

INTRODUCTION

On 21 August 1939, the Nazi-Soviet Pact was disclosed. On 23 August Prime Minister Mackenzie King announced that Parliament would be called into session at once if efforts to prevent the immediate outbreak of war were to fail.¹

Two days later, King's Minister of Justice, Ernest Lapointe, received a letter from the Commissioner of the RCMP, S.T. Wood, outlining the state of war readiness of Canada's national police force and internal security agency. The Mounties reported that they had prepared lists of "all known potential enemy aliens" and of all espionage suspects: these could be arrested "at a moment's notice" once the word was given. "Suspects of lesser importance" were to be kept under surveillance. A registry of enemy aliens would be supplied with information from the RCMP files. Although concerned with fascists and Nazis (and Ukrainian nationalists sympathetic toward the Hitler regime), the RCMP also anticipated a "more rigid and extended surveillance of Communist Agitators, particularly those active among industrial workers" and recommended the outlawing of the Communist party by Order in Council under the War Measures Act. The Commissioner also spoke of close co-ordination between the RCMP, military intelligence, External Affairs, and the departments of transport, justice, and immigration, and added that "liaison is being maintained in all matters of mutual interest with M.I.5, London, England."²

Canada was just days away from entering a global conflict for which it was ill-prepared in almost every way except one. The economy, battered by a decade of depression, was hardly in a promising state to wage war. Military preparations were, according to the official historian of the Canadian Army, "utterly inadequate by comparison with the scale of the coming emergency."³ Nor did Canada have any external intelligence capacity of its own, apart from scraps gathered by its small number of

¹ J.W. Pickersgill, *The Mackenzie King Record*, vol. 1: 1939-1944 (Toronto 1960), 15.

² National Archives of Canada [NAC], Ernest Lapointe Papers [MG 27 III B10] vol. 50 file 50, S.T. Wood to Ernest Lapointe, 25 August 1939.

³ Col C.P. Stacey, *Six Years of War: the Army in Canada, Britain and the Pacific* (Ottawa 1955); James Eayrs, *In Defence of Canada: Appeasement and Rearmament* (Toronto 1965), 134-53.

diplomatic representatives abroad. For foreign intelligence Canada was dependent upon Britain's Foreign Office and its Secret Intelligence Service, or M.I.6. During the war, Canada would carve out a small, if subordinate, role in signals intelligence gathering,⁴ and would host the celebrated (and rather over-romanticized) Camp X for training secret agents.⁵ But this was small potatoes in what Sir Winston Churchill called the "wizard war" of espionage and codebreaking. In only one area was the Canadian state ready for war—internal surveillance and control. Foreign enemies would await national mobilization and conversion of the economy to war production. The Canadian state was, on the other hand, well prepared for the enemy within.

There was some question, however, regarding the identity of this enemy within. Pro-Nazis and pro-Fascists would seem to be the obvious candidates in a war against the Axis powers. There were such groups in Canada, a few homegrown and others rooted in the German and Italian communities. There was general suspicion among Canadians regarding the German and Italian ethnic communities (justified or unjustified) and later in the war, outright racism would engulf the Japanese-Canadian population of British Columbia. Yet in the late 1930s, with fascist armies on the rise in Europe, it took the specific urging of Norman Robertson, a senior civil servant, to draw the close attention of the RCMP to pro-fascist activities.⁶ Charles Rivett-Carnac, head of the RCMP's Intelligence Branch, tried to assure Robertson in early 1939 that fascism was much less of a threat than Communism since the former guaranteed at least a "modified form of capitalism."⁷ The official historian of the RCMP has recently written that the Communists were the "principal target of RCMP intelligence" in the interwar years, while at the end of the 1930s pro-fascist groups became a "secondary objective."⁸

The weight of state repression did fall most heavily on those judged to be sympathetic to Canada's enemies.⁹ Yet to the RCMP and to many prominent civilian officials in both Ottawa and the provincial capitals, it

⁴ Wesley K. Wark, "Cryptographic innocence: the origins of signals intelligence in Canada in the Second World War," *Journal of Contemporary History*, 22 (1987), 639-65.

⁵ David Stafford, *Camp X: Canada's School for Secret Agents, 1941-45* (Toronto 1986).

⁶ Reg Whitaker, "Official repression of Communism during World War II," *Labour/le Travail*, 17 (1986), 137; J.L. Granatstein, *A Man of Influence* (Ottawa 1981), 81-6.

⁷ NAC, Norman Robertson Papers, vol. 12 file 137, Rivett-Carnac to Robertson, 24 January 1939.

⁸ S.W. Horrall, "Canada's security service: a brief history," *RCMP Quarterly*, 50:3 (Summer 1985), 45.

⁹ Just under 24,500 residents of Canada were interned or forcibly relocated, not counting another 5,400 so-called 'enemy aliens' from Britain interned in Canada

was obvious that Communism was the permanent and enduring enemy within. The Nazi-Soviet pact and the opposition of the Communist party to the "imperialist" war (which lasted until precisely 22 June 1941, the day the Nazi armies poured over the Soviet borders), offered valid grounds for targeting the Communists under the Defence of Canada Regulations. They also offered a pretext for intensified intrusive surveillance which the RCMP was eager to grasp.

The Intelligence Section of the RCMP was, on the eve of the war, run by a tiny six-man headquarters attached to the Criminal Investigation Branch. Yet despite its small numbers, its agents and sources had deeply penetrated the Canadian Communist party. One of its stalwarts was John Leopold who, as undercover agent "Jack Esselwein," had successfully played a prominent Communist agitator in the 1920s before making a dramatic appearance as a Crown witness in the case of *Rex v. Buck et al*, the 1931 prosecution of party leaders under Section 98 of the Criminal Code. Clearly one of the reasons for its relative success in Red-hunting was that it had marshalled its resources and limited its targets. War against Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy provided it with opportunities hitherto undreamed of. By 1943 the headquarters staff of the Intelligence Section had risen to 98 and in the field there was a sharp increase in personnel: 20 in Toronto, 19 in Montreal, 9 in Vancouver, for example.¹⁰ It seems to have acted competently in counter-espionage operations against the enemy, but Canada was far away from the centre of hostilities and unlikely to be a major target for Axis espionage. The main thrust of RCMP activities was mounted against the enemy within, and here the RCMP itself took a strong role in defining the tasks of security and intelligence.

The RCMP was represented on a high-level, top-secret committee of civil servants which mapped out plans for wartime emergency powers before hostilities actually began. Thus the police were able to contribute directly to the shaping of the laws and regulations they were later to enforce.¹¹ The Commissioner was appointed Registrar General of Enemy Aliens, responsible for registration of tens of thousands of Germans, Italians, and Japanese. Rounding up and interrogation of internees was a major task, as was the investigation of complaints from citizens regarding possible espionage or subversion cases. Guarding sites judged impor-

at the UK's request. 22,000 of the interned residents were the Japanese Canadians forcibly relocated from the West Coast to the interior. Of the remainder over 90% were of German, Japanese or Italian origin or were native fascists. 133 Communists were interned (more were ordered interned but went into hiding), although Communists escaped such attention in Britain and the United States.

¹⁰ Commission of Inquiry Concerning Certain Activities of the RCMP, Second Report, *Freedom and Security Under the Law*, vol. 1 (Ottawa 1981), 58-9.

¹¹ Whitaker, "Official repression," 136; Ramsay Cook, "Canadian Freedom in Wartime," MA thesis, Queen's University, 1955.

tant to the war effort and countering potential sabotage to war production made great demands on time and resources. When regular police work within the national jurisdiction (much expanded in wartime under the War Measures Act), and the Mounties' role as provincial police in most provinces, excluding only Quebec and Ontario, are taken into account, it is apparent that the RCMP had a major role to play in wartime Canada.

The Intelligence Bulletin, produced within the Intelligence Section and circulated to the Prime Minister's office and to the senior levels of federal departments, offers an invaluable insight into RCMP thinking on its rapidly expanding security and intelligence role. Intelligence gathering is an activity which requires a certain degree of analytical skill in interpretation and preparation of a finished intelligence product for its consumers—the latter being the senior RCMP brass and the government of Canada. Criminal investigation may not necessarily induce analytical reflection upon its practitioners, and certainly not literary expression. But intelligence work does lead in this direction. It is perhaps no accident that Inspector Charles Rivett-Carnac, head of the Intelligence Section, was also the editor of the *RCMP Quarterly*, and subsequently a published author following his retirement. The Intelligence Bulletins offer an insight into the RCMP mind as well as into the kind of intelligence they were pursuing in wartime Canada: who and what was considered dangerous and why.

Not everyone in official Ottawa in the select circle which received the Bulletins was impressed by their contents, or by the RCMP's concept of intelligence. Harry Ferns was serving as a young official in Mackenzie King's office in the spring of 1940 when he came up against the face of Canadian intelligence. As Ferns later recollected:¹²

Political intelligence in the Canadian government was characterized by bone-headed stupidity. I was not alone in this opinion. A few weeks after I entered the Prime Minister's Office, an RCMP constable came to my room bearing a large brown envelope marked SECRET. He saluted and asked me to sign a receipt. This I did. With some awe I carried the envelope to Pickersgill¹³ and asked him what to do with this. Jack gave one of his loud guffaws, waved his hand with a flourish and said, "That's the *Perils of Pauline*. Throw it in the file, but read it if you want a laugh."

I went back to my room and opened the envelope. Inside was another envelope together with a receipt returnable to the RCMP attesting to the fact that I was about to open the second envelope. Inside this envelope I found a mimeographed pamphlet bound in a green cover bearing the arms of the RCMP. About 80 per

¹² H.S. Ferns, *Reading From Right to Left: One Man's Political History* (Toronto, 1983), 182.

¹³ J.W. Pickersgill, the second ranking official of the PMO under W.A. Turnbull, the Prime Minister's Principal Secretary. Pickersgill was later to become Clerk of the Privy Council and a cabinet minister under Louis St. Laurent and Lester Pearson, as well as Mackenzie King's literary executor.

cent of the items were extracts from Canadian newspapers concerning the movements and utterances of Communists, supposed Communists, and various trade union officials. Some of the items I had already seen among the daily circulation of the Prime Minister's clipping service. There were a few items on various priests and pacifists, and nothing at all about various splinter groups in Quebec opposed to Canada's entry into the war. It was something of a mystery to me how the RCMP ever found the home-grown Fuhrer, Adrien Arcand, let alone arrested him. After reading this intelligence bulletin a few times I began to follow Pickersgill's advice. I simply "threw it in the file."

Ferns goes on to note that the discovery of Soviet espionage in wartime Ottawa came not through the counter-espionage activities of the RCMP but through the defection of the Soviet cypher clerk, Igor Gouzenko in 1945. The RCMP, he suggests, were instead "taught to see Communists at work wherever men and women assembled to talk about civil rights, trade union problems, poverty and peace." Ferns was not an entirely neutral observer. He had himself become a Communist while studying at Cambridge in the 1930s amidst that famous generation of Cambridge Communists. He maintains that his party ties had dropped away before he took up his duties in the PMO, but he retained a certain distance from some of the conservative shibboleths of official Ottawa. Indeed, he was later driven out of the civil service and later yet out of Canada for his alleged left-wing sympathies.¹⁴ But his doubts about RCMP "intelligence" were shared by others in the PMO.

Jack Pickersgill had prepared an analysis of the Intelligence Bulletin for the Prime Minister in late November 1939. This was passed on to King a year later by James A. Gibson, another PMO official, with approval.¹⁵ Pickersgill noted that in wartime, "the detection of espionage, of plans for sabotage, and of subversive activities is the most important aspect of intelligence work in connection with the maintenance of internal security." Such work was "presumably divided" between the RCMP and military intelligence. The latter reported no information to the Prime Minister. The RCMP on the other hand reported regularly through the Intelligence Bulletin. Pickersgill's analysis of a single issue of the Bulletin (30 October

¹⁴These difficulties are recounted at length in *Reading From Left to Right*. Some of the problem seems to have stemmed from an alleged mention in one of the documents that Gouzenko stole from the Soviet Embassy: this turns out to be an absurd case of mistaken identity based on a mistaken transliteration of Russian into English. See Reg Whitaker, "Spy story: lifting Gouzenko's cloak," *The Globe and Mail*, 6 November 1984.

¹⁵NAC, Mackenzie King Papers, J4 Series, vol. 372 file 3913, 'J.A.G.', memorandum to King, 16 November 1940; Pickersgill, "Note on a War-time intelligence service," 27 November 1939 and "Analysis of the Intelligence Bulletin issued at R.C.M.P. Headquarters, October 30, 1939" (C257902-C257910).

1939—'War Series No.2') revealed a number of serious deficiencies:

- (1) an inability to distinguish between 'facts' and 'hearsay';
- (2) an 'anti-Red complex' which has a striking resemblance to that of the notorious Dies Committee¹⁶ in the United States, with the same tendency to label labour organizers, mild radicals, etc., as Communists. It may be noted, for example, that a French Canadian Liberal candidate in a recent provincial by-election was described in one of the Bulletins (not the one analysed) as a member of a Communist-controlled organization;
- (3) no discrimination between legitimate social and political criticism and subversive doctrine;
- (4) an almost exclusive pre-occupation with so-called subversive organizations, and, even in this field, very little information about Nazis or Fascists;
- (5) no evidence of any suspected sabotage or espionage;
- (6) no suggestion that there is any co-ordination with the Military Intelligence, or with the Immigration authorities, or with the Department of External Affairs, or even with the Censorship.

It is evident that the police are attending and reporting on often completely harmless meetings, and spying on the daily activities of peaceful and law-abiding citizens. In itself this may not be very serious, although it would seem to be undesirable in a free country. It is, however, somewhat disturbing to discover that the police are setting themselves up as self-appointed censors of political opinion in the Community, especially when they regard the mildest expressions of liberal views as evidence of Communism.

What is more disturbing is the evidence of a total lack of capacity, education and training required for real intelligence work, and a failure to appreciate the direction from which serious danger may threaten us.

It may well be that there are Communists in Canada who are engaged in espionage or in planning sabotage, but they will presumably be working secretly and will obviously not be among the so-called "agitators" who are sufficiently well-known. It is more likely that there are secret German agents in the country....From a casual reading of these "Intelligence Bulletins" one would scarcely realize that Canada was at war with Germany; there is not the slightest hint that anything is being done in the way of intelligent and well-directed "anti-espionage" work.

Pickersgill went on to suggest greater co-ordination and liaison between various government agencies with an interest in aspects of intelligence and security under the overall direction of an Intelligence Branch located in the Department of Justice, to which the RCMP would report. The civilian Director of Intelligence, "with an adequate conception of the real function of intelligence work in war-time, could probably direct the energies of the police into channels which would enable them to contribute effectively to our internal security without creating public uneasi-

¹⁶The House Committee on Un-American Activities which under the chairmanship of Congressman Martin Dies of Texas investigated Communism in America in the late 1930s with scant attention to fact but a sharp eye for headlines.

ness about the development of a police-state."¹⁷

In his analysis of the October 30 1939 Bulletin, Pickersgill pointed out specific examples of the kind of problem to which he was alluding. For instance, its item on the Russian-language Communist organ *Kanadsky Gudok* refers to "seditious attacks." "To illustrate these seditious articles," Pickersgill notes, "a paragraph is quoted criticizing the Chamberlain government in terms which, to say the least, would not be considered outside the limits of legitimate criticism in England." Indeed, Britain was often cited by liberal Canadian officials as an example of relative tolerance of dissent, despite the close proximity of Britain to the Nazi threat.¹⁸ Canada, far from the direct threat of invasion, was apparently more jittery. The RCMP expressed a mood which had far wider roots than the police alone. Indeed, despite the existence of some critics with liberal reservations within the government, and despite the private expressions in his diary of Mackenzie King's liberal conscience, the King government in general and the Justice Department in particular, strongly supported the Mounties.¹⁹

The obsession with Communism, evident from the pages of the Bulletin in these years, was only tenuously related to the CP's anti-war propaganda during the life of the Nazi-Soviet pact. That propaganda was, in any event, pretty marginal and unimportant—as is evident from what the best efforts of the RCMP were able to uncover as revealed in the Bulletin. Although the Mounties had warned in the very first issue of the Bulletin's War Series [23 October 1939] that "we are of the opinion that there is more to fear from acts of espionage and sabotage on the part of the Communist Party than from Nazi or fascist organizations and adherents," no evidence of sabotage was ever adduced, and the espionage on behalf of the USSR revealed in 1945 by Igor Gouzenko did not seem to have been initiated until the arrival of a Soviet mission in Ottawa in 1942.

In February 1941, the Commissioner of the RCMP, S.T. Wood, went

¹⁷ This would not be the last time that civilian direction or control over RCMP activities in security and intelligence would be suggested. Only after two Royal Commissions, one reporting in 1968 and the second in 1981, would the RCMP security service be 'civilianized' under the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act of 1984. Pickersgill was thus ahead of his time by about forty-five years.

¹⁸ In the spring of 1941 His Majesty's Commander of Prisons for England and Wales had testified before the secret hearings of the House of Commons Committee on the Defence of Canada Regulations that 'there was not much trouble in Britain with Communists as the British sense of humour was somewhat inclined to view them as a joke rather than a menace...': 20 May 1941, Papers of the Committee, Office of the Clerk of the Committees of the House of Commons.

¹⁹ Whitaker, "Official repression of Communism," 163-4.

public with the anti-Communist message. In *The Canadian Spokesman*, under the title 'TOOLS FOR TREACHERY', Wood confided to his readers that

many may be surprised to hear that it is not the Nazi nor the Fascist but the radical who constitutes our most troublesome problem. Whereas the enemy alien is usually recognizable and easily rendered innocuous by clear-cut laws applicable to his case, your 'Red' has the protection of citizenship, his foreign master is not officially an enemy and, unless he blunders into the open and provides proof of his guilt, he is much more difficult to suppress....Most of his work is carried on under cover of other organizations and associations pretending to be, or in reality, loyal to the Constitution.

Wood cited, as examples of such witting or unwitting fronts: labour unions, groups of the unemployed, the "criminal and weakminded classes," youth clubs, civil liberties associations, dupes in the press who criticized government policies, and even "a few parliamentarians, who are apparently sincere but obviously un-informed or indifferent to facts" who were "greatly encouraging the subversive elements by attacking the Defence [of Canada] Regulations."²⁰

This diatribe roused the ire of the leader of the CCF, M.J. Coldwell. Coldwell's question in the House of Commons came to the attention of Pickersgill in Mackenzie King's office. The latter passed on a copy of the article to the Prime Minister with a handwritten note attached: "It seems to reveal the same kind of attitude which the Nazis fostered so successfully with the *Anti-Comintern Pact*, and which did so much to weaken the morale of France."²¹ King's reaction is not recorded, but there is no evidence that Wood was chastised.

After 22 June 1941 the Communists did a sharp U-turn and became instant enthusiasts for a total war effort of the democracies against fascism. The RCMP could not care less. The Bulletin for 16 August 1941 [War Series No. 46] had this to say:

Until Germany invaded Russia Canadian Communists were the relentless enemies of democracy and of anything that made for its defence. Now, because the Fatherland of Communism is in deadly peril, they deign to join forces with us against the common enemy—*until the enemy is destroyed*. They have turned their coats but not their hearts and their hatred of democracy burns as fiercely as ever. Should their interned leaders be freed again to stab us in the back?

The question was obviously rhetorical. And indeed the interned

²⁰ *The Canadian Spokesman: the Magazine on National Affairs*, 1:2 (February 1941), 1-6.

²¹ King Papers, J4 Series, vol. 355 file 3815, Pickersgill, memorandum to King, 18 February 1941 [C245668]; *Hansard*, 17 February 1941, 878.

"leaders" [*sic*—the leaders had gone into hiding, it was mostly lower level party operatives who ended up in jail], remained interned in many cases for almost a year after the USSR had become an ally.²² Moreover, the Communist party remained illegal throughout the duration of the war on the advice of the RCMP (as well as the Catholic church and the Quebec Liberal caucus). Canada was thus the only Western ally to maintain a ban on the local CP during the era of the Soviet alliance. A convenient fiction was worked out whereby the party was recreated as the Labour Progressive Party which could legally run candidates and its banned newspaper resurfaced as the *Tribune*. This peculiar protocol was necessary to appease the diehard opponents of Communism who savoured their symbolic, if not substantive, relegation of the party to illegality.

Yet once the USSR had become an ally, and once Mackenzie King began appearing before Canadian Aid to Russia rallies where rousing renditions of the Internationale and God Save the King opened proceedings, the diehard anti-Communism of the RCMP was bound to wear thin in the eyes of many officials. It even became embarrassing when the Communists in the unions began volunteering no strike pledges on behalf of war production, and such old Red-baiters as Ontario premier Mitch Hepburn started turning up on platforms beside prominent Communists to preach the virtues of a total war effort. By 1942, the Prime Minister's Principal Secretary, W.J. Turnbull, was complaining to his boss about the Mounties still engaging in "red' hunting." "Apparently there are in the...Mounted Police, some men like the notorious Sergeant Leopold, whose jobs would seem to depend on continuing to uncover bolshevik plots. They may have some grounds for their suspicions, but I would think that a change of policy might well be indicated to them, with Russia a valiant ally."²³

It may have been the attitudes of prime ministerial advisers like Turnbull and Pickersgill, given a strong boost by the international situation, which led to a sudden change of policy with regard to the circulation of the Intelligence Bulletins. At the end of 1941, all distribution beyond the RCMP security service itself came to a halt. Moreover, Mounties came around to offices where the Bulletin had previously been transmitted and removed all earlier editions dating back to the beginning of the war. Since documentary evidence is lacking on this decision, it remains unclear just what was behind it. Probably the government no longer found the regular anti-Communist litany of much interest. The Mounties went back to talking to themselves—if indeed, given the earlier testimony of Harry Ferns,

²² See William and Kathleen Repka, *Dangerous Patriots: Canada's Unknown prisoners of War* (Vancouver 1982).

²³ King Papers, J4 Series, vol. 328 file 3490, Turnbull, memorandum to the Prime Minister, 6 July 1942 [C227104].

the Bulletin had ever actually had much of an external readership. Intelligence is a product to be consumed, normally by the governments that employ intelligence agencies. The RCMP Intelligence Bulletin was a product consumed in-house.

Are these Bulletins then worth our attention almost a half century later, if the government of the day could scarcely be bothered to consult them? There are strong arguments for republishing them today—perhaps, ironically, for the very reasons that critics rejected them in the early war years.

The Bulletins provide us with a considerable amount of information on the very subject that the government of the day was growing tired of hearing about: Communism and Communist activities in various sectors of Canadian life. Not only is party activity, as such, chronicled, but trade unions and other organizations are surveyed as they relate, or allegedly relate, to Communist penetration. Particularly valuable as source material are RCMP studies of various ethnic organizations in Canada, including material which has never been in print (at least in English) before. The Mounties maintained sources in some of these organizations; their reports thus constitute first-hand accounts of the politics of ethnic communities. Pro-fascist activities were being reported upon, even though Communism held pride of place.

There are also interesting insights to be gained into the outlook of the RCMP: that, for instance, the force did not approve of free-lance vigilante groups attacking alleged “fifth-column” traitors [10 June 1940—War Series No.33], and that it preferred to see anti-alien hysteria in the population die down, rather than fan the flames. In Canada, questions of subversion and treason were to be dealt with by the accredited authorities of the state, not by unofficial entrepreneurs. In the United States, J. Edgar Hoover’s FBI was happy to feed Congressional and private witch-hunters with material from the Bureau’s files. This tendency, later to grow into McCarthyism by the early 1950s, was not at all to the taste or inclination of the RCMP. As is evident from a number of items in these Bulletins, the Mounties were not averse to quoting approvingly from the findings of the demagogic House Committee on Un-American Activities. But they would not have welcomed a Canadian equivalent. Such a body would itself have been rather un-Canadian.

The Bulletins which are reproduced here represent a very early use of the Access to Information Act. In 1983, shortly after the Act came into force, I directed a request to the RCMP for specific numbers of the Bulletins from October 1939 through December 1941. In the course of research I had come across a notation in the records of the External Affairs Department that in December of 1941 a representative of the Mounties had removed the War Series Bulletins which had been transmitted to the Department. The Bulletins taken away were itemized by date. I could thus

make my request very specific. After paying \$164.00 for photocopying charges, I received copies of the Bulletins early in 1984.

Numerous deletions had been made on the texts, but complaints to the Information Commissioner (as provided for by the Act) were of no assistance. Among the complaints I raised were that material was exempted on the grounds of s.19(1) of the Act regarding personal information, even though the documents were some 40 years old and dealt with persons already of mature years. Presumably most would now be dead, and a good many dead for the 20 years or more required under the Act for the release of personal information. The response of the Commissioner to this point was that neither her office nor the RCMP (*sic!*) "have the capacity to ascertain the status of each individual mentioned in the documents." She went on: "If you believe that a given person might be mentioned in an exempted portion, and that that person died over 20 years ago, please let us have the details and we will check the record."²⁴ The catch-22 in this, of course, is that when names are removed, how can one possibly prove that these phantom presences died 20 years ago or more? Similarly, my attempts to draw attention to the RCMP's apparent failure to apply the "injury test" clauses of the exemption sections they had invoked—s.15(1) speaks of material which could "reasonably be expected to be injurious to...." and s.16(1)(c) uses the same language—failed to impress or interest the Commissioner, who declined to press any of my complaints, except for one technical one.

In regard to the deletions in the text, the Pickersgill analysis of the 30 October 1939 Bulletin [War Series No. 2], includes a summary of the contents of each item. In the text released to me by the RCMP, three items have been removed. The headings in the table of contents have also been removed so that the reader has no idea even of the subject matter (which of course makes it difficult to make a case against the exemption). In the Pickersgill summary, the three missing items are described as follows:²⁵

There follows a report that a member of the Communist party has got a job as organizer with the Hosiery Workers Union in Hamilton. The next item reports the dismissal of the business manager of the *Daily Clarion of Toronto* for opposing the policy of the Communist party.

The next item records the resignation of the Mayor of Blairmore, Alberta, from the Communist party. In comment on the resignation, the report reads, "Whether this individual has an ulterior motive underlying his announcement, is not known as yet."

Readers may draw their own conclusions regarding the injury to the national interest or to the privacy of these individuals that would have been involved by the disclosure of these items 45 years after the event. It

²⁴ Letter from Inger Hansen to the author, 14 May 1984.

²⁵ See n.15, above.

may also be confidently assumed that much of the remaining exempted material falls into the same category.

At the end of 1987, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, which since the passage of the CSIS Act in 1984 now houses the historical records of the RCMP security service, gave unrestricted permission to the Committee on Labour History to publish the Bulletins which Professor Gregory Kealey and myself had had released under various Access to Information requests. Under different names and formats, these declassified Bulletins run from December 1919 through December 1955. We plan to publish all of them in successive volumes, of which this present series is one.

R.W.