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ARCHBISHOP MANNING AND THE *KULTURKAMPF*¹

by JEFFREY P. VON ARX, S.J.

IT IS not surprising that Henry Edward Manning had strong opinions about the *Kulturkampf*, Otto von Bismarck's effort in the early 1870's to bring the Roman Catholic Church in Germany under the control of the State. As head of the Catholic Church in England, it appropriately fell to Manning to condemn what most British Catholics would have seen as the persecution of their Church in the new German Empire. Moreover, Manning knew personally the bishops involved in the conflict with Bismarck from their time together at the Vatican Council. Indeed, he was well acquainted with some of them who had played important rôles, either for or against, in the great controversies of the Council that led to the definition of Papal Infallibility. Miecislau Ledochowski, Archbishop of Gnesen and Posen, imprisoned and expelled from his see by the German government in 1874, had, together with Manning, been a prominent infallibilist. Paulus Melchers, Archbishop of Cologne, and leader of the German inopportunist, suffered the same penalty. The bishops of Breslau, Trier and Paderborn, all of whom had played significant rôles at the Council, the first two against, the latter for the definition, were either imprisoned, expelled, or both.² Manning considered these men to have suffered for the cause of religious liberty, and could not understand the indifference of British politicians, especially of liberals like Gladstone, to their fate.³

It was not, of course, just his personal acquaintance with its victims that concerned Manning about the *Kulturkampf*. The provisions of the various laws introduced under the name of the Prussian Minister of Public Worship, Adalbert Falk, were not such as any Roman Catholic bishop could contemplate with equanimity. The law of March 11, 1872 removed school inspection from the hands of the Church and gave it to State inspectors. The law of July 4, 1872 expelled the Jesuits and related Orders and dissolved their existing foundations. The May laws of 1873 made clerical appointment dependent on State approval; placed all clerical educational institutions under the control of the State; and set a State examination for theology students in philosophy, history and German literature. Those same laws established a Royal Tribunal of Ecclesiastical Affairs which excluded the Pope and the Curia from disciplinary power over the Catholic clergy on appeal, and arrogated that power to itself; the Tribunal also had the power to dismiss clergy who violated law or civil regulations on its own recognizance. Finally, the May laws severely limited episcopal power of excommunication, which had been in recent use against opponents of the new dogma of papal infallibility.⁴ When Prussian bishops

refused and forbade any cooperation with the May laws, when directors of seminaries refused State supervision, theology students rejected the culture examinations, and bishops appointed priests without reference to the law, the State reacted. Seminaries were closed, and in December of 1873, indictments began against bishops and clergy who had appointed or been appointed illegally.⁵

It was, therefore, not surprising that Manning should have an opinion about the struggle. To express this opinion, he chose a favourite forum, a meeting of the Academia of the Catholic Religion, to deliver an opening salvo against the goings-on in Berlin.⁶ On December 23, he addressed the Academia on the subject 'Caesarism and Ultramontanism'.⁷

Now 'Caesarism and Ultramontanism' probably qualifies as the most controversial public pronouncement that Manning ever made. Certainly it stirred up more response from the press than any other statement or writing of his.⁸ It provoked, in addition, hostile reaction from the current as well as a former prime minister. For Earl Russell, Manning's position represented subjection to a 'despotic and fallible priesthood,' and later that winter Russell would convoke a public meeting to vote its sympathy with the desire of Germans to be free from papal aggression.⁹ The address was partly responsible as well for arousing William Gladstone to his first public expressions of doubt over the loyalty of Roman Catholics,¹⁰ and led eventually to his publication, in November, 1874, of *The Vatican Decrees in Their Bearing on Civil Allegiance*. Finally, 'Caesarism and Ultramontanism' stimulated a controversy with Sir James Fitzjames Stephen, the noted jurist, in the pages of the *Contemporary Review*. Stephen's own 'Caesarism and Ultramontanism' was followed by Manning's reply, Stephen's response, and a final rejoinder by Manning.¹¹

Manning's 'Caesarism and Ultramontanism' aroused such controversy because it was taken by his contemporaries to be a statement of the most extreme ultramontane position on the relations of Church and State. *The Times*, for example, claimed, to be startled 'to hear the fully-developed Roman theory proclaimed . . . with such vehement explicitness of iteration'.¹² Gladstone's remarks included the accusation that the Church had 'refurbished and paraded anew every rusty tool she was fondly thought to have disused'.¹³ Indeed, the only modern historian to have noticed Manning's address summarizes and quotes it in a way that confirms the contemporary interpretation of it as an instance of ultramontane overstatement.¹⁴

'Caesarism and Ultramontanism' was clearly topical: there can be no doubt that Manning used the occasion of this address to respond to disturbing manifestations of the *Kulturkampf*. Nor is there any question that it contains the rhetoric of the Roman 'thesis' position: the duty of the State to recognize the Church, support it and defer to the Church's own discernment of its spiritual mission. But there are other dimensions of this important statement by Manning and of the larger controversy it engendered that are not understood at all by viewing them only under the aspect of ultramontane polemic.

'Caesarism and Ultramontanism' and the controversial articles that followed upon it are a critique of modern politics—especially its statism and nationalism, in Germany, but also in England. More significantly, they represent another stage in Manning's effort to respond positively and creatively—aggressively, as his opponents charged—to the opportunities offered religious organizations by the new circumstances of mass democratic politics, especially in England. His opponents, however, both overestimated and underestimated Manning's intention if they thought his assertiveness in 'Caesarism and Ultramontanism' was aimed at restoring the exclusive and dominant position of the Church in the *ancien régime*. Manning's aim was both more compatible with the liberal national State than his opponents imagined, and a greater challenge to it than they feared.

It is significant that Manning chose a meeting of the Academia of the Catholic Religion as the occasion to castigate the *Kulturkampf*. It was, we know, an organization that he had played an important rôle in establishing and guiding, and one from which he had great expectations. In the past, especially in the sessions of 1866-67 and 1868-69, he had used the privilege he reserved to himself of delivering the inaugural address at annual meetings to make important statements about the condition and prospects of religion in England: the conditions and prospects of the Catholic Church, of course, but also, of the Established Church and the Nonconformists. Often, he dealt with the relation between Church and State, but less in theoretical terms than in commentary on the actual condition of those relations in contemporary Britain. Finally, it is interesting to note that in appraising Church-State relations, Manning spent much more time on the Established Church, the church of his birth, than he did on the church of his conversion.¹⁵ These addresses, I have argued earlier in these pages, represented an effort by Manning in the late 1860's to work out a rationale for the collaboration of Catholics with other committed Christian communities in the new circumstances of a non-sectarian but tolerant State, a pluralist religious community, and an increasingly democratic political culture.¹⁶

When Manning spoke, therefore, before the Academia of the Catholic Religion in December, 1873, on 'Caesarism and Ultramontanism,' it was in a particular context and as part of a continuing discourse about the political rôle of religious organizations in the changing circumstances of the liberal State as it was emerging in Great Britain.

That 'Caesarism and Ultramontanism' *should* in fact be read as another instalment of Manning's reflections on the place of a religious organization within the liberal State may be seen from what follows: Manning's address, as we have noted, evoked an immediate response: *The Times*, for example, editorializing against him the very next day, Christmas Eve. In light of this public response, Manning published the address with a preface, dated January 1, 1874, replying to the more important objections that had been made to it. Manning had stated in his address that wherever the civil and spiritual powers had been united in a government, the Church had been

and religious persecution followed. Critics objected that the condition of his own country [i.e., England, with its Established Church] was a refutation of this claim. Manning's rather surprising response to this objection was that he expressly excluded England in the present century from his generalization. He went on to quote extensively from his Inaugural Address to the Academia for the session 1868-69. The passage quoted contains a long quotation from a still earlier address to the Academia, that of 1866-67. This latter quotation was an account, first, of the collapse of the ecclesiastical supremacy of the Established Church through the gradual repeal of the penal and exclusive legislation—what, in another place, Manning had referred to as the 'moral disestablishment' of the Church of England.¹⁷ Second, the passage from the 1866-67 address describes the rejection of that supremacy by the great majority of the people in Ireland and Scotland, by Dissenters, and even by many in the Established Church itself.¹⁸ 'England,' Manning concluded in answer to his objectors, 'is therefore a normal example of my meaning. We have neither despotism nor persecution, because the exercise of the two powers is not united in one person.'¹⁹

Two important points must be made in relation to Manning's treatment of objectors in this preface to the published version of 'Caesarism and Ultramontanism'. First, of course, is the obvious one that as a key to understanding this present controversial essay, critics were referred to, and, indeed, offered selections from Manning's earlier reflections on Church-State relations. Second, far from being an instance of conflict between the Catholic Church and a modern secular State, England was a *counter indication* to developments Manning reprehended in Germany. Manning, as we have seen, believed that the Church of England was now *disestablished*—virtually, at least—and that the exercise of ecclesiastical supremacy by the civil power was decisively rejected by the great majority of people in the United Kingdom. England was, therefore, precisely *not* a State in which any Church could still be described as established, and so civil despotism and religious persecution did not occur. England was a counter indication to Prussian domination of the Church as an example of the authentically liberal, non-sectarian State. For such a State, in Manning's view, relationship to the Church was defined by an acceptance of the limits of the State's power, and the implicit recognition, therefore, of the autonomy of the Church in its own sphere. This second point will become clearer as we undertake a reading of the address.

Manning's object, he declared at the beginning of 'Caesarism and Ultramontanism,' was to understand the conflict in which the Church found itself in Germany and elsewhere; to discover the special and distinctive in that conflict in his own day. Now, obviously the Church had been in conflict with the civil power before it met Bismarck. In the Church's earliest encounters with the Roman Empire, for example, the emperors had claimed a political and religious supremacy—indeed, a divine status—and were unwilling to tolerate any jurisdiction apart from their own. From the

policy of the Caesars to hold all power—religious as well as civil—in their own hands, Manning derived his use of the term 'Caesarism,' and employed it to describe the political position of those like Bismarck who stood for the concentration of civil and religious power in a single political entity, whether king, assembly or the people as a whole.

The effect of Christianity on political life in the West, Manning believed, had been to limit the jurisdiction of the civil power by withdrawing from its control what Manning called 'the inner life of man',²⁰ that is, his intellect, conscience and will. This 'inner life' had been redeemed, restored and set free by God in Christ, and so it was only God or God's church that had authority over this part of human life. This religious anthropology precedes immediately, and so contextualizes one of the more controversial passages in the address: 'Obedience to the Church is liberty; and it is liberty because the Church cannot err or mislead either men or nations. . . . This is Ultramontanism, or the liberty of the soul divinely guaranteed by an infallible Church; the proper check and restraint on Caesarism. . . .'²¹

The liberty of the Church was not only for the sake, however, of the interior life of the believer. In a brief historical overview of relations of Church and State in the medieval period, Manning went on to indicate how he thought their encounter had led to ideas of the civil liberties of individuals and of government limited by laws. This was basically the idea of the two powers, civil and religious, each autonomous in its own sphere, but with the claims of the spiritual accorded precedence and acknowledged as a restraint on the exercise of civil power.

In distinguishing, therefore, between pagan Caesarism and the relationship of Church and State worked out in the medieval period, among the differences Manning noted were the following: 'the first [Caesarism] makes religion an instrument or department of State; the second makes it the limitation of civil power, and the protection of human liberty. The first treats the Church as subject to itself; the second treats all civil power as subject to God and His law, of which the Church is the guardian and interpreter'. And he concluded: 'This is Ultramontanism: the essence of which, is that, the Church being a Divine institution, and by Divine assistance infallible, is, within its own sphere, independent of all civil powers; and, as the guardian and interpreter of the Divine law, it is the proper judge of men and of nations in all things touching that law in faith and morals'.²²

The invocation of the word, 'ultramontanism,' would, Manning well knew, provoke misunderstanding and risk dismissal of this carefully crafted statement of the Church's relationship to the State. Therefore, in the next section of his address, he undertook to show that what he called ultramontanism was identical with the perennial Catholic position on Church and State, and indeed, not only with Catholicism, but with what any Christian would think on this subject.

Manning believed that his argument about the inevitable relationship between Christianity and the civil power could be reduced to two simple

principles: 1) the separation of the two powers; 2) the supremacy of the spiritual over the civil in all matters within its competence. These two principles were the ultramontane position on Church-State relations: 'the Bull "Unam Sanctam" contains no more . . . the Vatican Council could define no less'. It was a mistake, however, to think, as many obviously did, that the ultramontane position on Church-State relations was an innovation of the Vatican Council: 'its definitions enunciated nothing new; . . . its two Constitutions were, as Parliament would say, not enacting but declaratory acts; . . . they have changed nothing and added nothing either to the constitutions of the Church, or to the relations of the Church with the civil powers of the world'.²³

These principles, then, although they were the essence of the ultramontane position on Church-State relations, were, according to Manning, only what all Christians had always and everywhere believed. It was ultramontanism, Manning admitted, to insist on the separation of powers and the supremacy of the spiritual power in its own sphere, 'but it is not Ultramontanism alone; it is Christianity as it has been held by all men in all ages, by Catholics and Protestants alike, by Ultramontanes and by Gallicans, by Anglicans and by Presbyterians, by the Free Churches of England . . .'.²⁴ Conflict came, obviously, when Church and State both considered the same matter to be within their competence. But Manning thought the absolute character of the claims of conscience and faith made religious authority the ultimate judge in such disputes, and did not see how this could be denied by any Christian without denying Christianity. This, again, was all that was claimed by 'Unam Sanctam,' by the *Syllabus* or by the Vatican Council.²⁵

It is important to appreciate the character and reach of the authority Manning attributed to the Church in matters of faith and morals, because his position was largely misapprehended by his critics. Manning certainly realized that acceptance of the claims of conscience or of faith—and the Church's interest in them—depended, finally, on whether the State would allow the Church such authority: 'let it be clearly understood that in these assertions I am vindicating the Church in her Divine rights. I am not denying to the State its power to violate every Divine right upon earth. It may abuse its power at the license of its will . . . I only deny its right'.²⁶

In other words, it was not Manning's belief that the Church had or ought to have any power to enforce its authority against the State. It was only if so far as the State acknowledged and accepted limits upon its power that the Church could exercise its ministry in any kind of public way. But the acceptance of such limitation, the recognition that there were claims of conscience and of faith higher than the State knew, made the difference between tyranny and justice, between slavery and freedom: 'All freedom of soul and conscience of men, in families, in States, comes from the limitation of the civil power; but the limitation of the civil power can come only from a superior authority. That superior authority is not in the order of material power, but of Divine right. The limitation which has changed Caesarism

into Christian monarchy is law; and that law, the law of God, represented, expounded, applied upon earth, by an authority of His own creation . . .²⁷

During the history of Christendom, which for Manning extended from the fourth to the sixteenth century, the essence of Christianity in the political order had consisted in the separation of the powers, 'temporal and spiritual, into distinct authorities and spheres of jurisdiction, vested in distinct persons. To this we owe the order, progress, civilisation, and, so far as there has been peace on earth, the peace of the Christian world'.²⁸

The Reformation, of course, with its institution of royal supremacy, represented from Manning's point of view the recrudescence of Caesarism: the reunion in one person of the two powers which Christendom had put asunder. Now what was remarkable to Manning in the subsequent history of Protestant nations—particularly of the United Kingdom—was the reaction against what he termed a mixed civil and religious despotism. In England and Wales, Nonconformists and Catholics, who now represented about half the population, had suffered under this despotism, but eventually had obtained a complete religious liberty; in Ireland, the whole population had recently attained freedom in this regard; Scotland had always resisted royal interference, and only recently half the Presbyterian population had broken with the Established Church over the last remnants of civil interference in the law of patronage.²⁹

It is clear that in Manning's view, this rejection of the royal supremacy in the name of religious freedom represented a completely new stage in the relationship between Church and State: different from pagan Caesarism, or the political order of Christendom, or the Reformation royal supremacy. It was, in fact, that new stage of the Church's relationship with the State whose distinctiveness Manning had set out to discover at the beginning of his enquiry.

As far as Manning was concerned, the political tendencies of this new stage were certainly ambivalent as regarded the freedom of the Church. There was, for example, a very widespread opinion in favour of 'free Churches'. This tendency manifested itself on the one hand in what Manning called the 'desecration of the State': that is to say, in the religious neutrality of the State in relation to the denominations, a neutrality that Manning certainly welcomed in the English context. On the other hand, he recognized that the cry for free churches also mean aggression against the (Catholic) Church. This is what it had meant in the case of the pope's temporal sovereignty, which had been 'violated on the plea that the civil and spiritual powers ought to be once more separated, not as Providence had ordained hitherto, but on the impossible theory of a free Church in a free State'.³⁰

In the mid-sixties, Manning had believed that the temporal sovereignty of the pope was necessary for the free exercise of the Church's mission: necessary at least for the way in which that mission had always been exercised in the Christian world.³¹ He was in the process of modifying this

belief, and by 1876 would urge upon the Vatican an accommodation with the Italian government that the Vatican was unwilling to make.³² But what was it about 'a free Church in a free State' (the formula was the Italian government's and that of continental liberals in general) that Manning thought so impossible? Not, certainly, the idea of separation itself, since that was part of his own theory of Church-State relations; nor, surely, the notion of the religious neutrality of the State, which, Manning was beginning to think, operated in the best interests of the Church, certainly in Britain, her great colonies, and also the United States. What Manning thought impossible were the practical consequences of the theory of a free Church in a free State. 'The Italian Revolution,' Manning observed, 'has put this [theory] forward as its solution of the religious conflicts of the nineteenth century. It will endure until the first quarrel, and the first quarrel will arise upon the first pontifical act in condemnation of the usurpations of the free State. The supremacy of the civil power will then be declared to be vital to its freedom'.³³

It was, therefore, neither the notion of separation, nor the prospect of the religious neutrality of the State that concerned Manning as he considered this new stage in the relationship between Church and State. But he perceived that the modern reaction against official recognition or establishment of Churches and in favour of the non-sectarian State might be worked to very different purposes, some of them, paradoxically, quite inimical to the freedom of the Church. In Italy, for example, Manning believed certain acts of the so-called 'free State' against the Church had been of a violent and sacrilegious character. Even so, he was confident that the Catholic faith and instinct of the people would save Italy from an organized and systematic effort to subvert the divine liberty of the Church.³⁴ Prussia, however, was a different story. There, ecclesiastical legislation which claimed to vindicate the rights of the State against the Churches embodied explicitly anti-Christian doctrines in principle and in law. This legislation Manning considered 'the link between the old royal supremacies of the sixteenth century and the revived *Lex Regia* which the anti-Christian revolution is preparing for the future of Europe'.³⁵

In Prussia, therefore, Manning thought he recognized the form of a new and distinctively modern Caesarism. The essence of this modern Caesarism was the assertion 'not only that the State has supreme power over the Church in all persons and causes, but supreme power to determine the limits of the rights of the Church: its liberties, offices and duties; or, in other words, that the State can determine, and the Church cannot determine, what is the authority and commission entrusted to it by its Divine Founder'.³⁶

This new Caesarism was consequent upon the desecration of the State, which Manning considered to be the chief aspect of the changed relationship between Church and State in the modern world. That desecration, it must be emphasized, was not itself Caesarism, since England, which Manning regarded as a desecrated State, was explicitly exempted from the

imputation of Caesarism. But that was not to say that Caesarism of the Prussian variety could not gain a hold in England. For, as we have seen, the willingness of the religiously neutral State to concede the Churches their rights was nothing more than a matter of its own self-restraint. Indeed, the circumstances surrounding this address to the Academia argue that concern over the possibility of England following the Prussian example was precisely what had prompted Manning to deliver it. For if, as I have been arguing, Manning had by 1873 come to terms with—even embraced—the political action of the Churches in the democratic environment of the religiously neutral State, what he had most to fear was the appearance on the English scene of the kind of statism that was behind the Falk laws.

In 'Caesarism and Ultramontaniam,' Manning cited a number of indications that such a sentiment was present in England. There was, for example, the meeting impending under the presidency of Earl Russell to express sympathy with Bismarck.³⁷ Another piece of evidence for the existence in England of Prussian ways of thinking was a passage quoted by Manning from the *Pall Mall Gazette*. In this article, the anonymous writer, commenting upon developments in Germany, turned to the English scene, and remarked upon a 'conviction . . . exceedingly powerful [that] has been and still is growing up, that a nation, as such, is essentially a better thing than a Church; that it is . . . the most sacred, the most deeply rooted in human nature, and the best fitted to engage the affections of a rational man. Contrast for a moment the English nation and the Catholic Church, and see to which of the two it is best worth an Englishman's while to be loyal. . . . All this, we say, puts nations above Churches as objects of affection and loyalty. . . . We should regard no one as really loyal to his nation who did not regard it as being to him a higher and more sacred object than any Church whatever'. Manning's response was, 'this doctrine is revived Paganism'.³⁸

It is almost certain that the author of this anonymous piece in the *Pall Mall Gazette* was James Fitzjames Stephen, the distinguished jurist and legal scholar.³⁹ If that is so, Manning, by singling this passage out, provoked a response from Stephen with his mask down, in March, 1874, in the pages of the *Contemporary Review*, and initiated a controversy that ran in the next three issues of that journal.

We have seen that it was an important element in Manning's protest against the Falk laws to argue that the freedom claimed for the Church by ultramontane Roman Catholics was no more than the independence from State control of doctrine and discipline claimed by every Christian denomination in England. This freedom had its source, we recall, in the authority of the Church over the inner life of man redeemed by Christ, an authority which the Church received from God.

Like other critics of 'Caesarism and Ultramontaniam,' Stephen believed that Manning was trying to set up the spiritual authority of the Roman Catholic Church over men's consciences in opposition to their loyalty to the State. It made sense for him, therefore, to call that authority into question.

Now Stephen had the reputation of being a powerful and thorough-going controversialist. The method he adopted in his first essay against Manning, also called 'Caesarism and Ultramontaniam,' was characteristic of his controversial style: to proceed logically in his purpose of undermining the supposed authority ultramontanes claimed for the Church by a systematic critique, first, of the existence of God; then, of the truth of Christianity; and, finally, of the intention of Jesus to found a Church at all.⁴⁰

This was proving rather more against Manning than was necessary and involved Stephen in a mistake of strategy. For it offered Manning the opportunity of appealing against Stephen to other British Christians on grounds of the integrity of the Church and its fidelity to revelation. And this was precisely what Manning did in his response to Stephen, 'Ultramontaniam and Christianity'.⁴¹

The authority that Manning wished to vindicate was, of course, the authority of the Roman Catholic Church. What was intriguing, however, about his procedure in 'Ultramontaniam and Christianity,' and consistent with earlier treatment of Church-State questions,⁴² was the decision to prove his case that the Church is separate and supreme in its own sphere without any reference at all to Roman Catholic teaching, but 'only [on] the evidence of non-Catholic witnesses'.⁴³

In an essay of 34 pages, 22 pages were devoted to an exposition of the teachings of the Church of England, the Kirk of Scotland, the Free Kirk and the Free Churches of England on the independence and supremacy of the Churches in the sphere of faith and morals. Manning's vindication of the independence of the Church of England in relation to the crown is as sympathetic a presentation of the integrity and autonomy of that Church as any Anglican could have desired.⁴⁴ One reads it with the sense that, on this occasion, Manning had refurbished arguments with which he was used to assure himself of the viability of the Anglican position before his conversion. And even though he points out that the autonomy claimed by the Established Church had been 'again and again violently overborne by the Crown and Parliament,' he forbears to draw the conclusion he himself once drew from this state of affairs, observing that 'it is not my purpose now to point out the reach and bearing of this . . . in relation to Catholic truth and unity'.⁴⁵

At the end of his essay on 'Ultramontaniam and Christianity,' Manning concluded, without quoting so much as a single Catholic authority, that the universal witness of Christianity in Britain was for the independence and freedom of the Church:

I therefore affirm again that every Christian, who believes Christianity in a Divine Revelation, must also believe that a Divine Revelation is independent of all civil authorities, and is dependent upon the authority of God alone, whether that Divine authority make itself known by its own action in the isolated conscience of each individual man, or in the assembly of each Christian sect, or in the congregation of a Presbytery, or by the acts of an Episcopate, or by the voice of the Visible Head of the Universal Church. The forms, indeed, are different; the principle is one and the same. The revelation of God is sustained and promulgated

to the world by the authority of God Himself, in independence of all civil authorities, and in supremacy over them all.⁴⁶

It is obvious that Manning's appeal to the common witness of British Christianity, even of the Established Churches, against usurpation of the civil power, was made for the sake of a telling controversial point, exploiting an opening Stephen had offered. Stephen himself recognized this, and in the next instalment of the controversy, his 'Caesarism and Ultramontaniam' of May, 1873, cited the above passage, accusing Manning of inconsistency and insincerity in adopting a policy and tone toward other Christian denominations that was contradicted by the history of Catholic persecution.⁴⁷ And, of course, Stephen was right in judging that Manning's opening to the denominations was a departure from Catholic theory and practice. But he was wrong in thinking it insincere on Manning's part, or made only for the sake of polemical or partisan advantage.

For polemical effectiveness against the likes of Stephen was by no means all that Manning looked for from the irenic gesture of appealing to the universal witness of British Christianity in favour of a higher law than the law of the State. The invocation of a shared witness to the freedom of the Church clearly implied, in circumstances where religious freedom was arguably threatened by statism for all denominations, a willingness to mobilize and work together with other Christian denominations on issues of common concern and against common enemies. In Manning's next and final contribution to the controversy, his 'Christianity and Antichristianism',⁴⁸ we see those implications emerge and Manning accept them.

J. F. Stephen was again the occasion for Manning to consolidate and express his position. Respondents to 'Ultramontaniam and Christianity,' had, Manning said, admitted his main point, that all Christian denominations, at one time or another, presented themselves as representing a higher authority than the State in their claims on the consciences of men.⁴⁹ Against this claim, Stephen had defended the proposition that 'the nation is a higher and more sacred object than any Church whatsoever,' and so commanded a higher loyalty and obedience.⁵⁰

This assertion offered Manning the opportunity to portray the issue between himself and those of Stephen's mind who supported the *Kulturkampf* in the clearest possible light, and in such a way as to make the broadest possible appeal to all British Christians for concerted action. 'The conflict now raging,' Manning maintained, was nothing less than one 'between Christianity and Antichristianism. As the enemies of Christianity widen out their line against the Christian name in every country of Europe, so it is our duty to widen out our defence along the whole line of Christian faith.'⁵¹ That defence, Manning states in the essay, would be fought out over issues having to do with education, laws concerning marriage and the family, public and private morality:⁵² precisely those issues, in other words, that had been and would continue to be of utmost concern not just to English Roman Catholics, but to all English Christians in the 1870's. And Manning was convinced that 'the people of England would at once intrust

authority over marriage and education rather to Christianity than to Secularism, or Caesarism, or Scepticism, or to a State stripped of the laws and morals of Christianity'.⁵³

In vindicating the right of the Roman Catholic Church, whether in Germany or in England, to speak freely on issues of public policy, and to act in the political arena uninhibited by exceptive or penal legislation, it had never been part of Manning's brief to claim a privileged position in that arena for the Roman Catholic Church. Still less had he ever tried to argue that the infallibility of the Church or of the pope was the grounds for his claiming the Catholic Church's political rights. In fact, it had been the main point of his previous essay ('Ultramontaniam and Christianity') to show that all Christians, whatever the form or constitution of their Church, shared with Catholics a belief in the sovereignty of God and of God's law which was their common charter for political action. In 'Christianity and Antichristianism,' he announced his desire 'to rally all Christians in our common cause against the growing antichristianism of the day.'⁵⁴

This struggle against antichristianism as the common enemy of all British Christians committed Manning and the English Catholic community to a degree of political initiative, creativity, activism and collaboration with other religiously-minded people organized for political purposes that was typical neither of Roman Catholic theory of the Church's relation to the State, nor, certainly, of the practice, up until then, of English Roman Catholics.

NOTES

¹ The opportunity to write this article was provided to me while I was Visiting Fellow at the Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University. I would like to make this occasion to express my gratitude for the support and hospitality I received there.

² Hubert Jedin (ed.), *History of the Church* (London, 1981), Vol. IX, p. 40.

³ See Manning's strictures on Gladstone's unwillingness to condemn the *Kulturkampf* in H. E. Manning: *The Vatican Decrees in their Bearing on Civil Allegiance* (London, 1975), pp. 125-126.

⁴ Hubert Jedin, *op. cit.*, pp. 33-37.

⁵ *Ibidem*, vol. IX, pp. 37-38.

⁶ The Academia of the Catholic Religion was a learned society established in 1861 by Cardinal Wiseman on the model of the Roman Academy of Letters. Manning was involved in the Academia from its very inception, and when he became archbishop, made efforts to expand it beyond London by establishing branches in the provinces. Originally intended by Wiseman as a place for Catholic men of letters to meet monthly to read and discuss papers on theology, philosophy and history, the Academia became under Manning something more like Mechanics' Institutes for Catholics. As president of the Academia, Manning regularly gave the Inaugural Address at its sessions and used the occasion for some of his more significant public pronouncements. See E. S. Purcell: *Life of Cardinal Manning* (London, 1896), vol. II, pp. 384-385; V. A. McClelland: *Cardinal Manning: His Public Life and Influence* (London, 1962), pp. 126-127; Robert Gray: *Cardinal Manning* (London, 1985), p. 183.

⁷ In Manning: *Miscellanies* (London, 1909) Second Series, pp. 51-98.

⁸ When Manning published the address, he did so with a preface, dated January 1, 1874, that sought to reply to 'a great many answers and objections [that] have been made to it from various quarters' (Manning, 'Caesarism and Ultramontaniam,' in *Miscellanies*, Second Series, p. 53). See also press reaction from the *Pall Mall Gazette* and *The Times*, reported in W. L. Arnstein: *Protestant versus Catholic in Mid-Victorian Britain* (Columbia, MD, 1982), p. 188.

⁹ And earned Russell the thanks of Bismarck. See Arnstein, *op. cit.*, p. 188.

¹⁰ Gladstone, 'Essay on Ritualism,' in the *Contemporary Review*, 24 (October, 1874), p. 674, quoted in Arnstein, p. 190: '... no one can become her convert without renouncing his moral and mental freedom, and placing his civil loyalty and duty at the mercy of another ...'. Manning had sent Gladstone a copy of 'Caesarism and Ultramontaniam' in January, 1874. See Gladstone's response: 'Caesarism is the same thing as Erastianism. I can look on with comfort or equanimity while you pummed it ... but when

you get on your heights [i.e., on Ultramontanist] I am lame, deaf, and blind' Gladstone to Manning, January 22, 1874, quoted in Shane Leslie, *Henry Edward Manning* (London, 1921) p. 246. See also Robert Gray: *Cardinal Manning* (London, 1985) pp. 246-247.

¹¹ James Fitzjames Stephen, 'Caesarism and Ultramontanist,' in *Contemporary Review*, vol. 23 (March, 1874), pp. 497-527; Manning: 'Ultramontanist and Christianity,' *CR*, vol. 23 (April, 1874), pp. 683-702; Stephen: 'Caesarism and Ultramontanist,' *CR*, vol. 23 (May, 1874), pp. 989-1017; Manning: 'Christianity and Antichristianism,' *CR*, vol. 24 (June, 1874), pp. 149-174.

¹² *The Times* 24 December 1873, quoted in Arnstein, p. 188.

¹³ Gladstone, 'Ritualism and Ritual,' in *Contemporary Review*, vol. 24 (October, 1874), p. 674, quoted in Arnstein, p. 190. See Manning, 'Caesarism and Ultramontanist,' p. 80.

¹⁴ See Arnstein, pp. 187-188: 'Since the church was infallible, there was no cause for any jurisdictional dispute between the state and the church. Because the church is "certain with a Divine certainty as to the limits of its jurisdiction, its voice in such matters is final." The notion of a "free Church in a free State" was therefore an "impossible theory".'

¹⁵ See Manning: 'On the Subjects Proper to the Academia,' (session 1863-4), pp. 73-110; 'Inaugural Address,' (session 1866-7), pp. 171-192; 'Inaugural Address,' (session 1868-9), pp. 257-292, all in *Miscellanies*, First Series (London, 1869).

¹⁶ See my 'Manning's Ultramontanist and the Catholic Church in British Politics,' in *Recusant History*, Vol. 19, No. 3 (May, 1989), pp. 332-347.

¹⁷ See Manning: *England and Christendom* (London, 1897), p. xxxix.

¹⁸ Manning 'Caesarism and Ultramontanist,' in *Miscellanies*, Second Series, pp. 54-56.

¹⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 56.

²⁰ *Ibidem*, p. 70.

²¹ *Ibidem*, p. 71.

²² *Ibidem*, p. 76.

²³ *Ibidem*, p. 77.

²⁴ *Ibidem*, p. 83.

²⁵ *Ibidem*, p. 80.

²⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 82.

²⁷ *Ibidem*, p. 83.

²⁸ *Ibidem*, p. 84.

²⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 86.

³⁰ *Ibidem*, p. 86.

³¹ See my 'Manning's Ultramontanist and the Catholic Church in British Politics,' in *Recusant History*, p. 334.

³² See Robert Gray: *Cardinal Manning* (London, 1985), p. 261 and E. S. Purcell: *Life of Cardinal Manning*, vol. II, p. 610-615.

³³ 'Caesarism and Ultramontanist,' *op. cit.*, pp. 86-87.

³⁴ *Ibidem*, p. 87.

³⁵ *Ibidem*, p. 87.

³⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 89.

³⁷ *Ibidem*, p. 97.

³⁸ *Ibidem*, p. 88.

³⁹ Stephen was writing extensively for the *Poll-Magazine* and the rhetoric and argument is similar to what one finds in his replies to Manning in the *Contemporary Review* (see especially, J. F. Stephen: 'Caesarism and Ultramontanist,' *Contemporary Review* 23 (May 1874), p. 1015, where Stephen states the passage quoted by Manning 'entirely express my own views'). See also Leslie Stephen: *The Life of Sir James Fitzjames Stephen* (London, 1985) pp. 213-214; also p. 373.

⁴⁰ James Fitzjames Stephen: 'Caesarism and Ultramontanist,' in *Contemporary Review*, 23 (March, 1874) pp. 497-527.

⁴¹ Manning: 'Ultramontanist and Christianity,' in *Miscellanies*, Second Series, pp. 101-135; also in *Contemporary Review* 23 (April, 1874) pp. 683-702.

⁴² See my 'Manning's Ultramontanist and the Catholic Church in British Politics,' in *Recusant History*, p. 340.

⁴³ 'Caesarism and Christianity,' in *Miscellanies*, Second Series, p. 112.

⁴⁴ *Ibidem*, pp. 122-126.

⁴⁵ *Ibidem*, p. 126.

⁴⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 134.

⁴⁷ Stephen: 'Caesarism and Ultramontanist,' in *Contemporary Review*, 23 (May, 1874), p. 1002.

⁴⁸ Manning: 'Christianity and Antichristianism,' in *Miscellanies*, Second Series, pp. 137-184, also in *Contemporary Review* 24 (June, 1874), pp. 149-174.

⁴⁹ 'Christianity and Antichristianism,' p. 144.

⁵⁰ *Ibidem*, p. 177.

⁵¹ *Ibidem*, p. 176.

⁵² *Ibidem*, vol. II, p. 241-242.

⁵³ *Ibidem*, p. 177-178.

⁵⁴ *Ibidem*, vol. II, p. 155.

MANNING AS POLITICIAN

by DERMOT QUINN

IT IS a convention—now hardened to cliché—of Victorian historiography that Henry Edward Manning and John Henry Newman lived parallel lives: both virtual contemporaries, both sons of bankrupt fathers, both Oxford Anglicans with promise of greatness, both converts to Rome, both ascetics, both Cardinals. Equally conventional are the differences: Newman's subtlety, Manning's stoutness, Newman's 'Englishness', Manning's *Romanità*, Newman the outsider, Manning an Establishment figure from the start. These conceits are serviceable, but a more useful linkage is this: Manning and Newman lived not parallel lives, but paradoxical ones, the paradox being that each, in a sense, lived the other man's life. Consider how each developed in unimagined ways. Newman was one of the most private men of his day. To a temperament already solitary was added the isolation of conversion, then the loneliness of failure, finally the realisation that he represented only a minority in a flamboyantly Ultramontane church. Yet Newman was never left alone with his solitude. His inner life became public property: his soul-struggle debated in the popular prints, his spiritual journey subject of tract and pamphlet and letter to the editor. People thought they knew him better than he knew himself, and, were they a Henry Kingsley or a Robert Wilberforce or an Orestes Brownson, lost little time in telling him. The boundaries of a decent interiority were crossed again and again, until he became icon, symbol, Everyman's Newman.

Such was the paradox of one cardinal. With the other, it could be said, the pattern was similar in every detail, except in reverse. By every appearance, Manning was a man of action, born to public life. He was lobbyist, organizer, administrator. As an undergraduate, he dreamed of the House of Commons. The cabinet might have been his, perhaps a place at the head of it. Newman never aspired to public life or political office, but Manning did. For all that, he was convinced that the call to priesthood had put an end to vainglorious ambition. No theme is sounded more frequently in his writings than the claim that religion meant for him an abjuration of the world. On retreat before his consecration as Archbishop of Westminster, he reviewed his life. At the age of 24, he had possessed 'the strongest worldly ambition for public life a man could well have':

But God held me when I did not know it. He then called me out of politics and the World on which I was bent. He called me as I then believed to be a Pastor. He then called me to serve him at the cost of all things as a Catholic. He then called me to be a priest. He then called me to be an Oblate. He has now called me to the greatest cross of my life and to the greatest separation from the world.¹

Eighteen years later, his work almost done, the sense of renunciation was unchanged. On becoming a Catholic, he wrote, 'I could not have