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A Straight Path: Studies in Medieval Philosophy and Culture; Essays in Honor of Arthur Hyman

Ruth Link Salinger

R. James Long
Fairfield University, rjlong@fairfield.edu

Charles Manekin

Jeremiah Hackett

Michael S. Hyman

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Richard Fishacre's Way to God

There are some persons to whom the inquiry seeking to demonstrate that God exists may perhaps appear superfluous. These are the persons who assert that the existence of God is self-evident, in such wise that its contrary cannot be entertained in the mind.¹

With this observation St. Thomas begins his discussion of the problem of God's existence in the *Summa contra gentiles*. Twice before he had raised the issue, in the *Scriptum super libros Sententiarum* (1252–56) and the *De veritate* (1257–58), and would return to it in the *Summa theologiae*, always invoking the rubric *utrum Deum esse sit per se notum* (whether the proposition "God exists" is self-evident). The rubric, which was Thomas's invention—no one had, in fact, claimed that God's existence was self-evident—was a device, enabling him, by denying any privileged knowledge of God's essence, to place full weight on his own *a posteriori* demonstrations for God's existence. If the existence of God were not in any meaningful sense self-evident to us, then it could be denied prior to demonstration. A demonstration properly so called is therefore necessary if the human creature is to have any natural knowledge of the reality of its Maker.²

Notwithstanding, the statement of the *Contra gentiles* remains curiously provocative. Even on the supposition that Thomas's con-

1. St. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa contra gentiles*, 1.10; Anton C. Pegis, trans. (1955; University of Notre Dame Press, 1975) 79.

2. See Etienne Gilson, *The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas*, L. K. Shook, trans. (New York: Random House, 1956) 46–58, and *The Philosophy of St. Bonaventure*, Dom Iltyd Trethowan and Frank J. Sheed, trans. (Paterson: St. Anthony Guild, 1965) 107–26; Jean Chatillon, "De Guillaume d'Auxerre à saint Thomas d'Aquin. L'argument de saint Anselme chez les premiers scholastiques du XIII^e siècle," *Spicilegium Beccense*. I Congrès international du IX^e centenaire de l'arrivée d'Anselme au Bec (Paris: Vrin, 1959) 209–31; and Pegis, "The Bonaventurian Way to God," *Mediaeval Studies*, 29 (1967) 206–42.

cern here is not with writing history but with "borrowing themes which allow him to emphasize important points,"³ the wording suggests that he has in mind someone or some group maintaining that the existence of God was so evident that God's nonexistence could not even be thought. Who were these *asserentes*?

The question has been asked before, notably by Gilson and Chatillon,⁴ and the evidence they have marshaled indicates that Thomas's characterization could have represented any one or all of a group of theologians that included William of Auxerre, Alexander of Hales, Richard Fishacre, and Thomas's contemporary, St. Bonaventure. Advocates of what has been called a "theology of essence"⁵ all agree not only on the thesis that the nonexistence of God is unthinkable but also on the authorities they invoke in support of their position: St. Anselm, St. Augustine (sometimes by name, sometimes not), and St. John Damascene. It is no accident that, from his youthful Commentary on Peter Lombard's *Sentences* to his mature *Summa theologiae*, these are the same authorities St. Thomas cites as opposing his position.

My project in this paper will be to focus on one of these alleged sources, Richard Fishacre, and to ask whether indeed he qualifies as one of the *asserentes*. I do not intend to claim thereby that Thomas had ever read his older Dominican confrere,⁶ despite an otherwise unsubstantiated marginal gloss in a copy of the treatise *De quatuor in quibus* to the effect that St. Thomas wished to have a copy of Fishacre's *Sentences* Commentary.⁷

Although Fishacre is not the first of the thirteenth-century Scholastics to have exploited the arguments of Anselm, Augustine, and John Damascene,⁸ he is the first Oxford master to have done so.

3. Gilson, *Aquinas*, 47.

4. *Ibid.* 46–58, and *Bonaventure*, 107–26; Chatillon, "Guillaume," 209–31.

5. The expression is Gilson's; see *Aquinas*, 48–54.

6. Indeed the Leonine editors have found only one parallel passage in Fishacre's *Sentences* Commentary (*De gratia*, q. 27, art 4, resp.; Leon. ed. 22:2, 805).

7. "Item fr. Ricardus Fisacra, natione Anglicus, tempore s. Thome et eo antiquior, super sententias profundissime scripsit, cuius scripta s. Thomas desiderabat habere," Stephanus de Salaniaco and Bernardus Guidonis, *De quatuor in quibus Deus Praedicatorum Ordinem insignivit*, Thomas Kaeppli, ed. (Monumenta Ordinis Fratrum Praedicatorum Historica, 22. Rome: Institutum Historicum Fratrum Praedicatorum, 1949) 36, textual variant to line 11. The gloss was first noted by Quéatif-Echard (*Scriptores Ordinis Praedicatorum* [Paris: Ballard et Smart, 1719] 1:118).

8. That distinction belongs to William of Auxerre, secular master at Paris, who raises the issue in his *Summa aurea*, composed between 1215 and 1231 (Chatillon, "Guillaume," 214). The text is reprinted in A. Daniels, "Quellenbeiträge und Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der Gottesbeweise im dreizehnten Jahrhundert mit besonderer Berücksichtigung des Arguments im Proslogion des Hl. Anselm," *Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters*, 8/1–2 (Münster 1909) 25–27.

His, furthermore, was thitherto the most complete and coherent treatment of the problem of the divine existence,⁹ notwithstanding some obvious parallels with William of Auxerre's *Summa aurea*. Richard's discussion is to be found in his imposing *Commentarium in libros Sententiarum*, the first of its genre composed by an Oxford Dominican and very possibly the first by any Oxford master.¹⁰ Commenting on the text in book 1, distinction 3, which the Lombard cites from the *De civitate Dei*, a text wherein Augustine discusses how the Platonists have transcended the physical world to arrive at its immaterial Maker, Fishacre finds occasion to offer his own arguments.¹¹

Richard constructs ten arguments in all, each of which, with the exception of the final—a truncated version of a causal argument found in the *Summa aurea*¹²—is of the kind that Aquinas will term *a priori*. Each presupposes a metaphysics of participation and exemplarism, whereby every hierarchical order of perfection leads the mind to posit the existence of a greatest. Each argument contributes more or less forcefully to the conclusion toward which Fishacre is hastening—namely, that one cannot even say in one's heart that God does not exist.¹³

The centerpiece of the Fishacrean proofs is the argument from the *Proslogion*, variations on which account for three of the ten arguments. If there be something most simple, it would be identical with its being; otherwise it would have its being and something else besides and consequently would not be most simple. Therefore, if any-

9. I omit from consideration the *Summa* ascribed to Alexander of Hales, books 1–3 of which, according to the Quaracchi editors, were composed between the years 1236 and 1245 at Paris (Alexander de Hales, *Summa theologica*, 4.3 [Prolegomena], [Quaracchi, 1948] cccxxxix), approximately the same years Fishacre was writing at Oxford. See Chatillon, "Guillaume," 214, n. 21.

10. Daniel Callus, "Introduction of Aristotelian Learning to Oxford," *Proceedings of the British Academy*, 29 (1943) 32, and my "The Science of Theology according to Richard Fishacre: Edition of the Prologue to his *Commentary on the Sentences*," *Mediaeval Studies*, 34 (1972) 71, n. 1.

11. "Quod autem Deus sit multipliciter ostenditur" (Daniels, "Quellenbeiträge," 21). The text I cite in these notes is the one published by Daniels, corrected from four manuscripts, three of which are different from, and superior to, those employed to establish the Daniels text; any emendations to the latter are noted. The following are the manuscripts and the sigla I use: Bologna, Univ. MS 1546 (= Bo); Cambridge, Gonville and Caius College MS 329/410 (= C); London, British Library MS Royal 10.B.VII (= R); Vatican, Ottob. lat. MS 294 (= V).

12. See Daniels, "Quellenbeiträge," 26; the argument ultimately owes its inspiration to John Damascene (*De fide orthodoxa*, 1.3).

13. "Hinc patet quod non potest intelligi uel cogitari non esse quia ad ipsum non esse sequitur ipsum esse. Sed dicere in corde est cogitare: ergo non potest dici in corde ipsum non esse" (Daniels, "Quellenbeiträge," 24).

thing be most simple, it would exist; but the most simple is the most simple; therefore it exists.¹⁴

Moreover, continues Fishacre, if God were to exist, God would be something than which nothing greater could be thought; but upon hearing this anyone would think "something than which nothing greater can be thought"—if I say the words, my auditors understand them. What they are thinking exists either in their thought alone or also in fact. If the latter, then I have the conclusion I want; if the former, then something greater than this can be thought—namely, anything existing in both thought and fact.¹⁵

Fishacre illustrates his final working of the *Proslogion* inference with a particularly prosaic example. The "best" encompasses every good. But just as "snub nose" (*simus*) cannot be understood without also understanding "nose," neither can the best be understood without being. Therefore, if there be a best, it exists; but the best is the best; therefore it exists.¹⁶

Just as for Anselm before him (and for Bonaventure after him), the atheist represents an especially troublesome problem for Fishacre. If all his arguments lead him to the conclusion that God's non-existence is unthinkable, how can he explain that someone is thinking the unthinkable? And very much like Anselm before Gaunilon pressed him on the issue, Fishacre dismisses the fool of the Psalm text because he is ignorant and truly a fool. When the fool says "there is no God," he does not mean what I understand by "God" but something less than God. The atheist may be saying or thinking the words, but he is not comprehending their meaning.¹⁷

14. "(6) *Item, si aliquid esset simplicissimum, non differret ab esse suo sed esset suum esse; quia si non, iam haberet esse et aliquid amplius, et tunc non esset simplicissimum. Igitur [ergo, Bo, V] si aliquid esset simplicissimum, illud esset; sed simplicissimum est simplicissimum: ergo est*" (ibid. 23). Cf. the Bonaventuran argument: "*Si Deus est Deus, Deus est; sed antecedens est adeo verum quod non potest cogitari non esse; ergo Deum esse est verum indubitabile*" (*De mysterio Trinitatis* 1.1.29).

15. "(7) *Item, si Deus esset, esset quo maius [magis, Bo] cogitari non potest; sed aliquis hoc audiens cogitat quid quo magis cogitari non potest; si dico uerba, intelligit. Hoc quod ipse cogitat aut in cognitione [cogitatione, ed.] eius tantum aut in re: si in re, hoc uolui; si in cognitione [cogitatione, ed.] tantum, iam illo cognito aliquid erit maius, quia illud quod est in cognitione [cogitatione, ed.] et in re est maius quam illud quod est in cognitione [cogitatione, ed.] tantum*" (Daniels, "Quellenbeiträge," 23).

16. "(8) *Item, in intellectu optimi cadit esse bonum; sed hoc ipsum esse tam magnum bonum est ut illud omnes appetant: ergo in intellectu optimi est esse. Ergo sicut simus non potest intelligi sine naso, sic nec optimum sine esse: ergo si est optimum, est; sed optimum est optimum: ergo est*" (ibid. 23).

17. "*Contra. Dixit insipiens in corde suo non est Deus. Solutio. Cum hoc dicit, non de Deo dicit, sed de aliquo quod est minus Deo quod comprehendit per hoc*

Lest we think, however, that we are engaged in a vain exercise by attempting demonstrations of God's existence, for John Damascene has declared that nature has implanted in every person a knowledge of God, Richard responds with a counter-text from the same author: evil has prevailed over human nature to such an extent as to drag some down to the irrational and unspeakably evil pit of perdition, so that they are prompted to say that there is no God. Does not the psalmist add in the same text: "They are corrupt, and are become abominable in their ways"?¹⁸

Because the human mind is clouded by vice, it does not see what is otherwise radiantly clear. Therefore, the effort to argue God's existence rationally is not futile, insists Fishacre. But what of his proofs? How seriously does he take them and how seriously does he expect his students to take them? To say that they exhibit none of the intellectual rigor and almost obsessive attention to detail of the Thomistic proofs is to understate the case. Fishacre presents his arguments facilely, almost indifferently. And the careful reader is led to suspect that there is more here than meets the eye. There is: but to uncover it we must examine Fishacre's philosophy of knowledge.

Daniel Callus once wrote, with perhaps a touch of irony, that "it would certainly be an exaggeration to claim Fishacre as an ardent Aristotelian."¹⁹ Nowhere is this more true than in his epistemology. The sensible species, which is like the word by which the sensible object speaks to us, reaches only as far as the inmost sentient organ, which is the common sense (*sensus communis*). At this juncture Fishacre invokes the help of St. Augustine (or in this case pseudo-Augustine): the soul in marvelous ways and with awesome speed produces in itself something similar to that which is in the common

quod dico Deus; sicut dicens dii non intelligit Deum sed aliquid Deo inferius, quod potest cogitari conuenire pluribus" (ibid. 24).

18. "Item si non potest cogitari non esse et etiam innata [innatum Bo, C] est nobis cognitio existendi Deum, ut dicit Damascenus cap. 1: 'Non dereliquit nos Deus in [om., ed.] omnimoda ignorantia. Omnibus enim cognitio existendi Deum ab ipso naturaliter inserta est' [De fide orthodoxa 1.1]. Ergo probando ipsum esse stulto labore consumimur. Solutio. In tantum malitia quosdam corrumpit [corrumpit, R, ed.] ut quod naturaliter est certissimum fiat eis dubium. Damascenus cap. 3: 'In tantum preualuit malitia hominum nature, ut quosdam in irrationabilissimum et omnium malorum pessimum perditionis deduceret baratrum, ut dicant non esse Deum, de quorum insipientia ait sacrorum enuntiator Dauid: "Dixit insipiens in corde"' etc. [De fide 1.3]. Et bene subiungitur: 'corrupti sunt et abhominabiles' [Ps. 13:1]" (ibid. 24).

19. Callus, "Introduction," 31.

sense—that is, it assimilates and conforms itself to that received species, as the light to the water with which it comes in contact.²⁰

Although there are several passages in which he sounds very much like an Aristotelian, affirming, for example, that the process of knowing begins in the senses and is deficient to the extent that sensation is deficient,²¹ Fishacre nowhere endorses an Aristotelian theory of induction or abstraction. We find rather the oft-repeated conviction that the mind is not passive with respect to sensation and that the latter merely provides the occasion for the soul's activity.²²

What, then, is the origin of the intelligible similitude that the mind produces (*efficit*) in itself? The answer is soon forthcoming. The likenesses of things (*similitudines rerum*) have been implanted in us by nature, in such a way, however, that we can contemplate one without being aware of any other. It is at this point that the soul actually (*actu*) becomes like the object that is understood.²³ Later Fishacre reveals his sources: according to Augustine and the Platonists, every truth and all things are naturally written (*scripta sunt*) in the soul, although many things in our souls lie hidden to us. This is evident from the fact that the possible intellect is in a state of potentiality with respect to all intelligibles—not only passive potentiality but rather active. Were this not the case, that saying of Aristotle's would be false—namely: "Every man by nature desires to know."²⁴ From the fact that he says "to know" simply—not to know this or that—it is obvious that he intends that in the human being there is an active potentiality to know all things.²⁵

20. "*Cum uerbum quo se loquitur res exterior mihi, scilicet species rei, peruenerit ad intimum sentiens, non procedit ulterius ut intret gignendo se in mentem. Sed, ut dicit Augustinus [i.e., Alcher of Clairvaux, *De spiritu et anima*, cap. 25 (PL 40: 798)] anima miris modis et mira quadam uelocitate efficit in se simile et quod est in organo intimo, hoc est assimilatur se illi speciei susceptae et conformatur, ut lux aquae cui contiguatur" (1 Sent. 2). This and the following texts were edited from Bo, C, R, and V.*

21. See, e.g., the following text: "*Sensibilia, gignendo ex se similitudines suas et per sensus immittentes eas in nobis, imprimunt eas in instrumento sensus communis, id est in ultimo sentiente, scilicet in corde. Ex qua impressione efficitur ut anima—eo quod sit illi parti corporis maxime unita—intelligat illud cuius similitudo in corde fuit impressa. Nostra enim cognitio incipit a sensu, et ideo dicit Aristoteles quod deficiente sensu necesse est scientiam deficere in Post. Analyticis [1.18 (81a38) in *Arist. Lat.*, L. Minio-Paluello, ed., 4.2 (32)]" (2 Sent. 7).*

22. The position is Augustinian; see *De musica* 6.5 (PL 32: 1168).

23. "*Sic in anima naturaliter insite sunt similitudines rerum, et tamen unam earum intuemur actualiter sine alia. Et tunc quasi actu efficitur similis illi rei extra quam intelligimus" (1 Sent. 2).*

24. Aristotle, *Metaphysica* 1.1 (980a22).

25. "*Sed secundum Augustinum et Platonicos in ipsa anima naturaliter scripta sunt omnia et omnis ueritas—licet multa in animabus nostris scripta nos lateant.*

This attempt to enlist Aristotle in support of either Platonic in-natism or Augustinian immanence is philosophically awkward and raises more questions than it answers. Indeed we are confronted here with three distinct positions with respect to the origin of our concepts and in vain does one search the text of Fishacre's Commentary for an unequivocal statement on his own preference. Perhaps, like Augustine, he simply assumes their presence in the soul without venturing an opinion as to their origin.²⁶

Whatever the process by which they be "written" or "implanted" in the soul, however, it is clear that we become aware of the forms or the intelligibles of things only through God's power.²⁷ The analogy is a familiar one. If the soul can be understood as a panel (*tabula*) and the similitudes of things in it as paintings (*picture*), God is the light illumining these paintings.²⁸

Here Fishacre has entered the terrain staked out by St. Augustine and the metaphor of light/illumination recurs frequently. Everything begets a species or likeness of itself, because a thing is intelligible only through the likeness that it begets—and this by God's agency and gift to them (*Deo agente et eis dante*); for just as a corporeal light draws color into act, so God draws out into act every intelligible.²⁹ Again, in another distinction: God works on the mind as light illumines color and the eye.³⁰ The Light, then, that is God is present to the mind, more present indeed than the mind is to itself.³¹

Quod potest patere saltem ex hoc quod intellectus possibilis est in potentia respectu intelligibilium omnium: non tantum in potentia passiva sed potius in potentia activa. Alioquin falsum esset quod dicit Aristoteles: 'Omnis homo natura scire desiderat' [Metaph. 1.1 (980a22)]. Si desiderat, est in potentia activa cuiuslibet eorum respectu cuius est in potentia. Et ex hoc quod dicit scire simpliciter—non scire hoc uel illud—patet quod intendit in homine esse potentiam activam ad sciendum omnia" (2 Sent. 16).

26. See D. E. Sharp, "The Philosophy of Richard Fishacre," *New Scholasticism*, 7 (1933) 291.

27. "Creatura igitur cognoscuntur Deo adiuuante in quantum est natura, scilicet cognitione uespertina, non matutina" (2 Sent. 3).

28. "Igitur intelligo animam sicut tabulam, similitudines rerum in ea sicut picturas, Deum ut lucem has picturas illuminantem" (1 Sent. 17).

29. "Unaquaque res gignit ex se speciem uel similitudinem, quia quelibet est intelligibilis per similitudinem quam gignit—et hoc Deo agente et eis dante. Sicut enim lux corporalis educit colorem in actum talem, sic Deus omne intelligibile" (1 Sent. 3).

30. "Ipse enim est menti tanquam lux que illuminat colorem et oculum" (1 Sent. 32).

31. "Item summe presens est menti, quia presentior quam mens sibi, ut dicit Augustinus" (1 Sent. 17). And: "sed omni menti intimior est ipsa essentia Dei quam ipsa mens sibi. Ergo sicut nouit mens creaturas ei absentes similitudine earum et ea est sciens, sic Deum trinum et unum se ipso presente ipsi menti et ipse erit sapientia qua eum sapit mens" (1 Sent. 32).

In a remarkable text Fishacre draws a remarkable conclusion—namely, that whoever sees something in the presence of light, sees the light more than the object. Because, therefore, God is the light of every intelligible, as sensible light is of every visible object, whoever sees anything with the intellect, also sees God with the intellect. Therefore, regardless of one's state of grace, either one understands nothing whatsoever or one sees God.³²

Here we must exercise caution. Fishacre objects on behalf of the adversary that no one has ever seen God (John 1:18). Perhaps, Richard responds with his customary hesitation, we do see God with our minds in this life, though poorly (*tenuiter*); so poorly, in fact, that it can rightly be judged to be nothing compared to the vision that the blessed will enjoy *in patria*, just as the earth is but a point compared to the heavens. Even the wicked can be said to see God intellectually, though they are unaware that they see God. Again, the light metaphor serves Richard well: just as in seeing the color white in a strong light I indeed see the light—which I cannot gaze at directly—even though I be ignorant of the fact or inattentive to it.³³

That not all rational creatures acknowledge the existence of the Light intimately present to them, and without which they could not know intelligibles, Fishacre attributes to two causes: sinfulness and the necessity for the soul in this life to minister to the body. It is the latter that impeded our first parents, even before the Fall, from knowing God perfectly. Only when we are not only united to God by grace, but also freed from the task of managing the body, will we know God perfectly and immediately.³⁴

32. "Item quicumque uidet aliquid in luce magis uidet ipsam lucem. Igitur cum Deus sit lux omnis intelligibilis, sicut hec lux sensibilis est omnis uisibilis, quicumque aliquid uidet intellectu et Deum uidet intellectu. Igitur qui habent caritatem, immo et qui non habent, aut nichil omnino intelligunt aut Deum uident" (1 Sent. 17).

33. "Quid est ergo Io. 1: 'Deum nemo uidit unquam' [1 John 4:12]; Exo. 33: 'Non uidebit me homo et uiuet' [Exod. 33:20]; Ty. 6: 'Quem nullus hominum uidit nec uidere potest' [1 Tim. 6:16]. . . . Solutio. Forte uisione intellectuali uidetur Deus in uia licet tenuiter. Sed tam modica est ut respectu illius que erit in patria merito nulla iudicetur, sicut terra punctus est respectu celi. De malis uero dici potest quod si uident aliquid uisione intellectuali, uident et Deum sed nescientes se uidere eum, sicut uidendo album in luce uideo lucem nesciens nec attendens eam, quam etiam in se nunc uidere non possum. Hoc tamen asserere non audeo, licet huic consonare uideatur illud Iob 36: 'Omnes homines uident eum, unusquisque intuetur procul'" [Iob 36:25] (1 Sent. 17).

34. "Et cum anima de se nata sit omnia cognoscere, nec impeditur ab hoc nisi aut per culpam aut per corporis administrationem, estimo quod, cum culpa in eis non impediret animam a cognitione certissima omnium quam speramus in patria, sola administratio corporis animalis fuit in causa. Quia enim corpus erat animale, indigebat alimoniis et per consequens oportuit animam uti operibus uegetatiue—que

What, then, is the relationship between illumination and demonstration? Does the former allow us to dispense with the latter, or does it act as its ground of certitude? If the presence of the divine Light is so evident to the attentive mind (one might almost say *self-evident*), what role does proof play?

Surely, as Gilson remarks apropos of St. Bonaventure, any chain of reasoning must lose much of its significance if it makes use of some prior experience sufficient of itself to establish the same conclusion.³⁵ Noetically the Fishacrean proofs occupy a universe different from that of St. Thomas. It is with the God-given light of the mind that Thomas works his way from the beings that we know through our senses to the Cause of those beings. Fishacre focuses on the Light itself, without which the mind knows nothing, not even itself, and which therefore the mind knows to exist just as surely as it knows that it knows.

Fishacre's proofs are not superfluous only because wickedness has blinded humans to the obvious. But for the soul with charity and with sufficient attentiveness, the proofs are, strictly speaking, quite unnecessary. That is why they emit an air of nonchalance, and why a student of Thomas Aquinas must find them unacceptable.

Precisely what theologians Thomas might have had in mind when he attacked those who assert that the existence of God is self-evident we will of course never know. That Richard Fishacre in fact qualifies for inclusion among the *asserentes* is, I submit, beyond question.

*sunt augere, nutrire, generare—et similiter sensitivae utendi sensibus. Quanto autem amplius administrationi corporis intenditur, tanto minus utitur anima uisione intellectiua. Ut enim utamur hac uisione, necesse est aliquantulum animam subtrahere se ab administratione tali. In celo autem, cum erit corpus spirituale, non erit necesse sic administrare corpus, et ideo tunc per corpus in nullo impiedetur anima. In nobis uero fere tota anima in tali administratione occupatur. Et ideo aut omnino nulla aut modica est in nobis cognitio intellectualis et eorum que hac uisione cognoscuntur, scilicet spiritualium. . . . Sicut enim in uisione corporali aliquid uisum a remotis uidetur quidem, sed subtiles partium differentie non discernuntur nisi accedat proprius, similiter anima intenta corporis animalis administrationi uidit quasi Deum a longe uisione spirituali, sed rationes causales in mente eius discernere non potuit nisi accedens propius, scilicet ad statum celi, sicut nec nunc uisu corporali percipit rationes seminales in materia. Cognitio autem Dei perfecta per uisionem intellectualem et indistanter, que est omnino adherentium Deo (de qua indistantia dicitur Cor. 6: 'Qui adheret Deo, unus spiritus est' [1 Cor. 6:17]), hec est uita eterna, non talis que est per distantiam, quam dixi habuisse eos ante peccatum" (2 Sent. 23). For Fishacre's dualistic view of the soul, see my "Richard Fishacre and the Problem of the Soul," *The Modern Schoolman*, 52 (1975) 263–70.*

35. Gilson, *Bonaventure*, 114.