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# Villager Participation in the Relocation of El Gourn, Egypt

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VILLAGER PARTICIPATION IN THE RELOCATION  
OF EL GOURNA, EGYPT

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A Dissertation  
Presented to  
the Graduate School of  
Clemson University

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In Partial Fulfillment  
of the Requirements for the Degree  
Doctor of Philosophy  
Planning, Design and the Build Environment

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by  
Paul Daniel Duggan  
May 2012

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Accepted by:  
Dr. Hala Nassar, Committee Chair  
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## **ABSTRACT**

In 2005, approximately 850 families from the historic village of El Gurna, Egypt were relocated to a new village. The relocation was part of a government initiative to protect ancient records and artifacts from Egypt's Middle Kingdom contained in the Tombs of the Nobles that lay beneath the houses of the village. A special feature of the relocation was an effort made the local authorities to involve of local village leaders and residents in the process.

In the 1990s, about 8 to 10 million people per year were involuntary relocated due to large development projects, or about 100 million people for the decade, a number far greater than those displaced by wars, famines, and natural disasters. Recent estimates are still between between 6 to 8 million people per year.

Involuntary relocation involves significant long term risks and traumatic changes for displaced populations. They suffer the loss of lands, property, income, occupations, lifelong memories, and community structures that provided social and economic support systems. These upheavals result in permanent, irreversible changes, long term poverty in most cases, and a deep sense of loss and grief. And, it is typically a process over which the relocatees have little or no control.

This study focuses on villager participation in the relocation of El Gurna. It identifies unique characteristics of the village, important events and consequences of the relocation, and primary forms of local communication and participation. Information for the study was gathered from interviews, documents, artifacts, and participant observation, and inductive analysis was used to develop interpretive themes and explanatory concepts.

The study concludes that relocation should be re-conceptualized as a multifaceted process consisting of at least two interdependent undertakings, i.e., relocation and resettlement, and involving two or more unique entities with different goals, capabilities and resources, rather than as a single government project. By implication, participation must also be re-conceptualized as cooperation and collaboration between joint partners, not as consultation with local residents. When viewed as a single government project with participation as an adjunct, relocation often falls short of achieving hoped for goals.

The study also recommends that the unique characteristics and communicative structures of local communities, and the specific conditions and goals of the project itself, be carefully studied prior to relocation as background for the formulation of relocation plans and participatory techniques and procedures.

## **DEDICATION**

This research is dedicated to the residents of El Gurna, Egypt and to all families and people in many places that have given up their homes, occupations, and traditions for the sake of others.

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## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ADB	Asian Development Bank
CBA	Cost benefit analysis
CCM	Casual Conversation or Meeting
CDCL	Comprehensive Development for the City of Luxor project
EBD	Evidence based design
ESC	Engineering Systems and Consultants
EPA	Environmental Protection Agency
GM	the village of Gournet Mar'ii
Int	Interview
LSC	Luxor Supreme Council
n.d.	no date
NGO	non-government organization
TOR	Terms of Reference, i.e., a Request for Proposal
PMU	Project Management Unit
WT	Walking Tour

## LIST OF TERMS, CODES, AND NAMING CONVENTIONS

Baqsheesh	A tip or gift given for a favor.
Diwan	A private or public meeting place or hall.
Governorate	The area under the jurisdiction of a local governor.
Gournawii	Residents of old Gournaa.
Hoosh	A wall courtyard or yard area for keeping domestic animals or for family activities.
Mastaba Bench	A simple square bench about 6 ft. long with an upright back.
Naja	Plural: Najua <sup>1</sup> . An extended family unit or clan comprised of 200 to as many as 1,200 families. The Naja of old Gournaa are: Horobat, Hasasna, Rhabat, Attiyat and Gournet Mar'ii.
Q	A symbol for the name of a specific source at that point in the narrative.
Sa'idi	Upper Egyptians, and the Upper Egyptian experience

### Places in the West Bank

Deir el Medinet	A Pharaonic workers' village behind the hill of Gournet Mar'ii considered to be part of Gournet Mar'ii.
El Gournaa	Also called Old Gournaa, Gournaa Mountain and Gournaa Village. The focus of the study. A village built on the assents of the Theban mountains on Luxor's west bank. It was relocated two to three km. further north. The village consisted of about 24

hamlets. Each cluster of hamlets was composed of residents from one of the main families of El Gourna. 'Old' was not an official part of the name but distinguishes it from Hassan Fathy's village of New Gourna and from new village or new Qurna in El Tarif.

New Gourna	Hassan Fathy's village started in 1946 as a replacement for Old Gourna, but it was never completed.
new Qurna	Qurna is an alternative spelling for Gourna and is used in this study to distinguish it from old Gourna. It is sometimes called Qurna Jideeda, i.e., New Qurna.
Greater Gourna	Gourna City proper. The governmental district of El Gourna.
Gournet Mar'ii	A village at the south end of Gourna mountain. The settlers of this hamlet came from the district of Bairat, and are not related to the original four families of El Gourna.
Old Horobat	The old agricultural village on the valley floor near the temple of Seti I that was the original settlement site of El Gourna.
Suul	A village built to the west of El Tarif for residents who lost their homes in the floods of 1993/4. It was later expanded for other families who wished to move from old Gourna.

**Measures:**

feddan	A measure of land, 4,200 square meters, or 1.038 acres
1 square meter	10.56 square feet
1 kilometer	0.62 mile



## **CHAPTER 1**

### **INTRODUCTION**

#### **Problem of Relocation**

According to the World Bank, from 1986 to 1993, about 80 to 90 million people were dislocated due to large development projects involving infrastructure, dams, airports, and urban transportation, a number far greater than those displaced by wars, famines, and natural disasters (Betts, 2009; Cernea, 1997; Cernea & McDowell, 2000; Dwivedi, 2002). In the two decades of the 1980s and 1990s, Cernea and McDowell (2000) estimate that about 200 million people were displaced. By comparison, in 2002, the total number of refugees world wide was estimated to be about 25 million (Betts, 2009).

More recent figures for displacement have been difficult to compile because many new projects are internal and governments are reluctant to share figures (Scudder, 2005). In addition, many projects are not financed by major lending institutions that keep track of such figures such as the World Bank or the Asian Development Bank (Dwivedi, 2002). Estimates still fall within a wide range of 4 to 8 million per year, although “no accurate figures exist” (Betts, 2009; Stanley, 2004).

Relocation and resettlement are in reality two phases of a much larger, multi-faceted project. Together they comprise an on-going process of many interrelated steps and decisions over which relocatees usually have little or no control, but whose effects continue well after relocation authorities have departed. It requires an understanding of fundamental economic, social, cultural and psychological factors that are critical for the planning, designing, and construction of a complex new environment in which the

relocatees can recover.

Unlike refugees from wars or natural disasters, villagers who are involuntary relocated cannot maintain any hope of returning to their ancestral homes which are now either submerged behind a new dam or replaced by new uses. Relocation and resettlement involve sweeping social and cultural transformations that go far deeper than just a change of location or the design of a new town. It is, in essence, a permanent, irreversible change which engenders a deep sense of loss and grief (Fahim, 1983; Fernea & Kennedy, 1966; Marris, 1974; Scudder, 2003).

Relocatees undergo a series of traumatic changes and adjustments, such as the disruption of traditional community roles, social customs and economic structures, (Cernea & Guggenheim, 1993; Scudder, 2003, 2005). In addition, they face the intimidating prospect of re-creating new economic and social structures in unfamiliar conditions and amid an unknown host community.

While these changes may produce benefits for some segments of society, they frequently result in “an inequitable distribution of development benefits and losses” (Cernea & McDowell, 2000, p. 11). Rebuilding sustainable livelihoods remains one of the most critical and intractable problems in relocation and failure to resolve this one issue alone frequently results in long term impoverishment for the resettlers (Cernea & McDowell, 2000; Scoones, 1998; Solesbury, 2003). And, “Tragically, there are very few cases world-wide where resettlement caused by large dams has been able to improve, or even restore, the livelihoods of a majority of those who must relocate” (Scudder & Habbob, 2008).

All of these losses and disruptions are related and must be addressed on a holistic basis. Case studies on relocation, however, also describes some cases in which

the effective participation of relocatees has contributed to better results (Cernea & McDowell, 2000; Cernea & Guggenheim, 1993; Scudder, 2005).

### **Relocation of El Gourna**

Beginning in 2005, about 850 families from the historic village of El Gourna, Egypt were relocated to a new village near El Tarif about 3 to 4 km away. El Gourna consisted of about twenty hamlets and building clusters that included Arab settlers, and older groups of Coptic and indigenous peoples (Van der Spek, 2003). The hamlets were gradually established over a period of 250 to 300 years on the dry, sandy limestone ascents to the Theban mountains opposite the ancient capital of Thebes (modern Luxor) in an area known as the Tombs of the Nobles, (Maps 1.1, 1.2; El-Aref, 2007; Farag, 2004; Seel, 2008; Simpson, 2000).

Because they offered refuge from annual Nile inundations, visibility of the Nile Valley both north and south, and hiding places from roaming armies and conscription, the early settlers gradually moved into the caves and unfinished tombs and later established dwellings over or near the entrances often incorporating them into their family compounds.

The Tombs of the Nobles are one of Egypt's greatest treasures. They contain priceless artifacts and wall paintings of fascinating scenes from everyday life in ancient Egypt, providing a detailed account of the life and times of the Middle Kingdom. Although the kings, queens, and princes of Egypt's Middle Kingdom dug their tombs in the valleys and gorges that lie deeper in the nearby table top Libyan (Theban) Mountains, the royal nobles built their tombs and told their stories in the cliffs and the adjoining dry and rocky ground facing the Nile.



Map 1.1. The Nile Valley (<http://www.mnh.si.edu/exhibits/eternal-life/images/map-egypt-lg.gif/>)

Little is known about the early days of the village. Most of the written accounts of early El Gurna come from the records of travelers, adventures, artists, and archeologists beginning in the late 18th and early 19th centuries comprise. For example, there are descriptions of the village from the writings of Richard Pococke and C. S. Sonnini in the middle and late 1700s, and from E.W. Lane's travels in the 1820s (Simpson, 2000, 2003).



Map 1.2. The West Bank. El Gurna includes the areas from #3 to #10. ([http://www.luxor-westbank.com/karte\\_e.htm](http://www.luxor-westbank.com/karte_e.htm)).

Drawings of Robert Hay from the 1820s depict various scenes from village life and show the dwellings of villagers, ruins of a Coptic church, several above ground tombs of Muslim saints (Figure 1.1), and other structures that were already historic at that time (Qurna History Project, no date; Simpson, 2000).




Figure 1.1. Robert Hay, Gournah Village, c. 1826-32. (<http://www.qurna.org/hay.html>).

With the arrival of European adventures and archeologists in the early 19th century, the Gournawii, as the local residents are known, became expert guides and excavators. Their livelihoods became entwined with foreign travelers and adventurers working as low paid laborers and guides for foreign treasure hunters and archeologists. From time to time they sold artifacts from the tombs, or in many cases, hand made replicas (antikas), in order to supplement their income (Van der Spek, 2003). Unfortunately, long occupation and unregulated trade in ancient artifacts has damaged

some of the tombs and posed a threat to their preservation (Hawass, 2007; Kamil, 2008; Simpson, 2000).

In 1946, the Egyptian government initiated a program to protect and preserve the Tombs of the Nobles as well as other antiquities in the Luxor area. Well known Egyptian architect Hassan Fathy was commissioned to build a new village, known as New Gourna, or New-Qurna (Map 1.2), about 2 km. east the old village on the nearby valley floor for the purpose of relocating the residents of El Gourna (Fathy, 1969). Fathy used vernacular architecture and innovative low-cost mud brick construction to build the new village which included mosque, school, theatre, commercial center, and about 90 new homes. The project which lasted about three years was never completed and only a few families from El Gourna moved into the new village. After the flash floods of 1994/95, some of the Gournawii were moved to El Suul, a hastily build village near El Tarif, but many remained on the mountain.

Another attempt to relocate the residents began in January 2005 with the arrival of a new governor in Luxor, Dr. Samir Farag. The personal involvement of the governor and aspects of participatory planning were employed in order to persuade the Gournawii to relocate. As of February 2010, all of the residents had been relocated to new Qurna, or had moved to other villages on their own, and the old village of El Gourna was completely demolished except for about 30 to 40 buildings in the southernmost hamlet of Gournet Mar'ii that have been preserved as an example of the former mountain community.

The new village near El Tarif, called "Qurna Jediida" or new Qurna, is not yet completed. Government housing for many families has been built, but other plots set aside for families who wish to built their own homes and for commercial use are still

vacant. The Luxor Supreme Council (LSC) has drawn up plans for better and more diverse employment opportunities and for additional facilities such as recreational and health centers intended to upgrade community life, but these plans have not yet been implemented.

At the regional level, plans are being developed to diversify Luxor's economy with the addition of small clean industries, some of which are planned for the West Bank. These may eventually provide some replacement employment for the Gournawii but more importantly, new schools, new health centers, and city services such as water and sanitary have been provided for the residents.

### **Benefits of Local Participation**

Based on case studies of past relocations, it seems certain that the recovery and regeneration of village life cannot be achieved by external means (Cernea & Guggenheim, 1993). New towns and villages built for the purpose of relocation (or for redistribution of population) have generally not been successful. Several reasons account for this lack of success (Sabry, 2009) .

1. People do not want to move in the first place. Local residents have strong attachment to their homelands even in the face of poverty and growing populations.
2. Relocation to new towns and new circumstances often results in the loss of deeply rooted cultural ties and customs and the disruption of every aspect of life including livelihoods, social structures, buildings, and memories.
3. New towns represent economic uncertainty. Traditional livelihoods which are often tied to the culture and to an economy of place will be lost.



4. New towns present both an uncertain future and frequently a situation with no social organization at all. Social relationships and a long established ways of life are lost, and residents are released into an unknown situation. As a result, relocatees often experience feelings of resentment and uncertainty about the future.

In relocation itself, there is often a misalignment of the goals, resources and functions of various actors and actor groups. Government representatives, technical consultants, designers and planners, contractors, funding agencies, business interests, village leaders, and the villagers themselves all have different agendas, different ideas, varying capabilities and resources, and their solutions to the problems of relocation tend to favor the interests of the particular group, not the nature of the problem or the needs of the displacees (Scudder, 2005).

Case studies of relocation indicate that there are many practical benefits stemming from the meaningful involvement of local residents. Participation improves outcomes by providing critical local knowledge, innovative solutions, and important new roles for residents during the resettlement process and in the development of the new village. It strengthens the determination and self-motivation of resettlers to succeed in the new environment (Cernea & Guggenheim, 1993; Choguill, 1996; Colson, 2003). It enables residents to develop a sense of ownership and their own “initiative driven strategies” as well as new livelihoods and social structures (Sorenson in Cernea & McDowell, 2000, p. 201). And, it provides a dynamic management framework within which decisions can be shared and many of the diverse elements of relocation can be brought together into a more unified process (Cernea & Guggenheim, 1993, Davidson, et al., 2007; Ganapati & Ganapati, 2009).

Thus, meaningful participation provides a process through which differences can be reconciled and common goals formulated and agreed upon. However for relocation, it is not just “participation” in a general sense that is important, i.e., attending public meetings and soliciting input from residents, but a much more complicated involvement that includes the rebuilding cultural and socioeconomic systems. The framework and the structures that support these activities are essential and help insure that a process will take place within acceptable parameters. Without this framework, participation can only be a haphazard and limited affair.

### **Purposes of the Study**

The purpose of the study is to investigate a real world issue, namely how local villagers were involved in the relocation of El Gurna, Egypt, and to formulate interpretive principles that explain events and the mechanism of participation (Creswell, 2007; Spradley, 1979; Wolcott, 2001). It would be difficult, however, to pursue this purpose, to conduct an investigation, to answer important questions about relocation, or even to frame questions properly, from afar. The aims of the study called for an exploratory and investigative case study with an open-ended research agenda that allowed for discoveries and insights to be developed in the field (Creswell, 2007; Maxwell, 2005).

This study considers participation as a holistic phenomena, i.e., as participation in the various activities and events of the relocation since the involvement of the residents is imbedded in and can be best described and understood through these events. Relocation and participation form two interconnected realities. The study

endeavors to learn about these events from the participants themselves, to listen and learn from them and to carefully represent and report their viewpoints (Stake, 1995).

The resulting research paradigm is therefore qualitative and ethnographic, a case study of villager participation in the relocation of El Gournah. It is qualitative in that the information collected and processed is primarily verbal. And, it is ethnographic in that it is based on interviews, observations, documentary data, and the personal experiences of the investigator.

With this in mind, the aims of the study are:

1. to examine background conditions,
2. to explore, describe, and explain what took place in the relocation, the logistics of the relocation, the ways in which residents were involved, and the dynamics of villager participation,
3. to identify and describe specific forms of participation and communication,
4. to assess outcomes of the relocation and of the participatory procedures,
5. to inductively develop insights and interpretations that explain events and underlying principles,
6. to make policy recommendations for improving relocation and participation.

As relocation becomes an increasingly significant element in global economic development, and in the preservation of valuable heritage sites, a better understanding is essential. A study of a current relocation, such as El Gournah, can yield important information and insights regarding how local participation functions and how better local participation can improve relocation outcomes. The relocation of El Gournah provided a unique opportunity to study these issues because it was a small, yet significant relocation, that could be studied apart from the influences of a large metro area; it

attempted to involve local citizens; and the researcher was familiar with the area because of a previous study in Luxor.

### **Research Question**

The proposed research question is intended to be broad enough to encompass the unique situation at El Gurna, the various aims and purposes expressed above, and perhaps investigate unforeseen circumstances. Thus, the research question for the study has two elements:

*How were the villagers involved in the relocation of El Gurna, Egypt, and what explanatory and conceptual insights regarding participation can be derived from a study of this relocation?*

### **Limitations**

Given the complexity of involuntary relocation, there are many difficult issues to address, too many for a single study. Yet caution also needs to be exercised with respect to the research protocol so that the discovery and exploration of new investigative insights will not be inhibited. This study attempts to find a reasonable path between these two constraints.

There are also many variables that influence both relocation and participation. For example, political motivations, intergovernmental rivalries, adequate budgets, local resources and institutional capacity, and large scale economic interests. It is impossible in an exploratory research project of this kind to investigate all of these issues or to control for these and other unknown variables. Thus, while concentrating on the issue of villager participation, many other related issues will also be discussed.

With respect to El Gourn, the different cultural setting in which the relocation took place was an important consideration. There were many local customs and nuances that influence the gathering and interpretation of information, for example, a very informal and traditional way of life, a completely different view of time and schedules, problems in acquiring documentation, and a frequently ad hoc and unsystematic approach to solving problems. Nevertheless, the information obtained from the participants still provides a vivid and detailed description of events from which useful concepts and interpretations can be articulated. And experiences gained from living in the local environment provided a useful backdrop to the field work and helped in the interpretation of participant responses.

## **CHAPTER 2**

### **REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE**

Background literature for the study of participation in the context of relocation is found in two main areas, reports and analyses of relocation itself mostly from an anthropological and sociological point of view, and concepts of participation as found in planning literature typically detailed as an element of planning theory. Both areas have extensive literatures. This chapter is divided into two parts reflecting these two sources.

The first part of the chapter presents a review of the two main theories of relocation, a related concept of sustainable livelihoods, and an interpretive idea suggested by Hussein Fahim (1966) that sees relocation as cooperation between two cultural systems. It also presents case studies and examples of local involvement to illustrate how local populations have successfully participated in relocation.

The second part reviews the role of public participation in planning literature. Since, as Marcus Lane points out, “Public participation can only be understood in terms of the decision-making context in which it is embedded” (Lane, 2005, p. 297), and “the role of public participation in planning is largely determined by the nature of the planning enterprise being undertaken” (Lane, 2005, p. 284), the topic of participation is discussed in terms of the planning theories and practices of which it is a part.

After reviewing background issues in participation from the planning literature, the discussion, following the suggestion of Wolcott (2001), focuses on three themes of particular relevance to the research question itself: the role of the planner, the inclusion of marginal populations and local knowledge in the planning process, and the use of alternative and informal procedures for expanding the scope of participation.

For qualitative research, background literature can be used in several ways. First it provides a general background of concepts related to the research. Second, when conclusions and interpretations are presented, existing literature can be “linked up” with the results at that point (Wolcott, 2001) connecting specific points to existing literature or offer further explanation. Wolcott (2001) also recommends a third use that calls for existing literature be used on an “as needed” basis in the narrative portion of the report. Thus, the literature can be used in various ways to illumine data and conclusions from the research.

During the research, however, the investigator must carefully and critically employ the qualitative technique of “bracketing” so that interpretive concepts can be derived from the data itself rather from outside sources. Once interpretations and conclusions have been formulated, links can be made to existing literature. This is done so that interpretive concepts reflect the views and outlooks of the respondents and their unique situations rather than the viewpoint of the researcher. The goal is to provide an “emic” or insiders’ perspective, to explain the phenomena being studied from the viewpoint of the participants (Pelto & Pelto, 1978; Spradley, 1979; Stake, 1995).

The plan followed in this study follows all three uses of the literature, i.e., it reviews background literature from two main sources in this chapter, provides “as needed” links in the narrative, and makes connections to more specific issues in the final chapters that deal with analyses and interpretation.

### **Theories of Involuntary Relocation**

Because case studies and empirical research have played a major part in the development of the theoretical and conceptual understanding of relocation, literature

dealing with relocation tends to have a more practical and applied orientation. And although there are many case studies, there are not many longitudinal or follow up studies making it difficult to trace the long term effects of various planning approaches (Scudder, 2005).

During the 1980s and 1990s, involuntary relocation due to large development projects was considered to be part of a larger topic of involuntary migration, and not as a separate issue, although there were significant differences (Voutira & Harrell-Bond in Cernea & McDowell, 2000). The literature dealing with population displacement focused predominantly on wars, famines, and natural disasters but had less to say about displacement due to modernization, development, land reform and reclamation, and population redistribution (Shami, 1993). According to Seteney Shami (1993), most of the research regarding involuntary relocation had been in the form of individual case studies with little analytical discussion of the problems of displacement and relocation as a whole, and there were few theoretical studies that dealt with the causes and consequences of dislocation. Improvement in relocation theory started to occur when displacement began to be seen as a “twin” faceted problem involving both relocation and resettlement and one that encompassed the rebuilding of both economic and social support systems (Shami, 1993).

The conventional planning approach for large development projects had been primarily economic, i.e., cost-benefit analysis (CBA). However, CBA proved to be inadequate because it did not realistically account for the true social and economic costs born by the resettlers and resulted in “an inequitable distribution of development costs and benefits” (Cernea & McDowell, 2000, p. 11). It generally considered only aggregated costs such as threats to return on investment instead of the multifaceted risks and long



term effects experienced by both resettlers and host populations (Cernea, 1997; Cernea & McDowell, 2000). As observed by Michael Cernea, cost-benefit analysis was “incapable of answering displacement’s economic and financial challenges” (Cernea, 1999, p. 5).

The negative effects of displacement were often considered to be part of a natural evolutionary process of modernization and development calling for behavioral adjustment and viewed only from the perspective of the “greater good” for the society as a whole (Cernea & McDowell, 2000; Muggah, 2000; Shami, 1993). Thus, while the resettled populations suffered the loss of human, social, and economic capital necessary to rebuild their livelihoods and social structures, other sectors of the population benefited from new irrigation programs and cheap electricity (Cernea & McDowell, 2000).

Critical assessment of specific case studies began to show that relocation was disrupting not only economic, but social and relational structures as well with “devastating effects upon the powerless in society...” (Shami, 1993, p. 7). This criticism led to the gradual development of relocation strategies that dealt with pre-relocation planning, long term consequences, the role of the state, relationships between outside forces and strategies at the state level, and permanent changes and adaptations required at the level of local populations. “Population displacement needs to be seen as a process, conditioned by historically shaped social, economic, and political forces and not as a single (occurrence)” (Shami, 1993, p. 10). Although the real-life effects of relocation typically resulted in impoverishment and personal loss and dislocation, often times relocation projects provided only limited reconstruction. In most cases, the effects of development projects arose long before the actual relocation began and continued long after “final” resettlement (Cernea, 1997; Shami, 1993). Case studies showed that

“multidimensional stress” was incurred by resettlers that included physiological, psychological, social, economic, and cultural elements and called for a “multidisciplinary” solution (Cernea, 1997; Cernea & Guggenheim, 1993; Scudder, 1968, 2003; Shami, 1993).

At present, there are two main theories of relocation: Scudder’s (2003, 2005) theory regarding stages of adjustment and adaptation, and Cernea’s (1997, 2000) theory of impoverishment risks and reconstruction. Some additions and clarifications have been made to each theory, and Scudder (2005) has recently proposed a combination of the two theories, but no new comprehensive theory of relocation has been proposed.

For example, Ian Scoones (1998) developed a framework for analyzing the role of local institutions in establishing or providing sustainable rural livelihoods. Utilizing this concept, Christopher McDowell (2002) proposed that Cernea’s theory of reconstruction could be more effective if Scoones’ concept was integrated into it (below).

And in a study of the Nubian relocation, Hussein Fahim (1966) suggested a third approach which called attention to the interaction between two primary cultural systems, a bureaucratic culture represented by government and a local indigenous culture, but this concept was not developed further.

**Scudder’s Four Stages of Adaptation.** In the 1980s, Thayer Scudder and Elizabeth Colson proposed a four-stage framework of adjustment and adaptation, a sequence of stages that relocatees go through in *successful* voluntary resettlement (Scudder, 2005). Scudder identified four stages in the process of *voluntary* resettlement: a) resettlement planning and physical removal; b) multidimensional stress, and initial coping; c) economic and community redevelopment; and d) handing over of local governance and incorporation into the larger society (Scudder, 2003; Scudder &

Habbob, 2008).

It is important to note that Scudder's theory applied to *successful* voluntary resettlement (Scudder, 2005). The framework was primarily behavioral and dealt with three forms of stress: physiological, psychological, and socio-cultural. And, it helped "explain why resettlers are the key resource for achieving a positive outcome," a theme that reappears many times in this study (Scudder, 2005, p. 32). However, Scudder also conceded that the fourth stage was rarely achieved.

This framework was later applied to *involuntary* relocation and focused on the effects of social and psychological disruption in a different context (Colson, 2003; Scudder, 1968, 2003). It called for some adjustments in the theory to account for the more dramatic effects of involuntary relocation such as higher mortality among the elderly and children; difficulty in reestablishing even a subsistence economy; altered or disrupted behavioral patterns; new adjustment mechanisms appearing over several years; longing to return to the former lands; and after a time some older cultural patterns reappearing in modified form (Scudder, 2003; Fahim, 1983; Fernea & Kennedy, 1966). Scudder summarizes these changes as stress, temporary loss of identity and readjustment (Scudder, 1968).

The theory encountered several criticisms. First, it did not deal with socioeconomic problems such as impoverishment and its prevention through redevelopment, or with a process of recovery once residents were resettled (Cernea & McDowel, 2000; Cernea & Guggenheim, 1993). It also did not provide a method or strategy for successful relocation. And there was little evidence that it could be applied to *involuntary* relocation or that each relocation would actually go through the four stages. Nevertheless, it was an important step towards understanding the processes of

adjustment involved in relocation (Cernea, 1997; Cernea & McDowell, 2000; Scudder, 2005).

**Cernea's Impoverishment Risks and Redevelopment.** According to Michael Cernea, former Senior Advisor for Sociology and Social Policy at the World Bank, "The most widespread effect of involuntary displacement was the impoverishment of ... relocatees" (Cernea & McDowell, 2000, p. 12). Cernea identified the causes of impoverishment as a loss of homelands, livelihoods and occupations, and social support systems (Cernea & Guggenheim, 2000). And once resettled, the displacees frequently lacked the means to recover from these losses. For example, in relocation projects in India, of the approximately 20 million displaced in the 1980s and 1990s, about 75% have not recovered their former income or livelihoods (Cernea, 1997).

Relocation projects have traditionally used compensation payments, housing programs, and resettlement plans to assist the displaced, but have had no effective way of preventing the inevitable slide to impoverishment. Based on a study of projects financed by the World Bank, Cernea noticed that "virtually each empirically described case shows that problem resolution depends primarily on resolving land and employment issues," and that there were "repeated instances of resettlement without rehabilitation" (Cernea & McDowell, 2000, p. 37 & 13). In his view, "the primary objective of any induced involuntary resettlement process should be to prevent impoverishment and to reconstruct and improve the livelihood of resettlers" (Cernea & McDowell, 2000, p. 35).

The solution lay, according to Cernea, in social and economic reconstruction of communities and smaller groups of relocatees so that they could rebuild their livelihoods and social connections. "Protecting and reconstructing displaced peoples' livelihoods is

the central requirement of equitable resettlement programs” (Cernea, 1997, p. 1569). “*Risk recognition*,” he emphasized, “is crucial for sound planning” (Cernea & McDowell, 2000, p. 33). Cernea defined risk as “the possibility that certain courses of action will result in future injurious effects — losses and destruction (Cernea & McDowell, 2000. p. 19).

Cernea proposed a conceptual model for the evaluation and planning of counter strategies that could be utilized from planning through implementation and into follow-up stages which he called the “impoverishment risks and reconstruction model for resettling displaced populations,” or the Impoverishment Risks and Reconstruction (IRR) model. His model re-focused attention from compensation to redevelopment. The primary assumption for the model was that “general risks patterns inherent in displacement can be controlled through a policy response...” (Cernea & McDowell, 2000, p. 34), an assumption that has been debated in relocation and resettlement literature as unproven and in favor of economic interests and the power of the state at the expense of the local residents (Muggah, 2000).

The purpose of the model was to propose a way to identify and explain the risks associated with resettlement, the causes of impoverishment, and to provide a basis for planning a counter strategy for recovery. The model requires recognition of risks and the development of risk reversal policies. It identifies eight fundamental risk factors involved in relocation and uses these factors as the basis for redevelopment planning. The eight risk factors described in Cernea’s model are (Cernea, 1997; Cernea & McDowell, 2000):

1. landlessness: the primary result of being removed from traditional homeland areas, a “de-capitalization” of displaced people;
2. joblessness: loss of jobs, occupations and livelihoods, difficulty in finding

suitable employment in situations that fit the skills of the relocatees;

3. homelessness: loss of historic homes and places of family and village identification;
4. marginalization: difficulty in integrating into the host community, minimal subsistence on the margins of the larger society;
5. increased morbidity and mortality: increasing likelihood of disease, poor health, and greater mortality rates especially among the elderly and children;
6. food insecurity: uncertain availability of food supplies and undernourishment;
7. loss of access to common property: for the more vulnerable and traditional social groups, loss of shared common property as an important economic commodity, e.g., grazing land, water supply, fire wood and “edible forest products;”
8. social disarticulation: social disruption that “tears apart existing social fabric ... (and) life-sustaining informal (social) networks of reciprocal help...” (Cernea, 1997, p. 1572).

Relocated families can be affected by different combinations of factors and certain groups are more vulnerable to injurious effects than others, for example, women, children, the elderly and tribal groups (Fahim, 1983; Fernea & Kennedy, 1966; Scudder, 1968, 2003).

The model has four functions: 1) to predict risks and resettlement problems, 2) to act as a diagnostic tool, 3) to provide a basis for problem resolution, and 4) to function as a research model. As proposed, the model can be used to plan counteracting strategies and proactive responses tailored to the particular population at risk, and to provide for communication and information streams between planners and populations

at risk. Although Cernea's approach combined risk assessment with redevelopment strategies, and can assist planners in providing opportunities for improvement, it can only guide risk reversal policies since each resettlement is unique (Cernea, 1997).

A critical element pointed out by Cernea is that the model should not be used as a top-down paternalistic mechanism but requires the "participation and initiative of the displaced people themselves," and the involvement of all relevant actors such as the resettlers, local leaders, non-government organizations (NGOs), the host population, "downstream" residents and benefactors, national utility companies, governmental ministries, technical consultants and specialized experts, banks, lending institutions, and potential investment interests (Cernea, 1997; Cernea & McDowell, 2000; Scudder, 2005).

Cernea's theory, however, is not a stand alone model and must be used with other tools and methods. For example, planners also need to consider technical alternatives, optional project sites, specific risk elements such as land acquisition, food supply, and the rebuilding of homes, and plan for effective communication between planners and resettlers. This last issue is of particular importance for this study. As Cernea indicates, "Dysfunctional relationships between planners and groups affected by displacement are one of the roots of resettlement failure" (Cernea, 1997, p. 1577).

Although Cernea's risk and reconstruction guidelines have been incorporated into various relocation guidelines (World Bank, 1996, 2001, 2002; Asian Development Bank, 1995, 1998, 2009; International Development Bank, 2002), they do not address the deeper personal and psychological problems induced by relocation such as cultural continuity, reestablishing of a sense of personal self-worth and belonging, and a new sense of community purpose, nor do they present a procedure or model for the

involvement of local citizens (Colson, 2003; Dwivedi, 2002; Scudder, 2005).

The IRR model has also been criticized for an overemphasis on economic development at the expense of personal rights; failure to propose a way to identify the capabilities and vulnerabilities of the resettlers; and because it does not explain how reconstruction should be implemented, only what risks should be considered (Muggah, 2000). Cernea himself has replied that these problems must be solved on a project by project basis.

Nevertheless, the model is valuable for planners and relocation authorities in formulating resettlement strategies and stronger statutory guidelines at the national level that can be used to enforce local agreements (Price, 2009).

**Sustainable Livelihoods.** As Scudder and Cernea were developing their theories on resettlement, other related work on sustainable livelihoods was being advanced. In 1992, Robert Chambers and Gordon Conway, published a paper in which they discussed a concept of sustainable livelihoods that was being explored by development agencies in an effort to change the direction of development aid. A later definition adopted by Britain's Department for International Development closely followed the working definition of Chambers and Conway and defined sustainable livelihoods thus: "A livelihood is sustainable when it can cope with and recover from stresses and shocks and maintain or enhance its capabilities and assets both now and in the future, while not undermining the natural resource base" (Solesbury, 2003, p. 1).

Donor agencies such as Oxfam, CARE International, and the United Nations Development Programme began trying out the ideas developed by Chambers and Conway in their aid work. Further empirical work and discussion led to a competition sponsored by the Overseas Development Administration for additional research and



development of the concept. The Institute of Development Studies at Sussex University won the competition and in 1998 published a working paper by Ian Scoones (1998) which has become the basic framework for analyzing sustainable rural livelihoods. In Scoones' paper, the conceptual diagram (Figure 2.1) focused attention on the role of institutions and illustrated multifaceted relationships in graphic form (Solesbury, 2003).




Figure 2.1. Sustainable Livelihoods Approach (Scoones, 2003).

The concept developed by Scoones, known as the Sustainable Livelihoods Approach (SLA), involved four interacting elements to which he added a fifth intuitional component. Scoones' paper and graphic illustration resulted in a "paradigm shift" in the

approach to rural development in developing countries. It shifted emphasis from resources, facilities, and organizations to people, local social institutions, participation, and sustainable development. A key factor in the development of the sustainable livelihood concept was the close cooperation between research and practice involving NGOs, donor agencies and government programs in the UK (Solesbury, 2003).

By emphasizing people and the role of institutions and organizations in mediating and achieving sustainable livelihoods, SLA also became an important analytical concept for relocation projects in that it focused attention on institutional contributions to reconstruction. Following Giddens, Scoones defined institutions as regularized practices or norms of society which have persistent and widespread use (Scoones, 2003). The key questions concerning the role of institutions in reconstruction were, how do people gain access to resources, and how do institutions mediate this access once the former institutions are disrupted (McDowell, 2002).

Although Scoones was writing about formal institutions, both external, such as NGOs, and internal, such as government agencies, recovery from relocation and the development of sustainable livelihoods are also influenced by *informal* institutions including some that are not easily recognizable, such as informal social and communicative structures. And, as discussed below, local communities that lack such institutional development may need assistance in developing them if they are to become active partners in the relocation.

The emphasis on institutions in the analysis of sustainable livelihoods was combined with the IRR model of Cernea by Christopher McDowell. McDowell argued that in relocation existing “institutional arrangements are fundamentally altered” because of the “scattering of kinship groups and informal networks of mutual help” (McDowell

2002, p. 1, 3). The Sustainable Livelihoods model moved aid work and recovery of local economies “towards a concern with how poor people make a living and whether their livelihoods are secure or vulnerable over time” (McDowell, 2002, p. 5).




Figure 2.2. Forced Displacement, Sustainable Livelihoods and Impoverishment Risks – A Revised Framework for Analysis (McDowell, 2002, p. 9).

An important connection between the IRR and SLA models focused on identification of the causes and solutions to poverty, but in somewhat different ways. While the IRR model focused on how relocatees *become* impoverished, the SLA model focused on why people *stay* poor. Seeing the interconnection between these concepts,

McDowell modified Scoones' diagram to show how Cernea's Impoverishment Risk model can fit into the SLA diagram (Figure 2.2).

McDowell proposed that a research methodology for relocation projects could be developed by combining Cernea's IRR model and the Sustainable Livelihood concept (McDowell, 2002). The new diagram emphasized the institutional role in both models.

**Fahim's Two Cultures.** In his dissertation, Hussein Fahim (1966) suggested a novel approach to relocation and resettlement theory. Although his work as a whole has been appreciated, this particular contribution has not been thought of as a theoretical insight primarily because it was not developed into a full-fledged theory. Yet it offers an important insight and points to the need for the two fundamental actor groups involved in relocation to interact *as groups*.

Fahim (1966) recognized that there were two deeply rooted systems that had to cooperate in order for relocation to be successful: governmental bureaucracy, which focused on economic development and political positioning, and the local culture of the resettlers which was, as in the case of the Nubian relocation, what they used "to solve relocation problems" (Fahim, 1983, p. 176). The long-term goals of resettlement planning, according to Fahim, needed to include, in addition to overall government objectives, the design of a complex new environment that would meet the on-going needs of resettlers, and the redevelopment of community structures for people that had been traumatized by the loss of their former way of life (Fahim, 1983). In this sense, his approach is similar to that of Scudder.

Fahim also notice other relational and planning difficulties. Resettlers were viewed and dealt with by officials as individuals rather than as social units or socioeconomic groups; inadequate planning did not prepare the relocatees for the

problems that would arise; and failure to attend to the cultural dimensions of physical design severely weakened the efforts of the resettlers to adjust (Fahim, 1983). For example, in the relocation of the Egyptian Nubians important social support structures were broken up when families were separated from each other and from their traditional support groups thus weakening their ability to recover. (See case study below.)

The strength of Fahim's concept is that it recognizes the importance of the two main actor groups involved in relocation as distinct cultural systems representing unique goals and interests. However, while this approach may be closer to the reality of relocation and recognizes the importance of the local community, it does not provide a method or model by which these groups can cooperate or interact, nor does it address economic and institutional problems.

**Cernea and Scudder.** In a more recent study of 50 large dam projects, Scudder (2005) suggests that if his theory of adaptations and Cernea's theory of risk reversal are used in combination, they can provide a more complete approach to resettlement. If viewed properly, the two theories complement each other and each theory overcomes the weaknesses of the other. Thus, while Scudder's theory deals with behavioral issues, and enables planners to develop strategies to support residents in their adjustments, Cernea's theory provides a "framework" for analyzing risks, addressing the critical problem of impoverishment, and for providing redevelopment options and a basis for post-relocation studies. Together, the two theories, and perhaps including Fahim's observations regarding the interaction of two distinct cultures, can provide a more comprehensive conceptual background for relocation planning.

**Summary.** At the moment, the theories of Cernea and Scudder are the two principal theories for analyzing relocation (Scudder, 2005). And, as Scudder himself

acknowledges, no single theory of relocation is able to explain or clarify what actually happens in relocation or how to best proceed. Each case must be addressed by itself using a combination of theories and approaches. Yet as Scudder also goes on to point out, “*Resettlers* are the key resource for achieving a positive outcome ... (and) government policies and the activities of project authorities have been the main factors constraining a successful resettlement process” (Scudder, 2005, p. 32, emphasis added), pointing out the complex nature of the interactions that take place in relocation, and the importance of resettlers’ involvement at the local level.

### **Relocation Case Studies**

Whether at a local or regional scale, resettlement problems are intrinsically bound up with and influence each other in complex ways. For the resettlers, however, the critical effects and long term consequences tend to crystallize at the local level. Thus, case studies describing actual events and circumstances at the local level are important since a correct understanding of relocation and resettlement cannot be acquired from theories alone. Case studies document important factors and events that are often generalized and hidden in conceptual formulations. And, an understanding of actual conditions is necessary to provide context and examples that explain what the theories and terminology actually mean and imply.

Reports of case studies describing relocation have been provided mostly by anthropologists and sociologists and reflect this point of view. While planning issues are addressed by anthropologists, relocation is not often studied from a planning perspective. And although there is extensive case study material, as Fahim points out, “comparatively little of this has been utilized by planners” (Fahim, 1983, p. 156).

Anthropological studies have addressed many important issues such as a loss of trust in government, the relationship of local residents to relocation agencies, the loss of one's self-definition and one's place in community life, the related loss of village identity, and the danger of long-term dependency on outside agencies (Colson, 2003; Lepp, 2008; Scudder, 2003). While these issues are important, the principal value of these case studies for this project is that they provide connections between relocation events and consequences experienced by residents, as well as descriptions and examples of specific ways in which local residents can be involved in relocation.

*Anthropological Approaches to Resettlement*, a compendium of relocation case studies edited by Michael Cernea and Scott Guggenheim (1993), describe three key points with respect to relocation: 1) the great difficulties and complexities involved in relocation, 2) the importance of pre-relocation studies, and 3) the positive effects that result from the "active involvement of people affected by resettlement in project decision making" and in the implementation of a relocation programs (Cernea & Guggenheim, 1993, p. 6).

Three case studies from *Anthropological Approaches* provide concrete examples of effective participation and, as a result, better overall outcomes, although they should not be considered universal solutions (Cernea & Guggenheim, 1993). Specific examples of participation from each case follow a brief description of the cases.

**Karelia, Finland.** Following World War II, Finish families displaced by the war were resettled in Karelia in northwest Finland. Participation activities included local, municipal, and state level integration, negotiations between hosts and state agencies for lands, selection of replacement lands and homesteads by resettlers from a stock supply, and resettlement of entire communities on a single site as a way of keeping social ties

intact. As a result of this widespread and effective program of participation, “It is widely believed that true representation of the concerned parties – ‘people’s participation’ in development terminology – avoided gross mismanagement, and made implementation effective and efficient” (Mustanoja & Mustanoja in Cernea & Guggenheim, 1993, p. 101).

**Arenal, Costa Rica.** In Arenal, Costa Rica (1975-1980), project planners involved the local population from the beginning of the project in various ways, e.g., villagers assisted in the distribution of replacement lands and housing; local residents provided labor for the project; organizers moved the resettlement offices into the new village to encourage involvement and local contact; agronomists provided demonstrations and assistance for new crops and farming techniques; and due to changing economic circumstances villagers took the initiative to alter some production from meat to dairy. Cooperation and involvement from both sides provided critical local information and suggestions for alternative ways of resolving resettlement problems thereby reducing the “sullen and resentful dependency” on the national government (Partridge in Cernea & Guggenheim, 1993, p. 366).

**Aquamilpa and Zimapan, Mexico.** Resistance by relocatees to the Aguamilpa and Zimapan dam projects (1987–1993/4) forced planners to rethink and restrategize their efforts. Input from the World Bank helped planners develop a more inclusive participatory plan. A major change in national strategy put community participation on equal footing with economic and engineering concerns. Local level input reduced confrontation and new local institutions began to develop that assumed tasks formerly performed by national agencies. And “for the first time key decisions (were) being negotiated” (Cernea & Guggenheim, 1993, p. 218).

As a result of negotiation and participation, houses were redesigned to fit local



conditions and preferences; a village-wide strategy for managing replacement farmland was redone; new livelihoods such as dressmaking and a community bakery were started; and health services were dramatically improved. One of the most important achievements, according to Scott Guggenheim, was the formation of a “village-based negotiating committee” as a way of “balancing the playing field between the (national electric) company and the villagers” (Cernea & Guggenheim, 1993, p. 226).

**Examples of Participation.** From these three cases, we can compile helpful lists of activities in which local residents were involved as examples of how local residents can participate in relocation. However, these examples are not normative or exhaustive. Options must be explored for each project.

In Karelia, Finland, relocatees,

1. were involved in the planning, administration, monitoring, and managerial aspects of the relocation
2. chose representative to be members of parliament with the power to vote and had representatives in several political and administrative entities
3. supplied information on lost lands and property as a basis for compensation and provided expertise in the selection of new lands and farming methods
4. were responsible for their own subsistence on temporary lands and farms
5. distributed temporary welfare payments
6. formed new sociocultural societies to help resettlers cope with the new environment
7. provided some local governance through religious and social groups.

In Arenal, Costa Rica,

1. authorities held informational meetings, issued pamphlets, and published planning documents and materials before the project started
2. socioeconomic surveys were conducted to gather information about the

residents, and their “needs, desires, and aspirations”

3. staff helped villagers to organize local committees in order to discuss resettlement issues and areas of disagreement, and organized and promoted involvement in community activities
4. villagers were consulted about the design of the new village and occupational preferences
5. agricultural specialists worked with the resettlers and experimented with new crops and techniques
6. villagers approved a resettlement site and new village design from several alternatives, and families were directly involved in the acquisition of replacement land and buildings based on an agreed formula
7. new homes were built for relocatees based on their choice from 18 models; changes were permitted and villagers could incorporate items from the old houses
8. some young men from the village were trained and employed in the construction of the homes and village
9. specialists lived and had offices in the new village and interacted on a daily basis with the families
10. changes in procedure were introduced as difficulties developed.

In Aquamilpa and Zimapan, Mexico,

1. authorities held regular open meetings to keep villagers informed, to discuss new programs and to encouraged meaningful participation.
2. villagers formed a negotiating committee to handle contractual agreements with local contractors
3. authorities and villagers agreed that information regarding compensation and rates on start up costs and machinery would be public debated and jointly agreed and shared
4. relocation staff worked with local villagers to locate acceptable resettlement sites and plan new income generating projects
5. participants selected replacement farms by mutual agreement

6. villagers reached an agreement on housing design after experimenting with modern and traditional methods and materials (trial homes were built)
7. specialists spent two weeks per month living in the villages.

Other important case studies discussed below illustrate how inadequate local involvement can lead to unsatisfactory results.

**New Nubia.** An important case study which also took place in Egypt but with mixed results concerns the relocation of 50,000 Egyptian Nubians. In 1963, the Egyptian government began moving Egyptian Nubians from areas between Aswan and the Sudanese border that were being inundated by the rising waters of the new High Aswan Dam. In Old Nubia, the villagers lived in numerous small settlements and tribal groupings dispersed along the edge of the Nile. They had a strong attachment to the land and to a way of life based on the Nile River. Communication between villages was almost exclusively by boat. The Nubians were eventually resettled near Kom Ombo, 45 kilometers north of Aswan, into 47 village units approximating the distribution of tribes in Old Nubia (Fahim, 1966, 1983; Scudder, 2003).

The Nubians were not directly involved in the initial planning stages of the new settlement, although they were consulted later regarding potential resettlement sites, compensation, and development policies. However, surveys initiated by the government later in the planning stages resulted in problems with local administrators who felt that plans had already been made and should not be altered (Fahim, 1983; Scudder, 2003).

When the Egyptian Nubians began arriving in New Nubia, the new settlement was not ready, food was expensive, diseases were prevalent and there was an increase in mortality. Due to the impact of their arrival on the local economy, most Nubians were short of cash because of rising costs for basic needs (Fernea & Kennedy, 1966).

The housing layout “completely ignored extended family and wider kinship organization” (Scudder, 2003, p. 20). Unlike the family compounds which housed several generations, the new homes were arranged in barrack like rows and units were assigned to families based on the number of bedrooms in each unit. As a result, the elderly and young couples were given smaller units separate from their immediate families. Instead of being surrounded by family and kin, neighbors were now strangers (Scudder, 2003). Houses were smaller with less privacy. They were situated on opposite sides of wide rather than narrow streets, and thus did not furnish sufficient shade for cooling the streets. The courtyards, which typically provided the main source of cooling during the day, were smaller with lower walls than in their former homes. They did not function properly nor provide adequate privacy (Fathy, 1986). The space for domestic animals was too small, and visitors could not be accommodated, both important aspects of the Nubian way of life.

The resettlement led to food shortages, sickness, malnutrition, and a higher death rate. Livestock also died because of a lack of provisions. The Nubians endured “multidimensional stress,” undernourishment, disease, uncertain prospects, intense grieving over the loss of Old Nubia, mistrust of neighbors and the local population, and the loss of local architecture, rituals, and customs (Scudder, 2003).

After one year the Nubian slowly began to recover. Markets were open, land transportation was available, new business had started, and the women, according to their custom, had redecorated the exterior of the homes in the traditional Nubian fashion (Figure 2.3), (Fernea & Kennedy, 1966; Scudder, 2003).



Figure 2.3. Traditional Nubian Decorated Entrance. (<http://www.saudiaramcoworld.com/issue/200604/the.decorated.houses.of.nubia.htm>).

The villagers gradually formed new associations based on neighbors living along the same street. Customs for weddings, funerals, and Islamic feasts were simplified and shortened. For example, in the new village, since most of the tribes now lived in close proximity, guests for the various social celebrations tended to show up at the same time rather than over a period of months creating a burden for the families. Thus, some events were restricted to neighborhood communities rather than involving the whole tribe

or extended families. Intertribal councils agreed to the changes because of the excessive costs and burdens of maintaining the old customs. And, neighborhood councils rebuked families that did not adhere to the new customs (Fernea & Kennedy, 1966). Even with these adjustments, Nubian society was markedly different than before.

Several characteristics of Nubian culture helped the Nubians adapt to the changes they encountered in Kom Ombo, although some Nubians have returned to the shores of Lake Nubia and formed new communities there (Scudder, 2003). Prior to resettlement, the Egyptian Nubians had endured successive resettlements as the dam at Aswan was heightened over the years and the waters inundated more lands. These progressive resettlements prepared them for the final move from Old Nubia.

In Old Nubia, a unique system regarding the ownership of water wheels also helped structure cooperative efforts among the Nubians. The water wheels were owned in partnership, but not in community, by families and kin. The partners developed cooperative ways of sharing use of the water wheel and of collectively maintaining it (Scudder, 2003). Experience with these types of cooperative arrangements helped the Nubians to solve problems at Kom Ombo.

Over the years, urban migrant Nubians had also kept in contact with their home regions and organized educational and social clubs, and some food cooperatives, to preserve Nubian ways among the urban migrants. At the time of the relocation, about 70,000 Nubians worked outside Nubia (Fernea & Kennedy, 1966). The Nubian urban clubs played an important role in Kom Ombo and provided experience in cooperative organization. In Aswan alone, there were 40 such clubs (Scudder, 2003). Their familiarity with the Aswan area played an important part in their assimilation. Nubians also had a high regard for education and pursued better jobs and better education. They were

further sustained by their high sense of self-esteem and strong sense of community identity (Scudder, 2003).

**Three Gorges Dam.** Another example with mixed results involved the multiple relocations caused by the Three Gorges Dam in China. According to Chinese government reports, about 1.2 million people were relocated due to the Three Gorges Dam project (Heming & Rees, 2000). Residents were relocated to three areas: nearby upslope areas, sites at long distances from their original homes, and urban areas where it was hoped some would be able to make the transition to urban jobs. Problems were encountered at each of the sites.

Residents relocated to nearby upslope areas attempted to farm the poorer quality sites but unfamiliarity with farming practices in these areas led to erosion and loss of precious topsoil. The government had also prepared some terraced orchards but the trees were not old enough by the time of the relocation and the relocatees did not know how to make a living from this type of farming. In the end, there was little produce (Heming & Rees, 2000).

As might be expected, relocatees were also unwilling to move long distances because they were too far from their families and were viewed as strangers by the residents in the new areas. Some younger people, however, were able to adapt to urban employment and succeeded in resettling in medium size urban areas.

Most replacement housing was rebuilt by the relocatees themselves. But many villagers could not complete their homes without help from family or from government loans since compensation was not based on replacement costs. The government did make some attempts to create jobs by financing small factories and businesses, and providing job training for younger villagers in urban areas. But these efforts did not work

well since the skills of the villagers were much different from the skills needed for factory work and urban employment. Some villagers, however, did succeed in establishing new business related to their former type of farm work (Croll, 1999; Heming & Rees, 2000; Heming, Waley, Rees, 2001).

Many problems that developed in these two cases, i.e., New Nubia and Three Gorges Dam, involved issues for which the local residents could have provided expert knowledge and experience. And, it seems probable that they could have been avoided or mitigated by involving the residents beforehand and utilizing their capabilities and local knowledge. However, this expertise was not utilized mainly because there were no effective procedures for local involvement, an issue that is discussed in more detail below.

**Scudder Examines 50 Large Dams Projects.** In a recent study of resettlement involving 50 large dams, Thayer Scudder indicates that, where data was available, the living standards of resettlers were improved in only 3 of 44 cases (7%). In 36 cases (82%) standards were worse. And in 5 cases (11%) they merited the questionable label of “restored” (Scudder, 2005). Scudder comments, “I do not consider restoration to be a legitimate goal, because what evidence is available indicates that a restoration policy tends to leave the large majority worse off than before resettlement” (Scudder, 2005, p. 61).

In discussing the reasons for the failure, or success, of these resettlement projects, Scudder lists four important factors: the ability or capacity of project authorities; factors related to the relocatees themselves such as the number of residents moved, their involvement or participation in project planning, and their ability to succeed and compete in the new environment; unexpected events such as the loss of funding, civil



strife, or agricultural and environmental problems; and impoverishment risks as enumerated by Cernea (Scudder, 2005).

From a planning perspective, three key factors contributed to the poor results shown in Scudder's survey: a lack of institutional resources and capacity, resettlement goals were often set too low, and the resettlers were not sufficiently involved in the planning and implementation of the relocation (Scudder, 2005).

**Design Considerations.** Many case studies also indicate that there is a significant connection between the physical design of new homes and villages and the ability of the community to retain its culture and to rebuild economic and social structures (Bianca, 2000; Fahim, 1983; Fernea & Kennedy, 1966; Ganapati & Ganapati, 2009; Merdan, 1999;).

For example, in the 1940s, Hassan Fathy (2000) promoted the use of vernacular architecture and local materials for rural resettlement projects. He incorporated design features from peasant dwellings and villages from the delta region of lower Egypt into his project at New Gourna on Luxor's West Bank. He also used native materials and innovative designs to take advantage of natural conditions and local building techniques. His work is still preserved today as an example of environmentally and culturally sensitive design (See Chapter 6). However, his efforts were not accepted by local residents because his designs were drawn from a different area of Egypt and had different, and unacceptable, meanings for the local villagers.

Since Fathy, Fahim and Stefano Bianca (2000) have emphasized the critical link between design and culture and its impact on the local population. As stated by one Nubian resettler, "If we want to maintain our old customs, we must maintain our Nubian architecture" (Fahim, 1983, p. 63). New villages, however, cannot just reproduce the

designs and patterns of a prior settlement. Designers must try to create a “functional equivalency” that allows resettlers to rebuild and re-express their unique cultural identity in both old and new ways (Fahim, 1983, p. 67).

As illustrated in the Nubian relocation, and more recently by earthquake reconstruction in Turkey, design processes, as well as the overall planning of the project, frequently fall victim to a technocratic approach. In the design for New Nubia, for example, one did not find a single malqaf wind scoop to cool the new homes or even one mastaba bench where villagers could sit and talk to their friends (Merdan, 1999). The ceremonial wall decorations provided by the women and the cooling effects of the inner courtyard and narrow streets, all of which are so important to the functioning of the Nubian village and culture, were ignored by the designers, but were recreated by the Nubians themselves (Fathy, 1973, p. 1983; Fernea & Kennedy, 1966; Merdan, 1999).

In Sirinkoy, Turkey, following the earthquake of August 1999, formal institutions such as the World Bank and UN agencies hindered local participation, and “input that was received from beneficiaries was not incorporated into the plans due to a sense of urgency, a concern for cost-effectiveness, and inflexible terms and conditions of the World Bank loan” (Ganapati & Ganapati, 2009, p. 49). The resulting designs of the new village and homes did not fit the needs and occupations of the residents. As of 2002, the new village had an 80% vacancy rate.

While physical design can only indirectly address a portion of the social and cultural needs of a relocated community, it is clear from studies in the field that spatial logic and physical design play critical roles in the recovery of social and cultural values and the economic activities of the resettlers. And, local residents can be important sources of information and design criteria needed for creating acceptable designs

solutions, if they are effectively involved in the project.

### **Key Issues in Relocation**

From the relocation literature, several themes can be identified as important for the study of a local relocation.

1. Relocation is a complex and difficult process and rarely reaches a satisfactory conclusion. Relocates suffer dramatic social, economic, and personal losses and must rebuild and adapt to a new and uncertain environment.

At present, no one theory of relocation and resettlement, or related model of participation, can adequately explain or clarify what happens in a relocation or provide a complete framework for resettlement (Bartoleme in Cernea & Guggenheim, 1993; Scudder, 2005). And, as Scudder has suggested, it is perhaps not possible, or even advantageous, to conceptualize the complexity of relocation within a single theory (Scudder, 2005).

2. Local involvement is critical for relocation. If relocation is to succeed, it requires the “participation and initiative of the displaced people themselves” (Cernea & McDowell, 2000, p. 34). This theme is repeated frequently by relocation scholars. For example, Scudder points out that the local community is the core of the resettlement process. “Resettlers are the key resource for achieving a positive outcome (Scudder, 2005, p. 32). Cernea describes local participation as an untapped potential. “(Research) suggests that more encouragement given to the initiative, energy, and self-organizing capacity of oustees may unlock a potential insufficiently use in resettlement programs” (Cernea & Guggenheim, 1993, p. 397). And Sorenson calls for the use of local rather than bureaucratic solutions. “It is important that ‘outsiders,’ including the

government and humanitarian agencies, build on refugees' own initiative-driven strategies for survival and reconstruction of livelihoods instead of imposing preplanned packages" (Sorenson in Cernea & McDowell, 2000, p. 201). From these observations and from the case studies themselves, it can be safely concluded that meaningful participation is an essential element in successful resettlement.

3. In addition to local involvement, there is a fundamental need for comprehensive planning at all levels. An emphasis found throughout relocation literature is that improvement in relocation must first come at the policy level (Cernea, 1995; Cernea & Guggenheim, 1993). "Poor preparation of resettlement plans is the single most important reason for failure of resettlement components in development projects" (Cernea & Guggenheim, 1993, p. 351). Thus, participation alone is insufficient without proper planning, adequate programs of economic and social reconstruction, and a framework for local involvement. Adequate participation strategies must begin at the level of national policy and be supported by legal, structural, technical and financial commitments (Shihata in Cernea & Guggenheim, 1993).

4. A practical reality in relocation is that without the approval and support of the local government, no system of participation will work. However, an ethnographic method of investigation and an issue oriented approach to redevelopment does allow project managers and relocation officials to gather data and local knowledge, and involve the local community without reforming the political system (Davidson, et al., 2007). It can function at a more fundamental level and does not require a developed planning profession or tradition. It can proceed in a non-threatening way, does not require the community to have a developed political system or technical knowledge, meets villagers on their own turf, and focuses on interests, information, and local

knowledge not confrontation.

### **Participation in Planning Theory and Practice**

Public participation has been an important topic in planning literature since the days of the Garden City Movement (Howard, 1985). The discussion of citizen participation has moved from concerns about a “psychological understanding” of the population (Unwin, 1967) to the potential for full partnership where collaboration and involvement become mutual, where there is dialogue, exchange of information, and shared decision making (Innes & Booher, 2004). From this literature, there are two questions to ask that are relevant for relocation. What procedures and concepts regarding participation might be useful for improving relocation outcomes? And, can these concepts be used in assessing programs of local participation?

In practice, attempts to encourage participation in the planning process have led to uneven results. Conflicts are common, planning decisions are often made before citizens are consulted or all the facts are in, groups are often pitted against one another, substantial issues are not addressed, better organized and more powerful groups seems to have the upper hand, and private deals made behind the scenes often distort the process (Forester, 2006; Innes & Booher, 2004). In the words of John Forester, effective public participation is “easy to preach but difficult to practice” (Forester, 2006, p. 447).

In writing about the rebuilding of New Orleans, Kristina Ford, head of planning for 8 years in the City of New Orleans prior to hurricane Katrina, says the planning profession is “out of touch with its audience.” And, “after nearly fifty years of planners’ seeking participation by the public, the fact that relatively few people ever take part in creating a plan might indicate that citizens have not found their participation

worthwhile” (Ford, 2010, p. 75). She also notes that “plans written *with* citizen participation are not much different from plans written *without* citizen participation” (Ford, 2010, p. 150). As Andreas Faludi sees it, “People do not see planning proposals as serving their own ends” (Faludi, 1973, p. 100).

There are many factors at the root of this dissatisfaction. In the early days of planning, public participation was limited because planning had been “turned over to the ‘experts’” (Susskind in Forester, 1994, p. 312). Centralized top down planning resulted in dramatic failures, especially in the US in the 1950s and 1960s, in conflicts between citizens and local planning authorities, and calls for greater public participation (Jacobs, 1961; Laurence, 2006; Stifle, 2000).

In spite of these failures, public participation has become increasingly necessary due in part to the growth of “bureaucratization and technical bases of decisions in current urban society” (Peattie, 1968, p. 80). Bureaucratic decision making has become “ambiguous and uncertain” (Faludi, 1973, p. 222), and “the world has become too complex and our leaders too fallible. ... The new political culture no longer places much faith in solutions imposed from above, increasingly relying instead on a network of decision-making relationships that link government in civil society...” (Quoted in Lane, 2005, p. 283). “Citizens and interests groups have called for the right to effective objecting or appeal if a policy is damaging to their individual or groups interests. They (are striving) for greater influence on the policies and services in general” (Maier, 2001, p. 709).

“Poor communication and bureaucratic red tape” (Maier, 2002, p. 710) and an increasingly complex and interconnected world required a larger network of information and decision making activities (Lane, 2005). As democratic social and political theory

and practice moved away from centralized control to more decentralized systems, government sought to include more elements of society in the decision making process (Peattie, 1968).

Despite these difficulties and problems, there are, nevertheless, positive benefits to public participation. It can provide new ideas and information that planning agencies do not possess. It acts as a safeguard for pluralism and enables planners to draw from a wider range of viewpoints. And, it gives decision makers more choices and information (Faludi, 1973).

Public participation is also one way of insuring that planners listen to alternate information and solutions. “The public posses a mass of varied information which a planning agency by itself cannot provide” (Faludi, 1973, p. 1973). During public debate, the community itself can learn about alternatives and options for change and development (Faludi, 1973). And, a significant benefit for planning officials and the public is that citizen input is an important way of determining unintended consequences of planning proposals (Faludi, 1973).

Thus, while there are difficulties as well as benefits, and calls for improving public participation in planning and decision making, it has also become increasingly necessary as problems of society have become more complex and interconnected.

**Methods and Procedures in Public Participation.** Planning, it should be noted, is essentially a political process, one that generally begins in conflict, or at least in a difference of opinion (Susskind, in Forester, 1994). Planning has been described as “a state strategy in the creation and regulation of space, populations, and development” (Lauria, 2000, p. 331). And, as Lane has noted, since “the model of planning being used (in practice) is the fundamental determinant of the role of the

public” (Lane, 2005, p. 297), the relationship between planning theory and methods of public participation needs to be considered.

From a political perspective, public participation has been used to announce and defend decisions and positions, to gain acceptance of programs, to maintain legitimacy, and to improve outcomes (Allmendinger, 2002; Glass, 2007). Planners may also use public participation to seek solutions to difficult problems and attempt to meet citizens needs. From the perspective of the citizens, participation provides a voice in planning and decision making and can improve plans, decision, and services (Glass, 2007).

However, as Faludi points out, without statutory measures, participation would remain limited and many planners would not be prepared to listen to citizens (Faludi, 1973). Thus, public participation requires enabling procedures if it is to work at all. Statutory rules create important participatory structures, but do not penetrate very far. And their implementation can vary considerably from agency to agency (Brody, et al, 2003; Krumholz & Forester, 1990).

Although public participation has improved over time, there are certain weaknesses in the statutory formats that form the background for citizen participation especially as typified by the public meeting. Public hearings do not require people to listen to others, to find common ground, or to work out solutions. And there is no mechanism for gaining mutual understanding or agreement. The public meeting seems best suited as a place to express opinions and positions, and to approve and announce decisions (Susskind in Forester, 1994). Since it is not always the best place to develop and discuss ideas, important information required for planning and decision making needs to be gathered from regular citizens in other ways prior the public meeting (Innes & Booher, 2010).



Ford describes the public meetings as an “unproductive technique” and says that *some new way is needed*, not just a method of discussion (Ford, 2010, p. 191). She notes that “Planners ask citizens the wrong questions, questions that are premised on how the planning profession looks at the world ... Questions that make sense only to people who think they way we do” (Ford, 2010, p. 153). Improvement in participation depends, Ford continues, on how the planners frame their questions and on the role of the planner itself. Better questions and better techniques are one way to “re-imagine citizen participation” (Ford, 2010, p. 153).

In a study of neighborhood participation, Laurian and Shaw (2008) asked why people did or did not become involved in participatory planning. The results contain expected as well as unexpected findings. For example, many respondents said they did not know about the meetings or were unable to attend because of schedule conflicts. Some showed a resignation to plans and ideas they were hearing about and did not want to get involved. However, a lack of interest was reported by only 8% of the respondents. Most reported that they were involved in *informal ways* such as small meetings with neighbors in the local setting, filling out surveys or petitions, writing letters, and other informal forms of communication.

In addition to expected recommendations for disseminating better and more wide spread information and schedules that fit the residents, the authors also recommend that more informal means be use in participation, that more ways be provided for residents to fit into the process within their own local context, especially for low income residents (Laurian & Shaw, 2008).

Based on his experiences in Cleveland, Norman Krumholz (Krumholz & Forester, 1990) points out that neighborhood involvement requires different techniques and

approaches other than administrative or public meetings. Typically, neighborhood groups in poor or working class areas lack access to channels of information, financing, and power thus making it necessary for planning staff to get involved in the neighborhood itself. Junior planners on Krumholz's staff provided critical information and technical assistance for local groups, listen to complaints, and help them apply for grants. They served as mediators with other public agencies and private sector groups such as banks and developers, and as advocates for local needs. Their aim was to educate, to develop local capacity, and to help organize local networks that could interface with planners and public agencies (Krumholz & Forester, 1990).

Local groups need good and reliable information for effective participation (Forester, 1989). Forester puts a significant emphasis on listening to the stories of citizens at the local level and two way dialogue. He provides a list of practical ways to improve citizen involvement and effectiveness at the local level: 1) educate and inform citizens about projects, 2) assist in developing community organizations, 3) provide access to necessary information, 4) offer alternative solutions, 5) provide opportunities to broaden assent, 6) encourage citizen actions, and 7) learn why citizens are excluded from public discourse and decisions (Forester, 1999). Planners can learn, he says, "how to counteract the conditions" leading to poor public participation by developing local leadership, organizing local citizens into community groups, learning about the local conditions before proposing programs, developing networks of local information and cooperation, and creating trust in the neighborhood (Forester, 1999, p. 116). Such activities, and the ones proposed by Krumholz, work best if they take place prior or parallel to public meeting venues, and will produce better results when the time comes for the general public meeting.

Alternative participatory methods will require that planners go beyond methods of formal participation and take some risks on the streets, and point to the critical role of planners themselves in improving public participation (See below.) However, there are also limits to what planners can do based on the objectives of the planning agency itself and the needs of the local citizens. Planners can easily get entangled “in personal issues better left to social psychology” (Forester, 1999, p. 213). In other words, planners must have a clear vision of what needs to be accomplished (Glass, 2007), and establish and follow reasonable rules of engagement and involvement at the local level (Krumholz, 1990; Tuchman, 2005). The implication of this discussion is that better and more diverse participation procedures are needed in order to improve citizen participation.

**Fitting Procedures to Needs.** “The term citizen participation is an overgeneralization that often is defined simply as providing citizens with opportunities to take part in governmental decision or planning processes. Neither the term nor the definition provide even the slightest suggestion of how participatory efforts might be structured or what might be expected of them in terms of results” (Glass, 1979, p. 180). Thus James Glass begins an important article emphasizing the need to fit the procedures and formats of citizen participation to planning objectives and the needs of citizen groups themselves. Glass points out that no single technique will achieve all purposes and that each technique must be selected based on the specific planning objectives. This is especially important in relocation where participation involves a wide array of activities, and unique political, social and cultural conditions will affect the strategies employed in participation.

Forester (1999) emphasizes the need to address fundamental pre-conditions for participation. These include legal and formal structures, planners and planning staff, and

various types of meetings, i.e., public, stakeholder, and neighborhood meetings that include all relevant stakeholders and public interests. He also states “initial inequalities of time, resources, expertise and information threaten to render the actual democratic character of these processes problematic, if not altogether illusory” (Forester, 1989, p. 9). Involvement at the local level will require new ground rules and new methods of decision making, different modes of speech and patterns of expression, current information regarding neighborhood issues, awareness of personal goals and interests, and a study of important structural and social conditions which may need to be strengthened (Corburn, 2003).

Krumholz reports from his experiences in Cleveland that “planners working with neighborhood organizations had to adjust to different styles of discussion and negotiation than they might have grown accustomed to in city hall” (Krumholz & Forester, 1990, p. 185). Commonly accepted rules and procedures governing activities in public meetings are different than those which operate in the neighborhood. Meetings with neighborhood residents may require off-hour scheduling, inconvenient locations, and other adjustments for differences in education and background. Informal expressions of emotions, unexpected confrontation, and issues regarding trust and respect make patient listening essential (Krumholz & Forester, 1990). In order to circumvent traditional planning culture and try new approaches at the local level, Krumholz used newly hired part-time planners for “special” projects that enabled him to break out of the institutional inertia (Krumholz & Forester, 1990, p. 24ff.; c.f. Allmendinger, 2002, p. 151).

Despite all these challenges, “One of the strongest arguments in favor of neighborhood planning is the fact that it has a public and a private side” (Krumholz & Forester, 1990, p. 187). There can be dialogue. Two sides, or perhaps several sides, can

engage in discussion and exchange information and preferences usually unknown to the other participants. Informal techniques seem better able to encourage participation at this level.

In sum, effective and inclusive public participation at different levels of society and in different settings requires alternative procedures, techniques, and methods. Unspoken but accepted pre-conditions and manners of communication will not be the same for all segments of society. As Glass (2007) has pointed out, participatory techniques need to be suited not only to the objectives of the planning agency, but to the character of the citizen groups themselves. Thus, at a minimum, public participation requires not only enabling legislation and encouragement by local government (Brody, et al., 2003), but it must fit the participants, and government must show a willingness to participate and evidence of a potential acceptance of the results. It requires skilled planners and mediators, and it must engender a belief that participation by the public will matter in the end (Krumholz & Forester, 1990).

**Developing Role of Public Participation.** An understanding of the place of participation in planning theory requires some appreciation of the background ideas that inform planning theories and the planning practices of which participation is a part (Allmendinger, 2002; Lane, 2005). Planning theory is a complex area with many competing systems and ideas, and a complete survey of this area would take us too far afield. There are, nevertheless, certain common elements and fundamental concepts in most planning approaches that can be utilize to describe the development of public participation.

As pointed out by Lane and Philip Allmendinger,(2002), planning theory, and hence concepts of participation, tend to reflect political and social currents of their time.

Theories are “historically contingent and dependent upon cultural, social, and political circumstances” (Allmendinger, 2002, p. 18). They follow the implications and the background philosophies of contemporaneous political theories and are realistically embedded in those theories. According to Friedmann, planning theory has been “cobbled together from elements which were originally intended for altogether different uses” (Friedmann, 1998, p. 245).

In the current political climate, many different realities, viewpoints, alternative life stories, goals and objectives are now recognized as valid (Brooks, 2002). The growing emphasis on more effective participation in the public sector has been part of a general trend toward more open democracy. Similarly, many additional actors and local issues have become important for planning purposes including private sector entities, neighborhood organizations, and social and cultural interest groups (Innes & Booher, 2004). Thus, emphasis on public participation has changed from minimal involvement in rationalistic approaches to a more pluralistic concept.

As planning theory has developed and changed, theories have not developed in a linear pattern such that one theory displaces another. Rather, various approaches have continued to exist side by side. Thus, rational theory continues to exist along with newer communicative approaches. And because of the exogenous nature of planning theory, it has been difficult to categorize the various approaches or to propose a unified theory of planning (Allmendinger, 2002; Faludi, 1973). Commentators agree that there is no one indigenous theory within planning (Allmendinger, 2002; Faludi, 1973). And, as Friedmann says, developing a single planning theory is “nearly impossible” (Friedmann, 1998, p. 247).

But, each theory or approach also undergoes changes and development and is

influenced by criticisms and challenged by newer ideas. And, each approach addresses similar basic issues as part of its theoretical structure such as defining what planning is and what planners do, how they will deal with political and institutional contexts, and the role of power and influence in planning (Allmendinger, 2002).

Lane has proposed classifying various theories according to schools of planning rather than as individual theories. A school would thus include an “approach to planning with a single, although often broad intellectual basis from which particular planning methods or models are derived.” He identifies three types: blueprint or design oriented planning, systems or rational or synoptic planning, and pluralistic methods such as advocacy and communicative planning (Lane, 2005, p. 287).

In addition to theoretical classifications, certain labels have been attached to various planning approaches in order to assist in negotiating the theoretical landscape such as rational, synoptic, normative, instrumental, positivistic, communicative, pragmatic, critical, etc. These labels provide a way of sorting through ideas and a vocabulary for discussion that is helpful in making comparisons (Healey, 1998).

**Planning and Social Theory.** Early planning practice tended to be either blueprint planning, i.e., based on an architectural approach that used a “map” or drawing of desired development, or rational planning based on problem solving methods adopted from the physical sciences. Subsequent planning theory in turn was affected by changes in social theory, and a change in the theory of knowledge itself. This has been expressed in social and political terms as a change from modernism to postmodernism.

A key difference between modernism and postmodern is the underlying epistemology. Modernism sees knowledge as objective and rational in both the determination of ends and means. Rational planning was partly based on the paradigm

of instrumental rationalism, i.e., the application of optimal solutions to achieve a clearly formulated public good. And thus, an important goal for rational planning was the formulation of a single common public interest or public good (Allmendinger, 2002; Faludi, 1973).

But the rationalistic approach created political and social uncertainties because it left many people out of the process, excluding them from the benefits of planning, and resulted in unacceptable consequences for those who had no voice in the process (Allmendinger, 2002). There was a mismatch between planning ideology and the real needs of people, a lack of effective participation, unrealized public expectations, and unanticipated problems in its wake (Allmendinger, 2002).

Postmodernism proposed that there is no true objective knowledge of reality, that all knowledge is relative, and that society is fragmented with different views of truth. The postmodern critique, and several subsequent approaches to planning affected by its critique, also contended that there is no single common goal or public interest. Rather, there are many different approaches, and many proximate choices to be considered in the planning dialogue (Allmendinger, 2002).

The value of postmodernism lies in its criticism of an excessive dependence on rationalism and its “critique of power and dominance” (Allmendinger, 2002, p. 181). Postmodernism stressed that differences are more important than a single collective interest and that public input needed to be part of the planning process (Stifle, 2000). However, postmodernism did not develop a distinct planning theory. Rather, it remained more of an approach to planning than a theory of planning (Allmendinger, 2002).

Another key social philosophy to influence planning theory was pragmatism which emphasized that planning choices should be made based on what works best



(Allmendinger, 2002). John Dewey, one of the early proponents of pragmatism emphasized the importance of knowledge and public debate in planning a common direction for society. Applications of the original concept of pragmatism in planning are varied and do not always retain the original emphasis on a unified goal. And, according to Allmendinger (2002), pragmatism seems to require the need for a highly informed cadre or an alternate forum of power. But the emphasis on knowledge, public debate, and “what works” resurfaces again in later social and planning theory especially in the US.

Pluralism underlies most social theory in today’s democratic systems. It emphasizes the existence of multiple groups of people with different cultural systems and stresses the important roles these groups have in society. Politically it emphasizes what can be called “fragmented power centers and inequality in society” (Allmendinger, 2002, p. 144). Pluralism has led to the development of alternate approaches to planning such as advocacy planning and communication theories. And, political activities, such as planning, have felt the need to address the many different social groups and arenas. Pluralism also proposed that effective interaction of these various interests and groups would result in improved policy (Allmendinger, 2002, Stiftel, 2000).

American planning practice tends to be a mixture of philosophies and approaches. “The pluralistic perspective on power relations, a practical emphasis upon problem-solving and the role of argument and communication provide the backdrop to planning in the USA generally” (Allmendinger, 2002, p. 123).

Thus, planning theories have provided different approaches at different times and for different circumstances, and no one theory can answer or address all problems that planners encounter (Stiftel, 2000). Allmendinger goes so far as to suggest that, if

necessary, the practice of planning can exist without theory. He also suggests that a multiplicity of theories may be an advantage since each theory has a different application and illumines different problems. Thus, no one theory need be adopted as final (Allmendinger, 2002). In reality, planners themselves often “cobble together” a personal approach or philosophy of planning and participation that utilizes several approaches that they believe will suit their needs rather than being committed to only one theory.

Over time, public participation has become an integral part of modern planning practice. “Whereas participation was previously considered a decision-making adjunct, all schools of the contemporary era view participation as a fundamental element of planning and decision-making (Lane, 2005, p. 296).

One way to organize the many approaches to participation as discussed in planning theory is to follow a simple central question, “What do planners do (Allmendinger, 2002)? Since it is the planner who is most often responsible for formulating and implementing procedures for public participation no matter which theoretical school the planner adheres to, the role of the planner is helpful in linking planning literature to participation in relocation. We will discuss the role of the planner more specifically below. At this point, with the above background concepts in mind and using the role of the planner as an organizing motif (and as a modification of Lane’s concept of schools of planning), this project proposes that various planning theories and their approaches to participation be organized into three groups:

- 1) technical and systematic approaches such as rational and systems planning, incremental planning, and mixed scanning;

- 2) advocacy, equity, and activist approaches that employ alternative strategies to bring outlying groups into the planning and decision making process, and attempt to

carry at least part of the planning process out into the community itself, and

3) communicative approaches that emphasize the role of the planner as communicator, the importance of discourse and communicative rationality, and the involvement of many actors, groups and forces such as political, social and economic.

**Technical and Systematic Approaches.** Rational planning has roots in the 18th century philosophy of realism which assumes the existence of a fixed objective reality outside the mind of the knower and in a systematic way of thinking. Thus, rational planning implies “taking intelligent, rational action” (Faludi, 1973, p. 35). Or, as seen by Forester, the rational planner asks, “how should we solve this problem rationally” (Forester, 1989, p. 49).

The problem solving method used by rational planners was first introduced into planning by Edward Banfield in 1955. It involved selection and elaboration of ends, designing possible courses of action, evaluation of consequences, choice of means from among alternatives, and implementation of a selected method. The approach has been described as simple yet “unachievable” because of the excessive demand for resources and expertise (Stiftel, 2000). However, according to Faludi’s who reflects a more contemporary view, “The aim of rational planning is not that of pursuing a distant ideal of total rationality, but of producing optimal results in given circumstances, which include the limited capacities of decision-makers” (Faludi, 1973, p. 267). He adds that the rational process enumerates only a finite number of alternative programs, evaluates them, and selects one using a set of accepted decision-making rules (Faludi, 1973).

Thus, rational planning “emphasizes logical and technical solutions to problems (and) identifies a singular goal and best options to achieving that goal” (Allmendinger, 2002, p. 53). As described by Amitai Etzioni, “An actor becomes aware of a problem,

posits a goal, carefully weighs alternative means, and chooses among them according to his estimates of their respective merit, with reference to the state of affairs he prefers” (Etzioni, 1967, p. 385). This approach took planning beyond the initial influence of architectural and engineering proposals by utilizing an adaptation of the “scientific” method for solving problems. And, it relied on the planner as a scientific or technical expert (Stiflel, 2000).

Faludi proposed that the main purpose for using rational planning is to present a good argument, i.e., to give a good reason for a proposal or course of action, (Faludi, 1973, p. 36). He notes that a rational argument may also be “constructed after the solution has been found. ... The criterion is whether the proposed solution stands up to criticism in the same way as one that was reached by systematic procedures” (Faludi, 1973, p. 117). In other words, for rational planning, a solution may be reached by systematic or unconventional means, and come from any source, but when it is critically examined, it makes sense, there are good reasons for it.

As with all planning approaches, there is also a political dimension to rational planning. In an ideal situation, political choices would “supplement analytical knowledge where there is not enough of it to make a final decision” (Faludi, 1973, p. 103). However, in reality, technical knowledge is far from complete, and knowledge and expertise are not always at the foundation of political decisions. Faludi recognizes this and notes that the key problem for rational planning is coping with limited information and the limited capacity for handling information, both on the part of planners and decision makers, what he calls “information overload” (Faludi, 1973, p. 105f.). In effect, this approach makes room for public participation in rational planning.

Another important component of rationalism is the relationship of means and

ends. Although some have criticized rational planning for focusing exclusively on means, “Only when both the ends and the means of actions are judged rationally, ... when it is both functional and normative, can planning be described as substantially rational” (Faludi, 1973, p. 173). Faludi contrasts rational planning with instrumentalism which he sees as action guided by theory whether or not it represents reality as it is (Faludi, 1973, p. 26).

Although criticized for neglecting forms of knowing and reason outside of the planner’s purview, rationalism remains an important part of all planning approaches. (Allmendinger, 2002). One specific advantage it that it incorporates scientific contributions from many sources such as economics, geography, and social sciences. But, within rational planning there also tends to be a “disjunct between individual and collective rationality, i.e., the need to render a decision based on a perceived public intent versus the sum of all individual preferences and goals” (Stiftel, 2000, p. 6).

Friedmann reflects a typical criticism. “The old planning model, rooted in nineteenth-century concepts of science and engineering, is either dead or severely impaired. Though still practiced, it has become largely irrelevant to public life” (Friedmann, 1993, p. 484). But rationalism is neither dead nor irrelevant, and as Allmendinger points out, it is, in fact, an important element of more recent communicative and collaborative approaches to planning especially those based on Habermas’ theory of collective rationality.

The basic consideration in applying rational methods to planning, according to Faludi, is “the scope of the problems to which rational planning should be applied” (Faludi, 1973, p. 150). In other words, rational planning is not suitable for all planning problems and the over extension of rationalism in practice may account for

some of the criticisms that have been mounted against it.

Allmendinger summarizes the formal criticisms of rational planning as technical and practical limitations, a distrust of government and professionals, excessive centralized control, and an unsatisfactory process for prediction (Allmendinger, 2002). With respect to participation, “rationalism” as a system has tended to exclude those not privy to expert knowledge, variables and choices which are viewed as rational or optimal by planners. This leads to conflicts between planners and the public, and questions about how choices regarding optimal solutions are made and what is preferable or better (Allmendinger, 2002).

Although Allmendinger says that rational planning is limited by political and technical concerns, and that public input consists of comments rather than joint solutions or working with various publics (Allmendinger, 2002), Faludi (1973), a contemporary rational theorist, has stressed the importance of public participation for enhancing the planning process (For an example of his ideas see Advocacy Planning below.) Thus, difficulties in utilizing public participation in a rational planning system may have more to do with the specific planning agency than the approach itself. The problem is not one of employing a rational approach to planning, which is essential for planning, but with the overextension of rationalism to areas where it cannot explain or predict what choices or solutions society will prefer, i.e., to areas where it does not work well. Thus, a more contemporary approach such as Faludi’s does not by itself present obstacles to participation.

If the limitations of rationalism are acknowledged, i.e., limitation of knowledge and the abilities of “experts,” and the need for input from public sources is recognized, rational planning can continue to be a useful approach to planning. The challenge will be

if the rational method will be able to include those who are usually left out of the process, and if the role of the planner could be extended to include new ways of gathering information and input from the public.

***Synoptic Planning and Legislative Mandates.*** Synoptic or systems planning, which dominated planning in the 1960s, generally represented a continuation of rational-comprehensive methods. It relied on the use of models to represent components of urban systems and on extensive use of quantitative analysis with only limited room for participation (Lane, 2005).

During this time, however, there were two important developments that led to more public participation: legislative requirements for limited public comment, and a consideration and gradual inclusion of outside interests in the incremental method of planning (Lane, 2005).

In the US, public participation was first mandated by the Housing Act of 1954 which called for “full-fledged citizen participation” (McGraw, 1955). This mandate was later expanded in the Model Cities programs of the 1960s and in environmental legislation in the 1970s. At the state level, public participation was first required in Hawaii’s growth management program in 1962. However, “most state growth management laws (requiring citizen participation) are vague, outdated, and general” (Brody, et al., 2003, p. 246). Nevertheless, these actions marked turning points in the role of the planner and in citizen participation (Lane, 2005).

***Incrementalism.*** Two alternatives arose in reaction to the dominance of rational and systems planning: disjointed incrementalism and mixed scanning. Growing dissatisfaction with planning by experts gained a conceptual basis when Herbert Simon introduced the problem of bounded rationality. This principle “recognized (the) limited

capacity of the human mind in comparison with the size of the problem we attempt to resolve” (Brooks, 2002, p. 97). These concerns as well as a recognition of the way planning proceeded in practice led Charles Lindblom to propose disjointed incrementalism or a process of “muddling through,” as a more realistic approach to planning (Brooks, 2002; Lindblom, 1959).

Incrementalism criticized the disparity between the requirements of synoptic or systems models, the capacities of technical experts and decision-makers, and the realities of the way planning was actually done. It claimed that the nature of planning was limited in terms of information, knowledge, and the human capabilities (Faludi, 1973). But it did not abandon the need for reason. Rather, it claimed that comprehensive synoptic planning was unachievable and politically impossible, that a comparison and assessment of all possible alternatives exceeded human abilities, that it was difficult to get agreement on the best alternative or goal, and that there was in fact no right decision, no one best solution (Etzioni, 1967; Stiffel, 2000).

“Incrementalism (sought) to adapt decision-making strategies to the limited capacities of decision-makers and to reduce the scope and cost of information collection and computation” (Etzioni, 1967, p. 386). Rather than a comprehensive analysis of alternatives based on a prior determination of goals, it proposed a simultaneous selection of goals and policies. It limited policy alternatives to those only marginally different from the existing status, limited the scope of analysis, considered fewer alternatives and only modest complexity of data, and showed a preference for experimental results over theory (Stiffel, 2000). It also acknowledged a plurality of interests rather than a single unitary interest and accepted limited decentralization of planning (Lane, 2005).



In practice, however, incrementalism tended to limit public input. Because public policies were based on immediate marginal utility of a decision, incrementalism restricted public input to more well connected factions and created conditions in which the more powerful were likely to prevail (Faludi, 1973).

**Mixed Scanning.** Mixed scanning was proposed by Amitai Etzioni (1967) as an alternative to incrementalism, and as a way to overcome the problem of information overload. It required two levels of decision making, a higher strategic level where fundamental policy decisions were made, and a lower tactical level where application of policies were worked out on an incremental basis (Etzioni, 1967). It proposed a process of collecting information, the “scanning function,” the formation of strategic or overall objectives, a practical level of implementation, and a procedure for interacting between the two. Thus, it distinguished between fundamental and incremental decisions (Etzioni, 1967).

Information received was filtered and processed at the higher level of the strategic framework. A problem solving program was then formulated based on that framework. A revision of the framework was possible as problems develop thus creating an iterative process between strategic and tactical levels. This allowed action to be taken without waiting for a full comprehensive investigation. If significant problems developed, one could go back to the strategic level and choose another solution which fit better (Faludi, 1973).

Planning organizations could “scan” their environments at different decision making levels, and choose from both tactical and strategic choices. However, mixed scanning was not concerned with achieving consensus. As a variant of the rational-comprehensive paradigm, the planner remained in control and citizen participation

remained limited. Although mixed scanning created a space for local or incremental decision making, local decisions were constrained by higher level strategic goals. It required only minimal changes to the role of the planner and input from the public (Lane, 2005).

**Advocacy and Equity Planning.** Advocacy, equity, and activist planning form a group of planning approaches whose aim is to promote a “more equitably allocation of society’s benefits” (Krumholz & Forester, 1990, p. 50). They “pay particular attention to the needs of the poor and vulnerable populations” (Krumholz & Forester, 1990, p. 210), i.e., those left out of the planning process (Checkoway, 1994). These approaches are also concerned with fairness for all groups rather than just one or two forgotten groups or the most powerful (Krumholz & Forester, 1990).

“In terms of participation, advocacy planning represents an important break from the traditions of the past. Public participation became a fundamental objective, rather than a marginal planning technique” (Lane, 2005 p. 293). Dissatisfaction with top-down planning that excluded many segments of the population, a “devotion to the physical plan” and the idea of a single public interest, and the dominating control of planning commissions led Paul Davidoff (1965) to propose an approach to planning modeled on the role of legal advocates who represented “clients” (Brooks, 2002; Clavel, 1994). He proposed that planners become “advocates” for various segments of society especially the unrepresented and powerless.

Davidoff proposed that within the community there were many different values and versions of the public good, and that therefore many proposals should be formulated and debated (Brooks, 2002; Peattie, 1968; Stiffler, 2000). Similar to incrementalism, he proposed that there was no one “right solution” (Marris, 1994). His unique ideas included

competition and debate involving several planning proposals similar to an adversarial approach in a court of law (Checkoway, 1994).

Advocacy and equity planning sought a more equitable distribution of power and resources. They attempted to correct power imbalances, to improve the bargaining position of low income citizens and working class by affording them access to political structures, to involve those most affected by planning policies, and to represent and advocate for the generally unorganized, unrepresented and most vulnerable urban groups (Krumholz & Forester, 1990; Lane, 2005). It advocated social and political pluralism and challenged the unitary model of society (Lane, 2005).

“The essence of advocacy was to ensure that unheard or invisible interests were articulated and, as far as possible, accommodated in decision-making ... Beginning with the assumption of political plurality, advocacy planners are essential facilitators whose central task is to either catalyze the participation of inarticulate actors, or alternatively, advocate their interests directly” (Lane, 2005, p. 293).

Davidoff's concepts put planners in a difficult position with respect to whose values and ideas they should represent. However, it did successfully argue that since there was more than one public interest, these interests could not be represented by a single comprehensive plan (Stiftel, 2000). It also inspired many planners to be more willing to consider the disenfranchised.

However, there were difficulties with the legal analogy since there was no judge, no rules of evidence or procedure, and no method for deciding between alternate plans (Marris, 1994). Advocacy also tended to operate outside the normal political system which meant that victories tended to be short lived (Susskind in Forester, 1994b). There was a need for a more permanent framework within which the process could function

over a longer period of time. As Forester notes, advocacy planners may still need to learn how bridge the gap between local and larger community interests (Forester, 1994a).

Faludi has proposed a unique variation to advocacy planning. According to Faludi “the key problem of existing planning organizations can be summarized as follows: there is an absence of discussions and confrontations of different views in the organization itself” (Faludi, 1973, p. 248). He suggested that the planners themselves, as well as advocates for other agencies, develop several different proposals for public debate.<sup>1</sup>

Debates of proposals would be open to the public and citizens could ask questions, learn important information, and challenge the proposals. Citizens would be able to examine background assumptions and goals proposed by the various plans from the debates. Following the debates, politicians could select a plan or ideas from alternatives (Faludi, 1973). Instead of proposals being prepared by marginalized or unrepresented groups who may lack the capacity to prepare these proposals, although they are still free to do so, the planning staff itself performs this task as part of its operating procedure. The public debate becomes the primary form of participation and would be open to anyone with an interest.

Faludi believed that this would reduce the burden on citizen groups in preparing separate plans and proposals. It would provided better definitions of important issues and alternatives, and important technical information for all citizens. “What is therefore required for pluralism is the participation of the planners” (Faludi, 1973, p. 250). If this were coupled with alternative procedures for participation, such as informal

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<sup>1</sup> This is similar to the “attic” debates held by planners on Krumholz’s staff in Cleveland (Krumholz & Forester, 1990).

neighborhood meetings, it could prove to be a very dynamic approach to public participation.

In spite of the limitations, advocacy has changed planning in several important ways. It has broadened the focus of planners beyond the physical or comprehensive plan, it increased the ways in which unrepresented and marginal groups can participate in the planning process, and it broadened the structural framework of the process itself (Clavel, 1994).

However, advocacy planning proved to be more difficult to implement than imagined. As with other approaches to participation, it was difficult to involve marginal groups in the planning process (Innes & Booher, 2010). “All sources agree that the people at the bottom of the social structure are very much harder to draw into the planning framework than the members of the middle class” (Peattie, 1968, p. 84).

Based on her experience in advocacy planning, Lisa Peattie suggested several reasons for this difficulty: the middle class participates because they believe they can affect the process and they have property interests to protect, while the poor have little sense of neighborhood, do not think they can affect the outcome, and lack community organization and local communication among themselves. Peattie notes that the poor do not “associate among themselves more than minimally” (Peattie, 1968, p. 84). The disenfranchised view planners and other assistance workers as outsiders and have difficulty in identifying common interests. And, the heterogeneity of city neighborhoods restricts the utility of advocacy on a wider basis (Peattie, 1968).

To overcome these problems, Peattie suggests an approach similar to the one advocated, and used, in this study. “Since it is so hard to draw the poor into planning, why should not the planner go out to them — gather data, take a poll, do interviews —

and on this basis draw up an advocacy plan? ... A meaningful set of opinions can only be gathered after a long process in which people are stimulated to consider new alternatives and understand their consequences” (Peattie, 1968, p. 85). This is essentially an ethnographic approach.

Experience with advocacy planning has led to new approaches (Clavel, 1994). On the one hand, advocacy has moved from addressing the whole “pluralistic framework” to working with distinct communities (Clavel, 1994 p. 147). And on the other, because of the difficulties of involving the poor, it now tends to emphasize issues which may involve not only the unrepresented by other groups within the urban community that can align with the cause (Peattie, 1968). In this sense, advocacy planning may become more useful as an advocacy of issues (Marris, 1994).

***Arnstein's Ladder.*** A related concept that deals with relationships of power and inequality was proposed by Sherry Arnstein. Realizing the poor performance of public participation in a US context, Sherry Arnstein (1969) proposed a “typology of citizen participation” based on examples from urban renewal projects, and anti-poverty and model cities programs (Figure 2.4).

Levels of participation and power are arranged as rungs on a ladder from non-participation to citizen control. Arnstein grouped the levels of participation into three categories or levels of citizen empowerment: non-participation, degrees of tokenism, and degrees of citizen power. She then compared the levels of participation in her study with these conceptual levels of involvement and assessed them in terms of their effectiveness.




Figure 2.4. Ladder of Citizen Participation (<http://www.tandfonline.com/>).

Her research showed that participation in most of the programs studied was happening on the level of consultation which she describes as a level of tokenism, or “inviting citizens’ opinions ... (with) no assurance that citizen concerns and ideas will taken into account” (Arnstein, 1969, p. 219). “According to this view, unless citizens have a genuine opportunity to affect outcomes, participation is centrally concerned with ‘therapy and ‘manipulation’ of participants (Lane, 2005, p. 284).

Arnstein ladder is based on relationships of power and inherently suggests that a redistribution of power would result in better participation and planning (Lane, 2005). However, this may not be a realistic approach since a redistribution of power does not necessarily lead to better results. It also overlooks the fact that power has many manifestations and there are other form of influence, not only political power, that may be factors in the decision making environment. There are also advantages and benefits

to participation aside from power relationships (Lane, 2005). And as relocation case studies show, it is possible to form beneficial partnerships even with unequal power relationships, a condition essential for relocation.

The ladder also assumes that decision making is a single final act in the planning process when in fact there are many complex and fluid relationships (Lane, 2005). Maier (2001) points out that participation is not a one-dimensional linear process, and proposes an alternative model of participation as one of concentric circles of influence, more like a pebbles in a pond. Each groups operates at different distances from the power center and affects decisions in different ways (Maier, 2001). As Allmendinger says, “No one person has control over the aggregate outcomes and process” (Allmendinger, 2002, p. 89).

Marisa Choguill (1996) reached a similar conclusion regarding the importance of local participation despite unequal power relationships in her study of projects in underdeveloped countries. In order to assess the usefulness of Arnstein’s ladder for underdeveloped countries, she reviewed nearly 700 reports of self-help projects related to housing and infrastructure. Although she agreed with the basic concepts of the ladder, she made three important observations: governments are reluctant to share power, local organization is needed for partnerships to work, and, more importantly, “at any level of the ladder, it is clear that people’s self-determination plays a significant role in the process of improving their own conditions” (Choguill, 1996, p. 443). In other words, local initiative can still be effective even when power relationships are unequal, *if* the community is organized and motivated to succeed. This shifts emphasis in situations where power relationships are unequal to the involvement and motivation of the local population.



These observations are important for relocation since relocated populations rarely have political power, and there is little evidence that governments and national agencies are willing to share power.

**Communicative and Collaborative Approaches.** A third group of planning approaches emphasize communication and collaboration. At present, this group lacks a unified theoretical approach and must be described in more general terms (Allmendinger & Tewdwr-Jones, 2002), but a common emphasis is the importance of communication and dialog, and the role of the planner.

The main purpose of communicative approaches is “to widen the involvement and influence of citizens and business in public policy” (Healey, 1998, p. 3). Friedmann, an early proponent of this approach, says, “Planning must be, and is increasingly becoming, a collaborative process” (Friedmann, 2007, p. 379). Forester sees communicative action as creating a “bridge from analysis to implementation” (Forester, 1989, p. 157). And Healy comments that the communicative turn in planning “arises from the search for more efficient ways of conflict management” (Healey, 1998, p. 12).

Like other approaches to planning, collaborative planning has its roots in social theory rather than in an indigenous planning theory (Allmendinger, 2002). “The communicative turn in planning is not simply a theory but a ‘world view’ based on a participatory perspective of democracy” (Allmendinger & Tewdwr-Jones, 2002, p. 12). The concepts expressed in collaborative planning occupy a place somewhere between social theory and planning practice (Healey, 1998). And their implementation depends on the “political culture” and the “institutional context” in which it operates (Healey, 1998).

Based on Habermas’ idea of communicative rationality, i.e., a collectively formed rationality, communicative planning theory advocates dialog, and mutual learning in

addition to power sharing (Healey, 1992; Lane, 2005). It emphasized understanding of others and recognizes “different types of rationality” as a basis for mutual action. It involves “negotiation, bargaining, and debate” (Lane, 2005, p. 295). It requires a discursive environment in which there are many different voices and rationalities, and a recognition that there is no one single best plan or common public interest (Healey, 1992).

Communicative theory attempts to reach agreement through the power of the “better argument,” and to discover solutions through interpersonal dialogue, a sharing of ideas, and understanding the limitations and responsibilities of other participants (Healey, 1992). It also respects the responsibilities of civil authorities, the expertise of specialists, the social and financial resources and commitments of other actors and groups, and encourages the use of local knowledge in the planning process (Healey, 1992).

Communicative rationality, in contrast to scientific rationalism which depended on the authority of experts and the exactitude of technical data, is “collectively constructed” through a process of dialog using multiple sources of information and experience. It does not deny but expands the notion of rationality to include different ways in which people understand and act in the world (Lane, 2005) in an attempt to search for new ideas, new insights and new ways of solving problems (Innes & Booher, 2010).

Although public participation plays a crucial role in communicative planning, this role is carefully circumscribed by three key notions based on the social theory of Jurgen Habermas: communicative rationality, collaborative dialog, and pre-conditions for communicative speech and “collaborative rationality” (Allmendinger, 2002; Innes & Booher, 2010; Lane, 2005).

Communicative rationality and collaborative dialog, as presented by Innes and Booher, depend on certain pre-conditions *and* on Habermas' rules for ideal speech. They identify some of the more important pre-conditions, which are distinct from the rules for ideal speech, as diversity, interdependence, the acceptance and application of preexisting agreements or "ground rules" for discussion, *and* close adherence to Habermas' ideal speech conditions (Innes & Booher, 2010). Additional procedural requirement for the process itself specify that dialog must be free of coercion and face to face, all relevant stakeholders must be included, knowledge must be shared and have shared meanings, all parties must have access to necessary information, special staffing will be needed, systemic or structural changes will be needed for long term outcomes to be realized, and parties must be persuaded by the force of the better argument (Innes & Booher, 2010).

Habermas' rules for ideal speech are similar to the conditions noted by Innes and Booher, but are fairly restrictive and require that speech claims be legitimate, accurate, comprehensible and sincere; dialog must be inclusive of all interests and knowledge; parties must have equal access to information and equal opportunity to speak; and all assertions are subject to challenge (Innes & Booher, 2010).

These requirements have led some critics to question whether these conditions are possible in "normal" planning situations (Allmendinger, 2002). And Innes and Booher admit that collaborative dialog may not be appropriate for all situations (Innes & Booher, 2010). Certainly, for local populations caught up in relocation, it would present significant obstacles.

Forester identifies "listening" as another practical but critical activity for communicative dialog. This means that the planner, or the planning staff, must

understand the meaning and context of what is being said. It involves asking questions, showing respect, and interpreting motives and hidden causes behind statements. He puts considerable emphasis on listening to the stories and painful experiences of citizens who may be communicating in unconventional ways. Planners can learn “as much from insightful stories as from social scientists’ studies ... “ (Forester, 1994a, p. 156). Stories, he points out, are the primary way for residents and local populations to communicate (Forester, 1999).

An important element in communicative planning is that issues and concerns involved in the creation of plans should be “taken into account at the start of developing a planning framework” (Healey, 1998, p. 13). It is a process that begins *before* decisions are made and continues as an ongoing form of involvement. “Participation should be seen as a multi-way interaction in which citizens and other players work and talk in formal and informal ways to influence action in the public areas *before* it is virtually a forgone conclusion” (Innes & Booher, 2004, p. 429). This is an important emphasis.

Collaborative planning has been criticized for a number of shortcomings well as several practical and theoretical limitations. Perhaps the most common criticism is that it is “vague and amorphous” in terminology and conceptualization (Allmendinger & Tewdwr-Jones, 2002, p. 7), i.e., the concepts used to explain the approach are highly abstract and implementation is vague. For example, Habermas’ ideal speech conditions may not be achievable and the role of the planner is unclear. Thus, some have wondered if it is only a “conversation among elites: or a real effort to involve multiple stakeholders” (Healey, 1998, p. 15)?

The actual participatory methods to be used are not detailed and it is unclear who can be invited to participate and how decisions will be made or consensus achieved

(Allmendinger, 2002; Allmendinger & Tewdwr-Jones, 2002; Brooks, 2002; Huxley, 2000; Lauria, 2000). Allmendinger remarks that there is a “need for some kinds of institutions, ” or institutional structures, and that communicative theory is weakest in terms of its institutional or structural design (Allmendinger, 2002, p. 190).

Another frequent criticism is that communicative planning ignores political realities, social institutions, and underlying antagonistic values (Allmendinger & Tewdwr-Jones, 2002; Lauria, 2002). It assumes that the “problems of democracy are best solved through argument” and ignores other alternatives such as bargaining and voting (Allmendinger & Tewdwr-Jones, 2002, p. 13). And it ignores other complex, difficult and routine tasks and situations faced by planners (Allmendinger & Tewdwr-Jones, 2002).

Political traditions of unequal power relationships may also prevent lower classes from taking part because of apprehension, lack of experience in participation, inability to meet pre-conditions, and a lack of representation. And there is an ever present tension between ideals, and practical and pragmatic goals, between various social and cultural issues, and between local citizens and political interests (Brooks, 2002; Foley & Lauria, 2000; Huxley, 2000).

In practice, communicative dialogue may be not only difficult to implement but consensus hard to reach. Power structures and dominant groups would be reluctant to agree to the “better argument” if it undermines their interests (Allmendinger & Tewdwr-Jones, 2002; Huxley, 2000). As noted by Foley and Lauria, “Any communicative processes introduced in the planning process faces the barrier of basic antagonisms due to differences in values and priorities” (Foley & Lauria, 2000, p. 226). They caution that planners must pay careful attention to social and political factors in the neighborhood. Thus, a significant question is “when and where collaborative techniques are

appropriate” (Allmendinger & Tewdwr-Jones, 2002, p. 6).

As a countermeasure to these obstacles, Innes and Booher recommend a conflict assessment be performed before initiating a collaborative process in order to determine what obstacles might be present. As a practical matter, this could be useful since collaborative action is most effective if it begins before decisions are made and positions are set in stone, when all sectors of the community can be represented early on (Innes & Booher, 2004).

In non-western cultures, there could be difficulty in translating these ideas into practice. Collaborative planning can easily represent an Anglo-American viewpoint with an “imperialistic dimension” especially in societies where winning the argument, rather than finding a mutually acceptable solution, is often the most important goal. The “better argument” is frequently determined by bargaining, shouting, and force. And, the preconditions needed for communicative rationality and Habermas’ ideal speech conditions may not exist (Allmendinger & Tewdwr-Jones, 2002, p. 14).

Relocation planners must also bear in mind some additional considerations when working in non-western cultures. For example, on the one hand, power and politics may hinder collaborative action. Yet on the other, the power of the state can vary from absolute to weak, and powerful groups within the society are often balanced and offset by other groups and social factors. In each society, there are many power centers and these vary from culture to culture. More significantly, informal and collaborative forms of participation are still largely unrecognized and may represent a threat to existing authority (Lane, 2005; Maier, 2001).

Perhaps the greatest hurdle for collaborative planning is the inclusion of marginal populations and social groups on the edges of society that are not part of mainstream

political and social processes, and of the local knowledge they possess (Innes & Booher, 2004). “It remains unclear how, or even whether, the voices, knowledge, and emotions of the marginalized groups can be integrated into collaborative dialogues without destroying the very features that make these dialogues valuable (Innes & Booher, 2004, p. 191). This can be a problem for both western and non-western societies.

Examples given by Innes & Booher where marginal groups and local knowledge were successfully incorporated depended on alternate approaches that were outside the general methods of collaborative planning. Local and neighborhood venues were used rather than public or stakeholder meetings; governmental authorities made initial commitments to accept collaboratively produced solutions; and ethnographic methods were employed to gather information and form relationships (Innes & Booher, 2004).

When working with marginal groups, there are special issues that must be addressed. (See below also.) For example, there are differences in communicative ability and language that need to be overcome. Disadvantaged groups may need help in organizing themselves and in selecting spokespersons and representatives. And they may need financial and technical assistance in order to participate. For these groups, limited time and money are primary concerns.

The challenge for collaborative dialogue and planning is to define how to realistically proceed, to identify who is invited or not invited, where and by what rules the dialog will take place, and how to include a “wider constituency” especially marginalized groups (Healey, 1998, p. 15). Allmendinger sees the goals of collective decision making and inclusion of all those who will be affected by planning as still in the future (Allmendinger, 2002).

**Participatory Methods Based on Field Experiences.** There are also “practical”

approaches to participation that have demonstrated success in the field. These methods are mentioned here not because they represent specific conceptual models, but because they are methods derived from planning practice and provide examples of successful participation strategies. We briefly mention three such representatives of these methods.

**Mediation.** A potential source for alternative procedures in participation is mediation. Robert Tuchman, a lawyer who for 14 years acted as a mediator for neighborhood groups affected by Boston's Big Dig, describes mediation as "coordinating meaningful public participation involvement over time" (Tuchman, 2005, p. 335). Tuchman describes his "philosophy" of mediation thus: "If you explain to people what's happening, and they feel that the process by which those decisions will be made is first, rational, and second, provides them an opportunity to be heard, they will ultimately concur with the conclusions reached" (Tuchman, 2005, p. 363). Tuchman used a practical set of ground rules that participants agreed to beforehand, for example, communicating with all parties, accepting the fact that participants will not get everything they want, and assuring each party that they will have a voice and each one will be heard.

Lawrence Susskind lists these basic steps involved in the mediation process: determine the issues — "when people understand the issues, it is a lot easier to get agreement" (Susskind in Forester, 1994b, p. 318), learn from each other and collectively gather information, get behind the public positions and statements of experts to hidden rationales and assumptions, understand and appreciate the assumptions, background thinking and feelings of the parties, and articulate consequences of certain courses of action (Susskind in Forester, 1994b).

Susskind also put together a set of mutually acceptable ground rules such as



having the power to determine agendas, focusing on the problem rather than “going at each other — The essence of the process is acknowledging the other’s needs as well as your own ...,” and obtaining mutual agreement and recommending common solutions (Susskind in Forester, 1994b, p. 343). Thus, both Tuchman and Susskind rely on a combination of informal methods and clearly articulated ground rules.

When working with unrepresented groups, mediation can also function more like advocacy as the mediator seeks to listen, to clarify problems and solutions, and to act as an advocate by defending and vigorously representing local interests. However, there are also limitations to mediation: 1) it is not always possible to have the right conditions for mediation, 2) mediation requires a broader framework for acquiring local knowledge and input than most participation methods, and 3) with mediation, there may not be any continuing institutional organization. In other words, when the process is completed, no continuing structure remains (Susskind in Forester, 1994b).

***Hester’s Neighborhood Analysis.*** For more the 30 years, Randy Hester (1975) has advocated the incorporation of user needs and the involvement of local citizens in neighborhood projects. According to Hester, “The design of neighborhood space must relate to the behavior pattern and values of the people for who the space is designed” (Hester 1975, p. 41). This echoes the much earlier advice given by Raymond Unwin to Columbia students in 1932. “I cannot stress too strongly at this time the importance of human people in studying the housing and planning of a community” (Unwin, 1967, p. 167).

Hester suggests four ways of obtaining information on user needs and of involving citizens: town meetings, interviews, questionnaires, neighborhood observations, and post construction evaluation. These steps combine both formal and

informal methods and planning as well as follow up studies. As part of neighborhood observation, Hester also utilizes behavior mapping, a kind of graphic observation and documentation, to discover and record the habits and “daily rituals” of people that are often not mentioned in surveys and interviews (Hester, 1993).

Another concept utilized by Hester is sacred spaces, a notion that was first suggested by a local resident. Sacred spaces are places of special importance and meaning which are woven into the life of the community such that their “loss would destroy some social processes” (Hester, 1993, p. 279). Sacred places are noteworthy because they are “almost universally unappealing to the trained professions” and are frequently overlooked even by the local population (Hester, 1993, p. 279).

Taken together, these steps provide a practical and effective guide for the inclusion of local residents in a design or redevelopment project, and represent an approach that is not often discussed in theoretical essays.

***Evidence Based Design.*** Another approach which has been gaining notice in architectural practice is evidence based design (EBD). As with Hester’s approach, and aspects of communicative planning, EBD is a process that begins *before* the formulation of a project plan and focuses on interaction with users and gathering the local information that they can offer to a design project. It includes specific elements: background research and assessment of the needs of project users, interviews and studies of users and user needs, translation of data into design guidelines, predesign analysis of site and program conditions, design and construction, and post occupancy evaluation. Although there may be some additional costs at the outset, there are other benefits that offset these expenses such as overall long term savings, both top down and bottom up expertise and input is utilized, and multiple data gathering methods

produces a more comprehensive plan (Verderber, 2005; Verderber & Refuerzo, 1999).

### **Key Themes for Participation in Relocation:**

Three themes in participation literature are particularly relevant for interpreting and assessing the participation of local populations in relocation: the role of the planner, incorporating marginal populations and local knowledge, and alternate participation procedures. These themes are closely linked and overlap in emphasis and implementation and are discussed in more detail below.

1. The role of the planner: The role of the planner is the key role in determining what procedures and methods will be used and how the participation process will be structured and implemented (Brody, et al., 2003). In relocation, there may not be a “planner” involved at the local level such as one would expect to find in the typical western planning processes. Yet the functions of the planner can be assumed by a local project manager or by relocation staff if they are properly trained, and are aware of relevant issues and how to proceed. A description of the features of this role are described below.

2. Incorporating marginal populations and using local knowledge: As discussed above, local populations subject to relocation will typically be marginalized populations on the edges of the larger society who do not normally participate in public meetings or political processes, and hence will be difficult to include in the relocation project. It will, therefore, require the use of informal techniques and the personal involvement of the planner.

3. Alternative participation procedures: The special circumstances of a relocation call for the use of alternative methods of participation and communication beyond the sole use of public meetings, and the formulation of creative procedures to improve

communication between relocation officials and relocatees.

**Role of the Planner.** The role of the planner is critical to participation. Without a capable planner who can design and implement an engaging process, it is doubtful that participation will be successful (Brody, et al., 2003). However, planning theory does not necessarily dictate or predict how planners will interact with the public (Faludi, 1093). Rather, participation programs depend on the active involvement and individual choices made by planners about how they will handle unique situations and what kind of participation programs they will use.

Maier (2001) describes the multifaceted role of the planner as managing conflicts, clarifying positions, and helping to resolve problems and reach solutions. It involves communication, gathering and providing technical and local information, drawings, and graphic representation of ideas, and of developing planning guidelines, policies, and comprehensive plans (Maier, 2001).

“In non-Euclidian planning,” i.e., communicative planning, Friedman points out, “The planner is placed in the center of the activity we call planning as a responsible professional. This suggests a new and more aggressive role for planers“ (Friedmann, 1993, p. 484). Effective “non-Euclidian planning” depends on planners as responsible, thinking urban professionals rather than faceless technicians engaged in the production of anonymous plans (Friedmann, 1993).

Forester describes the planner’s role as “communicative action” regarding the future and change in the public sphere (Forester, 1989). This role encompasses a wide range of activities and assignments such as project and program management, public administration, program evaluation, and policy analysis with planners working at local, regional, state, and federal agency levels in both urban and rural settings. (Forester,

1989).

Forester has put the goal of the planner's role quite succinctly. "Here lies a crucial practical and ethical issue for planning analysts. In a democratic society citizens should be able not only to find out about issues affecting their lives but also to communicate meaningfully with other citizens about problems, social needs, and alternative policy options" (Forester, 1989, p. 22). At the center of this exchange are the planners.

The communicative function of planners requires that they frame problems clearly and adequately rather than with a broad brush (Forester, 1989). Thus, a significant responsibility of planners is "asking citizens for reformulations and new proposals, rather than simply passing along solutions" (Forester, 1989, p. 23). Planners should make citizens aware of risks and opportunities, of disagreements and potential collective actions (Forester, 2006), and "anticipate and reshape relations of power and powerlessness" (Forester, 1989, p. 7).

Transactive planning, an planning approach proposed by John Friedmann, focuses specifically on the role of the planner. It requires a face to face "transactive" process between the planner and the public (Lane, 2005). Its central focus is participation and the empowerment of the public. Planners function as the central "conduit" for information, feedback, and dialog (Lane, 2005). As Friedmann sees it, transactive planning links "expert knowledge (and) experiential knowledge to achieve a greater rationality in decision-making" (Friedmann, 2007, p. 378). This creates a more inclusive approach "in which 'ordinary' people will gain a chance to influence the world they live in" (Friedmann, 2007, p. 378).

Given the emphasis on communication, planners will need certain abilities and

training for their role as communicators and facilitators such as the ability to listen, to probe and search for unspoken factors, to gather essential knowledge, and to mediate and negotiate (Faludi, 1973; Forester, 1994). Forester calls these “special abilities” involving diplomatic, listening, negotiating and mediation skills (Forester, 1994).

Faludi points out that public participation requires “special skills beyond those currently taught to planners” (Faludi, 1973, p. 289), and Forester also recommends that more be done in planning schools to “teach these competencies” (Forester, 2006, p. 454). However, theorists must also realize that such special abilities and interpersonal skills are rare (Forester, 1994), and not all planners are suited for this type of activity. In this sense, it may be better for each planner to consider what skills and abilities they might have and decide where they can be most effective. Further, not all planning activities involve deliberation or extensive involvement with the public. Many activities are purely technical and routine.

A study by Brody, Godschalk, and Burby (2003) regarding the relationship between statutory requirements and local effectiveness in participation identified several activities on the part of planners that encouraged more participation: time devoted to encouraging participation, range of stakeholders and groups involved, and a wider range of objectives. “When citizens see an opportunity to genuinely impact local decision making, they are more likely to participate in the planning process. ... (And) as expected, the use of techniques that tend to engage the public and allow for two-way exchange of information generate the highest level of citizen participation” (Brody, et al., 2003, p. 257). The authors noted, “Planners were able to encourage citizen participation most by providing information that was created by participants themselves” (Brody, et al., 2003, p. 259). However, this type of publicly generated information was only infrequently

utilized by the programs surveyed (Brody, et al., 2003, p. 259). “It is the view of this study that a more deeply rooted structural change in the role of the planner and the design of locally shaped participation programs is needed” (Brody, et al., 2003, p. 260).

**Inclusion of Marginalized Groups and Local Knowledge.** One of the most significant and difficult problems in participation is the inclusion of marginalized groups and utilizing the local knowledge they possess. “The biggest challenge remains creating workable settings in which face to face dialogues can include the truly disadvantaged in productive ways so their authentic voices can be taken seriously and local knowledge can be part of policy making” (Innes & Booher, 2010, p. 195). This is a call for an effective and relevant policy framework and specific procedures, as well as communicative techniques.

Maier sees that there are dangers as well as difficulties involved. “It would futile, and perhaps even dangerous, to introduce legal patterns and procedures which do not reflect the existing societal and political environment” (Maier, 2000, p. 716). This danger works in both directions affecting social and political structures of both the larger society and local setting. In a very strongly worded statement, as already quoted above, Innes and Booher offer a similar assessment. “It remains unclear how, or even whether, the voices, knowledge and emotions of the marginalized groups can be integrated into collaborative dialogues without destroying the very features that make these dialogues valuable” (Innes & Booher, 2010, p. 191).

A basic question to consider is what do we mean by local knowledge and who are these marginalized people? Local knowledge is knowledge gained by first hand experiences. It uses common sense, reflective and accumulated experience, and historical knowledge, rather than scientific testing and verification. And it is gathered

from the life experiences of those who live in unique local and cultural contexts and from local communities that have shared cultures, languages, norms and interests (Corburn, 2003).

Local knowledge “provides crucial political and technical insights often overlooked by professionals” (Corburn, 2003, p. 420). It can be used to identify unequal burdens and overlooked injustices, “additional decision-making considerations,” and low cost and effective solutions (Corburn, 2003, p. 429). Inclusion of previously excluded voices promotes a wider basis for acceptance of planning policy, and rectifies “the tendency towards reductionism in professional vision and policy” (Corburn, 2003, p. 427). Local knowledge also provides problem solving advantages. It re-identifies and redefines problems in local contexts, articulates “relationships often overlooked in generalized statements of a problem,” and uncovers previously unknown information and influences (Corburn, 2003, p. 427).

Yet studies show that “planning processes ... often fail to capture both the technical and political insights community members can offer” (Corburn, 2003, p. 422). A typical professional view is that the public needs to be educated before it can participate, and although the public may contribute insights and values, scientific experts retain authority over technical issues (Corburn, 2003, p. 422).

Epistemologically, planners and technicians tend to aggregate knowledge and exclude local information and local experiences thus missing the importance of local conditions (Corburn, 2003, p. 422). “Professionals continue to treat community members as largely ignorant of the technical and scientific aspects of hazards they face” (Corburn, 2003, p. 422). “Their voices are not acknowledged in scholarship or in planning practice,” but their inclusion is critical to achieving “collaborative rationality” (Innes &



Booher, 2010, p. 170). These voices “must be integrated into the dialogue” (Innes & Booher, 2010, p. 194).

But, as Innes and Booher indicate, “Genuine inclusion ... is difficult” (Innes & Booher, 2010, p. 195). Local citizens in marginal groups frequently “do not share the taken for granted background understanding of most of the other stakeholders” (Innes & Booher, 2010, p. 191). Income, time, the expense of participating in meetings, putting food on the table, language differences and manners of speaking, anxieties about not being treated with respect, and the lack of expertise or experience in participation and public meetings — all of these conditions hinder wider participation by local groups (Innes & Booher, 2010). In what might be regarded as a condescending statement, Innes and Booher say, “Their world is about farming, living on the streets, or managing in the wilderness. It is not about negotiations and learning professional discourses” (Innes & Booher, 2010, p. 193). Their conclusion is that “It remains unclear how, or even whether, the voices, ...” can be included (Innes & Booher, 2010, p. 191). This is a problem that calls for creative responses on the part of the planner.

Innes and Booher identify three general areas in which they believe improvement can be made: data gathering methods, identifying capable spokespeople, and keeping local people separate from stakeholders and experts (Innes & Booher, 2010). Local populations will also require help in building institutional capacity, acquiring relevant knowledge, funding, and public speaking (Innes & Booher, 2010). Although not a comprehensive solution, local groups may be able to participate by “proxy” voices who can be invited to address meetings “in their own way, without necessarily requiring them to stay and participate over time” (Innes & Booher, 2010, p. 191). And participants should be allowed to make use of stories and experiences and to explain conditions in

their world (Forester, 1999; Innes & Booher, 2010).

In working with local groups, Susskind calls for premeditation conferences for participants in order to “provide skill building training to all parties who need it,” for mediators to work with local people to help them gather information, to organize and to identify credible representatives and spokespersons, and for the creation of a “resource kitty” of common information for all participants (Susskind in Forester, 1994b, p. 327).

Examples of successful involvement of local groups illustrate several important features and show similarities to the participatory examples taken from actual relocations discussed above. For example, classic problem solving approaches were not working, problems had to be reframed and redefined and their fundamental elements identified, underlying issues had to be jointly identified, an education phase to learn about what was involved had to be undertaken, and parameters, rationale and reasons for each position had to be articulated (Forester, 2006; Innes & Booher, 2010).

In addition, articulate spokespersons had to be identified and take a representative role, classic survey methods had to be abandoned in favor of an ethnographic approach of listening and learning, planning functions had to be decentralized in favor of local efforts using residents working with experts, local variations in data collection had to be recognized and utilized, personal experiences and local knowledge from long term work in the field had to be incorporated into scientific assessments, and in some case standardized testing methods had to be augmented or abandoned. A key factor in these examples was that planners and experts had to show respect for local residents and promote cooperative action if they wanted to gain access to local knowledge and experience (Corburn, 2003; Forester, 2006; Innes & Booher, 2010).

These examples point to the necessity and logic of formulating a participation

strategy that “fits” the local population, and then engages local villagers and neighborhood residents in their communities rather than expecting residents to conform to the conditions and practices that are part of the world of planners and technical experts. This represents a fundamental challenge for planners if participation is to be truly inclusive of all citizens especially those who live at the edge of the general society.

**Alternative Procedures in Participation.** As Forester has indicated, participatory planning is born in conflict. “Public participation ... can be messy, unpredictable, and uncertain” (Forester, 2006, p. 448). It involves argument, confrontation, and debate (Forester, 1994a). And as Maier comments, “The process of involvement is a continuous struggle...” (Maier, 2001, p. 716).

In non-democratic societies, the process can be even more problematic and requires special efforts and considerations such as knowledge of the indigenous political culture and the characteristics of the local population. “Different political cultures produce very different kinds of planning.” The planning and participation policy should be “tailored to the traditions of that country” (Friedmann, 1998, p. 249). Thus, the creation of a viable and contextualized framework for participation is essential for keeping the process on track.

Unsatisfactory results in participation often begins with an inadequate assessment of existing conditions followed by an unsatisfactory framework or viable plan for participation. Brody, et al., report that the most common format for public participation is “formal public meetings” (Brody, 2003, p. 252). The typical framework for participation in most cases is minimal and consists of meeting statutory requirements for public hearings and meetings, collecting minimal information and opinions, and the presentation, explanation, and defense of predetermined proposals (Brody, et al, 2003;

Faludi, 1973; Maier, 2001). However, as Krumholz has pointed out, all the many forms and examples of planners interacting with government and citizen groups should be included in the definition and the structural framework for participation, not just public meetings (Krumholz & Forester, 1990).

Forester has proposed a list of goals for widening the process and addressing the inevitable conflicts: making resources and relevant information available, agreeing to rules of engagement and a common goal, hearing every voice and articulating all concerns, mediating between parties in conflict, and “shifting from adversarial to collaborative problem solving” techniques (Forester, 1989, p. 88). These are typical procedures for communicative policy but do not provide specific suggestions about how this might be achieved.

A typical weak point in participation strategy is that planners do not vary the methods of participation for each case (Glass, 1979). Brody’s study (Brody, et al., 2003) indicated that the types of meetings and techniques used in participation were critical and that formal public hearings engendered less participation than other techniques. “Opportunities for citizens to share their views in an *informal* setting seemed to encourage participation” (Brody, et al., 2003, p. 257).

Just as different planning theories can be advantageously applied to specific types of planning problems, there are a variety of different participatory methods, formats and procedures, and a number of roles for citizens, that are available to the planner and that can be used to design a strategy or plan to fit the local situation (Glass, 1979). However, there are no pre-determined formats telling planners exactly how to achieve these goals. As Forester notes, “Planning strategies must vary as cases do” (Forester, 2006, p. 449). There is no “one strategy fits all.” At different levels of

society and for different circumstances, different forms of planning and participation need to be utilized (Friedmann, 2007).

For relocation, planners can make use of examples from successful relocations, but will still have to exercise a great deal of creativity, and rely on direct contact with the local population in order to formulate an effective participation program (Krumholz & Forester, 1990).

## CHAPTER 3

### RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

#### **Research Paradigm**

The purpose of this study is to describe, interpret and assess the events of the relocation of El Gourna and role of villager participation in those events. The study is intended to delineate a wide scope of issues and identify key elements rather than concentrating on one or two variables, and to report the results in the voices of the participants as much as possible. This approach required an exploration of the experiences of the participants, of the issues involved, and an interpretation of events in a holistic and comprehensive manner. To achieve this goal, a qualitative and ethnographic research approach was selected because it best fits the intentions and special circumstances of the study.

Qualitative study has unique characteristics. Its objective is to provide “an interpretive explanation of the phenomenon being studied” (Alasuutari, 1995, p. 16). It seeks to understand the meaning of events and experiences in a holistic manner, to interact with the participants and see problems from an insider’s perspective, to understand the context of events, local conditions and processes involved, to “identify *unanticipated* phenomena” (Maxwell, 2005, p. 22), and to develop inductive interpretations and explanations (Maxwell, 2005). It allows the investigator to explore the nuances of the human environment and to provide a rich holistic description of human events and experiences (Miles & Huberman, 1994).

Qualitative research also has distinctive investigative characteristics. It occurs in a natural setting; the researcher acts as the main research instrument; it uses multiple

sources of information and inductive analysis; it is mostly verbal as opposed to quantitative; its main tasks are description and explanation; it retains the meanings attached by participants to the phenomena as much as possible; it is open to changes in the direction of the inquiry; and is interpretive in its conclusions (Creswell, 2009; Miles & Huberman, 1994). “To be genuinely qualitative research, a study must take account of the theories and perspectives of those studied, rather than relying entirely on established views or the researcher’s own perspective” (Maxwell, 2005, p. 46).

Ethnographic research has similar characteristics. “Rather than *studying people*, ethnography means *learning from people*” (Spradley, 1979, p. 3). “The essential core of (ethnography) aims to understand another way of life from the native point of view” (Spradley, 1979, p. 3). As with qualitative research, “The end product of doing ethnography is a verbal description of the cultural scenes studied” (Spradley, 1979, p. 21).

Ethnography depends on time spent in the field with participants, on verbal descriptions and observed data, and on documentary records (Singleton and Straits, 2005). It seeks to understand the entire scope of an issue, records actual events and experiences, is open ended rather than limited, and portrays and insider’s view as the basis of interpretation (Creswell, 2009). It also takes into account the experiences of the researcher living in the local setting and interacting with residents.

In ethnography, inference is an essential technique for developing conclusions about culture and in interpreting events. James Spradley observes that inference is fundamental to the way people learn about culture. They “observe other people, listening to them, and then make inferences,” and then reason from accumulated evidence and prior knowledge to new insights (Spradley, 1979, p. 8).

Clifford Geertz explains this distinctive use of description and interpretation as “thick description.” “What defines (ethnography) is the kind of intellectual effort it is: an elaborate venture in, to borrow a notion from Gilbert Ryle, ‘thick description’ ” (Geertz, 1973, p. 7). He points out that the analysis of culture, or, as in this case, a particular set of events in the life of a relocated population, is “an interpretive one in search of meaning” (Geertz, 1973, p. 5). “Rather than beginning with a set of observations and attempting to subsume them under a governing law, such inference begins with a set of presumptive signifiers (i.e., meaningful cultural symbols) and attempts to place them within an intelligible frame” (Geertz, 1973, p. 26).

As a case study, the project is a bounded inquiry limited by a single setting and set of events. It seeks wholeness and connectedness in the interpretation and reporting of a particular case, and it makes use of data from multiple sources. However, as with all case studies, generalizations and concepts drawn from the data may be limited in scope and application (Punch, 2005; Stake, 1995; Yin, 2003).

Thus, qualitative research, the ethnographic method, and case studies share many common features and fit together well. “Case studies and ethnographic research involve a detailed description of the setting or individuals, followed by analysis of the data for themes or issues” (Creswell, 2009, p. 184).

Several practical considerations also contributed to the decision to use a qualitative and ethnographic approach. Prior to this study, no overall study of the relocation had yet been conducted. Without such a study, it was not possible to identify specific issues for study or to have a precise view of the relocation as a whole. In addition, the local population was not inclined to provide useful survey information. They wanted someone to sit and listen to them, and to talk with them about their experiences.



A survey would have generated predictable and inauthentic responses. In addition, the randomness of daily life and the distribution of the residents within the new village made it difficult if not impossible to prepare a true random sample.

Thus, given the disposition of the residents, the nature of the events being studied, and the intent to provide a wide ranging study of the relocation, a qualitative and ethnographic case study was chosen as the best fit for these purposes and practical circumstances.

### **Research Preparation and Duration of the Study**

The idea for a study of the village of El Gournia began to take shape as a result of a studio project concerning the redevelopment of Luxor's Avenue of the Sphinxes. During the field portion of that project, students visited Luxor in February 2007. As part of a team of Egyptian and American students, we were introduced to Upper Egyptian culture, interviewed residents living in the redevelopment area, recorded observations and special features of the city, and became aware of relocations that were beginning to take place in Luxor as a result of redevelopment. I also learned about the relocation of El Gournia at this time.

After some preliminary investigations, I decided to make a study of the village. I made another trip to Luxor in June 2007, and in the summer of 2008 I traveled to Cairo to begin preparing for field work. My purpose was to become better acquainted with the Egyptian culture, to learn some basic Arabic, to determine how best to operationalize the project, and to make preliminary contacts and arrangements for an extended study.

In November 2009, I returned to Egypt to begin the field portion of the study.

While in Cairo, I made final preparations for moving to the Luxor area, and interviewed designers, project managers, and leading residents of El Gournia who also lived in Cairo part time. These sources provided important information about the project as a whole.

In late January 2010, I relocated to the village of El Geziira on Luxor's west bank and lived there for the duration of the project. El Geziira is close to El Gournia which enabled me to make frequent visits to El Gournia and to gain first hand experience of the local culture. I remained in El Geziira until February 2011 when I returned to the US.

Total time in the field during this last phase was 1 year and 3 months.

**Pilot Study.** Since it was not possible to conduct a pilot study in El Gournia itself, a study of Arab students was conducted at Clemson University from January to April 2009. The study had several goals. First, it was intended to improve research and reporting techniques that would be used during field work, and to gain a better understanding of the culture and characteristics of Arab students as a preparation for interviewing Arab residents in El Gournia. The focus of the study was the cross cultural experiences of the students, and the observations and personal adjustments that they had made since coming to the US. The study was part of a project in ethnographic methods at Clemson University. The procedures and final report were critiqued by a professor of anthropology at Clemson.

### **Methods of Investigation**

Wolcott points out that the research methods for qualitative research are "ordinary and everyday" (Wolcott, 2001, p. 86), and that the "data consists essentially of rather everyday stuff collected in rather everyday ways" (Wolcott, 2001, p. 96). The primary techniques involve listening and learning from the participants. In qualitative

work, the methodology is most clearly revealed in the narrative descriptions and inferences provided by the study rather than by specialized techniques (Wolcott, 2001). Nevertheless, the study followed specific procedures that are described below.

**Research Setting, Units of Analysis, Types of Data.** The principal setting for the study was Luxor's west bank and included the villages of old Gurna and new Qurna although interviews were conducted in Cairo, Luxor, and El Geziira as well. Informants for the project were primarily the residents of El Gurna who had been relocated to new Qurna, but also included other participants as listed in Figure 3.1. Information was collected about their experiences and recollections, about the history and customs of the village, about the meaning of the events and activities of the relocation. Interviews involved the following groups of participants:

1. government officials and representatives
2. architects, designers and planners employed by the government to work on the relocation project
3. village leaders
4. special representatives appointed locally to assist in the relocation project
5. residents who lived in old Gurna and were relocated to new Qurna
6. other local residents who had lived in old Gurna but had moved elsewhere before the relocation, or who were living on the West Bank, but not in El Gurna, but had relatives and friends in El Gurna
7. archeologists, other scholars, and full time residents who lived on the West Bank and had studied the village extensively.

Dates of interviews:

Dec. 6, 2009 to Feb. 2, 2011 (One interview on  
March 4, 2009)

Sources interviewed: TOTAL	46
Government officials and representatives:	4
Architect, planners and designers:	3
Village Leaders:	3
Residents of Old Gourna:	22
Groups: 3 each, a net of 7 additional sources not grouped elsewhere	7
West Bank residents: Egyptians (5) and non-egyptian (2).	7

Average age of Sources: 40

Location of Interview:

Office or business:	12
Residence:	16
Public place:	3

Gender of participants:

Men (in office or place of business)	12
Men by themselves at home:	7
Mixed groups at home: Men, women, children, neighbors:	9
Women as primary interviewees:	3

Residences of Sources:

West Bank:	40
Luxor:	3
Cairo:	3

Educational Levels:	
University:	15
Diploma or equivalent:	7
Basic:	13
Little or None:	10
Unknown:	1
Occupations:	
Government	3
Professional	10
Land or Business Owner	7
Shopkeeper	2
Employee, Office worker	3
Farmer	1
Mechanic	1
Laborer	7
Artisan	3
Archeology	1
Tourism: Guides, Hotels, etc.	0
None or Unemployed	4
Unknown	4

Figure 3.1. Sources Interviewed.

Since the aim of qualitative research is to determine “what things meant for the participants” (Spradley, 1979, p. 95), multiple sources were used to develop a comprehensive description of actual events and the meanings of these events. Information was gathered from interviews, group meetings, casual conversations, documents, observations, and personal experiences of daily village life. Information was

recorded and transcribed in verbatim format as far as possible. Multiple sources, such as other participants, documents, casual conversations, and local activities and events were used to confirm or challenge reports and observations. The steps listed below describe the process of collecting and analyzing data for the study.

**Sampling.** Selection of participants for the study was generally purposive, i.e., sources were “deliberately” selected for their knowledge and experience of the relocation, sources that would “best help the researcher understand the problem” (Creswell, 2009, p, 178; Maxwell, 2005). Four initial interviews were conducted in Cairo involving designers, project managers, and village leaders who also lived part time in Cairo. In the Gournia area, sources were purposively selected at the beginning of the research. Additional sources were developed through referrals and introductions, by encountering residents during walking tours, and by visiting different areas of the village. (See Chapter 6 for a description of the new village.)

**Interviews.** Interviews were open ended and exploratory. The intent was to encourage informants to provide detailed information about their experiences and to gather comprehensive information from the residents.

A list of questions was prepared for each interview or group of participants as a guide for the interview (Appendix A). It also included semi-structured questions that focused on specific issues of interest. As the study progressed, questions were revised to account for new information and new areas of investigation. It should be noted, however, that it was only possible to ask 1 or 2 fundamental, or “grand tour,” questions (Spradley, 1979), from each group of questions since the informants tended to speak at length. However, the prepared lists of questions provided a helpful check list for the direction of the interview so that as much information as possible could be collected

during the time allotted.

For example, when a source was asked a “grand tour” question, the response would often go in unpredictable directions. As the informant talked, I would ask, from the prepared list and depending on the area of interest, more specific questions. By proceeding in this way, sources would usually cover the most important items on the list of questions. But many times they would focus on two or three issues that were important to them. I let them talk about these issues because if they were important to the source, they would be important for understanding the relocation and the personal, social and cultural background conditions.

Interviews were conducted in several locations, e.g., in an office, a place of business, in the home of a source, usually sitting outside on the mastaba benches, or in a public place such as a cafe, and lasted about 1 1/4 to 1 1/2 hours. Interviews in offices and places of business involved professionals, government officials, and business owners. Although several attempts were made to involve female professionals and officials, only male respondents were available for these interviews. Interviews conducted in the home of a source(s) were varied in format and followed family customs. In some homes, men who were being interviewed sat together in a separate room for visitors with the women or children entering occasionally to bring tea, cake, or other refreshments. In others, the custom was more open. The interview would be held in the main sitting room of the home, or outside, with men, women, children and often neighbors participating. In these types of interviews, opinions were expressed by anyone in the group including women, children and neighbors. In a similar fashion, interviews involving focus groups included the respondents as well as members of the family, visitors, neighbors and friends living nearby.

All of these voices were recorded and became part of the written transcripts. Thus, the total number of persons who actually contributed information to the study is more than the number of “official” sources (Figure 3.1, above). Only one of the interviews conducted in a home had just one person present, an antiquities guard who had limited time and needed to return to work. All other interviews in homes, or outside on the benches, had at least 2 or 3 persons and sometimes as many as 10 or more.

Interviews were recorded with permission and written verbatim transcripts were prepared from the recordings. No surveys or generalized questionnaires were used in the study.

**Observations and Casual Conversations.** Observations of village life and activities were made in new Qurna and in surrounding villages and towns. In addition, the personal experiences of the researcher gained from daily living on the West Bank and from participating in local activities, such as shopping in open air markets, attending festivals and weddings, and visiting families and the homes of residents and friends, proved to be invaluable in establishing a rapport with the villagers, in understanding of the local way of life, in gaining access to a wide range of residents, and in encouraging residents to share their experiences and feelings. Observations were documented by means of field notes and photos, and clarified by means of casual conversations and further interviews.

Notes from casual conversations in markets, public places, and homes of residents furnished additional useful information. These conversations provided a more complete understanding of information gathered from interviews and an opportunity to discretely crosscheck information from various sources.

**Walking Tours.** The researcher, alone or accompanied by a translator or a local



resident, conducted several walking tours of the village. These tours provided useful information about conditions in the village not gained through interviews. Conversations that occurred while walking in the village were recorded with permission, photos were used to document conditions, and personal experiences were recorded in field notes. The tours were important sources of additional information and insights and were used in the narratives and analysis.

**Documents.** Access to documentary information was limited as explained in Chapter 6. Documentary information concerning the historical development of the village, important events during the relocation, and comprehensive development plans prepared over the years primarily for Luxor, which included some studies of El Gourna, was graciously provided by Caroline Simpson (2000, 2003, 2008a) and the published and unpublished work of Kees Van der Spek (2000, 2003, 2008). Other documents as described in Chapter 6 were obtained from the Director of Housing in Luxor, from Archplan consultants in Cairo, or from personal sources.

Published document such as the Abt master plans for Luxor (2000a, 2000b), guidelines and critiques of settlement plans (ADB, 1995, 1998, 2009; IDB, 2002; World Bank, 2001, 2002; Yousry, 2004), art work, media accounts and interviews, villager petitions, and government pamphlets and maps that had been disseminated to the villagers were acquired from original sources or from the internet and are used in the study. Official government documents were not available to the public.

**Field Notes, Memos, Photos.** In addition to the above, other records were kept in the form of field notes, project charts, research memos, small vignettes of experiences in the villages, and photos. Taken together, these sources and procedures provided additional help in understanding the context of village life, and the meanings of local

activities and descriptions provided by the residents. They also proved helpful in confirming and clarifying verbal accounts (Alasuutari, 1995, Hester, 1975, 1985; Verderber & Refuerzo, 1999).

### **Processing of Information**

Information collected was processed using standard qualitative methods of coding or “chunking,” sorting, and classifying material into categories. Interpretive themes were developed from patterns in the data, by making connections between events and experiences, and by formulating causal explanations and interpretive statements some of which were articulated by the participants themselves. Conclusions were developed from insights generated during the processing of data, and the analysis and identification of themes and concepts.

**Chunking, Coding, and Sorting.** A set of 10 descriptive codes was prepared and continually edited and revised as new information was gathered (Appendix B). As the research progressed, additional new codes were developed and main headings were divided into subcategories. Information was sorted into these descriptive codes and then into topical subcodes for analysis. Documents and other sources of information were placed in general classifications using the master list of codes (Maxwell, 2005; Richards & Morse, 2007).

**Analysis.** Analysis began early with the creation and processing of transcripts and the assigning of descriptive codes. It continued during the sorting of information into topical categories and themes (Richards & Morse, 2007). Interpretive concepts and critical observations were developed by abstracting and generalizing from the data, i.e., by seeing connections and patterns, and by analyzing and abstracting concepts and

forming conclusions.

From the topical categories, a process of inductive analysis was used to identify patterns and themes, important concepts, connections, comparisons, contrasts, and to develop interpretative and explanatory concepts. Topics of interest and the main concerns of the participants were given special attention. Concepts were then organized into larger categories and structural themes, and used to describe and develop a coherent explanation of the relocation and experiences of participation (Lofland & Lofland, 1995; Maxwell, 2005; Miles & Huberman, 1994).

As interpretive concepts and ideas were being developed, they were discreetly tested by seeking confirmation or denial in subsequent interviews, casual conversations, and observations, and by being compared with information gathered from other sources (Punch, 2005; Richards & Morse, 2007).

Comparisons with existing literature are found primarily in Chapters 9 and 10 (Wolcott, 2001, p. 76). An effort was made to insure that inductive, or “grounded,” interpretations were developed from the data rather than from outside sources. “In qualitative research, inquirers use the literature in a manner consistent with the assumptions of learning from the participant, not prescribing the questions that need to be answered from the researcher’s standpoint” (Creswell, 2009, p. 26). Background literature has also been used to situate the study within a broader context (Wolcott, 2001; Chapter 2), to illumine findings, and to “compare and contrast with the results — or themes and categories — to emerge from the study” (Creswell, 2009, p. 27).

**Conclusions.** Explanatory propositions and generalizations were developed to explain overall relationships and to summarize the process of relocation and the role and forms of participation. Summaries, conclusions, and policy recommendations were

formulated based on insights acquired during the processing and analysis of information collected (Creswell, 2007; Miles & Huberman, 194; Richards & Morse, 2007; Wolcott, 2001).

### **Bias and Validity.**

Bias and validity are related threats in qualitative research and can be summarized by two questions: How do I know that the data is reliable? And, how do I know that the analysis and conclusions are logically derived from the data (Maxwell, 2005, p. 105)?

Since the researcher was at least partly immersed in the life and experiences of the residents, in their activities, feelings, and interpretations, and was privy to their intimate hopes and disappointments, it seems logical to accept that some bias will be impossible to avoid. However, certain measures were used to reduce the effects of bias and strengthen the validity of the study. These are summarized below and can be observed in the chapters on reporting and analysis.

Textbooks on qualitative methods handle the problems of bias and validity in different ways (Creswell, 2009; Maxwell, 2005; Tashakkori & Teddlie, 1998; Wolcott, 2001). The potential threats and guidelines provided below follow Maxwell (2005):

#### *Potential Threats:*

1. researcher bias
2. reactivity: the influence of the researcher on the sources
3. the effect of translation
4. the validity of the reporting
5. the validity of concepts and conclusions
6. the interpretive nature of verbal data

*Methods used in this study to limit bias and to establish validity:*

1. establishing clear and factual evidence from multiple sources, and comparing information obtained with that from other sources
2. verbatim recordings and transcripts
3. asking important questions more than once, in different ways, and from different angles during an interview
4. creating a clear chain of evidence
5. obtaining feedback from subsequent interviews and conversations, and testing information and concepts
6. comprehensive description and detailed reporting of events and conditions of the relocation
7. reporting and testing negative and alternative opinions
8. sufficient time in the setting to becoming accepted and known in the village, approximately 1 year and 3 months
9. utilizing a qualified translator who was trained for the project, i.e., taught about the objectives of the project, special terms and conditions, and what was expected from him/her
10. debriefing the translator after each interview.

## **Reporting**

Detailed description is essential in qualitative study since the interpretation of data relies extensively on verbal information and observations (Richards & Morse, 2007; Spradley, 1979). The reporting of information and the formulation of final interpretations contained in this study involved a series of iterative steps, i.e., description, analysis, explanation, development of insights and interpretations, and continual checking and testing of the formation and the overall interpretive themes (Creswell, 2009; Richards & Morse, 2007; Stake, 1995; Yin, 2003).

The reporting of events and experiences includes a significant amount of descriptive material in order to preserve the context, meaning, and voices of the participants in their original form as far as possible (Punch, 2005). Based on this first person data, the reporting then moves from descriptions of particular events to summaries and explanations, and identifies connections, concepts and themes that appear in the descriptive data. Chapters 4 to 7 makes extensive use of the expressions and wording of the residents.

An important issue in ethnographic studies is the distinction between emic and etic approaches in recording and reporting information (Alasuutari, 1995; Pelto & Pelto, 1978, Richards & Morse, 2007). An emic approach uses native wording and a local perspective to describe an understanding of the world from the local or native viewpoint. An etic approach involves explanations provided by the researcher of verbal and behavioral data. It adds interpretation to the data and may also reveal so called “hidden,” or deeper, and more universal meanings contained in local speech and activities. An etic perspective takes into account the need to transfer meanings and useful insights from the local context to a different or more universal perspective. It provides explanations for a larger audience. It can also be used to overcome inaccuracies in first person reports and statements. But, if not used properly it can overcome and change native meanings to the perspective of the researcher (Pelto & Pelto, 1978).

An ethnographic report should utilize both approaches in moving from the descriptive data to generalizations and conclusions. The use of these approaches in the proper proportion depends on the judgement of the researcher and on the case at hand. This report generally favors an emic perspective in order to capture and retain the real words and experiences of the residents. The etic perspective has been used sparingly,

for example, to record insights, to point out key factors and issues, to provide explanations, and in the formation of conclusions.

### **Special Issues**

**Research Team.** Qualified translators were used for each interview, except for a few interviews with fluent English speakers. Each translator was debriefed following an interview session. They also reviewed each recording and provided additional translation notes.

**Passages and Quotations.** There are two program notes for the reader regarding the descriptive quotations. The reader may encounter as many as three or more voices in a quotation as the conversation moves from person to person: the researcher, the translator, the respondent, and sometime to other persons present. As a result, the pronouns used in the text may change, but the information reported is not affected.

The text uses “Gourna” and “Qurna” to distinguish between old and new villages. Both spellings are transliterations of the same Arabic name and are used commonly in the West Bank. They are easily recognizable by reader or visitor. The symbol “Q” for Quella (German for a primary source) is occasionally used in quoted material in order to protect the confidentiality of a source.

**Arabic Transliterations.** Transliterations of Arabic words into English follow the conventions of pronunciation and spelling as found in local use in El Gourna and the West Bank itself. They would be readily recognizable and easily pronounced by a foreign visitor in the Luxor and West Bank areas. They may differ from spellings used in other sources since they are based on popular usage, and since in practice transliterations

can variably considerably.

**Clarifications and Delimitations.** The scope of the study is limited to the events of the relocation, the role and dynamics of participation, and information provided by the sources. Many interesting research topics involving economics, sociology, psychology, history, and anthropology, and issues such as the importance of place attachment and the phases of social adjustment, are outside the scope of this research. However, they are discussed to the degree that they were encountered and mentioned by the participants in the interviews.

The study does not assess the long term effects of relocation. And the transference of concepts, perceptions and feelings from one culture to another and from one location to another may also be limited. However, the results may be applicable to relocations under similar conditions and with a similar population such as are planned for Luxor.

**Rights of the Participants.** A description of the project and its purpose, and the rights and protections of participants as provided by the Clemson University Internal Review Board were explained and clarified in Arabic and English with the informants before beginning the interviews. Each participant was furnished with a written copy of this information in Arabic, and permission to be interviewed and recorded was obtained (Appendix C).



## CHAPTER 4

### A SHORT HISTORY OF THE EL GOURNA SETTLEMENT

An fundamental task of qualitative case study is the preparation and presentation of a narrative account of the case itself (Alasuutari, 1995; Creswell 2007, 2009; Maxwell, 2005; Pelto & Pelto, 1978; Spradley, 1979). For the study of El Gourn, a working knowledge of village life and of the relocation itself was essential for interpreting events and experiences in light of local conditions, and for assessing the relocation and the role of villager participation. Chapters 4 to 7 provide such an account beginning with the settlement of El Gourn through the events of the relocation to life in the new village. Chapter 4 describes the settlement and history of El Gourn prior to relocation, Chapter 5, characteristics of daily life in old Gourn, Chapter 6, events of the relocation, and Chapter 7, life in the new village.

This chapter, Chapter 4, addresses two important historical questions: When did the Gourn people first settle in the West Bank? And, how did they come to live in the caves and tombs of the Theban mountains? It also provides background information regarding three key issues in the study.

1. Why were the residents so strongly attached to their homes?
2. What was the relationship between the residents, the archeological excavations, and the tourist trade? (Were the residents actually tomb robbers?)
3. What kind of information was available to relocation officials from local sources as background for planning the relocation?

Chapters 4 and 5 together are also useful for comparing the daily life of the residents before and after the relocation. The stories and remembrances reflected in

these chapters are the kinds of stories referred to by Forester (1989, 1999) that reveal the needs and concerns of people and form a context for communicative action.

### **The Settlement of El Gournia**

El Gournia was located on the West Bank of the Nile opposite Luxor in Upper Egypt (Maps 1.1, 1.2, & 4.1). The West Bank is a large agricultural flood plain bordered on one side by the Nile and on the other by the Libyan, or Theban, mountains. Both ends of the valley are narrowed by the mountains as they approach to the Nile.



Map 4.1. Google Map of West Bank (retrieved August 18, 2011).

The geographical setting created a well protected and fertile agricultural valley,


perhaps one of the main attractions for the Pharaohs themselves. Until the building of the High Aswan Dam, annual Nile inundations brought rich new soil to the valley every year. Warm temperatures, abundant sunshine, fertile soil, and a large flat agricultural plain that could be easily watered from the Nile made this a very desirable and productive site.

In ancient times, elaborate and highly decorated tombs for the Pharaohs and their families were carved out of the limestone rock in the wadis and narrow valleys of the adjacent mountains. These areas became known as the Valley of the Kings and the Valley of the Queens. In contrast, tombs for nobles and high government officials were dug in the dry valley floor, in the very gradual ascents, and in the cliffs and ledges of the mountains facing the Nile just beyond the edge of the agricultural valley. This area is called the Tombs of the Nobles.

Occasionally, even high ranking foremen and workers from Deir el Medina, a worker's village hidden behind the hill of Gournet Mar'ii, dug tombs for themselves in the vicinity of the worker's village and are only now being discovered. Centuries later, the village and hamlets of Old Gournna were gradually built on these elevated areas, and in some cases over the Tombs of the Nobles themselves.

In addition to creating burial sites, the Pharaohs constructed temples, palaces, and even a hunting preserve and an artificial lake, in a long line of structures from the upper end of the valley almost to its southern extreme, where the fertile valley floor meets the edge of the desert (Map 4.2; Int 17). This line of temples and palaces is perhaps the largest assemblage of ancient religious and royal structures in the world and is still mostly unexplored. The activities of the West Bank required a great number of workers and attendants to keep the many operations going. They worked the farms, cut

and decorated tombs, serviced temples and palaces, tended to royal personages and activities, and otherwise supplied the requirement of daily life on the West Bank (Int 17). These activities are documented on the wall paintings in the Tombs of the Nobles. Far from being a sparsely inhabited land of the dead, it was a very active setting.



Map 4.2. Tombs, Temples and Palaces of the West Bank ([http://home.pi.be/~evdleene/images/egypt/map\\_westbank.jpg](http://home.pi.be/~evdleene/images/egypt/map_westbank.jpg)).

Written records concerning post-Pharaonic settlements on Luxor's West Bank

are sparse. After the end of the Roman period, the area around Luxor diminished in significance and little is known about it until the Coptic era. As Egyptian Copts<sup>2</sup> began fleeing from Roman persecution, they settled in desert areas such as the West Bank and built monasteries and small villages near or in the ruins of Pharaonic temples (Simpson, 2008).

During this time, there was a significant Coptic population on the West Bank and some Coptic settlements in Luxor on the east side as well. By the time Arab settlers arrived, Coptic populations had declined significantly, in part due to an outbreak of the plague, although some small Coptic communities remained in the West Bank around the temple sites of Seti I, Ramses II, and at Habu village (Int 17). About 24 Coptic families were still part of Old Gournna at the time of the relocation and a Coptic “monastery” is still in use at Malqata in the desert to the south of Gournna (Map 4.2).

Traditional accounts of the Gournawii, as the local residents are known, mention that when the Arab settlers first arrived Copts were using the caves and unfinished tombs, but it is unclear if they lived in them or if they used them for other purposes, such as storage, since they had already built structures next to these ruins on the elevated sites (Simpson, 2008).

**The Settlement of El Gournna According to Local Sources.** Since an important aspect of this research is to learn about El Gournna and the relocation from villagers, the following section portrays the history of old Gournna as told by local sources. It is not always possible to verify these stories, but they are important because they form the constructed reality of the local residents and help explain their reactions to the

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<sup>2</sup> Copts: Egyptian Christians

relocation.

The first settlement of the village itself begins somewhere in the middle of the 18th century, or perhaps earlier, when a small group of Arab settlers migrated from areas around the Faiyum Oasis, about 200 km. southwest of Cairo, to the agricultural plain on Luxor's West Bank. Early records indicate that a small settlement was formed around the Temple of Seti I (Map 4.2; Simpson, 2000). This seems to have been the first site settled by the migrating Arab families (Simpson, 2000, 2003) and also contains older ruins of a prior Coptic settlement.

According to traditional legends, three brothers, Harb, Attiya, and Rhaba, or as related by other residents, a man and three sons (Int 20, 23, 26), settled near the temple of Seti I about 200 to 250 years ago. Three of the five Najua<sup>3</sup> of El Gourn, El Horobat, Al Attiyat, and El Rhabat, descended from these three brothers (Int 4, 5, 19, 20, 24, 27). A local village leader tells this story of the settlement of the village.

They came maybe before 200 years. They were living in the farms, in the agricultural area of old Gourn just in front of the mountain. And they left the farms and came to the caves in the mountain. And they gradually moved to the mountain.

When they started in the farms, they would live in small tents. But if it rained, they went up to the caves. And they found out that it was very cool and very nice. So they moved. And gradually they cleaned and covered the tombs, and extended the homes and built the village.

Are we talking about the tombs, or just caves? In the ancient times during the Pharaohs they tried several places. Before they dug the real one, they tried how it was working. They make some trials and if it was not good, they left it. So the people came afterwards, the Egyptians (Copts?) came afterwards, they used it to

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<sup>3</sup> Naja: family ; Najua<sup>3</sup>: families

live there.

But it was not a finished tomb? Those caves they were like unfinished tombs. The Pharaohs they were preparing it for a tomb but if they found out for any reason that it was not good, ... they started in another place. (They were) living in Gournas since 200 years, the grandfathers or great grandfathers were living there. Those grandfathers they were cultivating the lands around Gournas and when it was too hot they went into the caves above the tombs in the mountain. And they found it to be better (Int 13).

Not every villager agrees with the story, or the details, of Harb, Attiya, and Rhaba primarily because there are no written accounts. Some interviewees thought that there were Egyptian people living in the Luxor/Gournas area and that Arab troops from the conquest of Egypt maybe 800 years earlier came to the area and mixed with them. Although all the stories mention prior Egyptian residents, there does not seem to be any evidence that Arab troops or Arab settlers came to upper Egypt at that time (Rogerson, 2006). However, the stories do agree that Harb, Attiya, and Rhaba were brothers and came to this site in the beginning (Int 27).

Shortly after the initial settlement, an Imam, a Sufi Muslim and teacher of the Koran named Hasan, migrated from Qina, about 50 km. north of Luxor along the Nile, to the Gournas valley. Families began sending their children to Hasan to teach them how to read the Koran. In appreciation, the three Gournas families invited him and his family to settle among them. Naja Hasasna, descends from this Imam.

Hasanie is the old man of this family. It's a very good man. And he going to the mosque every times and reading the Koran. It's very good man, very kind man. They come and staying here for a small place. And everybody like to learning the Koran before because there were no schools. So he send the childrens to him. And this is the old Mosque there. So the people, he change the

place and he stay with him. So they invited him to stay? Yes, stay with him because he's a nice man and like this (Int 24).

During the early years of the settlement, the Arab community of Gourna moved more than once from the small settlement around the temple of Seti I to the caves behind the Ramesseum (Map 4.2) and then back. This back and forth migration remained a pattern until the arrival of the Europeans. Seeing the monasteries and hamlets built by the Copts in these higher locations may have also influenced the Arab settlers to move from the valley floor to higher locations. But there were also other advantages. The caves, which can be easily seen by anyone standing on the valley floor (Photo 4.1), offered ideal protection from military operations, hiding places from tax collectors and conscription, relief from intense summer heat in the valley and retreat from yearly Nile inundations (Simpson, 2003). For example, when Mohamed Ali sought to strengthen his claim over Upper Egypt and the Sudan, military officials often came to the region seeking conscripts to build an army in Upper Egypt (al-Sayyid Marsot, 1984). Local villagers would hide in the caves to avoid being forced to join these armies.

Neighbors and sometime adversaries also lived in the villages and caves of Tarif immediately to the north and in Bairat to the south. Vivant Denon, a French traveler and artist c. 1800, says he received a hostile reception from "natives" who lived in the caves around Tarif dressed in loin cloths (not a typical Arab dress) and throwing spears, although he also reports being greeted hospitably by another group living closer to Seti I (Int 17; Simpson, 2000, 2003). At some point, the Gournawii left the area of Seti I altogether and moved to the caves permanently. However, a small community known as old Horobat still exists next to the temple of Seti I.





Photo 4.1. Entrances to a Cluster of Caves (by Author).

With Egyptian independence in 1922, little changed in upper Egypt. Prior to independence, Mohammed Ali had ‘nationalized’ many prime agricultural areas and turned them over to members of his family or loyal supporters (al-Sayyid Marsot, 1985). By the time of the revolution in 1952, the land was still controlled by vested parties. Local villagers worked these lands for the “owners” until the land reforms initiated by General Nasser. However, Nasser’s reforms did not have much effect on the life of the villagers. Many large land holding were split into small plots of 2 to 2 1/2 feddans each (1 feddan = 1.038 acres), so small that they were not adequate for meeting family needs (Frag, 1998).

The common elements in these accounts are: Arab settlers came to the valley about 200 to 250 years earlier, three brothers were the ancestors of three of the Gourna

Najua', an initial settlement was located near the temple of Seti I, Naja Hasasna became part of the village in the early days, and migration to the unfinished tombs provided shelter and protection from weather, occasional hostile parties, and floods.

A surprising finding from the study was how little knowledge government officials had regarding local historical traditions. This observation may be limited by the number of interviews obtained (7 interviews), but it is nevertheless surprising. For example, an official in Luxor says, he thinks "the original inhabitants of this place ... have been living there for the last 4 or 5 thousand years" (Int 9). While there may be some truth to the assertion that some of the current day residents are descended from older Egyptian peoples, perhaps throughout Coptic roots, it nevertheless shows little knowledge of the more recent Arab settlement.

An educated government official from a local village confessed he had no knowledge of the origin of the families of Gournna, but he thinks that they were Egyptian (Int 28). Another village leader who worked in government offices in Luxor says he does not know the origins of his own family, and "he thinks the people in old Gournna came from Arabic regions or Arabic tribes when the Moslems came from Saudi Arabia to Egypt 1400 years ago" (Int 5). However, there does not seem to be any evidence of an Arab migration to upper Egypt at that time (Rogerson, 2006).

**The Settlement of Gournet Mar'ii.** The village of Gournet Mar'ii, the fifth Naja, is a special case throughout the story of El Gournna. This hamlet is situated on a hill at the southern end of old Gournna, and was settled by people from the villages of neighboring Bairat, immediately to the southeast of El Gournna. Thus, the residents of Gournet Mar'ii were not directly related to the other families of Gournna by descent, but were still considered to be part of the mountain community. Gournet Mar'ii also became

the scene of a second and unexpected relocation with a much different scenario (Chapter 6).

The traditional history of Gournet Mar'ii as told by a leading resident is more detailed, the source being a direct descendent of one of the founders, and supplies additional details about the early days of the settlement. The following is a summary of the account from this source.

Q's grandfather was one of the founders of Gournet Mar'ii (GM). ... As far as Q knew from the stories of his grandfather, the great one (oldest), the people of Gournet Mar'ii first came to Faiyum from an area in Saudi Arabia near the Red Sea. Faiyum is one of the oases in Egypt in the western desert about 200 km. from Cairo. At that time they considered Faiyum to be Upper Egypt. His grandfather later moved with a few other family members and settled in Rosga. Rosga is one of the small farming villages on the agricultural flood plain in Bairat. Based on what he learned from his grandfather, all people of Gournet Mar'ii have this origin. This is somewhat different from the beginnings of the other hamlets of Gourna.

Q said that the first generation of settlers, the grandparents of all the present day residents, led by his uncles and his grandfather, eventually left Rosga and moved to the Bab-el-Hajer (Figure 4.1). Bab-el-Hajer is the local term for the unfinished hillside tombs which turned out to be the unfinished tombs of the Pharaonic nobles.

They moved to the mountain because they found the Bab-el-Hajer to be better for them and to get more space because there was not enough place for them in Rosga. That was the first step in the formation of Gournet Mar'ii. All the original residents of Gournet Mar'ii came from Rosga in Bairat ... Q said that the Bab-el-Hajer were about 150 square meters (approx. 1,585 sq. ft.) inside the mountain.

According to Q, the unfinished tombs in Gournet Mar'ii had no drawings on the walls. The explanation offered by Q was that the workers started with nothing

and just began to dig in the mountain to make a tomb. If they found out that there is something not correct in the area they left it and began digging elsewhere. After a while there were many of these unfinished tombs in the hills of old Gournna. Many generations later the people of Gournnet Mar'ii and old Gournna came and lived in them.

All the tombs were basically similar. They began using these unfinished tombs as houses and then as the families got larger, the next generation started to extend the house to the outside and to build on top of the tomb and build other rooms or houses for the growing families. They extended left and right and they built for themselves some rooms that they can live in (Int 26).

The account of the settlement of Gournnet Mar'ii is similar to that of Gournna in two respects, the connection with Faiyum and the reason for moving to the caves, but differs in that the settlers first go to Rosga and later to the mountain. This could represent two different migrations.

Although it seems, as this source indicates, that the majority of the cave dwellings were unfinished tombs, photos from the interiors of some of the homes in old Gournna do show Pharaonic paintings on the walls, and the remains of wall and ceiling decorations, but this seems to be the exception (Photos 4.3 & 4.3). Figure 4.1 below shows an early family at the entrance to a cave home.



Figure 4.1. Fendia, Grandmother of Horobat (<http://www.qurna.org/fphotos.html>).



Photo 4.2. Remains of a Decorated Ceiling (by Author).





Photo 4.3. Interior of a Cave Dwelling (Archplan n.d.).

### **Tourism and Adventure Come to Gourn**

The French invasion in 1798 brought with it surveyors, architects, artists, historians and other specialized personnel who began to record what they saw and found in Egypt. It also increased the number and influence of European explorers and travelers. But even before the invasion, some Europeans had made their way to upper Egypt via the Nile Valley and were overwhelmed by the monumental remains of Pharaonic, Greek and Roman civilizations. Some were especially interested in the temples at Luxor, and in the funerary temples, monuments and tombs of the West Bank (Loti, 1924).

This influx of travelers, explorers, and other curious Europeans began to change

the way of life on the West Bank. Stories of travelers and samples of artifacts sparked a world wide interest for ancient Egyptian artifacts and history. The traditional way of life for the Gournawii quickly changed to one influenced by western travelers, archeologists and western interests. As European explorers offered new sources of income, the people of Gourna responded by working in the archeological excavations, by becoming guides for European archeologists and treasure hunters hoping to find something spectacular, and by occasionally providing artifacts form the tombs. And a significant antiquities market for items from Luxor and from the tombs in the West Bank began to be built up in Luxor (Loti, 1924).



Figure 4.2. Luxor by William Lane, 1826 (<http://www.museumsyndicate.com/images/3/27391.jpg>).

For some villagers this resulted in a dramatic increase in personal wealth. They inadvertently became key elements in a supply chain for the antiquities markets and provided artifacts for avid explorers who themselves took home vast quantities of Egyptian antiquities (Van der Spek, 2003). One egyptologist reports, “We’ve got tombs here in Thebes which have been angle-grinded. The actual walls, the physical walls themselves have been removed by an angle grinder to sell the relief” (Int 17).

As the interest and activity of the Europeans treasure hunters increased, the villagers built homes, or additions to them, over or near the tombs as a way of claiming a tomb for their family (Van der Spek, 2003). Thus each tomb, or access to the tomb, could provide a source of income for the family.

As Kees Van der Spek, an anthropologist who has studied the relationship between the ancient sites of the West Bank and the local population, observes, “No questions were asked in those days regarding the ethics of extracting in situ murals, practiced by such noticeable scholars as Champollion” (2003, p. 3).

Did the Gournawii families loot the tombs as they were accused of doing, or as portrayed in the classic Egyptian movie *The Night of Counting the Years* (1969)? It is hard to disentangle the activities of the local population from the activities of treasure seekers, and their cohorts, that began to pour in from all over the world. Below is the account of a local Egyptian resident who has worked most of his life with European and American archeologists in the excavation of the tombs, and who has contributed to university research and publications on the tombs. Although he may be sheltering the reputation of the Gournawii in part, he also provides some interesting details regarding how the residents reacted to the antiquities trade. At the time of the interview, he still supervised a crew of excavation workers:



You know this is what always what they speak. I can say to you something. For example, us as an excavation (team), we work with 60 people sometimes in the tomb and we find very few things. And this is not true.

In the time of Berzoni<sup>4</sup> when he come and the time of the tourists they start to come and they are interested for antiquities, the people they start to deal with the tourists when they come. Before they don't know anything about antiquities. When they see mummy or they see this, (they) carry it away to keep it away from their own eyes. But they don't have a mind to take antiques or something. This come when they start the tourists to be looking for this.

So when the tourists started to come did they start selling them things from the tombs?

No, who started I think was from the time of Berzoni and the time of the people they are interested to the antiquities. The people from Gurna they find out the tourists they like this and they want this. And for this case, the one he have some stuff in his house he say, what I do with this? I give it. And they start to sell. But that's normal from nobody say I want to buy it, the people they can leave it.

So when did that start?

I think that start in the time of Berzoni and after this. It started the people to know this have a price. Before that they didn't know anything.

How long did it continue? It continued I think like 20 years or something like this and after it stopped about when the people they say, "Oh! This is history," and they stop. And of course some of the people from the alabaster factory when they have lots of connections and when some tourists they come always to ask they need antique and they need this. It keep some people to look for the tomb.

Did someone come to Gurna and tell them to stop selling things?

No. Of course the government, they did not allow the people to take them. ... You know when you are poor and somebody he say to you, "Oh you must find me something and we give you 1,000 pounds or 100 pounds." Of course the people they must look sad for this. But normally ... they don't do this (Int 19).

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<sup>4</sup> Berzoni: an 19th century Italian explorer of Egyptian antiquities.

The issue is clouded by time, the impact of the illegal trade in Egyptian artifacts, and pressure put on the residents of El Gourna to provide antiquities for treasure seekers.

### **Growing Momentum to Relocate Gourna**

In time, there was a growing concern over the loss of antiquities and specifically over the involvement of the Gournawii in the illicit trade as popularized by the movie *The Night of Counting the Years* (1969). The Gournawii were labeled as tomb robbers and bandits by foreign and Egyptian writers although these accusations seem to be exaggerated in light of the fact they may have played only a small part in a world wide illegal trade, and were merely emulating or satisfying the demands of their employers (Hawass, 2007; Kamil, 2008, Rakha, 1999; Seel, 2007; Van der Spek, 2003).

Sonnini, a French traveler in the 18th century, and one of the originators of the tomb robbers stories, calls the Gournawii “bandits,” and in the next breath says they “displayed as much integrity and fairness as if they had been the most honest people in the world” (Seel, 2007, Kamil, 2008).

In response to the loss of ancient artifacts, the Egyptian government prepared a series of plans to remove the Gournawii from their mountain homes and return the area to its “original uninhabited” state, a state which in reality never existed. As early as 1915, a royal decree was issued to evacuate the Tombs of the Nobles (Rakha, 1999). Later in 1981 and 1983 President Sadat issued a series of decrees forbidding any new building or any repairs to the existing houses (Van der Spek, 2003). As a result, the houses in old Gourna gradually deteriorated and some became unsafe.

As families continued to expand, houses were divided into smaller spaces for

new families so that each structure in El Gournā would often contain several related families. Since many of the houses were actually large family compounds with large courtyards (See the descriptions of village life in old Gournā in Chapter 5), conditions for most families were crowded but not uncomfortable. Other conditions such as the lack of running water and sanitary system were more of a problem. Over time, some families moved away to nearby villages, to Luxor or to other places.

**Important Events preceding the relocation.** There are four other important events in the history of Gournā that contribute to the political and social setting prior to the relocation of Gournā. These events are: the construction of Hassan Fathy's village of New Gournā in 1946, the floods of 1994/95, the terrorist attack at Hatshepsut Temple in 1997, and a confrontation between residents and police in 1998 in which 4 persons died. These events are described in detail in Chapter 6, Part 1 and charted in Figure 6.2.

## CHAPTER 5

### DAILY LIFE IN OLD GOURNA

*Are there tombs below these houses? No.  
There was no tomb below your house?  
They didn't even try to dig, but maybe. They don't know (Int 25).*

What was life like in old Gourna? Unfortunately there is little published work on this subject. The information presented in this chapter relies on the work of Caroline Simpson (2000, 2003) and Kees Van der Spek (2003, 2008) who have provided histories and descriptions of life in the old village. It also utilizes information and accounts from news journals and other media sources. But most of the information comes from the residents themselves, from interviews with the people who lived there, and from their recollections and experiences of the old village.

This chapter provides background information on life in the old village that is important for evaluating the strategies and policies of the relocation and the methods of participation employed (Chapter 6), and for comparing life in the new village with that of the old, to see what has changed and what remained the same (Chapter 7). Beyond the need for gathering information for the study, the experience of getting to know the residents is a unique reward in itself. There are countless riches in the stories and recollections of the local residents (Forester, 1999).

A brief history of the village has been presented in Chapter 4. A few events or conditions relating to its beginnings may be repeated here in order to present a more complete and clear picture of particular circumstances in the old village.

## **Families of Gournia**

Gournia is distinguished by its families. According to village traditions, three of Gournia's main families, Naja (family) Horobat, Naja Rhabat, and Naja Attiyat, descended from three brothers who settled in the Gournia valley about 250 years earlier. The forefather of the fourth family, Naja Hasasna, migrated from Qina, a city north of Gournia, a short time later and was invited to join the Gournia settlement (Chapter 4).

As the families increased in number, additional new hamlets were built close to the main family compounds. By the time of relocation, Gournia had grown to about 24 hamlets (Van der Spek, 2003), for example, Naja Horobat had become 7 hamlets (Int 23), and Naja Rhabat, 8 (Int 26).

Village life was centered on the family, although not to the exclusion of other neighboring families. As one resident says, "The most significant social feature of Old and New Gournia is the different families (Naja)" (Int 8). Young men tended to marry close relatives within the family, often marrying cousins. Even today, some say, "It's much better a cousin. Marry from own family it's much better" (Int 26). In earlier generations, it was not uncommon for men to take as many as 5 wives. There were two source in the study who had two wives and one widow who was the third wife of her husband (Int 10, 26, 29). As communication between families became more common due to expanding open air markets in Tarif and Gournia City, and even in Luxor, and as education and schools became increasingly important, couples married outside their own Naja more frequently (Int 22).

As families expanded, they built additional rooms or subdivided existing family compounds creating new living quarters so that family compounds often housed several related families. In these compounds, family chores were frequently shared. The women,

for example, would work together to prepare meals and take care of children while the men were in the fields or working elsewhere. With government restrictions on new building, residents continued to divide the existing interior space for new families, if the new family did not move away to another location. This meant that the houses were more crowded than they were intended to be, but still many of the original houses were large and spacious enough so that new families could be accommodated.

**Gournet Mar'ii.** The situation of Gournet Mar'ii was somewhat different than the other four villages of Gourna. Gournet Mar'ii (GM) consists of about 500 houses on the southern end of the Gourna mountain (Int 14). It is not part of the Gourna governmental district but belongs to Bairat, a large district of nine villages, that includes Kom, Tot, Hajer, Rosga, Gatr, about one half of the village of Geziira, an island in the Nile in past times, and all of Ramlah, an agricultural flood plain on the banks of the Nile opposite Luxor Temple (Int 28).

GM was settled by two or three grandfathers that moved with their families from Rosga in Bairat to the hill on which GM was built. All the descendants of GM come from these original grandfathers. Later, some families move back to the villages of Bairat, to Geziira, and to Ramlah. Thus, the families of GM maintained relationships and connections with families and relatives living in the towns and villages of the Bairat area (Int 16).

### **Village Life**

**Village Leadership.** A “key feature of village social structure is the leadership provided by the village committee or the (traditional) village leaders” (Int 2). According to Dr. Ahmed El Tayib, one of two principal sheiks in the village of El Gourna, each Naja

had 4 or 5 traditional leaders. These leaders were chosen from the older, more well known and respected men in the village. They were held in the highest position in each Naja and would help to solve “small” problems for the families. For bigger problems, such as divorce or squabbles between families, residents would go to Sheik Mohammed El Tayib, the older brother of Dr. Ahmed El Tayib, and a key figure in the relocation (Chapter 6). If the problem was too large, they went to the police (Inter 8). Although, the village committee was not always capable or effective in handling larger issues such as relocation, for Gournia it could be a helpful buffer between relocation officials and the village. However, results also varied between families. As reported by one resident, “They listen but they’re not effective” (Int 26).

Shortly before the relocation, the traditional leaders of GM had all died and thus GM lost the considerable weight and influence that they carried in local affairs. By the time of GM’s relocation, these leaders had not yet been replaced. Local authority in the village had reverted to the Mayor of Bairat and the five elected council members for the district of Bairat, only one of which lived in GM (Int 14, 15, 16, 28). In effect, GM was being governed by these officials.

In addition to the village committees, there were and still are a few venerated sheiks. In Gournia, Sheik Mohammed El Tayib and Dr. Ahmed El Tayib, from Naja Hasasna, occupied positions of personal trust and spiritual leadership (Int 3). Sheik Ramadan from Naja Attiyat was another well respected traditional sheik who was trusted by all four villages of Gournia, including the Hasasna family. There was great sadness in the villages when he died (Int 22).

**Population.** Demographic surveys of Gournia provided varying statistics regarding the local population. A report from the UNESCO Mission to Thebes on 17-18

November 1994, headed by B. Fonquernie, Chief Architect, Inspector General of Historic Monuments, France, mentions a “survey of the dwellings” that indicates the existence of 2,245 houses “of which 43% appear to have been built immediately above tombs and 30% close to them” (Van der Spek, 2003, p. 22 ). However, the ability to make that assessment would have been beyond the two days available to the mission. Van der Spek (2000, 2003) concludes that Fonquernie must have had access to previously generated data, probably from the architectural survey team of Engineering Systems and Consultants (ESC) in the 1990s (Chapter 6). But it is uncertain how these statistics were compiled.

In 1995, Social Planning, Analysis & Administration Consultants (SPAAC, 1995) contacted 1,397 families from all areas of Gourná for a survey of the village, but they did not give a count of the total number of families or the population. The report states that the survey counted a total of 1,776 houses with families, 379 closed and ruined houses, and 282 buildings used for other purposes. The total number of buildings counted was 2,437.

The Updated Master Plan for Luxor (Archplan, 2003, p. 72) states that it does not include old Gourná in the various social and economic reports and statistical studies. The Abt master plan (2000) includes Gourná in the overall population statistics, but not as a separate entity. The Directory of Housing in Luxor estimated that there were 3,000 families in Gourná, but did not have a firm count (Int 9). And, Dr. Ahmed El Tayib estimated the population of old Gourná to be about 15,000 and the larger governmental district of Gourná City to be 50,000.

**Education.** Despite the lack of schools in the early days of the settlement, currently one finds all levels of education from Ph. D. to none at all (See Figure 3.1). The



nearest school to old Gournas was 4 km. to 5 km. from the village at the border of El Tarif and Gournas City. Children had to get there by any available means of transportation, or if they were poor, they had to walk (Int 3). Some families were able to send their children to prep schools on the West Bank and in Luxor, and then to the universities in Suhag, Aswan, or Cairo (Int 23, 28). Nevertheless, because incomes were generally low and the cost of living on the mountain was high, and because of the attraction of immediate and easy income from tourists, many children only went to school for a few years (Int 24).

The SPAAC (1999) survey from 1995 shows an illiteracy rate of 39.1% in all of Gournas with a higher proportion among women than men, 51.4% to 26.9%. However, 35.6% of those surveyed completed primary school and 21.4% went beyond primary school to higher levels.

Surprisingly, one does not find what could be called an uneducated lower class among the Gournawii. Many residents with little or no formal education have learned to read and write on their own, and classes are held at various times and places for adults who still want to learn to read (Int 22). Villagers conduct intelligent and well thought out conversations, are well informed about events in Egypt and elsewhere, have successful businesses and occupations, and a respect for learning and knowledge. Formal education, however, like many resources in traditional society, tends to be inherited. "Education is passed on here. Children of families with education get education" (Int 23).

**Occupations and Sources of Income.** As with education, there was a wide spectrum in occupations, economic status, and incomes. Because of complex arrangements involving jobs, it is difficult to determine how much each family earns or from what source.

Most residents had several sources of income because one job did not provide

enough income to support a family. “Myself I work with (archeological) excavation, and in the afternoon I go to the fields with my brother. You cannot have only one thing. Since you need to live, you must work two, three things” (Int 19). Another resident says, “When I don’t work in the (alabaster) factory, I work at home making statues. And sometimes I go to work in the hotel” (Int 8).

The SPAAC survey (1995) indicates that in 1995 the average monthly income per family was 196.60 LE (Egyptian pounds, approximately \$35),<sup>5</sup> and that 50% of the families earned less than 150 LE (approximately \$26.70) per month. The highest family income reported was 2,000 LE (approximately \$356) per month.

At the time of this research, incomes had risen from the 1995 levels. Those with government jobs in Luxor could expect to earn about 500 LE (\$89) per month. Teachers earned about 300 LE (\$53) per month and other kinds of government workers made about 450 LE (\$80) per month. Some residents who worked in the antiquities offices on the West Bank or as armed guards earned about 300 LE per month.

A shopkeeper at Hatshepsut Temple reported that he earned about 30 LE per day or 1000 LE (\$178) per month after expenses. For expenses, he paid approximately 500 LE for rent, 500 LE to the Luxor government for licenses, and 500 LE per month for an employee (Int 14). Workers in the alabaster factories earn from 300 LE to 500 LE per month. The owners of the alabaster shops did not indicate how much the shops earn, but we did learn that it is common practice for tour guides who direct the huge tour busses to specific factories and showrooms to take a 50% commission on everything the tourists on that bus buy that day (Int 26).

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<sup>5</sup> The exchange rate at the time of the field work was 5.62 LE to \$1.00

Many residents also worked in archeological excavations or construction during the summer months. But this work was only intermittent casual labor since it is too hot to work outside in the summer. Casual laborers make about 30 LE (\$5.34) per day in construction.

Some residents also had small agricultural plots where they raised crops or had an animal or two. They might sell some of the crops or an animal for income, but most products would be used to feed their own animals or for their own consumption. A qualified source from Gournet Mar'ii who was also a career farmer said that not many residents could depend on farming for their livelihood (Int 16).

There are also many small restaurants and cafes on the corners and streets of the villages and towns of the West Bank where the residents of Gournet can work when they leave other jobs. Some own and others work in the restaurants almost full time, usually in the evening when they are open. Others have portable grills or a type of outdoor rotisserie unit on wheels that they move around or keep at certain places along the sidewalks (Photo 5.1). These local "entrepreneurs" usually work at other jobs during the day, and run their outdoor kitchens at night.

Similarly, there are small shops of all kinds. Someone may work in a restaurant, but may also own and employ a few people in a small shop nearby where all sorts of items such as scarfs, galabia (a long traditional tunic), sports clothes, cell phones, and other items, would be sold (CCM 1, 3), or perhaps own a computer repair shop or internet cafe. And of course, there are countless small shops in the marketplaces. (It is not uncommon to see two or three shops selling the same things next to each other.)



Photo 5.1. An Outdoor Street Vendor in Cairo (by Author)

The workers in all these small shops and cafes do not earn much, but from each job they assemble a weekly or daily income. The many small shops, cafes, and outdoor restaurants are evidence of an exceptional spirit of entrepreneurship on a small scale, and it is this kind of “hustle” that keeps the families going. However, many of these workers will spend what they earn that same day or the next (Int 17).

Another critical source of income was government pensions. Most payments went to widows and were combined into the family income. A widow from Gournah with adult sons received 80 LE (\$14.23) per month, but the government reduced it to 60 LE when her son was conscripted into the army (Int 10). Another widow received 60 LE (\$10.68) initially, but this was increased to 120 pounds because she has 5 children (Int 15).

The largest source of income for local residents in either a direct or indirect way was tourist connected operations. These again were innumerable and involve small and large hotels, tourist oriented cafes, shops, and restaurants, alabaster factories, souvenir shops with small crafts, books, and clothing for sale, tour guides, bike rentals, boat trips on the Nile, all kinds of tourist apparel shops, and anything else that a tourist might buy, eat, or rent. The West Bank economy is primarily dependent on these kinds of touristic operations (Int 23).

From interviewing and talking to the residents, it was apparent that a good portion of every family's income was derived directly from tourists who came to the village. A local resident with a university degree in commerce estimates that 70% of the people were mainly dependent on visiting tourists and had no other significant source of income. He indicated that about 30% worked as employees with small but steady incomes, but almost all families, even those who had office jobs, depended to some extent on selling small artifacts, guiding tourists, and serving tea or typical Egyptian meals to tourists to supplement their income (Int 23).

In addition to more identifiable occupations, villagers made small "antikas"<sup>6</sup> in their homes at night and sold them to the tourists who visited the village for 10 LE (\$1.78) or 20 LE depending on the size (Int 17; Van der Spek, 2008). Crafters sometimes sold the statues to children in the village for 5 LE or 10 LE. The children in turn would sell them for 10 LE to 20 LE (Int 10, 12). A family could earn a small daily income from this source (Int 8). Families would also invite tourists into their homes for tea, serve small local meals, or give tours of the village for baqsheesh (a tip or "gift").

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<sup>6</sup> Antikas: fine quality reproductions of Pharaonic art.

Baqsheesh from tea or tours of the village would amount to 5 or 10 LE for each occasion. A family might earn 100 to 200 pounds per month as additional income from these sources (WT 4). Overall, the most important source of income for the average resident of Gourna was “baqsheesh,” except perhaps in Gournet Mar’ii since there were not tombs open for tourists to visit in this village (Int 16).

A resident who as a child did not like to ask for baqsheesh from the tourists explains,

You know we have a big water wheel in the front of our house. The children they go and they climb this and they make a picture. And never we are like this. Only one of my brothers he like to go to the tombs. He like to sit in this place and to get baqsheesh and something like this (Int 19).

Adults had a different role:

“Mahmud” was not selling. He was like guiding them to see or to tell them there of the tombs, nice tombs to see, tombs of Seti or Thutmose, tombs of Assasif. He was just telling them where are the nice places to see and after they find him (to be) a nice guy so they give him some (money), (Int 20).

A university graduate relates how he earned money for the family as a child.

The first thing which we saw (was) the tourists and the monuments. While I was a child I was also like the children with the tourists (asking) if they want to see the temple of Hatshepsut or other tombs. We would show them and they will tip us. The tourists they were giving us money when we help them to visit any place or to show them any tomb there (Int 23).

The lure of immediate income from tourists who visited the village was unavoidable, as mentioned in another interview.

My father he work in the government. He make about 450 EG (Egyptian Pounds) a month. So he have five children. He want to give him about clothes

and food and give him the money every day. So what he do for 450? Nothing! So better if I be going to the tourists to sell something. I bring 100 pounds, 200. So I must do like this (Int 24).

As with income, spending on monthly items such as food, clothing, or transportation could vary widely. From conversations with villagers, it seems that most families spend about 300 LE (\$53.38) per month on food. This could vary depending on how they might be providing for themselves, for examples, by raising chickens, ducks, sheep, goats, or perhaps if they kept a cow in the “hoosh,” a walled courtyard attached to the main house for raising animals. The family of a local friend who worked on a “falluca,” a traditional Nile sailing boat, spent more money in the stores than his neighbors who had small farms and a few animals.<sup>7</sup>

Unfortunately, the importance of these small daily earnings and the complex way in which the residents made a living was not understood at the time of the relocation. It was widely believed that the majority of residents were making a living from agriculture or from some form of hotel work, sales, or transportation and that their income would not be greatly affected by the relocation (Int 0, 2). While this may have been true for Luxor, it was not true in Gournā. When the residents moved to new Qurnā, these small daily sources of income dried up.

**Living conditions.** Living conditions in old Gournā were difficult. Water and sewage facilities were very limited (See Figure 5.1 below). When water ran out, the younger boys would go to the public tap in the valley and fill up water tanks mounted on

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<sup>7</sup> I kept records of my own expenses at local markets and some specialized stores. My food budget ran from 400 LE (\$71) to 500 LE (\$89) per month. Thus, a figure of 300 to 400 LE per month for a family of 4 seems reasonable given that they would have provided some items for themselves and their ability to buy or barter with friends and neighbors.

donkey carts (Int 23, Photo 5.2). These would then be pulled up to homes at lower elevations. For higher elevations, it had to be transported further in large jugs or by the women in jars over their heads (Int 23). The boys had to wait from ½ to 1 hour for a turn at the tap as there were often as many as 10 carts in front of them. It took about 15 minutes to fill the water tanks before departing again up the hill (Int 23). Some resident put large fiberglass tanks on the roof of their houses to hold water for longer periods of time. But most kept water in jugs and containers in the house (Int 19).



Photo 5.2. Water Tank and Cart (by Author).

Sewage was a more serious problem. For drainage, many residents dug a hole like a cesspool somewhere inside the compound area (Int 3, 28). Others used holes already existing in the limestone rock. But no matter what method they used, some of



the refuse and water from the houses and animals was finding its way down into the tombs. These unsanitary conditions also resulted in poor health among the residents.

There were no paved roads in the villages, only narrow paths. One source exclaimed how surprised he was to see roads in new Qurna (Int 23). Some paths were so narrow, steep, and winding that a local taxi could not make it up the hill (Int 10). Transportation was also limited. "To get any kind or any means of transportation (one) had to walk a long time till he got to the main road" (Int 5).

Residents had to cope with other problems as well such as scorpions at night, government restrictions on new building or repairs to crumbling structures, and no permission to plant trees. They did have electricity and phone however. But the electricity was often cut off by the government after the relocation began in a effort to force some of the reluctant residents and "refusers" to move (Chapter 6). For many residents, life "was too difficult" (Int 5).

**Homes.** Like many other conditions in Upper Egypt, there is no single or simple description of the housing. While most homes in old Gournna were large and generally spacious, they were also of various sizes, and, except for the building restrictions, would have continued to be built and expanded in the traditional pattern (Photo 5.3).

Egyptian people here in Upper Egypt want big, big home. Why big home? You put it if you have donkey, cow. Maybe have sheep. Maybe some cousins living in the house, maybe two or three wives (Int 26).



Photo 5.3. Gurna Painted House (<http://www.thebanmappingproject.com/images/large/10008.jpg>).

A very poor widow who made a living by carving small statues at night says her house in old Gurna was bigger than the units in new Gurna. “The rooms were bigger. And It had two palm trees inside in the courtyard. ... This yard was equal to 2 rooms (i.e., 2 new housing units)” (Int 12). Another resident had 2 big houses. He lived there with 6 brothers and 4 sisters (Int 14). Another residents says his old house was smaller than most. “We are living in three rooms altogether. ... My old house is 450 meters (approximately 4,752 square feet). It’s a smaller (house)” (Int 24). However, it was also customary to include the courtyards in the calculation.

The SPAAC (1999) survey reports the following housing statistics:

Description	Percent
families who owned their home	99.4%
two floors	59.8%
three to four floors	1.7%
average number of rooms	6.2
more that 10 rooms	6.7%
homes with shops	6.5%
homes with electricity	94.9%
homes with water systems	20%
cesspits or other means of disposal	68.1%
no provisions for sewage	31.1%

Figure 5.1. SPAAC housing statistics (SPAAC, 1999).

Most homes were two or more floors (61.5%, Figure 5.1) and often a combination of cave and house. The survey also notes, “The large number of rooms may make it difficult to design the new houses in the new village” (SPAAC, 1999, P. 14). The hoosh, or courtyard area, was a walled enclosure for animals, a play area for children, a place for sleeping in the summer, and for entertaining visitors.

It was a big house. Two floors. (We) had the uncles, brothers of the father, and two sisters of the father also, altogether in the same house. It’s a family house (Int 23).

Before I have four families. It’s four brothers, it’s married, and four wives.

Some brothers have children and some brothers didn't have children. And also two sisters not married. And two sisters married. And also I have ... my mother and some women from my father, some other woman, two wives. Fifteen people in the house" (Int 26).

Married children were often living in the same house as the parents.

"I didn't have a house. We only had this one big house. My whole family. It was like three families. Me and my brother and my big brother. And I had my wife and children. We were all together in one house (Int 8).

Even in these conditions, families arranged to have some privacy. "The house (was big but) is just a few rooms. But they are practical ... (because) you can stay in one place where the others they cannot see you" (Int 19). Some homes also had small alabaster factories inside. The more talented family members would be engaged in carving small statues and other "antikas" for selling to tourists (Int 26, 29; Van der Spek, 2008). "But the houses were (becoming) too small because the people were not permitted to build anymore; they could not add on to the houses anymore or repair them so they were collapsing" (Int 3).

The homes of Gournia were mud brick construction and building it was a family project. Here is an account of one family's housing project.

They brought the earth from down below, from the villages, up to the hill, to the mountain, and they formed them. They mixed the mud with straw and they made the mixture. They had wooden forms to make the bricks. They made it by themselves. It only took one time. They made like 6,000 blocks. That was enough to build and after this they didn't make any more. ... The mud brick, it was so wide it could carry the building if the rain fell (Int 12).

Each brick was about 30 inches long by 18 inches wide and 10 inches high. But the mud brick was also weak under stress and subject to deterioration. When floods or

heavy rains came residents were afraid that the house would collapse. Sometimes they would stand outside until the the rain stopped (Int 4). An advantage of the mud brick houses was that, because the walls were thick, it was cool in summer and warm in winter, like the caves (Int 27). Houses were often built against one another for support. A resident told us that if the house in front of his was removed, his would fall down (Int 13). But, because the mud brick was subject to deterioration and could not be repaired, the buildings had acquired many dangerous cracks.

**The Tombs and Caves.** According to the residents, early settlers of Gournia had generally moved to “unfinished” tombs, or caves on the slopes of Gournia Mountain, perhaps dug out for a future client or left unfinished for some reason. The openings to the tombs, the Bab el Hajer, could be seen from the valley floor and the caves were useful for many daily needs (Figure 4.1; Photos 4.1 & 5.4). (Chapter 4 has a description of a Bab el Hajer in Gournet Mar’ii.) The situation was similar all across Gournia mountain. So, it seems that although there were *finished* tombs in the slopes of the mountain, and many were discovered by the residents as time went on, in the beginning of the settlement most villagers had moved into unfinished caves or, with the expansion of the hamlets, did not know if a tomb was directly below their house. As the families continued to use the caves or build new houses nearby, they eventually built some homes over the entrances to the caves or over tombs that were in the valley floor. Thus, part of the house might be next to, above or over a tomb, and another part would be the tomb or cave itself. It may not be possible to know how many tombs were finished, or unfinished, or had artifacts inside, and the total number of tombs is still unknown.

I personally visited some of these caves with the assistance of a local antiquities inspector. The entrances were very large and the caves were deep and cool inside.

Some caves also had side chambers. But the ones I visited had not progressed beyond being cut out of the rock to the point where interior finishes had been applied, and there was no evidence of occupation. However, one of the caves still had remains of ceiling tile indicating that it was probably finished and at some point had been plundered (Photo 4.2). Some of the unfinished caves also had mud brick structures from a later date built outside the cave (Photos 5.4 & 5.5).

Tombs, or caves, are not found everywhere on Gourná Mountain. A resident who lived higher on the mountain reports that there were no tombs at that level. Only on the “first and the second level” were homes built over the tombs (Int 12). Although homes may have incorporated caves or unfinished tombs, it is not correct to think that every house had a finished tomb below with ancient artifacts and mummies.



Photo 5.4. Cave Entrances (by Author).



Photo 5.5. Cave with Exterior Structures (by Author).

Residents found the caves to be useful in many ways. They are naturally cool in summer, and require only a small fire to be warm in winter. Eventually, the tombs, whether unfinished, finished, or below grade, became part of a composite structure consisting of tomb, house, and outside walled areas or courtyards where animals were kept, children played, and friends and visitors entertained. And they provided many good memories for the family (Int 13).

**Property Rights.** There were no legal titles or legal descriptions of property in old Gournā. Occupants designated what belonged to them by placing a line of small stone markers around the edge of the property or by building small stone walls. Many sites remained “unclaimed” and each compound included only the space that a family needed or might want for a building site. Property restrictions were limited by traditional customs that respected the rights of one’s neighbor and the community. For example, where access to property was gained through a small lane or path, the path had to be

wide enough and high enough for two loaded camels to pass (Hakim, 1988).

### **Social Patterns**

In addition to the closeness and intimacy of families, there are a few other social patterns in old Gournia that are important for understanding the impact of the relocation and the complexity of the participation process.

**Village Talk.** The first and most important is what I have labeled “village talk.” Village talk is the main form of communication in the villages. It occurs whenever residents get together to share news, to talk to each other, or just to spend time together. Village talk goes on in the streets, at the markets, in the cafes and restaurants, at the mosque, in the “diwans,”<sup>8</sup> and in front of the houses with residents, relatives, neighbors and guests seated on the mastaba benches. These places are the principal venues of social interaction in the village and are the core of village life. “The people in each village they meet every day. Everyday in the mosque and always they are speaking. And at night they sit in front of the houses and speak together” (Int 27).

News and information are reported and transferred most effectively in this way. Important news is most often discussed in the diwan. The diwan is a fundamental feature of life in Upper Egypt. Upper Egyptians take great pride and care in hosting visitors in the diwan and food is often served especially in the diwan at the mosque. On several occasions, myself and my translator were guests in the diwan of Dr. Ahmed El Tayib and his brother Sheik Mohammed in Suul. We observed the activities as people

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<sup>8</sup> Diwan: a large meeting hall or open room usually attached to a mosque, or a hall for meeting visitors in a private home, furnished with very simple mastaba benches and tables.



came and went discussing their problems or seeking advice from the Sheiks.

While Upper Egyptians entertain friends and guests in their homes, or outside on the mastaba benches, they also meet with them in the evening at public places such as the cafes. Lively communication also takes place at the frequently occurring community events such as weddings, funerals, holiday celebrations, community festivals, or at the temporary bazaars that spring up overnight in towns large and small.

**Privacy.** Another complex feature of Upper Egyptian life is privacy, or as is more often the case, the *lack* of privacy. Contrary to expectations, rather than privacy, the lack of privacy is what I observed in visiting with friends in their homes and spending time in the villages, and this was confirmed in conversation with Egyptian friends. In addition to the frequent public community activities, visitors are likely to show up at any time and must be extended traditional hospitality. Family members also have access to almost all spaces in the village home without restrictions. Thus, a sense of community openness, close contact with neighbors, friends, and family members, and frequent unexpected visitations work together with the concept of village talk to produce a complex culture of many extended and connected relationships.

**Outdoor Life, Traditions, and Memories.** Upper Egyptians enjoy living and even sleeping outside. They spend a considerable amount of time in front of the houses on the mastaba benches, gathered together in the hoosh, walking together and talking in the lanes and small paths of the village, or on the roofs of the houses under covered areas set up especially for informal use or sleeping.

Almost every house on old Gournna had some type of tent-like covered area on the roof usually made from date palm tree trunks and covered with palm branches or a heavy weight fabric or carpet. These areas are cooler, dryer, and more comfortable in

the evening and at night. In the winter, the roof tops can be quite cold and windy, but the residents still enjoy them. In old Gournna, cool breezes came off the mountains every night and even slight elevations reduced the heat and humidity from the day. And there are almost no mosquitoes or bugs in the mountain areas (Int 26). However, the great fear, as mentioned above, was scorpions.

The Gournawii strive to preserve cultural traditions as well, such as the baking of sun bread, providing food for neighbors and friends at wedding and funerals, and open invitations to all weddings and celebrations. Memories play a very important role in the life of the Gournawii. One cannot overestimate the importance of memorial places such as cemeteries, the family home, or even the village itself. "I believe it (the village) is a memory of my family" (Quoted in Farag, 1998).

Finally, Copts and Muslims have lived together on Gournna Mountain for several generations, ever since the coming of the Gournna settlers. They have similar life styles and respect each other's religions differences. "There were some living together as Copts, and some were spread out between the Muslims. Q said he was living beside the Muslims. The neighborhood was all Muslims. Other Copts were living beside each other" (Int 13).

Village life in old Gournna was complex but one that must be appreciated in its complexity, not as just a simple traditional or agricultural life style, but as an intricate tapestry involving a way of life, a respect for heritage, distinct social customs and habits, family traditions and memories, and sometimes contradictory tendencies and feelings. Consequently, there are no simple answers or simple solutions to the multifaceted problems involved in resettlement. However, an understanding of village customs, such as those at El Gournna, is essential for the planning and creation of new community

environments, new economic opportunities, and new facilities that relocated residents will need for rebuilding their lives and traditions in a new location.

### **Conditions Just Before the Relocation**

Several conditions that were present just before the relocation need to be mentioned because they influenced both relocation, resettlement, and the participation process. Additional Information concerning important historical and natural events is presented in Chapter 6, Part 1.

The most deleterious situation was the lack of government permission to build, expand or repair the family compounds which had been in effect since the decree of President Sadat in 1981 (Int 27; Van der Spek, 2003). As a result of this decree, many homes were crowded, crumbling and in need of repair. Some families had moved to nearby villages because of crowded or unhealthy conditions, or because the houses were unsafe. By the time of the relocation, many houses were already closed in Gourna. Other families had improved their way of life and no longer lived in Gourna. They had moved to other villages or perhaps to Luxor or Cairo. But the closed houses were still considered by residents to be part of the family heritage. When the relocation started, in some cases representatives of the families moved back to the closed houses hoping to obtain a “flat” or two from the government in new Qurna (Int 3, 17, 23; Chapter 6).

As described in Chapter 6, the floods of 1994/95 dramatically changed the situation in Gourna. Many families, especially from Naja Rhabat, had moved to Suul or to other villages because their houses were destroyed or severely damaged. A few others had moved fearing another flood. So a momentum for relocation had begun and, as a result of the floods, the government had gained useful experience in providing

alternate housing for the Gournawii (Van der Spek, 2000).

After the first phase of the relocation, the government cut off electricity for the remaining families who were somewhat reluctant to move. This increased the mistrust between the government and the remaining families. One widow relates that her family was forced to “take down” their house by themselves without lights or power (Int 12). Another residents explains how, without lights, even simple problems became stressful.

I remember some accident there, (with) some children ... (with) scorpions. He didn't have light to see where is it. And then he doesn't have a car to go into the hospital. He died? No, no. He's be okay but because some man he drunk and then he work tonight and then he will be stopped for speed, ... but he helped for this (problem, i.e., because he came home late, he was able to take the child to the hospital. Int 24.)

Before, as well as during the relocation, a trail of broken promises, the increasing use of force and intimidation, and what was perceived as a general disrespect for the residents contributed to a growing mistrust of government as expressed by this resident. “Many times the electric closed. Electric closed now. Look the mountain! (At the time of the interview, the mountains were lit up by a new lighting display.) Why light the mountain and the village here closed? What you do for (the) mountain?” (Int 26).

And there was a general fear of the police. “I was afraid to talk to anyone because the policeman might come and take me. And I would go to prison. I could not say what I wanted to” (CCM 6). Another resident says, “And then if you (are a) problem, and then General 'X' he don't like this, he don't like to help you. So he phone the police to come to take you to the jail inside” (Int 24).

Nevertheless, most residents realized that they would be the last generation on the mountain. “They were conscious of everything happening around them and they

knew that it was not so good to stay in such conditions which was not so humane like no water, and no drainage, and no schools for the children” (Int 5).

In addition to realizing the need for a better life, one of the truly remarkable conditions prior to the relocation was the almost unanimous agreement on the part of the residents with the reason for the relocation, specifically, to save the monuments.

**Tourism and its effects.** As discussed in Chapter 4, tourism became a local phenomenon as Europeans began to travel to Upper Egypt and were amazed by what they saw. Within a short time, their stories and displays of Egyptian artifacts sparked a world wide fascination with ancient Egypt especially with the temples of Luxor and the Valley of the Kings. In short order, tourism became an economic necessity for all but a few families. All kinds of shops, stores, alabaster factories, hotels, etc. were built to accommodate tourist interests (Loti, 1924). The hospitality of the residents was also tested. Luxor began to fill up with tourist shops, hotels, and hustlers that harassed tourists along the Luxor corniche. One of the chief priorities of the new governor in Luxor was to remove these hustlers and clean up the city (Chapter 6).

On the West Bank, the Gournawii had endured accusations of being unfriendly and dangerous tomb robbers. But as archeologists and visitors began to explore and mingle with the people of the mountain, they could see that this was not so (Simpson, 2008; Int 17). In fact, the hospitality and interesting village life of El Gourna was a significant attraction for the tourists (Int 19). The colorful and aesthetic qualities of Gourna and the hospitality of the residents became a highlight for many tourists who returned to Gourna each year because of it. The hospitality of the Gournawii became almost legendary as travelers reported their experiences in travel guides, and on web sites, and encouraged their friends to visit Gourna on their trips to Egypt (Int 19; and

personal source).



Figure 5.2. A Section of Old Gurna before Relocation. (Luxor Supreme Council, City of Luxor Master Plan 2030, n.d.)

This friendship of the tourists was returned by the Gournawii who looked forward to the coming of the tourists each year and formed relationships with visitors from all over the world. An example of this bond between the Gournawii and the tourists was demonstrated when terrorists attacked and killed 60 tourists at Hatshepsut's Temple in 1997. It was the local Gournawii who drove them off into the mountains and tended to the wounded while waiting for ambulances (Seel, 2007; Van der Spek, 2000).

But, there was also a negative side to tourism. The quick money garnered from tourists was drawing children away from school and was preventing families from improving their lives (Int 19, 24). Living conditions in old Gurna had badly deteriorated and threatened the health and stability of the community. Because of this, it was

necessary to make a change. This was the challenge that confronted government officials, planners, village leaders, and the residents themselves as relocation came upon them.

**Some Opinions of Residents Concerning Life in Old Gournā.** This short description of life in old Gournā demonstrates that village life was extremely complex and challenging. But, not everything the participants had to say about could be classified in precise categories. Some important observations made by residents are included below to illustrate the variety of opinions and sometimes ambivalent feelings concerning the old village. The scope of these opinions is important to note if the impact of the relocation is to be properly understood. Not everything is positive, but this ambivalence was characteristic of the residents and is important for interpreting the scope of their feelings and attachments. Chapter 7 provides reactions and opinions from residents concerning life in new Qurnā and can be contrasted and compared with descriptions of life in the old village provided in this chapter.

The life was not good at all. I only wanted to get rid, ... to get out of the old Gournā because it was too old and everything was not human there. I wanted to go to some place which had sewage and clean water, pure water to drink (Int 13). (This same source says later in the interview, "It has good memories for them." These complex and ambivalent feelings are typical of many interviews.)

The house there is beautiful, and life there is good. And also the business there is very good (Int 24).

The people were of course a little bit sad but when they knew and when they saw how beautiful are the new homes, they felt better and they started directly to forget the past. Only the older people, they were a little bit more sad because they were connected to the houses longer (Int 5).

In these caves or unfinished tombs where they lived that was another atmosphere (Int 13).

It was like full of fear. Fear of any guest coming; fear it was not clean, not safe; fear from scorpions in summer, and the rain in winter time. ... In winter he was afraid from rain. If it falls, the houses will melt. He was ashamed to have a guest. For example, he didn't know whether to give him some tea or to give him some water to wash. Either this or that, he cannot offer two (Int 5).

The last generation knew that it was very important to keep their heritage of monuments safe (Int 5).

Tell me about your life in the old village. What was it like? Mallish! (It was nothing!) Boring! Boring? (Laughter.) It was no change. The same day like the others. In the morning finding the same people in front of you (Int 15).

For me, I miss the time when I be in the old house.... When I sit in the front of my house you can see from the house till Luxor. Free in front of you. You are on a hill and you have a nice view in the front of you. You see the fields, you see the temples, you see Luxor, you see the city. You see everything. ... And I miss the families. When we are there we have really like one family. Me and my cousin and my neighbor, they are always in front of the houses. When the sun goes down, everybody in the front of the house. And they are sitting ... and talking (Int 19).

Of course in the old Gurna, they were used to this life. They liked it very much. And Q, the older one, he said that ... five years now since he came here (to new Qurna). He dreams every night of the life there (Int 27).

### **Importance of Local Context**

This brief description of village life in El Gourna illustrates that there were very unique features to village life of El Gourna that needed to be taken into account in planning for relocation and for devising a method of participation that would fit the local



population, for example, the intricate ways of making a living, the functions of a family compound, basic forms of village communication such as village talk, and the daily intimacy and closeness of the residents. In reviewing the events of the relocation itself and the forms of participation utilized, we must also ask how these customs and conditions were addressed, if at all. And, how have conditions in the new village affected these customs? Are neighbors and friends still able to visit one another and exchange news and information as they had before? Did the process of participation take advantage of "village talk?" Have family support systems and structures of collective living been affected or changed by relocation? What is the effect of relocation on incomes? Can families grow and expand and still live near each other in the new village, as in the old, or will new families have to move away? How was information about village life communicated to planners and government officials? Was there input from the villagers, and who did officials seek out for advice or solutions to difficult problems?

Thus, an understanding of the distinct conditions and characteristics of the old village is essential for assessing the outcomes of the relocation and the participation process. The next chapter will describe the relocation itself and the participation process that took place.

## CHAPTER 6

### THE RELOCATION OF EI GOURNA

This chapter has two parts. Part 1 summarizes background planning efforts and important historical occurrences that preceded the relocation of El Gourna. Part 2 describes events and details of the relocation itself and the role of participation.

#### PART 1: PLANNING BACKGROUND

##### **Background Issues.**

**Documentation.** Although a number of studies, reports, redevelopment plans, and master plans were produced for Luxor that discuss the possibility of a new village near El Tarif, there was no specific relocation or resettlement plan prepared for El Gourna, one that describes the relocation, assesses the conditions and the needs of the residents, details procedures for relocation, resettlement, and rules for compensation and housing, that has a budget, schedule, and timeline, or that assigns duties and responsibilities (Appendix D; ABD, 1998; Van der Spek, 2003).

When asked, a housing official in Luxor who monitored the construction of the new village said in an interview that he was unaware of any such plan. When pressed, he produce one handwritten sheet showing the projected number of houses to be built for each Naja in all areas of the West Bank. When asked what was the goal of the relocation, he stated, "To move the people." He referred to directives from President Mubarak as the basis for the relocation. Dr. Samir Farag, the Luxor governor, responded similarly when interviewed by the media. "One of the first orders of the President was to

transfer the people of Qurna” (Hider, 2009).

In practical terms, the relocation of El Gournia was authorized by the President, and then implemented by the governor and his representatives, the Luxor Supreme Council (LSC), and the military who controlled site operations. Local planning documents consisted of architectural drawings for the new village and a participation plan that was prepared for the redevelopment for Luxor (Int 0, 9). Other planning details such as an estimate of required resources, schedules, rules for compensation, and logistics were worked out on an “as needed” basis.

In 2004, following a long history of discussions, studies and development plans focused mostly on redevelopment in Luxor, Archplan, a planning and architectural consulting firm from Cairo, produced architectural drawings with a revised layout for the new village and a design for the new housing units. They also produced a new master plan for Luxor discussed below (Archplan, 2004; Yousry, 2004). But there was no plan specifically for the relocation or resettlement of El Gournia. According to Van der Spek, the “plan” for the removal of Gournia sporadically developed from an ad-hoc mixture of commissioned studies, natural events, and historical occurrences (Van der Spek, 2000).

This is not because some form of documentation does not exist somewhere, but because, for the outsider, it may be impossible to acquire. Van der Spek encountered similar problems while conducting his research on the village of old Gournia.<sup>9</sup> “There is no existing mechanism whereby these materials can be accessed in any methodical manner” (Van der Spek, 2000, p. 2). Much of Van der Spek’s material was obtained from private communications, personal copies of reports, or directly from persons involved in

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<sup>9</sup> This section is indebted to the research of Kees Van Der Speck who located many of the original documents.

the studies and reports. “In several instances, important consulting work could only be accessed by – sometimes fortuitously – locating one of the consultants involved and being allowed to use their personal copy” (Van der Spek, 2003, p. 18). He attributes the difficulty of obtaining documents to interdepartmental rivalry between governmental agencies, specifically Ministries of Culture, Tourism, and Housing.

These interdepartmental rivalries, so often brought up in conversations with indigenous and expatriate consultants working in Egypt, may frustrate the best intentions of development planners. They are also one of the reasons why it is now extremely difficult to arrive at a history of consultants’ activity in the Necropolis, the ‘archaeological excavation’ of that recommendations’ ‘littered’ landscape (is) a virtual impossibility by virtue of the effective *inaccessibility of consultants’ reports*. As one consultant commented: “My report was a nuisance, hence there will be no record of it in Egypt at all, I guess” (Van der Spek, 2003, p. 18).

Van der Spek quotes another researcher who sums up the situation thus, “Many studies have been commissioned and many plans produced, ... but few have seen the light of day and fewer have been implemented” (Van der Spek, 2003, p. 50).

**Relocation Goals and Planning Concepts.** The initial goal for the relocation was the preservation of antiquities and protection of the ancient monuments. A nationalistic sentiment regarding the preservation of ancient Egyptian treasures had arisen over time, being stirred up by the wholesale shipping of artifacts out of Egypt to museums and private collections around the world. This led to stricter controls on access to sites and plans to preserve the monuments and artifacts from loss through removal and from destruction by population expansion onto the ancient sites (Van der Spek, 2003).

As a result of the peace treaty with Israel in 1977 and Sadat's opening to the west, tourism became an important component of Egypt's economic recovery. Eventually, promoting tourism became the dominant development paradigm in Luxor and the West Bank coupled with visions of a city-wide theme park and open air museum that would attract millions of visitors to Luxor's temples and tombs. The removal of El Gurna and all non-Pharaonic elements from the preservation areas on the West Bank was justified on the basis of the open air museum paradigm, and buttressed by claims of theft from the tombs and water damage coming from the homes above (Van der Spek, 2003).

Following the Sadat initiative, several development plans were produced for the purpose of increasing tourist income. The basic relocation strategy inherent in these plans as they related to Gurna, and to much of Luxor between Luxor and Karnak temples, was based on two initiatives: the removal of existing housing and the creation of the open air museum. Although many statistical studies had been compiled, and plans developed for new employment facilities that would materialize somewhere in the distant future, little thought had been given to the immediate social and economic impacts that would be borne by the residents removed from these areas. The conflict between a traditional way of life in Gurna and the concept of the open air museum was characterized by one high-ranking antiquities official thus: "You can't have donkeys and cows in a world-class archaeological site" (Van der Spek, 2003, p. 16).

In promoting national economic objectives, statements from public officials took on an increasingly aggressive tone. Successive governors talked of "removal of slums to save antiquities" and removal of "nine shanty areas known as Old Gurnah" (Van der Spek, 2003, p. 30). Egypt's first Lady saw this as a necessary progression. "The people of Luxor are the priority in this project. If some villages have to be removed in order to

save our heritage, that does not mean we don't care for individuals. On the contrary we are giving them a better alternative with complete services" (Van der Spek, 2003, p. 30). Although speaking specifically about Luxor, this approach was being applied to El Gourna as well.

**Prior Plans.** Prior structure and development plans for Luxor and the West Bank emphasized these developing economic themes. In the 1970s, a UNESCO report known as the Westbank plan, although primarily a study of the effects of urbanization and tourism on heritage sites, proposed the creation of "an open air museum" requiring the removal of Gourna. The report and recommendations did not consider the impacts such a scheme would have on the residents or local antiquities workers (Van der Spek, 2000).

The general aim is to ensure that continued exploration and excavation by Egyptologists, archaeologists and other experts can continue in the area undisturbed by tourist and trespassers and to allow tourists to visit the tombs with pleasure and in ways which emphasize their sacredness (Van der Spek, 2000, p. 16).

In the 1980s, the Ministry of Tourism commissioned Arthur D. Little International, Inc. (ADL) to produce a plan detailing ways to increase tourist revenues.

The principal objective of this study has been to make recommendations which will allow Egypt to derive greater benefits, both near- and long-term, from its resources on the West Bank of the Nile at Luxor and at the same time preserve the antiquities, which are threatened as a result of the growing popularity (ADL, 1983:I-1 in Van der Spek, 2000, p. 19).

Although this report was primarily concerned with maximizing tourist revenue and preservation of antiquities sites, it did point out the need for future housing and economic development on the West Bank. And it contained a five page section entitled "New Taref

Community Brief” in which specific design criteria were presented for a new village at El Tarif (Van der Spek, 2003, p. 19). This appears to be the earliest reference to a specific plan for a new village near El Tarif (Van der Spek, 2000, p. 24).

While development plans for Luxor involved various national ministries, the City of Luxor itself had authority to commission and adopt a master plan. In 1992, the Luxor Supreme Council (LSC) issued Terms of Reference (TOR), i.e., a Request for Proposal, calling for “the preparation of preliminary studies and surveys, a physical plan, and detailed architectural designs for Qurnawi resettlement at New el-Taref ...” (Van der Spek, 2000, p. 26).

In response, Engineering Systems and Consultants (ESC) developed a “full fledged design study for the construction of a village at New el-Taref” (Van der Spek, 2003, p. 21). The ESC report also included a study of social conditions in Gournah, but appears to have limited its investigations to the opinions and preferences of upper level village representatives rather than gathering information from ordinary villagers (Van der Spek, 2003). The overall report provided a site design for the village that would allow families to remain in close proximity in separate sections of the new village similar to their traditional arrangement in the old village (Appendix E). Other details reappeared in subsequent plans prepared by Helwan University and Archplan.

Following a disagreement with ESC, the governor and the LSC, with funding provided by the Ministry of Housing, commissioned Helwan University in 1995 to prepare another plan and begin work on the project at El Tarif. Plans produced by Helwan relied on the earlier work of ESC with some modifications and provide additional engineering details for the new village at El Tarif (Van der Spek, 2003). Following a disagreement over payments to subcontractors, Helwan was in turn replaced by Archplan in 2002/3.

Archplan redesigned portions of the village and produced the final housing plans for the project (Yousry, 2004).

Meanwhile a larger more comprehensive approach to the redevelopment of Luxor, funded by the Ministry of Housing and the UN Development Program and known as Comprehensive Development for the City of Luxor Project (CDCL), was undertaken in 1996 (Yousry, 2004). This initiative has produced a series of project documents that sought to “accommodate projected growth in population, tourism and agriculture while preserving and enhancing the antiquities to absorb the escalation in tourism” (Abraham and Tilney, 1998 in Van der Spek, 2000, p. 43), or more generally, a comprehensive approach to development that will “promote environmentally, financially, and institutionally sustainable growth and diversified economic development in Luxor” (Yousry, 2004, p. 31). Taken together, the various documents and outputs of the CDCL have become the current overall operational guide for redevelopment in Luxor and the West Bank (Yousry, 2004).

A special emphasis in the current CDCL is the development of Luxor’s tourist economy, a primary source of foreign earnings and the ultimate justification for the removal of Gournia in preparation for the “open air museum.” (Dziadosz, 2010, El Aref, 2010). The principal document for the CDCL is the Comprehensive Development (Plan) of the City of Luxor Project, Egypt prepared by Abt Associates Inc. (Abt, 2000). It consists of three parts: a Structure Plan, a Heritage Plan, and Investment Projects that address the implementation of each element of the Plan (Abt, Vol. 2, p. 13). The plan assumes the relocation of Gournia in order to preserve the Tombs of the Nobles area. Thus, one of the objectives of the Abt development plan is the “Relocation of Old Gournia residents to New El-Tarif and adaptive re-use of two of the old villages (one as an Artisan



Village and the second as a Vernacular Village)” (Abt, Vol. 1, p. 101; notes in original). It went on to specify,

This should include planned relocation of residents from Old Gourna, restoration of tombs beneath presently populated areas, and retention of two villages (with few tombs beneath) for a touristic and economic base for residents of Old Gourna after relocation” (Abt, vol. 1, p. 52).

Located throughout the plan are several additional references to Gourna. For example,

Urban growth in the vicinity of both East Bank and West Bank antiquities threatens the integrity and setting of the historic resources. In the villages of Gourna at the foot of the Necropolis, growth has accentuated water infiltration, causing damage to tombs and their decorative surfaces (Abt, vol. 1, p. 24).

But there is no explanation of the how the relocation, or the subsequent resettlement, would be implemented.

Although Gourna is not included in the Luxor Heritage District, the Abt plan extends the concept of an open air museum to both East and West Bank.

The two parts of the city, on the east and west, are inexorably bound together across the river and the bond between both sides of the river must never be broken. It is an essential element of the beauty of Thebes, created by the clear relationship of the city of Thebes, on the eastern bank, to the river and the green valley stretching away to the Necropolis of Thebes in the hills of the West Bank (Abt, Vol 2, p. 109).

Thus, the fate of Gourna became tied to the comprehensive plan for Luxor and must be seen in that light, not as a separate project.

Recognizing the limited capacity of the Luxor government to implement a comprehensive plan of the type Abt calls for, the Abt plan also recommends creation of a

Project Management Unit (PMU):

... to provide direction to the overall implementation of the recommendations of the CDCL project. The PMU would provide oversight for all proposed Investment Projects of the CDCL, and would be the entity that would insure Central Government commitment to this sustained effort (Abt, Vol. 2, p. 62).

The report does not contain any relocation or resettlement plan for Gournia or for affected sections of Luxor, or a recommendation for one, although the impacts of resettlement are discussed in various places. This omission may account for the fact that there did not appear to be any knowledge of such plans on the part of local officials.

There have been some updates and additional documents, studies, and plans since the Abt initiative (Yousry, 2004). The most current master plan is the Luxor City Master Plan (LCMP) contracted by Archplan (AP) in 2003 and approved in January 2004 (Archplan, 2004; Yousry, 2004). This plan reviews and builds on ideas and concepts found in the Luxor master plans of 1984 and 2003. It has little to say, however, about Gournia and does not include it in the social and economic reports.

Archplan also produced a statement regarding citizen participation for planning activities in Luxor as Annex 5 to its plan (Archplan, 2004), something which was not contained in other plans. While noting the importance of participation, the statement points out that, "Generally speaking no agreement is reached ... on a specific definition of community or people participation" (Archplan, 2004, Annex 5, p. 2).

After noting the UN's general definition of participation, "The voluntarily integration of people in making and executing decisions that have direct impact on their life" (Archplan, 2004, Annex 5, p. 2), the statement offers its own description of participation. "Indeed it is the enablement of men and women within the same

community to determine the type, degree and direction of change that they require and desire” (Archplan, 2004, Annex 5, p. 2).

The statement then describes the goals and advantages of participation, types of participants and decision makers, and methods and stages of participation. The list of possible participants include: creditworthy citizens (a cultured and well informed group of citizens from the elite strata appointed by the government), local leaders selected by the government, two types of planners who act as advisors to those in power, and what may be identified as elected or politically connected officials, i.e., “people who have the dominating vote in local affairs through direct participation and controlling election votes and selecting planners and technicians to assist and support them” (Archplan, 2004, Annex 5, p. 2f.). The plan does not discuss the inclusion of regular citizens, mechanisms for public meetings, or ways of acquiring input from ordinary people in the villages. The statement reviews a number of ways in which citizens can be involved, but these are primarily ways for citizens to assist the government in reaching its goals (Archplan, 2004, Annex 5).

A report by Ahmed Yousry (2004) prepared for the UN Development Program evaluates the performance of the CDCL process and “presents the activities, findings, and recommendations” regarding the program from its inception to the situation current in 2004. In assessing the various outputs of the program, Yousry comments that there has been noteworthy progress in promoting participation through numerous administrative work groups. However, he also reports that input from the private sector “in formulation of development plans, investment packages, and priority projects has been rather symbolic and insubstantial.” And “when the project goes into implementation, uncertainty about successful participation begins to surface” (Yousry,

2004, p. 32).

Yousry also mentions an oft repeated opinion from local residents and village leaders that planning efforts often result “in producing merely studies, rather than concrete, let alone effective, outcomes and results” (Yousry, 2004, p. 33). His strongest recommendation is for an effective PMU. “Establishing a PMU remains a pressing and long awaited issue for all parties responsible for the CDCL project” (Yousry, 2004, p. 36).

In order to achieve this goal the report emphasizes several priorities:

- a broad base of local stakeholders should be included in the PMU organizational structure, including resource persons, local university, CBOs (community-based organizations), popular and local councils, the private sector, etc.,
- the role of professionals and consultants in the PMU should be that of facilitators and moderators in addition to their relevant expertise,
- the PMU should employ a flexible, bottom-up, broad-based participatory, learning-by-doing approach,
- the PMU should not overburden itself with creating ambitious major development programs and projects at the beginning (e.g., macro job creation, high-cost investment packages); these should come at latter stages,
- in its first stage, the PMU should reflect a high profile through visible deliverables in order to elicit public support,
- and high political support and ensured financial and managerial autonomy are prerequisites for the establishment of the PMU to ensure decentralized institutionalization and sustainability. Conflicts between governmental entities will require continuous efforts to smooth their impact and maintain efficiency and cooperation (Yousry, 2004, p. 37).

**Funding.** Budget estimates for the relocation vary depending on the source of information ranging from 300 to 500 million pounds:

Required funding for the project has invariably been reported at around the

LE 300m mark (Osman, 1998; el-Akhbar, 1999), although estimates by the contractor in July 1999 approached LE 350m. The latest estimates comes from Dr. Gaballa Ali Gaballa, Secretary General of the Supreme Council of Antiquities who offered a figure of US \$131m which converted would bring the amount in the vicinity of LE500m (Jenkins, 1999). Even if allowing for such variables as design changes, inflating costs, devaluation of the Egyptian Pound (Stewart, 1998) or corruption, the eventual cost of the project now appears to have grown out of the financial reach of private investor and government alike: “nobody is going to put up that kind of money” (Gaballa, quoted in Jenkins, 1999, in Van der Spek, 2000, p.65).

A planning consultant revealed that as of 2008 the project at El Tarif spent more than 200 million Egyptian pounds (Int 0). But this is well below the projected costs for the project and raises the prospect of construction shortcuts and questions about how completion of the project would be funded.

Abt cites a similar problem for the CDCL:

Funding for Comprehensive Development Plan implementation will require thousands of millions of Egyptian Pounds. ... The level of funding required to implement the Comprehensive Development Plan for Luxor is beyond the resources of the GOE (Government of Egypt) alone” (Abt, 2000, Vol. 1, p. 30).

Yousry reports that as of December 2004 funding activities did not achieve desired goals and continue to be an unsolved problem (Yousry, pp. 11, 22, 25). Budget figures listed in an unofficial information packet obtained from the Luxor Information Office (Appendix F) indicates that the total budget for the project was 170 million Egyptian Pounds. This is considerably less than projected.

Lack of funds seems to have also prevented the government from completing some facilities in the new village, such as interior roads, parks, and the second water

plant in the rear of the village, and affected the quality of the work especially in the later phases. For example, since the City Council could not afford to buy more equipment, it decided to dismantle the upper water plant that supplies water to the rear half of the village. This has left the upper part of the village without water except for 2 hours each day, once in the morning and once in the evening (Int 24).

In sum, the various plans seem to have been randomly coordinated but do represent an accumulation of ideas and concepts regarding the redevelopment of Luxor, the development of an open air museum that includes both East and West Banks, and a new village near El Tarif. And, it appears that various governors and officials have drawn on this stockpile, but without a unified or consistent plan. Except for the ESC report, these plans do not contain a thorough investigation of the local context beyond interaction with elected representatives and other high ranking village representatives (Van der Spek, 2003). As Van der Spek comments, “There is no information about Qurnawi direct consultative participation during that phase of the design process” (Van der Spek, 2000, p. 73), and, “Other than through initial social and architectural surveys, consultants have had little ongoing contact with people at grassroots’ level” (Van der Spek, 2000, p. 97).

### **Historical and Natural Events**

A series of historical and natural events involving the West Bank, and the actions of Luxor’s governors, had a direct influence on the planning process and played a critical role in the eventual relocation of El Gourna and construction of a new village at El Tarif.

**Fathy’s Village.** Before any of the plans mentioned above had been produced, in 1946 the Egyptian government commissioned Hassan Fathy to build a new village for El

Gourna villagers about 2 km. east of old Gourna near the El Fa'dliya irrigation canal. For Fathy, this was the fulfillment of a life long dream of improving living conditions for the rural poor (Fathy, 1969). Fathy had developed in his own mind a picture of the ideal fellaheen (rural peasant) dwelling and now had the opportunity to build it. The site for the village was problematic in that it was still subject to flooding and had to be protected by dikes. Fathy put together a small operation for the production of mud brick and hired masons from Aswan to construct the homes in traditional Nubian fashion. Although Fathy assumed that the villagers would approve of his designs and concepts, he also knew how important local participation would be in the project.

A village society takes long to measure and needs more subtle instruments than a tape measure. ... To find out what customs and rituals obtained and to map the hierarchy of the community, we should have to talk to the elders of the village, and watch the village life for many months. To find out how the people went about their work, and how they used their houses, we should have to observe and invite suggestions (Fathy, 1969, p. 51, 53).

Nevertheless the villagers were not inclined to move to the new village. Fathy attributes their refusal to relocate to their reluctance to give up the lucrative income they were receiving from the illegal market in ancient artifacts (Fathy, 1969, 2000). But the villagers themselves claimed that the homes and courtyards were too small; that they were subject to cracking, flooding, and needed considerable upkeep being made from mud brick; and they did not like the architecture which reminded them of tombs for the dead (See Figure 1.1 and Photo 6.1). "The villagers ... found fault with the houses, considering them to be built to an idealized plan of what a rural house should be but without any real respect for their needs" (El Aref, 2006).



Photo 6.1. A Typical Home in Fathy's Village (by Author).

Dr. Ahmed El Tayib, an important village leader, reports that his grandfather, a village sheik who was committed to improving the life of the villagers, advised villagers not to move to Fathy's New Gourn. As Dr. Ahmed recalls,

The first village of New Gourn was built by Dr. Hassan Fathy during the time of my grandfather, but it was not good at all. As a practical matter it was not suitable for the residents. For example, Hassan Fathy's design was too small. Residents could not get their camels in the protected yards for the night. In addition, the mud brick buildings started to crack a short time after they were built. My grandfather was the leader who advised the residents not to move from old Gourn to Fathy's new village."

Some residents reported that their parents and grandparents personally liked



Fathy and wanted to move to the village, but it did not suit their needs. “They liked it, but of course it was a little bit smaller. When they moved, they were three or four in the family and then when they increased they came back to old Gourna” (Int 21). Others resisted because of their attachments to old Gourna.

I hear from my father when he’s young, they built this Hassan Fathy village. And he say we have offer from the government to go to the Hassan Fathy village, (but) we don’t want.

Why not?

About the people they like more to be, you know they have history. Yourself, your roots is there. And this is why. I know exactly from (my father) and my father is still alive in this time when they move (Int 19).

In analyzing the reasons for the failure of the village, Hana Taragan points out, “From the outset, Hassan Fathy planned and formulated his ideas for the village on the basis of two concepts which put him in the position of the ‘knowing mind’ ” (Taragan, 1999). The author goes on to explain that Fathy’s own vision of what a rural village should be prevented him from understanding the realities of life in El Gourna.

The Fathy’s houses were small and tight with no room for family expansion (Photo 6.1). They could only accommodate a single family of perhaps 4 or 5 persons in contrast to the spacious hillside compounds of the Gournawi that often housed 10 or more people, and 2 or 3 families from more than one generation. The courtyards were also small, approximately 12 feet x 25 feet, too small to stable a cow or a camel except in emergencies.

The failure of New Gourna can be linked as much to a failure of communication and participation at the village level as to diminishing government support. In the end, Fathy transgressed his own advice by not talking to and listening to the villagers

themselves, although he had great concern and affection for them. The village was never completed and today, almost no one lives in the original homes either because they are too small or because they are crumbling and unsafe. Families that do live in New Gourna have added to the original structures with modern materials or have combined two or three units into suitable living quarters.

UNESCO has now embarked on a project to restore Fathy's village. This will necessitate acquiring some homes from villagers who have modified them from the original design. "Buildings built in concrete in the village would be demolished under the plan and replaced by new ones similar to those in Fathy's original design. The inhabitants of the demolished houses would be given new ones under the project" (El-Aref, 2010).

**Sadat's Treaty.** Egypt's treaty with Israel in 1977 and the subsequent re-opening to the west resulted in the return of Western capital and tourists. Touristic activity in Luxor led to a flow of studies and plans regarding development and tourism described above and strengthened the resolve to relocate El Gourna.

In 1981, by presidential decree, President Sadat forbid any new construction, modifications, or repair to existing homes in any monumental areas which included El Gourna and almost all of the West Bank (Van der Spek, 2003). This decree also forbid the extension of any kind of infrastructure to the hillside.

The effect of this decree cannot be overestimated. It led to the deterioration of existing homes and to crowded, unsafe, and unsanitary conditions. Because of these conditions, some families began to move from Gourna to surrounding villages, but the attraction and familiarity of the hillside living, and the ready income provided by the tourists, kept many from leaving. By the time of the relocation, many homes were simply

falling down, and when the government began demolishing homes that had been abandon or damaged by flooding, the structural support for adjacent homes was removed giving residents little choice but to move (Van der Spek, 2003).

**Flash Floods.** In 1994, a series of flash floods swept away portions of El Gourna near Seti 1 temple and Dra Abu Al-Naga' (Map 4.2; Van der Spek, personal note). An emergency tent village was set up at the temple of Seti I and promises were made to residents regarding new accommodations and emergency help (Int 24; Chapter 4). Emergency housing was quickly built at El Suul (the torrents) and Gabowie (the domes) in the area west of El Tarif. Some families from Naja Rhabat and Naja Attiyat moved to Suul at that time decreasing the number of families who moved to new Qurna later (Int 26). An elder resident recalls, "The first village mostly moved was Rhabat because they are the village most damaged by the floods" (Int 27).

Although the project at Gabowii never succeeded, the building of Suul provided City of Luxor with relocation experience in three key areas: building a new village and relocating residents, a simple low cost design for new housing units (row like structures of concrete and baked red brick), and the use of the military in managing the construction of the village (Van der Spek, 2003). After the initial resettlement of flood victims, "authorities conceived of the idea to expand accommodation there for the purpose of relocating the foothills' villagers" (Rakha, 1999, quoted in Van der Spek, 2000, p. 68). A total of about 350 houses were build in Suul (Int 9).

And in this time they started to get the measurements and to get how many persons they are living there, how many houses. They have drawn some ... accurate maps for the old Gourna. And they made a booklet and drawings for old Gourna... (Int 27; c.f., Appendix E).

Unfortunately, those who had been washed out by the flood, or whose houses were significantly damaged or deteriorated had few alternatives. They could move to another nearby village, or to Suul.

Gabowii was never accepted by the residents because the units were very small and the design unacceptable, i.e., two domes over rather small living areas (Int 26). Many of the abandoned houses in Gabowii are now used to stable animals, and some have been purchased and redesigned by European expatriates who now reside in the West Bank. Typically, they will buy two adjoining units and, with some creative interior design, combine them into one house.

Thus, the immediate and lasting impact of the floods was the building of the village of El Suul behind El Tarif.

According to observations made by the University of Cambridge Archaeological Mission to Western Thebes, the 'immediate catalyst' for the first, late 1996, voluntary relocations was the presence of es-Suyul. (Strudwick, 1997, in Van der Spek, 2003, P. 30)

However, as Van der Spek notes, during the building of Suul, local village participation was lacking:

This shifting government focus concerning the location of choice for Qurnawi resettlement bypassed any form of consultation with community members... It appears probable that no great weight was placed this time on community participation because community participation never amounted to much in the first place (Van der Spek, 2003, p. 33).

**Terrorist Attacks.** Following the Gulf war, terrorists attempted to disrupt Egypt's tourist economy by openly attacking tourists hoping to greatly reduce tourist income. On September 18, 1997, terrorists attacked and killed 9 tourists and their driver at the Cairo

Museum (Van der Spek, 2003, p. 27). Two months later on November 17, six terrorists attacked tourists at Hatshepsut's temple on Luxor's West Bank killing 58 foreign nationals and 4 Egyptians and "wounding scores of others, ... before being chased by Qurnawi (Gourna citizens) into the hills ... where they committed suicide" (Van der Spek, 2003, p. 26).

In response to these attacks, President Mubarak appointed a new Army general, General Selmi Selim, as governor in Luxor and a new Interior Minister. New security measures were adopted in the West Bank including a military post built at El Suul. The new governor also attempted to deal with economic and social problems in Luxor and the lingering relocation of El Gourna in his own way, often ignoring previous decisions and plans which added to the haphazard direction of events (Van der Spek, 2000, 2003).

**Tarif Melee.** Within weeks, another set of confusing circumstances and disorganized objectives led to the shooting of 4 innocent villagers in El Tarif on January 17, 1998. Lack of jurisdictional coordination between the Supreme Council of Antiquities, and the Luxor City Council's Monumental Zone, and misinterpretations by local villagers, led to a confrontation.

Apparently, the Supreme Council of Antiquities had authorized some additional building sites in the area west of El Tarif. However, the Luxor City Council, who controlled the monumental zone that included almost the entire West Bank, was unaware of this. With authorization from the Supreme Council, local villagers erected their customary low stone walls marking out future building sites. Unaware of the authorization, council workers from the Luxor Supreme Council backed up by the local police went to Tarif to demolish the stone walls. The shootings took place in the ensuing melee and confusion which had moved from the original place of confrontation to the

border between El Tarif and Gournia City (Van der Spek, 2003, p, 14).

According to the Ministry of the Interior, “Villagers attacked a police unit which was protecting municipal employees who came to destroy residents’ huts that were illegally built on an archaeological site in Gurna” (Van der Spek, 2003, p. 14). The incident was the culmination of a prevailing situation of misinformation, misunderstandings, haphazard action, lack of informed planning, and a top down administration that was not in contact with the local population.

**Governors’ Activities.** In addition to rivalry between agencies and confusion between jurisdictions, Luxor’s governors often struck out on their own. For example, with little reference to existing plans, Governor Selim adopted his own “three-pronged approach” to Luxor’s problems which included plans for “tourism, urban planning, and employment,” and visualized Luxor as “an open museum and a cultural preserve” (Van der Spek, 2000, p. 68). In addition, Selim initiated plans for a corniche project at El Geziira on the West Bank opposite Luxor Temple that many worried would bring the floating hotels to the West Bank of the Nile, and a new Khan market at Suul (Van der Spek, 2000, p. 69f.). The corniche project was later implemented and expanded by his successor Dr. Samir Farag, until the revolution of January 25, 2011.

During this period, the government issued some pamphlets and pictures of the proposed new village and new dwellings (Figure 6.1; Int 26) thus increasing the expectation of relocation. The villagers responded with their own petition explaining why they did not want to move from Gournia (Appendix G). Meanwhile, site work had begun at El Tarif and was proceeding according to the village plan laid out by Helwan University.



Figure 6.1. Proposed Gournawii Dwelling (Jenkins, 1996).

Governor Selim’s successor, Dr. Samir Farag, who was appointed in July 2004 (Mars, 2009), had similar visions for Luxor and the West Bank that were frequently reported in the Egyptian media.

The (excavation) work is part of an ambitious reorganization of Luxor that involves turning it, in the words of Samir Farag, the governor, into a ‘living museum’ with ‘tourist villages’ (Times Online, 2010).

“It is our philosophy now to evacuate the whole city between the two temples [Luxor and Karnak] to an area west of the railway line,” Luxor Governor Samir Farag told Al-Masry Al-Youm in late October. ...He said the government was paying LE300 million to convert the (Luxor) cornice into a pedestrian walkway.

Farag wants to build an industrial area in the desert for processed food

production and double the number of hotel rooms to 40,000. He is also looking for foreign investors to fund a US \$3 billion marina for cruise ships (Bossone, 2009).

As well intentioned as these projects were, they involved serious consequences for the people who were in the way. “ ‘We’re talking about destruction for the public good,’ he (Frag) said. ‘There are victims for every development’ ” (Dziadosz, 2010).

In retrospect, the history of planning for Luxor and the West Bank had been a sometimes confusing affair with no clear or consistent path, and with little input from the people most affected by the projects.

**Chronology of Events.** The following chart summarizes the historical, natural and planning events from Fathy’s village to the recent Cairo revolution.

Date	Historical Event	Planning Event
1946	Hassan Fathy, New Gourna	
1977	Sadat’s Treaty	Welbank report
1981	Sadat’s Decree	ADL Tourism Study
1992		Luxor TOR
1995		ESC Study
1994/5	Floods; Suul and Gabowii built	
1996		Helwan Plan
1996		Comprehensive Development for the City of Luxor
1997 March		Sitework begins behind El Tarif
1997 November	Terrorist attacks at Hatshepsut’s Temple	



Date	Historical Event	Planning Event
1998 February	Shooting at El Tarif	
2004	Dr. Farag appointed Governor	Archplan: Luxor Master Plan
2005	Construction at El Tarif	
2005	Relocation begins	
2010 January	Gournet Mar'ii moved to new Qurna	
2011 January 25	Cairo Revolution	

Figure 6.2. Chronology of Historical and Planning Events

### Participation Planning Before the Relocation of 2005

Before presenting information gathered from interviews regarding villager participation in the relocation, the following is a brief summary of what the many development plans had to say about participation.

Several early studies and plans discussed the need for participation but did not present a format or procedure for implementing participation, except for the Luxor City Master Plan of 2004. The LSC TOR of 1992 even bears the title “El-Gurna Region Resident Relocation Study and New El-Tarif Village Planning Through Community Participation” (Van der Spek, 2003, p. 20), and notes that the exclusion of local representation led to inadequate planning in the past. It encourages the development of a participation plan that will recognize local customs, initiatives and capabilities, but limits participants to “local executives, elected officials, and other representatives of the

residents” (Van der Spek, 2003, p. 21). However, no specific participation plan was forthcoming.

The ESC study prepared in response to the TOR does not indicate if villager participation was part of the preparation for the study but does contain a social survey of the village, accomplished in 9 days (Chapter5; Van der Spek, 2000, p. 31). The Helwan documents, relying on the ESC report, also stressed participation and accepted the ESC Social Survey (SPAAC, 1995). These recommendations do not seem to have been followed except for the inclusion of some elected representative and leading citizens of the West Bank in executive meetings in Luxor. Participation as advised in the Abt Comprehensive Plan is mostly concerned with engagement of the private sector for the purpose of economic development, and the participation of selected representatives in the PMU. It has little to say about how participation might involve average village residents.

As indicated, the LCMP’s explanation of the role of participation is more detailed but is limited in scope to the local elite, government official and representatives, consultants, and elected leaders. There is no provision for participation or input from residents at the village level except through selected representatives.

**Lack of Participation at the Village Level.** Despite recommendations for participation, it seems to have been confined to administrative levels. Based on his own studies, Van der Spek reports, “Those families and individuals questioned about local participation in a consultative process replied they were unaware of any” (Van der Spek, 2003, p. 34). This research confirmed the same finding (See below). Prior to the time of relocation, as Van der Spek has noted, “community participation never amounted to much in the first place” (Van der Spek, 2000, p. 72).

**Actor Groups.** Not only was there little or no participation at the village level, the dynamics of membership in a particular actor group affected the way participation worked in practice. As observed by Van der Spek:

Membership (of Gournā 'representatives' in) the Luxor City Council may have constituted a conflict of interest preventing a fair representation of community relocation-relevant concerns when these relate to issues of larger regional or even national interest. ... In effect community participation is conducted by prominent community members who are also elected representatives on the Luxor City Council, and who may have personal aspirations which on the available evidence appear to be in conflict with their representative and consultative responsibilities (Van der Spek, 2003, p. 34 & 51).

Interviews for this study pointed to similar conflicts of interest. For example the final design of the housing units was selected by a small group of experts and representatives who believed that they knew what the villagers needed, but in fact were out of touch with the space requirement of villagers and how family compounds actually functioned (Chapter 6, Part 2). Although many operational meetings took place in Luxor with higher ranking representatives of the villages present, these meetings did not include or truly represent ordinary villagers or life as actually lived at the village level.

Thus, while participation was seen as a necessary element in the comprehensive planning for Luxor, which included the relocation of Gournā, it only occurred at the administrative or executive level and only involved upper level participants. And while participation guidelines from major funding sources were available as patterns for the relocation project, for example from the World Bank (2002) and the Asian Development Bank (2009; Appendix D), they were not utilized, perhaps because neither of these agencies provided funding for the relocation.

## **Inevitability of Relocation**

Before relocation to new Qurna, a significant number of families had already moved to Suul and other places. The sequence of events initiated by Sadat's decree, damage from floods, and construction of El Suul brought home an uncomfortable reality to the residents.

(The) people felt fed up because they couldn't build any new flat or any new rooms or restore anything which collapsed in the houses. So when the first flood came they started to move (Int 27).

It rained for two hours and some of the houses were melting in the village. And houses were lost because of the considerable runoff. After that flood they built some homes in Gabowii for some of the families that lost their homes in the flood. Then they knew for sure that they would have to move (Int 14).

With the building of Suul and Gabowii, and seeing the site work at new Qurna, the villagers began to realize that houses would be there soon and that relocation was inevitable. Many people had already moved to other villages recognizing that the old houses in Gournna were no longer suitable. Some families with improved financial conditions had already moved to Luxor or further (Int 24). As a government official observed,

They were conscious of everything happening around them and they knew that it was not so good to stay in such conditions which were not so humane like no water, no drainage, and no schools for the children. So they were also ready to move (Int 5).

And, the younger generation would be affected most by the deteriorating conditions.

Every young people they move to other places. The most of the people they have other houses. But we know one day we going to move. ... I built myself a

house. When I be up (in Gourna), when I be with my family, I said if I want to marry, I cannot be married in this house. ... The most of us we moved since a long time ... since the flood” (Int 19).

So the villagers were “ready” and many wanted to move. The questions for them were what would the new village be like, what would they get in exchange for their homes in El Gourna, and how would life for them be different? In spite of everything, most villagers wanted to move to better conditions, but also wanted suitable homes and fair compensation.

## PART 2: THE RELOCATION OF 2005

One of the objectives of this research is to record and present a view of relocation and participation from the perspective of participants rather than as seen by outside sources.

Part 2 of this chapter describes events and experiences from their perspective. Information is presented largely in the voices of the participants, and interpretation and comments have been included only where it would help to explain events, what was being said, or the context of a situation. More complete analysis and interpretation are presented in Chapters 9 and 10.

### **Phases of the Relocation**

The relocation of the whole mountain community of El Gourna, i.e., all five Najua', occurred in what amounted to two separate relocations, the relocation of the four main families of El Gourna and the relocation of Gournet Mar'ii. The first relocation required two phases, and the second was accomplished in one, for a total of three phases.

The first phase of relocation included initial groups of families who were ready and willing to move and who were relocated to sections 2 and 3 of the new village. (See below for a description of the village layout.) These families were mostly from Naja Horobat and Naja Hasasna. This initial phase was typified by the personal involvement of the Luxor governor, participation of village leaders and representatives, better constructed homes, and more satisfaction.

The beginning of the second phase is unclear but generally coincides with

assumption of day to day responsibilities for relocation by the Governor of the West Bank who worked under the authority of Dr. Samir Farag. In this stage, there was little or no participatory activity, participation being reduced to personal negotiations with the West Bank Governor, governmental co-opting of some appointed representatives, significantly less involvement of the El Tayib brothers and the appointed representatives, and the movement of families from Horobat, Rhabat and Attiyat to sections 4 and 5. Residents were also less willing to move with some actually refusing to do so. There was a decline in the quality of construction, less satisfaction with the new village, and the West Bank Governor exhibited a more direct and authoritative style.

The second relocation, which was also the third overall phase of the relocation project as a whole, involved the village of Gournet Mar'ii (GM). Although GM was moved to new Qurna, this was not part of the original relocation plan and it follows a quite different strategy (See details below). Dr. Farag was not seen on the West Bank and the West Bank Governor directly controlled almost all elements of the process. There was no participation by the residents, Dr. Ahmed and Sheik Mohammed were not involved as mediators, and there were no appointed representatives for GM. There were initial conflicts between the residents, on one side, and the West Bank Governor, the mayor, and elected representatives of Bairat, on the other. And, as might be expected, much greater dissatisfaction. The new homes in section 1, however, are some of the best built in the village.

While limited comparisons between the three phases are possible, any comparison is also complicated by other factors such as budget problems, the managerial styles of the two Governors, involvement of the Supreme Council of Antiquities, the loss of the traditional village committee in GM, and a change in the

intended use of Section 1.

### **Actors and Actor Groups**

The principal actors and actor groups involved in the relocation are described below, and Figure 6.3 below shows political and structural relationships of the various groups.

**National Ministries and Agencies.** At the national level, the Ministries of Tourism, Housing, Transportation, Culture, and Justice were directly involved in the planning and implementation of the relocation (Int 0). The Supreme Council of Antiquities, a section of the Ministry of Culture, held a prominent role in determining management policies of the monumental areas on the West Bank and oversaw demolition of homes in Gournia in conjunction with Luxor City Council (Int 11, 17). The Ministry of Housing was represented locally by Engineer S. who was also the architectural advisor for Dr. Farag (Int 1). Ministries of the Interior and of International Cooperation, although less directly involved, also provided funding and oversight (Int 0).

**Luxor Supreme Council.** The Luxor Supreme Council (LSC), also known as the Supreme Council of Luxor City, was primarily responsible for the redevelopment in the Luxor area, of which the removal of Gournia was a part. At the beginning of the project, Luxor belonged to Qina governorate. In December 2009, Luxor became a separate governorate, gaining some additional authority over its own operations and over some surrounding areas, but with no significant change in its relationship to El Gournia.

**Egyptian Military.** With the arrival of Dr. Farag in 2004, the military replaced the contractor Osman Ahmed Osman and became responsible for construction of the new village through its Department for National Services (Appendix F).



**Luxor Governor.** Dr. Samir Farag was appointed Governor of Luxor in June 2004. He had a very complex role in balancing national and local priorities with both positive and negative results. Ultimately, as one consultant remarked, the relocation was accomplished in large part due to the political will and determination of Dr. Farag (Int 1). Whereas other governors has tried but had not succeeded, Dr. Farag had vigorously pursued his objectives both in Luxor and Gourn. And his efforts were not without a clear personal goal as well. “Dr. Farag told Q he wanted to give the residents something for the future” (Int 4).

**West Bank Governor.** The West Bank Governor worked under Dr. Farag’s jurisdiction. In the second and third stages of the relocation, he appeared to have almost unquestioned authority on the West Bank.

**Leaders of Gourn Village.** Sheik Mohammed El Tayib and his brother Dr. Ahmed El Tayib were the traditional spiritual leaders of the four Najua’ of El Gourn. At the time of the relocation, Dr. Ahmed El Tayib was president of Al Azhar University in Cairo. He worked with Sheik Mohammed in organizing the villagers, mediating between the government and the residents, and in solving other problems during the relocation. His presence added significant prestige and influence to the cause of the villagers. Mahmud El Tayib, the son of Dr. Ahmed, was architectural advisor to the leaders and representatives of the villages.

**Qurna City Council President.** The President of the new Qurna City Council was appointed by Dr. Farag. He worked under the authority of the West Bank Governor and provided much helpful information about the project. The Qurna City Council has both elected and appointed members and is responsible for operating village services, but has only limited legislative authority in the village.




Figure 6.3. Political and Structural Relationships in the Relocation

**Appointed Representatives.** Dr. Ahmed and Sheik Mohammed appointed special representatives from each Naja to work with the families and assist them in their roles as mediators and advocates for the residents. These representatives were not the same as the traditional village leaders that formed the village committees in each Naja. (See below for more information on the appointed representatives.)

**Village Committees.** Village committees have been explained in Chapter 5. They did not play a significant role in the relocation. For the four villages of Gourna, Dr. Ahmed El Tayib and Sheik Mohammed were the primary representatives of the villages. Gournet Mar'ii had lost its committee members as reported in Chapter 5. However, the committee has been reconstituted since the residents of Gournet Mar'ii have moved to new Qurna.

**Mayor of Bairat.** Bairat is the local governmental district in which Gournet Mar'ii is situated, although GM itself is also considered part of the Gourna mountain community. The other hamlets of Gourna are in the district of Gourna City. GM had recently lost its traditional village committee and was represented in the relocation by the Mayor and three representatives from Bairat (Chapter 5). Only one of these representatives actually lived in GM, and due to jurisdictional separation, Sheik Mohammed and Dr. Ahmed did not mediate for GM except in a few cases involving relatives.

**Designers and Consultants.** Just prior to relocation, Helwan University had designed and supervised some of the initial site work in the new village. The consulting firm Archplan took over from Helwan in 2004. Archplan modified the overall village layout and redesigned the residential and commercial areas of the village and, together with the military, supervised the first phase of construction. Archplan also conducted

workshops in Luxor that involve invited representatives, such as village leaders and prominent citizens (Chapter 6, Part 1).

**Village Residents.** The villagers who were relocated were from the 4 large Najua' in El Gourna plus the hamlet of Gournet Mar'ii. Altogether, El Gourna consisted of about 24 hamlets situated on the elevated desert floor in front of the Theban mountains. As the families expanded, additional new hamlets were built in areas near the main building clusters of each family.

The families of Gourna mountain have different ancestral roots (Chapter 4). Three are related to each other, Horobat, Rhabat, and Attiyat; one, Naja Hasasna, was incorporated into the community of Gourna families in the very early stages of settlement; and the fifth, Gournet Mar'ii, originated from families in neighboring Bairat. Marriage between families was not uncommon but limited. The Gournawii consider each family as relatives and close neighbors although social communication was generally limited to family groupings.

### **Official Reasons for the Relocation**

The primary reason for the relocation, as proposed by the government, was to protect the tombs, antiquities, and monuments. All but two of the residents interviewed agreed with this rationale for moving although some had additional reasons, such as better conditions, better houses, better services, and schools.

We know it's very bad for the tombs to have water (draining into them)... Me, I work with the antiquities, with the tombs. In this I agree with them (Int 19).

I agree because I am Egyptian. I like also the antique from inside, (it) come out and antiquities put in the museum because it's my history. History from all

Egypt. I love it. I go to museum many time. I go to museum in Luxor here. I love this one (Int 26).

For you, what was the most important reason why you moved? The houses. The others they were like tombs (Int 5).

He said the most important reasons he wanted to move and his family too was the (town) services because in the old city, old Gournna, there were no services like sewage, water, no schools. And in the new Qurna there is a better place to live, a better house (Int 8).

If you give me good house, I'm going (Int 30).

A few residents offered only qualified agreement. For example, some thought it was not necessary to move all the residents and others mentioned that the way of moving the people could be improved (Int 18, 24, 25).

Did the government tell you why they wanted you to move? Protecting the tombs. Do you think — is that a good reason? (It's) a good reason, protecting the monuments, but also to protect people also is a good reason (Int 25).

One resident thought that only people living above a tomb should be moved (Int 29), and another did not want to move because he lost his business (Int 8). Another resident agreed with protecting the monuments, but was upset that some of the antiquities were being removed from Gournna (Int 26). And a few others who agreed with protecting the tombs, did not agree with demolishing all the houses (Some homes in Gournnet Mar'ii had not been demolished as of February 2011), or moving all the people (Int 20). One resident from GM did not think it was necessary to move residents from GM because there were no finished tombs with antiquities inside in their village, most were only unfinished or partly excavated tombs or caves (Int 15). The various reasons given by villagers for moving are categorized in Figure 6.4.

<b>Reasons for Moving</b>	<b>Interview</b>	<b>Times Mentioned</b>
preservation of antiquities	3, 5, 12,14, 18, 19, 24, 25, 26	9
better houses	5, 8, 30, WT 1	4
better conditions, better services, cleanliness (since conditions in the old village were not humane)	3, 5, 8, WT 1	4

<b>Qualified Agreement</b>	<b>Interview</b>	<b>Times Mentioned</b>
need a better way to move the people	18, 24, 25	3
did not need to destroy all the houses	20	1
upset that the antiquities are being removed from Gournna	26	1
only if there is a tomb beneath the house	29	1

<b>Reasons for not moving</b>	<b>Interview</b>	<b>Times Mentioned</b>
lost business or income	8	1

<b>Did not agree with relocation</b>	<b>Interview</b>	<b>Times Mentioned</b>
No decorated tombs in Gournet Mar'ii	15	1

Figure 6.4. Reasons for Moving.

Thus, there was a very high percentage of agreement with protecting the tombs and the monuments, and many residents were happy with the improved conditions. But, a few also mentioned that at least some of the homes and activities of El Gourna should have remained, as was promised. In all of the replies there is a strong sense of responsibility for the monuments and their protection. As one resident expressed it, “This my family. And before it’s my family” (Int 26).

In statements to the press, Dr. Farag emphasized the government’s position which noted the “miserable” living conditions in Gourna. “It was a slum area. ... The people lived on top of the tombs in their houses. They didn’t have water, electricity, nothing. It was a very miserable life” (Mars, 2009). And, “Three thousand five hundred families will leave for a better life” (Kamil, 2008).

Hidden behind Dr. Farag’s statements were pressures from the national government to increase tourist revenues. Despite the inconveniences — the residents did have electricity and water was brought by donkey cart — many Gournawii preferred life on the mountain because of the warm human qualities and family connections, but they also wanted better services and a better life.

### **Strategy of the Relocation**

Government officials followed a strategy of implementation the include these steps:

- establishing recognizable lines of communication and participation,
- personal involvement of the governor, Dr. Samir Farag,
- support of the main village leaders, Sheik Mohammed El Tayib and his brother Dr. Ahmed El Tayib. Their support and participation was necessary for

rebuilding trust in the government, to act as mediators for the villagers, and to encourage the participation and cooperation of the residents.

- locally appointed relocation representatives for each family,
- building the village first and then encouraging the people to move after visiting the new houses and the new village,
- selecting a few families to be the first to move thereby encouraging the others to follow.

**Lines of Communication.** Lines of communication were provided by the personal involvement of recognizable leaders such as Dr. Farag, Dr. Ahmed El Tayib and Sheik Mohammed, and the appointment of representatives from each Naja who assisted in the relocation program.

**Personal Involvement.** In the beginning of the project, Dr. Farag could be seen talking to residents about the new village and attending meetings in the village diwans. Together with the West Bank Governor, he also visited families in the new village and inquired about how the people were doing (Int 4, 21). Although this did not continue beyond the first stage of the relocation, and not all the villagers were invited to meetings or personally aware of his visits (Int 5), it had a strong effect on the villagers as a whole.

**Mediation.** Dr. Farag realized that he could not succeed without the support of Sheik Mohammed and Dr. Ahmed especially since it was their grandfather who had advised the residents against moving to Hassan Fathy's village in the 1940s. Dr. Farag understood the influence and position of the El Tayibs and needed their help in rebuilding trust in the government and in encouraging the people to move. As Dr. Ahmed explained,



Because of the personal and spiritual trust in our family, our family was able to mediate between the people and the government, and people responsible for the relocation in the government. ... (It) helped us to convince the people to move and to relocate. And our family offered an example because we were the first to move to new Qurna (Int 3).

**Appointed Representatives.** The lines of communication were also enhanced by the appointment of representatives from each Naja, except for GM. Dr. Ahmed and Sheik Mohammed chose persons who had good reputations in the village and who were able to conduct the village survey. They were, however, not members of the traditional village committees and their appointment ended once the family they represented began moving to the new village. The appointed representatives attended meetings in the main diwan in Suul and they in turn carried information to the villagers.

**Visual Persuasion.** Given the poor performance of the government in the past, many villagers were skeptical of another new plan to build a new village. Since site work had already begun under the former governor, Dr. Farag sent limited information to the villagers until the first group of homes were ready. Then he went, along with the West Bank Governor and other village officials, to the old village to invite people to come and see the new homes. Visual and verbal communication were essential forms of communication at the village level.

To persuade them to relocate, the governor built New Gourna, a freshly constructed, planned settlement with schools, a hospital, police station and a cultural centre, five kilometers from their old location outside of town. "Of course, nobody wanted to move," he admits, "but we started with the young generation. I went to them and told them they could have a better life: You can have electricity, sewage, clean water, TVs, everything" (Mars, 2009).

The contrast with conditions in old Gourna was considerable and many residents

decided it was now time to move.

When they saw the new village they thought that it was very important for them. They liked it very much and they moved. The people were convinced and moved to the new village (Int 4).

**First Families to be Relocated.** When the first groups of units were ready, Governor Farag and the West Bank Governor selected a few of the poorest families and invited them to move to the new village.

They got four families in the beginning. The first four families moved from old Gournia to here. One from Horobab, one from Hasasna, one from Rhabab, and one from Attiyat. They are the first to move here from Attiyat. Her flat was the first flat from Attiyat to be given to her. ... And she said that they made it very nice that the people when they come to see us here because we are the first people who moved. So they see nice flats and then they are encouraged and they are motivated then to move also from old to new Gournia (Int 10, 22).

This strategy relied on the tendency of the villagers to stay together as a group or to act in concert. As one of the first residents to move reported in an interview,

She was the first one to move. Some people blamed her. Why did you move? They blamed her because they wanted to stay there. Maybe they have benefits to stay. They asked her why did you move? Now we are all obliged to move like you (Int 12).

Although decisions were not always collectively made, in a situation such as relocation in which it was important to keep families together, when one family decided to move very often everybody else in the group felt obliged to follow.

**Refusers.** Still, after the first wave of resettlers, there were some who were reluctant to move, and some who refused to do so. These were labeled by the leadership as “the refusers” and were a special category of residents in the minds of the

relocation officials. They were a persistent problem till the end of the relocation.

However, the main demands voiced by the refusers centered on adequate compensation for large homes or for lost businesses. It was not simply stubborn refusal to move as was supposed. The families felt they were not getting a fair exchange for their losses (Int 7, 18, 26, 29).

So, some people they refused at the beginning when they were not satisfied until the government give them enough rooms or enough flats (Int 22).

The reason Q refused is that he thought that they needed or they must get three houses for his family. And they got only two ... But they thought about it and they thought that there is no other possibility (Int 7).

He didn't want to (move). He has a problem with (his) business (Int 8).

I want to ask you about the man back here that hasn't moved yet. Did he say why he does not want to move? Because he (the Governor) wants to give him 2 flats. ... One for his mother and one for him, (for) 13 persons. (There were about 4 families in the compound). And he wants 4. He needs more flats. More than 2 (Int 25).

### **Design of the New Village**

Since the relocation was based on family distribution, the village was designed to accommodate the Najua' of Gourna in four sections, one section for each family beginning with section 2 (Int 4; Figure 6.5 below). Family members, such as brothers, cousins, and parents, were to be, as much as possible, relocated near each other. When the village was first built, the intention was to sell the units in section 1 to tourists and foreigners, but there was little interest. And since the village was large, the government had also planned to move people from other villages in the monumental area of the

West Bank to new Qurna especially those who might live above tombs or temples such as in Habu village (Int 6, 9).




Figure 6.5. Plan of new Qurna (Archplan, n.d.)

The village is organized around an east/west central core and linear boulevard. The entrance to the village is on the west side of El Tarif and the village stretches out to the west toward the mountains. The central core provides areas along both sides for community facilities such as parks, schools, police, future commercial development, and administrative offices (Figure 6.5 & 6.7 below). To the right of the central spine, government built housing units are configured in sections to accommodate the individual

Naja. Family areas are distinguished by slight changes in housing color and wider street entrances separating the sections.

The areas to the left and south of the main boulevard and to the rear of the village have been surveyed and marked out but were left vacant for residents who wish to build their own homes or for residents who were awarded plots of land rather than new units. So far, no private houses have been built in new Qurna.

The village has 9 residential sections altogether: the original 5 sections, i.e., sections 2 - 5, for the 4 Najua' from Gourna, and section 1 which was built after sections 2 - 5, and later occupied by Gournet Mar'ii; and 4 additional areas to the rear and to the south of the main "spine." The added sections are mainly two room units of lower quality and generally have not been provided with rear courtyards. A space has been left for the occupants to build a courtyard on their own. These areas are: an unnamed area of smaller units behind section 5 to the rear of the village (6); Zam Zam, an area in the very back of Qurna nearest to the mountains (7); a large vacant area of future homes to left and south of the village core (8); and another housing area of smaller units called Medinet Munewara behind the new Suq (an open market) and the administrative buildings, and abutting the village of Gabowii (9) (Int 29, WT 2, 3).

The two room units and Medinet Munewara were added to accommodate additional relocatees, single people, and widows and divorced women without children. All of Zam Zam was allotted to the Rasoul family and the units and open spaces have been combined forming a small hamlet.

The Ministry of Housing set certain requirements for the design of the village, namely central services, a centralized commercial area, and separation of uses such as local commercial, investment areas (hotels and institutes), residential, educational and

religious areas, in what amounts to a limited type of zoning and controlled development. They also set design standards for any new construction (Int 1).

The preliminary plans called for 400 homes. This was expanded twice to more than 800 homes although the whole of new Qurna has been designed to accommodate 2,300 homes or about 12,000 to 15,000 people (Int 0, 9). Some features and services were added to the village or changed in response to resident demands. For example, the village had only one mosque in the central core, but the villagers asked for permission to build a mosque in each family section (Int 9). Transportation, which was very limited when the residents first moved in, has also been improved in response to complaints. Microbus service to Geziira and surrounding villages has been added. As explained by a resident,

They came to interview her from some place, I don't know (some) magazine or television. She mentioned this (the transportation) many times. After she mentioned (it), the transportation got better (Int 12).

Because the village sits on a artificial plateau, it has a beautiful view of the valley, the Nile, and Luxor, especially at night. In the evening, a cool breeze comes off the mountains and residents can enjoy being outside and the view of the valley below. As an added benefit, because of the elevation and the dry conditions there are no mosquitos or bugs to trouble the residents.

**Design of the Units.** The housing units are built in a quad arrangement and are placed back to back with small courtyards for animals or other outdoor uses between them. Each unit is 175 square meters, 75 meters indoor and 100 meters for the courtyard, with two bedrooms, a hall for meeting guests, a family sitting area, and small kitchen and toilet (Int 8; Figure 6.6).



Figure 6.6. Quad Floor Plan of Four Room Units (Archplan, n. d.).

The original housing plan called for multiple story buildings of apartment blocks as found in government housing areas to the south of Luxor. This was changed to two story homes (Figure 6.1), and finally to one story homes because of the overall cost and at the request of the residents with the option of adding a second floor later (Int 1, 3, 20, 21).

Before construction began, the residents had requested other changes in the design of the units. They asked for a redesigned front entry with mastaba benches that would allow them to continue their custom of sitting outside in the evening and talking to neighbors and friends, a walled courtyard area for keeping small animals, the use of

modern materials rather than mud brick, and a staircase for future expansion to a second floor (Int 0, 1). Much to the surprise and consternation of the villagers, the staircases were omitted because of budget problems (Int 0), and, the rear courtyards were so small that only chickens and ducks can be kept. Many families have converted this space into badly needed extra rooms.

The units are small, hot, and space is limited. The smaller units in Medinet Munewara and those behind section 5 are only two rooms, with a small cooking area and toilet. Space has been set aside behind each of these units for a courtyard. Some families have been allotted more than one of these two room units and are allowed to combine them if needed.

The residents reported that as the plans was being developed they had limited contact with the designers except for Mahmud El Tayib, the son of Dr. Ahmed El Tayib (Int 26).

As some residents recalled,

“The designer they didn’t even know. They saw the plans. They met (and) they worked with Dr. Ahmed El Tayib” (Int 5).

In the old Gourn, engineer Mahmud took like an imagination or the design from the life of the upper Egyptian village, in Gourn. That they need for example, an entrance and a place to sit in the entrance and they need a backyard, how many rooms inside. He made a small hall to sit together. So he gave this design to the designers (Int 23).

Did the planners or the government people come to the village before the relocation to study the people? As far as he can remember the planners came just to get the measurements and to see what it would look like and they got the ideas about what would be comfortable for the villagers from the people who can give the information like Dr. Ahmed El Tayib and Sheik Mohammed and those



representatives that worked with them (Int 5).

After several meetings in the West Bank Diwan to discuss a final design, the village leaders and appointed representatives were presented with three designs and chose one (Int 3, 5, 13). However, the final design did not reflect the colorful variety, individual designs, outdoor spaces, and openness and size of the old Gournas houses.

### **Preparations for Relocation**

**Resettlement Planning.** Prior planning for the new village as developed in various master plans and other planning documents has been discussed above. The information in this section is based on interviews rather than documents. In reality, however, relocation planning for the new village was limited to physical or blueprint planning (Allmendinger, 2002). Although meetings and discussions regarding Gournas had been taking place in Luxor since before the flash floods in 1994/5, no written relocation or resettlement plans were produced other than blueprints. In an interview with a building official, when asked, “Was there any written plan about how the relocation would proceed?” He responded, “ No,” and added:

There were two points to the relocation. First, finish the buildings, the new houses. And then get the people to move into them.

So, as far as he knows, there was nothing written down? There was nothing written down. ... The main problem was how to remove all those illegal folks (living) on the monuments in El Gournas (Int 9).

After the floods, some survey work for the new village and later some pamphlets and information were disseminated to the villages (Figure 6.1; Appendix E).

Then they started to make reports in the old Gournas who was originally born and who owned a house and who got it new. The people who came just by, they

came and lived there recently, they were also counted in the report. So they make the report to separate the original people of old Gournia and the newcomers (Int 27).

Then they told them old Gournia will move, will be relocated. And they brought them the maps, and they showed us how they will build the Gournia ... in 2003, 2004. They put all the pictures in the Mosques that all the people they can see it. They showed them some choices. ... When the people went there (to see the new village), they find out that (it's) another home. Different, big difference (Int 26)!

Q said that the surveys started from maybe before 2002 or in 2002. And that was from the government side, but only from this side not with participation with the people or with all the people (Int 5).

However, no updated social, economic or ethnographic study of the village, nor survey of the potential risks implied by the relocation and redevelopment was conducted (Int 5, 9; Cernea, 1997; Fahim, 1983). Although the ESC plan of 1990 had included a study of social conditions in the village, later use of this study reveals that it was based only on the preferences and opinions of village leaders, not on actual interviews or studies of the residents themselves (Van der Spek, 2003).

The main "study" of the village was a counting of the families to determine which families would receive new units and how many were needed, but it did not include any investigation of the social and economic needs of the families. And so far, no post-occupancy study has been conducted (Int 6, 9).

Did anybody come to your house and talk to you about what you needed?  
No-no (Int 24).

Did they made a study of the village? No, they were not interested about what is he working or what is his job. They were interested in how many houses does

they have, the family have (Int 22).

They were moving (walked around), looking and then they go back to the Sheik in his house or in his Diwan. ... And engineer Mahmud was informing them what do the people need, how do they live, and giving them more of his observations. They got the information from looking around and from the engineer Mahmud, the son of Dr. Ahmed. So they didn't actually talk to families? Not like this (Int 21)!

When the government was ready to begin moving families, Dr. Farag, the Luxor Governor, did ask for a "study" of the most poor families. It was in effect only a list, not a study.

So during the relocation Q said that Dr. Samir asked them to make a study of the poor families and help them by furnishing the houses (Int 10).

They have a relative, a cousin, who's a member in the local assembly of the village. And they asked this man to mention names, to give them names of four or five names to check. And he informed them, the City Council, and General M., the Chief of the City Council. And he came to visit them this (West Bank Governor). He visited them to check how poor are they. And he said, yes. So they prepared twelve furnished houses for the very poor families (Int 12).

This "study" of the most poor residents revealed another side to this complex procedure. Amid the disarray and confusion of the relocation, this magnanimous gesture stands out as a wonderful example of human kindness.

Meanwhile, meetings and workshops were continuing at the Luxor Supreme Council regarding the relocation, but not in the local diwans of the West Bank (Int 1). "The meetings were always even before Dr. Samir Farag with the people in the city council. And the land here was already arranged for building by Osman, Ahmed, Osman" (Int 27).

From time to time, the design team received input concerning “the actual needs of the people there” (Int 1) via the Luxor workshops that included invited representatives and local authorities from El Gournah, and from meetings of the village council, but not from actual villagers. The villagers had to go through the local representatives if they had problems or suggestions. Their input had to work its way through the workshops to the planners (Int 1). Thus, the influence of average residents was limited.

**Compensation.** After the loss of livelihoods, occupations, and income, compensation was the most significant problem in the relocation (Int 9). At first, the government proposed giving money to residents as compensation and allowing them to build on their own. But the residents rejected this idea suggesting that if everyone was building at the same time it would raise the cost of materials and labor (Int 27).

It was then proposed to give a house for a house. But this also proved to be unworkable because, as the village leaders discovered, there were often several related families living in one family compound. Since the houses were large and the residents could not build anymore, this was not unusual.

At the beginning they wanted to give a house for a house in the old Gournah. But that was not good because married children were also living in the old houses. So an agreement was reached that each family, each married man, widow, or divorced woman with children, would get a house, a flat (Int 3).

Thus, if there were 3 married men living in a house they would get 3 units. This suggestion encouraged many young men to get married, especially if they were engaged or even thinking about getting married, or to just sign the “Kataba,” a marriage contract, so they could acquire a unit for themselves or for the family (Int 20, 23, 26).

So the people they made a trick so that if they have (an) adult, a young man

like 18 or 19 years old, they let him marry. And with a certificate of marriage (Kataba) they get for him a house. And they said also it made problems for some families who had younger children that are not married. So they live again in a small area in one flat in a condition nearly like in old Gournna before (Int 8).

This “trick” also increased the number of units needed and contributed to an overall shortage of units.

Another significant problem was the issue of closed houses. Many families had moved away from Gournna and closed their houses. The first proposal was to give them a piece of land instead of a unit for the closed house. This solution was eventually adopted, but there was also a problem of “multiple heritage” involving the closed houses.

What was the biggest problem with moving the village? The heritage (inheritance). People have heritage. The one who dies he leaves a house or land and many are sharing. ... They are the ones who inherit. They have the rights. That was the problem because there were many heirs (Int 13).

All the owners of the closed houses even if they were living in Cairo or Alexandrian they came and they said, my grandfather has given me this as heritage. So for the closed houses which are not used the agreement was to get land against it, a piece of land. It took about one year to convince people and to solve all these problems coming from the closed houses (Int 3).

Sometimes families that had moved away sent family members back to old Gournna while they were counting houses to see if they could get a flat.

I know from working up there that there was, not a lot, but a good number of houses up there that had been vacant for the best part of 30 to 40 years. ... What I saw was these families coming back. And I even remember seeing a lady turn up with her children, a chair, and a small little dough table which they role their bread out on. And she sat down in the rubble next to the house making bread surely because she knew the government was coming along to knock the

remainder of the house down so she could say, this is my house. Where's my *new* house (Int 17, original emphasis)?

When the people knew they would get a flat if they lived here after they found out about the inventory, they came back to the houses. And they asked for a house. That made the number which they had chose'd (calculated) in the beginning was wrong (Int 26).

Another problem involved assigning units to widows and divorced women with children. Many such widows or divorced women received the regular 2 bedroom units. But others widows, who for some reason could not live with their families, and divorced women without children, were given the very small 2 room units behind section 5 (Int 8). As the relocation progressed, however, widows and divorced women *with* children were also assigned the small units. And, many of these units also had major problems with large structural cracks in the walls (See below).

Families that had large houses or multiple houses in Gournah sometimes received only small units in Qurna, or the compensation was otherwise inadequate. And, residents complained that large families often had to accept just a single unit because there was only one married man in the house (Int 8, 16, 27).

Q had a large house in GM. Now he rents a small flat in El Geziira. He asked (the Governor) for compensation for his large house. (The Governor) said he would give him some land in Ramlah. Q will sell a portion of the land to raise funds and build on the other part. He does not have enough money to build by himself (Int 14).

My old house is 450 meters (approximately 4,844 square feet). It's a smaller (one). I remember. I have the picture, (of) bigger houses. (House measurements would typically include the exterior walled areas.) (Int 24).

He said his uncle has 7 children and he got one house, one flat only in the

new city (Int 8).

In order to solve some of these problems, families might be given more than one unit, or plots of land as additional compensation. But none of this was well thought out beforehand since there was no comprehensive study of village conditions, and no resettlement plan was prepared. Solutions were inconsistently applied and resulted in many unsatisfactory exchanges. In addition, when the government realized that they did not have enough units, residents were frequently pressured into accepting fewer units than they would have received under the original rules (Int 14, 24, 29). New units, a piece of land, or units and some land were the only compensation packages available to the residents.

And he said they promised him three units, and they gave him only 2. ... but they destroyed the old house there. So he couldn't do anything (Int 20).

He say ... I give you 5. I ask him please give me some minutes, one day because I want to ask my family. He say no. Now! If you like these, (or) don't like. ... Don't ask me after. How? I want to see my family. Maybe my family say no, maybe they say okay. I asked my family, they say okay, no problem. (The next day) I ask the (West Bank) Governor. He say no, I give you two. He was shouting at (me),(Int 26).

**Budget Planning.** As discussed above, funding was an uncertain and confidential aspect of planning. Dr. Farag was responsible for working with various ministries and the prime minister in obtaining funds from the national budget and international donors (Int 2). And although 1.5 billion pounds would be spent in Luxor (Int 0), and 170 million pounds on the relocation in Gournā (Appendix D), the project was short of funds. For example, budget problems led to the elimination of an important element in the new houses, a staircase to the second floor that would allow residents to

expand the house as their families grew. When it was eliminated the residents insisted on a meeting with Dr. Farag and the designers. “The vertical expansion is very important for them” (Int 0). They were told it would be supplied in a future phase (Int 0).

**Prior Work at New Qurna.** The contractor Osman Ahmed Osman had completed a significant portion of the site work and infrastructure for new Qurna based on a design by Helwan university before the arrival of Dr. Farag in 2004. When Dr. Farag arrived, he replaced Osman with the military who then hired contractors to build the project.

#### **Implementation of the Relocation.**

The current relocation project was set in motion in 2004 (Int 1), however, actual relocations began only in 2005 (El Aref, 2006). The first two phases of the relocation took about 3 1/2 years to complete (Int 4). The relocation of Gournet Mar’ii began in January 2009 with a tumultuous meeting in the village diwan and was completed about one year later.

**Role of the Appointed Representatives.** Official participation by the villagers depended almost entirely on the role of the appointed representatives who began working with Dr. Ahmed El Tayib at the beginning of the relocation project in 2005 while construction of the village had already started (Int 5). The residents were informed about planning details and upcoming events through the appointed representatives or through information passed from villager to villager by means of village talk.

Besides the task of passing information to the villagers, the main job of the representatives was to conduct a survey of the families to see which families needed new units, how many units would be needed, how many closed houses there were, how



many units or plots of land would be required all together, and who would received units or land as compensation (Int 3, 13).

But the approach was haphazard, and led to problems. For example, the estimate of units needed was low; there was favoritism in the allocation of units and land (Int 26); and the number of units assigned to a family was often insufficient.

The representatives, ... how did they talk to the people? ... (At) the Diwan, we talk, we meeting there. Did anybody come to your house and talk to you about what you needed? No, no (Int 24).

Did someone come to your house and count the number of people? No. He just leave one man. He looking how many people for this houses. And he can also write what he has in his mind. If somebody near for him (a relative), an uncle or brother, he get a new house (Int 25).

(He) said that ..., one of the representatives, he was not living in Horobat, in old Gourna. He had a house and this house was closed. And he lived in the old village of Horobat which is down the valley, which is not in the antiquity area. ... Normally he should get a land, because his house was closed, a piece of land and he can build, but he got 2 units ... in Horobat in new Qurna. He gave it to his family and he still lives in old Horobat (Int 20, cf. Int 24).

Maybe you (are a representative and) want (or need) ... 100 flats. (The Governor) give him ... the man from Rhabat ... just 65. Sixty-five for 100 families! Do with (that) what you like. He give me just 65. But I want 100. What you can do (Int 26)?

After the residents moved, the role and activity of the representatives ended. If the villagers encountered any problems after moving, such as families being separated or structural problems with the houses themselves, there was no procedure or board of appeals for addressing problems, except personally going to the West Bank Governor or, depending on the problem, to the military (Int 8).

### Ahmed, A Model Representative

“Ahmed” (a pseudonym) was the special representative appointed by Dr. Ahmed for Naja ... He made scarabs and small statues like many of the residents of ... He was the link between the village and the city council, and he was the only representative that Q’s family knew. Because he did not know all the families, two or three members of the city council helped him count the families. They walked the entire village and wrote down the names of the families and told them how many units they would receive.

When the government committee wanted to meet with the people to tell them when they would move or give them other information about the relocation, or if “Ahmed” had collected some information to give to them, he would go house to house informing the people. Sometimes he would notify a few of the people and they in turn would inform others until all (the whole Naja) knew of the meeting. The residents would gather and meet in the ... diwan and they heard from “Ahmed” or from the government representative whatever information they had to pass on.

“Ahmed’s” role ended when the residents of ... received contracts and keys to their new unit.

Are (you) satisfied with the way the government and the family representative took care of (you) and gave (you) information about the relocation when (you) were in old Gournah? (We) are satisfied, very satisfied (Int 22).

There are a lot of complex factors involved in a relocation, but the close relationship between “Ahmed” and the people of ... was a significant reason for their satisfaction with the relocation process.

As we were returning to his mother’s house, our guide asked, “Would you like to meet him? He lives right there,” pointing to one of the nearby units in the village (Int 22).

No special representatives were appointed in Gournet Mar'ii since it belonged to a separate governmental jurisdiction and was represented by the Mayor and the Bairat Council. Dr. Ahmed and Sheik Mohammed respected the jurisdiction of the mayor, except for a few occasions when they intervened on behalf of a relative. This is one of the main distinctions between the relocation of the four villages of El Gournna and the village of GM, and altered the entire form of participation for GM as discussed below.

When properly exercised, the role of appointed representative was an effective method for participation at the village level as illustrated by the vignette below.

**Local Meetings and Participation.** Since the relocation of El Gournna was part of a larger comprehensive redevelopment plan for Luxor, planning meetings concerning the relocation of El Gournna took place in Luxor. As the time for actual relocation approached, plans for implementing the relocation were developed at executive meetings and workshops in Luxor and then announced at meetings in the main diwan of the West Bank. Executive meetings and workshops in Luxor were for invited participants only (Int 1). And although participation was encouraged, few residents knew or actually participated in meetings in the West Bank. Dialog and discussion was limited to selected residents and village leaders.

Yes there were meetings and there were some conferences for the people to inform them that they are going to move or to be relocated in the new Gurna. And they attended (Int 27).

Did the government have any meetings to explain to you what was going to happen? Not for me! They got the meeting, and those they were invited. And the government speak to them at the meeting (Int 25).

At the village level, there was occasional involvement through the appointed representatives, or informally among the villagers themselves talking together in the local diwans and mosques, at the cafes and restaurants, or sitting in the front of the houses on the mastaba benches, i.e., through the process of “village talk” (See Chapter 5). As one village leader explains,

The meetings with the people were in reality with the representatives and there were not many. ...

So they only talked to certain people? They didn't talk to a lot of villagers then? The bigger ones, the more important ones (Int 5).

As reported by residents who did attend meetings in the West Bank Diwan and were active in the early phases of the relocation, “Normally there were no small meetings between the people and the representatives” (Int 27).

Some government officials thought that meetings with average residents were not practical. “You can't go there and meet with everybody and listen to everybody” (Int 9). Yet, people were talking to each other in the villages and information and opinions were being exchanged. Although meetings and other formal participatory events were happening at higher levels and involved “bigger” people, there was little or no interaction between these upper levels and the villagers. Thus “participation” was only partial and limited, and did not include the average residents. Relocation officials did not go to the villagers, to visit residents where they lived, to listen and learn from them, to gather their preferences and ideas, or to survey their needs and situations (Forester, 1989, 1994a; Krumholz & Forester, 1990; Peattie, 1968; See also Chapter 2). And information that was passed from higher levels to the villagers was only one way communication. The only purpose was to inform the villagers of what was going to happen next, not to hear

what they had to say.

**Information Provided to Residents.** Information provided to the villagers presented a mixed picture. According to consultants, the residents were first notified of the relocation by the LSC in 2005 (Int 2). Residents, however, say they first received information from other villagers.

They first heard from the people that there is an intention to move and then from the government in 2006. In 2006, they knew officially, and they told them it's already built. You can come to see the village here. And they came and saw it (Int 12).

When you say you were listening, who was talking about it, the men of the village or was there someone from the government coming to the village? All the people (were talking). From all (the villagers), (Int 25).

Although, the residents had seen some earlier leaflets and pictures in 2003/4 (Int 26), and they had heard about relocation from childhood, i.e., from the time of Hassan Fathy, the villagers had very little direct or official information about the new village, what it would look like, or where their families would be located, until just shortly before they moved. As one resident recalls,

They just knew the city was built. Only when they moved did they know anything about it (Int 8).

(He first heard) one month before he knew that definitely he would move. Just one month before? He said that in the beginning we were not believing that we will move from old Gournah. He said we hear this long time ago, and it was always like rumors and we didn't believe it. Only when they started to build in new Gurna here, then they believed that old Gournah will be relocated (Int 23).

Even for a village leader, information was limited. "Did you have much information before you moved? He (a village leader from Horobah) knew only general

information” (Int 5).

The site of the new village was also closely guarded by the military in order to prevent stealing so it was not easy to see it beforehand, although some villagers did manage to visit the village before moving.

(He) and his cousins came to the new city and looked at the first section which was already built (Section 2) and they saw the houses and they had an idea before they came, before they relocated and moved from the old Gurna (Int 8).

As the relocation got under way, villagers occasionally received updated information from their representatives, or from other villagers and family members.

He (the father) was always telling that all the people would be satisfied and that they listen to positive points in the meetings (Int 23).

Thus, there was very little information coming from the government prior to the actual relocation.

Did anybody from the government go to you in old Gournia to talk to you about coming here? No, No, No. All done in the family. (Or by) Dr. Ahmed, just Dr. Ahmed (Int 5).

**Construction of the Village.** The village was built in sections starting with sections 2 and 3 for Naja Horobat and Naja Hasasna. This phase was followed by sections 4 and 5 for Naja Attiyat, Naja Rhabat, and additional families from Horobat (Int 7). After section 5 was completed, smaller units were built behind section 5 in the rear of the village, and in Medinet Munewara (WT 3).

The first five sections of the new village have approximately 700 four rooms units. The three sections of two room units, many of which have been combined in various ways to form larger apartments, contain about 200 units.

Although the contractor Osman had started the site work for the project, the Army's Department for National Services actually built the the village, but not all at the same time (Int 8, 9, 19, 27; Appendix F). The military hired various contractors for most of the work, except for a part of Section 5 where some work was done by the soldiers (Int 24).

Section 1, approximately 140 units, was built last and is very good quality. These units were built to sell to tourists for 200,000 Egyptian pounds, or approximately \$35,700 at the time (Int 26, cf. Int 17). But there was little interest (Int 13). It proved convenient when the government realized that they could not find a place for GM in Bairat and decided to move the residents of GM to section 1. The early plans and pamphlets for new Qurna did not include Gournet Mar'ii (See below). And the residents were aware that section 1 was not built for them. "Q said that section 1, the section where they are living right now, was not planned or built for the residents of GM. The plan was to sell these units to tourists" (Int 14).

There is a distinct difference in the quality of construction between the first phase, sections 2 and 3, and the latter phases of construction, sections 4, 5 and the two room units behind section 5. Not only are sections 4 and 5 affected by adverse soil conditions and poor site work, but the quality of the construction and materials seems to have gone down considerably.

In sections 4 and 5, the walls of newly built homes have developed serious structural cracks to the point where several groups of units were demolished (Photos 6.3 & 6.4; Int 7, 8; WT 2, 3). I tested some of the material that had fallen from cracking walls and it crumbled easily in my hands. It was mostly sand and little cement. In other sections, residents had to replace electrical wiring because it could not support larger

appliances such as air conditioners (Int 8, 26).

Serious site work mistakes were made in the soil preparation. The original site had two small hills separated by a low trough (Int 26). For several years, the low area was filled with rubbish and then covered with material cut from the higher areas (Int 17). An Egyptologist with a background in real estate and who has lived in the west bank for about 8 years observed,

I watched what they put in that landfill and you don't then build houses on it. I remember the bulldozers up there and the dump trucks and everything else. They've been dumping rubbish up there for years. ... I don't mean household. I don't think there is any household (trash), any risk of gasses and so forth (Int 17).

In an important footnote to his unpublished account of various consulting studies and plans that ultimately led to the building of new Qurna, Van der Spek (2000) relates a conversation he had with site engineers from Helwan University. They complained about how the site work was proceeding.

There is now no quality control. Backfilling of excavated areas which should be done at 50 cm compacted, is now executed at 3-4 meters uncompacted. This will eventually lead to cracking walls. The designs will not be changed. Uncompacted soil can be rectified by increasing the structural building strength, chemical injection or re-excavation, but it is not possible to do all. The area affected by uncompacted material is 30-35% (of the site). It will only be rectified if there is external supervision. But the contractor is not voluntarily going to criticise his own work and make corrections. He will proceed according to his own plans (Van der Spek, 2000, p. 71).





Photo 6.2. Homes with Structural Problems (by Author).



Photo 6.3. Home with Cracking Walls (by Author).

Defective site work and poor materials have resulted in serious structural cracks in about 30% of the homes in sections 4 and 5 and the demolition of others. The homes have been repaired many times but given the soil conditions and poor materials, the cracks return depriving the residents of suitable accommodation and of any lasting value in the home.

He spoke about the cracks that appeared directly a few months after he (moved in). And they made it (repaired it) more than 15 times ... He said I'm fed up; I will not ... I'll just keep it like it is" (Int 20).

The building inspector from Luxor attributes the problem to: a) a misuse of water, and b) the nature of the geography itself (Int 9). When asked to explain, he said,

People can just leave the water tap open or just throw water (on the street). You can see some people just holding a hose and just spreading water in the street something like that. That may have affected the buildings. ... (And) The nature of the soil itself, it's a little bit sandy so whenever some water gets spread on it, it just blows up (Int 9).

He is referring to the practice of spraying water on the dusty streets in the early afternoon to keep the dust from blowing around. When further questioned about why this condition only occurred in certain parts of sections 4 and 5 he added,

Most of the villages that are built in the desert all over the country have cases like this, of cracking buildings. When the soil was prepared, was the soil compacted? Of course! It was compacted and it was tested many times. The density was 95 percent (Int 9).

These responses are puzzling especially in view of the comments made by the site engineers during the preparation of the soil.

**Smaller Units Added.** Medinet Munewara, the Zam Zam area, and the small units behind section 5 were an afterthought to the main construction project. These units have unfinished rear yards (Int 3; Photo 10.2), and streets are piled with trash and diggings from installing utilities after the units were built. The units were very small and the walls of many of the units behind section 5 were also cracking. Living conditions in these small units were difficult at best and occupants were partly cut off from the rest of the village.

There were also a few rows of empty 2 room units behind section 5 that did not have cracks like others nearby. I asked about this during a walking tour and was told, “They are very small. No one wants them because most of the families they are big families” (WT 3).

In Medinet Munewara, many units were given as incentives to those who helped the government with the “refusers.” In a few cases, those who received several contiguous units combined them to form larger dwellings. Other units were rented out or given to family members who were not from Gourn. As a result, this area has only a few families from old Gourn (Int 29).

**Preservation of Historic Houses.** A critical issue during the relocation concerned the preservation of some of the houses in old Gourn. Despite promises and agreements, by February 2011, all of the houses in El Gourn proper had been demolished, however, a few were still left in Gournet Mar’ii.

The accounts given by informants vary in the details, but they all point to government commitments to save some houses in each Naja for their historical significance. But this was not done.

One Egyptologist recalls,

From a historical (point of view)... , one of these or two or a selection of these houses will be an antiquity themselves. And some of them really are. Some of them were already over 100 years old. ... These have an architectural relevance. So it's a shame (Int 17).

A consultant mentioned that during the planning stages the villagers had requested that some houses be saved.

They asked to leave only about 30 to 50 houses in this area to be just a place for studios, for artists to draw, to (have) shops. ... And good examples would be in good condition ... (that) will be developed as (for) a visit in this western village (Int 0).

News articles reported that the government intended to preserve some houses.

Samir Farag, head of Luxor Supreme City Council, announced that 120 houses had already been demolished and that over the next month, the rest of the houses would also go, with the exception of three dozen of the most attractive buildings which will be retained as examples of the local cultural tradition. These houses will be handed over to the Supreme Council of Antiquities for conservation under an agreement with UNESCO (El Aref, 2006).

An official of the Supreme Council of Antiquities described the preservation plan.

So a compromise was reached with the history of Qurna by way of choosing about 25 historic houses to be left in situ to give an account of this great history and at the same time to do away with the gloominess existing in this place. The history will endure because monuments and mankind are valuable and important especially when they acknowledge humanity. This history is part of us and we must work to preserve it. It is a history which shall never die! (Statement of Zawi Hawas, Chief, Supreme Council of Antiquities in Hawas, 2007).

There were also meetings in the West Bank with the Supreme Council of Antiquities attended by concerned parties and residents. At these meetings, officials again agreed to preserve certain houses.

We have a big meeting in the antiquities (office). I remember very well. ... And we discussed. They choose 45 houses what they have an old history and look nice together and to keep. Every place like in Horobat, they can keep 45 houses. And in Attiyat they can keep 45 houses (Int 19).

When the UN World Heritage Committee became aware of the demolitions, they asked for restraint in the "unplanned demolition" because it was not part of the "advertised plan."

When the bureau of the World Heritage Committee met back in August 2001 to consider reports from a mission to Qurna, it recommended that the Egyptian authorities freeze the ongoing "unplanned demolition" of houses at the village of Qurna and requested technical assistance from the World Heritage Fund to prepare a management plan for the site (Kamil, 2008).

UNESCO raised a similar alarm.

The Bureau recommended that the Egyptian authorities freeze the on-going unplanned demolitions of houses at the village of Qurnah and to request technical assistance from the World Heritage Fund to prepare a Management Plan for the site, according to the terms of reference outlined in the ICOMOS report (UNESCO, 2001, V.209), (Van der Spek, 2003 p. 47).

But none remain.

In addition to the loss of all the houses in the area of the four families of old Gournah, many of them historic in their own right (Int 17), the Qurna Discovery Museum, a labour of love that contain a visual record of the history of Gournah, and the beautiful home in which it was housed, was demolished in August 2010 (Photo 6.2, Int 19). Previously, the government had promised to keep the house and the museum.

They had promised to keep it and his grandfather's house as museums. ... What we wish in this time, we wish at least they can keep the house as a history of Gournah. I don't agree they torn up all the houses. You know at least we plan it

before they break the houses (Int 19).



Photo 6.4. Qurna Discovery Museum (<http://www.qurna.org/images/wheel1-large.jpg>)

So, the sad fact is that none of the historic houses of El Gourna proper were saved, not even those with special significance for the story of Egyptology in the West Bank. In GM a cluster of houses remain within view of the “Ticket Office” (Map 4.2). It is hoped that these examples will encourage tourists to visit the area.

**Relocation Logistics.** As mentioned, the relocation from El Gourna was accomplished in stages as housing units were completed and people were ready and willing to move. In the first phase, trucks were provided by the government for those who were ready to move, and there was extensive cooperation among residents (Int 5, 9).

On that day of the relocation itself, they knew that it was going to be very crowded. Everyone was unfixing his furniture and getting loaded into the trucks in front of the houses; they were very busy. But they were helping each other; each

family was helping each other (Int 5).

Cooperation among the resident continued throughout the relocation even after the government stopped providing assistance with moving and the strategy of the government changed from one of encouragement to one of intimidation and force.

Once things got under way, not everything went as smoothly as planned. For example, the larger Najua', particularly Horobat was dispersed into 4 locations (Int 19, 27). This created problems for Horobat because family members found it difficult to continue community functions at the diwan (See Chap 7). While some of the separation was caused by sections of Horobat moving at different times (Int 30), there was no strategy or realistic plan for keeping the Najua' of various sizes together even though this was a primary goal of the relocation. In some cases, family members that lived next to each other were now separated in the village creating problems for younger family members who may have been trying to care for their parents (Int 24).

### **Changes in Implementation and Strategy.**

It is difficult to pin down the exact timing, but once the first group of residents had moved into sections 2 and 3, there was a shift in strategy and implementation. One of the main signs that things had changed was the direct involvement of the West Bank Governor, General M., and the absence of Dr. Farag. Instead of occasional meetings in the diwan and the work of the appointed representatives that had characterized the first phase, residents now had to deal directly with General M.

In the first phase of the relocation, if a resident had a problem he could go to Sheik Mohammed, Dr. Ahmed, his special representative, or in some cases to the

Governor Farag himself, however not much was gained by this approach. Most often residents would be sent back to Dr. Ahmed or the West Bank Governor (Int 5, 26, 29). In the second phase, he could go only to the West Bank Governor, unless there was some way to get Dr. Ahmed involved (Int 12). After the initial phase, while Dr. Ahmed and Sheik Mohammed remained involved, their involvement seemed to be limited to specific problems such as complaints about not getting enough units or dealing with refusers.

Meetings and negotiations with the West Bank Governor were substitutes for actual participation and did not result in favorable terms for the residents. Negotiations of this type were conducted away from the view of the larger community. In terms of relocation, it was a significant form of non-participation.

Thus, the primary change in this phase was the loss of the participatory process, limited as it was, and the initiation of direct negotiations with the West Bank Governor.

A resident who had not moved in the first phase reports,

Were there any meetings in the village here about the relocation that the residents could go to? No meetings. (I) had only one (option), take it or leave it. ... Because my brothers and my second brothers, there are three brothers, we get three flats and my father is four. That's very good. And then he (General M.) changed the mind. ...

Why did he change his mind? This man don't have, ah ah ah ... There is no controller. No control? (He) don't have control outside (Int 26).

Other residents explained their experiences following the first phase of relocation.

At the beginning ... they would help them to move. They were knocking the houses down. At the end they were cutting the electricity. They let them knock down the houses themselves and transport everything themselves (Int 27).



They punish us. This is like punishment. The people (that) they agree from the beginning, they have the best flats. (But) the people they speak about (their) own rights, we are the second (class) we can say. We are not the first; we are the second. And the third, and the fourth, I cannot say about that (Int 19).

He say that they try to collect most people (from the old village) that they can to send them to the people that they refused and try to take them out by any way. No control (i.e., no rules). The only way (i.e., requirement) that nobody die.

Is that the only rule? Yeah. There is no rules. You can try by any way you can. (For example) by telling him that we'll take your son or something like that because he told me that they want to take his son and his wife to make him leave the house.

What do you mean by take him? Where would they take him? They want (to) take him in the jail. I say okay but we don't leave my house! And he refused. When they told him that, he refused (Int 29).

So participation was replace by force and intimidation, especially for those who were reluctant to move. But, as indicated above, the primary reason the refusers did not want to move was simply inadequate compensation.

There were other signs of a change in strategy.

Pressure of the government and from those who benefited from the relocation was practiced on the village people to accept the move to new Qurna (Int 14).

Did anybody come to you and ask you if you wanted to move? They said no, no. They gave us a choice. You can move or you can stay but we will cut the electricity and water (Int 12).

Because he, in the beginning, I remember that he (said), this is a choice. If you like to move, you can move. If you like to stay here, you can stay here. So some people we move it. Some people they stay there. You know what you doing for the people there (who stay)? ... They cut the electricity for the houses. But the electricity for the tombs will be open. For the what? The tombs. So the people

there he take Ramadan without electricity. (And) two or three months in the summer without electricity. You know the summertime here is the cold water, he need something to bring the wind for the child, so the people there will be like cry. And tonight some scorpions and snakes (Int 24).

The moving procedure itself changed as the relocation moved into the second phase. For example, there was little or no notice before moving.

Somehow they don't plan well the movement. They don't give you a chance to move. ... I saw many, we can say 90% of the people just they move in the same day (Int 19).

Yes, he could see the bulldozers working in the near villages and they get a village after village. And they give a small chance that you get all your things out of the house, all what you need. So he finished first the houses which has nobody, the empty house. And then he come to (us) ... so you have a chance. (But) the only warning was from the people themselves. They were like rumors or like just talking (Int 25).

In the beginning the government had also provided the residents with transportation. But in the second phase, they no longer provided help in moving. The residents had to transfer everything themselves. Nor did they demolish the houses for the people. Some families had to knock down the old houses themselves in order to get a contract for the new house (Int 27).

They gave her two months to destroy the house. They did it by themselves. They destroy it, and then they get the contract here. They wanted the contract first, but he said no (Int 12).

There were also changes in the units and in the construction as noted above. In general, in the second phase, the units were lower in quality and smaller, and there was a shortage of units (Int 7, WT 3).

For the widows, and the divorced, and the single persons, they made only one room and a hall for the single person. That was done at the end just to save effort, and to save time and money, but it was not so good, it was not so perfect. That was from the negative in the building and the construction. So the people or the singles who are living in these small houses, only one room, they are not happy; they complain. Yes, you will go and see the houses there and can also take pictures there (Int 3).

After they start to make the flat more smaller when they see the people they need more flats. They count flats. They don't see it. Just they count flats. They start to do the flats like boxes. You can see the difference (Int 19).

What makes it worse that there were a lot of new apartments that were destroyed already (because of structural problems). So there weren't enough apartments for those families to move in. But actually all the people was already out of their houses. So a lot of families now are really in a very small apartment. But what they can do (WT 3)?

People who moved in the later stages felt that there were many broken promises regarding compensation (Int 22). Compensation was frequently altered either without notice or in negotiations with the government, and was also inconsistently applied.

They promised to give her two flats. They gave her one at the beginning and she was very angry. She didn't expect it. Then by chance came some relative of hers, to visit her. He is related to Dr. Ahmed El Tayib. He told him. He left everything, Dr. Ahmed, and came and asked is there anybody who didn't get flats. He's married and he doesn't get a flat separated for him. And they said (there are) many. One of them is Ibrahim. (Dr. Ahmed said,) "You will get your flat." And he called and he spoke to General M. Saturday they told him (Dr. Ahmed); Sunday he got his flat (Int 12).

At the beginning they said that every married (man) will get a flat, and the one who is in the age of marriage will get a piece of land. And the people they moved in the beginning like them they believed in this. At the end, the people who

refused to go out of old Gournā, they got also flats for the children who are not married (Int 27).

This was unusual. Most families got less than they were entitled to, but because of favoritism, some got more (Int 26).

Because ... there are three brothers, we get three flats and my father is four. That's very good. And then he changed the mind. He say, you take some land and money and then you can do it by yourself. About how much he give me? So he say that one he give 30,000, and then he give you 150 meters (land) and then you can do. So we stay ... 30,000? What you buying for (that)? Some stone, cement ... What you do with this? Nothing. So how many flats did your family get? Three (Int 24).

Before I had the house in Horobat, I have a factory in my house, an alabaster factory. But when they move my house, he say to me 10 flats something like that (Probably 10 of the 2 room flats built late in the relocation program which would equal about 5 of the 4 room flats.) And my son, the younger. He say (to) him also 4 flats and we don't want more. And then for one moment she's come (and) he give me this house (a single 2 room flat). And come for one moment with loader something like this, climb the mountain, pull down my house. ... Only give me one flat (Int 29).

**Demolition of the old Village.** Another indication of change was the way that demolition of the old homes was being carried out. Once a family had moved out of the old house but before the residents received the contracts and keys for the new house, the government would demolish the old house (Int 5). Demolition had been going on for some time in Gournā, since before 2005, but in the second phase of relocation it took on more belittling and discouraging tone.

And we were waiting here until they destroyed the house over there. ... This took maybe one or two days. They didn't give him the key here until they finished

demolishing the house there to guarantee that he didn't go back. So then they give him the key to the new house and he put his stuff ... in the new house. For all this time we waited in front of the house. We could not get inside (Int 7).

This way to destroy the houses before coming here should haven't been done. He said that they were informing each other with the walkie talkie. Did they destroy it? Okay, then they give him the key. That was not necessary (Int 20).

Q says they took down the mosque (in Rhabat) approximately September 26. (His neighbor) cried for about 30 minutes and eventually fainted when they demolished the mosque (Int 25, 26).

Careless demolition even involved some damage to the tombs.

Toward the end of 2007, they started in the Spanish tombs. ... And they were starting to demolish houses (in that area). All of a sudden it just happened. The information had filtered down that one of the local counselors hired a bulldozer, and the loader just moved in and took the house, but as it took the house, it took the tomb. So that was called to a halt. ... From the archeologist (point of view), ... how the hell can you take a loader up there? ... What's the point of moving these people if you are going to destroy everything in the process? So, it was piecemeal and it started to slow down at bit. There was a major slowdown. At the beginning it was an impetus. Get them down, get them out. I must say, it was pretty sad (Int 17).

The result was a creation of a dead zone, unlike anything that had existed before.

Some international experts on Egypt say that the Government is sacrificing a unique community to cash in on tourism. "The Egyptian authorities are now determined to sterilise the area, creating a kind of archaeological tourist park stripped of any trace of anything living or anything relating to the more modern [Roman onwards] history of the site," said one expert from Britain, who asked not to be named for fear of being banned from the country (Hider, 2009).

Hassan Amer, an Egyptologist and Cairo University professor who was born in a village south of Qurna (said), “They will turn Qurna into a city of the dead without caring much for the living and their history” (Kamil, 2008).

### **The Case of Gournet Mar’ii**

The relocation of Gournet Mar’ii represents a third phase of the relocation and in essence was a unique relocation in itself. The circumstances are described below.

**Conditions Prior to the Move.** The implied intent that permeated the village of Gournet Mar’ii was that the residents would remain somewhere in Bairat, that they would not be included in the relocation of Gourna. But this was overruled by the Supreme Council of Antiquities and rendered legally improbable by the fact that almost everything on the West Bank that was not designated as an antiquities area was classified as agriculture and thus no new construction would be allowed. Most families in GM wanted to move to Ramlah or to stay somewhere in Bairat. “Our families are there, our cemeteries, our businesses. Gournet Mar’ii is 98% from El Bairat, except for 2 or 3 houses. They are from Gourna” (Int 16).

This intention was also reflected in information provided by the Luxor Governorate. Below is slide 18 from a presentation entitled *Touristic and Cultural Field Transforming Luxor into an Open Air Museum* (n.d.) which shows the distribution of the Gourna families in the new village (Figure 6.7). Gournet Mar’ii is not among them. The section to which Gournet Mar’ii would eventually be moved is the grey area just below section 4 on the slide.


## Relocating AL- Qurna Residents & Building “Al-Qurna” New Village

- L.E. 50 million was allocated by the Ministries of Culture / Tourism
- L.E. 15 million from the Ministry of International Cooperation.
- L.E. 6 million for supplying electricity “Ministry of Electricity”
- Currently building: 2 schools, a police station, shopping mall, mosque, post office, & cultural center.
- Buildings, Phase I: 600

•Distributed into as follows:

①	El Atiyat	= 154
②	El Ghabat	= 62
③	El Hasasna	= 110
④	El Horoubat	= 274

The remaining 3500 plots of land will be allocated to relocate the rest of the residents



City of Luxor Master Plan 2030



خطة التنمية الشاملة لمدينة الأقصر

Figure 6.7. Family Distribution in the New Village (Luxor Governorate, n. d.)

Another informational release describes the project and lists the villages to be relocated, but does not include Gournet Mar’ii (Appendix F).

1- Defining the project: The evacuation of the antiquities areas on the West Bank of the residents who are living above the tombs: The second largest involuntary migration in Egypt after the involuntary migration/transfer process of the Nubians to Aswan, in which 3,200 families have been moved that were living over the tombs. The residents who have been moved to new Qurna city are from 4 Najua’ (Naja Rhabat, Naja Horobat, Naja Hasasna, Naja El Attiyat).

Although residents had good reasons for their expectations, the situation was awaiting final determination. A resident from Horobat recalls, “The plan was first to move those four (villages in Gourn) first and then to think about Gournet Mar’ii. In the

beginning Gournet Mar'ii was not in the plan" (Int 21). The mayor of GM himself commented that, "The people from Gournet Mar'ii came to expect that they won't be moved. They wanted to move to Bairat but there was no place" (Int). But, ultimately, they had to move, "Because there is no place in Bairat. And by law the land of Bairat is agricultural land so it's not allowed to build on it" (Int 21).

A son of the former mayor and relative of the current mayor says:

At first they heard that they would go to Bairat, not Qurna. The mayor of Bairat told them that if they give you the choice, choose to go to Bairat. But, there was no promise from the government and no one from the government said that they would move to Bairat. The only thing they heard was that the mayor advised them that if somebody from the government side comes and asks in Gournet Mar'ii where would you like to go, you should choose to go to Bairat, to an area which is near the Cloister at Deir el Muhared, in Bairat. ... So they had planned to go to this area near the Coptic cloister, the Muhared cloister, past Habu City (Int 16).

So there was uncertainty, but an expectation of being able to stay in Bairat, and the mayor himself may have contributed to this expectation by suggesting that the government might give them a choice. And, in the first village meeting, in January 2009, in which relocation was announced, that is exactly what happened (below). They were given a choice. But as the mayor explained.

It would take a longer time to find them a place here in Bairat and to support it with the services because they had already done it in new Qurna. So the expenses, the costs would be much more than (if) they make it here in Bairat. And it was already done in Qurna. ... The Antiquities Department, were they the strongest objectors to moving the people out to the area around the monastery? Ah (Yes). So if it wasn't for the Department of Antiquities, could the people have moved out to the monastery? Ah (Yes).



Ultimately the residents were compelled to relocate although the official position was that the government persuaded the residents.

(When General M.) first came to the village in November 2008, he told them they have to move (to Qurna) ... He told the residents there is no choice. You have to go to new Qurna (Int 15, 16).

According to another government official,

So it was not like they had to move, no. It was not a decision that they had to move in a certain day. It was an operation, a negotiation between people and the government (Int 28).

But as events unfolded, there was no choice.

The result was that there was little or no participatory process. The residents were not represented by specially appointed relocation representatives from the village, nor did they have the assistance of the El Tayibs. They were represented instead by the mayor and three politically elected representatives from the Bairat city council (Int 16).

As reported above, GM had recently lost its traditional village committee when the last member had died just before the relocation. This committee might have offered resistance to the move or acted as mediators for the village (Int 16). But not every government official was willing to deal with the village committee. As an assistant to the mayor put it, "They didn't even need those representatives. They came directly to the mayor and spoke with him. So they gave him all what they wanted and he was in direct contact with the people" (Int 28). However, in reality, "There was no other point of communication for the residents other than thorough (General) M." (Int 16). And, as reported by another resident, "The 3 representatives of Gournet Mar'ii were put under stress and got clear instructions to convince the people that they have no other choice

but to move to new Qurna, and quickly” (Int 14).

**The January Meeting.** In January 2009, General M. announced to the village by means of a car mounted loud speaker that a meeting would be held at a local diwan.

This was a crucial meeting.

There was a big meeting in a diwan in Gournet Mar’ii with General M., the mayor and representatives of the Bairat City Council, the police, and antiquities people. The first (question) was to know if the citizens of Gournet Mar’ii want houses in new Qurna or in Bairat. If they wanted to stay in Bairat, they were to leave the meeting. If they wanted to move to Qurna, they were to stay in the diwan. *Almost everyone left* (Int 14, 15, 28).

In effect, General M. had given them a choice and, as advised by the Mayor, they chose Bairat. But fearing trouble:

They took the mayor and the representatives to the police station because they were worried about a reaction from the residents. At the police station General M., appointed three people from the village and told them they had to convince the people to move (Int 14).

**The Relocation.** Eight days later, “They came with trucks to start moving the residents. The first was a lady who refused to move. Later, she did move and after that, they all moved one by one” (Int 14, 15). It took 45 days to move all the families (Int 28).

The government gave them one day to arrange everything. Then, that night they cut the electricity. So they had to start getting ready to move the next day, in the daylight. ... People from the government told him, you and your children have to put all your equipment and all your furniture on the trucks. Q had some furniture and he also had some wheat to move, some bread, even the wheat that was the harvest for the whole year that was still at home. And they got three trucks from the government in Qurna Jideeda (new Qurna). They had to pay 100 pounds for the use of each one and they loaded their possessions. It was very

exhausting for them (Int 14).

Eventually, all the residents moved. Some, not wanting to go to Qurna, moved to Kom, a town in Bairat near Gournet Mar'ii, or to other villages in Bairat. But most had to move to Qurna.

Officially, the rules for compensation were the same as those applied in Gourna. But there were many special exceptions and the rules were unevenly applied often depending on private negotiations or on one's connection to the General (Int 14, CM 1). For example, several residents requested and received land in Ramlah where they hoped to build later instead of going to Qurna (Int 14, 28). Although Bairat is primarily an agricultural area, development had been allowed in some areas such as in Ramlah along the Nile, in areas around Kom, and in some small settlements along the el Fa'dliya irrigation canal. But for others, there was no negotiation. "(He) had only (General M.) to speak with and he told them, you have one house here you get one flat in the new village and that's all" (Int 14). But this resident had a large and well kept house in GM with many rooms. When I last visited him, he and his family were living on different levels of an unfinished building in Ramlah.

There was also general disappointment in the mayor. Many who supported him said they did not get treated well in the end.

They were disappointed by the mayor. Sheik Mohammed ... was intermediating for other families (in Gourna, and for some in GM also) and they got enough or more than enough for them and for their children. But those who wanted, or they want to be beside the mayor, or to be with their mayor, they didn't get all their rights. That's why they are disappointed (Int 16).

## **Changes to Village Life in new Qurna**

Moving to new Qurna involved many inconveniences, unexpected costs, and changing social and economic conditions for the villagers. For example, one such change is the distance to farms and relatives, as much as 5 km. for residents of GM. This may not sound like much for people who live by automobile, but for a traditional family, in addition to the expense, it is like moving to another country.

There were added costs for transportation and for maintaining farms, lands, and cemeteries, in getting children to school, and in going to the traditional markets. There were also new unexpected costs for services, and for provisions that residents used to supply for themselves,

And there were changing social conditions. For traditional communities, social customs are intimately connected to distance and physical presence. When there was an accident, a funeral, a wedding party, or a celebration, the families would bring food and visit relatives and neighbors and often meet in the local diwan. Villagers have strong attachments to the cemetery where relatives and families are buried. But now, these are far away. For GM, this was an especially strong symbol (Int 16, 19, 28).

In the next chapter, we will describe life in the new village and the changes that are taking place. The information presented in Chapters 7 is important for making sense of the relocation and villager participation as a whole, for understanding important changes in village life, for determining if the villagers are involved in any way in determining the direction of life of the new village, and in formulating interpretive principles and conclusions.

## **CHAPTER 7**

### **LIFE IN NEW QURNA**

In assessing the impact of relocation and the effectiveness of villager participation it is important to ask if life in the new village is suitable for the residents, i.e., does it fit their way of life, has it brought improvements to their way of life, and what has been lost and what gained. In this chapter we will describe features of the new village, new conditions faced by the residents, and note changes in their patterns of life and customs.

#### **Village Organization**

There are two systems of government in new Qurna, the traditional system of village committees and Sheiks, and the Qurna City Council. The new entity for the villagers is the Qurna City Council which is made up of appointed and elected members. Previously, El Gourna was administered directly by Governor Samir Farag from Luxor. At the time of the relocation, General M., who was appointed by Dr. Farag as Governor of the West Bank, was in charge. Although the old village belonged to the Gourna governmental district, it had a fair degree of independence. With his appointment, General M. became the top official in the West Bank, and was also the Chief of the Qurna City Council. Just below him was the President of the Qurna City Council who handled most of the day to day business and administration of the new village.

The City Council is primarily an administrative entity. It can pass new laws and ordinances with the approval of the General, but its main activities are operating and

maintaining city facilities and services, such as the water service and the parks. It does not have much authority apart from General M. “They all smiled when the village council was mentioned because they ... know that the village council is very weak. It cannot decide any solution for any problem” (Int 8).

The village committees, as in old Gournā, are composed of senior members of each Naja (Chapter 5). They handle smaller problems between residents or families. Larger problems are referred to Sheik Mohammed El Tayib, or to the police. Some village committees have been reorganized with the help of the City Council. In the new system, committee members are elected for one year from a list of candidates put forward by the City Council. There is no actual campaigning since the candidates are respected members of each Naja and already well known by the residents. Members can serve successively on the village committee if nominated and reelected (Int 22).

The third governmental entity in new Qurna is the military which still has jurisdiction and responsibility for the housing. Residents are generally very satisfied with the assistance they have received from the military, although they realize after many attempts that the problem of cracking walls cannot be fixed (Chapter 6; Int 8). Thus, residents go to the military for problems with the housing units, to the City Council for problems with services, and to General M. for “permission” to build or make changes to the homes.

### **Features of the New Village**

**Services.** The new village has many city services that were not available in old Gournā. For example, water and sewer services, schools (Photo 7.1), a new police station, a large central mosque still under construction, a large new Suq as yet

unoccupied, a government store, and a communications building and post office. Centralized services and separation of uses were requirements from the Ministry of Housing. They represent a significant departure from the traditional pattern of organic organization where one finds mixed uses on every street and in almost every building (Int 1).



Photo 7.1. New School in Qurna (by Author)

In addition to the security provided by the new police station, residents can also complete paper work or file documents without going to Luxor. The new communications center and post office also distributes pension payments. Although commercial development is planned for the village, it is still in the future (Int 0, 6). And after a poor

start, microbus transportation service to Tarif, Gournia city and to the centralized bus station in Geziira has been improved (Int 12). In the rear half of the village which is higher in elevation, water service has been intermittent. Residents have water only two times per day (WT 2, 3). At one point the residents were without water for 10 days forcing them to use the water carts they brought with them from old Gournia. Apparently, the city lacks funds to complete the second water plant and has sold some of the equipment (Int 24).

**Family Clusters.** One of the main goals of the relocation was to keep families together at all levels. This was only partly achieved. For example, Naja Horobat is split into 4 parts in various sections of the village. Families from Attiyat and Rhabat are dispersed in sections 4 and 5. And often times, immediate families members are separated, as also happened in the Nubian relocation (Fahim, 1966). An exception would be the 14 Coptic families that did not move to Suul in 1999 (Van der Spek, 2003). In old Gournia the Copts were somewhat dispersed, but in new Qurna, they are all living together in a connected cluster of housing units.

**Mosques and Diwans.** A new central “Friday” mosque is under construction along the main boulevard. However, the residents have asked for land and are building at their own expense new mosques in each family area (Int 5, WT 4). The Copts have also asked for permission to build a 300 square meter diwan near their homes in the village so that they can meet together for community meetings, funerals, marriages and celebrations since these events require them to bring food and other preparations. At present, they must go to the monastery at Malkata, about 6 to 7 kilometers away, for church services on Sunday and for community meetings. Although they have a contract with the government and land was set aside for their diwan, permission to build was



withdrawn and the site remains vacant.

**The Suq.** The new central Suq is well designed but is out of the way being two blocks off the main boulevard and behind some government buildings. It has not opened and it does not appear that it will open in the foreseeable future. In the opinion of residents, the government is asking too much rent for the spaces (Int 23, 24). The villagers continue to go to the street markets in Tarif and Gourn, or to Geziira, Luxor or Bairat (Int 16).

In an attempt to provide small shops in the traditional manner, rooms in the some housing units that face the linear parks and the main “spine” have been converted into small stores and commercial services such as “mini-markets,” computer and hair services, and cafes (WT 2). However, the residents must pay fines or penalties to keep these stores open (See below; Int 20, 24).

Residents would prefer to use the new Suq, if it were open, although they also like having the small stores and shops along the main streets. As a consultant commented, “In the traditional villages, people are used to walking a short distance from their home to buy what they need” (Int 1). Residents like to walk to the stores, especially in the evenings, because it also fulfills a social function that they do not want to lose.

Markets that are farther away require either a car or public transportation, which makes shopping more expensive and inconvenient (Int 4, 16). Several residents said they would like to see a compromise that would allow the small shops and stores but not everywhere in the village (Int 12, WT 1). The village also has a government store similar to government stores throughout Egypt, but most items in the store cater to tourists, are not used by the residents, and are more expensive (Int 24).

**Parks and Gardens.** Two of the most popular features of the new village are the linear parks along the main boulevard and the small private gardens planted by the residents.

The parks are not yet completed (Photo 7.2), but the ones that are offer a place to relax and cool down at the end of the day. Some older children have converted unlandscaped sections of the parks into impromptu soccer fields (Photo 7.3).



Photo 7.2. Park Area in Qurna (by Author)



Photo 7.3. Unfinished Park and Impromptu Soccer Field (by Author).

One of the most pleasant features of the village is the many small gardens planted by the villagers. Residents have taken advantage of almost every open space and planted gardens of all types in front of or to the side of every house, or between streets or rows of units (Photo 7.4). In the interviews, the residents frequently talked about the need for more garden space. In order to have a gardens, residents must bring in soil to enrich the dry dust and sand. The gardens are one of the most beautiful and enjoyable aspects of new Qurna (Int 4, 15, 23).



Photo 7.4. Garden of a Resident (by Author).

**Environmental Conditions.** In the summer, the village is very hot. Many days are over 40 degrees Celsius (104 Fahrenheit). Because of the elevation and the dry conditions, the evenings are generally cool and gentle breezes flow down from the mountains. In the winter, the houses are very cold. The clear night skies seem to draw every bit of heat out of the houses. At night one can see many small fires in the open spaces and smoke everywhere in the air as small groups and families gathered around fires for warmth (Int & WT 10).

During the day, the bright yellow color on the walls of the buildings can be an acute eye irritant as it reflects the intense sunlight. The trees block some, but the reflection is very hard on the eyes (Int 24).

At night, the village has a beautiful view of Luxor, the agricultural valley and the



Nile. In the evenings, people gather together in the parks and in the small garden areas, when it is still too hot to go inside. They sit or recline on the grass, and visit and talk together, as they did in the old village, until the units cool down. Children play near the parents and teenagers wander around not far away talking with their friends. At night, many residents will sleep in the hoosh because it is too hot in the flats.

**Unfinished Areas.** There are several unfinished areas in the village. In the rear half of the village where the newer 2 room units have been built, the government has not completed the streets, or repaired the streets and curbs that have been torn up by later construction and installation of infrastructure. Many streets are full of construction debris and other trash, and conditions are generally uninviting (Photo 7.6).



Photo 7.5. Unfinished Area in Section 5 (by Author).

**Housing Units.** Most families are very happy with the new units. However, some units have significant structural problems. The structural cracking and poor construction in sections 4 and 5 have been mentioned in Chapter 6. The severity of these problems cannot be overestimated and it has discouraged some residents from considering an addition to the second floor (Int 12).

The units are very hot (Int 8, 16). Because of the materials used, and design elements such as low ceilings and no wall or ceiling insulation, an excessive amount of heat builds up during the day and is slowly re-radiated back into the units throughout the night. Residents refer to the units as “ovens” (Int 27).

One of the greatest advantages of the new homes is that the residents own the units. Several residents mentioned “ownership” as the most important benefit in moving (Int 9). “The best thing he finds is that they gave the contracts and the keys immediately. ... They own the house” (Inter 13). In old Gournah there was no recorded ownership.

**Household Space.** Space is a significant problem in the new village. Indoor living space is very limited and inadequate for family expansion. Although the individual rooms allotted for family members are generally larger than what each person had in old Gournah, conditions are often more crowded than before if the family is large or has relatives living with them (Int 16). A second floor can be added in the future, but the residents have to wait at least 5 years before they can add another floor, and no permissions have yet been given for second story additions (Int 16, 23). Many families already need extra rooms for children or family members. “She would like to build a room in the courtyard where she would make her at least a bed and better conditions because of her daughter in law (who also shares the unit)” (Int 12).

Outdoor space is likewise limited. Compared to the compounds in old Gournā, the units have only a small porch and little extra space for entertaining guests outside. The units are much closer together than in old Gournā, and there is little space near the units for gardens, keeping animals, or other domestic activities that help support the family (Int 16, 19). Although the “hoosh” is well liked by residents, it is too small for domestic animals except chickens and ducks. As a temporary solution, enterprising residents have converted unused spaces around the edges of the village into stalls and pens for keeping larger animals close to their homes (Photo 7.5).



Photo 7.6. Animal pen at the Edge of the Village (by Author).

**Housing Rules.** The new village has strict design codes regarding such features as colors of the units, construction of new units on vacant plots, and for the development of the village itself (Photo 7.7). These codes also govern additions or changes to the units, and expansion to the second floor. Although the government has not given any permission to make changes, to expand, or to build, many family have gone ahead on their own and built additions adding extra rooms in the courtyard, or making changes to the unit as they felt they needed. The government then penalizes them for the additions. After paying the penalty, and the additions then become legal (Int 7, 13, 23, 25, 27). “And they get this penalty and pay it, get the report, and the government considers it in this way legal” (Int 27). One villager paid a fine of 200 pounds for putting a door in the side of the courtyard wall (Int 24). Others families have also added rooms, paid fines, and now the rooms are legal (Int 27).



Photo 7.7. Qurna from the Air (Archplan, n. d.).



## **Life in the New Village**

Despite these problems, residents say life in new Qurna is much better than in the old village (Int 4, 5, 15, 27). And although family traditions have mostly remained the same (Int 5, cf. Int 3) — “The family relations in his family, are still the same. That is something that doesn’t change” (Int 5, cf. Int 3) — for many, their lives in new Qurna have changed dramatically. As one villager exclaimed, “(My life has) changed by 100 per cent. *I was dead and now I am alive! Al hamdu lilah!*” (Int 5). One resident clearly identified the two most critical changes, one positive and one negative. In the new village, “It will get better because of the schools, ... but, we lost income from tourists. Now we must go outside the new village for additional income” (Int 13).

Residents commented that the new village has better houses, better services, schools that are close by, more sanitary conditions, and it is generally cleaner (Except for the rear sections of the village as noted above.) Residents also consider the village more safe and secure, something one would not expect to hear when comparing it to the older traditional village of El Gurna (Int 16, 24). And, as noted by Dr. Ahmed El Tayib, improved sanitation and cleaner conditions have also led to healthier people.

Before, the residents were easily forgotten. Whenever someone got sick or died, nobody cared. But now it’s not the same now. They look cleaner. Everything looks clean. They have much better health. The area is very pure and clean. You will see yourself that the people have new ideas about cleanliness. Because they have water at home, they can wash. And there are small garden areas in front of each house and some parks for the children to play.

**Children.** Children have also benefited from the new village. As one government official pointed out, “In new Qurna, we start with the child. Now he goes to school. He has a better chance to learn. In old Gurna, the children were running up to the tourists

and getting baqsheesh. ... Here they have to go to school” (Int 6). When given a written description of this project, one resident said she could not read it. But, she emphasized, “For the future they need it (i.e., schools)” (Int 12). Because the schools are close by, the parents can be sure the children are in school (Int 15), and the play areas and parks that are close to the houses, also make it safer for them (Int 3).

**Changes in Village Life.** The following chart summarizes the main changes from the old village to the new discussed in this chapter.

Point of Comparison	Old Village	New Village
Demographics	Est. 1,400 families,	No survey yet, approximately 800-850 families.
Local government	traditional leaders	Qurna City Council
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>forms of governance</li> </ul>	village committees, sheiks, Luxor Governorate	new village committees, sheiks, West Bank Governor, Qurna City Council, Luxor Governorate
Village life	traditional village life	town life
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>economy</li> </ul>	producers, self-reliant	consumers, dependent
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>family connections</li> </ul>	close	some close, some split
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>community events: weddings, funerals, festivals</li> </ul>	walk to	some walk to, others too far
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>cemeteries</li> </ul>	close	far away, in another location
Village Design	organic, mountain side, small lanes	units in rows, artificial plateau, main “spine” w/ central services
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>services</li> </ul>	none, except electricity	all services

<b>Point of Comparison</b>	<b>Old Village</b>	<b>New Village</b>
• markets (Suq)	Tarif, Gourna City, Geziira, Luxor	Same as before (New Suq not open)
• schools	none	two in new village
• police	Tarif or Geziira, 4-5 km.	in the village
Housing Units	large 2-story compounds, open spaces	small 1 story unit with modest courtyard, little space between quads
• new units	not allowed	717, 4-room and approximately 200, 2-room units
• ownership	no legal title	legal title
• total area	300-600 square meters average, total space	150 square meters total
• living conditions	multiple families and relatives	single “married man” families with relatives
“ “	crowded	crowded
“ “	cool in summer, warm in winter, comfortable	extremely hot in summer, cold in winter
• possible expansion	expanded many times but no longer permitted	not permitted
• outdoor space	large,unrestricted	limited
• space for animals	walled courtyards or nearby open space	small animals only, residents added some stalls at village edge
Occupations:	70% tourist related, 30% office, shops, or government	30% office, shops, or government; no tourist income
• tourist related	crafts and hospitality provided directly to tourists	alabaster factories, souvenir shops, no visiting tourists

Point of Comparison	Old Village	New Village
• income	mixed, diverse	wages, piece work, many unemployed
Household expenses	electric	water, sewer, electric, gas, transportation
“ “	families provided some food and household items	purchase most food and household items
Transportation	personal car, motorcycle, taxi, donkey cart, walk	personal car, taxi, microbus, more motorcycles

Figure 7.1: Comparisons of Old and New Villages.

**Lost Occupations and Sources of Income.** Although many resident prefer life in the new village, the loss of occupations and income continues to be the most significant problem. For those who work in offices and shops, as armed guards, or in other jobs with fixed income, income from these jobs will continue. An antiquities guard explained, “He’s from the middle shift (class) of the site so he has only a fixed salary. He doesn’t have anything to do with tourism. So he doesn’t change. He changed to better” (Int 21).

But, even those who have a steady income will loose the extra income they earned from visiting tourists (Int 5). As explained,

In new Gurna the life is very nice. They like it very much and the houses are better, the streets, everything, but they don’t have this extra income which they got from tourism in old Gournna (Int 27).

The disadvantage (is) that they don't have any extra income. Because he is a clerk in the government, he gets a salary. And after this, ... in his free time he was working at home doing this souvenirs and selling it. Now it's totally closed (Int 27).

For other residents who depended almost exclusively on income from tourists who visited the village, their income has been greatly reduced or eliminated. For example:

In old Gurna, (he) was living from the tourism. The tourists were visiting him and every day he could earn some money. But in the new city there is no way (to do this), (Int 7).

Here in the new Gurna, it's very nice. It's clean, bigger, and I don't deny that it's much better. But I need to live. I have no income (Int 10).

So here, there are some people working in the government. There are some working in other professions. They have other jobs here in new Qurna. In old Gourn, it was not nice but much more money than here so we could live there better money-wise (Int 13).

The main problem for the people now is not the houses or the designs. It is mainly about businesses and occupations. Many residents lost their business in old Gourn because their businesses and occupations were closely connected to tourism (Int 8).

As mentioned above, it has been estimated that 30% of the residents were employees with salaried jobs, and 70% depended mainly on visiting tourists (Int 23; Chapter 5). A news report cites a similar estimate obtained from a villager in old Gourn. "Eighty per cent of my people have nothing else to live off" (Farag, 1998).

The cost of living in the new village has also increased as extra expenses have appeared that were not part of life in the old village. During a walking tour of the village,

we met several groups of people who complained about the extra costs for services in the new village (WT 1, 4). Villagers must now pay for water, sewer, electricity, and natural gas, if they install it.

Some neighbors they pay 135 pounds (for 2 months), so how shall I pay it? Till last month we have been paying 10 pounds, 15 pounds maximum per month for the water consumption. And we hear from the people that it's increased so what shall I do (Int 10)?

One resident pays 200 pounds for water for 3 months (Int 16). Another man we met in the Horobat mosque pays almost 100 pounds per month for water and 80 pounds for electricity. However, most men make only 300 to 500 pounds per month (WT 4).

There are other expenses such as the cost of transportation to and from the fields or the markets. "Q goes to Bairat and Gourna to shop. However, he would prefer to shop at the new Suq, if it were open, because it would save the cost of the taxi (5 LE/\$1 per trip)" (Int 16).

**Producers to Consumers.** The relocation has also affected the way residents live day by day.

Before everybody have animals. We have a cow. The most of the people (who) go to the new Qurna, before they have ... a donkey, he have a chicken, he have a cat, he have a cow, he have sheep" (Int 19).

Dr. Ahmed El Tayib has offered a penetrating insight regarding this significant change in their way of life.

A feature of the new village which is a little bit negative is that there is no space for the (larger) animals, for example, for cattle which were supporting the families there. The villagers used to make cheese and get milk from the cows. They supplied basic needs and were important factors in feeding the children.

Now the residents go to Luxor, (or to other markets), or to the supermarket and buy it. *And that has turned many people from producers into consumers.*"

Relocation has also affected the craft industry and the alabaster factories.

It was easier when old Gurna was here because he would get directly from the houses if he needs some scarabias, some obelisks, any kind of statues. He will get it directly from the people. But now they have to go very far away to bring it (Int 26).

And in new Qurna, it is forbidden for the alabaster factory to leave the large stones at the crafter's house so he can continue to work. The delivery man has to hide it somewhere.

If you put (the stone) outside in the street, they say no. They don't let you put it in the street? They say no. Just inside. But inside he didn't have a place for putting this one (Int 26).

The owner of a craft center and shop offers this assessment:

Do you think, will these skills continue? I hope so. But now (we) have a new (situation). Before the people stay here. They work with me and will work with factory. But now you go to new Qurna it's difficult work because ... if you want a scarab, I go to the house. Give me a scarab. You give me the cat, you give me this one. But if you go to another town, this one in Qurna, (this one) in another village. It's not easy. I only go to bring it. Maybe the artist come to me here? (But) I'm too far (Int 26).

Distance to the farms and other small business and shops has also added costs and inconvenience. Those with office jobs or with very small farms or few animals have had to purchase motorcycles to help them get around (Int 21).

I have my uncle, since they move to the new village, he stay at home. He cannot go out. Before he got from the house to the Ramesseum down. He go to the fields and stay all day. And there we have a small house for the elements

(sun, etc.). ... And he liked always to go in the morning, he come back in the evening up to the old house. Now since he go to the new place, he does not have money to pay car every day to come to fetch him to bring him there. And he buy motorbike for his son to take him from the house to the field and he go two or three times. He have a bad problem (an accident). He not allowed to go with the motorbike. Now he stay at home. He not able to go to the field. He getting more old. And this not only him. This is many the old people in (new Qurna)” (Int 19).

### **Improvements by Villagers**

One of the most promising and refreshing aspects of the village is the improvements provided by the residents themselves. The residents have shown considerable initiative by planting trees, flowers, and gardens, and by improving and adding to the housing units and outdoor spaces (See Photos 7.3 to 7.5, 7.8, and 10.3 to 10.8 in Chapter 10).

Everywhere one sees new gardens, new plants and trees, upgraded entrances, new shops and stores, make-shift animal pens and soccer fields, and all this despite crumbling buildings in section 4 and 5, cramped conditions for many families, a major loss of income, and conflict and fines from the local government.





Photo 7.8. Tree Lined Interior Street (by Author).

There is a clear contrast between the initiative of the residents in making improvements to the village, and the unfinished public areas and streets, the poor quality of the newer smaller units, and the restrictive policies of the government. As one resident, who lost his income from the old village, works 2 or 3 jobs, and opened a small store to help support his family, relates:

(He) was very proud of the plants (trees and small plants) he planted. But the city council says that they planted it for the houses. But he insists that he planted it and the city council didn't cultivate any of the plants. (He) did every tree and planted every tree by his hand with his parents and brothers.

When any visitor comes to see the new city, the city council tells them that they have done it, that the city council has cultivated this. And he spoke with someone from the city council when someone came to see the new city and they

told the visitor that it was cultivated by the city council. (He) told him directly, “No, you are a liar.” And he faced him with the fact that he paid even for the earth to cultivate the land at home. (He) paid for everything and he cultivated this by his hand. Nothing was paid or done from the city council. Then the visitor started to speak and to argue with the city council person because they thought the city council planted this for the people in the village (Int 7).

### **Government Restrictions**

As indicated, local government in new Qurna penalizes residents for certain improvements such as planting trees, additions to the housing units, and opening of small shops and stores. According to the village plan for the new city, these improvements are not permitted. However, there is considerable potential for new shops and social venues, such as small coffee shops and pocket parks, which would help improve village income and living conditions (Int 10).

The typical approach has been to impose penalties, or to collect an unofficial payment that then allows the offense to continue, although some attempts have been made to demolish improvements. For cafes and small restaurants, the government collects monthly payments, but has also begun imposing “taxes” on the offending businesses.

Fines, penalties, and under the table payments have hindered, but not prevented, the villagers from making needed improvements to the homes and the village, and from starting small businesses that might ease the burden of lost income.

As we walked, Q said that residents were not allowed to plant trees because the village plan called for open streets with no trees. If the owner wanted to keep the trees he had to pay a fee for each tree. They said that some of the local

authorities wanted money to allow them to fix their houses, or to get another house, or even to plant trees (WT 2).

Almost as soon as they moved in, residents began planting trees. But, on one occasion a government official came with a bulldozer.

He say, "If you not cut the trees I (will remove them)." Why did he change his mind? Because all the people (they) come together. They say no. Me, I will stay here and then I have something (makes a chopping motion) ... An ax? I say, "If you come, move one meter, I will show this for you." ...

When I start to make any private project for me, they come and ask me for papers and they ask me for the permission and the license and what all, taxes and everything. I would like them to give some time free of taxes especially at the beginning just to build up the businesses (Int 24).

Another resident gave this report.

"How much do you have to pay to keep your store open? One hundred fifty pounds per month" (Int 7).

A crafter explains,

And even if I would like to have a small (craft) shop here, where shall I get the money from to open the shop? And I'm not ready to pay 100 pounds every month as a punishment because I don't have a license or I have no building permission or like this (Int 10).

A conversation with the owner of a small market revealed that,

He has to pay for this shop because it is not permitted. There is no permission for this, so he has to pay like, like punishment. ... And that's even till now not allow to get a permission here, here in new Qurna for such a small market ... like this.

So is everybody paying a punishment? Yes.

Everybody? Yes, there is somebody coming from the city council and give him the receipt and gets the money. Like the traffic police when you (get) a ticket

for punishment.

Why don't they just give him permission? Mish 'arif. (I don't know.) And he pays taxes even (Int 20)!

Other residents report similar situations.

Taxes are more than a thousand and a half (pounds for the new cafe). Per month or per year? Per month. So do all of these, the restaurants and coffee houses, have to pay a tax each month? Yes (Int 24).

A resident who would like to get a job with the government also explains,

To apply for any job in the government he must pay, like under (the table). And he cannot.

How much money do they want? It depends on what you will get from this job.

How much you will get? If it's good salary, you will get higher, much (more), 2,000, 3,000 (pounds). If it's less, or just cleaning, or helping, that will be maybe 1,000 (Int 20).

## **CHAPTER 8**

### **PARTICIPANT EVALUATIONS**

An important goal of the study was to obtain evaluations of the project from participants. When asked to evaluate the relocation and the new village, the responses were unpredictable. A participant might concentrate on an issue of special importance and not talk about any other aspects of the relocation, or they might provide an assessment while responding to another question. Nevertheless, when coded and topically sorted, their responses revealed a broad range of issues that were important for the participants. These responses are also essential for assessing the effectiveness of villager participation.

The evaluations are separated into two groups. The first group represents the opinions of relocation officials and planners since they tended to have similar views. Their comments are grouped into three sections: political will and leadership, project evaluations, and recommendations for improvement.

The second group reports on the opinions of village leaders and residents. It includes sections on political leadership, mediation and representation; evaluations of the relocation and the new village as a whole; comments on compensation, housing, and life in the new village; and recommendations for improvement.

The evaluations are limited to what informants actually had to say, and each group did not address the same issues. Differences between the two groups offer some insights into the unique perspectives and objectives of each group.

## **Evaluations of Relocation Officials**

**Political Will and Leadership.** Relocation officials emphasize that the relocation could not have been accomplished without the political will and leadership of Governor Samir Farag. Past attempts did not succeed, they say, primarily because the political will was too weak (Int 1). But when Dr. Farag came to Luxor, he had the will and determination to complete the project (Int 1). A local official added that Dr. Farag was also concerned about social dimensions. For example, he established credibility with the villages, had good contact with local leaders and residents, delegated responsibility and established clear lines of communication, chose administrators wisely, and gave priority to the common good (Int 6).

Another reason mentioned for past failures was a lack of trust in the government due to many governmental missteps and confrontations with residents (Int 3; Chapter 6). “In order to succeed in a project like that, you have to build the trust between the residents and the head of the government” (Int 9). In the case of Gourna, planners noted that trust had to be built through dialog and a process of being heard (Int 1, 2). In addition, the government also sought to reestablish trust by taking the first step and building the village before asking the resident to move, a lesson they had learned from the emergency village of Suul (Int 1; Chapter 5 & 6). However, this trust did not last once compensation and moving problems arose. In effect, it diminished significantly after the first phase of the relocation (Chapter 6.)

The leadership and support of the village representatives who were also members of the Luxor Supreme Council and of local leaders was also cited as an important factor in the project (Int 1). And ultimately, widespread agreement with the reasons for relocation, i.e, protection of the monuments and improvement in the living

conditions of the villagers, provided support for the project as well(Int 1).

**Evaluation of the Project.** Relocation officials and planners mentioned the following as positive aspects of the project:

- The government delivered on the promise to build a village (Int 1).
- There was good community participation (Int 1).
- The residents own the units (Int 1, 6, 9).
- The living conditions of the new village are much improved from old Gourn, for example they have water, sewer, schools, streets, police, a new market, etc. (Int 9).
- “The people were satisfied with the relocation plans because they wanted to move and to leave the monuments in a good condition before it’s too late. For this reason there was a balance between the government objectives and the desires of the people” (Int 5).
- One government official attributes the success of the relocation to two factors: a) Dr. Farag cared very much about the social aspect of the relocation, and b) the people saw the city as it is now and they admired it (Int 6).

Weaknesses of the project were identified as:

- A strong centralized administration from Cairo could often be at odds with conditions in the local setting primarily because it had a different vision of what the city should be. Because a centralized administration is not involved in any way with local citizens, they may not understand their needs (Int 1).
- The participation process was faulty in that relocation was obligatory. The residents did not have a choice. Further, decisions regarding the relocation were already made in Luxor before interacting with the residents (Int 1).

- A lack of ownership documents in the old village weakened the negotiating position of residents (Int 1).
- Because of the many different types of families in the village, there was a need for more than one prototype (housing model), (Int 2). (Also suggested by the villagers.)
- The separation of uses in the plan of the village was not consistent with a village way of life. “They used to have shops under their buildings (on the ground floor) where most of them maintain their living through selling things. But it was not designed in such a manner” (Int 2). Although this was required by the Ministry of Housing, there was nothing inherent in the village itself that necessitated it. On the other hand, a traditional village design might not work for the city as a whole, so a compromise was needed, i.e., some small shops along the main streets could have been allowed (Int 2).
- Compensation was not based on replacement costs. “They didn’t have a basis for replacement costs and the cost that they paid for their relocation. It was simply about having a home” (Int 1).
- The inability to create or provide jobs and opportunities in the new village is a serious deficiency (Int 9).
- There is a lack of maintenance in the village (Int 2).

**Recommendations of Relocation Officials.** Planners and government officials offered these recommendations regarding the relocation of El Gourna:

- The people should take some part in the building process (Int 1, 2). (Some residents suggested this also.)
- Resident should have a choice to move or to stay in the old village (Int 1).



- Although some planners and officials said the project needed better participation, they did not indicate how this could be achieved (Int 1).

This group also offered some general suggestions about how future relocations should be implemented, perhaps thinking about relocations already planned for Luxor and other places in Egypt:

- “First of all, the place you have to move people to should be close to the one they are moved from. (And) pay attention to their requests as much as possible” (Int 9).
- “You have to motivate (them) to go to the other place. Put (in) all the services and make it more humane for people” (Int 28).
- A local government leader suggested a number of items (Int 6):
  - Choose the right place for the people before the relocation.
  - Take care about the social point of view of the people; take into consideration the social dimension.
  - Give the feeling to the people that the government is working for their good.
  - Offer all facilities and services in the new city.

Since government officials and planners were more difficult to meet and interview, these response are incomplete. And several responses are similar to those offered by the villagers, for example, the suggestion for some kind of direct physical involvement in building the homes and the village such as “sweat equity.” One planner expressed it in financial terms, but failed to take into account the value of what the villagers had given up.

For any person to have a better life, he should pay for it. I don't think that it's right for the government to take the whole financial burden of this project (Int 1).

Some responses from government representatives indicated that they had a much different agenda and outlook on relocation than the residents:

She (a widow who lost her house and her source of income) is much luckier than many others in Egypt. There are a lot of people in Cairo, they live in graves and tombs, cemeteries (Int 10).

Another official said that over the three or four years of the project, there wasn't anything that could be called a problem, that could be called a disadvantage (Int 9). And, another, "There is nothing better than this. They have all the services. There is nothing better than this in this area" (Int 6).

### **Evaluations of Residents**

The responses of the residents are more varied since we were able to interview 32 residents plus hear the voices of others who attended and contributed to the interviews. And, although the evaluations provided by the residents could be somewhat general, and not every aspect of the relocation was discussed, taken together they provide a reasonably complete evaluation of the project. It is also important to hear these evaluations as much as possible in the way the residents expressed them because they point to subtle emphases that are often overlooked in a more generalized approach.

One noticeable feature in the evaluations of the residents is the ambivalent feelings many villagers have about their new situation, i.e., liking and disliking it at the same time. While confusing and sometimes contradictory, these responses are nonetheless real, and they reflect the advantage of an emic approach in that the reader can see a whole range of responses, and thereby capture a larger scope of human

experience.

**Political Leadership, Mediation, and Representation.** Village leaders agreed with government officials and planners that a key factor in the relocation was the leadership provided by Dr. Farag. They also added that his efforts to include the El Tayib family helped to improve trust in the government program. From the beginning of the relocation, Dr. Farag was personally involved and worked with the El Tayib family to help convince the people to move (Int 3). He visited the villages and attended meetings in the Diwan of Sheik El Tayib (Int 4). As a result, the villagers had confidence in Dr. Farag (Int 5). As an older seasoned resident indicated, “Samir Farag (is) very good man and he give everything for the people” (Int 30).

Dr. Farag’s involvement was a basic foundation of the relocation. But this advantage diminished after the first wave of resident moved to new Qurna and he became less involved. Reactions to the West Bank Governor, who took over the day to day operations from and was appointed by Dr. Farag, were mostly unfavorable. For example, some said that the Governor was “not a patient man” (Int 14). Others saw his strategy as “punishment” (Int 19). He was accused of reducing the compensation offered if residents did not readily agree with it (Int 26) thereby “cheating” the people (Int 29), or of using tricks to get some refusers to move (Int 29). When residents indicated that government leaders didn’t listen to the people, they were usually referring to the West Bank Governor (Int 26). Their main criticism was that there was no outside control, no restrictions or supervision, on what government leaders could do (Int 26, 29). On the other hand, residents agreed that Dr. Ahmed El Tayib and Sheik Mohammed El Tayib played a significantly positive role in mediating the role of the government.

When residents evaluated the special representatives, contrary examples were

often mentioned. For example, some representatives followed the pattern of special representative “Ahmed” mentioned in Chapter 6. On the other hand, others commented on a representative for Horobat, that nobody knew before the relocation, who accepted personal benefits from the West Bank Governor for his role as a representative (Int 29). And, they mentioned a representative from Rhabat who gave extra units to his own family members while other families received less compensation than needed (Int 26; Chapter 6). Thus, it is not surprising that residents pointed to honesty and personal morality as essential qualities for representatives (Int 25), or that they suggested representatives should live in the community, rather than outside it (Int 25).

Mediation and special representation were not present in the relocation of Gournet Mar’ii. Rather, the residents were represented by the mayor and three council members. Residents “... were disappointed in the mayor and the Bairat representatives ... because they did not help them get their rights” (Int 16). In addition, “Those who stood by the Mayor, did not get fair compensation” (Int 16). A few times Sheik Mohammed and Dr. Ahmed intervened for relatives who lived in Gournet Mar’ii, but since they were not their official representatives, they had to respect the position of the Mayor (Int 16).

We report below in summary fashion specific points made by the residents in their evaluations beginning with general areas and then focusing on items of particular interest to the residents.

**Evaluations of the Relocation.** Residents seemed to be somewhat divided in their evaluations of the project as a whole depending on how the relocation affected them personally. Thus some said in agreement with the relocation officials:

- It was the best way. The government had a good plan and it was fair and accomplished very quickly. There is not any other way to move people (Int 13,

21).

- There was good communication between the government and the representative of the village (Int 5).
- It's better for me as a normal (person) from the middle shift (class) of the society because I was living in a bad condition there. So when I come here to the new Gurna, it's much better and I have the same salary. I have the same job. So I have no problem. I came to a better place (Int 21).

Other villagers who moved in the later phases had different opinions. The following is a summary of these viewpoints. The tone and tenor of each response has been retain as far as possible:

- It was the only way, but it was not a very good way (Int 23).
- A very good reason for moving but not a good method. ... There should be more care for the people (Int 25).
- There was "little time to prepare to move" (Int 16).
- The destruction of all the houses was unnecessary and contrary to agreements already made (Int 19, 20).
- The loss of so many historical homes was wrong (Int 29).
- "For the widows, and the divorced, and the single persons, they made only one room and a hall for the single person. That was done at the end just to save effort, and to save time and money, but it was not so good, it was not so perfect. That was from the negative in the building and the construction" (Int 3).
- The relocation was difficult for the old people (Int 13).
- The site was not good because there is a danger of flash floods from the mountains (Int 17).

- ... the relocation “has turned the people from producers to consumers” (Int ...).
- They could find another way to keep ... old Gournas as it is, and not to harm the monuments (Int 20, cf. Int 19).

**Evaluations of The New Village.** In general the residents were happy with the new village. Only one person who was treated poorly by the government and is living far from the main part of the village in Medinet Munewara did not like the new village. He was forced to leave his large home in old Gournas and move to a small 2 room unit with no courtyard, trash in the unpaved streets, unfinished areas all around him, and his family dispersed in several villages. “He don’t care about anything because he don’t like the place here” (Int 29). Other villagers had good opinions about the new village. For example, they pointed out that there are many advantages to the new village such as schools, services, and infrastructure. The new village “helps to have better families and the children, they have better chances in the future” (Int 3).

Some residents said they like the “big” houses, the drainage, the water, the schools, the green spaces, and the very good location. “Here in the new village everything is suitable and nice” (Int 5, 30). Citizens who had office jobs preferred having a city council that could handle local services such as water, sewer, and police security (WT 1). And one villager said, “I like the people in the village.” In the interview, he emphasized that they had lived together in the old village and now they were even closer friends having gone through the relocation experience together (Int 24).

Many residents commented on the same features such as the new units, private space for members of the family, the streets, the services, schools, etc. An oft repeated response was that they were happy except for lost income (Int 8, 10). A few pointed out that in old Gournas they were ashamed to have guests. But in the new village they are

happy to have them (Int 5, 8).

Although almost all the residents like the new village, there were problems, some more critical than others. For example, lost income, units being too close together, lack of space, and no shopping in the village. Residents preferred the centralized shops, if they were open, but would also like to see some shops along the main streets in the village so they could visit them as needed (WT 1). And a big problem for residents in the rear half of the village was that there were many unfinished areas, streets with rubble, crumbling houses, areas without streets or finished roads, and unfinished homes and courtyards (WT 4).

**Compensation.** After loss of income, residents complained about compensation more than any other issue. Overall, it was very uneven. Compensation rules did not take into account the many different situations in which the people were living, and were handicapped by the fact that there was only one prototype, or “flat,” provided, for all types of families. And, compensation rules were often subverted by attempts to persuade, reward, or punish certain families.

A typical observation was that, “Some people got less and some people got more than they had” (Int 12). And, “You cannot give 100 square meters to someone who is living in 300 square meters” (Int 13). Another resident gave this example.

His mother was living with them but she had her own house. It was closed. She was living with them but the house is there. She got only a room with them here and they gave them a piece of land. And the same with one of the brothers. So he would say it would be better a house for a house (Int 23).

In the beginning of the relocation, the government tried to solve compensation problems by giving some families additional flats, but by the middle of the relocation this

could no longer be done because there was a shortage of flats (Int 8).

Another difficult problem was “heritage”, or the rights of inheritance, and how to compensate individuals for these rights. And matters were further confused when members of families who had moved away came back to the old village in an attempt to acquire a unit or two, while poor families had to do with less than they needed (Int 24).

Most villagers expressed their dissatisfaction with the compensation as a principle of fairness. They believed that the same compensation rules should have applied to everyone, instead of some getting more than the rules allowed and others getting less (Int 26). “The people who did the inventory and who gave the contracts, they should be more fair, to make it equal for everybody because they favored some” (Int 27, cf. Int 12). Others said, compensation should be more commensurate with the size of the family and a more even exchange for what they gave up (Int 16). And, the government should have talked to the people before forming a compensation policy and have determined what would be needed (Int 24).

We just wanna tell you, we didn't say it's so bad. We say it's so good over there for the new houses. But I just want to (be) looking for the people. For the old family. They're people. They got less that they deserve. (Int 25).

A convergence of factors contributed to the shortage of units. To begin, there was no accurate estimate or count made during the planning stages of how many units would be needed. Second, the relocation officials simply did not know the living situation of the families in the compounds of the old village, or how many families there really were. And then, the counting survey which was done later also proved to be inaccurate.

Adding to the miscalculations, people who had left old Gournā and moved to other places returned and some were successful in acquiring units. As the relocation



progressed, additional units were granted as favors to those who helped the government with reluctant residents thus reducing the number available. And in the last stages of construction when the small two room units were being built, some of these units in the rear of the village were demolished because structural cracking made them unsafe. All of this added up to less units being available for distribution.

**Housing Units.** Although most families liked the “flats,” there were several critical problems with them. Positive and negative comments are reflected in the summary below:

- Ownership:
  - “The best thing that he finds it’s good that they gave the ownership contracts and the keys immediately” (Int 13).
  - “(Ownership) is one of the necessary or the very important things that (he) needs for stability” (Int 5).
- Residents would like to have:
  - a staircase (Int 23).
  - more models, more choices for residents (Int 22, 26).
  - permission to build a second floor (Int 3, 15, 16).
  - more space in the courtyard, around the house, and in front of the house (Int 23).
- The unit is:
  - much better than the old house (Int 15, 21).
  - too small for a big family (Int 3, 16), i.e., it only fits a husband, wife and one or two small children (Int 19, 23). Some suggested this problem could be addressed by allowing the residents to build a second floor (Int 3).

- too hot, like an oven (Int 16, 27, etc., almost all).
- Courtyards:
  - the courtyard is useful for raising small animals and for extra rooms (Int 16).
  - the areas is too small for family expansion or to keep animals (Int 13).
- Poor construction and structural damage:
  - the house is very nice except for the cracking (Int 20). (A severe problem in sections 4 and 5.)
  - some houses at the far end of the village are unsafe and have collapsed (Int 22, 24, 25).
  - the military has fixed the cracking many times, but the cracks return (Int 8, 20).
  - “They look at the others and they say why do we have this problem? Why don’t we have a stable houses like the other families, nice houses without cracks” (Int 8, WT 2).

**Life in the New Village.** Below are some additional responses from the residents that complement their evaluations of life in the new village.

***Advantages.*** Advantages of the new village and the relocation:

- “The best advantage is the jump from a hard life to a comfortable life” (Int 3).
- They are living in a very nice area with a very good start for a new future (Int 4).
- It will provide a chance for a better life, i.e., because of schools, facilities, the cleanliness, etc. (Int 4).
- The residents are healthier and look cleaner (Int 3).
- Each family has a house. “Before, I didn’t have a house. All my family, actually three families, ... we only had one big house for all the family” (Int 8).

- The people can extend their houses in the future (Int 4).
- Transportation has improved (Int 12).
- The village has schools: “It will get better because of the schools ...” (Int 13, 24).
- The village is good for the children (Int 21), and, the children are happy (Int 15).
- The parks, gardens, streets, and views are very good (Int 20, 23).
- There are more things to do in the new village (Int 15).
- The new village is clean (Int 3, 4).
- The relocation will provide protection for the monuments in the Old Gourna area (Int 4).
- The participation of the residents, at least at the beginning of the project, was a positive experience. “They did it in the beginning; they made meetings. They should keep the same procedures and the same rules. But at the end they changed it” (Int 27).

**Disadvantages.** The villagers noted the following disadvantages and unsatisfactory conditions:

- Loss of income and more expensive living — mentioned by many residents (Int 8, 10, 13, 21, 23, 24, 29, WT 1, WT 4).
- Favoritism in the distribution of units and land (Int 19).
- The Najua' are dispersed (Int 18, 19, 23).
- The village is far away from farms, jobs, (Int 18, 21) and markets (Int 3).
- The houses are too close together with little space between (Int 18).
- There are many unfinished elements in the village, for example unfinished and torn up streets, unfinished parks and housing units to the rear of the village (Int

22, WT 1, 2).

- The designs of the streets that separated the sections of the village should be different from each other (Int 23).
- Space for animals, family expansion, gardens, and between neighbors is too limited (Int 3, 16).
- No permission to build (Int 25, 27).

**Villager Recommendations.** Recommendations of the residents incorporate many of the criticisms above, but they also proposed some novel solutions and ideas that could have been incorporated into the relocation itself but were not because of a limited understanding of villager participation. This is a critical point in assessing participation especially since both relocation and planning literature point to local residents as important sources for local knowledge and solutions to planning problems.

The main recommendation are:

- A way to work (Int 29), or help in starting new businesses to replace lost income (Int 20).
- Fairness in compensation with no favoritism:
  - give everyone their rights (Int 10).
  - equal exchange for what they had in old Gournia (Int 14).
  - enough compensation for what each family needs since each family is not the same (Int 12, 13, and many others).
  - a single standard for all. Int 18.
- Fairness to women, for example:
  - “A chance to work, or training to get their own project ... small projects to live. ... She would like to have a piece of land or two pieces of land, or

something extra (i.e., more outside space) with the house so she can do some project and have some future for the children” (Int 15).

- The same compensation (for widows) as women who are married (Int 15).
- The right for widows and divorcees to attend relocation meetings in the Diwan (Int 15).
- Better representation from people who actually live in the village (Int 26).
- Government representatives should have personal contact with the residents and conduct an investigation into the life of the village, “like this study” (Int 18, 26).
  - “The (responsible) people they should do like you. Sitting with the people, asking them, talking to them what they need, what the facilities in the new places (are needed). After this they start to build (Int 18).
  - “Much better you talk with the people what you like because it’s not same” (Int 26).
- A followup study to determine how things turned out and where there are problems (Int 26).
- Build a basic housing structure or module on a plot with extra land of about 200 or 300 square meters around the house and let the families finish it to their needs (Int 19).
- Better quality houses (Int 26).
- Punish contractors who don’t do good work (Int 24).
- A larger house and more space for gardens, animals, and family expansion, and permission to build (Int 23, 27, 29).
- Keep some of the houses in old Gournā (Int 20).

- Find some way to attract tourists to new Qurna, for example, special factories for clothing or crafts, or small crafts shops and businesses catering to tourists (Int 23).
- Open the Suq so people from outside the village will come here to shop (Int 23).

The residents also had many positive comments about the military. The participants in one focus group agreed with a resident who said:

The military office here, they do the best. They tried maybe every two months to solve the problem of the cracks and they also tried some solutions for the foundation but the cracking appears again. All the people in the group were very satisfied with the effort and what the military is doing. He said if he goes to see them, they come with him, and they repair the house. They fix the cracks and even if you like to change the color totally of the house, they do it. But the cracking returns (Int 18).

### **Summary and Comment**

Two themes run through the evaluations: the need for thoroughness and comprehensiveness in relocation planning, and the potential advantage of involvement and cooperation between relocation officials, village leaders and residents, although it is not clear how far relocation officials are willing to go on this issue, whether they would include only upper level village representatives, or if they would support more direct involvement of average citizens. In reality, the advantages of utilizing local knowledge and villager participation fell far short of its potential.

One difference between the two group was that planners and government officials tended to overlook details of relocation and resettlement that were important for

residents. They were more focused on moving or relocating the families than on what would happen after they arrived in the new location. Residents, on the other hand, were more concerned about everyday problems and the details of life, such as compensation, occupations and income, room for family expansion, and separation from family members and from the larger Naja. And, a lingering feeling that seemed to pervade the responses of the residents, and was frequently mentioned by others sources who live almost year-round on the West Bank, was that the uniqueness of old Gournā had been lost.

We know it was a serious reason, but when we found old Gournā, we opened our eyes to this life and found these houses. We used to visit the people there and play there. And behind it (was) empty and suddenly ... (it's gone), (Int 18).

## CHAPTER 9

### ASSESSING RELOCATION AND PARTICIPATION

The events of the relocation and the ways in which residents were, or were not, involved, has been described in the preceding chapters. Description is an essential task of qualitative research, and presents the “data” of the study in narrative form (Alasuutari, 1995; Creswell, 2007, 2009; Lofland & Lofland, 1995; Maxwell, 2005, Miles & Huberman, 1994; Pelto & Pelto, 1978; Spradley, 1979; Wolcott, 2001). From this data, “findings” or outcomes of the study are developed by assembling the information gathered into larger conceptual categories that explain and give meaning to the events being studied.

Following this format, the next two chapters pull together various threads from the narrative into larger conceptual categories, summarize details, and develop interpretive explanations and causal connections. This chapter, Chapter 9, also provides a transition and link to more general conclusions and policy recommendations in the next chapter. Thus, the findings of the study are contained in Chapters 9 and 10 and they should be considered together.

Chapter 9 is divided into two sections. The first reviews the consequences of the relocation, and the second focuses on the forms and elements of villager participation.

#### **Consequences of the Relocation**

**Improved Living Conditions and Protection of Monuments.** Taken as a whole, the relocation of El Gourna had both positive and negative outcomes. On the one hand, major improvements were provided. There are better services, better houses, new



schools, and the quality of life has improved. And although some features of the village are not yet completed, it provides a healthy environment that will support a better future.

On the other hand, serious issues remain. Streets, parks, and some services and housing units remain unfinished. A significant number of residents have lost a portion if not all of their income. And for many, compensation was not an equal or fair exchange. Poor construction in sections 4 and 5 has caused walls to crack, some houses to be unsafe, and represents a loss of value for these residents. And government interference with the initiative and creativity of residents has discouraged or prevented them from making improvements and adaptations in the new village.

Since the residents have been moved from the monumental area, there is now no danger of loss or damage to the antiquities from encroachment. In the process, two historical epochs were affected: the Pharaonic, with its antiquities and monuments, and the newer monument of El Gourna itself. For the Pharaonic, access was gained to many valuable tombs and the antiquities and histories contained in them. But El Gourna, a living and historical monument of world class art and culture, was lost. Yet, because the residents strongly supported the government's goal of preservation, a question lingers if a compromise could have reached to preserve the unique values and special character of both the Pharaonic era and El Gourna.

**From Village to Town Life.** Perhaps the most significant change for the residents is the transition from a traditional village to town life, from a known homeplace to an unfamiliar "flat" among people that are friends, but "not my family." The small hamlets in old Gourna were in effect organic clusters of family compounds and domestic operations that had been expanded many times to accommodate growth. The new village has a fixed form with identical "units" in grid like rows, a new economic basis, and

new schools and social institutions (Photo 7.7).

One villager explains the difference:

It's like, ... if you get somebody from a village to put him in Cairo. He will get lost from the first week or the first day because for them they didn't know ... what means streets! ... The city was a bit too big. Not like in Gurna. ... Here the only difference between the units is the number. But there each house had its own shape (Int 23).

The same resident also emphasized in the interview that he “spent maybe six months until (he) adjusted or (became) accustomed to the place here. ... For six months he was like a stranger” (Int 23).

With the change from a traditional to a wage and money economy, residents lost a measure of economic independence they had in the old village, but gained new opportunities. In the traditional village economy, residents provided some food and basic domestic items for themselves by raising animals and producing small household goods, or by earning baqsheesh from the tourists, but economic conditions were minimal.

In the new village, most have no cattle, only small garden plots for growing a few vegetables, and no income from tourists. Extra income from crafts is also being lost as crafts are increasingly being produced and sold in the alabaster factories located along the main road on the way to the Valley of the Kings instead of in the homes of the villagers. If jobs are lost or residents can't earn wages, they will have little opportunity to provide for themselves (WT 10). In the future, the new economy will depend more on schools and specialized training. And the residents will face further complicated changes in occupations and livelihoods as the village is integrated into the larger national economy.

**Loss of Occupations and Income.** From the interviews, it was clear that a significant number of residents had lost all if not most of their income. At the time of the relocation, there was no current study regarding sources of income and local economic conditions in the village. The Luxor Master Plans did not consider Gourna as a separate economic entity, and only included it in generalized reports based on government statistics. This generalized data provided little useful information about specific occupations and local economic conditions. On the other hand, unofficial but helpful estimates and descriptions of local conditions were available from educated and informed local residents (Int 23).

Relocation not only moved the residents to a new village, it re-moved them from the physical location of their livelihoods. As with most traditional cultures, livelihoods are critically linked to location (ADB, 1998; Cernea, 1997). Although some residents had jobs in shops or offices in Luxor and elsewhere, and some worked in the alabaster factories, most, even office workers, also relied on income gained from direct contact with the tourists.

In effect, relocation officials seemed unaware of the complex ways in which the villagers made a living or how they might do so after the relocation. They believed that most villagers were making a living from agriculture or from jobs in tourist related business such as hotels and gift shops, and that their occupations and income would not be significantly affected by relocation (Int 1, 2). However, for El Gourna, a significant number of families earned their income day by day from tourists *who visited* the village and not from employment in hotels and shops. The economy of Gourna was unique in this way (Photo 9.1). As a result, no provision was made for the immediate needs of residents, or for replacement income and livelihoods which the relocation effectively

terminated (Int 0, 6).



Photo 9.1. A Local Resident Waits to Assist Tourists at Deir el Medina (by Author).

While the government has proposed new facilities for future employment, for example, new factories, a Higher Institute of Technology for training in technical skills, and tourist hotels and visitor accommodations, the realization of these plans remains far in the future. Currently, most villagers search for work day by day in construction, at the archeological sites, or in the shops of Luxor, Gournia City, Geziira, or Kom. And a significant number are unemployed.

***Craft Trades Being Lost.*** A significant economic consequence of relocation is the loss of world class craft workers, and craft trades. No matter what kind of job a resident might otherwise have, many residents produced fine quality craftwork in

their homes at night (Van der Spek, 2003). Since they can no longer mingle with tourists, and it is not allowed for the craft shops to bring stone to them in the new village, many residents are no longer producing these “antikas” (Van der Spek, 2008). As contact with tourists diminishes and in many cases ceases, these skills will most likely be lost along with a unique cultural and historic site (Int 24).

***Added Expenses.*** Another facet of economic change are the additional costs of living in the new village. Residents must now pay for all the services that the new village provides such as electricity, water, sanitation, natural gas, and transportation. And, since they produce few, if any, agricultural or domestic items, they must purchase replacement products for family use. As observed by Dr. Ahmed El Tayib, the relocation has changed “people from producers to consumers.”

Travel costs to farms and jobs have also increased. Whereas most villagers used to walk from old Gournia to nearby farms or worked in the village itself, they must now take a microbus or taxi. Some have purchase motorcycles with all the accompanying expenses of licensing, backsheesh for agency workers, gas, and maintenance.

One response from residents to the new economic situation, has been to open local markets, shops, and services and to restore a sense of village life by providing small cafes and restaurants. To the surprise of villagers and visitors alike, the government has resisted or penalized such efforts.

These economic hardships confirm Cernea’s findings that “The most widespread effect of involuntary displacement is the impoverishment of ... relocatees” (Cernea & McDowell, 2000, p. 12), and that “Protecting and reconstructing displaced peoples’ livelihoods is the central requirement of equitable resettlement programs” (Cernea, 1997, p. 1569).

**Compensation Problems.** Because there was no resettlement plan, and no current socioeconomic or anthropological study of the village itself, many compensation problems developed. The housing compensation of a “flat” for every married man was out of touch with the living situation of many families. And, replacement costs and allowances for costs of relocating and setting up homesteads anew were not considered in the compensation package (Int 1).

By the time construction was completed on sections two and three, and the residents were moved in, compensation problems began to snowball. In the old village, there were considerable differences in the size of family compounds, the number of families living in a compound, the size of individual families, and the needs of each family. Many households included additional family members such as unmarried adult sisters and brothers, parents and other relatives. And a few families with unmarried adults and dependent children were being supported by an unmarried head of household (Int 7). The result was that all these different family situations could not be accommodated by the “married man” solution.

Once a single design for the housing units was selected, there were few alternatives available. Each married man received a housing unit of 175 square meters consisting of house and courtyard no matter how big or how small their family was in old Gourn. Compromises were made allowing some families to receive additional units that could be joined together, at least in the first phase of relocation before a shortage of units developed. Or perhaps a family might receive a piece of land in the new village for which there was no permission to build.

After the initial phase of relocation, the application of even this simple rule became subject to negotiations with General M. who himself had the impossible task of

balancing budget problems with a shortage of units and unusable or defective structures.

**Housing Issues.** Although the new homes are a significant improvement from conditions in old Gournia and the residents were generally happy with the housing units, for large families, the units were too small. If a family wanted to add rooms, the only available space was in the courtyard, and if they did add rooms they would be penalized. If the family grew and sons or daughters were married, there was little room for expansion.

Although it seemed like a good idea at the time, the elimination of the staircase proved to be a problem not only because it prevented residents from expanding upwards, but it also prevented them from building the roof top living areas that are a common feature of homes in upper Egypt. These are typically covered sleeping and living areas and would have allowed the families to use lower rooms for other purposes. Acting as a roof top insulators, the coverings could also help protect the roof from heating up in the summer and the units from rapidly losing heat in the winter. Even if village officials were not yet ready to allow permanent construction on the second floor, roof top living areas, a vernacular architectural feature, would have been a significant advantage and provided a unique living solution.

From observations and conversations with villagers, it appears that only two or three spatial designs would have been necessary to accommodate the many different housing needs. And many design issues and space problems could have been left to the residents themselves to solve. In the old village, they had already exhibited a remarkably ability to build what they needed and adjust to existing conditions.

For Example, some residents suggested that the government could have provided a basic expandable unit which could be completed by residents as needed (Int

19). Each unit would also have a suitable amount of land attached to it providing room for expansion or space for various home industries such as raising animals and producing crafts. Some planners also advocated a similar solution adding that the residents should have been allowed to provide “sweat equity,” something the resident themselves also wanted to do (Int 1). Combining the two sets of ideas, a more flexible type of unit that provided a building and some land, and allowed residents to complete or reproduce a family style compound, could have led to a more suitable end product and have reduced the overall cost of the project.

**Structural Problems.** A very distressing problem for residents living in the rear half of the village are the large structural cracks that have appeared in about 30% of the houses in sections 4 and 5, and in some of the small two room units behind section 5. This is a severe problem that resulted from incorrect site work, cost cutting and poor materials (Chapter 6.) And it has led to a substantial loss in value for the residents because the homes cannot be fixed or sold as is. New construction in areas with soil problems will require an expensive foundation system, if soil cannot be compacted properly (Van der Spek, 2000), or the land could be put to some another use such as a park as was the original intent (Int 8). However, the only solution at this point seems to be to give these families a new house in another location in the village.

**Limited Space.** Space Problems have been described above. Basically, there is little room for family expansion, no stairs to the second floor, and no place for large animals or home industries. This lack of space also prevents many families from providing at least some consumable or salable items.

**Social Fragmentation.** Although plans for the village called for each Naja to be housed together similar to the arrangement in the old village, this was only partly



accomplished. For example, Naja Horobat is now housed in 4 different areas. One long time resident explained that when Horobat started to relocate, some people weren't ready or didn't want to relocate. Later they agreed, but they were then relocated to another section of the village (Int 27). And families from Naja Rhabat and Naja Attiyat, although parts of these families had already move to Suul and Tarif after the floods, are also separated in the new village.

Regardless of the causes, the splitting of the Naja has led to a diminished sense of traditional village life. In Horobat for example, families that do not live in section 2 are reluctant to attend family activities such as funerals and weddings because of the distance to the new diwan. A few residents attempted to trade housing units as a sensible solution, but were denied permission by the government (Int 24). However, given the poor conditions of the units in sections 4 and 5, it seems unlikely that much trading could be accomplished.

**Loss of Place.** One of the most emotionally troubling problems in relocation is the sense of loss and sadness experienced by residents when leaving the old village behind. In the relocation of the Egyptian Nubians, Hussein Fahim described the scene as the last boat left the villages that were being gradually submerged behind the High Aswan Dam.

Observers were touched by the shared grief at the moment of departure. Many Nubians kissed the land as they left their empty, vacated homes, while others filled their pockets or small bags with soil. After boarding the boat, the Nubians were feeling particularly vulnerable and sat in deep silence staring at the disappearing village; some had tears in their eyes and others cried openly (Fahim, 1983, p. 43).

Similar emotions were felt in Gourna also. A resident from Horobat who moved in

the first phase of the relocation recalls:

While we were moving from the old Gournna to the new, I didn't think it would be hard for me or difficult. Then when they started to destroy our house I was very sad. ... I felt like unconscious. I didn't know what to do, where to go. Pain, painful. My father and my mother they cried. They let the mother go to another part of the family that she doesn't see the house while they destroy it. ... (It was) the saddest time in his whole life when the loader came and destroyed the house. The father, he told me that (it) was the first time to see him cry. ... And he couldn't move, like paralyzed. That was too said. ... In old Gournna, it was (my) life and it was (my) memories. (Int 23)

Another villager expressed his longing for the old village in this way:

I miss the time when I be in the old house. ... When I sit in the front of my house, you can see from the house till Luxor. Free in front of you. You are on a hill and you have a nice view in the front of you. You see the fields, you see the temples, you see Luxor, you see the city. You see everything. You are in one place where it's nice views. You have this.

And I miss the families. When we are there we have really like one family. Me and my cousin and my neighbor, they are always in front of the houses. When the sun goes down, everybody in the front of the house. And they are sitting. And this, they talk to this, and this, they talk to this. And the life is like one family. The old Gournna had a nice image. You live in one place where you can see everything (Int 19).

But many residents also had ambivalent feelings.

The people were of course a little bit sad but when they knew and when they saw how beautiful are the new homes they felt better and they started directly to forget the past (Int 5).

She feels that life is better for her here because there she did not have good memories because he husband died there. But if he was living, she would prefer to stay in Gournnet Mar'ii (Int 15).

The new houses, it's better and clean. But you know sometime you don't need all that when you're missing the important feeling (Int 18).

In relocation, people are attached to their homes and lands in complicated ways. It is at the same time a combination of place and life whether it be present day life, or stories and memories of the past. Human experiences are woven together into an intricate pattern of people, places, lands, buildings, events, emotions, meanings, and feelings as if they were one continuous experience. In Gournah, memories and experiences were tied to real places that residents saw and visited each day such as cemeteries, family homes, local diwans, mosques, cafes, front porches, and neighbor's houses. Feelings and memories were recorded in views of the valley and the Nile, and in emotions of friendships and family ties. And the memories of life were alive in all the community and village events such as weddings, funerals, and festive celebrations.

Villagers also felt responsible to past generations. Thus, one resident resisted relocation because he did not want to be the one who lost the family home. He would not only lose a connection with his ancestors, he would lose the family's place in the heritage of the community. And he would lose a considerable part of himself.

He knew all of the grandfathers and they used to live in there. He can know that all of his family lived in the same place. There is a special feeling with the people here with the houses. They have a special relation with it. And it's not easy to leave it and go and live anywhere else (Int 29).

The cemeteries were a major cultural symbol linking residents to the past and they seem to be more attached to them than to other features of the village. Residents had a desire to be close to the relatives that had passed on. To leave the cemetery behind was to leave part of the family behind.

Peter Marris (1974) identifies these kinds of losses as a personal losses not just a loss of place. The loss of personal attachments, he says, such as family structures, community places and personal relationships, results in a loss of meaning and purpose. In order to make sense of life, one needs to preserve “a thread of continuity,” a continuity of life. With relocation that continuity is easily broken.

Loss of place, says Marris necessitates a process of mourning and bereavement during which the bereaved attempts to reestablish a sense of continuity by seeking replacement experiences and relationships. Marris notes that in slum clearance, which can be compared to our case of involuntary relocation, the removal of residents “provided no process akin to mourning by which the loss can be assimilated and the essential continuity of life restored” (Marris, 1974, p. 57).

**Unfinished Work.** From the start of the project, funding was a problem and led to critical cuts in the design of housing units, a gradual lowering of the quality and size of units, unfinished work in the village, and the elimination of courtyards for the smaller two room units (Int 2, 19; Photos 9.2 & 9.3). It also resulted in the dismantling of the upper water plant that supplied water to the rear half of the village (Int 24).

An information sheet provided by the Luxor Public Information Office (Appendix F) indicated that the budget for the project was 170 million pounds. This is approximately 56% of an earlier lower estimate for the new village (Chapter 6). Thus, it was inevitable that cuts had to be made. As Scudder (2005) has pointed out, underestimation of budget requirements and resources is a common fault in most relocations world wide.



Photo 9.2.

Unfinished Entrances to Two Room Units (by Author)

Photo 9.3.

Unfinished Rear Courtyard Areas (by Author)



**Government Restrictions.** Case studies of relocation show that the cooperation of government is necessary for residents to recover from relocation (Cernea & Guggenheim, 1993). On the other hand, government interference can be one of the main hindrances to recovery (Cernea & Guggenheim, 1993; Fahim, 1983; Scudder, 2005). In new Qurna, residents have shown a determination to improve their conditions by providing many improvements to the homes and village. However, government interference has hindered the initiative and creativity of the residents and resulted in an unproductive tension between the two. The villagers, for example, were subject to fines

for planting trees, opening shops and other business that might help them restore income, and for adding needed rooms to the housing units. There is a distinct contrast in the village between the unfinished conditions of streets and parks, the poor quality construction in sections 4 and 5, and the initiatives and improvements provided by the residents (WT 2, 3). Government cooperation and support is needed so that the residents can continue to make improvements and adjustments in the new village.

Some of the many improvements made by the residents are shown in photos 9.4 to 9.9.



Photo 9.4. A Decorated Entrance (by Author).



Photo 9.5. Family Garden and Park (by Author)



Photo 9.6. A Tree Lined Street at the Edge of a Park (by Author)





Photo 9.7. A New Mini Market (by Author)



Photo 9.8. Neighborhood Gathering Space (by Author)





Photo 9.9. At Home in new Qurna (by Author)

**Relocation of Gournet Mar'ii.** The details of the relocation of Gournet Mar'ii have been explained in Chapter 6, i.e., the sudden decision to move the village, the lack of participation, mediation, or choice, and the fact that they would be moving from their ancestral lands in Bairat to the homeland of their one time rivals near Tarif (Int 16). This relocation is important because GM offered an historical and cultural contrast from the other four village clusters of old Gourna, and although it was part of the mountain community of El Gourna, the unique circumstances of this village called for a different solution than what was applied.

The original settlers of GM had moved from villages in Bairat to the hill on which GM was built and felt no strong connection to Gourna, although they considered them to be friends and neighbors. The residents of GM also did not depend on visiting tourists

and baqsheesh as the other villages of Gourna had (Int 16). They wished to remain close to their relatives and historical roots, and if they could no longer live on the mountain, they wanted to move back to Bairat.

The stumbling block in allowing GM to move to Bairat, or to an area on the edge of the desert near the Coptic Monastery at Malqata (Map 1.2), was the Supreme Council of Antiquities. The Council seemed to operate in the unreachable background but did not present any good reason for refusing to let the residents move to other villages in the Bairat area or to Malqata other than there *might* be some antiquities in those areas as well (Int 28).

Many residents had hoped that the Mayor of Bairat would be a mediator and an advocate for them as the Tayibs had been for El Gourna since there was no traditional village committee representing GM at the time of the relocation (Chapter 5), and there were no other mediators or advocates to represent their concerns, or to resist pressure from the Luxor government and the Supreme Council of Antiquities. But they were disappointed.

In addition, for some unknown reason, Bairat had federal police or federal marshals appointed by the Ministry of the Interior with the power to arrest people. Officially, they were there “to assist the mayor” of Bairat (Int 28), but they also intimidated the residents.

So the situation was very different for GM and in the end it represented a lack of participation, a relocation by force and intimidation, and much more of a personal loss and radical change than for the villages of El Gourna proper. When it came time to move, many residents in GM could be seen crying because they had to leave their homes and their “heritage” (Int 14).

**Relocation Alternatives.** An important element in relocation planning is the consideration of alternatives to relocation. Relocation scholars (Cernea, 1993, 1997; de Wet, 2001; Dwivedi, 2002; Scudder, 2005) and lending agencies such as the World Bank (2001), the International Development Bank (1999), and Asian Development Bank (1995, 2009), strongly recommend that government agencies seek alternatives to relocation, not only alternative sites and programs, but even the possibility of avoiding relocation altogether.

Before the relocation began in earnest, Caroline Simpson, a local resident, archeologist, and preservationist from England, presented to the Supreme Council of Antiquities a series of relocation alternatives based on similar cases from other parts of the world (Int 19; personal communication). In England, she had worked with small villages and towns helping them to preserve historical buildings and the unique character of their towns, and thus was familiar with preservation alternatives. A resident who attended these meetings recalled the following details:

She (Simpson) give four choice to the Antiquities how to protect Gournah. First choice she say, the people they can stay. We can make a pipe to take the water away without affecting any tomb. ... We can keep the houses to bring water to the people and to take the water away from this. And we make it very nice. She have a plan, a system how it will be.

Second choice, she say move the people and keep the houses. Take all the rubbish in front of the houses, what's ugly in the front of the houses, and keep the house under restoration. And you can make it as a craft (house). The people they can work, (but) no alabaster factory, no nothing. Everybody can work in one's houses, ... every house have a workman. And the people (tourists) can visit the place and can make really (nice) image for the place.

The third thing. Keep a few houses and make all the workshops away from the places and keep all the alabaster factories and all this in one place, and keep

Gourna as a picture to take. And the artists they can restore it and take care of it. Like Kasr in the oasis. Gourna is more old than Kasr. And when they say to the people, it's 100 years, it's minimum (because) we are three hundred years old. And this is history.

And number four is very difficult. You must move everything. And you clean everything to keep it as a tomb, as a tomb area (Int 19).

Another Egyptologist, a long time resident of the West Bank who preferred preservation to removal, comments.

I personally believe there could have been a compromise. Let's put it this way. If UNESCO were involved there would have been a compromise. There would have been a way around saving half the village maybe, saving the houses for posterity, from a historical point of view, from an architectural and historical point of view. There would have been a way to integrate the families from Gourna into new Qurna and also old Gourna, employment wise (Int 17).

The general sentiment among residents was that alternatives were possible. "They could find another way to keep ... old Gourna as it is and not to harm the monuments" (Int 20). As indicated in Chapter 6, the authorities had agreed several times to retain a minimum number of houses in each Naja to preserve the history of Gourna, and possibly keep the craft industries alive. But as of February 2011, all the houses were demolished, including all the historic houses, shops, mosques, and museums, except a few houses in Gournet Mar'ii at the far south end of the mountain near the tourist ticket office (Map 4.2).

### **Villager Participation in the Relocation**

One of the goals of the relocation was to encourage local participation. Village leaders were invited to participate in administrative meetings in Luxor, special

representatives were appointed to assist village leaders in counting the families, and local villagers could attend public meeting in the West Bank Diwan. Outwardly, participatory activities were taking place although in reality the scope of participation was quite limited. There were only two objectives: “convincing” residents to relocate and obtaining limited input from leading members of the community regarding compensation and the final design of the units. As described in the *Gourna Relocation Information Packet*, convincing residents to move was a major goal. “There has been a lot of effort from all the departments and the civic institutions and agencies, and also from the leaders of thought to convince people in the process of migration” (Appendix F, p. 11). And, the involvement, or participation, of local leaders helped to “make it (the relocation) quicker in implementation” (Appendix F, p. 11). As a result, the involvement of average residents was minimal.

Once residents began moving into the new village, initial participatory activities quickly dissipated and were replaced by pressure and intimidation with residents having little to say. Yet, even after the initial move-in, there were still many unresolved problems that required and could have benefited from the participation and input of the villagers.

After the first wave of relocatees, the government encountered some resistance to relocation. The seriousness of this problem was overestimated by the government and they reacted by initiating tougher measures in dealing with anyone who did not readily agree to the compensation offered. The more resistant people were labeled “refusers,” perhaps not more than about 5 to 10 families. In interviewing some of these families, I found that the problem was almost always compensation, although a few had emotional reasons for not wanting to move such as the loss of a historical family compound, or the loss of a business (Int 29). Others knew there were no tombs below or

near the house and did not see a reason for moving. These families tended to have large compounds accommodating several families and many people, and usually a small home industry of some kind. But they were offered fewer units than needed to maintain their families and businesses. None of the “refusers” that I encountered had unreasonable demands but they seemed to become more obdurate after experiencing General M’s. hard nosed negotiating style.

The situation with the refusers is important because it was symbolic of the kind of tension and standoff that can arise when participants stop talking to each other. Rather than being a significant problem, they wanted nothing more than for someone to listen to them, to respect them, and to be fair (Int 29).

The three phases of the relocation (Chapter 6) also make it difficult to trace communication and participation patterns throughout the entire relocation. On the other hand, they provide an opportunity for noting contrasts in the way participants interacted, and for highlighting certain aspects of participation, such as the functions of mediation and negotiation.

**Elements of Participation.** The events and activities of the relocation of El Gourna demonstrated that participation is a complex process. Participation itself can be analyzed in two ways: by the events themselves, typically meetings between participants, and by the forms of communication (Forester, 1999; Glass, 1979; Kitzinger, 1994).

In the relocation of El Gourna, participation was occurring on three different levels: administrative and executive meetings in Luxor, public meetings in the West Bank Diwans, and informal gathering and settings in the villages. However, only two of these levels were officially recognized as public participation. Personal negotiations with the

West Bank Governor constituted a fourth form of “participation” with a very different dynamic, i.e., one-on-one confrontation between government and individual villagers with no public presence or involvement (Chapter 6).

A second way to analyze participation is in terms of formal and informal forms of communication. Formal participation was characterized by the presence of government or village leaders following a prescribed protocol, and was primarily intended to implement procedures or to announce decisions. Informal participation generally took place in the villages such as in the custom of village talk (Chapter 5), where meetings were spontaneous, unplanned and open to anyone. These meetings and gatherings were characterized by free discussion and informal expression, and were only infrequently attended by relocation officials.

The concepts of participatory event and communicative form overlap in that each participatory event also exhibited a specific form of communication. Taken together, these two concepts can describe a more complete process of participation than can be rendered by referring to events or communicative forms alone, and they also reflect critical differences between participants.

Using these concepts, one can assess the dimensions of participation at El Gouna by categorizing the different types of meetings, or participatory events, and the forms of communication that occurred at these meetings since meetings of various types were the primary forms of interaction. While these meetings represented a significant step in public participation, at the same time they were often limited because they did not involve or represent a very large cross section of residents from the village level. These meeting “events” can be group into four different types with different formats and objectives.

**Administrative and Executive Meetings.** The first type or level were executive and administrative meetings held in Luxor. They were mostly administrative in nature and discussed technical details. Input was provided by various specialists such as economists and designers, and by higher level representatives of the village. “At the meetings (in Luxor) the participants were asking about what each one did ... and who agrees or disagrees with this, and why” (Int 5). There was little room for new ideas or feedback (Int 1). The village representatives at these meetings were appointed by the governor or were chosen from a group of elected representatives and prominent citizens. A few meetings of this type were also held in the Diwan of Sheik El Tayib to discuss particular problems such as compensation.

**Public Meetings.** Public meetings that regular villagers could attend were the second type or second level of meetings and were held in the Diwan of the El Tayib family in Gourna, and later in Suul. At the beginning of the relocation, a few government officials and consultants attended these meetings although the purpose of these meetings was not to gather information, opinions and preferences of villagers, but to encourage residents to move, to inform the villagers of what would be happening in the relocation, to set rules for compensation, and to approve a final design for the housing units.

In these meetings, there was little sharing of information or collaboration between average residents, village leaders, and the relocation officials. The conversation was mostly between the “bigger” people (Int 5). In general, average villagers did not attend either because they were not invited, or they let the appointed representatives speak for them. As one village leader who attended these meetings recalled, “The most important



subject was to get out of the old Gournas as fast as possible and that the subcontractors will finish their houses as soon as possible” (Int 13). So there was only limited participation through these forums.

It should also be noted that public meetings in the main diwans are considerably different than public meetings in a western democratic context. Although the meetings are open and anyone can attend, there is a formality and etiquette to be followed. In the diwans, for example, the presiding Sheiks sit in places of honor with the villagers or anyone who has a matter to present seated in the rows of mastaba benches. If someone wished to speak, he or she will be escorted to a seat closer to the Sheik and will present their case in a low voice with great respect for the Sheik. If a group of dignitaries or important people arrive to speak with the Sheik, such as relocation authorities, the public meeting will be adjourned and the village leaders and sheiks will go aside to another private room out of respect for the visitors.

On one hand, the meetings in the diwan are a good example of the public and open nature of village life in El Gournas. On the other hand, while opposing opinions can be presented, it is not likely that an organized opposition of noisy objectors will be tolerated. While they are truly public meetings, they are also constrained by tradition and protocol.

After families began moving to the new village, public meetings for the purpose of discussing the relocation rarely occurred. According to local custom, meetings in the diwan continued to take place weekly and villagers could go and present any kind of problem. But if there was a problem relating to relocation, they would be referred to General M. If the problem persisted or if they were dissatisfied with the answer from the General, Sheik El Tayib and Dr. Ahmed would get involved, except for cases involving

## Gournet Mar'ii.

Overall, public meetings had only a limited impact on participatory interaction because most decisions had already been made in the executive and administrative meetings (Int 1), and they were very difficult to change. In general, there was little room for new discussion, for presentation of alternatives, or for development of new ideas in these meetings. Aside from the initial public meetings, most “participatory” interactions took place in smaller meetings between government officials, various consultants, village leaders, and residents, or as one-on-one meetings or negotiations between government officials, village leaders, and residents.

The public meetings that did occur addressed only four topics: convincing the residents to move, the design of the units, the rules for compensation, and permission to build individual mosques in each section of the village. This left a list of unresolved issues that could have been addressed by the meetings in the Diwan such as:

- adjustments to compensation rules
- alterations in the design standards for the new village
- reassignment of housing units so that related families could be closer together
- more favorable village rules and design codes allowing for new businesses, shops, and stores
- more space for both families and home industries
- methods for addressing grievances and unfair treatment
- adjustments, corrections, or replacement of defective units (e.g., trading houses, supplying replacement houses, or correcting defects)
- monitoring of the relocation process and assistance with problems occurring after move-in.

**Negotiations.** Once the first group of residents moved to new Qurna, the most common form of “formal participation” was the small one-on-one meetings and negotiations between government officials and the residents usually intended to work out compensation problems. These negotiations were often a substitute for public participation and frequently did not result in favorable terms for the residents.

**Village Gatherings.** A more important venue for public discussion and the exchange of ideas was the communication that was taking place in the local diwans and gathering places where villagers could speak their mind, e.g., in the process of the village talk. And there were practical reason for this. Public meetings at the West Bank Diwan were more suited for presenting information and for obtaining general agreement on specific proposals than for exchanging or developing ideas (Brody, et al., 2003). There were just too many voices to be heard.

These local meetings and gatherings were the most dynamic form of informal communication and participation during the relocation. They were taking place in the local diwans and mosques, and elsewhere in the villages, and sometimes involved appointed representatives. But, they were not viewed as official meetings or as a official forms of public participation and thus the overall process of participation did not tap into this level of communication.

The concept of village talk came to light during interviews as respondents described how they received information about the relocation and how they communicated with one another. Realizing that village talk was a significant form of communication led to questions of how and where participation was occurring, where and why it was not taking place, and what were its various forms. As described in Chapter 5,

Village talk is the main form of communication in the villages. It occurs whenever residents get together to share news, to talk to each other, or just to spend time together. Village talk goes on in the streets, at the market, in the cafes and restaurants, at the mosque, in the diwans, and in front of the houses with residents, relatives, neighbors and guests seated on the mastaba benches. These places are the principal venues of social interaction in the village and are the core of village life.

This informal communication was the basic form of “participation” for the villagers. Officials regarded communication on the village level primarily as a way for villagers to find out what was going on, but not as a way to gather information and ideas from the villagers. Hence, there was no communication from this level upward to public meetings in the West Bank or to executive meetings in Luxor. Information was only going downhill. However, village talk and village communication could have been utilized as primary sources of innovative ideas, solutions, and energy needed to achieve the goals of resettlement and recovery.

**Discourse.** A significant weakness in the participation process was that public discourse during the relocation was primarily a one-way process. Two way discourse tailored to fit the speech patterns and capabilities of local residents has been emphasized by communicative and collaborative approaches to planning as critical for obtaining the input of local residents and the local knowledge that they possess (Chapter 2; Innes & Booher, 2010; Forester, 1989, 1999). It involves an exchange between two parties in which information and ideas flow back and forth and not only in one direction (Forester, 1999; Friedmann, 1994). As applied to Gourna, it required that representatives from the government “side,” as the villagers liked to call it, would not only carry information to the village but would also go out into the village themselves, to the third

level of communication, and sit and listen to residents and gather information and ideas from them. Relocation officials and representatives would thereby *learn from* residents about their lives, about the village, and about their thoughts and suggestion regarding the project.

It also implies that villagers would engage government representatives by listening to and understanding issues from the government's point of view (Fahim, 1983). In Gournia, the most appropriate level for this type of communication was at the third level, in the villages at the various venues and gathering places of informal communication where villagers felt most comfortable. This aspect of communication in which information and ideas that originated in the village and moved up the lines of communication to the relocation authorities and decision makers was the missing "side" of the discourse (See Figure 10.4).

**Representation, Mediation and Advocacy.** In addition to public events and meetings, representation and mediation played important roles in the relocation of El Gournia. (See the discussion of special roles in Chapter 10.)

**Representation.** Representation is a practical solution that gives voice to many people who otherwise would not be heard, especially in a project as large as a relocation. Although their roles and activities were limited, the appointed representatives informed resident about relocation activities and gathered information needed for distributing units. The absence of representation and mediation in the case of Gournet Mar'ii left residents in this village with little voice or ability to withstand the determined efforts of the government to move them from their homes in Bairat, to consider alternate solutions, or to help them obtain satisfactory compensation.

Once the residents relocated, the role of the special representative ended. This

was a critical loss since they were no longer available to act as intermediaries between the government and residents. Had they continued, they might have also served as an appeals board or helped in other ways to solve problems that appeared after residents moved to the new village. Since the relocation took place over a long period of time, there was ample opportunity to address many post-occupancy problems, such as finding replacement homes for families with defective houses.

Other forms of official representation, such as provided by elected representatives or persons appointed to the Luxor City Council or to the administrative meetings held in Luxor, did not truly represent the average villagers from Gournah chiefly because these representatives were members of a different social class. As a result, official representation frequently did not have much of an effect beyond upper levels of the village society or families with connections. In reality, the function of representation was limited and did not achieve its potential for involving average residents.

As pointed out by Innes and Booher, the involvement of local citizens can be difficult, but it can be enhanced through better local representation (Innes & Booher, 2010). However, since local citizens are frequently not organized in ways that facilitate participation, planners may need to assist the local community in acquiring the capacities for effective representation and participation.

Krumholz describes several methods used with success while he was head of planning in Cleveland. These included frequent informal contact between planning staff and local citizens and groups, identifying capable spokespersons, and helping citizens organize around relevant issues (Krumholz & Forester, 1990).

***Mediation and Advocacy.*** Mediation, as exercised by the El Tayib brothers, was the most important participatory role in the relocation although there was

some dissolution of this role in phases two and three. And, Dr. Farag himself also functioned as a mediator between various national ministries and local government thus performing a key function by keeping many decisions in a local context.

Although advocacy was not a distinct role in the relocation, in practice, the roles of mediation and advocacy were combined in the activities of Dr. Ahmed and Sheik Mohammed. The El Tayibs were effective because that had sufficient power and prestige to block the relocation, as their grandfather had done in the 1940s (Chapter 6), if they thought that the relocation was not in the best interest of the villagers.

Dr. Ahmed's services also extended beyond his role in administrative and public meetings. For example, even though he had obligations and duties in Cairo, during the relocation, Dr. Ahmed visited Gournia about once a month. Since some residents were not able to read or write, and many were unable to complete the paperwork required to acquire ownership, Dr. Ahmed would help them in obtaining legal title to their new homes. "While I was the Grand Mufti of Egypt, I was working and doing by my hands and writing the files and requests for each family when I was in Luxor."

Given the political and social context of Gournia, the role of the mediator was fundamental to the relocation since there was no agency or other persons who could defend and protect the rights of the residents against the will and power of the government. Without a mediator, their only option would be to resist the relocation by force, as they had done in the past. But at this time, when there was considerable support for the general aims of the relocation, protecting the rights of the residents and representing their needs were crucial functions. By contrast, there was no mediator for the village of GM, no one to resist the government or question its activities. The Mayor of Bairat did not function as a mediator or advocate for the residents of GM, something

they badly needed, but was in effect an extension of the West Bank Governor, leaving the residents without voice or protection (Int 16).

Thus, representation, mediation, and advocacy proved to be critical elements in villager participation, but with different level of effectiveness. These role were important in protecting the rights of villagers, and in achieving a more satisfactory outcome, or, as with GM, a distinct disappointment if those so entrusted with these duties did not truly represent the people.

\* \* \* \* \*

The assessments of relocation and participation discussed in this chapter suggest there were many situations that could have benefited from more inclusive involvement of the residents. For example, early involvement of residents in the planning stages would have generated more complete knowledge of the social and economic conditions of the village. Based on this information, more satisfactory solutions for compensation could have been worked out, and perhaps more emphasis would have been placed on retaining unique sources of income until newer source could be developed.

The analysis of participation revealed several important features such as the need for an expanded framework for participation that includes more input from average citizens, the critical importance of special roles in the participation process, and the need for informal structures and methods of communication.

The real-life situations and events described in earlier chapters are also helpful for clarifying the meaning of ideas and concepts reached later in the report, and provided a basis for more generalized concepts, conclusions and policy recommendation presented in Chapter 10.



## CHAPTER 10

### CONCLUSIONS AND LESSONS LEARNED

“How do you conclude a qualitative study?” Wolcott replies, “You don’t” (Wolcott, 2001, p. 126). Wolcott refers to conclusions as “what has been learned” (Wolcott, 2001, p. 126). Alasuutari (1995) prefers to call conclusions “the results.” Although, “the focus of attention is on *explaining* the phenomena, on making it intelligible” (Alasuutari, 1995, p. 147), what Geertz (1973) calls, “thick description,” the end goal of qualitative study is to produce interpretive explanations of a particular phenomena at a certain place in time, i.e., insights and interpretations that clarify and explain.

This chapter generally follows these admonitions. It has three sections: interpretive conclusions and insights, a discussion of research themes and policy recommendations, and ideas for further research. These concepts overlap considerably and should not be taken as separate issues, or as conclusive or final. They represent an attempt to understand and explain how participation functioned in the relocation of EI Gourna, to present insights gained from the study, and possibilities for improving relocation outcomes (Creswell, 2007; Punch, 2005).

Since, the role of participation cannot be easily separated from the relocation itself or from the social and communicative patterns that occurred in the local context, the “conclusions” presented in this chapter must be understood, and read, in light of the narratives presented in Chapters 4 to 8 and the assessments provided in Chapter 9.

Explanations and interpretations have also been provided at many points in the narrative as an aid in understanding the flow of events, and when helpful or warranted. For many issues, such as the loss of occupations, compensation problems, the need for

more space for family expansion, and restrictive measures imposed on the residents, the interpretation is already inherent in the reporting itself and suggestions for changes and improvements are readily apparent. The conclusions presented here represent more fundamental insights and generalized concepts that draw together larger themes and have wider implications. They deal with four basic issues: the role of participation, special participatory roles, resettlement planning, and a re-definition of the problem of relocation itself.

Following the “conclusions,” policy recommendations of a practical nature are proposed as potential applications that flow from the overall study and the interpretive concepts. They are included with a general discussion of research themes to avoid repetition and since the two are closely related.

Concepts from the literature discussed in Chapter 2 are referred to throughout the chapter, both in the conclusions and recommendations, as they relate to the issues being discussed at that point (Wolcott, 2001).

The literature on relocation places strong emphasis on the involvement of local residents as a critical component of relocation (Chapter 2). This has been a guiding principle for this study. There are many other important issues that are intimately tied to relocation and could have been considered, for example, an evaluation of relocation risks as outlined by Cernea (1997), or of Scudder’s (2005) stages of adjustment, the role of local institutions (Scoones, 1998), plans for future economic redevelopment and social reintegration, the development of local governance, the place of cultural symbols in resettlement, etc. These issues are interdependent and have a considerable influence on each other. However, to consider them in detail would be outside the primary focus of the study.

From the planning literature, three main issues, as outlined in Chapter 2, are emphasized here in relation to the conclusions: the role of the planner, the difficulty of involving marginalized groups, and the need for alternative methods and procedures in public participation.

### **Conclusions from the Study**

**Role of Participation.** Although the intention was there, citizen participation had only a limited effect on the relocation for several reasons. To begin, it did not involve residents at the village level because the procedures and the definition of participation itself were limited. Participation was primarily concerned with formal meetings involving government officials, consultants, and village representatives from upper levels of village society. It did not recognize or take advantage of the resources, ideas, and solutions that were available from residents at the village level (See discussions regarding the elements of participation in Chapter 9 and below) .

A second reason for the limited effect was that the scope of participation was too narrow being mostly concerned with ad-hoc arrangements, and after-the-fact and unanticipated problems. And third, the participation process did not involve two way discourse, i.e., a flow of information and ideas in two directions. Relocation officials and representatives went “down” to the village to meet with residents only a few times. As a result, the flow of information and ideas from the village “upward” to administrative and public meetings was only minimal. Thus, relocation officials did not avail themselves of one of the most important and self sustaining dynamics in relocation, i.e., meaningful involvement of the villagers.

After a promising start, the government seemed to loose interest in participation,

perhaps, as a result of insufficient funding and as more urgent problems in Luxor drew attention away from Gournā. Following the first phase of the relocation, participation faltered and was replaced by an authoritarian approach and small one-on-one meetings between relocation officials and individual residents or families. This way of dealing with residents worked to their disadvantage because decisions were made and policies applied selectively where they could not be observed by other residents, or reviewed by their representatives and mediators.

Could a more inclusive form of participation have resulted in better outcomes? This might have been possible if the government was also willing to consider alternative solutions proposed by villagers. For example, if the government was willing to work out some form of resettlement for GM in the Bairat area, some residents would have still have moved to new Qurna, but many would have preferred to remain in Bairat. Or, if the government was more willing to help residents who depended on visiting tourists for their income by providing alternative ways for them to continue their trades in the old Gournā area, such as retaining some of the old homes as shops and craft centers. There were also other opportunities for cooperation. For example, if the residents would have been allowed to trade or exchange houses so that relatives and family members could move closer together, if they were allowed to build badly needed rooms or expand to the second floor, and if families could receive new homes to replace the ones with structural damage.

If the government was willing to consider these kinds of alternatives, then perhaps participation could have been a significant help in working through problems especially those that arose after the relocation began. Thus, it is not that clear that participation alone would have changed outcomes significantly without changes in

governmental policy.

As the research developed, participation as a process of involvement and communication turned out to be much more complex than anticipated (See “Definitions” below.) It involved not only participation in administrative and public meetings, but, more significantly, informal forms of communication especially at the village level.

Communication and involvement *among residents* was extremely active in the villages and an essential form of informal participatory communication, but it was overlooked.

**Special Roles.** In addition to the need for various types of relocation plans, resources, and management activities, the study identified a cluster of specialized roles that are critical for effective participation, e.g., the role of planners, mediators, advocates, and village representatives. A description of these roles as they functioned in the relocation of Gourná has been presented in Chapter 9.

The role of the planner, as distilled from the planning literature reviewed in Chapter 2, is perhaps the most important key to the successful implementation of a participation program (Brody, et al., 2003). Planners, especially “deliberative” planners as described by Forester (1989, 1999), can provide an invaluable service in the formation of a participatory framework and effective procedures, and act as links and interpreters between relocation officials and the local community, i.e., acting as “communicators and facilitators” (Faludi, 1973; Forester, 1994b).

During a relocation, the on-going presence of planners within the community can also significantly improve local involvement and project outcomes as was demonstrated at Arenal, Costa Rica, and Aquamilpa, Mexico (Chapter 2). However, the role of the planner, as a communicative or deliberative entity, was not present in El Gourná. This missing “role” handicapped the participation program.

In El Gourn, the combined role of mediator, advocate, and village leader as exercised by Sheik Mohammed El Tayib and Dr. Ahmed El Tayib, were the most important participatory roles and in reality symbolized participation in the relocation. Their activities also involved aspects of communication and facilitation thus putting into practice elements of the planner's role as well. These roles had a significantly greater effect on the relocation than other forms of participation primarily because of the prestige of the two brothers, their active involvement, and the fact that few average citizens were involved in participatory activities.

The special representatives who were appointed by village leaders to help with counting families and awarding compensation also played an important role. However, as soon as the families moved into the new village, this role was ended. These appointed representatives could have been retained well into the readjustment and recovery phase where they could continue to function as village representatives, or a grievance board, and help solve disputes and on-going problems that arose after move-in.

These roles overlap considerably. While they may not exist as distinct or specialized roles in the context of international relocations, it is possible that their functions could, at least in part, be carried out by properly trained staff, qualified local representatives, or by outside third parties participating in the project such as NGOs. These functions are indispensable for achieving better outcomes primarily because they assign responsibilities for promoting and encouraging cooperation between relocation entities. In the case of El Gourn, without the activities of Dr. Ahmed El Tayib and his brother Sheik Mohammed El Tayib as mediators and advocates, it is doubtful that many of the positive results of the relocation would have been achieved.

**Relocation Planning.** Although several types of redevelopment plans and some social and economic studies were prepared for Luxor (Chapter 6), no relocation or resettlement plans were developed specifically for El Gourna. This was a critical omission and led to many unsolved problems such as inadequate preparation, insufficient knowledge of local conditions, and many ad-hoc arrangements and unforeseen problems.

Two or three architectural plans were produced for El Gourna, but these did not address relocation risks and redevelopment strategies as outlined by Cernea in his IRR model (1997; Cernea & McDowell, 2000), nor the stages of adjustment and adaptation as described by Scudder (1968, 2003, 2005). At the time, only the physical design and some investment ideas for the new village were considered. And although a social assessment was included in the ESC plan of 1995 (Van der Spek, 2000), there did not seem to be any knowledge of it on the part of relocation officials or residents. According to Van der Spek, the ESC study considered only generalized features of the village and did not document its unique local character (Van der Spek, 2000, 2003).

Relocation literature consistently calls for better planning and a more comprehensive policy framework for relocation *and* resettlement including prior ethnographic and socioeconomic studies, a framework for participation based on these studies, and separate relocation and resettlement plans (Cernea, 1997; Cernea & Guggenheim, 1993; Cernea & McDowell, 2000; Dwivedi, 2002; Ganapati & Ganapati, 2009; Scudder, 2005). As noted by Cernea, “Poor preparation of resettlement plans is the single most important reason for failure of resettlement components in development projects” (Cernea & Guggenheim, 1993, p. 351).

Guidelines and manuals for resettlement plans were readily available from,

among others, the World Bank (2002), the International Development Bank (2002 ), and the Asian Development Bank (ADB, 1998), but were not utilized. The ADB Plan (1998; Appendix D) is especially useful. It lists the basic elements of a resettlement plan and the appropriate steps to needed address each issue. A few items listed in the ADB model such as compensation and public participation were considered during the relocation, but no documented plan was developed. And, fundamental background information needed for planning relocation and resettlement, was not gathered in any systematic way.

In addition to these models, relocation theory and case studies can be used as a basis for planning. For example, Cernea's model of relocation risks and redevelopment (Cernea, 1997; Cernea & McDowel, 2000), and Scudder's (2005) stages of adjustment, can be used for preparing redevelopment strategies and for making long-term provisions for readjustment. The participation of local residents is critical during these planning stages so that proposed plans "build on refugees' own initiative-driven strategies for survival and reconstruction of livelihoods instead of imposing preplanned packages" (Sorenson in Cernea & McDowell, 2000, p. 201).

**Definitions.** The fourth conclusion requires careful distinctions and clarifications, and deals with concepts of relocation and participation. An analysis of the concept of relocation led to the conclusion that an inadequate definition of relocation resulted in a minimal view and ineffective strategy of participation.

Guides for relocation planning, such as those published by the World Bank and others (2001, 2002; IDB, 2002; ADB, 1998, 2009), describe two primary activities within a relocation project: the relocation itself, and resettlement. Although these guides call for



a separate resettlement plan, they view “relocation” as a single government undertaking, or project, with resettlement and participation as a sub-components of that program.

The concept presented here is that relocation is more than this. In real terms, it involves two *separate but interdependent* activities, relocation *and* resettlement, with a common goal, the redevelopment and recovery of the local community. These activities are undertaken primarily by the two principal actor groups: the relocation authority, usually a national government, and the local community. If relocation is understood as a single government project with a resettlement component, and a participation program as an adjunct, it falls short of describing the true nature of the combined undertakings and results in difficulties for both actor groups.

The definition of relocation needs be restated in terms of the two primary activities and the two principal actors involved, and redefined as a complex two part enterprise with a common goal. Thus, relocation more closely resembles a joint venture, or public-private partnership, between government and a local community than a single government activity. And, it requires a fundamental change in the concept of participation from one of consultation, or finding ways for local citizens to be involved, to one of collaboration and cooperation between joint partners.

This view of relocation builds on Fahim’s concept of “two systems,” or two cultures, involved in relocation, the “system” of governmental bureaucracy and the local culture. Fahim (1966) proposed in his dissertation on the Nubian relocation that these two distinct “systems” had to cooperate in relocation, but he still saw relocation as a single government activity and did not develop his idea of systems into a theory. In fact, this idea did not reappear in a later book in which he revisited the Nubian relocation twenty years later (1983). Following Fahim’s suggestion, the next logical step needed to

bring the definition of relocation in line with actual conditions is to extend his concept and reclassify these two systems, or two cultures, as two fundamental activities undertaken by two partners who are involved in a joint endeavor.

This dual concept of relocation has also been intuitively recognized by the two main theories of relocation, one focussing on the responsibilities of government and relocation authorities (Cernea,1997), and the other on the adaptations and adjustments that are part of a satisfactory recovery (Scudder, 2005). (It is interesting, as noted above, that Scudder (2005) has recently advocated that both theories be used in conjunction.)

This is a fundamental inference from this study and affects all of the conclusions and recommendations presented. It implies that if relocation is a dual undertaking, such as a joint venture, then the strategy and procedures for participation should be fitted to this model (Glass, 1979), and that the community has a larger role to play than is generally considered in relocation planning.

Further, it is generally recognized in relocation literature that the goal of recovery, which is the principal goal of the local community, requires the direct, continuous and energetic involvement of the dislocated residents, not just consultation, representation at public meetings, or assistance from the government. It involves the recovery of social, economic and cultural life at a new location. It is the people themselves, with the assistance of government agencies and resources, and possibly outside agencies such as NGOs, professional and academic institutions, consultants, and local leaders, who will rebuild their community structures and economic life in a form they prefer.

These two primary activities also involve a significant number of important groups that must be accounted for and that influence the two primary actors in different ways. There are at least eight other important actor groups that influence a relocation,

specifically: government departments and ministries (i.e., departments not directly responsible for the relocation), consultants and specialists, project managers, funding agencies, downstream benefactors, investment interests, host communities, and in many cases a large migrant work force.

There can be a significant difference between the objectives and methods of the government, and hence the concepts used to plan a relocation, the goals of the various actor groups on the perimeter of the relocation, and those of the villagers. Government typically sees the project as a relocation, but for the villagers it is a type of “forced migration” and re-settlement (Colson, 2003; Forced Migration Review, 2010; Shami, 1993). Terms such as migration, resettlement and recovery describe important elements of the process and need to be recognized as belonging to a group of terms which are all needed to describe the entire reality of relocation.

There are also different risks for each principal participant. At the end of the day, government officials and planners do not face the same consequences as residents. They still have the same jobs, go home to the same houses at night, and enjoy the same social connections. The villagers, however, must rebuild almost all aspects of their community since, *“All involuntary resettlement destroys a previous way of life”* (Cernea & Guggenheim, 1993, p. 351).

These concepts are represented in the graphics below. Figure 10.1, shows some of the basic elements of relocation. The task for planners is to arrange these in a realistic and logical order, and to construct a meaningful plan for relocation and resettlement. Figure 10.2 illustrates a typical plan for relocation as conceived by relocation officials. Relocation is shown as a single government activity with the “relocation” of residents as the primary goal and villagers as participants in the government program. In actuality,

relocation is much more complicated than this.




Figure 10.1. Elements of Relocation.




Figure 10.2. Basic Plan for Relocation

Figure 10.3 shows various actors, relationships and descriptive terms, as identified from the relocation of El Gourna, and the true dual nature of relocation. Although of critical importance, the term “resettle” is a grey area in this diagram because it was not well defined at El Gourna, and no resettlement plan was produced. In Gourna this role fell to the military by fate. An overall description of relocation, and the resulting relocation plan, should incorporate these terms and their related objectives in a complete plan. Given this redefinition of relocation, the project planner must then ask, what kind of participation strategy will fit this case?




Figure 10.3. Components of Relocation at El Gourna

There are three significant implications stemming from a redefinition of relocation. First, a new definition requires a broader concept of participation, one that includes participation in all aspects and activities of the relocation, i.e., relocation, resettlement, redevelopment, and recovery. And, it requires a process that includes all residents either directly or through some form of representation.

A broader view of participation also requires that prior to relocation, planners identify ways in which residents can be involved in both the planning and the “doing” of relocation. Case studies are particularly helpful at this point because they provide a useful source of ideas and examples for involvement in a wide range of relocation activities (Cernea & Guggenheim, 1993). Chapter 2 provides lists of possible activities.

The second implication is that alternative procedures and methods of participation will be required if local populations, who may be living on the margins of the larger society, are to be effectively involved. The difficulties of involving local populations, especially those who may not be part of the general society, have been discussed in Chapter 2 (Innes & Booher, 2010; Krumholz & Forester, 1990; Peattie, 1968). Innes and Booher (2010) have identified some of the problems involved such as differences in speech and language, in communicative ability, in local organization and representation, and financial, educational and technical resources.

Examples of techniques that have been used successfully to involve marginal populations include: assisting local populations in organizing themselves into effective groups, locating capable spokespersons, maintaining personal contact with residents, and organizing groups around issues rather than by social cohorts. In other examples, local and neighborhood venues were used rather than public or stakeholder meetings; governmental authorities made commitments to accept collaboratively produced

solutions; and ethnographic methods were employed to gather information and form relationships (Innes & Booher, 2004, 2010; Krumholz & Forester, 1990; Peattie, 1968). At a minimum, alternative methods, and an individually crafted design for participation that utilize the capabilities and existing institutional structures of the local community, is required.

Figure 10.4 illustrates a more fully developed concept of participation showing formal and informal forms of communication as two tracks in the process and various participatory relationships that were identified from the study of El Gourna. To the left are the theoretical and practical sources contributing to the concept of participation, and to the right, the forms of participation that occurred at Gourna. Administrative and executive meetings along with public meetings represent typical “official” forms of participation favored by government officials. The diagram shows that in Gourna there existed a second form of participation, an informal path of village communication favored by the villagers that was not connected to the overall process of participation, or to a common goal. This informal element needs to be added to the equation.

The distinction between formal and informal forms is not always rigid. Informal forms of communication may also occur in public meetings or in formal settings. However, they are more likely in activities and forms of communication at the local level such as “village talk.” These informal encounters are essential components of participation. In Gourna, negotiations were a grey area. They can be a form of official participation, or a way of subverting participation.




Figure 10.4. Elements of Participation at El Gourna

The third implication is that effective participation and collaboration between the relocation authorities and the local community will require the use of specialized roles, as discussed above, such as “communicative” planners, representatives, mediators, and advocates. These roles are needed to address the complex nature of participation and to assist local populations that may lack the organization, critical knowledge, and capacities needed for effective participation (Forester, 1999; Innes and Booher, 2010; Krumholz & Forester, 1990).



## **Discussion and Recommendations**

**Fit.** Glass (1979) has argued that participation methods should correspond to the objectives and goals of the planning program in which citizens are asked to participate. “Many participatory programs,” he says, “(meet) with failure because little or no attention (is) given to structure or desired results” (Glass, 1979, p. 180). Expanding on this principle, an important implication of this study is that participatory techniques and procedures must fit not only the goals of the planning process, but the specific conditions of the project itself, and the unique characteristics and communicative structures of local communities. Thus, a principal recommendation is that the cultural, social, political and communicative structures of local communities be carefully studied and utilized as a basis for both relocation planning and for designing an effective participatory framework as well.

This requires the use of special investigative techniques such as ethnographic inquiry and participant observation, and alternative strategies of participation and inclusion that use creative and informal methods and procedures, ones designed to fit the unique characteristics of each case. Participatory methods must be expanded beyond the typical techniques used in formal meetings to include informal procedures and local settings, from being limited to official and formal contacts, to informal procedures that develop and promote local partnership and collaboration.

**Recovery Plan.** Since no resettlement plan was produced, a critical recommendation is that a comprehensive Recovery Plan for El Gournia be prepared. A recovery plan is essential in order to address problems encountered during the relocation and the subsequent resettlement. This plan should address the following elements:

- economic issues of lost occupations and incomes, and the need for new small businesses,
- adjustments in compensation packages,
- housing issues, such as replacement homes for those with structural cracking, insufficient space for family expansion, and the immediate need for additional living space in the units,
- changes in village design rules permitting new shops along main streets and other villager sponsored initiatives,
- social reintegration, i.e., realignment of family areas, perhaps exchanging and trading units to allow families to be closer together,
- rebuilding of community purpose and vision.

**Institutional Capacity and Relocation Management.** The final recommendation addresses the broad topic of resources and capacities required for relocation, a topic that can be considered here in outline form only since it lies somewhat outside the main concerns of this study.

Relocation requires significant resources including funding, staff, expertise, project management and local organization. It strains the capacities and resources of government agencies entrusted with relocation and local communities subject to removal. As Scudder (2005) and others have noted (e.g., Abt Associates, 2000; Yousry, 2004), the lack of institutional capacity is one of the main problems in relocation.

In reality, it is only logical to assume that both government and community will by themselves lack specific capacities needed to accomplish important goals, especially those that are critical to the other party. However, as joint partners, each can contribute specialized resources and abilities needed for the project as a whole. Incapacity tends to

be inherent in relocation and resettlement because of the nature and complexity of the problems involved, and institutional in that the both government and community are limited in their abilities to fund, plan, and implement relocation and recovery. In Gourna, a limited institutional capacity was exacerbated by the fact that local residents were viewed only as “recipients” of help not as participants or partners (Fahim, 1983), and in the practical sphere, by a lack of financial and human resources.

Looking at relocation from a broad perspective, government alone cannot solve all the problems that arise in a relocation, especially those that involve the rebuilding of a community, i.e., they cannot solve problems from the outside. But, they can contribute to a better resolution. Likewise, it is obvious that the community itself has little or no capacity to accomplish sophisticated tasks such as the construction of a new village or the planning of a new economy, but again they can make significant contributions to a successful and suitable accomplishment of those tasks. Thus, the lack of capacity is a problem for both partners in relocation and is inherent in the project especially when conceived as a single government venture. It is critical that government and community realize and acknowledge these limitations.

One mitigating solution that has been emphasized throughout this study is to involve residents much more deeply in every phase of planning, relocation, resettlement, and recovery. Other strategies involve an early assessment of goals and resources, and the use of an independent management entity. An early assessment can help quantify the resources that will be needed, especially financial resources, but even with such an assessment, projects may still exceed available resources (Abt, 2000a; Yousry, 2004; Van der Spek, 2000). The Abt (2000a) redevelopment plan for Luxor, and Yousry’s

(2004) evaluation of redevelopment planning, both noted that the proposed projects exceeded local and even national capacities in terms of financing and project management.

While they did not provide a direct solution for a lack of funding other than involving outside sources (Chapter 6; Van der Spek, 2000), they did suggest a third party management entity for these projects, i.e., a Project Management Unit (PMU). We agree with this assessment and suggest that a third party, independent management entity such as a PMU be used for relocation projects.

As an adjunct to the PMU, a written agreement between the parties, such as a *Relocation and Resettlement Contract*, with binding legal authority, would clarify and simplify relationships, and give the local community important leverage in the relocation. This agreement can be part of a resettlement plan and similar to agreements used in joint ventures and public private partnerships.

As a complex undertaking, relocation requires a basic set of operational rules, agreements, and guidelines. A Relocation Contract would, among other things, define roles, duties, expectations, schedules, compensation procedures, funding sources, penalties for non-performance, etc., and would spells out rights, responsibilities, activities, and relationships. It could be effective at national and local levels, and provide mechanisms for enforcing and implementing the agreement.

As a tool for organizing complex projects, contracts have a long and practical history, and most agencies involved in relocation are already familiar with them. In short, a relocation contract, backed up by a legal framework at the national level, could be used to clarify the many complex aspects of relocation, as well as provide penalties and remedies for non-performance.

## Further Research

**Formal and Informal Participation.** Building on the ideas presented by Glass (1979) and others (Brody, et al., 2003; Peattie, 1987), and the results of this study, further studies focusing on the two primary forms of communication involved in participation, i.e., formal and informal participation, as distinct forms of participation, would be helpful.

Statutory participation has generally focused on public meetings as the principal forum for involving citizens (Brody, et al., 2003). These meetings have distinct purposes such as informing the public, gaining public support, and reaching decisions. But they are not well suited for informal and sometimes hostile forms of public discussion (Ford, 2010; Innes & Booher, 2010). In practice, smaller collaborative procedures have been increasingly used to handle difficult and more specialized problems (Innes & Booher, 2010; Krumholz & Forester, 1990). But, the question remains if these constitute distinct forms of participation that should be further studied and developed on their own.

Informal procedures are often seen as adjuncts to formal meetings. Yet, in many cases, they are better suited for acquiring information and local knowledge *prior* to formal decision making activities (Innes & Booher, 2010), for reaching out to neighborhood communities and encouraging community input, for covering a wider range of topics than formal procedures, and for arriving at consensus on controversial issues (Krumholz & Forester, 1990; Peattie, 1987).

In Gourna, village talk was an example of informal “participation” with its own characteristics that had great participatory potential but it was not utilized because it did not fit within the definition of formal participation. And, its informal character also suggested that residents were perhaps not able to participate in formal ways. While both

forms of participation are essential, they are somewhat different, and it is important to better understand how these two forms of participation can be utilized and coordinated. Thus, additional research regarding informal participation as a distinct form of citizen participation in itself would be helpful.

**Local Institutions.** Scoones (Scoones, 1998; Solesbury, 2003) has shown the importance of local institutions in achieving sustainable livelihoods. Although, his study was primarily concerned with social and economic institutions, it has application to other local institutions as well, such as communicative structures. McDowell (2002), for example, has suggested that Scoones' insights could be extended to relocation and involve local institutions in pursuing redevelopment and recovery. Thus, the idea of local institutions can encompass a wide range of social, economic, communicative and participatory structures.

Over generations, local communities have developed indigenous institutions of various kinds for solving problems and insuring continuation of the community. These can be easily overlooked by experts who have different backgrounds and training, or they can be used to support and enhance community redevelopment (Faludi, 1973). Rather than expecting residents to abandon their local customs and institutions and adopt unfamiliar methods, or ones that they do not have the capacity to use, these institutions need to be carefully studied for their problem solving potential. In Gournia, there were several local institutions, for example, the communicative structure of village talk, the role of traditional leaders, local economic structures, and the function of family organization in providing economic and social support, that were not utilized in the relocation process.

**Role of Planners.** Planners can play important roles in relocation, yet it does not appear that urban planning as a discipline is very active in relocation. While concepts discussed in planning literature have application to relocation, more field experience is needed to determine how planners can be more effectively involved in relocation, and in the planning and redevelopment of communities and temporary living situations for the poor and disadvantaged, especially on a global stage. Two basic questions that still need answers based on field experience are: What expertise can “deliberative” planners bring to the problems of relocation? And, can the role of planner be internationalized to address global issues?

**Monuments and Cultural Continuity.** There are a number of difficult problems in relocation that are related to the loss of place, such as the loss of cultural and social continuity, emotional stresses due to the loss of homelands and occupations, and the challenge of unknown conditions in the new environment (Chapter 9; Marris, 1974). In *Architecture of the City*, Carlo Rossi (1982) describes how monuments and memorials have been used to provide social and cultural meanings for urban communities. While this is a topic that is outside the limits of this study, it is possible that the use of monuments and memorials, and perhaps yearly festivals, could help to preserve the history and values of relocated communities, to memorialize the contributions of residents to larger national interests, and to symbolize a continuity as well as the creation of new cultural meanings and purpose (Marris, 1974). (It is significant that the Gournawii saw the protection of the Pharaonic monuments as their cultural heritage and duty, but it was a cultural purpose that was lost to the national government.) Such memorials may provide encouragement to the local community as they work towards a new but unknown future.

## **Final Thoughts**

This research has been based on the simple proposition that the quality of town life could be greatly improved by talking to and learning from the people who live there. At the beginning of the project, my research interest was focused on finding ways to improve the quality of town life. As a result of this research, I have come to believe there are no prefabricated answers to this question. Each village, town, and city has its own way of doing things, and its own set of purposes, values, and methods. Planning cannot provide ultimate answers; it cannot tell people how to live. But it can provide a framework for community processes and communication, and still be compatible with local ways of life.

The best planning solutions often come from the people who live there. Hence the importance of citizen participation. However, for participation to work well, it needs to be part of a complete system. It has to be designed to work with other components such as an overall planning strategy, adequate resources, fundamental roles of representation and communication, sound management, and the unique characteristics of local community life.

For Qurna, the future has begun. Despite the difficulties encountered in the relocation, there is good potential for a better future and for a revival of Qurna culture. But, it requires the cooperation and good will of two very different cultures.



## **APPENDICES**

**APPENDIX A**  
**SAMPLE INTERVIEW QUESTIONS**

**Contact Cover Sheet & Report**

Date:

Location:

Source Code:

Source Type:

Language of Interview:

Assistant/Translator:

Topics Discussed or Contained:

Synopsis: (Description of interview, document, observations. See also transcripts, referenced documents, photos or other documentation and records..)

Personal Information:

    age:

    marital status:

    children:

    occupation:

    education:

    residence:

Follow-up:

    a. Issues:

    b. Questions, new data needed:

Introduction:

- a. Purpose of the Study
- b. Clemson IRB Letter
- c. Arrangement of the Questions.

\* \* \* \* \*

**Sample Questions by Group**

**A. Family Information:**

1. Can you please tell me about yourself and your family?
2. Was old Gourna your home town?
3. How long did you lived in old Gourna?
4. How long have you been living in new Qurna?
5. Do you have other family in Old or New Gourna?
6. What families are you related to in the village?
7. Do your relatives live close to you in new Qurna?
8. Do you have children?
9. Do family relatives live with you in your house?
10. Are they all part of your own family?
11. What do you do for a living?
12. Do you have a business in old or new Gurna?
13. How long have you worked at this occupation?
14. Has your income or your work changed since you moved to new Qurna?

**B. Notification/Involvement/Participation:**

1. When did you (or the village residents) first hear that the village would be moved ?
2. How did you heard about it?
3. Were you involved in the planning or carrying out of the relocation? How?
4. Were you notified officially by government representatives or a village leaders?
  - a. When were you notified? How?
5. Where there any meetings for the residents of the village to discuss the move? When was the first meeting held?
6. Did the meetings include all the villagers?
7. When and where were these meetings held?
8. Describe what happened at the meetings? What was discussed? How were they conducted? What was decided? What was the outcome of these meetings?
  - a. e.g., new ideas, new information, changes, confirmation of ideas and plans.
9. Where there any meetings or times when ALL or some of the participants met together for the purpose of collaboration, or for solving problems? When? Where? How often? What happened?
  - a. Who participated on each of these occasions?
  - b. Describe what happened at the meetings? What was discussed?  
How were they conducted?
10. Were there meeting in other places?

### **C. Local/Governmental Leaders, Planners:**

1. Did the villagers have representatives or leaders?
2. Please describe who they were and what their role was in the village.
3. Who were the village leaders that participated or worked on the relocation?
4. What did they do in the relocation as far as you know?
5. What information did you receive from village leaders or local officials about the relocation?
6. Did the villagers and village leaders have access to government information or planning documents?
7. Did the village leaders help resolve problems? How did they do this?
8. Did the village leaders or representatives meet with the residents to discuss the relocation, problems they had with moving, or preferences for the new homes and the new village?
  - a. How did this interaction take place?
  - b. What meetings? What kind of interaction?
9. Were the residents and village leaders consulted about the design of the new homes or the new village? Were they involved in the decision making?
10. Did you have any connection with local leaders or villagers during the relocation?
11. How often did YOU meet with the village leaders, planners, or government officials about the planning for the relocation? I.e., Did you take part in village meetings?
  - a. Please describe what happened at these meetings?

- b. Did the village leaders request meetings with you to talk to you about the relocation, their problems, or their preferences in the new village?
- 12. Who was your personal contact with the village leadership or representatives?
- 13. As far as you know, who were the government officials or representatives that were responsible for the relocation? Who was in charge?
- 14. What level of government were they?
- 15. Were they part of a ministry, national, regional, or local? What ministries or agencies did they represent?
- 16. How often did you meet with them?
- 17. Did the planners and government officials consult with or meet with residents or village leaders to plan and discuss the relocation prior to or during the move?
  - a. Where were these meeting held? In the village, in Luxor, or elsewhere? How often?
- 18. What information did you receive from planners or government officials about the relocation?

**D. Village Information:**

- 1. Can you please tell me what you know about the history of the village?
- 2. Do you know where the first settlers came from and when they first moved to El Gourna?

3. Do you know why the villagers built homes over the tombs when they settled in El Gourna?
4. Please describe life in the old village before the relocation.
5. Please describe life in the new village.
6. How has village life changed since the relocation? How is village life the same?
7. Would you like to have remained in old Gourna?
8. What are your memories of Old Gourna?
9. What are the important features (buildings, roads and lanes, gathering places, markets, and so on) of the new village?
10. Has the design of the new village changed the life of the residents? Please try to give specific examples of what you mean.
11. Were any features of the new village changed to respond to the suggestions of the residents?
12. Are there any restrictions on selling the new home? What are these restrictions?

**E. Evaluation:**

1. What is your assessment of the relocation process? What are its good points and its shortcomings? (I will also ask in a separate question your evaluation of the new village itself.)
2. Looking back, what suggestions do you have for improving the relocation and resettlement process?

3. OR, If you were in charge of the relocation, what would you do differently?
4. (As a women, what needs or ideas do you have that are different the men residents?)
5. How would you rate the relocation?
  1. not successful
  2. okay, needs some improvement
  3. successful
  4. somewhere between a, b, or c.
6. What is your assessment of the new village at El Tarif? What are its good points and its shortcomings?
7. What improvements could be made in the new village in terms of services, or the design?
8. What suggestions do you have for improving life in the new village?
9. How would you rate the village?
  1. not successful
  2. okay, needs some improvement
  3. successfuL
  4. somewhere between a, b, or c.

**F. Other Information:**

1. How long did you attend school?
2. What it the highest level of education that you have obtained?
3. Can I ask your age?



4. Do you know other people either in El Gurna or Cairo that I can talk to about the relocation of El Gurna? Can I tell them that you referred me to them?
5. *Is there anything else that you would like to add or mention or talk about regarding the village and its relocation?*

**APPENDIX B**  
**TOPICAL CODES**

- |   |     |
|---|-----|
| 1. Personal Information:<br>source & family information,<br>group & location,<br>source's occupation, education,<br>experiences in old and new Gourn.   | PRS |
| 2. Involvement, participatory role:<br>role in relocation,<br>degree, level, kind of interaction or invol.,<br>Involvement: none, low, med, high.   | INV |
| 3. People, Participants, Agencies, Other<br>Names, etc.:<br>people,<br>agencies,<br>places, (maps).   | PPL |
| 4. Information & documents received:<br>written info. provided, generated, or available,<br>oral or visual information,<br>plans, programs, etc.,<br>background studies.                                  | INF |
| 5. Village Life:<br>a. old village:<br>history,<br>daily life,<br>occupations, sources of income,<br>village organization.<br>b. new village:<br>life in the new village,<br>leaders and representatives, | VLL |

- the village Council, and the village committee,
    - connection of the sections,
    - gov. activity in N. Gurna,
  - c. changes in village life:
    - individual stories,
    - improvements made by the villagers.
  - d. case of Gournet Mar'ii.
  - e. Memories. MEM
- 6. Village design and construction: VDN
  - plan of village and house,
  - physical features, layout,
  - incomplete aspects of the village,
  - construction issues, cracking problem,
  - physical changes and improvements to houses and village.
- 7. Relocation: RLC
  - history of the project,
  - the relocation plan,
  - reasons for moving,
  - organ. of the project, lines of com.,
  - compensation rules,
  - housing rules, ownership,
  - village representation,
  - information provided to residents,
  - surveys:
    - the counting survey,
    - the study of very poor residents,
  - the overall construction project (project management),
  - logistics of the relocation, the moving process,
  - the Refusers,
  - post occupancy studies.

- |   |            |
|---|------------|
| <p>8. Participation: (subdiv. of RLC)</p> <p>(for degree or level of part.by the source see INV)</p> <p>description of: events, e.g. meetings, discussions,<br/>collaborative work,<br/>mediation, advocacy,<br/>interaction of actor groups.</p> | <p>PRT</p> |
| <p>9. Evaluation &amp; Assessment:</p> <p>of relocation process,<br/>of new village &amp; housing units,<br/>suggestions for improvement.</p>   | <p>EVA</p> |
| <p>10. Other Information:</p> <p>misc. opinions and information,<br/>new contacts,<br/>interpretive comments,<br/>information from non-residents.</p>   | <p>OTH</p> |

### **Participant Groups**

- |  |            |
|--|------------|
| <p>1. Gov. officials &amp; reps:</p> <p>Governor,<br/>gov. officials,<br/>gov. engineers and planners,<br/>local political leaders (e.g., mayor),<br/>village council representatives.</p> | <p>GOV</p> |
| <p>2. Architects, Planners &amp; Designers:</p> <p>private architects, planners, engineers,<br/>private consultants.</p>   | <p>APD</p> |
| <p>3. Village Leaders:</p> <p>traditional and family leaders,<br/>appointed, special representative</p>  | <p>VDR</p> |
| <p>4. Residents: old and new Gourna</p>  | <p>RSD</p> |

- assistants to special representatives
5. Host population: HST  
El Tarif, Gourna District.
6. Other groups: OTH  
foreign residents living on the West Bank  
Egyptians not living in new Gurna.

**Documents and Artifacts**

- Gov. documents and reports: GD  
Maps: MP  
Private documents: PD

## APPENDIX C

### Participant Information Sheet (IRB)

#### Arabic

معلومات بخصوص الإشتراك في دراسة بحثية  
بجامعه كليسون

العنوان : تحديد أدوار المشاركة للفئات البحثية في تغيير  
موقع قرية الجرته التاريخية ، مصر

وصف لطبيعة البحث وكيفية الإشتراك :  
سيادتك مدعوون للإشتراك في الدراسة البحثية التي يقوم بها كلا من ا.د.هاله نصار  
والباحث بول دوجان. غرض هذا البحث هو دراسة دور المشاركة المحلية للأهالي في  
إتخاذ القرار وتأثيراتها في تغيير موقع الجرته.  
سوف يشمل اشتراككم الإجابة على مجموعة من الأسئلة في لقاءات شخصية،  
اجتماعات، مجموعات من اللقاءات الأخرى. الوقت المطلوب لإشتراككم في حدود ساعة  
كاملة. ونحن نحتاج من سيادتك الموافقة على السماح لنا باستخدام تسجيلات صوت/  
فيديو وصور فوتغرافية. ونحن لن نستخدم أي من هذه الوسائل التسجيلية بدون  
الحصول على تصريح منكم بالقيام بها واستخدامها.

المخاطر والمشقات :  
ليس هناك مخاطر معروفة متعلقة بهذا البحث. إجاباتكم سوف تحفظ بسرية ولن يعلم بها  
أحد إلا الباحثين ا.د.هاله نصار والباحث بول دوجان فقط.

الفوائد:  
سوف يساعدنا هذا البحث في تحسين الوسائل المستخدمة في عملية تغيير مواقع  
السكان من مكان لآخر.

حماية السرية:  
سوف نعمل ما بوسعنا لحماية خصوصياتكم. جميع المعلومات سواء كانت ملاحظات،  
أوراق، صور فوتغرافية أو فيلم تسجيلي سوف يحتفظ بها الباحثين في مكان آمن ولن  
تستخدم بدون تصريح منكم. لن يكشف عن شخصيتك في أي إصدار أو كتابة ناتجة عن  
هذه الدراسة .

الإشتراك اختياري:  
اشترككم في هذا البحث اختياري. ممكن أن تختار ألا تشترك وممكن أن تنسحب أو تلغي  
اشترككم في أي وقت. لا عارض ولا مسئولية بأي طريقة إذا قررت عدم الإشتراك أو  
الانسحاب من هذه الدراسة.

الاستفسار:  
إن كان لديكم أي أسئلة بخصوص حقوقكم كمشاركين في هذا البحث أو عن هذه الدراسة  
أو إذا ظهرت أي مشاكل برجاء الاتصال ب ا.د. أيمن عاشور أستاذ العمارة والتخطيط  
بجامعة عين شمس ، كلية الهندسة، القاهرة 6831231 (202) أو  
6831417 (202).

## English

### Information Concerning Participation in a Research Study Clemson University

**Project Title:** *Assessing Participatory Roles of Actor-Groups in the Relocation of the Historic Village of El-Gourna, Egypt*

#### **Description of the research and your participation:**

You are invited to participate in a research study conducted by Professor Doctor Hala Nassar and Mr. Paul Duggan. The purpose of this research is to study the role of participation, local involvement and mediation, and its effects, in the relocation of El Gourna.

Your participation will involve answering questions in initial personal contacts, personal interviews, informational meetings, focus groups or other group meetings, and casual conversations. The amount of time required for your participation will be about one hour. We will also ask your permission to use audio and/or video recording, and take photographs. These recording methods will only be used if you give your permission.

#### **Risks and discomforts:**

There are no known risks associated with this research. Your answers will be kept confidential and no one but Dr. Nassar and Mr. Paul Duggan will know what you have said.

#### **Potential benefits:**

This research may help us improve the relocation process.

#### **Protection of confidentiality:**

We will do everything we can to protect your privacy. All information collected by notes, transcripts, photos, audio or video recordings will be kept by the researchers in a secure

place and will not be used without your permission. Your identity will not be revealed in any publication that might result from this study.

**Voluntary participation:**

Your participation in this research study is voluntary. You may choose not to participate and you may withdraw your consent to participate at any time. You will not be penalized in any way should you decide not to participate or to withdraw from this study.

**Contact information:**

If you have any questions or concerns about your rights as a research participant or about this study, or if any problems arise, please contact Professor Doctor Ayman Ashour at Ain Shams University, Faculty of Engineering, Cairo, at (202) 6831231 or (202) 6831417.



## APPENDIX D

### ABD Outline of a Resettlement Plan

ADB Policy Paper: Safeguard Policy Statement  
Asian Development Bank  
June 2009  
pp. 51-54

#### OUTLINE OF A RESETTLEMENT PLAN

This outline is part of the Safeguard Requirements 2. A resettlement plan is required for all projects with involuntary resettlement impacts. Its level of detail and comprehensiveness is commensurate with the significance of potential involuntary resettlement impacts and risks. The substantive aspects of the outline will guide the preparation of the resettlement plans, although not necessarily in the order shown.

##### **A. Executive Summary**

This section provides a concise statement of project scope, key survey findings, entitlements and recommended actions.

##### **B. Project Description**

This section provides a general description of the project, discusses project components that result in land acquisition, involuntary resettlement, or both and identify the project area. It also describes the alternatives considered to avoid or minimize resettlement. Include a table with quantified data and provide a rationale for the final decision.

##### **C. Scope of Land Acquisition and Resettlement**

This section:

- (i) discusses the project's potential impacts, and includes maps of the areas or zone of impact of project components or activities;
- (ii) describes the scope of land acquisition (provide maps) and explains why it is necessary for the main investment project;
- (iii) summarizes the key effects in terms of assets acquired and displaced persons; and
- (iv) provides details of any common property resources that will be acquired.

#### **D. Socioeconomic Information and Profile**

This section outlines the results of the social impact assessment, the census survey, and other studies, with information and/or data disaggregated by gender, vulnerability, and other social groupings, including:

- (i) define, identify, and enumerate the people and communities to be affected;
- (ii) describe the likely impacts of land and asset acquisition on the people and communities affected taking social, cultural, and economic parameters into account;
- (iii) discuss the project's impacts on the poor, indigenous and/or ethnic minorities, and other vulnerable groups; and
- (iv) identify gender and resettlement impacts, and the socioeconomic situation, impacts, needs, and priorities of women.

#### **E. Information Disclosure, Consultation, and Participation**

This section:

- (i) identifies project stakeholders, especially primary stakeholders;
- (ii) describes the consultation and participation mechanisms to be used during the different stages of the project cycle;
- (iii) describes the activities undertaken to disseminate project and resettlement information during project design and preparation for engaging stakeholders;
- (iv) summarizes the results of consultations with affected persons (including host communities), and discusses how concerns raised and recommendations made were addressed in the resettlement plan;
- (v) confirms disclosure of the draft resettlement plan to affected persons and includes arrangements to disclose any subsequent plans; and
- (vi) describes the planned information disclosure measures (including the type of information to be disseminated and the method of dissemination) and the process for consultation with affected persons during project implementation.

#### **F. Grievance Redress Mechanisms**

This section describes mechanisms to receive and facilitate the resolution of affected persons' concerns and grievances. It explains how the procedures are accessible to affected persons and gender sensitive.

#### **G. Legal Framework**

This section:

- (i) describes national and local laws and regulations that apply to the project and identify gaps between local laws and ADB's policy requirements; and discuss how any gaps will be addressed.
- (ii) describes the legal and policy commitments from the executing agency for all types of displaced persons;
- (iii) outlines the principles and methodologies used for determining valuations and compensation rates at replacement cost for assets, incomes, and

- livelihoods; and set out the compensation and assistance eligibility criteria and how and when compensation and assistance will be provided.
- (iv) describes the land acquisition process and prepare a schedule for meeting key procedural requirements.

## **H. Entitlements, Assistance and Benefits**

This section:

- (i) defines displaced persons' entitlements and eligibility, and describes all resettlement assistance measures (includes an entitlement matrix);
- (ii) specifies all assistance to vulnerable groups, including women, and other special groups; and
- (iii) outlines opportunities for affected persons to derive appropriate development benefits from the project.

## **I. Relocation of Housing and Settlements**

This section:

- (i) describes options for relocating housing and other structures, including replacement housing, replacement cash compensation, and/or self-selection (ensure that gender concerns and support to vulnerable groups are identified);
- (ii) describes alternative relocation sites considered; community consultations conducted; and justification for selected sites, including details about location, environmental assessment of sites, and development needs;
- (iii) provides timetables for site preparation and transfer;
- (iv) describes the legal arrangements to regularize tenure and transfer titles to resettled persons;
- (v) outlines measures to assist displaced persons with their transfer and establishment at new sites;
- (vi) describes plans to provide civic infrastructure; and (vii) explains how integration with host populations will be carried out.

## **J. Income Restoration and Rehabilitation**

This section:

- (i) identifies livelihood risks and prepare disaggregated tables based on demographic data and livelihood sources;
- (ii) describes income restoration programs, including multiple options for restoring all types of livelihoods (examples include project benefit sharing, revenue sharing arrangements, joint stock for equity contributions such as land, discuss sustainability and safety nets);
- (iii) outlines measures to provide social safety net through social insurance and/or project special funds;
- (iv) describes special measures to support vulnerable groups;
- (v) explains gender considerations; and
- (vi) describes training programs.

## **K. Resettlement Budget and Financing Plan**

This section:

- (i) provides an itemized budget for all resettlement activities, including for the resettlement unit, staff training, monitoring and evaluation, and preparation of resettlement plans during loan implementation.
- (ii) describes the flow of funds (the annual resettlement budget should show the budget-scheduled expenditure for key items).
- (iii) includes a justification for all assumptions made in calculating compensation rates and other cost estimates (taking into account both physical and cost contingencies), plus replacement costs.
- (iv) includes information about the source of funding for the resettlement plan budget.

## **L. Institutional Arrangements**

This section:

- (i) describes institutional arrangement responsibilities and mechanisms for carrying out the measures of the resettlement plan;
- (ii) includes institutional capacity building program, including technical assistance, if required;
- (iii) describes role of NGOs, if involved, and organizations of affected persons in resettlement planning and management; and
- (iv) describes how women's groups will be involved in resettlement planning and management.

## **M. Implementation Schedule**


This section includes a detailed, time bound, implementation schedule for all key resettlement and rehabilitation activities. The implementation schedule should cover all aspects of resettlement activities synchronized with the project schedule of civil works construction, and provide land acquisition process and timeline.

## **N. Monitoring and Reporting**

This section describes the mechanisms and benchmarks appropriate to the project for monitoring and evaluating the implementation of the resettlement plan. It specifies arrangements for participation of affected persons in the monitoring process. This section will also describe reporting procedures.

## APPENDIX E

### Engineering Systems and Consultants (ESC) Materials



المجلس الأعلى لمدينة الأقصر

## مشروع توطيق اهالى القرنة

فى منطقة الطارف



الإستشارى :

دار النظم و الإستشارات الهندسية

د. محمد فهمى حسين و شركاه

١٠٢ ب - عن النيل الدقى القاهره ت : ٣٤٨٣٩٠٤

فانكس : ٧١٩٣١٥

## شارك فى المشروع

من المكتب الاستشارى :

مجموعة الخبراء

- د. محمد فهمى حسين

- د. مجدى كمال ربيع

- م. ضياء الدين ابراهيم

- د. عطافى سنبلى

- د. سارة فهيم لوزة

- م. وليد الأفسى

- د. عيسى صبرى

- م. احمد وجيه

بالإضافة لمجموعة من المهندسين و الباحثين

- اللجنة العليا لتخطيط الطارف (القرنة الجديدة)

- م. حنى عبد العليم

- ا. محمد محمد الطيب

- م. صلاح الدين عبد الوهاب

- ا. احمد محمد ابو زيد

- د. عادل مختار

- ا. محمد حسين حسن

- د. محمد محمد الصغير

- ا. محمود الطيب

- م. محمد محمد شلاطة

- م. مصطفى رياض التهامى

- م. محمد اغسا

- م. سنى عمر بسبوى

- م. فتحى طه محمد

بالإضافة لمديرى اارات الخدمات المختلفة بالأقصر

من اهالى القرنة و غرب الأقصر :

- الطبيب ابراهيم محمد

- احمد عبد الستار عوض

- عبد الرحيم القاروى

- محمود هاشم سالم

- توفيق محمد مبيد

- حسان محمد حسان

- حسن احمد حسن

- ثابت حسين عبد الله

- محمد محمد ابو الحجاج

- حسين الأمير حسين

## معلومات أساسية

\* عدد نجوع القرنة ٩

\* عدد الأسر ١٣٩٧

\* عدد السكان ٧٣٨٨ نسمة

\* عدد المباني ١٧٧٦ مبنى

\* مساحة الموقع الجديد ٢٦١ فدان

- التكلفة التقديرية للمشروع :

مليون جنيه

\* إنشاء المباني لتكثيف (النواة) ٣٠,٠٠٠

\* الكهرباء ١٢,٥٠

\* الهاتف ٦,٠٠

\* تغذية المياه ٦,٥٠

\* الصرف الصحى ١٣,٥٠

\* الخدمات ١٢,٠٠

\* الطرق ٥,٧٠

\* تسوية المسوق ٢,٠٠

اجمالى التكلفة :

٨٨,٢٠ مليون جنيه

## **APPENDIX F**

### **Gourna Relocation Information Packet**

Information Sheet on the Relocation of El Gourna  
Obtained from the Office of Public Affairs, Luxor Governorate (no date)

(Arabic copy obtained March 2009 from the Public Information Office, Luxor  
Governorate. Translated by Tarek Mokhtar, Ph. D., and Sara Sahab)

The Supreme Council of Luxor City:

The Name of the Project:

The Relocation/Transferring of the Residents of the Tombs/Ancient Cemeteries.

The Name of the Main Agency

Which is Responsible for the Execution/Implementation (of) the Project:

Supreme Council of Luxor

First: The Project Description:

1- Defining the project: The evacuation of the antiquities areas on the West Bank of the residents who are living above the tombs: The second largest involuntary migration in Egypt after the involuntary migration/transfer process of the Nubians to Aswan, in which 3,200 families have been moved that were living over the tombs. The residents who have been moved to new Qurna city are from 4 Najua', (families), (Naja Rhabat, Naja Horobat, Naja Hasasna, Naja El Attiyat).

2- The main agencies responsible for the implementation:

- the Supreme Council of Luxor
- the Armed Forces Department for National Services

3- The existing conditions before project implementation: The first residents started living in this area in the 1850s. They were fleeing from the French invasion of Egypt and were hiding in the mountain areas in which the ancient Egyptians used as tombs for themselves. The area was a hiding place inside the mountains and also an ideal residence for the poor since it is warm in winter and moderate in summer. In addition the



Nile was close to the mountains so that when it flooded, it provided a new layer of mud and good soil close to the mountains while the mountain protected the people from the flooding and the rain.

Then new groups of residents started to be seen at the beginning of the discovery of the ancient sites in 1922. The settlements in this place grew and spread until the number of families reached 90 families by 1948. And then the famous architect Hassan Fathy, the father of Architecture for the Poor, started to build a project that was to be an ideal city for these people. It still exists till now in Gournah and is called Hassan Fathy's village. But the citizens rejected it because it lacked an adequate social dimension. Throughout the years there were many trials/attempts to transfer the people. One of them, a serious effort to move 1,385 houses, was prepared by a consultant in 1992 and it included many studies and lasted for 3 years. The project was stopped due to the lack of finances needed for construction, and for this reason that dream ended.

The flash floods in 1995 opened the doors for another chance to relocate the residents of El Gournah. At that time 600 homes were built in a place called Suul, and 400 houses in a village called the Mustasmir, or the investment village. But those houses were only for the people who lost their homes, whose houses collapsed because of the heavy rain, or because their homes were built over the tombs but were in a place where no flooding could reach them since the mountain prevented (it) and protected them from the dangers of dissolving or sinking. Thus, the other residents of the mountain did not get houses in this village.

After a while, educated people from the sons of the Qurna residents, (had) a big affect by asking for a relocation to another place. These residents found that this traditional life was very hard in these houses because they were lacking essential

services, for example, there was no water or electricity and no sanitary service. They depended on buying water and transporting it by a tank which cost 20 LE per barrel.

4- (No information)

5- Purposes and targeted plans: Move more than 800 houses from the antiquity tombs which are inhabited by 3,200 families:

- More than 1,000 ancient Egyptian tombs were under these houses. These can be categorized into tombs for the Nobles and for workers. And these tombs are covered by all types of buildings that were constructed over them.
- Another purpose of the study is to build a new village that provides a better quality of life for the families and which will have many kinds of services and infrastructure.

6- (No Information)

7- Procedures that have been utilized by the department which is responsible for the project: When Dr. Samir Farag, the President of the Supreme Council of Luxor, took place (took charge), he initiated the implementation of a wider, holistic (comprehensive) planning and development. The main goal of this planning by Samir Farag was to relocate the residents of el Qurna. And actually, the dream has been met. And they have built the city. However, there has been a lot of mistrust due to the previous experiences that many families had with the previous projects and because there have been a lot of promises that have never been fulfilled. Thus, when the Supreme Council started to build the new city in the same location which was proposed in the studies from 1992, opposition to the relocation (appeared) based on the belief that this project will not be completed. But by time, the department responsible for this project made some special rules for how they are going to distribute these housing units, and also the plots of land, to the families. This has been done under the supervision of the Chief Counsel for the

National Justice Department and also by the Supreme National Public Council, the Department of Supervision, representatives from the Engineering and Housing Departments, and also two representatives from each Naja that were to be moved, and all of these helped the people feel at ease and confident in these decisions. And then this council started to receive new requests (for housing). This group received a lot of requests while it was working in Qurna. And the voices of those who objected to this project had been quieted, which was a big obstacle at the beginning of the relocation process, especially after the group had made specific rules that respected the nature of the area and the needs of the families.

8- Funding Sources: The total budget is 170 million Egyptian Pounds. This is divided into 30 million from the Ministry of Tourism, 30 million from the Ministry of Culture, and 12 million from the Ministry of Electricity to build electrical infrastructure in the West Bank as a whole, and 10 million from the Ministry of International Cooperation.

9- Procedures and Methods of Implementation: The project started in 2004 when President Mohammed Hosni Mubarak gave directions to Dr. Samir Farag, President of the Supreme Council of Luxor, when he started his position in 2004, to evacuate the antiquities areas on the West Bank from all residents who were living over the tombs. This required them to move 3,200 families from four Najua', Naja El Rhabat, Naja El Horobat, Naja El Hasasna, and Naja El Attiyat, who were living over the tombs, to the city of new Qurna into residential units that are completely equipped with all infrastructure and services.

The total area of each unit is 180 square meters in which 80 square meters was for the concrete structure and 100 meters for a courtyard with the possibility of adding up to two more floors if the citizen would like to do that. They also had 1,886 plots of land

(available for distribution) with services and infrastructure ranging from 150 to 200 meters. The residents have the choice of accepting a full unit, which they own, or to own land. And in order to preserve the aesthetic and cultural appearance of the city, they provided 4 prototypes of different types of houses (from) which the citizens had to select one of them so as not to have more than 4 floors which is the rule in the historic sites. The city also has an huge network of main roads and secondary roads which cost 8 million Egyptian Pounds. Another 2 lanes were added to the main road so that it is a (divided) two way road of 4 lanes. This makes the transportation flow easier to and from the city.

And they have also provided full infrastructure for water and sewer to serve the needs of the West Bank at a cost of 60 million Egyptian Pounds, a service center that includes two schools, one with an advanced program for teaching languages, at a cost of 10 million pounds that came from the Ministry of Education, and a Mosque. The Ministry of Communication also built a post office and a telephone office at a cost of 5 million Egyptian Pounds. And there is a large Suq (open market) and also a garden park for kids that provides a place for the kids to play. And also to complete the aesthetic appearance of the city, the MInistry of Culture will build a new cultural center at a cost of 4 million pounds that includes a cinema equipped on the highest standards. And there will be a police station at a cost of 5 million pounds from the Interior Ministry, and a center for youth at a cost of 4 million pounds. The health center in El Tarif has also been renovated in addition to the complete development of the hospital that they have in the El Qurna at a cost of 14 million pounds. A new 5-year Higher Institute of Technology will be built so that the new city will change the culture of the whole West Bank. The time allowed for implementation of the project is 3 years.

## Second: The Benefits from the Project:

### 1- The Developmental Returns for the Region:

- Provide a healthy life for more than 3,500 families who were living above the Pharaonic tombs with houses that are (fully) equipped with infrastructure services (clean water, sewer, electricity, roads, etc.)
- Fulfill a dream that Luxor will present to the world that it has overcome this problem and will provide the excavators and scientists of ancient Egyptian studies an opportunity to search for and discover the secrets of approximately 1,000 Pharaonic tombs of Nobility and of workers which are buried below the 800 houses that have been removed.
- Provide plots of land in the city for development. So far, they have already provided two of those for those investors who would like to invest in hotels which can also provide a good place for youth to work.
- Providing large areas of land for green space and trees and flowers in addition to the center islands and the two sides of the main roads which will provide a place for people to breathe.
- Geographic scope:
  - the residents in old Gournah who were living over the Pharaonic tombs
  - The number of beneficiaries: 3,500 families
- Some other benefits:
  - This city will be a center for new residents because it has a large area of land attached to it.

- It will preserve the heritage of the ancestors of the Pharaonic tombs and aid in rediscovering them.

### Third: Lessons Learned and Recommendations:

1- The Challenges which have been faced in the Process of Implementation: All the previous attempts to relocate the residents have created a kind of distrust on the part of the citizens since there have been a lot of promises that were not fulfilled before the start of this project.

- The objecting voices were an obstacle at the beginning of the project and its implementation.
- The migration of citizens to leave their houses after they have been living in them for more than 100 years was not an easy job and it needed a lot of effort from all the departments and the civic institutes and leaders from the city to convince people that this migration would be a benefit for them. Among those who helped in this process and made it go quickly was the President of Al Azhar University, Dr. Ahmed El Tayib, who is also one of the residents of el Qurna.

2- The Factors that led to the success of the Implementation of this Project:

- A true scientific plan and also an understanding of prior planning concepts: This project was built on true scientific planning and the accumulation of ideas has respected precedents and provided the resources. The government and ministries were very generous and provided the resources for actual implementation.
- In addition, the President of the Supreme Council of Luxor had also asked many European ambassadors to provide grants, in collaboration with Dr. Fiza Abu Naga,

the Minister of International Collaboration. And he was successful in obtaining generous financing, with her support, from those countries so as to fulfill the goals.

- The design of the units provides a social dimension by fulfilling the needs of the families to be together in one place.
- The entrances and doors allow sheep to enter and they also have a place for them to be raised.
- As a way of encouraging people to relocate, they have 3,500 plots of land for those who didn't want to have units.
- There has been a lot of effort from all the departments and the civic institutions and agencies, and also from the leaders of thought to convince people of the process of migration. And among those who helped in this effort and made it quicker in implementation is Dr. Ahmed El Tayib who is the President of Al Azhar University.

### 3- Recommendations:

- Build new residences for people who are living in the El Kabash Street which involves about 250 buildings.
- Remove all the illegal structures that were built by squatters on the antiquities areas in the West Bank and at Karnak temple.
- Speed up the process of discovering the secrets and treasures of the tombs in the places where the people that were living over them have been removed.

**APPENDIX G**  
**Gournawii Petition**

**A Petition from the People of Gurna to the Egyptian Government**

**We, the people of Gurna**, have recourse to every governmental official to give us our lawful rights concerning the great injustice that has befallen on us. We shouted, moaned and complained.

We live in fear and worry as we are threatened with losing our own homes, when these homes are subjected to evacuation. You well know the suffering of refugees when driven away from their home-land. It is a devastating feeling of being a stranger in your own country, and an immigrant on your own land. We sometimes doubt our Egyptian nationality.

What is bewildering is the claim that we are offensive to tourism and the threat that our being on our own land is upsetting the security of our monuments. We are part of these monuments, we are born there and that is where we earn our only income. We cannot comprehend how we could threaten tourism in these sites when we care greatly, interact solely with tourists and live off tourism work. Without the ruins, we cease to exist.

Tourists from all over the world can see and know that we form an integral part of the pillar of the industry of tourism in Egypt. The tourist season is our season. From that season we can marry off our sons and daughters. We eagerly wait for its arrival like a



farmer waits the harvest.

More than 10,000 families live, inhabit and work in Gurna. It is to us like water is to fish. We ask: why move us away from the sites? What is it we have done wrong over a period of more than one hundred years here? We share next of kin tie with tourists. They, after all are our source of bread. We believe we honour Egypt when it comes to our relationship with tourists. Expulsion and evacuation serves none but those who want to gain from our expulsion.

We give readily with the help of God, our warmth and welcome. No matter how much preparation is made on receiving tourists, and money spent on investment in tourism; they will not suffice and take our place. We do not say no to sharing our source of income, but we do object to the denial of our livelihood. The security of the sites is a must, but we object to raiding our land and homes. Why declare a war against our livelihood?

When torrents of rain hit our villages, it was an omen to troubles ahead. Thankfully, the government gave us maximum support and aid. However the case is different when these same villages that suffered the torrents are threatened by flattening bulldozers. The reality is clear to us. Some bodies are eager to lay hands on our source of income. They are far removed from excavation work or tourism.

Please have mercy on us and our children. Do not deprive us of our land and homes. Do not make us feel strangers in our own country. We have no doors on which to knock

for help. Think and reflect on the prayers of those who are unjustly and wrongfully treated.

We would like you to remember our martyred heroes who fought when needed in times of war. Our people fought for Egypt bravely and thousands died willingly. However we will take it into our hands to banish from our lands and homes whoever is responsible for our evacuation in return for personal profit. They are merely a handful of profiteers who are ready to drive away 10,000 families from their homes for personal gain.

We understand and comprehend God almighty is there for the wrongly and unjustly treated, seeing those who take our livelihood and as written in the holy Qura'an: "It is but the truth, just as you speak (utter)"

God bless you and show you the right path.

**From the people of Gurna**

*Their representative*

*Abdul Alsalam Ahmed Souly (Luxor identity card no. 7565)*

*Al Gurna - Najah al-Horubat*

*Bandar al A'sir*

*Drawn up and signed by 70 heads of families in November 1996*

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