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### Book Reviews

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sent out to perform services, the extraterritorial provision applying irrespective of whether or not the contract of hiring was made in the state; nor do these statutes require that the employee be a resident of the state. *Johnson v. Falen*, 65 Idaho 542, 149 P. (2d) 228 (1944); *House v. State Industrial Acc. Commission*, 167 Ore. 257, 117 P. (2d) 611 (1941); *Aetna Casualty and Surety Co. v. Dixon*, 145 S. W. (2d) 620 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940). Although the facts of the instant case indicate that the employment outside the state was not incidental to employment inside the state, the court did not base its decision on this distinction. Rather it denied relief because the employee was not a resident and the contract had not been made within the state. This is a far different basis of decision than the above mentioned cases.

It is seen that many of these compensation acts expressly or impliedly provide that the act shall apply to injuries incurred outside the jurisdiction of the state. However this is generally true only under certain specified conditions. While a few omit all reference to extraterritorial application, a large number, as in the Michigan statute, expressly provide that the acts shall not apply to injuries received outside the state unless the employee is a resident and the contract of hire is concluded within the state. Where this is true, it would seem that under facts similar to the principal case, recourse can be had only to legislative amendment. The compensation law is a purely legislative creation and is in derogation of the common law, and therefore permits no enlargement of its express terms by principles of common law or equity. *Tews v. C. F. Hanks Coal Co.*, 267 Mich. 466, 255 N. W. 227 (1934). Under the facts of the instant case, the Michigan court arrived at the only solution compatible with the express provisions of the statute.

*Andrew V. Giorgi*

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## BOOK REVIEWS

THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAW, THE LAW MAKERS. By James Willard Hurst.<sup>1</sup> Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1950. Pp. xiii, 502. \$5.50.—This fine work might well have been provided with a more revealing title. For it is not, as one might suspect, just another series of popularized biographies of great law-men, like Seagle's *Men of Law* or Wormser's *The Law*, but a comprehensive highly rewarding history of the distinctive contributions of each of the several institutions which have collaborated to make the law of America. Scholarly as well as readable, it is a remarkably complete study of a tre-

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<sup>1</sup> Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin.

mendous mass of material, although for some reason not made clear, it stops short at the year 1940.

Professor Hurst lists as the great American law makers, the legislature, the courts, the constitution-draftsmen, the bar and the executive, the last including the "administrative agencies." A worthwhile addition would have been a separate account of the part played by the law schools and law professors in making the law, at least since 1932. The numerous scattered references to the work of the schools indicate that the author could have handled such a job very competently.

The author's views are, for the most part, mature and sound, and often his comments are telling hits at weaknesses of the institutions he describes. For instance, he notes that the legislative bodies, although largely made up of lawyers, have failed to develop standards of fair and orderly procedure in their investigative activities comparable to that of the courts. Other weaknesses or sources of weakness, in the legislative bodies are, he finds, their "localism," high turnover of membership, delays, bi-cameralism, dependence on "tight inner leadership," and failure to develop adequate agencies to relieve the members of mountains of detail. An interesting suggestion the author makes is that legislators be required to make full disclosure of the sources and extent of their incomes and their business connections and activities during their terms.

The courts too are charged, and rightly so, with another kind of "localism"—their lack of authoritative control. Historically, it is shown that the increasing volume of court business in this country has been met merely by increasing the number of courts and judges, with every court and sometimes every judge enjoying a measure of autonomy. Of course, judicial councils and similar bodies now operate in some of the states, and the federal courts have a substantial echelon of administrative control. Perhaps some day real simplicity of structure and control will be achieved, and at some distant time it is hoped that courts (and books on law) will have names that adequately explain their purpose and functions.

As to the bar, the author repeats and documents the ageless charge that lawyers as a group have not played the constructive role open to them, but have been much too preoccupied with the law as a game of skill or as an instrument for personal ends. He hopefully predicts that government intervention in all the corners of our economy may eventually remove lawyers from their absorption in technique and partisanship. The book contains striking proofs of the innate conservatism of lawyers, as sadly shown in the rocky road travelled by every effort at procedural simplification. At various places in this volume we find apparently authoritative data as to where lawyers

come from, how they spend their time, and how much they obtain for their services in money, prestige, and other intangibles. Pages 256 to 276 contain the finest brief history of legal education that this reviewer has ever seen. Mention is made of the recent growth of bar associations and the raising of entrance requirements for bar admission. There is reference to Tocqueville's early nineteenth century dictum that the bar was nearer to an aristocracy than any other American group, and a hint that this remains true to some extent.<sup>2</sup> Professor Hurst finds that lawyers and their clients usually come from the upper middle classes and that they tend to share the social attitudes of this group.<sup>3</sup> There is interesting information concerning trends and changes in the character of law firms and law practice. Surprisingly, it seems that the ratio of lawyers to population has not changed much in the last century. This reviewer was glad to find Professor Hurst included among those who do not subscribe to the old legend that the bar is "over-crowded."

Adequate attention is devoted to the part played by executive officers of government, especially governors, and by administrative bodies in "making Law." I found this the least interesting part of a thoroughly interesting book, probably because the same material has been overworked in recent years.

*Charles S. Desmond\**

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NATURAL LAW INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS 1949. Vol. III. Edited by Edward F. Barrett.<sup>1</sup> Notre Dame, Indiana: College of Law, University of Notre Dame, 1949. Pp. 152. \$2.00.—This volume continues, in a competent manner, the Notre Dame Natural Law Institute's worthwhile contributions to the philosophy of law. The Institute began in 1947 and since that time has published three volumes of lectures, of which the book under review is the third. All of them have maintained a high standard of scholarship and original thinking within the framework of sound natural law doctrine.

There is a vast difference between original thinking and merely deracinate novelty. The difference is the same as that which separates the art of Michaelangelo or Peter Paul Rubens from some of the more uncontrolled convulsions of surrealism and dadaism. In one sense,

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<sup>2</sup> Text, at 4, 250.

<sup>3</sup> On the other hand, Justice Proskauer, an able and most experienced observer, states in his book *Segment of My Times* that the New York bar is no longer a homogenous group.

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<sup>1</sup> Associate Professor of Law, University of Notre Dame.

I suppose it is accurate to say that a really great thinker cannot be original. He is always a copyist. He copies objective reality. He takes things as they are. He is measured, in his knowledge, by the existing natures and substances of realities. What is involved is that unique, vital and mysterious confrontation of existential being and mind with which we are concerned in the area of speculative truths. The very adjective, speculative, indicates a seeing or vision. If you see what is not there; if, in the act of seeing, you mutilate and destructively modify; you are the victim of hallucinations. You are not a philosopher; nor indeed, a scientist.

On the other hand and in another very real sense, all knowing and philosophizing expressed in language necessarily has practical and artistic aspect. You might *see* that *truth* but fail to express it or you might express it so sketchily or with such imprecision that those who hear and read what you say face an arid conceptualism. The symbolism of your words makes no contact with the reality that stands massively before your intellectual vision.

This is not to suggest that any act of intellection, any process of mental abstraction, or any speculative knowledge of truth is ever going to be adequate and final. Reality is so profound and so rich that it will always leave us with unplumbed depths of mystery and with reaches filled with our ignorances. Still less can mere written essays do complete justice to a great intellectual vision. Words are too often and too necessarily inadequate instruments. Reality, weighted with the heavy mass of truth, cannot easily float to the heaven of our abstractions.

The four essays which constitute the volume under review live up to the best traditions of speculative and practical thought. Their titles and authors are: "The Natural Law and Common Law," by Richard O'Sullivan; "The Natural Law and Constitutional Law," by Edward S. Corwin; "The Natural Law and Canon Law," by Stephan Kuttner; and "The Natural Law and International Law," by Carlos P. Romulo.

In each of these essays there are valuable insights and real contributions to natural law learning, although I think that the last is less philosophical and more rhetorical than any of the others. Personally, I liked Doctor Kuttner's treatment of the natural law best of all. He made some points which are, I think, too often neglected in treatises on natural law.

Many quotable passages characterize most of the chapters in this book, and I shall not be able to resist the temptation to exhibit a few stimulating samples.

In an interesting style Mr. O'Sullivan's lecture illustrates and emphasizes a rather evident historical conclusion, namely, that the roots of the early English common law are deeply embedded in natural law

reasoning and method. He establishes, with a display of historical erudition, that "during all of the centuries before the Reformation the thought and language of the Common Lawyers followed a kind of pattern or rhythm: the law of God, the law of nature, the law of the land."<sup>2</sup>

Because natural law philosophy and method regard the nature (in the orders of specification and exercise) of man as a crucial standard, and the myriad of existential realities or natures with which man is concerned (in act and conduct) as auxiliary but subordinate standards, it is easy to see why in the making and application of laws, persons with natural law inspiration should conclude that ". . . 'the sparks of all the sciences in the world are raked up in the ashes of the law.' Natural law in the classical and Christian conception may be said to mean the sum in order of the dynamic tendencies that are proper to man as a rational being. Natural law has reference to the internal tendency or thrust of things, their '*dynamisme original*.' It is rooted in the order of the world and in the conception of man as a part of that order; in a study of the inner constitution of man, . . . and the metaphysical foundations of our being."<sup>3</sup>

In the Anglo-American tradition of common law the rule of reason and argumentation from the *natures* of things rather than from their names or mere appearances constitute a golden thread of the natural law running through our whole jurisprudence.

Perhaps nowhere is the "higher law background" more apparent in American law than in the field of Constitutional Law. That is why Professor Corwin's contribution manifests an exceptional appreciation of natural law implications in American constitutional developments. His is the style, manner and scholarship of an outstanding exponent of Constitutional Law. The "common right and reason" of *Dr. Bonham's case* are nothing but direct or indirect derivations from the natural law. Corwin is supported by a vast armament of historical research in his conclusion that the whole doctrine and practice of judicial review in the United States traces back indirectly, if not directly, to the genuine natural law tradition. For, ". . . *judicial review initially had nothing to do with a written constitution*. In point of fact, the first appearance of the idea of judicial review in this country antedated the first written constitution by at least two decades."<sup>4</sup>

Very ingeniously does this author demonstrate the undeniable and irresistible claims of natural law thinking upon man's legal reasoning. He shows, despite protestations that judicial review today is confined

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<sup>2</sup> Text, at 31.

<sup>3</sup> Text, at 39-40.

<sup>4</sup> Text, at 58.

within the four corners of our Constitution to the complete neglect of natural law rights, "that in the very process of discarding the doctrine of natural rights and adherent doctrines . . . the courts have contrived to throw about those rights . . . the folds of the documentary Constitution."<sup>5</sup>

In only one respect do I have the temerity to disagree with the opinion of so eminent an authority in Constitutional Law. He believes that the original significance of the due process clause in the American Constitution was "purely procedural."<sup>6</sup>

In this, it seems to me, he forgets the very natural law inspiration which he finds omnipresent as a "background" of the Constitution. It is the whole point of the natural law view and method to deal with substance and natures rather than with forms, and to deal with forms and procedures for the sake of substance and natures. Genuine respect for the natures and subsisting reality of things would make pure procedure not relatively insignificant, but rather a means to an end. A pure procedure is as impossible and as unthinkable as a pure means, *i.e.*, one which is unrelated to an end. Whatever the emphasis on procedure in the due process clause in the minds of the Founding Fathers, surely they did not neglect the rule of reason behind "pure" procedure. The due process clause provides that no persons shall "be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law."<sup>7</sup> That meant more than that the forms and procedure of law must be complied with. The due process clause can be regarded as the most concentrated statement of the natural law tradition in our Constitution. Now, veritable natural law never in its long history tolerated *everything* that men have fashioned as or called laws. One of the glories of the natural law tradition is that it is said to lawmakers and tyrants: "Thus far shall you go and no further!" The Founding Fathers were very familiar with the idea of limitation on the competence of man to make laws. I cannot believe that they forgot about this limitation to the extent of conceiving the due process clause as purely procedural. Indeed, Corwin himself states, in the last paragraph of his essay, "Our present interest . . . has been in Natural Law as a challenge to the notion of unlimited human authority."<sup>8</sup>

With the Canon Law resonances of Doctor Kuttner's article I am not qualified to deal. They consist of a discussion of the natural law background of the whole Canon Law and the natural law implications or references contained in specific rules of the Canon Law. Thus, Doctor Kuttner's article is a statement of the intersections of Canon Law and natural law. But his presentation is more original and more

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<sup>5</sup> Text, at 62.

<sup>6</sup> Text, at 68.

<sup>7</sup> U. S. CONST. AMEND. V.

<sup>8</sup> Text, at 81.

significant than a mere rehearsal of the instances in which the Canon Law reflects the natural law. A young seminarian, after a course of Moral Theology and Canon Law, could collate such instances, if he were willing to make the somewhat exacting research. What I particularly liked about Doctor Kuttner's article were the frequent flashes of an exceptional appreciation of the function and nature of the natural law that gleam from his lines. Here is no mere *rechauffe* of remembered formulæ from studied texts about natural law. Here is the wisdom that flows from competent and mature reflection on the natures of man and other things, so that he is able to express the natural law insights accurately, in new ways and in a manner which evidences how vital a hold they have upon his mind.

It is refreshing for example to come upon passages like the following in a day when every enthusiast of Catholic social philosophy seems to live in the illusion that his opinions about what is right and wrong in, for example, the field of Industrial Relations are direct and obvious pontifications of the natural law:<sup>9</sup>

The observation is age-old that in Natural Law not all judgments, or precepts, or rights are evident to the same degree. Between the absolutely good and the absolutely evil act there is the immense sphere of the "relative," the indifferent, the contingent, and the complex, where the simple statement that the act acquires its goodness or badness from its end leads only to the further question of proper ends, proper means, and how to establish a right relation in the multitude of ends, values, interests, goods, and rights. The judgment of right reason is therefore anything but a judgment of "simple reason," unless we want to restrict the subject matter of Natural Law to what is evident to children, or self-evident. Man *as man* is never in the absolute (as far as the law is concerned) but always in concrete relations. To judge whether the concrete situation is just or unjust requires always a varying number of considerations and ratiocinations, *for us* to perform. Some of these situations are given with social life as such; but we must insist that even in regard to the most fundamental, to Life itself, the Natural Law does not consist of a simple formula, "killing is bad," "not-killing is good." What about self-defense? Just war? Capital punishment? Would we not reject, e.g., a legal order as against Natural Law which excludes the right of self-defense? Both the fifth commandment and self-defense are of Natural Law; yet defense can be excessive (as in the case of a harmless aggressor; of a trifling object; of inadequate weapons); again, the excess may be caused by overwhelming fright, etc. The *ratio naturalis* consists of one all-comprehensive judgment only, but in a given case its formulation may rest on a chain of conclusions which positive law will have to express by a number of rules and exceptions. It cannot be said, e.g., that of the different treatment given by different penal codes to excess in self-defense, one or the other must be "against" Natural Law. And the more we get away from the fundamental facts and forms of life into the relations existing in highly organized society, the more the technical, conventional regulation enters into the proper determination of wrong and right. What is Natural Law in regard to the

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<sup>9</sup> Text, at 101-2.



buying and selling of shares on the stock-exchange? Or to the ordination of a cleric outside his home diocese? It would be folly to expect in such situations a detailed answer from "pure" Natural Law, or to say that a given set of rules in such situations is the only possible determination of Natural Law. (Emphasis supplied.)

I make no apologies for selecting a quotation of this length; it would be unjust to Doctor Kuttner if I mutilated this characteristic sample of his essay.

The less profound generalities of the last essay point out how the path of natural law meets with the path of modern international law. The agreement of so many United Nations representatives of widely disparate cultures, religions and philosophies upon a declaration of the "universal rights of man" is no accident of political persuasion and oratory. It is natural law thinking whether acknowledged or not.

The Natural Law Institute deserves the commendation of all who wish to provide a sound philosophical platform for the fundamental deficiencies by which civilization and culture are sustained. I suppose that positivists, and those who have a small appreciation of natural law as Oliver Wendell Holmes had, will find little of interest in this volume. But after all if a book does not interest everybody, it is not always the fault of the book.

*Godfrey P. Schmidt\**

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LAW OF THE AIR: CASES AND MATERIALS. By Clarence E. Manion.<sup>1</sup> Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1950. Pp. xi, 689. \$7.50.—The advent of the age of flight and electronic communication has not only radically changed the mode of living of most of the inhabitants of this nation, but also has created a myriad of new legal problems. These problems have been met, for the most part, by unrelated case law and haphazard piecemeal legislation. True, in recent years great segments of the fields of air transportation and radio communication have been subjected to well defined governmental regulation, particularly by the Civil Aeronautics Board and the Federal Communications Commission. However, much has yet to be done in the field of air law. To give the practitioner and the prospective practitioner a sufficient background of the problems and rules involved so as to qualify him to deal with them adequately it is necessary that there be a comprehensive and systematic approach to the whole inter-related field. This has been attempted by the author, and this reviewer believes that he has succeeded.

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<sup>1</sup> Dean of Law, University of Notre Dame.

Further, the need of an up-to-date treatment of the subject is accentuated by the recent inception of television as a part of American everyday life. This timely phase of air law is also covered by the author.

The material is divided, to facilitate study, into two parts: aviation and communication. The first part contains a detailed treatment of the rights and duties which arise from a consideration of the proposition that "the coming of the airplane has not taken away any of the rights of the landowner to the use and enjoyment of his land and the air space above it."<sup>2</sup> The questions of governmental regulation, liability in contract and tort, and criminal sanctions are better understood after the theories of ownership of airspace are definitely established and exhaustively considered. This is the thesis of the author in arranging the subject matter of this part. The text of the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 is likewise included because:<sup>3</sup>

Since the enactment of the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, practically every problem that can arise in the field of aviation law can be solved by the application of some part of that act. The litigation since 1938 has been largely in the construction of the various sections of the act, or in the effort to reconcile conflicting theories as to the application of the Act to the specific case.

Part II proceeds on the theory that the evanescence of practical solutions in the field of communications precludes the consideration of everything save fundamental legal principles.<sup>4</sup> Nevertheless, there is a detailed examination of the regulation, licensing, and financing of radio broadcasting stations. This part concludes with the text of the Communications Act of 1934 and a section devoted to television and current state regulations thereof.

The cases and statutes are interspersed with supplementary textual material highlighting and explaining information hitherto unemphasized.<sup>5</sup> The index reflects the care with which the basic materials were prepared. It is more than the cursory appendage characteristic of many case books. Comprising twelve per cent of the total work it should prove invaluable to the lawyer or the law student.

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<sup>2</sup> *Guith v. Consumers Power Co.*, 36 F. Supp. 21 (E. D. Mich. 1940); text, at 158.

<sup>3</sup> Text, at 255.

<sup>4</sup> "A great many problems that will arise in connection with this new mode of communications [television] can be solved by applying the well settled rules of law that have developed in connection with radio law." Text, at 619.

<sup>5</sup> *E.g.*, ". . . there is no question now that the progress made by radio in any of the countries can be measured by the amount of government control. The greatest advances are seen in the countries with the least governmental regulation." Text, at 513.

Dean Manion has been successful in preparing a book for classroom use on the Law of the Air. In addition to providing a comprehensive text and case book it should serve as a ready reference to all persons interested in the fundamental legal conceptions underlying aviation, radio communication and television.

*Robert E. Sullivan\**

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THE LAW. By René A. Wormser.<sup>1</sup> New York: Simon and Schuster, Inc. 1949. Pp. xiv, 609. \$5.00.—This is an excellent book for laymen. The author relates the story of the development of the law in terms of the great men responsible for its growth. In doing this, he discusses not only the achievements of the legal scholars such as Justinian, Coke, Blackstone, Marshall, Kent, Holmes, Pound, Brandeis, and Cardozo and many others, but also the contributions of the saints, rulers, philosophers and presidents who have influenced the progress of the law. Thus, the reader is introduced to St. Thomas Aquinas and his great work on theology, to the legal philosophies of Hobbes and Locke, to Jefferson's concepts of democracy, and to Franklin D. Roosevelt's New Deal. Each of these men, and many others discussed or mentioned in this book, determined the course of the law for years to come. The author is to be commended for attributing the growth of law and its institutions to the work of these men as well as to the efforts of great judges, lawyers, and teachers of jurisprudence. Praise is also due to him for interrelating the development of law with mankind's progress in philosophy, religion, ethics and other fields of endeavor.

There is a feature in this volume that deserves special mention. Too many writers on legal history often ignore even the barest mention of canon law. Mr. Wormser's book contains a whole chapter on this subject.<sup>2</sup> He also has a part of a chapter on the Code Napoleon, generally passed without notice.<sup>3</sup> Further, his chapters on the origins of commercial and maritime law are very well done,<sup>4</sup> and his more extensive treatment of international law and of the organizations for world accord is excellent.<sup>5</sup>

Interspersed here and there in this readable work are bits of interesting legal lore which should prove fascinating to the reader interested

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<sup>2</sup> Text, c. 17.

<sup>3</sup> Text, c. 22.

<sup>4</sup> Text, c. 42.

<sup>5</sup> Text, cc. 43, 44, 45, and 46.

in the law. He will, for example, find out why even to this date an English barrister has a pocket in the back of his black gown which he wears in court,<sup>6</sup> and discover that the term "junior" has a particular meaning in English legal practice.<sup>7</sup> The footnotes are instructive to the layman, defining terms such as "entailing an estate"<sup>8</sup> or giving the legal meaning of "fungible goods,"<sup>9</sup> and noting many other facts about law and law-makers. If there is any doubt as to the variety of topics considered in this volume, one need only look in the index. Among the hundreds of listed topics one can even find a reference to the *Homma* case, the U. N., or the Talmud. Mr. Wormser has accumulated much information on the history of his profession—the law—and he wants his reader to at least have a glimpse of the materials.

While this book may be a storehouse of legal learning for laymen, it will probably not appeal to the members of the profession who have done some serious reading in legal history. There is too much written within the confines of one volume, and, consequently, there is very little analysis of the important trends that have characterized the advances in legal thought. But, for the busy practitioner, this book may be as interesting as it should be to the layman, and for some it may even be the first step in a lasting acquaintanceship with the historical background and future aims of their profession.

*Louis C. Kaplan\**

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THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS: ORGANIZATION AND PROCEDURE. By Floyd M. Riddick.<sup>1</sup> Washington: National Capitol Publishers, 1949. Pp. xi, 459. \$4.50.—Dr. Riddick has done a thorough job with this book. If there are questions about the organization and procedure of Congress that cannot be answered by consulting these pages, they indeed must be obscure. The book is a veritable encyclopedia of information on the subject, which, paradoxically, may be its greatest weakness. While the author has put life into the formal rules, for some persons, they may still lack reader interest. But the facts are here.

The book begins with a discussion of the basic functions of Congress, moves through the political organization of the two houses, and the official and unofficial organization with floor leaders, whips, and

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<sup>6</sup> Text, at 307.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>8</sup> Text, at 148.

<sup>9</sup> Text, at 403.

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<sup>1</sup> Senate Editor, DAILY DIGEST of the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD.

steering committees. There is adequate treatment given to the officers and employees of Congress and to the all-important committees. More than half of the book is devoted to the details of procedure in the two houses. Here Dr. Riddick draws upon his vast reservoir of knowledge of how Congress does things other than by the strictly formal rules. However, the latter are treated in extreme detail in step-by-step procedure. In this connection, in the preface, which was written by Professor Lindsay Rogers, the point is made that efficient government "is more likely if there is a full understanding of the rules that the two houses of Congress have and of how they are applied in practice. To this high end Mr. Riddick's volume has made a notable contribution."<sup>2</sup> Worthy of mention is the fact that procedure in the Senate, sometimes slighted in legislative discussion in favor of the House, is here given full treatment. Finally the author examines the relations between the President and Congress.

The effects of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 are discussed in detail. There is no attempt by Dr. Riddick to editorialize; he has no suggestions for changes in Congress, for introduction of the parliamentary system or other innovations, which, in this case, is all for the good. This is not a controversial book. It covers factual information, much of which is not available elsewhere. The text is well-documented with references to the *Congressional Record* and to the various volumes of precedents. Tables, charts, and facsimile reproductions of congressional documents aid in the reader's grasping a proper picture of Congress and its work. Illustrative examples constitute an outstanding feature, and the author repeatedly proves his competence to write such a book, which his intimate contact with Congress has given to him, especially his Senate editorship of the "Daily Digest" of the *Congressional Record* which he has held since 1946.

This is a noteworthy and valuable book. It has no competitor.

*Paul C. Bartholomew\**

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### BOOKS RECEIVED

AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONS (Revised Edition). By Charles Fairman. New York City: Henry Holt and Co., 1950. Pp. xiv, 489. \$2.75.

COMPARATIVE LAW, CASES AND MATERIALS. By Rudolf B. Schlesinger. Brooklyn: The Foundation Press, Inc., 1950. Pp. xxxiv, 552. \$7.50.

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<sup>2</sup> Text, at viii.

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- CONFLICT OF LAWS, CASES AND MATERIALS. By Harper, Taintor, Carnahan, and Brown. Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1950. Pp. xxvii, 1090. \$7.50.
- CORPORATE FINANCE, COMMENTS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON. By Hugh L. Sowards. Buffalo: Dennis & Co., Inc., 1950. Pp. xx, 952. \$7.50.
- DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE AND WHAT IT MEANS TODAY, THE. By Edward Dumbauld. Norman, Okla.: University of Oklahoma, 1950. Pp. xiii, 194. \$3.75.
- FROM THE WAGNER ACT TO TAFT-HARTLEY: A Study of National Labor Policy and Labor Relations. By Harry A. Millis and Emily Clark Brown. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1950. Pp. x, 723. \$8.50.
- GOVERNMENT FINANCING OF PRIVATE ENTERPRISE. By Douglas R. Fuller. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1950. Pp. viii, 206. \$3.00.
- \*GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAW, THE, THE LAW MAKERS. By James Willard Hurst. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1950. Pp. xiii, 502. \$5.50.
- INTERNATIONAL LAW, CASES AND MATERIALS ON. By Edward W. Dickinson. Brooklyn: The Foundation Press, Inc., 1950. Pp. xxix, 740. \$8.00.
- INTERPRETATION OF UNIFORM COMMERCIAL LAWS, CASES AND MATERIALS. By Frederick K. Beutel. Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1950. Pp. xxiii, 881. \$8.50.
- \*LAW, THE. By René A. Wormser. New York: Simon and Shuster, Inc., 1949. Pp. xiv, 609. \$5.00.
- LAW OF CADAVERS, THE: and of Burial and Burial Places. By Percival E. Jackson. New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1950. Pp. lxxxiii, 734. \$12.50.
- \*LAW OF THE AIR, CASES AND MATERIALS. By Clarence E. Manion. Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1950. Pp. xi, 689. \$7.50.
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