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Furthermore, significant as crime was in Petrograd for the political fortunes of the Bolsheviks, one could argue that there were more important reasons that explained their coming to power in the Fall of 1917, such as Lenin's ideological justifications that convinced members of his party that the time was ripe for the revolution to transition from the bourgeois-democratic phase of development to the proletarian-socialist one, as well as the Bolsheviks' answers to the popular demands for 1) an end to Russia's participation in the Great War, 2) workers' control in the factories, 3) a large measure of autonomy on the peripheries of the now deceased Russian Empire, where many non-Russian nationalities were located, and 4) the legalization of the seizure by the peasants of nobles' estates in the countryside. Should not all historians try to avoid mistaking a tree, even a big one, for a forest? Nevertheless, as a street-level analysis of the disturbances and chaos that engulfed Petrograd in 1917, this monograph—a project that was in the making, the author confesses in a brief epilogue, for thirty years—is very much worth reading.

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HONG, Young-Sun – *Cold War Germany, the Third World, and the Global Humanitarian Regime*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015. Pp. 427.

Young-Sun Hong's book is a welcome contribution to global Cold War history, the sprawling field that explores the military, diplomatic, and development activities not only of the US and USSR, but of other states as well. Deeply researched and densely argued, the book examines Cold War Germany (the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic, or West and East Germany) and its engagement with what was, at the time, known as the "Third World." In addition to central Europe, the action unfolds in Algeria, Cameroon, Congo, Egypt, Guinea, India, the Koreas, the Philippines, Tanzania, Uganda, and Vietnam—parts of what David Engerman in *Kritika* (2011) so evocatively called the "second world's third world."

Like much other work published since Odd Arne Westad's *Global Cold War* (2005), this book holds the conviction that the conflict cannot be understood as epiphenomenal to the Moscow-Washington rivalry. Rather, undertakings of the type Hong examines had an independent logic and momentum of their own, albeit one connected to the greater drama. She explores a wide range of German international activity that falls under the rubric of what she calls the "global humanitarian regime," encompassing medical aid, housing and infrastructure construction, public health, and medical education. These included East German efforts to help North Korea rebuild after the 1953 armistice, West German construction and operation of a South Korean hospital in postwar Pusan, and both Germany's medical missions to Algeria and Congo (among other destinations) in

the mid-1960s. The two countries pursued forward- and backward-looking goals, building relationships in the “global south” (as we now call it) to burnish an image tarnished by the legacy of National Socialism, simultaneously hoping to undercut the global standing of their fraternal rival.

Hong’s focus is on the 1950s and 1960s, when the Germanys were locked in combat for legitimacy in the international arena. Bonn refused to recognize East Germany (referring to it only as the Soviet Occupation Zone) and sought to impose a global isolation via what was known as the Halstein doctrine, under which West Germany threatened to sever diplomatic relations with any country that recognized East German sovereignty. The East Germans condemned the West as a redoubt for fascism and little more than an appendage of US imperial ambition. Closed in separate spheres—West Germany in the “empire of liberty,” East Germany in the “empire of justice” (to use Westad’s formulation)—both nonetheless had similar goals in reaching out to newly independent states emerging from colonial rule.

Hong makes clear how “notions of civilizational difference” (p. 13), ideas with genealogical roots in nineteenth-century imperialism, were rearticulated in what she calls “the three-world paradigm” (p. 15). This paradigm maintained the centrality of a “civilizational gradient” (p. 127), powered by the unequal distribution of financial and military capital, which ran downhill from north to south. One of the book’s continuous threads is how what both German states presented as “racial or/civilizational difference” (p. 269) was little more than thinly disguised, and sometimes undisguised, racism. Held by both, it underlay a neocolonial project that envisioned some parts of the south “primarily as a source of labor power and raw materials needed to realize the creative visions of industrialized countries” (p. 307). Indeed, this meticulously documented argument is a major conceptual contribution to histories not only of Germany and the Cold War, but to development, international organizations, and of the postwar order at large.

Yet if the Germanys’ humanitarian efforts were far from disinterested, Hong also shows that the targets of German designs were more than objects of exploitation and pawns of Cold War rivalries. Both German states depended on their southern allies to achieve important policy and ideological goals, and their counterparts in Dar es Salaam, Hanoi, and Pyongyang knew it. They were aware of how the Germans depended on them—if in a fashion different to their own dependence—and used that knowledge to whipsaw their German partners (p. 7). In following the plans and people that moved from Bonn and Berlin to Congo and the Koreas, Hong shows how local actors “adapted, adopted, rejected, integrated or ignored” the “global designs” of the great powers (p. 2). Thus, while both Germanys were convinced of their superior modernity with respect to their southern partners (and, for that matter, to each other), each found that success on their own terms was elusive and partial.

Thus, in 1954, when East German planners and engineers arrived in North Korea, full of plans to rebuild the city of Hamhung—which saw 90% of housing and industrial plants destroyed during the Korean War—they also brought with them the conviction that their mission would “showcase [East German]

technological achievements for all the world to see” (p. 71). North Korea and East Germany both embraced socialist modernity, but Hong shows how modernity’s actual content was no shared vision. In planning and building housing, the two had significantly different beliefs, for example, on ceiling heights and the type of beds on which people should sleep. A shared commitment to socialist internationalism ostensibly underwrote their relationship, yet divergent values—such as how to measure the benefit of individual or communal toilets against overall costs—made cooperation difficult. The Koreans stood firm in their belief that futons laid directly on a heated floor, in a low-ceilinged room, were a more efficient use of resources. Faced with their hosts’ insistence on cost containment, the Germans were disappointed: “they had not come halfway around the world just to build cheap housing that could hardly serve as a model of socialist modernity” (p. 79).

As Hong so colorfully illustrates, an inherent aspect of all international aid—humanitarian or otherwise, of “East” or “West”—is that donor and recipient interests align imperfectly. Aid is a vital part of broader bilateral relationships, but also inevitably serves domestic interests on either side. The result (specified here for the east, but true for both Germanys), in Hong’s narrative, is that “the East Germans were not always able to deliver on the goods that they had promised, and what the East Germans were willing and able to supply did not always correspond to what the North Korean government wanted to receive” (p. 60).

The book has moments that call to mind the adage of truth being stranger than fiction, such as some of West Germany’s choices for staffing its overseas missions. In light of how thoroughly the Nazi party had penetrated German society under the Third Reich, it is perhaps not so surprising that an “unrepentant Nazi” ended up staffing a mobile medical clinic in Algeria in 1962 (p. 159). It raises one’s eyebrows somewhat more, however, to learn that the director of a major diplomatic tour of West Africa had been a senior officer of the SS, “whose idea of relaxing in the evening was to sit around singing Nazi songs” (p. 236). Such choices are all the more puzzling because, as Hong points out, West German missions abroad were part of an explicit goal to “rehabilitate German medicine” and restore the reputational damage done to the profession during the Nazi years (p. 92). These episodes, like the story of “Heidi,” a talking transparent bovine replica capable of “speaking” twenty Indian languages, sent in 1959 to India as part of East Germany’s exhibit at the World Agricultural Fair in New Delhi, offer a sense of the absurd underside to Cold War rivalry.

Cold War Germany is essential reading for advanced undergraduates, graduate students, or others seeking to understand how the Germanys pursued Cold War-era diplomacy and strategy in the global south.

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