

# THE VALUES IN VIOLENCE: ORGANIZATIONAL AND POLITICAL OBJECTIVES OF TERRORIST GROUPS

by

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## INTRODUCTION

Terrorist violence, particularly in recent years, has frightened, attracted and intrigued academic, government and media analysts. The literature on the subject has expanded accordingly, albeit frequently without offering fresh or useful insights on how the events should be interpreted. To some extent, however, analysts are now approaching the phenomena more systematically, with greater attention to patterns and processes in the events and greater recognition of the need to synthesize and expand interpretations of the meaning of the violence.

The impetus, at least the most recent stimulus, for systematic event analysis has been the availability of the Mickolus dataset (ITERATE) from the I.C.P.S.R. at the University of Michigan. Professor Jerome Corsi's article, "Terrorism as a Desperate Game: Fear, Bargaining and Communication in the Terrorist Event" (*Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 1981), for example, is one of the first of what promises to be a new generation of quantitative studies based on the Mickolus or other datasets (quite apart from Edward Mickolus' own studies).

Martha Crenshaw's article, "The Causes of Terrorism" (*Comparative Politics*, 1981), represents the second group of new studies, the integrative analyses. That second approach is the one utilized here. The hope is that the synthesis and expansion of interpretations of terrorist objectives will have some utility in events analysis, as well as in policy and decisionmaking analyses. Because terrorist objectives are crucial factors to be considered in the formulation of effective response policies and the assessment of terrorist threats to government authority, the typology to follow is offered. The focus will be on what is called "transnational terrorism" by Milbank and Mickolus.<sup>1</sup>

## TERRORIST OBJECTIVES

Paul Wilkinson has made two important distinctions concerning terrorist objectives. First, he has differentiated between organizations having broad "revolutionary" goals, incompatible with the existing sociopolitical order in the target society, and those having narrower, "subrevolutionary" (e.g., policy- or personnel-specific) goals, largely compatible with the existing sociopolitical arrangements.<sup>2</sup> The distinction is crucial because terrorist organizations with "revolutionary" objectives present greater dangers to incumbent authorities simply

because they challenge the very basis of regime legitimacy. Thus, accommodation of their demands would be more damaging. The determination of the long-term objectives of terrorist organizations, then, is an important element in explaining and/or prescribing government response policies.

Second, Wilkinson has also noted the necessity of distinguishing between the "long-term political objectives and strategies and . . . military strategies"<sup>3</sup> of terrorist organizations. The suggestion that there are at least two levels of objectives sought by terrorist organizations is also important in that the differing levels may signal differing degrees of commitment to particular ends and even possible patterns (that is, priorities) in the terrorists' targeting strategy. Most importantly, the ultimate or ideological objectives of the terrorists may be less amenable to negotiation than would the lower-order objectives.

Based on Wilkinson's suggestions, then, terrorist objectives should be recognized as representing different degrees of challenge to regime authority, based on the magnitude of change sought by the terrorists and as having differing levels of importance to the terrorists, based on whether they represent long-term or short-term goals.

In terms of the distinction between long-term and short-term goals that Wilkinson offered, a further delineation can be made between the mid-range, strategic objectives sought by terrorists and their short-range, tactical (or military) objectives. Both refer primarily to the means which the terrorists are employing to achieve their ideological objectives. The tactical objectives are frequently articulated as demands during terrorist events and the strategic objectives are commonly the conditions sought as a result of the violence events and most often are not made explicit by the terrorists.

Very briefly, the suggestion here is that terrorist objectives be considered to have three distinct levels: (1) ideological or ultimate aim [long-range], (2) strategic [mid-range], and (3) tactical or military [short-range]. The categorization is roughly analogous to the objectives sought by governments in wars, campaigns and battles, even to the extent of the obvious overlaps in those strategies. The objectives are interrelated, not necessarily discrete, and generally hierarchical.

Further distinctions can be made among the three levels of terrorist objectives and among the specific objectives at each level; discussion of these distinctions follows.

### **Ideological Objectives**

If terrorism is a manifestation of rational, goal-directed, behavior as many analysts<sup>4</sup> suggest, some justification can be made for its use. Almost all terrorist organizations offer some ideological or moral justification for their violence, although the reasoning given may obscure more than it reveals about their intentions. Nonetheless, that "normative context," as it is called by Weisband and Roguly,<sup>5</sup> provides the organization's members with personal vindication for their violent acts

and, by extension, determines the organization's "legitimacy potential," or its potential to attract mass support.<sup>6</sup>

Apart from the previously mentioned distinction between "revolutionary" and "subrevolutionary" objectives, the ideological orientations of terrorist groups are extremely difficult to classify and have tended to be neglected variables in terrorism studies.<sup>7</sup> There are numerous reasons for that problem. First, some statements of ideology are unclear, which may signal the terrorists' unwillingness to expose their long-term objectives. Public support may be alienated by the expression of extreme or even, in some cases, moderate objectives. Weisband and Roguly (1976), for example, found that the ideological competition among Palestinian groups for members and support mitigated against more moderate positions. Strident rhetoric and high levels of violent activity seemed to attract greater interest and assistance. Alternately, the target governments themselves may react more intensely and, possibly, more effectively toward the most extreme ideological groups. The uncertainty that is created concerning the terrorists' intentions may buy them time, from a government, and aid from the public. The success of the Provisional Wing of the Irish Republican Army (P.I.R.A.) in finding financial and moral support among Americans of Irish descent has been attributed to the P.I.R.A.'s suppression of ideologically extreme positions in favor of anti-British, Republican positions. Similarly, the creation of satellite groups may be used to divorce the primary terrorist organization from more extreme violence or ideological positions. Such seems to have been the case for the creation of the Black September Organization and its actions at the Munich Olympics in 1972. Thus, *Al Fatah* avoided public criticism and a loss of public support.

Second, the same reasoning may prompt terrorist organizations to deliberately misrepresent their intentions, to avoid the alienation of possible supporters and to curry favour from publics that would not be sympathetic otherwise. It is uncertain to what extent the P.I.R.A. misrepresents or downplays its long-term goals, but it is likely that the clarification of its goals would alienate some patrons.

Third, the terrorist organization's membership may have different long-term, ideological expectations. International terrorist organizations, in particular, may have diverse, multinational memberships and constituencies that only share a few basic goals. Factionalism and fragmentation may result from any attempt to define the organization's goals more clearly. That problem has been suggested as a reason for the singular focus of P.I.R.A. rhetoric and actions.<sup>8</sup> Similar difficulties may explain the reluctance of other Western European terrorist groups and coalitions of groups to define their objectives beyond the demands issued during joint actions.

Fourth, some terrorist organizations may simply lack clearly defined long-term goals, focusing instead on more immediate organizational and political objectives. The Symbionese Liberation Army and other American terrorist organizations, including the Weather

Underground, seem to have little discernible ideological foundation other than vague statements of opposition to the present order. Much the same has been true of the more anarchistic and nihilistic Western European groups, although anarchism and nihilism, by their very nature, may create the appearance of non-ideological orientations.

Fifth and last, because terrorist organizations are vulnerable to the government's control or dominance of the mass media, their stated objectives may be deliberately misrepresented by their opposition. The media may be used to deceiving domestic and foreign audiences about both the terrorists' intentions and support. This can be a major problem for analysts who are forced to rely exclusively on the popular or government media for their data. Terrorists and guerrillas operating in the Third World face especial difficulties in publicizing their *causes without distortion from government media manipulation*. That may explain in part the selection of foreign targets by Latin American, African, and Asian terrorists and, perhaps, the choice to extend their campaigns of violence outside of their target nations — the choice to go international.

In short, ideological objectives frequently are not clearly articulated and, even if they are, are not easily fit into discrete categories. Moreover, analysts have noted a recent trend away from the traditional ideological bases that characterized post-World War II political violence and toward more nihilistic, anarchistic and ethnic bases.<sup>9</sup> As a result, the typologies based on the ideological orientations of terrorist groups have been awkward at best, often forcing terrorist groups into categories within which they share only the most superficial of characteristics.<sup>10</sup> The eclecticism of the many Marxist groups alone suggests the difficulty in categorization.

A more useful distinction appears to be that between the "territorial" (nationalist, autonomist, and secessionist, for example) groups and the "non-territorial" (anarchist, nihilist, and traditional ideological, for instance) groups. Indeed, movements for some form of self-determination, when genuinely representative of widespread *opposition to government authority within a distinct ethnic, religious, or racial minority (or even majority)*, do seem to draw more support from domestic and foreign publics than do movements with less well-defined land and population bases.<sup>11</sup> The long struggles of the I.R.A. (and P.I.R.A.) and the Palestinian groups attest to their strong popular bases. That is not to say that all "territorial" groups have been or will be as successful in maintaining their struggles, however. To the extent that the "territorial" groups have greater "legitimacy potential" by virtue of their distinct constituencies than do "non-territorial" groups, *they may have greater likelihood of success and many, therefore, pose greater danger to incumbent authorities*. Popular sympathy can be translated into greater access to material and financial resources, more easily developed and maintained clandestine support structures (for example, weapons caches, hideouts, and staging areas), more highly developed and effective intelligence networks, and greater recruit-

ment potential. The environmental constraints on "non-territorial" terrorist movements, on the other hand, can increase the burden of clandestine operations in terms of the expenditures of scarce personnel, material and financial resources.

The decline (if not the extinction) of several terrorist organizations can be traced to the loss of personnel and support structures. The Baader-Meinhof group (Rote Armee Fraktion), the Tupamaros in Uruguay, and the E.L.N. (National Liberation Army) in Bolivia are cases in point. Of course, it can be argued that oppressive countermeasures by the governments involved, rather than too little popular assistance, accounts for the decline of those organizations. Survivors continue the name, if not the operations, of each of the groups.

In any case, in terms of the utility of the classification scheme, the "territorial/non-territorial" and "revolutionary/subrevolutionary" dichotomies should provide at least a starting point. The intermediate level objectives of terrorist organizations are more easily typologized; indeed, most have been identified in the literature already.

### Strategic Objectives

Within the terrorism literature, six general, mid-range objectives can be discerned. They are: (1) organizational, (2) publicity, (3) punishment, (4) provocation, (5) disruption, and (6) instrumental objectives.

*Organizational Objectives.* Terroristic violence serves several functions within the terrorist organizations themselves. Intra-group violence assures discipline within the organizations by dissuading dissent, defection, and laxness. Extra-group violence builds morale within the membership through the experience of cooperative operations, the feelings of elitism generated by strict discipline and sacrifice, and the shared excitement of dangerous and clandestine activities.<sup>12</sup> The terroristic acts also serve to "bloody" group members, initiating new members into the organization, testing members' nerve and commitment, and cutting off escape routes back into society. The rites of passage reduce the likelihood of defections by supplementing the threats of organizational sanctions with those of societal and governmental sanctions.

Brian Crozier suggests that the use of terrorism within the organization is a good barometer of how much popular support the organization enjoys, with intra-group violence being indicative of low levels of external support.<sup>13</sup> The history of the Japanese Red Army would seem to bear out that conclusion given the instances in which members have been executed by the organization, the lack of strong domestic support (and reliance on international connections and support), and the resultant strength of commitment of its members.

The uses of violence outside of the organization have also been commented upon by terrorists themselves. Horst Mahler, a member of the Baader-Meinhof group, for example, stated that:

A fighting group can only come into being through struggle itself. All attempts to organize, develop and train the group outside the context of a real-life situation lead to utterly ridiculous results---sometimes with a tragic outcome.<sup>14</sup>

Much the same was stated by Carlos Marighella in the "Minimanual."<sup>15</sup> Training, discipline, and morals are built through the operations against perceived enemies. Marighella further suggested that organizational needs are also met through "expropriation." Extra-group violence is used to secure the necessary *matériel* and resources (e.g., weapons, ammunition, food, medical supplies and intelligence) to maintain the organization and to aid its operations. Thus, raids on gun stores and bank robberies are indications of impending terrorist activities of a more political nature. Authorities in the U.S., for example, have noted the potential for increased levels of violence after recent robberies involving the Weather Underground and the Black Liberation Army.

*Publicity Objectives.* Publicity has been called the *raison d'être* of international terrorism, but it is the basic objective (beyond organizational survival) of all forms of terrorism. Terrorism is a process of communication designed to intimidate or terrorize targeted groups of individuals in order to alter their behavior and, concurrently, to elicit popular sympathy and support from domestic and/or foreign audiences. In short, there are two distinct groups: (1) the public that is most directly involved in the violence as antagonists, and (2) the public that is only involved in the events as spectators (that is, the nontargeted public). The hostage-taking at the 1972 Munich Olympics, for instance, led to the deaths of eleven Israeli athletes, five Black September Organization members, and at least three other persons. Quite apart from the impact on the West Germans, the Israelis and the Palestinians estimates of the size of the international audience reach 500 million persons<sup>16</sup> and have led Richard Clutterbuck to contend that the violence was committed for the publicity alone.<sup>17</sup>

The nontargeted audience can be a major actor or set of actors in terrorist events, particularly international terrorist events. For this audience, the violence is intended to arouse emotions, to break the inertia of noninvolvement in the conflict, to force action or reaction, to evoke admiration and fear, and to mobilize support. Violent acts demonstrate the strength and commitment of the terrorist organization and may, if ineffectively countered, encourage imitators.<sup>18</sup> The greater the spectacle, the larger the audience, the better the effect will be. Hence, terrorists seek out targets which maximize their violence<sup>19</sup> and which help to cultivate and manipulate their relationship with the information media. That knowledge of the important role of the media has already prompted a number of journalists to question their own roles in the events<sup>20</sup> and government analysts have begun to investigate the relationship.<sup>21</sup> The visibility given acts of violence against diplomatic, foreign business, and international targets

(such as airports and airline passengers) argues against the choice of lesser known or less important targets.

*Provocation Objectives.* A large part of the task of attracting popular support for terrorist movements is gaining support from the incumbent authorities. Terrorists frequently seek to provoke an overreaction to their activities from the government. Repressive counter-terrorist operations, particularly when they affect the personal interests and freedoms of ostensibly innocent people, can undermine any regime's domestic<sup>22</sup> and foreign<sup>23</sup> support. The French Army's overreaction to violence in Algiers during the struggle for Algerian independence, the use of excessively repressive measures in Northern Ireland (such as the detention and search laws), and the Israeli government's reactions to violence on the West Bank and bombings of refugee camps in Lebanon are cases in point. Laying aside the possible justification or non-justification of violence and without debating whether one side or the other is 'right,' it can be argued that the countermeasures chosen by those governments are counterproductive to the extent that popular opinion and support were alienated. Foreign, as well as domestic, support for the governments' action was affected negatively.

More importantly, governments may be provoked to abridge their legally based guarantees of individual and collective civil liberties — possibly, to violate the very basis of their claims to represent legitimate authority and to reduce their own actions to the same level of "extra-legal" and arbitrary violence as that used by the terrorists.<sup>24</sup> The temptation for governments to contravene legally sanctioned procedures in resolving domestic violence may be the most damaging consequence of terrorist activities. The military takeover of the Uruguayan government in the wake of Tupamaro violence in the early 1970s underscores the dangers that overreaction may bring. In this specific case, it is not certain whether the Tupamaros will ultimately achieve their objectives when the military government is replaced. Domestic violence in other Latin American nations, such as El Salvador and, earlier, Nicaragua, has been met with government repression on a broad scale, leading to charges that the governments have violated human rights. Without judging whether the governments have acted justly or effectively, it can be claimed that their actions have called the legitimacy of their governments into question and estranged foreign allies and the loyal population.

*Punishment Objectives.* Terrorist organizations may also seek to punish individual government agents and private citizens (foreign and domestic) for failing to comply with or support terrorist demands. The imposition of terrorist sanctions against persons who fail to recognize the terrorist organization's authority and legitimacy demonstrates the strength of the terrorist organization. At the same time, it amply illustrates the failings of the incumbent authorities — their impotence and their inability to maintain civic order and to provide basic public security.<sup>25</sup>

The "knee-cappings" perpetrated by the Red Brigades in Italy, the selective kidnappings and murders committed by terrorists (as well as government sponsored or tolerated "death squads") in Latin America, and the assassinations of government officials are premeditated to influence the actions and loyalties of public officials and private citizens. Lenin called this situation, the competition between government and challenging authorities, the "dual power" situation. The objective of the tactic is to supplant state power by destroying its legitimacy and, additionally, turning the state's monopoly on the use of force over to the revolutionary group.<sup>26</sup> The power to punish "wrongdoers" and to "enforce" a set of laws or norms is associated with government authority. The ability of the terrorist organization to accomplish the same tasks indicates a major failure of the state authorities.

*Disruption Objectives.* Terrorist organizations may seek varying degrees of social, economic, and political disruption, ranging from brief interruptions of regime or societal function to the total collapse of the social, economic and political structures of the target society.

Disruption can be achieved through direct or indirect terrorist action. Bombings, arsons, shootings, kidnappings and other violent acts can directly affect the public's or the government's willingness or ability to carry on normal activities. If counterterrorist operations interfere with the public's routine activities, the same effect can be realized indirectly. In either case, the disruption may cause the polarization of popular sympathies.<sup>27</sup>

The most serious consequence of terrorists' disruption efforts can be the collapse of the rule of law. In fact, this extreme objective has been implicit in the recent activities of nihilist and anarchist groups. Disorienting and terrorizing violence is utilized to break down the fundamental structures and images of social interaction, to undermine the stability of societal expectations, and, ultimately, to atomize society.<sup>28</sup> This would be an extreme consequence of terrorist violence, however. It is more likely that terrorist organizations will seek only as much disruption as will facilitate the achievement of their own long-term goals. The chaos that would characterize a complete breakdown of civic order might provide problems for the terrorists themselves with the lack of order producing other contenders for power,<sup>29</sup> just as disruption preceding the military takeover of Uruguay has proved, at least for a time, counterproductive for the Tupamaros.

*Instrumental Objectives.* Definitions of political terrorism frequently specify that victims are selected principally for their symbolic, rather than their instrumental, value.<sup>30</sup> To a large extent, this is true. Terrorist organizations most often launch their attacks against highly visible targets rather than targets having "military" value. However, military, police and government agents may have both symbolic and instrumental value. As collectives they are the authorities and as individuals they represent the authorities. By attacking such targets, terrorists can damage the morale of the authorities, as well as of the



public,<sup>31</sup> and demonstrate the organization's power and its potential to become a large-scale, military movement.

The Italian Red Brigades' attacks on government officials, such as judges, prosecutors and anti-terrorist force commanders, represent just such instrumental objectives. The kidnappings of Aldo Moro and U.S. General Dozier, on the other hand, reflect the conscious selection of highly visible and symbolic targets. Neither Moro nor Dozier represented a specific threat to the Red Brigades.

If the terrorist organization is strong enough to carry out "military" operations against "military" targets as a principal focus of its competition with the incumbent authorities, it is crossing the threshold from terrorist to military organization. Then the conflict with incumbent authorities can be more properly termed "guerrilla war" or "civil war," if conducted by indigenous forces, or external aggression, if conducted by nonindigenous forces. This distinction can be utilized as an argument for recognition of both the Palestinian Liberation Organization and the Irish Republican Army (Provisional Wing) campaigns of violence as being military operations and therefore, despite the terroristic elements in each, more properly considered guerrilla warfare. Both organizations primarily choose military personnel or civilian authorities as targets.

Instrumental objectives seldom provide the primary impetus for terrorist attacks,<sup>32</sup> but the selection of targets with instrumental value by terrorist organizations is an indicator of the elevation of the level of violence and as such should not be ignored.

It is clear that the aforementioned strategic objectives are not always separately pursued. Several strategic objectives may be sought with each act or threat of violence. Moreover, dozens of tactical operations may be required for the terrorists to achieve the minimum goals sought or, occasionally, one operation such as the Black September Organization's attack at the 1972 Munich Olympics may achieve the desired effect. Mass destruction, even nuclear terrorism, could fulfill many of the objectives at once. Therefore, it is essential to assess the intermediate, strategic objectives of terrorist organizations in order to determine what kinds of violence and how many deaths the terrorists might perceive as being beneficial to their purposes, as well as to determine what goals or demands the terrorists may be willing to negotiate.

It is also important to note that all terrorist organizations do not have the same objectives. Some or all of these strategic objectives may be lacking, particularly among terrorist groups that have very limited or "subrevolutionary" goals.

### **Tactical Objectives**

The specific concessions and the logistical gains sought by terrorists in order to maintain or escalate their campaigns of violence and, ultimately, to realize their long-term goals seldom generate as much confusion as do their ideological and strategic objectives. Violent

acts are committed or threatened and demands are issued. Hostage incidents — i.e. kidnappings, barricade and hostage episodes, and hijackings — for example, generally have been conducted for the purposes of securing ransom monies or supplies, the releases of political prisoners, the publication or broadcast of terrorist propaganda messages, and/or the guarantee of safe passage or political asylum.<sup>33</sup> Armed attacks, robberies and break-ins, on the other hand, have frequently been used to procure supplies: weapons, ammunition, money, medical stores, explosives and food. In a few cases, armed attacks have been used to rescue imprisoned or detained terrorists and to create diversions.

Purely destructive acts (assassinations, maimings, bombings and arsons), violence not accompanied by the issuance of specific demands or the expropriation of materials needed by the terrorist organization, may be more directly connected with the terrorists' mid-range or strategic objectives, such as organizational, punishment, and disruption objectives. Consistent with this view are the findings of Professor Corsi that governments were likely to concede demands issued by terrorists during hostage events and resist capitulating to demands issued in conjunction with attacks on specific and general targets.<sup>34</sup> If the governments' willingness to accede to terrorist demands is predicated on their perceptions of the dangers to incumbent authority, rather than to the lives involved in the hostage incidents, there may be more support for a hierarchy of values thesis. An analysis of international hostage events between 1968 and 1977 conducted by this author<sup>35</sup> did indicate that governments are more receptive to the least damaging demands (as publicity and safe passage) than they are to the more threatening demands for ransom and the release of political prisoners, nevertheless, it must be admitted the correlations were weak.

*These lower-order objectives may be no less threatening to regime authority than are the higher-order, ideological and strategic, objectives, although they generally present less immediate risks to incumbent elites. Specific demands for safe passage or political asylum, for example, pose little direct danger to regime authority. However, it is possible that compliance with such demands, particularly when compliance would assure the escape of an important terrorist, would enhance an organization's capacity to continue or expand its violence. The payment of ransom or the release of political prisoners, on the other hand, more clearly increases the risks to incumbent authorities both in terms of increasing the capabilities of the terrorist organization and decreasing the prestige, popular respect and legitimacy enjoyed by the government.*

In short, the tactical objectives of the terrorists usually will be more negotiable than their long-term objectives. Only a very weak terrorist organization or an organization with very limited, "sub-revolutionary" goals will be motivated primarily by the promise of small, immediate gains. However, that is not to say that stronger, "revolu-

tionary" terrorist groups will not place a high value on immediate tactical goals. The risks that they assume in those operations attest to their valuation of short-term ends, but they may be more willing to compromise those goals if they perceive some advantage being gained for the attainment of their higher-order goals.

**SUMMARY**

In summary, this discussion is intended to suggest that terrorist organizations will place higher values on some of their objectives than on others and, to a large extent, those valuations will be ordered according to the levels summarized in the following table.

**TABLE: LEVELS OF TERRORIST OBJECTIVES AND SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES**

LEVELS OF OBJECTIVES	SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES
Ideological	Revolutionary/Subrevolutionary
Strategic	Organizational Publicity Punishment Provocation Disruption Instrumental
Tactical	Specific Concessions Safe Passage or Political Asylum Publication or Broadcast (Publicity) Ransom Release of Political Prisoners Logistical Gains — Expropriations Destruction of Persons or Property

Further, terrorist organizations will be more inclined to compromise the lower-order goals than they will the higher. More tentatively, the suggestion is that the specific vulnerabilities and needs of each terrorist organization will determine its valuation of the listed strategic and tactical objectives. For example, weak organizations cannot hope to orient their attacks principally toward instrumental targets because

to do so would present too much risk to fragile organizations. For that reason, the organizations will tend to satisfy their more immediate and basic needs or goals first, namely, organizational and publicity objectives, before they attempt to satisfy the more risky, resource-demanding, and resource-consuming objectives. If terrorism is a rational, goal-directed enterprise, terrorists will consider the limits of their capabilities and will formulate attainable goals.

At this point, one is more hesitant to suggest that the strategic and tactical objectives of terrorist organizations can be arrayed in some sort of a hierarchical order, beyond the three levels. Much depends on the particular capabilities and weaknesses of the individual terrorist group. However, it may be possible to develop a hierarchical order of objectives for specific terrorist organizations.

A further clarification must also be made. By assigning values to the particular strategic objectives there is an assumption of an escalation ladder, dependent on the terrorists' capabilities. However, terrorists' intentions may be much more limited. An organization with very limited goals might have little interest in maintaining or escalating its violence; indeed, it may be created for very shortlived purposes and, therefore, have no long-term organizational needs. On the other hand, while publicity has been identified as the fundamental strategic objective, terrorists may be willing to compromise some of the publicity value of their violence in order to satisfy organizational needs or objectives. That trade-off may be implicit in the choice of violent tactics that minimize the risk to organization members and in the choice of tactics that do not maximize the impact of the violence. Anonymous bombings are not nearly as spectacular as barricade and hostage events, for example. Similarly, the use of bombs without shrapnel, as done by Cuban revolutionaries during the late 1950s, may satisfy the personal reservations about violence of the group's members.

The difficulty in determining the goal priorities of terrorist organizations, as evidenced in the question of whether organizational or publicity objectives take precedence, is the most obvious reason for avoiding a hierarchical ordering of strategic or tactical objectives. Nonetheless, most terrorist organizations will likely place higher values on their organizational and publicity objectives than they will on their other strategic and tactical objectives. Ideological or long-term objectives, too, may be given separate and graduated values, but the two dimensions of ideological objectives mentioned here do not provide enough information to generalize regarding the form such basic value orientations will take. Again, valuations would have to be based on the specific needs and goals of each terrorist organization.

## CONCLUSIONS

The importance of assessing the goals and value priorities, as well as the capabilities and strengths of commitment, of challenging terrorist organizations, is clearly necessary for the determination of gov-

ernment bargaining strategies. All terrorist threats do not present the same dangers to target societies and governments; therefore, there is no need to respond to all terrorism in the same way. The costs of unmitigated violence have to be assessed. Some societies and regimes are more resilient, less vulnerable to terrorist disruption and challenge, than are others. That resilience is a social and political resource that greatly increases the bargaining options of the incumbent authorities and decreases the options of the terrorists. The response has to be tailored to the circumstances, just as the terrorists' objectives are tailored their organizational strengths and weaknesses. It is hoped, therefore, that the typology of terrorist objectives and the general structure of hierarchical values offered here can clarify some of the variables in the bargaining process.

Unfortunately, the conclusions and suggestions made here are less amenable to quantitative measurement and analysis than researchers would prefer. Ideological and strategic motivations of terrorist organizations present a number of major methodological problems that will have to be resolved. However, if the analysis of terrorist events is to have some utility for policymakers, as well as researchers, the limitations of the present typologies will have to be recognized. At this juncture, particularly in view of the availability of the Mickolus dataset, it is important not to lose sight of the unresolved conceptual problems. As Professor Corsi noted, however, it is also important to continue to study the phenomenon of political terrorism and to offer analytic frameworks with sufficient precision and utility to inform and guide policymakers. It is hoped that this effect will expand the discussion of bargaining strategies and the measurement of terrorist threats to incumbent regimes.

#### Footnotes

1. The choice of the Milbank/Mickolus definition is based on two factors: (1) the wide use of that definition by policy-oriented researchers; and, (2) the availability of the Mickolus dataset and its utility for quantitative terrorism research. Notwithstanding those reasons, it is not assumed that the definition is unbiased. See, D.L. Milbank, *International and Transnational Terrorism: Diagnosis and Prognosis*. RP76-1-073U (Washington: U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, December, 1976); E. Mickolus, "Trends in Transnational Terrorism," pp. 44-73 in Marius H. Livingston (ed.), *International Terrorism in the Contemporary World* (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1978); and, E. Mickolus "Transnational Terrorism," pp. 147-150 in Michael Stohl (ed.) *The Politics of Terrorism* (New York: Marcel Dekker, 1979).
2. Paul Wilkinson, *Political Terrorism* (London: Macmillan Press, 1974), pp. 36-40. Additionally, Ted Gurr in his study of terrorism in the 1960s found that only eight percent of the terrorist acts and campaigns during that period had explicit and primary objectives of seizing power or implementing a revolutionary ideology. See, T.R. Gurr, "Some Characteristics of Political Terrorism in the 1960s," in Michael Stohl (ed.), *The Politics of Terrorism* (New York: Marcel Dekker, 1979), p. 38.
3. Paul Wilkinson, *Terrorism and the Liberal State* (New York: Wiley and Sons, 1977), p. 106.

4. See J.R. Corsi, "Terrorism as a Desperate Game: Fear, Bargaining and Communication in the Terrorist Event," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* (March, 1981), p. 49; J.B. Bell, "Terror: An Overview," in Marius H. Livingston (ed.), *International Terrorism in the Contemporary World* (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1978), p. 37; and, B.M. Jenkins, "International Terrorism: A New Mode of Conflict," in David Carlton and Carlo Schaerf (eds.), *International Terrorism and World Security* (New York: Wiley and Sons, 1975), p. 15, among others.
5. E. Weisband and D. Roguly, "Palestinian Terrorism: Violence, Verbal Strategy and Legitimacy," in Yonah Alexander (ed.), *International Terrorism: National, Regional and Global Perspectives* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1976), p. 258.
6. Chalmers Johnson identified "legitimacy potential" as one of the concepts introduced at the 1976 U.S. State Department Conference on terrorism. He did not, however, identify the source of the concept (see Chalmers Johnson, "Perspectives on Terrorism," in Walter Laqueur (ed.), *The Terrorism Reader: A Historical Anthology* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1978), p. 274). A similar conceptualization can be found in Wilkinson's *Terrorism* (1977), p. 107.
7. E. Evans, *Calling a Truce to Terror: The American Response to International Terrorism* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1979), pp. 36-39.
8. E. Moxon-Browne, "The Water and the Fish," in Paul Wilkinson (ed.), *British Perspectives on Terrorism* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1981), pp. 47-53.
9. Wilkinson, *Terrorism* (1977), pp. 182, 192; R.R. Corrado, "Ethnic and Student Terrorism in Western Europe," in Michael Stohl (ed.), *The Politics of Terrorism* (New York: Marcel Dekker, 1979), pp. 192-95; and, R. Kupperman and D. Trent, *Terrorism: Threat, Reality, Response* (Stanford, Ca.: Hoover Institution Press, 1979), p. 5.
10. B. Crozier, *A Theory of Conflict* (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1974), pp. 105-106; and Mickolus, "Transnational Terrorism" (1979), p. 179.
11. Wilkinson, *Terrorism* (1977), pp. 83-86, 107.
12. This type of terrorism is called "organizational terror" by J. Bowyer Bell, although there seems to be some overlap with his concept of "allegiance terror." See J. Bowyer Bell, *Transnational Terror* (Washington: American Enterprise Institute, 1975), pp. 15-16; and also, J. Mallin, "Terrorism as a Military Weapon," *Air University Review* (January-February, 1977), p. 113 and, M. Stohl, "Myths and Realities of Political Terrorism," in Michael Stohl (ed.), *The Politics of Terrorism* (New York: Marcel Dekker, 1979), p. 14.
13. Crozier, *Theory* (1974), p. 129.
14. As quoted in H.J. Horchem, *Extremisten in einer selbstbewussten Demokratie* (Freiburg: Herderbucherei, 1975). Excerpted and translated in Walter Laqueur (ed.), *The Terrorism Reader: A Historical Anthology* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1978), pp. 246-251.
15. Laqueur, *Terrorism Reader* (1978), pp. 159-168.
16. C. Dobson and R. Payne, *The Terrorists: Their Weapons, Leaders and Tactics* (New York: Facts on File, 1979), p. 14.
17. R. Clutterbuck, *Living With Terrorism* (New Rochelle, N.Y.: Arlington House Publishers, 1975), p. 25.
18. This view is held by a number of authors including Crozier, *Theory* (1974), p. 127; Jenkins, "International Terrorism," (1975), p. 17; Evans, *Calling A Truce* (1979), p. 26-29.
19. Clutterbuck, *Living* (1975), p. 25; Mickolus, "Trends," (1978), p. 68; Mickolus, "Transnational Terrorism," (1979), p. 165; and, Dobson and Payne, *The Terrorists* (1979), p. 14.
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23. J.N. Rosenau, "Internal War as an International Event," in James N. Rosenau (ed.), *International Aspects of Civil Strife* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1964), p. 220; and, T.R. Gurr, "The Relevance of Theories of Internal Violence for the Control of Intervention," in John Norton Moore (ed.), *Law and Civil War in the Modern World* (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974), pp. 75-77.
24. Wilkinson, *Political Terrorism* (1974), p. 80.
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26. E. Halperin, *Terrorism in Latin America* (Beverly Hill, Ca.: Sage Publications, 1976), p. 16.
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28. For example, M.C. Hutchinson, "The Concept of Revolutionary Terrorism," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 16 (September 1972), p. 388.
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