

The Use of Force in Soviet Foreign Policy: The Case of Afghanistan

by
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Introduction

In assessing the significance of the Soviet invasion, Western analysts have been torn between two competing images. In the first image, favoured by George Kennan and others, the invasion is seen as a defensive reaction, a reflection of continuity in Soviet foreign policy, and *not* an ominous portent of increasingly bad things to come. A British analyst summed up the views of the first image:

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan is no threat to the Western world. It is a defensive reaction taken to support a "friendly" government within the accepted Soviet sphere of influence. It is not in a strategic area nor is it part of the major Soviet offensive. *The West has over-reacted and is ignoring the significance of the invasion for it proves the failure yet again, of Soviet foreign policy in an area that the Soviet Union considers vital to its protection.*¹

In the second image, the elements of change in Soviet foreign policy are stressed, and the geostrategic implications of the Soviet move are ominous. Former President Carter said:

The Soviet effort to dominate Afghanistan has brought Soviet military forces to within 300 miles of the Indian Ocean and close to the Straits of Hormuz—a waterway through which most of the world's oil must flow. The Soviet Union is now attempting to consolidate a strategic position, therefore, that poses a grave *threat to the free movement of Middle East oil.*²

While a final verdict on this dispute must be held in abeyance, it is possible three years later to examine the invasion as a case in which the Soviet Union used force in an attempt to accomplish its foreign policy objectives. Moreover, subsequent Soviet operations have provided the West with an opportunity to examine the combat performance of Soviet forces in a low-intensity environment. Accordingly, this study will address the following questions: What factors motivated the Soviet use of force in Afghanistan?; What is the nature of Soviet military policy in Afghanistan?; and, What can Western analysts deduce from Soviet policy in Afghanistan which may enable them to better predict future Soviet moves?

To answer these questions, subsequent sections of this paper will address:

* the prelude to the Soviet invasion,

- * the invasion itself,
- * the motives for the invasion,
- * the nature of current Soviet military policy in Afghanistan, and
- * scenarios for future developments.

Prelude to Invasion

About the size of the state of Texas, Afghanistan is a mountainous country which would fit into anyone's definition of "underdeveloped." Only 12% of the land area of Afghanistan is cultivated. There are only a few thousand miles of paved roads and virtually no railroads. Literacy is estimated at only 10%. The per capita income was 168 dollars per annum in 1978. Were it not for its position as a buffer state, we could be assured that it would hold very little interest for students of international affairs.³

Successive Soviet regimes, mindful of Afghanistan's position, have always taken a strong interest in Afghan affairs, and relations between the two states have usually been close and cordial. Both states, emerging in the afterglow of World War I, were the first to formally recognize each other and the first "friendship" treaty signed between the two states came about in February 1921. Furthermore, there is little doubt that Soviet interests in Afghanistan have, in the main, been security-related. For example, when Khrushchev began his open courtship of the Third World, Afghanistan was one of his first stops. Later, he justified his efforts:

There's no doubt that if the Afghans hadn't become our friends, the Americans would have managed to ingratiate themselves with their "humanitarian aid," as they call it. The amount of money we spent in gratuitous assistance to Afghanistan is a drop in the ocean compared to the price we would have had to pay in order to counter the threat of an American military base on Afghan territory.⁴

From 1956-77, the USSR and its allies trained over 4,000 Afghan officers and delivered more than \$600 million worth of military supplies. All of this was backed up by a 350-man advisory group. In the same period, the USSR also gave Afghanistan grants or credit lines totalling more than \$1.3 billion, a sum which was exceeded in the Middle East and South Asia areas only by grants given to Egypt, India and Syria.⁵

By 1975, however, the USSR began to experience trouble with the Afghan leader, Mohammad Daud, who had come to power with Soviet and local Marxist backing in 1973. Under the guise of adapting to "new realities" in the region, Daud began to move closer to Iran, accepting an offer of two billion dollars in aid and the Shah's promise (never fulfilled) to build a highway and a railroad to connect the two countries. In September 1975, Daud dismissed 40 high ranking officers and initiated military training agreements with Iran and Pakistan. He also reduced pressure on Pakistan in their border dispute

and began to move against both wings of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA). As Daud moved toward Islam, the CPSU, fronted by the Indian and Iraqi communist parties, began to pressure the factions of the PDPA to unite and move into opposition, succeeding in May 1977.⁶

The exact details of what followed in the spring of 1978 are, to this day, unclear. In April 1978, a leading Marxist, Mir Akbar Khaiber, was assassinated by persons unknown and, following a street demonstration, the PDPA leadership was arrested and the few remaining Marxists in the Daud government were purged. The leaders of the PDPA organized a revolt (with the aid of Soviet-trained elements in the Army and Air Force) and, 36 hours and perhaps as many as 2000 dead later, the PDPA came to rule Afghanistan.⁷ Contrary to earlier speculations, there is very little reason to believe that the coup was Soviet engineered. Indeed, the entire coup was a "hip pocket" affair, more a monument to the disorganization and poor leadership of Daud, than to the skill and tactics of his opponents.⁸

The PDPA which came to rule in Afghanistan was dominated by the *Khalq* ("Masses") faction, mainly composed of urban intellectuals divorced from the realities of life in the countryside. The party boss, Nur M. Taraki, became President and later on, his more radical deputy, Hafizullah Amin became Prime Minister. Ironically, Taraki had once worked for the U.S. embassy in Kabul and Amin had been educated in New York at Columbia University.

To preserve the remnants of Western aid and to avoid the stigma of atheism, the two leaders initially soft-pedalled their communist sympathies, but they were unable to develop broad-based support for their regime. The *Khalq's* repressive policies alienated both their fellow Marxists of the *Parcham* ("Banner") faction and Muslim fundamentalists. Among the *Khalq's* ill-advised policies were: a purge of the army officer corps, a disastrous land reform policy which cut Afghan peasants off from local sources of funds,⁹ a change of the national flag from Islamic green to red, a reemphasis on women's rights, and, the July 1978 purge of the *Parcham* faction from the Afghan leadership. Some *Parchamis*, like present leader Babrak Karmal, were posted to, and then exiled in, Eastern Europe, while other, lesser lights were jailed as political prisoners.¹⁰ The results of these policies were a revolt in the countryside and virtual pandemonium inside the government.

On the international scene, Taraki and company were no more successful than they were at home. Increasingly, their old ally, the USSR, became their lone supporter. Following consultations with Gromyko in May 1978, Soviet aid increased, and in December 1978, the two countries signed a Treaty of Friendship, Good Neighbourliness and Cooperation.¹¹ The door to the West was firmly shut in February 1979 when the U.S. Ambassador, Adolph Dubs, was taken hostage by fanatics and killed when the Soviet-advised Afghan police, over American objections, assaulted the Kabul hotel where the Ambassador was being held captive.

In March 1979 the rebellion in Afghanistan began to take an ominous turn. An army mutiny, coupled with a rebel attack on the western city of Herat, turned into a crisis for the Soviet Union. An American analyst summed up the tragedy in this manner:

... Soviet advisers were hunted down by specially assigned insurgent assassination squads conducting house-to-house searches. Westerners reportedly saw Russian women and children running for their lives from the area of the Soviet-built Herat Hotel. Those Russians that were caught were killed: some were flayed alive, others were beheaded and cut into pieces which were then paraded around the city impaled on pikes.¹²

As might be expected, the Afghan government and the Soviets reacted strongly. On the Afghan side, domestic repression increased, with one estimate of the final total of slain political prisoners (1978-1980) put as high as 20,000.¹³ In April 1979, an Afghan Army unit (with Soviet advisors in attendance) sacked the town of Kerala and massacred 640 of its male inhabitants.¹⁴ On the Soviet side, an authoritative *Pravda* article of March 19th, signed by the pseudonymous I. Aleksandrov, first accused "some Western countries," China, Iran, and Pakistan of instigating unrest in Afghanistan. In the same issue of *Pravda* an Afghan dispatch blamed the Herat problem on Iranian Army personnel. On 21 March, an authoritative article under the pen name A. Petrov blamed the disturbance on Pakistan, China and Western propaganda.¹⁵ In a more substantive vein, Soviet General Alexei Yepishev, chief of the main political directorate of the armed forces, was dispatched to Afghanistan and recommended an increase in military aid and advisors, then estimated at 1000 personnel. Among the weapons subsequently provided were 100 T-62 tanks and 12 Mi-24 helicopter gunships.¹⁶

Despite increased pressure, the guerrilla movement, disorganized as it was, began to grow, and further escalatory measures were taken by the Soviets. From August to October, General Ivan Pavlovsky, Deputy Defense Minister and Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Ground Forces, visited Afghanistan along with 12 other generals. At the same time, the role of Soviet advisors was broadened to include advising at the company-level and flying active combat missions. Later U.S. analysts would speculate that Pavlovsky's pessimistic assessment of the situation would be a key element in the Soviet decision to invade. Ironically, both Yepishev and Pavlovsky had performed similar functions in Czechoslovakia in 1968.¹⁷

In September 1979, after attending a nonaligned conference in Havana, Taraki visited Moscow. In retrospect, it appears likely that at this time Taraki was directed to oust his deputy, the radical Hafizullah Amin, who had by then become the repressive power behind the throne. Amin's demise was not forthcoming, however. Upon Taraki's return, a gun battle broke out in the Arg Palace and, when the smoke cleared, Amin was in control.¹⁸ Taraki was killed in the battle or assassinated shortly thereafter.

On the surface, relations between Amin and the USSR remained cordial. Under the surface, relations were deteriorating. No doubt, Brezhnev was embarrassed by Taraki's demise less than a week after their "fraternal" meeting. Were this not enough, the war had begun to go badly for Amin. In August, army forces had mutinied in Kabul. In September, rebels captured (at least temporarily) the Salang Pass, the key choke point on the road from Kabul to the USSR. Desertion by whole army units had become commonplace, and Amin was having difficulty staffing a government without *Parcham* or Taraki supporters. Adding to Amin's personnel problems, as many as 400,000 of his countrymen had become refugees. Despite Soviet pressure, Amin, acting like an "Afghan Tito," refused to broaden the base of the ruling party or to adopt more moderate policies. He rejected offers of Soviet troops, and a member of his government openly criticized the Soviets for interfering in the internal affairs of Afghanistan. Shortly thereafter, Amin demanded the recall of Soviet Ambassador, A. Puzanov.¹⁹ When a Soviet-supervised military operation failed in November, the Soviet leadership apparently decided that if the "revolution" were to succeed, the incumbent government would have to be changed.

Invasion

On December 8th, lead elements of a battalion-sized airborne unit landed at the Soviet-controlled air base at Bagram, north of Kabul. On the 20th, this unit moved north and cleared the Salang Pass area of rebel activity, thus opening the highway from Temertz in the Soviet Union to Kabul. This action was complemented by the call-up of Soviet reservists in late October and November to man the five category 2 and 3 divisions then near the Afghan border. Bridge equipment was brought up to the Oxus River (Amu Darya) and a command post for the invasion, headed by Marshal Sokolov, a First Deputy Defense Minister, was established at Temertz, near the Soviet-Afghan border.²⁰

Soviet diplomats were also busy around this time. Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin met with Secretary of State Vance to discuss the future prospects of U.S.-Soviet relations and shortly thereafter returned to the Soviet Union, apparently to brief the Politburo on any last minute developments in his area of responsibility. In Kabul, the new Soviet Ambassador, F. Tabayev, repeatedly tried to get Amin to agree to accept the offer of Soviet combat troops to supplement the 4,000 advisors already in country. Neither diplomat received any information which might have halted the next phase of the Soviet operation.

On Christmas eve, despite prior American warnings and the presence of an Afghan armoured division nearby, the Soviets began landing elements of an airborne division at Kabul Airport. On the 27th, following a three-day airlift which averaged 75-120 flights per day, troops from the division deployed to the Darulaman Palace outside Kabul, destroyed Amin's elite guard and its eight tanks, and killed President Amin. Babrak Karmal, head of the *Parcham* faction of the

PDPA, then in exile somewhere in USSR, was proclaimed President. Later that same day, senior Afghan Army officers, including the general commanding the Central Army Corps, unwilling to cooperate with Soviets, were killed by Soviet troops.²¹ MVD Lieutenant General Viktor Paputin, the apparent commander of the "political" operations associated with the invasion, also died either in Kabul or later, perhaps by his own hand, in Moscow. Rumours of suicide were reinforced by the fact that Paputin's obituary appeared without Brezhnev's signature.²² Beginning on the 26th, two motorized rifle divisions, one destined for Kabul and the other for Kandahar in southern Afghanistan, led the procession of Soviet troops across the border. By the first week in February, elements of seven Soviet divisions had been identified in Afghanistan. With the exception of the 105th Guards Airborne Division, these units were composed of at least 50% reserve-fillers on a 90-day call-up. Interestingly, a large number of the Soviet reservists (perhaps as many as 90%) were Central Asians.²³

Soviet forces were quite methodical in the operations which followed. First, they moved to consolidate their hold over major roads and urban areas. Second, troops were deployed to the Iranian and Pakistani borders in an attempt to limit infiltration from the sanctuary areas in these two countries. Third, concurrent with the first and second steps, disloyal elements of the Afghan Army were disarmed or, if they refused as the 26th Afghan Parachute Regiment did, were destroyed by the superior firepower of adjacent Soviet units. Throughout the initial stages of the invasion, Soviet advisors played a key role in neutralizing Afghan Army units whose loyalty was questionable. This was accomplished by Soviet control over fuel and by deceptions, such as having the questionable units turn over their ammunition for inventory or having them turn in vehicle batteries for winterizing.²⁴

In summary, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan demonstrated again that the Soviet leadership is capable of decisive action to achieve policy goals, under low-risk circumstances. As an instrument of that policy, the Soviet military and security *apparatus* proved that: (1) it is capable of rapid (though detectable) mobilization, (2) it can perform major operations without severe logistical breakdown, (3) it has sufficient ground forces to mount major, conventional operations in low-intensity environments outside of the Warsaw Pact or Chinese border areas, and (4) it is reliable in "political" operations, such as assassination and disarming unreliable friendly forces. All-in-all, the initial occupation of Afghanistan was a well-planned and well-executed operation.

The methods used by the Soviets in Afghanistan were similar to those used in their 1968 invasions of Czechoslovakia and were "heirs" to the experience of their previous operations in the Third World. Without a doubt, the tactics and operational experience gained in Czechoslovakia, along with the experience of sustained airlifts in the 1973 Arab-Israeli War and the Ethiopian-Somali war in 1977-78 con-

stituted "good training" for Afghanistan. Indeed, the ease with which the Soviets succeeded in Czechoslovakia may have made them overconfident in the case of Afghanistan. An Austrian analyst has noted:

The Soviet move in December 1979 clearly reflected Moscow's expectations of a quick and decisive solution. There was nothing in the initial Soviet military operations that betokened plans for a protracted conflict against durable opposition . . . Rather, the Soviet invasion had all the earmarks of a surgical thrust that was to protect the ineffective Afghan central authority against the encroaching cancer of insurgency . . .²⁵

Before examining what has since happened to Soviet forces in Afghanistan, we must pause and attempt to reconstruct Soviet motives for invading.

Motives

Whatever the Soviet motives for invading Afghanistan were, they were hardly clarified by the amateurish propaganda which was generated to support invasion. The Soviet claim to have been "invited" was obviously false and it would really stretch the imagination to believe President Karmal's claim that Amin was a "CIA agent." Furthermore, it did nothing for Soviet credibility to proclaim Amin's overthrow via a fake Radio Kabul announcement which came from a radio transmitter inside the Soviet Union.²⁶

Western analysts have also made assertions about the invasion which will not hold up under scrutiny. One such theory, put forth by George Kennan and others, speculated that the "moderate" Brezhnev was overruled on Afghanistan and that the invasion heralded the succession of, or at least a strong initiative from, a new, more militant Soviet leadership coalition. There is very little evidence which supports this assertion. Brezhnev strongly supported the invasion in subsequent speeches as did all of the other Politburo members. In a demonstration of his political strength, Brezhnev, just one month prior to the invasion, was able to install his crony, Nikolai Tikhonov (now Prime Minister) as a full member of a Politburo already packed with Brezhnev's other lifelong associates.²⁷ Brezhnev's political power was peaking in the fall of 1979. Even given limited working hours, it is unlikely that he was "overruled" or "out-voted" on such a critical issue.

In reality, we would be hard pressed to discover any group or individual who would have spoken with authority *against* the invasion. We might hypothesize, for example, that the USA and World Economy institutes could have objected to the invasion. However, with one of their chief spokesman, Georgi Arbatov, sidelined with a heart attack, the institutes apparently did not have a major input into the decision-making process. Speaking vaguely of the moderate "foreign policy elite," Robert Legvold of the Council on Foreign Relations tells us: "They were not consulted on Afghanistan, for as one of them

speculated after the invasion, when the crunch came late in the fall, 'the old bosses' had no need of their musings—"the old bosses' felt in their bones what they must do."²⁸ Were this not the case, it is still doubtful that the so-called moderates could have overcome the position which was apparently supported by first-hand observers such as Generals Yepishev and Pavlovsky, and former Ambassador Puzanov. In any case, the first and strongest speech in defense of the invasion by anyone in the Soviet leadership came from Leonid Ilyich himself.

The projected Soviet oil shortage also seems not to have provided an important impetus for the Soviet invasion. For one, the CIA's original pessimism on this matter has not been validated. While production may have temporarily peaked, the current situation has not yet reached crisis proportions. Indeed, by the 1990s, the Soviets may even be able to exploit a favorable energy situation in their foreign policy dealings with the West.²⁹ Furthermore, we give too much credit to the Soviet ability to control the future if we see their invasion as merely "Phase I" in their drive for Persian Gulf oil. Henry Kissinger reminded President Nixon in 1969 that:

It is always tempting to arrange diverse Soviet moves into a grand design. The more esoteric brands of Kremlinology often purport to see each and every move as part of the carefully orchestrated score in which events inexorably move to the grand finale. Experience has shown that this has rarely if ever been the case. From the Cuban missile crisis . . . to the invasion of Czechoslovakia, there has been a large element of improvisation in Soviet policy.³⁰

If the Soviets were intent on moving into Iran via military means, their invasion of Afghanistan was a poor move from both a political and a military standpoint.³¹ The invasion drew attention to the area and made the West more aware than ever of the critical importance of an independent Iran. After Afghanistan, any covert Soviet move into Iran carried a high risk of a strong American response in accordance with the Carter Doctrine. Furthermore, western Afghanistan is a poor springboard from which to invade Iran. This does not mean that the Soviets could not use Afghanistan as a base from which to invade Iran or that they would let pass a more "graceful" opportunity to move into Iran, but it does seem to indicate that their immediate motives for invading Afghanistan lay elsewhere.

In this regard, one area of Soviet concern seems to have been the relationship between the recent Islamic revival and the rapidly growing Soviet Muslim population of nearly 50 million people. By itself, however, the evidence to support an "invade Afghanistan to insulate Soviet Muslims" hypothesis is mixed. Supporting the "null" hypothesis is the fact that many Central Asian reservists were used to man the initial attacking divisions. Furthermore, recent newspaper accounts indicate that the Soviet leadership has not experienced any

problems over the invasion from their Muslim population.³² Nonetheless, expressions of leadership anxiety over this question have recently surfaced. In a December 1980 Armenian publication, a commentator stated that, "in the interest of its own global strategy, the US would like to use Islamic states against the USSR."³³ In an example more to the point, singling out "young people" as especially vulnerable, Major General Yusif Zade, Chairman of the Azerbaijan SSR KGB, stated in a *Bakinsky Rabochoy* article that:

In view of the situation in Iran and Afghanistan the U.S. special services are trying to exploit the Islamic religion—especially in areas where the Muslim population lives—as one factor influencing the political situation in our country.³⁴

Less than a week later, G.A. Aliyev, Azerbaijani party chief and candidate member of the Politburo, echoed Zade's concerns in the same newspaper.³⁵

On balance, we might dismiss the latter pronouncements as "bogeyman" tactics or, perhaps, as an oblique attempt to draw attention to Azerbaijan's critical location and thereby encourage an increase in the resource flow to that area in the new Five Year Plan. In any case, we must believe that Brezhnev *et al* are aware of and interested in the connection between "their" Muslims and their brethren (some of whom are descendants of the original *Basmachis*) in Afghanistan.³⁶ Time may be the factor which allows resolution here. It is quite possible that the future, long-term effects of an Islamic Republic in Afghanistan were feared by a Soviet leadership which, at the same time, perceived no immediate threat from exposing Central Asian reservists to their fellow Muslims.

The most immediate and important reasons that the Soviets possessed for invading Afghanistan can be subsumed under four headings: pressure of events, geopolitics, commitment, and absence of constraints.

As previously stated, it would have been very easy to have surmised that the Amin regime could not hold on much longer. With the *Parcham* leaders dead or exiled, the likelihood of another Marxist government emerging "spontaneously" was nil. Armed intervention may have been seen as the only alternative to uncertain developments which probably would have militated against Soviet national interests, especially in light of recent developments in the area.³⁷

Southwest Asia has always been a key geopolitical concern of the Soviet Union, not only because it forms their southern border, but also because of their quest for ocean access, and their more recent concern over the Suez-Indian Ocean-Pacific route to the Soviet Far East. Unfortunately, from a Soviet point of view, the West was also strongly interested in the area, especially where Iran and Pakistan were concerned. After World War II and the Soviet withdrawal from Iran in 1946, an uneasy geopolitical status quo emerged. Iran became decidedly pro-Western, but, for the most part, it also maintained

“correct” relations with the Soviets. Afghanistan was normally pro-Soviet, and although Pakistan was somewhat hostile to the Soviet Union, it was checked by India to the east and by Afghanistan to its west. In retrospect, even superpower naval activity in the Indian Ocean, prior to the fall of the Shah, seems to have been relatively insignificant. Preliminary talks had even been undertaken to demilitarize the entire area, but these came too late to bear fruit.³⁸

When the Shah of Iran fell in January 1979 and the Afghan insurgency against the Taraki regime heated up, the status quo quickly began to unravel. Iran became hostile to both superpowers, and it appeared as if an Islamic-based movement might topple the Afghan government. More significantly, U.S. fleet deployments increased, and the Soviets may have believed that the United States would soon move to reestablish their “position of strength” in Iran. The Soviets had previously been able to live with a pro-Western Iran, but “losing” Afghanistan now would create a bigger problem. If not kept solidly in the Soviet camp, Afghanistan could become the linchpin in a new NATO-Chinese encirclement of the Soviet Union. In Soviet eyes, the American fixation on its “problem” with Iran was, in part, a cover for grander purposes. A Petrov described the situation in this manner:

One needs no special powers of insight to discern the motives behind the US’s actions. There are people in Washington who are persistently seeking something to replace the positions lost as a result of the overthrow of the Shah’s regime in Iran. Holes were found in the notorious “strategic arc” that Americans have been building for decades near the Soviet Unions’ southern borders; to mend these holes, an effort was launched to subjugate the Afghan people, as well as the peoples of other countries in this region.³⁹

Soviet concern over a deteriorating strategic position was also reinforced by their security commitment to Afghanistan. Article 4 of their friendship treaty states that *in extremis* both parties will, “take appropriate measures with a view to ensuring the security, independence and territorial integrity of the two countries.”⁴⁰ While this represents far less than an ironclad guarantee of Afghan security, one can imagine the great loss of prestige that the Soviets would face if a Marxist “revolution” on their own border were to fall to “reactionary forces.” This commitment to Afghanistan was accentuated by previous “losses” to “counterrevolutionary forces,” such as in Chile.

In a widely reprinted interview in *Pravda*, Brezhnev himself justified the invasion by saying that:

To act in any other way would mean to leave Afghanistan to be torn to pieces by imperialism, to allow aggressive forces to repeat here what they were able to do, for example, in Chile, where the freedom of the people was drowned in blood. To act in any other way would mean to look on passively as a center of serious threat to the security of the Soviet state arose on our southern frontier.⁴¹

In calculating their plans for the invasion, the Soviets may have decided that they had little to lose in the area of East-West relations. While many U.S. analysts saw the Soviet invasion as the first decisive battle of a new Cold War, Soviet analysts found the origins in U.S. behavior prior to the crisis. Particularly vexing from the Soviet perspective was the NATO plan to station American Pershing II IRBM's (Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles) and GLCM's (Ground-Launched Cruise Missiles) in Europe to offset the growing Soviet advantage in Eurostrategic missilery. While the plan was not officially approved, *Pravda* (around the same time that the decision to invade Afghanistan was made) reported that German, British, Italian and Belgian acquiescence had been received. Gromyko, on a visit to Bonn, loudly and threateningly complained of the same thing in a news conference on November 25th.⁴²

Prospects for Sino-Soviet relations were also dim. In October-November 1979, talks in Moscow on an extension of the 1950 Sino-Soviet Treaty again found China putting forth claims to Soviet territory and, in a Soviet view, behaving rather stubbornly.⁴³ At the same time, the Carter administration all but announced the end of its even-handed policy toward the USSR and the PRC, announcing that Secretary of Defense Brown would visit the PRC in January 1981.

The leading Soviet Americanist, Georgi Arbatov, summed up the Soviet view in this manner:

It was *before* the events in Afghanistan that the US took other steps: it froze the arms limitation talks, put into effect a policy of delaying the SALT II Treaty that almost amounts to its rejection, sharply heightened the pitch of anti-Soviet hysteria and accelerated rapprochement with Peking on an anti-Soviet basis. Thus, it was clear by mid-December that the US was executing an abrupt policy swing . . .⁴⁴

In effect, the Soviets may have concluded that the United States and its allies could do little more to hurt the Soviet Union. It may also have occurred to them that Western furor over a rapid, successful invasion might dissipate quickly, as it did after the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, or that international furor against the Soviet Union might be deflected by aggressive U.S. actions in Iran.⁴⁵

Current Policy

Soviet military policy in Afghanistan cannot be analyzed in a vacuum. To understand the "big picture," international and Afghan domestic political factors must be taken into consideration. On the international scene, Soviet combat activities in Afghanistan have placed an enormous burden on Soviet foreign policy. Since the Soviet invasion, the USSR has been condemned three times in the UN General Assembly, each time by more than 100 nations, and again by the foreign ministers of Islamic countries in January and in May 1980. In other areas, more than 50 nations boycotted the Moscow Olympics, and Cuba, in part out of guilt by association, lost a chance for a Security

Council seat. The Soviet Union suffered for more than a year under a U.S. grain embargo and ban on technology transfer. The U.S. stepped up its presence in the Indian Ocean and SALT II was formally shelved because of the invasion. Even worse from a Soviet perspective, the invasion has contributed to greater Chinese-American cooperation in the defense field.

On the domestic scene, the Soviets apparently believed that decisive show of armed might, coupled with a change in rulers, would reunite the ruling party, restore order to Afghanistan, and prevent a potential "encirclement" of the Soviet Union. All of this would, at the same time, preserve the neo-socialist "revolution" on their southern border. Delivered in the combat trains of the Soviet invasion force, Babrak Karmal, the Soviet-picked replacement for Amin, was to have restored domestic political order, while the Soviet forces were to have frightened the rebels back to their villages.

To put it mildly, the Soviets have not accomplished their objectives. Babrak Karmal has failed in his efforts to reunite the *Khalq* ("Masses") and *Parcham* ("Banner") factions of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan. While the exact details of the political situation are unclear, it appears that many of the hard line *Khalq* faction have moved into opposition and, in some case, have even swung to the rebel side. This will continue to haunt the Karmal government because the *Khalq*, by some accounts, outnumbers the *Parcham* faction by a factor of two to one. Moreover, the *Khalq* is particularly strong among Army officers, as evidenced by the July 1980 revolt of the 10,000 men of the 14th Afghan Armored Division which took place when the government attempted to relieve its *Khalqi* commander.⁴⁶ In March and April 1982, according to the U.S. State Department, a large number of *Khalqi* army officers were arrested for plotting against the regime. In September 1982, the *Khalqi* general commanding the Central Army Corps was found shot to death in his offices under mysterious circumstances apparently not related to combat with the rebels.

The Afghan Army is itself in disarray. Disillusionment with the government has produced the defections of whole units to the rebel side. The Army has disintegrated from about 100,000 to 30,000 or less. In fact, even the paltry force which is left is more burden than boon to the Soviets. In August 1980, fearing further defections, the Soviets were forced to remove all anti-air and anti-tank weapons from the Afghan forces to preclude their falling into rebel hands.⁴⁷

To bolster their forces, take the pressure off Soviet units, and perhaps to regain some autonomy, the Karmal government has repeatedly resorted to desperate measures. In January 1981, a new draft law was promulgated and press gangs have reportedly been rounding up teenagers as young as 14 years of age. Paramilitary groups, "Defense of the Revolution Battalions," have been formed but, in spite of high pay, they have generally proven to be ineffective. In July 1981, the government, by design or incompetence, committed some

300 cadets of the Afghan Military Academy to combat only 16 miles from Kabul! The results were devastating: as many as 70 were killed and 200 defected.⁴⁸

In short, public support for the Karmal regime has been and continues to be non-existent. Massive riots took place in Kabul over a seven-day period February 1980 and again in April of that year. In 1981, the attempt to form a National Fatherland Front—a drawback to the old national tribal assembly—failed. Over 20% of the Afghan population has left the country for refugee camps—2.8 million in Pakistan, with a million or more living under similar conditions in Iran. One analyst has reported that some 2-3 million people in central Afghanistan are near starvation.⁴⁹

The military side of the policy equation is not much better for the Soviet Union. To date, Soviet strategy appears to have been to hold the major centers of communication, limit infiltration, and destroy local strongholds at minimum cost to their own forces. This last item has, in the main, been carried out by the more than 240 helicopter gunships and the several squadrons of fighter aircraft which are in the country. By intent or in effect, Soviet policy has been a combination of “scorched earth” and, in anthropologist Louis Dupree’s words, “migratory genocide!”⁵⁰ The Eastern provinces have been depopulated, cities rubble, and the narrow corridor joining China and Afghanistan has been occupied by Soviet forces.

All of this has not produced the desired results. Indeed, since January 1981, rebels, bolstered by aid from other nations, have become bolder. Major fighting has taken place in all of the eastern provinces and around every major city. Contrary to Soviet propaganda, the bulk of the fighting has been done by Soviet troops, sometimes opposed by mutinous Afghan Army forces. A Western summary of recent, major combat actions included the following:

Between April 13 and July 15, 1981, at least 107 high-level Afghan Communist officials and Soviet officers were assassinated in Kabul, on two occasions at the very gate of the Soviet Embassy at midday. In Herat, a noman’s-land for two years, Soviet soldiers are killed in their barracks. Unable to wrest Kandahar from the resistance, the Russians bombed much of it into rubble in June; two weeks later, the resistance again controlled Kandahar. On June 19, the main Soviet airbase at Bagram was set ablaze, and fuel ammunition dumps, and aircraft were destroyed. In July, the resistance won Gulbahar on the north-south supply road. The landscape is littered with ruined Soviet tanks and armor.⁵¹

In 1982, rebel strength and activity has forced the Soviets to employ larger units. One offensive in the Panjshir Valley (the sixth in three years) involved at least 12,000 troops for over 90 days with very little apparent benefit for the Soviets. In all, despite the costs, the Soviets are preparing for a prolonged stay. Permanent logistics facilities and barracks are being constructed. Airfields are being up-

graded and at least one permanent bridge across the Amu Darya (Oxus River) has been completed. The tour of duty for Soviet soldiers has also been set at two years.⁵²

Operationally, new or untried Soviet equipment (e.g., the improved BMP, the AK74 rifle, the Hind helicopter, the AGS 17 automatic grenade launcher, the new SU25 ground attack fighter) has been tested, but the innovations needed to turn a conventional army (six motorized rifle divisions and five two thousand man air assault brigades) into an effective counterinsurgency force are just beginning. For example: the border with Pakistan has been mined with small, scatterable, anti-personnel devices; trees have been cleared from roadsides; reservists have been replaced by regular forces; some tank units (with great diplomatic fanfare) have been removed but then replaced by infantry units, and increasingly, airmobile commandos have been employed in support of ground operations.⁵³

According to two highly-detailed U.S. State Department reports Soviet forces have used chemical weapons in at least half of the provinces of Afghanistan. Witnesses have made total of 59 separate incident reports and the State Department noted that at least 36 of the reports were corroborated by additional evidence. Amazingly, the Soviet use of chemical weapons—incapacitants, lethal chemicals, and even the dreaded mycotoxin biological weapons—has continued apace even after the first detailed U.S. report appeared in March 1982. The reports conservatively estimate that the attacks resulted in at least 3000 deaths. One other ominous detail did not go unnoticed: detailed survey and monitoring operations following some of the strikes showed that the Soviets were obviously “interested in studying after-effects, lethality, or some other quasi-experimental aspect of a new chemical weapon.”⁵⁴

There is very little reliable information on the performance of Soviet troops in Afghanistan. A distillation of the scant information which is available reveals that:

1. The Soviets initially relied on Central Asian reservists to man their invasion force. While some reports no doubt exaggerated the percentage of Central Asians present, it is also clear that the Soviets violated their non-territorial manning “SOP” by drawing very heavily on the Muslim republics. These soldiers were poorly trained and, in all probability, politically unreliable. They were replaced by regular forces within three months of the start of the invasion.

By using predominantly Muslim troops, the Soviets may have been trying to “low profile” their mobilization, believing that a mobilization in a limited geographic area—especially one with an abundant work force—might have been less noticeable than a national call-to-arms. Moreover, the Soviets may have believed that the Central Asian troops would be useful for interpreting and related tasks. In any case, this ploy backfired. Central Asian soldiers in the Soviet armed forces are frequently assigned to construction battalions and would thus be poorly trained for combat operations.

Furthermore, the use of Tadjik and Uzbek troops may have alienated the dominant Pathan majority group in Afghanistan. Finally, reports have even surfaced that some Central Asian troops defected or deserted rather than engage in combat with their co-religionists.⁵⁵

2. The initial complement of regular troops were not trained in counterinsurgency or mountain warfare techniques. One Soviet source even reported that "it took a while for (an Afghan) soldier to believe that the majority of Soviet servicemen had first seen mountains here—in Afghanistan."⁵⁶ Not finding the Chinese or American "agents" whom they were told were causing the trouble has also been bad for morale.⁵⁷
3. Soviet tactics still tend toward an overreliance on motorized rifle and tank troops employed in "sweep" operations. Air assault operations—usually of company or battalion strength—are normally conducted in conjunction with movements by motorized rifle units. Much of the Soviet operational experience apparently has been in road clearing operations.⁵⁸ On a whole, airborne or air assault troops seem to be held in higher esteem by the guerrillas than troops from the motorized division.

Rebel ambushes of various sizes have proven to be very effective. An Afghan Army major described guerrilla tactics in a conversation with a Soviet reporter:

Usually they operate in groups of 30-40 men. They used to assemble in larger gangs. They prefer to use ambushes. By bridges, or in defiles. They destroy the bridge or block the road and then open fire from the commanding heights. If a strong army subunit is moving, they allow the reconnaissance and the combat security detachment to go by. All of a sudden, they open up with volleys of well-aimed fire and then rapidly withdraw. They mine the roads, then cover the mined areas with small arms fire. The hand of professional foreign instructors can be felt at work.⁵⁹

4. The pace of operations ranges from frantic "offensives" or "damage limiting" operations, to long periods of boredom. Soviet soldiers are not coping very well with this and reports of the use of hashish have surfaced. Four separate sources, have confirmed the widespread use of hashish and the fact that Soviet soldiers have even traded truck parts, uniforms, shoes, ammunition, and even rifles for hashish.⁶⁰ This problem has apparently been exacerbated by a prohibition on vodka for enlisted soldiers.
5. The Soviet populace is eager to learn about what is happening in Afghanistan. Censorship within the military and the media is strictly enforced. Accounts of Soviet soldiers in combat are rare, usually anecdotal, and very heavy on propaganda content. In spite of this fact, some truth has emerged in Soviet sources. For example,

Service on Afghanistan's soil makes special demands on all servicemen. It is not easy being far from our motherland . . . The difficult climate conditions take their toll. The lack of roads presents quite a few difficulties. And how exhausting exercises in the mountains are, when each metre takes a tremendous and intensive effort and it is hard to breathe . . . There are considerable other ordeals. The Dushmans are continuing their piratical onslaughts.⁶¹

All in all, the Soviet forces in Afghanistan have not demonstrated the tactical flexibility, the small-unit expertise or the political sensitivity needed to put down an insurgency. Soviet unpreparedness can be traced to their initial estimate of the situation. There is no indication that the Soviets ever believed that they would get bogged down in an extended counterinsurgency operation. More likely, informed by the estimates of the now-retired CINC Soviet Ground Forces, Ivan Pavlovsky, the Soviet leadership envisioned an operation like their 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia, where overwhelming force met little resistance and left Soviet officials time to restore political stability. They failed to consider both the warlike nature of the Afghan freedom fighters and the difficulty of suppressing a revolt in a mountainous area the size of Texas. Of these two conditions, the fierceness of the freedom fighters is the most troublesome. While it is impossible to calculate their exact fighting strength, the estimated 80,000 guerrillas in Afghanistan are more than able to occupy the attention of 105-120,000 Soviet soldiers presently in Afghanistan.

Even given better training and tactics, the number of Soviet troops in Afghanistan is insufficient for the task. Most observers agree that since the onset of 1982 the Soviet hold on Afghanistan has slipped. While territorially-based estimates are suspect, experts have increased their estimate of rebel-controlled territory from 75% (December 1980) to as much as 90% (December 1981). While still poorly armed, the freedom fighters have benefited from defections from the Afghan Army and the generosity of other states, estimated by one source to have totalled nearly \$100 million to date, though this seems a bit exaggerated.⁶²

Disunity is without a doubt the freedom fighters' greatest problem, preventing them from being able to successfully coordinate major offensive operations. On the other hand, disunity may not rebound to the Soviet advantage. Even if the Soviets were to attempt to negotiate with the rebels, they would be unable to find anyone who could speak authoritatively for all of the resistance groups. Of course, any Afghan leader who would claim such a right would no doubt have a very short life expectancy.

Scenarios for Future Developments

Many scenarios could be drawn up for future developments in Afghanistan. Two seem highly unlikely to occur: a quick Soviet defeat, or a quick Soviet victory. To defeat the Soviets, the disunited rebel

groups would have to come together, receive massive quantities of arms, destroy the Soviet divisions in the countryside, and then eject the remainder from the urban areas and the center of communication. Nothing of this scale appears in the offing, and if it ever were to come to pass, Soviet troops in Afghanistan, backed up by another 30,000 across the border could easily handle the quasiconventional operations which would ensue.

For dissimilar reasons, a quick Soviet victory is also unlikely. Every additional increment of Soviet aid makes the Karmal government appear more like the agent of the "foreign devils." Resistance continues to grow, not only in the countryside but also on the campuses and in the cities.

On the military side of the policy equation, the Soviets have very little to rejoice over. The Afghan borders, especially the 1,000-mile stretch with Pakistan, are nearly impossible to seal off. Roads and airfields are scarce and crowded, and dramatic additions to troop strength would necessitate great improvements in the logistical infrastructure.⁶³ Consequently, the scenarios which reigns at present is one of stalemate. The Soviets will continue in the foreseeable future to control, for the most part, the roads and urban areas by day while the countryside and the night will be in the province of the illusive freedom fighters. A Pakistani official summed up the Soviet dilemma in Afghanistan:

The Soviets can continue to occupy the country, but they cannot win over the people. The longer they stay, the more they alienate the people. The more they alienate the people, the longer they must stay. This Russian dilemma is also the Afghan dilemma, and both seem condemned to suffer its consequences.⁶⁴

On the other hand, the stalemate which exists at present is by no means permanent. Unlike the United States in Vietnam, the Soviets are not thousands of miles from the fighting, nor will they be subject to the time pressure of an impatient public opinion, nurtured by an inquisitive fourth estate. One may also note here that the Soviets have in the past shown a tolerance for persevering under adverse conditions over long periods of time. For example, their own counter-guerrilla operations in the Central Asian republics lasted for nearly a decade after their own civil war in the early 1920s. In a real sense, time, contiguity, and military power ultimately favor the Soviets in Afghanistan. As an emerging great power, conscious of its status, and beset by internal difficulties the Soviet leadership may well believe that in Afghanistan, there is no substitute for victory.

Future Soviet policy choices on Afghanistan will not be made in a vacuum. The question of "what will work in Afghanistan," will be subordinated to policy issues of greater import for the Soviet Union, such as war avoidance, U.S.-Soviet relations, and the possibilities for trade and arms control with the West. Domestic conditions, such as economic problems or a succession struggle could also influence Soviet

choices. Long-range predictions are made doubly difficult here by the fact that a single stimulus could bring about a wide range of policy responses. For example, if Afghanistan became an issue in the post-Brezhnev succession struggle, there is no telling at this point whether that would tend to generate a more draconian military solution or some form of negotiated settlement. War and politics are both the province of chance.

While a thorough examination of all possible variables is beyond the scope of this paper, it is possible to examine some of the major options which the Soviets may or may not undertake. Two policy options which have apparently been rejected by the Soviets are: annexation and the "direct approach" of invading Pakistan to destroy rebel sanctuaries. Four policy options which the Soviets might pursue are: reinforcement, Afghanization, negotiated settlement, the Baluch option.

Reinforcement: The Soviets might choose to continue the same types of operations inside Afghanistan, but at dramatically increased troop levels. Although the Soviets have added more than 20,000 troops since December 1981, some experts have estimated that a total of as many as 300,000 soldiers (more than double the number presently assigned) would be needed to begin to pacify the country.⁶⁵ While a plan of this magnitude would be difficult logistically, it could force the freedom fighters back to their sanctuaries in Iran and Pakistan. Unfortunately, even if it were possible to limit infiltration, the freedom fighters would be free to renew their efforts whenever the Soviets let down their guard. On the other hand, a dramatic reinforcement, if coupled with an effective strategy of pacification, could give the Soviets time to pursue the policies needed to end the insurgency. This option is not an end in itself, but it may be an essential first step to accomplish the next option.

Afghanization: This option would call for the long-term rebuilding of the Afghan government and armed forces, depending mainly on new, Soviet trained cadres to provide the leadership. This might provide a long-term solution, but efforts at this type of policy to date have shown little immediate return. This is not surprising since the Soviets have not generally been successful in developing Soviet-style cadres in Third World countries. Indigenous, pro-Soviet movements have been successful, but only when they were able to draw on nationalism or ethnic/tribal affiliations. This is apparently beyond the realm of the probable in Afghanistan.

Negotiated Settlement: Up to now, the Soviets have rejected neutralization schemes proposed by Europeans, the latest of which was the July 1981 "Carrington Plan," rejected by the USSR only 24 hours after its submission. The Soviets have insisted that the Afghan government must be made a party to any talks. This would legitimize the Karmal government and provide a partial justification for the Soviet claim that the freedom fighters constitute "outside interference." In Western eyes, this in turn would be an unacceptable basis for starting negotiations.

Some analysts have highlighted the U.N. attempt to hold "indirect talks" in Geneva in June 1982. All sides have praised the effort but progress has been slow. The Iranians only "observed" the talks and Pakistan has been criticized for foot dragging. More importantly, although a wave of optimism accompanied the Andropov succession, the official Soviet position has not substantively changed since early 1980. As stated in an authoritative article in the December 16, 1982 issue of *Pravda*, the Soviet Union will only withdraw its "limited contingent" after there has been a cessation of "outside interference" with concurrent guarantees by Iran, Pakistan (and presumably the United States) that this "interference" will not be renewed.

For its part, the West should enter any such agreement with its eyes open. The Soviets should not be allowed to gain through diplomacy what they could not win on the battlefield. Furthermore, if we assume that Soviet leaders, like our own, formulate policy with an eye on "lessons learned" in previous situations, even a limited success in Afghanistan could further increase the Politburo's confidence in the Soviet military establishment and make them more prone to use force to solve future foreign policy problems.⁶⁶ In short, it is in the Western interest to insure that the lessons which the Soviets learn from Afghanistan are recorded on the debit side of the balance sheet.

The Baluch Option: In spite of its many problems in Afghanistan, the Soviet Union is now in a position to exploit ethnic rivalries in the area. The Baluch people, who occupy parts of Iran, Afghanistan, and Pakistan, are, by some accounts, receiving aid and advice from Soviet agents. Turbulent Pakistan might represent a potential target, all the more tempting because thousands of Baluchis died fighting the Pakistani army in the early 1970s. Recognition of an independent Baluchistan inside of southern Pakistan could ultimately net the Soviets access to the Indian Ocean port of Gwadar.⁶⁷ In any case, the Baluchistan issue could be a convenient lever to pressure Pakistan to limit its support of the freedom fighters. It also carries the advantage of being an "indirect approach" which would enable the Soviets to deny direct participation. While few in the West would believe this, it is also true that support for "liberation movements" is something which carries little stigma when compared to outright invasions.

It is, of course, quite possible that the Soviets will continue attempts at "muddling through," knowing they cannot quit, but unable as of yet to muster the political wherewithal needed to "win" the war. This appears to be the option which they are taking at present. The Kremlin will undoubtedly gauge their policy in Afghanistan in part by the level of risk and reward promised by their relations with Washington. The situation in Poland also represents a temporary restraint on Soviet policy toward Afghanistan. The possible requirement theatre is a significant material constraint on new Soviet initiatives in Afghanistan. The fate of the Afghan rebels may well be hostage to the activities of their less violent cousins in Gdansk.

In sum, one may predict a near-term continuance of the status quo—a hungry Soviet Union pitted against an indigestible Afghanistan. Options exist for the Soviets in the long-term, but each is costly and some are dangerous. In any case, the West must avoid complacency and remain alert.

Conclusions and Observations

This section will be oriented toward drawing conclusions on the material presented above. Some general observations on the relationship Soviet power and use of force will be made, followed by more specific conclusions which may assist analysts in predicting future Soviet moves.

In their seminal study on Soviet foreign policy, Jan Triska and David Finley stated that: "Soviet crisis behavior was found to be conservative rather than impulsive, and rational (not willing to lose) rather than nonrational."⁶⁸ In the main, Soviet actions in Afghanistan bear out this description. In no instance, did the Soviets move outside the boundaries of their physical capabilities. Although many miscalculations were made, the Soviets did proceed methodically, moving from aid to advisors to combat troops, only after information had been gathered by military experts on the ground. Similar techniques had previously worked in Angola and in Ethiopia. Soviet methods and troops had been successful in Czechoslovakia and Cuban proxies had performed well in Angola and Ethiopia.

What was different in the case of Afghanistan was not the pattern of crisis behavior but changes in situational factors. In the midst of such "progressive developments" as the post-Vietnam syndrome in the U.S., and turbulence in the Third World, the Soviets progressed from being a regional power to a bona fide global power.

Soviet policy analysts, of course, did not fail to recognize the flexibility which their new instruments and favorable circumstance had brought to them. At the 24th Party Congress in 1971, Andrei Gromyko stated that "there is no question of any significance which can be decided without the Soviet Union or in opposition to it."⁶⁹ In 1976, L.I. Brezhnev, at the 25th Party Congress, in remarks apparently tailored for both internal and external consumption, saluted the success of the liberation movements in Angola and Vietnam and related Soviet policy in the Third World to peaceful coexistence and detente:

Detente does not in the slightest abolish, and it cannot abolish or later, the laws of class struggle. No one should expect that in conditions of detente the Communists will become reconciled to capitalist exploitation or that monopolists will become supporters of the revolution . . .⁷⁰

In 1977, support for national liberation struggles was even written into the new Soviet constitution, in marked contrast to the 1936 document which did not even contain a section on foreign policy. Marshal

Grechko, the late Soviet Defense Minister, related these developments to the Soviet armed forces:

At the present stage the historic function of the Soviet Armed Forces is not restricted to their function in defending our Motherland and the other socialist countries. In its foreign policy activity the Soviet state purposefully opposes the export of counterrevolution and the policy of oppression, supports the national Liberation struggle, and resolutely resists imperialists' aggression in whatever distant region of our planet it may appear.⁷¹

In short, the Soviet Union has proclaimed that it is a socialist global power and is demanding the right to act as such, not only in its recognized East European sphere of influence, but also in the Third World, especially in the security sensitive areas around or near its periphery. In an "ideologically correct" explanation of Soviet activities in Afghanistan, one can even find an extension of the Brezhnev Doctrine. An unsigned (and presumably authoritative) article in the Soviet weekly *New Times* asked:

What is the internationalist solidarity of revolutionaries? Does it consist only of moral and diplomatic support, of verbal wishes of success, or also of material assistance, including military help, given in definite, extraordinary circumstances, and especially in a situation of manifest massive outside interference?

The history of the revolutionary movement confirms the moral and political legitimacy of this form of assistance and support. Such were the case, for instance in Spain in the 1930s, and in China in the 1920s and 1930s. Today, when there exists a system of socialist states, it would be simply ridiculous to question the right to such assistance . . . To refuse to use the possibilities at the disposal of the socialist countries would signify virtually evading performance of the internationalist duty and returning the world to the times when imperialism could throttle at will any revolutionary movement.⁷²

Thus, one can see that as usual in the case of Afghanistan, the USSR has managed to skillfully blend Marxist-Leninist ideology and perceived national interest into a coherent conceptual whole. Soviet security and prestige are aided, abetted, and explained by a policy of proletarian internationalism, a policy which is in turn made credible by the accumulation of Soviet military power. In effect, Soviet policy in Afghanistan was neither realist, nor socialist, but both. It was also flawed; indeed, it has turned into the second (behind Vietnam) most costly, long-term superpower blunder in the post-war era.

Among the general "lessons learned" here, pride of place belongs to the Soviet concept of power. Like many other great powers, the Soviets have confused force with power, and power with influence. The instruments which could bring them to the Rhine have not proven well-suited to combat opponents whose power base is spiritual and

traditional in nature. Again, great conventional military power has tempted its holder to fish in troubled waters, leading to another example of great powers making great blunders.

Has the West learned anything which we can apply in a predictive framework to future Soviet foreign policy? This author would answer that question affirmatively and cite the following observations:

1. Afghanistan demonstrates that regional moves by the Soviets are not divorced from a global geopolitical context. An especially important role here is played by Soviet perceptions of recent U.S.-Soviet relations. Having seen little finite reaction from the U.S. over Soviet moves in Angola, Ethiopia and over the original Marxist coup in Afghanistan, the Soviet may have felt overly secure in moving into Afghanistan. Furthermore, since prospects for detente were at a low point, they may have felt that no substantive future benefits were in jeopardy. Fearing no sticks, and expecting no carrots, the Soviets may have felt that, bereft of "hope or fear," they were free to pursue a policy which they perceived as "necessary."⁷³
2. The old fear of "capitalist encirclement" is not dead; indeed, the Soviet perception of a demi-alliance between the PRC and the United States has given it new life. Soviet policy is thus more interested and may become more militarily active in areas nearest the Soviet borders. Like Afghanistan, future Soviet moves in the Third World may well be generated more by perceptions of "necessity" than by perceptions of "opportunity."
3. Friendship treaties and high levels of military assistance can become prestige commitments. Like the U.S., the Soviets do not want to be perceived as deserting their allies.⁷⁴ To a large extent, future commitments will be determined by prior investments. This should not be interpreted to mean that, wherever one finds a Friendship Treaty, one has found an area ripe for direct Soviet intervention. As demonstrated in the case of Afghanistan, direct Soviet intervention is a last resort measure, one taken only after the old standbys—arms sales, advisors, and proxies—are either ruled out or overcome by events; and one taken only in the presence of unique and generally low-risk circumstances.
4. Organizational processes in the military realm appear to be more readily influenced by recent "lessons learned" as opposed to more profound lessons learned long ago. On the subject of Afghanistan, there is little evidence to suggest that the lessons of the *Basmachi* period were part of the Soviet mindset; but, on the other hand, there is much material to suggest that "failure" in Chile and "success in Czechoslovakia" were important pieces of conceptual baggage for Soviet decisionmakers.⁷⁵

The Czech case, as previously mentioned, seems to have exerted an especially strong influence both on the planning and the execution of the Afghan invasion. General's Yepishev and Pavolv-

sky were involved in both cases. In the execution, the use of air-landed troops to seize key communications facilities, the use of deception, the neutralization of unreliable indigenous forces, and the followup by a massive Soviet ground force suggest that—logistical problems in Czechoslovakia aside—the 1968 activity must have been viewed as a model for future operations.⁷⁶ Perhaps the subsequent “lessons learned” in Afghanistan may make the Soviets pause before they apply this “model” to any other country.

5. Also in the organizational framework, Afghanistan suggests that armies will do well only those things for which they habitually prepare and practice. Soviet forces performed well in the movement into Afghanistan, but have done poorly in dealing with the insurgency itself. To date, the Soviets have not adjusted to the conditions present in Afghanistan. They are gaining combat experience, but they have not shown the ability to match their awesome weapons with techniques appropriate to a counterinsurgency environment. Short of genocide, the methods in use at present will continue to be less than effective, to say the least. This seems to provide visible evidence of rigidity in the Soviet officer corps and it also points to the disadvantages of the “fundamentalist” approach to the interpretation of military doctrine so characteristic of the Soviet military. On the other hand, we ought not to entirely blame this failure on troop commanders. In Afghanistan, the deleterious effects of Pavolvsky’s miscalculations are still being felt today. Furthermore, research being conducted by Douglas Hart of the Pacific-Sierra Corporation seems to indicate that doctrinal and training changes are at last being recommended by senior Soviet commanders.⁷⁷
6. One Soviet “adaptation” which should strike fear into Western hearts is the use of chemical weapons. The use of these weapons in Afghanistan and Southeast Asia again confirms that—not surprisingly—the Soviets find them put to their best use against unprotected subjects, incapable of retaliation. Afghanistan is proof positive that the Soviets do not consider these devices as “special weapons.” For the Soviets, considerations of utility and not morality will govern their use in future conflicts.

The helicopter gunship has also come into its own in Afghanistan. Win, lose, or draw the Soviet pilot cadre will be better trained in the future. Whether or not their Afghan combat experience will be easily translated into a helicopter doctrine for the high intensity battlefield is moot. More research needs to be done in this area.

7. Finally, one should pause at this point and reflect on the concept of learning lessons from recent history. For one, the “great game” is far from over. Years from now, the record of events in Afghanistan may appear to be far different than that which has been predicted in the concluding sections of this paper. More importantly, learning the wrong lessons about the utility and effectiveness of Soviet military power could hurt more than ignoring their experience in Afghanistan altogether. For example, a Soviet defeat

in Afghanistan, even if it were to prove permanent, does not prove any static, general proposition about Soviet power. Even if the Soviets must one day "cut and run," it does not prove military impotence. As Kenneth Waltz has reminded us, a jackhammer is no less powerful because it cannot be used to drill teeth.⁷⁸

Footnotes

1. Geoffrey Warhurst, "Afghanistan—A Dissenting Appraisal," *RUSI* (Sept. 1980), p. 26.
2. In his "State of the Union Address," reprinted in U.S. Dept. of State, *Current Policy*, 132 (January, 1980).
3. On the matter of Afghanistan as a buffer state, a brief and interesting account of the 19th Century Anglo-Soviet Conflict in Afghanistan can be found in David Fromkin, "The Great Game in Asia," *Foreign Affairs* (Spring 1980), pp. 936-51.
4. Nikita Khrushchev, *Khrushchev Remembers*, ed. Strobe Talbott (London: Andre Deutsch, 1971), p. 508. A brief but interesting account of Soviet-Afghan relations in Lenin's time can be found in Louis Fischer, *The Soviets in World Affairs*, Volume 1 (NJ: Princeton, 1951), pp. 283-6, 432-4.
5. Data on Soviet-Afghan trade and aid can be found in CIA, *Communist Aid to Less Developed Countries of the Free World, 1977*, ER 78-10478U (Nov. 1978), pp. i-ii, 1-2, 4-11, 35-36; and Andreas Tenson, "The Soviet View of Soviet-Afghan Economic Relations," *Radio Liberty Research Bulletin*, RL 84/80 (Feb. 25, 1980), pp. 1-4.
6. Selig Harrison, "The Shah, Not the Kremlin Touched Off Afghan Coup," *Washington Post*, Feb. 13, 1979, pp. C1, C5.
7. Hannah Negaran (pseudonym), "Afghan Coup of 1978: Revolution and International Security," *Orbis* (Spring 1979), p. 100.
8. Reference cited immediately above and numerous others point toward some Soviet involvement in the coup with varying degrees of confidence. One fraudulently cited example is a vague account of Soviet air support early on in the coup. In my judgement, the Soviets may have helped, but it can not be proven that they were the prime movers in planning or executing the coup.
9. David Chafetz, "Afghanistan in Turmoil," *International Affairs* (January 1980), pp. 24-25. A more favourable view of the Taraki reforms can be found in L. Mironov, and G. Polyakov, "Afghanistan: Beginning of a New Life," *International Affairs* (Moscow), (March 1979), pp. 46-54.
10. Karmal received almost no attention from the Soviet press during the Taraki-Amin regimes. A brief biography appeared in *Pravda*, Oct. 16, 1980. See FBIS, *Daily Report-Soviet Union*, Vo. 3, No. 204, (Octo. 20, 1980), p. D13.
11. *Pravda*, Dec. 5, 1978, p. 1.
12. Patrick Garrity, "The Soviet Military Stake in Afghanistan: 1956-79," *RUSI* (Sept. 1980), p. 34.
13. *New York Times*, Feb. 18, 1980, p. 4.
14. *New York Times*, Feb. 17, 1980, p. 10.
15. *Pravda*, Mar. 19, 1979, p. 5 and Mar. 21, 1979, p. 5. "A. Petrov" is a pseudonym. Most Western Sovietologists interpret his by-line as a signal that the article in question is an authoritative statement from the Kremlin leadership. "I. Aleksandrov" performs a similar function.
16. Garrity, op. cit.
17. Jiri Valenta, "From Prague to Kabul: the Soviet Style of Invasion," *International Security* (Fall 1980), pp. 124-27.
18. For an excellent description of the emergence of Hafizullah Amin, see Louis Dupree, "Afghanistan Under the Khalq," *Problems of Communism* (July-August 1979), pp. 34-43; Originally, the Soviet press carried the Taraki-Amin transfer as a routine change in Afghan leadership. See *Pravda*, Sept. 17, 1979, p. 5.

19. Selig Harrison, "Did Moscow Fear an Afghan Tito?," *New York Times*, Jan. 13, 1980, p. 23.
20. David Binder, "Carter Says Soviet Isn't Telling Truth About Afghan Coup," *New York Times*, Jan. 1, 1980, p. 1, 4; Garrity, op. cit., p. 35. U.S. Congress, House, Comm. on Foreign Affairs, *East-West Relations in the Aftermath of Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan*, 96th Congress, 2nd session, Jan. 24 and 30, 1980, pp. 39-40.
21. Marshall Shulman, "Tales of Afghanistan, Moscow Style," in Dept. of State, *Current Policy*, 143 (March 1980); J. Valenta, op. cit. and IISS, *Strategic Review* (1979), cite 75 as appx. number of daily sorties from 24-26 December; David Charters, "Coup and Consolidation," *Conflict Quarterly* (Spring 1981) cites a figure of appx. 120 per day during the same period; *Time*, Nov. 22, 1982, Kuzichkin interview; *New York Times*, Jan. 14, 1980, p. 5.
22. Paputin's obituary appeared in *Pravda* on Jan. 3, 1980.
23. Some estimates ran as high as nine Soviet divisions in Afghanistan by the first week of February, but later recomputations of Soviet strength make seven divisions appear to be the maximum strength that was present. *East-West Relations in the Aftermath . . .*, op. cit., p. 39. See also Peter Kruzhin, "The Ethnic Composition of Soviet Forces in Afghanistan," *Radio Liberty Research Bulletin*, RL 20/80, (Jan. 11, 1980), pp. 1-2. Kruzhin is skeptical about the 90% figure.
24. *New York Times*, Jan. 14, 1980, p. 5; Valenta, op. cit., p. 134. See also Edward Luttwak, "After Afghanistan, What?," *Commentary* (April 1980), pp. 46-47.
25. Colonel Fritz Freistetter, "The Battle in Afghanistan," *Strategic Review*, (Winter 1981), p. 37.
26. Shulman, op. cit. The best examples of Soviet propaganda can be found in the late December—early January articles translated in *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, 31, no. 52 (Jan. 23, 1980), pp. 1-7.
27. Craig Whitney, "A Rumor in Moscow Has Brezhnev Being Overruled in Afghan Moves," *New York Times*, Jan. 10, 1980. More recently, a version of this idea, coupled with a prediction on Soviet succession was used by William Safire, "Brezhnev's Last Stand," *New York Times*, Apr. 6, 1981, p. 15.
28. Legvold, op. cit., p. 82.
29. See Tyrus Cobb, "Energy and East-West Relations," an unpublished paper presented at the 1981 NATO Colloquium. In a related matter, Soviet use of Afghan natural gas seems not to have been sufficient motive for invasion. See M. Goldman's letter in *New York Times*, Apr. 7, 1980.
30. Henry Kissinger, *White House Years* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1979), p. 161. An opposing view can be found in Richard Pipes, "Soviet Global Strategy," *Commentary* (April 1980), pp. 21-39.
31. Two recent articles have cast doubt on the conventional wisdom that a Soviet military move in Southwest Asia directed at Iran would be an easy undertaking. See Keith Dunn "Soviet Constraints in Southwest Asia," unpublished paper, USAWC, Jan. 1982 and Joshua Epstein, "Soviet Vulnerabilities in Iran and the RDF Deterrent," *International Security* (Fall 1981), pp. 126-158.
32. A precis of the Soviet nationality problem can be found in Azrael, op. cit; and in Paul Cook, "The Soviet Conglomerate," reprinted in U.S. Dept. of State, *Special Report* 67, March 1980. The relationship between the nationality problem and the stability of the Soviet government is addressed Seweryn Bialer, *Stalin's Successors Leadership, Stability and Change in the Soviet Union* (New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1980), pp. 183-227. On the issue of linkages, see Edward Corcoran, "Soviet Muslim Policy: Domestic and Foreign Policy Linkages," *Strategic Issues Research Memo.*, ACN 80042, (Carlisle, PA: USA War College, Apr. 1980), pp. 1-22. See articles by Craig Whitney in *New York Times*, Apr. 11, 12, 1980, p. 1. Also see R.W. Apple's story in *New York Times* Nov. 5, 1980, p. 3.
33. *Kommunist* (Armenia), Dec. 15, 1980.
34. *Bakinsky Rabochy*, Dec. 19, 1980, p. 3, in FBIS, *Daily Report—Soviet Union*, 3, no. 4 (Jan. 7, 1981), p. R1.

35. *Bakinsky Rabochy*, Dec. 25, 1980.
36. A brief account of the Soviet battles against the *basmachi*—anti-Soviet, Central Asian “counterrevolutionaries”—in the 1920s can be found in Michael Rywkin, *Russia in Central Asia* (New York: Collier Books, 1963) pp. 33-62. The parallel between the *basmachi* and the Afghan rebels has not been lost on the Soviets, and it has become quite common for Soviet analysts to refer to the rebels as bandits or *basmachi*. The earliest use of this term in recent Soviet work can be found in *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, Mar. 14, 1979.
37. A recently published explanation of Soviet motives “as a process” and not as a static, rational actor-type decision can be found in Robert Weinland, *An (The?) Explanation of the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan*, CNA Memorandum 81-0366.09 (Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval Analysis, March 1981), pp. 19-24.
38. For a Soviet appraisal of the importance of the Indian Ocean to the Soviet Union see D. Volsky, “A Strategy Without a Future,” *New Times* (Moscow), (August, 1978), pp. 405; and also A. Alexeyev and A. Fialkovsky “Peace and Security for the Indian Ocean” *International Affairs* (Moscow), (Sept. 1979), pp. 51, 55. See also A. Ladozhsky, “The USSR’s Efforts to Turn the Indian Ocean into a Zone of Peace,” *International Affairs* (Moscow), (August 1981), pp. 40-6.
- An interesting treatment of traditional Russian and Soviet foreign policy toward South Asia and Iran can be found in Jiri Valenta, “The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan: The Difficulty of Knowing Where to Stop,” *Orbis* (Summer 1980), pp. 201-204. Direct annexation of Afghanistan seems to be something that most Soviet officials would pass up. On a related matter, a recent visitor to Moscow was told by an institute member, “Look . . . all we need is another 15 million mouths to feed.” See unpublished IREX trip report, Tyrus Cobb, Jan. 1981. Quoted with the authors permission. See also ACDA, *Arms Control*, 1979 (Annual Report), p. 57.
39. *Pravda*, Dec. 31, 1979, p. 4.
40. *Pravda*, Dec. 5, 1979, p. 1.
41. *Pravda*, Jan. 13, 1980, p. 1.
42. *Pravda*, Nov. 15, 1979, p. 5. See Raymond Garthoff, Brezhnev’s Opening: The TNF Tangle,” *Foreign Policy* (Winter 1980-81), pp. 82-84; *Pravda*, Nov. 25, 1979.
43. For an excellent analysis of these meetings see William Hyland, “The Sino-Soviet Conflict: Dilemmas of the Strategic Triangle,” an unpublished paper presented at the American Assembly conference in Harriman, NY on “The China Factor,” March 1981. Also see the interview with Donald Zagoria in *Radio Free Liberty Research Bulletin*, RL 2/80, January 15, 1980.
44. In *Pravda*, Mar. 3, 1980, p. 5. Emphasis added. Also see the similar explanation in the following article by a U.S. Institute analyst: Genrikh Trofimenko, “The Third World in U.S.-Soviet Competition: A Soviet View,” *Foreign Affairs* (Summer 1981), pp. 1034-36.
45. Jiri Vlent and others have speculated that a faulty U.S. reaction to the Cuban crisis of 1979 might have convinced the Soviets that their “unacceptable” conduct in Afghanistan might soon become “accepted” by the U.S. I find this argument plausible, but, again, so is an opposing one. U.S. hypersensitivity to Soviet troops in Cuba could also have been an effective argument *against* the invasion. Carter and Vance’s rebuttal to the arguments about previous weak responses to USSR can be found in reprinted interviews in U.S. Dept. of State, *Current Policy*, 127 and 130 (January 1980).
46. See U.S. Dept of State, “Soviet Dilemmas in Afghanistan,” *Special Report 72* (June 1980) and Michael Kaufman, “Disaffected Afghans Said to Aid Rebels,” *New York Times*, Nov. 7, 1980, p. 3. An uncorroborated Agence France Presse dispatch reported that Karmal’s trip to Moscow in Nov. 1980 was designated to obtain permission for a partial purge of Khalqis. See FBIS, *Daily Report-South Asia* 8, no. 218 (Nov. 7, 1980), p. C4. Further information on feuding between factions can also be found in Zalmay Khalilzad, “Soviet-Occupied Afghanistan,” *Problems of Communism* (Nov-Dec 1980), pp. 26-9, and Nancy and Richard Newell, *The Struggle for Afghanistan* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell Univ. Press, 1981), pp. 179-81.

47. *Special Report 72*, op. cit. See also U.S. Dept. of State, "Afghanistan, A Year of Occupation," *Special Report 79* (Feb 1981).
48. *Ibid.* The new Afghan draft law can be found in FBIS *Daily Report-South Asia*, 8, nos. 16, 21, 24, 16 (Jan. 26, Feb. 5, 9, 1981). Details of a spectacular "roundup" can be found in *New York Times*, Jan. 20, 1982, p. A12. A Jul. 23, 1981 story in the *New York Times* reported that the cadets had been committed to battle, but a *Christian Science Monitor* story reported that the cadets had been passing through the area and were subsequently ambushed.
49. On the issue of refugees see "Russia in Afghanistan," *Economist* (May 23, 1981) pp. 33-7; Nicholas Wade, "Afghanistan: The Politics of Tragicomedy," *Science* (May 1981) pp. 521-23, and U.S. Dept. of State, "Afghanistan: Two Years of Occupation" *Current Policy*, 91 (Dec. 1981). On the *National Fatherland Front* see U.S. Dept. of State, "Afghanistan: 18 months of Occupation," *Special Report 87* (Aug. 1981).
50. Cited in Nicholas Wade, op. cit.
51. Rosanne Klass, "Afghans Battle On," *New York Times* July 30, 1981, p. 19.
52. Drew Middleton, "2 Afghans Who Fled Say Rebels Languish," *New York Times*, Nov. 23, 1980, p. 11. *Special Report 72*, op. cit.
53. See reports by Drew Middleton in *New York Times* of Nov. 17 and Dec. 25, 1980. Mining operations are described in *Washington Post*, July 8, 1980. Photographs of the new scatterable mines can be found in *Soldier of Fortune* (April 1981), pp. 23-4. Also see, DIA, *Review of Soviet Ground Forces*; May 1980, Feb. 81, June 81 for details on AK 74, and the AGS 17. An open source order of battle can be found in Z. Khalilzad, op. cit.
54. U.S. Dept. of State, *Chemical Warfare in Southeast Asia and Afghanistan*, *Special Report 98*, March 1982 and *Special Report 104*, November 1982. The quote is from the former publication, p. 23.
55. See, for example, accounts in Alexandre Bennigsen, "Soviet Muslim's and the World of Islam," *Problems of Communism* (March 1980), pp. 48-49. The most complete treatment of the question of Soviet Central Asians in Afghanistan can be found in S. Enders Wimbush and Alex Alexiev *Soviet Central Asian Soldiers in Afghanistan* Rand Research Note N-1634-NA (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 1981). Also see materials cited in note 23, 32 and 36.
56. *Krasnaya Zvezda*, Dec. 31, 1981, p. 2, translated in FBIS, *Daily Report-Soviet Union*, 3, no. 3, p. D4.
57. Alain Faudeux, "Soviet Captives Describe Afghan War Roles," *Washington Post*, Sept. 28, 1981, p. 15.
58. See, for example, *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, Aug. 7, 1981, p. 2, in FBIS, *Daily Report-Soviet Union*, 3, Aug. 13, 1981, p. D5-9.
59. *Pravda*, June 5, 1980, translated in USAF, *Soviet Press: Selected Translations*, 81, no. 9, Sept. 1981, p. 273.
60. A. Faudeux, op. cit. See also *Washington Post*, Dec. 27, 1981, p. 1; and *New York Times*, Jan. 12, 1982, p. 2; and Agence France Press of December 3, 1980, translated in *Daily Report-South Asia* 8, no. 235, Dec. 4, 1980.
61. *Krasnaya Svezda*, 26 Feb. 83, p. 1, translated from FBIS, *Daily Report-Soviet Union* 3, no. 41, 1 Mar. 83, p. D6.
62. A detailed account of U.S. actions to arm the rebels appeared in *New York Times*, Feb. 15, 1980, p. 1; but was later denied by the U.S. government. In 1980, the best source of rebel arms appears to have been Afghan deserters and the Soviets themselves. This trend may be changing. Islamic nations, especially Egypt, appear to have stepped up their efforts in this area. See *New York Times*, Jan. 22 and Apr. 14, 1981, p. 3. See also Carl Bernstein, "Arms for Afghanistan," *The New Republic*, July 18, 1981, pp. 8-10; and Anwar Sadat's oblique confirmation of the U.S. role in *New York Times* Sept. 23, 1981, p. A15.
See, on the 1980 estimate, *New York Times*, Dec. 25, 1980, p. 7. The 1981 estimate of 90% is cited (somewhat skeptically) by *Special Report* no. 91, op. cit.

63. Unnamed DOD experts have indicated that even a two division reinforcement would be logistically difficult. See Barry Schlacter, "Soviets Might Pour Troops into Afghanistan," *Philadelphia Inquirer*, Oct. 21, 1981, p. 13.
64. Quoted in Lord Saint Brides, "Afghanistan: the Empire Plays to Win," *Orbis* (Fall, 1980), p. 536.
65. For example, N. Newell and R. Newell, op. cit., p. 209. Also see, Drew Middleton's analysis in *New York Times* Dec. 25, 1980, p. 7.
66. For a different view on the prospects for and the value of a negotiated settlement see Selig Harrison, "Dateline Afghanistan: Exit Through Finland?" *Foreign Policy* (Winter 1980-81), pp. 163-87; and, Edward Luttwak, "After Afghanistan, What?" *Commentary* (April 1980), p. 40-8.
67. Selig Harrison, "Nightmare in Baluchistan," *Foreign Policy* (Fall 1978), pp. 136-160. A recent, firsthand account of Baluch resentment of the Pakistani government can be found in William Ellis and James Stanfield, "Pakistan Under Pressure," *National Geographic* (May 1981) pp. 668-702. William Griffith, "The USSR in Pakistan," *Problems of Communism*, (January-February 1982), pp. 38-44. See also *New York Times*, April 6, 1980, p. 16.
68. Jan Triska and David Finley, *Soviet Foreign Policy*, (New York: MacMillan, 1968), p. 346.
69. Cited in Vernon Aspaturian, "Soviet Global Power and the Correlation of Forces," *Problems of Communism* (May-June 1980), p. 1.
70. "Report to the CPSU Central Committee and the Party's Tasks in the Fields of Domestic and Foreign Policy" as translated in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press* (Mar. 24, 1976), p. 11.
71. V. Aspaturian, op. cit., p. 3, n. 5. A.A. Grechko "The Leading Role of the CPSU in Building the Army of a Developed Socialist Society," *Problems of History of CPSU*, May 1974 as quoted in H.F. Scott and W.F. Scott *The Armed Forces of the USSR*, 2nd ed. (Boulder, Col.: Westview, 1979), p. 57.
72. "World Communist Solidarity with the Afghan Revolution," *New Times* (Moscow), no. 3 (January 1980), p. 10.
73. The "hope"- "fear" observation is adapted from Richard Lowenthal, "Dealing with Soviet Global Power," *Encounter* (June 1978), p. 90.
74. This fact was reinforced by similar comments made by a retired Soviet general to an IREX fellow. Interview, Tyrus Cobb, Mar. 1, 1982.
75. For an analysis of the Soviet failure to analyze and adopt lessons learned from the *Basmachi* period, see Alexandre Benningson, *The Soviet Union and Muslim Guerrilla Wars, 1920-1981: Lesson for Afghanistan*, Rand Research Note N-1707/1 (Santa Monica, Cal.: RAND, August 1981).
76. As mentioned previously, the most complete comparison between Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan is Jiri Valenta's work, cited in no. 17 above. See also Lyman Kirkpatrick, *The Decision to Intervene: A Comparison of Soviet Intervention from 1953-1980*, an unpublished research report prepared by the U.S. Army Russian Inst., Garmisch, Germany, 1981.
77. Douglas Hart, "Low Intensity conflict in Afghanistan: the Soviet View," *Survival* (March-April, 1982), pp. 61-67.
78. Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979), p. 189.