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## **Framing the Internet in China: Cross-Cultural Comparisons of Newspapers' Coverage in China, Hong Kong, Singapore, the United States, and the United Kingdom**

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To the Graduate Council:

I am submitting herewith a dissertation written by Xiang Zhou entitled "Framing the Internet in China: Cross-Cultural Comparisons of Newspapers' Coverage in China, Hong Kong, Singapore, the United States, and the United Kingdom." I have examined the final electronic copy of this dissertation for form and content and recommend that it be accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, with a major in Communication and Information.

Catherine A. Luther, Major Professor

We have read this dissertation and recommend its acceptance:

Dorothy A. Bowles, Sally J. McMillan, Ramon V. Leon

Accepted for the Council:

Carolyn R. Hodges

Vice Provost and Dean of the Graduate School

(Original signatures are on file with official student records.)

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Ramón V. León

Accepted for the Council:

Anne Mayhew  
Vice Chancellor and  
Dean of Graduate Studies

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**Framing the Internet in China:  
Cross-Cultural Comparisons of Newspapers' Coverage  
in China, Hong Kong, Singapore,  
the United States and the United Kingdom**

**A Dissertation  
Presented for the  
Doctor of Philosophy Degree  
The University of Tennessee, Knoxville**

**Xiang Zhou  
August 2006**

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## **DEDICATION**

To my parents, with love and gratitude,

ZHOU Bi-wen and YU Qi,

for supporting me to reach this goal.

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## **ABSTRACT**

This study introduced the framing theory, Shoemaker and Reese's hierarchical model, and Hofstede's cultural dimensions into a cross-cultural comparative analysis of news coverage of the Internet in China from 2000 to 2004 in selected newspapers in China, Hong Kong, Singapore, the United States and the United Kingdom.

Significant differences were found to exist across the societies in both the salience of Internet-related issues and the usage of generic news frames. The issue of Internet diffusion and use was most frequently mentioned in the newspapers from China, Singapore, and the United Kingdom. The U.S. newspapers paid most attention to the issue of Internet censorship and regulations; whereas the issue of e-commerce and Internet business most frequently appeared in the newspapers from Hong Kong. In terms of generic news frames, the newspapers from China were significantly more likely to use the human interest, morality and leadership frames. The newspapers from Hong Kong mainly relied on the factual and economic consequences frames to report the Internet in mainland China. The U.S. and U.K. newspapers were distinct for their highly frequent usage of the conflict frame.

This study also investigated how much variations in media framing could be explained by such national-level factors as freedom status and cultural dimensions across societies. Logistic regression models indicated that the patterns of influence varied across the societies with different types of news frames and their associations with different types of Internet-related issues. The cultural dimension of long-/short-term orientation was found to be a general factor influencing the presence of different types of news frames.

In addition, a literature review of the changing Chinese media suggests that the Chinese press has become increasingly diversified in both structure and function. Therefore, another goal of the study was to test the influence of extramedia-level factors within a society by examining whether the framing of the Internet in the leading Party organ newspaper, the *People's Daily*, would differ from the *Beijing Youth Daily*, a local newspaper with national influence and more financial and operational autonomy. They differed from each other in presenting the politically sensitive issue, Internet censorship and regulations.

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## **CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION**

The rapid growth of the Internet, and in particular the World Wide Web, has attracted a number of research interests across disciplines. Although China, the 71<sup>st</sup> country to join the Internet, embraced the so-called fourth medium later than did most developed countries, the Internet has penetrated China at an exponentially rapid rate since the end of the last century. According to statistics provided by the Chinese Internet Network Information Center (CNNIC), the population of Internet users reported in January 2006 is 111 million, which is 179 times as much as that in November 1997 (*Semiannual statistical report on the Internet development in China*).

Such a leapfrog development has drawn intensive interests from researchers both in China and abroad, with particular attention to such issues as Internet diffusion and use, the government's cyberstrategies, particularly its control of the Internet, and the implications of the Internet for freedom of expression and China's democratization. Only one study has been found to provide a rough picture of the Internet in China portrayed in news stories. McMillan and Hwang (2002) compared an English-language newspaper published in China and four U.S. newspapers to see how such Internet-related topics as business and economic concerns, culture and social issues, and law and policy directions were covered in the newspapers. No specific theories of media content directed the descriptive presentations, and no explanations were given to the differences in coverage between the newspapers in China and the United States and how the underlying political and cultural factors might affect coverage, thus leaving areas for further research. The current study aims to systematically conduct multicultural comparisons of framing

China's Internet<sup>1</sup> in selected newspapers in mainland China, Hong Kong, Singapore, the United States, and the United Kingdom, during the time period from 2000 to 2004, to see how the differences of political systems and cultural dimensions across the societies might affect issue selections and news frames in stories.

Chapter 2 provides information about the origin and history of the Internet in China, with attention paid to the incentives for the Chinese government to promote Internet development, while a political and cultural understanding of the Chinese government's attempts to control the Internet is also given. Previous scholarly research is briefly integrated into the descriptions and interpretations of China's Internet.

Chapter 3 introduces research on media content and influences on media content, such as Shoemaker and Reese's hierarchical model, and media framing that provides a theoretical framework for the current study, which focuses on the socio-political, ideological and cultural factors at the macro level that shape media content. The seminal work of Hofstede (1980) and subsequent studies in cultural dimensions lays the conceptual foundation for relating the variants of frame to the impacts of culture.

Chapter 4 is devoted to a review of the changing role of the media in China, including the Party organ press's struggle in the commercialized media market. Such an investigation serves as a proper rationale for a comparison of the differences between the *People's Daily*, the leading Party organ newspaper in China, and the *Beijing Youth Daily*, a local newspaper with national influence, to see whether the newspapers might be

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<sup>1</sup> The phrase *China's Internet* is used in the paper in a general way, referring to any aspects of the Internet, from Internet growth to Internet use to Internet regulation, in China. It does not imply there is a separate Internet specifically belonging to China.

different in news coverage of the new medium with the dynamic of structural change of media and the fast diffusion of the Internet in China.

The other chapters inform readers of research questions/hypotheses, methods, and results. Chapter 5 addresses the research objectives and research questions/hypotheses. Chapter 6 details the methodological steps and the reasons for undertaking the steps as a process of answering the research questions and testing the research hypotheses. Chapter 7 presents the results of the current study. Chapter 8 offers discussion about the findings, the contributions and limitations of the study and suggestions for future research.

While exploring the frames constructed in the new stories of the examined newspapers and providing a dynamic picture of the Internet in China as painted in the newspapers, this study also attempts to test empirically the predictability of the assumed factors in the literature, that is, the underlying political and cultural differences in societies. It examines how those factors might affect news frames of the Internet in China, and the integrated influences of those factors on news frames building. Such tests are mainly based on a quantitative content analysis. In addition, the quantitative comparison between the selected Chinese newspapers aims to see the effects of organizational and extramedia of factors as represented by the Shoemaker and Reese model.

## **CHAPTER II.**

### **BUILDING A REGULATED NETWORKED EMPIRE: A REVIEW OF THE INTERNET IN CHINA**

On September 20, 1987, Professor Qian Tianbai sent China's first e-mail titled "Crossing the Great Wall to Join the World" (*yueguo changcheng, zouxiang shijie*), after the China Academic Network (CANet), the first computer network in China, was set up. The network provided e-mail access and support for academic and science research in computer science (*Evolution of Internet in China*; Tsui, 2001). On March 2, 1993, a 64K dedicated circuit to the Stanford Linear Accelerator Center (SLAC), built by the Institute of High-Energy Physics under the Chinese Academic of Sciences (CAS), was opened officially. China was not accepted to directly and fully connect to the Internet until April 1994 (*Evolution of Internet in China*). Since then, the Internet has penetrated China at an exponentially rapid rate. The tremendous progress of telecommunications in recent years has provided a matrix for the development of Internet in mainland China.

The Chinese government has actively encouraged and invested in the growth of the Internet to capture the Internet's vast commercial potential. The central government has encouraged the competing state-owned telecommunications providers, China Telecom (*zhongguo dianxin*), China Unicom (*zhongguo liantong*), China Mobile (*zhongguo yidong tongxun*), China Netcom (*zhongguo wangtong*), JiTong Communications Company (*jitong tongxun gongsi*), and China Railway Telecom (*zhongguo tiantong*), to build their own networks. Government-funded technology parks provide low-cost homes for Internet start-ups, and Beijing offers tax breaks for high-tech firms. On the other hand, China has also exerted state control over the Internet and its

use, preventing this commercial gold mine from becoming political quicksand. Faced with an entirely new networked society, and potential political or social challenges that the new medium may bring, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has utilized a multiple-part network control strategy to create the maximum possible scope of official authority. It includes blocking certain websites' IP addresses through a national firewall, acquiring and developing software and hardware to filter out certain information, producing legislation to control the Internet, and fostering a culture of self-censorship.

The rapid development of the Internet in China has drawn much attention both in China and abroad. There is an extensive amount of literature on the Internet itself, which talks of how the Internet has a culture of its own. Particularly, the past 15 years have seen numerous scholars keeping their eyes on China's Internet. Much of the attention in discussions and studies among both professionals and academia has been paid to the physical infrastructure and diffusion of China's Internet (e.g., Guo, 2003a, 2003b; Lee, 1997; Riquelme, 2002; Tang, 2000), the government's cyberstrategies, particularly its control of the Internet (e.g., Hachigian, 2001; Hartford, 2000; Harwit & Clark, 2001; Kalathil & Boas, 2001; Qiu & Zhou, 2005; Tsui, 2001; Wu, 1996), and the implications of the Internet for freedom of expression and China's democratization (e.g., Hong & Huang, 2005; Marsh & Whalen, 2000; Peters, 2002).

## **2.1. Informatization and Modernization Strategies**

It may be more useful to place the Internet development into a wider economic and political context in China to better understand the country's Internet policies and the whole picture of Internet development in China.



The big Internet boom in China did not grow out of throwing the Net open to the private sector – as was the case in the United States – but out of a state-centric strategy for comprehensive “informatization (*xinxihua*),” envisioned as essential to China’s future growth and international competitiveness. The key lies in the Party’s commitment to modernize China, and to strengthen modern China as a global economic, military and political powerhouse. One of the macro-level forces was the shift in China Ninth Five Year Plan (1995-2000) from an economy fueled by capital goods development to one fueled by consumer goods development. The shift was heralded by the revisions to the Eighth Five Year Plan (1990-1995) when the service industry was given a planned annual growth target of over 10 per cent (Li, 1991). China’s leaders hoped to skip certain stages in the development process and integrate information technology into all sectors of society, with the understanding that at some level modernization would help consolidate popular support for the current regime. The simple rationale here was what Confucius said, “Give them enough food, give them enough arms, and the common people will have trust in you” (Analects 12:7). They used the concept of “informatization” to describe the process, using information technology to modernize the economy and help decentralized decision-making, yet also make the administrative process more transparent for better control at the center.

Informatization goes hand in hand with decentralization. In fact, China’s leadership has held out the vision that information technology will allow the country to decentralize decision-making, while allowing the central government to monitor and control the economy. Since 1993, the central government has launched its own “National Information Infrastructure” projects, known as the Golden Projects, to introduce

information technology into various sectors of government and society. For example, projects have been initiated to utilize information technology to transform the way the state handles taxation, customs, and other transactions.

In 1993, the National Joint Conference on Economic Informatization, replaced by the State Council's Steering Committee on National Information Infrastructure<sup>2</sup> in 1996 (*China Internet chronology 1*), was created under the chairmanship of former Vice-Premier Zou Jiahua. The first national meeting of the National Informatization Work Conference, held in Shenzhen on April 18, 1997, was opened with an address by Zou Jiahua, who set out the "24-character direction for China's informatization: Overall planning (*tongchou guihua*), state dominance (*guojia zhudao*), unified standards (*tongyi biao zhun*), joint construction (*lianhe jianshe*), link up to supply each other (*hulian hutong*), and shared resources (*ziyuan gongxiang*)" (*China information chronology 2*). Development of the Internet was put on the top of the Chinese government's new policy agenda for creating a national information infrastructure and developing economy. During the Ninth Five-Year Plan period, the annual growth rate of China's information equipment manufacturing and service industries was over three times as much as that of the GNP. The information industry emerged "prominently as a new growth point of China's national economic development" (*China's IT develops at tremendous pace*).

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<sup>2</sup> Also called the Information Leading Group, a cross-ministerial coordination group reporting directly to the State Council, was responsible for the first attempt to establish regulatory guidelines for Internet development in China. It was in charge of overseeing the Internet in China based on Article 5 of the State Council's Order No. 195. The Steering Committee served before the Ministry of Information Industry established in 1998, as the final decision-maker on Internet regulations by coordinating relevant government agencies/regulators. The temporary/transitional status of the Steering Committee was similar to an Administration's Task Force in the United States.

In November 2001, China's State Economic and Trade Commission published the "Tenth Five-Year Plan of Industrial Structure Adjustment." One of the six major adjustments was "to promote industrialization by information" (Du, 2001). The Fifth Plenary Session of the 15<sup>th</sup> Central Committee of the Communist Party of China clearly pointed out that:

Informatization is an important tendency in today's global economy and social development. It is also a key link for enterprise upgrading, industrialization, and modernization in our country. We should prioritize the informatization of the national economy and society, comply to the development trend of global information technology, meet the terms of market demands, and move toward with institutional innovations, trying to leap-frog in our information industry (*Recommendations from the CCP Party Center on the Tenth Five-Year Plan for national economic and social development*).

As the Internet boom hit the United States, Chinese policymakers concluded that linking with the global network of networks was essential to the overall strategy. The Internet was a vital factor in China's transformation from a developing country to a superpower (Sinclair, 2002).

## **2.2. Building a Networked Empire**

Widely recognized as critical to the modernization strategy of the CCP has been the development of telecommunications, computers, and communication networks. China has invested heavily in its information infrastructure at the same time encouraging foreign investment in key information-related sectors (Hachigian, 2001). Starting from the ground up, China has quickly built a vast information infrastructure. China's Internet backbone began by building the telecom system. Historically, China's telecom provision was a bottleneck in the national economy in the 1960s and 1970s when telecom

availability was very poor. At the outset of the reform era, for instance, almost no private households had telephones. In the 1980s, China changed its telecom policies to speed up telecom development. As a result, the growth rate of telecom traffic from the early 1980s to the mid-1990s had dramatically increased, with 1994, the highest year of the value in the telecom industry, about five times higher than GDP (Wang, 2001). Telephone lines have been laid by the state telecommunications monopoly, China Telecom, at a skyrocketing rate. In 1990, there were fewer than 10 million telephone lines in China; by June 2001, the total number of telephone users hit 281 million (Li, 2001). Many advanced technologies have been incorporated into the Chinese telecommunication infrastructure, including digital microwave, satellites, program-controlled exchange, movable telecommunication and data telecommunication. China has also increasingly seen the type of cross-media convergence common in Western countries whereby mobile and wireless communications devices are made Internet accessible, increasing the penetration and depth of the Internet (Wang, 2001).

The Internet has been one of the cornerstones of the information technology explosion in China. As in other countries, China's early computer networking efforts came from the research and education communities. The CANet, established in 1987, is generally recognized as the first computer network in China. Since China realized a full-function linkage to the Internet on April 20, 1994, the Chinese Internet has rapidly expanded throughout many sectors of Chinese society. From 1997 to 2005, computer hosts, Internet users, domain names registered under the top level ".cn," Web sites and total bandwidth capacity of leased international connections respectively increased by over 150 times (see Table 2.1).

**Table 2.1. Internet Growth in China**

	<b>Computer Hosts</b>	<b>Internet Users</b>	<b>Domain Names (.cn)</b>	<b>Web Sites</b>	<b>Bandwidth for International Connection</b>
<b>Nov. 1997</b>	299,000	620,000	4,066	1,500	18.64 Mbps
<b>July 1998</b>	542,000	1,750,000	9,415	3,700	84.64 Mbps
<b>Jan. 1999</b>	747,000	2,100,000	18,396	5,300	143.00 Mbps
<b>July 1999</b>	1,460,000	4,000,000	29,045	9,906	241.00 Mbps
<b>Jan. 2000</b>	3,500,000	8,900,000	48,695	15,153	351.00 Mbps
<b>July 2000</b>	6,500,000	16,900,000	99,734	27,289	1,234.00 Mbps
<b>Jan. 2001</b>	8,920,000	22,500,000	122,099	265,405	2,799.00 Mbps
<b>July 2001</b>	10,020,000	26,500,000	128,362	242,739	3,257.00 Mbps
<b>Jan. 2002</b>	12,540,000	33,700,000	127,319	277,100	7,597.50 Mbps
<b>July 2002</b>	16,130,000	45,800,000	126,146	293,213	10,576.50 Mbps
<b>Jan. 2003</b>	20,830,000	59,100,000	179,544	371,600	9,380.00 Mbps
<b>July 2003</b>	25,720,000	68,000,000	250,651	473,900	18,599.00 Mbps
<b>Jan. 2004</b>	30,890,000	79,500,000	340,040	595,550	27,216.00 Mbps
<b>July 2004</b>	36,300,000	87,000,000	382,216	626,600	53,941.00 Mbps
<b>Jan. 2005</b>	41,600,000	94,000,000	432,077	668,900	74,429.00 Mbps
<b>July 2005</b>	45,600,000	103,000,000	622,534	677,500	82,617.00 Mbps
<b>Jan. 2006</b>	49,500,000	111,000,000	2,592,410	694,200	136,106.00 Mbps

(Source: CNNIC's semiannual reports, <http://www.cnnic.net.cn/index/0E/00/11/index.htm>)<sup>3</sup>

<sup>3</sup> The table was created based on the information provided in the CNNIC's reports from 1997 through 2006. The Chinese Internet Network Information Center (CNNIC), located in Beijing's Haidian district, was established in June 1997 and was authorized by the government to be a domain name management entity. It operates under the leadership of the Ministry of Information Industry and the Chinese Academic of Sciences. Its responsibilities include registering domain names, distributing IP addresses, and conducting statistical surveys on the development of the Internet in China. The CNNIC has issued sixteen reports. Although these statistics are challenged by several other companies that specialized in market research, such as IAMAsia and NetValue, the enormous growth of the Internet in China is undeniable.

age. Two state ministries construct the optical backbone of China separately – the Ministry of Information Industry (MII) and the State Administration of Radio Film and Television (SARFT). By the end of 2001, MII had deployed 1.46 Mkm of optical network mainly for voice and data communication services covering all provinces and cities. SARFT had deployed 30,000 Km of optical cable mainly for cable-TV delivering, which covered over 30 major provinces and most cities, and the switch capacity at main segments reached 1,600 Gbps. Fiber optic cable networks now cover across the country. By 2000, China had established more than 300 ISP companies and more than 1,000 ICPs (*China's IT develops at tremendous pace*, 1995). Unlike some authoritarian governments that exert larger control over the Internet by limiting bandwidth, the amount of data traffic per second the network can process, the Chinese government instead chooses to continue expanding bandwidth. The total Internet bandwidth is listed in the latest CNNIC report at 136.1 Gbps, which is almost 388 times as much as six years ago (see Table 2.1).

Also, as a part of the strategy for driving the information economy, thus fostering economic growth and further increasing legitimacy of the government, Chinese officials have focused on ways that the Internet can be used to enhance government performance, to reduce tension between the government and the citizens. For instance, the central government demanded in the early 1990s that all government offices throughout the country move online, starting minimally with information carrying websites as the first step towards more complex and comprehensive interactive services (Zhou, 2004a). The Government Online Project (GOP), launched on January 22, 1999, interconnects government offices of every province, autonomous region and municipality, and is to establish the basis for the development of e-government in China, provide more effective

coordination between and across governments at different levels, so that the public can have more access to government information and procure specific government services via the Internet (Lovelock & Ure, 2002; Zhou, 2004a).

As identified in a series of surveys directed by Guo (2003b), the government, which encourages people “to access the ‘healthy’ Internet,” is one of the four key players in the fast growth of the Internet in China.<sup>4</sup> For instance, the survey in Nanhai, Guangdong Province, reported that the Internet development in the city is typical of the “government driven model.” The Nanhai municipal government, which has invested a vast amount of money in its informatization endeavors, has realized its goal of connecting “every village” to an optical cable, and “every family” to the Internet (pp.3-9). As a matter of fact, the Chinese government is “actively promoting the Internet” at all levels (Hachigian, 2002a, p.49).

### **2.3. Shaping the Internet within a Regulatory Framework**

However, all of this significant effort to promote the wide application of the Internet in China does not mean that the Chinese government is prepared to relax its control over the Internet. As the Internet takes hold in the country, many international observers have begun to suggest that the technology poses an insurmountable threat to China’s authoritarian regime. The Chinese government has responded with a number of restrictions designed to counter potentially challenging uses of the Internet, as well as a range of proactive measure designed to reap the technology’s benefits. State strategies toward the Internet have addressed the balance between economic modernization and

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<sup>4</sup> The other three players are competitive Internet companies, Internet cafés, and Internet users.

political control. In fact, Internet control has become more systematic and comprehensive in China, both on the statute books and in real life.

From the very beginning, the Chinese government has successfully controlled Internet access in terms of both infrastructure and legislation. On February 12, 1996, the State Council issued Order No.195, “PRC Interim Regulations Governing the Management of International Interconnection of Computer Information Networks” (*Zhongguo renmin gongheguo jisuanji xinxi wangluo guoji lianwang guanli zanxing guiding*, Ministry of Information Industry a), signed by former Premier Li Peng on February 1, 1996, later modified by PRC State Council’s Order No.218 on May 20, 1997. Article 3 of the order separated networks into Interconnecting Networks (IN, *hulian wangluo*), defined as those networks directly connecting into the global Internet through international leased circuits, and Access Networks (AN, *jieru wangluo*), which were required to obtain the connection through one of the four authorized INs.<sup>5</sup> The order (Article 7) further specified that such four organizations would operate INs for the first backbone networks: two offering access to business and the general public, ChinaNet and GBNet, which can Internet access (on commercial terms) to other ISPs<sup>6</sup>, and two

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<sup>5</sup> The authorized nature of INs could also be seen from a perspective that diversity and competition have been recognized by the Chinese government. There were four administering organizations of INs rather than one. The number of telecom players, which were allowed to link their networks with those abroad, rose to nine in December 2000. The State Council recognized existing stakeholders instead of forcing Internet activity into one centralized organization. This is an important indication that China’s political process is not monolithic and that policy is a product of contending interests, not simply the political interests of the CCP. Further, the regulations permit authorization of new INs in the future, which may intensify the competition. There is no specific effort to centralize the ownership of ANs. Many different ANs can exist and compete.

<sup>6</sup> ChinaNet (China Public Computer Network, *zhongguo gongyong jisuanji wang*), which was originally based on the National Computing & Networking Facilities of China (NCFC), the first high-speed network funded by the State Development Planning Commission and the World Bank, and now is featured as tiered structure, high speed Internet connection, and multi-homing. ChinaNet was first operated by the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications (MPT). After the merging of the MPT with the MEI into the Ministry of



reserved exclusively for educational and research institutions, CERNet and CSTNet<sup>7</sup>.

All these networks are state-owned, in line with the government's insistence that the country's communications infrastructure remain solidly under government control. Their overall structure reveals the attempt to create a "designer" competition cut to patterns set by state specifications. Which company may offer what services in which markets has been the subject of a great deal of bureaucratic politicking. Government moves to restrict the competitors of China Telecom,<sup>8</sup> the state-owned monopoly, are more likely to be economically motivated than what some foreign observers suggest as being ideologically inspired.

In addition to the control of Internet access, China has promulgated numerous pieces of Internet-related legislation for the last five years, covering a variety of areas. In

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Information Industry (MII), the operator of China's national public telephone network, China Telecom, which is under the jurisdiction of the MII, has run ChinaNet. Often referred to as the 163 Network after the number users dial to gain access to it, ChinaNet, covering across the country, linking with more than 600 cities, and embracing a registered collection of 3 million users (*System integration – Merging of 163/169 Network*), is also the effective international gatekeeper by virtue of the fact that all networks must go through China Telecom's international telecommunications access. ChinaGBN (Golden Bridge Network, *zhongguo jinqiao wang*), provides the commercial alternative to ChinaNet. Currently run by JiTong Communications, a state-owned company formerly linked with the now abolished MEI, ChinaGBN has focused primarily on the corporate market.

<sup>7</sup> CERNet (China's Education and Research Network, *zhongguo jiaoyu he keyan jisuanji wang*, <http://www.net.edu.cn>) is the principle academic network centered upon Beijing's prestigious Tsinghua University and links together the universities, schools and education and research institutes via CHINAPAC (X.25). Its link to the Internet was primarily through the NCFC, and switched to Sprint 128k bps line in May 1995. CERNet plays an indispensable role in connecting the Chinese education system to the outside world and facilitates exchange and communication among academics and educators in China and their counterparts overseas. It is still technically distinct from the main public network such that websites blocked by the government on ChinaNet will often be accessible from CERNet. CSTNet (Chinese Scientific and Technology Network, *zhongguo keji wang*, <http://www.cstnet.net.cn/gb/index.html>) is similar to CERNet, but significantly smaller in scale: it connects subsidiaries of the CAS. It is also based on NCFC backbone.

<sup>8</sup> Since 1994, China Telecom has made enormous investments in developing two national networks, namely, 163 Network and 169 Network, also called China Public Multimedia Network, is more often known by its dial-up access number, 169, like 163 Network. It is an attempt by the government to build a China-specific content platform for domestic users. Effectively, an American Online style platform, it does not provide direct access to the Internet, but rather creates a Chinese intranet, allowing the government to provide cheaper access and Chinese-language content.

2000 alone, six major regulations regarding state secrets, online business operation, information and news services, and Internet security were issued (Cheung, 2003, pp.79-82).<sup>9</sup> The rules issued since 2000 fall into four following major categories such as regulations governing the Internet infrastructure, regulations dealing with crimes related to the Internet, regulations monitoring Internet Services Providers (ISPs) and Internet Content Providers (ICPs), Internet users and online content, and regulations dealing with domain names. Although computer crimes and Internet security,<sup>10</sup> and the issues of domain names are also two of primary concerns on the list of China's cyber agendas<sup>11</sup>, regulations monitoring ISPs and ICPs, Internet users and online content have drawn particular attention from observers outside China, and have been widely criticized by Western commentators, journalists and politicians who are concerned with the issues of

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<sup>9</sup> For example, the Regulations on Secrets Management for International Networking of Computer Information System (*jisuanji xinxi xitong guoji lianwang baomi guanli guiding*), issued on January 25, 2000 but applied retroactively from January 1, 2000, should be considered as legislation that specifically and most comprehensively addressed problems of prohibition of disclosure of state secrets through the Internet in China (China Legal Change, 2002). The Article 1 set the issue of security protection on the Internet under the broad umbrella of the Law of the People's Republic of China on the Protection of State Secrets (State Secrets Law), "in order to strengthen the administration of maintenance of secrets in the international networking of computer information system," which was defined as interconnection between computer information systems inside China and foreign computer information systems in order to achieve international exchange of information, and "to ensure the security of state secrets." The regulations further clearly distinguished the responsibilities of secrecy authorities at two levels. The national secrecy authorities are in charge of secrets preservation work for the international networking of computer systems on a nationwide basis. The secrecy authorities at country level and above are in charge of the work within their administrative districts. Central national organs are in charge of, or should guide, the secrets preservation work falling within the scope of their authority.

<sup>10</sup> Since the beginning of the 1990's, the number of computer crimes has risen dramatically. According to the *People's Daily*, hacker crimes in China increased at an annual rate of 30% by 1998 (12 October, 1998). In March 1997, the National People's Congress (NPC) amended the country's criminal code, Criminal Law of the People's Republic of China, with three articles, Article 285, Article 286, and Article 287, that included computer hacking and fraud as serious crimes. The information warfare involving international security, called "the smokeless war" (Hughes, 2003), between China and other countries, such as the United States, Taiwan and Japan, has become a central theme in the Chinese military.

<sup>11</sup> China entered the Domain Name System (DNS) at a comparatively late stage. It was not until 1990 that the system of "country code Top Level Domains" (ccTLD) ".cn" was delegated by Jonathan Postel to Professor Qian Tianbai, then manager and administrator of the CANet. In recent years, cybersquatting cases have emerged in China, forcing the Chinese government to put more efforts to strengthen its management of Chinese domain name disputes. As a result, the Provisional Rules for Chinese Domain Name Dispute Resolution was adopted on November 7, 2000.

censorship and human rights. The attempts of the Chinese government to interfere with network communications have frequently been viewed as an infringement on the freedom of information considered a basic human right in Western societies (e.g., Woesler, 2002).

China's regulations on Internet content involve such two major concerns as political and social stability and culture values, apart from the restrictions relative to state security. As early as in 1996, as mentioned above, the PRC Interim Regulations prohibited individuals "to produce, retrieve, duplicate, and disseminate information prejudicial to public order or pornographic materials" (Ministry of Information Industry a). The Internet content boundaries in China were clearly and systematically marked since the PRC Regulations on the Security and Management of Computer Information Networks and the Internet was promulgated in 1997.<sup>12</sup> The statute, criticized as "repressive" (*Freedom of expression and the Internet in China*), has become one of the major sources used to accuse China of restricting freedom of expression.

## **2.4. Internet Censorship and Scholarly Concerns**

The major noticeable turning point implied in the Regulations on Secrets Management for International Networking of Computer Information System (*jisuanji*

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<sup>12</sup> The Article 5 of the 1997 statute stated nine forbidden zones of information that "no unit or individual may use the Internet to create, replicate, retrieve, or transmit," including:

1. Inciting to resist or violate the Constitution or laws or the implementation of administrative regulations;
2. Inciting to overthrow the government or the socialist system;
3. Inciting division of the country, harming national unification;
4. Inciting hatred or discrimination among nationalities or harming the unity of nationalities;
5. Making falsehoods or distorting the truth, spreading rumors, destroying the order of society;
6. Promoting feudal superstitions, pornography, gambling, violence, murder, terrorism, or instigating others to criminal activity;
7. Openly insulting other people or distorting the truth to slander people;
8. Injuring the reputation of state organs;
9. Other activities against the Constitution, laws or administrative regulations (Feiyu Net).

*xinxi xitong guoji lianwang baomi guanli guiding*) issued in 2000 was that the Chinese government strategically encouraged Chinese ISPs, ICPs, and individual persons to censor themselves. This mode of self-regulation and self-censorship (Tsui, 2001) at each level is said to be a characteristics of China's cyberspace (Hachigian, 2001; Hartford, 2000; Sinclair, 2002). Article 8 stipulates that the principle of "responsibility is borne by the person who placed it on the network" as a basis for regulating the revelation of state secrets on the Internet. This did not, however, exempt each ISP's obligation to monitor. Information provided to or released on Web sites must undergo a security inspection and approval. Inspection and approval should be carried out by related departments. Units that provide the information should establish a security system for information examination and approval in accordance with certain work procedures.

Under Article 10, ISPs, BBS, chat rooms or network news group organizers were required to set up their own management mechanisms to assist in ensuring that no state secrets were transmitted on the Internet by their users. The regulations also demanded that Internet access providers should provide instruction about protecting secrets as an important part of the Internet related technical training. Agreements and user rules signed between the controllers of national trunk lines and Internet access providers, and between Internet access providers and users should stipulate clearly that "state laws on protecting secrets must be obeyed and that state secrets shall not be leaked." Internet access providers and users should assist department in charge of protecting secrets in "investigating illegal actions that divulge state secrets on the Internet." Under such legal restrictions and driven by economic incentives, Internet-related companies in China

practice “a high degree of self-censorship” (Tsui, 2001, p.27),<sup>13</sup> which is perceived as “the most effective way” for the Chinese government to control the information flow on the Internet (Hachigian, 2002a, p.48).

In addition to extensive regulations, the Chinese government has also implemented various technical measures to achieve its goal of Internet censorship. For instance, the Beijing Telecom servers are known among Chinese Internet users as the “Great Firewall” (*fanghuo qiang*, a direct translation from English).<sup>14</sup> The function of the “firewall” is not only to block unauthorized access to Chinese government or corporate websites but also to block access by Chinese citizens to “undesirable” foreign websites. As the Chinese proverb says, “walls have ears!” This centralized approach has made it possible for the government to censor the Internet broadly. In 1996 alone, the government blocked access to more than 100 websites outside China.<sup>15</sup> By the end of 2005, Chinese police had closed 598 websites in a crackdown on pornography launched in March 2005 (*China reins in pornographic websites*, 2005). With somewhat random choices of

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<sup>13</sup> For example, news portals such as *Sina*, *NetEase*, *Sohu* and *Yahoo* try to stay clear from politically sensitive issues in general. American companies also keep in the same line to gain the trust and cooperation of the government. At the government’s request, Microsoft Corp. shut down the Internet journal of a Chinese blogger that discussed politically sensitive issues in December 2005. On the one hand, non-compliance with the government means no business in China; on the other hand, there is a big demand for filtering software to filter out a wide range of sensitive materials, from pornography to websites containing content related to Tibetan independence, Falun Gong, the Tiananmen Square incident, opposition political parties, or a variety of ant-Communist movements (See OpenNet Initiative, 2005, for the detailed information on the websites that have been filtered out during the period of 2004-2005), and the market for such kind of software was expected to become a billion dollar industry in 2004 (Silva, 2001). It is ironic that, as Wacker (2003) pointed out, while the Western media frequently criticize China for Internet censorship, “it is Western firms that are supplying the technological means which enable China to carry out surveillance” (p.69).

<sup>14</sup> A more popular phrase for it is *wangguan*, literally “NetWall” – a name harking back to an earlier effort to repel foreign invaders.

<sup>15</sup> The sites of some American news media, such as the *Los Angeles Times*, the *Wall Street Journal*, the *Washington Post*, the *Voice of America*, and *CNN*, the Taiwan Government Information Office, and some human rights groups, the US-based *China News Digest* (CND), and pornographic sources, such as *Playboy*, were blocked. See <http://amarillonet.com/news/china9996.html> for more information.

blocking certain websites and setting up examples to intimidate the public,<sup>16</sup> the government has been able to reach the effect of “killing the chicken to scare the monkeys,” as the Chinese proverb suggests (Tsui, 2001, p.29), and nurture an attitude of “voluntary” self-censorship among users, a “firewall within one’s head,” as the *People’s Daily* puts it (Wacker, 2003, p.68).

Scholars frequently link the censorship practices of the Chinese government to the political implications of the Internet. They point out, those who are computer literate and Internet users belong to the well-educated group, “with its better than average ties to foreign people and information sources,” and represent “a potentially dangerous source of opposition and dissent” (Mueller & Tan, 1997, p.95). The Chinese government might lose its information monopoly on the Internet, a mass medium that can challenge state hegemony over the distribution of information and ideologies (e.g., Kalathil & Boas, 2001; Taubman, 1998; Woesler, 2002). With new technology means, ordinary people are able to be more exposed to the Western ideas and information that was banned by the government before (e.g., Hong & Huang, 2005), and have more freedom of speech and more access to platforms for discussion of the issues regarding policies and public good, thus constituting a threat to the authoritarian regime and weakening the state power (e.g., Hachigian, 2002b). Especially with the number of Internet users and criticisms of a variety of subjects increasing, the demands for a more competent political system will be also increasing, and an “Internet-driven political revolution” is expected (Peters, 2002, p.106).

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<sup>16</sup> An increasing number of individuals have fallen victim to the government’s crack-down on “illegal” use of the Internet. The cases of Lin Hai, Qi Yanchen, Huang Qi, Du Daobin, and Li Dawei are several good examples of intimidation at work.

Yet, such arguments overlook the other side of the statistics of Internet users in China. To put things in perspective, Internet users are not representative of China on the whole. 111 million Internet users still only account for about 8.5 percent of the whole Chinese population. Users aged under 35 account for 81.3 percent of all the Internet users (*Semiannual statistical report on the Internet development in China*). Moreover, political use of the Internet has not been reported so far as the mainstream in the Chinese cyber society. For example, in a recent survey conducted in the five major cities of Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, Chengdu, and Changsha, 90 percent of young adult reported that they go online mainly for games, although reading online news was overall the most frequently mentioned usage of the Internet, accounting for 65.9 percent of the survey respondents (The Chinese Academic of Social Sciences, 2005). In addition, some scholars also have suggested, it is possible that “stability may be further reinforced” if online content helps with consensus building within the parameters set by the authorities (Harwit & Clark, 2001, p.406)

A few scholars approach the issue of Internet censorship in China from a perspective other than a politically-preoriented one. Wang (1999) pointed out, the reasons for taming the net in Asian countries “are not merely because of its ‘polluting influence,’ but also because it is full of decadent ‘Western’ values, something the leaders of former colonies are eager to keep out in order to maintain their own cultural integrity and autonomy. Simply put, it is a matter of gaining control of what is coming into and happening within a nation’s territory; or more briefly, a matter of sovereignty” (p.283). Foster and Goodman (2000) also acknowledged such concerns of Chinese leaders who fear that “massive exposure to Western culture and language will undermine China’s

culture and language, particularly among its youth” (p.32). In addition to political considerations, the policy-making process in China, a country with a cultural tradition that values human community and order more highly than individual rights, is also directed by cultural concerns (Wu, 1996, p.707). “In fact, social (and cultural) norms play a major part in explaining Chinese attempts to regulate the internet” (Ang, 2003).

## **2.5. Culture Matters: An Alternative Perspective**

Exploring the deep-rooted cultural and social backgrounds upon which the Internet regulations are built may provide us a thorough understanding of Internet content restrictions in China.

Traditionally, China’s cultural beliefs associate with its own dimensions of power, authority and legitimacy. Confucian culture, the dominating one in China, is a typical one of collectivism in that the interests of the collective must not be challenged by lesser groups and individuals. In such a culture, intermediate and ultimate ends are closely connected, and conceived of as a total entity, no part of which could be changed without threatening the whole. Associated with it, the government has to proceed on the basis of harmony rather than conflict. Rulers should be paternalistic in a political system. Most Chinese start with the ideal that all power should emanate from above, from the center, from a single supreme power (Pye, 1985). Most Chinese leaders believe that diversity and a pluralistic power structure lead to social disorder and do not foster more creativity or ensure faster modernization (p.183).

Since 1949, the CCP has reinforced collectivism in the belief that collectivism is the highest noble moral of communist ideology. This ideology sees humans as social



beings. Social historical conditions and social relationships constrain an individual's needs. Only through maintaining public order, safety and benefits, can one receive a true personal benefit – a country's public and personal benefits are fundamentally the same. The Party inherited, consciously or unconsciously, the traditional administrative style, whereas the majority of Chinese comfortably accepted Party authorities as in the past. Using propaganda and organized study, the Party has spread the collectivist spirit by way of real life models, such as Lei Feng in Mao's time, Li Xiangqun and Li Suli in the reform age. Whether culturally or politically, Chinese collectivism inhabits a hierarchical structure; thus it appears vertical. To maintain the system, social stability on the grounds of collective interests and harmony is the key. The preoccupation with preserving social stability is a perennial aspect of one-party rule. The Party slogan "one hand soft, one hand hard (*yi shou ruan, yi shou ying*)" after the reform and open door policy typically mirrors the CCP's strong desire to simultaneously build two sides of socialist civilization – socialist materialistic civilization, which ensures its credibility by promoting economic reforms and market openings, thus getting people prosperous, and socialist spiritual civilization (*shehuizhuyi jingshen wenming jianshe*),<sup>17</sup> which is aimed at preserving the quintessence of traditional culture and maintaining the social stability, thus safeguarding the Party's grip on political power.

Reformers are giving up the effort to unify idea, instead, encouraging greater intellectual and cultural freedom under the slogan of "let a hundred flowers blossom and

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<sup>17</sup> The socialist spiritual civilization concept is vague and complex, but one high-ranking propaganda cadre explained in the interview with the author, working as a journalist with the Xinhua News Agency, in 1996 that its basic components include putting the collective good above individual self-interest, esteeming education and science, and supporting the production of such public goods as a clean environment, social order, and refined art.

let a hundred schools of thought contend (*baihua qifang, baijia zhengming*)” (Harding, 1987, p.225; White, 1993, p.152). In Deng Xiaoping’s China (1978-1997),<sup>18</sup> great new things had been happening: the emergence, and expansion of the scope, of tolerance, the decline of ideocracy, the advocacy of “plural truths” by intellectuals, skepticism of unanimity and praise of plurality and dissidents, the emerging competing ideas (new constructed humanist Marxism, neo-Confucianism and Liberalism), the state’s neutral attitude towards different life-styles, and the reinterpretation of the traditional Chinese culture as being of a plural nature.

Unlike in Mao Zedong’s time (1949-1976) when ideology was a major means for maintaining political and social integration, the Chinese leaders in post-Mao era introduce a legal line: any dissident who uses ideas or values to mobilize people will be prohibited in public; otherwise, dissenting views are tolerated in the private sphere, which has become an implicit rule of the Chinese government. There have been limitations on tolerance. As Deng said clearly:

Can we permit such an open call for intervention in China’s internal affairs? Can we tolerate the kind of freedom of speech which flagrantly contravene the principles of our Constitution? (Deng, 1983, p.181)

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<sup>18</sup> Since Deng had made valuable contributions during the long revolutionary years, had waged a resolute struggle against the Gang of Four and had already achieved notable success in his efforts to restore order, he had earned enormous prestige in the Party and among the people. In July 1977, at the Third Plenary Session of the Tenth Central Committee, Deng was reinstated as Vice-Chairman of the Central Committee, Vice-Premier of the State Council, Vice-Chairman of the Military Commission and Chief of the General Staff of the People’s Liberation Army. In March 1978 he was elected Chairman of the Fifth national Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference. In December 1978, the Third Plenary Session of the Party’s Eleventh Central Committee was convened, marking a fundamental turning point in the history of the Chinese Communist Party. At a working conference of the Central Committee held before the Session, Deng delivered a speech which turned out to be the keynote of the Third Plenary. In this speech he explained in detail that people should emancipate their minds and seek truth from facts. Deng stressed that the Chinese people should be dedicated and steadfast in pursuit of socialist modernization and not let themselves be hindered by interference from any quarter. This was a fundamental rectification of the political line, and it ushered in a new era of reform and opening to the outside world.

The downfall of the Soviet Union and the disintegration of Eastern Europe in the 1990s convinced the Chinese intellectuals that a “shock therapy” or “big bang” was not applicable to China, a clear example of reflexivity at work. The Chinese were convinced that democracy and a free-market economy could not be introduced without having the proper institutions in place, otherwise changes would result in chaos as was apparent in Russia and Eastern Europe. Rather, a safe and stable authoritarian government is preferred, signifying the Hobbesian state where personal freedom is exchanged for a sense of safety and security of the greater whole. Meanwhile, the open door policy<sup>19</sup> and Westernization also have brought on some negative consequences, such as the moral maze of “money worship (*baijin zhuyi*),” in the Chinese society. The Chinese leadership and intellectuals point to the moral decline of the West as manifested by drug consumption, suicide, divorce, and increasing crime. The impacts could bring the country down. Asian values were the antidote to all that was wrong with Westernization. As some scholars have pointed out, traditionally based Chinese values, such as the morally autonomous individual, the absolute just ruler, the responsibility of the government for people’s welfare, and the ordinary person’s responsibility for the fate of the nation, have served as the positive elements in Confucian culture (Nathan, 1990, p.308-11, 384).

Faced with social and political problems brought by the reforms, the reformers insisted on a socialist spiritual civilization that is very much traditional in the sense that it appeals to Confucian ideas of family, general love and loyalty. Also, they emphasized the

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<sup>19</sup> Unlike Mao Zedong, who promoted the radical politics-oriented and self-sustained policy, Deng started his economic reforms in 1978 by advocating China to open her door to the rest of the world, which is called the “open door policy,” including earmarking four southern cities as Special Economic Zones (SEZs), which were Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Shantou and Xiamen, to take advantage of their geographic proximity to overseas Chinese communities such as Hong Kong, Taiwan and Macau and for their vast overseas connections. Foreign investment was encouraged and new factories were established in these SEZs.

balance between the necessity of plural ideas and of discipline. These ideas are believed to play a part in integrating political life. One of the important parts of building socialist spiritual civilization strongly promoted by the CCP is to rebuild “public morality (*gongde*),” which has two meanings in Chinese. One refers to the general moral requirement in the public life such as the rules of no smoking on bus or at a gasoline stand. Another meaning refers to the “Five Lovings (*wu'ai*),” which are counted as loving motherland, loving people, loving science, loving work, and loving socialism. In the 1980s and 90s, the “Five Lovings” were considered as the most basic guideline in Chinese spiritual civilization reconstructions. As Huntington (1991) wrote, in Confucian societies, “[h]armony and cooperation were preferred over disagreement and competition. The maintenance of order and respect for hierarchy were central value” (p.24).

While being committed to rebuild and promote the morality norms with some political flavor, the central government has gone to great efforts to protect the Chinese society from the negative social and political impacts from outside the country. Its two major concerns are “bourgeois liberalization (*zichan jieji ziyouhua*),” such as assertions of the superiority of capitalism over socialism, of democracy over the “people’s democratic dictatorship,” and of foreign countries over China, and “spiritual pollution (*jingshen wuran*),” such as excessive sex, violence, and superstition in the symbolic environment, which are perceived in the view of the Chinese leadership as big threats to the social stability and its legitimacy in China. This can be clearly reflected in the injunction that Deng Xiaoping issued to the Twelfth Central Committee of the CCP on October 12, 1983:

Don't think that a little spiritual pollution doesn't matter much, that it's nothing to be alarmed at. Some of its ill effects may not be immediately apparent. But unless we take it seriously and adopt firm measures right now to prevent its spread, many people will fall prey to it and be led astray, with grave consequences. In the long run, this question will determine what kind of people will succeed us to carry on the cause and what the future of the Party and state will be (Deng, 1987, p.36).

In the eyes of the Chinese leadership, apparently apolitical communications can be loaded with subtle political implications whose consequences are only visible in the long run. In the March 1996 issue of *Qiushi* – the Party's authoritative ideological journal – one theorist argued against more lax and liberal comrades that the arts can be equally as important as news in the formation of people's political attitudes, even if the arts typically are less centrally concerned with politics:

When ideology is mentioned, some people always fix their eyes on the core, naively thinking that nothing serious will come of it so long as the core is not touched upon. We cannot but say that this is ossified point of view. Content and form, and contents and levels can infiltrate and transform one into the other ... In this regard, certain, Western political bigwigs are much wiser than some of our comrades. They said: As long as the youth of the country to be overturned have learned our language and dances and have a weakness for our movies and television programs, they will, sooner or later, accept our concepts of value. Unfortunately, this remark has been proved by what happened in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe (Liu, 1996).

Obviously, the Chinese leadership has clearly recognized the dialectical relationships between quantitative change and quality change, and does not want the country to be overturned, politically and culturally, under the influence of Western pop culture and political propaganda. With the exponential growth of the Internet, the new multi-medium, the Chinese government has been more and more concerned with the potential problems that the Internet may generate. The question regarding the restrictions on Internet content is not "whether," but rather "how." The leaders decided that the nation needs to retain a singular course, not affected by unpredictable factors. The

collective social order and behavior are superior to individual thoughts, which stems from the Confucius tradition. The state controls the media generally “in order to foster the values of group and hierarchy” (Winfield, Mizuno & Beaudoin, 2000).

As the history of any kind of media in China has indicated, China’s Internet content regulations have strong traditional cultural backgrounds, and current social and political needs, which are reflected in the strong moralistic orientation and political utilization of the regulations. The nine boundaries of Internet content<sup>20</sup> have been reiterated in a series of subsequent regulations formulated by different departments in China, which implies the uncompromising standpoint of the Chinese government on some principle issues.<sup>21</sup>

## 2.6. Conclusion

Overall, Internet growth, rather than simply control, is the Chinese government’s primary objective, as has been demonstrated through the early 1990s in basic telecommunications. Clear evidence of this is, for example, the fact that in 1999 to expand access to the Internet, Chinese authorities twice cut the fees that ISPs pay to access telecommunications lines. The Internet development is the key to China’s

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<sup>20</sup> Refer to Footnote 12.

<sup>21</sup> Refer to the Article 57 in the Telecommunications Regulations of the People’s Republic of China (*Zhonghua renmin gongheguo dianxin tiaoli*), the State Council’s Order No.291 issued on October 11, 2000, signed by the former Premier Zhu Rongji on September 25, 2000 (Ministry of Information Industry b); the Article 15 in the Measures for Managing Internet Information Services (*Hulianwang xinxi fuwu guanli banfa*), the State Council’s Order No.292, signed by former Premier Zhu Rongji on September 25, 2000 and issued on October 11, 2000 (Ministry of Information Industry c); the Article 1, 2, 3, 4 in the Decisions of the National People’s Congress Standing Committee on Safeguarding Internet Safety (*Quanguo renda changweihui guanyu weihu hulianwang anquan de guiding*, Guoxin China Law Net); and the Article 9 in Regulations for Managing Internet Electronic Bulletin Services (*Hulianwang dianzi gonggao fuwu guanli guiding*), the Order 3 of the MII, approved on October 8, 2000 and issued on November 6, 2000 (Ministry of Information Industry d).

informationization and economic modernization, through which the government wants to build a powerful socialist country. The promotion of Internet-driven economic development has become another proactive strategy to increase the regime's popularity and political legitimacy, in that the state responds to the challenge of economic liberalization by preemptively allowing certain forms of political liberalization while taking credit for economic prosperity.

Yet, the picture of China's Internet is of a rather mixed character, showing that the Chinese government is struggling with walking on a balance beam, which requires a balance between economic benefits and political challenges, between maximizing the gain from the flow of economic information and protecting China's networks and national security from attack, between opening to the outside world and maintaining the independence of Chinese nationality and preserving its own culture and values, between collective harmony and individual interests, and between freedom of expression and the need to protect the public from harmful materials, such as pornography. To the Chinese leadership, the situation of Internet development in China is just like what the Chinese word for "crisis" (*weiji*), literally meaning "crisis and opportunity."

Hartford (2000) pointed out, "Smart authoritarians do not try to control everything; they focus on controlling what really matters ... keeping the vast majority from politically sensitive areas, and preventing the nonconforming small minority from organizing enough to mount a challenge." To meet the political and social challenges, the Chinese government has been committed to building a coherent regulatory regime and formulating systematic regulations to better control the Internet. In general, China's Internet policy and regulation follow precedents set by its treatment of other media,

which can be described as an attempt to balance gradual commercialization and modernization with controls protecting the CCP's political dominance and the general guideline that "stability is the topmost priority" (Foster & Goodman, 2000, p.26). The policy is designed to allow development to proceed while maintaining a residual capacity to prevent the use of media to mount direct, organized threats to the regime. As what Lin Quan, secretary-general of China's State Science and Technology Commission told a conference: official censorship would not be allowed to stop the growth of net use (FlorCruz, 1998). The key here is how to handle the scope and scale of control.



### **CHAPTER III. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK: FRAMING AND CULTURAL DIMENSIONS**

The past 15 years have seen numerous studies regarding the Internet in China. Yet, as stated earlier, only one study has been found to provide a preliminary investigation of newspapers' treatment of China's Internet by looking at the coverage in the *China Daily*, the only national English newspaper in China, and four U.S. newspapers (McMillan & Hwang, 2002). The researchers categorized their descriptive investigation based on three topics drawn from the literature of studying the Internet in China, such as business and economic concerns, culture and social issues, and law and policy directions.

Such categorization, which reflects scholarly interests in China's Internet from various disciplines, is meaningful to sort out the topics of related news stories in a general way. Yet it might be too general for a framing analysis, for the core idea of framing is selecting and highlighting certain aspects or attributes of an issue or event, while leaving out others (e.g., Entman, 1993; Gitlin, 1980). In addition, although the authors acknowledged the importance of the media framing of an international story in terms of people's understanding the world outside their own countries, the study did not theoretically interpret how framing is related to media content construction, and why differences in news coverage may exist across the countries in question.


The current study hopes to fill this gap by introducing framing and media content theories into a cross-cultural analysis of newspaper treatments of China's Internet in mainland China, Hong Kong, Singapore, the United States, and the United Kingdom. Some cultural concepts are also introduced from the work of Hofstede and subsequent

cross-cultural research in the field of social behavior. Instead of looking at general aspects of China's Internet, this study centers around the specific issues frequently addressed in scholarly discussions, such as the Internet diffusion and development in China (e.g., Guo, 2003a, 2003b; Lee, 1997; Riquelme, 2002; Tang, 2000), Internet use (e.g., Bu & Guo, 2001; Guo, 2003a, 2003b; Zhou, 2004a; Zhu & He, 2002), issues of Internet censorship, regulation and policy (e.g., Cullen & Choy, 1999; Hachigian, 2001, 2002a, 2002b; Hartford, 2000; Kalathil & Boas, 2001; Lacharite, 2002; Tan, 1999; Tsui, 2001; Wu, 1996; Zhou, 2004b), hackers and Internet security (e.g., Deibert, 2002; Hughes, 2003; Thomas, 2001), and the political, economical, cultural and social consequences and impacts of the Internet (e.g., Bu, & Guo, 2001; Chen, 1999).

### **3.1. The Hierarchical Model of Shoemaker and Reese**

Research exploring various forces shaping media content has identified a broad array of sources, ranging from news professionals and gatekeepers (e.g., Bass, 1969; Bleske, 1991; Donohew, 1967; Epstein, 1973; Gans, 1979; Lewin, 1947; Peterson, 1979; Sigal, 1973; White, 1950), to corporate ownership (e.g., Campaine, & Gomery, 2000; Einstein, 2004; Herman, & Chomsky, 1988), to cultural and ideological factors (e.g., Fishman, 1980; Peterson, 1979; Shoemaker, & Reese, 1991, 1996). Scholarship in media content analysis assumes that multiple and varying realities are constructed through discourse (e.g., Berger, & Luckmann, 1966; Gieber, 1964; Goffman, 1974).

Summarizing previous studies, Shoemaker and Reese (1991, 1996) suggested a multi-level hierarchical model of influences on media content. The model consists of the following five levels: individual, media routines, organization, extramedia, and ideology



**Figure 3.1. The Shoemaker and Reese Hierarchical Model of Influences on Media Content** <sup>22</sup>

(see Figure 3.1). They argued that each level has its own effects on content, which is limited by each hierarchically superior level. In their model, the authors placed “individual communication workers” at the center, which includes such influences as the personal attitudes and orientations of media workers. Then the circle expands outward in concentric rings with the next level being the routines of media work (i.e., deadlines, the beat system, notions of newsworthiness, official sources). The next circle includes influences on content at the organizational level (i.e., corporate policies, political endorsements, editorial positions). The next broader category in the model is extramedia influences, like the effect of the economic environment, the marketplace, cultural and

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<sup>22</sup> Figure was recreated based on Shoemaker and Reese, 1996, p.64.

national variables, and public relations activities. The broadest level includes influences that occur due to ideology and societal level factors, such as societal definitions of deviance and normalcy or the influence of power centers within society.

Shoemaker and Reese (1996) proposed building a more cohesive theory of media content, one that synthesizes “what is already known about the influences on media content into a more systematic set of interrelated statements about the relationships between media content and the influences on it” (p.261). They also suggested analyses that offer multiple perspectives of the influences of content, such that each level of influence is linked to or combined with another level of influence. They argued that combining the influences on content in media studies research offers a richer, more complete picture of the role of mass media in society (p.271).

A few years later, Shoemaker, along with several colleagues, tested one hypothesis suggested by the “hierarchy of influences model” – the effects of individual influences versus media routine influences (Shoemaker, Eichholz, Kim, & Wrigley, 2001). The study examined whether newspaper gatekeeping is influenced more by forces on the media routine level, or by forces or “characteristics” of individual staffers. The authors expected that routines would exert more control on content than individual forces, based on Shoemaker and Reese’s suggestion that unless individuals hold significant power within the organization, they exert minimal influence on content (1996, p.102). The study found that characteristics of individual journalists had no effect on how prominently Congressional bills were covered in the newspapers, but the routine force of newsworthiness had a positive effect on the amount of coverage. The data showed consistency with the Shoemaker and Reese hierarchical model, in that influences on

media content occur on more complex and intertwined levels than Lewin (1947) and White's (1950) more simplistic notion of gatekeeping as a series of individual decisions.

The tests in the study of Shoemaker et al. remain at the lower levels in the hierarchical model. Few studies have been found to empirically test the significance of the factors at the higher levels, although they may be more important in shaping media content, especially when comparisons across different societies are involved. One of the major difficulties to deal with is how to measure and test the relationships between the factors at the macro levels and media content. Therefore, one of the purposes of this study is to further this aspect of this research stream by focusing on the influence of factors in Shoemaker and Reese's model at the ideological level, which vary with political systems and cultural dimensions across societies, on news coverage and frames.

## **3.2. Media Framing**

### **3.2.1. An Overall Review**

The concept of framing has been developed as a tool for analysis in various fields, including psychology and sociology (e.g., Gonos, 1997; Taylor, 2000), business management (e.g., Goldratt, 1990; Watzkawick, Weakland, & Fisch, 1974), decision-making (e.g., Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), and negotiation (e.g., Neale & Bazerman, 1985; Pinkley, 1990). The idea of framing first appeared in Goffman's work (1974), which defined frames as embodiments of "the principles of organization which govern [social] events." Tuchman (1978) and Gitlin (1980) were two of the earliest scholars who introduced framing to American media studies. They used the concept of framing as a

tool to understand, in Tuchman's words, "news as a social construction and a social resource" (Tuchman, 1978, p.14). From the late 1980s onward, with Entman's (1993) leading promotion, framing research has been transformed from a method of media content analysis to a theoretical concept or even a theory in the making. However, the concept is still not clearly conceptualized. The concept seems to be, as Smith (1997) pointed out, "many different things to different researchers because of the variety of potential locations and level of specificity" (p.2).<sup>23</sup>

A large scholarship has qualified framing in a variety of ways. Yet the core idea of the concept is related to the fundamental process of meaning construction in which certain aspects or attributes of an issue or event, or certain ideas, themes and experiences are highlighted or drawn attention to, and others are left out. As Entman (1993) suggested, framing entails selection and salience. "To frame is to *select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text*, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item described" (p.52, emphasis in original). Recently, Reese (2001) provided a synthesized definition, that is, "Frames are organizing principles that are socially *shared* and *persistent* over time, that work *symbolically* to meaningfully *structure* the social world," and framing is concerned with "the way interests, communicators, sources, and culture combine to yield coherent ways of understanding the world" (p.11). Carragee and Roefs (2004) pointed out that most studies in framing have focused on the ways news stories articulate frames. "Although specific

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<sup>23</sup> See Yioutas and Segvic (2003) for discussions about the sources that cause conceptualizing framing problematic.

characterizations of frames differ, meaningful definitions emphasize the ways in which frames organize news stories and other discourses by their patterns of selection, emphasis, interpretation, and exclusion” (pp.215-6. See, for example, Gamson & Modigliani, 1989; Gitlin, 1980; Reese, 2001).

Scheufele (1999, 2000) identified four distinct processes, which may be examined in framing research: frame-building, frame-setting, individual-level outcomes of framing, and a feedback loop from audiences to journalists. The middle two processes, in which media frames are usually taken as the independent variable, are related to the effects of media frames. A majority of framing studies have focused on these two processes, in which the impacts of media frames on audience frames, and the links between audience frames and individual information processing or political action are examined (Scheufele, 2000, pp.307-8). Researchers have shown intense interests in examining framing in terms of audience effects (e.g., Cappella & Jamieson, 1996; Iyengar, 1987, 1991; Iyengar & Simon, 1991; McLeod, & Detenber, 1999; Pan, & Kosicki, 1993; Price, Tewksbury, & Powers, 1997; Rhee, 1997; Shah, Domke, & Wackman, 2001; Shah, Kwak, Schmierbach, Zubric, 2004; Shen, 2004; Valkenburg, Semetko, & de Vreese, 1999; Zillmann, Chen, Knobloch, & Callison, 2004), leading to Carragee and Roefs’(2004) criticism that framing has been reduced to the study of media effects.

In contrast, the other two processes identified by Scheufele -- frame-building and feedback loop from audiences to journalists -- have largely been marginalized in framing research, although researchers have conceptually recognized and examined extrinsic and intrinsic factors influencing the production and selection of news, as discussed above.


Issues, such as why certain frames dominate news texts or discourses and others do not, are virtually ignored (Carragee, & Roefs, 2004, p.220).

Based on previous research, Scheufele (1999) suggested “at least five factors may potentially influence how journalists frame a given issue: social norms and values, organizational pressures and constraints, pressures of interest groups, journalistic routines, and ideological or political orientations of journalists” (p.109). Yet framing studies have not clearly related media frames to those factors in terms of empirical tests, or as Scheufele (1999) put it, “no evidence has yet been systematically collected about how various factors impact the structural qualities of news in terms of framing” (p.109). Methodologically, researchers also tend to ignore the possibilities that these factors can have combined and interactive effects on media content.

### **3.2.2. An Interactive Model of Frame-Building Process**

Concentrating on the process of frame building, I propose an interactive model, in which the interplaying roles of the major elements are considered (see Figure 3.2). *Media* place in the center of the model, in which *journalists*, as primary actors, build a variety of *media frames*. In the process of *journalists*' building media frames to present and interpret *objective reality*, the factors at the different levels summarized in the Shoemaker and Reese model are assumed to play major roles. Through the presentations of media frames, *objective reality* is translated into *constructed reality*, which is assumed to have an influence on taking shape of *individual frames* cognitively in the long term, while *individual frames* would in turn adjust and modify *constructed reality* with the synthetic effects of individuals' direct observation on *objective reality* and the factors that the





**Figure 3.2. An Interactive Model of Frame-Building Process**

circles represent. In the other direction, *individual frames* formed in the long term, in which ideological, cultural backgrounds, prior knowledge of constructed reality, and personal experience come into play, are assumed to play a role in how individual journalists working for *media* perceive *objective reality* and build *media frames*, and their further perceiving and understanding *media frames*. In the long term, both *media frames* and *individual frames* would influence how individual journalists perceive and construct *objective reality*.

The reasons I propose such a model here are twofold. First, in previous research on frame building, the interactions between *media frames* and *individual frames*, and the roles of *constructed reality*, such as its direct influence on *individual frames* and its

indirect influence on *media frames*, have more or less been ignored. Second, I would assume that the Shoemaker and Reese model, if examined alone, could explain only a certain portion of variations in media frames. With the interactions between *media frames* and *individual frames* and the roles of *constructed reality* added in, the residuals might be explained more, although the current study may not be able to address all the elements in the model.

The current study only looks at a part of the process of frame building, from *objective reality* through *media*, which are under the overarching influences of multiple factors posed in the Shoemaker and Reese model, to *media frames*. Attention is paid particularly to the factors at the higher levels, by looking at the relationships between the framing of the Internet in China and such factors as ideology and political system, social norms and cultural values, which theoretically should be examined and tested at a cross-cultural level. The study aims to determine to what extent the variants of media frames could be explained by the combination of effects of political and cultural factors.

Specifically, *objective reality* in this study is the Internet in China, which consists of many issues such as Internet use, Internet censorship, Internet business, Internet security, and the impacts of the Internet in China. The term *framing* refers to the selection of various issues related to the Internet in China and the process of presenting those issues. Different types of news frames are the results of the process.

### 3.2.3. Types of Generic News Frames

Accordingly, *news frames*, as a result of framing, refer to the generic ways to present certain issues concerning China's Internet in news stories (see Table 3.1),<sup>24</sup> consisting of actors, operational processes and evaluations on actors and what have been done. A frame in this context is an interpretative tool that journalists use to make sense of the Internet in China. Previous framing studies (e.g., Gamson, 1992; Luther & Zhou, 2005; Neuman, Just, & Crigler, 1992; Price, Tewksbury & Powers, 1997; Semetko & Valkenburg, 2000) have identified at least six of what de Vreese, Peter, and Semetko (2001) term *generic news frames*, such as *human interest*, *responsibility*, *morality*, *economic consequences*, *conflict*, and *leadership*. Such generic news frames might not be determinative in attaining a detailed and thorough understanding of media interpretations of subjects or issues in question. Yet they can help framing researchers get around the limitations brought by the *ad hoc* frames, referred to by McCombs and Ghanem (2001) as "frames defined specifically for a single study with little or no attention to explicating either their basic characteristics or theoretical context" (p.79). This will make it possible to compare across cultures and generalize into different contexts.

A *human interest frame*, as Valkenburg, Semetko and de Vreese (1999) put it, "brings an individual's story or an emotional angle to the presentation of an event, issue, or problem" (p.551). Therefore, to personalize, dramatize, and emotionalize the news is one way for journalists to present and interpret the issues of China's Internet.

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<sup>24</sup> It might not be feasible to find all of the frames in a particular newspaper. Yet the absence, if any, still can illustrate the tendency of journalists to frame China's Internet, especially for some issues.

**Table 3.1. Typologies for Analyzing the Frames of the Internet in China**

<b>Issues related to China's Internet</b> <sup>25</sup>	<b>Factual Frames</b>	<b>Human Interest Frames</b>	<b>Responsibility Frames</b>	<b>Morality Frame</b>	<b>Economic Consequence Frames</b>	<b>Conflict Frames</b>	<b>Leadership Frames</b>
Internet diffusion & development							
Internet use							
Internet censorship & regulations							
Hackers & Internet security							
E-commerce & Internet business							
Consequences and implications of the Internet <sup>26</sup>							
Other(s)							

<sup>25</sup> These issues are not mutually exclusive; therefore more than one of them could appear in the same story. See the coding guidelines (APPENDIX C) for details.

<sup>26</sup> See the coding forms (APPENDIX B), in which this category is broken down by political, cultural, commercial, and other aspects.

*Responsibility frames* present an issue or problem “in such a way as to attribute responsibility for its cause or solution to either the government or to an individual or group” (Semetko, & Valkenburg, 2000, p.96). In the context of the Internet in China, for instance, journalists might attribute the responsibility for the social problems brought by *wangba* (Internet cafés) to different targets, e.g., governments, or business operators, or individual customers.

*Morality frames* interpret an issue, event or problem in terms of “moral prescription,” such as presenting moral messages, or offering “specific social prescriptions about how to behave” (Semetko & Valkenburg, 2000, p.96). Taking *wangba* as an example again, journalists in different societies might frame the stories in terms of either responsibility or morality. Specifically, the media in China might have framed the regulation of *wangba*, in which there have been a lot of teenagers playing online games all day long and visiting pornographic Web sites, from the perspective of educating youths to be civilized Internet users.

With regard to *economic consequence frames*, the actual or potential economic impact or consequences of an event, issue, action or problem on individuals, societies, or nations are emphasized (Luther & Zhou, 2005; Neuman et al., 1992; Valkenburg et al., 1999).

In terms of *conflict frames*, journalists rely on “conflict between individuals, groups, or institutions as a means of capturing audience interests” (Semetko & Valkenburg, 2000, p.95). Luther and Zhou (2005) have observed that researchers have acknowledged the primary role the conflict frame plays in storytelling in Western media. They have also identified a new generic frame, the *leadership frame* in which the story is

centered on the activities, actions or speech of a leader of a nation, group, government agency, or an institution, or the discussion and assessment of leadership are highlighted.

Besides these frames, scholars have proposed another type of news frame “without indication of implications,” that is, a *factual frame* presenting events or issues “in a straightforward fashion” (Zillmann et al., 2004, p.66).<sup>27</sup>

In the current study, framing will be conceived in terms of the different sets of values in the socio-political and cultural environment of various countries, which provide the underlying rationale for particular issue interpretations in news stories. Although journalists, trying hard to be objective, do not deliberately insert values into the news (Gans, 1979), some overarching sets of values, as what Haider-Markel and Meier (1996) termed *deeply held values*, or as what Gans (1979) proposed as *enduring values*, are associated with reality judgments and included in the news, which also contains ideology (Gans, 1979). It is assumed that such values influence journalists, directly and indirectly, to frame the Internet, the medium itself, and its story in China. Thus cultural comparisons are given more attention in this study.

### **3.3. Hofstede’s Cultural Dimensions and Subsequent Cross-Cultural Projects**

Culture can have many meanings. De Mooij and Keegar (1991) took culture to mean “that complex whole which includes knowledge, beliefs, art, morals, law, customs and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society”(p.74).

According to Hofstede (1980), culture is the “collective programming of the mind which

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<sup>27</sup> See the coding guidelines (APPENDIX C) for detailed information on how to determine the presence of each type of generic news frames based on a series of questions.

distinguishes the members of one group or category of people from another” (p.260). For the purpose of this study, it is referred to in terms of shared values that symbolize a society and thus the thinking, feeling, and behaviors of members of that society. Or, it is what Srikandath called *cultural values*, “the governing ideas and guiding principles for thought and action” in a given society (1991, p.166). Values – judgments of good or bad, right or wrong – are often viewed as central tenets of a society’s culture (Kluckhohn & Strodtbeck, 1961). The underlying assumption is that general cultural characteristics within a particular society contributes to people within that society thinking and behaving in similar ways, with similar perceptions, mind sets and, indeed, expectations. So, it is understandable how different countries are associated with or characterized by different cultural traits. In the current study, using Hofstede’s cultural dimensions, how such general cultural values embodied in a society, together with the political system in the society, influence framing and news frames will be examined. Such political and cultural factors are located at the broadest level in the Shoemaker and Reese’s hierarchical model.

### **3.3.1. Hofstede’s Original Work and Cultural Dimensions in Cross-Cultural Research**

The mapping of culture has usually been made by using values. The most widely known value mapping is the seminal work of Hofstede (1980). Before Hofstede, culture had been referred to as a residual explanation, because other factors or variables are more easily measured and allowing for a cause and effect relationship to be identified. In contrast, Hofstede concentrated on culture itself, mainly with “national cultures” (i.e. those cultural characteristics that are kindred to a particular nation). He conducted a

research project with a very large sample of IBM Corp. employees, involving 116,000 questionnaires across 50 countries and three regions at two points in time, which makes Hofstede's framework most useful in both academic and business settings (Cutler, Erdem, & Javalgi, 1997), to develop a way of describing culture according to similarities and dissimilarities among countries.<sup>28</sup> He derived four dimensions of national culture: *power distance*, *uncertainty avoidance*, *individualism/collectivism*, and *masculinity/femininity*.

As Han (2003) pointed out, there has been no research effort with such a huge sample size in conducting cross-national comparisons; and no conceptual foundation as powerful as Hofstede's has been yet established in the area of cross-cultural research. Hofstede's original work has been used as organizing and explanatory constructs in many disciplines. In a number of publications (for example, Hofstede, 1980, 1983, 1991, 1998; Hofstede & Bond, 1984, 1988), these dimensions have been thoroughly described and their correlates presented. By locating cultures on a four-factor map, this groundbreaking work has enabled cross-cultural psychologists to select cultures for comparison on an a priori basis (e.g., Bond & Forgas, 1984; Gudykunst, Yang, & Nishida, 1985). Later, tapping values salient to Chinese people, Hofstede (1991; Hofstede & Bond, 1988) added one additional dimension, long- versus short-term orientation, also known as "Confucian work dynamism," to his cultural dimensions. All five dimensions of culture-level values have provided the conceptual impetus for numerous cross-cultural studies (e.g., Hofstede, & Bond, 1988; Schwartz, 1994).

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<sup>28</sup> See Hofstede and Bond (1988) for discussions about indirect and direct measures of culture, and how matched samples of respondents from a number of different countries are crucial for direct measures of culture. They provided strong arguments regarding the IBM samples, which "represented extremely well-matched subsets from each country's population."



In short, the studies have demonstrated that national cultures vary substantially in a variety of dimensions. Hofstede's cultural dimensions are one of the most frequently cited frameworks for understanding culture, although concern over his methodology has also been expressed (e.g., Goodstein, 1981; Roberts & Boyacigiller, 1984). His typology has been greatly influential in cross-cultural studies (e.g., Albers-Miller & Gelb, 1996; Cutler et al., 1997; Fernandez, Carlson, Stepina, & Nicholson, 1997; Frith & Sengupta, 1991; Moon & Franke, 2000; Triandis, 1990). Scholars have shown that Hofstede's research effort still provides a well-tested framework for analyzing cultural differences in multinational communication. After reviewing 61 studies using Hofstede's cultural dimensions, Sondergaard (1994) found that these dimensions were stable across populations and time periods. According to several studies replicating Hofstede's country classification in the late 1990s, findings were generally consistent with Hofstede's original report (Cutler et al, 1997; Fernandez et al, 1997; Wildeman, Hofstede, Noorderhaven, Thurik, Verhoeve, & Wennekers, 1999), although some shifts in value classifications were found in some countries (Fernandez et al, 1997).

The present study will introduce cultural dimensions to media content analysis. They will be taken as independent variables to see to what extent culture variations would influence the construction of media content and the framing of news stories. The underlying assumption is that journalists, the primary producers of media content, work in an overarching system of cultural values in which the way they perceive and interpret the world is shaped. The dimension of "masculinity versus femininity" will be excluded from the study because it mainly addresses gender roles in a society, and is not relevant

to the focus of the study; thus, the following brief descriptions of cultural dimensions will not cover it.

### **3.3.2. The Dimension of Individualism versus Collectivism**

The dimension of “individualism vs. collectivism” has been suggested to be the most prominent dimension of cultural variability identified by scholars (Cutler et al, 1997; Taylor, Wilson, & Miracle, 1994; Triandis, 1990),<sup>29</sup> and has been considered an appropriate choice for cross-cultural research, thus being most frequently used across disciplines (e.g., Belk & Bryce, 1986; Cho, Kwon, Gentry, Jun, & Kropp, 1999; Cutler et al, 1997; Frith & Sengupta, 1991; Han & Shavitt, 1994). Scholars have also warned researchers of the incorrectness to think of them as “end points at a continuum” (Cho et al., 1999), by noting that “the tendencies toward collectivism and individualism can coexist” (Triandis, 1990).

Generally, the dimension pertains to the importance of the group versus the individual. Collectivism is where the members of a society operate within a close knit social framework, with a high emphasis on loyalty to members of that social framework, and “emotional dependence of members on their organizations” (Hofstede, 2001, p.212). In contrast, in individualistic societies, where the family in its nuclear form is the most common set up, “the ties between individuals are loose: everyone is expected to look after himself or herself”(Hofstede, 1991, p.51), rather than to function on the basis of a shared loyalty to society. Social ties are tighter in collectivistic countries, where “one

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<sup>29</sup> Taylor et al. (1994) drew such a conclusion from their reading of more than 75 articles and books in the area.

owes lifelong loyalty to one's ingroup, and breaking this loyalty is one of the worst things a person can do" (Hofstede, 1991, p.50). Under individualism, "laws, rules and regulations are institutionalized to protect individual rights" (Kim, Triandis, Kagitcibasi, Choi, & Yoon, 1994, p.8), whereas "morality among collectivists is more contextual and the supreme value is the welfare of the collective" (Triandis, 1995, p.77).

In all, the emphasis in individualistic cultures is on a person's initiative and achievement. Collectivistic cultures, in which attitudes toward others depend upon their group members, seek group harmony and consensus, and confrontations are to be avoided (Hofstede, 1980, 2001; Zandpour, Campos, Catalano, Chang, Cho, Hoobyar, Jiang, Lin, Madrid, Scheideler, & Osborn, 1994). Reflected in communication, for instance, individualistic cultures are more likely to put more emphasis on individual differences or strength in argument and to put less emphasis on shared feeling and consonance among persons when they process persuasive messages such as advertising; and collectivistic cultures are the opposite (Zandpour et al, 1994).

The existence of cultural differences in the individualism vs. collectivism dimension has generally been accepted by scholars (Cutler et al, 1997; Frith & Sengupta, 1991). There is a tendency to relate individualism to the West and collectivism to the East. As Hofstede put, "in the United States there has been and still is a strong feeling that individualism is good and collectivism bad" (Hofstede, 2001, p.213). Work by Lodge and Vogel (1987), led to the recognition that the major difference between the West and East lies in their different emphasis on communitarianism and individualism. Scholars tend to link Confucian ethic and thus the East to the notion of collectivism. For example, Gerth (1968) and Andreski (1983) noted how in Weber's study, religion was found to

impinge on economic behavior, leading Weber to look at the Confucian ethic and Confucianism, which do not advocate individualism.

### **3.3.3. The Dimension of Power Distance**

Power distance, to some extent addressing human inequality or the issue of whether status is important, involves the extent to which people accept unequal distributions of power in society and organizations (Hofstede, 2001; Hofstede & Bond, 1988). A high power distance index (PDI) reflects the notion of knowing one's place and accepting inequality. High PDI societies, such as China, are more tolerant of hierarchies (Fernandez et al., 1997). In such a society, where status consistency is supported, inequality is seen as the basis of societal order, and there is a preference for a dictatorial autocratic style of management. Thus decisions are taken from the top and dictated throughout the organization. The public tends to leave issues of public interest to the authorities, waiting for action by the government. There is a latent conflict between the powerful and the powerless. The underdog is to be blamed for anything wrong in the system, whereas no denouncement is against power abuse by superior (Hofstede, 2001, pp.97-121).

Conversely low power distance does not readily accept inequality, leading to attempts to minimize positions of status and to eliminate inequality, seen as a necessary evil. It can be said that those nations with a high power distance place great emphasis on status and positions of power, whereas those with a low power distance, tend to place more emphasis on personal competence rather than status, put value on independence, and stress reward, legitimate and expert power. Freedom is seen in as important. The

society's system is to be blamed if something goes wrong. In addition, unlike high-PDI societies, where the use of force is seen as the essence of power, in low-PDI societies, it is a sign of the failure of power (Hofstede, 2001, pp.97-121).

#### **3.3.4. The Dimension of Uncertainty Avoidance**

This concept is concerned with the extent to which a society attempts to avoid uncertainty and puts measures in place to reduce uncertainty (Hofstede, 2001, pp.145-146). Such measures may include: 1) life long employment; 2) adherence to rules and regulations; 3) refusal to tolerate deviant ideas or behavior; 4) resisting innovation; ignoring concepts; and 5) high power distance (Hofstede, 2001, pp.148-159). In strong uncertainty avoidance societies, its members are encouraged to anticipate the future, create institutions establishing and reinforcing security and stability, and avoid or manage risk. Members in such a society, as Japan and Korea, tend to avoid attitudes and behaviors that could increase anxiety, such as doing away with rules. Employees are more likely to feel that “company rules should not be broken – even if the employee thinks it is in the company's best interests” (Hofstede, 1991, p.112). Loyalty is a virtue, and there is more resistance to changes in such a society (Hofstede, 2001, p.160). In contrast, members in a weak uncertainty avoidance society are encouraged to take risks, take each day as it comes, and perhaps have low expectations and a fatalistic outlook. Individuals in countries low in uncertainty avoidance, such as Singapore, are relatively comfortable with ambiguity and are tolerant of others' behaviors and opinions. To them, truth is relative; the need for legislation in such a society is less than uncertainty-avoiding

countries (Hofstede, 1991; Hofstede, 2001, pp.160-174).<sup>30</sup>

### 3.3.5. The Dimension of Long- Versus Short-Term Orientation

To examine culture from an Eastern perspective, a group of researchers known as the “Chinese Culture Connection” developed the so-called Chinese Value Survey (CVS) based on Chinese values.<sup>31</sup> This instrument revealed a fifth cultural dimension, *long-/short-term orientation*, which was taken by Hofstede in his later research. The dimension presents the opposite poles of Confucian thinking: perseverance and thrift that are oriented towards future rewards, and saving face, respect for tradition and fulfilling social obligations that stress more past-oriented values (Hofstede, 2001, p.354, 359).<sup>32</sup> Cultures with a long-term orientation, or a high score on a Long Term Orientation Index (LTO), are concerned with the demands of “virtue” – what one *does* (Hofstede, 1991; Hofstede & Bond, 1988). Members in such a country believe less in universal guidelines for what is good and evil, and tend to make judgments by considering the circumstances (Hofstede, 2001, p.363). This is a pragmatic approach that emphasizes Confucian principles, such as respect for the unequal status of individuals. Cultures with a short-term orientation, or a low score on LTO, are more concerned with “truth” – religion-

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<sup>30</sup> Hofstede (2001) also pointed out that such a need does not imply a greater trust in the legal system (p.174).

<sup>31</sup> See Chinese Culture Connection (1987). Specifically, Michael Harris Bond developed an instrument in Hong Kong from values suggested by Chinese scholars. The group conducted the survey among students from 23 countries around 1985.

<sup>32</sup> According to Hofstede (2001), the missing of the dimension from the original IBM data can be seen as a result of the thinking of Western minds that differ from Eastern minds. For instance, such a concept as “filial piety,” which is explained as “honoring of ancestors and obedience to, respect for and financial support of parents,” in the CVS seem unfamiliar to a Western mind, even though some values would be clearly recognized by the Eastern mind. A Westerner would not normally find them important. Hofstede also pointed out that cultural bias could be minimized by well designed and conducted “decentered research” and the dynamics of the research team (pp.351-355).

based issues of right and wrong involving what one *believes*. Tolerance and respect for others are seen as a matter of principle. People are expecting quick results in such a society (Hofstede, 2001, pp. 359-365).

In general, East Asian countries scored highest on LTO, with China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Japan and South Korea on the top five of the Hofstede's list including 23 countries.<sup>33</sup> In contrast, Western countries were on the low side (Hofstede, 2001). Such a listing is consistent with the findings in other studies, showing that people from East Asian countries such as China, Japan, and Korea tend to have a past orientation, while Westerners such as Americans and Northern Europeans have more of a future orientation (Hall, 1976; Kluckhohn & Strodtbeck, 1961; Yau, 1988). After the pioneering study of Chinese Culture Connection, replications of their measurement were conducted by a U.S.-Hong Kong team of researchers who collected responses to the CVS from different organizations in China, Hong Kong, and the United States (see Ralston, Gustafson, Cheung, & Terpstra, 1993; Ralston, Gustafson, Elsass, Cheung, & Terpstra, 1992). This led to similar results. China scored on top, Hong Kong in the middle, and the United States last (as cited in Hofstede, 2001, p.355).

### **3.4. Conclusion**

The literature review suggests that there is much room left for researchers to examine the construction of media content and the factors influencing such a process. Ideological and societal factors at the broadest level in the hierarchical model of

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<sup>33</sup> This list is mainly based on the one generated by Bond and his colleagues (Chinese Culture Connection, 1987).

Shoemaker and Reese have appealed to scholars in terms of theory and cultural studies. Yet, few studies have empirically tied such factors to media production, particularly in terms of framing, which concerns the selection and salience of issues and the way to present those issues, or news frames. Since the factors at the macro levels vary with political systems and cultural dimensions across societies, a cross-cultural study would fit into such examinations. Scholars have suggested several types of generic news frames, which are free from the limitations brought by individual news stories with different topics and cultural backgrounds in terms of generalization across studies. Their generic nature may make it possible to compare across cultures, although under such a framework detailed information cannot be obtained.

Cross-cultural studies have benefited from cultural dimensions since Hofstede published his seminal work (1980). With the contributions of later studies, cultural dimensions have demonstrated their strong practical values in cross-cultural studies across disciplines. Yet, few studies have been found to apply the dimensions to news content research, particularly in terms of framing, although numerous studies comparing advertising across countries have adopted the framework since the 1990s. The current study is exploratory to see whether such a framework suits to framing research; and if so, to what extent. The cultural dimensions, together with freedom status, were taken as independent variables to see to what extent cultural variations might affect the construction of media content and the framing of news stories.

Such effects were also examined with the influence of factors at the extramedia level in Shoemaker and Reese's model within a society, specifically China, to see the variations of newspapers' treatment in the same overarching political and cultural



systems. In their model, Shoemaker and Reese (1996) detailed two primary factors at this level, government control and the marketplace (pp.199-215). The next chapter will address the unevenly developed Chinese media under the influence of the interaction between the party/state power and the market power and the structural differences between the two Chinese newspapers sampled in the current study, the *People's Daily* and *Beijing Youth Daily*.

## **CHAPTER IV. FROM IDEOLOGICAL PROPAGANDA TO COMMERCIAL OPERATION: THE CHANGING MEDIA IN CHINA**

Since the mid 1980s, particularly the 1990s, the Chinese media have been undergoing the multifaceted transformation full of what Lee (1994) indicated “ambiguities and contradictions,” as a result of Deng Xiaoping’s moving China’s priorities from ideology to economic growth and embracing market-oriented socioeconomic reforms. The changing process is unique in that it is taking place in an authoritarian society within the general framework of the “commandist system” (Lee, 1990).

The “inherent paradox between political control and economic liberalism” manifested in the Chinese media (Lee, 1994, p.12) may suggest that the extramedia influences at the fourth level in Shoemaker and Reese’ hierarchical model would particularly contribute to differences in news framing patterns within a transitional society, thus being worth a close examination. Therefore, another goal of this study was to see whether the framing of the Internet in China would vary with the level of financial and operational autonomy enjoyed by individual Chinese newspapers. Accordingly, this chapter provides an overview of the trajectory of the media transformation, with an emphasis on newspapers, from the commandist system into one that enjoys greater relative autonomy from the Party-state, and from the Party-organ structure to a multi-level structure with media liberalization unevenly developed (Chan, 1995; Chan & Qiu, 2002; White III, 1990; Zhang, 2000). This is followed by introductions to the *People’s*

*Daily* and the *Beijing Youth Daily*, two newspapers selected as the representatives of Chinese newspapers.

#### **4.1. Propaganda, Media Control and Power Dispersion in Reform China**

The Chinese media in Mao Zedong's era had been analyzed within the dominant framework of a mass propaganda and persuasion model (Chang, Chen, & Zhang, 1993). In such a model, the media functioned as a mouthpiece of the central government and an ideological apparatus of the state, and were tightly controlled to meet the needs of political indoctrination and mass mobilization so that the state could impose ideological hegemony on the society (Edelstein & Liu, 1963; Lee, 1990; Siebert, Peterson, & Schramm, 1956). Many studies showed how the Party used the press to propagate its party line and party policies, and promote changes in the attitudes and behavior of the people in the early 1950s and early 1960s (e.g., Bishop, 1989; Houn, 1961; Liu, 1971).

Today, while the Party still insists that the press is its mouthpiece and continues to employ different mechanisms of media control and censorship,<sup>34</sup> the role of media as a propaganda tool has shifted in reform China. Thus, many scholars have expressed dissatisfaction with the propaganda model (e.g., Chang et al., 1993; Cheek, 1989; Huang, 2003; Lee, 1994; Sun, 1995, 1996), which is seen as "inadequate in the increasingly multifunctional and multi-level media in China" (Sun, 1995, p.195). The use of media to maintain political control is now coupled with the dissemination of information to

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<sup>34</sup> See Polunbaum (1990) for detailed descriptions of the mechanisms of press control used by the Chinese government, such as regulatory control, financial controls, personnel management, prepublication review, news suppression, and self-censorship. Also see Chan (1995) for the pendulum-like pattern of the Chinese Communist Party's ideological controls of the media from the early of 1980s to the mid-1990s.

promote the benefits of economic reform to the Chinese people (Pan, 2000; Wu, 2000). Scholars have found tremendous changes occurring in the Chinese media since late 1970s, both structurally and functionally (e.g. Chan, 1993; Chang, et al., 1993; Chu, 1994; Huang, 2001; Robinson, 1981; Sun, 1996; Wu, 2000; Zhao, 1998, 2000).

Deng Xiaoping initiated reforms in 1978. Taking the first step, Deng rejected the notion that political legitimacy could stem from the charismatic personality of one man, and institutionalized the political process, such as restoring the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 1979 and promulgating a new CCP charter in 1981. Following it, Deng initiated an unprecedented discussion on whether Mao's policies centered on class struggle should be rectified, later known as "Great Debate Concerning the Criterion of Truth" (*gunyu zhengli biao zhun de datao lun*). As a result, Maoist ideology was replaced with pragmatism and empiricism, and the country shifted its national policy from class struggle to economic construction with a new central policy goal, that is, to satisfy the material aspirations of the people without sacrificing CCP leadership (Kuan, 1991, 1.3). The phrase "socialism with Chinese characteristics" (*you zhongguo tese shehui zhiyi*), coined by Deng and officially proposed at the 12<sup>th</sup> CCP Congress in 1982, was used to justify the economic imperative (*The theory of building a socialism with Chinese characteristics*). On the other hand, the pace of political reforms has far lagged behind enthusiastic economic reforms. Although the 13<sup>th</sup> CCP Congress in 1987 proclaimed that political reforms were important, it narrowly defined political reform in the official report of then-Premier Zhao Ziyang as improving government efficiency, strengthening the vitality of the CCP, fighting bureaucracy, and promoting

enthusiasm among people (Zhao, 1987).<sup>35</sup> Both economic and political reforms were carried out within the context of the CCP's overall goal of retaining power.

The Chinese media, which began developing rapidly after the reforms, have both contributed to this shift and formed part of the re-orientation within this context. At the center of the media growth has been the Chinese government's focus on reconfiguring the control and propaganda modalities of the domestic media system to promote economic reforms and growth through the introduction of a "competitive" environment, while the party-state still owns all mass media organizations in principle to ensure the control of information as a key to political and social order, an idea originating in years of history of a hierarchical society.<sup>36</sup> From late 1989 to the immediate post-1992 period,<sup>37</sup> the dominant role of the media was to promote Deng's agenda and champion

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<sup>35</sup> Even so, reformist journalists still took heart and got a moral boost because in the report Zhao also accentuated the importance of "supervision (of government) by public opinion" (*yulun jiandu*). When the author discussed such issues with her senior colleagues at the Xinhua News Agency in late 1990s, they all appraised it, seeing it as a new cast to the journalism reform. Zhao did not actually use the phrase "journalism reform" in this speech; he did so for the first time in a commemorative message published in *Chinese Journalist* (1988, no.1.1), a journal published by Xinhua.

<sup>36</sup> See Winfield, Mizuno and Beaudoin (2000) for more discussion about the idea of maintaining the social order of unidirectional flow of information within the five filial relationships, which was borrowed from Confucianism. A typical example of such a hierarchical system of information control is that the publications published by the Xinhua News Agency fall into two major categories, publicly circulated (*gongkai baokan*) and internally circulated publications (*neibu baokan*). The internal publications are available only to Party cadres at different levels. The readers of the publication at the top level, which is delivered only by Xinhua personnel, include only the members of the Politburo of the CCP. The *People's Daily* also publishes such internal reference publications. Through the internal reporting, which is almost by definition investigative, negative and problem-orientated, journalists identify flaws in current policies and serious social problems, and highlight the need for disciplinary actions against delinquent officials, which are usually not available to the public. Instead of the mouth, such publications function as "ermu," the eyes and ears of the central leaders for policy decision-making, by providing feedback in the implementation of particular policies and directives, and borrowing examples from foreign countries.

<sup>37</sup> In 1992, when visiting Shenzhen, one of the first Special Economic Zones in reform China, Deng gave a talk urging officials to forget about the "socialism versus capitalism" debate and focus, instead, on accelerating marketization. Newspapers in Shanghai and Shenzhen publicized his talks, subsequently leading to a media campaign, which marked the marginalization of the orthodox left. In the same year, the Ministry of Culture released ten policy guidelines on reforming cultural institutions, which included the policy allowing cultural organizations to form joint-ventures with foreign capital. Since then, ideological control has relaxed somewhat (Chan, 1993). Scholars recognize that the year of 1992 marked a more

market-oriented government officials and successful business operations. While advocating the ideology of the market, the Chinese media have found themselves to be involved in a process of commercialization, which is perceived by some scholars to represent a “peaceful evolution” or a “quiet revolution” toward establishment of a market system (e.g., Chun, 1993; Huang, 1994). The process started in 1978, and was accelerated after 1987 when the State Science and Technology Commission listed newspaper publishing and broadcasting as “information commodification industries” (Huang & Ding, 1997, as cited in Zhao, 2000). For instance, in the newspaper industry, the number of newspapers published from January 1, 1980, to March 1, 1985, across the country was 1,008, which means there was one newspaper coming out every two days (Fang, 1999, p.504). The total number of newspapers reached 2,235 by early 1996, a 91.7 percent increase above the 1979 level, 186 (Rosen, 2000).<sup>38</sup> A majority of newly published papers were market-oriented, such as *Shopping Guide* and *Stock Exchange Herald*, which increased their market share dramatically.

Although the CCP continues its commitment to political control of mass media,<sup>39</sup> the macro-environment of media operations is seen to be moving away from the

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visible mass commercialization in terms of both policy and reality (e.g., Chan, 1993; Zhao, 2000; See more information in the next section).

<sup>38</sup> The number has run back to 1,926 by the end of July 2005 (Interfax China, 2006), after the process of press conglomeration speeded up and the so-called No.19 Document was issued in 2003 to clean up the press industry.

<sup>39</sup> The post-Mao leadership continues to stress the mouthpiece theory. Hu Yaobang, widely considered one of the most enlightened post-Mao leaders, in a widely publicized speech in 1985 stated, “The Party’s journalism is the Party’s mouthpiece, and naturally it is the mouthpiece of the people’s government, which is led by the Party, and also the mouthpiece of the people themselves” (Hu, 1985). In November 1989, former President Jiang Zemin gave a speech on the Party’s leadership in journalism, stressing, “Party Committees at various levels should frequently discuss and study news work. Issues such as propaganda policy, guiding ideas, focus of news reporting, effects of propaganda in each period must be discussed in Party Committee meetings” (Jiang, 1990, p.199). Interestingly, Guo Chaoren, who had suffered the long-time denial of Party membership but took over the directorship of Xinhua News Agency in 1992 and sat on

propaganda-led model toward a loosening of political controls and a relaxing of ideological orthodoxy (Chan, 1993, 1995; Huang, 2001; Zhang, 1993). Unlike the Mao era when state influence and ideological control were secured to pervade every domain of social life, as Lee (1990) pointed out, the post-Mao regime has not imposed “an all-encompassing ideology,” which has made it possible for various cultural genres and less ideologically oriented content to flourish in the media.

Wu (2000) analyzed two ways, decentralization and socialization, in which the Chinese media have become structurally diversified; that is, the Chinese media have been dispersed from the national and provincial capitals to localities, from the power center of the state system to different branches, departments and bureaus of the government, and from the state to some social sectors. For instance, the percentage of centrally located newspapers dropped drastically from 24.6 percent in 1979 to the bottom 5.2 percent in 1984; it then climbed with difficulty to 9.6 percent in 1997 (Wu, 2000),<sup>40</sup> after the Party started the market consolidation campaign and the process of press conglomeration. Zhao (2000) asserted that they were mechanisms aimed at “enhancing political control, on the one hand, and facilitating press capitalization, on the other” (p.5). Due to the increasingly fierce competition from the local popular press, the major nationally circulated papers have declined on average 30 percent (Rosen, 2000, p.153).<sup>41</sup> In fact, such structural

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the Party Secretariat as an observer, published a book *Houshe Lun (The theory of being a mouthpiece)* in 1997, voluntarily advocating the role of the press as an instrument of the Party at a time when most journalists in China loathed the notion of being a mouthpiece. Because of its slow-selling, each staff in the newsrooms at the agency was given one copy paid by different departments affiliated with the agency, which caused complaints in every newsroom. Most journalists, including the author who worked with the agency at the time, simply put the copies aside or threw them away after receiving them.

<sup>40</sup> Also see Lee (1990) for the diversity of newspapers’ structure and content genres in 1987 as an example.

<sup>41</sup> Refer to Tong (2003) for detailed descriptions of strong competitions among Chinese newspapers, which are represented as various “big wars (*dazhan*),” such as “big wars of news,” “big wars of expanding pages,”

diversification occurred across all media types.<sup>42</sup>

Dispersion of power to run the press from the national center to peripheries carried important political implications, due to the fact that it has brought difficulties to the central government to unify voices of the media run by the local government.<sup>43</sup> Also, various social or non-official organizations, such as the All-China Writers' Association (*Zhongguo quanguo zuojia xiehui*; ACWA), and the All-China Federation of Women

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“big wars of weekend versions,” “big wars of circulations,” “big wars of quotations,” “big wars of advertising,” and so on.

<sup>42</sup> A typical example is that the China Central Television (CCTV), the only national television station in China, has lost its monopoly over the television industry because numerous television stations have been set up at provincial and subprovincial levels of the government. See Chan (1995) for the television competition across the national, provincial and city levels; and see Lee (1990) for broadcasting regionalization.

<sup>43</sup> Scholars have also recognized the bureaucratic hurdles of inefficiency brought by the structural weaknesses of the Chinese administration system in a vertically-organized hierarchy and the not-well defined responsibilities of different administrative entities (e.g., Ding, 1994; Wu, 1996). The dismantlement of the central command economic system is freeing local governments and entrepreneurs from the control of central government. This is leading to highly dynamic and diversified developments in many provinces, especially in those remote areas, such as Guangdong Province. While all the state law-enforcement bodies and the CCP's discipline inspection commissions in an area help to achieve the “ultimate control,” the unified leadership may not keep a close eye on every operational detail of the organizations within its jurisdiction on a daily base (Ding, 2002). In China, there is a popular saying, “*Shang you zhengce, xia you duice* (Policy from the top will be met with counter-measures at the bottom),” which suggests the possibility of deviations, comprises, and even opposition to the policies issued by the political center, especially in the remote local workplace. The following is an interesting example to see how a policy from the central government is executed locally. The author emailed a friend of hers in Shenzhen, Guangdong, regarding the “PRC Regulations on the Security and Management of Computer Information Networks and the Internet” issued in 1997 (refer to Note 12 in Chapter 1), which required new users to sign a Net Access Responsibility Agreement in which they swore not to threaten state security or reveal state secrets or do anything that endangered the state, obstructed public safety, or was obscene or pornographic. She sent me two messages in English as follows:

- 1) “for internet setup in my home: 1. call the local LAN company for setup broadband network and leave the home phone number; 2. the network company come[sic] to set up the LAN, installation fee RMB ¥200.00 (about \$23.00) and they send network card for free; 3. Sign the payment contract by means of bank account deduction; 4. the fee rate per month = RMB ¥120.00 /month (less than \$15).

Note: if ADSL/cable is installed, the similar steps. *The remarks u [sic] quoted is bullshitting* (emphasis added by the author).”

- 2) “in 94/95, the users had to sign the agreement with China Telecom, one of the terms is not to threaten ... blahblah ...”

In terms of traditional media, it is not uncommon that editors play “an edge ball (*caibianqiu*),” a reference to journalistic practices that Chinese journalists sneak in their own ideas to stretch the editorial boundaries of the CCP's tolerance, in their daily news treatment. He (2000a) mentioned four tactics frequently employed by Chinese journalists. See also Chan (1995) for the example to show how the *Beijing Youth Daily* broke the news about the event of Hongze Lake and escaped punishment.



(*Zhongguo quanguo funü lianhehui*; ACFW), have established their own media organizations, printing less ideological news and taking a more relaxed editorial line.<sup>44</sup> As Lee (1990) noted, such pluralistic semi-autonomous groups have gradually sought to articulate their self-interests within the system (p.5). With the loosened controls and the introduction of market mechanisms into media operation, the press has started pushing the ideological limits, thus eroding the commandist-commanded relationship between the Party and the media operations (Zhang, 2000).<sup>45</sup>

## 4.2. State Power and Market Power: Uneven Patterns of Liberalization

There is no doubt that much of the observed changes in China's press are commercially driven, which is one of the least contested understandings shared among scholars of the country's media.<sup>46</sup> Two interlocking steps have mostly contributed to the dispersion of power to run the press: the reduction and gradual termination of state

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<sup>44</sup> In the mid-1990s, the author had personal experiences with a Beijing-located culture and lifestyle weekly newspaper, contracted out from the ACWA with a "publication number" (*kanhao*) from the Beijing Press and Publications Administration. To profit, the ACWA leased its *kanhao* to several individuals who had media experiences and were interested in running media operations. In return, the ACWA got paid in the form of annual fee within the contract duration for authorization to publish under its name. The actual editors-publishers were held responsible for the editing, printing, distribution, taxation and all other expenses, such as hiring staff. All the pages of the newspapers were further sub-contracted out to individual experienced editors or journalists in Beijing. This is one form of what is called the "contractual system" (*chengbao zhi*). Thanks to its content genre, and financial and personnel autonomy, the newspaper enjoyed no censorship from the authorities, even the ACWA. Yet, as Zhao (2000) noted, editors and publishers under such a system tended to focus on nonexplicit political content to avoid political troubles because of the dubious policy base upon which the contractual relationships were built. The highly controversial Shanghai-based *World Economic Herald*, who obtained its license from the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences and the World Economists Association, was one of the few exceptions (see Shen, 1995, for the information on the role of the independent newspaper in fighting press control and promoting economic and political reform in China during the 1980s). This contractual system applies also to the movie, television and other audio-visual media (see Chan, 1993, for more information).

<sup>45</sup> See his detailed comparisons of the Maoist Party-press system and the present market-based Party-press system.

<sup>46</sup> Liu and Jin (2006) stressed the dual attributes of government behavior in the commercialization process of the Chinese press. They held that the root cause of the process is the relatively loosening of government control. Using Howard Aldrich's theory, the resource-power model, they argued that the Chinese

subsidies and “the return of advertising” (Liang & Jacobs, 1996; Stross, 1990; Zhao & Shen, 1995). The reduction and termination of subsidies applied to almost all media organizations except the *People’s Daily*, the *Economic Daily*, and the *Qiushi (Seeking Truth)*, starting in 1992, “the year of commercialization.” That is the year when the National Working Conference on Press Management (NWCPM) recognized the “commodity nature” of the press, and formalized the policy to commercialize publications (Chan, 1993).<sup>47</sup>

With the progress of economic reforms, the central government could not afford subsidizing the old media, let alone the new ones.<sup>48</sup> To meet the needs of economic reforms, the central government promulgated a new policy at the 1992 NWCPM with a specific schedule for the transformation of the Chinese press. The press could no longer use state money to pay for wages and fringe benefits, to defray any deficit in operating costs, or to acquire and maintain fixed assets. Based on the schedule, the first batch of newspapers with subsidies terminated were local or non-official publications that mainly carried information about consumption and daily life (Chan, 1993). Coming next was the

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government has provided the main resource, “permission,” for the media to achieve the goal of transformation. They further noted that the government is still the principal part of fostering and adjusting the market. Their views represent the views of some scholars in mainland China.

<sup>47</sup> In fact, as early as in December, 1949, the NWCPM proposed the policy of commercializing the management of the newspaper industry: “Newspapers should be managed as production enterprises, gradually realizing the business accounting system” (Liang, 1999, as cited in Yuan, 2006). In 1950, the Central Propaganda Department released “*Guanyu baozhi shixing qiyehua jingying qingkuang tonggao*” (the Announcement on the Situation of Newspapers’ Implementing Business Management), clearly stating that the policy of commercializing the management of newspaper industry was “completely right and realizable” (Yuan, 2006). The policy suffered serious setbacks in the Cultural Revolution era, when newspapers entirely lost their functions of commercial development.

<sup>48</sup> Press subsidies were implemented in 1949. Until 1992, the state had provided almost guaranteed revenues to the press through subscriptions and direct financial assistance, which had been one of the important mechanisms to control the media.

national or official press. Both the central and local governments adopted the new financial policy during 1992 and 1993, which is later known as the “weaning plan,” to reduce and finally end media subsidy.<sup>49</sup>

Consistent with the plan to increase the media’s financial autonomy was the Chinese government’s decision to separate the Party press from its mass-appeal counterparts, and liberalize Party control over publications traditionally considered to be at the lower political ranking. Greater autonomy was granted to: (1) afternoon and evening publications; (2) news digests; (3) papers specializing in culture and lifestyle, as well as (4) trade journals. They were not required to carry ideological propaganda, although political control still applied to Party mouthpieces, army papers and national or municipal general papers (Chan, 1993).

Under these new policies, more and more Chinese newspapers have found themselves operating as business organizations, either financially relying on advertising revenue,<sup>50</sup> or sponsored by business organizations (Chan, 1993; Yu, 1994; Zhao, 2000).

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<sup>49</sup> The author joined the Xinhua News Agency at the time when it started going through such a process and decided to change the *Reference News*, a digest newspaper enjoying the largest circulation in China, from a classified publication to a publicly circulated one, and expand from four pages to eight so as to increase profits. As a matter of fact, the newspaper has been the leading profit-making machine for Xinhua, with more than RMB ¥120 million (about US\$14.5 million at the time) per year, accounting for a majority of the newspaper’s annual net profits, turned over to Xinhua since the mid-1990s. The number will be increased to RMB ¥250 million (about US\$31million) for the year of 2006, according to a confidential source. See Chen and Lee (1998) for more detailed information on the numbers of papers at the central and provincial levels which reported to be partially subsidized or self-supporting by 1997. The reduction of state subsidies was accompanied by the provision for financial incentives, including tax breaks, performance-based salary supplements, and operational freedom (Zhao, 2000).

<sup>50</sup> Advertising has become an increasingly significant feature of the Chinese media. From 1990 to 1995, the advertising revenue of newspapers increased by 28% (Chan & Qiu, 2002). Total advertising revenue in China was reported in 1992 to have exceeded RMB ¥5 billion (about US\$575 million at the time), an increase of about 43% over 1991. In some places like Beijing, Jiangsu and Shanxi, the growth rates had been almost as high as 100% (Chan, 1993). With media operation becoming more commercialized, divisions for advertisement, public relations, and other market-related activities are increasingly influential within media organizations (Chen & Lee, 1998). Some scholars viewed it as the “renaissance of press advertising” (Liang & Jacobs, 1996; Stross, 1990; Zhao & Shen, 1995).

The high ranking Party organs continue to juggle between the role of media in both functioning as the Party's mouthpiece and serving the public life, between indoctrination and readability (Chan, 1993).<sup>51</sup> The mid-1990s saw a large number of provincial organs jumping into the waves of city newspapers and evening newspapers, which are highly commercialized and urban-reader oriented (Huang, 2001), to release the "dual pressure" (*shuangchong yali*), that is, playing games within ideological restrictions while being financially independent (Wei, 2005).<sup>52</sup> Most major Party media had expanded as large press conglomerates with a "one-Party organ many subsidiary media" scheme (Huang, 2000).<sup>53</sup> The past years have also seen the phenomenon of "one city, many newspapers" emerging in a number of cities across the country. In Beijing alone, according to statistics in 1999, there were 10 titles of local daily newspapers and 82 titles of central daily newspapers. This did not even include those non-daily newspapers (*Zhongguo xinwen tongji ziliao huibian*, 2000, as cited in Ming, 2002).

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<sup>51</sup> This antagonism, which does not sound every appropriate, suggests an example to see how unique the development of the Chinese press is. Under the pressure of commercialism, journalists are driven to conceptualize the news as a commodity in the pursuit of readers. "*Kedu xing*" (readability) has become a savvy word in newsrooms with a desire to feed readers with "soft," entertainment-oriented and sensational material without forgetting the media function of indoctrinating the masses as suggested in traditional Chinese journalism principles. Such a paradox becomes part of "the irony of commercialisation" (Yu, 1994, p.35), a situation in which the practice of professionalism might be undermined, and Chinese journalists have been forced to search for balance in their every day practices (e.g., Zhou, 2000). This is also part of the difficulties for Chinese journalists with dual missions to serve two masters, the leaders and the masses (see more discussions in Polumbaum, 1990).

<sup>52</sup> Faced with the increasing competition of so-called "*xiaobao*" (small papers, referring to those tabloids which mostly fall into the last three categories mentioned above and are market-oriented local newspapers usually with a small size of pages in terms of physical measurement), provincial Party organ papers have experienced a sharp decline in circulations since the 1990s. By 1996, among 30 of such newspapers, there were 23 reporting that their circulations had dropped more than 30 percent. The highest one was the *Anhui Daily* at 59.8% (Liang, 1996, pp.185-186, as cited in Wei, 2005).

<sup>53</sup> See Zhao (2000) for the example of the *Guangzhou Daily* Group. She viewed the nationwide press conglomeration as a redistribution of organizational resources and a means to enhance press control and strengthen party organs, to balance the fragmentary power of commercialization for optimal integration between propaganda and business.

Because of the interplay of the two forces of state power and market power, the Chinese media, although all have more or less bureaucratic affiliations, have transformed from the commandist system into one that enjoys greater relative autonomy from the Party-state, and from the Party-organ structure to a multi-level structure with media liberalization unevenly developed (Chan, 1995; Chan & Qiu, 2002; Chen, 1996; White III, 1990; Zhang, 2000). According to Chan and Qiu (2002), such uneven patterns of liberalization are embodied in three factors: content genre, media type, and the media location. Politically sensitive content (vs. less sensitive genres like entertainment, sports, and art), newspapers and television (vs. film, advertising, and the Internet), and the media organizations located in Beijing and/or the center areas (vs. other cities and/or the periphery) are more subject to ideological control by the CCP than their counterparts. Unlike before, the Central Propaganda Department (CPD), the CCP's central administration of media censorship, focuses its control on just eight institutions (the Xinhua News Agency, the *People's Daily*, the *Qiushi*, the *Economic Daily*, the *Guangming Daily*, CCTV, Central People's Radio, China International Radio) and in important areas such as Beijing, Shanghai, Guangdong, Sichuan, Shaanxi, Hubei, and Liaoning (Gong, 1994, as cited in Chan, 1995).

### **4.3. A Scheme of the Uneven Structures of Chinese Newspapers**

Scholars who recognize the interaction of ideological control and market force and the diversity of function becoming a key feature of the Chinese press have categorized Chinese newspapers into distinctive groups (e.g., Chen & Lee, 1998; Chen &

Guo, 1998; Fang, 1999; Guo, 2001; Huang, 2000; Lee, 1990; Sun, 1994; Zhao, 2000).<sup>54</sup>

Although the categories differ across studies, the literature has seen a common way to separate *Party papers*, or *Party organ papers* (*dangbao*, or *dang de jiguanbao*),<sup>55</sup> from the others. Based on the discussions in the literature and the understanding of this author's experiences with the Chinese press, a schematic representation was created to show different types of current Chinese newspapers operating in the Party-state sphere and the market sphere with two different powers, the pluralistic nature of the press structures, and the unevenly developed liberalization of the Chinese press (see Figure 4.1).


Instead of embracing a simplistic state versus market dichotomy, as Zhao (2000) suggested, the interaction between the press and their complicated institutional and financial relationships is recognized. Therefore, the Party-state sphere and the market sphere in the schema should not be understood as operating in two completely separated levels. The dashed line between the two spheres is vague because interactions, negotiations, and compromises of two forces, the state power and the market power, are more or less involved at various administrative levels and among all types of newspapers.<sup>56</sup> Through administrative agencies, such as the CPD at the pinnacle of the administrative pyramid of the press control and its provincial and subprovincial

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<sup>54</sup> For example, Chen and Lee (1998) classified the newspapers in China into five types, such as the Party press, the target press, the enterprise/industry press, the mass press and a variety of digests.

<sup>55</sup> In this dissertation, the terms, Party papers, Party organ papers, and the Party press, are interchangeable, all referring to newspapers directly run by the CCP committees at given administrative levels. The capitalized term "Party" in this dissertation restrictedly refers to the CCP only.

<sup>56</sup> Refer to Guo (2001) He (2000b), Lee (1994, 2000), and Xue (1995) for the use of a political-economic perspective to explain the dynamics of the changes in the Chinese press, in which the two forces, Communist politics and market forces are involved.



**Figure 4.1. Chinese Newspapers in Party-State and Market Spheres**

administrations, licensing, centralized allocation of resources, preferential policy treatment and regulatory constraints, the state continues to intervene in the operation of the media market, thus blurring the boundaries between the state and the market (Pan, 2000). Yet the state power is decreasing with the press sectors being closer to the market sphere, while the market power is increasing; and the vice-a-versus is also true. The market dynamism (as granted by the state) has allowed different types of press various scopes in pursuing managerial autonomy and operational liberalization. In the figure, the closer a group box is to the market sphere, the more autonomy and liberalization that the newspapers in the box enjoy.

As shown in Figure 4.1, three primary groups of Chinese newspapers, *Party organ papers*, *other organ papers*, and *non-organ papers*,<sup>57</sup> distinguish themselves from each other because of their different bureaucratic affiliations, organizational practices, market share, and content appeal. Bureaucracy takes place at all administrative levels of the Chinese press. Yet compared to the other types of newspapers, the first group *Party organ papers*, which are directly controlled by the CCP's propaganda departments at different levels and represent the orthodox party-line voice in the central government, various provinces and autonomous regions, and municipalities, have traditionally been at the highest political ranking and are subject to the tightest political control in any given political administrative region (Chen & Guo, 1998; Guo, 2001), while enjoying the higher preferential policy treatment and editorial priority and privileges.<sup>58</sup> Such political

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<sup>57</sup> Ideas were partly drawn from Pan's (2000) work to categorize Chinese newspapers into such three groups.

<sup>58</sup> For instance, central and provincial Party organs enjoy tax privileges. In terms of editorial priority, Party organs generally have mandatory propaganda topics to cover. Coverage of the Party and important national affairs always appears on front pages and pages ahead of international news pages. For example, during the



ranking decreases from the national to the provincial and to the municipal levels of administration.<sup>59</sup> Despite individual variations, Party organ papers at the provincial and municipal levels tend to be more dependent on advertising and outside business than central-level Party papers (Chen & Lee, 1998);<sup>60</sup> therefore, they are closer to the market sphere than central-level papers. Regardless of their differences in terms of administrative hierarchy, all Party organ papers heavily rely on state-subsidized office subscriptions rather than private subscriptions.<sup>61</sup> Because of their emphases on policy guidance and ideological propaganda, the readership of Party organ papers is mostly in the officialdom (Chen & Guo, 1998). Party members, government officials, and intellectuals get a sense of the prevailing political climates by paying particularly close attention to who and what

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time from 1942 to 1986 when the *People's Daily* discussed journalism reforms, international news had never appeared in its front pages. Until now, international news seems still not to be allowed as the top line in a front page, although it may occasionally appear in front pages (Chen, 2005). Compared to other levels of Party organs, central Party organs enjoy most editorial privileges. All important reports and documents of the central government can only be first printed in central Party organ papers, such as the *People's Daily*, and usually on front pages, and then further copied verbatim by other newspapers. The author personally experienced how editorial privileges work at the Xinhua News Agency, a monopoly in the provision of international news in China. The story happened in the late 1990s. Two high-ranking managers of the commercial website, Sina.com, one of the largest news portals in China, came to the agency to apologize for using news stories printed in foreign newspapers without getting advice from the agency. One of the deputy editors-in-chief of the *Reference News* told these two guys, "We actually could sue you because the central government has only authorized the agency with such rights." The Sina guys promised never to do it again. For now, Internet news portals in China, like mass appeal newspapers and tabloids, bend these rules by rewriting politically safe and commercially attractive international agency stories or Internet reports (Zhao, 2000). This seems to come from one of the work traditions of Party papers before China's reforms. As one of the Party disciplines, Party organs could use only wire news provided by the Xinhua News Agency. The underlying logic was that the fundamental task of Party papers is to guide the Party's work instead of being voluntary spokespersons for foreign news agencies. In addition, to use wire news provided by bourgeois news agencies would be misleading to the Party's work (Chen, 2005).

<sup>59</sup> In China's political and economic system, rank always constitutes a determinant of occupational status and reward. Media organizations, especially the Party press, are absorbed into the national administrative rank system which consists of the ministerial level (*bu*), the district or bureau level (*ju*), and the county or division level (*chu*). For instance, the central-level organs, such as the *People's Daily* and the *Economic Daily*, are at the *bu* level, whereas the provincial Party organ newspapers, which are usually named after the province, such as the *Hunan Daily*, are at the *ju* level. See Pan (2000) for more information on the administrative ladder.

<sup>60</sup> Zhao (2000) has particularly seen the rising market power of municipal Party organs.

<sup>61</sup> According to Chen and Guo (1998), for example, more than 80 percent of the subscription funding for provincial level Party newspapers are directly subsidized by the state. Zhao (2000) named central and provincial Party organs as "losers in the press market" (p.9).

get reported in high-ranking newspapers (Guo, 2001). Compared to the other two groups, this group of newspapers is most subject to the state power, thus staying far inside the Party-state sphere in Figure 4.1.

The second group of *other organ papers* in the schema refers to those organ papers (*jiguan bao*) published by official, semi-official or non official organizations, bureaucratic authorities, and/or large state-own enterprises. This group of newspapers is still in the name of “organ” because of its bureaucratic nature. Yet unlike *Party organ papers*, the newspapers in this group are NOT directly led by the CCP committees at various levels. They function as the institutional voice of a given organization, institution or enterprise aimed at promoting its policies and the operational goals while serving specialized readers based on occupational backgrounds and/or socio-economic interests. Because of their more social ties and less tints of Party ideology, the degree that they are subject to the state power is less than Party organ papers. On the other hand, the newspapers in this group are more self-financially supported because they do not have the privileges of resources that their Party organ peers enjoy. Therefore, they are farther away from the Party-state sphere but span more over the market sphere in Figure 4.1. These papers mainly include professional newspapers published by government organs or professional organizations for certain fields (e.g., the *Procuratorial Daily* published by the Supreme People’s Procuratorate of China, and the *China Post News* published by the China State Post Bureau), target newspapers (e.g., the *Worker’s Daily* owned by the All-China Federation of Trade Unions, and the *China Women’s News* published by the ACFW), and enterprise/trade newspapers (e.g., the *Chinese Petroleum Daily* owned by the China National Petroleum Corporation and aimed at promoting the Party’s

ideological propaganda within the corporation).<sup>62</sup> This group of newspapers also includes those published by satellite parties other than the CCP (e.g., the *Unity News*, the national organ paper of the China Kuomintang Revolutionary Committee<sup>63</sup>, and the organ papers of provincial committees of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC)). Like Party organ papers, most of these kinds of organ papers are rarely seen on the streets. They are mostly subscribed to with public money and for consumption in offices and factory workshops.

The third group in Figure 4.1 is *non-organ papers*, which are now the majority of newspapers in China in terms of circulation and advertising revenue. The newspapers in this group differentiate themselves from the first two groups because they are not set to be the mouthpiece of a given Party or a work unit. Their main functions are not promoting the Party's line or the policies of a given institution or enterprise. Instead, they are more targeted to mass audiences. They may or may not belong to the major Party organ unites, government departments, or semi-official organizations. This group primarily comprises of city newspapers, evening and morning newspapers, digest papers, special-subject papers (e.g., sports newspapers), and others that are less ideologically oriented than the Party mouthpieces. Among them, city newspapers (or metro papers) and evening newspapers, together with some newspapers published by semi-official organizations, such as the *Beijing Youth Daily*,<sup>64</sup> and some popular professional and enterprise papers and special-subject papers, constitute what scholars often call "mass-

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<sup>62</sup> In China, the conventional hierarchy of power units at the same jurisdictional level is the Party, the government, the trade union, the Youth League, the Women's Federation, and enterprises. According to Chen and Lee (1998), Fang (1999), and Guo (2001), these types of newspapers also include those more market-oriented tabloids specifically targeting certain audiences.

<sup>63</sup> One of China's eight democratic parties.

<sup>64</sup> See more information about the newspaper in the fifth sector.

appeal” papers or the mass press, and depend primarily on private subscriptions and newsstand purchases by individuals to attract advertising.<sup>65</sup> They are grouped into official or semi-official papers, since they have more or less official backgrounds or are tied with Party organ papers at various levels of jurisdiction. Among them, city newspapers are all subsidiaries of provincial Party organ papers (Zhao, 2000). For example, the famous *Southern City Newspaper (Nanfang Dushi Bao)* is published by the *Southern Daily (Nanfang Ribao)*, the Party organ paper of the CCP Committee of Guangdong Province, and belongs to the *Southern Daily Group*. Scholars in mainland China acknowledge the parental relationships between Party-organ and city newspapers, holding that city newspapers are the agents of Party papers at the provincial level to capture the market benefits (e.g., Wei, 2005; Yuan, 2003). History has also seen the institutional ties of evening and morning newspapers with the Party press, in that Chinese evening and morning newspapers are usually published by municipal Party organ papers (Fang, 1999).<sup>66</sup> After being pushed into the market, these newspapers have found themselves striving for maximum readership and profit (Guo, 2001). Although they all are more or less institutionally tied with state authorities at different levels, they are distinct from *Party organ papers* in terms of ideological control, financial management, social influence, and editorial content. They also differ from *other organ papers* because

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<sup>65</sup> See Zhao (2000) for the example of comparing the municipal Party organ, the *Beijing Daily*, and one of its subsidiaries, the *Beijing Evening News*, and the shrinking office subscriptions of Party papers. Chen and Guo (1998) also reported that in 1992, evening newspapers in Shanghai, Guangdong, and Shaanxi surpassed their parental Party organ papers both in advertising dollars gained and net revenue growth rate. According to Huang (2000, 2001) and Rosen (2000), the most popular newspapers in Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, and Chengdu, based on consumer spending, are all mass-appeal papers. For example, by 1995, there were 128 officially registered evening papers. 90 percent of their subscribers are individuals, not work units (*gongzuo danwei*) (Rosen, 2000).

<sup>66</sup> See more discussions about the differences and the institutional relationships between Party newspapers and mass-appeal newspapers, such as city newspapers and evening newspapers, in Zhao (2000).

they are more intensively market-driven. Among the three groups, this group of newspapers is most subject to the market power, thus standing furthest inside the market sphere in Figure 4.1.

Within the group of *non-organ papers*, non-official newspapers separate themselves from official or semi-official papers by their being independent from institutions, organizations, or enterprises with Party-state backgrounds. The examples include those papers with non-Party backgrounds from the very beginning of their launching (e.g., the *Xinmin Evening News*, which is an unofficial paper originally published by capitalists before the New China was established), and industry-involved newspapers (e.g., the *Computer Weekly*).

Generally speaking, non-organ papers are more accessible to advertisers but less reliant on centralized allocation of resources with the dramatic expansion of advertising volume in the process of market maturity. Therefore, they enjoy less control from the central authorities, greater autonomy in management, and more popularity among residents in large- or medium sized metropolitan areas. With increasing financial autonomy, these newspapers have seen more human-interest oriented and increasingly diversified content (Pan, 1997; Chen & Lee, 1998; Guo, 2001).

#### **4.4. *People's Daily*: The Flagship Mouthpiece of the CCP**

Two influential newspapers both published in Beijing were selected as representatives of Chinese newspapers for this current study. One is the *People's Daily*, the national mouthpiece of the CCP; and the other is the *Beijing Youth Daily*, one of the most influential mass-appeal newspapers in China. In addition to the newspapers' nature

in terms of their positions in the Party-state sphere and the market sphere, the two papers were selected to minimize the influences of regional differences.

The *People's Daily* was launched on June 15, 1948, as a regional Party organ paper of the CCP's North China Branch, and was changed to the Party's central organ paper on August 1, 1949. In 1952, its circulation increased from about 40,000 as a regional paper to 480,000, becoming the most influential and authoritative newspaper with the largest circulation (Fang, 1999, p.3). The leading status of the *People's Daily* in Chinese newspapers did not meet any challenges until the 1990s. As the discussions above suggest, the share of Party organ newspapers in the market had dramatically declined by the mid-1990s.<sup>67</sup> Despite some attempts at expansion, newspapers like the *People's Daily* were unable to compete with mass-appeal papers for individual subscribers or advertising revenues (Bacani & Law, 1996). During the period from 1982 to 1996, the circulation of the *People's Daily* plunged sharply from 5.2 million to about 2 million (*Chinese Journalism Yearbook 1997*, as cited in Huang, 2001; *Zhongguo xinwen chuban tongji ziliao huibian*, 1998, as cited in Wu, 2000).<sup>68</sup> With the largest circulation among all the publicly circulated daily newspapers,<sup>69</sup> the *People's Daily* had always dominated the advertising market and headed the list of top ten newspaper advertising revenue earners (Chen & Guo, 1998; Lee, 2000). From 1990, however, the paper's

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<sup>67</sup> According to Rosen (2000), as late as 1988, there were 407 party-organ newspapers, constituting 25 percent of the publicly circulated papers. Yet with more than 600 new papers entering the market during the late 1980s to 1996, a perceptible shift appeared.

<sup>68</sup> Based on the author's observations as a journalist in China and the confidential interview conducted by the author, the circulation figure of the *People's Daily* has been about one million since the late 1990s, although it claims to have a three-million circulation on its website. See its website, "Introduction to the *People's Daily*," <http://www.people.com.cn/GB/1018/22259/2220957.html> [in Chinese].

<sup>69</sup> This does not take into account of the *Reference News (Cankao Xiaoxi)*, which had been seen as an internal publication even though it became a publicly circulated paper in 1985. In fact, this newspaper has been heading the list of circulation among all Chinese newspapers.

advertising revenue plummeted and the paper had dropped out of the nation's top 10 revenue list by 1995 (Chen, 1996; Chen & Guo, 1998).

While continuing to be a tool of Party propaganda, the *People's Daily* has continuously taken steps to increase its revenues, such as expanding pages, allotting more coverage to economic news, publishing regional editions and increasing its satellite publications, which are mostly market-oriented (e.g., the *Securities Times* (*Zhengquan Shibao*), the *International Finance News* (*Guoji Jingrong Bao*), the *Market* (*Shichang Bao*) and the *Satire and Humor* (*Fengci yu Youmo*)). Currently, the *People's Daily* prints 16 pages during weekdays.<sup>70</sup> The first four pages reports breaking news. The next eight pages, from Page 5 to Page 12, cover in-depth reports. The other pages are special sections and/or weekly sections,<sup>71</sup> mainly publishing non-politically oriented content such as coverage of culture, science and technology, and essays. Currently, there are eight daily newspapers, including two regional editions and one overseas edition, five weekly newspapers, and 11 magazines published under the *People's Daily*, which also operates a website, People's Daily Online, one of the most influential and authoritative websites with the largest volume of updated databases in China (Ye, Gan, Xia, Zheng, Tan, Pu, & Hu 2001).

Under the jurisdiction of the CPD, the *People's Daily* with a political rank at the ministry level<sup>72</sup> is one of the primary elements of the propaganda system (*xuanchan xitong*). It acts as the chief conduit of official interpretations of important political,

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<sup>70</sup> The first and fourth pages of the copies printed in Beijing are in color. Only eight pages are printed on Saturdays and Sundays. Its two regional versions of East-China and South China publish 20 pages per day.

<sup>71</sup> There are three weekly sections, such as Economics Weekly on Mondays, Society Weekly on Wednesdays, and Mother Earth Weekly on Fridays.

<sup>72</sup> Refer to Footnote 59 for the administrative ladders of media organizations in China.

economic, social and cultural events to Party members and ordinary people across the country (Lynch, 1999). CCP leaders have consistently used the paper to give Party guides and/or political directives, explicitly and implicitly, on important occasions.<sup>73</sup> As one of the four major national media agenda-setters (Zhao, 1998), the *People's Daily* enjoys the highest editorial priority and privileges.<sup>74</sup> Government documents and important editorials in the *People's Daily* are aired on the national radio and television and reprinted by local news media, especially provincial Party organs (Zhao, 1998). Local newspapers, while enjoying some level of autonomy in terms of news selection, usually scrutinize the *People's Daily* for signs regarding coverage of important issues or events with political implications (Lynch, 1999).

The central concept that underlines the practice of the *People's Daily* is the “Party principle” (*dangxing yuanze*), which comprises three basic components: “that the news media must accept the Party’s guiding ideology as its own; that they must propagate the Party’s programs, policies, and directives; and that they must accept the Party’s leadership and stick to the Party’s organizational principles and press policies” (Tong & Cheng, 1993, as cited in Zhao, 1998, p.19). Although Chinese journalists and scholars have been discussing the issue of reorienting Party organs in a commercialized society,<sup>75</sup> the CCP has never changed the foundation of the Party-control system and loosened its

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<sup>73</sup> For instance, Mao himself wrote a number of key editorials. Some famous pieces include “Press Du Yuming to Surrender,” “Carry the Revolution through to the End,” and “Five Criticisms White Paper.” Even today, editorials regarding policies or important issues are usually conceived and drafted by a special group, and then modified under the instructions from the CCP Central Committee. One of the examples is the editorial on April 26, 1989, which defined the student demonstrations as “counter-revolutionary turmoil,” and was widely believed to have been written by Party officials (Zhao, 1998).

<sup>74</sup> Refer to Footnote 58.

<sup>75</sup> See, for example, Liu and Sun (2005), Peng (2004), and Wang (2004),



tight control over its flagship mouthpiece, the *People's Daily*.<sup>76</sup> In 1996, then- President Jiang Zemin visited the *People's Daily* and emphasized the need to maintain political loyalty (Li, 1998). In 1998, when the paper celebrated its 50 anniversary, Jiang wrote a piece of dedication, “Adhere to taking the correct lead of public opinion, enthusiastically propagate the Party line, theories, and policies, and fully play the role as the leader of national newspapers (*Jianchi zhengque yulun daoxiang, jiji xuanchuan dang de lilun luxian fangzheng zhengce, fahui quanguo baozhi paitoubing zuoyong*)” (*The memorabilia of the People's Daily*). Within the ideological framework, the *People's Daily* still closely follows the Party line, selecting news and editorials often on the basis of their relevance to the central theme of the Party. Its fundamental role is “to inform the public *after* an authoritative decision has been reached” (Rosen, 2000, p.155, *italic original*). The national importance of the *People's Daily* to the CCP means its fortune should be subject to the market power at minimum.

#### **4.5. Beijing Youth Daily: An Example of Transcending Its Official Origin**

The *Beijing Youth Daily* was founded on March 21, 1949, originally as an official organ of the Chinese Communist Youth League Beijing Committee. When it resumed publication on March 7, 1981, the newspaper was a weekly four-page tabloid only available in the Beijing region with a circulation of 29,000 copies and an official subsidy of RMB ¥260,000 (about US\$30,000 at the time, Zhao, 1998, p.141). Soon after its third

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<sup>76</sup> In the scheme I posed in the last section, the *People's Daily* is at the top rank in the group of Party organs, mostly in the Party-state sphere and under the strong influence of the state power. In He's (1996) three-tier system, the *People's Daily* is in the first tier tightly controlled by the Party's central leadership. It is not unusual for the paper's staff to receive phone calls of condemnation from the central leaders. See Liu (1990) for examples.

resumption of publication in July 1987,<sup>77</sup> the *Beijing Youth Daily*, along with many of other Chinese media, recognized “news is also commodity,” and started packaging (*baozhuang*) its news in an entirely new way on January 3, 1989, when the name of the layout designer for the first time appeared on its front page.<sup>78</sup> Since then, the *Beijing Youth Daily* has been a pioneer in experimenting with new operational and editorial measures, such as contracting the paper out to its staff,<sup>79</sup> eliminating lifetime tenure and disregarding the official wage system, using large and sensational headlines and huge eye-catching photos, and creating various special sections and pages, such as “News Weekly” (on Tuesdays, beginning in 1993),<sup>80</sup> “The World of Literature, Culture, and Sports” (on Thursdays) and “Youth Weekend” (on Saturdays, beginning in 1992). These special sections and new journalistic practices created a journalism shock wave, from form to content, in the early of 1990s (Qiu, 1995), during which time other official organ papers were limiting their reforms to discussion rather than implement (Zhao, 1998).<sup>81</sup>

Thanks to the efforts of a group of “most energetic and reform-minded” news people (Zhao, 1998, p.141), the *Beijing Youth Daily* has risen as an influential popular daily newspaper proclaiming “Provide One Thing Only – News” as its logo (Huang,

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<sup>77</sup> In this research, although an effort was made to search for explanations as to why the interruptions occurred, none could be found.

<sup>78</sup> The newspaper assigned responsibility for individual pages to subeditors, who then planned the layout of the entire page (Rosen, 2000).

<sup>79</sup> The newspaper voluntarily cut its financial connection with the government by signing a four-year contract (1991-94) which had made the paper become financially independent without receiving any subsidy from the city who in return allowed it to keep all of its profits (Zhao, 1998).

<sup>80</sup> See Zhao (1998) for detailed information on how the newspaper uses this edition to “make the most out of news values” (p.143).

<sup>81</sup> Zhao attributed its ability to experiment with all kinds of reforms mostly to the obscure status and relative lack of direct control from authorities of the newspaper with one of the lowest official rank (*chu*, the county or division level), compared to many of other newspapers in Beijing, and its relative lack of vested interest in the Party media system. Its innovations were to a great degree based on “self-determination, self-development, self-financing, and self-restraint” (1998, p.141).

2000; Zhao, 1998). Currently, this broadsheet newspaper is distributed to readers both at home and abroad. With its annual circulation growth rate of 30%, an unmatched rate in press circles, the Beijing Youth Daily, now enjoys a daily circulation of 600,000 (*Beijing Youth Daily acquires Qianlong.com*; Zhang, 2006), almost four times the circulation reported in 1994 (Rosen, 2000). Street sales and private subscriptions account for the majority of its circulation, while office subscriptions are much lower than for other official organ papers (Zhao, 1998). A single issue of the paper during regular week days is currently 68 full-size pages. Headquartered in Beijing, the *Beijing Youth Daily* has five printing sites in China.<sup>82</sup> It has incorporated data-transfer via satellite link in its production, which is instrumental in helping the paper to achieve its goal of covering all of China and the world. Within a decade, the newspaper has grown from a four-page weekly tabloid into a conglomerate that publishes ten newspapers and one magazine, and runs one website and more than 10 businesses, such as an advertising company, a book store, an arts center, a high-tech firm, a public relations firm, a grocery store, a medical clinic, a resort, and so on, in a wide range of areas (*Beijing Youth Daily acquires Qianlong.com*; Wang, 2005; Zhao, 1998). It has evolved into the second-largest newspaper group after the Guangzhou Daily Group by revenue (Hui & Bei, 2004).

The *Beijing Youth Daily* is seen as the most interesting case of an organ paper that has transcended its origin (Rosen, 2000), not only in terms of its readership, but also its content and business management. As the organ of the Beijing Youth League, the *Beijing Youth Daily* was exclusively targeted at youth in the past. With its introducing a series of reforms, the *Beijing Youth Daily* does not limit its audience to youth any more. Instead,

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<sup>82</sup> The paper began printing in color in 1999.

the newspaper covers all fields of public interest, according to its editor-in-chief Zhang Yanping (Zhang, 2006). Its readers consist of business employees (23.2%), government employees and office workers (20.3%), university students (13.3%), and educational, cultural, scientific and health workers (10.4%) (Pu, 1994, as cited in Zhao, 1998).<sup>83</sup> Among them, only 1.8 percent are leading cadres, compared to 13.4 percent of the *People's Daily* readers (Zhao, 1998).

As a part of its strategy for success in a crowded marketplace, the *Beijing Youth Daily* pays special attention to stories with wide public interest or concern, and puts forward the motto: “use news values to push the main paper to the market” (Zhao, 1998). It is not uncommon for the paper to raise important questions and generate heated debates about contentious issues and the new phenomena that have arisen under the impact of a market economy (see Rosen, 2000). The paper won high praise in public opinion polls for its emphasis on investigative reporting and consumer issues. Its approval rate among the public was “far higher” than the average of national papers, according to a survey conducted by the Public Opinion Research Institute of Chinese People’s University (Rosen, 2000). On January 1<sup>st</sup>, 2004, the China Dominant-Journalism Development Center (CDDC)<sup>84</sup> published *The 2003 Report of the Influence and Credibility of Newspapers and Magazines in Mainland China*, which lists the *Beijing Youth Daily* as the most influential newspaper in Beijing.<sup>85</sup>

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<sup>83</sup> As the author observed in the 1990s, many newsrooms at the elite media, such as the Xinhua News Agency, the *People's Daily*, the CCTV, the *China Daily*, and other organ newspapers subscribed to the *Beijing Youth Daily*, and occasionally took it as an example of reform to learn.

<sup>84</sup> A non-profit website for journalism and communication research in mainland China. See the website <http://www.cddc.net>.

<sup>85</sup> Part organ papers were excluded from the report. The most credible newspaper in Beijing was the *Beijing Evening News*.

Since the 2000s, the *Beijing Youth Daily* has taken big steps to commercialize its operation management, further enhancing the feeling of its readers that the newspaper is more like a commercial one instead of an organ paper. Its advertising company, *Beiqing Chuanmei* (Beijing Media Corporation Limited, HK\$1000),<sup>86</sup> formed from the newspaper's non-editorial operations, listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange's H share market on December 22, 2004, at a value of HK\$4 billion (US\$512 million), which made the newspaper the first mainland media enterprise to list overseas. In 2005, the *Beijing Youth Daily* succeeded in purchasing 51 percent of stock shares of a fashion magazine in mainland China, which cost RMB ¥2 million (about US\$240,964). Soon after its announcement of planning to use RMB¥200 million (about US\$24.1 million) in the way of entire capital cash purchase to merge a national capital morning newspaper into its media group, the paper officially began on August 31, 2005, its expansion strategy of “*kua meiti, kua hangye, kua quyū*” (cross-media, cross-industry, cross-region), which covers print media, online media, radio broadcast stations and television stations, by successfully acquiring a controlling stake in Qianlong.com, a Beijing-based popular news portal (*Beijing Youth Daily acquires Qianlong.com*; Wang, 2005).

Yet the newspaper's market-oriented taste and defense of the interests of common people against corrupt officials and businesses does not suggest it is free from political boundaries. Despite its seeking public sales, as Zhao (1998) pointed out, the newspaper still works hard on a balance between the Party line and the bottom line. Although it is

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<sup>86</sup> According to its annual report issued in April, 2005, the *Beiqing Chuanmei*, the main advertising company for the *Beijing Youth Daily* and its subsidiaries, realized a business income of RMB ¥1.1 billion (about US\$132.5 million), increased by 2.9% compared to the previous year. The advertising revenue amounted to RMB ¥814 million (about US\$98 million). The net profit grew by 26.8% to RMB ¥194 million (about US\$23.4 million, Wang, 2005).

not unusual that contradictions between appealing to its readers and being politically correct come up in daily operations,<sup>87</sup> there is no overall contradiction between being commercialized and promoting the official ideology, which is what most Chinese newspapers do in China. As a matter of fact, the *Beijing Youth Daily* has perfected the “art of propaganda” to make both “masters” happy (Zhao, 1998).<sup>88</sup> Within the overarching framework of government policies, and political and cultural ideology, Rosen (2000) found that the debates and discussions of public interest sponsored by the newspaper did not fall outside the parameters of Party initiatives.

#### **4.6. Conclusion**

The Chinese press, now facing the challenges to meet the needs of both the leader and the led, has become increasingly diversified in both structure and function, while it is undergoing a process of conglomeration (Huang, 2001; Zhao, 2000). As a reflection of the broad changes of economic reform since 1978, especially the 1990s, there has been a steep rise of various publications other than *Party organ papers*, ranging from evening newspapers, city newspapers, targeted-population papers, enterprise newspapers, and special-subject newspapers, in terms of both the number of titles and the volumes of circulation and advertising revenue. Because of the government’s different expectations and different structural and financial policies towards them, the newspapers

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<sup>87</sup> The newspaper is also famous for frequently getting into trouble and being subject to leadership changes as a result of its challenges against the authorities. Yet such challenges are big enough to get readers’ attention but inconsistent enough to avoid being closed down (Zhao, 1998). The paper’s low official status in terms of administrative hierarchy also provides its safety margin to “play the edge ball,” which is mentioned in Footnote 43.

<sup>88</sup> See more examples in Zhao (1998) about how the newspaper repackages the official ideology, sometimes even using sensationalism.

place differential weights to propaganda and objective content (Guo & Chen, 1997), while they all face the challenges of serving the state and the market, and commonly have the responsibility of promoting economic modernization, a new official line in reform China, as part of the ideological superstructure (Lee, 1990).

In the scheme of Chinese newspapers unevenly developed within the Party-state sphere and the market sphere (Figure 4.1), Party organ papers particularly distinguish themselves from the other two groups for their dominating position in the Party-state sphere, thus enjoying most editorial priority and privileges while suffering the tightest control of the CCP. As the flagship mouthpiece of the CCP, the *People's Daily* is at the top level of Party authorities; therefore, its role as a propaganda tool to facilitate government policies and promote Party ideology are emphasized more at this paper than at other Party organs at lower levels, other organ papers, and non-organ papers. In contrast, the *Beijing Youth Daily*, which has undergone the transcendent process from a typical organ paper targeted at youth to a hybrid of an official organ and a mass appeal newspaper, are much more market-oriented in terms of both editorial tendency and operation management. The paper's financial autonomy and marginal official status make it possible to stretch its editorial boundaries. Yet it is still limited within the overall framework of political and cultural ideology.

The literature review suggests that the content presented in the Chinese newspapers might differ, to a more or less degree, across the sectors of news organizations, even if the news organizations are under the same umbrella of political and cultural systems. For instance, the study of Luther and Zhou (2004) presents the differences of valences [positive, negative and neutral] of frames between the *People's*

*Daily*, and the *China Daily*, the only daily newspaper published in English with a major target of foreign readers. Although this is a very good starting point to detect whether differences in media content exist across the structural levels of the Chinese press, more systematic research needs to be done to see how such influences might interact with other macro factors such as the political system and cultural traditions. The selection of the *People's Daily* and the *Beijing Youth Daily* for this study is a result of a thorough literature review of the emerging commercialized media market and uneven structures of newspapers in China.

Unlike their peers in other societies, such as the United States, the United Kingdom, Hong Kong and Singapore, where the media are largely privately owned and government controls are exerted through laws, regulations, licenses, and taxes (Shoemaker & Reese, 1996), the media in China are primarily government-owned with government control exerted through media financing in addition to the control mechanisms above. Therefore, it is acceptable to select two newspapers with different financial statuses, such as the *People's Daily* and *Beijing Youth Daily* to represent the Chinese press as a whole for the cross-cultural analysis to avoid the bias toward neither type of newspaper. It is also meaningful to separate the two newspapers for the purpose of testing the impacts of the factors at the extramedia level, such as government control and the marketplace.



## **CHAPTER V. OBJECTIVES AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS/HYPOTHESES**

### **5.1. Research Objectives and Study's Significance**

The literature review of research on the Internet in China and factors influencing the construction of media content suggests a good opportunity to study the media treatment of the Internet in China. As discussed before, the research on the Internet and China's Internet is very productive. Yet only one study has approached the Internet in China from the perspective of news media coverage. Moreover, the pictures of China's Internet in media have not fully been drawn in terms of framing. Comparisons of the treatment could be done both within a country, where the factors at the first four levels in Shoemaker and Reese's hierarchical model are examined, and across societies, where the broadest level regarding socio-political, ideological and cultural factors are paid particular attention.

The Internet has been at the forefront of the information revolution in China. It is an integral part of the overall information and communications technology (ICT) sector, which is high on the Chinese government's new policy agenda for creating a national information infrastructure. Yet for China, the only large communist country, the Internet is a double-edged sword. On the one hand, the Chinese government is trying to realize *informatization (xinxihua)* over the country through Internet development, which is viewed by the state as critical to China's future growth and international competitiveness (Zhou, 2004a); on the other hand, it has attempted to exert its own control of this information infrastructure by means of heavy regulation and technical measures to reduce

the “undesirable” political impact of the global computer network (Zhou, 2004b). This is contrary to the idea emphasized in countries such as the United States that the Internet is in nature free of control and a force for democracy. The topic of China’s Internet, which involves multiple aspects of a society, has drawn intensive attention from governments, media, and academic circles both inside and outside China. Therefore, such a topic is very suitable for a cross-cultural study. The intrinsic antinomy of China’s Internet policies and the contradiction between the Chinese government’s political control of the Internet and the principles of the free flow of information provide a good opportunity for a framing study, since power and ideology have been articulated from the very beginning of framing research.

As far as the literature on media content is concerned, research tends to examine the factors at the lower levels in the Shoemaker and Reese model, such as gate keeping of individuals, media routines, and organizational elements. Few studies have virtually moved onto the higher level, especially empirically, although scholars have to a great degree been aware of the importance of the factors, such as ideology, political system, and culture, in shaping media content.

The literature review has also mentioned that considerable research on media framing has been carried out exploring the relationship between media frames and individual frames, and how media frames influence the way in which individuals perceive and construct reality. The first part of the framing process, that is, how reality is constructed, how media frames are formed or the types of frames that result from this process, and how various factors at both micro and macro levels – especially those at the macro level – play a role in this process, has largely been ignored. Carragee and Roefs

(2004) criticize that recent framing research “have neglected the relationship between media frames and broader issues of political and social power” (p.214). Particularly, in previous empirical studies of media framing, questions of power and ideology, which are usually inquired in the context of critical analysis, typically have not been raised. As Shoemaker and Reese (1996) put it, scholars concerned with ideology typically have adopted a critical approach, emphasizing “more general, abstract theorizing than testing specific hypotheses with empirical data” (p.223).

The current study set out with three primary objectives: 1) To identify the patterns of newspapers’ treatment of the Internet in China; 2) To empirically test the influence of factors at two broadest levels, such as the extramedia and ideology levels, in Shoemaker and Reese’s model on media content by incorporating the framework of framing studies; 3) To make a contribution to the literature of framing research by introducing Hofstede’s cultural dimensions as independent variables to explain the variations of the presentations of generic news frames.

There are some studies being done cross-culturally (e.g., de Vreese, Peter, & Semetko, 2001). However, such studies do not present clear relationships between media frames and certain factors influencing content, in that the focus of such studies tends to only present the differences of media frames and the researchers tend not to empirically correlate the factors influencing media content to the presentations of media frames. Furthermore, no systematic study has been done on a larger scale, in that most studies in this area are limited to comparisons between two or three countries by singling out one factor. As a result, the interactions between factors are easily ignored.

This study may fill those gaps by looking at news frames of the Internet and China's Internet in the newspapers published in five societies, and empirically testing the relationship between news frames and the factors at the higher level in the Shoemaker and Reese model. Multicultural comparisons enable us to detect patterns among countries and cultures instead of restricting the research to differences between an arbitrary pairing of two countries.

Last but by no means least important, the comparisons between the national Party Organ newspaper, the *People's Daily*, and its local counterpart, the *Beijing Youth Daily*, with relative institutional and financial autonomy in China will serve as a preliminary investigation of whether news frames vary along with the changing structure of media in China.

## **5.2. Research Questions and Hypotheses**

Major goals in this study include identifying and outlining the issues related to the Internet in China, which issues more frequently appeared in news stories, how the issues were framed, and what the dominant frames and their variations were. Several research questions are raised to address these concerns:

RQ1a: Which issues appeared most frequently and which issue was most frequently taken as the primary subject of a given story within each society?

RQ1b: Did the newspapers from different societies significantly differ from one another in reporting the issues? If so, how?

RQ2a: Regardless of the types of issues, which news frames dominated in the newspapers of each society?

RQ2b: Would the pattern of the presentations of news frames be associated with the societies? If so, what variations of the presentations existed across the societies?

A second goal is to examine how much variations in media framing could be explained by such factors at the macro levels as political systems, social norms and cultural values, and their interactions, by comparing the newspapers published in different countries. The variations were examined quantitatively by measuring the frequencies of generic news frames, and running seven logistic regression models for seven generic news frames.

RQ3: In general, when political systems and cultural dimensions are considered, how much variations in the presentation of each of the generic news frames could be explained? Would any interaction effects of the factors be found?

Particular attention is paid to such issues as the Internet use in China, the issues of Internet censorship and/or regulations, and the political and social impact and consequences of the Internet in China, since all these three issues are controversial with political and cultural implications, and most frequently discussed in the literature of China's Internet. Therefore, it will be very interesting to see how the newspapers across the societies used news frames to report these issues.

RQ4a: In the newspapers of each society, which news frames were most often associated with the issues of Internet diffusion and use, Internet censorship and regulations, and the consequences and implications of the Internet as primary subjects?

RQ4b: For each of these issues, would the presentations of news frames be associated with societies?

In addition, the variations of framing stories across societies were also measured by the political tendency and/or tolerance index (PTI) scores of news stories, which were

counted based on the information regarding the three issues.<sup>89</sup>

RQ5a: In terms of political tendency and/or tolerance presented in the newspapers' coverage of the Internet in China, did the societies significantly differ from one another?

RQ5b: If so, did political systems and/or any cultural dimensions significantly contribute to the differences?

The Internet has begun to permeate into China, especially in cities. While bringing numerous benefits to people's daily lives, the Internet has also been perceived as a challenge to the political authorities of the CCP in China because of its potential to provide an alternative channel for the voices of dissent. I would assume that the media from societies with more political freedom might be more likely to discuss such controversial issues as China's control of the Internet than in the media from societies with less political freedom. To marginalize such issues, the media from societies such as China and Singapore might be more likely to devote more space to those issues such as Internet diffusion and use, and the socio-cultural impact of the Internet, which are closely tied to daily life. Also, as discussed above in the literature review of generic news frames, the conflict frame has commonly been used in Western media in storytelling. Compared to the factual frame, the conflict frame "with two clearly polarized parties," as Richards and King (2000) suggest, "brings an element of drama." The effects of storytelling in such a news frame are assumed to be much stronger than the factual frame. Therefore, the researcher assumed that even though such controversial issues as Internet censorship and regulations were mentioned, the media from societies with less political freedom might have presented them in factual frames so as to understate their importance. Also they might have interpreted such issues from the perspective of morality to justify censoring

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<sup>89</sup> Refer to Chapter 6 and the coding forms (APPENDIX B) for detailed information on PTI.

content, such as pornography, which is socially and culturally controversial. With the above assumptions and the assumptions underlying Hofstede's (1980, 1983) cultural value dimensions, the following hypotheses were proposed:

H1a: In the newspapers from societies with more political freedom, the issue of Internet censorship and regulations in China will more likely to be mentioned or discussed.

H1b: In the newspapers from societies with less political freedom, the issue of Internet use in China will more likely to be mentioned or discussed.

H2: Among those news stories concerning the Internet use in China, there will be more mentioning of dissident users and/or content in the newspapers from societies with more political freedom.

H3a: Among those news stories concerning the issues of Internet censorship and regulations in China, the factual frame will be more likely to be present in the newspapers from societies with less political freedom.

H3b: Among those news stories concerning the issues of Internet censorship and regulations in China, the responsibility frame will be more likely to be present in the newspapers from societies with less political freedom.

H3c: Among those news stories concerning the issues of Internet censorship and regulations in China, the morality frame will be more likely to be present in the newspapers from societies with less political freedom.

H3d: Among those news stories concerning the issues of Internet censorship and regulations in China, the human interest frame will be more likely to be present in the newspapers from societies with more political freedom.

H3e: Among those news stories concerning the issues of Internet censorship and regulations in China, the conflict frame will be more likely to be present in the newspapers from societies with more political freedom.

H4: Among those news stories mentioning or discussing the consequences and implications of the Internet in China, there will be more concerning political aspects in the newspapers from societies with more political freedom.

H5a: The role played by the government will be more likely to be mentioned in the newspapers from societies with higher index scores on the dimension of power distance.

H5b: The role played by individuals will be more likely to be mentioned in the newspapers from societies with higher index scores on the dimension of individualism vs. collectivism.

The third goal of the current study is to see whether the news coverage and frames in the Party organ dailies would differ from the local newspapers with more financial autonomy.

RQ6: Did any differences of reporting the issues related to China's Internet appear to exist between the *People's Daily* and *Beijing Youth Daily*?

RQ7: Was the presentation of each generic news frame associated with the types of Chinese newspapers?



## **CHAPTER VI. METHODOLOGY**

A content analysis was conducted to identify the issues related to the Internet in China and the news frames used to cover these issues during the period of 2000 to 2004 in the newspapers of China, Hong Kong, Singapore, the United States, and the United Kingdom. Samples of news stories drawn from ten selected newspapers were analyzed to compare the thematic choices or news frames used to depict the Internet in China.

### **6.1. Selection of Societies**

Five societies, China, Hong Kong, Singapore, the United States, and the United Kingdom, were selected in this study. Among them, China, Hong Kong, and Singapore belong to “Greater China” (Harding, 1993; Shambaugh, 1993), or “cultural China” (Frith, 1996). They are joined by a set of cultural values that includes collectivism, modernization, authoritarianism and relative noncompetitiveness (Martin, 1996). One might assume that with increased affluence, population growth and increased trading activity with Western nations, some of the unique cultural characteristics of these societies have diminished. Yet much of Chinese culture remains and exerts a strong influence over everyday life. It would be meaningful to compare Eastern culture and Western culture, especially between China and the United States. China is regarded as typical of Eastern culture while the United States is typical of Western culture (Porter & Samovar, 1997). Based on the indexes of cultural dimensions, China is more collectivistic, higher in power distance, and more long-term oriented, whereas the United States is more individualistic, lower in power distance, and more short-term oriented

(Hofstede, 2001).<sup>90</sup> The United Kingdom was added into this study in order to expand the scope of cultural comparison. Chinese communication differs from its Western counterpart. Hall's (1976) differentiation between low and high-context cultures is a dimension of socio-cultural variability that is used to explain cultural differences in communication-related processes, especially between Eastern and Western societies. It would be of significance to determine how wide, if any, the "culture lag" exists in these differing societies in terms of perceiving the Internet, the so-called fourth medium.

Cultural values are assumed to have influences on the perceptions of the Internet presented in the media. For instance, the Singapore government has drawn up a list of "good" and "bad" Asian and Western values (Stravens, 1996) shared in its country. Among the Western values perceived as "good" for Singapore are "a political system based on democracy," the "rule of law" and the "egalitarian belief in affording equality of opportunity to all." Among the values perceived to be "bad" for Singapore are "excessive materialism and hedonism," "living beyond one's means," "too much emphasis on the rights and interests of the individual and too little emphasis on the rights and interests of the community and the state," and "inability to make sacrifices in the short-term for long-term benefits" (p.277). Compared to Americans, these shared values may prompt in Singaporeans a stronger belief in the role of government and less emphasis on symbols and actions that glorify individual identity. Such differences are assumed to have impacts on media frames.

Although the selected Chinese societies have their own unique aspects of history, culture, and consumption patterns, including variations in personal values and interest,

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<sup>90</sup> They are relatively close in terms of uncertainty avoidance.

they seem to have similar cultural backgrounds influenced by Confucius culture. One of the reasons for selecting these societies of Confucius culture is based on the assumption that if the media frames presented in the newspapers in these societies with close cultural traditions vary along the cultural dimensions, then we will be more confident to generalize such conclusions to the comparisons between those societies with very different cultural backgrounds. By looking at several culturally different societies, we may be able to see a more dynamic process in which positive and negative effects of different factors or dimensions might offset one another. This process cannot be examined in the comparative study only between two societies.

## **6.2. Selection of Newspapers**

Two newspapers published in either Chinese or English in each of the selected societies, were purposely selected. Two English newspapers were chosen respectively for the United States and the United Kingdom, where only English is the official language. Because of the bilingual nature of official language policy in Singapore and Hong Kong, two newspapers, each representing Chinese or English, were chosen for these two societies. For China, where Chinese is the only official language, two Chinese newspapers, the *People's Daily* and *Beijing Youth Daily* were selected based on the literature presented in Chapter 4.

The *New York Times* and *Los Angeles Times* were selected for the United States, because they both rank among the national leaders, covering international news widely,

and geographically representing the East and West Coast.<sup>91</sup> For the newspapers published in the other societies, the reliable Newslink list of newspapers (<http://newslink.org/>), which contains the links to major newspapers over the world, was used to locate only national daily newspapers, either Chinese or English. Those specialty newspapers such as the *Commercial Daily*, *Asian Business News*, and *Financial Times*, and non-daily newspapers were excluded. The final list included the *South China Morning Post*<sup>92</sup> and *Sing Tao Daily*<sup>93</sup> in Hong Kong, the *Lianhe Zaobao*<sup>94</sup> and *Straits Times*<sup>95</sup> in Singapore, and the *Times* and *Guardian* in the United Kingdom. All these newspapers are influential in their home societies.

### 6.3. Time Frame for the Study

The time frame, from 2000 through 2004, was chosen for the comparison study across societies, because for the first time in history, the growth of international connection bandwidth outstripped the increase of user population in the second half of

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<sup>91</sup> For the *New York Times*, the Lexis-Nexis Academic database was used to locate the relevant articles. Because of copyright laws, the database does not include stories written by freelance reporters, which might be a potential limitation of this study. Refer to the section of data collection for the collection of the articles in the *Los Angeles Times*.

<sup>92</sup> Founded in 1903, the leading English language newspaper in Hong Kong is currently published by the SCMP Group. The newspaper, with a total readership of 322,040 in 2005, has the highest percentage of readers being business decision makers and opinion leaders among all major Hong Kong newspapers ([http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/South\\_China\\_Morning\\_Post](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/South_China_Morning_Post)).

<sup>93</sup> Published in 1938, the newspaper enjoys one of the longest publishing histories among Chinese newspapers in Hong Kong. With 9 overseas bureaus, the paper, positioning itself for the middle class, circulates over 100 cities around the world ([http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sing\\_Tao\\_Daily](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sing_Tao_Daily)).

<sup>94</sup> As the most-read Chinese daily in Singapore, the *Lianhe Zaobao*, with subscribers in Southeast Asia, China, Hong Kong, Taiwan and the United Nations, is regarded as an important source of political and economic news on East Asia, especially China. It was established in 1983, following the merger of two of Singapore's oldest Chinese newspapers – Nanyang Siang Pau and Sin Chew Jit Poh. (<http://www.zaobao.com.sg/pages/lianhe.html>).

<sup>95</sup> First published in 1845, the *Straits Times* is the oldest newspaper of any kind in Singapore. With 11 bureaus in major cities over the world, it is the only broadsheet English-language newspaper with general news coverage in the country ([http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Straits\\_Times](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Straits_Times)).

year 2000. The bandwidth capability for international connection in China made a quantum leap from 351 Mbps in January 2000 to 1234 Mbps in July 2000, increasing almost tenfold, while the number of computers connected to the Internet, only 747,000 in January 1999, had surpassed 6,500,000 by July 2000 (see Table 2.1). Also, the world began in 2000 to be more aware of the development of the Internet in China. A preliminary search in the LexisNexis database found only a few related articles available in each year before 2000.

#### **6.4. Data Collection**

Only news stories were collected for this study. Editorials, opinions, readers' letters, etc., were excluded. The Lexis-Nexis database was used for consistency to locate the related news stories for the newspapers published in English, the *New York Times*, *Times*, *Guardian*,<sup>96</sup> and *Strait Times*. The *Los Angeles Times* is unavailable in this database. The archive index of the Los Angeles Times' online version was used to locate the related news articles; then the microfilm copies of the newspaper were used for full texts.<sup>97</sup> The Factiva database was used to find news stories from the Chinese newspapers published in Hong Kong and Singapore. For the newspapers in China, the online archives of the two Chinese newspapers were used.

In all the searching, the following combination of key words “‘China’ AND ‘Internet’ OR ‘network’ OR ‘Web’” (with a Chinese version “‘zhongguo dalu’ OR

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<sup>96</sup> The *Times* does not file any stories with the Lexis-Nexis database unless it is written by its employees. No articles from the Reuters, AP and other wire services are included in the database. The *Guardian* is published only six days. These might have been the reasons for the few numbers of the relevant articles in the two newspapers, thus introducing some bias in sampling.

<sup>97</sup> The Home Edition was used.

‘*neidi*’ (mainland China) AND ‘*yintewang*’ OR ‘*hulianwang*’ OR ‘*wangluo*’ OR ‘*wangye*’”) was used to search for full texts. Eliminated from the sample were articles in which the key words were mentioned, but were unrelated to the main topic concerning the Internet in mainland China.<sup>98</sup> The procedure resulted in a total population of 6,088 news stories with the Internet in mainland China as primary subject (1148 for the *People’s Daily*, 3,574 for the *Beijing Youth Daily*, 485 for Hong Kong, 662 for Singapore, 153 for the United States, and 66 for the United Kingdom),<sup>99</sup> and a total population of 1,994 non-primary stories, in which China’s Internet-related issues were mentioned in one or several sentences, but the primary subject of a given story was not about the Internet in China (645 for the *People’s Daily*, 183 for the *Beijing Youth Daily*, 353 for Hong Kong, 385 for Singapore, 246 for the United States, and 182 for the United Kingdom).<sup>100</sup>

## 6.5. Sampling

The sample strata were determined based on the origin of the newspaper and the differentiation between primary and non-primary stories.<sup>101</sup> A simple random sampling method was used to draw samples from each stratum. The statistics software JMP was

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<sup>98</sup> Those discussing the Internet in Hong Kong were also excluded.

<sup>99</sup> To examine the differences between the *People’s Daily* and the *Beijing Youth Daily*, the sub-population of China was divided up into two separate groups.

<sup>100</sup> Primary stories and non-primary stories were treated in this study differently. Non-primary stories in were primarily coded for the theme of the related sentence(s) in question (see APPENDIX A for the detailed instructions about how to differentiate primary stories and non-primary stories). Therefore, the sub-population of each society was also separated varying with the groups of primary or non-primary stories.

<sup>101</sup> Because one of the goals was to compare the two newspapers from China, the sample strata were further determined by the population of the relevant stories of each newspaper within China.

used to obtain the random numbers. In order to determine a desirable sample size for my research project, several decisions involving my judgment were made step by step.

The present study primarily involved a series of binary variables (presenting or not presenting a type of frame), which was the most important attribute of the outcome variables. Because of the exploratory nature, this study took the estimate of the proportion of the population possessing that attribute (presenting or not presenting a type of frame) as 50%. Then the margin of error in estimating the proportion was determined. That is an assessment made as to how accurate or representative a sample was needed. Since the current study did not involve some crucial considerations of factors such as fatal diseases, where a very small variance may cause serious effects, the confidence interval  $\pm 10\%$  was used, which means the sample would possess the attribute in question within  $\pm 10\%$  of the population value, e.g.,  $50\% \pm 10\%$ . This way, the sample size could also be reduced substantially. The next step was to determine the confidence level. While a sample size that would prevent the researcher from carrying out this study in a timely fashion was avoided, a large enough sample size was used so that the proportion possessing the attribute could fall within the specified margin of error. It is customary to choose the 99% confidence level for extreme confidence; the 95% level for reasonable confidence; and the 90% level for a slightly less level of confidence. The 95% confidence level was chosen. Thus, in this study, randomly drawn samples from a population will possess the outcome attribute – presenting a type of news frame – within a range of error of  $\pm 10\%$ , 95 times out of 100. The last step was to use the formula “ $n = (pq)/SE^2$ ” and its adjusted version with a corrected factor “ $n = (pq)/(SE^2 + pq/N)$ ” to determine the

**Table 6.1. Sample Sizes of Primary & Non-Primary Stories in Newspapers in Each Society**

		<i>People's Daily</i>	<i>Beijing Youth Daily</i>	Hong Kong	Singapore	U.S.	U.K.
<b>Primary Stories</b>	Population	1148	3574	485	662	153	66
	Sample	96	96	96	96	59	39
<b>Non-primary Stories</b>	Population	645	183	353	385	246	182
	Sample	96	63	75	77	69	63

sampling sizes for the newspapers in each society based on the knowledge about the population sizes involved in the study.<sup>102</sup>

As a result, a full list of the sample sizes for both primary and non-primary stories was obtained (see Table 6.1). The total sample was 925, 482 for primary stories and 443 for non-primary stories. To reduce the bias that might be introduced by the year of articles, I further stratified the sample based on the proportion of each year of articles within each society.<sup>103</sup>

## 6.6. Unit of Analysis and Coding

The process of identifying the frequently appearing issues related to China's Internet and the presentations of generic news frames were carried out through a

<sup>102</sup> If the population is large such that the sample will not be more than 20% of the population, it is not necessary to introduce a correction factor. In this study,  $p = .5$  (the estimate of the proportion of the population possessing the attribute),  $q = 1 - p = 1 - .5 = .5$ ,  $SE = (10\%)/1.96 = 0.051$ . Therefore, for the case where the population was large enough, the sample size was:  $n = 0.25/0.002601 = 96$ . This was the case for China, Hong Kong, and Singapore. For the United States and the United Kingdom, where the populations were relatively small, a correction factor was introduced, and the second formula was used. In the formula,  $N$  represents the population size. For detailed information on the application of the formulae, see <http://www2.uta.edu/sswmindel/S6324/Class%20Materials/Sampling/samplesize.pdf>. See also Tamhane and Dunlop (2000).

<sup>103</sup> Again, within China, the samples for the *People's Daily* and *Beijing Youth Daily* were separately drawn.



quantitative content analysis. The correlations between the news frames and the issues in questions and the variances of such correlations and the presentations of news frames across the societies were quantitatively examined. The comparisons of the newspapers in China were also conducted quantitatively.

The unit of analysis was the individual news article. A coding book was designed based on three primary research interests (see Appendix B(I) and Appendix B(II)). In coding, the first set of questions asked what issue(s) related to the Internet in China was(were) mentioned or discussed in a given article, and which issue was the primary subject of the article. The second set concerned the extent to which the article in question framed a given issue from a political perspective and/or presented tolerance to political views that were not favorable to the Chinese government. This part, called “Political Tolerance Index” (PTI), included a series of questions, such as whether the Internet use discussed in the article stressed the political aspect, whether dissident content or users were mentioned, whether the discussion regarding China’s Internet control, if any, stressed the necessity of regulating the Internet or the position unfavorable to the regulation, whether the discussion stressed the Chinese government’s ability or success in regulating the Internet or its impossibility or failure in regulating the Internet, and so on.<sup>104</sup> The third set of questions asked whether the article presented a certain type of news frame, and whether the frame was associated with the primary subject. Under several questions, some further questions were developed regarding the primary agent(s) or actor(s) involved in Internet-related practice.

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<sup>104</sup> See the coding forms in APPENDIX B for detailed information. Two additional categories, “not ascertainable” and “not applicable,” were set for the stories with no value judgment or neutral judgment and those that have nothing to do with these questions. Refer to APPENDIX C for the guidelines for these two categories.

In order to establish intercoder reliability figures, two trained bilingual coders<sup>105</sup> coded a random sample of 10 percent of the English newspaper articles and the same percentage of articles from the Chinese newspapers.<sup>106</sup> Detailed instructions used to categorize different Internet-related issues, and determine which Internet-related issue was the primary subject of a given article and whether a certain type of news frame was present, were given in the coding guidelines (see Appendix C). Before coding, discussion of the meanings of the PTI questions and the generic news frames took place. With all of the Internet-related issues and the news frames listed in the coding sheet, the coders had the opportunity to code for more than one issue and one frame, but only one primary subject within each article. Scott's *pi*, a reliability measurement approach stricter than Holsti's coefficient, was used for calculating the reliability figures. To take account of the probability of agreement by chance, Scott (1955) developed the *pi* index, which corrects for the number of categories used and also for the probable frequency of use:

$$\text{Reliability} = \frac{\% \text{ observed agreement} - \% \text{ expected agreement}}{1 - \% \text{ expected agreement}}$$

The coefficients for the key variables generated from such calculation were well beyond the generally accepted .70 for content analysis. For the English newspapers, the intercoder reliability figures for several of the main variables were as follows: 1.00 (the Internet-related issue taken as the primary subject of a story), .74 (the Internet-related issues mentioned or discussed other than the primary subject), .88 (the PTI questions),

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<sup>105</sup> Cultural bias might have been introduced because both coders were native Chinese fluent in English.

<sup>106</sup> The sample used for calculating intercoder reliability figures were all primary stories, because the categories designed for non-primary stories were consistent with those for primary stories.

1.00 (the presence of a factual frame), .93 (the presence of a human interest frame), 1.00 (the presence of a conflict frame), .93 (the presence of a responsibility frame), 1.00 (the presence of a morality frame), .94 (the presence of an economic consequence frame), and .94 (the presence of a leadership frame). For the Chinese newspapers, the intercoder reliability figures for the same variables were as follows: 1.00 (the Internet-related issue taken as the primary subject of a story), .89 (Internet-related issues mentioned or discussed other than the primary subject), .92 (the PTI questions), 1.00 (the presence of a factual frame), .95 (the presence of a human interest frame), .97 (the presence of a conflict frame), .95 (the presence of an economic consequence frame), .97 (the presence of a morality frame), 1.00 (the presence of a responsibility frame), and .93 (the presence of a leadership frame).

## **6.7. Independent and Dependent Variables**

As discussed in the literature review of media framing, the frame-building process concerns the relationships between media frames and the factors influencing media content. In this study, the focus was on how political systems, and cultural dimensions, the independent variables, might impact on the presentations of the issues and the news frames covering the Internet in China in the newspapers across cultural societies, the dependent variables.

The variable of political systems was operationalized based on the ratings of Freedom House (Table 6.2). Since 1972, Freedom House has published an annual assessment of the state of freedom in all countries (and territories), now known as Freedom in the World (Freedom House, 2004). It measures freedom according to two

**Table 6.2. Five Year Ratings Timeline of Freedom House  
(Political Rights, Civil Liberties, Status)**

	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
<b>China</b>	7,6,NF	7,6,NF	7,6,NF	7,6,NF	7,6,NF
<b>Hong Kong</b>	5,3,PF	5,3,PF	5,3,PF	5,3,PF	5,3,PF
<b>Singapore</b>	5,5,PF	5,5,PF	5,4,PF	5,4,PF	5,4,PF
<b>U.S.</b>	1,1,F	1,1,F	1,1,F	1,1,F	1,1,F
<b>U.K.</b>	1,2, F	1,2, F	1,2, F	1,1, F	1,1, F

(Source: Freedom House <http://www.freedomhouse.org/ratings/allscore04.xls><sup>107</sup>)

two broad categories: political rights and civil liberties. Political rights include the right to vote, compete for public office, and elect representatives who have a decisive impact on public policies and are accountable to the electorate. Civil liberties allow for the freedoms of expression and belief, associational and organizational rights, rule of law, and personal autonomy without interference from the state. It is claimed that the country and territory ratings “generally reflect the interplay of a variety of actors, both governmental and nongovernmental.” In this study, the overall status was used, with 1, 2 and 3 respectively taking on the values “not free,” “partly free,” and “free,” as one of the independent variables representing variance in political systems across the five selected societies.

Freedom House does not maintain a cultural-bound view of freedom. For comparisons of cultural impacts, the index scores of cultural dimensions presented in

<sup>107</sup> Each country or territory is assigned a numerical rating, which is calculated based on the methodology described below, on a scale of 1 to 7. A rating of 1 indicates the highest degree of freedom and 7 the least amount of freedom. Each pair of political rights and civil liberties ratings is averaged to determine an overall status of “Free (F),” “Partly Free (PF),” or “Not Free (NF).” Those whose ratings average 1.0-2.5 are considered “Free,” 3.0-5.0 “Partly Free,” and 5.5-7.0 “Not Free.”

Hofstede's study (Table 6.3) was adopted, when the set of logistic regression models was built (see the next section) and the hypotheses related to the dimensions were tested.

The scores of Political Tolerance Index (PTI), which were calculated from the answers to the series of PTI questions, measured the extent to which the newspapers were predisposed to reporting the political aspect of the Internet in China, and presented certain tolerance to the content or views unfavorable to the Chinese government. The scores were obtained following two steps: 1) A score scale was set up for each checked PTI question. A score of "0" was assigned to the non-political aspect of a given issue (e.g., non-political use of the Internet, non-political aspect of Internet regulation, etc.), or the position favorable to the Chinese government (e.g., it is necessary to regulate the Internet, or it is possible for the government to control the Internet, or the Internet development will strengthen the current regime), which was taken as the reference point. A score of "+1" was assigned to the opposite of the reference. Those "unascertainable"

**Table 6.3. Index Scores of Cultural Dimensions**

	Power Distance (PDI)	Uncertainty Avoidance (UAI)	Individualism/ Collectivism (IDV)	Long-/ Short- Term Orientation (LTO)
<b>China</b> <sup>a</sup>	80	30	20	118
<b>Hong Kong</b>	68	29	25	96
<b>Singapore</b>	74	8	20	48
<b>U.S.</b>	40	46	91	29
<b>U.K.</b>	35	35	89	25

<sup>a</sup> Unlike the others, China was not included in the IBM database of Hofstede's 1980 seminal work. (Source: Scores from Exhibit A5.1 and A5.3 in Hofstede, 2001.)

answers for the articles mixed with both political and non-political, or favorable and unfavorable sides, were given a score “0.5.” 2) The sum of scores for all PTI questions yielded the total PTI score for each article.

## 6.8. Statistics Methods

Descriptive statistics, such as frequencies and percentages,  $I \times J$  contingency tables, and Chi-square tests, were used to address the first two sets of research questions, the fourth set of questions, and the first four sets of hypotheses. For RQ3, a set of logistic regression models were built to predict whether a type of news frame occurs or not:

$\text{logit}(\pi) = \beta_0 + \beta_1 X_1 + \beta_2 X_2 + \beta_3 X_3 + \beta_4 X_4 + \beta_5 X_5$ ,<sup>108</sup> where  $X_1$  stands for the status of freedom,  $X_2$  for Power Distance,  $X_3$  for Uncertainty Avoidance,  $X_4$  for Individualism vs. Collectivism, and  $X_5$  or Long-/Short-Term Orientation. Similar approaches were adopted when the two newspapers published in mainland China were compared. To address the fifth set of RQs regarding the PTI scores, ANOVA and the forward stepwise method for regression models were used. Regression models were also built to address the fifth set of hypotheses.

Two statistical software programs, SPSS and JMP, were used in this study.

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<sup>108</sup> This is a main effect model. The interaction terms between the factors were considered when all of the potential models were run and the best fitted one was selected.

## **CHAPTER VII. ANALYSES AND RESULTS**

### **7.1. What Issues Were Reported and Highlighted?**

RQ1a: Which issues appeared most frequently and which issue was most frequently taken as the primary subject of a given story within each society?

RQ1b: Did the newspapers from different societies significantly differ from one another in reporting the issues? If so, how?

Table 7.1 shows the frequencies of Internet-related issues appearing in the sample of both primary and non-primary stories. Among all issues in question, the issue of Internet diffusion and use in China was most frequently mentioned in the newspapers from two Chinese societies, mainland China (61.54%, 216 of 351 articles) and Singapore (48.55%, 84 of 173), and one Western society, the United Kingdom (53.92%, 55 of 102). The newspapers from Hong Kong paid most attention to events about e-commerce, Internet business and industry in mainland China (46.2%, 79 of 171), closely followed by the issue of Internet diffusion and use (45.03%, 77 of 171). In Singapore, the issue of Internet economy, with a percentage ranked second (40.46%, 70 of 173) drew much attention. In the United States, the issue most frequently appearing in the newspapers was Internet censorship and regulations in China, accounting for 55.47% (71 of 128 articles). The percentage of the issue was also relatively high in the U.K. newspapers, ranked second (39.22%, 40 of 102).

When the five societies were compared, Chi-square tests indicated that significant within-issue differences existed across societies in terms of whether an article mentioned

**Table 7.1. Percentages of Articles with Internet-Related Issues Mentioned within Each Society <sup>a</sup>**

	Internet diffusion & use	Internet censorship & regulations	E-commerce, Internet business & industry	Consequences & implications of the Internet	Others <sup>b</sup>
<b>China</b> ( <i>N</i> = 351)	216 61.54% <sup>c</sup>	49 13.96%	102 29.06%	21 5.98%	57 16.24%
<b>Hong Kong</b> ( <i>N</i> = 171)	77 45.03%	36 21.05%	79 46.20%	5 2.92%	19 11.11%
<b>Singapore</b> ( <i>N</i> = 173)	84 48.55%	40 23.12%	70 40.46%	24 13.87%	21 12.14%
<b>U.S.</b> ( <i>N</i> = 128)	55 42.97%	71 55.47%	40 31.25%	20 15.63%	3 2.34%
<b>U.K.</b> ( <i>N</i> = 102)	55 53.92%	40 39.22%	25 24.51%	10 9.80%	8 7.84%

<sup>a</sup> Both primary and non-primary stories were included. Each article was allowed to have more than one issue checked.

<sup>b</sup> The issues, such as Internet technologies, Internet security and other cybercrimes, and other issues listed in the coding sheet were combined into one category for analysis. Same in the tables below.

<sup>c</sup> % of *N*. Same for all percentages in the table.



a certain type of issue. The differences came most from three societies, mainland China, Hong Kong, and the United States, which had high cell Chi-square values for most issues (see Table 7.2 and Table 7.3).<sup>109</sup> The newspapers from mainland China were significantly more likely to mention the issue of Internet diffusion and use (61.54%, 216 of 351), and other issues (16.24%, 57 of 351). The observed frequency counts of these two issues were significantly larger than the expected counts, especially with regard to the first issue (216 vs. 184.8). The issues, such as Internet censorship and regulations (13.96%, 49 of 351), e-commerce, Internet business and industry (29.06%, 102 of 351), and the consequences and implications of the Internet (5.98%, 21 of 351), were less likely to be mentioned in China's newspapers. Their observed frequency counts were all significantly smaller than the expected, particularly the issue of Internet censorship and regulations (49 vs. 89.6). In contrast, the U.S. newspapers presented the issues of Internet censorship and regulations (55.47%, 71 of 128) and the consequences and implications of Internet (15.63%, 20 of 128) much more often than China and the other societies. Their observed frequency counts were significantly larger than the expected. The observed count of the articles mentioning the issue of Internet censorship and regulations was more than twice as many as the expected (71 vs. 32.7). Hong Kong stood out for its significantly greater likelihood of discussing e-commerce, Internet business and industry in mainland China (46.2%, 79 of 171), and less likelihood of mentioning the issues of Internet diffusion and use (45.03%, 77 of 171), and the consequences and implications of the Internet (2.92%, 5 of 171). Their observed counts were significantly smaller than the expected, especially in

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<sup>109</sup> Each cell Chi-Square value represents how much contribution the given cell has made to the total Chi-Square statistics. A high cell value means the difference between the observed and expected counts in the cell is substantial. Most of the association between variables, if any, comes from the cells with a high value.

**Table 7.2. Differences in Mentioning Internet-Related Issues in Both Primary and Non-Primary Stories across Societies (Issues of Internet Diffusion & Use, Internet Censorship & Regulations, and E-Commerce, Internet Business & Industry) <sup>a</sup>**

		<b>Internet diffusion &amp; use</b> ( $\chi^2 = 21.15$ , $df = 4$ , $p < .001$ )		<b>Internet censorship &amp; regulations</b> ( $\chi^2 = 97.48$ , $df = 4$ , $p < .0001$ )		<b>E-commerce, Internet business &amp; industry</b> ( $\chi^2 = 22.84$ , $df = 4$ , $p < .001$ )	
		Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No
<b>China</b> ( $N = 351$ )	Count	216	135	49	302	102	249
	Expected	184.797	166.203	89.552	261.448	119.909	231.091
	Row %	61.54%	38.46%	13.96%	86.04%	29.06%	70.94%
	Cell $\chi^2$	<b>5.269</b>	<b>5.858</b>	<b>18.364</b>	<b>6.290</b>	<b>2.675</b>	1.388
<b>Hong Kong</b> ( $N = 171$ )	Count	77	94	36	135	79	92
	Expected	90.029	80.971	43.628	127.372	58.417	112.583
	Row %	45.03%	54.97%	21.05%	78.95%	46.20%	53.80%
	Cell $\chi^2$	<b>1.886</b>	<b>2.097</b>	1.334	0.457	<b>7.252</b>	<b>3.763</b>
<b>Singapore</b> ( $N = 173$ )	Count	84	89	40	133	70	103
	Expected	91.082	81.918	44.138	128.862	59.101	113.899
	Row %	48.55%	51.45%	23.12%	76.88%	40.46%	59.54%
	Cell $\chi^2$	0.551	0.612	0.388	0.133	2.010	1.043
<b>U.S.</b> ( $N = 128$ )	Count	55	73	71	57	40	88
	Expected	67.390	60.610	32.657	95.343	43.728	84.272
	Row %	42.97%	57.03%	55.47%	44.53%	31.25%	68.75%
	Cell $\chi^2$	<b>2.278</b>	<b>2.533</b>	<b>45.018</b>	<b>15.420</b>	0.318	0.165
<b>U.K.</b> ( $N = 102$ )	Count	55	47	40	62	25	77
	Expected	53.702	48.298	26.024	75.976	34.845	67.155
	Row %	53.92%	46.08%	39.22%	60.78%	24.51%	75.49%
	Cell $\chi^2$	0.031	0.035	<b>7.506</b>	<b>2.571</b>	<b>2.782</b>	1.443

<sup>a</sup> The cell Chi-Square values with a significantly large difference between the observed and expected counts are highlighted in the table. Standardized Pearson residuals were calculated to determine whether such differences were significant. If the absolute value of a residual was more than two, the difference between the observed and expected counts was significant. Same in the tables below. Refer to Simonoff (2003, pp.215-218) for the explanation on the formula used to calculate standardized residuals and an example. The formula is as follows:

$$r_{ij} = \frac{n_{ij} - e_{ij}}{\sqrt{e_{ij}(1 - n_{i.}/n)(1 - n_{.j}/n)}}$$

**Table 7.3. Differences in Mentioning Internet-Related Issues in Both Primary and Non-Primary Stories across Societies (Issues of Consequences & Implications of the Internet, and Other Issues)**

		<b>Consequences &amp; implications of the Internet</b> ( $\chi^2 = 24.28$ , $df = 4$ , $p < .0001$ )		<b>Other issues</b> ( $\chi^2 = 19.44$ , $df = 4$ , $p < .001$ )	
		Yes	No	Yes	No
<b>China</b> ( $N = 351$ )	Count	21	330	57	294
	Expected	30.357	320.643	40.982	310.018
	Row %	5.98%	94.02%	16.24%	83.76%
	Cell $\chi^2$	<b>2.884</b>	0.273	<b>6.261</b>	0.828
<b>Hong Kong</b> ( $N = 171$ )	Count	5	166	19	152
	Expected	14.789	156.211	19.965	151.035
	Row %	2.92%	97.08%	11.11%	88.89%
	Cell $\chi^2$	<b>6.480</b>	0.614	0.047	0.006
<b>Singapore</b> ( $N = 173$ )	Count	24	149	21	152
	Expected	14.962	158.038	20.199	152.801
	Row %	13.87%	86.13%	12.14%	87.86%
	Cell $\chi^2$	<b>5.459</b>	0.517	0.032	0.004
<b>U.S.</b> ( $N = 128$ )	Count	20	108	3	125
	Expected	11.070	116.930	14.945	113.055
	Row %	15.63%	84.38%	2.34%	97.66%
	Cell $\chi^2$	<b>7.203</b>	0.682	<b>9.547</b>	1.262
<b>U.K.</b> ( $N = 102$ )	Count	10	92	8	94
	Expected	8.822	93.178	11.909	90.091
	Row %	9.80%	90.20%	7.84%	92.16%
	Cell $\chi^2$	0.157	0.015	1.283	0.170

regard to the latter issue (5 vs. 14.8).

Unlike these three societies, Singapore and the United Kingdom with relatively small cell Chi-Square values showed little deviations from the expected counts in many issues. Singapore significantly contributed to the total Chi-Square statistics in only one issue. What made Singapore different from its Eastern peers was its newspapers' greater likelihood of discussing the consequences and implications of the Internet in China, with the observed count significantly larger than the expected (24 vs. 15). The percentage of such articles (13.87%, 24 of 173) in Singapore's newspapers was very close to the one in the U.S. newspapers, and even higher than that in the U.K. newspapers. The United Kingdom was distinctive in two issues. In the U.K. newspapers, the observed count of the issue of Internet censorship and regulations was about twice as many as the expected (40 vs. 26). The percentage of the articles mentioning the issue in the U.K. newspapers (39.22%, 40 of 102) was second-ranked after the United States, much higher than the Eastern societies, with a percentage ranging from 13.96% to 23.12%. In addition, like China, the frequency of mentioning the issue of e-commerce and Internet business in the U.K. newspapers was significantly smaller than the expected count.

In terms of primary subjects, the Internet-related issues were unequally highlighted in the newspapers within each society (see Table 7.4). In China, the observed frequency of the issue of Internet diffusion and use as the primary subject of a given story was more than twice as many as the expected frequency, much more than those of the other issues. In the other two Chinese societies, Hong Kong and Singapore, the issue of e-commerce, Internet business or industry, with a positive high value of frequency residual for both societies, was the most salient concern of the newspapers. This issue was the

**Table 7.4. Comparisons of Internet-Related Issues as Primary Subject in Newspapers within Each Society <sup>a</sup>**

		Internet diffusion & use	Internet censorship & regulations	E-commerce, Internet business & industry	Consequences & implications of the Internet	Others
<b>China</b> ( $\chi^2 = 135.74$ , df = 4, $p < .0001$ )	Observed	96	17	45	4	27
	Expected	37.8	37.8	37.8	37.8	37.8
	Residual	58.2	-20.8	7.2	-33.8	-10.8
<b>Hong Kong</b> ( $\chi^2 = 82.33$ , df = 4, $p < .0001$ )	Observed	13	18	53	1	11
	Expected	19.2	19.2	19.2	19.2	19.2
	Residual	-6.2	-1.2	33.8	-18.2	-8.2
<b>Singapore</b> ( $\chi^2 = 59.1$ , df = 4, $p < .0001$ )	Observed	19	20	46	1	10
	Expected	19.2	19.2	19.2	19.2	19.2
	Residual	-2	.8	26.8	-18.2	-9.2
<b>U.S.</b> ( $\chi^2 = 41.59$ , df = 4, $p < .0001$ )	Observed	4	32	20		2
	Expected	14.5	14.5	14.5		14.5
	Residual	-10.5	17.5	5.5		-12.5
<b>U.K.</b> ( $\chi^2 = 13.16$ , df = 4, $p < .005$ )	Observed	6	19	8		5
	Expected	9.5	9.5	9.5		9.5
	Residual	-3.5	9.5	-1.5		-4.5

<sup>a</sup> The articles with primary subject as unascertainable were excluded.

second most prominent issue in the newspapers from mainland China. Unlike their Eastern counterparts, the U.S. and U.K. newspapers made the issue of Internet censorship and regulations most prominent by frequently highlighting it as the primary subject. The issue of the consequences and implications of Internet was less profiled in all Eastern newspapers. The issue did not exist as a primary subject in any of the U.S. and U.K. samples.

Significant differences also existed across the societies in terms of the prominence of the Internet-related issues ( $\chi^2 = 141.77$ ,  $df = 16$ ,  $p < .0001$ ; see Table 7.5). The main differences appeared to occur in the issue of Internet censorship and regulations. The subtotal of the five cell Chi-Square values of the issue (57.02) accounted for 40.22 percent of the total Chi-Square statistics. The cell Chi-Square values for China, the United States and the United Kingdom were particularly high. Compared to their Eastern counterparts, China, Hong Kong and Singapore, the two Western countries were much more likely to highlight the issue as the primary subject of a given story. Particularly in the United States, the observed count was almost three times as many as the expected (32 vs. 12.9). 55.17 percent of the articles in the U.S. newspapers took this issue as primary subject with a cell Chi-Square value as high as 28.34, more than twice as many as those in Hong Kong (18.75%) and Singapore (20.83%), and almost seven times as many as that in China (8.99%). In China's newspapers, the observed count was much smaller than the expected count (17 vs. 42).

The United States, together with the United Kingdom again, was distinct for its newspapers' less frequently taking Internet diffusion and use in China, the second issue

**Table 7.5. Comparisons of Primary Subjects in Newspapers across Societies <sup>a</sup>**

		Internet diffusion & use	Internet censorship & regulations	E-commerce, Internet business & industry	Consequences & implications of the Internet	Others
<b>China</b> ( <i>N</i> = 189)	Count	96	17	45	4	27
	Expected	54.679	42	68.151	2.377	21.793
	Row %	50.79%	8.99%	23.81%	2.12%	14.29%
	Cell $\chi^2$	<b>31.226</b>	<b>14.881</b>	<b>7.864</b>	1.108	1.244
<b>Hong Kong</b> ( <i>N</i> = 96)	Count	13	18	53	1	11
	Expected	27.774	21.333	34.616	1.208	11.069
	Row %	13.54%	18.75%	55.21%	1.04%	11.46%
	Cell $\chi^2$	<b>7.859</b>	0.521	<b>9.763</b>	0.036	0.001
<b>Singapore</b> ( <i>N</i> = 96)	Count	19	20	46	1	10
	Expected	27.774	21.333	34.616	1.208	11.069
	Row %	19.79%	20.83%	47.92%	1.04%	10.42%
	Cell $\chi^2$	<b>2.772</b>	0.083	<b>3.744</b>	0.036	0.103
<b>U.S.</b> ( <i>N</i> = 58)	Count	4	32	20	0	2
	Expected	16.780	12.889	20.914	0.7296	6.688
	Row %	6.90%	55.17%	34.48%	0.00%	3.45%
	Cell $\chi^2$	<b>9.733</b>	<b>28.337</b>	0.040	0.730	<b>3.286</b>
<b>U.K.</b> ( <i>N</i> = 38)	Count	6	19	8	0	5
	Expected	10.994	8.444	13.702	0.478	4.382
	Row %	15.79%	50.00%	21.05%	0.00%	13.16%
	Cell $\chi^2$	<b>2.268</b>	<b>13.194</b>	<b>2.373</b>	0.478	0.087

<sup>a</sup>  $\chi^2 = 141.77$ , *df* = 16, *p* < .0001. The articles with more than one primary subjects were excluded.

mainly causing the across-society differences, as the primary subject of a given story. The observed count of the issue was less than one fourth as many as the expected value. The percentage of the issue (6.9%) was less than half as many as Hong Kong (13.54%), Singapore (19.79%) and the United Kingdom (15.79%), and only one eighth as China. In contrast, the newspapers from China had 50.79 percent of the sample articles taking the issue of Internet diffusion and use as primary subject, which enjoyed the highest cell Chi-Square value across issues and societies.

China was also in a sharp contrast to Hong Kong because of their newspapers' treatment of events in China's e-commerce and Internet business. Compared to the others, the newspapers in Hong Kong made the issue more salient by frequently taking it as its primary subject, with a percentage as high as 55.21%, more than twice as many as China (23.84%). The observed count was much larger than the expected (53 vs. 34.6). Singapore was also more likely to highlight the issue as its primary subject, with the observed count significantly larger than the expected (46 vs. 34.6). Like China, the percentage of the issue in the U.K. newspapers was relatively low (21.05%).

In terms of the issue of the consequences and implications of the Internet, there seemed to be no significant differences across societies, although the observed frequency in the newspapers from China was a little larger than the expected one (4 vs. 2.4). As far as other unspecified issues are considered, only the United States was found to differ from the other societies in that its percentage of the article taking the issue as primary subject, 3.45%, was much lower than all the others ranging from 10.42% to 14.24%. The observed frequency count was even less than one third of the expected count.



## **7.2. How and Why Were the Issues Framed in Certain Ways, If Any?**

RQ2a: Regardless of the types of issues, which news frames dominated in the newspapers of each society?

RQ2b: Would the pattern of the presentations of news frames be associated with the societies? If so, what variations of the presentations existed across the societies?

Table 7.6, Table 7.7 and Table 7.8 summarize the frequency counts of different types of news frames used in primary stories about the Internet in China in the selected newspapers across societies. It is not surprising to see the factual frame, accounting for more than 80 percent of articles in every single society, dominated in all newspapers. In addition to the factual frame, the dominating type of news frame in the newspapers of each society was respectively the human interest frame in China (33.16%), Singapore (22.92%) and the United Kingdom (33.33%), the economic consequences frame in Hong Kong (25.00%), and the conflict frame in the United States (47.46%). The three types of news frames, such as the leadership, morality, and responsibility frames, were rarely used in most newspapers.

As shown in Table 7.6, Table 7.7 and Table 7.8, significant differences existed in the presentation of each type of news frame. The main differences appeared to occur in Hong Kong and mainland China, which differed from the other societies in many aspects. Besides the leading percentage of the factual frame, news articles from Hong Kong reported the highest percentage (25%, 24 of 96) of the articles with the economic consequences frame presented, which was significantly higher than the other societies with a percentage ranging from 6.67% to 18.64%. In contrast, the percentages of the human interest, responsibility, morality and leadership frames present in the Hong Kong

**Table 7.6. Comparisons of the Presentations of News Frames  
in Newspapers across Societies  
(Factual Frame, Human Interest Frame, and Conflict Frame) <sup>a</sup>**

		<b>Factual Frame</b> ( $\chi^2 = 17.46$ , df = 4, $p < .005$ )		<b>Human Interest Frame</b> ( $\chi^2 = 33.7$ , df = 4, $p < .0001$ )		<b>Conflict Frame</b> ( $\chi^2 = 73.98$ , df = 4, $p < .0001$ )	
		Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No
<b>China</b> ( $N = 189$ )	Count	151	28	63	127	9	173
	Expected	159.15	19.847	46.708	143.292	27.377	154.623
	Row %	84.36%	15.64%	33.16%	66.84%	4.95%	95.05%
	Cell $\chi^2$	0.418	<b>3.350</b>	<b>5.683</b>	<b>1.852</b>	<b>12.334</b>	<b>2.184</b>
<b>Hong Kong</b> ( $N = 96$ )	Count	96	0	3	93	8	88
	Expected	85.356	10.644	23.6	72.4	14.441	81.559
	Row %	100.00%	0.00%	3.13%	96.88%	8.33%	91.67%
	Cell $\chi^2$	1.327	<b>10.644</b>	<b>17.98</b>	<b>5.861</b>	<b>2.873</b>	0.509
<b>Singapore</b> ( $N = 96$ )	Count	83	13	22	74	14	82
	Expected	85.356	10.644	23.6	72.4	14.441	81.559
	Row %	86.46%	13.54%	22.92%	77.08%	14.58%	85.42%
	Cell $\chi^2$	0.065	0.522	0.109	0.035	0.013	0.002
<b>U.S.</b> ( $N = 59$ )	Count	54	5	17	42	28	31
	Expected	52.458	6.542	14.504	44.496	8.875	50.125
	Row %	91.53%	8.47%	28.81%	71.19%	47.46%	52.54%
	Cell $\chi^2$	0.045	0.363	0.430	0.140	<b>41.213</b>	<b>7.297</b>
<b>U.K.</b> ( $N = 39$ )	Count	33	6	13	26	12	27
	Expected	34.676	4.324	9.588	29.413	5.867	33.134
	Row %	84.62%	15.38%	33.33%	66.67%	30.77%	69.23%
	Cell $\chi^2$	0.081	0.650	1.215	0.396	<b>6.413</b>	1.135

<sup>a</sup> Only primary stories were coded for the presence of news frames.

**Table 7.7. Comparisons of the Presentations of News Frames  
in Newspapers across Societies  
(Economic Consequences Frame and Responsibility Frame)**

		<b>Economic Consequences Frame</b> ( $\chi^2 = 20.48$ , df = 4, $p < .001$ )		<b>Responsibility Frame<sup>a</sup></b> ( $\chi^2 = 8.846$ , df = 4, $p < .05$ )	
		Yes	No	Yes	No
<b>China</b> ( <i>N</i> = 189)	Count	12	168	12	168
	Expected	24.511	155.489	11.106	168.89
	Row %	6.67%	93.33%	6.67%	93.33%
	Cell $\chi^2$	<b>6.386</b>	1.007	0.072	0.005
<b>Hong Kong</b> ( <i>N</i> = 96)	Count	24	72	1	95
	Expected	13.072	82.928	5.923	90.077
	Row %	25.00%	75.00%	1.04%	98.96%
	Cell $\chi^2$	<b>9.135</b>	1.440	<b>4.092</b>	0.269
<b>Singapore</b> ( <i>N</i> = 96)	Count	14	82	10	86
	Expected	13.072	82.928	5.923	90.077
	Row %	14.58%	85.42%	10.42%	89.58%
	Cell $\chi^2$	0.066	0.010	<b>2.806</b>	0.185
<b>U.S.</b> ( <i>N</i> = 59)	Count	11	48	5	54
	Expected	8.034	50.966	3.640	55.360
	Row %	18.64%	81.36%	8.47%	91.53%
	Cell $\chi^2$	1.095	0.173	0.508	0.033
<b>U.K.</b> ( <i>N</i> = 39)	Count	3	36	1	38
	Expected	5.311	33.689	2.406	36.594
	Row %	7.69%	92.31%	2.56%	97.44%
	Cell $\chi^2$	1.005	0.159	0.822	0.054

<sup>a</sup> 20% of cells have expected count less than 5; Pearson Chi-Square suspect. Likelihood ratio Chi-Square was used for each type of news frame.

**Table 7.8. Comparisons of the Presentations of News Frames  
in Newspapers across Societies  
(Morality Frame and Leadership Frame)<sup>a</sup>**

		<b>Morality Frame</b> ( $\chi^2 = 17.44$ , $df = 4$ , $p < .0001$ )		<b>Leadership Frame</b> ( $\chi^2 = 7.834$ , $df = 4$ , $p < .05$ )	
		Yes	No	Yes	No
<b>China</b> ( $N = 189$ )	Count	16	164	12	168
	Expected	8.043	171.96	7.277	172.723
	Row %	8.89%	91.11%	6.67%	93.33%
	Cell $\chi^2$	<b>7.873</b>	0.368	<b>3.066</b>	0.129
<b>Hong Kong</b> ( $N = 96$ )	Count	0	96	0	96
	Expected	4.289	91.711	3.881	92.119
	Row %	0.00%	100.00%	0.00%	100.00%
	Cell $\chi^2$	<b>4.289</b>	0.201	<b>3.881</b>	0.164
<b>Singapore</b> ( $N = 96$ )	Count	5	91	3	93
	Expected	4.289	91.711	3.881	92.119
	Row %	5.21%	94.79%	3.13%	96.88%
	Cell $\chi^2$	0.118	0.006	0.200	0.008
<b>U.S.</b> ( $N = 59$ )	Count	0	59	3	56
	Expected	2.636	56.364	2.385	56.615
	Row %	0.00%	100.00%	5.08%	94.92%
	Cell $\chi^2$	2.636	0.123	0.159	0.007
<b>U.K.</b> ( $N = 39$ )	Count	0	39	1	38
	Expected	1.743	37.257	1.577	37.423
	Row %	0.00%	100.00%	2.56%	97.44%
	Cell $\chi^2$	1.743	0.082	0.211	0.009

<sup>a</sup> 20% of cells have expected count less than 5; Pearson Chi-Square suspect. Likelihood ratio Chi-Square was used for each type of news frame.

newspapers, compared to the other newspapers, were significantly lower, respectively accounting for 3.13%, 1.04%, 0% and 0%. China differentiated itself from the others in a different way. Its newspapers were more likely to use the human interest (33.16%, 63 of 189), morality (8.89%, 16 of 189) and leadership frames (6.67%, 12 of 189), respectively with a percentage significantly higher than the others, but less likely to present a conflict frame with a percentage (4.95%, 9 of 189) much lower than the others ranging from 8.33% to 47.46%. The observed count of the articles with a conflict frame in China was significantly low, less than one third as many as the expected count (9 vs. 27.377).

By contrast, both the U.S. and U.K. newspapers were particularly likely to provide a conflict frame for their news treatment of the Internet in China.<sup>110</sup> In addition to the factual frame, the conflict frame had the highest percentage respectively in the two countries, 47.76% (28 of 58) and 30.77% (12 of 38), much higher than their Eastern counterparts. The U.S. newspapers posting a cell Chi-Square value as high as 41.213, accounting for 55.71 percent of the total Chi-Square statistics, were particularly distinctive in presenting a conflict frame. Except for the conflict frame, the U.K. newspapers seemed to be normal in the presentations of the other types of news frames.

Singapore was the one least contributing to the total Chi-Square statistics. It appeared to be the benchmark for comparing two opposite sides in each frame except for

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<sup>110</sup> Detailed investigations found that a large number of the articles with a conflict frame in the U.S. and U.K. newspapers involved the Chinese government or people representing government, accounting for 80.5 percent of all conflict accounts in total (see Table D.1 in APPENDIX D). Among them the conflicts between the two groups, the government or people representing government and individual(s) as ordinary people, were most salient, accounting for 56.1 percent alone. The U.S. newspapers especially highlighted this type of conflict, which had a dominant percentage, 58.6% (see Table D.2 in APPENDIX D). The percentages of this type of conflict in the newspapers from three Eastern societies were relatively low, especially China (0.00%) and Hong Kong (11.1%) (see Table D.4, Table D.5, and Table D.6 in Appendix D).

the responsibility frame. The newspapers from Singapore had the greatest likelihood to present a responsibility frame with the highest percentage, 10.42% (10 of 96), among all newspapers.

RQ3: In general, when political systems and cultural dimensions are considered, how much variations in the presentation of each of the generic news frames could be explained? Would any interaction effects of the factors be found?

Table 7.9 shows the results from running logistics regression models with the parameters identified by the forward stepwise method. Among the examined factors, freedom status was the leading significant one in predicting whether such four news frames as the factual, human interest, economic consequences and leadership frames were presented in newspapers.

Compared to the others, the difference between the not-free society, China, and the partly-free and free societies contributed most to the variations of the presentation of the factual frame. The newspapers in the not-free society were less likely to present a factual frame than the societies at the second and third levels of freedom status. Two cultural dimensions, uncertainty avoidance (UAI)<sup>111</sup> and long-/short-term orientation (LTO), were significantly associated with the presentation of the frame. A society with a higher score on UAI and LTO was more likely to provide a factual frame. Without the influence of any other factors, a society with a UAI score one unit more was 1.057 times more likely to present a factual frame as much as its reference society. Such a chance for

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<sup>111</sup> The abbreviations in Hofstede (2001) are used: PDI stands for power distance; UAI stands for uncertainty avoidance; IVD stands for individualism vs. collectivism; LTO stands for long-/short-term orientation.

**Table 7.9. The Effects of Political Systems and Cultural Dimensions on the Overall Presence of News Frames**

	$\beta^a$	Wald $\chi^2$	Unit Odds Ratio <sup>b</sup>
<b>Factual Frame</b> ( $R^2 = .084, \chi^2 = 27.239, df = 3, p < .0001$ )			
Intercept	-5.753		
Freedom Status (1- 2&3)	-3.394**	4.645**	.032
UAI	.056**	4.317**	1.057
LTO	.078**	4.267**	1.081
<b>Human Interest Frame</b> ( $R^2 = .081, \chi^2 = 43.437, df = 3, p < .0001$ )			
Intercept	4.769***		
Freedom Status (2-1)	-3.757****	18.55****	.023
Freedom Status (3-2)	-.562	1.37	.570
LTO	-.046***	12.42***	.955
<b>Conflict Frame</b> ( $R^2 = .158, \chi^2 = 63.335, df = 3, p < .0001$ )			
Intercept	.278		
IVD	-.032	1.228	.969
LTO	-.043**	6.196**	.958
UAI	.082*	2.897*	1.085
<b>Responsibility Frame<sup>c</sup></b>			
<b>Morality Frame<sup>c</sup></b>			
<b>Economic Consequences Frame</b> ( $R^2 = .047, \chi^2 = 19.514, df = 2, p < .001$ )			
Intercept	-3.084****		
Freedom Status (1-2&3)	-.887****	16.043****	.412
LTO	.011**	4.658**	1.011
<b>Leadership Frame</b> ( $R^2 = .060, \chi^2 = 9.518, df = 2, p < .01$ )			
Intercept	.012		
Freedom Status (1-2&3)	1.954**	3.916**	7.058
LTO	-.039*	2.742*	.962

<sup>a</sup> The equation for a simple logistic regression model is as follows:  $\log [p/(1-p)] = \alpha + \beta x$ , where  $p$  denotes the probability of presenting a type of news frame when an explanatory variable  $X$ , e.g., a cultural dimension, takes value  $x$ ;  $\alpha$  is the intercept and  $\beta$  is the parameter of the explanatory variable. The order of parameter estimates is based on the one of entering the model in the step history of stepwise regression.

<sup>b</sup> For log odds of Yes/No.

<sup>c</sup> No parameters were selected when the forward stepwise method was conducted with the probability to enter set as .10. There was evidence showing the results were unstable. It might be caused by the fact that the numbers of articles with the frame in question in the newspapers from the societies other than China and Singapore were few.

\*  $p < .1$ , \*\*  $p < .05$ , \*\*\*  $p < .001$ , \*\*\*\*  $p < .0001$

a society with a LTO score one unit more was 1.081 times as much as for the reference.<sup>112</sup>

Whether an article provided a human interest frame was significantly associated with freedom status and long-/short-term orientation. In the model, the difference between the partly-free societies and the not-free society was the one contributing most to the variations of presenting the human interest frame. Without the impacts of other factors, the newspapers from the partly-free societies were less likely to provide a human interest frame than those from the not-free society. Yet whether a society was a partly-free or free society did not make a big difference in predicting the possibility of presenting the human interest frame, which was also negatively associated with the cultural dimension of long-/short-term orientation. The higher scores on LTO a society had, the less likely the newspapers in the society were to present a human interest frame. The presentation of the conflict frame was associated with three cultural dimensions, individualism vs. collectivism (IVD), long-/short-term orientation, and uncertainty avoidance. Yet the association with the dimension of individualism vs. collectivism was not significant in the model. The dimension of long-/short-term orientation negatively predicted whether an article provided a conflict frame, whereas the dimension of uncertainty avoidance, which was significant only at the level of  $\alpha = 0.1$ , was positively

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<sup>112</sup> Because of the reversed order of the scores of the two dimensions assigned to some societies, the interaction between the two dimensions was detected. Take the comparison between Hong Kong and the United States as an example. With 17 more units of scores on UAI (see Table 6.3), the probability of presenting a factual frame in the U.S. newspapers theoretically should be 17.96 ( $17 \times 1.057$ ) times as much as in the Hong Kong newspapers (see Table 7.9). Yet, with 67 more units on the LTO score, the probability in the Hong Kong newspapers should be 72.43 ( $67 \times 1.081$ ) times as much as in the U.S. newspapers. Such an interaction at least partially explained why the percentage of presenting this type of frame in the Hong Kong newspapers was actually significantly higher than in the U.S. newspapers. The positive association between the dimension of long-/short-term and the presence of the factual frame might be because instead of being interested in arguing about what is true, people in a long-term oriented culture stress what has been done, as Hofstede (1991) suggested.



associated with the presence of the frame. Newspapers in a society with a lower score on LTO and a higher score on UAI, such as the United States, were more likely to present a conflict frame.

Freedom status, specifically the difference between the non-free society and the partly-free and free societies, was significant in predicting the presentations of both the economic consequences frame and the leadership frame. The dimension of long-/short-term orientation was significant at the level of  $\alpha = 0.1$ . The effect directions of the two factors were different. A society at a higher level of freedom status and a higher score on LTO was more likely to present an economic consequences frame, but less likely to present a leadership frame. Yet a free society did not differ much from a partly-free society in predicting the presence of these two frames.

RQ4a: In the newspapers of each society, which news frames were most often associated with the issues of Internet diffusion and use, Internet censorship and regulations, and the consequences and implications of the Internet as primary subjects?

RQ4b: For each of these issues, would the presentations of news frames be associated with societies?

Among the stories with the issue of Internet diffusion and use as primary subject, the most frequently used news frame was the factual frame in the newspapers in China (58.14%, 75 of 96), Hong Kong (100%, 13 of 13), Singapore (78.95%, 15 of 19), and the United Kingdom (83.33%, 5 of 6), and the human interest (100%, 4 of 4) and conflict frames (100%, 4 of 4) in the U.S. newspapers (see Table 7.10). The second-ranked frames were respectively the economic consequences frame in Hong Kong (15.38%, 2 of 13), and the human interest frame in all other societies, China (33.33%, 32 of 96), Singapore (42.11%, 8 of 19), and the United Kingdom (50%, 3 of 6). There were no

**Table 7.10. Percentage of Articles Using Different Types of News Frames in Stories with Internet Diffusion and Use as Primary Subject**

	Factual Frame	Human Interest Frame	Conflict Frame	Economic Consequences Frame	Leadership Frame	Morality Frame	Responsibility Frame
<b>China</b> ( <i>N</i> = 96)	75 78.13% <sup>a</sup>	32 33.33%	0 0%	4 4.17%	10 10.42%	6 6.25%	2 2.08%
<b>Hong Kong</b> ( <i>N</i> = 13)	13 100%	1 7.69%	0 0%	2 15.38%	0 0%	0 0%	0 0%
<b>Singapore</b> ( <i>N</i> = 19)	15 78.95%	8 42.11%	5 26.32%	1 5.26%	1 5.26%	2 10.53%	3 15.79%
<b>U.S.</b> ( <i>N</i> = 4)	1 25%	4 100%	4 100%	0 0%	1 25%	0 0%	1 25%
<b>U.K.</b> ( <i>N</i> = 6)	5 83.33%	3 50%	1 16.67%	0 0%	0 0%	0 0%	0 0%

<sup>a</sup> % of *N*. Same for all percentages in the table.

articles with Internet diffusion and use as its primary subject that used the conflict frame in the newspapers from mainland China and Hong Kong. In the Hong Kong newspapers, three other frames such as the leadership, morality and responsibility frames were also missing. These frames, together with the economic consequences frame, were missing in the U.K. newspapers. The news frames missing from the stories with Internet diffusion and use as primary subject in the U.S. newspapers were the economic consequences and morality frames.

Chi-Square tests suggested that significant across-society differences were found in the presentations of the factual ( $\chi^2 = 10.594, p < .05$ ), human interest ( $\chi^2 = 12.857, p < .005$ ), and conflict frames ( $\chi^2 = 70.789, p < .0001$ ), especially the conflict frame, which had the highest total Chi-Square statistics. No significant differences were found in the

other frames.<sup>113</sup> As shown in Table 7.11, the U.S. newspapers were particularly singled out from the others for its significantly higher percentages in the presentations of the human interest and conflict frames, which both were 100 percent. Both frames had a significant difference between the observed and expected counts. The U.S. newspapers had a lower percentage in presenting a factual frame (25%, 1 of 4), significantly lower than those in the other societies, ranging from 78.13% to 100%. Hong Kong was the second distinctive society, different from the others in the factual and human interest frames. The newspapers from Hong Kong were more likely to use the factual frame with the observed count significantly more than the expected count, and less likely to provide a human interest with the observed count significantly less than the expected. The percentage of the related articles with a human interest frame (7.69%, 1 of 13) was much lower than the others ranging from 33.33% to 100%. In contrast to the United States and Singapore, where the newspapers used the conflict frame in framing the issue of Internet diffusion and use significantly more often than what were expected, the newspapers from China did not present such a frame even once, leaving the observed count zero, significantly less than the expected count of 6.957. The U.K. newspapers did not present any unusual patterns on all the news frames.

In terms of the issue of Internet censorship and regulations as primary subject, the most frequently used frame was still the factual frame in all societies (Hong Kong, 100%, 18 of 18; the United States, 93.75%, 30 of 32; Singapore, 90%, 18 of 20; the United Kingdom, 84.21%, 16 of 19; and China, 82.35%, 14 of 17; see Table 7.12). Particularly

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<sup>113</sup> The count number of each cell was so few, and the *p* value for testing the responsibility frame was 0.068, larger than 0.5. It was considered insignificant.

**Table 7.11. Comparisons of News Frames for Stories with Internet Diffusion and Use as Primary Subject across Societies**

		<b>Factual Frame</b> ( $\chi^2 = 10.594$ , <sup>a</sup> df = 4, $p < .05$ )		<b>Human Interest Frame</b> ( $\chi^2 = 12.857$ , <sup>a</sup> df = 4, $p < .005$ )		<b>Conflict Frame</b> ( $\chi^2 = 70.789$ , <sup>b</sup> df = 4, $p < .0001$ )	
		Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No
<b>China</b> ( $N = 96$ )	Count	75	21	32	64	0	96
	Expected	75.826	20.174	33.391	62.609	6.957	89.044
	Row %	78.13%	21.88%	33.33%	66.67%	0.00%	100.00%
	Cell $\chi^2$	0.009	0.034	0.058	0.031	<b>6.957</b>	0.544
<b>Hong Kong</b> ( $N = 13$ )	Count	13	0	1	12	0	13
	Expected	10.268	2.732	4.522	8.478	0.942	12.058
	Row %	100.00%	0.00%	7.69%	92.31%	0.00%	100.00%
	Cell $\chi^2$	<b>0.727</b>	<b>2.732</b>	<b>2.743</b>	<b>1.463</b>	0.942	0.074
<b>Singapore</b> ( $N = 19$ )	Count	15	4	8	11	5	14
	Expected	15.007	3.993	6.609	12.391	1.377	17.623
	Row %	78.95%	21.05%	42.11%	57.89%	26.32%	73.68%
	Cell $\chi^2$	0.000	0.000	0.293	0.156	<b>9.535</b>	0.745
<b>U.S.</b> ( $N = 4$ )	Count	1	3	4	0	4	0
	Expected	3.159	0.841	1.391	2.609	0.290	3.710
	Row %	25.00%	75.00%	100.00%	0.00%	100.00%	0.00%
	Cell $\chi^2$	<b>1.476</b>	<b>5.548</b>	<b>4.891</b>	<b>2.609</b>	<b>47.490</b>	<b>3.710</b>
<b>U.K.</b> ( $N = 6$ )	Count	5	1	3	3	1	5
	Expected	4.740	1.261	2.087	3.913	0.435	5.565
	Row %	83.33%	16.67%	50.00%	50.00%	16.67%	83.33%
	Cell $\chi^2$	0.014	0.054	0.400	0.2130	0.735	0.057

<sup>a</sup> 20% of cells have expected count less than 5; Pearson Chi-Square suspect. Likelihood ratio Chi-Square was used.

<sup>b</sup> 50% of cells have expected count less than 5; Pearson Chi-Square suspect. Fisher's exact test was used.

**Table 7.12. Percentage of Articles Using Different Types of News Frames in Stories with Internet Censorship and Regulations as Primary Subject**

	Factual Frame	Human Interest Frame	Conflict Frame	Economic Consequences Frame	Leadership Frame	Morality Frame	Responsibility Frame
<b>China</b> ( <i>N</i> = 17)	14 82.35%	1 5.88%	0 0.00%	1 5.88%	1 5.88%	4 23.53%	5 29.41%
<b>Hong Kong</b> ( <i>N</i> = 18)	18 100.0%	0 0.00%	1 5.56%	0 0.00%	0 0.00%	0 0.00%	1 5.56%
<b>Singapore</b> ( <i>N</i> = 20)	18 90.00%	3 15.00%	6 30.00%	1 5.00%	1 5.00%	2 10.00%	3 15.00%
<b>U.S.</b> ( <i>N</i> = 32)	30 93.75%	9 28.13%	16 50.00%	2 6.25%	2 6.25%	0 0.00%	2 6.25%
<b>U.K.</b> ( <i>N</i> = 19)	16 84.21%	5 26.32%	7 36.84%	1 5.26%	1 5.26%	0 0.00%	1 5.26%

<sup>a</sup> % of *N*. Same for all percentages in the table.

in Hong Kong, the frame dominated in the newspapers with the other types of news frames rarely used. The second frequently used frame varied with societies. The newspapers in the two Western societies, U.S. (50%, 16 of 32) and U.K. (36.84%, 7 of 19), together with one Eastern society, Singapore (30%, 6 of 20), used the conflict frame most often after the factual frame. In the newspapers from China, the responsibility frame (29.41%, 5 of 17) was used most often in addition to the universal one, the factual frame, closely followed by the morality frame (23.53%, 4 of 17), in framing the issue of Internet censorship and regulations.

According to Chi-Square tests, no significant differences in the presentations of the factual, economic consequences, leadership and responsibility frames in framing the issue of Internet censorship and regulations existed across societies. Differences were found only in three types of news frames, the human interest frame ( $\chi^2 = 13.758, p < .05$ ), the conflict frame ( $\chi^2 = 19.463, p < .001$ ), and the morality frame ( $\chi^2 = 15.011, p < .0001$ ; see Table 7.13). Hong Kong and the United States were vastly different in their usage of the human interest frame. None of articles in the Hong Kong newspapers used it to frame the issue of Internet censorship and regulations, with the observed count significantly less than the expected. In contrast, the U.S. newspapers used the frame significantly more often than what was expected, enjoying the highest percentage (28.13%, 9 of 32) among all societies. The U.S. newspapers also had the highest percentage of the related articles (50.00%, 16 of 32) in presenting a conflict frame, with the observed count almost twice that of the expected count. This was in a sharp contrast to the cases in mainland China (0.00%) and Hong Kong (5.56%, 1 of 18). In addition to the distinctive pattern of presenting the conflict frame, China was also separated from the others for its

**Table 7.13. Comparison of News Frames for Stories with Internet Censorship and Regulations as Primary Subject across Societies**

		<b>Human Interest Frame</b> ( $\chi^2 = 13.758^a$ df = 4, $p < .05$ )		<b>Conflict Frame</b> ( $\chi^2 = 19.436$ , df = 4, $p < .001$ )		<b>Morality Frame</b> ( $\chi^2 = 15.011$ , <sup>b</sup> df = 4, $p < .0001$ )	
		Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No
<b>China</b> ( $N = 17$ )	Count	1	16	0	17	4	13
	Expected	2.887	14.113	4.811	12.189	0.962	16.038
	Row %	5.88%	94.12%	0.00%	100.00%	23.53%	76.47%
	Cell $\chi^2$	1.233	0.252	<b>4.811</b>	<b>1.899</b>	<b>9.590</b>	0.575
<b>Hong Kong</b> ( $N = 18$ )	Count	0	18	1	17	0	18
	Expected	3.057	14.943	5.094	12.906	1.019	16.981
	Row %	0.00%	100.00%	5.56%	94.44%	0.00%	100.00%
	Cell $\chi^2$	<b>3.057</b>	0.625	<b>3.291</b>	<b>1.299</b>	1.019	0.061
<b>Singapore</b> ( $N = 20$ )	Count	3	17	6	14	2	18
	Expected	3.396	16.604	5.660	14.340	1.132	18.868
	Row %	15.00%	85.00%	30.00%	70.00%	10.00%	90.00%
	Cell $\chi^2$	0.046	0.010	0.020	0.008	0.665	0.040
<b>U.S.</b> ( $N = 32$ )	Count	9	23	16	16	0	32
	Expected	5.434	26.566	9.057	22.943	1.811	30.189
	Row %	28.13%	71.88%	50.00%	50.00%	0.00%	100.00%
	Cell $\chi^2$	<b>2.340</b>	0.479	<b>5.323</b>	<b>2.101</b>	1.811	0.109
<b>U.K.</b> ( $N = 19$ )	Count	5	14	7	12	0	19
	Expected	3.226	15.774	5.377	13.623	1.076	17.925
	Row %	26.32%	73.68%	36.84%	63.16%	0.00%	100.00%
	Cell $\chi^2$	0.975	0.199	0.490	0.193	1.076	0.065

<sup>a</sup> 20% of cells have expected count less than 5; Pearson Chi-Square suspect. Likelihood ratio Chi-Square was used.

<sup>b</sup> 50% of cells have expected count less than 5; Pearson Chi-Square suspect. Fisher's exact test was used.

newspapers' usage of the morality frame to interpret its Internet censorship and regulations, which was significantly more often than the expected and had a high percentage, 23.53% (4 of 17), far more than the others, ranging from 0.00% to 10%.

As far as the issue of the consequences and implications of the Internet in China is concerned, very few articles were found to take it as primary subject (see Table 7.14). There were only four in the newspapers in China, and one in both the Hong Kong and Singapore newspapers. No such articles were found in the U.S. and U.K. newspapers. It is interesting to see the percentage of articles from China's newspapers using the leadership frame was very high. Yet a Chi-Square test could not be conducted with such few counts across societies.

RQ5a: In terms of political tendency and/or tolerance presented in the newspapers' coverage of the Internet in China, did the societies significantly differ from one another? RQ5b: If so, did political systems and/or any cultural dimensions significantly contribute to the differences?

The U.S. newspapers enjoyed the highest mean of the Political Tolerance Index scores ( $M = 1.959$ ,  $SD = 1.781$ ), followed by the United Kingdom ( $M = 1.263$ ,  $SD = 1.428$ ), Singapore ( $M = .745$ ,  $SD = 1.245$ ), Hong Kong ( $M = .623$ ,  $SD = 1.111$ ), and China ( $M = .155$ ,  $SD = .385$ ).<sup>114</sup> As shown in Table 7.15, China was singled out for its mean significantly lower than the other societies. In contrast, the average PTI score reported by the U.S. newspapers was significantly higher than China ( $MD = 1.804$ ), Hong Kong ( $MD = 1.337$ ), Singapore ( $MD = 1.214$ ), and the United Kingdom ( $MD = .697$ ).<sup>115</sup> In addition to China and the United States, Hong Kong also significantly differed from

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<sup>114</sup> A high mean indicates more political tolerance.

<sup>115</sup> The group sizes were unequal. The harmonic mean of the group sizes was used.



**Table 7.14. Percentages of Articles Using Different Types of News Frames among Stories with the Consequences and Implications of the Internet as Primary Subject**

	Factual Frame	Human Interest Frame	Conflict Frame	Economic Consequences Frame	Leadership Frame	Morality Frame	Responsibility Frame
<b>China</b> ( <i>N</i> = 4)	3 75.0% <sup>a</sup>	0 0.0%	0 0.0%	0 0.0%	3 75.0%	1 25.0%	0 0.0%
<b>Hong Kong</b> ( <i>N</i> = 1)	1 100.0%	0 0.0%	1 100.0%	0 0.0%	0 0.0%	0 0.0%	0 0.00%
<b>Singapore</b> ( <i>N</i> = 1)	1 100.0%	0 0.0%	0 0.0%	0 0.0%	0 0.0%	0 0.0%	0 0.0%
<b>U.S.</b> ( <i>N</i> = 0)							
<b>U.K.</b> ( <i>N</i> = 0)							

<sup>a</sup> % of *N*. Same for all percentages in the table.


**Table 7.15. Multiple Comparisons of PTI Means across Societies<sup>a</sup>**

(I) Society1	(J) Society2	Mean Difference (I-J)	Std. Error	95% Confidence Interval	
				Lower Bound	Upper Bound
<b>China</b> (N = 261)	Hong Kong	-.4674**	.1126	-.7890	-.1458
	Singapore	-.5902***	.1221	-.9387	-.2417
	U.S.	-1.8040***	.1815	-2.3236	-1.2844
	U.K.	-1.1073***	.1614	-1.5715	-.6432
<b>Hong Kong</b> (N = 102)	China	.4674**	.1126	.1458	.7890
	Singapore	-.1228	.1626	-.5830	.3374
	U.S.	-1.3366***	.2109	-1.9353	-.7379
	U.K.	-.6400*	.1939	-1.1910	-.0889
<b>Singapore</b> (N = 108)	China	.5902***	.1221	.2417	.9387
	Hong Kong	.1228	.1626	-.3374	.5830
	U.S.	-1.2138***	.2162	-1.8269	-.6007
	U.K.	-.5171	.1995	-1.0838	.0495
<b>U.S.</b> (N = 98)	China	1.8040***	.1815	1.2844	2.3236
	Hong Kong	1.3366***	.2109	.7379	1.9353
	Singapore	1.2138***	.2162	.6007	1.8269
	U.K.	.6967*	.2405	.0147	1.3786
<b>U.K.</b> (N = 80)	China	1.1073***	.1614	.6432	1.5715
	Hong Kong	.6400*	.1939	.0889	1.1910
	Singapore	.5171	.1995	-.0495	1.0838
	U.S.	-.6967*	.2405	-1.3786	-.0147

<sup>a</sup> The PTI score scale is as follows: 0, assigned for the articles stressing the non-political aspect of a given issue, or the position favorable to the Chinese government; 1, for the articles stressing the political aspect of a given issue, or the position unfavorable to the Chinese government; 0.5, for the articles mixed with both aspects, or two sides above. The Levene's Test ( $F = 60.63$ ,  $df_1 = 4$ ,  $df_2 = 644$ ,  $p < .0001$ ) suggested that the error variances across societies were not equal. Therefore, Tamhane's T2 that does not assume equal variances was used.

\*  $p < .05$ , \*\*  $p < .001$ , \*\*\*  $p < .0001$ .

the United Kingdom, with a negative mean difference. No differences were found between two peers, Hong Kong and Singapore, and Singapore and the United Kingdom. As a result of the forward stepwise regression model,<sup>116</sup> three independent variables, freedom status ( $F = 17.730, p < .0001$ ) and two cultural dimensions, power distance ( $F = 17.435, p < .0001$ ) and individualism vs. collectivism ( $F = 7.934, p < .005$ ), were selected (see Figure 7.1).<sup>117</sup> The other two dimensions were dropped out. The difference between the not-free society, China, and the partly free societies, Hong Kong and Singapore, the first one entering the model, contributed most to the variations of the PTI scores,



\* Freedom Status: 1 = not free, 2 = partly free, 3 = free; PDI: power distance; IDV: individualism vs. collectivism

**Figure 7.1. PTI Predictors Selected by Stepwise Method**

<sup>116</sup> For the stepwise regression control, both the probabilities to enter and to leave were set as .10.

<sup>117</sup> In the effect tests, for freedom status,  $F = 17.730, df = 2, p < .0001$ ; for power distance,  $F = 17.435, df = 1, p < .0001$ ; and for individualism vs. collectivism,  $F = 7.934, df = 1, p = .005$ .

followed by the dimensions, power distance and individualism vs. collectivism. Based on the stepwise results, a regression model with these three predictors was generated ( $R^2 = .245$ ,  $F = 52.104$ ,  $df = 4$ ,  $p < .0001$ , see Table 7.16). Specifically speaking of freedom status in this model, the partly-free and free societies did not significantly differ from each other in predicting the variations of PTI scores. Yet China, the only country with freedom status not free in this study, really made a difference for its significant association with a low PTI score. The two cultural dimensions, power distance (PDI) and individualism vs. collectivism (IDV), positively predicted PTI scores. Higher scores on the dimensions led to higher PTI scores, which means the more tolerant to inequality of power and the more individualistic a society, the more likely newspapers in the society would be to report events about the Internet in China from a political perspective and/or present content unfavorable to the government.<sup>118</sup>

**Table 7.16. Parameter Estimates of PTI Predictors**

Term	$\beta$	Std Error	t Ratio
Intercept	-9.8352***	2.3711	-4.15***
Freedom Status[2-1]	1.1949***	0.2113	5.66***
Freedom Status[3-2]	-2.2023	2.0050	-1.10
PDI	0.1008***	0.0241	4.18***
IDV	0.0964**	0.0342	2.82**

\*\*  $p < .005$ , \*\*\*  $p < .0001$

<sup>118</sup> Since the variable, freedom status, was the most significant predictor and had a much larger parameter estimate, the positive effect of the two cultural dimensions was relatively reduced, particularly on the not-free society, China.

### 7.3. Results from Testing Hypotheses

H1a: In the newspapers from societies with more political freedom, the issue of Internet censorship and regulations in China will be more likely to be mentioned or discussed.

H1b: In the newspapers from societies with less political freedom, the issue of Internet diffusion and use in China will be more likely to be mentioned or discussed.

H1a was strongly supported. Significant differences existed across the levels of freedom status ( $\chi^2 = 90.394$ ,  $df = 2$ ,  $p < .0001$ ). With the increasing freedom, the percentage of the articles mentioning the issue of Internet censorship and regulations increased from 14.81% in the not-free society to 22.03% in the partly-free societies and to 49.34% in the free societies (see Table 7.17). For both the not-free and partly-free societies, the frequencies of the articles with the issue were significantly less than the expected. The case for the free societies was opposite. The logistic regression model generated with freedom status as the predictor suggested that the variable was positively associated with the probability for an article to mention or discuss the issue of Internet censorship and regulations (see Table 7.18). Each level of freedom status was significantly different from one another in predicting the probability of the issue being mentioned. The odds of the issue being mentioned in the newspapers from the partly-free societies were 1.748 times as much as that in the newspapers from the not-free society. The odds in the newspapers from the free societies were 3.289 times as much as that from the partly-free societies. Fishers' exact tests showed that the probability of mentioning the issue of Internet censorship and regulations in China was greater for the partly-free societies than the not-free society, for the free societies than the partly-free societies, and for the free societies than the not-free societies.

**Table 7.17. Association between Freedom Status and Whether the Issue of Internet Censorship and Regulations Mentioned in Newspapers**

			Whether the Issue Was Mentioned	
			Yes	No
<b>Freedom Status</b>	Not Free (N = 351)	Count	52	299
		Expected	91.450	259.55
		Row %	14.81%	85.19%
		Cell $\chi^2$	<b>17.018</b>	<b>5.997</b>
	Partly Free (N = 345)	Count	76	269
		Expected	89.887	255.114
		Row %	22.03%	77.97%
		Cell $\chi^2$	<b>2.145</b>	0.756
	Free (N = 229)	Count	113	116
		Expected	59.664	169.336
		Row %	49.34%	50.66%
		Cell $\chi^2$	<b>47.680</b>	<b>16.800</b>

**Table 7.18. Freedom Status and the Presence of the Issue of Internet Censorship and Regulations in Logistic Regression Model<sup>a</sup>**

Term	$\beta$	Std Error	$\chi^2$	Odds Ratio
Intercept	-1.8186***	0.1540	139.44	.
Freedom Status[2-1]	0.5584**	0.2015	7.68	1.7478
Freedom Status[3-2]	1.1907***	0.1852	41.33	3.2893

<sup>a</sup> Effect Wald test for freedom status: Wald  $\chi^2 = 92.976, p < .0001$ .

\*\*  $p < .005$ , \*\*\*  $p < .0001$

H1b was partially supported. Significant differences were found across societies with different levels of freedom status ( $\chi^2 = 13.371$ ,  $df = 2$ ,  $p = .0012$ ; see Table 7.19). Yet, differences mainly existed between the not-free and partly-free societies, and between the not-free and free societies. In the newspapers from the not-free society, the observed count was significantly larger than the expected. In contrast, the difference between the observed and expected counts was significantly negative in the newspapers from the partly-free societies. Although the observed frequency count was also less than the expected in the newspapers from the free societies, such a difference was not statistically significant. Fisher's exact tests suggested that the probability of mentioning the issue of Internet diffusion and use in China was greater for the not-free society than the partly-free societies, and for the not-free society than the free societies. Generally, the newspapers from the not-free society had a greater likelihood of mentioning the issue of

**Table 7.19. Association between Freedom Status and Whether the Issue of Internet Diffusion and Use Was Mentioned in Newspapers**

			Whether the Issue Was Mentioned	
			Yes	No
<b>Freedom Status</b>	Not Free ( <i>N</i> = 351)	Count	209	142
		Expected	182.141	168.859
		Row %	59.54%	40.46%
		Cell $\chi^2$	<b>3.961</b>	<b>4.272</b>
	Partly Free ( <i>N</i> = 345)	Count	161	184
		Expected	179.027	165.973
		Row %	46.67%	53.33%
		Cell $\chi^2$	<b>1.815</b>	<b>1.958</b>
	Free ( <i>N</i> = 229)	Count	110	119
		Expected	118.832	110.168
		Row %	48.03%	51.97%
		Cell $\chi^2$	0.657	0.708

**Table 7.20. Freedom Status and the Presence of the Issue of Internet Diffusion and Use in Logistic Regression Model <sup>a</sup>**

Term	$\beta$	Std Error	$\chi^2$	Odds Ratio
Intercept	0.4700***	0.1097	18.35	.
Freedom Status[2-1]	-0.5980***	0.1540	15.08	0.5499
Freedom Status[3-2]	0.0410	0.1706	0.06	1.0419

<sup>a</sup> Effect Wald test for freedom status: Wald  $\chi^2 = 13.287, p < .005$ .

\*\*\*  $p < .0001$

Internet diffusion and use than the partly-free societies (see Table 7.20). The partly-free and free societies did not significantly differ from each other.

H2: Among those news stories mentioning or discussing Internet use in China, there will be more mentioning of dissident users and/or content in the newspapers from societies with more political freedom.

H2 was strongly supported. Whether an article mentioned dissident users and/or content was very significantly associated with the levels of freedom status ( $\chi^2 = 152.829, df = 2, p < .0001$ ). The percentage of the articles with the issue mentioned dramatically increased with the increasing level of freedom status, from 2.29% to 25.20% to 73.26% (see Table 7.21). In the newspapers from the not-free society, the observed frequency count of such articles was significantly small, only one eleventh of the expected count (4 vs. 44.652). In contrast, the observed count in the newspapers from the free societies, the observed count was about three times as many as the expected (63 vs. 21.943). The logistic regression model generated with freedom status as the predictor shows that the odds of mentioning dissident users and/or content for the newspapers from a society at a higher level was much higher than from societies at a lower level (see Table 7.22). For



**Table 7.21. Association between Freedom Status and Whether Dissident Users and/or Content Mentioned in Newspapers**

			Whether the Issue Was Mentioned	
			Yes	No
<b>Freedom Status</b>	Not Free ( <i>N</i> = 175)	Count	4	171
		Expected	44.652	130.348
		Row %	2.29%	97.71%
		Cell $\chi^2$	<b>37.010</b>	<b>12.678</b>
	Partly Free ( <i>N</i> = 127)	Count	32	95
		Expected	32.405	94.595
		Row %	25.20%	74.80%
		Cell $\chi^2$	0.005	0.002
	Free ( <i>N</i> = 86)	Count	63	23
		Expected	21.943	64.057
		Row %	73.26%	26.74%
		Cell $\chi^2$	<b>76.817</b>	<b>26.315</b>

**Table 7.22. Freedom Status and the Presence of Dissident Users and/or Content in Logistic Regression Model**

Term	$\beta$	Std Error	$\chi^2$	Odds Ratio
Intercept	-3.7554***	0.5058	55.12	.
Freedom Status[2-1]	2.6672***	0.5455	23.90	14.4000
Freedom Status[3-2]	2.0958***	0.3180	43.43	8.1318

<sup>a</sup> Effect Wald test for freedom status: Wald  $\chi^2$  = 87.954, *p* < .0001.

\*\*\* *p* < .0001

instance, the odds for newspapers from the partly-free societies were 14.4 times as much as that for the newspapers from the not-free society. The odds for the free societies were 8.13 times as much as that for the partly-free societies. Fishers' exact tests also showed that the probability of mentioning dissident users and/or content was greater for the partly-free societies than the not-free society, for the free societies than the partly-free societies, and the free societies than the not-free society.

H3b: Among those news stories with the issue of Internet censorship and regulations as primary subject, the responsibility frame will be more likely to be present in the newspapers from societies with less political freedom.

H3c: Among those news stories with the issue of Internet censorship and regulations in China as primary subject, the morality frame will be more likely to be present in the newspapers from societies with less political freedom.

H3d: Among those news stories with the issue of Internet censorship and regulations in China as primary subject, the human interest frame will be more likely to be present in the newspapers from societies with more political freedom.

H3e: Among those news stories with the issue of Internet censorship and regulations in China as primary subject, the conflict frame will be more likely to be present in the newspapers from societies with more political freedom.

H3a was not supported. No significant differences were found in using the factual frame to present the issue of Internet censorship and regulations across societies with different freedom status.

H3b was partly supported. Significant differences existed across societies with different levels of freedom status ( $\chi^2 = 7.068, p < .005$ ). Yet, such differences mainly came from the difference between the not-free society, China, which contributed most to the total Chi-Square statistics (see Table 7.23), and the free societies ( $\chi^2 = 6.8, p < .01$ ;

**Table 7.23. Association between Freedom Status and the Presence of the Responsibility Frame in Stories with the Issue of Internet Censorship and Regulations as Primary Subject <sup>a</sup>**

			Responsibility Frame	
			Yes	No
<b>Freedom Status</b>	Not Free (N = 17)	Count	5	12
		Expected	1.924	15.076
		Row %	29.41%	70.59%
		Cell $\chi^2$	<b>4.915</b>	0.627
	Partly Free (N = 38)	Count	4	34
		Expected	4.302	33.698
		Row %	10.53%	89.47%
		Cell $\chi^2$	0.021	0.003
	Free (N = 51)	Count	3	48
		Expected	5.774	45.226
		Row %	5.88%	94.12%
		Cell $\chi^2$	1.332	0.170

<sup>a</sup> 20% of cells have expected count less than 5; Pearson Chi-Square suspect. Likelihood ratio Chi-Square was used ( $\chi^2 = 7.068, p < .005$ ).

see Table 7.24).<sup>119</sup> The newspapers from China presented an unusual pattern in using the responsibility frame, with an actual count significantly larger than the expected. Fisher's exact tests showed that the likelihood of presenting a responsibility frame in a story with the issue of Internet censorship and regulations was greater for the not-free society than for the free societies. There were no differences between the not-free society and the partly-free societies, and between the partly-free and free societies.

H3c was partly supported. Significant differences existed across societies with different levels ( $\chi^2 = 13.237, p < .0001$ ). The not-free society, China, used the morality

<sup>119</sup> Logistic regression was not run because the few numbers of articles may cause unstable results. Each pair of the levels of freedom status was compared by using Fisher's exact tests.

**Table 7.24. Association between Freedom Status and the Presence of the Responsibility Frame in Stories with the Issue of Internet Censorship and Regulations as Primary Subject (Partial Comparison, Not Free vs. Free)**

			Responsibility Frame	
			Yes	No
<b>Freedom Status</b>	Not Free ( <i>N</i> = 17)	Count	5	12
		Expected	2	15
		Row %	29.41%	70.59%
		Cell $\chi^2$	<b>4.500</b>	0.600
	Free ( <i>N</i> = 51)	Count	3	48
		Expected	6	45
		Row %	5.88%	94.12%
		Cell $\chi^2$	<b>1.500</b>	0.200

frame in framing the issue of Internet censorship and regulations significantly more often than what was expected statistically (4 vs. 0.962; see Table 7.25). The percentage of the related articles with a morality frame was much higher than the societies at the other two levels. In contrast, societies at the free level had a zero observed count, significantly less than the expected count. Yet, significant differences existed only between this pair ( $\chi^2 = 12.75, p < .001$ ; see Table 7.26).<sup>120</sup> Fisher's exact tests suggested that the probability of presenting a morality frame in a story with the issue of Internet censorship and regulations as primary subject was greater for the not-free society than the free societies, and there were no differences between the not-free and partly-free societies, and the

<sup>120</sup> Logistic regression was not run because the few numbers of articles may cause unstable results. Each pair of the levels of freedom status was compared by using Fisher's exact tests.

**Table 7.25. Association between Freedom Status and the Presence of the Morality Frame in Stories with the Issue of Internet Censorship and Regulations as Primary Subject <sup>a</sup>**

			Morality Frame	
			Yes	No
<b>Freedom Status</b>	Not Free (N = 17)	Count	4	13
		Expected	0.962	16.038
		Row %	23.53%	76.47%
		Cell $\chi^2$	<b>9.590</b>	0.575
	Partly Free (N = 38)	Count	2	36
		Expected	2.151	35.849
		Row %	5.26%	94.74%
		Cell $\chi^2$	0.011	0.001
	Free (N = 51)	Count	0	51
		Expected	2.887	48.113
		Row %	0.00%	100.00%
		Cell $\chi^2$	<b>2.887</b>	0.173

<sup>a</sup> 50% of cells have expected count less than 5; Pearson Chi-Square suspect. Fishers' exact test was used.

**Table 7.26. Association between Freedom Status and the Presence of the Morality Frame in Stories with the Issue of Internet Censorship and Regulations as Primary Subject (Partial Comparison, Not Free vs. Free)**

			Morality Frame	
			Yes	No
<b>Freedom Status</b>	Not Free (N = 17)	Count	4	13
		Expected	1	16
		Row %	23.53%	76.47%
		Cell $\chi^2$	<b>9.000</b>	0.563
	Free (N = 51)	Count	0	51
		Expected	3	48
		Row %	0.00%	100.00%
		Cell $\chi^2$	<b>3.000</b>	0.188

partly-free and free societies.

H3d was partly supported. Although significant differences were found across different levels of freedom status ( $\chi^2 = 8.043, p < .05$ ; see Table 7.27), only the differences between the free and not-free societies ( $\chi^2 = 4.210, p < .05$ ; see Table 7.28), and between the free and partly-free societies were significant ( $\chi^2 = 5.389, p < .05$ ; see Table 7.29). Fisher's exact tests indicated that the probability of presenting a human interest frame in a story with the issue of Internet censorship and regulations as primary subject was greater for the free societies than the partly-free societies and the not-free society, China. No significant difference existed between the not-free and partly-free societies.

**Table 7.27. Association between Freedom Status and the Presence of the Human Interest Frame in Stories with the Issue of Internet Censorship and Regulations as Primary Subject <sup>a</sup>**

			Human Interest Frame	
			Yes	No
<b>Freedom Status</b>	Not Free (N = 17)	Count	1	16
		Expected	2.887	14.113
		Row %	5.88%	94.12%
		Cell $\chi^2$	1.233	0.252
	Partly Free (N = 38)	Count	3	35
		Expected	6.453	31.547
		Row %	7.89%	92.11%
		Cell $\chi^2$	1.848	0.378
	Free (N = 51)	Count	14	37
		Expected	8.660	42.340
		Row %	27.45%	72.55%
		Cell $\chi^2$	<b>3.292</b>	0.673

<sup>a</sup> 20% of cells have expected count less than 5; Pearson Chi-Square suspect. Likelihood ratio was used.

**Table 7.28. Association between Freedom Status and the Presence of the Human Interest Frame in Stories with the Issue of Internet Censorship and Regulations as Primary Subject (Partial Comparison, Not Free vs. Free)**

			Human Interest Frame	
			Yes	No
<b>Freedom Status</b>	Not Free ( <i>N</i> = 17)	Count	1	16
		Expected	3.75	13.25
		Row %	5.88%	94.12%
		Cell $\chi^2$	<b>2.017</b>	0.571
	Free ( <i>N</i> = 51)	Count	14	37
		Expected	11.25	39.75
		Row %	27.45%	72.55%
		Cell $\chi^2$	0.672	0.190

**Table 7.29. Association between Freedom Status and the Presence of the Human Interest Frame in Stories with the Issue of Internet Censorship and Regulations as Primary Subject (Partial Comparison, Partly Free vs. Free)**

			Human Interest Frame	
			Yes	No
<b>Freedom Status</b>	Partly Free ( <i>N</i> = 38)	Count	3	35
		Expected	7.258	30.742
		Row %	7.89%	92.11%
		Cell $\chi^2$	<b>2.498</b>	0.590
	Free ( <i>N</i> = 51)	Count	14	37
		Expected	9.742	41.258
		Row %	27.45%	72.55%
		Cell $\chi^2$	<b>1.862</b>	0.440

H3e was supported. Chi-Square test suggested significant differences existed across societies with different levels of freedom status ( $\chi^2 = 15.629, p < .001$ ; see Table 7.30). The percentage of the articles presenting a conflict frame increased with the level of freedom status, from 0.00% in the not-free society to 18.42% in the part-free societies, and to 45.10% in the free societies, where the frequency number of such articles in the newspapers was significantly more than the expected count. The observed count in the newspapers from the not-free society was zero, significantly less than the expected. Because of the zero number, it caused the unstable result regarding the comparison between the not-free and free societies when the logistic regression model was run.

**Table 7.30. Association between Freedom Status and the Presence of the Conflict Frame in Stories with the Issue of Internet Censorship and Regulations as Primary Subject**

			Conflict Frame	
			Yes	No
<b>Freedom Status</b>	Not Free ( <i>N</i> = 17)	Count	0	17
		Expected	4.811	12.189
		Row %	0.00%	100.00%
		Cell $\chi^2$	<b>4.811</b>	<b>1.899</b>
	Partly Free ( <i>N</i> = 38)	Count	7	31
		Expected	10.755	27.245
		Row %	18.42%	81.58%
		Cell $\chi^2$	1.312	0.517
	Free ( <i>N</i> = 51)	Count	23	28
		Expected	14.434	36.566
		Row %	45.10%	54.90%
		Cell $\chi^2$	<b>5.084</b>	<b>2.007</b>



Therefore, each pair of different levels of freedom status was compared by using Fisher's exact tests, which suggested the newspapers in the free societies were more likely to present a conflict frame in a story with the issue of Internet censorship and regulations as primary subject than the partly-free ( $\chi^2 = 6.935, p < .001$ ; see Table 7.31) and not free society ( $\chi^2 = 11.585, p < .001$ ; see Table 7.32). So were the newspapers from the partly-free societies than the not free society ( $\chi^2 = 5.622, p < .05$ ; see Table 7.33).

H4: Among those news stories mentioning or discussing the consequences and implications of the Internet in China, there will be more concerning political aspects in the newspapers from societies with more political freedom.

The hypothesis was strongly supported. Significant differences were found across

**Table 7.31. Association between Freedom Status and the Presence of the Conflict Frame in Stories with the Issue of Internet Censorship and Regulations as Primary Subject (Partial Comparison, Partly Free vs. Free)**

			Conflict Frame	
			Yes	No
<b>Freedom Status</b>	Partly Free ( <i>N</i> = 38)	Count	7	31
		Expected	12.809	25.191
		Row %	18.42%	81.58%
		Cell $\chi^2$	<b>2.634</b>	<b>1.340</b>
	Free ( <i>N</i> = 51)	Count	23	28
		Expected	17.191	33.809
		Row %	45.10%	54.90%
		Cell $\chi^2$	<b>1.963</b>	<b>0.998</b>

**Table 7.32. Association between Freedom Status and the Presence of the Conflict Frame in Stories with the Issue of Internet Censorship and Regulations as Primary Subject (Partial Comparison, Not Free vs. Free)**

			Conflict Frame	
			Yes	No
<b>Freedom Status</b>	Not Free ( <i>N</i> = 17)	Count	0	17
		Expected	5.75	11.25
		Row %	0.00%	100.00%
		Cell $\chi^2$	<b>5.750</b>	<b>2.939</b>
	Free ( <i>N</i> = 51)	Count	23	28
		Expected	17.25	33.75
		Row %	45.10%	54.90%
		Cell $\chi^2$	<b>1.917</b>	<b>0.980</b>

**Table 7.33. Association between Freedom Status and the Presence of the Conflict Frame in Stories with the Issue of Internet Censorship and Regulations as Primary Subject (Partial Comparison, Not Free vs. Partly Free)**

			Conflict Frame	
			Yes	No
<b>Freedom Status</b>	Not Free ( <i>N</i> = 17)	Count	0	17
		Expected	2.164	14.836
		Row %	0.00%	100.00%
		Cell $\chi^2$	<b>2.164</b>	0.316
	Partly Free ( <i>N</i> = 38)	Count	7	31
		Expected	4.836	33.164
		Row %	18.42%	81.58%
		Cell $\chi^2$	0.968	0.141

different levels of freedom status ( $\chi^2 = 24.293, p < .0001$ ). As shown in Table 7.34, the percentage of the articles with an emphasis on the political aspects of the issue of the consequences and/or implications of the Internet in China increased from 0.00% in the not-free society to 31.03% in the partly-free societies and to 66.67% in the free societies. Particularly, in the not-free society, the frequency count of such articles was significantly less than the expected (0 vs. 7.613), which was in a contrast to the free societies, where the count was significantly more than the expected (20 vs. 10.875). Significant differences also existed between each pair of the three levels of freedom status ( $\chi^2 = 7.948, p < .005$ , for the comparison between the not-free society and the partly-free societies;  $\chi^2 = 7.491, p < .01$ , between the partly-free and free societies;  $\chi^2 = 23.032, p < .0001$ , between the not-free society and the free societies, which had the largest difference; see Table 7.35, 7.36 and 7.37). Fisher's exact tests suggested that the probability of giving an emphasis on the political aspects of the related issue in an article was greater for the partly-free societies than the not-free society, and for the free societies than the partly-free societies and the not-free society.

H5a: The role played by the government will be more likely to be mentioned in the newspapers from societies with higher index scores on the dimension of power distance.

H5b: The role played by individuals will be more likely to be mentioned in the newspapers from societies with higher index scores on the dimension of individualism vs. collectivism.

H5a was supported. Significant differences existed across societies with different

**Table 7.34. Association between Freedom Status and Aspects of the Consequences and Implications of the Internet**

			Political Aspects	
			Yes	No
<b>Freedom Status</b>	Not Free ( <i>N</i> = 21)	Count	0	21
		Expected	7.613	13.388
		Row %	0.00%	100.00%
		Cell $\chi^2$	<b>7.613</b>	<b>4.329</b>
	Partly Free ( <i>N</i> = 29)	Count	9	20
		Expected	10.513	18.488
		Row %	31.03%	68.97%
		Cell $\chi^2$	0.218	0.124
	Free ( <i>N</i> = 30)	Count	20	10
		Expected	10.875	19.125
		Row %	66.67%	33.33%
		Cell $\chi^2$	<b>7.657</b>	<b>4.354</b>

**Table 7.35. Association between Freedom Status and Aspects of the Consequences and Implications of the Internet (Partial Comparison, Not Free vs. Partly Free)**

			Political Aspects	
			Yes	No
<b>Freedom Status</b>	Not Free ( <i>N</i> = 21)	Count	0	21
		Expected	3.78	17.22
		Row %	0.00%	100.00%
		Cell $\chi^2$	<b>3.780</b>	<b>0.830</b>
	Partly Free ( <i>N</i> = 29)	Count	9	20
		Expected	5.22	23.78
		Row %	31.03%	68.97%
		Cell $\chi^2$	<b>2.737</b>	<b>0.601</b>

**Table 7.36. Association between Freedom Status and Aspects of the Consequences and Implications of the Internet (Partial Comparison, Partly Free vs. Free)**

			Political Aspects	
			Yes	No
<b>Freedom Status</b>	Partly Free ( <i>N</i> = 29)	Count	9	20
		Expected	14.254	14.746
		Row %	31.03%	68.97%
		Cell $\chi^2$	<b>1.937</b>	<b>1.872</b>
	Free ( <i>N</i> = 30)	Count	20	10
		Expected	14.746	15.254
		Row %	66.67%	33.33%
		Cell $\chi^2$	<b>1.872</b>	<b>1.810</b>

**Table 7.37. Association between Freedom Status and Aspects of the Consequences and Implications of the Internet (Partial Comparison, Not Free vs. Free)**


			Political Aspects	
			Yes	No
<b>Freedom Status</b>	Not Free ( <i>N</i> = 21)	Count	0	21
		Expected	8.235	12.765
		Row %	0.00%	100.00%
		Cell $\chi^2$	<b>8.235</b>	<b>5.313</b>
	Free ( <i>N</i> = 30)	Count	20	10
		Expected	11.765	18.235
		Row %	66.67%	33.33%
		Cell $\chi^2$	<b>5.765</b>	<b>3.719</b>

scores on the dimension of power distance ( $\chi^2 = 55.63, p < .0001$ ; see Table 7.38). The percentage of the articles mentioning the role played by the government increased with the increasing score on power distance (PDI), from 6.78% at the lowest level, the United Kingdom, to 37.04% at the highest level, China. The probability of mentioning the government role in articles was positively associated with PDI scores. Yet it was not a simple linear association (see Figure 7.2). The exponential regression model<sup>121</sup> suggested that the increasing tendency was miniscule when PDI scores were lower than 70. The

**Table 7.38. Associations between Country and Government Role Presented in Newspapers**

		Government Role	
		Yes	No
<b>U.K.</b> (PDI = 35; <i>N</i> = 59)	Count	4	55
	Expected	13.379	45.621
	Row %	6.78%	93.22%
	Cell $\chi^2$	<b>6.575</b>	<b>1.928</b>
<b>U.S.</b> (PDI = 40; <i>N</i> = 58)	Count	4	54
	Expected	13.152	44.848
	Row %	6.90%	93.10%
	Cell $\chi^2$	<b>6.369</b>	<b>1.868</b>
<b>Hong Kong</b> (PDI = 68; <i>N</i> = 79)	Count	7	72
	Expected	17.915	61.086
	Row %	8.86%	91.14%
	Cell $\chi^2$	<b>6.650</b>	<b>1.950</b>
<b>Singapore</b> (PDI = 74; <i>N</i> = 99)	Count	17	82
	Expected	22.450	76.550
	Row %	17.17%	82.83%
	Cell $\chi^2$	1.323	0.388
<b>China</b> (PDI = 80; <i>N</i> = 243)	Count	90	153
	Expected	55.104	187.896
	Row %	37.04%	62.96%
	Cell $\chi^2$	<b>22.099</b>	<b>6.481</b>


<sup>121</sup> The equation for the exponential regression model is as follows:  $p = 0.0990617 + 4.9e-36 \text{ Exp(PDI)}$ ;  $R^2 = 0.8915$ ;  $F = 24.6477$ ,  $p < .05$ ; t Ratio for  $\text{Exp(PDI)} = 4.96$ ,  $p < .05$ .



**Figure 7.2. Bivariate Fit to Exponential Regression Model of the Government-Role Probability by Power Distance**

probability linearly changed with PDI scores. When PDI scores were at a high level, the probability increased at an exponential rate.

H5b was not supported. Although the probability of mentioning the individual role played in the Internet in China significantly changed with different societies ( $\chi^2 = 34.092, p < .0001$ ), no particular association was found with the dimension of individualism vs. collectivism. In fact, the stepwise regression method suggested that freedom status, particularly the not-free societies and the partly-free and free societies, and the dimension of uncertainty avoidance (UAI) were two significant predictors (see Figure 7.3).



**Figure 7.3. Significant Predictors Selected by Stepwise Method Associated with Mentioning the Individual Role in Articles**

#### **7.4. The Differences between the *People's Daily* and *Beijing Youth Daily***

RQ6: Did any differences of reporting the issues related to China's Internet appear to exist between the *People's Daily* and *Beijing Youth Daily*?

Table 7.39 shows that the issue of Internet diffusion and use received most attention in both Chinese newspapers. The articles mentioning the issue accounted for 51.81 percent and 64.15 percent of the total respectively in the *People's Daily* and *Beijing Youth Daily*. Both newspapers also frequently reported events of e-commerce and Internet business in China, which enjoyed the second-highest percentage respectively,



**Table 7.39. Articles with Internet-Related Issues Mentioned in Each Newspaper in China <sup>a</sup>**

	Internet diffusion & use	Internet censorship & regulations	E-commerce, Internet business & industry	Consequences & implications of the Internet	Others
<i>People's Daily</i> ( <i>N</i> = 192)	111 57.81%	45 23.44%	53 27.60%	16 8.33%	28 14.58%
<i>Beijing Youth Daily</i> ( <i>N</i> = 159)	102 64.15%	9 5.66%	48 30.19%	4 2.52%	31 19.50%

<sup>a</sup> Both primary and non-primary stories were included. Each article was allowed to have more than one issue checked.

27.60% in the *People's Daily*, and 30.19% in the *Beijing Youth Daily*. Chi-Square analyses found no between-newspaper differences in these two issues and other unspecified issues. However, the newspapers were significantly associated with the presence of two issues, Internet censorship and regulations ( $\chi^2 = 21.114$ , *df* = 1, *p* < .0001) and the consequences and implications of Internet ( $\chi^2 = 5.478$ , *df* = 1, *p* = .019; see Table 7.40). According to Fisher's exact tests, the probabilities of mentioning these two issues were both greater for the *People's Daily* than the *Beijing Youth Daily*. The percentages of the articles with the issues mentioned in the *People's Daily* (23.44%, 5.66%) were both issues.<sup>122</sup> Significant differences were found only in the issue of Internet censorship and regulations ( $\chi^2 = 11.076$ , *df* = 1, *p* < .001; see Table 7.41). In the *People's Daily*, the observed count of the articles taking the issue as primary subject was significant more than the expected. The case in the *Beijing Youth Daily* was opposite.

<sup>122</sup> The differences in other unspecified issues between the two newspapers was significant at the level  $\alpha = 0.1$ .

**Table 7.40. Differences in Mentioning Internet-Related Issues in Both Primary and Non-Primary Stories between the *People's Daily* and *Beijing Youth Daily***

		<b>Internet censorship &amp; regulations</b> ( $\chi^2 = 21.114$ , $df = 1$ , $p < .0001$ )		<b>Consequences &amp; implications of the Internet</b> ( $\chi^2 = 5.478$ , $df = 1$ , $p = .019$ )	
		Yes	No	Yes	No
<b><i>People's Daily</i></b> ( $N = 192$ )	Count	45	147	16	176
	Expected	29.539	162.462	10.940	181.06
	Row %	23.44%	76.56%	8.33%	91.67%
	Cell $\chi^2$	<b>8.093</b>	1.472	<b>2.340</b>	0.141
<b><i>Beijing Youth Daily</i></b> ( $N = 159$ )	Count	9	150	4	155
	Expected	24.462	134.538	9.060	149.94
	Row %	5.66%	94.34%	2.52%	97.48%
	Cell $\chi^2$	<b>9.773</b>	1.777	<b>2.826</b>	0.171

**Table 7.41. Comparison of Internet Censorship and Regulations as Primary Subject between the *People's Daily* and *Beijing Youth Daily* <sup>a</sup>**

		<b>Internet censorship &amp; regulations</b> ( $\chi^2 = 11.076$ , $df = 1$ , $p < .001$ )	
		Yes	No
<b><i>People's Daily</i></b> ( $N = 94$ )	Count	15	79
	Expected	8.455	85.545
	Row %	15.96%	84.04%
	Cell $\chi^2$	<b>5.066</b>	<b>0.501</b>
<b><i>Beijing Youth Daily</i></b> ( $N = 95$ )	Count	2	93
	Expected	8.545	86.455
	Row %	2.11%	97.89%
	Cell $\chi^2$	<b>5.013</b>	<b>0.496</b>

<sup>a</sup> The articles with primary subject unascertainable were excluded.

Fisher's exact test also suggested that the *People's Daily* was more likely to use the issue as primary subject than the *Beijing Youth Daily*.

RQ7: Was the presentation of each generic news frame associated with the types of Chinese newspapers?

Chi-Square tests found significant differences in the presentations of many types of news frames between the *People's Daily* and *Beijing Youth Daily* (see Table 7.42 and Table 7.43). Regardless the types of Internet-related issues, the *People's Daily* was more likely to present the factual ( $\chi^2 = 10.575$ ,  $df = 1$ ,  $p = .0015$ ), responsibility ( $\chi^2 = 8.889$ ,  $df = 1$ ,  $p = .0029$ ), morality ( $\chi^2 = 9.818$ ,  $df = 1$ ,  $p = .0017$ ) and leadership frames ( $\chi^2 = 11.669$ ,  $df = 1$ ,  $p = .0006$ ) than the *Beijing Youth Daily*. The percentages of the articles

**Table 7.42. Comparisons of the Presentations of News Frames between the *People's Daily* and *Beijing Youth Daily* (Factual Frame, Human Interest Frame, and Responsibility Frame)**

		<b>Factual Frame</b> ( $\chi^2 = 10.575$ , $df = 1$ , $p = .0015$ )		<b>Human Interest Frame</b> ( $\chi^2 = 9.199$ , $df = 1$ , $p = .0024$ )		<b>Responsibility Frame</b> ( $\chi^2 = 8.889$ , $df = 1$ , $p = .0029$ )	
		Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No
<b><i>People's Daily</i></b> ( $N = 96$ )	Count	89	7	18	78	11	85
	Expected	81	15	27.5	68.5	6	90
	Row %	92.71%	7.29%	18.75%	81.25%	11.46%	88.54%
	Cell $\chi^2$	0.790	<b>4.267</b>	<b>3.282</b>	1.318	<b>4.167</b>	0.278
<b><i>Beijing Youth Daily</i></b> ( $N = 96$ )	Count	73	23	37	59	1	95
	Expected	81	15	27.5	68.5	6	90
	Row %	76.04%	23.96%	38.54%	61.46%	1.04%	98.96%
	Cell $\chi^2$	0.790	<b>4.267</b>	<b>3.282</b>	1.318	<b>4.167</b>	0.278

**Table 7.43. Comparisons of the Presentations of News Frames between the *People's Daily* and *Beijing Youth Daily* (Morality Frame and Leadership Frame)**

		<b>Morality Frame</b> ( $\chi^2 = 9.818$ , $df = 1$ , $p = .0017$ )		<b>Leadership Frame</b> ( $\chi^2 = 11.669$ , $df = 1$ , $p = .0006$ )	
		Yes	No	Yes	No
<b><i>People's Daily</i></b> ( $N = 96$ )	Count	14	82	11	85
	Expected	8	88	5.5	90.5
	Row %	14.58%	85.42%	11.46%	88.54%
	Cell $\chi^2$	<b>4.500</b>	0.409	<b>5.500</b>	0.334
<b><i>Beijing Youth Daily</i></b> ( $N = 96$ )	Count	2	94	0	96
	Expected	8	88	5.5	90.5
	Row %	2.08%	97.92%	0.00%	100.00%
	Cell $\chi^2$	<b>4.500</b>	0.409	<b>5.500</b>	0.334

with these frames in the former newspaper were respectively much higher than those in the latter. Yet, the *Beijing Youth Daily*, with a higher percentage, was distinctive for its greater probability of providing a human interest frame than the *People's Daily* ( $\chi^2 = 9.199$ ,  $df = 1$ ,  $p = .0024$ ). No significant differences in the conflict frame and the economic consequences frame were found between these two newspapers.

In addition to the overall presenting of different types of news frames, this study also looked at how each type of news frame was associated with the issue of Internet diffusion and use as primary subject.<sup>123</sup> As shown in Table 7.44, significant associations were found in the presenting of four types of news frames, such as the factual ( $\chi^2 = 5.275$ ,

<sup>123</sup> Two other issues focused upon in this study, Internet censorship and regulations, and the consequences and implications of the Internet, were not examined, because the numbers of the articles with these issues as primary subject were few, which caused difficulties in Chi-Square tests for each type of news frame.

df = 1,  $p < .05$ ), human interest ( $\chi^2 = 4.155$  df = 1,  $p < .05$ ), morality ( $\chi^2 = 5.77$ , df = 1,  $p < .05$ ), and leadership frames ( $\chi^2 = 10.746$ , df = 1,  $p = .001$ ). The *People's Daily* was more likely to use the morality and leadership frames in framing the issue of Internet diffusion and use, with the observed counts significantly more than the expected ones and the percentages much higher than the *Beijing Youth Daily* (13.56% vs. 1.72%; 16.95% vs. 0.00%), which in contrast was more likely to present a human interest frame. Chi-Square tests found no differences in the presenting of the factual, conflict, economic consequences, and responsibility frames.

**Table 7.44. Differences in the Presentations of News Frames between the *People's Daily* and *Beijing Youth Daily* in Framing the Issue of Internet Diffusion and Use**

		<b>Human Interest Frame</b> ( $\chi^2 = 4.155$ , df = 1, $p < .05$ )		<b>Morality Frame</b> ( $\chi^2 = 5.77$ , df = 1, $P < .05$ )		<b>Leadership Frame</b> ( $\chi^2 = 10.749$ , df = 1, $p = .001$ )	
		Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No
<b><i>People's Daily</i></b> ( $N = 59$ )	Count	14	45	8	51	10	49
	Expected	19.162	39.838	4.539	54.462	5.043	53.958
	Row %	23.73%	76.27%	13.56%	86.44%	16.95%	83.05%
	Cell $\chi^2$	<b>1.391</b>	<b>0.669</b>	<b>2.640</b>	<b>0.220</b>	<b>4.873</b>	<b>0.455</b>
<b><i>Beijing Youth Daily</i></b> ( $N = 58$ )	Count	24	34	1	57	0	58
	Expected	18.838	39.162	4.462	53.539	4.958	53.043
	Row %	41.38%	58.62%	1.72%	98.28%	0.00%	100.00%
	Cell $\chi^2$	<b>1.415</b>	<b>0.681</b>	<b>2.686</b>	<b>0.224</b>	<b>4.957</b>	<b>0.463</b>

## CHAPTER VIII. DISCUSSION

Framing theory is one way to investigate what Gamson and Modigliani (1989) called an “issue culture,” providing interpretations and meaning for relevant events (pp.1-2). The theory provides two relevant, commonsense understandings of what it means to “frame.” First, the media can be said to frame events and issues in the same way as a photographer frames a photograph, choosing what aspects to highlight or draw attention to, and what parts to leave out (Cappella & Jamieson, 1997). Similarly, a media frame can be likened to the frame of a house, providing the structure around which everything else fits, and influencing the overall style of the construction (Tankard, 2001). Framing studies typically begin with an attempt to identify issues and characterize frames. This current research considered media framing in such terms – a construction of reality, specifically the Internet in China, under the influence of the overarching socio-cultural factors in five societies with different political systems and cultural dimensions. It was created through absorbing not only *what* information was presented in the selected newspapers but, more importantly, *how* it was presented. The content analysis reveals that the presentations of the Internet in China were distinct in different newspapers across societies in terms of both the salience of issues and the use of news frames.

This chapter discusses the findings of the analysis and considers the contributions of the present research to the scholarly literature, as well as the study’s limitations. Opportunities for future research are also discussed.

## **8.1. Issue Salience and Its Implications**

One of the goals of the current study was to examine the salience of issues related to the Internet in China. The concept of salience was understood in the study as the extent to which an issue stood out from other issues in terms of its relation to other issues, or media awareness of a certain issue. It was gauged by the percentage of news articles dedicated to mentioning or discussing a given issue. Another instrumental part of media salience was prominence, which was measured in the study by the percentage of news articles taking a certain issue as the primary subject of a given story.

In terms of the first way to measure issue salience, the issue of Internet diffusion and use was given greater coverage and dominated over the other issues in China, Singapore and the United Kingdom, especially in China. Although the issue also received attention in Hong Kong and the United States, the dominant issues were different. The newspapers from Hong Kong showed more interest in events about e-commerce, Internet business and industry, whereas the U.S. newspapers paid most attention to the issue of Internet censorship and regulations in mainland China. The U.K. newspapers also devoted a relatively large volume of articles to reporting that subject.

Internet censorship and regulations, a controversial subject matter with great political, social, and cultural meanings, was frequently highlighted as the primary subject of a given story in the U.S. and U.K. newspapers, especially in the U.S. newspapers. In contrast, their Eastern peers gave prominence to two other issues, e-commerce and Internet business in Hong Kong and Singapore's newspapers, and Internet diffusion and use in the newspapers from mainland China, which also highlighted the economic issue.

Differences in the newspapers' issue salience across societies could be as a result of the differences of True vs. Virtue in long-/short-term orientation cultures. People in low-LTO countries, such as the U.S. and the U.K., believe that there are absolutely clear guidelines about what is good and evil, and feel less satisfied with their efforts at doing good (Hofstede, 2001, p.363). Thus, journalists in such a society might have been more concerned about the problems in a given system. The search for truth and respecting for "musts" led U.S. and U.K. journalists to pay more attention to the issue of Internet censorship and regulations. In contrast, among people in high-LTO cultures, such as mainland China and Hong Kong, what is considered good and evil depends on the circumstances. They do not feel a strong need to do more to correct social injustice (Hofstede, 2001, p.363); therefore, journalists in such a society might have switched their attention to the pragmatic practices with long-term benefits, such as Internet diffusion and use, and Internet business. Specifically for the newspapers from China, the attention paid to the issues of Internet diffusion and use, and e-commerce and Internet business might be also a natural result of the fact that what was covered was the Internet in its home country, which is in a nationwide process of adopting the new technology and promoting Internet economy.

The differences found in the presentation of issue salience across societies have important implications in terms of the role of news media in political life (Reese, 2001) and the effects of framing information on the audience's attitudes, perceptions, and choices. According to Neuman, Just and Crigler (1992), the character of the topic of communication is critical to the effectiveness of the communication, which is what the constructionist perspective emphasizes. Their study demonstrated that issue salience is



critical to understanding the dynamics of political learning. It is assumed that most people will not read all of the articles and often will not read to the end of the articles selected. Therefore, it is logical to surmise that high salience issues would be likely to draw a high level of attention from readers. On the other hand, it makes sense to write stories addressed to those already “in the know.” It should come as no surprise that newspapers are less likely to “grab attention” on low salience stories.

Along with Goffman’s (1974) argument that the framing of an event or activity establishes its meaning, Gamson (1989) pointed out that “facts have no intrinsic meaning. They take on their meaning by being embedded in a frame or story line that organizes them and gives them coherence, selecting certain ones to emphasize while ignoring others.” Thus, those issues being consistently emphasized could be more meaningful to audience members. As discussed in Chapter 3, an important distinction is between the frames that *media* use to portray different events or phenomena and the frames that *individuals* use to sort information and make sense of the world (Scheufele, 1999). The relation between the two has been intensively studied, usually in experimental settings, in order better to understand the effects of media frames. Studies suggest that news frames influence public opinion by making certain aspects of a story more salient, thereby activating specific thoughts and ideas for audience members (e.g., Iyengar, 1990a; Price & Tewksbury, 1997). These thoughts and ideas are likely to be applied when audience members evaluate groups, issues, and other story elements (Price, Tewksbury, & Powers, 1997).

Scholars employ the cognitive accessibility theory to explain this process, in which people have the inclination to use cognitive economic short-cuts or heuristics in

information processing (Iyengar, 1990b; Fiske & Taylor, 1991; Price & Tewksbury, 1997). The “accessibility bias” (Iyengar, 1990b), or the “availability heuristic” (Schrum & O’Guinn, 1993; Tversky & Kahneman, 1973), occurs automatically and simplifies the cognitive tasks of making judgments and interpretations. This means that when a subset of relevant information about issues regarding a given topic are consistently salient in news media, they are likely to be activated and remain accessible to audiences and, consequently, affect subsequent judgments and opinions. Applying this to the case of reporting the Internet in China, it can be inferred that the issue of Internet censorship and regulations, a high salient issue in the U.S. newspapers but a low salient issue in China, would be activated in a different way to audiences in these two countries, when people are called upon to make judgments or decisions with regard to Internet policies in China. For instance, when China’s Internet is considered, the first issue coming to the minds of U.S. audiences might be the issue of censorship. The Chinese government’s other policy, promoting public Internet access, might be ignored. Chinese audiences, unlike Americans, might not realize how serious the issue of censorship is in China and how important it is to the public life.

## **8.2. Use of Generic News Frames and Behind the Presentations**

In terms of generic news frames, this current research found that some frames were presented more often than other frames, and were more often evident for certain issues in a given society.

Based on common sense, it is not surprising to see that the factual frame, a universal journalistic practice with presenting facts as one of its important principles,

predominated in all the newspapers from the five societies selected in the study. Regardless of it, the researcher's attention was drawn to the unique patterns of the U.S. newspapers in using the frame in the stories with the issue of Internet diffusion and use as primary subject. Like the newspapers from the other societies, the U.S. newspapers used the factual frame most in general. In fact, the percentage of the articles presenting the frame in the U.S. newspapers ranked second among the societies. Yet, the percentage for the stories with the issue of Internet diffusion and use as primary subject was the lowest one, significantly lower than the others, which otherwise exhibited similar patterns to their overall use of the frame, significantly predicted by a society's political system and two cultural dimensions, uncertainty avoidance and long-/short-term orientation.

The inconsistent patterns for particular stories shown in the U.S. newspapers inspired the researcher to take a more qualitative look at the stories in question. Detailed investigations found that instead of providing general information or discussing the determinants of Internet diffusion in China, the stories with the issue of Internet diffusion and use as primary subject in the U.S. newspapers focused on individuals' use of the Internet, which were all framed as human interest and conflict stories (see APPENDIX E for the examples of stories). Both the human interest frame and the conflict frame, as explained in previous research on news values, are of great newsworthiness and are more effective in attracting readers' attention (e.g., Altheide & Snow, 1979; Neuman, et al., 1992). It might not have been interesting enough to tell a story about how the Internet is used in China to Americans if it had not been framed in such a way. This might also relate to idea of journalistic training in the United States. U.S. journalists try to show how individuals are affected by something instead of emphasizing only the big picture or

abstract ideas. The U.S. case suggests that further research needs to be done to investigate the factors contributing to those residuals that the factors at the macro socio-cultural level cannot explain how the use of news frames is associated with specific issues. These could be the effects of the lower levels in Shoemaker and Reese's hierarchical model, such as personal orientations of media workers, notions of newsworthiness and media routines.

In addition to the factual frame, the second dominant type of generic news frame was respectively the conflict frame in the U.S. newspapers, the human interest frame in the newspapers from China, Singapore and the United Kingdom, and the economic consequences frame in the newspapers from Hong Kong.

The conflict frame was a salient feature in the Western newspapers' treatment of the Internet in China. Particularly, the U.S. newspapers were most likely to present a conflict frame, a result consistent with what Luther and Zhou (2005) found and what has been emphasized in Western news media coverage (e.g., Neuman, et al., 1992; Richards & King, 2000; Semetko & Valkenburg, 2000). As pointed out by Neuman, et al. (1992), in the communication literature many references to the media's emphasis on conflict as a means of attracting attention and readership and defining it as a good journalistic practice exist. Scholars have also given reasons for this. While Richards and King (2000) acknowledged the element of drama lies in the conflict frame, other scholars specifically addressed how well the conflict frame fits with the media's game interpretation of the political world as an ongoing series of contests, each with a set of winners and losers (Gans, 1979; Patterson, 1980). Along this line of reasoning, the issue of Internet censorship and regulations, which were more often taken as the primary subject in a given story in the Western newspapers, compared to their Eastern peers, should become

even more salient to U.S. and U.K. readers, when it was frequently presented in a conflict frame.

Although the communication literature has seen the frequent presence of conflict stories in Western news media, no studies examined the presence of the conflict frame and other types of news frames within the context of cultural comparisons to see their correlations with socio-cultural differences across societies. Previous research has shown the inclination to downplay any conflict frame in Asian newspapers (e.g., Luther & Zhou, 2005; Massey, 2000) and to accentuate harmony in the interpersonal communication practices in many of Confucian-based cultures (e.g. Chen & Chung, 1994; Kirkbride, Tang, & Westwood, 1991; Leung, 1997; Leung, 1987; Merkin, 2004; Oliver, 1971; Peng & Nisbett, 1999). For instance, Merkin (2004) found that members in societies with a cultural long-term orientation were more likely to use harmonious and cooperative facework strategies than their short-term oriented counterparts. Yet there is no empirical evidence for the linkage between the presence of the conflict frame and cultural traditions. Making a contribution to it, this current study found that cultural factors, instead of political systems of societies, played an important role here.

Two of Hofstede's (2001) cultural dimensions, long-/short-term orientation and uncertainty avoidance, were found to be significant in predicting the presence of the frame. Newspapers in a society with a lower score on long-/short-term orientation (LTO) and a higher score on uncertainty avoidance (UAI) were more likely to present a conflict frame. This is exactly the case for the U.S. and U.K. newspapers. According to Hofstede (2001), tolerance and respect for other people, and fulfilling social obligations have higher priority in short-term orientation societies than long-term orientation societies. In a

society with a low score on LTO, quick results and immediate gratification of needs are expected. People are less satisfied with daily human relations but more satisfied with making efforts to correct social inequality and injustice (pp.356-367). Therefore, we can assume that to journalists in such a society, controversy and/or confrontation in thoughts, opinions or views, and different parties and groups are tolerable. Being able to see and willing to present social problems and different interests, instead of sacrificing pursuing the absolute truth so as to maintain social stability and harmonic relationships between individuals, should be desirable. In addition, uncertainty-avoiding cultures, like the United States with the highest score on UAI among the examined societies, further strengthen the belief in an absolute truth (Hofstede, 2001, p.363). On the other hand, using a conflict frame to tell a story can more easily satisfy immediate gratification of needs of readers in such a society.

Another type of news frame frequently addressed in the literature is the human interest frame. An article is considered belonging to the human interest frame when a particular individual, family or group of people is brought forward, or an emotional angle is brought to, as an illustration of a larger phenomenon or a wider issue (Semetko & Valkenburg, 2000; Valkenburg, Semetko, & de Vreese, 1999). The media emphasize human interest stories as a natural technique to attract the attention of their audiences, getting at the idea that personalization of news report plays an important role (Altheide & Snow, 1979). In the present study, all the newspapers, except for the ones from Hong Kong, exhibited a strong tendency to use the human interest frame.

Overall, the newspapers from mainland China were particularly likely to use the frame, which enjoyed a frequency count significantly higher than the expected. Yet, it is

interesting to see the use of the frame in the Chinese newspapers had different patterns in treating stories with two different primary subjects, Internet diffusion and use, and Internet censorship and relationships. The overall likelihood of presenting the human interest frame was mirrored in the stories with the issues of Internet diffusion and use.<sup>124</sup> Yet, Chinese journalists rarely used this frame to report a story mainly concerning the issue of Internet censorship and regulations, a highly sensitive topic in China. On the surface, this seems to be contradictory to the finding that the not-free society was more likely to present a human interest frame than a society with freedom status at the partly-free or free level. However, it is explainable when we take into account the nature of the human interest frame, together with the political economic backdrops in a home-nation to the issues in question.

Experimental research has shown that stories using exemplars are effective since they are more easily remembered than stories with abstract or logic reasoning. They “tend to form judgments on the basis of vividness instead of validity” (Brosius, & Bathelt, 1994). The “newsworthiness” of a human interest story depends partly on the possibilities to visualize it. Visual images in news are effective in conveying emotional meaning (Boholm, 1998, p.127; Ferreira, Boholm, & Löfstedt, 2000; Graber, 1996, p.90). Using such a frame is assumed to evoke general sympathy or affections for the ones involved in a given event. Therefore, practically, it is hard for journalists in China, a politically restricted country, to apply such a frame to a highly politically sensitive issue. Instead, it is more reasonable to imagine that Chinese journalists would more likely tell a human

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<sup>124</sup> In an additional examination, the human interest frame was frequently found in the stories with the issue of e-commerce, Internet business and industry as primary subject in the *Beijing Youth Daily*.

interest story about those issues, such as Internet diffusion and use, and e-commerce, which more fit into the state-centric agenda to promote informatization and modernization, as discussed in Chapter 2. By using the human interest frame focusing on individual experiences to highlight such issues, the Chinese media would be able to divert the audience's attention away from the problems of the system in place, as Iyengar and Kinder (1987) suggested. In addition, the uneven patterns of two Chinese newspapers might also explain the disparities in using the frame (see the discussion in the section below). The case of the human interest frame in China, like the case of the factual frame in the United States, suggests again that besides the overall presentations of news frames, it is important to look at how a certain type of news frame is associated with a given issue in framing research, which may give us more information on the interplay between factors at the macro level and variables at the micro level that both influence media content.

Hong Kong stood out for its newspapers' significantly less likelihood of using the human interest frame. As a matter of fact, its newspapers mainly relied on the factual and economic consequences frames in their coverage. It could be a typical example to see how the cultural dimension, long-/short-term orientation (LTO), came to play in the presence of news frames. In general, the patterns of influence of cultural dimensions varied with different types of news frames with one or two dimensions specifically significant. Yet, the dimension of long-/short-term orientation was found to be the only one significant in each of the logistic regression models, which indicates that this dimension is the most important cultural factor in predicting the presence of a generic news frame. The regression models show that without other factors being taken into



account, a society with a high score on LTO was more likely to use the factual and economic consequences frames, but less likely to use the human interest, conflict and leadership frames. This was exactly the case for Hong Kong, whose newspapers showed special interests in the issue of e-commerce, Internet business and industry and the economic consequences frame.

The economic consequences frame not only considers the actual, perceived, or future economic consequences, but also refers to the possible gains or losses. A careful reading following the quantitative study found that most of the Hong Kong articles with a distinct economic perspective referred to the actual or possible gains or losses. It can be assumed that the positive association of long-term orientation, which emphasizes events with effects in the future, with using the economic consequences frame perhaps has been strengthened by the business tradition in Hong Kong and its subtle connections with mainland China. This might be why the coverage of the issue of e-commerce and Internet business and the use of the economic consequences frame were particularly more often present than was expected statistically in the newspapers from Hong Kong. It is well known that Hong Kong is the least traditional of all provinces and territories of China. Hong Kong has long been the immediate center for trade between mainland China and the rest of the world. Its business community's embrace of China is "largely pragmatic" (Alexander, 2001, p.6). Given the exposure of Hong Kong's inhabitants to Western capitalist social values, and its economic relationships with mainland China, it is not surprising to see the intensive concerns about Internet business in mainland China and the frequent use of the economic consequences frame in the newspapers from Hong Kong. As Neuman et al. (1992) put it, the economic consequences frame reflects "the

preoccupation with ‘the bottom line,’ profit and loss, and wider values of the culture of capitalism” (p.63). They found that the application of the economic frame by the media tended to reinforce dominant capitalist social values. In addition, considering the political climate after the 1997 handover, we may reason that the protocol that “no one speaks ill of the Chinese government publicly” (Alexander, 2001, p.6) might have caused journalists in Hong Kong to downplay those politically sensitive issues, such as Internet censorship in mainland China, by switching their attention to the pragmatic issues of Internet diffusion and use, and Internet business, and mainly relying on the factual and economic consequences frames.

### **8.3. Freedom Status and Beyond It**

If the way that an issue or event is framed affects the way public policy is formed, then it is critical that we understand what factors influence framing. In the present analysis, in addition to the presence of Internet-related issues and news frames, the researcher also examined the correlations between the media’s use of framing and the political and socio-cultural factors, specifically freedom status and cultural dimensions. As shown in the previous sections, differences in the use of news frames existed across societies, and the differences in the newspapers’ usage of news frames were predictable on some dimensions but not on others. This section focuses on the effects of freedom status, while pointing out cautions that need to be considered in interpreting and generalizing the effects.

In general, freedom status was found to be significantly associated with how stories were framed, such as whether a certain type of news frame was presented, whether

a certain type of politically sensitive issue or content was mentioned, and whether a certain type of news frame was associated with a certain type of Internet-related issue. The differences across the levels of freedom status were particularly exhibited in reporting politically sensitive issues or content, such as the issues of Internet censorship and regulations and the consequences and implications of the Internet, and dissident users and/or content. The presence of such an issue or content significantly increased with the increasing level of freedom a society enjoyed, from not-free to partly-free to free. Yet the implications of the differences of framing stories associated with freedom status could not be overestimated, given the following points:

First, it should be noticed that much evidence attributed the functions of freedom status mainly to the not-free society, China, which differed from the societies at the other two levels in many aspects, particularly the free societies. The partly-free and free societies did not differ much in terms of the presence of each type of news frames, and the associations between the presence of news frames and Internet-related issues, except for the stories with the issue of Internet censorship and regulations as primary subject. Such patterns could be true in general, saying that differences across the levels of freedom status mainly mirror in not-free societies. Yet this generalization has to be proved by taking a more representative sample from different levels of societies, especially from not-free societies, because there was only one sample from not-free societies in the current study. We may also attribute the disparities between China and the other societies to factors other than freedom status. For instance, the subject matter concerned in this study, the Internet in China, was a home-nation one for Chinese journalists.

Second, even if we had had a representative sample, we might still not be confident in establishing a causal relationship mainly based on the information on various associations without taking into account confounding variables and controlling variables which might have influences. For instance, this study found that the presence of the conflict frame in the stories with the issue of Internet censorship and regulations as primary subject was significantly associated with freedom status. Yet, freedom status was not selected in the logistic regression model to predict the overall presence of the conflict frame. There could be at least two ways to explain. First, both the overall and specific presence of the conflict frame had nothing to do with freedom status. The association found in the stories regarding Internet censorship and regulations could be a result of the function of the cultural dimension of long/short-term orientation, which was found to be significant in predicting the presence of the conflict frame, or the combined effect of the dimension with other variables. The increasing direction of LTO scores that the examined societies had was consistent with that of freedom status. Another explanation could be that freedom status might have different functions in predicting the overall presence of the conflict frame and its presence in certain types of stories under the combined influences with other variables.

As a matter of fact, the present study shows that the presentations of news frames rarely were a result of the influence of one single factor. The interaction effects between variables were also detected (see Footnote 112 for an example). In addition, it should be noticed that: 1) There were only five samples in terms of country; and 2) the predicting variables were limited at the broadest level in Shoemaker and Reese's hierarchical model, and the best combined effects of different variables might have not been found.

All these suggest that important information might be missing if a cross-cultural study involves only two countries and singles out only one factor, such as country. Such studies may easily produce inconsistent results because the interaction effects of multiple factors are not taken into account together. Multicultural comparisons enable us to detect patterns among countries and cultures instead of restricting the research to differences between an arbitrary pairing of two countries. Although the current study brought five cultural societies in, it would be even better to have more cultures involved so that the test of the influences of political system and cultural dimensions on media content could be leading to more confident and valid conclusions.

#### **8.4. The Chinese Press: How Far Is It Pushing the Ideological Limits?**

Another goal of the current study was to investigate extramedia influences in Shoemaker and Reese's model, specifically the influences of the changing structure of media in China, if any, by comparing the *People's Daily* and *Beijing Youth Daily*, which are at different administrative levels and enjoy institutional and financial autonomy in different degrees.

In terms of issue salience, it was found that compared to the *People's Daily*, the *Beijing Youth Daily* was significantly less likely to present and highlight those issues particularly with political implications, such as the issues of Internet censorship and regulations, and the consequences and implications of the Internet in China. Although no significant differences in the presentations of the issue of Internet diffusion and use were found between the newspapers, they differed in the use of news frames for telling stories about the issue. The *People's Daily* used more often the morality and leadership frames,

whereas the *Beijing Youth Daily* was more likely to rely on the human interest frame to highlight personal uses of the Internet. In general, the *People's Daily* was more likely to use the responsibility frame, especially in the stories with the issue of Internet censorship and regulations.

The findings in issue salience seem to be a little confusing at the first look, because it might be hard to understand why the *People's Daily* tightly controlled by the Chinese Communist Party, discussed the politically sensitive issues, Internet censorship and regulations and the consequences and implications of the Internet, even more often than the *Beijing Youth Daily* with more institutional autonomy. On the surface, the *People's Daily* appeared to inform the public more of issues important to public political life, which seemed to be similar to what its Western counterparts did. Yet, the picture becomes clearer after we take a look at the stories regarding the issue of Internet censorship and regulations in the *People's Daily*.

The examples included in APPENDIX E show that the emphasis of the stories about Internet censorship and regulations in the *People's Daily* was different from those in the Western newspapers, or the newspapers from Singapore, which were more concerned with Internet censorship in terms of individuals' political use of the Internet, such as blocking websites, monitoring online messages, and arresting Internet dissidents. The stories in the *People's Daily* mainly reported events about regulating Internet content such as pornography and copy right, or business such as Internet cafés and online advertising, which are less politically sensitive. Also, they were mostly framed from the point of view of morality or responsibility. Among 15 articles with such a primary subject, six presented a responsibility frame and five presented a morality frame. The

purposes for shutting down porn websites and regulating Internet cafés (*Wangba*) were reported to protect adolescents from bad impacts so as to keep their morality standards. Individual businesses were taken on responsibilities for the social problems, such as safety violations and students' Internet addiction and playing truant, which were claimed to come with Internet cafés. In such a way, the stories presented in the *People's Daily*, the CCP's flagship mouthpiece, justified the government's censorship, such as shutting down websites and clearing up Internet cafés, which was consistent with the central theme of the Party's concerns with minimizing harmful political and social impacts of the Internet. By doing this, the paper was on the right track within the boundaries of the state's power and ideological control to propagate the Party line and maintain its political loyalty.

Unlike the *People's Daily*, which is at a higher political ranking and enjoys more editorial privileges than local newspapers, the *Beijing Youth Daily* presented its inclination to marginalize politically sensitive issues, such as Internet censorship and regulations and the consequences and implications of the Internet. The inclination chimed with what the literature review presented in Chapter 4 suggests regarding the unevenly developed media in China: 1) Politically sensitive content is more subject to ideological control by the CCP; and 2) newspapers at the political periphery have greater autonomy than their peers at the center. Yet such autonomy is very limited. The *Beijing Youth Daily* could choose to stay away from helping the government to propagate its control of the Internet and its interpretation of Internet control within the context of socialist spiritual civilization. It might still not be able to push the ideological limits further to challenge the legitimacy of maintaining "public morality" in cyberspace by clearing up what the

government views as bad. Instead, the newspaper focused on individuals' use of the Internet and stories of individual businesses, which were frequently presented in a human interest frame, so as to meet the needs of another master of the Chinese media, readers.

In terms of the presence of the issue of e-commerce, Internet business and industry and the economic consequences frame, the *People's Daily* and *Beijing Youth Daily* did not show significant differences from each other. This might indicate that both of them were subject to the responsibility of promoting economic modernization as part of the ideological superstructure (Lee, 1990).

The literature has seen the diversified structure of the Chinese media. Yet studies on how the diversification is reflected in Chinese media content and to what extent the diversification has brought liberality to the Chinese media in terms of the media's serving for public political life are few. The comparison of the *People's Daily* and *Beijing Youth Daily* shows that differences existed in issue salience and use of different types of news frames. Yet in terms of those political sensitive issues (e.g., the issue of Internet censorship and regulations), the comparison suggests that we might need to be conservative to draw an inference that the Chinese media would enjoy more political liberality with its increased diversified structure. However, such a suggestion is based on the comparison conducted between only two papers. It should be more informative to include more local newspapers, especially those in the areas far away from Beijing, the center of politics and power.



## **8.5. Implications of the Research**

This research set out to determine how certain issues and news frames were consistently presented in news articles from China, Hong Kong, Singapore, the United States and the United Kingdom within the context of the Internet in China. It was expected that differences would exist because of the political and socio-cultural conditions under which the newspapers operate. It was anticipated that the generic news frames (i.e., factual, human interest, conflict, economic consequences, responsibility, morality and leadership) identified in previous studies would come to light. How these frames were presented, however, was expected to vary as a result of the papers' differing cultural environment. It is hoped that this research has contributed to the literature of media content and framing by introducing freedom status and cultural dimensions as independent variables into a cross-cultural analysis of explaining the different patterns of using news frames across societies.

Going beyond the descriptive level of measuring the number of times that the types of Internet-related issues were mentioned and news frames were implemented, as much past research has done, the study added to both method and theory in two ways: 1) investigating certain issues with comprehensive implications to the public's political and social life, such as the issues of Internet use and censorship, through their associations with the presentations of news frames; and 2) empirically introducing national-level variables, such as freedom status and cultural dimensions, into the procedure of establishing a variety of regression models to predict the presence of news frames and the ways to frame a story, and explicitly building the variables into the across-society comparison, as Przeworski and Teune (1981) suggested.

These approaches allowed the researcher to discover important links between the variables that previously were either assumed or were not investigated, as suggested in Shoemaker and Reese's model, and provide a more thorough understanding of macro-social influences on news construction so as to remedy the deficiencies of the tradition of framing research, which has focused on the effects of news frames on individuals' attitudes and perceptions of media content, and has largely neglected how factors at the macro level, such as political and cultural values, play a role in the process of media framing. From this point of view, the present study made a contribution to our further knowledge of how media frames are formed.

In addition, the current research also helped build the body of the literature in cross-culture studies on media content. There are some studies being done cross-culturally (e.g., de Vreese, Peter, & Semetko, 2001). However, such studies may not be able to present clear relationships between media frames and certain factors influencing content, in that the focus of such studies tends to present the differences of media frames and the researchers tend not to empirically correlate the factors to the presentations of media frames. Furthermore, no systematic study has been done on a larger scale, in that most studies in this area are limited to comparisons between two or three countries by singling out one factor. As a result, differences in specific aspects, political systems or cultural values, are hidden under the cover of simple between-country differences. The interplay between factors and how positive and negative effects of different factors might offset one another are thus not detected. For instance, when significant differences were observed between two or three countries, it becomes problematic to determine whether the differences are attributable to political systems, cultural values, economic conditions,

or some combination of these. By introducing five different societies, the present research was able to make a good try to go beyond such limitations.

## **8.6. Limitations of the Study**

A significant shortcoming of this study is the sampling of societies. The sample consisted of only five purposely selected societies. Although it is meaningful to compare typical Western and Eastern societies, and attempts were made to expand the scope of cross-cultural comparisons, as discussed in Chapter 6 and the previous section, the number of samples was still few, which might have caused some problems methodologically. One of the limitations could be that the wide range of scores of each cultural dimension with many intervals missing might have biased the results. As mentioned in previous sections, this could be one of the reasons why many of the regression models generated in this study could not explain much variations of the presentations of news frames. In addition, this study empirically considered only the influence of ideological values varying with political systems and cultural dimensions across societies. Also, due to the non-representative samples, we have to be very cautious in generalizing the results to other societies.

Another concern is the limits brought by a quantitative content analysis in framing research. First, a content analysis cannot determine causality due to its lack of inference power. Although some predicting variables were introduced into the study and as discussed in previous sections, informed speculation and reasoning were provided, causal relationships still cannot be established. Second, the quantitative analysis was founded on the repetition of issues, news frames, or certain characteristics of content. Yet, many

powerful concepts central to framing do not necessarily have to be repeated often to have a great impact. Without a qualitative analysis, concepts implied between the lines of words, the connections between concepts, and what is more latently among the connotative levels of meaning cannot be revealed so as to further offer some insight and understanding about how these concepts might have influenced in framing a story, and how ideology plays out through the language. Furthermore, the content analysis provided no information on how the stories were perceived and interpreted by readers.

In addition, the current study focused on the presentations of generic news frames from the point of view of journalists, leaving room for other future studies to look at how framing is taken as a strategic action and acted out by multiple social actors by looking at news sources and frame sponsorship in news. Scholars also view framing as a part of a discursive process in which strategic actors, such as political actors, organizations, and social movements, use symbolic resources to participate in collective sense-making about public policy issues (Gamson, 1992, 1996; Pan & Kosicki, 2001), and to work to “sponsor” the frames that appear in news (Carragee & Roefs, 2004; Gamson & Modigliani, 1989). By relating news sources to types of news frames, we might be able to determine whether media’s maintaining the status quo in framing contests (Carragee & Roefs, 2004; Gamson & Modigliani, 1989; Gitlin, 1980; Tuchman, 1978) interplay with political systems and cultural values, and if so, how.

## **8.7. Opportunities for Future Research**

This study analyzed newspaper frames about the Internet in China over a five-year period by selecting two newspapers from each of five societies, China, Hong Kong,

Singapore, the United States, and the United Kingdom. As discussed in previous sections, bringing more societies into a more systematic study that combines variables at different levels in the hierarchical model of Shoemaker and Reese could give us more confidence in the predicting power of regression models for the presence of generic news frames. For instance, Shoemaker and Reese (1996) argued that the influences on media content not only come from the journalists who write stories, but also from interest groups, news organizations themselves and their policies, e.g., political endorsements, editorial positions, and corporate procedures. Perhaps it is difficult to measure quantitatively; yet it is not entirely impossible. Meanwhile, research using a more qualitative approach could offer more insight into the procedure of frame building. In addition, a more complicated comparative research involving different social units at two different time periods could be considered to examine whether the influence of national-level variables would change over the time, although Chang et al (2001) pointed out such a comparison is “empirically less feasible” (p.418).

Further research is suggested that includes more titles of newspapers and a variety of news media, including television, radio, and the Internet, to gain a more complete understanding of mass media portrayals of China’s Internet. This would be particularly meaningful in terms of comparative purposes for examining to what extent the influences of political and cultural values in Shoemaker and Reese’s hierarchical model on the patterns of news coverage could go beyond the boundaries of different types of news media. For instance, will news stories carried on the Internet, a universal medium more open to ordinary people to discuss political issues, exhibit less differences across societies?

In terms of media content, an avenue of research to broaden the scope of the current study, focusing on only news articles, would be including editorials and commentaries in news media, which could provide more precise knowledge of and insight into a newspaper's leanings toward such controversial issues as Internet use, Internet censorship, and the consequences and implications of the Internet in China. A qualitative analysis could provide greater understanding of whether frames in editorial content reflect the power structure in a given society, and if so, how. Besides this, further research could include non-news sources that people rely on in daily life to construct meaning about topics in the public arena.

Another question can be raised about the extent to which journalists' individual frames may influence the procedure of media framing. As indicated in Figure 3.2, constructed reality plays a role in shaping individual frames in the long term, which in turn takes a function in how journalists, also as individual audiences who accept information from media sources, frame stories. Yet, the current study only examined a part of the process of frame building, from objective reality through media, leaving the interactions between media frames and individual frames and the roles of constructed reality unconsidered. If these functions are included, more residuals or variations could be explained. For instance, if a certain issue has been reported in a salient way over time, journalists could pick up this type of issue easily because of its availability and accessibility, as discussed in the first section. Therefore, further research should combine a variety of methods, such as content analysis, surveys, interviews, and experimental designs to capture alternative meanings constructed by journalists.

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## **APPENDICES**

**APPENDIX A**

**GUIDELINES FOR IDENTIFYING PRIMARY  
AND NON-PRIMARY STORIES**

## 1. *Primary stories vs. non-primary stories*

1) Does the headline of the story contain any key word(s), such as Beijing and Web, directly referring to China AND Internet-related object(s)? Examples:

China Lists Controls To Restrict the Use Of E-Mail and Web

Tracking the Web Across China

Beijing Blocks Access to Google

Such stories definitely are primary stories.

2) If the headline of the story does not clearly suggest that the primary subject of the story is related to the Internet in China, then, does the lead in the story primarily present or discuss an issue/event/problem related to Internet in China? In some cases, it is very easy to answer the question as “Yes.” Then, such stories should be coded as primary stories. In some cases, it is more complicated. For example:

From the headline “China's New Culture Starting To Take Shape,” it is not clear whether or not the primary subject of the story is related to the Internet in China. You should then look at the lead:

For Sun Jiazheng, the Chinese culture minister, the emergence of a global culture wears many faces. On the one hand, moviegoers in Beijing can swoon at screenings of “Titanic.” On the other, computer jockeys in Shanghai might surf Web sites that carry “unhealthy” material.

The lead suggests that the story could be the one with the primary subject related to the Internet in China, in which the cultural implications of the Internet in China might be discussed. Yet, it is still not clear whether or not such an issue would be the primary subject of the story. In such a case, you should consider the following question:

3) Does the content related to the Internet in China, overall, dominate over other content in the story? If yes, then the story should be coded as a primary story.

## 2. *Other general rules concerning primary or non-primary stories*

1) Stories mainly discussing the Internet in Hong Kong are excluded from primary stories.

2) The activities of foreign Internet companies in the Internet market of mainland China are considered to be related to the Internet in China.

3) The overseas activities of China’s Internet companies are also considered to be related to the Internet in China.

4) Stories discussing the Internet in a broader area, such as Asia, with China as a part of it, are coded non-primary stories.

**APPENDIX B (I)**

**CODING FORM FOR CONTENT ANALYSIS – 1**

**PRIMARY STORIES**

**Section 1: Basic information of the story and the issue(s) related to China's Internet in the story.**

Variable 01: Newspaper Title

- 1) People's Daily
- 2) Beijing Youth Daily
- 3) Singtao Daily
- 4) South China Morning Post
- 5) Lianhe Zaobao
- 6) The Straits Times
- 7) The New York Times
- 8) The Los Angeles Times
- 9) The Guardian
- 10) The Times

Variable 02: Date of the story: \_\_\_\_\_ (dd/mm/yy)

Variable 03: The country/territory with which the newspaper is associated:

- 1) Mainland China
- 2) Hong Kong
- 3) Singapore
- 4) The United States
- 5) The United Kingdom

Variable 04: What issue is taken as the primary subject in the story? Please check **ONLY ONE**.

- 1) Internet technologies
- 2) Internet diffusion & use [**If this is checked, GO TO Variable 05 through Variable 08**]
- 3) Internet censorship & regulations [**If this is checked, GO TO Variable 09 through Variable 11**]
- 4) E-commerce, Internet business & Internet industry
- 5) Hackers, Internet security & other cybercrimes
- 6) The consequences & implications of the Internet [**If this is checked, GO TO Variable 12 through 12a**]
- 7) Other (If other, please specify here: \_\_\_\_\_)
- 8) Not ascertainable [**If this is checked, GO TO Variable 13**]

If check **2)** for Variable 04, then,

Variable 05 (PTI Question-01): The discussion of Internet use or the mention of online content stresses more:

- 1) political use/content
- 2) non-political use/content
- 3) Not ascertainable

4) Not applicable

Variable 06 (PTI Question-02): Is(are) specific dissident user(s) or organization(s), such as Falun Gong, human rights organizations, mentioned?

1) Yes            2) No            3) Not applicable

Variable 07 (PTI Question-03): Is dissident content or politically sensitive content that the Chinese government is trying to avoid or does not want to project, such as anti-Communist, pro-democracy, corruption, extreme nationalism sentiments, criticism of officials?

1) Yes            2) No            3) Not applicable

Variable 08: Who is(are) the primary agent(s)/actor(s), if any?

- 1) Individual(s) as ordinary people
- 2) Business person(s)/corporate(s)
- 3) Government/people representing government
- 4) Other(s) (If this is checked, specify here: \_\_\_\_\_)
- 5) Not ascertainable
- 6) Not applicable

If check **3** for Variable 04, then,

Variable 09 (PTI Question-04): Does the discussion regarding regulating the Internet in the story, if any, stress:

- 1) the necessity of regulating the Internet
- 2) the unfavorable position to regulating the Internet
- 3) Not ascertainable
- 4) Not applicable

Variable 10 (PTI Question-05): Does the discussion related to regulating the Internet in the story, if any, stress:

- 1) Chinese government's ability or success of regulating the Internet
- 2) the impossibility or failure of regulating the Internet, or weak impact on Internet use
- 3) Not ascertainable
- 4) Not applicable

Variable 11 (PTI Question-06): The concern over regulating the Internet, the regulation/policy and/or the step/measure that the government has taken, or the law suit, if any, is more related to:

- 1) the political aspect
- 2) other aspect (If this is checked, specify here: \_\_\_\_\_)
- 3) Not ascertainable

4) Not applicable

If check **6** for Variable 04, then,

Variable 12 (PTI Question-07): What type of consequence or implication is more emphasized?

- 1) political
- 2) social/cultural
- 3) commercial
- 4) other (If this is checked, specify here: \_\_\_\_\_)
- 5) Not ascertainable

Variable 12a (PTI Question-08): If any political implications/consequences are mentioned, such implications or consequences discussed in the story more emphasize on:

- 1) strengthening the current government or regime
- 2) weakening the current government or regime
- 3) Not ascertainable
- 4) Not applicable

Variable 13: Other than the primary subject, what issues related to China's Internet are mentioned or discussed in the story? Please check as MANY as you can:

- 1) Internet technologies
- 2) Internet diffusion & use [**If this is checked, GO TO Variable 14 through Variable 17**]
- 3) Internet censorship & regulations [**If this is checked, GO TO Variable 18 through Variable 20**]
- 4) E-commerce, Internet business & Internet industry
- 5) Hackers, Internet security & other cybercrimes
- 6) The consequences & implications of the Internet [**If this is checked, GO TO Variable 21 through 21a**]
- 7) Other(s) (If other(s), please specify here: \_\_\_\_\_)
- 8) Not applicable

If **2**) for Variable 13 is checked, then,

Variable 14 (PTI Question-01a): The discussion of Internet use or the mention of online content more stresses:

- 1) political use/content
- 2) non-political use/content
- 3) Not ascertainable
- 4) Not applicable



Variable 15 (PTI Question-02a): Is(are) specific dissident user(s) or organization(s), such as Falun Gong, human rights organizations, mentioned?

- 1) Yes            2) No            3) Not applicable

Variable 16 (PTI Question-03a): Is dissident content or politically sensitive content that the Chinese government is trying to avoid or does not want to project, such as anti-Communist, pro-democracy, corruption, extreme nationalism sentiments, criticism of officials, mentioned/discussed?

- 1) Yes            2) No            3) Not applicable

Variable 17: Who is(are) the primary agent(s)/actor(s), if any?

- 1) Individual(s) as ordinary people
- 2) Business person(s)/corporate(s)
- 3) Government/people representing government
- 4) Other(s) (If this is checked, specify here: \_\_\_\_\_)
- 5) Not ascertainable
- 6) Not applicable

If **3)** for Variable 13 is checked, then,

Variable 18 (PTI Question-04a): The discussion regarding regulating the Internet in the story, if any, more stresses:

- 1) the necessity of regulating the Internet, or
- 2) the unfavorable position to regulating the Internet
- 3) Not ascertainable
- 4) Not applicable

Variable 19 (PTI Question-05a): The discussion related to regulating the Internet in the story, if any, more stresses:

- 1) Chinese government's ability or success of regulating the Internet, or
- 2) the impossibility or failure of regulating the Internet, or weak impact on Internet use
- 3) Not ascertainable
- 4) Not applicable

Variable 20 (PTI Question-06a): The concern over regulating the Internet, the regulation/policy and/or the step/measure that the government has taken, or the law suit, if any, is more related to:

- 1) the political aspect
- 2) other aspect (If this is checked, specify here: \_\_\_\_\_)
- 3) Not ascertainable
- 4) Not applicable

If 6) for Variable 13 is checked, then,

Variable 21(PTI Question-07a): What type of consequence or implication is more emphasized?

- 1) political
- 2) social/cultural
- 3) commercial
- 4) other (If this is checked, specify here: \_\_\_\_\_)
- 5) Not ascertainable

Variable 21a (PTI Question-08a): If the political implications/consequences are mentioned, such implications or consequences discussed in the story more emphasize on:

- 1) strengthening the current government
- 2) transforming China into a new society
- 3) Not ascertainable
- 4) Not applicable

## **Section 2: The presence of frame.**

Variable 22: Is a factual frame present in the story?

- 1) Yes
- 2) No

If checked YES, then,

Variable 22a: Is the frame associated with the primary subject of the story?

- 1) Yes
- 2) No
- 3) Not applicable

Variable 23: Is a human interest frame present in the story?

- 1) Yes
- 2) No

If checked YES, then,

Variable 23a: Who is(are) the agent(s)/actor(s) involved in the frame?  
(Check as MANY as you can.)

- 1) Individual(s) as ordinary people
- 2) Business person(s)/corporate(s)
- 3) Government/people representing government
- 4) Other(s) (If this is checked, specify here: \_\_\_\_\_)
- 5) Not applicable

Variable 23b: Is the frame associated with the primary subject of the story?

- 1) Yes
- 2) No
- 3) Not applicable

Variable 24: Is a conflict frame present in the story?

1. Yes            2. No

If checked YES, then

Variable 24a: Who are the counterparts involved? (Check as MANY as you can.)

- 1) Individual(s) as ordinary people vs. individual(s) as ordinary people
- 2) Business person(s)/corporate(s) vs. business person(s)/corporate(s)
- 3) Business person(s)/corporate(s) vs. individual(s) as ordinary people
- 4) Government/people representing government vs. Government/people representing government
- 5) Government/people representing government vs. individual(s) as ordinary people
- 6) Government/people representing government vs. business person(s)/corporate(s)
- 7) Others (If this is checked, specify here: \_\_\_\_\_)
- 8) Not applicable

Variable 24b: Is the frame associated with the primary subject of the story?

- 1) Yes            2) No            3) Not applicable

Variable 25: Is a responsibility frame present in the story?

1. Yes            2. No

If checked YES, then

Variable 25a: Who is suggested in the story being responsible for or having ability to alleviate the problem/adversity/disaster in question? (Check as MANY as you can.)

- 1) Individual(s) as ordinary people
- 2) Business person(s)/corporate(s)
- 3) Government/ people representing government
- 4) Other(s) (If this is checked, specify here: \_\_\_\_\_)
- 5) Not applicable

Variable 25b: Who is given credit? (Check as MANY as you can.)

- 1) Individual(s) as ordinary people
- 2) Business person(s)/corporate(s)
- 3) Government/people representing government
- 4) Other(s) (If this is checked, specify here: \_\_\_\_\_)
- 5) Not applicable

Variable 25c: Is the frame associated with the primary subject of the story?

- 1) Yes          2) No          3) Not applicable

Variable 26: Is a morality frame present in the story?

1. Yes          2. No

If checked YES, then

Variable 26a: Who provides the moral message/interpretation? (Check as MANY as you can.)

- 1) Individual(s) as ordinary people
- 2) Business man(men)/ corporate(s)
- 3) Government/ people representing government
- 4) Other(s) (If this is checked, specify here: \_\_\_\_\_)
- 5) Not applicable

Variable 26b: Is the frame associated with the primary subject of the story?

- 1) Yes          2) No          3) Not applicable

Variable 27: Is an economic consequence frame present in the story?

1. Yes          2. No

If checked YES, then

Variable 27a: Is the frame associated with the primary subject of the story?

- 1) Yes          2) No          3) Not applicable

Variable 28: Is a leadership frame present in the story?

1. Yes          2. No

If checked YES, then

Variable 28a: Is the frame associated with the primary subject of the story?

- 1) Yes          2) No          3) Not applicable

**APPENDIX B (II)**

**CODING FORM FOR CONTENT ANALYSIS – 2**

**NON-PRIMARY STORIES**

**Basic information of the story and the issue(s) related to China's Internet in the story.**

Variable 01: Newspaper Title

- 1) People's Daily
- 2) Beijing Youth Daily
- 3) Singtao Daily
- 4) South China Morning Post
- 5) Lianhe Zaobao
- 6) The Straits Times
- 7) The New York Times
- 8) The Los Angeles Times
- 9) The Guardian
- 10) The Times

Variable 02: Date of the story: \_\_\_\_\_ (dd/mm/yy)

Variable 03: The country/territory that the newspaper is associated:

- 1) Mainland China
- 2) Hong Kong
- 3) Singapore
- 4) The United States
- 5) The United Kingdom

Variable 04: What issue(s) related to China's Internet is(are) mentioned in the story?

Please check as MANY as you can.

- 1) Internet technologies
- 2) Internet diffusion & use **[If this is checked for Internet use, GO TO Variable 05 through Variable 08]**
- 3) Internet censorship & regulations **[If this is checked, GO TO Variable 09 through Variable 11]**
- 4) E-commerce & Internet business
- 5) Hackers, Internet security & other cybercrimes
- 6) The consequences & implications of the Internet **[If this is checked, GO TO Variable 12 through 12a]**
- 7) Other (If other, please specify here: \_\_\_\_\_)

If check **2)** for Variable 04, then,

Variable 05 (PTI Question-01): The discussion of Internet use or the mention of online content more stresses:

- 1) political use/content
- 2) non-political use/content
- 3) Not ascertainable
- 4) Not applicable

Variable 06 (PTI Question-02): Is(are) specific dissident user(s) or organization(s), such as Falun Gong, human rights organizations, mentioned?

- 1) Yes                      2) No                      3) Not applicable

Variable 07 (PTI Question-03): Is dissident content or politically sensitive content that the Chinese government is trying to avoid or does not want to project, such as anti-Communist, pro-democracy, corruption, extreme nationalism sentiments, criticism of officials?

- 1) Yes                      2) No                      3) Not applicable

Variable 08: Who is(are) the primary agent(s)/actor(s), if any?

- 1) Individual(s) as ordinary people
- 2) Business person(s)/corporate(s)
- 3) Government/people representing government
- 4) Other(s) (If this is checked, specify here: \_\_\_\_\_)
- 5) Not ascertainable
- 6) Not applicable

If check **3** for Variable 04, then,

Variable 09 (PTI Question-04): The discussion regarding regulating the Internet in the story, if any, more stresses:

- 1) the necessity of regulating the Internet, or
- 2) the opposite
- 3) Not ascertainable
- 4) Not applicable

Variable 10 (PTI Question-05): The discussion related to regulating the Internet in the story, if any, more stresses:

- 1) Chinese government's ability or success of regulating the Internet, or
- 2) the impossibility or failure of regulating the Internet
- 3) Not ascertainable
- 4) Not applicable

Variable 11 (PTI Question-06): The concern over regulating the Internet, the regulation/policy and/or the step/measure that the government has taken, or the law suit, if any, is more related to:

- 1) the political aspect
- 2) other aspect (If this is checked, specify here: \_\_\_\_\_)
- 3) Not ascertainable
- 4) Not applicable

If check **6** for Variable 04, then,

Variable 12 (PTI Question-07): What type of consequence or implication is more emphasized?

- 1) political
- 2) social/cultural
- 3) commercial
- 4) other (If this is checked, specify here: \_\_\_\_\_)
- 5) Not ascertainable

Variable 12a (PTI Question-08): If any political implications/consequences are mentioned, such implications or consequences discussed in the story more emphasize on:

- 1) strengthening the current government or regime, or
- 2) weakening the current government or regime
- 3) Not ascertainable
- 4) Not applicable



**APPENDIX C**  
**CODING GUIDELINES**

## **Part – 1: Identifying the primary subject and the issue(s) related to the Internet in China in a story.**

### *1. Identifying the primary subject of a PRIMARY story*

The issues related to China's Internet in the coding sheet are not mutually exclusive but may be combined in the same story. Follow the steps to determine which one is the primary subject of a primary story:

1) Content contained in headlines and leads is the important key. If the content is consistent in both the headline and lead of a story, then it should be taken as the primary subject of the story. For example:

Headline: Web Sites' Merger Signals Consolidation of China's Internet Industry

Lead: China's Internet industry, serving one of the most promising markets, is about to undergo a sweeping consolidation after the first major merger of the industry's short life.

Then the primary subject of the story is coded as “e-commerce & Internet business.”

2) If the consistency of the content in the headline and lead of a story is not very clear, then, a careful reading of the entire story is desired. For example:

Headline: Complaints and Concern Rise Over Poor Policing in China

Lead: The first boy disappeared in March 2001, then others went missing, all teenage boys, all regulars at the Internet cafes near the schools. Suspicious parents went to the police, who were not impressed. Maybe, the police said, the boys ran away.

If the content of the story is dominated by or mainly centers around a certain issue included in the coding sheet, then the issue is the primary subject of the story.

3) If the identified issue is not specifically addressed in the list, code it as “other,” and specify the issue.

4) If the story emphasizes equally two or more issues, then code it as “not ascertainable/not applicable.”

### *2. Identifying the issue(s) related to the Internet in China*

1) The category of “Internet technologies”

Includes:

- The technological aspect of the Internet, such as the innovation and diffusion of an emerging technology applied to the Internet, the features and applications of

Internet technologies, such as e-platform, encryption software, Web browser, etc, or technological problems of a Web site or network, and scientific research on the solutions.

Excludes:

- How Internet technologies benefit people and societies, which will be grouped into the category of “the consequences & implications of the Internet.”

Specific cases:

- Filtering/blocking software/technologies issue  
If a story mainly discusses the software/technology itself, such as the developer(s), and its advantages and applications, it will be grouped into this category. If the story mentions the software in the context of discussing the issue of Internet censorship in China, for instance, mainly discussing how the software is used to censor the content online, then it will be grouped into the category of “Internet censorship & regulations.”
- Security issue  
The rule similar to the one above applies. When the technology of online security, such as encryption, firewall, etc., is mentioned or discussed, if the story emphasizes more on the technology itself, it will be grouped into this category. Otherwise, it will be grouped into the category of “hackers, Internet security & other cybercrimes.”

2) The category of “Internet diffusion & use”

Includes:

- General information on Internet diffusion and/or use in China, such as news release of how many people are there on the Internet, who’s on the Internet, the size of the Internet, how frequently people visit the Internet, etc.
- Discussion of the determinants of Internet diffusion in China, such as Internet backbone and/or network infrastructure, access to the Internet and/or constituent technologies, perceived value of the Internet, demand for capacity and connectivity, etc., and the issue of digital divide.
- The Internet use of ordinary people, organizations, or institutions, such as communicative interaction, message dissemination, e-learning, political involvement, etc.
- Government initiatives to use the Internet to spread information, disseminate material, and provide channels for two-way communication, or use the Internet as a tool for self-promotion, Party propaganda, and/or for public goods and services, such as the launch of an official Web site for public use or e-governance, e-education, or organizing a specific non-commercial online event getting ordinary people involved.

- The Internet use of Internet-based companies/corporations for purposes other than business, such as contributing to public goods, and organizing a specific non-commercial online event, e.g., collecting e-signatures to bid for Olympics.

Excludes:

- Government's involvement in e-commerce by using the Internet, which will be grouped into the category of "e-commerce & Internet business."
- The Internet use of individuals and/or Internet-based companies/corporations for doing business, such as launching an e-commerce Web site, and providing commercial services via Internet technologies, etc., which will be grouped into the category of "e-commerce & Internet business."
- Discussion of how regulatory/legal framework affects/determines the Internet diffusion/use in China, which will be grouped into the category of "Internet censorship & regulations."
- The consequences and/or implications of Internet use, such as the implications of using Web to disseminate dissent content, which will be grouped into the category of "the consequences & implications of the Internet."

Specific cases:

- Discussion of the backbone networks and access to the Internet  
If the discussion is mainly from the perspective of the pervasiveness, geographic dispersion and/or connectivity infrastructure of the Internet in China, it will be grouped into the category "Internet diffusion & use." If the discussion is mainly from the perspective of how the Chinese government controls the Internet through controlling access to the Internet, it will be grouped into the category of "Internet censorship & regulations."
- Individuals' online shopping activities  
If such activities are mentioned/discussed/perceived more from the angle of personal online behavior, it will be grouped into the category of "Internet diffusion & use." If they are mentioned/discussed/perceived more from the angle of business, such as how commercial Web sites promote online shopping, it will be grouped into the category of "e-commerce & Internet business."
- Discussion of perceived value of the Internet  
If the discussion is more associated with how such perceptions determine the use of the Internet, it will be grouped into the category of "Internet diffusion & use." If the discussion is more associated with social and/or cultural change, it will be grouped into the category of "the consequences & implications of the Internet."
- Discussion of Internet cafe  
If the discussion is centered on individual use of the Internet, such as who visits Internet cafés, what users are look for on the Internet, and how users enjoy Internet cafes, etc, it will be grouped into the category of "Internet diffusion & use." If the discussion is centered on the business operation of Internet cafes, it will be grouped into the category of "e-commerce & Internet business." If the discussion is centered on regulations that cover the operation of Internet cafes,

and lawsuits related to Internet cafes, it will be grouped into the category of “Internet censorship & regulations.”

### 3) The category of “Internet censorship & regulations”

#### Includes:

- Filtering/ blocking software and/or other technologies/methods used for censoring the online content. (Refer to the guidelines above concerning the specific cases in the category of “Internet technologies.”)
- Discussion of the backbone networks and access to the Internet as a part of discussion of the strategies of controlling the Internet in China. (Refer to the guidelines above concerning the specific cases in the category of “Internet diffusion & use.”)
- Specific steps or strategies taken by the Chinese government to control the Internet, such as closing down or blocking a specific Web site, creating special Internet police, etc., and individual anti-blocking methods or strategies, such as using proxy servers to bypass official blocks.
- Any policies, regulations and/or laws regarding all Internet-related aspects, such as domain names, online content, online behaviors, and Internet industry.
- Specific Internet-related lawsuits, such as intellectual property cases, and prosecutions and imprisonment of Internet users, including dissidents, and/or Internet-interested businessmen.
- Discussion of Internet-interested policy bodies and/or the regulatory regime governing the Internet.

### 4) The category of “e-commerce & Internet business”

#### Includes:

- The Internet use of individuals and/or Internet-based companies/corporations for doing business and providing commercial services. (Refer to the guidelines above concerning the exclusions in the category of “Internet diffusion & use.”)
- The government’s involvement in e-commerce by using the Internet. (Refer to the guidelines above concerning the exclusions in the category of “Internet diffusion & use.”)
- The trend of Internet industry in China.
- Foreign companies/investors’ economic activities in Internet industry in China.
- The government’s strategies for driving the information economy and Internet business.

#### Excludes:

- How e-commerce will transform China, which will be grouped into “the consequences & implications of the Internet.”

### 5) The category of “hackers, Internet security & other cybercrimes”

Includes:

- Domestic hacker activities in China and “cyberwars” against foreign countries, such as Indonesia, America and Japan.
- Technical discussions related to hacking, such as phony IPs, distant assaults, backdoors, etc., and the technology of protecting online security discussed with an emphasis on Internet security rather than the technology itself. (Refers to the guidelines above concerning the specific cases in the category of “Internet technologies.”)
- Virus and protection
- General information on other Internet-related crimes, such as copy right piracy, theft of trade secrets, Internet fraud and spam, Internet harassment and threats, trademark counterfeiting, etc.

Excludes:

- Any specific law suits or cases involved in hacking, and other Internet-related crimes, and associated with regulating or controlling the Internet in China, which will be grouped into the category of “Internet censorship and regulations.” (Refer to the guidelines above concerning the category of “Internet censorship and regulations.”)

Specific cases:

- The encryption issue  
If the discussion is more technologically oriented, it will be grouped into the category of “Internet technologies.” If the discussion is centered on securing the Internet in China, it will be grouped in the category of “hackers, Internet security & other cybercrimes.” (Refer to the guidelines above concerning the specific cases in the category of “Internet technologies.”) If the discussion is more from the perspective of regulations, such as the rules on the importation of encryption software into China, it will be grouped into the category of “Internet censorship & regulations.”

6) The category of “other”

Any other issues, concerns or events related to China’s Internet, which are clearly addressed in a story but not included in the categories above, will be grouped in this category.

7) The category of “not ascertainable”

This category applies to the cases where there are more than one issue addressed in a primary story and it is not easy to single out one as the primary subject of the story from the others. Before checking this category, read the story very carefully to find out whether or not the story gives more attention to a certain issue than the others. If that is

not the case, and the story equally emphasizes two or more issues, the category is checked.

For other questions, such as the PTI questions, if a given story is mixed with the two opposite statements for a given question, and there is no way to weigh one over the other, the category is checked.

#### 8) The category of “not applicable”

This category applies when a given question is not applicable to a given story, that is, the story has nothing to do with the subject matter or statement concerned in the given question.

### **Part – 2: Identifying the frame(s) present in the story.**

(The instrument to measure whether or not a certain type of frame is presented is modified and created mostly based on the following research projects, such as Luther & Zhou, 2005, Semetko & Valkenburg, 1998, Valkenburg, Semetko, & De Vreese, 1999, and Zillmann, Chen, Knobloch, & Callison, 2004.)

#### *1. Identifying the Factual Frame:*

Questions to measure the presence of the factual frame:

2. Does the story present the issue/event/problem in question mainly based on facts and/or factual interpretation?

If yes, then,

3. Does the story present the facts in a straightforward fashion?

If yes, then a factual frame is presented.

#### *2. Identifying the Human Interest Frame:*

Questions to measure the presence of the human interest frame:

1. Does the story provide a human example, a human face, a personal story or an emotional angle?

If yes, then,

2. Does the story emphasize how individuals and groups play a role in or are affected by the issue/event/problem in question?

Or,

3. Does the story contain feelings of outrage, empathy or caring, or sympathy or compassion?

If yes to any one of these two questions (#2 or #3), then a human interest frame is presented.

#### *3. Identifying the Conflict Frame:*

Questions to measure the presence of the conflict frame:

1. Does the story provide two parties, individuals, groups, or countries with different interests?

Or,

2. Does the story refer to two sides or to more than two sides of the issue/event/problem/thoughts/arguments in question?

If yes to any one of these two questions (#1 or #2), then,

3. Does the story reflect disagreement between parties, individuals, groups, or countries?

Or,

4. Does one party, individual, group, or country reproach another?

Or,

5. Does the story present a battle, confrontation, scuffle, clash, controversy etc.?

If yes to any one of these three questions (#3, #4, or #5), then a conflict frame is presented.

#### *4. Identifying the Responsibility Frame:*

Questions to measure the presence of the responsibility frame:

1. Does the story point out a specific problem/adversity/disaster?

If yes, then,

2. Does the story suggest that any individual(s), organization(s)/institution(s), company(-ies)/corporation(s), some level of the government and/or the society is responsible for the problem/ adversity/disaster in question?

Or,

3. Does the story suggest that individual(s), organization(s)/institution(s), company(-ies)/corporation(s), some level of the government and/or the society has the ability to alleviate the problem/adversity/disaster in question? Or does the story give credit to any individual(s), organization(s)/institution(s), company(-ies)/corporation(s), some level of the government and/or the society?

Or,

4. Does the story suggest that the problem adversity/disaster requires urgent action from individual(s), organization(s)/institution(s), company(-ies)/corporation(s), some level of the government and/or the society?

If yes to any one of these three questions (#2, #3, and #4), then a responsibility frame is presented.

#### *5. Identifying the Morality Frame:*

Questions to measure the presence of the morality frame:

1. Does the story interpret an issue/event/problem in terms of moral prescription, e.g., offering specific social prescriptions about how to behave?

Or,



2. Does the story present an issue/event/problem for the sake of caring about the state of social morality or to promote ethical education in the society?  
If yes to any one of these two questions, then a morality frame is presented.

*6. Identifying the Economic Consequence Frame:*

Questions to measure the presence of the economic consequence frame:

1. Is there a reference to the (actual, perceived, and future) economic consequences of pursuing or not pursuing a course of action?

Or,

2. Is there a mention of the costs or the degree of expense involved?

If yes to any one of these two questions, then an economic consequence frame is presented.

*7. Identifying the Leadership Frame:*

Questions to measure the presence of the leadership frame:

1. Does the story mention any leader(s) involved in an issue/event/problem?

Or,

2. Does the story mention the notion of leadership related to the Internet in China?

If yes to any one of these two questions, then,

3. Does the story specifically address leadership activities, reactions, effectiveness, and/or roles played in the arena of the Internet in China?

If yes, then a leadership frame is presented.

## **APPENDIX D**

### **CONFLICT TYPES IN STORIES WITH CONFLICT FRAME**

**Table D.1. Conflict Types in the U.S. and U.K. Newspapers**

<b>Conflict type</b>	<b>Count</b>	<b>Percent <sup>a</sup></b>
Individual(s) as ordinary people vs. individual(s) as ordinary people	0	0.0
Business person(s)/corporate(s) vs. business person(s)/corporate(s)	6	14.6
Business person(s)/corporate(s) vs. individual(s) as ordinary people	1	2.4
Government/people representing government vs. government/people representing government	1	2.4
Government/people representing government vs. individual(s) as ordinary people	23	56.1
Government/people representing government vs. business person(s)/corporate(s)	9	22.0
Other	6	14.6

<sup>a</sup> Percentage of all conflict accounts,  $N = 41$ .

**Table D.2. Conflict Types in the U.S. Newspapers**

<b>Conflict type</b>	<b>Count</b>	<b>Percent <sup>a</sup></b>
Individual(s) as ordinary people vs. individual(s) as ordinary people	0	0.0
Business person(s)/corporate(s) vs. business person(s)/corporate(s)	4	13.8
Business person(s)/corporate(s) vs. individual(s) as ordinary people	1	3.4
Government/people representing government vs. government/people representing government	1	3.4
Government/people representing government vs. individual(s) as ordinary people	17	58.6
Government/people representing government vs. business person(s)/corporate(s)	7	24.1
Other	2	6.9

<sup>a</sup> Percentage of all conflict accounts,  $N = 29$ .

**Table D.3. Conflict Types in the U.K. Newspapers**

<b>Conflict type</b>	<b>Count</b>	<b>Percent <sup>a</sup></b>
Individual(s) as ordinary people vs. individual(s) as ordinary people	0	0.0
Business person(s)/corporate(s) vs. business person(s)/corporate(s)	2	16.7
Business person(s)/corporate(s) vs. individual(s) as ordinary people	0	0.0
Government/people representing government vs. government/people representing government	0	0.0
Government/people representing government vs. individual(s) as ordinary people	5	41.7
Government/people representing government vs. business person(s)/corporate(s)	2	16.7
Other	4	33.3

<sup>a</sup> Percentage of all conflict accounts,  $N = 12$ .

**Table D.4. Conflict Types in the Newspapers from China**

<b>Conflict type</b>	<b>Count</b>	<b>Percent <sup>a</sup></b>
Individual(s) as ordinary people vs. individual(s) as ordinary people	1	11.1
Business person(s)/corporate(s) vs. business person(s)/corporate(s)	4	44.4
Business person(s)/corporate(s) vs. individual(s) as ordinary people	2	22.2
Government/people representing government vs. government/people representing government	0	0.0
Government/people representing government vs. individual(s) as ordinary people	0	0.0
Government/people representing government vs. business person(s)/corporate(s)	0	0.0
Other	1	11.1

<sup>a</sup> Percentage of all conflict accounts,  $N = 9$ .

**Table D.5. Conflict Types in the Newspapers from Hong Kong**

<b>Conflict type</b>	<b>Count</b>	<b>Percent <sup>a</sup></b>
Individual(s) as ordinary people vs. individual(s) as ordinary people	0	0.0
Business person(s)/corporate(s) vs. business person(s)/corporate(s)	2	22.2
Business person(s)/corporate(s) vs. individual(s) as ordinary people	1	11.1
Government/people representing government vs. government/people representing government	0	0.0
Government/people representing government vs. individual(s) as ordinary people	1	11.1
Government/people representing government vs. business person(s)/corporate(s)	1	11.1
Other	4	44.4

<sup>a</sup> Percentage of all conflict accounts,  $N = 9$ .

**Table D.6. Conflict Types in the Newspapers from Singapore**

<b>Conflict type</b>	<b>Count</b>	<b>Percent <sup>a</sup></b>
Individual(s) as ordinary people vs. individual(s) as ordinary people	1	7.1
Business person(s)/corporate(s) vs. business person(s)/corporate(s)	4	28.6
Business person(s)/corporate(s) vs. individual(s) as ordinary people	2	14.3
Government/people representing government vs. government/people representing government	1	7.1
Government/people representing government vs. individual(s) as ordinary people	5	35.7
Government/people representing government vs. business person(s)/corporate(s)	1	7.1
Other	3	21.4

<sup>a</sup> Percentage of all conflict accounts,  $N = 14$ .

## **APPENDIX E**

### **EXAMPLES OF PRIMARY STORIES WITH INTERNET DIFFUSION AND USE, AND INTERNET CENSORSHIP AND REGULATIONS AS PRIMARY SUBJECTS**

## 1. Internet Diffusion and Use

Country	Newspaper & Date	Headline
China	<i>The People's Daily</i> , January 23, 2000.	政府上网工程推出新举措 [Government Online Project makes new moves]
	<i>The People's Daily</i> , February 4, 2000.	农民上网找买家 [Peasants go online looking for buyers]
	<i>The People's Daily</i> , March 2, 2000.	中国人大新闻站点开通 [The news website of the National People's Congress is open]
	<i>The People's Daily</i> , January 12, 2001.	山东省开发“电子邮政” [Shangdong develops e-postal services]
	<i>The People's Daily</i> , February 16, 2001.	全国农业网站达 2200 家 [Agricultural websites amount to 2,200 throughout the country]
	<i>The People's Daily</i> , May 10, 2002.	西部大学校园网建设工程将启动 [The project of building universities' campus networks in Western China will be launched]
	<i>The People's Daily</i> , January 2, 2003.	给“新五类”网民画像 [Portraying “five new types” of netizens]
	<i>The People's Daily</i> , December 11, 2003.	中青网启用全新域名, CN 域名每月注册量超过 1 万 [The Youth Net starts using a new domain name; The number of registration for “.cn” domain names is over 10,000 per month]
	<i>The People's Daily</i> , March 20, 2004.	我国全面启动下一代互联网建设 [China completely starts building next generation of the Internet]
	<i>The People's Daily</i> , December 22, 2004.	山东安丘市检察院—“网上监督”实现“在线管理” [The Qian Procuratorate in Shandong: “online supervision” realizes “online management”]
	<i>The Beijing Youth Daily</i> , February 1, 2000.	王刚上网任人数落 [Wanggang goes online letting people scold]
	<i>The Beijing Youth Daily</i> , September 5, 2000.	网上传递谢师礼 [Pass gifts on the Internet in appreciation of teachers]
	<i>The Beijing Youth Daily</i> , July 26, 2000.	网络成为奥运新舞台 [The Net becomes the new stage of Olympics]
	<i>The Beijing Youth Daily</i> , October 24, 2001.	新疆网民挑战网络生存 [Xinjiang Netizens challenge being online]
	<i>The Beijing Youth Daily</i> , March 18, 2002.	大学生帮花农办网站 [College students help flower peasants to launch websites]

## 1. Internet Diffusion and Use (Continued)

Country	Newspaper & Date	Headline
China	The <i>Beijing Youth Daily</i> , June 13, 2003.	网驴不怵非典 [“Online donkeys” are not fearful of SARS]
	The <i>Beijing Youth Daily</i> , March 4, 2004	以个人名义 开通学雷锋网 [Personally open a website of learning from Lei Feng]
Hong Kong	The <i>Singtao Daily</i> , January 9, 2001.	中国三千万人曾上网 [China has 30 millions people with online experience]
	The <i>Singtao Daily</i> , April 3, 2001.	网吧提供宽频上网 [Internet cafés provide broadband access]
	The <i>South China Morning Post</i> , August 2, 2002.	China Web surfers No 2 in the world; User figures estimated to double every 12 to 18 months
Singapore	The <i>Lianhe Zaobao</i> , March 18, 2000.	中国首家 WAP 中文信息网开通 [China opens the first Chinese WAP website]
	The <i>Lianhe Zaobao</i> , September 23, 2000.	北京市公务员 45.7%从未上过网 [45.7% civil servants in Beijing never go online]
	The <i>Lianhe Zaobao</i> , September 29, 2000.	上海“88547”服务热线添婚姻网 [The service hotline “88547” in Shanghai sets up an additional website for marriage]
	The <i>Lianhe Zaobao</i> , December 12, 2000.	《死亡日記》吸引千万读者 上海著名网上作家陆幼青病逝 [ <i>Death Diary</i> attracts thousands and millions of readers; Shanghai famous online writer Lu Youqing dies]
	The <i>Lianhe Zaobao</i> , April 5, 2002.	清明节即将到来 中国网上祭祀之风猛吹 [Tomb-Sweeping Day is coming; The wind of online sacrifice is blasting in China]
	The <i>Lianhe Zaobao</i> , February 17, 2003.	42%中国网民愿为下载软件付费 [42% Chinese Internet users willing to pay for downloading software]
	The <i>Straits Times</i> , September 22, 2000.	Dalian ports use PSA system
	The <i>Straits Times</i> , February 14, 2002.	SMS way to a Happy New Year; A whopping two million messages flood mobile phones and the Internet in Beijing in the hour leading up to the New Year
	The <i>Straits Times</i> , March 19, 2003.	Students in Beijing addicted to Internet; Nearly 15% of secondary schoolchildren are stuck on cyberspace and online games, and the problem is expected to worsen



## 1. Internet Diffusion and Use (Continued)

Country	Newspaper & Date	Headline
Singapore	The <i>Straits Times</i> , October 5, 2003.	Online, China's protesters are too loud to ignore
	The <i>Straits Times</i> , January 6, 2004.	Chinese Internet users wield clout; Bombarded by thousands of furious online postings, police reopen case of a woman who got off lightly after causing a peasant's death
U.S.	The <i>New York Times</i> , June 29, 2000.	In China, Web Revolution Means Games
	The <i>New York Times</i> , January 16, 2004.	Chinese go online in search of justice against elite class
	The <i>New York Times</i> , December 06, 2004.	Beijing Loves the Web Until the Web Talks Back
	The <i>Log Angeles Times</i> , May 18, 2002.	Chinese surfers see more of Net
U.K.	The <i>Times</i> , June 10, 2000.	Internet use in China has doubled
	The <i>Times</i> , November 7, 2000.	Beijing decides to paint town grey
	The <i>Guardian</i> , January 15, 2001.	China tries to snare Tibet's web visitors
	The <i>Times</i> , April 3, 2001.	Chinese use the Net to speak out; Island a hub of military activity
	The <i>Guardian</i> , July 8, 2002.	Mr Li's diary reveals human dimension of the crisis in China

## 2. Internet Censorship and Regulations

Country	Newspaper & Date	Headline
China	The <i>People's Daily</i> , December 2, 2000.	国内首例网站与传统媒体的版权案昨宣判 [The first Internet copyright case was ruled yesterday]
	The <i>People's Daily</i> , December 18, 2000.	网络广告，亟待游戏规则 [Online advertising needs urgently game rules]
	The <i>People's Daily</i> , July 12, 2001.	全国公安机关集中清理整治违法违规“网吧” [Public security bureaus over the country clear up and publish illegal “Wangba”] <sup>125</sup>
	The <i>People's Daily</i> , June 19, 2002.	昆明市网吧停业整顿 [Wangba in Kungmin City are closed down and rectified]

<sup>125</sup> Wangba, Internet café or cyber café.

## 2. Internet Censorship and Regulations (Continued)

Country	Newspaper & Date	Headline
China	The <i>People's Daily</i> , January 30, 2003.	网吧，请让未成年人止步！ [ <i>Wangba</i> , please let the youth under age stop!]
	The <i>People's Daily</i> , March 21, 2004.	安全文明上网 自觉远离网吧 [Go online in a safe and civilized way; Consciously stay away from <i>Wangba</i> ]
	The <i>People's Daily</i> , July 18, 2004.	坚决拥护和支持打击淫秽色情网站专项行动 [Firmly support the special action cracking down on obscene and porn websites]
	The <i>People's Daily</i> , August 7, 2004.	全国各大商业网站全面清理涉“黄”信息 [Main commercial websites over the country completely clear up porn messages]
	The <i>People's Daily</i> , October 31, 2004.	上海：数百色情网 依法被关闭 [Shanghai: Hundreds porn websites are closed according to law]
Hong Kong	The <i>South China Morning Post</i> , October 4, 2000.	Rules hailed for adding clarity as shares falter
	The <i>South China Morning Post</i> , December 6, 2000.	Beijing seeks tighter Net bulletin-board controls
	The <i>South China Morning Post</i> , July 1, 2003.	Web sites told to clean up their content
	The <i>South China Morning Post</i> , January 26, 2004.	Firms in uphill battle to stop porn
	The <i>Singtao Daily</i> , September 14, 2002.	Google 网站部分解封 [Google is partly unblocked]
Singapore	The <i>Lianhe Zaobao</i> , May 18, 2000.	中国新闻网站管理法规今年半年或出台 [China will issue regulations on managing news websites in the first half of this year]
	The <i>Lianhe Zaobao</i> , June 4, 2000.	主页点击率高达 145 万 上海查获首例网络色情案 [Homepage hits reach 14.5 millions: The first case of porn websites is tracked down in Shanghai]
	The <i>Lianhe Zaobao</i> , June 10, 2000.	中国监管互联网广告 [China supervises Internet advertising]
	The <i>Lianhe Zaobao</i> , November 3, 2000.	中国公安部：买卖电邮地址会受到法律制裁 [China's ministry of public security: Buying and selling e-mail addresses subject to punishment according to law]
	The <i>Lianhe Zaobao</i> , June 24, 2001.	“大陆多家网上论坛被关闭” [Many online forums in mainland are shut down]

## 2. Internet Censorship and Regulations (Continued)

Country	Newspaper & Date	Headline
Singapore	The <i>Lianhe Zaobao</i> , February 18, 2004.	网络异议作者杜导斌被控颠覆中国国家政权 [Internet dissident writer Du Daobing is charged with subverting China's state regime]
	The <i>Straits Times</i> , June 21, 2000.	Beijing easing up on Internet control, says report by think-tank
	The <i>Straits Times</i> , January 22, 2001	China fights losing battle to censor cyberspace
	The <i>Straits Times</i> , July 22, 2003	On patrol: 30,000 cybercops
	The <i>Straits Times</i> , December 30, 2004	No let-up in China's crackdown on liberals; Analysts say arrests are an attempt by govt to assert control as social unrest increases
U.S.	The <i>New York Times</i> , January 27, 2000.	China lists controls to restrict the use of e-mail and Web
	The <i>New York Times</i> , August 24, 2000.	China arrests owner of Internet café
	The <i>Los Angeles Times</i> , October 3, 2000.	China issues new rules on Internet content
	The <i>New York Times</i> , October 4, 2000.	Tough new rules don't faze Chinese Internet start-ups
	The <i>New York Times</i> , October 11, 2000.	China lays out investment rules
	The <i>New York Times</i> , April 21, 2001.	China detains and isolates liberal computer wiz
	The <i>New York Times</i> , April 26, 2001.	Punching holes in Internet walls
	The <i>Los Angeles Times</i> , March 11, 2001.	Talk of blast cleared from China Internet
	The <i>Los Angeles Times</i> , September 10, 2001.	Censors and surfers locked in a battle over Internet access; China
	The <i>New York Times</i> , January 12, 2002.	Testing China's censors with a gay love story
	The <i>New York Times</i> , June 17, 2002.	Beijing mayor cracks down on Internet cafes after fatal fire
	The <i>New York Times</i> , September 4, 2002.	Beijing blocks access to Google
	The <i>New York Times</i> , December 4, 2002.	China has world's tightest Internet censorship, Study Finds
	The <i>New York Times</i> , December 19, 2002.	China: Internet publisher is detained

## 2. Internet Censorship and Regulations (Continued)

Country	Newspaper & Date	Headline
U.S.	The <i>New York Times</i> , January 28, 2004.	China urged to free 54 jailed in Internet use
	The <i>New York Times</i> , June 12, 2004.	China: Reprieve for Internet dissident
	The <i>New York Times</i> , June 27, 2004.	Despite an act of leniency, China has its eye on the Web
	The <i>Los Angeles Times</i> , June 12, 2004.	Chinese Web activist gets suspended sentence
	The <i>Los Angeles Times</i> , February 26, 2004.	China clamps down on Web news discussion
U.K.	The <i>Times</i> , January 28, 2000.	Internet in China stifled by new rules
	The <i>Times</i> , February 19, 2000.	China to censor website news
	The <i>Times</i> , March 14, 2000.	China softens IT restrictions
	The <i>Times</i> , March 27, 2000.	Beijing to curb online trade in audio-visual products
	The <i>Guardian</i> , June 3, 2000.	Beijing fails to hush Tiananmen whispers: 11 years on, defiant protesters and victims' families refuse to let the massacre be forgotten
	The <i>Guardian</i> , June 8, 2000.	Beijing tries, but fails, to gag Internet hosts
	The <i>Times</i> , April 13, 2001	Internet censors cut the Chinese chat
	The <i>Guardian</i> , September 27, 2001.	In the Chinese doghouse: Authorities lifted a ban on the BBC, but not for long
	The <i>Times</i> , September 4, 2002.	Chinese block on Internet
	The <i>Guardian</i> , September 5, 2002.	Engine trouble: In the mid 1990s, two Stanford university dropouts dreamed up a search engine with a unique cataloguing system. Now Google is the biggest on the Web. But not everyone is a fan - some say it unfairly favours certain websites. The latest critic is China, which has blocked it completely. Oliver Burkeman investigates
	The <i>Times</i> , May 30, 2003.	Beijing jails online critics in crackdown

## VITA

Xiang Zhou, with an English name Julie, earned her bachelor of arts degree in Chinese Language and Literature from the Wuhan University, mainland China, in July 1990 and was honored as one of the university's top graduates. As an undergraduate at the Wuhan University, she was awarded the Wen Yiduo Literature Prize and the top paper in the Contest of Academic Theses at the Advancing Front in Sciences and Social Science Research for her research on modern Chinese romantic poetry. She also won a national prize for one of her creative poems. She was a four-year recipient of the Wuhan University Scholarship and the honor of Excellent Undergraduate Student.

Because of her outstanding performance, she was waived from taking entrance exams and was recommended to the master program of Chinese language at the Wuhan University in September 1990. She majored in modern Chinese language with a concentration on Chinese rhetoric. She was awarded the Huang Kan Language Prize for her research on structural linguistics. Her master thesis won the Best Graduate Thesis Award. While co-teaching courses in Chinese, she also co-authored a textbook on traditional Chinese culture.

Before she received her Master's of Arts degree in July 1993, she reported for duty as a copy editor at the Xinhua News Agency, China's state-run agency, in March, 1993. During the time at the agency, she received a series of national and local awards for her professional achievements. She became a page principal in 1995, involved in taking charge of the front page and several columns of the *Reference News*. She co-launched the *Wednesday Supplement* of the digest daily newspaper, which was famous for its in-depth news analysis and lively international news features. She also worked part-time as a

special reporter/columnist for the *Leisure Weekly*, a weekly lifestyle newspaper published by the Beijing Press and Publications Administration. As a journalist in international news coverage, she specialized in U.S.-China relations and the Middle East, and published three books, including two volumes of translation, and hundreds of research papers and news articles in journalism and world affairs. Because of her achievements, she was awarded a national scholarship from China's Minister of Education in 1999.

With a goal to plunge herself into the course of journalism and communication education in China, Zhou came to the United States on August 16, 2000, for graduate studies. She first received a master's degree in communications with an emphasis in journalism in August 2002, from the University of Tennessee, and then started her journey for a Ph.D. in communication with a primary concentration in new media and a secondary concentration in statistics. During the six-year period at UT, she received the Edward J. Meeman Fellowship in international communication for four years. In 2003, she became a lifelong member of Kappa Tau Alpha, a national journalism honor society for the recognition of scholarship in mass communications because of her academic achievement and character. She was also featured in the 2004-2005 edition of *The Chancellor's List*, a compendium recognizing the academic achievements of outstanding graduate students in America. She received the top doctoral paper award at the 27<sup>th</sup> annual College of Communication and Information Annual Symposium at the University of Tennessee in 2005.

With primary research interests in the Internet, the Chinese media, international news, and framing, Zhou has presented papers at several international and national academic conferences, including the Association for Education in Journalism and Mass

Communications. Her research papers have appeared in the *Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly* and the *Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication*. She received a Scholarly Activity and Research Incentive Funds Grant from the Research Office, the University of Tennessee, in 2005. She also received the GSS Travel Fund in 2003 and 2004 from the University of Tennessee Graduate Student Senate, and the Montgomery-Howard Graduate Student Fund from the College of Communication and Information at UT in 2003, 2004 and 2006, for presenting her research papers at scholarly conferences.

Zhou had taught Chinese at various levels for four years as a graduate teaching associate in the Department of Modern Foreign Languages and Literatures at the University of Tennessee. She is currently a research assistant under the leadership of Dr. Carol Tenopir, the interim director of the Center of Information Studies at UT. She will leave the United States for her professorship at the Shantou University in Guangdong Province, China, after she graduates.

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