well are likely to elicit the trust of citizens; those that perform badly or ineffectively generate feelings of distrust and low confidence. In the case of this dissertation research, the more Serbians thought news media were corrupt, the more they distrusted them. Trust in news media, insulated from the effects of generalized trust, was substantially determined by news media performance. As citizens negatively evaluated news media for corruption practices, they were skeptical of their news media.

In the view of Serbians interviewed in this study, corruption is a very serious problem of Serbian media. The survey results showed that Serbian media are perceived as highly corrupt. On a 7-point scale, Serbians gave them a very high average score of 5.26 (SD=1.41). During the in-depth interviews, participants of this study stated that they thought that news media, under the influence of politicians or media owners publish information that are in the interests of these centers of power, not in the interests of people (e.g., P9; P17). They thought that Serbian journalists intentionally cover up some stories, while promoting others and that they take money for doing it (P3; P7). For the Serbians interviewed in this study, corruption in journalism is so

prevalent that those who write objectively are considered as endangered species (P4; P13). But it is not only in journalism that Serbians recognized the omnipresent corruption. They viewed that ravaging corruption infiltrated into all institutions of the Serbian society, from state and local administrations, through educational system to health care, police, and judiciary (P6; P9; P10; P13). Due to perceived presence of corruption in all institutions, Serbians would go to state institutions with already prepared bribes. During the in-depth interviews they described how they would bring money, foods and drinks to representatives of different institutions, but feared that their interests would still not be fully protected (e.g., P6; P13).

More importantly, Serbians not only considered news media as highly corrupt but also distrusted corrupt journalists. The survey results of this dissertation showed that, when evaluating the corrupt journalistic practices in the form of hypothetical situations presented to them, Serbians clearly sent a message that they did not believe that corrupt journalists would work in people's interest. The average score for this question was extremely low: 1.65 (*SD*=0.90) on a 7-point scale.

This perception of corruption could have more devastating effects than corruption itself. As Melgar, Rosi and Smith (2009) point out, it generates a "culture of distrust" towards institutions and can create a cultural tradition of gift giving, which, in a vicious circle, raises corruption. Čábelková and Hanousek (2004) found that corruption perception is one of the key factors in giving a bribe. The higher the perceived corruption in an organization, the more probable it is that a person dealing with that organization will offer a bribe, therefore supporting corruption. As Melgar, Rosi and Smith (2009) state, high levels of corruption perception are enough to cause institutional instability and the deterioration of relationships among individuals, institutions and states. Serbia's scores in perceived corruption are worrisome not only judging by

the data from this dissertation, but also from other sources. Transparency International is a non-governmental organization that monitors and publicizes corporate and political corruption in international development. Its 2013 Corruption Perception Index, based on expert opinions, measured the perceived levels of public sector corruption in countries worldwide, scoring them from 0 (highly corrupt) to 100 (very clean). Serbia scored 42, indicating that it is perceived as a corrupt country in which institutions and leaders are not bribe-free and rather answer to their powerful friends than to the public. In Eastern Europe and Central Asia, an incredible 95% of countries had a score below 50 (Transparency International, 2013). In terms of news media, high corruption perception can not only prevent citizens from being properly informed but can further reinforce the practice of gift giving to news media practitioners and undermine even more their fragile credibility.

The results of this study supported the findings of other studies that have found performance explanations superior to cultural explanations in predicting trust in institutions (e.g., Mishler & Rose, 2001; Newton & Norris, 2000). For example, Mishler and Rose (2001) did not find evidence that general trust in humankind spills over to trust in institutions. By contrast, their study showed that institutional trust was substantially affected by both political and economic performance, while being almost completely unaffected by interpersonal trust or by socialization influences. Their findings suggested that institutional performance holds the key to developing trust in political institutions, and that trust can be built more surely and swiftly than the decades or generations suggested by cultural theories. The superiority of performance explanation in the Serbian case might have important implications for news media development. If trust in news media is largely dependent on the performance of news media, then it can be nurtured by improving the conduct and performance of news media. Journalists can generate trust the old-

fashioned way: they can earn it by responding to public needs and rooting out corruption practices. They can also earn it by sticking to the doctrines of fair, independent and independent reporting. The character and performance of trustworthy news media can generate trust just as the performance of untrustworthy news media generated skepticism and distrust.

The importance of performance of news media in predicting trust in news media in Serbia, can be also looked at from the perspective of the relatively smaller contribution of generalized trust. As pointed out earlier, generalized trust had smaller predictive value of trust in news media, as its beta weight was smaller than the beta weights of the news media performance measures, as was the amount of variance it explained in trust in news media. The smaller contribution of generalized trust in explaining trust in news media might suggest a changing relationship of Eastern Europeans towards their institutions, especially taking into account the history of distrust in Eastern Europe noted by numerous researchers (e.g., Aasland, Grodeland & Pleines, 2012; Bjornskov, 2007; Macek & Markova, 2004; Miheljak, 2006; Paldam & Svedsen, 2001; Petrova, 2007; Rose, 1994; Sztompka, 2000). All these scholars pointed out that during the rule of oppressive Communist regimes in the region, erosion of distrust was widespread. Due to the controlling nature of the Communist rules, peoples from Eastern Europe started distrusting everybody and everything that did not belong to immediate circles of family and friends. According to some researchers, this general predisposition to distrust spilled into the post-Communist period, as the levels of trust in other people and institutions remained small (e.g., Miheljak, 2006; Rose, 1994). Using survey data from 1997, 1999-2001, and 2002-2003, Bjornskov (2007) discovered that the Communist past had a clear effect on perceptions of trust, as these countries were about eight percentage points less trusting than otherwise comparable countries. In-depth interviews with elite representatives of East Central Europe, South East

Europe, and the Western Balkans, revealed that people in this region distinguished between "us" and "them" between "our people" and "others." Whereas the former usually enjoy their full trust, the latter are generally viewed with skepticism, a clear relic of communist past's atomization of human relations.

The results of this dissertation study, which showed that the impact of generalized trust in predicting trust in news media was statistically significant but small, might indicate that the predisposition to distrust as predictor of trust in institutions in Eastern Europe might be changing. For Serbian citizens, performance of news media appears to play a more significant role in determining trust in news media than generalized distrust. This might indicate that rational assessments of performance might be starting to prevail over cultural explanations, and that some Eastern European nations might be moving towards evaluations based on past actions rather than relying on cultural beliefs and norms that belong more to the domain of faith than reason.

The third inference suggests that performance should be coupled with culture in understanding trust in news media in Serbia. Despite the fact that perception of news media corruption was shown to be a better predictor of trust in news media in Serbia than generalized trust, as a cultural factor generalized trust was still a significant predictor of trust in news media. In the model with controls, generalized trust's beta weight was smaller than the beta weight of news media performance but still statistically significant. This indicates that together with news media performance generalized trust had a significant predictive value of trust in news media, even when controlling for other variables. In addition, the moderation tests showed that the relationship between generalized trust and trust in news media did not change when the interaction effects of age, education and political party affiliation were tested. This shows that

generalized trust positively affects trust in news media regardless of people's age, educational level or political party affiliation. Finally, the predictive power of the whole model increased when generalized trust and news media performance were also entered in the equation, indicating that these two variables together bring significant variance in explaining trust in news media. This suggests that trust in strangers cannot be ignored when assessing trust in news media in Serbia.

Even more so, the results of the survey further showed that levels of trust in people we don't know are pretty low in Serbia. In terms of generalized trust, Serbians moved very close to the active distrust category. Their average score of $M=2.90$ ($SD=1.38$) indicates that they thought that other people would be more likely to look out for themselves and to take advantage of others, than to help others or be fair. Thus, Serbians thought that one has to be rather careful when dealing with other people. The results of in-depth interviews provided a deeper look at the sources of generalized distrust in Serbia. During in-depth interviews participants pointed out that one can completely trust only family members and closest friends. Most thought that other "people would try to cheat you on every corner" (P2; P4), and that they would do so "intentionally" without "choosing means to achieve their goals" (P4). Some interviewees thought that even people who spontaneously start conversations in public places usually have other intentions, such as stealing from your purse (P10) or committing some sort of fraud (P13; P17), illustrating the prevalent thought of most participants that, "it is in the human nature to use good people" (P6).

These findings suggest that generalized distrust is not only a significant predictor of trust in news media in Serbia, but a very strong feeling among citizens of Serbia, too. Thus, although news media performance plays a greater role in explaining trust in news media, trust in strangers

has to remain an active variable in models predicting trust in news media. Trust in news media in Serbia significantly does not only depend on how well Serbians evaluate the functioning of news media, but also on how much people in that country trust others. The results of this dissertation study showed that the more Serbians trusted strangers and the less they thought news media were corrupt, the more they trusted news media. In this context, cultural and performance theories that provide contrasting explanations of the origins of trust, have to be considered not as mutually exclusive, but as complementary. Cultural predisposition to trust or distrust other people does not necessarily have to exclude the possibility that people also take into account performance of particular institutions when attributing trust to them. Although one variable might be stronger than the other in predictions of trust, taken together they provide a more powerful explanation of trust in news media. It can also be argued that although on a country level, cultural predispositions can be stronger than performance assessments in predicting trust (or vice versa), each individual does carry in oneself both cultural predispositions towards trust and distrust and possibilities to assess institutional performace. Thus, instead of looking at cultural and performace theoretical perspectives as competing explanations, a more holistic assessment would be to integrate them in the same model. They should be used together as long as both variables keep their predictive values.

In terms of journalistic practices, the complimentary influences of performance and generalized trust suggest that trust in news media in Serbia can be improved by correcting for both. If corrupted practices of news media are improved and interpersonal relations ameliorated, it can be expected that the levels of trust in news media would improve. Although the improvement of corruption practices is more likely to get bigger increases in absolute numbers of trust in news media than improvement of generalized trust alone, its coupling with the

improvement of interpersonal relations could bring even more trust in news media. In addition, it can bring a more inclusive and productive society overall. Research has already found that generalized trust positively influences trust in political institutions (e.g., Brehm & Rahn, 1997; Cole, 1973; Newton, 2001) and spills over to create better organizational functioning (e.g., Fukuyama, 1995; Rothstein & Stolle, 2002). Following this logic, the increase of generalized trust could spill over to create a more functional environment for journalists in Serbia too and, coupled with the decrease in corruptive journalistic practices, could most probably positively influence the perceptions of trust in the fourth estate.

CHAPTER VII:
CONCLUSION

In times of the transformation of Serbian news media from an institution that served the interests of the state during Communism and authoritarianism, to the one that ought to serve the public, in present, not fully developed democratic circumstances, audiences proved to be cautious about trusting the newly transformed news media. This dissertation study found that Serbians conceptualize trust in news media in the same way as their Western counterparts but thought that normative standards of journalistic fairness, objectivity, neutrality or independence are not applicable to current conditions in their country. Skeptical towards their news media, Serbians believe that news media are under political and economic pressures, corrupt, unprofessional, or even inherently organized as instruments of manipulations. This dissertation study also showed that low trust in news media in Serbia is determined by low levels of trust in other people. Serbians do not trust people that they don't know personally and are deeply distrustful about their intentions. They think that other people mainly want to use them for fulfilling their own goals and interests. But even more so trust in news media in Serbia is determined by poor news media performance. Serbians who participated in this study saw their news media as highly corrupt and this significantly affected their trust in the fourth estate. The more they thought the news media were corrupt, the less they were likely to trust them.

This dissertation study has several limitations. Previous studies that tested cultural and performance impact on institutional trust (e.g., Bjornskov, 2007; Mishler & Rose, 2001; Newton & Norris, 2000) based their findings on cross-cultural analyses. Being able to compare the results among Eastern European countries and between Eastern European and Western countries, they have been able to interpret the results in a larger context and relative to other similar or different

societies. This dissertation research examined the determinants of trust in news media in the Serbian context and thus is not able to interpret its results relative to the impact these factors might be having in other countries. Futures studies should include more countries in their analyses in order to see whether the same pattern might be discovered in other Eastern European societies. In addition, this dissertation based its findings on cross-sectional data. Thus it is not able to compare the levels of trust in news media in Serbia relative to previous levels of trust in news media in this post-Communist country. A longitudinal approach would have provided a more in-depth view of trust in news media in Serbia and would have allowed for a more substantial interpretation of its levels.

This dissertation study's finding that news media performance had a higher impact on determining trust in news media in Serbia than the cultural factor of generalized trust, might be suggesting that the habit of relying on cultural beliefs in at least assessing news media might be fading in parts of Eastern Europe. For this claim to be tested, larger comparative studies among post-Communist bloc countries are needed. Future studies would also have to look into the reasons of why generalized trust might be a weaker predictor of trust in news media, especially having in mind that other studies had already pointed out that in new democracies generalized trust could be a weaker predictor of trust in institutions than institutional performance, but failed to explain why (e.g., Almond and Verba, 1963; Rohrscheider & Schmitt-Beck, 2002).

In addition, the explanatory power of the model that included generalized trust and news media performance and other control variables was not large. The model in which news media performance was conceptualized as trust in corrupted journalists explained 19.2% of the total variance in trust in news media, whereas the model in which news media performance was conceptualized as perceived news media corruption explained 23.7% of the variance in trust in

news media. Future studies should include other variables which may be better predictors of trust in news media. For example, as trust in government, one of the control variables used in this study was significant and explained more unique variance in trust in news media than any other variable used in the models, including the two main independent variables, other predictors of trust in news media might be maybe found among variables that assess trust in different state institutions.

Finally, the analysis of survey data from this dissertation study showed that the impact of news media performance on trust in news media in Serbia was stronger when news media performance was conceptualized as perceived news media corruption then when it was conceptualized as trust in corrupt journalists. Conceptualized as perception of news media corruption, news media performance was able to explain 4.47% of the variance more than when it was conceptualized as trust in corrupt journalists. This indicates that a scale that taps into general perception of news media corruption might be better than situational vignettes, which tap into performance of individual journalists. This could also be interpreted as supporting the findings of in-depth interviews which indicate that the impact of corruption perception might change depending on how one asks the question. The analysis of in-depth interviews with Serbians showed that the apriori negative perception of institutional corruption (e.g., P10 – "They are all a bunch of liars and cheaters!") fades to some extent when they are presented with real-life situational events of corrupt processes, in which the individual might benefit. Participants did not find such corrupt practices repellant any more, but even found them acceptable (e.g., to give presents to different representatives of state institutions if they would provide a service in return). In that case, Serbians would justify the acceptance of these practices by citing low salaries and hard work in the public sector (e.g., P6; P7). These justifications

spilled over to corrupt news media behaviors, with participants acknowledging that the work of journalists "is not easy" or is "very hard" (P6; P8; P10), that journalists are subject to various pressures and have even been killed if they reported objectively (P10). Future studies could further explore this area when conducting studies in other post-Communist bloc countries. Also, it has to be noted that the results of this study might have been different if different conceptualization of news media performance was used. Corruption perceptions were used in this study as they were found to representat the best news media performance in the Serbian context. Future studies should test how corruption perceptions would predict trust in news media in other countries.

In sum, I have attempted, in this dissertation study, to assess the current state of trust in news media in Serbia, one of the post-Communist countries of Eastern Europe. In doing this, I have tried not only to explain the origins of trust in news media, but to position it in a larger socio-economic and historical context and explain it in relationship to other types of trust, such as trust in other people or trust in corrupt journalists. Although at first glance, it might seem that the results point out to an optimistic shift of Eastern European thinking that started to allocate trust based on others' actions and not based on previous beliefs rotted in the national culture, it has to be noted that Serbians remain deeply skeptical about other people as well as institutions. Thus, it might be fair to note that the culture of distrust and skepticism has not disappeared in Eastern Europe, but that it might have only changed its form – from fear to disillusionment.

Past totalitarian regimes in the region persistently stimulated distrust among citizens by inducing uncertainly and propagating fear. News media's, as other official institutions' role was to propagate state ideology and not to independently inform citizens. Both trust and distrust were equated with fear. When, in the atmosphere of fear, citizens of authoritarian countries express

high trust in institutions in public opinion polls it is implied that they do it out of fear (e.g.,

Markova, 2004; Muller, 2013) of possible regime's repercussions. Privately though, they distrust

everything and everybody, and are terrified that trust might make them more open in

conversations and thus more vulnerable to secret services' persecutions. In new democracies,

such as Serbia is today, it doesn't seem that trust is equated with fear any more. Serbians are not

afraid of expressing their skepticism towards their news media and are willing to state their

reasons openly. It seems that in the present context, skepticism towards news media in Serbia

reflects rather a certain disappointment with the performance of the institution. Serbians are

bitter that their news media are not up the Western standards of journalistic professionalism.

They are disappointed that their news media are not reporting fairly, accurately, neutrally, and

that their journalists are corrupt. As is the case with many other countries in which democracy is

fairly a new phenomenon, the low levels of trust in news media in Serbia might reflect, what

Catterberg and Moreno (2005) called, the "post-honeymoon disillusionment" (p. 31). In many

emerging nations, transition to democracy has been followed by aspirations of civil, political,

and economic rights. As a result of these new demands, higher standards for evaluating the news

media emerged after the regime changed. The existence of normative standards of fair and

balanced reporting became not enough anymore. In the Serbian case, the citizens evidently

started demanding their implementation as well.

The results of this study indicate that the basic news needs of vast segments of the

Serbian population have not yet been met, which might have increased people's skepticism

towards their media systems. The mere fact that the political system changed, only implies that

news media in Serbia have transitioned from Communist and authoritarian to another system of

operation. It does not imply that they have fully transformed into systems capable of unbiased

and independent presentation of information. For that to happen, a longer period of time might be needed, a period in which the corrupt practices would be eradicated and mass media systems transformed from those that serve the elites to those that serve the people. For that to happen, it seems inevitable that disillusionment will be followed by abrupt sobering and decisive action.

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APPENDICES

Appendix A: Interview guide

Date of Interview:_____

Place:_____

Time:_____

Section I – Biographical/Demographic Questions

1. Pseudonym:

2. Sex:

3. Age:

4. Resides in:

5. Occupation:

    a. Title:

    b. Place of employment:

    c. Years practicing:

6. Education:

    a. Highest level:

    b. Areas of specialty:

7. Family:

    a. Marital status:

    b. Number, ages of children:

Section II – Question Categories, Grand Tour Questions, and Planned Prompts

a. Explore trust in other people:

    i. What does it mean for you to trust other people?

    ii. Who do you trust? Why do you trust them? Imagine a person that you trust. Please describe him/her.

    iii. Which characteristics trustworthy people should have?

    iv. How do you decide to trust other people?

    v. Who do you distrust? Why? Which characteristics these people have?

    vi. Imagine the situation: you are at the bus stop in your place of residence. A stranger approaches you. What is the first thing that comes to your mind? Why?

b. Explore trust towards family members, friends, co-workers

    i. Imagine the situation in which you would have to give something that is very dear to you to another person for a particular period of time. Which person would it be? Why?

c. Explore trust towards strangers

    i. Generally speaking, how much should we trust people that we don't know? Why?

    ii. Generally speaking, how much should one be careful towards other people? Why?

    iii. Describe situations in which people that you don't know personally helped you.

iv. Please tell me what you think about this hypothetical person: This person is open in relationships with other people that he/she doesn't know personally like family or friends. This person thinks that, in general (not all people, but on average), people are ready to help her and not take advantage of her, that other people, generally speaking, tend to be fair and don't only look for their own interests.

d. Explore trust in institutions.

i. Do you trust institutions? Why ? Did you have some negative-positive experiences ? Describe them.

ii. Are there some institutions that you trust? Which ones? Why?

iii. If they say that instutions are corrupted – describe some cases of corruption that you are aware of or that you heard of. What do you consider as corruption?

e. Explore news media habits

i. Which news media do you follow? Why? On which platforms?

ii. Are their particular actions, routines with which you connect the consumption of news media (e.g. drinking coffee, waiting for the bus, watching news with friends, etc.)

iii. Can you describe your particular day in terms of following news media?

f. Explore trust in news media.

i. What does it mean for you to trust news media?

ii. Which characteristics should media have in order for you to trust them? Elaborate on each characteristic having in mind Serbian media/foreign media?

iii. How do media gain your confidence? Describe the process.

iv. Can you describe your perfect news media channel. What should it have? Why?

v. How would a newscast look like if you were in charge of it?

vi. Can you describe a perfect journalist? Which characteristics should he/she have?

vii. How would you describe the work of journalists in Serbia? Why?

viii. How would you describe the work of foreign news media? Why?

ix. How would you describe the sources that journalists/media use?

x. How would you describe the work of the news media regarding their selection of topics?

xi. What do you think about the accuracy of news media reports?

xii. What do you think about the journalistic criticism?

xiii. Which news media you do not trust? Why?

xiv. Can you describe some situations in which news media were helpful to you?

xv. Generally speaking, what do you think about the work of news media in Serbia?

xvi. If you had to choose between state and private news media, what would you choose and why?

xvii. Is corruption present in Serbia news media? If yes – how much; where; how do you know.

Interview guide - Serbian translation

Datum:_____

Mesto:_____

Vreme:_____

Sekcija I – Biografski podaci

1. Pseudonim:

2. Pol:

3. Godine:

4. Mesto boravišta:

5. Zanimanje:

   a. Radno mesto:

   b. Mesto zaposlenja:

   c. Godine zaposlenja:

6. Obrazovanje:

   a. Najviši nivo:

   b. Oblast specijalizacije:

7. Porodica:

   a. Bračni status:

   b. Broj i godine dece:

Sekcija II – Pitanja

a. Istražiti poverenje u druge ljude.

   i. Šta za vas znači verovati drugim ljudima?

   ii. Kome verujete? Zašto? Zamislite osobu u koju imate poverenja. Opišite je.

   iii. Koje karakteristike ljudi treba da imaju da biste im verovali?

   iv. Kako se odlučujete da verujete nekoj osobi?

   v. Da li postoje ljudi kojima ne verujete? Koji su to ljudi? Koje osobine imaju ljudi kojima ne verujete?

   vi. Zamislite sledeću situaciju. Nalazite se na autobuskoj stanici u Vašem gradu i prilazi vam nepoznata osoba. Šta je Vaša prva misao? Zašto?

b. Istražiti poverenje u članove porodice, prijatelje, kolege.

   i. Zamislite sada situaciju u kojoj treba da poverite nešto što vam je dragoceno nekoj drugoj osobi. Koja bi to osoba bila?

c. Istražiti poverenje u nepoznate ljude.

   i. Šta mislite, uopšteno govoreći, koliko čovek treba da veruje ljudima koje ne poznaje? Zašto?

   ii. Šta mislite, uopšteno govoreći, koliko čovek treba da bude pažljiv/oprezan u odnosu sa ljudima koje ne poznaje?

   iii. Da li možete da opišite neke situacije u kojima su vam ljudi koje ne poznajete dobro pomogli?

   iv. Sada ću vam opisati jednu osobu a vi mi recite šta mislite o njoj. Ta osoba ulazi otvoreno u odnose bilo koje vrste sa drugim ljudima, sa ljudima koje ne poznaje intimno, recimo kao prijatelje ili porodicu. Polazi od toga da su

drugi ljudi generalno (u proseku/ne svi, nego u proseku) spremni da joj

pomognu a ne da je iskoriste, da drugi ljudi generalno (u proseku) teže da

budu fer i da generalno drugi ljudi ne gledaju samo svoju korist.

d. Istražiti poverenje u institucije.

    i. Da li verujete državnim institucijama? Zašto? Da li ste imali neka

        negativna-pozitivna iskustva? Opišite ih.

    ii. Da li postoje državne institucije kojima verujete? Koje su to? Zašto?

    iii. Ukoliko kažu da ima korupcije u državnim institucijama, neka opišu

        slučajeve korupcije za koje znaju ili za koje su čuli. I da opišu šta smatraju

        da je korupcija.

e. Istražiti navike što se tiče praćenja informativnih programa.

    i. Koje informativne programe-sadržaje pratite ? Zašto njih ? Na kojim

        platforma (TV, novine, radio, Internet)?

    ii. Da li vezujete odredjene dnevne aktivnosti za praćenje informativnih

        sadržaja (pr. čitanje kafe uz novine) ?

    iii. Da li možete da opišete vaš tipičan dan što se tiče praćenja informativnih

        sadržaja ?

f. Istražiti poverenje u medije.

    i. Šta za Vas znači verovati medijima (informativnim sadržajima) ?

    ii. Koje karakteristike mediji treba da imaju da biste im verovali? Opišite

        svaku karakteristiku.

    iii. Kako mediji zadobijaju vaše poverenje? Opište taj process.

    iv. Zamislite idealan medij. Možete li ga opisati? Šta treba da ima i zašto ?

v.   Kako bi izgledao Dnevnik da ga vi uredjujete?

vi.   Možete li da opišete idealnog novinara? Koje karakteristike treba da ima?

vii.   Kako biste opisali rad novinara u Srbiji. Zašto?

viii.   Kako biste opisali rad stranih novinara? Zašto?

ix.   Šta mislite o izvorima koje mediji koriste u informativnoim programima?

x.   Šta mislite o selekciji tema koje informativni programi biraju?

xi.   Šta mislite koliko su tačni izveštaji koji se objavljuju u informativnim
programima ?

xii.   Šta mislite o novinarskim komentarima koji se objavljuju u medijima ?

xiii.   Kojima medijima ne verujete? Zašto ?

xiv.   Da li možete da opišete situacije u kojima su vam informativni programi
bili od pomoći (bilo koje vrste) ?

xv.   Uopšteno govoreći, šta misilite o radu informativnih medija u Srbiji ?

xvi.   Kad biste birali izmedju privatnih i državnih medija koje biste izabrali i
zašto ?

xvii.   Da li ima korupcije u medijima? Ako da - šta mislite kako se ona
ispoljava?

Appendix B: Survey questionnaire

I Please show on this 7-point scale where 1 represents great distrust and 7 represents great trust, how much you personally trust …

1. … the news provided in newspapers.

    Great distrust 1---2---3---4---5---6---7 Great trust

2. … the news you see on television.

    Great distrust 1---2---3---4---5---6---7 Great trust

3. … the news that you hear on radio.

    Great distrust 1---2---3---4---5---6---7 Great trust

4. … the news from online sources.

    Great distrust 1---2---3---4---5---6---7 Great trust

II Keeping in mind the coverage of economic crisis in news media in Serbia, please answer whether you 1 = strongly disagree; 2=disagree; 3=slightly disagree; 4=neither agree nor disagree; 5=slightly agree; 6=agree; 7=strongly agree with the following statements.

1. The topic of economic crisis receives necessary attention.

    Strongly disagree –1—2—3—4—5—6—7—Strongly agree

2. The topic of economic crisis is assigned an adequate status.

    Strongly disagree –1—2—3—4—5—6—7—Strongly agree

3. The frequency with which economic crisis is covered is adequate.

Strongly disagree –1—2—3—4—5—6—7—Strongly agree

4. The topic is covered on the necessary regular basis.

   Strongly disagree –1—2—3—4—5—6—7—Strongly agree

5. The essential points are included.

   Strongly disagree –1—2—3—4—5—6—7—Strongly agree

6. The focus is on important facts.

   Strongly disagree –1—2—3—4—5—6—7—Strongly agree

7. All important information regarding the topic of economic crisis is provided.

   Strongly disagree –1—2—3—4—5—6—7—Strongly agree

8. Reporting includes different points of view.

   Strongly disagree –1—2—3—4—5—6—7—Strongly agree

9. The information in a report would be verifiable if examined.

Strongly disagree –1—2—3—4—5—6—7—Strongly agree

10. The reported information is true.

    Strongly disagree –1—2—3—4—5—6—7—Strongly agree

11. The reports recount the facts truthfully.

    Strongly disagree –1—2—3—4—5—6—7—Strongly agree

12. The facts that I receive regarding economic crisis are correct.

    Strongly disagree –1—2—3—4—5—6—7—Strongly agree

13. Criticism is expressed in an adequate manner.

    Strongly disagree –1—2—3—4—5—6—7—Strongly agree

14. The journalists' opinions are well-founded.

Strongly disagree –1—2—3—4—5—6—7—Strongly agree

15. The commentary regarding economic crisis consists of well-reflected conclusions.

Strongly disagree –1—2—3—4—5—6—7—Strongly agree

16. I feel that the journalistic assessments regarding the topic of economic crisis are useful.

Strongly disagree –1—2—3—4—5—6—7—Strongly agree

III Having in mind people that you DO NOT know personally, please answer the following three questions.

1. Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people? Please tell me on a score of 1 to 7, where 1 means you can't be too careful and 7 means that most people can be trusted.

    You can't be too careful 1—2—3—4—5—6—7 Most people can be trusted

2. Do you think that most people would try to take advantage of you if they got the chance, or would they try to be fair? Please tell me on a score of 1 to 7, where 1 means most people would try to take advantage of me and 7 means that most people would try to be fair.

    Most people would   1—2—3—4—5—6—7 Most people would

    try to take advantage of me   try to be fair

3. Would you say that most of the time people try to be helpful or that they are mostly looking out for themselves? Please tell me on a score of 1 to 7, where 1 means most people look out for themselves and 7 means that people mostly try to be helpful.

Most people look out for   Most people try to be

themselves   1—2—3—4—5—6—7   helpful

IV Now, I would like to ask you a couple of questions about yourself.

1. How often do you meet socially with friends, relatives or work colleagues?

   Never -1

   Less than once a month – 2

   Once a month – 3

   Several times a month – 4

   Once a week – 5

   Several times a week – 6

   Every day – 7

2. Compared to other people of your age, how often would you say you take part in social activities?

   Much less than most – 1

   Less than most- 2

   About the same – 3

   More than most- 4

   Much more than most - 5

V Now I will read to you several short stories and will ask you to answer the questions after them:

1. Milosh is a journalist in Serbia. Last year Milosh helped his cousin, a construction worker, to get a job as a journalist.

How likely do you think Milosh is to work in your best interest, when fulfilling his journalistic duties?

<div align="center">Not at all likely 1---2---3---4---5---6---7   Very likely</div>

2. Lazar is a journalist in Serbia. When writing a story about the success of young talents in Serbia, Lazar put the focus of the story on his nephew, although he knew that another student from the Mathematical High School in Belgrade had better grades and won more prizes in international competitions.

How likely do you think Lazar is to work in your best interest, when fulfilling his journalistic duties?

<div align="center">Not at all likely 1---2---3---4---5---6---7   Very likely</div>

3. Jovan is a journalist in Serbia. One day a prominent politician asked him not to publish an investigative article Jovan was working on about the politician's involvement in a love affair. He promised he would return the favor to Jovan. Jovan accepted and did not publish the article.

How likely do you think Jovan is to work in your best interest, when fulfilling his journalistic duties?

<div align="center">Not at all likely 1---2---3---4---5---6---7   Very likely</div>

4. Milan is a journalist in Serbia. One day a prominent politician asked him not to publish an investigative article Milan was working on about the politician's involvement in political scuffles among the ruling coalition. He gave Milan a bottle of Scotch and a packet of cigarettes. Milan accepted and did not publish the article.

How likely do you think Milan is to work in your best interest, when fulfilling his journalistic duties?

Not at all likely 1---2---3---4---5---6---7   Very likely

5. Zoran is a journalist in Serbia. A prominent politician asked him not to publish an investigative article Zoran was working on about the politician's involvement in a criminal enterprise. He gave Zoran 150 Euroes. Zoran accepted and did not publish the article.

How likely do you think Zoran is to work in your best interest, when fulfilling his journalistic duties?

Not at all likely 1---2---3---4---5---6---7   Very likely

6. Petar is a journalist in Serbia. A prominent politician asked him not to publish the investigative article Petar was working on about politician's involvement in covering up the real figures for unemployment in the country. He gave Petar 1,000 Euroes. Petar accepted and did not publish the article.

How likely do you think Petar is to work in your best interest, when fulfilling his journalistic duties?

Not likely at all 1---2---3---4---5---6---7   Very likely

VI Please answer the following questions:

1. Please indicate how many days per week you discuss news with your friends/family?

    0—1—2—3—4—5—6—7

2. Please indicate how many days per week you listen to the radio?

    0—1—2—3—4—5—6—7

3. Please indicate how many days per week you read newspapers?

    0—1—2—3—4—5—6—7

4. Please indicate how many days per week you watch television?

    0—1—2—3—4—5—6—7

5. Please indicate how many days per week you use Internet?

    0—1—2—3—4—5—6—7

6. Please indicate which medium is your main source of information:

    _____

7. On a scale from Not at all (1) to Very much (7), please indicate to what extent you think you can trust the government in Belgrade to do what is right**?**

    Not at all 1—2—3—4—5—6—7 Very much

8. On a scale from Not at all (1) to Very much (7), please indicate how much guidance does religion provide you in your day-to-day life?

    Not at all 1—2—3—4—5—6—7 Very much

9. On a scale from Never (0) to Every week (7), please indicate how often do you attend religious services?

    Never 0 —1—2—3—4—5—6—7 Every week

10. On a scale from Not important at all (1) to Very important (7), please indicate

how important of a role does religion play in your life?

Not important at all —1—2—3—4—5—6—7- Very important

11. On a scale from Never (0) to Every week (7), please indicate how often do you

pray?

Never 0—1—2—3—4—5—6—7 Every week

12. Please tell me on a sale of 1-7 how much you personally trust each of the

institutions I read out. 1 means you do not trust the institution at all, and 7 means

you have complete trust in the institution.

	No trust at all						*Complete trust*
…the Parliament of Serbia	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
…the legal system	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
…the police	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
…political parties	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
…the European Parliament	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
…The United Nations	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

13. All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole nowadays?

Please answer using a scale from 1 to 7, where 1 means extremely dissatisfied and

7 means extremely satisfied.

Extremely dissatisfied   1—2—3—4—5—6—7 Extremely satisfied

14. Taking all things together, how happy would you say you are?

Extremely unhappy   1—2—3—4—5—6—7 Extremely happy

VII Now I will ask you some questions about the democracy in your country. There are no right or wrong answers, so just please tell me what you think. To what extent you think each of the following statements apply in Serbia. 1 means you think the statement does not apply at all and 7 means you think it applies completely.

1. Elections in Serbia are free and fair.

   Does not apply at all   1—2—3—4—5—6—7 Applies completely

2. Voters in Serbia discuss politics with people they know before deciding how

   to vote.

   Does not apply at all   1—2—3—4—5—6—7 Applies completely

3. Different political parties in Serbia offer clear alternatives to one another.

   Does not apply at all   1—2—3—4—5—6—7 Applies completely

4. Opposition parties in Serbia are free to criticize the government.

   Does not apply at all   1—2—3—4—5—6—7 Applies completely

5. The media in Serbia are free to criticize the government.

   Does not apply at all   1—2—3—4—5—6—7 Applies completely

VIII Please answer whether you 1 = strongly disagree; 2=disagree; 3=slightly disagree; 4=neither agree nor disagree; 5=slightly agree; 6=agree; 7=strongly agree with the following statements.

1. Serbia should prohibit certain racial and religious groups from living in our country.

   Strongly disagree –1—2—3—4—5—6—7—Strongly agree

2. Racial prejudice may be a good thing for us because it keeps many undesirable foreigners from coming to Serbia.

   Strongly disagree –1—2—3—4—5—6—7—Strongly agree

3. If necessary we ought to be willing to lower our standard of living to cooperate with other countries in getting an equal standard for every person in the world.

   Strongly disagree –1—2—3—4—5—6—7—Strongly agree

4. My country does not have a moral obligation to share its technological and economic riches with the less fortunate people of the world.

   Strongly disagree –1—2—3—4—5—6—7—Strongly agree

5. Rich nations should share their wealth with the less fortunate people of the world.

   Strongly disagree –1—2—3—4—5—6—7—Strongly agree

6. Citizens of Serbia should be entitled to pursue whatever materialistic standard of living they desire, regardless of the effects on the planet's environment and natural resources.

   Strongly disagree –1—2—3—4—5—6—7—Strongly agree

7. Any person should be allowed to live wherever he or she wants in the world.

   Strongly disagree –1—2—3—4—5—6—7—Strongly agree

8. It would be better to be a citizen of the world than of any particular country.

Strongly disagree –1—2—3—4—5—6—7—Strongly agree

9. All national governments ought to be abolished and replaced by one central world government.

Strongly disagree –1—2—3—4—5—6—7—Strongly agree

10. An international police force ought to be the only group in the world allowed to have armaments.

Strongly disagree –1—2—3—4—5—6—7—Strongly agree

11. Concessions on the part of Serbia to other nations are morally right if the concessions will promote world peace.

Strongly disagree –1—2—3—4—5—6—7—Strongly agree

IX How widespread do you think corruption is in the news media in Serbia? Please rate your answer on a scale from (1) Not widespread at all to (7) Extremely widespread.

Not widespread at all 1---2---3---4---5---6---7   Extremely widespread

X Finally, I would like to ask you some more questions about yourself.

1. What is your age? _____

2. What is your biological sex?

   a. Male

   b. Female

3. Which political party do you identify with/you support?

   a. Socialist Party of Serbia

   b. Democratic Party

   c. Democratic Party of Serbia

d. Serbian Radical Party

e. Liberal Party

f. Serbian Progressive Party

g. Other. Please indicate _____

h. None

4. What is your level of education? (highest level)

   a. Less than elementary school

   b. Elementary school

   c. High school

   d. Bachelor's degree

   e. Master's degree

   f. Doctoral degree

5. What is your religion?

   a. Orthodox

   b. Catholic

   c. Muslim

   d. Jewish

   e. Other. Please indicate _____

   f. Atheist

   g. Does not want to indicate

6. What is you ethnicity?

   _____

7. What is the average earning of your household per month?

1. None	7. 20,001 – 24,000 dinars	13. 56,001 – 64,000 dinars
2. Less than 8,000 dinars	8. 24,001 – 30,000 dinars	14. 64,001 – 74,000 dinars
3. 8,001 – 10,000 dinars	9. 30,001 – 36,000 dinars	15. 74,001 – 86,000 dinars
4. 10,001 – 13,000 dinars	10. 36,001 – 42,000 dinars	16. 86,001 – 100,000 dinars
5. 13,001 – 16,000 dinars	11. 42,001 – 48,000 dinars	17. Above 100,000 dinars
6. 16,001 – 20,000 dinars	12. 48,001 – 56,000 dinars	18. Does not want to answer

8. Place of birth: _____ (village/town/city)

_____ (state)

9. Place of birth of your mother: _____(village/town/city)

_____ (state)

10. Place of birth of your father: _____(village/town/city)

_____ (state)

11. Are you a citizen of Serbia?

    a. Yes

    b. Now

    c. Does not want to indicate

Survey questionnaire – Serbian translation

I   Molim da odgovorite na skali od 1 do 7, gde 1 znači "Uopšte ne verujem" a 7 znači "U potpunosti verujem" koliko lično verujete …

1.   … vestima koje se objavljuju u novinama.

Uopšte ne verujem 1---2---3---4---5---6---7 U potpunosti verujem

2.   … vestima koje se objavljuju na televiziji.

Uopšte ne verujem 1---2---3---4---5---6---7   U potpunosti verujem

3.   … vestima koje se objavljuju na radiju.

Uopšte ne verujem 1---2---3---4---5---6---7 U potpunosti verujem

4.   … vestima koje se objavljuju na Internetu.

Uopšte ne verujem 1---2---3---4---5---6---7   U potpunosti verujem

II   Imajući u vidu pokrivanje teme ekonomske krize u <u>informativnim</u> medijima u Srbiji (uopšteno), molim odgovite da li se 1 = uopšte ne slažete; 2= ne slažete; 3=delimično ne slažete; 4=niti slažete niti ne slažete; 5=delimično slažete; 6=slažete; ili se 7=u potpunosti slažete, sa sledećim izjavama.

1.   Dovoljno pažnje se posvećuje temi ekonomske krize.

Uopšte se ne slažem –1—2—3—4—5—6—7—U potpunosti se slažem

2.   Temi ekonomske krize se daje adekvatan status.

Uopšte se ne slažem –1—2—3—4—5—6—7—U potpunosti se slažem

3. Učestalost pokrivanja teme ekonomske krize je adekvatna.

   Uopšte se ne slažem –1—2—3—4—5—6—7—U potpunosti se slažem

4. Kada za tim postoji potreba, tema se obrađuje redovno.

   Uopšte se ne slažem –1—2—3—4—5—6—7—U potpunosti se ne slažem

5. U medijske izveštaje o ekonomskoj krizi uključuju se neophodni elementi.

   Uopšte se ne slažem –1—2—3—4—5—6—7—U potpunosti se ne slažem

6. Pažnja se usresređuje na važne činjenice.

   Uopšte se ne slažem –1—2—3—4—5—6—7—U potpunosti se slažem

7. Daju se sve važne informacije o temi ekonomske krize.

   Uopšte se ne slažem –1—2—3—4—5—6—7—U potpunosti se slažem

8. U medijskim izveštajima su predstavljene različite tačke gledišta.

   Uopšte se ne slažem –1—2—3—4—5—6—7—U potpunosti se slažem

9. Informacije predstavljene u medijskim izveštajima mogu biti proverene.

   Uopšte se ne slažem –1—2—3—4—5—6—7—U potpunosti se slažem

10. Informacije iznete u medijskim izveštajima su tačne.

    Uopšte se ne slažem –1—2—3—4—5—6—7—U potpunosti se slažem

11. Činjenice se iznose istinito u izveštajima informativnih medija.

    Uopšte se ne slažem –1—2—3—4—5—6—7—U potpunosti se slažem

12. Činjenice koje dobijam iz informativnih medija o ekonomskoj krizi su tačne.

    Uopšte se ne slažem –1—2—3—4—5—6—7—U potpunosti se slažem

13. Kritike u informativnim medijima se izražavaju na adekvatan način.

    Uopšte se ne slažem –1—2—3—4—5—6—7—U potpunosti se slažem

14. Mišljenja novinara su dobro utemeljena.

Uopšte se ne slažem –1—2—3—4—5—6—7—U potpunosti se slažem

15. Novinarski komentari o ekonomskoj krizi su rezultat dubokog promišljanja.

Uopšte se ne slažem –1—2—3—4—5—6—7—U upotpunosti se slažem

16. Mislim da su ocene novinara o temi ekonomske krize korisne.

Uopšte se ne slažem –1—2—3—4—5—6—7—U potpunosti se slažem

III   Imajući u vidu ljude koje NE POZNAJETE, molim Vas odogovorite na sledeća pitanja.

1. Uopšteno govoreći, da li smatrate da se većini ljudi može verovati, ili da nikada ne možete biti previše oprezni? Molim odgovorite na skali od 1 do 7 gde 1 znači da nikada ne možete biti previše oprezni a 7 da se većini ljudi može verovati.

Nikada ne možete biti previše oprezni 1—2—3—4—5—6—7 Većini ljudi se može verovati

2. Da li mislite da bi većina ljudi pokušala da Vas iskoristi, ukoliko bi imala priliku, ili bi pokušala da bude fer ?

Većina ljudi bi pokušala 1—2—3—4—5—6—7 Većina ljudi bi pokušala

da me iskoristi   da bude fer

3. Da li smatrate da, u većini slučajeva, ljudi pokušavaju da pomognu drugima ili da uglavnom gledaju sebe?

Ljudi uglavnom gledaju   Ljudi uglavnom pokušavaju

sebe   1—2—3—4—5—6—7   da pomognu drugima

IV Sada bih želeo-la da Vam postavim nekoliko pitanja o Vama.

1. Koliko često se družite s prijateljima, rođacima i-ili kolegama? (ne poslovno)

    Nikad -1

    Ređe od jednom mesečno– 2

    Jednom mesečno – 3

    Nekoliko puta mesečno – 4

    Jednom nedeljno – 5

    Nekoliko puta nedeljno – 6

    Svaki dan – 7

2. U poredjenju sa drugim ljudima vaših godina, koliko često učestvujete u društvenim aktivnostima?

    Mnogo manje nego drugi – 1

    Manje nego drugi- 2

    Uglavnom podjednako – 3

    Više nego drugi- 4

    Mnogo više nego drugi- 5

V Sada ću Vam pročitati nekoliko kratkih priča i zamoliti Vas da odgovorite na jedno pitanje posle svake od njih.

1. Miloš je novinar u Srbiji. Prošle godine Miloš je pomogao svom bratu od strica, građevinaru po struci, da se zaposli kao novinar.

Po Vašem mišljenju, koliko je Miloš spreman da kao novinar radi u najboljem interesu građana?

Uopšte nije spreman 1---2---3---4---5---6---7   Veoma je spreman

2. Lazar je novinar u Srbiji. Radeći na priči o uspesima naših mladih stručnjaka, Lazar je kao primer najuspešnijeg mladog matematičara naveo svog sestrića, iako je znao da jedan drugi učenik Matematičke gimazije iz Beograda ima bolje ocene i više priznanja sa međunardonih takmičenja.

Po Vašem mišljenju, koliko je Lazar spreman da kao novinar radi u najboljem interesu građana?

Uopšte nije spreman 1---2---3---4---5---6---7   Veoma je spreman

3. Jovan je novinar u Srbiji. Jednog dana, jedan poznati političar ga je zamolio da ne objavi istraživački članak o ljubavnoj aferi koju je imao. Političar je obećao da će vratiti uslugu Jovanu. Jovan je prihvatio i nije objavio članak.

Po Vašem mišljenju, koliko je Jovan spreman da kao novinar radi u najboljem interesu građana?

Uopšte nije spreman 1---2---3---4---5---6---7   Veoma je spreman

4. Milan je novinar u Srbiji. Jednog dana poznati političar ga je zamolio da ne objavi članak na kojem je radio, a koji se bavio učešćem tog političara u političkim prepucavanjima unutar vladajuće koalciije. Zauzvrat, političar je dao Milanu flašu viskija i boks cigareta. Milan je prihvatio i nije objavio članak.

Po Vašem mišljenju, koliko je Milan spreman da kao novinar radi u najboljem interesu građana?

Uopšte nije spreman 1---2---3---4---5---6---7   Veoma je spreman

5. Zoran je novinar u Srbiji. Poznati političar ga je zamolio da ne objavi članak o kriminalnim aktivnostima u koje je bio umešan i dao mu 150 evra. Zoran je prihvatio i nije objavio članak.

Po Vašem mišljenju, koliko je Zoran spreman da kao novinar radi u najboljem interesu građana?

Uopšte nije spreman 1---2---3---4---5---6---7   Veoma je spreman

6. Petar je novinar u Srbiji. Poznati političar ga je zamolio da ne objavi članak o tome da
    je političar skrivao informacije o pravom stanju nezaposlenosti u zemlji. Političar je
    dao Petru 1000 evra. Petar je prihvatio i nije objavio članak.

Po Vašem mišljenju, koliko je Petar spreman da kao novinar radi u najboljem interesu građana?

Uopšte nije spreman 1---2---3---4---5---6---7   Veoma je spreman

VI Molim Vas da odgovorite na sledeća pitanja.

1. Koliko dana u nedelji raspravljate o vestima sa članovima porodice ili sa
    prijateljima?

    0—1—2—3—4—5—6—7

2. Koliko dana u nedelji slušate radio?

    0—1—2—3—4—5—6—7

3. Koliko dana u nedelji čitate novine?

    0—1—2—3—4—5—6—7

4. Koliko dana u nedelji gledate televiziju?

    0—1—2—3—4—5—6—7

5. Koliko dana u nedelji koristite Internet?

    0—1—2—3—4—5—6—7

6. Molim Vas navedite koji medij je Vaš glavni izvor informisanja?

    _____

7. Na skali od (1) Ne, uopšte do (7) U velikoj meri, molim Vas navedite u kojoj meri verujete da vlada Srbije postupa ispravno?

    Ne, uopšte 1—2—3—4—5—6—7 U velikoj meri

8. Na skali od (1) Ne, uopšte do (7) U velikoj meri, molim Vas navedite koliko se rukovodite verskim načelima u skakodnevnom životu.

    Ne, uopšte 1—2—3—4—5—6—7 U velikoj meri

9. Na skali od (0) Nikad do (7) Svake nedelje, molim navedite koliko često prisustvujete verskoj službi.

    Nikad 0 —1—2—3—4—5—6—7 Svake nedelje

10. Na skali od (1) Uopšte nije važna do (7) Veoma je važna, molim navedite koliko je važna uloga koju religija igra u Vašem životu.

    Uopšte nije važna —1—2—3—4—5—6—7 Veoma je važna

11. Na skali od (0) Nikad do (7) Svake nedelje, molim navedite koliko se često molite.

    Nikad 0—1—2—3—4—5—6—7 Svake nedelje

12. Molim Vas recite mi na skali od 1 do 7 koliko lično verujete svakoj od navedenih institucija. 1 znači da uopšte ne verujete a 7 znači da imate potpuno poverenje.

	Uopšte ne verujem						*Potpuno verujem*
…Skupštini Srbije	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
…pravosudju	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
…policiji	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
…političkim strankama	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
…Evropskom parlamentu	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
…Ujedinjenim nacijama	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

13. Uopšteno govoreći, koliko ste u celini zadovoljni svojim životom? Molim da odgovorite na skali od 1 do 7, gde 1 znači da ste izrazito nezadovoljni a 7 znači da ste izrazito zadovoljni.

Izrazito nezadovoljan-na   1—2—3—4—5—6—7 Izrazito zadovoljan-na

14. Uopšteno govoreći, koliko biste rekli da ste srećni?

Izrazito neserećan-na   1—2—3—4—5—6—7 Izrazito srećan-na

VII   Sada bih želeo-la da Vam postavim nekoliko pitanja o demokratiji u Srbiji. Molim Vas da imate na umu da ne postoje tačni ili netačni oddgovori, već samo tražim od Vas da mi kažete šta mislite. U kojoj meri se, po Vašem mišljenju, svaka od navedenih izjava odnosi na Srbiju? 1 znači da se uopšte ne odnosi a 7 da se odnosi u potpunosti.

1. Izbori u Srbiji su slobodni i fer.

Uopšte se ne odnosi 1—2—3—4—5—6—7 Odnosi se u potpunosti

2. Građani Srbije raspravljaju o politici sa drugima pre nego što odluče kako će glasati.

Uopšte se ne odnosi 1—2—3—4—5—6—7 Odnosi se u potpunosti

3. Političke stranke nude jasne alternative jedna drugoj.

Uopšte se ne odnosi   1—2—3—4—5—6—7 Odnosi se u potpunosti

4. Opozicione stranke mogu slobodno da kritikuju Vladu.

Uopšte se ne odnosi   1—2—3—4—5—6—7 Odnosi se u potpunosti

5. Mediji u Srbiji mogu slobodno da kritikuju Vladu.

Uopšte se ne odnosi   1—2—3—4—5—6—7 Odnosi se u potpunosti

VIII Molim odgovite da li se 1 = uopšte ne slažete; 2= ne slažete; 3=delimično ne slažete; 4=niti slažete niti ne slažete; 5=delimično slažete; 6=slažete; ili se 7=u potpunosti slažete, sa sledećim izjavama.

1. Srbija bi trebalo da zabrani određenim rasnim i verskim grupama da žive u našoj zemlji.

Uopšte se ne slažem –1—2—3—4—5—6—7—U potpunosti se slažem

2. Rasne predrasude mogu biti dobra stvar zato što sprečavaju da mnogi nepodobni stranci dodju u Srbiju.

Uopšte se ne slažem –1—2—3—4—5—6—7—U potpunosti se slažem

3. U slučaju nužde, trebalo bi da budemo spremni da smanjimo životni standard, kako bi, u saradnji sa drugim zemljama, postigli podjednak standard za sve ljude na svetu.

Uopšte se ne slažem –1—2—3—4—5—6—7—U potpunosti se slažem

4. Moja zemlja nema moralnih obaveza da deli svoja tehnološka i privredna bogatsva sa siromašnijim ljudima na svetu.

Uopšte se ne slažem –1—2—3—4—5—6—7—U potpunosti se slažem

5. Bogate zemlje bi trebalo da dele svoja bogatsva sa siromašnijima.

Uopšte se ne slažem –1—2—3—4—5—6—7—U potpunosti se slažem

6. Građanima Srbije bi trebalo dozvoliti postizanje željenog životnog standarda bez obzira na posledice koje to može imati na životnu sredinu i prirodne resurse planete.

Uopšte se ne slažem –1—2—3—4—5—6—7—U potpunosti se slažem

7. Svakoj osobi bi trebalo da bude dozvoljeno da živi gde god hoće na svetu.

Uopšte se ne slažem –1—2—3—4—5—6—7—U potpunosti se slažem

8. Bolje bi bilo biti građanin sveta nego neke određene zemlje.

Uopšte se ne slažem –1—2—3—4—5—6—7—U potpunosti se slažem

9. Vlade pojedinačnih država trebalo bi da budu zamenjene jednom centralnom svetskom vladom.

   Uopšte se ne slažem –1—2—3—4—5—6—7—U potpunosti se slažem

10. Medjunarodne policijske snage bi trebalo da budu jedina oružana grupa na svetu.

   Uopšte se ne slažem –1—2—3—4—5—6—7—U potpunosti se slažem

11. Ustupci Srbije drugim državama su moralno opravdani ukoliko je to u interesu mira u svetu.

   Uopšte se ne slažem –1—2—3—4—5—6—7—U potpunosti se slažem

IX Koliko mislite da je korupcija rasprostranjena u informativnim medijima u Srbiji? Molim Vas odgovorite na skali od (1) Nije uopšte rasprostranjena do (7) Izrazito je rasprostranjena.

   Nije uopšte rasprostranjena 1---2---3---4---5---6---7   Izrazito je rasprostranjena

X I za kraj, bih želeo-la da Vam postavim još nekoliko pitanja o Vama.

12. Koliko imate godina? _____

13. Kog ste pola?

   a. Muški

   b. Ženski

14. Koju političku partiju podržavate?

   a. Socijalističku Partiju Srbije (SPS)

   b. Demokratsku Stranku (DS)

    c.   Demokratsku Stranku Srbije (DSS)

    d.   Srpsku Radikalnu Stranku (SRS)

    e.   Liberalno Demokratsku Partiju (LDP)

    f.   Srpsku Naprednu Stranku (SNS)

    g.   Neku drugu (molim navedite) _____

    h.   Nijednu

15. Koji je Vaš nivo obrazovanja? (najviši dostignuti nivo-diploma)

    a.   Manje od osnovne škole

    b.   Osnovna škola

    c.   Srednja škola

    d.   Osnovne studije

    e.   Master studije ili magistratura

    f.   Doktorat

16. Koja je Vaše versko opredeljenje?

    a.   Pravoslavno

    b.   Katoličko

    c.   Islamsko

    d.   Judaističko (Jevrejsko)

    e.   Drugo (molim navedite)_____

    f.   Nisam verski opredeljen-a

    g.   Ne želi da navede

17. Koja je Vaša nacionalna pripadnost?

    _____

18. Koja su Vam prosečna mesečna primanja po domaćinstvu?

19. Bez prihoda	25. 20001 do 24000 dinara	31. 56001 do 64000 dinara
20. Ispod 8000 dinara	26. 24001 do 30000 dinara	32. 64001 do 74000 dinara
21. 8001 do 10000 dinara	27. 30001 do 36000 dinara	33. 74001 do 86000 dinara
22. 10001 do 13000 dinara	28. 36001 do 42000 dinara	34. 86001 do 100000 dinara
23. 13001 do 16000 dinara	29. 42001 do 48000 dinara	35. Preko 100000 dinara
24. 16001 do 20000 dinara	30. 48001 do 56000 dinara	36. BO (Odbija da odgovori)

19. Mesto rođenja: _____ (selo-grad)

_____ (država)

20. Mesto rođenja majke: _____(selo-grad)

_____ (država)

21. Mesto rođenja oca: _____(selo-grad)

_____ (država)

22. Da li ste državljanin Srbije?

    a. Da

    b. Ne

    c. Ne želi da navede

Appendix C: Tables

Table 1: Levels of Trust in News Media, Generalized Trust and News Media Performance (measured as Trust in Corrupt Journalists and Perceived News Media Corruption) in Serbia

	N	Range	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
Trust in News Media	544	6.00	1.00	7.00	3.7346	1.25976
Generalized Trust	544	6.00	1.00	7.00	2.8989	1.38031
Trust in Corrupt Journalists	544	6.00	1.00	7.00	1.6489	.90028
Perceived News Media Corruption	544	6.00	1.00	7.00	5.26	1.406
Valid N	544					

Table 2: Summary of Hierarchical Regression Analysis Predicting Trust in News Media with Trust in Corrupt Journalists as Proxy for News Media Performance

Variable	B	p	Partial Correlation	Part Correlation	R^2	R^2 Change	F Change	Sign. F Change
Step 1					.148			
Pol. Party Affiliation	-.025	.662	-.023	-.021				
Income	.000	.997	.000	.000				
Gender	-.036	.476	-.038.	-.035				
Trust in Government	.372	.000	.317	.309				
Discussion of News	.041	.418	.043	.040				
Religiosity	.071	.172	.072	.067				
Media Use	.061	.306	.054	.050				
Education	-.058	.348	-.050	-.046				
Age	-.085	.136	-.079	-.073				
Step 2					.192	.045	9.843	.000
Pol. Party Affiliation	.012	.825	.012	.011				
Income	.002	.974	.002	.002				
Gender	-.026	.595	-.028	-.025				
Trust in Government	.321	.000	.278	.260				
Discussion of News	.039	.431	.042	.038				
Religiosity	.075	.145	.077	.070				
Media Use	.033	.570	.030	.027				
Education	-.060	.317	-.053	-.048				
Age	-.082	.141	-.078	-.070				
Gen. Trust	**.119**	**.021**	**.122**	**.111**				
Trust in Corrupt Journalists	**.163**	**.001**	**.173**	**.158**				

Note: Political party affiliation was dichotomized and coded as 1: those supporting two main political parties in power (Serbian progressive Party and Socialist Party of Serbia) and 0: those supporting all other parties. Gender was coded as 1: Male 0: Female.

Table 3: Summary of Step 3 of Hierarchical Regression Analysis Predicting Trust in News Media with Trust in Corrupt Journalists as Proxy for News Media Performance and with Age as Moderating Variable between Generalized Trust and Trust in News Media

Variable	b	p	Partial Correlation	Part Correlation	R^2	R^2 Change	F Change	Sign. F Change
Step 3					.192	.000	.006	.937
Pol. Party Affiliation	.012	.827	.012	.010				
Income	.001	.984	.001	.001				
Gender	-.026	.597	-.028	-.025				
Trust in Government	.322	.000	.277	.259				
Discussion of News	.039	.431	.042	.038				
Religiosity	.075	.148	.077	.069				
Media Use	.033	.570	.030	.027				
Education	-.060	.318	-.053	-.048				
Age	-.090	.455	-.040	-.036				
Generalized Trust	.109	.452	.040	.036				
Trust in Corrupt Journalists	.163	.001	.173	.158				
Age X Gen.Trust	**.014**	**.937**	**.004**	**.004**				

Note: Political party affiliation was dichotomized and coded as 1: those supporting two main political parties in power (Serbian progressive Party and Socialist Party of Serbia) and 0: those supporting all other parties. Gender was coded as 1: Male 0: Female.

Table 4: Summary of Step 3 of Hierarchical Regression Analysis Predicting Trust in News Media with Trust in Corrupt Journalists as Proxy for News Media Performance and with Education as Moderating Variable between Generalized Trust and Trust in News Media

Variable	B	P	Partial Correlation	Part Correlation	R^2	R^2 Change	F Change	Sign. F Change
Step 3					.195	.002	1.068	.302
Pol. Party Affiliation	.012	.838	.011	.010				
Income	.003	.957	.003	.003				
Gender	-.030	.548	-.032	-.029				
Trust in Government	.325	.000	.281	.263				
Discussion of News	.038	.450	.040	.036				
Religiosity	.072	.164	.074	.067				
Media Use	.038	.519	.034	.031				
Education	.040	.725	.019	.017				
Age	-.079	.156	-.075	-.068				
Generalized Trust	.245	.064	.098	.088				
Trust in Corrupt Journalists	.159	.001	.169	.153				
Education X Gen. Trust	**-.181**	**.302**	**-.055**	**-.049**				

Note: Political party affiliation was dichotomized and coded as 1: those supporting two main political parties in power (Serbian progressive Party and Socialist Party of Serbia) and 0: those supporting all other parties. Gender was coded as 1: Male 0: Female.

Table 5: Summary of Step 3 of Hierarchical Regression Analysis Predicting Trust in News Media with Trust in Corrupt Journalists as Proxy for News Media Performance and with Political Affiliation as Moderating Variable between Generalized Trust and Trust in News Media

Variable		B	P	Partial Correlation	Part Correlation	R^2	R^2 change	F change	Sign. F change
Step 3						.193	.001	.279	.598
	Pol. Party Affiliation	-.042	.722	-.019	-.017				
	Income	.000	.994	.000	.000				
	Gender	-.024	.625	-.026	-.023				
	Trust in Government	.324	.000	.280	.262				
	Discussion of News	.041	.410	.044	.039				
	Religiosity	.076	.138	.079	.071				
	Media Use	.030	.602	.028	.025				
	Education	-.059	.332	-.052	-.046				
	Age	-.083.	.135	-.079	-.072				
	Generalized Trust	.098	.131	.080	.072				
	Trust in Corrupt Journalists	.162	.001	.172	.157				
	Pol. Party X Gen. Trust	**.061**	**.598**	**.028**	**.025**				

Note: Political party affiliation was dichotomized and coded as 1: those supporting two main political parties in power (Serbian progressive Party and Socialist Party of Serbia) and 0: those supporting all other parties. Gender was coded as 1: Male 0: Female.

Table 6: Summary of Hierarchical Regression Analysis Predicting Trust in News Media with Perceived News Media Corruption as Proxy for News Media Performance

Variable	b	p	Partial Correlation	Part Correlation	R^2	R^2 Change	F Change	Sign. F Change
Step 1					.148			
Pol. Party Affiliation	-.025	.662	-.023	-.021				
Income	.000	.997	.000	.000				
Gender	-.036	.476	-.038	-.035				
Trust in Government	.372	.000	.317	.309				
Discussion of News	.041	.418	.043	.040				
Religiosity	.071	.172	.072	.067				
Media Use	.061	.306	.054	.050				
Education	-.058	.348	-.050	-.046				
Age	-.085	.136	-.079	-.073				
Step 2					.237	.089	20.806	.000
Pol. Party Affiliation	-.023	.678	-.022	-.019				
Income	.022	.687	.021	.019				
Gender	.001	.976	.002	.001				
Trust in Government	.297	.000	.265	.240				
Discussion of News	.040	.828	.044	.038				
Religiosity	.064	.196	.069	.060				
Media Use	.038	.504	.035	.031				
Education	-.068	.246	-.062	-.054				
Age	-.082	.127	-.081	-.071				
Gen. Trust	**.123**	**.013**	**.131**	**.116**				
Perceived News Media Corruption	**-.274**	**.000**	**-.289**	**-.264**				

Note: Political party affiliation was dichotomized and coded as 1: those supporting two main political parties in power (Serbian progressive Party and Socialist Party of Serbia) and 0: those supporting all other parties. Gender was coded as 1: Male 0: Female.

Table 7: Summary of Step 3 of Hierarchical Regression Analysis Predicting Trust in News Media with Perceived News Media Corruption as Proxy for News Media Performance and with Age as Moderating Variable between Generalized Trust and Trust in News Media

Variable	b	p	Partial Correlation	Part Correlation	R^2	R^2 Change	F Change	Sign. F Change
Step 3					.237	.000	.120	.720
Pol. Party Affiliation	-.022	.684	-.022	-.019				
Income	.025	.652	.024	.021				
Gender	.001	.979	.001	.001				
Trust in Government	.295	.000	.261	.236				
Discussion of News	.039	.417	.043	.038				
Religiosity	.066	.189	.070	.061				
Media Use	.038	.503	.036	.031				
Education	-.046	.695	-.062	-.054				
Age	-.090	.455	-.021	-.018				
Generalized Trust	.169	.229	.064	.056				
Perceived News Media Corruption	-.275	.000	-.289	-.264				
Age X Gen.Trust	**-.059**	**.729**	**-.018**	**-.016**				

Note: Political party affiliation was dichotomized and coded as 1: those supporting two main political parties in power (Serbian progressive Party and Socialist Party of Serbia) and 0: those supporting all other parties. Gender was coded as 1: Male 0: Female.

Table 8: Summary of Step 3 of Hierarchical Regression Analysis Predicting Trust in News Media with Perceived News Media Corruption as Proxy for News Media Performance and with Education as Moderating Variable between Generalized Trust and Trust in News Media

Variable		b	p	Partial Correlation	Part Correlation	R^2	R^2 Change	F Change	Sign. F Change
Step 3						.239	.002	.725	.395
	Pol. Party Affiliation	-.023	.675	-.022	-.019				
	Income	.023	.676	.022	.019				
	Gender	-.002	.979	-.002	-.002				
	Trust in Government	.300	.000	.267	.242				
	Discussion of News	.039	.423	.043	.037				
	Religiosity	.062	.214	.066	.058				
	Media Use	.041	.466	.039	.034				
	Education	.013	.114	.006	.005				
	Age	-.080	.138	-.079	-.069				
	Generalized Trust	.224	.081	.093	.081				
	Perceived News Media Corruption	-.270	.000	-.285	-.259				
	Education X Gen. Trust	**-.145**	**.395**	**-.045**	**-.040**				

Note: Political party affiliation was dichotomized and coded as 1: those supporting two main political parties in power (Serbian progressive Party and Socialist Party of Serbia) and 0: those supporting all other parties. Gender was coded as 1: Male 0: Female.

Table 9: Summary of Step 3 of Hierarchical Regression Analysis Predicting Trust in News Media with Perceived News Media Corruption as Proxy for News Media Performance and with Political Affiliation as Moderating Variable between Generalized Trust and Trust in News Media

Variable	B	p	Partial Correlation	Part Correlation	R^2	R^2 change	F change	Sign. F change
Step 3					.237	.000	.053	.818
Pol. Party Affiliation	-.046	.689	-.019	-.017				
Income	.021	.703	.000	.000				
Gender	.002	.964	-.026	-.023				
Trust in Government	.298	.000	.280	.262				
Discussion of News	.041	.400	.044	.039				
Religiosity	.065	.192	.079	.071				
Media Use	.037	.518	.028	.025				
Education	-.067	.252	-.052	-.046				
Age	-.083	.125	-.079	-.072				
Generalized Trust	.114	.069	.080	.072				
Perceived News Media Corruption	-.273	.000	.172	.157				
Pol. Party X Gen. Trust	**.026**	**.818**	**.028**	**.025**				

Note: Political party affiliation was dichotomized and coded as 1: those supporting two main political parties in power (Serbian progressive Party and Socialist Party of Serbia) and 0: those supporting all other parties. Gender was coded as 1: Male 0: Female.

Table 10: Correlation Matrix of Indepedent and Dependent Variables

		Trust News Media	Gen.Trust	Trust in Corrupt Journalists	Perception of News Media Corruption
Trust News Media	Pearson Correlation	1	.214**	.198**	-.332**
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.000	.000	.000
	N	544	544	544	544
Gen.Trust	Pearson Correlation	.214**	1	.183**	-.090*
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000		.000	.036
	N	544	544	544	544
Trust in Corrupt Journalists	Pearson Correlation	.198**	.183**	1	-.153**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000		.000
	N	544	544	544	544
Perception of News Media Corruption	Pearson Correlation	-.332**	-.090*	-.153**	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.036	.000	
	N	544	544	544	544

Note: **. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). *. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

VITA

Ivanka Pješivac (Pjesivac) was born on June 1, 1978, in Belgrade, Serbia, to the parents of Slavica and Maksim Radović. She is the first of three children: Nataša and Milutin. She finished her elementary, high school and college education in Belgrade, where she obtained her Bachelor's degree in French Language and Literature. She also studied French at the University of Nancy, France. She worked for 10 years at the news department of Radio-Television of Serbia in Belgrade. Her career at RTS included reporting and producing news about political, foreign affairs, and war crimes issues. Ivanka covered most of the significant political events in Serbia from 2003 to 2007 and was RTS's permanent correspondent from the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in The Hague, the Netherlands. During her journalistic career, she pursued several professional development programs in France, Switzerland, and the United States.

After spending a professional development year in the United States on a State Department scholarship (2007-2008) and collaborating with CNN on stories concerning Serbia, she decided to pursue an academic career. She obtained her Master's Degree in Communication and Information at the University of Tennessee, Knoxville in 2010 with the topic "Radio-Television of Serbia (1989-2009): The Changing Role of State TV in a post-Communist Country" and enrolled the University of Tennessee's doctoral program in Communication and Information. During her doctoral studies she taught classes in news media writing and international communication, and conducted multinational survey research and analysis for DataONE, a world-wide project for scientific data archiving. Her research efforts have been awarded several times: Best Debut Paper (BEA 2013); Top Student Paper (AEJMC 2012); UT-CCI Best

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Ivanka's research interests are in international and cross-cultural communication and new media, and she plans to pursue them as an Assistant Professor of Digital and Broadcast Journalism at the University of Georgia, starting August 2014.