

**Lavish Generosity  
The American Dimension of International Support for the  
Provisional Irish Republican Army 1968-1983**

by  
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It was due to the lavish generosity of American citizens that our country, so ravished by war, was able to support the derelicts of that war, the wives and children of prisoners, and those whose means of livelihood had been destroyed.<sup>1</sup>

(‘AE’)

**INTRODUCTION**

Irish-Americans have ever been sensitive to events and developments in the land of their ancestry. However, the travails of Ireland have not very often impinged upon the attention of the American people as a whole. Even less have they commanded the attention of the politicians of the United States or the American government. Nonetheless, since the re-emergence of communal violence in Northern Ireland in 1968-69, the troubles have been accorded a special, if not always undivided and sustained, attention, albeit from different perspectives and towards divergent and frequently conflicting ends, at all three levels. Thus, while it was not surprising that surnames such as Kennedy and O’Neill should recur in accounts of Irish-American activity, it was curious that they should do so in *competition* with say a Flannery or an O’Dwyer for the right to interpret the will of Catholic Ireland and to be heard as the Voice of Irish America. It was still more bizarre that they should have been in competition with those whose names suggested interests which were hardly Hibernian — Biaggi, Wolff, Won Pat and Zeferetti — to name but a few.<sup>2</sup>

In other circumstances such situations might have qualified as ephemeral and, accordingly, not warranted a mention. However, in the context of this analysis, it is clear that at each level the particular external interests which gave rise to the situations instanced in the preceding paragraph not only became the concern of international politics, but also in some cases exerted considerable influence upon the course of the conflict in Northern Ireland. Basically these effects were in direct proportion to the support or commitment each interest group could marshal in support of four very general, and sometimes overlapping objectives which were, in descending order of influence:

- (1) a United Ireland predicated on an immediate and total British withdrawal from the Six Counties and brought about by violence if necessary;
- (2) a United Ireland brought about by what might be termed non-violence due process;

- (3) the acceptance of the situation in Northern Ireland as being entirely an internal matter for the British Government either out of conviction, or the belief that to do otherwise would be to unduly disturb the trans-Atlantic (Anglo-American) relationship; and
- (4) the achievement of short-term specific objectives in Northern Ireland which may or may not have related to the future constitutional status of Northern Ireland.

This miscellany, quite obviously, is internally inconsistent, and for that reason, a useful gauge by which to separate those that are the subject of this essay. For the most part the focus in the following pages is on those that advocate the first (and occasionally the fourth) objective. By espousing and supporting the recourse to violence by republican nationalists in Ireland they set themselves apart and need to be analysed as a distinct and significant phenomenon of the American dimension to the Irish Question.

Justified as this differentiation might seem in both intellectual and political terms, it must also be conceded that there are commentators, scholars and writers who would dismiss it as a form of excessive intellectualisation or as a meaningless distinction. And foremost among such people would be the eminent Irish men of letters, Dr. Conor Cruise O'Brien, who maintains this position on the basis of a consequentialist argument. According to Cruise O'Brien, distinguishing between the intentions, substance and style of the supporters of the Provisionals and for example, those such as Senators Edward Kennedy and Daniel Patrick Moynihan, speaker of the House 'Tip' O'Neill, and former Governor of New York Hugh Carey, who have held for some fifteen years now a responsible position which eschews violence, is to engage in an irrelevance. His view is that the latter and all those that share their views,

... suffer from one fatal *idée fixe*: that Ulster Protestants are basically England's puppets and England (if rightly squeezed) can reverse their political allegiances.<sup>3</sup>

Thus, he argues that it is of no matter that a *prima facie* case would appear to set them apart from the declared supporters of the Provisionals: "their efforts are complementary in their effects and are so perceived by those who resist." They therefore stand accused, in Cruise O'Brien's judgement, "of unwittingly pushing Ireland — all of it — toward the abyss [of civil war]."<sup>4</sup>

These views, it is emphasised, are not widely shared — for example, they have not been expressed by the British Government or the Irish Government, and both have records of candour in relation to any unwanted external involvement in the affairs of Northern Ireland. Nevertheless it was felt necessary to cite them here so as to acknowledge the essential difficulty that attends so many attempts to delineate the politics in, and of the province. At the heart of this difficulty is the ambiguity which results from disparate groups working towards somewhat similar objectives but advocating radically different means. If the unanimity of

the former sometimes dominates the mutual exclusivity of the latter the disposition to view all external interest as malignant is as understandable in subjective terms as it is difficult to accommodate intellectually.

If any sense is to be made of the spectrum of support the Provisional Irish Republican Army derives from the United States, a selection must be made, consciously, reasonably and in good faith. In the perhaps un-Irish hope that this will find wide, if not unanimous acceptance, the following analysis excludes those parties which neither directly nor intentionally give succour to the IRA; it includes, on the other hand, those organisations which openly espouse the IRA's cause in the United States and provide it, from a trans-Atlantic remove, with what the strategists refer to as 'the sinews of war.' To facilitate this analysis a further selection is made in relation to time frames, for reasons which can only be alluded to in the proceeding pages.

### 1968 - MARCH 1976

The selection of these dates is forced on any account of the American dimension for the reason that, within them, the activities of Irish Americans and others who supported the IRA were in ascendance over all other Northern Ireland-related activities in the United States. It is to be noted, however, that the general interest evinced by Irish Americans in events in Northern Ireland throughout 1968-69 was hardly a new development. Neither was it unusual that it should be expressed by some in cash and kind. In times of strife in Ireland since the last century such an expression has virtually defined the relationship between the Irish at home and those in the United States to the point where, in the Declaration of Independence of 1916, the support of Ireland's 'exiled children in America' was especially recognised. In December 1969 the breakaway Provisional Army Council, in the face of overwhelming evidence that the Irish Republican Army (IRA) which had existed prior to that time was unable to provide the maximum defence for the Republican population of Belfast, made a plea which, although less specific, was clearly directed at the USA:

We call on the Irish at home and in exile for increased support towards defending our people in the North and the eventual achievement of the full political, social, economic and cultural freedom of Ireland.<sup>5</sup>

The message was clear; it was a call to provide aid for military action. However, the likelihood that it would produce an effective and immediate response in military terms was not overwhelming. This was a consequence of a number of factors, perhaps the most important being the attrition due to Americanisation of the ethnic Irish. It also reflected the overall inability of the Northern Ireland conflict itself to inspire and mobilise, in any *sustained* fashion, groups (journalists, civil libertarians, American radicals, the Democratic Party, etc), which by their traditions and/or their principal interests, might have been expected to have provided sympathy and assistance. This meant that no more than an

'emaciated framework' was available upon which to build an aid network in 1968-69.<sup>6</sup>

The organisational malaise was exacerbated by the fact that, despite the claimed predominance of those with North of Ireland ties within it, it also included what Dennis Clark observed as an "... estrangement, confusion of viewpoints, and a general perplexity about what could be done in any practical way."<sup>7</sup> In turn, this determined the essentially negative character of the support network which resulted, and its aversion to any cognitive effort with regard to the future of Ireland — as instanced by its recourse to slogans — 'England Get Out of Ireland' or its equivalent.

It was probably no surprise, then, that James Bowyer Bell's 1971 edition of his standard history of the IRA should have contained the following passage:

Any kind of armament acquired in Ireland is very dear indeed (a revolver may cost eighty pounds), and outside Ireland there are *few sympathetic sources or sponsors. American money flowing into Dublin in response to the troubles in the North was far less than the English Sunday papers liked to believe...*[emphasis added].<sup>8</sup>

The amount which Bell thought fit to dismiss thereby was of the order of "hundreds of thousands of pounds."<sup>9</sup>

It was a surprise, therefore, to find that the English papers were in fact closer to the mark in their estimate of a general American willingness to contribute funds to relief programmes in Northern Ireland, and, more particularly to the IRA. In late August 1969, Bernadette Devlin, visiting the United States on behalf of the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association (NICRA), claimed to have received 'pledges' totalling \$US650,000 for the 'homeless' of the Six Counties.<sup>10</sup> In October of the same year the actual amount estimated to have been raised was a considerably less, but still substantial, \$US92,000.<sup>11</sup> The following year, total American funds for a multiplicity of uses was estimated at \$US450,000,<sup>12</sup> an amount which was consistent with Mick Flannery's claim that, for the three years to October 1972, the organisation which he represented (the Irish Northern Aid Committee) had been responsible for forwarding some \$US500,000 to the North.<sup>13</sup>

Evidently, the IRA did not miss out on the bonanza. In Bell's 1974 edition of *The Secret Army* his 1971 opinion was noticeably changed in respect of the US financial response to the Provisional's appeals of 1970:

Already some money had begun to flow through a variety of pipelines, in some cases to independent defense groups in the North but increasingly through overt or covert conduits to Dublin G.H.Q. or various Republican aid committees. *The response from America was like nothing since the Troubles...*<sup>14</sup>

Exactly how much the Provisional IRA received Bell did not divulge. Indeed, apart from the inference that the financial aid it received was

substantial, the only conclusion which can be drawn with any certainty, even at this time, is that stated by Clark — that “the full record of assistance to the Catholic minority and to the IRA will ever remain obfuscated.”<sup>15</sup>

Nevertheless, there were patterns and influences clear in those early years which were to govern American influence upon the Northern Ireland conflict until the mid-1970s. First, despite Bernadette Devlin’s fund-raising success of August 1969, the socialist views she professed were anathema to the essentially conservative Irish-Americans who formed the large majority of contributors.<sup>16</sup> Indeed, in view of subsequent events, the latter’s generosity at that time must be seen as an indiscriminate outpouring of sympathy for the plight of the Northern Catholic community. The measure of American opposition for Devlin’s goals may be gauged from a report that a visit by her in 1971, during which she met Black Panthers and hippies, and after she had given birth to a child out of wedlock, yielded only some 150 pounds after expenses.<sup>17</sup>

Second, it followed that the Official IRA, with its openly socialist orientation, was unlikely to be popular with the Irish-American community, and indeed, this was the case. By the same logic the Provisionals should also have been excluded from the financial benevolence of that community. The fact that they were not resulted from their not entirely deserved appearance as a more ‘traditional’ Republican organisation. While the Provisionals were certainly closer to the mainstream of Republic tradition than their Official counterparts, their philosophy and policies, such as they were, admitted some of the same left-radical elements which the Irish-American community found so unacceptable.<sup>18</sup>

The Provisionals, however, were possessed of more forethought, guile and dishonesty. They contrived, and quite cynically at that, to enhance their appeal to those who lived in the past while muting their adherence to socialist principles — both being undertaken in the belief that the end, however ill-defined, justified the means, however disagreeable. It worked, as Maria McGuire testified:

There should be copious references to the martyrs of 1919 and 1920-22 — the period most of the audience would be living in. Anti-British sentiment, recalling Cromwell, the potato famine, and the Black and Tans, could be profitably exploited. By no means should anything be said against the Catholic Church. And all references to socialism should be strictly avoided — tell them by all means that the Ireland we were fighting for would be free and united, but say nothing about just what form the new free and united Ireland would take. The formula was in general, very successful....<sup>19</sup>

Indeed, it was so successful that the Official’s network of support in the United States could not be described as other than modest. Therefore, unless specifically excepted, all references to the IRA in the following pages are to its Provisional wing.

The financial broker for the Provisionals' trans-Atlantic fund-raising is the Irish Aid Committee — NORAIID, also known as INAC. According to its statement of registration with the U.S. authorities under the Foreign Agents Registration Act, 1938, (FARA), it was founded in New York City in April 1970 by three IRA veterans of the civil war period, Mick Flannery, Jack McCarthy and John McGowan,<sup>20</sup> 'in response to an urgent call from its foreign principal, the Northern Aid Committee, Belfast.'<sup>21</sup> Accordingly, since its foundation, NORAIID's record has been consistent in four aspects. It has:

- (1) boasted of the large amounts it was remitting to persons such as Joe Cahill<sup>22</sup> in Northern Ireland;
- (2) insisted that while these funds were intended for "relief," it was up to "the people on the other side" to decide how to spend them;
- (3) agreed that part of the money was used for the purchase of arms; and
- (4) repeatedly, and without reservation, supported the Provisionals' campaigns.

The organizational structure upon which NORAIID's efforts are based has been variously estimated at 100 chapters (in 1972, by Flannery) and 80 chapters (in 1975, also by the NORAIID source).<sup>23</sup> The latter is generally regarded as the more reliable figure. Similarly, the NORAIID claim of 80,000 members throughout the US has been discounted by official sources as an absurd exaggeration which was probably based on a paper estimate of members attending social functions over a particular period. The estimate which is favoured is "several thousand...possibly upwards of 2,000," who are sufficiently numerous and active to have a considerable effect on most Irish-American organisations in the United States.<sup>24</sup> Of this number the largest concentration is in New York and the National headquarters is in the Bronx. Otherwise the most important centres are Chicago, Boston, Philadelphia, San Francisco, Los Angeles, Baltimore, and various towns in New Jersey and Connecticut.<sup>25</sup> Among those who have spent some time observing its activities, NORAIID has acquired a reputation, based on an apparently high level of visible co-ordination, as a close-knit and disciplined group.<sup>26</sup>

In support of its activities NORAIID appears to command the full-time attention of its President and Vice-Presidents.<sup>27</sup> It also runs a weekly newspaper, the *Irish People*, with a full-time editor. In addition, in 1975 Flannery (then President) was known to have a telex machine in his home in the Bronx and, according to journalists who visited him there, received continuous reports on it from Provisional sources in Ireland.<sup>28</sup> Unfortunately the use of modern technology has frequently failed to advance NORAIID's understanding of the issues in Northern Ireland; for example, one report carried in the *Irish People* claimed that the Irish Special Branch had attempted to break an IRA ceasefire by organising sectarian murders in collusion with the Northern Ireland Social Democratic and Labour Party.<sup>29</sup>

To further sustain the fund-raising and lobbying operations, NORAIID has played host to a number of prominent Provisionals such as Billy Kelly<sup>30</sup> and Ruairi O Bradaigh,<sup>31</sup> but they and others were hampered by the US Immigration and Nationality Acts which exclude aliens "connected with organisations which advocate the killing of government agents or the unlawful destruction of property." While this provision undoubtedly had an effect on the guest-of-honour lists for money-spinners such as dances and dinners, it probably had little impact on the other main source of finance, direct subscriptions.

To judge by reports and the schedule attached to NORAIID's more recent six-monthly returns under the FARA, most contributors are working-class Irish Americans. In some cases the arrangements are institutionalised; a number of Locals of the Transport Union and the Longshoremen's Union in New York are said to contribute fixed weekly amounts to the organisation (NORAIID has close links with the national presidents of both unions). In addition, a small number of wealthy Irish Americans such as hotelier Billy Fuller are known to be contributors, as are some Irish-born owners of chains of bars in New York who both contribute funds themselves and allow their establishments to be used as collection centres. However, it is understood that the larger contributors in America, like those in Ireland, try to maintain anonymity by insisting that their contributions be 'laundered.'

The results of these combined efforts have summarised in the following table:

**TABLE 1**  
Irish Northern Aid Committee  
Reported Details of Financial Undertakings<sup>32</sup>  
(All amounts in US Dollars)

Six Month period ended:		Income	Expenditure	Disbursements to N.I.	Surplus
29 July	1971*	no information	4,575	11,500	not known
29 January	1972	no information	12,738	128,099	not known
29 July	1972**	no information	25,440	312,700	not known
29 January	1973	172,000	41,388	150,438	-19,826
29 July	1973	159,617	19,581	121,723	18,313
29 January	1974	129,968	10,826	99,966	19,176
29 July	1974	121,822	8,193	110,833	2,796
29 January	1975	115,522	11,620	102,648	1,254
29 July	1975	130,852	44,472	70,977	15,403
29 January	1976	no information	24,955	64,205	not known
Minimum Total		\$829,781	\$203,788	\$1,173,089	\$56,942

\* Information taken from document entitled 'Supplement Statement'.

\*\*Information taken from hand-written draft

As may be seen, Flannery's October 1972 claim (cited earlier) that NORAID had sent close to \$US500,000 to Northern Ireland in the three previous years was probably not excessive; in just the eighteen month period ended 29 July 1972 the total remitted was \$US452,299. But there were, and remain reservations about accepting many of NORAID's claims. The above, for instance, mentions a three year period — presumably from October 1969 — yet NORAID's statement of registration also claims that it was founded some seven months later in April 1970.<sup>33</sup> Furthermore it is obvious from the table that, in default of *income* figures for the first three reporting periods, and of a complete absence of reliable information before that time, even the most informed estimates of NORAID's financial dealings could be hopelessly wrong.

In this regard it is useful to refer to the return for 29 January 1973, in which it will be found that nearly \$US20,000 *in excess of reported receipts* was remitted. This suggests that latter figures detailed under 'Surplus' appear to confirm — that part of each six months takings are retained, to bolster poor performances, aid special projects in the future, or establish a capital fund.

For undefined reasons this latter question of a steadily accumulating NORAID fund has received no attention from commentators, yet it is, potentially, of some significance. At the very least it could, if NORAID chose to falsify its returns, be used for a period of one-two years to disguise the falling away of financial assistance from the average level since 1976. On the other hand, there is a widely held belief that 'blood on the streets' of Northern Ireland, or what are euphemistically termed 'spectaculars,' particularly daring IRA operations, induce the sympathetic Irish-American community to renew or increase its contributions. The suggestion that some of the surplus has been used in sustaining or enhancing this cannot be discounted.<sup>34</sup> If it should be thought that such suggestions unwarrantedly impugn the honesty of NORAID's officials, there is always the caveat provided by the attorney responsible over some years for the monitoring of the organisation's compliance with the FARA, that they were of a type who "just can't treat straight with any government."<sup>35</sup>

Thus it is only prudent to conclude that the figures produced in the foregoing represent less than accurate accounts of NORAID's transactions. Indeed NORAID personnel were reported, in 1975, to have boasted in private of much greater sums than those found in the table — up to \$US4 million per year — being remitted to Northern Ireland.<sup>36</sup> As these claims were generally held to be more in the nature of romantic speculation, the conservative 'official' figures remain as the best available, albeit probably understated, indication of the intensity and fluctuations of popular Irish-American support for the Provisionals.

By way of comparison, it is interesting to note the extent to which the potential of Irish-America was not realised, as illustrated by the following examples. Throughout the entire period 1968-83 the best NORAID appeared capable of, in so far as attracting public figures in support of its fund-raising, was to interest actor Richard Harris,



thriller-writer Len Deighton and President of the Longshoremen Teddy Gleason, in attending a dinner for which the Provisional Republicans faithfully paid \$US18 per head. Yet an Ireland Fund Dinner, organised by Tony O'Reilly, probably the most prominent and successful Irishman living in the United States,<sup>37</sup> could count on the presence of leading members of the Irish-American establishment — such as Speaker 'Tip' O'Neill — and would command \$US175 per plate.<sup>38</sup>

The distinctions, needless to say, were only superficially of a culinary nature. What they attested to was the failure, foreshadowed at the outbreak of the troubles, of the aid network to expand its following beyond the narrow confines of the sectional 'Old Irish' (Republican) interests. In general, not the politicians, not the wealthy Irish-Americans, nor the Catholic Church found the prospect of associating with NORAID worth the opprobrium it would have earned them.<sup>39</sup> It was to be expected, therefore, that the isolation of the activists should have extended to non-Irish-American organisations and the higher reaches of the US Federal Government, although the former was the more difficult to account for. After a promising beginning in which specialised groups of humanitarians concerned themselves with Northern Ireland, their interest withered; groups working in the fields of foreign policy, inter-religious understanding, and anti-colonial concerns generally avoided the issues of Northern Ireland with a consistency quite inconsistent with their stated objectives.

If there was any one reason for this behaviour it was to be found in Northern Ireland and in the terror bombing campaigns of the IRA. As Clark wrote of these other, influential and many 'friends of Ireland' and their view of the network:

...they saw it as tied to more of the same murderous violence without solution that they recoiled from in Vietnam.<sup>41</sup>

In this they were perceptive. While NORAID spokesmen were inclined to pretend that its funds were used purely for relief, there were far too many instances in which the lie was given to this claim. As one anonymous representative explained in 1971:

Our job is to get up the money and send it to the people over there. What they use it for is up to them. We attach no strings. Everything we do in this country is aimed at assisting the final phase of the struggle for freedom in Ireland.<sup>41</sup>

Moreover, there is irrefutable evidence that several of NORAID's officers were implicated in numerous arms offences which led to trials in Canada and the United States. The following year the same manifestation of support without responsibility was clear in Mathew Higgins' (Vice President of NORAID) statement that:

We're involved in supporting the activities of the Provisional IRA and that Branch of Sinn Fein which supports the Provisional IRA. We provide what funds we can

and the people on the other side have to decide what has to be used for what purpose.<sup>43</sup>

In 1975 he was even more frank:

We have no objections to it [the purchase of guns] if they have no money to spare. They've got to get them from somewhere. If the overall kitty is big enough to buy weapons that's their business. We were formed for the purpose of supporting the Irish Freedom movement. We still support the Provisional IRA — no ifs and buts about that ....<sup>44</sup>

For some time, however, there was no irrefutable evidence that NORAIID, *per se*, engaged in activities other than *fund-raising and supply*. On the other hand, there appeared to be little refuge for the organisation in Mick Flannery's protestations that allegations of gun-running were 'terrible' and 'vicious' lies, and in his appeal to the Scottish juridical prerogative that 'no one has ever proved a thing.'<sup>45</sup> By the end of 1982 Flannery's cover was particularly transparent with his admitted involvement as a conspirator in an unsuccessful venture to smuggle arms to IRA from the United States.<sup>46</sup>

According to a report of testimony given in the trial of Frank Grady, convicted in New York in March 1976 for illegally exporting arms and falsifying documents, the organisation's intentions were clear from the earliest days of its existence:

Shortly after the formation of the [Yonkers] branch, they [Grady and others] were approached by Martin Lyons, then a senior official at Northern Aid headquarters and one of the founders of the organisation and asked to assist in the purchase and export of guns for use by the Provisional IRA in Northern Ireland.<sup>47</sup>

Thereafter, the most notorious case involved the 'Fort Worth Five' in 1972. This became a *cause célèbre* in both Irish-American and US civil rights circles because, from the viewpoint of the former, of the issue of the supply of arms and ammunition to the IRA and, from the latter perspective, of constitutional and civil rights questions. Among other cases which came to light were those of Charles Malone, a NORAIID member living in San Francisco, and James O'Gara, a New York NORAIID official, both of whom were convicted on arms charges in 1973. Within a year, four people — two Irish and two Irish-Americans — were convicted in Baltimore, Maryland, of conspiring to smuggle 158 semi-automatic rifles (worth about \$US30,000), plus armour-piercing shells and other explosives from New York to Ireland. According to reports this was the biggest case of gun-running to take place in the United States, and although there was no indication in the course of the trial as to who or what provided its financial backing, the Baltimore District Attorney, Jeff White, left little doubt as to what inference should have been taken:

The statements [at the trial] didn't actually mention the Irish Northern Aid Committee, but it was clear who was meant. ...We didn't make radical distinctions between the two groups [NORAIID and the IRA]. Statements made at the trial in reference to the group which came up with the money were to 'Irish' and 'IRA,' but we considered them to mean the Irish Northern Aid Committee.<sup>48</sup>

Further grounds supporting this conclusion were provided by three instances in the two succeeding years. The first concerned the 1975 conviction of Joseph Myles, described by the police as "an executive officer of a US organisation, Northern Irish Aid [sic]," on a charge of conspiracy to export arms to Ireland. The second was the Grady case, already mentioned, while the third related to two Philadelphians — Neil Bryne and Daniel Cahalane<sup>49</sup> (head of NORAIID's Delaware County Chapter) — who were found guilty of illegally exporting arms to the IRA.<sup>50</sup>

Such examples not only highlighted the value of the United States as an armoury to the IRA, but also pointed to the potential which existed for a widening of the conflict by involving American citizens in ancillary, or actual, fighting roles — or at least the fear of this development. Early on, there were reports that a group calling itself the United Ireland Committee of New York had enlisted volunteers to fight in aid of the Catholic population in the North but these seem now to be either overstated or simply patriotic fiction. Scepticism, also, was attached to reports that the IRA had obtained the services of former American servicemen and that some of them were under investigation by the Army Council for spying and treachery. These reports relied heavily on the judicious use of statements by unidentified British military and IRA personnel which did not necessarily confirm the claim of the articles, and they appear to have been carried only in the papers of the Berry group.<sup>51</sup>

The same dismissive attitude was not appropriate to, nor was it adopted by, any of the governments concerned, in respect of the trans-Atlantic traffic in arms for the IRA. According to Stanley Orme, a Minister of State at the Northern Ireland Office, the evidence from recovery operations conducted by the security forces in the Province indicated that 85 per cent of the Provisional's weapons originated in the United States,<sup>52</sup> thus establishing that country as its most important single source of supply.<sup>53</sup>

The American government, notwithstanding the seriousness with which it viewed this matter, disputed the British estimates. One agent of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, Dom Zimmerman, countered that a claim of even 75 per cent was "a ridiculous exaggeration."<sup>54</sup> Moreover, the available data appeared to support his position, although certain juxtapositions of time were required in order to achieve such support. In the same June 1975 article which carried Zimmerman's statement, it was reported that 1,581 "guns of American manufacture" had been found in Northern Ireland connected with the IRA. This figure,

when compared with the overall (Ulster-wide) total of 4,974 for the period 1971-75,<sup>55</sup> represented a proportion of approximately 30 per cent. This appeared to be a steadily decreasing ratio over time; when figures to 1979 were taken, it fell as low as 23 per cent, for weapons which were "said to be of US manufacture."<sup>56</sup>

If allowance is made for the fact that the 1971-75 percentage was artificially high because of the figure of 1,581 included recoveries of US arms for 1969 and 1970 as well, but omitted total (Ulster-wide) recoveries for the same period which must have increased the figure of 4,974, then it would seem that there was a wild divergence between the competing British and American estimates. Irrespective of the interpretation given to the statistics of arms recoveries, they confirmed in a rather obvious way the relative ease with which the IRA was able to replenish and maintain its fighting requirements in Ulster, a point made by Bell and Jones.<sup>57</sup> Indeed, some arms were reported to have travelled the greater part of their journey in style — aboard the Cunard liner, *Queen Elizabeth II*.<sup>58</sup>

It is possible, however, to effect a reconciliation between the American and British claims by reference to the impressive record of the actual weapons which the IRA came to use. In 1969 it was poorly armed, where it was armed at all. By 1971 it had introduced the Armalite AR130 (the civilian, semi-automatic version of the selective fire AR 1S) and the M1 Garand into its arsenal. From 1972 on these were supplemented by military surplus and commercial variants of the M1 carbine, the AR 1S, and the M3 SMG ('Grease Gun').<sup>59</sup> As from 1974, recoveries in Northern Ireland included the above weapons plus small quantities or single examples of the following:

- (1) AG 42b semi-automatic rifle (Swedish Army surplus);
- (2) NATO M1A semi-automatic rifles (commercial name for M 14 U.S. Army rifles);
- (3) GA1/42 semi-automatic rifles (Wehrmacht surplus);
- (4) SAFN semi-automatic rifles (Venezuelan Army surplus);
- (5) M 62 semi-automatic rifles (current Finnish Army rifle); and
- (6) NATO Beretta 59/69 semi-automatic rifle (current Italian Army rifle).<sup>60</sup>

According to R.D. Jones of the British Intelligence Corps, the above list was "very significant." Apart from the M3 SMG, all the weapons listed were available over the counter in the United States — with the last two having the names of firearms dealers engraved upon the receiver.<sup>61</sup> If one added to this the knowledge that until 1973, the AR 180 was made under licence in Japan, and thereafter by the Stirling Armament Co. Ltd. of Great Britain, for sale and distribution by the Armalite company at Costa Mesa, California, and hence forwarded to the IRA from the US, the grounds for a considerable divergence of views became well established. They became even more so in the light of the claim made by (US) Assistant Attorney-General, William Olsen, that some Americans were involved on behalf of the IRA in attempts in Mexico to illegally purchase, *inter alia*, this same weapon. Whether or not such factors fully

accounted for the conflicting views is not clear, but it may be inferred that they were substantially a consequence of the British government's position that the term 'American arms' should be interpreted so as to encompass those which were modern and to include weapons which were not only of US manufacture, but also of a loosely defined US origin. This despite the fact that the AR 180 (according to Bell the 'IRA's favourite weapon'), by virtue of being made by Stirling, was in effect also a British weapon.<sup>62</sup>

But the list also indicated that the IRA possessed a multiplicity of types and calibres among both their longarm and pistol weaponry. In Jones's opinion this reflected the success of the security forces in repeatedly depriving the IRA of its weapons, and its subsequent recourse to piecemeal procurement. The further consequence was that insoluble problems of maintenance were created, which in turn exacerbated the supply situation by rendering useless weapons with relatively simple faults.<sup>63</sup> Thus despite its success in obtaining arms and ammunition in quantity, it was evident by 1978 (the year of Jones's article) that, in the period 1968-1976, the IRA had probably failed in its objective of obtaining them according to its criterion of "*identical...and recent manufacture.*"<sup>64</sup>

From the vantage point of 1987 this conclusion is further confirmed. The record of US financial and material assistance in the early and mid-1970s now appears as a guttering of a candle rather than the advent of a truly transnational movement. Although the figures do not show it, it is Clark's contention that "apathy reconquered the spirits of many" in the Irish-American support network after the Ulster Workers' Council Strike in mid-1974.<sup>65</sup> Certainly NORAID's reported disbursements to Northern Ireland show a dramatic tumble in 1975, and by that time, too, there was an apparent hiatus in gun-running sufficient to suggest that major attempts were a matter of history. American interests in Ireland were to be revived, but as a result of initiatives which are beyond the scope of this essay. For the most part, these were undertaken by those whose motivations might be classified as other and better than the motivations which coloured this early period.

### **MARCH 1976 - 1983**

If this paper was to address the American dimension in its fullest sense, it would concentrate on the significance of political developments which eclipsed that of the support network in the period 1976-1980. It would feature the role of certain prominent Irish-American politicians — Hugh Carey, Edward Kennedy, Daniel Patrick Moynihan and 'Tip' O'Neill — and their efforts to move a President in what culminated, in 1977, as the "Carter Initiative." Thus it would consider the emergence, at the highest political levels in the United States, of a more pragmatic, and ultimately, a more responsible approach to the Irish Question than had been in evidence before. This is, however, outside the present terms of reference but, nonetheless, the period between March 1976 and 1983 needs to be understood within that context.

In order to understand the decline in support it is necessary to consider, first, the standing and effectiveness of the Northern Ireland support network in the US after 1976. In so far as the supply of arms was concerned, the record provides a *qualified* confirmation of the optimistic assessment given in 1977 by the US Ambassador to the Court of St. James, Kingman Brewster, that it was on the wane. The reason for this caution is that there were a number of claims which, when set against the available evidence, appear exaggerated, if not contradictory.

On one hand there is the IRA claim, inspired it seems by low-grade science fiction, that it had shot down a British Army Air Corps *Gazelle* helicopter using a US-made M-60 machine gun firing 'specially developed magnetic bullets.' This was almost certainly a fabrication. Indeed, reports of the Army inquiry into the loss of this aircraft pointed to a structural or dynamic failure after a "beyond-limits manoeuvre."<sup>66</sup> Nevertheless, it was true that the IRA was in possession of a small number of belt-fed M-60s, which it is now generally believed were stolen from a National Guard armoury in Danvers, Massachusetts. Exactly who stole them and how they were obtained is not clear. In any case, the possession of this weapon, a somewhat cumbersome one for the urban operations which are the mainstay of IRA actions, was more important for the psychological boost it gave its owners than for its military value. On the other hand, US explosives were in good supply: according to Bell and Coogan, IRA sympathisers working on the construction of the New York City water tunnel diverted sizeable quantities of this material to Ireland in the course of the project.<sup>67</sup> Also acquired from the US were useful field aids such as stolen US Army electronic binoculars which made worthless the infra-red torch surveillance of the Northern Ireland security forces.<sup>68</sup>

None of these indications, however, provided a clear image of the extent of supply of arms and associated equipment from the US to the IRA. Nevertheless, there were facts and figures which suggested that the arms traffic was being reduced in this period. By September 1979, American-made arms comprised only 23 per cent of arms recovered by the security forces in Northern Ireland — down from approximately 30 per cent in 1975 (based on the analysis undertaken previously).<sup>69</sup> Even allowing for the basis upon which it computed its estimates of the national origin of recovered arms, the British government, in 1981, reduced its estimate of American arms to 47 per cent, down from 85 per cent in 1976.<sup>70</sup> Finally, in late 1981, NORAIID was placed on the defensive with the arrest in New York of four Irish-Americans including founder Mick Flannery and a branch treasurer on arms-smuggling charges. In the same period NORAIID itself was required to amend its registration under the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938 to show the Irish Republican Army as its foreign principal, rather than the 'Northern Aid Committee, Belfast, Ireland.' Legal action with a similar objective was also taken by US federal authorities against the organisation's newspaper, the *Irish People*.

Though these developments pointed to a contradiction of the American dimension in respect of weapons, there were two further

developments which suggested the contrary. First, reports of the use of 'US arms' by the IRA continued throughout the period under review, despite the recovery of such arms in search operations by the security forces. Second, certain contradictory information became available after the successful interdiction of an IRA arms supply route in February 1982. According to Federal immigration officials, a conduit from the US to Dublin and Belfast had been in operation from as far back as 1974. Furthermore, in the eighteen months prior to the interdiction, at least twelve smuggling operations had been allowed to pass unhindered in order to piece together precise details of the IRA's network which extended from Dublin through Amsterdam and Toronto to Buffalo.

**TABLE 2**  
**Irish Northern Aid Committee**  
**Reported Details of Financial Undertakings<sup>71</sup>**  
**(All amounts in US Dollars)**

Six Month period ended:		Income	Expenditure	Disbursements to N.I.	Surplus
29 July	1971	no information	4,575	11,500	not known
29 January	1972	no information	12,738	128,099	not known
29 July	1972	no information	25,440	312,700	not known
29 January	1973	172,000	41,388	150,438	-19,826
29 July	1973	159,617	19,581	121,723	18,313
29 January	1974	129,968	10,826	99,966	19,176
29 July	1974	121,822	8,193	110,833	2,796
29 January	1975	115,522	11,620	102,648	1,254
29 July	1975	130,852	44,472	70,977	15,403
29 January	1976	no information	24,955	64,205	not known
Minimum Six Year Total:		\$ 829,781	\$203,788	\$1,173,089	\$ 56,942
29 July	1976	80,201	20,278	55,500	4,423
31 January	1977	81,262	12,342	48,000	20,920
29 July	1977	84,017	12,914	60,115	10,988
29 January	1978	68,713	11,985	39,000	17,728
29 July	1978	84,091	19,179	73,857	8,945
29 January	1979	83,417	17,672	59,200	6,545
31 July	1979	74,550	21,653	61,616	-8,719
31 January	1980	140,074	15,625	105,230	19,219
Four Year Total:		\$696,325	\$131,648	\$502,518	\$80,049
Minimum Ten Year Total:		\$1,526,106	\$335,436	\$1,675,607	\$136,991
31 July	1980	90,056		52,000	
31 January	1981	105,124		69,200	
31 July	1981	250,511		92,800	
Minimum Eleven Year Total:		\$1,971,796		\$1,889,607	

By these accounts, the IRA was operating a regular and relatively sophisticated system of weapons procurement out of North America. In the absence of any reference to the quantities involved it is not possible at this stage to assess the full significance of this system, nor is it possible to extrapolate merely from its existence and international extent to the alleged operation of a French Connection through Brittany. Nevertheless, on balance this would appear to be a system which was not only operating under pressure, but at a reduced scale compared to its earlier performance.

Financial support, as reflected in the bi-annual returns of the Irish Northern Aid Committee (NORAID), and set out in Table 2, is also difficult to gauge. These figures are subject to the same qualifications and reservations which were made in respect of NORAID's returns earlier. According to information provided by IRA defector Peter McMullen, the discrepancy between reported and actual income of NORAID could have been staggering. Whereas the organisation claimed to have raised some \$US1.5 million between 1971 and 1980, McMullen claimed that, between 1969 and early 1981, nearly \$US5 million had been received by NORAID.<sup>72</sup>

However, if official figures are the criterion, a different, seemingly confused, picture is painted. For the most part (eight out of eleven), the level of NORAID's six-monthly receipts post-1975 is down in comparison with that of the earlier period. The confusion stems from the three exceptions to this pattern, though it is instructive to approach them with a knowledge of events within each return period. Thus, in the return for 31 January 1980, the increase coincides with a period that included the murder of Lord Mountbatten and the killing of eighteen British Soldiers at Warrenpoint, County Down (August 1979). The second uncharacteristic return is that filed for the period ended 31 January 1981 — a period which also brackets the IRA bombings in Britain of December 1980.<sup>73</sup> The third, and by far the largest amount of income reported by NORAID, was for the period ended 31 July 1981, during which time the H-Block hunger strike campaign by Republican prisoners in the Maze Prison outside Belfast reached its peak.<sup>74</sup> What emerges, then, is a reinforced belief in the criminally perverse power of 'blood-in-the streets' ("spectaculars") to loosen the purse strings of Irish-Americans sympathetic to the Provisional cause. In the absence of such stimuli, however, the financial reports of NORAID suggest that Northern Ireland gradually slipped as a priority from 1976 onwards. Regrettably, for both the relevant US Government agencies and students of the Irish question, NORAID in the early 1980's refused to file details of its financial undertakings.

In other respects, too, it was apparent that the support network was faced with reduced interest. In September 1978, Teddy Gleason, a Vice-President of the Irish National Caucus, a pro-Provisional lobby group, and President of the International Longshoremens's Association, called for a world-wide boycott of British goods in support of demands being made by four relatives of Irish prisoners in Long Kesh (the name by



which the Maze Prison was formally known). Despite the fact that Gleason expected full support for the measure from the Executive of the American Federation of Labor — Congress of Industrial Organisations, seven of whom were first generation Irish-Americans, British commerce was not endangered. This should not have been a surprise to anyone, least of all to Gleason; he had, in 1975, disavowed boycotts as being unlikely to either save lives in Ulster or bring the sides to the bargaining table.

Furthermore, when American intervention by those associated with the network became more direct, lack of interest at home was replaced by hostility in Northern Ireland. Thus in 1978, the Deputy Leader of the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP), John Hume, denounced the *American* Ancient Order of Hibernians for their crude attempts to sabotage US investment initiatives. According to him, there was evidence that the latter, under the sway of some of its leadership who sympathised with the IRA, had resorted to suggesting that, in general, there should be no American investment in the North. They argued that such investment would result mainly in Protestant employment and warned that one US company in particular should be “concerned about the possible safety of its plant.” As Hume was quick to observe, the notion that a lack of investment would somehow contribute to political change was not only ‘misguided,’ but difficult to reconcile with the (American) Hibernians’ recent resolution at a conference in Killarney which purported to offer friendship to Protestants.

Overall, the situation in the US could be attributed to five factors although their relative weight may be difficult to ascertain. Political developments, or the lack thereof, in Northern Ireland formed the most obvious factor influencing the situation. The Ulster Workers Council Strike in 1974 gave birth to a political stalemate which effectively remains to this day. Furthermore that stalemate was followed by a decrease in the level of violence (as compared with the early 1970s). When combined they deprived the support network of what Clark termed “the energizing effect [of] constant headlines.”<sup>75</sup>

Secondly, there was an erosion of support by conservative Irish-Americans as a consequence of their increasing awareness of the IRA’s socialist orientation — evidenced by its assassination campaign against Northern businessmen. Thirdly, within the United States weariness from years of activity had so sapped the movement that much of it, even before 1976, was pervaded by apathy.<sup>76</sup> Fourthly, it appears that, by 1979, at the latest, a breach had developed between NORAIID and the Irish National Caucus as a result of personality clashes and a conflict over which group was to provide the leadership for Irish-American supporters of the Provisionals.

Finally, the network and those associated with it were out of touch with the prevailing mood which, from March 1976 in both Northern Ireland and the US, embodied a firm rejection of violence, and hence of the Provisionals. In the former it rose from the courageous stand taken by the Peace People and the promise and inspiration they provided

across the sectarian divide.<sup>77</sup> To many around the world, accustomed to being informed only of the carnage which was sweeping Northern Ireland, the peace group seemed the best hope for a solution that had emerged in eight years of conflict. Even when the promise which the Peace People represented proved illusory and the Provisional movement subsequently grew in popularity, the above impediments were sufficient to militate against any notable rejuvenation or re-energising of the support structure.

At this point it is appropriate to return to the perspective under discussion in this essay, principally concerning the supply of American arms and finance to a relatively localised conflict which, between 1968 and 1983, claimed the lives of 2,200 people. Sadly, in terms of the natural and man-made hazards to which the world is accustomed, it is frequently regarded as a small toll of a small war in the north-eastern confines of a small country. Other indices confirm this: according to a Foreign Aid Commonwealth Office authority on the situation in Northern Ireland, ballistic signatures indicated that, in 1978, only about 1,000 weapons were in *active use* in the Province.<sup>78</sup> This, and the relatively small quantity described in virtually all of the IRA's attempts to acquire arms from the US and other sources, both frustrated and successful, is a caution against taking *too* expansive a view of the American dimension.

If it is accepted, as a precautionary measure, that NORAID's returns are understated by fifty per cent, the amounts in question are still relatively small in terms of external support for on-going nationalist irredentist struggles in the 1980s. They are also less than lavish (to use 'AE's description) when one has considered the amounts that could have been forthcoming. Had the entire Irish-American community truly been seized by the Irish question as, for example, the American Jewish community had internalised the Zionist cause over the last three decades, contributions might have been much greater. The significance of the American dimension of support for the IRA, however, lies in the fact that Northern Ireland *is* a small place and that NORAID's contributions can provide a significant, if not essential, component of its operating capability.

It is important, therefore, to appreciate the strength and vitality of the IRA in its campaign of attrition against Britain. To this end, the record of casualties is revealing. The conflict in Northern Ireland has claimed, on average, one hundred and fifty lives per year since the 'troubles' broke out in 1968. Outside the Six Counties, the comparable figure is around ten. It is a persistent and serious conflict. Since the IRA has been responsible for the majority of those deaths, it follows that that enduring organisation must be taken seriously. Just how seriously was illustrated by a 1978 British military intelligence report, which concluded:

[The IRA] has the dedication and the sinews of war to raise violence intermittently to at least the level of early 1978, certainly for the foreseeable future ....<sup>79</sup>

As a reminder, in just the first nine months of 1978 (the quietest year since 1970 in security terms), the official toll of violence in Northern Ireland was:

Killed — 14 soldiers,  
18 policemen,  
42 civilians;  
Shooting incidents — 591  
Bomb Explosions — 260  
Firearms Recovered — 305  
Explosives Recovered — 882 pounds.

In addition 664 people were charged with security-type offences. In this same period, the Provisionals' profile was also quite high in Britain and Western Europe.

Accepting that, for the most part, the thrust of security force operations is against the IRA, then figures such as those for the first nine months of 1978 are especially significant. At the supply level alone, such figures suggest that the Provisionals were acquiring arms at a rate faster than they could be intercepted or recovered. This was also stated in Document 37.<sup>80</sup> No matter that the IRA's support and arms supply network was, apparently, under pressure at this time, and no matter that 1978 was a 'quiet' year: between January and September, 66 people were killed in Northern Ireland. Sufficient to recall Peter Janke's admonition that, in relation to arms, "very, very few suffice."<sup>81</sup>

It is this reverse economy of scale that lends perspective to the workings of the IRA. On the one hand the IRA is capable, as it was on the night of 6-7 March 1979, of detonating 49 bombs in 22 towns throughout Northern Ireland, or of breaching the security of Britain's royal family, as Lord Mountbatten's murder proved. On the other, it operates at this level so infrequently as to suggest the existence of powerful constraints against doing so on a sustained basis. It is as though the world in which the IRA operates is treated periodically to the potential rather than the immediately realisable force of the Provisional movement.

Notwithstanding this disjunction between the IRA's capability and performance, any international influence contributing to the death and destruction that did result can only be described as malign. This is particularly so of the support network in the United States, whether or not contemporary generosity is as deserving of the description of lavish, as it was in the 1920s. The fact remains that, even in the leaner years which followed 1976, the importance of this component remained, still providing the IRA with the "sinews of war."

It was of no matter that the IRA was by then self-sufficient in terms of generating financial resources, and that, in any case, only a minority of Irish-Americans were lending their support to the Provisional cause. A substantial, if undetermined, portion of the violence, suffering and death in Northern Ireland must be attributed to US support down through the years.

## Endnotes

1. 'AE', "Twenty-five Years of Irish Nationality," *Foreign Affairs*, 2 (January 1929), p. 212.
2. In 1978, all members of the Ad Hoc Congressional Committee for Irish Affairs.
3. Conor Cruise O'Brien, "Hands Off," *Foreign Policy*, 37 (Winter 1978-79), p. 110.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 109.
5. *Irish Times*, December 29, 1969.
6. Dennis J. Clark, *Irish Blood: Northern Ireland and the American Conscience* (Port Washington, New York: Kennikat, 1977), pp. 31-3 (hereafter cited as Clark, *Irish Blood*).
7. *Ibid.*, p. 34.
8. J. Bowyer Bell, *The Secret Army: The IRA, 1916-1970* (New York: John Day, 1971), p. 369.
9. *Ibid.*, p. 372, note 12.
10. *Times*, August 26, 1969.
11. *Sunday Telegraph*, October 19, 1969. This might be an understated figure: Clark, *Irish Blood*, p. 19, claimed Devlin raised \$US200,000 from her American visit.
12. *Financial Times*, June 24, 1970.
13. *Daily Telegraph*, October 26, 1972.
14. J. Bowyer Bell, *The Secret Army: A History of the IRA* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1974), p. 373, (hereafter cited as Bell, *The Secret Army*). An even later edition of this work was published in 1980 by the Academy Press, Dublin, and covers the period to 1979.
15. Clark, *Irish Blood*, p. 39.
16. *Ibid.*, p. 19.
17. *Daily Telegraph*, September 9, 1971.
18. The clearest exposition of the Provisional Republican socialist principles is to be found in a document published by (Provisional) Sinn Fein, from which the Provisional IRA is only notionally separate. See, for instance, *Eire Nua [New Ireland]: The Social and Economic Programme of Sinn Fein* (Dublin: Sinn Fein, 1971).
19. Maria McGuire, *To Take Arms: A Year in the Provisional IRA* (London: Macmillan, 1973), p. 108 (hereafter cited as McGuire, *To Take Arms*).
20. Irish Northern Aid Committee, Registration No. 2239, two public files designated Section I and Section II respectively, held by the U.S. Department of Justice at the Federal Triangle Building, 315 9th Street, Washington, D.C., (hereinafter cited as U.S. Department of Justice, NORAIID files).
21. *Focus: The Irish Question*, by NORAIID, 1975.
22. A Provisional IRA leader, who had barely escaped hanging for his part in the murder of a policeman in 1942, and who in 1973, was convicted of gun-running for his part in the "Claudia" affair (Cahill was the ranking Provisional on board the vessel when it was intercepted).
23. See the *Sunday Telegraph* December 10, 1972, and *New York Times* December 16, 1975, respectively.
24. Confidential Briefing Paper, Embassy of Ireland, Washington, D.C., dated 17 April 1975 (hereafter cited as Embassy of Ireland, Briefing, 17 April 1975).
25. *Ibid.*
26. *Ibid.*
27. Higgins was McGowan's successor on the death of the latter in 1974.
28. Embassy of Ireland, Briefing, 17 April 1975.
29. *Irish People*, April 26, 1975. For an account of Conor Cruise O'Brien's comments on such 'infamous inventions,' see the *Irish Times*, April 30, 1975.

30. Described as being the former 'commander of the Provisionals' Third Belfast Battalion' and also the 'first Chief of Staff of the Provisionals in Belfast,' *Sunday Times* "Insight" Team, *Ulster*, (Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin, 1972), pp. 25, 189.
31. IRA Chief of Staff in 1958-59 and 1961-62. In the period with which this discussion of NORAIID is concerned (1970-76), O Bradaigh was President of the Provisional Sinn Fein.
32. US Department of Justice, NORAIID files.
33. US Department of Justice, NORAIID files.
34. Daring as opposed to stupid — although the difference very often escapes the writer; the term murderous could be applied with equal validity to many of the operations in either category. Nevertheless, if the distinction is made, it might be noted that following the Birmingham bombings of November 21, 1974, the amounts reported by NORAIID decreased and this trend may have been assisted by the narrow escape by Miss Caroline Kennedy from a London car-bombing in October 1975. On the other hand the murder of Lord Mountbatten in August 1979 evidently met with approval, if the returns are any indication. It is likely, of course, that other influences contributed to these results, but these appear not to have detracted from the strength of the perception noted in the above text.
35. Interview, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., 1979 (hereafter cited as Department of Justice Interview, 1979).
36. Embassy of Ireland, Briefing, 17 April 1975. Publicly (in 1975), Deirdre O'Connell, wife of Daithi O'Connell (then a member of the Provisional's ruling Army Council), admitted that NORAIID was sending \$US36,000 per week (\$US1,872,000 per year) to Northern Ireland (*Daily Express*, February 4, 1975).
37. Anthony John Francis O'Reilly, an outstanding international rugby footballer in the mid 1950s and early 1960s, whose achievements in business matched those in sport. His life and business interests require him to live both in Ireland and the United States — in the latter of which he is widely known as President of the Heinz Foods conglomerate. According to an associate editor of *Fortune*, "O'Reilly, ... figuratively speaking, has the longest reach of any living Irishman." See Thomas J. O'Hanlon, *The Irish: Sinners, Saints, Gamblers, etc.* (New York: Harper and Row, 1975), p. 256.
38. The proceeds of such functions go towards Irish charities and, according to McKittrick's report, "O'Reilly's efforts raise much more than those groups associated with Republican causes."
39. Clark, *Irish Blood*, p. 40. Although the Catholic Church in America was one of the principal agents in breaking down the ethnic identity of Irish-Americans since the late nineteenth century, and although it avoided taking up the issue of Northern Ireland after 1969, certain clerics within it have provided what might be termed "moral" support which may have been sufficient, when viewed through some eyes, to have countered any residual qualms about supporting organizations which subsidized or engaged in violence. In this three clerics were prominent: Bishop Drury of Corpus Christi Diocese, Texas, who appeared publicly with Ruairi O Bradaigh and was a frequent speaker at NORAIID functions; Fr. Sean McManus, national chaplain to the Ancient Order of Hibernians, and National Co-ordinator of the Irish National Caucus in the U.S.; and Sister St. Hugh of NORAIID, New York, who was at one time editor of the *Irish People* (Embassy of Ireland, Briefing, 17 April 1975).
40. *Ibid.*, pp. 33 and 67.
41. *Ibid.*, p. 75.
42. As reported in the *Irish Times*, October 20, 1971.
43. *Washington Post*, March 16, 1972.
44. *New York Times*, December 16, 1975.
45. *Daily Express*, January 8, 1976, in conjunction with *International Herald Tribune*, January 14, 1976.
46. Radio Telfish Eireann Transcript of Radio 1 programme, "This Week," Report No. 149 of November 7, 1982.
47. *Dublin Sunday Independent*, March 14, 1976.
48. *Sunday Herald Advertiser*, June 9, 1974.

49. Cahalane had previously spent five-and-a-half months in jail in 1973 for refusing to testify to a Federal Grand Jury.
50. For a brief reference to this case, the recovery by the British authorities in Northern Ireland of almost half the arms in question, and the subsequent loss of Byrne and Cahalane's appeal to the Supreme Court, see the *Times*, January 24, 1978.
51. Proprietors of the *Daily Telegraph* and *Sunday Telegraph*.
52. As reported in the *Daily Telegraph*, January 10, 1976. Prime Minister Harold Wilson made a similar claim at this time which deserves inclusion because of the different inferences, emphasized in the following, which he appeared to draw from recovery information: "The fact is that most of the *modern* weapons now reaching the terrorists in Northern Ireland are of American origin, possibly as much as eighty-five per cent of them. They are *bought in the United States* and they are bought with American donated money." (London Press Service, Verbatim Service, "IRA Fund Raising," 243/75, December 17, 1975, an extract from Wilson's speech to the Association of American Correspondents, Savoy Hotel, London, December 17, 1975).
53. Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, *Official Report*, Vol. 901, 4 December 1975, col. 1924 (hereafter cited as House of Commons, *Official Report*). See in conjunction with R.D. Jones, "Terrorist Weaponry in Northern Ireland," *British Army Review* (April 1978), p. 17, (hereafter cited as Jones, "Terrorist Weaponry in Northern Ireland").
54. As reported in the *London Sunday Times*, November 2, 1975.
55. Jones, "Terrorist Weaponry in Northern Ireland," p. 24 (see Table).
56. *International Herald Tribune*, September 25, 1979, p. 3. According to this report 2,300 of a grand total of 10,000 weapons conformed to the above description.
57. Bell, *The Secret Army*, p. 373; and Jones, "Terrorist Weaponry in Northern Ireland," p. 24.
58. Interview with William V. Shannon, United States Ambassador to Ireland, Dublin, April 24, 1978, (hereafter cited as Shannon Interview). The Ambassador also mentioned the involvement of some stewardesses of Aer Lingus in smuggling small quantities of arms into Ireland.
59. Jones, "Terrorist Weaponry in Northern Ireland," p. 17.
60. *Ibid.*, p. 19.
61. *Ibid.* Note: the M3 SMG was capable of automatic fire and hence illegal in the United States; nevertheless it was believed by the British authorities that this weapon was also obtained in the US, probably on the Black Market (*Ibid.*, p. 17).
62. Bell, *The Secret Army*, pp. 439 and 446n, and Coogan, *The IRA*, p. 538n.
63. Jones, "Terrorist Weaponry in Northern Ireland," p. 24. As this is not a technical discussion, specific reference to calibre types has been omitted, but they (eight pistol and nine rifle calibres) are to be found in the article cited. Note: Jones makes no mention of *where* the IRA's pistol inventory was obtained from, but it is clear from his account (when used in conjunction with a small arms reference manual) that it was predominantly of non-US manufacture.
64. McGuire, *To Take Arms*, p. 40.
65. Clark, *Irish Blood*, p. 69.
66. *Flight International*, March 18, 1978, p. 756. The helicopter in question crashed close to the village of Jonesboro, Co. Armagh, in February 1978, killing the Commanding Officer of the 2nd Battalion, Royal Green Jackets, Lieutenant Colonel Corden-Lloyd. Note: The above explanation of the crash is not universally accepted. One respected historian of the IRA accepts its claim that the *Gazelle* was shot down — see Tim Pat Coogan, *The IRA*, rev. and exp. ed. (London: Fontana, 1980), pp. 481 and 510 (hereafter cited as Coogan, *The IRA*).
67. J. Bowyer Bell, *The Secret Army: The IRA 1916-1979*, rev. and updated ed. (Dublin: Academy Press, 1979), p. 438; and Coogan, *The IRA*, p. 476.

68. *Guardian Weekly*, October 19, 1980, p. 5. This report also records that another American-made counter-surveillance device was acquired at this time, but from Dublin where it was openly available — a cheap receiver which could detect the man-detecting radar used by the Special Air Services at observation posts along the border.
69. That is, approximately 2,300 of 10,000 weapons were said to be of U.S. manufacture (*International Herald Tribune*, September 25, 1979, p. 3).
70. *International Herald Tribune*, July 30, 1981.
71. US Department of Justice, NORAIID files. The figures for July 31, 1980 onwards were supplied by the Registration Unit, Internal Security Section, Criminal Division US Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. in answer to the writer's letter of inquiry; unfortunately, the extracts from NORAIID's returns did not show the additional data concerning expenditure. Furthermore, NORAIID filed no returns for the periods ending January and July 1982, January and July 1983, and January, 1984.
72. *Times*, February 23, 1982, p. 24.
73. The month-by-month breakdown of income of NORAIID supports this interpretation: of the \$105,000 subscribed, over \$55,000 was received in December and January. The targets attacked were the Hammersmith Territorial Barracks, the Royal Air Force Base at Uxbridge, and the Bromley-by-Bow gas works (*Guardian*, January 18, 1981, p. 4).
74. In the campaign itself ten Republican prisoners (IRA and INLA) starved themselves to death; on the streets, civilians and members of the security forces died as the violence increased.
75. Clark, *Irish Blood*, p. 69.
76. *Ibid.*
77. An organization, composed mainly of women, founded in 1976 and generally associated in the public eye with the work of Betty Williams and Mairead Corrigan, who introduced a note of hope, based on Christian love and tolerance, into the otherwise violent atmosphere of Northern Ireland. In 1977, Corrigan and Williams were recognized when awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for the preceding year. It should be noted, however, that the Movement had, by March 31, 1978, received only £900 in donations from the US (*Daily Telegraph*, April 24, 1978). See also Dalry O'Donnell, *The Peace People of Northern Ireland* (Camberwell, Victoria, Australia: Widescope), 1977.
78. Interview, Foreign and Commonwealth Office.
79. *Guardian*, October 19, 1980, p. 5. The report cited was a private assessment stolen from military intelligence by the IRA in 1979, and released by it. The authenticity of Document 37, as it was formally titled, was admitted by the British Government (*Canberra Times*, May 12, 1979).
80. Originally cited in *An Phoblact*, May 10, 1979, are here cited from that source in Coogan, *The IRA*, p. 581.
81. Peter Janke, "The Response to Terrorism," in Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies (RUSI), *Ten Years of Terrorism: Collected Views* (London: RUSI, 1979), p. 25.