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sant à approfondir : quel rôle des individus engagés dans une production de type industriel, touchant un quasi salaire, ont ils défini pour leurs activités agricoles. Comment voyaient-ils la relation entre ces deux secteurs? Le livre n'en dit mot, et tend à traiter l'agriculture comme un vestige voué à une disparition rapide. Les théories marxistes le veulent ainsi, mais est-ce ce qui s'est vraiment passé? Les petits propriétaires sont eux aussi occultés par un « point aveugle » théorique. Ils sont supposés disparaître, une minorité rejoignant les rangs des possédants, et la majorité, celle des prolétaires. Dupuy décrit les mécanismes par lesquels cette double absorption peut avoir lieu. Mais à quel rythme s'est-elle produite? Dans quelle proportion? Comment ces petits propriétaires-gemmeurs ont-ils tenté de survivre en tant que producteurs indépendants? Étaient-ils nécessairement voués à l'échec?

Ces quelques réserves mises à part, l'ouvrage reste une importante contribution à notre compréhension de l'économie et de la société du Sud Ouest français, et à celle des transformations du monde rural en général.

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John Hellman — *The Knight-Monks of Vichy France: Uriage, 1940–1945* (2nd ed.).
Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1997. Pp. xiv, 364.

Few periods in French history have occasioned more controversy than the years 1940 to 1945. In this short space of time, France witnessed crushing military defeat and German occupation; the creation of a new French state based at Vichy, whose leaders attempted to carry out a domestic National Revolution while pursuing a policy of collaboration with the German occupiers; and the emergence of a Resistance movement whose diverse members worked to oust the Germans and, for the most part, the Vichyites from French soil. How French institutions, political formations, and individuals related to these events and to the memory subsequently constructed of them has recently been a source of considerable interest to historians of France. During the 1980s and 1990s, in fact, there has been a veritable explosion of studies examining both the history of these years and the processes by which the actors — including former president François Mitterand — “managed” the memory of their past. One of the many virtues of the second edition of John Hellman's excellent *The Knight-Monks of Vichy France* is its important contributions both to Vichy historiography and to the history of memory.

Hellman's book examines a group of prominent Catholic intellectuals and activists and their wartime attempts to implement a new vision of France, one that prized community and the community-oriented *personne* over the individual, the spiritual over the material, and authority, discipline, and virility over the presumed decadence and general flabbiness of the Third Republic. This effort to remake France occurred primarily at the *École Nationale des Cadres d'Uriage*, which was established in 1940 to train youth elites, and much of the book examines the founding, operation, and demise of the school. Using a range of archival materials

and printed sources, Hellman analyses the intellectual synthesis which emerged at Uriage out of ideas from the Old Right, the New Catholic Left, and 1930s non-conformism, and he examines the curriculum established to train successive groups of *stagiaires* in these ideas. At the school, which was located in an imposing medieval château in the Alps near Grenoble, the uniformed students — who only very rarely came from the peasantry or the working class and were always male — followed a regime which combined rigorous physical training, religious worship and contemplation, manual labour, study, and communal evening gatherings in front of the château's massive fireplace. This attempt to form new leaders emphasized discipline, hierarchy, submission to leadership (in the persons of both Uriage's *Vieux Chef* Pierre Dunoyer de Segonzac and Marshal Pétain himself), self-sacrifice, community, spirituality, and virility. (In this highly masculinized male community, even the young women employed at the school ate by themselves and were not to come into contact with the instructors.)

Hellman makes the nature of Uriage's relationship to Vichy central to his study. Taking issue with many earlier historical treatments of these men and their school, he argues that the Uriage experience was central to Vichy's National Revolution and that its intellectual synthesis was the Vichy ideology. To make his case, he marshals considerable evidence. He discusses, for example, how the school viewed itself as an avant-garde laboratory for the National Revolution, how it demanded loyalty to Pétain from its students, and how, for a time, it enjoyed considerable support from the Vichy government. He also cites numerous proclamations of loyalty to Pétain and to the National Revolution on the part of the *Vieux Chef*. If Hellman situates Uriage at the centre of Vichy's National Revolution, however, he also points out how Uriage's particular brand of communitarian spiritual revolution (not to mention its ambitions) soon came under criticism from a range of forces within Vichy. The school was closed at the end of 1942.

Following closure, the "knight-monks" of Uriage reconstituted themselves as an order and continued spreading their message. Hellman details how they formed themselves into "flying squads" which swooped down into the mountains and attempted to initiate young *résistants* into their brand of renewal. For the men of Uriage, this undertaking proved terribly exciting, a kind of mystical mountaintop male brotherhood forged against the backdrop of war. For many on the receiving end, however, the effort was often tainted by the school's prior association with Vichy. As the military tide turned against Germany and increasing numbers of French men and women embraced armed resistance, many of the men of Uriage moved gradually in that direction. As Hellman is clear to point out, however, their priorities remained distinctive. Even as D-Day approached in 1944, the men of Uriage remained less concerned with expelling the Germans and the *Milice* from France through armed struggle than with laying the groundwork for postwar renovation and their central role within it. Indeed, while others gathered arms in 1944, they prepared to place themselves in positions to influence the postwar situation. This they did remarkably well. Through their involvement in new training schools, social and cultural movements in newly liberated areas, and in Parisian journalism and publishing, these men quickly carved out roles as central figures in the postwar cultural and intellectual

landscape. For example, Emmanuel Mounier, who had been an important intellectual influence at Uriage, emerged at the head of a relaunched *Esprit*, while Uriage's director of studies, Hubert Beuve-Méry, became the head of the new *Le Monde*, arguably France's most important postwar newspaper.

That these men were able to position themselves so successfully in postwar France depended, at least in part, on their ability to reconstruct their wartime pasts. At the end of the book, Hellman gives a fascinating account of the process by which these prominent men managed the memory of their past. He describes, for instance, how Mounier rewrote the history of both *Esprit* and the associated philosophy of personalism in a way that situated them on the political left and laid claim to excellent Resistance credentials. This set the stage, Hellman argues, for further "memory management" regarding both *Esprit* and the Uriage experiment more broadly. Through such actions as careful control over access to archival material, encouragement of sympathetic historical treatments, and denunciation of those with opposing views, the men associated with Uriage helped construct a past that downplayed certain aspects of their ideas, erased their central involvement with Vichy, and exaggerated their Resistance credentials. For Hellman, this effort to "manage" history is less understandable — and less forgivable — than the men's own wartime actions.

Were the history of the "knight-monks" of Uriage merely one isolated example it would be interesting enough, but what makes Hellman's study all the more important is that this group's intellectual and political journey and subsequent memory management represent a path taken by many other Catholics of this generation, including François Mitterand. As Hellman points out in the second edition, we now know that Mitterand's trajectory — from right-wing student activism in the 1930s, to support for Pétain's National Revolution in the early 1940s, to engagement in the Resistance, to subsequent postwar political prominence — paralleled that of the men of Uriage. By tracing the knight-monks' history, Hellman thus provides an important contribution to ongoing debates about the complicated relationship many French people had to the events of 1940–1945. As his study suggests, there were few Catholics in France who wholeheartedly supported either Vichy or the Resistance, and it was often only careful memory management that made it appear so in retrospect. By highlighting these complexities and by unmasking the politics of postwar memory and forgetfulness, Hellman makes a significant contribution to questions of central interest to historians of contemporary France.

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Keith Lindley — *Popular Politics and Religion in Civil War London*. Aldershot, England: Scholar Press, 1997. Pp. xiii, 413.

London in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries has attracted the attention of many able scholars in the past 30 to 40 years. Ian Archer and E. S. Rappoport have