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# FORM FOLLOWS VALUES. Explaining Embassy Architecture

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I am submitting herewith a dissertation written by Natasha Dimitrova Guenova entitled "FORM FOLLOWS VALUES. Explaining Embassy Architecture." I have examined the final electronic copy of this dissertation for form and content and recommend that it be accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, with a major in Political Science.

Bruce E. Tonn, Major Professor

We have read this dissertation and recommend its acceptance:

Patricia K. Freeland, David J. Houston, Robert E. Jones

Accepted for the Council:

Dixie L. Thompson

Vice Provost and Dean of the Graduate School

(Original signatures are on file with official student records.)

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**FORM FOLLOWS VALUES**  
**Explaining Embassy Architecture**

**A Dissertation Presented for the  
Doctor of Philosophy Degree  
The University of Tennessee, Knoxville**

**Natasha Dimitrova Guenova**  
**May 2012**

To Prof. Harold D. Lasswell,  
for whom policy and architecture were tools for realizing the “the human dignity.”

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## Abstract

What influences the embassy architecture as expression of political values? For a cross-section of fifteen countries, the author performs linear regression analysis for fifty one embassies from 15 countries in 30 host countries. The measurements for the political values, reflected in embassies, were derived from a specially designed and conducted survey, for which 138 respondents from 14 countries rated buildings on the four political values of tradition, innovation, wealth and security. As explanatory variables, the analysis takes into account the wealth of both countries owning and hosting the respective embassy, domestic politics of the owner country, culture and regionalism. This examination of embassies demonstrates that political values can be measured and thus empirically examined, explained and predicted by different objective factors as well as by cultural affiliations. The major contribution of this study is the empirical support for the designed model for deriving stable measurements of political values. Values expressed in political architecture have the potential to support existing relations, to influence changes in behaviors, processes and activities and even to influence social and political change. The major finding of this study is that the wealth of host country is the single most important predictor of embassy design as reflection of values. Limitations for this study may be considered the use photographs as proxies for embassies, the comparatively small sample size and its Eurocentric focus. Despite these limitations, this study holds promise for a fruitful research agenda for examining first, how and why values change over time; second, how architectural forms support old or influence the occurrence of new and different values and third, if architecture matters, an empirical study of individual perceptions may reveal how architecture is important for different people. While there is substantial scholarship on the politics-architecture nexus, this study compliments this impressive scholarship, demonstrating that values reflected in and through architecture can be examined and measured empirically, and thus predicted by external factors. While values exist throughout all human activity, in architecture they are “frozen” and thus amenable to solid scientific examination because the function of political architecture is politics and the form is value-laden.

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## Chapter 1.

### Introduction

Several years ago, already a US citizen, I had to visit the American embassy in Sofia, Bulgaria, my country of origin. The embassy is one of the newly built and secured US embassy compounds, result of stringent design standards implemented since 2002 addressing security concerns. The experience - when entering - was surreal, intimidating and frightening. And I recalled my several past experiences from the late 1970s and early 1980s, when the US embassy was located in the perfect downtown on a pedestrian street in a regular building with an entrance directly from the sidewalk. On the front façade there was a glass display with constantly changing photographs and news briefs from the United States, and it was a great attention-catcher for passersby. There was only one Bulgarian guard, whose function was, most likely, part of the Bulgarian, at that time special – and frightening - security services, but he did not visibly bother anyone. Access was simple: you ring the bell and reply, for example, that you would like to visit the library, in my case. The door opened and you were kindly welcomed. Most likely, providing such experiences was part of the U.S. embassy propaganda agenda. Nevertheless, it is incomparable with today's "security" concerns. Thus, from my own personal experience I know that the formal part of embassies – besides their routine functioning - matters.

A world apart, another person had similar experiences. As a young man growing up in Singapore in the 1960s, Kishore Mahbubani<sup>1</sup> (2005) often walked into the United States Information Section of the American embassy to enjoy the library. The embassy in Singapore was similarly with only one guard and Singaporeans could walk freely in and out of the building

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<sup>1</sup> Kishore Mahbubani has been Singapore's Ambassador to the United Nations and is currently Dean of a School of Public Policy in Singapore. He is a regular contributor to newspapers and journals, including *Foreign Affairs* and *Foreign Policy*. His wife is a US citizen.

at a time when that part of the world was in turmoil with the Vietnam war picking up steam. At that time, American diplomats could safely walk the streets and live and work in regular buildings, in contrast to the present fortified compounds. Mahbubani also observed that while in the past, American embassies looked welcoming, at the time of his writing all new American embassies were built as fortresses. Mahbubani suggests that while their physical openness in the past symbolized an open society, today “American embassies look like citadels on the hill, besieged by their own defenses,” (134) neither open, nor welcoming.

This change is – maybe – best expressed by Thomas Friedman’s experience in Istanbul, Turkey (Fig.1).

*The U.S. Consulate used to be in the heart of the city, where it was easy ... to pop in for a visa or to use the library. For security reasons ...the new consulate looks like a maximum-security prison. All that's missing is a moat with alligators and a sign that says: "Attention! You are now approaching a U.S. Consulate. Any sudden movement and you will be shot. All visitors welcome." ... We need to figure out a better system. Because where birds don't fly, ideas don't fly, friendships don't fly and mutual understanding never takes off.*

(Friedman December 21, 2003)

### **1.1. Embassy Architecture Matters**

Embassy buildings are nations’ physical embodiments abroad. At their best, embassies may set the stage for building bridges among nations, while at their worst they can aggravate difficult relations. While in the 1950s and 60s the United States’ embassies were employed to project to the world an image of novelty, openness and optimism, since the 1980s they represent security, fear and anxiety. Whether representing optimistic novelty, straightforward existential fear, unabashed self-interest or national identity, in the modern era embassy architecture as art proliferates from Washington to Berlin to Addis Ababa. Embassy architecture is used as a powerful tool for making bold political statements about international relations.

In the post-WWII years most of the newly built U.S. embassies were innovative, modernist, symbolizing an open and progressive society. Their modernist design was part of the

country's foreign policy of promoting its interests abroad and countering the influence of the ideological opponent at that time, the Soviet Union. The U.S. Embassy in Delhi, India, is a telling example of that period. As India claimed neutrality, the State Department opted for a modernist avant-garde building which was praised by India's Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, and the Indian public received it enthusiastically. According to the architectural historian and expert on the U.S. embassies Jane Loeffler (1998), it turned out to be a "lasting diplomatic coup" (p. 38). (Fig. 2) On the other side, Ron Robin (1992) points out how the precedence of ideology over function produced dysfunctional buildings, ignoring the fundamental function of an embassy – to provide quarters for the conducting of routine business. Robin notes that the embassy in New Delhi drew sharp criticism from Ambassador John Galbraith, who objected the monumentality of the building at the expense of functionality. Consistent complaints about dysfunctional embassies prompted revisions of the guidelines of the Architectural Advisory Panel at the Office of Foreign Buildings Operations to the State Department, which stressed the practical side of the buildings as opposed to their monumentality or symbolism.<sup>2</sup>

How embassy architecture matters and how the change in embassy architecture occurred has been already the subject of scholarly interest (Robin 1992; Loeffler 1998). What has to be done about the architectural design of future embassies also has been the subject of public, political and professional discussions (Loeffler 1998; Loeffler 2008). For example, besides the discussions in the media and professional journals, in May 2009, Senator John Kerry addressed the issue at a Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing. Kerry said, "We are building some of the ugliest embassies I've ever seen. We're building fortresses around the world. We're separating ourselves from people in these countries. I cringe when I see what we're doing"

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<sup>2</sup> (1963). *Open Diplomacy*. *Times*, 12 April 1963, cited in Robin, 1992., cited in Robin, R. (1992). *Enclaves of America*. Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press.

(Kennicott July 19, 2009). Shortly before that, on July 1, 2009, from its side, the American Institute of Architects (AIA) (July 1, 2009) presented its report in which the architectural profession envisioned embassies, “the physical presence of the United States beyond its borders,” as “symbols of the values and aspirations of the American people” (p. 3) and suggested recommendations and strategies of design excellence for achieving ideological and political goals.

Explanations of embassies as “strategic investments” signaling commitments to relations with nations has also been the subject of scientific research (Webster 2001a; Webster 2001b; Webster 2001c; Webster and Ivanov 2007). While they are conducted in a rigorous empirical fashion, these studies treat embassies only as strategic investments, not accounting for their symbolic significance, which is, in fact, an important part of embassies as national representations abroad. The construction of embassies is a dimension of foreign policy and thus, embassies may be considered foreign policy outcomes, objectified through architecture. Embassies are not unique buildings. They are one type of government buildings, or political architecture, which are expected to be especially expressive as symbols of countries abroad. The literature review reveals a widely accepted agreement that architecture reflects values (Lasswell 1979; Goodsell 1988a; Goodsell 1988b; Goodsell 2001; Valkov 2009, among others). From the literature on the United States embassy program emerge four major points. First, from the beginning of the 20th century and up to the post-WWII years, the architectural patterns were traditional, neo-classical. Second, since the late 1940s and up to the 1970s; there was a definite shift in the embassy program to Modernist architecture as an ideological reaction to the totalitarian neo-classical architecture in the Soviet Union during the Stalinist period.



Figure 1: U.S. Consulate in Istanbul, Turkey, early 2000s.<sup>3</sup>




Figure 2: U.S. Embassy in New Delhi, India. Architect: Edward Durrell Stone (1954-1959)  
Source: Khan, Hasan-Uddin (2001). International Style: Modernist Architecture from 1925 to 1965

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<sup>3</sup> The source for the photographs, which were obtained from the internet, are provided at the end of the study.

Third, from the very beginning, the embassy program was employed for promoting American business interests abroad to the extent of transforming the program itself into a real estate business enterprise in the post-WWII years, against which, in the early 1950s “members of Congress argued forcefully that the government should not be in the business of real estate speculation and urged FBO to sell off all properties for which there was no immediate use”(Loeffler 1998, p. 49). Fourth, since the terrorist attacks from the 1980s, security has become the major redefining concern in embassy building and is powerfully reflected in fortress-like structures. These four architectural types are quite universal in the sense that they reflect four basic human needs, or values: 1) stability, continuity, social order; 2) innovation, change or progress, moving forward; 3) wealth or prosperity and 4) safety and security. These values are also consistent, to a large extent, with Schwartz’ theory of integrated value systems (Schwartz 1992; Schwartz 1994; Schwartz 1996). What also emerges from the literature is the differential approach to designing and building embassies in different countries, contingent on their power or wealth; culture and religion, belonging or not to a region, or geopolitics (Robin 1992; Loeffler 1998; Webster 2001a; Webster 2001b; Webster 2001c; Webster and Ivanov 2007).

## **1.2. Thesis Statement and Research Question**

While the literature on political architecture, in general, and on embassies, in particular, provides a wealth of information and suggests explanatory variables, rigorous empirical testing of suggested hypotheses on political values expressed through architecture is limited and this is the subject of my study. The thesis of this study is that in embassy architecture *form follows values* and national characteristics of both countries - that owns and that hosts the embassy - will influence what values will prevail in the embassy architecture. While a research agenda on

embassies could be substantial in scope, as a beginning, the research question, which I aim to answer through this study is, “*What influences the architecture of embassy buildings?*”

Architecture consists of two major aspects: utility (function, content) and aesthetics (beauty, style, form), most generally defined. If function is constant, as is the case for one type of buildings, variation in form must necessarily reflect values (Prown 1980). In the case of embassy architecture, these values could be expected to be even purposely reinforced. In contrast to the strictly functionalist assumption that *form follows function*, I argue that in political architecture *form follows values*<sup>4</sup>. This is not a rejection of functionalism, but a qualification for political architecture.

*Values*, defined broadly as things, ideas and beliefs that matter, are expected to be purposely reflected in political architecture and the four general political values reflected in the United States embassies— *tradition, innovation, wealth* and *security* – are expected to be reflected in other countries’ embassies also, with tradition less expressed in an era of globalization. Robin (1992) claims that American symbols abroad vary by place and time. This claim can be generalized for all political architecture and is supported by other scholars’ claims that architecture reflects values at the time of construction (Lasswell 1979; Goodsell 1988a; Mayo 1996). Hence, this study will focus on embassies built since the 1980s, a period of essential recognizable common characteristics of world politics, known as economic and financial globalization, or neoliberalism.

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<sup>4</sup> In other words, this is a summary of the hypotheses that built environments reflect values.



### **1.3. Research Methods**

The conceptualization of values reflected in embassy architecture is based on the four major design patterns reflecting the values of tradition, innovation, wealth and security. The purpose of this study is from these sufficiently common patterns of embassy architecture to derive measurements for the respective four political values and to examine what national and international factors influence what political values are purposefully expressed, or just reflected in embassy designs. As a result, such a study can contribute to better understanding and predicting changes in the architectural landscape of embassy building. As there are not metrics for the four major values reflected in embassy architecture, survey is the method of research choice to obtain such measurements and, consequently, the analysis technique is ordinary least squares (OLS) regression. The unit of analysis is the embassy buildings, represented by its proxy – a photograph, and the levels of analysis are individual (in relation to respondents of the survey), national (factors) and international (cultural affiliations between nations and regionalism). The dependent variables are the political values of tradition, innovation, wealth and security, derived from a survey of 138 respondents from 14 countries. The independent variables are national characteristics: the wealth of both countries that own and host the embassies; military power, political culture, exports and unemployment of the owner country and indicators of cultural affiliation to civilization and religion, and proximity. To account for the probable influence of respondents' perceptions on creating the measurements for the reflected values in embassies, regression analysis of three individual embassies is conducted.

#### **1.4. Conclusions, Limitations and Dissertation Outline**

In conclusion, this examination of embassies demonstrates that political values – as reflected in architectural patterns of government buildings – can be measured and thus empirically examined, explained and predicted by different objective factors as well as by cultural affiliations. The major contribution of this study is the empirical support for the designed model for deriving stable measurements of political values, defined as supra-individual, collective and reflected in the man-created environments. They are stable because are reflected in physical forms, enduring over long periods of time. Values expressed in political architecture have the potential to support existing relations, to influence changes in behaviors, processes and activities and even to influence social and political change. The major finding of this study is that the characteristics of host country are the single most important predictors of embassy design as reflection of values. The data provide strong support for the Realist perspective in international relations that countries act in their self-interest as well as for the Identity perspective about the importance of cultural factors and some for the Liberal perspective about the importance of trade in international relations.

The major limitation of this study is its Eurocentric focus, which is due to the lack of information about embassies of other, less wealthy and non-Western nations as well as of the lack of relevant scientific literature. While with some limitations, this study holds promise for successful research agenda for examining first, how and why values change over time; second, how architectural forms support old or influence the occurrence of new and different values and third, if architecture matters, an empirical study of individual perceptions may reveal how architecture is important for different people. While there is substantial scholarship on the politics-architecture nexus, this study compliments this impressive scholarship, demonstrating

that values reflected in and through architecture can be examined and measured empirically, and thus explained and predicted by external factors. While values exist throughout all human activity, in architecture they are “frozen” and thus amenable to solid scientific examination because the function of political architecture is politics and the form is value-laden.

This study consists of six parts. The introductory part (Chapter I) is followed by Literature review (Chapter II), which summarizes previous research on architecture relevant to political science. Based on the existing literature, this part of the study examined definitions of architecture, reveals the role of architecture in expressing and reflecting political values and identifies the topic of my dissertation *Form follows Values*, which is developed in the next Chapter III. This chapter examines theories on form and function, architectural functionalism, values and embassy architecture, which provide the basic set of explanatory variables for testing hypotheses for their explanatory and predictive power for embassy architectural patterns as reflection of values. In Chapter IV: Methods, I provide the key conceptual and operational definitions of political values exemplified in embassy architecture and clarify how their measurements are derived from a specially designed and conducted survey among respondents from a variety of countries. Here the possible explanatory variables related to the countries that own and host the embassies under examination, the sample, the level of analysis – individual, national and international- and the last thirty – years period selected are identified, analyzed and justified. Four models – for the four major political values – are proposed. The analyses of the results is presented and discussed in the next part – Chapter V. Analysis - using descriptive statistics for reporting the ratings of individual buildings, bivariate – for reporting and interpreting difference of means tests for the dependent and independent variables, and multivariate statistics for the regression models. A sensitivity analysis of parallel regression

models is performed to account for the overrepresentation of US and finally, regressions on three embassies were run to account for variation in respondents' ratings. In the last part – Chapter VI: Conclusions – I summarize the conducted research and its findings; discuss the significance of the findings; identify limitations as well as questions for future research.

## **Chapter 2.**

### **Political Architecture**

The role of architecture and the built environment - more generally - for political purposes is evidenced from the most ancient times throughout history. For what we know about history is based on writings and on material artifacts, the greater part of which are constructions. Besides, from at least Plato, most political visions have been expressed through architectural and urban metaphors. In general, architecture can legitimate authority and, by interpreting ideals through physical form, may serve as inspiration. By creating new forms, architecture also creates possibilities for new contents. Thus, architecture is a powerful political tool for achieving different purposes based on values and this is the essence of the politics-architecture nexus, or political architecture.

In outline, this chapter summarizes the literature on political architecture relevant to political science, beginning with defining architecture in general and political architecture, in particular. This is followed by examining how architecture matters for politics and review of the literature examining how architecture reflects political values.

While architecture has been defined in many – often contradictory - ways, one of the most accepted definitions is a unity of form and function. The comprehensive examination of definitions of architecture reveals how assumptions of human nature and values underlie different views of architecture as a tool for achieving different goals. For the purpose of this study architecture refers mainly to political architecture represented by government buildings. The second section of this chapter demonstrates how architecture may serve politics for legitimation of power, creating a sense of community, envisioning a probable future and also for

conducting conventional everyday politics. The role of architecture for society is revealed not only by writings of great visionaries but also by brief review of some New Deal policies in this country which may be relevant even today in the current economic crisis. The final, third section demonstrates that the politics-architecture nexus is about values, such as power (as domination), political authority, national identity as well as tradition, innovation, wealth and security, as revealed by the literature on US embassies. In conclusion, the literature review reveals that there is already a widely accepted agreement that political architecture reflects the values of the time. As they are embodied in physical observable forms, enduring over time, a formal analysis of architectural patterns can provide information of the dominant values during a definite period of time.

## **2.1. Architecture Defined**

Architecture has been defined as “the ultimate aim of all creative activity”<sup>5</sup>, pure art, disregarding utility, “social art” with political implications (Mayo 1996), “the signature of power” (Lasswell 1979), legitimization of power (Goodsell 1988a; Mayo 1996, among others), an economic factor (Lefebvre 1991; Mayo 1996; Judd and Fainstein 1999; Hackworth 2007), durable “readout” of the past (Goodsell 1988a) and also as ideology (Ockman 1985). Most generally, architecture is defined as a unity of form (style, aesthetics, symbolism) and function (content, utility).

While definitions vary, paraphrasing one of the 20<sup>th</sup> century most pronounced architects, Le Corbusier (1985), architecture realizes an order by arrangement of forms and shapes to affect

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<sup>5</sup> This definition is a part of the *Manifesto and program of the Weimar Bauhaus*, founded by Walter Gropius in Germany in 1919 with the purpose of ending the isolation of the arts one from the other. While during the school’s 1919-1926 Weimar period, the focus was on elevating the status of the crafts to that of fine arts, during its Dessau phase from 1926 to its closing by the Nazis in 1933, the focus of Bauhaus was on architectural form, aesthetics, for achieving social purposes.

our senses. By the relationships it creates, it awakes profound echoes in us, it gives us the measure of an order which we feel – or not – to be in accordance with that of our world and determines the various movements of our heart and of our understanding. While “the purpose of construction is “TO MAKE THINGS HOLD TOGETHER, of architecture is TO MOVE US” (19). *Architecture is capable to impress immensely by its objectivity. While architecture “is rooted in hard fact it spiritualizes it because the naked fact is nothing more than the materialization of a possible idea”* (26, emphasis added). The naked fact is a medium for ideas only by reason of the “order” that is applied to it. The emotions that architecture arouses spring from physical conditions that are inevitable and irrefutable. Architecture, according to Le Corbusier, “is the first manifestation of man, creating his own universe” (73); *it is the art above all others which achieves a state of platonic grandeur, mathematical order, speculation, and perceptions which lie in the emotional relationships; “this is the AIM of architecture”* (111, emphasis added). Houses and palaces are built from stone, wood and concrete. “That is construction. Ingenuity is at work.” If a building touches our hearts, “[T]hat is Architecture. Art enters in.” This is because architecture expresses “a thought”. “A thought which reveals itself without word or sound, but solely by means of shapes which stand in a certain relationship to one another” By the use of raw materials and starting from conditions more or less utilitarian, architecture establishes certain relationships which arouse emotions. “That is Architecture” (Le Corbusier 1985, p. 153).

Quite consistent with Le Corbusier’s notion of architecture is Lasswell’s (1979), - one of the founders of modern political science - whose view on the possible transformative role of architecture and environmental design is evident from the – albeit rhetorical - concluding part of

his “sketch” in the last chapter (“The Earth as an Icon”) in his book *The Signature of Power*,<sup>6</sup> which reveals Lasswell’s idealistic grand view of policy goals: “realization of human dignity on the widest possible scale” (xiii). Thus, according to Lasswell, the question is: how architecture – as the signature of power – “might contribute to the realization of a secure world, and of a society in which self-integrating tendencies keep the upper hand over tendencies toward self-segregation” (xiv). Although somewhat scientifically vague, Lasswell’s concerns are still current, especially now in an era of “lifestyle politics” based on consumption and consumerism where architecture – or “design” - defines the “lifestyle” part with economic, social and political consequences, resulting in segregation and exclusion of publics and negative influence on politics (Bickford 2000; Williamson, Imbroscio et al. 2002; Kohn 2004; Purcell 2008).

Lasswell’s idealistic view of the positive transformative role of architecture is also demonstrated by his discussion of prisons. For him, prisons are political buildings, designed and constructed on an assumption about human nature and thus, they can be constructed to intimidate or to rehabilitate, and Lasswell considers that “it is not impossible to create special environments in which ‘defectives’ can lead relatively happy and productive, though restrictive lives.” “It is essential to plan optimum physical surroundings for correctional problem persons considering their sex, age, health condition, personality structure, social background and prospects” (pp.40-41).

This vision is in stark contrast to the utilitarian, also idealist view of the English philosopher Jeremy Bentham, who realized too, that architecture could be a powerful tool for achieving social and political goals. Bentham invented the panopticon, or the “all-seeing” structure, and was passionate of applying it to transform society. Bentham defines his vision of

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<sup>6</sup> As the signature is the material, objective side of one person’s mind, thought or decision, so is architecture the objectified signature of power, or politics.



the panopticon in the title of his writings. It is “THE INSPECTION-HOUSE: containing the idea of a new principle of construction applicable to any sort of establishment, in which persons of any description are to be kept under inspection, and in particular to penitentiary-houses, prisons, houses of industry, work-houses, poor-houses, lazarettos, manufactories, hospitals, mad-houses, and schools with a plan of management...” The idea is presented in first lines of his introduction: *“Morals reformed - health preserved - industry invigorated instruction diffused - public burthens lightened - Economy seated, as it were, upon a rock - the gordian knot of the Poor-Laws are not cut, but untied - all by a simple idea in Architecture!-...A new mode of obtaining power of mind over mind, in a quantity hitherto without example: and that, to a degree equally without example, secured by whoever chooses to have it so, against abuse. - Such is the engine: such the work that may be done with it.”*<sup>7</sup>

The caveat is “against abuse.” Architecture is a tool and, as such, can be used for achieving different goals. Based on Bentham’s writings, French philosopher Michel Foucault (1995) has examined how prison architecture was used as surveillance structure – “machine” - for creating and sustaining power relations independent of concrete people, a theme further developed on contemporary methods for maintaining social order in the cities (Dear and Flusty 1997; Flusty 1997; Lang 2004; Lang 2008). What is of importance here is the underlying assumption of human nature and thus the underlying value system, which is reflected in architecture as artifacts.

Public administrationist, Charles T. Goodsell (1988a) views architecture as “physical and therefore durable ‘readout’ of common tendencies in political life prevailing at the time of construction” (xv) (which is in fact objectified values) and has studied parliaments, American

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<sup>7</sup> Bentham, J. (1995). The Panopticon Writings. Panopticon. M. Bozovic. London, Verso., available at: <http://cartome.org/panopticon2.htm>

statehouses and city-council halls as symbols of political authority (Goodsell 1988a; Goodsell 1988b; 2001). The property of architecture as durable is one of its three defining properties according to the Roman architect Vitruvius from 1st century BC, who - in his *De Architectura* (“On Architecture”) – defined architecture as a synthesis of the three properties of *firmitas*, *utilitas*, *venustas* — that is, *durability*, *utility*, *beauty*. Consistent with this “ancient” definition of architecture is Lasswell’s interpretation in his pioneering examination of architecture, *The Signature of Power: Buildings, Communication, and Policy* (1979), the most comprehensive analysis of the politics (and policy) -architecture nexus, in which -as the title (amazingly – intentionally or intuitively) indicates the three properties of architecture: the building as a durable, time-contingent, physical object of architectural practice (*firmitas*), the symbolic communicative function of architecture (*venustas*) and the utilitarian, practical side of architecture as a response to needs (*utilitas*). This definition is still valid, especially for political architecture, and arguments vary as to which of these three qualities has priority. This “ancient” definition provides also a good method of “triangulating” knowledge as providing maximum strength, according to the laws of physics. As no forms and functions are constant, or “timeless”, any analysis of architecture needs to specify the time period of construction or analysis, something noted by practically all authors.

Lasswell examines the relationship between architecture and power on two levels, or scales. First, on the levels of world politics, where the expectation is of violence, Lasswell examines how the fundamental structure of power helps to explain characteristic features of the built environment and the architecture of fortification, in particular. Second, in contrast to the international environment, which Lasswell calls “military”, he defines the domestic arena as

“civil” and argues that on this scale power-sharing affects government buildings and the built environment, more generally.

The role of scale (space) is emphasized also by Andrew Seidel (1988) who relates politics and architecture through scale and argues that political behavior can range from the informal (office politics) to the formal (political philosophy) and its relation to the built environment varies from micro (room furnishings) to the macro (continental surveying). Seidel’s framework actually utilizes a definition of architecture, ranging from interior design to buildings, to urban design and planning of spaces to regional transnational planning. This is consistent with a general definition of architecture as spatial organization ranging from interiors of buildings to regional planning, reflected in many university programs all over the world.

While some may share Goethe’s view of architecture as “frozen music,” architecture could be better compared to “frozen politics” as it, for sure, is “the signature of power,” as Lasswell aptly named his book on buildings, communication, and policy. This is the meaning in which Lasswell (1979) uses the term: *architecture as a means of communicating expected relationships and which lends itself to examination because its signs “tend to ‘freeze’ a given pattern of relationship”* (p. 19).

In relation to embassy architecture, Robin (1992) defines political architecture as “a mode of monumental construction that openly demands some form of privilege for its patrons by distinguishing the particular dimensions of their power over those of the rival political entities” (p. 9). This definition obviously refers to “great powers” embassy architecture. However, all countries build embassies and thus a more general purpose of embassy architecture is to influence perceptions and strategic political decisions by purposely and selectively expressed ideas and values. While embassies are assumed to be more symbolically expressive, they are not

a unique type of buildings, but a type of government buildings in a foreign country. Many domestic governmental buildings may be as much - or even more expressive - than the respective embassies of the country abroad. Thus, the literature on political architecture - understood as public and/or government buildings - is the basis of any analysis of embassies.

## 2.2. Architecture Matters

The power of symbolic architecture is so impressive that it was used by the authors of *Reframing Organizations* (Bolman and Deal 1997) to emphasize the role of organizational culture and symbols, expressed through architecture. The following quotation also demonstrates the use of architecture as a powerful tool of consumerist politics in the era of globalization and neo-liberalization.

*To awestruck sightseers in the land of the business hierarchy, the architectural grandeur is overpowering and impressive. Stately edifices dominate landscaped vistas of suburbia and mighty skyscrapers silhouette the profiles of major cities. Flowering gardens, soaring plazas, ample parking, vaulted lobbies, air conditioning, musical elevators, carpeted lounges, spacious dining rooms, and hundreds upon hundreds of linear offices bathed relentlessly in fluorescent brilliance dutifully impress gaping tourists. But all this structural munificence does not divert the expert gamester who looks beyond the steel and concrete public visor of the corporate persona to identify the heraldic markings painted on the battle armor. Like the shields carried by knights of legend, the modern corporate building reeks with symbolism. Far from being a mere architectural wonder, every pane of glass, slab of marble, and foot of carpet performs a dual function in identifying the tournament site. The buildings are impersonal monuments to the power and wealth contained therein. Space itself, in both the exterior and interior layout, is weighted with abstract significance. Just as a heraldic seal reveals a great deal about the one using it, so spatial divisions reveal information about the modern-day knights.*<sup>8</sup>

Similarly, the design and symbolism of public buildings may inspire awe in the citizens and thus reinforce political power (Goodsell 1988a). At a more mundane level, government offices and meeting rooms – with their design, size and décor – may reinforce the impression of just authority (Edelman 1995), or simply inspire noble ideas. However, architecture relates to politics not only symbolically but also substantively. By providing spaces for conventional everyday life

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<sup>8</sup> Harragan, B. L. (1977). *Games Mother Never Taught You*. New York, Rawson Associates., quoted in Bolman, L. G. and T. E. Deal (1997). *Reframing Organizations*. San Francisco, Jossey-Bass Inc., Publishers., pp. 211-212.

and by creating new forms and spaces, architecture may offers - although limited – new possibilities for social and political change (Ockman 1985; Mayo 1996), rehabilitating prisoners (Lasswell 1979), supporting public life, creating social capital and practicing everyday citizenship (Putnam 1994; Bickford 2000; Putnam and Feldstein. 2003; Kohn 2004) as well as promoting consumerism (Chase 1991, among others).

In his general theory of the politics-architecture nexus, Mayo (1996) demonstrates succinctly how architecture is relevant to politics as: 1) propaganda, 2) advocacy, 3) utopias and 4) conventional politics. Design as a form of propaganda can help a political agenda gain attention and support. According to Mayo, design as propaganda may laud the past, but in actuality it is consistently used “to pave the way toward expanding political authority or personal power” (p. 81).<sup>9</sup> An example for the positive role of symbolism is the engagement of the federal government during the New Deal in public art, including architecture. Realizing the role of art and discovering that “contemporary realistic representations were the most effective form of iconography”, the federal government involved public art and produced “working guidelines that eventually affected the content of postwar symbolism” (Robin 1992, p. 107).

Architecture as an *advocacy* strategy can be used to challenge the distribution of political power and to introduce alternative political practices that focus on supporting a given minority position or challenge current processes for reproducing political relations in the built environment. Mayo notes that scientific research “has moved beyond simple physical determinism” (p. 76) and “human process used in design may do more that create innovative architecture” that “can redefine what functions are desirable or even what portions of an ideology are worth sustaining or rejecting” (p. 85), without, nevertheless, eliminating the dominant role of ideology.

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<sup>9</sup> See also Mayo, J. M. (1978). "Propaganda with Design: Environmental Dramaturgy in the Political Rally." *JAE, Politics and Design Symbolism* 32(2).

As *utopias* enable people to realize that political agendas can have an achievable physical vision, architecture is a powerful tool of visualizing ideas and possible futures. For example, the 1893 Columbian Exposition in Chicago created a temporary landscape as a hopeful guide to the future of this country. “Thus utopias are humankind’s attempts to provide physical manifestation of social ideologies, and these settings can then support or create a reaction against the initial ideological aims.” (Mayo, 1996; p. 81)

Architecture serves also the ends of *conventional politics*. Societies need buildings to carry out their everyday functions and where public authorities can exercise legitimate power to reshape behaviors and lives, as for example in prisons. On the other side, the design of city halls, state capitols and embassies provides a setting for politics while simultaneously legitimating the political structure as a symbolic statement. The public buildings provide a spatial presence of politics. “Design can shape and reflect politics in many contingent ways,” concludes Mayo (1996, 81).

Returning back to Le Corbusier on the role of architecture, he is categorical in providing an answer for the role of architecture: “*Architecture of Revolution. Revolution can be avoided.*” (1985, p. 289) Le Corbusier’s slogan is not so much rejection of revolutions as a reflection of his belief in the positive transformative role of architectural forms for everyday life. For philosopher Lefebvre (1991), space is a productive force and the fundamental category of politics, prompting him to declare: “Change Life! Change society! These precepts mean nothing without the production of space.” (p. 59)

In the current economic crisis, how architecture may be important is evident from the history of this country in the 1930s, when – as a part of the New Deal – the construction of public projects such as national and state parks, schools, conservation trails and playgrounds,

became a way to counter the Depression by providing work opportunities and for which purpose the Public Works Administration (PWA) and the Work Projects Administration were founded. Between 1933 and 1939, The PWA administered “70% of the country’s new school buildings, 65% of its courthouses, city halls and sewage plants, and 35% of its hospitals and public health facilities – a major architectural venture” (Auge 1995, p. 91, see also Ghirardo 1989). On the negative side, the ongoing suburbanization of this country is considered one of the three major threats - along with mobility of capital inside and outside the country – to “to community and democracy in the United States” (Williamson, Imbroscio et al. 2002; p. 25).

The role of architecture and urban design for expressing political ideas and public values has been widely acknowledged (Moynihan 1967; Lasswell 1979; Milne 1981; Goodsell 1988a; Mayo 1996). At the same time, as public administrationist Charles Goodsell (1988a) notes in his book, *The Social Meaning of Civic Space: Studying Political Authority*, architecture is a durable “readout of common tendencies in political life prevailing at the time of construction” (vi). Architecture can “tell” a lot about “those who inspired, built, arranged, and use it” (p. 7). Thus architecture matters in many different ways and it affects politics on all levels, from city hall meetings to national events - on the Mall in Washington, for example - to the diverse multicultural global cities, where the city hall does not matter anymore. Although somewhat hyperbolically, Carter Wiseman’s (1998), book title *Shaping of a Nation: Twentieth-century American Architecture and Its Makers* makes a point: architecture can shape a nation with the help of its makers and as the result of political decisions. The examples of skyscrapers and suburbanization – as forms - evidence the role of architecture and urbanism for this country.

### 2.3. The Politics-Architecture Nexus Is about Values

The relationship between politics and architecture is part of the more general cause-and-effect relationship between the built environment and behavior, part of which is architecture in the service of politics as a tool for structuring perceptions, or buildings purposely designed for politics (Mayo 1996). This is well expressed by Churchill's famous statement "We shape our buildings, and afterwards our buildings shape us."<sup>10</sup> While Churchill's hypothesis is representative of architectural determinism *there is a widely accepted agreement that architecture can influence – enhance or inhibit – political processes and this is the major point of interest to political science scholarship.* Architecture is a powerful political tool for achieving influence through examples of magnificence, wealth and craftsmanship as well as for propaganda through manipulating symbolic meanings.

Theoretical concerns for the relationship between the built environment and politics have been of interest to scholars from different fields, such as environmental psychology, architecture and urban planning as well as geography. Academic interest in the spatial relations is a long and well established tradition. Political scholars have studied: power and architecture (Lasswell 1979); the political economy of the city (Long 1949; Downs 1969; Long 1971; Long 1977; Long 1980; Downs 1994); the symbolism and influence of interior design in courts (Nagel 1962; Hazard 1994); the meanings of civic spaces (Goodsell 1977; Goodsell 1988a; Goodsell 1988b; Goodsell 2001); civic spaces and social capital (Putnam 1995; Putnam 2000; Putnam and Feldstein. 2003); citizenship, public space and inequality (Bickford 2000; Kohn 2004); public

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<sup>10</sup> From Churchill's speech of October 28, 1943 to the House of the Commons when he addressed the reconstruction of the Commons chamber demolished during a Luftwaffe air raid in May 1941. Quoted and cited in Goodsell, C. T. (1988a). The Social Meaning of Civic Space: Studying Political Authority. Lawrence, University Press of Kansas. Goodsell suggests that in this phrase, Churchill was most likely echoing Montesquieu's words, "At the birth of societies, the rulers of republics establish institutions; afterwards the institutions mold the rulers." (quoted in Goodsell, 1988, p.5, n.7)



space, democracy and citizenship (Barber 1984; Barber 1996; Barber 1998); suburbia (sprawl) and economic development (Williamson, Imbroscio et al. 2002; Hackworth 2007; among others); the impact of superstores (Wal-Mart) on rural communities (Stone 1997); the interaction between politics and architecture and the symbolism of monuments and memorials (Mayo 1978; Mayo 1996), among others. Scholars from other fields have also addressed similar issues: anthropology (Hall 1966; Hall 1968; Watson 1969; Hall and Hall 1995; Hall 1998); sociology (Gottdiener 1985; Saunders 1985; Lefebvre 1991; Oldenburg 1991; Robin 1992; Lefebvre 1996); geography (Soja 1980; Harvey 1985; Soja 1992; Soja 1995; Soja 1996; Soja 1996; Harvey 2001); urban planning (Davidoff 1965; Fainstein and Fainstein 1978; Forester 1989; Hoch 1994 ; Phillips 1996; Ellin 1997; Ellin 1999; Judd and Fainstein 1999; Fainstein 2001; Ross and Levine 2001; Ross and Levine 2001; Cochrane 2006; Hackworth 2007; Purcell 2008; Mumford (1938), 1970); architecture and urban design (Crawford 1995; Chase, Crawford et al. 1999; Shane 2005; Greenberg 2006; Shane 2008); cultural studies (Loeffler 1998); to which need to be added self-taught urbanologist Jane Jacobs (1961).

Some political scholars have made major theoretical contributions to the study of the relationship between politics and architecture, specifically relating values to political architecture. Lasswell's (1979) examination of the politics (and policy) – architecture relationship touches all aspects of this relationship, Goodsell's (Goodsell 1988a; Goodsell 1988b; Goodsell 2001) focus is on how political authority is reflected in different types of government buildings while Mayo (1996) has developed a full blown general theory of the politics-architecture nexus.

### **2.3.1. Architecture as power**

The possibility to express unequivocally the idea of power as domination with architectural devices is widely acknowledged and well examined. The positive role that political architecture can play in society has also been well acknowledged (Lasswell 1979; Goodsell 1988a; Markus 1993; Mayo 1996). On the other side, in the current era of consumerism, the success of commercial architecture is a good example of expressing the power of the market (Chase 1991).

For Lasswell (1979) architecture is “the signature of power.” Lasswell clearly points out that architecture is basic to his arguments and he distinguishes it from other “skills” specialized to the manipulation of resources for communicative purposes. According to Lasswell, architecture is best understood as the deliberate designing of symbols for the purpose of communication and thus “the experiences of those who will be exposed to an edifice must be taken into account” (p. 18). When architecture reflects power-sharing through relative accessibility, the citizenry would comply; when it reflects superiority or domination through high elevation or exclusion/inaccessibility – the citizenry could react with hostile coercive acts. This would imply that architecture can contribute to both legitimization of power or to the loss of it. Lasswell points out how architecture can be utilized to address both political expectations – of compliance or of distancing, deterring, which he terms “response modeling” and “response contrasting”. A “defense” structure as a response modeling in reference to deeds sends the message, “I will fight you if you fight.”, while in a response contrasting situation, the message is, “Go away! I am too mighty for you to win.” (Lasswell 1979, p. 19)

In contrast to the “military” arena of power and fortifications, Lasswell views domestic politics as “civil” arena with different degrees of power-sharing. This is achieved through three

types of strategies: of “awe” in autocratic regimes, aiming at defense through exclusion and isolation; of “fraternity” in democracies and of “admiration”, when power is narrowly held. In contrast to despotism and autocracies, in democracies physical barriers separating governors and governed are insignificant in both public and residential areas. The “strategy of fraternity” is the dominant means of gaining and holding the support of the body politic (p. 17). While political edifices in democracies are accessible to different degrees, accepted as legitimate, the strategy of admiration caters to the excitement of perpetual innovation and display to play down overtones of threat associated with strategies inspiring awe. The principal object of this strategy of admiration is the seduction of hostile elements and thus, the aim is “to attract by putting up a fine show” rather than “to overwhelm with majestic display of power”. The strategy has been used by “tyrants” and “princes” alike to divert attention from the illegitimacy of their power by obtaining architecture with “heroic and histrionic effects” (p. 17). Historical analysis of architectural patterns reveals that despots, autocrats and oligarchs tend to favor horizontal or vertical withdrawal from the lower levels of the body politic (p. 18). Power sharing is demonstrated through a “silhouette” analysis of photographs, illustrations and charts of cityscapes, where the dominant structures reveal the relative power location within the community. The narrow sharing of power favors patterns of exclusion, wide sharing encourages permeation.

While Lasswell acknowledges the primacy of power, he stresses the reverse arrow of influence and its importance. As all systems of public order achieve relative durable patterns of value priority, accumulation and distribution, as well as institutional practices, specialized to particular values sectors, established spatial arrangements tend to exert a lag effect on drastic innovation. This means that the physical environment has the potential to influence values: to inhibit, in this case, or alternatively, to promote. Lasswell provides some indicative examples of

the reversed causal relationship. Once created (as the result of a political decision) – *government buildings - as political architecture - affect the political process and public attitudes*. For example, the number of legislative chambers can be ascribed in many instances to the number of social classes who are represented in collective affairs. As the well know example of the British Parliament demonstrates, once built, its floor plan of two parallel and opposing sides with benches and symbolic separating lines of the floor seems to support the two-party system. By contrast, semicircular plans seem “simultaneously to express and to perpetuate the freedom of coalition that prevails among them” (Lasswell 1979, p. 34). According to Lasswell, the huge administrative buildings situated in “block after block of giant, faceless buildings, indistinguishable from one another without an address book” (p. 37) “contribute to the anti-bureaucratic undercurrent in the contemporary world” (p. 38)<sup>11</sup>. Similarly, embassies, with their design, would be expected to influence perceptions abroad about the respective country.

By examining the relationship of political functions and responding buildings, Lasswell (1979) develops a theoretical model of the decision making process that distinguishes seven phases of policy making and execution, some of which influence the architecture of different types of buildings. In contrast to the strictly function-environment relationship, Lasswell examines the values (and institutions)-buildings relationship and develops a theoretical model, illustrating how architecture can reflect different values. The major argument is from a realist perspective: human actors – as all living forms – seek to maximize values, defined as preferred events. They initiate, diffuse and restrict institutions that are specialized in the shaping and sharing of their valued outcomes. Thus, a clue to arrangements in space is the interrelationship of

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<sup>11</sup> An observation well reflected even in spy stories, cited in Lasswell, H. D. (1979). The Signiture of Power: Buildings, Communication, and Policy. New Brunswick, NJ, Transaction Books.

values and institutions. *This claim implies that public, political architecture does not just reflect values, but political, collective values, the result of the interaction of values and institutions.*

Lasswell argues that the seven categories of functional analysis: intelligence, promotion, prescription, invocation, application, termination and appraisal - or outcomes of the political process (which are invariably performed independent from participants/actors or power-sharing) - are served by different structures, or types of buildings, and the analysis reveals that “several phases of decision generate separable and distinctive effects on physical surroundings” (p. 20), which implies that function influences architecture. Or form follows function, the tenet of functionalism. As these functional categories relate to political situations, the participating actors seek to maximize their values (preferred events) and initiate, diffuse and restrict institutions that are specialized to the shaping and sharing of different value outcomes. Thus, values also influence architecture. The analysis reveals that in some circumstances a particular phase, or outcome, is carried on in a structure that has been operationally differentiated for the purpose and can be recognizably demarcated in the perspectives of the relevant social setting. In other words, institutions also influence architecture. Thus, it is not surprising to discover that the interrelationship of values and institutions is a clue to spatial arrangements (Lasswell 1979). These reflections reveal that functionalism in political science is more complicated than usually assumed, the main point being the role of values-institutions, or political values.

What is of special interest is that Lasswell specifically notes – albeit briefly - the importance of embassies, suggesting that an examination of “the buildings occupied or constructed for the conduct of foreign affairs, would undoubtedly reveal, often in advance, significant changes in the direction and weight of public power” (p. 42). In other words,

architectural patterns have predictive power for future developments because they are reflection of enduring political values.

The symbolic role of architecture –as reflecting political values - is also the focus of study of David Milne’s article, *Architecture, Politics and the Public Realm* (1981), in which he argues that public buildings enshrine each civilization’s code of law and order and thus perform a conservative, stabilizing function for the society as a whole (p. 3). While at its most superficial level architecture merely houses institutions, at a deeper level, it imposes political demands. “The political demand is that architecture shall make edifices befitting the importance and power of these institutions, that it shall make these institutions appear mighty and durable, and that it shall in its symbolism and expressive form, state dramatically something of these institutions’ ‘idea’ of the world.” (Milne 1981; pp. 131-46, quoted in Goodsell, p. 29). Similarly, Edelman (1995) contends that the effects of architecture go beyond interiors and exteriors, and fortress-like buildings like the Pentagon and the FBI headquarters in Washington reassure the public that the dangers of war, crime and terrorism will be overcome. The very monumentality of government buildings itself exudes a sense of clarity, order, timelessness and predictability with respect to the authority of government. Edelman, however, points out that the emotive significance of architecture is subjective: while for some, spaces like legislative halls and courtrooms symbolize legitimacy and equality, for others they stand for state oppression or elite domination (Edelman 1995). This implies that only an empirical study can reveal what values definite buildings communicate in general, taking into account subjectivity of perceptions.

Thomas Markus (1993) offers a different analysis of the relationship of buildings and human behavior and perceptions. In his examination of monasteries, courthouses and council halls, he concedes that these structures confer power over the present people by means of

architectural devices and asymmetrical arrangements of furniture. However, common rooms and cafeteria confer equity by incorporating different people regardless of individual status. Hence buildings – architecture – can also provide a tangible symbol of the common bond of membership, not only of power as legitimation or domination.

### **2.3.2. As political authority**

Political architecture – as reflection of changing concepts of political values - has been of major interest to public administrationist Charles T. Goodsell who has conducted the most comprehensive examinations of political values reflected in different types of government buildings. Most generally, Goodsell’s claim is that the architecture of government buildings reflects political authority defined as the relationship between governors and governed. Goodsell examines 1) the political values or ideas embedded in different government buildings; 2) the effects of the buildings on contemporary political behavior and 3) the larger impressions the buildings have on society (Goodsell 1988a; Goodsell 1988b; Goodsell 2001). In his most recent examinations on government buildings, he summarizes the role of architecture for politics by introducing three perspectives or “lenses”: expressive, behavioral and societal (Goodsell 2001). Goodsell views “government architecture as an expression of political ideas” (xv) and nonverbal statement emanating from the political culture of the time. Goodsell’s major studies - *The Social Meaning of Civic Space: Studying Political Authority* (1988a) and *The American Statehouse: Interpreting Democracy's Temples* (2001) are comparative in nature with photographs as the major evidence and limited to the United States with some examples from North America. While his article *Bureaucratic Manipulation of Physical Symbols* (1977) empirically examines the effects of “certain symbols exhibited in public bureaucracy utilizing unobtrusive observation” (p.

79) and is one of the few statistical studies in this area, Goodsell clearly states that his approach is mainly interpretive.

## **Parliaments**

In his analysis of the relationship between political culture and the architecture of houses of parliament in countries around the world, Goodsell (1988b) assumes that the architecture of parliaments is – or should be – of interest to political science because buildings and their interior spaces relate in important ways to political culture. His argument is that parliament buildings are artifacts of political culture and they are among the most prominent symbols of government in any polity and thus, studying parliament buildings is important for political science because of what they “say” about the broader political culture that surrounds and molds them. Parliament buildings and spaces 1) preserve cultural values of the polity over time; 2) articulate contemporaneous political attitudes and values and 3) contribute to the formation of political culture. Goodsell proposes that the architecture of parliament buildings has three functions contributing to political culture by perpetuating the past; manifesting the present and conditioning the future, which he calls respectively: “Preservation, Articulation and Formation” (p. 288). Preservation is defined as “the mobilization, conservation and maintenance of cultural values over long periods of time” and the durability of architecture performs well as a bearer of ideas over time. Political architecture embodies deeply-rooted cultural concepts in its form and substance, “which are then on display for later generations to absorb” (p. 288). The second function, Articulation, is the manifestation of values and ideas currently extant in political life at the time of the building’s construction, remodeling, refinishing or rearrangement. In its Articulation function, architecture acts as a record or index of ongoing political life (see also



Bonta 1979). The third function, Formation, of public architecture affects the political future by indirectly influencing behavior. These three functions are the result of intentional political decisions as well as of unconscious reflection of the “surrounding cultural milieu” (p. 289).

Goodsell illustrates his thesis that “parliamentary architecture can perpetuate, manifest and shape political culture with a variety of examples from throughout the world. The preservation function is illustrated generally by prominent location, the articulation – by the interior arrangements, reflecting and affecting power relations, and the potential formation function – by the perpetuated spatial setting. Concluding, Goodsell notes that the impact of parliamentary architecture on political culture is essentially mediated by national elites, while mass behavioral involvement is limited to tourist visits and suggests that with the widespread adoption of television coverage, the functioning of parliaments will increasingly become familiar to ordinary citizens and this will promote even more their importance for political culture “on a scale unknown in the past” (p. 302).

### **City-council Chambers Reflect the Value of Political Authority**

Goodsell’s focus on the relation between governmental buildings and their interiors to political culture is best expressed in the title of his book, *The Social Meaning of Civic Space: Studying Political Authority* (Goodsell 1988a). Goodsell grounds his thesis on Clifford Geertz’ (1981) claim about the need of political symbolism, starting with a quotation from Geertz’ work as a motto: “Thrones may be out of fashion, and pageantry too; but political authority still requires a cultural frame in which to define itself and advance its claims, and so does opposition to it.” (cited in Goodsell 1988a). With this quotation, Goodsell emphasizes the need of legitimation of power as authority and the role of symbolism in this respect.

Goodsell is interested in what architecture “says” about political life, that is, in architecture as expression of political “ideals” and for this reason, he examines the design of buildings “built (and rebuilt) under the aegis of political authority, as a nonverbal statement emanating from the political culture of the time,” focusing on political values “with specific reference to the evolving concepts of political authority” (xv). The purpose of Goodsell’s study is “to explicate trends in underlying concepts of political authority as they have unfolded over time in North America from the Civil War to the 1980s” (xv-xvi). Goodsell admits that despite his systematic methodology, his personal interpretations permeate his work throughout and acknowledges that “subjectivity” is “inevitable in a study of this kind” and the provided photographs and floor plans “should assist the reader in checking” his interpretations and “arriving at an independent judgment” (xvi). The conclusion of the study is that city-council chambers from the studied period fall into three categories, each identified with a time period: 1) Traditional (1865-1920); 2) Midcentury (1920-1960) and 3) Contemporary (1960-mid-1980). Goodsell argues that the design features of the chambers in these three categories express distinctive and meaningful concepts of political authority.

The Traditional chamber reflected the spirit of “imposed authority” expressed with an imposing central rostrum for the presiding officer, individual desks for council members, facing the rostrum and public seating at the periphery beyond a low barrier or in upper galleries. The second, Midcentury chamber was shaped by “confronted authority” expressed by a usually semicircular dais with continuous work space for mayor and council members, facing outward to confront the public half the hall across a low barrier. The third, Contemporary type of chamber embodied “joined authority” expressed with an expanded dais for more non elected officials, facing amphitheater seating and the public to complete the circle of government. In this

Contemporary chamber, Goodsell notes, political architecture tends to treat space as “undifferentiated, ideally formless, continuous, open and flowing – a piece of limitless continuum” (Goodsell 1988a; p. 35).

The progression of architectural types seemingly indicates movement away from authoritarianism toward greater public influence in government. The Midcentury chamber is the most democratic, while the Contemporary chamber obscures the distinction between governors and governed and invites manipulation of the public. In the appendix, Goodsell suggests that city governments and architects should consciously seek to incorporate the best elements of the Midcentury chamber. Goodsell conducts his study through a meticulous method of photographing, recording interior and furniture arrangements and measuring walls, distances and angles of sight lines. From a detailed description, Goodsell proceeds to an analysis of the chambers’ psychological and social significance and thus constructs his argument that council chambers constructed in different eras do indeed reveal changing perceptions of city governance. This point is also supported by interviews with city officials or community activists, regarding the effects of particular chambers. Every of these three types of city council chambers encompasses a cross-section of cities in size, geographical location and ethnic composition of some 25 examples, or total seventy-five.

### **Statehouses: Political Architecture through Different Lenses**

Goodsell (2001) studies American statehouses as a generic building type and offers social interpretation of architecture focusing on 1) political values or ideas embedded in the buildings; 2) the effects of the buildings on contemporary political behavior and 3) “the appraisal of the larger impressions the buildings have on society”. Goodsell points out that statehouses have been

referred to as symbols, temples and icons for they are deeply vested with cultural meaning. At the same time, statehouses are eminently political artifacts as they are purposely built as legitimization of government and personal prestige of governors and other elected executives.

Goodsell emphasizes that his “topical focus is the political analysis of architecture: the way in which statehouses reflect and affect aspects of authority, influence, hierarchy, and culture as they relate to public governing” (p. 7). Goodsell examines the American statehouse offering a social interpretation of all 50 state capitols as architectural expression of American political values and argues that architecture can be used to trace the evolving character of political culture and scientifically examines the issue illustrating his argument with convincing personal observations and photographs. Rejecting “rigorous” social science methods, Goodsell conducts an in-depth study of the historical evolution of this type of government buildings parallel with the political concepts and values that unite the political process and – at the same time – reveals differences in each state’s political and legislative procedures.

Goodsell bases his analysis of the statehouse on several ideas. First, “statehouses reflect and affect aspects of authority, influence, hierarchy and culture as they relate to public governing” (p. 7). Second, Goodsell utilizes the concept of building type as an instrument of his analysis, linking the idea to Max Weber’s; concept of “ideal type” as an abstraction that captures the essence of a diverse phenomenon by isolating its central functional characteristics.” Third, the conscious employment of the comparative method allows discovering of “fundamental, overarching tendencies allowing broad generalizations despite individual exceptions and departures.” Fourth, the research is centered on extensive personal observations and interviews. Goodsell’s study was conducted in the course of seven years (from 1991 to 1998) during which

he collected documents, took photographs and “interviewed 307 knowledgeable individuals” (p. 8).

Goodsell examines and interprets these buildings through three conceptual lenses which provide three distinguishing but compatible avenues for acquiring an understanding of architecture’s social meaning. These lenses are the expressive, the behavioral and the societal and together they reveal the ideas and values implicitly embedded in the statehouses’ design, the ways in which capitols affect their users and the impact of these buildings on the broader society. The first, expressive lens seeks concepts of values embedded within the buildings. The second, the behavioral lens looks at the impact of a statehouse on political behavior and the third, the societal lens reveals the impressions these buildings have on society in general. Architecture provides not only the space for politics but also sets the stage on which it is acted out and thus has effects. By means of the expressive lens, citizens infer ideas, values and concepts of state governance held by governors or by the general public at the time of construction. The underlying assumption is that the buildings embody – consciously or not – broad conceptions of what was considered right and proper within a system of state governance during the era of construction.

Through the second, behavioral lens of inquiry into architecture and politics Goodsell seeks to find “not what buildings say about their originators or eras of construction, but how they may shape the attitudes and conduct of contemporary users and others affected by them” (pp. 10-11). That is, this frame is used to look for ways in which the built environment affects, not reflects, the social reality and “architecture is seen not as an imprint of earlier ideas, but as a pathway that steers or conditions current behavior” (p. 11). This lens is best expressed by Winston Churchill’s well known saying that “We shape buildings and afterwards our buildings

shape us,” representing the deterministic treatment of the environment. Goodsell claims that the behavioral perspective was used “to speculate on the consequences for behavior of the design and settings of the statehouse, the effects of placing all parts of state government in one building, the contemporaneous consequences of constructing the capitol, and space as a setting for political conduct” (p. 12).

The third, societal lens reveals how public buildings present themselves to the external society in becoming symbols of social subcultures, economic interests, geographic locality, legal jurisdiction, government body, political regime, or system of authority, “whether negatively or positively” (p. 12). Goodsell’s major conclusion is that from these three lenses – the expressive, the behavioral and the societal - the American statehouse reveals the complexity and multiplicity of “reading architecture”.

Finally, Goodsell (2003) provides a good basis for operationalization of criteria for evaluating the content of place-bounded public spaces by examining architectural and urban forms such as: 1) access (clear entrances, ample fenestration, ample interior dimensions); 2) power relations (height, barriers, separation); 3) symbolic representations (leaders versus more egalitarian staging); 4) who accomplished the staging (governed or governing) as well as 5) furniture arrangements as conducive or inhibiting interactions.<sup>12</sup> Thus, in his most recent work Goodsell accepts physical architectural forms as indicators for operationalizing the concept of one of the most discussed political values, of public space.

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<sup>12</sup> Goodsell supports his conceptualization by examining nine cases which are evidenced by photographs and these criteria are based on the literature of political analysis of architecture, something which Goodsell acknowledges.

### 2.3.3. As national representation

#### Capitals

The role of political architecture is especially evident from the attention to design of national capitals. It suffices to mention the National Mall in Washington and the capital of Brazil – Brasília – both of which help to support a special national identity. In *Architecture, Power and National Identity*, a book of essays on political architecture, Vale (2008) examines the relationship between the design of national capitals across the world and the formation of national identity in modern era, explaining the role that architecture and planning play for politics. Similarly to Goodsell, Vale argues that government buildings serve as symbols of the state and thus, by examining them, we can learn much about a political regime. Vale examines parliamentary complexes in capital cities on six continents and explains the government buildings as products of the political and cultural balance of power within pluralist societies, demonstrating the manipulation of symbolism as an important force in urban development.

**The literature review on political architecture** reveals a general agreement that architecture reflects the political values of the time while – at the same time – influences political behaviors and processes (Lasswell 1979; Goodsell 1988a; Goodsell 1988b; Goodsell 2001). This agreement is well expressed by Valkov's (2009) succinct conclusion that the history of architectural forms is the history of human values.

#### Embassies

Embassy building, as a dimension of foreign policy, is national politics on the international global arena. As such, embassies should be expected to reflect major political values in an expressive powerful fashion and thus be easily identified. However, *embassy*

*architecture – as a subject of inquiry – has been ignored* (Robin 1992). According to Robin, the neglect of the study of embassy architecture “derives in part from the interdisciplinary nature of the subject matter.” (p. 18) Albeit in passing, the importance of embassies as communicators of values was noted specifically by Lasswell (1979, p. 42) as well as mentioned by Goodsell (2001). Scientific examination of embassy architecture as reflection of political values is limited. Empirical examination of embassies as strategic investments of one country in another has been a subject of major interest to political scientist Craig Webster (Webster 2001a; Webster 2001b; Webster 2001c; Webster and Ivanov 2007).

While embassies are just another type of government buildings they have been defined as diplomacy’s physical settings, public diplomacy, serving as “showcases” of national art, culture and political philosophy (Loeffler 1998), “the physical presence of the United States beyond its borders,” as “symbols of the values and aspirations of the American people” (July 1, 2009, p. 3), etc., all of which reveal the role of embassies in the public imagination. The extant literature on embassy architecture is represented by American scholarship (Robin 1992; Loeffler 1998) and focuses on historical analysis of the United States embassy program as foreign policy. While Robin (1992) views the American embassy program as an agenda of an empire, Loeffler (1998) views it as a tool for spreading democracy. Both scholars provide a wealth of information on the US embassy program as a dimension of the country’s foreign policy, acknowledging the role of the complexity of the American pluralist politics, including all levels of analysis. These literatures reveal that at the beginning the architectural patters of American embassies followed classical styles, while later –in opposition to the Stalinist architecture in the Soviet Union during the 1940s– architectural Modernism was purposely employed to represent a new image of the United States as a modern, progressive and innovative country, in contrast to its rival, the Soviet



Union. Besides as a political tool, The U.S. embassy program was used for achieving economic goals (Robin 1992; Loeffler 1998). Finally, the literature on American embassies reveals the transformation of American embassies from modern open and welcoming symbols of this country abroad into inaccessible fortified and frightening compounds (see also Mahbubani 2005).

By contrast, international relations scholar Craig Webster (Webster 2001a; Webster 2001b; Webster 2001c; Webster and Ivanov 2007) views embassy construction as “strategic investments” and empirically examines what influences the choice of placement of embassies of different countries, without accounting for their symbolic significance. While Webster does not examine specifically values, he emphasizes the importance of such investments in relationships between two countries, which, in fact, reflect values. Thus, while the first two scholars provide a wealth of information and some explanatory variables to start with, Webster leads the way to a more systematic study of embassies as representations of countries abroad.

### *Symbols of Power*

According to cultural historian Ron Robin (1992), American embassy building is an attempt to redefine the United States global role as an empire. Robin contends that the objective of American embassy architecture was a part of the U.S. efforts to consolidate its international standing and express the imperial concept of Pax Americana. From its inception to the 1960s (the time period under investigation) the embassy program was two-pronged: 1) to extract prerogatives from the host nations and 2) to offer an alliance with the United States as an alternative to competing demands from other expansionist powers. This would imply architecture as reflecting “hard” power with references to military might and “soft” through references to prosperity, wealth, democracy and culture, more generally. All these are “preferred outcomes” or

“values” according also to Lasswell’s analysis (1979). The conclusion is that the embassies are the result of “the contributions of a variety of influencing actors – the overbearing architect, the demands of the federal client, and the sometimes elusive impact of routine political pressures.” Thus, this is not architectural history –notes Robin - but an attempt to discover how America’s concepts of the global arena were etched in stone and the recurrent themes that demonstrate the evolution of American symbolism “from restrained concepts of the American dominion to more grandiose designs” (p. 11). In fact, Robin claims that the American embassy program failed to create its imperial symbolism because of the inherent democratic political process domestically.

Robin points out that his analysis of American political symbolism abroad conforms to the conventional historiographical divisions of American foreign policy from the rise to power at the turn of the 20th century through the 1960s and beyond. The embassy architecture program was designed to portray and enhance foreign policy objectives through architectural symbolism. As an instrument of public diplomacy, embassy architecture “strove to win the sympathies of or induce awe among foreign beholders” (p. 4). The U.S. symbolic representations were designed to distinguish the United States from other national entities by the transposition of its principles and goals into a supposedly universal language of visual form” (p. 5). As a symbolic illustration of American power and willingness to intervene forcefully in the theater of international relations, political architecture played a significant role in the complex mission of orchestrating world affairs. Thus, an analysis of the American symbolic architecture abroad “reveals the crystallization of fundamental American goals in the international arena” (p. 5). Robin concludes that the United States embassy program has failed because of the always conflicting values in the American democratic society, “in which compromise and diversity, rather than a single-minded mission, were the norm” (p. 9). Failure, however, is not a reason for scholarly neglect. The

United States embassy program -as mobilization of art in service of foreign policy– can be a fine indicator of the changing perception of government and national identity. Similarly to Lasswell and Goodsell, Robin also views the role of architecture as an “extremely rich source of information”, as “historical documents” transcending the narrow field of foreign affairs and denoting “significant foreign policy transitions and important international transformations in the nation’s character” (pp. 7-8). Robin points out the lack of studies in this field and considers the interdisciplinary nature of the subject matter as – in part – a reason for this, something noted also by Lasswell (1979) and Goodsell (1988a). Robin has employed the method of historical analysis and points out that his work was designed to illuminate the process of harnessing architecture for political purposes (p. 9).

### *Symbols of Democracy*

In contrast to Robin’s analysis of American embassies as symbols of imperial power, architectural historian Jane C. Loeffler (1998) views the United States embassy program as a part of export of democracy and American embassies as “symbols of the United States and its desire to be perceived as an energetic and future-oriented nation” (p. 8). Loeffler claims that no investigation had existed “into the connection between *domestic politics* and foreign buildings” or “an appraisal of the history or significance of America’s overseas landmarks” (p. 9, emphasis added) and thus her book - *Architecture of Diplomacy* - aims to provide a groundwork for future study of diplomacy architecture and its history. Loeffler suggests that “it provides evidence that may fuel many debates,” including “the already heated debate over cultural imperialism and whether or not the United States diplomatic building program represents a form of domination” (viii). If architecture is an assertion of power then the United States embassy program represents

a mode of conquest. However, Loeffler notes that it was neither a sinister one, nor a well-orchestrated plan and it would be simplistic to presuppose such organized intent.

In searching for meaning, Loeffler examines policies and traces the United States embassy program from its inception in 1926, demonstrating the complexity of American politics. She claims that the United States embassy building program was one of several responses aimed at containing Soviet expansion in Europe<sup>13</sup> and defines embassies as “showcases” for art, culture and political philosophy. Loeffler claims that her study examines the first efforts of this country to establish a foreign presence through traditional neo-classical architectural forms and styles; the “confident years” following the WWII, when the program reached its peak in terms of scope and popularity through modernist novel embassy buildings; the prosperous and turbulent 1960s and 70s marked also by political doubts and a rising concern for security; and the developments of the 1980s and 90s including terrorist attacks and the increasing concerns with security. According to Loeffler, “the embassy building program was, and remains, part of America’s larger effort to define its world role” and new American embassies have been hailed as “evidence of the American goodwill and commitment, and their modern architecture, introduced in the late 1940s, has come to symbolize the openness of public diplomacy” (p. 3). After the WWII architectural modernism became “linked with the idea of freedom” and in a radical departure from government buildings at home, the State Department began to showcase modern architecture abroad. While in the 1950s openness was both a top design priority and a diplomatic objective this ended with the embassy in Dublin, completed in 1964 for which design still had priority in shaping embassy architecture. Loeffler claims that the recent uncertainty and lack of commitment that surrounds the United States embassy building program “directly affects a broad

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<sup>13</sup> The other being the Truman Doctrine and the creation of the United States Information Agency (USIA).

spectrum of American interests” (p. 266). Thus, Loeffler’s analysis clearly demonstrates that the US embassies reveal four major architectural patterns: neo-classical (traditional), modernist, one of prosperity and lastly, of security.

Loeffler (1998) claims that her book reveals that numerous individuals contributed to the planning process, concludes that there is much to be learned from the overall history of the program and suggests that future studies to focus on historical assessment of Congress members who were engaged in the program as well as participating architects’ biographies. That is, Loeffler’s focus is on the role of personality.

Empirical examination of embassy architecture is limited. The American international relations scholar Craig Webster has conducted research on embassies and his examinations are the only rigorous empirical research of embassies as foreign policy (2001a; Webster 2001b; Webster 2001c) and Webster and Ivanov (2007). Webster treats embassy building as strategic investments, measured in numbers of embassies one country has built in foreign lands. His studies provide insights into probable explanatory variables from the broader categories of power, culture or “civilization” and geopolitics. While values indisputably underpin embassy construction, Webster does not examine values in his studies. Thus, much of the existing research on the politics-architecture nexus does not help in terms of leading the way in an empirical analysis of what values embassies reflect and what factors influence the architecture of embassies as symbolic representations of countries abroad, except to suggest the proper variables to begin with.

In conclusion, architecture consists of two major properties: form (symbolism) and function (substance, utility). However, in political architecture substance or function is mostly political and is reflected - or expressed - in form. Thus, a formal analysis of architectural patterns

can provide information about values during a period of time. Politics and architecture are inseparable and causally related. While the major causal arrow leads from politics to architecture, architecture, in turn, can influence some political behaviors and processes. With its powerful symbolism, as reflected in governmental buildings from city halls to national parliaments and capitals to embassies as national symbols abroad, architecture can influence perceptions and attitudes and thus, politics. To no surprise, besides symbols, embassies are “strategic investments” in international relations.

## Chapter 3.

### Explaining Embassy Architecture: Form Follows Function

*In any age there are certain widely shared beliefs – assumption, attitudes, values – that are so obvious that they remain unstated, As such, they are most clearly perceivable, not in what a society says it doing in its histories, literature, or public and private documents, but rather in the way in which it does things. The way in which something is done, produced, or expressed is its style.*

(Prown 1980)

In outline, this chapter reviews some theoretical explanations of architecture and human values in general and embassy architecture in particular, identifies probable explanatory variables and derives testable hypotheses. This literature suggests that in political architecture not only that form reflects values, but also that functions are political. This is supported by the studies on American embassy architecture. Thus, the thesis of this dissertation: *Form follows values*. The first section justifies the use of architectural patterns – forms - as legitimate sources of data about values, while the second demonstrates that “functionalism” in architecture refers mostly to form, aesthetics and content. In the third section two substantial theories on human values are briefly examined while the fourth section “explains” embassy architecture from a historical perspective as export of values and from an international relations as strategic investments. Based on the suggested explanatory variables and testable hypotheses from the literature, and the four major reflected values in US embassies: tradition, innovation, wealth and security, a total of 58 hypotheses are suggested, including five on micro, individual level and four, accounting for the special role of the United States as the most powerful nation in the examined period.

### **3.1. Explaining form and function**

While definitions and arguments about the priority of form or function vary, in the case of political architecture form usually has primacy over function to the extent that buildings often become dysfunctional monuments (Robin 1992). Architecture belongs to a larger class of artifacts usually referred to as material culture, but in contrast to other artifacts crafted only for utilitarian purposes, it is more responsive to formal analysis as a type of art (Prown 1980). Based on Prown's theory of style as evidence, this section justifies the possible use of architectural patterns as sources for obtaining data about values.

Prown accepts that form and function (content) are interrelated and they affect and modify each other, but he assumes that especially for analytical purposes they can be treated as discrete. Prown notes that while form and style have overlapping meaning, form is restricted to configuration of the object itself, while "style" refers to the way something is done, produced, or expressed and is manifested in the form of things rather than in their content or function Prown points out that content –by itself – does not in any obvious sense possess style, whereas style possesses significant meaning and thus formal or stylistic analysis concentrating on the object itself, its configuration and style can reveal a lot in understanding culture. The formal data embodied in objects are of value as cultural evidence and analysis of style can be used for other than purely art history studies. Therefore we can obtain information from the data embodied in architecture.

Prown considers that nonverbal source materials are more revealing about certain widely shared beliefs than words or writings. Certain aspects of human activity – or creations – are more expressive of style than others and this is in inverse proportion to the extent to which they are consciously purposeful, or functional. This is so because functional intentions obscure style.



Objects - such as tools or machines –are almost completely determined by their purpose and style is a peripheral consideration: form clearly follows function. When an object or activity is purposefully concerned with a message, it is strongly conditioned by the message, serves as a vehicle for some sort of communication and while form again, in part, follows function, the function is a message, meaning. Form is dominant and function follows from it. While works of architecture do have intended function, their formal component is at least as important as is their functional component. By holding content – or function – constant, form – as a manifestation of style – reveals information (content) about intended claims, “function” is the constant against which stylistic variables play” (p. 198). Variety in form provides information about different times, places or shifts in style, rather than shifts in function. Thus style can be factored out as separate from function, which by and large does not change, and from overt meaning, which is not present except in exceptional examples. “This style, now isolable and identifiable, must necessarily reflect values of the individual and the society that produced the object.” (p. 199)

Prown claims that if the thesis that a society in a particular time or place deposits a cultural fingerprint, as it were, on what it produces is correct, two conclusions follow by which the thesis can be tested. First, we would expect to find shared stylistic elements in the objects, produced in the same time and in the same place. Second, we would expect to find a stylistic change concurrent with a shift in cultural values (p. 200).

Thus, based on Prown’s reflections, the function of embassy buildings is relatively constant, against which four architectural patterns – formal variables - play. Variety in these variables reflects difference in values rather than in the programmatic requirements of embassies as buildings. Hence, the variation, that embassy buildings reveal, responds to different values that the respective nation found important enough to demonstrate in its national symbolic

representation abroad. If the embassies of different countries differ significantly in form, this implies different values, consistent with Prown's (1980) claim on form(style) as reflection of values.

Thus, it follows that the four major patterns of traditional, modernist, opulent corporate-looking and "security-focused" architectural patterns, observable in the U.S. embassies built since the 1920s and up to now, reflect the four values of tradition, innovation, wealth and security. As Prown claims, we could expect to observe common stylistic elements in embassies built in the same time and in the same place. Second, we would expect to find a change in architectural form concurrent with a shift in cultural values. While these hypotheses can be tested for the embassies built in Berlin within a decade (1990s-2000s) in an era of globalization (the same place) and by the change in American embassies over time, the important point is that style is manifested in form, which by necessity reflects political values as function is held constant, that is, it is the same for all embassies in general.

### **3.2. Explaining Architectural Functionalism**

While for analytical purposes, Prown (1980) assumes that function in architecture is constant, Mayo (1996) conceptualizes functions as activities that clients oblige architects to recognize in their designs, or an operation that is expected of the building. Given political constraints and forms of power, the resulting functions of *culture*, *economics*, *current issues* and *programming* are often politicized and proscribe the actual design solutions. As defined, functions in Mayo's model of the politics-architecture nexus are rather content than strict requirements for the functioning of the building, which is indicative for discussing political architecture. Thus proscribed, these four functions should explain embassy architectural patterns

and should be possible explanatory variables as 1) political culture; 2) requirements for facilitating and promoting economic ties, or prosperity, wealth; 3) current issues, such as the ongoing terrorist attacks cannot be ignored and result in an architecture reflecting the value of security and 4) programming contingent on set goals, such as was the promotion of modernism during the Cold War years. Most importantly, what is evident from Mayo's conceptualization of functions in political architecture is that, in actuality, function as utility is a very small, practically on the border of insignificance, portion.

Function as utility was not an important part even of modernist architecture agenda with its well known motto: *Form Follows Function*. While functionalism can be traced to Vitruvius' definition of architecture as a unity of utility (function), beauty (form) and durability over time, architectural functionalism was revitalized by the American architect Louis Sullivan's maximum "form ever follows function" in his essay *The tall office building, artistically considered* (1896, cited in Khan 2001) and who himself did not follow it. Shortened to "form follows function", this catch-phrase implied that utility, the demands of practical use, is above aesthetics and would later be taken to imply that decorative elements, or "ornament" were superfluous in modern buildings. But whoever knows Sullivan's buildings, knows well that this was not what he practiced, nor did his disciples, such as Frank Lloyd Wright. While becoming a subject of multiple architectural discussions in the first half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, many Rationalist architects viewed design – form, aesthetics – as a primary social and ethical activity to satisfy social needs on both architectural and urban levels. Later, after Rationalist Alberto Sartoris' 1931 widely influential book *Gli Elementi dell'Architettura Funzionale* - a compilation of examples of architectural modernism from all over the world - functionalism was used more commonly as a replacement of Rationalism (Auge 1995). Khan argues that modernist architecture – functionalist

or rationalist – underpinned by internationalist ideas is present in most of the early modern movements embracing the belief that architecture and technology could improve the human condition everywhere. While other arts – painting and sculpture – moved away from public to pure aesthetic and theoretical concerns as early as the 1930s, architecture remained a “social art”, as Mayo (1996) defines architectural practice. Thus, “functionalism” in architecture, and even more so in political architecture, should be accepted with qualifications.

Architecture is a tool and as such can be used for different purposes, as the discussions on the United States embassies reveal in regard to the International Style as reflecting an egalitarian modernist worldview for a common world or corporate interests.

One year after the publication of Sartoris’ book, the Americans Henry-Russell Hitchcock and Philip Johnson coined and introduced the term “The International Style” to mean architectural modernism concerned with form but disconnected from social context. However, the International Style was never purely formalistic and neutral, it represented symbolism, monumentality and considered context (Auge 1995). While the International Style stood for representing the internationalism of the first half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, since the 1960s, it came to represent the rise of economic globalization by becoming synonymous with the related to globalization corporate placeless architecture, transmittable to all parts of the globe and embodying modern and universal principles. Thus, politically internationalism was transformed in content to universalism and architecture, respectively, was assumed to reflect the different values of this second stage of globalization. As a result, modernist architecture has become the subject of different interpretations. While some associate it with Bauhaus from its Dessau period (1926-1933) of everything modern, functional and clean-lined, others highlight the importance of its earlier Weimar years (1919-1926) when the focus was on theory intellectual rigor and form.

From another politicized perspective, some relate it to socialist agendas while others focus on its transformation in the American post-WWII years as architecture reflecting capitalist values (Loeffler 1998). Khan (1995) also points out the transformation of modernism expressing internationalism and solidarity by the International Style into its conceptualization since the 1960s as universalism, reflecting the values of the ongoing globalization. Khan concludes that both Bauhaus experience and the tenets of modernism and architectural Functionalism have been exhaustively re-examined (p. 26). This theoretical context can explain the contradictory claims in the literatures on U.S. embassies, represented by Robin (1992) and Loeffler (1998) about modernist architectural patterns as reflection of values. While both studies are from a pluralistic perspective, they represent different views and thus different interpretations.

The discussions on explanations of architecture reveal several points. First, while modernist architecture in form stayed comparatively “constant”, its content changed, but it inevitable stayed political. The architectural discussions on the rise of modernism and its possible decline reveal that it developed to counter traditional values, then was utilized to represent the values of internationalism as a mode of operation, later economic globalization and lastly, was challenged by postmodern and historicist forms since the 1960s, but modernism still exists and prospers. From this discussion, it is also evident that only empirical data can reveal what political values embassy buildings represent or reflect during a defined -period of time, accounting for subjectivity of perceptions.

### **3.3. Explaining Values**

Lasswell’s (1979) major argument is that human actors – as all living forms – seek to maximize values, defined as preferred events. They initiate, diffuse and restrict institutions that

are specialized in the shaping and sharing of their valued outcomes. Thus, a clue to arrangements in space is the interrelationship of values and institutions. *This claim implies that public, political architecture does not just reflect values, but political, collective values, the result of the interaction of values and institutions.* Lasswell's develops an eight-category model of the value-institution process in society, to which there are responding different buildings. These values are *political power; enlightenment, wealth, well-being, skills; affection; respect and rectitude.* According to Lasswell, values are significantly affected by political power, defined as "the giving and receiving of support for decisions" and this refers to values in a community. Thus, values and political power are causally related with the causal arrow pointing to values. Lasswell argues also that space arrangements influence value-shaping and sharing, as well as institutional innovation, diffusion and restriction. This is implied by "the maximization postulate," according to which "spacing depends on the net value expectations of those who conform to or modify space relations" (p. 47). In other words, this proposition claims that *space arrangements reflect different values, defined as desired, preferred events, based on institutions and collective norms.* Thus, spatial arrangements "reflect and transmit" values (p. 48). Lasswell distinguishes between "scope" and "base" values,<sup>14</sup> and notes that no space arrangement reflects one single value and argues that during a given period of time, one value may be the principal, dominant, "scope" value when an outcome is pursued for its own sake. For example, during a protracted war of survival, power is the principal (scope) value and all other values are subordinated to serve as

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<sup>14</sup> These definitions are consistent with what Rokeach terms as "terminal" and "instrumental" values. See (2011). Muslim-Western Tensions Persist: Common Concerns About Islamic Extremism, Pew Global Attitudes Project.

base values for the protection and realization of power (the scope value). That is, a base value serves for obtaining other values.<sup>15</sup>

In the current era of domination of the market economy, it is plausible to suggest that on the global “stage” the purpose of embassies is rather economically- oriented than politically and, consequently, their symbolism is more likely to reflect the “scope” value of prosperity, opulence, wealth. Hence, a first major hypothesis can be suggested:

***Hypothesis 1: Embassy architecture is more likely to reflect economic interests.***

Goodsell analyses of government buildings demonstrate how *the values of political authority* are reflected through architectural means and architectural patterns reveal how they have changed over time. Rokeach (1973; 2000) developed a taxonomy where the values of freedom and equality define the four major world ideologies – capitalism, socialism, fascism and communism. Rokeach’s empirical findings on values are one of the sources for Mayo’s contingent theory on the politics-architecture nexus (1996) and for Schwartz’ theory of integrated value systems (1992; 1994; 1996). As Schwartz (1996) notes in his introductory summation of his research on values, much research selects a few single values whose priorities are postulated “to associate with the attitude, behavior, or background variable of interest and then examine empirical relationships” (p. 1).<sup>16</sup> A second approach is of relating lists of values to various other variables and then making sense, *post hoc*. Schwartz considers both approaches to

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<sup>15</sup> . Lasswell’s analysis also examines how changes in the environment may provide clues to the shifting priorities of values (xii).

<sup>16</sup> Such are the cases with Rokeach (1973) (which Schwartz notes), Lasswell Lasswell, H. D. (1979). The Signature of Power: Buildings, Communication, and Policy. New Brunswick, NJ, Transaction Books., Goodsell Goodsell, C. T. (1988a). The Social Meaning of Civic Space: Studying Political Authority. Lawrence, University Press of Kansas, Goodsell, C. T. (1988b). "The Architecture of Parliaments: Legislative Houses and Political Structure." British Journal of Political Science **18**(3): 287-302, Goodsell, C. T. (2001). The American Statehouse: Interpreting Democracy's Temples. Lawrence, University of Kansas Press. and Mayo Mayo, J. M. (1996). "The Manifestation of Politics in Architectural Practice." Journal of Architectural Education **50**(2): 76-88..

examining values unsatisfying because of the “piecemeal accumulation of lists of information about values that is not conducive to the construction of coherent theories” (p. 1). According to him, there are three problems with these approaches. First, the reliability of any single values is low, while the role of chance is high. Second, in the absence of a broad theory or a comprehensive set of values, more meaningful values may be excluded, as is the case of power and political orientation. Third, “these single-value approaches ignore the widely shared assumptions that attitudes and behavior are guided not by the priority given to a single value but by tradeoffs among competing values that are implicated simultaneously in a behavior or attitude”(pp. 1-2). The third criticism is important because “values are likely to be activated, to enter awareness and to be used as guiding principles” (p. 2) in the presence of conflict. For these reasons, Schwartz developed a theory of integrated value systems and claims that it is based on a “nearly comprehensive set of different motivational types of values, recognized across cultures.”

### **3.3.1. Theory of Integrated Value Systems**

Each of these integrated value types is represented by a number of single values that are combined to form relatively reliable indexes of value priorities. The theory also conceptualizes the set of value types as an integrated system. Thus, Schwartz claims, this “full set of value priorities can be related to other variables in an organized, coherent manner rather than in a piecemeal fashion” (p. 2).

Adapting Schwartz’ definition, political values are “desirable, trans-institutional goals, varying in importance, that serve as guiding principles in people’s” – as collectivities – “lives.” Schwartz emphasizes that “the crucial content aspect that distinguishes among values is the type of motivational goal they express” (p. 2) and derives a typology of the different contents of



values by reasoning that they (values) represent three universal requirements of human existence in the form of conscious goals: 1) biological needs, 2) requisites of coordinated social interaction and 3) demands of group survival and functioning. From these three universal requirements are derived ten motivationally distinct types of values: power, achievement, hedonism, stimulation, self-direction, universalism, benevolence, tradition, conformity and security. Schwartz claims that his research has provided cross-cultural support for these distinctive ten types of values in research with samples from 41 countries.

The ten value types include single values, representing its central goal. A specific value represents a type when actions – expressing the value or leading to its attainment – promote the central goal of the type. In addition to propositions about the content of values, the theory specifies dynamic relations among the value types. Actions taken in pursuit of each value type may conflict or be compatible with the pursuit of other value types. The total pattern of relations gives rise to a circular structure of value systems which has received empirical support in cross-cultural research. Values in opposing directions from the center are competing, while in close proximity – are complimentary (Fig. 3). Schwartz claims that the empirical support in over 95% of sample from 41 countries enables the conceptualization of the total structure of value systems as organized on two basic dimensions, each, as shown in Figure 3, is a polar opposition between two higher order values types. Schwartz claims that this view of value systems as integrated structures facilitates the generation of systematic, coherent hypotheses regarding the relations of the full set of value priorities to other variables. It also may facilitate interpretations of the observed relations of sets of values to other variables in a comprehensive fashion. The interrelatedness of value priorities for generating hypotheses and interpreting findings is summarized by the following statements:




Fig. 2. Individual-level value structure averaged across 20 countries (36 samples): Two-dimensional smallest space analysis.

Figure 3. Values Dimension and Value Types (Schwartz 1992)

Source: Schwartz, S. H. (1992). "Universals in the Content and Structure of Values: Theoretical Advances and Empirical Tests in 20 Countries." *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology* 25: 1-65.

1. *Any outside variable tends to be associated similarly with value types that are adjacent in the value structure.*
2. *Associations with any outside variable decreases monotonically as one moves around the circular structure of value types in both directions from the most positively associated value type to the least positively associated value type.*(Schwartz 1992)

The first statement implies that the associations for value types that are adjacent in the value structure may not differ significantly from one another, unless the sample size is large. The second statement implies that order of these associations is, nonetheless, exactly predicted.

“Although the order of the value types is set by the theory, it is not necessarily the case that the types most and least positively associated with an outside variable are those in exactly opposing positions in Fig. 3 below. This is because the specific characteristics of the behavior in question make particular motivational goals more or less relevant to a decision.

Applying Schwartz’ theory to values reflected in embassy architecture, we would expect that the values of national power – or wealth – and tradition will associated similarly to security, while security and innovation will be in inverse relationship and thus, the following four hypotheses can be suggested:

***Hypothesis 2: The higher the value of security the lower the value of innovation.***

***Hypothesis 3: Embassies reflecting security are also likely to reflect the value of tradition.***

***Hypothesis 4: Embassies reflecting the value of security are also likely to reflect the value of wealth.***

***Hypothesis 5: Embassies reflecting the value wealth are more likely to reflect also the value of innovation.***

### **3.3.2. Theory of Intergenerational Value Change**

While modernization theory has long suggested that socioeconomic development has a powerful impact on values, Inglehart and Welzel (2005) emphasize the role of a society’s

cultural heritage in shaping beliefs and motivations – in particular its religious traditions and colonial history. Political scientist, Ronald Inglehart (1990; 1997) has developed a theory of intergenerational value change demonstrating that socioeconomic development is driving changes in values, dubbed traditional, modern, and postmodern. The poor nations have traditional values focused on survival needs, including respect for authority, religious faith, national pride, obedience, work ethic, large families with strong family ties, a clear sense of good and evil, and respect for parents. The middle-income nations have modern values focused on achievement, including high trust in science and technology, faith in the state (bureaucratization), rejection of out-groups, appreciation of money, hard work, and determination; and a belief that women need children and children need both parents. The rich nations have postmodern values focused on self-expression, including an emphasis on individual responsibility and decision-making, imagination, tolerance, life balance and satisfaction, ecology, leisure, free choice, and good health.

Inglehart and Welzel (2005) claim that economic growth, rising levels of education and information, and diversifying human interactions increase people's material, cognitive, and social resources, making them materially, intellectually, and socially more independent. First, reduction of poverty diminishes material constraints on human choice and nourishes a sense of existential security. Second, socioeconomic development tends to increase people's levels of formal education and to give them greater access to information through the mass media, fueling a sense of intellectual independence. Third, socioeconomic development increases occupational specialization and social complexity, diversifying human interactions, which frees people from fixed social roles and social ties, nurturing a sense of social autonomy. For Inglehart, rising levels of existential security is a key driver of the change in values. Thus, existential security

enables people to emphasize goals that were previously given lower priority, such as the pursuit of freedom and cultural emphasis shifts from collectivism to individual liberty, from group conformity to human diversity, and from state authority to individual autonomy.

Inglehart plots nations on a scale of values. The most postmodern nations are the Northern European countries. The United States is more traditional than would be predicted by its socioeconomic status. The middle-income nations fall in the realm of modern values, focusing on growth and belief in the power of technology. The poor nations predictably are characterized by traditional values characterized by a strong respect for authority and acceptance of the existing order.

This theory of intergenerational value change is based on two key hypotheses, requirements for survival. First, under conditions of scarcity, people give top priority to materialistic goals, whereas under conditions of prosperity, they become more likely to emphasize post-materialist goals. Second, the socialization hypothesis claims that in the relationship between material scarcity and value priorities there is a substantial time lag because one's basic values, to a large extent, reflect the conditions that prevailed during one's pre-adult years.

The book draws on new survey data completed from 1999-2001, which includes data from 81 societies containing 85% of the world's population and supplements earlier data going back to 1981. Inglehart, as a political scientist, considers the implications of the findings for democracy and claims that this research aims to integrate socioeconomic development, cultural change, and democratization under the overarching theme of human development. Inglehart and Welzel argue that there is a causal relationship, rather than the previously posited a mere relationship. Their empirical study suggests that socioeconomic modernization, a cultural shift

toward self-expression values, and democratization are all components of a single underlying process: human development, at the core of which is the expansion of human choice and autonomy.

Inglehart and Welzel claim that the causal arrow points from economic change (existential security) to cultural change (self-expression values) to political change (democratic institutions). Inglehart and Welzel consider that fears of cultural homogenization due to globalization are over-blown. Inglehart suggests that while the value systems of different countries are moving in the same direction under the impact of powerful modernizing forces, their value systems have not been converging. Thus, while there are structural similarities in the types of values driven by socioeconomic development, their particular expression remains under the influence of local culture, including religion and other aspects of society's traditional cultural heritage, which are not disappearing with modernization. This theory is generally supportive of Huntington's (1993) ideas of cultural zones as part of his *Clash of Civilizations* thesis and the value maps correspond to some degree. Inglehart points out that modernization is not equivalent to westernization and other countries are not following a US model – as suggested above, the US is a deviant case, exhibiting much more traditional and religious values than other rich countries. Inglehart and Welzel claim that self-expression values (individualism) prevail over survival values (collectivism) based on levels of socioeconomic development; as external constraints on human choice recede, people and societies tend to place increasing emphasis on self-expression values or individualism. The pattern is not culture-specific, but universal.

Inglehart's theory provides a wealth of testable hypotheses. However, for the purpose of this study, only those that can be reflected in architecture would be considered. According to this theory, poor nations would represent traditional values. Middle-income nations would reveal

modern values associated with economic growth, wealth and prosperity. That is, they will rate high on both innovation and wealth. The rich, post-materialist, countries care about environmentalism, existential security and thus, could not be expected to rate high on wealth and technological innovation. For the United States, according to Inglehart's claims, we would expect high ratings on traditional values, while for the Scandinavian countries, we should not expect that wealth and modernism as technological innovation are valued. Thus, from Inglehart and Welzel's theory the following hypotheses can be tested:

*Hypothesis 6: The poor nations are more likely to value tradition.*

*Hypothesis 7: Middle-income nations are more likely to value wealth.*

*Hypothesis 8: Middle-income nations are more likely to value (technological) innovation.*

*Hypothesis 9: Rich nations are less likely to value wealth.*

*Hypothesis 10: Rich nations are less likely to value (technological) innovation.*

*Hypothesis 11: The Scandinavian countries are less likely to value wealth.*

*Hypothesis 12: The Scandinavian countries are less likely to value (technological) innovation.*

*Hypothesis 13: U.S. embassies are more likely to reflect traditional values.*

### **3.4. Explaining Embassies**

Succinctly defined, embassies are physical representations of relationships between countries (Robin 1992; Webster 2001b; Webster and Ivanov 2007) and as such, they would be expected to reflect these relationships. The existing literature on embassies suggests that the larger categories of power, domestic politics, civilization, culture and geopolitics can offer testable hypotheses about what indicators can explain what values embassies reflect.

Robin claims that American symbols abroad vary by place and time. While before the WWII in most regions of the world the State Department (henceforth, SD) built palaces according to the regional traditions, within the confines of its traditional sphere of influence – Central America and China - the SD built replicas of southern plantation mansions deliberately to express paternalism and master-subject relationships “that the United States aspired to maintain in these regions” (p. 6). The second generation American symbols abroad became distinctly American, paying no “tribute to local traditional values and were abruptly future-oriented.” Post WWII American symbolism abroad “stated unequivocally that the war had been won because of the superior American technology and management skills. The iconography implicitly demanded a preferred status for the American political entity in the international arena.” American embassies “demanded deference by demeaning competing ideologies.” Redeeming local stagnant cultures, American embassies “implicitly stated, required subordination to innovative, future-oriented American goals” (6). Thus, the United States ostentatious embassy architecture revealed unequal relationships with the host country: Western, underdeveloped and Moslem [sic].

Robin especially emphasizes that architectural forms in the 1950s and 1960s reflected the assumptions that oriental cultures were timeless, eternal, immobile and stagnant in contrast to a progressive West. Examples for these unequal relationships are the embassies in London (UK), in Accra (Ghana), Baghdad (Iraq), Karachi (Pakistan) as well as in Rabat (Morocco) (pp. 158-165). According to Robin, the post-WWII Modernist architecture was seen as aggressive, trivializing local traditions and backfired. Rather than arousing awe or admiration, America’s embassies triggered animosity. These symbols of foreign power were viewed as attempts for neocolonization.



Robin claims that foreign policy objectives “are mirrors of any given society’s innermost concerns”, that is values. Thus, Robin continues, these monuments unwittingly reveal the culture change of the pre-Depression era of a laissez-faire mentality to one of regimented, urban-industrial society, espousing technology. The post-WWII embassy architecture suggests that America gained its strength from its future-orientation. “Modernization, not the tracing of footsteps to a previous age, functioned as the guiding light of society” (p. 7). While Robin’s claims suggest many hypotheses for the changing image of the U.S. embassies over time (which is beyond the scope of this study), they also suggest several interesting testable propositions about the relationships between values and the cultural context in the host countries, as well as culture of owner country as an explanatory variable.

In their analyses Webster (2001a; 2001b; 2001c; Webster and Ivanov 2007) and Webster and Ivanov (2007) model the probability of placement of embassies and look into power considerations, cultural affinities, regional aspects, political culture and political aspirations that lead to influencing how countries place their embassies. Generally, Webster’s findings illustrate that 1) countries place embassies in powerful states, supporting the notion that states recognize the need to have clear communication channels in countries with the ability to influence international relations and 2) cultural influences play a role in the placement of embassies.

Webster’s most global work (2001b) is an investigation to determine whether Commonwealth membership influences states’ bilateral interactions by reciprocating embassies. The dependent variable for the analysis is the presence or absence of an embassy. The major hypothesis tested is that Commonwealth members would favor other Commonwealth members since they have certain historical and cultural commonalities. The embassy placements of five countries were investigated: Australia, Bangladesh, Canada, Cyprus and Kenya. In the

investigation, control variables were used to determine whether alternative explanations played a role. These are power of the host country (measured in logged GDP); or region of the host country. Thus, using only three indicators to show the five Commonwealth countries and their values for the host country, Webster's models explain between 74 and 87 percent of the variation of the embassies abroad. In each of the five regressions, the measure of power (logged GDP) is the most powerful explanatory variable and is statistically significant for regressions on each country. The regional variable is statistically significant for four out of five countries, while the main explanatory variable, suggesting that Commonwealth nations are favored as hosts of embassies, fails. Thus, the major finding is that countries largely place their embassies on the basis of power and region.

Webster investigates more thoroughly the placement of embassies and high commissions by Canada (2001c). In this work, Webster takes into account five independent variables to determine which ones play a role. In the model used, Webster measures 1) power of host country (logged GDP); 2) NATO membership; 3) a dummy variable denoting the USA; 4) membership in the Francophone area and 5) Commonwealth membership. This model explains 75% of the placements of embassies abroad, while merely guessing would have explained only 53% of the placements correctly. In this model, power showed only two variables, power and Francophone membership, suggesting that Canada places its embassies on the basis of whether the host countries are powerful and whether the host country is a Francophone member. The implications of this research are that for the Canadian state's embassy placements matters power and the regional component. (Francophone is a regional variable) Similar research on Cyprus (Webster 2001a) demonstrates that the Cypriot state considered EU membership, as well as power of host

countries and countries in the Middle East region. As in the previous research, Webster's study on Cyprus revealed that there is no evidence that Cyprus favors other Commonwealth countries.

In their analysis of the placement of embassies of Bulgaria and Romania, Webster and Ivanov (2007) investigate the logic by which these two neighboring Balkan countries locate their embassies abroad. The dependent variable for this analysis is again the existence or non-existence of a Bulgarian or Romanian embassy in a country and the major independent variables account for EU membership and communist past, both of which are dummy variables. The three control variables are 1) power of host country, measured in GDP; 2) region, the Balkans, as a dummy variable and 3) culture or "civilization", measured as a percent Christian Orthodox population at ratio level. The findings of the logistical regression illustrate that these two very similar countries locate embassies using a slightly different logic. While Romania locates embassies strategically in order to facilitate communications with EU member states – and thus build up relationships in the EU – it does not seem that Bulgaria does the same. The evidence illustrates that Bulgaria seems to locate embassies based on past communist legacy, on power and in countries with predominantly Orthodox population. What is common in terms of locating embassies is that both countries seem not to show any favoring of regional (Balkan) countries, something contrary to the initial assumption. Both countries also favor powerful states, which is consistent in all analyses on the subject, and "so far has underscored the realist concerns for power in the location of embassies" (Webster and Ivanov 2007, p. 114). Webster and Ivanov claim that their research findings illustrate the value of the classical rational actor approach to the study of foreign policy of countries as the model shows that despite a lack of detailed knowledge about these two countries, nearly 90% of the placement of their embassies could be predicted using publicly available data.

As a shortcoming of the model, Webster and Ivanov note that the dichotomous dependent variable misses some information since it does not discern the size of the diplomatic mission in countries and acknowledge the well known to researchers problems with obtaining data. The authors note also that their investigation illustrates that “investments in foreign policy may not seem to be consistent with stated policy” and suggest that “vested interests may prevent flexibility in realigning foreign policy”. According to Webster and Ivanov, their contribution consists in illustrating that “states have ways of measuring the importance of other states in the international system and locate embassies on that basis” (p. 116). Power as the “currency” of international relations seems to be the major explanatory variable and thus “*confirmed the one rule that realists would consider paramount – that the power of other countries in the system is a universal consideration in terms of constructing a strategic foundation of embassy placement*” (p. 117, emphasis added). The main conclusion of this research is that “powerful countries are the key countries to be rewarded with embassies” (Webster and Ivanov 2007, p. 107).

While Webster’s studies on placement of embassies suggest plausible explanatory variables he does not address embassies as symbolic representations, but only as “strategic investments and thus, he does not account for values. However, values – *political* again as they relate to international relations – underpin embassy placements. Thus, applicable explanatory variables, suggested by Webster are: power of the host country, belonging or not to the West, belonging or not to Islamic culture, regionalism and political culture.

### **3.5. Explaining embassy architecture**

Succinctly defined, embassies are physical representations of relationships between countries (Robin 1992; Webster 2001b; Webster and Ivanov 2007) and as such, they would be

expected to reflect these relationships. As political architecture, embassies reflects values. The literature reveals that the United States embassies - as political architecture - reveal the values of tradition, innovation, wealth and security. The main assumption of this study is that during the most recent period of globalization and neo-liberalization since the 1980s, these values are reflected in other countries' embassies also. The main research thesis of this study is that differences in values reflected in embassy architecture is linked to differences in national characteristics of the owner and the host countries. Examining the relationships between values and national characteristics is expected to provide answer to the major research question: *What influences the embassy architecture?* The existing literature on embassies suggests that the larger categories of power, domestic politics, civilization, culture and geopolitics can offer testable hypotheses about what indicators can explain what values embassies reflect.

### **“Great” nations have “great” embassies, or power matters**

“Great” is assumed to mean both, magnificent and awesome and “value” judgments as to “good” or “bad” are not considered. Great powers have great architecture – a potential symbol of primacy and an example of what political scientist Joseph Nye (2004) has called “soft power” – the ability to exercise influence by shaping beliefs and perceptions. The literature reveals that “great powers” have “great” embassies (Glancey 9 January 2009; Loeffler 1998; Gournay and Loeffler 2002). In *Washington and Ottawa: A Tale of Two Embassies*, Gournay and Loeffler (2002), analyze the politics of the construction of the embassies of the United States and Canada, respectively in Ottawa and in Washington. The authors point out that the Canadian embassy “embodies a sense of openness and grandeur that has much enhanced Canada’s identity in Washington” (p. 482), while the stringent security standards for the US embassy were waived for

selecting and purchasing a site in the most prestigious part of Ottawa, even it did not meet the established security standards. Both embassies are “celebrations” of each country in the other, “two symbols of mutual regard and political purpose,” “signs of the strength and significance of the ties between two nations, symbols of national commitment and expectations, representing snapshots of key moments in the history of a diplomatic relationship, “real billboards advertising national identity,” mutual respect and other subtler or more potent political and cultural messages (pp. 480-481). Robin (1992) also refers to U.S. embassies as “mobilization of art” and a “fine indicator of the changing perception of government and national identity” (9).

If countries represent their “identities” they would be expected to represent this authentically everywhere during a defined period of time. I would call this an “identity” perspective, as in contrast to the realist one, from which the main purpose of embassy building would be to promote strictly and selectively their self-interest and thus their embassies are expected to be selectively designed and built, depending on host country’s characteristics. From an “identity” perspective, embassies would be expected to present authentically self-images of their countries abroad, be it traditional or innovative. The important point is that if it is “identity” it should be consistent everywhere and in everything. Hence, “great” nations are expected to have “great” embassies. Commonly accepted measurements for greatness in international relations are the wealth and the military power of a nation.

### **Wealth**

If a country is wealthy, this should be expected to be reflected even more so in its symbolic representation abroad. Thus, the national wealth of the country that owns an embassy should be a good indicator for embassies reflecting the value of wealth. While the major, “scope” or “terminal” value reflected in the embassy of a wealthy nation is expected to be wealth, it also

can reflect national pride thorough historical references to its past of belonging to an old and acknowledged civilization, or culture, and thus reflect the value of tradition. However, in the current era of globalization traditionalism is not likely to be valued to such a degree that to be reflected in national symbolic representations abroad. Wealth can be expressed through novel modernist architecture emphasizing technological advancement and future-forwardness. Similarly, the wealth of the owner country should be positively correlated with security, as wealth and security are natural universal concerns. Besides, simply put, the wealthy have what to lose, so security should be a legitimate concern. Thus, the wealth of the owner country could be a major explanatory variable and would be expected to be negatively correlated with architectural patterns reflecting traditional values and positively correlated with embassy patterns reflecting wealth, security, as well as innovation. Thus, from these reflections, follow the next four hypotheses:

***Hypothesis 14: Traditional values are less likely to be reflected in “great powers” embassies.***

***Hypothesis 15: The embassies of wealthy nations are more likely to be novel.***

***Hypothesis 16: The wealthier a nation, the more opulent its embassy would be.***

***Hypothesis 17: Wealthy nations are likely to emphasize security in their embassies.***

### **Military power**

Similarly to wealth, if a nation is a military power, this would be expected to influence what values are reflected in its embassies. The United States is the world’s military power. The change in the appearance of the American embassies is reflected in their “price tags”: from \$150,000, which was considered to be the limit for one facility abroad in 1911 (Robin 1992), the price in 2008 has rocketed to, at least, \$736,000,000 for the embassy in Iraq (Epstein August 8, 2008)

and Mahbubani (2005) points out that a cynic might suggest that American embassies represent symbolically the military power of America. The major concern – and thus, the major value – reflected in the United States embassies is security. Thus, by inference, the military power of a nation should be expected to influence whether security is major value. As adjacent to security in Schwartz' circular structure of value systems, wealth and tradition also are likely to be positively correlated with military power, while innovation could be expected to be negatively correlated with military power. From these reflections, the next four hypotheses follow:

*Hypothesis 18: A military power is more likely to reflect traditional values in its embassies.*

*Hypothesis 19: A military power is less likely to reflect innovation in its embassies.*

*Hypothesis 20: A military power is more likely to reflect wealth in its embassies.*

*Hypothesis 21: A military power is more likely to reflect security in its embassies.*

### **Domestic politics matter**

If embassies promote the national interest abroad, then domestic politics, such as political regime, employment and the related exports should be good indicators for the values reflected in the respective embassies.

### **Political culture**

Robin (1992) considers that the transition from traditional to modernist (innovative) US embassies reflected the changes in the political culture of the nation and were “expressions of important internal developments – in particular, they showed the impact of modernization on American society” (p. 174) and thus, “at least some of the difficulties experienced in articulating cohesive and enduring symbols abroad were due to the fluid and contentious nature of America's political culture”. However, Robin concludes that “Symbols do not produce cohesive societies;



cohesive societies produce forceful symbols that reflect political conformity and common causes.” (p. 175) While Robin’s reflections are meaningful and correct, they are not very helpful in operationalizing “political culture”. Mayo (1996) defines culture as a social order that people practically structure, which often determines politically how buildings will be designed and built. Mayo considers political culture conservative and thus, when reflected in architecture, government buildings continue the normative beliefs of how we should govern through their symbolic and functional design. Goodsell views government architecture as reflecting the values of political elites. These authoritative opinions reveal that political culture is difficult to define and even more so to operationalize for statistical purposes. However, all scholars on political architecture point to its significance as an explanatory variable. As definitions of democracy are contested, I assume that political rights – as related to “political”, “collective”, in contrast to civil rights - are a good proxy for the political culture in liberal democracy, which is the dominant form in the current age and provides a reference point for comparing nations. Besides, liberal democracies are the major actors on the global arena, building most of the embassies and thus provide the opportunities to “read” the values reflected in them. Lastly, Loeffler (1998) argues that the major part of the United States embassy program is promoting *liberal democracy* through modernist innovative architecture. This, in fact, is supporting the neo-liberalist perspective in international relations, which claims that the spread of democracy will result in cooperation and prosperity for all. If this is so, security concerns should be less. Thus the political culture of liberal democracy should be a good indicator for embassy structures, reflecting political values. From these reflections, the following set of four hypotheses can be generated:

***Hypothesis 22: Liberal democracies are less likely to reflect tradition in their embassies.***

*Hypothesis 23: Liberal democracies are more likely to reflect innovation in their embassies.*

*Hypothesis 24: Liberal democracies are more likely to reflect wealth in their embassies.*

*Hypothesis 25: Liberal democracies are less likely to reflect security in their embassies.*

## **Exports**

Negotiating exports, as was discussed by Loeffler (1998), is one of the major substantial functions of embassies. Thus, the exports of a country should be a good indicator of the values, its embassy reflects. As a country would aim at presenting itself as wealthy, innovative and progressive, having the most innovative technologies and “know-how” to offer, this would be expressed in its embassy. Hence, exports should be expected to predict reflection of the values of innovation and wealth and less so of tradition and security, as exports imply technological innovation, not looking back to the past and openness, not security as inaccessibility. From these reflections the next set of four hypotheses follow:

*Hypothesis 26: The more exports a nation has, the less its embassy expresses the value of tradition.*

*Hypothesis 27: The more exports a nation has, the more its embassy expresses the value of innovation.*

*Hypothesis 28: The more exports a nation has, the more its embassy expresses the value of wealth.*

*Hypothesis 29: The more exports a nation has, the less its embassy expresses the value of security.*

## **Unemployment**

Although at first sight overstretched, unemployment, according to the author, is the single most important political factor and the rate of unemployment should be reflected in a country's

embassy as “strategic investment.” If the unemployment in this age of globalization in a country is low, this would mean that it “does well” on the global arena and this would be reflected in an embassy of great wealth and innovation; no reasons for “security/survival” concerns; it looks in the future, not in the past for glorious heritage and traditions. Thus, the unemployment rate would predict positive correlation with tradition and security and negative with innovation and wealth (if unemployment is high, innovation and wealth go down). Hence, these reflections yield the next four hypotheses:

*Hypothesis 30: Nations with less unemployment are less likely to reflect traditional values in their embassies.*

*Hypothesis 31: Nations with less unemployment are more likely to reflect innovation in their embassies.*

*Hypothesis 32: Nations with less unemployment are more likely to reflect wealth in their embassies.*

*Hypothesis 33: Nations with less unemployment are less likely to reflect security in their embassies.*

### **Host country matters**

Webster (2001a; 2001b; 2001c) and Webster and Ivanov (2007) claim that the most important – and first – reason that a country may value a relationship with another state is that it is a powerful state. A logic consistent with the long-standing tradition of Realism in International Relations, that was theorized by Hans Morgethau (1948), Mearscheimer (2003) as well as by Lasswell (1979) and Robin (1992). From this realist perspective, states are assumed to act only in their self-interest. Thus, when considering the design of their embassies, it is apparent that the

countries will design and built their most impressive – and, most likely, most innovative embassies in the most powerful, the wealthiest states as they have the power to influence the outcomes in the international system.

## **Wealth**

Consistent with Prown's (1923) claims, we could expect to observe common stylistic elements in embassies built during the same time and in the same place. For example, the embassies built most recently in Berlin, Germany would be expected to make bold statements of wealth and innovation. As tradition and innovation are in opposite directions in Schwartz' circular structure of value types, on average, traditional values are not expected to be of importance in the embassies in Berlin. Similarly with security, it is on the opposite side of innovation. As, according to Lasswell (1979), the usual line of diffusion is from the strong to the weak, the weak voluntarily imitates the strong to symbolize power and this is in harmony with a basic mechanism of human development (pp. 52-53). This should be true for all embassies in all countries during a definite period. For example, embassies in the developed Western countries will differ predictably from those in Africa, the Middle East or in Central Asia. This is consistent also with Robin's analysis on U.S. embassies from the 1960s. These reflections yield the following set of hypotheses:

***Hypothesis 34: The wealthier a host nation, the less the other countries express tradition.***

***Hypothesis 35: The wealthier a host nation, the more the other nations express innovation.***

***Hypothesis 36 The wealthier a host nation, the more the other nations express wealth.***

***Hypothesis 37: The wealthier a host nation, the les the other countries are concerned with security.***

## Identity matters

The role of architecture to national or other territorial identities has been acknowledged. Vale (2008) demonstrates the role of political architecture to support national identity, while Robin (1992) claims that embassies indicate changes in perceptions of government and national identity. Loeffler's article *The Identity Crisis of the American Embassy. Are embassies to be fortresses, cultural landmarks or simply offices? The answer is up for grabs* (2000) emphasize the close connection between embassy architecture and identity while another coauthored article *Washington and Ottawa: A Tale of Two Embassies* (Gournay and Loeffler 2002) discusses the role of embassies in enhancing national identities. "Identity" is one of four perspectives in international relations scholarship, the other being realist, liberal and critical theory each identified by different emphases on power, institutions, ideas and embedded forces (Dikov August 1, 2011). Nau subdivides the identity perspective into idealist, normative, social constructivist, discursive, psychological and methodological. As concepts of "identity" vary, in this study it refers to identification or commonality with a civilization, culture or territory (neighborhood). While civilization implies more instrumental values, culture implies more intrinsic values, such as Tonnies' *Gesselschaft* and *Gemeinschaft* notions of communities (Tonnies 1963). Thus, to Mayo's (1996) definition of culture, as a social order that people practically structure and which influences how buildings are designed and built, for the international system, belonging to a "civilization," religious affiliation, as part of culture, and proximity (localism or neighborhood) need to be added. According to Webster and Ivanov (2007), culture and its related concept of "civilization" count on the basis that "birds of a feather flock together" (108). Indeed, proximity, common language, culture and other historical and social linkages probably influence positively perceptions of the values of other countries and

thus may facilitate cooperation and favorable relations between countries, while “slight impediments may occur when dealing with other types of countries” (Webster 2001b, p. 530).

Robin (1992), Webster (2001a; 2001b; 2001c) and Webster and Ivanov (2007) demonstrate that embassies are designed and built, or placed, depending on the culture of the host country. Hence, for example, the design projects for the United States embassies in Canada, Berlin and the most recent one, in London, have been the subject of special attention and numerous discussions of all types in the respective countries – owning and hosting - the concern being to account for all reasonable opinions and concerns, especially of the publics in the host countries. Besides, the close historical relations between the US and the UK are still another factor for the most “special” embassy design of the future US embassy in London. On the other side, not much discussions have been known about the newly built embassies in Iraq, Pakistan or Afghanistan, or even in Mexico. Hence, cultural indicators, such as belonging to – or not- to a civilization or culture, represented through religious affiliation, should make difference.

### **Western civilization**

The dominant culture in the world is that of the Western civilization of Europe and North America and the expectation would be that countries would consider this in their decisions how to represent their states in Western civilization context.

Robin claims that the US used sculptural embassy architecture as a tool for demonstrating power and control in both Western and non-Western (third world) countries. However, while in the Western countries embassies were modernist with ornamentation and references to history (the embassy in Athens), in the third world countries, embassies represented a stereotypical pseudo-traditional architecture that the FBO used uniformly in countries and regions that had little in common with each other (pp. 153-158) and this reflected the imposition of new divisions

of politics and culture. According to Robin, embassy architecture differentiated the world into two distinct groups: complex, nuanced Western European cultures and, by contrast, a backward, somewhat faceless Third World, in which differences between nations made little difference.

While Loeffler (1998) disagrees with Robin's interpretations, she points out that unlike projects for American embassies in "Amman and elsewhere" (p. 257), the US embassy in Ottawa, Canada, is conspicuous for the way it fits into the fabric of the city. Instead of being a walled compound, it accommodates itself to the existing urban environment accounting also for existing vistas. The embassy in Ottawa (Gournay and Loeffler 2002) as well as in Berlin (Loeffler 1998) and the future one in London are unusual for their design and also for the intensive review process that accompanied their construction by both, American and host country authorities. Thus wealth and innovation would be expected to rate high in Western host countries, while tradition and security – low.

*Hypothesis 38: Embassies in Western countries are less likely to be traditional.*

*Hypothesis 39: Embassies in Western countries are more likely to be innovative.*

*Hypothesis 40: Embassies in Western countries are more likely to be opulent.*

*Hypothesis 41: Embassies in Western countries are less likely to be security-oriented.*

## **Islam**

Robin (1992) considers that American embassies in the Islamic world were characterized by strategies of manipulating native building techniques to achieve stereotypical elements of pseudo-Moslem architecture, such as screen walls and vaulted roofs. The basic formula in Moslem countries was to show how "modern technology" could benefit "native tradition", adding to the local aesthetic "a sophistication and refinement not found in peasant architecture", as explained by Edward Larrabee Barnes, the architect of the American consulate in Tabriz, Iran

(1962), quoted in Robin, 1992, p. 162). Besides, the non-West was considered “oriental” in the meaning of being too traditional and stagnant to change in comparison with the occidental West, notions reflected in the scholarship on Orientalism and in Weber’s concept about the occidental city (Weber 1966).

While Robin’s reflections are on the traditional forms, most recently, the predominant concerns with security are related to “terrorism” and Islam states. Besides, as the most recent Pew Global Attitudes Project report reveals, that the major tensions in the world - between the Muslim and Western publics persist (PEW Jul 21, 2011). Thus embassies of Western countries in Islamic countries would be expected to differ and rate high on security, in contrast to those in countries of non-Islamic countries, and they would be more traditional, in accordance with Robin’s reflections. Thus, from these reflections follow the next four hypotheses:

***Hypothesis 42: Embassies in Islam countries are more likely to be traditional.***

***Hypothesis 43: Embassies in Islam countries are less likely to be innovative.***

***Hypothesis 44: Embassies in Islam countries are more likely to be opulent.***

***Hypothesis 45: Embassies in Islam countries are more likely to be security-oriented.***

## **Neighborhood matters**

Finally, consistent with Webster’s (2001a; 2001b; 2001c) and Webster and Ivanov (2007) reflections on embassy placement “the neighborhood” should make difference. According to the geographical principle, interests generally decline over distance, when all else is considered <sup>17</sup>. It seems reasonable that neighboring countries care about developing stable and good relations with neighbors, based on more than just pure “realist” self-interest. As Webster notes, “the USA

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<sup>17</sup> Mesquita, B. B. d., J. D. Morrow, et al. (2005). The Logic of Political Survival, MIT Press., cited in Webster, C. (2001b). "Commonwealth Diplomatic Missions: A comparative empirical investigation of the foreign policy of five commonwealth members." The Round Table(361): 529-539.



and Canada need to facilitate a good working relationship with each other through diplomatic channels because they need to have good ties in order to facilitate economic development and political cooperation” (2001b, p. 530). In addition, the concept of integration into a community can be taken also in consideration, such as membership in the European Union, or the NAFTA zone, for example.

It should be to no surprise that the embassies of these two countries are some of the most impressive and the subject of special scholarly analysis (Gournay and Loeffler 2002). It took the United States about 40 years and Canada about twenty to work and rework the designs of their embassies, in order to please all sides. The State Department even waived its stringent security standards for Ottawa, while suspending all new embassy construction after the attacks on the U.S. Embassy and Marine barracks in Beirut; this was done in order to purchase a site in the most prestigious part of Ottawa (Gournay and Loeffler 2002, p. 481)

As Webster notes, this geopolitical notion is not in contradiction to the realist perspective, but “suggests that there is an interaction between them” (p. 530). However, this focus on cooperative behavior is part of the neo-liberal perspective about international relations. *Thus, the expectation is that embassies in neighboring countries will rate high on wealth, innovation and low on security and tradition. These reflections yield the following four hypotheses:*

***Hypothesis 46: Embassies in close proximity are less likely to be traditional.***

***Hypothesis 47: Embassies in close proximity are more likely to be innovative.***

***Hypothesis 48: Embassies in close proximity are more likely to be opulent***

***Hypothesis 49: Embassies in close proximity are less likely to be security-concerned.***

## **USA matters**

Robin (1992) considers American embassies as symbols abroad that “functioned as substitutes for the use of military might”. Political architecture as symbolic illustration of American power and willingness to intervene forcefully in the theater on international relations, played a significant role in US foreign policy while refraining from an enduring and large physical presence abroad. “Thus an analysis of the symbolism of American architecture abroad reveal the crystallization of fundamental American goals in the international arena” (p. 5).

Gradually, since the 1950s (Robin 1992; Loeffler 1998), security concerns for the US embassies have been on the rise and this is reflected in the US embassies. Besides, in his theory of intergenerational values system, Inglehart plots nations on a scale of values and while the most postmodern nations are the Northern European countries, the United States is more traditional than would be predicted by its socioeconomic status. Inglehart defines the US as a deviant case, exhibiting much more traditional and religious values than other rich countries. Thus, the analyses on US embassies and Inglehart’s theory yield two major hypotheses: security is the major value reflected in US embassies and that they are most traditional, in comparison with other comparable states. Consistent with Schwartz’ theory, we may expect also that US embassies are more opulent and less innovative.

*Hypothesis 50: US embassies are likely to be more traditional.*

*Hypothesis 51: US embassies are likely to be less innovative.*

*Hypothesis 52: US embassies are likely to be more opulent.*

*Hypothesis 53: US embassies are likely to be more security-oriented.*

## **Perceptions Matter**

While national and international factors are expected to explain the architectural patterns as reflection of values, individual perceptions matter, as many scholars have noted (Goodsell 1988a; Edelman 1995; Goodsell 2001). Perceptions may differ because of gender, age, educational attainment, ideological inclinations and, most importantly, because of different national culture. While the explanatory variables of interest in this study are national and international factors, testing subjective perceptions would reveal if there might be any biases in the respondents; ratings as measurements of values and thus allow to explore the underlying soundness of the new metrics and the validity of the hypothesized relationships on national and international levels. The expectation is that variables from the individual micro level of perceptions are not likely to overturn explanatory variables from the macro level. However, how individuals perceive political architecture should matter to policy decision-makers. For clarity, the next general hypotheses will be tested:

*Hypothesis54: Gender is likely to influences perceptions about values as reflected in embassies.*

*Hypothesis55: Age is likely to influences perceptions about values as reflected in embassies.*

*Hypothesis56: Education is likely to influences perceptions about values as reflected in embassies.*

*Hypothesis57: Nationality is likely to influences perceptions about values as reflected in embassies.*

*Hypothesis58: Ideological orientation is likely to influences perceptions about values as reflected in embassies.*

In summation, values define architectural form. The literature on embassy architecture reveals four major design patterns reflecting the values of tradition, innovation, wealth and security. The purpose of this study is from these sufficiently common patterns of embassy architecture to derive scientifically verifiable relationships which can explain what factors influence what political values are purposefully expressed – or just reflected – by the embassy architecture and thus to understand, explain and predict changes in the architectural landscape of embassy building. The explanations are expected to express the relationships between values and national characteristics as well as international relations.

The basic model for comparing the statistical measures for political values is

$$y_i = (X_1, X_2, \dots, X_n),$$

where  $y_i$  represents the average of each of the four political values reflected in embassy architecture – tradition, innovation, wealth and security - and the  $x_{(1to n)}$  are the variables related to the countries that own and host the embassy. As there are not available measurements for the four values reflected in embassy patterns, a major part of this study is to empirically derive measurements, accounting for the subjectivity of individual perceptions.

## **Chapter 4.**

### **Methods**

In outline, this chapter begins with a review of the approaches of different scholars in studying the politics-architecture relationships, revealing that architectural patterns are a legitimate data source and concluding that they can be measured.

To go from theories to hypothesized relationships and then to empirical testing, the use of formal - as derived from studying of forms - sources of data are justified. Then the four political values of tradition, innovation, wealth and security, as reflected in embassies (dependent variables) are conceptualized and operationalized. The explanatory variables presented at the end of the previous chapter are further operationalized. As there are not metrics for values expressed through architectural patterns, I employ the method of survey research to derive measurements for the dependent variables. As individual perceptions are likely to be subjective, I examine whether they may influence the major findings in any substantial way on the examples of three embassies. Finally, I explain the applied analysis techniques.

#### **4.1. Architecture as Data**

Art forms as data (Prown 1980), and architecture, more specifically, is a widely used method of supporting arguments in the literature on the environment-politics relationship (Lasswell 1979; Goodsell 1988a; Goodsell 1988b; Goodsell 2001), on embassies (Robin 1992; Loeffler 1998; Gournay and Loeffler 2002), as well as on propaganda with design (Mayo 1978). The major assumption, driving the interest in the research on the relationship between politics and architecture is that architecture reflects values.

For guiding his investigation of space dynamics, Lasswell (1979) hypothesizes that the relative priority of power is reflected in the environmental emphasis on power. He chooses the dimension of verticality as a measure indicating power and employs a “silhouette analysis” to illustrate his argument, justifying his choice by noting that there is a general agreement in many societies that height is positively related to prominence, since it commands attention. When value priorities change, this typically finds architectural expression. For example, when a military gives way to a civil arena, the concern for values other than power increases and government buildings are modified in a manner that stresses, not power as a scope value, but power as a base for other values. Hence, values change is reflected in buildings’ patterns, or designs. While Lasswell emphasized the role of politics, he acknowledges also the reverse influence of values, reflected in the environment, on political behavior and process. Similarly, Goodsell considers that buildings contribute to the preservation and formation of political culture.

Goodsell studies the changes over time of different types of public buildings as indicators for changing ideas of political authority. According to Goodsell (1988a), he is the first to employ “a detailed, widespread, comparative field study” (xv), restricting his analysis to a single functional class of space, claiming that this approach “makes the comparisons both possible and revealing” (xv). The durability of the buildings allows them to function as carriers and perpetuators of social ideas over time, while the long lasting components serve as a kind of enduring text that people can judiciously attempt to “read.” Accordingly, the buildings with their architecture and unchanged furniture placement can be regarded as constituting a kind of “imprint” or set of residual markers of collective ideas.

Acknowledging the pitfalls of “reading” architecture, Goodsell however notes that with appropriate methodology - and a reflective, informed and prudent research strategy - such inquiry is potentially revealing and informative. Thus “generalizations are possible at the appropriate level” (p. 9). Goodsell notes that this is consistent with Amos Rapoport’s – the most distinguished expert on the interaction of architecture and culture - claim that the built environment’s symbolic messages from other times and places carry multiple meanings but are capable of some pan-cultural significance (Rapoport 1982, cited in Goodsell 2001). Such examples are the significance of height and the importance of centrality. Rapoport cautions that in deriving inferences, we should examine many cases, make explicit comparisons, consciously seek patterns and infer directly as well as indirectly. To this, Goodsell adds the need to research numerous and collaborative sources of information before formulating an interpretation as well as to have a generalized understanding of the architectural, political and historical context. “Even then, it is important to make needed qualifications and not overreach.” (Goodsell 2001, p. 10)

Ontologically, Goodsell accepts “the material objectivity of physical matter while regarding its social meaning as subjectively derived by human observers.” “When these individually constructed social ‘realities’ fuse into a common, intersubjective whole, the meaning seems irrefutably ‘objective’.” This is plausible especially in the case when the social constructions are tied to perceived material objects rather than to verbal abstractions. When “discovering” these constructions in a full sense is impossible, if repetitive architectural patterns correspond logically to certain social ideas from the documentary records and from interviews, then we have achieved a very plausible interpretation, if not certainty of understanding. In his study on the American statehouse, “expressive insights are sought from the overall physical setting of the statehouse, the way institutions of government are treated spatially over time, the

decorative displays in and historic preservation projects undertaken in the capitol, and the design of specific rooms” (Goodsell 2001, p. 10).

Goodsell notes that along with design, other variables have also been acknowledged such as familiarity with the building (first –time visitors vs. employees); the surrounding built environment, as well as the extent of utilization at a time (empty vs. very crowded); all of which affects human perceptions and behavior. While noting some positive results of survey and experimental simulations in environmental psychology, Goodsell notes that he does not “pretend to follow the canons of “rigorous” social science but conducts numerous in-depth, open-ended interviews supplementing them with personal observations seeking corroboration “where possible” aiming not at generating objective data about causal variables but at opening a window into a subjectively experienced, complex, and unique world, the final result being “an interpretation of possible environment-behavior relationships, not proven fact.” Goodsell rejects the objectivity of symbols that can be discovered empirically and accepts subjective interpretations within various communities of thought and notes that the prevalent is that “large and majestic government buildings should be understood as instruments of deliberate intimidation of the populace” (p. 12). He demonstrates his claim with an analysis of a multitude of perspectives and individual scholars’ contentions, including historian Ron Robin’s (1992) study on the United States symbolism abroad, represented by embassies and war memorials. The main point is that the prevailing arguments are that architecture is used as an assertion of government authority over the masses and in the case of representations abroad – as promotion and accomplishing of strategic international objectives.

While Goodsell analyzes how governmental buildings - or political architecture - may reflect different degrees of democracy, the concept of democracy is hard to be examined as



revealed by photographs of embassy architecture.<sup>18</sup> By contrast, the urban planning and the urbanism of the surrounding area, more generally, have the potential to reveal egalitarian values. In the case of embassies, the surrounding built environment – by its evident accessibility and equal treatment - could indicate the values of equality and freedom, for example, but these values are not part of this study as the unit of analysis is the embassy building, represented by its proxy – a photograph - as a symbolic representation of states and this is, however, one of the limitations of this study.

While all authors point to the explanatory variables of culture, political culture and ideology, in Mayo's (1996) model, ideology is represented by the values of freedom and equality. Mayo employs Rokeach's (1973) taxonomy where the values of freedom and equality define the four major world ideologies – capitalism, socialism, fascism and communism – and points out that it should be understood as an ideal type. In real life, no capitalist society denies equality, whereas no communist society totally limits personal freedom. Similarly, no socialist society ever maximizes both freedom and equality, but some countries, such as Sweden, which emphasizes both capitalism and socialism, have achieved a good blend of freedom and equality. Mayo demonstrates how different degrees of these basic values are reflected in architectural practice in this country.

There are two points of relevance to this study with Mayo's theory. First, the values of equality and freedom may be reflected in urban environments, but they are not easily identifiable in embassies as symbolic representations of nations abroad. As Goodsell's examinations reveal, these values are not typically found in government buildings, although, for sure, there are many city halls, courthouses and public libraries all over the world which may reveal these values and

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<sup>18</sup> The same seems to be true about such universally accepted values as equality, freedom and justice.

they could – and should - be a part of a study of political values. Second, while Mayo’s theory may explain well cases in known context, as it is contingent, it does not allow for broader, generalizations across political units. This said, Mayo’s conceptualizations are applicable and can explain any point of the politics-architecture nexus in a given context.

While both examinations on the United States embassy program note the role of the unique pluralist American politics and the role of individuals in decisions on the symbolic representations of this country abroad, Loeffler especially focuses of the role of politicians and architects. According to Loeffler (1998), architects’ role is important and therefore a future study on the United States embassies should include biographies of the architects who have built embassies. In her discussion of the role of architects in the designing – and thus in the final appearance – of American embassies, Loeffler points out that the freedom some architects had was “an interesting and important part of their contribution” (p. 79). For example, Rapson and van der Meulen were novices in embassy designing, naïve and unaware of the symbolic connotations expected from them and thus created some of the most innovative representations of the United States, which was widely appreciated. By contrast, later, when “prominent American architects saw the prestige value in embassy projects, did many begin to provide more sophisticated and elaborate explanations for their designs –explanations that did not necessarily make the schemes better understood or appreciated” (p. 80). In the case of embassies, as national representations abroad, an argument that the role of architects is crucially important is hardly sustainable. While the role of architects is important, Mayo (1996) demonstrates how ideology determines functions through power and political constraints. However, as the role of professionals engaged in making architectural and urban decisions, as well as of practitioners is extremely important, a future empirical examination on their role is worth pursuing.

In summation, the reviewed research on the politics-architecture nexus is contextual. While Lasswell's approach is deductive, based on historical analysis and seems to explain well the location of power and its change over time, Goodsell's comparative studies of government buildings reveal how values change in one type of building over time. While Robin's historical analysis provides deep understanding and explanation of the US embassy program as foreign policy and export of values, Loeffler's historical analysis contributes immensely to our understanding of how the politics of architecture takes place. While in most of these studies values are the explanatory variables for architectural patterns (form), most authors point out the influence of architecture on behaviors and thus, to some extent, on values. In contrast to these studies, I undertake a different approach. Why I do this is revealed in the next section.

#### **4.2. In search of a method**

While the best option of personal observation, experiencing the atmosphere, interviewing the staff and regular visitors alike – as Goodsell did – would be the first choice, it is not plausible in the case of examining 51 embassies, located in 30 countries, for example. Neither is observing enough embassies around the world by enough observers fulfilling surveys. Thus, using photographs, as proxies for the buildings, has the potential to reveal enough to derive measurements for values, reflected in the architecture of the buildings. For example, if a photograph shows that an embassy is located in an urban environment, with cars in close proximity and people passing by, a fence and barriers restricting parking or direct access are likely to be perceived as normal, legitimate and acceptable. Similarly, an embassy building with large windows and without a wall around it would be expected to be evaluated as accessible in

contrast to a “fortress-like” structure behind a wall or a monumental building in a landscaped environment without visible public access points to it. Similarly, if a building is heavily ornamented, with a “temple front” or columns, it is likely to be viewed as “traditional” in contrast to a “novel” one represented by a clean-lined, without decorations and with large windows structure. The same is relevant for measuring “wealth”: grandeur through size and/or opulence, seems not to be hard to recognize. While 3D digital images from *Google Earth* would be a good option, it is also implausible to ask respondents to explore 51 embassies from different perspectives; it will take too much time and thus, the results are more likely to be compromised. Thus, remains the “realistic” option of using well-selected photographs from authoritative sources and based on professional personal judgment.

As there are no metrics for values expressed in architectural patterns, the major task is to devise and derive such measurements. Devising measurements of political values from photographs of embassy buildings is a challenging task. First, and most importantly, I got very well familiar with the US embassy program and all the photographs of embassies analyzed in the two studies (Robin 1992; Loeffler 1998) as well as with the comparative study of the embassies of the United States in Ottawa, Canada, and respectively, of Canada in Washington (Gournay and Loeffler 2002). I have been also following the media discussions of the newly built embassies in Berlin, Germany, during the 1990s and 2000s, as the result of the moving the capital of Germany from Bonn to Berlin after the uniting of East and West Germany (Redecke and Stern 1997). I have also followed the review articles on the newly built – mainly US and British embassies - in different places (Berlin 1991; [www.germany.usembassy.gov](http://www.germany.usembassy.gov) 2008; Tisdall 2009; Pickard 2011; Hall May 28, 2008, among others). Indeed, the four architectural patterns:

traditional, modern, of opulence, wealth, and of security concerns do appear to be clearly recognizable.

Initially, I started exploring embassies of different countries looking for patterns and insights. I have examined 312 embassies from 39 countries and the illustrations are on file.<sup>19</sup> The major sources of photographs were the lists of missions of the respective countries from Wikipedia. In order to avoid any bias, I chose embassies “by rule,” depending on the number of needed examples and on the total number of photographs available. For example, if there were 45 images of USA embassies and I needed seven photographs, the 6th, 12th, 18th, 24th, 30th, 36th and 42nd were chosen (Appendix 1). First, I tried to examine the embassies of four major countries - USA, UK, China and Russia - and thus, to conduct a comparative analysis; but I did not discover any specifics or patterns. The embassies were selected “randomly” from the lists of diplomatic missions by “rule”: every third, or fourth, or seventh, depending on the total number of embassy photographs available (Appendices 2).<sup>20</sup> Then I increased the number of examined countries to seven, varying in wealth and from different world regions. The selected countries were: United States, the United Kingdom, Saudi Arabia, Russia, China, Bulgaria and Nigeria. Still, no patterns were discovered (Appendix 3). As I couldn’t find any patterns from this selection of photographs of countries differing in power, size, wealth, geography or national culture, I assumed that political system/culture matters and went on with seven nations representing the three major political systems – liberal democracy, social democracy and authoritarianism. The selected countries were: the United States, the United Kingdom, Russia, Sweden, China, France and Germany (Appendix 4). However, I had problems finding

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<sup>19</sup> The appendices illustrate these explorations, although not all 312 photographs are included in the appendices.

<sup>20</sup> The exploratory compositions with recorded “rules of selection” are applied in the Appendices section to the dissertation.

photographs of embassies of all nations in the respective capitals and thus became evident that the United States and the United Kingdom are best represented and the best represented locations were Washington and Berlin: powerful nations and representation in locations of power. I also grouped embassies according to the four values and tried to focus on embassies as symbols of magnificence, that is, as art forms. However, such a treatment would have been extremely selective. I also tried to approach embassies from the four major methodological perspectives in international relations: realism, liberalism, constructivism and (neo-) functionalism. Finally, I had an insight from the mass media about the unique Nordic collective embassy in Berlin, the popular in Washington “House of Sweden” as well as from the literature on the attractiveness and the uniqueness of the Scandinavian social and political model. So, I decided to examine embassies by the four major ideologies: liberal democracy, social democracy, communism/socialism and authoritarianism. The major expectations were: positive correlations between modernist innovation (as reflecting egalitarian values) and social democracy, wealth and liberal democracy, tradition and authoritarianism, and the “undecidable” was “security”. No patterns occurred from the pictures, but an interesting surprise: the egalitarian Sweden turned out to also selectively build embassies in different countries. This interesting fact contradicted Inglehart’s value theory, according to which the Northern European countries were especially mentioned as an example for being in a post-materialistic value phase. This “discovery” seemed in contradiction also with Mayo’s (1996) comment on Sweden, which, according to him, emphasizes the best from both capitalism and socialism and has achieved a good blend of freedom and equality and, in fact, was given as the “best case” example. As this somehow had agreed with my perceptions about the uniqueness of the Scandinavian countries, I hadn’t questioned this thus far. Blending freedom and equality is as close as it can come to

egalitarianism. If this was so, why would Sweden's embassies look so different in different countries? Thus, in contrast to context-bound research - historical analysis and case studies - which may explain well what could influence the architectural patterns as reflection of values in one or several particular cases, I decided to approach the question more generally and examine what factors on average influence the values expressed in architecture as represented by embassies.

#### **4.3. Sample of photographs as proxies of embassies**

Although perceptions are subjective (Goodsell 1988a; Goodsell 2001, among others) and there are no explicit architectural forms that relate to architecture and politics in a timeless and spaceless way (Mayo 1996), there appear to exist some forms and architectural techniques – such as size, mass, scale, height and centrality – that are generally accepted to imply similar things (values) to different people and cultures (Lasswell 1979; Goodsell 1988a, among others). Thus some generalizations can be made, accounting for the subjectivity of perceptions.

Most authors note that architecture reflects the social and political values of the time of construction, which means time is held constant. Thus, the second node – *firmitas* (durability, after *utilitas*, function) - of the triangulated unity of architecture as *firmitas, utilitas, venustas* (*durability, utility, beauty*) would be held constant. What would be left to analyze is *venustas*, or beauty aesthetics, form. For this reason, I started to systemize embassies by decades, contingent on construction, or purchase. First, information is available basically for the United States embassies and the most recent British embassies. Second, I decided to examine the most recent period in the world politics since the 1960s, known as second stage of globalization, and accompanied by the process of intensive financial liberalization since the 1980s. Thus, I limited

the period of time from 1980s to the present. While information is much easier to obtain about the “great” powers, in order to have variation, I tried hard to include as much other countries as I could, while limiting overrepresentation as much as possible, for example for the United States, for which there was information for more newly built embassies. The final sample includes 51 images from 15 countries in 30 host countries. The countries owning embassies are: USA (22), UK (7), Canada (5), Netherlands (2), France (2), Greece (3), China (2) and Mexico, India, Sweden, Bulgaria, Egypt, Germany, Iran and Italy, each represented with one embassy. The host countries are: USA (6), Mexico (2), Ethiopia (3), UK (2), Germany (10), Poland (2), Yemen (2), China (2) and Jordan, Bangladesh, Guyana, Japan, Somalia, Malaysia, Romania, Belarus, Latvia, Moldova, Armenia, Uganda, Turkey, Bulgaria, Spain, Belgium, Thailand, Liberia, Peru, Oman, Canada and Algeria with one embassy each.

I included only these countries because first, there was available data for the time of construction and second, I had to consider the attention span of respondents, who were expected to rate 51 images on four dimensions and this takes at least 45 minutes.<sup>21</sup> The larger sample included also some of the embassies of: Denmark, Finland, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Nigeria, Japan, South Korea, Australia, Azerbaijan, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Kyrgyzstan, Lithuania, Poland, Uzbekistan, Thailand, Switzerland, Spain, Kenya and New Zealand. The illustrations of these embassies are on file and they do not differ significantly from the embassy photographs included in the survey.<sup>22</sup> Thus, a total of at least 312 images of the embassies of 36 countries were examined and are on file. The data on the variables match the time period (Appendix 5).

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<sup>21</sup> Later the length did deter a lot of respondents and I got a lot of criticisms and advice from friends and colleagues about this. Although not all criticisms were serious, length needs to be considered if we want to get good results.

<sup>22</sup> The major sources of photographs are indicated in appendix 6.



A major problem was finding the exact time of construction, or purchase, data needed for matching the independent variables, the national characteristics. The time between a decision about building an embassy – and the consequent allocation and appropriation of funding - and its actual opening may span decades. Such was the case, for example, with the embassies of US in Ottawa (four decades) and that of Canada in Washington (two decades) (Gournay and Loeffler 2002). When I had both years of beginning and of completion, I have used the middle of the period. When I had only the completion year, I subtracted two years, as four years is a plausible period of planning –including appropriation of funding and design – and completion of construction work of an embassy. For embassies which were built in the 2000s and for which I did not find exact years, I have used the year of 2005. These approximations are justifiable because of the importance of the decision to build an embassy as a national representation abroad. If a country decides to build an embassy, small fluctuations in the economy - such as changes in the GDP or the GNI – are not likely to deter it from constructing an embassy, while for the examined period, there weren't any crisis situations, such as the current. For example, while during the 2000s, Greece has built at least three new impressive embassies, it is not likely that this can take place in the current financial turmoil. As for the quality of photographs, I have tried to provide the most authoritative - from books, whenever available,<sup>23</sup> and the most informative and revealing, as to my personal judgment. The sources of the photographs are recorded and applied in the Appendix 6.

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<sup>23</sup> I have used three books for the photographs: Loeffler, J. C. (1998). The Architecture of Diplomacy. Building America's Embassies. New York, Princeton Architectural Press., Robin, R. (1992). Enclaves of America. Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press. and Auge, M. (1995). Non-places: Introduction to an Anthropology of Supermodernity. London and New York, Verso.

#### **4.4. Variables: definitions and measurements**

The major assumption of this study is that the four core values of tradition, innovation, wealth and security – as reflected in the United States embassies – are reflected in other countries' embassies also. As my interest is in the national and international factors that influence what political values are embodied in embassy architecture, I treat political values as dependent variables and national and international factors as independent variables. The thesis of this study is that these values are linked to the national characteristics of the countries owning and hosting the embassies and other factors, reflecting international relations. Statistical analysis can reveal patterns of embassy groupings reflecting different values and testing against objective data on national and international indicators could reveal what factors may influence the reflection of different values in embassies.

While the operational concepts and the indicators for the independent variables are based on authoritative databases, there are not measurements for the reflected values in architecture. However, we know by empirical examination of people's perceptions. For this reason, metrics for values are derived from respondents' ratings of embassy photographs as proxies for the buildings. Despite that "things speak louder" than either actions or words (Lasswell 1979, p. 55), perceptions are subjective and, for this purpose, I have collected data also on respondents characteristics and have examined whether there are significant relationships between respondents' demographics and their ratings of images, as represented by three indicative examples of embassies. Demographics such as gender, age, education, ideological inclinations and nationality are commonly assumed to influence individual perceptions. Thus, there are three groups of independent variables: national indicators, three dummy variables indicating international relations and respondents' demographics.

#### 4.4.1. Dependent Variables

In order to derive measurements for the dependent variables, the four values reflected in embassies, I have designed and conducted an international survey in which respondents are asked to rate 51 photographs, as proxies for 51 embassies built during the last 30 years, on a scale ranging from one (1: negation of the examined value) to seven (7: maximal evidence for the existence of the examined value) for each of the four values: tradition, innovation, wealth and security. The cover letter of the survey (Appendix 7) provided explanation for the purpose of the survey and simple instructions how to rate the images. If the means of the ratings differ significantly from the neutral (4) for “neither-nor” the value or its opposite, then values are indeed reflected or expressed in the respective embassies. Thus, the dependent variables – expressed through embassy buildings - were measured as continuous by ratings of photographs of embassy buildings on all four values on a scale from 1 to 7 and the measurements for the political values were created as averages for the ratings from the survey.<sup>24</sup> In order to get enough responses for the analysis, the set goal was to collect at least 100 surveys from respondents from different countries<sup>25</sup>, the final number of completed surveys is 138. A pre-test of the survey, consisting of eight images of details, which are indicative of commonly accepted assumptions about perceptions of architectural forms and rated by 25 respondents, revealed a satisfactory consistence in expected ratings, that is whether the survey’s wording and clarity was apparent to all respondents and whether the questions meant the same thing to all respondents. The pilot survey was expected also to reveal more precisely whether: 1) the respondents understood the

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<sup>24</sup> The survey is applied in Appendix 7 and is still available at:

<http://survey.utk.edu/mrIWeb/mrIWeb.dll?I.Project=POLITICALVALUES>

<sup>25</sup> The major selected countries were the USA, Bulgaria, India, China, South Korea and Kyrgyzstan as colleagues (doctoral students at the Political Science Department at the UTK) agreed to help with the distribution of the survey among students from the respective countries.

objective of the survey; 2) the answer choices were compatible with the respondents' competency; 3) whether the items required them to think too long or hard before responding; 4) the answers collected reflected what was expected in regards to the purpose of the survey; 5) there was enough diversity in the answers received and 6) whether the survey is too long (Iraossi, 2006, cited on SurveyMonkey website).<sup>26</sup>

Thus, the average ratings on the architectural patterns for each building are the variables representing the four political values. The explanatory variables are from the broader categories of wealth, domestic politics, civilization, culture and geopolitics.

## **Tradition**

Nowadays, tradition in buildings is expressed through classical architectural forms, usually decorated. Robin views traditional symbolic forms as “the search for legitimacy by tracing roots to the past” (p. 7). According to Goodsell (2001), the “temple front” is almost universally recognizable around the world as probably the strongest visual design ever produced in Western architecture, symbolizing authority, while classical architectural forms - in general - impute implicit order and are a universal sign of government power (p. 186). According to Robin (1992), traditional values, expressed through classical structures promoted commonality with Western civilization, and solid historical architecture in a modern context provides reassurance, stability, continuity as historically-oriented traditional architectural forms are parochial and inward-looking (pp. 92, 103, 141). Neo-classical architecture, linked with antiquity, makes references to reason, law and to legitimate government power with “its temporal permanence beyond doubt” (Goodsell 1988b, p. 290). With the early modernist International Style –

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<sup>26</sup> However, later, during the real survey, length and thus, concentration seem to have been a problem.

expressing innovation and technological progress - declining since the 1960s, the pendulum in architectural form swung away from manifestation of internationalism to postmodern and historicist forms referring to “universalism” and classical “timeless” forms, reflection of “deep structures” and “natural laws” of architecture applicable everywhere because of its “inherent truth” and “timelessness” rather than because of its practicality or ideology (Khan 2001, p. 9). The Functionalist modernist aesthetics of “Less is more,” coined by one of the greatest modernists, Mies van der Rohe, was challenged with Robert Venturi’s postmodern dictum “Less is a bore”.

In regard to embassy architecture, Robin (1992) claims first, that embassies in underdeveloped nations are more traditional than in developed countries, second, embassies in Islam countries are more traditional than in non-Islam countries and third, classicism reflects the architectural preferences of big business, finance and monopoly (pp. 41, 176, 177, 181).

According to Schwartz’ (2000) theory, traditional architectural forms would reflect the value type of tradition, as conceptualized by: “respect, commitment and acceptance of the customs and ideas that traditional culture or religion provide the self” (p. 3), or in the case of political values, the collectivity. However, it is obvious that there is a contradiction between Robin’s interpretations of traditionalism and that of Schwartz’. As public administrationist Richard Box (2008) has argued about values in public administration, values may come in opposite pairs- progressive or regressive. Similarly “tradition” may imply different meaning to different people. Besides, as architecture can “reflect” authentically as well as “express” intentionally different “values,” I am interested in survey research to determine how embassy architecture is perceived by regular people. Only an explanatory, including substantiated interpretations, empirical analysis can reveal why and when “traditionalism” refers to respect for

the country's own past inferring national pride, stability and order and when it can refer to other intentions, such as domination and demeaning local culture.

Thus, if an embassy building has a “temple front,” other classical forms, heavy ornamentation and some national symbols that can distinguish it, then it could reveal traditional values and national interests, such as stability and continuity on the one side, or attitude toward the host country, on the other side. Hence, from ratings on an embassy photograph on a scale from (1) to (7), we can derive a continuous measure for tradition for each embassy building with (4) denoting neutral (“neither-nor”). An embassy building, rated from (1) to (3), would reveal the lack of traditional values. *Tradition* can be measured on a continuous scale with (1) for *unconventional* to (7) for *traditional*.

## **Innovation**

Innovation in general stands for the opposite of tradition and represents values related with modernity as observable in architectural modernist patterns. Architectural modernism emerged in the 1920s as a reaction and rejection of the prevailing at the time traditionalism and exuberant ornamentation in buildings, be it in material or style, and reflected the optimistic belief that the new technologies of industrialization - spread by applying ideas to architecture and urbanism as a social agenda as well as an aesthetic form – “would produce a qualitatively better world” (Khan 2001, p. 7). The purpose of modernism was functional efficiency and aesthetic form, both aiming at improving the human condition by functional aesthetic simplicity and social relevance. The contrast between traditional and modernist architectural forms is well expressed by Lasswell (1979), who viewed architectural forms as related to power relations or politics. According to him, embellishments are not typical for democratic societies, where “popular regard

for human dignity is a factor that tends to eliminate many of the prestige devices used in despotisms and autocracies as means of widening the gap between elite and non-elite” (p. 40). In contrast to place-bounded traditionalism, Khan points out that Modernist architecture is internationalist, unbounded by place or culture that may be regarded as an escape from the styles of nineteenth century different “revivals”, “concurrently with a struggle for the definition of a new architectural paradigm” (p. 14), focusing on a new attitude to function – Functionalism, which in architecture claimed a set of aesthetics with the implication that the 20<sup>th</sup> century possessed a single body of architecture defined by broad principles. Khan claims that what was common for all strands of modernism was their rejection of tradition, be it in material or style. For example, the *Neue Sachlichkeit* (New Objectivity) movement of objectivity and rationality of form emerged in opposition to the then-current exuberance of styles (p. 16).

Modernism in architecture was founded in new technologies through which earlier notions of functionalism as utilitarianism could be refined and re-defined. In contrast to the utilitarian functionalism, the new modernist functionalism of the 1920s “centered on both practical and aesthetic interpretations of form where all details, construction and plan served a purpose, and embellishments for the sake of ornamentation were disallowed” (Khan 2001, p. 13). Hence, the assumption was a unity of form and function combining a modernist outlook and the use of mass production and prefabrication for an egalitarian purpose of improving the human condition through the outcomes of industrialization – modern technologies. That modernism had an egalitarian social agenda is evidenced by the aversion of both totalitarian systems – the Nazis who closed the Bauhaus and the Stalinists who suppressed the Soviet constructivism in the 1930s; both resorting to neo-classical formal architecture representing stability and eternity.

By contrast to these totalitarian systems, the United States embraced modernism during the New Deal (Auge 1995) domestically and later in the 1940s to present itself to the world as a progressive innovative country through its embassies (Loeffler 1998). While Robin (1992) views the embassy building program as using architecture as a tool of a technologically advanced arrogant empire, Loeffler (1998) claims that at that time the socialist agenda of modernism had withered and it had become a symbol of American capitalism and thus a tool for spreading the values of liberal democracy in the world. All these politically concerned intricacies are based on the assumption of the “neutrality” of functionalism and formalism, as well as on the assumption of the possibility of architecture as pure art to affect political change. In the 1960s, not only the American embassies became targets of attacks (Huxtable 1960), but modernism itself - as representing the architecture of globalism - came also under attacks (Auge 1995), although not literally.

While the demise of modern architecture was proclaimed by the physical demolition of one of its representations as a social enterprise— the Pruitt-Igoe low-cost housing project in St. Louis, Missouri, finished in 1958 and demolished in 1972, paraphrasing Mark Twain, the report of its death is an exaggeration. According to Khan, modernism represents “the progressive face of modernity in many societies” (Khan; p. 223). Many share Khan’s concluding argument that although modernism was never a single style or even a single attitude, “it was nevertheless characterized by an international outlook” and is expanding globally in “a greater plurality of architectural expression, engendered by a world ever-increasingly aware of itself” (p. 224). Or, as Habermas suggests, the project of modernity is still unfinished (McLuhan 1964).

This discussion of conflicting claims on modernism reveals that only an empirical study could reveal first, which - buildings are perceived as innovative or modernist, and which - as



reflecting wealth through opulence, and second, patterns of innovative modernist embassies and their relative standing in comparison with other architectural patterns.

Innovation is generally speaking the opposite of tradition (Schwartz 1992; Schwartz 1994; Gordon 2000). If a building is not heavily decorated, but is with straight clean lines and surfaces and with comparatively small walls to windows/glass ratio as well as with novel design, materials or approach to the surrounding environment, it is expected to be perceived as modern, reflecting modernization notions of newness, technological innovation and efficiency as functionality. *Innovation* can be measured on a continuous scale with (1) for *generic* to (7) for *novel*.

## **Wealth**

The value for wealth is natural and thus major. For this reason, the first and most important reason for a country to build an embassy abroad is to promote its economic interests, and thus, its economic growth and national prosperity. That is, the major foreign policy objective is wealth. The logic flows from the long-standing tradition of liberalism in international relations that was popularized most recently by Doyle (1986) and Keohane (1990), among others. When considering what the design of an embassy should be, it is apparent that it must express the country's wealth and thus convince foreign partners in the worthiness of doing business. For example, it seems unlikely that a modest, conventional, although functionally adequate building could influence a country to negotiate a trade settlement in favor of the country who owns that embassy in comparison with an opulent, impressive building.

Wealth in this study stands for the value of economic power. As the last concept, as reflected in architecture, has been shown to imply different things for different people (Edelman

1964; Edelman 1995), the concept of wealth has a quite straightforward meaning: economic wellbeing, prosperity and the related with it, social status and prestige. Aiming at wealth seems to be a natural human trait in survival and thus is valued. Both analyses of the United States embassy program reveal that the economic prosperity of this country is the major concern of its foreign policy. While opinions about advantages in comparative or absolute terms may differ, aiming at economic benefits from international relations should be true for all countries.

According to Robin (1992), by the end of the 19th century the diplomatic corps allied with businessmen to establish the American Embassy Association which started lobbying for expansion of diplomatic representation and the construction of embassies abroad (Robin 1992). Robin argues that while the reform of the foreign service “focused on improvement of the human element in the State Department the American embassy Association focused exclusively on formal symbolic appearances abroad” (p. 20) to serve the interest of business by promoting “product awareness.” Architecture as symbol of prestige was assumed to lead to material gain as well as to peace. According to its president, E. Clarence Jones, the purpose of association was the promotion of a symbolic American presence abroad:

*Foreigners necessarily judge us by what they see of us in their own country... Their opinion of our country and its resources is formed largely by the character of our embassies, the manner in which our representatives are housed... The conditions of our embassies has lowered their estimation. That was proved just prior to the Spanish American war, when the majority of Europeans believed that Spain was greater and more powerful than the United States... We feel ashamed at appearing poverty-stricken in the eyes of the inhabitants of other countries and of placing ourselves commercially below third or even fourth rate powers... The nation that lives within itself cannot hope to influence international opinion anymore than the individual who leads a life of recluse can aspire to shape public opinion. (Jones, cited in Robin, 1992)*

Thus the association identified that the connection between economic expansion and international relations, and symbolism was important.

Robin (1992) claims that in addition to the traditional function of providing economic leverage through treaty negotiations and intelligence-gathering for an expanding economy, the

diplomatic outpost served as a modern-day billboard to heighten an awareness of national goods through “imposing and aesthetically pleasing political symbols” (p. 21). Although from a very different perspective, Loeffler (1998) also demonstrates how the U.S. embassies served as “billboards” and how the Foreign Building Operations office turned into a real business enterprise during the post-WWII years (pp. 47-48).

According to L. Craig Johnstone,<sup>27</sup> American prosperity is the top U.S. foreign objective and it can be best achieved by promoting free trade and *increasing exports* and for that purpose embassies provide the environment and staff support – as part of the State Department – to assist U.S. exporters (Loeffler 1998). A similar point made Alain de Sarran, Foreign and Commercial Services (FCS) Associate Director for EU (as of 1996). According to him, embassies offer settings that are “more impressive to foreigners” and have an “aura of influence” that appeals to U.S. business as well as to their local partners (quoted in Loeffler 1998, pp. 266-7). The image of embassies reflecting modernity and activism associated with American business is considered a tangible asset that can be measured on a balance sheet (Loeffler 1998). From this perspective, embassies are viewed as bridges between nations. The goal is to affect relations and thus increase trade. All this is expected to be reflected in embassy architecture.

The value of wealth is normally reflected - or expressed - in architecture by size and ornamentation and it can extend from innocuous decorations to screaming opulence of “the bigger, the better”. Wealth is also expressed through novelty of material, technological innovations and techniques as well as impressing – and impressive - landscaping of the surrounding area. Recognizing wealth in embassy buildings should not be a problem. However,

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<sup>27</sup> Former United States Ambassador to Algeria (1985-88) and member of the American Academy of Diplomacy and the Council on Foreign Relations.

as architectural modernism can represent both, innovation and wealth, some overlaps do exist and it becomes a question of degree and perceptions. *Wealth* can be measured on a scale from *inexpensive* (1) to *opulent* (7).

## **Security**

Security is one of the most important reasons for people to get to live in communities. According to Schwartz' theory of value systems, security refers to "safety, harmony and stability of society, of relationships and of self", or in this case, of countries, as collectivities. Security is one of the major subjects in Max Weber's (Weber 1966) seminal essay, *The City*, in which he examines how the opening of the city concomitant with the rise of the nation-state compromised its security and led to its decline. This reference is quite relevant in the current era of globalization, when some claim that the nation-state is in decline while global cities' role is on the rise. Security is also the subject of examination of Lasswell's seminal work on architecture, *The Signature of Power* (1979). Lasswell views the world political system as characterized by "the expectation of violence, the emphasis on national identity, and the demand for national power" (p. 55). Related to the preserving of wealth and power, is the demand for "security", based on expectations of vulnerability to external violence. This is expressed by architecture and urban forms – "walls and towers" as "the best available technology for sustaining an assault" (viii). These defensive devices "influenced the perspectives of all who participated in the arenas of power by a surge of loyalty, confidence and determination toward the future". Thus created, the built environment was a message to any potential enemy. "For example, the new fortification might be seen as signifying that a previously body politic was now ready to play an affirmative role in intercity or interimperial politics." (viii). The expectation of violence is transmitted by

experiences that include also the perceptions of fortifications and other military-oriented edifices and sites. “If actions speak louder than words, things speak louder than either.” (p. 55) Lasswell points out that when architecture reflects superiority or domination through high elevation or exclusion/inaccessibility – the citizenry could react with hostile coercive acts. This would imply that architecture can contribute to both legitimization of power or to the loss of it. Architecture can be utilized to address both political expectations – of compliance or of distancing, deterring, which Lasswell terms “response modeling” and “response contrasting”. A “defense” structure as a response modeling in reference to actions sends the message, “I will fight you if you fight.”, while in a response contrasting situation, the message would be, “Go away! I am too mighty for you to win.” (Lasswell 1979, p. 19)

Lasswell’s approaches architecture from the long-standing tradition of realism in international relations, starting, at least, with Thucydides. This perspective assumes that the world is in a state of permanent competition and violence because of scarce resources. In such a world, the participating actors seek to maximize their values (preferred events) and initiate, diffuse and restrict institutions that are specialized to the shaping and sharing of different value outcomes. If this is so, architecture of security is an adaptation to an anarchic world of competition and security concerns and the embassy architecture would be expected to reflect this value. It is apparent that the most powerful countries will make unequivocal statement of their goals and the means of achieving them. If need be, relations will be enforced.

More recently, Gournay and Loeffler (2002), claim that the threat of political violence prompts increased security measures at and around embassies and pose the question whether embassies will retain their role as civic landmarks, political symbols and cultural beacons, concluding: “Only time will tell.” (p. 502) About the same time, in 2003, the ambassador of

Japan, Kuniko Inoguchi said at the Conference on the Implementation by the Arab States of the UN Program of Action on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons (held on December 18, 2003 in Cairo) that although the likelihood of large-scale international armed conflicts seemed to be receding, regional ethnic confrontations and civil war have become salient (Inoguchi 2003).

Ideally a security concept for international relations would be expected to be based on mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality, cooperation and joint creation of a long-term stable and peaceful international environment. However, currently many agree that the international security situation has become more complex. In an interview in August 2011, the Chinese Defense Attache in Bulgaria Zhang Ge summed it up: “Security threats posed by such global challenges as terrorism, nuclear proliferation, insecurity of information, natural disasters and trans-national crime are on the rise, while traditional security concerns are blending with non-traditional ones” (Dikov August 1, 2011).

Security is normally achieved through restricting access. If the building is in urban environment with no visible barriers and there are people walking along and cars passing by, then the building is accessible. Conversely, if the building is walled, situated outside the city on a hilltop, its main purpose is security. Thus, (1) for *accessible* and (7) for *fortress-like* should provide measures for the value of *security* reflected in embassy buildings.

These operational concepts are illustrated on Figure 4, which is a sample of the conducted survey for obtaining measurements of the four major values reflected in embassy architecture<sup>28</sup>. The survey respondents sample was one of convenience. After the survey was

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<sup>28</sup> The survey was prepared under the guidance of Prof. Tonn and with the help of Cary Springer from the Office of Information Technology (OIT) and was approved by the Office for Research at the UTK. According to the requirements, data were collected anonymously and no personal data were collected.

posted on the university website, I started emailing the link to colleagues, friends and relatives, as well as to former professors, asking them to fulfill and spread it further. I have emailed the survey also to all Ph.D. students from the Political Science Department at the University of



9	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
Accessible								Fortress-like
Inexpensive								Opulent
Unconventional								Traditional
Generic								Novel



10	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
Accessible								Fortress-like
Inexpensive								Opulent
Unconventional								Traditional
Generic								Novel



11	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
Accessible								Fortress-like
Inexpensive								Opulent
Unconventional								Traditional
Generic								Novel

12	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
Accessible								Fortress-like
Inexpensive								Opulent
Unconventional								Traditional
Generic								Novel



Figure 4. Sample of the conducted survey for obtaining measurements of the four major values reflected in embassy architecture.



Tennessee in Knoxville, asking them kindly to help. Besides, on the cover page, I asked every possible respondent to forward it also to other willing to fulfill it. Thus, I was successful to collect enough responses; however, it was not an easy task.

#### **4.4.2. Independent variables**

The independent variables in this study are national characteristics: wealth of both countries owning and hosting the embassy and military power, political culture, exports and unemployment for the owner country; indicators of international relationships such as belonging or not to the West civilization, Islamic culture and one region (neighborhood); and finally, respondents' demographics accounting for possible subjectivity of perceptions: age, gender, education, ideological inclinations and nationality.

#### **National Characteristics**

Wealth of owner and host countries, political culture, exports, unemployment and military power of the owner country, as well as the grouping variables of culture, religious affiliation and region are operationalized on definitions and measures obtained from several databases. The independent variable for wealth of owner (*GNI\_owner*) and host (*GNI\_host*) country is measured as Gross National Income per capita (GNI) in US dollars. GNI per capita is the gross national income, converted to U.S. dollars using the World Bank *Atlas* method, divided by the midyear population. In contrast to the GNP, GNI accounts for income from abroad, which can be taken into account as the main purpose of embassies is promoting the national interest, including total income, domestic and from abroad<sup>29</sup>. As the difference between the GNI of

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<sup>29</sup> To smooth fluctuations in prices and exchange rates, a special Atlas method of conversion is used by the World Bank that averages the exchange rate for a given year and the two preceding years, adjusted for differences in rates of inflation between the country, and through 2000, the G-5 countries (France, Germany, Japan, the United

countries is, in some cases is hundreds of times, the *GNI\_owner* and *GNI\_host* have been logged in order to have a closer to normal distribution.

The operational concept for political culture is based on the *Freedom House* definitions, freedom for all peoples is best achieved in liberal democratic societies. The *Freedom House* survey measures freedom according to two broad categories: political rights and civil liberties. According to the *Freedom House* definition, political rights enable people to participate freely in the political process, including the right to vote freely for distinct alternatives in legitimate elections, compete for public office, join political parties and organizations, and elect representatives who have a decisive impact on public policies and are accountable to the electorate. This is, in fact, political culture. For the purpose of this study freedom implies liberal democracy as a political system and the political culture of this system can be measured by the political rights of the citizens.<sup>30</sup> Thus, political culture is operationalized as political rights (*PR*) based on the *Freedom in the World Report*, according to which the political rights (and civil liberties categories) are measured by numerical ratings between 1 and 7 for each country, with 1 representing the most free and 7 the least free<sup>31</sup>.

Military power is operationalized as military expenditure (*Mil\_exp*) and is obtained from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), where it is defined as an indicator of the economic resources devoted to military purposes and measured as percentage of gross domestic product. While the SIPRI concept of military expenditure is comprehensively defined and operationalized, the data is available since 1988 and thus for several cases approximations

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Kingdom, and the United States). From 2001, these countries include the Euro area, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States. <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD>

<sup>30</sup> This discussion is based on the *Freedom House* definitions, available at :

[http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=351&ana\\_page=363&year=2010](http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=351&ana_page=363&year=2010)

<sup>31</sup> Available at: <http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=363&year=2011>

were made. These are for the embassy of Canada in Mexico, finished in 1982; the embassies of the USA in Japan, finished in 1987; in Malaysia, finished in 1983; and in Liberia, reconstructed in 1985. The last approximation was for the embassy of France in USA, finished in 1984. For all these cases the data is for 1988.<sup>32</sup>

The variable of “exports” represents the value of all goods and other market services provided by the owner country to the rest of the world, as percent of the country’s GDP, and is from the World Bank database<sup>33</sup>.

Unemployment is operationalized again on the World Bank definition as “the share of the labor force that is without work but available for and seeking employment” of the percentage of total labor force<sup>34</sup>. Because of lack of data some approximations were made. The most significant is for Yemen (case 10: the USA embassy in Yemen), where instead of GNI for the year of beginning construction 1986, the first available data were for the year of 1992. The other two cases are for the US purchased embassies in Moldova and in Belarus in 1991: cases 40 (US in Moldova) and 42 (US in Belarus). For both countries the first available data were for the year of 1992. As we know, there are inherent trade-offs in research. The more demanding the research questions and precise the information needed, the more difficult it is to find these data. These approximations are justified on the basis that nothing substantial had changed in these three countries during the 1980s which could have influenced the embassy architecture to such a degree that to change its style.

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<sup>32</sup> The data is available since 1988 at: <http://milexdata.sipri.org/>

<sup>33</sup> Available since 1981 at: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NE.EXP.GNFS.ZS>

<sup>34</sup> Available since 1981 at: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.UEM.TOTL.ZS>

## **International Indicators**

The grouping variables for belonging or not to the West civilization, Islamic culture and region are operationalized as dummy variables with “1” meaning “belonging of host country to” and “0” – for not belonging. The variables for Islam and Western cultures are based on Samuel Huntington’s (1976) classification and, more precisely, on data from the CIA’s World Factbook<sup>35</sup>. The geography variable for region or “neighborhood” is to some extent arbitrary, but is based on the concept of the United Nations delineation of world regions.<sup>36</sup>

## **Respondents Demographics**

As part of the survey, data on respondents’ age, gender, education, ideological inclinations and nationality were collected. The measurements for age, education and ideological inclinations are the means of these demographics, while gender is operationalized as a dummy variable with “1” for female and “0” for male respondents.

### **4.5. Analysis techniques**

As the method of research is survey, consequently, the analysis techniques are descriptive, bivariate and multivariate analyses. The unit of analysis is the embassy buildings, represented by its proxy, a photograph, and the levels of analysis are national, as relating to national representations, international, as relating to other nations and the international system, more generally and, finally individual as reflected in respondents’ ratings.

As the data on the dependent variables were obtained from a comparatively small sample of respondents, the most proper technique to determine the best fit line to the data would be

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<sup>35</sup> Source: [www.cia.org](http://www.cia.org)

<sup>36</sup> Found at <http://unstats.un.org/unsd/methods/m49/m49regin.htm>

ordinary least squares regression. Thus, the problem is to find values of coefficients such that the linear combination

$$Y_i = a + b_1x_1 + \dots + b_nx_n$$

is the best approximation to the data. The OLS estimates of the regression coefficients ensure that they are unbiased, have minimum variance, are consistent and are normally distributed and thus the sample will not be considered a problem.

In conclusion, this general model can account for the general tendencies in embassy architecture during a definite period, as is the case with this study. Besides, if enough data are accumulated, it can account for the embassies of a group of countries or of one single country's different architectural embassy patterns in different host countries. For example, the "House of Sweden" in Washington, D.C. differs significantly from the Swedish embassy in Islamabad, Pakistan; as do the U.S. embassies in Ottawa or Berlin compared with those in Bulgaria or Somalia; the same is true about any country. Hence, a future comparative research may attempt to account for middle-range theoretical dimensions that relate more closely to the different political realities of groups of countries or of individual countries.

## **Chapter V.**

### **Analysis**

To analyze the data I use the following analysis techniques: 1) descriptive statistics derived from the ratings of each building, 2) bivariate statistics to report and interpret difference of means tests for the variables as well as to examine relationships and 3) multivariate statistics to report and interpret regression models for each of the dependent variables with the same independent variables. The unit of analysis is the embassy buildings as represented by its proxy, a photograph<sup>37</sup> and the levels of analysis are three: national in relation to the countries owning and hosting embassies, international in relation to culture and region, and individual to investigate whether respondents view values differently. To account for the overrepresentation of the United States, I have conducted also a sensitivity analysis. The main “surprise” of this analysis is that wealth of the nation owning the embassy has no explanatory power while the wealth of the host country is the single most- important explanation of embassies appearance. This finding supports the realist perspective in international relations that countries make selectively strategic calculations in which countries to invest and how.

#### **5.1. Descriptive statistics**

This section describes the respondents’ characteristics, provides summary statistics for the measurements of the four values of tradition, innovation, wealth and security, and descriptive statistics for each embassy in the sample. The four values are grouped by highest, average and lowest ratings to examine whether the embassies of countries vary contingent on their wealth.

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<sup>37</sup> For simplicity, “embassy building” or “embassy” in the text are assumed to mean “the image of the embassy building” and it may also refer to consulates or “high commissions”; all of which are symbolic representations of a nation abroad. Photographs were chosen purposely and selectively to represent to the best possible degree the real building. The sources of photographs are marked in Appendix 6.

### 5.1.1. Respondents' Characteristics

All images were evaluated on the four dependent variables by 138 respondents from 14 countries (Table 1). I have collected individual data on *gender*, *age*, *education* (in number of years after high school), *nationality* and *attitude towards government* (ideological inclinations). The completed surveys are 138, or 36%, of a total of 384 attempted. From these 138 respondents, 81 are female (58.7%) and 57 (41.3%) are male. The most numerous are Bulgarians, 57 (41.3%), followed by Americans, 36 (26.4%) and South Koreans, 16 (11.5%). The rest of the respondents include nine Chinese, six Kyrgyzstani, three Russians, two Macedonians, two Turkmenistani, and one of each, UK, Iraq, Montenegro, Romania and Ukraine.

The respondents' average age is 32.67 with a minimum of 17 and a maximum of 68. They are highly educated with an average of 6.31 years of education after high school (Table 2). This may be explained by the fact that the sampling was convenient and a lot of doctoral students and PH.Ds were approached to participate. The measure of ideological inclination is 4.64, which means that the respondents definitely prefer the government to participate in public affairs.<sup>38</sup>

### 5.1.2. Measurements for Value Means

The summary statistics for the dependent variables reveal that their distributions are approximately normal with all value means falling approximately within one standard deviation (Table 3).

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<sup>38</sup> Ideological inclinations here means level of support for governmental intervention, with less support meaning the political Right and more – the political Left Aspinwall, M. (2002). "Preferring Europe." European Union Politics: Ideology and National Preferences on European Integration 3(1): 81-111. While Aspinwall refers to the European Union, this definition is quite universal.

Table 1. Frequency Table. Nationality of respondents

	Nationality	Frequency	Percent
1	USA	36	26.5
2	Bulgaria	57	41.3
3	South Korea	16	11.5
4	China	9	6.5
5	Kyrgyzstan	6	4.3
6	Russia	3	2.2
7	India	2	1.4
8	Macedonia	2	1.4
9	UK	1	0.7
10	Montenegro	1	0.7
11	Iraq	1	0.7
12	Romania	1	0.7
13	Turkmenistan	1	1.4
14	Ukraine	2	0.7
	Total	18	100

Table 2. Respondents. Descriptive Statistics

Question asked	Min.	Max.	Mean	St.Dev.
1 What is your age?	17	68	32.67	10.55
2 What is your education in number of years after high school?	0	16	6.31	2.82
3 Generally speaking, according to you, what the role of government should be in regard to public affairs?	1	7	4.64	1.37

The difference between the means and the medians are not too large either and thus, the distributions seem to be approximately normal, which is evident also from their histograms (Table 4). A rating of about four - “neither-nor” – means that a value cannot be identified. While the mean and median for tradition are equal and low (3.80), as expected, innovation seems to be less than expected with a mean of “neither-nor” of exactly 4.00 and a median of 4.10, which means that innovation, on average, is almost indistinguishable as value. The mean for wealth is 4.48, while the median is again quite high: 4.64. Security seems to be low with a mean of 3.68




and a median of 3.38. From these simple statistics becomes already evident that wealth is likely to be the dominant value.

Table 3. Values. Summary Statistics

Value/Statistics	Tradition	Innovation	Wealth	Security
<b>Mean</b>	3.80	4.00	4.48	3.68
<b>Median</b>	3.80	4.10	4.64	3.38
<b>Std. Deviation</b>	.82	.82	.67	1.04
<b>Minimum</b>	2.49	2.36	2.73	2.20
<b>Maximum</b>	5.94	5.41	5.71	6.33

Table 4. Value Means Distributions



The descriptive statistics (Table 6) for each building reveal several interesting points, which may reveal some tendencies. First, while the great powers rate high on innovation and wealth, so do other countries' embassies, for example Bulgaria (4.20) and Egypt (4.73) in Germany, Iran in UK (5.21) and Greece in Belgium (4.59), which means that the wealth of owner country (*GNI\_owner*) is not likely to be a good explanation for embassy patterns. Second, security is highest for Islamic countries. A point of great interest is the fact that while the US embassies rate highest on security<sup>39</sup>, the newest embassies – unique and standardized – in Canada (4.26), Germany (4.29), Mexico (4.93), Peru (4.77), Bulgaria (3.87) and in Ethiopia (3.21) - rate somewhat lower on security, which means that the concerns about the impression of the US embassies - reflected in stringent design standards addressing security concerns and being implemented since 2002 - were considered and the results are positive<sup>40</sup>. Third, while in most cases tradition is skewed to the left of the neutral (4) rating, there is a pattern of higher ratings for the US embassies in Islam countries (Table 6). The US embassy in China also rates high on security (4.97), while the impression from the newest future US embassy project in London rates

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<sup>39</sup> The consulate in Istanbul (Figure 1) rates highest (6.33) among all ratings.

<sup>40</sup> After the terrorist bombings in Beirut in 1983, FBO adopted stringent new security rules known as the Inman standard, after Admiral Bobby Ray Inman, who headed the panel that authored the 1985 report calling for sweeping changes in embassy design and location. In 1986, the SD began its new Inman embassy construction program, the goal of which was to better protect U.S. facilities and personnel abroad. FBO built defensive walled compounds in Sana'a, Nicosia, San Salvador, Santiago, Amman, Caracas, Kuwait, Lima, Bangkok, and Singapore. Loeffler, J. C. (2000). "The Identity Crisis of the American Embassy. Are embassies to be fortresses, cultural landmarks or simply offices? The answer is up for grabs." *Foreign Service Journal* (June 2000)., in all of which security was the main concern. According to the GAO, U.S. diplomatic facilities abroad were attacked on more than 200 occasions in a ten-year period, from 1987 to 1997. Office, U. S. G. A. (January 2009). Embassy Construction: Additional Actions Are Needed to Address Contractor Participation, GAO-09-48. Washington, D.C. While the Inman program was dismissed in the early 1990s (July 1, 2009). Design for Diplomacy: New embassies for the 21st century. A Report of the AIA 21st-Century Embassy Task Force, The American Institute of Architects., after the 1998 bombings in Africa, when 220 people were killed and thousands injured, the Inman program was practically reaffirmed. Admiral William J. Crowe Jr. chaired two accountability panels for the SD and the Crowe report reaffirmed the values of the Inman Standard Embassy Design (SED) standards and noted that they had been undermined by some granted exceptions. The Crowe report stated clearly that the United States must not allow terrorists to force it to retreat from its interests abroad. Loeffler, J. C. (2000). "The Identity Crisis of the American Embassy. Are embassies to be fortresses, cultural landmarks or simply offices? The answer is up for grabs." *Foreign Service Journal* (June 2000).

low (2.84)<sup>41</sup>. UK embassies rate higher on security in Islamic countries also: in Yemen (5.99) and Algeria (4.00) in comparison with those in Western countries: in Poland (3.49) and Germany (3.36).

A more interesting finding is the distances between the highest and the neutral and between the neutral and the lowest six scores for each dimension of the values. For example, innovation seems very valued, as it is revealed from the difference between the maximums and the averages and between the averages and the minimums, represented by the highest, the “neither-nor” around (4) and the lowest six ratings (Table 7). Tradition is in inverse relation to innovation, consistent with Schwartz’ theory of integrated values systems. While wealth is the value expressed in most embassies, security is reflected - or expressed - in the least number of the embassies (Table 8 and Table 9).

These general observations generally support the first ten hypotheses. More precisely, as wealth is the value expressed in most embassies, embassy architecture is more likely to reflect economic interests (H1), which was derived from the analysis of the definition of architecture, contingent on scale. There is no evidence to support Inglehart’s claims about relations between materialist and post-materialist values to less developed and, respectively, to developed countries. While poor nations are underrepresented, there is no evidence about his claims and thus, some tentative conclusions can be suggested. While the quite high rating for innovation of the Iranian embassy in London, UK, is for the embassy design model (5.21), the newly built embassy of Bulgaria – considered one of the poorest countries in the EU – rates on innovation also comparatively high, above the neutral 4 - (4.20). It rates also less than the neutral on tradition (3.73) and the lowest of security (2.20), which means the highest on accessibility or

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<sup>41</sup> Something, which has to be considered with some caution as design models differ from their realizations, but so do scientific models in political science

openness. On wealth, it does rate low: 3.73. Similarly for the Indian embassy in Berlin, Germany: while it rates comparatively low on innovation (3.79) and higher on tradition (4.34), it rates above the neutral on wealth (4.42) and low on security (3.20). Egypt's embassy in Berlin ratings are as follows: innovation: 4.73, tradition: 3.29, wealth: 4.97 and security: 3.35. Similarly for the Greek embassy in Belgium: innovation: 4.59, tradition: 3.26, wealth: 4.98 and security: 3.35 and in Spain: innovation: 3.99, tradition: 3.59, wealth: 3.86 and security: 2.33. However, the "post modern" neo-traditional experiment of Greece in Armenia (innovation: 3.01, tradition: 5.50, wealth: 3.49 and security: 5.49) is an interesting example that "neo-traditional" post-modernism does not go well with innovation. This is consistent with Schwartz' theory claims that tradition and innovation values are not complimentary to each other.

This provides an interesting idea to examine whether postmodernism is backwards-looking or futures-oriented. While Iran is in "the most innovative six" with a photograph of a design model, Mexico is also there with its unique, one of the most innovative, embassy buildings in Berlin, Germany. Although Iglehart seems to be correct about USA being an exception from the rich countries in regard to traditionalism, again, there is no evidence – or a pattern – to suggest that poor countries are more traditional. While "the first six in wealth" include only the "greatest" –US, UK, CA and China – the lowest six also include rich countries: US, UK and France. For the time being, Sweden, with I5.30, T2.61, W4.76 and S2.60, does seem to be a special "post-materialist" case. The data reveal also that tradition - as reflected in embassies - is highest in less developed countries, while least evident in the most developed, a tentative observation supporting the hypotheses on the selective embassy design contingent on the characteristics of the host country (Table 5).

In summation thus far, embassies do seem more likely to reflect “wealth” values, that is, it seems that the data support H1 that embassy architecture is more likely to reflect economic interests. However, the data do not seem to support hypotheses H6 to H10, based on Inglehart’s theory of intergenerational change, because there is no evidence for different preferences between poor, middle-income and rich countries’ embassy patterns as reflection of national values abroad. So are H11 and H12: the Scandinavian countries, represented by Sweden and the Netherlands, do seem likely to value wealth as well as technological innovation, as a part of the materialist modernist era, or in other words, their embassies are not different from the rest. It seems, however, that Inglehart is correct about the United States, H13: American embassies do reveal more traditionalism and less innovation, and this is consistent with Schwartz’ theory of integrated value systems. Thus, H13 is likely to be supported.

## **5.2. Bivariate statistics**

Next, I examine correlations between the four dimensions of the dependent variables, then between the dependent and the independent variables and finally I conduct t-tests to see whether there is difference in the means of the dependent variables depending on the categorical variables for Western civilization, Islamic culture and region, or “neighborhood.”

### **5.2.1. Bivariate analysis of dependent and independent continuous variables.**

The bivariate analysis of dependent and independent continuous variables reveals that the wealth of the owner country (*GNI\_owner*) is not correlated with any of the dependent variables

Table 5. Value Means

VALUES						
Image Embassy	Year	Tradition	Innovation	Wealth	Security	
1 Canada in Mexico	1980	3.04	4.20	3.89	3.91	
2 Canada in USA	1985	3.86	4.38	5.61	3.35	
3 USA in Jordan	1988	4.55	3.23	5.20	6.30	
4 USA in Bangladesh	1983	4.37	3.28	4.38	4.24	
5 USA in Guyana	1983	5.12	3.02	4.88	5.49	
6 Iran in UK	2010	2.56	5.21	4.58	2.69	
7 USA in Japan	1981	3.91	4.01	4.51	3.66	
8 USA in Somalia	1984	4.40	3.38	4.64	5.65	
9 USA in Malaysia	1980	4.55	3.40	4.75	3.86	
10 USA in Yemen	1986	3.78	3.93	4.91	4.83	
11 Netherlands in Ethiopia	2003	3.67	4.21	3.91	3.69	
12 Mexico in Germany	2000	2.49	5.13	4.20	3.24	
13 France in USA	1984	3.52	4.26	4.71	3.99	
14 Canada in Romania	2004	2.86	4.62	4.07	2.91	
15 Greece in Belgium	2005	3.26	4.59	4.98	2.90	
16 Greece in Armenia	2005	5.50	3.01	3.49	3.38	
17 India in in Germany	2000	4.34	3.79	4.42	3.20	
18 UK in Uganda	2004	3.80	4.09	4.43	3.57	
19 Sweden in USA	2004	2.61	5.30	4.76	2.60	
20 UK in Ethiopia	2007	2.62	4.94	4.02	2.90	
21 Bulgaria in Germany	2005	3.73	4.20	4.67	2.20	
22 Canada in Germany	2005	3.48	4.14	4.26	2.85	
23 Canada in Poland	1999	2.88	5.09	4.88	2.83	
24 China in USA	2006	4.09	3.70	4.22	3.14	
25 USA in China	2006	3.86	3.99	4.93	4.97	
26 USA in Turkey	2000	4.33	2.91	4.83	6.33	
27 Egypt in Germany	2001	3.29	4.73	4.97	3.35	
28 USA in Bulgaria	2005	3.99	2.98	3.86	3.87	
29 UK in Germany	1998	3.25	4.62	5.10	3.36	
30 France in Germany	2001	3.75	4.10	3.86	2.41	
31 Greece in Spain	2000	3.59	3.99	3.86	2.33	
32 USA in Mexico	2000	3.89	4.14	5.61	4.93	
33 UK in Poland	2000	3.00	4.96	4.83	3.49	
34 UK in Yemen	2005	4.28	2.58	3.36	5.99	
35 Italy in USA	1994	3.22	4.61	4.69	3.88	
36 UK in China	1994	3.41	4.50	5.24	3.36	
37 Netherlands in Germany	2003	2.54	5.41	4.40	3.04	
38 Germany in USA	1994	3.30	4.63	4.17	2.49	
39 USA in Germany	2006	4.43	3.25	4.80	4.29	
40 USA in Moldova	1989	5.94	2.78	3.54	2.49	
41 USA in Latvia	1989	4.96	2.51	2.73	2.21	
42 USA in Belarus	1989	5.74	2.36	3.39	2.84	
43 USA in Thailand	1994	3.88	3.96	4.89	4.54	
44 USA in Liberia	1985	4.00	3.27	3.28	3.73	
45 USA in Canada	1997	3.08	4.73	5.36	4.26	
46 USA in Ethiopia	1999	4.02	2.88	3.25	3.21	
47 USA in Peru	1992	4.10	3.48	5.04	4.77	
48 USA in UK	2005	3.30	4.71	5.71	2.84	
49 USA in Oman	1981	5.18	2.88	4.32	4.05	
50 China in Germany	2005	3.86	4.36	5.44	3.16	
51 UK in Algeria	2007	2.85	5.37	4.93	4.00	
Mean		3.80	4.00	4.49	3.68	
St. deviation		.82	.83	.67	1.04	

Table 6. Value Means. Tradition

VALUES						
Image Embassy	Year	Tradition	Innovation	Wealth	Security	
40 USA in Moldova	1989	5.94	2.78	3.54	2.49	
42 USA in Belarus	1989	5.74	2.36	3.39	2.84	
16 Greece in Armenia	2005	5.50	3.01	3.49	3.38	
49 USA in Oman	1981	5.18	2.88	4.32	4.05	
5 USA in Guyana	1983	5.12	3.02	4.88	5.49	
41 USA in Latvia	1989	4.96	2.51	2.73	2.21	
3 USA in Jordan	1988	4.55	3.23	5.20	6.30	↑
9 USA in Malaysia	1980	4.55	3.40	4.75	3.86	
39 USA in Germany	2006	4.43	3.25	4.80	4.29	
8 USA in Somalia	1984	4.40	3.38	4.64	5.65	
4 USA in Bangladesh	1983	4.37	3.28	4.38	4.24	
17 India in in Germany	2000	4.34	3.79	4.42	3.20	
26 USA in Turkey	2000	4.33	2.91	4.83	6.33	
34 UK in Yemen	2005	4.28	2.58	3.36	5.99	
47 USA in Peru	1992	4.10	3.48	5.04	4.77	
24 China in USA	2006	4.09	3.70	4.22	3.14	
46 USA in Ethiopia	1999	4.02	2.88	3.25	3.21	
44 USA in Liberia	1985	4.00	3.27	3.28	3.73	
28 USA in Bulgaria	2005	3.99	2.98	3.86	3.87	
7 USA in Japan	1981	3.91	4.01	4.51	3.66	
32 USA in Mexico	2000	3.89	4.14	5.61	4.93	
43 USA in Thailand	1994	3.88	3.96	4.89	4.54	
25 USA in China	2006	3.86	3.99	4.93	4.97	
2 Canada in USA	1985	3.86	4.38	5.61	3.35	
50 China in Germany	2005	3.86	4.36	5.44	3.16	
18 UK in Uganda	2004	3.80	4.09	4.43	3.57	
10 USA in Yemen	1986	3.78	3.93	4.91	4.83	
30 France in Germany	2001	3.75	4.10	3.86	2.41	
21 Bulgaria in Germany	2005	3.73	4.20	4.67	2.20	
11 Netherlands in Ethiopia	2003	3.67	4.21	3.91	3.69	
31 Greece in Spain	2000	3.59	3.99	3.86	2.33	
13 France in USA	1984	3.52	4.26	4.71	3.99	
22 Canada in Germany	2005	3.48	4.14	4.26	2.85	
36 UK in China	1994	3.41	4.50	5.24	3.36	
38 Germany in USA	1994	3.30	4.63	4.17	2.49	
48 USA in UK	2005	3.30	4.71	5.71	2.84	
27 Egypt in Germany	2001	3.29	4.73	4.97	3.35	
15 Greece in Belgium	2005	3.26	4.59	4.98	2.90	
29 UK in Germany	1998	3.25	4.62	5.10	3.36	
35 Italy in USA	1994	3.22	4.61	4.69	3.88	
45 USA in Canada	1997	3.08	4.73	5.36	4.26	
1 Canada in Mexico	1980	3.04	4.20	3.89	3.91	
33 UK in Poland	2000	3.00	4.96	4.83	3.49	
23 Canada in Poland	1999	2.88	5.09	4.88	2.83	
14 Canada in Romania	2004	2.86	4.62	4.07	2.91	
51 UK in Algeria	2007	2.85	5.37	4.93	4.00	
20 UK in Ethiopia	2007	2.62	4.94	4.02	2.90	
19 Sweden in USA	2004	2.61	5.30	4.76	2.60	
6 Iran in UK	2010	2.56	5.21	4.58	2.69	
37 Netherlands in Germany	2003	2.54	5.41	4.40	3.04	
12 Mexico in Germany	2000	2.49	5.13	4.20	3.24	
Mean		3.80	4.00	4.49	3.68	
St. deviation		.82	.83	.67	1.04	

Table 7. Value Means. Innovation

VALUES						
Image Embassy	Year	Tradition	Innovation	Wealth	Security	
37 Netherlands in Germany	2003	2.54	5.41	4.40	3.04	
51 UK in Algeria	2007	2.85	5.37	4.93	4.00	
19 Sweden in USA	2004	2.61	5.30	4.76	2.60	
6 Iran in UK	2010	2.56	5.21	4.58	2.69	
12 Mexico in Germany	2000	2.49	5.13	4.20	3.24	
23 Canada in Poland	1999	2.88	5.09	4.88	2.83	
33 UK in Poland	2000	3.00	4.96	4.83	3.49	
20 UK in Ethiopia	2007	2.62	4.94	4.02	2.90	
27 Egypt in Germany	2001	3.29	4.73	4.97	3.35	
45 USA in Canada	1997	3.08	4.73	5.36	4.26	
48 USA in UK	2005	3.30	4.71	5.71	2.84	
38 Germany in USA	1994	3.30	4.63	4.17	2.49	
14 Canada in Romania	2004	2.86	4.62	4.07	2.91	
29 UK in Germany	1998	3.25	4.62	5.10	3.36	
35 Italy in USA	1994	3.22	4.61	4.69	3.88	
15 Greece in Belgium	2005	3.26	4.59	4.98	2.90	
36 UK in China	1994	3.41	4.50	5.24	3.36	
2 Canada in USA	1985	3.86	4.38	5.61	3.35	
50 China in Germany	2005	3.86	4.36	5.44	3.16	
13 France in USA	1984	3.52	4.26	4.71	3.99	
11 Netherlands in Ethiopia	2003	3.67	4.21	3.91	3.69	
1 Canada in Mexico	1980	3.04	4.20	3.89	3.91	
21 Bulgaria in Germany	2005	3.73	4.20	4.67	2.20	
22 Canada in Germany	2005	3.48	4.14	4.26	2.85	
32 USA in Mexico	2000	3.89	4.14	5.61	4.93	
30 France in Germany	2001	3.75	4.10	3.86	2.41	
18 UK in Uganda	2004	3.80	4.09	4.43	3.57	
7 USA in Japan	1981	3.91	4.01	4.51	3.66	
25 USA in China	2006	3.86	3.99	4.93	4.97	
31 Greece in Spain	2000	3.59	3.99	3.86	2.33	
43 USA in Thailand	1994	3.88	3.96	4.89	4.54	
10 USA in Yemen	1986	3.78	3.93	4.91	4.83	
17 India in Germany	2000	4.34	3.79	4.42	3.20	
24 China in USA	2006	4.09	3.70	4.22	3.14	
47 USA in Peru	1992	4.10	3.48	5.04	4.77	
9 USA in Malaysia	1980	4.55	3.40	4.75	3.86	
8 USA in Somalia	1984	4.40	3.38	4.64	5.65	
4 USA in Bangladesh	1983	4.37	3.28	4.38	4.24	
44 USA in Liberia	1985	4.00	3.27	3.28	3.73	
39 USA in Germany	2006	4.43	3.25	4.80	4.29	
3 USA in Jordan	1988	4.55	3.23	5.20	6.30	
5 USA in Guyana	1983	5.12	3.02	4.88	5.49	
16 Greece in Armenia	2005	5.50	3.01	3.49	3.38	
28 USA in Bulgaria	2005	3.99	2.98	3.86	3.87	
26 USA in Turkey	2000	4.33	2.91	4.83	6.33	
49 USA in Oman	1981	5.18	2.88	4.32	4.05	
46 USA in Ethiopia	1999	4.02	2.88	3.25	3.21	
40 USA in Moldova	1989	5.94	2.78	3.54	2.49	
34 UK in Yemen	2005	4.28	2.58	3.36	5.99	
41 USA in Latvia	1989	4.96	2.51	2.73	2.21	
42 USA in Belarus	1989	5.74	2.36	3.39	2.84	
Mean		3.80	4.00	4.49	3.68	
St. deviation		.82	.83	.67	1.04	



Table 8. Value Means. Wealth

VALUES						
Image Embassy	Year	Tradition	Innovation	Wealth	Security	
48 USA in UK	2005	3.30	4.71	5.71	2.84	
2 Canada in USA	1985	3.86	4.38	5.61	3.35	
32 USA in Mexico	2000	3.89	4.14	5.61	4.93	
50 China in Germany	2005	3.86	4.36	5.44	3.16	
45 USA in Canada	1997	3.08	4.73	5.36	4.26	
36 UK in China	1994	3.41	4.50	5.24	3.36	
3 USA in Jordan	1988	4.55	3.23	5.20	6.30	
29 UK in Germany	1998	3.25	4.62	5.10	3.36	
47 USA in Peru	1992	4.10	3.48	5.04	4.77	
15 Greece in Belgium	2005	3.26	4.59	4.98	2.90	
27 Egypt in Germany	2001	3.29	4.73	4.97	3.35	
25 USA in China	2006	3.86	3.99	4.93	4.97	
51 UK in Algeria	2007	2.85	5.37	4.93	4.00	
10 USA in Yemen	1986	3.78	3.93	4.91	4.83	
43 USA in Thailand	1994	3.88	3.96	4.89	4.54	
5 USA in Guyana	1983	5.12	3.02	4.88	5.49	
23 Canada in Poland	1999	2.88	5.09	4.88	2.83	
26 USA in Turkey	2000	4.33	2.91	4.83	6.33	
33 UK in Poland	2000	3.00	4.96	4.83	3.49	
39 USA in Germany	2006	4.43	3.25	4.80	4.29	
19 Sweden in USA	2004	2.61	5.30	4.76	2.60	
9 USA in Malaysia	1980	4.55	3.40	4.75	3.86	
13 France in USA	1984	3.52	4.26	4.71	3.99	
35 Italy in USA	1994	3.22	4.61	4.69	3.88	
21 Bulgaria in Germany	2005	3.73	4.20	4.67	2.20	
8 USA in Somalia	1984	4.40	3.38	4.64	5.65	
6 Iran in UK	2010	2.56	5.21	4.58	2.69	
7 USA in Japan	1981	3.91	4.01	4.51	3.66	
18 UK in Uganda	2004	3.80	4.09	4.43	3.57	
17 India in Germany	2000	4.34	3.79	4.42	3.20	
37 Netherlands in Germany	2003	2.54	5.41	4.40	3.04	
4 USA in Bangladesh	1983	4.37	3.28	4.38	4.24	
49 USA in Oman	1981	5.18	2.88	4.32	4.05	
22 Canada in Germany	2005	3.48	4.14	4.26	2.85	
24 China in USA	2006	4.09	3.70	4.22	3.14	
12 Mexico in Germany	2000	2.49	5.13	4.20	3.24	
38 Germany in USA	1994	3.30	4.63	4.17	2.49	
14 Canada in Romania	2004	2.86	4.62	4.07	2.91	
20 UK in Ethiopia	2007	2.62	4.94	4.02	2.90	
11 Netherlands in Ethiopia	2003	3.67	4.21	3.91	3.69	
1 Canada in Mexico	1980	3.04	4.20	3.89	3.91	
28 USA in Bulgaria	2005	3.99	2.98	3.86	3.87	
31 Greece in Spain	2000	3.59	3.99	3.86	2.33	
30 France in Germany	2001	3.75	4.10	3.86	2.41	
40 USA in Moldova	1989	5.94	2.78	3.54	2.49	
16 Greece in Armenia	2005	5.50	3.01	3.49	3.38	
42 USA in Belarus	1989	5.74	2.36	3.39	2.84	
34 UK in Yemen	2005	4.28	2.58	3.36	5.99	
44 USA in Liberia	1985	4.00	3.27	3.28	3.73	
46 USA in Ethiopia	1999	4.02	2.88	3.25	3.21	
41 USA in Latvia	1989	4.96	2.51	2.73	2.21	
Mean		3.8	4	4.49	3.68	
St. Deviation		0.82	0.83	0.67	1.04	

Table 9. Value Means. Security

VALUES						
Image Embassy	Year	Tradition	Innovation	Wealth	Security	
26 USA in Turkey	2000	4.33	2.91	4.83	6.33	
3 USA in Jordan	1988	4.55	3.23	5.20	6.30	
34 UK in Yemen	2005	4.28	2.58	3.36	5.99	
8 USA in Somalia	1984	4.40	3.38	4.64	5.65	
5 USA in Guyana	1983	5.12	3.02	4.88	5.49	
25 USA in China	2006	3.86	3.99	4.93	4.97	
32 USA in Mexico	2000	3.89	4.14	5.61	4.93	
10 USA in Yemen	1986	3.78	3.93	4.91	4.83	
47 USA in Peru	1992	4.10	3.48	5.04	4.77	
43 USA in Thailand	1994	3.88	3.96	4.89	4.54	
39 USA in Germany	2006	4.43	3.25	4.80	4.29	
45 USA in Canada	1997	3.08	4.73	5.36	4.26	
4 USA in Bangladesh	1983	4.37	3.28	4.38	4.24	
49 USA in Oman	1981	5.18	2.88	4.32	4.05	
51 UK in Algeria	2007	2.85	5.37	4.93	4.00	
13 France in USA	1984	3.52	4.26	4.71	3.99	
1 Canada in Mexico	1980	3.04	4.20	3.89	3.91	
35 Italy in USA	1994	3.22	4.61	4.69	3.88	
28 USA in Bulgaria	2005	3.99	2.98	3.86	3.87	
9 USA in Malaysia	1980	4.55	3.40	4.75	3.86	
44 USA in Liberia	1985	4.00	3.27	3.28	3.73	
11 Netherlands in Ethiopia	2003	3.67	4.21	3.91	3.69	
7 USA in Japan	1981	3.91	4.01	4.51	3.66	
18 UK in Uganda	2004	3.80	4.09	4.43	3.57	
33 UK in Poland	2000	3.00	4.96	4.83	3.49	
16 Greece in Armenia	2005	5.50	3.01	3.49	3.38	
29 UK in Germany	1998	3.25	4.62	5.10	3.36	
36 UK in China	1994	3.41	4.50	5.24	3.36	
2 Canada in USA	1985	3.86	4.38	5.61	3.35	
27 Egypt in Germany	2001	3.29	4.73	4.97	3.35	
12 Mexico in Germany	2000	2.49	5.13	4.20	3.24	
46 USA in Ethiopia	1999	4.02	2.88	3.25	3.21	
17 India in Germany	2000	4.34	3.79	4.42	3.20	
50 China in Germany	2005	3.86	4.36	5.44	3.16	
24 China in USA	2006	4.09	3.70	4.22	3.14	
37 Netherlands in Germany	2003	2.54	5.41	4.40	3.04	
14 Canada in Romania	2004	2.86	4.62	4.07	2.91	
15 Greece in Belgium	2005	3.26	4.59	4.98	2.90	
20 UK in Ethiopia	2007	2.62	4.94	4.02	2.90	
22 Canada in Germany	2005	3.48	4.14	4.26	2.85	
42 USA in Belarus	1989	5.74	2.36	3.39	2.84	
48 USA in UK	2005	3.30	4.71	5.71	2.84	
23 Canada in Poland	1999	2.88	5.09	4.88	2.83	
6 Iran in UK	2010	2.56	5.21	4.58	2.69	
19 Sweden in USA	2004	2.61	5.30	4.76	2.60	
38 Germany in USA	1994	3.30	4.63	4.17	2.49	
40 USA in Moldova	1989	5.94	2.78	3.54	2.49	
30 France in Germany	2001	3.75	4.10	3.86	2.41	
31 Greece in Spain	2000	3.59	3.99	3.86	2.33	
41 USA in Latvia	1989	4.96	2.51	2.73	2.21	
21 Bulgaria in Germany	2005	3.73	4.20	4.67	2.20	
Mean		3.80	4.00	4.49	3.68	
St. deviation		.82	.83	.67	1.04	

and thus, cannot explain anything; the same is with political system, or liberal democracy, operationalized as political rights (*PR*) from the Freedom House database (Table 11).

### **5.2.2. Bivariate analysis of dependent variables dimensions**

The correlations between the dependent variables reveal that innovation is negatively correlated with security and tradition, and positively with wealth, all at the 0.01 significance level, which means strong correlations (Table 10). Security is positively correlated with wealth, however, the relationship is significant only at the 0.05 level, that is a weak relationship. Tradition is negatively correlated with wealth, but the relationship is not strong (at the 0.05 level of significance). These correlations seem to support to a great extent Schwartz' theory of integrated value systems. As the group of values referring to innovation are, in general, on the opposite side of security; they are negatively correlated and the relationship is significant. As wealth (or power in Schwartz's term) is close to the group of innovation values, they may be in different degrees of positive relations, depending on the exact location. Wealth (power) is adjacent to security and thus, they are positively correlated with it. Tradition and wealth are from both sides of security and thus they are likely to be in slightly negative relationship.

Although it seems plausible that the power of the owner country (*GNI\_owner*) should be expected to matter and thus explain and predict embassy appearance, the results may imply that countries seem to symbolically overstate – “express”, not just “reflect” - their own wealth and thus variation is not significant. In fact, Lasswell (1979) claims that an analysis of the interplay between strong and weak powers in a given arena would reveal that the usual line of diffusion is from the strong to the weak, that is, the weak voluntarily imitates the strong to symbolize power, which is in harmony with a basic mechanism of human development (pp. 52-53).

Table 10. Correlations between the dependent variables

<b>Value</b>	<b>Tradition</b>	<b>Innovation</b>	<b>Wealth</b>	<b>Security</b>
<b>Tradition</b>	1			
<b>Innovation</b>	-.906*** (.000)	1		
<b>Wealth</b>	.486*** (.000)	-.327** (.019)	1	
<b>Security</b>	-.366** (.008)	.259 (.067)	.286** (.042)	1

\*\*\*. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

\*\* . Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Pearson Correlation, Sig. (2-tailed)

These reflections imply that, in actuality, embassies cannot be distinguished by state power, which is also evident from the descriptive analysis of the ratings.

The correlations between the dependent and the independent variables (Table 11) reveal that the wealth of the host country (*GNI\_host*) is statistically significant at less than the 0.01 level of significance for all dependent variables: tradition (-.413), innovation (.515), wealth (.398) and security (-.423) and thus holds the promise to be a good predictor of embassy architecture as reflection of values. Military power, operationalized as military expenditure is positively correlated with traditional values (.609) and security (.431) and negatively with innovation (-.619) and thus is expected to be a good predictor of these values. The correlation of exports is statistically significant and negative with tradition (-.555) and security (-.415) and statistically significant and positive with innovation (.589) and thus is expected to be a good predictor for these three values. Unemployment seems to be negatively correlated with security (-.328), or, in other words, employment is positively correlated with security, which seems to be in contradiction with the hypothesized relationship, H33: Nations with less unemployment are

less likely to reflect security in their embassies. While correlations are not sufficient to prove the predictive power of the independent variables, they indicate significant probabilities which will be tested with regression models.

Table 11. Bivariate Analysis of dependent and continuous independent variables

	<b>Tradition</b>	<b>Innovation</b>	<b>Wealth</b>	<b>Security</b>
<b>GNI_owner</b>	-.013 (.930)	-.088 (.539)	-.077 (.591)	.221 (.119)
<b>GNI_host</b>	-.413*** (.003)	.515*** (.000)	.398*** (.004)	-.423*** (.002)
<b>Political Rights</b>	-.128 (.372)	.184 (.197)	.137 (.339)	-.173 (.225)
<b>Mil_expenditure</b>	.609*** (.000)	-.619*** (.000)	-.019 (.892)	.431*** (.002)
<b>Exports</b>	-.555*** (.000)	.589*** (.000)	-.022 (.881)	-.415*** (.002)
<b>Unemployment</b>	-.014 (.925)	.080 (.579)	-.021 (.884)	-.328** (.019)

Pearson Correlation, (2-tailed). Correlation is significant: \*\*\*at the 0.01 level, \*\* at the 0.05 level.

### 5.2.3. Categorical variables: t-tests

For estimating whether there is a difference of means between the ratings for values in relation to the categorical variables for *West*, *Islam* and *Region*, I conduct independent t-tests for the difference between the two independent groups denoted with “1” for belonging to, and “0” for not belonging. The difference in the means between the embassy images in Western and non-Western countries is statistically significant for innovation, tradition and security at the 0.01 level, and insignificant for wealth (Table 12)<sup>42</sup>. The first three correlations are consistent with

<sup>42</sup> All t-tests are at the 95% confidence interval of the difference. If Lavene’s test for equality of variance showed that the F statistic was not significant (>0.05) the “equal variance assumed” row was used for the t-test and when F statistic was significant (<0.05) then “equal variance not assumed” row was used; this is reflected in the tables.

Robin's (1992) claim that American embassies in non-Western countries were more traditional than in Western. The fact that there is no correlation with wealth seems to support Lasswell's claim that the weak powers follow, or imitate, the strong and thus wealth of a nation is less likely to be correlated with the wealth represented in its embassy is likely to be supported.

The t-test for *Islam* reveals that the difference in means between embassy architecture in Islam and non-Islam countries is significant for tradition at the 0.05 level, for innovation at the 0.10 level and for security at the 0.01 level; there is no statistically significance difference between the values of wealth (Table 13). The t-test for *Region* reveals that the difference in means between embassy architecture in countries within proximity (neighborhood) is only weakly significant for tradition at the 0.10 level. (Table 14). As the United States is overrepresented, a t-test is conducted to account US embassies. Whether the embassy is American or not makes significant difference for innovation, security and tradition, all at the 0.01 level, and no difference for wealth. These findings are consistent with Inglehart's claim on US traditionalism and with Lasswell's claim that "the weak follow the strong" or may be just evidence for similar valuation of wealth (Table 15).

### **5.3. Multivariate statistics**

In this section, I report and interpret correlations between the independent variables and regression models. As the US is over represented, I conducted a sensitivity analysis, which revealed that the "US matters". Finally, I ran regressions for the values reflected in three very different examples of embassies on the respondents' demographics.

Table 12. T-test for difference of means between Western (1) and non-Western countries (0).

<b>Value</b>	<b>West</b>	<b>N</b>	<b>Mean</b>	<b>Std. Dev.</b>	<b>t</b>	<b>Sig. (2-tailed)</b>
Tradition	1	24	4.43	.67	4.10	.000
	0	27	3.60	.75		
Innovation	1	24	3.43	.62	-3.34	.002
	0	27	4.13	.84		
Wealth	1	24	4.63	.64	1.50	.141
	0	27	4.35	.68		
Security	1	24	3.09	.60	-4.65	.000
	0	27	4.20	1.07		

Table 13. T-test for difference of means between Islamic (1) and non-Islamic countries (0).

<b>Value</b>	<b>Islam</b>	<b>N</b>	<b>Mean</b>	<b>Std. Dev.</b>	<b>t</b>	<b>Sig. (2-tailed)</b>
Tradition	1	9	3.44	.82	-2.32	.024
	0	42	4.12	.78		
Innovation	1	9	4.25	.64	1.86	.070
	0	42	3.71	.83		
Wealth	1	9	4.59	.54	.52	.607
	0	42	4.46	.70		
Security	1	9	5.03	1.04	5.35	.000
	0	42	3.39	.79		

Table 14. T-test for difference of means within a region (1) and not within a region (0).

<b>Value</b>	<b>Region</b>	<b>N</b>	<b>Mean</b>	<b>Std. Dev.</b>	<b>t</b>	<b>Sig. (2-tailed)</b>
Tradition	1	13	4.29	.62	1.80	.082
	0	38	3.90	.87		
Innovation	1	13	3.58	.73	-1.12	.267
	0	38	3.88	.85		
Wealth	1	13	4.67	.71	1.14	.261
	0	38	4.42	.66		
Security	1	13	3.41	.87	-1.08	.285
	0	38	3.77	1.08		

Table 15. T-test for difference of means for USA embassy (1) and for non-USA embassy (0).

<b>Value</b>	<b>USA</b>	<b>N</b>	<b>Mean</b>	<b>Std. Dev.</b>	<b>t</b>	<b>Sig. (2-tailed)</b>
Tradition	1	22	3.41	.65	-5.57	.000
	0	29	4.44	.65		
Innovation	1	22	4.34	.71	4.85	.000
	0	29	3.40	.66		
Wealth	1	22	4.49	.81	.06	.955
	0	29	4.48	.56		
Security	1	22	4.24	1.13	3.61	.001
	0	29	3.25	.72		

The selection includes the well-known innovative and seemingly accessible embassy of Sweden (House of Sweden) in Washington, the also well-known Consulate of US in Istanbul, discussed by Thomas Friedman and the embassy of Bulgaria in Berlin, Germany, which rated lowest on security and was a “nice” surprise for the author as she is originally from there. In the concluding section, I discuss briefly two cases: of Sweden and of the USA. The conclusion for Sweden is that it, as any other country, expresses values contingent on its geopolitical interests, while for the United States, the conclusion is that it represents itself authentically as the most powerful country during the discussed period.

Based on the literature review, the derived measurements for the values reflected in embassy architecture from the survey (dependent variables) and on the considered explanatory variables, the formulated in the previous chapter hypotheses are presented in the following Table 16.

Table 16. Hypothesized Relationships between the four values reflected in embassy patterns and national and international factors.

<b>Variables</b>		<b>Tradition</b>	<b>Innovation</b>	<b>Wealth</b>	<b>Security</b>
<b>Wealth of owner, GNI_owner</b>	<b>(H14-17)</b>	Negative	Positive	Positive	Negative
<b>Military power_owner</b>	<b>(H18-21)</b>	Positive	Negative	Positive	Positive
<b>Political culture_owner (PR)</b>	<b>(H22-25)</b>	Negative	Positive	Positive	Negative
<b>Exports_owner</b>	<b>(H26-29)</b>	Negative	Positive	Positive	Negative
<b>Unemployment_owner</b>	<b>(H30-33)</b>	Positive	Negative	Negative	Positive
<b>Wealth of host, GNI_host</b>	<b>(H34-37)</b>	Negative	Positive	Positive	Negative
<b>West (host) = “1”</b>	<b>(H38-41)</b>	Negative	Positive	Positive	Negative
<b>Islam (host) = “1”</b>	<b>(H42-45)</b>	Positive	Negative	Positive	Positive
<b>Region = “1”</b>	<b>(H46-49)</b>	Negative	Positive	Positive	Negative
<b>USA = “1”</b>	<b>(H50-53)</b>	Positive	Negative	Positive	Positive

### 5.3.1. Correlations between the independent variables

With nine independent variables in the analysis, there is some reason that there would be a problem with multicollinearity in the data. For this reason, I performed correlations with the



independent variables in the analysis (Table 17). Some of the statistically significant strong correlations are between: the wealth of the owner country and political rights as indicator for political culture (-.697) at the 0.01 level of statistical significance, wealth of the host country and locations in the Western civilization (.803) all at the 0.01 level of statistical significance and military expenditure with exports (-.767) at the 0.01 level of significance. USA is correlated with military expenditure (.875) and with exports (-.756), both at the 0.01 level of statistical significance. High degree of collinearity may affect the regression coefficients and consequently they may be poorly estimated. For these reasons, I considered the variance inflation factors (VIFs) for all variables in all models, assuming that VIFs below 10 are acceptable. Most VIFs are less than 3 with only those for military expenditure and US exceeding 8. As USA is significantly correlated with most independent variables, I conducted a sensitivity analysis by introducing a dummy variable with “1” denoting non-USA embassy and with “0” denoting USA embassy.

### **5.3.2. Regression Analysis**

In this section, I present the results from two types of OLS regression models. First, the four values reflected in embassy architecture are regressed on national and international factors and the statistically significant estimates which could predict embassy architectural patterns are identified. Second, in order to examine how and to what extent perceptions matter, the values reflected in three examples of embassy buildings are regressed on respondents’ demographics. Besides the performed correlations between the independent variables, the examined values of the VIFs for all independent variables are below 10 and this implies that collinearity is not a concern with any of these independent variables.

Table 17. Pearson's Correlations among the Independent Variables

<b>Correlations</b>										
	Wealth_own.	Wealth_host	West	Islam	Region	PR	Mil_exp	Exports	Unemploym.	USA
logWealth_own.	1									
logWealth_host	-.344**	1								
	.013									
West	-.376***	.803***	1							
	.007	.000								
Islam	.122	-.375***	-.436***	1						
	.392	.007	.001							
Region	.046	.233	.260	-.271	1					
	.747	.099	.066	.055						
Political Rights	-.697***	.340**	.350**	-.153	-.193	1				
	.000	.015	.012	.285	.175					
Mil. power	.169	-.493***	-.582***	.458***	-.238	-.237	1			
	.237	.000	.000	.001	.092	.094				
Exports	-.109	.321**	.389***	-.316**	.134	.184	-.767***	1		
	.447	.021	.005	.024	.350	.195	.000			
Unemployment	-.005	.185	.110	-.181	.196	-.044	.020	-.033	1	
	.974	.195	.444	.204	.167	.757	.887	.817		
USA	.312**	-.433***	-.504***	.324**	-.237	-.287**	.875***	-.756***	-.178	1
	.026	.001	.000	.020	.094	.041	.000	.000	.211	

Significance: \*\* p < .05; \*\*\* p < .01 (two-tailed test).

## Values and Nations

For the first regression model, with tradition as the dependent variable, the F-ratio is 3.674, which means that the model as a whole is statistically significant (Table 18). The R-squared statistic is .45 and this means that about 45% of the variation in traditionalism is accounted for by the model. However, there are no statistically significant explanatory variables. The constant is 6.380 and is statistically significant at the 0.01 level. This means that while objective indicators cannot predict traditionalism in embassies, it can be predicted as perceived (and estimated) by the respondents. When accounting for USA embassies (USA = “0”), the wealth of the country that owns an embassy is negatively correlated with tradition (-.638) and this relationship is statistically significant at the 0.01 level (Table 19). This may suggest that that the presence of a US embassy increases traditionalism on the embassy landscape. This is consistent with Inglehart’s conclusion on US traditionalism and provides some more support for H13 and supports H14 with USA embassy = “0”.

***Hypothesis 14: Traditional values are less likely to be reflected in “great powers” embassies.***

The second regression model, with innovation as the dependent variable, has an F-ratio of 4.513, which indicates that the model is statistically significant and, with an R-squared statistic of .50 explains about 50% of the variation in innovation with only one significant explanatory variable, exports of the owner country. Exports is positively correlated with innovation at the 0.05 significance level and this relationship means that for each percent of the country’s exports, measured as percent of the country’s GDP, the value of innovation would be expected to increase with .017. Thus, the following hypothesis is supported:

***Hypothesis 27: The more exports a nation has, the more its embassy expresses the value of innovation.***

The parallel regression model accounting for non-USA embassies (USA embassy = “0”), reveals a positive relationship between belonging to the West of the host country and innovation (.129), which is statistically significant at the 0.10 level. If the host country does not belong to the West, the value of innovation would be negative, equal to the constant of the model: -.285. This provides qualified support (USA = “0”) for the following hypothesis:

***Hypothesis 39: Embassies in Western countries are more likely to be innovative.***

The third regression model, with wealth as the dependent variable, has an F-ratio of 1.871 and explains about 29% of the variation in the dependent variable and the model reveals a positive relationship (.559) between the value of wealth reflected in embassies and the wealth of the host country at the 0,01 level of statistical significance. As the wealth of the host country is measured as Gross National Income per capita in US dollars and is logged (*logGNI\_host*), the coefficient tells us how much the value of wealth (Y) will change given a 1% change in the wealth of the host country (X). So, since the coefficient is .559, Y will change by .559/100 units, or .00559 units when X changes by 1%. Thus the following hypothesis is supported:

***Hypothesis 36: The wealthier a host nation, the more the other nations express wealth.***

The parallel regression model for non-USA embassies (USA embassy = “0”) confirms the above positive relationship (.554) at the 0.05 level of statistical significance. However, it should be noted that this model is not statistically significant: it has an F-ratio of 1.654 and a p-value of .127, and thus is not a good model. With an F-ratio of 1.871, statistically significant at the .10 level, the basic regression model has some predictive power.

The fourth regression model, with security as the dependent variable, has an F-ratio of 5.989 and is statistically significant at the .01 level. With an R-squared statistic of .568, it explains about 57% of the variation in the dependent variable and reveals four statistically significant relationships. The relationship between belonging to the West of the host country and security is negative (-.838) and statistically significant at the 0.05 level, while the relationship with belonging to Islamic culture is positive with a coefficient of 1.158, statistically significant at the 0.01 level. Thus, the following two hypotheses are supported:

***Hypothesis 41: Embassies in Western countries are less likely to be security-oriented.***

***Hypothesis 45: Embassies in Islam countries are more likely to be security-oriented.***

Exports of the owner country are negatively correlated with security (-.020) at the 0.10 level of significance and thus the following hypothesis is also supported:

***Hypothesis 29: The more exports a nation has, the less its embassy expresses the value of security.***

Contrary to the hypothesized positive relationship between security and unemployment, the data reveal that the relationship is negative, (-.122) at the 0.05 level of statistical significance, which is an interesting finding and needs future examination. As a relationship does exist and the value of security can be predicted by the unemployment rate, the following qualified hypothesis is supported by the data:

***Hypothesis 33\*: Nations with less unemployment are MORE likely to reflect security in their embassies.***

The parallel regression model, with USA embassy = "0", confirms H41 about a negative relationship of security with West (host country) (-.880) at the 0.05 significance level and H45 about a positive relationship with Islam (.1.338) at the 0.01 level of significance.

Table 18. Multivariate ordinary least squares (OLS) regression results, by value

Independent variable	OLS regression estimates			
	Tradition	Innovation	Wealth	Security
	6.380 (1.766)***	1.459 (1.690)	1.355 (1.640)	3.462 (1.976)*
logWealth of owner country	-.482 (.324)	.291 (.310)	.234 (.301)	.285 (.362)
logWealth of host country	-.178 (.201)	.280 (.192)	.559 (.186)***	.149 (.225)
West (host country)	-.136 (.352)	.094 (.337)	-.255 (.327)	-.838 (.394)**
Islam (host country)	-.135 (.295)	.054 (.282)	.361 (.274)	1.158 (.330)***
Regionalism	-.014 (.245)	.090 (.235)	.307 (.228)	.273 (.275)
Political culture (owner)	-.054 (.095)	.043 (.091)	.082 (.088)	.076 (.106)
Military power of owner	.182 (.115)	-.113 (.110)	.068 (.106)	-.083 (.128)
Exports of owner	-.013 (.010)	.017 (.009)*	-.001 (.009)	-.020 (.011)*
Unemployment of owner	-.001 (.047)	.014 (.045)	-.038 (.044)	-.122 (.053)**
Observations (N)	51	51	51	51
R-squared	.45	.50	.29	.57
Adj. R-squared	.32	.39	.14	.47
F-ratio	3.674	4.513	1.871	5.989

Note: Standard error in parentheses. Significance: \*  $p < .10$ ; \*\*  $p < .05$ ; \*\*\*  $p < .01$  (two-tailed test).

Table 19. Multivariate ordinary least squares (OLS) regression results, by value. Sensitivity analysis for the overrepresentation of the USA

Independent variable	OLS regression estimates			
	Tradition	Innovation	Wealth	Security
Constant	7.629 (2.108)***	-.285 (1.983)	1.659 (1.983)	5.513 (2.318)**
logWealth of owner country	-.638 (.354)*	.508 (.333)	.196 (.333)	.029 (.389)
logWealth of host country	-.200 (.201)	.311 (.189)	.554 (.189)**	.113 (.221)
West = "1" (host country)	-.161 (.352)	.129 (.331)*	-.261 (.331)	-.880 (.387)**
Islam = "1" (host country)	-.026 (.311)	-.099 (.293)	.387 (.293)	1.338 (.342)***
Regionalism	.016 (.247)	.049 (.232)	.314 (.232)	.322 (.271)
Political culture (owner)	-.058 (.095)	.049 (.089)	.081 (.089)	.070 .104
Military power of owner	.031 (.181)	.099 (.170)	.031 (.170)	-.332 (.199)*
Exports of owner	-.009 (.011)	.012 (.010)	.000 (.010)	-.013 (.012)
Unemployment of owner	.031 (.055)	-.030 (.052)	-.031 (.052)	-.070 (.061)
Non-USA embassy = "1"	-.585 (.541)	.817 (.509)	-.142 (.509)	-.960 (.595)
Observations (N)	51	51	51	51
R-squared	.46	.53	.29	.59
Adj. R-squared	.33	.41	.12	.49
F-ratio	3.437	4.474	1.654	5.861

Note: Standard error in parentheses. Significance: \*  $p < .10$ ; \*\*  $p < .05$ ; \*\*\*  $p < .01$  (two-tailed test).

These findings suggest that whether the embassy is American or not does not make difference for these relationships. However, for non-US embassy the relationship between military power and security is negative (-.332) at the 0.1 level of significance, which is contrary to the hypothesized positive relationship (H21) and thus the data provide support for the following qualified hypothesis:

***Hypothesis 21\*: A military power is LESS likely to reflect security in its embassies.***

The regression analysis accounting for non-USA embassies reveals the relationship between security and exports and unemployment, and this may suggest that these variables may have predictive power for the US embassy patterns as reflection of values, which may be a subject for further examination.

Table 20. Supported Relationships between the four values reflected in embassy patterns and national characteristics.

Variables		Tradition	Innovation	Wealth	Security
Wealth of owner, GNI_owner	(H14-17)	<b>Negative</b>	Positive	Positive	Negative
Military power_owner	(H18-21)	Positive	Negative	Positive	<b>Negative</b>
Political culture_owner (PR)	(H22-25)	Negative	Positive	Positive	Negative
Exports_owner	(H26-29)	Negative	<b>Positive</b>	Positive	<b>Negative</b>
Unemployment_owner	(H30-33)	Positive	Negative	Negative	<b>Negative</b>
Wealth of host, GNI_host	(H34-37)	Negative	Positive	<b>Positive</b>	Negative
West (host) = "1"	(H38-41)	Negative	<b>Positive</b>	Positive	<b>Negative</b>
Islam (host) = "1"	(H42-45)	Positive	Negative	Positive	<b>Positive</b>
Region = "1"	(H46-49)	Negative	Positive	Positive	Negative
USA = "1"	(H50-53)	Positive	Negative	Positive	Positive

Of great interest in this study are the values of the constants in these regression models which are the results of respondents' perceptions of values as reflected in their ratings of the images of the embassies. While the constants for tradition in both models – without and with accounting for USA embassies – are large: 7.629 and 6.380, respectively, and statistically significant at the 0.01 level, for innovation and wealth they are comparatively small (1.459 and -



.285, when accounting for non-USA embassy for innovation, and 1.355 and 1.659 for wealth), neither of which are statistically significant. The constant for security without accounting for USA embassies is 3.462, statistically significant at the 0.10 level and 5.513, statistically significant at the 0.05 level, when USA embassy = “0”. These numbers may suggest that either traditionalism and security concerns simply prevail over innovation and wealth, regardless of objective national characteristics and international affiliations<sup>43</sup>, or that respondents are more familiar with architectural patterns reflecting these values. For example, it is generally accepted that (neo)classical forms reflect traditionalism (Goodsell 2001, among others) and, as the general public is quite familiar with classical forms, it was easy to identify and rate, in contrast to innovation which, as current, in constant development and ever changing, is represented by a variety of formal patterns. Or it could be that innovation is really on the decline as some commentators have noted (Quiggin 2005, among others). These reflections suggest also that the individual respondents’ perceptions matter and this is the subject of the next section.

### **Respondents’ Perceptions**

Whether respondents’ perceptions about values expressed through embassy architectural forms differ is examined on the examples of three embassies: the embassy of Sweden in Washington, USA, the consulate of USA in Istanbul, Turkey and the embassy of Bulgaria in Berlin, Germany. These national representations were selected for the following reasons: the Swedish embassy in Washington is well-known for its innovation and accessibility, the consulate in Istanbul - for its extremely expressed security concerns (these qualities of both embassies have been acknowledged), while the Bulgarian embassy in Berlin was rated lowest on security, which

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<sup>43</sup> That is, all independent variables are simultaneously equal to zero.

implies high on openness. Thus, the data especially for these three models should provide evidence whether there is *consistent* difference or not in respondents' perceptions.

The first model, estimating the predictors in perceptions about innovation, is statistically significant with an F-ratio of 4.104 and explains about 18% of the variation with two statistically significant predictors: age is negatively correlated, while Bulgarian nationality – positively. The second model, estimating how security is perceived for the American consulate in Istanbul, while explaining about 9% of the variation in perceptions has an F-ratio of 1.834 and does not reveal any statistically significant relationships. While weak, this model may imply that when security concerns are evident, demographics do not make a difference in perceiving this. The third model with “the lack of security concerns” (lowest security rating) is an interesting one. With an F-ratio of 5.635, statistically significant at the .01 level, it explains about 32% of the variation in perceptions, revealing four statistically significant relationships: negative for gender at the 0.05 level, positive for age at the 0.1 level and negative at the 0.01 level for both American and Bulgarian nationalities. While all models have some explanatory power with R-squared statistic of .09 and above, estimating individual perceptions of many different values does not seem to provide consistent results. Thus, despite that “things speak louder” than either actions or words (Lasswell 1979, p. 55), there seems to be some significant differences among the respondents' perceptions, but they do not appear to be systematic. While all respondents' characteristics matter in different degree in how values are perceived, nationality does seem to play a more special role. Americans and Bulgarians are more likely to perceive the values in a similar fashion, while South Koreans' perceptions differ from both Americans and Bulgarians, although in respect to different images. While nationality matters, they do not seem to have influenced significantly the ratings as many hypothesized relationships with national and international

predictive factors seem to be supported. This may be the result, to large extent, to the variation in respect to nationality as the respondents are from 14 countries. However, this examination of the same respondents' perceptions as independent variables about different dependent variables seems to pose some methodological questions which are worth further examination with a larger sample of respondents and over time. In conclusion, all general hypotheses on respondents' perceptions seem to be supported, with gender, age and nationality more relevant than education and ideological affiliations:

*Hypothesis 50: Gender is likely to influence perceptions about values as reflected in embassies.*

*Hypothesis 51: Age is likely to influence perceptions about values as reflected in embassies.*

*Hypothesis 52: Education is likely to influence perceptions about values as reflected in embassies.*

*Hypothesis 53: Nationality is likely to influence perceptions about values as reflected in embassies.*

*Hypothesis 54: Ideological orientation is likely to influence perceptions about values as reflected in embassies.*

#### **5.4. Conclusion: Embassy Architecture Is Politics**

Architecture and politics are inseparable to the extent that it may be argued that on the international "stage" embassy architecture is politics. Besides the statistically supported hypotheses, examples for this claim are the following brief discussions of the cases of Sweden and USA.

Table 21. Respondents perceptions about three embassies: Sweden in Washington, USA, U.S. Consulate in Istanbul, Turkey and Bulgaria in Berlin, Germany.

Embassy	Sweden in Washington, USA (19)				USA in Istanbul, Turkey (26)				Bulgaria in Berlin, Germany (21)			
Rating	T: 2.61	<b>I: 5.30</b>	W: 4.76	S: 2.60	T: 4.33	I: 2.91	W: 4.83	<b>S: 6.33</b>	T: 3.73	I: 4.20	W: 4.67	<b>S: 2.20</b>
<b>Constant</b>	1.918 (.736)***	5.638 (.737)***	4.430 (.666)***	3.076 (.631)***	5.228 (.669)***	2.643 (.655)***	3.003 (.830)***	6.372 (.658)***	1.906 (.693)***	4.850 (.746)***	4.430 (.666)***	3.076 (.631)***
<b>Gender</b>	-.642 (.283)**	.158 (.287)	-.281 (.256)	-.485 (.243)**	-.648 (.257)**	.135 (.252)	.601 (.319)*	-.151 (.253)	-.007 (.246)	.158 (.287)	-.281 (.256)	-.483 (.243)**
<b>Age</b>	.019 (.012)	-.029 (.013)**	.004 (.011)	.021 (.011)*	-.025 (.011)**	.022 (.011)**	.028 (.014)**	-.001 (.011)	.026 (.011)**	-.029 (.013)**	.004 (.011)	.021 (.011)*
<b>Education</b>	.096 (.051)*	.005 (.052)	-.069 (.046)	.007 (.044)	.042 (.046)	.004 (.045)	.005 (.058)	-.056 (.046)	.038 (.044)	.005 (.052)	-.069 (.046)	.007 (.044)
<b>Ideology</b>	.042 (.098)	-.059 (.100)	.077 (.089)	-.098 (.084)	-.006 (.090)	.020 (.088)	.101 (.111)	.098 (.088)	.212 (.086)*	-.059 (.100)	.077 (.089)	-.098 (.084)
<b>USA</b>	-.679 (.376)*	.503 (.381)	.863 (.340)**	-1.633 (.323)***	.099 (.342)	-.940 (.335)***	.596 (.425)	.506 (.337)	.112 (.327)	.503 (.381)	.393 (.332)	-1.633 (.323)***
<b>Bulgaria</b>	-.502 (.367)	.798 (.372)**	.393 (.332)	-1.150 (.315)***	.163 (.333)	-.922 (.327)***	-.152 (.414)	-.126 (.328)	-.374 (.319)	.798 (.372)**	-.315 (.432)	-1.150 (.315)***
<b>South Korea</b>	.097 (.478)	.041 (.484)	-.315 (.432)	.184 (.410)	-.330 (.434)	-.261 (.425)	-.362 (.539)	-.790 (.427)	-.992 (.415)**	.041 (.484)	.863 (.341)**	.184 (.410)
<b>Observ. (N)</b>	138	138	138	138	138	138	138	138	138	138	138	138
<b>R-squared</b>	.16	.18	.10	.24	.09	.11	.12	.09	.16	.09	.10	.32
<b>Adj. R sq.</b>	.12	.14	.05	.20	.04	.09	.08	.04	.11	.04	.06	.28
<b>F-ratio</b>	3.562***	4.104***	1.951*	5.906***	1.831*	2.397**	2.589**	1.834*	3,453***	1.823*	2.134**	5.633***

Note: Standard error in parentheses. Significance: \* p < 0.10; \*\* p < 0.05; \*\*\* p < 0.01 (two-tailed test)

#### 5.4.1. Embassies as selective “soft” power

The renowned embassy of Sweden in Washington, D.C. (Figure 4) was open in 2006 and is one of the largest Swedish delegations in the world. It is known as “House of Sweden” and is considered “a stunning example of contemporary Scandinavian architecture designed by Gert Wingardh and Tomas Hansen.” The Swedish embassy web site notes that its building in Washington is a physical representation of Swedish values such as openness, transparency and democracy and is the flagship of Swedish public diplomacy in the United States.<sup>44</sup>

The embassy of Sweden in Washington, DC is a piece of art and as such is widely displayed by the embassy itself (as an institution) on its web site as well as by the Oslo Scholl of Architecture and Design, for example.<sup>45</sup> It has also been widely admired by the American public. Here is what Laura L. from Arlington, VA says: “...an industrial designer's dream: a house made of wood and/or glass-- and how it's still standing is a mystery!), be extremely hospitable and be into really cool, eclectic music. Sound awesome? Probably because it is.” From her side, Tara G. from Washington, DC, exclaims, “Beautiful venue and beautiful views!” and thinks that “The incredibly stylish and amazing design incorporates many elements reminiscent of Sweden.” A third blogger, Chris M. from Alexandria, VA, is so impressed that after a visit to the embassy he's “bumping it up” on his world travel wish list. These are only several of the many American admirers of the House of Sweden.<sup>46</sup>

Embassies are among Berlin's modern architectural highlights as the city became the capital of a reunified Germany in the 1990s. Similarly to the public in the United States, the

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<sup>44</sup> From the Embassy of Sweden in Washington web sites: [http://www.swedenabroad.com/Page\\_7036.aspx](http://www.swedenabroad.com/Page_7036.aspx) and <http://houseofsweden.com>.

<sup>45</sup> The Oslo Scholl of Architecture and Design web site is available at: <http://www.aho.no/no/AHO/Aktuelt/Kalender/2009/Gjesteforelesning-Gert-Wingardh/>

<sup>46</sup> The blog is available at: <http://www.yelp.com/biz/embassy-of-sweden-washington>  
Web site accessed on October 5, 2011.

public in Berlin, Germany, admires the communal embassy complex of the Nordic countries, including Finland, Sweden, Norway, Denmark and Iceland, which has already become a tourist destination (Figure 5).<sup>47</sup> The Nordic Embassies complex is particularly enticing and is considered “the darling of the district,” which even has its own bus stop on line 100 (Nordische Botschaften) .<sup>48</sup> It is acknowledged as a masterpiece of modern Nordic architecture and is defined as “a design-lover's delight.” The separate national buildings are joined seamlessly together from the outside by a sheath of copper, symbolizing their unity while, a sixth building, Felleshus (the common house open to the public, Danish for “house for all”), serves as a communal canteen and auditorium, “open to the public at certain points during the day, although the best time to come is at night, when the building illuminates with thousands of neon lights and strobes that often change colour [sic] at regular, jaw-dropping intervals,” advises Guidepal. <sup>49</sup> (Figure 6) By contrast, the photograph of the embassy of Sweden in Islamabad, Pakistan, (Figure 7) is under *Useful information before traveling to/from South Asia*, provided by the web site of one of northern Europe’s most prestigious universities, the Swedish Lund University. <sup>50</sup>

Thus, from such mass media presentations and discussions of the unique Nordic collective embassy in Berlin, the popular Washington “House of Sweden” as well as from theorizing on the attractiveness and the uniqueness of the Scandinavian social and political model, the expectation was that unique political culture and such admirable social and political achievements would be reflected in the countries’ embassies as national representations abroad.

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<sup>47</sup> Designed by the Austrian-Finnish architects Berger and Parkkinen

<sup>48</sup> *Embassy Architecture*. [http://www.inyourpocket.com/germany/berlin/embassy-architecture\\_55348f](http://www.inyourpocket.com/germany/berlin/embassy-architecture_55348f). Web site accessed on December 19, 2011. See also Nordic Embassies. 2010. Available at: <http://www.miniloft.com/en/architecture/nordic-embassies.html>. Web site accessed on December 19, 2011.

<sup>49</sup> *A masterpiece of modern Nordic architecture*. Available at: <http://guidepal.com/berlin/see--do/nordic-embassies>. Web site accessed on December 19, 2011.

<sup>50</sup> Available at <http://www.sasnet.lu.se/news-sources/useful-information-travelling-tofrom-south-asia>. Web site accessed on December 19, 2011.

According to Inglehart and Welzel's (1992) value theory, the Northern European countries are an example for post-materialistic values. This would seem to be consistent also with Mayo's (1996) reflections on the political values of Sweden. While in real life, freedom and equality exist in different degrees in different political systems, Mayo considers that some countries, such as Sweden, which emphasizes both capitalism and socialism, have achieved a good blend of freedom and equality. While Mayo is most likely correct in his conclusions, Sweden does not "behave" on the international arena as "expected." While, in contrast to the United States, the case of Sweden did not make any statistically significant difference, embassies as national representations abroad have the potential to reveal quite a lot about values. "[I]f actions speak louder than words, things speak louder than either." (p. 55), Lasswell pointed (Figs. 5, 6 and 7). Thus, the photographs of Sweden's embassies reveal a very selective approach to representing itself to the world. Embassies reveal relations (Webster 2001b; Webster and Ivanov 2007) and thus, if Sweden selectively represents itself according to the wealth (power) of the host country, the realist perspective is strongly supported.

#### **5.4.2. Architecture as Power**

Security concerns have been the major factor in the design of the United States embassies during the last thirty years, the period under examination, and this is reflected powerfully and undeniably (Figs. 8-17). Security concerns, however, had started during the late 1950s (Robin 1992; Loeffler 1998) and the embassy in Dublin, Ireland, finished in 1964 was the last one in which design prevailed over security concerns. Loeffler's analysis of the evolution of the embassy program reveals how it became a part of the country's post-WWII expansion and the Truman doctrine of Soviet containment. Such major projects included Germany, Greece, Turkey, Iran, India and Pakistan, which bordered the Soviet Union and its satellites. Loeffler considers

the embassies in Greece., Turkey and India especially constructed to appease those countries which claimed neutrality and views the US embassy program as part of the country's geopolitical strategies for controlling the Atlantic and Pacific oceans. For this purpose an array of overseas airbases were built, an initiative known as "the base system plan" (39) and which was coupled with another strategic initiative designed to add to military capability "a plan to secure air transit and landing rights for American aircraft at key cities along a route that ran from Casablanca through Algiers and Tripoli to Cairo, east to Dhahran, on to Karachi, across India to New Delhi and Calcutta, then southeast to Rangoon, and across Southeast Asia to Bangkok, Saigon, and ending in Manila" (39). According to Loeffler, while coincidence may have played a role, the plan to secure transit and landing rights appears to have had an impact on the embassy program. While Leland King – the Foreign Building Office (FBO) Chief – had stated that FBO was not influence by military considerations after WWII, he did not deny that such considerations may have motivated decisions at higher levels of the State Department. Loeffler points out that the "subsequent State Department plans included proposed project, new embassies, or supplemental facilities at all of the twelve cities on that route". "Strategic interest in oil was responsible for the much of the interest in Saudi Arabia, and similar concern prompted plans for a larger new embassy in Iran." (39) Thus, in the context of the Cold War, embassy construction was part of the SD efforts to counterbalance Soviet influence in the Third World.

Besides, in his theory of intergenerational values system, Inglehart plots nations on a scale of values and the conclusion is that the United States is more traditional than would be predicted by its socioeconomic status. Inglehart defines the US as a deviant case, exhibiting much more traditional and religious values than other rich countries.



Thus, the analyses of US embassies and Inglehart's theory support two major claims: security is the major value reflected in US embassies and that the US is more traditional, than it could be expected based on the wealth and the standing of the country in the world. The sensitivity analysis supports these hypotheses. Based on these analyses, we may expect that the embassy in London, when completed, will also reveal the primacy of security concerns, that is, the security tendency will prevail over that of architecture as public diplomacy.



Figure 4: "The House of Sweden". Architecture as art in Washington, DC.



Figure 5. The Nordic Embassy Complex in Berlin, Germany. Architecture as art and collective representation.




Figure 6. The Nordic Embassy Complex in Berlin, Germany, at night.



Figure 7. Embassy of Sweden in Islamabad, Pakistan.



## Architecture as Power



Figures 8 to 17. From left to right: US embassies in Guyana, Yemen, Canada, Turkey (Consulate in Istanbul), Bulgaria, Germany, Thailand, Mexico, Jordan and in UK (future).

## **Chapter VI.**

### **Conclusion**

This examination of embassies demonstrates that political values - as reflected in architectural patterns – can be measured and thus empirically examined, explained and predicted by different objective factors as well as by cultural affiliations. This study compliments the research on values by empirically examining what factors influence the values reflected in embassies as national representations abroad and thus some predictions become possible about future developments. The major finding of this study is that the wealth of the host country is the single most important indicator for the values expressed in embassy design while the wealth of the owner country does not seem to be a good explanation and thus predictor of the country's embassy as national representation abroad. Second, there is significant evidence that different affiliations to civilization and culture play role in decisions on embassy architecture. The data have also provided support for Schwartz' theory of integrated values systems and not for Inglehart's theory of intergenerational change. However, the data have provided support for Inglehart's claims on the prevailing traditionalism in the United States. The major contribution of this examination is the empirical support for the designed model for deriving stable measurements of political values, defined as supra-individual and thus collective. They are stable because are reflected in physical forms, enduring over long periods of time. As such, they have also the potential to support existing relations or, alternatively to influence behaviors, processes and activities. By creating new forms supporting definite values, architecture has the potential, although limited, to even influence social and political change.

## 6.1. Findings

This study provides support for the Realist perspective in International Relations that nations act as self-interested entities in pursuing their objectives and this is reflected in their embassies as national representations abroad. Thus, the wealth of the country, hosting the respective embassy, influences how an embassy would look like and thus is the only most powerful predictor of embassy design. This study also provides support for the Identity perspective that cultural affiliations matter, as well as support for the Liberal perspective, emphasizing the role of trade in international relations. Whether a host country belongs to the West European or the Islam culture influences what values would be intentionally expressed. The data have also provided some evidence that unemployment of the owner country could predict reflection of security concerns in embassy buildings. The empirical evidence provides strong support of the influence of the United States military power in the international architectural landscape. The data also support the claim that on the global arena, wealth is the major value. However, the data do not provide support for the hypothesis that “great nations have great embassies”. That is, the wealth of a nation is not a significant predictor for a nation’s representation abroad and this implies that international relations are more subtle and complex than just based on wealth as indicator for power.

By not providing support for the role of political culture as an indicator for a political order and theorized by different scholars, this study poses the question of the need of its better conceptualization and consequent operationalization. By also not providing support for the role of proximity, or “neighborhood”, the study may demonstrate the values of globalization and neo-liberalization as openness to the world. Finally, by partially examining the influence of respondents’ characteristics, the study evidences that perceptual cognition matters.

Besides the potential of deriving stable measurements for values, in this case political, the results of this study model can account for the general tendencies in architecture as reflection of values during a definite period. If enough data are accumulated, it can account for values reflected in architecture of one single country or a group of countries, or cultures. While regression analysis provides the broader context for research, a future comparative research may attempt to account for middle-range theoretical dimensions that relate more closely to the different political realities of groups of countries, of individual countries, or different environments within a country, such as “small town” and “large city” values. Thus, this initial exploration has the potential for a promising research agenda.

## **6.2. Limitations**

While the potential for future research is substantial, this study has some limitations. The first is the use of photographs as proxies for the real buildings for deriving measurements for the values. This, in most cases, does not allow for judging size and, more importantly, scale. Whenever possible, I have chosen photographs revealing scale and especially in comparison to people as the measurement for everything. Human scale is probably the best measure for how architecture is used as a tool for different purposes and this could be demonstrated by a human figure at the entrance, – accessibility, if comparable, and power, if over-exceeding the normally required less than 10 feet.

The second most important limitation is the small sample size, which is due to the limitations, characteristic for doctoral students’ research first, and second, the lack of control over the number of returned completed surveys. I consider as a third major limitation the study’s Eurocentric focus. This is due to the lack of information about embassies of other, less wealthy and non-Western nations as well as of the lack of relevant scientific literature. A major limitation

in this respect is the lack of non-Western embassies in non-Western countries and thus possible generalizations, especially about the value of security, need to be carefully qualified. Although not conclusive, the testing of respondents' perceptions revealed that the combination of different nationality and culture, such as the South Koreans, may result in different views about values. By implications, if values are viewed differently, contingent on nationality, the expectation would be different reflections through different architectural forms. This implies the relevance of comparative research on values, based on the suggested research design. However, the mix of nationalities in the conducted survey seems to have balanced such differences in perceptual cognition.

### **6.3. Future research**

While with some limitations, this study holds promise for a fruitful research agenda, based on its design of measuring values through, existing and revealing a lot about the social and political reality, physical durable forms. First, if the United States embassy program reveals how embassies changed, and with them the values the country demonstrates to the world, then the next question is to examine empirically what could explain this change. Similarly, an empirical examination of values, as reflected in the urban environment, for example central city-suburbs, could reveal not only how values change but also how these new urban forms influence the occurrence of new and different values.

Second, if architecture matters so much – and it undeniably does - an empirical study of the work of urbanists – public administrators, architects and planners, engaged in urban politics – could reveal not only their role as professionals but also as public servants and their role in politics. That architecture matters for influencing human behaviors and political processes is evidenced by the proliferating and successful consumerist architecture throughout. Related to

these reflections, another question could be worth investigating: if self-governing urban forms and consumerism are proliferating and public life is declining, how could these developments affect the capacity of city governments to function? These research questions can refer also to the international environment in the current era of globalization, economic liberalization and opening of countries to the global financial system. Recalling Max Weber's (1966) seminal essay on the city's gradual decline as the result of the physical removal of the city fortification, we may hypothesize about the role of the global cities – functioning as open economies - as predictors for the future of the institution of the sovereign state. Architecture and urban forms provide powerful tools not only for achieving political and consumerist objectives, but also for scientific examination and evidence, which was one of the major points of this study.

While Lasswell (1979) developed a silhouette analysis to examine power through urban forms and suggested that embassies could reveal a lot about power relations among nations, cultural historians Robin (1992) and Loeffler (1998) examined embassy architecture as spreading the values of empire or democracy, respectively. Goodsell's (1988a) interpretive analysis reveals how government buildings reflect changing values of authority, defined as the relationship between governors and governed, while Mayo's (1996) contingent general theory on the politics-architecture nexus provides causal explanation. Finally, political scientist Craig Webster (2001a; 2001b; 2001c) and Webster and Ivanov (2007) address the importance of embassies as strategic investments in relations among nations. What all these scholars, among others, emphasize is the role of architecture for politics. This study compliments this impressive scholarship, demonstrating that values reflected in and through architecture can be examined and measured empirically, and thus predicted by external factors. While values exist throughout all human activity, in architecture they are “frozen” and thus amenable to solid scientific examination



because the function of political architecture is politics and the form is value. Thus, the major argument of this study is: *Form Follows Values*, while its potential lies in an examination of how value-laden architectural patterns influence political behaviors. Architecture and urban forms provide powerful tools not only for achieving political and consumerist objectives, but also for scientific examination and evidence, which was one of the major points of this study.

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## Illustration Credits

Figure 1 and 10. US Consulate in Istanbul, Turkey (2000s). Photograph retrieved on November 5, 2011. URL:[http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-07/09/xin\\_0220705100754250159018.jpg](http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-07/09/xin_0220705100754250159018.jpg)

Figure 1: U.S. Embassy in New Delhi, India. Architect: Edward Durrell Stone (1954-1959)  
Source: Khan, Hasan-Uddin (2001). International Style: Modernist Architecture from 1925 to 1965

Figure 3. Values Dimension and Value Types ( Schwartz 1996)  
Source: Schwartz, S. (1996). Value Priorities and Behavior: Applying a Theory of Integrated Values Systems. The Psychology of Values: The Ontario Symposium, Vol. 8 (pp. 1–24). C. Seligman, J. Olson and M. Zanna. Hillsdale, NJ, L. Erlbaum Associates.

Figure 4. Embassy of Sweden in Washington, DC. (2006). Photograph retrieved on November 5, 2011. URL:<http://www.aho.no/no/AHO/Aktuelt/Kalender/2009/Gjesteforelesning-Gert-Wingardh/>

Figure 5. Nordic Embassy Complex in Berlin, Germany. Photograph retrieved on November 5, 2011. URL:<http://www.panoramio.com/photo/554536>

Figure 6. Jule Berlin. (2007). Nordic Embassies. Photograph retrieved on November 5, 2011. URL: [http://www.flickr.com/photos/jule\\_berlin/2019548987](http://www.flickr.com/photos/jule_berlin/2019548987)

Figure 7. Embassy of Sweden in Islamabad, Pakistan. Photograph retrieved on November 5, 2011. URL:<http://www.sasnet.lu.se/news-sources/useful-information-travelling-tofrom-south-asia>

Figure 8. US embassy in Guyana (1883-91). Source: Loeffler, J. C. (1998). The Architecture of Diplomacy. Building America's Embassies. New York, Princeton Architectural Press.

Figure 9. US embassy in Yemen. (1986-90). Source: Loeffler, J. C. (1998). The Architecture of Diplomacy. Building America's Embassies. New York, Princeton Architectural Press

Figure 10. US embassy in Canada. (1999). Photograph retrieved on November 5, 2011. URL: <http://static.panoramio.com/photos/original/1329182.jpg>

Figure 11. US Consulate in Istanbul, Turkey. Photograph retrieved on November 5, 2011. URL: [http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-07/09/xin\\_0220705100754250159018.jpg](http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-07/09/xin_0220705100754250159018.jpg)

Figure 12. USA embassy in Bulgaria. (2000s). Photograph retrieved on November 5, 2011. URL: [http://bulgaria.usembassy.gov/about\\_ambassy\\_new.html](http://bulgaria.usembassy.gov/about_ambassy_new.html)

Figure 13. US embassy in Germany. (2008). Photograph retrieved on November 5, 2011. URL: [http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=File:New\\_US\\_Embassy\\_-\\_Muttter\\_Erde\\_fec.jpg](http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=File:New_US_Embassy_-_Muttter_Erde_fec.jpg)

Figure 14. US embassy in Thailand. (1994-96). Source: Loeffler, J. C. (1998). *The Architecture of Diplomacy. Building America's Embassies*. New York, Princeton Architectural Press.

Figure 15. US embassy in Mexico (2000s). Photograph retrieved on November 5, 2011. URL: <http://www.caddell.com/MarketsInternational.html>

Figure 16. US embassy in Jordan. (1988-92). Source: Loeffler, J. C. (1998). *The Architecture of Diplomacy. Building America's Embassies*. New York, Princeton Architectural Press.

Figure 17. US Embassy in the UK. (2012). Photograph retrieved on November 5, 2011. URL: <http://inhabitat.com/kierantimberlake-wins-competition-to-design-new-us-embassy-in-london/>



## Appendices

## Appendix 1. Selection rules

Initially, I started exploring embassies of different countries looking for patterns and insights. I have examined 312 embassies from 39 countries and the illustrations are on file. The major sources of photographs were the lists of missions of the respective countries from Wikipedia. In order to avoid any bias, I chose embassies “by rule,” depending on the number of needed examples and the total number of photographs available. For example, if there were 45 images of USA embassies and I needed seven photographs, the 6<sup>th</sup>, 12<sup>th</sup>, 18<sup>th</sup>, 24<sup>th</sup>, 30<sup>th</sup>, 36<sup>th</sup> and 42<sup>nd</sup> were chosen.

### USA

[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List\\_of\\_diplomatic\\_missions\\_of\\_the\\_United\\_States](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_diplomatic_missions_of_the_United_States)

45 embassy building: chosen each 6th.: 6, 12, 18,... 42th.

The Hague; Paris, Skopje, San Jose, Costa Rica; Tel Aviv; Beijing, Canberra

### UK

[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List\\_of\\_diplomatic\\_missions\\_of\\_the\\_United\\_Kingdom](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_diplomatic_missions_of_the_United_Kingdom)

20, 2nd and then every third: 2,5,8,11,14,17,20

British consulate General in Hong Kong, Ho Chi Minh City

British embassy in Helsinki, Budapest, Bratislava

British high commission in Wellington

### Russia

[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List\\_of\\_diplomatic\\_missions\\_of\\_Russia](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_diplomatic_missions_of_Russia)

30: every fourth, starting from 3

Copenhagen, London, Tallinn, Ottawa, Asmara, Danang, Ho Chi Minh City

### Bulgaria

[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List\\_of\\_diplomatic\\_missions\\_of\\_Bulgaria](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_diplomatic_missions_of_Bulgaria)

7 = 8 minus the consulate general in Saint Petersburg

Berlin, Warsaw, Oslo, Prague, Moscow, Washington Addis Ababa

### Saudi Arabia

[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List\\_of\\_diplomatic\\_missions\\_of\\_Saudi\\_Arabia](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_diplomatic_missions_of_Saudi_Arabia)

13: 1, 3, 5, 7, 9 (consulate in LA,) 11,13,15

Berlin, Madrid, Prague, Washington, Buenos Aires, Manama, Canberra

### China

[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List\\_of\\_diplomatic\\_missions\\_of\\_China](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_diplomatic_missions_of_China)

16: 1,3,5,7, consulates, 13,15,16

Berlin, Budapest, Prague, Washington, Ottawa, Windhoek, Nuku'alofa

### Nigeria


[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List\\_of\\_diplomatic\\_missions\\_of\\_Nigeria](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_diplomatic_missions_of_Nigeria)

9- two High Commissions:

Bern, Moscow, Stockholm, Vienna, Warsaw, Ottawa, Washington


## Appendix 2. Four nations

As a first attempt to find some recognizable architectural patterns, the embassies of four countries – USA, UK, China and Russia - were selected “randomly” from the lists of diplomatic missions by “rule”: every third, or fourth, or seventh, depending on the total number of embassy photographs available. No specific patterns were discovered.



### Appendix 3. Seven Nations, varying by wealth and geography.


Next, I increased the number of examined countries from four to seven, varying in wealth and from different world regions. The selected countries were: the United States, the United Kingdom, Saudi Arabia, Russia, China, Bulgaria and Nigeria. Still, no patterns were discovered.





#### Appendix 4. Seven Nations, four ideologies

As I couldn't find any patterns from selections of photographs of countries differing in power, size, wealth, geography or national culture, I assumed that political system/culture matters and went on with seven nations representing the three major political systems – liberal democracy, social democracy and authoritarianism, holding context constant. The selected countries were: the United States, the United Kingdom, Russia, Sweden, China, France and Germany. However, I had problems finding photographs of embassies of all nations in the respective capitals and thus became evident that the United States and the United Kingdom are best represented and the best represented locations were Washington and Berlin: powerful nations and representation in locations of power.



## Appendix 5. Time period

### Embassy Data

	--	1900s-	1910s-	1920s	1930s	1040s	1050s	1060s	1070s	1980s	1990s	2000s	2010s	Total
1	USA			12	6	8	38	2	4	8	8	5	1	92
2	Sweden											1		1
3	Netherlands											2		2
4	Mexico											1		1
5	Italy										1			1
6	Iran												1	1
7	India											1		1
8	Greece											3		4
9	Germany		2								1			3
10	UK			2				4			2	5		13
11	France									1		1		2
12	Egypt											1		1
13	China											2		1
14	Canada							1		2		3		6
15	Bulgaria											1		1
	Total		2	14	7	8	38	7	4	11	12	26	2	129

USA (22), UK (7), Canada (5), Netherlands (2), France (2), Greece (3), China (2) and Mexico, India, Sweden, Bulgaria, Egypt, Germany, Iran and Italy, each represented with one embassy.

Additional examined embassies for which there was no enough data, especially for the time of construction, include some of the embassies of: Denmark, Finland, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Nigeria, Japan, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand, Azerbaijan, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Kyrgyzstan, Lithuania, Poland, Uzbekistan, Thailand, Switzerland, Spain, Lithuania, Kenya and New Zealand. The illustrations of these embassies are on file. Thus, a total of 39 countries and 312 embassy images were explored and are on file. The statistical analysis includes the period since the 1980s, or 15 countries with 51 embassy buildings. The data on the variables match the time period.

## Appendix 6.

### Survey Data

I have used photographs from the following two books: Robin, R. (1992). *Enclaves of America*, Princeton University Press and Loeffler, J. C. (1998). *The Architecture of Diplomacy. Building America's Embassies*. New York, Princeton Architectural Press and from the internet, downloaded at no charge.

When a photograph of an U.S. embassy was available in the referenced books, it was used. Whenever possible, photographs from online architectural journals were used. When none of these options existed, photographs were obtained from internet sources and I made the judgment for the most appropriate; for how this choice was made, some examples are included.

When I initially explored different embassies, the primary source was:

[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List\\_of\\_diplomatic\\_missions\\_of\\_\(name\\_of\\_country\)](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_diplomatic_missions_of_(name_of_country))

and in Berlin:

<http://www.nytimes.com/2005/02/26/arts/design/26emba.html?n=Top/Reference/Times%20Topics/Subjects/A/Architecture&position=&pagewanted=all&position=>

The photographs from the internet are in the public domain and were obtained at no cost. All images were retrieved in May 2011.



Canada in Mexico

<http://www.canadaisbetter.com/2010/07/06/canadian-embassies-around-the-world-travellers-aim-here-when-running-for-your-life/>



Canada in US

<http://www.canadaisbetter.com/2010/07/06/canadian-embassies-around-the-world-travellers-aim-here-when-running-for-your-life/>




US in Jordan

Loeffler, J. C. (1998). *The Architecture of Diplomacy. Building America's Embassies*. New York, Princeton Architectural Press.



US in Bangladesh

Loeffler, J. C. (1998). *The Architecture of Diplomacy. Building America's Embassies*. New York, Princeton Architectural Press.



US in Guyana

Loeffler, J. C. (1998). *The Architecture of Diplomacy. Building America's Embassies*. New York, Princeton Architectural Press.



Iran in UK

[www.e-architect.co.uk/london/iranian\\_embassy.htm](http://www.e-architect.co.uk/london/iranian_embassy.htm)





US in Japan

Loeffler, J. C. (1998). *The Architecture of Diplomacy. Building America's Embassies*. New York, Princeton Architectural Press.



US in Somalia

Loeffler, J. C. (1998). *The Architecture of Diplomacy. Building America's Embassies*. New York, Princeton Architectural Press.



US in Malaysia

Loeffler, J. C. (1998). *The Architecture of Diplomacy. Building America's Embassies*. New York, Princeton Architectural Press.



US in Yemen

Loeffler, J. C. (1998). *The Architecture of Diplomacy. Building America's Embassies*. New York, Princeton Architectural Press.



Netherlands in Ethiopia

<http://www.dexigner.com/news/11811>



Mexico in Germany

[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Embassy\\_of\\_Mexico,\\_Berlin](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Embassy_of_Mexico,_Berlin)



France in US

<http://www.google.com/imgres?q=french+embassy+in+washington>



Canada in Romania, better

<http://it.urbarama.com/project/the-canadian-embassy>

(The above photograph was chosen as revealing more form the surrounding environment.)



Canada in Romania, first

<http://www.canadaisbetter.com/2010/07/06/canadian-embassies-around-the-world-travellers-aim-here-when-running-for-your-life/>



Greece in Belgium

[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Embassy\\_of\\_Greece\\_in\\_Belgium.JPG](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Embassy_of_Greece_in_Belgium.JPG)




Greece in Armenia

[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Greek\\_embassy\\_Yerevan.jpg](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Greek_embassy_Yerevan.jpg)



India in Germany

[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Be\\_Indian\\_Embassy\\_02.jpg](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Be_Indian_Embassy_02.jpg)



UK in Uganda

[http://www.e-architect.co.uk/africa/bhc\\_kampala.htm](http://www.e-architect.co.uk/africa/bhc_kampala.htm)



Sweden in US

House of Sweden



UK in Ethiopia

<http://www.ethiopianreview.com/content/13765>

[http://www.e-architect.co.uk/africa/british\\_council\\_building\\_addis\\_ababa.htm](http://www.e-architect.co.uk/africa/british_council_building_addis_ababa.htm)



Bulgaria in Germany

<http://www.skyscrapercity.com/showthread.php?t=1141803>



Canada in Germany

<http://www.canadaisbetter.com/2010/07/06/canadian-embassies-around-the-world-travellers-aim-here-when-running-for-your-life/>



Canada in Poland

[http://www.wzmf.com/index.php/projects/institutional/canadian\\_embassy/](http://www.wzmf.com/index.php/projects/institutional/canadian_embassy/)



China in US. [www.china.org.cn/.../31/content\\_16105316.htm](http://www.china.org.cn/.../31/content_16105316.htm)



US in China

[www.chinadaily.com.cn/.../06/content\\_6906823.htm](http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/.../06/content_6906823.htm)





US in Turkey

Photo: [http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-07/09/xin\\_0220705100754250159018.jpg](http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-07/09/xin_0220705100754250159018.jpg)

T.Friedman: <http://www.nytimes.com/2003/12/21/opinion/where-birds-don-t-fly.html>



Egypt in Germany

[http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/1/14/Egyptian\\_Embassy\\_in\\_Berlin.jpg/220px-Egyptian\\_Embassy\\_in\\_Berlin.jpg](http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/1/14/Egyptian_Embassy_in_Berlin.jpg/220px-Egyptian_Embassy_in_Berlin.jpg)



USA in Bulgaria

[http://bulgaria.usembassy.gov/about\\_embassy\\_new.html](http://bulgaria.usembassy.gov/about_embassy_new.html)



UK in Germany

<http://www.ministry-of-information.co.uk/blog1/0607/embassy.htm>

[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Embassy\\_of\\_the\\_United\\_Kingdom,\\_Berlin.jpg](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Embassy_of_the_United_Kingdom,_Berlin.jpg)



France in Germany

<http://www.viewpictures.co.uk/Details.aspx?ID=114537&TypeID=1>



Greece in Spain

[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Greek\\_Embassy\\_Madrid.jpg](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Greek_Embassy_Madrid.jpg)



US in Mexico

<http://www.caddell.com/MarketsInternational.html>



UK in Poland

[http://www.e-architect.co.uk/poland/british\\_embassy\\_warsaw.htm](http://www.e-architect.co.uk/poland/british_embassy_warsaw.htm)



UK in Yemen

<http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/william-hague-condemns-shameful-attack-on-british-embassy-car-2099149.html>



Italy in US

[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Embassy\\_Row](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Embassy_Row)



British Consulate – General: UK in China (Hong Cong)

[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:HK\\_British\\_Consulate\\_Justice\\_Drive\\_1.JPG](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:HK_British_Consulate_Justice_Drive_1.JPG)



Netherlandy in Germany

<http://figure-ground.com/germany/berlin/0016/>





Germany in US

<http://www.hpp.com/en/projekte/typologies/buero-und-verwaltung/german-embassy-washington.html>



US in Germany

[http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=File:New\\_US\\_Embassy\\_-\\_Muttter\\_Erde\\_fec.jpg](http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=File:New_US_Embassy_-_Muttter_Erde_fec.jpg)



Loeffler, J. C. (1998). *The Architecture of Diplomacy. Building America's Embassies*. New York, Princeton Architectural Press.



Loeffler, J. C. (1998). *The Architecture of Diplomacy. Building America's Embassies*. New York, Princeton Architectural Press.



Loeffler, J. C. (1998). *The Architecture of Diplomacy. Building America's Embassies*. New York, Princeton Architectural Press.



Loeffler, J. C. (1998). *The Architecture of Diplomacy. Building America's Embassies*. New York, Princeton Architectural Press.



US in Liberia

Robin, R. (1992). *Enclaves of America*, Princeton University Press.



US in Canada

<http://static.panoramio.com/photos/original/1329182.jpg>



US in Ethiopia

<http://usgbccnews.blogspot.com/2011/02/us-builds-lead-embassy-in-addis-ababa.html>



US in Peru

<http://www.pri.org/theworld/?q=week/2007/10/21>



US in UK

<http://inhabitat.com/kierantimberlake-wins-competition-to-design-new-us-embassy-in-london/>



US in OMAN

Loeffler, J. C. (1998). *The Architecture of Diplomacy. Building America's Embassies*. New York, Princeton Architectural Press.



China in Germany

[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Berlin\\_-\\_Jannowitzbruecke\\_-\\_chinese\\_embassy.jpg](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Berlin_-_Jannowitzbruecke_-_chinese_embassy.jpg)



UK in Algeria

[http://www.e-architect.co.uk/architects/john\\_mcaslan\\_awards.htm](http://www.e-architect.co.uk/architects/john_mcaslan_awards.htm)

## **Appendix 7.**

### **Survey**

Dear Respondents,

I am a doctoral student in the Political Science Department at the University of Tennessee in Knoxville, USA and I am conducting this study as part of my dissertation project. The objective of this research project is to attempt to understand what political values embassy buildings express and through your participation, I eventually hope to understand how values are reflected in political architecture.

Enclosed with this letter is a questionnaire that asks you to mark each picture on a scale from one to seven for each of the four variables: security, wealth, tradition and innovation. You are expected to rate 51 images of embassies on four scales with 1 meaning the one extreme (negative), 4 - neither- nor and 7 - the other extreme (positive) value of the four dimensions for the variables. Completing the survey will take you about 45 minutes. I hope you will take the time to complete this questionnaire and I appreciate greatly your participation.

If you have any questions or concerns about completing the questionnaire, about participating in this study, or if you would like to have a report showing the results emailed to you, you may contact me at [nguenova@utk.edu](mailto:nguenova@utk.edu). Return of the completed survey constitutes your consent to participate.

I would appreciate it very much if you could distribute this survey to others willing to participate.

Thank you for your participation and help.

Natasha Guenova, ABD  
Department of Political Science  
University of Tennessee, Knoxville

The survey is available at:

<http://survey.utk.edu/mrIWeb/mrIWeb.dll?I.Project=POLITICALVALUES>





1	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
Accessible								Fortress-like
Inexpensive								Opulent
Unconventional								Traditional
Generic								Novel



2	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
Accessible								Fortress-like
Inexpensive								Opulent
Unconventional								Traditional
Generic								Novel



3	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
Accessible								Fortress-like
Inexpensive								Opulent
Unconventional								Traditional
Generic								Novel



4	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
Accessible								Fortress-like
Inexpensive								Opulent
Unconventional								Traditional
Generic								Novel



5	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
Accessible								Fortress-like
Inexpensive								Opulent
Unconventional								Traditional
Generic								Novel



6	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
Accessible								Fortress-like
Inexpensive								Opulent
Unconventional								Traditional
Generic								Novel



7	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
Accessible								Fortress-like
Inexpensive								Opulent
Unconventional								Traditional
Generic								Novel



8	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
Accessible								Fortress-like
Inexpensive								Opulent
Unconventional								Traditional
Generic								Novel



9	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
Accessible								Fortress-like
Inexpensive								Opulent
Unconventional								Traditional
Generic								Novel



10	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
Accessible								Fortress-like
Inexpensive								Opulent
Unconventional								Traditional
Generic								Novel



11	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
Accessible								Fortress-like
Inexpensive								Opulent
Unconventional								Traditional
Generic								Novel



12	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
Accessible								Fortress-like
Inexpensive								Opulent
Unconventional								Traditional
Generic								Novel





13	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
Accessible								Fortress-like
Inexpensive								Opulent
Unconventional								Traditional
Generic								Novel



14	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
Accessible								Fortress-like
Inexpensive								Opulent
Unconventional								Traditional
Generic								Novel



15	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
Accessible								Fortress-like
Inexpensive								Opulent
Unconventional								Traditional
Generic								Novel



16	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
Accessible								Fortress-like
Inexpensive								Opulent
Unconventional								Traditional
Generic								Novel



17	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
Accessible								Fortress-like
Inexpensive								Opulent
Unconventional								Traditional
Generic								Novel



18	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
Accessible								Fortress-like
Inexpensive								Opulent
Unconventional								Traditional
Generic								Novel



19	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
Accessible								Fortress-like
Inexpensive								Opulent
Unconventional								Traditional
Generic								Novel



20	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
Accessible								Fortress-like
Inexpensive								Opulent
Unconventional								Traditional
Generic								Novel



21	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
Accessible								Fortress-like
Inexpensive								Opulent
Unconventional								Traditional
Generic								Novel



22	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
Accessible								Fortress-like
Inexpensive								Opulent
Unconventional								Traditional
Generic								Novel



23	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
Accessible								Fortress-like
Inexpensive								Opulent
Unconventional								Traditional
Generic								Novel



24	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
Accessible								Fortress-like
Inexpensive								Opulent
Unconventional								Traditional
Generic								Novel



25	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
Accessible								Fortress-like
Inexpensive								Opulent
Unconventional								Traditional
Generic								Novel



26	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
Accessible								Fortress-like
Inexpensive								Opulent
Unconventional								Traditional
Generic								Novel



27	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
Accessible								Fortress-like
Inexpensive								Opulent
Unconventional								Traditional
Generic								Novel



28	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
Accessible								Fortress-like
Inexpensive								Opulent
Unconventional								Traditional
Generic								Novel





29	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
Accessible								Fortress-like
Inexpensive								Opulent
Unconventional								Traditional
Generic								Novel



30	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
Accessible								Fortress-like
Inexpensive								Opulent
Unconventional								Traditional
Generic								Novel



31	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
Accessible								Fortress-like
Inexpensive								Opulent
Unconventional								Traditional
Generic								Novel



32	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
Accessible								Fortress-like
Inexpensive								Opulent
Unconventional								Traditional
Generic								Novel



33	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
Accessible								Fortress-like
Inexpensive								Opulent
Unconventional								Traditional
Generic								Novel



34	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
Accessible								Fortress-like
Inexpensive								Opulent
Unconventional								Traditional
Generic								Novel



35	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
Accessible								Fortress-like
Inexpensive								Opulent
Unconventional								Traditional
Generic								Novel



36	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
Accessible								Fortress-like
Inexpensive								Opulent
Unconventional								Traditional
Generic								Novel



37	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
Accessible								Fortress-like
Inexpensive								Opulent
Unconventional								Traditional
Generic								Novel



38	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
Accessible								Fortress-like
Inexpensive								Opulent
Unconventional								Traditional
Generic								Novel



39	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
Accessible								Fortress-like
Inexpensive								Opulent
Unconventional								Traditional
Generic								Novel



40	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
Accessible								Fortress-like
Inexpensive								Opulent
Unconventional								Traditional
Generic								Novel






41	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
Accessible								Fortress-like
Inexpensive								Opulent
Unconventional								Traditional
Generic								Novel



42	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
Accessible								Fortress-like
Inexpensive								Opulent
Unconventional								Traditional
Generic								Novel



43	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
Accessible								Fortress-like
Inexpensive								Opulent
Unconventional								Traditional
Generic								Novel



44	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
Accessible								Fortress-like
Inexpensive								Opulent
Unconventional								Traditional
Generic								Novel





45	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
Accessible								Fortress-like
Inexpensive								Opulent
Unconventional								Traditional
Generic								Novel



46	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
Accessible								Fortress-like
Inexpensive								Opulent
Unconventional								Traditional
Generic								Novel



47	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
Accessible								Fortress-like
Inexpensive								Opulent
Unconventional								Traditional
Generic								Novel



48	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
Accessible								Fortress-like
Inexpensive								Opulent
Unconventional								Traditional
Generic								Novel



49	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
Accessible								Fortress-like
Inexpensive								Opulent
Unconventional								Traditional
Generic								Novel



50	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
Accessible								Fortress-like
Inexpensive								Opulent
Unconventional								Traditional
Generic								Novel



51	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
Accessible								Fortress-like
Inexpensive								Opulent
Unconventional								Traditional
Generic								Novel

Generally speaking, according to you, what the role of government should be in regard to public affairs?

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
minimal								maximal

Please provide your age, education (years after high school), gender and nationality.

Age	Education in number of years after high school	gender	nationality

**Thank you!**

## **Vita**

Natasha Guenova was born in Bulgaria, Europe and she moved to the United States in 1999. At the University of Architecture, Civil Engineering and Geodesy in Sofia, Bulgaria, she studied Architecture and Urban Planning. In the United States, Natasha earned a Master's of Science in Planning degree at the University of Tennessee in Knoxville, TN, and a Doctor of Philosophy degree in Political Science.