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# Race, Identity and Democracy

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### UNIVERSITY HONORS PROGRAM

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## Race, Identity, and Democracy

**Patrick Bolt** 

July 22nd, 1997

"I don't want to be simply described as 'black.' I'm Cabliasian."

-Tiger Woods

### Introduction:

There has been much talk over the past couple of years about the "race problem" in the United States, but that is a relatively new term for a much older situation. It is a problem of "other," the psychological concept that represent the part of our identity that we create through the negation of other people and beliefs. When we feel that "other" is different enough, especially if we believe that the very existence of this "other" is a threat to our own identity, we may seek to reinforce our "self" through the destruction of the "other." Thus, groups of people work to destroy each other, and this is largely the history of humanity. What makes "race" different? Why is race such a hot issue for America? How do democracy and "other" mix in the issues of race and minority and majority interaction?

This project is a collection of three essays that attempt to explain these and other questions, and it represents almost two year's worth of research, discussion, and reflection for me. The first essay, "The Concept of Race as defined by the United States Census Bureau," examines the history of race in the U.S. and takes an in-depth look at its methods of enumeration and definitions of race and color. The second essay, "Democracy and 'Other," discusses the psychological mechanisms at work in representative democracies and specifically examines the psychological construct of "other" in political situations. The final essay, "Mauritius and the USA," is a quick comparison between the United States and the small island-nation of Mauritius, which specifically addresses the topics found in the two previous essays with regard to each country.

#### The Concept of Race as defined by the United States Census Bureau

Americans have long had a fascination with race. The concept and ideology of race receives much attention from politicians, the media, and academia alike, however, much of the population of the United States cannot even provide a most general definition of it. Even researchers and thinkers who have dedicated their lives to studying and grappling with the problems and concepts cannot agree on any single definition of it, and no one has yet been able to provide the world with a scientific definition that could divide the world's population into "races" with any respectable degree of scientific consensus. Yet race in American culture remains a psychologically and sociologically fundamental concept, often being one of the first categories we assign to people, whether meeting them for the first time in our neighborhood or conducting a survey of the population.

The US Government is an excellent source for historically examining the concept of race. It has had to deal with racial issues since its inception and is a fairly good model for the prevailing attitudes and beliefs towards the subject at any time. The US Census Bureau has been forced to deal with (or to ignore) the concept of race since the first Census (1790). This paper focuses on the Census Bureau and its historical role in defining and dealing with the concept of race. In an examination of racial typologies of different American historical periods, Marshall states, "both scientific and popular racial classifications reflect prevailing socio-political conditions."<sup>1</sup>

### History and Lack of Scientific Basis for Race

The word "race" (from the German, "Rasse") was first used to distinguish large groups of people by physical characteristics by Kant in 1775. The concept of race owes its scientific

beginnings to 18th Century zoologists who attempted to classify and categorize men as they had earlier the animal and plant kingdoms. Carol von Linneaus classified all men into four "varieties" in his book, Systematic Naturae (1735). The varieties were Black, Red, White, and Yellow. Linneaus used the color-coded designations to correlate the skin colors of major populations of men with the similarly-coded body humors, of which, at the time, medicine believed various combinations determined one's temperament.<sup>2</sup> The Linneaus system is most likely the basic foundation for the current taxonomy of race. Once it had its scientific beginnings, scientific racial debate proceeded in three stages.<sup>3</sup> First, in the 18th and 19th centuries, there was intense debate between monogenic (single origin) and polygenic (multiple origin) positions. The polygenic argument implied serious racial inequity thereby justifying the different attitudes towards whites and blacks. The major source of the monogenic stance was the Creation story of the Bible. If man came from the single source described in the Bible, and only had 6000 years to evolve the racial varieties, then one could only naturally assume that human variation occurred rather quickly and racial differences therefore did not represent any monumental changes. This argument stemmed from the debate over whether the non-European peoples were capable of being "civilized."

With the advent of Darwin and the assumption that adaptive changes occur over long periods of time, however, the debate shifted. The realization that racial differences might actually be the result of long periods of evolutionary change was enough for many people to move towards racial determinism. This, coupled with the even more dangerous pseudo-scientific ideas of "social Darwinism" and Spencer's social "survival of the fittest," seemed to be plenty for some to justify White supremacy. People were faced with the startling conclusion that racial egalitarianism might actually be going against the laws of nature and "natural selection."<sup>4</sup> Thus, the second phase of the debate focused specifically on the equality or inequality of the races. The

corresponding political environment was one that turned a noncommittal or even supporting eye towards Apartheid and the Jim Crow laws of the South that followed Reconstruction.

Only recently, in the third phase, was the concept of race reexamined and found wanting by many. Ironically, the concept found its biggest setbacks coming in the area that had once been its staunchest ally, genetics. As advancements were made in the field, it gradually became clear that large classifications of people, readily identifiable by many fixed hereditary traits, simply did not exist. Physical anthropologists took the genetic data and attempted to use it to clarify the number and different attributes of races. They discovered two important things from genetic comparisons between people of different races: 1) Homo sapiens as a species is rather homogeneous throughout most of its genetic code, and 2) the external features that are responsible for racial classifications are governed by a very small number of genes. The extremes of skin color, the major determinant of race, differ by only 3 or 4 genes. Luca Cavalli-Sforza, a pioneer in the field of genetic anthropology, states, "The genes responsible for these differences [between races] are those that have reacted to climate ... We must bear in mind that the genes that react to climate are those that influence external features ... the remainder of our genetic makeup hardly differs at all."5 In fact, the two human groups who actually differ the most, based on genetic difference, are Khoi-san Africans and Native Australians, groups that have developed similar external, or "racial" features, in adaptation to their climates over time.<sup>6</sup> Plus, the genetic data lays out on world maps in gradations, suggesting that human migrations have produced populations whose genetics change gradually over distance (see Appendix A) rather than populations differentiated by sharp lines representing racial groups.7

Ashley Montagu was one of the first to state that races did not exist at all, pointing out the almost absolute lack of biological coherence. He proposed that the term "ethnic group" be used instead.<sup>8</sup> "Ethnic group" carries most if not all the sociological emphasis that "race" held but downplays the importance of identifiable and intractable biological characteristics. This trend has

become more and more prevalent in usage for all groups except black Americans, for reasons we shall turn to later. Montagu's work historically corresponds with the Second World War and the beginning of the Civil Rights movement and end of Jim Crow, which ushers in the third period, in which the "colored problem" becomes euphemistically known as the "race problem." From Montagu forward, race has become increasingly unpopular among anthropologists as time has passed. In fact, a 1987 study found that 42% of biological anthropologists and 52% of cultural anthropologists denied the very existence of biological races altogether.<sup>9</sup>

#### Folk Taxonomy of Race

Unfortunately, the scientific debate of the very existence of identifiable biological races has gone largely unnoticed by the general American public. The reason for this seems to be the strong influence that the "folk taxonomy of race" possesses in the culture.<sup>10</sup> This is a holdover from colonial America's cultural and economic make-up and has been allowed to fester by the lack of scientific consensus at any historical point within the race debate. Early America consisted of three readily identifiable, culturally and economically distinct groups: European colonists, African slaves, and Native Americans. Naturally, the Linnean idea that man could be divided into several large groups with certain characteristics appealed to Americans, who had it laid out before their very eyes: Blacks, Whites, and Reds. For the "whites," race presented itself very neatly with the "Indian problem" and the "slave problem." But what is this "problem" and why is it a problem? The problems arose from the friction generated by displacing entire populations of people. As time progressed, the Indians were slowly eradicated, and the slave problem became the "colored problem." Millions of Africans had been torn away from homeland and culture and brought to the Americas as slaves. Then, slavery was abolished, and no one, including the new African citizens, was quite sure what should happen next, as W.E.B. Du Bois said, "What shall be done with the

Negroes?"<sup>11</sup> This is the race question that dominates in American culture. Many former slaves were willing to stay Americans, content to explore and define a new cultural identity for the African-Americans, others wanted to return to Africa and return to their forebears' ways. This uncertainty about the place and role of blacks in American society combined with other Americans' indifference and at times hostility towards all blacks. In it's most recent incarnation, this friction has become simply known as the "race problem." This final categorization of the friction is telling. It acts as its own indictment. It's not the problem *of race* but the problem *with race*. The artificial lines dividing large groups of people in our society breed nothing but equally artificial problems. The constant source of the problem is the deeply ingrained folk taxonomy of race. The antiquated belief in the races of man, combined with the more global problems of stereotyping behavior produces the misperceptions and prejudices that plague the US to this day.

The folk taxonomy of race has its roots in the colonial era. It was often referred to as the Age of Enlightenment or the Age of Man. Philosophic and technological breakthroughs were changing the nature of Europe. It was also the age of conquest and genocide. The war was made upon all the other peoples of the Earth, and the conquest yielded raw materials, torn away from others' lands, and unlimited human labor in the form of slaves. As Frantz Fanon stated in The Wretched of the Earth, "Europe was built upon the blood and gold of the rest of the world."<sup>12</sup> Specifically, in the Americas, gold, silver, and lumber were stripped from the land, millions of native Americans were either killed outright or fell victim to disease, and millions of Africans were brought over in chains to work in the sugar and cotton fields. How did the men and women of Europe and European America rationalize the rape and conquest of colonialism with the ideals of the Enlightenment? The folk taxonomy of race filled this gap in reasoning, allowed the non-European peoples of the world to be labeled "sub-human" and thus justly conquered and enslaved, or at least no cause of real concern. This has lingered within the American psyche long after the end of the colonial era.

The US Government has historically been involved with almost all aspects of the race debate, at times enthusiastically and at times very reluctantly. As the Government's sensory organ for the population, the US Census Bureau has always been responsible for categorizing and organizing the population. This categorization of the people has reflected the current prevailing views of race and ethnicity. Thus, the Census Bureau is an excellent tool for historically examining the evolution of race in America. This part of the paper examine the US Government's Census policies and practices.

The first US Census was conducted in 1790 with following ones conducted every ten years. The 1790 Census listed the head of each family in each state by name, the number of males and females aged under and over 16 (whites only, but it doesn't say this) living in the household, the number of "free coloureds", and the number of slaves.<sup>13</sup> The simplicity of the information gathered on African-Americans is telling. The young government wanted a tally of its citizenry (which didn't include slaves) and was small enough to do it by state and name. Most everyone else in the country at this point was of primarily Anglo-Saxon origin, which represented the "default" group. The Census told only how many people of African origin there were in America and how many were free versus slaves in each state. This reflects the Government's lack of concern with the topic of race and slavery that is mirrored almost throughout the slavery era, during which the Government's limited concerns deal with the "slave problem." Since most of the blacks in America were slaves, they were under control. There was only a need to check how many slaves per state there were totally and per household for economic reasons. At this point the government had not yet begun to worry about the race problem.

Things remained fairly static for the Census Bureau up through the Civil War, when in 1870, it had to treat all blacks as free coloreds and added counts for Chinese, Japanese, and Native Americans. The Chinese and Japanese were immigrant workers in the West that had come with the gold rushes. They weren't considered to be "white," but they didn't seem to be "black" either. To fit into America's neat mythical racial picture, it seemed that they should all be ushered into some umbrella-like "yellow" race, but since it didn't work out as neatly, and there was no precedent, they were listed by national origin (since, unlike most blacks, the point of origin was known), betraying the first cracks in America's race mythos. The many Native Americans on US territory resisting being moved to reservations at this point were still considered hostile and therefore better counted when dead if at all. The Census doesn't even include them as part of the regular Census until 1890 when they were finally brought under U.S. government control on reservations.<sup>14</sup>

In the 20th Century, the waves of immigrants from all over the world began to make the Census Bureau's job much harder. The Census Bureau was completely unable to apply the race category to this sampling of the world and for a simple reason: the American and European racial "taxonomies" do not represent a global theory of race. They are simply local, antiquated social, economic, and political support systems that enforced colonial rule (which is one reason all the major former colonies in the Americas each have their own version of a racial caste system though what it means to be "black" in Brazil is different than in Cuba and they both are different from the racial definitions in the United States). The Census Bureau's "General Report" on the 1930 Census provides a good example of the problem:

"The classification of the population of the United States by color or race distinguishes in many cases only three main groups, namely, white, Negro, and "Other races." The "Other race" group includes Mexican, Indian, Chinese, Japanese, Filipino, Hindu, Korean, Hawaiian, Malay, Siamese, and Samoan."<sup>15</sup>

This excerpt clearly shows the American folk taxonomy of race, and its inadequacies in dealing with groups other than "black" and "white." There is only a weak attempt to preserve the

racial system by inanely creating the group "Other races," which includes such random groups as Native Americans and nationalities as diverse as Mexican and Siamese, even a religious group, Hindus (see Appendix C). Again, the Census is mainly interested in who's black and white, the classic American racial make-up, and the foundation for the whole American theory of race. Everyone else, indeed, the entire rest of the world, is just "Other races."

The "Race or Color" category on the Census has always been what's known as a "100% category," meaning that every member of the population must put down an answer for that question. The 100% answering mark can only be demanded of categories that apply to every single person in the country such as sex, marital status, and age. To ensure that the 100% mark for race was reached, the enumerators were to ascertain the race or color of each person by observation.<sup>16</sup> Of course, this also ensured that a certain standard of racial classification was maintained.

The government gave its Census-takers guidelines for determining the answer to the race question. Up until 1970, if the enumerator came to the home, he determined the race by observation alone, proving that race is entirely determined by external appearance. If he was unsure of the race, he could ask the person, but only to provide a clue as to which race should be answered. If the Census form was filled out by the individual themselves, and the race question was left blank, then the race of other members of the household was used, or, if the entry was blank for the entire household, then the race of the head of the *preceding* household was used. The two assumptions at work in this policy were that everyone in any given household, and their neighbors, would all be members of the same race, and, with segregation firmly in place and miscegenation frowned upon, the assumptions, however revealing, were not statistically damaging.

The 1960 Census brought massive changes to the "race question." Not coincidentally, the beginning of the Civil Rights Movement and the end of Jim Crow (the dawn of the "race problem"

era and the end of the "colored problem" era) corresponded with the first race disclaimer by the Census Bureau.

"The concept of race, as used by the Bureau of the Census, is derived from that which is commonly accepted by the general public. It does not reflect clear-cut definitions of biological stock, and several of the categories used obviously refer to national origin."

Even with the glaring contradiction (even in 1997, it is commonly accepted by most of the general public that race *does* reflect clear-cut definitions of biological stock, and the Census Bureau almost admits that itself, the general public, and the concept of race are wrong), the disclaimer is a bold step (if a small one) away from the racial caste system. This statement also shows the two-way nature of the Census's and government's treatment of the concept of race and the classification of its population in general. The government admits that its concept of race is "derived from what is commonly accepted by the general public," but also, the government puts forth to the general public, a relatively new concept, that race doesn't reflect any clear biological stock. The degree to which the government can dictate beliefs and classifications to the people is an extremely important issue currently with the latest changes in the Census definitions of race.

The 1960 Census (see Appendix D) also heralds a reshuffling of the "main groups" divined by the race question, potentially signifying a shift in the "other-self" organization of the default ("white") population (see also "Democracy and 'Other""). Instead of "white," "Negro," and "Other races," representing the "main groups" in the racial classification of the American citizenry, the 1960 Census report claims that the population now breaks down into "white" and "nonwhite" super-groups.

"The term "color" refers to the division of the population into two groups, white and nonwhite. The group designated as nonwhite consists of Negroes, Indians, Japanese, Chinese, Filipinos, Aleuts, Eskimos, Hawaiians, part-Hawaiians, Asian Indians, Koreans, Malayans, and other racial or ethnic groups of non-European or non-Near Eastern origin."<sup>17</sup>

Does this reconfiguration represent a change in the white American perception of "other"? No, in social and cultural terms, all of those "nonwhite" groups are distinct from default American society, and, in racial terms, nonwhite is defined as the "Negro" race, and myriad nationalities and ethnicities. In other words, socially, the groups are "white" and "other" (nonwhite). Racially, the groups are still, "white," "black," and "other," where "other" is made of nationalities and ethnicities. It makes very little sense that the race question on the Census divides the American population into all people of light-skinned European origin, all people of dark-skinned African origin, and individual Asian nationalities. The explanation is that "race" has two meanings in the United States. The original meaning was the pseudo-scientific taxonomy system, mentioned earlier in this essay, which served to differentiate between the European settlers and their African slaves. The later function of race is separate who is "white," or default, and who is "other," but the fact that the race categorization can so easily switch to include nationalities and ethnic groups in addition to racial groups suggests that its only real function ever was to separate the default population from the "other." This is why the "race" categories of this, and later Censuses, not only include race in the original form (e.g. "black"), but also nationalities (e.g. "Korean") and ethnic groups (e.g. "Hawaiian").

The 1960 Census included at least some self-enumeration on the race question, although Census-takers still worked on a general policy of observation. Self-enumeration works well because people tend to label themselves as they would be labeled. However, this is not always the case, and the fact that the Census included an "Other (please specify)" category, opened the door for future resistance to the racial encoding of the question (although the "Other (please specify)" entries were later interpreted and filed into existing racial categories by Census-workers).

The next significant change occurs in the very next (1970) Census: the government fully adopts its "self-enumeration" or "hand's-off" policy of racial classification. With the success of the Civil Rights Movement and meteoric rise of minority group nationalism during the 1960's, the race issue became so politically-charged (and therefore dangerous) that the "hand's-off" policy is not surprising. It is also another admission or acknowledgment that the race system is inherently flawed and that the government should distance itself from it. The 1970 Census also drops the contradiction from its race disclaimer, simply stating that race "does not denote any scientific definition of biological stock."<sup>17</sup>

Although self-enumeration is a large step away from government enforcement of racial encoding, it still serves the original purpose of the Census race question (to count "other") because the racial system and the folk taxonomy of race have such a strong hold on the American people that they will police themselves. Because group identity is part of self-identity, people will defend it vigorously, even to the point of continuing a system that is harmful to them, and in America, there are few group identities stronger than the racial identities. This fact isn't surprising, considering the amount of abuse some groups have taken and continue to take, as a group.

The 1980 Census was not substantially different from the 1970 Census. The self-identification policy was maintained, as was the "white," "black," "nonwhite" (and "nonblack") nationalities/ethnicities categorization. One change was that people who put "Hispanic" or "Latino" or a Hispanic nationality in the "Other (please specify)" slot were left there as "nonwhite" whereas previously, in 1960 and 1970, they had been included in "white." This reflects both the rise of Hispanic nationalism in the 1970's and the corresponding "otherizing" of Hispanics with the large increases in immigration from Puerto Rico, Cuba, and Mexico.<sup>19</sup>

Another major change, although not numerically, was that Asian Indians were assigned their own race question category. Up to that point, Asian Indians had been included in the "white" category on the Census, although briefly, in the 1930-1940 versions, many Asian Indians would have qualified for the "Hindu" category.<sup>20</sup> The reason for the addition was likely an increase in the Asian Indian population of America made them a large enough group to gain "other" status, and thus, by being non-default, no longer "white" (the move also roughly cut the total global population of the "white race" in half, with about one billion Asian Indians abruptly becoming "other"). The 1980 Census also increases the number of Asian and Pacific Islander groups reporting from 5 in 1970 to 12 (see Appendix E), including an umbrella "Other Asian and Pacific Islander" group.<sup>21</sup>

The 1990 Census takes the division of the Asian and Pacific Islander groups to the extreme, however, by jumping from 12 to 51, including such groups as "Bhutanese" and "Northern Mariana Islander," all under the "race" item (see Appendix F). The Census adds again to its disclaimer, which has accompanied every Census since 1960, "furthermore, it is recognized that the categories of the race item include both racial and national origin or socio-cultural groups." Once again, it is apparent that the race item and the function of "race" in general is to report "default" and "other" rather than the person's "racial" group.<sup>22</sup>

The reason for the dramatic increase in reported groups in the race item is linked directly to the self-identification policy of the Census Bureau, not to any corresponding increase in immigration and "otherizing" of these myriad groups. In the political and social climate of the past few decades, many groups have felt it in their best interest to assert themselves as "minority groups," in effect, declaring themselves as "other." This is a reversal of the previous trend among newly immigrated groups, many of which tried to assimilate as quickly as possible into the "default" American group. The most notable of these groups is the Hispanics with the Chicano movement of the 1960's and 1970's, but the trend can been seen above in the increase of groups reporting.

With the 1990 Census, the United States Census Bureau marks 30 years of denying "the concept of race ... clear-cut definitions of biological stock." If the concept of race, which is based entirely on external appearances (clearly a function of biology), doesn't reflect clear-cut definitions of biological stock, then is that not contradictory, invalidating the category as a whole?

And, if the definitions are simply not clear-cut, then how can the category possess any statistical veracity? The answer to the first question is has been provided many times by sociologists and cultural anthropologists: race may not be a scientifically or genetically coherent category, but it still holds major significance as a social or cultural category, and therefore should be researched and used in population studies. This, of course, is an entirely reasonable and sensible argument, but it should be pointed out that *the only reason "race" holds any social or cultural significance as a category is that most of the population still believes in the myth of race as a clear-cut biological category*. If most people recognized race as an artificial classification, it wouldn't have such social, political, and cultural clout.

The second question and its implications have received national attention recently with the Census Bureau's announcement of a new "multiracial" or "multiethnic" category to be included in the next (2000) Census. The announcement and the ensuing discussion have raised questions about the "lines" in between races. What about people of mixed-race? Are the children of one white parent and one black parent, black or white? Tiger Woods, the young golf professional making waves in the sport, when asked about his feelings on being the first black man to win the Masters, replied that he didn't like being simply described as "black" because of his European, South-East Asian, African, and Native American heritage. Tiger Woods could been seen as a role-model for multiracial people, but others criticize that since the media, the people, and indeed, the whole world, see him as "black," then that is the group with which he should identify.

The argument around the new "multiracial" category for the race item is very political, although it does represent a general feeling of dissatisfaction with the traditional racial encoding among the people. Many liberals and traditional minority-rights groups are opposed to the new category, fearing that it will weaken their continuing struggle for rights and lead to undercounts in Civil Rights Compliance verifications. The "multiracial" category, however controversial, further reveals the lack of substance in the traditional taxonomy of race. Any question that has as a valid answer "all (or none) of the above" explains nothing and everything at the same time. The question will actually give no valuable information statistically, yet it divulges that the question itself is flawed somehow. The Government of the United States of America does still need to follow certain groups to prevent discriminatory practices from infringing upon their Civil Rights, but it also needs to educate its citizenry (of all "racial groups") and banish the folk taxonomy of race from its heartland.

### DEMOCRACY AND "OTHER"

Representative democracy has long been viewed as the pinnacle of national development, considered to be far superior to other more autocratic and totalitarian forms of government. Ideally, of course, this is true. There is no better way to guarantee the rights of the people and protect them from oppression than by giving them final say over who controls the government. Since the global spread of democracy began in earnest, however, many fledgling democratic governments have collapsed into totalitarianism or autocratic military rule. Why has this "higher" form of government not succeeded in so many of the countries where it has been instituted? The answer lies in the type and makeup of each country's voting population.

Democracy depends on the will of the majority representing what is the country's best interests. The majority's interests, however, may not be the same as the remainder of the population's, and, in fact, can be extremely contrary to minority groups' interests. Although this has been a problem from time to time in the world's leading democracies, they manage to avoid major problems because they consist, almost without exception, of large, fairly homogenous populations that possess strong national identities (which almost always means that whatever minority groups that might once have existed, have been destroyed, controlled, or silenced in some way in the past). The interests of the majority in these cases, often closely approximate the needs the majority of the nation. Great Britain, France, Germany, Canada, Italy, Japan, and the United States are the world's most successful democracies, and they also have some of the strongest national identities and make up the G7, the most powerful global economies. They are also, not coincidentally, some of the most imperialistic nations for which that near mythically strong national identity is a pre-requisite. At least all of them have powerful majority groups that *believe* in a strong national identity, even if most or all of the identity is folklore or legend.

Many countries, especially developing countries that are still overcoming the effects of colonialism, have neither a homogenous population nor a strong national identity. In fact, many developing nations are patchworks of several, even dozens of different ethnic groups that don't

see themselves as having common interests, and that were themselves independent entities prior to colonization. Needless to say, not many of these countries have any national identity at all, let alone strong ones. Many times, this situation is a result of poor or misguided planning on the part of the departing colonial governments which were often corrupt and favored one ethnic group over all the others. In the case of Africa and the Middle East, many nations were created that had never existed in any form before (but where people had lived for tens of thousands of years), drawn up in meeting rooms in Europe over tea between the "mother" countries and their native sympathizers (usually members of one elite group). These countries, with almost arbitrary borders that cut large ethnic groups into halves and even thirds, almost inevitably have major problems with either democracy or human rights, and the left-out ethnic and religious groups are often brutally oppressed by the majority. The Kurds, Palestinians, Oromo, Tutsis, and Hutus, are all examples of left-out or displaced ethnic groups that have suffered at the hands of their governments or each other.

The instances where democracy has failed give us fascinating insight into the dynamics and mechanisms at work in democracy. Inevitably, democracies produce different factions within the population. That is a good thing. Democracies can thrive on differences: political parties working against and with each other can produce a safer and stronger nation than one with only one ruling party. Furthermore, groups in opposition can prevent extremism and force compromise. But, if the differences are too great, if the people feel that they have no common ground with members of the other groups, the system can breakdown, with groups resorting to violence to protect their interests. What are the factors that decide whether differences are too great? When do the differences between opposing groups supersede the commonality of nationalism and lead to a systemic failure? These are the questions that this essay will attempt to address by investigating the psychological mechanism of the "other."

One of the ways that individuals construct their self-identity is to form an idea of who they are *not*. They identify themselves by negation of other groups. These groups begin to form the psychological construct of "other" which plays a very important part in human behavior both

group and individual. The psychological construction of the "other" occurs primarily during the pre-pubescent and adolescent years and is built through the individual's interaction with groups with which they *do* identify. For example, pre-pubescent males begin to formulate a gender-based self-identity by identifying females as "other," which is one reason many young boys would be mortified to be caught playing with Barbie dolls or other such "girl" toys. Early adolescent males narrow their self-identity and form an additional sexual identity "other" when they identify homosexuals as "other," which is why one of the gravest schoolyard insults to many boys is of the "sissy" or "homo" variety. "Other-ness" is dependent on stereotypes. The young men who engage in such schoolyard behavior have almost certainly never had any experience with homosexuals that they can recount as negative, justifying their animosity. But they probably are all familiar with the "sissy" and "gay" stereotypes, which symbolizes this "other." Unfortunately this is also the stage in life when many children in the US are faced with racial issues, too often forming strong "others" for different racial groups, which suffer greatly from stereotypes.<sup>1</sup>

"Other" can be built on, added to, and changed throughout life however. As people grow to adulthood, learn a trade, get employed, and go through the trials of life, they change who they identify with, and conversely, who is "other" to them. For many people, political affiliation and philosophy is a large part of self-identity. The stronger a sense of self-identification with a party or philosophy is, usually the stronger a sense of who (or sometimes what) is "other." This is why this psychological construct is such an important part of the dynamics of democracy. Subscribers of one political affiliation often feel a degree of kinship to those who hold close to the same beliefs and often feel equally negative feelings towards those who hold the "other" beliefs. "Other" mental status is not an on/off switch, it is a gradation, group by group, which is why democracies can function in such a myriad of ways around different issues. Some people don't identify strongly at all with many issues and thus, those who hold different beliefs are not so foreign. Other times, people are, or become, strongly attached to issues and include the issues as part of their self-identity, what makes them who they are. This is when democracy is put to the test because when people feel that their beliefs of this magnitude are threatened, they can respond with violence to protect themselves and their identities. This has been the downfall of many prospective democratic nations. It is also why a strong national identity is important for the success of democracy. If most citizens of a country include a strong national identity as part of their self-identity, especially if democracy and democratic issues are part of that identity, then they are far less likely to sacrifice the nation or its democratic ideals in the name of any one issue or group. For example, a Republican is unlikely to sacrifice the American national identity, along with its democratic ideals, in the struggle against the Democrats. And many times, in many democratic countries, this is the case: most would not risk or threaten the stability of the nation in the name of any one issue.

However, people in the US are by no means free of the problems of "other" and democracy. The long history of race and racism in the Americas permeates every democratic issue of the nation. The very fact that Hispanic-, African-, Native, and Asian-Americans are considered to be *voting blocks* is evidence enough that group identity and politics are closely combined. But who is exactly "other" in America, the land of the immigrant assimilation and the "melting pot"?

Of course the "others" depend on whom one has picked as the "self." The median American, at least for a little while longer, is a person of mostly European ancestry. This person, on average, identifies themselves with two main groups: their gender, and the "default" American. "Default" here simply means non-black, non-Hispanic, non-Asian, non-gay, non-handicapped, Christian, who presumably is a hard-working, over-taxed member of the middle-class, in other words, members of the American general population, both male and female, who have never identified themselves with any of the American "other" populations and who ascribe to the American dream and myth of the "middle class." Although the number of people who actually fit that description is nowhere near a majority, the number of people who identify with that group or believe that most other people do is a majority, especially of the voting population. Many of the people who would include themselves in that group are much poorer than the "middle class," some are far richer (as shown so exquisitely recently when a politician, whose family's earnings rose above \$175,000 a year, proudly declared himself a member of the "upper middle class"), and even more are not as hard-working as the mythical American.

The problems of self-identity are not monopolized by white middle America. Many groups have struggled with their group-identities over the years. African-Americans, Hispanic-Americans, Asian-Americans, and homosexuals, just to name a few, have fought long and hard to forge solid group identities, distinct from the American default of heterosexual "white." It has not been easy, as there is often much disagreement in which direction the identity should be growing.

A solid group identity is an absolute necessity in our democracy as we have seen, however. Without a strong, clear, united voice, backed up by votes, a group's needs have a good chance of being ignored by their government. If African-Americans had not formed a strong group identity and struggled to make their voice heard, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 might not yet have been passed. Unfortunately, since many of the economic and social problems are racially encoded (African-Americans, on average, make less money, go to poorer schools, have more health problems, die younger, and get stiffer prison sentences for comparable crimes than whites), the solutions and groups to lobby the democratic system for them are often racially encoded as well. For example, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, is directly responsible for many advances in racial problems and indirectly responsible for many, many more, but their very existence also propagates the artificial "other" category that race represents in America.

This has begun to cause problems of self-identity for many Americans who might be thought of as one ethnic or racial group but who are racially mixed. Many Americans feel that the traditional system of racial encoding does not adequately describe them at all. Most of these people are children of racially mixed marriages who reject the traditional race categories, and who are stirring the first callings for both a reexamination of racial categories and a new "multiracial" category (described in "The Concept of Race and the U.S. Census Bureau"). While this is a noble rejection of the artificial categories of race that do nothing but divide, it causes serious problems for the groups that are trying to protect these same individuals from racial oppression and discrimination (which do still present significant problems in our time) that will affect them, no matter their actual racial make-up. Democracy only protects groups that protect themselves, and groups that are unclear of their self-identity are unable to do that as well as strong groups. The more individuals there are that legally declare themselves "multi-racial," that is, that they are no longer "black," "Hispanic," or "Asian," the less of a voice each of those corresponding minority and minority-advocacy groups have, which could lessen their ability to oppose discriminatory practices affecting their group. The problems of self-identity are clear, however: we are as confused about ourselves as we are about who "others" are.

The inadequacies of stereotypes in describing reality becomes painfully apparent when their reliance on emotion and lack of logic are exposed to the world. Unfortunately, they are often the only tool at hand for defending one's conception of "other." As we have seen, the primary requirement for "other" status in the mind is a person who fills the category "not-me," a person that one does not identify as being similar to oneself. This distinction can be as narrow as which neighborhood one lives in or which high school one attended ("*I/we* went to Duckberg High, *they* went to Goosetown"), or as broad as what "race" one is or one's religion or nationality ("*I/we* am/are black, *they* are white," "*I/we* am/are Hindu, *they* are Muslim."). The distinction can also vary in strength for place to place, person to person, and group to group. Catholics and Protestants live completely peacefully side-by-side in the US; they don't represent strong "other" groups for one another in America. In Northern Ireland, however, Catholics and Protestants view themselves and each other as near the highest degree of "other" and are often willing to resort to violence to "protect" their identities. Thus, "otherness" can vary in both scope and magnitude, depending on circumstance.

A person or group's reaction to "others" is dependent on the degree to which they feel their self-identity is threatened by the "other." The perception of threat from an "other" is (almost) always dependent on the stereotype that defines the mental category. When a white person is complaining about "those damn blacks" (for the purpose of the example any "other"

group can work here, such as Muslims, homosexuals, Catholics, Jews, Asians, or Hispanics, and one can also substitute a member of any group into the complaining role), they usually are not speaking of a specific person, rather they are speaking of the stereotype that forms their conception of "other," or, worse yet, they are speaking of a specific person, letting that single person or group represent the whole "other" (thus, in effect, forming a new or different stereotype or strengthening an existing one). In that complaining, they are reaffirming their self-identity, by separating themselves from perceived negative behavior in an exercise of what is known as the social-gain theory.<sup>2</sup> This theory states that one of the causes of this behavior (specifically to the theory: racism, but it applies to all "other-self" dichotomies) is the social, and thus, psychological and potentially economic, gain that comes from exploiting existing stereotypes of other groups to the favor of one's own group. An excellent example of the social-gain theory at work in America is provided by David Kunstler's The Wages of Whiteness in which he closely examines the integration of the Irish into white America in the Nineteenth Century through negation by their efforts to draw distinctions between themselves and blacks, who were their main competition for both low-income labor positions and the bottom of the social ladder at that point in history.<sup>3</sup> Their efforts were successful, and they changed their social standing at least in part by enforcing and reinforcing the "other-ness" of African-Americans.

Up to this point, we have only examined one side of the mechanisms of democracy. The people, groups, and their interactions are only half the issue of democracy and "other." Not only do the complexities of democracy and "other" cause problems on their own in the population, these problems can be aggravated and even multiplied exponentially by politicians and others who exploit the differences between groups to expand their own political fortunes and agendas. Not surprisingly, this concept is known as the *political-gain theory*.<sup>3</sup> Once again, this theory was meant to describe racism, which it does exceptionally well; it also describes the way in which any two or more groups can be maneuvered into politically-or-otherwise favorable opposition through manipulation of the "other" categories of groups. In the United States, one of the world's oldest "modern" democracies, it is one of the oldest and time-tested methods for increasing one's

political worth or manipulating large groups in general. A recent quote in a Knoxville News-Sentinel editorial sums up American politics quite well, "Ethnic politics are as American as Chinese takeout."<sup>5</sup>

"Other" and "self" are crucial concepts in understanding an individual's identity. "Self" represents the concepts, images, issues, stereotypes, and beliefs that make up a person. That which defines "self" is often inseparable from that which is *not* "other," the concepts, images, issues, stereotypes, and beliefs that a person believes do *not* represent who they are. Thus, we often define our identity by ruling out what we are not. Since individuals make up groups, and since these individuals chose to join groups of people who they feel closely resemble themselves, and since group selection is entirely dependent on the individual's "other-self" dichotomy, group behavior is tied closely to who the group sees as "other."

In representative democracies, where "majority rules," who the main political groups see as "other" and the degree to which they feel "other" is different from themselves can vastly affect the political climate. Nations that have strong national identities tend to be more stable, as different political groups tend to view themselves as having the common national interest. Since the voting majority is the common national interest, majority rules without too much conflict. Nations that do not have strong national identities are more prone to violence and dissolution because the political groups see their own issues as taking precedence over those of the nation. Thus, a key to the success of representative democracies is the presence or formation of a national identity among the population.

### "Mauritius and The USA"

Mauritius is a small island-nation in the south-western part of the Indian Ocean. Uninhabited until Europeans colonized it in the 17th Century, it has become one of the most culturally and ethnically diverse nations in the world. The French were the first to permanently colonize Mauritius, and they brought in slaves from Africa to work the vast sugar plantations which sprung up around the island.

The British took the island as booty after the defeat of Napoleon as it was of great strategic importance to the sea route from Europe to India before the Suez Canal was built, but they did little to influence the French and emerging Creole cultures of the island. They did, however, outlaw slavery, instead choosing to bring in cheap, indentured labor from India to work the sugar fields. Soon, those of Indian descent, both Hindu and Muslim, outnumbered the African and ever-dwindling French populations. While part of the British Empire, Mauritius attracted people from other parts of the world, notably Chinese, who came as entrepreneurs. All these people converged on this previously uninhabited tropical island to form what has been rightly called, "a microcosm of the world."

Like Mauritius, the United States of America is made up of peoples from many different parts of the world. Unlike Mauritius, where each culture keeps much of its language, customs and religion in a cultural plurality, the US has assimilated its immigrants into the single mainstream culture. This essay will attempt to address the major similarities and differences between the two nations by focusing on how each nations' government separates and classifies its own population, and how each nations' political environment is affected its ethnic and racial make-up.

The US Government's instrument for counting and sorting it's population is the US Census Bureau. Throughout its history, the US Census Bureau has differentiated between the original European colonists and the slaves they brought from Africa. The designations have changed over the years, with "slave" being replaced by "colored," "Negro," "black," and more recently, "African-American." In the original census, there was no special designation for what today we call "white," it was, and remains, simply the "default" American identity (what Americans think of when they think of the average American). As time passed, "white" came to mean more than Anglo-Saxon as the default population of America grew rapidly with the newer immigrants from Europe. The remained a single dichotomy of race: blacks and whites (which can be seen as the dichotomy between "other" and "self" or "default" on the individual level). The problem of the two populations has plagued every administration from Washington to Clinton (see "The Concept of Race as defined by the US Census Bureau").

In the days of American Apartheid, the race was used politically (via political-gain mechanisms: see "Democracy and 'Other"") directly to mobilize the white vote by exploiting its ignorance and fear. More recently, it has been used much more subtly, perhaps even subconsciously, by the Bush election campaign. The Willie Horton political advertisement worked because it played upon white America's stereotype of the black male: an hyperviolent, oversexual being who will rape and kill white women if not kept locked up. The fact that the Bush campaign used the actual video footage suggests that there was a direct attempt to draw attention to the fact that Willie Horton was black. By the same token, sometimes even more directly, African-American politicians have played the race card to solidify their backing by blacks in their constituencies. Marion Barry, who was convicted of using crack cocaine during his previous term as mayor of Washington D.C., was reelected by the predominately black population of Washington by playing African-American solidarity against his white opponent. The mechanism for politicians is the same and the result is the same: divide the population in your favor, solidify that support, and win.

Mauritian politics are notorious for ruthless use of what is known there as the "community card." In this small country of 1.2 Million people, the Hindus, descended from indentured laborers brought by the British from India in the 19th Century, hold a small majority in the voting population. Small enough, that if almost all the Hindus don't vote the same way, the Hindu candidate for Prime Minister might not win. But they always have, since independence from Great Britain in 1968.

Several times, there have been serious challenges brought by members of what is known as the "General Population," which is made up of the Creoles (mostly of African descent) and the remainder of the original French white population (race doesn't seem to play a big role in Mauritius politics - it is as appalling to a Mauritian that the US Census asks us to which race we belong, as it is to an American that the Mauritian Census asks them to which religion they ascribe) both largely of Christian (Roman Catholic) faith, but each time the Hindu candidate has made direct appeals to the majority Hindu population for unity against the "other." The Hindu candidates have even openly declared that Hindus "betray" their people and themselves by not voting with their religion.

In addition to the mostly Catholic General Population of Creoles and French, there is a sizable Muslim block, which also votes primarily as a unit, and the remaining Chinese who have not intermarried or changed religion thus becoming part of another block. The Mauritian Census asks directly to which religion and language group each citizen belongs (see Appendix G), and, although the Office of Statistics in Mauritius denies that the Census asks "to which community a citizen belongs," the Census *does* ask religion and language, from which the specific communities can easily be figured.<sup>1</sup> So the Mauritian political scene is one rife with problems caused directly by political-gain manipulation of ethnic and religious groups.

In this factor the two nations are strikingly similar. Each country has a majority population of one group and several strong minority populations. In elections, many times, when

there are two opposing candidates from different communities, the candidate whose community holds the advantage of voters will call upon community solidarity to ensure victory, or when the race is especially close, in addition to identifying themselves with a community, they will identify themselves *in opposition* to another community. In Mauritius, this tactic has been used to rally Hindus against challenges from both the Creoles and the Muslims. In America, it has been used to mobilize whites into voting against blacks (read: anti-crime, anti-welfare, anti-affirmative action - what are the white voters' stereotypes for each of these?).

These uses of the race or community "card" are examples of the political-gain theory of racism in which political contenders or aides manipulate different groups into opposition for their own political or professional benefit.<sup>2</sup> Political-gain seems to be the source for much of the racial/religious/communal strife in Mauritius and the US. A politician who is in an unfavorable position can increase his or her stock in two ways: first, by calling on his or her own group for support, either by rallying around their own nationalism as a group or by uniting against a common enemy (usually a scapegoated group), or, second, by splintering the opponents' groups by setting them internally at odds with each other.

Both the United States and Mauritius are representative democracies that have a clear majority group with a strong group identity. Both countries also had that same majority group in power when their respective constitutions were written. However, unlike the U.S. whose minority groups had no rights at all at the time of its Constitutional Convention because of slavery and the war on the Native Americans, Mauritius has provisions in its constitution for dealing with community problems. There are constitutional guarantees for minority groups that they will have a certain number of seats in the Mauritian Parliament.<sup>3</sup> While this provision sounds fair and egalitarian for the minority groups, it actually is a constitutional provision to keep the majority group in power. The minority groups of Mauritius must always show solidarity or else they will not have access to these extra seats of Parliament, as they are based on voter support for certain groups. As long as the minority groups are solid, the majority will remain solid as well in opposition, and thus its control of the government remains solid as well. This system gives Muslims, Christians, and Chinese a voice in the government, but as long as the system remains in place, the Hindus will remain in control. As long as the Hindus remain in political control, the government will continue to favor their group on all issues of concern.

An analogous situation of this paradox can be drawn in the United States. The American minority groups' require strong identities to protect their rights from the majority, and this same solidarity can also limit what can be achieved by maintaining the same power hierarchy that caused many of the problems in the first place. For example, the problems of race in America are well-known. African-Americans had to form a solid political identity and presence to win the battles of the Civil Rights Movement, and there are still battles to be fought. However, the very same solidarity along racial lines perpetuates the racial caste system which was responsible for the original problems of race.

This is an uncomfortable paradox for proponents of representative democracy. "Majority rules" means minorities lose, and if the majority-minority system breaks down along *caste* lines (i.e. people are born into the majority or minority and cannot change easily if at all), then majority *always* rules, and minorities *always* lose.

Unfortunately for Mauritius, whose politics revolve around religion, people rarely change from one major world religion to another, and thus, they have a semi-caste system which probably ensure Hindu domination of the government for some time now. Even more unfortunately for the United States, whose politics all too often break down by the folk taxonomy of race (see "The Concept of Race as Defined by the U.S. Census Bureau"), which is a full-blown caste system (you can't change your skin color ... yet). There is a major difference, however. The U.S. racial caste system is an artificial construction. There have been, are, and always will be religion and religious differences, but racial differences are far more recent and much more shallow than religion. There are already cracks showing in the American race wall, and while there are many, of all racial groups, trying to patch those cracks, there are many others who are doing their best to bring down that wall once and for all.

### Conclusion:


Sometimes I despair at the state of my community, my nation, my world. Other times, I am filled with optimism and hope that there truly is a better way and we are moving towards it. I first encountered the issue of race at around age nine, when I asked to have a friend of mine over for swimming at the pool at our local country club. My mother told me that I couldn't do that because the country club was "white-only," and my friend was black. It seemed like the craziest and stupidest thing I had ever heard, still does in fact, but as I thought about it, I realized I had never seen a black person at the country club that didn't work there.

The more I thought about it, the wicked world of race opened before my mind's eye. The jokes and slurs I'd overheard, the way my black friends treated me differently than they did each other, and one of my white friends who had told me that I should not be friends with the black kids. Something that had never concerned me, never bothered me, never before presented any kind of problem in any social setting, suddenly invaded every aspect of my life uninvited. Then I was off to an almost all-white private school on the other end of town, cutting me off from black friends and peers and throwing me into the world of blacks as "other."

A young child is never prepared for the world of race. They accept so much of their world-view from their parents that usually by the time they are ready to think for themselves, "other" is firmly in place. Of course, that psychological mechanism is in operation the world over, and, the whole world over, kids grow up hating and not understanding. They, who were once the children, become the next generation of the struggle against the "other."

I think the future rests on each generation of children being educated that no one is completely "other." If we can get away from racism and the politics of race, hate, and fear that cause strife between groups that are very similar in core belief systems, we can have every reason to celebrate our common interests.

I would like to thank the people on my committee for their patience and help in things ranging far beyond this paper alone. Thanks to Dr. Hopson who opened my eyes and removed the blinders placed there by too much TV, showing me the racism that still exists everyday in America 35 years after "the struggle" took place; to Dr. Jalata, who showed me the different forms racism and its kin can take and that they are a world phenomenon; and to Ms. Hazeur for showing me that the central issue in improving race relations is contact between groups which led directly to the my research into "other" and how it affects our world views. Thanks also to Dr. Broadhead for helping me get to Mauritius, and special thanks to Dr. Reese and the College Scholars staff for allowing this to happen.



 $6.9\,$  Genetic frequency maps for Rh-individuals (above) and B genes (page 146) in Europe.

### Appendix C

#### TABLE 1.—POPULATION OF THE UNITED STATES BY COLOR OR RACE AND NATIVITY: 1930


5 E	Total	NATIVE		POREIGN BORN		PER CENT DISTRIBUTION		
COLOR OR RACE	popula- tion	Number	Per cent of total	Number	Per cent of total	To- tal	Na- live	For- eign born
Total	122, 775, 046	108, 570, 897	68.4	14, 204, 149	11.6	100.0	100.0	1000.
White	108, 864, 207 11, 591, 140 1, 122, 535	11, 792, 523	90.2	13, 366, 107 93, 626 616, 998	12.3 0.8 43.4	88.7 9.7	55. 0 10. 0 0. 7	94. 0. 4.
Indian Chinese	332 307 74, 054 138, 831	30, 863	. 95. 9	3. 552	- 1.1	-0.3	0.1	0.
Filipino Hindu	45, 20 <sup>0</sup> 3, 130	45, 026	99.6 13.2	182 2, 718	0.4			
Korean Hawalian Malay	1, 860 68/ 90	816 654 4N	43. 9 99. 1	1, 0i4 6 45	0.5			
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[Per cent not shown where less than 0.1 or where base is less than 100]

### Appendix D



1960 Census



### Appendix E

Facsimile of questionnaire item 4.

4. Is this person -	-> White	O Asian Indian
	Black or Negro	O Hawaiian
Fill one circle.	U Japanese	O Guamanian
	Chinese	O Samoan
	G Filipino	O Eskimo
	🔆 Korean	O . Aleut
	<ul> <li>Vietnamese</li> </ul>	O Other - Specify -
	<ul> <li>Indian (Amer.)</li> </ul>	
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	tribe 🗕	

Instructions to the respondent for questionnaire item 4.

Fill the circle for the category with which the person most closely 4. identifies. If you fill the Indian (American) or Other circle, be sure to print the name of the specific Indian tribe or specific group.

### Appendix F

Figure 2.	Asian or Pacific Islander Groups Reported
-	In the 1990 Census

Asian	Pacific Islander		
Chinese Filipino Japanese Asian Indian Korean Vietnamese Cambodian Hmong Laotian Thai Other Asian' Bangladeshi Bhutanese Borneo Burmese Celebesian Cerain Indochinese Indonesian Indochinese Indonesian Iwo-Jiman Javanese Malayan Maldivian Nepali Okinawan Pakistani Sikkim Singaporean Sri Lankan Sumatran Asian, not specified <sup>2</sup>	Hawaiian Samoan Guamanian Other Pacific Islander' Carolinian Fijian Kosraean Melanesian <sup>3</sup> Micronesian <sup>3</sup> Northern Mariana Islander Palauan Papua New Guinean Ponapean (Pohnpeian) Polynesian <sup>3</sup> Solomon Islander Tahitian Tarawa Islander Tokelauan Tongan Trukese (Chuukese) Yapese Pacific Islander, not specified		

'In some data products, specific groups listed under "Other Asian" or "Other Pacific Islander" are shown separately. Groups not shown are tabulated as "All other Asian" or "All other Pacific Islander," respectively.

<sup>2</sup>Includes entries such as Asian American, Asian, Asiatic, Amerasian, and Eurasian.

<sup>3</sup>Polynesian, Micronesian, and Melanesian are Pacific Islander cultural groups.

IN STRICT CONFIDENCE



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ADDRESS				

MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT CENTRALSTATISTICALOFFICE

POPULATION CENSUS MAURITIUS

Night of 1 - 2 July 1990

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2. Persons in respect of when the return is to be nucle. whom the return is to be made In the case of : By: (i) All persons who spend census night 1-2 July 1990 on the premises whether they are members of the household, visitors, guests, boarders or servants; the Head of the household or jerson for the (i) households : (ii) all persons who arrive on the premises and join the household on Monday time being acting as head; 2 July 1990 without having been enumerated elsewhere; and all temporarily absent members of the household, i.e. all persons who usually live The head of a household is any adult member, whether male or female, who is (iii) acknowledged as head by the other members. in the household, but who are away on census night, for example, on a business trip, on vacation, in inspital or studying abroad; include them even if you know that they A household is either (i) a person living on his own or (ii) a group of two or more are being enumerated chewhere. 25.24 persons who may or may not be related, but who live together and make . .. common provision for food and other easentials for living. 3. Legal provisions 2. 24.2 \* 1 Two families living in one house constitute one household if they have (i) The Census is taken by the Central Statistical Office under the Statistics Act. common housekeeping arrangements, but should be considered as separate Every person is required by law to give to the person responsible for making the return households if they have separate housekeeping amangements and should then such information as may be necessary to enable the return to be made. No use may be entered on two separate consus forms. and the states however he made of such information by the person to whom it is given except for the purpose of making the return. the Manager or other person for the time being (ii) hosels, clubs, boarding houses : in charge of the premises; (ii) Any person who refuses or neglects to fill in the form or to supply the particulars required therein or who knowingly makes in this form any statement which is untrue in any material particular shall commit an offence under the Statistics Act, and shall, on conviction, be the Chief Resident Officer or other person for (iii) hospitala, fairmaries, - asylums, liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year and to a fine not exceeding prisons or any other residential instithe time being in charge of the institution; Rs. LOCKI, tation : .. (iii) All information obtained in the course of the Census is treated as CONFIDENTIAL. No information about named individuals is ever passed on by the Central Statistical Office (iv) Naval Forces, Air Forces, the Special the Commanding Officer or the officer presin ANY other Government Department or to any other Authority or person. All Mobile Force or the Police Training cutly in charge: 1.22.4 enumerators and other officers engaged in the taking of the Census are under oath and are School 1, the liable to prosecution if they improperly disclose any information which has come to their \*\*\*\* · · · · · knowledge while performing their duties. the Captain, master or other person for the time (v) ships, barges or other vessels in any 4. Completion of the form port or harbour in Mauritius : being in charge of the vessel; The form should be completely filled in by the person designated in section 1 above. If any difficulty is experienced, particularly with columns 24 to 37, guidance should be (vi) persons arriving after midnight on the the person specified above by when the return anught from the Enumerator when he calls to collect the form. If the answers are night 1-2 July 1990 and who have not is to be made with respect to the persons

incomplete or inaccurate, the counternor will ask any questions necessary to enable him to complete or correct the form. The information should be entered in the space provided using tak or a ball-point pen.

Nuthing should be written in the bases [] which are reserved for cudes.

#### 5. Collection of the form

mementened chicginics : mark. Edd. ... 10 .... The form will be collected on 2 or 1 July 1990 by the approvided counterator. BEFORE COMPLETING THE CENSUS FORM, PLEASE CONSULT THE GUIDE WHICH IS IN BOTH ENGLISH AND FRENCH THE PORT DECLARATION I declare that the information in this return is true to the best of my knowledge and belief. 17. 17 Sintas Signature or mark of the person making the return : Signature of authorized officer : ..... 1.7

present at midnight on 1 July 1990 in any of the

the person in respect of a heart the return is to be

premises mentioned above;

Table D7 - Resident population by language of forefathers and sex

	Language of forefathers	Both sexes	Male	Female
AURITIUS				
AL	l linguistic groups	1,056,660	527,760	528,900
	Creole	379,288	190,566	188,722
	Cantonese	316	160	156
	Chinese	13,538	7,170	6,368
	Hakka	3,343	1,680	1,663
	Mandarin	395	207	188
	Other Chinese	60	25	35
	English	888	402	486
		22,367	10,486	11,881
	French	229	10,488	128
			8/0	837
	Arabic	1,686	849	
	Bhojpuri	343,832	171, 184	172,648
	Gujrati	2,181	1,046	1,135
	Hindi	38,181	18,935	19,246
	Marathi	17,732	8,844	8,888
	Tamil	47,953	23,786	24,167
	Telegu	21,033	10,384	10,649
	Urdu	45,311	22,609	22,702
	Other Oriental	1,019	518	501
	Creole & Chinese	2,439	1,247	1,192
	Creole & French	15,023	7,402	7,621
	Creole & Other European	1,100	557	543
	Creole & Bhojpuri	34,371	17,253	17,118
	Creole & Hindi	2,316	1,152	1,164
	Creole & Marathi	1,089	530	559
	Creole & Tamil	5,983	2,996	2,987
	Creole & Telegu	1,163	573	590
	Creole & Urdu	10,119	5,037	5,082
	Creole & Other Oriental	1,207	622	585
	Chinese & European	58	24	34
	Chinese & Oriental.	227	100	127
	French & Other European	1,276	629	647
	French & Oriental	222	109	113
	Other European & Oriental	326	165	161
	Obsimusi & Vindi	30 000	16 /74	14 //4
	Bhojpuri & Hindi	32,922	16,476	16,446
	Bhojpuri & Marathi	352	178	174
	Bhojpuri & Tamil	498	250	248
	Bhojpuri & Telegu	516	246	270
	Bhojpuri & Urdu	3,553	1,787	1,766
	Bhojpuri & Other Oriental	163	82	81

Table D5 -Resident population by religion and sex

Religion	Both sexes	Male	Female
TIUS			
Total	1,056,660	527,760	528,9
No religion	2,339	1,441	E
Buddhist	2,766	1,464	1,3
Chinese	847	470	3
Adventist	3,312	1,572	1.7
Assemblée de Dieu	8,236	3,974	4,3
Bahai	1,134	595	
Christian	31,099	15,795	15,
Christian Tamil	477	237	
	4,399	2,269	
Church of England			2,
Evangelic	274	131	
Mission Salut et Guérison	1,013	485	
Pentecotiste Church	1,978	935	1,
Presbyterian	578	293	
Roman Catholic	287,726	143,958	143,
Témoin de Jehovah	1,663	761	
Other Christian	659	317	
Ahir	28	16	
Aryan	579	301	
Arya Samajist	. 850	415	
Hindi speaking	600	301	
Arya Samajist, Other	100	43	
Bengali	84	45	
Baboojee	147		
	288,578		145.
Hindu.	206,578	143,568	142,
Kabir Panthis.		96	10
Marathi & Marathi Hindu	20,069	10,034	10,
Puranic	1,358	700	
Rabidass	129	51	
Rajput	15,018	7,584	7,
Ravived	2,418	1,220	1,
Sanatanist	4,592	2,289	2,
Sanatanist, Hindi speaking	33,809	16,937	16,
Sanatanist, Marathi speaking	120	63	2
Sanatanist, Tamil speaking	17	7	
Sanatanist, famil speaking			
	21	10	
Telegu speaking	67	36	
Tamil and Tamil Hindu	68,451	33,862	34,
Telegu and Telegu Hindu	28,606	14,129	14,
Vaish	13,215	6,717	6.

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### Table D5 -Resident population by religion and sex

	Religion	Both sexes	Male	Female
AURITIUS				
	Vedic	55,155 811	27,562 403	27,59 40
	Ahmadhya	164 91,809 339 79,697 38	83 46,121 164 39,472 23	8 45,68 17 40,22 1
	Other	217	122	9
	Not stated	868	615	25

#### Table D7 - Resident population by language of forefathers and sex

6	Language of forefathers	Both sexes	Male	Female
IAURITIUS				
	Hindi & Marathi	87	45	43
	Kindi & Tamil	196	98	98
	Hindi & Telegu	81	37	44
	Hindi & Urdu	88	48	40
	Hindi & Other Oriental	92 ·	43	49
	Marathi & Tamil	4	4	
	Marathi & Telegu	2		
	Marathi & Urdu	5	3	
	Marathi & Other Oriental	4	1	
	Tamil & Telegu	32	18	1.
	Tamil & Urdu	23	14	
	Tamil & Other Oriental	16	7	
	Other	750	365	38
	Not stated	1,005	710	29

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