

# **Low-Intensity Conflict in the Peaceable Kingdom: The Attributes of International Terrorism in Canada, 1960-90**

*by*  
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## **INTRODUCTION**

International terrorism in relatively peaceful democracies like Canada is an unsettling affair. Among other effects, it causes casualties and damage, disrupts the routine of citizens, calls into question the adequacy of those bodies responsible for preventing, combating, and investigating terrorist groups and acts of terrorism,<sup>1</sup> and provides fodder for opposition critics.

Although the earliest act of international terrorism in Canada was the assassination of Member of Parliament Thomas D'Arcy McGee by Fenian separatists in 1868, the country generally was spared this type of violence until almost a century later.<sup>2</sup> Over the past three decades, however, Canada, like many Western countries, experienced a number of international terrorist events committed on its home soil. Most of these actions have been successful in capturing the attention of the Canadian public, the government, and the national security agencies. However, few academic studies of an empirical nature analyze political terrorism or any other type of political violence in Canada.<sup>3</sup>

Partly in an attempt to remedy this state of affairs, partly because of a concern among Canadian politicians, policy makers and national security agencies about the past, present, and future impact of terrorism on Canada, and largely as a result of the author's familiarity with Canada, he developed an original detailed, rigorous, comprehensive and publicly available chronology and data set on Canadian terrorist events.

The original data collection project, titled *Attributes of Terrorism in Canada (ATIC)*,<sup>4</sup> was divided into three stages of data collection and analysis, and based on three types of terrorism: domestic (ATIC I), international (including transnational) (ATIC II), and state (ATIC III).<sup>5</sup> The current version of the data base (amalgamated, revised, and labelled ATIC IV) includes 411 domestic events (88 percent) and 58 international events (12 percent).<sup>6</sup> Because the number of domestic events clearly outweigh the amount of international and state terrorist incidents, they were analyzed first. The international events have not been previously analyzed and thus are the subject of this article.

## **CONCEPTUAL ISSUES**

Conceptual issues on terrorism fall under five general interrelated areas: past research on terrorism, geographical focus, definitional issues, typology clarification, and international terrorism in particular.

## **Past Research on Terrorism**

The study of political terrorism in general, and in Canada in particular, involves a number of conceptual and methodological problems.<sup>7</sup> These challenges aside, the majority of research on terrorism over the past quarter of a century has focused on what has been labelled international terrorism. This direction has been influenced by a number of factors, including media coverage of these events, the political agendas of governments, the availability of funding for research, and the development of large-scale data bases on this form of political behavior and crime. Moreover, regional studies of terrorism have concentrated on the more terrorism prone areas, such as the Middle East and Western Europe, while the more peaceful areas (North America, for example) have received less attention.

## **Why Focus on International Terrorism in Canada?**

The decline of domestic terrorism in Canada since the mid 1970s,<sup>8</sup> the occurrence of such dramatic acts as the bombing of the Air India jet (22 June 1985),<sup>9</sup> and the apprehension of actual or suspected "international" terrorists who were living in Canada or in transit,<sup>10</sup> prompted a greater concern for knowledge on international terrorism. This concern stimulated two Canadian senate inquiries into terrorism,<sup>11</sup> the revision of governmental policies, the restructuring of a crisis, command and control division of the Solicitor General department,<sup>12</sup> and additional academic research.<sup>13</sup>

Other issues make the study of the occurrence of terrorism in Canada an interesting case study. For example, Canada acts as a peacekeeper in areas of the world that have endured some border or internal war, and/or has maintained a low profile in those countries experiencing international terrorism. Although Canadians were subjected to terrorist attacks in those countries, it is not clear whether this type of violence has also transported itself to Canada. Additionally, Canada's immigration policies and practices were accused of indirectly facilitating the flow of terrorists into the country. Moreover, according to data collected by various bodies North America, including Canada, experienced a relatively low level of international terrorism. These statistics, however, generally do not separate the countries, preventing more detailed analysis of the Canadian experience of terrorism.<sup>14</sup> Moreover, Canada shares the largest undefended border with the United States, the world's major target of international terrorism.

Given the foregoing issues, as well as the similarities between Canada and the United States, it would be worthwhile to analyze the factors that make international terrorism in Canada less of a concern than it is for the USA.<sup>15</sup> To this end, a data set on international terrorism in Canada might provide a variety of dependent variables that would help distinguish what attributes international terrorism demonstrates in countries such as Canada. Comparing the international terrorist events with the domestic ones should place the phenomenon of international terrorism in a clearer perspective, particularly by clarifying typological differences. Finally, adequate data concerning international terrorism in Canada could help policy makers and those charged with monitoring or combating terrorism

to better understand the problem and to respond effectively, thereby preventing needless deaths, injuries, damage and overreaction.

### **Definitional Issues**

For purposes of the chronology, data set, and this article, a definition of terrorism in general, of international terrorism in particular, and an acceptable typology is offered. A considerable debate exists about the acceptable definition of terrorism. After an exhaustive analysis of more than 100 expert definitions, Alex Schmid outlines twenty-two elements and develops a consensus definition consisting ostensibly of five parts. First, terrorism is a method of combat in which random or symbolic victims are targets of violence. Second, through previous use of violence or the credible threat of violence, other members of that group or class are put in a state of chronic fear. Third, the victimization of the target is considered extranormal by most observers, which, fourth, creates an audience beyond the target of terror. Fifth, the purpose of terrorism is either to immobilize the target of terror in order to produce disorientation and/or compliance, or to mobilize secondary targets of demands (for example, a government) or targets of attention, such as public opinion.<sup>16</sup>

This definition has some advantages: it encompasses terrorism by governments, by oppositions, and by domestic and international movements, and it helps to distinguish the action of one individual from that of the group in whose name it is carried out. That is, a person who commits a terrorist action is a terrorist, but people like him/her who are from the same group (race, class, nation, etc.) are not considered terrorists unless they engage in terrorist actions as defined above.

With four qualifications, this conceptualization of terrorism suits the purposes of this essay. First, not all five previously mentioned elements must exist for an action or campaign to be labelled terrorism. Second, while terrorism sometimes appears random in its targeting, it may be actually selective (for example, against certain races, classes, ethnic or religious groups). Third, violent attacks on symbolic material targets (statues, buildings, etc.) that have the essential traits and objects listed in the definition are also considered to be acts of terrorism. Fourth, only acts that have a political motive can justifiably be included. Conversely, those events that are mainly "criminal" in nature (monetary extortion for personal gain) or committed by mentally unbalanced people, where political motives are absent, are not included.

### **Typology Clarification**

The study of terrorism can be further sharpened by delineating different types. Like the definition of terrorism itself, several typologies exist in the academic literature to classify terrorist actions.<sup>17</sup> One of the most popular and useful is the multidimensional typology developed by Edward Mickolus and adopted by others, which this researcher accepts for his purposes. Mickolus distinguishes among four general types of political terrorism based on whether an event involves government control or direction and direct involvement of nationals of more than

one state. He thus identifies four types of terrorism: interstate, international, state, and domestic.<sup>18</sup> None of these types are, however, mutually exclusive in practice. For example, terrorist groups operating in a country may take part in both domestic and international terrorism. The Front de Libération du Québec (FLQ) kidnapping of James Cross, the British Trade Commissioner in Montréal is a case in point. Moreover, all types of terrorism identified by Mickolus have occurred in Canada.

A further specification can be made with the concept of *international terrorism*. Here it is defined as “those terrorist actions carried out by autonomous or state-controlled actors, affecting nationals, states or their property at home or abroad.” Essentially, this combines definitions for international and transnational terrorism.<sup>19</sup> More explicitly, for this researcher’s purposes, it includes acts of terrorism carried out by Canadians against foreign targets in Canada; foreigners against Canadian targets in Canada; and, foreigners against foreign targets in Canada.

## **METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES**

How to study terrorism, what is studied, and the quality of this research vary over time and among investigators. The study of political terrorism in general, and in Canada in particular, is hampered by a number of methodological problems. These problems aside, there are several methodologies for empirically analyzing terrorism. One of the methods that gained popularity is the events data approach. Even though ample criticisms of this methodology with respect to its usage, purpose, and utility in political violence research has been articulated, this is probably the best available tool because it provides a comprehensive view of the scope of the phenomenon.<sup>20</sup>

### **Statistical Compilations on International Terrorism in Canada**

The logical consequence of the scarcity of studies on political terrorism in Canada is that few statistical studies have been compiled.<sup>21</sup> In general, efforts to collect data on terrorism in Canada can variously be criticized for their inclusion/exclusion criteria, selections (events included and excluded), periods covered, methods for making statistical inferences, and methods for validating events. Thus what is needed is a data set that minimizes or eliminates these shortcomings. Apart from ameliorating the difficulties with the work of Anthony Kellett, Mickolus, Todd Sandler and Jean Murdock, coding of this author’s original international events will allow reliable comparison between international and domestic events. This approach will help place the phenomenon of international terrorism relating to Canada in a broader context.

### **ATIC IV: How was it Created?**

The biggest hurdle in creating ATIC IV was the considerable amount of missing data. This is generally attributed to the difficulty in compiling the details of each incident, which is the most time consuming part of the research process.

To clean up this portion of the data set to allow for more meaningful interpretations, it was necessary to repeat the research process that was followed for the domestic data set.<sup>22</sup>

The three reference requirements, including one newspaper source from the city where the event took place,<sup>23</sup> and the fleshing out of the details of 70 possible events listed in the original master chronology were performed. After the information was as complete as possible, each incident was reassessed to determine if it met the inclusion criteria. This permitted the author to classify events by two categories: those accepted and those rejected.<sup>24</sup> All incidents were recorded, paying extra attention to gathering information for cases that had missing data. In addition to the variables that were originally coded, a new variable was created to represent the city where the event took place. This will be useful when performing tests of spatial correlation, contagion, and diffusion.

**TABLE I**  
**Reasons Cases were omitted from ATIC IV**

<b>Value Label</b>	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>Percent</b>
Threat or Hoax	34	(23.1)
Action took place outside of Canada	33	(22.4)
Did not meet three source inclusion criteria	17	(13.7)
Arrest of terrorist/s	13	(8.8)
Personal/psychological and not political motives	9	(6.1)
Protest and not terrorism	8	(5.4)
Non activated conspiracy	7	(4.8)
Insufficient details	6	(4.1)
Criminal and not political motives	4	(2.7)
Evidence of training	2	(1.4)
Domestic and not international	2	(1.4)
Target unclear	2	(1.4)
Extortion	2	(1.4)
Evidence of terrorist/s in transit	1	(.7)
State terrorism/intelligence operation	1	(.7)
Accidental detonation by terrorists	1	(.7)
Terrorists seeking asylum	1	(.7)
Wrong Date	1	(.7)
<b>Total</b>	<b>147</b>	<b>100.00</b>

Variable and value selection, and the creation of a coding form followed the conventions previously established by this author. Besides the additional variable, the methodology for analysis of international acts differed in two significant respects from the one used in the analysis of domestic terrorism. First, to minimize experimenter bias, all events were coded twice, on separate occasions, by the author and then by a research assistant. Second, when it was determined that there were insufficient details for inclusion of an event, a letter was drafted and sent to the appropriate police department exercising jurisdiction in that matter, to the organization that was attacked, or the victim(s) of the attack asking for additional information. Although the majority of written inquiries were not answered, this process helped to create a more rigorous data set than ATIC I and II. When the coding was provisionally completed, frequency distributions were run on all variables. This pointed out irregularities that were caused in the coding process and helped to 'clean' the data.

Selected variables from the international terrorism portion of the resultant data set (ATIC IV) were then compared with relevant variables from five data collection efforts. First, domestic and international variables from ATIC IV were compared. Second, ATIC IV was examined next to Kellett's latest chronology, coded by this author. Third, ATIC IV was compared with the events occurring in Canada listed in ITERATE 4. And finally, ATIC IV was examined next to the State Department's yearly tallies of events.

## **SELECTED TRENDS AND PATTERNS OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST EVENTS IN CANADA**

Fourteen variables from the data set are explored in this article. The first five, the incident characteristics, refer to the timing, type, location, and targets of terrorist events.<sup>25</sup> The balance refer to group responsibility, casualties from terrorism, and nationalities of victims. Although all of the variables have measurement difficulties they will not be discussed here.


### **Annual Incidence**

Most studies of international or transnational terrorism indicate that it increased steadily since data was first compiled starting with the year 1968.<sup>26</sup> This pattern was not demonstrated in Canada, which consistently experienced a relatively low level of international terrorism with one exception (See Figure 1 and Table 2). In 1968 there was a total of 18 international terrorist events occurring in Canada, accounting for 31 percent of the total number of incidents in the 1960-90 period. Otherwise, the attacks occurred in four waves. The first period, during the mid-1960s, consisted of events carried out by Croatian and Cuban nationalist organizations against Yugoslavian and Cuban government and commercial targets, respectively. In the late 1960s there were the early manifestations of 'anti-American' terrorism, generating the largest number of attacks in 1968. This loosely corresponds with the height of the anti-Vietnam War protests in the USA. Interna-

tional terrorism during the 1970s started with the FLQ kidnapping of Cross. This action was followed with attacks by Hungarian, Jewish, and Palestinian factions on Soviet, and Israeli or Jewish targets, respectively. Finally, in the late 1970s and first half of the 1980s, attacks were committed by Croatian and Armenian nationalists against Yugoslavian and Turkish targets, respectively.

As Table 2 shows, there were a total of 58 international terrorist incidents in Canada between 1960 and 1990, with an average of 1.87 events occurring in any given year. Even though sophisticated statistical comparisons of the entire ATIC IV data set with others are beyond the scope of this article, some general observations can be made. First, although there appears to be more stability in the frequency of international terrorist events than in domestic ones, there are also some parallels between the two, particularly in 1968.<sup>27</sup> Two pairs of data sets showed the highest correlations: the international and domestic portions of ATIC IV; and, the domestic portion of ATIC IV and the US State Department's annual tally of international events.<sup>28</sup> Although the former correlation may be a result of contagion or diffusion, it is difficult to speculate what might be happening between the international portion

**FIGURE I**  
**Frequency of International Terrorist Events per year**



**TABLE 2**  
**Comparison of the frequency of terrorist events occurring each year in**  
**Canada among the various data sets**

Year	<u>DOMESTIC</u>				<u>INTERNATIONAL</u>		
	ATIC I		ATIC IV[a]		Kellett 1988 [b]	Mickolus [c]& Mickolus et al. [d]	State Dept. [e]
	Freq.	(%)	Freq.	(%)	Freq.	Freq.	Freq.
60	0	(0.0)	6	(1.5)			
61	0	(0.0)	41	(10.1)			
62	0	(0.0)	33	(8.0)			
63	0	(0.0)	25	(6.1)			
64	1	(1.7)	11	(2.7)			
65	1	(1.7)	13	(3.2)			
66	1	(1.7)	5	(1.2)			
67	5	(8.6)	7	(1.7)			
68	18	(31.0)	51	(12.4)	1	2	125
69	1	(1.7)	40	(9.7)	1	2	193
70	2	(3.4)	41	(10.0)	1	6	309
71	3	(5.2)	36	(8.8)	3	1	264
72	4	(6.9)	6	(1.5)	4	2	558
73	1	(1.7)	5	(1.2)	0	0	345
74	0	(0.0)	2	(.5)	2	2	394
75	1	(1.7)	3	(.7)	0	1	382
76	1	(1.7)	2	(.5)	1	1	484
77	2	(3.4)	2	(.5)	1	1	455
78	0	(0.0)	5	(1.2)	0	0	581
79	1	(1.7)	5	(1.2)	0	0	462
80	3	(5.2)	11	(2.7)	2	1	504
81	2	(3.4)	24	(5.8)	1	1	497
82	4	(6.9)	9	(2.2)	3	3	480
83	0	(0.0)	15	(3.6)	0	2	487
84	0	(0.0)	3	(.7)	2	1	611
85	1	(1.7)	4	(1.0)	2	3	792
86	4	(6.9)	2	(.5)		4	775
87	0	(0.0)	0	(0.0)		0	835
88	1	(1.7)	2	(.5)			862
89	1	(1.7)	1	(.2)			528
90	0	(0.0)	1	(.2)			455
<b>Total</b>	<b>58</b>	<b>(100.0)</b>	<b>411</b>	<b>(100.0)</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>11378</b>



- [a] Only claimed, reliably attributed, and inferred actions of the international events were included in ATIC IV.
  - [b] Only the international actions labelled internal were included.
  - [c] Based only on international actions occurring in Canada listed in Edward F. Mickolus, *Transnational Terrorism: A Chronology of Events, 1968-1979* (Westport, CO: Greenwood, 1980).
  - [d] Based only on international actions occurring in Canada listed in Edward F. Mickolus, Todd Sandler, and Jean Murdock, *International Terrorism in the 1980s: A Chronology of Events*, Vol. 1, 1980-1983 and Vol. 2, 1984-1987 (Ames, IA: Iowa State University Press, 1989).
  - [e] Based on total world-wide amounts cited in United States, Department of State, *International Terrorist Incidents, 1968-1988*, 3/6/91.
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of ATIC IV and the State Department statistics. Second, ATIC IV has more rigorous inclusion criteria than Kellett's 1988 chronology. Consequently, Kellett reports almost twice the number of events for the same time period (1968-85). Setting aside 1968, with its multiple counting of coordinated events occurring on the same night but in different locations, then ATIC IV has approximately 60 percent more events than ATIC I. Also, ATIC IV has more events than the Canadian portion of INTERATE 4 for the same time period. Furthermore, ATIC IV and the events taking place in Canada listed in Kellett's and Mickolus' data sets are different from the world-wide pattern as evidenced by the State Department statistics.<sup>29</sup>

### Monthly Incidence

Annual trends are but rough consolidations of more intricate processes. Are there periods during which we might expect a higher probability of attack? We find in Table 3 a clustering of events in September with January, April, October and November a distant second. Even though no comprehensive explanation can be given for this clustering, it is also possible that this pattern is the result of multiple coordinated operations on a world-wide basis (for example, mailings of scores of letter bombs in a given month, commemoration of specific events, etc.). For instance, some terrorist events that took place in September were attacks in commemoration of the forcible ousting of members of al-Fatah and the Popular Front For the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) from Jordan in September 1970. Otherwise, there was an average of 4.73 events per month. Finally, a correlation of  $-.2127$  was found between the month of international terrorism and domestic terrorism.

### Daily Incidence

On the other hand, there is little, if any, clustering of the 58 international events throughout each month (see Table 4). If the events were randomly distributed, almost two events should have happened on any given day. In fact, 14 events (24.1 percent) occurred on the 24th of a given month, while all other dates

**TABLE 3**  
**Comparison of Month Event Took Place between**  
**International and Domestic events in ATIC IV**

Month	International		Domestic	
	Freq.	Percent	Freq.	Percent
January	9	(15.5)	31	(7.5)
February	1	(1.7)	30	(7.3)
March	2	(3.4)	22	(5.4)
April	5	(8.6)	31	(7.5)
May	4	(6.9)	56	(13.6)
June	1	(1.7)	45	(10.9)
July	1	(1.7)	41	(10.0)
August	4	(6.9)	24	(5.8)
September	18	(31.0)	29	(7.1)
October	5	(8.6)	31	(7.5)
November	5	(8.6)	39	(9.5)
December	3	(5.2)	31	(7.5)
Missing data			1	(0.2)
<b>Total</b>	<b>58</b>	<b>(100.0)</b>	<b>411</b>	<b>(100.0)</b>

are a distant second in terms of ranking. This anomaly, as with the previous variable, may be explained by coordinated attacks. On the other hand, there is no parallel clustering of the domestic events. This observation is buttressed by the statistically insignificant correlation of 0.893 for the day of the month between the international and domestic data sets.

### Type

Differing patterns also emerge for each type of terrorist incident (See Table 5). The majority of events were low-tech actions, requiring little sophistication (technical skill, access to equipment and logistic support, planning, personnel, intelligence and timing). Consistent with the pattern of domestic terrorism in Canada and world-wide, bombings account for the lion's share of all events (72.4 percent). Since most bombs are easy to make and bombing attacks relatively easy to carry out, this pattern is scarcely surprising. However, the more sophisticated bombs, such as time-delayed and letter/parcel types, are underrepresented in the Canadian experience.

### Targets

The bulk of the targets of international terrorist bombings in Canada were American corporations or the homes of corporate executives working for American

**TABLE 4**  
**Comparison of Day Event Took Place between**  
**International and Domestic events in ATIC IV**

Day of Month	International		Domestic	
	Freq.	Percent	Freq.	Percent
1	3	(5.2)	19	(4.6)
2	1	(1.7)	18	(4.4)
3	4	(6.9)	13	(3.2)
4	2	(3.4)	11	(2.7)
5	2	(3.4)	14	(3.4)
6	0		15	(3.6)
7	2	(3.4)	13	(3.2)
8	0		12	(2.9)
9	2	(3.4)	5	(1.2)
10	1	(1.7)	14	(3.4)
11	3	(5.2)	8	(1.9)
12	1	(1.7)	10	(2.4)
13	1	(1.7)	11	(2.7)
14	2	(3.4)	14	(3.4)
15	0		10	(2.4)
16	1	(1.7)	16	(3.9)
17	0		16	(3.9)
18	1	(1.7)	5	(1.2)
19	1	(1.7)	10	(2.4)
20	3	(5.2)	19	(4.6)
21	0		6	(1.5)
22	1	(1.7)	18	(4.4)
23	2	(3.4)	7	(1.7)
24	14	(24.1)	12	(2.9)
25	1	(1.7)	12	(2.9)
26	3	(5.2)	9	(2.2)
27	3	(5.2)	10	(2.4)
28	1	(1.7)	13	(3.2)
29	2	(3.4)	12	(2.9)
30	1	(1.7)	21	(5.1)
31	0		17	(4.1)
Missing Data			21	(5.1)
<b>Total</b>	<b>58</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>411</b>	<b>100.00</b>

**TABLE 5**  
**Comparison of Type of Terrorist Event between**  
**International and Domestic events in ATIC IV**

Type of Event	International		Domestic	
	Freq.	Percent	Freq.	Percent
<b>Bombings [a]</b>				
Unknown tupe	27	(46.6)	218	(53.0)
Molotov	6	(10.3)	57	(3.9)
Dynamite	5	(8.6)	28	(6.8)
Letter/parcel	3	(5.2)	1	(.2)
Time-delayed	1	(1.7)	14	(3.4)
Smoke			1	(.2)
Pipe			3	(.7)
<b>Other attacks/actions</b>				
Arson	2	(3.4)	53	(12.9)
Seizure/occupation	2	(3.4)	3	(.7)
<b>Armed Attack-missiles</b>	1	(1.7)		
Skyjacking	1	(1.7)		
Takeover of non air means of Transport	1	(1.7)		
Destruction			18	(4.4)
Sabotage			1	(.2)
<b>Attacks on human targets</b>				
Assassination/murder	4	(6.9)	3	(.7)
Assassination attempt	3	(5.2)	1	(.2)
Assault/slashing	1	(1.7)	2	(.5)
Kidnapping	1	(1.7)	1	(.2)
<b>Missing data</b>			7	(1.7)
<b>Total</b>	<b>58</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>411</b>	<b>100.0</b>

[a] Does not include direct attacks on human targets.

companies (17 actions). This is followed by attacks on Cuban-related targets (7) and on the US consulate (5). The remainder were directed against: Soviet interests (3), the Yugoslavian embassy (1) and consulate (1), and businesses owned by Yugoslavian-Canadians (2), the British High Commission (1), the Israeli embassy (1), Jewish businessmen (2), the Department of National Defence (1), the Turkish embassy (1), and a Croatian business (1). Physical targets received the majority of bombings, while people were the recipients of relatively few bomb attacks.

Direct attacks on human targets, such as assassinations or murders, (4 in all) were very rare in the context of international terrorism in Canada. But, as a percentage of the total number of events, they were almost 10 times as frequent as those caused by domestic terrorist actions. It appears then that the international terrorist events are directed more at human than non-human targets. Meanwhile, the number of kidnappings, hijackings, assaults and other actions are approximately equal in number and account for the balance of terrorist acts. This pattern contrasts with domestic terrorism where kidnapping ranks fourth, armed attacks rank fifth, and hijacks rank sixth. Surprisingly, although there were a handful of plane hijackings in Canada, only one qualifies as a terrorist act, namely the hijacking by Croatian nationalists of a Boeing 727, which made several stops including Montréal and Gander (11-12 September 1976). Most of the other hijackings were the activities of criminal or mentally unbalanced people and not political terrorist acts *per se*.

There were no barricade/hostage situations between 1960-90. Of the events that could possibly be counted, one was actually a protest, which occurred during another type of incident (an assassination), and was clearly the secondary type of event. Although there was only one kidnapping, that of British diplomat James Cross by the FLQ in October 1970, there were a number of attempted kidnappings. However, since they were never realized, these events were considered inactivated conspiracies and thus were not included in the data set.

### **Locale: Province**

In increasing order of frequency the provinces of British Columbia, Québec and Ontario experienced the largest proportion of international terrorist attacks (See Table 6). Not surprisingly, international terrorist incidents occurred where the majority of Canadians, emigré and immigrant populations, live. Logically, a major reason why Ontario holds the number one position in international terrorist incidents is because of the plethora of targets: foreign consulates, embassies, and trade offices in Ottawa and Toronto. Additionally, the three top provinces are well served by the news media. It follows then that the provinces which are not part of the mainstream – the maritimes, the prairies, and the northern territories – do not experience any international terrorism at all.

### **Locale: City**

Cities where the events took place, are more revealing than provinces (See Table 7). It shows that urban locales are the preferred locations for international terrorist events. These cities are chosen because they provide a number of advantages.<sup>30</sup> Most of these cities in Canada have at least two daily newspapers, several radio stations and at least one television station. The most preferred cities appear to be Toronto and Montréal, which have the largest and second largest, populations in Canada respectively. Ottawa, where the majority of embassies and consulates are located and which has media of both official languages, had approximately two-thirds the number of attacks as the previously mentioned cities.

**TABLE 6**  
**Comparison of Province Where Terrorist Action took Place**  
**between International and Domestic events in ATIC IV**

Province	International		Domestic	
	Freq.	Percent	Freq.	Percent
Ontario	33	(56.9)	23	(5.6)
Quebec	20	(34.5)	234	(56.9)
British Columbia	5	(8.6)	146	(36.1)
New Brunswick			3	(.7)
Alberta			1	(.2)
Manitoba			1	(.2)
Newfoundland			1	(.2)
<b>Total</b>	<b>58</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>411</b>	<b>100.0</b>

**TABLE 7**  
**City Where Terrorist Incident Took Place**

City	Freq.	Percent
Toronto (ON)	21	(36.2)
Montréal (PQ)	19	(32.8)
Ottawa (ON)	12	(20.7)
Vancouver (BC)	3	(5.2)
Quebec City (PQ)	1	(1.7)
Surrey (BC)	1	(1.7)
Missing data	1	(1.7)
<b>Total</b>	<b>58</b>	<b>100.0</b>

**Responsibility for Action**

Responsibility for terrorist actions can be analyzed by distinguishing among events that an organization claimed responsibility for, incidents that are popularly attributed by the media to particular groups, and those incidents that are authoritatively attributed to a particular group, by government sources or by inference, (for

**TABLE 8**  
**Group Responsibility for Action**

Group	Claimed by group	Popularly believed responsible [h]	Authoritatively believed responsible [i]	
	Freq.	Freq.	Freq.	Percent
Anti-US Policy	17	19	7	(12.1)
Cuban Nationalists [a]	7	8	8	(13.8)
Croatian Nationalists [b]	1	7	7	(12.1)
Armenian Nationalists [c]	4	4	4	(6.9)
Palestinian Nationalists [d]	2	3	3	(5.2)
Québec Separatists [e]	1	2	3	(5.2)
JDL [f]	1	1	1	(1.7)
CPC (Marxist-Leninist)	1	1	1	(1.7)
Hungarian Nationalists [g]	1		1	(1.7)
Direct Action	1		1	(1.7)
Weather Underground		1	1	(1.7)
Irish Republican Army		1	1	(1.7)
RR/FLQ/QLF/ALQ	1	3	1	(1.7)
Pro FLN	1			
Direct Action	1	1	1	(1.7)
Auid	1	2	1	(1.7)
Front for the Liberation of Christian Lebanon	1			
Sikh Nationalist		1	2	(3.4)
None	5	3	2	(3.4)
Missing data	12	1	13	(22.4)
<b>Total</b>	<b>58</b>	<b>58</b>	<b>58</b>	<b>100.00</b>

[a] Including Cuban Action, Cuban Nationalist Association, and Cuban Secret Government.

[b] Including Ustasha.

[c] Including Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia, and Armenian Revolutionary Army.

[d] Including Black September.

[e] Including the Front de Liberation du Québec.

[f] Including splinter groups.

[g] Including the Hungarian Freedom Fighters Association.

[h] Based on media reports.

[i] Based on police report or conviction.

example by choice of target, type of event, location, method of attack). Based on Table 8, groups claimed responsibility for 41 events (70.7 percent), 54 actions (93 percent) were popularly attributed to identifiable organizations, and 45 (74 percent) incidents were authoritatively attributed to particular groups.<sup>31</sup> According to Table 8, eighteen different categories of groups or individuals either claimed responsibility, were popularly attributed, or authoritatively believed responsible for almost 80 percent of the international terrorist acts in Canada.

Of the events claimed by a group or individual, those opposed to US foreign policy were the most frequent. Distant seconds were the Cuban and Armenian nationalist groups. Most of the other groups or causes were ephemeral, their existence demonstrated by only one or two acts of violence over the thirty-one years accounted for in the data set. Furthermore, while some of the groups who claimed responsibility or whose responsibility was inferred were left-wing in orientation (for example, the FLQ), others, such as the anti-Castro Cubans, were not. One thing these groups had in common, however, was that the majority of them had their roots in nationalist and autonomist struggles, and thus could draw upon thriving emigré communities in Canada.

### **Primary and Secondary Targets**

The bulk of primary targets were private property (28) events, followed by public property (17) and then people (12) (See Table 9). Specific targets that were most likely to be attacked were embassies/consulates (28 percent), residences (26 percent), and people (20 percent). More than half of the targets were physical targets. Unlike domestic terrorism, international terrorism did not affect official Canadian targets, such as government buildings, postal facilities, and public utilities. For the majority of events, the information about secondary or incidental targets was missing or there were no secondary targets. Of the incidents that had complete information, residences, commercial property, and people were generally the main secondary targets. In general, people are three times more likely to be primary targets resulting from international terrorism than domestic attacks.

### **Casualties**

In the thirty-one years covered by this data set, only four people were killed as a result of international terrorism in Canada (See Table 10). In other words, approximately seven percent of acts of terrorism ended in deaths to the victims. The individuals killed were of different national origin and occupations: one was a Canadian security guard killed during an assault on the Turkish Embassy in Ottawa; another was a Turkish military attaché assassinated en route to work; one was a Rumanian official working in his country's consulate in Montréal; and the last was a prominent Yugoslavian doctor of Canadian citizenship living in Vancouver who was killed by the *Ustasha*. Unlike acts of domestic terrorism, no terrorists were killed in international terrorist attacks. As compared to other data sets listing deaths related to international terrorism, no corporation officials or prominent opinion leaders were



**TABLE 9**  
**Primary and Secondary Targets of International Terrorism**

Target	Primary Target		Secondary Target	
	Freq.	Percent	Freq.	Percent
Private Property				
Residences [a]	15	(25.9)	4	(6.9)
Commercial [b]	9	(15.5)	3	(5.2)
Means of transportation	4	(6.9)		
Public Property				
Embassies/consulates	16	(27.6)	1	(1.7)
Military buildings	1	(1.7)		
People [d]	12	(20.7)	4	(8.6)
None			31	(53.4)
Missing data	1	(1.7)	15	(20.7)
<b>Total</b>	<b>58</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>58</b>	<b>100.0</b>

- [a] Including homes, apartments, etc.
- [b] Including hotels, restaurants, construction sites, and miscellaneous offices.
- [c] Including installations.
- [d] Indicating people who were directly targeted.

killed in international terrorist attacks in Canada. Although no terrorists were killed during these events, two Croats, suspected of engaging in terrorist actions, died while they were assembling a bomb in their home (1 September 1977).

More dramatic were the statistics showing that 20 people were injured as a result of international terrorism in Canada. These injuries occurred in 34.4 percent of the events. In increasing order of frequency, the type of individuals injured included: those whose occupations could not be identified (1); workers/employees (4); security personnel (6); and government officials (9). In most cases, the people injured were not directly targeted but were hurt by fallen debris or shattered glass. These individuals were either at the wrong place at the wrong time or were responding to a bomb call. Also in most events where there were injuries only one person was hurt per event. And, in most cases of deaths and injuries, the cause was an assassination or assassination attempt. Finally, the majority of people attacked were of foreign and not of Canadian citizenship.<sup>32</sup>

### **Nationalities of Victims**

Of the 58 incidents of international terrorism in Canada, 47 either had missing data or the nationality of the victim was not relevant. Of the remaining 11

**TABLE 10**  
**Professions and Occupations of Casualties**  
**from International Terrorism**

	Killed		Injured [a]	
	Freq.	Percent	Freq.	Percent
Security personnel [b]	1	(25.0)	6	(30.0)
Government officials	2	(50.0)	9	(45.0)
Worker/Employee			4	(20.0)
Professional	1	(25.0)		
Unidentified			1	(5.0)
<b>Total</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>100.0</b>

- [a] An injury which led to a death was counted as a killing and not an injury to avoid double counting.
- [b] Including military, police, security guards, and prison guards but Canadian citizens.

**TABLE 11**  
**Nationality of Victims from International Terrorism**

	Freq.	Percent
Canadian	3	(5.2)
Turkey	2	(3.4)
American	1	(1.7)
USSR	1	(1.7)
Rumanian	2	(3.4)
Indian	2	(3.4)
None/Not Relevant	43	(74.1)
Missing data	4	(6.9)
<b>Total</b>	<b>58</b>	<b>100.0</b>

actions (19 percent), the majority were directed against foreign governments or emigré groups (See Table 11). Of the events where the nationalities of the victims were known, the lion's share were aimed at Turkish, Indian, and Rumanian government officials. On the other hand, only one-fifth of the terrorist acts were committed against purely Canadian targets – government and corporate officials.

## **CONCLUSIONS**

### **Summary**

Although the current effort is the most detailed publicly available data set on terrorism in Canada, like most data compilations, it is not without its problems; the largest of which is missing information. This drawback and possible methods for improvement aside, what have we learned or substantiated from this current data collection? What are some of its implications and applications; in particular, what could one reasonably expect the future of international terrorism in Canada to be like? The answers follow below.

### **Correlational Comparisons**

With this measure derived from other data sets and data derived from chronologies of other researchers and organizations, correlations among ATIC IV's domestic and international annual level of incidents produced unexpected results. Given that all data sets were designed to measure international terrorist events and as such should have been related, correlations among three of them, namely ATIC IV, Kellett's, and Mickolus et al.'s chronology were weak. Yet there was a strong negative correlation between the Canadian rate of domestic (ATIC I data) and international terrorism world-wide (the State Department data). But, within the ATIC data, there was a strong positive correlation between international and domestic terrorism in Canada. In sum, although both types of terrorism in Canada were related, the majority of international terrorism in Canada was not significantly related to international terrorism which occurred in the world-wide geopolitical context.

### **Changed Perceptions**

This study minimizes the perception, often articulated in definitions of terrorism, that terrorists are unpredictable, act randomly, and are indiscriminate in their choices of actions. As demonstrated, terrorists choose among a limited range of options. Second, this study determined the physical, temporal, and terrorist-imposed boundaries where international terrorism in Canada takes place. Finally, the present analysis attached a statistical probability to these choices, thereby helping to gauge the severity of the terrorist threat.

### **Typology Clarification**

If we can generalize from the Canadian case to other similar Western democracies, international terrorism embodies more violent and deadly actions than does domestic terrorism. These international incidents are also primarily directed at human targets, kill more people than domestic terrorism, and take place more often in large cities and on days that commemorate other events.

### **Reasons for the Low Level of International Terrorism**

When compared with other Western countries, Canada experienced a rather low level of international terrorism.<sup>33</sup> In many respects this phenomenon is

connected to a larger process – the incidence of political violence in Canada. Five explanations specifically connected to international terrorism bear scrutiny. First, because Canada has an international posture as a “middle power,” maintains a “peaceful” role in international affairs, and was generally on the periphery of important world issues (the arms race, Middle East conflicts and peace process), the country is not regarded by the world community as playing a sufficiently significant role in conflicts that produce high levels of international terrorism to justify its frequent targeting. The US, by contrast, is a readily identifiable target because of its global political and economic position, which explains why approximately 40 percent of all victims of international terrorist attacks between 1968 and 1979 were Americans.<sup>34</sup>

Second, Canada’s physical location may have spared it some acts of terrorism. Kellett, and later reiterated by the first Kelly report, suggested that “Canada’s relative remoteness from many of the conflicts that generate acts of international terrorism insulates it to a certain extent from the commission within its boundaries of such acts.” He goes on to claim that “the great distances involved in crossing the Atlantic or the Pacific may have acted as a deterrent to extra-hemispheric hijacking involving Canada.”<sup>35</sup> He toned down this assessment in his later report by stating that “[w]hile the distances involved in the trans-Atlantic route appear likely to continue for some time to discourage hijacking, air travel itself reduced Canada’s insulation from the major terrorist ‘hot spots’ by making the country increasingly accessible from any point on the globe.<sup>36</sup>

Third, an interesting finding from the omissions section of the chronology, which could account for the low level of terrorism, is the frequent apprehension of a number of real or suspected foreign terrorists present, if not active, in Canada. From 1960 to 1990 there were approximately 22 foreign terrorists who were either apprehended and/or deported from or refused entry into Canada. The greatest number of terrorists apprehended were those attempting to cross at border points during the 1976 Olympic Games. Groups whose members have attempted to cross borders or who were arrested in Canada include: the Japanese Red Army; Provisional Irish Republican Army; Baader-Meinhof Gang; Red Brigades; Gray Wolves; and Monteneros.<sup>37</sup>

Fourth, the patterns of international terrorist activity in Canada were interesting. International terrorist actions hovered around two events per year, and no sooner had one group stopped its campaign than it was replaced by another. One can infer from this that international terrorist acts committed in Canada by particular groups or individuals tended to be disconnected from each other. In other words, there is no evidence that any group or individual was conducting a systematic and consistent campaign of terrorism over a prolonged period of time. Of this sporadic terrorist activity, only the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA) and the anti-Castro terrorists engaged in a significantly higher than the average number of terrorist acts.

Perhaps there is a normative and tolerable cultural level of international terrorism occurring in Canada. This hypothesis might be dismissed if it only took

into account the different cultural backgrounds of the people perpetrating the terrorist actions. It is more likely, however, that when actions of terrorism impinge on the Canadian "collective conscience" (in the Durkheimian sense) it forces Canada's national security agencies to become more vigilant in ferreting out potential acts of international terrorism and monitoring international terrorists operating in Canada. It is also possible that a substitution effect may have occurred. For example, when national security agencies focused on one group it provided opportunities for another to act.<sup>38</sup>

### **Anti-Americanism and Criticism of US Foreign Policy**

The 17 incidents against American targets appear connected to US foreign policy issues and bear more detailed commentary. The majority of literature bearing on Canadian criticism of US foreign policy or anti-Americanism in Canada stops short of analyzing political behavior of a violent nature.<sup>39</sup> Moreover, it suggests that anti-Americanism in Canada has an upper-class bias with the mass of the people more tolerant of American shortcomings. The majority of violent events linked opposition to US foreign policy during the 1960s were primarily related to the Vietnam War. These actions were carried out both by Canadians and by Americans living in Canada who avoided the draft. Apart from the June 1970 conspiracy by the FLQ to kidnap Harrison Burgess, the American Ambassador to Canada, which was uncovered and foiled by the police, none of the anti-American events were more serious than a fire-bombing. Moreover, most of the attacks were against American corporations that were building weapons for the war effort and not individuals.

### **Future of International Terrorism in Canada**

Even though the overall rate of terrorism in Canada is relatively low, both the McDonald Commission and the first Kelly Committee predicted that international terrorism would continue to pose a threat to national security. According to the McDonald report,

the internationalization of terrorist activities since the late 1960s has significantly increased the severity of this threat to the security of Canada ... [i]t would be rash to predict a disappearance of the 'terrorist' threat in the future. Political fanaticism is not on the wane, and modern technology increases the power of a few to threaten the many.<sup>40</sup>

Likewise, the Kelly report said that "[i]nternational [t]errorism is ... likely to be for the foreseeable future the major source of terrorist incidents in Canada, at least in terms of severity and impact."<sup>41</sup>

Although the Kelly Committee was more directed toward international terrorism than the McDonald Inquiry, neither of their reports adequately predicted future levels of terrorism. Roughly, three methodologies are relevant and should be explored in future predictive research: first, comprehensive modelling efforts that

include multivariate, time series, process and simulation analysis of events; second, in-depth case studies of groups/populations that are likely to engage in this type of behavior;<sup>42</sup> and, third, tracking the rate of international terrorism in the US much better and comparing it to Canada.

### **Future Research with ATIC IV**

Now that both the domestic and international data sets are completed there are three possible research avenues that should be pursued: first, additional comparisons with other data sets; second, the analysis of causes; and finally, an examination of the effects of terrorism in Canada. Some additional questions that require answers concern the degree of government preoccupation with terrorism, public opinion, and the maintenance of this data set.

First, ATIC IV should be more rigorously compared with other data sets and should be used in theory building and testing. This data set should also be compared with others currently available or being constructed. This leads to three meaningful comparisons/tests: with terrorism in other countries (employing both most similar and dissimilar research designs), with groups using terrorism in other countries, and among different types of terrorism in Canada. Furthermore, all types of terrorism should eventually be compared and interactions among them explored within and between countries.<sup>43</sup> In addition, the author is searching for similar data sets for other Western countries with which to make further comparisons.

Second, other opportunities for research include the exploration of other effects of terrorism on society as a whole, on the political context of the event (for example, on the party in power), and on policy responses. Generally referred to as impact studies, issues of public opinion could be examined in combination with the data generated. For instance, if international terrorism was of such low incidence in Canada, why was it the subject of so much governmental interest, particularly inspiring expensive, extended, governmental commissions, and inquiries? Moreover, what are the processes fuelling the fire of this phenomenon?

More in-depth public opinion research clearly needs to be done.<sup>44</sup> There needs to be ongoing monitoring of Canadians' perceptions about the seriousness of terrorism of all varieties in Canada, and how much their lives are affected by these events. This would help governmental decision-makers react more cautiously rather than be subject to the whims of politicians and opinion makers rallying public support.

Third, and most fruitful, is the exploration of the causes of terrorism. Having a reasonably reliable dependent variable (the number and type of "terrorist acts"), one could specify and test the independent variables that are related to the increase or decrease in terrorism.<sup>45</sup> This research needs to be done on a continuous basis in order to be able to predict with a degree of confidence the occurrence of terrorist incidents.

Furthermore, the existing data sets need to be updated and revised on an annual basis. Events added to the data set will help put the problems into a larger,

more comprehensive perspective.<sup>46</sup> In addition, there are a number of other variables that with more forthcoming access to information and resources should be coded.<sup>47</sup> Both of these hurdles are difficult for private researchers to overcome.

In the final analysis, it is safe to say that Canada has been relatively untouched by international terrorism, even allowing for the possibility that not every terrorist act that occurred has been recorded. This reality brings into question the approach that should be taken to ensure that Canada's future terrorist track record remains relatively low. Continuing to harden targets, introducing anti-terrorist legislation, meting out stiffer penalties, and retaining the country's posture as a middle power in international politics represent a range of possible preventative measures. These strategies, however, must be balanced with the increased costs, the tendency for the number of laws to increase, the cluttering of the courts, overcrowding of prisons, and the potential for abuse and hence infringement of civil liberties.

Although the Canadian experience of international terrorist activity is still of such a low level and sporadic pattern, that it hardly qualifies as an epidemic of any sort, it is still a social and policy problem. The disruption, repercussions, destruction, and loss of life that even a few incidents of terrorist activity can bring upon a state more than justifies the continued tracking of terrorist events and their attributes. Input now, rather than later, with respect to data quality, variable selection, and research applications, will undoubtedly make this work more productive and useful.

### Endnotes

The author is grateful to Natasha J. Cabrera, David Charters, and the anonymous referees of this journal for helpful comments, and to Richard Froelich for research assistance.

1. This group includes the police, military, and national security agencies and organizations at the municipal, provincial, and federal levels.
2. In fact, Canada has limited experience with terrorism relative to other more common forms of political violence such as riots and internal wars. Actions like coups d'etat, guerrilla warfare, civil wars, and political revolutions have been non-existent in Canadian history. See Judy Torrance, *Public Violence in Canada, 1867-1982* (Kingston and Montréal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1986), p. 45.
3. This point has been made in the author's earlier work: see Jeffrey Ian Ross, "Domestic Political Terrorism in Canada, 1960-1985: An Empirical Analysis", published MA thesis, University of Colorado at Boulder, 1988, and Ross, "An Events Data Base on Political Terrorism in Canada: Some Conceptual and Methodological Problems," *Conflict Quarterly*, 8, no. 2 (Spring 1988), pp. 47-65. This view may be reinforced by reviewing Bruce Beanlands and James Deacon, *Counter-Terrorism Bibliography* (Ottawa: Solicitor General of Canada, 1989). Only 17 items are listed in the general section on Canada. Many of the other citations, listed in the other parts that were cross-referenced with Canada, had nothing to do with terrorism in Canada but focused on security issues in general.
4. While most chronologies start in 1968, ATIC begins in 1960 to encompass the majority of activities of the Sons of Freedom Doukhobors and the early phases of Cuban Nationalist terrorism in Canada. ATIC is part of a larger data collection and analysis project called Political Violence in Canada (PVIC), which includes separate data sets on right-wing violence, (see Jeffrey Ian Ross, "Contemporary Radical Right-Wing Violence in Canada: A Quantitative Analysis," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 4, no. 3 (Autumn 1992), pp. 72-101), left-wing violence, strike violence, native

violence, and state violence. See Jeffrey Ian Ross, "Proposal for the Creation of a Data Set on Political and Criminal Violence in Canada," unpublished manuscript, 1989.

5. See Ross, "Domestic Political Terrorism in Canada." A pilot data set for ATIC II was previously used in Jeffrey Ian Ross, "Attacking Terrorist Attacks: Initial Tests of the Contagion between Domestic and International Terrorism in Canada," *Low Intensity Conflict and Law Enforcement*, 1, no. 2 (1992), pp. 163-83. Work on ATIC III has been temporarily discontinued due to the low number of events.
6. The discrepancy between number of domestic terrorist events reported in this version (411), and those discussed in Ross, "An Events Data Base on Political Terrorism in Canada," (415) is due to more precise verification of the data. Furthermore, the discrepancy between numbers of international events recorded in Jeffrey Ian Ross, "Attributes of Domestic Political Terrorism in Canada, 1960-1985," *Terrorism: An International Journal*, 11, no. 3 (Fall 1988), pp. 213-33 (71) and this version of ATIC II (58) can be explained by the fact that the number mentioned in the article was an estimation, as noted by the work "roughly." Further checking determined that four events were miscoded. Additionally, a number of cases were dropped from ATIC I because they were later determined to be either acts of international terrorism or other forms of violence short of terrorism.
7. Ross, "An Events Data Base on Political Terrorism in Canada," pp. 48-53.
8. See Jeffrey Ian Ross and Ted Robert Gurr, "Why Terrorism Subsides: A Comparative Study of Canada and The United States," *Comparative Politics*, 21, no. 4 (July 1989), pp. 405-26 for a discussion of the decline of domestic political terrorism in Canada, the United States and other advanced industrialized countries.
9. See, for example, Salim Jiwa, *The Death of Air India Flight 182* (London: New Star Books, 1986); Clark Blaise and Bharati Mukherjee, *The Sorrow and the Terror* (Markham, ON: Penguin Books, 1988).
10. See sub-section below on Reasons for the Low Level of International Terrorism.
11. Canada, *The Report of the Senate Special Committee on Terrorism and the Public Safety*, (Kelly Committee) (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, 1987). This was followed by Canada, *The Report of the Second Special Committee of the Senate on Terrorism and Public Safety* (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, 1989).
12. G. Davidson Smith, *Combating Terrorism* (London and New York: Routledge, 1990), pp. 152-53, 178-81.
13. David A. Charters, ed., *Democratic Responses to International Terrorism* (Ardley-on-Hudson, NY: Transnational, 1991).
14. See, for example, United States, Department of State, *Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1989* (Washington, DC: Office of the Coordinator for Counter-Terrorism, April 1990). See also, Eugene Mastrangelo, "International Terrorism: A Regional and Global Overview, 1970-1986," in Yonah Alexander, ed., *The 1986 Annual on Terrorism* (Dordrecht, Netherlands: Marinus Nijhoff, 1987); Martin C. Arostegui, "Special Reports of Risks International," *Terrorism*, 7, no. 4 (1985), pp. 417-30; Brian M. Jenkins and Janera Johnston, *International Terrorism: A Chronology, 1968-1974* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1975); and Edward F. Mickolus, "International Terrorism," in Michael Stohl, ed., *The Politics of Terrorism*, 2nd ed. (New York: Marcel Dekker, 1983), pp. 221-53.
15. See Thomas H. Mitchell, "Politically-Motivated Terrorism in North America: The Threat and the Response," PhD diss., Carleton University, 1985, and Canada *Report of the Senate Special Committee* (1987), p. 12 for a comment on why there is a difference between terrorism in the United States and Canada.
16. This definition comes from Alex P. Schmid, *Political Terrorism: A Research Guide to Concepts, Theories, Data Bases and Literature* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 1984), p. 111. It is chosen, despite some shortcomings, over the revised definition appearing in Alex P. Schmid and Albert J. Jongman, *Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Actors, Concepts, Data Bases, Theories, and Literature* rev. expanded and updated ed. (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 1988), p. 28 because the latter was perceived to have more difficulties than the earlier one.
17. See, for example, Paul Wilkinson, *Political Terrorism* (Toronto: John Wiley and Sons, 1974); Frederick J. Hacker, *Crusaders, Criminals, Crazies: Terror and Terrorism in our Time* (New York:



- Bantam, 1976); and Chalmers Johnson, *Revolutionary Change* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1982). See Schmid and Jongman, *Political Terrorism*, chap. 3 for a review of research on terrorism typology construction.
18. The definitions of the different types of terrorism are based on Edward F. Mickolus, "Combating International Terrorism: A Quantitative Analysis," unpublished PhD diss., Yale University, 1981, pp. 218-9.
  19. On the distinctions between international, transnational and interstate terrorism, see Mickolus, "Combating International Terrorism," p. 218; and David Milbank, *International and Transnational Terrorism* (Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 1976).
  20. See Ted Robert Gurr, "Empirical Research on Political Terrorism: The State of the Art and How it might be Improved," in Robert O. Slater and Michael Stohl, eds. *Current Perspectives on International Terrorism* (New York: St. Martin's, 1988), pp. 115-54; and Ross, "An Events Data Base on Political Terrorism in Canada," pp. 48-53 for a summary of those problems. In general, one of the difficulties with this type of methodology is the source of data gathering. The majority of data sets on international terrorism, whether governmental, private or academic, mainly depend upon information from major newspapers as the basis of their research. These newspapers have a tendency to underreport less dramatic, although no less important events. Using a wide variety of data sources, such as other types of mass media (including but not limited to newspaper indexes, or computerized newspaper indexes or articles), and more local news sources should give a more comprehensive picture.
  21. In addition to the author's work, there are several other chronologies and quantitative studies: Anthony Kellett, Bruce Beanlands and James Deacon, *Terrorism in Canada, 1960-1989 User Report no. 1990-16* (Ottawa: National Security Coordination Centre, Solicitor General Canada, 1991); Anthony Kellett, *Contemporary International Terrorism and Its Impact on Canada, ORAE Report no. R100* (Ottawa: Operational Research and Analysis Establishment, Department of National Defence, February 1988); David A Charters, "Canadian Security Intelligence Problems in Historical Perspective," paper presented at Conference on Intelligence and Policy, (Defense Intelligence College/American Political Science Association), August 1986, pp. 19-32, and Appendix 2. See also, Edward F. Mickolus, *Transnational Terrorism: A Chronology of Events, 1968-1979* (Westport, CN: Greenwood, 1980); Edward F. Mickolus, Todd Sandler, and Jean Murdock, *International Terrorism in the 1980s: A Chronology of Events, Vol. 1, 1980-1983 and Vol. 2, 1983-1987* (Ames, IA: Iowa State University Press, 1989).
  22. For a detailed discussion of the construction of the data set, see Ross "Domestic Political Terrorism in Canada," and "Attributes of Domestic Political Terrorism in Canada."
  23. Although this requirement has been criticized for being arbitrary, it provides a benchmark for reliability.
  24. The rigor of the data set can be judged in a number of ways. One of them is by analyzing the events that were discarded. A total of 147 possible international events were excluded from ATIC IV. Although many of these events were included in other publicly available chronologies, others were not. In general, the most common reasons for exclusion were threats and hoaxes (34 events), actions taking place outside of Canada (33 events), failure to meet the three source criteria (17 events), and arrests of actual or suspected terrorists unconnected to the events that occurred in Canada (13 events).
  25. The majority of these factors are dependent variables. There is no theoretical reason why they should be related. As the data set stands, three variables may act in a causal fashion: linkage, injuries, and deaths. Linkage entertains the possibility that if the group actually responsible for the event is part of a larger group, then injuries and deaths may be conceptualized as costs. But the presence of terrorism in one form or the other may act as a catalyst for other actions of terrorism (i.e., prior events). This would be the contagion process. The effect of the media could be coded from this chronology which lists three news sources, including the newspaper of the city where the action took place. One could argue that if there is an article in the location where an action took place, it could act as a catalyst to future terrorist actions.
  26. See Mickolus, "Combating International Terrorism" for a discussion of this early research.
  27. See Ross, "Attacking Terrorist Attacks," for further details.

28. The international and domestic portions of ATIC IV had a correlation coefficient of .4162 with a 1-tailed significance of  $p < .01$ , and the domestic portion of ATIC IV and State Department's figures demonstrated a correlation coefficient of .6928 with a 1-tailed significance of  $p < .001$ .
29. This observation is buttressed by weak correlations obtained between the international portion of ATIC IV with Kellett's study (.1493), Mickolus' (.1953) and the State Department's (-.4073) data sets. There was also a relatively weak correlation coefficient of .2905 between Kellett's and Mickolus' data sets.
30. See Peter Grabosky, "The Urban Context of Political Terrorism," in Michael Stohl, ed., *The Politics of Terrorism* 2nd ed. (New York: Marcel Dekker, 1983), pp. 51-76.
31. One might be tempted to discard events for which no organizations claimed responsibility, but due to the nature of the target or background details surrounding the action, they are definitely classified as terrorism and are thus included under the category of internal acts. Additionally, many groups and individuals never claim responsibility for acts of terrorism they commit in Canada. Moreover, ferreting out responsibility is often complicated when multiple persons call authorities or media outlets claiming responsibility on behalf of different groups. Actual responsibility was determined from the most reliable sources. For example, if someone belonging to a particular group was convicted for the event, responsibility was attributed to that group. If a reliable source could not be found, the information was coded as missing.
32. A caveat is in order. There were a considerable number of newspaper articles that failed to provide information on the fate of people involved in the events discussed. It is also assumed that deaths and injuries are salient and almost always reported by newspapers and case studies.
33. See Kellett, *Contemporary International Terrorism*, pp. 106-7, for a comparison of Canada's rate of international terrorism with those of other countries. Kellett relied on Edward F. Mickolus, *Transnational Terrorism: A Chronology of Events, 1968-1979* (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1980), for this data.
34. See Mickolus, *Transnational Terrorism*, p. 14.
35. Anthony Kellett, *International Terrorism: a Retrospective and Prospective Examination. ORAE Report no. R78* (Ottawa: Operational Research and Analysis Establishment, Department of National Defence 1981), p. 49.
36. Kellett, *Contemporary International Terrorism*, p. 110. He also notes that there are no sanctuaries adjoining Canada where terrorists can organize, plan, and recuperate, and from which they mount operations.
37. This data was gleaned from a series of cases. Many of the newspaper reports did not list the group affiliation (if any) of the individuals involved, but described the reasons why they were detained.
38. See Emile Durkheim, *Rules of Sociological Method* (New York: Free Press, 1938); Noemi Gal-Or, ed., *Tolerating Terrorism in the West: An International Survey* (London: Routledge, 1991).
39. See, for example, Roger Gibbins, *Conflict and Unity: An Introduction to Canadian Political Life* (Toronto: Nelson, 1989), chap. 5; and Charles F. Doran and James Patrick Sewell, "Anti-Americanism in Canada?," *Annals, AAPSS*, (May 1988), pp. 105-19.
40. Canada, Commission of Inquiry Concerning Certain Activities of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. *Second Report—Freedom and Security Under the Law* (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 1981), p. 40.
41. Canada, *Report of the Senate Special Committee*, p. 9.
42. In addition to the statistical work, perhaps one of the more important work to be done in this area include case studies of terrorist organizations operating in Canada. Even though a number of good case studies were written on Sikh terrorism (for example, Ian Mulgrew, *Unholy Terror: The Sikhs and International Terrorism* Toronto: Key Porter Books, 1988), and Armenian terrorism (Michael J. Kelly, "The Media and Terrorism: An Examination of News coverage of Armenian Terrorism in Canada," unpublished PhD diss., Carleton University, 1988), more work clearly needs to be done on other organizations that have participated in various forms of international terrorism in Canada such as the Cuban and Croatian nationalists.
43. See Ross, "Attacking Terrorist Attacks," for an example of this kind of comparison.

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44. The now defunct Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security used to ask Canadians to rank order "international problems that may affect Canada's security"; one such problem was terrorism. They conducted this survey from 1989 until the institute's closure. The only other public opinion study has been a survey of Canadians after the Achille Lauro hijacking. See *World Opinion Update*, X, Issue 1 (January 1986), p. 7.
45. See Jeffrey Ian Ross, "Structural Causes of Oppositional Political Terrorism: Towards A Causal Model," *Journal of Peace Research*, 30, no. 3 (1993), pp. 317-29, and Jeffrey Ian Ross and Reuben Miller, "The Effects of International Terrorism," Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Caucus for a New Political Science, 31 August 1990.
46. Schlesinger's quote: "History, by putting crisis in perspective, supplies the antidote to every generation's illusion that its own problems are uniquely oppressive," is particularly apt in this matter. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., *The Cycles of American History* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1986), pp. xii-xiii.
47. These include information on arrests, charges, convictions, jail sentences, and dollar value of property damage, events prevented, etc. This information could not be coded for this project due to methodological limitations and problems with access.